Battles of the American Revolution 1775-1781. Historical and military criticism with topographical illustration [1 ed.]

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Battles of the American Revolution 1775-1781. Historical and military criticism with topographical illustration [1 ed.]

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Maps missing/

b
rks the niaehine, or with

of theoretical

arms has largely absorbed that indus-

the life-blood of a civilized state, and the individ

uality of the citizen

one

While

and were utterly foreign to a sound education of the young

instruction, the physical drill in

!/i(rj'

defeat.

the Iolmc of war has been as listlessly and coolly

precepts imposed

its

In Continental Iiuroi)e, however, with a

trial

assured

possible, or

physiology are deemed indispensable to every sound

physics and

hand, that when a

in

is

feather-light in

Great Britain, the assumption

crisis shall

demand

is

ever

the soldier, there will be

found the hero and the victory.

This possible

is

trifling

matter

in

with grave issues.

modern

It

is

a verv rare,

times, for a great

if

not an im-

war to ensue witliout

antecedent deliberation on the part of one or both o{ the parties in

interest.

related

The mighty aggregate

to intense brain-work,

of European armies

is

closely

and no advocate more exhaustively

anticipates the contingencies of evidence

and the

sco[)e of past ad-

6

4 *, :

f'

THE KEY TO MILITARY HISTORY.

MI1.ITAKY SCIENCK

1

do

judications, than

and

tlie

adepts

in

[i775

military sc-ii-ncc rovit;\v their maps,

sprciilatc ujxin tlvj very riTcsscs, as wi-ll as the VL'sourccs of tlie

coiintr\" llu\- |>iirpiisr to attack.

tlurcforc, possible

It is,

ree neoiile

t(j

with

ai id

hecomiiiLj, for the educ.ited

th.it familiarity,

science into evi'ry housi-hold.

which has

Tlu'

the

a IK 1 this,

fruit

the

rii^htly fits

of

iiul ei)endenc'.'

demand

IVat

unacknowled;j;ed sentiment, that the

tle,

be smoothl)' and

will

from the

dcvelopeil

laws are

of farm-

1

invention

there

sub-

with

all this,

civil

functions of the state

performed by those

fairly

fact that

am

fresh

and personal action,

thoiii^ht

ol

of the times.

the

due

in

those of n.itura!

carrii-d

heads of mechanics

have ached from the e'laboralion of some

sons,

ers'

masses of

principles wliuli hich under

ot if tl the

These principles have not been unfolded

ational lU-fense.

proportion

and

Uearn sonietluni:j •th

in force,

assured of wise and conipetent s.uiction.

is

,i

This

in chari;e.

llere bej^ins for military

.And yet, before

science,

its startiiii^^

tluie

to be I'-^tablishetl cert.iin s^round-woik, necessarily i^^nored

is

point,

while

strictly military writers,

purpose

its L^enesis.

adapt, ition of

and

crisis,

and fund.urientid

its iliscussion,

by

to the ;j;eneral

view.

in

Milit.iry law, while that

u]ion the

intej^r.il

is

and that those laws arc

uuthods of

its

The wi-dom

all

f

of force,

ai)])lic,ition

tin st.itesman

the householder, aiul

both

is

;is

is v virtue

of

Tlic niciital pro-

various shaftings.

dilferciii a/^/^/ieatioits, but the

prime

activities are the same.

The domain of natural It

ti.d

so witli

is

physics.

force, the milit.ir)- art,

atory to

all

f.iils

its

demand.

as offenses

so shall

of e.xperts

all

in its

This

sciiuice h.is its

departments and sections. of

.\nd yet, to the ijreat eni;4ma all

science's exttiid

behalf.

rests

upon

All a

their

dynamic

No

aitl.

force

l)a\-s

simple necessity.

esseii-

labor-

tribute

In.ismuch

against society and law, require the sanction of force, a|)pliances of

.art

and science contribute

their

full

measur


b.itu lit

nerve and commensurate in

possible

all

possible

all

and

'fiieiilla

vin-

enip/ojin^^ force to

h.is

il

captains, i)eloro

and

not

and since

unseldom

its

pe'riod, filled

th.it

h.ive

\.o

Frederic .md Jomiiii asserts nothing

its

e.\i)res>ion,

The philosojjhy

masterly ap[)lication.

the

be}()iul

of

wisdom

,ind

skill

therein illustr.ited. It

is

.issuined that

all

truth which be.irs direct rel.ition to a better

undeisl.indiiij^ of those battles,

imis t be placed side by th.it histors' t

iry science

sitle.

bear

tavil

must

fill

is

of value to the student,

m

tlieir ii.irt

its pi, ice.

the elucid.ilioii. .ind mil-

or the jud;j;ment will

of the future.

tl le

cussion of military scii-nce, the purpose lund.iment.il laws

and

rel.itions

which

wil

to

is

to reach

fiil

conclusion- wliieli convi.'rl the anleceuent experience ot i^uides lor the resolution

llistor)'

with the })hilosophy which interprets

men

propcjsed brief dis

set

forth

the re.ider

.lid

lh>.

into sate ife

onl\-

m

h is

those

UKdu-

Jl

inent o( the ficts, ins[)ire fresh respect for that talent which sustains

the

commonwealth

in ,in

hour of

sense of responsibility for a Ljcncies

fit

(.l.in;_;er,

which can come to the body

In the

discussion of battles

topogr.iphical

have been

illustr.ition,

summoiud

and

pre[).ir.ition

i)ossibly ti

)

induce

meet

a 11

I'

.i

le

hii^her

contin-

politic.

.md

battle-direction,

including

the

the standard authorities of both countries

;o the witness-staiul,

.md

are duly accredited.

!'

h

!

CHAPTER 1()K

ai'()L(k;v

u-.r (if

in

the

and

niatcd, ar

their application in the

(.IcnnMUs that shape or ap[)iy to force,

of estaljlishiii;^ or

ilircctioii

militarv art.

riiK

niilitai)' .irt, havin;.^

iionii.il

fiiiw.-, all

a])propriale place

so

the

iJiiiiciplcs (if

Till'"-

IV.

the stale, have their

protectin;,^'

Those principles,

relation-,.

much matters

uihdoin to

of discovery as the tlirect

rii^ht

thal

struf''.

tf

do

to war, are

'o

.111(1

must

proL;ress of invention

inti nsily

inli-

human

application of

All priniitiw; ([uestions of ethics or morals,

The

already

reco;_;iiized e.\ii;encies.

to the abstract

table

,is

not of nece^.sity and exclusively professional, nor are tliey



physical

force

essential principles

merged

and

m

all

discussion as

the-

actual, inevi-

(jccur.

indeed developed machinery to

lias

and multiply

its

forms of action

;

hut the

have not been created; tluy are only UKjre

lully

I

Ml

detectetl, unl

The I

ill

.;d

and ut nizerl

successful man, of whatever calling,

through intimacy with the

by use of such

skill in

sprin;.;s

the adju-itmei

must achieve that success

and modes of human t

.iction, a.nd

of plans as to meet or anticipate

such action.

