Being Human.A Philosophical Anthropology after Wittgenstein [1] 9788189958480

Table of contents :
BEING HUMAN AFTER WITTGENSTEIN
Volume 1
A Philosophical Anthropology
BEING HUMAN AFTER WITTGENSTEIN
Volume 1
A Philosophical Anthropology
Jose Nandhikkara
Table of Contents
Abbreviations
Foreword
Preface
Chapter 1
The ‘I’: Philosophical Explorations
Chapter 2
The ‘I’: Philosophical Analysis
2.1. ‘The Deeply Mysterious I’ (NB 80)
2.2. ‘The Philosophical Self’ (TLP 5.641)
2.3. ‘The I Is … the Bearer of Good and Evil’ (NB 80)
Chapter 3
The ‘I’: Philosophical Therapy
3.1. The Pernicious I: ‘Something for Philosophical Treatment‘ (PI 254)
3.2. Therapy I: ‘The Word ‘I’ … Can Be Eliminated from Language’ (WVC 49)
3.3. Therapy II: ‘The Word ‘I’ Does Not Designate a Person’ (PO 228)
Chapter 4
The ‘I’: A Living Human Being
4.1. ‘“Carry out a Grammatical Investigation”‘ (PI 150)
4.4. ‘The Human Being Is the Best Picture of the Human Soul’ (CV 56)
Chapter 5
Rule Following and Being Human
5.1. ‘What We Call “Obeying the Rule”‘ (PI 201)
5.2. “Here We Can’t Talk about “Right”‘ (PI 258)
5.4. ‘We Belong to a Community’ (OC 298)
Chapter 6
Private Language and Being Human
6.1. Treatment of Private Language
6.2. ‘How Do Words Refer to Sensations’? (PI 244)
6.3. ‘In What Sense Are My Sensations Private?’ (PI 246)

Citation preview

BEING HUMAN AFTER WITTGENSTEIN Volume 1

A Philosophical Anthropology

BEING HUMAN AFTER WITTGENSTEIN Volume 1

A Philosophical Anthropology

Jose Nandhikkara

Dharmaram Publications Bangalore 2011

BEING HUMAN AFTER WITTGENSTEIN, Volume 1 A Philosophical Anthropology

Jose Nandhikkara

Address: Dr. Jose Nandhikkara CMI Faculty of Philosophy Dharmaram Vidya Kshetram Bangalore 560 029, India Email: [email protected] © Jose Nandhikkara First Edition, 2011 Published by Dharmaram Publications ISBN: 978-81-89958-48-0 Cover Design: Geo, Rijo and Praisemon Printed at: Matha Prints, Bangalore

Price: `. 300; US$ 30

Dharmaram Publications Dharmaram College, Bangalore 560 029, India Tel. 080/4111 6227; 4111 6137; 4111 6111 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.dharmarampublications.com

To My Dear Parents Rosa and Poulose Nandhikkara who nurtured me to be human rooted in nature belonging to a community and oriented to the divine!

Table of Contents Abbreviations Foreword Preface

9 11 15

Chapter 1. The ‘I’: Philosophical Explorations 1.1. The Project 1.2. ‘Look Closer’ (OC 3) 1.3. ‘Take a Wider Look Round’ (RFM 127).

19 19 22 26

Chapter 2. The ‘I’: Philosophical Analysis 2.1. ‘The Deeply Mysterious I’ (NB 80) 2.2. ‘The Philosophical Self’ (TLP 5.641) 2.3. ‘The I is … the Bearer of Good and Evil’ (NB 80)

35 35 38 45

Chapter 3. The ‘I’: Philosophical Therapy 3.1. The Pernicious I: ‘“Something for Philosophical Treatment”’ (PI 254) 3.2. Therapy I: ‘The Word ‘I’ … Can Be Eliminated from Language’ (WVC 49) 3.3. Therapy II: ‘The Word ‘I’ Does not Designate a Person’ (PO 228)

57

Chapter 4. The I: A Living Human Being 4.1. ‘“Carry Out a Grammatical Investigation”’(PI 150) 4.2. ‘I Presuppose the Inner in so far as I Presuppose a Human Being’ (LW II, 84) 4.3. ‘The Human Body is the Best Picture of the Human Soul’ (PI p. 178) 4.4. ‘The Human Being is the Best Picture of the Human Soul’ (CV 56)

81 81 88

57 59 65

92 97

8

Being Human after Wittgenstein

Chapter 5. Rule Following and Being Human 5.1. ‘What We Call “Obeying the Rule”’ (PI 201) 5.2. ‘“Look Closer”’ (OC 3) 5.3. ‘‘Obeying a Rule’ is a Practice’ (PI 202) 5.4. ‘We Belong to a Community’ (OC 298)

103 103 108 117 125

Chapter 6. Private Language and Being Human 6.1. Treatment of Private Language 6.2. ‘How Do Words Refer to Sensations’? (PI 244) 6.3. ‘In What Sense are My Sensations Private?’ (PI 246) 6.4. ‘Possibility of a Private Language’ (RFM 334) 6.5. ‘Language Relates to a Way of Living’ (RFM 335) 6.6. ‘It would be a ‘confusion of tongues’’ (MS 165, 94)

139 139 144 152 158 167 178

Chapter 7. Being Human: A Personal Point of View 7.1. ‘One Pattern in the Weave is Interwoven with Many Others’ (Z 569) 7.2. ‘On How One Sees Things’ (CV 24)

185

Bibliography: Primary Sources Bibliography: Secondary Sources Wittgenstein Index Author Index Subject Index

195 197 219 227 229

185 188

Abbreviations BB CV LC LE LFM LW I LW II MS NB OC PG PI PO PR RC RFGB RFM RPP I RPP II TLP WL 32 WL 35 WL 47 WVC Z

The Blue and Brown Books Culture and Value Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief Lecture on Ethics Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. I Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. II Manuscripts, Wittgenstein’s Nachlass Notebooks 1914-1916 On Certainty Philosophical Grammar Philosophical Investigations Philosophical Occasions Philosophical Remarks Remarks on Colour Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. I Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. II Tractatus Logico-philosophicus Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge 1930-32 Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge 1932-35 Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Philosophical Psychology 1946-47 Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle Zettel

Foreword Being Human after Wittgenstein: A Philosophical Anthropology is an uncompromisingly honest book. It offers a philosophical anthropology of ‘being human’. It does this in the spirit of the later Wittgenstein. One of the hardest things to get right about Wittgenstein’s later work concerns the nature of his methodology. For some commentators Wittgenstein eschews not only all theory, but also all philosophy and offers, in their place, mere descriptions of language use that, when seen aright, cure the perceived need to provide a theoretical account of those concepts that have traditionally preoccupied philosophers. That is, if you like, the reading of Wittgenstein as pure therapist. Nandhikkara’s focus is the concept of being human. He calls his book a philosophical anthropology, for it occupies a methodological position somewhere between the reading of Wittgenstein as pure therapist and the use of Wittgenstein by those who raid his texts for contributions towards ongoing philosophical theory construction. Nandhikkara takes neither approach. His approach is anthropological because he follows Wittgenstein in positioning himself against the possibility of a complete theoretical articulation or definition of what it is to be human. Although he approvingly cites Wittgenstein’s instruction to bring words ‘home’ from the wanderings of philosophical theory, he also wants to bring our understanding of what it is to be human into clarity. ‘Home’ will look a slightly different place when Nandhikkara has finished his anthropology. If nothing else, he wants to show it to us more clearly than we have thus far seen it. There is work to be done in understanding being human

12

Being Human after Wittgenstein

– the anthropology is not just a ‘show-and-tell’ of what people do and say about their being – and some of the work is sophisticated and makes use of high end contributions from a string of contemporary and recent philosophers – Williams, Evans, Campbell, etc. So, although anthropological, the works is philosophical too. ‘Bringing words home’ is not a therapy that brings philosophy to an end; it brings it to truth. (There is more than truth at stake, but more of that in a moment.) So, the therapy that Nandhikkara finds in Wittgenstein’s grammatical enquiries into the nature of the self is not a therapy for ending philosophy, but only for bringing to close an erroneous ambition of philosophy that sought to find canonical theoretical articulations of key concepts – the essence of being a self, etc. And that is where, philosophically, this book shows its honesty. If one is doing philosophy, but not a philosophy framed in the discourse of theoretical abstractions whereby one tries to delineate concepts in a universal and timeless way, then one must have some sense of the criteria by which you judge that you have things right. Nandhikkara is aiming for truth. But if the project is also anthropological, if it is an attempt to describe the shape of key concepts in their home ground – what Nandhikkara calls the ‘actual use of words in the stream of life’ – then how do you tell that you have described that stream aright? Where is the Archimedean point from which we lever out the false and misguided. There has to be a worry that the anthropological turn cuts off the very scope for a criterion for getting things right that the project surely needs. But Nandhikkara knows that this methodological problem lies at the heart of his conception of a philosophical anthropology and he meets it head on in perhaps the only way he can given the enterprise he has set himself. He will not offer you a set of fine distinctions, further theoretical articulations to mark the criterion that distinguishes

Foreword

13

right from seems right. That would be to ignore the anthropology of the enquiry. He will instead, following Wittgenstein, enjoin you to ‘look and see’. Look at your own use of the first-personal pronoun, look at your own sense of being, look at how and where you are located and embedded within a shared life with others and then, and only then, will you see the truth about what it is to be human. That is the bold and honest form of philosophical anthropology that Nandhikkara offers. It is bold for it meets head on the obvious concern about a criterion for the correctness of what is on offer given the refusal to indulge in the theoretical pursuit of ‘fine distinctions.’ Whether or not one agrees with the execution of this strategy as presented here, at some point the idea that the pursuit of philosophical understanding comes to rest on a moment of ‘look and see’ is perhaps unavoidable. Whether Nandhikkara has the point correctly located is a substantive issue, but his preparedness to accept head on the methodological nuances of the anthropological approach is to be welcomed. There is, however, a little more than truth that is at stake. Although this book does not complete the exercise (a further volume will do that), Nandhikkara is clear also that what is at stake at achieving the self-understanding on offer is not just the truth, but also our passionate commitments. It is here that the anthropology perhaps becomes most strained. For what Nandhikkara enjoins us to look and see is not just our being as socially and culturally embodied beings who live in this world in communion with others, but also beings in communion with God. For some, that will be a surprising result of the anthropological ‘look and see’. Many look and don’t see. What happens then to the search for truth and passionate commitment? Here the two things perhaps pull in separate ways.

14

Being Human after Wittgenstein

If someone fails to ‘get’ the search for truth, one might aspire to some sort of transcendental argument to show that they thereby lack the wherewithal to defend let alone advance any articulated position at all. If their use of words is not capable of being marshalled in the service of truth (whatever other virtues it may serve), then perhaps it is simply not a comprehensible use of words at all. But if someone’s use of words fails to accord with a sense of passionate communion with the divine, what kind of failing, if any, is that? The divine will be treated in the next volume, so we cannot expect the answer to that specific point here, but it raises a question about the precise shape of Nandhikkara’s show and tell methodology that cannot be put to rest until that volume is completed. Again, on this further dimension, Nandhikkara is disarmingly honest with his affirmation at the end of the First Chapter. But that in itself is striking, due to the relativised expression that indexes his faith to ‘this religious point of view’. The power of the ‘look and see’ anthropological turn, as it plays out in the current volume, is surely the apparent absence of any particular point of view to which one might relativise what you find when you look and see. Curious then that the anthropology that reveals the passion of communion with the divine should warrant such indexing. The anthropological turn is not then a sign of the end of argument and disagreement. It is, however, an insistence that the debates that will and must continue be conducted by careful and patient examination of how we live and how we describe how we live, examinations like that offered here that begin with the invitation to look and see… Warwick University September 2011

Prof. Michael Luntley

Preface Being Human after Wittgenstein: A Philosophical Anthropology presents Being Human as an ongoing project to be realised in living our fundamental relations to fellow human beings and nature in truth and love. The aim is to provide a synoptic view of living human beings rooted and acting in the world, and formed by and extended to the community. The work displays a very rich conception of the human subject in fundamental living relations to nature and nurture. This is not presented as a general thesis that philosophy can establish, but as explorations and investigation of the landscape of being human from a philosophical point of view. The methodology is Wittgensteinian, that of assembling reminders, criss-crossing the terrain, than of sustained deductive arguments. By bringing out how Wittgenstein enlightened me in providing an Übersicht of being human, I am seeking to show how it might intelligibly illuminate that of others who attend carefully to Wittgenstein. What the book provides is a synoptic view of being human, a point of view illuminated by Wittgenstein’s philosophical investigations on self, rule-following and private language. Wittgenstein’s treatment of ‘subject’ is the focus of attention in the first part, chapters 2, 3 and 4. He was indeed challenged and puzzled by the apparently mysterious and elusive nature of ‘self’/‘ego’/‘I’. He struggled himself to clarify the confusions with regard to the nature of self, both in his early and later philosophy. At the beginning of the Blue Book, he identified a source of ‘philosophical bewilderment:’ ‘a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it’ (BB 1). Applied to human subjectivity, philosophers tend to ask

16

Being Human after Wittgenstein

‘What sort of entity is I?’ and come up with a number of answers, which are often nonsensical. The task of philosophy, according to Wittgenstein, is to raise the questions ‘How is the word used?’ and ‘What is the grammar of the word?’ (WL 35, 3) and to describe the grammar of the word that provides us with a surveyable representation of the use of the word. A grammatical investigation of ‘I’ would remind us of the obvious fact that human beings are neither bodies nor bodiless selves, but living beings with distinctive ways of life. While criss-crossing these vast fields of thoughts on human beings, a philosopher should resist making fine distinctions, reductions and compartmentalisations; instead one should ‘look and see’ the whole web of human actions and reactions, judgements and commitments, passions and reasons and their interconnections. In the second part, chapters 5 and 6, this view is further clarified through Wittgenstein’s treatment of ‘rule-following’ and ‘private language’. His remarks on ‘rule-following’ and ‘private language’ picture human beings as embodied, socially and culturally situated beings, who attain the full potentialities of being human through their appropriation of the human practices that constitute characteristic human forms of life. Human beings are not merely finished products but we are ever in the process of becoming fully human. We are not just born but formed as human beings. This process of being human is not done in total seclusion but in a life in the world in conversation and collaboration with others. We can neither separate ourselves from nature or nurture nor separate nature from nurture in our being human. We cannot place ourselves over and against the world and/or community; rather we belong to the world and community. That does not mean we are merely products of nature and/or nurture. We are active and creative agents and live, move and have our being in the world in communion with

Preface

17

fellow human beings. Being human is becoming human – a project to be realised. In presenting the fruits of my research and reflection on Being Human, I wish to acknowledge my sincere gratitude to Prof. Dr. Michael Luntley, my PhD supervisor at Warwick University, for his expert guidance. He has enlarged my philosophical horizons with his critical suggestions and valuable insights. I am also deeply indebted to my examiners Professor Martin Warner and Professor D. Z. Phillips for their insightful remarks and Dr Saju Chackalakkal for his support and expertise. May I also place on record my profound gratitude to the late Rev. Dr. Cyril Barrett and the late Dr. Gordon Baker who opened my philosophical investigations to Wittgenstein’s points of views during my undergraduate studies at Oxford University. Dharmaram Vidya Kshetram September 2011

Jose Nandhikkara CMI

Chapter 1

The ‘I’: Philosophical Explorations 1.1. The Project Questions, puzzles and mysteries concerning human subjectivity gave rise to some of the most illuminating philosophical remarks by Wittgenstein. He struggled himself to clarify the confusions with regard to the nature of self, both in his early and later philosophy. My project is to collect Wittgenstein’s remarks on ‘human beings’ as ‘sketches,’ ‘made in the course of long and involved journeyings’ ‘over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction’ and to critically and creatively arrange them in an ‘album’ in such a way that ‘if you looked at them you could get a picture of the landscape’ of the concept ‘Human Being’ (PI Preface, vii). I do this as the first step in presenting a philosophical anthropology after Wittgenstein, both in method and in content, showing a very rich conception of human subject rooted in nature and extended to community.1 According to Wittgenstein, ‘A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words. – Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity’ (PI 122). This is true about the words that we use for human beings. Besides the proper names and personal pronouns, we use words like ego, self, soul, mind, spirit, reason, 1

Human beings’ fundamental openness to the divine is the subject matter of another work.

20 Being Human after Wittgenstein will, etc. to define, describe or refer to human beings. By arranging Wittgenstein’s relevant remarks I would like to render a synoptic view of ‘human being’ showing various connexions as well as differences of our uses of words that refer to human subjectivity. Following Wittgenstein, I resist the temptation ‘to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination’ (PI Preface, vii). In this attempt to make a synopsis and a critical and creative assessment of the sketches on human beings, I have also taken seriously Wittgenstein’s own belief that his later thoughts could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of his ‘old way of thinking’ (PI Preface, viii). When we look at the landscape of Wittgenstein’s remarks on ‘human being’, we see all sorts of distinct and indistinct movements; it is quite hazy. The concept makes a tangled impression. There is not one genuine proper case of such description of ‘human being’ – the rest being just vague, something which awaits clarification, or which must just be swept aside as rubbish. As in other areas of philosophical investigations, for example, when one tries to define the concept of a material object in terms of ‘what is really seen’, we are in enormous danger of wanting to make fine distinctions and to come up with novel definition of human subject. What we have rather to do, following Wittgenstein, is to accept the everyday language-game, and to note false accounts of the matter as false.1 1

Wittgenstein wrote perceptively on ‘seeing’: ‘The concept of ‘seeing’ makes a tangled impression. Well, it is tangled. – I look at the landscape, my gaze ranges over it, I see all sorts of distinct and indistinct movement; this impresses itself sharply on me, that is quite hazy. After all, how completely ragged what we see can appear! And now look at all that can be meant by “description of what is seen”. – But this just is what is called description of what is seen. There is not

The ‘I’: Philosophical Explorations

21

The method here is more that of assembling reminders than of a sustained deductive argument. It is a matter of encouraging the reader to look at the whole picture rather than giving a complete theoretical articulation on “Who and What is human being?” This is also not to grant everyday language a normative or prescriptive role or to claim that ordinary usage can never be mistaken. Ordinary use is, of course, subject to correction, modification and creative innovations; but always depending on our actual needs. Wittgenstein’s prescription is this: When philosophers use a word – “knowledge”, “being”, “object”, “I”, “proposition”, “name” – and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the languagegame which is its original home?’1 – What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use (PI 116). By bringing the words back to their everyday use we could see the words in action as they are used in the stream of our life; one genuine proper case of such description – the rest being just vague, something which awaits clarification, or which must just be swept aside as rubbish. Here we are in enormous danger of wanting to make fine distinctions. – It is the same when one tries to define the concept of a material object in terms of ‘what is really seen’. – What we have rather to do is to accept the everyday language-game, and to note false accounts of the matter as false. The primitive language-game which children are taught needs no justification; attempts at justification need to be rejected’ (PI p. 200). 1The German text, Wird denn dieses Wort in der Sprache, in der es seine Heimat hat, je tatsächlich so gebraucht? speaks of language rather than ‘language game‘ and home not ‘original home‘.

22 Being Human after Wittgenstein Wittgenstein treats philosophical investigations as answerable to our life. Therefore, the philosophical anthropology that I propose is a description of human life in which words and concepts are at home. Wittgenstein repeatedly claimed that ‘Only in the stream of thought and life do words have meaning’ (RPP II, 504; Z 173; RPP II, 687; LW I, 913). In this process I do not attempt to give a complete theoretical articulation or a definition but a background against which concepts regarding human subjectivity can be clarified. The resulting inconclusiveness and blurred edges is preferred to solutions that look crystal clear but are far from the actual use of words in the stream of life. Wittgenstein himself has engaged in an attempt to give the final solution of the problems on all essential points in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Preface, 4). 1.2. ‘Look Closer’ (OC 3) In the first part of the book, I present Wittgenstein’s earlier attempts to give such crystalline clarity to human subjectivity in terms of the ‘philosophical and ethical subject’. Here we can see that drawing fine distinctions to make the concept neat and tidy would take us only to the ‘high seas of language’ (PI 194), or to the ‘slippery ice where there is no friction that we are unable to walk’ (PI 107). As Wittgenstein himself later found out, this was not a good method in philosophy. We need to get back to the rough ground1 – the hurly-burly of our lives. In his words, ‘The

1

‘The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty. – We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal,

The ‘I’: Philosophical Explorations

23

preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole examination round. (One might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need)’ (PI 108). One has to struggle to bring back the words from metaphysical applications to their home in everyday use (PI 116) in our life (OC 186). Following this methodology, instead of aiming at a complete theoretical articulation on human being, I ‘look and see’ (PI 66) words and concepts on human subjectivity in the context of ‘our life’ (OC 559) in this work. The concept of human being is rich and complex giving a ‘very complicated filigree pattern’ (RPP II, 624) and has various applications in the stream of our thought and life. This struggle is continuous because ‘we keep on finding ourselves on the old level’ (RFM 333) of analysis and definitions. The reason is that we want to give a complete theoretical articulation and feel that a failure to do so is our ignorance and we must try harder. As Wittgenstein has pointed out it is difficult for philosophers to accept that there is no definition of ‘games’ and there is no problem about it (PI 65-67). This is also true about concepts like ‘time’, ‘space’, ‘number’, ‘reading’, ‘seeing’, etc. I argue that there is no perfect definition of human being either and we are not particularly ignorant or troubled because of that. In fact, it is philosophical ignorance and arrogance to claim a final solution on all essential points on human being, as Wittgenstein himself claimed in the Preface to the Tractatus. ‘What’s ragged should be left ragged’ (CV 51): that is philosophical wisdom that dawned later on Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein in his later philosophical investigations did not examine the traditional philosophical debates and argue for

but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!’ (PI 107).

24 Being Human after Wittgenstein one position. Neither did he attempt for a final synthesis of all valid arguments nor for a final solution on all problems. He challenged the presuppositions of the traditional philosophical questions instead and tried to dissolve the problems. In his view, ‘The very word “problem,” one might say, is misapplied when used for our philosophical troubles. These difficulties, as long as they are seen as problems, are tantalizing, and appear insoluble’ (BB 46). These difficulties, of course, we don’t see in ordinary life; understanding the use of our words that refer to human beings, like names and personal pronouns, is not an insoluble problem. Most of us learn and use them correctly. ‘But somehow, when we look at them in a certain way, our expression is liable to get into a tangle’ (BB 46). According to Wittgenstein this is due to ‘the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language’ (PI 109). Somehow we are held captives by certain pictures. ‘And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably’ (PI 115). The way out is to see the actual working of our concepts and words in real life. In the next chapter, I pay close attention to Wittgenstein’s ‘old way of thinking’ on self. Here he seems to be obsessed with replacing the Cartesian ego with a metaphysical/ethical subject, characterised as the ‘centre’, ‘source’ and the ‘limits’ of the world and at the same time the ‘bearer of good and evil’. He makes two basic mistakes here: firstly, he is looking for an entity that ‘I’ stands for similar to that of a Cartesian ego though he denies the existence of a thinking substance; secondly, he discards the study of ‘human being’ together with body and mind/soul to empirical sciences, declaring such studies have ‘nothing to do with philosophy’ (TLP 6.53). Neither his distinction between saying and showing nor his attempt to show what he claims to be the truth of solipsism, coinciding solipsism with pure realism, solve or dissolve the philosophical problems regarding the existence

The ‘I’: Philosophical Explorations

25

and nature of self. He just strips the leaves in a vain attempt ‘to find the real artichoke’ (PI 164, BB 125), leaving behind not only the world and community but also ‘the living human being’ with flesh and blood, body and soul, which ought to be the real concern of any genuine philosophy of human being. The third chapter is concerned with Wittgenstein’s later treatment of self as an investigation into the grammar of ‘I’. He argues, at this stage, that the use of ‘I’ is something that ‘causes deep-rooted and pernicious confusion’ (WL 32, 45) and needs ‘philosophical treatment’ (PI 254). I consider two of his prescriptions: first, eliminate ‘I’ altogether from language and second, deny the referential function of ‘I’ and make ‘I’ redundant. He is treating the questions on self, at this stage, as pseudoproblems, generated by misunderstanding the role of ‘I’. We need to see that ‘self’ does not refer to something in the way that ‘body’ refers to a body. I shall argue that Wittgenstein’s diagnosis was correct, but the treatment drastic and harmful; he would throw away the baby with the bath-water. We continue to use ‘I’ defying both the prescriptions to reject and ignore and we need such a linguistic device to speak from the subjective point of view. What Wittgenstein has left as something ‘that has nothing to do with philosophy’ at the initial stages and tried to discard altogether as philosophically pernicious in the second phase claims the centre stage, its rightful place, in the fourth chapter, namely the ‘living human being.’ Here I consider the roles of body and mind/soul resisting temptations to reduction and compartmentalization. Philosophy’s real concern, I would argue, is not with the Cartesian ego or the transcendental subject, but with ‘all of the situations and reactions which constitute human life’ (RPP II, 16), which includes thinking and willing, words and deeds. Only a ‘living human being’ can be spoken of as the empirical, metaphysical and ethical subject. What I learn from

26 Being Human after Wittgenstein Wittgenstein in providing a synoptic view of ‘human being’ is that we have to take the concept of ‘living human being’ as something fundamental and resist the temptation to reduce it to something else. Here, a philosopher admits, ‘I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned’ (PI 217). The concept of ‘human being’ is fundamental defying a complete theoretical articulation. Definitions like ‘rational animal,’ ‘political animal,’ ‘social being,’ ‘language-using animal,’ ‘thinking thing’ and ‘willing substance’ do not give the essence of living human being; they point only to certain aspects of the rich and complex stream of human life and thought. When we narrow down the concept so that it has the ‘crystalline purity’ of logic, which Wittgenstein himself tried in his early philosophy, it fails to correspond to the whole reality of living human being. We must ‘look closer’ (OC 3) as well as ‘Take a wider look round’ (RFM 127) to have a synoptic view of ‘human being.’ That we cannot properly define ‘human being’ is not ignorance on our part. It is due to both the primitiveness and richness of the concept. As in other areas of philosophical investigations, ‘The difficult thing here is not, to dig down to the ground; no, it is to recognize the ground that lies before us as the ground. For the ground keeps on giving us the illusory image of a greater depth, and when we seek to reach this, we keep on finding ourselves on the old level’ (RFM 333). Resisting our temptations to seek further explanations and justifications we need to rest with the clarification of our actual use of words that refer to ‘living human being’. 1.3. ‘Take a Wider Look Round’ (RFM 127) A synopsis of Wittgenstein’s sketches on ‘human being’ could also provide correctives to certain trends in the fields of religion, philosophy and society. Religion often advocates a picture of self

The ‘I’: Philosophical Explorations

27

– free and faithful before God, in constant struggle to keep oneself pure from the corrupt and corrupting body and world. Beginning with Descartes, modern philosophy spoke of a selfconscious and autonomous thinking substance, independent of body and world. Modern Western society, to a large extent, rejects God and declares itself totally free and struggles to overcome limitations set by body, world and religion. In all these three fields – religion, philosophy and society – there is a persisting temptation to think of an autonomous self-conscious subject. Wittgenstein’s sketches on human subjectivity help us not only to reject the dualism of body and mind but also to treat the self as ‘a living human being’ affirming our being in nature and becoming by nurture. We are not just born as human beings; we are also formed by nurture and become fully human through a dynamic process. (The role of nurture is dealt with in the second part of the book.) Philosophers in their passionate commitment to truth should also acknowledge the truth about our passionate commitments, including that of religion. Wittgenstein reminds us that human beings as ‘individuals’ – complete in oneself and separated from others – would remain just as beings-in-the-world. Living human beings, however, are not merely beings-in-the-world but beingstogether-with-others. What is emphasised is the logical point that belonging to a community is part of becoming human rather than the empirical fact whether an individual is surrounded by other human beings in a particular situation. To become fully human one need not necessarily be surrounded by others, but one must be open to others; one cannot remain a private individual. Here, care should be taken not to reduce the individual into a community or to separate the individual from nature and nurture. A living human being is not just a bundle of perceptions, thoughts or judgements but is an individual actively

28 Being Human after Wittgenstein and critically engaging in varying relations with God, community and world. The world becomes a human world, rather than a biological environment. ‘The world as I found it’ (TLP 5.631) is to be also seen as ‘the world I live in’ in conversation and collaboration with others. I carry out this project through a critical study of Wittgenstein’s illuminating remarks on ‘Rule-Following’ and ‘Private Language.’ As I see them, these remarks not only clarify the phenomena of rule-following and language use but throw light on who we are and how we live in conversation and collaboration with fellow human beings. It is the latter aspect in which I am primarily interested in this chapter. In Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, as we have seen, ‘the world is my world;’ his later philosophy reminds us of as an obvious fact that ‘the world is our world.’ By living in the world, we transform the world and make it a human world. Learning from Wittgenstein’s sketches on ‘RuleFollowing’ and ‘Private Language,’ I want to show the philosophical importance of the community without reducing the significance of individual human beings. Individuals and communities are not contraries nor do they stand at opposite poles. They are related to each other not just empirically but logically. ‘The motto here is always: Take a wider look round’ (RFM 127). The move concerns the breadth of the synoptic view required for a proper philosophical anthropology, after Wittgenstein. The roles of individuals and community are seen from the point of view of being human without reducing one to the other. Our engagement with the confusions regarding body and mind in the previous chapter showed that compartmentalisation and reducing one to the other is pernicious. It also showed that the body and mind are related both empirically and logically. Wittgenstein’s attack on the Cartesian conception of the mind as ‘private’ is directed towards not just replacing the I of cogito

The ‘I’: Philosophical Explorations

29

with a solitary individual or a we of society. It is equally wrong to deny the society in an attempt to secure the place of individuals or to present them as gifts of society. Drawing sharp boundaries and presenting individualistic and collectivistic interpretations of Wittgenstein are merely battle cries; both parties make unjust assertions at variance with Wittgenstein and our day-to-day practice of rule-following and language use.1 My aim is to argue for human existence as coexistence and proexistence giving due importance both to the individual and to the society. It is similar to the way the picture of ‘living human being’ has shown the importance of both the physical and spiritual character of human beings. I argue for living human beings’ substantial presence in the world, as subjects, engaging both with other subjects and objects in the world. This is fundamental, meaning, ‘it’s something to do with the way we live’ (LFM 249). It is tempting to think that a human being first exists in himself and, then, for the sake of his growth and development, enters into all kinds of social contacts with others. Being in relation with others is, then, seen as something consequent and contingent – an important addition – to being an individual. Such an approach tends to speak of der Mensch – an individual complete in itself and separate from others (things and persons). It is true that living human beings, like other animals, interact directly in a physico-biological way within the spatio-temporal environment. Human subjectivity is shown in the spatio-temporal world through one’s substantial and creative presence and

1

‘This dispute is so like the one between realism and idealism in that it will soon have become obsolete, for example, and in that both parties make unjust assertions at variance with their day-to-day practice’ (RFM 293).

30 Being Human after Wittgenstein engagement with objects in the world. One is to be reminded, however, of the obvious fact that we are not just solitary individuals.1 We are in collaboration and conversation with other human beings in an inter-subjective world. This is not just something additional and consequent, but something constitutive and existential of being human. A method that is suitable for matter-in-motion cannot capture things human and the language of physics is not sufficient for expressing the characteristics of being human. One has to see the fundamental similarities and differences in our engagement with things and other living human beings. Both of them constitute and shape our streams of life. This is not merely an empirical fact, but a conceptual fact that shapes the framework of a philosophical anthropology, after Wittgenstein. Living human beings are not only rooted in the world of things but also formed by and extended to the world of persons. Being human is a joint venture of nature and nurture. It is typical of philosophers ‘to ask whether it could not happen that only one man would exist, and to press this question as an argument against the idea that being-man is a being-together, co-existence.’2 One reason for endorsing such a method ‘is simply the methodological prescription to keep our analytical tools as simple as possible.’3 From a Wittgensteinian point of view, I see this as a result of ‘our preoccupation with the methods of science . . . reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural According to Wittgenstein, ‘The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something – because it is always before one’s eyes)’ (PI 129). 2Plattel 1965, 38. 3Luntley 2003, 94. 1

The ‘I’: Philosophical Explorations

31

laws’ (BB 18). Philosophers often apply the methods of science to philosophical investigations. Because of the enormous success of science in its fields, philosophers are tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. ‘This tendency,’ according to Wittgenstein, ‘leads the philosopher into compete darkness’ (BB 18). This obsession with the methods of science is not useful for philosophical investigations, especially for a philosophical anthropology that concerns with ‘living human beings’. As he observed in the Tractatus, ‘even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched’ (TLP 6.51). Being human is not just an empirical question for me but concerns the meaning of my life. The nature of our passions and commitments, aesthetic, ethical, political and religious values, in short, all that make our lives human, are not susceptible for complete theoretical articulations. We continue to raise fundamental questions on the meaning of life. Philosophers, including the early Wittgenstein, complained that the subject is not found and concluded that the ego is an illusion or a fiction. They failed in their search because they were looking for a subject among objects. The search could be compared with that of someone who tries to find something blue by means of spectacles that are impervious to blue light. This is true about the search for other human beings. If I look for persons in the world of objects, I find only individuals, who could be deemed as living human beings on the basis of the best available evidence. For people who are influenced by the linguistic turn in philosophy, perhaps, ‘it was only when the other opened his mouth and spoke that one realized that a person lay hidden within the middle-sized, lightly sweating and

32 Being Human after Wittgenstein gently palpitating object on the other side of the dinner table.’1 In reality, in the stream of our life and thought, our attitudes to living human beings are categorically different from our attitude to other objects in the world. I argue for our substantial, interactive and creative presence in the world through a critical examination of Wittgenstein’s remarks on ‘Rule-Following’ and ‘Private Language’. Rule-following and linguistic use are two basic human activities that show the fundamental fact that ‘we belong to a community’ (OC 298) throwing more light on who we are and what we are. A ‘living human being’ is not just an animated body nor an embodied spirit nor something that can be characterised as ‘body +’ or ‘soul +’. Physical, mental, emotional, volitional, spiritual and other characteristics are attributed to the same entity – ‘living human being.’ Resisting temptations of reductions and compartmentalisations, I argue, following Wittgenstein, for treating ‘living human being’ as a fundamental concept. In the fifth chapter, I show that a living human being is substantially present in the world in collaboration and conversation with fellow human beings. I present this as a dynamic and creative process of being human or becoming fully human, realising our potentialities. Besides nature, nurture plays a substantial role in this process of being human. According to the philosophical anthropology that I present after Wittgenstein, living human beings are not just present in the material world in direct interaction with other objects in the world, but also in a human world, where our being and becoming fully human depend on our interaction with fellow human beings. The notion of becoming fully human does not mean that there are degrees of more or less in human beings. 1

Kerr 1997, 23.

The ‘I’: Philosophical Explorations

33

None of the human beings are less than human beings, even if some of the physical or mental faculties are not fully developed. What the notion of ‘fully human’ picks up is that human beings are not just born; they are formed and they become. There is a creative process in being human which is not completed by birth. I shall also argue that it is a fundamental fact that ‘we belong to a community’ (OC 298); it is not just a homely reminder of an empirical fact but an existentially fundamental fact of life (Tatsachen des Lebens) that is given (RPP I 630) showing who we are and how we live. Belonging to a community does not mean, however, that an individual is always surrounded by a group of people. It is a basic presupposition in our rulefollowing and language use, which are fundamental to being and becoming human. As a believer, I live in God’s world and it is given to me to realise my potentialities to the maximum – to become fully human and to have life in its fullness. From this religious point of view,1 a living human being is rooted and acting in the world, formed by and extended to the community, and sustained by and oriented to God. I depend on nature, nurture and God; a declaration of independence does not free me from the bonds and bounds that describe and design the ‘living human being’ that I am. I begin with clarifying the concept of ‘human being’ by looking closer at what looked to early Wittgenstein ‘deeply mysterious’!

1

This religious point of view will be explored in the next volume, A Religious Point of View, after Wittgenstein.

Chapter 2

The ‘I’: Philosophical Analysis 2.1. ‘The Deeply Mysterious I’ (NB 80) Wittgenstein wrote in his Note Books as early as in 1916: ‘The I, the I is what is deeply mysterious!’ (NB 80). He was indeed challenged and puzzled by the apparent mysterious and elusive nature of ‘self’. It appears to be an entity whose nature we grasp in our experience, but which we cannot define. We know, of course, what we mean by ‘I’; yet it stands beyond a theoretical articulation. According to Evans, ‘‘I’ thoughts give rise to the most challenging philosophical questions, which have exercised the most considerable philosophers, including Descartes, Kant, and Wittgenstein.’1 It continues to grip contemporary philosophers. In his ‘old way of thinking,’ Wittgenstein was in search of a metaphysical subject, the ‘centre,’ ‘source’ and ‘limit’ of the world. To arrive at ‘complete clarity’ (PI 133), his guiding motto was ‘Look closer;’ and he sharpened his focus of attention by getting rid of world, society, body and soul. He was trying to find the ‘philosophical I’ which is ‘not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit – not a part of the world’ (NB 82). In his obsession to impress upon his listeners ‘just the opposite of Descartes’ emphasis on I’ (WL 35, 63) and to have ‘crystalline purity of logic’ he postulated a ‘metaphysical/ethical 1

Evans 1982, 205.

36 Being Human after Wittgenstein subject.’ Confusions, however, thrive as he was still looking for an entity that ‘I’ stands for, which looked mysterious because from a third-person point of view it was only a body like other material things and from a first-person point of view it was reduced to ‘a point without extension’ (TLP 5.64). One of the roots of philosophical maladies is confusion about similarities and differences of various language-games. We tend to concentrate on the form of the words rather than their varying uses. In his Lectures on Aesthetics, Wittgenstein observed: ‘If I had to say what is the main mistake made by philosophers of the present generation, including Moore, I would say that it is that when language is looked at, what is looked at is a form of words and not the use made of the form of words’ (LC 2). We need to move from form to actual use of words in the stream of our thought and life. According to one picture which held Wittgenstein (many others before and after him) captive in his early philosophy, ‘A name means an object. The object is its meaning’ (TLP 3.203). This is to assume that the fundamental form of explanation of words is given by ostensive definition. We are troubled then if we cannot give such a definition. We feel that we failed to connect with the reality. The confusions are compounded by a related pervasive picture, according to which ‘the individual words in language name objects – sentences are combinations of such names’ (PI 1). That means all meaningful words in language are names and they are used to refer to the respective objects. To make matters worse, a third picture drags us to assume that all objects have similar properties to that of material objects. We want to name, locate, describe and define them. The history of philosophy is full of examples of such attempts with regard to ‘self’, ‘God’, ‘time’, ‘number’, etc. We do not have a set of necessary and sufficient rules for the use of these words and

The ‘I’: Philosophical Analysis

37

for many other words that we use. Nor do we need them. Philosophers, however, are reluctant to give up their old habits. In his old ways of thinking, Wittgenstein also struggled with forms of words and their presumed philosophical import rather than with their actual uses. This self-imposed requirement dragged him into the muddle resulting in more confusion rather than providing the final solution of the problems on all essential points as he had claimed in the Preface to the Tractatus. However, taking seriously his remark in the Preface to the Philosophical Investigations that his ‘new thoughts’ ‘could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of his old way of thinking,’ we begin with a ‘closer look’ at his old ways of thinking on self which was indeed a ‘closer look’ at the meaning and reference of ‘self’ by Wittgenstein. These remarks are oracular and mysterious, as they stand. They are revealing, however, as they show how the demand for ‘crystalline purity of logic’ takes one to ‘philosophical chimeras.’ According to Mounce, Wittgenstein seems to suggest that philosophy can bring out, though not state, a sense of the self which has not been captured in what has been said about the empirical self; in this sense, the self does not appear in the world of experience, for it is the source of that experience, and therefore can no more be located there than the eye can be located in the visual field.1 Let us ‘look closer’ at Wittgenstein’s early treatment of human subjectivity.

