Barbarian or Greek?: The Charge of Barbarism and Early Christian Apologetics 9004306242, 9789004306240

Table of contents :
1 Prologue..............1
2 Ancient Rhetoric and the Charge of Barbarism..............14
3 Conceptualizations and Representations of the Barbarian in GrecoRoman Literature..............58
4 The Charge of Barbarism and Greek Christian Apologetic..............129
5 The Charge of Barbarism and Latin Christian Apologetic..............212

Citation preview

Barbarian or Greek?

Studies in the History of Christian Traditions General Editor Robert J. Bast (Knoxville, Tennessee) Editorial Board Paul C.H. Lim (Nashville, Tennessee) Brad C. Pardue (Point Lookout, Missouri) Eric Saak (Indianapolis) Christine Shepardson (Knoxville, Tennessee) Brian Tierney (Ithaca, New York) John Van Engen (Notre Dame, Indiana) Founding Editor Heiko A. Oberman†

volume 187

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/shct

Barbarian or Greek? The Charge of Barbarism and Early Christian Apologetics

By

Stamenka E. Antonova

leiden | boston

Cover illustration: Relief panel of the Great Ludovisi sarcophagus, portraying a battle scene between Roman soldiers and Germans in the third century bc. Photographer unknown. Location: Palazzo Altemps, National Roman Museum. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Antonova, Stamenka Emilova, author. Title: Barbarian or Greek? : the charge of Barbarism and early Christian apologetics / by Stamenka Emilova Antonova. Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2019. | Series: Studies in the history of Christian traditions, ISSN 1573-5664 ; volume 187 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018024001 (print) | LCCN 2018026225 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004306240 (E-book) | ISBN 9789004306257 (hardback : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Church history--Primitive and early church, ca. 30-600. | Christianity--Controversial literature. | Apologetics. Classification: LCC BR166 (ebook) | LCC BR166 .A58 2018 (print) | DDC 270.1--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018024001

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 1573-5664 isbn 978-90-04-30625-7 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-30624-0 (e-book) Copyright 2019 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense and Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, ma 01923, usa. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

To the memory of my father Emil Antonov Dochev and to my mother Roumiana Stamenova Docheva

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Contents Acknowledgements ix List of Abbreviations xi 1 Prologue 1 2 Ancient Rhetoric and the Charge of Barbarism 14 2.1 The Charge of Barbarism and Early Christian Apologetics 14 2.2 Ancient Rhetorical Practices and Christian Apologetic Literature 29 2.3 Methodological Approaches and Theoretical Considerations: Postcolonial Theory and Literary Constructions of “Self” and “Other” 42 3 Conceptualizations and Representations of the “Barbarian” in GrecoRoman Literature 58 3.1 Roman Literature and the Notion of the “Barbarian”: Caesar, Cicero, Tacitus, and Seneca 62 3.2 Greek Literature and the Concept of the “Barbarian”: Aristides, Dios Chrysostom, and Philostratus 94 3.3 Excursus: Lucian of Samotasa and the Self-defintion of the “Barbarian” 120 4 The Charge of Barbarism and Greek Christian Apologetic 129 4.1 Justin Martyr and the Charge of Barbarism 130 4.2 Tatian and the Charge of Barbarism 146 4.3 Clement of Alexandria and the Charge of Barbarism 163 4.4 Origen of Alexandria and the Charge of Barbarism 177 4.5 Eusebius of Caesarea and the Charge of Barbarism 194 5 The Charge of Barbarism and Latin Christian Apologetic 212 5.1 Tertullian and the Charge of Barbarism 213 5.2 Arnobius of Sicca and the Charge of Barbarism 247 5.3 Lactantius and the Charge of Barbarism 273 6 Epilogue 304 Bibliography 307 Index 334

Acknowledgements I am profoundly indebted to many colleagues, mentors, friends and family members, without whom this book would not have been completed. First and foremost, I would like to thank my doctoral advisers from the Religion Department at Columbia University, Professor John A. McGuckin and Professor Vincent L. Wimbush, who enthusiastically encouraged me to pursue my chosen topic of research and generously supported me throughout the process of writing. I owe special thanks to my three external dissertation readers, who offered invaluable advice and excellent expertise: Professor Kathy H. Eden from the Classics and Comparative Literature Departments at Columbia University; the late Professor Alan F. Segal from the Religion Department at Barnard College; and Professor William V. Harris from the History Department at Columbia University. I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to Professor Roger S. Bagnall from the Classics Department at Columbia University and Professor Hal Taussig at Union Theological Seminary for their critical feedback and collegial support. In addition, I would like to acknowledge the receipt of generous research fellowships from Columbia’s Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, the Center for the Ancient Mediterranean, and the Whiting Foundation. I am most grateful for the funds that I was awarded and the opportunity that they afforded me to dedicate my time to do research, to travel and to write. In addition, I would like to express my gratitude for the chance to present my research project in different academic venues and to receive helpful feedback from colleagues at Columbia University, Union Theological Seminary, and other academic institutions. I am particularly thankful for taking part in the international conference on the “Spread of Early Christianity in the First Four Centuries” organized at Columbia’s Center for the Ancient Mediterranean, where I was able to present the early stages of this research project. As a result of it, I was able to contribute the article “Barbarians and the Empire-wide Spread of Christianity” to the collective volume entitled The Spread of Christianity in the First Four Centuries. Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition, edited by ­William V. Harris (Boston: Brill, 2005). The list of names of colleagues who have offered their encouragement and support for this research project would be too long to enumerate in its entirety, but I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude especially to Dr. Margaret Aymer, Dr. Denise Buell, Dr. Gay Byron, Dr. Kate Cooper, Dr. ­Andrew Jacobs, Dr. Jennifer Knust, Dr. Jinyu Liu, Dr. Kimberly Stratton, and Dr. Zsuzsana Varhelyi, among others. Also, I would also like to express my deep

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appreciation to my esteemed friends and colleagues, who have read the manuscript in part or in its entirety and have offered critical comments and helpful suggestions: Dr. Anna Boozer, Dr. Mina Brenneman, Dr. Polina Dimova, Dr. Zachary Herz, Dr. John Lee, Dr. Asha Moorthy, Dr. Jonathan Pratt, Dr. David Ratzan, and Dr. Judith Wermuth-Atkinson. I remain deeply indebted to all of them for their valuable contributions. Last but not least, I would like to thank Matthew W. Bennett and Dr. Paul Lim for connecting me with Dr. Robert J. Bast, the editor-in-chief of the book series Studies in the History of Christian Traditions, and Ivo Romein from History, Slavic and Eurasian Studies at Brill Academic Publishers. I am extremely grateful for all the expert support that I have received from the representatives of Brill Academic Publishers, without whom this book would not be a reality. I would like to dedicate this work to the memory of my father and to my mother, whose unceasing love, generosity and support have made it possible for me to pursue my intellectual interests and to achieve many academic and personal goals. To all these mentioned here and to many more, I owe my heartfelt appreciation and my most sincere thanks. Stamenka E. Antonova New York City

List of Abbreviations ac Antike und Christentum: Kultur und Religionsgeschichtliche Studien. acw Ancient Christian Writers. as Ancient Society. ahr American Historical Review. ajp American Journal of Philology. anwr Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt. bz Biblische Zeitschrift. cag Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca. cbq Catholic Biblical Quaterly. ccl Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina. Turnhout and Paris, 1953. ccsa Corpus Christianorum, Series apocryphum. cil Corpus inscriptionum Latinarum. Berlin, 1862-. Coll. Leg. Mos. et Rom.  Mosaicarum et Romanarum legum collatio. Ed. Nicolaas Smits. Haarlem, 1934. cp Classical Philology. cq Classical Quaterly. csco  Corpus scriptorum Christianorum orientalium. Louvain, 1903. csel  Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum. Vienna, 1866. Dig. Digesta Iustiniani Augusti. fc  Fathers of the Church: A New Translation. Washington, d.c. Catholic University Press, 1947-. FrGrTh Fragmente griechischer Theolosophien. Ed. Hartmut Ersbe. Hamburg, 1941. gcs  Griechische christliche Schriftssteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte. grbs Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies. htr Harvard Theological Review. icur Inscriptiones Christianae urbis Romae. ils Inscriptiones Latinae selectae. Ed. Herman Desau. Berlin, 1892–1916. jaar Journal of the American Academy of Religion. jac Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum. jbl Journal of Biblical Literature.

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List of Abbreviations

jecs Journal of Early Christisan Studies. jr Journal of Religion. jrs Journal of Roman Studies. jsnt Journal for the Study of the New Testament. jsot Journal for the Study of the Old Testament. jts Journal of Theological Studies. l&s  A Latin Dictionary. Eds. Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short. Oxford, 1989. lcc Library of Christian Classics. lcl Loeb Classical Library. lsj  A Greek-English Lexicon. Eds. Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, Henry Stuart Jones, et al. Oxford, 1968. npnf Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers. pg Patrologia Graeca cursus completus. 162 vols. Ed. J.-P. Migne, Paris, 1857–86. pl Patrologia Latina cursus completus. 217 vols. Ed. J.-P. Migne, Paris, 1844–64. rac Reallexicon für Antike und Christentum. rb Review biblique. reg Review des études grecques. rel Review des études latines. RelSRev Religious Studies Review. sc Sources chrétiennes. Paris, 1941. StPatr Studia Patristica. ThZ Theologische Zeitschrift. tdnt  Theological Dictionary of the New Testament Ed. Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich. 9 vols. Trans. Geoffey W. Bromiley. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964–74. tu Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur. sha Scriptores Historiae Augustae. vc Vita Christianorum. Vox P Vox Patrum. usqr Union Seminary Quaterly Review.

Chapter 1

Prologue In 1 Peter the author of the text writes to his addressees, identified as “chosen exiles from the diaspora (ἐκλεκτοῖς παρεπιδήμοις διασπορᾶς) in Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia and Asia and Bithynia,”1 who have been chosen by God the Father and sanctified by the Holy Spirit.2 The author of 1 Peter portrays the change affected in his addressees as a result of their divine election and he resorts to the use of ethnic designations, when he continues in his letter: “Once you were no people (οὐ λαός), but now you are God’s people (λαὸς ϑεοῦ).”3 The author writes that they have become “[a] chosen generation (γένος), [a] royal priesthood, [a] holy race (ἔθνος), God’s own people (λαός)”4 in addition to being “sojourners and exiles” (παροίκους καὶ παρεπιδήμους)5 among the various “nations” (ἔθνη).6 As suggested by these references from the New Testament corpus, a number of ethnic and political categories of individual and group identity, belonging, differentiation and formation are to be found in the canonical scriptures, as well as other early Christian sources. In the Epistle to Diognetus, a text which was most likely composed circa 200 ce in Alexandria, the anonymous author responds to questions raised by his addressee and takes some of the same issues of group identity and formation. The letter states at the beginning: “I perceive, most excellent Diognetus, that you are exceedingly eager to learn about the piety (θεοσέβεια) of the Christians and you are asking very clear and careful questions about them: who is the God that they believe, and how do they worship … and why this new race (γένος) or practice (ἢ ἐπιτήδευμα) has come to life at this time and not formerly.”7 When the author proceeds to provide specific answers to these questions, he draws distinctions among Greeks, Jews, and Christians by referring to religious conviction and civic status. The author explains: “For distinction between Christians and the rest of humanity is neither country (γῇ), nor language (ϕωνῇ), nor customs (ἔθεσι). For they do not dwell in cities in some places of their own, nor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1 Peter 1:1. 1 Peter 1:1. 1 Peter 2:10. 1 Peter 2:9. 1 Peter 2:11. 1 Peter 2:12. Epistle to Diognetus 1:1.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���9 | doi 10.1163/9789004306240_002

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do they use any strange variety of dialect, nor practice an extraordinary kind of life.”8 Instead of explaining the distinctiveness of Christians in terms of ethnic categories, the author emphasizes their civic status and political participation and he elaborates: Yet, while living in Greek and barbarian cities (πόλεις ἑλληνίδας τε καὶ βαρβάρους), depending upon their respective situations, and following the local customs, both in clothing and food and in the rest of life, they display the wonderful and admittedly strange character of the constitution of their own citizenship (πολιτείας). They dwell in their own homelands (πατρίδας) but only as resident aliens (πάροικοι) in them; they ­participate in all things as citizens (πολῖται) and they endure all things as foreigners (ξένοι). Every foreign territory (ξένη πάτρις) is a homeland for them, every homeland a foreign territory (πάτρις ξένη) … They live on earth but have their citizenship (πολιτεύονται) in heaven.9 Instead of using ethnic designations to differentiate Christians, the author of this text emphasizes their civic status as distinguishing mark of the new religious formation. This letter presents Christian identity and belonging by highlighting their citizenship and residency, as well as by emphasizing their allegiance to the heavenly kingdom. While ethnic categories, such as ἔθνος, λαός, γένος, φῦλος, tend to imply a monolithic makeup, the alternative political categories of citizen, resident, exile, or foreigner designate a contingent condition and a malleable state of being and belonging. Similar to the authors of 1 Peter and the Epistle to Diognetus, Aristides in his second-century Apology addresses the Roman emperor Hadrian and resorts to ethnic categories, when he refers to Christians as a people (γένος) and proclaims their superiority to other groups. In the Greek version of his Apology, Aristides states that “there are three kinds of humans (τρία γένη … ἀνθρώπων), namely, worshippers of the so-called gods, Jews and Christians.”10 In addition to mentioning that Greeks are practitioners of polytheism, the Greek version also refers to the Chaldeans and the Egyptians as upholding wrong ideas about the gods.11 It is noteworthy that in the Syriac variant of the Apology of Aristides, which is considered by some scholars to be more complete and reliable version of the text, there is a reference to four races, including barbarians and Greeks. 8 Epistle to Diognetus 5:1–2. 9 Epistle to Diognetus 5:4–5, 9. 10 Aristides, Apology 2.2. 11 Aristides, Apology 2.2,3.

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They Syriac text of the Apology specifies that “there are four races in this world: Barbarians and Greeks, Jews and Christians,” who trace their origin to different figures.12 The Syriac variant of the text begins first with the barbarians, who allegedly trace their origin to Kronos and Rhea, and it also states that Greeks trace their origin to Helen and Zeus.13 In both the Greek and the Syriac variants of Aristides’ Apology, the author specifies that Jews identify their origin with their forefather Abraham, whereas Christians refer to Jesus Christ, the Son of God, as the originator of their religion.14 While the Greek version of the apology does not mention the category of “barbarians,” it is noteworthy that the Syriac text begins with the category of the barbarians and goes into great detail discussing their errors, before proceeding to enumerate the errors of other ethnic groups, including Greeks, Jews.15 In both the Syriac and the Greek versions, Aristides not only mentions that the founder of Christianity comes from the Hebrew race but also explains that “Christians reckon the beginning of their race (γενεαλογοῦνται) from Jesus Christ,”16 and that his following consists of all those “who today believe in this teaching.”17 Aristides defines the collective identity of the participant members of Christianity as “those who conform to the righteousness of this preaching”18 and as “those, who more than all other ethnicities (ἔθνη) on earth, have discovered the truth.”19 In spite of the existence of some textual differences between the Syriac and the Greek versions of Aristides’s Apology, it is evident that the apologist uses various ethnic categories, such as Greek and barbarian, in order to distinguish, to define and to explain the identity of Christians as a distinct religious group in late antique society. Likewise, Athenagoras in his Embassy on Behalf of Christians, a text written in the period between 166 and 180 and addressed to the emperors Marcus Aurelius and Commodus, argues for the recognition of Christians on the same terms as other ethnic and civic groups in the Roman Empire. Athenagoras’ text

12

Cf. Aristides, Apology 2.2. See the Syrian translation of Aristides’ Apology in J. Rendel Harris, The Apology of Aristides on Behalf of the Christians (Piscataway, nj: Gorgias Press, 2004). 13 J. Rendel Harris, The Apology of Aristides on Behalf of the Christians, 36. 14 Aristides, Apology 14, 15. 15 See especially Chapters 2 and 3 of the Syrian variant of Aristides’ Apology. Cf. J. Rendel Harris, The Apology of Aristides on Behalf of the Christians, 36–37. 16 Aristides, Apology 15.1. 17 Aristides, Apology 2.4. 18 Aristides, Apology 15.2. 19 Aristides, Apology 15.3.

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opens with a comparison of Christians with other groups in the empire by referring to their ethnicity and citizenship. The apologist explains: The inhabitants of your empire, greatest of kings, follow many different customs (ἔθεσι) and laws (νόμοις), and none of them is prevented by law or fear of punishment from cherishing their ancestral ways (τὰ πάτρια) … All these both you and the laws permit, since you regard it as impious and irreligious to have no belief at all in a god and think it necessary for all to venerate as god whom they wish, that through fear of the divine they may refrain from evil… We, however, who are called Christians, you have not given the same consideration.20 Athenagoras alludes to the official recognition of ethnic diversity within the Roman Empire, allowing for a variety of laws, customs and ancestral ways of worship of different peoples, and he also asserts that Christians are pious members of the Roman state who secure its safety and peace. Athenagoras criticizes the charge of atheism against Christians and continues the same train of argumentation and defense, when he explains: As to the other complaint that we do not pray to and believe in the same city gods (πόλεσι θεοὺς), it is an exceedingly silly one. Why, the very people who charge us with atheism for not admitting the same gods as they acknowledge are not agreed among themselves concerning the gods … If then we are guilty of impiety because we do not practice piety corresponding with theirs, then all cities (πόλεις) and all peoples (ἔθνη) are guilty of impiety, for they do not acknowledge the same gods (θεούς).21 In his attempt to deny the charge of atheism against Christians, Athenagoras points to the disjunction between the religious practices amongst various cities and peoples within the Roman Empire and the wide variety of religious practices in the ancient world. As Christians in the late antique period are described by different ethnic and political terms both by outsiders and by insiders, they are also identified as “barbarians” in early Christian apologetic literature. The categorization of Christians as being “barbarian” is analogous to other designations of ethnic, religious and civic groups in the Roman Empire. The notion of the barbarian in the Greek and Latin apologetic texts serves not only as a charge leveled against 20 Athenagoras, Embassy on Behalf of Christians 1.1–3. 21 Athenagoras, Embassy on Behalf of Christians 14.1, 7.

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Christians by its critics, but also as an occasion for members of the Christians movement to define and articulate their identity with respect to it. For example, the fourth century apologist Eusebius of Caesarea notes the importance of the charge of barbarism against Christians, when he opens his apologetic treatise Preparation for the Gospel, as follows: Are we Greeks or barbarians (Ἕλληνες ἢ βάρβαροι)? Or what can there be intermediate to these? And what do we claim to be, not in regard to the name, because it is manifest to all, but in the manner and purpose of life? … What then may this strangeness in us be, and what the newfangled manner of our life?22 On the one hand, Eusebius of Caesarea notes that Christians, who were formerly “Greeks” either by virtue of their ethnic origin or their education, had abandoned their ancestral tradition in favor of a foreign one. He explains the predicament posed by Christian coverts leaving the beliefs and customs of their forefathers, as follows: Well, then, that being Greeks by race (γένος Ἕλληνες) and Greeks by sentiment (Ἑλλήνων ϕρονοῦντες) and gathered from all sorts of nations (ἐθνῶν) like the chosen men of a newly enlisted army, we have become deserters from the superstition of our ancestors.23 Eusebius uses the cultural and ethnic category of Greek identity, indicating that one can either be Greek by virtue of one’s ethnic origin or become an acculturated Greek as a result of obtaining Greek paideia, which encompasses language, education, and culture. On both counts, according to the apologist, Christians are accused of being traitors to the Greek ancestral norms and traditions. At the end of his Preparation for the Gospel, Eusebius affirms the allegation that Christians have deserted their proper Greek ethnic and cultural heritage and have embraced a barbarian tradition instead, when he explains: All this I have striven to prove in the argument in this present Preparation, as at once an answer and a defense against those who shall inquire, what beauty and what majesty have we seen in the writings of barbarians (βαρβάρων γράμμασι) that we have decided to prefer them to our ancestral and noble philosophy, that, I mean, of the Greeks.24 22 23 24

Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel 1.2. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel 1.3. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel 14.1.

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While Eusebius does not deny the act of apostasy against Greek culture and tradition on part of Christians, he also notes the ambiguous positionality of Christians vis à vis “barbarians,” which in this context is understood to designate Jews. The apologist lays out one further predicament of the converts to Christianity, as he notes: But the sons of the Hebrews also would find fault with us that, being strangers and aliens (ἀλλόϕυλοι ὄντες καὶ ἀλλογενεῖς), we misuse their books which do not belong to us at all and because in an impudent and shameless way, as they would say, we thrust ourselves in, and try violently to thrust out the true family and kindred from their own ancestral rights.25 As Eusebius marks the act of apostasy and barbarization on part of Greeks in favor of a foreign religion, he also observes the complex Christian identity and the necessary negotiation and self-articulation of Christians with respect to both Jews, understood as “barbarians,” and Greeks alike. It is in this context of self-definition that Eusebius refers to supersessionist claims that are made by Christians in their presentation as replacing the chosen nation of Israel. A similar claim to Eusebius’ is also made by Justin Martyr, as well as other early Christian writers, when he argues in his Dialogue with Trypho that Christians are “not only a people (λαός)” but also a “holy people (λαὸς ἅγιος)” in reference to prophecies in Is. 62:12 and Zech. 2:15.26 The ethnic, cultural, religious and political belonging of Christians in relation to both Greeks and Jews is a problem that is explored by the opponents and the defendants of Christianity, such as Justin Martyr, Eusebius of Caesarea, and many others. The complex set of terms, categories and concepts that they employ in order to properly understand, accurately describe and adequately explain Christian identity indicates the difficult task that they faced, as well as their ingenuity and creativity. The articulation of Christian identity with respect to existing binary categories, such as “Greek” and “barbarian,” “Jew” and “Gentile,” “Roman” and “other,” poses a challenge for early Christian intellectuals, as they try to present Christianity as an acceptable part of Roman society, and at the same time attempt to articulate its distinctness. As is evident in the instances of early Christian apologetic writings, the plethora of references to ethnic, religious, political and civic categories is central for the perceptions of Christians by outsiders and for their critique of this emerging religious group. 25 26

Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel 1.2. Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho 119.3.

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Recent studies of ethnic and political designations in early Christian literature, i.e. ethnicity, race, and color, such as works of Gay L. Byron27 and Denise K. Buell,28 reveal both the negative and the positive implications in the construction of Christian identity in reference to these terms.29 In Symbolic Blackness and Ethnic Difference in Early Christian Literature, Gay Byron emphasizes the negative symbolic meanings of race and color, as is witnessed by the designations “black,” “blackness” and “Ethiopians” in Christian discourse and inner-Christian polemic, and she argues against the widely accepted claims of scholars of early Christianity for the universality, racial diversity and ethnic inclusivity of early Christian communities. In This New Race?: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity, Denise Buell demonstrates the positive aspects of the construction of Christian identity through recourse to the concepts of ­ethnicity 27 28 29

Gay L. Byron, Symbolic Blackness and Ethnic Difference in Early Christian Literature (London: Routledge, 2002). Denise K. Buell, This New Race?: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). There has been a spur of scholarly interest on constructions of identity and ethnicity in the ancient Mediterranean world, as well as within the context of the development of early Christianity and Judaism in the late antique period. Recently, there have been a number of studies and publications, such as L. Nasrallah and E. Schüssler-Fiorenza, eds., Prejudice and Christian Beginnings: Investigating Race, Gender, and Ethnicity in Early Christian Studies (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2010); Aaron Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument in Eusebius’ Preparatio Evangelica (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Jeremy Schott, Christianity, Empire and the Making of Religion in Late Antiquity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Judith Lieu, Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Ibid., Neither Jew nor Greek?: Constructing Early Christianity (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2002); Ibid., Image and Reality (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996); Judith Perkins, Roman Imperial Identities in the Early Christian Era (London: Routledge, 2009). For discussion of apologetic literature, see Mark Edwards, Martin Goodman and Simon Price, eds., Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews and Christians (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999); Jörg Ulrich, Anders-Christian Jacobsen, Maijastina Kahlos, eds., Continuity and Discontinuity in Early Christian Apologetics (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2009); David Brakke, Anders-Christian Jacobsen, Jörg Ulrich, eds., Critique and Apologetics: Jews, Christians and Pagans in Antiquity (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2009); Jakob Engberg, Anders-Christian Jacobsen, Jörg Ulrich, eds., In Defense of Christianity: Early Christian Apologists (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2014). For discussion of the broader context, see also Richard Miles, ed., Constructing Identities in Late Antiquity (London: Routledge, 1999); R. Mathisen and D. Shanzer, eds. Romans, Barbarians, and the Transformation of the Roman World: Cultural Interaction and the Creation of Identity in Late Antiquity (Surrey: Ashgate, 2011). For new theoretical approaches to the study of ethnography in the ancient world, see E. Almagor and J. Skinner, eds., Ancient Ethnography: New Approaches (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).

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and nationality, such as ἔθνος, λαός, γένος, φῦλος, among others, as allowing claims for legitimation and authority. Both Byron and Buell have noted the importance and the relevance of what they respectively call “ethno-political rhetoric”30 and “ethnic reasoning”31 in the argumentation of Christians for their group identity and social formations. In my own analysis of a specific concept of ethnicity and identity in late antiquity, I examine the allegation raised against early Christians that they are “barbarian” in conjunction with other charges related to it. For this purpose, I examine a selection of Christian apologetic texts from the second, third and the early fourth centuries. The textual analysis of the charge of barbarism in the Christian apologetic literature is divided into two parts (Greek and Latin) not only because of the linguistic and semantic differences in the conceptualization of the notion of the barbarian in the two languages, but also because of the two distinct apologetic traditions that emerge in the eastern and western territories of the late Roman Empire. In my examination of the charge of barbarism, I take into consideration both sides of the forensic context: First, as there are no surviving accusatory texts from the critics of early Christians that testify directly to the charge of barbarism, I attempt to reconstruct its meaning and function to the extent that the Christian apologetic texts allow. Second, I analyze a select number of Greek and Latin Christian apologetic texts with respect to the charge of barbarism in order to present the array of different responses given to it. In my close reading of the apologetic works of Justin Martyr, Tatian, Clement of Alexandria, Origen of Alexandria and Eusebius of Caesarea in the Greek and those of Tertullian, Arnobius and Lactantius in the Latin, I demonstrate that the charge of barbarism conveys a range of different meanings. In the Christian apologetic corpus, the term “barbarian” designates foreign ethnicity and tongue, as well as incest, sexual immorality, atheism, human sacrifice, cannibalism, political treason, military threat, criminal activity, low social class, inadequate education, intellectual inferiority, and physical deformity, among others. In the apologetic texts, the concept of barbarism indicates mechanisms of marginalization and othering on part of the accusers, as well as ­attempts for self-defense and self-definition on part of the Christian authors. Although some early Christian apologists choose to define the term “barbarian” in a positive light in reference to Christians per se, the n ­ egative ­connotations 30 31

Gay Byron, Symbolic Blackness and Ethnic Difference in Early Christian Literature (London: Routledge, 2002), 1–18. Denise Buell, Why this New Race? Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 1–34; 116–137.

Prologue

9

of the charge of barbarism remain evident in these texts. It should be noted also that there is a clear line of division between the Greek and the Latin Christian apologetics when the charge of barbarism is taken into account. As I demonstrate, in the Greek Christian apologetic literature there is a tendency on part of the apologists accept the charge of barbarism, especially when it is re-defined by them in positive terms. In the Latin Christian apologetic tradition, however, the prevailing tendency on part of the apologists is to deny the charge of barbarism and to align Christians with the notion of Romanitas instead. In conjunction with the analysis of the charge of barbarism in early Christian literature, I also lay out the ancient concept of the barbarian via literary ­presentations of foreigners in the contemporary and near-contemporary ­Greco-Roman texts. This inclusion of non-Christian sources is necessitated not only by the fact that the notion of the “barbarian” in the early Christian apologetic corpus is informed by the concept of barbarism in the context ­Greco-Roman culture, but also by the fact that there are no surviving ­accusatory documents against the early Christians from the period. The examination of contemporary Greek and Latin texts reveals the multiple meanings and contexts that a­ ttend to the notion of the “barbarian” and, in this way, helps the modern reader to better understand the charge of barbarism against the early Christians from the perspective of their contemporaries. In addition to the close reading and analysis of Greco-Roman literature and Christian apologetic texts, I also employ the theoretical works of post-modern and post-colonial critics, as these help to illuminate the ideological function of the notion of the “barbarian” in the context of the Roman imperial system. For example, the writings of Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, Homi Bhabha and Julia Kristeva offer critiques of the construction of the “other” and provide analogues to the construction of the “barbarian” evident in the ancient sources. For instance, Edward Said scrutinizes the oppositional construction of “orient” and “occident” in the context of colonial structures of economic and political domination of countries in the Middle East by the West.32 He examines the formation of knowledge about the oriental “other” informed by the discourse of Orientalism and connects the formulations of the “oriental” subject as being marked by its alleged passivity, femininity, inferiority, materiality and subordination, with the ideological and political dominance of the West. Furthermore, Spivak analyzes the construction of the “other,” which she terms as the

32

Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient (New York: Random House, 1994).

10

Chapter 1

“subaltern,” in the (post)colonial context of India.33 In her analysis of the colonial subject as the “subaltern,” she stresses its heterogeneity in terms of gender, class, race and other factors, rather than seeing it as a monolith formation, in addition to presenting its interconnection with foreign and native structures of domination. Likewise, Homi Bhabha attends to the formulations of the colonized other as a “hybrid” as a result of the interdependent relationship between the “self” and the “other,” the colonizer and the colonized.34 Behind the facades of the dominant modes of representation of “self” and “other,” Bhabha demonstrates the inherent ambivalence and uncertainty embedded in them and, in this way, he proposes a processes of hybridization and impurity in their formation, instead of their purported binary differentiation and essentialization asserted in the dominant colonial discourse. Additionally, Julia Kristeva presents the process of “abjectification” in the constitution of the “self” and she also sees as foundational the necessary act of violence that it entails.35 In her explication of the “abject,” which is the indeterminate state between subject and object, in the formation of one’s identity, Kristeva pays particular attention to the inherent ambiguity, in addition to the central role of the female and the mother, as well as various categories of marginalized social groups. The analyses and critiques of the process of formulation of the “other” provided by Said, Spivak, Bhabha and Kristeva provide a helpful lens for the examination of the notion of the “barbarian” in early Christian literature. In the context of the Roman imperial politico-economic system and multi-ethnic society, Christians are perceived as being “barbarian” and are cast in the category of the “other” vis à vis the larger society. When early Christian apologists address the allegation that Christians are “barbarian” and are attributed qualities proper to it, they respond to it and attempt to formulate their individual and group identity. While some early Christian apologists decide to turn the designation “barbarian” from a charge to a counter-charge, others choose to use it as a marker of their self-identification and self-articulation. It is important to recognize that Christians are demarcated as the “barbarian” other from the standpoint of the larger Greco-Roman society, as well as to understand how and why the notion of the barbarian becomes central in the self-definition and self-formation of early Christians. This study of the concept of barbarism and 33

34 35

See Gayatri Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak? Speculations on a Widow Sacrifice,” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, eds., Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271–315. Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994). Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).

Prologue

11

the forensic context of its use in early Christian apologetic literature, therefore, contributes to the better understanding of these texts, in particular, as well as to the critical reading and unmasking of rhetorical-ideological tools for alienation and marginalization in the late antique world. In the following chapters I turn to the examination of the charge of barbarism and the concept of the “barbarian,” as these are reflected both in Christian and Greco-Roman literature in late antiquity. The next chapter outlines the subject matter under consideration and the different approaches and methodologies that have been applied to it. Chapter 3 presents the broader cultural Greco-Roman context and focuses on the contemporary or near-contemporary non-Christian texts that relate to the definition of the notion of the “barbarian.” The selection of texts takes into account a broad array of Greek and Roman literature, such as literary, historical, rhetorical, ethnographic and philosophical works. The Greek and Latin attestations to the semantic range of the “barbarian” are presented separately in order to help interpret the Christian sources and shed light on the differences that are found in the Greek and the Latin Christian apologetic traditions. First, I present the elaborations of the “barbarian” by Roman elites – Caesar, Cicero, Tacitus and Seneca – and analyze the construction of the notion of the “barbarian” for particular political and military purposes, including the subjugation and domination of foreign territories and peoples. In my layout of the concept of the “barbarian” in Greek literature from the second and third centuries of the common era, I turn to the writings of Aelius Aristides, Cassius Dio and Philostratus not only because they expound on the notion of the “barbarian,” but also because they write in the context of the Second Sophistic movement. The preoccupation with language, more particularly the revival of Attic Greek, which is emblematic of the Second Sophistic, in addition to the focus on Greek classical literature in the late antique period, has been understood as a sign of the political disengagement of Greek intellectuals and loss of actual power.36 The treatment of the notion of the barbarian within the context of the Second Sophistic presents a similar effort to that of the Roman authors at constructing the notion of the barbarian for specific purposes within a particular socio-historic context. At the same time, it registers the critique of the elite perceptions and practices in the Roman Empire from the standpoint of the Greek-speaking elite. Additionally, the writings of Lucian, a Syrian and a sophist, concerning the notion of the “barbarian” further contribute to the complication of the function of this concept in the multi-ethnic and linguistic milieu of the Roman Empire. 36

See Simon Swain, Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World ad 50–250 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 1–43.

12

Chapter 1

Lucian’s reflections provide a lens through which one can read and understand the (self-) designation “barbarian” vis à vis Christians, as well as other groups in Roman society. In Chapter 4 I examine the charge of barbarism in the Greek Christian apologetic literature from the second, third and early fourth centuries, focusing on the various denotations of the notion of the “barbarian,” especially as it refers to the early Christians. This chapter demonstrates the centrality of the term not only for the accusers and the opponents of Christians, but also for the defenders in their self-understanding and self-definition as members of Christian communities. The selection of authors and texts that span a period of over two centuries are contextualized and regarded in isolation, as well as in relationship to one another as a part of a larger apologetic tradition. In examining the notion of the “barbarian” and the charge of barbarism in Greek apologetic texts, I include the works of Justin Martyr, Tatian, Origen of Alexandria, Clement of Alexandria and Eusebius of Caesarea. The focus of this chapter is not only literary and rhetorical by analyzing the usage and functions of the word “barbarian” both as a charge and as a defensive strategy, but also socio-­historical as this study contextualizes the writings in trying to explain the complex d­ ynamics behind these polemical texts. Furthermore, connections between the Greek Christian apologetic writings and the larger cultural phenomenon of the Second Sophistic movement are drawn, as the movement comes to illuminate the articulation of critique to Roman imperial rule.37 In this chapter, I demonstrate not merely that Christians were charged with being “barbarian” but also that they willingly chose to define themselves as such vis à vis the larger society. The connections between Greek and Christian literature from the period, especially as they relate to the Second Sophistic movement, come to shed light on the dynamics behind the accusation, counter-­accusation, and self-designation of individuals and groups as “barbarian.” Chapter 5 considers the use of the concept of the “barbarian” in the Latin Christian apologetic literature in order to examine and juxtapose these texts to the attestations of the charge of barbarism in the Greek Christian apologetic works. The selection of texts includes the writings of Tertullian, Arnobius and Lactnatius, who originate from the western regions of the Roman Empire. This chapter reveals the persistence of the charge of barbarism, as well as the ­different conceptualization and self-understanding of the Latinspeaking Christian apologists vis à vis the charge of barbarism from the ones encountered in the preceding chapter. The analysis of the Latin apologetic 37

See Simon Swain, Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World ad 50–250 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 17–101.

Prologue

13

t­radition ­demonstrates that in spite of the existing commonalities between the two a­ pologetic ­traditions – Greek and Latin – there are different patterns and distinct developments that emerge in the Greek and Latin Christian ­apologetic texts, especially with regard to the Christian self-identification with the “­barbarian.” In this chapter, I demonstrate that the divergences in the Greek and Latin Christian apologetic texts can be explained not merely in terms of semantic variations in the definition of the term “barbarian” in the Greek and Latin ­languages and different rhetorical traditions but also in terms of larger social, political, military, economic realities besetting the Roman Empire at large and bearing directly on the (self-) perception and treatment of Christians. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the findings of the book and draws conclusions about the study of Christian apologetics and the rhetorical and ideological understanding of Christian articulations of self- and group-identity within the larger Greco-Roman world. It also brings together critique on the conceptualization of the “other” in post-colonial theory and the notion of the barbarian, as it is articulated in the early Christian apologetic corpus. Furthermore, this chapter lays out the contribution of the study to the rhetorical-ideological reading of early Christian apologetic literature. As a whole, this study focuses on the charge of barbarism in the apologetic corpus and examines the wide semantic range of the charge, as well as the rhetorical strategies of the accusers and defenders of the early Christian movement. My analysis of the charge of barbarism includes both Greek and Latin Christian texts from the beginning of the second to the early fourth century of the common era. I posit that the charge of barbarism, along with other related charges, such as incest, infanticide, and cannibalism, need to be understood in the context of ancient rhetorical practices and contemporary Greco-Roman notions of the “barbarian.” Rather than reading the charge of barbarism as a reflection of ethnic composition and socio-historical reality, as has been done in past scholarship, I argue that it serves as a rhetorical device for the effective othering and persecution of a minority group. Additionally, I apply different interpretive models and post-colonial theory to the ancient texts in order to probe the socio-rhetorical function of the notion of the “barbarian” and to illuminate its mechanisms of marginalization and persecution. This scholarly work is intended to contribute to the better understanding of the crucial early period of persecution and marginalization of Christianity in late antiquity, as well as to the social-historical and cultural-religious analysis of conflict and violence in late Roman society.

Chapter 2

Ancient Rhetoric and the Charge of Barbarism 2.1

The Charge of Barbarism and Early Christian Apologetics

Christian apologetic writings from the second to the early part of the fourth centuries address a number of charges that were leveled against followers of the emerging religious movement in the Roman Empire.1 Among the various allegations brought against early Christians is the charge of barbarism (βαρβαρία), which takes on a number of denotations in the Christian apologetic corpus. First, this study attempts to establish, on the basis of the extant textual evidence from the apologetic corpus, that the early Christians were in fact accused of being “barbarian” (Greek: βάρβαρος; Latin: barbarus).2 Such a task is not straightforward as the reconstruction of the charge is based on ancient sources provided by Christian apologists responding to the allegations of their opponents, rather than on the accusatory texts themselves, as these have not been preserved. Therefore, reconstructing the charge of barbarism is based on negative rather than positive evidence and the information found in the early Christian apologetic writings. Despite the fact that many explicit references and direct quotations from the accusatory literature appear in the Christian sources,3 it is important to read these apologetic texts in the context of the practices of ancient rhetoric that the authors employ, as it was widely accepted to quote one’s adversaries in ways that try to undermine the ­validity 1 For analysis of different charges raised against early Christians, see Stephen Benko, Pagan Rome and the Early Christians (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984); Robert L. Wilken, The Christians as the Romans Saw Them (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). 2 Justin, First Apology 60.11, 5.4, 7.3; Dialogue with Trypho 119.4; Tatian, Address to the Greeks 1.3, 12.5, 42.1, 35.1; Origen, Contra Celsum 1.2, 1.14, 7.59–60, 8.68; Tertullian, Apology 3.5, Ad Nationes 1.3; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 2.2.8, 6.8.67, 1.15.66; Arnobius, Adversus Gentes 1.4–6, 1.58–59, 2.6, 2.66; Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.11; Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 1.1, 1.2, 14.1, 10.3, 11.18–19; Ecclesiastical History 7.25. This is not an exhaustive list but instead a mention of some of the instances of the designation of Christians as being “barbarian” in the apologetic writings. 3 The most extensive citations provided from the side of the Christian opponents are found in Origen’s Contra Celsum where the author consistently quotes from Celsus’ True Doctrine before responding to each critical remark. This rhetorical strategy, however, is uncommon among other apologetic texts, where citations from the opponents’ side are rare and very limited in length and detail.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���9 | doi 10.1163/9789004306240_003

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of the assertions and the credibility of one’s opponents.4 In my reading of the apologetic texts and the charge of barbarism, I draw on the actual forensic practices and the theoretical writings on ancient rhetoric, in order to examine and to contextualize the charge of barbarism found in the extant early Christian apologetic literature.5 My study takes into account the complex nature of the charge of barbarism, as it is leveled against early Christians by their critics, as well as the rhetoricalideological function of the concept of the barbarian in the apologetic literature. Instead of reducing the designation “barbarian” merely to ethnic and religious difference, as is suggested by the connection between ancient Christianity and its parent Jewish religion, or the diverse composition of the early Christian communities, I connect this charge to a wider gamut of denotations inherent in the Greco-Roman notion of the barbarian, i.e. low social class, inadequate education, criminal activity, political treason, sexual immorality, and others. Additionally, I not only examine critically the different meanings and various functions of the concept of the barbarian in the early Christian apologetic literature, but also try to demonstrate how it stands in relation to other related allegations. In my analysis of the charge of barbarism, therefore, I do not strictly isolate it from other accusations that are closely associated with it, such as human sacrifice,6 cannibalism,7 and incest,8 but rather point to an important link between this complex of related charges that are connected to the concept of the barbarian in the ancient context. In order to substantiate this link, I rely primarily on the evidence found in non-Christian literature 4 For a discussion of the adoption of ancient rhetorical tradition by early Christian writers, see Averil Cameron, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); George Kennedy The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World, 300 bc-ad 300 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); Id., Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Id., Greek Rhetoric Under Christian Emperors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983). See also Peter Brown, Power and Persuasion in Late Antiquity (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992). 5 More particularly, I focus on the discussion of forensic rhetoric in Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric, in addition to referring to the changes and adaptations of Aristotelian framework by other writers, such as Cicero, Tacitus, Quintilian. 6 James Rives, “Human Sacrifice among Pagans and Christians,” jrs 85 (1995): 65–85. 7 Andrew McGowan, “Eating People: Accusations of Cannibalism Against Christians in the Second Century,” jecs 2:3 (1994): 413–442. 8 See Jennifer Knust, Abandoned to Lust: Sexual Slander and Ancient Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), where the author focuses on Christian appropriations and transformations of the charge of sexual immorality from the Greco-Roman accusatory practices.

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Chapter 2

by ­exploring the semantic field of the term “barbarian” in contemporary and near-contemporary Greek and Latin texts, which make apparent the connections in this constellation of accusations. Furthermore, I embed the charge of barbarism in the ancient rhetorical practices of forensic oratory, as I contextualize the Christian apologetic literature and its use of the term barbarian in specific.9 To this end, I read the apologetic texts not merely as historically positive and textually transparent testimonies, but rather as carefully crafted texts and skillfully constructed rhetorical pieces that are created for specific ideological purposes. It is my contention that the charge of barbarism is to be read and understood as a rhetorical tool, which is primarily intended for the marginalization and persecution of a minority group. In my analysis of the charge and counter-charge of barbarism in late antiquity, I take into consideration the Christian apologists not only as “defenders,” but also as ideologues of the emerging movement, as they deploy and subvert the Greco-Roman concept of the “barbarian” in order to articulate and to define both the identity and the legitimacy of early Christians. In spite of the fact that a number of accusations contained in the Christian apologetic literature have been treated either separately or in isolation, a thorough study of the charge of barbarism against Christians, as witnessed by the Greek and Latin Christian apologetic corpus, is lacking up to date.10 9

10

For instance, Hilton illustrates an uncomplicated understanding of charges of incest and cannibalism, without attention to prevalent rhetorical practices. Also he writes on the ­problem of why Christians were targeted for being illiterate, when in fact a very small ­percentage of the population in the Roman Empire (between 10 and 15 percent) were able to read and write in varying degrees. Although he questions and examines the charge of illiteracy, he explains: “The Christians were atheists because their monotheism disallowed them to acknowledge or participate in the worship of traditional Greek and ­Roman deities; they were misanthropes because they kept to themselves and abstained from popular social practices on religious grounds; incestuous because they called one another brother and sister; murderous because they used the language of human sacrifice in describing both their founding event and the conduct of their communal gatherings; cannibalistic because of the body and blood language of the eucharistic liturgies.” Cf. A ­ llen Hilton, “The Dumb Speak: Early Christian Literacy and Pagan Criticism” (Ph. D. diss., Yale University, 1997), 3. As a result of several international conferences on Christian apologetics held in Aarhus, there are volumes of scholarly articles that have been published in the series Early Christianity in the Context of Antiquity, namely: Jakob Engberg, Anders-Christian Jacobsen and Jörg Ulrich, eds., In Defense of Christianity: Early Christian Apologists (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2006); Anders-Christian Jacobsen, Jörg Ulrich and David Brakke, eds., Critique and Apologetics: Jews, Christians and Pagans in Antiquity (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2009); Jörg Ulrich, Anders-Christian Jacobsen and Maijastine Kahlos, eds., Continuity and Discontinuity in

Ancient Rhetoric and the Charge of Barbarism

17

Scholars of early Christian apologetics provide only a cursory treatment of the allegation that Christians are “barbarians” rather than focus and carefully analyze the charge of barbarism and the responses given to it.11 When attention is given to this charge against early Christians, the identification of Christians as barbarian is normally taken as a positivistic characterization due to their link with the Jewish people and religion, since the origin of Christianity and its scripture is traced back to the ancient Hebrew tradition.12 As scholars have also noted, the characterization of Christians as barbarians is sometimes connected with other foreign ethnicities represented in the Christian community.13 For instance, J.H. Waszink focuses in particular on the concepts

11

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Early Christian Apologetics (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2009). From these recent treatments of early Christian apologetics in its context, only one deals with the issue of the barbarian character of Christianity in the work of Tatian, namely John E. Fojtik’s essay “Tatain the Barbarian: Language, Education and Identity in the Oratio ad Graecos” in Continuity and Discontinuity in Early Christian Apologetics, 23–35. For example, in the study of critics of Christianity, such as Galen, Celsus, Porphyry, and the various accusations in the early Christian apologetic literature, including cannibalism and human sacrifice, Robert L. Wilken and Stephen Benko do not make note of the association of Christians with “barbarians” although Wilken has a detailed list of different charges against early Christians. See Robert L. Wilken, The Christians as the Romans Saw Them (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984) and Robert Benko, Pagan Rome and the Early Christians (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984). Judith Lieu comments in brief on the designation “barbarians” in Aristides’ Apology, which she understands as referring to religious difference in analogy to Melito’s Apology, and she refers to the concession of the “barbarian” origin of Christianity due to its Jewish roots. She also understands the references to “barbarians” in Justin Martyr’s apologetic texts to refer to the Jewish ethnic and religious origins of the Christian religion. For a brief treatment of the allegation of the barbarian character of Jews and Christians, see Judith Lieu, Image and Reality (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 164–186. See also R.M. Grant, Greek Apologists of the Second Century (Westminster: John Knox, 1988), 113–120. Ramsey MacMullen in his Enemies of the Roman Order explains the association of Christians with barbarians due to the diverse ethnic composition of the Christian community: “To the question of cultural diversity, Tertullian and Origen addressed themselves, as we have seen, and two other Christians besides: Tatian, around the year 175, and Barsdesanes in the early third century. Both were born and became famous in Mesopotamia; both spoke and wrote in Greek and Syriac, and contributed enormously to the spread of their faith in the East… Though most of Tatian’s dislike is for the Greeks, he also met and hated ‘the Roman haughtiness.’ Barsdenanes had little cause to mention his western neighbors, but in the list of things that each people does most characteristically he gives it as the Romans’ particular nature to ‘conquer’; and their conquests, he saw, brought an end to their subjects’ native laws. Still another Mesopotamian knew the Romans and had scarifying comments to make on the life lived in their capital city: Lucian. The appearance

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Chapter 2

of “barbarian philosophy” or “barbarian wisdom” in the early Christian apologetic texts.14 He emphasizes the significance of the Jewish predecessors for the early Christian apologists, such as Philo, in constructing their defense of the foreign origin of their religion and asserting its antiquity and superiority.15 Additionally, Wasznik highlights the Greco-Roman examples of idealization of the “barbarian” as the exotic other.16 His understanding of the term “barbarian” is not specific to a Christian or Jewish ethnic or religious designation, but it is rather a concept that is adopted by the early Christian apologists and used for polemical purposes against their critics.17 In contrast to Wasznik, Arthur Droge focuses more narrowly on the ethnic designation of the concept of the barbarian on the basis of the immediate connection of Christianity with its Jewish roots.18 He emphasizes the centrality of the Jewish apologetic tradition pre-existing the Christian one, upon which the arguments that Christian apologists develop in order to assert the ­primacy

14

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of these three men in the latter half of the second century, from a country that had earlier lain quite outside the orbit of classical letters, matches the increasing contributions from ­Africa in the same period – Apulieus comes to mind, and Tertullian, Fronto, Minucius Felix, and Alius Gellius – suggesting a stir of reaction of alien genius in widening circles from the centers of the Greco-Roman world.” Cf. Ramsay MacMullen, Enemies of the Roman Order: Treason, Unrest, and Alienation in the Empire (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2001; Reprint), 220–221. See I.M. Ferris’ Enemies of Rome: Barbarians Through Roman Eyes (Gloucestershire: Sutton, 2000) for close analysis of both textual and iconographic representations of barbarians in imperial Rome, beginning with the time of Augustus. See also R. Mathisen and D. Shanzer, eds. Romans, Barbarians, and the Transformation of the Roman World: Cultural Interaction and the Creation of Identity in Late Antiquity (Surrey: ­Ashgate, 2011) for diverse perspectives on the interactions between different ethnic groups in the late antique period. J.H. Waszink, “Some Observations on the ‘Philosophy of the Barbarians’ in Early Christian Literature” in Melanges offerts à Mlle. Christine Mohrmann, eds., L.J. Engels et al. (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1963), 41–56. J.H. Waszink, “Some Observations on the ‘Philosophy of the Barbarians’ in Early Christian Literature” in Melanges offerts à Mlle. Christine Mohrmann, eds., L.J. Engels et al. (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1963), 46. J.H. Waszink refers to this phenomenon as lauditones barbarorum. Cf. “Some Observations on the ‘Philosophy of the Barbarians’ in Early Christian Literature” in Melanges offerts à Mlle. Christine Mohrmann, eds., L.J. Engels et al. (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1963), 52. Wasznik argues against R. Kukala who understands the designation “barbarian” in the term “barbarian philosophy” to apply to Christianity alone, rather than other religious traditions. Cf. Wasznik, “Was bedeuten die Namen Hellenes und Barbaroi in der altchristlichen Apologetik?” in Festschrift Theodor Gomperz (Wien: Hölder, 1902), 259–263. Arthur Droge, Homer or Moses?: Early Christian Interpretations of the History of Culture (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1989).

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of the Jewish scripture and religion.19 Despite his insistence on the Jewish antecedents of Christian apologetic literature, Droge also admits the reliance of some Christian apologists, such as Tatian20 and Clement,21 on the GrecoRoman tradition of laudatio barbarorum, as well as the connection between Greek philosophy and barbarian intellectual traditions. According to Droge, the primary appeal to the Jewish roots of Christianity and the secondary references to other foreign traditions in art, philosophy, and culture are a result of the hellenistic “war of books.”22 It is both the particular context of hellenistic society and the necessity to prove the antiquity of Christianity that he sees as main motivations for the self-designation of Christians as barbarian. Similarly, Francis Young23 understands the term “barbarian” to refer to both Jewish ethnic origins and to Hebrew literature that are associated with Christianity, in contrast with the dominant Greek language and paideia.24 Francis Young notes the importance of demonstrating the antiquity and the wisdom of the “barbarian” Moses as a defensive posture of the early Christian writers.25 According to her, the identification of Christians with foreign ethnicities, such as the Egyptians, Babylonians, Phoenicians, and others, is done for the sake of showing the superiority of these foreign nations in comparison with the Greeks, in addition to pointing to the existing parallels between Hellenic culture and Christian teachings.26 In her reading of the notion of the “barbarian,” Francis Young sees the importance of literature and rhetoric for the definition of early Christianity as equal to or superior to the hellenistic tradition, which is the prevailing cultural paradigm of the late Roman empire.

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Arthur Droge discusses in detail the argumentation presented by Eupolemus, PseudoEupolemus, Artapanus, Josephus and Philo. Cf. Droge, Homer or Moses, 12–48. Arthur Droge, Homer or Moses?: Early Christian Interpretations of the History of Culture (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1989), 85–91. Arthur Droge, Homer or Moses?: Early Christian Interpretations of the History of Culture (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1989), 143–149. Arthur Droge, Homer or Moses?: Early Christian Interpretations of the History of Culture (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1989), 196. Francis Young, Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Francis Young, Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 49–75. Francis Young, Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 50. Francis Young, Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 52–53.

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Chapter 2

In his book entitled Barbarian Philosophy: The Religious Revolution of Early Christianity, Guy Stroumsa discusses the characterization of Christianity as “barbarian” in his attempt to understand its meaning and significance in the writings of early Christians as reflective of the composition of the new religious movement.27 In his analysis of the identification of Christianity specifically as a “barbarian philosophy,” Stroumsa underscores the new radical and universal nature of Christianity, which comes into conflict with the existing religious traditions of both Jews and Gentiles, and manages to achieve an intellectual synthesis of the two traditions.28 For him, the term “barbarian,” as it is applied to Christians, designates ethnic difference in reference to the Jewish origin of the religion, or to members of any other foreign group that joined the Christian community.29 Stroumsa interprets the term “barbarian” in the context of Christian universalistic claims for radical inclusivity and ethnic diversity on account of the “successful efforts [of Christian missionaries] to convert various exotic barbarian peoples to the new faith.”30 In spite of the focus on ethnic diversity of early Christian communities, Stroumsa also remarks in passing the identification of Christians as being “barbarian” with regard to the prevailing hellenistic culture, as he refers to the low social standing and inadequate education of the constituents of the emerging religious group.31 He examines the definition of Christian identity primarily through the lens of the ethnic marker of the term “barbarian” either on account of the direct link with the Jewish religious traditions or on account of the composition of the Christian movement, in addition to his emphasis on the unique composition and character of the Christian religion.32 27 28 29 30 31 32

Guy Stroumsa, Barbarian Philosophy: The Religious Revolution of Early Christianity (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeg, 1999). Guy Stroumsa, Barbarian Philosophy: The Religious Revolution of Early Christianity (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeg, 1999), 8–26. Guy Stroumsa, Barbarian Philosophy: The Religious Revolution of Early Christianity (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeg, 1999), 57–85. Guy Stroumsa, Barbarian Philosophy: The Religious Revolution of Early Christianity (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeg, 1999), 57. Guy Stroumsa, Barbarian Philosophy: The Religious Revolution of Early Christianity (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeg, 1999), 57 ff. Stroumsa bases his argument for the ethnic reading of the term “barbarian” on the writings of Paul, more particularly Colossians 3:11, Epistle of Diognetus, Justin Martyr, Tatian, Origen, Augustine, Tertullian, and Clement of Alexandria. Furthermore, he includes ­patristic sources, such as the writings of Jerome and Sozomen, in order to present the perception of two different foreign “barbarian” peoples – Indians and Arabs – from a Christian standpoint and to argue for the ethnic inclusivity and universality of the ­Christian

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In her treatment of the subject of ethnic reasoning in early Christian literature, Denise Buell argues for the need to study racial and ethnic categories in the attempt to avoid extreme claims for the universality of Christianity and the particularity of Judaism.33 According to her, the use of ethnic designations, such as people (λαός), race (γένος), tribe (φῦλος), and others in early Christian discourse serves the purposes of self-definition, legitimation and authority.34 When examining the use of various ethnic categories, Buell notes both the “fixity” and the “fluidity” in the construction of Christian identity in light of these concepts.35 She explains that the function of these categories is to negotiate Christian identities on the imperial landscape and to “define Christianness … in contrast to other peoples (including Jews, Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, etc.),” in addition to allowing the inclusion of “individuals from a range of different races.”36 Buell pays special attention to the notion of the “barbarian” in particular as an ethnic self-designation on the part of Christians in their articulation of legitimacy and formulation of group identity.37 Furthermore, Judith Lieu, when considering the concept of the barbarian in reference to both Jews and Christians, takes into account the negative meanings of the allegations of barbarism used against the two minority groups in late antiquity.38 Lieu points to the attempt of early Christian apologists, such as Justin Martyr, to define their own identity with respect to ethnic categories, such as race and others.39 In a similar vein, John Fojtik also analyzes Tatian’s Address to the Greeks in light of the concept of the “barbarian” and points out both its polemical and constructive aspects, as it is used by the apologist in the critique and mutual denigration of both Greek and barbarian languages,

33 34 35 36 37

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religion. Cf. Guy Stroumsa, Barbarian Philosophy: The Religious Revolution of Early Christianity (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeg, 1999), 72 ff. Denise K. Buell, Why This New Race?: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). Denise Buell, Why This New Race?: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York: ­Columbia University Press, 2005), 63–116. Denise Buell, Why This New Race?: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York: ­Columbia University Press, 2005), 7. Denise Buell, Why This New Race?: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York: ­Columbia University Press, 2005), 3. See also Gay Byron’s argumentation for the rhetorical function of racial categories, such as “black,” “Ethiopian,” and “Egyptian,” in early Christian polemics. Cf. Gay L. Byron, Symbolic Blackness and Ethnic Difference in Early Christian Literature (New York: Routledge, 2002). Judith Lieu, Image and Reality (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 167 ff. Judith Lieu, Image and Reality (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 167 ff.

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systems of education and cultures.40 Both Lieu and Fojtik agree that the use of the concept of the barbarian in the early Christian apologies is in fact very nuanced, complicated and multi-layered. It is precisely the multiplicity, fluidity and malleability of the notion of the barbarian that are in focus in this study of early Christian polemic and apologetic literature. In my examination of the charge of barbarism in the early Christian apologetic texts, there is an important two-fold task: first, to uncover the various meanings of the term “barbarian” vis à vis Christians as it is meant by the opponents of the Christian movement and, second, to present it as it is understood and (re-)defined by the Christian apologists. In my reconstruction of the meaning of the term “barbarian” on part of the Christian accusers, I draw upon the extant Christian apologetic texts, in addition to other ancient Roman literature. More specifically, I include a selection of a variety of both Greek and Latin non-Christian sources from the first century bce to the third century ce that are relevant and near contemporary with the apologetic texts in order to shed light on the meaning of the notion of the barbarian in the late antique period. The semantic mapping of the word “barbarian” necessitates the philological, rhetorical, historical and ideological consideration of these texts as crafted forensic and literary pieces in their cultural and historical context. As will be shown, the term barbarian is pregnant with meaning not only from the standpoint of the Christian apologetic writings, as they represent only one side of the polemics, but also from the standpoint of Romans, Greeks and other ethnic groups represented in the Roman Empire. It is important to note that the definition of the concept “barbarian” is culture- and time-specific and it bears the stamp of the observer, or commentator, as well as the signature of the observed, or the described. It is therefore an elastic concept that covers an entire gamut of meanings, some of which may be rendered as positive or neutral, while others are thoroughly negative. Although the Greek word βαρβαρόφωνος, from which βάρβαρος is derived, originally had a neutral meaning and designated a person of foreign tongue (or non-Greek speaker), it soon obtained negative connotations, especially referring to cultural difference, ethnic inferiority and diametrical opposition.41 In fact, one might argue, the bias against the foreigner is built into the etymology of the 40

41

John E. Fojtik, “Tatian the Barbarian: Language, Education and Identity in the Oratio ad Graecos” in Continuity and Discontinuity in Early Christian Apologetics, eds., Jörg Ulrich, Anders-Christian Jacobsen and Maijastine Kahlos (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2009), 23–35. See definition provided in H.G. Liddell’s Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964; Reprint). The word appears in Homer as βαρβαρόφωνος and is originally used in a neutral manner to designate a person, who does not speak Greek language, such as the

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Greek word βάρβαρος itself, as it is a concept which is consciously designed to bear no meaning, for it designates incomprehensibility and confusion, in addition to implying inferiority vis à vis the Greeks, by the mimetic repetition of the inarticulate sound bar-bar. Although the Greek term apparently designates the non-Greek speaker in a descriptive manner, it does so in a coded and eminently biased way. Moreover, the proper command of Greek language is also closely associated with the possession of λόγος, understood both as reason and as speech. As a result, the barbarian is someone who does not speak Greek and is distinguished not only by incomprehensible speech but also by irrational drives and chaotic thought-processes.42 The concept of barbarism is employed in antiquity by both Greeks and ­Romans in reference to a large array of ethnicities, as well as in reference to each other. The early Christians are only one among many other groups in the Roman Empire that are described as barbarian in its various valences. This classification of early Christians as being barbarians found in the apologetic literature from the second, third and fourth centuries is noteworthy, e­ specially when one contrasts it to the rare use of the term “barbarian” in the New Testament corpus.43 Whereas the texts in the New Testament do not make an identification of “barbarians” with Christians per se, the apologetic writings not only assume but also complicate such a characterization in a­ ccordance

42 43

Persians or the Medians. After the Persian war, however, the word βάρβαρος gains a negative meaning and is used in derogatory ways. See Marie-Francoise Baslez, L’Étranger dans la Grèce Antique (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1984), 183–206. In the New Testament corpus, the word “barbarian” occurs in 1 Corinthians 14:11, Romans 1:14, Colossians 3:11, Acts 28:2, 4. In Acts, the word refers strictly to the inhabitants of the island of Malta and underscores their unusual actions of extreme hospitality and eagerness to deify Paul on account of a miraculous deed. In Romans, Paul is drawing a series of oppositions in his initial introductory remarks to the Christian congregation in Rome, and he opposes such categories as Greek and barbarian, wise and foolish. He attempts to justify his mission to Rome and to the Gentiles and he therefore draws upon universalistic claims for the spread of the gospel to the Gentile world. In 1 Corinthians, Paul comments upon the benefits of spiritual gifts and the gifts of prophecy and tongues in particular. He explains the superiority of the gift of prophecy, i.e., comprehensible speech, over that of tongues, which can be linked to a barbarian or incomprehensible sound. In Colossians 3:11 appears the universalistic claim of the applicability of the gospel: “there is no longer Greek and Jew, circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave and free; but Christ is all in all.” The author of this text is denying the validity of such categories as free and slave, barbarian and Greek, while pitting these opposite categories against each other.

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with the authors’ own rhetorical purposes.44 The term “barbarian” in the e­ arly Christian apologetic texts bears a wide variety of meanings and has multiple functions. It simultaneously serves as a charge and a counter-charge in the hands (or mouths) of the apologists. It is hardly ever a neutral term but is normally pregnant with predominantly negative meanings. From the perspective of the early Christian apologists and their adversaries, the characterization of  the  ­barbarian ‘other’ is one of denigration, abuse and accusation. It functions as one traditionally (ab)used term both in the ancient forensic context and in the practice of invective that can be found in different literary genres in antiquity.45 Specifically in the apologetic corpus, the meaning of the word “barbarian” has a broad semantic field: it can be invested with positive,46 as well as negative meanings,47 as it functions in apologetic texts both rhetorically and forensically. It is striking that, despite the predominantly negative connotations of the charge of barbarism, some Christian apologists choose to use the concept of the barbarian in positive ways. For instance, some of the apologists attempt to redefine it in their own favor by demonstrating its superiority over against Greek and Roman identity,48 while others try to deny and exculpate Christians from any barbarian characteristics, as they turn these charges against their opponents.49 In the writings of the early Christian apologists, the term “barbarian” functions not only as a charge against Christians but also as a counter-charge 44

The charge is encountered in both Greek and Latin apologetic texts, such as the writings of Justin (Dialogue 119.4; First Apology 5.4, 7.3, 60.11), Tatian (Address to the Greeks 1.3, 12.5, 26.4, 35.1, 42.1), Origen (Conta Celsum 1.2, 1.14, 6.80, 8.68), Clement of Alexandria (Stromata 1.1, 1.15, 2.2, 6.6, 6.8, 6.17), Eusebius (Preparation for the Gospel 1.1, 1.2, 10.3, 11.18–19, 14.1), Tertullian (Apology 3.5; Ad Nationes 1.3) Arnobius (Adversus Gentes 1.4–6, 1.59, 2.6, 2.66), Lactantius (Divine Institutes 5.11), among others. The term “barbarian” becomes particularly central in Tatian’s and Clement’s definitions of the Christian religion, as shall be discussed in detail. 45 Cf. Severin Koster, Die Invektive in der griechischen und römischen Literatur. Beiträge zur klassischen Philologie 99 (Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain, 1980); Gay L. Byron, Symbolic Blackness and Ethnic Difference in Early Christian Literature (London: Routledge, 2002); Jennifer Knust, Abandoned to Lust: Sexual Slander and Ancient Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). 46 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 1, 2, 3, 8, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 31, 35; Origen, Contra Celsum 1.2; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.1, 1.14, 1.15, 1.21. 47 Justin, Dialogue with Trypho 119.4; First Apology 60.11; Arnobius, Adversus Gentes 1.4, 1.6, 2.66; Origen, Contra Celsum 8.68. 48 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 35, 42; Clement, Stromata 1.1, 1.14, 1.15, 1.21. 49 Arnobius, Adversus Gentes 1.6, 1.65, 5.19, 5.22, 5.24, 7.9, 7.15; Lactantius, Divine Institutes 1.21; De Mortibus Persecutorum 9, 11, 21, 27, 38.

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against their opponents, as well as an occasion for self-definition.50 It serves as self-identifying and self-descriptive concept for the early Christian groups and individuals, in addition to being used by them as a point of criticism of different aspects of Greco-Roman society.51 The wide variety of significations of the concept of the “barbarian” in the Greek and Latin Christian apologetic literature is indicative of the rhetorical and social formations of early Christians and the importance of the concept of barbarism for Christians, as well as their contemporaries. For example, in the apologetic corpus the term barbarian can point strictly to the external and hostile political enemy and to military threat of incursions on the Roman Empire.52 It can designate a foreign language, such as Hebrew or others,53 or it stand for an association with foreign ethnicity, such as Jewish, Syrian and others.54 It can also point to a lack of education, erudition and culture.55 In some instances, it can refer to the specific origin, style and content of Scripture, in comparison with Greek and Roman literary and rhetorical norms,56 as well as to members of the lower classes and to politically suspect individuals.57 In some cases, the term barbarian is associated with the exhibition of excess and the practice of atrocities, such as cannibalism, incest, sexual immorality, or ritual murder.58 It is noteworthy that all of the above denotations found in the apologetic corpus are primarily negative and accusatory, even when the apologists attempt to re-define and re-invest these with alternative positive meanings. In addition to demonstrating that the charge of barbarism was indeed leveled against early Christians, I also examine the various responses given to it by the apologists, while also attempting to contextualize and understand their different rhetorical-ideological positionality. When addressing the allegation of barbarism in its different valences, the early Christian apologists tend to 50

For example, Arnobius launches a critique of Roman religious, social and military practices through a recourse to the notion of the “barbarian.” Cf. Arnobius, Adversus Gentes 1.6, 1.65. 51 Arnobius is highly critical of Roman religious practices (Adversus Gentes 5.19, 5.22, 7.9, 7.15), while Lactantius uses the notion of the “barbarian” to criticize the military and political careers of Roman emperors (De Mortibus Persecututorum 21, 27). 52 Arnobius, Adversus Gentes 1.4–5; Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.11. 53 Origen, Contra Celsum 7.60. 54 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 42; Origen, Contra Celsum 1.2, 1.14, 6.2. 55 Justin, First Apology 60.11. 56 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 11.18–19, Ecclesiastical History 7.25; Arnobius, Adversus Gentes 1.58–9. 57 Origen, Contra Celsum 8.68; Arnobius, Contra Gentes 1.4–5. 58 Tertullian, Apology 7.1, 8.5, 8.7–8.

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employ one of two rhetorical strategies: they either try to re-define the concept of the barbarian positively for their own rhetorical purposes59 or they choose to leave it negative and accusatory and re-direct it against their opponents.60 There is a wide gamut of responses given to the charge of barbarism in the early Christian apologetic literature, spanning from non-questioning assumption or a proud acknowledgment of this allegation,61 to apologetic explanations and rationalizations,62 and, finally, to outright denial and counter-charge.63 In part, the various responses to the allegation that Christians are “barbarian” are a result of the different provenance, authorship, occasion, audience, circumstance, purpose, and the time of composition of the texts. This study, therefore, entails not only a close reading and a detailed philological and a rhetorical analysis of the apologetic writings, but also the social and historical contextualization of the ancient documents and their authors.64 In the analysis of the charge of barbarism, it is of equal importance to take into consideration the socio-historical context of the different apologetic works, as well as the rhetorical arguments of the individual authors in their attempt to present a self-defense and a self-definition, whether as an insider (Greek or Roman) or as an outsider, i.e. Jewish, Syrian, or any other analogous “barbarian” type. The presence of a wide variety of different tactics, rhetorical strategies and ideological positionality of the Christian apologists is a witness to the diversity of self-perceptions, self-articulations and experimentations in this early formative period of Christianity. Furthermore, in order to understand the concept of the barbarian in the Christian apologetics texts per se, it is important to consider the conceptualization and the different denotations of the term in non-Christian literature 59 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 12, 35, 42; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.14, 6.17. 60 Arnobius, Adversus Gentes 5.19, 5.22, 5.24, 7.9, 7.15; Lactantius, De Mortibus Persecututorum 9, 11, 21, 27, 38. 61 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 12, 35, 42. 62 Justin, First Apology 60.11; Arnobius, Contra Gentes 1.4, 1.59, 2.6. 63 Tertullian, Apology 1.3; Origen, Contra Celsum 8.68. 64 The historical dating of some of these texts is questioned and debated by scholars, so that a precise date of origin in some cases is not established with any reasonable certainty. This is particularly true of the earlier material, but it also applies to later apologetic literature, such as Lactantius’ Divine Institutes. For example, Elizabeth Digeser in her The Making of a Christian Empire argues for an earlier date for the composition of the work than is generally accepted in scholarship. Such uncertainty makes an interpretive project more challenging and speculative, as the precise historical time and circumstances of origination are not always precisely known. Cf. Elizabeth Digeser, The Making of a Christian Empire: Lactantius and Rome (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

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at the time. This examination of the notion of the “barbarian” prevalent in Greco-Roman literature provides a necessary supplement and a corrective to the textual evidence found in the early Christian apologetic corpus. The consideration of the broader literary and cultural context also highlights the centrality of the construct of the barbarian for the self-perception and selfidentification of both Greeks and Romans in late antiquity. For a more comprehensive and contextualized overview, this study includes a variety of ancient literary genres, including philosophical, historiographic, ethnographic and literary material related to locating and defining, as well as expelling, the barbarian, both within and without.65 A synthetic presentation of the many valences of the Greco-Roman notion of the barbarian helps both to contextualize and better understand its different usages and its rhetorical-ideological functions. This is necessary and important not only for the sake of comparison between 65

See Edith Hall, Inventing the Barbarian (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989); Marie-Francoise Baslez, L’Étranger dans la Grèce Antique (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1984); Laoul Lonis, ed., L’Étranger dans le monde grec. Actes du colloque organise par l’Institut d’Etudes Anciennes de Nancy. 1 & 2 (Nancy: Presses universitaire de Nancy, 1988, 1992); Yves Albert Dauge, Le Barbare: Recherches sur la conception romaine de la barbarie et de la civilisation (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981); Isaac Benjamin, The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Amir Mehdi Badi, Les Grec et les Barbares: L’autre face de l’histore, 6 vols. (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1963, 1966, 1968, 1975, 1984, 1990); Irad Malkin, ed., Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Timothy Long, Barbarians in Greek Comedy (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986); John Barett, Andrew Fitzpatrick, and Lesley Macinnes, eds., Barbarians and Romans in North-West Europe (Oxford: bar, 1989); Ralph Mathisen and Danuta Shnanzer, eds., Romans, Barbarians and the Transformation of the Roman World (Burlington: Ashgate, 2011); I.M. Ferris, Enemies of Rome: Barbarians Through Roman Eyes (Gloucestershire: Sutton, 2000); Micheal Rowlands, Larsen Morgens, and Kristin Kristiansen, eds., Centre and Periphery in the Ancient World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Per Bilde et al., Centre and Periphery in the Hellenistic World (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1993); Pericles George, Barbarian Asia and the Greek Experience (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994); Arnaldo Momigliano, Alien Wisdom: The Limits of Hellenization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Richard Miles, ed., Constructing Identities in Late Antiquity (London: Routledge, 1999); J.P.V.D. Baldson, Romans and Aliens (London: Duckworth, 1979); Thomas Harrison, ed., Greeks and Barbarians (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002); Kostas Vlasopoulos, Greeks and Barbarians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Simon Goldhill, ed., Being Greek Under Rome: Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic and the Development of Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Erich Gruen, Rethinking the Other in Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); L. Nasrallah and E. Schüssler-Fiorenza, eds., Prejudice and Christian Beginnings: Investigating Race, Gender, and Ethnicity in Early Christian Studies (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2010).

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Christian and non-Christian references to an entourage of terms related to the concept of barbarism, but also for the proper contextualization of its rhetorical use and function in late antiquity. In order to fully grasp how the concept of the barbarian is historically defined and used in the literature of the late antique period, I include not only authors writing in Latin66 and Greek,67 but also the works of the satirist Lucian of Samotasa, who identifies with and writes from the perspective of a Syrian. It seems pertinent not only to take into consideration the writings of Roman elites, as they address the problem of the “barbarian” as the alien and inferior “other,” but also of those who are perceived as and see themselves as barbarian vis à vis Greco-Roman society, even when fully versed and participating in the dominant culture. It is important to note that the understanding of the notion of barbarism from the standpoint of the self-professed barbarian, such as Lucian, is parallel to the self-designation of some Christian apologists.68 The presence of a dialogue between those who launch the charge of barbarism and those who respond to it, as is witnessed in Lucian’s writings, reveals a parallel discourse to that found in the early Christian apologetic literature, in spite of the different contexts and socio-historical circumstances. The treatment of the notion of the “barbarian” from the perspectives of these three distinct groups of authors – Greeks, Romans, and a Syrian – helps to illuminate the two sides of the polemic between Christians and their accusers in its proper cultural context. Lastly, in addition to examining the charge of barbarism and the notion of the barbarian in light of ancient rhetoric and hellenistic literature, I also take into consideration modern theoretical writings on the conceptualization and function of the “other” in post-modern and post-colonial theory, more particularly, as critical thinkers elaborate on the processes of construction of “self” and “other.”69 Such a theoretical approach brings new methods and insights to the ancient documents and contributes to the better understanding of early Chris66 67 68

69

In specific, my focus is on the writings of Caesar, Cicero, Seneca and Tacitus, as they conceptualize and articulate the notion of the “barbarian.” More particularly, I turn to the writings of proponents of the Second Sophistic Aristides, Dio Chrysostom and Philostratus, as they reflect on the notion of the “barbarian.” It is not insignificant that the understanding of the notion of the “barbarian” from the standpoint of the self-professed barbarian, such as Lucian of Samotasa, is parallel to the self-designation of some Christian apologists. See especially Tatian, Address to the Greeks 12, 35, 42. See section below in this chapter for a detailed discussion of the critical literary theories by Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak, Homi Bhabha and Julia Kristeva, as these relate to the perception and construction of the “other.”