Mental philos(jphy demaiuls as much credit IS for an\'

for military success,

other success.

ie(JL;raphical (iisco\ery, so

hypotl lesis

oi

the proper

c,

died. has al\va\s

harmony

had some antecedimt

and lias thus So with physics,

of the physical wor'

been impelled to push the conviction to assurance.

whether of ice i

M

and

all

e.irlli

or heaven.

Even

the diversities of the earth's sur-

avenues of inter communication have proved as

military as to commercial or political

common

relations.

1

with other science, applies sound reasoning to

contingencies that can

come

within

its

vital to

he arrt of war,

sphere of duty.

all

in

possible

APOLOGY FOR TIIK MII.ITARV AK

17751

shares

It

with sonic

wherever

tlic"

limitations of

niilit;

fmilc knowlcdLjc, and

all

any

rv buiiaii, n(jr stored in

and

obst;rv'ation, iiuickness,

sa_L;acit>',

harmony .md material. Types of mind of e(iual

«9 is

not closeted inheres

arsenal.

It

[)recisi(jn,

have their

best

with

slren;^th in all those

circumst.inces of birth,

tile

cleinents

— will

education

or

various

objectives and exhiljit tlissimilar manifestations, so that society, its

civil

adiustments and

;^ro\vth,

which couM'rvc the riidiU of the

The

\>()V\i.

m.ixinis of

rel.itions,

civil

or)-, indicatiuL^'

the

l'',n;_;lish

common

which

l.iw

honor, when

its

a correspundiny;

physical sup-

.iffecl civil life,

and

are but accumulated ex[)erience, beycjiid date or mein-

how

society

many

of the

ri;^dits

and

in all

the same faculties

emjjloys

and vindicate

state,

of sanction

the aid

peril invoke-^

onl)'

drift

v/ill

seek

may

so happily

and securely

subsi-^t, that

be but the ai^grej^ate of individual

shall

ri;^hts.

These flow from the the centuries: but

past, i^ainiiiL;

thiJse

are

volume and illumination with

not older nor

more

with

consistent

iiuman reason than are the ijeneral maxims which inspire a wise

They

defense, and the conse(iuent, national defense.

one and indivisible. war, that

{(>

is

it

It is

llow

self

toi^ether,

as great an ern-r to predicite of the art of

abnormal and beyoml the

field of

the schokir, as to

tre.it

the whole system of state and nmnicipal politics as of

terial

concern to the individual ulizen,

in

his

imma-

comparatively passive

sphere of trust and de])endence. In proportion

takes part

as the citizen

in their

his privilege

freely exercises

and duty to understand,

respond to their hearty supi)ort

if

7i'/iy,

assailed.

idea that these are

cal

in

are

agents

(jf

is

and mora! sujjport is

i.o

rights, it

lioxv,

and

become he

shall

delegation of certain

predicated upon the

the people, duly responsible

their charge; but the obligation to render

their trust,

civil

when, and

The

trusts to the cabinet, the bench, or the bailiff,

trusts

his

establishment ;uul perpetuation, so does

all

for

the

needed physi-

the faithful discharge of the functions of

im[)erative in every well ordered state.

These functions

performed almost automatically during peace, with but incidental

friction,

and under

light burdens.

But the contingencies of lawlessness and violence and a consequent appeal to force are not to be ignoretl, because in abeyance, or out of sight. In the state, as in the houseiiold, during

wholesome peace, the

supremacy of law seems to be most positive when the external display

20

FOR THE MILITARY ART.

AI'OI.OGV

['775

::!

•I

nf sanction

There

prominent.

least

is

no exception

is

there every outlook

77ic visih/c ivldp stands for its

comprehends

a possible strut^;^le,

precludes the idea of substantial peace. tncajis



\

rest

from

ready

the case of states haviiiij large armies

in

There

is

no

;

use.

for

which of

itself

and

/'cace

rrst,

with a corresponding devotion of personal

coiijlkt,

,• 1

and national resources to permanent

i^ood.

While therefore, that sanction which

is

the reser\e force to

com-

•'

(

sii!

paraded

pel order, nia\' not be

must be pervasive

the sight of

in

men,

all

and the capacity to defend or

;

its

existence

assert rights

depends alone upon outside forbearance,

wise, ever\- franchise

most

accepted, that

of

fickk'

elements, falsely

all

policy.

have a deej) concern

tliat all citizens

lies in

stx-led

other nations.

man

iile tlie

i

l'

'

1

itii

its

its

crowning

those deeds of self-sacrifice and

ot

penalty acts as a preventive

its

assault, so

off

history of

;1»

I!

um e

oif

crmie, auui

does true valor

most brutal aspects, and assimilate the guardian

all

legitimate warfare

and

justice.

instinct with the exhibition

is

of noble attributes and profound wisdom.

h

possibilities, its

indeed the sphere

advent.

vindicate rights wards

rescue war from

The

compared with that of

glories, be

of public peace to the administrator of law

i

every [primary truth

compensations and

of values in its

assurance

thee cai)acity to

1

that

can alone secure renewal of primeval perfection, there

large wealth

heroism which hasten

W

w

If peace,

sweet domesticities and mu-.t be

(jr

therefore

is

the direction of national defense, or guides their judgment

to a right estimate of the national history, as

wherein

in

It

must

Other-

be coextensive with the ultimate value of the rights enjoyed.

If the object

of this vol-

were but the simple compilation of battle-narrative, there would

be no

pi, ice for

the present discussion

battles in the scales,

and

but the desire

;

test their merits

is,

to place the

by the experience of other

nations and other great captains, in order that

all

non-military schol-

'.

I

ars

who have

set

uj) false

standards of judgment, or have presumed

upon the ignorance gnorance of ot past generations, as to

;

direction

of the

will

deny

and ambition nr

denounce

There tion of

who

wi 11

rej

to the soldier a

for place it

will

;iy

determine

for

themselves

and

battle-

American Revolution.

Th ere are those

Some

m

ption advanced in behalf of the battles

the issu

ect

the

term, " science

of war.

higher purpose than self-support,

and power, and decry the profession as

servile,

as despotic.

not be wanting those

Germany and

who

will treat

the general educa-

the elastic resources of France, as at variance

APOLOGY FOR THE MILITARV ART.

1775]

with the assumption, that nations

dition of society

is

peace

;

and

suffers,

and

true

is

it

to

tl;at

the teeth are

the normal con-

proportion as the resources of the

in

state are diverted to \varlike uses, exccj)t

pensable preparation

armed

liabittially

Nevertheless,

sloioly bleediii!^ to dee.th.