1

Mounce 1981, 89-90.

38 Being Human after Wittgenstein 2.2. ‘The Philosophical Self’ (TLP 5.641) ‘The philosophical self,’ according to Wittgenstein, ‘is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject’ (TLP 5.641). It is only with reference to the metaphysical self that philosophy can (TLP 5.641) and must (NB 80) talk about the self. The metaphysical self is not the Cartesian ego; rather the opposite of it: ‘There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas’ (TLP 5.631), he wrote. What brings the metaphysical self into philosophy is the fact that ‘The world is my world’ (TLP 5.641). The empirical subject – the human being, body, mind/soul – is just an item in the world along with other items. Its nature, behaviour and character are subject matters for empirical sciences, but the results of such investigations have ‘nothing to do with philosophy’ (TLP 6.53). Body, mind/soul and their activities would find a place in the book, ‘The world as I found it’, ‘but not the subject’ (TLP 5.631). Wittgenstein, however, was not denying subjectivity, reducing everything to objects describable by natural sciences, but rather he was showing that the subject is not one among the objects. His claim was that ‘The I is not an object. I objectively confront every object. But not the I’ (NB 80). The I does not belong to the world; rather it is the limit of the world (TLP 5.632). The metaphysical subject, he claimed, is necessary to conceive an objective world. ‘This fundamental feature of subjectivity cannot be accounted for by postulating objectively available subject(s) within the world. The mental is not a sphere within the world nor is it an object outside the world; ‘the metaphysical subject’ is, rather, ‘the nonobjective condition of the possibility of the objective world.’1 Though a complete description of the world will not and cannot 1

Sluga 1996, 329.

The ‘I’: Philosophical Analysis

39

mention the I, the world so described is still ‘The world as I found it.’ The subject makes appearance because the world is my world (TLP 5.641). ‘The world as I found it’ is a description of my world and the metaphysical subject is both the author of the book and the author of the world. ‘I am my world’ (TLP 5.63). Wittgenstein was struggling himself to present the metaphysical subject through showing, what he characterised as ‘the truth of solipsism.’ A solipsist is one who thinks that the world is essentially an object of experience and there is only one subject, I, who claims, ‘The world is my world’ (TLP 5.641). Nothing exists save my present experience and myself. Moreover, nothing else could exist: ‘Mine is the first and only world!’ (NB 81). Neither the past nor the future can be said to exist; only my immediate present experience ‘has reality.’ According to early Wittgenstein, solipsism is seen as the only way to mention or acknowledge the ‘nonpsychological I’ (NB 80). ‘That the world is my world, shows itself in the fact that the limits of the language (the only language which I understand [die allein ich verstehe]) mean the limits of my world’ (TLP 5.62). Here ‘The world and life are one’ (TLP 5.621) and ‘I am my world’ (TLP 5.63) and the only language is my language. According to Tractatus, this is not saying anything about the subject, but showing the presence of the subject.1 Wittgenstein has reduced everything that can be said to the propositions of natural science about the world (TLP 4.11). The metaphysical self is not part of the world. Therefore, we cannot talk about it. It shows itself, however, he claimed, ‘at the limits of my world’ (TLP 5.62).

1

A detailed discussion of saying and showing is beyond the scope of this work. My interest here is to present Wittgenstein’s earlier views on ‘self’ in order to understand better his later views on ‘living human being’.

40 Being Human after Wittgenstein According to Wittgenstein, ‘what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest’ (TLP 5.62). This is not a contingent truth that could be otherwise. This is a transcendental point of view of the world and self. Similarly, the only experience that I know and have is mine is also not something that could be otherwise. He also gave a ‘linguistic perspective on solipsism.’1 ‘The limits of my language mean the limits of my world’ (TLP 5.6). Anscombe considers the truth of solipsism as ‘the most notorious of the things that Wittgenstein says are ‘shewn’, but cannot be said’.2 To speak about the self that shows itself at the limits of my world, I need to get beyond the limits of my world, which is impossible by Wittgenstein’s own standards. I do not and cannot have a language for talking about the relation of language, the world, and the philosophical I, because my world is not one among the many to talk about: ‘Mine is the first and only world!’ (NB 81). The limits of the world are given by the limits of my language. I cannot, however, speak about the limits. I can only think and speak meaningfully about the states of affairs that are within the limits and not about the limits themselves. I have no vantage point outside my world to describe the limits of my language because my world is the only world and my language is the only language. Attempts to cross to the other side of the limit are futile because nothing would count as transcending the limits.3 Although we cannot transcend the limits, or describe the limits coherently, Wittgenstein hoped to show them by pointing to certain features of language and the world, namely that the

Glock 1996, 348. Anscombe 1967, 166. 3This tendency Wittgenstein describes as ‘absolutely hopeless,’ but ‘cannot help respecting deeply’ (PO 45). 1 2

The ‘I’: Philosophical Analysis

41

limits of my language are the limits of my world. The work of the Tractatus was to provide this transcendental point of view. For Wittgenstein, the limits of language are also the limits of thought and logic. ‘Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its limits’ (TLP 5.61). They are like the ‘scaffolding of the world’ (TLP 6.124). My world is pervaded by my logic and shares the structure of the only language I understand. Wittgenstein speaks of inner and outer limits, pointing to the figure of a circle: ‘The middle point of a circle can be conceived as its inner limit’ (NB 54). With regard to language and logic, contradiction is seen as the outer limit and tautology as their substanceless (substanzloser) centre (TLP 5.143). Similarly, the self of solipsism can be seen as ‘the extensionless (ausdehnungslosen) point’ (TLP 5.64); it bears the world. ‘I’ am the centre, source and limit of my thought, logic, language and world. By affirming ‘I am my world’ (TLP 5.63) Wittgenstein is moving towards transcendental monism. Yet he sees his results as identical with pure realism. Wittgenstein compares the relation between the world and self with that of the visual field and the eye. The eye is not seen in the visual field nor can it see itself. In fact, Wittgenstein claims that ‘From nothing in the field of sight can it be concluded that it is seen from an eye’ (TLP 5.633). This is something to be shown rather than to be argued for. The eye of the visual field is not, of course, the physical eye, but what Wittgenstein later called ‘the geometrical eye’ (PO 257); it is the source of the visual field, not a constituent of it. It is not that I always notice the position from which I see what I see, but that ‘I also always find myself at a particular point of my visual space, so my visual space has as it were a shape’ (NB 86). A visual field, though it depends entirely on the eye, cannot bear witness to its author. Similarly, though the subject confronts every object, the subject

42 Being Human after Wittgenstein himself is not an object of experience. The self is not to be found anywhere in the world of experience because it is the source of all experience. At the same time every experience is a subject’s experience. There is no experience without a subject. Later Wittgenstein would clarify these observations as grammatical determinations. ‘What is seen is always seen by an eye,’ ‘experience is always an experience of a subject,’ etc. are how we use language; it is neither an empirical observation nor a philosophical conclusion. For the early Wittgenstein, however, this is part of the project ‘to see the world aright’ (TLP 6.54) giving the final solution of all philosophical problems on all essential points. The metaphysical subject of the Tractatus defines the inner and outer limits of the world. At death, ‘the world does not change, but ceases’ (TLP 6.431). Of course, this is true only about ‘my world,’ the creation of the metaphysical subject, not about the empirical world, where my death is only an insignificant event. On the empirical level there is a world of things; at the philosophical level ‘the totality of facts’ becomes ‘my world’. ‘The world as I found it’ and ‘my world’ are not two; the world is my world and the only world. For Wittgenstein, ‘Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it’ (TLP 5.64). Wittgenstein was trying to express what he saw as the truth of solipsism: ‘I am my world.’ Confusions abound, however, from a commonsense point of view; the solipsist’s use of language is also far from the actual use of language. Wittgenstein himself would later ask: ‘The solipsist flutters and flutters in the flyglass, strikes against the walls, flutters further. How can he be brought to rest?’ (PO 258).

The ‘I’: Philosophical Analysis

43

Let me bring to light some of the confusions involved in the solipsistic view of the world and language. According to the solipsist, reality and immediate experience are one and the same and my experience is all that is real. For him, ‘Only the experience of the present moment is real’ (WVC 107). The word ‘present’ as employed by the solipsist, however, is redundant; it cannot be used to distinguish it from past and future. In the mouth of the solipsist, the ‘present’ is without neighbours; it does not refer to anything within a system of temporally related events. It is part of the solipsistic view that other possible temporal points are excluded. Therefore, the term ‘present’ is redundant; it is a freely rotating cog in the wheel, not connected with a system. Secondly, the solipsist wanted to say: ‘But I am in a favoured position. I am the centre of the world’ (PO 257). But who is this I? In our normal language, we use ‘I’ in contrast/relation to other persons and things. Its use is interwoven with the use of other person referring expressions and all of us can use ‘I’ and other words that refer to human subjectivity. With regard to the use of ‘I’ by the solipsist, however, there is no criterion. When the solipsist says, ‘I am the vessel of life’ (NB 65), it is impossible for others to know what he means by this utterance. It follows that the use of ‘my’ by the solipsist also fails to have any significance. Any genuine ownership of experiences is determined by the living human being who gives expression to them in word and deed in the stream of thought and life. We cannot make sense of free-floating ownership. The solipsist’s peculiar use of ‘I’ excludes him using terms that refer to ownership. There is no mine or thine. ‘What started out as my world becomes only the world: Solipsism and realism thus coincide.’1 It only adds to the confusion, however, 1

Tilgman, 1991, 51.

44 Being Human after Wittgenstein as we see that solipsistic world is our ordinary world in which we live in conversation and collaboration. The muddle becomes even more confusing when we try to get to grips with the solipsist’s use of ‘experience’ that he ‘has.’ Without the support of the other concepts – ‘present’, ‘I’, ‘my’ – ‘experience’ also becomes a mere noise or scribble rather than a meaningful word. There are no criteria; he can only gesticulate ‘This.’ Thus, the whole solipsistic enterprise is truly a labyrinth, a confusion of thought and language and a philosophical chimera. The solipsist has to begin with his particular self; there he is only an item in the world. From his own point of view, everything occurs within his world. Here the solipsist is at the limits of the world. This is, however, confusing if his world means just the world of an individual. The solipsist is thus presented both as a particular item in the world and as the limit of the world. ‘We seemed to be forced to treat subjectivity in the Tractatus both as an item in the world so that it can be talked about and transcendentally as a condition of the world.’1 Wittgenstein tried in vain to overcome the muddle by introducing his distinction between what can be shown and what can be said. What we can speak about is the human being who is an individual among the totality of things; and philosophy has nothing to do with it, according to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein wanted to show the metaphysical self, the self that bears the world. The self that is talked about is an item in the world, not its limit; the self that is shown, on the other hand, is at the limits of the world, not an item within the world. Wittgenstein could not speak about the relationship between the two nor did he succeed to show it. When the solipsist makes the assertion ‘The world is my world’, the self is not an item in the 1

Hodges 1990, 86.

The ‘I’: Philosophical Analysis

45

world. To show that it is at the limits of the world is to use language to present language and the world as a whole – from outside of language, which is beyond the capability of language. By his own admission, ‘One has to pass over in silence’ (TLP 7); we cannot say anything about the metaphysical subject. 2.3. ‘The I Is … the Bearer of Good and Evil’ (NB 80) Wittgenstein who rejects ‘the thinking subject’ as merely ‘illusion’ affirms ‘the willing subject’ as real: the thinking subject is surely mere illusion. But the willing subject exists. If the will did not exist, neither would there be that centre of the world, which we call the I, and which is the bearer of good and evil. What is good and evil is essentially the I, not the world (NB 80). The ethical subject is, thus, considered as the centre of the world and the bearer of good and evil. Confusions reign, however, regarding the philosophical status of the willing subject. I find it arbitrary for Wittgenstein to reject ‘thinking subject’ and to affirm ‘willing subject’. If there won’t be good and evil without a willing subject, there won’t be thought and language without a thinking subject. I agree with Wittgenstein that it is wrong to reduce the human subject to a thinking substance as Descartes did. It is equally wrong, however, to find the essence of human being as a willing subject. This is not to deny ‘willing’ or ‘thinking’ but to show the futility of reduction and compartmentalisation with regard to human subjectivity. In his later philosophical investigations Wittgenstein fought consistently against essentialism in philosophy. The tension between the empirical self and the metaphysical self repeats itself in the distinction between empirical will and ethical will. The empirical will is an item in the world and is a matter for empirical investigations whereas

46 Being Human after Wittgenstein the ethical will about which philosophy is concerned is not found in the world; it is ‘first and foremost the bearer of good and evil’ (NB 76). It lies outside the world. It is part of the Tractatrian system that we cannot say anything about what lies outside the world and, therefore, ‘ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental’ (TLP 6.421). His argument is as follows: The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists – and if it did exist, it would have no value. If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental. It must lie outside the world (TLP 6.41). Ethics for Wittgenstein is a ‘condition of the world, like logic’ (NB 77). Since ‘ethics is transcendental,’ it is possible only for a transcendental will not for an empirical will. Therefore, ‘It is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes’ (TLP 6.423). The ethical will, like the metaphysical subject, lies at the limits of the world for if it were merely an item in the world, all value would be relative and there would be no ethical value which is absolute, for Wittgenstein. Ethical value cannot be an item in the world without losing its status as ethical. The world is the totality of facts and ethical value is not one item among the facts. Though not an item in the world, for Wittgenstein, ethical value is real and the world does have a meaning. The problem, however, is how to argue for something about which there can be no discourse.

The ‘I’: Philosophical Analysis

47

As we have seen, Wittgenstein treated the subject not as part of the world, but as its boundary and presupposition of its existence. The ethical will is the bearer of good and evil. ‘Good and evil only enter through the subject’ (NB 79). In his treatment of ethics, it would seem that he treats good and evil as predicates of the subject rather than the properties of the world. It could be better seen as two ways of having an attitude to the world. We may learn from his observation with regard to the Necker cube: his remark that ‘there are two possible ways of seeing the figure’ is based on the fact that ‘we really see two different facts’ (TLP 5.5423).1 Wittgenstein does not reduce ethics either to the subject or to the object, or compartmentalise it into world and self. Though ‘good and evil enter through the subject’ and the world is neither good nor evil, these are really two possibilities about the world, before the subject. The world, as it were, presents itself in two modes: to be taken up in a good or evil way. Ethics is concerned with the subject’s attitude to the world. Wittgenstein observes, ‘The world is independent of my will’ (TLP 6.373) though he admits that in a popular sense ‘there are things that I do, and other things not done by me’ (NB 88). For Wittgenstein, that is just ‘a phenomenon, only of interest to psychology’ (TLP 6.423). He saw the relation between the will and the willed actions in causal terms. Since their relation is 1

Similarities can be seen in Wittgenstein’s treatment of ‘seeing aspects’ in the Investigations (Part II, section xi). We see an internal relation between an object and other objects when an aspect is dawn in a flash. Otherwise we remain blind to such an aspect. Ethical subject sees the world differently from one who is blind to this dimension. However, ethical view as presented in the Tractatus is a transcendental view; the world is seen sub specie aeternitatis, as a limited whole whereas the aspect perception discussed in the Investigations is the perception of an internal relation between an object and other objects.

48 Being Human after Wittgenstein contingent they can have only relative value; not ethical value, which is absolute, for Wittgenstein. It is also true that such willed actions depend on the world, on conditions outside the control of our willed actions. ‘That is why we have the feeling of being dependent on an alien will’ (NB 74). Therefore, as Phillips observes, ‘if I am able to find sense in the world, it must come from a will which is not itself a phenomenon – a transcendental ethical will.’1 Moreover, according to this view, ‘Even if all that we wish for were to happen still this would only be a favour granted by fate, so to speak: for there is no logical connection between the will and the world, which would guarantee it. And the supposed physical connection itself is surely not something that we can will’ (TLP 6.374). If, on the other hand, one tries to have control over happenings and lives accordingly, unhappiness is certain since all attempts to control the world are doomed to ultimate failure at death. Insofar as my will seeks its fulfilment in the world, it is at the mercy of such an alien will. One needs a stoic independence from the order of events that is the world and should view the world, according to Wittgenstein, sub specie aeternitatis. For Wittgenstein, ‘Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same’ (TLP 6.421) because both are seen sub specie aeternitatis: ‘The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis; and the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis’ (NB 83). ‘The contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni is its contemplation as a limited whole’ (TLP 6.45). That is to say, the happy person who is also the ethically right person sees the world with a ‘happy eye’ and will find ‘that the world exists’ as an ‘aesthetic miracle’ (NB 86). He has the right attitude to the world as a whole: it is the life that sees the world and its content sub specie 1

Phillips 2000, 162.

The ‘I’: Philosophical Analysis

49

aeternitatis, whatever it might be. Both the ethical and aesthetic subject has a transcendental view of the world and the art object respectively. Wittgenstein is identifying metaphysical, ethical and aesthetic subjects in their attitude to the world. However, the metaphysical subject is the source and bearer of the world whereas the world is independent of the ethical subject and is contemplated by the aesthetic subject. Though all the three view the world sub specie aeternitatis, as a limited whole, they present different transcendental point of views. Wittgenstein is trying to hold categorically different positions. The metaphysical subject is a monist – ‘The world is my world’ (TLP 5.641); the ethical subject is a dualist, ‘The world is independent of my will’ (TLP 6.373) and aesthetic subject sees the world as an object of enjoyment. These are to be seen as three modes of our attitude to the world. A living human being is creative and yet depends on the world; he enjoys both the fruits of his labour and what is given to him in the world. Unfortunately, Wittgenstein ruled that these are empirical matters and have nothing to do with philosophy. These empirical matters are, however, connected logically in our thought and life and are important in our philosophical investigations, as Wittgenstein himself would show in his later philosophy. The world of the ethical/happy person, according to the Tractatus, is the totality of facts as a whole, and that of the unethical/unhappy person is piece-meal. The former is achieved at the boundaries and the latter within the totality of facts. So a happy person is not the one who is caught up in the affairs of the world but one who wills the world as a given totality. There is not much scope for willing either; for ‘the world is independent of my will.’ It is confusing what Wittgenstein means by saying that the good or bad exercise of the will affects only the limits of the world. According to Wittgenstein, the ethical subject is

50 Being Human after Wittgenstein happy whatever happens; he is in ‘total agreement with the world’ (NB 75). The ethically good exercise of the will treats the world as a limited whole – a given totality, whereas the bad exercise of the will takes the world as an ongoing field of action and reaction. Thus, transcendence and happiness are coextensive, for happiness consists in willing the world in such a way that what is willed and what is given are ‘in total agreement.’ Here, the ethical subject, as in the case of metaphysical subject, ‘shrinks to a point without extension and there remains the reality coordinate with it’ (TLP 5.64). Unhappiness results from the failure of the will to ‘shrink to a point’ so that it continues to exist as an item that stands in some potential or actual conflict with the rest of the world.1 The empirical will can be either happy or unhappy depending on the good or bad exercise of the will. Since ethics is transcendental, the exercise of the will, good or bad ‘can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts – not what can be expressed by means of language’. Through the exercise of the will the world becomes altogether different: ‘It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole. The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man’ (TLP 6.43). The difference cannot just be in the facts the totality of which is the world (TLP 1.1). At the empirical level, the world of the happy person is the same as that of the unhappy person. Also at the ethical level, it does not matter what is happening in the world; ‘The world is independent of my will.’ What is different is the attitude of the will itself. And what is confusing is the status of this attitude of the will as this exercise of the will is of a living human being in the world. It is acting in this way rather than that way. It is a fact about a living human being in the world and 1

Hodges 1990, 178.

The ‘I’: Philosophical Analysis

51

in that respect, a fact in the world, which according to Wittgenstein, is matter about which philosophy has nothing to do with. Wittgenstein fails to give a sufficient account of the relation between the phenomenal and ethical will.1 Wittgenstein correctly identifies that ethical, aesthetic and philosophical matters are different from empirical matters; however, he relegates all of these important aspects of human life to the realm of mystical about which there cannot be any discourse, according to Tractatus. As in the case of metaphysical subject, the status of ethical subject and its relation to the world are also confusing. The ethical subject views the world as a given totality, so change within that totality is not the concern of the ethical subject. In this sense the will does not act in the world but ‘is an attitude of the subject to the world’ (NB 87). The ethical will does not change the world in its details, but rather transforms it into an altogether different world. Though this transformation does not alter the facts, it alters the meaning, value, or significance of the facts. That is something that ‘happens’ as a whole. What is changed is not any particular fact in the world but rather the ‘limits’ of the world. What is changed is the meaning of the totality of facts, not the totality itself. ‘Going by the above, then, the willing subject would have to be happy or unhappy, and happiness or unhappiness could not be part of the world’ (NB 79). It cannot be part of the ethical subject either. The ethical subject is eternally happy, whatever happens in the world, given the independence of the will and the world. One wonders what is the point of using ‘happy’ here as there is no variation, no change or anything other than a transcendental state about which there can be no discourse.

1

Winch 1972, 119.

52 Being Human after Wittgenstein Wittgenstein, by his own standards, is at the boundaries of language and thought. Wittgenstein pointedly asks: ‘How can man be happy at all, since he cannot ward off the misery of the world?’ The world is independent of the will and Wittgenstein admits there is misery in the world. To be happy in spite of the misery of the world, one has to be a sage: ... now it seems to me too that besides the work of the artist there is another through which the world may be captured sub specie aeterni. It is – as I believe – the way of thought which as it were flies above the world and leaves it the way it is, contemplating it from above in its flight’ (CV 7). A life of knowledge enables one to transcend the limits of the world and to view it sub specie aeternitatis. ‘The life of knowledge is the life that is happy in spite of the misery of the world. The only life that is happy is the life that can renounce the amenities of the world. To it the amenities of the world are so many graces of fate’ (NB 81). The foolish man tries to take control of the world to satisfy his desires. Wittgenstein seems to admit the truth of the Buddhist principle that desire is the cause of all pain. The wise person achieves happiness by the good exercise of his will. According to Wittgenstein, ‘someone who lives rightly does not experience the problem as sorrow, hence not after all as a problem, but rather as joy, that is so to speak as a bright halo round his life, not a murky background’ (CV 31). He does not try to control the world’s happenings in accord with his will, but masters the world ‘by renouncing any influence on happenings’ (NB 73). For him, life’s amenities are ‘graces of fate.’ By adopting this detached attitude, ‘renouncing any influence on happenings’ and accepting everything as ‘graces of fate’, the sage lives ‘in total agreement with the world.’ ‘And that is what ‘being happy

The ‘I’: Philosophical Analysis

53

means’’ (NB 75). This transcendental knowledge replaces hope and fear. ‘A man who is happy must have no fear; not even in the face of death.’ According to Wittgenstein, ‘Fear in the face of death is the best sign of a false, i.e., a bad life’ (NB 75). One cannot, however, take these as objective marks of the happy, harmonious life. Because, according to him, ‘there cannot be any such mark, that can be described. This mark cannot be a physical one but only a metaphysical one, a transcendental one’ (NB 78). One just lives by the maxim: ‘Live Happily!’ (NB 75). On this reading of Wittgenstein, there is no particular purpose or goal to achieve other than to simply live. The sage lives happily, by rising above the threats and miseries of life, leaving fear and hope behind.1 This sublime frame of mind, with its mystical, aesthetic, and ethical dimensions, enables the human subject to view life and the world from a transcendental perspective. Once again, what is confusing is the fact that it is an individual will that can so renounce the amenities and live in agreement with the world and thereby transcend the world. That achievement is also a fact about a human being in the world, a fact about the world. It is also a fact about the world that there are happy and unhappy people in the world. Often in one’s own life there are happy and unhappy events. Going by Wittgenstein’s standards such a person will end up in misery until and unless he transcends the limits of the world by renouncing ‘the amenities of the world’ and living in total agreement with the world. Besides, all these have nothing

1

Malcolm records his final words: ‘That night (Wittgenstein) fell violently ill. He remained conscious and when informed that he could live for only a few days, he exclaimed: “Good!” Before losing consciousness . . . he said: “Tell them I’ve had a wonderful life!” (Malcolm 1984, 100).

54 Being Human after Wittgenstein to do with philosophy as they are concerned with the living human beings rather than with the metaphysical and ethical subject about which there cannot be any discourse. Wittgenstein’s separation of the empirical and ethical will is confusing. From the Tractatus point of view it cannot be resolved. Because as Winch explains: In the Tractatus my relation to the world is mediated through, and only through, the proposition. The proposition is a picture of a state of affairs and the relation between a proposition and a state of affairs is always of the same sort. I discover whether a proposition is true by comparing it with a state of affairs – by seeing whether things are in reality as the proposition says they are. But the consideration of willing seems to imply that I can be related to reality in quite a different way: that I can formulate a proposition and then not discover whether it is true by comparing it with the facts, but make it true by tinkering with the facts.1 From this point of view, the world is not independent of the will. The human subject can change the facts about the world. Wittgenstein’s solipsistic point of view also could not resolve the problem. If there can be more than one ethical subject, then the world is only the world for a particular subject. At the same time any difference between one will and another is 1

Winch 1972, 123-4. Wittgenstein had an alternative conception in the Notebooks 86-88 in which will is internally and not causally related to action. This is in tune with Wittgenstein’s later view of ‘living human beings’ as a fundamental concept where human will and willed actions are firmly placed in the stream of our lives. Ethical actions are human actions in the hurly-burly of our lives; they are not at the margins of the world transcendentally. This is true about religious practices.

The ‘I’: Philosophical Analysis

55

a difference with regard to the attitude of the wills to the totality of the facts. The problem is where to place the happy and unhappy person, at the limits or among the facts of the world. It is an empirical will that transforms itself to an ethical will. This brings us to a similar dilemma as in the case of the empirical and transcendental subjects. The willing subject, as the condition for possibility of ethics, must, in the final analysis, be both empirical and transcendental. That is, the transcendental will, in some sense, will be an individual empirical will. Once again, we can only speak about the empirical will not about the ethical will. Yet, as Russell observed in his Introduction to the Tractatus, Wittgenstein managed ‘to say a good deal about what cannot be said’ (xxii). That was not, however, enough to throw away the ladder and to see the world aright and to remain in silence, as Wittgenstein himself claimed: My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: any one who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them – as steps – to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after has climbed up it). He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright (TLP 6.54). Wittgenstein continued his struggles with the mysterious ‘I.’ He tried to give an account for the difficulties involved in the ‘I thoughts’ concerning empirical, metaphysical, ethical and aesthetic subject(s). The solipsistic answer was only a confusion, a Luftgebäude (castle-in-the-air). It takes everything into a mystical realm about which there can be no discourse. One is reminded of Wittgenstein’s final phrase in his Preface to the Tractatus: ‘… it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved’ (4). As we have seen, however, the problems regarding human subjectivity are not really solved, by

56 Being Human after Wittgenstein Tractatus; they were just pushed to the margins of thought and language together with aesthetics, ethics and philosophy. He was not successful in his postulation of ‘metaphysical subject’ and ‘ethical subject’ to replace the Cartesian ego. Confusions thrive regarding the philosophical status of ‘I’ and the relation between the empirical subject and the metaphysical/ethical subject. We have ‘something for a philosophical treatment,’ from the point of view of the later Wittgenstein. Our sketch of his early views serves in the next chapter as the background against which his later thoughts on ‘I’ as a living human being is seen.

Chapter 3

The ‘I’: Philosophical Therapy 3.1. The Pernicious I: ‘Something for Philosophical Treatment‘ (PI 254) At the beginning of the Blue Book, Wittgenstein made the following diagnosis for the ‘philosophical bewilderment’ with regard to meaning: ‘a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to it’ (BB 1). Applied to ‘self’, ‘The first mistake,’ in his view, ‘is to take ‘I’ as standing for something’ (WL 47, 47). This is, Wittgenstein argued, pernicious as the meaning of the word ‘I,’ then, is the object for which it stands, the entity that is referred to when we ascribe sensations, perceptions, thoughts, desires and actions to ourselves. Once we yield to this temptation to grasp the essence of the thing that ‘I’ supposedly refers to, we are off, according to Wittgenstein, ‘in pursuit of chimeras’ (PI 94). The results of such pursuits by Wittgenstein are, as we have seen in the previous chapter, metaphysical and ethical subjects about which there can be no discourse, nonsensical and beyond the limits of meaningful language. In his later attempts, he wanted to cure us of the temptation to raise such questions. Because we are adjusted mainly to the model of describing physical objects (Z 40) we tend to assume that the self is an object that can be located, defined and described. Wittgenstein characterised it as ‘the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language’ (PI 109). It is very difficult, however, to cast off the spell on ‘I’ as ‘something,’ because the alternative seems to be that it is ‘nothing’ (PI 304), a conclusion

58 Being Human after Wittgenstein we instinctively want to avoid. The therapies which Wittgenstein advocated, were to make us see that being irresistibly tempted to speak of a self does not mean that we are to assume its existence as some kind of object; ‘self’ does not mean something in the way that ‘body’ refers to a body. I consider here two of Wittgenstein’s therapies: (1) Eliminate ‘I’ altogether from language so that people would not be tempted to raise the baffling question, ‘What is the self?’ (2) Deny the referring function of ‘I,’ at least when we use ‘I’ ‘as-asubject’. Wittgenstein at this stage was treating the question of ‘self’ as a pseudo-problem, generated by a misunderstanding of the role of ‘I.’ He wanted to show that it was a mistake to take ‘I’ to be a referring expression and then confuse ourselves trying to describe what kind of entity is, thus, referred to. As a referring expression, ‘I’ is redundant, he claimed. In the following sections, I shall critically consider his arguments and show that these drastic measures were unwarranted. Even if these were effective in clarifying certain nuances of the uses of ‘I,’ they would not by themselves solve problems regarding human subjectivity. The question would appear in other forms. Besides ‘I,’ there are other personal pronouns and proper names that we use to refer to human subjects. The question would be what do they refer to. We could not simply get rid of all these tools from language or deny their referential functions. The elimination of ‘I’ and the nonreferential thesis could only prevent us from the first-person formulation of the question.1 As Wittgenstein himself observed, ‘One must not in philosophy attempt to short-circuit problems’ (LW 35, 109). Attempts to eliminate ‘I’ and/or deny its referential function are only short-circuiting and not solving or dissolving 1

McGinn 1999, 141.

The ‘I’: Philosophical Therapy

59

the problems concerned with subjectivity. We continue to use ‘I’ and its derivatives in the language. Reportedly Wittgenstein’s last sentence was, “Tell them I’ve had a wonderful life!”1 Here the use of ‘I’ is not redundant; it referred to a living human being, Ludwig Wittgenstein. 3.2. Therapy I: ‘The Word ‘I’ … Can Be Eliminated from Language’ (WVC 49) Following Lichtenberg, Wittgenstein prescribed that the word ‘I’ be eliminated from the language altogether (WVC 49) and thereby avoid confusion in raising the question, ‘What is ‘I’?’2 We shall no longer be baffled about the nature of the entity referred to; and he assured us that there is none. He wrote in the Philosophical Remarks: One of the most misleading representational techniques in our language is the use of the word “I,” particularly when it is used in representing immediate experience, as in “I can see a red patch”. It would be instructive to replace this way of speaking by another in which immediate experience would be represented without using the personal pronoun; for then we’d be able to see that the previous representation wasn’t essential to the facts. Not that the representation would be in any sense more correct than the old one, but it would serve to show clearly what was logically essential in the representation (PR 88). The therapy that is prescribed here is only a technique to make evident ‘what was logically essential in the representation,’ and 1 2

Malcolm 1984, 100. According to G. H. von Wright, Wittgenstein esteemed Lichtenberg highly and ‘some of Lichtenberg’s thoughts on philosophical questions show a striking resemblance to Wittgenstein’s’ (von Wright 1982, 19).

60 Being Human after Wittgenstein to show that replacing ‘I’ will serve that purpose. He was trying to give what is essential as in the Tractatus. He instructed accordingly in his Lectures: ‘Instead of saying “I think” or “I have an ache” one might say “It thinks” (like “It rains”), and in the place of “I have an ache,” “There is an ache here”‘(WL 35, 21). The use of ‘it’ and ‘here’ are only grammatical dummies; there is neither a reference nor a subject. Similarly, there is no subject to which the thinking is being ascribed in ‘I think,’ ‘I have an ache’ or in other first-person present tense formulations. The use of ‘I’ is not logically essential in the representation, he claimed. The reason for this ‘replacing’ is not, according to this view, that ‘thinking’ is a feature-placing predicate like ‘raining,’ but that it is logically impossible for anybody else to have what I have when I have a pain, since no one else could have a pain which I could experience. ‘There is thinking,’ he claimed, conveys the sense of ‘I think’ without the confusion of looking for the entity that stands for ‘I.’ Though it would save the trouble of looking for the reference of ‘I,’ it is a mistake to claim that ‘There is thinking’ conveys the sense of ‘I think.’ Wittgenstein’s argument seems to be, according to Glock, ‘I think’ is analytic; it is nonsense to say that I as opposed to someone else thinks. In first-person present tense psychological utterances, therefore, ‘I’ is redundant.1 As it is not essential to the representation of the fact, Wittgenstein prescribes that it is better to eliminate ‘I’ lest should we be led astray by the substantive appearance of the term and not realise that it is only a grammatical dummy. This prescription, however, is unwarranted. It may be admitted that it is nonsense to say that I as opposed to someone else thinks or sees red in ‘I think’ or ‘I see red,’ but the use of ‘I’ is necessary to express the subjective point of view in representing immediate 1

Glock 1996, 160-1.

The ‘I’: Philosophical Therapy

61

experience; it is not redundant. It cannot be eliminated from language without seriously affecting our ability to express our subjective experiences. Thinking does not just happen independent of being thought by some one. It is always an activity of living human beings. The mistake here is rather the view that all words are names that refer to some material object that can be located and described. What we need to be reminded is that all words are not names, words are used for different purposes not just for referring; words refer differently and ‘I’ does not refer to something in the way that ‘body’ refers to body. On a superficial level, it would seem a far cry from the Wittgenstein who earlier struggled with the truth of solipsism: “But I am in a favoured position. I am the centre of the world” (PO 257), to prescribe elimination of ‘I’ altogether from language. One would have expected of him to advise the use of ‘I’ with every meaningful sentence. Wittgenstein, however, is only making it explicit that for the solipsist, the first-person formulation is not necessary ‘to show clearly what was logically essential in the representation’ (PR 88): ‘there is pain’ serves well in the place of ‘I am in pain’. If I am not a solipsist, ‘there is pain’ and ‘I am in pain’ say the same thing only in cases where the pain is mine. As Campbell argued, ‘if a particular use of ‘There is thinking’ expresses a truth, then so too would a use by that speaker of ‘I am thinking’, and conversely.’1 The solipsist could say, ‘There is thinking’, where a non-solipsist would say ‘I am thinking’. In fact, ‘I am thinking’ is the basic form and ‘There is thinking’ depends on the former for meaning as the latter makes full sense only when we grasp it as elliptical for the former (as a special case for a solipsist or a dictator). In all other cases, the formulation ‘There is thinking’ is of no use as it is only a poor 1

Campbell 1995, 171.

62 Being Human after Wittgenstein approximation toward ‘I am thinking.’ It fails to express human subjectivity. We cannot make sense of experiences without an experiencing subject. In our ordinary (non-solipsistic) language, from thoughts T1, ‘I think P’ and T2, ‘I think Q,’ thought T3, ‘I think P and Q’ follows. There is no need for a further premise asserting the identity of the subject referred to by those two uses of ‘I.’ If, however, one subject thinks T1 and another thinks, T2, neither is entitled to conclude T3. Similarly, if we consider, two Lichtenbergian thoughts, T1*, ‘There is thought: P’ and T2*, ‘There is thought: Q’, it does not follow T3*, ‘There is thought: P and Q’. A distinct thought-content is involved in T3*, and there is nothing in the two thought-events T1* and T2* to determine that that thought T3* ever occurred at all.1 For Lichtenberg, I is not the producer but merely the observer of its own thoughts. To know whether we can trade on identity in inferences involving these two thoughts, we need to know whether the same subject is being referred to and this in turn, depends on knowing whether the same person is thinking both thoughts. Only then will the subject be able to talk about the way her thinking on a certain topic has changed over time. In the non-solipsistic language the subject does not need this additional statement to say something about how she has come to think about a topic over a course of time. Moreover, as Madell observed, If I consider my experiences at the present time – the various visual, tactile, auditory and kinaesthetic sensations that I have, together with my thinking about what I am writing – one thing which is absolutely clear is that these various experiences do not come to one as a sort of pointilliste scatter of ‘“I” thoughts’: they are all 1

Williams 1978, 96.

The ‘I’: Philosophical Therapy

63

experiences of the same subject (all mine) is something which is given in experience.1 A Lichtenbergian must begin with a solipsistic base, to form an understanding of oneself as the author of the whole network of these thoughts. As we have shown in the previous section solipsism is a confusion and something that is claimed from a solipsistic basis would generate further muddle. A further important distinction between thoughts T1 and T1* is that the former is an expression of an experience and the latter a report of an object. Objects are displayed in spatiotemporal dimension whereas experiences have a third dimension, namely subjectivity. ‘Any experience, that is, takes place at a certain time and a certain place, just as any object exists in time and space, but in addition the experience has a dimension which no object could have: it is either mine or not mine.’2 It does not make sense to say: “I think there’s a pain somewhere in the room, but I couldn’t positively say that I have got it.” Experiences like pain and thinking do not exist in principle unowned and they can be talked about meaningfully only at personal levels, not at impersonal levels. Impersonal levels as in ‘There is pain/thinking’ are neither more basic nor perspicuous than the personal levels in this regard. Wittgenstein is wrong to assert that ‘I distinguish an intensity, a location, etc., in the pain, but not an owner’ (PR 94). Firstly, it is only with respect to an owner that one can distinguish intensity, location, etc. We cannot simply make sense of pain without a subject of pain or the possibility of thinking without a subject who is thinking. Thinking without a subject and pain without a sufferer is a logical anomaly. Secondly, we do

1 2

Madell 1981, 33. Madell 1981, 87.