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tian apologetics. This study, therefore, sheds light on the rhetorical-­ideological reading of early Christian apologies, as well as the better understanding of the discursive practices in the perception and the production of the “other,” in this case designated as the “barbarian,” as represented in the early Christian ­apologetic corpus. 2.2

Ancient Rhetorical Practices and Christian Apologetic Literature

The question of genre of the early Christian apologetic literature dating from the second, third and the beginning of the fourth century is an issue that needs to be visited first before considering any specific accusations. This issue is directly related to the proper understanding of the charge of barbarism, as it is embedded in a particular literary tradition that has bearing on its meaning and significance. Thus, we turn to the question of genre in order to embed the charge of barbarism in the literary and rhetorical traditions of the time period in order to fully grasp its importance and its function. It is appropriate to consider the Roman forensic practices and the treatment of apology as a speech of defense in the context of the law court, before proceeding further to the early Christian texts in order to contextualize the charge of barbarism in the ancient rhetorical tradition. Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Forensic Oratory The technical term apology (ἀπολογία) in the sphere of ancient rhetoric refers to the forensic type of oratory and designates a specific kind of speech on part of the defendant. As a leading authority on the subject, Aristotle in his treatise on rhetoric describes the three divisions of oratory with respect to subject matter, speaker, and audience, namely: forensic (δικανικός), epideictic (ἐπιδεικτικός) and deliberative (συμβουλευτικός).70 In the Art of Rhetoric he explains the difference in subject matter between the three classes of rhetoric: forensic rhetoric is intended for the law court and takes two forms, defense (ἀπολογία) and accusation (κατηγορία) in order to arrive at a judgment on a given action in the past;71 deliberative rhetoric is intended to exhort or to dissuade the hearers that a certain action is either beneficial or harmful for their future;72 epideictic rhetoric is intended to demonstrate that a person or an 70 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1358b. See also Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 3.3.14; Rhetorica ad Herennium 1.1.2; Cicero, De Oratre 1.31.141. 71 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1368b. 72 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1358a.

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a­ ction is either noble or disgraceful, and it can take the form of either praise (ἔπαινος) or blame (ψόγος).73 Whereas epideictic rhetoric concerns primarily ethical issues, such as virtue and vice, and can refer to the present or the future, forensic rhetoric normally concerns the past, and deliberative rhetoric involves the future.74 The aim of forensic rhetoric is to establish justice, while the purpose of epideictic oratory is primarily moral and the goal of deliberative rhetoric is personal benefit.75 Aristotle elaborates on the particular aspects of forensic rhetoric, as distinguished from the other classes of oratory, and he observes that both forms of forensic speeches – both defense (ἀπολογία) and accusation (κατηγορία) – take into account three main topics: (a) the motives for the wrongdoing,76 (b) the frame of mind of the wrongdoer,77 (c) the kind of people to whom the wrong has been inflicted.78 With regard to the exact nature of the misdeed, Aristotle asserts that a precise definition of the act of injustice is necessary, as well as a determination of whether it violates the written or the unwritten laws.79 Depending on whether the wrongful act concerns the written or the unwritten laws, a judgment must be reached that is either just in the case of written laws or equitable in the case of the unwritten laws.80 Aristotle understands a wrongful act to be the result of voluntary infliction of injustice and he also indicates that the forensic orator must take into consideration several kinds of motivations for voluntary acts, such as habit, anger, and desire, while involuntary actions concern chance, nature and compulsion.81 In spite of these differentiations, Aristotle underlines the uniform purpose of all oratory as a means of persuasion: “Rhetoric then may be defined as the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever.”82 73 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1365a. 74 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1358b. 75 Translations from the original Greek and Latin texts that are provided here are based on the translations cited in the bibliography with occasional minor changes, where appropriate. 76 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1368b. 77 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1372a. 78 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1373b. 79 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1373b. 80 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1374a. 81 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1369a. 82 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1355b. Quintilian considers the different rhetorical definitions proposed by Greek and Roman authors, among whom he also includes the writings of Aristotle. He laments the common definition of rhetoric as the “art of persuasion” (­rhetoricen esse vim persuadendi) because this limited definition does not take into account the

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The proofs that are adduced to demonstrate a point and to convince the audience in all three branches of rhetoric employ logical reasoning and assume an understanding of character, virtue and human emotions.83 The construction of an argument and the proof of the different elements of the argument, irrespective of its subject matter, purpose and audience, as a result, remain similar in many respects. In his exposition of the formal structure of a speech, Aristotle is a minimalist and he proposes that two parts are indispensible, namely, the statement of the case (πρόθεσις) and the proof (πίστεις).84 He makes qualified distinctions among the remaining parts of a speech, such as the exordium (προοίμιον), the narrative (διῆγησις), the refutation (ἔλεγχον), and the epilogue (ἐπίλογος), with regard to the different branches of rhetoric.85 In so far as forensic rhetoric is concerned, Aristotle makes very specific recommendations on the importance of the components of a speech of defense or accusation. For example, he emphasizes that the exordium (προοίμιον) is particularly important for forensic oratory since redundancy “the most essential and special function of the exordium is to make clear what is the end or purpose of the speech.”86 Additionally, the exordium is important because it can be used to remove any prejudice against the defendant87 as well as to “state the subject (πρᾶγμα), in order that the question to be decided may not escape notice.”88 The second part of a speech, the narrative (διῆγησις), according to him, is most suitable for forensic oratory in specific89 because it is a clear statement of the issue of debate. However, the narrative should not be very long, especially in the case of a speech of defense, and it ought to be presented only in so far as it is primarily

­ oral character of the orator, but rather his persuasive powers that may be divorced from m it. See Institutio Oratoria 2.15.3. See also Cicero, De Oratore 1.31.138, De Inventione 1.5.6. For the enumeration of different rhetorical definitions and assessment and criticism of these, see Institutio Oratoria 2.15. 83 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1356a. 84 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1414a,b. 85 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1414a ff. Plato in the Phaedrus 266d–267a provides the following parts for a forensic speech: exordium (προοίμιον), narrative or statement of the case with the evidence (διῆγησις), confirmation with positive proofs (πίστωσις), additional confirmation with probabilities (ἐπιπίστωσις), refutation (ἔλεγχος), additional refutation (ἐπεξέλεχγος), recapitulation (ἐπάνοδος). 86 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1415a. 87 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1416a. 88 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1414a. 89 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1414a.

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meant to “excite pity or indignation”90 in the audience. Aristotle also remarks that the “narrative” should not be constricted to one part of the speech but can be interspersed in various sections.91 It is noteworthy that the narrative exposition should ideally highlight the virtue of the speaker and the depravity of the opponent,92 and its ultimate purpose should be moral. He explains: “One thing is to make clear our moral purpose; for as is the moral purpose, so is the character, and as is the end, so is the moral purpose.”93 According to Aristotle, the proofs (πίστεις) of a forensic speech should correspond to the issue of dispute and consist primarily of enthymemes, which are most appropriate for forensic rhetoric, as they concern “the question of existence or non-existence of facts.”94 Despite the emphasis on the necessity of enthymemes in forensic oratory, he also warns against the excessive use of this method; in fact, he advises against it, if the orator would like to arouse the emotions or to aim at ethical purposes, as the enthymeme will either be unproductive or counterproductive in these instances.95 In order to achieve a moral purpose in a public speech, Aristotle advises the use of maxims instead. Under the category of proofs, he also includes that sub-category of refutation (ἔλεγχον), in spite of its separate treatment in his treatise.96 He elaborates on the subject of refutation and states: “The refutation of the opponent is not a particular kind of proof; his arguments should be refuted partly by objection, partly by syllogism.”97 Therefore, the refutation of the adversary’s arguments is important not only for the removal of prejudice against one’s own case, but also for the accurate exposition and substantiation of the case. Lastly, Aristotle comments on the final part of a speech, the epilogue (ἐπίλογος), which serves not only as a summation of the entire speech but also as an occasion to reiterate the most important aspects already mentioned in it: The epilogue is composed of four parts: to dispose the hearer favorably towards oneself and unfavorably towards the adversary; to amplify and deprecate; to excite the emotions of the hearer; to recapitulate. For after 90 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1417a. 91 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1417b. 92 Aristotle explains: “And you should incidentally narrate everything that tends to show your own virtue … or the wickedness of your opponent.” Cf. Rhetorica 1417a. 93 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1417a. 94 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1418a. 95 Aristotle writes: “And whenever you wish to arouse emotion, do not use an enthymeme, for it will either drive out the emotion or will be useless” Cf. Rhetorica 1418a. 96 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1418b. 97 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1418b.

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you have proved that you are truthful and that the adversary is false, the natural order of things is to praise ourselves, blame him, and put the finishing touches.98 The analysis of oratory provided by Aristotle in the Art of Rhetoric is similar to that proposed by other Greek and Roman theorists of ancient rhetoric. In the Roman context, for instance, the author of Rhetorica ad Herennium expounds on six parts of oratorical speech: exordium, narratio, divisio, confirmatio, confutatio and conclusio, all of which correspond to the categories proposed by Aristotle.99 In his writings on rhetoric, Cicero also proposes a division into seven sections by adding the possibility of a digression: exordium, narratio, partitio, confirmatio, reprehensio, digressio and conclusio.100 Quintilian, who was viewed as highly authoritative, makes a minor change in the categorization of the different parts of oratory, as he eliminates partitio, which he considers not to be a part of a speech but rather a feature of each individual section. Quintilian thus proposes the following parts: prooemium, narratio, probatio, refutatio, and peroratio.101 As it becomes apparent from this brief outline of the different parts of ancient Greek and Roman rhetoric, the segments of a forensic speech, as presented by Aristotle, are widely accepted and employed in antiquity, despite the small variance in categorization and sub-categorization. In spite of the various instructions and recommendations of different experts of ancient rhetoric, Quintilian advises against any strict rigidity of the orator and emphasizes the need for flexibility: Let no one however demand from me a rigid code of rules such as most authors of textbooks have laid down, or ask me to impose on students of rhetoric a system of laws immutable as fate … If the whole of rhetoric could be thus embodied in one compact code, it would be an easy task of little compass: but most rules are liable to be altered by the nature of the case, circumstances of time and place, and by hard necessity itself. Consequently, the all-important gift for an orator is a wise adaptability since he is called upon to meet the most varied emergencies.102

98 Aristotle, Rhetorica 1419b. 99 Cf. Rhetorica ad Herennium 1.3.4. 100 Cf. Orator 2.80, Inv. Rhet. 1.19–109. 101 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 3.9.2–3. 102 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 2.13.1–2.

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Quintialian’s warning against the unnecessarily strict application and understanding of the prescriptions of the theorists of rhetoric is a helpful guide in considering Greek and Roman oratory, as well as Christian apologetic literature. After this brief presentation of ancient rhetorical theory, we turn next to the Christian sources in order to explore the implications of ancient rhetorical forensic practices for the apologetic corpus of texts. For this purpose, the scholarship on the New Testament will be included in addition to what is ­commonly referred to as early Christian apologetic texts that originate from a later period, spanning the second through the fourth century. Forensic Rhetoric and Early Christian Apologetics The designation apologetics in reference to Christian literature from the second, third and beginning of the fourth centuries is normally used in both primary texts and secondary literature as an all-embracing term, rather than as genre-specific. When delineating early Christian apologetics, Robert M. Grant in his Greek Apologists of the Second Century explains: Apologetic literature emerges from minority groups that are trying to come to terms with the larger culture within which they live. Apologists do not completely identify themselves with the broader society, but they are not advocates of confrontation or revolution. They address their contemporaries with persuasion, looking for links between the outside world and their own group and thus modifying the development of both. An apologist who finds the link in philosophy or in cultural life will lay emphasis on aspects of philosophy or culture that favor his own group’s attitudes and ideals and, at the same time, will emphasize a philosophical or cultural analysis or structuring of his group’s views. His primary goal is to interpret his own culture – religious, philosophical, or artistic, as the case may be – to the broader group.103 Grant defines early Christian apologetic texts not in terms of a specific genre but rather as an attempted explication of a maligned and misunderstood minority group presented to the larger society, notwithstanding the particular form that it takes. In this sense, the genre and the content of the apologetic works are determined by the author himself, rather than by the necessity of any strict literary or rhetorical conventions. Given this broad definition, it is no surprise when the church historian Eusebius uses the word “apology” (ἀπολογία) to refer to a speech of defense 103 R.M. Grant, Greek Apologists of the Second Century (Westminster: John Knox, 1988), 9.

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delivered in court, as well as to a wider category of texts that deal with the defense of Christian doctrines and practices. Eusebius uses the term apology in its legal sense of a speech of defense, when he narrates the martyrdom of Apollonius,104 in which the Christian martyr addresses his speech to the senate before he is sentenced to death. He also uses the same term apology in an extended sense and a broader context when referring to early Christian texts that are addressed to a state official, such as the Roman Emperor or a local prefect. For instance, when he mentions the writings of Quadratus,105 Aristides,106 Justin Martyr,107 Melito and Apollinarius108 and Miltiades109 and Tertullian’s Apologeticum,110 he identifies them as apologies on account of the official addressees of these texts.111 Additionally, Eusebius applies the word apology to an even larger category of texts that include not only speeches of defense and texts written in defense of Christians that are addressed to official state authorities, but also other works that are written either as refutations of treatises opposing Christianity or as polemical pieces, as well as certain commentaries and homilies on biblical passages.112 The vague use of the term “apology” by Eusebius can be understood in the context of ancient rhetorical practices, which support both its specific forensic use as a speech of defense and its more general application to designate the content and purpose of a text, rather than a particular literary form. Eusebius’ designation of “apology” in reference to a large array of texts is furthermore supported by the usage of the term by other early Christian authors in the labeling of their own works. Origen, for instance, conceives of his Contra Celsum as an apology, as he answers directly the numerous accusations (κατηγορίαι) and false testimonies (ψευδομαρτυρίαι) presented by the

104 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 5.21.2–5. 105 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 4.3.1. 106 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 4.3.3. 107 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 4.8.3. 108 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 4.26.1. 109 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 5.17.5. 110 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 2.2.4, 3.33.3, 5.5.5. 111 Tertullian’s Apologeticum, for example, is addressed to the “antistites” or the governors of the Roman Empire, thus justifying the use of the term apology in accordance with Eusebius’ categorization. This fact is to be contrasted to other early Christian writings, such as Tatian’s Address to the Greeks and Justin’s Dialogue with Trypho, among others, as not falling under the same narrowly defined category. 112 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 1.3.4.

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pagan critic Celsus.113 Despite the fact that there is no actual situation of the law court against Celsus per se, as the adversary was already deceased, Origen uses the term apology (ἀπολογία)114 to describe his work and to designate its purpose. Similar to Origen, Lactiantius also designates his Divine Institutes as a type of apology, even when he distinguishes his method of exposition from those of his predecessors, and he situates his work within the tradition of Latin Christian apologetic writings, when he writes: Although Tertullian has amply pleaded the same cause in that book which is called Apology, it is one thing to respond to accusers, which consists solely in defense or refutation, and another to instruct [instituere], as I am doing, which entails setting out the substance of the whole doctrine.115 Both Origen and Lactantius exhibit self-consciousness as authors of apologies, even when they recognize the different historical circumstances and the variety of methods of composition and argumentation. The varied use of the term “apology” by early Christians, such as Eusebius, Origen and Lactantius, is not unique, as it is employed in antiquity in the context of court of law, as well as outside the parameters of strictly legal structures. In the collective volume Aspects of Religious Propaganda in Judaism and Early Christianity, Schüssler-Fiorenza argues in her article “Miracles, Mission, and Apologetics”116 that apologetic literature is not a narrow set of texts, but rather it is a term that defines the nature of early Christian writings, including the New Testament corpus. The scholarly essays in this volume attempt not only to broaden the notion of “apologetics” vis à vis early Christian texts, but also to include non-Christian literature and Jewish texts from the ancient period under the same category. Schüssler-Fiorenza notes the pervasiveness of inner-Christian debates and conflicts that necessitate the creation of a body of literature that serves the propagandistic and the apologetic purposes of the early Christian missionary movement. She observes that both Jews and Christians “appealed to the Greco-Roman world and used the means and methods 113 See the various references to the lawcourt in Contra Celsum Preface, 1.51.1, 4, 6–7, 9–10, 11–12, 16; 2.52.9, 19, 23–24. 114 Origen, Contra Celsum 1.2. 115 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.4. 116 Elizabeth Schüssler-Fiorenza, “Miracles, Mission, and Apologetics” in Aspects of Religious Propaganda in Judaism and Early Christianity, ed., Elizabeth Schüssler-Fiorenza (Notre Dame, in: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976).

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of Hellenistic religious propaganda” for the sake of expanding their following and competing against other rival religions and philosophies.117 She points to the existence of a long tradition of apologetic writings of the Jewish diaspora in the hellenistic world, as well as the interconnectedness between arguments and themes in Jewish and Christian religious writings. Schüssler-Fiorenza highlights the connection between apologetics and propaganda as a means of preservation, self-defense and expansion of minority religious groups, as she views both Jews and Christians in the late Roman Empire. She justifies this generalized and non form-specific understanding of apologetic literature by expanding the notion of apology to include early Christian literature and to connect it, rather than dissociate or oppose it, to other philosophical and religious writings in the Roman period. According to Schüssler-Fiorenza, apologetics is understood as a socio-rhetorical strategy for persuasion and conversion, as it is the flip side of propagandistic and missionary literature. She clearly demarcates her reading of early Christian texts in a broad cultural context, instead of delineating a specific period of persecution and apologetics of early Christians, as has been traditionally done in historiography. As she sees it, apologetic literature is generated for internal purposes, in the attempt to reach out and expand the religious group, as well as face external pressures, such as state persecutions. In a more recent collaborative volume entitled Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews and Christians,118 a number of scholars have considered early Christian writings under the rubric of apologetics as a part of a larger complex phenomenon in the context of Christian, Jewish and Roman literature in late antiquity. For the purposes of the study of apologetic literature in the late antique period, the editors of this volume provide a very general definition, as follows: … a working definition of apologetic, taking as the core meaning of the term the sense in which it is commonly applied to the formal treatises undertaken in defense of Christianity from the second century onwards. Apologetic is thus the defense of a cause or party supposed to be of paramount importance to the speaker. It may include apologia in the sense of Plato’s Apology, the defense of a single person, but is distinguished from 117 E. Schüssler-Fiorenza, “Miracles, Mission, and Apologetics” in Aspects of Religious Propaganda in Judaism and Early Christianity, ed., Elizabeth Schüssler-Fiorenza (Notre Dame, in: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), 2–3. 118 Mark Edwards, Martin Goodman and Simon Price, eds., Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews and Christians (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999).

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polemic (which need not assume any previous attack by the opponent) and from merely epideictic or occasional orations.119 This definition of apologetics in the Roman Empire embraces a general view of the kind of literature viewed as “apologetic.” It should be noted that some of the contributors to the collaborative volume do employ a narrower definition that is more closely linked to the genre of apology in antiquity, as they attempt to examine specific texts under this literary classification, while others accept this broad definition. For example, Francis Young approaches the range of different works designated as “apologetic” by early Christian authors and she notes the wide variety of existing works that are attributed to the category of apologetic literature, whose “‘surface-genre’ of texts that purport to defend Christianity is variable.”120 She observes that within the three types of ancient rhetoric – deliberative, forensic, and epideictic – one branch, forensic rhetoric, takes two possible forms of accusation (κατηγορία) and defense (ἀπολογία).121 Based on the divisions of rhetorical types in the ancient practice of oratory, Young concludes that an apology is not a genre in itself, as it is only a type of a speech geared toward a particular purpose, namely the defense of a person in the context of the court of law, although it is not constricted to this situation. She explains: It could be said, therefore, that “apology” is not a genre, but properly the end or purpose of a speech, particularly a speech for the defense in court, and then more loosely a defense or excuse offered in a less precise context or genre. Demetrius’ catalogue of letter types includes the apologetic letter: “The apologetic type is that which adduces, with proof, arguments that contradict charges that are being made.” This confirms the conclusion: the genre is “letter,” the content “defense,” following the model of the lawcourt speech.122 119 See Mark Edwards, Martin Goodman and Simon Price, eds., Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews and Christians (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 1. 120 Francis Young, “Greek Apologists of the Second Century” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews and Christians, eds., Mark Edwards, Martin Goodman and Simon Price (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 82. 121 She refers to the divisions in rhetorical types in Anasimenes’ Art of Rhetoric (1.3.3). See Francis Young, “Greek Apologists of the Second Century” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews and Christians, eds., Mark Edwards, Martin Goodman and Simon Price (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 90. 122 Francis Young, “Greek Apologists of the Second Century” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews and Christians, eds., Mark Edwards, Martin Goodman and Simon Price (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 91.

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Young’s recourse to ancient rhetorical theory and literary forms confirms that both the genre-specific description of apology, as well as the more generalized use of the term in the Christian context, is characteristic of non-Christian literature as well. In contrast to Young, L. Alexander examines the strictly forensic use of the term apology in the ancient context and takes into consideration the scenario of the court in antiquity.123 He observes that even the narrow definition of apology in the forensic context of the law court “contains an accepted element of necessary fiction.”124 He points to the fact that, according to the ancient Greek rhetorical tradition, the apologetic oration may have been written in the first person by a professional logograph on behalf of the defendant, in contrast to the Roman legal convention of the representation of the defendant by an advocate in court. The gap that is created between the composition of the text and its actual delivery, between implied and actual audience, as well as between the composer of the speech and the person of the defendant, indicate a situation, in which the creation of an apologetic text and the composition of a forensic speech of defense may be not be far distanced.125 If Alexander’s observation of the composition of apologies as “dramatic fiction” is accepted, even within the narrow context of the court of law, it is not surprising that both in Greek and Roman literature,126 as well as in early Christian texts, the designation “apology” can be adequately and justifiably applied to a large array of literary forms, some of which are directly linked to a forensic setting. Mark Edwards also reflects on the practices of ancient rhetoricians and ­remarks that an apology is not only encountered in the forensic branch of ­rhetoric – whether real or fictional – but also in the epideictic type of rhetoric, which is normally divorced from the particular circumstances of the ­social-historical situation.127 The literary aspect of the apology can therefore 123 Loveday Alexander, “The Acts of the Apostles as an Apologetic Text” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews and Christians, eds., Mark Edwards, Martin Goodman and Simon Price (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 15–44. 124 Loveday Alexander, “The Acts of the Apostles as an Apologetic Text” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews and Christians, eds., Mark Edwards, Martin Goodman and Simon Price (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 20. 125 He notes: “This kind of dramatic fiction was of course bread and butter to an educated Greek and Roman readership brought up on the multilayered fictions of rhetoric.” See Loveday Alexander, “The Acts of the Apostles as an Apologetic Text” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews and Christians, eds., Mark Edwards, Martin Goodman and Simon Price (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 21. 126 The most widely known example in antiquity is Plato’s Apology of Socrates, among many other literary adaptations of the genre of apology. 127 Mark Edwards, “The Flowering of Latin Apologetic: Lactantius and Arnobius” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews and Christians., eds., Mark Edwards, Martin ­Goodman and Simon Price (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 202 ff.

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be ­translated not only from the actual to the fictional forensic setting, but also from forensic to epideictic rhetorical exercise. It is precisely within the context of epideictic oratory that Edwards chooses to identify the writings of the Latin Christian apologists Lactantius and Arnobius, as he sees them as abstracted from the actual historical circumstances.128 Thus, it must be noted that it is not the form or the genre of the apology that is relevant to the study of the early Christian apologetic corpus, as it encompasses a wide array of literary forms, but rather the content or the apologetic motifs that run through these texts, irrespective of the specific historical setting. It is precisely within the context of the rhetorical arts of accusation and counter-accusation that the charge of barbarism in the early Christian apologetic literature that will also be examined. One final aspect of the Christian apologetic writings should be mentioned, namely the addressees of these texts. The audience of these apologetic treatises, both the purported and the actual readership, as well as the literary form and the particular historical occasion, is important for their classification as such only to a certain extent. As has been noted above, the historian Eusebius does refer to the specific addressees of the Christian apologies as an indication of their classification, but he does not exclude other types of texts from the same category.129 Simon Price also takes into consideration an important aspect of the apologetic works, that is the actual application of these texts within the Christian community itself. He draws attention to the fact that regardless of the express addressees of the early Christian apologies, it is a plausible assumption that the main readership consisted of Christians themselves, rather than outsiders, as they were thereby equipped with ready-made arguments and proofs in order to counter various charges against them.130 Whether these texts reached directly the outsiders through an immediate access or did so indirectly by influencing early Christian intellectuals and patrons of literary texts is a question that concerns the implied and the actual readership, 128 Mark Edward, “The Flowering of Latin Apologetic: Lactantius and Arnobius” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews and Christians, eds., Mark Edwards, Martin Goodman and Simon Price (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 197–222. 129 For instance, Simon Price in his treatment of three Latin apologists notes that the explicit and the actual audiences of their writings are not crucial for their classification as apologetic works. See Price, “Latin Christian Apologetics: Minucis Felix, Tertullian, and Cyprian” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews and Christians, eds., Mark Edwards, Martin Goodman and Simon Price (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 105–130. 130 Simon Price, “Latin Christian Apologetics: Minucis Felix, Tertullian, and Cyprian” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews and Christians, eds., Mark Edwards, Martin Goodman and Simon Price (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 105 ff.

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rather than putting into doubt the nature of these texts as apologetic. It is both understandable and justifiable for early Christian writers, such as Eusebius, Origen, and others, to adopt a very broad definition of “apology” with regard to their own writings and to those of others. The early Christian writers were in no sense innovators in the adoption of the apologetic discourse, whether in the form of a speech, a dialogue or a narrative, in their attempt to explain and to defend their own religious doctrines and practices to outsiders. They embraced the established tradition not merely of forensic rhetoric, where the apology is understood strictly as a particular type of speech, but also in the different appropriations of the apology in a wide variety of literary forms. It is not accidental that many of the early Christian apologists were trained master rhetoricians, lawyers, teachers, and practitioners of oratory. Their writings naturally exhibit their specialized education, professional expertise and personal experience. The apologetic texts from the early Christian period stand in a line of a long tradition of both Greco-Roman and Jewish apologetic writings and are indebted to these, even when articulating something new and different and expressing the self-definition of the early Christian movement through the recourse of the notion of the barbarian and the “other.” It is striking that in the recent years there has been a revived interest in the study of early Christian apologetic literature with its literary, historical, cultural and rhetorical context, leading to international academic conferences and publications. Most recently, there have been published several conference proceedings in collected volumes of scholarly articles, including Continuity and Discontinuity in Early Christian Apologetics,131 Critique and Apologetics: Jews, Christians and Pagans in Antiquity,132 and In Defense of Christianity: Early Christian Apologists.133 The renewed scholarly interest in early Christian apologetics is to an extent due to the implementation of new approaches, theoretical methods, and tools of analysis applied to the ancient texts.134 In my own 131 Jörg Ulrich, Anders-Christian Jacobsen, Maijastina Kahlos, eds., Continuity and Discontinuity in Early Christian Apologetics (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2009). 132 Anders-Christian Jacobsen, Jörg Ulrich, David Brakke, eds., Critique and Apologetics: Jews, Christians and Pagans in Antiquity (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2009). 133 Anders-Christian Jacobsen, Jörg Ulrich, Jakob Engberg, eds., In Defense of Christianity: Early Christian Apologists (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2014). 134 See A. Klostergaard Petersen, “The Diversity of Apologetics. From Genre to a Mode of Thinking” in Critique and Apologetics: Jews, Christians and Pagans in Antiquity, eds., ­Anders-Christian Jacobsen, Jörg Ulrich, David Brakke (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2009), 15–41. In ­trying to define the genre of the ancient apology, Klostergaard draws on an array of literary critics and theorists, such as A. Fowler, T. Todorov, K. Campbell and K. Jamieson.

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examination of the early Christian apologetic literature, I also include postcolonial and literary criticism in order to shed light on the different facets of the charge of barbarism leveled against the early Christians in the context of imperial Rome. 2.3

Methodological Approaches and Theoretical Considerations: Postcolonial Theory and Literary Constructions of “Self” and “Other”

The parameters of this study of the charge of barbarism in the early Christian apologetic literature are dictated by the specific focus of the lens, which in this case is one concept and a constellation of closely related terms. Although the examination of this charge focuses on specific segments of the early Christian apologetic corpus, it provides the opportunity to analyze the rhetorical strategies in the Greek and Latin apologetic writings that span a period of time of over two hundred years. It also allows for a complex and layered view of the conceptualization of the barbarian in the late antique Roman world. This focused analysis of the charge of barbarism allows for its detailed treatment in the contemporary Greco-Roman literary milieu, social-historical setting and rhetorical context. It should also be noted that the scope of this examination is limited to authors from the pre-Constantinian period, despite the attestation of the notion of the barbarian in later periods as well.135 The method of this study is multifaceted, as it involves not only a philological, literary and rhetorical study of the range of semantic meanings and rhetorical-ideological functions of the word “barbarian” in Christian and nonChristian sources, but also a social-historical analysis and contextualization in the late antique period. On the one hand, this study implements ancient rhetorical theory and critical tools for analyzing the charge of barbarism in the early Christian apologies and in the broader cultural context of the late Roman Empire. The rhetorical analysis of these carefully crafted texts also implicates an ideological understanding of the charge of barbarism and the role that it plays in the early Christian apologetic literature in particular. On the other 135 This is particularly true of the fifth century and is closely connected with the increasing threats that different people groups pose to the integrity and the boundaries of the Roman empire. Augustine writes extensively in City of God on this problem, in light of the invasion and devastation in Italy and in the city of Rome caused by the Goths in 410. See especially preface and Chapters 1–12 of Book i of Augustine’s City of God.

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hand, the study situates the apologetic works and their authors in their specific socio-historical context, as the various apologetic texts under consideration have different provenance, authorship, occasion, addressees, and purpose. The literary and rhetorical aspects of the apologies are illuminated by the social conditions and historical developments at the time and allow us to understand the function of the charge of barbarism not only in the apologetic texts per se but also in the larger late antique culture. In the Christian apologetic texts from the second, third and beginning of the fourth centuries, the charge of barbarism functions not only as an allegation and a tool for othering early Christians but also as a tool for self-definition and as a means of resistance to the mainstream of society. As will be shown, the concept of the barbarian is re-defined by some Christian apologists from negative and accusatory to positive, as well as it is turned as a counter-accusation against the accusers by others. Whether one is on the side of defense, as the Christian apologists happen to be, or on the side of accusation, as their opponents are, the rhetorical practices and ideological stratagems are similar in nature, as they follow the same cultural norms of discourse. In order for us to understand the full implications of the charge of barbarism, along with its multiple semantic meanings, its rhetorical-ideological function, and its sociohistorical contextualization, this study emphasizes these primary foci of analysis of the ancient literature, both Christian and non-Christian, from the late antique period. Additionally, this study employs post-colonial criticism in order to understand the rhetorical-ideological role of the charge of barbarism, along with charges related to it, raised against Christians in the conditions of Roman imperial society. The appropriateness of the use of post-colonial criticism in the study of the late antique period resides in the textual and rhetorical formations that take place in the presence of imperial structures of control and domination both in the ancient and in the modern contexts. In spite of the fact that the application of a modern theoretical model of conceptualizing the “other” that arises in the context of twentieth century post-structuralist and post-colonial criticism might be perceived as an artificial importation into the reading of the ancient material, this methodology adds to the deeper understanding of late antique society and the power dynamic between different groups in the Roman Empire. These modern critical approaches can also be implemented in order to illuminate the ancient material and to reveal dynamics of power, marginalization and resistance in late antiquity, despite the historically contingent and deeply contextual post-colonial and post-structuralist theory. Post-colonial and post-modern theory is employed on a secondary level

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to the philological-rhetorical and socio-historical analysis as a tool of interpreting the dynamics behind the charge and counter-charge of barbarism, as well as other related accusations.136 As in the modern context of colonial and post-colonial societies, the ancient context of Roman imperial society provides channels for the possession and the subjugation of different ethnic groups and geographical t­erritories for ­political, economic, and other material gains. The social dynamic in these ­colonial societies – both the ancient and the modern ones – bears many ­similarities at the level of the underlining interests and structures for maintaining control, regardless of the divergence in their historical periodization. As ancient rhetorical theory helps to contextualize rhetorical practices of the early Christian apologists in their own socio-historical context, so does postcolonial theory shed light on the process of formation of “self” and “other” in a colonial cultural context through the lens of the barbarian. Post-colonial criticism makes apparent how notions of “self” and “other” are actively or passively constructed and how they function in the context of colonial structures of power and domination. In the conditions of imperial suppression and control, rhetorical-ideological strategies serve not only for the “othering” of certain groups in the interest of maintaining the status quo, but also for the sake of the peripheral groups and their own self-definition over against the central political power. Both groups, one in the center and the other at the margins, one on the offensive and the other on the defensive, deploy rhetorical strategies in the articulation of both “self” and “other.” For the purpose of employing post-colonial criticism in the study of the charge of barbarism in late antiquity, this study resorts to the writings of Edward Said, Gyatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha and, more particularly, the notions of the “oriental,” of the “subaltern” and of “hybridity” that they develop. In addition, Julia Kristeva’s critical work is also included and, specifically, her elaboration of the notion of the “abject” as it comes to problematize the binarity of “self” and “other” in the construction of identity. Her work demonstrates the mutual dependency rather than the oppositionality between conceptions of “self” and “other,” similar to the notions of “Roman” or “Greek” and “barbarian.” 136 Recent studies of the early Christian apologetic texts have also included theoretical writings of postmodern and postcolonial thinkers. For example, Anders Petersen refers to the literary critics T. Todorov and A. Fowler when analyzing the question of genre of the early Christian apologetic literature in his essay “The Diversity of Apologetics: From Genre to a Mode of Thinking” in Critique and Apologetics: Jews, Christians and Pagans in Antiquity, eds., Anders-Christian Jacobsen, Jörg Ulrich and David Brakke (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2009), 15–42.

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These four contemporary critics help illuminate the complex dynamics of the literary, ideological, political, social, and psychological functions of the notion of the “other,” especially as it relates to the early Christians. The different theoretical insights and methodological approaches of these four critics contribute to the complex and layered understanding of the notion of the barbarian in the late antique context.137 Their theoretical and critical insights shed light on the rhetorical-ideological and social-political mechanisms through which the concept of the “barbarian” was constructed and operated against early Christians. Although these authors address different cultures, periods and body of texts, their writings lend helpful lenses through which one can also view the early Christian apologetic corpus as reflective of colonial relations and power dynamics in the context of the late Roman imperial society. Edward Said and the Formation of the “Oriental” Subject In his book Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient138 the postcolonial theorist Edward Said describes the origin and the history of the development of the notion of the “Orient” and demonstrates its pervasiveness in western literature.139 He is primarily interested in the systematic manner in which “European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically and imaginatively.”140 In his analysis of the concept of the “Oriental,” Said notes the interconnections between knowledge, which is primarily generated for the purposes of academia, and the existing political and economic structures in western society. He emphasizes the fact that no disinterested knowledge is possible because the observer is implicated by the prevailing political institutions and social-economic conditions. According to him, therefore, the construct of the “Orient” is a product of the vested interests of western imperial and colonial powers that they study and come to create for specific geo-­ political and economic ends. In this scheme of representation of the East by the dominant western empires, it is assumed that the “Orient” is normally an object of observation, of evaluation, and of sustained scrutiny as the “Orient 137 For the application of new methods and theories on the study of ethnicity in the ancient world, see E. Almagor and J. Skinner, eds., Ancient Ethnography: New Approaches (London: Bloomsbury, 2013). 138 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient (New York: Random House, 1994; Reprint). 139 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient (New York: Random House, 1994; Reprint), 24. 140 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient (New York: Random House, 1994; Reprint), 3.

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was (and is not) a free subject of thought and action.”141 The interdependence and the mutuality between the colonial institutions and Orientalism are such that one cannot fully understand the nature and the function of the latter without taking into considerations the fact of the political domination of the western powers. This understanding of Orientalism allows Said to claim that the Orient is “orientalized”142 by the West in so far it is produced both ideologically and materially through the academic enterprise of Orientalism, as well as through the colonial system of control. It is for this reason that Said asserts that Orientalism is “an accomplice to empire”143 in so far as it provides the tools for the effective subjugation and containment of the Orient by the West. In his subsequent article “Orientalism Reconsidered”144 Said also affirms that the Orient is treated consistently by the occident as an object rather than a subject and claims that “the Orient was therefore not Europe’s interlocutor, but its silent Other.”145 The idea of the Orient and the Oriental is starkly opposed to the self-understanding of Europe and its image of the dominant and the superior. For Said, the Orient is the “antetype of Europe” characterized by its “radical difference” from and opposition to it.146 Accordingly, the leading characteristics of the Oriental are not only its alleged passivity and its perceived status of a reactive object rather than a proactive subject, but also its association with the feminine, sensuality, sexuality, emotions, and excess. This representation of the Orient is sharply opposed to the self-image of Europe perceived as embodying reason, rationality, and masculinity. It is precisely in the binary opposition between “Occident” and “Orient” that that latter comes to define the former not merely by providing “its contrasting image, idea, personality and experience” but also by being integrally incorporated in the material culture of Europe.147 141 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient (New York: Random House, 1994; Reprint), 3. 142 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient (New York: Random House, 1994; Reprint), 6. 143 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient (New York: Random House, 1994; Reprint), 333. 144 Edward Said, “Orientalism Reconsidered,” in Europe and Its Others, eds., Francis Barker et al. Vol. 1. (Colchester: University of Essex Press, 19850), 14–27. 145 Edward Said, “Orientalism Reconsidered” in Europe and Its Others, eds., Francis Barker et al. Vol. 1. (Colchester: University of Essex Press, 19850), 17. 146 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient (New York: Random House, 1994; Reprint), 17. 147 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient (New York: Random House, 1994; Reprint), 2.

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In this polarity of things Oriental and Occidental, the “Orient” is not only stigmatized as being “irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, different,”148 but can also be invested with positive qualities that are perceived as lacking in the self-constructed image of the West. In addition to its alignment with negative characteristics, such as despotism, sensuality, fatalism,149 the Orient also can be Europe’s idealized and desirous Other, as can be gleaned from the romantic representations of the East as an “exotic locale” characterized by its “sublimity, idyllic pleasure, intense energy” and its “promise.”150 It is therefore not a simple and unified “Orient” that is present in western literature, but rather a complex mosaic of representations of the East because the notion of the Oriental is dictated by a series of “desires, repressions, investments, and projections” that such a flexible notion is made possible.151 This logic of representation of the East also makes possible the association of the Oriental with “elements in Western society (delinquents, the insane, women, the poor) having in common an identity best described as lamentably alien.”152 Said explains that the inhabitants of the Orient, as projected and objectified by the West, are never seen as “citizens” or as “people” but rather as “problems” that had “to be solved, or confined … or taken over.”153 Accordingly, the image of the Orient served not only to define the West, but also to conform its own image in opposition to the inferior and lesser “other,” whether in its own midst or in its colonies. For Said, Orientalism as a discourse allows for the creation of a body of theory that is translated into a particular “style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.”154 As a mode of discourse, Orientalism feeds and supports ideologically the institutions of colonial power and administration of western countries in the East and perpetuates the system of political and economic inequality. 148 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western House, 1994; Reprint), 40. 149 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western House, 1994; Reprint), 102. 150 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western House, 1994; Reprint), 118–119. 151 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western House, 1994; Reprint), 8. 152 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western House, 1994; Reprint), 207. 153 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western House, 1994; Reprint), 207. 154 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western House, 1994; Reprint), 3.

Representations of the Orient (New York: Random Representations of the Orient (New York: Random Representations of the Orient (New York: Random Representations of the Orient (New York: Random Representations of the Orient (New York: Random Representations of the Orient (New York: Random Representations of the Orient (New York: Random

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Said’s structuralist approach to the critique of the Orientalist discourse is especially helpful in understanding the operations of power and knowledge through the creation of the notion of the “Orient.” This approach reveals the manifestations of the phenomenon of Orientalism in different contexts and explains for the essentializing and dichotomizing view of West and East, as well as the definition of the West in terms of the Orient, as its radically different “other.” The structuralist approach that Said undertakes is furthermore complemented by the deconstructionist approach undertaken by other critics of Orientalism and western imperial and colonial structures of domination. The deconstructive approach differs not merely in the technique of reading what is left out and repressed, but is also opposed to the structuralist attention to the central, as it is primarily focused on the marginal, the fringe and the periphery of the text. The new insight that deconstructionism brings to the reading and understanding of the general functioning of texts is brought to bear to the post-colonial criticism by Gayatri Spivak, among other contemporary critics. Gayatri Spivak and the Suppression of the “Subaltern” Spivak takes a different theoretical approach from Said and she includes the treatment of texts that are written by colonialist and the colonized people. In her criticism of post-coloniality, Spivak draws on Derrida’s deconstructionism by focusing on tangents of the text, such as minor plots, characters, and motifs, and she contributes to the subversion of binary systems that inform and legitimate the dominant colonial discourses.155 The tendency to read against the grain of logic or the surface meaning of the text is emphasized in the readings of colonial literature, which serves for the purposes of construction and constitution of the subject as an integral part of the systems of domination. In addition, Spivak focuses on the heterogeneity of the colonized subject by stressing the differences in class, gender, and race, and especially focusing on the female subject as a product of the colonial formation. Furthermore, Spivak views the effects of western domination not merely as oppressive and exploitive, but also as complex and positive. She considers imperialism as paradoxical because of its dominating and yet civilizing influence and she understands

155 See Spivak’s emphasis on “measuring silences” and acknowledgement that the investigation of what a work does not and cannot say is important. Cf. Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak? Speculations on a Widow Sacrifice,” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, eds., Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 286.

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it as an “enabling violation”156 rather than merely a means of exploitation. Her self-awareness as a critic of postcolonialism is such that she does not assume that there is an uncontaminated space from which one might come to speech. She also recognizes her own privileged position of someone who has benefited from the positive effects of colonialism and is based in a western educational setting, even as she is a staunch critic of western imperialistic practices. In this manner, Spivak rejects the possibility for objectivity and impartiality in the critique of postcolonialism. The key analytic concept in Spivak’s criticism is a term that she borrows from the sociologist A. Gramsci, namely the notion of the “subaltern.” While in Gramsci’s theoretical writings the term refers to rural labor and the working class, for Spivak it comes to designate the heterogeneous non-elite members of Indian society. While she is interested in the subaltern in all of its manifestations in Indian post-colonial society, she pays particular attention to the position of the female “subaltern” subject, as it is the doubly marginalized by economic disadvantage and by gender subordination. In her article “Can the Subaltern Speak,” Spivak asserts that the subaltern colonized subject cannot speak and she states that “there is no unrepresentable subaltern subject that can know and speak itself”157 because the traces of the colonized subject are not available to the intellectual who represents it, and because of the incapacity of the subaltern to know its conditions and to represent itself. She emphasizes the fact that the female as subaltern is doubly effaced on account of its subordination in the male dominated systems of foreign colonial and native patriarchal power. It is in the intersection of the interlocking structures of both patriarchy and colonialism that she sees the particular predicament of the subject constitution of the female subaltern, being caught between tradition and modernity, as well as native and foreign powers of subjection and domination. She therefore claims that the subaltern as female has no space from which it is able to express itself and it cannot be properly read and understood because of the danger of its assimilation and appropriation in the ideological structures of the dominant discourses, whether native or foreign. In examining the position of the subaltern, Spivak furthermore emphasizes the fact that the subaltern, whether female and male, cannot speak because she understands the speech act to be constituted by two integral parts, by 156 Gayatri Spivak, The Spivak Reader: Selected Works of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, eds., Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean (New York: Routledge, 1996), 19. 157 Gayatri Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak? Speculations on a Widow Sacrifice,” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, eds., Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 284.

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speaking and hearing. The act of speech can thus be precluded either by the inability of the subaltern to represent itself or by the incapacity of the elite to perceive the attempt at self-representation. In the case of Indian colonial history, Spivak notes that two hundred years of subaltern insurgencies have failed to be heard, as they have not succeeded at inscribing themselves in the official transcript and have remained marginalized.158 She attributes the inaccessibility of subaltern speech acts both because the “texts” that register them are not accessible to the representing elite,159 that is, they are mostly contained in oral form, and because that acts of insurgency are consistently suppressed.160 This is why she concludes that the subaltern as such cannot speak. Ultimately, as she claims, the “subaltern” or colonized subject in its purity cannot be retrieved and understood because of its functional marginality within society and within the dominant discourses. Although the definition of the subaltern itself precludes the possibility for agency, Spivak stresses the role of the intellectual at representing the subaltern, as she sees her own task and ethical calling.161 She acknowledges the necessity of the intellectual to recognize the limitations of representation while giving voice to the subaltern to the extent that it is possible. Homi Bhabha and the Transgression of the “Hybrid” Homi Bhabha’s approach in his critique of postcolonialism is similar to that of Spivak not only because of his attention to the complex relationship between the colonized and the colonizer, but also because of his reliance on 158 Gayatri Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak? Speculations on a Widow Sacrifice,” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, eds., Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 290 ff. 159 Spivak gives the example of rumor, rather than official transcripts, in the effort to recover and render visible the voice of the subaltern (Cf. “Subaltern Studies? Speculations on a Widow Sacrifice,” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, eds., Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 213 ff). This is particularly important because she criticizes the work of the Subaltern Studies group, among others, for the heavy reliance on the texts produced by the colonial administration for the recovery of the voice of the subaltern, which she finds highly problematic. Cf. “Subaltern Studies? Speculations on a Widow Sacrifice,” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, eds., Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 202. 160 Gayatri Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak? Speculations on a Widow Sacrifice,” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, eds., Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 305. 161 Gayatri Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak? Speculations on a Widow Sacrifice,” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, eds., Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 308.

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­ ost-structuralism and deconstructionism in his analysis of ­post-colonialism.162 p Instead of underscoring the opposition between the colonizer and the colonized, Bhabha notes the affective ambivalence that takes place in the colonial discourse. He points to the fact that, on the one hand, the colonized “other” is represented as being savage and primitive, and, on the other hand, it is portrayed as being obedient and subservient.163 Bhabha sees such mixed and contradictory modes of representation in the colonial discourse as indicative of the contradictions and anxieties inherent in the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. Bhabha emphasizes the centrality of translation in the colonial and post-­ colonial experience of translating ideas, texts and narratives from one language to another. In the renditions of English texts into local languages, he shows traces of resistance as well as attempts for negotiation between the colonizer and the colonized. The capacity of the native to question the foundational narratives of the west provides the colonized with the opportunity to interpret a “text” in ways other than it was originally intended, as well as to actively hybridize it. The destabilization of colonial discourse through the process of translation is understood as particularly important by Bhabha, for whom the semiotic domain is viewed as the prime site for postcolonial resistance. ­According to him, the realm of representations and the process of signification are of central importance for the discursive construction of the colonial and post-colonial space.164 Therefore, Bhabha postulates his u ­ nderstanding of the 162 Bhabha focuses more particularly on the post-colonial realities of India and the presence of immigrants in western countries, as well as other minority groups. Cf. Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 2004). 163 Bhabha explains: “It is the scenario of the colonial fantasy which, in staging the ambivalence of desire, articulates the demand for the Negro which the Negro disrupts. For the stereotype is at once a substitute and a shadow. By acceding to the wildest fantasies (in the popular sense) of the colonizer, the stereotyped Other reveals something of the fantasy (as desire, defense) of that position of mastery… It is recognizably true that the chain of stereotypical signification is curiously mixed and split, polymorphous and perverse, an articulation of multiple belief. The Negro is both savage (cannibal) and yet the most obedient and dignified of servants (the bearer of food); he is the embodiment of rampant sexuality and yet innocent as a child; he is mystical, primitive, simple-minded and yet the most worldly and accomplished liar, and manipulator of social forces.” Cf. Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 2004), 82. 164 Bhabha is criticized for his emphasis on psychoanalytic theory and his attention to semiotics at the expense of other lenses of analysis of colonial and post-colonial society, such as the geographic, the political, the historical or the socio-economic. He is criticized for his ahistoric analytical model that does not take into account the specifics of the material

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colonized, or the “other,” not as merely being subject to control and ­submission but rather as actively involved in its own self-construction and in the resistance against dominant colonial structures.165 In contradistinction to the traditional claims of colonial discourse, according to which the “Other loses its power to signify, to negate, to initiate its historic desire, to establish its own institutional and oppositional discourse,”166 he marks the pervasiveness  of the processes of opposition. He is particularly interested in the contestation of the Bible, as a prime instance of cultural hegemony in the colonized world, through the multiple transmutations and (mis)translations that produce ambivalent meanings.167 For him, the possibility for translation opens new sites for invention and self-articulation, as well as contestation and resistance to the dominant colonial discourse. Through ambivalences and contradictions the colonized can challenge not only the teachings of the biblical text and of the western missionaries, but also the superstructure of colonial power and the authority of colonial discourse. Therefore, the act of signification in the colonial context does not merely demonstrate the indeterminancy of textuality, but it also reveals the opposition to colonial power and knowledge by recourse to creative transmutations.168 In his understanding of the formation of the subjectivity of the colonized “other,” Bhabha emphasizes the importance of the liminal and interstitial

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processes and historical contexts of empire. See, for example, Bart Moore-Gilbert, Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics (New York: Verso, 1997), 139 ff. Homi Bhabha is interested not in the representation of the colonized subject, but rather in the structure of symbolization, in the content and meaning of symbols, their transformation and manipulation in the production of meaning. His attention therefore rests with language, its significations and its processes of transformation. He relies on Derrida’s concept of difference in the process of language and the production of meaning. See Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 36 ff. Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 2004), 31. The process of signification by the colonized on the texts of the colonizer is demonstrated by the translation of the Christian concept of new birth employing Hindu concepts. Bhabha quotes missionary diaries where the dilemma of translation is evident: “But what do they understand by the expression? It is that they are to be born again and again, in some other form, agreeably to their own system of transmigration or reiterated births. To avoid the appearance of countenancing such an absurd and pernicious a doctrine, you vary your language and tell them that there must be a second birth – that they must be twice-born.” Bhabha shows that through the practice of translation the language of domination becomes “hybrid – neither one thing nor the other.” Cf. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 2004), 33. Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 2004), 30 ff.

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space so as to bypass simple binary divisions.169 In the realities of the colonial and post-colonial society, he recognizes the importance of the insterstitial perspective, which lies in-between established identities and opens up the space for cultural hybridity and for the construction of identities in such a way that the hierarchy of a binary system is negated.170 Hybridity for Bhabha does not exist solely on the level of language, as it is inevitably involved in the process of translation, but also in the constitution of post-colonial society.171 The cultural interstices open up space for creativity and invention that take the form of hybridity, i.e. being at the borderline between different communities and identities. It is precisely the space at the border and at the frontier that the colonized, the marginal, the foreigner, and the migrant inhabit. Bhabha is particularly interested in the experiences, the literary productions and the psychic affects that the borderline existence implies for various groups in colonial and post-colonial society.172 For him, the hybrid defies the neat delineations of the “other” and the simple opposition to the self, as it combines and incorporates many different elements and is uniquely constituted as a threat.173 For Bhabha, the colonial hybrid is an articulation of ambivalent space, as it occupies a

169 Bhabha refers to the image of the stairway in a building in order to invoke the importance of liminal and interstitial space. He quotes Renee Green’s image of the stairway as a “liminal space, a pathway between the upper and the lower areas, each of which was annotated with plaques referring to blackness and whiteness” (cf. The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 2004), 3). In his attempt to emphasize the boundary and the i­ n-betweenness between binary categories, such as black and white, Bhabha stresses the limits of these categories where sites for new identities and self-expressions are to be found. It is for this reason that he pays special attention to migrants, among other groups, for both for the translational phenomenon and for the existence in-between, on the interstices of postcolonial society, as people who do not fit in the category of the other. 170 Ultimately, Bhabha claims that any culture and society are hybrid and impure, and he dispels the myths of historical origination and cultural primacy on the basis of the interpenetration and mutual influence of different cultures. Cf. The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 2004), 74 ff. 171 Bhabha defines hybridity as being both “translational” and “transnational.” Cf. The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 2004), 5. 172 Bhabha is not restricted in his analysis to historiographic texts but rather chooses to analyze fiction, such as the writings of Toni Morrison, for the identification and articulation of hybridization, as well as social and psychic displacements of minority groups. Cf. The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 2004), 12 ff. 173 Bhabha notes that “the paranoid threat of the hybrid” is caused by the breaking down of boundaries and dualities, such as self/other, inside/outside. See The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 2004), 116.

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liminal space and is “neither one nor the other,”174 “neither a contestation of contradictories nor antagonism of dialectical opposition.”175 As a result, the notion of hybridity is important for the understanding of colonial and postcolonial society because of its role in the splitting of the colonial discourse and weakening of its power.176 According to Bhabha, hybridity is central not only for understanding of the liminality of cultural identity, namely the act of “living on the borderline of history and language”177 that characterizes the position of the colonized or of minorities, but also for the understanding of the writing of a group that is based upon a memory that is “the site of hybridity of histories and the displacement of narratives.”178 It follows that Bhabha understands both the narrative of a nation and the formation of cultural identity in the colonial and post-colonial context as a hybridization processes of both language and history. Julia Kristeva and the Concept of the “Abject” The literary critic Julia Kristeva is a poststructuralist who applies psychoanalytic theory in her analysis of the concept of the “other” and articulates the notion of the “abject,” as distinguished from subject and object, as well as the concept of “abjection.”179 Kristeva demonstrates the birth and the constitution of the subject as such to be based on the process of abjection, which she understands as the radical exclusion and expulsion of the self. For instance, she describes the formation of subjectivity of the infant through the rejection of food, the mother’s milk, as an act of establishing one’s self.180 In this case, the foundation of the self is based on a loss, as well as on negation and violence that accompany the act of expulsion.181 For her, the foundation of the subject is intimately connected with aggression and deprivation at the same time. 174 175 176 177 178 179

Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 2004), 127. Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 2004), 131. Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 2004), 114. Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 2004), 170. Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 2004), 169. In her book Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, Julia Kristeva develops the notion of the “abject” by focusing primarily on the work of Celine, as well as making references to other contemporary authors, such as Goya, Borges, and Joyce. She also considers the Bible and early Christian literature. Cf. Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 18–28; 90–133. 180 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 3. 181 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 5.

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Kristeva claims that it is the coexistence of want and aggression that marks the beginning of the self as an independent subject.182 She furthermore sees the role of language183 as the articulation of and confrontation with the abject.184 Accordingly, the “abject” is the object of primal repression that demonstrates the tendency of the speaking being to separate, to divide, and to reject in order to constitute its own identity.185 Kristeva sees not only the mother, on whom the existence of the child is fully dependent, but also the human body as prime loci of abjection. Additionally, she also asserts that the process of abjection is linked with the initial formation of the subject, and it also persists as it is necessary and integral in the continued constitution of the heterogeneous self that feels constantly threatened.186 According to Kristeva, the “abject” occupies a space that is in-between, i.e. it is neither the subject nor the object, for it properly belongs to the self even as it is rejected and jettisoned by it. The ambiguous space that the abject occupies, its composite nature and state of in-betweenness signify the underlying ambivalence and fragility of identity.187 The abject marks the transgression of boundaries, as well as the corruption of regulations, and it has manifestations both on the level of the individual and on the level of society. For example, Kristeva posits that the abject is often manifested by religious rites, such as rituals for the removal of defilement and pollution as a result of the transgression of taboos and prohibitions.188 According to her, the sacred is intimately bound to the notion of the abject. In the realm of the social as a whole, she associates the abject with the dissolution of laws, whether religious, familial 182 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 39. 183 See, for instance, Kristeva’s assertion that language replaces the breast in the process of separation between the child, or the subject, and the mother, or the object, through abjection. Cf. Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 45. 184 See Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 41. Kristeva points to the importance of literature, where the abject is most clearly and fully expressed. Cf. Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 204–210. 185 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 11–13. 186 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 9. 187 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 4. 188 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 17.

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or moral. Kristeva views abjection as a universal phenomenon, in addition to it being a stage in the formation and development of the self.189 As the process of abjection underlies the formation of culture and identity, it also reveals the frailty of the social and symbolic order. Kristeva analyzes the association of the abject not only with the mother, as integral in the formation of the individual, but also of the female subject that she sees coded as abject. She asserts that woman is the personification of abjection not merely on the account of her abjectification as an infant, but also on account of her connection with blood and generative power. For Kristeva, a woman is commonly the object of loathing because her body is demarcated as ritually unclean and in need of purification.190 Blood, as the source of life and the symbol of death, signifies a place of abjection and designates not only woman as abject, but also death, murder, and procreation. Furthermore, the female is designated as a locus of abjection not merely on the basis of the association with her body and her function as the abjected mother, but also on the basis of her contested power in a patriarchal social order.191 Prohibitions and regulations against woman as personification of the abject are incorporated within the social order so as to circumvent the threat that she poses in society. Women, therefore, come to be “synonymous with a radical evil to be suppressed”192 as result of the struggle between the two genders, one dominant and the other subordinate within the patriarchal structures of society. As it is suggested by the alignment of woman with the bodily processes and the functions of life and death, the abject is furthermore associated with animality, as representing the basic drives of sex and aggression. The mapping of the human body and its functions as pure and impure for the maintenance of the boundary of the subject on the basis of “clean and proper body”193 is demonstrated in the logic of exclusion and expulsion. It is precisely the abject, that which is excluded and discarded for the maintenance of the integrity and wholeness of the self, that is associated with the realm of animals rather than humans. The process of abjection, which is integrally linked to expulsion, 189 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Press, 1982), 68. 190 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Press, 1982), 93. 191 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Press, 1982), 70 ff. 192 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Press, 1982), 70. 193 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Press, 1982), 75.

Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University

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want and aggression, is thus aligned with the domain of animals.194 The abject, as Kristeva understands it and discovers its multiple manifestations through literature, is precisely the fragile border canceling the distinctions of subject and object where identities “do not exist or barely so – double, fuzzy, heterogeneous, animal, metamorphosed, altered, abject,”195 whether it be between the self and the other, child and mother, human and animal.

Concluding Remarks

Thus far, I have outlined four concepts that relate to the study of the concept of the “barbarian” in late antique culture, namely the “oriental,” the “subaltern,” the “hybrid” and the “abject” articulated respectively by four postcolonial and postmodern thinkers – E. Said, G. Spivak, H. Bhabha and J. Kristeva. These four interpretive concepts are based upon different methodological assumptions and are derived from the evidence of varied literary texts and social-historical contexts. The four concepts and their interpretive implications are nonetheless important for the understanding of the concept of the “barbarian” in late antiquity because they reflect the dynamics in the construction of the “other,” be it the female, the Arab, or the colonized. The techniques and methods employed by colonial structures in the construction and the maintenance of the subordinate “other,” as it is reflected in the writings of these theoreticians, is particularly relevant for the ancient context not only because of the importance of rhetorical formations and resistance to the dominant discourses, but also because of the presence of multiple and competing identities in the Roman imperial context, where processes of definition and revision constantly occur. The concept of the barbarian in the ancient texts, both Christian and non-Christian, bears similarities to the notions of the “Oriental,” the “subaltern,” the “hybrid” and the “abject” in reflecting many different aspects of these notions, as will be demonstrated in more detail in the following chapters. 194 Julia Kristeva associates the abject with the animal on the basis of their understanding as symbolizing the repressed and threatening human drives of sex and aggression (cf. Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 12–13), as well as their association with cruelty, violence and death (cf. Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982),147). For instance, she states: “The abject confronts us, on the one hand, with those fragile states where man strays on the territories of the animal.” Cf. Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 12. 195 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 207.

Chapter 3

Conceptualizations and Representations of the “Barbarian” in Greco-Roman Literature The concept of the “barbarian” in Greek and Roman literature in the period preceding and coinciding with the early stages of Christianity is important not only for contextualizing the charge of barbarism in the apologetic texts, but also for understanding the concept of the barbarian, as it was perceived in the larger culture. An analysis of the different representations in both Greek and Latin texts will not only provide a full understanding of the semantic field of signification for the term barbarian in the late antique period, but also supplement the Christian sources that are included here. In this way, the lack of extant non-Christian sources that contain the various accusations to which the early apologists respond is partially remedied. For the purpose of presenting the multi-faceted and complex conceptualization of the concept of the “barbarian” in the ancient Greco-Roman sources, a variety of literary works are taken into consideration, such as historiographic, ethnographic, philosophical, and rhetorical texts. In presenting a wide variety of ancient elaborations on the “barbarian,”1 my intention is to show that it is a concept that constantly 1 There are a number of important studies on the perception and representation of barbarians in antiquity that need to be mentioned here. Fransois Hartog’s The Mirror of Herodotos: The Representation of the Other in the Writing of History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988) examines carefully the modes of representation of the other in historical writings from Greek antiquity. Edith Hall’s Inventing the Barbarian (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989) takes into consideration the ancient Greek tragedy in examining the various representations of the barbarian as the other. Jonathan Hall in his work Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2002) analyzes the different aspects of Greek ethnic and cultural identity, as well as Greek perceptions of the barbarian, and suggests that cultural transformation and assimilation of foreigners were made possible from a very early period. Yves’ Dauge’s monumental Le Barbare: Recherches sur la conception romaine de la barbarie et de la civilisation (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981) focuses more specifically on Latin literature, rather than Greek, and emphasizes the polarity between the representations of Romans and non-Romans. Benjamin Isaac in his Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004) summons both Greek and Roman exempla of adverse attitudes toward foreigners in the ancient Mediterranean and argues that these negative views are tantamount to proto-racism and ethnic prejudice. Erich Gruen’s Rethinking the Other in Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011) complicates the issue of self-representation and perceptions of others in antiquity by pointing to the wide variety of impressions, inventions, views and constructs

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���9 | doi 10.1163/9789004306240_004

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shifts in meaning and function, depending on the author, the audience, the historical circumstances, and the rhetorical situation. Despite the many different definitions of the concept of the “barbarian,” the Greek and Latin sources spanning from the first century bce to the third century ce indelibly represent the wider cultural perceptions and construals of barbarians in Roman society.2 The construct of the “barbarian” in late antiquity is subject to the effort of Greek and Roman authors, as well as others who are perceived as “barbarian” in the Roman Empire, such as the Syrian Lucian of Samotasa. This chapter addresses different aspects of the notion of the barbarian in Greco-Roman ­literature, in three distinct parts: first, select Roman sources from the first century bce to the third century ce are included in order to illustrate the concerted effort in the construction of the concept of the barbarian, especially as these texts reflect Roman political and military interests. The ruling elites writing about and actively constructing the notion of the barbarian render it as the inferior “other,”3 that is largely determined by the territorial expansion and the cultural-political assertions of Roman power in the ancient Mediterranean territories.4 The Roman literary expressions and the imperial propaganda

in different genres of literature from the period and considers texts as windows to the ancient mentalities, rather than to actual historical realities. Gruen discusses not only the subjective impressions of foreigners in the ancient texts, but also seeks to discover the mutual cultural influences, whether real or imagined. Additionally, the collaborative volume entitled Constructing Identities in Late Antiquity (New York: Routledge: 1999), edited by Richard Miles, presents the scholarly contributions of several different authors on the literary constructions of both self and other in the context of a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural ancient society. For a discussion of the concept of the barbarian in late antiquity, see Peter Heather, “The Barbarian in Late Antiquity: Image, Reality, and Transformation” in Constructing Identities in Late Antiquity, ed. Richard Miles (New York: Routledge: 1999), 112–132. See also Gillian Clark, “Translate into Greek: Porphyry of Tyre on the New Barbarian” in Constructing Identities in Late Antiquity, ed., Richard Miles (New York: Routledge: 1999), 214–232. Finally, for definitions and (self-) perceptions of Greek ethnicity and identity, see Irad Malkin, ed., Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001). 2 See Richard Miles, “Constructing Identities in Late Antiquity,” in Constructing Identities in Late Antiquity, ed. Richard Miles (New York: Routledge: 1999), 1–15. 3 The Roman sources representing “barbarian” individuals or groups reflect very closely the construction of the barbarian as the “other” in the way in which Edward Said understands the notion of the Orient or the Oriental in the context of European imperialism and ­western colonialism in the East. Cf. Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient (New York: ­Random House, 1994; Reprint). 4 For discussion of the subject of Roman imperialism by scholars expressing different perspectives on the subject, see E. Bedian, Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968); William V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327–70 b.c. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); Sigrid Albert, Bellum Iustum: die Theorie des “gerechten

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concerning other people groups are deeply intertwined with the selfunderstanding of the Roman elites as conquerors and rightful rulers over others, as well as actively creating and re-creating the image of the barbarian for the purposes of retaining and legitimating power in the territories under Roman control.5 Following an overview of Roman views concerning barbarians, a selection of Greek texts from the second and third centuries ce are also included for the sake of comparing the conception of the barbarian to that of the Roman sources and demonstrating the marked differences in the self-definition and self-understanding of Greek intellectuals in the context of Roman society. It is significant to examine Greek sources not only to represent the complex notion of the “barbarian” in the mutli-ethnic environment of the Roman Empire, but also to see its function as a tool for self-definition and for critique of the dominant discourse on the “barbarian” generated by the Roman elites. While Greek literature does reveal some overlaps in the semantic field of the term “barbarian” with that of the Latin sources, it also indicates a more multi-­layered and contradictory positioning of Greek intellectuals. As will be demonstrated, Greeks often chose to align themselves with the “other” or the “barbarian” due to the fact that they were subject to Roman rule and lacked political independence. However, members of the Greek intelligentsia at times also decided to identify with the Roman elite as as a result of its self-consciousness of Krieges” und ihre praktische Bedeutung für die auswärtigen Auseinandersetzungen Roms in republikansicher Zeit (Frakfurter althistorische Studien 10; Kallmünz: Lassleben, 1980); JeanLouis Ferray, Philhellénisme et impérialisme: aspects idélogique de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique (Rome: École française de Rome, 1988); Fergus Millar, The Roman Empire and Its Neighbours (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967); Peter Garnsey and C.R. Whittaker, eds., Imperialism in the Ancient World: The Cambridge University Research Seminar in Ancient History (Cambridge Classical Studies; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); C.R. Whittaker, Les frontières de l’Empire romain, trans., Christian Goudineau (Paris: Belles-lettres, 1989); John Rich and Graham Shipley, eds., War and Society in the Roman World (London: Routledge, 1993). 5 For example, Dauge’s presentation of the Roman concept of the barbarian is exactly the mirror image of what they wished to assert for themselves. In his analysis of the Roman notion of the “barbarian,” he also classifies barbarism as “functional” and as “historical” and he emphasizes the necessity of the construction for the purposes of the Roman elite. (Cf. Dauge, Le Barbare (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 393–449; 681 ff.). Emma Dench in her book Romulus’ Asylum discusses Roman ethnography and stresses the importance of Roman public representations of other ethnic groups in asserting their own military and political power in the Mediterranean region. Cf. Dench, Romulus’ Asylum: Roman Identities from the Age of Alexander to the Age of Hadrian (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 37–92.

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belonging to an educated and privileged group.6 In my analysis of the Greek sources, there is a special attention to the political situation of the Greek intelligentsia due to their active engagement in the re-creation and resurrection of a Greek identity in the Second Sophistic movement. As their writings indicate, Greeks were cognizant and reflective of their own lack of political independence and self-determination under Roman imperial domination. The selfunderstanding and self-presentation of Greek authors as crossing categories and as being in-between categories,7 such as “Romans” and “barbarians,” help to illuminate the analysis of the Christian apologetic works, as these texts address questions of self-definition and self-understanding of a minority group that cannot be neatly fitted into existing categories. Finally, the writings of second-century teacher of rhetoric, Lucian of Samotasa, will also be taken into consideration. Lucian, who originates from the province of Syria and is a highly educated person addressing the cultural elite of his time, presents a case study that is helpful in understanding the rhetorics in the Christian apologetic writings in response to the charge of barbarism.8 Lucian straddles the categories of “barbarian,” “Greek,” and “Roman” as a highly educated individual, who is fluent in Greek language, while originating from the eastern territory of Syria. At the same time when Lucian addresses primarily, if not exclusively, a Greek-speaking audience, he maintains his identity of an outsider who is engaging them directly.9 His ethnic origin, peculiar personality and social position in Roman society mirror to a certain extent the position of the early Christian apologists, some of whom choose to identify themselves as “barbarian,” even when they speak the language of the hellenized elites 6 Simon Swain puts forward the thesis that the dispossession of political independence led to the subsequent investment in and revival of ancient Greek linguistic and literary heritage, although he also notes that Greek intellectuals had an ambivalent position vis à vis Rome. See Swain, Hellenism and Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 17–100. 7 In the analysis of the Greek sources from the late antique period, it is more helpful to consider the notion of “hybridity” rather than binary opposition in the construction of the barbarian, as theorized by Homi Bhabha in The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994). 8 For example, Porphyry of Tyre is also identified in the ancient sources as a “barbarian” and “Greek,” as well as transcending the categories of Greekness and barbarism in accordance with his philosophical concepts. This treatment of the self-definition of a Phonecian, in the case of Porphyry, demonstrates the practice and perhaps the necessity for a self-articulation and self-definition on his part with regard to Greek culture and to Roman imperial realities. Cf. Gillian Clark, “Translate into Greek: Porphyry of Tyre on the New Barbarians” in Constructing Identities in Late Antiquity, ed., Richard Miles (New York: Routledge: 1999), 112–132. 9 For a discussion of Lucian’s criticism of Rome, see J.P.V.D. Baldson, Romans and Aliens (London: Duckworth, 1979), 185 ff.

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and address the Roman ruling class.10 Lucian’s writings, therefore, provide a glimpse of the self-definition and self-understanding of “barbarians,” who were both hellenized and Romanized. His works serve also as a touchstone for understanding the attempts on the part of Christian intellectuals to grapple with the self-definition and self-identification of the early Christian movement as a marginal and illegitimate part of Roman society. 3.1

Roman Literature and the Notion of the “Barbarian”: Caesar, Cicero, Tacitus, and Seneca

The notion of the barbarian in Roman literature in the period between the first century bce to the second century ce provides a glimpse not only of the wide semantic range of the term in the period, but also its shifting meaning depending on the author’s intent and the various historical circumstances. The writings of influential Roman authors are included, such as Caesar, Cicero, Seneca and Tacitus, as these capture significant moments in the creation and reenvisioning of the notion of the barbarian from a Roman point of view.11 The works of Caesar, Cicero, Seneca and Tacitus represent the concerted effort of Roman elites to construct the image of the “barbarian” during a time of territorial expansion and consolidation of the Roman Empire. In addition, their writings encompass a variety of literary genres and interests, such as ethnographic, historiographic, philosophical, rhetorical, political and others. When considering 10

11

In Chapter four there will be detailed discussion of the self-identification of Tatian, as a barbarian, as well as the elaboration of the Christian religion as a barbarian philosophy by Clement of Alexandria. It should be noted here that this study focuses on the Roman views of other ethnicities and foreign groups, exclusive of Greeks. Roman perceptions of Greeks differed very widely in antiquity and reflected the complex relations between Greeks and Romans in terms of their cultural continuities, differences and conflicts. For example, Erich Gruen examines Roman views of Greeks and remarks: “Roman attitudes towards the Greeks were complex and ambivalent through the centuries. The Greeks, with their language and culture, made more an impact on Rome than any other people, and the Romans knew them better than they knew any other people. Often the Romans distinguish between the Greeks of the classical period and their contemporary Greeks who were a subject people. Thus, classical Greek objects of art were admired and therefore stolen when the Romans conquered Greek cities. This is the reason why inconsistent, seemingly contradictory, views could be held by the Roman writers of the same period – or even by the same person. Attitudes were highly ambivalent towards their own contemporary Greeks.” See Erich Gruen, Rethinking the Other in Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 404–405.

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the conceptualization of the “barbarian” in the writings of these four prominent Romans, it is important to note the overlapping meanings in the term barbarus, as well as the notable divergences in its understanding. Their literary representations of the concept of the barbarian allow us to see wider cultural perceptions of non-Romans at the time, in addition to capturing their particular views and personal opinions. It is therefore not only for the purpose of presenting the conceptualization of the barbarian by Roman elites in antiquity, but also for the purpose of demonstrating the active and creative reformulation of the concept of the “barbarian” by the ruling class that it is appropriate to turn to the writings of individuals, such as Caesar, Cicero, Seneca and Tacitus. Julius Caesar in his Gallic War and the Civil Wars provides many detailed descriptions and taxonomies of foreign ethnic groups that he encounters during his military expeditions in the course of his political career. Caesar reveals not only his intense interest in various categories of “barbarians” but also the desire to fully understand the social and political structure of foreign groups in order to make possible the swift Roman conquest and efficient subjugation of new territories. Caesar undertakes a descriptive and systematic project, as he tries to accurately and carefully analyze the structures and characteristics of different people groups, as well as to provide a justification for Roman military control in the territories under discussion. It is therefore in the context of the imperial military machine that he both describes and identifies “barbarians” as the “other,” or as the potential threat to peace and social order. For him, the barbarian, whether residing inside or outside the territory of the Roman state, is in need of conquest, control and subjugation.12 Similarly, Tacitus, who also has a distinguished political career, has an interest in recording recent historical events and analyzing political problems of the Roman state, some of which Caesar also encountered during his military expeditions. Like Julius Caesar, Tacitus delineates “barbarians,” such as the Germanic and the British tribes, as potentially dangerous and posing a real threat to the security of the Roman state.13 Tacitus is also concerned with the accurate ethnographic description and classification of various ethnic groups in light of the political interests of the Roman Empire. However, his analysis is not merely limited to the current events and to the people of central and western Europe, as he also refers to other foreign groups, regions and periods. 12 13

Cf. Y. Dauge, Le Barbare (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 90–118. See I.M. Ferris, Enemies of Rome: Barbarians through Roman Eyes (Phoenix: Sutton, 2000), where the author pays attention both to the literary and visual representations of barbarians and points to the important ideological and political role of the Roman portrayals of foreign ethnic groups.