2\

///

extremis, or in the indis-

impeiulin;^ or continj^ent dant^er, society

for

suffers just in proportion as the oblit^ations of

are impcnitivo.

and

God's law

depends upon adherence to those

vital prosperity

oblii^ations.

All similar and related questions of every kind are swallowed

up

in the fact, that as society suffers from internal violence, so nations as

True wisdom

such, are put in peril.

discharije of every tluty that as an outrage,

Should

homage

which humanity

at large

any maintain that

to military attainment,

the it

such a just and honorable

lies in

war without

just cause,

is

only possible,

would condemn and resent.

time has

must be

passed

made

first

for rendering

to appear that

all

nations are prompt to rentier justice, and to accept and practice the cardinal principles which Montestjuieu declares to be the spirit of laws,

that the higher refinement of duty which attaches to the precepts

or,

of the Saviour himself, has already blossomed fact

that true

is,

life

is

made up

resolution as against oppression,

of for

inner

all

When

life.

holy ends,

.it

ami ambition

these partake of

the risk of

life,

into fruit.

iMnulation

struggle.

of

for

is

great

in

labor,

preferment are parts

.self-sacrifice

the subject

The

lifted

and ex[)osure

above the

pl.uie

monumental worth and bright example. Where these elements work evil, and assail the rights of man. the

of mere living, to that of

issue

must be squarely met

by every agent

avail.ible

for

the

r

suppression.

No

nation rises by easy spring

Injustice f.ir

to well balanced independence.

and wrong assert their claims, and unless a people

indicate

under any possible phase of the future, there to their experience the

bitter lessons

will

be brought

which have involved so

so

duty

home many

corrupted, and conceited nations in remediless ruin.

listless,

If a nation, like

the m.in, be tloubly armed,

conscious dignity that cause,

will

their self-respect as willingly to understand their

is

in

a just c.iuse, so tne

ability to maintain that

strong assurance of independence, and a stern warning to

aggressors.

No

student of history

of arms has ever been

The

follows an assured

will fail to see that

the profession

esteemed honorable.

sacred record which

lies

at

the foundation of society

and thus becomes the vitalizing and essential element of

all

itself,

true pro-

f

AI'Ol.OCY FOR

22

I1775

honorable testimony to the prowess of those

gress, bears

liljH

MII.irAKY ART.

I'lIK

The

arms against unrigliteous violence.

who

the necessity for those

bear the shield

records and honors their triumphs.

the front of battle, both

in

Where,

classic epic, will

in

found more jubilant refrains over victories won, than

Deborah

\er\- l.iws

Moses

be

the song of

and what can surpass the majesty and all-embracing

!

ness of the chorus of Miriam and

The

who bore

Bible, therefore, recognizing

full-

!

and usages of chivalry were predicated upon the

idea that the true soldier represented the best type of ri'tlnement and

honor.

I'iety itself,

now

once but a synonym its

manifestations of

the hero of Virgil.

so exalted, self-denying, and precious, was

generous courage and true manhood.

for

In

combined with brave deeds, was fouml There have indeed been periods of history, when love,

filial

the soklier knight was almost exclusively the scholar, and the cloister alone furnished those who, besides himself, could transcribe thought

upon parchment or paper.

Bunyan and Milton assume the metaphors and terms

of military

while they delineate their highest characters, and expend the

life,

best efforts of their genius

forms which borrow strength and

in

cance from the military profession.

combine

to

honor him who honors himself

fight " has not

been fought

glories of millennial peace

crowned

for other merit

out. ;

signifi-

Both sacred and profane history

This

is

arms.

in

not the day

for

The

"

good

the gracious

neither should the military profession be

than that which attaches to

its fa'ithfulness

to

duty, as the conservator of just and sacred rights. T/u' ever iiiereasing responsibilities t/uil

•a the

zi'or.'d's

vivilizcd

population,

and

and barbarous

t/ie

attend

people into intimacy

and

rapid increase of which brings half-

tlic

eotnniereial enterprise

interfusion with less

populous, but better educated nations, are pregnant with issues ivhich

M

provoke luDiian passion and huvuiii

conflict.

Tidal waves of armed

ignorance, superstition, and brutalism are not impossible because a select minority of the earth's inhabitants

are enlightened and

civil-

[

ized.

h

History has recorded such events under circumstances no more I

f

difficult

than the future

may

evolve.

So

also, the irresponsibility of

despotic power, and the fiery scourge of religious fanaticism, are not )arrcd

ou t bee ause just now

There

is

restrain ed.

already a relaxation of fealty to authority, an indepen-

dence of individual obligation to the rights of the many, a jealousy of superiority, whether of mental or industrial attainment, which

APOLOGY FOR THE MILITARY ART.

'775.J

tend to anarchy arrogant

spirit

inquiringly

;

and these work

in

23

the same direction with the

of centralization and oppression, which gradually and

lifts its

arm

of a

as in the middle ages.

must be resolved, either by

The common moral final issue

obligation,

and respect

the conflicts of physical force will go

intelligent recognition

for the rights of all

beyond

their true mission

;

or

and

introduce unparalleled conflict. Tlicre

not

is

no aspect

commend

itself to

in

which the knowledge of military science does

the favor of the present generation.

The

les-

sons to be derived from history were never so pre-eminently useful

and they will hereafter hold a more solemn place in the mind of the thoughtful scholar. In introducing those principles

as now,

which place military attainment stating the laws tion,

it

by which

in fellowship

with true science, thereby

to test the deeds of the

American Revolu-

can not be entirely foreign or discursive thus to blend their

statement with honorable mention of

its

history.

'i

'i.'.

1'

r

ii

ji"

-III

I

fii

ii

}

'(

,

'

WARS BKTWKEV

1775-

NATIONis.

35

makes the distinction between those solemnly undertaken by the state, and those non-so/oiiii, that ^low out of the acts of subordinate authority, not r.itified by the head of the state. IV/icaion asserts that, if war be declared in form by one state, it Grotiiis

entitles both bellii;erent parties to all the rights of

whether the war be

other,

I

Ilallcck notices the

distinction

one case,

wars, when, in

all

tln'ngs, as illustrated in

is

in

179S.

and defensive have

offensive

more applicable

tinguish wars, although

also

been applied to

Even

in

dis-

to military opcratioiiSy since

every war o" considerable magnitude or duration, has of attack and defense.

in

a limitation ol persons, places,

the character of hostilities authorized by

the United States against France

The terms

between perfect and imperfect

the citizens of two states are placed

anta^Ljonism, aiul in the other, there

and

war against each

just or not.

its

alternations

the shaping of cabinet policy, these

terms are rather those of action than of type of contest, the verbal or diplomatic initiative b ing so aggressive as to

compel protest and

armed resentment.

An

equivalent principle obtains at

acts," so called,

may

common

warrant physical redress.

carry this discussion into the

It

law, is

where

" verbal

not proposed to

domain of international law, which is and energizing

largely that of ethics, but to recognize the distinctions

principles of battle-issues.

