Beijing Transforms: Urban Infrastructure, Public Works, and Social Change in the Chinese Capital, 1900-1928

613 73 20MB

English Pages [471] Year 1993

Report DMCA / Copyright

DOWNLOAD FILE

Polecaj historie

Beijing Transforms: Urban Infrastructure, Public Works, and Social Change in the Chinese Capital, 1900-1928

Citation preview

INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

U niversity M icrofilm s International A B ell & H ow ell Inform ation C o m p a n y 3 0 0 N orth Z e e b R o a d . A nn Arbor, Ml 4 8 1 0 6 - 1 3 4 6 U S A 3 1 3 /7 6 1 - 4 7 0 0

8 0 0 /5 2 1 - 0 6 0 0

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

R eproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

Order Number 9S33861

Beijing transforms: Urban infrastructure, public works, and social change in the Chinese capital, 1900-1928 Shi, Mingzheng, Ph.D. Columbia University, 1993

Copyright ©1993 by Shi, Mingzheng. All rights reserved.

UMI

300 N. Zeeb Rd. Ann Arbor, MI 48106

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

R eproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. F urther reproduction prohibited w itho ut perm ission.

BEIJING TRANSFORMS: URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE, PUBLIC WORKS, AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE CHINESE CAPITAL, 1900-1928

Mingzheng Shi

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 1993

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

©1993 Mingzheng Shi All Rights Reserved

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ABSTRACT

Beijing Transforms: Urban Infrastructure, Public Works, and Social Change in the Chinese Capital, 1900-1928

Mingzheng Shi

This dissertation is about the physical and social transformation of an important Chinese city during the early twentieth century. Focusing on the first three decades of the twentieth century, during which time major public works were undertaken, essential elements of a modern infrastructure came into existence, and a new metropolis took shape, it investigates four aspects of urban infrastructure: modem waterworks, mass transit, electrification, and public parks. It also examines the development of municipal institutions and the public works sponsored by the city government, especially urban planning, street paving and sewer repair. The seven chapters each deal with one major aspect of urban infrastructure; together they address three related questions: what was the city like before these changes occurred? How and why was it transformed? What does the change mean? Relying heavily on archival sources, I give equal treatment to the city's spatial transformation and its implication for social change. Through this case study, I explore the diffusion of Western technology in China, the role of municipal government and entrepreneurship in the context of rising Chinese nationalism, and the impact

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of technological change on the urban environment and on the everyday life of ordinary Chinese city dwellers. Although the focus of this study is on the tradition and transformation of an Asian city, I attempt to compare and contrast Beijing's path to urbanization with urban development in North American and European cities. By examining the role of Western technology in Chinese public works and by documenting a conscious attempt by the Chinese to combine the strengths of their own urban heritage with Western experiences, I hope to initiate an international dialogue in comparative urbanism, and to contribute to the lively historical debate over whether urbanism displays common characteristics throughout the world or whether Chinese urban development charts its own distinctive course.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CONTENTS

Page

List of Maps, Tables and Graphs Acknowledgment Preface

iii iv vi

Introduction

The Rise of a New Metropolis Beijing as an Ancient City Modern Transformation

Chapter 1

Evolution of Municipal Administration Introduction Development of Municipal Institutions Characteristics of the Municipal Council Municipal Finance The Affordability Factor Impact on Urban Life Conclusion

Chapter 2

Street Paving and Zoning Introduction The Changing Face of Beijing Preparation for the Movement Street Improvement Rebuilding the City Gates Zoning and Urban Planning Social Meaning of Spatial Growth

88 88 89 98 102 109 120 125

Chapter 3

Sewerage Introduction Origins and Development The Official Role in Sewerage Control Sewerage Renewal in Early Twentieth Century Conclusion

134 134 135 147 154 166

Chapter 4

Public Space Introduction Imperial Hierarchy of Space The Public Park Movement The Impact of Public Space on Urban Society Conclusion

174 174 174 183 201 211

i

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1 1 9 25 25 26 35 46 61 67 78

Chapter 5

Water Supply Introduction The Birth of Modern Water Supply Structure of the Beijing Waterworks Company Financing the Waterworks Purchasing Equipment Locating Water Source Building a Water Infrastructure The Politics of Water Sale Government, Water Company and Public Health The Economics of Water Provision Conclusion

221 221 226 232 241 252 258 263 271 282 288 301

Chapter 6

Electric Lighting Introduction Imperial Illumination Electrification in the Diplomatic Quarter From Imperial and Foreign to Civilian Use Political Nexus of Electric Power Social Impact of Electrification

312 312 315 317 320 327 336

Chapter 7

Transportation Introduction The Chinese Patterns of Transportation Railroad Rickshaw The Coming of the Streetcar Rapid Transit in a Slow City Conclusion

347 347 349 353 364 370 378 387

Conclusion

Building a Modem Urban Infrastructure Toward a Comparative Perspective

393 404

Bibliography Glossary Appendices

411 439 444

ii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

TABLES, MAPS AND GRAPHS Tables

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

Page

Age Distribution of City Government Officials Educational Backgrounds of City Officials Native Places of City Officials Revenue of the Beijing Municipal Council, 1925 Chronology of Beijing Municipal Taxation Municipal Taxation in Beijing, 1931-1932 Expenditures of the Municipal Council, 1925 Municipal Expenditures in Beijing, 1931-1932 Distribution of Urban Households by Economic Classes,1926 Percentage Distribution of Expenditure in Selected Cities, 1929 Percentage Distribution of Expenditure of Beijing Residents,1918-24 Composition of Garbage in Beijing in 1930 (in percentage) Chronological Breakdown of Sewer Repairs, 1900-1930 Frequency of Major Fires in Beijing, 1821-1948 Monthly Salary Scale for Employees of Beijing Waterworks Co. Total and Per Capita Water Consumption of Beijing, 1928-1945 Incomes and Expenditures of Beijing Waterworks Co. Electric Enterprises Established in China by Western Countries Transportation Vehicles in Beijing, 1932 Streetcar Transit in Major Chinese Cities

40 41

42 47 49

50 55

56 62 64 64 146 164 226 239 291 296 313 369 372

Maps

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Beijing through History City Plan of Beijing Sewerage System Public Parks Water Supply System Legation Quarter Railroad System Streetcar Routes

2 7 137

175 259 318 358 379

Graphs

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Population of Beijing, 1912-1942 Annual Paving of Streets, 1904-1930 Types of Street Paving by Districts Organizational Structure of Beijing Waterworks Company Water Consumption by Households, 1912-1932 Annual Balance Sheet of Beijing Waterworks Company, 1915-1924 Growth of Electric Usage in Beijing, 1929-1945 iii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

13

105 129 234 290 293 338

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This study would not have been possible without the support of many people. I would like to begin by thanking my advisor, Professor Madeleine Zelin, for her vigorous support and insightful critique from the dissertation's conception to completion. At various stages of the project, Professor Andrew J. Nathan provided timely and sound advice. Professor Kenneth T. Jackson kept alive my interest in American cities and encouraged my cross-cultural and comparative approach. Professor Herbert Klein brought me into the exciting world of computer and history, some results of which were reflected in the study. Professor Elizabeth Blackmar's comments on the Public Space Chapter were equally inspiring. I also benefitted from criticism of the members of the George Washington Plunkitt Benevolent Association, a Columbia dissertation workshop under the guidance of Professor Jackson. I will never forget those monthly gatherings in New York City, especially the wonderful food that came before discussions, provided by our gracious hosts and hostesses. Sandra Opdycke, who skillfully and meticulously edited the manuscript, deserves my special thanks. Outside Columbia, I would like to thank Professor William Rowe of the Johns Hopkins University for his helpful comments. Special thanks also go to Columbia's C.V. Starr East Asian Library and the Interlibrary Loan Office. I am also indebted to the knowledgeable staff at the following institutions: the Library of Congress, Harvard-Yenching East iv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Asian Library, Princeton University Gest Oriental Library; and overseas, Toyo Bunko, the National Library of China and the Capital Library in Beijing, Beijing Municipal Archives, China's Number One and Number Two Historical Archives, and Peking University Library. I am happy to acknowledge financial support from the Joint Committee on Chinese Studies of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council, which named me a Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation fellow to conduct research in Japan. The Columbia University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences awarded me a much coveted travelling fellowship to the People's Republic of China. Ms. Giles Whiting Foundation offered me a Dissertation Fellowship in the Humanities to support my write­ up. To all of them I am grateful. Finally, on a personal note, Professor Bruce Stave of the University of Connecticut and his wife Sondra Stave ushered me into American life. They have never failed to provide scholarly, financial, and emotional support, especially when I needed it most. They watched with pride my progress as I navigated through the American system of higher learning. Back in China, my family understands the woes and sorrows of living in a foreign land and has always offered unconditional support. I hope this study of our hometown will be a token of appreciation for their tolerance of my prolonged absence from home. To my family and the Stave family this dissertation is dedicated.

v

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

PREFACE

Most visitors come to Beijing-China's grand and historic capital--to see the Great Wall, the Forbidden City, the Altar of Heaven and other magnificent monuments of the country's past. In recent years, however, they have not only been impressed by the history of the ancient capital, but have also been struck by the immense physical changes that have recently taken place in this Asian metropolis. In the late 1970s, the Chinese government embarked on an ambitious campaign to modernize the capital. Since then Beijing has taken on a new modern look: four speedway loops encircle the city, connecting to inter­ provincial highways while a major rapid transit subway system runs beneath the former walls of the Inner City. Domestic and imported automobiles share the streets, with the buses and bicycles that remain the primary means of transporting nine million people. A gigantic Olympic sports center occupies the northwest corner of the city, home of the 1990 Asian Games and a contender for the 2000 Olympic Games. Western-style, multiple-story apartment complexes mushroom everywhere, gradually replacing the traditional courtyard houses and encroaching upon valuable farmlands in the suburbs. Glittering luxury hotels and fancy shopping malls dot the bustling downtown districts, catering not only to foreign tourists and businessmen, but also to the Chinese nouveaux riches, the beneficiaries of Deng Xiaoping's reform.

vi

with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The modernization of Beijing continues. The city government recently issued 150 million yuan of municipal bonds to raise funds for a multi-lane highway between downtown and the international airport, as well as between Beijing and Shijiazhuang, the provincial capital of Hebei. This public bondissue was unprecedented in the city's history. Moreover, the innovative municipal authorities have designed attractive tax-breaks to lure foreign investment and businesses. The MacDonalds, Holiday Inns and Coca Colas, trademarks of Western capitalism, are no longer considered strange and exotic; they have been embraced heartily by sa w y Chinese urbanites. The ultimate goal, announced the city mayor recently, is for Beijing to rank with New York, London, Tokyo, and Paris as one of the world's premier cosmopolitan centers in the twenty-first century. Born and raised in Beijing, I had lived in the city for over twenty years before coming to the United States. My trips home in 1988 and in 1990 revealed changes so great that I found it necessary to carry the latest street maps wherever I biked or walked about the city. The seed of the current study had already been planted during my first return trip, as I wondered at the transformation. Had I not left Beijing, I would probably not have been so acutely aware of its changing face. But because of my academic interest in urban history and my four-year sojourn in New York, America's largest and most dynamic city, I began to look at distant Beijing with a fresh perspective. I realized that the contemporary transformation was part of an on-going

vii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

historical process. Even before the 1980s, the socialist capital was different from its imperial past. The Forbidden City had long since been turned into a museum, city walls had come down, and moats had been filled. The old skyline of walls, towers and gates, symbols of the old Beijing, had given way to modem high-rises. The change was so dramatic that many place names had lost their original meanings. As a historian of modern China, I was intrigued by the question of when and how Beijing began its modern transformation. The second trip, a research oriented one, took me into the libraries, museums, and archives in search of that answer. My findings are summarized in the present dissertation. This study builds on earlier studies of the Chinese urban experience by historians, sociologists, geographers, and political scientists. The pioneering works of Rhodes Murphy, G. William Skinner, Gilbert Rozman, Chang Sendou, Hou Renzhi and others had shaped the field of urban Chinese history and still remain influential. William Rowe's two-volume work on Hankou in the Qing period is the first detailed study of an important Chinese city. Jeffery Myer's recent study on traditional Beijing, especially its sacred symbolism, and Nancy Steinhardt's work on Chinese imperial city planning, offer insights into the configuration of the imperial order. David Strand has written a sophisticated and enlightening account of Beijing's people and politics during the 1920s; especially valuable is his documentation and treatment of the urban inhabitants' a burgeoning civic identity and political consciousness. The

viii

with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

studies of Shanghai by Frederic Wakeman, Ye Wen-hsing, and others, explore the political, economic, social, and cultural factors in the formation of one of China's most modern and vibrant urban centers. Despite these accomplishments, however, the study of Chinese cities can hardly be considered exhaustive. Compared with studies of other world cities, like Paris, London, and New York, work on Chinese urban centers still has not done justice to a rich history. Moreover, although recent works focusing on individual cities represent a new stage in the growth of Chinese urban history, the fundamental question of urbanization as a process and the city as a center of change remains to be fully addressed. Urbanization not only involves population growth, thriving trade and commerce, and the budding political consciousness of an urban class, but also the development of an infrastructure, including roads, bridges, houses, parks, water, telephone and telegraph, fire-fighting, transportation and sewer systems. The study of a city's physical history as a result of technological progress is significant because transformation in the urban landscape (the hardware) reflects and reinforces social change (the software), including new patterns of work, residence, mobility, class division, and the identity and living standard of the city people. Therefore, an analysis of spatial development as one of the multiple dimensions of urbanization can enrich our understanding of the historical changes in modern Chinese society. Beijing is one of the world's largest cities and has a long and rich

ix

with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

history. Founded some 3,000 years ago, it has been China's capital for over 900 years. But Beijing's modern transformation was a twentieth century phenomenon. To be sure, the city experienced large-scale building and significant expansion during the times of Kublai Khan in the Yuan (13th century), the Yongle and Jiajing emperors in the Ming (15th century and 16th century) and the Qianlong emperor in the Qing (18th century). But none of these modifications changed the city's role as the symbol of imperial power and dynastic majesty. Rather, they were attempts to articulate more clearly the cosmic meaning already present in the structure of the city. Each represented an effort to achieve a more faithful expression of the ancient norms. Modern transformation did not begin until the early twentieth century, coinciding with the breakdown of the imperial order and the birth of the Chinese republic. The process has already involved several crucial stages of development and will undoubtedly last into the twenty-first century. This study, however, concentrates on the formative years of that process. Such an inquiry can not only illuminate the political, economic, social, and technological forces shaping Beijing's modern transformation, but also offer historical insight into the Chinese government's current modernization campaign. The demise of the last imperial dynasty in the early twentieth century ushered China into a new era of change. The modernization of Chinese urban centers took hold, both as a government policy and as a secular trend. During the last decade of the Qing dynasty and the early years of the

x

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Republic, or the first thirty years of the twentieth century, the infrastructural transformation of Beijing gained momentum, culminating in the opening of the city's first streetcar and railroad systems, the provision of electricity, the conversion of former imperial gardens into public space, the expansion of paved streets, and the construction of waterworks and sewer systems. Never in so short a period had the city's physical landscape been so fundamentally transformed. Outgrowing traditional constraints, Beijing stood poised on the threshold of the modem age. Beginning in 1900 with the Boxer Uprising and the imperially sanctioned New Policies Reform (xinzheng) and ending in 1928, when Beijing ceased to be the capital of the Republic, this dissertation deals mainly with the development of the municipal government which initiated and coordinated many public works and the growth of three public utility enterprises: the streetcar, waterworks and electric companies. In 1914, the Beijing Municipal Council was created to take charge of overall urban planning and public works. This powerful government agency reflected an official determination to promote Beijing's urban development. The Municipal Council obtained its chief source of revenue from commercial taxes, and spent a good portion of it on public works. Paved streets and reconstructed city gates through the ancient walls eased the problems of traffic and crowding, facilitated commerce and communication, and opened Beijing to the rest of China and the world. An expanded underground sewer system improved sanitation and beautified

xi

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the urban milieu. The city government also transformed former imperial gardens into public parks, expanded government power over zoning and land use, and implemented reform measures in poor relief, elementary education, and public health. The modernization efforts by the private sector were equally impressive. Founded in 1908 with the approval of the Qing court, the Waterworks Company was a private business run by Chinese entrepreneurs and supervised by the government. The Streetcar Company came into existence in 1921 through an official-private joint venture. For the first time, electric trams offered the ancient city an alternative to transportation based on manual or animal power. Similarly, the Electric Company, founded in 1905, gradually expanded its operation from serving only the imperial court and the diplomatic quarters to benefitting commercial and civilian society as a whole. Significant as they were, these companies made only slow progress, constantly hampered by political disruption, financial stringency, technological backwardness, and weak consumer demand because of the low standard of living. An institutional and historical investigation of these public utility firms offers insights into the dynamics of the modernization process and social change in China's capital city. The dissertation has seven chapters, six of them each dealing with one specific aspect of urban infrastructure or public utility: street paving and zoning, sewer repair and refuse disposal, public space, water supply,

xii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

electrification, and urban transit. Chapter One examines the evolution of municipal institutions and addresses the question of municipal finance. The government's determination to modernize the city and the institutionalization of municipal taxation were two critical factors contributing to the success of public works and the transformation of the urban infrastructure. Chapter Two, Three and Four concentrate on major public works undertaken by the city government: traffic improvement, sewerage repair, and creation of public parks. Chapter Five, Six and Seven deal with three important public utilities: waterworks, electric lighting, and transportation, which the government franchised to private companies. This study does not cover the entire municipal infrastructure. Modern postal service, telecommunications (telephone and telegraph), public health, and education, for example, receive only cursory treatment. Readers will also find only brief discussion of other important functions of the municipal government, such as poor relief and the promotion of business. I can only hope that at a future time, when I expand the current thesis, I will have the opportunity to address these important subjects. Simply put, the seven chapters attempt to answer three related questions: What was the Beijing like before 1900? How and why was it transformed? What did the change mean? Concentrating on thirty years of infrastructural development in an important Chinese city, I have chosen to examine four issues within the context of emerging Chinese nationalism and as

xiii

with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

part of the modern state-building process. First, what made the spatial transformation of Beijing possible? Who initiated and carried out these reforms? I argue that the municipal bureaucratic apparatus was in the hands of a group of modem technocrats who campaigned for modernization along Western lines, and that the state and society interacted to bring about changes in Beijing. Here, I join the current scholarly debate over the state-society relationship by emphasizing the role of the state in the city's transformation during the early twentieth century. While acknowledging the positive role exercised by an emerging civil society and its important interest groups, my analysis indicates that the key player in the public works and capital projects was the city government itself and its expanding municipal apparatus. It sought aggressively to levy taxes to be used for city improvement. It repaired the city's sewerage system, paved and expanded many of the city's roads and opened public spaces for recreation and entertainment. Wherever the city's funds could not reach, the municipal institutions, including the Municipal Council and Metropolitan Police Board, played a critical supervisory role. They promulgated the zoning and land use laws, traffic regulations, and rules for public utilities to protect customers and promote fair business. A major force to be reckoned with, the state penetrated deeply into the urban society'. This assertive style of government was not unique to Beijing, but represented a trend in the early twentieth century and can be documented in other Chinese urban centers as well. This pattern may

xiv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

in fact represent the gradual reversal of a tendency since the middle of the nineteenth century for state power to diminish while the role of the private sector grew. The resurgence of state power is clearly visible in this examination of modernization efforts in Beijing. Secondly, Beijing provides an opportunity to study the interaction between Western influence and Chinese indigenous development. I emphasize the role of Western technology in the capital-intensive public works and utility projects. Indeed the issue of Western technological transfer figures prominently in all aspects of the urban infrastructure reform under discussion. While the influence on Chinese society of Western democratic ideas and philosophies, or Mr. Democracy in the parlance of the May Fourth Movement (1919), has been focus of many scholarly inquiries, the impact on China of Western science and technology, or Mr. Science, has received much less attention. This thesis seeks to fill at least part of the gap by analyzing how the Chinese used Western technologies to modernize their urban environment and to improve their life. The decision to select, adopt, adapt, or reject Western technology was intertwined with the political, economic, and cultural forces that came to define the Chinese city in the early twentieth century. I document a conscious attempt by the Chinese to combine the strengths of their own urban heritage with such Western experiences as creation of modern police forces and self-government institutions. Western technologies facilitated the process of structural change, but Beijing was unable to take full advantage

xv

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of what such technology had to offer. Thirdly, my concern over the effects of urban change on the city people makes this study different from other studies of Chinese cities that focus primarily on historical geography and urban planning. In many ways this is a study in social history, integrating physical transformation with social change. Public works and utility projects by their very nature influence the lives of urban dwellers. But did modernization in Beijing's municipal infrastructure necessarily better people's lives? For example, how did the new streetcar system change their mobility patterns and influence the reorganization of work places and the secularization (as opposed to the former imperial hierarchy of space) of residential neighborhoods? What was the effect of the modern water supply on public sanitation and fire-fighting? How did the opening Tiananmen Square help shape political consciousness? Did the existence of public spaces alter the structure of civic expression, making possible mass rallies? Who used running water, consumed electricity, visited parks, or took streetcar rides? I have compared standards of living and patterns of mass consumption in Beijing and other world cities, demonstrating how the affordability factor weakens popular demand and makes the transition to modern municipal infrastructure a slow and painful journey. I have also examined the interaction between new and old technologies, showing how they competed with and in some cases impeded each other. In short, the interaction of physical and social change is key to understand modern Beijing.

xvi

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Finally, I have explored issues of national and cross-cultural significance. Whenever appropriate, I have compared and contrasted Beijing with other major cities in China, Japan, Europe and North America. Comparative data have been developed, for instance, on population growth, water consumption patterns, streetcar ridership, park acreage, rates of suburbanization, and mobility patterns. All can illuminate Beijing's position in the world-wide process of urbanization. Most significantly, I hope to participate through these comparisons the debate over comparability between Chinese and Western cities. Does urbanization display common characteristics throughout the world? Or has Chinese urban development charted its own distinctive course?

xvii

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1

Introduction The Rise of a New Metropolis

Beijing as an Ancient City

The recorded history of Beijing dates back to 1045 B.C., when small settlements began to appear on the Beijing Sub-plain, where Peking Man, a primitive caveman, had lived about 500,000 years earlier.1 One of the settlements was located in what is now southwestern Beijing. Strategically important, the colony lay in a natural corridor connecting the Yellow River valley in the South and the Northeastern and Mongolian regions in the North. Starting out as a small settlement of only few hundred people, it gradually grew into a military garrison, then a prosperous market town, and later into the political and cultural center of the Central Kingdom. Throughout its more than three millennia of history, Beijing has had a variety of names, from Jicheng and Yanjing (pre-seventh century A.D.) to Youzhou in the Tang Dynasty (618-907), to Nanjing and Yanjing in the Liao Dynasty (947-1122), to Zhongdu in the Jin Dynasty (1126-1215), Dadu in the Yuan Dynasty (12151368), Beiping and Beijing in the Ming (1368-1644), Jingshi in the Qing (16441911), Beijing and Beiping in the Republic (1912-1949), and Beijing from the founding of the People's Republic to the present.2 It has also changed boundaries a number of times. Nevertheless, the city has remained throughout the centuries a major commercial and military center in North China, and since

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

2

Map 1. Beijing through History

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the twelfth century, has been the political and cultural center of the entire country as well. Beijing's history as China's imperial capital can be traced to 1153, when the Jurchen, the ancestors of the Manchu, transferred their capital to Beijing after their conquest of North China. Serving as the seat of the Jin empire for over sixty years, Beijing (Zhongdu, or Central Capital) expanded and established transportation links to other regions of China. The famous Lugou Bridge (Marco Polo Bridge), built between 1189 and 1192 and extolled by Marco Polo as an exquisite wonder of the world, was an effort to facilitate transportation and communication between Beijing and the surrounding North China region. When Genghis Khan and his Mongol forces captured Beijing in 1215, they found a city devastated by war. Genghis did not, however, live long enough to supervise the reconstruction, and the city remained a ruin for almost half a century. His grandson, Kublai Khan undertook the task of rebuilding the capital. Envisioning a grand center from which to extend his rule, Kublai decided in 1266 to abandon the war-torn capital of Jin and construct a new capital for the Yuan empire just to the northeast. The massive construction of Khanbaliq (Khan's Town), known in Chinese as Dadu (Great Capital), began in 1267, and was completed after seventeen years, in 1284. In addition to the fact that Zhongdu was devastated by war and thus costly to rebuild, there was another important reason for relocating the capital

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

from Zhongdu to Dadu: water supply. Zhongdu was not close to the ocean or to any major rivers. The Yuan city planners chose to build Dadu in the northeastern suburbs of the Jin City because the new site was blessed with abundant water from several large lakes nearby. Water was important not only for human consumption, but also for moving grain and goods to the capital, since water was the major means of transportation in imperial China. The famous hydraulic engineer Gao Shoujing, commissioned by Kublai, brought water from the Jade Spring (yuquari) in the Western Hills, and built the Tonghui Canal to link the northern end of the Grand Canal with the lakes in Dadu, enabling barges from southern China to enter the city.3 Having an abundant water source also had cultural meaning to the Mongols, whose nomadic tribes lived on grassland and dessert. Without water, grass could not grow for the cattle to eat; and without cattle, the Mongols' staple food, life itself was in peril. Water to the mongols was like land and grain to the Han Chinese and the Manchu, who came from agricultural origins.4 It was therefore natural for the Mongols to move close to water sources by building their palaces around rivers and lakes, as symbols of their cultural roots.5 Although supervised by alien Mongol rulers, the city was built in a manner prescribed by Chinese tradition. Chinese imperial city planning followed certain principles laid down two millennia ago in the classic Zhouli: Kaogongji (The Rites of Zhou: On Craftsmanship). The chapter on urban

construction stipulates that a city ought to be built nine li (2.7 miles) in square

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

with three gates on each side. Surrounded by walls, a recommended city is about seven square miles, a good size for a pedestrian city. Nine thoroughfares running North-South should intersect with nine other East-West thoroughfares. On the east side of the city an ancestral temple (taimiao) should be built, while on the west side there should be an altar of earth and grain (shejitan). The market place is situated in the North, while the imperial court

lies in the southern part of the city. These guidelines were based on traditional Chinese philosophy and the belief that "nine" is an auspicious number.6 However, like most Chinese ancient cities, Dadu was not built exactly according to the scheme.7 Primarily out of geomantic concerns, the Yuan capital was oblong, with longer sides running North and South, and with only two gates, not three, on the Northern side of the city. Nevertheless, Dadu did resemble the ideal city in Zhouli to a large degree. The whole city was laid out like a checkerboard, with broad and straight avenues running between opposite pairs of gates. To complete the grid pattern, principal streets mostly ran north-south, intersected by narrower alleyways (hutong) running east-west. In the center of the city stood the Drum Tower and behind it, the Bell Tower, where drums and bells were beaten to mark the hours of the day and night. The most prominent buildings of Dadu were the imperial compounds, consisting of three clusters of palaces on the banks of the lakes called the Three Seas (sanhai). The Imperial City (Danei), predecessor of the Forbidden City in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the following Ming and Qing dynasties, represented the absolute majesty and highest rule of the Yuan dynasty. The construction of Dadu marked a turning point in the history of Beijing. Since then, the city has been China's national capital with only brief interruptions. In the mid-14th century, Zhu Yuanzhang, the founding father of the Ming dynasty, led a successful rebellion against the Yuan in central China and established the Ming dynasty in 1368 with its capital in Nanjing. In the same year, his general Xu Da launched a northern expedition and drove the Yuan emperor back to the Mongolian steppes. Dadu was renamed Beiping (Northern peace). Fearing Mongol revenge, the Ming troops reduced the physical size of the city by moving its northern walls south. The two northern gates were also renamed "Victorious" and "Pacifying" Gates to show Ming's determination to pacify and triumph over their northern neighbors. Not long after taking the throne, Emperor Yongle restored the name Beijing (Northern capital) and in 1420 formally transferred Ming's capital from Nanjing to Beijing. During the reign of Yongle, Beijing was rebuilt on the foundations of Dadu. The most important change was the construction of the Forbidden City (zijincheng) in the center of the city. All city walls, formerly made of earth,

were now rebuilt with bricks, an improvement not only in aesthetics, but also in technology. During the reign of the Jiajing emperor (1522-1566), another three-sided wall was added to enclose the southern suburbs; it adjoined the south side of the existing rectangular city. The earlier and larger northern part

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

7

a*

bo

c** >

:a» o CQ

C

CQ

E >, «*■*

“ ir

2

u CO

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

of the city became known as the Inner City (Tartar City) and the newly built walled area was called the Outer City (Chinese City). Inside the Inner City were two additional rectangular walled "cities." Measuring about six miles in perimeter with six gates was the Imperial City and located within it was the two-mile wall with four gates of the Forbidden City.8 By 1553, Beijing had become a forty square-mile twin city, with a square Inner City and an oblong Outer City to the south, and a semi-rural surrounding suburbs of more than 390 square miles. While some changes were made in the Qing Dynasty (16441911), the basic pattern remained the same. The most noticeable achievement of the Qing was the construction of a vast complex of imperial gardens and palaces during the Kangxi (1662-1722) and Qianlong (1736-1795) reigns on the northwestern outskirts of Beijing, known collectively as the Summer Palace.9 Thus, the establishment of a city at the site of Beijing predates imperial China. For centuries this location was the administrative center of a pre­ imperial state and later of a zhou (prefecture). From the late Tang period Beijing gained prominence as the seat of a governor-general, as the Liao dynasty capital known as Yanjing, as the twelfth century Jin dynasty capital, as a Mongol center, and finally from 1264 as capital of the empire established by Kublai Khan. Although in the early Ming period, the walls of the former Yuan national capital were reduced to dimensions appropriate to the capital of a province, they were quickly rebuilt with an imposing perimeter of roughly fifteen miles when Emperor Yongle decided to return the capital to Beijing.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

9

From then on Beijing remained physically unchanged until the early twentieth century.

Modem Transformation

By the late nineteenth century, the ancient capital was already showing signs of physical decay, reflecting the declining strength of the Manchu dynasty, who had ruled China for over two hundred years. Gone were the days when Emperor Qianlong could present a lavish 600-acre Summer Palace as a birthday gift to his mother. Because of shrinking financial resources, public works in the capital, which were funded by the national government and undertaken by the Board of Works (gongbu), dwindled year after year. Furthermore, Beijing had repeatedly been invaded by foreign powers. An Anglo-French army ransacked the city in 1860 and burned down the Summer Palace. The Allied Expeditionary Force also pillaged the city during the aftermath of the Boxer Uprising in 1900. The devastation of these wars exacerbated the decay of Beijing. Thus, by the time the city entered the twentieth century, its physical condition was dismal. Streets were either dusty or muddy depending on the weather, and were littered with animal droppings and human feces. Open sewers emitted toxic gases, while underground sewage overflowed onto the streets. Most Beijing residents drank bitter-tasting and foul-smelling water, had few public places for recreation, burned kerosene oil for illumination, and moved about the city on foot or by mule-drawn

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

10

carriages. Only the wealthy and powerful could afford gaslight and spring water, ride in sedan chairs, and entertain in their own private gardens. But the first three decades of the twentieth century witnessed a dramatic transformation of the city. In Chinese historical development, the years from 1900-1930 cover to the last decade of China's imperial dynasty and the early years of the Republic. During this period the city began to rid itself of the old image of backwardness, especially the "vile odor and unsightly scene" that many foreign visitors came to associate the city. Public works campaigns were launched in the areas most representative of urban decay: streets were paved with asphalt and macadam; sewer mains were rebuilt; commercial districts were developed; and urban life was enhanced by electrification, the creation of public space, the introduction of potable water, and a railroad and streetcar network. The ancient city was being transformed into a new and modern metropolis. These changes did not go unnoticed. One visitor, in 1922, commented on the city's transformation. "The present smooth thoroughfare succeeded to the straggling, unpaved road, crowded in pre-Seige days [of the Boxer Uprising] by donkeys, mule carts and camel trains."10 Another traveller wrote in 1923, "People who were at Peking some ten years ago will probably still remember the conditions of the city as it existed then. The streets were full of mud...Canals smelt something like open sewage drains. The idea of sanitation was unborn." But he quickly added, "if the same person who was in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

11

Peking ten years ago, revisits the city today, he will find himself in an entirely different city that could hardly be identified with the old."11 These comprehensive capital improvement projects were undertaken by the Metropolitan Police Board in the late Qing, and the Municipal Council after the founding of the Republic. They were new modern municipal institutions that were founded in the early twentieth century. Entrusted with the responsibilities for public works, the municipal government obtained most of its sources of revenue from the central government and from commercial taxes. The municipal government rebuilt city gates, paved and expanded streets to ease traffic and crowding, and developed commercial and residential districts to encourage business activities and offer models for urban development. It overhauled the city's Ming-vintage sewerage which improved public sanitation and beautified the urban milieu. It transformed former imperial gardens into public parks, expanded government power over zoning and land use, and implemented reform measures in poor relief, elementary education, and public health. Some capital improvement projects, however, required financing beyond the resources of the government. The Electric Company, founded in 1905, gradually expanded its operation from serving only the imperial court and the diplomatic quarters to benefitting commercial and civilian society as a whole. Founded in 1908, the Waterworks Company was granted a franchise by the Qing court to ensure city dwellers clean, drinkable water and to protect the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

12

city from fire hazards. Finally, in 1921, the new Streetcar Company offered the ancient city a modern alternative to a transportation system based on manual labor and animal power. What made possible the transformation of an ancient city that had long accepted stability as the norm and change as an aberration? Some of the influences came from within Beijing's own history. During the early twentieth century, migration added to the city's population. This reversed a long-term population decline begun in 1782, the height of Qing Dynasty, when the imperial capital had attained a record population of 870,000. As a general rule, the population of a city increases and business flourishes when the political situation remains stable and opportunities abound. On the contrary, when a city is in political turmoil, residents leave and commercial activities diminish. Scholars have generally attributed the long term decline in Beijing's population to the wars of 1860 and 1900.12 Political instability raised death-rates and prompted outward migration. After the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, however, the domestic situation in Beijing was relatively stable. From all over the country, particularly from adjacent provinces, people began to flood into the capital city again, seeking job opportunities and engaging in various kinds of commercial activities. In short, the relatively stable political environment in the decade prior to the downfall of the Qing empire encouraged population growth, which in turn generated a need for more and larger public utilities. According to the city's first comprehensive census, the population of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

O

o o

o o

o o

o

1912

1917

1922

O-

1927

1932

1937

Graph 1. Population of Beijing, 1912-1942

1942

13

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Beijing reached 760,000 on the eve of the collapse of the Qing state in 1911.13 In 1925 the population passed the one million mark and in 1930 it stood at 1.3 million, almost doubling its 1911 figure in only twenty years (Graph 1). In pure numbers, the city's population in 1911 fell behind those of other world cities such as London (6.0 million), New York (4.7 million), Tokyo (2.3 million) and Chicago (2.1 million).14 But because of Beijing's small area (a total of 24.74 square miles within the city limits), its population density per square mile averaged 33,626, three times that of Chicago (11,450) and Philadelphia (11,740), and surpassing all other major world cities.15 Thus, the city urgently needed public utilities and a significant improvement in its ancient infrastructure in order to accommodate the challenge of a modernizing and multiplying urban population. A metropolis with over one million people, Beijing demanded an urban environment comparable with its newly acquired status as one of the world's largest cities. The precipitating events in the transformation of Beijing were the Boxer Rebellion and the imperially sanctioned New Policies Reform (xinzheng) that followed it. Yet the social implications of these two important events have been little studied, and even less is known of their impact on Beijing's modernization. But these two events were a sufficient shock to both the physical and social structure to stimulate massive urban reconstruction. As was the case with the Great Earthquake on the emergence of the new Tokyo, the dramatic events of the turn of the century had repercussions which ended

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

15

forever business as usual for Beijing and brought it into direct contact with the Western powers. Prior to the early twentieth century, China remained relatively immune to developments in the West. Even ideas which were taken as a matter of course in the West were resisted, despite the presence of foreign businessmen, diplomats and missionaries for decades. In the summer of 1900, the Boxers' attack upon the legations and the consequent international expedition to China for the relief of the besieged foreigners culminated in the military occupation of Beijing. The fighting, looting, pillage, and fire of the Boxer Rebellion brought destruction to the city. Many government and civilian buildings went up in flames. Even the Qianmen Tower, symbol of traditional Beijing, was seriously damaged. The imperial court fled into exile, leaving city residents to suffer the devastation alone. However, during this absence of the Chinese imperial family from the capital, while foreign troops were still in possession of the city, the first experimental steps were taken toward the establishment of municipal institutions.16 In a recent article on the origins of the Shanghai modern police force, Frederic Wakeman pointed out the same effects of the Western occupation on Beijing during the aftermath of the Boxer Rebellion.17 When the upheaval of 1900 subsided, reconstruction began. The efforts took two forms. One was the government-sponsored New Policy Reform, a last minute Westernization endeavor pursued in earnest; the other was a privatelysponsored relief movement. As Juliet Bredon observed, "The cleansing fires so

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

16

cruel to the individual, benefitted the city as a whole. The repulsive sights and vile odours disappeared and a higher ideal of municipal cleanliness began. Probably nothing short of such a convulsion could have brought this about in a country so averse to change."18 Thus, the turn-of-the-century turmoil served as a catalyst of change for the age-old imperial city. First, the diplomatic quarter, a microcosm of Western cities in the Chinese capital, became even more modernized. Since the 1860s, the reserved area just east of the Qianmen Gate had been an international settlement completely free from Chinese control. According to Bredon, Its business affairs are directed by an Administrative Commission. It has its own police force, its own electric light. The streets were paved and in some cases named, like the Rue Labrousse, in memory of those who gave their lives to defend them. The guards contribute patrols and means for fighting fires. When the Legations re-built, for the most part with money from the Boxer Indemnity, they were surrounded by cleanliness and order. At last the diplomats in Peking lived in a manner compatible with their own civilization.19

Another important outcome of the Boxer Uprising, as far as the modern transformation of Beijing was concerned, was the diffusion of Western technology into the city. Western powers increased their presence in the Chinese capital after the Boxer Debacle. They were the obvious sources to which to turn when the Empress Dowager Cixi was ready to launch Western style reforms. The role of technology in the transformation of Beijing was not abstract, but concrete. Almost all public works and utility projects involved Western technology introduced via commercial channels and backed by the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

17

unequal treaties signed by the West and China. Some capital projects, the reconstruction of Qianmen, for example, were undertaken with Western supervision and technical guidance. Others, like the Beijing-Zhangjiakou railroad, were constructed by Chinese engineers with Western training. Equipped with technical knowledge, the reformers in the Qing court set in motion a process of institutional and social change that lasted well into the Republic period. The reform called for a departure from the imperial past to a modern future. It sent a powerful message that the city, like the country, should modernize itself along Western lines. To a large extent, the new modem-style institutions that became the movers and shakers of the city's infrastructural change were also the products of Western influence. The municipal institutions in the Chinese part of Shanghai were certainly inspired by their counterparts in the International Settlements and in the French concession, as Mark Elvin attests.20 Western influence was not quite so decisive in Beijing, even though the diplomatic quarter, the area in the Inner City inhabited by a foreign community, had been established in the 1860s and grew rapidly thereafter. Here, Beijing's new Municipal Council was more an extension of the Central Government, with the Interior Minister serving as head of the Council and with all major officials appointed by the center rather than popularly elected. Nevertheless, the new Council was quite independent from the state in centralizing urban planning, prioritizing capital projects and making efficient use of the city's resources. Its

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

18

role as a self-government institution showed Western influence. Equally important was the government's vigorous campaign for public projects and, resulting from them, the making of public opinion and people's idea about the new city. Here the government played a leading role in combating resistance to change and progress, and in educating a new urban citizenry in the context of a Chinese republic. The effects of these campaigns went beyond providing modem services and reconstructing the built environment. The promulgation of new ideas by the city government inevitably contributed to the ongoing social transformation as well. The dawning of the Republic brought dramatic changes in social custom: men cutting their queues, women unbinding their feet, and both men and women changing their ways of dressing. But the physical transformation being made in the city by the municipal government speeded up the process of social change. Public spaces, for instance, encouraged public use, bringing people together for political expression and giving people a greater sense than ever before that the city belonged to them. In some ways, however, the physical and social change in Beijing during the first three decades of the twentieth century was rather limited. The transformation of Beijing was contained within the city walls and did not spread like many Western cities. What reconstruction took place was in the spirit of modernity conquering tradition, rather than building a new city from scratch. Other Western patterns were also absent in Beijing, such as the rise in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

19

urban land values and the creation of middle-class suburbs. The modern amenities of electricity, running water, paved streets and streetcar service did not become available to every stratum of the urban population, nor did they improve significantly ways in which many urban residents lived and worked. The reasons why Beijing did not develop more fully during these thirty years are as complex as the city itself. First, municipal government was still at formative stage and had yet to define its responsibilities clearly. Furthermore, the inadequate tax system, as new as it was imperfect, was unable to provide sufficient resources. It was thus unable to undertake the long term projects needed for transforming Beijing into a world-class metropolis. At best the government made some progress on improving the existing structures, but it hardly made any effort to extend the city into the suburbs, to build efficient transport, and to provide public housing. The lack of leadership was exacerbated by an unsettled political environment. Rebellions, revolutions, civil wars, and political disruptions constantly plagued the city during this short period. Beijing became a battle ground for the Boxers, Western allied forces, and especially warlords. During the chaotic years between 1916-28, the city was a prize fought over by numerous military strongmen. The wars that followed not only disrupted the normal operations of waterworks and electric plants, but also halted efforts at street paving and sewer repair. The periodic interruption and long delays in many public works projects can usually be attributed to these military ventures

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

20

in the city. The third reason for the slow and painful progress of transformation lay in the private sector. The public utility companies of electricity, streetcars and waterworks, like other industrial enterprises in China at this time, were financially strained and short of qualified technical personnel. Their business decisions were often flawed and their marketing strategies short-sighted. Very often they also had to deal with an unsympathetic city government that demanded high taxes and mandated excessive services. The example of the streetcars being required to transport the city's garbage to dump-sites at night when they were not in service was one case in point. Fourth, problems existed in the pattern of Western technological diffusion and of Chinese adoption. Admittedly, technology came into China via commercial channels, so it did not take long for the Chinese to taste the fruits of Western industrialization and begin applying modern technology to China's urban development. There were two problems, however. On the Westerners' side, the motive for quick profits sometimes came into conflict with the desire to help China modernize. The equipment sold to China was often old and out-dated, while technical help was sometimes inadequate and superficial. On the Chinese side, sophisticated equipment was always expensive, and the Chinese generally lacked the ability to adapt it suit local situation. Finally, public works should by their nature serve urban inhabitants. In

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

21

this respect the Chinese urban experience compared poorly with that of Western countries. The majority of Chinese urban dwellers could not afford what Western technology had to offer. Although the rich and the powerful, and sometimes the middle class were quick to take advantage of modern services, their numbers were small and their demands were soon satisfied. For much of the early twentieth century, modern utilities remained more luxury than necessity. Although widely accepted as indispensable in the West, they still commanded a weak following in Chinese cities, reflecting the living standards in China at that time.

"The history of Beijing is the history of China in miniature."21 The early twentieth century was an age of change and transition for China-from an century-old imperial monarchy to a republic-and an age of conflict between tradition and modernity. The evidence suggests that the city began to transform from a imperially planned capital, reflecting a supreme imperial order, to a mass oriented metropolis. Of course it took the new Chinese city years to take shape, and the process was slow and difficult. In the end the outcome was a combination of the traditional Chinese heritage with elements of Western city planning and practice. This study focuses on the structural dimensions of urban growth and social change and examines ideology and technology in shaping infrastructural transformation. It will assess the impact of these changes on the urban

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

22

environment and urban life.22

I will examine how the city was changed,

what were the forces behind such transformation, and what were the social implications of the change in the built environment. I will treat the first three decades of the twentieth century, the focus of this study, as a significant component of the larger process of urbanization and social change in modern China. The city witnessed many firsts during this period, but the development was far from complete. From the 1940s to the 1970s, the Chinese communists sought to build a socialist capital. Despite their efforts to bring down the city walls, to enlarge the Tiananmen Square, and to construct model buildings to emphasize the socialist nature of the city, the appearance of Beijing changed very little from the 1930s. Only in recent years has the city truly transformed itself again. This study is to trace the origins of Beijing's modern transformation. The historical perspective will undoubtedly shed light on the city's contemporary development. However, just as the transformation of modern China is unfinished, the urban development of Beijing, the microcosm of China, remains a complex, dynamic, and above all, on-going process.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

23

NOTES

lRenmin Ribao (Hai wai ban) (People's Daily, overseas edition), December 26, 1989.