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Caesar’s contemporary and political enemy, Cicero, complicates the notion of the “barbarian” to include not only external groups perceived as actual political threat and commonly characterized by savagery and ferocity, but also to internal factions within Roman society that seem to threaten its fabric.14 Cicero takes the typifying features of barbarians endangering the state and transfers them to other groups and individuals, who are part of Roman society and are seen as presenting a threat to the existing political status quo. Cicero expands the meaning of the term “barbarian” to include not only persons of foreign ethnic origin and an unknown tongue, but also those who by virtue of their character and their habits are classified in the category of inferior or marginal groups.15 It is noteworthy that the notion of the “barbarian” is primarily understood and defined by Cicero with respect to the security of the ­Roman state and the procurement of peace and stability for its people. Although the use of the term barbarian may differ at times, the main function remains the same, as is also suggested by Caesar and Tacitus, that is the maintenance of the status quo. The catalogue of negative qualities connected with the “barbarian,” such as cruelty, savagery and brutality, and the possibility for their universal application are also evident in Seneca’s philosophical writings in the first century ce. While Seneca recognizes the alleged inferior mental and physical capacities of barbarians vis à vis the Roman people, in conjunction with their perceived inferior social life and inadequate political organization, he also admits to the existence of a common human nature that harbors the potential for barbarism. The subdivision of the human soul into rational and irrational parts allows Seneca to understand barbarism as an innate human state, which he views as the rule of emotions and passions over reason.16 According to Seneca’s recasting of the concept of the “barbarian,” it becomes a term that can be applied and relevant to every individual irrespective of the external insignia of ethnic origin, culture or education. However, Seneca delineates some specific categories of lesser “others,” such as foreigners, women, children and the elderly, as fitting best the notion of the barbarian not on the basis of their ethnicity but rather their perceived innate characteristics.17 Seneca, as a representative of the Roman elite class, is a proponent of a conservative political agenda that is informed by Stoic philosophy and, thus, he delineates the concept of the 14

See I.M. Ferris, Enemies of Rome: Barbarians through Roman Eyes (Phoenix: Sutton, 2000), 119–177. See also Y. Dauge, Le Barbare (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 119–131. 15 Cicero, Republic 1.37.58. 16 Seneca, Letter 92.8, 27. 17 Seneca, De Clementia 1.5.

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“barbarian” in such as way that it represents a broad term universally applicable to the socially inferior, as well as to any potential enemy of the Roman state. Although his intellectual justification for such an all-encompassing definition is based primarily on Stoic philosophical concepts, his re-casting of the notion of the barbarian bolsters those provided by Caesar, Tacitus and Cicero and provides a logical continuation for their arguments and assertions.

Caesar: Construction and Contestation of the “Barbarian” and the Making of Empire Both in his Gallic War and in the Civil Wars Caesar writes extensively about foreign groups outside and inside the confines of the Roman state and he elaborates on the notion of the barbarian in the context of the various military exploits, in which he participates directly.18 In the Gallic War Cicero comments in detail on a large number of barbarian groups19 in connection not only with their military involvements with the Roman army, but also with ethnographic and socio-political aspects of these different ethnic groups, such as local customs, appearance, values, and religious practices.20 It should be noted that the word “barbarian” appears relatively rarely in the Gallic War in spite of the fact that the commentary deals with the interaction of the Roman general and the army with different tribes in the territories of western and northern Europe.21 In it the use of the term “barbarian” is often generic referring to a number of foreign groups, such as the Germans or the Gauls, and has the same meaning 18

19

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See C. Kircher-Durand, “De βάρβαρος à barbarus: valeurs et emplois de barbarus chez Ciceron, César, et Tacite” in Colloque Franco-Polonais. Les relations économiques et culturelles entre l’Occident et l’Orient (Nice: Antibes, 1980), 197–209; Y. Dauge, Le Barbare (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), esp. 90–118. Caesar mentions more than 140 barbarian tribes throughout the Gallic War. For details, see Index ii of Caesar’s The Gallic War, trans., H.J. Edwards (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1917). For commentary on Caesar’s particular use of the names of various peoples and tribes, see E.D. Kollmann, “Die Macht des Namens. Beobachtungen zum unpersönlichen Stil Caesars,” StudClas 17 (1975): 45–60. The word Barbarus and barbari appears 31 times in the Gallic War and 9 times in the Civil Wars, although there are numerous references to particular barbarian groups. For example, Caesar comments on the Germans and he writes: posteaquam agros et cultum et copias Gallorum homines feri ac barbari adamassent, traductors plures (Gallic War 1.31.5); neque sibi homines feros ac barbaros terperaturos existimabat (Gallic War 1.33.4). Similarly, in reference to Gauls, Caesar writes: contra homines barbaros atque imperitos (Gallic War 1.40.9). For a detailed discussion and analysis on the occurrences of “barbarian,” see J. Rueger, Barbarus. Wort und Begriff Bei Cicero, Livius, Caesar (Ph.D. diss. Göttingen, 1966).

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as externos, or people outside the boundary of the Roman state.22 Additionally, Caesar employs the word barbarian when referring to his military opponents, who are attributed a specific range of characteristics that are commonly associated with barbarians, such as ferocia,23 infirmitas,24 temeritas,25 mobilitas animi,26 levitas,27 and discordia28 among others. Caesar: Barbarians as the External Enemy Although Caesar comments on a variety of outside groups,29 some of the same characteristics of these different categories of barbarians remain constant, and it is in fact the degree of the particular quality that distinguishes one group from another.30 For example, at the very beginning of the Gallic War Caesar proceeds to enumerate the characteristics of the Belgae and emphasizes one of the leading features of these barbarians, namely their fierceness and propensity for warmongering.31 He explains: Gaul is a whole divided into three parts, one of which in inhabited by the Belgae, another by Aquitani, and a third by a people called in their own tongue Celtae, in the Latin Galli. All these are different one from another in language, institutions, and laws… Of all these peoples the Belgae are the most courageous, because they are the farthest removed from the culture and the civilization of the Province, and least often visited by merchants introducing the commodities that make for effeminacy; and 22 Caesar, Gallic War 1.31.5, 1.40.9. 23 Caesar, Gallic War 1.31.5, 1.33.4, 4.10.4. 24 Caesar, Gallic War 1.40.9, 1.44.9, 6.10.2, 4.5.1–3. 25 Caesar, Gallic War 4.13.3, 6.20.2, 7.42.2. For example, Caesar comments: Inpellit alios avaritia, alios iracundia et temeritas, quae maxime illi hominum generi est innata, ut levem auditionem habeant pro re conperta. Cf. Gallic War 7.42.2. 26 Caesar, Gallic War 2.1.3, 3.10.3. 27 Caesar, Gallic War 2.1.3. 28 Caesar, Gallic War 6.11.2. 29 Caesar uses barbari in reference to Gauls in general (Gallic War 1.40.9, 3.16.4, 5.54.4), and eight times in reference to specific Gallic tribes (Gallic War 3.14.4, 3.15.2, 3.16.4, 3.6.2, 4.10.4, 4.22.1, 5.34.1, 6.34.6), six times in reference to Bretons (Gallic War 4.21.9, 4.24.1, 4.25.1, 4.25.2, 4.32.2, 4.34.5), twelve times in reference to Germans (Gallic War 1.31.5, 1.33.4, 2.35.1, 4.17.10, 6.10.2, 6.29.2, 6.35.6, 6.37.7, 6.37.9, 6.39.4, 6.40.8, 6.42.2), and two times in reference to Ariovistus (Gallic War 1.31.13, 1.44.9). 30 Cf. M. Gelzer, Caesar, Politician and Statesman, trans., R. Needham (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968). 31 Cf. G. Walser, Caesar und die Germanen. Studien zur Politischen Tendënz der Römischer Feldzugsberichte (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1956).

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also because they are nearest to the Germans dwelling beyond the Rhine, with whom they are continually at war. For this reason the Helvettii also excel the rest of the Gauls in valor, because they are struggling in almost daily fights with the Germans, either endeavoring to keep them out of Gallic territory or waging aggressive warfare in German territory.32 Although Caesar does not deny the possession of positive qualities and excellence among the various foreign tribes,33 the conception of virtue34 that he represents is closely related to the perception of non-Romans as having a distinct form of aggressive and fierce nature, in opposition to the self-perception of the Roman citizen as someone who relies on the advantages of technology not only in the art of fighting but also in everyday life.35 When describing Germanic tribes, Caesar paints a very similar picture to that of the Belgae and he explicitly refers to them both as “barbarian” and as “fierce” in their disposition, even though he emphasizes the difference between the two groups: 32

Cf. Caesar, Gallic War 1.1.1 ff.: Gallia est omnis divisa in partes tres, quarum unam incolunt Belgae, aliam Aquitani, tertiam qui ipsorum lingua Celtae, nostra Galli appellantur. Hi omnes lingua, institutis, legibus inter se differunt… Horum omnium fortissimi sunt Belgae, propterea quod a cultu atque humanitate proviniciae longissime absunt, minimesque ad eos mercatores saepe commeant atque ea quae ad effeminandos animos pertinent important, proximique sunt Germanis, qui trans Rhenum incolunt, quibiscum continenter bellum gerunt. Qua de causa Helvetii quoque reliquos Gallos virtute praecedunt, qoud fere cotidianis proeliis cum Germanis conendunt, cum aut suis finibus eos prohibent, aut ipsi in eorum finibus bellum gerunt. 33 Erich Gruen, for example, highlights the respect and the common values that Caesar highlights between the Romans and the Gauls, even when they are mutual enemies. Gruen writes “The Gauls may be enemies on the battlefield but they are not alien creatures, with values altogether incommensurable with those of Rome, antithetical to Roman practices and character, and adverse to the principles of their antagonists. Caesar portrays them, in a clear-eyed and unsentimental fashion, with all their flaws, as a valorous people, fiercely devoted to liberty, adherents of moral and religious values remarkably akin to those of Rome.” See Gruen, Rethinking the Other in Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 158. 34 Caesar, Gallic War 1.1.3–4, 1.36.7, 2.4.5, 3.22.1–3. 35 For instance, Dauge comments on the polarity that is normally drawn in Roman literature between “barbarian” and “Roman” and highlights the prevalence of the qualities of ferocia and feritas. (Cf. Dauge, Le Barbare (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 428–430). Emma Dench also observes in her study of Roman ethnography and her analysis of Caesar’s writings on the excessive cruelty and savagery of the different foreign tribes that he describes, as well as a dramatic opposition in the portrayal of Romans and barbarians as a strategy for justifying the military involvement of Rome. See Dench, Romulus’ Asylum: Roman Identities from the Age of Alexander to the Age of Hadrian (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 52–53.

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For many years there was a vehement struggle between the two [Aedui and Arverni] for dominion; then it came about that the Arverni and Sequani summoned the Germans to their aid for a price. About fifteen thousand of them crossed the Rhine in the first instance; then, when those fierce barbarians (homines feri ac barbari) had got a liking for the farmlands, the civilization, and the wealth of the Gauls, more were brought over…36 Caesar proceeds to explain his rationale for initiatiating a military campaign in Gaul by referring to the cruel nature of the Germanic people who are allegedly incapable of stopping the warfare even after conquering the entire territory of Gaul, thereby posing a potential threat to the Roman people. Nor did he [Caesar] suppose that barbarians so fierce would stop short of seizing the whole of Gaul (neque sibi homines feros ac barbaros temperaturos existimabat quin cum omnem Galliam occupavissent); but rather as the Cimbri and the Teutoni before them, they would break forth into the Province, and push thence into Italy, especially as there was the Rhone to separate the Sequani from the Roman Province.37 Caesar’s perception of the foreign tribes neighboring with the Romans, and more particularly of the Germans, is such that it clearly indicates that they are an uncontrollable force which, if left unchecked, will ultimately endanger the integrity of the Roman borders. The logical consequence of Caesar’s observation is that they should be stopped, rather than left to incur any damage. The description of the Germanic people as the epitome of the barbarian qua its potential for violence, savagery and ferocity is exemplified through the presentation of their leader Ariovistus.38 His characterization represents some of the key aspects of the barbarian, as understood and presented by Caesar throughout the Gallic War. It also comes to reflect on not only the notion of the barbarian as the “other,” but also the perception of the Roman identity, to which it is radically opposed. Ariovistus, as a ruler of the Germans, is 36 Caesar, Gallic War 1.31: Hi cum tantopere de potentatu inter se multos annos contenderent, factum esse, uti ab Arvernis Sequanisque Germani mercede arcesserentur. Horum primo circiter milia Rhenum transisse: posteaquam agros et cultum et copias Gallorum homines feri ac barbari adamassent, traductos plures. 37 Caesar, Gallic War 1.40. 38 Cf. E. Klostermann, “Caesar und Ariovist,” Klio 15 (1940): 308–334.

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identified as being a “proud and cruel tyrant” (superbe et crudeliter imperare)39 who oppresses the local population, as well as embodying an irrational force of aggressiveness. According to Caesar, Ariovistus is a “passionate, reckless barbarian” (Hominem esse barbarum, iracundum, termerarium)40 who exercises his cruelty and imposes torture on account of his tempestuous will. The link between cruelty and irrationality, as an expression of the emotional impulse rather than the rational principle of action, captures two of the main aspects of the barbarian, as rendered by Caesar in his description of his military exploits in Gaul.41 The extreme nature of Ariovistus’ “barbarian” character is furthermore emphasized when Caesar relates that the Seguani, one of the tribes subject to German occupation, are so deeply affected by extreme harsh treatment that they would not dare to complain even if given the chance because of their immense fear: The lot of the Sequani, he said, is more pitiable than the rest, insomuch as they alone dare not to even in secret make a complaint or entreat assistance, dreading the cruelty (crudelitatem) of Ariovistus as much in his absence as if he were present before them.42 In his description of Ariovistus, as well as in his commentary on the Gallic, Germanic and British tribes, Caesar stresses the importance and the real danger of ferocia that is embodied by the leaders and the populace alike. His portrayal of the foreigners’ propensity for aggressiveness and the lack of reasoning capacity represent the antipode of Roman civilization, where order allegedly prevails. In justifying his military campaigns in the western and northern parts of Europe, Caesar reflects both on the qualities and characteristics of both foreign groups and Romans, as he distinguishes and contrasts the two. In narrating his military actions, Caesar stresses not merely the opposition between the two, but also the necessity and the beneficial effect of the Roman conquest and subjugation of foreign tribes and territories. 39 Caesar, Gallic War 1.31. 40 Caesar, Gallic War 1.31. 41 In his analysis of the Roman perception of foreign ethnicities, Y. Dauge emphasizes that an important aspect of the Roman image of the “barbarian” is precisely its lack of rationality. See Dauge, Le Barbare (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 424 ff. 42 Caesar, Gallic War 1.33: Hoc esse misericorem et graviorem fortunam Sequanorum quam reliquorum, quod soli ne in occulto quidem queri neque auxilium implorare auderent absentisque Ariovisti crudelitatem.

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In addition to the savage and cruel nature of different barbarian groups in general and of Ariovistus in particular, Caesar also notes the attendant propensity for insolence that aggravates it.43 For example, when Caesar desribes Ariovistus’ extreme form of fierceness, he also illustrates another characteristic feature, namely the alleged arrogance (arrogantia) of the German leader.44 In the report of the exchange between Ariovistus and Caesar, it becomes clear that it is the balance of power that rests at the center of the conflict between the two. On the one hand, Caesar remarks that Ariovistus has assumed “such airs, such arrogance” (tantos sibi spiritus, tantam arrogantiam)45 that the Roman general finds such an attitude intolerable. On the other hand, Ariovistus emerges from his exchange with Julius Caesar as claiming the same rights that the Romans themselves exercise over their conquered territories.46 In his conversations with Caesar, Ariovistus demonstrates his knowledge of Roman practices and policies, as well as his competence as a military leader. In response to Caesar’s request to relinquish certain rights over the local population, Ariovistus retorts: “the Roman people also were accustomed to dictate to those whom they conquered not according to the order of a third party, but according to their own choice.”47 Furthermore, Ariovistus observes: If he, for his part did not ordain how the Roman people should exercise their own right, he ought not to be hindered by the Roman people in the enjoyment of his own right. (Si ipse populo Romano non praescribet, quem ad modum suo iure uteretur, non oportere sese a populo Romano in suo iure impediri).48 It becomes clear that while Ariovistus views both barbarians and Romans as being similar, Caesar asserts a fundamental distinction between them by assuming the superiority of the latter. It is important to note that despite the negative portrayal of Ariovistus, Caesar presents him as a perceptive leader 43

The claim for the arrogance of the barbarians made by Caesar should be contrasted to the more normative claim in Roman literature for the levity (levitas) of barbarians. See Y. Dauge, Le Barbare (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 433 ff. 44 Caesar, Gallic War 1.33. 45 Caesar, Gallic War 1.33. 46 Cf. Caesar, Gallic War 1.32 ff. 47 Caesar, Gallic War 1.36: item populum Romanum victis non ad alterius praescriptum, sed ad suum arbitrium imperare consuesse. 48 Caesar, Gallic War 1.36.

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who is familiar with Roman military activity. For instance, the German leader questions the interaction between Rome and its allies, rather than accepting the official Roman position that justifies military intervention in the friendly relations between the Aedui and the Roman people.49 Behind the facade of Caesar’s portrayal of Ariovistus as the quintessential barbarian, who is cruel and merciless, it is possible to discern that Ariovistus attempts to follow the same rules of warfare and conquest as the Romans. Nonetheless, Ariovistus is denigrated as a “barbarian” who oversteps the realm of acceptable military activity and endangers the integrity of the Roman state. It is on account of his capacity of posing a threat that he is cast by Caesar as an epitome of the quintessential enemy of Rome, who is in need of subjugation. It is precisely the perceived danger of Ariovistus and the foreign tribes that informs a negative representation of “barbarians” from the Roman standpoint and calls for intervention on the part of Rome.50 Caesar: Barbarians as the Internal Enemy In the Civil Wars, as in the Gallic War, there is a generic reference to barbarian tribes that take sides in the course of the wars in support of Caesar and other Roman leaders involved in the political crisis at the time. In addition to the use of the word “barbarian” in reference to various ethnic groups in passing,51 Caesar also describes in considerable detail two of his allies from the Gallic War, the Allobrogian brothers Raucillus and Egus.52 Similar to the image of Ariovistus in the Gallic War, his presentation of the two brothers marks Caesar’s understanding of the role of foreigners in the context of the civil wars. In Caesar’s view, despite Roman generosity providing economic wealth and political leadership to the two in their native Gaul, Egus and Raucillus decide to take advantage of their favored status by attempting to assume more power and to embezzle money. Thus, Caesar defines the “barbarian” nature of the two leaders with respect to their arrogance and greed:

49 Caesar, Gallic War 1.44. 50 G. Freyburger argues that despite his negative portrayal of the barbarian tribes encountered during his military exploits, Caesar does accept the possibility for their transformation under Roman influence. (See especially Gallic War 7). Cf. “César face aux barbares. Sens emploi du mot barbarus dans le De bello Gallico et le De bello civili,” bflm 8 (1976–7): 13–19. 51 Cf. Caesar, Civil Wars 1.34, 1.38. 52 Caesar, Civil Wars 3.59 ff.

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[B]ut, relying on Caesar’s friendship and puffed up with stupid and barbarous arrogance (stulta ac barbara arrogantia), they began to despise their countrymen and fraudulently to appropriate the pay of the cavalry and to divert the whole of the plunder to their homes.53 As in the Gallic War, so too here Caesar describes foreigners as the chief enemy of the Roman state. While he presents himself as willing to overlook the wrongdoings of the two distinguished brothers on account of their “many virtues” (multa virtuti eorum)54 by resorting only to private castigation rather than any serious measures, the Allobrogian brothers decide to switch sides and join the Pompeian opposition. The two leaders not only embezzle property, but also betray Caesar by turning to his opponent Pompey and by revealing important military information about the affairs of the camp.55 The foreign leaders are portrayed as inferior and potentially destructive, as they are contrasted with Caesar, who views himself as a conciliator and a proponent of the interests of the Roman people.56 Therefore, whether “barbarians” represent the enemy within or the enemy without, they are castigated by Caesar as that which has to be conquered and checked because of the potential danger to the integrity and safety of the Roman state. It is in this context that the notion of the barbarian functions in Caesar’s writings not only as a designation of foreign ethnicity but also as a marker of the political and military enemy pitted against the interests of Rome. For him, whether “barbarians” are involved in the external or internal affairs of the Roman state, they represent a direct challenge to the status quo of Roman society and need to be subjugated, subordinated and controlled. Cicero: Barbarian Multiplicity and Roman Identity As a contemporary and a political opponent of Caesar and as someone who is involved actively in the affairs of the Roman state, Cicero reflects critically on barbarians who are entangled at the time both in Roman wars of conquest, as 53 Caesar, Civil Wars 3.59: sed freti amicitia Caesaris et stulta ac barbara arrogantia elati despiciebant suos stipendiumque equitum fraudabant et praedam omnem domum avertebant. 54 Caesar, Civil Wars 3.60. 55 Caesar, Civil Wars 3.61. 56 When considering the representation of foreign tribes by Caesar, Emma Dench refers to his strategy of “defensive imperialism” by pointing to the “looming German threat” and castigating the external enemies of Rome as posing a real threat. See Dench, Romulus’ Asylum: Roman Identities from the Age of Alexander to the Age of Hadrian (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 53. Y. Dauge also notes the prevalent image of “barbarians” in the Roman sources as being disorderly and the cause for war and dissent. See Le Barbare (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 430 ff.

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well as in the social crises of the civil wars.57 His conceptualization of the notion of the “barbarian,” as it relates to external and internal political and social events of his time, is a complicated one, for it comes to reflect these mutually interdependent realities during the period.58 Cicero: Barbarians, Greeks, and Romans The notion of the barbarian in Cicero’s works bears some of the connotations that are commonly related to foreign ethnicities, as they are perceived from the Roman standpoint, but it also goes beyond the customary use as it is applied to other groups, including Greeks and Romans.59 When it is used in connection with foreign peoples by him, the concept of the barbarian bears a number of negative connotations, such as cruelty, inhumanity, and savageness. When describing India, for example, Cicero qualifies the country as the quintessence of barbarism, as he understands it. In the Tusculan Disputations, Cicero writes: “What barbarous country is more rude and wild than India?” (Quae barbaria India vastior aut agrestior).60 When analyzing the various characteristics of India specifically, Cicero proceeds to comment on its physical features, in addition to making numerous references to the aspects that pertain to its character, religion and customs.61 In fact, in his conceptualization of barbarism, Cicero distinguishes not two but rather three fundamental classes of people, namely barbarians, Greeks and Romans, all of whom are ascribed distinct and different qualities. For example, while he identifies the most prominent characteristic of barbarian individuals 57

David Stockton, Cicero. A Political Biography (London: Oxford University Press, 1971); M. Gelzer, Cicero. Ein Biographischer Versuch (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1969). 58 Cf. C. Kircher-Durand, “De βάρβαρος à barbarus: valeurs et emplois de barbarus chez Ciceron, César, et Tacite,” in Colloque Franco-Polonais. Les relations économiques et culturelles entre l’Occident et l’Orient (Nice: Antibes, 1980), 197–209. 59 Cicero uses the term “barbarian” and its derivatives (barbarus, barbaria, barbare) often: in his orations, there are 61 occurrences, in his rhetorical works, there are 11 occurrences, in his philosophical works, there are 36 occurrences, in his letters, there are 9 occurrences. Cicero uses the word “barbarian” most often in reference to foreign groups, such as the Trojans (De Officiis 3.99), the Etruscans (Republic 2.9), the Scythians (In Verrem 5.150), the Parthians (Letters to Atticus 5.16.4), the Persians (In Verrem 3.76), the Chaldeans (De Divinatione 1.37), the Syrians (In Verrem 3.76), the Jews (Pro Flacco 67), the Arabs (De Divivantione 1.90), the Egyptians (De Finibus 5.87), Africans (Letter to his Brother Quintus 1.1.27), the Spanish (Letters to his Brother Quintus 1.1.27), the Germans (Tusculan Disputations 2.65) and others. 60 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 5.27.77. 61 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 5.27.77 ff.

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to be cruelty and inhumanity (crudelitas, immanitas),62 he points out that Greeks in particular are distinguished by their instability and fickleness (levitas).63 In addition to his emphasis on cruelty as being a prominent feature of foreign peoples, Cicero designates a complex of distinguishing marks that comes to define them. He notes the practice of human sacrifice that exists among certain foreign tribes and expresses his disapproval of its religious basis.64 He declares the act of human sacrifice to be a “monstrous and barbarian custom” (immanem ac barbaram consuetudinem hominum immolandorum)65 and questions the existence of this religious practice. He objects to the destruction of human life, that is seen by him as a crime, as well as the nature of the religious system allowing the defilement caused by this practice.66 Cicero claims that this religious rite spells the violation of religion, as he understands it. Furthermore, in relation to Judaism, he observes other foreign religious practices and he describes it as a “barbarian superstition” (barbarae superstitioni).67 It is therefore in connection with extreme form of brutality exemplified in the act of human sacrifice and in divergent forms of religiosity (religio) from the official Roman ones that are viewed by Cicero as being “barbarian.” Despite Cicero’s use of the term “barbarian” when he makes numerous references to foreign ethnic groups and their practices, he also employs it in contexts that concern the internal affairs of the Roman state, rather than strictly pointing to relations with external groups. In this instance, the abstract qualities that are connoted by the term “barbarian,” such as savagery and cruelty, are applied to situations of political turmoil in the Roman state. For example, 62

For example, Cicero calls the Africans, the Spanish and the Gauls “uncouth and barbarous nations” (immanibus ac barbaris nationis) who lack the humanity of a Roman citizen, such as Cicero’s addressee. Cf. Letters to His Brother Quintus 1.1.27. See also Cicero’s reference to the “inhumanity and ruthlessness” of barbarians (umquam barbarorum tam immane ac tam crudele). Cf. Pro Cnaeo Plancio 29.71. 63 Cf. Pro Flacco 24: “[N]ot to surrender them to men who are Greeks in their unreliability and barbarians in their savagery” (ne hominibus levitate Graecis, crudelitate barbaris civem ac supplicem vestrum dederetis). Compare also: “No citizen of Rome has ever had such an aim before you. These are foreign ways – the ways of one whose hatred spurs him to bloodshed – of shallow Greeks or unnatural barbarians” (Hoc egit civis Romanus ante te nemo: externi isti mores, qui usque ad sanguinem incitiri solent odio, aut levitum Graecorum aut immanium barbarorum). Cf. Pro Ligario 11. 64 Cicero comments on the practice of human sacrifice among the Tuarians, the people of Euxine, the Egyptians, the Gauls and the Carthaginians and its significance in their religious system. Cf. Cicero, Republic 3.9.15. 65 Cicero, Pro Fonteio 31. 66 Cf. Cicero, Pro Fonteio 30–33. 67 Cicero, Pro Flacco 67.

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­ icero resorts to the concept of the “barbarian” when he describes Mark AnC thony as a traitor and an enemy of the Roman state on account of his alliance with foreign groups, as well as his actions toward his fellow citizens. In the Philippic Cicero identifies Mark Anthony as a “savage beast” (taeterrimam beluam)68 in whom there is only “lust, cruelty, insolence and audacity” (libidinem, crudelitatem, petulantiam, audaciam).69 According to Cicero, Mark Anthony poses a threat by enlisting “barbarous nations” (genti barbaras)70 in the ranks of his army in order to turn against Rome and to bring with him “all the savagery of barbarism” (cum omni immanitate barbariae).71 Moreover, according to Cicero, Mark Anthony’s personality embodies the chief characteristics of barbarism.72 Cicero presents his political opponent not only as closely allied with foreigners but also as surpassing them in cruelty: For in what barbarous country was there ever a tyrant as savage, as cruel as, in this city, when fenced by the arms of barbarians, as Anthony? (Qua enim in barbaria quisquam tam taeter, tam crudelis tyrannis quam in hac urbe armis barbarorum stipatus Antonius)73 In Cicero’s view, therefore, the concept of barbarism is embodied in the inhuman practices of foreigners, as it is also embedded in the character of Mark Anthony. Additionally, he finds Dolabella,74 Anthony’s counterpart in Asia, to be comparable to him in his inhumanity. In reference to Dolabella, Cicero states: 68 Cicero, Philippic 3.11.28. 69 Cicero, Philippic 3.11.28. 70 Cicero, Philippic 5.2.5. 71 Cicero, Philippic 5.13.37. 72 Ferris in his study of literary and iconographic representations of barbarians in Rome draws attention to the connections between the internal and external political enemies of the state, as well as the feminizing of the barbarian other as seen from the perspective of the male Roman gaze. See Ferris, Enemies of Rome: Barbarians through Roman Eyes (Phoenix: Sutton, 2000), 135 ff. Y. Dauge notes that one of the semantic denotations of the Roman notion of the “barbarian” is its association with licentiousness, i.e. libido; libidines; liscentia; luxus; luxuria. Cf. Dauge, Le Barbare (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 456. 73 Cicero, Philippic 13.8.18. 74 Anthony and Dolabella are not the only Romans who are described by Cicero in terms of the “barbarian.” For instance, Cicero compares the acts of Lentulus, Cataline, Cethegus and Casius to those of “barbarian tribes” (barbaria cum sua gente) and to the actions of a nation “so barbarous and savage” (gens tam barbara aut tam immanis). Cf. Pro Sulla 25, 76. Similarly, Cicero refers to Apronius, an ally of Verres, as an “uncouth and barbarian” (inhumanus ac barbarus) on account of his cruel deeds and reproachable character. Cf. In Verrem 2.3.23.

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This is the enemy with whom we must war, one by whose savage cruelty all barbarism (crudelitate omnis barbaria) has been surpassed…. You see in Dolabella the image of the cruelty of Marc Anthony; on him it has been modelled; it is from him Dolabella’s schooling in villainy has been received.75 In addition to branding political enemies as being barbarian by character or by nature, Cicero also refers to some Roman ancestors as such. He reports, for instance, that Romulus was a “king of barbarians” (barbarorum Romulus rex).76 Furthermore, in the Republic Cicero expressly draws a distinction between barbarians, Greeks and Romans based upon “origin” (genus) and “language” (lingua), on the one hand, and “character” (ingenium) and “customs” (moris), on the other.77 The classification of Romans and Greeks as “barbarian” is done on the basis of these criteria, and it is varies radically: Cicero notes that while Romans are “barbarian” vis à vis Greeks according to their ethnic “origin,” while Greeks are considered to be “barbarian” vis à vis Romans on account of their “character.”78 It is on the basis of this differentiation that Cicero concludes in the Republic that one can understand his numerous references of the term “barbarian” that are not strictly applied to foreign nations.79 In this manner, the term “barbarian” becomes relativized by Cicero, as demonstrated by the qualified equivalence between Greeks and Romans with respect to the notion of barbarism, at the same time when it is applied to barbarians, Greeks and Romans alike. Nonetheless, the notion of barbarism, as it is understood by Cicero, is not static but rather a dynamic one, subject to positive and negative transformation, to improvement or to deterioration. While Cicero comments on the 75 Cicero, Philippic 11.2.6–7: Cum hoc hoste bellandum est, cuius taeterrima crudelitate omnis barbaria superata est…. Imaginem M. Antoni crudelitatis in Dolabella cernitis; ex hoc illa efficat est, ab hoc Dolabellae scelerum praecepta sunt tradita. 76 Cicero, Republic 1.37.58. 77 Cicero, Republic 1.37.58. 78 Cicero, Republic 1.37.58. Compare this classification of both Romans and Greeks as barbarians with the distinction normally drawn by Cicero between Romans, on the one hand, and Greeks and barbarians, on the other. While Greeks are qualified by their levitas, barbarians are often qualifed by their immanis. Cf. Pro Flacco 25; Pro Ligario 11. 79 In Against Verres Cicero draws a parallel distinction between barbarians by “language” and “origin” (barbari lingua et natione), on the one hand, and barbarians by virtue of their “nature” and “customs” (natura et moribus). Cf. In Verrem 2.4.112. This bifurcation of the notion of the barbarian – one that is the result of nature and another that is a product of culture allows Cicero to use the term in different contexts in such a manner that it can apply with equal force to barbarians, Romans and Greeks alike.

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salutary effects of the Roman civilizing laws in Spain, he makes the claim that the barbarian character of the Spanish requires the Roman administration of the region. He writes: I say nothing about the distinctions which Gaius Caesar, when he was governor of Spain, conferred upon that people, how he settled disputes, by their own consent established codes of law, extirpated a kind of ingrained barbarity from the customs and institutions of the people of Gades (inveteritam quandam barbariam ex Gaditanorum moribus disciplinaque delerit).80 If one follows the logic of Cicero’s argument, the natural conclusion that follows is that Roman law and civilization necessarily bring about positive effects and transform a savage group into good and moral citizens. Cicero: Barbarism and Social Class As Cicero asserts the possibility of Roman civilization to undo the effects of barbarism in foreign regions, he also confirms that the same process has taken place in the case of the Roman people themselves. For instance, in the Laws Cicero states that mystery religions have affected the transformation from a “cruel and savage mode of life” (agresti immanique vita) to a civilized existence by bestowing the possibility for a happy life and hope for the afterlife.81 Similarly, Cicero comments in his letter to his brother Quintus that Greek philosophical concepts have enabled the progression from ignorance to an educated and civilized state.82 Cicero explains: [W]e owe a special debt to that race of men, and that is, among those very people whose precepts have rescued us from barbarism, to be the willing exponents of the lessons we have learnt from them (omnibus debetur, 80 Cicero, Pro Balbo 43. 81 Cicero, Laws 2.14.36. 82 In reference to the late antique period, P. Heather comments on the role of literature that is similar to that of philosophy, as outlined by Cicero. He writes: “Classical literature, in which the elite was customarily educated, played a central role. Immersion in classical literature exposed the individual to accumulated exempla of human vice and virtue, which, if properly digested, enabled the powers of the mind to be extended, as reflected in an individual’s character.” Cf. Peter Heather, “The Barbarian in Late Antiquity,” in Constructing Identities in Late Antiquity, ed., Richard Miles (New York: Routledge: 1999), 236. See also R.A. Kaster, Guardians of the Language: The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

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praeterea nos isti hominum generi praecipue debere videmur, ut, quorum praeceptis eruditi simus, apud eos ipsos, quod ab iis didicerimus, velimus expromere).83 As is suggested by his reflections on the effects of religion and philosophy upon the individual and society, Cicero uses the term “barbarian” not only to describe specific persons or groups, but also to refer to distinctions of social class among Romans. Cicero defines the non-contemplative way of life, the mark of the lower social stata, as being “barbaric”84 at the same time when he identifies the crowd with barbarity.85 According to him, although the Roman elite has the opportunity to rise above the state of barbarism, the majority of the populace and the plebs remain in the same state of barbarian primitivity as their a­ ncestors, or as foreigners that remain untouched by Roman law and civilization. In conjunction with his distinctions between the upper echelon of society and the Roman populace at large, Cicero also refers to grammatical mistakes, solecisms (barbare loquatur),86 and mistakes in the pronunciation of Latin language.87 Cicero laments the effects of foreigners in particular on the Latin language, as well as the deleterious influence of one’s home environment (barbaries domestica) upon Latin diction.88 Tied with the importance of proper Latin grammar and pronunciation is the mastery of rhetoric.89 Cicero explains that, as the effect of philosophical teachings and institutions causes the transformation from a barbarian to a civilized state, so too eloquence has the ability to drive a people from its “brutish and cruel existence” (fera agrestique vita) 83 Cicero, Letters to his Brother Quintus 1.1.28. 84 In De Oratore Cicero explains: “If the mark of uncivilized folk is to live but for the day, our own purposes should contemplate all time” (si barbarorum est in diem vivere, nostra consilia sempiternum tempus spectare debent). Cf. De Oratore 2.39.169. 85 Cicero complains of the effects of the crowd in public spaces and refers to the barbarism of public space: haec turba et barbaria forensis. Cf. De Oratore 1.25.118. 86 Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 1.4.12. 87 In Orator Cicero explains that the pronunciation of non scire is “barbarous” (barbarum), while the pronunciation of nescire is “more pleasant” (dulcius). Cf. Orator 47.157–8. 88 Cicero, Brutus 75.258. 89 The connection between mastery of Latin language and rhetoric, knowledge of Latin literature and the possession of the proper qualities of a Roman is hard to underestimate for the construction of the self-image of the Roman elite, as well as for the delineation of the “barbarian” other, whether it be of foreign ethnicity or of lower social class. The concerns for purity of language and the exclusion of corrupt, barbarian and vulgar styles are parallel to anxieties over identity and status in Roman society. See W. Martin Bloomer, Latinity and Literary Society at Rome (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 1–18.

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to a “condition of civilization” (constitutis civitatibus).90 It is therefore in the context of Latin language and the practice of oratory, the proper domain of the Roman elite, that Cicero locates the antithesis of barbarism, as well as the possibility for its elimination. Although Cicero’s conception of the barbarian remains fluid and varigated, as it has the possibility of progress, it also demarcates clearly the lines of distinction between the lower and upper classes, even when laying out the means of transformation from one to the other.91 Tacitus: Formulations of the “Barbarian” and Roman Historiography As a recorder and interpreter of historical events, Tacitus92 writes extensively on the subject of barbarians and their relationship to the Roman Empire in Agricola and in Germania, which are entirely devoted to account of Britons and of Germans respectively, as well as in his Histories and in the Annals, where a number of nations are concerned.93 In his works Tacitus depicts various foreign groups and aims at accuracy and objectivity, as he isolates both the positive and negative traits that they possess.94 Nonetheless, a prevailing characterization of “barbarians” can be discerned from his writings that bears a core of negative aspects, which transcend the specificity of the concrete ethnic group and inhere in the conceptualization of the “barbarian” itself.95 90 Cicero, De Oratore 1.8.33. 91 The designation of the lower classes as uneducated and as lacking proper command of the Latin language is in keeping with the characterization of barbarians in Roman literature. See Y. Dauge, Le Barbare (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 456 ff. 92 Cf. Martin Ronald, Tacitus (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1994); Ronald Mellor, Tacitus (London: Routledge, 1993); Robert Syme, Tacitus (Oxford: Clarendon, 1958). 93 Cf. A. Staedele, “Tacitus und die Barbaren,” in Reflexionen antiker Kulturen, ed., Peter Neukam (Meunchen: Bayerische Schulbuch Verlag, 1986), 123–143; C. Kircher-Durand, “De βάρβαρος à barbarus: valeurs et emplois de barbarus chez Ciceron, César, et Tacite,” 197–209. 94 For example, Tacitus comments in Germania on the virtues of military organization and combat (7.1 ff., 11.1 ff., 13.1–14.5) as well as moral vigor and courage (29.1–2, 30.2–31.5, 32.24, 40.1). 95 Tacitus uses barbarus, barbari four times in Agricola, three times in Germania, twelve times in the Histories, and fifty-three times in the Annals. Cf. Agricola 11.1, 16.1, 33.1; Germania 18.1, 39.2, 45.5; Histories 2.20.2, 3.48.3, 4.13.3, 4.15.1, 4.61.1; Annals 1.57.1, 1.61.5, 1.68.1, 2.56.2, 3.33.2, 4.49.3, 6.38.3, 11.16.4, 12.11.2, 12.12.3, 12.14.2 12.45.4 13.38.3, 13.54.4, 14.36.1. For a discussion of the Roman practice of cataloging and classifying different class of barbarians in the late antique period, see Ralph Mathisen, “Catalogues of Barbarians in Late Antiquity” in Romans, Barbarians, and the Transformation of the Roman World: Cultural Interaction and the Creation of Identity in Late Antiquity, eds., R. Mathisen and D. Shanzer (Surrey: Ashgate, 2011), 17–32.

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Tacitus: Native and Foreign Exempla of Barbarism In Agricola Tacitus recounts the activity of the Roman general Agricola in Britain and reflects on the origin, nature and organization of the inhabitants of the British territory in order to analyze and to explain historical events. The Britons are viewed as a barbarian people and are described by Tacitus as possessing a distinct quality of “savagery” (saevitia)96 that is best captured by Boadicea, a female leader of the Britons, in the course of a military battle. Tacitus elaborates on the events and on the foreign nation, as follows: The whole nation took up arms, under the command of Boadicea, a woman of the ruling house – they recognize no distinction of sex among the rulers – and after pursuing the soldiers scattered among the Roman forts and capturing garrisons, they invaded the colony itself, as the local center of servitude: no sort of barbarian cruelty (barbaris saevitiae genus) was overlooked in the hour of victory and vengeance.97 The description of the Britons in terms of their “barbarian” savagery as a result of their military exploits and their assault on the Roman army is furthermore strengthened by the fact that a woman leads the military expedition. The military leadership of a woman represents not only the different social norms of the population in Britain, but also the radical opposition of other nations to the Romans, as it emphasizes the extreme form of cruelty of the foreign population and the irreconcilability with Roman norms. This understanding of the Britons as essentially anti-Roman is contrasted to the instances of incorporation of 96

Along with fertias, ferocia, immanitas and inhumanitas, cruelty (saevitia) is one of the main semantic denotations of the notion of the “barbarian” in Roman literature, as these are interrelated concepts that come to describe the negative qualities of the otherness of barbarian peoples. For instance, Y. Dauge breaks down the different aspects of the quality of feritas as follows: lack of culture (agrestis, rusticus, horridus, rudis, iners, incultus, indoctus, imperitus, siluerstris, stolidus, inhumanus); bestiality (bestia, belua, fera, saevus, saevitia, rabies, efferatus, truculentus); inhumanity: a. insocialability (asper, asperitas, acerbus, durus, immitis, immansuetus, intractabilis, implacabilis, toruus, trux) and, b. malevolence (crudelis, cruentus, atrox, atrocitas, dirus, efferus, trux, truculentus, immanis, saevus, saevitia, rabies, furor); impiety (impius, impietas, immanis, dirus, nefas, nefarius, nefarie, nefandus, monstrum, poertentum, prodigium); distance (extremus, ultimus, longinquus, remotus, latere, latebrae, priscus, perantiquus). See Dauge, Le Barbare (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 459. 97 Tacitus, Agricola 16: Boudicca generis regii femina duce (neque enim sexum in imperiis discerunt) sumpsere universi bellum; ac sparsos per castella milites consectati, expugnatis praesidiis ipsam coloniam invasere ut sedem servitutis, nec ullum in barbaris saevitiae ­genus omisit ira et victoria.

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Roman customs, such as the use of the bath and the practice of dinner etiquette (balinea et conviviorum elegantiam),98 as well as the use of Latin language and training in liberal education.99 These moments of assimilation by the Britons are understood as emblematic of Roman identity and humanitas, as well as they signify the possibility for transformation of the conquered population.100 The identification of “barbarians” with the practice of habitual cruelty and warlike mentality is even more pronounced in the Germania than it is in Agricola. In the Germania101 Tacitus notes, for instance, the inherent savagery of the German people on account of their “barbarous rites of worship” (celebrant barbari ritus horrenda primordia)102 and the religious practice of human sacrifice in specific.103 However, it is not only in the domain of religious customs that the inhumanity of the German nation is exhibited, but also in their social organization and interactions. Tacitus recounts the structure of daily activities of the Germans and remarks that war, in addition to occasional hunting and idleness, constitutes their very lifestyle: Should it happen that the community where they are born be drugged with long years of peace and quiet, many of the high-born youth voluntarily seek those tribes which are at the same time engaged in some war; for rest is unwelcome to the race, and they distinguish themselves more readily in the midst of uncertainties.104 98 Tacitus, Agricola 21. 99 Y. Dauge notes the opposition of the two concepts “barbarian” and “Roman” in Roman literature, as is implied by the use of the following mutually exclusive categories: feritas – humanitas, sapientia, magnitudo animi; ferocia – continentia, temperantia, recta ratio, perfecta ratio; belli furor – fortitudo, firmitas, tranquilitas, pacis amor; discordia – iustia, aequitas, concordia, fides, pietas; vanitas – constantia, gravitas, prudentia, vera virtus. See Dauge, Le Barbare (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 460. 100 Tacitus, Agricola 21 ff. 101 Patzek posits that Tacitus’ analysis of German tribes in the Germania and his portrayal of their virtues and vices are conditioned by his concerns with developments in Roman society, as he uses the Germans as a case of illustration for problems inherent within the Roman Empire. Cf. Barbara Patzek, “Die Historischen Bedingungen des Fremdverstehens in Tacitus’ Germania,” hz 247 (1988): 26–51. 102 Tacitus, Germania 39. 103 Tacitus, Germania 9. 104 Tacitus, Germania 14: Si civitas, in qua orti sunt, longa pace et otio torpeat, plerique nobilium adulescentium petunt ultro eas nationes, quae tum bellum aliquod gerunt, quia et ingrata genti quies et facilius inter ancipitia clarescunt magnumque comitatum non nisi vi belloque tueare.

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There is an emphasis on aggression as the fundamental quality of the German population, which is further illustrated by the description of the Chatti tribe’s rite of passage. Tacitus’ elaboration of the rite of passage into manhood not only indicates a ritual in one tribe, but also captures his understanding of the German people in terms of their bellicose nature. Tacitus explains: The ceremony, practiced by other German peoples only occasionally, and by individual hardihood, has with the Chatti become a convention, to let the hair and beard grow when a youth has attained manhood, and to put off the facial garb vowed and held as due to manliness only after an enemy has been slain: standing above the sanguinary spoil, they dismantle their faces again, and advertise that then and not before they have paid the price of their birth-pangs, and are worthy of their kin and country.105 In the Germania Tacitus does not depict the Germanic people exclusively as fierce,106 as he also shows the diversity within the various tribes and testifies to the existence of noble groups, such as the Chausi.107 Nonetheless, the overwhelming examples of German tribes emphasize the inhuman qualities of the nation in general, in spite of the existence of few exceptions. Saevitia or 105 Tacitus, Germania 31: Et aliis Germanorum populis usurpatum raro et privata cuiusque audentia apud Chattos in consensum vertit, ut primum adoleverint, crinem barbamque ­submittere, nec nisi hoste caeso exuere votivum obligatumque virtuti oris habitum. Supersanguinem et spolia revelant frontem, seque tum demum pretia nascendi rettulisse dignosque patria ac parentibus ferunt. 106 Erich Gruen asserts that Tacitus remains intentionally ambiguous in Germania as he often praises the Germans and uses them as a tool to criticize contemporary Roman mores and practices. Gruen writes “Tacitus neither brands the German as “Other” nor propped him as an inspired primitive to contrast with the degenerate Roman. The historian’s nuanced, clever and often sardonic text had other ends in view. He could point to the foibles of Germans as he did to those of Romans, employing each to reflect on the other. German restraint might contrast with Roman indulgence, but Roman discipline contrasted with German impatience.” Cf. Gruen, Rethinking the Other in Antiquity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 178. 107 Tacitus writes concerning the Chausi: “They are the noblest of the German tribes, and so constituted as to prefer to protect their vast domain by justice alone: they are neither grasping, nor lawless; in peaceful seclusion they provoke no wars and despatch no raiders on marauding forays.” (populus inter Germanos nobilissimus, quique magnitudem suam malit iustitia tueri. Sine cupididate, sine impotentia, quieti secretique nulla provocant bella, nullis raptibus aut latrociniis populantur). Cf. Germania 35.

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savagery remains one of the main negative qualities that becomes emblematic of the Germans and helps casts them as the diametrically opposed “other” and the quintessential “barbarian” vis à vis Roman society. In the Histories Tacitus narrates the conflicts with foreign peoples and the civil wars through a recourse to the concept of the “barbarian,” as representing a violent and anti-Roman force. The ancient historian states explicitly that foreigners became the source of two types of wars, when he indicates that German tribes provided the soldiers for both “civil and foreign war” (in Germaniam remisse, principium interno simul externoque bello),108 thus associating internal and external problems of the Roman Empire with outsiders. Furthermore, Tacitus identifies foreigners as the measure for cruelty when he describes the actions of Vitellius, the leader of the Roman army and the ally of Vespasian, after a series of successful campaigns in the East. Tacitus specifies that both “emperor and army, believing that they had no rival, broke out into cruelty, lust and rapine, equalling the excess of foreigners” (tum ipse exercitusque, ut nullo aemulo, saevitia libidine raptu in externos mores proruperant).109 As the external threat to the Roman Empire is signified by the inhumanity of barbarian tribes, such as the Germans and the Britons, so too the internal forces of disintegration and dissolution of the state are understood by the ancient historian in the same terms. Both the external and the internal groups that threaten the fabric of Roman society and the integrity of the Empire are referred to as “barbarians” and as a destructive force, which has to be eliminated or suppressed. Tacitus: Typology of the “Barbarian” In addition to describing different foreign nations, as well as certain Roman individuals as emblematic of the “barbarian,” Tacitus provides an incisive psychological profile of the “barbarian” as a type that is abstracted from any particular ethnicity. According to Tacitus, the term barbarian is not merely identifiable by its affinity with inhumanity,110 but also by its association with 108 Tacitus, Histories 2.69. 109 Tacitus, Histories 2.73. 110 In the Annals for instance Tacitus relates the incident of the massacre of Varus and his legions by the Germans and describes in stark terms the human remains of unburried bodies in the vicinity of the “barbarian altars” (barbarae arae) (Cf. Annals 1.61). Analagous to the narrated behavior of the Germans is that of the Thracians, who, according to Tacitus, not only pillaged and ravaged the place of victory following a successful battle on the side of the Roman army, but furthermore committed themselves to a “wild orgy” (lascivia epularum) and a state of drunkenness, acts that emphasize even more the cruelty of their actions. Cf. Annals 4.48.

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ignorance.111 Furthermore, the barbarian is characterized by chaos and disorder on the plane of the individual, as well as on the level of social and political organization. Tacitus also identifies barbarians as prone to taking risks, as eminently spontaneous and easily excitable. According to him, barbarians are marked by a strong propensity for quick and extreme actions without much forethought.112 The consequence of the barbarians’ alleged lack of premeditation and the tendency for swift action is a lack of stability, as well as a proclivity for constant change.113 Tacitus indicates that the tendency for change caused by the “instability” (levitas) of barbarian nations results in the precarious structure of their society as a whole.114 It is both the personal and the political arena that are intimated by Tacitus in his analysis of the profile of barbarian groups, as well as the relationship between foreign nations and the Romans. Moreover, the Roman historian defines and understands barbarism with respect to not only social disorder but also extreme forms of government, such as tyrannical rule.115 As the nature of the barbarian is juxtaposed to that of the Roman citizen,116 so too are the social order and the political structure in the Roman Empire contrasted to the realm outside its territories.117 According to Tacitus, the most salient feature of a foreign government is its affinity with totalitarian and arbitrary rule of a tyrant, as well as the treatment of the

111 For example, in Agricola Tacitus remarks that the inhabitants of Britain never inquired into the origin of their race (Agricola 11), while in the Germania he explains that the Germans, being barbarian, did not inquire into the “substance or the process” of formation of amber (Germania 45) which they export to the Roman Empire. Likewise, Tacitus notes the lack of military knowledge as a distinguishing mark of the barbarian opponents to the Roman army and implies the consequent disadvantage of the former to the latter in the domain of warfare. Cf. Annals 12.45. Additionally, Tacitus paints a caricature in the Annals of two barbarian brothers, Verritus and Malorix, of Frisian origin, during their first visit of Rome and represents the two as the epitome of ignorance. Cf. Annals 13.54 ff. 112 Tacitus, Annals 1.51, 1.68, 4.32. 113 Tacitus narrates the incident of an insurgent barbarian, Anicetus, who seeks protection with the king of Sedochezi and describes the “unstable loyalty of a barbarian” (fluxa, ut est barbaris, fide). Cf. Histories 3.48. 114 In the case of the Arabs, Tacitus makes a passing remark that “barbarians are more inclined to seek their kings from Rome than to keep them” (barbaros malle Roma petere reges quam habere) on account of their lightness (levitate gentii). Cf. Annals 12.14. 115 Tacitus, Annals 4.64, 12.11. 116 Cf. Tacitus, Annals 6.41. 117 For instance, Tacitus remarks of the city Seleucia that it had not “degenerated into barbarism” (neque in barbarum corrupta) on account of its preservation of hellenistic political structures, such as the senate, and the presence of democracy. Cf. Annals 6.42.

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­ opulace as subordinates and “slaves” rather than as free citizens.118 Therefore, p it is not only the inner qualities of the barbarian that are elaborated by Tacitus, but also the societal structures and political organizations that are reflective of these characteristics. In this way, he distinguishes and opposes barbarians and Romans on the level of the individual and of the socio-political body. Tacitus does not only describe barbarians with respect to habitual activities and typical characteristics, such as volatility of character, pervasive ignorance, and tendency for drunkenness and licentiousness,119 but he also draws a psychological profile of the barbarian that is diametrically opposed to the self-perception and image of the Roman citizen.120 For example, Tacitus explains Severus’ reservations for not allowing women to accompany the magistrates in their allotted provinces because of possible degeneration of a “Roman march” (Romanum agnem) into a “barbarian procession” (barbari incessus)121 due to the participation of women in it.122 The transformation of the Roman army into a “barbarian” one is marked by the symbolic presence of women whose alleged natural deficiencies are castigated through a recourse to the notion of the “barbarian.”123 Barbarians, therefore, are not merely associated with the exercise of cruelty,124 or the lack of mercy and 118 Cf. Tacitus, Annals 12.11. Additionally, it should be noted that Tacitus also emphasizes another important aspect of the barbarian, namely the potential for treachery and treason that pose a direct threat to the Roman army. Cf. Histories 4.8; Annals 13.38. 119 Cf. Tacitus, Annals 11.16: “drunkenness and incontinence dear to barbarians” (violentiam ac libidines, grata barbaris). 120 Tacitus subscribes in his description of the “barbarian” in important aspects to the structural analysis of the Roman notion of barbarism that Y. Dauge presents in his study, as he offers six main fields of signification of the term in Roman sources: 1. cruelty: inhumanitas, immanis, crudelis, saevus; 2. rage: demens, vecors, rabies, furor; 3. lack of culture: agrestis, indoctus, inhumanus, ferus; 4. pride: superbia, insolentia, adrogantia; 5. impotence: insolentia, ira, saevitia, furor, impotentia; 6. instability: mutabilis, temerarius, perfidius, vanus. See Dauge, Le Barbare (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 457. 121 Tacitus, Annals 3.33. 122 According to Tacitus, women are allegedly not allowed not only on account of their innate timidity and luxury, but also due to their tendency to engender intrigue and ambition. Cf. Annals 3.33 ff. 123 The presence of women and the association with barbarians is furthermore supported by the examples that Tacitus provides of female military leaders, such as Boudicca. Cf. ­Annals 14.34. 124 It should be noted that cruelty, according to Tacitus, is a fundamental characteristic of barbarians, but not an invariable one for it is through the influence of Roman culture that it can be transformed. For example, concerning the barbarian Tiridates, Tacitus writes that he could be influenced by Roman culture: “it was hoped that Roman culture had mellowed the character of Tiridates” (come Tiridatis ingenium Romanas per artis sperabunt). Cf. Annals 6.41.

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justice,125 but also with what are perceived as inherently “female” characteristics, such as luxury,126 sensuality127 and timidity.128 It should not come as a surprise, perhaps, that the Roman concept of the barbarian is linked with women, who, from the perspective of an elite man, such as Tacitus himself, represent the less-advantaged gender in society. In spite of typologizing the “barbarian” and demarcating clearly qualities that pertain to it, Tacitus admits and supports the possibility for personal and societal transformation and betterment through contact with Roman culture. The meticulous classification and detailed description of a diverse number of foreign peoples thus serve the explicit goal of not only proscribing them as radically opposed to Roman civilization and mores, but also the implicit agenda of demonstrating the potential for assimilation and change on personal level and on a larger socio-political plane. While Tacitus demonstrates that the qualities that inhere in the “barbarian” threaten to encroach on Roman practices129 as well as on the territorial integrity of the Empire,130 he also sees the important role of the state as a guarantee for universal peace and for the betterment of the barbarian population that resides both inside and outside the Roman borders.131 Seneca: The Internalization and Universalization of Barbarism Seneca’s elaboration on the notion of the “barbarian” is conditioned both by his systematic philosophical understandings of the workings of the human 125 Tacitus explains with respect to Partians that the “practice of mercy and justice [are] qualities unknown to barbarians” (clementiamque ac iustitiam, quanto ignota barbaris). Cf. Annals 12.11. 126 Tacitus, Annals 2.33. 127 Tacitus, Histories 3.45.1 ff. 128 Tacitus. Histories 1.79.2–9. 129 See in particular Tacitus’ criticism of barbarian religious influences or “oriental superstitions,” such as Egyptian and Jewish religions. Cf. Annals 2.85.5, 13.32.3, 15.44.4–9. 130 Tacitus laments the foreign influences that are brought not only during the civil wars by Romans, such as Vitellius, who is involved with barbarians and semi-barbarians but also by the Roman emperors, such as Caligula and Nero, who are fascinated with eastern exoticism and barbarian practices. Cf. Histories 2.73.2; Annals 11.23 ff. 131 Tacitus explains the necessity for a Roman civilization: “For, if the Romans are driven out – which Heaven forbid – what will follow except universal war among all the peoples? The good fortune and order of eight hundred years have built up this mighty fabric which cannot be destroyed without overwhelming its destroyers.” (Nam pulsis quod di prohibeant, Romanis quid aliud quam bella omnium inter se gentium existent? Octingentorusm annorum fortuna disciplinaque compages haec coaluit, quae conuelli sine exitio conuellentium non potest). Cf. Histories 4.74.4.

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psyche, as well as by his own personal experience of a provincial elite, originating from Spain and belonging to the Roman upper echelon. His view of the “barbarian” is reflective of the two tendencies to designate the barbarian as the “other” with regard to the Roman ruling class and as the “self” when he points to a common human nature that is inherent in everyone, ­Romans and barbarians alike. The notion of the “barbarian” in Seneca’s writings is deeply imbedded in his philosophical worldview and in particular Stoic principles, to which he adheres.132 His construal of the “barbarian,” therefore, is not strictly limited to foreign tribes and other nations, but is rather very expansive and is applied to human anthropology and psychology, and it is embedded within the larger philosophical framework of Stoicism.133 Seneca: Barbarism Internalized Whereas Seneca does identify foreigners as quintessentially “barbarian,” he tends to transfer this notion to the plane of the individual and of the inner constitution of the human soul.134 When referring to other nations, Seneca emphasizes the extreme and innate brutality that they possess, as exemplified by their propensity for anger. De Ira, where Seneca narrates the various causes and manifestations of anger, contains bountiful examples of barbarian individuals and groups, in addition to Romans, who have come under foreign influence.135 It is precisely in the domain of the “barbarian” that Seneca demarcates the origin and the existence of anger and its various manifestations. Seneca asserts that anger is a deficiency characteristic of foreign nations in contrast to Romans.136 His assertion that foreign people possess and exhibit anger is done in reference to their alleged lack of reason, as well as bodily constitution, climate, and social and political make-up. Seneca notes important differences between various groups of people and juxtaposes barbarians and Romans, as he views them as opposite extremes. In reference to foreign nations, Seneca emphasizes the distinction between their barbarian 132 The emphasis in Stoic philosophy on reason and rationality relates directly to the R ­ oman conceptualization of the “barbarian” that is normally characterized as being prone to ­irrationality. See Y. Dauge, Le Barbare (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 424 ff. 133 Max Pohlenz, Die Stoa. Geschihte einer geistigen Bewegung, 2 vols. 2nd ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1955–1959). 134 Coccia argues that Seneca differs in his understanding of barbarians in contrast to other Roman writers, as a result of his Stoic philosophical principles and view of cosmopolitanism. Cf. M. Coccia, “Seneca e i barbari,” RomBarb 5 (1980): 61–87. 135 For an enumeration of barbarians as examples of human anger, see Seneca, De Ira 3.1 ff. 136 Seneca, De Ira 1.10.

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“nature” (natura), on the one hand, and that of Romans, on the other. For example, when Seneca states that Germans and Scythians are “prone to anger” (pronae in iram sunt) as an indisputable fact, he also points to their different bodily physique and natural climate.137 In this manner, he is able to explain their physical constitution and mental disposition, as well to link these to the political circumstances under which barbarian peoples normally find themselves.138 For instance, Seneca claims that the bodily structure of Germans and Scythians is “strong and sturdy” (fortia solidaque natura ingenia) and connects this fact with the particular climactic features of their respective regions of habitation,139 as he assumes that the environmental conditions shape the physical qualities and the mental dispositions of the inhabitants. On this basis, he concludes regarding Germans and Scythians: “Those who lie toward the frozen north have savage tempers.”140 In response to the harsh conditions, these groups have developed a strong physique and a character that is accordant with it:141 And so natures that have innate vigor likewise produce wrath, and being hot and fiery they have no room for anything weak and feeble, but their energy is defective, as is the case with everything that springs up without civilization through the bounty of merely nature herself; and unless the natures are quickly tamed, what was a disposition to bravery tends to become recklessness and temerity.142 Furthermore, for Seneca, barbarian tribes are characterized by their “excitable minds” (mobiles animos)143 and their lack of orderliness (effusos)144 leading to 137 Seneca, De Ira 2.15. 138 Seneca, De Ira 2.15 ff. 139 Seneca, De Ira 2.15. 140 Seneca, De Ira 2.15: In frigora septemtrionemque vergentibus immansueta ingenia sunt. 141 The association of barbarians with irrationality, passions and disorderly mental processes is embedded in the Roman notion of barbarism. For a detailed discussion of this point, see Y. Dauge, Le Barbare (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 424 ff. It is noteworthy that Seneca objectifies the claim for the irrationality of barbarians through recourse to the natural conditions and physical constitution of these peoples. 142 Seneca, De Ira 2. 15: Itaque et ingenia natura fortia iracundiam ferunt nihilque tenue et exile capiunt ignea et fervida, sed imperfectus illis vigor est ut omnibus, quae sine arte ipsius tantum naturae bono exsurgunt, sed nisi cito domita sunt, quae fortitudini apta erant, audaciae temeritatique consuescunt. 143 Seneca, De Ira 3.2. 144 Seneca, De Ira 1.10.

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rashness in their actions and to defeat on the military arena.145 It is noteworthy that Seneca connects the alleged barbarian characteristic with their incapacity to govern themselves and their political subordination to the Roman Empire in particular. For instance, in connection with a military disaster of a foreign army, Seneca remarks: Such is the outcome, when barbarians rush haphazard into war; the moment their excitable minds are roused by the semblance of injury, they are forthwith in action, and where their resentment draws them, like an avalanche they fall upon our legions – all unorganized, unfeared, unguarded, seeking their own destruction.146 In addition to juxtaposing barbarians and Romans on the basis of alleged differences in their physical makeup, mental attitude, and social organization, Seneca also stresses the similarity between barbarians and animals:147 Then, again, all those peoples which are, like lions and wolves, free by reason of their wildness, even as they cannot submit themselves to servitude, neither can they exercise dominion; for the ability they possess is not that of a human being but of something wild and ungovernable; and no man is able to rule unless he can also submit to be ruled. Consequently, the peoples who have held the empire are commonly those who live in a rather mild climate.148 The association of barbarians with the animal world and the opposition between “barbarians” and “Romans” on this basis serve to introduce a hierarchy between the two in order to assert both the natural superiority of the Romans and their legitimate right to rule over others. Such an understanding of 145 For example, Y. Dauge comments on the centrality of the idea that barbarians are disorderly and chaotic in their thinking, actions and constitution, and he explains that this alignment of barbarians with lack of order (discordia) serves as one of the main justifications for the introduction of Roman law and structures of governance. See Le Barbare (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 431 ff. 146 Seneca, De Ira 3.2: Hic barbaris forte ruentibus in bella exitus est; cum mobiles animos species iniuriae perculit, aguntur statim et qua dolor traxit ruinae modo legionibus incidunt incompositi, interriti, incauti, pericula adpetentes sua. 147 The association of barbarians with animals in Roman literature is often connected with assertion of their cruelty and inhumanity. See Y. Dauge, Le Barbare (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 459. 148 Seneca, De Ira 2.15.

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“barbarians” is subordinated to the Roman interest and justifies the political intervention of the Roman Empire, as well as members of the ruling class, who are Seneca’s addresses. The interconnections that Seneca makes between the features of the physique, the characteristics of the soul, and the constitution of the social and political body of “barbarians” in contrast to those of the Romans can be properly understood in relation to his view of the Roman Empire as inaugurating order, peace and civilization.149 Seneca: Barbarism and Categories of the “Other” In addition to aligning barbarism with the animal kingdom, Seneca associates it also with classes of individuals perceived as inferior from his perspective, namely children and women. In describing the quality of cruelty in De Clementia, he ascribes it to the animal world proper, rather than to humanity as such. He explains: Cruelty is an evil thing befitting least of all a man, and is unworthy of his spirit that is so kindly; for one to take delight in blood and wounds and, throwing off the man, to change into a creature of the woods, is the madness of a wild beast. For what difference does it make, I beg of you, Alexander, whether you throw Lysimachus to a lion, or yourself tear him into pieces with your teeth? That lion’s maw is yours, and yours its savagery.150 In this text Seneca assigns the attributes of cruelty (crudelitas) and of brutality (saevitia) to the animal realm and describes the transformation from a humanlike to an animal-like nature as a result of these.151 In De Ira, Seneca understands anger as properly belonging to animals, in contrast to humans whose drive is based on reason, rather than passion.152 He justifies this assertion with the necessity for animals to possess anger in order to acquire what they need for their existence.153 Thus, while animals do benefit from exhibiting anger, 149 In contrast, Huttner argues that Seneca’s view of barbarians is conditioned by his criticism of imperial rule. See Ulrich Huttner, “Zur Zivilisationspolitik in der frühen Kaiserzeit: die Diskreditierung der pax Romana,” Historia 49.4 (2000): 447–466. 150 Seneca, De Clementia 1.25: Crudelitas minime humanum malum est indignumque tam miti animo; ferina ista rabies est sanguine gaudere ac vulneribus et abiecto homine in silvestere animal transire. Quid enim interest, oro te, Alexander, leoni Lysimachum obicias an ipse laceres dentibus tuis? Tuum illud os est, tua illa feritas. 151 Seneca, De Clementia 1.25. 152 Seneca, De Ira 2.16. 153 Seneca writes: “wild beasts which gain their food by rapine … do so the better the angrier they are” (Feras putem, quibus exraptu alimenta sunt, meliores quo iratories). Cf. De Ira 2.16.

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humans incur a loss.154 In connection with anger and cruelty of the animal kingdom, Seneca notes that ferocity (feritas), a quality that is closely allied with anger (ira), is attributed to animals.155 He states: No animal is so hateful and so deadly by nature as not to show a fresh access of fierceness as soon as it is assailed by anger.156 Whereas it may not be surprising that animals are associated with the expression of deleterious passions, such as anger, cruelty and ferocity, Seneca makes a similar connection with two other groups of individuals: women and children. In De Clementia, for example, he describes anger as a female rather than a barbarian characteristic, when he writes: “it is for a woman to rage in anger” (muliebre est furere in ira),157 in addition to this behavior being characteristic of wild beasts (ferarum).158 Although ferocity and cruelty are not attributed to women, as they are highlighted in the case of animals, anger is associated with women on account of its antithetical relation to reason. Seneca notes in On Firmness, for instance, that a woman is an “unthinking creature – wild and unrestrained in her passions” (imprudens animal est … ferum, cupiditatium incontinens),159 as he points to women’s alleged extreme and uncontrolled passions. In a similar vein, the expression of anger by children is explained by Seneca as a “weakness” that comes as a result of a “weak mind” (animi … infirmi).160 It is in this sense that he is able to define anger as “most womanish and childish weakness” (ira muliebre maxime ac puerile vitium est),161 since it represents a flaw in the human reasoning capacities.162 According to him, the “childish and womanish natures” (puerilia ac muliebria ingenia) exhibit anger and stand in 154 According to Seneca, it is only humans in the extreme parts of the earth, such as the north, who are akin to the wild animals because of their purported inferior natures. For example, Seneca mentions German and Scythian tribes as examples and explains the fact on the basis of climactic and geographic specificities. Cf. De Ira 2.15 ff. 155 Seneca, De Ira 1.1. 156 Seneca, De Ira 1.1: Nullum est animal tam horrendum tam perniciosumque natura, ut non appareat in illo, simul ira invasit, novae feritatis accessio. 157 Seneca, De Clementia 1.5. 158 See section above. 159 Seneca, On Firmness 14.1. 160 Seneca, De Ira 1.12. 161 Seneca, De Ira 1.20. 162 For an in-depth discussion of this issue, see William V. Harris, Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 264–284, 317–338.

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contradistinction to the character of men.163 In this manner, Seneca manages to connect “anger” (ira) not only with barbarians and with animals but also with women and children on account of their purported inferior nature and alleged deficiencies. It is in this manner that he associates children and women with anger and with weakness, as well as the elderly and the sick: “children, old men, and the sick are most prone to anger, and weakness of any sort is captious.”164 Therefore, Seneca puts all categories of the inferior “other,” including children and women, in one class which is closely parallel to the notion of the “barbarian” due to the same inherent characteristics. Seneca: Barbarism Universalized Although Seneca normally relates the notion of the “barbarian” to foreign groups, there are many instances in his writings where he refers to Roman citizens as well. In De Ira, for instance, Seneca enumerates various examples to illustrate extreme emotions, such as the barbarian ruler Cyrus and the Roman emperor Caesar.165 He notes the cruelty (saevitia) of Julius Caesar in his acts of destruction of people, cities and nations and connects it to his possession of anger in particular (ira).166 Seneca emphasizes the fact that, although “ferocity in barbarian kings when in anger”167 is formidable, Romans themselves are not exempt from it, in spite of their acquired education. While the presence of inhumanity in foreign groups is explained by the fact that “they had no contact with learning or the culture of letters,”168 actions of cruelty on the part of Romans, such as Julius Caesar, are not easily explainable. The underlining similarity between barbarians and Romans is rooted in the training and discipline necessary for the cultivation of the individual.169 It is therefore not surprising that “barbarity” exists and is ubiquitous in Roman society as well as in foreign territories.170 Seneca contends:

163 Seneca, De Ira 1.20. 164 Seneca, De Ira 1.13: iracundissimi infantes senesque et aegri sunt, et invalidum omne natura querulum est. 165 Seneca, De Ira 3.20. 166 Seneca, De Ira 3.19–20. 167 Seneca, De Ira 3.17: barbaris regibus feritas in ira. 168 Seneca, De Ira 3.14: nulla eruditio, nullus litterarum cultus imbuerat. 169 In Letter 90 Seneca makes the assertion that virtue is acquired through instruction and is not bestowed upon by nature, a statement that effectively annihilates a distinction between barbarians and Romans. He states: “For nature does not bestow virtue; it is an art to become good” (Non enim dat natura virtutem; ars est bonum fieri). Cf. Letter 90.44. 170 Seneca, De Ira 3.18 ff.

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Would to heaven that the examples of such cruelty had been confined to foreigners, and that along with other vices from abroad the barbarity of torture and such venting of anger had not been imported into the practices of the Romans! (Utinam ista saevitia intra perigrina exempla mansisset nec in Romanos mores cum aliis adventiciis vitiis etiam suppliciorum irarumque barbaria transisset!)171 Whereas Seneca makes the effort to distinguish and to oppose foreigners, on the one hand, and Romans, on the other, he also acknowledges the presence and pervasiveness of barbarism in the ranks of Roman society and among different classes of individuals, including men, women and children.172 In addition to Seneca’s attempt to connect the notion of the “barbarian,” along with the qualities that are ascribed to it, such as cruelty, anger, fierceness, and mental deficiency, with various categories of the “other” in Roman society, he suggests that there is a universal human nature that transcends the alleged differences between them. Seneca outlines the constitution of the human soul as consisting of two different parts: one rational and the other irrational;173 while the faculty of reason is the common possession of humans and of gods,174 the irrational part brings humanity closer to animals.175 Nonetheless, Seneca points to the degree of difference between Roman (men) and “others,” whether they be barbarians, women or children, on the basis of a process of training and cultivation of virtue through paideia.176 Thus, what sets apart the Roman elites and “others” is the deciding factor of education, a prerogative of the upper echelon of society and primarily, albeit not exclusively, of Roman men. In spite of these concessions that Seneca makes in acknowledging a common human nature shared by barbarians and Romans alike, in the final analysis he affirms the fundamental and irreconcilable differences between them. The construction of the notion of the “barbarian” in Seneca’s writings reflects the concerns of the Roman elite to discipline and control the “self” not as an end in itself but rather in order to be able to exert control over social inferiors, including barbarians and others both inside and outside the territory of the Empire. The discipline and mastery of “self” are a necessary precondition for 171 Seneca, De Ira 3.18. 172 See M. Coccia, “Seneca e i barbari,” RomBarb 5 (1980) 63 ff. 173 Seneca, Letter 92.8. 174 Seneca, Letter 92.27. 175 Seneca, Letter 103.2. 176 Seneca, Letter 90.44.

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the control over “others,” irrespective of the fact whether they may be native or foreign.177 Furthemore, Seneca claims that the inner mental battle, which is not unconnected to external and physical combat, is more difficult to lead and to win, as it involves the depths of the inner self rather than the outside enemy. He observes: “It is easier to rule barbarian nations, impatient as they are of the authority of others, than to restrain one’s own spirit and submit to selfcontrol” (Gentes facilius est barbaras impatientesque arbitrii alieni regere, quam animum suum continere et tradere sibi).178 Irrespective of its intended internalization and universalization, the concept of the “barbarian” ultimately serves in Seneca’s writings to construct and define the “self” of the Roman elite men as conquerors and as rulers of various classes of subordinate individuals and other nations, as well as it serves to define and to delineate the “other” as being in need of subjugation and domination.179 3.2

Greek Literature and the Concept of the “Barbarian”: Aristides, Dios Chrysostom, and Philostratus

In addition to presenting Roman perceptions and presentations of the barbarian, it is important to consider the same concept from a Greek perspective in order to grasp the semantic field of the Greco-Roman idea of the “­barbarian,” as well as to uncover the existence of simultaneous and competing ­discourses.180 The position of Greeks in the Roman Empire is complicated and multi-­layered, as they often fall within the category of the “barbarian” from the standpoint of the Roman occupiers, even when Roman elites claim

177 See Y. Dauge’s explanation of the importance of ratio and disciplina for the Roman selfimage and, in particular, for the Roman ruling elite. Cf. Le Barbare (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 209 ff. 178 Seneca, De Benificiis 5.7.5. See also De Ira 1.11.5–8, 3.13.1; Letters 71.37, 89.9. 179 Cf. Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality vol. 3. The Care of the Self. Trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1985). 180 Benjamin Isaac in his essay “Attitudes toward Provincial Intellectuals in the Roman Empire” examines the writings of Roman authors regarding different ethnic groups under their imperial control, such as Greeks, Syrians, Egyptians and others, noting the inherent bias against provincial citizens of any ethnic background. Cf. Cultural Identity in the Ancient Mediterranean, ed. Erich Gruen (Los Angeles: Getty Publications, 2011), 491–518.