Writers have needlessly enlarged upon the classification of wars,

and only a wnich has itjcd

brief allusion real

While wars vary cess involves

is

deemed necessary

to cover

all

the ground

value to the citizen or student.

the

the manifestation and use of force, their suc-

in

same

principles of the military art.

The elements

that inspire hostility, and tender the battle-issue, largely determine his

the character of the war, and decide whether a whole nation

the

put

e

is

be

its

resources and existence at

force for

risk,

is

to

or only to display a partial

some temporary advantage to itself, or in behalf of another But when two nations, as two pugilists, em-

nation seeking its support.

iCise

ploy their resources exhaustively against each other, the term national

:tive

Tfrtrhas proper application.

IS

in

Such wars are peculiarly

free

from those

heathenish exhibitions which attach to internecine types of conflict.

The

national honor, sensitive and forced to the issue, aims to pay

respect to international law,

and thereby to challenge the moral recog-

nition of civilized neutrals. It

is

not an error,

in

a qualified sense, to treat as national wars,

WAKs

26 the

striigf;lcs

of

The

cicnce.

supprcssrcl riiitidiiality

althoui^h lacking piibhc

rc;^ain

I'okiiul

their iiulcpcii-

])atiiotic

its

loni^iii^^s,

Hungary

.iiul

by the force of

hut assertion of national

union whicli

Such cases

contiuest.

tended re-assertion of

for

example,

i/i/i'/y,

differ,

n.itional character in

kept

in

subjection

however, from a pre-

attempted disruption of a

the consent of both parties, and where the merger

h.ul

Thus Scotland became an by common consent. Turkey has

of individuality has oeen voluntary and complete.

became an

intej^ral

of (ireat Ihitain, ami Te.xas

irt

i

integral part of the United States

repeatedly

made war

Russia to ward off the accumulating force

witii

which threatened her iniiependeiice, her national

The General

life.

of the Netherlands against Spain, of the Spa!iish

stiu_ij;;^Ie

peninsula against France, of France against the

Halleck

wars

as

allies,

and

indepentlence,

for

are treated

)'et

fi'

of

i.Sij,

as a

between

war

for

(ireat IJritain

independence.

and the United

It

.States,

by

those were

national wars, to perfect and vindicate national existence. II

aiul

the struLj^le par-

re>unie their place anion^ nations, so that revolt was not

to

.nerel)' insurrection,

i

h.is

[1775

rccoijiiitioii until successful,

takes of a national character. tried

)ns.

vanquished pt-nplc to

oncL-

;i

nati

ri:t\vf;i:n

The war

has been treated

was, however, largely the culmination

of misunderstandings, put at issue indeed by the dawning develop-

ment of those

rights of citizenship which in later years have gained

general acceptance.

The

of independence from

a claim for independence

The former was

claim of America was no ni'^re an assertion

l^ritish in

control, than

was that of Great

l^ritain

the control of her home-born subjects.

the outgrowth of questions unsettled by the Ameri-

can Revolution, and the latter but the instinctive adherence to long

The former guaranteed

existing prerogative.

the

full

measure of national protection

petual allegiance of

all

once

;

to the adopted citizen

the latter claimed the per-

and the right to reclaim their

citizens,

persons even on the high seas, whenever found.

was

truly a national war.

mission.

It is

A

war

for

The

war, howeve-,

independence suggests

its

own

the struggle of a colony, a dependent section of the

state or of a distinct race, to obtain as a distinct nation.

It

finds

its

and maintain public recognition

key

the

in

first

grade of Revolution

hereafter considered. liaron Jouiini

declares that. " the

spontaneous uprising of an

united nation, must not be confounded with a national defense, in

accordance with the institutions of the state and

ernment."

His statement originates

in

ilirected

by the gov-

the idea, that the govern-

[1775

WARS

I77S]

ment

nirrwKKN' nations.

m.iy'act indopendeiUly of

He would

or wishes.

people, .ind foreign to their interests

tiie

thus limit

37

iiiitional w.irs to popiil.ir

outbursts

in

search of iiuiepcndcnce, or such as are necessary to save the national life

which has been put

whose government

of the people,

will

The statement

in peril.

is rep,

cscntativc,

"The term

adds:

lie

ignores those states

and therefore the e.^ecutive of the national,

can

only be

applied to such wars as are waged against an united people, or a

majority of them,

filled

entire

ition

1.

may be precipitated upon an by blunders of administration, misconception of con-

flicting issues, or

which

with a noble ardor, and determined to sustain

Wars, however,

their inilependence."

want of that

will ^'eierally

command

and generous negotiation

catholicity [)eace

when

nations really desire peace.

There may be re.di/.ed in such cases only a lukewarm support of the government by the people but the nation is responsible for the war, ;

and is

government

its

responsible to the people.

is

begun which dishonors national character and

of other nations, without

wars

conquest are of this type, and so are

the propagandism of ideas, whether political or religious.

for

Upon

any reasonable equivalent to the party tak-

Wars for

ing the aggressive.

the assumption, not to be thoughtlessly discredited, that every

nati(Jii,

as an abstract matter, has a rightful

independence

pursuits of peace, but no right to enforce Lsscrtion Britiiin

uhjects.

Anicri-

equally independent nations,

pcr-

|hc

their

iii

tnvevc", [its

own

of the

tvhich, as

between nations,

which governs citizens

The Crusades and

of an

lie

gov-

tovern-

legitimate

upm

forms of propagandism by force of

the

is

but the application of the wise restraint

Moslem wars were

shows in

itself.

To

fruit,

and

of the character adverted

defiance of all social and mere conquest have rarely perpetuated the state which committed the robbery. The compensations of time under Providence brand conquest. The mark of Cain national rights.

in

Fortunately, wars for

rob a nation of

life, is

not to be a glorious mission

the future.

Wars of

Intervention, once so

common

in

behalf of a so-called

balance of pozvcr, are almost invariably of doubtful expediency,

can only be justified

|nse, in

in

domestic policy

the exercise of individual personal rights.

in

of evil passions and evil

to, full

ignition lolution

all

its

arms are destructive of society, and violate that international comity

to long citizen

Sometimes a war strikes at the rights

when

and

there has been that willful violation of the

law of nations, which calls upon the strong to protect or vindicate the

weak from an attempt are

at conquest, or the destruction of rights

fundamental and essential to national

The

true balance

uf poiver,

is

which

life.

that of moral and industrial excel

»'•:

WARS BETWEEN NATIONS,

28

All else savors of the dark ages, and

lence.

is

[i77S.

as absurd

irl

essence,

as the impossible equality of individuals in wealth or accomplishments.

Hit

Equality to-day, will end to-morrow, just

in

proportion as the deserving

improve their acquisitions and the unthrifty and

When will

the French

prompt

army

selfish

shall equal the German,, the

waste them.