2For the sake of clarity, the name Beijing was used throughout the thesis regardless of historical variations. Also the piny in system was adopted to transliterate all Chinese names, places and special terms. 3Hou Renzhi, "Beijing dushi fazhan guocheng zhong de shuiyuan wenti," (The question of water source in the development of metropolitan Beijing), Lishi dilixue de lilun yu zhijian (Theory and practice of historical geography) (Shanghai: Renmin Press, 1984), p.290. 4 The Chinese considered earth sacred and built altars to worship it. The Altar of the Earth and Grain was located to the West of the Forbidden City. It ranked next in importance to that of ancestral worship, whose temple was located on the right of the imperial court. See Chapter Four for a discussion of the altar. 5The cultural theory of Mongol's relocation of capital was put forward by Yan Chongnian, Chinese historian of Beijing's history. Summarized from an oral history interview conducted in Beijing in September 1990. 6For a detailed description of symbolism of traditional Beijing, see Jeffery Myer, Dragons of Tiananmen: Beijing as a Sacred City (Columbia,S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), passim. 7H o u Renzhi, "Beijing jiucheng pingmian sheji de gaizao" (Change in the design of the old Beijing), Lishi dilixue de lilun yu zhijian, p.209.

8Gilbert Rozman, Urban networks in Ch'ing China and Tokugawa Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p.289. 9For a more detailed discussion of Chinese imperial urban planning, see Nancy Steinhardt, Chinese Imperial City Planning (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991); and Jeffery Myer's study of traditional Beijing, The Dragons of Tiananmen. 10Juliet Bredon, Peking: A Historical and Intimate Description of Its Chief Places of Interest (Shanghai: Kelley and Walsh, 1922), p.40. ;iChow Zian-yien, "Public Works in the City of Peking", The Chinese Social and Political Science Review (1923), p.102.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

24

12 In I860, the allied British and French forces invaded Beijing in what was known as the Second Opium War, and in 1900 the eight Western allied forces occupied the city again following the seige of Beijing by the Boxers. Li Muzhen, Zhongguo renkou: Beijing fence (Population of China: Beijing), (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1987), p.45. 13Ibid., p.45. u The World Almanac and the Book of Facts (New York: New York World Telegram, 1910), pp.374. See Appendix One for comparative population growth of the world's largest cities.

15 Population density, however, was extremely uneven in Beijing, ranging from 83,800 per square mile in the central business districts to 6,200 per square mile in the outlying areas where farm land still dominated. Sidney Gamble, Peking: A Social Survey, (New York: George H. Doran, 1921), p.413. 16Robert Duncan, Peiping Municipality and the Diplomatic Quarter (Beijing: Department of Political Science, Yenching University, 1933), pp.1-2. 17Frederic Wakeman, "American Police Advisers and the Nationalist Chinese Secret Service, 1930-1937" Modem China 18:2 (April, 1992), pp.109-112. 18Bredon, Peking, p.50. 19Ibid., pp.48-49. 20Mark Elvin, "The Administration of Shanghai, 1905-1914," in Mark Elvin and G. William Skinner, eds., "The Chinese City Between Two Worlds,(Stanford: Stanford University Press), pp.239-62. 21Ibid., p.2. “ Archival materials of the city government and public utility companies, official publications of the municipal government, reminiscences of long time Beijing residents, newspapers and journals are among the sources cited.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

25

Chapter One The Evolution of Municipal Administration

Introduction

One of the driving forces behind the modern transformation of Beijing was the municipal institutions that developed during the late Qing and early Republican period. The local city administration came into existence as a result of political changes in late Qing and in response to Western influence. In addition, it emerged as a result of the impact of demographic and commercial changes on the ancient city. The first three decades of the twentieth century witnessed the birth and growth of Beijing's municipal institutions. It was not until the late 1920s and after several stages of development that Beijing's city government reached its mature form. We will examine the municipal institutions in the first chapter because of the pivotal role they played in improving the city's infrastructure and in undertaking a number of significant public works. The development of city administration has not been adequately studied in recent studies of Chinese cities. Mark Elvin's study on the Municipal Council of Shanghai pointed out the self-governing nature of the city government, but he was primarily interested in changes in late Qing. Another important work by Christine Henriot, a French scholar, deals with municipal reforms in Nanjing during the Nanjing Decade (1928-1937). While David Strand studies Beijing in the early Republic period, he focuses on the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

26

Beijing police and fails to even mention the existence of the Municipal Council. The evolution of municipal institutions received some treatment in a recent study of the Shanghai police by Frederic Wakeman, but only as an introduction to their later development during Guomindang's China. The municipal government in the early Republic has not received the attention it deserves in scholarly works, considering that it is such an important force driving urban and social change in early twentieth century China. This chapter attempts to fill the gap in current scholarship about municipal administration. I will trace how the city government evolved in Beijing, and discuss the Municipal Council's organization and structure, as well as its role in raising funds for public works. Finally I will assess the general impact of the municipal administration on the city life of Beijing.

Development of Municipal Institutions

For centuries Beijing has been China's premier political and cultural center and one of China's most important commercial centers. Like other Chinese cities, however, Beijing had no official city government prior to the beginning of the twentieth century. During the Qing, following the established tradition, Beijing was under the jurisdiction of two counties, both part of the Shuntian Prefecture in Zhili Province. The magistrates of Wanping and Daxing counties shared the municipal responsibilities of the capital, not the least of which was tax collection. To protect the seat of the imperial

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

27

government, the military guard, the gendarmerie, the Board of Inspectorate, and the Board of Works worked together to police Beijing and handled municipal affairs such as road construction, sewer repair, poor relief, fire fighting, Confucian indoctrination and litigation.1 This arrangement persisted well into the end of the nineteenth century. The events of the early twentieth century affected the imperial capital profoundly. First, the occupation of Beijing by the Western allied forces during the Boxer Uprising in 1900 spurred the growth of municipal institutions. When the Allied Expeditionary Force entered Beijing in July 1900, the Guangxu emperor and Empress Dowager had fled to Xi'an. The whole city was in a state of panic, disorder and lawlessness. "It was during the absence of the Chinese imperial family while the foreign troops were in possession of the city," Robert Duncan pointed out, "that some experimental steps were taken toward the establishment of municipal institutions."2 For the greater part of the period of occupation, the city was divided into a number of sections, and the expeditionary forces of Germany, France, Italy, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States each exercised police authority in one section. The Japanese, for example, formed a military police at the seat of Shuntian prefecture and controlled the Northeast section of Beijing. The power vacuum created by the absence of the Chinese imperial government also gave local gentry and merchants an opportunity to exercise self-government. These city-wide initiatives would have been impossible

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

28

under normal circumstances, because the Qing court would have naturally discouraged and even prohibited self-government activities on such a large scale. With the Qing control of power temporarily suspended, local notables cooperated with the Western powers to organize Pacifying Councils (Anmin gongsuo) in the eastern and western sections of the city to patrol Beijing and

administer municipal affairs. The Pacifying Councils, prototypes of the modern municipal government, were grassroots organizations aimed at protecting private property, dispensing poor relief, and repairing public utilities, such as streets and sewers in the war-devastated city. Under these extraordinary circumstances, spontaneous self-government continued for almost a year with the support of Western forces and without the permission of the imperial government. Immediately after the Qing court secured peace with the Western forces in 1901, however, it disbanded all Pacifying Councils and replaced

them

with the General Administration of Residual Affairs (Shanhou xiexun zongju) in Beijing. This governmental agency, the first of its kind charged with municipal administration of the capital, worked closely with former members of various Pacifying Councils to begin reconstruction of the city. In cooperation with the government, the local gentry and merchants still played an active role, and their influence did not diminish after the abandonment of the self-government organizations. Thus, the dramatic events during the Boxer Uprising, the siege of the legations, the occupation by Western forces, the temporary absence of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

29

the imperial family, and the restoration of Beijing together gave rise to a type of municipal institution not previously known in China's long imperial history. More important changes were yet to come. Before the downfall of imperial China and during the constitutionalist movement, the Qing empire made a last effort reform of its own bureaucracy, known as xinzheng (new policies). Modeling on Western government institutions, a Ministry of Civil Affairs (minzheng bu) was set up, combining police work with the domestic functions of the Boards of Rites, Works, Revenue, and Civil Appointment to streamline the central bureaucracy. In 1901, a group of students were sent to Japan for training in modern methods of police administration. Returning to Beijing two years later, they were assigned to areas in the Inner City, where they established a number of Western-style police offices. The Qing Court also initiated several reform measures to rationalize local administration. In 1902, at the request of H u Jufen, head of the Board of Works, the General Administration of Residual Affairs was replaced by a more permanent Inner City Administration of Public Works and Patrol (Neicheng gongxun ju). In 1905, a similar Outer City Administration of Public Works and Patrol (Waicheng gongxun ju) was also established. Later in the same year, a further

reorganization was effected and the two separate administrations were combined, forming the Metropolitan Police Board of the Inner and Outer City (Neimicheng xunjing zongting).3 The Police Board, accountable to the Ministry

of Civil Affairs, played an active role in municipal administration in the last

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30

years of the Qing. As the Beijing police took over many of the responsibilities of the former city administrations, it was defined more broadly than Western counterparts. The police of Beijing were responsible for census taking, public works, fire-fighting, poor relief, public sanitation, and public health as well as policing. If the Boxer Uprising set in motion a process of change in Beijing's municipal administration, then the new Republic founded in 1912 accelerated the pace of change. In fact, the second major impetus for municipal reform in the capital city came after the 1911 Revolution. The new Republic, deeply influenced by Western models, set up various agencies to govern the new China. The Ministry of the Interior (neizheng bu) was founded, with minor changes, to replace the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Similar to its predecessor, the Interior Ministry was a modern and specialized bureaucratic institution. Its wide range of responsibilities included the census, land registration, policing, public works, poor relief, public health, and ceremonial activities.4 The Metropolitan Police Board of Beijing, as it was called in the early Republic, was directly affiliated with the Interior Ministry, and became its de facto local agent. Similar local police institutions also began to appear in other cities of China, such as Chengdu, the provincial capital of Sichuan.5 Until the creation of the Municipal Council in 1914, the Metropolitan Police Board was the whole city government of Beijing. In addition to directing traffic and keeping law and order in the city, the police collected

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

taxes, conducted the census, and censored the media. For public health, the police board maintained a street cleaning-team, a drug squad, four public hospitals, a laboratory for testing food and water quality, and a construction team for public works. It also ran reformaries for prostitutes, mental patients, beggars, and criminals.6 In the range of these Police Board responsibilities, we can see the emergence of an embryonic city government. These diverse activities had one thing in common: all dealt with municipal affairs had formerly come under the jurisdiction of higher levels of government, including the Board of Works, the imperial Gendarmerie, the military guards, and the two county magistrates of the Shuntian prefecture. The transfer of power to the local police force and the partial rationalization of municipal administration reflect not only the impact of recent political events and the influence of Western examples, but also demographic and economic changes in the Chinese capital city. As Beijing's population growth and commercialization turned the city into an increasingly complex metropolis, the police force seemed unable to shoulder all the responsibilities of municipal administration. In June 1914, the Municipal Council of Beijing was officially founded at the initiative of Zhu Qiqian, minister of the Interior of the Republican government. In his proposal to Yuan Shikai, president of China, Zhu stressed the need for the establishment of local government institutions. Zhu, who had experience working as the police chief of the Beijing Metropolitan Police Board, knew better than anyone

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

32

else the necessity of a municipal institution in the capital separate from the central government. He called on the government to "learn from the Western experience of municipal administration" and to "meet the challenge of a modernizing capital."7 The Ministry of the Interior, he argued, should concentrate on coordination of China's internal development and address issues of national significance. It would simply be too burdensome and inefficient for the ministry to attend to local affairs. Faulting the central government for its lack of coordination and overall planning in municipal affairs, Zhu recommended that new management be installed in the city, and proposed the establishment of a city government to perform public works and provide social services. The Municipal Council of Beijing (Jingdu shizheng gongsuo) came into existence as a result of Yuan Shikai's support. It was one of the most significant institutional changes in the history of the city. The sphere of the new municipal administration was at first limited to selected districts, then extended to both the Inner and Outer cities in 1914, and in 1927, broadened to include the four surrounding suburbs. The Taxation Department of the former Administration of Public Works and Patrol, a primitive municipal organ that had been established by an Imperial ordinance in 1906, was brought under the control of the Beijing Municipal Council in 1914. For the first time a clear distinction was made between national and local administrative expenses, although revenues secured through the Taxation Department had been used

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

33

for some time for local street construction and policing. Another change occurred in 1921, when the Municipal Council set up a Municipal Senate to encourage public participation in municipal affairs. Chaired by the president of the Council, the senate consisted of thirty notables required to meet the following three qualifications: at least three year of residency in Beijing, payment of at least fifty yuan worth of municipal taxes, and a significant record of public philanthropy. The post of senator was honorary, carrying a one-year renewable term. According to its bylaws, the Senate would discuss all major issues of municipal government, including city planning, fund raising, and management of public property, as well as public education, sanitation, and poor relief.8 It is not entirely clear how many resolutions adopted by the Senate were implemented by the Municipal Council. We only know that under the directive of the Beiyang Government in 1922, all cities in China, like Beijing, were allowed to practice autonomous selfgovernment. But the plan was aborted as a result of the years of political turmoil before Guomindang's unification. The Municipal Senate was one of the casualties of the late warlord period. In 1927 the senate resumed, with minor changes in its constitution, notably a cut in its size from thirty to twenty. In 1928, both the Senate and the Municipal Council were replaced by the City Government (shizhengfu). We therefore have reason to conclude that, while the intention of fostering democratic participation was evident, the plan hardly took permanent root.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

34

From 1914 to 1928, Beijing had a city government composed of two bureaucratic apparatuses: the Municipal Council and the Police Board. They were separate but equal, each focused on different aspects of municipal governance, and both reported to the Interior Ministry. While cooperating on many projects, the two municipal institutions had a clear division of responsibilities. The Municipal Council took charge of overall city planning and the construction of Beijing's infrastructure such as roads and sewerage. The Police Board, on the other hand, concentrated on maintaining order, tax collecting, census reporting, fire-fighting, and commerce regulation. Working together, the two governmental agencies influenced major aspects of urban life of Beijing. With the success of the Chinese Nationalist northern expedition and the collapse of the warlord government in 1928, the national capital was moved from Beijing to Nanjing in the lower Yangzi River region. Designated as a special city, Beijing was renamed Beiping. The municipal government also underwent substantial reorganization, resulting in the establishment of five departments: social work, public safety, finance, public work, and sanitation. The former Police Board was turned into the Department of Public Safety, which was responsible only for policing and maintaining order, while the rest of its duties were farmed out to the other departments. For example, a new department was created for public sanitation, formerly the responsibility of the police. The city government, building on the basis of the Municipal Council,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

35

greatly expanded its role, taking over nearly every aspect of public life. In addition, special commissions were established to oversee public parks, libraries, temples, and athletic activities. In short, the structure of the municipal bureaucracy under the Nationalist government resembled that of many their Western cities, except for the fact that major city officials were not popularly elected.

Characteristics of the Municipal Council

The constitution of the council, adopted on December 28,1914, stipulated that the president of the Municipal Council must be the Minister of the Interior. To coordinate work, the vice president usually was the head of the Police Board. Both, however, were only nominal positions; both the minister and the police chief necessarily had to delegate many of their duties to the executive director. The latter, appointed by the President of China on recommendation of the Minister of the Interior and with the approval of the Beijing Chamber of Commerce, was the one really in charge of the daily administration.9 The other officers consisted of four heads and four vice­ heads of departments, forty secretaries, two to four engineers, four to eight architects and six to twelve investigators, and a number of clerks and minor employees. The principal sub-officers were appointed by the head officers of the council, while the minor employees of the various departments, were selected by the departmental heads. Based on the principle of specialization of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

36

responsibility, the Municipal Council was divided into the following four departments: Department One 1. Correspondence Division. Receipt and mailing of all correspondence, publication of notices and proclamations, use of the Council seal, filing. 2. Accounting Division. Preparation of the budget, receipt and disbursement of all money, auditing of claims and accounts. 3. Editing Division. Preparation of reports, editing of the Municipal Council Magazine, keeping of the minutes of the meetings of the council, care of the maps and books belonging to the Council. 4. Miscellaneous Division. Purchase and storing of materials and supplies; supervision of clerks, guards and servants; general miscellaneous matters not definitely belonging to other departments. Department Two 1. Political Division. Communication, industry, public health, relief, city business. 2. Property Division. Care of city property, revision of regulations dealing with city affairs. 3. Investigation Division. Laying out and changing city streets, investigation of the use of private property by the government, building permits, buying and selling of property. Department Three

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

37

1. Construction Inspection Division. Inspection of all construction work, examination of all estimates for engineering work, preparation of list of kinds and amounts of material needed. 2. Surveying Division. Surveying of new and old roads, bridges, sewers, making m aps of the city, special surveying for other departments. 3. Engineering Division. Planning of all engineering work, making of maps, designs, sketches, working drawings. Department Four 1. Construction Division. Construction work connected with roads, bridges, sewers and other city work. 2. Estimating Division. Superintending of work to be done by the city, superintending of all work done by contract, preparation of estimates for construction work. 3. Material and Supply Division. Purchase of all materials, the lending and sale of construction materials, issuing of materials to the construction division.10 The sources now available do not allow a statistical analysis of the social background of the municipal officials before 1928. However, we do have biographical information on key figures of the city government in 1931. Although somewhat a later historical period, the social composition of the city leadership remained relatively stable during these years. Many Municipal Council officials continued to serve in the city government. This was especially

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

38

true of officials at specific and technical division levels. A sample of the top-ranking officer-holders in the city government of Beijing in 1931 reveal the average age, salary, former experience and education background of the city officials. The average age was rather young (forty-five, and the mayor was thirty-seven), and the salaries were quite high (ranging from 400 yuan to 100 yuan, with the mayor earning 420 yuan a month). The clerks and secretaries were mostly high school graduates coming from the Beijing metropolitan region, but almost all officers beyond the division level were college graduates or had extensive experience in their specialized fields. They also appeared to represent a wide spectrum of geographical and native origins. Those who received their education in the West held some of the most important posts. For example, Lou Xuexi, director of the Department of Social Services, had received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University. He had been a county magistrate in Liaoning Province, a professor at Northeastern University in Manchuria, and a counsel to the Ministry of the Interior on urban affairs. Wang Shen, director of the Public Works Department, had obtained his special training in architecture at a French university. Some other officers had been trained in Japan, very often Waseda University in Tokyo. Some graduates of Chinese institutions of higher learning also held leading posts at the municipal government. Many division directors either had a college degree or had received special post-secondary training from a modem technical school. Among the institutions from which officials

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

39

had graduated were Peking University, Beijing School of Politics and Law, the Beijing Police Academy and the Beijing Translators Institute (Jingshi yixue guan). These schools, generally considered centers for Western learning,

produced a modem technocratic elite that played an important role in the modernization of China. Only a few city officials possessed imperial degrees. On the whole, the municipal government was surprisingly modern, staffed with highly educated and Westernized officials. A number of city officials also had strong military background. In the early twentieth century, many ambitious people distinguished themselves through a military career, and quite a number of municipal bureaucrats had served in the army, usually as technical personnel before they joined the civil service. Zhou Dawen, mayor of Beijing in 1931, had been in charge of telecommunication operations for a Northeastern warlord and then for the Nationalist army of Chiang Kai-shek. Zheng Shifen, Secretary General of the city government, had been the Chief of Staff in the Nationalist army. Finally, some officers who had graduated from military academies in China found positions in the Department of Public Security, the police force of Beijing. Zhu Qiqian, founder of the Municipal Council, was an important figure in the modernization of Beijing. Born in 1871, Zhu spent his childhood with his step-father in France. Coming back to China as a young man, he launched an official career. Highly trusted by presidents Yuan Shikai and Xu Shichang, Zhu became a powerful figure in the Beiyang government. He was considered

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction

i i

Table 1. Age Distribution of City Government Officials TOTAL

Below 20

21-30

31-40

41-50

51-60

Over 60

Secretariat Social Services Public Security Finance Public Work Sanitation Special Committees

137 239 973 408 188 460 408

0 1 1 7 4 41 6

37 94 249 132 66 242 121

45 93 339 140 68 117 133

37 40 271 107 40 44 101

16 10 106 21 8 11 42

2 1 7 1 2 5 4

TOTAL

2,813

60

942

936

639

214

22

Source: BZTT, p.332.

prohibited without perm ission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction

.1

Table 2. Educational Backgrounds of City Officials College TOTAL Domestic Foreign Secretariat Social Services Public Security Finance Public Work Sanitation Special Committee TOTAL

137 239 973 408 188 460 408

2;,813

Military Technical

High

Elementary

Unknown

41 93 94 97 47 43 119

16 8 6 5 0 1 4

2 10 432 21 34 25 26

1 28 3 75 15 158 28

37 79 139 120 73 85 202

0 4 170 67 12 12 8

40 17 129 23 17 136 102

534

40

540

308

644

273

474

prohibited without perm ission.

Source: BZTT, p.336.

4*.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction

Table 3. Native Places of City Officials TOTAL

Hebei

Beijing Shandong Zhejiang Anhui Liaoning Tianjin Jiangsu

137 Secretariat Social Services 239 Public Security 973 Finance 408 188 Public Works Public Sanitation 460 Special Committees480

36 83 530 177 60 207 140

TOTAL

1232 405

2813

prohibited without perm ission.

Source: BZTT, p.298.

14 27 143 65 25 69 52

Others

29 9 53 28 21 26 42

11 17 35 22 4 18 29

8 11 37 16 13 9 36

2 4 47 6 17 29 11

2 1 31 40 11 19 8

11 17 16 21 10 13 9

26 70 81 39 27 70 153

208

136

130

116

112

97

377

43

one of the founders of the powerful "Communications Clique" in the political arena. Following a career pattern similar to other officials in Republican China, Zhu participated actively in commercial activities and business endeavors. Serving on the Board of directors of many influential firms such as the Bank of Communications, The Jincheng Bank, the Beijing Streetcar Company and Zhongxing Coal Mine Company, he wielded his political influence in business and promoted the growth of modern Chinese enterprises.11 Zhu reached the height of his official career when he was appointed president of the Municipal Council of Beijing, a post he held while serving as the Interior Minister. Frequently traveling to Japan, France, England and the United States, he familiarized himself with Western-style municipal administration and attempted to apply what he learned to the modern transformation the city. He was also a strong advocate of building and renovating the capital's streets, gates, sewer and transportation facilities.12 Under his leadership, public spaces were created for the first time in Beijing's history. To be sure, Zhu was not the quintessential Western style technocrat. His support of Yuan Shikai in his effort to become the Hongxian emperor revealed his vacillation between tradition and modernity. He was committed to reform, but not to fundamental change in the social and political order. To some extent, his ideology epitomized the general public works movement:

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

44

progressive but not revolutionary, politically radical but socially conservative. Nevertheless, the secret of his success lay in his connection w ith the ruling Chinese elite, his knowledge of Western learning, his familiarity with modern institutions, his pragmatic approach to municipal administration, and above all, his ability to promote Western educated people to important positions in the city government. Zhu was undoubtedly one of the most important municipal leader in Beijing in the early twentieth century. The Municipal Council of Beijing differed from Western city governments in one important way: its chief officials were not elected by popular votes, but were appointed to their positions by the Council president. The Council president in turn was appointed by the President of China on recommendation of the Interior Minister and with the approval of the Beijing Chamber of Commerce.13 Sidney D. Gamble, an American sociologist who conducted extensive field research in early twentieth century Beijing, considered the role of the Chamber of Commerce in the appointments of municipal officials significant, as it was the only instance in which the citizens of Beijing exercised any participation in or control over the Government, except that exerted by the force of public opinion.14 It was doubtful, however, whether the Chamber of Commerce, sanctioned by the government, represented real public participation in the political process. The evidence indicates that the Municipal Council was under the tight control and close scrutiny of the Ministry of the Interior; the Council had to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

45

constantly report its activities to the Ministry. Although nominally an institution of self-government, the Municipal Council was functionally an extension of state power at the local level. The city government was accountable to the central government, not to the urban inhabitants. The archives of the Interior Ministry housed at China's Number Two Historical Archives in Nanjing reveal the close relationship between the Municipal Council and the Interior Ministry. These documents, in the forms of petitions, memoranda and reports, provide ample evidence of the decision-making process at the municipal level. Usually large public utility projects were initiated by the Council, but they had to be approved by the central government. So did the promotion and demotion of major municipal officials. Sometimes, even residents' complaints found their way to the top level and were handled by the Interior Minister, who acted as the final arbitrator of disputes. Despite the tight control from the top, the Municipal Council was a highly dedicated and efficient institution. Many city officials were experts and professionals in their respective fields. They were more receptive to new ideas and understood the needs of the urban society better than their imperial predecessors. To them, making China strong and powerful meant modernization along Western lines. Their overriding goal was a strong China, and their models were the Western nations and Japan. They commanded a far greater degree of specialized training and technical expertise than traditional

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

46

bureaucrats. Although few people had actual experience in modern municipal administration, many municipal officials at least had knowledge of Western theories and methods. Books about city government in the West and Japan were readily available to these technocrats. For example, the monthly gazettes published by the Municipal Council contained articles describing city administration in foreign countries and discussing ways in which Western governments solved various urban problems. The Western influence became so strong that city officials tended to justify each public works project by telling the city residents that the West had undertaken one like it.

Municipal Finance

Building a modern urban infrastructure was expensive. It required advanced technology, a subject we will come to in later chapters. It also required large outlays for basic supplies and personnel. The expansion and paving of streets, renovation of sewer mains, creation of public spaces, and other capital projects of municipal improvement usually took the lion's share of the municipal budget. In this section, we will examine municipal finance. W hat were the sources of income for the city government? How heavy was the burden on the city residents and how was it shared among different urban classes? Finally, were municipal finances adequate for public works? If not, what were the obstacles to raising sufficient revenues for the city's public services and capital projects?

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

47

The revenue of Beijing's government during the early twentieth century can be divided into two parts: central government allocation and municipal taxation. The central government's annual contribution to Beijing accounted for about ten percent of the city's total revenue. Additional funding might also be provided for special projects upon petition by local officials. Such funds, however, were limited and usually required matching funds from private sources. Table 4. Revenue of the Beijing Municipal Council, 1925 Amount

Item

610,646 Taxes Funding from Interior Ministry 90,250 17,838 Title deed and transfer fee 13,452 Street pavement contribution 12,037 Municipal land sale 10,725 Interest 33,569 Miscellaneous 788,517

Total

Percentage 77.4 11.4 2.2 1.7 1.5 1.3 4.2 100.0

Source: SZTG, p.407. Most municipal revenue came from taxes levied on stores, vehicles, theaters, prostitutes and brothels, the sale and mortgaging of property, and rent paid for the use of the city property. Among them, direct taxes amounted to more than three quarters of the city's total income. Less than ten percent was generated from license fees and excise taxes. Together, these taxes and fees were collected for the exclusive use of the municipality in the provision of social services, public works and policing.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

48

Municipal taxation was new to Chinese cities. Only a handful of taxes were collected by the government prior to the twentieth century: the land tax, the lijin tax (taxes on goods in transit), and the traditional pawn and brokerage taxes. Of these, the central government's major method of taxation in the capital areas was the century-old lijin. During the early twentieth century Beijing generated substantial income for the state through this form of commercial taxation. The Administration of Taxation of Beijing, the tax collection agency for the central government, maintained a number of check­ points around the city, usually located at city gates. The Chongwen Gate, located on the east side of Beijing, was the headquarters of the administration. Commercial traffic passing through these gates into the city had to pay taxes by category and quantity of merchandise. The real taxpayers, therefore, were urban consumers when lijin taxes were incorporated into higher prices of goods. Thus, since all taxes from this source went to the central government, these lijin taxes were the urban residents' share of taxation to the state. Only about ten percent were funnelled back to benefit the inhabitants of the city. As shown in Table 5, many new taxes were initiated during the early twentieth century when the municipal government took a vigorous and progressive approach toward tax collection. New kinds of taxes were devised, while conventional ones such as land and lijin taxes were retained. In 1912 there were a total of seventeen taxes in the city, eight of which were municipal taxes. In 1930, city taxes jumped to thirty and some national taxes were

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

converted into taxes whose revenue went to the city. In 1916, the city collected 737,694 yuan; by 1930, the figure had increased five times to 3,638,770 yuan.15 The multiplication in the kinds of taxes and in the amount they raised provided the funds necessary for public works and social services during the early years of the Republic. Table 5. Chronology of Beijing Municipal Taxation Type

Year Started

Land Title deed Chongwen Gate lijin (abolished 1930) Brokerage Pawn Animal Slaughter Entertainment Prostitution Shop Vehicle Theater Tobacco & liquor Nightlife Poor relief Stamp Advertisement Deed verification Long distance bus Streetcar Animal checkup Real estate Parcel Public welfare Police salary addition Luxury Stock registration Public toilet Night soil treatment

3,000 years ago Ming dynasty 1494 Pre-Qing 1664 late Qing late Qing 1905 1905 1907 1908 1908 1909 1910 1911 1913 1913 1913 1918 1926 1926 1927 1927 1927 1928 1928 1928 late Qing late Qing

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

50

Philanthropy

late Qing

Source: Lei jihui, Beiping juanshui kaolue, p.102. Encompassing almost every aspect of commerce and services in a preindustrial society, Beijing's taxes can be categorized into levies on transportation, public health, entertainment, and merchandise sales. A good number of them were initiated between 1905 to 1914, during late Qing and the early Republican reforms. Apparently these reforms were influenced by the Western urban experience, wherein progressive governments pursued aggressive financial policies that taxed the urban population heavily in the name of urban improvement, and then provided a full range of public services.

Table 6. Municipal Taxation in Beijing, 1931-1932 (In Chinese Yuan) Sources

Amount

Percentage

Land tax Title deed and transfer tax Commission or license tax Pawn shop tax Animal tax Slaughter tax Shop tax Carriage tax Prostitution tax Theater ticket tax Welfare tax Certificate fees Fines Income from public land

10,659 431,744 160,559 11,250 20,717 224,393 362,425 207,071 90,106 36,378 10,880 8,616 6,112 100,222

0.6 25.6 9.5 0.6 1.2 13.3 21.5 12.3 5.4 2.2 0.6 0.5 0.3 5.9

Total

1,681,132

100

Source: Duncan, Peiping Municipality and the Diplomatic Quarter, p.61.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 6 gives a breakdown of taxes collected by the city in 1931-32. The store taxes, based on business volume, amounted to about one-half to twothirds of one percent of their income. They were grouped into fourteen different classes, paying from ten cents to over 20 yuan a month. The total monthly tax collected amounted to some 31,000 yuan, with each store paying approximately 1.25 yuan. In addition, a total of 11,000 yuan a month was collected from the 377 brothels and 3,130 registered prostitutes of the city. The brothels paid 24,14, 6 or 3 yuan a month, and the prostitutes 4,1.5,1 or 0.5 a month, depending upon the class in which they were placed.16 The taxes on vehicles amounted to some 11,000 yuan a month. Automobiles paid 4 yuan, carriages 2 yuan, passenger carts 60 (about 0.4 yuan) coppers, rickshas 40 coppers, freight carts 100 coppers, and hand push carts 60 coppers a month. Carts that came into the city only occasionally paid four coppers a day. When the taxes were paid for the entire year, one month's taxes were rebated, except on hand carts for which the tax was only 1 yuan a year even though the monthly tax was 60 coppers.17 There was no tax on residential housing in Beijing. In the imperial era, the city housed not only the emperor, but also many government officials or Manchus supported by government stipends. Consequently, no land taxes were collected in the city proper. Land in the suburbs, however, was taxed, though it accounted for less than one percent of the city's tax-receipts. The exemption for urban land-owners continued under the Republic, but a tax was

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

52

levied in 1914 on the sale and mortgaging of all real estate. Title deed and transfer taxes, producing more than a quarter of all municipal tax revenues, was the most important source of taxation.18 The sale and mortgage of land also constituted the most complicated form of tax collection. Before taxes were accepted by the tax bureau, the deeds had to be ratified by the Municipal Council. The buyer and seller signed a joint petition to the Council, asking for the approval of the deeds, and filed the petition with the police, who forwarded it to the Council. The property was inspected by a representative of the council, so that the description of the property and all buildings might be properly entered on the deed and any encroachments on public property might be discovered. The deed, as ratified, was returned to the police for delivery to the purchaser of the property, who could then pay the purchase price of the land. The taxes had to be paid within six months. Whenever any new buildings were erected or the external dimensions of old buildings were changed, the deeds for the property had to be returned to the police and be re-issued, so that they would show accurately all buildings on the site. Among all taxes levied by the Beijing government in the early twentieth century, the property tax in the form of transfer fees and title fees accounted for 25 percent, followed by the shop tax (21 percent), the slaughter tax (13 percent), and the carriage tax (12 percent). These four kinds of taxes accounted for nearly three-quarters of the total revenue of the city. They were

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

53

not levied directly on consumers, but on businesses. Property and shop taxes were the mainstay of city finances throughout the first half of the twentieth century. The slaughter tax, carriage tax, prostitution tax, and other special assessments also helped finance municipal enterprises. Property taxes were the most significant form of taxation for some Western cities, amounting to 70-80 percent of the total municipal tax revenues for New York and 75 percent for Boston in the early twentieth century. As the chief means for exacting cash from the citizenry, American historian Jon Teaford points out, the property levy determined the fortunes of the American municipality.19 In Beijing, although the property tax was the largest levy, it was by no means dominant; business taxes were equally important. Therefore, while municipal finance in the West rested largely on the foundation of the general property tax, in Beijing both property and commercial taxes combined to provide the city with most of its revenue. This crucial distinction leads to another question: who provided the brick and mortar of the municipal tax-base in different urban societies? In the West, as demonstrated by Teaford, the municipal tax burden was not strictly distributed according to wealth or ability to pay. Thrifty workingclass families and owners of cheaper dwellings seemed to have shouldered more taxation burden than their share of urban wealth would merit. The members of the well-to-do class, while favored by the municipal tax structure, enjoyed more water, sewer, parks and other urban amenities and paid less for

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

54

their use than the working class.20 The situation in Beijing was different. The majority of tax collected, as we have seen, were in fact special assessments. As property owning was not as widespread as in Western cities, taxes on transferring deeds and license titles could hardly be the dominant form of taxation. Even in this area, which produced a quarter of the municipal income, the well-to-do members of Chinese society shouldered the burden. As for the commercial shop taxes, many were levied on luxuries, such as prostitution and theater-going, or vehicles for hire-services which lower-income members of the society could not patronize. Thus the tax burden fell primarily on the rather wealthy urban classes. However, because Beijing had small upper and middle classes, it was impossible for the city to collect enough to meet the rising demand for public services. Therefore, the vast majority of urbanites were under-taxed not as a matter of social policy but because they were too poor to patronize the taxable services, such as riding rickshaws or streetcars, visiting theaters or prostitutes. From the perspective of municipal financing, we may say that the absence of a large middle class contributed to the shortage of tax revenue, and ultimately to the slowness with which the city's infrastructure and public works developed. The allocation of tax revenues was largely divided into municipal administration (including paying salaries of city officers and police) and supporting social programs, such as subsidizing public and private schools, opening soup kitchens for the city's poor and homeless, and establishing

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

55

municipal hospitals to serve the public. Another major expenditure, more pertinent to our discussion, was the financing of major public works, such as street paving and sewer repairs. Between 1914 and 1918, the early stage of the public works movement, about two million yuan from municipal taxation were spent to develop Beijing's modern infrastructure.21 One report in the Municipal Council Magazine gave the expenditure for the second half of 1914 as 104,650 yuan, including 39,839 yuan for street repair.22

Table 7. Expenditures of the Municipal Council, 1925 Item

Amount

Percentage

Land purchase Public works Normal expenses of Council Support of Police Municipal hospitals Others

230,250 175,434 156,213 60,000 42,177 71,183

31.3 23.8 21.2 8.1 5.7 9.6

Total

735,457

100.0

Source: SZTG, appendix.

Table 7 shows the major components of the Municipal Council's expenditures of 735,457 in 1925. (Additional amounts, spent by the Metropolitan Police Board to cover policing and provision of some social services, was not included in the table.) The biggest expenditure, 30 percent, went to land purchases associated with the condemnation of private land for public use. Among these uses were public housing projects, such as the residential and commercial development in the Xiangchang District of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

56

Outer City (Chapter Two). The second largest expenditure, about 25 percent, covered public works for the city, primarily street paving and sewage repairs. All together, over half of the city's revenues were spent directly on improving the infrastructure. Normal expenses of the city government operations took a chunk of 20 percent. Only about fifteen percent went to funding various social services, such as the municipal hospitals. Again the Police Board was also involved in the provision of certain urban services, such as poor relief and fire­ fighting. In short, although less than a million yuan was spent every year during the early twentieth century, these budgets represented a major commitment by the government to municipal administration and public works.

Table 8. Municipal Expenditures in Beijing, 1931-1932 (in Chinese yuan) Classifications

Amount

Percentage

Secretariat Department of Public Safety Department of Public Health Department of Public Works Department of Public Utilities Department of Finance Department of Land Administration Department of Social Services Department of Education

200,757 2,059,821 19,662 388,766 33,880 217,070 30,597 199,334 49,951

6.2 64.3 0.6 12.1 1.1 6.7 0.9 6.2 1.6

Total

3,199,838

100.0

Source: SZTG, pp.62-64.

Table 8, which offers a appropriation breakdown by governmental agencies in 1931 and 1932, can clarify the point further. A first look may be

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

57

misleading because the Department of Public Safety (The Police Department) took a hefty 64 percent. But it should be remembered that the police function was very broadly defined. The city's street cleaning, for example, was administered by the police department. The police were also responsible for fire fighting and for maintaining the city 's public fire brigades. Policemen were stationed in major thoroughfares, regulating traffic and assisting visitors. The police commanded a large work force. One in every twenty employees in Beijing in the 1920s and 1930s worked for the police department.23 Although raising municipal revenues had become institutionalized during the early twentieth century, Beijing's tax collection system was still flawed. First of all, the dazzling array of taxes were very confusing. Some overlapped with others and should have been combined and consolidated. Even within one category of tax, the specific requirements were, as one resident complained, "as many as an ox's hairs." Secondly, there were a disproportionate number of municipal agencies collecting taxes. Lei Jihui, an investigator of Beijing's tax problem in the early 1930s, reported that there were over twenty institutions collecting more than forty different taxes.24 The Department of Finance, for example, had a special municipal taxation office that collected vehicle, shop, animal and land taxes. Even within this department, there were two more agencies that collected taxes from livestock registration and railroad freight. The Police Department was responsible for charging fees for animal inspection, real estate transactions, and for public

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

toilets and night soil treatment. The Social Services Department and the Public Works Department each had their own tax-collecting privileges. All of these government agencies worked independently in tax collection, and none was directly accountable to the city government. Each kept what it collected in its own department, or tried to keep as much of the revenue as possible. This practice not only prevented any rational allocation of funds according to the priorities of urban development, but also created an imbalance of treatment among municipal agencies. For example, since the police force kept the real estate tax receipts, it was the most amply funded municipal institution in the city. But the Department of Education suffered tremendously because it was not a tax-collecting agency and had to use whatever money was left over. Consequently, people who worked for city departments received drastically different salaries and benefits, not as a result of the duties they performed, but as a result of how much money each department controlled. This system of tax collection, a critic pointed out, needed immediate reform. He suggested that only the Finance Department be given the power to collect taxes. All other departments must receive their shares of funding according to a centralized budget. Only in this way could municipal administration develop evenly.25 The city government failed to explore other sources of municipal funding. Although Western cities obtained their finances from municipal taxes, they also aggressively sought other sources to finance their capital projects. One means way was municipal indebtedness in bonds. Urban

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

59

reformers in the West believed that municipal bonds were an appropriate means for financing permanent improvements, such as civic centers, boulevards, and parks. The issuance of municipal bonds was justified because, in the words of Chicago's Comptroller in 1898, "they benefit not only the present but future generations who, in justice and equity, should bear their proportion of the expense."26 In the United States during the late nineteenth century, urban governments embarked on massive projects costing millions of borrowed dollars. "New York City funded the development of Central Park, Brooklyn laid out Prospect Park, Philadelphia opened Fairmount Park, and Chicago's park districts purchased the ring of preserves surrounding the that city. Construction of waterworks in Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, Baltimore, and Cleveland added substantially to the debt of those cities...And Boston borrowed millions for street improvements..."27 Throughout Western cities, municipal bonds were raised to supplement city taxes and to cover the cost of major capital projects. The per capita municipal debt in 1898-1899 was $73 for New York, $32 for Philadelphia, $54 for London, and $37 for Berlin.28 Public indebtedness was not unfamiliar to early twentieth century China. Both the imperial Qing government and the early Republican government depended on borrowed money to boost their meager revenue. But their main source was foreign loans, with various conditions and guarantees attached. From the 1910s on, the central government also sought to raise funds domestically by encouraging citizens to purchase savings bonds. As the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

60

local arm of the state, the Municipal Council of Beijing urged urban residents to answer the call of the state in various publications. The city government appealed to the people's sense of patriotism (to reduce unscrupulous foreign exploitation and to protect China's national interest) and offered incentives to appeal to individual investors, such as a lottery. However, funds raised through savings bonds went to the state, not the city. There were no initiatives on the local level to issue municipal bonds so as to finance key capital projects. To be sure, some funds raised by the state trickled down to pay for some municipal improvement projects. Part of the cost for reconstructing the Altar of the Grain and Earth, for example, was defrayed by a grant from the central government. Foreign loans were also used to partially finance the Beijing Streetcar Company in 1924, whereby half of the capital was secured through an earlier French bank loan to the Republican government. Despite these unusual instances, public borrowing was not a major source of revenue in the public works campaign of Beijing during the early twentieth century. It seems that a weak domestic money market, the absence of financial institutions to facilitate issuing bonds, the general impoverishment of the urban public, and perhaps more importantly, the central government's unwillingness to let the local government compete with the state for funds were more responsible for the lack of municipal debt financing than a mere lack of imagination on the part of the municipal government. Regardless of the causes, the city's inability to raise additional

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

61

funds contributed to perennial financial crunch, ultimately preventing the government from expanding urban services and upgrading public utilities on a larger and grander scale.

The Affordability Factor

On the whole, the residents of Beijing shouldered much heavier financial burdens during the early Republic period than during the imperial times. As neither the income nor job opportunities of the average city inhabitant increased very much, more taxes may have translated into a diminished standard of living. With a population of 1.3 million in Beijing in 1930, the total tax amounted to 1.6 million yuan, or an average of more than one yuan in per capita taxes.29 The only good news was that taxes going to the national coffers began to decline for Beijing residents, while municipal taxes were on the rise. That meant that more funding was made available for the city. In this section, we will explore the relationship between municipal taxation and the standard of living. What was the tax base of Beijing like? How much a tax burden did people have to shoulder? If municipal taxation lowered the standard of living, what were the manifestations? Finally, over a million people of Beijing were not monolithic. Who actually gained and who lost from this public works movement?30 For the majority of Beijing's residents in the early twentieth century, life was difficult. According to an estimate made by the Beijing Police Department

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

62

in December 1926, the population of the metropolis fell into five economic groups, distributed in the following manner31:

Table 9. Distribution of Urban Households by Economic Classes, 1926 Class

City Proper Suburbs

Total

Percent

Destitute Poor Lower middle Comfortable Well-to-do

24,037 9,730 92,394 37,559 6,618

18,946 13,890 28,043 19,433 3,732

42,982 23,620 120,437 56,992 10,350

16.9% 9.2 47.3 22.4 4.1

Total

170,338

84,040

254,382

100

Source: Tao Li-kung, Livelihood in Peking, p.19.