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­Hellenic culture and ­heritage.181 The loss of political independence of Greeks under Roman rule is a significant factor not only in their own self-definition as a conquered group, but also in their perception by others.182 For the purpose of presenting the Greek (self-) understanding and (self-) representation of “barbarians,” this study includes works from three authors from the second and early third centuries, who were actively engaged in the Second Sophistic: Aelius Aristides, Dio Chrysostom and Philostratus.183 These authors are representatives of the Second Sophistic movement, which was influential and led to the revival of the classical form of Attic Greek language and the preservation of ancient Greek literature and thought, as well as to the critique of the Roman structures of domination vis à vis Greeks. As Simon Swain has argued cogently, the participation in and occupation with classical Attic Greek language and literature, which mark the Second Sophistic movement, are not merely antiquarian concerns unconnected to political realities, but rather constitute a poignant response to the disempowerment and marginalization of Greek intellectuals in the Roman Empire.184 The intense engagement with and articulation of classical Greek language, literature and tradition allow Greek i­ ntellectuals to voice 181 Cicero, for example, dissociates Greeks from authentic hellenism and characterizes them as degenerated Asiatic people marked by their levitas in particular. He views them as barbari and externi and claims the true heir of hellenism and civilization, as well as the embodiment of humanity, is Rome. Cf. Pro Ligario 11: Non habet eam vim ista accusation ut Q. Ligarius condemnetur, sed ut necetur. Hoc egit ciuis Romanus ante et nemo; externi sunt isti mores, aut levium Graecorum, aut immanium barbarorum, qui usque ad sanguinem incitari solent odio. See also Pro Flacco 24: ne hominibus levitate Graecis, crudelitate barbaris ciuem ac supplicem vestrum dederietis. For Cicero’s view of Greeks in general, see Pro Flacco 9 ff.; M.A. Trouard, “Cicero’s Attitude Towards the Greeks” (Ph.D. diss., Chicago University, 1942). For Roman views of Greeks, see N. Petrochilos, Roman Attitudes to the Greeks (Athens: National Capodistrian University, 1974); J.P.V.D. Baldson, Romans and Aliens (London: Duckworth, 1979), 30 ff. 182 Simon Swain discusses the impact of loss of political independence and self-determination of the Greek elite on their position in Roman society and their self-definition. See Swain, Hellenism and Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 65–100. 183 Cf. Graham Anderson, The Second Sophistic: A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire (London: Routledge, 1993); G.W. Bowerstock, Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); Id., Hellenism in Late Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Id., ed., Approaches to the Second Sophistic (University Park, Pa: American Philosophical Association, 1974); E.L. Bowie, “The Greeks and their Past in the Second Sophistic” in Studies in Ancient Society, ed. M.I. Finley (London: Routledge, 1974): 166–209; Id., “Hellenes and Hellenism in Writers of the early Second Sophistic,” wnrw 2.33.1 (1989): 209–258. 184 Simon Swain, Hellenism and Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 17–134.

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their critique of foreign domination and loss of political self-determination, a position that is analogous to other minority groups at the time.185 In the writings pertaining to the Second Sophistic, the definitions of Greek/ness and of barbarian/ness are often related, as the (self-) perception of Greek writers is often expressed through the prism of the barbarian or the “other.”186 First, the conceptualization of the “barbarian” in Aelius Aristides’ works is explored in order to demonstrate that the second-century sophist constructs the two concepts – “Greek” and “barbarian” – in such a way that “Romans” fall under the category of the “barbarian,” on account of their exertion of power.187 Aristides draws a contrast between the “empire” of Athens,188 on the one hand, 185 It should be noted that the definition of Greek identity and ethnicity is a complicated issue even before the subjection to Roman power. The collaborative volume entitled Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), edited by Irad Malkin, addresses this issue of self-perception and identity formation starting from the archaic period. David Konstan highlights the difficulty of finding a unitary Greek identity in classical antiquity before the necessity for Greek city-states to collaborate in facing the common threat of Persia and need to form a Hellenic military league by overcoming political and other differences. See D. Konstan, “Tos Hellenikon Ethnon: Ethnicity and the Construction of Ancient Greek Identity,” in Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity, ed., Irad Malkin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 29–50. 186 Attention to Greek language and to the Attic dialect in defining Hellenic identity is pertinent to earlier periods as well. Jonathan Hall traces the development of Greek self-­ definition in antiquity and he pays attention to the importance of language and Attic Greek, as well as Hellenic culture “conceived in terms of diatia (material culture; subsistence; livelihood), ethea (cultural ‘personality’) and nomoi (laws/norms) of the different ethne.” Cf. Hall, Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 192–193. 187 Simon Swain argues that Aristides shows his support for the Roman Empire and provides an ideological justification for it in his oration To Rome, but he also notes the ambiguities inherent in Aristides’ rhetorical pieces. For instance, Swain notes the fact that the speech delivered at Rome before the imperial family represents not what Aristides thought but rather “what the imperials wished to hear about themselves” (Hellenism and Empire (­Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 275). Swain furthermore notes that Aristides never identifies himself as Roman, although he prides himself in being “first of the Greeks.” (Cf. ­Hellenism and Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 283). For a presentation of the diversity of interpretations of the oration and Aristides’ position on Rome, see F. ­Vannier, “Aelius Aristide et la domination romaine d’après le discours A Rome,” dha 2 (1976): 497–506. See also J. Bleicken, “Der Preis des Aelius Aristides auf das römische Weltreich,” nag 7 (1966): 173–185; Joseph Mesk, Der Aufbau der xxvi. Rede des Aelius Aristides (­Vienna: Realgymnasium, 1909); Rirchard Klein, Die Romrede des Aelius Aristides: E­ infürung (Darmstadt: Wissentschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1981). 188 Aristides, Panathenaic Discourse 326.

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embodied by the spread of Greek language, culture and ideas, and the Roman Empire, on the other, exemplified by the forced imposition by the Roman army. His critique of the Roman imperium through recourse to the notion of the “barbarian” is primarily political in its nature and is directed against the existing structures of domination and control exercised by the Roman rulers.189 In the writings of Dio Chrysostom, a contemporary of Aristides, the notion of the barbarian functions differently, as it reflects his own personal experience as a political exile during Domitian’s reign,190 in addition to the state of Greeks in the empire.191 In contrast to Aristides, Dio tends to identify Greeks with barbarians on the basis of his own acknowledgment of the subordinate status of his fellow countrymen,192 although he also juxtaposes Greeks and barbarians.193 This mixed alignment of Greeks as “barbarians” and of Greeks in opposition to “barbarians” reflects both a socio-economic and political reality, as well as the complex self-understanding of proponents of the Second Sophistic. Lastly, Philostratus’s writings are also presented to show the interest of writers of the Second Sophistic in the self-definition of Greek/ness in terms of language, rhetoric and literature, as well as the delineation of barbarian/ ness. Philostratus emphasizes the inherent lack of education of other ethnic groups, as distinct from the Greeks, and advocates their hellenization through the acquisition of Greek language and learning.194 Philostraphus’ definition of the “barbarian” in relation to Atticism prevalent in the Second Sophistic indicates the relegation of Greeks to the realm of language-study, rhetoric and instruction, which lie outside the sphere of politics.195 His construction of the “barbarian” primarily in relation to classical Hellenic language and literature reveals the limited scope of freedom for self-expression of Greek intellectuals under Roman rule.196 His definition of the “barbarian,” in addition to those 189 The focus of my analysis is Aristides’ Panathenaic Discourse, rather than orations given to other cities, such as Rome. 190 Dio Chrysostom, First Discourse 50. 191 Cf. C.P. Jones, The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978); J.L. Moles, “Dio Chrysostom: Exile, Tarsus, Nero and Domitian,” lcm 8 (1983): ­130–134; Id., “The Career and Conversion of Dio Chrysostom,” jhs 98 (1978): 79–100. 192 Dio Chrysostom, Seventh Discourse 133 ff. 193 Dio Chrysostom, Twenty First Discourse 3 ff., Twelfth Discourse 59 ff. 194 Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists 490, 563; Life of Apollonius of Tyana 2.26. 195 Simon Swain, Hellenism and Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 17–100. 196 For the importance of language and education in the context of late antiquity, see R.A. Kaster, Guardians of the Language: The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

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by Aristides and Dio Chrysostom, is important as it reveals dimensions of the concepts of “Greek” and “barbarian” in the period when Christian apologists attempt to articulate their own self-understanding against charges of barbarism, as well as to position themselves vis à vis Greeks and Romans. Aelius Aristides: Reformulations of Romanness and Barbarism Aelius Aristides197 develops in his orations the notion of the “barbarian” in such a way that he draws a sharp contrast between the two notions – Greek and barbarian – and emphasizes the primacy of Greek language, education, philosophy and culture.198 When Aristides delineates the two notions “Greek” and “barbarian” as diametrically opposed, he does so as an implicit critique of Roman rule, which he classifies in the category of the “barbarian” and opposes it to Hellenism.199 In his Panathenaic Discourse Aristides points to the unbridgeable differences between “barbarians” and “Hellenes,” and he implicitly aligns Roman identity with the former. In this oration, Aristides not only addresses the prime representatives of Hellenic culture, namely the free citizens of Athens, but he furthermore creates an idealized image of Greek ethnicity and civilization.200 It is precisely at the juncture of his idealized construction of Hellenic identity that the notion of the “barbarian” also emerges. Aristides: Hellenism and Barbarism In the Panathenaic Discourse Aristides develops the two notions, “Greek” and “barbarian,” as mutually opposed on the bases of several purported differences between them, such as ethnicity, cultural accomplishments and military 197 Charles A. Behr, “Studies on the Biography of Aelius Aristides,” anrw II.32.2: 1140–1233; H. Baumgart, Aelius Aristides als Repräsentant der sophistischen Rhetorik des zweiten Jahrhunderts der Kaiserzeit (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1874); A. Boulanger, Aelius Aristide et la sophistique dans la province d’Asie au ii siècle de notre ère (Paris: de Boccard, 1968). 198 This important opposition between Greek and barbarian should be contrasted to the opposition between Roman and non-Roman by Aristides. Cf. To Rome 11, 14, 41, 96, 100. 199 As Simon Swain argues, Aristides enjoys personal favors from the imperial family in the form of immunity from local liturgical service in his native Smyrna and in his oration To Rome he explicitly favors imperial propaganda on account of the political stability and philhellenism of the Antonine emperors. Yet, Swain emphasizes the fact that Greeks were not equal partners in the Empire. Cf. Swain, Hellenism and Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 297 ff. 200 Cf. J.H. Oliver, The Civilizing Power. A Study of the Panathenaic Discourse of Aelius Aristides Against the Background of Literature and Cultural Conflict (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1968); H. Nidermayer, Die Athenrede des Ailios Aristeides (Innsburg, 1982); F.W. Lenz, Aristeidesstudien (Berlin: Akademischer Verlag, 1964).

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activity. When Aristides elaborates on the uniqueness of the city of Athens, he emphasizes the ethnic composition of its inhabitants and the existence of legal distinctions between citizens and foreigners, in contrast to the practices of other nations.201 He points out that the geographical isolation of Athens suggests its ethnic homogeneity and lack of foreign influences and barbarian intermixtures, as follows: And just as its own territory is adjacent to the city, so the whole of Greece is adjacent to Attica. For this reason it alone has assumed the appearance of an unblemished Greek people, and is to the greatest degree racially distinct from the barbarians. For to the extent that it is separated by the nature of its geography, it is also removed from the barbarians in the customs of its men.202 Aristides claims that due to its geographical location, Athens is in fact different from the rest of the Greek cities and other nations not only in terms of its ethnic composition but also in terms of its culture and style of life. According to him, its location, ethnicity and customs are intextricably linked. Aristides continues the same train of argumentation and contrasts “Athenians,” as the unadultarated representatives of Greekness, and barbarains, in the following manner: As if this city had been naturally disposed as an opponent and enemy of the barbarian race, it has avoided foreign and barbarian land to such an extent that it even put forth as a bulwark another Greece, its colony, on the mainland opposite, which even now has kept far apart from the barbarians. From these causes it has always provided its people with pure and uncorrupted customs, and it also introduced, as a mode for all Greek speech, a dialect that is clear, pure and pleasant.203 201 Aristides, Panathenaic Discourse 14 ff. 202 Aristides, Panathenaic Discourse 14: καὶ ὥσπερ πόλιν ἡ οἰκεία χώρα προσοικεῖ, οὕτω καὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἅπασα ἡ Ἑλλὰς προσοικεῖ. διὸ δὴ καὶ μόνη τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρόσχημα καθαρῶς ἀνῄρηται καὶ τοῖς βαρβάροις ἐστὶν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἀλλόφυλος. ὅσον γὰρ τῇ φύσει τοῦ τόπου κεχώρισται, τοσοῦτον καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσι τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀφέστηκεν. 203 Aristides, Panathenaic Discourse 15: τοσοῦτον δὲ πέφευγε τὴν ἀλλοδαπὴν καὶ βάρβαρον ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀντιπέρας ἠπείρου προὐβάλετο ἑτέραν Ἑλλάδα ἄποικον ἑυαυτῆς, ἣ νῦν ἤδη πλεῖστον βαρβάρων ἀφέστηκεν, ὥσπερ φύσει ταχθεῖσα ἡ πόλις ἀντίπαλος τοῦτῳ τῷ γένει καὶ πολεμία. ἐξ ὧν ἄδολον μὲν καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ἀδιάφθορον τὸ ἦθος ἀεὶ τοῖς ἐξ αὐτῆς διαγέγονε παρεχομένη, εἰλικρινῆ δὲ καὶ καθαρὰν καὶ ἄλυπον καὶ παράδειγμα πάσης τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ὁμιλίας φωνὴν εἰσηνέγκατο.

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For Aristides the purported insularity of Athens makes possible its isolation from other foreign groups and enhances the preservation of the original language, culture and social habits. This assertion allows Aristides to claim that only the city of Athens from among other Greek cities has maintained its “pure race” (καθαρὰν εὐγένειαν)204 and its freedom from any “foreign contagion” (ἐπωνυμίαν τῷ καθαροὶ ξένων εἶναι).205 Furthermore, Aristides notes that the privilege of an Athenian citizen belonged only to the original inhabitants of the city and excluded any foreigners who resided there.206 The existence of a legal distinction between citizens and foreigners further reinforced and reified the differentiation between “Greeks” and “barbarians” within the boundaries of the city. Aristides contrasts this legal separation between citizens and residents in Athens to the lack of such in other cities, where the “original nature” (ἀρχαίαν φύσιν)207 of the inhabitants was obliterated by outside intruders. In his description of cities other than the ideal Hellenic city of Athens, Aristides launches an implicit critique on Roman practices, as he opposes the two civilizations. In his veiled criticism, he alludes to contemporary policies in the Roman Empire, when he states: Other people inhabit their cities like camps, remaining in those which they seized, but that this city, alone of cities, is the rightful possession only of the offspring of this land…208 The distinction that Aristides draws between “Greeks” and “barbarians” on the basis of military engagement is connected with his commentary on the ethnic, geographical, and legal characteristics of Athens. On the one hand, he admits that Athenians have to push barbarians away in order to secure their own protection, in addition to sending the increasing Greek population and setting colonies abroad.209 On the other hand, he emphasizes the radically different nature of war waged by Athenians in opposition to the practices of others. For example, Aristides claims that Athens has engaged in military activity in an effort to save fellow Greeks and to free them from enslavement, rather than 204 Aristides, Panathenaic Discourse 26. 205 Aristides, Panathenaic Discourse 27. 206 Aristides, Panathenaic Discourse 26 ff. 207 Aristides, Panathenaic Discourse 29. 208 Aristides, Panathenaic Discourse 30: οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι τὰς πόλεις οἰκοῦσιν, ὥσπερ στρατόπεδα, οἷς κατέλαβον ἐμμείναντες, μόνοις δὲ τοῖς ταύτης ἐγγόνοις τῆς χώρας ἡ πόλις ἐστὶ κυρία καὶ μόνη πόλεων…. 209 Aristides, Panathenaic Discourse 63–64.

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to exercise dominion over them.210 Aristides juxtaposes the Hellenic practice of fighting defensive wars and acting justly under compulsion to that of other nations, who tend to get involved in aggressive wars.211 According to him, while “barbarians” fight often for the acquisition of wealth and territory, “Greeks” fight for the sake of liberty.212 In addition to delineating differences in the nature of military activities on the basis of motivation and purpose, Aristides also draws a finer distinction between the citizens of Athens vis à vis other Greeks and barbarians. He maintains that while Athens normally fights against other Greeks to the point of proving its superiority, rather than subjugating them, it wages “total war against the barbarians” (ἡγουμένη πρὸς μὲν τοὺς βαρβάρους δεῖν πολεμεῖν).213 In spite of his claim that Athens wages war for the purpose of liberation rather than subjugation, Aristides admits that this applies only to other Greeks rather than other nations. In so far as barbarians are concerned, he asserts that Athens remains radically opposed in all aspects of life. Aristides: Barbarism and Romanness In conjunction with elaborating on the issue of war, Aristides draws a distinction between Athenians and Greeks on the basis of their imperial policies and practices. In this manner, Aristides provides a veiled critique of the policies of the Roman Empire through the lens of Athenian history, rather than launching an open attack on Rome. His insightful reflections represent a critical assessment of prevailing practices and social structures that can also be applied to the actual circumstances of his own time.214 For instance, Aristides comments on the inherently unjust nature of empires, as they are normally founded upon the subjugation of the physically weaker by the stronger. According to him, empires in fact exist as a result of the lack of equitable laws. He expounds on this point and he writes: For every empire obviously belongs to the stronger and is contrary to the very law of equality. For if this is not so, how is it fair or in what way 210 Aristides, Panathenaic Discourse 93, 167. 211 Aristides, Panathenaic Discourse 194 ff. 212 Aristides, Panathenaic Discourse 210. 213 Aristides, Panathenaic Discourse 225. 214 Cf. Kostas Buraselis, “Aelius Aristides als Panegyriker und Mahner: von Theorie und Praxis des politisch-sozialen Gleichgewichts im griechischen Osten der Kaiserzeit,” in Politische Theorie und Praxis im Altertum, ed., Wolfgang Schuller (Darmstadt: Wissentschaftliche Buchgesellshaft, 1998), 183–203; Stephen A. Stertz, “Aelius Aristides’ Political Ideas,” anrw II.34.2: 1248–1270.

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is it just to collect tribute from a foreign land, or to legislate for those who do not desire it, or to judge their affairs, or to give them orders, or to wage war, or to possess what is not properly one’s own? In general none of these circumstances is equitable.215 While Aristides exposes the oppressive reality of imperialism, and by extension implicating Roman rule, he portrays an idealized image of Athens, that is contrasted to “barbarian” empires, as well as to other Hellenistic kingdoms. Aristides criticizes totalitarian structures and policies and, instead, he offers the alternative democratic model of Athens: In respect to power [Athenians] have been a ruler from the start, but in generosity, have voluntarily dispensed with the terror of empire and have almost themselves been responsible for the complaints. For when they behaved most democratically and moderately toward all and in a way made everyone partners in their government rather than restraining them under the law of empire, they had the same experience as good masters. For they received no gratitude from some because of their goodness; but if they used any compulsion, their application of force appeared particularly noticeable.216 The idealized image of the Athenian political regime serves not merely to bolster the fervent tone of the panegyric oration of Aristides, but also to juxtapose it to the social conditions of Greeks living in the context of the Roman Empire. However, Aristides’ criticism of Roman rule remains an implicit criticism, rather than an explicit attack on the contemporary political and social practices.217 215 Aristides, Panathenaic Discourse 306: ἅπασα γὰρ δήπουθεν ἀρχὴ τῶν κρειττόνων ἐστὶν καὶ παρ’ αὐτὸν τὸν τῆς ἰσότητος νόμον. εἰ δὲ μή, πῶς ἴσον ἢ ποῦ δίκαιον ἢ φόρους ἐκλέγειν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀλλοτρίας, ἢ νόμους τιθέναι τοῖς οὐδὲν δεομένοις, ἢ κρίνειν τἀκείνων, ἢ προστάττειν, ἢ πολεμεῖν, ἢ κτᾶσθαι τὰ μὴ προσήκοντα; ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲν τούτων ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου γίγνεται. 216 Aristides, Panathenaic Discourse 308: καὶ δυνάμει μὲν ἄρχων καταστὰς τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, φιλανθρωπίᾳ δὲ τὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς δεδοικὸς ἑκὼν μεθεὶς καὶ σχεδὸν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ τῶν ἐγκλημάτων αἴτιος γεγονώς. πλεῖστῳ γὰρ τῷ κοινῷ καὶ μετρίῳ πρὸς ἅπαντας χρησάμενος καὶ τρόπον τινὰ τῆς πολιτείας μᾶλλον κοινωνοὺς ποιησάμενος ἢ δυναστείας νόμῳ κατέχων, ταὐτὸν τοῖς χρηστοῖς η ἔπαθεν τῶν δεσποτῶν. οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἐπιείκειαν χάριτος παρ’ ἐνίων ἔτυχεν, ἀλλ’ εἴ τι προσηνάγκασεν, ἐπιφανῶς ἔδοξεν βιάζεσθαι. Furthermore, Aristides proceeds to demonstrate how Athens has served to save others, more specifically Greeks, rather than to conquer and to possess them. Cf. Panathenaic Discourse 309 ff. 217 Aristides’ critique of Rome is only implicitly indicated in the Panathenaic Discourse. See, for example, the explicit approval of the Roman rule that Aristides brings calling it “the

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Furthermore, Aristides notes that Athenian power is no longer invested in physical prowess, which it once possessed, but rather serves as an example for the spread of education and learning. In this manner, he highlights the humane influence of the city of Athens in particular over other nations and contrasts the Athenian cultural preponderance over against the force of military machinery, such as the one adopted by Rome. For example, in his juxtaposition of the Athenians, as prime representatives of Greeks, he emphasizes the voluntary acceptance of Attic language and education, in contrast to the unwanted imposition of military occupation and political domination. Therefore, he views the “victory” of Athens, as follows: For all the cities and all the races of humankind turned to you and your form of life, and dialect. And the power of the city is not contained in the establishment of garrisons, but in the fact that all men of their own accord have chosen your ways and enrolled themselves as far as possible into the city, praying that their sons and they themselves may have a share in the beauty which is yours.218 According to Aristides, the “victory of the city” (τῇ πόλει τῆς νίκης)219 is constituted by the fact that, without necessary compulsion, both Greeks and barbarians not only emulate the Attic dialect, but also copy the Athenian style of life. The influence of culture and education, rather than the domination of armies and administrators, is the way in which Aristides chooses to configure the cultural hegemony of Athens. He writes: And all men have come to accept this dialect, in the belief that it is as it were a mark of education. This I call the great empire of the Athenians, not two hundred trirements, or more, and not Ionia, or the Hellespont, or the regions of Thrace, which have changed their rulers countless times.220

best and the greatest” (ἀρίστης καὶ μεγίστης). Cf. Panathenaic Discourse 335. See also his oration To Rome for outright praise of Roman emperors and rule. 218 Aristides, Panathenaic Discourse 323: ἅπασαι γὰρ αἱ πόλεις καὶ πάντα τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένη πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν δίαιταν καὶ φωνὴν ἀπέκλινεν. καὶ οὐ φρουραῖς ἐγκαθεστηκυίαις ἡ δύναμις τῆς πόλεως συνέχεται, ἀλλ’ ἁπάντων ἐξεπίτηδες τὰ ὑμέτερα ᾑρημένων καὶ εἰσποιούντων ἑαυτούς, ὡς δυνατόν, τῇ πόλει, συνευχομένων καὶ παισὶ καὶ ἑαυτοῖς, τοῦ παρ’ ὑμῖν καλοῦ μεταλαβεῖν. 219 Aristides, Panathenaic Discourse 326. 220 Aristides, Panathenaic Discourse 326–327: πάντες δὲ ἐπὶ τήνδε ἐληλύθασιν ὥσπερ ὅρον τινὰ παιδείας νομίζοντες. ταύτην ἐγὼ τὴν μεγάλην ἀρχὴν καλῶ τὴν Ἀθηναίων, οὐ τριήρεις διακοσίας, ἢ πλείους, οὐδ’ Ἰωνίαν, οὐδ’ Ἑλλήσποντον, οὐδὲ τὰ ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης, ἃ μυρίους μεταβέβληκεν ἄρχοντας.

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In opposition to foreign forms of expansion and domination, including the Romans, Aristides points out that Athens devises a different method for the incorporation of barbarians by enriching rather than impoverishing humanity. In this way, Aristides does not only critique the Roman imperial system, but he also proposes an alternative to it, namely the spread of Attic language and education. As the methods of acquisition and control of the two models of empire – one being the Roman and the other the Athenian – differ, so do too their effects on the rulers and the ruled. Instead of the economic devastation and social injustices resulting from conventional imperial practices, Aristides presents the dignifying and enriching impact of Attic Greek, as a conduit of Hellenic education and culture.221 In the Panathenaic Discourse Aristides takes a position that not only reflects his education and his professional practices of a rhetor, but also his social belonging to a class of Greek intellectuals in the Roman Empire, who forgo participation in the existing political structures.222 It is not insignificant that in his Panathenaic Discourse he chooses to align empire, and its habitual policies, with the practices of “barbarians” and, in this way, to implicate Roman rule as non-democratic and inhumane. His implicit critique of imperial rule in general, and of the Roman system in particular, rests on his association with a class of Greek literati, whose professional ideas and practices stand in contradiction to the prevalent political ambience. Aristides’ use of the notion of the “barbarian,” as oppositional to that of Hellenic and Athenian, reveals the sentiments of an entire class of highly educated Greeks, as well as his own view of the prevailing Roman practices. His Panathenaic Discourse is therefore as much a praise of Athens, and of things Greek, as it is a critique of Rome through the notion of the “barbarian.” His critical stance vis à vis Roman rule is indicative both of his own personal opinion and of a larger intellectual milieu during the Second Sophistic movement, in which he partakes along with others.223 Dio Chrysostom: Greek Identity and Valences of Barbarism Dio Chrysostom is significant for the contextualization of the Greco-Roman concept of the barbarian because of his Greek ethnicity, as he originates from the eastern province of Bithynia, as well as his political involvements with

221 Aristides, Panathenaic Discourse 327. 222 Cf. Charles A. Behr, “Studies on the Biography of Aelius Aristides,” 1140–1233; Simon Swain, Hellenism and Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 254–297. 223 Simon Swain, Hellenism and Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 17–100.

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Greek cities and his forced exile from Bithynia during the reign of Domitian.224 During his exile, Dio Chrysostom assumes the persona of a wandering Cynic philosopher, as he travels extensively in foreign territories and observes “barbarian” cultures and customs, before being allowed to return back after the death of Domitian. Dio’s understanding of the concept of the barbarian is complex as it reflects not only his own experience of a marginalized Greek in the Roman Empire,225 but also the impact of his political exile.226 Dio Chrysostom: Greekness versus Barbarianness In Dio’s writings the word “barbarian” appears both in conjunction with the term “Greek” and in opposition to it. In a conventional manner, Dio makes use of the term “barbarian” in order to distinguish between Greek and/or Roman and other ethnic groups in different contexts. For instance, when Dio draws a distinction in the Twelfth Discourse227 between Greeks and barbarians, he notes the existing differences between them in regards to sculpture.228 Dio lists the representation of the deities in human form, the prevalent ­hellenistic 224 See C.P. Jones, The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978); J.L. Moles, “Dio Chrysostom: Exile, Tarsus, Nero and Domitian,” lcm 8 (1983), 130–134; J.L. Moles, “The Career and Conversion of Dio Chrysostom,” jhs 98 (1978), 79–100; Simon Swain, Hellenism and Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 187–240. 225 In his Rhodian Discourse for example he refers to the position of Greek cities as “slavery,” even when he acknowledges degrees of freedom that are sometimes allowed to them. Cf. Rhodian Discourse 125. 226 Tim Whitmarsh in his essay “‘Greece is the World’: Exile and Identity in the Second Sophistic” focuses on the motif of exile in Greek and Roman literature from the late antique period as an exploration of identity and self-definition of different groups with the context of the Roman Empire. In this article, Whitmarsh also emphasizes that as provincial elites gained access to Roman citizenship and accessed new modalities of identity, so too the identity “Greek” could be obtained either by descent or by education. He writes: “Attic Greek, as opposed to demotic Greek spoken by the masses, was the lingua franca of the educated elites, the common cultural store which bound them together and excluded the lower class. There were two fundamental criteria which could define ‘Greekness,’ and they were not always complimentary: on the one hand, ‘Greeks’ were, as they had been in the past, the inhabitants of the old poleis and their colonial offshoots; on the other, ‘Greeks’ were an elite group from a range of cities which covered the entire eastern Empire, united solely by their ability to speak in Attic, the archaizing dialect which had originally been used in the fifth and forth centuries bce. ‘Hellenizing’ (hellenizein) in this latter sense, quite clearly, implied a fundamentally different relationship with the polis of one’s birth.” Cf. Being Greek under Rome: Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic, and the Development of Empire, ed., Simon Goldhill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 272–273. 227 It is also known as the Olympic Discourse. 228 Dio Chrysostom, Twelfth Discourse 59 ff.

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practice, as the correct one, and ridicules divine representations by others in animal and other shapes, as he considers these symbolic portrayals “trivial and absurd.”229 Additionally, he links the presumed lack of artistic abilities among barbarian nations to the worship of objects rather than the gods.230 He writes: Consequently, many of the barbarians, because they lack artistic means and find difficulty employing them, name mountains gods, and unhewn trees, too, and unshapen stones, things which are by no means whatever more appropriate in shape than is the human form.231 In addition to opposing Greeks and other ethnicities in the context of religious conceptions and artistic representations, Dio associates the “barbarian” with a conventional score of attributes. For instance, in the Twenty-First Discourse (On Beauty) Dio contrasts “Greek” and “barbarian,” more particularly Persian, perceptions of aesthetics. For instance, he comments on different perceptions of male beauty and decries the Persian custom of feminizing the male body by the castration of eunuchs.232 Dio also notes the association of barbarians with licentiousness and he marks their lust vis à vis eunuchs and women. Regarding the Persian attitude toward eunuchs, Dio writes: And practically all the barbarians treated them in the same way, just as they did the animals – because the only thing they thought of was the lust of the flesh (σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ πάντες οἱ βάρβαροι, ᾗπερ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα, διὰ τὸ μόνον τὰ ἀφροδίσια ἐννοεῖν).233 Likewise, Dio claims that Persians, as representative and emblematic of barbarians, commit incest with their mothers due to the alleged lack of contact with other males.234 It is noteworthy that Dio’s criticism of foreign customs is connected with his attack on Roman practices. For example, Dio proceeds to 229 Dio Chrysostom, Twelfth Discourse 59: τῶν βαρβάρων τινὰς ζῷοις τὸ θεῖον ἀφομοιοῦν κατὰ σμικρὰς καὶ ἀτόπους ἀφορμάς. 230 It should be noted that in the Twelfth Discourse Dio is addressing a primarily Greek audience and thus the distinction between barbarian and Greek is cast in the context of the understanding of the two notions vis à vis each other, rather with respect to Romans. 231 Dio Chrysostom, Twelfth Discourse 61: ὥστε καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων πενίᾳ τε καὶ ἀπορία τέχνης ὄρη θεοὺς ἐπονομάζουσι καὶ δένδρα ἀργὰ καὶ ἀσήμους λίθους, οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οἰκειότερα τὴν μορφήν. 232 Dio Chrysostom, Twenty-First Discourse 3 ff. 233 Dio Chrysostom, Twenty-First Discourse 4. 234 Dio Chrysostom, Twenty-First Discourse 5–6.

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designate emperor Nero as belonging to the category of the barbarian,235 when he refers to Nero’s conversion of a man into a woman by altering the physical state of the eunuch and by changing his name. Dio also ascribes barbarian character to the Roman ruler when he points to the excess of political power and points to Nero’s unlimited and “lawless” (παράνομόν) exercise of “power” (ἐξουσία).236 Although this critique concerns Nero specifically, it also suggests the potential excesses of absolute power vested with the Roman emperors in general.237 In addition to alluding to extreme practices in his conceptualization of the “barbarian,” Dio draws a distinction between the structure of the Greek polis and style of life of its citizens, on the one hand, and the scatteredness of barbarians in villages, on the other.238 Dio also associates barbarians with warlike nature, with rudenessas, and with subhuman qualities.239 For example, he contrasts Greek and barbarian manner of fighting, when he writes: “we fight like Greeks against barbarians, or, what is still more like your conduct than that, like human beings against wild beasts” (ὥσπερ Ἕλληνες πρὸς βαρβάρους μαχόμεθα, ἢ τὸ ἔτι τούτου τῷ γιγνομένῳ ὑφ’ ὑμῶν ὁμοιότερον, ὥσπερ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς θηρία).240 235 Dio Chrysostom, Twenty-First Discourse 7 ff. 236 Dio writes: “In human beings unlimited power also is a lawless sort of thing. Take Nero for instance: we all know how in our own time that he not only castrated the youth whom he loved, but also changed his name for a woman’s, that of the girl whom he loved and his subsequent wife, for whom he conceived a passion and wedded after openly incarcerating his former wife, to whom he was already married when he became Emperor.” Cf. Twenty-First Discourse 6. 237 On the basis of Dio’s orations and their specific context and addressees, Simon Swain notes “To determine Dio’s attitude to Rome is no easy matter.” Swain presents the contradictory evidence from Dio’s four Disourses on Kingship which were dedicated to Trajan and which contain a positive evaluation of monarchical rule as the ideal form of government, on the one hand, and Dio’s orations to Greek cities, on the other, which contain critical remarks of Roman rule, such as Thirteenth Discourse (In Athens, On Exile), ThirtyThird and Thirty-Fourth Discourse (Tarsian Discourses), Thirty-Eighth Discourse (To the Nichomedians). Swain nonetheless admits that “Despite their very different contexts and aims, it is probably right, then, to associate Dio’s attacks on governors with the veiled but certain expression of distaste for Rome’s control of Greece.” See Simon Swain, Hellenism and Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 191, 240. See also C.P. Jones, The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), 124–131. 238 Dio Chrysostom, Forty-Seventh Discourse 10. 239 Dio makes the following remarking in passing: “do not think it boorish or barbarous (ἄγροικον μηδὲ βαρβαρικόν) of me to intervene in the midst of your discourse.” Cf. ThirtySixth Discourse 24. 240 Dio Chrysostom, Thirty-Eighth Discourse 46.

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Furthermore, Dio associates the notion of the “barbarian” with ignorance and lack of education.241 In his Thirty-Sixth Discourse he criticizes the Greek-­ speaking who lack adequate education and knowledge as being “barbarian” and implies that social distinction, rather than ethnic difference, is invested in this concept. Additionally, when Dio draws a distinction between “Greeks” and “barbarians,” he tends to do this on the basis of Hellenic language and culture, rather than ethnicity or geographic location. In his Thirty-Sixth Discourse, Dio remarks that the Greek colony of Borysthenes lies in the region of Scythia “in the midst of barbarians … the most warlike of all” (ἐν μέσοις οἰκοῦσα τοῖς βαρβάροις … καὶ τούτοις σχεδόν τι τοῖς πολεμικωτάτοις),242 as well as observing that due to the foreign incursions on the city, its size and importance has decreased significantly. Although Dio comments on the fact of its location, he also remarks that “Greece” is to be found everywhere irrespective of geographical restrictions: Indeed, many cities have been captured in many parts of Greece, inasmuch as Greece lies scattered in many regions. (πολλαὶ γὰρ δή τινες ἁλώσεις κατὰ πολλὰ μέρη γεγόνασι τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἅτε ἐν πολλοῖς τόποις διεσπαρμένης)243 In spite of his claim for the spread of Greek language and culture in a wide variety of territories, Dio also acknowledges the foreign influences upon Greek colonies. For instance, in his Thirty-Sixth Discourse Dio describes the reaction of the elders in the Greek colony to visitors and he comments on the degrees of barbarism exhibited by these Greeks: As a usual thing those who come here are nominally Greek but actually more barbarous than ourselves, traders and marketmen, fellows who import cheap rags and vile wine and export in exchange products of no better quality.244 Although Dio addresses a Greek audience in order to reaffirm their Hellenic identity, he also acknowledges existing differences among them, as some 241 242 243 244

Dio Chrysostom, Thirty-Sixth Discourse 19. Dio Chrysostom, Thirty-Sixth Discourse 4. Dio Chrysostom, Thirty-Sixth Discourse 5. Dio Chrysostom, Thirty-Sixth Discourse 25: τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν σχεδόν τι δεῦρο ἀφικνοῦνται ὀνόματι Ἕλληνες, τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ βαρβαρώτεροι ἡμῶν, ἔμποροι καὶ ἀγοραῖοι, ῥάκη φαῦλα καὶ οἶνον πονηρὸν εἰσκομίζοντες καὶ τά γε παρ’ ἡμῶν οὐδὲν βελτίω τούτων ἐξαγόμενοι.

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inhabit colonies in distant territories from their motherland. In spite of the differentiation between Greeks depending on their geographical location, Dio attempts to re-inscribe the two notions of “Greek” and “barbarian” as binary and mutually exclusive poles. Dio Chrysostom: Greekness as Barbarianness Despite Dio’s conventional uses of the concepts of “Greek” and “barbarian” as dametrically opposed,245 he also employs the two not in contradistinction but rather in tandem with each other. In fact, Dio’s primary emphasis in his writings remains on the similarities and the commonalities between Greeks and barbarians, in addition to them being used as binary opposites as well. For example, Dio describes the universal conception of divinity by Greeks and barbarians and he uses the two terms in conjunction with one another, rather than in oppositon, as well as their common humanity based on the possession of reason.246 Furthermore, Dio refers to barbarians in a positive manner with respect to their intellectual and linguistic capacities. When describing Homer’s style, Dio comments positively on the mixture of Athenian, Dorian and Ionian dialects, as well as the incorporation of foreign words on account of their rich sounds: [B]ecause of his love of language … he also used many barbarian words as well, sparing none that he believed to have in it anything of charm or of vividness.247 In addition to his positive valuation of the concept of “barbarian,” Dio employs the two notions “Greek” and “barbarian” in conjunction with one another in various contexts.248 The fact that Dio tends to isolate and emphasize 245 See for example the allusion to attire of barbarian peoples as a marker of difference. Cf. Thirty-Sixth Discourse 7 ff.; Seventy-Second Discourse 3. 246 On this point, Dio Chrystom explains: “Now concerning the nature of the Gods in general, and especially that of the ruler of the universe, first and foremost an idea regarding him and a conception of him common to the whole human race, to the Greeks and to the barbarians alike (ξύμπαντος ἀνθρωοπίνου γένους, ὁμοίως μὲν Ἑλλήνων, ὁμοίως δὲ βαρβάρων), a conception that is inevitable and innate in every creature endowed with reason.” Cf. Twelfth Discourse 27. 247 Dio Chrysostom, Twelfth Discourse 67: διὰ φιλορρηματίαν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ βαρβάρων ὀνόματα, φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ὅ τι μόνον ἡδονὴν ἣ σφοδρότητα ἔδοξεν αὐτῷ ῥῆμα ἔχειν. 248 For example, Dio uses the two terms in conjunction with each other when he presents his ideas about the ideal ruler (Discourse 1.14; 1.38; 1.83; 3.38; 4.4; 4.25), when he discusses the distribution of punishment (Discourse 14.16), or the difficulty of fighting pleasure

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similarities between Hellenes and others, as well as the existing differences, is not an accident. In his post-exilic speeches, Dio presents himself as a wandering philosopher, who has traversed many foreign territories, and he comments on his own low social position during the period of his journeys abroad.249 In his First Discourse, Dio refers to himself, as follows: Once when I chanced to be wandering in exile – and great is my gratitude to the gods that they thus prevented my becoming an eye-witness of many an act of injustice – I visited as many lands as possible, at one time going among the Greeks, at another among the barbarians, assuming the guise of a vagabond beggar.250 Dio Chrysostom reflects on his personal experience and notes his own inferior status in ethnic, social and political terms. However, it is not only his own particular experience of a political exile and a wandering beggar, but also the position of Greeks in the Roman Empire, that inform his representation of “Greeks” and “barbarians.” In his Seventh Discourse, for instance, Dio criticizes the existence of prostitution and remarks that barbarians, as well as Greeks, become prey for this business. In this oration he addresses the Euboeans in indignation of this cultural practice, and he states: They [brothel-keepers] must not take hapless women or children, captured in war or else purchased with money, and expose them for shameful ends in dirty booths, which are flaunted before the eyes in every part of the city, at the doors of the houses of magistrates and in marketplaces, near government buildings and temples, in the midst of all that is holiest. Neither barbarian women, I say, nor Greeks – of whom that latter were in (Discourse 9.12). Dio uses the formula “Greek and barbarian” in demonstrating the similarities between the two groups of people in other contexts as well. Cf. Discourse 31.20; 32.35; 32.40; 45.1; 47.5; 49.9; 56.7. 249 See Swain’s warning against Dio’s adoption of the persona of a Cynic philosopher, given his political aspirations both before and after his exile. In spite of his reservations, Swain notes that Dio’s prominent political engagements in Greek cities and interaction with Roman emperors, however, are primarily for the purpose of promoting the position of Greek cities within the existing system of imperial control, even when he expresses his criticism of it. Cf. Hellenism and Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 231–234. 250 Dio Chrysostom, First Discourse (On Kingship) 50: Ὡς γὰρ ἔτυχον ἐν τῇ φυγῇ ποτε ἀλώμενος – καὶ πολλήν γε χάριν οἶδα τοῖς θεοῖς, ὅτι με οὐκ εἴασαν θεατὴν γενέσθαι πολλῶν καὶ ἀδίκων πραγμάτων – ἐπῄειν δ’ οὖν ὡς ἐδυνάμην πλείστην γῆν ἐν ἀγύρτου σχήματι καὶ στολῇ, τοῦτο μὲν παρ’ Ἕλληνας, τοῦτο δὲ παρὰ βαρβάρους.

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former times almost free but now live in bondage utter and complete – shall they put in such shameful constraint, doing a much more evil and unclean business than breeders of horses…251 In this passage it becomes apparent that Dio conceives of the inferior state of Greeks and barbarians in terms of their economic occupation and low social status in the Roman Empire. Similarly, when Dio comments on the political situation of Greek cities, he notes that their position is comparable to the status of slaves, due to their lack of self-determination and political autonomy.252 In spite of the conventional opposition of Greekness and barbarianness that he assumes, his conception of the “barbarian” is multi-faceted not only on account of his own experience of a political pariah, but also on account of his belonging to a group of people, who occupy a subordinate position in the imperial structures in analogue to other ethnic groups. Only in the context of this complex framework of references can Dio’s own understanding of the “barbarian,” as well as the “Greek,” be properly interpreted. Philostratus: Construction and Deconstruction of Barbarism The concept of the “barbarian” in the writings of Philostratus, similar to those of Aristides and Dio Chrysostom, is conditioned to a large extent by the prevalence of the Second Sophistic movement during his lifetime in the late second and the early third centuries.253 Philostratus is keenly interested in the professional career of philosophers, and in his Lives of the Sophists he presents the biographies of famous individuals starting from the fifth century bce to his contemporary period. In his work devoted to representatives of the old and the new sophistic movements, Philostratus places an emphasis on the significance of Greek language, literature and rhetoric, as he traces the lives of individual philosophers. It is precisely in the context of the Second Sophistic that 251 Dio Chrysostom, Seventh Discourse 133–134: αἰχμάλωτα σώματα γυναικῶν ἢ παίδων ἢ ἄλλως ἀργυρώνητα ἐπ’ αἰσχύνῃ προϊστάντας ἐπ’ οἰκημάτων ῥυπαρῶν, πανταχοῦ τῆς πόλεως ἀποδεδειγμένων, ἔν τε παρόδοις ἀρχόντων καὶ ἀγοραῖς, πλησίον ἀρχείων τε καὶ ἱερῶν, μεταξὺ τῶν ὁσιωτάτων, μήτ’ οὖν βαρβαρικὰ σώματα μήτε Ἑλλήνων πρότερον μὲν οὐ πάνυ, τὰ νῦν δὲ ἀφθόνῳ τε καὶ πολλῇ δουλείᾳ κεχρημένων, ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην λώβην καὶ ἀνάγκην ἄγοντας, ἱπποφορβῶν καὶ ὀνοφορβῶν πολὺ κάκιον καὶ ἀκαθαρτότερον ἔργον ἐργαζομένους. 252 Dio Chrysostom, Rhodian Discourse 125, Tarsian Discourse (Thirty-Fourth Discourse) 51. 253 See Graham Anderson, Philostratus: Biography and Belles Lettres in the Third Century (London: Croom Helm, 1986); Id., The Second Sophistic: A Cultural Phenomenon in the Roman Empire (London: Routledge, 1993); G. Bowerstock, Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969). See also Simon Swain, Hellenism and Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 380–400.

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Atticism, the revival of classical Greek words and forms, arises in conjunction with the renewed interest in the ἀρχαῖοι, the ancient Greek authors, as well as in Hellenic philosophical, religious and cultural heritage.254 Philostratus, as someone who has been under the strong influence of his teacher, the Syrian sophist Antipater, pays particular attention to aspects of language and rhetoric in his definition of Greek identity, as well as his conceptualization of the barbarian “other.” Philostratus: Atticism and Demarcation of the “Barbarian” The concept of the barbarian in Philostratus’ Lives of the Sophists is tied closely with language and rhetoric, as indicative of the preoccupations of the Second Sophistic movement and of the prevalent tendencies of the Attic and the Asianic tendencies in rhetoric at the time. For instance, Philostratus writes in Lives of the Sophists about Favorinus, who bequeathed to his friend a slave, described in the following manner: This [Autolecythus] was an Indian, entirely black, a pet of Herodes and Favorinus, for as they drank their wine together he used to divert them by sprinkling his Indian dialect with Attic words and by speaking barbarous Greek with a tongue that stammered and faltered.255 The mention of “barbarous speech” (γλώττῃ βαρβαρίζων)256 is connected with the pronunciation of Attic Greek, and it refers specifically to the foreign ethnicity and tongue of the Indian slave. The comical combination of Attic words and strange accent is mentioned by Philostratus as an illustration of interest of sophists, such as Herodes and Favorinus, with language, in addition to it being an indication of ethnic markers that are betrayed by his outward appearance and his mispronunciation of Greek language. The derision with which a foreign pronunciation is perceived by sophists is corroborated also by Herodes’ attitude toward the philosopher Peregrinus.257 Philostratus narrates an encounter between Herodes, a sophist, and 254 Simon Swain argues, for example, that interest in language, as well as in literature, is tied with the cultural self-definition of Greeks and is not devoid of political and social meaning. See Swain, Hellenism and Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 17–42. 255 Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists 490: ἦν δὲ οὗτος Ἰνδὸς μὲν καὶ ἱκανῶς μέλας, ἄθυρμα δὲ Ἡρώδου τε καὶ Φαβωρίνου, ξυμπίνοντας γὰρ αὐτοὺς διῆγεν ἐγκαταμιγνὺς Ἰνδικοῖς Ἀττικὰ καὶ πεπλανημένῃ τῇ γλώττῃ βαρβαρίζων. 256 Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists 490. 257 Cf. Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists 563.

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Peregrinus, a cynic, who purportedly “used to dog the steps of Herodes and insult him in a semi-barbarous dialect.”258 According to Philostratus, Herodes ridicules Peregrinus’ criticism and refuses to take it as serious on account of his poor Greek. Reportedly, he retorts: “You speak ill of me, so be it, but why in such bad Greek?”259 As the Indian’s pronunciation of Attic Greek is a subject of amusement, so too does the cynic’s mispronunciation evoke scorn and laughter in the sophist Herodes.260 Furthermore, Philostratus explains that the infiltration of foreigners in Greek cities can lead to an unwanted barbarization and deterioration of the Greek language. For example, in Lives of the Sophists Agathion clarifies his reason for acquiring education in Attica, rather than in Athens per se, by referring to the deleterious influence of foreigners on Greek language: “And what about your speech?” asked Herodes. “How were you educated and by whom? For you do not seem to be an uneducated man.” “The interior of Attica educated me,” Agathion replied, “a good school for a man who wishes to be able to converse. For the Athenians in the city admit as hirelings youths who come in like a flood from Thrace and the Pontus and from other barbarian peoples, and their own speech deteriorates from the influence of these barbarians to a greater extent than they can contribute to the improvement of the speech of newcomers. But the central district is untainted by barbarians, and hence its language remains uncorrupted and its dialect sounds the purest strain of Atthis” (ἡ μεσογεία δὲ ἄμικτος βαρβάροις οὖσα ὑγιαίνει αὐτοῖς ἡ φωνὴ καὶ ἡ γλῶττα τὴν ἄκραν Ἀτθίδα ἀποψάλλει).261 In this manner, Philostratus indicates not only the amusing and laughable quality of “barbarian” pronunciation of Greek language by foreigners but also the harmful impact on the native population. According to him, the proper 258 Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists 563: ἐπηκολούθει δὲ τῷ Ἡρώδῃ κακῶς ἀγορεύων αὐτὸν ἡμιβαρβάρῳ γλώττῃ. 259 Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists 563: “ἔστω,” ἔφη “κακῶς με ἀγορεύεις, πρὸς τί καὶ οὗτως”. 260 Cf. Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists 563 ff. 261 Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists 553: “τὴν δὲ δὴ γλῶτταν” ἔφη ὁ Ἡρώδης “πῶς ἐπαιδεύθης καὶ ὑπὸ τίνων; οὐ γάρ μοι τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων φαίνῃ.” καὶ ὁ Ἀγαθίων “ἡ μεσογεία” ἔφη “τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἀγαθὸν διδασκαλεῖον ἀνδρὶ βουλομένῳ διαλέγεσθαι, οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἄστει Ἀθηναῖοι μισθοῦ δεχόμενοι Θρᾴκια καὶ Ποντικὰ μειράκια καὶ ἐξ ἄλλων ἐθνῶν βαρβάρων ξυνερρυηκότα παραφθείρονται παρ’ αὐτῶν τὴν φωνὴν μᾶλλον ἢ ξυμβάλλονταί τι αὐτοῖς ἐς εὐγλωττίαν, ἡ μεσογεία δὲ ἄμικτος βαρβάροις οὖσα ὑγιαίνει αὐτοῖς ἡ φωνὴ καὶ ἡ γλῶττα τὴν ἄκραν Ἀτθίδα ἀποψάλλει.”

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pronunciation of Greek language is closely associated with the lack of contact with and influence of other ethnic groups. He asserts that it is not only foreigners who employ non-Greek words and speak with a strange accent, but also Greeks themselves are impacted by the barbarization of their language. Furthermore, Philostratus implies that one can obtain mastery of pure Attic Greek only in isolation from barbarian people, as no one is exempt from their harmful influence. It should be noted, however, that Romans are also included in the category of the “barbarian” as it is understood by Philostratus. For instance, when Philostratus refers to a letter by Apollonius castigating Ionians for changing their names from Greek to Latin, he calls the use of Roman names “barbarism” (βαρβαρισμοῦ τούτου)262 and criticizes them for relinquishing their Hellenic heritage.263 Similarly, when Philostratus makes reference to the western territories of the Empire, he uses the term “barbarian” in order to describe Romans, as he views them as well as other non-Greeks to belong together: The cities were multiplying their sacrifices in honor of the Emperor’s victories, for those at the Pythian festival were already announced, when an actor of tragedy, who was one of those that had not ventured to contend for the prize against Nero, was on a strolling tour around the cities of the west, and by histrionic talent he had won no small fame among the less barbarous of the populations (παρὰ τοῖς ἧττον βαρβαροῖς) for two reasons, firstly because he found himself among people who had never before heard tragedy, and secondly because he pretended exactly to reproduce the melodies of Nero.264 In conjunction with his attention to Attic Greek, Philostratus emphasizes the importance of education necessary for the acquisition of correct pronunciation of Greek language so as to avoid any barbarisms. In connection with an untrained youth, for instance, he criticizes a student delivering a speech in a declamation exercise that is “full of solecisms, barbarisms, and inconsistencies” (σολοικισμῶν τε καὶ βαρβαρισμῶν καὶ ἐναντιώσεων πλέα ἦν),265 and highlights his need for a formal training. Yet, Philostratus remarks that as the lack of proper training leads to committing grammatical errors, so too does the extreme 262 Philostratus, Life of Apollonius of Tyana 4.5. 263 Note that in the original letters of Apollonius the word “barbarism” is not used in reference to the change of names of the Ionian citizens. Cf. Apollonius, Letters 71, 72. 264 Philostratus, Life of Apollonius of Tyana 5.9. 265 Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists 541.

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t­ endency to atticize. Although Philostratus is a staunch proponent of Atticism, he finds its extreme forms objectionable. In reference to Critias, a model for proper Atticizing, he asserts: I observe, moreover that he was a master of concise eloquence, and that even when he maintained the tone proper to a speech in defense, he used to make vigorous attacks on the opponent; and that he Atticized, but in moderation, nor did he use outlandish words – for bad taste in Atticizing is truly barbarous – but his Attic words shine through his discourse like the gleams of the sun’s rays. (ἀτικίζοντά τε οὐκ ἀκρατῶς, οὐδὲ ἐκφύλως – τὸ γὰρ ἀπειρόκαλον ἐν τῷ ἀττικίζειν βάρβαρον – ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἀκτίνων αὐγαὶ τὰ Ἀττικὰ ὀνόματα διαφαίνεται τοῦ λόγου.)266 Therefore, it is the perceived distortion of Attic Greek, marked by its infiltration with foreign words and with antiquated Greek words, that is characterized by Philostratus as “barbarous.” Although he is a proponent of the use of Attic Greek, he retains a level of self-reflective criticism for hyper-atticizing tendencies and obscurintism that occur in connection with it. It is noteworthy that Philostratus chooses to define this linguistic issue in Attic Greek in terms of the “barbarian” as well as its opposite. Philostratus: Essentialization of the “Barbarian” It is not only with regard to language and diction in the context of the Second Sophistic that Philostratus uses the notion of the “barbarian,” but also in connection with qualities normally attributed by Greeks to other ethnic groups. In Lives of the Sophists, for example, Philostratus notes in reference to the Medes that Scopelian, a sophist, succeeded in bringing out the typical features associated with barbarians, i.e. “arrogance” and “levity”: He excelled also in the use of covert allusions and ambiguous language, but he was even more admirable in his treatment of the more vigorous and grandiloquent themes, and especially those relating to the Medes, in which occur passages about Darius and Xerxes; for in my opinion he surpassed all other sophists, both in phrasing these allusions and in handing down that sort of eloquence for his successors to use; and in delivering them he used to represent dramatically the arrogance and levity that are characteristic of the barbarians (καὶ γὰρ φρόνημα ἐν αὐταῖς ὑπεκρίνετο καὶ 266 Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists 503.

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κουφότητα τὴν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις ἤθεσιν). It is said that at these times he would sway to and fro more than usual, as though in a Bacchic frenzy, and one of Ptolemo’s students said of him that he beat a loud drum…267 Similarly, in Life of Apollonius of Tyana, Philostratus employs the notion of the “barbarian” with regard to foreigners and, in so doing, contrasts it to Greek/ ness. Throughout the narrative in which the biographical details of Apollonius are laid out, it becomes clear that “barbarian” is contrasted to “Greek” and subordinated to it, in spite of the apparent fact that Apollonius visits and learns from the sages in the East. For instance, while visiting a temple in Antioch in Assyria, Apollonius indicates his different perception of Hellenic and barbarian religious practices, as he expresses his intention to improve the performance of foreign religious rites and to correct the improper performance of Greek rituals. Philostratus elaborates on this point when he writes: In case the city was a Greek one, and the sacred rites familiar to a Greek, he [Apollonius] would call the priests together and talk wisely about the gods, and would correct them, supposing they had departed from the traditional forms. If, however, the rites were barbarous and peculiar (εἰ δὲ βάρβαρά τε καὶ ἰδιότροπα εἴη), then he would find out who had founded them and on what occasion they were established, and having learnt the sort of cult it was, he would make suggestions, in case he would think of any improvement upon them and then he would go in quest of his followers and bid them ask any questions they liked.268 Philostratus implies in this passage that while Greek religious rites are an ­occasion for a deep religious discussion, the barbarian ones are a trigger for further investigation and correction on the part of the wandering philosopher. Also, Philostratus observes that the Assyrian temple was not a center of ­serious studies and that the Assyrian people are “half-barbarous and uncivilized” (ἡμιβαρβάρους καὶ ἀμούσους).269 For example, when Apollonius first 267 Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists 520. 268 Philostratus, Life of Apollonius of Tyana 1.16: τὸν δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα καιρόν, εἰ μὲν Ἑλλὰς ἡ πόλις εἴη καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ γνώριμα, ξυγκαλῶν ἂν τοὺς ἱερέας ἐφιλοσόφει περὶ τῶν θεῶν καὶ διωρθοῦτο αὐτούς, ἔι που τῶν νομιζομένων ἐξαλλάττοιεν, εἰ δὲ βάρβαρά τε καὶ ἰδιότροπα εἴη, διεμάνθανε τοὺς ἱδρυσαμένους αὐτὰ καὶ ἐφ’ ὅτῳ ἱδρύθη, πυθόμενός τε, ὅπη θεραπεύεται ταῦτα καὶ ὑποθέμενος, εἴ τι σοφώτερον τοῦ δρωμένου ἐνθυμηθείη, μετῄει ἐπὶ τοὺς ὁμιλητὰς καὶ ἐκέλευεν ἐρωτᾶν, ἃ βούλονται. 269 Philostratus, Life of Apollonius of Tyana 1.16.

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e­ ncounters Damis, the Assyrian who eventually becomes his companion, the philosopher observes the inferior quality of the Assyrian language, as well as the lack of education of the foreigner: This Assyrian’s language, however, was of a mediocre quality, for he had not the gift of expressing himself, having been educated among the barbarians.270 It is not only with regard to the Assyrians that Philostratus criticizes the language, education, and religion,271 but also with regard to others ethnic groups, such as the Medes. For instance, when the satrap of Babylon initially addresses Apollonius in a rude manner, Philostratus explains that he spoke in “barbaric language” (βαρβαρίζοντος).272 In addition, Philostratus notes the apparently nonsensical occupations of the Median rulers, such as the duty of the satrap to hold an image of the king to be kissed by everyone entering the city of Babylon.273 The existing foreign cultural practices and norms are represented as antithetical to the Greek ones, along with the style of speech of the satrap. On the issue of the satrap’s duties, Philsotratus states: When he [Apollonius] arrived in Babylon, the satrap in command of the great gates having learnt that he had come to see the country, held out the golden image of the king, which everyone must kiss before he is allowed to enter the city. Now an ambassador coming from the Roman Emperor has not this ceremony imposed upon him, but anyone who comes from the barbarians or just to look at the country, is arrested with dishonor unless he has first paid his respects to the image. Such are the silly duties committed to satraps among the barbarians (καὶ σατραπεύεται παρὰ τοῖς βαρβάροις τὰ οὕτως εὐήθη).274

270 Philostratus, Life of Apollonius of Tyana 1.19: φωνὴ δὲ ἦν τῷ Ἀσσυρίῳ ξυμμέτρως πράττουσα, τὸ γὰρ λογοειδὲς οὐκ εἶχεν, ἅτε παιδευθεὶς ἐν βαρβάροις. 271 For example, Philostratus notes the peculiar decorations of foreign temples and the excessive shine and glitter of the artifacts found there. Cf. Life of Apollonius of Tyana 1.19, 2.24. 272 Philostratus, Life of Apollonius of Tyana 1.21. 273 Philostratus, Life of Apollonius of Tyana 1.27. 274 Philostratus, Life of Apollonius of Tyana 1.27: πρεσβεύοντι μὲν οὖν παρὰ τοῦ Ῥωμαίνων ἄρχοντος οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη τούτου, παρὰ βαρβάρων δὲ ἥκοντι ἢ ἀφιστοροῦντι τὴν χώραν, εἰ μὴ τὴν εἰκόνα προθεραπεύσειεν, ἄτιμον ἀπειλῆφθαι· καὶ σατραπεύεται παρὰ τοῖς βαρβάροις τὰ οὕτως εὐήθη.

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Philostratus therefore connects the concept of barbarism not merely with language, as Attic Greek is used by others of his social class, but also with cultural, religious and political practices associated with foreign ethnic groups. In this sense, he follows the conventional representation of “barbarian” cultural paradigms as being opposite to Greek customs and norms. Philostratus: Barbarism Deconstructed In Life of Apollonius of Tyana Philostratus presents Apollonius as a Greek philosopher who is a “wise” person and a “good counsellor”275 especially vis à vis foreign individuals and groups upon whom he exercises a positive influence. Apollonius is portrayed as superior to non-Greeks in terms of his wisdom and knowledge, as well as his mastery of foreign languages.276 Apollonius declares to Damis: “I … understand all languages (πάσας οἶδα φωνὰς ἄνθρωπων), though I never learnt a single one.”277 In the case of the Greek philosopher, therefore, Philostratus seems to suggest that the binaries “barbarian” and “Greek” do not apply as they are transcended. Thus, for Apollonius the conventional division between “Greek” and “barbarian” does not hold: [A] wise man finds Hellas everywhere, and that a sage will not regard or consider any place to be a desert or barbarous because he, at any rate, lives under the eyes of virtue … (σοφῷ ἀνδρὶ Ἑλλὰς πάντα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔρημον ἢ βάρβαρον χωρίον οὔτε ἡγήσεται ὁ σοφὸς οὔτε νομιεῖ, ζῶν γε ὑπὸ τοῖς τῆς ἀρετῆς ὀφθαλμοῖς…)278 As the philosopher is represented by Philostratus as someone who transcends the division between “barbarian” and “Greek,” so too foreigners are represented as crossing from one category – that of the barbarian – to its opposite. Such a transition from being “barbarian” to becoming “Greek” suggests the possibility of transformation for barbarians, rather than a permanent state. Apollonius’ loyal companion, the Assyrian Damis, for example, states that he has decided to follow Apollonius in order to be transformed by his wisdom from an ignorant barbarian into a wise Greek man. Accordingly, Damis states: I should be held a wise man instead of an ignoramus and a dullard, and an educated man instead of a barbarian; for I saw that, if I followed him 275 Philostratus, Life of Apollonius of Tyana 1.28: σοφός τε καὶ Ἕλλην καὶ ξύμβουλος ἀγαθός. 276 Philostratus, Life of Apollonius of Tyana 1.21. 277 Philostratus, Life of Apollonius of Tyana 1.19. 278 Philostratus, Life of Apollonius of Tyana 1.34.

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and shared his pursuits … that I should be turned into a Hellene by him and be able to mix with the Hellenes.279 ξυγγενομένος αὐτῷ σοφὸς μὲν ᾠήθην δόξειν ἐξ ἰδιώτου τε καὶ ἀσόφου, πεπαιδευμένος δὲ ἐκ βαρβάρου, ἑπόμενος δὲ αὐτῷ καὶ ξυσπουδάζων … Ἕλλησί τε ἐπιμίξειν Ἕλλην ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ γενόμενος. While Damis expresses his desire and potential for change from an uneducated “barbarian” to a sophisticated “Greek,” one of the personages that Apollonius meets on his journey is represented as having fully accomplished this process. According to Philostratus, Apollonius meets with an Indian king, who is able to speak the Greek language and has obtained Hellenic education.280 Although the Indian ruler is described as “barbarian by decree of fate” (βάρβαρον εἶναί με δοκεῖ τῇ τύχῃ),281 he is recognized as a genuine “philosopher” due to his education and his virtuous way of life.282 It becomes apparent that although Philostratus uses the categories of “barbarian” and “Greek” as binary opposites, and subordinates the former to the latter, he also recognizes the possibility for transformation and cancellation of the two. However, the metamorphosis of “barbarian” into “Greek” is accomplished only by singular individuals who have had exposure to Greek education. This opportunity, therefore, is reserved only for exceptional persons. In spite of allowing for the annihilation of the cultural distinction between Greeks and barbarians, such a change reinforces the superiority of Greek education and norms, rather than introducing a marker of equality or parity ­between them. Therefore, Philostratus’ conceptualization of barbarian/ness vis à vis Greek/ ness retains the hierarchical opposition that is originally imbedded in the two notions. Furthermore, it reveals the preoccupation of Greek intellectuals, such as Philostratus, with Greek language, philosophy, culture and ­education as a compensation for the absence of actual power in the political arena. Similarly, the occupation with the re-creation of Attic Greek, in imitation of far-distanced authors of the glorious Greek past, as well as the intellectual investment in classical Greek literature, that characterize the Second Sophistic represent an indirect opposition to Rome.283 The disengagement from politics that normally attends the increased focus on Hellenic language, literature and 279 Philostratus, Life of Apollonius of Tyana 3.26. 280 Cf. Philostratus, Life of Apollonius of Tyana 2.26 ff. 281 Philostratus, Life of Apollonius of Tyana 2.27. 282 Philostratus, Life of Apollonius of Tyana 2.26. 283 Simon Swain, Hellenism and Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 17–100.

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culture on the part of Greek intellectuals and literati signifies a de facto opposition to the Roman imperial structures of domination during the time of the Second Sophistic movement. 3.3

Excursus: Lucian of Samotasa and the Self-defintion of the “Barbarian”

Lucian’s conceptualization of the “barbarian” in the context of Greco-Roman culture is important not only because he lives and writes in the second century ce, being a contemporary of early Christian apologists, but also because his ethnic origin is Syrian.284 Lucian represents a curious case for analyzing the concept of the barbarian in late antiquity, as he identifies himself as a Syrian285 and a “barbarian” and, at the same time, he is heavily invested in Greek culture, as well as being a proponent of the Second Sophistic.286 His (self-)understanding and (self-)designation as a “barbarian” are important, for they reflect not only the ethnic background of the second-century critic and satirist,287 but also because they are parallel to the notion of the “barbarian” found in the early Christian apologetic material.288 This parallel features are not accidental, for they indicate larger cultural trends in Roman society and signify social realities 284 Cf. J. Schwartz, Biographie de Lucien de Samotase (Brusselles: Latomus, 1967); Graham Anderson, Lucian: Theme and Variation in the Second Sophistic (Leiden: Brill, 1976); C.P. Jones, Culture and Society in Lucian (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986); Simon Swain, Hellenism and Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 298–329; See also, B. Baldwin, Studies in Lucian (Toronto: Hakkert, 1973); R.B. Branham, Unruly Eloquence: Lucian and the Comedy of Traditions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989); J.A. Hall, Lucian’s Satire (Monographs in Classical Studies; New York: Arno, 1981); Jas Elsner, “Describing Self in the Language of Other: Pseudo (?) Lucian at the Temple of Hierapolis” in Being Greek Under Rome: Cultural Identity, the Second Sophistic and the Development of Empire, ed., Simon Goldhill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 123–153. 285 Lucian, On the Syrian Goddes 1. 286 Cf. Suzanne Saïd, “Le ‘je’ de Lucien,” in L’invention de l’autobiographie de Hésiode à Saint Augustine, eds., Marie-Françoise Baslez, Philippe Hoffman, and Laurent Pernot (Paris: Ecole normale supérieure, 1993), 253–270. 287 Tim Whitmarsh reads Lucian’s satirical style of writing as an example of subversive and critical stance with regard to Rome, as well as a strategy for self-definition. See his article “Satirizing Rome: Lucian” in Greek Literature and the Roman Empire: The Politics of Imitation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 247–294. 288 See the discussion of Tatian’s Address to the Greeks in Chapter four of this book which dedicated to the Greek Christian apologetic writings.

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that are not limited to an isolated minority group, such as Christians, but are in fact characteristic of other individuals and groups in the late antique period. In his writings Lucian represents a complex view of himself as the “barbarian” who is an outsider to the prevailing Greco-Roman culture and, yet, whose education and literary sophistication speak to the achievement of the summit of Hellenic paideia. This multi-layered self-representation of the “barbarian” Lucian also reveals the contradictory nature of his relationship both to his place of birth, Syria, and to his adoptive language and culture. His representation of barbarism has many facets, some of which reflect prevailing aspects of the Greco-Roman notion of the barbarian, without any critical interrogation, while others arise from his own criticism of this widely accepted concept, which he tries to expose, ridicule and subvert. Like Lucian himself, his conceptualization of the “barbarian” is at times difficult to decipher, for it shifts between the conventional meanings and the satirical and subversive ones. The style and the content of Lucian’s writings make the task of uncovering the semantic field of the notion of the “barbarian” uncertain, as the authorial voice and purpose alter. It is perhaps not accidental that Lucian’s works bear a close resemblance to Tatian’s Address to the Greeks, for Lucian not only allows himself to write autobiographical detail and personal information, comparable to that of the early Christian apologist originating from Syria, but also subverts and mocks received notions and stereotypes of the dominant Greco-Roman culture. The two Syrians epitomize not only the “other” or the “barbarian” but also the height of Hellenic education and, as gifted rhetoricians, they both embody and undermine Greco-Roman concepts with equal dexterity, persuasiveness and force.289 Lucian: Barbarism and Self-definition In the Scythian Lucian represents the figure of the Scythian, who not only symbolizes the extreme end of barbarianness, as Scythians are normally represented in the ancient sources as emblematically inhuman and uncivilized, but who also stands for Lucian himself.290 The main character, Anacharsis, and his patron, Toxaris, are two Scythians who, along with Lucian himself, portray the complex spectrum of barbarism: Anacharsis is the stereotypical “barbarian,” 289 Alex Mullen in his article “Multiple Languages, Multiple Identities” discusses the plurality of languages in the Greco-Roman world and the individual ability to cross boundaries by acquiring multiple languages and becoming conversant in divers cultures, as well as the possibility to identify with a variety of different ethnic groups. Cf. Multilingualism in the Graeco-Roman Worlds, eds., Alex Mullen and Patrick James (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1–35. 290 Lucian, Scythian 9 ff.

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whose language, mental disposition and outward appearance stand in stark contrast to the Hellenes, whereas Toxaris is a Scythian who has conformed to Greek culture to a point of no recognition. Lucian juxtaposes the two, as follows: A stranger and a foreigner (ξένος καὶ βάρβαρος) he [Anacharsis] experienced considerable confusion of mind, for everything was strange and there were many sounds which frightened him; he did not know what to do with himself; he saw that people who saw him laughed at his dress; he met no one who spoke his language, and altogether he was already sorry he made the trip…. Toxaris had been first attracted by the familiar cut of his Scythian dress and then was bound to recognize Anacharsis himself quite easily as he was of very noble stock and one of the leading men of Scythia. But Anacharsis had no means of recognizing Toxaris as a fellow-countryman, with his Greek garb, his shaven chin, his lack of belt or sword, his fluency of speech – one of the real Attic natives; so much had time changed him.291 While Lucian portrays Anacharsis292 in a conventional manner as the stranger who is easily spotted and ridiculed by Greeks, he also provides the image of Toxaris as the hellenized foreigner. However, in the Scythian Lucian decides to identify himself with Anacharsis, rather than with Toxaris, on the basis of his own ethnic origin.293 Lucian presents himself to his prospective patron in the category of the “barbarian” and the socially and culturally inferior, when he writes: 291 Lucian, Scythian 3: ξένος καὶ βάρβαρος οὐ μετρίως τεταραγμένος ἔτι τὴν γνώμην, πάντα ἀγνῶν, ψοφοδεὴς πρὸς τὰ πολλά, οὐκ ἔχων ὅ τι χρήσαιτο ἑαυτῷ. καὶ γὰρ συνίει καταγελώμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ὁρώντων ἐπὶ τῇ σκευῇ, καὶ ὁμόγλωσσον οὐδένα εὕρισκεν, καὶ ὅλως μετέμελεν αὐτῷ ἤδη τῆς ὁδοῦ … καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἡ στολὴ αὐτὸν ἐπεσπάσατο πατριῶτις οὖσα, εἶτα μέντοι οὐ χαλεπῶς ἔμελλε καὶ αὐτὸν γνώσεσθαι τὸν Ἀνάχαρσιν ἅτε γένους τοῦ δοκιμωτάτου ὄντα καὶ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις Σκυθων. ὁ Ἀνάχαρσις δὲ πόθεν ἂν ἐκεῖνον ἔγνω ὁμοεθνῆ ὄντα, Ἑλληνιστὶ ἐσταλμένον, ἐν χρῷ κεκαρμένον τὸ γένειον, ἄζωστον, ἀσίδηρον, ἤδη στωμύλον, αὐτῶν τῶν Ἀττικῶν ἕνα τῶν αὐτοχθόνων; οὕτω μετεπεποίητο ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου. 292 In the Ignorant Book-Collector, in which Lucian is attacking a Syrian, there is a similar employment of common topoi associated with the notion of the barbarian. In his diatribe against his ignorant fellow Syrian, Lucian calls him “barbarous of speech and obtuse in mind” (βαρβάρους μὲν τὴν φωνὴν ὥσπερ σύ, ἀξυνέτους δὲ τῇ γνώσει). Cf. Ignorant BookCollector 4. In this instance, the connection between a barbarian tongue and an inferior mental capacity is made more explicit, while in the Scythian it is only implied. 293 Cf. Lucian, Scythian 10 ff.

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Well, my own situation is like that of Anacharsis – and please do not resent my likening myself to a man of regal stature, for he too was a barbarian, and no one could say that we Syrians are inferior to Scythians. It is not on grounds of royalty that I compare my situation with his, but rather because we are both barbarians.294 In his self-identification, Lucian demonstrates his awareness of foreign ethnicity and of existing gradations of the classification of barbarism, as he implies differences in the perception of Syrians and Scythians in particular. While he attempts to destabilize the notion of the “barbarian” with respect to the two Scythians, with respect to himself and vis à vis his prospective patron, Lucian identifies himself as ethnically distinct and tries to reify the prevailing perception of the “barbarian” other. Despite the explicit identification on the part of Lucian with Anacharsis, Lucian’s erudition and knowledge of Greek culture and language are comparable with those of Toxaris, who is a highly hellenized foreigner. The implied resemblance between the author and Toxaris suggests the more complex relationship that exists between Lucian and his adoptive Greek culture, as both an insider and an outsider, as well as the multi-facetedness of the notion of the barbarian, which is not merely reduced to incomprehensible speech or to ethnic origin.295 The concept of the “barbarian” is used by Lucian not only in conventional ways in reference to ethnicity, language and education, but it is also employed as a critical category in his attempt to scrutinize Greek language, rhetoric and philosophy. In Hermotimus, or Concerning the Sects, where Lucian launches a sustained attack on a variety of philosophical schools, he argues that virtue belongs to the inhabitants of an ideal city in which foreigners constitute the citizen body, rather than Greeks: “all the inhabitants were aliens and foreigners, not one was native; there were even many barbarians among the citizens, as well as slaves, cripples, dwarfs, and paupers.”296 Lucian questions the ­assumption that Greeks alone possess virtue and, furthermore, he posits that 294 Lucian, Scythian 9: φημὶ δὴ ὅμοιόν τι καὶ αὐτὸς παθεῖν τῷ Ἀναχάρσιδι – καὶ πρὸς Χαρίτων μὴ νεμεσήσητέ μοι τῆς εἰκόνος, εἰ βασιλικῷ ἀνδρὶ ἐμαυτὸν εἴκασα. βάρβαρος μέν γάρ κἀκεῖνος καὶ οὐδέν τι φαίης ἄν τοὺς Σύρους ἡμᾶς φαυλοτέρους εἶναι τῶν Σκυθῶν. ἀτὰρ οὐδέ κατὰ τὸ βασιλικὸν εἰσποιῶ τἀμὰ ἐς τὴν ὁμοιότητα, κατ’ ἐκεῖνα δέ. 295 Lucian introduces other Scythians in his writings, i.e. in Toxaris, which is a discourse on friendship conducted between a Scythian and a Greek, and in Anacharsis, or Athletics, in which a discussion of athletics is presented by a Scythian and a Greek. 296 Lucian, Hermotimus 24: ξύμπαντες μέν ἐπήλυδες καὶ ξένοι εἶεν, αὐθιγενὴς δὲ οὐδὲ μὲν εἷς, ἀλλὰ καὶ βαρβάρους ἐμπολιτεύεσθαι πολλοὺς καὶ δούλους καὶ ἀμόρφους καὶ μικροὺς καὶ πένητας.