German -impulse

a fresh expenditure to retain ascendency in the material

of war, at the expense of domestic rest.

Such

are the considerations

which, as a general rule, are to determine the character of national

wars and indicate their

A nation

limit.

has in fact no right to go to war unless

entire national resources to the hazard.

to go to war

if

As

pose to destroy or absorb it

will

its

its

a general rule, one nation has no pur-

opponent, but only to wear

be too tired to keep up controversy.

general rule, nations are in

can pledge

there be any attainable settlement of controversy upon

a just basis without war.

so that

it

Neither has a nation the right

left after

it

out a

As an

little,

equally

war pretty much where they started

respect of the issue made, but fearfully poor in the elements of a

truly national

life

it!

1

13

"

4

1

[i77S.

CHAPTER CIVIL

WAR, DISTINCTION BETWEEN

Vr. INSURRECTIO'-I, REBELLION,

AND REVOLUTION.

CIVIL war

is

a war of one's

own household,

intestine,

and

full

of

bitter issues.

conserves the rights of

In proportion as a state

its

citizens

and

dispenses even justice, a civil struggle has the same merit which the

claim of any bodily

member might

assert against the

supremacy of the

Just as the mangled limb or deranged function

head or the heart.

imperils the whole system,

wholesoine acceptance of

and can only revive

its

its

normal use by

dependence, and such treatment as sub-

serves the welfare of the uninjured parts, so do civil feuds and strifes

endanger the state at the expense of the disaffected members, crowning the struggle with the ruin of

war proper,

Civil

is

all alike.

a war of factions, not necessaiily aiming at the

integrity of the state, but involving separate

control of the state, or at least

aspirations to obtain

supremacy over the

rival faction.

The

South American States and Mexico furnish impressive examples of civil

war.

The

English "

War

of the Roses," that of the

League

in

France, and of the Guelphs and Ghibellines in Italy, arc suggestive of the mischief to the

body

push personal or party

strifes to the

Success

itself

times

an

effort to

in

defiance of others' rights.

Such wars were

rife in

for national offense or defense,

by the

of rival aspirants for local power or influence at court.

Civil war,

however, has a general sweep which includes other and

related classes similar

attftnd

usurpation of national authority.

and more than once the powers of Burgundy and

;

France were well-nigh paralyzed selfish strife

which must

has no sound basis of perpetuity, because essentially

maintained only feudal

politic

;

these having subjective relations while

elements,

viz.,

INSURRECTION,

Rebellion,

full

of dis-

Revolution

!

»

It

^

•;:

ir

CIVIL WAR.

30

Each

alike, belong; to

bcloni; to tlic state

IxsURRKC'l'IDN

{

•Molllisr

lllr

uvnw

1)1

I

,11111)',

c

sill. nils, li.illril tllr

l.ll;'/1))'

I.k

tutiily

(iiini.il

tin- h.iin

i)iiii)rlliil

I

37

•.

;i|;.iiii

issue

iilTnisivr

with

,illil

1.1

I

r.iviiii,

.rviiit)' piil Mil, ill

ill-

t

prrsMirr

Ni.Miii .iml (iliivi-r (l(-scit(-r

III

ufii-

lluiisi-

ISiiliili

rilil.li|il|)lli

h.iil

iilH

(

,

ill;;,

111-

I

llli-

Ik iIh-

triiii|ts ,iiiil

llMlll

I{iii;;iiyiii-

r'-trr,ll

luildU

liMiii

iiiliiiiin

mils

IK A

!s

1,1.1

Ainniciii

ill'

I

iiiiusii.il

iiMi\v,il

i-ii

llii'

III

111

tiiniril llltn

.iiiil

i)iiliisi:il

,11

Wliitf

II

llllril

>i',

II

iiltiiii,i!n

i
1I||)

(

laiiil,

,md limi

I"!!-;

(I

I

llli-

.

.iivilli',

llii'

l)\-

tllc (MllllfrV,

I.S^i;,

S'')!

1

l')ll

Im milmiil Imili

ll'

1)1

,

jr

iiinhi

'

si-cdiiiI

.\i-'.\

Im-

li-

t

niDVciiiriil

N (-W

1)1

ii'.ii

a

.ivi-

ir.si

\aliu.'

mi

.1

Ii'iiii

Na

111-

t

rmi t|-.)l

In-

t

that

1)11

(iirccl Iv

VHW

li.

Imii.-

1)1

DplT.ll

111

I

war

ii .III

I

U'l'll

Id

t

.mil

Li.iii->vill''

VIC

ll

U'llll

CDiiliiliiMli-

)\\(st I

llVi-

of

c's

l''l

'

/"III' •l'^

tlir ITSdlllH

ill

I'

All)'

iic

llllillli'-

till-

IllililllA' ll.lM-,

rmas-

l)\ l)\'

1

.lllf

lilCFlNKI).

KINCII'I.I.S

1

"775. J

loj-

.a

l'LnL;lanil

army

of

tiiird line of

Iroin

oper.uimis,

lliri.iliiiiii;^'

the otln:r tol oiin-s

Washington, which

reiii.iiiie-d

but

llii;

on

tlie

i

u?

rUINl-Il'I.MS DKKINKI).

52 '.



alert, u'itliin wliicii

w

IS

strikiiv^

to strike

distance of

toga.

Wliile a base restini^ on the sea

as was

New

'S'

i

'II

t^

f-

(1

!

fi'ii

York,

still

paralyzed the arm

must be adecjnately supplied,

York, throus^h superior maritime resources,

was that of Cornwallis, '^

New

with Hur^^oyiie, and his operations closed at Sara-

true that an .irniy forced back

I

11775-

(

is lust.

n/>ofi

it

.is

equally

the sea by a competent force, as

CHAPTER STRATEC.Y

TIIR prime objective of

X.

WAR CON IINUKO.

IN

the war of 1775 -17S1, w.is

of the colonial armies and enforcement of

The occupation of territory or

cr(3\vn.

while the opposinLj armies ke[)t

tlie

tiie

tlie

rcduclioii

authority ot the

by an ina(le(|iiate force, was therefore of tran>iei\t

cities

fieM,

benefit.

made

Philadelphia was

the objective of the British

the campaii^n of 1777, mainly because

Congress removed to Wilmington,

Gcrmantown,

close to the city,

A

conchision.

sinj^Ie

reniaik

it

was the

— Washington

and the

issue

army

ca[)ital of

struck a blow at

was as

f.ir

as ever from

therefore i)ro])er as to the

is

diirin;,^

the enemy.

v.

due

ot

a

national ca])ital as a chief military objective. Colcjnel llamley,

excellent .states

(

British Staff College, in

is

not

field.