As noted by the census takers, this classification was arbitrary and the classes were not so distinct as they seemed. However, these figures may be taken as an approximate indication of economic classes in the city. "The destitute," defined Tao, a social worker who conducted the survey, "are understood as absolutely penniless and having no means of livelihood, the poor as those whose incomes are insufficient even for the bare subsistence of their members unless they are supplemented by gifts or relief, and the lower middle class as those whose incomes are narrowly sufficient to cover their daily living expenses."32 The statistics showed a population which was bottom heavy, i.e., the majority belonged to the destitute, poor and lower middle class, bordering on the edge of poverty and maintaining only a meager existence. Generally, they included not only most of the unskilled and semi-skilled

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

63

workers, such as street hawkers, handicraft workers, and rickshaw pullers, but even some policemen of the lower rank, servants, and clerks in small shops.33 In general, the small shopowners, urban workers, students, and office workers together accounted for about 70 percent of working population in early twentieth century Beijing. According to a study of 300 account books of 48 of these families between 1926-27, some 80 percent of the families received between 150 and 300 yuan a year. The total average expenditure per family was 200 yuan per year. 97 percent of this sum went to food (71.2%), utilities like fuel, light, and water (7.5%), and clothing (6.8%), absolute necessities to sustain life.34 This study suggests deplorable living conditions. Hardly any money was left to the family for securing things other than survival. Education, recreation, arts and entertainment, and all other forms of modern living were denied to them. A comparison with other world cities drives the point home. The following two tables show the distribution of expenditures for the principle items in family budgets in selected countries and Beijing. Admittedly, in the early twentieth century, all urban dwellers spent a significant portion of their income on food, clothing, rent, and utilities. However, city residents in major industrialized countries spent only about half their expenses on food consumption, whereas in Beijing, the figure was usually in the high seventies. The real measure of the standard of living is the portion of income spent on books, education, recreation, insurance, savings, and other items under the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

64

heading "Miscellaneous." On this account, Western cities had a percentage in the twenties, but for the Chinese this varied from 2.5 to 8.5 percent. Gamble observes that "[t]he lowest proportion spent for 'Miscellaneous' by American families is almost twice the maximum of the Chinese, while in America a family is thought to be very poor if it does not spend 20 percent of its income on 'Miscellaneous,' or more than three times the proportion spent by the most fortunate of these families."35

Table 10. Percentage Distribution of Expenditure in Selected Cities, 1929 Country

Annual Income

Aus.$900 Australia Fr. 856 Belgium Rup. 630 India Y. 200 Japan R. 1214 Russia United States$ 1637

Food Clothing

Rent Heat Misc.

41.2 65.8 56.8 65.0 45.1 40.4

12.4 8.7 7.7 12.0 7.2 14.7

13.6 13.2 9.6 6.0 19.4 18.4

4.5 5.5 7.4 * 6.1 4.6

28.3 5.8 18.5 17.0 22.4 22.0

Note: * Heat included in Miscellaneous. Source: Sidney Gamble, How Chinese Families Live in Peiping, p.323.

Table 11. Percentage Distribution of Expenditures of Beijing Residents, 1918-24 Resident type

Food Cloth

Rent Lt&Fuel

Misc.

93 College Employees 100 Suburban Families 95 Manchu Families 200 Factory Workers

72.2% 76.5 73.2 73.6

6.7% 7.94 9.00 11.1

*

3.17 2.5 5.48 8.5

19.03% 6.18 5.31 6.6

2.5 5.96 *

Note: * The cost of light and fuel in included in the food expenses. Source: Tao Li-kung, Livelihood in Peking, p .75.

What, then, was the standard of living in Beijing in the twentieth

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

century? To begin with, there was a huge working-class population, almost 80 percent of the city, whose standard of living could only be described as poor, making less than an annual income of 100 yuan per family of four (35 to 40 coppers a day).36 For the rest of the 20 percent, life was relatively easier. This meant, according to C.G. Dittmer, "that they can have enough food, though simple and poor, live in a house that will at least shelter them from the elements, have at least two suits of clothes, have enough fuel so they do not have to go out and gather it and have $5 left over for miscellaneous expenses, which will give them meat on feast days and tea quite often, almost every week, while if there is sickness they can even make a trip to the Temple Fair back in the mountains."37 Finally, there were a tiny minority, less than one percent of the population, big businessmen and high ranking officials, for example, whose pattern of conspicuous consumption differed dramatically from the rest of urban inhabitants. As they did not alter the overall picture of living standard, a discussion of their life style is not given here. The most important conclusion to be drawn from the discussion of living standards was that Beijing in the early twentieth century lacked the well-to-do middle class that was coming to dominate many Western cities at the same time. This phenomenon had far-reaching implications for Beijing's physical and social transformation. Its impact will be discussed in the implementation of modern water supply, electrification, streetcar transit, as well as for the provision of other urban amenities. Here I would like to dwell

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

66

on the relationship between Beijing's low standard of living and municipal taxation. Since Beijing had no income tax, property and business taxes constituted the main sources of municipal revenue. Thus, thousands of petty shop owners contributed heavily to the tax-base of the city, which meant that the average resident paid the taxes indirectly, through higher prices on food, clothing, and rent. As there were no special tax rates for the wealthy and powerful, everyone was taxed equally regardless of economic status. Therefore, while the tax per capita was tolerable for the top twenty percent of the population, it was an enormous burden on the city's working-class families. The low incomes received by most urban residents prevented raising a large amount of taxes for municipal services. Furthermore, modern businesses and factories in Western cities enhanced municipal revenues both through the taxes they paid themselves and through the wealth they created among their employees. The preindustrial nature of Beijing deprived the city of this important source of taxation and precipitated the impoverishment of the urban population as few industrial jobs were available. The large destitute population in Beijing also required that the city government spend some tax dollars on poor relief, though it never became a major source of expenditure, nor was Beijing the kind of socialist welfare city it is today. Finally, effective resistance to tax increases strained the city's already

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

67

limited resources. For example, a new tax was levied on the city's restaurants and public bath houses in 1926 to finance a pay increase for the city's police. However, the Chamber of Commerce protested vigorously to the central government by arguing that the new tax would deprive the resteuranteurs and bath house owners of their livelihood.38 The Chamber also accused the city government of not putting taxes into productive use. Their lobbying efforts proved successful, and the city repealed the taxes after only a few months. Likewise, taxation on luxury items, such as rugs and foreign clocks, was also strongly opposed by the city's wealthy elite. After only a couple of years, rich consumers forced the annulment of these taxes. For all these reasons, the municipal taxation failed to generate sufficient funds to support the massive and capital-intensive projects that were needed to transform the city completely. Many plans, such as the creation of modern market places and public housing projects, remained on paper due to a shortage of financial resources. Thus, the city's transformation could only be a slow, arduous, and often painful process.

Impact cm Urban Life

People who were at Peking some ten years ago will probably still remember the conditions of the city as it existed then. The streets were full of mud and there was practically no attempt made for the improvement of roads in any respect. Canals smelt something like open sewage drains. The idea of sanitation was unborn. As modern methods of municipal management has gradually crept into the minds of the administrators, public works for city improvement likewise

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

68

gradually shows signs of growth. If the same person who was in Peking ten years ago, revisits the city today, he will find himself in an entirely different city that could hardly be identified with the old. As the population of the city increases, the improvement of the public works of the city becomes more and more important, so much so that the government realizes the necessity of organizing a special administration for all the public works of the city.39 This passage from a major social science journal of the time illustrates the dramatic change in the urban landscape of Beijing between 1913 and 1922. Equally importantly, it gives special credit to the Municipal Council for its efforts to transform the old Beijing into a modern metropolis. Indeed, from the time of its establishment in June 1914, the Council undertook numerous public projects that had a tremendous impact on the spatial development of the capital. Its accomplishments were not limited to improving an urban infrastructure of streets, sewage, parks and assisting such public utilities of water supply, mass transit and electric light and power, even though these aspects were the focus of this dissertation. It also made progress in areas of social services, such as public education, poor relief and public health. What follows is an account of these achievements. Subsequent chapters will discuss in detail the urban infrastructural improvement, with an emphasis on the social implication of these changes as well. Promotion of Commerce. One of the Municipal Council's primary

objectives was to encourage trade and commerce in Beijing. To sharpen Beijing's competitive edge, the Beijing Export Association was established under the auspices of the Municipal council. Among other things, the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

69

association organized an annual trade fair. Very often more than one hundred major businesses participated, and over one thousand Beijing local products were represented in the exposition. The Council also gave out three classes of awards for quality products and provided free advertising for them in national newspapers.40 Further, with the support of the Council, the Beijing Industrial and Commercial Improvement Bureau was established in 1919, made up of departments of product appraisal, research, and sale. Through the Bureau's efforts, Beijing's traditionally strong products such as cloisonne, embroidery, lacquer ware and Chinese traditional herbal medicine was made even more competitive and better known in national and international markets.41 Enjoying these incentives and the strong support of the city government, Beijing's indigenous trade and handicraft industry, historically underdeveloped and uncompetitive, underwent substantial growth. The city emerged as a major commercial center of China in the early twentieth century. Campaigning for Improvement of People's Lives (Minsheng). Sun Yat-sen's

formulation of mingsheng, a classical Confucian terminology literally meaning "people's lives", was used by the new city government as a justification to advocate civilian concerns. Before the founding of the Municipal Council, social welfare services had been carried on almost entirely by individuals or private organizations such as guilds, charities, volunteer fire-fighting and common origin associations, while the government generally stayed out of directly providing urban services. Once the Republic was established,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

70

however, the Municipal Council, together with the Police Board, took an increasingly active role in the sphere of social services, particularly in public health, public education and poor relief. Public Health. The Division of Sanitation, one branch of the Police

Department, was responsible for the public health work of the city, including street cleaning, repair and cleaning of sewers, construction and supervision of all public toilets, and transportation of night soil. It was also responsible for the inspection of food offered for sale and for the supervision of houses of prostitution. Finally, it supervised all hospitals, managed those that were run by the police, and licensed all doctors, midwives, and those making medicines. The regular expenses of the department were paid from the general police fund.42 The Municipal Council supplemented the work of the police in public health. Although two hospitals run by the Police Board already existed, they could hardly meet the demand of city residents, so in 1916 the Council proposed to set up a new hospital on government land in the Xiangchang District. The Renmin hospital, literally meaning 'benefiting the people", practiced both Western and Chinese medicine in a complex of spacious new buildings designed by British architects. In the same year, the Beijing Hospital for Contagious Diseases (Beijing chuanranbing yiyuan) was established by the Ministry of the Interior; in the following year ownership of the hospital was transferred to the Municipal Council. As a center for controlling contagious

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

71

diseases and for disseminating public health information, the hospital treated more than 1,000 in-bed patients annually, and vaccinated many more.43 Between 1914 and 1918, the foundations of public health work were well laid in Beijing. Health regulations and ordinances were adopted, and a large number of hospitals were opened . According to the survey conducted by Sidney Gamble, Beijing had 38 hospitals in 1917, and 46 in 1919. Among them six were rim by the government, four were supported by other public funds, 17 were under private Chinese management, and sixteen were run by foreigners, including German, French, Japanese and American.44 To encourage private initiatives in public health, the council offered financial assistance to a number of private Chinese hospitals. For example, from September 1914 to 1928, it paid 100 yuan a month to the Beijing Medical Association, a private medical consortium founded in 1911 to offer discounts to poor patients. A separate annual grant of 6,000 yuan went to Beijing's private Central Hospital (zhongyang yiyuan ) which was considered the best Chinese-run hospital in the

city.45 Public Education. In the early twentieth century, the majority of Beijing's

population belonged to the lower middle and working classes. Many were unemployed and lived below subsistence level. In order to make a living, children from poor families either joined the work force early without an adequate primary education. Many other children simply squandered their childhood idling in the streets. Realizing the worrisome implications of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

72

children's illiteracy for the nation's future, the Municipal Council became actively involved with Beijing's primary education. Initially the Council envisioned a grand plan of making all elementary schools in Beijing public, thus enabling every family, however poor, to educate their youngsters. This program failed before it even started, however, mainly due to lack of funds. Without reforming the municipal tax structure on which public schools depended, municipal officials came to realize, any effort to promote public education could only remain on paper. Instead, therefore, government funds were made available to existing private schools. Starting in May 1917, the Council offered 100 yuan per month to every registered elementary school in the city. In addition, special efforts were made to encourage poor children to attend school. 53 part-time schools in Beijing catered to specifically poor children. Tuition at these schools was relatively inexpensive because the teachers were volunteers from the Police Board and the classrooms were located in the local outposts of the police. The Council provided a special fund of 50 yuan a month to each of these schools, and awarded scholarships to students who performed well. In 1918 about 4,000 students won scholarships amounting to 3,000 yuan.46 Poor Relief. Poverty was a serious social problem in early Republican

Beijing. One police survey estimated that 11.9 percent, or 96,850 persons of the population were "poor" or "very poor"47 According to Gamble, there are two important reasons for this poverty. One was high unemployment rates caused

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

73

in part by the preindustrial system which required that a person be recommended by some friend or relative for any available work. The other was the demise of Qing dynasty leaving destitute a huge number of Manchus in Beijing.48 Under the Qing empire/practically all of charitable institutions were privately managed, and the government did little relief work. The only exception was the two county magistrates governing Beijing, who dispensed famine relief and allotted a small allowance for widows and orphans. In early Republic Beijing, however, the municipal government became heavily involved in the provision of services to the poor. Soup kitchens, foundling homes, orphanages, poor houses, old people's homes, and reform schools were either managed directly by the Police Board and the Municipal Council, or were indirectly funded by the government. For example, Beijing's orphanages were originally sponsored by the Longquan Temple and financed by merchants who were members of the gentry. Starting in 1914, the Municipal Council used municipal tax funds to provide every orphanage in Beijing with a monthly stipend of 100 yuan. It also gave 400 yuan a month to the foundling home set up by Beijing's Chamber of Commerce in 1917. Moreover, the Council ran a number of houses for the poor, the old, and the handicapped, providing financial support and teaching technical and work skills. During the winters, 12 soup kitchens set up in and around the city by the Council distributed free food. Between 1914 and 1918, the council spent 5,000 yuan on these soup

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

74

kitchens, with additional funding during times of natural calamities such as flood and drought.49 To be sure, the official initiatives in social services were limited and quite ad hoc. These initiatives did, however, mark the beginning of an era when government provision of social services multiplied. The determination of the government to assume the function of social welfare had profound ramifications not only for the shifting state-society relationship, but for the rest of twentieth century Chinese history. The evidence above suggests that the Municipal Council differed in important ways from institutions set up by the imperial government to handle urban affairs. It was a governmental agency dedicated to transforming the old urban landscape and improving people's lives. Representing the official determination to promote Beijing's modern development, the Municipal Council spread itself thin and attempted to influence the life of city people as much as it could. However, it was still unable to touch all aspects of urban life. For instance, the construction division of the council greatly expanded when it was taken over from the construction team of the Ministry of the Interior, yet it still comprised only 300 workers.50 The demand for public works in Beijing was so great that it simply could not meet the need. Over the years, the Municipal Council relied on three strategies to influence the public sphere in the city: legislation, contracting work and joint ventures. From 1914 to 1917 the Municipal Council passed scores of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

75

regulations concerning public works and city administration. Through the execution of specific policies, the municipal government hoped to control the life of city people and shape the direction of Beijing's urban development. Generally, the ordinances and statutes can be roughly divided into those regulating trade and commerce and those promoting public utility development. First of all, the volume of commercial activities reached an all-time high during the early twentieth century. The existing markets of Beijing could no longer accommodate merchants pouring in from all over the country. The problems of overcrowding, traffic congestion, poor sanitation, price hoarding, and haphazard market growth became increasingly acute. To put an end to this chaotic situation, the Municipal Council enacted in 1914 a series of regulations aimed at fostering more orderly markets and more ethical business practices. City government inspectors enforced the new rules, and violators were required to pay heavy fines.51 At the same time, in order to protect the legitimate rights of businessmen, the Council helped fund the arbitration department of the Beijing Chamber of Commerce, which was responsible for handling grievances and disputes of merchants.52 Lastly, to protect the public interest, the council conducted regular tests of drinking water, meat from slaughter houses, toilets, fire escapes, emergency exits, and other public utilities.53 The government's supervisory role can also be illustrated in official-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

76

private joint ventures. Private merchant management with official supervision (guandu shangban) and official-merchant joint management (guanshang heban)

both began during the Tongzhi Restoration of the late Qing. Most enterprises in China managed in these ways were modern industrial plants, such as textile and artillery manufacturing. In Beijing where modern factories were very few, the enterprises run by guandu shangban were mostly public utility firms, the most important of which were the Beijing Water Works Company, the Beijing Electric Company and the Beijing Streetcar Company. Founded in 1908 with the approval of the Empress Dowager, the Beijing Water Works Company was originally a guandu shangban firm operated by a Chinese gentry-merchant consortium under the supervision of the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce (nonggongshang bu) of the Qing imperial government. It was established to ensure Beijing residents clean, drinkable water and to protect the city from fire hazards. After the founding of the Republic, the supervisory role was assumed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce under the Beiyang government, which then delegated its duties to the Municipal Council in 1914.54 Similarly, the Beijing Electric Company was founded in 1905, with the approval of the Qing government, to compete with foreign ventures for the Chinese civilian market. Its establishment, masterminded by some late Qing officials and businessmen, made electric lighting, once the privilege of the imperial court and the foreign community, available to the urban public. The Beijing Streetcar Company,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

77

established in 1921, was a guandu heban joint venture in which the government actually enjoyed managerial rights. Purchasing half of the shares of the company and appointing six of eleven board members, the official partner controlled the decision-making process of the company. For several terms, the president of the Municipal Council chaired the board of directors of the Streetcar Company.55 We will examine these three utility firms individually in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Suffice it to say here that, through guandu shangban or guandu heban, the government was able to exert control over enterprises providing public amenities. Curbing the ruthless urge of pure profit-making at the public's expense, the Municipal Council closely monitored construction and repair of all these utility companies. All projects and plans were required to the overall urban planning of the city. For example, water taps and utility posts had to be away from traffic, and roads must be paved immediately after pipeline installation. The Council kept updated maps and detailed files of all city water works, electric distribution charts, and streetcar routes and stops. It also offered advice on the pricing of fares and meters, settling disputes between the companies and urban residents, and through the Police Board, maintained law and order on the premises of the companies.56 During this era, both the official sector, represented by the Municipal government, and the private sector, represented by the public utility firms, worked in concert for the public, or the residents of Beijing as a collective

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

78

entity. In this process, however, the power of the official sector grew faster than that of the private sector, or the public. Increasingly, the private component of these joint enterprises came under the control of the government. In later years (During the Guomindang and the CCP periods), such control was abused and extended to include much of the urban populace. Between 1914 and 1928, however, things had not turned ugly, and official supervision of urban growth was both justified and successful. Nevertheless, the state-society relationship established during the Beiyang era, however stable and rational it may seem, did sow the seeds for the growth of a centralizing and unifying state power. It was during this period that the statesociety balance began to shift in the direction of the state.

Conclusion

Although there were precedents in earlier times for some of the policies of the new municipal administration, the role of the Municipal Council in transforming Beijing during the early years of the Republic was no accident. Like the city council in Shanghai a decade earlier, studied by Mark Elvin, Beijing's Council launched a vigorous program, characterized by an extensive use of regulatory law, to improve the city's physical environment, to modernize old ways of thoughts, and to create a city that was healthier, prettier, and more efficient. The Municipal Council's creation and assumption of power reflected

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

larger forces shaping Chinese society during the early twentieth century. On the political front, the decentralizing force unleashed by the post-Taiping reconstruction had a tremendous impact on late Qing society. Population growth and flourishing commercial activities accelerated the pace of urbanization in the Chinese cities, while a weak state created vacuums filled up by private gentry groups operating in the name of public service. During the twentieth century, however, the state began to re-centralize its power. These efforts were facilitated by increasing commercialization and population growth. The gentry's role became more limited, since it lacked coordination and bureaucratic efficiency and its power base was confined to the locality. Their efforts proved insufficient to cope with the overwhelming problems of a modernizing Chinese city, and this deficiency gave the state a chance to assert its power. Modern municipal administration demanded an efficient central power staffed by professional officers to tackle an increasingly complex and technologically sophisticated urban society. Once again, the time was ripe for the centralization of government power, but this time it was combined with new ways of thinking and new methods of governance. The transfer of power from private and semi-official organizations to the modern bureaucracy did not spell death of private influence, since many members of the gentry class made their way into the new government, but it did weaken their power considerably. On the social front, the new Municipal Council embodied the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

80

aspirations of many pro-Western reformers, including intellectuals, technocrats, and new style army officers. Consequently, the Municipal government differed from its imperial predecessors. Instead of being monolithically ruled by warlords, militarists, or old-style bureaucrats loyal only to the emperor, the Municipal Council remained in the hands of the emerging technocrats. These men no longer served the interest of an imperial dynasty, but had a stake in social transformation. Compared to their predecessors, they were more receptive to new ideas, more aware of Western technology and management, and more in touch with the people they governed. The Municipal Council, equipped with Western methods and modern technology, launched in urban construction on an unprecedented scale. Public works transformed the physical landscape, making Beijing more livable and convenient than before. New social service programs addressed a variety of social problems and improved the lives of city residents. Realizing its own limitations in carrying out public projects and social reform, the council emphasized policies that would draw various social groups into the orbit of modern management. The private operation and official supervision of the major public utilities, for instance, involved private business interests for in activities that served the common good. Through these collaborative efforts, led by the Municipal Council, a new modern metropolis emerged. Perhaps not even the Municipal Council could have predicated how significantly Beijing would be transformed. For example, opening of public

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

81

space facilitated the gathering of mass rallies. These in turn led to the May Fourth Movement, in which city people, especially students and intellectuals, publicly expressed their commitment to the idea of democracy in a sovereign republic. On a concrete level, the public works initiated by the Municipal Council had a profound impact on the city people. Paved roads and rebuilt city gates not only eased the problems of traffic and crowding, but opened up Beijing to the rest of China and to the world. The renewal of the ancient sewage system improved public health and beautified the urban landscape. Zoning and land sale regulations helped rationalized Beijing's housing market and began the era of Westem-style urban planning. Electric power lighted the houses of thousands of families. The waterworks, though still limited in scope, ensured Beijing residents clean drinkable water and protected the city from fire hazards. Streetcars, running on Beijing's major boulevards, became not only an important part of city life, but a symbol of progress for the modern city. In the history of China, the Municipal Council was the precursor of modern municipal government. Heavily influenced by Western urban experience and the dramatic events of the early twentieth century, it was born with a mission to assume functions of public works and municipal administration. In a strict sense, the Council was not the entire city government of Beijing, since the Police Board, a separate government agency, played a number of roles beyond policing and security. While in most cases these two agencies' functions were different, occasionally they overlapped. But

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

82

their combined role did indeed constitute the basic elements of modern municipal administration. The distribution of power between the Council and the Police Board began to change in 1928 with the unification of China under Guomindang, when the Chinese capital was moved from Beijing to Nanjing. At that point, Beijing entered into a new phase of development. Designated a Special City by Chiang Kai-shek's Guomindang government, Beijing established a new municipal structure headed by a mayor and cabinet.57 To conclude, if we define the public sphere, on the one hand, as a domain of proprietorship and of managerial responsibility over collective goods and services, and on the other, as an arena of political debate and political action, we may date the transformation of the public sphere to early twentieth century China.58 True, the public sphere was greatly expanded in late Qing period. But starting in the early twentieth century, the public sphere was gradually restricted by a somewhat belated but no less dramatic expansion of the official sphere, first in late Qing xinzheng, then further under the Beiyang government, and finally under the regimes of Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party. However transitional its form, the growth of the governmental sphere in the sense of bureaucratic command over resources, personnel and especially supervision and control of public works, originated in this period. Positively, it contributed to the modernization of Beijing, but negatively, it heralded a long period of political centralization that characterized much of China's history during the twentieth century.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

83

The Beijing Municipal Council was an impressive attempt by progressive social reformers to reshape the city according to modern Western ideals of democracy and of organizational and technological efficiency. These municipal governments represented the beginning of a renewal process in Chinese cities at two levels. First, they improved the appearance of cities through a policy of urban development. Second, they represented politically, for the first time in Chinese history, an administration close to the inhabitants and aware of their problems and expectations.59 Like other Chinese municipalities, Beijing endeavored to reshape itself to solve the very real problems caused by population growth and the development of economic activities. At the same time, these actions were the expression of a new political will. Despite the problems of municipal taxation, growing centralization, and the conservative social and public policies, Beijing's new municipal institutions helped bring about the modern transformation of an ancient Chinese city in the early twentieth century.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

84

NOTES

’Liu Ziyang et al., Qingdai difang guanzhi kao, (Local government institutions in Qing dynasty,) (Beijing: Zijincheng chubanshe, 1988) pp.231-244; Li Pengnian et al., Qingdai zhongyang guojia jiguan gaishu (Central government institutions in Qing dynasty,) (Beijing: Zijincheng chubanshe, 1989) pp. 361-365. See also Alison Dray-Novey, "Policing Imperial Peking: The Ch'ing Gendarmerie, 16501850" Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1981. 2Duncan, Peking Municipality and the Diplomatic Quarter, p.2. ^ e Chief Office in the Inner City had five Branch Offices, namely, Central, East, West, North, South. Each Branch Office had under its jurisdiction a number of precincts. Under the Central Branch Office there were six precincts, the others having five each, making a total of twenty-six. In the Outer City there were four Branch Offices, namely, East, West, North, and South. Of these there were six precincts apiece for the East and West, and four apiece for the North and South, making a total of twenty precincts for the Outer City. 4Neizuu faling tigang (An introduction to laws and regulations of the Ministry of the Interior), not dated, published in early Republic, pp.12-14.

sSee Kristin Stapleton, "Late Qing Reforms and the Urban Political Environment: Chengdu, 1903-1912" conference paper, Association for Asian Studies, Washington DC, April, 1992. 6Beijing jingcha yange jiyao (Highlights of the evolution of police in Beijing); Jingcha faling huibian (A compilation of police regulations), Section 2: administration, pp.95-428. 7Jingdu Shizheng Huilan (Overview of Beijing city administration), edited by Jingdu shizheng gongsuo (Beijing Municipal Council), (Beijing: Jinghua Press, 1919), pp.25-26. Hereafter JSH. 8JSH, p.327. 9JSH, p.36.

10Gamble, Peking: A Social Survey, pp.76-77. nYang Daxin, Beijing zhengfu zongtong yu zongli (The presidents and prime ministers of the Beiyang Government). (Tianjin: Nankai University Press, 1989), p.243. 12Ibid. p.248.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

85

13Ibid. p.36. 14Gamble, Peking: a Social Survey, p.65. 15Lei Jihui, Beiping shuijuan kaolue (A study of taxation in Beijing) (Beijing: Shehui diaocha suo, 1932), p. 103. 16Gamble, Peking: A Social Survey, p.73. 17Ibid., p.74. 18The tax on title deed amounted to six percent of the sale price of the land. Unless the seller was a Manchu noble, in which case the deed for the property was made on special red paper and the tax was four and half percent. If the land was a gift or the price was below the regular market price, the value of the sale for tax purposes was estimated at 70 yuan per room if the house was of brick, and 20 yuan a room if the building was made of earth. When the land was mortgaged the tax was three percent of the amount of that mortgage. Deeds and mortgages to be legal and binding had to be stamped by the tax bureau, showing that taxes had been paid. 19Jon C. Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph: City Government in America, 1870-1900 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), p.298. 20Ibid., p.304. “ Wang Guohua, "Jingdu shizheng gongsuo de jiguo jiqi gongzuo" (The structure and work of the Beijing Municipal Council), Beijing Lishi Dang'an 1 (1986), p.82. “ Ibid., p.88. afSH, p.439.

24Lei Jihui, Beiping shuijuan kaolue, p.'l. 25Ibid., p.113. 26Teaford, The Unheralded Triumph, p.292. 27 Ibid., p.285. 28Ibid., p.290. 29Lei jihui, Beiping juanshui kaolue, p. 112.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30The sources cited here included the cost of living studies by Sidney Gamble, an American sociologist doing field work in Beijing in the 1920s. 31In 1914, the police began taking census in the city of Beijing. 32L.K. Tao, Livelihood in Peking: An Analysis of the Budgets of Sixty Families, (Beijing: China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture, 1928), p.19. “ Ibid., p.23. mL.K. Tao, Livelihood in Peking, (Beijing: China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture, 1928), p.21. “ Gamble, Peking: A Social Survey, p.269. 36 Sidney Gamble, How Chinese Families Live in Peiping, (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1933), p.315. 37C.G. Dittmer, "An Estimate of the Chinese Standard of Living," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 33 (November 1918),p. 122. “ Archives of the Ministry of the Interior, China Number Two Historical Archives (Nanjing, China), 1001/2883 (1926-1927). “ Chow Zian-yien, "Public Works in the City of Peking" The Chinese Social and Political Science Review (1923), p.102. 40JSH, pp.134. 41JSH, p.135. ^Gamble, Peking: A Social Survey, p.114. 43JSH, p.209.

^Gamble, Peking: A Social Survey, p.118. 4BJSH, p.209.

46JSH, p.232. 47Gamble, Peking: A Social Survey, p.270. 48Ibid., pp.273-274. 49JSH, p.233.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

87

50JSH , p.470. 51JSH, p.176. 52}SH, p.171. 53JSH, pp.244-226.

MBai Shulan, "Jiefang qian Beijing zilaishui shiye fazhan gaikuang" (The development of Beijing water system before liberation), Beijing D am n Shiliao (the archival history of Beijing) 1:1. s5Zhu Lijun, "Jiefang qian Beijing yougui dianche gongsi gaikuang" (A survey of the development of the Beijing street car company before liberation), Beijing damn shiliao 2:2 (1987) 56A synthesis has been made from Beijing dianche qongsi dang'an shiliao (Beijing streetcar company archival history), (Beijing: Yanshan chubanshe, 1987); and Beijing zilaishui gongsi dang'an shiliao (Beijing water works company archival history), (Beijing: Yanshan chubanshe, 1988). 57No one has done any study on the Beijing city government in the Nanjing decade and after, but Christian Henriot wrote about Shanghai in this period. See Henriot, "Municipal Reform in GMD China (1927-1937): A First Appraisal". Republican China XV: 1 (November, 1989). “ William T. Rowe, "The Public Sphere in Modern China", Modem China 16:3 (July), pp.309-329. 59The conclusion drawn by Henriot in his study of municipal reform during the Nanjing Decade applies to Beijing as well. See Henriot, "Municipal Reform in GMD China (1927-1937): A first Appraisal," p.21.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

88

Chapter Two Street Paving and Zoning

Introduction

When Beijing entered the Republican era in 1912, the Forbidden City, built by the Ming Emperor Yongle in the fifteenth century, still loomed large in the center of the city. But the power it symbolized, a monument of imperial majesty, had ceased to exist. Puyi, the last emperor of the Qing dynasty continued to live in the magnificent palaces until 1924, when he was expelled and the Forbidden City was turned into the Palace Museum. The world outside the walled imperial compound had changed long before the emperor was gone. While the city walls and gates still dominated Beijing's skyline, hundreds of years of population growth had crowded the city unmercifully, while unchecked commercial and real estate development had turned many formerly orderly and quiet streets into bustling and dirty thoroughfares. The ancient city had outgrown the kind of imperial capital envisioned by the earlier urban planners for the celestial empire. By the turn of the nineteenth century, Beijing needed of a new breath of life. The new city government during the late Qing and early Republican periods faced a challenge: how to turn an old imperial capital serving the interest of the ruling elite into a metropolis meeting the needs of a civilian society. It entailed such difficult tasks as revamping the imperial urban

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

89

design, modernizing the street system to diffuse traffic and facilitate mobility, and enacting zoning ordinances to rationalize city planning. In this chapter I will discuss Beijing's imperial planning, its application of Western technology in macadam and asphalt paving, its reorganization of city gates and the expansion of streets, and its experiments in zoning and modem urban planning. I will conclude by examining the effects of these changes on both the urban environment and city life in the early twentieth century Beijing.

The Changing Face of Beijing

Early Chinese city planners and builders succeeded in creating a capital of immense imperial grandeur. For over six centuries, Beijing stood as an imposing twenty square-mile quadrangle on the North China plain. It was a city surrounded by moated walls, which sharply separated the hustle and bustle of urban life from the quiet open fields of rural China outside. The walls further divided the city into the Inner and Outer City. Within the Inner City, there was yet another walled city, the Imperial City. Finally, the Forbidden City, a vast assemblage of imperial palaces inside the Imperial City, was separated from the rest by its own wall and moat. Within the city walls, straight and broad avenues crossed the city from east to west and from north to south. Connecting more than twenty city-gates, the major thoroughfares accommodated people and goods moving in and out of the city. Networks of smaller lanes and alleys intersected these

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

thoroughfares. If any street did not follow the straight line of the compass, its name would suggest the difference with the word xie (irregular), such as the Pipe Irregular Street (yandai xiejie) in the Inner City and the Cherry Irregular Street (yingtao xiejie) outside Qianmen (the front gate). But there were only a few such streets in the whole city. According to the Gazetteer of Shuntian Prefecture (the metropolitan Beijing) compiled in 1885, there were a total of 1,350 streets in Beijing, seventy percent of which were in the Outer City and thirty percent in the Inner City.1 The major thoroughfares crisscrossing the city were usually thronged with traffic and commerce. They were lined with elaborately painted and carved shops, temples, and memorial arches. Hiding behind these broad streets were small lanes which provided walking space for dwellers of traditional courtyards (siheyuan), the core of Beijing residences. The alleyways also provided space for neighborhood contacts, gossip exchanges, grass-root entertainment, as well as giving residents a place to breathe fresh air during Beijing's notoriously hot and humid summers. The single-story residences, whether palaces, mansions, or ordinary houses, were surrounded by white or grey plaster walls with dark wooden gates, making a sharp contrast to the ornate decoration of shops and temples. Inside the residential courtyards, however, shrubs and trees were planted to soften the drab windowless exterior. When the door was closed, the courtyard became an exclusive world, making alleyways the only place for community contacts.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

91

One major drawback in the original imperial urban plan became evident when the city was built in the thirteenth century. While the centrality of the Forbidden City reflected the supreme power of the monarch, the construction of an enclosed and secluded city right in the center of Beijing blocked through traffic in both a north-south and an east-west direction. Put another way, rather than a hub that could have facilitated mobility from every direction, the Forbidden City operated as a gigantic obstacle, cutting off traffic from all sides. People travelling from Fucheng Gate on the west side, for example, could not reach Chaoyang Gate on the east side without making a detour around the entire imperial compound. On the north-south axis, the major thoroughfare connecting the Inner and Outer City, was also blocked, diverting traffic to nearby narrower streets. The walls and their limited number of openings made the situation even worse. Early imperial city planners must have known that the Forbidden City would be a physical impediment to traffic, but chose to sacrifice civilian interests in order to demonstrate of supreme imperial power. Further, the spatial design was also based on military considerations that the seat of the imperial government be at the center, surrounded by layers of walls, to make it safe from enemy attacks. Finally, life did not move so quickly and people did not travel much beyond their own neighborhoods, which were also segregated ethnically in the Qing. Before the twentieth century, a few main streets were paved with either stone slabs or bricks in the city, but the overwhelming majority of roads were

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

92

unpaved. Street paving reflected the social hierarchy of an imperial state as well. The stone or brick paved streets were usually concentrated in the imperial palaces. The numerous courtyards and pathways in the Forbidden City, for instance, were covered by stone tiles and bricks. Carved in intricate patterns of dragons and phoenixes, the ramps leading to all palace halls were reserved for the emperor exclusively. Special gates and streets outside of the Forbidden City were also carefully maintained for the occasional use by the emperor and his entourage so that they could travel to the ceremonial altars scattered around the dty, such as the Temple of Heaven. These boulevards, referred to as Imperial Passages (yudao), symbolized the supreme power of the Son of Heaven in a despotic state. By the early twentieth century, however, even these streets were in a dilapidated condition, due to years of abuse and lack of maintenance. As described by a Chinese observer, [t]he streets [outside Qianmen Gate] were bumpy and hard to walk on. Since the aged stone roads lacked repairs and the fish markets nearby dumped their waste water onto the streets daily, the stone cracks became so filthy and smelly that during the summer months, pedestrians had to cover their noses and quicken their pace. Even the central streets of the nation's capital were like this. You do not have to ask about other ones, such as Chongwen and Xuanwu Streets. There was usually an earth path several feet above the street level. The path was so high that people could not see each other from shops on either side of the streets. Mule carriages travelled under the earth pass. Every time it rained, however, pools of water accumulated on the streets. It was impossible to describe how difficult it was for carriages to ease out of the m uddy holes. Moreover, the muddy splashes made by the carriages often fell on passing pedestrians. Sometimes mules and horses dropped dead right in the mud

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

93

pools, unable to carry the heavy burden or tolerate the whipping of their cruel drivers. These daily happenings caused terrible traffic congestion for vehicles and pedestrians alike. Those responsible for maintenance of order, especially the Street Ad­ ministration, were so corrupt that they pretended not noticing at all.2 The old city planning and the unpaved streets, alternately m uddy and dusty depending on the weather, were not the only problems. Wanton encroachment upon public roads by commercial establishments also made formerly broad and straight boulevards narrow and crooked. When Qianmen Boulevard, the central north-south avenue's section in the Outer City, was first built in the fifteenth century, it was wide enough to hold ten horse carriages side by side.3 But as commerce and trade developed along both sides of the major street, land value soared. Proprietors along the avenue began to build new commercial properties, encroaching on the large space of the original plan. The protruding shop fronts severely impeded the free flow of traffic, and the more prosperous this commercial district became, the narrower were the streets. Over the years, two rows of buildings gradually formed along each side of Qianmen Boulevard, and the spaces between them became streets themselves. The two new streets were named Meat Market (rou shi) Street, and Jewelry Market (zhubao shi) Street.4 Because of their central location, both markets together became one of the city's busiest shopping districts, attracting shoppers from all over the city. The imperial government did attempt to keep up the streets and regulate commerce. In fact, special agencies were assigned, not only to patrol

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

94

the city streets, but to repair and maintain them. During the Qing Dynasty, the Street Supervision and Management Office (duli jiedao yameri), a branch of the Board of Works staffed by an ethnic mixture of Manchu and Chinese officials, was responsible for the city's streets.5 "All street surfaces, stone or dirt alike, must meet three standards: smoothness, solidness, and cleanness. When the road becomes bumpy, cracks and holes must be filled. Loose dirt of several inches deep and several feet wide must also be maintained all the time to enable heavy vehicles to pass through [to protect the road surface]. Light pushcarts must travel on the lanes next to the loose soil."6 In the beginning, the agency would levy city residents to fix bad roads, build stone bridges, and plant trees annually. But starting in 1771, the office started to enlist the city's gendarmerie privates to do the road repair. "Eight hundred privates in two shifts of four hundred were designated to fix roads leading into the countryside. Their pay and rations, amounting to 7,500 taels each spring, came from the Department of the Privy Purse."7 During the mid­ nineteenth century, however, the worsening financial situation forced the empire to cut back on its road-fixing projects. The number of full-time workers was cut by half to 400 in 1832, to 320 in 1842 and finally to 160 in 1843.® As a result, street conditions deteriorated considerably. Along with other aspects of urban infrastructure, the decaying streets contributed to the physical breakdown of the city. Although there were no formal zoning laws to regulate the city's real

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

95

estate development, according to Alison Dray-Novey, "the Captain-General's yamen regulated all erecting, razing, moving, or repairing of houses in the banner living areas. The Five District Road Office performed the same function in the Outer City. Policemen in both cities issued notices to residents ordering repair, demolition, or construction of certain structures. They also were empowered to approve (or disapprove) of any resident's own plans for building changes and to inspect the result."9 It was necessary, for example, for urban residents to apply for licenses from the appropriate government agency to start housing construction. "After receiving an application," according to the regulation, "the yamen must investigate and reply between three to six days. If approved, a construction permit would be issued. The builder m ust report the progress monthly to the Ministry of Works, Censorate and military guards. If previously built houses were known to have occupied the public road space, they must make way for the infringed space when demolished; the number of houses must be kept on file; if a house was rebuilt on another location, both original and current sites as well as the number of rooms must be recorded. For those houses bordering on streets, there should be no space left between them."10 Thus something resembling present-day zoning existed in late imperial Beijing. But how effectively was it implemented? Dray-Novey suggests that on the whole, the government was concerned more with the regularity and good appearance of a street rather than with its safety. "Conservatively, they

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

96

favored repairing a house on its old pattern. When residents were erecting, razing, repairing, or moving structures inside a courtyard - that is - structures that did not face the street -- the police imposed no prohibitions."11 Theoretically, infringement of streets, which were government property (guanchan), was prohibited and violators could be penalized. But as enforcement was lax, regulations were often ignored by city residents. As a local saying went, "as the prohibition poster crumbles on the wall, the order dissolves with it." Therefore, it was not unusual for the petty shop owners to encroach upon public space in the streets and get away with it. According to a reminiscence, The typical way was to set up temporary vending stands along both sides of the street, an action permissible by the government because they were only temporary. Gradually, the stands were added sunlight shields, then movable windows on one side, eventually on three sides. Later on the sun shades were replaced by simple thatched roofs, and the stands became small detached houses. As they still resembled temporary buildings, the street patrols passed them on "with one eye open and the other closed." With official tolerance, more people joined in. Eventually temporary shops were regarded as commodities, and shop owners could either sell or rent them. Consequently, many broad streets turned into narrow lanes.12

In the late Qing times, the physical decay, like the political decay of the dynasty, was nowhere more evident than in Beijing, the imperial capital. Even the palaces in the Forbidden City were in shambles. Grass spread through the formerly magnificent court yards. Vermillion walls lost their color, standing guard over an empty and forlorn Forbidden City. During summer days a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

97

steaming filthy odor permeated the air, while at night, flies and mosquitos bombarded the palaces. Because it was forbidden, ordinary people dared not enter. The guardsmen's duty was to patrol, and they could not care less about cleaning and revitalizing the place. To a visitor, the Forbidden City looked like "abandoned temples" seen from afar.13 The city's streets, commented a Western visitor, "were unpaved and generally impassable, either ankle-deep in mud or dust according to the season."14 Another Western visitor observed, The urban squalor outside Qianmen was beyond words to describe. The main gates would not open except during grand ceremonies. But because the gates remained closed, they became a temporary refuge for beggars and the homeless. Close to the gates, human waste scattered everywhere. On the bridge over the moat lay beggars covered with rags. Looking south from the Qianmen, on the east side was a sea of temporary shops with the noise and odor of a fish market. On the west side also were scattered houses with lime-plastered roofs. Known as the Treasure Market (zhubao shi), this place, full of bargains, was the shoppers' paradise. Many vendors of the so-called "Tiger Stands" (laohu tan), specialized in the sale of bogus items, such as imitation ivory chopsticks. Every year die metropolitan examinees gathered in the capital from all provinces to give a special boost to the business here.15 As the twentieth century began, commercial activities were on the rise, while the city's role as the imperial capital was declining. More than ever imperial planning seemed out of place, and the old urban design became increasingly inadequate to meet the need of a diverse and rapidly expanding metropolis. How to reconstruct the capital and how to rationalize the imperial plan to accommodate modern needs remained a critical issue for the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

98

progressive urban reformers.