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Philosophy,297 which is personified in his Runways, was first sent by Zeus to the barbarian nations, such as Indians, Ethiopians, Egyptians, Chaldeans, Scythians and Thracians, before entering Greek territory, where, according to Lucian, she was severely mistreated.298 In addition to attacking Greek philosophy in general, Lucian also criticizes specific schools by resorting to the same notion of the “barbarian.” For example, in Philosophies for Sale, he exposes Cynics on the basis of their barbarous language and savage demeanor: Let your language be barbarous, your voice discordant, and just like the barking of a dog: let your expression be set and your gait consistent with your expression. In a word, let everything about you be bestial and savage.299 βάρβαρος δὲ ἡ φωνὴ ἔστω καὶ ἀπηχὲς τὸ φθέγμα καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ὅμοιον κυνί, καὶ πρόσωπον δὲ ἐντεταμένον καὶ βάδισμα τοιούτῳ προσώπῳ πρέπον, καὶ ὅλως θηριώδη τὰ πάντα καὶ ἄγρια. In connection with their alleged barbarian character, Cynics are furthermore described in the dialogue as “abominable and inhuman” (μιαρὰ γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώπινα).300 Although the link between Cynics and barbarism may be easily understood by Lucian’s contemporaries, the same may not hold true in the case of Stoics. In Zeus Rants, where Lucian launches a sustained attack on Stoic doctrine, he criticizes Timocles, a Stoic teacher, for his “vulgar and half-barbarian language” (τὴν φωνὴν ἰδιώτης καὶ μιξοβάρβαρος), as well as his lack of fluency, clarity and intelligibility.301 In the above-mentioned instances, the concept of the “barbarian” is used not only to undermine philosophy as a Hellenic enterprise, but also to denigrate it for its failure to communicate or to achieve its professed purposes. In a similar vein, Lucian uses the notion of the “barbarian” with regard to Greek language and oratory and he undermines prevailing cultural norms and practices through his recourse to it. In his Lexiphanes, as its telling title “word-flaunter” suggests, the author undertakes a criticism and a mockery of 297 In the Runways, Philosophy claims to have the task to “educate and instruct the foreigners” (βαρβάρους παιδεύειν καὶ διδάσκειν) before the Greeks. Cf. Runways 6. 298 Lucian, Runways 6 ff. 299 Lucian, Philosophies for Sale 10. 300 Lucian, Philosophies for Sale 10. 301 Lucian, Zeus Rants 27.

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Lexiphanes, a personage whose fascination with antiquated and rare words, reminiscent of the extreme proponents of Atticism, is harshly scrutinized and compared to barbarian pratices. According to Lucian, the designation “Greek” or “Athenian” is an improper reference to Lexiphanes for he “does not deserve to be numbered even among the most intelligible of barbarians” (μηδὲ βαρβὰρων ἐν τοῖς σαφεστάτοις ἀριθμεῖσθαι ἄξιον).302 In addition to his criticism of Atticism characteristic of the Second Sophistic, Lucian also launches an attack on his contemporaries with respect to their pervasive use of rhetoric. As Lucian comes to describe the extreme obsession with antiquated and obscure words as ultimately unintelligible and outlandish, so too does he decide to satirize oratory as being barbarous. In the Professor of Public Speaking, Lucian mocks the current norms of rhetoric by ­satirizing contemporary practitioners of the prevalent trends in oratory, as well as comparing them to foreign speech. In it, the self-professed teacher of rhetoric pronounces: If you commit a solecism or a barbarism, let shamelessness be your sole and only remedy, and be ready at once with the name of someone who is not now alive and never was, either a poet or a historian, saying that he, a learned man, extremely precise in his diction, approved of the expression.303 Thus, Lucian criticizes his contemporaries who were followers of different philosophical branches, practioners of rhetoric and proponents of Atticism alike through a recourse to the notion of the “barbarian.” Therefore, the concept of barbarism does not only serve him as emblematic of his foreign ethnicity and language, but also as a point of poignant critique of contemporary Greco-Roman culture and prevailing practices. Lucian: Barbarism and Self-defense It is important to note, however, that Lucian himself – albeit an astute observer and a caustic critic – is also under attack on the same grounds that he ascribes 302 Lucian, Lexiphanes 23. 303 Lucian, Professor of Public Speaking 17: ἄν σολοικίσῃς δὲ ἢ βαρβαρίσῃς, ἓν ἔστω φάρμακον ἡ ἀναισχυντία, καὶ πρόχειρον εὐθὺς ὄνομα οὔτε ὄντος τινὸς οὔτε γενομένου ποτέ, ἢ ποιητοῦ ἢ συγγρφέως, ὂς οὕτω λέγειν ἐδοκίμαζε σοφὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ τὴν φωνὴν εἰς τὸ ἀκρότατον ἀπηκριβωμένος. See also Lucian’s censure elsewhere in the work: “it [the tongue] can not only solecize and barbarize (σολοικίζειν μόνον καὶ βαρβαρίζειν), not only twaddle and forswear, call names and slander and lie…” Cf. Professor of Public Speaking 23.

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to his contemporaries, namely the barbarization of rhetoric and philosophy. In his self-defense entitled The Double Indictment, or Trials by Jury, Lucian responds to criticism of his own works, which are perceived as not fitting into the category of either rhetoric or philosophy and constitute an admixture of form and content belonging to the two. In his Double Indictment, Lucian introduces the personifications of oratory and philosophy, namely Rhetoric and Dialogue, in order to defend himself against the accusation of barbarism raised against him. Rhetoric, one of the litigants in this imaginary trial, describes the young Lucian as a Syrian and a “barbarian” in terms of his speech and attire as someone “speaking with a foreign accent and … wearing a caftan in the Syrian style” (ὄντα βάρβαρον ἔτι τὴν φωνὴν καὶ μονονουχὶ κύνδυν ἐνδεδυκότα εἰς τὸν Ἀσσύριον τρόπον)304 before his encounter with rhetoric. Similarly, when Lucian responds to the indictment of Dialogue, the second litigant, he confirms the same allegation, as follows: He [Dialogue] cannot complain, I am sure, that I have stripped him of that Greek mantle and shifted him into a barbarian one, even though I myself am considered barbarian. Indeed I should be doing wrong to transgress in that way against him and to steal away his native garb.305 In responding to his accusers, Lucian accedes to the fact that he, being a Syrian, has led to the barbarization of both rhetoric and philosophy proper. In the case of philosophy, Lucian himself specifies that the transformation that Dialogue has undergone is with respect to the subject matter and style.306 Therefore, it becomes clear that, as Lucian tries to defend himself against accusations of barbarizing Greek norms of oratory and philosophy, he uses the concept of “barbarism” in attacking and satirizing his Greek contemporaries. As can be seen from his writings, the concept of the “barbarian” is pervasive in Lucian’s works not merely as a self-reference and self-identification, but also as an accusation that is raised against him, even when he also uses the same concept 304 Lucian, Double Indictment 27. 305 Lucian, Double Indictment 34: ἕκενα οὐκ ἄν οἶμαι μέμψαιτό μοι, ὡς θοἰμάτιον τοῦτο τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν περισπάσας ἀυτοῦ βαρβαρικόν τι μετενέδυσα, καὶ ταῦτα βάρβαρος αὐτὸς εἶναι δοκῶν ἠδίκσιν γὰρ ἂν τὰ τοιαῦτα εἰς αὐτὸν παρανομῶν καὶ τὴν πάτριον ἐσθῆτα λωποδυτῶν. 306 Lucian explains concerning Dialogue, that he has not only taken its “skeleton” by taking away the subject matter and making it “more attractive and agreeable to the public” but has also forced it to “smile” and “paired him with Comedy.” These considerable transformations suggest the opposite of what Lucian apparently claims – namely, the barbarization of Dialogue through its substantive change. Cf. Double Indictment 34.

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in order to undermine the arguments of his opponents. Despite the satirical and comical context in which the concept of barbarism may appear in his literary works, its presence and its force in Lucian’s writings are not to be denied or downplayed. It is precisely in the same context of accusations, self-defense and counter-accusations that Christian apologists, such as the Syrian Tatian and others, come to re-define and contest the notion of the “barbarian,” which often serves in their writings as a self-designation and as a point of attack on Greco-Roman civilization.307

Conclusion

This chapter has presented the Greco-Roman concept of the “barbarian” in the period from the first century bce to the third century ce from the standpoint of three major groups in the Roman empire – Romans, Greeks and “barbarians.” In this presentation of the construction of the “barbarian” in the ancient Greek and Latin sources, it becomes evident that its semantic range is varigated and that its meanings are determined to a large degree by the particular author and the specific motivations for and circumstances of his writings. For example, from the standpoint of the Roman rulers and conquerors, such as Caesar, the “barbarians” are often defined as the external or the internal potential enemy of the Roman state and are typified in terms of ferocity, cruelty, instability, disorder and licentiousness. For Caesar and for Tacitus, the concept of the barbarian delineates the “other” that is in need of constant subordination, control and domination, and it is therefore viewed as posing a threat to the internal stability and the external integrity of the state. Similarly, while for Seneca the notion of the “barbarian” designates the “other,” it is also universalized and internalized in order to include all of humanity, in addition to referring to different categories of the “other” within Roman society. For the Roman authors of the first century bce to second century ce the term “barbarian” serves not only to designate the “other” inside or outside the boundaries 307 See Simon Swain’s commentary on the complex self-identification of Lucian as a Syrian, who has been thoroughly hellenized due to his Greek education, at the same time when he also presents himself as a Roman citizen. This divergent ethnic, cultural and political self-presentation suggests the complex nature of the position of non-Greeks and nonRomans in Roman society. It should be noted that it is precisely his position of an outsider that allows him the distance and the opportunity to express acute criticism of both Greek and Roman perceptions and practices at the time. Cf. Swain, Hellenism and Empire (­Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 312 ff.

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of the Roman Empire, but also to define the “self” in the process of subjection, control and rule over different ethnicities and minority groups. For the rest of the inhabitants of the Roman Empire, such as Greeks and others, the designation “barbarian” has additional connotations not encountered in the Latin material. More importantly, for Greek and other authors in late antiquity, the concept of the barbarian has various significations, as it comes to serve the purpose of self-definition vis à vis Roman society. For Greek authors, such as Aelius Aristides, Dio Chrysostom and Philostratus, who take part in the Second Sophistic movement, the term “barbarian” is most often used in the context of Greek grammar, language, literature, rhetoric and philosophy. When they come to articulate and formulate their own Greek identity in the context of Roman society, they define the “barbarian” in terms that are quite different from the ones encountered in the Latin literature from the period. While Greeks normally perceive themselves as opposed to “barbarians” in many respects, their subordinate political status in the Roman Empire gives the occasion for their self-identification as “barbarian” and their belonging to the category of the “other” along with many other minority groups. Likewise, the Syrian Lucian of Samotasa expresses a notion of the “barbarian” that refers to his own self-understanding and self-definition as an outsider to both Greek culture and Roman society, even when he partakes in both. In accordance with their ethnic origin, cultural familiarity and socio-political position, Roman, Greek and other authors express divers conceptions of the “barbarian” as defining the “other” or the “self.” The wide semantic range of the term “barbarian” in the Greek and Latin literature in antiquity, as well as the conditionality of its understanding and definition, helps illuminate the discursive context in which Christian apologists address the charge of barbarism and articulate their own group identity with respect to it. The discourse of barbarism in the context of Roman society sheds light on the rhetoricalideological dynamics that Christian apologists encounter, as they enter into and position themselves within it.

Chapter 4

The Charge of Barbarism and Greek Christian Apologetic Having presented an overview of the concept of the barbarian in GrecoRoman literature in late antiquity, it is appropriate to examine the particular ways in which early Christian apologists, writing in Greek, understand and use the term “barbarian” and how they define themselves vis à vis the larger hellenized and romanized world which they inhabit. To this end, the focus of this chapter will be on the conceptualization and representation of the notion of the barbarian, as it is launched from outsiders against early Christian groups, as well as the responses given by Christian apologists in an effort to re-define and re-formulate it. More specifically, in order to analyze the charge of barbarism in the Greek apologetic tradition, the works of Justin Martyr, Tatian, Clement, Origen and Eusebius will be taken into consideration. These early Christian apologetic texts span the period from the beginning of the second to the beginning of the fourth centuries and arise from a variety of geographical locations, historical occasions and social contexts. Despite their particularities and divergences that are contingent upon their respective authorship, date of composition, audience and purpose, these works represent the sustained effort of the early Christian apologists to address the charge of barbarism against Christians, as well as to explain their place in the Greco-Roman world both to themselves and to those outside the confines of their religious group. In their response to the charge of barbarism and representation of the notion of the “barbarian,” the apologists assume different rhetorical strategies, as some of them choose to identify themselves and the Christian religion in opposition to Greco-Roman culture, while others chose to define their critics in similar terms by employing the concept of barbarism. For example, the works of Justin, Tatian, Clement and Origen tend to associate Christians with the notion of the barbarian, even when the apologists opt to hurl the same charge against their adversaries. However, Eusebius, writing at the cusp of a new period of toleration, accepts this identification with the concept of the barbarian at the same time when he chooses to identify Christians as the epitome of Romanness. Through their different rhetorical strategies in response to the charge of barbarism, these early Christian apologists reveal their own self-­ definitions and their re-formulations of Christian identity vis à vis the predominant Greco-Roman cultural, religious and political realities. Therefore, the © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���9 | doi 10.1163/9789004306240_005

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analysis of the concept of the barbarian is important not only on account of the actual historical context of the early Christian apologetic writings, but also because of the different attempts on part of the early apologists to a­ rticulate a self-definition for the early Christian movement in reaction to the a­ ccusation of barbarism, as well as other charges related to it.1 4.1

Justin Martyr and the Charge of Barbarism

Justin Martyr,2 who identifies himself as being of Samaritan or “barbarian origin” (γένος)3 and pens two apologetic works in defense of Christians, is an important source for analyzing the charge of barbarism against Christians of the second century.4 His perspective, that of someone who represents himself as a Samaritan or a barbarian by virtue of his ethnic origin, as well as someone who is directly implicated in the punitive actions of Roman authorities against Christians, makes Justin’s position particularly important for an examination of the charge of barbarism. Justin writes in the conditions of sporadic violent actions against his fellow religionists and against himself, as he defends the cause of Christianity both to its Roman and to its Jewish critics. The charge of barbarism takes a significant place in his writings, as he makes reference to the notion of the barbarian with respect to Christians both in his Apologies 1 See Jonathan Z. Smith, “What a Difference a Difference Makes,” in “To See Ourselves as Others See Us”: Christians, Jews and “Others” in Late Antiquity, eds., Jacob Neusner an Ernest Frerich (Chico, California: Scholars, 1985), 3–48. 2 See L.W. Barnard, Justin Martyr: His Life and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967); Eric Osborn, Justin Martyr (Beiträge zur historischen Theologie 47; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1973); Edmond Robillard, Jutin: L’Itinéraire Philosophique (Recherches Nouvelle Série 23; Montréal: Bellarmin, 1989); E.R. Goodenough, The Theology of Jusin Martyr (Jena: Formmann, 1923); Bernard Pouderon and Joseph Doré, eds., Les Apologistes chrétiens et la culture grecque (Théologie Historique 105; Paris: Beauchesne, 1998); N. Hyldahl, Philosophie und Christentum: Eine Interpretation der Einleitung zum Dialog Justins (Acta Theologica Danica ix; Kopenhagen: Munksgaard, 1966); R. Joly, Christianisme et Philosophie: Etudes sur Justin et les Apologistes grec de deuxième siècle (Université Libré de Bruxelles lii; Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1973); J.C.M. van Winden, An Early Christian Philosopher: Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho, chapters one to nine. Introduction, text and commentary (Philosophia Patrum 1; Leiden: Brill, 1971). 3 Justin, Dialogue with Trypho 120.6. 4 There is controversy in scholarship over whether the first and the second apologies of Justin are not in fact one work. For a detailed discussion of the division of the two apologies, see R. Grant, Greek Apologists of the Second Century (Westminster: John Knox, 1988), 54–55; P. Keresztes, “The ‘So-Called’ Second Apology of Justin,” Latomus 24 (1965): 858–869.

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and in his polemic and propagandistic treatise Dialogue with Trypho the Jew. Although his two treatises entitled First and Second Apology and his Dialogue with Trypho differ in content, purpose and rhetorical situation, Justin gives a positive indication in these writings that the charge of barbarism is indeed leveled against Christians by their detractors and outside opponents. Justin Martyr: Social Inferiority and the Charge of Barbarism In his First Apology Justin identifies Christians with barbarians in an unequivocal manner, although this designation is made on the basis of social distinction rather than foreign origin or an incomprehensible tongue. In it, Justin indicates the fact that the social position, as well as the physical traits and intellectual characteristics, of some of the constituents of the Christian religion are castigated as being “barbarian.” The post-colonial critic Edward Said describes a similar cultural phenomenon when he explains that the discourse of orientalism presents the “oriental” subjects as problems and as individuals that are backward, uncivilized and degenerate. Said notes the association of the colonial oriental subject and elements in western society, such as “delinquents, the insane, women, the poor” who are perceived as “lamentably alien.”5 Likewise, when he explicates points of Christian doctrine, Justin makes the following observation: Among us these things can be heard and learned from persons who do not even know the forms of the letters, who are uneducated and barbarous in speech, though wise and believing in mind; some indeed maimed and deprived of eyesight (Παρ’ ἡμῖν οὖν ἔστι ταῦτα ἀκοῦσαι καὶ μαθεῖν παρὰ τῶν οὐδὲ τοὺς χαρακτῆρας τῶν στοιχείων ἐπισταμένων, ἰδιωτῶν μὲν καὶ βαρβάρων τὸ φθέγμα σοφῶν δὲ καὶ πιστῶν τὸν νοῦν ὄντων, πηρῶν καὶ χήρων τινῶν τὰς ὄψεις); so that you may understand these things are not the effect of human wisdom, but are uttered by the power of God.6 According to Justin, Christians are not designated as being “barbarian” with respect to their foreign ethnicity or strange language, but they are rather perceived as such in connection with their educational, intellectual, and physical deficiencies, in addition to their lack of credibility and low social status.7 It is 5 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient (Reprint, New York: Random House, 1994), 207. 6 Justin, First Apology 60.11. 7 For analysis of the evidence on the spread of literacy in the Roman Empire, see William V. Harris, Ancient Literacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 175–285.

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also interesting that the apologist does not deny such castigations of his fellow believers and, in fact, he proceeds to explain why the Christian movement is composed of different classes of individuals with a wide variety of attributes and abilities. Furthermore, in his defense of Christians against the charge of barbarism, he posits an opposition between those who are “foolish” (ἰδιῶται) and the “wise” (σὸφοί), rather than denying the charge as such. In spite of his admission to their apparent lack of education, social standing and intellectual pedigree, he refers to Christians as being illiterate and “barbarous in speech” (βαρβάρων τὸ φθέγμα), at the same time when he also claims that they are wise “in mind” (νοῦς).8 It is thus a reversal of binary categories, such as educated and non-educated, wise and foolish, that Justin tries to achieve in his defense of Christians, rather than denying the designation of Christians as being barbarian per se.9 It becomes clear from the accusation and the response given by Justin that the early Christian community does not discriminate on the basis of social class, education, physical abilities or intellectual capacity. Unlike the ancient Roman priestly collegia and existing religious cults in the Roman Empire that were admitting only the uppermost segment of society and usually carried social and political prestige, the early Christian community that Justin is defending seems to be disparate and widely variegated, including highly educated individuals like himself and many others who were perceived as socially inferior due to their physical, intellectual, and educational inadequacies. Justin Martyr: Ethnicity and the Charge of Barbarism In addition to the identification of Christians as being barbarian on the basis of their low social position and perceived mental inadequacy and physical incapacity, Justin indicates in his writings that Christians are also viewed as “barbarian” on the basis of their ethnic origin.10 For example, he mentions in his Dialogue with Trypho that the allegation that Christians are barbarian was launched by outsiders on the basis of perceived ethnic differences. When Justin argues for the legitimacy of the Christian religion, he describes Christians as a collective entity by referring to them as a “people” (λαός), and he also 8 Justin, First Apology 60.11. 9 For a similar opposition between the “wise” and the “foolish,” see 2 Corinthians 10–11, where Paul shows that one derogatory term can be turned on its head and turned against the accusers. 10 On the construction of ethnicity and race in early Christian discourse, see Denise Buell, Why This New Race: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Id., “Race and Universalism in Early Christianity,” jecs 10:4 (2002): 429–468; Id., “Rethinking the Relevance of Race for Early Christian Self-Definition,” htr 94 (2001): 449–476.

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makes the assertion that they come to replace the chosen Jewish people.11 In his polemical argumentation against his imaginary Jewish interlocutor Trypho in his Dialogue, Justin writes:12 But we are not only a people but also a holy people… Therefore, we are not a people to be despised, nor a barbarous tribe, nor such as the Carian and Phrygian nations (Ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ μόνον λαὸς ἀλλὰ καὶ λαὸς ἅγιος ἐσμεν ... Οὐκοῦν οὐκ εὐκαταφρόνητος δῆμός ἐσμεν οὐδὲ βάρβαρον φῦλον οὐδὲ ὁποῖα Καρῶν ἢ Φρυγῶν ἔθνη); but God has chosen us, and He has become manifest to those who asked not after Him.13 In the context of this work, it is not entirely clear who levels the allegation that Christians are a “barbarous tribe” (βάρβαρον φῦλον) or comparable to the “nations” (ἔθνη) that are viewed negatively, although one might assume that the charge is a product of polemic with Jews in particular, rather than ­another group.14 Whether the allegation that Christians are “barbarian” is made by ­Jewish opponents or others,15 it is important to note that the proponents of Christianity are compared with different ethnic groups that are perceived negatively in ­Greco-Roman society. The specific ethnic designations of “nation/s” 11

For further discussion of the supercessionist claims made by Justin in his Dialogue, see Tessa Rajak, “Talking at Trypho: Christian Apologetic as Anti-Judaism in Justin’s Dialogue with Trypho the Jew,” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire, eds., M. Edwards, M. Goodman, and S. Price (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 59–80. See also Judith Lieu, Image and Reality (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 177–182. 12 The question of the existence of Jewish-Christian polemic in the first few centuries ce has been discussed by many scholars. For example, see A. Harnack, “Die Altercatio Simois Judaei et Theophili Christiani, nebst Untersuchungen über die antijüdische Polemik der alten Kirche,” Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichens Literatur 1, 3 (1883); J. Parkes, The Conflict of the Church and the Synagogue: A Study in the Origins of Antisemitism (London: Soncino, 1934); L.A. Williams, Adversus Judaeos, A Birds’s Eye View of Christian Apologiae until the Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1935); M. Simon, Verus Isreal: A Study of the Relations between Christians and Jews in the Roman Empire (135–425) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); D. Rokeah, Jews, Pagans and Christians (Jerusalem: Leiden, 1982); H. Schreckenberg, Die Christlichen Adversus-JudaeosTexte und ihr literarisches und historisches Umwelt (1–11Jh.) (Frankfurt a.M: P. Lang, 1982). 13 Justin, Dialogue with Trypho 119.4. 14 Justin, Dialogue with Trypho 119.4. 15 See Justin’s enumeration of the allegations of Jews in particular against Christians: “For other nations have not inflicted on us and on Christ this wrong to such an extent as you have, who in every deed are the authors of wicked prejudice against the Just One, and us who hold by Him.” Cf. Dialogue with Trypho 17.

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(δῆμος, ἔθνη), “tribe”(φῦλον), and “people” (λαός) in reference to Christians is notable in the context of the Dialogue with Trypho, as well as the association with particular foreign groups that were negatively viewed and represented, such as the Carians and the Phrygians.16 Moreover, the specific groups that are associated with Christians are designated as being “despised,”17 so that the association of Christians with other foreign ethnicities clearly points to an intensely negative perception of these groups in late antiquity. It is also important to note that the allegation that Christians are “barbarians” ought to be read in the larger context of the Dialogue with Trypho and within the broader argument which Justin develops in this text. In it, Justin Martyr argues with Trypho, a literarily constructed Jewish interlocutor, that the Christian gospel carries a universal message of salvation applicable to all, rather than being addressed to a single nation. In contrast, Justin makes assertions for the inclusion of all nations in the promises of Abraham and his descendants when he claims: “As, therefore, all these latter prophecies refer to Christ and the nations, you should believe that the former refer to Him and them in like manner.”18 To this end, Justin juxtaposes Christianity per se to ­Judaism, which he chooses to limit as applicable to one ethnic group alone.19 He explains: For there is not one single race of men, whether barbarians, or Greeks, or whatever they may be called, nomads, or vagrants or herdsmen living in tents, among whom prayers and giving of thanks are not offered through the name of the crucified Jesus...20 Οὐδὲ ἓν γὰρ ὅλως ἐστί τι γένος ἀνθρώπων, εἴτε βαρβάρων εἴτε Ἑλλήνων εἴτε ἁπλῶς ᾡτινιοῦν ὀνόματι προσαγορευμένων, ἢ ἁμαξοβίων ἢ ἀοίκων καλουμένων ἢ ἐν σκηναῖς κτηνοτρόφων οἰκούντων, ἐν οἷς μὴ διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος τοῦ σταυρωθέντος Ἰησοῦ… 16

On the use of terms designating ethnicity for the construction of Christian identity, see Denise K. Buell, This New Race?: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 94–37. 17 Justin, Dialogue with Trypho 119.4. 18 Justin, Dialogue with Trypho 123. For a similar train of argumentation, see also later assertions in Dialogue with Trypho 130 ff. 19 For a thorough analysis of Justin’s construction of “Jews” and “Judaism,” see David Rokeah, Justin Martyr and the Jews (Jewish and Christian Perspectives Series 5; Leiden: Brill, 2002). See also Judith Lieu, Image and Reality (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 103–154. 20 Justin, Dialogue with Trypho 117.5.

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As Paul writes in his Epistle to the Romans, which is addressed to a community of both Jewish and Gentile believers, that he is under obligation “both to Greeks and to barbarians, both to the wise and to the foolish,”21 Justin emphasizes the spread of Christianity irrespective of ethnic differences and geographical boundaries. Since the claim for the universal reach of the Christian religion and the supersessionist argument with regard to the Jewish people22 are central to the treatise, it is important to understand the use of terms referring to ethnicity in Justin’s Dialogue in the context of his larger assertion regarding the expansion of the promise made to Abraham to include both Jews and Gentiles. The assertion that Christians are “barbarian” and the analogy drawn with other foreign nations should be read in the specific context of the Dialogue and the terms of Justin’s anti-Jewish polemic, which stresses the purported limitations imposed by the Jewish religion at the time and the claim for the universality of Christianity.23 It should be noted that despite Justin’s attempt to emphasize the broad appeal of Christianity in his polemic against the rival Jewish religion, the designation “barbarian” is indicative of the negative perceptions of Christians by outsiders, whether Gentile or Jewish. Unlike the Dialogue, which is heavily polemical in its argumentation against both the Jewish people and Judaism,24 Justin’s First and Second Apologies stem from an entirely different rhetorical situation, as he addresses the highest Roman state officials and pleads the case of Christians.25 The explicit addressees for the two apologies are not literarily constructed interlocutors for 21 22 23

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Paul, Letter to the Romans 1:14. Cf. Denise Buell, Why This New Race?: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 94–115. Cf. Tessa Rajak, “Talking at Trypho: Christian Apologetic as Anti-Judaism in Justin’s Dialogue with Trypho the Jew,” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire, eds., M. Edwards, M. Goodman, and S. Price (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 59–68. When considering the address of Justin’s Dialogue, for example, Tessa Rajak notes the problems inherent in the proposition that this book was composed for the purposes of conversion of Jews, on account of its hostile attacks against Jews, and posits that it was primarily meant for a Christian readership instead. (Cf. Tessa Rajak, “Talking at Trypho: Christian Apologetic as Anti-Judaism in Justin’s Dialogue with Trypho the Jew,” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire, eds., M. Edwards, M. Goodman, and S. Price (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 77–80). See also E.R. Goodenough, Theology of Justin Martyr: An Investigation into the Conception of Early Christian Literature and Its Hellenistic and Jewish Influences (Amsterdam: Philo, 1960), 99; Theodore Stylianopoulos, Justin Martyr and the Mosaic Law (Dissertation Series 20; Society of Biblical Literature; Missoula: Scholars, 1975). R.M. Grant argues based on internal textual evidence that the Apology was composed in the period between 155 and 157 and he furthermore connects the composition of Justin’s apologetic works to the martyrdom of Polycarp, the bishop of Smyrna, which took

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propagandistic and missionizing purposes but rather the official authorities, including the emperors of Rome. Justin opens his First Apology in the ­following manner: To the emperor Titus Aelius Adrianus Antoninus Pius Augustus Caesar and to his son Verissumus the Philosopher and to Lucius the Philosopher, the natural son of Caesar, and the adopted son of Pius, a lover of learning and to the sacred Senate, and to the whole people of the Romans, i, Justin the son of Priscus and grandson of Bacchius, natives of Flavia Neapolis in Palestine, present this address and petition on behalf of all those nations who are unjustly hated and wantonly abused, myself being one of them.26 Αὐτοκράτορι Τίτῳ Αἰλίῳ Ἀδριανῷ Ἀντωνίνῳ Εὐσεβεῖ Σεβαστιῷ Καίσαρι, καὶ Οὐηρισσίμῳ υἱῷ Φιλοσόφῳ, καὶ Λουκίῳ Φιλοσόφῳ, Καίσαρος φύσει υἱῷ καὶ Εὐσεβοῦς εἰσποιητῷ, ἐραστῇ παιδείας, Ἱερᾷ τε Ζυγκλήτῳ καὶ Δήμῳ παντὶ Ῥωμαίων, ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκ παντὸς γένους ἀνθρώπων ἀδίκως μισουμένων καὶ ἐπηρεαζομένων, Ἰουστῖνος Πρίσκου τοῦ Βακχείου, τῶν ἀπὸ Φλαουΐας Νέας πόλωες τῆς Ζυρίας Παλαιστίνης, εἷς αὐτῶν ὤν, τὴν προσφώνησιν καὶ ἔντευξιν πεποίημαι. Likewise, the address of his Second Apology is made to the citizens of Rome in general, although Justin mentions specific names of Roman governors involved in trials against Christians. He opens his Second Apology in the following way: Romans, the things that have recently happened in your city under ­Urbicus, and the things which are likewise being everywhere unreasonably done by the governors, have compelled me to frame this composition for your sakes, who are men of like passions, and brethren, though you do not know it, and though you are unwilling to acknowledge it on account of your glorying in what you esteem dignities.27 Justin specifically addresses Urbicus when criticizing his punishment of a Christian teacher, Ptolemaeus, and writes: “Why have you not punished this man as an adulterer, nor a fornicator, nor murderer, nor thief, nor robber, nor place in 155 or 156. See R. Grant, Greek Apologists of the Second Century (Westminster: John Knox, 1988), 52–53. 26 Justin, First Apology 1. 27 Justin, Second Apology 1.

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convicted of any crime at all, but who has only confessed that he is called by the name of Christian? This judgment of yours, O Urbicus, does not become the Emperor Pius, nor the philosopher, the son of Caesar, nor the sacred senate.”28 While Justin addresses in his two apologies the official Roman authorities involved in actions against Christians, as well as the Senate and the people of Rome, he also identifies himself as being of foreign origin, coming from the Roman province of Palestine, and also describes other Christians as representing the “nations” (γένεις).29 The emphasis on the ethnic distinction between Justin in particular and Christians in general, on the one hand, and Romans, on the other, coheres with a similar distinction made between Jews and Christians in his Dialogue with Trypho. The fact that in Justin’s apologetic and polemical works Christians are associated with different ethnic groups that were viewed negatively indicates not only their perception by outsiders, whether Jews, Greeks or Romans, as being “barbarian” but also the self-articulation of Christians through the category of the barbarian. Such terms as “nation” (γένος, δῆμος), “tribe” (φῦλος) and “people” (λαός) used in reference to Christians either by their opponents or by Christian authors themselves point to the adoption of these categories by Christians in their claims for legitimacy vis à vis both Jews and Romans, as well as their attempt to arrive at a self-definition. On the one hand, Justin claims the terminology of nation, tribe and people to polemicize against potential or actual Jewish opponents and, on the other hand, he uses the very same terms to claim legitimacy for Christians within the context of their Jewish ancestral tradition.30 While identifying Christians with foreign groups in response to his Jewish opponents for the sake of their inclusion in the Abrahamic promises, Justin chooses to identify Christians with foreign peoples, and in particular with Jews, in response to other critics. The association of Christians with Jews specifically is not surprising, as the two groups were often perceived by outsiders as closely linked. For example, in his explication of Christian beliefs and practices, Justin aligns Christians with Jews and assumes they can be identified as “barbarian” with regard to Greeks.31 In this way, he asserts not only the foreign origin of the Jewish religion, thus demarcating Jews as being “barbarian,” but he also does the same for Christians. When he argues that 28 Justin, Second Apology 2. 29 Justin, First Apology 1. 30 On the polemical and apologetic uses of ethnic designations for the purposes of selflegitimation, see the critical work of Denise Buell, Why This New Race?: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 35–62. 31 Justin, First Apology 7.3.

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the name “Christian” is not a sufficient ground for condemnation and that each individual should be judged on the basis of his or her own deeds, rather than merely on the basis of the name Χριστιανοί Justin posits a clear opposition between Greeks, on the one hand, and Christians as “barbarians,” on the other: And this we acknowledge, that among the Greeks those who teach such theories as please themselves are all called by one name “philosopher,” though their doctrines be diverse; so also among the barbarians this name on which accusations are accumulated is the common property of those who are and those who seem wise (ἐν βαρβάροις γενομένων καὶ δοξάντων σοφῶν τὸ ἐπικατηγορούμενον ὄνομα κοινόν ἐστι). For all are called Christians.32 In his address to the state authorities and people of Rome, the opposition of “Christians” and “Greeks” is not accidental for Justin, as he emphasizes the connection between Christians and the Jewish ethnic and religious group in particular. It is also noteworthy that Justin chooses to oppose “Christian” and “Greek” in this instance, rather than “Christian” and “Roman,” as he invokes Greek philosophy in particular for building his argument in defense of Christians. The identification “Greek” should not be read as being entirely in opposition to “Roman,” as the apologist makes references to the philosophical leanings of the ruling emperors and their connection with the Greek cultural heritage. For example, Antoninus Pius’ rule, following the reign of Hadrian, is also noted for his interest in Greek culture and for his program for its preservation, as is witnessed by his letters to Greek cities in the eastern provinces forbidding innovation and fostering hellenic heritage.33 While Justin assumes the validity of the charge of barbarism34 and identifies Christians as being barbarian,35 he also emphasizes the existence of a connection between the cultural achievements of Greeks and Jews.36 In his First Apology Justin draws an 32 Justin, First Apology 7.3. 33 For a commentary on inscriptions testifying to Antoninus’ addresses to Greek cities, see A.S. Benjamin, “Two Dedications in Athens to Archons of the Panhellenion,” Hesperia 37 (1968). See citation of Melito in Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History 4.26.10. 34 Justin, First Apology 60.11. 35 Justin, First Apology 7.3. 36 Henry Chadwick argues that Justin has a positive evaluation of Greek culture and, in particular, Greek philosophy and claims that Justin sees Christianity and the best elements of Greek philosophy as “almost identical ways of apprehending the same truth.” (Cf. Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition: Studies in Justin, Clement,

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analogy between Greek philosophical ideas and Jewish biblical teachings and he posits that there is a harmony between ancient Greek philosophy and the Mosaic law, even when claiming a dependency of the former upon the latter. He argues, for example, for the antiquity and veracity of Moses’ tradition and the plagiarism of Plato when he writes: “And so, too, Plato when he says, “The blame is his who chooses, and God is blameless,” took this from the prophet Moses and uttered it. For Moses is more ancient than all the Greek writers. And whatever both philosophers and poets have said about concerning immortality of the soul, or punishment after death, or contemplation of things heavenly, or doctrines of the like kind, they have received such suggestions from the prophets as have enabled them to understand and interpret these things. And hence there seem to be seeds of truth among all men; but they are charged with inaccurately understanding when they assert contradictories.”37 Justin’s assertion of the derivation of Greek philosophical ideas from the Mosaic legal tradition and Hebrew prophetic writings leads him to deduce not only its secondary nature but also incompleteness and inferiority of Greek philosophy on account of the more ancient traditions of the Hebrews. Therefore, Justin boldly asserts that anything that is true in Greek philosophical writings pertains to Christians as well as Jews, while all false ideas are attributed to human misunderstanding and the erroneous teachings of the ancient philosophers.38 In this way, he elevates the stature and the value of the Hebrew traditions at the same time when tempering and accepting some parts of Greek philosophy that are consistent with Christianity.

and Origen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 11). This opinion is contradicted by Arthur Droge who posits that the appeal for similarity between Jewish and Christian traditions and Greek culture only serve his purposes of proving their superiority and antiquity. He explains: “Greek philosophy, and Platonism in particular, has only an imperfect understanding of the truth because it is rife with contradictions and errors. Christianity, on the other hand, represents truth in fullness. Its relation to philosophy is therefore one of completion and above all correction.” Cf. Arthur Droge, Homer or Moses?: Early Christian Interpretations of the History of Culture (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1989), 53. 37 Justin, First Apology 44. 38 Justin elaborates on this point: “I confess that I both pray and strive with all my strength to be found a Christian; not because the teachings of Plato are altogether foreign to those of Christ, but because they do not in all respects coincide, as do neither those of the others: Stoics, poets, and historians. Since they have contradicted themselves even in the principle doctrines, they appear not to have possessed spiritual understanding and irrefutable knowledge. Therefore whatever things were rightly said among all men belong to us Christians.” Cf. First Apology 13.2–4.

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Justin Martyr: Logos and the Charge of Barbarism In addition to connecting Jewish religious texts with ancient Greek writings on the basis of their antiquity and truthfulness,39 the apologist stresses the commonality between Christianity and Greek philosophy per se.40 He is not led to this position only because philosophers, similar to Christians of his day, were often perceived to hold atheistic views, as they rejected the prevalent religious views but also because he considers philosophy to be the summit of hellenic civilization.41 He expounds on the connections between the two and makes the following claims: “But being carried away by fear, and not knowing that these were evil demons, they called them gods, and gave to each the name which each of the demons chose for himself. But ... we say that those who did these things are not gods, but wicked and impious demons, whose actions will not bear comparison with those men desirous of virtue. Hence we are called atheists.”42 Justin connects Christianity and Hebrew Scripture to Greek philosophy in particular, because he understands the tenets of the new religion to comply with the teachings of influential Greek thinkers and especially Socrates and Plato.43 He accepts the validity of the intellectual achievements of Greek philosophers and presents the core of the Christian belief system as analogous to their expositions. It is not insignificant that Justin assumes the persona of a ­philosopher in his Dialogue, in which he presents himself as having gone through a variety of different schools of philosophy before his conversion to Christianity.44 Nonetheless, the admission of common ground b­ etween 39

In fact, Justin develops two parallel arguments in support of Greek philosophy: one is in support of the antiquity and veracity of Jewish literature, which has been plagiarized by Greeks and others (see section above); the other is the claim for possession of “reason” by all humanity and the capacity to arrive at formulation of the truth and appreciation of virtue through the power of reason (see section below). These two arguments are on the surface contradictory but they need not exclude each other. See A. Droge, Homer or Moses?: Early Christian Interpretations of the History of Culture (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1989), 53–54. 40 Justin, First Apology 5, 13, 20. Cf. Second Apology 8, 10, 12, 13. 41 Cf. Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition: Studies in Justin, Clement, and Origen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 11 ff. 42 Justin, First Apology 5.3–6.1. 43 Justin makes reference to Socrates (First Apology 5), Plato (First Apology 8), as well as to Stoic philosophy (Second Apology 8) and to Epicureanism (Second Apology 12). 44 Some scholars have accepted this self-identification, while others have been more skeptical of Justin’s self-stylization as a philosopher. For example, Barnard argues that “the account of Justin’s philosophical quest as recorded in Dial. ii is based on sound historical tradition – namely that Justin really underwent instruction at the hands of a Stoic teacher,

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Christian teachings and Greek philosophy is made with one significant qualification: Justin claims that before Christ, presented by the apologist in philosophical terms as the supreme Λόγος, there have been followers of the ­Christian god or Logos among Greeks and barbarians alike. Justin clarifies this point of commonality as follows: We have been taught that Christ is the first-born of God, and we have declared above that He is the Word (Λόγος) of whom every race of men were partakers; and those who lived reasonably (μετὰ λόγου) are Christians, even though they have been atheists; as among the Greeks, Socrates and Heraclitus, and men like them; and among the barbarians, Abraham, and Azarias, and Misael, and Elias, and many others whose actions and names we now decline to recount, because we know it would be tedious. So that even they who lived before Christ, and lived without reason, were wicked and hostile to Christ, and slew those who lived reasonably (Ὧστε καὶ οἱ προγενόμενοι ἄνευ λόγου βιώσαντες ἄχρηστοι καὶ ἐχθροὶ τῷ Χριστῷ ἦσαν καὶ φονεῖς τῶν μετὰ λόγου βιούντων· οἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου βιώσαντες καὶ βιοῦντες χριστιανοὶ καὶ ἄφοβοι καὶ ἀτάραχοι ὑπάρχουσι).45 According to Justin, the sole criterion for distinguishing “Christians,” both before and after the incarnation, is namely the possession of “reason” or logos rather than the adherence to a particular philosophical, intellectual or religious tradition. In the Second Apology he explains his conception of the partaking of λόγος, which he strictly understands as Christ, by non-Christians per se and states that “the seed of reason [is] implanted in every race of men” (ἔμφυτον παντὶ γένει ἀνθρώπων σπέρμα τοῦ λόγου).46 In his defense of the name Χριστιανοί, Justin defines it in terms familiar to the educated class of Roman elites, who were normally familiar with Greek philosophical writings. He introduces Socrates as a paragon of Christian existence and asserts that his life and a Peripatetic, a Pythagorean and finally the Platonists.” (Cf. Barnard, Justin Martyr: His Life and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 11). In contrast, Goodenough asserts “the chances are very probable that Justin’s adventures in the philosophical schools are as ideal as his conversation with the old man which introduced him to Christianity.” (Cf. Goodenough, Theology of Justin Martyr: An Investigation into the Conception of Early Christian Literature and Its Hellenistic and Jewish Influences (Amsterdam: Philo, 1960), 58). For a detailed analysis of Justin’s self-presentation as a philosopher, see also J.C.M. van Winden, An Early Christian Philosopher: Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho, chapters one to nine. Introduction, text and commentary (Leiden: Brill, 1971). 45 Justin, First Apology 46. 46 Justin, Second Apology 8.

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death capture the essence of Jesus’ teachings.47 Justin claims that before Christ every nation partook in “reason” (λόγος) and, in particular, points to Greek philosophers who benefited the most from a large share in it.48 Socrates, being Justin’s preferred example of a philosopher, is said to have “partially known” Christ (Χριστῷ δέ, τῷ καὶ ὑπὸ Σωκράτους ἀπὸ μέρους γνωσθέντι),49 thus implying that the famous Greek philosopher has also died on account of his familiarity with the founder of Christianity. In reference to Socrates, Justin elaborates: And when Socrates endeavored, by true reason and examination, to bring these things to light [i.e. that the gods are demons], and deliver men from the demons, then the demons themselves, by means of men who rejoiced in iniquity, compassed his death, as an atheist and a profane person, on the charge that “he was introducing new divinities”; and in our case they display similar activity. For not only among the Greeks did reason prevail to condemn these things through Socrates, but also among the barbarians were they condemned by reason, who took shape, and became man (οὐ γὰρ μόνον Ἕλλησι διὰ Σωκράτους ὑπὸ λόγου ἠλέγχθη ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν βαρβάροις ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου μορφωθέντος καὶ ἀνθρώπου γενομένου), and was called Jesus Christ.50 Furthermore, Justin asserts that the pursuit of Christians and philosophers is the same: seeking the truth, as opposed to human opinion and public norm.51 In this way, the apologist is able to present Christians as embodying the highest ideals of Greek philosophers, who in search of the truth are often forced to deny received notions, established traditions and accepted customs. Justin highlights the fact that ideally philosophers are guided by rational impulses in their pursuit of the truth, for which they are also ready to undergo punishment, as is exemplified by the public trial and death of Socrates.52 Nonetheless, despite the fact that Justin concedes to a participation of all humanity in logos, which he identifies strictly with Christ, he sees it only as a partial participation in the truth since the entirety of the Word/Reason (λόγος) is understood to be the incarnation. Justin explains:

47 Justin, First Apology 5. 48 Justin, First Apology 46. 49 Justin, Second Apology 10. 50 Justin, First Apology 5. 51 Justin, First Apology 12. 52 Justin, Second Apology 10.

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... Christ, who appeared for our sakes, became the whole rational being, both body, and reason and soul. For whatever either lawgivers or philosophers uttered, they elaborated by finding and contemplating part of the Word. But since they did not know the whole of the Word, which is Christ, contradicted themselves.53 ... τὸ λογικὸν τὸ ὅλον τὸν φανέντα δι’ ἡμᾶς Χριστὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ σῶμα καὶ λόγον καὶ ψυχήν. Ὅσα γὰρ καλῶς ἀεὶ ἐφθέγξαντο καὶ εὗρον οἱ φιλοσοφήσαντες ἢ νομοθετήσαντες, κατὰ λόγου μέρος δι’ εὑρέσεως καὶ θεωρίας ἐστὶ πονηθέντα αὐτοῖς. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐ πάντα τὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐγνώρισαν, ὅς ἐστι Χριστός, καὶ ἐναντία ἑαυτοῖς πολλάκις εἶπον. Ιn spite of the parallel that Justin draws between Greek philosophy and Christianity, as well as individual philosophers and Jesus Christ, he introduces an hierarchy that subordinates the former to the latter. This hierarchy between (Greek) philosophy and (barbarian) Christianity, as a later development of Judaism, is predicated on the completeness and the antiquity of one and the derivative nature of the other.54 His argument for the subordination of Greek philosophy to both Jewish and Christian teachings, however, undermines to a certain extent his assertion that all nations have a share in “reason” without the necessity for plagiarism from the Hebrew scriptures. It is noteworthy that while Justin asserts that Plato has borrowed ideas from the Mosaic law,55 he never suggests that Socrates had recourse to the Bible, for whom he claims the application of “reason” as his sole avenue to discovering the truth. While Justin highlights the commonality between Socrates and Christ on the basis of reason or logos, on the one hand, he stresses the commonality between Plato’s writings and Hebrew scripture on the basis of textual borrowings and interpretations, on the other. Whereas Justin demonstrates a very positive valuation of Socrates and asserts his connection to Jesus Christ in particular, this is not the case for Plato, who is accused of incapacity to fully comprehend and articulate what he has allegedly stolen from the biblical texts.56 For example, Justin claims that Plato has taken the idea of “free will” from Moses.57 When Justin explains free will, which he sees as being linked to the accountability for one’s actions, he compares it to 53 Justin, Second Apology 10. 54 Justin, First Apology 44. 55 Justin, First Apology 44. 56 Justin, First Apology 44. 57 Justin, First Apology 44.

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a similar doctrine in Plato’s writings.58 Likewise, Justin claims that Plato borrowed from Moses the idea of the creation of the world through the ordering of shapeless matter through the rational principle of logos.59 Furthermore, Justin understands Plato’s explanation of the creation of the cosmos in the Timaeus to constitute another borrowing from Moses. Justin presents Plato’s explanation of creation in the exposition in the Timaeus as indicative of both a borrowing and misconstrual of the biblical text, when he writes “[Plato] taking it [the cross] to be a placing crosswise, he said that the power next to the first God was placed crosswise in the universe.”60 Plato is blamed for reading and “not accurately understanding, and not apprehending that it was the figure of the cross” when he came across the account of Moses and the serpent in the wilderness.61 As a consequence, according to Justin, Plato, reading Moses, agrees with the doctrine of the Trinity by incorporating the three persons of the deity in his account of the creation of the world: the first God, the Logos and the Spirit.62 In spite of the apparent contradictions and disagreements between Plato’s dialogues and biblical passages on account of his alleged misconstrual, Justin implies that there is an agreement between Plato’s views and those of Christians, as the philosopher used the writings of the Hebrew prophets as a source for his ideas. Whether based on the universal possession and application of reason/logos or on the textual borrowings from the Hebrew Bible, therefore, Justin presents the partial validity of Greek philosophy and its commonality with both Jewish and Christian literature. It should be noted that, although Justin lays emphasis on philosophy in his defense of Christians against allegations of atheism and immorality, he also claims that the Greek poets have also plundered the writings of the more ancient Hebrew prophets and have masqueraded them as their own opinions.63 In addition, Justin draws a parallel between Christian doctrines and biblical texts, on the one hand, and Roman religion and mythology, on the other.64 For example, the apologist highlights in numerous accounts the agreement between the writings of the poets and those of the prophets:65 he provides analogies between Christ and the sons of Jupiter, i.e. Mercury, in his capacity as a 58 Justin, First Apology 44. 59 Justin, First Apology 59. 60 Justin, First Apology 60. 61 Justin, First Apology 60. 62 Justin, First Apology 60. 63 Justin, First Apology 44. 64 Justin, First Apology 20 ff. 65 Justin, First Apology 20.

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teacher, and Asclepius, in his capacity as a physician and as someone who has ascended to heaven, in addition to other gods in the Roman pantheon.66 Furthermore, Justin draws a comparison between the story of the miraculous birth of Jesus and the extraordinary birth of Mercury, as well as pointing to Jesus’ passion and death by comparing them to the suffering and death of the sons of Jupiter.67 Similar to the comparison with Greek philosophical doctrines, the parallels between Roman mythology and the biography of Jesus emphasize the contiguity between Roman religion and Christianity. However, as in the case of Greek philosophy, the sameness between Greco-Roman myths and Christianity is highlighted but also subordinated to the idea of borrowing and purposeful deception.68 Justin claims that whereas Greek philosophers were unable to entirely grasp the writings of the Hebrew prophets, the demons, who allegedly inspired the poets, have purposefully misrepresented the words of the prophets.69 For instance, Justin posits that Bacchus (Dionysius) is associated with a donkey, which is assumed by the apologist to be a sign of the coming of Jesus, and is said to have ascended to heaven; likewise, by a mistaken association, Perseus is said to have been born from a virgin, while Asclepius was thought of as healing every illness.70 According to Justin, all of these characteristics of Roman deities are qualities belonging to Jesus and are also to be found in the Hebrew prophetic literature. Justin’s train of argumentation leads implicitly to the conclusion that Jesus constitutes a higher synthesis of the Roman pantheon, representing the most typifying features of widely revered Roman gods. According to Justin, therefore, Roman mythology, in addition to Greek philosophy, captures a segment of the truth that is represented by Christianity. In conclusion, in his response to the charge of barbarism against Christians, Justin does concede to the foreign origin of Christianity, while he argues for its analogous role and superior standing vis à vis Roman religion and Greek philosophy. While he takes the charge of barbarism in its various aspects seriously and responds to it, he also defends Christians against it on the basis of a program that underscores the underlying links between Christianity and the philosophical ideas and religious views of the hellenized Roman elites. Rather 66 Justin, First Apology 21–22. 67 Justin, First Apology 22. 68 In his analysis of Justin’s apologetic work, Droge highlights the fact that Justin explains the similarities between Greco-Roman religion and Christianity on the basis of the activity of demons, who allegedly try to deceive by mimicking the true religion. See Arthur Droge, Homer or Moses?: Early Christian Interpretations of the History of Culture (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1989), 53–55. Cf. Justin, First Apology 5–6. 69 Justin, First Apology 50 ff. 70 Justin, First Apology 54.

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than severing any interconnections between his own, “barbarian” tradition and Greco-Roman philosophy and religion, Justin emphasizes their points of commonality, at the same time when he posits the superiority of the Hebrew and Christian religious texts and traditions.71 This rhetorical strategy aiming at a conciliation between Christianity and Greco-Roman culture is contrasted in particular by his student Tatian, to whose apologetic work we turn next. 4.2

Tatian and the Charge of Barbarism

More than any other early Christian apologist, Tatian72 parses the identification of Christians with barbarians at the same time when he also argues consistently throughout his Address to the Greeks against his supposed opponents,73 whom he addresses as “men of Greece” (ῶ ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες), largely on the basis of such an accusation.74 The rhetorical approach that Tatian assumes is very different from that of his teacher and predecessor, Justin Martyr.75 Similar to 71 72

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See Henry Chadwick, Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition: Studies in Justin, Clement, and Origen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 11 ff. For further discussion of Tatian’s works, see Emily Hunt, Christianity in the Second Century: The Case of Tatian (London: Routledge, 2003); R.M. Grant, “Five Apologists and Marcus Aurelius,” Vigiliae Christianae 42 no. 1 (1988): 1–17; Id., Greek Apologists of the Second Century (Westminster: John Knox, 1988), 112–132; Id., “The Heresy of Tatian,” jts 5 (1954): 62–68; Aimé Puech, Les Apologistes grecs de IIe siècle de notre ère (Paris: Hachette, 1912); Id., Recherches sure le Discours aux Grec de Tatien (Paris: Hachette, 1913); R.C. Kukula, Tatians sogennante Apologie (Leipzig: Tübner, 1900); Molly Whittaker, Tatian, Oratio ad Graecos and Fragments. Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982); Id., “Tatian’s Educational Background,” StPatr 13 (1975): 57–59; L.W. Barnard, “The Heresy of Tatian – Once Again,” jeh 19 (1968): 1–10; G.F. Hawthorne, “Tatian and His Discourse to the Greeks,” htr 57 (1964): 161–188; G.W. Clarke, “The Date of the Oration of Tatian,” htr 60 (1967): 122–126; Martin Elze, Tatian und seine Theologie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1960); See also Robert F. Shedinger, Tatian and the Jewish Scriptures: A Textual and Philological Analysis of the Old Testament Citations in Tatian’s Diatessaron. (Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium 51; Louvain: Peeters, 2001); Gilles Quispel, Tatian and the Gospel of Thomas (Leiden: Brill, 1975). Tatian mentions at the beginning of his Address to the Greeks (Τατιανοῦ πρὸς Ἕλληνας) the “men of Greece” (ῶ ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες) as his addressees. Cf. Address to the Greeks 1. Compare Justin’s mention of the concept of barbarism in connection with Christians in First Apology 5.4, 7.3, 46.3, 60.11 and Dialogue with Trypho 119.4 to the mention of the same in Tatian’s Address to the Greeks 1.1, 1.3, 12.5, 26.4, 28.1, 29.1, 30.1, 35.1, 35.2, 42.1. On the influence of Justin’s teachings upon Tatian, see Emily Hunt, Christianity in the Second Century: The Case of Tatian (London: Routledge, 2003), 52–73. Hunt argues for a strong

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Justin, Tatian chooses not to deny that Christians are described as “barbarian,” a term that is understood in his work to denote a wide spectrum of negative valences. Unlike Justin, however, Tatian subverts all existing (presumably Greek) categories and received notions, such as barbarianness and Greekness, by successfully breaking down and dissolving them. Tatian’s approach is similar to the postcolonial analysis of subjectivity of the literary theorist Gayatri Spivak, who questions the presentation of the colonial other as a diametrically opposed and monolithic construct against the colonist and she emphasizes the heterogeneity of the “subaltern” subject in order to subvert the binary system of representations of the two.76 Likewise, the postcolonial critic Homi Bhabha underlines the “hybridity” of the colonizer and the colonized, the self and the other, and points to the possibility for both resistance and self-construction on part of the colonized subject in the domain of semiotics, especially through the process of “translation.”77 It is striking that Homi Bhabha indicates the possibility for re-signification and destabilization of the dominant colonial discourse by the colonized, rather than presenting the colonial subject as

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connection between Justin and his student Tatian, than has been assumed in scholarship due to Tatian’s alleged heretical Valentinian and Encratite leanings. She writes: “The number of parallels between Justin and Tatian’s Oration are in fact considerable... I believe that the weight of the cumulative evidence strongly suggests that Justin exerted a substantial influence over his pupil. At any rate, Tatian certainly has more in common with his master than he does with the Valentinians, and I believe that some of Tatian’s purported “Valentinian” tendencies can be explained in reference to his teacher.” (Cf. Christianity in the Second Century: The Case of Tatian (London: Routledge, 2003), 73). Hunt dismantles anachronistic scholarly assumptions of Tatian’s heretical tendencies as she demonstrates the impact of hellenistic philosophy and, in particular Middle Platonism, on his biblical exegesis, as is the case with Justin, and, furthermore, she contextualizes Tatian in the Syriac Christian tradition. Hunt explains: “It is very difficult indeed to identify a heretical Encratite sect amidst the strong asceticism of early Syriac Christianity. Whilst it is true that several texts of Syriac provenance have been labelled “Encratite,” this seems to have been based entirely on their ascetic content. The label “Encratite” originates with the western heresiologists, and we should remember that the heresiologists had agendas of their own. What seems radical in the West as regards ascetic practices appears to have been the norm in the East, and whilst Tatian is denounced as an arch-heretic in the West, in the East the “heresy” of Tatian passed over in silence – a silence that seems very significant in its acceptance of Tatian’s views.” Cf. Hunt, Christianity in the Second Century: The Case of Tatian (London: Routledge, 2003), 154–155. G. Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak? Speculations on a Widow Sacrifice,” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, eds., Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 286. Cf. Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994), 139 ff.

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passive and silent. In turning to language and re-definition of concepts, such as “barbarian” and “Greek,” Tatian demonstrates the power of both translation and resistance to prevailing norms of representations that Bhabha addresses in his critique of post-coloniality. Thus, Tatian’s oration, being a parody of a speech, satirizes and subverts serious charges leveled against Christians and thus achieves a persuasive power that a more rational exposition, as exemplified by Justin’s apologetic and polemic works, achieves on the basis of logical reasoning.78 In addition to the unique rhetorical style and peculiar manner of exposition and argumentation, the content of Tatian’s masterful apology79 is characterized by its singular emphasis on the notion of the “barbarian” vis à vis his own self-definition and his understanding of the early Christian movement. The highly rhetorical nature of the oration is revealed, for example, by Tatian’s choice of addressees, namely the abstract category of the “men of Greece” 78 79

Cf. Michael McGehee, “Why Tatian Never “Apologized” to the Greeks,” jecs 1:2 (1993): 143–158. Whether or not Tatian is to be considered an “apologist” is an issue of unresolved scholarly debate. Tatian’s work has been regarded mainly under several rubrics: apology, diatribe, protrepticus, logos eisiterios (convocation lecture) and logos syntaktikos (farewell discourse). In spite of its vituperative style, the work is referred to as an apology by the majority of scholars. (Cf. Barnard, “The Heresy of Tatian,” jts 5 (1954), 10; Hawthorne, “Tatian and His Discourse to the Greeks,” htr 57 (1964), 161; Puech, Les Apologistes grecs de IIe siècle de notre ère (Paris: Hachette, 1912), 167; Puech, Recherches sure le Discours aux Grec de Tatien (Paris: Hachette, 1913), 4). In spite of the usual classification of the work as an apology, some scholars acknowledge the difficulty of this classification on account of the vituperative style and they refer to it as a diatribe. (Cf. Osborne, Tatian: A Literary Analysis and Essay in Interpretation (Ph.D. diss., University of Cincinnati, 1969), 28; Barnard, “The Heresy of Tatian,” jts 5 (1954), 1, 9.) Other scholars, such as McGehee, have identified the genre of Tatian’s work as protrepticus. McGehee specifically connects the genre of Tatian’s oration to one branch of protreptic discourse, namely the teaching one, as he argues that Tatian intended to attract students to his self-professed barbarian philosophy (Epictetus 3.23.33–38). (Cf. McGehee, “Why Tatian Never Apologized,” jecs 1:2 (1993), 143–150.) Furthermore, Kukula has identified the genre of Tatian’s work as ­logos eisiterios or convocation lecture, as he explains that “eine Inaugurationsrede ist, die wirklich einmal zur E ­ roffnung einer Schule von Tatian gesprochen worden ist.” (Cf. Kukula, Tatians sogennante Apologie (Leipzig: Tübner, 1900), 51.) R.M. Grant has furthermore identified the genre as logos syntaktikos or a farewell discourse to Greek and Roman culture and refers to the classifications of literary genres in Menander’s rhetorical handbook in specific. Instead of understanding the oration as an exercise in vituperation (psogos) or diatribe, he sees it as a leave-taking address. (Cf. R. Grant, Greek Apologists of the Second Century (Westminster: John Knox, 1988), 115–117).

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(ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες),80 rather than referring to the official Roman authorities, as is the case with other apologetic works.81 Tatian’s choice of addressing “Greeks” rather than “Romans” should be seen in the context of Marcus Aurelius’ penchant for Greek philosophy and culture, but also in connection with his father Antoninus Pius’ concern for the preservation of Greek heritage in the late Roman Empire. There is evidence that both Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius wrote letters between 147 and 161 in which the emperors explicitly forbade innovations and addressed specifically eastern Greek cities, such as Larissa, Thessalonica, Athens, as well as “all the Hellenes (Panhellenion)” or the Panhellenic Council of Asia established by Hadrian in 131–132.82 Antoninus Pius also composed similar letters to cities located in Macedonia, Thessaly and Achaia, in addition to the Panhellenic Council.83 It is precisely in the context of the continuation, preservation and revival of hellenic heritage by the Roman emperors that Tatian’s address to “Greek” citizens rather than to Roman emperors and state officials is to be understood. The express audience of Tatian’s oration is therefore a non-specific rhetorical construction of the author rather than a reference to concrete individuals connected to any concrete historical circumstances of his time.84 In his attempt 80 81

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Cf. Tatian, Address to the Greeks 1, 4, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 21, 25, 30, 42. Compare Justin’s express addresses in his First Apology to the Roman emperors, Senate and the Roman people (First Apology 1) and his express address to the Roman people in his Second Apology as he proposes to criticize the actions of the local governors (Second Apology 1). In spite of this more general reference, Justin addresses a concrete audience in his Second Apology, when her refers to the events leading to the trials and punishments of Christians, rather than the abstract audience that Tatian presents in his Address to the Greeks. Compare also Tertullian’s address of the Apology to “the magistrates of the Roman Empire” (Romani imperii antistites), when he writes in defense of Christians. (Cf. Apology 1). See the report of Melito found in Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 4.26.10. See J.A.O. Larsen, “Cyrene and the Panhellenion” in Classical Philology 47 (1952): 7–16; J.H. Oliver, Marcus Aurelius: Aspects of Civic and Cultural Policy in the East, Hesperia. Supplement 13 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 114–115. It should be mentioned here that there is scholarly debate as to the precise dating of Tatian’s work. According to R.M. Grant the date of composition of Tatian’s Address to the Greeks is around 177 or 178, after the martyrdoms at Vienne and Lyons in Gaul of 177 during the reign of Marcus Aurelius. Grant argues on the basis of a textual analysis of the text for a presence of Valentian elements and assumes a later date in agreement with Irenaeus’ assertion of Tatian’s apostasy after the death of Justin. L.W. Barnard, however, disagrees with this late date and posits that the work was written shortly before Justin’s death at around 160. For a detailed argumentation for the precise date of the oration, see Grant, Greek Apologists of the Second Century (Westminster: John Knox, 1988), 113–115. For

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to demonstrate that the categories of “Greek” and “barbarian” are artificially constructed, rather than actual, Tatian chooses to address an imaginary and abstract audience rather than actual historical personages of his time. In his work Tatian refers to the notion of “Greek/ness” in its full semantic range, and he includes the following sub-categories: the sciences,85 the arts,86 language,87 rhetoric,88 philosophy,89 mythology,90 religion,91 laws,92 medicine,93 as well as cultural practices, such as public games,94 festivals95 and theater.96 He deconstructs these different aspects of what is normally denoted by the designation “Hellenic” and undermines them through recourse to the notion of the “barbarian.” Tatian’s deconstruction intended to not merely bring Greek language, culture and society down to the level of their barbarian counterparts but also to subordinate and to denigrate them. In response to the charge of barbarism, Tatian proceeds to prove in his oration that what is “Greek” has no real existence and essence in itself, as it consists only of borrowed elements from barbarian nations. As a result, Tatian posits that Hellenic civilization owes its very existence and its highest achievements to its extensive borrowings from other nations, which it has disguised as its own. Whereas Tatian elevates and reifies the “barbarian” as a superior category, things “Greek” are shown to be lacking in any value or significance.97

arguments against Grant’s proposition for a later date, see Barnard, “The Heresy of Tatian,” jts 5 (1954), 10; G.W. Clarke, “The Date of the Oration of Tatian,” htr 60 (1967), 122– 126; see also Emily Hunt, Christianity in the Second Century: The Case of Tatian (London: Routledge, 2003), 3–25. In particular, Emily Hunt offers a careful analysis of the alleged Valentinian influences on Tatian’s work and dismantles the argument that such tendencies exist in Tatian’s Address. 85 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 18. 86 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 26. 87 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 1, 26. 88 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 1, 26. 89 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 2, 3, 19, 25, 31, 35. 90 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 8, 10, 21, 22. 91 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 8, 10, 21, 22. 92 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 28. 93 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 18. 94 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 23. 95 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 22. 96 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 24. 97 See Tatian’s argument for the antiquity of “barbarian” wisdom and philosophy (cf. Address to the Greeks 21) and his presentation of the antiquity of Moses with respect to Greek authors and philosophers (cf. Address to the Greeks 36–40).

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Tatian: The Charge of Barbarism and the Destabilization of “Greekness” Greek language is the first and foremost characteristic of Hellenic identity, and it is not surprising that Tatian highlights its centrality,98 as the concept of the “barbarian” is primarily associated with incomprehensible and inarticulate speech from the standpoint of the Greek-speaker.99 Tatian is aware that etymologically the word bar-bar-ian (βάρβαρος) is an onomatopoetic word designating someone who speaks a language incomprehensible to the ear of the Greek-speaker. In his apology, Tatian responds to the charge of barbarism, as he first disputes the existence of a unitary Greek language, which in the context of the contemporary Second Sophistic movement is understood to be the classical form of Attic Greek.100 Tatian takes the opportunity to attack the artificiality of the revival of Attic Greek by criticizing the proponents of Atticism. In support of his argument for the non-existence of a unitary Greek language, the apologist points to the fact that Greeks de facto differ in the pronunciation of their language: But as matters stand, to you alone it has happened not to speak alike even in common discourse; for the way of speaking among the Dorians is not the same as that of the inhabitants of Attica, nor do the Aeolians speak like the Ionians. And, since such a discrepancy exists where it ought not to be, I am at a loss whom to call Greek.101 Νῦν δὲ μόνοις ὑμῖν ἀποβέβηκε μηδὲ ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις ὁμοφωνεῖν· Δωριέων μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ λέξις τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀττικῆς, Αἰολεῖς τε οὐχ ὁμοίως τοῖς Ἴωσι φθέγγονται. Στάσεως δὲ οὔσης τοσαύτης παρ’ οἷς οὐκ ἐχρῆν, ἀπορῶ τίνα με δεῖ καλεῖν Ἕλληνα. 98 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 1, 26. 99 Scholars agree that in his criticism of the binary construction of “Greek/ness” and “barbarian/ness,” Tatian relies on a long existing tradition of Greek writers who denigrate Hellenic culture. (Cf. Letters of Anacharsis; Strabo. Geography 7.3.7). See Arthur Droge, Homer or Moses?: Early Christian Interpretations of the History of Culture (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1989), 85–91; H. Dörrie, “Die Wertung der Barbaren im Urteil der Griechen,” in Antike und Universalgeschichte: Festschrift H.E. Stier (Münster: Aschendorf, 1972), 146–175; R. MacMullen, Enemies of the Roman Order: Treason, Unrest, and Alienation in the Empire (Reprint, Eugene, or: Wipf and Stock, 2001), 221–223, 359; L. Alfonsi, “Taziano i barbari: Une nota,” Romanobarbarica 2 (1977): 5–9. 100 On the prominent place of Atticism in the Second Sophistic, see Simon Swain, ­Hellenism and Empire: Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World ad 50–250 (Oxford: ­Clarendon Press, 1996), 17–42. 101 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 1.

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According to Tatian, Greek language per se does not exist, for it consists of a multitude of different dialects, such as Ionian, Dorian and others. This state of disunity and confusion in the pronunciation of the “Greek” language is furthermore amplified by its barbarization through its adoption of foreign words. In order to demonstrate the barbarianness of Greek language, Tatian remarks: “by the intermixture of barbaric words [you] have made your language a medley (βαρβαρικαῖς τε φωναῖς ἔσθ’ ὅτε καταχρώμενοι συμφύρδην ὑμῶν πεποιήκατε τὴν διάλεκτον).102 Therefore, the Greek language is doubly discredited for its diversity of local dialects and for its inclusion of foreign words. Tatian launches an attack on the Attic dialect in particular, as it is the accepted standard version of the language in the context of the ancient grammar school, as well as the public assembly. He considers the attempt to speak in the Attic dialect to be a demonstration of an artificial discourse, as well as an admission of the existence of other, allegedly “barbarous” forms of the “Greek” language.103 He writes evocatively by stating a series of rhetorical questions, as follows: Why, O man, do you set the letters of the alphabet at war with one another? Why do you, as in a boxing match, make their sounds clash together with your mincing the Attic way of speaking, whereas you ought to speak more according to nature? For if you adopt the Attic dialect, though not an Athenian, why do you not speak like the Dorians? How is it that one appears to you more barbarian and the other more pleasant for discourse?104 Τί γάρ, ἄνθρωπε, τῶν γραμμάτων ἐξαρτύεις τὸν πόλεμον; Τί δὲ ὡς ἐν πυγμῇ συγκρούεις τὰς ἐκφωνήσεις αὐτῶν διὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ψελλισμῶν, δέον δὲ λαλεῖν φυσικώτερον; Εἰ γὰρ ἀττικίζεις οὐκ ὤν Ἀθηναῖος, λέγε μοὶ τοῦ μὴ Δωρίζειν τὴν αἰτίαν· Πῶς τὸ μὲν εἶναί σοι δοκεῖ βαρβαρικῶτερον, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὁμιλίαν ἱλαρώτερον;

102 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 1. 103 Tatian’s critique of the pedantry of the proponents of Atticism is similarly voiced by Lucian of Samotasa and especially his allusion to war of the letters in his Consonants in Court, where Lucian describes a lawsuit brought by Sigma against the atticizing use of Tau. See the detailed discussion of Lucian’s writings in the last section of the previous chapter. 104 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 26.

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Tatian claims that the unnatural and forced attempt to speak, and thereby to spoil, the Attic dialect indicates that some forms of Greek language are considered to be better suited for speech, while others are regarded as strange and unpleasant for the listener. As a result, Tatian demonstrates that Greek ­language – the Attic and all other dialects – can be regarded as “barbarian” in so far as it is mispronounced, variegated in accordance with geographical locale and interspersed with foreign words. In this manner, in terms of language, which is the chief identification of the “barbarian” vis à vis the “Greek,” Greekness is shown to be comparable and analogous to its “barbarian” counterpart. In conjunction with the deconstruction of Greek language, Tatian also denigrates the Greek manner of speech and rhetoric.105 The apologist launches an attack on what he perceives to be the arrogance of the “men of Greece,” who allegedly claim the right for public discussion to the exclusion of others.106 In his critique of the art of rhetoric, Tatian resorts to the opposition of “words” and “actions” and he pits two main elements against each other in order to debunk Greek oratory.107 Whereas Tatian understands the Hellenic contribution to be in the domain of “words” and sophistry, he highlights the contribution of their barbarian counterparts to be in other more important domains of human knowledge and expertise. In contradistinction to the Hellenic art of rhetoric, Tatian enumerates the important contributions of other ethnic groups in the following manner: Be not, O Greeks, so very hostilely disposed towards the barbarians, nor look with ill will on their opinions. For which of your institutions has not been derived from the barbarians? (Μὴ πάνυ φιλέχθρως διατίθεσθε πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, μηδὲ φθονήσητε τοῖς τούτων δόγμασι. Ποῖον γὰρ ἐπιτήδευμα παρ’ ὑμῖν τὴν σύστασιν οὐκ ἀπὸ βαρβάρων ἐκτήσατο;) The most eminent of the Telmessians invented the art of divining dreams; the Carians, that of prognosticating by the stars; the Phrygians and the most ancient Isaurians, augury by the flight of the birds; the Cyprians, the art of inspecting victims. To the Babylonians you owe astronomy; to the Persians, magic; to the Egyptians, geometry; to the Phoenicians, instruction by alphabetic writing. Cease, then, to miscall these imitations 105 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 1, 26. 106 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 26. 107 Tatian writes: “While you arrogate to yourselves the sole right of discussion, you discourse like the blind man with the deaf. Why do you handle the builder’s tools without knowing how to build? Why do you busy yourselves with words, while you keep aloof from deeds, puffed up with praise, but cast down by misfortunes?” (Cf. Address to the Greeks 26).