It

is

final,

" The mere possessicin enemy can still make head

when the

ascendency over it,

so long as the

th.it

the;

his

of War," (edition of 1S75)

the proposition very precisely.

capital

retake

commandant of the " The )per,itions

volume u[)on

seizure of the capital

is

cou[)led

of the in

the

with such

defensive armies that they can ne\er hope to

further resistance

to national extinction, and that

is

felt

to

be hopeless, as lead \nn to an issue

front.

Ironl

its

adwuilaj^e, so that the

wu It

artificial

has l)eeu called the stratiy;ic front.

deni.inil

itod

however, an

indication of the tract wi thin w nic h

n

matter of

.1

is,

nn passable stream,

decisive

strategic iVoiit

As

itselt".

an

,rm\- be oi'lniK ri lis

This

inarch.

(l,l\'S

dependiMU upon the nature of the country.

tance, wlioll)-

N;ipo-

[

hrKAlKClV

tVb

artificial

obstacles should be iiKule

army wiien driven

Riv ers often form lines of defense, as

to the stationary dein

repeated instance:

STRATEGY IN WAR CON'ITXUED.

5f>

during the campaign of 1781 quarters of the American

The winter

the Soutliern States.

in

army

[»775.

at Valley I"\)rge. 1777-S,

were a

line

of defense no less than a peculiarly well selected strategic position.

A

back country was accessible

large

impoverished by the waste of war,

army

at Philadelphi.i fulfilled all

for supplies,

]5ritish

the conditions which were necessary

reasonable safety, keep the troops on the

to secure

although greatly

the distance from the

anil

both opportunity and intlucement

alert,

and afford

observation and operations to

for

the front.

A

line of

defense should be as compact as possible, with a strategic

front so limited as to give promi^t concentration of the

One

critical points.

student

who would

army

assured of

is

equal, that to

considenition

rightly estimate the merits of an issue,

means of defense.

artificial

army which holds

the advantage

If

a firm position, h.i^

of that position,

while

the

strength equal to the estimated loss involved

issue, the

elements which

No |i

i^a

£

line of

/>/iis

strength equal has iiiinus

;issailant

forcing that position.

in

force of discipline

command

and both the moral and physical

success are

left

to their free exercise.

detensc should he passively occupied.

Fayette to Barren

and Washington's attack

Hill,

The at

atlvance of

Germantown,

were expressions of torce which gave value to the position Forge, exalted itself

its

defensive

tioo

properties,

The

upon a quasi-dcfcnsivc.

campaign, had

when one

forces be otherwise

where successful movements and hard fighting make

In an ojien field

up the

army upon

uorthy of suggestion to the

is

latter

and

at

Valley

put the British army

army during the New Jersey

ultimate lines of defense.

cordon of posts extending to

The banks of the Dela-

New

Brunswick and Perth

ware, with

X\\c

Amboy,

nied one, and the river Raritan on the right, was auxiliary

foi

to the former, so long as the fleet controlled the waters about Staten Istand. I

The

latter

was

l!-!l

working southward from the

movements

middle :.i

tiiii

V,

New

practically an

New

advanced base

for operations

York, with a strategic front looking to

of Washington's

army which occupied the heights

of

Jersey.

Zones of opodtion are belts of territory controlled by m )ving columns, or those within which columns can act in real concert. Several lines of operation

may

fall

within one zone.

During the war of 1775-178 1,

New

Jersey and Pentisylvania were

within the cetitre zone, while (ieorgia and the Carolinas belonged to

the

left.

During

the American

war of 1861-1865, the

trans-Mississippi

:^

[1775.

SrUATEGY

i:75.J

states filled the right zone

IN

;

WAR

CONTINUi:i).

57

the country eastward to Virginia, indi-

cated the centre; while the Atlantic belt, with operations on Rich-

mond, determined the zone of the

left.

with the motlern telegraph and railroad system,

It is possible,

for

a competent commander to ordain a general policy, by which operations in different zones may determine together toward the general Thus General Grant on the left, and General Sherman in the result. centre, acted in full concert during the spring and summer of 1864,

so to

occupy the Confederate forces as to neutralize the benefit which

otherwise enured to the latter by virtue of a series of interior railroad lines,

which enabled their armies to operate alternateiy against the

Federal armies of either zone, by a shorter route than was available for

the latter troops.

ity,

Dining July, lS62,the author was instructed by competent authorto meet Generals Halleck and Pope on their arrival at Wash-

ington, t)

which pkice they had been called by telegram,

inform them that an immediate interview was desired by dent, then at the Soldiers'

Home,

antl

to

tiie Presi-

The

a short distance from the city.

whole object of the proposed interview was, that the Presitlent might determine souri,

own mind whether the

in his

judgment, or merely accidental. eral

different operations in Mis-

Kentuck}', and Tennessee, were the result of one forecast, or

Halleck was placed

of staff to the President,

in

general

As the result of their arrival, command, under the st\'le of

who thereby

asserted his constitutional pre-

General

rogative as commander-in-chief, ufion the assumption that

Halleck had

(ien-

chief

mental scope and executive ability to handle

the

all

General Pope was also

the armies over the entire theatre of w.ir.

assigned to a highly responsible sphere of duty. rile details ot

separate zones are necessarily distinct, as are

many

same

zone.

oper.itions of single arinies

moving on separate

General Sherma:i\ march to the sea operations, because he kept entire

command,

that

it

was

w.is

lines in the

practically but

one

line of

up such constant communication with at all times in

the efficient accom[)lishment of his plans.

hand If

for concentration, it

his

and

be regarded as the

equivalent of two lines of operations acting together within one zone, it

had the perfect accord of purpose and action, which under

hands, makes every key in music to vibrate

in

harmony

skillful

together.

grand divisio f his army moved as a unit, on their mission. During the war of 1775-178 1, the operations of General Clinton were marked by great wisdom, and a fi.xed purpose to secure a suf1

lie

srUAII-CV IN

S8

concentration of force to realize success on

ficiont

proposed oper.ition. 1

WAR COXriNUFD.

hulson river and

'riie

tiiree

tlie

zones of

bounded on the left by tiie was favored by Lord Geort;e (jerniaine,

riL;ht

delenses,

its

but at the sacrifice

[177:

zone,

results elsewhere, aiul without an appreci.ition

ot

of the resistance with which he had to cope, and the character of the

country

in

which the war was

c.irricd on.

^Althou;4h Massachusetts was after 1

!'
t> posscsscil

till'

li

^lnwlv, ihr

traiiiiiiL^, iri)iit

vi|4i>r iif W'.i-^liiiv^tdi),

soldiLis

l.\rlU>

ai)ove-

all

others.

'

'J!

'!