Preparation for the Movement

The Beijing urban renewal was primarily the work of the city government. Street paving and expansion projects had already started in late Qing under the New Policies reform. The movement gathered momentum in the early Republican period. As early as 1914, the newly created Municipal Council publicized its mission of transforming the old infrastructure through government sponsored projects. In the inaugural issue of Municipal Report, the official publication of the Council, an editorial spelled out the theoretical basis of the public works movement. "The purpose of politics," the article began, "is to promote the prosperity of both a country and members of that country. To make the country strong, we need to construct railroads, build arsenals and create state banks etc.; and to make the people prosperous, we need to develop modern industries, promote commerce and champaign for the people's livelihood. The kind of politics that has a direct bearing on people is what we call municipal administration (shizheng)."16 This declaration provided the philosophical underpinning of the public works campaign. Defining local politics as serving the interest of the people, the statement represented a shift from an ideology emphasizing the supremacy of the imperial power to one that stressed the primacy of civilian life. Indeed, with the disappearance of China's last dynasty and the founding of a Republic,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

99

people began to reconsider the meaning of the city. Preserving the physical legacy of the imperial order became less significant than modeling on the Western experience to improve urban life. The technocrats in the Municipal Council were more eager than their imperial counterparts to satisfy the aspirations of city residents. Whereas a willingness to preserve the Forbidden City as a historical landmark existed, the vestiges of imperial glory were subordinated to the need to better the lives of the people. Structures that were considered of less historical value must give way to projects designed to improve urban life. Thus the imposing walls of the Imperial City that deterred free flow of traffic were demolished for expansion of new streets. The new ideology, in which the people's interests took priority over those of the ru lin g elite, justified all public work projects that required the demolition, reconstruction, and transformation of former palaces and other forbidden zones. Although it was the new technocratic ruling elite who defined the interests of the people, the change had revolutionary implications. When the idea of a city shifted from a symbol of imperial order to one that emphasized secular and civilian use, the needs of denizens of the metropolis became the center of concern. What could be done to improve the living conditions of at least some strata of the people and how could the secular urbanization process be speeded up? To some extent, the public works projects addressed those questions. As we shall see, the new governmentsponsored works were themselves subject to political influence. Many

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

100

benefitted primarily the wealthy and powerful while neglecting the urban underclass. But the movement did use democratic rhetoric and placed a higher value on the quality of civilian life. As the government took an increasingly active role on behalf of the general public, the majority of city residents benefitted from the public works, roads, sewerage, commercial districts, and so on. The movement was significant as a challenge to a century-old imperial order, and as the beginning of a long process of urban modernization. If the city's changing political role promoted its physical transformation, technology was yet another catalyst for change. Western invention and innovation in street paving and urban planning greatly influenced Beijing's new leaders. The Chinese not only witnessed Western technologies at work in the self-governing foreign concessions; they also read translations of Western books and articles about engineering feats elsewhere in the world. Moreover, they learned about modern development in the West through study trips abroad. In fact Beijing could choose among several new technologies for replacing its aged and primitive dirt roads. First, gravel or macadam (a technically superior method of using gravel) had become widely used in the West by the 1880s. The first macadam roads appeared in Beijing in 1904, located primarily in the commercial districts of Dongsi, Xisi, Chang'an Avenue and Qianmen Street. Second, cobblestone, the most popular form of heavy duty paving, provided about a quarter of all street surfaces in the West

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

101

between 1880 and 1924, but it could hardly be found on the streets of Beijing. Cobblestone paving required a supply of small and water-rounded stones set on one end in a bed of sand. Located far from water sources, Beijing had neither sand nor cobblestones. In their place, brick or slab stone pavement constituted the most elaborate form of street paving in imperial China. Finally, the technology of asphalt and cement had the most long lasting impact. Concrete as a building material can be dated back to ancient Rome. In the United States, cement deposits were used during the construction of the Erie Canal in the 1820s. But the new industrial chemistry of the 1880s began an era of cheap, manufactured concrete. European cities also adopted natural asphalt as early as the 1850s; the first successful American asphalt pavements were laid in Newark in 1871 by the Belgian chemist, E.J. de Smedt. Then, with the pioneering chemical research of Allen Dow, Frederick Warren and Clifford Richardson in the 1890s, asphalt was put to industrial use.17 In general, the new roads had a macadam foundation of 14 inches thick, topped with a twoinch layer of asphalt or concrete. This combination of a solid foundation, adequate drainage, and a thick coating of asphalt or concrete made the new street surfaces durable, and smooth. Because asphalt had the decisive advantage of reducing the dust level which persisted on streets paved with dirt and crushed stones, it became the most popular form of pavement in the West. While cement technology did not develop in China during this period,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

102

the first asphalt street appeared in the legation quarter of Beijing in 1915. In 1920 the section on Western Chang'an Avenue that bordered the southern gate of Zhongnanhai, seat of the Republican government, was paved with asphalt. In 1928 the streets in the commercial district of Wangfujing in the Inner City saw the application of asphalt surfaces. Thus, installation of asphalt on Beijing's streets in the government, diplomatic and commercial districts illustrated the pattern of Western technological diffusion to Chinese cities. Members of the foreign community in the diplomatic quarters were the immediate beneficiaries of Western technology. They were the first to walk on the asphalt-paved streets just as they enjoyed electric lighting, potable water, telephone service and other modern amenities. Craving for comforts they enjoyed in their home countries, they served as intermediaries for the modernization of the Chinese urban infrastructure. Unwittingly they facilitated the transfer of Western technology into China. Eager to adopt Western life styles which they envied and admired, rich and powerful Chinese quickly followed suit. They had little reservation about tapping the new resources that the Westerners brought to their city. Western technologies, such as asphalt paving, soon spread into major Chinese urban centers.

Street Improvement

Since the creation of the police in the capital, we have not had a special agency to take charge of municipal administration.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

103

The police have been acting as such an agency. Although some progress has been made, our city can still not compare with cities in Japan and the West. In past years, we have undertaken to build new roads, but the old dirt roads are still in need of repair.18 Municipal administration means many things, such as taxation, education, welfare, policing and public works. Given our limited resources, how do we set our priorities? The most urgent task is to rebuild our streets to facilitate traffic. Our capital cannot compete with other famous world cities where wide cement streets are kept clean and constantly washed by running water. But the least we can do is to make our streets walkable rain or shine, streets that are not muddy, bumpy or foul smelling."19 In an effort to cope with the upsurge in street traffic as a result of population growth and rapid commercialization, the urban reformers made street paving and renovation their top priority. The campaign started in late Qing and leveled off around 1929, when Beijing ceased to be China's capital. During the twenty five years between 1904 to 1929, a total of 96.7 kilometers of macadam road and 8.27 kilometers of asphalt streets were built.20 More than 80 percent of the roads were macadam surfaced, while asphalt was a more expensive choice. Both macadam and asphalt roads were concentrated in the business districts and the wealthy residential neighborhoods of the Outer and Inner Cities, and wherever there was active construction of asphalt roads there was an equal active building of macadam roads. District One and Six of the Inner City had the most paved streets, which is not surprising, given the concentration of commercial activities and rich neighborhoods in these districts.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

104

The Municipal Council, through its collection of taxes, paid for much of the costs of street construction. Along with sewerage repairs, road paving was considered the quintessential public works to be sponsored by the city. Abutting property owners also made substantial contributions to defray street paving costs, sometimes paying as much as two-thirds of the expense for macadam paving. The streetcar company, a semi-private utility firm, also contributed to the paving cost because streetcars would benefit from the work. The Public Works Department purchased a dozen steam rollers from the West and maintained large labor gangs for street construction.21 Graph 2 gives annual street paving figures between 1904 and 1929. Development proceeded unevenly. For example, the macadam road construction peaked six times in the twenty-five-year period, most noticeably between 1905 and 1908 in late Qing, with the completion of 20 kilometers, and 1927 in the Republic, when 14 kilometers were finished. Asphalt road construction started in 1904 and developed gradually, peaking once in 1921 with five kilometers of construction. The figures may appear quite low, compared with Western cities, but for Beijing, which had had no macadam or asphalt roads at all prior to the twentieth century, the street improvement during these years was significant. It literally paved the way for future development. Why did the volume of road construction differ so dramatically from year to year during this period? The political situation in China was a major

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Years

Graph 2. Annual Paving of Streets, 1904-1930

105

-W 6 I

-'£161

-'£061

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

factor. What characterized the early Republican period was political turmoil and military fighting. As Beijing, still the capital of China, became an arena of contention among different factions of Chinese warlordism, domestic instability hampered the progress of many public works. Low points of road construction often coincide with periods of intensified warfare. For example, in 1926, road work almost completely stopped. During this year the Northeast warlord Zhang Zuolin ransacked the city and toppled the existing Peiyang government. Under these circumstances, urban improvement projects were delayed, interrupted, and even aborted. The dramatic ups and downs of street paving demonstrate graphically how military politics and wars affected the modern transformation of Beijing. Although political turmoil brought disasters and delays to the massive urban infrastructrual projects, this does not mean that all warlord activities were destructive. As variegated as warlords' backgrounds themselves, their years in power in Beijing produced different results. Some warlords were known for their savageness toward civilian society, others were remembered for being more gentle and friendly. The troops of warlord Feng Yuxiang even helped build the city. As we shall see, his soldiers supplied the necessary manpower to rebuild the Qianmen Gate to facilitate traffic and to expand several major streets. Known as a Christian army, Feng's soldiers were committed to performing good deeds for the public and helping to improve the living environment for urban inhabitants. In their reminiscences, some old

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

107

Beijing residents often remembered with appreciation Feng's troops as builders of the city. Once the public roads were in place, maintenance became important. Road repairs consumed most of the fund allocated to road improvement. Besides being subject to natural wear and tear, the macadam road, the most common type of road found in Beijing during this time, was less durable than asphalt, and more difficult to clean and maintain. Cost-saving in road construction resulted in costlier repairs. In order to predict cost in road repairs, the city government promulgated a set of road maintenance standards in 1918. The cost was set at one yuan per square meter; higher rates were set for heavy traffic areas, defined according to four criteria. For example, if a project had a construction area of 100 square meters, then the road would cost 100 yuan more to maintain a year, and its cost could increase to as high as 250 yuan if the road was heavily travelled.22 Every year, the Public Works Department would survey road conditions in the city and report what repairs needed to be included in the following year's budget. Twice a year, in the spring and the fall, general street maintenance was undertaken by the public works division, which had such modern equipment as steam pressers and grinders. Between 1914 and 1918, the city government spent over 173,000 yuan repairing 10 kilometers of roads, about sixty percent of the entire allocation for public works.23 The kinds of vehicle travelling on Beijing's streets often increased the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

need for repairs. The traditional narrow wooden wheels stirred dust easily and carved deep trenches in the road surfaces. To protect the new paving, the city government issued an ordinance in 1929 prohibiting vehicles without rubber wheels to travel on Beijing's streets. Moreover, all carts were required to have wheels at least ten centimeters wide. In order to attack the wheel problem at the root, the Municipal Council ordered manufacturers to stop making old-style wheels and to replace them with wide rubber tires. If they continued to make them illegally, they would be fined twenty yuan. Repeat offenders would not only be fined another twenty yuan, but would have them confiscated and the cart maker's operations be suspended.24 The result was quite satisfactory. Within a few months, all of the carts travelling on Beijing's streets were switched to wide and rubber wheels. The old-style wheels, banned within the city walls, found themselves on the country roads outside of Beijing proper. Government intervention reduced damage to the roads, thereby lengthening their life, cutting down repairs and reducing the cost. Private initiatives to build streets were also encouraged, to lighten the burden on the financially starved government. Usually a private sponsor was the commercial proprietor on a busy street, or a charitable foundation. According to an ordinance passed in 1914, the city council encouraged private contributions to public works, by providing additional funding where donations were insufficient, or offering police help in construction, and lending equipment and expertise. The typical subsidy offered to any project would be

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

109

a third or a quarter of the operating cost. Finally, to recognize people dedicated to public service, the president of the Republic would personally award those who contributed over 1,000 yuan to street paving with honorable plaques, and gold or silver medals. For those who contributed less than 1,000 yuan, similar awards would be conferred by the Ministry of the Interior. Between 1914 and 1918, private donors built 1,442 meters of streets, all of macadam, at a cost of 13,701 yuan.25 Compared with the government's massive investment in paving, the private contribution were small, a significant change, because it represented the reversal of a long-term trend in public works. Since the middle of the nineteenth century or even earlier, local gentry and merchants had actively engaged in public administration and public works. By the early twentieth century, as meticulously documented by historians like Mary Rankin and William Rowe, the public sphere was starting to lose ground to an aggressively expanding state. In Beijing, state control over urban life had always been tight. But the municipal government, by taking over the responsibility of public works, became the decisive force in the modernization of the urban environment in the early twentieth century.

Rebuilding the City Gates

Theoretically, as arteries of a city, streets should facilitate traffic flow and promote intra-urban mobility. The construction of new roads had to be undertaken within the framework of overall city planning. We have already

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

110

seen how incompatible the imperial urban plan was to Beijing, an emerging modern metropolis. To change this situation, the government broke through formerly forbidden zones by building public roads through them. It also reconfigured ancient city gates to facilitate traffic. The ultimate goal was to eliminate the prejoratives of an imperial city and meet the needs of a civilian society. One major project was the reconstruction of some of the city's ancient gates. In traditional China, nearly all Chinese cities were walled, with great gates at each of the cardinal points of the compass, from which broad, straight avenues ran to the opposite gate, intersecting in the middle of the city, where there were often a drum tower, a plaza, a cluster of official buildings, or a temple. "The gates may be called the mouths of the city;" wrote Osvald Siren, referring to Beijing, "they are the openings through which this huge walled-in body of half a million or more organisms breathes and speaks. The life of the whole city becomes concentrated at the gates; everything that goes out of or in to it m ust pass these narrow openings...At the gates can be felt the pulse of the whole city, as its life and purpose flows through the narrow openings—a pulsebeat which gives the rhythm of the life and activity of this highly complex organism which is called Peking."26 City gates and walls, as another historian put it simply, were what the old Beijing was all about.27 Since the introduction of modern methods of warfare, the gates had become useless militarily. Solid walls and gates could no long render the city

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Ill

invincible. Gradually, some ancient gates had been converted to customs houses, where transit taxes, one of the surest sources of revenue to the central government, were collected. Chongwen Gate, located at the mid-eastern section of city walls separating the Inner and the Outer Cities, was one such gate. Over the years it had become synonymous with tax collection. More than half a dozen gates other were simply kept as historical landmarks. The most important of these historical monuments was Qianmen (the front gate), or Zhengyangmen as it had formally been called, the great middle gate on the South wall of the Inner City. In traditional times, Qianmen was probably more significant as a symbol of the imperial capital than Tiananmen (the gate of heavenly peace). Situated inside the Imperial City, Tiananmen was not easily visible and accessible. According to Jeffrey Meyer, Tiananmen was used chiefly for ceremonial purposes. "Great imperial proclamations were promulgated at this gate during Ming and Qing times. On such occasions, the emperor stood on the platform built over the gate. His official degree was read in its entirety to the assembled military and civil officials bowed below him, then lowered from the platform in the mouth of a gilded wooden pheasant and received below on a special wooden plate by a member of the Board of Rites. Then it was copied by a board secretary, and promulgated."28 It was not until the early twentieth century, after the Tiananmen square was thrown open to the public and became a site for demonstrators during the famous May Fourth Movement rallied on the square that Tiananmen became

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

112

well known. Qianmen's location as a traffic hub at the crossroads between the Inner and Outer City, however, had made it a historical and architectural landmark for centuries. The view from Qianmen, wrote. Juliet Bredon, "is indeed the key to the whole city, and the visitor who means to study it must begin here. Here he commands the wonderful prospect of the Palaces, the leading feature in every view of Peking, so that the eye is always returning to rest upon them."29 Like all traditional city gates, Qianmen had around it a protective battlement called a wengcheng, where additional walls were built to safeguard the gates. Usually two tower gates were situated inside each wengcheng, the main one at the back and the other in the front. Qianmen was the gate in the rear of the wengcheng. At the foot of the outside walls, a moat was usually dug to prevent enemies from breaking into the city. Sitting on the Northern end of the Qianmen Street, which separated the Outer City into two halves, the Qianmen complex occupied a strategic location in defending traditional Beijing. As China entered the twentieth century, however, modern warfare made the ancient gates irrelevant, because modern cannon with powerful gunpowder could easily destroy the towers and penetrate the walls. The gates and walls did not keep out the British-French forces in 1860 or the Allied Expeditionary Force in 1900. Except for their symbolic value and their importance as a cultural relic, the gates had no practical use. Like other traditional city gates in the city, as a military device, the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

113

Qianmen complex blocked traffic. The walls, moats, bridges, and gate entrances formed a bottleneck, causing serious traffic delays. Before the creation of traffic police, congestions were endemic. Sometimes the traffic-jams persisted into the night, blocking the complex well past the nightly curfewhour when the city gates were closed. The establishment of Western-style traffic police improved the situation, but did not solve it completely, particularly on special occasions. When a general assembly of city residents was held in the Central Park in 1915, it took many of those living in the Outer City more than an hour just to pass through the Qianmen Gate.30 Two newly built railroad stations, one on each side of the barbican, caused even more traffic through the gates, making the situation still worse. During the Boxer Uprising in 1901, the front Qianmen tower was destroyed by fires set by the Western Allied forces. But they were so quickly rebuilt that little consideration was given to how the traffic conditions in the area might be improved. Given the importance of Qianmen as a symbol of Beijing, the Chinese authorities feared that ill-luck might overtake the city if there were any change. During the early Republic, Qianmen continued to be a hindrance to traffic. The area was so congested during rush hours that no vehicle could pass the gates without being seriously delayed. In addition to the problem of traffic, city leaders also wanted to make the ancient landmark look better. Regarded as the premier gate of the capital, Qianmen greeted all visitors disembarking at the Qianmen railroad stations. A

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

114

closer look, however, revealed towers with paint peeling off the walls, and roofs covered with long grass, testifying to years of neglect and poor maintenance. As the gate entrances lacked adequate ventilation, air-borne diseases spread quickly when pedestrians and animal-drawn vehicles thronged to pass through the twenty-foot long passageways. Building roads around them would reduce overcrowding and risks to public health. "Nowadays we have opened to the outside world," editorialized an article in the Municipal Report, "we should do all we can to improve our living environment."31

As will be discussed in Chapter 4, a desire in the early Republican period to turn former imperial perquisites to public use led to an impulse to transform imperial gardens and altars into public parks. In the same way, plans were made to convert the Qianmen Gate, another legacy of the imperial age, into public use. The central gate entrance, which had been previously reserved only for the Emperor and his entourage, was opened to everyone. With the emperor gone, it did not make sense to perpetuate his former privileges, especially when this area was plagued with the most annoying congestion in the city. Thus by 1915 reconstruction of Qianmen became an urgent item on the agenda of the Municipal Council. The project, proposed by Zhu Qiqian, Minister of the Interior, was approved by the national government. As was usual with technologically demanding public works, a Westerner was retained to plan the project. Rothkegel, a German architect, was commissioned in 1915

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

115

to make plans for the rearrangement and modernization of the Qianmen Gate to rationalize traffic in the area. Over the course of six months, a part of the city wall was torn down and four more new gates were opened. The wengcheng was also dismantled to allow direct passage between the Tiananmen

area and the Outer City. Furthermore, according to Siren, The barbican wall was entirely demolished and the closed gateyard became an open space or an oblong with a broad detached (outer) tower at its southern end. Two new openings were made through the main wall on both sides of the old inner gate and new broad streets were arranged here, facilitating access to the [railroad] stations on the east and west sides of the gates. The streets run just outside the old barbican wall and join at the broad bridge which leads over the moat... In conjunction with this, the square to the north, between the main gate tower and Chung Hua men, was paved with flagstones and rearranged. The guard-houses which used to stand at its northern end were moved nearer to the wall and enclosed by chain-rails, while decorative fountains were erected in front of them to the north. The further half of this square, up to Chung Hua men, was planted with rows of trees, in European fashion, and enclosed with chain-rails. The main underlying idea of this new plan was to create better facilities for the traffic between the Inner and Outer City, it was carried out quite effectively by means of two broad side streets running from north to south and passing through the wall by the double new openings on both sides of the gates.32 Rebuilding Qianmen alone cost 182,000 yuan. Added to this was the expenditure for building new roads, houses, and lawns in the gate district. The total expenses amounted to 298,000 yuan.33 In general the project was well received. A newspaper columnist praised the fact that the design "preserved one of the architectural marvels of ancient Beijing while meeting the developmental need of the modern capital."35 It was also significant that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

116

a touch of European landscaping was evident in the reconstruction project. Western-style decorative fountains were erected, and trees were planted to promote the idea of the city as a place of recreation and leisure. Still, some people opposed this project strongly, arguing that transforming Qianmen, a historic monument, would hurt geomancy, or the flow of wind and water (fengshui), a symbol system based on the traditional Yin-yang and five-phase thinking to determine the location and form of a particular building. They argued that the "northwest corner of Beijing's inner city is lightly irregular because of fengshui, and that the gates and towers of the city were no more than 99 feet high because good spirits soar through the air at 100 feet and they must be allowed unhindered passage."35 Thus the city was so carefully planned and built centuries ago that any change would be disastrous. Siren observed that "those who have been fortunate enough to see Qianmen in its original state with the huge barbican, the side gates and the picturesque yard, are unanimous in deploring the wholesale manner in which so much of the old structure was destroyed."36 Much blame heaped upon the German architect who had redesigned Qianmen and the adjoining streets. It was dangerous to ask a foreigner to rebuild Qianmen, the conservatives warned, as he knew nothing about the cultural consequences of such dramatic revamping. The city government, however, stood firmly behind the project, a symbolic clash between Chinese and Western cultures. Rothkegel himself also refuted the charges, claiming his original plan was excellent. He did admit,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

117

however, that some details in the completed work were less than perfect, but he blamed the Chinese builders, the construction team of the Municipal Council, for arbitrarily modifying his plan.37 A group of merchants directly affected by the change also criticized the project as useless and needlessly extravagant. Some even tried to impeach Zhu Qiqian for mismanagement and the squandering of public money. Among the most vociferous opponents were the petty shop owners around the One-Thousand-Step Corridor (qianbulang) area inside the Qianmen gate, where houses and shops must be cleared away to make room for new roads. In an avalanche of petitions, the merchants urged the Ministry of the Interior to protect their business interests. They argued that hundreds of families depended on business in this area for their livings, and many would face starvation and even death if they were wiped out. The meager compensation promised by the government would not save their lives. The central government returned the petitions, insisting that the interests of the majority of city residents overweighed the particular concerns of these shop owners. While giving the project a green light, the state did order the Municipal Council to find ways to accommodate these merchants. As it turned out, the shop owners were offered discounted rents for spaces in a newly-built Western style department store outside Qianmen, by special arrangement with the city government.38 Thus the physical transformation of the city also made tangible impact on the lives of the city people. To some, it meant dislocation of their

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

118

traditional means of living. While carrying out the public works projects with energy and determination, the city government also attempted to accommodate the urban people whose lives were affected. As this case indicates, the traditional vendors at qianbulang were turned to modern salesmen in a department store, joining the growing modern service sector of the city. But as we shall see in subsequent chapters, not everyone affected by the urban structural change was as lucky as these merchants were. The Qianmen project accomplished its original goals. Traffic congestion was alleviated in the busiest district of the city--the middle section of the important North-South axis. The newly paved streets connected the Inner and Outer City and facilitated communication and transportation. And the renovation of the ancient gate of Qianmen, a major face-lift, gave this central district a youthful and modern look. At the same time, other significant projects were also carried out around the city. New roads pierced the ancient city walls, allowing traffic to go through former forbidden zones rather than making detours around them. The Avenue of Eternal Peace (Chang'an jie), for example, formerly a less travelled street, was expanded and widened to split the Imperial City into halves. Serving as the only major street connecting east-west traffic, the Chang'an Avenue gradually became the east-west axis to complement the north-south axis. Both axes intersected in front of Tiananmen, greatly enhancing the status of that in recent times. In the long run, the two axes also provided a cross-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

119

shaped framework from which other networks of streets and roadways developed during the second half of the twentieth century. In addition to changing the city physically, the street paving and the reconstruction of city gates and walls had deeper social implications. The transformation of former forbidden zones into public thoroughfares redefined the imperial concept of space based on a strict social hierarchy. Opening these exclusive and forbidden zones to public access meant that such spaces were no longer monopolized by the privileged few. These projects changed the city landscape, adding urban amenities to a formerly exclusive and impersonal imperial capital. Concerns over public sanitation gave rise to the cleaning and sprinkling of the paved roads by the city police. In short, paved roads and the expansion of services made easier the everyday life of Beijing's inhabitants and visitors. But the most important effect of the physical transformation was the emergence of what might be called a "civilian city," one that stressed, not imperial power and privileges, but rather the needs and aspirations of city people. Needless to say, this was only the beginning of a long process, which is not yet complete. But it seems clear that a metropolis based on the new social order was already starting to take shape. The revamping of imperial urban planning and the concentration on civilian concerns like traffic, physical mobility, and commercial activities were indications of the profound social change in the Chinese capital during the crucial transitional period of the early twentieth century.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

120

Zoning and Urban Planning

One important role of the modem city government in Beijing was to rationalize haphazard urban spatial development by regulation and by exemplary construction. In this section, I will discuss the supervisory function of the Municipal Council in zoning and urban planning and its policies on model development. Because of Beijing's large size and complexity and because of municipal financial constraints, it was impossible for the Municipal Council to build all the urban housing and public works the city required. Instead, the government concentrated on small-scale but meaningful projects that were intended to provide examples for the private sector to follow. The most successful of these endeavor was the planning of Xiangchang District, located north of the Temple of Agriculture in the Outer City of Beijing. The Xiangchang area was a large piece of thinly populated government land. Just a little further north lay Tianqiao (bridge of heaven), a major urban business district, where the narrow streets were filled with shopping crowds and residences. In 1914, the Municipal Council decided to divert a portion of the population and traffic away from Tianqiao to Xiangchang to ease the congestion problem there. Plans for remodeling and regulations to govern the construction of buildings in this area were also laid out. It was the intention of the city government to make Xiangchang a model district of urban planning in Beijing. To promote fair competition and exercise its governing role in the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

121

supervision of economic activities, the Council promulgated two important regulations: the Land Development Act and the Lease Rights Act. The law for land development permitted private citizens to lease government land for a term of thirty years. During this period, the lessee might construct residential and commercial buildings, build roads, parks, hospitals, and other public utilities. The whole process of land leasing was subject to public scrutiny, and bidding was open to Chinese nationals only. Foreign investors were excluded primarily because of Chinese concern that foreign interests would encroach on the domestic real estate market. The role of the Council was to coordinate the process by issuing certificates of rent, approving the construction plans of real estate developers and promoting timely construction by penalizing delays.39 For the first time in China's history, the concept of eminent domain was formally introduced. The plan for the Xiangchang district extended to areas not originally belonging to the government. Moreover, in order to attract more investment, public utility amenities such as electricity, water and sewage systems were to be built on private land so that a favorable business environment could be created. At the request of the Municipal Council, the Beiyang government passed a land condemnation law in 1915. The order, revised in November 1916, gave the municipal government the power of eminent domain. Based on this directive, the Council issued its own temporary regulations in January 1918. In order to improve communications develop markets, and carry out public works the Council could condemn

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

122

private land by resolution without court proceedings.40 Land-owners were reimbursed according to the amount of land taken and the property condemned, but the payment was determined according to a fixed scale rather than according to the appraised value of the property. Three types of property could be condemned. The first, official and semi-official land and property (such as ancient buildings) received no payment. The second and third, private corporate property (including temples and churches) and private individual property would receive payment.41 The payment itself was also divided into three categories: the value of the landed property, the owner's moving cost, and compensation in cases where only part of the property was to be condemned. First-class houses, those made of good materials and with rooms larger than 14'x 11', were paid for at the rate of 100 yuan per room when bought outright, and 150 yuan a room if the owner was required to remove them from the land. Second-class houses, those built of good materials, with rooms smaller than 14'xll' but larger than 12'xlO', and those of first-class dimensions made of inferior materials, were bought for 70 yuan a room and moved for another 30 yuan. Third-class houses, those of first and second class dimensions but built of inferior material, and those of first-class construction with rooms less than 12'x8', were bought for 50 yuan a room and moved for another 20 yuan a room. Two-story houses were considered to contain one-and-a-half times the number of room on the first floor. When only part of a piece of property was

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

123

taken, the amount to be paid was determined by the Municipal Council but it never exceeded the buying or moving fee for the class of building involved.42 Between 1914 and 1918, according to the statistics compiled by the Municipal Council, more than 10,000 houses were condemned under these rules. The majority of landed property claimed was situated in three areas: the Xiangchang District, the area along North and South New China Street (xinhnajie) and Hufan Boulevard (hufanglu), and the East and West China Gates (zhonghuameri). Each of these projects was undertaken in an effort to ease

traffic and disperse population. Over these four years the council spent a total of 28,000 yuan in such condemnation proceedings.43 Initially the government policy was received with hostility and misunderstanding from the city residents. Taking a cautious approach, the Municipal Council handled landrelated disputes carefully, investigating each case thoroughly to ensure fair appraisals. To help those dislocated, the government also arranged housing swaps and provided temporary housing for those in need. Gradually the eminent domain policy was accepted and those affected became more cooperative with the government. Zoning legislation constituted an integral part of the Municipal Council's work. New laws on housing construction and real estate sale and transfer were enacted as necessary steps in rational urban planning. To keep streets orderly and clean, private construction was required to follow certain rules. "Housing construction shall not take up public spaces, hamper public

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

utilities, or obstruct traffic."44 Space must also be preserved for possible future public works, such as bus-routes. Before a new building project began, the developer had to submit detailed plans to the Council, which was the ultimate authority on construction. Any illegal buildings would be torn down without compensation. In matters of private interest versus public good, the message was loud and clear: the private must conform to the welfare and interests of the public. In a Confucian society where private interest was always seen as secondary to the public good, this doctrine was met with considerably less resistance than was experienced in some Western societies. For years the real estate market in Beijing had been disorderly. New houses were frequently not documented in government records, while demolished ones were not deleted from the official files. Profiteering and illegal transfer or sales were rampant; lawsuits involving real estate were also on the rise. Few buyers or sellers knew their legal rights and responsibilities. In 1914, the Municipal Council ordered that before any sale or transfer was made, both the buying and selling parties must submit an application form to the Police Board, which would pass it on to the Council for approval. If no violation was found, then a certificate would be issued to certify the amount of the sale or transfer tax to be paid. Once the deal was completed and the proper taxes paid, the sale or transfer had to be registered with the Municipal Council; any changes had to be reported promptly.45 To be sure, registration of real estate was law in the imperial times, but people often evaded it. After

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

125

the new zoning rules went into effect, the city government took an increasingly aggressive role in enforcing these regulations. As a result, the haphazard urban development that had characterized Beijing since the late imperial period was beginning to be rationalized in the early twentieth century.

The Social Meaning of Spatial Growth

Streets, walls and gates, the basic elements of Beijing's urban infrastructure, probably affected more people than other aspects of the city's physical environment. In imperial times, however, urban planning and street paving projects were designed to preserve imperial power rather than to

fulfill

the needs of the common people. The planning and construction of the Forbidden City in the center of Beijing, while symbolizing the centrality and supreme command of the ruling elite, made intra-city traffic and communications very difficult. The different types of street surfaces, stone and brick for the imperial passageways and dirt for all others, also strengthened the social hierarchy of the capital. Although special government agencies regulated and repaired the streets and maintained the walls and gates of the city, they were constrained by the same factors that caused the decline of other aspect of the infrastructure: financial weakness, political corruption, lax enforcement of regulations, and the growing pressures of expanding population and booming commerce. The change during the early twentieth century was, on one level,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

126

ideological. The decline and collapse of the ancient regime not only sounded the death knell for the imperial order, but legitimatized the demand of the people to transform the built environment to improve their own lives. The shift of emphasis from imperial supremacy to civilian need changed people's view of the city. The old order, no longer sacred and untouchable, should make way for projects directly benefitting of lives of common people. This change of perception was introduced by reformers, primarily urban intellectuals and government officials, who worked hard to publicize the successful Western urban experience and highlight China's backwardness. What was there to cherish in the old system, they argued in the end, if the city people must sacrifice their own interests for the sake of a privileged few at the top of the society? In this sense the modern urban planning and public works projects were as much about a social, intellectual and ideological change as they were about a physical transformation. But the change in the physical urban environment was also critical. During the late Qing New Policies Reform, projects had already begun to pave old streets and build new ones, often in the commercial districts of the city with heavy traffic and high population density. Streets were paved with asphalt for the first time, utilizing Western technology. The public works movement gathered even more momentum during the early Republic under the new Municipal Council. By 1929, all major streets in the city had been transformed into macadam and asphalt roads, and many had been widened

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

127

and expanded. New streets were also built on the former site of city walls, over open sewer canals or through the dty gates. Miles of newly paved roads altered the urban landscape considerably. Western influence was apparent in the development of new housing districts and new Western-style buildings. The mere presence of a diplomatic quarter in Beijing since the 1860s, populated by foreigners, offered a window on a world that the Chinese had never seen. Duncan observed, In contrast to the relatively small amount of asphalt paving that had been done in the Chinese municipality, in proportion to the total street area, the situation in the Diplomatic Quarter is excellent, for the streets of the Quarter, totalling about nine miles in length, are nearly all well paved. The Quarter can also claim almost the only paved sidewalks in Peiping. Architecturally the Diplomatic Quarter is a place of strange contrasts, but at least it can be said that its streets are in far better condition in practically any kind of weather than is the case in other parts of the city.46 This model development inspired the Chinese municipal planners as Beijing entered the Republican age. They sponsored the development of a number of residential and commercial zones in the outlying areas of the city, the Xiangchang District being the most famous, using Western methods of urban planning. They invited Western architects to design Western style buildings throughout the city, among which the renowned Beijing Hotel, the Qianmen Railroad Station, and the City Hall, all of which still exist today. They also purchased Western public works machines, such as steam pressers and grinders and used them to pave streets and modify city gates and walls. The rapid urban development and technological breakthroughs of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

128

Western cities during the late nineteenth century influenced the Chinese planners as well. The Chinese studied with great interest how Westerners managed their cities and how they adapted their environments to boost their living standard. To progressive reformers, Western science and technology were the secret to the success of Western cities, and therefore were the key to ridding China of its backwardness. Armed with Western technologies, they aggressively reshaped the old imperial city by revamping city gates, piercing city walls to build streets, and expanding public space into formerly forbidden zones. The transformation, however, was incomplete. First of all, spatial development followed a socially segregated pattern. The best modern streets clustered around the wealthy residential neighborhoods, mainly in the Inner City (Graph 3). Commercial districts benefitted the next most from the street improvement projects, receiving preferential treatment in both funding and scheduling priority. The areas inhabited by the working class and the urban underclasses in the Outer City were neglected, even though the areas they lived in were often more densely populated and had worse traffic conditions. Favoring one segment of the population over another revealed the politically progressive yet socially conservative nature of these public works. Despite their democratic rhetoric, the city council, comprised of members of the urban elite, seemed little concerned with the plight of people at the bottom of the society.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Graph 3. Types of Street Paving by Districts

129

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Furthermore, street paving was closely connected with the vehicles that travelled and the pedestrians that walked on them. The automobile was still a rarity in early twentieth century Beijing, so its presence did not compel the conversion from macadam roads to the asphalt surfaces that automobile travel required. In the long run, macadam roads declined, but during the first half of the twentieth century, it remained the dominant form of road pavement in Beijing. Since the types of vehicles changed little, there was little pressure to change the type of road. It was not until the 1950s that macadam was replaced by asphalt and cement roads, the two predominant types predominantly in use today. Finally, the traditional function of streets as centers of social interaction remained. The paving of major streets and urban planning improved traffic conditions, beautified the urban landscape, and enhanced public health, but hundreds of alleyways and narrow lanes continued to be used for community socializing and neighborhood contacts. Free of crimes and the other problems of modern streets, the Chinese street was still a safe haven and intimate gathering place for the majority of urban residents, especially during the summer months when residents congregated on the streets to escape the heat of their dingy and suffocating houses. New urban planning did not dispel the old neighborly atmosphere. Therefore, the streets were not merely arteries of travel, but open social spaces catering to specific social classes, something many modern streets have lost.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

131

NOTES

lShuntian fu zhi (A gazetteer of the Shuntian prefecture), Guangxu Reign edition, juan 13 and 14,1885. 2Tancong: sanshi nian qian zhi Beijing (Miscellaneous notes: Beijing thirty years ago), Published in the Republic period, p.24.

3Fang Shiduo, Beiping conghua (Miscellaneous talks on Beijing), (Taiwan: Tianyi Press, 1976), p.107. 4Ibid., p.108. Dray-Novey also points out that "Encroachment was typically a problem of the commercial Outer City. In some cases, an accumulation of refuse or debris would first build up the level of the street near the shop. An area thus having been set off from the rest of the street, the proprietor of the shop would then erect a structure -- often a booth -- on top of the elevated piece of land. By gradual degree, the space available for street traffic or for the bank of the canal would be significantly reduced." Dray-Novey, "Policing Imperial Peking," p.261. 5 Dray-Novey, "Policing Imperial Peking", p.243. 6Qing hui dim , Quangxu reign (1899), section on local administration.

7Dray-Novey, "Policing Imperial Peking," p.246. 8Ibid., p.246. 9Dray-Novey, "Policing Imperial Peking," p.260. 10Ibid., p.243. "Ibid., p.261. n Cheng bao (The morning newspaper), October 12, 1940, p.5. n Tancong: sanshi nian qian zhi Beijing, p.23.

14Bredon, Peking, p.18. 15Ibid., p.26. uShizheng tonggao (Municipal Reports), hereafter SZTG, No.l (November 20, 1914), pp.1-2. This publication of the Municipal Council was also known in two other names, Shizheng yuekan, Shizheng xunkan. SZTG refers to all three for

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the sake of clarity. 17SZTG, p.3. 18SZTG, p.4. 19SZTG, No.3, (December 10,1914), p.16.

20 Beiping tebie shi gongwu ju gongwu tekan (Special issue of public works undertaken by the public works bureau of the special city of Beijing), 1929, p. 59. “ Duncan, Peiping Municipality and the Diplomatic Quarter, p.67. “ W u Tingbian et al, Beijing shi zhigao (Manuscript gazetteer of Beijing), Beijing: Yanshan Press, reprints in 1990. p. 146. “ Ibid., pp.150-164. 2iGongwu tekan, p.176. 2sJSH, pp.375-376.

26Osvald Siren, The Walls and Gates o f Peking (London: Lane, 1924), p.130. 27 Myer, The Dragons of Tiananmen, introduction. 28Myer, Dragons of Tiananmen, pp.46-47. “ Bredon, Peking, p.21. 30SZTG, No. 19 (May 1915), p.93.

31SZTG, p.95. 32Siren, The Walls and Gates of Peking, p.171-172. “/SH, p.95. ^Chow, "Public Works in the City of Peking," p.103. 35For a detailed discussion of the symbolic meaning of Beijing from afengshui perspective, see Jeffrey F. Meyer, The Dragons of Tiananmen: Beijing as a Sacred City, pp.40-45. 36Siren, The Walls and Gates of Peking, p.170.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

37Ibid., p.170. 38Ibid., p.103. 39JSH, p.235-237. 4QJSH, pp.268-270.

41Gamble, Peking: A Social Survey, p.235. “ Ibid., p.75. 43JSH, p.367. 44/SH, p.262. 45JSH, p.268.

46 Duncan, Peiping Municipality and the Diplomatic Quarter, p.118.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

134

Chapter Three Sewerage

Introduction

From the time cities existed, urbanites had to confront the vexing and paradoxical problems of urban ecology. Cities were centers of civilization, yet the concentrated population also brought the byproducts of urban life, solid and liquid waste, to the built environment. The industrial revolution exacerbated the problem, as cities experienced increasing population density and industrial waste. Urban refuse became not only a nuisance, but a public health problem as well. Urban refuse, in the form of solid waste, sewage, and hum an waste, was been handled in ancient times by a sewer system and scavenger service. The sewers, covered or uncovered, a network of conduits and channels for carrying off drainage water and excrement, were indispensable to city life. Such a system developed in Chinese cities as part of the city construction process.1 In Beijing, an extensive water-borne sewer system was constructed in the thirteenth century and had become well established by the fifteenth century. Considering a dependable drainage network critical for public health and the functioning of the city, the government took charge of it just as it took care of street cleaning and maintenance. Removal of ground refuse, including human waste, was handled by a private scavenger network contracted by the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

135

government. In this chapter I will first describe the origins, development and characteristics of Beijing's sewerage. Then I will discuss both government and private efforts to maintain the system. I will focus on the governmental and secular forces behind the sewerage renewal projects in the early twentieth century; the issues of public health, civic identity and urban beautification; the sewerage renewal movement; and the effects of the sewer system on the built environment and urban life.

Origins and Development

Beijing's sewer system was as old as the city itself. In the late thirteenth century, when Kublai Khan, grandson of Genghis, came down from the Mongolian steppes to build Khanbaliq (khan's town), or Dadu (great capital), on the present site of Beijing, he built a comprehensive water-borne sewer system of stone as part of the city. The waterways which traversed Beijing and the moat which surrounded it helped cleanse the city. Six centuries later, this ancient system no longer existed, but archaeologists have discovered its remains underneath major boulevards and streets on the old site of Yuan Dadu.2 The reconstruction of the city in the Ming dynasty under its third emperor Yongle in the fifteenth century greatly expanded the sewerage system, making it arguably the most sophisticated water carriage system in the world.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

136

Perhaps less visible and renowned than some other architectural wonders of Ming Beijing, such as the Great Wall, the Forbidden City, and the Temple of Heaven, the sewer system, running through the Forbidden City, the Inner City and the Outer City, provided the urban inhabitants with drainage and waste­ water disposal, thus making the urban environment livable. Moreover, this intricate underground network laid a foundation upon which successive reigns from the Qing dynasty to the People's Republic could build. Many existing sewer mains in Beijing today can still be traced back to the fifteenth century, when the imperial capital was constructed.3 Like the organization of streets, the distribution of sewer mains in Beijing reflected the ideology of imperial urban planning: the preservation and upholding of monarchical power and the facilitation of imperial rule. The network of underground sewers that provided the imperial household with flood drainage and waste disposal in the Forbidden City was much more elaborate than other networks in the city. It thus helped to highlight imperial authority in Beijing, a city specially designed as the seat of the monarchy. An independent sewer system, consisting of an intricate and flood-proof network of mains, flew into an open and sinuous canal called the Golden Water River (jinshuihe). Meandering inside the Forbidden City, the Golden Water River connected sewage disposal spots, carried the waste out of the imperial compounds and disposed it into the moats surrounding the city. Aesthetically, the river added life and beauty to an otherwise waterless palace building

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

137

Map 3. Sewerage System

DESHENG GATE

ANDING GATE

■I DRUM

I

Jl il!

M ZH I

GATE

ip

DONGZHI

GATE

IT

j iDONGSI I

COAL HILL

ARCH

I

FUCHENG GATE

CHAOYANG QATE FORBIDDEN -! CITY S \Z2& V

ARCH_ XIBIAN GATE.