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inventions of your own. Orpheus, again, taught you poetry and the song; from him you too learned the mysteries. The Tuscans taught you the plastic art; from the annals of the Egyptians you learned to write history; you acquired the art of playing the flute from Marsyas and Olympus – these two rustic Phrygians constructed the harmony of the shepherd’s pipe. The Tyrrhenians invented the trumpet; the Cyclopes, the smith’s art; and a woman who was formerly a queen of the Persians, as Hellanicus tells us, the method of joining together epistolary tablets; her name was Atossa. Wherefore lay aside this conceit and be not ever boasting of your elegance of diction...108 Tatian accuses Greeks for misrepresenting some of the above-mentioned inventions (εὑρέσεις) as their own, rather than properly calling them imitations (μιμήσεις) of foreign creations.109 In this manner, that which presents itself as being “Greek” is found to be “barbarian” and to be masquerading as something else. While Tatian claims that it is the “barbarian” that brings originality to human culture, Greeks allegedly capitalize on it. Similarly, Tatian argues that Greeks have borrowed from the Hebrew scriptures, as they have done with regard to other foreign ethnic groups. Once again, he critiques the misuse of rhetorical skill in the act of transmission of knowledge through recourse to barbarian inventions, when he states: For many of the sophists among them [Greeks], stimulated by curiosity, endeavored to adulterate whatever they learned from Moses, and from those who have philosophized like him, first that they might be considered as having something of their own, and secondly, that covering up by a certain rhetorical artifice whatever things they did not understand, they might misrepresent the truth as if it were fable.110 Πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ κατ’ αὐτοὺς σοφισταί, κεχρημένοι περιεργίᾳ, τὰ ὅσα παρὰ τῶν κατὰ Μωυσέα καὶ τῶν ὁμοίως αὐτῷ φιλοσοφούντων ἔγνωσαν καὶ πραχαράττειν ἐπειράθησαν, πρῶτον μὲν ἵνα τι λέγειν ἴδιον νομισθῶσι, δεύτερον δὲ ὅπως, τὰ

108 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 1. 109 For a detailed discussion of Tatian’s use of Greek sources in support of his catalogue of “barbarian” achievements, see A. Droge, Homer or Moses?: Early Christian Interpretations of the History of Culture (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1989), 87–89. See also Puech, Recherches sure le Discours aux Grec de Tatien (Paris: Hachette, 1913), 39 ff. 110 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 40.

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ὅσα μὴ συνίεσαν διά τινος ἐπιπλάστου ῥητολογίας παρακαλύπτοντες, ὡς μυθολογίαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν πραπρεσβεύωσι. While Tatian posits that the knowledge possessed by Greeks comes from foreign groups, he concludes that the sole Hellenic contribution belongs to the sphere of oratory. His verdict on Greek rhetoric is a harsh one, as the apologist polemicizes against his opponents. He asserts boldly: “If each city-state were to take its contribution to your speech, your fallacies would lose their power” (Ἑκάστη πόλις ἐὰν ἀφέληται τὴν ἰδίαν αὐτῆς ἀφ’ ἡμῶν λέξιν, ἐξαδυνατήσουσιν ὑμῖν τὰ σοφίσματα).111 As Greek language is demonstrated to be a mixture of different dialects, so too are Greek writings critiqued by Tatian for being convoluted and deceptive.112 Tatian caricatures Greeks as being “profuse in words, but with minds strangely warped” (ῥήμασι μὲν στωμύλοι, γνώμην δὲ ἔχοντες ἀλλόκοτον)113 so that the state of the “Greek” language and the state of the Hellenic mind reflect each other. Furthermore, when the apologist addresses the art of rhetoric, which he understands to be Greek in origin and nature, he blames his opponents for putting it in the service of “injustice and slander,” as well as for the purpose of generating profit and money.114 In this manner, Tatian is disqualifying the sole achievement of the Greeks as “speech for hire”115 employed for deceit, and for camouflaging, rather than conferring any actual significance.116 Tatian’s sharp denigration of Greek rhetoric, like his critique of the Greek language, reflects the indebtedness of Hellenes to barbarians. Furthermore, Tatian addresses philosophy as a defining element of Greek culture and constitutive of Greek identity, and he proceeds to deconstruct it in order to show the utter vacuity of the designation “Greek,” as well as to recuperate the significance of the notion of the “barbarian.” While his predecessor Justin Martyr attempts to emphasize the common ground between Greek philosophy and Christianity and tries to recuperate respected philosophers, such 111 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 26. 112 Tatian explains: “The reading of your books is like walking through a labyrinth, and their readers resemble the cask of the Danaids... The grammarians have been the beginning of this idle talk; and you who parcel out wisdom are cut off from the wisdom that is according to truth, and assign the names of the several parts to particular men; and you know not God but in your fierce contention destroy one another.” Cf. Address to the Greeks 21. 113 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 14. 114 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 1. 115 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 1. 116 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 26.

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as Socrates and Plato, as being in line with foundational biblical teachings, Tatian instead slanders and discredits the ancient philosophers.117 Tatian not only ridicules Greek philosophers, such as Diogenes, Plato and Aristotle, but he also accuses them of holding conflicting opinions and forming cliques that are violently opposed to one another.118 For example, the apologist resorts to abusive language when he mocks the shabby appearance of the Cynics, whom he views as imitating and competing with irrational animals.119 Moreover, Tatian does not treat in any serious manner the ideas of famous ancient philosophers but rather resorts to slander and ridicule. In a cursory manner, the apologist claims that the teachings of Greek philosophers are irrational, as instantiated by Aristotle’s limitation of providence120 and Zeno’s proposition of the conflagration and the renewal of life.121 Apart from tendentious and sarcastic remarks with regard to select philosophical writings, the apologist does not engage in an extended explanation or refutation of these. However, he accuses philosophers of vices, such as gluttony, deception, monetary gain, public fame, and sexual immoralities, including pederasty (παιδεραστία).122 More importantly, Tatian’s intent is to show the state of confusion reigning in the field of Greek philosophy, which comes to support his critical view of Greek language and rhetoric.123 He contrasts the disharmony among the different philosophical doctrines and the controversy among philosophers and, in contrast, points to the unity and agreement of those who follow the “word of God” (λόγος Θεοῦ).124 In opposition to the linguistic confusion, the misuse of rhetoric and the ­inner contradictions of ancient philosophy, Tatian presents Christianity as supplanting and surpassing the preoccupation of the Greek grammarians, rhetoricians and philosophers with λόγος understood as word, logical speech or a rational principle of order. The apologist explains the Christian understanding of Jesus as the Λόγος who, according to him, is the first-begotten of God and comes into existence through participation in the “logos-power” of God (λογικῆς δυνάμεως).125 Additionally, Tatian draws an analogy between ­human 117 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 2, 3, 19, 25, 31, 35. 118 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 2–3. 119 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 25. 120 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 2. 121 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 3. 122 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 19. 123 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 3. 124 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 25. 125 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 5.

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speech and the personification of the Logos in Jesus Christ. He explains that, as human beings apply speech in order to bring order to the existing state of confusion, so too the supreme Logos, or Jesus Christ, has brought an order to the chaos by the creation of the world. He explains: I who converse do not become destitute of speech by the transmission of speech, but by the utterance of my voice I endeavor to reduce to order the unarranged matter in your minds. And as the Logos, begotten in the beginning…, so I too, in imitation of the Logos, … am trying to reduce to order the confused matter which is kindred to myself.126 Καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ λαλῶ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἀκούετε, καὶ οὐ δήπου διὰ τῆς μεταβάσεως τοῦ λόγου κενὸς ὁ προσομιλῶν λόγου γίνομαι· προβαλλόμενος δὲ τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ φωνὴν διακοσμεῖν τὴν ἐν ὑμῖν ἀκόσμητον ὕλην προῄρημαι. Καὶ καθάπερ ὁ λόγος ἐν ἀρχῇ ... οὕτω κἀγώ, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου μίμησιν ... μεταρρυθμίζω τῆς συγγενοῦς ὕλης τὴν σύγχυσιν. In contrast to the disorder in Greek language, speech and thought that Tatian presents, he portrays Christians as the ones who follow and understand the true Logos. He sees the Logos not only as the embodiment of Jesus, but also as “spirit emanating from the Father and a Logos from the Logos-power”127 and all of humanity created in the image of God as possessing a share of it.128 In contrast to Greeks who, according to Tatian, strive to study and to introduce systematic order and rationality (logos) in the domains of grammar, rhetoric and philosophy, it is Christians who are presented as understanding and possessing its power.129 In opposition to the disorder on the side of things Greek, Tatian contrasts the harmony of Christians, as the disciples of the Logos.130 Therefore, as he deconstructs “Greek/ness” to the level of words, language and speech, all of which are reflective of the processes of thought and intellection, and shows it to be wanting, he presents the Christian doctrine of the Logos in defense of its barbarian counterpart.131 126 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 5. 127 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 7. 128 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 7. 129 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 5, 7. 130 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 5. 131 In a similar train of argumentation, Tatian makes an extended treatment of medicine, which is commonly associated with the practice of Greeks across the Roman Empire.

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In addition to the condemnation of philosophy, the second-century apologist derides the existing legal system, which he considers to be inconsistent and variable in accordance with the laws of a particular city or province in the Roman Empire. Tatian notes the barbarian character of Roman legislature and the inclusion of Persian, Latin, Greek and other codes of law in it.132 He points to the contradictions that result from the admixture of different sets of laws, as certain actions may be considered honorable and acceptable in certain locales, while in other places they might be regarded as unlawful and punishable.133 In his commentary on the Roman legal tradition, it becomes apparent that Tatian’s criticism of the existing laws is most likely occasioned by a similar allegation vis à vis Christians. When Tatian pleads a fair hearing for the “barbaric code of laws” to which he adheres, he points to the negative perception of Christians by comparing them to other foreign nations: You who do not reject with contempt the Scythian Anacharsis, do not disdain to be taught by those who follow a barbaric code of laws. Give at least a favorable reception to our tenets, as you would to the prognostication of the Babylonians.134 Καὶ οἱ τὸν Σκύθην Ἀνάχαρσιν μὴ ἀποσκορακίζοντες καὶ νῦν μὴ ἀναξιοπαθήσητε παρὰ τοῖς βαρβαρικῇ νομοθεσίᾳ παρακολουθοῦσι παιδεύεσθαι. Χρήσασθε τοῖς δόγμασιν ἡμῶν, κἂν ὡς τῇ κατὰ Βαγυλωνίους προγνωστικῇ. The ground on which Tatian is asking for a fair hearing and court justice on behalf of Christians is the alleged respect that Romans hold for foreign groups, including the Babylonians and even the Scythians, who were usually viewed negatively in antiquity. Tatian posits that as Greeks and Romans have borrowed and found valuable the cultural achievements of various ethnic groups and foreign civilizations, so too they are likely to find the new Christian beliefs and practices both respectable and socially beneficial. It is noteworthy that Tatian does not deny the description of Christian practices in terms of the notion Accordingly, the study and practice of medicine are considered to represent a trust in matter, rather than the powers of God to heal. The apologist claims that Christians do not believe in the “system of matter” (ὕλης οἰκονομίᾳ) by having a recourse to “dog with grass, or stag with a viper, or the hog with river-crabs” for obtaining a cure but, instead, believe in the power of the Logos to procure a remedy. Cf. Address to the Greeks 18. 132 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 28. 133 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 28. 134 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 12.

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of the “barbarian,” as well as the fact that the apologist demonstrates the barbarian elements of Roman legislation in the late antique period. In a similar vein, the modern postcolonial critic Homi Bhabha elaborates on the processes of “hybridization” in colonial contexts and points to the ambivalence and ambiguity of the identity of the colonizer and the colonized, as he notes the ability of the colonized subjects to resist and to subvert the claims of the dominant discourse through its “translation,” transmutation and re-definition of both terms and texts.135 In this way, Tatian strives to make Roman laws equivalent to the different sets of laws pertaining to a wide variety of ethnic groups included in the territory of the late Roman Empire. He suggests that as Romans are comparable to other foreign groups whether in or outside the borders of the Roman state, so too are Christians to be regarded on par with them. It should also be noted that Tatian refers explicitly to two specific charges raised against Christians, both of which have a bearing on the concept of barbarism. One of the allegations that he mentions is in reference to Christians not participating in Roman religious rituals136 and the other is the alleged practice of cannibalism.137 The apologist defends Christian believers by explaining their position on worship of the genius of the emperor, while he denies the second charge vehemently. Nonetheless, allegations that Christians are cannibalistic or that they refuse to participate in the imperial cult automatically imply that they are viewed as engaging in illegal and anti-Roman practices. In response to these grave charges, Tatian paints a caricature of Greco-Roman mythology and religious practices, as well as popular holidays and official celebrations which are the cornerstones of private and public life in late antique society.138 He is especially critical of the immorality and inhumanity that are exemplified by the poets, the actors and the gladiators in equal measure. For example, he accuses the Greek and Roman pantheon of gods, as well as the theater-goers, of cannibalism, as he asserts: “it is among you that Pelops is made a supper for the gods, although beloved by Poseidon, and Kronos devours his children, and Zeus swallows Metis.”139 More than the versified tales of the poets, he finds the unnatural enactment of the actors140 and the violent exhibitions of the gladiators141 to be highly problematic and indicative of Roman culture and society. 135 Cf. Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994), 30 ff. 136 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 4.1. 137 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 25.3. 138 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 8, 10, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25. 139 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 25. 140 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 22, 24. 141 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 23.

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He describes a gladiatorial combat as a “cannibal banquet for the soul”142 and thus raises the very same charge of barbarism against the Roman people that is also leveled by his contemporaries against Christians. In countering the charge of barbarism and various allegations connected with it, including atheism and cannibalism, Tatian prefers to demonstrate the barbaric features of Greco-­ Roman civilization, as these are deeply embedded in the religious system and in the public affairs of the Roman state. Tatian: Barbarism and Self-Definition Tatian’s personal testimony and his self-identification as a quintessential “barbarian” lend further credence to the association of Christians with barbarians that is both assumed and acknowledged by him. For instance, to the high Attic style of Greek language, Tatian contrasts his own foreign tongue and Syrian origin, as well as his adherence to a “barbarian philosophy” and system of laws:143 These things, O Greeks, I, Tatian, a disciple of barbarian philosophy, have composed for you. I was born in the land of the Assyrians, having been first instructed in your doctrines, and afterwards in those which I now undertake to proclaim.144 Ταῦθ’ ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, ὁ κατὰ βαρβάρους φιλοσοφῶν Τατιανὸς συνέταξα, γεννηθεὶς μὲν ἐν τῇ τῶν Ἀσσυρίων γῇ, παιδευθεὶς δὲ προτῶν μὲν τὰ ὑμέτερα, δεύτερον δὲ ἅτινα νῦν κηρύττειν ἐπαγγέλλομαι. 142 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 23. 143 In his treatment of Tatian’s work, Waszink, in agreement with Kukulka, argues that “barbarian” is not to be understood in reference to Christian, but rather as a broader category inclusive of other groups, and he explains: “at the beginning of chapter 21 Tatian calls Moses, whom he opposes to Homer, πάσης βαρβάρου σοφίας ἀρχηγόν. The absence of an article clearly shows that Tatian knows of more than one form of βάρβαρος σοφία and this, combined with the fact that, like here, βάρβαρος is used throughout the Oration as the opposite of Ἕλλην, and that in the first chapter the term βάρβαρος does include a great number of nations (among them Babylonians, Persians, and Egyptians), and, finally, that Tatian also mentions Anacharsis the Scythian (12.5), makes it certain that by βάρβαρος σοφία Tatian meant not the wisdom of the Jews but that of the Barbarians.” (Cf. Waszink, “Some Observations,” on the “Philosophy of the Barbarians in Early Christian Literature,” in Mélanges offerts à Mlle. Christine Mohrmann, eds., L.J. Engels et al. (Utrecht: Spectrum), 51). See also Kukala, “Was bedeuten die Namen Ἕλληνες und Βάρβαροι in der altchristlichen Apologetik?” in Festschrift Theodor Gomperz, ed., Moritz von Schwind. (Wien: Hölder, 1902) 259–263. 144 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 42.

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It is striking that Tatian demonstrates his intimate familiarity with Greek language and Roman culture, but at the same time he declares their achievements to be a sham. According to his own admission, not only does he come from a barbarian land, but he also decides to cut himself off from Roman civilization as a consequence of having obtained a deep familiarity with it. He describes his own desertion of Roman customs and traditions in favor of a new “barbarian” philosophy and lawcode: I have visited many lands; I have followed rhetoric, like yourselves; I have fallen in with many arts and inventions; and finally, when ­sojourning in the city of the Romans, I inspected the multiplicity of statues brought thither by you… So, bidding farewell to the arrogance of the Romans and the idle talk of the Athenians, and all their ill-connected opinions, I embraced our barbaric philosophy… more ancient than your institutions...145 ... πολλὴν ἐπιφοιτήσας γῆν, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν σοφιστεύσας τὰ ὑμέτερα, τοῦτο δὲ τέχναις καὶ ἐπινοίαις ἐγκυρήσας πολλαῖς, ἔσχατον δὲ τῇ Ῥωμαίων ἐνδιατρίψας πόλει, καὶ τὰς ἀφ’ ὑμῶν ὡς αὐτοὺς ἀνακομισθείσας ἀνδριάντων ποικιλίας καταμαθών· ... Διόπερ χαίρειν εἰπὼν καὶ τῇ Ῥωμαίων μεγαλαυχίᾳ καὶ τῇ Ἀθηναίων ψυχρολογίᾳ, δόγμασιν ἀσυναρτήτοις, τῆς καθ’ ἡμᾶς βαρβάρου φιλοσοφίας ἀντεποιησάμην... τῶν παρ’ ὑμῖν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἀρχαιοτέρα ... Tatian professes proudly to belong to a foreign people by his birth and to follow a “barbarian philosophy,” that is superior to the Greek, by virtue of his own free choice and as a result of an informed decision. This transvaluation of the term “barbarian” and the express self-designation of Tatian as a barbarian par excellence, however, should not be taken at face value, as he is most likely responding to allegations that are raised against himself and other members of the Christian community.146 This likelihood is confirmed by his reference to his opponents, when Tatian reports their assertion: “Tatian, aspiring to be above the Greeks, above the infinite number of philosophic inquirers, has struck a new

145 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 35. 146 In his analysis of the oration, Waszink argues that Tatian’s positive valuation of barbarians betrays the influence of a wide-spread theme in Greco-Roman literature, “laudatio barbarorum,” as is evident in Tacitus’ Germania. For more detail on this identification, see Waszink, “Some Observations in Early Christian Literature,” in Mélanges offerts à Mlle. Christine Mohrmann, eds., L.J. Engels et al. (Utrecht: Spectrum), 49–52.

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path, and embraced the doctrines of the barbarians (τὰ βαρβάρων δόγματα).”147 Tatian, when identifying himself as a quintessential foreigner by virtue of his origin, persuasion, and life-style, is therefore responding to a series of related accusations against himself personally and against Christians in general. The fact that Tatian refers to the charge of cannibalism and to the allegation that Christians do not participate in the official state religion further confirms this thesis.148 In his response to the charge of barbarism and mimicry of it, Tatian is imitating and replicating the polemic language of his opponents. In this manner, it is a parody of accusation and a parody of defense that he achieves in his Address to the Greeks. In response to the charge of barbarism directed against himself and against his co-religionists, Tatian undertakes in his apologetic oration a consistent program for the subversion of all aspects of the concept of “Greek/ness.” Tatian does not deny the charge that Christians are “barbarian,” but, quite on the contrary, proudly claims it for himself, and for the new religious movement that he has joined, even when he accuses his Greek-speaking addressees of the same charge. Contrary to Justin’s rhetorical tactic of proving the derivation of Greek philosophical and mythological writings from the corpus of the Hebrew Bible in order to compare and to elevate the achievements of the barbarian people on par with those of the educated Greeks, Tatian in fact diminishes and denigrates all aspects of Greco-Roman culture and society. Instead of emphasizing the sameness and partial continuity between what is “Greek,” or “Roman,” and what is considered “barbarian” by underscoring the incompleteness of the former, as his predecessor does, Tatian stresses the wide and gaping differences between them and the lack of any originality, substance or validity of the former. In the final analysis, it is a complete mockery and parody that he puts forward, rather than a sustained effort to find a common basis of comparison for the sake of making Christianity presentable and likable to his Greek-speaking audience of educated elites in the context of late antique society. From among all the early Christian apologists, Tatian stands tall and proud as being both “barbarian” by birth and by conscious and deliberate choice, and he comes to embody and signify the otherness of Christians not merely on the basis of law, morality and religion, but also on the basis of self-perception and selfrepresentation within the larger Roman society.

147 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 35. 148 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 4.1; 25.3.

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Clement of Alexandria and the Charge of Barbarism

Like his predecessor Tatian, Clement of Alexandria149 uses extensively the notion of the “barbarian” in defining Christian identity and group formation in the late antique Roman world. Furthermore, Clement pushes the limits of the concept of barbarism in order to re-cast it in entirely different and positive terms and to accommodate his own agenda of appropriating the ancient Greek system of education or παιδεία.150 Although the concept βάρβαρος and its related family of words are especially common in his writings and might vary in meaning in accordance with the context, there is a general, recognizable trend in his use of the term “barbarian” when it refers to various aspects of Christianity.151 In so far as the notion of barbarism applies to Christians, the original label “barbarian” is re-appropriated and re-valuated by Clement, when he opts to redefine it and invest it with a positive semantic significance. Following in the apologetic tradition of Justin and Tatian, Clement writes in defense of the “barbarian” origins and the ancient roots of the Christian religion. Similar to 149 For detailed discussion of Clement’s writings on ancient philosophy, see Salvatore Lilla, Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism (Oxford Theological Monographs; London: Oxford University Press, 1971); Eric F. Osborn, The Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957); Claude Mondésert, Clément d’Alexandrie: Introdution à l’étude de sa pensée religieuse à partir d l’Écriture (Paris: Montaigne, 1944); Michel Spinneut, Le Stoïcisme de Pères de l’Église: De Clément de Rome à Clément d’Alexandrie (Paris: Seuil, 1957); John Feruson, Clement of Alexandria (New York: Twayne, 1974); Annewies van den Hoek, Clement of Alexandria and his use of Philo in the Stromateis: An Early Christian Reshaping of a Jewish Model (Supplements to Vigiale Christianae 3; Leiden: Brill, 1988); Everett Proctor, Christian Controversy in Alexandria: Clement’s Polemic against the Basilideans and Valentinians (New York: Peter Lang, 1995); Denise K. Buell, Making Christians: Clement of Alexandria and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Id., Why This New Race?: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 94–115. 150 Cf. Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Paideia vol. 1. Trans. Gilbert Highet. Second Edition. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1947); vol. 2 and 3 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1943–44); Id., Early Christianity and Greek Paideia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961). 151 For Clement’s use of the term “barbarian” in reference to Christians, see J.H. Waszink, “Some Observations in Early Christian Literature,” in Mélanges offerts à Mlle. Christine Mohrmann, eds., L.J. Engels et al. (Utrecht: Spectrum), 53–56; Guy Stroumsa, Barbarian Philosophy: The Religious Revolution of Early Christianity (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeg, 1999), 70–78; Arthur Droge, Homer or Moses?: Early Christian Interpretations of the History of Culture (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1989), 124–149.

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both predecessors, he points to the derivative nature of Greek philosophical thinking and poetic inspiration from their “barbarian” precursors.152 In spite of his trans-valuation of the concept of the barbarian, however, Clement does not denigrate or depreciate the foundations of the ancient Greek paideia, which includes grammar, rhetoric, literature, and philosophy, in the manner in which Tatian dismantles Hellenic language and education. On the contrary, Clement’s purpose in redefining “barbarian/ness” is not merely to defend the validity and the necessity of different elements of Greek culture as legitimate counterparts to the Hebrew Bible, but also to argue for the continued applicability of Hellenic paideia and its vital potential for training and preparation in anticipation of the gospel. It should be noted that Homi Bhabha’s insightful critique of postcolonial society applies to Clement’s, as well as Tatian’s, self-presentation as a proponent of “barbarian” philosophy. As Bhabha notes in his critical analysis of modern postcolonialism, there is an endless possibility for the marginal and the colonial “other” to re-signify and to re-define its position vis à vis the dominant society. According to Bhabha, it is the often subversive act of “translation” from one language and one culture to another, as he understands it, that allows for the self-invention and self-articulation of the colonized other.153 Clement of Alexandria: Christianity and “Barbarian Philosophy” In his Miscellanies (Stromata), Clement addresses the issue of Christian selfdefinition and, to this end, he is preoccupied with the articulation and explication of the construct of “barbarian philosophy.”154 Despite its apparent ­positive meaning in his writings, the term “barbarian philosophy” in reference to Christianity is forged by Clement most likely as a defensive construct against the charge of barbarism leveled against his co-religionists, as this concept is 152 See section below in this chapter. 153 Cf. Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994), 31 ff. 154 For discussion of Clement’s treatment of philosophy, see J. Daniélou, Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture. A History of Early Christian Doctrine Before the Council of Nicaea vol. 2 (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1973), 48–63; J.H. Waszink, “Some Observations in Early Christian Literature,” in Mélanges offerts à Mlle. Christine Mohrmann, eds., L.J. Engels et al. (Utrecht: Spectrum), 53–56; S.R.C. Lilla, Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism (Oxford Theological Monographs; London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 9–59; E. Molland, “Clement of Alexandria on the Origin of Greek Philosophy,” Symbolae Osloenses 15/16 (1936): 57–85; Id., The Conception of the Gospel in the Alexandrian Theology (Oslo: Dybwad, 1938), 40–69; Arthur Droge, Homer or Moses?: Early Christian Interpretations of the History of Culture (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1989), 139–149; Guy Stroumsa, Barbarian Philosophy: The Religious Revolution of Early Christianity (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeg, 1999), 70–78.

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normally laden with negative connotations and denotations. Furthermore, Clement adopts the idea of “barbarian philosophy” not merely to respond to the charge of barbarism but also to present Christianity as an equal counterpart to Greek philosophy, which was highly influential and revered in antiquity. In spite of the nominally positive definition of this construct of barbarian philosophy, however, most probably it stems directly from the negative allegations that are raised against Christians at the time. Clement’s remarks give a clear indication of the labeling of Christians with respect to the notion of the barbarian and suggest that such an allegation has given the initial impetus for his adoption of the rhetorical construct of “barbarian philosophy.” For example, Clement maintains that some of the detractors of Christianity, whom he identifies as a “great crowd (πολὺς ... ὄχλος),” refuse to accept the new religion and “laugh at the truth which is worthy of all reverence, making sport of its barbarousness (τὸ βάρβαρον ἐν παιδιᾷ τιθέμενοι).”155 It is not only in the context of his discussion of Greek philosophy and sophistry in particular that he makes reference to the purported barbarousness of the Christian religion.156 Elsewhere in Stromata the apologist comments that Greeks malign Christian teachings and regard them as “barbarous” when he writes: But faith, which the Greeks disparage, deeming it futile and barbarous (πίστις δέ, ἣν διαβάλλουσι κενὴν καὶ βάρβαρον νομίζοντες Ἕλληνες), is a voluntary preconception, the assent of piety – “the subject of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen,” according to the divine apostle.157 It becomes apparent from these two references to his contemporaries and his opponents that Christians were indeed viewed and described as “barbarian,” in addition to the fact that the meaning of the term is highly negative and derogatory, rather than positive. In a direct response to the charge of barbarism, Clement offers not a refutation per se but rather a positive re-formulation of what he comes to postulate as “barbarian philosophy” (βάρβαρος φιλοσοφία). In his elaboration of the concept of barbarian philosophy, Clement indicates the context in which the Christian religious system is perceived and promulgated as being “barbarian” from the perspective of outside critics. In his juxtaposition of Hellenic and “barbarian philosophy,” which is also referred to as “philosophy according to

155 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.3.22. 156 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.2–3. 157 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 2.2.8.

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Christ,”158 the apologist reveals the negative attitude of outsiders towards the Christian doctrine, that is castigated by them as “barbarian:” ... philosophy more especially was given to the Greeks, as a covenant peculiar to them – being, as a stepping stone to the philosophy which is according to Christ (τῆς κατὰ Χριστὸν φιλοσοφίας) – although those who applied themselves to the philosophy of the Greeks shut their ears voluntarily to the truth, despising the voice of the barbarians (οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες τὰ Ἑλλήνων ἐθελοκωφῶσι πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἐξευτελίζοντες τὴν φωνὴν τὴν βαρβάρων).159 In addition to offering a defense of the Christian faith and teachings, it is the explicit objective of the apologist to present Christianity as a viable alternative to the Hellenic system of thought and education. Additionally, he aims at demonstrating that it is the “barbarian philosophy” rather than its Greek counterpart that is “in reality both perfect and true” (ἡ μὲν οὖν βάρβαρος φιλοσοφία, ἣν μεθέπομεν ἡμεῖς, τελεία τῷ ὄντι καὶ ἀληθής).160 Clement juxtaposes the veracity of the Christian religion, which he assumes is the highest and purest embodiment of “barbarian philosophy,” with its Hellenic counterpart, which is presented by him in a positive light as “the clear image of truth” and “divine gift to the Greeks.”161 In contrast to Tatian, Clement does not debunk Greek philosophy, as he acknowledges its advantages and affirms it as a divine gift given to the Greek-speaking population, in the same way in which the Torah is given to the Hebrew people.162 Although Clement agrees with the claims made by other apologists before him by identifying the origins of Greek philosophy with different foreign nations,163 he supports this argument not as a subversive gesture towards the edifice of Greek civilization, but rather as a substantiation of its continued legitimacy and validity. In order to unpack the designation βάρβαρος φιλοσοφία, Clement’s code name for Christianity, it is necessary to look at the first component – βάρβαρος – as it is being used in reference to the new religious movement. One constitutive 158 159 160 161 162 163

Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 6.8.67. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 6.8.67. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 2.2.5. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.2. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.5. See, for instance, Clement’s claim that Plato has obtained knowledge from the Hebrew Scriptures. (Cf. Stromata 1.1 ff.). For claims of plagiarism of other philosophers from the Hebrews, see also Stromata 1.15, 1.21.

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aspect of the notion of the barbarian raised by Clement is naturally language. He refers to it in his comments on the number of languages and dialects in existence at the time and he observes that there are “seventy-five nations and tongues,” as well as five different Greek dialects, i.e. Attic, Doric, Ionic, Aeolic and koine.164 Although he remarks that dialects and languages are conditioned by the geographic locality and ethnic specificity of both Greeks and barbarians, Clement explains the derivation of various Hellenic dialects from the name of Hellen, the offspring of Zeus, who is demonstrated to follow chronologically the Hebrew matriarchs and patriarchs. As a result of this postulation, the apologist concludes that the “dialects that [are] obtained by the Greeks are posterior to the language of the Hebrews.”165 His proposition for the posteriority of Greek language is also complemented by the assertion that “Hebrew philosophy was older by many generations” than its Greek counterpart, which has been informed by the intellectual contributions of the nations.166 In addition to the claim for the antiquity of Hebrew language, literature and philosophy made on the basis of relative chronology, Clement also argues for the secondary and tertiary derivation of Greek philosophy from other foreign nations. It should be noted that in his critique of Hellenic philosophy, Clement follows the existing reflective tendency in the Greek philosophical tradition itself to regard new or recent ideas as degenerate and to call for a return to its origins. According to Posidonius of Apamea, for instance, philosophy was sent down to men in primordial times but later became corrupt and split into various schools, thereby devaluing its significance and diminishing its validity.167 Although there is a distinct tradition within Greek philosophy that is adopted by Christian apologists for the purposes of its critique, the most prominent example of the attempt to connect Greek philosophy with its barbarian origins is expressed by second-century Numenius of Apamea. In his writings, Numenius traces Plato through Pythagoras to the most ancient nations and is known for his famous quotation “What is Plato but Moses speaking Attic Greek,” also found in Clement’s Stromata 1.150.4.168 In his critical commentary, Clement divides Greek philosophy into three different schools: the Italic school starting 164 165 166 167

Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.21. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 6.15. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.14. For a discussion of Posidonius’ critique of Greek philosophy and its relation to Christian apologist, see Niels Hyldahl, Philosophie und Christentum: Eine Interpretation der Einleitung zum Dialog Justins (Acta Theologica Danica ix. Kopenhagen: Munksgaard, 1966), 112–140. 168 For a discussion of Numenius’ ideas of derivation of Greek philosophy from oriental sources, see R.M. Grant, The Letter and the Spirit (London: spck, 1957), 18–30.

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with Pythagoras, the Ionic school originating with Thales and the Eleatic school stemming from Xenophanes of Colophon.169 He claims foreign origin for Pythagoras and specifies that he is either Samian, Tuscan, Syrian, or Tyrian, depending on the information from different literary sources.170 Despite the uncertainty of Pythagoras’ precise origin, Clement asserts that the majority of the literary sources attribute to him a barbarian origin, as he states explicitly: Πυθαγόραν βάρβαρον τὸ γένος.171 Likewise, Thales is shown to be of a Phoenician or Milesian by origin, as well as to have had contact with Egyptian teachers.172 As Clement traces the origin and development of various Greek philosophic schools, he also asserts the dependence of Greek philosophers on barbarians: These are the times of the oldest wise men and philosophers among the Greeks. And that the most of them were barbarian by extraction, and were trained among barbarians, what need there is to say?173 Οἵδε μὲν οἱ χρόνοι τῶν παρ‘ Ἕλλησι πρεσβυτάτων σοφῶν τε καὶ φιλοσόφων. ὡς δὲ οἱ πλεῖστοι αὐτῶν βάρβαροι τὸ γένος καὶ παρὰ βαρβάροις παιδευθέντες, τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν; In support of his claim for the foreign origin of Greek philosophy, Clement invokes also Plato’s opinion on the practices of barbarians and he refers to favorable pronouncements in the Platonic dialogues concerning the philosophy of different nations, such as the Egyptians.174 Moreover, Clement states that Plato is indebted to non-Greek thinkers, from whom he has allegedly borrowed the “best of his ideas.”175 According to Clement, Plato is found “perpetually celebrating the barbarians” (σεμνύνων αἰεὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους), remembering that both himself and Pythagoras learned the “most and the noblest of [their] dogmas among the barbarians” (τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ γενναιότατα τῶν δογμάτων ἐν βαρβάροις μαθόντος).176 In this manner, the apologist shows both the Greek respect for and affirmation of the pursuit of philosophy among a variety of ethnic groups, as well as the derivative and secondary character of Greek philosophy. 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176

Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.14–15. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.14. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.14.62. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.14. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.15.66. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.15.66: οἴεται ὁ Πλάτων καὶ φιλοσόφους τινὰς εἶναι. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.15.66: τὰ κάλλιστα εἰς φιλοσοφίαν παρὰ τῶν βαρβάρων. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.15.68.

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In addition to demonstrating the superiority of barbarians with respect to philosophy, Clement does the same for other domains of human knowledge as well. He highlights especially the creative capacity and inventive nature of different ethnic groups: And barbarians were inventors not only of philosophy, but almost of every other art. The Egyptians were the first to introduce astrology among men. Similarly also the Chaldeans. The Egyptians showed first how to burn lamps, and divided the year into twelve months, prohibited intercourse with women in the temples, and enacted that no one should enter a temple from a woman without bathing. Again they were the inventors of geometry. There are some who say that the Carians invented the prognostication by the stars. The Phrygians were the first who attended the flight of the birds. And the Tuscans, the neighbors of Italy, were adepts at the art of Haruspex. The Isaurians and the Arabians invented augury, as the Telmesians divination by dreams. The Etruscans invented the trumpet, and the Phrygians the flute. For Olympus and Marsyas were Phrygians. And Cadmus, the inventor of the letters among the Greeks, as ­Euphorus says, was a Phoenician; whence also Herodotus writes that they were called Phoenician letters. And they say that the Phoenicians and the Syrians first invented the letters; and the Apis, an aboriginal inhabitant of Egypt, invented the healing art before Io came into Egypt. But afterwards they say that Asclepius improved the art. Atlas the Lybian was the first who built a ship and navigated the sea. Kelmis and Damnaaneus, Idean Dactyli, first discovered iron in Cyprus. Another Idean the tempering of brass; according to Hesiod, a Scythian... I have added a few details to them to confirm the inventive and practically useful genius of the barbarians, by whom the Greeks have profited in their studies.”177 Furthermore, it should be noted that Clement classifies the Hebrew Scriptures under the category of “philosophy” and presents the writings attributed to Moses as corresponding to its different branches. He elevates Hebrew philosophy in relation to that of Greeks and points to its primacy and superiority on account of its antiquity: Thus, philosophy, a thing of the highest utility, flourished in antiquity among the barbarians, shedding its light over the nations. And afterwards it came to Greece. First in its ranks were the philosophers of 177 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.16.

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the Egyptians; and the Chaldeans among the Assyrians; and the Druids among the Gauls; and the Samaneans among the Bactrians; and the philosophers of the Celts; and the Magi of the Persians, who foretold the Savior’s birth, and came into the land of Judea guided by a star. And of these there are two classes, some of them called Sarnamae, and others Brahmins. ... Of all these, by far the oldest is the Jewish race; and their philosophy committed to writing has the precedence of philosophy among the Greeks...178 According to Clement, “Mosaic philosophy” found in the Hebrew Bible is divided into four parts: history, referring to the chronological accounts; ethics, referring to the legal aspects of the Torah; physics, referring to the sacrificial literature; and, finally, theology, referring to visionary and mystical expositions.179 Not only does Clement conceptualize and present the Hebrew Scriptures in terms proper to philosophy, but he also claims a direct dependence of Greek philosophy on the ancient Hebrew writings.180 Despite the fact that Clement emphasizes the antiquity and higher value of the philosophy of foreign nations in general and especially Jews, the apologist attempts to salvage the Greek philosophical tradition, as he emphasizes its positive aspects. While Clement admits the indebtedness of Greek philosophers to barbarians, he affirms their contiguity and borrowing from others in order to demonstrate the partial validity of their teachings. When illustrating his conception of the relationship between Greek and barbarian philosophy, he explains: “just as the Bacchanes tore asunder the limbs of Pentheus, so the sects both of barbarian and Hellenic philosophy (φιλοσοφίας τῆς τε βαρβάρου τῆς τε Ἑλληνικῆς) have done with truth, and each vaunts as the whole truth the portion which has fallen to its lot.”181 While Clement asserts that both “barbarians” and “Greeks” have arrived at some partial understanding of the truth, he also claims that the entire truth is to be found in the “philosophy according to Christ” or “barbarian philosophy” par excellence:182 178 179 180 181

Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.15. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.28. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.1. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.13.57: αἱ τῆς φιλοσοφίας τῆς τε βαρβάρου τῆς τε Ἑλληνικῆς αἱρέσεις, ἑκάστη ὅπερ ἔλαχεν ὡς πᾶσαν αὐχεῖ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. 182 It should be noted that Clement uses the term barbarian philosophy or βάρβαρος φιλοσοφία in reference to Christianity, whereas the expression the philosophy of barbarians or φιλοσοφία βαρβάρων is a general reference to the intellectual endeavors of nonGreeks, such as the Egyptians and Jews.

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So, then, the barbarian and Hellenic philosophy has torn off a fragment of eternal truth not from the mythology of Dionysos, but from the theology of the ever-living Word (οὕτως οὖν ἥ τε βάρβαρος ἥ τε Ἐλληνικὴ φιλοσοφία τὴν ἀίδιον ἀλήθειαν σπαραγμόν τινα, οὐ τῆς Διονύσου μυθολογίας, τῆς δε τοῦ λόγου τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ θεολογίας πεποίηται). And He who brings again together the separate fragments and makes them one, will without peril, be assured, contemplate the perfect Word (Λόγος), the truth.183 Clement thus draws both a parallel and a distinction between Greek and other philosophies in so far as they are incomplete and constitute precursors of the Christian religion. With respect to Christianity, understood by the apologist as the highest epitome of divine wisdom and of “barbarian philosophy,” both Hebrew and Greek philosophical writings are inadequate. According to Clement, Greek philosophical ideas and Hebrew religious teachings are equally important as preliminary stages of illumination, although they are insufficient for the full instruction in the truth.184 In his commentary on Greek philosophy, the apologist not only asserts that Greek thinkers were informed by others, but he also points to its perceived weaknesses.185 In critiquing it, Clement exploits a common topos to underline the relationship of barbarian and Hellenic philosophy, when he refers to the study of “names” (ὀνόματα) and “words” (λόγοι) to that of “things” (πράγματα).186 In the domain of Greek philosophy he places the preoccupation with expressions and words, whereas he ascribes to barbarians and to Christians the concern for “real things.”187 The apologist identifies Christians with barbarians and contrasts them to Greeks, as he asserts, “But we, who are barbarians, have the things” (τὰ πράγματα δὲ παρ’ ὑμῖν ἐστι τοῖς βαρβάροις).188 Nonetheless, even though the apologist raises objections to Greek philosophy, he also asserts that it is a necessary “preparatory discipline for the perfection which is in Christ” (προπαιδεύουσαν εἰς τὴν διὰ Χριστοῦ τελείωσιν)189 and a helpful tool for “arriving at the complete knowledge about the truth that is obtainable from the 183 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.13.57. 184 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 6.17. 185 Clement explains the dependence of Plato on barbarians for his philosophical ideas, as has already been noted, as well as of other Greek philosophers, such as Democritus who “appropriated Babylonian ethic discourses,” in addition to other famous individuals, such as Solon and Numa. Cf. Stromata 1.15. 186 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 6.17. 187 Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.16. 188 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 6.17.152. 189 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 6.17.152.

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barbarian philosophy” (γνώσει βαρβάρῳ μαθητεύουσα φιλοσοφία προκόπτειν εἰς ἀλήθειαν).190 Clement’s assessment of Greek philosophy is such that he both preserves its importance and makes it into a necessary stage in the instruction of the Greek-speaking in their progress to grasping the absolute truth. Clement is unambiguous, even to the point of belaboring this issue, as he defends the importance of philosophy and its essential goodness: Philosophy is not, then, the product of vice, since it makes men virtuous; it follows, then, that it is the work of God, whose work it is solely to do good… Further, if the practice of philosophy does not belong to the wicked, but was accorded to the best of the Greeks, it is clear also from what source it was bestowed – manifestly from providence, which assigns to each what is befitting in accordance with his desert…191 Although Clement aligns Christians and Jews with “barbarians” over against Greeks, he also creates an equivalence between Jews and Greeks over against Christians. He concedes that philosophy was a covenant with the Greeks, as the Law was a covenant with the Jews, both of which were introduced in anticipation of the arrival of Christianity. The apologist states: “as the proclamation has come now at the fit time, so also at the fit time were the Law and the Prophets given to the barbarians, and Philosophy to the Greeks (νόμος μὲν καὶ προφῆται βαρβάροις, φιλοσοφία δὲ Ἕλλησι), to fit their ears for the Gospel.”192 Clement delineates the first two covenants as pertaining to the past and as aimed particularly at Greek-speaking population and the Jewish people, whereas the “new” covenant is given to the Christians as one that negates the linguistic and ethnic specificity of the two earlier ones.193 He draws a distinction between the three distinct covenants along ethnic, linguistic and temporal lines and implies a continuation between the “old” and “new” ones by insisting on their necessity and usefulness.194 Consequently, Clement posits the limited scope of both the Greek philosophical teachings and Jewish legal traditions in comparison with Christianity, which he presents as inclusive of all ethnic and linguistic groups regardless of location or culture: 190 191 192 193 194

Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 6.17.152. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 6.17. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 6.6.44. Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 6.5. Clement bases his argument for the preparatory nature of Greek philosophy on Paul and exegetes Colossians 2.8 referring to philosophy as “being most rudimentary, and a preparatory training for the truth.” Cf. Stromata 6.8.

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The philosophers, however, chose to [teach philosophy] to the Greeks alone, and not even to all of them; but Socrates to Plato, Plato to Xenocrates, Aristotle to Theophrastus, and Zeno to Cleanthes, who persuaded their own followers alone. But the word of the Teacher remained not in Judea alone, as philosophy did in Greece; but was diffused over the whole world, over every nation, and village, and town, bringing already over to the truth whole houses, and each individual of those who heard it by him himself, and not a few of the philosophers themselves.195 In addition to connecting Christianity with its barbarian origins and claiming its inclusiveness of all ethnicities, Clement indicates that the “new” covenant causes the transformation of different nations into one “nation” (γένος) and one “people” (λαός).196 He elaborates further on this point: He [God] made a new covenant with us; for what belonged to the Greeks and Jews is old. But we, who worship him in a new, in a third way, in the third form, are Christians. For clearly, I think, he showed that the one and only God was known by the Greeks in a gentile way, by the Jews judaically, and in a new and spiritual way by us... And further, that the same God that furnished both Covenants was the giver of Greek philosophy to the Greeks, by which the Almighty is glorified among the Greeks... ­Accordingly, then, from the Hellenic training, and also from the [Jewish] law, are gathered into the one race of the saved people those who accept faith: not that the three people are separated by time, so that one might suppose three natures, but trained in different covenants of the Lord.197 Νέαν ὑμῖν διέθετο· τὰ γὰρ Ἑλλήνων καὶ Ἰουδαίων παλαιά, ὑμεῖς δὲ, οἱ καινῶς αὐτὸν τρίτῳ γένει σεβόμενοι, Χριστιανοί. Σαφῶς γὰρ, οἶομαι, ἐδήλωσε τὸν ἕνα καὶ μόνον Θεὸν, ὑπὸ μὲν Ἑλλήνων ἐθνικῶς, ὑπὸ δὲ Ἰουδαίων Ἰουδαϊκῶς, καινῶς δὲ ὑφ’ ἡμῶν καὶ πνευματικῶς γινωσκόμενον. Πρὸς δὲ καὶ ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς Θεὸς ἀμφοῖν ταῖν Διαθήκαιν χορηγὸς, ὁ καὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς φιλοσοφίας δοτὴρ τοῖς Ἕλλησι, δι’ ἧς ὁ παντοκράτωρ παρ’ Ἕλλησι δοξάζεται... Ἐκ γ’ οὖν τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς παιδείας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῆς νομικῆς, εἰς τὸ ἓν γένος τοῦ σωζομένου 195 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.18. 196 For further analysis of Clement’s use of categories of ethnicity, see Denise Buell, Making Christians: Clement of Alexandria and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 104–106; Id., Why This New Race?: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 81–82, 119–123. 197 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 6.5.

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συνάγονται λαοῦ οἱ τὴν πίστιν προσιέμενοι, οὐ χρόνῳ διαιρουνένων τῶν τριῶν λαῶν, ἵνα τις φύσεις ὑπολάβοι τριττὰς, διαφόροις δὲ παιδευμένων Διαθήκαις, τοῦ ἑνὸς Κυρίου ὄντως, ἑνὸς Κυρίου ῥήματι. In this cohesive interpretive scheme, Clement defines both Hebrew Scripture and Greek philosophy with reference to the concept of barbarism, as he traces their origins and teachings to different nations. Nonetheless, he defines Christianity in such a way that it subsumes and supersedes both of its precursors. In his explication of this new “third” form of religious identification, he also resorts to the concept of barbarism and adopts the term “barbarian philosophy” in reference to it in order to delineate both its continuity with and its difference from its Hellenic and Hebrew predecessors. Clement of Alexandria: The Charge of Barbarism and Greek Paideia In spite of the fact that in his Stromata Clement unequivocally embeds Christianity within the frame of what he calls “barbarian philosophy” in contradistinction to its Hellenic counterpart, the distinction between the two is ­subordinated to a larger program for demonstrating a coherence between Greek παιδεία and Christianity.198 Irrespective of the designation of Christians as “barbarians” based upon their origin and belief system, Clement strives to achieve their social acceptability and inclusion in the dominant hellenistic ­culture. His program for the incorporation of the barbarian, or Christian, into the fold of Greek paideia is evident not only in his Stromata but also in his Exhortation199 and especially in the Instructor, where the incorporation in the cultured and respected stratum of Roman society is his overriding concern.200 In his Instructor Clement defines virtue as “reason” par excellence and, 198 Cf. Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition: Studies in Justin, Clement and Origen (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 31–65. See also Werner Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961). 199 In his Exhortation, following the tradition of protrepticus form, Clement begins with the “call of the Logos” (ch.1), proceeds to criticize Greek religion (Chs. 2–7), and makes references to the Sibyls and to scripture to support God’s call (Chs. 8–9), and he ends with an appeal for the abandon of Greek institutions for the sake of joining the universal mission of the Logos (Chs. 10–12). 200 This emphatically practical handbook on the cultivation of virtue focuses on such particulars of daily existence as eating, drinking, dressing, walking, laughing, speaking, bathing, sleeping, procreating, as well as details such as use of vessels, application of ointments, permission of finger- and ear-rings and many others. This practically-oriented text helps us understand the effort that Clement makes in order to affect the style of life of Christians in accordance with the prevalent social norms.

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conversely, sin as the “error of reason”201 and asserts that the main principle that should govern every human action and each aspect of life is rationality.202 The pragmatic directions for day-to-day living in the Instructor correspond to his larger agenda in Stromata for salvaging Greek philosophy for the sake of instruction and training.203 Clement espouses a program for reconciliation between Greek παιδεία and Christianity in order to allow the cultivation of Hellenic and Roman pedagogical methods and models for the promotion and propagation of the Christian religion. Although presenting Christianity as essentially foreign and casting it in terms of the notion of the “barbarian,” he attempts to bring together Christian teaching with ancient Greek παιδεία.204 His vision for the incorporation of Christianity within the folds of hellenistic culture and Roman society is complete and all-inclusive, as he does not designate any inherent contradiction or opposition. This comprehensive program of cultural conciliation allows Clement to define Christianity in reference to the predominant Greco-Roman civilization, in addition to drawing on the importance of the ancient Jewish religious tradition. In circumscribing Christianity as barbarian in nature, on the one hand, and in claiming the centrality of Hellenic language and thought, on the other, Clement is forced to be an apologist both for Greek philosophy and for the Christian religion.205 It is important that Clement maintains that philosophy helps in reaching the ultimate truth and pleads for its study in Christian circles. 201 Clement of Alexandria, Instructor 1.13. 202 See, for instance, Clement’s reference to the Tuscans as “barbarian” on account of their base passions. Cf. Exhortation to the Greeks 2.16. 203 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 6.8. 204 Clement explains: “And how irrational to regard philosophy as inferior to architecture and shipbuilding! And the Lord fed the multitudes of those who reclined on the grass opposite to Tiberius with the two fishes and the five barley loaves, indicating the preparatory training of the Greeks and Jews previous to the divine grain, which is the food cultivated by the law... and the fishes signified the Hellenic philosophy that was produced and moved in the midst of the Gentile billow ... But if you are curious, understand one of the fishes to mean curriculum of study, and the other the philosophy which supervenes...” Cf. Stromata 6.11. 205 Clement of Alexandria is not often categorized as a Christian apologist in spite of the strong apologetic themes in his writings. Robert M. Grant, for instance, shows this problem of classification when he states: “This means that Clement, writing the Exhortation under Pertinax or Severus, felt free to criticize severely the Eleusinian mysteries into which both Marcus Aurelius and Commodus had been initiated. It also means that Clement must be viewed not as an apologist but as an independent literary figure. The age of the second-century apologists had come to an end.” (Cf. Grant, Greek Apologists of the ­Second Century (Westminster: John Knox, 1988), 175). Yet, Grant contradicts this statement when he writes: “Clement himself was undoubtedly the most significant ­Alexandrian

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In defense of the need for philosophy, he writes: “The studies of philosophy, therefore, and philosophy itself, are aids in treating the truth... Accordingly, the soul must be prepared and variously exercised, if it would become the highest degree good ... for there is a need of great practice, and exercise, and experience.”206 Furthermore, in his re-definition of Jewish, Greek and Christian traditions in terms of the “barbarian,” he manages to undermine the oppositionality of the notions of “barbarian” and “Greek” and to incorporate elements of all three in a cohesive whole. In the final analysis, the apologist destabilizes the charge of barbarism by defining Hellenic language, culture and philosophy in reference to outsiders. As a rhetorical and ideological strategy, the appropriation of the term “barbarian” to designate Christianity is made for the purpose of its re-definition and re-constitution. Clement’s adoption of the construct of “barbarian philosophy” as descriptive of Christianity comes to demonstrate his effort to undermine a charge of barbarism, as well as to present a tenable intellectual defense of the Christian religion through the trans-valuation of the concept of the “barbarian.” Similarly, the contemporary critic Homi Bhabha in his elaboration of the colonial subject stresses the “hybridity” and impurity of cultures, as well as the ambivalent identity of both the colonizer and the colonized, and he also underscores the possibility for re-definition of the “self” and the “other” from the perspective of the colonized subject through processes of translation and re-signification.207 It is precisely the cross-pollination and the mutual influence of these two concepts – Greek and barbarian – that Clement attempts to demonstrate in his argument. Unlike his predecessors Justin and Tatian, in his analysis of the barbarian character of Christianity, Clement achieves an equalization between the binary concepts of “Greek” and “barbarian” vis à vis Christians. For him, the strict and hierarchical opposition between the notion of “Greekness,” on the one hand, and “barbarianness,” on the other, is annulled as he shifts and expands these categories instead of reifying and re-inscribing them. In his writings, there is a complex negotiation and an unstable relation between these two categories, as they are interrupted and checked by the introduction of a new, third one, i.e. “Christian.” Clement’s program for re-definition of “barbarism” intends the incorporation of Christianity, identified by society as being outside the parameters of traditional paideia and understood in terms of the “other,” within the dominant hellenistic culture. In affecting the re-evaluation of the concepts apologist, at least among the Christians, for he wrote the important Exhortation.” Cf. R. Grant, Greek Apologists of the Second Century (Westminster: John Knox, 1988), 179. 206 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 6.11. 207 See Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994), 74 ff.

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“Greek” and “barbarian” in order to create space for Christians in the normative hellenistic culture, Clement straddles two apparently different and mutually exclusive programs: one for the positive trans-valuation of the notion of the “barbarian” with regard to Christians, and the other for the absorption of Christians into the fold of hellenistic παιδεία. There is an inbuilt disjunction in his strategy of both acknowledging the charge of barbarism and of re-defining the concept of the barbarian: whereas Clement both identifies and defends Christians as the bearers of new and foreign practices and religious tradition, he provides the script for their incorporation into the dominant Greco-Roman cultural paradigms. In effect, the apologist acts as a midwife in accommodating the smooth transition of Christians from one position, defined as marginal both socially and culturally, to another by remodeling Christianity in accordance with the standards of the prevailing societal customs and norms. 4.4

Origen of Alexandria and the Charge of Barbarism

The direct addressee of Origen’s apologetic work Contra Celsum, Celsus is perhaps the first systematic critic of Christianity who demonstrates a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of both the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament, as well as the distinctions and similarities between Jewish and Christian beliefs and practices.208 Although Celsus composed his polemical treatise True Doctrine (Ἀληθὴς Λόγος) most likely around 177–180,209 Origen penned 208 For further information on the critic Celsus, see K. Pitcher, Streit um das Christentum: der Angriff des Kelsos und die Antwort des Origenes (Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 1980); M. Fédou, Christianisme et religions païennes dans les Contre Celse d’Origène (Théologie historique 81; Paris: Beauchesne, 1988); L. Rougier, Celse contre les chrétiens: la réaction païenne sous l’empire romain (Paris: Copernic, 1977); See also R.L. Wilken, The Christians as the Pagans Saw Them (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 94–125; S. Benko, Pagan Rome and the Early Christians (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 147–158. 209 The composition of Celsus’ True Doctrine has been variously attributed to the period between 160’s and 170’s. Henry Chadwick indicates to particular instances in Celsus’ True Doctrine that point to a time of active persecutions and he suggests that Celsus makes reference to the persecutions in Lyon and Vienne in 177. Celsus states: “While in your case, if anyone still wanders about in secret, yet he is sought out and condemned to death” (ὑμῶν δὲ κἂν πλανᾶταί τις ἔτι λανθάνων, ἀλλὰ ζητεῖται πρὸς θανάτου δίκην). (Cf. Contra Celsum 8.69; see also Henry Chadwick, Origen: Contra Celsum (Cambridge, uk: Cambridge University Press, 1965), xxvi-xxix). For a support of this date of composition, see also S. Benko, Pagan Rome and the Early Christians (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 147 ff. Carl Anderson has proposed an earlier date for the work, around 170, as he connects the composition of Celsus’ True Doctrine to Justin Martyr. (See Carl Anderson, Logos und Nomos:

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his Contra Celsum approximately eighty years after Celsus’ work in order to address important issues that this influential opponent had raised earlier in his writings.210 The fact that Origen decides to consider Celsus’ harsh and indepth critique of the Christian religion and to respond to this adversary after a hiatus of several decades speaks to the continued validity and relevance of Celsus’ arguments even decades after his death. Furthermore, Origen’s work Contra ­Celsum is unique in the early Christian apologetic corpus because of its extensive verbatim citations that it contains from the critical writings of the opponents of Christianity. The ample and long quotations from Celsus’ True Doctrine in Origen’s treatise undoubtedly testify to the charge of barbarism against Christians, as is also testified in other apologetic works from the second century.211 It should be noted that in Celsus’ writings in particular the concept of the “barbarian,” as it relates to Christians, reflects the concerns of the ruling Roman elites, rather than the popular misperceptions and sentiments of citizens reacting against Christians, as can be discerned by charges of sexual immorality, human sacrifice and cannibalism associated with barbarism in the apologies of Justin and Tatian.212 The criticisms that are raised by Celsus demonstrate both the deeper understanding and the high erudition of a Roman intellectual, who has carefully studied and scrutinized the Jewish and ­Christian Die Polemik des Kelsos wider das Christentum (Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte 30; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1955). Similarly, Rozenbaum argues for a date of composition sometime after 160 and before 175. Cf. H.-U. Rozenbaum, “Zur Datierung von Celsus’ Alethes Logos,” Vigiliae Christianae 26 (1972): 102–111. For a support of this date, see also R. Wilken, The Christians as the Romans Saw Them (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 94 ff. 210 The majority of scholars agree that Origen’s Contra Celsum was written around 249 before the outbreak of the Decian persecutions. Internal textual evidence suggests that the work was composed during a period of relative peace for Christians and at a time of upheaval and revolt in the empire (cf. Contra Celsum 3.15; 8.44; 8.70; 7.26), most likely pointing to the revolts of Jotapianus, Pacatianus and Uranius Antoninus in 248. (See Henry Chadwick, Origen: Contra Celsum (Cambridge, uk: Cambridge University Press, 1965), xiv–xv). On the date and the occasion of the work, see Michael Frede, “Origen’s Treatise Against Celsus,” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire, eds., Mark Edwards, Martin Goodman and Simon Price (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 131–156. 211 For a discussion of the connection between Christians and “barbarians” in Celsus’ critique of Christianity, see Guy Stroumsa, Barbarian Philosophy: The Religious Revolution of Early Christianity (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeg, 1999), 46; See also, R.L. Wilken, The Christians as the Romans Saw Them (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 97, 100, 124–125. 212 On popular charges and allegations of sexual immorality, human sacrifice and cannibalism, see S. Benko, Pagan Rome and the Early Christians (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 54–78.

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texts, in addition to attentively questioning and listening to ­contemporary practitioners of the two religions.213 While other apologists before Origen are forced into the position of combatting wide-spread ignorance and general prejudice against Christians,214 he is hard pressed in his direct commentary and response to Celsus’ arguments to acknowledge his opponent’s close reading and careful examination of the sacred scriptures and their interpretation and application by Christians. The fact that he faces an informed and formidable foe, although one from the past, compels Origen to respond in the appropriate manner by scrupulously listing and quoting each objection and by countering and overturning it to the best of his ability.215 Origen of Alexandria: The Charge of Barbarism and Ethnic Slander Origen of Alexandria mentions at the very start of his Contra Celsum the inception of Christianity from its Jewish roots and its direct connection to the “barbarian” people hailing from the eastern Mediterranean basin. In his alignment of Christians with the Jewish people and religion, Celsus draws on binary and oppositional ethnic categories and on existing rhetorical practices of opprobrium and ethnic slander.216 In fact, Origen explicitly mentions 213 Unlike other critics, Celsus was able to distinguish between different Christian groups, such as the Simonians, Helena, Monarchiand, Carpocratians, Marcian, and the ­Orphites (cf. Contra Celsum 5.62; 6.28), as well as between orthodox and Gnostic Christian groups (cf. Contra Celsum 6.28, 30, 53). Furthermore, he shows contradictions between Hebrew Scripture and the New Testament, as for example in asserting that Jesus contradicted Moses (cf. Contra Celsum 6.29; 7.18). 214 See chapter four for a discussion of the charges found in Tertullian’s Apology in particular. 215 For the structure of Origen’s work, see Frede, “Origen’s Treatise Against Celsus,” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire, eds. Mark Edwards, Martin Goodman and Simon Price (­Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 131 ff. 216 For analysis of ethnic categories and ethnic slander in ancient literature, see Severin Koster, Die Invektive in der griechischen und römischen Literatur (Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain, 1980); Gay Byron, Symbolic Blackness and Ethnic Difference in Early Christian Literature (London: Routledge, 2002), 17–28; Denise Buell, Why This New Race?: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 35–62; Id., “Ethnicity and Religion in Mediterranean Antiquity and Beyond,” RelSRev 26 (2000): 243–249; Judith Lieu, Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); David Olster, “Classical Ethnography and Early Christianity,” in The Formulations of Christianity Through the Ages, ed. Katharine Free (Lewiston, N.Y.: Mellen, 1995), 9–31; See also, Roger S. Bagnall, “Greeks and Egyptians: Ethnicity, Status, and Culture,” in Cleopatra’s Egypt: Age of the Ptolemies, ed. R.S. Bianchi (New York: Brooklyn Museum, 1988), 21–27; Irad Malkin, ed., Ancient Perceptions of Greek Ethnicity;

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Celsus’ designation of both Christianity and Judaism as “barbarian” phenomena as follows:217 Next he [Celsus] says that the doctrine (obviously meaning Judaism with which Christianity is connected) was originally barbarian (βάρβαρον φύσιν ἄνωθεν εἶναι τὸ δόγμα). Having an open mind he does not reproach the gospel for its barbarian origin (ἀπὸ βαρβάρων ἀρχῇ τῷ λόγῳ), but praises the barbarians for being capable of discovering doctrines (εὑρεῖν δόγματα τοὺς βαρβάρους); but he adds to this that the Greeks are better able to judge the value of what the barbarians have discovered, and to establish the doctrines and put them into practice by virtue (κρῖναι καὶ βεβαιώσασθαι καὶ ἀσκῆσαι πρὸς ἀρετὴν τὰ ὑπὸ βαρβάρων εὑρεθέντα ἀμείνονές εἰσιν Ἕλληνες).218 This clear and distinct delineation of what is properly “Greek” and “barbarian” at the very onset of Origen’s apology,219 and most likely at the very onset of Celsus’ exposition in his True Doctrine,220 pits Christians, as well as Jews, and Greeks against each other. Celsus, whose primary goal is to debunk the theological foundations of Christianity, first claims for himself and for other “Greeks” the prerogative to be able to assess and to actualize the new ideas and inventions of other nations. Celsus, being highly educated and well informed, is not entirely bigoted, for he admits that “barbarians” do in fact have the capacity to invent new things.221 Despite his acceptance of their innate ingenuity and creativity, he strips the foreign nations of any critical abilities of ­estimating the actual value of their innovations, as well as the moral aptitude to implement their new ideas for the cultivation of virtue. Therefore, it Jonathan Hall, Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Greg Wolf, “Becoming Roman, Staying Greek: Culture, Identity and the Civilizing Process in the Roman Near East,” Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, n.s. 40 (1994): 116–143; Id., ed., Becoming Roman: The Origins of Provincial Civilization in Gaul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 217 Please note that the English translation of Contra Celsum contains italics which designate the sections from Celsus’ True Doctrine that are directly cited from Origen and incorporated into his own commentary and response. 218 Origen, Contra Celsum 1.2. 219 Note the conscious use of ἀπολογία by Origen, when responding to the accusation of Celsus: εἰς ἀπολογίαν περὶ τῶν ἐν χριστιανισμῷ κειμένων. (Cf. Contra Celsum 1.2). 220 For a detailed elucidation on the structure of Origen’s and Celsus’ works, see Frede, “Origen’s Treatise Against Celsus,” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire, eds., Mark Edwards, Martin Goodman and Simon Price (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 131 ff. 221 Origen, Contra Celsum 1.2.

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follows that according to Celsus both “Greeks” and Hellenized elites like him are granted a superior position vis à vis other ethnic groups on account of their intellectual, moral and practical advantages. In spite of his admission that non-Greeks have the mental capacity to make original discoveries and his express appreciation of this fact, Celsus excludes the Jewish people from this special sub-category of favored “barbarians” who possess a measure of positive qualities.222 For example, while Celsus acknowledges that foreign nations, such as the Chaldeans, the Egyptians, and the Persians are “endowed with the highest inspiration,”223 he denigrates Judaism ­because he does not regard Jews as possessing the gift of inspiration. As a ­result, he describes Jews both as deprived of inspiration and as lacking in education especially in comparison with Greeks. Origen reports verbatim Celsus’ criticism by disparaging the alleged ignorance of the Hebrews: ... the Jews, having bowed down in some corner of Palestine, were totally uneducated and had not heard of these things which were sung in poetry long before by Hesiod and a thousand other inspired men.224 Furthermore, his association of Jews with an inferior class of barbarian nations allows Celsus to implicate Christians as well. Origen is able to demonstrate that Celsus treats Christians by analogy to Jews, when he comments and mentions explicitly that “the well-read and learned Celsus … accuses both Jews and Christians of ignorance and want of education.”225 It is not only the Jewish people, but also the followers of Christianity, that are denigrated by Celsus as being ignorant and uneducated and are differentiated from other ethnic and religious groups. In accordance with his classification of barbarian people with respect to their purported possession of knowledge and wisdom, Celsus qualifies some barbarians as being “wise,” while he castigates others as being “utterly 222 Stroumsa notes that the absence of Jews from the list of wise nations is intentionally polemical, as he compares the mention of the Jewish nation among the wise peoples in Numenius of Apamea, another second-century intellectual. (Cf. Stroumsa, Barbarian Philosophy: The Religious Revolution of Early Christianity (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeg, 1999), 49). For more information on Numenius of Apamea, see M. Stern, Greek and Latin Authors on Jews and Judaism. Vol. 2 (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of the Sciences and the Humanities, 1980), 206–216. 223 Origen, Contra Celsum 6.80. 224 Origen, Contra Celsum 4.36. 225 Origen, Contra Celsum 4.36.

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stupid.”226 Whereas Celsus concedes that various foreign nations do possess true wisdom, he denies this highly prized quality to the Jewish people.227 In this manner, Celsus effectively distinguishes Jews from other classes of barbarians that are regarded positively in the hellenized world, such as Indians, Egyptians, Persians, and others.228 On his part, Origen lambasts his opponent for misrepresenting Jews and for discrediting their writings, when he protests Celsus’ prejudiced treatment of the Jewish people and states: “it is only this nation whose histories he regards as untrue” (μόνου δὲ τοῦ ἔθνους τὰς ἱστορίας τούτου ψευδοποιεῖ).229 Origen recognizes the different classifications of barbarians groups that existed at the time, and whereas he does not deny that Jews, and Christians, are to be viewed as such, he notes that they are to be included in the superior rather than the inferior sub-category of barbarians, as Celsus posits in his polemical treatise. In conjunction with his critique of scripture and biblical exegesis, Celsus remarks on the embarrassment of the “more reasonable Jews and Christians” who tend to allegorize the alleged crude language and unsophisticated content of the sacred texts.230 For instance, when examining the Hebrew Bible, Celsus contrasts the “crude story” of the creation of the world in the book of Genesis to those of other barbarians, including the Egyptians and the Phrygians.231 As a result of Celsus’ incisive criticism, Origen is put on the defensive and compelled to exculpate the Hebrew prophets from the allegation of intellectual inferiority.232 In response to Celsus’ claim that the biblical prophets were uneducated and were not divinely inspired, Origen affirms that while some of them were already wise before they were endowed with “the gift of prophecy or divine inspiration,” others obtained wisdom only afterwards.233 Furthermore, Origen distinguishes the ancient Hebrew prophets from the inspired individuals of other nations by claiming that they were selected on the basis of their virtuous life, rather than any of their intellectual abilities, so as to be able to convict the conscience and to correct the lifestyle of their contemporaries.234 Although Origen attempts to distinguish the biblical prophets 226 Origen, Contra Celsum 1.14. 227 Origen, Contra Celsum 1.14. 228 Origen, Contra Celsum 1.14. 229 Origen, Contra Celsum 1.14. 230 Origen, Contra Celsum 4.38. 231 Origen, Contra Celsum 4.36. 232 Origen, Contra Celsum 7.7. 233 Origen, Contra Celsum 7.7. 234 Origen, Contra Celsum 7.7.

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from the inspired individuals of other nations, he de facto tacitly admits Celsus’ critical remarks regarding their intellectual pedigree. In addition to classifying the Jewish people as belonging to an inferior class within the broader category of barbarian nations, Celsus actually connects their ethnic origin to the Egyptian “race” (γένος) and, moreover, discredits them for being a seditious segment of society because they have allegedly deserted the geographical territory and the religious practices of Egypt. Origen quotes Celsus in toto and reports: [T]he Jews were Egyptian by race, and left Egypt after revolting against the Egyptian community and despising the religious customs of the Egyptians... [C]ertain people who were Egyptian by race revolted against the Egyptians and left Egypt, and came to Palestine where they inhabited the part now called Judaea.235 ... τοὺς Ἰουδαίους Αἰγυπτίους τῷ γένει τυγχάνοντας, καταλελοιπέναι τὴν Αἴγυπτον, στασιάσαντας πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ... τὸ Αἰγυπτίους τὸ γένος ὄντας τινὰς ἐστασιακέναι πρὸς Αἰγυπτίους, καὶ τὴν Αἴγυπτον καταλελοιπέναι, καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν Παλαιστίνην ἐληλυθέναι, τήν τε νῦν καλουμένην Ἰουδαίαν ᾠκηκέναι. Furthermore, Celsus draws an analogy between the supposed sedition of the Hebrews in Egyptian society, on the one hand, and the separation of Christians from the Jewish religious traditions, on the other, as he links the two phenomena of one minority group splitting from the majority. It is important to note that Celsus explicitly links particular nations with specific religious beliefs and practices, as he explains: “There is nothing wrong if each people observes its own laws of worship. Actually, we will find that the difference between each nation is very considerable and nevertheless each one of them appears to think its own by far the best. The Ethiopians who live in Meroe worship only Zeus and Dionysus. The Arabians worship only Ourania and Dionysus. The Egyptians worship Osiris and Isis...”236 In spite of his acknowledgement of religious diversity among the different nations, Celsus makes a claim for the dangerous seditiousness 235 Origen, Contra Celsum 3.5, 3.6. 236 Origen, Contra Celsum 5.35. Robert Wilken notes the prominent link between nationality and religious practices in Celsus’ writings, as he explains, “The ancients took for granted that religion was indissolubly linked to a particular city or people. Indeed, there was no term for religion in the sense that we now use it to refer to the beliefs and practices of a specific group of people or of a voluntary association divorced from ethnic or national

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of Christians, as well as Jews, when Origen quotes him verbatim and writes: “He says that what they [ Jews] did to the Egyptians they suffered in turn through those who followed Jesus and believed him to be the Christ; in both instances a revolt against the community led to the introduction of new ideas.”237 In conjunction with Celsus’ seemingly dispassionate argumentation, Origen testifies to the prevalent ethnic slander that attends the designation “barbarian” and reflects on the existing popular sentiment against Jews and Christians in particular. Celsus mocks Jews, in tandem with Christians, in highly derogatory terms, as follows: After this he continues as usual by laughing at the race of Jews and Christians (γελῶν τὸ Ἰουδαίων καὶ Χριστιανῶν γένος), comparing them all to a cluster of bats or ants coming out of a nest, or frogs holding a council round a marsh, or worms assembling in some filthy corner, disagreeing with one another about which of them are the worse sinners.238 The close link between Jews and Christians proves advantageous to Celsus’ argument, as he makes use of both ethnic and religious slander in building his case against Christianity. The fact that Celsus emphasizes the origin of Christianity from Judaism and the association of Christians with Jews, who are cast by him as a secondary class of “barbarians,” allows him to add Christians to the list of suspicious foreign elements with a discredited history, as well as to ascribe to them the existing inventory of ethnic and religious invective. Moreover, the castigation of Christians as the inferior and deficient “barbarians” due to their connection with the Jewish people and religion gives him the occasion to describe them in extreme ways by also using sub-human terms. This rhetorical strategy is similar to Julia Kristeva’s own formulation of the subject as the “abject” and as inherently ambiguous and as transgressing boundaries between “self” and “other,” including human and animal realms.239 As Origen suggests, the analogy between Jews and Christians, on the one hand, and animals, on the other, is based on a judgment about the possession of reason, or the “rational element” (λογικόν)240 which is normally considered to be identity.” Cf. R.L. Wilken, The Christians As the Romans Saw Them (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 124. 237 Celsus, Contra Celsum 3.5. 238 Origen, Contra Celsum 4.23. 239 See Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection. Trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 180 ff. 240 Origen, Contra Celsum 4.24.

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a faculty proper to humanity. Origen’s response to Celsus’ association of Jews and Christians with the animal kingdom follows in toto: Or do you hold this comparison is not true of other men whom, on account of their rationality and established views, you still regard as men, whereas Christians and Jews you disparage and compare to these animals merely because their opinions are not agreeable to you?241 Ἢ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους εἰς τὴν προκειμένην εἰκόνα μὴ παραλαμβάνετε ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τοὺς καθεστῶτας νόμους τηρεῖτε αὐτοὺς ἀνθρώπους, Χριστιανοὺς δὲ καὶ Ἰουδαίους διὰ τὰ μὴ ἀρέσκοντα ὑμῖν αὐτῶν δόγματα ἐξευτελίζοντες τούτοις τοῖς ζῴοις παραβεβλήκατε; Origen’s response suggests that Celsus’ opprobrium is founded upon an assumed distinction between “rationality” usually associated with Greeks, or Romans, in contradistinction to the lack thereof in the case of barbarians, including Jews and Christians.242 Origen objects to Celsus’ disparagement of Jews and Christians as being inadequate in their “soul,” which is characterized primarily by its rational powers, and he also disputes his opponent’s verdict that they are “inferior to other rational beings” and “other races.”243 Celsus’ claims for superiority and inferiority along ethnic lines are premised upon his own judgments on the basis of the literature, the social structure, as well as the perceived capacity for rationality and virtuous life of particular group.244 In invoking these particular aspects of culture and society, Celsus amplifies his invective against the two specific “barbarian” groups that come under harsh criticism. In addition to asserting the alleged irrationality of the Jewish people, Celsus not only regards them as a break-away and reactionary part of Egyptian society, but he also describes them as “runaway slaves who escaped from Egypt (ἀπ’ Αἰγύπτου δραπέτας γεγονέναι); they never did anything important, nor have they ever been of any significance or prominence whatever.”245 The attribution of slave status to Jews vis à vis the rest of Egyptian society further reinforces 241 Origen, Contra Celsum 4.24. 242 Origen, Contra Celsum 4.24. 243 Cf. Origen, Contra Celsum 4.25: “If you disparage a man of small stature not on account of his body but of his soul, thinking him inferior to other rational beings and especially to those who are good, and holding that the reason for his inferiority is the evil within him, why are the bad men among Christians and those Jews who live evil lives as cluster of bats or ants or worms or frogs any more than wicked men of other races?” 244 Origen, Contra Celsum 4.25. 245 Origen, Contra Celsum 4.31.