"'iji'

The ^reat represented

German

-I

m.ii(ru\ri' which ciiaracteri/.eil I*'rederic

skill in

Clinton,

l)y

troops came' promptly

methods of severe

IVrcy .md

Kn_\'piiau-en,

duty

to

u|)

Tarjeton,

was

well

and the

accordance with the

in

which they had been trained.

schooliiiL^ to

'

t

Lee,

\\'ashin;.;ton, (ireene,

i

,,.1'JI

however t)f

com-

otlu-r coni])etent

who took

toreii;n,

armv

the .\merican

ham!, wt-re compelled to enter the contest before their soldiers,

in

I

and

.Ma.xwell,

American and

maViders, both

i

well-drilled, indi\idually, could possibly accjuiie that

action which

This affords in

the

field.

makes

An

many

clew to

tiie

army

of ,m educated

illustration oi

concert

a perfect machine.

disasters which attended oper.itions

recent d.ite will del'iue the point in

\iew.

rcijimeiUs

single

m

instructed

commanders

been

h.ul

arm\'

I'"edera!

These movements were

ilrill.

e.xact.

llriijatle

from the colonels

ibk

o lar f. a-

assitjnec

divisions,

had been commeiicetl ami well .ulvaiiced

ever, the

re-'iiiieiit

their ori;.inic i

divisions, ri le

captain

I

si )kiR r,

wiiich

svstem, even ,is

opportunit)' i.in lu^^dstic-.

art.

and

within a period so short

dc'ci-^ive',

and ada[)tation of

])reparation

of

hy had

the (aiuiean war

diu-in'.;

aili'.'s

movement

tin;

proni-ited

on^icU.-raljly

u.is

I'rn^-^ia,

modern

oi

have cvinceil a niuic

limes,

tiioron;_di

meet the demands

m.iterials to

in

the Franco

of

hattIe-i.-..-.ues.

Tin:

Coast of (juinea campai;.nis of Great

Ahys-inia and

were marked hy C(;mmenTurate connn.ind he

\

(hff'iciiit

its neccTsitii.;

sewrel)' ta-.ke'd exactin;,^^

:S

lo;_;i^iic^

whether of service or

i,

nl

h\"

SOi -1865.

1

modern war the

is

siir^le

I'i'UT-iian

not

the i)recision the

\',ist

direction of transportation i-;

is

found

u|) on

necessary to

i

Ijelon;.;

s

I'aris invi.)lved

(juinii)re-sent

oifensive

,ind

\'et

recpjirt.'S

move six

armies.

hundi'eil

ioilin;4'

hrid'^e

re(iuisitif)n,

with

all

th.in;_;s

inspection

liie

thousand

department of

control, that accidents

work.

the control

head of railroad cor-

and such was were

and

r,u-e.

essential

t(j

of troops and

its

ol

to tais dej),irtmcnt.

not referahle to had

lo_L,dslics.

in

the

To

means

of equippin;^ an

OvercroAded transports

shipn\ent of sui)piii;s, the confusion of

arms of the

SL-rvice,

table, unles.s

the m'tli-

or

m

and exact s>'slem

tr.iins,

that

the

in

the

indiscrimin.Ue

iteri.d helon;^in:4 to dilfcrent

and the misdirection of these '.

army

;4:\e el'lect to this resjjonsihh: trust,

there must he thorou:^h coacert of i)ur[)osc

execution.

re-S'Mii'Ce-.,

the adjustments of

ICveuy

untailin;^!)- sup[)lied

The; a; can he no deficiency is

liian

was called into

en;_;ineerin;.;

ami

at the

mo\'ed more

rail'.v.i\'s

army was

Comfort and supplies

which enteied into

made the ,-esiilt pos-^ihle. 'idle sjjhere hound up in merely mechanical w(irk. In

(ireat tale'Ut

The advance

and

would

several staff department>> were

TIk.:

stock and material to dilfereut roads. huiliiin;,;"

tin;

(>\

It

fully met.

porations: and similar capacity

troops.

Jiritain

outfit

of lahor aloni;

however,

of a m, titer mind,

'I'he

the

clim.ite.

the e-normou-. drain up-ui their

demand was

'i'lie 'livi->ii)ii

of

adjustin'4

in

to estimate the expenditure of material

the .\mc:rican w.u"

the

skill

sup[jlies are inevi-

be Ldd down clearly, and competent

officers

T

LOGISTICS.

I77;-

1775

Battle iiistory

instructions.

to "-rcat captains, to

wlio taiK'd

when

is

full

71

of disasters which attach thscredit

responsibiht}- properly belonj^ed to tiiosc

tlie

to execute, tlie will of the

api)reciate, or accurately

comm.uuler. It is

authoritatively stated, that on the evenin;^ of July 4th, 1809,

before the battle of Wayrani, the nii;ht bein;^ dark, and in

ini;

tlie rain

f.ill-

torrents, when one hundred and fifty thousand men were across the arm of the Danube, there one huiulred and fifty

puslied

yards wide,

1)_\-

brid;4es, that

three

who

assigned to Davoust,

w.is

it

commanded tlie r!;^ht win;.;, to cross the centre bricf-je, and to Oudinot, who commanded the cmitre, to cross the bridLje to the rigiit. These commamlers obe)-ed the orilers as received, and such was the marvellous discipHne of the triio[)s tliat the armies jj.issed each oilier with-

out disorder, and the

movement was accomplished without knowledge

While the

of the enemy.

error

dictatin;4 the onler, Berthier

take, since he

is

attributed to Najioleon's haste

criticised

is

in

observini^ the mis-

for not

was called u[)on to make ten copies of the

cM'der

for

information of the army. asserts, that " Na])oleon

Jomini broadly

contiui^ciicy of retreat,

be done, but

was

It

in

loliat

army was

in

the

o!tl

confol of experienced The

livetl,

loL^istics

the siege of Boston, devolved vast mili-

inexperienced citizen

into the

soon

.IS

Nliort

enlistment involved a

new

Those consider.itions

tory ot successive campaigns, eltect of b

    i^

    ^iS'i

    If 74

    II' *i

    ih: r"

    ^'

    :i'

    i;

    MISCI.I.l \Ni:()l!S

    ('nNSIDI'KA'MoNS.

    1

    I

    77^

    MisrKF.i.Axr.nrs coxsrnF.RA'noNS.

    i;75-J I

    75

    -"7^

    as will w.irnuit success under the (M'diiiary [)liases of a positive retreat

    from a beaten

    The

    field.

    /^itrsiiil

    unles.--

    cut off

    cessfull)'

    too busy,

    ami earnest as to ke'ep

    it

    de-^triK'tion of bridt^es

    and

    leiiLjth

    of time to save the

    It is

    tlaiik

    of

    '1

    he

    the

    for

    for

    a

    sufficient

    pursued.

    tiie

    jjursuit shall l)e so directed

    army upon

    retirin;4

    check their progress, ami

    counlr\- wliich

    action.

    escape, to .illow time

    may thus be stopped

    .irir.y

    movements, as to crowd

    tions of

    in

    importance that the

    hi;4'h

    new

    should be so constant

    force,

    inter])osition of obstacles to the pur-

    \.\\v.