‘AIPING

^ (ffiS s a a a

!i xJANWU

gftTE

GUANCAN GATE

ll l l f

a

f u f j ’W IG A T E l|X'MHUA

BAOZI

| I LEGA1

■•«*"=

CANAL IQUARTER CHONGWENGATE&

DONGBlAN GATE

GUANGQU GATE

T —I

TEMPLE OF

TEMPLE OF HEAVEN

O•

RICULTURE

YONGDING GATE

ZUO’AN GATE

CANAL MAIN SEWERAOE MINOR SEWER RAILROAD BRIDGE

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

compound. More importantly, however, it provided an abundant water source to fight fires and a conduit to dispose of flood water. According to Hou Renzhi, the flood disposal function of the sewerage in the Forbidden City was significant, 'because the whole Forbidden City was not only densely populated, but every large and small courtyard was built with brick floors. Without an adequate sewerage, floods would have inundated the Forbidden City many times."4 Indeed, during its five hundred year history, there are no reports of flooding in the Forbidden City despite repeated occurrences of fires. In short, the flood-free Forbidden City was the result of a complex underground sewer system designed and constructed to ensure a sound and safe physical environment for the imperial rulers of China. The Inner City, including the Imperial City, was larger and more populous than the Forbidden City. Inhabited mostly by imperial officials in the Western section and wealthy merchants in the Eastern section, as well as by Manchu Bannermen all over, the Inner City also had an extensive sewer system. Underground sewer mains were built to run parallel with major streets and lanes. By the force of gravity, smaller local mains flowed into larger regional branches, which then ran into two large open sewerage rivers, the Big Open Canal (darning hao) on the west side and the Imperial River (yuhe) on the east side. The two sewer canals flowed into the city moats, which served not only the function of military defense, but also carried sewage into rivers and then into the ocean. City planners hoped that the self-cleansing

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

139

power of the water and the sun would rid the water of its harmful content when it reached the ocean. Additional open sewers were built in the Qing times, forming two sewer reservoirs, Taiping Lake and Baozi River, on the southwest and southeast corners of the Inner City respectively. In 1787, the Inner City boasted a total of 3,533 zhang (6.7 miles) of large sewer mains and over 97,100 zhang (183 miles) of small sewer mains.5 The Outer City, mostly populated by working class residents, such as petty shop owners and laborers, was the least developed region in the city. The neglect of this district by urban planners during the fifteenth century again reflected the imperial hierarchy with the predominance of the Inner City being achieved at the expense of the Outer City. In the years that followed, priority for sewer repairs was also given to the location where the rich and the powerful concentrated. In the Qing dynasty, the areas immediately south of the moat separating the Inner and Outer City experienced a tremendous boom in commercial activities. This was not only because of the Manchu policy of residential segregation, which drove ethnic Han Chinese from the Inner City to the Outer City, but also because of massive waves of migration from neighboring provinces. By mid-Qing, the Qianmen region had become the most densely populated in Beijing, with myriaas of shops crowding the streets and residential complexes operating in full capacity. There was a fundamental difference between the Inner City and the Outer City, known in the Qing dynasty as Tartar City and the Chinese City respectively. As subjects, the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

140

Chinese were not only ethnically segregated, but were treated as inferiors and were discriminated against by the Manchus in the provision of urban amenities. Sewerage construction did not keep up with the rapid population growth, and subsequent development in the area lacked overall planning and coordination as well as government funding. The farther south one went, however, the less densely the Outer City was populated. Places near the Temple of Heaven and the southern gates, for example, were so sparsely populated that they resembled suburbs. Under these circumstances, the demand for expanded sewerage was not as great as elsewhere in the city. Thus, when construction of the Outer City was completed during Ming Jiajing reign in 1553, only one open sewer, later known as the Dragon Beard Canal (longxiugou.) was built to accommodate the need for drainage in the Outer City. It ran diagonally from northwest to southeast across much of the Outer City into the southern moat. Few people anticipated that years later parts of the Outer City would experience a tremendous growth in population and commerce. The Ming-vintage sewer system utilized bricks and stone as its basic building material. The depth of the underground sewer pipes was determined by the flow of sewerage and the level of the ground. In general they were between one to four feet down, utilizing the force of gravity. But as there were cracks between the stones, water could easily seep into the surrounding earth, saturating it with waste materials.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

141

A typical traditional Chinese sewer main was only three to four feet high and wide, much smaller than the contemporary sewer mains of the West. The renowned Paris system, for example, was large enough for sewermen to enter and clean. The Chinese main, designed primarily for the drainage of storm water, could not accommodate large quantities of sewage. This posed a tremendous problem for the future when the urban population grew rapidly, bringing the volume of the sewage to unprecedented levels. Also, the narrow sewers were difficult to clean, as adult cleaners could hardly walk in them. To maintain them, the Chinese authorities found it necessary to employ child laborers.6 Thus the city was covered by a comprehensive network of these traditional sewage mains. According to one estimate, there were approximately 145 miles of sewers in the city, excluding several open sewer channels.7 Gutters were installed throughout the city, mostly on the streets and inside residential courtyards. A number of public gutters could be found on major boulevards, at least two in each lane or alleyway, usually one at each end. Unlike the contemporary gutters made of cement and iron, the traditional Chinese ones were stone, with the top left open to receive rain water. Sidney Gamble provided this description of the old Ming system, still in use during the early twentieth century: When a sewer is nearby, most of houses are connected with it, so that their courtyards may drain rapidly after a rain. Openings are provided along the streets for drainage and to care for the waste water of the houses that are not connected with the sewers. This

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

142

waste is collected in large wooden buckets and then carried out and emptied into the sewer. The police insist that it m ust go into the sewer and not onto the street.8 The fact that many city residents threw waste water onto the streets, rather than dumping it into the sewer, made streets dirty and hard to travel. Even worse, some urbanites abused the sewerage by dum ping in solid waste, clogging the system and making the sewers difficult to clean. Violation of public sanitation regulations was so widespread that city officials tended to ignore them for lack of ability to control them. In short, heavy use, the friable nature of soil and the introduction of solid refuse into the sewers all contributed to the general breakdown of the system. To deal with the problem of silting, the government had to clean and dredge the sewer mains every spring. This cleaning practice existed long before the Ming-vintage sewerage of Beijing, actually beginning in the Song capital of Bianliang in the Northwest of China in the 1000s.9 But in Beijing, through the ages it had evolved into a local custom that affected all urban dwellers. Spring was a good time for sewer repairs for two reasons. First, after a long winter season the earth began to unfreeze, making digging and dredging easier. Secondly, the spring season was the beginning of outdoor activities and laborers for hire could more easily be found. Given the nature of the job, ordinary urban dwellers were reluctant to work as sewermen, so the work was usually performed by seasonal farmhands coming to the city in search of employment. Sidney Gamble also reported seeing inmates of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

143

poor houses cleaning out refuse during the early Republican period.10 Considered a coolie's job, sewer cleaning was labor intensive, low-paying, unpleasant, and dangerous. The poisonous gas produced by the rotten refuse could be deadly. Many eyewitness accounts described graphically how sewermen fainted and died of harmful miasmas at work because of poor ventilation. It took about two months, beginning in early February and ending in late March, to complete the annual cleaning of the city's sewer mains. "Manhole-like apertures located at intervals along the massive stone flags that covered the drains were opened so that the accumulated debris could be removed."11 Sewer upkeep had become so customary that by the late imperial times both foreign visitors and local folklore had vivid descriptions of the practice. Most sewer repairs coincided with the metropolitan examinations held annually in Beijing, when degree candidates from all over the country gathered in the capital to take the civil service exams. One popular saying described the event: "When the stinking sewer opens, the examinees appear; and when the sewer closes, the zhuangyuan degree holders are determined." It was a most gruelling experience for these out-of-town students, because the streets in the city during these two months were in their worst possible condition. Digging up the silt from the sewers produced large quantities of mud, which turned to dust as the newly loosened dirt met the notorious dry wind of Beijing's spring. The most intolerable part, however, was the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

144

repulsive smell that the sewer mains unleashed as they were opened. As a preventive measure, pedestrians usually carried herbs with them to drive away the odor. A Western visitor noted in the spring of 1821, All the filth which has been collected during the year is piled up in the streets, and fills the air with noxious exhalations. The inhabitants wear over their garments, during this time, perfumed rosaries which hang down to the breast, and are chiefly made of musk, of which the Chinese are very fond.12 Ironically, the sewer repairs that were designed to enhance public health in the long run had become a major source of environmental pollution. The annual event had also become deeply ingrained as part of the urban life, affecting not only the urban inhabitant, but also visitors to the city. All these ancient sewer lines were built to facilitate the removal of storm water and waste water only. They were not meant to dispose of night soil. Human waste was collected in cesspools and privy vaults. These were holes in the ground, often lined with bricks or stone, located close to residences. The contents were periodically removed by scavengers or farmers who purchased the excremental matter under contract with the city and transported it to the suburbs for use as fertilizer. It was a booming business in late imperial Beijing, because chemicals had not yet been introduced, and suburban farms and vegetable gardens depended on the night soil for fertilizer. In fact, there were so many scavengers in the city that a guild with thousands of members was created to represent their interests, one of many occupational associations in the city.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

145

A common scene in Chinese traditional urban life, the scavengers would rise at dawn to gather fecal waste on every street and lane of Beijing. "The movement of stinking fecal baskets and wheelbarrows on the streets every morning," lamented a critic, "was indeed a major disaster for a civilized city like ours."13 This method of human waste removal were locally based and privately maintained. Removal was erratic, inefficient, and labor intensive. Different from the separate and systematic drainage and waste water disposal, the removal of feces never became a part of the centralized water carriage system. Even today, in the old districts of the city, though human waste is now collected with motorized pumps instead of hand baskets, the system is still locally based, separate from the extensive sewerage network.14 Like sewage and human waste removal, solid waste disposal was also an important aspect of urban services. The solid refuse of Beijing was transported via ground vehicles from very ancient times. In late imperial China, garbage was collected by the districts and sent to central landfills in the surrounding suburbs. It was a private venture supervised by the government. Starting in the 1930s, collectors were hired by the city government to collect garbage from the streets using pushcarts. The carts transported the garbage to designated sites, where trucks were used to transport it to landfills outside the city walls. From the 1920s streetcars were also contracted to transport part of the garbage. Some 2,100 garbage collectors were hired by the city government to service a total of 210,000 households, one for every 100 households.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

146

Twenty- four trucks were used to disperse the garbage daily.15

Table 12. Composition of Garbage in Beijing in 1930 (in percentage) Residence Coal ashes Fine ashes Kitchen Disposal Paper, leaves Tiles, Iron scraps TOTAL

28.9 50.6 8.9 9.5 2.1 100

Factory 25.6 52.6 8.5 8.9 4.4 100

School

Average

Total

25.6 52.7 8.9 8.9 3.9 100

28.1 55.5 3.9 10.3 2.2 100

27.0 52.9 7.6 9.4 3.1 100

Source: Beijing shi dushi jihua sheji ziliao, p.31.

In pre-industrial Beijing, garbage was not a serious environmental problem. Table 12 shows the composition of solid refuse in the city in 1930. Because coal was Beijing's principal cocking and heating fuel, ashes constituted almost 80 percent of the garbage. They piled up in the garbage dumps, where poor residents often collected them again to burn the unfinished portion. The coal balls which urban residents used contained at least 30 percent clay. Although the clay helped the coal balls stick together, it did not burn, and so contributed a huge amount of fine powder to the garbage dump. A environmental problem became inevitable, as coal ashes heaped inside the city while numerous earth holes were dug outside the city to produce coal balls. A recycling program was then introduced in which ashes were used to fill up cracks in the street surfaces to ensure their smoothness, or even to build ashroads, similar to macadam roads. Beijing's garbage contained no toxic waste.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

147

Incineration, a method used to get rid of the city's autumn leaves, was never used to dispose of garbage because the content of Beijing's refuse precluded that as an option.16 Since both the removal of human waste and solid garbage remained basically unchanged during the early twentieth century, I will devote the rest of the chapter to discussing Beijing's sewerage system.

The Official Role in Sewer Control

In late imperial Beijing, the sewer mains were considered government property. Designated as official sewers (guan gou), the system was under state protection and supervision. Special officials were designated to maintain and patrol the system. Over time several important institutional changes occurred, each reinforcing the government's control over the sewer system. In 1474, the Ming court ordered local police forces, the Gendarmerie (military police) Division and the Five Battalions (wucheng bingma) to take charge of protecting and maintaining the city's sewer system. Then, [t]he police set up offices at various sluice gates, equipped with dredging facilities. After each storm, two watchers were dispatched to dredge the ditches at each gate. Local patrols were also responsible to hire laborers to clean small sewer lines in their precincts every February.17 During late Ming, a senior official from the Board of Works (gongbu) was appointed to supervise the sewers of the city. The local police forces were required to attend to sewer cleaning and fire-fighting, in addition to their responsibilities for patrolling the city, and arresting thieves and arsonists.18

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

148

The sewer system inside the Forbidden City, however, was taken care of by the Imperial Household Administration. In the Qing dynasty, the responsibility for sewer control was apportioned in even greater detail. In 1644 the Bureau of Street Affairs was set up under the Ministry of Works to manage and maintain the sewer mains in both the Inner and the Outer Cities. Starting from 1752, Qianlong Emperor appointed four sewer commissioners annually, with one each from the Ministry of Public Works, the gendarmerie, the Managing Board of the Summer Palace and the Managing Board of the Forbidden City. Together these four officials were to supervise sewer projects in Beijing. The commissioners would regularly assess the costs of sewer repairs and use operating funds from the Board of Works to pay for the expenses. Should the cost exceeded 200 taels of silver, they could apply for special funding.19 In late Qing, the commissioners could apply directly to the Board of Revenue (hubu) for funding, should the sewer repair cost exceed 1,000 taels.20 The largest sewer expansion and overhaul took place during the high Qing period. By the middle of the eighteenth century, Beijing's Ming-vintage sewerage was three hundred years old and its deteriorating condition cried out for imperial attention. As made clear by a memorial to Kangxi emperor in 1742, When heavy rainfalls occur in Beijing, the streets are flooded because they are slow to rid themselves of the surface water. The real problem, however, is clogging of the sewerage. The city moats that transported the flood water beyond city limits are also

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

149

silted in the same way as the street sewer mains. All these problems are due to years of neglect and lack of repairs.21 This memorial caught the attention of the emperor, who ordered an investigation of the situation. A survey conducted by the Board of Works produced a comprehensive sewer system map of the entire Inner City, the first one since the fifteenth century. The map detailed every sewer line, open and covered, large and small, in the city. Then a massive campaign for sewage repairs was launched, financed by the Qing court. Existing sewer mains were cleaned, silt and other solid refuse blocking the system were removed, tile ditches were replaced with more solid brick ones, and the existing mains were consolidated while new ones added. Most of the construction took place in the Inner City, including the Imperial City, where the city's elite were concentrated. It was estimated that a total of 30,533 zhang (57 miles) of large sewer mains and 98,100 zhang (190 miles) of small sewer mains were either repaired or built, totalling 128,633 zhang (247 miles).22 Compared with the early figures, this represented a significant expansion of the system. In the Chinese-populated Outer City, which the government saw as less important than the Inner City, local residents were expected to be self-reliant. Property owners had always been expected to take care of their own section of the sewers, either by cleaning it themselves or by hiring laborers to do it. While local residents dared not challenge this unfair treatment openly, they usually performed the duty without enthusiasm and tried to save money whenever possible. Some even falsified repair reports.23 During the major

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

150

sewer overhaul in the mid-eighteenth century, repair costs were assessed on the abutting shops and residences. The government did not finance any repair works in the Outer City; it only sent in inspectors to supervise the cleaning work. Forced to pay for their sewage repairs, people living in the Outer Chinese City completed the project in a most perfunctory manner. Partly because of the discriminatory policy, the sewer mains of the Outer City deteriorated faster than those of the Inner City. Thus, during the reign of Qianglong Emperor, the most prosperous period in the Qing, the sewerage system was renewed and expanded. It would be another hundred years or so before such a massive renewal project was undertaken again. As China's imperial capital, Beijing was blessed with the financial support of the central government in public work projects. Other cities were not so lucky, and had to rely on the provincial government and the charity of the local gentry to undertake these ventures. Although in general, the central government was very concerned about the condition of the capital's sewer system, this top-down approach was inefficient. As we shall see, official corruption, lack of overall planning and control, and shortages of funding meant that the government efforts to keep the sewer mains open were largely unsuccessful. Just like the deterioration of streets, the sewer system was another part of the urban infrastructure that had begun to crumble as the city entered the twentieth century. Furthermore, the massive Ming sewer system showed one major defect

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

151

in design and construction: the old sewer mains were built with little attention to gravitational flow. Some sewer mains' middle sections were lower than their ends, making it difficult for waste water to flow into the trunk mains or the open sewer canals. In addition, the standing waste-water corroded the inner walls of the mains, and overburdened the pipes, thus shortening their life and leading to general breakdown.24 Abuse of existing sewer mains precipitated their general deterioration. As the traditional practice of dumping untreated waste into waterways continued, the sewer mains gradually silted up, requiring massive maintenance efforts. Moreover, because of lax enforcement of sewer regulations, residents felt free to connect their cesspools with the public sewer mains. Many connections were so shoddy that leakage was commonplace, corroding roads, developing puddles, and emitting toxic odors. To make the situation worse, sewer repair work was minimal and fell behind schedule in late Qing, a trend that was symptomatic of the decline of the Qing empire. In 1766, the Qing government spent 170,000 taels of silver for the overhaul project. By 1809 the annual maintenance cost had fallen to 38,000 taels. During the late nineteenth century, the average annual cost was only between 10,000 to 30,000 taels.25 The dwindling support for sewer maintenance reflected the government's lack of leadership in public works and the decline of the Qing state's financial strength. Also contributing to the sewer breakdown was the widespread

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

152

corruption among officials in charge of the repair work. In 1809, the Jiaqing emperor remarked that these officials rarely took their jobs seriously. Even worse, some pocketed funds designated for equipment, material purchase, and workers' salaries. Some contractors bribed the supervising officials who were to look the other way when they inspected the completed projects. An inspection by corrupt officials usually followed this routine: one sewerman was supposed to enter one end of the sewer tunnel and exit the other to make sure the sewer main was clean and unblocked. But the officials who took bribes pretended not to notice when contractors cheated by having one worker enter into one end of the sewer main and stay there while another worker walked out of the other end. This ruse made it appear that the main was unblocked and the cleaning had been done. Although the officials never bothered to check into the real sewer conditions themselves, they pocketed the inspecting fees as well as kickbacks from the contractors.26 To be sure, the problem of corruption and bribery existed throughout the government bureaucracy. But in this case, unscrupulous officials took advantage of an already dwindling fund reserved for the city's sewer system. During the late Qing, the deterioration of the sewer system became intolerable, following years of financial stringency, corruption, mismanagement, and neglect. In the spring of 1890, for example, torrential rains soaked Beijing for four consecutive days, causing tremendous property damage as well as disruption of traffic. It was reported that the flood water

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

153

on the streets could reach the belly of a horse (several feet deep). So precarious was the situation that supplies became scarce, prompting prices of food and other necessities to rise rapidly. The Outer City suffered the most from this flood, because of the long neglect of the Han Chinese by the Qing court. In a memorial to the emperor, Zhou Tianlin, a local official in Shuntian Prefecture, attributed the emergency to the clogging of the city's sewers. "Despite dredging and cleaning every Spring," he said, "our sewer lines continue to clog. If no substantial repairs are made, it is almost certain that the system will collapse some day."27 The warning of Zhou, however, received little attention from the higher authority. The deterioration of the city's sewer mains facilitated the spread of contagious diseases and posed a serious threat to public health. In 1900, a cholera epidemic struck Beijing. The sewer commissioners regarded both the water supply and the sewers as direct causes of the epidemic. They reasoned that the toxic air produced by the city's clogged sewers was the culprit, as well as the contaminated water supply. Although they did not understand modern germ theory, their suspicions were by no means groundless. This time they contacted the officials in charge of street affairs (jiedao yushi), who responded that the public sewer system had been seriously

neglected. "Every spring the abutters were ordered to clean their sections of the sewer mains," they wrote, ’b u t since the sewer lines have not been overhauled for a long time because no funding was available, the abutter

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

154

could dredge only select parts of the sewerage, especially portions close to their property."28 While such efforts might help in the short term, they proved harmful in the long run, as the mains that did not receive proper cleaning might clog and backup into the cleaned sections.

The local officials also

complained about insufficient funding. The annual fund for local administration averaged only 1,800 taels, they said, barely enough for street maintenance. The allocation for sewerage repairs was negligible.29 Given these conditions, and the increasing use and abuse of existing sewer mains, how could the city's century-old sewers not be in terrible physical shape? In short, like the dynasty itself, the sewer of Beijing at the turn of the nineteenth century was also on the verge of collapse.

Sewerage Renewal in Early Twentieth Century

During the early twentieth century, visitors to Beijing often complained about two things: the dust and the smell. The dust derived from the city's many unpaved streets and the smell from the open sewer channels. Well aware of these two problems, the city government listed street paving and sewer repair as the top priorities on its agenda for public works. The Metropolitan Police Board, the de facto government in the late Qing, introduced zoning regulations to protect the existing public sewer lines, and to ensure that no private sewer construction would violate overall city plan and present a hazard to neighboring residences. The zoning laws required that licenses must

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

155

be obtained for the connection of drainage facilities with the sewerage system. If approved, courtyard sewers might be connected to the street sewer mains, and in the case of other waste water, to cesspools and privy vaults.30 But in 1918, according to government statistics, only 73 households throughout the city had obtained approval to install or repair sewer lines on their premises. Among them, 43 were for the new installation of private sewer lines, while about 17 were for repairs of public sewers.31 This figure, typical of official statistics of annual repairs by private funds, was insignificant for a city approaching one million in population. It suggest that the majority of people continued to hook up their sewers to the public mains without government authorization. Even if zoning helped reduce unauthorized use of the sewer system, it did not make repair work unnecessary. In a preparatory step toward a major overhaul, the city decided first to gather information about the existing system, just as the Qianlong emperor had done in the mid-eighteenth century. In September 1916, the Urban Planning Department of the Municipal Council conducted a comprehensive survey of the city's sewer system. After a lapse of over one hundred years, the effort proved worthwhile. Funded by tax revenues of the Council, the survey was conducted with the assistance of the local police force and gendarmerie. Former sewermen, some of whom had worked in the late Qing, also joined the effort. The seven-month survey resulted in a map detailing all major sewer mains of the city. It recorded such

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

156

useful information as the type and dimension of each sewer, the direction of sewage flow, and the current condition of each sewer. With detailed and accurate statistics, the survey confirmed the worst fears about the city's sewer system. It was found that less than ten percent of the city's sewer mains were working properly. Most of these were located, not surprisingly, in the Inner City, where the rich and the powerful resided and where the sewers had always been in better condition. About five percent could not be accounted for, because over the years, the sewer mains had been destroyed by housing construction or other haphazard land-uses. The vast majority, some 85 percent, had become partially or completely silted.32 This meant that the city's mechanism for disposal of waste water and flood had virtually stopped functioning, and that the sewer mains had become elongated cesspools. For the first time, the survey offered concrete statistical evidence for the anecdotal accounts of the sewers' collapse. The toxic odor that many visitors to Beijing complained about and the threat to public health that reformers had warmed of suddenly became all too real. To find a solution, city planners looked to the West for inspiration. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the new sewer system widely adopted in Europe and the United States were based on water carriage removal. Referred to as the combined sewer system, this method could not only dispose of flood water and waste water, but also replace the privy vaultcesspool system. In addition, the new sewers were large enough for sewermen

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

157

to enter regularly for cleaning, reducing the chance of their becoming blocked by solid waste and silt. Finally, the sewer mains often provided space for transmitting and storing water pipes, telephone and telegraph cables and electric wires, thus saving the cost of above-the-ground installations. According to Joel Tarr, an American urban historian, two factors contributed to the decision to replace the old privy vault-cesspool system in the West. First was the demographic change, i.e., urban population and density growth, which increased the problems caused by the privy vaultcesspool system. "Located close together and serving larger populations, these receptacles often overflowed, causing nuisances and aesthetic problems. The night soil carts of the scavengers, utilized to contain and remove the wastes from the privies, created similar difficulties. Soil saturated with fecal wastes contaminated groundwater supplies and wells and ponds, often badly polluting sources of water supply."33 The other factor was American cities' adoption of running water and the water-closet. The constant supply of water for drinking and household use, for fire fighting, and for street cleaning, caused a rapid expansion of the volume of water used. On the one hand, the new water supply flooded the existing cesspools and privy vaults and exacerbated the problems of public health; on the other hand, it made possible the new sewer system, which required large quantities of water to carry the waste water.34 In Beijing, however, the sewer mains constructed in the fifteenth century

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

had been designed mainly for the dissipation of flood-water and for a much smaller urban population. In Beijing as in the Western cities, the old type of system could hardly accommodate the growing amount of waste water produced by an expanding population. Beijing's once-advanced system of sewer disposal had become highly inadequate by the time the ancient city entered the modern age. Unlike many American cities, however, Beijing did not have an abundant supply of potable water. As Chapter Five will illustrate, running water never became readily available for the majority of urban residents, because the high price of buying potable water prevented its use by the working class, a vast majority of urban residents. Although the environmental and aesthetic problems associated with the cesspools and privy vaults in China continued to exist, the demand for the combined system of sewerage being developed in the West was weak, and the shortage of water supply made the application of the technology in Beijing less feasible. The Chinese urban planners were aware of the new and improved water carriage system in the West. In 1917, a municipal engineer gave a detailed description of the famous Paris sewerage: In continental Europe, public utilities are divided into waterworks above the ground and a sewer system under the ground. Three trunk sewer mains were built in Paris in the 1860s to dispose of waste water in the city. The sewer trunks were kept distant from the major streets and sewers were connected with the Seine River. Later sewer mains were constructed underneath the streets to connect with the sewer trunks. Shaped like horse shoes, the trunk mains are built with stone with a diameter of between 15 and 20 feet. The sewer water is about 4 to 5 feet deep. On both sides are paths 2-3 feet wide. The sewer

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

159

mains underneath the streets are oval, about 6-7 feet in diameter, also with narrow paths. It is required that all streets 20 meters or narrower install water pipes inside the sewer mains. The sewermen use powerful jet stream to dean silts that block the mains. They then use the silts as fertilizers to transform barren lands into rich farming fields.35 "Compared with the new style Western water carriage systems," wrote one critic, "the Chinese sewerage is inferior in its brick structure and flat slope. Constantly silting up, the system is extremely difficult to clean." He also realized that "as the population of the city grows and the demand for water increases, the fundamental solution is to build Western type of sewers."36 However, sewer reconfiguration meant that the existing system would have to be replaced by a modern one, involving sophisticated technology, substantial financial resources, and the relocation of thousands of urban households and shops. The magnitude of this project was far beyond a technically ill-equipped and finandally starved dty government. Selective revamping seemed a more realistic and feasible answer to the impending sewer crisis. But fadng massive decay and collapse, where should the renewal project begin? In a report to the Municipal Coundl, Tang Zaixian, director of the Public Works Department, recommended the repair of the dty's trunk sewer canals first. Before we renew our dty's sewer system, we must determine from where the water comes into where it flows. We know that water generally flows out of sewer mains into the city moats and the Imperial River. Our dty's topography is such that the northwest is higher in elevation than its southeast. Originating from the Jade Spring Mountain (yuquan shari), all major rivers diverge into two main branches: one into the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

160

northeast moat, the other the southwest moat, and converge in the southeast of the city and flow into the Tongzhou Canal. All sewer mains in the Inner City usually reach the moat either directly, or by way of the Great Open Canal (doming hao) and the trunk mains near the Xisi Arch in the West District or truck mains near the Dongsi Arch in the East District, as well as the Imperial River. Sewer mains in the Outer City rely on the Qianmen moat and trunk mains between Guang'an Gate and Chongwen Gate, as well as the Dragon Beard Canal (longxu gou), as the major arteries of sewer dissipation. But as most trunk sewer mains are either collapsed or silted, they can hardly carry sewage into the city moats. If we want to make the whole city's sewer mains circulate, we must first of all repair these trunk mains.37 The Municipal Council approved this proposal. Special funds were made available to undertake three large projects involving the open sewer canals: the moat between the Inner and Outer Cities, the Darning sewer in the Western section of the city and the Longxiu sewer in the Outer City. Connected with a myriad of smaller sewer mains nearby, these three canals were major depositories for all the drainage water and sewage in the city. The Dragon Beard Canal was the primary collector of sewer mains in the Southeast section of the Outer City. The Big Open Canal covered the western part of the Inner City, while the Imperial River covered the eastern part. The moat separating the Inner and Outer Cities was in fact a canal absorbing sewage from both the Inner and Outer Cities. Although these uncovered canals were vital arteries for collecting all the other smaller ones, they had suffered years of abuse, with garbage dumping and other illegal waste disposal. Here and there, they had already collapsed, posing a potential danger to traffic. More hazardous to public health was the odor the open canals emitted into the air,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

causing many visitors of Beijing to comment on the uncivilized smell of the ancient city. In short, the broken and stinking sewer trunks gave the city a forlorn look, devastating the prestige of the ancient capital. First, the three-mile long moat separating the Inner and Outer City underwent a transformation. Beginning in April 1915 and finishing in December 1917, the moat was deepened and widened, a stone embankment was built on the slope to eliminate soil erosion, and tunnels and cesspools were constructed. Wire fences and police kiosks were also built, to protect the moat from the abuse of nearby residents. The project was undertaken by the construction team of the Interior Ministry, which became affiliated with the Municipal Council in 1915. Costing 54,678 yuan, the expense was entirely absorbed by the city government, with no private money involved.38 The Big Open Canal, located on the west side of the Inner City, was next to undergo a surgery. About 3.3 miles long, it was the major sewer depository of sewers from western part of the Inner City, serving tens of thousands residents. Because of its proximity to residential neighborhoods, the canal was also victim to years of garbage dumping, brick stealing, and other kinds of abuse. The toxic gas it unleashed became a nuisance and a threat to public health. During the rebuilding, sand bags were laid to shore up places where the canal banks had already collapsed, endangering pedestrians and vehicles alike, especially at night. The municipal government decided to convert the Big Open Canal into an underground sewer main. Compared with

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

162

the intra-dty moat, this project was more complicated, more costly, and took a longer time. The central government's Ministry of the Interior agreed to share about two-thirds of the cost, which was estimated at about 150,000 yuan. Started in 1919 and finished in 1930, the project was divided into five construction phases. It was initially undertaken by the Construction Team of the Municipal Council and later was open for bidding to private construction companies. The Dragon Beard Canal, the last major sewer construction project, was located in the southeastern section of the Outer City. Meandering four miles from Hufang Bridge in the north to the Bridge of Heaven (tianqiao), the canal joined the moat outside the Yongding Gate. Its condition was even worse than that of the Big Open Canal, as the majority of the residents living in the Outer City depended on it for drainage and waste-water disposal. In the rainy season, the canal would overflow the lowlands near the Temple of Heaven. An estimated 200,000 yuan were needed to convert the open canal into a underground sewer main. Lacking funding, the city government only repaired the northern section of the canal where most shops and restaurants were located. The Xiangchang District, the flagship real estate development zone of the city government, received priority. The southern section of the Canal, where most working-class people lived, remained open until the early 1950s. A total of 72,000 yuan was spent in repairing the Dragon Beard Canal. In The Dragon Beard Canal, Lao She, a well-known Chinese writer, depicted the misery

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

163

and hardship of working-class people living near the canal in the early twentieth century. He not only showed vividly how the lack of urban amenities affected the lives of city people, but also examined the political and implications of how these utilities were provided. In addition to these three major projects, a number of local, small-scale sewer mains were also cleaned and rebuilt. Every year from 1916 on, the Municipal Council allocated 7,000 yuan to finance selected repairs and construction.39 The sewer team of the Police Board was put to work on the task. Starting from the main sewer lines, the team worked its way toward the branches. The job involved mostly digging and removing silt and building brick walls in the sewer mains to reduce sagging and waste deposit. Bricks from the old Imperial City wall, which was being demolished during this time, were utilized to build large brick sewer mains. In 1917, for example, the Sewer Team rebuilt 59 sewer mains throughout the city, with a total length of 25 miles. The following year, 77 sewer mains were worked on, totaling 19 miles. An average of 25-30 workers were assigned to a sewer project; the average time per project was about three weeks.40 During the thirty years between 1900 and 1930, the city undertook 449 sewer constructions projects (including both repairs and cleaning). 337 (75 percent) of them, were in the Inner City. The rest were in the Outer City. As Table 12 shows, sewer renewal occurred in two waves, the first taking place in late Qing between 1900 and 1905, the second between 1916 and 1925 during

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

164

the early Republic period. As a general rule, the Inner City had the most repairs, not only because it was more densely populated and its infrastructure was older than the Outer City, but also because it held the city's government offices and the homes of the upper and middle classes.

Table 13. Chronological Breakdown of Sewer Repairs in Beijing, 1900-1930 Year

1900-05 1911-15 1916-20 1921-25 1926-30 Total

Inner City Outer City

123 36

46 1

92 10

48 39

28 26

337 112

Total % Total

159 35.4

47 10.5

102 22.7

87 19.4

54 12.0

449 100.0

Source: Gongwu tekan, pp.89-119.

The second major revamping in the history of the city's sewer system brought noticeable accomplishments. By 1930, nearly 80 percent of the city's sewer mains that had been silted up were restored to working order.41 More repair work was conducted after 1930, but most of the results had already been achieved by 1930. Compared with only 10 percent functioning sewer mains in the beginning years of the century, this represented a great improvement. Due to the massive sewer renewal projects of the city government, a major infrastructure crisis was averted. Moreover, as some sewer canals w ent underground, Beijing's air had became fresher, the city prettier, and the chances of epidemic and other threats to public health had been greatly reduced.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

165

However, the sewer renewal campaign in the first three decades of the twentieth century was by no means an infrastructural revolution, nor a major technological breakthrough. Some Western-style sewers had been built, notably the Big Open Canal and the sewer mains outside of the Bridge of Heaven, but these large underground water carriage systems were very few compared to the overwhelming number of traditional sewer mains. Even after the major revamping, the Ming mains still dominated the city's sewer system. Little had been done to redesign the system, and it was still poorly equipped to accommodate the demands of an increasing urban population. Some city engineers pointed out that the fundamental solution to Beijing's sewerage problem lay in reconfiguration, not just repairs, because the existing sewer system had proved incompatible with the needs of a modernizing metropolis. Although most sewer mains were dredged and cleaned, and steps were taken to prevent their abuse, the same problem of clogging and silting would come back to hound the city government in the years to come.42 To genuinely solve the problem, the system must be restructured, a task the city was unable to perform at the time. One important reason was shortage of funding. Most of the sewer repairs were financed by the municipal taxes collected by the City Council. But, as discussed in Chapter One, the tax-base in early twentieth century Beijing was so small that the government simply could not afford to spend large amounts of money on building sewer mains. The central government

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

166

subsidized some key projects; for instance, it paid two-thirds of the expenses for the Big Open Canal in the Inner City. But the central government's aid was sporadic and limited, too small to change Beijing's basic funding shortage. Many Western cities raised money by issuing municipal bonds, but Beijing did not, for reasons we have examined earlier. The sewer renewal campaign was also socially conservative. Threequarters of the repairs undertaken between 1900 and 1930 benefitted only the commercial and wealthy residential districts in the Inner City. This allocation of resources correlated neither with population density nor with structural urgency. While the majority of the city's population resided in the Outer City, most repair projects were done in the Inner City. While the Outer City in general had a worse sewer main problem, attention was focused on the Inner City. Finally, while the working-class people financed most of the public works through the taxes they paid, they did not receive a comparable share of urban amenities. This pattern of neglecting the poor could be seen in other utility projects as well, such as street paving, streetcar services, water provision and electricity distribution. In the name of public service, the city government favored those areas it deemed important: wealthy residential neighborhoods, commercial districts, places that traditionally belonged to the rich and powerful.

Conclusion

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

167

As an important aspect of urban infrastructure, the sewer was part of the urban eco-system. Sewer mains made possible the removal of human and household waste, as well as the removal of storm water from the streets, permitting traffic to circulate.43 Like the urban water supply, the city's sewers functioned as arteries do in the human body. Beijing boasted one of the world's earliest and most sophisticated sewerage networks in ancient times. Established when the city was built, the ancient sewer system served the city for hundreds of years. However, once it was in place, the infrastructure was resistant to change, lagging behind urban technological, commercial and demographic developments in modern times. Thus the Ming sewers gradually proved inadequate as the city expanded in population and space. In addition, government efforts to maintain the century-old public utility were far from adequate. With the exception of one major overhaul in the mid-eighteenth century, the sewers were generally neglected, and subjected to all kinds of abuses and official corruption. Consequently, the system suffered increasingly physical deterioration. By the turn of the nineteenth century, an impending sewer crisis threatened to paralyze the city and disrupt normal urban life. Thus, a formerly positive element in Beijing's municipal infrastructure, the sewer system became a barrier to urban change in the late Qing period. Sewer renewal was an important feature of the public works campaign and the transformation of modern Beijing during the early twentieth century.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

168

Urban reformers saw that something m ust be done to save the old sewer system. It was decided to revamp the old system instead of undertaking the impossibly expensive option of structural change. The sewer renewal project proceeded slowly and selectively because of the shortage of funds. In a uniquely Chinese approach to public works, open sewer canals were converted into underground tunnels, using bricks from the recently demolished walls of the Imperial City. This action was both pragmatic (in that reusing bricks lowered the cost of the project) and symbolic (in that materials from the imperial city wall which had formerly protected the privileges of the elite were now used to benefit the city people). On the other hand, sewer improvement projects were primarily undertaken by the municipality. Reflecting a socially conservative public policy, the city's limited resources were committed to rebuilding the sewer mains in the commercial districts and wealthy residential neighborhoods of the Inner City. This decision was made not only because the commercial development created a tremendous need for water carriage systems, but also because municipal officials favored those in the upper echelons of the social scale, who used political connections and economic clout to benefit themselves. The working-class majority who lived on the periphery of the city were usually deprived of sewer services, even though they were the ones who contributed the largest share of public works funds through their taxes. Adaption and accommodation, rather than reconfiguration and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

169

structural change, characterized the turn-of-the-century sewer renewal movement. Technologically, the system did not represent a revolutionary breakthrough. In the West, the water-carriage system of waste removal used the waste water itself as a transporting medium and as a cleansing agent in the pipe. But in Beijing, that system never came into existence. The storm drainage and waste water disposal on the one hand, and night soil and solid refuse, on the other hand, remained separate. The old system was expanded, renovated, repaired, and maintained, but it was not totally transformed. The messy, decentralized and labor-intensive methods of the preindustrial city were not replaced by sanitary, centralized, and capital-intensive systems. This failure of technological change was indicative of another deeper problem. The water carriage technology of waste-removal depended on water, but as Chapter Five will show, Beijing's level of water consumption fell far below that of Western cities. Piped water was available to only a minority of people in certain parts of the city. Water closets were even rarer, available only to the wealthiest residents. Thus the rarity and expense of running water precluded its ample use by urban residents, making a water carriage system of sewerage inapplicable to Beijing. Until very recently, the sewer mains of Beijing have continued to be used only for storm drainage and to a lesser extent, for conveying waste water. The cesspool-privy vault systems of waste removal has continued meanwhile, generating filth and presenting a health hazard. Compared to the continual cost of emptying cesspools and privies, it

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

170

might have seemed wise to invest in the new system by paying for the one­ time connection costs and the minimal maintenance charges. But the poverty of city residents, which ultimately accounted for the weak demand, invariably retarded the implementation of the new technology. As a result, sewerage technology did not have as revolutionary an effect on Beijing as did other urban technologies had. However, in the short term at least, the crisis in the city's sewer system inherited from the last imperial state was averted. Underground, hundreds of renovated sewer mains resumed normal operation. The three major sewer canal projects also made the city look prettier, smell better, and become more attractive to both residents and visitors. Sewer renewal joined other public works movements, such as street paving and the creation of public space, to improve urban sanitation conditions, to encourage an awareness of public health, to reduce contagious diseases, and eventually, to establish a healthier city.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

171

NOTES

4In the United States, for example, extensive municipal construction of sewer systems did not begin until the 1850s. It began earlier in Europe, but only by about a decade. 2Hou, Lishi dilixue de lilun yu shijiang, p.181. 3Jingshi chengnei hedao gouqu tushuo (An illustrated survey of the waterways and sewerage in Beijing), (Beijing, 1941), pp.5-7.

4Hou, Lishi dilixue de lilun yu shijian, p.203. 5Huidian, Vol. 934. 6Jingshi chengnei hedao gouqu tushuo, p.28.

7Gamble, Peking: A Social Survey, p.122. 8Ibid., p.122. 9Songshi (History of the Song dynasty), 1343, "hequ zhi" (Rivers and canals). Vol. 496.

10Gamble, Peking: A Social Survey, p.122. nDray-Novey, Policing Imperial Peking, p.249. 12George Timkovsky, Travels of the Russian Mission through Mongolia to China, and Residence in Peking, in the years 1820-1821, Translated by H.E. Lloyd. 2 vols. (London: Longman, 1827), vol.II, p.89. l3Beiping shi dushi jihua sheji ziliao (The material of metropolitan planning and design of Beijing), ed. by Beijing shi gongwu ju (public works department of the city of Beijing), (Beijing, 1947), p.22.

14In the United States, major cities adopted the water-carriage system, which was a system of waste removal that used waste water itself as a transporting medium and as a cleansing agent in the pipe. It transported human waste as well as waster water and flood water. See Joel A. Tarr, "The Separate Vs. Combined Sewer Problem: A Case Study in Urban Technology Design Choice," Journal of Urban History 5:3 (May 1979), pp.308-339. and his "Sewerage and the Development of the networked City in the United States, 1850-1930," in Joel Tarr and Gabriel Dupuy eds., Technology and the Rise of the Networked City in Europe and America, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988), pp.159-185.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

172 15Beijing shi dushi jihua sheji ziliao, p.30.

16Ibid, p.31. 17Ming hui dian, published in Wanli reign (1587), vol.200.

18Ibid. vol.200. 19Jingshi chengnei hedao gouqu tushuo, p.13.

20Ibid., p.35. “ Ibid., p.23. “ The figures were culled from Beiping tehie shi gongwu ju gongwu tekan, pp.88119. 23Jingshi chengnei hedao guoqu tushou, p .l6.

“ Ibid., p.23. 25Ibid., pp.24-25. 26 Beiping fengsu leizheng (A classified description of social customs of Beijing), Vol.42, p.43. 27Jingshi chengnei hedao gouqu tushuo, pp.17-18.

28 Wu, Beijing shi zhigao, p.214. ^ i d . , p.215. 30 Shen Ruilin, Jingdu shizheng fagui huibian (Rules and regulations of the City of Beijing), (revised edition, Beijing, 1918), p.256. 31/SH, p.469. “ The figures were compiled from a survey conducted by the Beijing Municipal Council. See Beiping tebie shi gongwu ju gongwu tekan, pp.89-117. “ Joel A. Tarr, "The Separate Vs. Combined Sewer Problem: A Case Study in Urban Technology Design Choice," Journal of Urban History 5:3 (May 1979), p.310. “ Ibid., pp.310-311. 35SZTG, No.1-19 (1917), p.l.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

173

36SZ T G , p.508. 37Tang Zaixian, "Jingdu shizheng jihuashu" (Plans for public works in Beijing), SZTG, No. 10 (Feb. 1918), pp.14-15. 38/SH, pp.614-615. 39/SH, p.569. 40}SH, pp.604-614.

41The results were summarized from raw data I collected at the Beijing Municipal Archives. More than 400 cases were keyed into a database and were analyzed using SPSS. ‘“ The ancient sewerage system is still in use in the old sections of the city. The problems of silting and clogging require intensive repair works, just like in the early twentieth century. ^Joel A. Tarr and Joself W. Konvitz, "Patterns in the Development of the Urban Infrastructure," in Perspectives on Urban Infrastructure (Washington D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1982), p.198.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

174

Chapter Four Public Space

Introduction

This chapter examines the transformation of imperial, private, and restricted urban space into areas that were civilian, open, and available for public use. I will first show how the traditional idea of social hierarchy influenced both the concept and organization of space in imperial Beijing. Then I will discuss the emergence of public space as a result of the late Qing reforms and the founding of the Republic. I will identify both the official and private forces shaping the public park movement and demonstrate how the municipal government interacted with the local gentry and merchants to create public parks in the city. Finally, I will describe some salient features of the Chinese park system and assess the impact of the new public space on the life of city people.

The Imperial Hierarchy of Space

For hundreds of years, as the residence of the emperor and his consort, Beijing served as the center of political, cultural, and social activities of the Chinese empire. As discussed in the introduction, the main layout of the city had taken shape during the Yongle years of the Ming dynasty. At that time,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

175

Map 4. Public Parks

TEMPLE OF GUAM-1 EARTH XIANG ---------

GUANXIANG DESHENG GATE

W ANSHENG-'. . . . I YUAN J GUAN-^ XIZHI V XIANG J GATE

.TEMPLES

J

THREE GUAN­ XIANG

ANDING GATE

GUAN­ XIANG

CHAOYANG GATE

GUAN­ XIANG

COAL

FUCHENG GATE

TEMPLE OF THE MOON.