64 Being Human after Wittgenstein distinguish between my pain/thinking and other people’s pain/thinking. Experiences are distinguished from other things and also from other experiences ‘by reference to the distinctness of the person to, or in, whom they occur.’1 To clarify the nature of subject, we need to focus on expressions that involve subjects; rather than statements that involve only objects. The world as I found it, if it includes only Lichtenbergian pronouncements would be incomplete because there is no mention of the subject, I (TLP 5.631), who ‘found’ the world and described it. It is impossible to make sense of ‘I’ if it occurs only on the title page. Lichtenbergian thoughts are incapable of distinguishing and reporting both my own states and the states of other people. Wittgenstein’s remark, ‘What has history to do with me? Mine is the first and only world!’ (NB 82), shows the character of a philosophical obsession rather than truths about the subject of his enquiry, namely, human subject and our relation to the world. A human subject has to see himself or herself as one among the many all of whom can have first-person thoughts rather than one without a second. As Campbell argued, If I can use the subjectless construction to report what are in fact the states of different people, I need to be able to relativize it in some way or other. Moreover, I have to relativize in such a way that suitable pairs of psychological ascriptions are relativized to the same thing.2 The Lichtenbergian formulations must be relativized and structured so that they can be part of meaningful discourse. In fact, what makes one’s judgements of ‘thinking P’ into the firstperson judgement T1, ‘I think P,’ rather than unstructured Lichtenbergian reports of T1*, ‘It is thought: P,’ is understanding

1 2

Evans 1982, 253. Campbell 1995, 162.

The ‘I’: Philosophical Therapy

65

the possibility of other people thinking P, so that one also understands ‘X thinks P,’ ‘Y thinks P,’ and so on. Lichtenbergian thoughts relate to a level of thought at which the possibility of assigning mental states to other people, has simply not come into play. To make sense of our discourse and life in the world, we simply have to admit the possibility of ascribing thoughts and experiences to a plurality of subjects as well as our need to distinguish my thoughts and experiences from other subjects.1 Thus, Wittgenstein’s efforts to get rid of ‘I’ eliminate the subjective character of all human beings. This is, however, not a viable option even if it would liberate us from the spell of a Cartesian ego. 3.3. Therapy II: ‘The Word ‘I’ Does Not Designate a Person’ (PO 228) A second prescription Wittgenstein gave to dissolve the problem of ‘I-thoughts’ was to deny the referring function of ‘I.’ He wrote: ‘The word ‘I’ does not designate a person’ (MS 116, 215; 149, 4; 228, 44). He wanted to show that ‘I’ is neither a name nor an expression whose logical role is to make a reference. Referring to its use he remarked: ‘We don’t use it because we recognize a particular person by his bodily characteristic and this creates the illusion that we use this word to refer to something bodiless, which, however, has its seat in our body’ (BB 69). By denying the referring function Wittgenstein wanted to resist the idea that the self or subject is an entity bodily or ethereal. He felt that once we admit referring function to a word, we could not help pursuing its reference – an entity however elusive and mysterious. In this view, as Hacker made it explicit, the very search for ‘I’ is 1

What we need here is to recognize the possibility of rather than actual plurality of subjects having ‘I’ thoughts. The relation between the individual and community will be further discussed in the second part, in chapters five and six.

66 Being Human after Wittgenstein unintelligible – ‘like ‘looking for the East Pole,’ not like looking for the source of the Nile or even for Eldorado. It is not that one cannot find it, but that nothing would count as finding it.’ 1 Wittgenstein, therefore, thought that the no-subject thesis is devoid of confusion and is superior to the thesis with a bogus non-bodily ethereal subject.2 It is prescribed as an antidote to the postulation of philosophical chimeras. Denying the referential function to ‘I,’ however, goes against our basic intuition regarding the use of ‘I.’ We want to say that ‘the essence of ‘I’ is self-reference. . . . ‘I’-thoughts are thoughts in which a subject of thought and action is thinking about himself – i.e., about a subject of thought and action.’3 In sentences in which ‘I’ occurs as grammatical subject, the author uses ‘I’ to refer to, to stand for, to designate, one particular individual being, namely himself. In self-conscious thought, the subject thinks of an object that is at the same time the subject of that very thought. Such a self-reference is characteristic of selfconscious thoughts. We would say ‘the very function of the firstperson pronoun in any language that has it is to enable a speaker to make a unique reference, to select out one and only one thing, from all the beings, things, or objects that there are in the world. Descartes certainly believed that ‘je,’ ‘moi,’ ‘ego,’ were used by him to refer to a certain thing . . . that has nature and properties.’4 It is part of the grammar of our language that a subject can refer to himself by making use of the grammatical tool, ‘I.’ Before proceeding to look into Wittgenstein’s arguments for the denial of referential function to ‘I,’ let me bring into

Hacker 1993, 222. Chandra 1990, 86. 3Evans 1982, 252. 4Malcolm 1995, 16. 1 2

The ‘I’: Philosophical Therapy

67

account his distinction between I-as-subject and I as-object (BB 66). Wittgenstein has brought in this distinction to clarify the apparent referential function of ‘I.’ In his view, ‘the idea that the real I lives in my body is connected with the peculiar grammar of the word “I,” and the misunderstandings this grammar is liable to give rise to’ (BB 66). ‘The word ‘I,’ or ‘any other word which denotes a subject,’ is used in ‘two utterly different ways,’ he argued, as subject and as object. It was a ‘difference of grammatical levels.’ At object level, the word ‘I’ is replaceable by ‘this body’ whereas at the subject level this substitution cannot be done (PO 101). Examples of the object use may concern physical features such as ‘I have black hair’ and of the subject use are ‘I have pain,’ ‘I am thinking,’ etc. The former can be reduced to bodily level and can be used to describe the facts of the world whereas the latter cannot be reduced to bodily, mental or any objective level. The subjective uses of ‘I’ cannot function as referring expressions, he argued. He also rephrased the point by saying that in the object uses, ‘I’ is on the ‘same grammatical level’ with ‘he’ or ‘on a level with other people’ and at the subject level ‘I’ is ‘without neighbours’: You can’t deny that there is my personal experience and that this in a most important sense has no neighbour. – But you don’t mean that it happens to be alone but that its grammatical position is that of having no neighbour (PO 229). By uncovering this ‘neighbourless level’ in the grammar of the word ‘I,’ Wittgenstein wanted to deny the referential function of ‘I,’ when it is used as a subject. At this level, one can eliminate ‘I’ because ‘There is pain’ just means ‘I am in pain.’ Having made the distinction between object-use and subject-use, we shall proceed to clarify their importance for

68 Being Human after Wittgenstein Wittgenstein with regard to the referential function. In his view, we can refer to an object but not to a subject. Bodily expressions refer to an object whereas the non-bodily expressions do not. ‘If, in saying ‘I,’ I point to my own body, I model the use of the word ‘I’ on that of the demonstrative ‘this person’ or ‘he’’ (BB 68). In subject-uses pointing is superfluous, he argued. The cases of the first category involves the recognition of a particular person, and there is in these cases the possibility of an error, or as I should rather put it: the possibility of an error has been provided for (BB 67). By implication, subject-uses do not involve recognition of a particular person, and there is no possibility of error. Possibility for reference failure characterizes the object uses of ‘I.’ The conclusion, therefore, is that object uses of ‘I’ refer and subject uses of ‘I’ do not refer at all, and, hence, not to a person. Wittgenstein tried to clarify his point: When I say “I am in pain”, I do not point to a person who is in pain, since in a certain sense I have no idea who is. . . Now in saying this I don’t name any person. Just as I don’t name anyone when I groan with pain. Though someone else sees who is in pain from the groaning (PI 404). It is not used to avoid misidentification; it is rather to draw attention to myself, like raising my hand or groaning. ‘To say, ‘I have pain’ is no more a statement about a particular person than moaning is’ (BB 67). We cannot, however, assimilate the entire sphere of self-knowledge to this paradigm. Statements like ‘I am writing an essay’ and ‘I increasingly realise the difficulty of the topic’ do not function merely like groaning and moaning (though a lot of groaning and moaning may be involved). They are structured and can function as premises of inferences and figure in truth-functional operations. It is wrong trying to identify such utterances with natural expressions that are

The ‘I’: Philosophical Therapy

69

grammatically inarticulate and logically useless. Although, for the subject himself, ‘I’ does not identify someone, Wittgenstein admits that its use may enable others to identify someone. It has a value in our daily lives. As Phillips rightly observes, My sensations are accompanied by natural expressions, which are themselves responded to in characteristic ways by others. In the traffic of human discourse, I move between being someone who experiences pain, receives the responses of others, observes the expression of pain in others, and responds to them in characteristic ways.1 Through the use of ‘I’-thoughts, it is possible for others to identify the referent, the person who produced the ‘I’-thought. ‘That is, the audience identifies the referent, in the first instance, by description, as the utterer of certain sounds (or producer of a certain inscription).’2 As far as the subject himself is concerned, there are no failures of understanding, misunderstanding or misidentification. The referring function, according to Wittgenstein, is applicable to expression E1, ‘I have black hair’ but not to E2, ‘I have pain.’ The use of ‘I’ in E1 refers to my body and thereby to myself. It is an assertion and anyone, including myself, who wants to know whether this is mine can find out whether my hair is black. Finding out whether this is my pain, with regard to E2, however, is altogether different; there is no finding out for me and nothing would qualify as a method of finding out. Others could find out whether I have pain or not from my behaviour, including my words. This is an awkward conclusion; namely, others can know about my experience, which I cannot know. This is not how we use language. I have pain; I feel it and I know

1 2

Phillips 2000, 161. Evans 1982, 252.

70 Being Human after Wittgenstein it when I say ‘I have pain.’ This is how we use language to express subjective experiences. Grammar does not allow the request: ‘Check whether this is my pain.’ When I say ‘I have pain,’ I cannot be wrong about whom I have in mind, nor can I fail to be such a person. Thus, if ‘I’ were a referring expression, it would be guaranteed to refer correctly on each occasion of its use; ‘possibility for error is not provided for.’ This was a reason for Wittgenstein to conclude that the word ‘I’ is not a referring expression when used as a subject. The argument, however, seems to be muddled. The distinction involved here is between the natures of the objects involved – hair and pain – rather than the subject and object uses of ‘I’ in E1 and E2. Hair is a sort of object that can be named, described and verified for its various properties whereas pain is a very different category of object, if one can name it as an object at all. The observation that there are criteria for misidentification in object cases and there are no such criteria for subject cases is also not sustainable. Bakhurst rightly observes that ‘Even when ‘I’ is used ‘as object’ there is no chance of my misidentifying myself in the sense of taking myself for someone else.’1 In the case where I have black hair and I mistakenly judge that I have red hair, I do so because I mistake the colour of my hair, not because I mistake myself for someone with red hair. Nor am I confused about whom I made the judgement. Perhaps one needs to remind himself and others that we are speaking about normal living human beings, not about metaphysical subjects. Therefore, we need to abandon the importance of Wittgenstein’s distinction of subject and object uses of ‘I.’ The question remains whether ‘I’ refers or not. Anscombe, Malcolm, Kenny, Hacker and others argue that 1

Bakhurst 2001, 232.

The ‘I’: Philosophical Therapy

71

‘Nowhere does ‘I’ have the role of designating or meaning a distinctly conceived object or subject.’1 According to Kenny, ‘If ‘I’ were a referring expression at all, it would seem to be one whose reference is guaranteed in the sense that the object an ‘I’ – user means by it must exist so long as he is using ‘I,’ and in the sense that he cannot take the wrong object to be the object he means by ‘I’.’2 According to Anscombe, ‘Getting hold of the wrong object is excluded, and that makes us think that getting hold of the right object is guaranteed. But the reason is that there is no getting hold of an object at all.’3 Another temptation, according to this line of thought, is to take the first-person pronoun as a kind of super-referring expression guaranteed against reference-failure or misidentification, something like a magic arrow that always hits the target. Whenever the word ‘I’ is used, the referent I is present. Only a subject can use ‘I’. Hacker prefers to characterise it more like drawing a bull’s-eye around an arrow already stuck in the wall and to claim that it was a perfect shot.4 It is part of the grammar of the expressions with ‘I.’ ‘I’ does not refer, they argue, because in those cases what looks like immunity from misidentification or reference-failure is, in fact, the absence of any reference at all. Those who hold this view are afraid that if we grant referring status to ‘I,’ we shall be forced to conclude that it refers to something like a Cartesian ego: ‘if ‘I’ is a referring expression, then Descartes was right about what the referent was.’5 They are convinced that such a thinking substance is a philosophical

Malcolm 1995, 26. Kenny 1984, 79. 3Anscombe 1975, 59. 4Hacker 1993, 223. 5Anscombe 1975, 58. 1 2

72 Being Human after Wittgenstein chimera. So they conclude that ‘I’ does not refer at all. Anscombe wrote: ‘… if ‘I’ is a name it cannot be an empty name. I’s existence is existence in the thinking of the thought expressed by ‘I . . .’. This of course is the point of the cogito.’1 For Descartes, in thinking, the existence of I is guaranteed beyond doubt; it is the first piece of indubitable knowledge. In an attempt to exorcize the Cartesian ego from philosophy, which Wittgenstein and those follow him in this direction consider as a philosophical chimera and a root cause of many philosophical confusions, they want either to eliminate ‘I’ from language or at least deny its referring function. It is as if they are obsessed with a Cartesian phobia. Wittgenstein once characterized his thinking on self as ‘just the opposite of Descartes’ emphasis on I’ (WL 35, 63). In this, he is guilty, by his own standards, of forcing his thoughts in a ‘single direction against their natural inclination’ (PI Preface, vii). Learning from Wittgenstein, what we really need to do is ‘to call to mind the differences between the language-games’ (PI 290) and note the differences and similarities of the various uses of ‘I.’ Though ‘I’ is not a name, it does not follow that it does not refer to a person. The immunity to referential failure and misidentification does not rule out the referential use of ‘I’ altogether. According to Evans, Immunity to error through misidentification is a straightforward consequence of demonstrative identification; it will exist whenever a subject’s Idea of an object depends upon his ways of gaining knowledge about it. And demonstrative identification is, precisely, a way in which a thought can concern (be about) an object.2

1 2

Anscombe 1975, 55. Evans 1982, 218.

The ‘I’: Philosophical Therapy

73

He accuses Wittgenstein of his failure to take ‘sufficient account of the fact that the property of being immune to error through misidentification is not one which applies to propositions simpliciter, but one which applies only to judgements made upon this or that basis.’1 We cannot make mistakes with regard to our perception of our bodies like our sense of balance, feeling of heat and cold, and also our position and orientation to other objects in the world. They are experiential propositions and are immune to reference failure; but that does not mean that they do not refer nor can we eliminate all of them from language. Wittgenstein is treating them as metaphysical propositions bringing, once again, all the confusions that he brought when, in the Tractatus, he introduced the metaphysical subject without any connection with the empirical subject. We need to clarify their grammar rather than eliminate words from language. Ryle spoke of a class of words called ‘index words’ that ‘indicate to the hearer or reader the particular thing, episode, person or moment referred to.’2 They are linguistic devices for referring without ascribing any properties. Examples are ‘this,’ ‘that,’ ‘here,’ ‘now,’ ‘I,’ ‘you,’ etc. These index words are used to pick one thing out from others and the object so selected is shown by a pointing gesture, or by a previously given name or description, or by the context of previous or subsequent remarks. They are not governed by criteria of identification. ‘This’ and ‘that’ are whatever the subject chooses to indicate; ‘here’ indicates the place where it was produced; ‘now’ indicates the time when it was produced and ‘I’ thoughts indicate whoever produced them. Though the use of index words does not require general criteria of identification, it requires that the author

1 2

Evans 1982, 219. Ryle 1963, 179.

74 Being Human after Wittgenstein intends to single out some particular object(s) from a kind of object. This could be done only if the author has some grasp of what distinguishes the object(s) in question. For example, though I need not know where I am, and when it is, to assert correctly, ‘I am here now,’ uses of ‘here’ and ‘now’ still require that I should define their range and refer to a place and a time. I can, of course, use ‘now’ to indicate the present moment or any other specific period of time, and ‘here’ to a point or any specific area. Though it is possible to use ‘here’ without knowing where I am, ‘now’ without having a clue to when it is or ‘I’ in amnesia, it does not follow that these words can be used without knowledge of a referent. ‘I must be aware of something as the object I pick out.’1 We should also make sure that different cases of ‘here’ are produced at the same place, ‘now’ at the same time, ‘I’ by the same person, if we want to trade on identity or infer with these propositions. Even among the index words ‘I’ is a class by itself. First of all, other index words depend on ‘I’: ‘this’ is what is in front of me, ‘here’ is where I am, ‘now’ is the moment at which I am speaking.2 The first-person pronoun has a use to indicate the person who is using it. Moreover, ‘in the all subject’s thinking there is no possibility of him using ‘I’ on different occasions to refer to different things,’3 whereas with regard to other index words the referents vary according to the context. ‘What makes Wittgenstein suspicious about ‘I’ is that neither speakers’ intentions, nor contextual considerations, are ever relevant to its successful use.’4 They invariably refer to the person who

Madell 1981, 28. Madell 1981, 39. 3Campbell 1995, 107. 4Bakhurst 2001, 233. 1 2

The ‘I’: Philosophical Therapy

75

produced them. First-person present-tense assertions are directly bound up with experiences so that logically there cannot be any condition, the satisfaction of which is required for the experience to be of the subject. Wittgenstein makes this point through his interlocutor: ‘“But surely the word ‘I’ in the mouth of a man refers to the man who says it; it points to himself; and very often a man who says it actually points to himself with his finger.” His response is simply, ‘But it was quite superfluous to point to himself. He might just as well only have raised his hand’ (BB 67). The ‘I’, therefore, according to Wittgenstein, does not mean ‘such-and-such a person;’ it does not refer to ‘a particular person’ (PI 405). This conclusion, however, is not justified. Think of a situation: I am in a hospital bed and the nurse asks me: ‘Do you have pain?;’ I reply, ‘Yes; I have pain;’ and the nurse writes in her report: ‘J. N. has pain.’ I understand her statement as a true representation of my expression. Anyone who reads the chart understands the situation. Her expression refers to my pain as I told her and as she understood it. The truth of these statements depends on the fact that ‘you,’ ‘I,’ and ‘J. N.,’ in this context, have the same object as reference. ‘I’ indicates the producer of ‘I;’ ‘you’ indicates the person addressed and ‘J. N.,’ in this case, is the being indicated by ‘I’ and ‘you.’ ‘I’ and ‘you’ are not extra names for J. N. nor are they alias for J. N. ‘I’ indicates the subject whom ‘J. N.’ refers to, when J. N. uses ‘I’ and ‘you’ indicates the subject whom ‘J. N.’ names, when J. N. is addressed.1 Moreover, ‘‘I,’ in my use of it, always indicates me and only indicates me. Other pronouns indicate different people at different times.’2 Because there are differences in how ‘I’ refers

1 2

Ryle 1963, 180. Ryle 1963, 189.

76 Being Human after Wittgenstein to a person from how other pronouns refer to persons, one cannot conclude that ‘I’ does not refer at all. There is a logical symmetry when I say ‘I am in pain’, and someone else says, referring to me, ‘He is in pain’. This allows them to stand in logical relations and to make possible the coordination of first-, second- and third-person perspectives. Dictionaries, after all, do not give three sets of meaning for expressions that describe states of consciousness: a first-, a second- and a third-person meaning. The words are applied in all the three ways and the meanings are given from the whole range of uses. There are also important asymmetries between these statements. ‘I have pain’ is different from ‘J. N. has pain.’ ‘I have pain’ is not ascribed on the basis of behavioural criteria, while ‘J. N. has pain’ is ascribed to me on the strength of my behaviour, including what I said. When the nurse ascribes ‘pain’ to me, she ascribes it to the same entity that I have ascribed, when she enquired about my situation. She has reasons to ascribe the predicate to me whereas those reasons are not the reasons for myself. That does not mean to say that I have no reason to complain that ‘I have pain;’ ‘reasons’ are differently used because my having pain is a state of my being. According to Strawson, we need to ‘acknowledge that there is a kind of predicate which is unambiguously and adequately ascribable both on the basis of observation of the subject of the predicate and not on this basis i.e., independently of observation of the subject: the second case is the case where the ascriber is also the subject.’1 This distinction speaks both of the predicate and of the subject. However, as Jones points out the concept of self-ascription is also confusing and it does not resolve the problem. I am not typically ascribing certain 1

Strawson 1959, 108.

The ‘I’: Philosophical Therapy

77

properties to myself without criteria for identification, which others ascribe to me only with appropriate criteria for identification. ‘The point is that there can be no ascribing to an identified subject where there is no question of mis-ascribing – of mis-identifying the owner to whom the experience is ascribed.’1 ‘I have pain’ is not a self-ascription rather as Phillips clarifies, ‘Instead of the philosophical problem of assigning ‘pain’ as a state of affairs to ourselves and to others, or the problem of correlating mere signs of pain to what pain is, … our concept of pain has its sense in connection with actions, where pains have natural expressions, and others respond to them in characteristic ways.’2 We cannot have an epistemological gap between a human subject, his experiences and the natural expressions of those experiences, though he learns to express his experiences in various ways, including using experiential propositions that are free from reference failure. Wittgenstein himself observed later that The word “I” does not mean the same as “L.W.” even if I am L.W., nor does it mean the same as the expression ‘the person who is now speaking.’ But that doesn’t mean that “L.W.” and “I” mean different things. All it means is that these words are different instruments in our language (BB 67). What he could have done was a detailed description of the various uses of ‘I’ and related terms that characterise human subjectivity instead of denying the referential function and elimination of the word ‘I.’ Policing of words is not included in the job description of a philosopher. It is also foolish to think that removal of a word or denial of a certain use of the word would

1 2

Jones 1967, 16. Phillips 2000, 164. The nature of ‘pain’ and other psychological properties will be clarified in the fifth chapter.

78 Being Human after Wittgenstein make philosophy more neat and tidy. Wittgenstein came to such a sensible view when he remarked, “One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that. But the difficulty is to remove the prejudice which stands in the way of doing this. It is not a stupid prejudice” (PI 340). Wittgenstein himself was not free from these prejudices. He was obsessed with a Cartesian phobia. In order to resist the temptations of the Cartesian ego, he tried in vain to deny the referential function of ‘I’ and thereby to make it redundant or to eliminate ‘I’ altogether from language. Elimination of ‘I’ or denial of the reference function of ‘I’ do not solve the problems. Even if we deny the referential use of ‘I’ and eliminate ‘I’ from language, we would need word(s) to describe the subjective point of view. Then we would be raising questions about the character of that word. The question ‘What does ‘I’ refer to?’ would persist and appear in other forms.1 It is our wrong perception of the use of our expressions, our asking misconceived questions and trying to answer them that give rise to absurd theories of ‘self.’ One has to see that the self is neither a bodiless ego nor a merely bodily thing, but a living human being. The concept of a living human being spans ‘the gap between the mental and the physical’ showing our use of ‘I’ ‘is no more intimately connected with one aspect of our self-conception than the other.’2 Wittgenstein in his obsession with the Cartesian ego and insistence on complete clarity through analysis left out important aspects of the human subject, especially the subject’s relation to bodily and psychological predicates. ‘An experiencing and acting subject is a living thing, with active and passive bodily powers that are genuinely her

1 2

McGinn 1999, 141-2. Evans 1982, 256.

The ‘I’: Philosophical Therapy

79

own; she is herself embodied, substantially present in the world that she experiences and acts on.’1 I also need to realise that I cannot logically apply predicates to myself if I am not ready to apply them to other subjects in appropriate contexts. These aspects of ‘I’-thoughts are my concern in the next chapter.

1

McDowell 1994, 111.

Chapter 4

The ‘I’: A Living Human Being 4.1. ‘“Carry out a Grammatical Investigation”‘ (PI 150) Wittgenstein often labelled his later philosophical investigations as grammatical investigations (PR 52, PG 71, PI 90, 150). He was providing a new method in philosophy. ‘There is not a (eine) philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies’ (PI 133), he agreed. When he said, however, that ‘In philosophy, all that isn’t gas is grammar’ (WL 32, 112), he was not recommending philosophers to do the grammarian’s work; his interest was in the forms of expressions that gave rise to philosophical puzzles. He was engaged in philosophical investigations and the linguistic analysis was in view of conceptual clarification by providing a synoptic view of the use of our words and concepts. Grammarians are concerned mainly with syntax whereas philosophers are concerned with meaning. The meaning of a word is given not by introspection or by a metaphysical flight to a transcendental realm but by careful descriptions of the various uses of the word that gives a synoptic view of the word. A philosopher who is carried away by certain forms and uses of language must be brought to see that it is foolish to insist that ‘the facts must conform’ to the forms suggested by his language and resist from postulating metaphysical entities. In his later philosophy Wittgenstein insisted that philosophy must be answerable to our lives, to the

82 Being Human after Wittgenstein actual use of words and concepts in our human discourse. He wanted to clarify ‘the philosophical problems the investigation of words are intended to solve, the life in which those words are embedded and which give them their sense and their point, and the difference it makes in our lives to achieve a solution of those problems.’1 What we need are philosophical investigations to give us a synoptic view of the uses of the words throwing light on the life in which the use of the words is embedded. Our words are answerable to life. We use them in the hurly-burly of our ordinary life, in our conversations and collaborations with fellow human beings. This claim is the basis of my methodology of a philosophical anthropology, after Wittgenstein. If this is right, then we need to investigate and describe our ways of living and forms of life to clarify the concept of a human being. Even in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein admitted: ‘In fact, all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order’ (TLP 5.5563). Later he added: ‘Only in the stream of thought and life do words have meaning’ (Z 173). Our real need in life is the norm of our philosophical investigations. Providing an Übersicht of our words is a painstaking process because once we get into such a muddle it is very difficult to get out of it. There is no point in merely stating the grammatical rules or repeating how we ordinarily use language. Dissolving the puzzles, one must be enabled to see their actual uses. This is not an easy task. ‘Language,’ Wittgenstein wrote, ‘is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about’ (PI 203). To get out of a labyrinth is a difficult task. The object of philosophy is to provide us with an Übersicht 1

Tilgman 1991, 16.

The ‘I’: A Living Human Being

83

of our use of words so that we know our way about (PI 123). The same philosophical method is also expressed in another metaphor: ‘What is your aim in philosophy? – To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle’ (PI 309). It is difficult for a fly to retrace the trap door. He also compared the situation to a jigsaw puzzle. The challenge is to arrange the pieces. When we get into a tangle in arranging them, we might think that we have wrong pieces or not enough of them; but the pieces are there. ‘All we should do is to look at them carefully and arrange them’ (BB 46). It could be a laborious work but there is no use in applying force. In all the three examples – labyrinth, fly-bottle and jigsaw puzzle – Wittgenstein is drawing our attention to certain pitfalls and confusions in typical philosophical investigations. We are driven to certain ways of thinking which are far from the actual use of words. ‘The thing to do in such cases is,’ according to Wittgenstein, ‘always to look how the words in question are actually used in our language’ (BB 56). Our aim is to have a synoptic view of the actual use of the words and the concepts involved and not to presuppose their uses or force them in a presumed direction. The method is to bring out clearly the actual use into view. This is the key to the philosophical investigations and conceptual clarifications, a description of actual use that is sufficiently illuminating to dissolve certain traditional philosophical problems. The description is not a complete theoretical articulation or a sustained deductive argument. It is a method of assembling reminders of actual use, criss-crossing the terrain and presenting them synoptically so that we get a picture of the concept of human being. Often the form of words may confuse us from seeing the actual use of the words. Though they all look similar, their uses are varied and complex. There may be certain uses that strongly recommend themselves to us. According to Wittgenstein,

84 Being Human after Wittgenstein … it confuses everything to say “the one is a different kind of object from the other”; for those who say that a sense datum is a different kind of object from a physical object misunderstand the grammar of the word “kind”, just as those who say that a number is a different kind of object from a numeral. They think they are making such a statement as “A railway train, a railway station, and a railway car are different kinds of objects”, whereas their statement is analogous to “A railway train, a railway accident, and a railway law are different kinds of objects” (BB 64). All the five terms – railway train, railway station, railway car, railway accident and railway law – are connected with railways. There are, however, similarities and differences in their applications. A railway train, railway station, and railway car are different physical objects and can be talked about in the language that is used to describe physical objects. A railway accident and railway law though concerned with railways, giving, therefore, an impression that we are speaking of similar things, are categorically different. A philosopher is to ‘fight against the fascination which forms of expression exert upon us’ (BB 27) and not be deceived by them. Wittgenstein’s object in his later philosophical investigations is to enable the reader to look for these differences in our use of words and concepts in the areas of traditional philosophical problems. Once, he thought of giving ‘I will teach you differences’ from King Lear (Act 1 scene 1) as the motto of Philosophical Investigations. We need to see both the similarities and differences to have a synoptic view of our use of words and a better understanding of the concepts involved. A grammatical investigation, after Wittgenstein, is undertaken in this section to bring to light the use of words that refer to human subjectivity to clarify the puzzles with regard to the human subject and to give a synoptic view of human being.

The ‘I’: A Living Human Being

85

According to Wittgenstein, ‘the idea that the real I lives in my body is connected with the peculiar grammar of the word “I,” and the misunderstanding this grammar is liable to give rise to’ (BB 66). ‘How the words ‘I,’ ‘self,’ ‘body,’ ‘mind,’ ‘soul,’ etc. are used?’ is the question that we should raise if we want to clarify the nature of these concepts as well as the nature of human subject. Questions like ‘What is I, body, soul, etc.?’ are confusing and misleading; they are the result of wrong pictures (such as all words are names referring to objects similar to physical objects) that held us captives. The division of a human being into body and soul results from our failure to understand the actual use of these words. First of all, ‘soul,’ ‘spirit,’ ‘mind,’ ‘reason,’ ‘will,’ etc. are not used to refer to something in the way ‘body’ refers to a body. Secondly, we need to look and see the actual uses of these words in relation to human being. For example, though we say, ‘I have a body,’ it is different from ‘I have a pen’ or even ‘I have a hand.’ Like other objects I occupy a space, but I am not my body. Though we can say ‘I am a body’ the expression ‘my body’ shows certain distinctness between a human being and human body and we say ‘I am not my body.’ When we use expressions like ‘I have a soul (mind/will, etc.)’ it is different from ‘I have a body.’ ‘I can search my soul;’ but it is not like searching in my room. We say ‘I make up my mind,’ but I am not my mind. ‘I can bring up something into my mind;’ it is not, however, bringing something into my room or into my body. ‘My soul/mind/will,’ like ‘my body,’ shows certain distinctness but they cannot be separated from ‘my being.’ It would only add to the confusion if we think that the distinctions are similar to those between different kinds of things like chairs and tables. We would fail to see the categorical differences and similarities. Wittgenstein is brilliant in reminding us of the differences in uses of body and soul/mind/will in relation to a human being.

86 Being Human after Wittgenstein The sketches relating to the grammar of ‘body’ illuminate our embodied nature and our sharing in the animal kingdom. The sketches on ‘soul,’ ‘mind,’ ‘will,’ etc. on their part point to the subjective dimensions of human being. These two ways of speaking about human beings are interwoven in a number of ways. ‘Here we have two different language-games and a complicated relation between them. – If you try to reduce their relations to a simple formula you go wrong’ (PI p. 180). This is far more realistic and consistent with Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and philosophical method than his earlier framework in which, from a third-person perspective, human beings are seen, like other material substances, plants and animals, as bodies and from a first-person perspective, they ‘shrink to a point without extension’ (TLP 5.64). A grammatical investigation, after Wittgenstein, will show the fundamental nature of the concept ‘human being’ and its relation to human body and soul. In the following three sections I ‘look closer’ into the Wittgensteinian sketches that are related to soul/mind/will, body and human being. In the first section I examine Wittgenstein’s investigations on the ‘inner,’ a family resemblance term that includes in its fibres expressions with ‘soul,’ ‘mind,’ ‘reason,’ ‘will,’ etc. It refers to all the human characteristics that are not bodily. These characteristics give certain mental and spiritual identity and unity to living human beings. It is a ‘delusion’ to treat the inner as something bodily or to deny its reality. Though the inner is expressed in and through the body it is wrong to see them as two separate entities that are united contingently. Their special relationship is examined further in sections: 4.3. ‘The body is the best picture of the human soul’ (PI p. 178) and 4.4. ‘The human being is the best picture of the human soul’ (CV 56). Body and human being, of course, remain best pictures of the

The ‘I’: A Living Human Being

87

human soul and unlike other pictures I cannot show what they are pictured of as independently verifiable facts. They correspond to the concept of a soul. These pictures have to be used in different ways from our pictures that picture empirical realities. They are not given in the language of information; but they are not without cognitive content. They have different roles. They are more like how people express their love in a variety of ways – poems, metaphors, letters, etc. They give expression to their soul. A poetic expression is different from a scientific proposition or a mathematical formula. ‘An image (Vorstellung)1 is not a picture (Bild), but a picture (Bild) can correspond to it’ (PI 301). Pictures of human body and human being can correspond to the idea (Vorstellung) of a human soul. Wittgenstein’s attempts were not to use philosophy to revise our view of ourselves in response to puzzles, problems and mysteries about the nature of human beings. On the contrary, he wanted to dispel the confusions that surrounded the concept of a ‘human being,’ so that thought can rest with a proper appreciation of the fact that there is nothing philosophically problematic about the concept of human beings as we use it in the stream of our thought and life, where the words, including those that are related to human subjectivity have their meaning. Following Wittgenstein’s advice to resist the temptation ‘to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination,’ I do not reduce all the sketches under ‘a living human being’; though all the sketches have a relation to ‘living human being’ and only in relation to ‘living human being’ could they be viewed with any relevance. Human being is a

1

Though Vorstellung could be translated as image, it does not give its contrast with Bild as picture. Vorstellung is here better understood as idea, concept or imaginative representation.

88 Being Human after Wittgenstein primitive, fundamental concept and it cannot be reduced to other terms like mind, body, will, soul, etc. These concepts are used in relation to human being. 4.2. ‘I Presuppose the Inner in so far as I Presuppose a Human Being’ (LW II, 84) Descartes rightly observed that ‘one can perfectly well engage in first-person thinking even though one is not in a position to keep track of oneself as a physical object.’1 From the observation that ‘I could suppose I had no body,’ ‘but not that I was not,’ he, however, postulated an ego that owns and controls the body. To say that a human being has such-and-such a sort of body is not to imply that the person is a thinking thing that owns that body. Descartes, who argued for such a view, admitted that the soul is not merely present in the body as a sailor is present in a ship, but rather very closely joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so that soul and the body form a unit.2 They are two separate entities and it is the ‘thinking thing’ that owns and controls the body and their unity is contingent. To hold that ‘the ego is mental’ (BB 73) is to place oneself in a long tradition starting from Plato of isolating the spiritual from the physical. Wittgenstein argued that to say that ‘a human being is not a body,’ does not necessarily imply that some new entity besides body, namely, the ego, has been discovered (WL 35, 60). It is equally true that a human being is not identical with ego or some other entity – a mind, soul, spirit or will. As I cannot identify my self with my body, I cannot do so with my mind. A human being is neither a body nor a mind. However, a human being is not without a mind or a body. It is true that we do not

1 2

Campbell 1995, 90. Descartes, Sixth Meditation.

The ‘I’: A Living Human Being

89

assign psychological predicates to the body and its parts, but we cannot ascribe them to the mind either. Otherwise it would be the mind that sees, smells, feels, thinks, desires, decides, etc. This is a difficult situation, because we want to say: ‘it cannot be a ‘nothing’.’ To avoid this embarrassment, ‘I presuppose the inner in so far as I presuppose a human being’ (LW II, 84). In the very next sentence, however, Wittgenstein remarks: ‘The ‘inner’ is a delusion. That is: the whole complex of ideas alluded to by this word is like a painted curtain drawn in front of the scene of the actual word use.’ The ‘inner’ is a delusion, if we think it is something similar to other physical objects that can be located, named, described and defined. It is also not like the inside of something, a box, for example, or something like an inner room or inner cave. However, this is not a denial of ‘inner;’ it means the inner cannot be spoken of in the language of object and designation. The inner corresponds to human subjectivity. According to Wittgenstein, the assumption of the ego as an independent entity results from philosophical confusions. When we are forced to recognise that the word ‘I’ is not used, in some important occasions, to designate a body, we look for an immaterial one (BB 47). ‘Where our language suggests a body and there is none: there, we should like to say, is a spirit’ (PI 36). This is because of the bewitching power of the picture of the language in which words always name objects. According to this picture, the meaning of a word is always the object for which the word stands (PI 1). If body is not a proper object for self, we feel forced to posit an immaterial substance – the real ego (BB 69). In his view, ‘to say that the ego is mental is like saying that the number 3 is of a mental or an immaterial nature, when we recognize that the numeral “3” isn’t used as a sign for a physical object’ (BB 73). What we need to do is to remind ourselves the fact that ‘inner’ is not a name of a material or immaterial object.

90 Being Human after Wittgenstein That is not denying the reality of the inner. What is resisted is our temptation to treat it as a material or ethereal object. We remind ourselves that the inner is not bodily; ‘inner’ does not refer to something in the way ‘body’ refers to body. It is not the inner that is deluding; it is to assume the inner as an object, material or ethereal, that is the delusion. There are inner and outer concepts, inner and outer ways of looking at human beings. Indeed there are also inner and outer facts – just as there are for example physical and mathematical facts. But they do not stand to each other like plants of different species’ (LW II, 63). They relate to each other in a variety of ways in the stream of our life and thought. ‘The inner is tied up with the outer not only empirically, but also logically (LW II, 63). Wittgenstein is realist about the inner; but we should not see it as an object similar to a material object. Wittgenstein does not assume that all that is real is empirical. According to him, ‘Not empiricism and yet realism in philosophy, that is the hardest thing’ (RFM 325). In his famous example of shopping for ‘five red apples’, he has shown that we use words differently. ‘Five’, ‘red’ and ‘apple’ are meaningful words and they are differently used in our language. ‘Body’ and ‘soul’ are also used differently. To see the empirical as well as logical inter-relations of ‘body’ and ‘soul’, we have to examine how the words those stand for the ‘soul’ and ‘body’ are used in our actual language. Following Wittgenstein, instead of searching for a Merkmal definition of ‘soul/mind/will,’ we should better raise the question: ‘How is the word ‘soul/mind/will’ used?’(refer PI 370). As with the use of ‘my body,’ the expression ‘my mind/soul/will’ points to a distinction between ‘soul/mind/will’ and the possessor. We want to draw attention to the fact that it is not the soul that perceives, thinks, remembers, loves, wills, believes, etc.;

The ‘I’: A Living Human Being

91

it is the human being who is the subject of these predicates. It is wrong to give a pre-eminence to the soul. Wittgenstein does not want to treat ‘the head and heart as loci of the soul’ (PG 106). ‘What sort of entity is the ‘inner’?’ like ‘What sort of entity is a number?’ can only be answered insisting that the ‘inner,’ like a number, is not an entity of a sort; neither empirical nor metaphysical, neither bodily nor spiritual. But it is not a ‘nothing’ either. It is not just a matter of opinion that a living human has a soul (mind/spirit/will) (refer PI p. 178). That a living human being has a soul is my fundamental attitude in dealing with living human beings. It is not, however, something about which we can talk in the language of physical things. The inner confers a kind of unity to the living human being that is categorically different from the unity conferred by the body. It is a unity that is captured especially from within, from the firstperson perspective. According to Luntley, ‘having a mind involves having a point of view upon the world in the sense that it involves experiencing the world in a certain way.’1 The subject’s point of view, though not expressible in the language of empirical sciences, is something very important to our life as human beings. We need to bring in the subjective dimension of our experience, the dimension we have earlier noticed between the expressions ‘There is pain’ and ‘I have pain.’ This is not however, to say that experiences can be approached only from a first-person. We do talk about them from the third-person perspectives. A proper account of the mental has to take into account the differences and similarities among the first-secondand third person predicates. ‘Inner’ is a word in our language that has a number of uses. It is, in Wittgensteinian terms, a family resemblance 1

Luntley 1995, 57.