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the assertion of their irrationality, as slaves, similar to irrational animals and to “barbarians,” are normally not regarded as independent agents who can act in accordance with their rational faculties but, rather, are entirely controlled and dominated by their masters. Origen attempts to counteract the charge that Jews were originally Egyptian slaves not only by claiming the independence of the Hebrew race but also by asserting that they had formed their own society with its own laws and regulations for the maintenance of citizenship. According to him, the model of Hebrew society is a replica of the Greek city-state, where the law is the sole basis of communal life and a prerequisite for membership in the citizen body.246 The argument that Celsus presents, however, clearly suggests the need for subjugation and subjection of potentially dangerous and destabilizing elements in society for the sake of stability and continuation of the status quo. Origen of Alexandria: The Charge of Barbarism and Social Class Whereas in his invective against the Jewish roots of Christianity Celsus resorts to the concept of the barbarian and to ethnic slander, in his criticism of Christianity per se he underscores the social distance between his own class and the originators and proponents of the parvenu religious community. The awareness and the significance of one’s social position are especially pertinent to Celsus’ understanding of the ancestry and public activity of Jesus Christ. For example, Celsus maligns Jesus’ humble background as “coming from a Jewish village,” rather than a distinguished Greek or a Roman city, and states that “because he was poor hired himself out as a workman in Egypt,” where he allegedly became an expert in the ancient magical arts.247 The pagan critic similarly disparages Jesus’ parents, both his mother, who was a “poor country woman 246 Origen, Contra Celsum 4.31–32. For the perception of slaves in ancient society, see Ramsay MacMullen, Roman Social Relations, 50 bc to ad 284 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974); Peter Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine (Stanford Memorial Lectures; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Id., The Roman Empire: Economy, Society, and Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Moses Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology (London: Chatto & Windus, 1980); Keith Bradley, Slavery and Society at Rome (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Thomas Wiedemann, Greek and Roman Slavery (London: Croom Helm, 1981). 247 See Origen, Contra Celsum 1.28. It should be noted that the practice of magic is not only perceived as posing a threat to the political and social order of the empire, but is also linked to foreign and “barbarian” elements in Roman society. For more discussion, see Ramsay MacMullen, Enemies of the Roman Order (Reprint, Eugene, or: Wipf and Stock, 2001), 95–127; R.L. Wilken, The Christians as the Romans Saw Them (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 98–101.

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who earned her living by spinning,” and his father, who was “a carpenter by trade.”248 Celsus’ attack on Christianity focuses especially on its founder and is conditioned in particular by his own view of social distance.249 In response to Celsus’ claims, Origen takes into account Jesus’ upbringing in “meanness and poverty” in the eastern Roman province, as well as his alleged lack of education, rhetorical skill and power of argumentation.250 Origen is compelled to defend the reputation of Jesus, who is described by Celsus as “a carpenter by trade” because of his menial profession.251 In response to Celsus, the apologist asserts that in fact the gospels do not provide information to corroborate such contentious claims. The allegations of low social class and insufficient education raised by Celsus against Jesus are further extended to his disciples and initial followers. When Celsus refers to the twelve disciples, he describes them as “infamous men, the most wicked tax-collectors and sailors” who “had not even a primary education.”252 It is noteworthy that the occupations of tax-collector and sailor are viewed in antiquity as inferior to that of a carpenter because of the social stigma attached to them. In his apology, Origen tries to downplay and equivocate the association of Jesus’ disciples with the lower classes marked by their socially marginal occupations and manual professions. For example, he specifies that, of the twelve disciples, it was only Matthew who was a tax-collector, while none of the rest could be considered as sailors, although some are identified as fishermen.253 In so far as Celsus’ objection to the lack of education of Jesus and his early followers is concerned, Origen does not attempt to disprove that the apostles were indeed “unlettered and ignorant men,” as his adversary contends.254 Instead, the apologist justifies the popular appeal of Jesus and the apostles with the wider accessibility of their teachings. The apologist de facto agrees with Celsus’ point, when he comments: “In them [the apostles] there was no power of speaking or of giving an ordered narrative by the standard Greek dialectical or rhetorical arts which convinced their hearers.”255 However, 248 Origen, Contra Celsum 1.28. 249 For a detailed analysis of distinctions in social status and their legal aspects, see Peter Garnsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970), 221–259. See also Ramsay MacMullen, Roman Social Relations, 50 bc to ad 284 (New ­Haven: Yale University Press, 1974). 250 Origen, Contra Celsum 1.29. 251 Origen, Contra Celsum 6.36. 252 Origen, Contra Celsum 1.62. 253 Origen, Contra Celsum 1.62. 254 Origen, Contra Celsum 8.47. 255 Origen, Contra Celsum 1.62.

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he presents this characteristic as an advantage, rather than a hindrance, since both Jesus and his disciples possessed the ability to think and to express themselves in ways that were easily understood by the unlettered masses.256 Instead of denying Celsus’ allegations, Origen makes an argument in defense of Jesus and the apostles in favor of their service to the wider society and the broader reach of their teachings in opposition to the literature of Greek philosophers geared toward the highly educated elites.257 Additionally, scripture holds a central place in Celsus’ attack on Christianity and it comes under his scrutiny in connection with its style and content. While Celsus argues against the merits of the biblical text by pointing to the fact that the same “ideas have been better expressed among the Greeks” and maintaining that its main purpose is to affect “the most stupid and uneducated yokels,”258 the apologist ventures to turn these critical observations into advantageous qualities. Instead of denying the association of Christians with the low social strata of Roman society, Origen argues for the beneficial effect of the biblical writings on the common people.259 In contrast to Jewish and Christian religious texts, Origen regards Greek philosophical literature as having only a limited capacity to communicate effectively and to exert a positive influence with a broader societal reach. According to him, unlike the strictly elite-bound Greek philosophical texts, scripture can affect virtually everyone by reaching “not only the intelligent, but also the stupid, and again not just the Greeks without including the barbarians (δ’ αὖ οὐχὶ Ἕλληνας μὲν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ βαρβάρους).”260 In his response to Celsus’ association of Christian scripture with the lower echelons of society, Origen on his part criticizes the educated Greek-speaking elites for disregarding other members of society and for limiting the usefulness of their teachings. In fact, Origen turns against his opponent with a counter accusation when he states the following argument: Obviously, therefore, when such teachers speak they have to take pains to use a type of vocabulary that will help everybody and can command a hearing with anyone. On the other hand, all those who have abandoned the uneducated as being low class and incapable of appreciating the 256 Origen, Contra Celsum 1.62. 257 Origen, Contra Celsum 6.1. 258 Origen, Contra Celsum 6.1. 259 Origen, Contra Celsum 6.1. 260 Origen, Contra Celsum 6.1: οὐ μόνον ἐντρεχῆ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνόητον, πάλιν δ’ αὖ οὐχὶ Ἕλληνας μὲν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ βαρβάρους, πολὺ δὲ τὸ ἥμερον ἐὰν καὶ τοὺς ἀγροικοτάτους καὶ ἰδιώτας οἷός τέ τις γένηται ἐπιστρέφειν.

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smoothness of a literary style and an orderly description, and who pay attention only to people educated in learning and scholarship, confine what should be of benefit to the community to a very narrow and limited circle.261 δῆλον ἐστιν, ὅτι χαρακτῆρος ἐν τῷ λέγειν φροντιστέον αὐτῷ κοινωφελοῦς καὶ δυναμένου πᾶσαν ἐπαγαγέσθαι ἀκοήν· ὅσοι δὲ, πολλὰ χαίρειν φράσαντες ὡς ἀνδραπόδοις τοῖς ἰδιώταις, καὶ μὴ οἷοί τε κατακούειν τῆς ἐν φράσει λόγων καὶ τάξει ἀπαγγελλομένων ἀκολουθίας, μόνων ἐφρόντισαν τῶν ἀνατραφέντων ἐν λόγοις καὶ μαθήμασιν, οὗτοι τὸ κοινωνικὸν εἰς κομιδῆ στενὸν καὶ βραχὺ συνήγαγον. Therefore, it follows that, rather than excusing the poor vocabulary of the biblical text, the apologist defends its necessity for achieving its aim of successful personal transformation and individual progress.262 In response to Celsus’ criticism of the “mean style of the Bible” (λέξισιν εὐτελείας τῶν Γραφῶν), he explains that unlike the elevated style of Greek literature, that of the biblical text can reach the multitude and extend beyond a small circle of privileged individuals.263 Origen emphasizes the fact that whereas Greek literary and philosophical compositions are accessible only to the Greek-speaking and to the highly educated, Scripture is available to everyone without any social limitations and any ethnic or class distinctions. Furthermore, Origen notes that Christian teachers have made the effort to travel widely and to make the message available to “many other nations of the world” (πολλὰ ἔθνη τῆς οἰκουμένης) and, as a result, they have extended the scope of influence to barbarians and Greeks alike.264 In contrast to the attempt of Christians to reach all people, rather than to limit its impact to the hellenized world alone, Origen criticizes Plato, as well as other Greeks, who “would have never taken pains” to learn a foreign language and to “speak like a barbarian for the sake of improving Egyptians and Syrians, rather than, by remaining Greek, have no power to say anything helpful to either of them” (βαρβαρίζειν μᾶλλον ὑπὲρ τῆς Αἰγυπτίων καὶ Σύρων βελτιώσεως ἢ Ἕλλην μένων μηδὲν δύνασθαι χρήσιμον λέγειν Αἰγυπτίοις καὶ Σύροις).265 The same logic of argumentation applies to prevailing differentiations along social as well as ethnic distinctions. 261 Origen, Contra Celsum 6.1. 262 Origen, Contra Celsum 6.1. 263 Origen, Contra Celsum 6.2. 264 Origen, Contra Celsum 6.2. 265 Origen, Contra Celsum 7.60.

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It is important to note that the main issue behind the objection against the style and the language of Greek philosophical texts and Christian literature remains the linguistic and the social differentiation. When comparing the style of Plato to that of the Bible, Origen makes an apt analogy, which captures the chief problem implicated by contrasting Greek philosophy and Christian scripture.266 Origen compares the various literary styles of Greek philosophical and of biblical writings by offering the analogy of food preparation: he explains that whereas the same substance is prepared with select sophisticated condiments for the “rich and luxurious people” according to the tastes of the “supposed better classes,” it would normally be prepared in a simple way for the “poor and simple folk.”267 Therefore, the apologist draws a direct connection between the “poorer style and simpler language used by Jews and Christians” and its important relevance to the majority of the people belonging to the lower echelons of society.268 Origen counters Celsus’ critique of the Bible by asserting that the multitude would be alienated from an inappropriate style.269 Moreover, the apologist actually accuses Plato and other Greek philosophers of caring only for the classes that are regarded as being “better” and disregarding and despising the multitude.270 For this reason, the apologist contrasts the wise philosophers of the Greeks to the prophets of the Jews and he stresses the important role of the disciples of Jesus, whose diction enables communication rather than estrangement of the wide majority of common people.271 Furthermore, the list of allegations leveled against Jesus and his immediate circle of disciples, in tandem with criticism of the biblical text, are analogously extended by Celsus to his contemporary Christians. As the criticisms against Jesus and the apostles are based upon their personal background, professional occupation and lack of formal education, those against his contemporary Christians are on the basis of their intellectual abilities and low social status. Celsus locates the success of the religious movement primarily among the “vulgar and illiterate,” although he also admits the existence of exceptions of “some moderate, reasonable, and intelligent people” as well.272 Celsus identifies the overwhelming majority of Christians with the “stupid and the low-class folk”273 266 Origen, Contra Celsum 7.59. 267 Origen, Contra Celsum 7.59. 268 Origen, Contra Celsum 7.59. 269 Origen, Contra Celsum 7.60. 270 Origen, Contra Celsum 7.60. 271 Origen, Contra Celsum 7.60. 272 Origen, Contra Celsum 1.27. 273 Origen, Contra Celsum 3.18.

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and highlights individuals at the bottom of the social pyramid, such as women, children, and slaves. The description of Christians as the inferior element within Roman society is consistent with Said’s alignment of the “oriental” subject with segments of western society that are similarly cast as the “other” in terms of gender, class, ethnicity, and education.274 Christian constituents are not only relegated by Celsus to inferior social stratum but are also subjected to ridicule: In private houses also we see wool-workers, cobblers, laundry-workers, and the most illiterate and bucolic yokels, who would not dare to say anything at all in front of their elders and more intelligent masters.275 Celsus laments the intellectual inadequacy of Christians, as well as the fact that, instead of going to the schoolmaster to obtain proper Hellenic education, they send their children to “go along with the women and little children who are their playfellows to the wooldresser’s shop, or to the cobbler’s or to the washerwoman’s shop, that they may learn perfection.”276 In addition to the specification of poor education, the critic designates the low social strata represented by Christians, as suggested by the mention of menial occupations, and the references to slaves, women, and adolescents as comprising a significant number of Christians.277 In Celsus’ profile of the Christian movement, therefore, it is the lowest elements of Roman society that are attracted to it, rather than the highly cultured, educated and respected elites. In response to the perspicacious observations made by Celsus, Origen does not deny the fact that the Christian religion is especially successful with the lower echelons of society, but he also provides a rationalization for it. In explicating the low social profile of the Christian constituents, the apologist points to the fact that those who are most in need of moral reformation are precisely the “unclean” (ἀκαθάρτοις) and those who are “destitute of reason and sick in their soul” (τοῖς χωρὶς λόγου ὁτιποτοῦν φρονοῦσι, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν νοσοῦσιν).278 Origen explains that the possibility for self- improvement and individual transformation is made available to the large majority and especially to the segment of society that needs it the most.279 In this way, we obtain the complete picture of 274 E. Said, Orientalism, 207. 275 Origen, Contra Celsum 3.56. 276 Origen, Contra Celsum 3.56. 277 Origen, Contra Celsum 3.49–50, 4.13. 278 Origen, Contra Celsum 8.50. 279 Origen, Contra Celsum 8.50.

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the Christian movement that Celsus propounds by stressing the social characteristic of its current membership, as well as its founder, leaders and founding documents. Furthermore, the negative profile of Christians based on ethnicity, class and education is also extended to allegations of criminality and suspicion of lawlessness. On the one hand, Celsus is critical of the fact that Christians target social outcasts, or as he remarks someone who is “dishonest, a thief, a burglar, a poisoner, a sacrilegious fellow”280 (τὸν ἄδικον, καὶ κλέπτην, καὶ τοιχωρύχον, καὶ φαρμακέα, καὶ ἱερόσυλον, καὶ τυμβωρύχον) and, on the other, he states his genuine concern about the possible increase of the number of Christians.281 Celsus claims that an eventual growth of the Christian constituency will overthrow the existing Roman law and will lead to a major social upheaval. He ­expresses the concern that if such an unfortunate eventuality would occur in the future, the existence of the Roman Empire will be endangered and the emperor will be “abandoned, alone and deserted, while earthly things would come into the power of the most lawless and savage barbarians” (μόνον καὶ ἔρημον, τὰ δ’ ἐπὶ γῆς ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνομωτάτοις τε καὶ ἀγριωτάτοις βαρβάροις γενέσθαι).282 According to Celsus, the criminal nature of the constituents of the Christian religion, as members of the low classes, poses a potential threat to the entire Roman state.283 More specifically, Celsus is particularly critical of the isolationism of Christians when he explains in reference to the scriptural quotation in Matthew 6:24, “it is impossible for the same man to serve several masters,” that it is a “seditious word” (στάσεως εἶναι φωνήν) targeting the “people who wall themselves off and break away from the rest of mankind.”284 In refuting the charge of barbarism and the serious allegation of potential political threat, Origen emphasizes the fact that Christian teachings lead to a moral transformation of individuals that is beneficial for society, rather than instigating a revolt against the Roman emperor.285 Origen claims that just as Jesus and his disciples sought sinners in order to correct their character and lifestyle, “barbarians would also 280 Origen, Contra Celsum 3.59. 281 Origen, Contra Celsum 8.68. 282 Origen, Contra Celsum 8.68. 283 Celsus is also aware that some Christians refused military service and were unwilling to protect the Roman Empire, and he urges them “to help the emperor with all power and to cooperate with him in what is right, and fight for him, and be fellow soldiers if he presses for this, and fellow-generals with him.” Cf. Contra Celsum 8.73. 284 Origen, Contra Celsum 8.2. For other references to seditiousness, see also Contra Celsum 3.5; 8.49. 285 Origen, Contra Celsum 8.68.

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be ­converted to the word of God and would be most law-abiding and mild” (καὶ οἱ βάρβαροι, τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ προσελθόντες, νομιμώτατοι ἔσονται, καὶ ἡμερώτατοι), rather than posing a threat to the Roman order.286 Here Origen claims that Christianity will not only reach all individuals and transform the lower classes of Roman society but will also have a profound beneficial effect on all people groups, as it will lead to the radical transformations of Greeks and barbarians alike. Instead of spelling danger and sedition for Roman society, however, the apologist claims that the Christian religion introduces effective ethical teachings and moral improvement that will benefit and enrich both individuals and entire communities. Celsus’ characterization of the Christian religion and his concerns related to its expansion and possible political ramifications indicate the social distance between the Roman elite and the potentially endangering “barbarian” others that belong to the lower classes.287 His critique of Christianity betrays the viewpoint of the social conservative and his particular interest to defend and preserve the status quo by eliminating any conceivable challenges to the political order of the day. The characterization or caricature of Christians as vulgar, criminal and quintessentially barbarian, whether based on their ethnic origin, level of education, or social standing, demonstrates the contempt of the Roman intellectual who chooses to put his opponents in the category of the radical “other.” The concept of barbarism functions in its various valences in Celsus’ critique of Christianity in order to describe and to malign the emerging religious group that he finds particularly objectionable from his intellectual and social standpoint. By resorting to the notion of the “barbarian” in his qualification of Christianity, as analogous to Judaism, Celsus manages to assert successfully his position of power and social control over against the claims of barbarian “others” to the Roman political order. As Celsus’ polemical work True Doctrine and Origen’s apologetic treatise Contra Celsum demonstrate, there are many dimensions of the notion of the barbarian that help to understand the complex dynamics between Jews, Christians, Greeks and Romans, as well as the members of different social strata and ethno-religious groups in late imperial period.

286 Origen, Contra Celsum 8.68. 287 On the political dangers of Christianity in Celsus’ critique, see Anderson, Logos und Nomos: Die Polemik des Kelsos wider das Christentum (Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte 30; Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1955), 146, 219; S. Benko, Pagan Rome and the Early Christians (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 156; R. Wilken, The Christians as the Romans Saw Them (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 118–124.

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Eusebius of Caesarea and the Charge of Barbarism

Similar to other apologists before him, Eusebius of Caesarea288 addresses the charge of barbarism vis à vis Christians and, in turn, attempts to hurl this indictment against his opponents. In his response to the charge that Christians are “barbarian” Eusebius offers a program that is primarily political in nature, rather than cultural, as is the case in earlier apologetic writings.289 In his exposition and argumentation in favor of the Christian religion, Eusebius connects the origin and development of Christianity to the emergence and stabilization of the Roman imperial regime and to the figure of the emperor in particular. This is not accidental, since Eusebius begins the writing of his apologetic work the Preparation for the Gospel soon after being appointed as a bishop of Caesarea in Palestine in 313, following the successful victory of emperor Constantine in the city of Rome and the Edict of Milan.290 In it, instead of emphasizing Greek literature, philosophy or education, Eusebius underscores the important link between the Christian religion and the Roman political system. 288 For in-depth discussion of the apologetic works of Eusebius, see T.D. Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981); Id., The New Empire of Diocletian and Constantine (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982); Aryeh Kofsky, Eusebius of Caesarea Against Paganism (Leiden: Brill, 2000); H.W. Attrige and G. Hatta, eds., Eusebius, Christianity and Judaism (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1992); F.J. FoakesJackson, Eusebius Pamphili (Cambridge: W. Heffner, 1933); D.S. Wallace-Hadrill, Eusebius of Caesarea (London: A.R. Mowbray, 1960); H. Berkhof, Die Theologie des Eusebius von Caesarea (Amsterdam: Uitgeversmaatschappij, 1939); J. Stephenson, Studies in Eusebius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929); R.M. Grant, Eusebius as Church Historian (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980); A.A. Mosshammer, The Chronicle of Eusebius and Greek Chronographic Tradition (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1979); F.G. Chestnut, The First Christian Histories: Eusebius, Socrates, Sozomen, Theodoret and Evagrius (Theologie Histroique 46; Paris: Beauchesne, 1977); R. Farina, L’impero e l’imperatore cristiano in Eusebio di Cesarea: La prima teologica politica del Cristianismo (Zürich: Pas Verlag, 1966); Arnaldo Momigliano, “Pagan and Christian Historiography in the Fourth Century a.d.,” in The Conflict between Paganism and Christianity in the Fourth Century, ed., Aranaldo Momigliano (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963), 79–99; Jörg Urlich, Euseb von Caesarea und die Juden (Berlin: Gruyter, 1999); L.I. Levine, Caesarea under Roman Rule (Leiden: Brill, 1975); See also Aaron Johnson, Ethnicity and Argument in Eusebius’ Praeparatio Evangelica (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 289 See above in this chapter the section on Clement of Alexandria highlighting his emphasis on Greek paideia. 290 For the proper dating of the composition of Eusebius’ Preparation for the Gospel, see J. Sirinelli and E. Des Places who suggest the period circa 313–325. Cf. Eusebe de Cesaree. La Preparation Evangelique, Livre i, sc 206 (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1974), 8–14.

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Eusebius goes as far as to stress the fact that the paradigmatic Christian is an epitome of Roman citizenry, serving loyally the reigning emperor and observing the existing laws and regulations of the Roman state. In his apologetic writings, Eusebius offers a complex negotiation between the different associations of Christians with various aspects of their Greek, Jewish, and Roman identities, not only in light of the charge of barbarism but, more importantly, in an effort to re-define Christianity at a time of major transition and transformation for both the Roman Empire and the Christian religion. Eusebius of Caesarea: Classification of the “Barbarian” Eusebius starts his defense of Christianity in his apologetic treatise Preparation for the Gospel291 by posing a series of revealing questions that bear directly on the charge of barbarism against the early Christians. The apologist articulates significant questions regarding Christian identity and self-understanding: Are we Greeks or barbarians? Or what can there be intermediate to these? (πότερον Ἕλληνες ἢ βάρβαροι; ἢ τί ἂν γένοιτο τούτων μέσον;) And what do we claim to be, not in regard to the name (προσηγορίαν), because it is manifest to all, but in the manner (τρόπον) and purpose (προαίρεσιν) of life?… What then may the strangeness in us be, and what the newfangled manner of our life? (τί οὖν ἂν γένοιτο τὸ καθ‘ ἡμᾶς ξένον καὶ τίς ὁ νεωτερισμὸς τοῦ βίου)”292 From the very beginning of the Preparation for the Gospel, the author suggests a differentiation of the Christian worldview and lifestyle from both the Greek and the barbarian ones. Similar to the theoretical elaborations of the literary critic Julia Kristeva on the articulation of self as third category of the “abject,” that is being neither “object” nor “subject,” as it transgresses and defiles boundaries between the two and indicates their fragility and ambiguity, here too 291 Eusebius’ works that are usually classified in scholarship as “apologetic” are his treatises Against Hierocles and Against Porphyry, where he answers concrete questions, objections and accusations raised against Christianity. Although in his two-volume work, Preparation of the Gospel and Demonstration of the Gospel, there seems to be a lack of explicit apologetics on the surface of the text, the underlying structure and the systematic argumentation against critics of the Christian religion reveal a clear apologetic agenda. For further substantiation of the apologetic nature of Preparation of the Gospel, see ­Micheal Frede, “Eusebius’ Apologetic Writings” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire, eds., M. E ­ dwards, M. Goodman and S. Price (Oxford: Clarendon: 1999), 223–250; See also A. Kofsky, Eusebius of Caesarea Against Paganism (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 74–99. 292 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 1.2.1.

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Eusebius presents a third and distinct form of identity.293 Likewise, the postcolonial critic Homi Bhabha also suggests that the colonial subject, which he defines as the “hybrid,” is marked by its ambivalence because it occupies a liminal space that is “neither one nor the other.”294 In response to the questions raised by him and by outsiders, Eusebius elaborates further on the puzzling identity of Christians, as he comments:295 “For they would see that we agree neither with the opinions of the Greeks, nor with the customs of the barbarians” (οὔτε γὰρ τὰ Ἑλλήνων φρονοῦντας ὁρᾶν οὔτε τὰ βαρβάρων ἐπιτηδεύοντας).296 In this specific context, the designation “barbarian” is most likely made in reference to Judaism in particular, rather than a broader category of non-Greeks.297 For example, he specifies the act of desertion of the ancestral hellenic culture and tradition when he writes: “And to what kind of punishments would they not justly be subjected, who deserting the customs of their forefathers have become zealots for the foreign mythologies of the Jews, which are of evil report among all men (Ἰουδαϊκῶν μυθολογημάτων γενόμενοι ζηλωταί)?298 In response to these important questions posed by his opponents, Eusebius chooses to designate Christians as distinct and separate from both Greeks and Jews, as he juxtaposes Christians to these two ethnic and religious groups in particular. In this train of argumentation, he in fact claims the intentional severance and the radical difference of Christians from their Hellenic and Hebrew ancestral traditions. Eusebius also expresses the potential objections from a Jewish perspective, when he writes: “But the sons of the Hebrews also would find fault with us that, being strangers and aliens (ἀλλόφυλοι ὄντες καὶ ἀλλογενεῖς), we misuse 293 See Julia, Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans., Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 4, 17, 68. 294 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994), 127. 295 It is very likely that Eusebius has in mind Porphyry when he refers to the allegation that Christians have apostatized from Greek culture and religion for barbarian ones. For example, in Ecclesiastical Histories 6.19.7, Eusebius reports that Porphyry blames Origen, who, although “having been educated as a Greek in Greek literature, went over to the barbarian recklessness (βάρβαρον τόλμημα).” It is therefore highly probable that the opponent that Eusebius quotes in Preparation for the Gospel 1.2.1 is in fact Porphyry. This possibility is further confirmed by Porphyry’s criticism of the Gospel of John and in particular his reference to the eucharist as an act of cannibalism without parallel among barbarians. (cf. Fragment 69). For support of the hypothesis that Eusebius addresses Porphyry’s objections in his Preparation for the Gospel, see A. Kofsky, Eusebius of Caesarea Against Paganism (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 74–85. 296 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 1.2.1. 297 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 1.2. 298 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 1.2.

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their books, which do not belong to us at all and because in an impudent and shameless way, as they would say, we thrust ourselves in, and try violently to thrust out the true family and kindred from their own ancestral rights.”299 The apologist postulates clearly the distinctness of the Christian religion both from its Jewish and Greek analogues, when he states that it is “neither Hellenism or Judaism, but a new and true kind of divine philosophy (οὔθ’ Ἑλληνισμὸς, ὢν οὔτε Ἰουδαϊσμὸς, ἀλλά τις καινὴ καὶ ἀληθὴς θεοσοφία), bringing evidence of its novelty from its very name.”300 In response to the allegation that Christians have deserted their Hellenic heritage and have adopted new and foreign religious beliefs and practices, the apologist indicates their association with the Jewish people, a class of barbarians perceived negatively by outsiders in antiquity due to their purported “evil report among all men.”301 As Christianity is associated with its Jewish ethnic and religious roots, it is therefore regarded as essentially non-Greek and barbarian by its very nature. In spite of Eusebius’ attempt to demarcate Christians as entirely distinct from both Jews and Greeks, he largely assumes a predominantly hellenized readership, as he explicitly indicates the need for a “defense of the reason for which we have welcomed the barbarian philosophy in preference to the Greek” (ἀπολογίας δὲ ἡμετέρας χάριν, δι‘ ἣν τὴν βάρβαρον φιλοσοφίαν τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς ὁμολογοῦμεν προησμενικέναι).302 Moreover, Eusebius indicates that Christians, being “Greeks by race, and Greeks by sentiment (τὸ γένος Ἕλληνες ὄτνες, καὶ τὰ Ἑλλήνων φρονοῦντες)” have consequently become deserters to their ancient traditions in favor of another.303 Despite the apologist’s attempt to demarcate Christianity as being distinct and different from both Hellenism and Judaism, Eusebius does not deny its important link with the Jewish people and religion. At the same time, it is patently clear that the audience that he has in mind is primarily “Hellenic” either by virtue of their ethnic origin or as a result of their formal education, in addition to the fact they that these converts have caused a major rupture with their previous religious beliefs and practices by embracing Christianity. Alongside the characterization of Christianity as quintessentially non-Greek primarily on the basis of its foreign origin and its close association with its parent Jewish religion, its followers are also identified as “barbarian” on account of their own ethnicity, as well as religious persuasion. For example, the apologist 299 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 1.2. 300 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 1.5. 301 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 1.2.4. 302 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 11. Preface. 303 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 1.5.

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mentions Amelius, whom he identifies as a Platonist, and points to the fact that the critic refers to the evangelist St. John as being barbarian.304 According to Eusebius, Amelius comments with respect to the writings of John, the author of the fourth gospel, and states that “the barbarian (ὁ βάρβαρος) maintains that He was with God and was God.”305 In response to this assertion, Eusebius claims that St. John was a Hebrew,306 similar to Paul,307 and in this way he attempts to demarcate the authors of the New Testament as ethnically Jewish, as well as being proponents of an entirely new religious formation. Furthermore, Eusebius reflects on the characterization of Christianity as barbarian in contexts specific to it, rather than in reference to its ancestral Jewish ethnic and religious roots. In his multi-volume work Ecclesiastical History, Eusebius also expounds on the “barbarian” aspects of the New Testament, when he comments on the biblical text and takes into consideration its literary style.308 For example, he stresses the uniqueness of the book of Revelation in the New Testament corpus on the basis of its “conceptions” (νοημάτοι), “terms” (ῥημάτοι), and “arrangement” (συντάξις), and he observes that it entails a different authorial hand than that of the fourth gospel and the epistles bearing the name of John.309 The apologist refers to the peculiar literary style of the book of Revelation as being “barbarian” and as distinguished from the impeccable Greek language, high diction and perfect syntax of the writings of John the evangelist. He notes that while the book of Revelation contains “barbarous idioms” (ἰδιώμασίν τε βαρβαρικοῖς), the gospel and the letters composed by St. John are marked by a “complete absence of any barbarous word, or solecism, or any vulgarism” (βάρβαρόν τινα φθόγγον ἢ σολοικισμὸν ἢ ὅλως ἰδιωτισμὸν).310 In so far as the authorship, the textual content or the literary style of the New Testament corpus is concerned, Eusebius concedes to the ascription of certain “­barbarian” characteristics in a limited way. In his own understanding of Christian scripture, however, it is apparent that the concept of barbarism is found to be appropriate and applicable especially to the textual composition and to the Greek grammar and language.

304 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 11.19. 305 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 11.19.1. 306 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 11.18. 307 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 11.19. 308 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 7.25. 309 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 7.25.17: καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν νοημάτων δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ῥημάτων καὶ τῆς συντάξεως αὐτῶν εἰκότως ἕτερος οὗτος παρ’ ἐκεῖνον ὑποληφθήσεται. 310 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 7.25.26–27.

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In spite of associating Christianity with Jewishness, understood more narrowly in ethnic or religious terms, and barbarism, understood in a much broader context, Eusebius maintains a level of ambiguity when he refers to his contemporary Christians per se. It is important to note that Eusebius identifies Christians as originating from various “nations” (ἔθνη), in addition to referencing their initial adherence to Hellenic culture and their subsequent abandonment of it.311 For example, Eusebius cites Porphyry’s verbal attack and “­slander” (ἐνδιαβάλλειν) of Christian scripture, as well as of Origen himself, when he re-states that “Origen, a Greek educated in Greek learning, drove headlong towards barbarian recklessness” (Ἕλλην ἐν Ἕλλησιν παιδευθεὶς λόγοις, πρὸς τὸ βάρβαρον ἐξώκειλεν τόλμημα) by virtue of his acceptance of C ­ hristianity.312 This comment by Porphyry reveals the perception of outside critics, as well insiders, that conversion of both Greeks and the Greek-speaking population to Christianity entailed a betrayal of the hellenic cultural heritage. From Porphyry’s remarks, it becomes clear that the idea of barbarism is connected to the Jewish origins of Christianity, as well as to the perceived inferior qualities of Scripture from the standpoint of pagan intellectuals and philosophers.313 While it is not surprising that early Christians are accused of committing acts of barbarism by virtue of their conversation to a new foreign religion, it is striking that Eusebius does not attempt to deny these allegations. In his Preparation for the Gospel the apologist remarks further on the perception of Christians as being “barbarian”314 and he expounds upon it: [L]et us go back to the first indictment, and give an answer to those who inquire who we are and whence we come. Well then, that being Greeks by race, and Greeks by sentiment, and gathered out of all sorts of nations, like the chosen men of a newly enlisted army, we have become deserters from the superstition of our ancestors – this even we ourselves should never deny.315 … ἀνίωμεν ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην κατηγορίαν, καὶ τίνες ὄντες καὶ πόθεν ὁρμώμενοι τοῖς διερωτῶσιν ἀποκρινώμεθα. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸ γένος Ἕλληνες ὄντες καὶ τὰ Ἑλλήνων φρονοῦντες ἐκ παντοίων τε ἐθνῶν ὡς ἂν νεολέκτου στρατιᾶς λογάδες

311 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 1.1.9. 312 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 6.19.7. 313 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 6.19.1–5. 314 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 1.2. 315 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 1.5–6.

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συνειλεγμένοι τῆς πατρίου δεισιδαιμονίας ἀποστάται καθεστήκαμεν, οὐδ’ ἂν αὐτοί ποτε ἀρνηθείημεν· The assertion of the alleged barbarization of individuals identified as being “Greek” on the basis of either their ethnic origin (γένος, ἔθνος) or their received education (παιδεία) is made even more explicit when Eusebius articulates the necessity for an apology on behalf of Christians. In the penultimate chapter of his Preparation for the Gospel, he summarizes the main argument of his apologetic treatise by mentioning the “writings of the barbarians” in the following manner: All this I have striven to prove in the argument of this present Preparation, as at once an answer and a defense against those who shall inquire, what beauty or majesty have we seen in the writings of the barbarians, that we have decided to prefer them to our ancestral and noble philosophy, that, I mean, of the Greeks (εἰς ἀπόκρισιν ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀπολογίαν τῶν δὴ πευσομένων τί δὴ ἄρα καλὸν ἢ σεμνὸν ἰδόντες ἐν τοῖς βαρβάρων γράμμασι τῆς πατρῴας καὶ εὐγενοῦς φιλοσοφίας, τῆς Ἑλλήνων λέγω).316 Although Eusebius is defending his fellow Christians from various accusations of committing barbarism, as exemplified by their preference for a radically new and foreign religion, he suggests that he has in mind primarily the Greekspeaking, if not the Greek-born. According to Eusebius, it is precisely because of the barbarization of Greeks and of other Hellenized peoples as a result of conversion to Christianity that an apology, such as his Preparation for the Gospel, is necessary to compose and to present. Whereas Eusebius tries to defend Christians and to respond directly to the charge of barbarism in its different valences, he also accuses his opponents of the same allegations. In fact, he emphasizes the fact that all the philosophical and religious ideas that the Greeks have come from the Egyptians, the Phoenicians, or the ancient Hebrews. For instance, he comments extensively on the travels of Cadmus and he writes: “The Greeks introduced nothing of their own in their own writings but fell into the mythologies of those outside.”317 In his response to the charge of the sudden abandonment of the Hellenic ancestral traditions on part of Christians, the apologist points to Greek philosophers who have culled “all their philosophical lore and all that was otherwise of common benefit and profitable for their social needs from the barbarians” 316 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 14.1.4. 317 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 2.1.

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(τοῖς Ἕλλησι καὶ αὐτοῖς γε τοῖς βοωμένοις αὐτῶν φιλοσόφοις τὰ φιλόσοφα μαθήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλως κοινὰ καὶ ταῖς πολιτικαῖς λυσιτελοῦντα χρείαις παρὰ βαρβάρων).318 In developing his argument, Eusebius draws an analogy between the Christian religion and Greek philosophy and attempts to “prove that our borrowing what was profitable from barbarians brings no blame upon us” (μὴ φέρειν τινὰ μέμψιν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀπὸ βαρβάρων τοῦ συμφέροντος μετάληψιν).319 Similar to his predecessors Tatian and Clement of Alexandria, he also points to the barbarian character of Greek philosophy, as he traces its origins to other nations, such as the Syrian, the Egyptian, the Persian, the Phoenician and the Hebrew.320 More particularly, he proceeds to demonstrate the indebtedness of Greek philosophy to Judaism when he explains: Yet in further preparation for showing the benefit which has overflowed to the Greeks from the Hebrew Scriptures, I think it will be right and necessary for me to prove generally that all the celebrated learning and philosophy (παιδείαν τε καὶ φιλοσοφίαν) of the Greeks, both their elementary studies and their grand system of logical science, have been collected by them from the barbarians (τά τε πρῶτα αὐτῶν μαθήματα καὶ τὰ σεμνὰ τῆς λογικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀπὸ βαρβάρων), so that none of them may any longer lay blame upon us, because we have preferred the religion and philosophy of the barbarians (παρὰ βαρβάροις εὐσεβείαν τε καὶ φιλοσοφίαν) to their grand doctrines.321 Eusebius argues for the superiority of the Hebrew religious system, which, as he asserts, has been plundered by different Greek philosophers. In addition, he chooses to present the Hebrew social structure as being subordinated to rational principles and analogous to the Greek political constitutions.322 The concept of “Greek/ness” is destabilized by Eusebius’ claim that Greeks have benefited not only with respect to philosophy by borrowing ideas from the ancient Hebrews but also that they “have received help in everything from the barbarians.”323 The apologist asserts the dependence of both Greeks and Christians on Judaism and, in this way, he manages to relativize the allegation that Christians have betrayed their Hellenic ethnic and cultural identity, 318 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 7.1.3. 319 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 7.1.3. 320 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 10.4. 321 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 10.3.26. 322 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 7.3. 323 See Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 11.6.

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as he points out that both Greek philosophy and the Christian religion derive their origins from barbarian traditions. This representation of the “barbarian” in Eusebius’ work can be understood in the context of post-colonial critique of Homi Bhabha, who emphasizes the hybridization of the colonized and the colonizer, self and other, and insists on the importance of the process of translation in the destabilization of and resistance to the dominant colonial discourse.324 In an indirect way, the very allegations of apostasy and barbarism against Christians are undermined and turned into counter-charges in so far as Greeks are shown to be largely dependent upon the actual contributions of foreign nations, such as Jews and others.325 In trying to defend Christians against the charge of barbarism, Eusebius does not deny the serious allegations of cultural betrayal and religious apostasy but rather re-directs these back to their point of origin. The charge of barbarism, in its various aspects, is turned into a counter-charge involving the entire spectrum of the Greco-Roman philosophical, religious, cultural and political arenas. In order to combat this allegation of barbarism, which suggests a radical severance from established ancient traditions, the apologist proceeds to demonstrate that what is considered to be properly “Greek” is in fact at its very core “barbarian” as well. For example, Eusebius indicates that the Greek and Roman gods were initially the same as foreign gods before the subsequent proliferation of divinities.326 He also states that both Greco-Roman and barbarian practices of animal sacrifice are to be regarded as cruel acts of desecration rather than actual sanctification of the altar of the deity in question.327 In connection with his demonstration of the cruel character of Greco-Roman religions, Eusebius describes the public celebration of a religious festival as being “barbarous” (τὴν βάρβαρον ἑορτήν) when referring to a sacrifice offered to the god of medicine, Asclepius.328 Related to Greco-Roman religious practice is not only animal offering but also human sacrifice, which Eusebius denounces as an inhumane and sacrilegious action.329 In addition, he is critical of the alleged orgiastic rites of ancient mystery religions and the pursuit of physical pleasure that he identifies in Greco-Roman religions.330 324 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994), 139 ff. 325 For instance, Eusebius traces the origin of the Greek alphabet to the Hebrew one and explicates each letter as testifying to the reasoning capacity of the Hebrews. (Cf. Preparation for the Gospel 11.6–7). 326 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 1.9. 327 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 3.9. 328 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 13.14.3. 329 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 4.15. 330 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 7.2.

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Additionally, it should be noted that the apologist ridicules the resort to oracles on the part of both Greeks and Romans and describes the incantation of the prophets as being an “unintelligible and barbaric” (ἀσήμου καὶ βαρβαρικῆς) utterance that merely serves to deceive and misguide because of its ambiguity and meaninglessness.331 In a similar vein, Eusebius brands the wide-spread practice of magic as a manipulation of “certain unintelligible and barbarous cries and voices” (ἄλλαις ἀσήμοις καὶ βαρβάροις ἠχαῖς τε καὶ φωναῖς).332 For Eusebius, the different manifestations of Greco-Roman religiosity, such as the customary offering of sacrifices and the celebration of holidays, become objects of astute criticism and give him the occasion to direct accusations of barbarity and cruelty. Nonetheless, this insistent identification of Greek and Roman philosophical ideas and religious practices with foreign ones is founded upon the premise that they have borrowed from other nations, a claim that makes such an association understandable.333 Furthermore, it is important to mark that when referring to the persecution of Christian believers, Eusebius takes the opportunity to describe the killing of Christian martyrs as an act of inhumanity and barbarism.334 For example, the perpetrators in Lyons and Vienne are portrayed as an intractable mob that “turned into beasts” (ἀπεθηριώθησαν)335 and exhibited the cruelty and the madness of “wild and barbarous tribes” (ἄγρια καὶ βάρβαρα φῦλα).336 This historical account that describes the persecutors of Christians as cruel and savage, as well as the case of alleged orgiastic gatherings and killing of innocents,337 demonstrates the rhetorical deployment of the charge of barbarism, as it is overturned and used as a counter-charge by Eusebius. In the same manner in which Christians are blamed for their cultural apostasy and subversion of traditional religion, so too are elements of Greco-Roman culture and society exposed as encapsulating barbarism in various expressions and forms.

Eusebius of Caesarea: The Rhetoric of Empire and the Charge of Barbarism In addition to turning the charge of barbarism into a counter accusation against the detractors of Christianity and Greco-Roman civilization in ­general, 331 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 4.1.11. 332 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 5.9.12. 333 Cf. Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 10.1. 334 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 5.1.56. 335 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 5.1.15. 336 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 5.1.56. 337 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 5.1.14.

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Eusebius develops an important argument that is fundamental to his presentation of the Christian religion.338 According to his conceptualization of Christianity, it is presented by him as a civilizing and humanizing force that eliminates all expressions of barbarity, cruelty and savagery. For him, Christianity does not denote merely a theological or philosophical system that is somehow devoid of a particular social structure and political organization. Eusebius asserts that prior to the coming of Jesus Christ, which he dates according to Luke’s account to the reign of emperor Augustus, the state of political affairs in Rome was marked by brutality and barbarism, as exemplified by the customary practices of human sacrifice, wars, enslavement, and destruction of human life.339 According to Eusebius, after the arrival of the gospel, these social ills have slowly been eradicated due to the beneficial impact of the Christian teachings upon both individuals and communities.340 Furthermore, the apologist posits a connection between the consolidation of Roman imperial power, on the one hand, and the societal transformation brought about by the emergence of Christianity, on the other. For example, he emphasizes the dissemination of “books and lectures, and all kinds of learning, and instructions ­containing exhortations concerning the highest virtue” that accompany the spread of the Christian religion across the territory of the Roman Empire.341 In tandem with the emergence of Christianity, he stresses the rise of monolithic power concentrated in the hands of one person, as he comments that pax romana is successfully achieved as a result of the consolidation of imperial power at the time of Jesus’ birth.342 In conjunction with making a claim for the inauguration of peace in the Roman state in anticipation of the arrival of the messiah, Eusebius points out that the preaching of the gospel has led to the abolition of various “savage and barbarous (θηριώδη καὶ βάρβαρα) customs” of different nations.343 The apologist lists a number of inhumane and morally objectionable practices, including cannibalism, human sacrifice, and ritual killing among the Scythians, as well as incest among the Persians.344 In contrast to these extreme examples of barbarism, he claims that similar practices exhibiting cruelty and savagery have 338 See T.D. Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 191–271. 339 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 5.1. 340 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 5.1 ff. 341 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 5.1. 342 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 1.4. 343 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 1.4.6. 344 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 1.4.

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ceased as a result of the “salutary law” of the gospel.345 For Eusebius, therefore, the influence of Christianity on Roman society in particular is exemplified by the ascendancy of a new civilizing and peaceful force, as well as the opportunity to concentrate and strengthen imperial political power.346 With respect to the foreign nations, he claims that the teachings of Christianity can affect both individuals and entire societies in a radical manner, as follows: [I]t [Christian doctrine] induced the whole human race, not only Greeks, but also the most savage barbarians and those who dwell in the utmost parts of the world, to refrain from their irrational brutality and adopt the opinions of a wise philosophy.347 ... πᾶν γένος ἀνθρώπων, οὐ μόνον Ἑλλήνων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀνημερωτάτων βαρβάρων καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐσχατιαῖς τῆς γῆς οἰκούντων τῆς μὲν ἀλόγου θηριωδίας ἀνασχεῖν, δόξας δὲ φιλοσόφους ἀναλαβεῖν παρασκευάσαι. According to Eusebius, human cruelty expressed in various religious rites, patterns of social life, or legal structures is a fundamental characteristic of Greeks, Romans and barbarians alike before the arrival of Christ.348 Therefore, the effective “cure” (θεραπείαν) of the gospel is designed for and applied to all ethnic groups in the same manner, as they are not regarded by him as being different in any significant measure.349 The connection that Eusebius assumes between Jesus’ birth and the reign of Augustus, as well as the propagation of the Christian religion and the period of political stability of the Roman Empire, is conditioned by the new Christian imperial theology that the apologist develops in his writings. Not only does Eusebius claim that the inauguration of pax romana under emperor Augustus is to be strictly understood in the context of the rise of Christianity, but he also tries to naturalize the coexistence of the consolidation of political power and the formation of the Christian religion. In a panegyric speech written later in his Ecclesiastical History, Eusebius explains the eventual success of Christianity by referring to the beneficial impact that its ethical teachings have upon society. He mentions both Greek and barbarian territories and poses the following r­ hetorical question to his Christian audience: “Who abolished 345 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 1.4. 346 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 10.4.17–18. 347 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 1.4.13. 348 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 2.5. 349 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 4.21.

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the barbarous and uncivilized customs of uncivilized nations by civilized and ­humane laws?” (τίς ἀνημέρων ἐθνῶν ἔθη βάρβαρα καὶ ἀνήμερα τοῖς ἡμέροις αὐτοῦ καὶ φιλανθρωποτάτοις παρέλυσε νόμοις·).350 In Eusebius’ speech, Jesus Christ is contrasted to human rulers and is shown to be the king par excellence, on account of his universal triumph. As the apologist suggests in his Preparation for the Gospel that it was during the reign of emperor Augustus that Christianity first emerged and d­ eveloped, he also equates adopting Christianity with becoming Roman.351 For example, Eusebius compares Licinius with his coemperor Constantine and accuses him of abolishing ancient Roman laws, as well as introducing foreign legislation and “unlawful laws” (βαρβάρους τινὰς καὶ ἀνημέρους ἀντεισῆγεν, νόμους ἀνόμους)352 and exhibiting inhumanity to prisoners.353 In contrast to ­Licinius’ profile of cruel characteristics and extreme a­ ctions, Eusebius describes the sound “reasonableness” (λογισμός) and “humanity” (φιλανθρωπία) of Constantine that mark him both as a Christian convert and a Roman emperor.354 In Eusebius’ presentation of the gospel in its relation to the existing imperial political structures, the conception of Romanitas comes to overlap with the idea of Christianismos. In fact, he casts the Christian religious system as an analogue to the Roman political ideology and presents it as a civilizing and peaceful force that is best channeled through the centralized power of the emperor. For Eusebius, therefore, the defining ­characteristics of the Christian believer and of the ideal Roman citizen are equivalent, namely obedience to the emperor, observance of the laws, and embodiment of humaneness and civility. According to Eusebius, it is precisely through the vehicle of Christian teachings, in conjunction with the existing political structures of the Roman Empire, that the “barbarian” is transformed into its opposite, namely, Christianized or Romanized.

Conclusion: Greek Christian Apologetics and the Charge of Barbarism

The writings of Justin, Tatian, Clement, Origen and Eusebius provide a plethora of textual evidence supporting the allegation that Christians were indeed described as “barbarian” and were associated with a number of ­characteristics 350 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 4.26. 351 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 10.8 ff. 352 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 10.8.12. 353 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 10.8.11. 354 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 10.9.2.

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pertaining to the Greco-Roman concept of barbarism. In these apologetic writings, the term barbarian used in reference to Christians is found to have five major significations: First, it is used in reference to foreign ethnic origin and tongue, most commonly Jewish, as well as Syrian and other.355 Second, it can refer at times to the content and the style of Scripture, both the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament.356 Third, it is employed in reference to certain features of language and literature, as well as grammar,357 rhetoric,358 and philosophy.359 Fourth, it can signify one’s belonging to the lower classes and the u ­ neducated segments of society, either native or foreign.360 Fifth and last, it also appears in reference to sub-human qualities connected with extreme forms of behavior and patterns of social life.361 This rich taxonomy of the various valences of the notion of the “barbarian” found in the Greek Christian apologetic corpus of texts is a response to the charge of barbarism leveled by outsiders vis à vis the new religious community. While the allegation of barbarism with its various valences is sometimes sustained by the Christian apologists, even when it is re-defined by some of them,362 it is also turned into a rhetorical tool and an effective counter-charge.363 With regard to the accusation that Christians are “barbarian,” the apologists adopt one of two possible rhetorical positions: they adopt either the re-definition and trans-valuation of the term barbarian in reference to Christians, or Jews, or, alternatively, the denial and the re-direction of the charge of barbarism into a counter-charge against their critics. In the former case, the initial negative meaning is turned into a positive one and is re-claimed for entirely different purposes,364 while, 355 Justin, First Apology 5, 7, 46; Dialogue with Trypho 119; Tatian, Address to the Greeks 1, 12, 35, 42; Origen, Contra Celsum 1.2, 1.14, 1.28, 3.6, 4.23, 4.31; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.2–3, 1.14, 6.8; Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 1.2, 6.19, 7.1, 10.3, 11.18–19, 14.1. 356 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 12; Origen, Contra Celsum 4.38, 6.1–2, 7.59–60; Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 7.25, 11.18–19. 357 Justin, First Apology 60; Tatian, Address to the Greeks; Origen, Contra Celsum 7.59–60; ­Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 7.25. 358 Origen, Contra Celsum 1.62; Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 7.25. 359 Justin, First Apology 5, 7, 46, 59–60; Tatian, Address to the Greeks 35, 42; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.2–3, 13–15, 28, 2.2, 6. 6, 8, 17; Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 11. Preface. 360 Justin, First Apology 60; Origen, Contra Celsum 1.27–29, 1.62, 3.18, 3.56, 4.31, 36, 6.1, 36, 7.59–60. 361 Origen, Contra Celsum 3.59, 8.68. 362 Cf. Tatian, Address to the Greeks 35, 42; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.13–15, 28, 6.17. 363 Cf. Tatian, Address to the Greeks 1, 14, 26; Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 7.1, 10.3, 11.6–7. 364 Cf. Tatian, Address to the Greeks 35, 42; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.13–15, 28, 6.17.

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in the latter case, the original negative meaning is most commonly preserved, reinforced and hurled back in the opposite direction.365 In so far as the ethnic classification of Christians as belonging to the category of barbarian nations is concerned, Justin, Tatian, Clement, Origen and Eusebius maintain the connection between Christianity and a specific foreign ethnicity, such as Jewish or Syrian.366 The claim for the barbarian origin of Christianity is made in such a way that it discredits the assertions made by the accusers for the superiority of the Greek ancestral traditions. For this purpose, Justin, Clement, Tatian and Eusebius proceed to demonstrate the antiquity of Hebrew Scripture and established religious traditions, as well as the dependence of Greek authors on Jewish literature. In fact, Tatian proceeds to debunk all Hellenic institutions and domains of knowledge, as he demonstrates both the antiquity of “barbarian” institutions and ideas and the derivative nature of their “Greek” counterparts. In connection with the ethnic designation of the term “barbarian,” it is similarly applied to the Bible and is viewed as pertinent by the apologists.367 The aptness of the term “barbarian” in reference to Scripture is due not only to its Jewish origination, but it is also to the actual content and the occurrence of poor narration, mediocre style, bad syntax, obscure meaning and incorrect logic of exposition.368 In defense of the perceived mediocre style and the alleged inferior content of both the Jewish and Christian religious texts, Origen of Alexandria is compelled to present these qualities as advantageous and appropriate for the recruitment of the uneducated population coming from the lower classes,369 while Eusebius admits with embarrassment that certain sacred writings are indeed to be considered “barbarian” with regard to their authorship, diction, grammar and terminology.370 Whether in fact it is a point of embarrassment or an occasion for the assertion of its comparative advantage, the description of both the Hebrew Bible and of Christian Scripture as “barbarian” is undeniable evident in the Greek Christian apologetic literature and can hardly be ignored or dismissed as unimportant.

365 Cf. Tatian, Address to the Greeks 1, 14, 26; Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 7.1, 10.3, 11.6–7. 366 Justin, First Apology 5, 7, 46; Dialogue with Trypho 119; Tatian, Address to the Greeks 1, 12, 35, 42; Origen. Contra Celsum 1.2, 1.14, 1.28, 3.6, 4.23, 4.31; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.2–3, 1.14, 6.8; Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 1.2, 6.19, 7.1, 10.3, 11.18–19, 14.1. 367 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 12; Origen, Contra Celsum 4.38, 6.1–2, 7.59–60; Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 7.25, 11.18–19. 368 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 7.25, 11.18–19. 369 Origen, Contra Celsum 7.59. 370 Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 7.25.

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The third class of meaning of the concept of the “barbarian” in the apologetic literature designates a complex of interrelated aspects that are normally associated with it, including literature, grammar,371 rhetoric,372 and philosophy.373 In response to these closely related allegations, the apologists attempt to re-define domains that are often perceived and represented as “barbarian” in such a way that they subordinate the Greek equivalents to their barbarian counterparts, as is the case of ancient philosophy.374 In imitation of their adversaries, the apologists also come to denigrate the realms of Greek language, grammar and rhetoric and to reduce their significance, as well as to bring them to the level of the “barbarian.”375 In the instance of Greek philosophy, Justin, Tatian, Clement and Eusebius strive to prove its derivation from foreign individuals and barbarian sources, as well as to establish its indebtedness to other nations.376 Justin Martyr, for example, claims that the validity of Greek philosophy is due either to the fact that Socrates knew the true Logos (Jesus) or that Plato borrowed ideas and material from the Hebrew Scripture.377 Analogous to the demonstration of the foreign origin of Greek philosophy is Tatian’s attempt to prove the barbarization of Greek language and rhetoric, as well as other domains of knowledge.378 In reference to various institutions and achievements of Greek culture, the charge of barbarism is both prominent and important in the apologetic writings of the early Christian authors, as well as in the polemic against their critics. The fourth major classification of notion of the “barbarian” recognizable in the Greek apologetic literature is in reference to the low-class, the illiterate, the uneducated, as well as the female, the child and the marginal.379 The profile of the Christian religious formation as represented by the lower echelons and the 371 Justin, First Apology 60; Origen, Contra Celsum 7.59–60; Eusebius, Preparation for the ­Gospel 7.25. 372 Origen, Contra Celsum 1.62; Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 7.25. 373 Justin, First Apology 5, 7, 46, 59–60; Tatian, Address to the Greeks 35, 42; Clement of ­Alexandria, Stromata 1.2–3, 13–15, 28, 2.2, 6. 6, 8, 17; Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 11. Preface. 374 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 1; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.13–15. 375 See Tatian, Address to the Greeks 1. 376 Justin, First Apology 5, 7, 46, 59–60; Tatian, Address to the Greeks 35, 42; Clement of Alexandria, Stromata 1.2–3, 13–15, 28, 2.2, 6. 6, 8, 17; Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 11. Preface. 377 Justin, First Apology 5, 44, 59; Second Apology 8, 10. 378 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 1, 26. 379 Justin, First Apology 60; Origen, Contra Celsum 1.27–29, 1.62, 3.18, 3.56, 4.31, 36, 6.1, 36, 7.59–60.

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outcasts of Roman society is a major concern for Origen in particular, as he responds to charges raised by his formidable intellectual opponent Celsus. Like Justin Martyr, Origen does not deny the fact that the emerging religious movement originates from and is propagated among people of low social standing. Instead, Origen turns the greater success of Christianity among the humble and uneducated people of late antique society into a point of defense and argues for the advantage of Christian doctrine over against Greek philosophy.380 Lastly, the fifth class of meaning of the charge of barbarism encompasses the more extreme aspects of alleged inhumanity, cruelty and savagery and, therefore, it designates marginalized and threatening elements in Roman society.381 In response to accusations of criminality, cruelty and violence, the apologists unanimously reject and even turn these same allegations against their opponents. Tatian, for example, criticizes aspects of Greek culture, such as theater and gladiatorial games, and he manages to ascribe cannibalism, savagery, sexual immorality and other reprehensible acts to public life, as well as to the pagan religious lore.382 Eusebius too turns these negative aspects of the notion of barbarism against instances of violence in Roman society, as he points to the existence of military activity, enslavement, brutality, incest, and sacrifice.383 The early Christian apologists attempt to demonstrate barbaric aspects of Greco-Roman culture, tradition and society, whether the religious system, the public sphere or the political domain are concerned. Furthermore, they try to persuade their audience that the Christian religion provides an antidote to the prevalent instances of cruelty and barbarism, as it manages to ameliorate the extreme characteristics of Greek, Roman and barbarians alike, as well as to affect change and to transform them into exemplary citizens of the Roman state.384 Therefore, the accusation of barbarism in its various designations and meanings functions in the writings of Justin, Tatian, Clement, Origen and Eusebius not only as a critique of Christian civic and religious practices but also as a polemical device against opponents of Christianity. In defining and re-formulating the notion of the “barbarian” for both apologetic and polemical purposes, the early Christian writers articulate their own understanding of the formation of the Christian community and the delineation of its group identity. The notion of the “barbarian,” as it appears in the writings of the 380 Origen, Contra Celsum 7.60. 381 Origen, Contra Celsum 3.59, 8.68. 382 Tatian, Address to the Greeks 22–25. 383 Eusebius, Ecclesiastical History 10.8–9. 384 Origen, Contra Celsum 8.68; Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 1.4.

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Greek-speaking apologists of the second, third and beginning of the fourth centuries, represents not only an effective mechanism for the marginalization and persecution of Christians, but, more importantly, it also comes to serve as a rhetorical-ideological tool for its own self-definition and self-articulation. The early Christian intellectuals choose to circumscribe the term “barbarian” in such a way that it becomes a central concept in their presentation of the Christian religion both to its outside critics and to its own members. In the act of defending and explaining their own positionality within the larger GrecoRoman society vis à vis the charge of barbarism, the apologists embrace the concept of the “barbarian” in order to provide a new and positive definition for the Christian movement. While the concept of barbarism serves in the hands of the accusers as a rhetorical tool for marginalization and othering of an unwanted and potentially destabilizing religious group, it also serves in the hands of the apologists as a device for the delineation of the “self” of members of the new religious community within the larger society. Consequently, the concept of the “barbarian” is significant for understanding not only the forensic context of early Christian apologetics in a period when Christians are targeted and threatened on legal and intellectual grounds, but also the early Christian attempts to construct a cogent self-definition on the level of both individuals and communities.

Chapter 5

The Charge of Barbarism and Latin Christian Apologetic After this close examination of different valences of the charge of barbarism in the Greek Christian apologetic literature, it is appropriate to analyze the charge of barbarism in the Latin Christian apologetic tradition. The main focus of this chapter is to investigate the charge of barbarism against Christians, particularly as expressed in the apologetic writings of Tertullian, Arnobius and Lactantius, and how these Christian apologists responded to that charge. As these three Latin apologists attempt to defend the Christian constituency, they employ varying rhetorical methods and approaches and they exert different levels of authority and influence within the Christian communities.1 It should be noted that Arnobius of Sicca, who is not regarded by some scholars as a Christian apologist in the strict sense, is often excluded from the narrow category of an apologist who writes in defense of Christianity in order to correct its perception by outsiders.2 However, it is evident that Tertullian, Arnobius and Lactantius, all of whom originate from African provinces of the Roman Empire, address the charge of barbarism in their writings from a variety of standpoints and use different arguments in countering it. It is important to read their response to the charge of barbarism in the context of the rhetorical composition and logical argumentation of their respective apologetic treatises. For instance, Tertullian in his Apology delivers a rhetorical tour de force in 1 For further information, see Jean Daniélou, History of Early Christian Doctrine Before the Council of Nicaea. Vol. 3. The Origins of Latin Christianity, trans., David Smith and J.A. Baker (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1977). See also C.H. Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church: A Study of Conflict from the Maccabees to Donatus (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965). 2 Despite Arnobius’ status as a novice in Christianity and his relative unfamiliarity with Christian scripture and religion, as compared to other apologists, I consider his work of equal importance and relevance for early Christian apologetic. Arnobius’ work not only raises some of the same issues that are addressed by other apologists but also provides important information about the interaction between outsiders and insiders, as he addresses and attempts to amend the perceptions of Christians from without. For further historical background, see Micheal B. Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca: Religious Conflict and Competition in the Age of Diocletian (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 6–22. See also Mark Edwards, “The Flowering of Latin Apologetic: Lactantius and Arnobius,” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire, eds., Mark Edwards, Martin Goodman and Simon Price (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 197–223.

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his characteristic Asiatic style by countering each charge leveled against early Christians, while also turning those allegations against his opponents. By contrast, Lactantius in his Divine Institutes aims to instruct his audience in an elevated literary style by mustering examples from classical Latin literature, while Arnobius engages in direct polemics against his adversaries in his work Against the Nations (Adversus Nationes) by means of speculative a­ rgumentation and philosophical exposition. In spite of their different rhetorical strategies and methods of argumentation, all three of the Latin apologists differ from their Greek analogues in denying the charge of barbarism in its multiple negative valences and rather than attempting to redefine it in positive terms. Despite their diverging literary approaches in their apologetic writings, the three Latin apologists overlap in their attempt to cast Christianity as eminently “Roman” and to present Christians as exemplary citizens of the Roman Empire. Furthermore, they use the notion of the barbrian to criticize contemporaneous religious practices and political realia. Instead of representing Christians as being “barbarian” and as the “other” to Roman culture and society, as do the majority of the Greek apologists, these three Latin apologists try to render Christians as the epitome of Romanness, while deploying the same charge of barbarism against their detractors. Therefore, they undertake a two-pronged strategy in defending Christian communities against allegations of barbarism while re-directing the same charge against their opponents. This double approach underlines the common over-arching ideological agenda of the three African apologists, despite the differences in the particular style, content and rhetoric found in their apologetic writings. 5.1

Tertullian and the Charge of Barbarism

Tertullian is one of the most skilled and rhetorically forceful early Christian apologists, applying his expertise in Roman law and ancient rhetoric to defend the emerging religious group in Roman Africa at the end of the second and beginning of the third century. The North African rhetorician makes a very similar defense of Christianity in both his Apology (Apologeticus) and his address To the Nations (Ad Nationes).3 Many themes from the earlier work, the 3 For discussion of Tertullian’s apologetic works, see T.D. Barnes, Tertullian: A Historical and Literary Study (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971); Jean Daniélou, The Origins of Latin Christianity, trans., David Smith and J.A. Baker (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1977), 139–188; J. Lortz, Tertullian als Apologet (Münsterliche Beiträge zur Theologie; Münster, 1927/28); J.B. Rives, Religion and Authority in Roman Carthage from Augustus to Constantine (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995); Simon

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Apologeticus, reappear in the later work, Ad Nationes, and are further developed and sharpened, and yet his position with regard to the charge of barbarism against Christians remains fundamentally unchanged.4 One of the major ­preoccupations of Tertullian in these two apologetic texts is his effort to demonstrate the Romanness of Christian believers, who are not only accused of a variety of crimes against the state, but are also forcefully stripped of their identity as Romans.5 The allegations raised against Christians, some of which belong to the common stock of charges already encountered in the Greek apologies, including cannibalism, infanticide and incest, culminate in the denigration of Christians as anti-Roman and, consequently, their categorization in the realm of the uncivilized and the uncultured antithesis to the Roman sensibilities, relegating them to the inferior category of the “barbarian.”6 The various charges that are raised against early Christians by their opponents are closely tied with the prevalent Greco-Roman concept of the barbarian in the late antique period. Most of these allegations signify an aspect of the ancient notion of barbarism and, taken together, complete the image of the “barbarian” as it is understood from a Roman standpoint.7 In order to demonstrate Tertullian’s arguments, the different charges brought against Christians at the time, such as cannibalism, incest, irreligiosity, and political treason, will be considered individually in the context of the contemporary understanding

4

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Price, “Latin Christian Apologetics: Minicius Felix, Tertullian, and Cyprian,” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire, eds., Mark Edwards, Martin Goodman and Simon Price (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 105–130. For some textual problems with both Apologeticus and Ad Nationes, in particular the two versions of the former and the missing parts of the latter, see T.D. Barnes, Tertullian: A Historical and Literary Study (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971), 19–21, 239–241; Simon Price, “Latin Christian Apologetics: Minicius Felix, Tertullian, and Cyprian,” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire, eds., Mark Edwards, Martin Goodman and Simon Price (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 108–109. This pro-Roman position that Tertullian takes in this early apologetic work differs in tone from his later pieces where he expresses anti-Roman sentiments, as for example in his De Idolatria 19, where he writes: “The fact that Christ rejected the earthly kingdom should be enough to convince you that all secular powers and dignitaries are not merely alien from but hostile to God... there can be no reconciliation between the oath of allegiance taken to God and that taken to man, between the standard of Christ and that of the devil, between the camp of light and that of darkness.” (Cf. De Corona 10). For discussion of this topic, see J.-C. Fredouille, “Tertullien et l’empire,” Recherches Augustiniennes 19 (1984): 111–131. Cf. Tertullian, Apology 3.5 ff. See discussion of Caesar, Cicero, Tacitus and Seneca in chapter three of this book for a ­detailed presentation of the Roman notion of barbarism.

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of barbarism. It should be noted that while in certain instances Tertullian mentions explicitly that Christians are denied Romanitas and are relegated to the category of the “barbarian,” in other instances these associations are indirect and implicit. What is striking in Tertullian’s approach to these interconnected charges that are related to the idea of barbarism is that he tries to turn these accusations against his opponents and to point to some anti-Roman characteristics as constitutive of and pervasive in the dominant culture and society of his day.8 Tertullian’s attempt at (self-)defense is not limited merely to the refutation of the numerous serious charges against Christians and the recuperation of their Roman identity. Tertullian goes beyond mere explanation and apology, as he makes those very same charges against his opponents in order to cast prevalent Roman mores, traditions and practices as fundamentally barbarian. Tertullian: Identifying the Barbarian Tertullian takes the issue of the designation of his co-religionists as Christians (Christianos)9 and tries to elucidate the connection between the popular reaction and judicial mistreatment of members of the Christian religion simply on account of their own self-designation. Tertullian points to the fact that the main accusation brought against Christians is their self-identification as belonging to Christianity,10 rather than any particular act of wrong-doing. The apologist brings up the issue of the name “Christian” at the very onset of his Apology, noting: This, then, is the first plea we lodge with you – the injustice of your hatred of the Christian name.11 Hanc itaque primam causam apud vos collocamus iniquitatis odii erga nomen Christianorum.

8

The structure of the Apology is as follows: 1–3, injustice of general hatred; 4–6, injustice of laws; 7–9, innocence of charges of cannibalism and incest; 10–45, treatment of the charges of treason (10–28.1) and sacrilege (28.2–45); 46–49, case made for the treatment of Christianity as philosophy; 50, subject of martyrdom. For an analysis of the structure of the Apology, see R.B. Sider, “On Symmetrical Composition in Tertullian,” jts 24 (1973): 405–423; See also R.B. Sider, Ancient Rhetoric and the Art of Tertullian (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). 9 Cf. Tertullian, Apology 1.3 ff. 10 Tertullian, Apology 1.3 ff. 11 Tertullian, Apology 1.3.4.

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He goes on to explain that, according to him, the lack of proper judicial procedure of legal investigation is because of the assumption that the name “­Christian” is in itself a sufficient and necessary ground for indictment. In explicating the name and the alleged erroneous assumption, Tertullian also marks its mispronunciation by outsiders as “Chrestian” (Chrestianus) rather than “Christian” (Christianus).12 Furthermore, Tertullian elaborates on the ­irony of the incorrect pronunciation on part of Latin speakers, as the derivation of the Latin word Christianus comes from the Greek word χριστός meaning “anointed one” and is related to the title of the Jewish messiah, in reference to the anointed one or the legitimate heir from the Davidic dynastic line.13 He clarifies that the mispronunciation of the name denotes in Greek another word, χρῆστος, which bears a positive meaning and characterizes the members of the church: Yes, and when it [the name] is mispronounced by you “Chrestian” (for you have not even certain knowledge of the mere name), it is framed from “sweetness” and “kindness.” So in innocent men you hate even the innocent name.14 Sed et cum perperam Chrestianus pronuntiatur a vobis (nam nec nominis certa est notitia penes vos), de suavitate vel benignitate conpositum est. Oditur itaque in hominibus innocuis etiam nomen innocuum. Additionally, the apologist uses the mispronunciation of the foreign appellation Christianus by Latin as a metaphor for the general misperception of Christians by outsiders. For him, the fact that opponents of Christianity, knowingly or unknowingly, mispronounce Christians’ self-designation suggests a lack of familiarity with the emerging religion, as well as its followers, and signifies their pervasive misunderstanding and distorted perception by outsiders.15 Furthermore, when commenting on the appellation “Christian,” Tertullian also remarks that the word has a “barbarous” sound for the ear of the Latinspeaker (barbarum sonat aliqua vox nominis).16 In addition to noting the Greek derivation of the name, as indicative of the foreign origin of the religious 12 Tertullian, Apology 3.3.5. 13 Tertullian, Apology 3.3.5. 14 Tertullian, Apology 3.3.5. 15 Tertullian, Apology 4–45. 16 Tertullian, Apology 3.5. In Ad Nationes Tertullian confirms the same when he alludes that the name has a “barbarous sound” (barbarum sonat). Cf. Ad Nationes 1.3.

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movement itself, he also remarks on the prevalent negative biases and false ­assumptions attached to the religion by Roman audiences.17 The “barbarian” sound of the name foreshadows the predominanantly negative characterization of Christians as a whole. The long catalogue of charges that Tertullian provides throughout the Apology corresponds directly to the negative perception and the prevailing view of Christians as members of an illegal civic and religious formation, that is effectively being stripped of Romanitas and castigated as enemies of the Roman order. These converts are de facto seen by outsiders as a quintessential “other” to Roman society in every aspect constitutive of ­Roman idenity, such as laws, morals, ancestral traditions, religiosity, public life, and political loyalty.18 Additionally, the allusion to the barbarian sound of the name Christian not only points to their assumed antitheticality vis à vis Roman society, but also signifies the fantastical character attributed to the Christian movement in the imagination of outsiders.19 In addition to being stripped of their rightful Roman identity, Christians are attributed extreme characteristics that are normally associated with the notion of the barbarian in the Greco-Roman context, such as practicing incestuous sex, human sacrifice and cannibalism. In this way, Christians are denied properly belonging not only to Roman culture and society but also to the sphere of civilization and humanity, for they are represented by their critics as the antithesis of both. Thus, it is Tertullian’s task to overturn these two aspects of the classification of Christians as being “barbarian” – one that dissociates Christians from the prevailing Roman social order,20 and the other that casts them as savage and uncultivated.21 These two aspects of the ancient concept of the barbarian are interrelated and reinforce each other, as one is a more intensified and radicalized form of the other. While contesting the identification of barbarians as the antipodal “other” to the Roman order of the day, Tertullian proceeds with methodic consistency to address each charge. However, the apologist challenges the image of the barbarian as the antithesis of humanity by demonstrating its extravagant and incredulous nature. While these two aspects of the ancient conceptualization of the barbarian as the ­anti-Roman or the anti-human remain distinct, it is clear 17

Tertullian proceeds to enumerate the numerous grave charges raised against Christians, such as incest, human sacrifice, cannibalism, treason and others. Cf. Apology 4 ff. 18 See Ramsay MacMullen, Enemies of the Roman Order (Eugene, or: Wipf and Stock, 2001; Reprint), 192–241. 19 Tertullian, Apology 7–9. 20 For charges of treason and sacrilege in Tertullian’s Apology, see 10–45. 21 For charges of incest and cannibalism, among others, in Apology, see 7–9.

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that both are mutually related and conditioned, as the difference in meaning between them is one of degree rather than kind.22 Tertullian: The Charge of Barbarism and Illegality In the Apology Tertullian notes the intense hostility and animosity generated by the followers of Christianity, when he alludes to the “general hatred of the public toward us” (odii erga nos publici),23 and he then connects this strong sentiment to the contrived construction of “Christians” through the rhetorical ploys of their opponents.24 The apologist defends Christians against this judicial mistreatment and makes note of their peculiar position vis à vis the official state authorities, as compared to that of other suspected criminals. He remarks on the paradoxical treatment of Christians, when he points to the inconsistencies in the judicial practices: So much more upside down is your procedure with us, when you presume our crimes from our confession of the name and then try by torture to force us to cancel our confession, in order that, by denying the name, we may really deny the crimes too, which you had presumed from our confession of the name.25 Quo perversius, cum praesumatis de sceleribus nostris ex nominis confessione, cogitis tormentis de confessione decedere, ut negantes n­ omen pariter utique negemus et scelera, de quibus ex confessione nominis praesumpseratis. According to the apologist, it is simply someone’s association with the Christian religion and not the commission of any specific illegal act that leads to indictment. This objection alleges that the normal legal procedure is ­subverted 22

The connection between Roman identity and “humanity” on the one hand, and the notion of the “barbarian” and lack of civilization, on the other, is often expressed in Latin literature. Cf. Y. Dauge, Le Barbare: Recherches sur la conception romaine de la barbarie et de la civilisation (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 532–560. 23 Tertullian, Apology 4.1. 24 The unrealistic, imaginary and fantastic qualities of the “other” in the critical writings of Edward Said and Julia Kristeva correspond to the function of the serious charges and various allegations against Christians, such as cannibalistic and orgiastic meals that are reported by Tertullian. See espcially E. Said, Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient (New York: Random House, 1994; Reprint), 8–17; J. Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans., Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 85. 25 Tertullian, Apology 2.11.