DONGZHI GATE

TEMPLE OF THE

FORBIDDEN CITY

TIAN'AN GATE

XIBIAN GATE

XUANWU GATE

HEPING GATE

DAQING GATE

CHONGWEN GATE

DONGBIAN GATE

ZHENGYANG GATE GUAN­ XIANG

GUANG’AN GATE

GUANGOU k GUANGATE f. XIANG

TEMPLE OF HEAVEN MERRY AGRICULTURE PAVILION '-----------» GUANXIANG

YONGDING GATE GUANXIANG

ZUO’AN GATE GUAN­ XIANG

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

176

the city was divided into different districts: the Outer City (Waicheng); the Inner City (Neicheng); the Imperial City (Huangchmg) surrounded by the Inner City; and finally the Forbidden City (Zijincheng), where the emperor's offices and residential chambers were located.1 Traditional urban planning reflected both the national ideologyConfucianism, which was adopted by monarchs of successive dynasties as the ruling philosophy-and the political system of the state. Confucianism supported a hierarchical state structure, which in the late imperial period consisted largely of a bureaucratic meritocracy surmounted by an emperor whose mandate to rule was derived from heaven itself. Beijing, as the physical and material symbol of imperial power, was constructed to embody this hierarchical vision in its urban plan. In the words of one scholar of China's imperial city planning, "[i]n China as elsewhere the ruler's power and authority were unchallenged, but in China, in addition, an emperor's reign was always compared to the exemplary models of rulership of former emperors and even pre-imperial dynasts. The form of the capital city and its architecture were just two of the many means the emperor used to display his legitimized position as both ruler and guardian of tradition. The alteration of an accepted design was therefore considered a challenge to the imperial past. The imperial city was such a powerful symbol of rule that a normative conqueror would always choose to implement a Chinese design instead of plans more reminiscent of his homeland.2 As long as Beijing remained the imperial capital, the organization of its urban space remained relatively unchanged. All the citizens of Beijing, remarked a Western observer, "are conscious of the city's majesty; the sheer breadth of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

177

setting enhances composure and lends dignity to everyday manners."3 In this sense the alteration in the names of the dynasties was insignificant. The Forbidden City, home to the emperor, was situated at the center of the city. Proximity to the emperor was a sign of rank: as a general rule, the closer a residence lay to the center of the city, the more privileged it was. At the same time, the supremacy of the imperial personage and those close to him was reflected in the construction of the space within which they lived and worked. The higher one was on the hierarchy, the more space one got. Within the Forbidden City, large open spaces were preserved for a few, privileged inhabitants. Three times the size of the Forbidden City, the Imperial City contained many administrative offices and the residences of Manchu nobles and high ranking court officials.4 Outside of Imperial City, the Inner City occupied mostly by privileged Manchu bannermen and Chinese imperial officials, was the next in the spatial hierarchy.5 Meanwhile, the Han Chinese, the majority of the urban population, were relegated to the Outer City adjacent to the southern edge of the Inner City, and to the immediate suburbs (guanxiang), just outside the city walls and close to the city gates.6 Both the Outer City and guanxiang were densely populated by the early twentieth century. There, the

only open space consisted of the inner courtyards of traditional Chinese homes; the public streets and alleyways that wound past compound walls were narrow and constricted. As one moved outward from the imperial

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

178

residence, open space, as an emblem of status, gradually diminished. "Thus was contrived the grand design;" observed Gilbert Rozman, "moat enclosing moat, wall behind wall, and compartment opening within compartment, a hierarchy reflecting every gradation of power and influence, a symbolism finally embracing the heavens themselves."7 Access to urban space was strictly controlled. One law kept both Manchu and Chinese from the forbidden region within which the emperor dwelled. Commoners of all ethnic groups were banned from the Imperial City as well. And while rules regarding ethnic segregation in residential areas were somewhat relaxed in the later years of the dynasty, most Manchu dwelled in the Inner City and Han Chinese in the Outer. It was not until the establishment of the Republic and the expulsion of the last emperor, Puyi, in 1924 that the Imperial City and the Forbidden City were opened to the public. Before the twentieth century, Beijing had a number of imperial gardens, but were reserved for the exclusive use of the imperial family and the aristocracy. Inside the Forbidden City, for example, there was the Imperial Garden (yuhuayuan). In the Imperial City, three large lakes, known simply as the North, Central and Southern Seas (beihai, zhonghai, nanhai), ran through the city. Pavilions, temples, and kiosks dotted the islands in these lakes. Moreover, lavishly decorated gardens were usually an integral part of the residences of the nobles and high-ranking officials. The residences of He Shen, the infamous Grand Councillor of the Qianlong reign and Prince Kung, regent

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

179

to the Tongzhi emperor, for example, were well-known in Beijing for their sumptuous grounds. Outside the city proper, the imperial family also maintained more huge gardens, including the Summer Palace, completed in 1750 in the Western Hills and the Rehe Resort, finished in 1780, about 150 miles northeast of Beijing in Manchuria.8 Hunting grounds in the suburbs of Beijing were also set aside as reserves for imperial use. These areas offered space for recreation, hunting, and entertainment, but only for the imperial and aristocratic elite. The traditional design of a Chinese garden was different from that of the West. Instead of the blooming flowers, well-kept lawns, and clipped greenery typical of Western gardens, Chinese gardens had few flowers and no lawns. The natural contours of the land, shade-giving trees, and especially water and rockery were the charms of Chinese gardens. A Western visitor admired the idyllic image in which "water mirrors the sky, and its sparkle animates a landscape; while well-shaped rock--masses of it, often brought from long distances with much labor—moves the Chinese by its constant suggestion of the strength of nature, of what is permanent, enduring, and imperishable."9 The Chinese found their own scheme deeply satisfying. For a Chinese to make a garden is no less than to fashion the world as he would like it to be. In additional to the imperial gardens, the city also contained imperial altars and temples that were reserved for conducting ancestral and religious sacrifices by the ruling elite. The imperial plan of the city provided ample

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

space for religious rites, for even though the Chinese emperor was not a devotee of a religion in the Western sense, ritual is important in any dynastic rule. The imperial ruler often looked to supernatural beings for blessings and the Chinese people looked to him as their intermediary between heaven's favor and human labor. "By carefully observing an astrological calendar and conducting sacrifices in accordance with certain colors and natural elements," Frederic Wakeman observes, "a ruler could help ensure the success of his reign."10 Consequently, imperial temples dotted the capital. At set times each year the emperor went out from the Forbidden City to these altars to perform sacrifices, pray to heaven, and express earthly concerns. These altars were often exposed to the heavens, but they were always built inside walled compounds. Close to the Forbidden City, there were the Altar of Earth and Grain (shejitan) and the Temple of Ancestors (taimiao). The Ancestral Temple, a grand version of the ancestral halls built by commoners as well, was erected for the ruler to pay homage to the founder of the dynasty, his wife, and other imperial ancestors, whose names were entered on tablets in the temple. In the Outer City stood the Temple of Heaven (tiantan) and the Temple of Agriculture (xiannongtan). At times of high ceremony in the Temple of Heaven, the Emperor knelt to take upon his mortal shoulders responsibility for the welfare of the whole empire. Similarly, the Emperor came to the Temple of Agriculture, in a separate enclosure not far from the Temple of Heaven, to plow the first furrow of the agricultural year. Symbolically, this

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

181

readied the whole empire for a new cycle of sowing and planting. There were also the Temple of the Earth (ditan), the Temple of the Sun (ritan), the Temple of the Moon (yuetari), and the Temple of Silkworms (xiancantan) where the empress performed the rite of cocoon washing. Each of these altars was situated in a prescribed relationship to the four cardinal corners of the Earth (Chinese believed that the earth was square and heaven was round) to achieve a complete harmony between man and nature.11 The Altar of Earth and Grain was one of the most sacred places reserved for state ceremonies. The activities associated with it illustrate the importance of the emperor's ritual role. Twice a year, in the Spring and Autumn, the emperor would come to the Altar of Earth and Grain to conduct sacrificial rites. The Altar was built in the eighth year of the Yongle reign (1411) of the Ming and renovated in the twenty-first year of the Qianlong reign (1757) in the following Qing dynasty. Earth and grain (sheji) were seen by the Chinese as the two elements most vital to the livelihood of the people and the prosperity of the country, since "people cannot stand without the earth or eat without grain."12 The same idea is expressed in the popular saying, "People are the support of the king, while grain is the support of the people.13 Consequently, the word, sheji, was often used to refer to the state. There were actually twin altars, for earth and grain respectively. On the Earth Altar were placed five colors of earth: vermilion, azure, black, and white, at positions corresponding to the four directions, while yellow earth at the center spilled

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

182

onto the four sides. The Grain Altar was covered only with yellow earth.14 For five hundred years, Chinese emperors came to the Altar of Earth and Grain to perform the biannual sacrificial ceremonies to the Gods of Earth and Grain. The space for such worship also became sacred and exclusive. The practice survived both the Ming and the Qing dynasties, but it was finally discontinued after the 1911 Revolution. While most open spaces were thus reserved for a small elite to enjoy, common people had their own form of public amusements. In late imperial times, many Beijing residents visited the periodic folk temple fairs, which resembled, in some ways, the activities of modern parks today. These fairs, which combined cultural, commercial, social, and entertainment activities, were held annually, seasonally, monthly, or even more frequently. People would visit the temple fairs to shop, barter, meet friends, watch variety shows or traditional operas, and taste various kinds of local snacks and specialty foods. For people who did not like the crowds and bustle of commercial temple fairs, the city had several other areas for recreation. One such place was the Merry Pavilion (taoranting) near Yongding Gate on the southern periphery of the city. Men of letters went to this pavilion for a taste of quiet, peace, and plenty of greenery and fresh air. It was also an ideal place for intellectuals to hold wine and poetry parties and other social gatherings. Another such place was the Sea of Ten Temples (shishahai) north of the imperial Three Seas (sanhai), a popular gathering spot during the summer for

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

all kinds of people. Finally, there was the Western Hills in the northwestern suburbs of the city.15 Although both the Merry Pavilion and the Sea of Ten Temples were free of imperial control and open to the general public, use of them was limited by their small size and underdeveloped facilities. Moreover, situated in relatively isolated areas unreachable by public transportation, they never attracted large numbers of visitors. Even further from the city proper, the Western Hills were visited only very infrequently by urban residents. More often, ordinary city dwellers used the streets for recreation, especially during the summer, when they were forced to escape the heat and suffocation of their dingy living quarters. In short, imperial urban planning dictated that before the twentieth century Beijing was a city that offered an abundance of recreational space to royalty and the nobility, and neglected the needs of ordinary city dwellers.

The Public Park Movement

The concept of the public park, where common people can go for relaxation and recreation is purely Western and modern.16 Public parks in the West are areas set aside for recreation, education, or for the preservation and enjoyment of natural beauty. They are usually created and administered by city, state or national governments. It was not until the rise of republican regimes and the beginning of industrialization in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that public spaces in the West emerged. The public park movement

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

184

began in Europe in the 1830s and had spread to the United States by the middle of the nineteenth century. The American movement emerged in response to the worsening condition of cities, as well as in acknowledgment of the importance of open and recreational spaces in promoting public health. The development of public parks also became linked to the self-esteem of emerging republics, expressing their commitment to the intellectual and moral improvement of common people.17 In Europe, as in China, most parks were originally restricted to use by royalty. But by the 1840s and 1850s, many had been opened for the enjoyment of all classes of people. In the United States creating the parks necessitated restricting the aggressive development of real estate and the encroachment of grid-patterned cities. The opening of the Central Park in New York, designed by Frederick Law Olmstead and Calvert Vaux in the 1850s, set a pattern for ambitious park development that was followed for more than a century.18 Public parks in Europe and the United States have undergone two distinctive phases of development. Early parks emphasized the natural landscape, offering a pastoral counterpoint to the urban environment of straight lines and rigid angles. "Such parks consisted of large areas of turf, trees, lakes, and streams, arranged to form a pleasing natural scene in contrast with the crowded conditions of the city. The beauty of nature provided a serene atmosphere conducive to quiet contemplation and relaxation."19 A second period of park development began shortly before 1900, as playgrounds,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

185

outdoor gymnasiums, athletic fields, tennis courts, and other sports facilities invaded parks that had originally been designed as quiet retreats. This mixture of sports and landscape resulted in a new concept of municipal park and recreation systems. Parks were designed to accommodate the greatly expanded demand for play space while preserving the values of the landscape park.20 The concept of the public park (gongyuan) was first introduced into China in the early twentieth century. The word gongyuan appears to have been a new addition to the Chinese vocabulary during these years, and its absence from pre-twentieth century writing suggests its foreign origin. A direct translation of "public park," a gongyuan was different from a huayuan (garden) and yuanlin (collective gardens). Gongyuan implied public ownership and access while both huayuan and yuanlin could be imperial or private preserves. "The building of private gardens in China," Joanna Handlin Smith points out, originated in the Han dynasty and was somewhat prevalent during the Sung, but during the late Ming construction gained real momentum, both in quantity of gardens and in the amount of documentation they generated. Indeed a veritable mania for garden-building swept through centers of prosperity. Retired officials, merchants, and local gentry alike spent enormous amounts of money to purchase mountains and wall in properties, to dredge ponds and pile up artificial hills, to lug in huge exotic rocks from afar and erect towers for viewing distant panoramas.21 During the Ming, the region of southern Jiangsu and northern Zhejiang provinces was particularly prosperous, and much of this period's material and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

186

cultural wealth was created and enjoyed in this region's thriving cities. The landed gentry and well-endowed temples cultivated their estates by digging pools, setting out fancy rocks, and building pavilions and artificial hills to fashion the delicate beauty of the classical Chinese garden. All of these, however, were private, and the notion of public parks was missing. The precursor of public parks in Beijing appeared following the Empress Dowager Cixi's New Policies reforms in late Qing. Outside the northwestern Xizhi Gate, there was an imperial garden covering half a square mile. It had been built under the auspices of Cixi during the Guangxu reign and presented to Sanbeizi, a Manchu prince, as an imperial gift. But the Manchu prince found little use for a garden which was so far away from the center of the city that the garden remained vacant most of the time. In 1906, as part of the New Policies reforms, the Qing government dispatched a delegation of imperial court officials to study "foreign affairs" abroad. Upon their return, they brought back various exotic animals, including lions, tigers, zebras, leopards, and elephants, and presented them to the Empress Dowager. Cixi put these animals in the Prince Sanbeizi's garden and named the place Wanshengyuan (land of ten thousand animals). Soon a zoological garden was developed in Wanshengyuan, the very first in the nation. Two years later, in 1908, the park was opened for public visits. Charging sixteen coppers for adults and eight for children, and open seven days a week from nine o'clock in the morning till ten at night, the zoo

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

187

attracted about two hundred visitors a day on weekdays, and four hundred on Sundays.22 A trip to the zoo became a family event for urban dwellers. Children and their parents from all parts of the city would come and spend the whole day. It was also a favorite place for many out-of-town visitors. Thus it could be said that the zoo was the oldest public park in Beijing.23 Obviously, the difference between this park and other later parksindeed the reason for its special appeal--was its exhibit of animals. Although in no way comparable in scale to its successor, the present Beijing Zoo, Wanshengyuan offered visitors a new kind of entertainment. Its appeal

extended to children and adults alike. The exhibits included animals like the giraffe, hippopotamus, rhinoceros, and panda bear, which had never been seen by Beijing residents before. A parrot that could c h a n t"Maibao, maibaol" (newspaper, newspaper) or shout "Hundan, hundanl" (jerk, jerk), was reportedly most popular among the zoo visitors24 The transformation of a former imperial garden into a public park in the last years of the Qing dynasty was significant. The opening of Wanshengyuan predated the public park movement in the early Republican period. It was by and large the result of the Empress Dowager Cixi's reforms. Although sources are not yet available to document its organization, funding, and the other forces behind the founding of China's first zoo, it seems clear that only the Manchu government had the authority to turn an imperial garden into a park accessible to the public. The animals brought back by the imperial delegation

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

188

were originally meant primarily as presents to Cixi. However, it is also likely that the group had some exposure to the philosophy and management of Western zoological gardens. The Bronx Zoo, established in New York in 1899, for example, collected various species and put them on display for public entertainment. This policy may have influenced the Qing court's decision to establish a zoo in Beijing as well. While it is an exaggeration to regard this action as a deliberate attempt on the part of the government to allow public access to imperial property, or to initiate a massive modem park movement for public interest, the opening of the Beijing zoological garden can be seen as the first step in that direction, the precursor of what was to come. The public park movement itself was not to emerge until after the fall of the dynasty. It was among the earliest projects of the new Municipal Council founded in 1914. Most Council members were advocates of Western style reforms. As discussed in Chapter One, many of them had been educated in Japan or the West and they were hired by the government to apply their expertise in modern municipal administration. They had at their command much more specialized training and technical expertise than traditional bureaucrats. As a group they constituted the most progressive force for social reform and the most vociferous voice for Western style modernization in early twentieth century Beijing. Building public parks in the city was one of the Municipal Council's top priorities. The city officials launched the project with a publicity campaign.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

189

The Municipal Gazette (shizheng tonggao), an official publication of the Municipal Council, became an important forum for campaigning for public space. The biweekly gazette published articles describing public parks in New York, London, Paris, Tokyo, and other Western cities. It was also in this journal, in a translation of an English article that we encounter what is probably the first use of gongyuan in Chinese writings.25 More importantly, the gazette carried editorials aimed at promoting the public's awareness of and desire for public parks in the city. "A family consists of people," one article began, A city consists of families. Within a city, no matter who you are: scholars, farmers, workers, and merchants, or seniors, juniors, men, and women, everyone is busy working throughout the day, either intellectually or physically. If these people live a busy life without a break, there will be various harms. Therefore, it has become a general rule in other countries that people will take a day off every seven days, and each city has to have one or two public parks, small or large, for people to refresh their spirit and do exercise. In the past, the people of our country did not know about this secret and totally neglected the importance of the recreation. Although there was not a day that our people were not working, there was actually not a day that our people worked seriously. And there was not a place where our people could engage themselves in open and fair entertainments. Now the Sunday holiday is already practiced in China; however, within this great capital city, there is not a decent place for recreation and entertainment, and many men are driven to seek pleasure in alcohol, gambling, and prostitution. As compared w ith other countries, where pleasure-seeking is beneficial to health and spirit, the old Chinese society seeks pleasure harmful to both. What a contrast between the two extremes! If we decide to reform our society, we should start from the root of the problem. Creating public parks is one good way to help reform our unhealthy society. The word "gongyuan" is generally interpreted as "public garden." As a matter of fact, it is not a garden, for in the old China, the garden was considered a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

190

luxury and therefore unnecessary. Wealthy families had both surplus money and leisure [to build gardens], but the common people could barely afford food and clothing. How could they possibly afford gardens? ....As everyone knows, people from poor families in Beijing like to hang out on the streets. This is because their houses are usually cramped and unclean. Staying inside all day long stifles people. So they must come outside to breathe some fresh air. What is true for a family is also true for a city. When residents of the city live without a clean place for relaxation, they are like a person who stays in a small, filthy house and who is not allowed to get out....Therefore, public parks in a city are an indispensable element in people's lives second in importance only to clothing, food, and shelters.26 Simple and straightforward, the editorial called for the creation of public space to reform the life style of the common people of Beijing. The author, speaking for the city government, tried to convey several messages. First of all, by attacking the old social customs, he attempted to create a sense of public spirit and belonging to the city. Secondly, he implied that the government had responsibility for the people's health and morals. Since public parks were something modern cities had, China should also have them. Finally, the editorial addressed a different kind of audience. Even though the language used in the article was colloquial, the tone suggested that the author was not hoping to reach the average citizen of Beijing and create mass demand for parks. Common people rarely read the municipal gazette, and there was little the average urbanite could do to establish public parks. Rather, the article was aimed at an elite audience who, out of a sense of moral responsibility and the need to reform society, would demand the establishment of parks. It was also this urban elite, as we will find out soon,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

191

who played an important role in managing and financing public parks of the city. There was a real need for building public space in the city. Prior to the early Republican period, there were very few options of recreational activities. Those who were eager to maintain their mental and physical health had to go to the Merry Pavilion in the Outer City, the Sea of Ten Temples close to city's northern periphery, or the Western Hills out in the suburbs. Even in these places, as discussed earlier, facilities were limited. Therefore, creating public parks close to city neighborhoods became a necessity, not a luxury. The climate of Beijing created an added need for building public parks. Because of its proximity to the Loess Plateau and the harsh Mongolian wind that blew over the plateau from northwest of the city, Beijing was notorious for its arid air. "Ten feet of red dust" (shizhang hongcheri) was a common expression used to describe the weather conditions in Beijing. Because it rained so infrequently, Matteo Ricci complained that "the whole place is usually dustridden. With every slightest breeze an extraordinary amount of sand penetrates into the recesses of each house and every room. There is no way to guard against this grit, and everything is always dirty."27 Logically, plots of fresh, clean land within the city where people could go and rest in their leisure time could change the situation considerably. By providing grass and trees and thus reducing the level of dust in the air, modern parks could improve conditions throughout the city.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

192

In addition to concerns about mental health and the living environment, public parks also promised a means of social control. Reformers argued that a lack of public space contributed to unhealthy life styles and even to crime. "Where else could our urbanites in their spare time turn to," pointed out a writer in another article, "except for them to seek pleasure from alcohol, gambling and women."28 Then he turned to the practice in Western countries. In Paris [in 1917], public parks total 11,000 acres; in London, eighteen parks and thirty-nine playgrounds cover 3,800 acres; and the public parks in Berlin also total seventy acres, in addition to children's playgrounds. Why did these countries build so many parks on precious urban land? Because they realized that by creating public parks the government could change people's bad behavior and foster gentility and civic virtues.29

The public relations campaign launched by the Municipal Council was immediately followed by concrete plans and feasibility studies. However, when it actually came to beginning the task of creating public parks, the Council soon confronted two problems: a shortage of land and a shortage of funds. First, hundreds of years as the imperial capital had led to the overdevelopment of Beijing's real estate. Few open spaces existed within the city walls that were large enough to build public parks. Of course this does not mean that there was no open space and greenery in Beijing. Former imperial temples and gardens, the Altar of Earth and Grain and the Temple of Heaven, for example, commanded large pieces of lands at the best locations. Situated in the center of the city, the Altar of Earth and Grain occupied about

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

193

360 Chinese mu (60 acres) of land while the Temple of Heaven in the Outer City took up over 500 acres. With the imperial dynasty gone, these places had been neglected and allowed to become overgrown and untidy. As a Western traveler observed, The squalor reached to the Palaces. Even the open space around Ch'ien Men was littered with refuse. Weeds pushed their way between the uneven flagstones of the pavement. The stone guardian lions looked grimy. Grass grew on the roof of the Dynastic Gate. Gaps in the railings showed where pillars had fallen....This Sacred Enclosure, in theory rigidly forbidden to all, became the resort of idlers and beggars who sprawled there in the sun out of the way of traffic.30 It was at this time that the Municipal Council, pressed hard to find space for public parks, began to consider turning these formerly sacred places into public parks. The transformation seemed to make both political and economic sense. Politically, the Municipal Council differed in important ways from the institutions set up by the imperial government to handle urban affairs. It was a governmental agency charged with the task of transforming the old urban landscape so as to improve people's lives. The imperial gardens and temples, vestiges of the old city, should give way to the people's urgent need of public space. By transforming the private gardens into public space, the Republican government could demonstrate its resolve to break with China's imperial past and show its concern for people's welfare. After all, China was a young Republic now, and the members of the Municipal Council intended to take this opportunity to show that they were social reformers campaigning seriously for

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

194

people's rights and representing rigorously the public interest. Former temples and imperial gardens also made sense as park-sites for economic reasons. Most already had lawns, bridges, benches, and other park amenities. Transforming these spaces for public use could build on these resources, rather than having to construct them from scratch. For this reason, the building of Beijing's Central Park (zhongyang gongyuan), for instance, based on the Altar of Earth and Grain, was far more cost-effective than the construction of the Central Park in New York. In New York, as Rozensweig and Blackmar describes, the municipal government had to purchase land from private real estate dealers, build architectural landmarks, create the Great Lawn, excavate and fill an artificial lake, and so on. The Beijing government avoided much of this initial cost. We should not be surprised to find the Municipal Council so budget­ conscious. Lack of funding was the biggest barrier to public works in early twentieth century Beijing. As already discussed, the Council received two major forms of revenue: allocation from the central government and municipal taxes. The latter was derived from taxes levied on stores, vehicles, theaters, prostitutes and brothels, the sale and mortgaging of property, and rent paid for the use of the city property. China did not have an income tax. This tax system proved quite inadequate to fund all the work the Municipal Council wished to undertake. In order to make the best use of the available funds, the city government had to make certain choices. The public works that received

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

195

priority for funding were street-cleaning, garbage collection, road pavement and expansion, and repairs and maintenance of the city's Ming sewer system. Public parks could not compete with these projects, since they were less directly linked to public health and welfare. Proponents of the Central Park, Beijing's largest recreational space, had to confront serious funding shortages. An account of this venture will show how the Municipal Council overcame this problem by turning to the private sector for help. At the same time, by raising funds from city residents, the Council helped to mobilize public support and participation in the movement for public parks. The Altar of Earth and Grain was among the first few places to be considered for transformation into a public park. The idea of opening the altar to public visits was raised by Zhu Qiqian, Minister of Communications at the time. In 1913, when many parts of Beijing were still closed to the average citizen, Zhu had a chance to enter the altar on a special occasion. The altar impressed him with its thousand giant ancient cypresses towering toward the skies. Grouped around the atlar, the grove of these old trees had been planted about the time that the altar was built in early Ming. The seven largest trees, planted to the south of the altar, were believed to have survived from the ancient temple of the Jin and the Yuan dynasties.31 Also important was the fact that the altar occupied a valuable piece of land right in the center of the city, to which city residents had easy access. Zhu's original interest in public use of the area stemmed from his feeling that to keep it closed was a waste of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

196

its beauty. In the third year of the Republic (1914), Zhu, now president of the Municipal Council as well as minister of the Interior Ministry, sponsored preparatory work for the creation of what was later named the Central Park. (So named because of its central location in the city.)32 The Municipal Council was unable to finance construction of the park on its own. Citing budgetary constraints, the Beiyang government also declined to fund the project. In order to raise money, the Municipal Council decided to have the expenses shared by city residents. In June of 1915, the Council set up the Central Park Administration. According to its bylaws, any resident or sojourner in Beijing who wished to become a member of its board could do so by contributing an annual fee of 50 yuan. The contribution for corporate sponsors was 500 hundred yuan. An executive committee composed of 34 members was to be chosen to serve a one-year renewable term. Contributions were considered a charity and no profits were expected. Donors, consisting largely of the city's prominent political figures and members of the social elite with business and government connections, volunteered money to support the public project and to enhance their own public image. The response to the Council's initiative was overwhelming; 40,000 yuan was raised in less than six months. Xu Shichang, Zhang Xun, Li Yuanhong and Zhu Qiqian topped the list of individual donors, with contributions between 1,000 and 1,500 yuan. Corporate donors included the Ministry of Communications, the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of China and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

197

the Beijing Electric Company.33 Local merchants comprised the majority of those donors contributing between 50 to 100 yuan. Before long, enough funds had been raised to cover the cost of the project.34 Under the leadership of an elected executive committee, the Central Park project began. Although an independent entity, the Central Park Administration had to report to the Municipal Council on its progress and activities. The Council also ruled that the administration could not demolish or renovate any ancient buildings in the park. The buildings, maintained the council, were the property of the government. Finally, the Council set the entrance fee, for it wanted to prevent any attempt to set up illegal or unfair prices at the public's expense. In the course of construction, the council also financed a few projects; it spent 562 yuan on construction of the South Entrance, 1,772 yuan on the wooden bridge across the river, and more than 10,000 yuan on the Central Park lake.35 At the end of 1915 Central Park was opened to the public. Although managed directly by a consortium of private citizens and merchants, it was under the strict supervision of the Municipal Council. It was the first modem park in Beijing. Flowers and trees were planted, paths and roads laid out, restaurants and tea houses opened, and playgrounds, ball fields, and archery courts put in place. There was also plenty of space for visitors to rest and picnic. Park restaurants catered wedding ceremonies and lavish banquets. The existing halls were used to house the central library reading rooms of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

198

Ministry of Education, the sanitation exhibition rooms of the Ministry of the Interior, and even to exhibit products manufactured by the inmates of model prisons in Beijing.36 In short, the park became a gathering place where city residents could simultaneously relax, enjoy the scenery, communicate, and be educated. Soon after the opening of Central Park the city government expressed its intention to open more parks for people living far from the city center. For several months [since the opening of Central Park], various arrangements [in the park] have been perfected, and residents have welcomed them whole-heartedly....But to speak seriously, given the fact that the capital is such a big city with such a large population, Central Park alone cannot satisfy the demand of our residents. Because Central Park is inside the Imperial City and can only serve the residents around it, people living out in the southern city find the location very inconvenient. Actually, the household registration reveals that more people lived in the densely settled Outer City, and it is very difficult for them to find a place to relax.37 Thus, following the success of the Central Park, the Municipal Council opened a few more parks, providing recreation areas for city dwellers. Among them, the Altar of Agriculture Park, close to the southern border of the city, opened in 1915; the Beihai Park in the old Imperial City, in 1925,38 the Jingzhao Park, based on the Temple of Earth outside the northern city wall, in 192539 The famous Summer Palace and the Forbidden City were added to the list in the late 1920s. Smaller parks were also built near market places, providing greenery to beautify the landscape and to fend off Beijing's notorious dust. Meanwhile small street parks provided a temporary refuge for

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

199

market goers. Noticing the change, a commentator remarked, "places where only the emperor and empress strolled in the past have now become a wonderland for the citizens."40 The opening of public spaces was not accomplished easily. There were charges of corruption within the Central Park Administration. In 1923, the Board of Directors submitted a letter to the Ministry of the Interior, accusing Zhu Qiqian and Wu Bingxiang, Beijing's Police Chief, of occupying public property for their private use. They were also charged with financial impropriety in mishandling the Central Park's 100,000 yuan in annual revenue. These acts of violation, the letter alleged, had been permitted to continue because of Zhu and Wu's power and influence. The committee urged the government to take over the management of Central Park.41 Although the government promised to investigate the case, it did not agree to the official take-over proposal, because official management might prevent present and potential donors from supporting the park. For some time, rumors spread about the corruption inside Central Park. An investigation by the Interior Ministry of the corruption charges found no evidence of criminal behavior. Zhu Qiqian founded the Chinese Society for Architectural Study (Zhouguo yingzao xueshe) on the premises of Central Park, and used his influence to

funnel funds from the park's proceeds to the scholarly association. But he did not pocket public funds, nor did he occupy public property for personal use, as charged. The negative publicity, however, made some visitors reluctant to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

200

patronize the park. According to the Park Administration's own statistics, when the scandal was publicized in 1912, the annual sale of entrance tickets (a good indicator of visitor volume) dropped 35 percent, to 18,000 from 28,000 the previous year. In monetary terms, this presented a loss of 10,000 yuan in revenue.42 Most important, the corruption charges revealed a serious problem in the Central Park Administration, where privileged government officials tended to overshadow their civilian counterparts, thus causing resentment and acrimony within the new public park movement. In addition to internal conflict, there were two other sources of opposition to the park administration. One locus of resistance was those conservatives who lamented the fading of the old glory of imperial power. They could hardly tolerate the government's efforts to build public parks on the sites of former imperial temples or gardens, nor could they share the joy that public parks brought to the common people. Yu Qichang, for instance, used the word "degenerate" or "downgrade" (fei) in his description of the revolutionary events in the public parks movement. As he put it, Between the Gate of Heavenly Peace and the Wumen Gate were the Temple of Ancestors on the left and the Alter of Earth and Grains on the right. They were built during the Ming, inherited by the Qing, and degenerated as public parks during the Republic.43 Yu was born in Beijing during the Guangxu reign and had served the Qing court as an official. To him two disasters had ruined the old capital city, the Boxers Rebellion in 1900 and the 1911 Revolution. He claimed that during his

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

201

adulthood, he witnessed this former "beautiful and imposing" capital go through a movement "from prosperity to its decline and to degeneration."44 Works attacking the public use of imperial space appear to have been far outnumbered by those that support the movement, but for those who felt that the essence of the city resided in the sacred nature of such sites, the building of public parks was a distressing event. The other oppositional force came from architectural experts, who argued for preservation of historical sites. They opposed the movement to turn former imperial gardens and temples into public parks because any change would reduce the historical value of these places. Instead of public parks, they suggested that these places be turned to museums with little modification. In this way the public could have access while the historical monuments could be preserved. The preservation advocates had only limited success. While they were unable to stop the majority of imperial gardens and temples from being transformed into parks, they did manage to convince the Beiyang government to keep the Forbidden City as a museum. The Palace Museum was established in the 1920s following the expulsion of the last emperor, Puyi, and remains to this day, with little change, a major historical monument.

The Impact of Public Space on Urban Society

Public parks in Beijing in the early twentieth century played an

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

202

important role not only in the transformation of the urban environment but in the life of city people. The first obvious change was in the political arena. Prior to 1911, when public spaces were not available, political activists usually held their secret meetings in their homes or in the few public establishments available, of which brothels were a notable example. The creation of public parks changed the situation considerably. Access to public spaces provided a venue in which city people could express in mass rallies their commitment to the idea of democracy in a sovereign republic. In 1915, for example, when a rally was held in the Central Park to protest against the Twenty One Demands of the Japanese and the compromise by the Beiyang government, over 300,000 Beijing citizens gathered in the park on one day.45 Also, with the influence of Western democratic ideas, politically oriented gatherings by civilians-mostly intellectuals and students-took place in the new public places. During the famous May Fourth Movement, students held a number of the mass rallies at the square in front of the Gate of Heavenly Peace (Tiananmen). The plaza, much smaller than the Tiananmen Square of today, had been opened to the public only a few years before. In 1925, the Tiananmen Square again became a political focal point during what was known as the May Thirtieth Movement in Shanghai (protesting the murder of a Chinese worker by a Japanese shop foreman). The December Ninth Movement (an anti-Japanese protest) was launched from the same spot in 1935. Finally, on October 1,1949, Mao Zedong raised the five-star red flag from the Gate of Heavenly Peace,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

203

proclaiming the People's Republic of China. Anticipated by neither the government nor the people involved, public spaces became an arena for popular political participation and facilitated the political transformation of modern China. Commercially, the modern parks in the city replaced the traditional temple fairs as popular gathering places for city dwellers. This change was accompanied by the emergence of Western style department stores, such as the new Eastern Peace Market (Dong'an shichang) in downtown Beijing, which provided ideal shopping places for all kinds of goods—from antique to modern, from Chinese to imported. Also gaining popularity were Westemstyle theaters. The modem convenience of stage, lighting, and seats proved more popular than the traditional noisy, open, and outdoor stages. Although the audience still preferred local operatic performances, they could now enjoy them in modern theaters, not at the temple fairs. Having lost both their trading and entertainment functions, the tradition of the temple fairs gradually declined. In some cases, the locations of former temple fairs were converted into public parks. Indeed, modern parks competed with both the modern department stores and theaters to fulfill people's need for shopping, recreation, and entertainment. The old buildings of the Altar of Earth and Grain, formerly dedicated to serious ceremonies performed by emperors and the imperial court, now were turned into movie theaters, souvenir shops, restaurants, and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

204

cafes, and so on. The open fields in the parks were turned into children's playgrounds, equipped with swings and merry-go-rounds. There were also skating rinks, tennis courts, and mini-golf courses for sports enthusiasts. These athletic facilities, however, catered primarily to well-to-do visitors, as ordinary park-goers could not afford their high use fees. Nevertheless, the existence of these facilities demonstrated an eagerness of Western-influenced residents of Beijing in the parks, as well as the willingness of the park administration to satisfy their demands. In addition to offering a wide array of recreational facilities, the parks also stressed educational functions. In the Central Park, as we have noted, there was a public library, an exhibition hall of public health, and an exhibition of prison products. These educational facilities drew large crowds of parkgoers every day. The Central Park library, opened in 1916, was one of the first public libraries in China. Here, city residents could borrow books, journals, and newspapers for reading in the spacious reading hall. The library was donated and managed by the Ministry of Education. Since the majority of Beijing's residents were illiterate, most of the people who frequented the library were scholars, students and other educated people. Nevertheless, the intent of its service, open to all who could use it, set the library apart from the many private libraries whose collections were available only to a select and elite clientele. Sometimes the educational activities in the parks were carried to an

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

205

extreme and bordered on indoctrination. Maxim Pavilions (geyanting), for example, were erected in the Central Park and in the Jingzhao Park (formerly the imperial Temple of Earth) for the purpose of instilling "proper norms of behavior” in park visitors. The park administrators attempted to cultivate civic virtues and proper behavior among the park visitors, exposing them to a world of both Confucian moral teachings and Western learning. The mottos ranged from advice for young people suffering from emotional depression to ethical and moral suggestions for good, socially acceptable behavior to the latest scientific discoveries in the West. Displayed prominently near the entrance gates and along the park paths, the colorfully illustrated maxims represented an attempt by social reformers to use the newly created public space to forge an urban identity among city people.46 The permanent exhibition of prison products was sponsored by the Ministry of Justice in the eighth year of the Republic (1919). A seven-room hall roofed with traditional glazed tiles was built near the public library in the Central Park for displaying handicraft goods manufactured by prisoners serving time at Beijing's First and Second Prisons.47 The exhibition and sale of prison products were meant to demonstrate the rehabilitative role of the new republican correctional system. At the same time they presented an underlying Confucian confidence in the human capacity for reform. The park was an appropriate place for this display, because the general public could be expected to have an interest in learning that criminals, threats to all, could

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

206

mend their ways and became useful members of society. Obviously, by selling the products produced by cheap prison labor to the visitors, the Ministry of Justice also hoped to make a profit that could help defray the expenses of operating Chinese prisons, which were often inadequately funded. Two accounts in the diary of Lu Xun, a famous modern writer, written in 1919, provide a glimpse of the kind of products manufactured by prisoners. Went to the Central Park to see the exhibit of the prison products and bought a dozen blue-checked towels for three yuan... In the afternoon, asked Zipei to buy nineteen pieces of furniture [made by the First Prison], and met Quansishi.48 Promotion of public health had always been a major issue in the public park movement of Beijing. The city government reiterated time after time in its propaganda otgan-Municipal Gazette-th e importance of the public park to the mental and physical welfare of city residents. "The public park is to a city", argued an editorial, "what the lungs are to a person. If we want to exchange urban dust for rural fresh air, we will have to set up more public parks so as to protect the public health of our citizens. This is particularly important for a densely populated metropolis. All municipal governments in Western countries have realized this and are sparing no effort to encourage the establishment of public parks."49 The importance of public health was also stated in nearly all park constitutions. The goal of the Central Park Administration, for example, was to "work for the public health, promote respectable entertainments, and maintain fine social customs."50 The planning and construction of the park

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

207

reflected this determination to create a healthy environment for park goers. Apart from the hundreds of ancient cypresses, numerous groves of fruit trees and flower beds were planted. Paths winding through the park were paved, so that people could avoid inhaling harmful dust while enjoying the refreshing surroundings. Perhaps the most important effort of the government in promoting public health was carried out in the Central Park. In 1917, the Ministry of the Interior erected an exhibition hall for public health. It was located in five former Divine Depositaries (shenku) in the Altar of Earth and Grain. This permanent exhibit was aimed at spreading scientific knowledge of public health among city people by displaying medical specimens, dissection charts, and anything else that could enhance public awareness of health issues.51 The exhibit, administered by the Public Health Department of the Beijing Municipal Council, was open free of charge during regular business hours of the park. It drew large crowds of visitors daily.52 To coordinate with the exhibit on public health education, the Central Park Administration also built a number of physical exercise facilities, such as the tennis courts and skating rinks, as mentioned earlier. In 1915, the Physical Fitness Society of Beijing (jiang xing hui) was founded. This comprehensive exercise center contained billiard rooms and archery targets. Also, a number of martial arts coaches were hired to teach boxing and fencing to members of the society. This program proved extremely popular, and membership soon

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

208

expanded to over one hundred. It was the first martial arts training organization in the city.53 A few years later, in 1919, a twelve-room ball-game center (jian qiufang) was constructed in the southwestern corner of the park, and to meet popular demand, eight additional rooms were added to it two years later.54 Park-going also became an integral part of recreation and entertainment for the majority of visitors who were not athletically inclined. Jermyn ChiHung Lynn, an American educated Chinese official, recalled that, for twenty coppers, the Central Park was open to everybody.55 An American Christian missionary survey conducted in 1918 and 1919 concluded that, in spite of the admission fee, four thousand to five thousand people a day went to the Park during the summer, and a hundred or two in the winter. When there were festivals or special occasions, admission to the park was usually free, and on these days 10,000 people would fill the park's sixty acres.56 To these people, the park was more than a place of relaxation. It soon developed into a multi-functional environment, where people could enjoy a variety of activities-recreational, educational, commercial, cultural, social, and political. There were as many reasons to visit parks as the number of visitors themselves. The park with its varied features welcomed people of all interests. In the Central Park, modern cafes and traditional tea houses, Chinese r e s ta u r a n ts a n d W e s t e r n d i n i n g h a lls , e x is t e d s i d e

by

s id e a n d c o m p e t e d fo r

customers, offering special attractions late into the night. Both playing tennis in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

209

the sunshine or having a poetry-wine gathering under the green-shaded pavilion became part of the park's harmonious scenery. In a way, it represented the ideal of a modern China, in which the best of East and West coexisted in a healthy environment of hard-working citizens. Some Beijing residents made daily use of the park, others paid regular visits on weekends, still others went to the park only for special events, such as weddings, funerals or anniversary celebrations. Among facilities available in the park, however, the tea houses were the most popular, because of the century-old love for tea and tea houses among Beijing urbanites. When the Central Park, and later the Beihai Park, both situated in crowded downtown areas of the city, were first opened, their tea houses began to replace the tea booths in many commercial markets, like the Dong'an Market, that had been popular for years.57 The social role of tea houses, however, remained the same. Instead of fostering new patterns of mixed-class socializing, the tea house catered to predominantly middle-class crowds.58 Urban intellectuals were especially fond of the new public parks, enjoying the poetic flavor that the picturesque environment added to their rendezvous. They held frequent get-togethers for drinks and intellectual exchanges, planned or impromptu. Moreover, the quiet corners of the park provided inspiration for those writers who preferred to do their intellectual work in solitude. It was at one of the tea tables in the Central Park that Lu Xun finished his translation of a Russian novel, The Little John. During the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

210

month of July in 1926, Lu Xun went to the Central Park almost every afternoon and sat in the quiet Siyixuan tea house to translate the book. Since the location was in the southwestern comer of the park at the foot of a hillock and overlooking the water, tourists taking the main road would rarely pass by, and it was extremely peaceful for reading, writing and reflecting.59 While the parks attracted literary men like Lu Xun, most visitors came to seek leisure and relaxation. Within the pleasant environment, one could easily spend the whole day. In fact, park-goers began to develop a new life style. One resident remembers vividly an almost idyllic day at a tea house in the Central Park during 1920s: Each tea table is provided with four trays of nuts....There are no strict business hours. If you come in the morning and make yourself a pot of tea, you may stay as late at night as you want. Or, if you take a stroll somewhere or go to lunch in the park, your seat at the tea house will be kept for you....If you are tired from chatting with some old friends, you may take a nap in the chair, after which you will find the sun already setting in the west, shining through the tree leaves, and cicadae chirping at the ears. You ask the waiter to change the tea leaves and make another pot. After sipping a cup, you will feel refreshed all over. At this time, a newsboy will quietly put a newspaper on your table, which you may leaf through if you want and drop one or two coppers on the paper after reading it. A moment later, he will come back and take them away, still without a word.60 Another Western tourist describes, Here in the late afternoon, especially when the peonies that were one of the attractions of the place were in bloom, willowy Chinese girls, the local belles, were accustomed to promenade in the midst of their families to show off their lovely figures, encased in far less lovely Shanghai brocades and silks. Their flat slippered feet detracted somewhat from the picture, but they were often thin and graceful as antelopes.61

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

In this way the Central Park and other public parks contributed to the social life of Beijing. Serving as new centers of traditional and modern entertainment and recreation, they achieved both their educational and recreational goals with tremendous success. This was partly due to the fact that construction and upkeep of the parks was sustained despite the warfare and political upheaval that plagued much of China during the early twentieth century. Nor did the constant change in governments force a reduction in park support as it undermined many other municipal construction projects. The park administrations, funded primarily by merchants residing in Beijing, managed the public parks independently of the local government. A contemporary social worker observed that the board of directors, "composed of socially responsible bankers, lawyers, and prominent men of all professions,"62 who had donated funds to the public park projects and treated them as an act of philanthropy, were "isolated from the game of politics, and as a result, the Central Park has been independent and making steady improvements ever since, despite the numerous revolutions and coups d'etat."63

Conclusion

Historians of modern China have recently discovered the expansion of a public sphere in late imperial and early Republican Chinese society. The works of Mary Rankin and William Rowe, for example, focusing on late

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

212

imperial Zhejiang and Hankou respectively, point to community-centered, extra-bureaucratic elite activism as the major force behind China's modern political transformation.64 David Strand's work on early Republican Beijing, further demonstrates how new organizations, such as the police, political parties, chambers of commerce and labor unions, developed in parallel with old institutions, such as guilds, volunteer fire-fighting and militia corps, charities, labor gangs, and elite mediation.65 In short, recent scholarship suggests that the public sphere expanded rapidly, taking advantage of the state's inability to extend itself aggressively into new areas of social life.66 This chapter differs from these scholars in its approach to the public sphere. First of all, it dealt with the public sphere in its physical form, i.e. public space. By examining the process by which private and imperial gardens and temples were transformed into public parks in Beijing, we have seen the contraction of the imperial sphere and the expansion of public space. In many ways the transformation of space in the capital city was a revolutionary movement. Between 1914 and 1924, in only about a decade, nearly all former imperial gardens and temples were thrown open to the public. The pace of change was indeed breath-taking if we take into account the fact that the concept of the public park (gongyuari) had not even existed before the founding of the Republic. Undoubtedly, the spatial transformation would have been meaningless without a corresponding change in the city people's mentality and activities. We have seen how enthusiastically the city

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

213

residents embraced the idea of public space by frequenting the newly created parks and by participating in all kinds of educational and recreational programs cleverly designed and implemented by the park administration. It is important to point out, however, that those who benefitted the most from these new arrangements were largely people from the upper and middle classes. This chapter differs from other interpretations of the public sphere in still another important way. Instead of attributing the expansion of the public sphere to the waning role of formal state power, I have tried to demonstrate that both the state and the local elite played critical roles in the public park movement of Beijing. The Municipal Council, the local state apparatus, initiated and implemented the Central Park and other park projects in the city, and launched effective publicity campaign to promote this contribution to the people's welfare. Local merchants and private bankers shouldered much of the financial burden of these parks and successfully managed them even during the tumultuous years of Chinese warlordism. Thus, official and private forces together made possible the transformation of public space and contributed to the change in the urban milieu of modern Beijing. The public parks that emerged in early twentieth century Beijing were inspired by Western experiences. Like similar spaces in the West, Beijing's parks provided pleasing natural scenery in contrast to the crowded conditions of the city. They also offered a wide variety of facilities, including children's

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

214

playgrounds, theaters, restaurants, and gymnasiums for recreation and entertainment. But the Chinese parks did not represent a romanticized vision of rural landscape, as many earlier Western parks did. Beijing's parks were built on the sites of former imperial gardens and temples, and the imperial urban planning that stressed an architectural hierarchy was not compatible with the English natural landscape tradition. Instead, Chinese public parks developed their own distinctive characteristics. First of all, Chinese parks provided public space for mass participation in modern China's political change. Unheard of in imperial times, frequent mass rallies held in the newly created public spaces heightened city people's demand for a political voice in national policy-making and demonstrated their strong commitment to the idea of democracy in a sovereign republic. Secondly, the educational function of public parks was especially emphasized. The social reformers of the public park movement in Beijing considered the parks an ideal arena in which to effect social change. In the parks, campaigns for public health, moral cultivation, and the fight against illiteracy were pursued through free exhibitions, reading rooms, and Maxim Pavilions. By popularizing new types of recreation and entertainment in the public parks, the reformers also hoped to eradicate harmful social customs, such as gambling and prostitution. Finally, while in the West almost all public parks were funded by the municipal or central government, the Chinese parks during this period relied on private donations and admittance fees to stay

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

215

open. Although they remained public and non-profit institutions throughout our period, the admission fees prevented many poor people from visiting the parks. Since China in the early twentieth century had a large economic underclass, many urban residents were unable to visit these less than public "public parks." In this failure to serve all classes of people, the public park movement compared poorly with its Western counterparts, demonstrating again the incompleteness of social change that tainted an otherwise spectacular and revolutionary transformation of space in modern Chinese history.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

216

NOTES

1 For discussions of the physical layout of imperial Beijing, see Nancy Shatzman Steinhardt, Chinese Imperial City Planning, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), pp.1-13; Meyer, The Dragons of Tiananmen; Chang Yinghwa, "The Internal Structure of Chinese Cities: An Ecological Approach," Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1982); and James Geiss, "Peking Under the Ming, 1368-1644," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1979), pp.23-50. 2 Steinhardt, Chinese Imperial City Planning, p.4. During the Qing period, the Inner City was reserved exclusively for Manchu and high ranking Chinese officials. While the ethnic segregation was not strictly enforced toward the end of the dynasty, the Qing court made no attempt to change the physical structure of the city with the exception of some names of streets and gates. 3 George N. Kates, The Years That Were Fat: Peking: 1933-1940, (New York: Harper, 1952), p.69. 4 According to Gilbert Rozman, in 1851 the population of the Imperial City was estimated at 60,000. That figure is derived from the calculation of 8,966 regular households and 1,081 households of shopkeepers. An additional 72 people were also listed as dwelling in temples. See Gilbert Rozman, Urban Networks in Ch'ing China and Tokugawa Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p.292. 5 The population of the Inner City in 1851 included 67,477 regular households, 14,252 shopkeepers and 794 temple dwellers, translating into approximately 400,000 to 500,000 residents. About forty percent were Chinese and the rest were Manchu bannermen. More than one-half the 116,000 bannermen in China resided in the Inner City. See Rozman, Urban Networks in Ch'ing China and Tokugawa Japan, p.292. 6 "The Outer City was known as the Chinese City. Land in the southeast and southwest portions were not built up, but the north-central area along the wall shared with the Inner City was undoubtedly the most densely populated area in Peking. This was the commercial center where thousands of small shops lined countless intersecting streets. Merchant and artisan householders lived in the back of their stores and many peddlers and hired laborers rented lodgings in the crowded courtyards...At the very least, the Outer City contained 300,000 inhabitants and it is likely that the actual total reached in excess of 450,000 or 500,000." Rozman, Urban Networks in Ch'ing China and Tokugawa Japan, p.293. 7Ibid., p.73.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

217

8 In the Rehe Summer Resort built during the reign of Qianlong, the Emperor sometimes deliberately made use of his great hunting parties, or elaborate religious ceremonies, to gain far-reaching political ends. "[A]lthough this place was created wholly for imperial sojoums...its situation was far enough north to make it a natural place of assembly, annually, both for the nomadic Mongol nobles and their religious leaders. On the pretext of sport or worship, they could be summoned to visit an Emperor to whom they owned an uneasy allegiance." Kates, The Years That Were Fat, p.212. "Ibid., p.182. 10 Frederic Wakeman, The Fall of Imperial China (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p.57. 11 The Temple of the Sun was set within its great enclosure outside the walls and to the east; that of the Moon, its somewhat lesser counterpart, lay to the west, opposite. The Temple of Heaven is to the south, balanced across the main axis by the Temple of Agriculture, with which it creates a pair. The Altar of the Earth, lying outside the walls in the north, was the true counterpart of the Temple of Heaven. As one moves about within and without the metropolis, the sun and moon, the heavens and earth, are thus constantly in mind. See Kates, The Years That Were Fat, p.72. 12 Quoted from "Sheji," Baihu tongyi, compiled by Ban Gu (32-92 A.D., a historian and literary writer) and others of the Eastern Han dynasty (25-220 A.D.). 13 From "Lishi qizhuan," Honshu (History of the Han), China's first biographical dynastic history, compiled by Ban Gu. 14 Steinhardt, Chinese Imperial City Planning, p. 14. 15 Jermyn Chi-Hung Lynn, Social Life of the Chinese in Peking (Beijing:China Booksellers, 1928), p.59. 16 Gamble, Peking: A Social Survey, p.236. 17 David Shuyler, The New Urban Landscape: The Redefinition of City Form in Nineteenth-Century America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p.66. 18The history of the New York Central Park is subject of a study by Roy Rosenzweig and Elizabeth Blackmar, The Park and the People: A History of Central Park (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

19 Encyclopedia Americana, p.445. 20 Gilden Cranz, The Politics of Park Design: A History of Urban Parks in America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), passim. 21 Joanna F. Handlin Smith, "Gardens in Ch'i Piao-chia's Social World: Wealth and Values in Late-Ming Kiangnan," The Journal of Asian Studies 51:1 (1992):57. 22 Gamble, Peking: A Social Survey, p.237. ^Ibid., p.237. 24 Deng Yunxiang, Lu Xun yu Beijing fengtu (Lu Xun and cultural customs of Beijing), (Beijing: Wenshiziliao Press, 1982), p.114. 25 SZTG, no. 18 (1915): 31. 26 SZTG, no.2 (1914): 9-10. 27 Quoted by Jame Geiss, "Peking under the Ming," p.45. 28SZTG, No.2 (1914):2.