92 Being Human after Wittgenstein concept like ‘game.’ There are no necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of the terms that refer to ‘inner.’ We use ‘mind,’ ‘soul,’ ‘spirit,’ ‘reason,’ ‘will,’ etc., to refer to what we indicate by human subjectivity. If we look and see at all these terms and their use what we observe is ‘a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.’ We could say words that refer to ‘inner’ ‘form a family.’ There is no single property (or a sum of properties) like a fibre that runs through the whole length of the thread, on the part of all and only phenomena so called but only overlapping of many fibres (PI 6667). A grammatical investigation gives a description of the various uses of these words clarifying the existence and nature of the inner. It is used in our language as a principle to unite all the mental, rational and spiritual characteristics, something characteristic of human beings. Though we can make sense of the demonstrative ‘this body’, we cannot make sense of ‘this mind (soul/spirit/will).’ We could only say, ‘I meant my mind, but could only point to it via my body’ (BB 66). I examine further in the next section Wittgenstein’s struggles to throw light on the relation between mind/soul/spirit and body. 4.3. ‘The Human Body Is the Best Picture of the Human Soul’ (PI p. 178) Human beings as a rule are recognized by the appearance of their bodies. The characteristics of a human body do change, but gradually and within a recognizable range. ‘We are inclined to use personal names in the way we do, only as a consequence of these facts.’ ‘If facts were different,’ for example, ‘all human bodies which exist looked alike’ or ‘the shape, size and characteristics of behaviour periodically undergo a complete change,’ then the use of names would also change. Thus the use of the concept of an individual human being depends on certain

The ‘I’: A Living Human Being

93

contingent facts (BB 61-62). This, as far as philosophy is concerned, should be treated not only as an empirical fact but also as a logical fact; for ‘The inner is tied up with the outer logically, and not just empirically’ (LW II, 64). Often Wittgenstein reminds us that language-games and forms of life and the words and concepts that are interwoven with them are closely connected with facts about human nature and the nature of the world. ‘If we imagine the facts otherwise than they are, certain language-games lose some of their importance, while others become important’ (OC 63). Even when things are a matter of convention, it may be determined by our situation, and requirements. For example, legal concepts presuppose ‘a scaffolding of facts,’ particularly a normal human background (Z 350). To have different concepts, ‘we would have to be made in such a way that all of us or almost all of us in fact would react in the same way under the same circumstances’ (LW II, 23). This is not to argue that human conventions give norms for our use of words but a reminder that we agree in our actions and in our judgements.1 Wittgenstein stresses the natural capacities of human beings that permit calculation to occur and calls mathematics ‘an anthropological phenomenon’ (RFM 180). Though mathematical procedures as well as logical and grammatical features are sui generis, it is the ‘facts of daily experience’ that give them their importance (RFM 3). Similarly, induction is made logically possible by the regularity of events (OC 618). Actions like walking, eating, and bringing up children are part of our natural history (PI 25, 467). Expecting, loving, and hoping arise only in certain surroundings and situations (PI 481,

1

The complicated role of human agreement in our actions and judgments in relation to our word use and forms of life will be clarified in the next chapter.

94 Being Human after Wittgenstein 583). If we did not laugh and smile at jokes, cry and weep when hurt, turn pale, shiver and run away when in danger, then our shared concepts of joy, pain and fear would not have their roles in our form of life. At the bottom of our language-games and forms of life in which our words and concepts are interwoven are ways of acting and ways of living (OC 204). This is true also about words that we use to talk about human subjectivity; they are interwoven with our characteristic ways of acting and living. I can talk about myself and in this regard sometimes I do talk about my body, which is a material thing that can be identified and described like other material bodies in physical terms. Accordingly, I ascribe myself material characteristics like height, weight, colour and my body is just like and part of the world among others, among beasts, plants, stones, etc. A body, including my body, has some shape and occupies some space excluding other bodies. It could be perceived by the senses and could be moved to occupy other spaces. It could be picked out, identified, labelled and described like any other material thing. There are, however, important differences between material bodies and living bodies, between plants and animals and more importantly for our purpose between animals and human beings. Our attitude to what is alive and what is dead, is not the same. All our reactions are different. – If anyone says: “That cannot simply come from the fact that the living move about in such-and-such a way and a dead one not,” then I want to intimate to him that this is a case of the transition ‘from quantity to quality’’ (PI 284). This fundamental attitude, a transition ‘from quantity to quality’’ is also a transition from physical to spiritual. Applied to human beings, ‘having a body’ is grammatically distinct from ‘being a body’ though we use both ‘I have a body’ and ‘I am a body.’ The distinctions with regard to

The ‘I’: A Living Human Being

95

the use of ‘having’ and ‘being’ with regard to ‘body,’ ‘soul,’ ‘mind,’ ‘will,’ etc. in relation to ‘human being’ are blurred. These expressions with ‘having’ are not anything like a human being owning something. I have two hands and they are part of my body; but my body and mind are not part of anything. I do have a special relation to my body. It is uniquely mine, not just like having land or other properties. Human beings are not, however, identical with their bodies. Though I am bodily, I am not my body. ‘We can’t substitute for “I” a description of a body’ (BB 74). It cannot be used without a body either. Even mental and spiritual properties are expressed in and through the body. Although a human body reacts to a great variety of stimuli, even when I am asleep or unconscious, it is not the bearer of the sensations, moods, thoughts and so on. ‘I’ is not used here ‘because we recognize a particular person by his bodily characteristics’ (BB 69), a feature particularly obvious in firstperson experiential propositions. We don’t say ‘Now I feel much better: the feeling in my facial muscles and round about the corners of my mouth is good’ (RPP I, 454). When I say, ‘I feel much better’ others understand me from the context and from the tone of my voice, expression in my face, and other fine shades of behaviour. ‘It is always presupposed that the person who smiles is human, and not just that what smiles is a human body’ (LW II, 84). The smile is expressed on the face and we can have a smile only on a human face and we cannot separate the smile from the face (LW II, 3). We cannot separate the inner from the outer: ‘“I noticed that he was out of humour.” Is this a report about his behaviour or his state of mind? (“The sky looks threatening”: is this about the present or the future?) Both; not side-by-side, however, but about the one via the other (PI p. 179).

96 Being Human after Wittgenstein The body is the medium by which the presence of the soul is brought about. It is in and through our bodies that we are present to the world and to fellow human beings and relate to them and live in collaboration and conversation. It is to be remembered, not just as an empirical fact but also as a logical fact, that ‘human being’ does not mean the same as ‘this body,’ although it ‘only has meaning with reference to a body’ (WL 35, 62). We cannot drive a wedge between the body that expresses an idea of human action, and the body that is the subject matter of the idea of action, because it is part of the sense of human action that speaker and subject should be one and the same.1 Commenting on Fraser’s report that Malays conceive the human soul as a homunculus corresponding exactly in shape, proportion, and colour to the body in which it resides, Wittgenstein wrote: ‘How much more truth there is in this view which ascribes the same multiplicity to the soul as to the body, than in a modern watered down theory’ (PO 141). It is in this spirit we can understand his remark: ‘The human body is the best picture of the human soul’ (PI p. 178). Human subjectivity is revealed in and through the body; ‘not side-by-side, however, but about the one via the other’ (PI p. 179). A picture of body can correspond to an idea (Vorstellung) of soul. We cannot have pictures of soul. A picture of body can, however, correspond to a Vorstellung of a soul. We look at photographs and portraits and see human beings not just bodies. We see the expression of soul in a face and in the bodily posture. We see happy, sad, serious, fearful, persons not just pictures of bodies. The picture itself, however, is not soul nor does it stand equivalent to the word ‘soul.’ Words and pictures are used to represent imaginatively soul; they are not soul(s). An idea of soul 1

Kenny 1984, 87.

The ‘I’: A Living Human Being

97

is not a picture of a soul, nor a picture of a body, nor the word ‘soul.’ It is not replaceable in the language-game by anything that we should call a picture. The idea of soul certainly enters into the language-game in a sense; only not as a picture.1 The word ‘soul’ cannot mean what it does by way of a picture qua picture: there cannot be a picture of soul; however, pictures can correspond to it. The idea of soul represents something for which there cannot be a picture; yet we typically use pictures in our talking about soul. This is true also about what we say regarding ‘mind,’ ‘spirit,’ ‘will,’ ‘inner,’ etc. with necessary changes depending on the context. They are all pictured using pictures of body. ‘Body’ and ‘soul’ are, thus, used to speak about human beings. The expressions regarding body are interwoven with expressions regarding mind, soul, spirit, reason, will, etc. They do not stand for separate parts of the human person, but for the whole human being considered from different perspectives. All of them are interwoven to give a synoptic view of human beings. 4.4. ‘The Human Being Is the Best Picture of the Human Soul’ (CV 56) At a certain stage in his pervasive and persistent attempts in clarifying the concepts regarding the human subject, Wittgenstein made the following illuminating remark: It comes to this: only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious (PI 281).

1

‘The image of pain is not a picture and this image is not replaceable in the language-game by anything that we should call a picture. – The image of pain certainly enters into the language game in a sense; only not as a picture’ (PI 300). The meaning would be clearer if Vorstellung is translated as idea or concept rather than image.

98 Being Human after Wittgenstein From an empirical point of view, it is merely a description, a common sense report. It is revealing, however, from a philosophical point of view; it puts an end to our struggles to decide between body and soul, matter and spirit as the essence of human being. The category of human being is drawn here as fundamental to our language-game; the basis of all our talk on human beings. Human being is what it is and is neither to be reduced to some other thing like body, mind, soul, spirit, reason, will, etc., though they are used in relation to the concept of ‘human being,’ nor is it a compound of such entities. We do speak of body, soul, mind, will, reason, spirit, etc., but we should not forget at any stage that we are speaking about human body, human soul, human mind, etc., and that the subject is always a living human being. In fact, philosophy has nothing to do with metaphysical and ethical subjects if these concepts have nothing to do with living human beings (TLP 5.641, 6.53). Human beings are neither bodies nor bodiless selves, but beings with distinctive psychophysical characteristics. Our use of ‘living human being,’ as Evans observed, ‘simply spans the gap between the mental and the physical, and is no more intimately connected with one aspect of our self-conception than the other.’1 It is primitive in the sense that it is not an ‘abstraction’ from or a ‘fiction’ constructed out of other basic concepts. It is not to be analysed in terms of body or soul nor as that of an animated body or of an embodied anima. A human being is no more a thinking substance than a bodily thing. He/she is a living creature that perceives its environment, and responds in various ways with its own goals and purposes. In their responses to the environment human beings are creative to such an extent that they make the given world, a human world. To conceive them 1

Evans 1982, 256.

The ‘I’: A Living Human Being

99

simply as automatons is not intelligible (PI 420). A living human being is an embodied subject with active and passive bodily and spiritual (rational, emotional, volitional, etc.) powers and is substantially and creatively present in the world. We live, move and have our being in the world. A human being cannot be reduced to ‘body,’ ‘mind,’ ‘soul,’ ‘reason’ or ‘will’ or a combination of all these or some of them. I may be proud or ashamed of myself without being proud or ashamed of my body or mind. I may hurt my foot, but it is I who suffer, not my foot. My foot may hurt, but it does not hurt itself; it hurts me and it is I who have hurt myself. I may be conscious of a sharp pain in my foot, but my head is neither conscious nor unconscious of it. ‘It is a primitive reaction to tend, to treat, the part that hurts when someone else is in pain’ (Z 540) and, ‘if someone has a pain in his hand, then the hand does not say so . . . and one does not comfort the hand, but the sufferer: one looks into his face’ (PI 286). It is human beings, not their bodily organs like eyes, ears, hearts, and brains that behave. A person sees with his eyes, and listens with his ears but eyes do not see nor do the ears hear. It is not like writing with a pen. Hearts beat and pump blood, but they do not fall in or out of love; it is human beings who love and take care. Emotions are exhibited in human face, tone of voice, bodily responses, and in other fine shades of behaviour. It is the human being who expresses thoughts, opinions, and beliefs in utterances and manifests them in deeds. Therefore, ‘Instead of “attitude toward the soul” one could also say “attitude toward a human”‘ (LW II, 38). What we learn from these investigations is that the concept of human being is to be treated as something fundamental. It can neither be reduced to bodily or mental characteristics nor be seen as a product of body and something else (mind, soul, spirit, etc., or a compound of all these). Human

100 Being Human after Wittgenstein being is a fundamental concept. There are no metaphysical definitions for human being and our inability to produce definitions or sufficient and necessary conditions or criteria for human subject is not ignorance. Nor is it the result of the depth or mystery of the topic; it is just a matter of the primitiveness and irreducibility of the concept of a ‘living human being.’1 We agree in our judgements regarding human beings and our attitude to human beings is different from our attitudes to other objects, living and non-living.2 In all the sketches on self, person, I, body, mind, soul, will, consciousness, etc., we are to take into account the concept of living human being as fundamental. It is only in relation to such terms that human subjectivity can be expressed. Also those terms have their currency only in relation to ‘human beings.’ We can rightly use ‘body,’ ‘mind,’ ‘soul,’ ‘will,’ ‘reason,’ etc., with regard to human beings. We note the similarities and differences in the use of these words and understand their meanings in their contexts. ‘What goes on within also has meaning only in the stream of life’ (LW II, 30). Care is to be taken, however, not to reduce human subjectivity into any one or a definite grouping of them. We also look and see how these words and other related expressions are interwoven to give the fabric of human subjectivity. As Wittgenstein observed, ‘… one pattern in the weave is interwoven with many others’ (Z 569) and one has to see them in the context of the ‘weave of our life’ (PI 174). 1 2

McGinn 1999, 146. There are occasions when we raise questions whether something or someone is a living human being. For example, our attitudes and opinions regarding human embryos vary. It is a moral problem whether to treat them as babies or foetus. We discuss and debate when do the embryos become babies and what makes them living human beings.

The ‘I’: A Living Human Being

101

The identity and continuity through time of a ‘living human being’ is intelligible in the context of human life, and it is just that continuity which allows us to talk about human beings, rather than just about points of views, pointilliste scatter of thoughts and random sequences of experiences. ‘Prima facie, such continuity does not need anything underlying it of a mysterious and indefinable nature, any more than the continuity of a physical object needs to be thus supported.’1 A living human being is not just a bundle of perceptions or a collection of points of views or a host of relations. He/she is living, dynamic and creative, and at the same time subject to bounds and bonds. The nature of such bonds and bounds to world, community and God will be made clear in the coming chapters. It is the project of the thesis to present living human beings as rooted in and acting on the world, formed by and extended to the community and dependent on and oriented to God. At this stage I conclude with Evans, ‘All the peculiarities we have noticed about ‘I’-thoughts are consistent with and indeed, at points encourage, the idea that there is a living human being which those thoughts concern.’2 The human being is indeed the best picture of human subjectivity (RPP I, 281). If someone insists on asking ‘What is self?’ we can simply answer, ‘a living human being.’ By nature we are human beings endowed with body and mind, reason and will, feelings and passions. How we develop them and become fully human depends on our nature as well as nurture. Being human is a joint venture of nature and nurture – that I present in the next chapters investigating Wittgenstein’s remarks on Rule Following and Private Language.

1 2

Madell 1981, 10. Evans 1982, 256.

Chapter 5

Rule Following and Being Human 5.1. ‘What We Call “Obeying the Rule”‘ (PI 201) According to Wittgenstein, ‘Following according to rule is FUNDAMENTAL to our language-game’ (RFM 330). We follow rules in our lives and they inform, form and transform our forms of life. The fabric of human life is made of a web of rules. Besides the linguistic, logical, mathematical and scientific laws, there are rules governing values in the fields of aesthetics, ethics and religion. Though modern man clamours for a life without bounds and bonds, he finds himself bounded and bonded. A life without rules is only an illusion. That does not mean that our lives are bound by fixed rules always and everywhere; there is scope for dynamism, creativity and spontaneity. Patterns emerge as we go on; we join in and sustain, amend and create the structures in our ongoing practices. Rules, like bonds, restrict as well as support our forms of life. This fundamental feature of human life is philosophically important as it throws light on the relations between nature and nurture, the focus of our search in this chapter. Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following are connected with his investigations on the meaning and use of words in our lives. He considers in what sense the meaning of a word is different from the use that a speaker subsequently makes of the word. For ‘we understand the meaning of a word when we hear or say it; we grasp it in a flash, and what we grasp

104

Being Human after Wittgenstein

in this way is surely something different from the ‘use’ which is extended in time!’ This remark in PI 138 marks the beginning of an investigation designed to command a clear view of what is conceptually involved in ‘understanding’ and ‘following’ a rule. Wittgenstein discusses a simple case (PI 143-55) in which a pupil is taught the rule ‘+1’ which generates the series of natural numbers. The pupil normally learns to write 1, 2, 3, 4 . . . In learning the series, he may go wrong sometimes and the teacher could correct the mistakes. The kind of correction would depend on the kind of the mistake, the pupil and the teacher as they vary from mistake to mistake and person to person. There is no one single explanation or a group of them that will cure all forms of errors. We need to resist our ‘craving for generality’ and to desist ‘the contemptuous attitude towards the particular case’ (BB 18). Explanations clear up particular problems, particular errors, and these may vary enormously. In all these attempts the teacher is trying to give the pupil the rule ‘+1’: ‘the effect of any further explanation depends on his reaction’ (PI 145). The pupil somehow should see the connections and understand the meaning of the rule through alternative expressions and examples of the rule’s applications. The understanding is not given by a theoretical articulation but rather in practice, in actual following of rules. There is no guarantee that a particular individual will understand the series. The vast majority of us do, though. We join in and go on following the rule. In fact, the relative uniformity of the responses that human beings make to training provides the foundation of all language-games.1 Nature and nurture work together here. The philosophical problem that Wittgenstein wants to focus is the apparent mystery regarding normativity and 1

Bloor 1983, 26.

Rule Following and Being Human

105

infinity. Past training seems to determine a correct way of following a rule for indefinitely many new situations in the future!1 The problem of infinity concerns the fact that although the pupil has been acquainted with only a finite number of examples, the rule determines his action for indefinitely many new occasions that the pupil has never previously considered. Once the pupil sees the connections and understands the series then he should continue it on his own, independently of the teacher’s promptings and explanatory corrections. The pupil may at a later stage make mistakes in continuing the series. What is philosophically important is the notion that independent of what he does in future, there is something that he ought to do. That is the notion of normativity. For example, everyone who is familiar with the sequence of even numbers 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, … knows how to continue it. If we are going to follow the rule we have to say 14 after 12; we must do it this way if we are to obey the rule. We must say 14 because this is what the rule requires. The mystery is, ‘You say you must; but cannot say what compels you’ (RFM 326). This ‘hardness of the logical must’ (RFM 84) is the mystery of normativity. The puzzling question seems to be: ‘How does he know that he is to make that movement?’ (PI 433). It is not the empirical or the epistemological question of how does a particular rule-follower know the matter that is important, but rather the metaphysical questions: What makes an action a correct or incorrect application of a rule and what makes it normative for an indefinite number of cases. Wittgenstein deals with these metaphysical questions. He sets the stage for this investigation by imagining how the pupil who learned the series of natural numbers (PI 143-55) may 1

Kripke 1982, 7, 8.

106

Being Human after Wittgenstein

further be taught other series of cardinal numbers (PI 185). The teacher teaches him through examples and explanations. In one case the pupil is taught the series ‘+2.’ He has been given appropriate examples and guidance up to the number 1000. When he is asked to continue the series beyond 1000, however, he writes 1004, 1008, 1012, … The teacher corrects his mistakes explaining that he is not continuing correctly. According to the pupil, however, he did go on in the same way. To continue the series ‘+2’, by writing ‘1004, 1008, 1012, …’ the pupil exhibited how he grasped the rule, and what he wrote is in accord with his understanding. The pupil might have understood the instructor to mean by ‘+2’ that he is to add two up to 1000, four up to 2000, six up to 3000, and so on. If this is how he understood ‘+2,’ then he did indeed go on in the same way; the series he wrote down was how he thought he was meant to proceed. From the order ‘+2’ indefinite number of steps follow, although at a given instance ‘n+2’ there is only one correct answer.1 The teaching by examples and explanations involved only a finite number of examples. The teacher himself did not think of all the steps when he taught the pupil the series ‘+2.’ The teacher knew all these steps and the right step at any given instance. In giving the order, he also knew what the pupil should do if he followed the rule correctly. The pupil in the example, however, understood the series differently and acted accordingly. The puzzling question is that if whatever one does can be brought into accord with a rule on some interpretation, how can the rule show one what is to be done at any step? What

1

We distinguish between rules that determine an answer at each step (y = 2x) and those that do not (y ≠ 2x). The sketches are drawn more on the former type, the apparently determined type.

Rule Following and Being Human

107

is the right step? The problem is general, not just arithmetical, as given in the ‘paradox’ in PI 201: No course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. . . . if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here. Obviously, if ‘whatever I do’ can be said to accord with a rule, then the very notion of following a rule correctly, in contrast to following it incorrectly, loses all sense and rule-following would be an empty and meaningless exercise. At the linguistic level, it takes away all meaning and normativity from language use. Consequences are disastrous in the fields of aesthetics, ethics and religion threatening meaning and value of our lives. According to Kripke, ‘Wittgenstein has invented a new form of scepticism. … the most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date, one that only a highly unusual cast of mind could have produced.’1 As Kripke himself correctly observed, Wittgenstein never saw himself as a ‘sceptic;’ he was rather anxious to ‘dissolve traditional philosophical doubts.’2 In fact, he wanted to ‘clear away misunderstandings of how rules operate’3 and to offer a synoptic view of meaning. Wittgenstein in his attempts to dissolve traditional philosophical puzzles regarding rules and rule-following considered a number of traditional philosophical solutions. A closer look at those remarks not only shows the nature of the problem but more importantly throws light on the complex nature of human life – how we live, move and have our being.

Kripke 1982, 59. Kripke 1982, 63. 3Arrington 2001, 127. 1 2

108

Being Human after Wittgenstein

5.2. “Here We Can’t Talk about “Right”‘ (PI 258) While doing philosophy, it is tempting to think that ‘There is a gulf between an order and its execution. It has to be filled by the act of understanding’ (PI 431). The temptation is to posit some entity to bridge the apparent gulf between understanding and following a rule and to use it as a norm to determine whether one is following a rule correctly or not. Wittgenstein’s treatment of the problem is not to question normativity, leading to scepticism about rules but to clarify what counts as correct usage and how a rule-follower maintains the correctness of his usage. He dissolves the problem by bringing normativity internal to the rule, something that is built into practice – patterns of use. The ‘rule’ and its ‘application’ are not two things that can be grasped independently of one another (LFM 85, 108). There is no gap between these terms and nothing can be inserted between a rule and its application as mortar between two bricks (WVC 154ff.). They are not the same either. Like the relation between a true proposition and the fact that verifies it or a desire and something that satisfies it, the relation between a rule and an act in accord with it is internal (WVC 157). To understand a rule is to recognise which acts are in agreement or in conflict with it just as to understand a description is to grasp what would be the case if it were true or false. Wittgenstein shows that once a gap between rule and application is admitted, we are on a slippery road to a maze where we do not know our way out. Four of the traditional solutions are examined in this section – Platonic entity, Cartesian entity, Interpretation, and Disposition – to see the underlying temptations and to show the way out of the maze.1 According to Wittgenstein, ‘To show a man how to get out you have first of all

1

A fifth possible solution, community, to safeguard objectivity and normativity of rule-following is discussed later.

Rule Following and Being Human

109

to free him from the misleading influence of the question’ (BB 169). Accordingly, our motif of ‘looking closer’ to the traditional solutions is to show the confusions that drive us to raise those misleading questions in the first place and the futility of proposed answers. Platonism is considered as an obvious traditional choice to save the normativity of rules. Here a transcendental ‘superlative fact’ is postulated. For example, the sequence generated by the rule ‘+2’ is an abstract but real object or pattern of such objects existing in a Platonic realm perceived by a special kind of intellectual intuition. All the steps have already been laid out as rails extending to infinity. ‘And infinitely long rails correspond to the unlimited application of a rule’ (PI 218). ‘The steps are really already taken, even before I take them in writing or orally or in thought’ (PI 188). Correct steps are those that follow the one in the Platonic realm. That apparently gives the rule follower a definite norm. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, however, Platonism is a confusion. Platonic objects are postulated as self-interpreting, or rather, they are transparent and need no interpretation. They are self-validating, meaning, they are normative in themselves; they cannot be wrong. It does not explain, however, how we gain access into the Platonic realm and keep on to the rails. Taking our earthly problems to Platonic realms in a metaphysical flight does not help us to follow the rules here and now. More importantly, even if we accept the metaphysics of Platonic entities and the epistemology of Platonic grammar, it does not solve our initial problem about normativity. If there is a problem with regard to our understanding and following of rules correctly, one can raise the same questions regarding the Platonic rules. There is no reason why we should accept the transparent nature of Platonic rules, if we are puzzled by the normativity of our rules. Rules to interpret

110

Being Human after Wittgenstein

rules are incapable of giving normativity, even if they are Platonic. The solution only transfers the original puzzle with regard to the normativity of our rules to that of Platonic rules. A second candidate to bridge the gap between the understanding and following a rule correctly is a Cartesian entity, process or event – something within the subject. According to this view, rule following is made possible by the pupil’s power to grasp the meaning of the signs used in the rule. Once he has grasped them, the meaning is in his mind, which determines his future behaviour. The rule in the mind becomes the measure of correct or incorrect practice. Since they are in the mind of the rule-follower, they are transparent and are readily available. It is tempting to suppose that when a teacher is using examples to convey the meaning of a word, the teacher has something ‘in mind,’ and the finite number of examples are just a fragmentary substitute for what is really meant. If only the pupil could look directly into the mind of the teacher then he too would have access to the state of understanding that is the source of the teacher’s ability to follow the rule. The idea of the rule in the teacher’s mind does not confine itself to a finite number of cases; it refers to the infinite scope of the rule, but obviously he cannot lay that before the pupil. So he contends himself with an alternative – say, the first 10 or 20 members of the sequence for inspection. Wittgenstein objects to this sketch: ‘If you use a rule to give a description, you yourself do not know more than you say. I.e., you yourself do not foresee the application that you will make of the rule in a particular case. If you say ‘and so on’, you yourself do not know more than ‘and so on’’ (RFM 228). We do not have a mental entity either in the teacher or in the successful pupil as the norm. The truth is, ‘One gives examples and intends them to be taken in a particular way. – I do not, however, mean by this that he is supposed to see in

Rule Following and Being Human

111

those examples that common thing which I – for some reason – was unable to express’ (PI 71). Wittgenstein is emphatic: ‘if God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there who we were speaking of’ (PI p. 217), because there is nothing in the mind to see. As we have seen in the first chapter, mind is neither a place to look into nor a thing for a closer look. Wittgenstein suggests we pay close attention to what apparently goes on in our minds when we say something like ‘now I understand the series of numbers.’ Can we catch in our inner gaze this mental act of understanding? On reflection on the experience of understanding we find that many different things may (or may not!) occur (PI 152-5). They fail, however, to add up to understanding. They are experiences that might be called accompaniments of understanding; they are not, however, proofs of understanding. At best, as accompaniments of understanding they provide, in certain contexts, some justification for claiming that one understands. Proof of understanding still remains a demonstration of an ability to do correctly. Taking them to a mental arena does not help the situation in any way. If there is a problem with regard to our ordinary rule-following, they are not solved by a mental process or entity. The Cartesian faces similar problems as the Platonist. Mental rules are not any better than the Platonic rules. The Cartesian is only positing entities with normativity without clarifying what they are or how they relate to the practice of rulefollowing. These entities are characterisable only in terms of how they are for the subject. The Cartesian cannot give a concept of normativity because he has no account of what is independent of mind. Whatever seems right to the mind is right. Luntley makes it clear: That is the problem that lies at the heart of the Cartesian conception of mind, a conception of mind in which

112

Being Human after Wittgenstein

everything is transparent to the subject of experience, available to the subject in immediate experience. If experience is transparent then what is available within experience cannot bear the weight required to deliver the notion of ‘independence of will,’ the notion that is central to the normativity of meaning. For the Cartesian mind, everything is just as it appears to the mind and the properties of what is available to the mind are exhausted by properties that are detectable immediately through and through. For the Cartesian mind nothing is hidden. What you see is what you get.1 A Cartesian, thus, has only a conception of how things appear; he does not have a conception of how things are or how they ought to be. That means the Cartesian can have neither objectivity nor normativity.2 Therefore, rule-following is meaningless for the Cartesian. Everything just is as it is. When puzzled about how a rule can determine what must be done to act in accord with it, one might be tempted to invoke an interpretation to mediate between a rule and its application. We console ourselves that though the ruleformulation alone does not determine the future steps they are determined by interpretations. This is a temptation to which Wittgenstein himself once succumbed: How do we know that someone had understood a plan or order? He can only show his understanding by translating it into other symbols. He may understand Luntley 2003, 13. Luntley presents a human subject as a will with a point of view. Similar confusions, however, would follow if ‘will’ is considered as an object similar to ‘mind.’ For objectivity, what we need is the concept of ‘independent of subject,’ safeguarding the distinction between seems and is. 2I examine objectivity and normativity in the next section. 1

Rule Following and Being Human

113

without obeying. But if he obeys he is again translating – i.e., by coordinating his action with the symbols. So understanding is really translating, whether into other symbols or into action (WL 32, 24). Interpretation, thus conceived, seems to determine how to follow a rule. ‘I feel that I have given the rule an interpretation before I have followed it; and that this interpretation is enough to determine what I have to do in order to follow it in the particular case’ (RFM 332). An interpretation appears to be sufficient and necessary to bridge the gap between a rule and the acts that accord with it, e.g., between the rule ‘+2’ and what is to be done after writing ‘1000.’ This picture, however, is also confused. On closer examination, we find that rule-following cannot be explained by invoking rules on how to apply rules. ‘Rules for interpreting rules don’t get us any further.’1 This would lead only to a reductio ad absurdum since ‘Any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any support. Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning’ (PI 198). According to Wittgenstein, ‘we ought to restrict the term “interpretation” to the substitution of one expression of the rule for another’ (PI 201). Instead of writing ‘+2,’ we might write ‘add two’ or ‘the next but one number.’ These are expressions that can be substituted for ‘+2.’ They do not, however, determine meanings normatively. Understanding a rule is not knowing the right interpretation; for to understand a rule if I must interpret it, then I must interpret the interpretation. ‘It would almost be like settling how much a toss is to be worth by another toss’ (Z 230). An interpretation is incapable of bridging the apparent gulf between a rule and one’s action. It is just another formulation of 1

McGinn 1998, 77.

114

Being Human after Wittgenstein

the rule. Ultimately, if the original rule-formulation hangs in the air, so does the later rule-interpretation. After the interpretation we are still left with a set of symbols to which we must respond, i.e., upon which we must act.1 Rule-following cannot be grounded in rule-interpretation. It is not just that we are not any closer, but it would take away the normativity of rules as ‘Whatever I do can, on some interpretation, be brought into accord with the rule’ (PI 189). For any action, I can come with alternative interpretations. If ‘anything goes,’ there is no following of a rule at all! On a general level, if meaning is not something independent of interpretation, then there is nothing to constrain the interpretation. There is no way to ascertain the correct interpretation. The implications for language use and logic are profound and pernicious. That everything can be interpreted as being in accord with a rule obviously does not mean that everything is in accord with it (refer RFM 414). Our understanding of a rule is not an interpretation of it; nor in grasping a rule do we typically get hold of an interpretation. After pointing to the paradox that no course of action can be determined by a rule because every action can be made to accord with it, Wittgenstein adds: It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but

1

Bloor 1997, 18.

Rule Following and Being Human

115

which is exhibited in what we call ‘obeying’ the rule and ‘going against it’ in actual cases (PI 201).1 Understanding is shown in rule-following actions. Interpretations might help; but they are neither necessary nor sufficient. They do not demonstrate understanding; the proof of understanding is correct applications of the rule,2 not correct rule interpretations. The move from understanding a rule to following a rule correctly could be examined further on a dispositional theory. According to this view, the pupil acquires a set of dispositions or tendencies. These dispositions may be there as innate or happen to be activated in this way by the examples used in training. The dispositional view appreciates the fact that it is neither a kind of insight or seeing, Platonic or mental nor an interpretation that lies at the bottom of the language game; it is a way of acting (OC 204). The dispositional hypothesis moves from signs to action whereas in the previous three options that we have examined, the rule follower remained at the level of signs. The rule follower has already a set of signs in the rule formulation. To give normativity to rules, the signs were taken to Platonic or mental realms or to further interpretations. Remaining at the level of signs, one cannot, however, resolve the problem of normativity. According to the dispositional hypothesis, rule-following is an exercise of a disposition that the rule follower acquired when he learned some rule-following actions. The rule follower, according to this view, is one who just says that ‘I am inclined to do so.’ Obviously, that is not sufficient to safeguard either objectivity or normativity. ‘One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only

The German von Fall zu Fall der Anwendung which literally means ‘from case to case of the application’ is translated here ‘in actual cases.’ 2Arrington 2001, 129. 1

116

Being Human after Wittgenstein

means that here we can’t talk about “right”‘ (PI 258). This sketch turns the rule from a reason for action into a cause and violates the normative structure of rules. The important distinction between ‘it seems right’ and ‘it is right’ is lost in this picture. In rule-following, whatever I am disposed to do, there is a unique thing that I should do. To say that ‘1002’ is the next correct step is not merely to say that it is the one I am disposed to make. What I should do as the correct step cannot be reduced to the one I am disposed to do, though by training I may be disposed to do the right thing. Thus, the four dominant hypotheses that allegedly render normativity to our rule-following are neither sufficient nor necessary. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, these hypotheses were confusions because of the lack of a synoptic view of the reality. They were the results of false pictures according to which understanding and following a rule are two separate realities that are in need of a third entity to bridge them. Ultimately our ways of intellectualising our lives by means of interpretations, explanations and justifications do not really satisfy us.1 According to Wittgenstein, the criterion of understanding a rule is actually following it (correctly); there are no intermediaries between the rule and its applications. Interpretations and explanations are in the end at the service of practice. ‘It is not the interpretation which builds the bridge between the sign and what is signified //meant//. Only the practice does that’ (MS 165, 82).2 Rules make sense only in the context of established practices and standards of correctness of

1 2

Cavell 1999, 175. ‘Nicht die Deutung schlägt die Brücke zwischen dem Zeichen und dem Bezeichneten //gemeinten//. Nur die Praxis tut das.’ MS 165, 79 qualifies practice as common practice (nur durch eine allgemeine Praxis).

Rule Following and Being Human

117

application. An examination of rule-following as practice is undertaken next to arrive at a better understanding of it and to have a synoptic view of being human. 5.3. ‘‘Obeying a Rule’ Is a Practice’ (PI 202) After clarifying the confusions surrounding the traditional solutions regarding the understanding and following of rules, we shall now focus our attention on an important aspect of rulefollowing, namely, ‘‘Obeying a rule’ is a practice’ (PI 202). Wittgenstein links the notion of a practice to other expressions for standard ways of doing things: ‘To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions)’ (PI 199). A practice shows the relation between a rule and a specific action. The notion of practice refers to a certain normative way of doing things. According to Luntley, it is a word ‘for the complex form of all word use which has, at its heart, subjects with an active direct attitude to things, the things in virtue of which word use is calibrated.’1 I distinguish three important elements in the concept of practice – objectivity, regularity and normativity. First of all, it is objective; there is a distinction between thinking that one is following a rule and actually following it. Objectivity safeguards the distinction between seems/thinks so and is so. Rule-following is something that an agent actually does, not merely something that seems so to the agent. It is only in the actual use of a rule, that is, in the actual practice, a rule is revealed, understood and followed. The concept of an essentially subjective rule-following 1

Luntley 2003, 113. Luntley restricts this calibration primarily to things; calibration against persons being secondary and consequent. In my view, both calibration against things and persons are primary and our attitude to persons is categorically different from our attitude to things.

118

Being Human after Wittgenstein

is incoherent because it cannot keep the distinction between thinking that one is following a rule and it being the case that one is actually following it. Secondly, there is regularity; meaning, rule-following is a repeatable procedure. It is repeatable over time and across persons. It can be taught and learned. Thirdly, there is normativity; meaning, regularity is subject to standards of correctness. The distinction between is and ought is kept; there is a correct way of following a rule. Rule-following actions are not just regularities of behaviour but regularities that have normative force, ways one ought to act. ‘Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular way’ (PI 206). This is not just acquiring a disposition to do something; it is something we ought to do not just disposed to do. Though these three elements – objectivity, regularity and normativity – are constitutive of rule-following, they do not make the sufficient and necessary conditions for rule-following. They provide a frame of reference. There is, however, a certain ‘indefiniteness’ and ‘variability’ with regard to human behaviour, including rule-following (RPP II, 626, 627). ‘What is most difficult here is to put this indefiniteness, correctly and unfalsified, into words’ (PI p. 227). Human practices are beyond complete theoretical articulations. This is not however, ignorance; but a fact of our natural history: ‘It is there – like our life’ (OC 559). From a Wittgensteinian point of view, the concept of rule-following is better understood as a family resemblance concept: ‘This and similar things are called rules and this is how we follow rules actually in our lives.’ We typically point to rulefollowing practices and human beings generally learn the concept of rule-following. We examine further these three inter-

Rule Following and Being Human

119

related elements starting with objectivity. Wittgenstein contrasts objectivity with privacy. The remark that ‘‘Obeying a rule’ is a practice’ is followed by an equally illuminating and at the same time controversial remark, ‘it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’.’ The reason Wittgenstein gives is: ‘otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it’ (PI 202). Objectivity refers to something that is independent of the subject. Wittgenstein emphasized that a technique is exhibited in a pattern of behaviour, in action rather than in thought. Sometimes we consider counting, calculating, inferring and constructing proofs as primarily cerebral or mental activities. What is essential to these techniques seems to be carried out in the brain, and any overt actions seem mere symptoms of something deeper and mysterious. They seem to be basically theoretical and only by chance practical. This is profoundly misleading. Wittgenstein wrote in his last numbered remark in the Philosophical Investigations, Part I: ‘And nothing is more wrong-headed than calling meaning a mental activity!’ (PI 693). According to him, meaning something by words and deeds is part of our natural history: ‘Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting are as much part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing’ (PI 25). Rule-following is not a mental activity, though inner faculties are involved in it. It is an objective, regular and normative human practice, involving objects and persons in the world, ‘a fact of our natural history’ (RFM 61). It is to be noted that Wittgenstein uses ‘privately’ in a special sense as is evident from the quotation marks in PI 202, 256 and 653 and italicisation in PI 246 and 380. There is a view according to which ‘private’ is ‘what can be known to the person’ concerned exclusively such that ‘another person cannot understand it’ (PI 243) and ‘another person can’t have [it]’ (PI 253). The first is

120

Being Human after Wittgenstein

private knowledge and the second is private ownership. Wittgenstein clarified the notion by looking closer at the ‘private’ sensations in his private language fantasy (which are treated in the next chapter). With regard to rule-following, the remark could be reformulated as ‘it is not possible to obey a rule in such a way that only I know I follow the rule’ and ‘only I can follow that rule.’ This, from a Wittgensteinian point of view, is only a philosophical confusion. There cannot be a rule that is essentially ‘private’ such that others are logically excluded from knowing and following it. Wittgenstein is not denying the possibility of an individual in physical isolation following a rule; his issue is logical: whether one can have an essentially private rule. Wittgenstein’s remark that ‘‘obeying a rule’ is a practice’ (PI 202), however, is not so much to differentiate private from social but apparent from genuine cases of following rules. An agent’s sincere belief that he is following a rule is not sufficient to judge that he is actually following a rule. The idea that following a rule is a practice secures the important difference between appearance and reality (the distinction between seems and is) in following rules. Practices provide objective criteria for rulefollowing, something independent of the subject. ‘Hence the words ‘to follow a rule’ relate to a practice which cannot be replaced by the appearance of a practice’ (MS 180a, 36).1 Rulefollowing is not something that can be restricted to the mental arena; it is something that we do. It is neither exclusively a mental nor merely a bodily activity. It is an action of a ‘living human being’ in the world. As such it is observable and repeatable. It can be taught and learned. Our rule-following behaviour is part of our stream of life. The very prospect of

1

‘Darum bezieht sich, die Worte ‘einer Regel folgen’ auf eine Praxis der nicht durch den Schein einer Praxis ersetzt werden kann.’