    Cav.dry and artillerv

    suit.

    his adversary, suc-

    can be Ijrou^dit up to induce a

    upon the retiring

    howi'ver,

    li.irass

    detachments, and occujjy the rear i^uard

    fuL^itive

    all

    until ade(]uate force

    pressure,

    wisdom,

    nf a retreat ill;::; uriny involves hardly less

    the victor has sufficient cavalry to

    rivers or

    by

    por-

    strategical

    c^ive

    aiivantage to the adveu'sary pursuing. Pircrsiiiiis,

    made by the

    such as those

    V:)ik into Connecticut, are calculated l)ians of is

    in

    army from New

    British

    interfere

    with the general

    proportion as that result

    and the army which spares the detaciiment

    an adecpiate force for

    bv

    Tiiey have value

    the adversary.

    effected,

    to

    Washington

    its

    general operations.

    It

    he was so bent u[)on

    is

    still

    retains

    due to General

    his

    purpose to suike

    that

    he could not be

    diverted from chief and paramount objects b\' those

    which were minor

    to state, that

    1* ; -1'

    those armies which kept the

    in

    field

    ft)rce,

    and transient, even while such movements real loss in propert\-

    The

    and

    waste and

    Morgan

    in 1781,

    which thre;itcned

    and other posts to the rear of the British headquarters

    Camden, really exposeil the army to be beaten was however successful. Fearing lest the base would

    Charleston

    be

    of the

    be

    threatened

    army with

    rejoined the

    imjieriled,

    wouM

    victory over Gates tection

    local

    life.

    diversions of Greene and

    Ninet}--si\

    inflicted

    a,

    lost,

    posts,

    and every

    in

    The

    detail.

    so far

    benefit

    .it

    feint

    advanced from of the

    recent

    the army was divided ior the pro-

    and the American detachments

    safety. 'J

    Iiiipro:i('iiu'iit

    tlie

    of

    sKcccss.

    After the battle of Bennington

    American troops, elated with the

    result of the day's fight,

    themselves so intently with the plunder of the battle artillery of

    field,

    in

    !

    I/"/,

    occupied that the

    Colonel Breyman, alone, aroused thcni to the conviction

    that another

    enemy was on

    their hands,

    and that victory

    itself

    was

    well nigh lost.

    General

    Howe

    habitually failed to realize the best fruits ot success

    1^

    ;^'s,

    I()\>.

    I

    all

    ij^morant

    down,

    slcH-piiiL^, lyiiv^'

    1775

    1

    they arc

    ;

    all

    down

    lyiiiLj

    to

    sliiinlxr I" t

    '

    :

    riiiis si;^iials

    I

    than

    I

    'III'

    ;!,.

    lion,

    natural!)'

    ver_\-

    emi)almed.

    men, .md

    1

    a

    blotted ^"' pies

    'I'lu:

    and

    instance wlu'n

    oni;

    entire!)- hiiv^ed H't i

    oitcn

    al.iriu,

    1)1"

    nad early introihu

    scarcit)' of

    in llic iniiiilhrs

    of the .Anu.ii-

    th.m their uncert.u'nty of

    strikiiiL;

    arms and proper equipments.

    Several

    pa\',

    l),itt!es

    and were

    I

    affectid Ijv tlieir

    j

    moments

    !))

    skill

    as

    marksmen.

    (Others were clKuv^ed at critical

    possession and [prompt use of

    tlie

    bayonet.

    If as a i^^ener-d

    ''I

    rule, tlie

    American

    ^ive an

    el'fect

    arms," the

    to the

    rille

    were

    and could which was beyond the reach of the " kini^'s

    soldiers

    opposiii;,; force h id

    individuail)' l)etter "shots,"

    the advanta;_;e's which the l)ayoiiet and

    a complete e(pii[)nunt ahorded.

    It h.id

    adi.ipiate supplies of [)owder,

    suitable caniiJ eipaipaj^e, an orL;ani/ed conimisScuiat, liistor)' is

    not

    more

    instructive

    and

    and

    iiiouov.

    The

    interesting^ ju inspect of the par-

    ticular deeils done, than in the really extensive operations

    compassed

    through disproportioiied means and under discourai^in;^ circumstances. Neither side was ready lor war wlien it beLjan. The British army Tlie American army complemented by nuiubers and

    fouyht with inad.eipiate lorces.

    foui^ht

    inade(|uate means, onl)-

    faith in their

    ultimate imlepenileiice.

    'Tliis last

    consideration was the potent

    with

    niai;ic

    which transmuted continental paper into a semblance of money, and dignified

    semi-starvation into a herijic

    waitiii;^ for

    the rewards oi the

    future.

    Tb.e assum[)tion of independence, so long merely nominal, w.is

    found

    t(j

    be a poor antidote

    instituted that Si,

    for

    liimyr and

    rags,

    and Congress fmally

    system of bounties so largely adopted

    in

    the war uf

    •775

    Misci:i,i,\\i;i)rs (•(l\^ll>l•;k aiidns.

    1775-1

    iS^i-iSr),,

    were otlii r

    and

    biiliiiii

    ^is

    iif"

    soiii';

    the

    i'iilaj\m(l

    iii-.tor)'

    I'lic

    (ilTensiw;

    and

    with the

    llnil^.'d .States

    and

    |)()\ver,

    Fr.mcc, and 'iiade Louis .W'L, that license

    re\dlutioii

    l''rench

    the

    wliicli affecliid

    re-acted

    in

    racy

    eiiually true.

    is

    of

    f)riii

    IVeedoiii

    it

    upon

    r(.MCte'd

    lihert}-,

    is

    a fict.

    I'll, it

    the

    maniua', and threatened .America

    like-

    names

    I'he

    Mrilish

    ol

    sympathy with the

    Lafi\ette indeeti, to suffer under

    .iiid

    uith the supremacy of a fmatical,

    That ol I'rance

    of the- principles which

    ^Xnierican w.ir ' tact, unselfishness, and solid

    'I'iie

    monumental,

    much

    (jf its

    the cooper.ition of several powers in

    as dis[)rojt of the [)roposition, let

    it

    .is

    determiniiv^ elements

    harmony and enhanced

    value.

    its

    Crimean war be

    tlie

    citcil

    be noticed that the Crimean war

    was based upon the supposed purpose of Rus-^ia to control the Dardanelles at nations,

    the

    expense of

    Turlie)-,

    and was predicited iipon a

    biiuls societv to

    protect

    its

    members

    and of

    all

    princi[)lc

    interested

    .similar

    maritime

    to that

    against lawless assault.

    which It

    was

    another protest a-^ainst a war for conquest. Military commanders.

    ,5*

    The

    selection of

    men who

    shall vindicate

    *.

    IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3)

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    20 I.I

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