29 "Gongyuan yu shimin zhi guanxi" (On the relationship between public parks and city people," SZTG, No.1-19 (1917-1918):1. 30 Bredon, Peking, p.64. 31 Zhu Qiqian, "Zhongyang gongyuan jianzhi ji (A record of the construction of the Central Park)", in Tang Yongbin, et al, Jiudu wenwu lue (Cultural relics of Beijing), (Beijing: Shumu wenxian press 1925), p.58. 32 Beijing shi zhigao, vol. 1, pp.508-511. 33 Beiping shi zhongshan gongyuan shiwu baogao shu (Report of Administration of Central Park in Beijng), (Beijing, 1936), pp.3-4. 34 JSH, pp. 183-185. 35 JSH, p.187. 36 Gamble, Peking: A Social Survey, p.223. 37 "Shigongyuan zhi zengshe (On the establishment of more municipal parks)" SZTG, no.18 (1915), p.89.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

38 SZTG, no.18 (1915), p.2; also Shizheng jikan (Municipal quarterly), no.l (1925), pp.1-2. 39 Jingzhao gongyuan jishi (A factual account of the Jingzhao Park), (Beijing, 1926), passim. 40 Tang, Jiudu wenxvu lue, p.56. 41 Archives of the Ministry of the Interior, serial 1001:4274. (Nanjing: China Number Two Historical Archives.) 42 Peiping shi zhongyang gongyuan shiwu baogao shu, pp.180-195. 43 Yu Qichang, Gudu bianqian jilue (A brief account of transformation of the ancient capital), (Beijing, 1913), p.2-a. ^Ibid., p.5. 45 Gamble, Peking: A Social Survey, p.237. 46 Jingzhao gongyuan jishi, pp. 6-7. 47 Deng Yunxiang, Lu Xun yu Beijing fengtu, p.159. 48Ibid., p.159. 49 "Lun gongyuan yu shimin zhi guanxi" (On the relationship between the public parks and the residents), SZTG (1917-1918):1. 50 "Zhongyang gongyuan kaifang zhangcheng (Regulations regarding opening of the Central Park)," JSH, pp.184-185. 51Zhongyang gongyuan shitouhui baogaoshu (Reports of administrative affairs of the Central Park), (Beijing, 1943), p.17.

52 A fee for the exhibit was charged when it was first opened but was soon abolished. 53 Zhongyang gongyuan shiwuhui baogaoshu, p. 16. MIbid., p. 21. 55 Lynn, Social Life of the Chinese in Peking, p.61. 56 Gamble, Peking: A Social Survey, p.237.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

220

57 Deng Yunxiang, Lu Xun yu Beijing fengtu, pp.91-93. 58Even the middle dass customers congregated in different places catering to their particular tastes. Western educated Chinese liked to gather in laijinyuxuan, a modern-style hall of entertainment, whereas old-fashioned literati preferred chunmingguan, a traditional tea house. See Tan Qixiang, "yicao yimu zongshi qing" (Everything boils down to sentimentality), in Dushu (Reading), No.7 (1992), pp.23-31. 59Ibid., p.95. 60Ibid., pp.98-99. 61 Kates, The Years That Were Fat, p.110. 62 Jermmyn Chi-Hung Lynn, Social Life of the Chinese in Peking, p.61. “ Ibid., pp.61-62. 64 Mary B. Rankin, Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China: Zhejiang Province, 1865-1911. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986); Rowe, Hankow: Conflict and Community in a Chinese City, 1796-1889. 65 Strand, Rickshaw Beijing: City People and Politics in the 1920.

“ For the latest discussion of the public sphere and tivil society debate, see "Symposium: 'Public Sphere'/'Civil Society' in China? Paradigmatic issues in Chinese Studies, m" in Modem China, 19:2 (April, 1993).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

221

Chapter Five Water Supply

Introduction

Water to a city is like blood to the human body. An abundant supply of wholesome water is a basic requirement of civilized urban life, and a modern water system is an important component of any municipal infrastructure. With the growth of Beijing in modern times, such a system was acutely needed, but its development was slow and painful. In this chapter, I will trace the origin and development of Beijing's water supply system during the early twentieth century. I will study the Beijing Water Works Company, the role it played in developing a modern infrastructure, and the social impact it had on the lives of city residents. I will discuss the problems of financing and construction of the waterworks, the distribution and provision of running water to city residents, and the role of waterworks in public sanitation and fire-fighting. Making its first appearance in the Chinese capital dturing the final years of the imperial period, the Beijing Waterworks Company struggled for its very survival throughout the entire forty years of its existence. Beset by political turmoil, financial stringency, and a flawed marketing strategy, Beijing's waterworks failed to reach a broad base of urban residents. For many years, running water served only a limited well-to-do clientele, remaining a privilege for the elite rather than a right of the public.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

In researching Chinese business history, studies of modern industrial enterprises have focused on textile, cement, mining, and cigarette companies. No scholars have yet studied public utility ventures. Similarly, the few available studies on the modern industrialist Zhou Xuexi have concentrated on his commercial enterprises, such as the Qixin Cement Company. His involvement with the water project of Beijing, one of his most important accomplishments, has never before been examined. Yet public utility companies often had more impact on people's lives than modern industries. Moreover, their development tells us much about the emerging public sphere, where forces of the state interacted with competing urban interest groups. If approached from the perspective of urban development, the business history of these public utilities can also provide insight into the growth of the modern municipal infrastructure, city planning, and technology transfer. The story of Beijing's water supply illuminates the development of an important part of the city's infrastructure, which underwent significant transformation during the early years of the twentieth century. The pattern of water consumption in Beijing can be divided into three periods. First, from the founding of the city to the turn of the twentieth century, well-water constituted the main source of water. Since Beijing was not near any major river systems, the city could not rely on river-water. Individual households usually either shared wells sunk through collective efforts with their neighbors or bought water from merchants. In general,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

before the twentieth century, drinking water in Beijing was of inferior quality and inconvenient to obtain. Because of primitive technology and the high cost of drilling, most wells drew their water from less than three meters down. For this reason, the majority of wells in the city prior to the early twentieth century produced highly alkaline water, whose taste was so disagreeable that residents referred to it as bitter water (kushui). Throughout the whole city, there were only five well-known natural wells deep enough to produce sweeter water. Of these, four were located in the Inner City and one in the Outer City.1 As good-tasting water was scarce, wealthy people, including foreigners in the legation quarter, usually bought their water from peddlers, who brought it by wheelbarrow from the few natural wells or from the distant Western Hills. Throughout the imperial period, the court also consumed spring water brought daily by imperial carts from the Jade Mountains. Needless to say, the long­ distance transport of water by animal power was inefficient. From the very beginning, the pattern of water consumption in Beijing was hierarchic, with the rich and imperial families enjoying water from a very limited number of quality sources while the overwhelming majority of city dwellers lived on kushui from shabbily drilled wells (tujing ). Even so, both groups continually

experienced shortages, as the sources of supply were so limited. The second phase began around the turn of the nineteenth century, when innovations in well-drilling technology lead to the widespread use of foreign wells (yangjing). The new method was first introduced after the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

occupation of Beijing by the Allied Expeditionary Force after the Boxer Rebellion. Suffering themselves from the shortage of quality water in Beijing, unable to tolerate the bitter water that most city residents drank, and frustrated by the limited quantity and inconvenience of water fetched from the springs in the Western Hills, the foreign troops began to sink wells themselves, using technologies similar to those in their home countries. The first yangjing, sunk by the German troops in Yingtaoxie Street outside of Qianmen, became very popular among the occupying allied forces. Upon the return of the Qing court from Xi'an and the withdrawal of Western troops, the well was sold to a Chinese merchant, who soon started selling the sweet water to city residents. This marked the beginning of yangjing drinking water in Beijing.2 Impressed by the quality of the water, the Ministry of Commerce soon commissioned Japanese engineers to sink four more yangjing to provide water to the imperial palaces.3 As China entered the Republican era, the new well-drilling technology began to slowly spread across the city. Thanks to the new method, significantly superior water could be draw n from aquifers ten meters beneath the ground. Purer and cleaner than that from tujing, the yangjing water became increasingly popular among urban consumers. The distribution system, however, was a handicap to the diffusion of the new water supply technology. The distribution of water was "a monopoly firmly held by the water carriers' guild, most of whom were originally natives of Shangdong province."4 The guild, which had a membership of 2,500 men,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

225

maintained tight control over the water supply and the profits from spiling water. It was represented by hundreds of water houses, each consisting of a water merchant and a number of water carriers. However, because there were no government regulations controlling the sale of the water, disputes frequently arose between the water merchants and their consumers. For years, the Shandong water merchants and carriers were notorious for their poor service and monopolistic practices. Often referred to as "Waterlords," the merchants and carriers unscrupulously raised their prices and cheated on their quantities. If confronted, they could make it difficult for a city resident to obtain any water at all. During the final years of the dynasty, such abuses malpractice were common in the water industry, and consumers found themselves with no channel through which to voice their grievances.5 Running water did not become available to Beijing residents until the Beijing Water Works Company was founded in 1908. This was the final phase in the development of Beijing's water supply. As we will discuss in greater detail, running water did not immediately replace either Chinese bitter wells or Western wells. For much of the first half of the twentieth century, it provided only a small portion of water supply. Facing popular resistance to buying water, the water company had to struggle to win over consumers with clean, convenient, and affordable water. Gradually, however, water treatment plants were set up and water pipelines were extended through the streets of the city.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

226 The Birth of Modem Water Supply

Beijing was not the first Chinese city to develop a modem water supply system. Two other large cities, Tianjin and Shanghai, established waterworks earlier, in 1898 and 1904 respectively. Financed and operated by Western companies, however, these waterworks were designed for the exclusive use by Westerners in the foreign concessions.6 Following the Boxer Rebellion and inspired by Western experience, residents in Beijing repeatedly petitioned to the central government for the establishment of water works, but to no avail. The Qing government rejected these requests on the grounds that it lacked funds and trained personnel to undertake the venture. However, this denial was reversed during the New Policies reform. In addition to different political climate, the demand for a modern water system was reinforced by the quest for new ways to fight and prevent fires.

Table 14. Frequency of Major Fires in Beijing, 1821-1948 Year

Number

1821-1840 1841-1860 1861-1880 1881-1900 1901-1920 1921-1940 Total

8 5 8 6 4 4 33

Frequency (years) 2.5 4 2.5 3.3 5 5 2.9

Source: Qing Shi Lu, pp.404-538; Beijing lishijinian, pp.115-247.

Fire was a major danger in many pre-industrial societies, and fire-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

227

fighting was a matter of utmost concern for people living in large urban centers. As Table 14 indicates, devastating fires were no stranger to Beijing throughout the Qing dynasty. Since the traditional Chinese buildings were largely built of wood, they were very susceptible to fire. A number of these fires took place in the Forbidden City, where the emperors and their consorts lived and worked. Thus, vigilance against fire had a high claim on the minds of officials. In the Forbidden City, a total of 308 huge decorative urns were kept filled with water at all times to guard against fire. Given the auspicious name "Big Ocean in front of the Gate" (menqian dahai), these urns were checked by court runners every five days to ensure that they were full. During the winter, fires were kept burning under the urns to keep water in them from freezing.7 Despite these extremely precautions, fires continued to rage in the Forbidden City, causing tremendous damage in terms of both property and human lives.8 Fires among the civilian population were no less frequent and hazardous. During the first decade after 1900 alone, three major fire caused extensive damage. In 1903, the buildings that housed the Board of Revenue caught fire, disrupting business for months. In 1905 the official Granary in North Beijing burned to ground, destroying much of the city's grain reserves. A third great fire destroyed the Beijing Industrial Training School in 1908, causing several hundred fatalities.9 Such fires could not be fought effectively without an efficient modern water supply. Even fire hydrants were unheard of in Beijing before the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

228

twentieth century. In late imperial times, the Gendarmerie Division and the Five Battalions were responsible for fighting fires, but as they became less effective during the second half of the nineteenth century, the responsibility for fighting fires was taken over by Water Associations (shuihui), private voluntary associations supported by local gentry and businessmen. These groups had to rely on well-water, an extremely inconvenient and not always accessible source. Moreover, shuihui used primitive equipment, consisting of "squirting" buckets and hand-operated engines only capable of throwing a small stream of water fifteen to twenty yards.10 Thus, securing a reliable and abundant water supply for fire-fighting became an important consideration in Beijing's construction of a modern water works. On April 18, 1908, three officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce (Nonggongshang hu) memorialized the Empress Dowager Cixi and Emperor Guangxu for the establishment of a water works company. In the memorial, Fu Ting, Xiyan and Yang Shiyi, heads of the ministry, claimed that "as the government agency in general charge of agricultural, industrial and commercial affairs of the country, we hold it necessary to promote businesses which would benefit the livelihood of the people. The creation of running water for Beijing, critical for public sanitation and fire-prevention, is one such undertaking.n11 The officials acknowledged that to provide running water for China's capital city was no easy task. First, geographic conditions in Beijing were

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

229

unfavorable for building waterworks. We have already noted that Beijing was geographically distant from any large rivers. Before the project was carried out, the ministry explained, special efforts would have to be made to locate adequate water sources. Second was the problem of financing the project. Huge indemnities in the nineteenth century and the increasing reluctance of the provinces to remit their land taxes had made the Manchu court economically weak, unable to finance a major capital project. Urban taxation, except in the form of small commodities taxes, was unheard of in the Qing system. Nevertheless, the dynasty felt it alone could be trusted to carry out modern industrial development in China. As Wellington Chan points out, it was an issue of political culture-one which sees the public good coming from the state, not from the private sector.12 Furthermore, the central bureaucracy was unwilling to delegate such a project to the private sphere. The movement for local selfgovernment was barely underway, and to allow political autonomy in the nation's capital was unacceptable. Although funding of the modern water supply project would have to come from private sources, the government insisted on retaining control over its management. The method chosen was to establish privately-managed enterprises with official supervision (Guandu shangbari). Guandu shangban had facilitated many other modern industrial

enterprises, including mining, manufacturing, and textile ventures, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Here, for the first time, however,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

230

the same combination of private financing and official managerial involvement would be applied to a public utility project. To provide leadership for this capital-intensive project, the Qing government was determined to select someone with both experience and competence in business. The recommendation of Zhou Xuexi for the job was no accident. By this time Zhou had already established himself a modern Chinese industrialist.13 More important, as we shall see, he had political connection with Yuan Shikai, a powerful figure in late Qing who later became the president of the Republic of China. Zhou Xuexi was the fourth son of Zhou Fu, a protege of Li Hongzhang and former Governor of Shandong, governor-general of Jiangsu and Zhejiang, and governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi. From childhood, Zhou Xuexi had had a strict classical Confucian education and had received a juren degree after passing the 1893 provincial examination in Anhui. But he was unsuccessful in passing the highest metropolitan examination. After three years of fruitless effort, Zhou Xuexi gave up studying and purchased the official title of an expectant Prefect in 1896. In the years that followed, he served as the general manager of Kaiping Mine Bureau near Tianjin, an official-run enterprise sponsored by Li Hongzhang in 1877. In 1901, Zhou Xuexi went to work for Yuan Shikai, then governor of Shandong Province, as the Superintendent of the Shandong Advanced School (daxuetang). Both Yuan and Zhou Fu had worked for Li Hongzhang in their early days. The two men

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

231

became very good friends and Yuan's eighth son married Zhou Fu's eighth daughter. The patron-client relationship that developed between Yuan Shikai and Zhou Xuexi was to be of crucial importance to Zhou's later career as an industrial entrepreneur. In 1902, Yuan Shikai was promoted to Governor-general of Zhili and Zhou Fu took over his position as governor of Shandong. By the rule of avoidance, Zhou Xuexi had to resign his position as school superintendent to avoid a conflict of interest resulting from his relationship with his father. He decided to follow Yuan to Zhili and help Yuan carry out his reform programs there. In 1902, Yuan appointed Zhou chairman of the newly established Zhili Mint (yinyuanju). Soon, impressed by Zhou's ability, Yuan began entrusting him with the responsibility of developing industries in Zhili. In 1903, Yuan sent Zhou to Japan to study industrial development there. Upon his return, Zhou was appointed head of the provincial Bureau of Industries and Technology (gongyiju). During his four-year tenure, Zhou created the most successful program in the Qing empire for the promotion of industry. The modern enterprises he invested in and managed, in particular the Qixin Cement Company and the Luanzhou Mining Company in particular, brought him both experience and a reputation as one of the nation's premier industrial entrepreneurs.14 In 1908 Zhou again followed Yuan, who had been promoted to membership in the Grand Council, from Tianjin to Beijing. It was on Yuan's

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

recommendation that Zhou was chosen to organize the Beijing Waterworks Company. Zhou Xuexi's career pattern thus far had been decisively shaped by his political connection with Yuan Shikai, without whose patronage Zhou could hardly have launched a successful career as a modem industrialist. In addition, Zhou, like many other officially supported entrepreneurs, benefitted greatly from the political environment of the New Policies reform. This movement, officially sanctioned by the Qing court, was the last effort of the officials such as Yuan Shikai to modernize China along Western lines during the imperial period. Sim Dousen, who became vice-president of the Beijing Water Company, was also a close follower of Yuan Shikai and a nephew of Zhou Xuexi. The technical personnel, who proved crucial for the project, were transferred from the Bureau of Technology and Industrial School, both in the province of Zhili, strongholds of Yuan Shikai's reform efforts.15 Thus as a prot£g£ of the reform-minded Yuan Shikai and with experience gained from his previous industrial ventures, Zhou began working with his subordinates to plan a modern waterworks in the imperial capital.

The Structure of the Beiiim Water Comvanu J

/

U

#



The Beijing Waterworks Company was set up with three goals: to provide wholesome drinking water to the residents of Beijing, to supply water for fire-fighting, and to perform some functions of public sanitation, such as street cleaning. Thus the company differed from other modern industrial

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

233

enterprises of the period in one important way. It served a much wider clientele and potentially affected the life of most city people. As Graph 4 shows, the Beijing Waterworks Company used a multi-tier system to rank its employees. There were five classes in all. On the top, the first class, was the government overseer, followed by the president, vicepresident in the second class; water plant managing directors, chief engineers, machinist and accountants in the third; lab technicians and mechanics in the fourth; and skilled workers in the fifth. The board of directors and auditors fell between the first and the second class. The water company was chartered by the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce (nonggongshang bu), which provided supervision and protection over the company. Organizationally, the overseer (jiandu), appointed by the ministry, was the government's representative. According to the firm's constitution, the position of overseer was given to someone who had both ministerial rank and experience in coordinating commercial activities. He was appointed to an unlimited term by the Ministry of Commerce; the company had no say in his appointment or continuation. When a vacancy occurred, the company president reported to the Ministry of Commerce, requesting a reappointment. As the highest ranking officer in the company, the overseer was responsible for matters directly connected with the government. For example, if the water company needed to expand or sought official protection, the overseer would serve as liaison between the company

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Graph 4. Organizational Structure of Beijing Waterworks Company

234

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

235

and the appropriate governmental agencies. It was also his responsibility to ensure that all the personnel of the company, from the president to the workers, were performing their jobs satisfactorily. If someone's performance was below expectations, the overseer could instruct the Board of Directors to take disciplinary action. In short, the position of the overseer represented the tangible supervisory presence of the government at the company. An important clause in the charter, however, stipulated that the overseer had no power over the daily business decisions of the company.16 The Board of Directors (dongshiju) was comprised of seven men, each of whom must have invested at least 1,000 shares in the company. Elected by the shareholders, the directors served two years. Renewal was permitted as long as two-fifth of the board was new blood each year. A lottery was usually conducted to decide who could remain after serving one term on the board. The directors' most important responsibilities were to review all company business decisions and management strategies. The directors were directly accountable to the shareholders and had to report to them, through the president of the company, at the annual shareholders' meeting. In the event that the directors found the president of the company incompetent, or the business in financial trouble, they could seek permission from the official overseer to convene an extraordinary shareholders' meeting. In additional to providing general counsel, each director specialized in one aspect of the company's management by studying Western experience in that one aspect.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

236

Together, they contributed to improving the company's business. The Board of Directors was a powerful governing body and determined the future of the Beijing Waterworks company.17 An important feature of the company's organizational structure were the two positions of auditor. Holding the same rank as the Board of Directors, the auditors also had to own at least 1,000 shares each in the company. They worked together as the chief financial officers of the company, responsible for inspecting all financial records and accounts. All receipts and expenditures had to bear the auditors' stamp of approval before they took effect. The auditors were also in a position to make suggestions to both the management and the board of directors on how to cut costs and explore new avenues of profit.18 The president of the Beijing Waterworks Company served as the chief executive officer. He was in charge of the daily operations of the company, including charting short and long term development plans, proposing the annual budget to the general shareholders' meeting, and deciding such matters as hiring, dismissing and evaluating employees. The president was accountable to the Board of Directors and to the shareholders' general assembly. If the company needed major expansion or if changes were to be made in the constitution, the president would bring these matters to the board of directors and the general assembly for deliberation. The vice-president was to assist the president in all of the above tasks. Both the president and vice

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

237

president served for three-year renewable terms. They also were required to make a substantial investment in the company, usually more than two thousand shares each, though this requirement could be waived with the approval of the shareholders. For more than ten years Zhou Xuexi served as president, and his nephew Sun Dousen as vice-president of the company.19 Employees below the second rank were appointed by the president, supposedly on merit. They included the managing directors of the two water plants at Sun River and Dongzhimen, the chief engineer and one chief machinist of each plant, the chief accountant and the chief inspector. Requiring personnel with technical expertise and facing a shortage of trained water experts, the company began by hiring European (Danish and German) engineers to supervise technical work. Later, however, Chinese engineers with Western education and training assumed these important posts. Zhou Xuexi spent much of his time seeking qualified technical personnel to work for the company. From the Zhili Bureau of Technology, he recruited Chinese engineers just returned from study abroad. From the Advanced School of Industry, which he had founded, he hired graduates specializing in modern machine technology. Zhou also employed foreign engineers, usually w ith attractive compensation and benefits.20 Throughout the company's existence, the chief machinists and chief engineers were all foreign experts or Chinese engineers with Western education. Zhou made it clear from the beginning, however, that the foreign personnel only advised the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

238

company on technical matters, not on business administration. This was to ensure Chinese managerial control and to prevent foreign encroachment on the decision-making process. While the overall management structure of the water company resembled that of its Western counterparts, there was one key difference: the firm had no legal counsel. As we will see, there were many legal disputes between the water company and other companies or individuals, but litigation played a minor role in their settlement. Mediation and government arbitration were preferred. The lack of institutional channels to resolve business disputes and the weak role of legal procedures in the Water company were characteristic of modern Chinese business history. As discussed earlier, all high-ranking officers had to purchase a minimum number of shares to show their allegiance to the company. Usually they were chosen from among the large shareholders. The shares required for directors and auditors were 1,000 and those for the president and vice president were 2,000. This requirement, however, could be waived by a 7/10 vote of the shareholders. There was no share requirement for employees in the third, fourth and fifth ranks, but they had to be recommended by shareholders with at least 500 shares or by company employees already in the third or fourth class. As in other Chinese businesses of the time, anyone seeking employment in the firm had first to obtain a guarantor to insure against financial loss to the company should the person fail to perform

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

satisfactorily. The guarantor was usually a shareholder with a minimum of 500 shares, or a reputable shop with sound financial records.21 The annual shareholder's meeting was held in February, usually the beginning of Chinese New Year. At the assembly, the president and the Board of Directors would report on the performance of the firm during the previous year and present a budget for the coming year. Elections would be held for new Board directors, the president and vice-president, and the auditors. According to the company bylaws, only shareholders who were over twenty years of age and held more than 100 shares could initiate proposals, and only those with more than 500 shares could vote. Since shareholders received one vote for each 500 shares owned, larger shareholders exerted a greater influence on company policy and only they were eligible for positions on the board and as officers of the firm.

Table 15. Monthly Salary Scale for Employees of Beijing Waterworks Co. Rank

n TTT

JLU

VI

V

Base Salary

300 200 /lf\ uu 50 40 30 24 20 16 14 12 10

Merit Salary Category 1 2 3 150 100 on JU 25 20 15 12 10 8 7 6 5

75 50 15 12 10 7 6 5 4 3 3 2

38 25 7 6 5 3 3 2 2 1 1 1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

240

Note: All figures in Chinese yuan. Source: BZGDS, p.23. The compensation for company employees was divided into basic salary (zhifeng) and merit salary (gongfeng). The overseer, board of directors, and

auditors, however, received no salary. Instead, they were given a monthly expense account of 300 yuan for the overseer and 60 yuan each for the directors and auditors. Employees from Class 2 to Class 5 received salaries. As Table 14 demonstrates, the president and vice president were paid 300 yuan and 200 yuan respectively. Class III employees earned from 30 to 60 yuan, class IV 16 to 24 yuan and Class V 10 to 14 yuan. Merit salary was also divided into three categories in each class: in Category One, the merit salary amounted to 50 percent of basic salary; in Category Two, 25 percent; and in Category Three, 10 percent. The decision on which category of merit salary was given depended on how much contribution employees were judged to have made to the company. In addition, those who worked in the company for a certain number of years could also receive a maximum of three pay raises at three-year intervals. Billed as seniority salary, the first pay raise represented 10 percent of the basic salary for a given class; the second, 15 percent; and the third, 25 percent. The company charter especially stipulated that technical personnel, such as engineers, mechanics and foreign technicians, would be treated differently; their salaries and raises were not subject to the above regulations.22

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

241

For forty years the organizational structure of the water company remained basically the same. The firm was in private hands under the supervision of the state. In many respects, it was run like a modern Western enterprise, conforming to what Zhou Xuexi referred to as shanglu (commercial laws) and market forces. On the other hand, the company perpetuated many practices of traditional Chinese business, such as the requirement of guaranteeship before recruitment and the prerequisite of stock purchases for its senior employees. Patronage and personal connections were also visible in the company practices. Nevertheless, in many other ways, the water company resembled the prototype of a capitalist venture. Zhou demonstrated his eagerness to seek out qualified technical personnel for his company. The salary scale also reflected his determination to follow a Western industrial model in its system of reward and punishment.23 Thus, drawing on Western examples and Chinese traditions, the firm developed, almost single-handedly, Beijing's modern waterworks and supply system.

Financing the Waterworks

Financing the construction of the waterworks was the water company's first concern. Zhou began by petitioning the government for financial support. In response, the state granted the company an interest-free loan of 150,000 taels of silver (the equivalent of 210,000 yuan at the exchange rate of 1.4 yuan per tael) a year for the first three years of operation. This grant of seed money to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

242

get the project started would, the government hoped, allay fears and attract more capital from potential private investors. This loan reflected a keen understanding of the difficulties involved in attracting long-term investment capital. Many industrial ventures in China, such as railroad construction, suffered from investors' the reluctance to defer dividends during the period before operations began. In their memorial to the Qing court, the officials of the newly founded Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce argued that capital might be particularly difficult to attract for a concept so completely new as running water. At the same time, they predicted that the cost of the project might be very high, with little or no profits during the first few years. In the West, said the memorial, government usually financed public utility projects in order to encourage infrastructual innovation and improvement. Since the waterworks in Beijing were crucial for public sanitation and fire-fighting, they should be financed at least in part by the government. In Zhili in recent years, many modern enterprises, supported by government funds, had proved successful. Compared with those endeavors, the water supply project to the capital was especially significant, because it would affect directly the lives of city people. Therefore, Ministry officials requested that the court authorize the governor of Zhili to loan the company 150,000 taels a year for three years, out of which the company could pay guaranteed dividends until it began operating at a profit. It was hoped that, once the business prospered, the company could pay back

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

243

the loan in installments.24 The Qing court approved this request. The other support provided by the Qing government was duty-exempt status for all its imported equipment. This applied in particular to all lijin taxes for imported materials passing through the Chongwen Gate, Beijing's official custom house. In arguing for exemption, the company cited earlier precedents. "It is well-known that the railroad company enjoyed tax-exempt privilege for its imported materials. " a memorial pointed out, "For the purpose of public sanitation and fire-fight in the capital area, the waterworks project is even more important than railroad construction. "2S With little struggle the Qing court granted the request. Having secured financial backing and preferential treatment from the state, the water company proceeded to raise capital by issuing common stock. Since there were no stock markets in China during this period,26 common stock was usually issued through a native bank, which served as guarantor for its sale. This practice was significant, because in an environment of low capital accumulation, the arrangement provided an institutional mechanism for promoting investment. Also, as shareholding was a fairly new phenomenon, the practice enhanced investors' sense of security by allying new business ventures with reputable native banks. The water company's goal was to raise a total of 3,000,000 yuan, divided into 300,000 shares, each worth ten yuan. To reassure investors who might worry about the profitability of their investment and the safety of the water

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

business, the company chose a native bank in Tianjin to be its financial guarantor. The reason for choosing Tianjin rather than Beijing was two-fold. First, as the premier business center in North China, Tianjin was more developed in trade and commerce than Beijing, thus offering an optimal environment for business activities such as issuing stocks. Second, Zhou Xuexi, head of the water company, had begun his entrepreneurial career in Tianjin. While working for Yuan Shikai, Zhou had personally invested over 30 million yuan in about ten industrial enterprises there between the late Qing and Beiyang periods.27 As a result, Zhou was familiar with the business world there, and had close connections with many bankers in that city.28 According to the agreement, the native bank of Tianjin (yinghao) was in charge of raising capital on behalf of the water company. Serving as the headquarters of fund-raising, the yinhao designated stock-sale responsibilities to well-known shops and native banks in such cities as Beijing, Shanghai, Hankou, Baoding, Tangshan and Zhangjiakou. All of these subcontractors were branch offices of the Tianjin yinhao, except for in Canton, where the Risheng shop was chosen. These banks charged the water company a 2.5 percent fee for their service. While the targeted 3,000,000 yuan was being raised, the Tianjin yinhao and its nationwide agents also agreed to provide the company with either long term or short term loans, at an annual interest of 7.2 percent for each. Usually for every 1,000 yuan of capital raised, the bank or its agent was entitled to lend a loan of 600 yuan to the water company at a rate

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

245

favorable to the bank. Consequently, both the service charge and the promise of the loan encouraged the yinhao and bank's agents to work with dedication and without delay.29 One important feature of the money-raising campaign was the decision to exclude foreign capital. The company constitution included an article stipulating that "the company shall raise Chinese capital only. All citizens of China, officials, gentry, merchants and average citizens alike, can purchase shares and become shareholders. It is unacceptable for Chinese to buy shares with foreign capital and if discovered those shares will be declared void."30 The company also forbade the transfer of shares to foreign parties. This policy was set for both political and economic reasons. The water project began only a few years after the Boxer Rebellion, a movement in which the xenophobic sentiment of the Chinese people reached its apex. By excluding foreign capital, the company hoped to appeal to a growing sense of nationalism among potential investors. At the same time, the water company did not want to risk loss of management control by allowing foreign investors to participate in the project. This was particularly important because Western equipment and technology were vital to the project's success. In short, the refusal to employ foreign capital reflected the rise of a more self-conscious nationalism in Beijing in 1908, three years before the Rights Recovery Movement, during which the government were under ferocious attack for accepting foreign railroad loans. Besides from ensuring the "Chineseness" of the shares, the company

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

246

offered investors the option of purchasing their shares in three installments. Based on the price of ten yuan per share, investors could pay four yuan per share in the first installment, and three yuan each in the second and third. To encourage shareholders to purchase shares in one lump sum, however, the company also announced that for every ten shares paid for in full at the time of purchase, an additional share would be granted as bonus. This amounted to a nine percent discount on the share-price. Both the bonus shares, called honggu, and the regular shares, or zhenggu, produced dividends and accrue

capital gains. It was hoped that by using such incentives, capital could be raised quickly and efficiently. This strategy of making the share-price only 10 yuan and permitting payments in three installments was aimed at the small investor. According to Sidney Gamble's study of the salary structure in Beijing, the average income of the 283 Chinese families surveyed was between eight yuan and 550 yuan a month. Those earning more than 50 yuan worked predominantly in modernstyle businesses, such as the post office, factories, libraries, schools and the railroad.31 It is likely that they were the main targets of this share policy although there was little quantifiable data on investors' occupations. The water company developed specific regulations on how the profits from annual revenues were to be distributed. First of all, there was a guaranteed annual dividend return of 9.8 percent.32 The practice of guaranteed dividends was critical to getting investment in an environment

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

247

where other sources of investment like usury and commerce were more lucrative. Net income, excluding the guaranteed dividend and regular expenditures for salaries, equipment purchases, machinery depreciation, would be divided into twelve equal parts. One part would pay back the government loan (including the Zhili loan); once that was paid up, the money would still be sent to the Ministry of Commerce as seed-money for other new industrial enterprises. Two parts would be set aside for bonuses to lower-ranking company employees. Two more parts were for bonuses to the president, vicepresident and directors of the company. The remaining seven parts would go to bonus dividends tyuli) to be divided equally among the shareholders according to the size of their holdings in the company.33 It was planned that in lean years, top-ranking officers of the company would voluntarily defer payment of their salaries to pay back the company debt. If the company made too little profit to pay shareholders the guaranteed dividend, the company was authorized to borrow money for this purpose, using the company's assets as collateral, but this procedure could not be used for more than two consecutive years. If the financial situation had not improved at the end of two years, the shareholders agreed to suspend payment of dividends until such time as they could be paid from profits.34 In fact, during its operation, the company's books were almost always in the red, and both the executives' salaries and the shareholders' dividends were frequently deferred. The company raised another two million yuan by issuing stocks in 1923. The new funds did not go

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

248

into investment and expansion, but were spent to pay off the accumulated backlog of deferred dividends.35 The utilization of shares (gu) to raise money, though on the face of it a modern practice, was actually an adaptation of traditional Chinese business methods. As such, it represented more than simple profit sharing; it reflected the interpersonal relationships among partners in a business venture. The rights of a partner in a company depended on how many shares he possessed. The more shares, the more powerful the investor. Moreover, shares could be issued for reasons other than direct investment. Shares could be used as rewards and incentives. People whose contribution of time, skill (or occasionally, tools) could receive labor shares (laoli gu).36 Finally, in traditional businesses, shareholders were entitled to a fixed amount of annual dividends, referred to as guanli, regardless of how well the company performed. In the West, with the possible exception of interest on bonds, there was no equivalent to guanli, which amounted to a guaranteed income for the investors. If a traditional Chinese enterprise performed outstandingly, shareholders also enjoyed hongli, additional dividends beyond the guanli The Beijing Waterworks Company shared most of these features of the traditional Chinese businesses. While the use of shares to raise funds was traditional, the method by which investors were recruited was not. To ensure successful fund-raising, the water company launched a public relations campaign. Newspapers, the only

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

mass media available, had emerged rapidly in late Qing to inform Chinese urban residents of the news in China and around the world. Anxious to get its message across to a wide audience, the company spared no expense in making use of the press. In a series of advertisements in popular local newspapers, the company enumerated the financial advantages of investing in the water project. First, it stressed the attractions of the guaranteed annualized yield of 9.8 percent, and emphasized the additional ten percent bonus available to investors who paid for their stocks in full instead of relying on three installments. Secondly, the water company compared itself favorably with other ventures. Many new companies, said the advertisement, incurred deficits in their early years, making it impossible to distribute dividends. However, since the water company was backed by an official interest-free loan, investors could be sure of receiving their dividends. Thirdly, for investors who installed water taps in their own homes, the company would offer an attractive discount.37 In addition to the tangible incentives, the company also elaborated on the advantages of establishing modern water supply in Beijing. The waterworks in Shanghai and Tianjin were business successes, the advertisement pointed out, and despite the fact that in these cities water could easily be drawn from nearby rivers, city residents there subscribed to running water in great numbers. Since Beijing had no nearby rivers, running water could enjoy a monopoly unmatched by the other two cities. Moreover, as

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

electricity had become an increasingly popular urban amenity in Beijing, generating huge profits for the electric company, there seemed no reason to think that running water, needed by more urban residents than electricity, would not also be. profitable. Finally, the advertisement argued, the nature of the water supply venture could ensure profitability. Unlike other businesses, where industrial materials might be costly and profitability could vary, the water company would draw its source from natural water. Once the plants, aqueduct, tunnels, taps and pipes were installed, investors could enjoy a constant flow of profits. Also unlike other commodities which might not be needed by everyone or might not be in frequent use, water was a crucial part of everyone's daily life. The fact that the patterns of per capita water consumption were fairly stable meant steady income for investors. Lastly, unlike other businesses, the water company would operate twenty-four hours a day, all year around. In this way, both machinery and man-power could be put to the best use. All these factors, the company concluded in the announcement, suggested that the water business could only expand and profits could only rise.38 While there was some truth in these arguments, the advertisement was essentially a propaganda piece aimed at potential investors. In reality, the picture was not as rosy as this document suggested. Yet the remarks honestly reflected the euphoria of the company executives in the early stages of operations and should not be read as a deliberate attempt to defraud the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

251

public. Indulgence in wishful thinking proved foolhardy, however, as the company soon learned. Vigorous fund-raising, government support, and the chance of potential profits did attract adequate funds. This fact refutes the arguments of some scholars who have studied capital accumulation and investment in nineteenth century China. They have argued that there was no money for investment, or that potential investment capital was put into usury and other non-productive uses. While we cannot deny that some industries continued to suffer from under-capitalization, government support and the use of mass media, two factors unavailable earlier, contributed to a successful campaign in this case. Beginning in July 1908, when the stock-issue was announced, the public response was enthusiastic. The marketing strategy of the company, coupled with special dividend guarantees, made the water project appear to be a highly profitable investment. Although it is difficult to document the number of investors or the average size of investments, it is very likely that the two groups which purchased the most stock be gentry officials and merchants. The fact that the company was financially backed by the imperial government gave all investors a sense of security. The links to the government were especially important in attracting gentry and official investment. Also, the promise that the company would be rim independent of government and according to commercial laws must have been very appealing to investors. Finally, their confidence in the success of the project was undoubtedly bolstered by the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

appointment of Zhou Xuexi, a well-known entrepreneur with governmental connections. It did not take long before the 3,000,000 yuan w orth of shares were subscribed in full. Among the shares, a substantial amount was bonus shares, as investors took advantage of the special offer. So enthusiastic was the response that the water company had to return 300,000 worth of surplus shares.39 The task of raising 2,700,000 yuan needed was successfully completed.