Rule Following and Being Human

121

following a rule implies the existence of a use or custom independent of the subject. These points are further emphasised in the second characteristic of rule-following, namely, regularity. According to Wittgenstein, the use of ‘regular’ and ‘uniform’ is interwoven with the use of ‘same’ and thereby too with the use of ‘rule’ (PI 208). Acquiring the mastery of a rule normally involves practice, i.e. drill, training and exercises. ‘Only through a technique can we grasp a regularity’ (RFM 303). Mastery is judged by the display of regular, successful actions. The occasional failures must be able to be identified and corrected. He draws a sketch of how one may go about it in PI 208: I shall teach him to use the words by means of examples and by practice. . . . I do it, he does it after me; and I influence him by expressions of agreement, rejection, expectation, encouragement. I let him go his way, or hold him back; and so on. What we see here are repeatable instances of an action; a certain regularity. The master trains the pupil to acquire that regularity. Wittgenstein distinguishes between mere regularity and normative regularity. The behaviour of creatures other than human beings also have natural expressions of regularity, or uniformity, but following a rule is manifest in regularity that presupposes recognition and judgement of a uniformity (RFM 348). This is not ruling out the possibility of other creatures having rule-like behaviour; rather it shows that natural expressions of regularity are different from the patterns of regularity in rule-following behaviour. Our patterns of behaviour following our natural instincts are not included in the family of rule-following actions. One must also distinguish a conditioned response, a disposition, inculcated by drill from a volitional exercise of a practice. A person must be able to manifest in his behaviour his grasp of the rule and standards of

122

Being Human after Wittgenstein

correctness and follow a pattern rather than react to a stimulus. In acquiring a rule-following practice one is not trained to react like Pavlov’s dogs (PR 70); one is taught that doing thus is correct, doing otherwise incorrect and to judge accordingly. Rule-following is not just a stimulus response, but a practice involving knowledge and judgement: ‘Following a rule is a human activity’ (RFM 331). Something must be judged as a standard procedure and a competent practitioner should follow the standard use. In the absence of understanding the relevant rule, which, of course, is to know how to apply it, the command ‘Do the same’ would have no meaning (RPP II, 408). The judgement itself is possible only where an established pattern of behaviour is discernible. It is essential to have such standards of correctness to specify the scope and content of any technique. They are intrinsic parts of techniques. Uttering the sequence ‘1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6’ is something that we fix (LFM 83) or lay down as a rule for correct counting (refer LFM 107), without which there would be no practice of counting or miscounting. It is important to note that these standards of correctness are internal to rule-following. They are constitutive of the rule. There are no rules without standards of correctness. If they were drawn outside of a practice, we would slip into a reductio ad absurdum as we have seen in the earlier attempts to bridge rules and rule-following in terms of Platonism, mental entity, interpretation and disposition. It is philosophical myth-making to think that there must be, in such cases, a single, context-free and purpose-independent way to decide whether something is the same as before (refer PI 226).1 The mastery of a practice is exhibited in acts that satisfy the standards of correctness. 1

Baker & Hacker 1988, 166.

Rule Following and Being Human

123

We must not forget the fact that understanding and using a rule involve the mastery of many interrelated practices and a whole web of human behaviour. According to Wittgenstein, one cannot follow just one rule just once in a lifetime as one cannot make a move in chess without being able to play chess. RFM 193 clarifies that consensus among those who calculate is an essential feature of the phenomenon of our calculating. To the question whether a solitary human being could calculate, Wittgenstein’s answer is qualified: ‘Well, one human being could at any rate not calculate just once in his life.’ One action does not make a practice. One cannot do something just once and claim he has a new rule either. Further light is thrown by MS 124, 187: ‘if I observed a being on Mars who looked at something like a signpost, and then walked parallel to it, I have no justification to say, it follows it, even if I knew all its feelings at this moment.’1 Wittgenstein makes it clear: ‘What, in a complicated surrounding, we call ‘following a rule’ we should certainly not call that if it stood in isolation. . . . one must describe a practice, not something that happens once, no matter of what kind’ (RFM 335). If we can describe a regular practice within a stream of life, then we can say whether a particular action is following a rule or not. The background against which we describe a practice, according to him, ‘is the bustle of life. And our concept points to something within this bustle’ (RPP II, 625). It makes sense to talk of understanding and following a rule, only in the context of a form of life in which these rules can be regularly used. Whether we need regularity across persons, not just spatio-temporal regularity, is discussed further in the next section.

1

‘Wenn ich auf dem Mars ein Wesen beobachtete das auf einen Wegweiserähnlichen Gegenstand schaut und ihm dann parallel geht, so hätte ich keine Berechtigung zu sagen, es folge ihm, auch wenn ich alle seine Gefühle in diesem Augenblick kennte.’

124

Being Human after Wittgenstein

The emphasis on practice can lead to another myth, namely, the view that a practice binds rules and rule-following. It could be presented as Wittgenstein’s attempt to bridge the gulf between a rule and its application. As with other attempts to bridge the apparent gap between rule and application, this is also bound to be another fly-bottle. The claim is in conflict with Wittgenstein’s claim that rules and rule-following actions are internally related. Practices are normative structures with internal standards of correctness. The notion of normativity does not consist in transcendent patterns that give justification for our rules. A practice of following a rule, and of using a rule as a guide in various normative activities, is not an independent ‘entity’ mediating between the rule and acts following it. Normativity is internal to rule following; practice does not provide any further explanation in terms of justification. ‘Following according to a rule is FUNDAMENTAL to our language-game’ (RFM 330). It is ‘something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified . . .’ (OC 359). We understand and follow rules. Our actions are judged correct or incorrect by the rules themselves. Philosophical wisdom is to realise this fact of human behaviour as part of our natural history and to refrain from digging beneath it in the hope of uncovering more basic concepts upon which it rests and to which it is reducible. ‘This is simply what I do’ (PI 217). We reach the bedrock of our investigations. Wittgenstein is emphatic: ‘We need have no reason to follow the rule as we do’ (BB 143). A justification is something separate from the use of a rule: ‘justification consists in appealing to something independent’ (PI 265). ‘Wittgenstein’s point is that the right to use a word need not consist in anything separate from the use of the word; one can simply use it with right.’1 That means 1

Luntley 2003, 100.

Rule Following and Being Human

125

the action is performed without justification, but not without right (PI 289). It has already been justified, and no further justification is needed and there is not yet another standing behind the one that has been given, and one behind that and so on. Of course, this does not mean that it is not possible to say more about it. Further talk, however, will not be appealing to something more basic than the original use of the word. Once all the reasons are given out, one acts without reasons (PI 211). ‘We can dig down to the ground to find justifications but we will reach a level where no further explanation can be given by reference to what goes on at the level below.’1 And when we exhaust our justifications and explanations we hit the ‘bedrock,’ where any further question is answered simply by ‘Well, that is what we call rule-following.’ Though it is ‘use and custom among us, or a fact of our natural history,’ it is controversial whether, for Wittgenstein, the normativity arises from individual’s calibration with things, ‘This is simply what I do’ (PI 217) or from the community, ‘this is simply what we do’ (RFM 61) (emphasis added). What we have so far learned from Wittgenstein in the context of following a rule is that rulefollowing practice (what I/we do regularly and normatively) is a primary concept like that of ‘living human being’ in the previous chapter. We shall examine the roles of the individual and the community in human practices in the next section. 5.4. ‘We Belong to a Community’ (OC 298) Wittgenstein raised the question, Is what we call “obeying a rule” something that it would be possible for only one man to do, and to do only once in his life? – This is of course a note on the grammar of the expression “to obey a rule.” It is not possible that

1

Smith, Routledge CD-ROM.

126

Being Human after Wittgenstein

there should have been only one occasion on which only one man1 obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or understood; and so on. – To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions) (PI 199). This ‘note on the grammar of the expression “to obey a rule”‘ is also a note on the grammar of our ways of being human. ‘To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess,’ are ways of being human. They also point to the fact that ‘we belong to a community:’ our characteristic ways of beings human – ‘customs, uses and institutions’ involve other human beings at least potentially. ‘Belonging to a community’ does not necessarily mean that individuals are always surrounded by other human beings. Even when an individual is physically isolated he has a fundamental openness to other human beings. This is not something that could be argued in a theoretical way; it is something that to look and see. It is shown here that ‘we belong to a community’ by a synoptic picturing of Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following and language use. In rule-following and in language use, Wittgenstein insists on regularity; however, it is controversial whether he meant spatio-temporal regularity, or regularity across subjects. I argue that the notion of regularity includes both instances over time (and place) and across subjects emphasising the roles of the individual and the community in human normative practices. What I am arguing for, first of all, is the logical possibility for repeatability, rather than actually repeated instances across

1

‘Es kann nicht ein einziges Mal nur ein Mensch einer Regel gefolgt sein’ was previously translated as ‘It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which someone obeyed a rule.’

Rule Following and Being Human

127

subjects. Secondly, what is possible for one person to repeat over time cannot be logically impossible for other human beings to do. Thirdly, following a rule is objective, meaning there must be a use of the rule independent of the individual rule-follower. Fourthly, rule-following practice also shows that living human beings belong to a community in their characteristic ways of being human. Wittgenstein admitted the possibility of a solitary individual like Robinson Crusoe following rules in physical isolation. Having mastered the techniques of following rules, Robinson could continue to practice them in the island. What Wittgenstein insists on is that there is a certain normative regularity in his behaviour. Robinson could formulate new rules but they are to be manifested in his behaviour. We can even imagine Robinson using a rule only for himself, ‘but then he must behave in a certain way’ (MS 149, 22). His behavioural pattern, however, cannot be essentially ‘private.’ As we have seen, a living human being is substantially present in the world, and his actions are calibrated against the objects in the world. These actions are observable by others and capable of being judged as rule-following acts. Observers could theoretically learn them. The idea that a human being is practising a technique that no other human being could be taught or master is incoherent. Robinson’s rule is a rule ‘only in so far as it might be used among human beings’ (PO 321). This is one of the grammatical points that Wittgenstein wants to clarify by the claim that one cannot follow a rule ‘privately.’ Wittgenstein does not exclude the possibility of following a rule in private in the sense of physical isolation, although, of course, a solitary rule-follower will lack any opportunity to explain the rules he is following to anyone else; nor can he be taught or corrected by others. Though a person in physical

128

Being Human after Wittgenstein

isolation is not ipso facto disqualified from following rules, his engagements with things are not private in the radical sense; they are open to others. Others can observe them, understand them and follow them. From the point of view of being human, being with others matters and it matters in a categorically different way from our engagement with the physical environment. A living human being in being present to the world is present also to other human beings. Being present to other human beings is characteristically different from being present to objects and this capacity is of enormous significance in the growth and development of a human being – ‘on being human.’ According to Archer, ‘it is just as ineluctable that we have subject/subject relationships in the social realm as that we had subject/object relations in the practical world and bodily/environmental relations in the nature. The three together make up the human condition; they stem from our human nature and we would not be recognisably human in the absence of any of them.’1 Limiting our engagements to the world of things significantly alters the character of our ‘being human.’ Wittgenstein’s language often suggests that he has communal practice (‘eine allgemeine Praxis’ MS 165, 79) in mind. His reference to ‘customs’ and ‘institutions’ in relation to the discussion of rules and rule-following and in other related issues led Malcolm, Kripke, Wright, Bloor and others to argue that rulefollowing practices are inherently social. As we have seen, Wittgenstein emphasised the importance of training, drill and exercises in inculcating practices within groups of people (e.g., PI 189, 208). To teach someone to follow a rule, for example, the series of integers, we put them through a certain amount of training. The process of training is rigorous because of its 1

Archer 2000, 215.

Rule Following and Being Human

129

centrality and importance in our lives: ‘And that is why we learn to count as we do: with endless practice, with merciless exactitude; that is why it is inexorably insisted that we shall all say “two” after “one,” “three” after “two” and so on’ (RFM 37). His focus is on practices both for generating and preserving shared patterns of behaviour. ‘This is how one calculates. Calculating is this. What we learn at school, for example’ (OC 47). According to this interpretation of rule-following, practice is necessarily a shared pattern of behaviour – a common property of a community of like-minded and consenting living human beings who agree in their definitions, judgements and in their forms of life. Wittgenstein’s remark that someone directs himself by a signpost ‘only in so far as there exists a regular use of signposts, a custom’ (PI 198) is taken by these authors to argue that rulefollowing is a shared form of behaviour. In their view, an individual practice is a ‘private’ practice and it lacks normativity because a solitary individual cannot maintain the important distinction between thinking and actually following a rule. Moreover, a practice is something one can be instructed in or trained to engage in and it must be a procedure that could be taught to another person, even if, in fact, only one person engages in it.1 According to them, rule-following is ‘a collective pattern of self-referring activity’2 and a framework of community is essential for following a rule. Regularity across persons and calibration against other people are essential to rule-following behaviour, as it provides the necessary and sufficient objectivity and normativity to rules, they argue.

1 2

Arrington 2001, 130-1. Bloor 1997, 33.

130

Being Human after Wittgenstein

On this view, the notion of practice is meant to highlight this essential social nature of what we call ‘following a rule;’ it is necessarily a custom established by the activities of a group. ‘How could human behaviour be described?’ Wittgenstein asked: Surely only by sketching the actions of a variety of humans, as they are all mixed up together. What determines our judgment, our concepts and reactions, is not what one man is doing now, an individual action, but the whole hurly-burly of human actions, the background against which we see any action’ (Z 567; RPP II, 629). Clearly, Wittgenstein subscribes in this remark not only to spatio-temporal regularity but also to regularity across persons. This seems also to offer an immediate answer to the question of how a practice provides normativity for actions. It is provided by the agreement of the members of the group and the individual’s action is judged right or wrong objectively. Here ‘correct’ means what is agreed by the community, and ‘wrong’ means what is against the will of the group. A decision is made not on what the individual intends, but on what others typically do and say. ‘The common behaviour of a group provides, as it were, the background of the fixed stars against which individual bodies can be perceived to be in motion or at rest (regular or deviant).’1 According to this view, it is only in virtue of the possibility of referring an action to the standard behavioural pattern of a community that we can distinguish between thinking that one is obeying a rule and actually obeying it.2 Where such comparison cannot be made, the distinction between is and ought, without which there cannot be any rule-following, vanishes. Considered

1 2

Baker & Hacker 1988, 171. Kripke 1982, 79.

Rule Following and Being Human

131

in isolation, no person can be said to conform to a rule: ‘It is not possible to follow a rule “privately”‘ (PI 202). According to Bloor, ‘The authentic, independent or ‘extrinsical,’ existence of a rule – independent or extrinsic, that is, to any individual consciousness – consists in its being a social institution.’1 This is ‘a form of collectivism’: ‘Rules are social institutions or social customs or social conventions; to follow a rule is therefore to participate in an institution and to adopt or conform to a custom or convention.’2 In this view, the idea of individuals following a rule in isolation from the community does not make sense because rule-following is a matter of participating in a communal practice. The notion of a rule guiding an isolated person has no substantive content, though the situation radically changes if we consider him as interacting with a wider community.3 Individuals follow rules when they participate in communal practices. The community decides the rule and judges the individual’s action as following a rule or not. Individuals may go wrong; and the community gives the necessary standards of correctness. Community itself cannot be wrong, because it is autonomous. According to this view, Normative standards come from the consensus generated by a number of interacting rule followers, and it is maintained by collective monitoring, controlling and sanctioning their individual tendencies. The consensus makes norms objective, that is, a source of external and impersonal constraint on the individual. It gives substance to the distinction between rule followers

Bloor 1997, 55. Bloor 1997, 5. 3Kripke 1982, 89. 1 2

132

Being Human after Wittgenstein

thinking they have got it right, and their having really got it right.1 To the question, ‘even if everybody believed that twice two was five would it still be four?’ (PI p. 226), the answer, on this view, is negative – it would be five, not four. The act of parliament in Italy to fix the gender of the word ‘euro’ is a case in point. Similarly, a piece of wire is a standard metre, because there is an agreement in using it so and rules of chess are what they collectively agreed to be. In short, rules are institutions, conventions implicitly or explicitly agreed by the community. The argument can be summarised as follows: No single individual can make sense of the idea of correct employment of a rule except with reference to the authority of securable communal agreement on the matter; and ‘for the community itself there is no authority, no standard to meet.’2 These communitarian interpreters admit a number of constraints that provide us with the necessary normativity with regard to rulefollowing like our instincts, biological nature, sense of experience, interactions with other people, training, etc. Though they might start with human physical and psychological nature, they all end with the sociological aspects of human life. According to Bloor, It is society that is external to us and the true source of our sense that rules exist as an independent reality set over against the individual rule follower. So there is a reality answering to these mysterious, myth-ridden feelings, but nothing that lies beyond the social collectivity and its constituent parts. We are only

1 2

Bloor 1997, 17. Wright 1980, 220.

Rule Following and Being Human

133

compelled by rules in so far as we, collectively, compel one another.1 This communitarian interpretation, however, is confused. First of all, this is not what we generally do; this is not a ‘use and custom among us, or a fact of our natural history’ (RFM 61). For example, we do not typically make use of the agreement of the members of the group or statistics about their behaviour in settling what accords or conflicts with a rule even though we settle what rules they have by reference to their behaviour. Similarly, we do not define ‘correct’ in terms of what is normal in a group (RPP II, 414) nor do we acknowledge such an explanation as evidence for understanding of the term ‘correct.’ ‘“Well, because we all do it like that”‘ (Z 319) is neither a necessary nor a sufficient reason for the normativity of a rule. A parallel claim would be that ‘red’ means the colour that most people call ‘red’ and that is simply an erroneous definition of ‘red’ (Z 431), although it is true that English speakers normally call red things ‘red’ (PI 381). Similarly the definition of “same” is not ‘what all or most human beings with one voice take for the same’ (RFM 406). If we regard an individual as aiming to follow in accord with a communal practice, we only take account of the possibility that the person may go out of step with the practice of his fellow members, but not with a rule that is independent of the community judgement.2 This would leave us a notion of right and wrong totally dependent on community agreement and truth becomes whatever is agreed by the community. ‘This is right’ just means, according to this view, ‘This is what is agreed by the majority members of the community.’ Truth becomes

1 2

Bloor 1997, 22. McDowell 1984, 328.

134

Being Human after Wittgenstein

whatever decreed by the community and an action becomes right when interpreted so by the community. Truth does no longer depend on Platonic or Cartesian entity but on the communal custom and practice. If whatever seems right to the community is to be judged right and that judgement makes it right, one would like to say, that only means that here also we can’t talk about “right” (refer PI 258). Objectivity of rules demands that they are independent of both the individuals and the community, though there could not be human rules independent of living human beings. This social interpretation of practice is against the spirit of Wittgenstein’s emphatic remark that ‘Following according to a rule is FUNDAMENTAL’ (RFM 330) since it tries to ground rulefollowing in human collective agreement. According to Wittgenstein, a rule is internally related to rule-following acts and, therefore, stipulating standards of correctness is also internal to the rule. Wittgenstein’s illuminating remark that ‘‘Obeying a rule’ is a practice’ (PI 202) is to bring to light this aspect of rule-following rather than to make it a social phenomenon. The notion of ‘practice,’ as we have seen, also gave the necessary normativity to rule. Defining ‘correct’ in terms of consensus among the interacting agents, on the other hand, make correctness as externally related to the technique of applying a given rule. Once it is postulated external to the rule, as McDowell observed, ‘It is obscure how we could hope to claw ourselves back by manipulating the notion of accredited membership in a linguistic community.’1 If the idea is that linguistic action of the solitary agent is disciplined by the action of others, all it offers as the basis is further linguistic action,

1

McDowell 1984, 330.

Rule Following and Being Human

135

which, in turn, stands in need of calibration.1 Wittgensteinian texts do not support a social interpretation of rules where the source of normativity is reduced to the community; nor does he give an individualistic interpretation. His interest was to show that there is no gap between rules and rule-following actions and that in practices both rules and rule-following actions are seen in action. Practices are normative human actions resulting from our direct engagements with what is independent of us. ‘Practice’ is to be taken as a primitive concept as we have taken ‘living human being’ as a fundamental concept in the previous chapter. The notion of practice does not necessarily involve community. There can be individual practices. What matters to the concept of rule-following as a practice is not whether the rule follower is singular or plural; it is the nature of practice itself, objective, regular and normative human actions. It is not the empirical issue of a lone rule-follower that engages Wittgenstein but the logical issue of what is it to follow a rule. He objected to ‘private’ practices, meaning practices that are essentially private in such a way that other human beings are logically excluded from learning and participating in them. It is not part of the grammar of the concept of practice that it must be shared, but only that it must be shareable.2 It must be shareable because as we have seen, rule-following is a human action that must be repeatable. If it is repeatable over instances, there cannot be something constitutive of such actions that prevent logically the repeatability across persons. It must be logically possible to teach and learn a technique of following a rule, to determine whether a given act is in accordance or in conflict with the rule. It must be intelligible that others can qualify as masters of any genuine

1 2

Luntley 2003, 114. Baker & Hacker 1988, 164.

136

Being Human after Wittgenstein

technique. It cannot remain something that one person alone can understand and apply. That, however, does not mean that at any given moment there must be a group of people following a rule. In observing that ‘rule’ and ‘following a rule’ relate to a technique or custom (RFM 346) and that ‘following a rule’ is a practice (PI 202), Wittgenstein is locating them in a wider context of the concepts of regularity of human nature and the nature of the world rather than restricting them to a solitary individual or multiplicity of interacting agents. Wittgenstein did not just liberate us from the confusion of Platonic and mental entities and from interpretational and dispositional hypotheses to lead us to a solitary confinement or communitarian camp. To conclude, Wittgenstein’s remarks on rules and rulefollowing highlight the important characteristics of rulefollowing: objectivity, regularity, and normativity. It is rightly seen as an instantiation of regular patterns within a complex form of life. A single action would not be qualified as a rule and one cannot follow a rule ‘privately.’ Rules guide human behaviour by providing reasons for action and set standards of correctness for behavioural patterns. Explanations and interpretations do not mediate between rules and their applications though they may serve in learning and teaching rules. They are, however, neither sufficient nor necessary. We typically learn and teach rules by examples and practice. Given that ‘following according to the rule is FUNDAMENTAL to our language-game’ (RFM 330), there are no other justifications or explanations underlying these. One may understand or misunderstand a rule and how one understands is shown in the actions one performs in following it. Since how we understand the rule is manifest in our actions, the correctness of our understanding turns on the correctness of our rule-following acts. That is, the test for our

Rule Following and Being Human

137

understanding of a rule is not explanation or interpretation but patterns of behaviour that exhibit the mastery of a rule. These patterns of behaviour are what we understand by human practices. What we understand by a rule is exhibited in the custom of going by it, in the normative regularity of following it, of doing what we call ‘following it.’ For example, we understand the rule ‘add 2’ if we write down just this sequence, since that is what is determined as ‘following this rule.’ Wittgenstein does not say that following a rule is necessarily a social practice, as if the notion of following a rule needs a team of rule-followers, as in playing cricket, in order to be meaningfully applied. His point is that it is a practice, a skill shown in normative action. Following a rule is an activity that manifests mastery of a practice; not a one-off affair, but something generally exhibited on many occasions. This is what Wittgenstein means by practice – normative regularity of human actions (refer PI 51, 197). The notion of practice, as we have seen, is primarily concerned with objectivity, regularity and normativity of an action, rather than the multiplicity of interacting agents, though other human beings cannot be logically excluded from following a particular rule. Thus, the rule-following remarks not only clarify the nature of understanding and application of rules but also of our life in the world as living human beings. The claim that normativity is internal to rule-following practices shows also the character of who we are and how we live. We are active agents; not merely followers of Platonic rules. As we follow the rules we shape the form of our lives. The normative practices play decisive roles in the process of our being human. It is not the rules, but we as living human beings who are in charge here. It is part of our natural history that we belong to communities leading rule-governed lives in conversation and collaboration with fellow human beings. This is not a theory of being human

138

Being Human after Wittgenstein

but part of the framework of a philosophical anthropology, after Wittgenstein. These fundamental facts of our lives – facts about how we live, move and have our being – are further investigated and clarified in the next section, by Wittgenstein’s remarks on ‘private language.’ Language is a rule-governed system, a practice that is fundamental to living human beings. Wittgenstein’s treatment of private language would show that language is a practice based on human interaction with the objects in the world and develops in agreement with fellow human beings. Like rule-following, language use is a joint venture of nature and nurture.

Chapter 6

Private Language and Being Human 6.1. Treatment of Private Language Wittgenstein raises the problem of a private language in PI 243: Could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences – his feelings, moods, and the rest – for his private use? – Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? – But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. A private language, as described here, is not just a language used privately like a code language or a language that is used only in monologues (PI 243). It is not a language spoken by only one person like Robinson Crusoe (MS 124, 221), or the last Mohican, or the inventor of a new language like Esperanto. All these languages are private in the sense that only one person contingently uses them. They are, however, potentially public as they could be taught to others and might be translated into other languages. The private language that is discussed here is essentially so private that it is logically impossible for another to understand. The issue is not about the contingent privacy of someone who has a language, and happens to live alone. The issue is about the logical privacy of a language, the ‘sounds which no one else understands’ but which the speaker alone

140

Being Human after Wittgenstein

‘appears to understand’ (PI 269). It is also to be noted that Wittgenstein’s concern is not with a private or solitary person but with an ordinary person who wants to devise a private language ab initio ‘to give vocal expression to his inner experiences … for his private use.’ Wittgenstein wants to question the presuppositions of such a private language use. To devise and maintain the logical privacy of this language, the words of this language should not be connected with anything that may undermine their radical privacy. Thus, the natural expressions of sensations (PI 256), words and logical concepts used in ordinary language (PI 261) are excluded; otherwise, ‘someone else might understand it as well as I’ (PI 256). By definition, one could only ‘enter the world of private language semantically naked.’1 The crucial issue is: Can there be ‘a language which describes my inner experiences’ on the assumption that my experiences are privately owned and known? If yes, can I keep the language private? It is not a question whether I can have a language if I decide to live alone. This is about inventing a language ab initio which logically can have only one user. Negatively, the argument shows that a logically private language is without content; even the speaker does not understand it; it cannot have standards of correctness and, therefore, no use; it is ‘a philosophical monstrosity.’2 Positively, the treatment shows who we are and how we live in the world in our direct engagement with things and persons in the world. It is this positive aspect of being human that forms part of the framework of a philosophical anthropology, after Wittgenstein, my primary interest in this work.

1 2

Fogelin 1987, 174. Hacker 1993, 39.

Private Language and Being Human

141

Wittgenstein’s illuminating and controversial remarks on private language are critically examined here to show our fundamental belongingness on the world and fellow human beings. As we have seen in the first part, human beings are not just ‘thinking things,’ but ‘living beings’ with rich filigree patterns of life involving body, mind, spirit, reason, will, etc. Following Wittgenstein, I have argued for the primitiveness of the concept of ‘living human being.’ Here in this section, the ‘living human being’ in the world is presented as living in communion with fellow human beings, in the characteristic use of language. Our way of being human involves fellow human beings. This is a conceptual point (not merely an empirical fact) that picks up the fact that ‘we belong to a community.’ It is not shown by a philosophical analysis but through a description of how we actually use language. Here the question is also not on the theoretical possibility of a human life without any possible or actual contact with other human beings but on our characteristic ways of being human. What I learn from Wittgenstein is that our philosophical investigations must look and see how we actually live, move and have our being rather than building-up fantastic theories about language, thought and content in abstraction. We need a philosophical anthropology that is concerned with living human beings and their ways of being human. Our language-use bears witness to the fact that ‘we belong to a community.’ It is not merely an empirical fact, but a conceptual fact about how we live in conversation and collaboration with others. The arguments here would show, as in the case of ‘rule-following,’ that language-use should not be reduced to the individual or to society. That would be similar to the pernicious reduction of living human being to body, mind, will, soul or anything other than the living human being. Language, as we use it, is a fundamental human practice that is

142

Being Human after Wittgenstein

rooted in nature and developed in collaboration and conversation with fellow human beings. Language-use is neither an invention by an individual nor a gift from society. It is the development of natural propensities of living human beings, a joint venture of nature and nurture. Language-use is also neither a finished product nor is it unfinished; it is an open-ended process, like human beings who use language in various ways in the stream of life in conversation and collaboration with fellow human beings. Wittgenstein’s sketches on rules and rule-following are reminders assembled (PI 127) for the purpose of dissolving the pseudo-intermediaries like Platonic and mental entities, interpretation and disposition between a rule and its application. Other concepts like practice and community are not proposed as possible candidates to bridge the apparent gap. They are not further candidates for intermediaries; they rather clarify the framework of the institution of rule-following. It is in the stream of human life, our common ways of acting that a rule and the act in accord with it make contact; a rule is described and the corresponding act is explained. Wittgenstein’s treatment of private language will show that this is true about our languageuse. ‘For words have meaning only in the stream of life’ (RPP II, 687). Life in its variety and complexity is the conceptual framework of anything that is significantly human and this background is beyond a complete theoretical articulation. The simile of the stream shows the dynamic shape of ‘our complicated forms of life.’ The stream is formed as it flows on and our concepts stand in the middle of it (RC 302). He also uses the analogy of a weave: ‘Seeing life as a weave … where one pattern is not always complete and is varied in a multiplicity of ways … and is interwoven with many others’ (Z 568, 569). The necessary stability of our lives is provided by the interweaving

Private Language and Being Human

143

of the many patterns rather than by any one single pattern. The concept of living human being and language use are interwoven with many other patterns. Neither is complete without the other. Our language-use is both dynamic and stable; it is part of our being human and rests on agreement in our form of life (PI 241), which includes both agreements in actions and judgements.1 It is important to note that a lot of ‘stage-setting’ is presupposed (PI 257) for language-use, including a shareable human nature and the uniformity of the nature of the world in which we live, move and have our being. This is what I learn from Wittgenstein when he uses expressions like ‘stream,’ ‘weave,’ ‘web,’ ‘hurly-burly’ and ‘bustle’ of life. They make up not just the empirical but also the conceptual background against which rule-following and language-use are possible. If one were to take away the surrounding contexts and the patterns in the weave, the web of collaboration and conversation, only empty marks, noises and movements would remain (refer RFM 345, 414). Our common ways of acting are the patterns in the weave of life. They serve as systems of reference by means of which we interpret a word or a language use (PI 206). For example, what the word ‘pain’ means is not fixed by speakers looking inward and identifying ‘the same again’ – as the private linguist thinks; it gets used in the web of human life, by the way we use it. A private linguist separates himself off from this immense variety of patterns of human practices in the weave of life to such an extent that the proposed language could not be that of a ‘living human being.’ It would remain mere sounds and ink marks. Following Wittgenstein, I shall first discuss a pervasive picture of human experience and language upon which the

1

The crucial role of agreement in action and judgement is discussed further in the next section.

144

Being Human after Wittgenstein

private linguist seems to base himself. Wittgenstein questioned the presuppositions that (1) sensations are exclusively private, meaning that they are owned and known by the subject alone, (2) they can be named by ostensive definition and (3) those words can be used in a private language. The remarks show negatively the incoherence of private language and positively the importance of regularity of practice and agreement in judgements in our language use thereby showing the character of our direct engagement with things and persons in the world in the process of our ‘being human.’ I begin with the clarifications regarding sensation-words and private language. 6.2. ‘How Do Words Refer to Sensations’? (PI 244) This is the first question that Wittgenstein asks once he begins his diagnosis of private language. He observes: ‘when we surrender ourselves to philosophical thought’ (PI 299), ‘We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena’ (PI 90) and raise the question: ‘For how can I go so far as to try to use language to get between pain and its expression?’ (PI 245). A traditional philosophical answer is private ostensive definition according to which we grasp the meaning of ‘pain’ on the basis of being presented with a sample of pain, which we fix in our minds by concentrating our attention on our feeling. According to this view, ‘once you know what the words stand for, you understand it, you know its whole use’ (PI 264). This view is, however, wrong. Wittgenstein is pitching himself against a pervasive picture of human experience and language, according to which sensations are exclusively private. According to this picture, the subjective knowledge about sensations, feelings and other experiences is infallible. Others cannot contest my claims about my state of mind such as ‘I am in pain,’ ‘I am happy’ and ‘I am hungry.’ In this view, one’s own mind is transparent to oneself

Private Language and Being Human

145

and inaccessible to others. The objects, events, and processes in it are immediately known by introspection, and what seems to be in the mind is in it. Moreover, these states are independent of behaviour. It follows that one cannot know of other people’s experiences and mental states as one knows one’s own, direct and infallible, as they are inferred only from the observation of their behaviour, an indirect and fallible form of knowledge. We cannot achieve certain knowledge of others’ mental states; we can, at best, only surmise that things are thus-and-so with them. Further, it seems impossible for another person to have what I have when I have pain. Therefore, if I define ‘pain’ by reference to what I have, then it is logically impossible for others to know what I mean by the word ‘pain.’ That means my sensation language is essentially private. Wittgenstein’s sketches, however, show that this view of sensation language is ‘patently nonsense.’ Words do not acquire their meaning for each of us by an essentially private process: ‘an internal ostensive definition in which an appropriate sample of experience was attended to and associated with a word.’1 Making a noise while concentrating one’s attention on a sensation does not make the noise a name of anything, for it does not lay down a norm of correct use. ‘Pain’ and other sensation words are not defined by a private ostensive definition nor are they identified by introspection. In fact, we do not have an ideal special vocabulary and language for subjective experiences without any reference to the objective world but available to the person through pure acts of introspection. Wittgenstein claims that our sensation language cannot be essentially private. It is part of our ordinary language and is interwoven with other uses of language. 1

Kenny 1973, 179.

146

Being Human after Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein reminds us that When one says ‘He gave a name to his sensation’ one forgets that a great deal of stage setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense. Naming is only a preparation for description; it is not yet a move in a language-game (PI 49). And when we speak of someone’s having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word ‘pain;’ it shews the post where the new word is stationed (PI 257). A new word is used in connection with other words. The ‘post’ refers to the rules of grammar for the use of the new word. The grammar explains the meaning of the word only ‘when the overall role of the word in language is clear’ (PI 30) and ‘only someone who already knows how to do something with it can significantly ask a name’ (PI 31). ‘The overall role of the word,’ obviously, does not mean all the rules that determine the use of words for every single occasion. For example, when a child learns the word ‘pain,’ he is not expected to ‘know its whole use.’ Yet that does not give rise to anarchy. He learns the rules as he goes on. Some of the rules may change. Those who participate in the language game show ‘the overall role of the word’ in the stream of their lives, in the regularity of their words and deeds and in their agreement in actions and judgements. In learning language, thus, we do not merely learn the pronunciation, spelling and syntax of words, but the forms of life which make those sounds and ink marks the words they are, play their role in the respective language-games – asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying, etc.1 We are not just copying, but we actively join in to go on creatively. We learn words and we use them in 1

Cavell 1999, 177.

Private Language and Being Human

147

various life situations as we move on. Wittgenstein denies the possibility of a private language, because a private practice cannot have independent criteria of correctness. Practices are, as we have seen, objective, regular and normative and therefore open to other fellow human beings. Wittgenstein follows his own advice1 and engages in a descriptive philosophical anthropology to answer the question, ‘How do words refer to sensations?’ ‘In such a difficulty always ask yourself: How did we learn the meaning of this word (‘good’ for instance)? From what sort of examples? In what languagegames?’ (PI 77). The question with regard to sensation, then, becomes, ‘How does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations?’ (PI 244). He tries to answer it with the example of ‘pain’ and draws our attention to how we learned the use of the word. ‘A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour.’ The child’s natural tendency to moan and rub an injured arm is made with training, into the articulate expression “I have pain in my arm.” By learning to use the word ‘pain,’ the child, thus, acquires a linguistic technique which enables him to express what he feels instead of the natural expressions of pain: ‘words are connected with the primitive, the natural expressions of the sensation and used in their place.’ The word ‘pain’, however, does not mean crying. ‘On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it’ (PI 244). The expression, ‘I have

1

At PI 179, we find, ‘Think how we learn to use the expressions “Now I know how to go on”, “Now I can go on” and others; in what family of language-games we learn their use’, and again at PI p. 190, “How did we ever come to use such an expression as “I believe ...”?

148

Being Human after Wittgenstein

pain,’ according to this picture, is a ‘cry of complaint’ (PI p. 189), an ‘articulated crying.’1 Crying, however, is not a report about the child’s feelings of pain, but an expression of pain. Though they are related, they have different semantical properties. ‘I have pain’ is subject to true or false judgements whereas crying is not. Being in pain is independent of my will whereas the expression of pain depends on my will. More importantly, the non-propositional account of avowals, according to which the sensation words do not describe how things are, but only express how the subject experiences things, takes away the force of the argument against the private language. The problem for the private linguist is the lack of normativity. He cannot make the distinction between seems right and is right. That means he cannot have calibration for his word use. For that claim to be significant, the sensation word-use must be subject to this distinction and stand in need of calibration. If ‘I have pain’ is only ‘a cry of complaint,’ it is only a pain behaviour, there is no point in true/false judgement; there is no seems/is right distinction; there is no issue about calibration.2 If that is the case, the private linguist does not need calibration for his use of sensation words and private language is possible. In his description, Wittgenstein, however, reminds us that sensation words are not defined by a private ostensive definition nor are they identified by introspection. He refers to the example ‘I’m afraid:’ I can find no answer if I try to settle the question “What am I referring to?” “What am I thinking when I say it?” by repeating the expression of fear and at the same time

1 2

Fogelin 1987, 170. Luntley 2003, 126-7.

Private Language and Being Human

149

attending to myself, as it were observing my soul out of the corner of my eye (PI p. 188). We are not taught to look introspectively either to learn the grammar of ‘pain,’ ‘fear,’ ‘joy,’ etc. or to use it as a criterion in future. ‘If we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of “object and name” the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant’ (PI 293). In the Zettel, to the observation by the interlocutor that ‘“Joy” surely designates an inward thing,’ Wittgenstein replies, ‘No. “Joy” designates nothing. Neither any inward nor any outward thing’ (Z 487). This is not the same as to claim, however, that pain, joy, fear, etc., do not exist nor are they identified with forms of behaviour. For Wittgenstein they are real and are important aspects of human life (PI 304). The words that refer to these experiences, like other words, have their roles in the stream of life. They cannot, however, be described on the model of ‘object and name.’ It is not an inner/outer/transcendent object: ‘It is not a something, but not a nothing either!’ (PI 304). Wittgenstein rightly points out that we are given lessons neither in introspection nor in ostensive definition to use the word ‘pain.’ Instead, ‘we learn words in certain contexts’ (BB 9) and those words have a function in the weave of life and the patterns are varied and interconnected. According to Wittgenstein, ‘Describing my state of mind (of fear, say) is something I do in a particular context. (Just as it takes a particular context to make a certain action into an experiment)’ (PI p.188). We judge an action according to its background within the ‘bustle of life.’ This background is not ‘monochrome,’ but ‘a very complicated filigree pattern,’ with a rich variety and a certain indefiniteness. It would be artificial to draw a conceptual boundary line where there is not some special justification for it (RPP II, 624-8). For example, ‘We learn the use of ‘feed the kitty’,

150

Being Human after Wittgenstein

‘feed the lion’, ‘feed the swans’, and one day one of us says ‘feed the meter’, or ‘feed the film’, or ‘feed the machine’, or ‘feed his pride’, or ‘feed wire’, and we understand, we are not troubled.’1 Similarly, through repeated regular uses – ‘pain’, ‘my pain’, ‘his/her pain’ and so on – the child is taught the use of the word ‘pain.’ The child also learns the similarities and differences with regard to physical pain, mental pain, pain at the suffering/death of a loved one, etc. What he learns is not the sum total of what was taught. He understands that one does not speak univocally, but analogically in these occasions. In Wittgensteinian terms, the child learns that ‘This and similar things are called ‘pain’’ (refer PI 69). He sees connexions and judges accordingly. According to Cavell, ‘Persons who cannot use words, or gestures, in these ways with you may yet be in your world, but perhaps not of your flesh.’2 ‘We cannot find our feet with them’ (PI p. 223),3 Wittgenstein would say. What matters for the mastery of our concept of pain is an ability to use the relevant expression in accordance with the rules of the language-game. Wittgenstein wants to remind us that ‘You learned the concept ‘pain’ when you learned language’ (PI 384). This is true about other words referring to ‘feelings, moods and the rest.’ Their meanings are internal to the patterns of use. If anything, it is the context and the characteristic form of life that would enable meaningful use of those words. Learning of a language, as we have noted, is not just learning the spelling, pronunciation and syntax; it is to join in the stream of life.

Cavell 1999, 181. Cavell 1999, 189. 3Wir können uns nicht in sie finden literally means we cannot find us in them. 1 2

Private Language and Being Human

151

It seems that, with respect to the private linguist’s efforts to refer to sensations, part of the stage setting is available for him. There is a certain regularity in the way he is and the way the world is. How he interacts with the objects in the world gives rise to similar sensations. When cold, he extends his hands towards the fire, but excessive heat leads him to withdraw them, and ‘it is upon these prior physiological signifiers that our language of feelings is built and our emotional expressiveness is born.’1 It is upon nature that nurture builds up. If he has also acquired the grammar of a public language, that would also be part of the stage setting. A child progresses gradually in the use of a language. A private linguist also might progress similarly. Besides, all the stage setting need not be learned. At PI 262, Wittgenstein himself admits the possibility that one invents the technique of using the word or finds it ready-made. He also does not seem to reject the possibility that such stage setting could even be innate. It is imaginable that a word in a private language ‘gains its sense through an equally private employment in a private language-game, a private practice, or a private form of life.’2 What then is the problem? It won’t be a word as we know and use it; it would be merely a mark or noise. Our word-use is objective, keeping the seems/is distinction, and normative, maintaining the is/ought distinction. It can be taught, learned and translated to other languages. That would mean that a private language would not belong to the family of languages as we use. Before we proceed further, we need to clarify the nature of ‘privacy’ of the private language.

1 2

Archer 2000, 155. Fogelin 1987, 175.

152

Being Human after Wittgenstein

6.3. ‘In What Sense Are My Sensations Private?’ (PI 246) Wittgenstein distinguishes two senses of the word ‘private.’ The first sense of privacy is epistemic: ‘Only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it’ (PI 246). Secondly, something is private to me if only I can have it: ‘Another person can’t have my pains’ (PI 253). The first is private knowledge and the second private ownership. Wittgenstein rejects both these claims. He wants to undermine the picture of sensation language, according to which, ‘The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person possesses his own exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people also have this or something else’ (PI 272). The epistemic claim about privacy has two aspects: (1) ‘Only I can know whether I am really in pain’ and (2) ‘Another person can only surmise it.’ Wittgenstein rejects the first claim: ‘It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. . . . for I cannot be said to learn of them’ (PI 246). According to him, learning is a constitutive element of knowing. He seems to hold that if you cannot learn something, you cannot be said to know it. Of course, there is no such thing as learning that I am in pain though I learn to use the word ‘pain.’ Wittgenstein brings in a supportive argument for his claim: ‘One says “I know” where one can also say “I believe” or “I suspect;” where one can find out’ (PI p. 221). Obviously, one cannot doubt that one is in pain and it is senseless to say either ‘I suspect whether ouch’ or ‘I know that I ouch.’ In fact, ‘it means nothing to doubt whether I am in pain!’ (PI 288). Therefore, Wittgenstein rejects the claim ‘I know I am in pain’ as meaningful language. For Wittgenstein, exclusion of doubt excludes knowledge. This is, however, unwarranted. There are other genuine pieces of knowledge where we do not ‘doubt.’ I do not doubt perceptual knowledge; yet it is a genuine piece of

Private Language and Being Human

153

knowledge. I know how to swim; yet I don’t doubt swimming. I do not doubt whether two plus two is four; that does not mean that it is not a genuine piece of knowledge. In fact, as Wittgenstein himself admitted, ‘the absence of doubt is of the essence of the language-game’ (OC 370). Though different from other empirical knowledge, ‘I know I am in pain’ is a genuine piece of knowledge. I shall act with a certainty that knows no doubt here (OC 360). It is doubt that is nonsense not the statement about the knowledge. If I cannot know of my own sensations, how can I know of anything else? Though there are occasions when others will not know about my pain, there are no occasions when I do not know about my pain. Hence, ‘I know I am in pain’ must be responded with ‘of course’ and not ‘nonsense’ (refer PI 252). That does not mean that it is a logically private knowledge. The second claim about private knowledge that ‘others can only surmise that I am in pain’ is also rejected by Wittgenstein: ‘In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense.’ It is wrong, in his view, because ‘other people very often know when I am in pain’ (PI 246) and nonsense, because if it were logically impossible for another to know that I am in pain, it would be equally impossible for another to surmise it. This view, however, weakens his arguments against the first claim. Wittgenstein who did not want to use ‘to know’ with the first-person sensation language finds no qualms to use it with the third-person pronouncements. It is patently nonsense to hold a position in which I do not know that I am in pain though other people know that I am in pain. Do others always ‘learn’ that I am in pain; or do they always need to ‘doubt’ whether I am really in pain? There are occasions when others do not learn that I am in pain; neither do they doubt it. As Wittgenstein himself remarked, ‘If I see someone writhing in pain with evident cause I

154

Being Human after Wittgenstein

do not think: all the same, his feelings are hidden from me’ (PI p. 223). This is true about when I am writhing in pain, say in a road accident. Others do not doubt whether I am in pain, they come to help me (hopefully!). Wittgenstein himself admits, I can be as certain of someone else’s sensations as of any fact. But this does not make the propositions “He is much depressed,” “25 x 25 = 625” and “I am sixty years old” into similar instruments. The explanation suggests itself that the certainty is of a different kind. . . . The kind of certainty is the kind of language-game (PI p. 224). I want to add that I can be as certain of my own sensations as of any fact. Of course, ‘the certainty is of a different kind.’ It is a genuine piece of knowledge, however; not ‘nonsense!’ We need only to remind ourselves: ‘My own relation to my words is wholly different from other people’s’ (PI p. 192). Wittgenstein who is brilliant to note the differences and similarities in different language-games draws sharp boundaries around ‘know’ against his own intuition that ‘the application of a word is not everywhere bounded by rules’ (PI 84). After drawing our attention to the similarities and differences in how we apply ‘to know’ to objects, sensations and others, he should have said: “This and similar things are called ‘knowledge;’ this is how we use the word ‘know.’” That there is no set of necessary and sufficient rules for the use of the concept ‘knowledge’ ‘is not ignorance’ (refer PI 69). It is what we know. Being able to see that one activity is similar to another . . . is primitive. There is no reason behind our use of words for classifying something as a game. The reason lies in our seeing similarities. We cite

Private Language and Being Human

155

examples and, as we become competent with the concept, we learn to see activities as similar.1 Learning to see activities as similar is part of our being human. This is how human beings ‘learn’ and ‘understand.’ That this is right is important to our methodology for bringing out a philosophical anthropology, after Wittgenstein. Our language use and streams of life rest on seeing similarities. I know that I am in pain, I know that someone else is in pain and someone else knows that I am in pain. Though the certainty is of a different kind, there are enough similarities to use the word ‘know’ in all these situations. Of course, these are different situations and we learn to use ‘know’ and ‘pain’ in these varying contexts of human life. This is part of the learning of sensation words. The learning process includes both nature and nurture and nurture modifies nature. I know that I am in pain by having it; I know that someone else is in pain from the context, including the person’s words and deeds. However, I do not have his pain; others do not have my pain either. Wittgenstein, however, rejects the claim that “Another person can’t have my pains.” He asks: ‘Which are my pains? What counts as a criterion of identity here?’(PI 253). If ‘The subject of pain is the person who gives it expression’ (PI 302), then, my pains are the pains to which I give expression. This behaviouristic description of pain, however, is unwarranted. Behavioural expressions are neither necessary nor sufficient for having sensations and feelings. For example, holding one’s cheek is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for having toothache. There are feelings like hope, trust, contrition and anxiety for which we have no characteristic expressions. Even when there are possible expressions, we may not express them 1

Luntley 2002, 278.

156

Being Human after Wittgenstein

always. There is also the possibility that we may give expression when we are not in pain; or we might give a wrong expression. We simply accept the fact that people may feign pain, or stoically hide it. There is a vast variety of both differences and similarities in the language-game of pain. For a variety of pains, the expressions of the baby may be the same, namely crying. If a private experience is one that is kept secret, there is no reason to call an experience that is not kept secret, a private experience. If a man is in pain, but does not show any pain behaviour or report his pain, we may call that a private experience; but if he is in pain and shows pain behaviour, why should we call that pain ‘private’? If we take ‘private’ in this sense, and ask ‘Are pains private experiences?’ the only possible answer is ‘Some are, and some are not.’ ‘Another person can’t have my pains’ cannot be used to support the argument that my pains must be different from others. Our actual talk about sensations does not depend on using criteria, ‘since there is no such thing as either identifying or misidentifying one’s own sensations.’1 I recognise that an image is the same as another, without using any criterion. ‘What is the criterion for the redness of an image (Vorstellung)? For me, when it is someone else’s image: what he says and does. For myself, when it is my image: nothing’ (PI 377). There may not be any criterion for my sorrow for the death of my mother, though I will distinguish it from my pain at the loss of life of people in natural catastrophes or war in a distant island or in my own country. Wittgenstein’s point is that this is not done by introspection. As we have seen in the previous section, pain and other sensation words do not describe a Platonic, Cartesian or empirical object. However, they are not without connection to 1

Glock 1996, 314.

Private Language and Being Human

157

objects in the world. We describe pain in terms of location, intensity and history and they are genuine pieces of knowledge, though they are different from the description of objects. This can be considered as a kind of knowledge that we have without having to learn it. Here, ‘I could not accept any experience as proof to the contrary’ (OC 360). This tells us something about the use of ‘pain,’ about our practice with the word. ‘Pain’ is not the name of an entity – private, public or transcendental – and we cannot use ‘identity’ and ‘difference’ as in the case of other objects. Of course, pains are not private as physical objects can be private. That means, we speak about ‘ownership’ here analogically. Think of ‘my pen,’ ‘my idea,’ ‘my discovery,’ ‘my body,’ ‘my land,’ ‘my mother,’ ‘my country,’ ‘my world,’ etc. The mistake is to treat them univocally and to draw rigid boundaries around the use of the word, forgetting that ‘the application of a word is not everywhere bounded by rules’ (PI 84). Drawing rigid limits to the concept of knowledge so that they can be applied only with respect to empirical objects is a philosophical mistake, even if it is done by Wittgenstein. We do not have a set of necessary and sufficient rules for the use of our words of daily use, including sensation words. Nor do we need them, as Wittgenstein clarified through his examples of ‘games,’ ‘reading,’ ‘seeing,’ etc. One of the roots of philosophical maladies is confusion about the differences of various language-games. We tend to concentrate on the form of the words rather than their varying uses. We have already referred to his remark, If I had to say what is the main mistake made by philosophers of the present generation, including Moore, I would say that it is that when language is looked at, what is looked at is a form of words and not the use made of the form of words (LC 2).

158

Being Human after Wittgenstein

When we look at ‘the use made of the forms of words,’ we are looking at human practices, normative uses by living human beings. A description of these uses would reveal characteristic ways of being human and would contribute to a philosophical anthropology, after Wittgenstein. Though ‘look and see’ is later Wittgenstein’s preferred methodology, he is not immune to the malady of looking at the form rather than the use of words. Instead of rejecting the validity of claims that ‘I know that I have pain,’ he should have just reminded himself and others of the differences in using ‘know’ and ‘have’ with regard to sensation words (‘My own relation to my words is wholly different from other peoples’ (PI p. 192)). One cannot argue for the validity of a move in a game because it is valid in another game. Similarly, a statement about ‘my pain’ is to be treated differently from statements about ‘my pen,’ because the ‘grammar’ is different. I have my pain and I know that. Neither do others have my pain nor do they know my pain; but they can know that I am in pain. The words ‘have’ and ‘know’ are used differently when they are applied to sensations rather than to physical objects; there are also obvious differences in their first-, second- and third-person applications. Following Wittgenstein, one has to remind oneself and others that there are ‘different modes of employment of words’ (RFM 202). We do have words to refer to sensations. That does not mean, however, that one can have a ‘private’ language for sensations. We need to examine Wittgenstein’s remarks to see why ‘private’ language is incoherent. 6.4. ‘Possibility of a Private Language’ (RFM 334) A private language is about private experiences and the private linguist wants to make sure that it is logically impossible for another person to understand it. Wittgenstein, in his arguments, shows that the private linguist himself cannot be said to

Private Language and Being Human

159

understand it. In his view, a private language is not only useless in communication, but also downright impossible. It is neither objective nor normative. Calibration is impossible for the private linguist because he cannot have the resources for the concept of correct use for his private experiences. He does not have a sense of something that is independent of him. The so-called private language has no use; it is merely a fantasy. Wittgenstein raises a number of pertinent questions: ‘What does it mean to say that he has ‘named his pain? – How has he done this naming of pain?! And whatever he did, what was its purpose?’ (PI 257). Private linguist is shown not to have satisfactory answers for these questions. Wittgenstein shows through various imaginary uses that the person cannot have named a sensation for his private use, because there cannot be any criterion for him; whatever seems to him is so, for him. As we have seen earlier, without the distinction between seems and is there cannot be any human practices. In PI 258, he introduces the example of a private diary to demonstrate the unintelligibility of private ostensive definition. The diarist wants to keep a diary about the occurrence of a certain sensation, and associates it with the sign ‘S.’ The sign must be defined for the diarist alone, and this must be by a private ostensive definition, that is, by his attending to the sensation and producing the sign. ‘I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation – and so, it were, point to it inwardly.’ Wittgenstein rejects the claim that a private linguist can establish correctly a connection between a sign and a sensation in this way. In his view, ‘S’ is neither the name of a sensation nor does it denote a particular kind of occurrence and it cannot be used as a word in any language.1 In as much as ‘S’ is meant to 1

Schroeder 2001, 181.

160

Being Human after Wittgenstein

name what can be known only to the private linguist and not anyone else, ‘S’ cannot be the name of a sensation, because ‘sensation’ is a word in our common language. Human sensations are bodily and are related to objects in the world and cannot be exclusively mental and private. They are described in terms of location, intensity, bodily behaviour, duration, causes, etc. If ‘S’ is characterised by any or some of these, ‘S’ is no longer essentially private. On the other hand, if ‘S’ is not characterised by any of these, it cannot be used to refer to sensations, as we understand them. To use ‘S’ as the name of a sensation, the private linguist has to relinquish the characteristics of the proposed private language. For the same reason, no definition of the sign can be expressed in terms of our public language. Similarly, a private linguist cannot use terms like ‘same,’ ‘have,’ ‘something,’ because they have a grammar in ordinary language (PI 261). They all would defeat his purpose of having a private language. Wittgenstein’s argument is that the private ostensive definition, ‘This is called ‘S’’ cannot confer meaning on ‘S.’ If the private linguist says, ‘By ‘S’ I mean this,’ gesturing, as it were, to his inner experience, then, ‘This is S’ is not a proposition capable of being true or false; ‘for what gives it its content is the very same thing as gives it its truth: the significance of the predicate is settled by the reference of the subject.’1 A description must be independent of what it is to be compared with if it is to be assessed as a correct or an incorrect description. There is no way of giving ‘S’ genuine independence of the object it purports to name, a private experience. “I impress it on myself” can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connexion right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of 1

Kenny 1973, 193.

Private Language and Being Human

161

correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘right’ (PI 258). To have any use, function, or connection with anything, ‘S’ should have certain objectivity, meaning something independent of the subject that would make calibration possible. The private linguist simply does not have this; for him everything is transparent; there is neither objectivity nor normativity. A private linguist cannot, by definition, calibrate his private sensations against things or people. Hence, ‘S’ remains an idle mark; it has yet no use. It is like someone saying: ‘“But I know how tall I am!” and laying down his hand on top of his head to prove it’ (PI 279). Obviously, that is an idle ceremony! A second option for the private linguist is to say: ‘By ‘S’ I mean the sensation I named ‘S’ in the past.’ The person is relying here on memory: one must call up a memory-sample of S to compare it with the current sensation and see whether they are alike. However, the private linguist has no criterion for ‘right memory;’ whatever seems right to him is right for him. The person can only say, “I believe that this is the sensation S again,” to which Wittgenstein retorts, ‘Perhaps you believe that you believe it!’ (PI 260). If ‘S’ means whatever memory occurs to him in connection with ‘S,’ then what seems right is right. Without certain objectivity and normativity, there cannot be a memorysample about an inner experience. He rejects also the claim that one memory impression (such as a memory image of a timetable) could confirm another. We need something independent of the subject that could function as a standard of comparison, to lay it alongside the present reality or experience for a match. There is no point in buying several copies of the morning paper to assure oneself that what is said in it is actually true (PI 265).

162

Being Human after Wittgenstein

This, however, should not be construed as a sceptical argument about our memory. How do I know that my appeal to memory is actually correct? By its connection to other events in the stream of life. My memories are connected with the rest of my life empirically and logically. This is true about statements about material objects in ordinary language; one’s ultimate appeal is often one’s own sensations and memories.1 Of course, other people can point out my error, but in order for me to understand and take account of what they say, I must recognize and judge correctly the auditory sensations of their words. If I say ‘this is red,’ and you tell me that ‘it is blue,’ I can correct myself only if I am sure that your use of ‘blue’ is correct. To do that I must be sure that I heard you saying, “No, it is blue,” and for this I must be certain that you are there, are not deaf-mute, were talking to me, etc. Each of these can further be doubted, leading to an indefinite regress. So, if to be certain that I have used a word correctly (or incorrectly) I must reach a level where no doubt is possible, then, all languages are also susceptible to the present argument.2 Here, ‘I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned’ (PI 217). If some further justification is demanded, then I must admit that I have none, but as Wittgenstein himself admits, ‘to use a word without justification does not mean to use it without right’ (PI 289). Wittgenstein himself pointed out that our language-use need not depend on definitions and samples. Our knowledge of how to apply, say, the word ‘red’ is not derived from a definition, or from some general propositional knowledge that ‘red’ denotes such-and-such a class of objects; nor do we consult a colour-chart in ordinary situations. Therefore, ‘The lack of a

1 2

Klemke 1971, 210. Klemke 1971, 233.

Private Language and Being Human

163

proper definition that would determine the meaning of the sign ‘S’ cannot be a fatal flaw of the private diary, for it is not a fatal flaw in our common-or-garden practice of teaching and using basic colour terms.’1 How do I know then that this is red if not by invoking a definition or by comparing it with a sample? ‘It would be an answer to say’, Wittgenstein affirms, “I have learned English” (PI 381). This does not, of course, mean that whatever seems to me red is red, though most of the instances I get it right. Luntley elaborates the point: Our giving of reasons has to stop somewhere, for we need to take something as given in order to get the giving of reasons off the ground. . . . there is nothing more primitive that one can say other than that the two things look similar. The fact that one has nothing more to say is not to admit that one uses the word without right. Indeed, one’s right to use the word (the fact that one is using it correctly) is shown by the fact that one uses it of two things that are similar. That is to use it with right, but it is not to give a justification, for there may be no further articulation, one has reached the point where the other has to see the similarity that you see.2 Similarly, it is possible to check one memory against another, so that the private diarist is not always totally without any criterion for detecting false recognitions of a sensation. What is problematic about the private linguist is his resolve to remain in the private realm, excluding other objects and persons logically. The memories as well as other experiences are connected to his body and other bodies outside of him. Though they are internal to his life, they are connected to things outside

1 2

Schroeder 2001, 188. Luntley 2002, 281.

164

Being Human after Wittgenstein

of him and are not essentially private. My memories, as we have seen in the case of sensations, are mine; I know them by having them. I come to know about the memories of other people by observing them, especially by listening to them but not by having them. Like my sensations, my memories are not essentially private. The private linguist’s mistake is to treat them as essentially private. Memories of living human beings are related to objects and persons in the world. What is connected with the world cannot be logically excluded from other living human beings. That is not to deny the subjective experiential dimension of my memories and sensations but to point out their relation to other objects in the world and the possibility of sharing them with other subjects. Human lives cannot be logically private. To have any use, ‘S’ needs to be measured against something objective, something independent of the subject. Wittgenstein proposes a use for ‘S:’ ‘Let us now imagine a use for the entry of the sign ‘S’ in my diary. I discover that whenever I have a particular sensation a manometer shows that my bloodpressure rises. So I shall be able to say that my blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus’ (PI 270). This is, however, a ‘mere show’ and does not give a genuine use for ‘S.’ By supposedly improving my discrimination of the sensation of blood-pressure I have only improved my discrimination of my blood-pressure. The conclusion is, ‘if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and designation’ the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant’ (PI 293). He asks us to imagine that the person regularly identifies the sensation wrong; ‘it does not matter in the least.’ That only can mean that there is no genuine use. The conclusion, once again, is that ‘S’ has no function, not even as a note. This is the predicament: to have a function ‘S’ needs to be linked to

Private Language and Being Human

165

some independent standard; it needs to be calibrated. Calibration against things or persons, however, would undermine the logical privacy of ‘S.’ Wittgenstein, here, seems to have given preference to the manometer over the subjective experience. It is just possible that the manometer reading is wrong and the person has identified the sensation ‘right.’ This is, however, Wittgenstein’s preferred way of getting rid of private objects: ‘assume that it constantly changes, but that you do not notice the change because your memory constantly deceives you’ (PI p. 207). This method, however, would bring back the Cartesian sceptical demon back into philosophy to doubt everything that is not certain. As we have seen earlier, we need to assume something and take it beyond doubt for any language-game to take-off. Wittgenstein himself admits, The primitive form of the language-game is certainty, not uncertainty. For uncertainty could not lead to action. I will say: it is characteristic for our language that it grows up from the ground of stable forms of life, regular practice (MS 119, 147. 74v).1 This is true about human experiences about our ‘feelings, moods and the rest.’ They have certain regularities. In the everyday world we would assume that the person regularly identifies the sensation right. As Wittgenstein correctly remarked, ‘our language-games are characterised by what we can and cannot do’ (Z 345). Without this presupposition of uniformity of human nature and the nature of the world, no language is possible. ‘The

1

Die primitive Form des Sprachspiels ist die Sicherheit, nicht die Unsicherheit. Denn die Unsicherheit könnte nicht zur Tat führen. Ich will sagen: es ist charakteristisch für unsere Sprache, dass sie auf dem Grund fester Lebensformen, regelmäßigen Tuns, emporwächst.

166

Being Human after Wittgenstein

common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language’ (PI 205), including a private language, if there is one. On the private language model of meaning, the private linguist can know only from his experience what ‘pain’ means, because it is his experience that makes the word meaningful. At PI 293, Wittgenstein argues that it would then be possible for the experience everyone calls ‘pain’ to be quite different. The individual’s experience would be like a beetle hidden in a box that no one else could see. Everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. – Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. . . . The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as something: for the box might even be empty. ‘The assumption would thus be possible – though unverifiable – that one section of mankind had one sensation of red and another section another’ (PI 272). This does not imply that there are no sensations, but rather that sensations cannot be understood as private entities.1 If pain is treated as a private entity, ‘It is not a something, but not a nothing either! The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said’ (PI 304). It is not just that if our sensations were completely detached from the world, there would be no point in opening our mouths to speak about them,2 but there would be no use for the private linguist either. The private linguist’s vocabulary is neither objective nor normative and therefore it cannot have any genuine use. It is ‘a mere ornament, not connected with the mechanism’ (PI 270); ‘a

1 2

Glock 1996, 314. Pears 1988, 333.

Private Language and Being Human

167

wheel that is not part of the mechanism’ (PI 271). Our ‘feelings, moods and the rest,’ however, are not private entities; they are real and are very important in our lives and we do talk about them. They are not mere ornaments; they are part and parcel of our lives. They are connected with the objects and persons in the world and are experienced and expressed in and through the body in the way we live, move and have our being. We do speak about them in ordinary language and our language is based on regularity of sensations and our agreement in actions and in judgements. These are reminders about our ways of living, rather than parts of a theory. A philosophical anthropology, thus, clarifies our ways of being human. 6.5. ‘Language Relates to a Way of Living’ (RFM 335) The use of language is characteristically human. It is something that a ‘living human being’ does and is constitutive of being human. It relates to a way of living, how we live, move and have our being in the world; it is not just a mental phenomena. This is true about our use of other symbols. Wittgenstein wrote: ‘The arrow points only in the application that a living being makes of it. This pointing is not a hocus-pocus which can be performed only by the soul’ (PI 454). ‘And if it is now said: “Isn’t it enough for there to be an imaginary application?” the answer is: No’ (RFM 334). As in the case of rule-following, language use is a practice with characteristic elements of objectivity, regularity and normativity. ‘Only in the practice of a language can a word have meaning’ (RFM 344). What Wittgenstein wants to get across is that languageuse takes place in the sphere of actual behaviour of living human beings and its foundations are in the stream of our lives. Neither the Cartesian res cogitans nor the Platonic Ideas provides the foundations for our language use. The bedrock of our practices,

168

Being Human after Wittgenstein

including language use, is the regularity of practice and agreement in acting and judgement. Unless there is regularity in the use of a word, it cannot function as a word in any language. This is something fundamental and as such could only be described as a part of a philosophical anthropology. ‘The phenomenon of language rests on regularity, on agreement in acting’ (RFM 342). It is a regularity of our lives that is based on the regularity of nature. Though regularity of nature is necessary for language, it is not sufficient. For example, the sound of thunder is not the name of lightning. Some animals do make sounds in relation to eating and courting. Yet we hesitate to call it a language; it is certainly very different from human language. Our language capacity, according to Wittgenstein, belongs to our nature as animals of a certain kind. ‘I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. . . . Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination’ (OC 475). Once language-games are established there are reasons. In his words, ‘Instincts come first, reasoning second. Not until there is a language-game are there reasons’ (RPP II, 689). Though reasons are not the source of language-games, they are not without reasons. ‘The child learns this language from the grown-ups by being trained to its use. I am using the word “trained” in a way strictly analogous to that in which we talk of an animal being trained to do certain things’ (BB 77; refer also 89-90). Language is thus a product of nature and nurture and could be seen as part of our second nature, after Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein’s point is that the bedrock of our linguistic use is our regularity and agreement in actions rather than ratiocination. ‘It is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game’ (OC 204). The crucial point, as in the case of

Private Language and Being Human

169

rule-following, is the normativity that is shown by the agreement in acting and in judgements. Here it is of the greatest importance that all of us, or the overwhelming number, agree on certain things. For example, I can be sure that the colour of this object will be called ‘green’ by most people who see it (RFM 342). ‘If there was no agreement in what we call “red”, etc., etc., language would come to an end’ (RFM 196). Without agreement the words would be meaningless; they would not be words but just sounds and ink marks. That is the problem for the private linguist. For him, ‘The sounds and marks would not have a meaning independent of his production of them – which comes to saying that would not have meaning in the sense that words have meaning’.1 If there were no overwhelming agreement in applying a word, it would have no role in a language. ‘If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments’ (PI 242). Communicability is a necessary characteristic of a word. For the private linguist, the possibility of communication is logically excluded. That means there is no linguistic-use for ‘S’, or any other mark that he cares to make. Both regularity and overwhelming agreement in judgements are to be seen as ‘part of the framework on which the working of our language is based’ (PI 240). They provide a system of co-ordinates for the practice of a language. This is not merely an epistemological point but a metaphysical aspect of there being any language use. Wittgenstein wrote: ‘Our language-game only works, of course, when a certain agreement prevails, but the concept of agreement does not enter into the language-game’ (Z 430); it is part of the framework of having any 1

Malcolm 1995, 165.

170

Being Human after Wittgenstein

language. This is true also about regularity of practice. Regularity and agreement are not inserted between a word and meaning to bridge them. Meaning is not a Platonic, Cartesian or social entity. It is our use of the word that is highlighted by drawing attention to the role of regularity and agreement of the members of the community. A community is not external to the word use; it is part of the characteristic surrounding and framework of language use.1 They are interdependent. First of all, if there are no similarities in the world, human beings cannot see similarities and classify them; there would not be any language. Secondly, if there is no human being with capacities to see and judge similarities, there cannot be any seeing of similarities and classification without which there cannot be any language. ‘The seeing of similarities underpins patterns of language use’ and these ‘patterns of word use . . . emerge from our ongoing practice’.2 This is something fundamental to human living. Thirdly, if there are no human beings who quietly agree on a vast variety of judgements concerning regularity in nature and in human actions, there would not be any language because language as we have seen is a human practice and practices are by nature objective, regular and normative. Languages are not human inventions or ‘It is of the greatest importance that a dispute hardly ever arises between people about whether the colour of this object is the same as the colour of that, the length of this rod the same as the length of that, etc. This peaceful agreement is the characteristic surrounding of the use of the word “same.” And one must say something analogous about proceeding according to a rule. No dispute breaks out over the question whether a proceeding was according to the rule or not. It doesn’t come to blows, for example. This belongs to the framework, out of which our language works (for example, gives a description)’ (RFM 323). 2Luntley 2002, 274, 271. 1

Private Language and Being Human

171

discoveries but human practices that evolved as a joint venture of nature and nurture. Things are similar and they are seen and judged as similar, not by just one individual but all of us or the vast majority of us who share in a form of life. Our concepts, in general, depend on the fact that ‘all of us or almost all of us in fact would react in the same way (correspondingly or almost correspondingly) under the same circumstances’ (LW II, 23). Pressing for which (similarities, seeing similarities or judging similarities) is basic or reducing one to the other is a philosophical obsession rather than philosophical investigation. It is futile to distinguish between elements of nature and nurture in human practices. They are interwoven to give shape to our complicated forms of life. ‘Wittgenstein’s position is simply this: what I mean is determined by my natural use of words, so that we cannot sensibly ask whether my use really conforms to what my words mean.’1 My natural use of words is interwoven with the rest of my life. It is formed by nurture and becomes my second nature. Calibration is made possible by my regularity in patterns of use. Given the same training, human beings respond in certain regular ways; we agree in acting and in our judgements. Other beings may respond in different ways. It is also possible that a particular human being or a group of people may respond differently. ‘Such a case would present similarities with one in which a person naturally reacted to the gesture of pointing with the hand by looking in the direction of the line from finger-tip to wrist, not from wrist to finger-tip’ (PI 185). In such situations, there cannot be normative practices including language use. Since language is a practice, regularity, as in the case of rule-following, is essential to language use. ‘In order to describe 1

McGinn 1984, 87-88.

172

Being Human after Wittgenstein

the phenomenon of language one has to describe a practice, not a one-time occurrence, whatever it might be’ (RFM 335). Wittgenstein adds: ‘It is very hard to realize this’ (RFM 336). Of course, new words, like new rules, can be invented which are perhaps never used and yet could be understood. It would not be possible, however, if there were no use of words at all (RFM 334). Moreover, ‘concepts are not for use on a single occasion’ (Z 568); they must be repeatable. That does not mean that each word is actually used on a number of occasions by many people. As we have seen in the discussions of rule-following, there is an important distinction between regularity over time and place by repeatability of instances and regularity across persons who participate in a form of life. It is contingently possible that at a given time there is only one single person who is using a language. But, as we have noted at the beginning of this section, that is not a private language. It can be taught and learned by other human agents. Possibility for multiplicity of instances is fundamental to our language use. This cannot be logically restricted to one human being. A language that could not be shared (logically) is a philosophical chimera. For actual linguist use, we need at least the possibility of not only multiplicity of instances but also multiplicity of agents agreeing in judgements and sharing in a form of life. The participating agents must be able to see and judge similarities and act accordingly to form, what Wittgenstein calls, ‘the bustle/web/stream/form of life’. We judge an action according to its background within the bustle of human life, and this ‘bustle comes about only through constant repetition. And there is no definite starting point for ‘constant repetition’’ (RPP

Private Language and Being Human

173

II, 626).1 The agreement here is not merely agreement in opinions (RFM 353); it is agreement in judgements (PI 242); it is also agreement in acting (RFM 342), ‘a consensus of action: a consensus of doing the same thing, reacting in the same way’ (LFM 184). It is an agreement in the form of life (PI 241). This ‘very complicated filigree pattern’ does not seem to be given by an individual’s responses to the environment. We need the possibility of agreement of fellow human beings with whom the individual shares the environment and lives in collaboration and conversation. Wittgenstein repeatedly raises the question: ‘But isn’t human agreement essential to the game’? (Z 428) ‘Doesn’t human agreement decide’? (Z 429). According to certain influential interpreters, Wittgenstein’s position is that language use presupposes a human community in which there is agreement as to what is the right use of a word. Some of Wittgenstein’s remarks support this position. To the question, ‘How could human behaviour be described?’ Wittgenstein answered, ‘Surely only by showing the actions of a variety of humans, as they are all mixed up together. Not what one man is doing now, but the whole hurly-burly, is the background against which we see an action, and it determines our judgment, our

We judge an action according to its background within human life, and this background is not monochrome, but we might picture it as a very complicated filigree pattern, which, to be sure, we can’t copy, but which we can recognize from the general impression it makes. The background is the bustle of life. And our concept points to something within this bustle. And it is the very concept ‘bustle’ that brings about this indefiniteness. For a bustle comes about only through constant repetition. And there is no definite starting point for ‘constant repetition’ (RPP II, 624-6). 1

174

Being Human after Wittgenstein

concepts, and our reactions’ (RPP II, 629; Z 567). Applying to linguistic use Malcolm wrote, To speak a language is to participate in a way of living in which many people are engaged. The language I speak gets its meaning from the common ways of acting and responding of many people. I take part in a game . . .. To follow the rules for the use of an expression is nothing other than to use by those many people who take part in the activities in which the expression is embedded. Thus the meaning of the expression is independent of me, or of any particular person; and this is why I can use the expression correctly or incorrectly. It has a meaning independent of my use of it.1 A second group of philosophers, however, holds that Wittgenstein does not subscribe to a social practice or collectivist view. They claim that, according to Wittgenstein, language use presupposes only spatio-temporal regularity, which could be exemplified in the life of a solitary person. Baker & Hacker, along with many others hold such a view. According to them, Wittgenstein ‘was aware of the danger that his remarks about agreement might be misinterpreted in this way. He quite explicitly took care not to exclude the possibility that a solitary individual could follow a rule or speak a language to himself’.2 Wittgenstein himself admitted: ‘One can of course imagine someone who lives alone and sketches pictures of the objects

1 2

Malcolm 1995, 164. Baker & Hacker 1988, 172.

Private Language and Being Human

175

around him (say on the walls of his cave), and his picture language could be easily understood’ (MS 165, 105).1 McGinn went a step forward when he wrote: I find it perfectly possible to imagine that Romulus, upon reaching the age of reason, hits upon the idea of distributing sign-posts around his island as an aidemémoire. . . . Nor do I see any conceptual obstacle to his introducing properly linguistic signs for his own use, e.g., to keep records of the weather: all he needs is a good reason to introduce the signs and the intelligence to operate with them.2 To be precise, Wittgenstein allowed only a picture language not properly linguistic signs and his other relevant remarks were on Robinson who had a normal social upbringing whereas Romulus was brought up by a wolf. It is also to be noted that Robinson is a character in a fiction and Romulus in a myth whereas the whole discussion of private language is concerned not with a solitary human being but someone who in real life wanted to have a language to give expressions to his inner experiences – his feelings, moods, and the rest – for his private use so that another person cannot understand the language. The investigation was conceptual and not on an empirical issue whether a person in isolation would develop a language at all. The conceptual clarification is used here to throw light on our attempt to give an Übersicht of living human beings and their language use. According to Malcolm, Wittgenstein rejected the view that if a human infant grew up, by some strange chance, in

Man kann sich doch einen Menschen vorstellen der allein lebt und Bilder von den Gegenständen um ihn her zeichnet (etwa an die Wände seiner Höhle) und seine Bildersprache ließe sich leicht verstehen. 2McGinn 1984, 196-7. 1

176

Being Human after Wittgenstein

complete isolation from any human society, this human being could, in his solitary existence, devise a language, a system of signs, which he could use to record observations, make predictions, set down rules for action for his own guidance and so on. If a rule is followed, it must be followed correctly. There must be a use of the rule which is independent of this particular individual user if correctly is to mean anything. In his view, this independent source of normativity is given by the community: ‘Any use of language at all presupposes a community in which there is agreement in the application of words and signs.’1 For our language use, according to his view, we need not only multiplicity of instances, ‘the whole hurly-burly of human actions’ but also ‘the actions of a variety of humans, as they are all mixed up together’ (Z 567; RPP II, 629). Therefore, according to him, to use a word correctly is to use it in the same way as other people do. With regard to the private language, he writes: Since the words of this language refer to what can be known only to its speaker, his application of those words cannot be measured against their customary application by other speakers. It would be a case where there would be no distinction between believing one was following a rule and following a rule; between going on the ‘same’ way and going on in a ‘different’ way; between the application of one of those words by the speaker seeming to him to be right and is being right.2 McGinn, however, differs: The most glaring feature of these sections in the present connection is that the words ‘custom,’ ‘practice,’ and ‘use’ are never qualified with ‘social’ or ‘community’ – and

1 2

Malcolm 1986, 157. Malcolm 1986, 158.