Purchasing Equipment

The technology of modern water supply systems originated in the West. Centuries earlier, Europeans had pioneered modern water supply technologies such as the aqueduct and methods of filtration. Urban growth during the nineteenth century produced a demand for new sources of water and new methods of distribution. By the late nineteenth century, cities in the United States were providing more water to their residents than were European cities. By the early twentieth century, both American and European cities provided large quantities of treated water through the use of filtration and chlorination plants. This water supply technology reached China at the turn of the nineteenth century. Shanghai and Tianjin, China's largest sea ports and foreign concessions in the late nineteenth century, were the first to introduce running water. In these two cities, however, water projects were undertaken

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

253

by Western engineers using European equipment. The Chinese lacked both plumbing expertise and experience in waterworks engineering. Moreover, no Chinese manufacturer was able to make the kind of equipment needed for such projects. Beijing's waterworks managers found they could save money by hiring Chinese engineers with experience in other similar projects; most had been trained at the Zhili Bureau of Technology. However, no alternative could be found to the purchase of foreign equipment. Once the plan to purchase the necessary equipment was made, Zhou Xuexi and his management staff began to survey foreign trading firms in China's coastal cities for a favorable deal. There was no shortage of bidders. However, most of their quotes, ranging between two and three million taels of silver, were too high. After months of meticulous investigation of dozens of foreign trading firms, the company decided to purchase its equipment from a German firm in Tianjin. Siemens, or ruiji yanghang as it was called in Chinese, was a logical choice. Having undertaken the project in Tianjin a few years before, Siemens was familiar with Chinese business practices and had experience in trading waterworks equipment. Secondly, having spent several years locating appropriate water sources for the Tianjin waterworks project, it had already surveyed the topography of the Sim River, which was to be the source for the water supply of Beijing. Not least in importance, the price the firm offered was acceptable. On June 8, 1908 the Beijing Waterworks Company and Siemens signed a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

254

contract, in which Siemens took responsibility for providing the latest equipment, such as steam engines, towers, boilers, and pipes. The contract between the Chinese and the German company was laid out in meticulous detail, as was the custom in Chinese contract negotiations. One goal of the Chinese managers was to assure the provision of the highest quality equipment and latest technology in the execution of this project. Zhou Xuexi and his staff kept abreast of developments in waterworks operations in the West throughout the life of the project. For example, when the managers learned that steel water-pipes were gaining acceptance, Zhou insisted that the 150 kilometer long water pipes for the Beijing project, originally specified to be made of iron, should be made of steel as well. The firm selected four German water engineers to come to Beijing to supervise installation. Their salaries were to be 10,000 taels, bargained down from 30,000 taels, payable upon completion of the project. The total cost of the imported equipment was valued at one million taels, to be paid in five installments. The water company made it clear that the project must be completed within 22 months from the date of the contract. Thus, all the equipment had to be shipped to Beijing within ten months, with the first shipment taking place within five months. Penalties were set at 5,000 taels for each week's delay after the twenty-two months deadline.40 Despite the management's care in setting the terms of the agreement, the project was not carried out exactly according to the contract. Problems

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

255

arose in two areas: delay in the shipment of equipment and flaws in the quality of the machinery. Even the engineers' drawings had not reached Beijing by August 1908. By October 10,1908 the first shipment of watertowers should have arrived, but had not. By the end of the year only onefourth of the equipment had arrived, causing serious delays in construction. It was only by February 1909 that water pipes and other equipment were ready for installation.41 The reasons for these delays were two-fold. On the one hand, in drawing up the contract, neither side had realistically calculated the time involved in shipping from Germany to China. Cargoes coming out of Germany had to travel by train to a German harbor, then travel for months by water to reach Tianjin harbor. There, the cargoes had to be unloaded and reloaded onto trains for Beijing. Even aside from the time needed for manufacturing, the shipment itself took months. Poor weather and erratic shipping schedules could delay a cargo's arrival even further. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that the German manufacturers did not address the delays decisively, despite repeated warnings from the Chinese. Indeed, the Germans did not even bother to reply to many of the appeals from the Chinese company. Linguistic barriers and cultural differences may have played a part in the lack of communication between the two parties, but it was clear that the German's own negligence and irresponsibility also contributed to the breach of contract. Even more damaging than delays was the inferior quality of the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

256

equipment that was sent to Beijing. For instance, within a week after public water taps were installed in the streets of the city, there were over two hundred reports of missing parts, including locks, caps and taps. The water company later found out that the parts had been stolen because the installed taps did not meet the specifications in the drawings and could not be securely fastened to the water pipes. Seeing the loophole as an opportunity, thieves stole large quantity of the parts at night and sold them in the underground market for a huge profit. The problem, however, had been anticipated. On inspecting the parts when they arrived in Tianjin, Zhou Xuexi had commented, "These taps looked ugly and fragile; when installed they surely can be easily damaged or stolen.1,42 At first, he refused to accept them, only agreeing later when Siemens pleaded guilty and expressed a willingness to sell them at a discount. Pressed by the deadline, Zhou made a compromise which not only incurred financial losses later on, but damaged the reputation and credibility of the young water company. Another serious incident of defective equipment involved an exploding water pipe. On November 3,1907, after completing construction of the water treatment plant at Dongzhimen, the water company began testing the reliability of all the installed equipment. When water was forced to flow up the water tower, a defective iron pipe suddenly exploded under the pressure. According to the chief engineer of the plant, the explosion was caused by cracks in the pipe, which had either gone unnoticed or had been passed

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

257

deliberately by the German manufacturer.43 Many minor instances of cheating by the German manufacturer were also discovered. For example, instead of using rubber gaskets in the taps as specified in the contract, the manufacturer used paper cushions, allowing water to leak soon after the taps became functional. Rusting pipes were also installed, spoiling the water quality and leading to further leakage. Poor equipment performance could not be blamed only on the manufacturer. Considerable damage also occurred during Chinese shipping and handling. When twenty-five railroad cars of water pipes arrived at the Qianmen station in Beijing, Siemens contracted the unloading to a local Chinese company, whose workers were very careless. Ma Xu, deputy vicepresident of the water company noted that "pipes were unloaded not by pulley, as they should have been, but pushed down with crowbars."44 As a result, many pipes were dented, and the rust-proof paint peeled off. The company called upon Siemens to send people to inspect the unloading and it urged the local police to prevent irresponsible unloading. These preventive measures came too late, however, as many pipes were already damaged. Lacking replacements, the water company installed many of the broken pipes without regard to future consequences. Despite their errors, the Western trading firm and manufacturers, as suppliers of technology and equipment to China, were of enormous help in the waterworks project. Without the benefit of Western expertise and products, it

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

258

would have been much more difficult to modernize Beijing's water system. The transfer of technology took place purely on commercial terms and the contracts with the Western firm, imperfect as they were, served as the only control over this commercial interaction between China and the West. It is important to note, however, that the Chinese company had little legal recourse, even when the Germans failed to live up to the contract. Although there were commercial arbitration arrangements in China at this time, they were meant for settling disputes between Chinese firms. Foreign firms were seldom taken to court by their Chinese counterparts, partly because the process was timeconsuming and tended to be financially unrewarding.

Locating a Water Source

One of the most important aspects of any modern water supply system is the assurance of a reliable arid abundant water source. Typically, there are two kinds of sources: underground and riverine. The selection of which type depends on availability, quality, and cost-effectiveness. In the case of Beijing, underground water from surface wells had been used for centuries. But because these wells were all sunk with primitive methods, purer water in the deep levels of the aquifer could not be reached. As the surface well-water contained a high level of alkali from the soil, it had a bitter taste and was unsuitable for drinking. River-water tended to be of higher quality, especially after treatment. Usually water drawn from rivers was pooled into one or more

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Map 5. Water Supply System

259

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

260

reservoirs, and then transported to population centers via aqueducts. Anticipating a growing demand for running water and considering the cost factor, the Beijing Water Company decided to draw water directly from a river and build a treatment plant nearby. The selection of a river as a water source, then, became a critical issue for the project. Beijing was not close to a major river system. The Yongding River and Chaobai River, two large rivers, pass to the southwest and the northeast of the city, and were so distant that it would have been prohibitively expensive to build aqueducts from either one to Beijing. The numerous natural springs in the Western Hills northwest of the city appeared to be a good source, but the water there was not enough to supply nearly a million people. Thus the three obvious options had to be abandoned. After months of careful field surveys, engineers decided on the Sun River twenty kilometers northeast of Beijing. The Sun River, sometimes called the Sunhou River, was formed by the convergence of two other rivers, the Sha River, which originated in the Northern Hills and the Qing River, which rose in the Western Hills. After joining near the town of Shaziying outside of Beijing's northeastern Anding Gate, the combined Sun River became wide and deep, carrying sufficient water to be a major water source. The water quality of the Sun River was good, especially suitable for drinking. Since it contained large concentrations of minerals, it was not suitable for industrial use, but since there was little

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

industry in Beijing during 1900's, this factor was simply ignored. The water of the Sun River was dear and abundant all year round except in the summer season, when floods carried sand and soil from the mountains down to the plateau, making filtration more difficult. In north China generally, the volume flow of water varied greatly with the seasons. Most rivers had plenty of water during spring and fall, and particularly during summer. During the winter, water courses might decrease significantly and even dry up. In order to offset the shortage of water in winter, the engineers proposed to built a stone dam around a valley, which would be used to collect water from rainfall and floods during the summer season. The only serious technical problem was how to pump the water to the city, since the city sat at a higher elevation than the riverbed. One strength of the Sim River was its sound ecology and lack of pollution. Far from any major urban center, the river was surrounded by wheat fields. As chemical fertilizers were not used in early twentieth century Chinese agriculture, the river water was not contaminated. Moreover, traditional fertilizers, such as human and animal waste, were only applied to vegetable gardens in this region, and were not a serious problem in the vicinity of the Sun River. Finally, the area around the river system was so sparsely populated that sewage and other wastes presented no danger. Having adopted the Sun River as its water source, the company moved quickly and decisively to protect it from contamination. Soon after the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

decision, the company learned that a leather processing factory had been under construction near the upper reaches of the Qing River, one of the two mother rivers of the Sun River. Alarmed by the likelihood of pollution to the water source, Zhou Xuexi immediately urged the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce to stop its construction. In an official letter, Zhou wrote that "when the waste water from leather processing is dumped back into the river, the water will be putrid and harmful. It would create a danger to public sanitation. If the site of the leather processing factory can not be relocated, at least the waste water should be dumped elsewhere."45 Four weeks after receiving Zhou's petition, officials at the Ministry of Commerce replied that the problem had been solved. They maintained that, since the factory was close to completion, it was impossible to relocate, but they did order the factory, an affiliate of the military, to find a way to contain the waste water, and plans were drawn up to build an underground sewer leading the waste water away from the river. The ministry also invited the water company to send its engineers to the site, to make sure that the river was indeed safe from contamination.46 This incident was resolved without further clashes, and the company succeeded in safeguarding its precious supply. The incident shows the influence that Zhou Xuexi wielded within the government, even against the interests of the military. The ministry's swift and obliging response could only have been obtained by someone like Zhou, who had a mandate from the Qing court and who enjoyed the patronage of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

263

powerful figures like Yuan Shikai.47

Building a Water Infrastructure

Having raised sufficient funds, found a water source and purchased the necessary equipment, the water company began actual construction in 1908. In less than two years, two water plants were built, one near the Sun River and the other at the northeastern entrance of the city outside Dongzhimen Gate. The Sun River plant, some 15 kilometers northeast of Beijing, covered an area of thirteen acres. In the plant, there were ten sand tanks for water filtration, three sedimentation tanks, as well as steam-powered water pumps, engines, and boilers fueled by coal. This plant was designed to pump water from the Sun River and filtrate it in the tanks. The second water plant, half a kilometer northeast of the Dongzhimen, encompassed an area of 6.3 acres. Here were four gigantic square treatment tanks used for chlorination, with a total capacity of 800,000 gallons. These tanks also served as supply reservoirs, holding enough water to supply the city for nine hours. In addition, there were two 300-horsepower steam engines, each of which could pump 78,000 gallons of water per hour into the mains of the city. Lastly, the edifice that became the symbol of the water company was the water tower. With a capacity of 75,000 gallons of water, the Beijing tower was allegedly the largest in the country. Measuring 37 meters in height, it was also the tallest structure in Beijing, where one and two storied

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

264

buildings predominated. One weakness of the tower was its placement on the northeast side of Beijing, a location that made it inefficient in providing pressured water to the southwest section of the city, where most poor people lived. There, water shortages became acute, especially in the summer season, when demand for water soared. During these years, parts of the city often experienced reduced water flow in their taps, and some were even rationed. Water was transported from the Sun River plant to the Dongzhimen plant via an aqueduct, built of two steel pipes measuring 0.4 meter in diameter. The pipes were 14.3 kilometers long, with a difference in horizonal level of 6.5 meters. Connecting the two water plants, the aqueduct served as a critical link between the source and the city. The underground water mains in Beijing were the water plants' distribution channels. Two major networks covered most of the city. One started at Dongzhimen, traveling underground along Dongzhi Street, passing through Beixin Bridge, then turning south into Dongsi Arch, Dongdan Arch, Chongwen Gate, then turning west into Qian Gate and Xuanwu Gate, back north into Xidan Arch, Xisi Arch, and arriving at Ping'anli. The other network began at Beixin Bridge, going west, passing Jiaodao Crossroad and the Drum Tower, turning south into Di'an Gate, then west again, passing Ping'anli, then north into Xinjiekou. As shown in Map 5, the water mains followed straight and direct routes, usually built underneath the major boulevards of the city. In this way, not only could the cost of relocating and destroying private property be kept to a minimum, but if

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

265

needed, the water mains could be extended without difficulty into the hundreds of narrow lanes intersected by the streets. The final phase of waterworks construction involved plumbing and finetuning to bring water to the households of consumers. The water pipes were divided into trunk mains and distribution channels. The trunk mains, measuring 450 to 400 millimeters in diameter, basically coincided with the major streets of the city and were evenly distributed. Where necessary, the mains extended underneath railroads, such as the Beijing-Hankou railroad. Distribution channels, each measuring 150 to 200 millimeters, were branch pipes bringing water directly to the households taps or the public taps in the streets. Altogether, a total of 185 kilometers (484,754 feet) of steel pipes were laid and 423 public water taps were installed. An additional sixty taps were designated as fire hydrants, the first public facility of this kind in Beijing for fighting fire hazards. In sum, the birth of modern waterworks in the capital was significant in two ways. It marked the first time in the city's history that residents enjoyed the benefits of modern water supply technology. A new alternative to well-water, running water gradually gained popularity, though the process was slow. It also laid the foundation for modern waterworks. Many trunk mains laid in 1908 are still in use today. On the whole, however, these first waterworks were inadequate to meet the city's need, with only one water tap for every 400 meters of pipe. To make matters worse, most of these mains were too small in diameter, causing severe

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

266

water shortages when demand increased in the years that followed. As we will see, because of the high cost of imported pipes and expensive plumbing, running water could not reach the majority of households in Beijing for decades. Even the construction of these limited facilities did not go smoothly. The water company had to confront opposition to the project, an adverse political climate, and unanticipated business losses. As we have discussed earlier, in late imperial China, only the state had the authority to undertake public works. As a private initiative in managing a public utility, the water company had to rely on the government when issues arose that required balancing the private interest and the public good. Having the government overseer as the nominal head of the company was intended to provide liaison between the state and the company. For such matters as land condemnation, however, the water company had to appeal to a host of official agencies, including the imperial court, the county magistrates, the governor of Shuntian prefecture, and the military yamen of Beijing. The following case suggests how the company defended itself from opposition in the name of public interest. The twenty acres of land on which the water company proposed to construct its two water plants were all privately owned. In order to proceed, the company had to purchase the land at an official rate.48 Resisting the intended condemnation, local land owners together formed an alliance to bid for higher prices. The local self-government official (dibao) joined the land

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

267

owners' campaign against condemnation at the set rate. The head of the alliance, Ma Delu, refused to negotiate with the water company, and even destroyed all the boundaries markers establishing the plant sites. Helpless against such strong local sentiment, the company sought protection from the local government. In a letter to the magistrates of Daxing and Wanping, the two counties that shared local governance of Beijing, Zhou Xuexi wrote that "the water project, approved by the imperial court, is critical to the public interest and municipal development. The water company is not to be treated as an ordinary private enterprise." The magistrates, he urged, "should take necessary action to stop the land owners from blocking the project."49 Days later, the local officials intervened by arresting Ma Delu and putting him in jail. The landowners' dissent was silenced and their attempt to obtain better prices failed. State involvement played a critical role in allowing the project to proceed on schedule. Further resistance arose when the aqueduct was built from the Sun River to Dongzhimen. Along the fifteen-mile route were a number of graveyards. While surveying possible sites for the aqueduct, the water company made it a rule that graves be avoided whenever possible. In so doing, the company could reduce the mandated extra payment for moving graves, and more importantly, could minimize local opposition to the project. However, this policy could not always be enforced. Engineering efficiency required that the aqueduct be constructed as straight as possible. A winding

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

268

water-route not only increased the chances of leakage, but also raised construction and maintenance costs. As a result, private interests sometimes had to be sacrificed to public interests. Outside of Dongzhimen, a Manchu family, a branch of the Aisin clan, owned a graveyard that lay along the proposed water route. The water company made a detour around the main cemetery but had to cut a corner off one small grave about a mile away. During the initial survey, the clan did not object to the arrangement, but when the aqueduct, built simultaneously from both ends, was about to meet near the graveyard, the Aisin clan fiercely protested construction on its land. The project had to stop while negotiations between the water company and the clan were proceeding. For two months, negotiations remained deadlocked. Again the water company resorted to the government, this time to the Ministry of the Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, which in turn forwarded the case to the Bureau of Manchu Affairs Czongren fit), the Shuntian prefecture and the Gendarmerie, forces policing Beijing during the Qing period. (The zongren ju was called in because a Manchu clan was involved. The Shuntian prefecture officials and the Gendarmerie shared jurisdiction over disputes in metropolitan Beijing.) Eventually, the case was settled in favor of the water company, forcing the Manchu clan to accept the original arrangement.50 Although the water company won the case, it soon found itself facing more vicious forms of attack. Rumors began to spread, accusing the water

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

269

company of destroying graves wholesale to make way for the water project. A local newspaper carried the rumor, describing how the Manchu clan had fallen victim to greedy businessmen. Because the clan did not consent to the water company's offer of money, said the article, the company took revenge by digging out ancestral graves, even those that did not obstruct the aqueduct.51 In a society where nothing was more humiliating than having one's ancestral graves deliberately mutilated, the rumors posed a deadly threat to the company's public image. To counteract these rumors, Zhou Xuexi again resorted to the press. Spending a large sum of money, the company ran an advertisement giving its side of the story for ten consecutive days in six newspapers in Beijing, including the popular Shuntian Times and Beijing Daily. This was not the last time that modern advertising techniques were enlisted in the service of the water company's business. Zhou Xuexi realized how important it was to make use of the media to disseminate information. The publicity campaigns were a strategy used by Zhou Xuexi again and again. Although there was no public relations department in the company, a fixed proportion of their budget went to public relations each year, amounting to about two percent of the budget in the initial years, and about three percent thereafter. Almost invariably the investment paid off in increased good-will for the firm.52 An uncertain political environment during the last few years of the Qing Dynasty also affected the construction of the waterworks. Citywide

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

installation of water mains began in January 1909. But on November 14,1908 Emperor Guangxu passed away, followed by the death of Empress Dowager Cixi twenty days later. The protracted period of national mourning seriously delayed construction. In traditional China, no national event was more significant than the wedding or funeral of an emperor. The Imperial Household Administration (neiwu fu) assumed the task of arranging for the imperial funeral, scheduled for March 12, 1909. Before the funeral, the procession had to be rehearsed. The procession would come out the eastern gate of Jingshan, travel out of the Dian Gate, proceed along the western walls of the Imperial City, turn around at Mashi into the Xisi Arch, and walk out of the city through Fucheng Gate. Then after hours of travel, the emperor would be buried at the imperial ancestral tombs in the Western Hills. By this time, however, work on the water pipelines had already begun. The roads on which the funeral procession would pass had been dug up for pipe installation. On March 8, 1909, the police of the Inner City ordered that work must be completed by the funeral, four days away. On any unfinished portion, work had to be suspended for the funeral. Moreover, the company was ordered to fill up any ditch already dug (even if no pipes had yet been installed) and smooth the roads for the procession. The water company labored day and night to complete the task. Many of the trenches which had taken days to excavate by hand had to be filled up. In addition to the time and energy wasted, the water company had to absorb the costs of this deference to

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

271

imperial pomp.53

The Politics of Water Sale

After twenty-two months of hard work, the water supply system was completed in 1910. Entrusted by the imperial government with a dual mandate to provide wholesome water to insure public health and to offer a reliable and efficient source of water to fight fires, the water company seemed well on the way to accomplishing these objectives, but as we will see, the process of reaching its goals was slow and painful. In a memorial to the Qing court in 1908, the water company had proposed to sell water to both the Inner and Outer Cities as well as suburban areas immediately outside of the city walls. The only notable exception was the Forbidden City. For several reasons, the imperial palaces were excluded for the water project. First, all construction and renovation in the Forbidden City had to be approved by the neiwufu. A s a private enterprise, the water company could not engage in business undertakings with the imperial family unless authorized to do so. Second, the provision of water to the Forbidden City, a vast complex of palaces, would have meant massive construction work, much of it underground. Conservative beliefs that one should not disturb the physical edifices inherited from one's ancestors, coupled with the fear that disruptions of the physical environment might bring bad luck, made many Manchus loath to allow the project into the imperial compound. Nor was

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

272

there a felt need for running water in this privileged neighborhood. Served by hundreds of eunuchs, the imperial entourage saw no reason to change their pattern of water consumption. They also believed that their present supply, spring water from the Jade Mountain in the Western Hills, was better for their health than tap water. For all these reasons, the Manchu court was not anxious to participate in the modern water system. In a report to the Ministry of the Commerce, however, Zhou Xuexi suggested that if, in the future, running water was needed in the Forbidden City, the government should follow the precedent of the imperial quarters' electrification during the late nineteenth century. Modem waterworks in the imperial compound ought to be built separately and independent of that supplying the rest of the city.54 Another important section of the city that the initial waterworks did not cover was the legation quarter close to the center of Beijing. In an effort to expand water sales, however, the water company contacted representatives of the foreign diplomatic missions for a possible deal. Looking for ways to improve their water quality and concerned about fire-fighting, representatives of the diplomatic missions were greatly interested. To overcome the cultural and linguistic barriers to business negotiations, the water company chose the Siemens, which had arranged the purchase of equipment, to act as its sales agent. In return, Siemens retained ten percent of the water sale receipts and five percent of the equipment sale receipts generated by extending the company's facilities to this part of the city.55 According to the contract signed

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

273

between the legation quarter and Siemens on behalf of the water company in 1911, the water company would construct the system based on a plan drawn up by the legation quarter's governing body. All equipment and facilities, except those purchased by the Western customers themselves, would remain the property of the water company and would enjoy protection by the western police forces. For residential and personal use, water was sold at the price of one British pound per 1,000 gallons; and for fire-fighting and street-cleaning, the charge was 0.5 pound per 1,000 gallons. All we shall see, these prices were slightly higher than those charged against the Chinese consumers. A total of twelve fire hydrants were installed throughout the legation quarter.56 The deal with the diplomatic residences of Beijing provided the water company a steady flow of income, accounting for an average of five to ten percent of total sales receipts. By 1910 the population of the Beijing had reached 760,000. Assuming an average of five people per household, the total number of households were 152,000.57 But there were only a little over 400 public taps. On an average, 380 households shared one tap. The problems of the new system were compounded by an irrational distribution network in some areas. During the trial period, the water company discovered that while there were too few water taps in the commercial districts, such as areas near Qianmen Gate, Xidan Arch and the Drum and Bell Tower, other places w ith less population density enjoyed a surplus of taps. The problem of uneven distribution was solved by

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

274

shutting off some taps and moving them to where they were needed most. But the high cost of water equipment and installation prevented the company from adding a substantial number of new water taps. Although it was bad for business, unwillingly, they sometimes had to turn down requests for the installation of water in places out of the reach of a trunk main. The following incident was indicative of this predicament. The western Shunzhi Gate (also known as Fucheng Gate) was Beijing's gateway to the coal mines of Mentougou in the Western Hills. Between the circular railroad and the city wall outside of Shunzhi Gate clustered a number of coal warehouses. The area lacked water wells, forcing workers at the warehouses to transport water by shoulder-pole from inside the city walls. Upon hearing of the new waterworks, the warehouse owners sent a representative to negotiate an extension of water pipelines to their area. Over thirty warehouses along the city walls signed a petition requesting a water pipeline half a mile long with two to three taps. They estimated that the daily water consumption would be around 2,000 to 3,000 gallons. The water company sent an inspection team to the warehouse district, but in the end rejected their proposal. Although the area was within the confines of the city, the company argued that it was so distant from the existing water mains that extension would be unprofitable, given the volume of potential water sales.58 It is important to understand from this instance that although the water supply was a public utility and would be expected to absorb some

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

275

unprofitable business in the interests of providing service to the whole community, the profit motive was still invoked to exclude from participation some areas that were judged too costly to hook up to the mains. Decisions like this provoked resentment among city residents. Describing the executives as ruthless and unscrupulous, some critics urged the city government to revoke the company's license to manage water supply to the city. Others proposed that new ventures be set up to compete with the existing one and rid it of its monopoly. To these critics, the idea of a public utility meant responsibility to the whole community, and public interests should override profit motives. However, as there were no specific government regulations, the water company was not required to serve some people at a loss in the interests of comprehensive service. The composition of their investors, mostly wealthy officials and merchants, also dictated that a strong profit motive behind business decisions would keep service minimal in unprofitable areas. Public interest in running water did not arise automatically. Marketing played an important part in the success of the company. Soon after the completion of waterworks, Zhou Xuexi launched a campaign to promote his product. To begin with, the company issued a series of rules, approved by the Municipal Council, regarding the sale of water. Water was to be sold through two distribution channels: household subscription and street vendors. For households, regulations issued in May 1909 stated that "customers who desire that a water tap be installed on their premises may do so by

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

276

contacting the water company, which will send out an inspector to estimate the cost of installation. The costs of water pipes, taps and installation are the responsibility of the customer. The cost of materials will be waived when connecting pipes within 100 yards of the water mains. Once payment is made, the company will make an appointment for installation. "S9 The customers could choose from two service plans. The first one, called the metered plan, measured the amount of water consumption by a meter, which might be rented or purchased from the company. The other plan, referred to as the contract plan, estimated consumption and set a fixed price to be paid each month. For example, the minimum monthly consumption of water was set at three hundred tiao (3,000 gallons)60 of water for 1.5 yuan. 2.25 yuan was charged for consumption between 300 (3,000 gallons) and 450 tiao (4,500 gallons); 3 yuan, between 450 (4,500 gallons) and 600 tiao (6,000 gallons), and so on. In the latter case, the water meter would be provided by the water company at no additional charge. Although water itself was not expensive, the installation, running hundreds of yuan, was prohibitive for many working-class families. Only well-to-do residents could afford the high cost of running water at their own homes. The other channel of water provision was the street vendor. Many water taps were installed in the streets of Beijing and were available for public use. The water company hired keepers for every public tap, and water coupons (shuichou) used for buying water were sold in stores throughout the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

277

city. Every coupon, which cost five wen (one half of copper yuan)61 each and was good for one year, could be exchanged for one tiao (ten gallon) of water and could be used at any public water tap. During the initial three months of operation, coupons were sold at a fifty percent discount to attract customers to the new service. To sell as many water coupons as possible, the water company hired a number of sales agents in Beijing. Any shop or residential household with a good reputation could apply to be a sales agent. A sign was hung at a prominent place, telling passers-by that water coupons were on sale there. Agents sold the coupons at the official price and made their profit from commissions paid by the company. To encourage increased volume, for every 200 or more coupons sold, the agent retained three percent of the sales; for every 2,000, six percent; for every 5,000, eight percent.62 Rather than hire workers to staff hundreds of public water taps along the streets of Beijing. Zhou Xuexi proposed a system whereby taps were contracted to local people. A prospective keeper had to obtain a bond of guarantee from a reputable local shop, and put down a security deposit of four yuan. The shop had to agree to compensate the company for whatever damage or loss the keeper might incur. Then there was a probation period of two months before the keeper was paid a full monthly salary of 700 copper yuan (including 500 yuan for food). Keepers with sales over 12,000 tiao of water per month also earned free coupons as bonuses. Applications for the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

278

tap keeper positions were numerous. To ease tension with the water merchants' guild, the company intentionally gave a number of keepers' jobs to former water carriers. The public taps were open from six thirty a.m. to six p.m., later in the summer, reflecting the tendency among the working population to rise and retire early. Still problems about service remained. Complaints over tap keepers who closed early or opened late, or whose personal habits slowed the rate at which they conducted sales, were common. The company responded with a set of disciplinary guidelines for delinquent tap keepers, but their effectiveness is not known.63 For many people accustomed to drinking well-water, the habit died hard. To change people's perception of running water, Zhou Xuexi once again utilized the newspapers. Large-print advertisements were placed in four major city newspapers for ten consecutive days. In these ads, the water company announced that before the official opening in the spring of 1910, water taps in all major commercial districts would be open free for ten days from February 2 to 11,1910. No water coupons would be needed and consultants from the company would be available on the spot to answer any questions customers might have.64 The free offer, according to one newspaper report, brought hundreds of curious city dwellers to each of the public taps each day that the offer was in effect.65 The other promotional strategy employed by Zhou Xuexi also involved

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

279

the press. Zhou first sought free publicity for his company by utilizing his contacts in the world of progressive social reformers. In personal letters to newspaper editors, the heads of local self-government associations, and the people who spoke at Beijing's growing number of public lecture halls, Zhou placed running water in a league with the other accoutrements of civilization to which the Chinese people should aspire. Playing on their self-image as leaders of public opinion and champions of the public welfare, he urged them to use their access to the media to promote the use of running water. Appeal to intellectual circles was no substitute for a direct appeal to the people of the city. Early in its operation, the water company faced a wave of negative propaganda that was probably initiated by its chief competitors, the water carriers guild. According to these attacks, Beijing's new water system was a foreign plot and the water was tainted. The reason that the water was white when it first came out of the tap was because it had soap in it. Such bad publicity damaged the water company's credibility and reduced water sales. To counterattack, Zhou Xuexi ran an open letter to the people of Beijing. The letter was friendly, free of jargon and easily understood.66 "To our respectable neighbors," the ad began, The water company was set up by order from our emperor. We raised money only from our fellow Chinese. We only employ Chinese. You can see we don't do this only for profit. Indeed water is something nobody can live without. If it's not clean, people will suffer from all kinds of disease, especially in the hot summer. Since running water has become available, all smart people have enjoyed it. But some have insisted that the water is foreign and made with foreign soap. Some of our poor

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

280

countrymen believe in this nonsense and would not touch the water even if the tap is right in front of their doors. It is really a pity that as civilized as our city is, there are still old-fashioned people around.67

To counter suspicions regarding the purity of the water, the letter continued, Some people might find the color of water just released from the taps was white, but this is nothing to worry about. If seen under a microscope, the white color is actually the result of thousands of tiny water bubbles. Water, when siphoned from the Sun River on to the tower outside of Dongzhimen, is forced down to our taps by utilizing air pressure. Since the tower is tall, pressure is great and if the weather is cold, air in the water pipes flows in with the water. But it shouldn't be a cause for great concern. In less than a minute, the bubbles disappear and the water becomes clear again. Those who don't understand think the pipes are not clean enough or compare [our product] to soapy water. Once they know the truth, there shouldn't be any more misunderstandings. According to Chinese and Western experts, the best quality water, for every million units, should contain no more than five hundred units of dissolvent, one hundred of sulphur compounds, forty units of salt compounds and sixty three units of organic matter. The hardness of water should not exceed twenty units. Also, water that contains iron is good, water that contains ammonia, phosphorus, lead, copper and pyridine is not good. The running water on our streets, having passed all chemical tests, is both superior and clean. For every million units, our water contains only 260 units of dissolvents, 7.5 sulphur compounds, 13.5 salt compounds and 32.5 organic matter. There is no ammonia or other impurities such as phosphorus, lead, copper and pyridine. With a hardness of only nine units, our water also contains nineteen units of iron. This chemical combination is indeed good for sanitation and health.68

For the first time, scientific knowledge about water was popularized in Beijing, presented in a clear and easily understood fashion. And the appeal to patriotism in the open letter was significant. Although it was long before the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

281

period of popular nationalism identified by scholars, the stress on the Chineseness of the water project apparently encouraged people to buy a product that they might not normally have bought. Overall, the publicity campaign for running water triumphed. In the years that immediately followed, as we will see, water subscriptions increased noticeably, and the record of sales from public taps also improved. Rumors about running water as a danger and a mystery gradually died down, and the promotional advertisements helped demystify running water. No longer fearful, many people began to perceive it as a staple of life. At least psychologically, running water was accepted by the residents of Beijing. Psychological barriers were not the only obstacles to water sales, however. Many customers were unable to carry water from the public taps to their homes. As one customer observed, men of most families went out to make a living, leaving only women and children to transport water during the hours the public taps were open. But women and children were not strong enough to carry water on their shoulders for long distances. In 1910, the water company decided to hire water carriers for door-to-door service. Special water coupons were introduced whose price combined the price of water and labor. For every one hundred pounds of water sent to a customer, regardless of distance, the cost was one silver yuan.69 Tried out in some Inner City districts, the method proved to be popular and practical, and was extended to the rest of Beijing. In this way, it also became possible for areas far from the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

282

mains to order water. A typical family would have a big water vat at home, which, once filled, would last for several days. Since the family had limited amount of water, the cost of which was known, the tendency was to use it very sparingly. Once most interested households were being served, demand of course stopped expanding so rapidly. In carrying out this door-to-door service, the water company was careful to remain competitive with the well water salesmen from Shangdong. If it could offer better quality water at a lower price, Zhou thought, tap water might outperform well water and gradually replace it in the market place. However, because of the expense of installation and large capital investment involved, many residents who desired running water still could not afford it. Well merchants had lower operating costs and no need for a large capital investment, making well water more affordable to many city residents, especially among the poorer classes. As late as the late 1940's, some 400 commercial wells run by Shangdong merchants were still in operation, as compared with only 60 public water stations run by the water company. Shangdong well-water merchants remained extremely competitive, monopolizing poor and working-class residential districts until the communist takeover in 1949.

Government, the Water Company and Public Health

We have already discussed the financial support that the government

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

283

gave to the fledgling water company. In fact, the state provided more than monetary assistance; its official protection proved even more important. Throughout the company's forty years of operation, it often received special protection for its facilities and business operations. Only under the protective wing of the state was the company able to operate. The company sought protection from the state in the name of the public interest. The special responsibility of the modern waterworks in public safety and sanitation, Zhou Xuexi explained, warranted extra care by the government. Zhou petitioned the Qing court to issue decrees instructing all interested governmental agencies, including the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce, the Beijing gendarmerie, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and the Shuntian prefectural government to ensure the safety and smooth operation of the water supply system. The local police in street sentry boxes, for example, were responsible for guarding public water taps, pipes and meters against theft and vandalism. Anyone found causing damage to the water facilities was to be punished without leniency. Protection of water sources also became important. To keep the river source clean and environmentally sound, local police were instructed not to allow any kind of pollution within twenty miles of the Sha and Qing Rivers. Residents living close to the rivers were also told to plant trees and grass to prevent soil erosion.70 The government also interacted with the water company regarding two important municipal services: fire-fighting and street cleaning. During the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

284

early twentieth century, street cleaning was the responsibility of local police forces. As most roads in Beijing were made of macadam or mud, it was necessary to spray them with water to reduce the level of dust in the air. Thus, considerable quantities of water were required, and the supply of water for street cleaning was a constant concern. Since well water was difficult to fetch, street-cleaning was inefficient and slow. The coming of street water taps increased the number of water outlets. The water company issued special water coupons used only for street-cleaning. Using these coupons, street cleaners could purchase water at any public tap in Beijing for 20 percent off the regular price. Selling water at a discount in this way, the company was in, fact making a public contribution. Or the system might be viewed as a way of paying business taxes in addition to the public utility tax, since street cleaners were government employees. The founding of the waterworks company modernized fire-fighting efforts in Beijing. The fire brigade, founded in 1914 as an integral component of the police force, had ten bureaus allocated throughout the city. Running water from public fire hydrants became the chief source of water for these brigades. To help fight fires, the water company designed a special ticket used by the fire brigade. In case of fire, the proper bureau would notify the company by telephone, and obtain water by presenting the special ticket. The price charged was set by the amount of time spent in extinguishing the fire, not by meter. Mock fire-fighting sessions were held to determine the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

285

consumption of water per time unit. On an average, water supplied to fight fires was sold at a forty percent discount below the fee for residential use.71 Local fire-fighting associations (shuihui) were different from the fire brigade. While the latter was an official organization administered by the police force, the former were privately sponsored and community oriented benevolent associations. Manned by volunteers from local communities, the shuihui had a much longer history, having been established as early as the

mid-nineteenth century by local gentry and merchants. In addition to fighting fires, they were also neighborhood defense organizations, specializing in fighting crime and caring for the poor.72 Starting in the twentieth century, however, shuihui gradually became less important, as many of their former functions were replaced by the city government. A powerful modern police force took over the responsibilities of street cleaning, fire fighting and crime prevention. The shuihui faced legal restrictions as well. According to a regulation issued by the water company and approved by the city council, the fire brigade had priority over the shuihui in the use of fire hydrants. When the local shuihui needed water to fight a fire, they had to first get permission from the fire brigade. If approved, they had to go through the same the procedure as the fire brigade to obtain the discounted water. The difference between the water price and price charged the fire-fighters was sometimes picked up by the government. In 1911, for example, the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Commerce subsidized the water company by more than 130 yuan to cover

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

286

the use of 57,135 dan of water by all shuihui in the capital.73 Protection and cooperation were not the only forms of interaction between the state and the water company. In public health issues, the government played an important supervisory role. Because the cleanliness of water was crucial for public health, the water company was required to maintain a permanent laboratory at the Dongzhimen treatment plant, where the technicians tested the purity of water three times a day and reported the results daily to the company headquarters. A detailed report was also to be presented to the president and vice president every three days. In reality, however, the rules were enforced only on paper. There is evidence from the very beginning that the company overlooked the importance of water testing. There was only one full-time laboratory technician for the entire company, and he does not appear to have had the necessary training in bacteriology to undertake this important task. The test schedules and report procedures were not vigorously followed. It was not until public outrage arose over a cholera epidemic in 1925 that the water company began to mend its ways and improve the quality of the running water. During the summer of 1925, a cholera epidemic spread across Beijing. The cause was determined to be a contaminated water supply. Floods had raised the levels of nearby rivers to converge with the upper reaches of the Sun River. Since the water in these rivers was polluted, the Sun River now produced water that was unsafe to drink. At the treatment plant, filtration

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

287

failed to eliminate all harmful bacteria from the water. As a result, the number of residents of Beijing suffering from diarrhea soared, and the official Hospital of Contagious Diseases was filled with patients. Newspapers published readers' attacks on the water company for its failure to provide wholesome water.74 For several months, the number of people using running water dropped sharply, bringing company's profits to an all time low. Water purification technicians had to be brought in from Shanghai to undertake a thorough examination of the company's water supply and filtration processes. The Municipal Council played a major role in forcing the company to comply with safety standards. On the one hand, they threatened to impose heavy fines if hazardous water continued to be dispensed. On the other hand, the government sent a medical team headed by director Yan Zizhong and Dr. Li Zhensheng from the Beijing Hospital for Contagious Diseases to the water treatment plants to inspect the water quality. Test results were sent to the Municipal Council, along with an evaluation of the testing facilities and personnel at the water plants. The tests showed the existence of a large quantity of coliform bacillus, which made the company's water harmful unless boiled. The report gave high marks for the generally high quality of water supply management, but lamented the lack of both testing facilities and qualified technicians. "We should certainly cite flood as a cause of the epidemic in Beijing this summer," the report said, "but more importantly, the water company should take responsibility. There was no testing equipment,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

288

and no specially trained technicians available to examine the water quality and report on abnormal conditions. Therefore, when the water got contaminated, nobody had the slightest idea of what went wrong, nor what measures to use to solve the problem. Knowledge of bacteriology was simply absent." Finally, the report of the medical team recommended two remedies: first, the water company should hire qualified lab technicians to regularly watch the water quality and publicize the test results. Second, the water company should immediately purchase new anti-bacteria facilities, and in the event of contamination, apply bactericide quickly and effectively.75 The water company learned a big lesson from the epidemic in 1925. Henceforth they improved their water quality control, and made test results available for public review. Between 1925 and 1948 there were no further reports of water quality problems. Indeed, after several official inspections, the city government noted approvingly in 1926 that the water company had corrected their past mistakes and that the public should no longer be afraid to use running water.

The Economics of Water Provision

Entering the Republican period in 1912 did not accelerate the process of Beijing's water system. In fact, throughout the next twenty years, the development of the water company was sluggish. Water sales remained low, with little fluctuation. Subscriptions grew only slightly, at an annual rate of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

289

two to three percent. Expansion of waterworks facilities was also modest. The following statistics culled from various sources offer a glimpse of the company's scope. Graph 5 indicates that the number of households using running water in Beijing increasingly slowly until the Japanese occupation. By 1932, with already over twenty years of operation, only ten percent of Beijing's residents enjoyed running water for their daily use. The vast majority still relied on oldfashioned well water. During the early years, from 1910 to 1922, there was hardly any development. Table 16 shows daily water consumption among the users of running water in Beijing between 1928 and 1945. From the table, we may observe that the number of users increased each year, slowly at first, and faster toward the end. But per capita consumption remained basically the same, around thirteen gallons per day. This pattern reflects two factors. In the first place, there was little industrial use of running water in the city. Indeed, throughout the first half of the twentieth century, modern industry centered on China's coastal regions, especially the treaty ports, such as Shanghai and Tianjin. China's political center for centuries, Beijing was not an industrial city. Even after Beijing ceased to be China's capital in 1928, it was very slow to build up its industrial base. The city did have a number of modern industrial enterprises, such as textile, rug and match factories, but most of them were located outside the city walls in the suburban areas beyond the water company's area of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

290

Graph 5. Water Consumption by Households, 1912-1932

i3£6I

l£6l \Q£6l

6361 8361 Z,36I co

2

9361

XI 0) co P

9361

O X

17361

3

£361

co

3361

X < u co

1361

0 X I-

0361

1

6161

2 o P

§

8X61 co

2 o

L 161

•s

9161

CO

3 O

X

9X6X

o CO

T3 a p CO

17X61

§

£161

X

H o in m

o o CO

o

^ CNCNrHC^rt^COCO^COC^CNCOCOCOtri CO rH rH tH rH

VO CM v

^

I* o U US

Q u.

Si

£ a n) U

i bo

C

fi g

h r t in o\ ^ co h i n* CO w tsN N O \M 5 1 /iH H

lOOr^TfTf^iniO^lO to in

CM 0 0 rH CM rH O

in m rr in m in in

’53

CQ OS

fi

IS INTJ H H ^ Ov ^ CM CM h m n as Tf in in in n o' n n m n is o\ h in rS |^ic«r ri goTo» a< \r 't 4m 'COT i\ ao^nc Nv (5j o^ iinoc no i' f4t r| H'Oi*| ( r i o Wu \ v Tr -rfTtrro'^'^t-r}(ininininincN^oa\iN^in'£i r l r l H N N W CN

88888

at

3

CN TT IT£ ■ Cx NO ON oo ^ i n cx CM CM CM NO X X NO

CM

rH CM CM X * rH CM X rH

CM X

C x Cx ON

X

oX

CA CA

9>

cO) in rH

ON

o

CM

X CM

. . _ R 58OO ... HC^C^W Cx CM rH 00“ X * rH CM rH

^ Cx X oo in ' cm r f rH X X X rH rH X

rH

r H Q ^ Q V C O O cm i n o N W rH CM txv rH CM X

Cx

&

c x

u '53 E -.

rH

ON

to rH

ON

C x C x C M C M X X O N C x N O H t X O N O N l f i H H M n ^ H H r t O N tN( CMs N H H fO H ^ C O 'C M rH V O 'v O CM* X X

Cx ON 0 0 x

x

8S

CS| VO 00 rH tv If)

X

Ov Ov O 3 ) v8 tV Tf r-H ^ tv co in vf vj ® *CO O OVOrt ^ 'T H S3 N ON rH 00 tv r-H

CO rH

vo' c n CM

rf'

CM

X ON* T* ON rH

x

rH

X

s

8X

N

£ S N •s e

Cx

R

*s N

& CM rH

O'.

sx

00 X in X rH CM © © 00

^ no

CM ON i n CM

©* CM rH rH ntf

CM

X

CM Cx rH X

m rH

m rH NO rH CM CM $ 8 rH ON in

X CM CM rH

in © rH “1 o Cx NO rH

X

in

8

S'

Cx

IRQ C?

% 3

in ’3

0CA) vV S CA n*

i