Private Language and Being Human

177

‘social custom/practice’ is not pleonastic’. … Wittgenstein does use ‘custom’ and ‘practice’ to suggest the idea of multiplicity, but it is a multiplicity of instances of rulefollowing not of persons who follow the rules. And this is part and parcel of Wittgenstein’s general thesis that meaning is use: a sign has meaning only in virtue of being (repeatedly) used in a certain way. This thesis does not in itself carry any suggestion that meaning is inconceivable in social isolation.1 A private linguist does not make sense. Does that, however, mean that we cannot make sense of the use of a word on the part of a given individual unless the individual gets agreement from the community? Wittgenstein raises these questions: ‘Does human agreement decide what is red? Is it decided by appeal to the majority? Were we taught to determine colour in that way?’ (Z 431). Certainly, it is not the case that the majority opinion decides what is ‘pain,’ ‘red’ or ‘same’. We do not appeal to community agreement for that purpose (RFM 406). After saying, ‘I cannot describe how (in general) to employ rules, except by teaching you, training you to employ rules’ (Z 318), he goes on: I may now e.g., make a talkie of such instruction. The teacher will sometimes say “That’s right.” If the pupil should ask him “why?” – he will answer nothing, or at any rate nothing relevant, not even: “Well, because we all do it like that”; that will not be the reason. It is true that human agreement and majority opinion can play decisive roles in some situations. As we have noted earlier, rules of chess and other games are what they collectively agreed to be; a piece of wire is a standard metre, because there is an agreement 1

McGinn 1984, 78-9.

178

Being Human after Wittgenstein

in using it so and the gender of the word ‘euro’ in Italian language is decided as masculine by an act of the parliament in Italy. Verbal or ostensive definitions work only if there is an underlying overwhelming agreement in judgements, without which any definition may be interpreted differently and the normativity of language-use would be lost. Wittgenstein’s claim is not so much that there could not be a language without agreement but that there would be no language,1 meaning, language will have no point. Without agreement language would not exist and without the possibility of agreement language could not exist. These are not merely empirical claims but are related to our ways of being human. Language, as we have seen, relates to a way of living. Wittgenstein’s remarks on language use and rule following, thus, form part of a philosophical anthropology showing how we live, move and have our being. 6.6. ‘It would be a ‘Confusion of Tongues’’ (MS 165, 94) To conclude, if there is sufficient regularity regarding mental events and if there is a function within the web of human life, there can be a language about those events. That is, an individual may succeed in having a language regarding those events. However, although such (a fragment of) a language is about an individual’s mental occurrences, the use of the language itself is no longer logically private. For descriptions of these signs can be given, so that the characteristics of objectivity and normativity are safeguarded. If there is room for a distinction between seems right and is right, assuming only the sincerity of the individual’s reports someone else could check whether they are actually 1

“If humans were not in general agreed about the colours of things, if undetermined cases were not exceptional, then our concept of colour could not exist.” No: – our concept would not exist (Z 351; RPP II, 393).

Private Language and Being Human

179

correct, according to the description. Other people can participate in such a language. As we have seen, mental experiences are human experiences and are related to the subject’s own body and other bodies in the world. These mental events are not essentially private; they are shareable. Other human beings experience and respond similarly in similar circumstances. In fact, as we have seen, the normative patterns of language-use emerge from the activity of seeing similarities and judging them accordingly. It is a fundamental feature of human life that human experiences are sufficiently regular to have common language-games and forms of life. They are not and cannot be private in the private linguist’s sense. As one cannot follow a rule ‘privately’ (PI 202) so also one cannot use a language privately. Adam can name mental events only if they are experienced sufficiently regular and if they have function in his life. It is also part of Wittgenstein’s argument that though Adam might use words with different meanings from those of Eve, they are not essentially private. He can teach them to Eve and she can learn them. Those meanings are not given through private ostensive definitions. Instead, they get their meaning by Adam’s regular use of them in his life and Eve shares in these meanings as she agrees in acting and judging with Adam and together they shape the stream of their lives. Though Adam can name things independently of Eve, if those words should serve a use in their lives, both should agree in judgements and share in the form of life. The former is achieved through Adam’s capacity to judge the regularity of nature and for the latter both Adam and Eve must agree overwhelmingly in their patterns of actions and in their judgements. Eve is also endowed with similar capacities to see and judge patterns in nature. Wittgenstein does not rule out the possibility that Eve might employ words with different

180

Being Human after Wittgenstein

meanings from those of Adam. She is an individual who can calibrate directly with the objects in the nature. His point is that if Adam and Eve are to use words with the same meanings then both must agree in their use and share in the same form of life. Both must see and judge patterns of behaviour in each other’s actions. Without these overwhelming agreements in judgements, we will have only ‘confusion of tongues’ (Sprachverwirrung), rather than a language-game (Sprachspiel): ‘It would be a ‘confusion of tongues’, and say that although each one accompanied his actions with the uttering of sounds, nevertheless there was no language’ (MS 165, 94).1 What is logically unshareable cannot be a language, according to Wittgenstein. Whatever they speak is language only in the sense that they used their tongues – and other biological organs for noise production. Both nature and nurture work together to create and shape language-games and forms of life. Without nurture, we end up with noises, marks and Sprachverwirrung rather than Sprachspiel. During our discussion, we have noted that the agreement in the rule we use is, according to Wittgenstein, an agreement in our form of life (PI 241), which includes agreement in acting and in judgements. If individual responses were very different and have no discernible patterns of behaviour we could not attribute rule-following character to our actions. For example, a pupil will be considered to have mastered the concept of addition, only when his responses to particular addition problems agree with those of the members of the community in sufficient number of

1

Es wäre eine ‘Sprachverwirrung’ und sagen, dass jeder seine Handlungen allerdings mit dem Ausstoßen von Lauten begleitete, das aber noch keine Sprache ergibt.

Private Language and Being Human

181

cases, especially in simple ones.1 Similarly, language use, like many other rule-governed systems, depends upon the fact of widespread agreement. The emphasis here is not on the need for a group of people, but rather on normative patterns of behaviour, in which living human beings overwhelmingly agree. For example, if we did not laugh and smile at jokes, cry and weep when hurt, turn pale, shiver and run away when in danger, then our shared concepts of joy, pain and fear would not have their roles in our form of life. It is not that we establish them by agreement, as if we were all witnesses of them (LFM 107); rather we agree in our responses and in our judgements about those actions and situations. The patterns emerge as we live in the world in collaboration and conversation with fellow human beings and are maintained by nurture. These empirical matters are philosophically important because our possibility of following a rule and using a language depend on them. In rulefollowing and language use, as we have seen, individuals are trained to join in patterns of behaviour and they continue the practices on their own in collaboration and conversation with fellow human beings. The existence of rule-following and language use depend upon a variety of background facts that yield general agreement. The relative stability of human nature and the nature of the world provide the framework for our lives characterised also by rule-following and language use. If things were quite different from what they actually are . . . this would make our normal rule-following and language use lose their point (PI 142). We would not employ such-and-such concepts – not because they would be incorrect, but rather the point of using them would be lost, and our purposes in employing them would not be served 1

Kripke 1982, 91.

182

Being Human after Wittgenstein

(Z 350). We live in collaboration and conversation with fellow human beings. Our nature and culture are shared, (though Wittgenstein admits the possibility of individuals having individual uses). We would have no use for measurements if objects continuously shrank and grew in size (PI 142). Similarly, we cannot use colour words in a world where the colours of objects changed incessantly. We say that there are three primary colours, seven colours in the colour spectrum, and we are prone to believe that this reflects the nature of things. They do not depend exclusively on the nature of things or on our nature. In fact, we do not see any ‘pure’ colours. The temptation to pin our concepts to the nature of things or to our own nature and to embrace some version of realism or idealism is enormous. Wittgenstein’s consistent efforts are designed to enable us to untie these philosophical knots. He wants to represent them as grammatical determinations (Z 331) based on facts about human nature and the nature of the world. The remarks, ‘What has to be accepted, the given – it might be said – are facts of living (Tatsachen des Lebens)’ (RPP I 630) and ‘. . . forms of life’ (Lebensformen) (PI p. 226) point both to the natural and cultural features. Though there are individual facts of living, they are shareable and in fact they are shared to give forms of life. ‘The given’ is not only something biological and individualistic but also social and cultural. The remarks ‘to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life’ (PI 19) and ‘speaking a language is part of a form of life’ (PI 23) have earlier forms in the observations ‘Imagine a use of language (a culture)’ and ‘imagine a language (and that means again a culture) (BB 134). These are not merely empirical features of rule-following and language use, but fundamental features that make our form of life possible. Fruits of nurture depend upon the roots of nature and attempts to explain the forms of life in terms of any one of

Private Language and Being Human

183

them are doomed to failure. As in other features of human life, both nature and nurture contribute to rule-following and language use. Our study of Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following and private language, thus, reveals a picture of human subjectivity – a synoptic representation of who we are and how we become. As an individual, a human being is complete in himself and separate from others; he is just a being-in-the world. In the process of being human we expand our horizons to beingtogether-with others. Our existence becomes co-existence and pro-existence. The world is made a human world, rather than a biological environment. As active and free agents living in the world, we realise ourselves not in seclusion but in a life of conversation and collaboration with fellow human beings. Belonging to a community is a fundamental way of our being human. Though we are born with capacities for rule-following and language use, it is through nurture that we become mature human beings. We are neither born merely as finished products of nature nor are we mere products of society; we are free living human beings, responsible for our lives. There is a process of becoming fully human realising our natural potentialities with the help of nurture. Our attitudes to what is given are fundamental in shaping our becoming. We see similarities, agree in our judgements and actions and build up communities. We not only acquire and inhabit these structures of our lives but also creatively shape them. Though influenced by nature and nurture we are responsible for what we become. Rule-following, language use and other characteristic aspects of being human are part of our second nature, to use a Wittgensteinian terminology. Being human is a joint venture of nature and nurture.

Chapter 7

Being Human: A Personal Point of View 7.1. ‘One Pattern in the Weave is Interwoven with Many Others’ (Z 569). To recapitulate Wittgenstein’s as well as our journeyings in this vast field of thought: in the Tractatus, he was certain that ‘there is no such thing as the soul . . . as it is conceived in the superficial psychology of the present day’ (TLP 5.5421), and he replaced it with ‘the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world – not part of it’ (TLP 5.641). Though the body and its parts may be mentioned in the book ‘The world as I found it’ (TLP 5.631), philosophy has nothing to do with it (TLP 6.53), as it is the concern of natural sciences. In his later philosophy, he rejected this transcendental substitute. His sketches have shown the futility of seeking a referent for such terms (BB 1), and finding none within our experience, postulating a spiritual one (PI 36). The words ‘self,’ ‘mind,’ ‘reason,’ ‘will’ and ‘soul’ are not employed in this way; they are not names for anything. From this it does not follow, as it might have in his youth, to claim that it is sheer nonsense to say that human beings have souls (TLP 6.53). His later sketches brought back what he had rejected earlier as philosophically uninteresting, namely, body, soul and human being and showed the interweaving nature of body and soul in relation to a living human being. Sketches on human body and human being are drawn as the best pictures of human soul.

186

Being Human after Wittgenstein

His sketches on ‘I’ have shown us that it ‘is in a class by itself’ (WL 35, 21), but interwoven with the uses of other personal pronouns and index words. Its distinct grammar is shown by its special category, first-person pronoun singular. The grammatical function of ‘I’ is different from that of proper names and other pronouns. Wittgenstein’s investigations are reminders of this special role of ‘I’. Philosophers are wrong to look for a referent to ‘I’ in body, brain, mind, soul and similar other entities. The referent of ‘I’ is the human being who is using ‘I.’ In this respect Wittgenstein is also wrong to assert that ‘I’ does not refer to a person. Because there are differences between how ‘I’ refers to a person and how other pronouns refer to persons, one cannot rule that ‘I’ does not refer at all. Wittgenstein allows: ‘Say what you choose, so long as it does not prevent you from seeing the facts’ (PI 79). ‘One symbolism is just as good as the next. The word “I” is one symbol among others having a practical use, and could be discarded when not necessary for practical speech’ (WL 35, 63). ‘I’ still remains to be one of the most used words, however, in English, and its equivalents in other languages and we are right in using ‘I’ to refer to the human being each one of us is. It is distinctive of us that we can use first-person reference in our thought and language that are interwoven with our action in the stream of our thought and life (Z 173). Augustine’s words with which Wittgenstein famously opened his Investigations not only ‘give us a particular picture of the essence of human language’ (PI 1) but also a picture of ‘a living human being’. Though the portrait of the infant Augustine’s struggles to acquire a language shows clear affinities with the Cartesian ego, ‘a thinking thing,’ the reference to his elders and to their bodily movements – ‘the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice …’ – as ‘the natural language of all

Being Human: A Personal Point of View

187

peoples’ (PI 1), already reminds us of the community and of the expressiveness of the body. Wittgenstein’s emphasis on ‘living human being,’ helps us to exorcize the bewitching picture of the solitary disembodied egos independent of nature and nurture that philosophy for a long time favoured and in a pernicious way estranged us from ourselves. A philosophical investigation cannot succeed, if it failed to take into account our everyday world of conversation and collaboration. It has to begin with ‘all of the situations and reactions which constitute human life’ (RPP II, 16) and not just with the Cartesian indubitable truth ‘I think, therefore, I am’. Philosophy is ultimately answerable to our lives, in all its variety and complexity. To show this truth, Wittgenstein takes the autonomous ego, in the very first remark in the Investigations, from its mental enclosure to the social world for some shopping where the human subject is shown as an agent in conversation and collaboration. This view complements Wittgenstein’s critique of broadly Cartesian conceptions of the mind in his treatment of rule-following and private language, which I have examined in the next chapters. His remarks on rule-following and private language picture human beings as embodied beings, who grow to maturity through participation in normative practices grounded in nature and formed by nurture. The ‘self’ is not a private theatre of representations nor does it inhabit in a world of private thoughts and experiences. Human beings would find themselves not in ‘total seclusion’ separated from nature and nurture but in actions in the world and in their interaction with other fellow human beings. It is this weave of our life – individuals in conversation and collaboration with others – that I examined in the fifth and sixth next chapters in the light of Wittgenstein’s illuminating remarks on ‘rule-following’ and ‘private language’. It is important to stress that ‘One pattern in

188

Being Human after Wittgenstein

the weave is interwoven with many others’ (Z 569). Being human is a product of nature and nurture. From this synoptic view of the words concerning living human beings and the claim that ‘living human being’ is a primitive fundamental concept we look and see how this ‘human living’ is in conversation and collaboration with other living human beings in the next chapter. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, this is seen as connected both empirically and logically. We examine critically Wittgenstein’s influencing remarks on ‘rule-following’ and ‘private language fantasy’ to see the connexions between the individual and the community, nature and nurture. 7.2. ‘On How One Sees Things’ (CV 24) To conclude, let me make a personal confession both because of my personal conviction and Wittgenstein’s example. He spoke in the first person both at the end of the Tractatus and the Lecture on Ethics. He held the view that it is essential to speak in the first person. ‘At the end of my lecture on ethics I spoke in the first person: I think that this is something very essential. Here there is nothing to be stated any more; all I can do is to step forth as an individual and speak in the first person’ (WVC 117). Here I step forth as an individual and speak in the first person, presenting my personal point of view. From Wittgenstein’s point of view, working in philosophy is working on oneself: ‘On how one sees things’ (CV 24). My vision of life presents how I see my life and make sense of my life. My philosophical concerns are interwoven with my aesthetical, ethical and spiritual passions and commitments. I realise myself and find meaning in my life in my relations to God, fellow human beings and the world. I see myself as a product of nature and nurture sustained by God and

Being Human: A Personal Point of View

189

the project of my life is to work on the world, build up the community and walk toward God freely and faithfully. Making a personal confession is also in tune with the method that I followed in this dissertation, after Wittgenstein. By presenting being human as an ongoing project to be realised in living our fundamental relations to fellow human beings and nature, I have provided a synoptic view of Wittgenstein’s views on being human.1 I have also shown that his philosophical investigations on self, rule-following and language can be used to present a philosophical anthropology. In all these, what is most remarkable is the obvious fact that our lives are fundamental to our philosophical investigations. Our thoughts, words and actions can have meaning only in the stream of our lives. ‘Our problems are not abstract’ and I assume with Wittgenstein that ‘all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order’ (TLP 5.5563). What a philosopher can do is to clarify the concepts as they are actually used in their original language-games and show similarities, differences and inter-connections in the context of the hurly-burly of our lives. If this philosophical method is correct, believers are entitled to use religious language in the way they use with right, though they are unable to give further justifications. Religious use of language is to be understood in the religious framework and not in terms of empirical evidence. It is then appropriate to conclude with my personal confession showing how I live, move and have my being in the world in my fundamental relations to God and fellow human beings. This is not an empirical achievement but a basic system of reference that forms the stream of my life.

That his philosophical investigations have a religious character is the thesis of the volume, Being Human, A Religious Point of View. 1

190

Being Human after Wittgenstein

I confess: “Jesus Christ is my Lord and my God”. Those who are in the Christian tradition would know that this is a confession, after Apostle Thomas. According to the Gospel of John, Thomas was not present when Jesus appeared to the disciples for the first time after the resurrection. When they told him about it, he refused to believe: ‘Unless I see the nail marks in his hands and put my finger where the nails were, and put my hand into his side, I will not believe it’ (20.25). A week later, Jesus appeared again and told Thomas: ‘Put your finger here; see my hands. Reach out your hand and put it into my side. Stop doubting and believe’. Thomas replied: ‘My Lord and my God’ (20.27-28). In the tradition into which I was born and in which I was brought up, it is believed that the Apostle Thomas came to India and founded a Christian community in the South-West Indian coast. We call ourselves Thomas Christians. In the wider Christian tradition, the confession ‘My Lord and my God’ is interpreted showing the full humanity and divinity of Jesus Christ. From a Wittgensteinian point of view, this is my confession, a fundamental judgement in my life. I am not able to verify the truth of the statement from a scientific point of view. There is no rational verification in this language-game. As Wittgenstein observed, ‘The kind of certainty is the kind of language-game’ (PI p. 224). My certainty is a religious certainty based on the authority of the Sacred Tradition and the Scriptures which I take as true believingly and lovingly. ‘I act with complete certainty, but the certainty is my own’ (OC 174). Whom I mean by the confession is given by my interpretation of what I take to be normative. In this case, I profess the life of Jesus as given in the Gospels and as interpreted by the Catholic Church as normative. Though I do not verify the Gospels for their historical accuracy, if the Gospels were to be proved as

Being Human: A Personal Point of View

191

fictions, I would be lost. I believe the Gospels lovingly and take them to be true (refer CV 37-8). What I mean by the confession is given by how I live, move, and have my being. Only in the stream of my life, my beliefs and practices have meaning and significance. Obviously that involves the whole hurly-burly of my life. It is not a private relationship between Jesus and myself; it is open to others. The confession relates to my way of life fundamentally; it is both personal and communitarian. There are indispensable personal and communitarian dimensions. Though born into this tradition and brought up accordingly, I have to profess the faith myself and commit myself to such a fundamental way of life. All those who nurtured me in my faith – parents, sisters and brothers, priests, nuns, teachers and friends – can only show the way, I have to walk on my feet. As Wittgenstein has so perceptively shown, others can only point to the rescue-anchor, I have to rush up and seize it of my own accord (CV 73). To remain in this faith I have to struggle. It is not primarily a question of understanding the meaning of the statement but living accordingly. To hold and live this confession, the support, from a scientific point of view, is the slenderest imaginable. It is tightrope walking, to use a Wittgensteinian metaphor. But I am hanging from above; I am supported by divine grace, which is absolutely necessary and sufficient from my religious point of view. I cannot believe and practise a religion as long as I rest my whole weight on nature and/or nurture. I have to suspend myself from heaven; my ultimate support is from above because faith is fundamentally a gift from God. Someone who has religious belief lives differently from someone who has no such belief. The world looks different to him and his attitude to the world is also significantly different. The world of the religious person is different from one who has no faith. Living in contact with God makes me strong (MS 183,

192

Being Human after Wittgenstein

56) and helps me to realise my potentialities more fully. I see religious significance in my life in the world and my religious point of view gives meaning to my life and shapes the stream of my life, my way of being fully human. It is part of my confession that Jesus Christ, by his death on the cross, transformed the torture instrument into the source of life and now I see my threefold relationship with God, community and the world in the symbol of a cross. I am rooted in nature, formed by nurture and sustained by God; positively I act upon the world, build up the community and move towards God. From a Wittgensteinian religious point of view, this is the picture by which I live, move and have my being.1 It is constantly before me, influences my decisions and forms the stream of my life. My being human is described in terms of these fundamental existential relations. The symbol of Christianity thus becomes the symbol of my self-realisation. I see myself at the meeting point of the horizontal and vertical bars of the cross. The lower part of the vertical bar shows my rootedness in nature. I depend on the nature for my being and becoming. I live by the fruits of nature. According to one Biblical tradition the first human being is created from the earth. The name of the first man, Adam is related to the Hebrew word for ground, adamah. According to Genesis, God formed Adam from adamah (2.7) and placed him on adamah ‘to work on it and take care of it’ (2.15). Though I am from the nature, live by the fruits of nature and when I die, return to it, I carry within me the breath of God; that’s what makes me a living human being (2.7). That indicates that I am not merely a product of nature and that I should never be a slave

1

Elaboration of this picture is the subject matter of the work: A Religious Point of View, after Wittgenstein.

Being Human: A Personal Point of View

193

to the material world; rather I should master it and live on it according to God’s plan. I have a certain power over my life on earth. From my religious point of view, my relationship to nature is that of creative stewardship. It is given to me to realise myself and to work on it, to maintain and to develop. I work on nature and transform it for my well-being, for the benefit of others and for the glory of God. The upper part of the cross symbolises my dependence on and orientation to God. I totally depend on God for my being and becoming. I see myself as a creature, servant and child. Absolute obedience in faith is required of me. God decides what is good and bad; I have to follow it and live according to His commands. That’s the purpose of my life: In Him I live, move and have my being. When I try to make my life independent of and against the will of God, I am moving away from the purpose of my life; I am committing a sin. Sin is, according to this view, a futile attempt at self-realisation without reference to God and fellow human beings. As I turn away from God, I distort the harmony of my relationship to nature and to fellow human beings. In the Biblical story of the first sin, Adam and Eve disobeyed God and hid from him; they turned against each other and the work on the ground became hard and the earth produced only thorns and thistles. Instead of bringing blessings on one another and on earth, they brought curses. The cross by restoring those relations brings back, once again, the blessings on humankind and on nature. The horizontal bar of the cross shows my fraternity and equality with my fellow human beings. According to the Biblical story in the book of Genesis, the second human being, Eve is formed from the body of the first human being, Adam. When God brought Eve before Adam, he said: ‘This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called woman, for she was

194

Being Human after Wittgenstein

taken out of man’ (2.23). God created Eve as a suitable helper and fitting partner for Adam. They are equal in dignity and mutually support each other to live in harmony on earth bringing blessings on the world for the Glory of God. Because God is the Father of all human beings and I am one of his children, all others are my sisters and brothers. I am formed by nurture and contribute to the well-being of the community. It becomes my religious duty to love and care for them – especially those who are in need, materially, emotionally and spiritually. When I move away from this religious duty, I am turning against both God and my fellow human beings. This would distort God’s image in me and I move away from God bringing curses rather than blessing on myself, others and on the world. Ideally, I receive blessings from God and become a blessing to others on earth. Bach wrote on the title page of his Orgelbuchlein, “To the glory of the most high God, and that my neighbour may be benefited thereby.” That is what Wittgenstein wanted to say about his work. In presenting the fruits of my research that is my wish and prayer. This goal is achieved by my being fully human by living my fundamental relations to God, fellow human beings and the world. That would also be the measure of the success of this thesis. Wittgenstein anxiously searched his soul with regard to his work: ‘Will the work, so to speak, lose its meaning? I hope not; but that is possible! – First one must live, – then one can also philosophise’ (MS 183, 209).1 This is a high ideal and great challenge for me and I see this both as a privilege and a duty to fulfil.

1

’Wird die Arbeit sozusagen ihren Sinn verlieren? Ich wünsche es nicht; aber es ist möglich! – Denn erst muß man leben, --dann kann man auch philosophieren’.

Bibliography: Primary Sources

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, C. K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge, 1922. Philosophical Investigations, G. E. M. Anscombe (trans.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953. The Blue and the Brown Books, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958. Notebooks 1914-1916, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1961. Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932-35: From the Notes of Alice Ambrose and Margaret Macdonald, A. Ambrose, (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979. “A Lecture on Ethics”, Philosophical Review (1965), 3-12. Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, C. Barrett (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966. Zettel, G. E M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, (eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967. “Notes for Lectures on ‘Private Experience’ and ‘Sense Data’”, Philosophical Review (1968), 271-320. On Certainty, G. E M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969. Letters to C.K. Ogden: With Comments on the English translation of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, edited with an

196

Being Human after Wittgenstein introduction by G.H. von Wright and an appendix of letters by Frank Plumpton Ramsey, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973.

Philosophical Grammar, R. Rhees (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974. Letters to Russell, Keyenes, and Moore, Oxford: Blackwell, 1974. Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, Cambridge 1939, C. Diamond (ed.), Sussex: Harvester Press, 1976. Remarks on Colour, G. E. M. Anscombe (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, 1977. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, G. E. M. Anscombe (eds.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978. Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, R. Rees, (ed.), Doncaster: Brynmill Press, 1979. Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, B. F. McGuinnes (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, 1979. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. I, G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright, (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, 1980. Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, vol. II, G. H. von Wright and H. Nyman, (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, 1980. Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge 1930-32: From the Notes of John King and Desmond Lee, D. Lee (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980. Last Writings on The Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. I, (ed) G. H. Von Wright, and Heikki Nyman, (trans.) C. G. Luckhardt and Maximilian A. E. Aue, London: Basil Blackwell, 1990. Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Philosophical Psychology 1946-47, P. T. Geach (ed.), Hassocks: Harvester, 1988.

Bibliography: Primary Sources

197

Philosophical Occasions, Klagge, J. and A. Nordmann (eds.), Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993. Ludwig Wittgenstein – Cambridge Letters: Correspondence with Russell, Keynes, Moore, Ramsey, and Sraffa, B. McGuinness, G.H. von Wright (eds.), 3rd revised edition. Oxford, U.K. and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1995. Culture and Value, G. H. von Wright (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1998. Wittgenstein’s Nachlass: The Bergen Electronic Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Bibliography: Secondary Sources

Almond, P. C. “Wittgenstein and Religion”, Sophia (1977), 24-27. Anscombe, G. E. M. “Misinformation: What Wittgenstein Really Said”, The Tablet (17th April, 1954), 373. Anscombe, G. E. M. An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, London: Hutchinson University Library, 1967. Anscombe, G. E. M. “The First Person”, in S. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. Anscombe, G. E. M. “A Theory of Language?” in I. Block (ed.), Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981. Archer, M. S. Being Human: the Problem of Agency, Cambridge: University Press, 2000. Armstrong, B. Jr., “Wittgenstein on Philosophical Investigations (1984).

Private

Language”,

Armour, L. and Mostafa F. “Wittgenstein’s Philosophy and Religious Insight”, Southern Journal of Philosophy (1984), 33-48. Arrington, R. L. “Following a Rule” in H. Glock (ed.), Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001. Ayer, A. J. The Concept of Person and Other Essays, London: Macmillan, 1963. Ayer, A. J. Wittgenstein, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985.

200

Being Human after Wittgenstein

Ayer, A. J. Language, Truth and Logic, London: Penguin Books, 1990. Baker, G. P. and Hacker, P. M. S. Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983. Baker, G. P. and Hacker, P. M. S. Scepticism, Rules and Language, Oxford: Blackwell, 1984. Baker, G. P. and Hacker, P. M. S. Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988. Baker, G. P. “Wittgenstein on Metaphysical/Everyday Use”, The Philosophical Quarterly (2002), 289-302. Bakhurst, D.: “Wittgenstein and ‘I’”, in H. Glock (ed.), Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001. Barrett, C. “Ethics and Aesthetics Are One”?, Aesthetics: Proceedings of the 8th International Wittgenstein Symposium, part I, Vienna: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1984. Barrett, C. Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993. Barrett, C. “Newman and Wittgenstein on the Rationality of Religious Belief”, in I. Ker (ed.), Newman and Conversion, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1997. Baum, W. “Ludwig Wittgenstein's World View”, Ratio (1980), 64-74. Beardsmore, R. W. “Wittgenstein on Tolstoi's What is Art?”, Philosophical Investigations (1991), 187-204. Bell, R. H. “Theology As Grammar: Is God An Object of Understanding?”, Religious Studies (1975), 307-317.

Bibliography: Secondary Sources

201

Bell, R. H. and R. E. Hustwit, Essays on Kierkegaard & Wittgenstein On Understanding the Self, Ohio: The College of Wooster, 1978. Bell, R. H. “Religion and Wittgenstein’s Legacy: Beyond Fideism and Language Games” in T. Tessin and M. von Der Ruhr, eds., Philosophy and the Grammar of Religious Belief, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995. Berlin, I., The Hedgehog and the Fox, London: 1957. Black, M. A. Companion to Wittgenstein’s ‘Tractatus’, Cambridge: University Press, 1964. Black, M. A. “Language and Reality”, in R. Rorty (ed.), The Linguistic Turn, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. Black, M. A. “Wittgenstein’s Language-games”, Dialectica (1979), 337-53. Blackburn, S. Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984. Bloor, D. A Social Theory of Knowledge, London: Macmillan, 1983. Bloor, D. Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions, London: Routledge, 1997. Bolton, D. An Approach to Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, London: Macmillan, 1979. Bouwsma, O.K. Wittgenstein: Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986.

Conversations

1949-1951,

Braithwaite, R.B. “An Empiricist’s View of the Nature of Religious Belief”, in B. Mitchell (ed.), The Philosophy of Religion, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.

202

Being Human after Wittgenstein

Bruening, W.T. “Aquinas and Wittgenstein on God-Talk”, Sophia (1977), 1-7. Burlingame, C. E., “Wittgenstein: His Logic and His Promethean Mission”, Philosophy Research Archives (1987), 195-218. Burnyeat, M. F. “Wittgenstein and Augustine De Magistro”, The Aristotelian Society, The Supplementary Volume (1987), 1-24. Burrhenn, H. “Religious Beliefs As Pictures”, Journal of the American Academy of Religion (1974), 326-35. Cahn, S. M. and Shatz, D. (eds.) Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. Campbell, J. Past, Space and Self, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995. Canfield, J. Wittgenstein: Language and the World, Massachussetts: University Press, 1981. Canfield, J. “Wittgenstein’s ‘I’” in Haller, R. and Brandl, J. (eds.), Wittgenstein – Towards a Re-Evaluation II, Vienna: Verlag Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1990. Cavell, S. This New Yet Unapproachable America, Albuquerque, New Mexico: Living Batch Press, 1989. Cavell, S. The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Scepticism, Morality and Tragedy, Oxford: University Press, 1999. Chadwick, H. Saint Augustine: Confessions, Oxford: University Press, 1991. Chandra, S. “Does ‘I’ Refer to Something Bodiless?”, in Haller, R. and Brandl, J. (eds.), Wittgenstein – Towards a ReEvaluation III, Vienna: Verlag Hölder-PichlerTempsky, 1990.

Bibliography: Secondary Sources

203

Charles, D. and W. Child. Wittgensteinian Themes, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. Charlesworth, M. J. Philosophy of Religion: The Historic Approaches, London: Macmillan, 1972. Churchill, J. “Wittgenstein’s Adaptation of Schopenhauer”, Southern Journal of Philosophy (1983), 489-501. Cioffi, F. “Wittgenstein and the Fire-festivals”, in I. Block (ed.), Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, Oxford: Blackwell, 1981. Cioffi, F. Wittgenstein on Freud and Frazer, Cambridge: University Press, 1998. Clack, B. R. Wittgenstein, Frazer and Religion, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999. Clack, B. R. An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Religion, Edinburgh: University Press, 1999. Collinson, D. “Ethics and Aesthetics are One”, British Journal of Aesthetics 25 (1983), 266-272. Conant, J. “Putting Two and Two Together: Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein and the Point of View for Their Work as Authors” in T. Tessin and M. von Der Ruhr, eds., Philosophy and the Grammar of Religious Belief, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995, 248-331. Cook, J. W. “Wittgenstein on Privacy” in A. P. Martinich (ed.), The Philosophy of Language, New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Cook, J. W. “Human Beings”, in P. Winch (ed.), Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969.

204

Being Human after Wittgenstein

Cook, J. W. Wittgenstein’s Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Cooke, V. M. “Wittgenstein and Religion”, Thought (1986), 348-359. Crary, A. and R. Read. The New Wittgenstein, London: Routledge, 2000. Craufurd, A. H. The Religion and Ethics of Tolstoy, London, 1912. Dennett, D. “The Century’s Greatest Minds”, The Times, (March 29, 1999). Durrant, M. “The Use of ‘Pictures’ in Religious Belief”, Sophia (1971), 16-21. D’Hert, I. Wittgenstein’s Relevance for Theology, Frankfurt: Herbert Land, Peter Lang, 1975. Drury, M. O’C. The Danger of Words, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973. Engel, S. M. “Schopenhauer’s Impact on Wittgenstein”, Journal of the History of Philosophy (1969), 285-302. Engelmann, P. Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein: with a Memoir, L. Furtmuller (Trans.), B.F. McGuinness (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, 1967. Evans, D. “Ian Ramsey on Talk About God”, Religious Studies (1971), 125-40, 213-26. Evans, G. The Varieties of Reference, J. McDowell (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982. Fogelin, R. J. Wittgenstein, London: Routledge, 1987. Gahringer, R. E. “Can Games Explain Language?”, Journal of Philosophy (1959), 661-667.

Bibliography: Secondary Sources

205

Gardiner, P. Schopenhauer, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963. Garver, N. This Complicated Form of Life, Chicago: Open Court, 1994. Geivett, R. D. and Sweetman, B. Contemporary Perspectives on Religious Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. Genova, J. Wittgenstein: A Way of Seeing, New York: Routledge, 1995. Gier, N. F. Wittgenstein and Phenomenology: A Comparative Study of the Later Wittgenstein, Husserl, Heidegger, and MerleauPonty, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981. Gill, J. H. “Wittgenstein and Religious Language”, Theology Today (1964), 59-72. Glock,

H. A Wittgenstein Publishers, 1996.

Dictionary,

Oxford:

Blackwell

Glock, H. Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001. Goodman, R. “Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer and Ethics”, Journal of the History of Philosophy (1979), 437-447. Grennan, W. “Wittgenstein on Religious Utterances,” Sophia (1976), 13-18. Greenwood, E. B. “Tolstoy, Wittgenstein, and Schopenhauer”, Encounter (1973), 60-72. Griffiths, A. Phillips. “Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer, and Ethics” in G. Vesey (ed.), Understanding Wittgenstein, Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1974, 96-116. Griffiths, A. Phillips. “Wittgenstein and the Four-fold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplementary volume (1976), 1-20.

206

Being Human after Wittgenstein

Gutting, G. Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982. Hacker, P. M. S. Insight and Illusion, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Hacker, P. M. S. Wittgenstein: Meaning and Mind, Vol. 3 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993. Hacker, P. M. S. Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-Century Analytical Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. Hacker, P. M. S. Wittgenstein: Mind and Will, Vol. 4 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, 2000. Hacker, P. M. S. Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. Haikola, L. Religion as a Language-game: A Critical Study with Special Regard to D. Z. Phillips, Lund: Gleerup, 1977. Haller, R. and Brandl, J. eds. Wittgenstein – Towards a Re-Evaluation III, Vienna: Verlag Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1990. Hallett, G. A Companion to Wittgenstein’s ‘Philosophical Investigations’, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997. Hanfling, O. Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy, London: Macmillan Press, 1989. Henze, D. “Language-games and the Ontological Argument”, Religious Studies (1968), 147-152. Hick, J. “Religious Faith As Experiencing-as,” in G. N. A. Vesey (ed.), Talk of God, London: Macmillan, 1969.

Bibliography: Secondary Sources

207

High, D. M. (ed.), New Essays in Religious Language, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. High, D. M. “Wittgenstein: On Seeing Problems From A Religious Point of View”, International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (1990), 105-117. Hodges, M. P. Transcendence and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990. Holiday, A. “Wittgenstein’s Silence; Philosophy, Ritual and the Limits of Language”, Language and Communication (1985), 133-142. Holland, R. F. “Not Bending Investigations, Jan. 1990.

the

Knee”,

Philosophical

Hollis, M. Invitation to Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. Holtzman, S. H. and C. M. Leich, C. M. (eds.), Wittgenstein: to Follow A Rule, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981. Hudson, W. D. Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Bearing of His Philosophy Upon Religious Belief, London: Lutterworth Press, 1968. Hudson, W. D. “Some Remarks on Wittgenstein’s Account of Religious Belief” in G.N.A. Vesey (ed.), Talk of God, London: Macmillan, 1969. Hudson, W. D. Wittgenstein and Religious Belief, London: Macmillan, 1975. Hudson, W. D. “On Two Points Against Wittgensteinian Fideism”, Philosophy (1968), 269-273. Hudson, W. D. “‘Using A Picture’ and Religious Belief”, Sophia (1973), 11-17.

208

Being Human after Wittgenstein

Hunter, J. F. M. “‘Forms of Life’ in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations”, American Philosophical Quarterly (1968), 233-243. Hunter, J. F. M. Wittgenstein on Words as Instruments: Lessons in Philosophical Psychology, Edinburgh: University Press, 1990. Hyman, J. “Wittgensteinianism” in P. I. Quinn, C. A. Taliaferro (eds.), Companion to Philosophy of Religion, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. Janik,

A. “Schopenhauer and the Philosophical Studies (1966), 76-95.

Early

Wittgenstein”,

Janik, A. and Toulman, S. Wittgenstein’s Vienna, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1973. John Paul II. Fides et Ratio, Vatican: Libereria Editrice Vaticana, 1998. Johnston, P. Wittgenstein and Moral Philosophy, London, New York: Routledge, 1989. Johnston, P. Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner, London, New York: Routledge, 1993. Jones, J. R. “How do I Know Who I am?”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, (1967), 1-18. Jones, O. R. (ed.). The Private Language Argument, London: Macmillan, 1971. Kallenberger, J. “The Language-game View of Religion and Religious Certainty”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy (1972), 255-275. Keightley, A. Wittgenstein, Grammar and God, London: Epworth Press, 1976.

Bibliography: Secondary Sources

209

Kennick, W. “The Language of Religion”, Philosophical Review (1956), 56-71. Kenny, A. Wittgenstein, London: Penguin, 1973. Kenny, A., B. McGuinness, J.C. Nyiri, Rush Rhees, G.H. von Wrigh, Wittgenstein and His Times, B. McGuinness (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982. Kenny, A. The Legacy of Wittgenstein, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984. Kerr, F. Theology After Wittgenstein, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1997. Klagge, J. C. Wittgenstein: Biography and Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Klemke, E. D. Essays on Wittgenstein, Illinois: University Press, 1971. Kripke, S. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language – An Elementary Exposition, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982. Lash, N. “How Large is a ‘Language-game’?” Theology (1984), 19-28. Lucchetta, P. M. “La Presenza Di Pensatori Wittgenstein”, Sapienza (1980), 56-78.

Russi

in

Luckhardt, C. G. Wittgenstein: Sources and Perspectives, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1979. Luntley, M. Language, Logic & Experience: the Case for Anti-realism, London: Duckworth, 1988. Luntley, M. “The Transcendental Grounds of Meaning and the Place of Silence” in K. Puhl (ed.), Meaning Scepticism, Berlin, New York: Walter De Gruyters, 1991, 170-188. Luntley, M. Reason, Truth and Self: the postmodern reconditioned, London, New York: Routledge, 1995.

210

Being Human after Wittgenstein

Luntley, M. Contemporary Philosophy of Thought: Truth World, Content, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999. Luntley, M. “Patterns, Particularism and Seeing the Similarity”, Philosophical Papers, (November 2002), 271-291. Luntley, M. Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003. Mackey, L. Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971. Mackie, J. L. The Miracle of Theism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982. MacMurray, J. The Self as Agent, London: Faber and Faber, 1961. Madell, G. The Identity of the Self, Edinburgh: The University Press, 1981. Magee, B. The Philosophy of Schopenhauer, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983. Malcolm, N. “Discussion: Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations”, Philosophical Review (1954), 530-559. Malcolm, N. “Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann”, in P. Edwards (ed.) The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 8, New York: Macmillan, 1967. Malcolm, N. Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. Malcolm, N. Wittgenstein: Nothing is Hidden: Wittgenstein’s Criticism of His Early Thought, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986. Malcolm, N. Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View?, London: Routledge, 1993.

Bibliography: Secondary Sources

211

Malcolm, N. Wittgensteinian Themes: Essays, G.H. von Wright (ed.), New York: Cornell University Press, 1995. Malcolm, N. Thought and Knowledge, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977. Manser, A. “Games and Family Resemblances”, Philosophy (1967), 210 -225. Mathrani, G. N. The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, New Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1991. McCutcheon, F. Religion within the Limits of Language Alone: Wittgenstein on Philosophy and Religion, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001. McDowell, J. “Wittgenstein on Following A Rule”, Synthese (1984), 325-363. McDowell, J. “Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy” in The Wittgenstein Legacy, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992. McDowell, J. Mind and World, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994. McDowell, J. Meaning, Knowledge and Reality, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998a. McDowell, J. Mind, Value, and Reality, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998b. McGinn, C. Wittgenstein on Meaning, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984. McGinn, C. The Character of Mind, Oxford: University Press, 1999.

212

Being Human after Wittgenstein

McGinn, M. Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations, London: Routledge, 1998. McGuinness, B. Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, New York: Barnes & Noble, 1979. McGuinness, B. (ed.), Wittgenstein and His Times, Oxford: Blackwell, 1982. McGuinness, B. Wittgenstein: A Life, London: Duckworth, 1988. McGuinness, B. “The Mysticism of the ‘Tractatus’”, Philosophical Review (1996), 305-328. Monk, R. Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius, London: Vintage, 1991. Monk, R. How to Read Wittgenstein, London: Granta Books, 2005. Moore, G. Believing in God, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988. Moore G. and B. Davies, “Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Religion,” in B. Davies, (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: A Guide to the Subject, London: Cassell, 1998. Mounce, H. O. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: An Introduction, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981. Mitchell, B. (ed.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971. Nielsen, K. “ Wittgensteinian Fideism”, Philosophy (1967), 191-209. Nielsen, K. “Wittgensteinian Fideism Again: A Reply to Hudson”, Philosophy (1969), 63-65. Nielsen, K. “The Coherence of Wittgensteinian Fideism”, Sophia (1972), 4-12.

Bibliography: Secondary Sources

213

Nielsen, K. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, London: Macmillan, 1982. O’Connell, J. J. Augustine: Confessions Vol. 1, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. Pears, D. Wittgenstein, London: Fontana Press, 1971. Pears, D. The False Prison, Oxford: Clarendon Press, Vol. I (1987), II (1988). Peterson, M., W. Hasker, B. Reichenbach, and D. Basinger. Reason and Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. Pettit, P., J. McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought, and Context, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986. Phillips, D. Z. Religion and Understanding, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967. Phillips, D. Z. Religion Without Explanation, Oxford: Blackwell, 1976. Phillips, D. Z. The Concept of Prayer, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981. Phillips, D. Z. Belief, Change and Forms of Life, London: Macmillan Press, 1986. Phillips, D. Z. Faith After Foundationalism, London: Routledge, 1988. Phillips, D. Z. Wittgenstein and Religion, London: Macmillan Press, 1993. Phillips, D. Z. Can Religion be Explained Away?, London: Macmillan Press, 1996. Phillips, D. Z. Recovering Religious Concepts: Closing Epistemic Divides, London: Macmillan Press, 2000.

214

Being Human after Wittgenstein

Phillips, D. Z. Religion and the Hermeneutics of Contemplation, Cambridge: University Press, 2001. Phillips, D. Z. assisted by M. von der Ruhr, Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Phillips, D. Z. and T. Tessin (eds.). Religion Transcendence?, London: Macmillan Press, 1997.

without

Pinsent, D. H., A Portrait of Wittgenstein as a Young Man: from the diary of David Hume Pinsent, 1912-1914, G. H. von Wright (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990. Plattel, M. G. Social Philosophy, Pittsburg, Pa.: Duquesne University Press, 1965. Quinn, P. l. and C. Taliaferro. A Companion to the Philosophy of Religion, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. Redpath, T. Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Student’s Memoir, London: Duckworth, 1990. Rhees, R. Without Answers, London: Routledge, 1969. Rhees, R. Discussions of Wittgenstein, London: Routledge, 1970. Rhees, R. (ed.). Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984. Rhees, R., D. Z. Phillips, assisted by M. von der Ruhr, Rush Rhees on Religion and Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Rhees, R. Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Discourse, D. Z. Phillips (ed.), Cambridge: University Press, 1998. Ramsey, I. T. (ed.), Words about God, London: SCM, 1971. Rubinstein, D. Marx and Wittgenstein: Social Praxis and Social Explanation, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981.

Bibliography: Secondary Sources

215

Ryle, G. The Concept of Mind, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1963. Schopenhauer, A. On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, E. F. J. Payne (tr.), La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1974. Schopenhauer, A. The World as Will and Representation, E. F. J. Payne (tr.), New York: Dover Publications, 1969. Schroeder, S. “Private Language and Private Experience” in H. Glock (ed.), Wittgenstein: A Critical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001, 174-198. Shakespeare, S. Kierkegaard, Language and the Reality of God, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001. Sherry,

P. “Truth and the Philosophy (1972), 18-37.

‘Religious

Language-game’”,

Sherry, P. “Is Religion a ‘Form of Life’?”, American Philosophical Quarterly (1972), 159-167. Sherry, P. Religion, Truth and Language-games, London: Macmillan Press, 1977. Shields, P. R. Logic and Sin in the Writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. Sluga, H. ““Whose house is that?” Wittgenstein on the self” in H. Sluga and D.G. Stern (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 320-353. Smith, B. C. “Meaning and Rule-Following” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, CD ROM Version 1.0, London: Routledge, 1998. Sontag, F. Wittgenstein and the Mystical: Philosophy As An Ascetic Practice, Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995.

216

Being Human after Wittgenstein

Spiegelberg, H. “Augustine in Wittgenstein: A Case Study in Philosophical Stimulation”, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1979, 319-327. Standish, P. Beyond the Self: Wittgenstein, Heidegger and the Limits of Language, Aldershot: Avebury, 1992. Stenius, E. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus: A Critical Exposition of Its Main Lines of Thought, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1964. Strawson, P. F. “Critical Notice: Philosophical Investigations”, Mind (1954), 70-99. Strawson, P. F. Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, London: University Paperbacks, 1959. Sutherland, S. “On the Idea of A Form of Life”, Religious Studies (1975), 293-306. Taliaferro, C. Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, Oxford: Blackwell, 1988. Tessin, T. and M. von Der Ruhr, (eds.), Philosophy and the Grammar of Religious Belief, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995. Thomas, E, V. “Wittgenstein and Tolstoy: The Authentic Orientation”, Religious Studies (1997), 363-377. Thompson, C. “Wittgenstein, Tolstoy and the Meaning of Life”, Philosophical Investigations (1997), 97-116. Thomte, R. Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Religion, Princeton, New Jersey: University Press, 1949. Thornton, T. Wittgenstein on Language and Thought, Edinburgh: University Press, 1998. Tilgman, B. R. Wittgenstein, Ethics and Aesthetics: The View From Eternity, London: Macmillan, 1991.

Bibliography: Secondary Sources

217

Trigg, R. Reason and Commitment, Cambridge: University Press, 1973. Trigg, R. Rationality and Religion: Does Faith Need Reason?, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1988. Van Bruen, P. The Edges of Language, London: SCM, 1972. Vesey, G. (ed.), Talk of God, London: Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, 1969. Von Wright, G. H. Wittgenstein, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publishers, 1982. Warner, M. “Philosophical Autobiography: St Augustine and John Stuart Mill”, Philosophy and Literature, Supplement to Philosophy 1983, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series, 16 A. Phillips Griffiths, (ed.), 189-210. Warner, M. Philosophical Finesse, Studies in the Art of Personal Persuasion, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. Warner, M. (ed.), Religion and Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Waismann, F., Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, Conversations Recorded by Friedrich Waismann, B. McGuinness (ed.), J. Schulte and B. McGuinness (trans.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979. Watt, A. J. “Religious Belief and Pictures”, Sophia (1970), 1-7. Weiner, D. A. Genius and Talent: Schopenhauer’s Influence on Wittgenstein’s Early Philosophy, London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1992. Whittaker, J. H. “Language-games and Forms of Life Unconfused”, Philosophical Investigations (1978), 44-45.

218

Being Human after Wittgenstein

Williams, B. Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978. Wilson, B. Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: A Guide, Edinburgh: University Press, 1998. Winch, P. The Idea of a Social Science, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958. Winch, P. Ethics and Action, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972. Winch, P. “Meaning and Religious Language”, in S. C. Brown (ed.), Reason and Religion, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977. Winch, P. Trying to Make Sense, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987. Winch, P. “Asking Too Many Questions” in T. Tessin and M. von Der Ruhr (eds.), Philosophy and the Grammar of Religious Belief, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995, 200-214. Worthington, B. A., “Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus”, Journal of the History of Philosophy (1981), 481-496. Wright, C. Wittgenstein on the Foundations of Mathematics, London: Duckworth, 1980. Wright, C. “Does Philosophical Investigations I. 258-60 Suggest a Cogent Argument Against Private Language?” in Pettit, P., J. McDowell, (eds.), Subject, Thought, and Context, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.

Wittgenstein Index

The Blue and Brown Book (BB) BB 1 15, 57, 185 BB 9 149 BB 18 31 BB 18 104 BB 27 84 BB 46 24 BB 46 83 BB 56 83 BB 61 93 BB 62 93 BB 64 84 BB 66 67, 85, 92 BB 67 68, 75, 77 BB 68 68 BB 69 65, 95 BB 73 89 BB 74 85 BB 77 168 BB 89 168 BB 90 168

BB 125 BB 134 BB 143 BB 169

25 182 124 109

Culture and Value (CV) CV 7 52 CV 24 8, 188 CV 31 52 CV 37 191 CV 38 191 CV 51 23 CV 56 86, 87 CV 73 191 Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief (LC) LC 32 36, 157 Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics (LFM) LFM 83 122

220

Being Human after Wittgenstein

LFM 85 LFM 107 LFM 108 LFM 184 LFM 249

108 122, 181 108 173 29

Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. I (LW I) LWI 913 22 Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. II (LW II) LWII 3 95 LW II 23 93, 171 LW II 30 100 LW II 38 95 LW II 63 90 LW II 64 93 LW II 84 7, 88, 89, 95 Manuscripts, Wittgenstein’s Nachlass (MS) MS 116. 215 65 MS119.147.74v 165 MS 124.187 123 MS 124.221 139 MS 149.22 127 MS 149.4 65 MS 165.79 128 MS 165.79 116

MS 165.82 MS 165.94 MS 165.105 MS 180a.36 MS 183.56 MS 183.209

116 8, 178, 180 175 120 191 194

Notebooks 1914-1916 (NB) NB 54 41 NB 65 43 NB 73 52 NB 74 48 NB 75 50, 53 NB 76 46 NB 77 46 NB 78 53 NB 79 47, 51 NB 80 7,8,22 NB 81 39,40, 52 NB 82 64 NB 83 48 NB 86 41, 48 NB 87 51 NB 88 47 On Certainty (OC) OC 3 7, 8, 22, 26 OC 47 129 OC 63 93 OC 174 190 OC 186 23

Wittgenstein Index OC 204 OC 298 OC 359 OC 360 OC 370 OC 475 OC 559 OC 618

115, 168 8, 32, 33, 125 124 153,157 153 168 23, 118 93

Philosophical Grammar (PG) PG 71 81 PG 106 91 Philosophical Investigations (PI) PI vii 19, 20, 72 PI viii 20 PI 1 36, 89, 186, 187 PI 19 182 PI 25 93, 119 PI 30 146 PI 31 146 PI 36 89, 185 PI 49 146 PI 51 137 PI 66 23, 92 PI 67 23, 92 PI 69 150, 154 PI 71 111 PI 77 147 PI 79 186

PI 84 PI 90 PI 94 PI 107 PI 108 PI 109 PI 115 PI 116 PI 122 PI 123 PI 127 PI 133 PI 138 PI 142 PI 143 PI 145 PI 150 PI 152 PI 164 PI 174 PI 185 PI 188 PI 189 PI 194 PI 197 PI 198 PI 199 PI 201 PI 202

221

154, 157 81, 144 57 22 23 24, 57 24 21, 23 9 83, 182 142 35, 81 104 182 104, 105 104 7, 81 111 25 100 106, 171 109 114, 128 22 137 113, 129 117, 126 103, 107, 113, 115 8, 117, 119, 120, 131, 134, 136, 179

222

Being Human after Wittgenstein

PI 203 PI 205 PI 206 PI 207 PI 208 PI 211 PI 216 PI 217 PI 218 PI 226 PI 240 PI 241 PI 241 PI 242 PI 243 PI 244 PI 245 PI 246 PI 252 PI 253 PI 254 PI 256 PI 257 PI 258 PI 260 PI 261 PI 262 PI 264 PI 265

82 166 118, 143 165 121, 128 125 26 124, 125, 162 109 122 169 143 173, 180 169, 173, 181 119, 139 8, 144, 147 144 8, 119, 152, 153 153 119, 152, 155 7, 25, 57 119, 140 143, 146, 159 108, 116, 134, 159, 161 161 140, 160 151 144 124, 161

PI 269 PI 270 PI 271 PI 272 PI 279 PI 281 PI 284 PI 286 PI 288 PI 289 PI 290 PI 293 PI 299 PI 301 PI 302 PI 304 PI 309 PI 340 PI 370 PI 377 PI 380 PI 381 PI 384 PI 404 PI 405 PI 420 PI 431 PI 433 PI 454 PI 467

140 164, 166 167 152, 166 161 97 94 99 152 125, 162 72 149, 164, 166 144 87 155 58, 149, 166 83 78 90 156 119 133, 163 150 68 75 99 108 105 167 93

Wittgenstein Index PI 481 PI 693 PI p 178 PI p 179 PI p 180 PI p 188 PI p 189 PI p 192 PI p 217 PI p 221 PI p 223 PI p 224 PI p 226 PI p 227

93 119 7, 86, 91, 92, 96 95, 96 86 149 148 154, 158 111 152 150, 154 154, 190 132, 182 118

Philosophical Occasions (PO) PO 45 40 PO 101 67 PO 141 96 PO 229 67 PO 228 7, 65 PO 257 41, 43, 61 PO 258 42 PO 321 127 Philosophical Remarks (PR) PR 52 81 PR 70 12 PR 88 59, 61 PR 94 63

223

Remarks on Colour (RC) RC 302 142 Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (RFM) RFM 3 93 RFM 37 129 RFM 61 119, 125, 133 RFM 84 105 RFM 127 7, 26, 28 RFM 180 93 RFM 193 122 RFM 196 169 RFM 202 158 RFM 228 110 RFM 303 121 RFM 325 90 RFM 326 105 RFM 330 103, 124, 134, 136 RFM 331 122 RFM 332 113 RFM 333 23, 26 RFM 334 8, 158, 167, 172 RFM 335 8, 123, 167, 172 RFM 342 168, 169 RFM 344 167 RFM 345 143 RFM 348 121 RFM 353 173 RFM 406 133, 177 RFM 414 114

224

Being Human after Wittgenstein

Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. I (RPP I) RPP I 281 101 RPP I 454 95 RPP I 630 33, 182 Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. II (RPP II) RPP II 16 25, 187 RPP II 408 122 RPP II 414 133 RPP II 504 22 RPP II 624 23, 149 RPP II 625 123 RPP II 626 118, 173 RPP II 627 118 RPP II 629 130, 174, 176 RPP II 687 22, 142 RPP II 689 168 Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus (TLP) TLP 1.1 50 TLP 3.203 36 TLP 5.143 41 TLP 5.5421 185 TLP 5.5423 47 TLP 5.5563 82, 189 TLP 5.6 40 TLP 5.61 41 TLP 5.62 39, 40 TLP 5.621 39

TLP 5.63 TLP 5.631 TLP 5.632 TLP 5.633 TLP 5.64 TLP 5.641 TLP 6.124 TLP 6.373 TLP 6.41 TLP 6.421 TLP 6.423 TLP 6.43 TLP 6.431 TLP 6.45 TLP 6.51 TLP 6.53 TLP 6.54 TLP 7

39, 41, 185 28, 38, 64 38 41 38,41,42,50,86 38,39,49,98,185 41 49 46 46 46 50 42 48 31 24, 38, 98, 185 42, 55 45

Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge 1930-32 (WL 32) WL 32 24 113 WL 32 45 25 WL 32 112 81 Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge 1932-35 (WL 35) WL 35 3 16 WL 35 21 60, 186 WL 35 60 88 WL 35 62 96 WL 35 63 35, 72, 186

Wittgenstein Index Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Philosophical Psychology 1946-47 (WL 47) WL 47 47 57 Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (WVC) WVC 49 31, 59 WVC 107 43 WVC 117 188 WVC 154 108 WVC 157 108 Zettel (Z) Z 40 57 Z 173 22, 82, 186 Z 230 113 Z 318 177 Z 319 133

Z 331 Z 345 Z 350 Z 351 Z 428 Z 429 Z 430 Z 431 Z 487 Z 540 Z 567 Z 568 Z 569

225

182 165 93, 182 178 173 173 169 133, 177 149 99 130, 174, 176 142, 172 8, 100, 142, 185, 188

Author Index

Anscombe 19, 40, 71, 72, 195, 16, 197

Glock 40, 60, 156, 166, 198, 203, 213

Archer 128, 151

Hacker 66, 71, 122, 130, 135, 174, 140

Arrington 107, 115, 129 Augustine 186, 200, 201, 211, 214, 215

Hodges 44, 50 Jones 77

Bloor 104, 114, 129, 131-133

Kant 35

Baker & Hacker 122, 130, 135, 174

Kenny 71, 96, 145, 160, 207

Bakhurst 70, 75, 198 Campbell 12, 61, 64, 74, 88, 200 Cavell 116, 146, 150, 156, 201 Descartes 27, 35, 45, 66, 72, 88, 216 Evans 12, 35, 64, 66, 69, 72, 73, 78, 98, 101, 201, 203 Fogelin 59, 140, 148, 151 Fraser 96

Kerr 9 Klemke 162 Kripke 105, 107, 128, 130, 131, 181, 207 Lichtenberg 59, 62-65 Luntley 30, 91, 112, 117, 124, 135, 148, 155, 163, 170, 208 Madell 62, 63, 74, 101, 208 Malcolm 53, 59, 66, 71, 128, 169, 174-176, 208, 209

228

Being Human after Wittgenstein

McDowell 79, 133, 134, 203, 209, 210, 211, 217 McGinn 58, 78, 100, 113, 171, 175, 177 Mounce 37 Pears 166 Phillips 48, 69, 77, 204, 211-215 Russell 55, 196, 197 Ryle 73, 75, 76, 213 Schroeder 159, 163 Sluga 38 Strawson 76, 77, 214 Tilgman 43, 82 Williams 12, 62, 216 Winch 51, 54 Wright 132

Subject Index

A

B

Adam 179, 180, 192, 193, 194

Behaviour 38, 69, 76, 92, 95, 99, 110, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 127, 129, 130, 133, 136, 137, 145, 147, 148, 149, 155, 156, 160, 166, 167, 173, 180, 181

Aesthetics 36, 48, 56, 103, 107, 195, 198, 201, 215 Agreement 50, 52, 53, 93, 108, 121, 130, 132-134, 138, 143, 144, 146, 147, 168170, 173, 176-178, 180, 181 Anthropology 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 22, 28, 30, 31, 32, 82, 138, 140, 147, 155, 158, 167, 168, 178, 189 Argument 14, 15, 21, 24, 30, 46, 58, 60, 67, 70, 83, 114, 132, 140, 141, 148, 153, 156, 158, 160, 162, 179, 205, 207, 217 Articulation 11, 12, 21, 22, 23, 26, 31, 35, 83, 104, 118, 142, 163 Attitude 32, 47-52, 55, 91, 94, 99, 100, 104, 117, 183, 191

Belief 20, 99, 120, 191, 195, 198, 199, 200, 202, 204, 205, 206, 211, 212, 215 Bewitchment 24, 57 Body 24-28, 32, 35, 36, 38, 58, 60, 61, 65, 67, -69, 85-101, 141, 152, 157, 163, 167, 179, 185-187, 193 C Cartesian 24, 25, 28, 38, 56, 65, 71, 72, 78, 108, 110-112, 134, 156, 165, 167, 170, 186, 187 Cause 25, 52, 72, 116, 153, 160 Certain 22, 24, 26, 40, 48, 58, 62, 63, 66, 68, 69, 77, 78, 81, 83, 85, 86, 91-93, 97, 11,

230

Being Human after Wittgenstein 117, 118, 121, 123, 127, 128, 145, 149, 151, 154, 159, 161, 162, 165, 168, 169, 171, 173, 177, 185, 193

Certainty 153-155, 165, 190, 195, 207, 220 Collaboration 16, 28, 30, 32, 44, 82, 96, 137, 141-143, 173, 181, 182, 183, 187, 188 Communication 159, 169, 205 Communion 13, 14, 16, 141 Community 5, 8, 15, 16, 19, 25, 27, 28, 32, 33, 101, 125-135, 141, 142, 147, 170, 173, 176, 177, 180, 183, 187-192, 194 Conversation 16, 28, 30, 32, 44, 82, 96, 137, 141-143, 173, 181-183, 187, 188, 195, 200, 216 Correct 13, 21, 24, 25, 40, 61, 59, 70, 74, 104-111, 114116, 118, 121, 122, 124, 127, 130-134, 136, 140, 145, 147, 159, 160-165, 174, 176, 179, 189 Culture 182, 197 Custom 117, 121, 125, 126,

128-137, 176, 177 Criterion 12, 13, 43, 116, 149, 155, 156, 159-161, 163 Critical 17, 19, 20, 28, 32, 58, 141, 188, 198, 203, 204, 213, 215 D Death 42, 48, 53, 150, 156, 192 Definition 11, 20, 22, 23, 26, 36, 90, 100, 129, 133, 140, 144, 145, 148, 149, 159-163, 169 Disposition 108, 115, 118, 121, 122, 136, 142 Distinctions 12, 13, 16, 20-22, 85 E Ego 15, 19, 24, 25, 31, 38, 56, 65, 71, 72, 78, 88, 89, 91, 186, 187 Empirical 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33, 37, 38, 42, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 54-56, 73, 87, 90, 91, 93, 96, 98, 105, 135, 141, 143, 153, 156, 157, 162, 175, 178, 181, 182, 188, 189 Epistemological 77, 105, 169 Ethical 22, 24, 25, 31, 35, 45-57, 98, 188

Subject Index Ethics 46, 47, 48, 50, 55, 56, 103, 107, 188, 195, 198, 201 Eve 179, 180, 193, 194 Evil 7, 24, 45-47 Experience 35, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43-44, 52, 59, 60, 61, 63, 67, 70, 75, 77, 91, 93, 111, 112, 132, 143-145, 152, 156, 157, 160, 161, 165, 166, 179, 185, 195, 208, 213

95, 147, 175, 186, 193 Grammar 16, 19, 25, 66, 67, 70, 71, 73, 81, 84-86, 109, 125, 135, 146, 149, 151, 158, 160, 164, 186, 196, 198, 199, 202, 207, 215, 216 Grammatical 7, 12, 16, 42, 60, 66, 67, 69, 81, 82, 84, 86, 92, 94, 127, 182, 186 H

F

Home 11, 12, 2-22, 33

Family Resemblance 86, 91, 118, 209

Homunculus 96

First-Person 13, 36, 58, 60, 61, 64, 66, 71, 74, 75, 86, 88, 91, 95, 153, 186 Form of life 94, 123, 136, 143, 150, 151, 171-173, 179-182, 203, 213, 214

231

I I 7, 15, 16, 17, 19-48, 53-79, 81, 84-89, 91, 92, 94, 95, 99101, 107, 109-126, 139-149, 152-165, 168, 169, 171, 174, 175, 177, 182, 185-193, 196198, 200, 201, 207

Fundamental 19, 54, 98-100, 103, 124, 126, 134-136, 138, 141, 168, 170, 172, 179, 182, 183, 188-194

Image 26, 87, 97, 156, 161, 194

G

Interpretation 29, 106, 108, 109, 112-116, 122, 129, 133137, 142, 190

Game 23, 92, 117, 126, 154, 157, 158, 173, 174, 177, 209 Good 22, 24, 45-50, 52, 53, 55,

Immaterial 89 Index 73, 74, 186

Judgement 16, 27, 64, 65, 70, 73, 93, 100, 121, 122, 129, 133,

232

Being Human after Wittgenstein

134, 143, 144, 146, 148, 167173, 178-181, 183, 190, 208 Justification 26, 111, 116, 123125, 136, 149, 162 L Labyrinth 44, 82, 83 Language 7, 8, 11, 15, 16, 21, 22, 24-30, 32, 33, 36, 39-45, 50, 52, 56-66, 70, 72, 73, 77, 78, 81-84, 87, 89-92, 101, 107, 114, 120, 126, 128, 138-148, 150-162, 166-189, 197-217 Language-Game 20, 21, 36, 72, 86, 93, 94, 97, 98, 103, 104, 115, 124, 128, 142, 146-148, 151, 153-157, 165, 166, 168180, 189, 190, 199, 204, 205, 207, 213, 216 Life 12, 13, 16, 21-26, 30-33, 36, 39, 43, 48-53, 59, 65, 82, 87, 90, 91, 93, 94, 100, 101, 103, 107, 118, 120, 123, 125, 129, 132, 136, 137, 141-143, 146, 147, 149-151, 155, 156, 162, 163, 165, 171-175, 178-183, 186193, 203, 206, 210, 212,-216 Limit 24, 35, 38-57, 157, 185, 205, 209, 214, 217 Logic 22, 26, 35, 37, 41, 46, 114,

198, 200, 208, 214 Look 7, 8, 1, 13, 14-16, 20-24, 26, 28, 31, 35, 37, 57, 67, 78, 83-86, 89, 92, 96, 100, 107, 110, 111, 126, 141, 149, 158, 163, 186, 188 M Meaning 22, 29, 31, 36, 37, 40, 44, 46, 51, 57, 61, 76, 81, 82, 87, 89, 96, 100, 103, 104, 107, 109, 110, 113, 114, 118, 119, 122, 127, 135, 142, 144-147, 150-161, 163, 166, 167, 169, 170, 174, 177-180, 188-194, 198, 204, 208-210, 214-216 Memory 161-163, 165 Metaphysical 21, 23-25, 35, 38, 39, 42, 44-46, 49-51, 53-57, 70, 73, 81, 91, 98, 100, 105, 109, 169, 185, 198 Method 19, 21, 22, 30, 31, 69, 81, 83, 86 Methodological 11-15, 23, 30, 82, 155, 158, 165, 189 Mind 19, 24, 25, 27, 28, 38, 53, 79, 72, 85, 86, 88-92, 95, 97101, 107, 110-112, 128, 141, 144, 145, 149, 185, 204, 210, 213, 214

Subject Index

233

Motto 28, 35, 84

Numeral 84, 89

Mystical 51, 53, 55, 214

Nurture 15, 16, 27, 39, 32, 33, 101, 103, 104, 138, 142, 151, 155, 168, 171, 180-183, 187194

N Name 19, 21, 24, 25, 36, 40, 58, 61, 63-66, 68-70, 72, 73, 75, 85, 88, 89, 92, 117, 121, 124, 144-147, 149, 156, 157, 159161, 168, 179, 185, 186, 192 Nature 5, 11, 12, 15, 16, 19, 25, 27, 30-35, 38, 59, 64, 66, 70, 85-87, 89, 92, 93, 101, 103, 104, 107, 109, 128, 130, 132, 135-138, 142, 143, 151, 155, 165, 168, 170, 171, 179-183, 185, 188-193, 200 Natural History 93, 118, 119, 124, 125, 133, 137 Normative 21, 105, 109, 113, 116-119, 121, 124-127, 131, 135, 137, 147, 151, 158, 159, 166, 170, 171, 179, 181, 187, 190 Normativity 104, 105, 107118, 124,125, 129-137, 148, 161, 167, 169, 176, 178 Number 15, 23, 30, 36, 84, 86, 89, 91, 104-107, 110, 111, 113, 119, 131, 132, 159, 169, 172, 180

O Obeying 103, 113, 115, 117120, 125, 130, 134 Objectivity 108, 112, 115, 117, 118, 119, 129, 134, 136, 137, 161, 167, 178 Ordinary 21, 24, 44, 62, 82, 111, 139, 140, 145, 160, 162, 167 Ostensive 36, 144, 145, 148, 149, 159, 160, 178, 179 Pain 52, 60, 61, 63, 64, 67-70, 7577, 91, 94, 97 99, 143-159, 166, 177, 181 P Paradox 107, 114 Pattern 8, 23, 100, 103, 108, 109, 119, 121, 122, 124, 127, 129, 130, 136, 137, 141-143, 149, 150, 170, 171, 173, 179181, 185, 187, 208 Pain 52, 60-70, 75-77, 91, 94, 97, 99, 143-159, 166, 177, 181

234

Being Human after Wittgenstein

Person 7, 8, 13, 19, 24, 29-31, 36, 43, 48-50, 52, 53, 55, 5877, 86, 88, 91, 92, 95-97, 99, 100, 104, 117-119, 121, 123, 127, 129-131, 133, 135, 136, 139, 140, 144, 145, 150, 152, 153, 155, 156, 158, 159, 161, 163, 164, 165, 167, 171, 172, 174, 175, 177, 185, 186, 188, 189, 191, 197, 198, 213, 215 Perspicuity 19 Phenomenal 51 Philosophical 7, 11-13, 15, 17, 19, 20, 22-26, 28, 20-32, 3538, 40, 42, 44, 45, 49, 51, 56, 57, 59, 64, 66, 66, 72, 77, 81-884, 86, 87, 89, 98, 103105, 107, 119, 120, 122, 124, 138, 140, 141, 144, 147, 155, 157, 158, 167, 171, 172, 178, 181, 182, 185, 187-189, 195199, 204-208, 210, 213-217 Physical 29, 32, 33, 41, 48, 53, 57, 67, 78, 84, 85, 88-91, 94, 98, 101, 120, 127, 128, 132, 150, 157, 158 Picture 7, 16, 19, 26, 29, 36, 54, 83, 86, 87, 89, 92, 96, 97, 101, 113, 116, 143, 144, 148, 152, 175, 183, 186, 187, 192, 206

Platonic 108-111, 115, 134, 136, 137, 142, 156, 167, 170 Practice 8, 29, 104, 108, 110, 111, 116, 117, 119-125, 127131, 133-138, 141, 142, 144, 147, 151, 157, 163, 165, 167172, 174, 176, 177, 214 Private 8, 15, 16, 27, 28, 32, 101, 119, 120, 127-129, 135, 138-145, 147, 148, 151-153, 156-161, 163-167, 169, 172, 175-179, 183, 187, 188, 191, 195, 197, 207, 213 Problem 12, 22-25, 31, 37, 42, 46, 52, 54, 55, 58, 59, 65, 77, 78, 82-84, 87, 100, 104, 105, 107109, 111, 115, 139, 148, 151, 163, 169, 180, 189, 197, 205 Process 16, 22, 27, 32, 33, 82, 110, 111, 129, 137, 142, 144, 145, 155, 160, 183 Proposition 21, 39, 54, 55, 73, 74, 77, 82, 87, 95, 108, 148, 154, 160, 162, 189 R Realism 24, 29, 41, 42, 43, 90, 182 Referring 43, 58, 61, 65, 67, 6973, 76, 85, 129, 130, 148, 150

Subject Index Regularity 93, 117, 118, 121, 123, 126, 127, 129, 130, 136, 137, 144, 146, 151, 167-172, 174, 178, 179

235

Science 24, 30, 31, 38, 39, 91, 185, 216

Relevant 20, 75, 122, 149, 150, 175, 177

Self 7, 12, 15, 19, 24-27, 35-42, 44, 45, 57, 58, 65, 72, 78, 85, 89, 101, 185, 187, 189, 199, 200, 208, 214

Religion 26, 27, 103, 107, 191, 107, 199-202, 204-216

Sensation 8, 57, 62, 69, 95, 97, 120, 139, 140, 144-167

Remarks 16, 17, 19, 20, 28, 32, 37, 59, 73, 89, 101, 103, 107, 126, 136-138, 141, 144, 158, 173-175, 178, 182, 183, 187, 188, 196, 206

Solipsism 24, 39-43, 61, 63

Representation 16, 59, 60, 61, 75, 87, 183, 187, 213 Rule 8, 36, 49, 72, 82, 92, 103107, 110-137, 142, 146, 150, 154, 157, 172, 174, 176-181, 186, 198, 200, 205, 207, 209

Solipsist 39, 40, 42-44, 54, 55, 61-63 Solution 22-24, 37, 42, 82, 107110, 117 Soul 7, 19, 24, 25, 32, 35, 38, 85-100, 141, 149, 167, 185, 186, 194 Spiritual 29, 32, 86, 88, 91, 92, 94, 95, 99, 185, 188, 194

Rule-Following 15, 16, 28, 29, 32, 33, 101, 103, 107-120, 122, 124-130, 132, 134-138, 141-143, 167, 169, 171, 172, 177, 180-183, 187-189, 214

Stream 12, 21-23, 26, 30, 32, 36, 43, 54, 82, 87, 90, 100, 120, 123, 142, 143, 146, 149, 150, 155, 162, 167, 172, 179, 186, 189, 191, 192

S

Subject 15, 19-22, 24, 25, 27, 29-31, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 42, 45-47, 49, 51, 53-55, 57, 58, 60-79, 85, 86, 91, 96-101, 110-112, 117-121, 126-128,

Scepticism 107, 108, 162, 165, 198, 201, 208

236

Being Human after Wittgenstein

144, 145, 148, 155, 160, 161, 161, 164, 165, 179, 185, 192, 210, 211, 217 Subjectivity 15, 19, 20, 22, 23, 27, 29, 37, 38, 43-45, 55, 56, 58, 59, 62-64, 77, 84, 87, 89, 92, 94, 96, 100, 101, 183, 187 Substance 24, 26, 27, 45, 72, 86, 89, 98, 131 T Technique 59, 60, 119, 121, 122, 127, 134-136, 147, 151 Theoretical 6, 11-13, 21-23, 26, 31, 35, 83, 104, 118, 119, 126, 127, 141, 142 Theory 11, 96, 115, 137, 167, 197, 199 Therapy 7, 12, 57, 59, 60, 65 Third-Person 36, 76, 86, 91, 153, 158 Thought 16, 19, 20, 22, 23, 26, 27, 32, 35-37, 41, 43, 44, 45, 49, 52, 55, 56, 57, 59, 61-66, 69, 71-74, 79, 82, 84, 87, 90, 95, 99, 101, 106, 109, 114, 119, 141, 144, 185-187, 189, 202, 208, 209, 211, 214, 215, 217

Treatment 7, 8, 15, 16, 25, 37, 47, 56, 57, 108, 138-140, 142, 187 True 19, 23, 29, 31, 42, 44, 48, 54, 75, 88, 94, 97, 108, 132, 133, 142, 148, 150, 154, 160162, 165, 167, 170, 177, 190, 191, 198, 208, 213 Truth 12-15, 24, 27, 39, 40, 52, 61, 64, 75, 96, 110, 133, 134, 160, 187, 190 U Übersicht 15, 82, 175 Understanding 11, 13, 24, 25, 58, 63, 65, 67, 69, 84, 85, 104, 106-117, 122, 123, 133, 136, 137, 191198, 199, 204, 211 Use 11-14, 16, 19-29, 32, 33, 36, 37, 42-45, 55, 58-98, 100, 103, 104, 107, 108, 110, 114, 117, 119, 121-129, 133, 138-145, 148-183, 186, 189, 191, 198, 202 V Vorstellung 87, 96, 97, 156

Subject Index

237

W Will 26, 45-55, 85, 86, 88, 9092, 95, 97-101, 112, 141, 148, 185, 204, 213 Word 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 16, 19-26, 36, 37, 43, 44, 46, 59, 61, 65, 6797, 100, 103, 110, 117-125, 132, 139, 140, 142-150, 152, 154-189, 192, 199, 206, 213

World 13, 15, 16, 24, 25, 27-51, 53, 98, 99, 101, 119, 120, 127, 128, 136-145, 150, 151, 157, 160, 164-167, 170, 179, 181-183, 185, 187-194, 199, 200, 208, 210, 213