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and used for the exculpation of the indicted persons, rather than for their proper indictment.26 According to him, the use of torture for extracting confession, which is normally an instrument for obtaining information against the will of the suspect for the purpose of indictment, is instead implemented in the case of the trials against Christians in order to compel a denial of the original charges. As a result, instead of being used to uncover and expose the truth, forced confession is employed for the purpose of exculpation of Christians. It is not insignificant that Tertullian initiates his defense of Christians by attacking the Roman judicial procedures, as he tries to expose the failures of the justice system, and particularly its system of trials when applied to Christians.27 He points to practices that survived the implementation of the laws, as well as the contradictory nature of the existing Roman system of laws.28 In this way, Tertullian is questioning not only the legality of the trials of Christians in particular, but also the soundness of the Roman judicial system in general.29 As his opponents level charges against Christians and accuse them of criminal actions, so too does Tertullian accuse them of contradicting the Roman law in the resulting trials themselves. In this way, the apologist manages to fulfill his express intent of turning the serious accusations raised against Christians against his opponents: I will not say that the worst of men are accusing the best, but I will put it, as they would wish, and say – their equals. We will reply in detail as to the crimes we are alleged to commit in secret but which we find them openly committing – matters in which we are set down as guilty, empty-headed, damnable, ridiculous.30 [S]imul uti erubescant accusantes non dico pessimi optimos, sed iam, ut volunt, conpares suos. Respondebimus ad singula quae in occulto admittere dicimur, quae illos palam admittentes invenimus, in quibus scelesti, in quibus vani, in quibus damnandi, in quibus inridendi deputamur. Tertullian’s rhetorical strategy of disproving the charges and finding the accusers guilty of the same allegations relates directly to the rhetorical function 26

For a discussion of Tertullian’s familiarity with Roman law and legal practice, see T.D. Barnes, Tertullian: A Historical and Literary Study (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971), 22–29. 27 Cf. Tertullian, Apology 4.1 ff. 28 Cf. Tertullian, Apology 4.7 ff. 29 For instance, Tertullian refers to the existence of a “jungle of laws” and the implementation of “new axes of imperial rescripts and edicts.” Cf. Apology 4.7–8. 30 Tertullian, Apology 3.1–2.

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of the notion of the barbarian in the hands of the accusers. While Tertullian ­responds to the various accusations that identify Christians are ultimately ­anti-Roman or “barbarian,” he simultaneously tries to apply the same identification on his adversaries. It is precisely the Roman legal machinery, in tandem with its economic, political and military power, that rests at the foundation of Roman civilization and its self-perception as a civilizing force for foreign peoples.31 In his sustained attack on the existing Roman judicial system, Tertullian points to the gradual formation of Roman laws and the inevitable innovations and contradictions that accompany their development, as well as Roman law’s alleged failure to improve upon these flawed historical precedents. For example, Tertullian explains: “Yes, and you yourselves, as experiment every day lightens the darkness of antiquity, do you not lop and fell that old squalid jungle of laws with the new axes of imperial rescripts and edicts? Why, those absurd Papian laws which require people to have children at an earlier age than the Julian laws require them to be married – did not the valiant Emperor Severus clear them out but yesterday for all their old age and authority?”32 It is noteworthy that in his commentary on the existing Roman legislation, Tertullian downplays the authority of antiquity, even while criticizing the contemporary Roman judicial practices and traditions. This emphasis the possibility of change and improvement in the law is significant particularly for pleading the case of Christians because his ultimate goal is to incorporate Christianity into Roman society.33 Tertullian’s argument implies that openness to new laws, which inevitably involves the continual transformation in Roman society, is both acceptable and necessary. According to him, the adoption of new laws as they become embedded in Roman legal structures reflects the evolving nature of the Roman state and allows necessary accommodations for new conditions and challenges that may arise over time. Tertullian rests his defense of Christians precisely on the basis of this practice of legal precedent and the 31

For further commentary on the importance of Roman law in the civilizing mission of the Empire to the barbarian nations, see for instance the analysis of Y. Dauge in Le Barbare: Recherches sur la conception romaine de la barbarie et de la civilisation (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 620–630. 32 Tertullian, Apology 4.7: Nonne et vos cotidie experimentis inluminantibus tenebras antiquitatis totam illam veterem et squalentem silvam legum novis principalium rescriptorum et edictorum securibus truncatis et caeditis? Nonne vanissimas Papias leges, quae ante liberos suscipi cogunt quam Iuliae matrimonium contrahi, post tantae auctoritatis senectutem heri Severus, constantissimus principum, exclusit? 33 See Tertullian’s Apology 4.4, where he asserts that the accusations against Christians amount to saying: “Your existence is illegal” (Non licet esse vos!).

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acceptance of innovation, as Christianity is a relatively new phenomenon at the time. In conjunction with his criticism of the Roman legal system, Tertullian refers to the implementation of state persecution of Christians by Roman emperors and tries to discredit the persecutions on the basis of their instigators’ moral flaws. He draws attention to the fact that the first imperial persecution was undertaken by emperor Nero, an infamous figure in Roman history because of his incompetence as a ruler and his hostility towards Roman elites.34 Tertullian implies that, since the first initiator of the persecutions of Christians is himself morally questionable, so too are his actual measures against Christianity. As Christians are criticized for their lack of traditional Roman virtues and religiosity, Tertullian levels the very same allegations against the instigators of the persecutions against Christians. In defense of the Christian cause, he writes and mimics the very language that his opponents use as follows: Such are ever our persecutors – men unjust, impious, foul – men whom you yourselves are accustomed to condemn; and those whom they condemn you have become accustomed to restore.35 Tales semper nobis insecutores, iniusti, impii, turpes, quos et ipsi damnare consuestis, a quibus damnatos restituere soliti estis. In addition to his sharp criticism of Nero, Tertullian mounts an appeal to popular sentiments and perceptions of Roman emperors36 who were involved with the persecutions of Christians. The apologist tries to undermine both the credibility of imperial legislation and the actual authority of the Roman rulers, as he discards their measures against Christians on the basis of their morality. This critique not only serves the interests of the apologist in weakening the force of the written laws, but also allows him to tap into a well established ­Roman tradition of appraisal and criticism of emperors in accordance with their service to the public interest and to the state. This practice not only helps Tertullian to discredit to a certain extent the legtimacy of the actions of the persecutors of Christians, but, more importantly, it allows him to connect Christians to larger 34 Tertullian, Apology 5.3. 35 Tertullian, Apology 5.4. 36 It is noteworthy that Tertullian also falsifies historical data in order to paint a portrait of the emperors who either persecuted or refrained from taking measures against Christians in accordance with this simple paradigm that appeals to prevailing perceptions of Roman emperors. Cf. Apology 5.

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discourses of legality and loyalty to Rome, as well as the traditional catalog of the ethical virtues and moral practices of the paradigmatic Roman citizen. While pointing to the moral flaws in select Roman emperors, Tertullian implicitly casts Christians embodying true Roman virtues, in contradistinction to the allegations that they do not deserve to be identified as Roman. While the denial of the appelation “Roman” directly relegates Christians to the category of the inferior “barbarian,” the radical “other,” or the public enemy, Tertullian’s attempt to associate Christians with traditional Roman virtues that are ideally exemplified by the ruling emperors is designed to counteract and to deny the serious charges raised against them. Tertullian: The Charge of Barbarism and Human Sacrifice Accusations of human sacrifice and infanticide,37 which are closely related with other grave charges raised against Christians, such as cannibalism, are often associated in late antiquity with the characteristics of barbarians as the uncivilized and the anti-social types.38 Understanding human sacrifice as one 37

38

For further discussion of this topic, see James Rives, “Human Sacrifice Among Pagans and Christians,” jrs 85 (1995), 65–85; J.-P. Waltzing, “Le Crime rituel reproché aux chrétiens de IIe siècle,” Musée Belge 29 (1925): 209–238; F.J. Dölger, “Sacramentum infanticidi: die Schlachtung eines Kindes und der Genuss seinses Fleisches und Blutes als vermeintlicher Einwirkungsakt im ältestem Christentum,” ac 4 (1934): 188–228; W. Speyer, “Zu den Vorwürfen der Heiden gegen die Christen,” jac 6 (1963): 129–135; R. Freudenberger, “Der Vorwurf ritueller Verbrechen gegen die Christen im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert,” ThZ 23 (1967): 97–107; A. Heinrichs, “Pagan Ritual and the Alleged Crimes of the Early Christians: A Reconsideration” in Kyriakion: Festschrift J. Quasten, eds., P. Kranfield and J.A. Jungmann (1970), 18–35; R.M. Grant, “Charges of “Immorality” against Various Religious Groups in Antiquity” in Studies in Gnosticism and Hellenistic Religion Presented to G. Quispel, eds., R. van den Broek and M.J. Vermaseren (1981), 161–170; S. Benko, Pagan Rome and the Early Christians (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 54–78; M. Edwards, “Some Early Christian Immoralities,” as 23 (1992): 72–82; A. McGowan, “Eating People: Accusations of Cannibalism against the Christians in the Second Century,” jecs 2 (1994): 413–442; Albert Heinrichs, “Human Sacrifice in Greek Religion: three case studies,” in Sacrifice dans l’antiquite, trans., Jean Rudhardt and Olivier Reverdin (Geneva: Vandoeuvres, 1981), 195–235; Lawrence Stager, “The Rite of Child Sacrifice at Carthage” in New Light on Ancient Carthage, ed., John Griffiths Pedley (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1980), 1–11. The act of human sacrifice in Greek and Roman literature is very often attributed to Scythians, who are sometimes called Taurians, as well as to other foreign groups. (Cf. Cicero, Amic. 24; Fin. 5.63; Rep. 3.15; Fab. 120; Ovid, Trist. 4.4.61–82; Pont. 3.2.45–96; Juvenal, 15.116–9; Lucian, Tox. 2; Sacr. 13). The allegation that barbarians practice human sacrifice is one aspect of the feritas and inhumanitas that are ascribed to them in Greco-Roman

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component of the complex of characteristics attributed to the ancient concept of the barbarian makes sense of the list of the charges cited by Tertullian, all of which belong to the cluster of stock qualities normally ascribed to “barbarians” in Greco-Roman literature. He uses colorful language in describing Christians from the perspective of their adversaries and states: We are said to be the most criminal of men, on the score of our sacramental baby-killing and baby-eating that goes with it and the incest that follows the banquet, where the dogs are our pimps in the dark and make a sort of decency for guilty lusts by overturning the lamps.39 Dicumur sceleratissimi de sacramento infanticidii et pabulo inde, et post convivium incesto, quod eversores luminum canes, lenones scilicet tenebrarum, libidinum impiarum in verecundiam procurent. Tertullian proceeds to deny the charge of infanticide primarily on the basis of there being no acceptable legal evidence, and he then points to existing practices of human sacrifice within the confines of the Roman Empire.40 First and foremost, the apologist emphasizes the insufficient and inadequate evidence for Christian infanticide, apart from unreliable hearsay and malicious misinformation proffered by detractors of Christianity. As Tertullian remarks, despite the efforts to investigate the religious gatherings, no direct evidence has been discovered to support the charge, except for these pieces of misinformation, which he attributes to rumors and discredits as unreliable.41 Tertullian notes the problem of the lack of direct evidence, when he turns to his opponents directly and poses questions for them: “Who yet, I ask, came upon a baby wailing, as they say? Who ever kept for the judge’s sight the jaws of Cyclops and Siren, bloodstained as he had found them?” (Quis umquam taliter vagienti infanti supervenit? Quis cruenta, ut invenerat, Cyclopum et Sirenum ora iudici reservavit?).42 In spite of these mere assertions of facts, the apologist suggests the sheer impossibility of the charge of infanticide, as well as implying a similar lack of evidence for the accompanying allegations. In fact, he subjects the

literature, as well as to foreign religious practices. See the overview on this subject provided by Y. Dauge in Le Barbare: Recherches sur la conception romaine de la barbarie et de la civilisation (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 413–450. 39 Tertullian, Apology 7.1. 40 Tertullian, Apology 7.1 ff. 41 Tertullian, Apology 7.4. 42 Tertullian, Apology 7.5.

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propagators of the accusation of human sacrifice to ridicule and exposes the faulty logic and inner contradition embedded in it: Yet when men seek initiation, the usual thing, I suppose, is first to approach the “father” of the ritual, to map out what is to be prepared. Then he quotes: “You must have a baby, still tender, that can know nothing of death, that can smile under your knife; item a loaf, to catch its juicy blood; add lampstands and lamps, a dog or two, and some sops to wet the dogs tumbling the lamps over; above all you must come with your brother or sister” What, Christians with no relatives? I suppose, a man is not a regular Christian unless he is a brother or a son.43 Atquin volentibus initiari moris est, opinor, prius patrem illum sacrorum adire, quae praeparanda sint describere. Tum ille: Infans tibi necessarius adhunc tener, qui nesciat mortem, qui sub cultro tuo redeat; item panis, quo sangiunis iurulentiam colligas; praeterea candelabra et lucernae et canes aliqui et offulae, quae illos ad eversionem luminum extendant: ante omnia cum matre et sorore tua venire debebis. Quid si noluerint vel nullae fuerint? quid denique singulares Christiani? Non erit, opinor, legitimus Christianus nisi frater aut filius. Tertullian exposes not only the sheer absurdity of the cluster of serious allegations against Christians, but also the implausibility of their actual implementation. The long enumeration of the requirements for initiation reveals that it will be nearly impossible for one to be able to join a Christianity constituted along the lines that its detractors suggest, while also demonstrating the highly fabricated and unrealistic nature of the perceptions of Christians as emblematic of the antithesis of Roman society and as encapsulating the “other” to the prevailing mores and practices at the time.44 It is important to note that Christians are not accused of a generic kind of human sacrifice, as other perceived enemies of the Roman order or different ethnic groups have been often accused. According to the report of the 43 Tertullian, Apology 8.7–8. 44 See also Dennis D. Hughes, Human Sacrifice in Ancient Greece (London: Routledge, 1991); Walter Burkert, Homo Necans: The Anthroplogy of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); René Girard, Violence and the Sacred (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1987); R. Hamerton-Kelly, ed., Violent Origins (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982).

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a­ pologist, they are charged with infanticide, a claim that increases the gravity of the crime of ritual murder.45 Although some early Christian writers and, as a result, later interpreters and scholars attribute the charge of infanticide, as well as the related charge of cannibalism, to the particular language of the Eucharist,46 it remains uncertain whether such an explanation is plausible. Given the list of accusations, it is more likely that this specific explication of the charges of cannibalism and human sacrifice represent an effort on part of Christian apologists to rationalize rather than the actual misunderstanding of their practices by outsiders. This is further supported not only by the fact that other perceived enemies of the Roman state and potentially dangerous elements in Roman society have been charged with infanticide and human sacrifice,47 but also the juxtaposition of this charge with other related accusations in the apologetic corpus that bear no resemblance to Christian ritual make it less likely to be the case. The specific kind of human sacrifice attributed to Christians represents an intensification of the act of homicide, as it is committed against an innocent and unsuspecting victim who cannot offer any resistance. It is remarkable that, rather than viewing the charge as rooted in a misunderstanding of Christian theology and religious rituals, Tertullian understands this accusation as a false charge that rests in the unbridled imagination of his opponents, as well as in their desire to castigate the members of the Christian religion as public enemies of the Roman order. In addition to denying the charge of human sacrifice and demonstrating its virtual implausibility for actual religious meetings, Tertullian demonstrates its continued practice by other groups. For instance, he refers to the custom of 45

46

47

James Rives notes similarities between the charge of human sacrifice leveled against Christians and against other formations in Roman society that are perceived as potentially threatening the status quo. Cf. J. Rives, “Human Sacrifice Among Pagans and Christians,” jrs 85 (1995), 67–74. See also F.J. Dölger, “Sacramentum Infanticidi: die Schlachtung eines Kindes und der Genuss seinses Fleisches und Blutes als vermeintlicher Einwirkungsakt im ältestem Christentum,” ac 4 (1934),” 200 ff.; M. Edwards, “Some Early Christian Immoralities,” as 23 (1992), 75–82. See, for example, the argument of J.-P. Waltzing, “Le Crime rituel reproché aux chrétiens de IIe siècle,” Musée Belge 29 (1925), 209–238. For a continued appearance of this idea in recent discussion, see Justo L. Gonzalez, A History of Christian Thought (Nashville: Abingdon, 1970), 1.9–10. Rives demonstrates that both external groups, such as barbarian people, and internal groups, which constitute a political threat to the Roman state, are equally meted the charge of human sacrifice. Cf. “Human Sacrifice among Pagans and Christians,” jrs 85 (1995), 67–74.

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i­nfanticide in the Roman province of Africa practiced openly “until the proconsulate of Tiberius”48 and its subsequent clandestine existence. Furthermore, the apologist destroys the distinction between human sacrifice, which can be performed as a religious ritual, as in the case of Africa, and the act of homicide. Moreover, Tertullian points to the practice of human sacrifice dedicated to the worship of Mercury by the Gauls, who became incorporated in the Roman Empire.49 He also notes the virtual killing of infants by abortion and the widespread Roman custom of child exposure,50 in addition to the popularity of theatrical performances and gladiatorial games in which murder is either simulated or actually committed in public.51 Tertullian goes further by claiming that murder is embedded not only in the Roman religious system, as it is part of the founding stories of the ancient pantheon of gods, including the murderous Saturn, but also in the Roman celebration of gladiatorial games at religious holidays and the spilling of human blood in the name of Jupiter.52 In this way, Tertullian demonstrates not only the existence of human sacrifice, infanticide and homicide in the Roman state, but also how these cruel actions are sanctioned by popular religious sentiments and widespread customary practices. Therefore, it is Roman society, rather than Christianity, that is shown to possess barbarian qualities deeply embedded in its ancient traditions and in various aspects of its culture and religion.53 Tertullian: The Charge of Barbarism and Allegations of Cannibalism Very closely related to the charges of infanticide and human sacrifice is the accusation of cannibalism that was also raised against the early Christians.54 48 Tertullian, Apology 9.2. 49 Tertullian, Apology 9.5. 50 Tertullian, Apology 9.8. 51 Tertullian, Apology 9.5. 52 Tertullian, Apology 9.5. 53 This interpretation of the charge of human sacrifice is similar to and informed by those of Dölger, Edwards and Rives, cited above, who emphasize the rhetorical-ideological aspects of the allegation, as they emphasize the symbolic and social significance of the charge as demarcating the potential threat to the status quo. My association of the charge infanticide with the notion of the “barbarian” and with a larger cluster of related charges serves the same function, namely to marginalize a minority group that is perceived as potentially dangerous. 54 For bibliography, see above, footnote 37. For scholarly discussion of this topic, see also W. Arens, The Man-Eating Myth (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Eli Sagan, Cannibalism: Human Aggression and Cultural Form (New York: Harper, 1974); Marvin Harris, Cannibals and Kings: The Origin of Cultures (New York: Random House, 1977); P.R. ­Sunday,

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Although these accusations are closely related, it is important to make a distinction between them, as Tertullian and his contemporaries did, for the sake of understanding the significance of the charge of cannibalism as related and, yet, separate from the rest. Since the practice of human sacrifice is commonly regarded in antiquity to be a mark of barbarians that are not permitted in the realm of the Roman Empire,55 so too is the consumption of human body parts.56 The eating of human flesh and the drinking of human blood are even more radically opposed to accepted and permissible social behavior than is religious or ritual infanticide. Therefore, this extreme and radical accusation signifies even more strongly the perceived anti-Roman profile of the members of the Christian religion.57 The powerful images of the act of cannibalism demonstrate the strong alignment of Christians with barbarians commonly known in antiquity for their cruel and savage practices, in addition to their association with internal political enemies of the Roman state.58 In an attempt to deny this charge and

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Divine Hunger: Cannibalism as a Cultural System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Maggie Kilgour, From Communion to Cannibalism: An Anatomy of Metaphors of Incorporation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). Tertullian notes the eradication of the practice of human sacrifice by the punishment of priests of Africa, who were put to death at the exact place where they had committed the religious rite. Cf. Apology 8.2. Greek and Roman sources ascribe cannibalism to foreign groups, i.e. Herodotus refers to cannibalistic groups, such as the Indians (4.26), the Callatiae (3.38), and Scythians (4.64), among others. See also Aristotle, Pol. 8.3.4; Pliny the Elder, Natural History 7.9–10; Philostratus, Life of Apollonius 6.25; Strabo 15.1.56. Nonetheless, political enemies are also accused of cannibalistic acts, i.e. Sallust, Cataline 22 in reference to Cicero’s opponent L. Sergius Catalina and other senatorial individuals who try to seize power in 63 bce. See also, Plutarch, Life of Cicero 10.4 and Cassius Dio, History 37.30 in reference to the same allegation. See for example Y. Dauge, Le Barbare: Recherches sur la conception romaine de la barbarie et de la civilisation (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 561–580. In his analysis of the charge of cannibalism, McGowan notes four major cases of such allegations in Roman literature: the philosophical cannibal, the exotic (foreign) cannibal, the mythical cannibal, and the political cannibal. (Cf. “Eating People: Accusations of Cannibalism against the Christians in the Second Century,” jecs 2 (1994), 423–433). He asserts that in all these cases the issue of social and symbolic boundary is central, as the primary function of the allegation of cannibalism is to designate the Other: “It is so much more important to acknowledge that Christians and many of these other “cannibals” were probably nothing like the picture of them widely promulgated and accepted; such “labeling” expresses a fantasy whose real substance is the anxiety thus expressed about the internal structure and the external boundary of society. By accepting the fantastic nature of the allegations we are, in fact, enabled to take them more seriously, and to at least begin

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to turn it against his opponents, Tertullian refers to recorded occurrences of the drawing of human blood not only in Herodotus’ description of foreign tribes but also the mentioning of an instance of a similar act in Roman history, namely the Catiline political plot.59 In addition, Tertullian also specifies that the Scythian tribes living in the north allegedly eat dead members of their community.60 By isolating the practice of consumption of human body parts either within the parameters of foreign nations or the political enemies of the Roman state, Tertullian casts cannibalism as a constitutive practice of external and internal enemies of Rome. It is precisely in this context of viewing Christians as a direct public threat to the status quo that the charge of cannibalism in connection with Christians is to be properly contextualized and understood, rather than by attributing the charge to any mistaken understanding of the Eucharistic meals by outside observers.61 Furthermore, Tertullian tries to turn the accusation of cannibalism into a counter-accusation against the Roman people and notes occasions on which blood is collected from dead gladiators for medicinal purposes.62 Moreover, the apologist condemns the indirect digestion of the flesh and blood of the dead gladiators by those who consume the meat of animals from the arena that are filled with the “blood of the gladiator” (gladiatoris sanguine) and “raw and undigested human flesh” (crudantes adhuc de visceribus humanis).63 This speculation allows Tertullian to assert that the Roman feasts and public festivals are not in any way different from the alleged banquets of Christians, as reported by the critics. In spite of the attempt on the part of the apologist to associate Romans with cannibalistic acts as such, Tertullian suggests not only the gravity of the charge but also its clear link with actual enemies of the Roman state. It becomes evident that the more extreme accusation of cannibalism is indicative of the perceptions of Christians as both inhumane and politically suspect to a much greater extent than the charge of human sacrifice that can be discovered in the context of foreign religious rites, as well as politically subversive behavior vis à vis the Roman state.

to see how they are evidence for social relations. To wonder at the naivety of such beliefs is understandable; to wonder for too long is perhaps a sign of naivete. Labels and stereotypes are not matters of ancient history alone.” Cf. McGowan, “Eating People: Accusations of Cannibalism against the Christians in the Second Century,” jecs 2 (1994), 441–442. 59 Cf. Sallust, Cataline 22. The incident is referred to in Tertullian’s Apology 9.9. 60 Tertullian, Apology 9.9. 61 Cf. J.-P. Waltzing, “Le Crime rituel reproché aux chrétiens de IIe siècle,” Musée Belge 29 (1925), 209–238. 62 Tertullian, Apology 9.10. 63 Tertullian, Apology 9.11.

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Tertullian: Barbarism and Allegations of Incest In addition to being accused of human sacrifice and cannibalism, both of which are common marks of barbarian and uncivilized peoples, Christians are also charged with sexual immorality and incest.64 In his response to the allegation of illicit sex with family members, Tertullian writes about the implication for new converts by commenting on the necessity to have available either siblings or children: “What, Christians with no relatives? I suppose, a man is not a regular Christian unless he is a brother or a son.”65 The charge of incest is another crucial component for the hostile profile of Christians, as it poignantly illustrates the same logic that operates in the rhetoric of ancient invective, which includes the designation “barbarian” as a derogatory term.66 In combatting this charge, Tertullian first points to the lack of any evidence in support of such an accusation and its proponents’ reliance on questionable sources rather than actual witnesses,67 before turning the same accusation against his opponents. He points to the existence of sexual impropriety among different ethnic groups, such as the alleged custom of Persian custom of mother-son sexuality,68 and the supposed incestuous acts of the Macedonians, resulting from the influence of the theatrical enactment of the story of Oedipus.69 Furthermore, Tertullian insinuates that the Romans themselves are incestuous not only because they are worshipers and “followers of Jupiter” (quos ipse Iupiter docuit),70 but also because their practice of exposing children allows for the possibility of eventual promiscuity and acts of incest.71 As in his counter-accusations of cannibalism and human sacrifice, Tertullian refers to instances of ancient mythology and contemporary theater, as well as the alleged practices of different ethnic groups. However, these examples reiterate not only the association of the allegation of incest with the customs and practices of foreign nations, but also the imaginary dimensions of the charge itself. The unrealistic aspects of the accusation of incest, as suggested by Tertullian’s caricature of it,72 however,

64

For detailed discussion of this charge, see K. Thraede, “Inzest in der frühen Apologetik bei Tertullians,” in Hairesis, eds., Manfred Hutter, Wassilios Klein, Ulrich Vollmer (Münster: Aschendorf, 2002), 248–260. 65 Tertullian, Apology 8.8. 66 See previous section, especially footnote 37. 67 Tertullian, Apology 7.5, 13. 68 Tertullian, Apology 9.16. 69 Tertullian, Apology 9.16–17. 70 Tertullian, Apology 9.16. 71 Tertullian, Apology 9.17. 72 Tertullian, Apology 8.7–8.

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do not diminish its significance in the ancient polemical texts. The allegation of sexual immorality against Christians, as well as against barbarian groups, who are similarly accused of incest, allows for their categorization as the antithesis of both civilized humanity and Roman identity.73 Much like how allegations of human sacrifice and cannibalism function both rhetorically and ideologically to designate the barbarian “other” as the opposite of Romanitas, the charge of incest puts into question not simply the bonds with fellow human beings that constitute the foundation of civilization and society, but also the more immediate familial bonds, such as the relation between son and mother, daughter and father, brother and sister.74 As barbarians often represent an external danger to the state, or the destabilizing foreign element within society, the incestuous impulse represents another kind of threat to the fabric of society, this one aimed at the foundation of the Roman familia. It is important to note that Tertullian does not resort to any metaphorical language that may have been used by Christians either to provide a rationalization for this accusation or to present a platform for his defense against it. The apologist does not exhibit any shallow understanding of the serious charge of incest, nor does he try to diminish its significance. Instead, he takes the allegation of the taboo practice of incest seriously and responds to it without resorting to any Christian phraseology or theological explanations, as for example would be references to brotherly or sisterly affection in the context of the Christian community.75 In this way, Tertullian’s answer to the charge of incest reflects the charge’s efficacy as an invective and as a form of rhetorical othering. Rather than trying to deflect or diminish in any way the accusation of sexual immorality, his response to the allegation of incest demonstrates the trope’s power and the ideological force behind it. Tertullian: Barbarism and Animality The charge of incest, along with the accusations of cannibalism and human sacrifice, is expressed in language reminiscent of the stock characteristics of the “barbarians” in antiquity, namely a savagery that is often rendered 73

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My reading of the charge of incest, as one aspect of the charge of barbarism, is parallel to the readings of human sacrifice and cannibalism provided by MacGowan and Rives (see above section in this chapter). For a discussion of the significance of women’s presence in early Christianity and the charges of incest, see Kathleen Corley, Private Women, Public Meals: Social Conflict in the Synoptic Tradition (Peabody, ma: Hendrickson, 1993), 24–79. For such an uncritical explanation in secondary literature, see Waltzing, “Le Crime rituel reproché aux chrétiens de IIe siècle,” Musée Belge 29 (1925), 215.

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through animalistic and sub-human terms.76 According to Tertullian’s account, C ­ hristians are not only associated with alleged canine activities in the course of their meetings,77 but they are also said to worship a god that possesses ­animal-like features similar to those of the Egyptians deities.78 As acts of human sacrifice and ritual murder, cannibalism and incest in the Roman imagination are intimately connected with the presumed brutality of foreign nations, so too is the animal kingdom an embodiment of cruelty, which is radically opposed to the civilized realm of the empire.79 Animal imagery in reference to religious beliefs and ritual practices functions ideologically in a parallel way to the the charge of barbarism, in so far as it casts its object as the antithetical “other” in contradistinction to the ordered and organized sphere of the Roman state. The polarity that is embedded in the two notions – “Roman” and “barbarian” – necessitates the opposition between civilized and barbarian, on the one hand, and human and animalistic, on the other. Rhetorically, the two notions are functional equivalents in that they both castigate and expel Christian beliefs and practices as the opposite of the received Roman religious norms and rituals. As indicated previously, Tertullian quotes in his Apology a detailed description of secret Christian gatherings, in which dogs reportedly have a key role in the alleged incestuous unions of members of the religious group. In accordance with his written account, the climax of the celebration of infanticide and cannibalism is the purported incestuous encounters facilitated by “dogs” that are tied to lampstands: We are said to be the most criminal of men, on the score of our sacramental baby-killing and baby-eating that goes with it and the incest that follows the banquet, where the dogs are our pimps in the dark and make sort of decency for guilty lusts by overturning the lamps.80 Dicimur sceleratissimi de sacramento infanticidii et pabulo inde, et post convivium incesto, quod eversores luminum canes, lenones scilicet tenebrarum, libidinum impiarum in verecundiam procurent. 76

See pertinent discussion of the issue in Y. Dauge, Le Barbare: Recherches sur la conception romaine de la barbarie et de la civilisation (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 605–607, 673–674. 77 Cf. Tertullian, Apology 8.7–8. 78 Cf. Tertullian, Apology 16. 79 For other examples of similar binary constructions in Roman literature, see Y. Dauge, Le Barbare: Recherches sur la conception romaine de la barbarie et de la civilisation (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 393–413. 80 Tertullian, Apology 7.1.

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Tertullian refers not only to the close association of Christians with the ad hoc animalistic activity of dogs, who facilitate the supposed acts of sexual transgression, but he also points to the assumption on the part of the accusers that Christians possess a very different human constitution. The extreme polarity between Roman and barbarian identity, as well as the Roman representation of perceptions of self and other, is in keeping with the construct of the Western self and the Oriental “other” that is discovered in the colonialist discourse by the literary critic Edward Said. As Said explains and demonstrates through textual evidence, the Orient is most commonly represented as the “antitype of Europe” and is marked by its “radical difference.”81 In response to the numerous charges that lead to the characterization of Christians as the paradigmatic “other” to the Roman self-perception and self-representation, Tertullian exclaims: Oh, we have another nature, I suppose! Dog-headed men, perhaps or Sciapods? A different arrangement of teeth, other muscles for incestuous lust?” 82 Alia nos, opinor, natura; Cynopaene aut Sciapodes? Alii ordines dentium, alii ad incestam libidinem nervi? Tertullian poses these paradoxical questions that indicate the latent assumptions on part of his adversaries, namely that Christians are viewed not only as anti-Roman but also as quintessentially inferior and as ultimately subhuman. The apologist tries to plead with his addressee, as he continues to explain: You are a man yourself and this is just what a Christian is. You, sir, who cannot do the thing ought not to believe it of another. For a Christian too is a man and exactly what you are.83 Homo es et ipse, quod et Christianus. Qui non potes facere, non debes credere. Homo est enim et Christianus et quod et tu. In a similar vein, Tertullian refers to other commentators connecting dogs with the Christian god and the priesthood, both of which are themselves ridiculed 81

Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient (New York: Random House, 1994; Reprint), 17. 82 Tertullian, Apology 8.5. 83 Tertullian, Apology 8.5.

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by outsiders for their comical resemblances to the animal kingdom. Tertullian notes that some of his opponents describe the deity of the Christians with the “head of a donkey” (caput asininum esse deum nostrum)84 and he attributes this claim to Tacitus’ explanation of the Jewish divinity.85 Tertullian recounts Tacitus’ report that relates the origin of the Jewish nation and religion, and he mentions that Jews were exiles from the land of Egypt who came to deify and consecrate the “likeness of a beast” as their god (consimilis bestiae superficiem consecrasse).86 According to the detractors of Christianity, both Jews and Christians came to worship the image of a donkey that represented their god. In this explanation of animal imagery, it becomes clear that Christians are not merely placed in a Jewish religious context but are also analogized to other ethnic and religious groups that are perceived as radically opposed to the Roman ones. In the same way Christians are ridiculed for their alleged beastly activities and presented as a potential threat to the Roman status quo, so too Jews are viewed as an originally crude and uncivilized group that owed its survival in the desert to an animal and, as a result, they came to worship its image. In his Histories, Tacitus writes that a herd of wild donkeys led the Jews to find water in the desert and because of this fact “they consecrated an image of the animal that had delivered them” in the temple in Jerusalem.87 These parallels between accusations leveled Jews and Christians demonstrate the ideological function of animal imagery to designate the lesser “other” and to strip from any aspects of dignity, worth, or humanity. This rhetorical strategy is also inherent in the Greco-Roman concept of the barbarian, which contains similar derogatory significations and nuances within a largely pejorative semantic field.88 In addition, both in his Ad Nationes and in the Apologeticus Tertullian refers to one specific incident related to the animal imagery already mentioned. Tertullian gives an account of the alleged actions of a Roman contemporary, who has made a public display and mockery of the Christian deity by the exhibiting an image of animal-like figure with the inscription: “The God of the Christians, ass-begotten” (Deus Chrestianorum ΟΝΟΚΟΙΤΗΣ).89 The apologist 84 Tertullian, Apology 16.1. 85 Cf. Tacitus, Histories 4. 86 Tertullian, Apology 16.2. 87 Cf. Tacitus, Histories 5.3 88 In his exhaustive survey of Roman literature, Dauge explains the connection between the alleged savagery of barbarians and their association with animals and bestiality. Cf. Dague, Le Barbare: Recherches sur la conception romaine de la barbarie et de la civilisation (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 277–278. 89 Tertullian, Apology 16.12.

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describes the caricature of the Christian deity, as follows: “It had ass’s ears; one foot was a hoof; it carried a book and wore a toga” (Is erat auribus asininis, altero pede u­ ngulatus, librum gestans et togatus).90 Parallel to the Roman polemic against Judaism, the Christian god is presented here as a mongrel and a mixture between the human and the animal, as Christians are simultaneously ascribed subhuman and beastly qualities as well. While the rhetoric of exaggerated ridicule and caustic invective is operative in this passage, it is important to note that Tertullian employs the same rhetorical tools in identifying the person in question. He not only explains that the creator of this scandalous exhibition was a “criminal hired to dodge wild beasts in the arena” (ex quo quidam frustrandis bestiis mercenarius),91 but he also comments in his Ad Nationes that the person was a “deserter” of the Jewish religion (suae religionis desertor, solo detrimento cutis Iudaeus).92 Tertullian employs rhetorical stratagems analogous to his opponents, even when he attempts to expose the charge that Christians and Jews are worshipers of a semi-beastly deity as flawed. In addition to denying these allegations, Tertullian accuses the Romans of similar practices, when he writes: “You in fact worship the ass in its entirety, not just the head. And then you throw in Epona, the patron saint of donkeys and all the beasts of burden, cattle, and wild animals. You even worship their stables. Perhaps this is your charge against us that in the midst of all these indiscriminate animal lovers, we save our devotion for asses alone.”93 Tertullian attempts to accuse his adversaries of the same change, as well as to exaggerate it to much larger extent. It is important to note here that there is in fact a surviving image of the crucified Christian god with the head of a horse that has been discovered and preserved in the city of Rome. The earliest extant representation of the crucifixion is the scandalous image known as the graffiti of Alexamenos that was scratched on plaster around 200 ce in the Paedagogium on the Palatine Hill, which most likely served as a school to train servants in the imperial household.94 As his adversaries accuse Christians of criminal acts, dubious religious practices and problematic connections with foreign nations, Tertullian makes similar claims against an individual, whether Anaximenos or another contemporary figure, who dared to mock and denigrate Christians in a public setting. 90 Tertullian, Apology 16.12. 91 Tertullian, Apology 16.12. 92 Tertullian, Ad Nationes 1.14. 93 Tertullian, Ad Nationes 11. 94 The image was first discovered in Rome in 1856.

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Tertullian: Barbarism and Monstrosity The qualification of Christians in animalistic terms parallels their designation as the “third race” (tertium genus)95 to appear in Tertullian’s Ad Nationes.96 In this apologetic text in particular, Tertullian defends the cause of the innocence of Christians and remonstrates against the description of his fellow religionists as belonging to a “third race”: We are indeed said to be the “third race” of men. What, a dog-faced race? Or broadly shadow-footed? Or some subterranean Anitpodes? If you attach any meaning to these names, pray tell us what are the first and the second race, that so we may know what something of this “third.”97 Tertium genus dicimur, cynopennae aliqui, vel sciapodes, vel aliqui de subterranea antipodes. Si qua istic, apud vos saltem ratio est, edatis velim ­primum et secundum genus, ut ita de tertio constet. Tertullian tries to understand this classification of Christians as an altogether different “race” (genus) in accordance with existing theories of human development, as well as the division along religious lines that distinguishes Romans, Jews, and Christians.98 Moreover, he draws a comparison between the liminal situation of Christians in terms of their religious belonging and the position of eunuchs as the anomalous gender in Roman society, when he states: “You too have your “third race” not indeed third in the way of religious rite, but a third race in sex (habetis et vos tertium genus, etsi non de tertio ritu, attamen de tertio sexu), and made up as it is of male and female in one.”99 Tertullian analogizes this perceived anomalous and unnatural category to the popular image of the Christian, who is also seen as similarly grotesque and abnormal vis à vis the rest of society. Notwithstanding what the specific reference to a “third race”100 may refer to originally, this designation implies both abnormal, 95 Tertullian, Ad Nationes 7 ff. 96 For a discussion of ethnic terms and designations for early Christians, see also Denise Buell’s Why This New Race: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Gay Byron’s Symbolic Blackness and Ethnic Difference in Early Christian Literature (London: Routledge, 2002). 97 Tertullian, Ad Nationes 7–8. 98 Tertullian, Ad Nationes 8. 99 Tertullian, Ad Nationes 19. 100 Tertullian, Ad Nationes 8.

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the exceptional and the “monstrous.”101 The categorization of Christians as the third race is in fact very similar to the charge that they are barbarian in so far as the two terms designate the antithesis of the customary, the familiar, and the socially acceptable. Rhetorically and ideologically, these concepts are functional synonyms not only because they both imply ethnic and religious difference, but also because they both demarcate the threatening category of the liminal other. Tertullian: The Charge of Barbarism and Political Treason According to the writings of Tertullian, the charge of political treason is leveled against Christians because they are perceived as endangering the security and safety of the Roman state.102 Tertullian specifies that Christians are singled out on account of their refusal to participate in the “celebration of the holidays” of the Roman emperors (Christiani non celebrando vobiscum solemnia Caesarum).103 He cites his opponents, who not only identify Christians as “enemies of the Roman princes” (hostes principum Romanorum)104 and “public enemies” of the state (publicorum hostium),105 but also deny them the proper designation “Roman.”106 Tertullian specifies that “we outrage the Romans and we are not considered Romans (Romani), since we do not worship the god of the Romans.”107 In addition to abstaining from participating in the celebration of public festivals and religious holidays, Tertullian also mentions that Christians refuse to offer sacrifice to the health of the emperor,108 automatically disqualifying them from expressing loyalty to the Roman state and relegating them to the category of enemy of the political status quo.109 It should be noted that in 101 On strategies of rhetorical demonization, see Timothy K. Beal, Religion and Its Monsters (New York: Routledge, 2002). 102 See Richard Klein, Tertullian und das römische Reich (Heidelberg, Germany: Carl Winter, 1968). 103 Tertullian, Apology 35.5. 104 Tertullian, Apology 35.6. 105 Tertullian, Apology 35.10. 106 Tertullian addresses “those who will not allow us to be counted Romans” (qui nos nolunt Romanos haberi). Cf. Apology 35.5. 107 Tertullian, Apology 24.8. 108 Tertullian, Apology 35.10. 109 Tertullian’s Apology has been variously dated to 197, to 202–203 during the persecution of Septimus Severus and to the persecution of Scapula, proconsul of Africa, in 212–213. (See A. Harnack, Die Chronologie der christlichen Litterature bis Eusebius. 2 vol. (Leipzig: Hinrich, 1904), 279). For example, T.D. Barnes maintains Tertullian’s datable works to be written between 197 and 212 and asserts that the Apology was written in or after 197. Cf. T.D. Barnes, Tertullian: A Historical and Literary Study (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971), 30–32.

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212 ce, around the time of compostion of Tertullian’s Apology, emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (Caracalla) extended Roman citizenship in the Antonine Constitution to everyone in the Roman Empire. In spite of the fact that the privileges of Roman citizenship had declined substantially already, the immediate consequences of the extension of Roman citizenship to all inhabitants are the uniformity of Roman law and religious observance.110 In 212 Caracalla expresses his desire to “give thanks to the immortal gods” and “to join the foreigners in applying to the religious observances of the gods” and offers “to all the foreigners ... citizenship of the Romans.”111 Caracalla’s measure of incorporation of foreigners in the body of Roman citizens, rather than being an empty gesture, aims at both legal and religious unity in the Empire, as it links religious observance directly to Roman citizenship. This fact has a far-reaching impact for different kinds of groups, including the Christians, as they are subsequently required to participate in the imperial cult in order to demonstrate allegiance to the emperor.112 Despite the difficulty in dating precisely Tertullian’s Apology, namely whether it is written before or after Caracalla’s edict, the link that the apologist makes between Romanitas and religious observance can be best understood in this context of centralized efforts to enforce social conformity and religious uniformity. Tertullian is put in a position to defend Christians against charges of disloyalty to the Roman Empire and, for this reason, he attempts to demonstrate that no traitors have come from among the ranks of Christians. Instead, he points to the disloyalty of the common people (vulgus, plebs),113 as well as of members of other Roman social orders.114 Tertullian cites specific incidents from Roman history in order to show that disloyalty and opposition originate from within Roman society itself, rather than any foreign religious formation.115 In addition, Tertullian protests the inconsistency between Christians being denied 110 Peter Garnsey, Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1970), 265–270. See also A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire (London: Blackwell, 1964), i. 17. 111 See Otto Eger, Ernst Kornemann and Paul M. Mayer, eds., Griechische Payri im Museum des oberhessischen Geschichtsverein zu Giessen, Bd. i, Heife 1–3 (Leipzig: Tubner, 1910–12), 40.1. 112 Cf. A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire (London: Blackwell, 1964), i. 17; J. Rives, Religion and Authority in Roman Carthage from Augustus to Constantie (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 250. 113 Tertullian, Apology 35.6–7. 114 Tertullian, Apology 35.8 ff. 115 Tertullian emphasizes: “From among Romans, unless I am mistaken, from among nonChristians” (De Romanis, nisi fallor, id est de non Christianis). Cf. Apology 35.9.

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the appellation “Roman” and other criminal groups receiving very different treatment: If it comes to this that men who were called Romans are found to be enemies, why are we, who are thought to be enemies, denied the name of Romans? It is impossible to say that we are not Romans because we are enemies, when enemies are discovered who are counted Romans.116 Si haec ita sunt, ut hostes deprehendantur qui Romani vocabantur, cur nos, qui hostes existimamur, Romani negamur? Non possumus et Romani non esse et hostes esse, cum hostes reperiantur qui Romani habebantur. As the name “Christian” signifies the perception of the religious group as an “other” to the larger Roman society, so too the denial of the appellation “Roman” indicates the perception of Christians as quintessential barbarians and the public enemies of the state. As it is important for his adversaries to assert that the name “Christian” implies a denial of Roman citizen identity, so too it is crucial for Tertullian to prove Christians’ loyalty to the state and valid claim on Romanitas. The apologist responds to the criticism of Christian non-participation in the imperial holidays by asserting the actual loyalty of Christians to Rome. Tertullian emphasizes the sheer number of the members of Christianity and their significant presence in all segments of Roman society and in every crucial aspect of its governing bodies: We are but of yesterday, and we have filled everything you have – cities, islands, forts, towns, exchanges, and even camps, tribes, decuria, palace, senate, forum.117 Hesterni sumus, et vestra omnia implevimus, urbes, insulas, castella, municipia, conciliabula, castra ipsa, tribus, decurias, palatium, senatum, forum. Furthermore, Tertullian claims that if Christians were to play the part of “open enemies” (hostes exertos) rather than “secret avengers” (vindices occultos), they would exert an enormous power as a result of their large numbers.118 At the 116 Tertullian, Apology 36.1. 117 Tertullian, Apology 37.4. 118 Tertullian, Apology 37.4: vis numerorum et copiarum.

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same time when the apologist tries to assure his opponents that Christians are not threatening the Roman state because of their doctrinal precept to love one’s enemies, he suggests that Christians could potentially have the resources needed to become a threat to the existing social order.119 In this oblique manner, rather than entirely negating the accusation, he supports the identification of Christians as potentially endangering the existing status quo, in so far as their large number and possible influence are concerned. Instead of negating the qualification of Christians as “public enemies,” Tertullian describes them as constituting a latent force that could pose a potential threat to the safety of the Roman state. In such a way, the apologist indirectly accepts and modifies the classification of Christians as “public enemies,” rather than completely denying the charge of treason. As a result, the inherent threat that the religious group represents not only remains but is strengthened by the assertion that Christians are so numerous and omnipresent in Roman society as to be able to endanger its very fabric. Tertullian indicates that even a passive resistance on the part of Christians might present a challenge to the reigning order. The apologist warns that if Christians refuse to cooperate and fulfill their duties as citizens and as members of society, not only would the social regime be endangered, but also imperial rule will be incapacitated: [W]ithout taking up arms, without rebellion, simply by standing aside, by mere ill-natured separation, we could have fought you! For if so vast a mass of people as we had broken away from you and removed to some recess of the world apart, the mere loss of so many citizens of whatever sort would have brought blush to your rule – yes, that it would, and p ­ unished you too by sheer desertion!.... You would have had to look about for people to rule. You would have had more enemies left than citizens.120 Potuimus et inermes nec rebelles, sed tantummodo discordes solius divortii invidia adversus vos dimicasse. Si enim tanta vis hominum in aliquem orbis remoti sinum abrupissemus a vobis, suffudisset utique dominationem vestram tot qualiumcumque civium amissio, immo enim et ipsa destitutione punisset.... Quaesissetis quibus imperaretis. Plures hostes quam cives vobis remansissent.

119 Tertullian, Apology 37.1. 120 Tertullian, Apology 38.6–7.

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While Tertullian suggests that the functioning of the empire rests upon the enormous daily contributions of Christians, he intentionally intensifies the perceived threat by indicating that the Roman imperial regime and entire social fabric are at the mercy of Christians. Tertullian goes so far as to claim that not only the active but also the passive resistance of Christians would suffice to overturn the safety of the empire. As he protests the identification of Christians as “enemies” (hostes) of the state, so too he criticizes the designation of a political “faction” (factio) that is given to their religious formation.121 While Tertullian responds to the charge of political threat that Christians pose on account of their illegal meetings, he proposes that these gatherings need to be identified as “assemblies” (curia) rather than meetings of a faction.122 In a similar rhetorical move to his response to the charge that Christians are public enemies, here too the apologist appropriates political terminology and tacitly accepts and confirms the grounds for the allegation of treason. In the final analysis, Tertullian does not disassociate Christians from the designation “public enemies” but, instead, he accepts the possibility of Christian non-­ cooperation and active resistance to the imperial political regime. Therefore, the designation “public enemies” that is ascribed from outside critics is ultimately accepted and affirmed by the apologist, rather than entirely denied. Even when he rejects the actuality of a present threat, Tertullian emphasizes its possibility and potentiality for the future. Closely connected with the accusation that Christians are political enemies is the allegation that they have caused natural disasters, public calamities, and economic problems.123 In addition to mustering examples of past occurrences, such as famine and plague, in order to prove that they are not caused by Christians, Tertullian suggests that such phenomena might in fact be the result of divine retribution and chastisement for Roman irreligiosity and sin.124 In opposition to the claims of his adversaries, Tertullian asserts that in fact fewer such phenomena occur because of Christian presence and intercession.125 In his defense of fellow Christians, the apologist blames his opponents for the existence of misfortunes by using the same arguments that they launch against Christians, namely by condemning their inadequate participation in religious activity.126 He mimics the exact line of reasoning and argumentation that his 121 Tertullian, Apology 39.21. 122 Tertullian, Apology 39.21. 123 Tertullian, Apology 40.1 ff. 124 Tertullian, Apology 40.4, 10. 125 Tertullian, Apology 40.13. 126 Tertullian, Apology 41.1.

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opponents present in accusing them and in trying to overcome their negative contentions. When responding to the charge of economic unprofitability, Tertullian emphasizes that Christians are no different in their style of life than the rest of the inhabitants of the empire. He underlines that his fellow religionists are not “exiles from life” (exules vitae)127 but are in fact hardly distinguishable from the rest of the Roman population. He insists that Christians live with everyone else “in this world” (cohabitamus in hoc saeculo)128 and, consequently, they participate equally in the established economic structures of society. While Tertullian stresses the different attitude of Christians toward the imperial political regime and religious superstructures and sets Christians in a separate category, he marks the same level of participation in the sphere of the economy for all inhabitants. It is noteworthy that despite his insistence on the participation of Christians in the Roman economy, Tertullian distinguishes them sharply from the rest of the populace by calling them citizens of the “universe” rather than ­Roman citizens.129 Additionally, he suggests the opposition of Christians to the rest of society, when he makes the bold statement that “nothing is more foreign to us than the state” (nec ulla magis res aliena quam publica).130 While a strict separation of the different spheres of civic life is hardly possible, the charge of economic unprofitability, in addition to the accusations of causing public danger and natural calamities, indicates that the official views and the popular sentiments coincide regarding Christians as a distinct and separate formation within Roman religious, political, social or economic communities. In accordance with Tertullian’s understanding, Christians are citizens of the universe, as he asserts their belonging to it: “One state we know, of which all are citizens – the universe” (Unam omnium rempublicam agnoscimus mundum).131 This opposition between Roman and universal citizenship more accurately represents the popular and official view of Christians as separate and estranged from the rest of society. This express allegiance to citizenship of the “universe” rather than the empire underlines both the alienation of Christians from the rest of society and the limited scope of the Roman state. It is noteworthy that in his polemical work An Answer to the Jews Tertullian explicitly posits that the Roman state and Christianity as competing entities, 127 Tertullian, Apology 42.1. 128 Tertullian, Apology 43.2. 129 Tertullian, Apology 38.3. 130 Tertullian, Apology 38.3. 131 Tertullian, Apology 38.3.

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as well as the power of the emperor and that of Christ. In this treatise, which aims at a different audience than the Apology,132 the author comments on the significance of various nations and ethnic groups for the spread of Christianity. He asserts that the universal scope of Christianity has appealed to a wide variety of nations, including “Parthians, Medes, Elamites, and they who inhabit Mesopotamia, Armenia, Phrygia, Cappadocia, and they who dwell in Pontus, and Asia, and Pamphylia, tarriers in Egypt, and inhabitants of the region of Africa, which is beyond Cyrene, Romans and sojourners, and also in Jerusalem Jews and all other nations.”133 Tertullian not only emphasizes Christianity’s global reach, but he also reiterates the fact that the new religion has penetrated regions that have defied the power of Rome. He continues the list of nations, as follows: ... the varied races of the Gaetulians, and manifold confines of the Moors, all the limits of the Spains, and the diverse nations of the Gauls, and the haunts of the Britons – inaccessible to the Romans, but subjugated to Christ – , and of the Sarmatians, and Dacians, and Germans, and Scythians, and of many remote nations, and of provinces and islands many, to us unknown, and which we can scarce enumerate.134 ... ut iam Getulorum varietates, et Maurorum multi fines, Hispaniarum omnes termini, et Galliarum diversae nationes, et Britanorrum inaccessa Romanis loca, Christo vero subdita, et Sarmatarum, et Dacorum, et Germanorum, et Scytharum, et additarum multarum gentium, et provinciarum et insularum multarum nobis ignoratum, et quae enumerare minus possumus? Tertullian contrasts the ubiquitous presence of Christianity with the limited geographical scope of the Roman Empire, which fails to expand or is forced to guard its frontiers constantly against foreign invaders.135 It is noteworthy that, as his opponents associate the Christian religion with barbarian characteristics and foreign practices, so too Tertullian aligns its successful dispersion not only among outside foreign nations but also among barbarian groups on the inside of the Empire. He pits the worship of Jesus against the Roman emperor 132 In his Answer to the Jews Tertullian argues against followers of the Jewish religion, rather than specifically addressing Roman officials involved with the persecutions and trials of Christians and attempting to defend them against different allegations. 133 Tertullian, An Answer to the Jews 7. 134 Tertullian, An Answer to the Jews 7. 135 Tertullian, An Answer to the Jews 7.

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and asserts that Christ’s rule is universal, while Rome is struggling to keep its boundaries from alien forces: Christ’s name is extending everywhere, believed everywhere, worshiped by all the above-enumerated nations, adored everywhere, conferred equally everywhere upon all. No king, with Him, finds greater favor, no barbarian lesser joy.136 Christi autem regnum et nomen ubique porrigitur, ubique creditur, ab omnibus gentibus supra enumeratis colitur, ubique regnat, ubique adoratur, omnibus ubique tribuitur aequaliter; non regis apud illum maior gratia; non barbari alicuius inferior laetitia. In spite of Tertullian’s apparent exaggeration of Christianity’s scope, his statement further supports the allegation that Christians are to be associated with barbarians and with other enemies of the Roman Empire. Although he is more measured in making contentious political claims in his Apology, Tertullian states his views on the attitudes of Christians toward the Roman state more openly and freely in his Answer to the Jews. In fact, the apologist explicitly refers here to an opposition between Rome and foreign nations, while identifying Christians with barbarian peoples. Tertullian: The Charge of Barbarism and Atheism Tertullian highlights the importance of religion as an integral part of Roman identity in contrast to common perception of Christians as a dangerous group and as “public enemies” (publici hostes).137 The apologist expresses his awareness of the prevalent propaganda that the reign of the emperor and the success of the empire as a whole are attributed to popular religious observance.138 However, Tertullian contests the supposed connection between religious participation and the safety, protection and prosperity of the state in order to be able to defend the religious affiliation of Christians. Tertullian argues that to connect religion and the welfare of the state in such a direct way is unconvincing. In this regard, he asserts the opposite by emphasizing that Christianity ermerged at the same time when the imperial regime was formed: 136 Tertullian, An Answer to the Jews 7. 137 The Roman conceptions of religion, superstition and atheism follow the lines of distinction between Romans and barbarians. Cf. Cicero, Pro Flacco 67; Tacitus, Histories 2.4.5, 5.2.1 ff.; Seneca, De Clementia 2.5.1, Epistolae 41.1, 95.47, 123.16. 138 Tertullian, Apology 25.12.

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But how absurd it is to set down the glory of the Roman name as the reward of religious feeling, when it is only since the empire (or perhaps it was still kingdom) was achieved, that the religion made its forward strides.139 Sed quam vanum est fastigium Romani nominis religiositatis meritis deputare, cum post imperium sive adhuc regnum religio profecerit. Instead of attributing the success of the Roman Empire to particular religious traditions, Tertullian attributes it instead to their impiety, when he asserts: “How could they be great because of their religion, when their greatness came from irreligion?” (Atquin quomodo ob religionem magni, quibus magnitudo de inreligiositate provenit?).140 In order to contradict the popular political theory, Tertullian invokes the origin of the Roman gods themselves and the nature of Roman religion. To this end, he also argues that the military victories of Romans over other nations necessitate the destruction of regular citizens and priests, as well as the plunder of sacred places, all of which are acts of sacrilege and bear the mark of atheism.141 Likewise, Tertullian refuses to accept the illogical explanation that the ­foreign gods captured in the course of military action are thought to have provided victory to the Romans and to have ensured an “empire without end” (imperium sine fine).142 Tertullian points to the inconsistent logic in the proposition that the gods grant victory to an aggressor, which in this case is understood to be the Roman army. On the one hand, the direct connection between religious practice and the safety of the empire is questioned by Tertullian, as he reveals inherent inconsistencies in the prevailing Roman political propaganda and the justification for war. On the other hand, he admits the link between the two is affirmed in the case of the Christian religion in particular, indicating that Christians pray both for the security of the emperor and for the welfare of the whole of the “Roman Empire.”143 Notwithstanding this claim that Christians are praying for the security and prosperity of Rome, Tertullian argues that religious activity is important for the Roman state, and does so by emphasizing the state’s precarity in the face of perceived threats. While Tertullian asserts 139 Tertullian, Apology 25.12. 140 Tertullian, Apology 25.14. 141 Tertullian, Apology 25.16. 142 Tertullian, Apology 25.16. 143 Tertullian, Apology 32.1: nobis orandi pro imperatoribus, et ita uniuerso orbe et statu imperii rebus que Romanis.

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that Christians intercede before their deity for the sake of the emperor and the people, he remarks that they also try to postpone Rome’s imminent end and to delay the devastation and suffering that will accompany it.144 In this manner, Tertullian imagines a role for Christianity that gives some credence to its detractors’ suspicions about potential dangers to the Roman state, even while claiming that Christian supplication sustains and perpetuates the existing status quo. Tertullian: Intra-Christian Polemic and the Charge of Barbarism The rhetorical strategies and tools that Tertullian uses are evident not only in his apologetic works but also in his polemical treatises against heretics in the context of an intra-Christian dialogue and debate. For instance, in his Five Books Against Marcion, Tertullian makes use of the very same category of barbarism employed against Christians, while exposing and disproving the teachings of Marcion. Tertullian intersperses his substantive arguments with ­invective, and he opens his treatise with a prolonged address against his Christian opponent. He comments on Marcion’s place of origin in the region of Pontus and the E ­ uxine Sea, and he invokes the charge of barbarism against the heretical teacher: But you would not account it hospitable from its situation: so severed it is from our more civilized waters, almost as if by a certain shame at its own barbarity.145 Caeterum, hospitalem Pontum nec de situ aestimes: ita ab humanioribus fretis nostris, quasi quodam barbariae suae pudore secessit. Tertullian comments on the geographical location of the Euxine Sea, as well as the crude lifestyle of the inhabitants of Pontus. His description of the people of the region deserves a full citation, as certain parts parallel charges against Christians already seen in his apologetic writings: The fiercest nations inhabit it, if indeed it can be called habitation, when life is passed in wagons. They have no fixed abode; their life has no germ of civilization; they indulge in libidinous desires without restraint, and for the most part naked. Moreover, when they gratify their secret lust, they hang up their quivers on their car-yokes, to warn off the curious and 144 Tertullian, Apology 32.1. 145 Tertullian, Five Books Against Marcion 1.1.

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rash observer. The dead bodies of their parents they cut up with their sheep, and devour at their feasts. They who have not died so as to become food for others, are thought to have died an accursed death. Their women are not by their sex softened to modesty. They uncover the breast, from which they suspend their battle-axes, and prefer warfare to marriage. In their climate too, there is the same rude nature.146 Gentes ferocissimae inhabitant; si tamen habitatur in plaustro. Sedes ­incerta, vita cruda, libido promiscua et plurimum nuda; etiam cum abscondunt, suspensis de iugo pharetris ut indicibus notantur, ne qui intercedat. Ita nec armis suis erubescunt. Parentum cadauera cum pecudibus caesa conuiuio conuorant. Qui non ita decesserint, ut escatiles fuerint, maledicta mors est. Nec feminae sexu mitigantur secundum pudorem; ubera excludunt, pensum securibus faciunt, malunt militare quam nubere. Duritia de caelo quoque. In addition to commenting on the uncivilized place of origin of Marcion and describing the harsh conditions, savage customs and the hostile nature of the region of Pontus, Tertullian elaborates on violent aspect of its inhabitants: It is a different matter, of course, when the babes of your barbarian Pontus spring forth to the fight. They are, I ween, taught to lance before they lacerate; swathed at first in sunshine and ointment, afterwords armed with the satchel.147 Aliud etsi penes Ponticos, barbaricae gentis infantes in praelium erumpunt, credo ad solem uncti prius, dehinc pannis armati, et butyro stipendiati, qui ante norint lancere, quam lancinare. The inhabitants of Pontus are described in an extreme fashion, so as to implicate Tertullian’s addressee. As the opponents of Christianity castigate the new religion as being barbarous and its members as being murderous, incestuous and transgressive, so too does Tertullian describe Marcion’s ethnic character as cruel, licentious and primitive. Tertullian represents his adversary as the quintessential product of his native region and localized foreign culture. Tertullian describes his arch enemy as a “barbarian” par excellence whose ­counternormativity supersedes all other ethnic groups and even the savage animal world: 146 Tertullian, Five Books Against Marcion 1.1. 147 Tertullian, Five Books Against Marcion 3.13.

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Nothing, however, in Pontus is so barbarous and sad as the fact that Marcion was born there, fouler than any Scythian, more roving than the ­wagon-life of the Sarmatians, more inhuman than the Massagete, more audacious than an Amazon, darker than the cloud, (of Pontus) colder than its winter... Marcion is more savage than even the beasts of that barbarous region.... Verily, O Euxine, you have produced a monster...148 Sed nihil tam barbarum ac triste apud Pontum, quam quod illic Marcion natus est, Scythia tetrior, Hamaxobio instabilior, Massageta inhumanior, Amazone audacior; nubilo obscurior, hieme frigidior, gelu fragilior... Iam et bestiis illius barbariae importunior Marcion... Nae tu, Euxine, probabiliorem feram... The extensive invective against the “barbarian heretic” (barbare haeretice)149 that is found in Tertullian’s treatise is indicative not only of his command of common rhetorical topoi, but also of the accusations leveled against Christians by outsiders. As Tertullian resorts to the category of the barbarian with its concomitant features of savagery, ferocity, animality and monstrosity in order to describe the origin and nature of his adversary, so too were Christians at the time identified and criticized by their opponents. It is precisely the ancient concept of barbarism that implicates charges such as human sacrifice, cannibalism, immorality, and incest, as these practices are understood to be constitutive aspects of that concept in ancient literature. Tertullian’s deployment of the concept of the “barbarian” against Marcion sheds important light on the defensive posture that he assumes in his Apologeticus and in Ad Nationes, in which he responds to similar charges. While the actual allegations against Christians no longer survive, these examples of intra-Christian debate show the potency of this charge in late antiquity. In fact, the parallel uses of othering rhetoric in Tertullian’s apologetic writings and in polemical intra-Christian literature reflect the very same terminology and themes, deployed from totally opposite argumentative positions. 5.2

Arnobius of Sicca and the Charge of Barbarism

The concept of the barbarian has a similarly central role in Arnobius’ Seven Books Against the Heathen (Adversus Nationes),150 although the context and 148 Tertullian, Five Books Against Marcion 1.1. 149 Tertullian, Five Books Against Marcion 1.10. 150 See Micheal B. Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca: Religious Conflict and Competition in the Age of Diocletian (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995); P. Monceaux, Histoire littéraire de l’Afrique ­chrétienne depuis les origines jusqu’à l’invasion arabe. 3 vols. (Paris: Culture et Civilisation,

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the occasion for its use in reference to Christians differ from the ones in Tertullian’s apologetic and polemical works. Arnobius’ Adversus Nationes151 contests a discourse blaming Christians for introducing a new and foreign religion and for allegedly causing a number of serious problems and social ills.152 In Adversus Nationes 1.26.1–7 Arnobius mentions explicitly the persecution of Christians and the majority of scholars date the work during the time of the Great Persecutions under Diocletian’s reign (303–311), although there some scholarly debate surrounding the exact dating of his treatise.153 According to Arnobius, the allegations concerning the spread of Christianity in the Roman Empire are not purely of religious significance, but also of social, political, military, as well as natural and cosmic importance.154 The rich ensemble of accusations against Christians mentioned by Arnobius encompasses a wide gamut of issues and

1901–23); G. Gierlich, Arnobius von Sicca: Kommentar zu den ersten beiden Büchern seines Werkes Adversus Nationes (Ph.D. diss., Mainz, 1985); G.E. McCracken, “Critical Notes to ­Arnobius’ Adversus Nationes,” vc 3 (1949): 39–49; Mark Edwards, “The Flowering of the Latin Apologetic: Lactantius and Arnobius,” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire, eds., Mark Edwards, Martin Goodman and Simon Price (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 197–222. 151 The classification of Arnobius’ work Adversus Nationes as apologetic is in fact contradicted by some early Christian writers, such as Jerome, who do not identify the work as an apology. Jerome provides biographical information on Arnobius and explains the inception of the work, as follows: “Arnobius enjoys great repute as a rhetorician in Africa. While he was giving instruction in oratory to the youth in Sicca and was yet a pagan, he was drawn as a result of dreams to belief in Christianity. Failing, however, to obtain from the bishop acceptance into the faith, which he had hitherto always attacked, he gave all his efforts to the composition of most splendid books against his former religion; and with these as so many pledges of his loyalty, he at last obtained the desired affiliation. (Arnobius in Africa rhetor clarus habetur, qui cum in civitate Siccae ad declamandum iuventes erudiret, et adhuc ethnicus, ad credulitatem somniis compelletur, neque ab apiscopo impetraret fidem, quam semper impugnaverat: elucubravit adversus pristinam religionem luculentissimos libros, et tamen velut quibusdam obsidibus pietatis foedus impetravit.)” (Cf. Chronicon s.a. 326–327). This assertion of the polemical nature rather than defensive character of Arnobius’ work is supported by the fact that a large part of it is dedicated to the dismantling of the pagan religious system (Books iii–vii), as well as the unusual views of Arnobius on theological issues. For a detailed summary and discussion of the diversity of scholarly opinion on this issue, see Michael B. Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca: Religious Conflict and Competition in the Age of Diocletian (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 6–21. 152 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.3–7. 153 For a detailed discussion of the scholarly debate and argumentation of the dating of the work some time after the First Edict of Diocletian and before the end of the Great Persecution, see M. Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca: Religious Conflict and Competition in the Age of Diocletian (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 47–93. 154 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.1 ff.

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highlights the intensity and gravity of the political situation for the followers of Christianity, on whose behalf the apologist is writing. While Arnobius defines the Christian religion, its founder and its followers as popularly associated with the charge of barbarism, allegations such as human sacrifice, cannibalism, and incest are completely lacking from the repertoire of accusations in his multi-volume treatise. In contrast to his predecessor Tertullian, Arnobius emphasizes other aspects of the concept of barbarian. In his apologetic work Adversus Nationes, Arnobius enumerates the various charges against Christians in order of their severity and proceeds to respond to each one of them to the best of his ability and understanding. Arnobius classifies the charges raised against Christians in accordance with their importance and touches upon every aspect of these allegations. For instance, Arnobius begins with the accusation that “the universe has deviated from its laws” on account of the impiety of the members of the Christian religion.155 He proceeds to address the allegations that Chritians have caused natural disasters like plagues, pestilences, droughts, famines, hailstorms and others.156 Next, Arnobius responds to the accusation that Christians are responsible for Roman military defeats and a number of social problems.157 Additionally, Arnobius addresses the charge that Christians are culpable for the punishment inflicted upon the Roman population by the gods, an accusation that deserves its own treatment, although it contains to a certain extent some of the charges already listed.158 It is important to note that Arnobius explicitly addresses the association of Christianity with barbarians in particular in addition to the other charges raised against Christians.159 In his response to these negative allegations, Arnobius resorts to philosophical and speculative discussions, as he engages in a detailed and thorough elaboration of a variety of different topics in attempting to persuade his opponents.160 Although the majority of the charges that the apologist addresses are similar to those found in Tertullian’s treatises,161 it is clear that Arnobius wrote for an audience with more accurate 155 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.1. 156 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.3. 157 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.4–5, 7. 158 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.17. 159 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.66. 160 For example, Arnobius undertakes a detailed discussion and makes philosophical speculations in response to the allegation that Christians caused natural disasters. Cf. Adversus Nationes 1.3. 161 Arnobius states that the most serious charge against Christians, according to him, is that they are “public enemies,” in addition to claims that they caused natural disasters and calamities. Cf. Adversus Nationes 1.1 ff.

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and ample information about Christianity. While Tertullian’s writings reveal an insufficient and inaccurate knowledge of Christian beliefs and practices by his contemporary opponents, Arnobius’ addressees are described as having a much higher level of familiarity with Christian doctrines and rituals. Most likely Arnobius’ Adversus Nationes was addressed not simply to the Roman intellectuals who would have grasped his biting critique of Diocletians’ antiChristian legal measures and other political, economic and religious reforms initiated by the emperor, but even more specifically to Porphyry, who was directly connected to Diocletian and who provided the necessary justification for the persecutions against Christians. Porphyry, who composed at least two works against Christians, Contra Chritianos and Philosophia ex Oraculis, was associated with the imperial court and advised Diocletian on religious matters.162 In his apologetic treatise Arnobius does not provide selected basic information about the Christian religion, as did his predecessor Tertullian, but rather he offers an in-depth treatment of important topics concerning both Christianity and the Roman religious system in an effort to sway his audience and to defend his co-religionists against different charges. Arnobius’ responses to the various accusations share a common element, basing their arguments on coherent logic and rational exposition, even while dealing with speculative topics.163 It is important to underscore this common element in all of his responses not only because of its prominence within the work itself but also because of its articulation in response to common allegations that Christians are lacking in intellectual capacities, reasoning abilities and proper education.164 Thus, the apparent purpose of the apologist is not only to provide a satisfactory and convincing answer to the relevant charges but also to demonstrate the intellectual competence of his co-religionists. With his philosophical bent, Arnobius tries to address the heart of the criticism leveled against his fellow Christians, namely the perception that they are an ignorant and uneducated group that threatens the religious, the social, and the political fabric of Roman culture.165 162 For further discussion of the period and the connection between Porphyry and the ­imperial propaganda at the time of Diocletian, see Michael Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca: ­Religious Conflict and Competition in the Age of Diocletian (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 23 ff. 163 See, for example, his argument on the nature of evil. Cf. Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.10–11. 164 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.28. 165 Porphyry, who represents the intellectual critique against Christianity at the time, argues that its teachings lack any rational basis. For further discussion, see J.H.W.G. Liebeschuetz, Continuity and Change in Roman Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 252 ff.; T.D Barnes, “Porphyry Against the Christians: Date and Attribution of Fragments,” jts ns

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Arnobius: The Charge of Bararism and Foreign Invasions Arnobius separates the numerous charges leveled against Christians into several distinct categories that concern the political, the socio-religious, the natural and cosmic domains. Despite this formal separation between the different charges, it becomes apparent that such a scheme is inevitably artificial, as the various allegations are interconnected and cannot be strictly divided.166 Unlike his response to the charges related to universal and natural changes, which have quasi-philosophical overtones,167 Arnobius’ answer to the alleged political and military threat of Christians is much more concrete. The a­ pologist makes it clear that the blame for “the cause of frequent wars, the devastation of cities, the eruptions of the Germans and the Scythians” (bellorum frequentium causas, vastationes urbium, Germanorum et Scythicas irruptiones)168 is laid upon Christians, along with that for other public calamities and natural disasters. According to Arnobius, his adversaries claim that the most recent Roman military encounters “were instigated through the hatred of our [Christian] religion” (bella religionis nostrae ob invidiam commoveri).169 In response to these serious allegations, the apologist first invokes historical precedents of military defeats and victories in order to exculpate Christians from any blame for territorial incursions.170 In order to corroborate his argument, Arnobius

24 (1973): 242–242; R. Wilken, “Pagan Criticism of Christianity: Greek Religion and Christian Faith,” in Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition, eds., W. Schoedel and R. Wilken (Paris: Beauchesne, 1979), 117–134; R.M. Grant, “Porphyry Among the Early Christians,” in Studia I.H. Waszink Oblata, eds., W. den Boer et al. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1973), 181–187. On Roman religions, see also Mary Beard, John North and Simon Price, eds., Religions of Rome. 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 166 While Arnobius attempts to achieve a clear distinction for the sake of isolating each accusation and refuting it singly, he also suggests the relatedness that exists between all of them. He lists a number of rhetorical questions that reveal the all-encompassing nature of the accusations that touch upon every aspect of life: “In fine, do men themselves, whom an active energy with its first impulses has scattered over habitable lands, not form marriages and with due rites? Do they not beget dear children? Do they not attend to public, to individual, and to family concerns? Do they not apply their talents, as each one pleases, to varied occupations, to different kinds of learning? And do they not reap the fruit of diligent application? Do those to whom it has been so allotted, not exercise kingly power or military authority? Are men not every day advanced in posts of honor, in offices of power? Do they not preside in the discussions of the law courts? Do they not explain the code of law? Do they not expound the principles of equity?” Cf. Adversus Nationes 1.2. 167 Cf. Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.8–10. 168 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.4. 169 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.6. 170 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.5.

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mentions past defeats, such as the Trojan War and the Persian Wars, that occurred before the Christian religion had come into existence.171 Furthermore, Arnobius applies the same logic as his opponents and claims that if military defeats can be attributed to Christians, military victories of the Roman army must be attributed to them as well:172 Did we urge the deities into frenzy, so that the Romans lately, like some swollen torrent, overthrew all nations, and swept them beneath blood?173 Ut modo Romani, velut aliquod flumen torrens, cunctas submergerent atque obruerint nationes, nos videlicet numina praecipitavimus in furorem? In addition to mentioning the distant past, Arnobius also considers the contemporary period in order to defend cogently the cause of the legitimacy of Christianity. He contradicts the assertions made by his adversaries and points to the fact that for the three hundred years since the inception of Christianity, there have not been incessant wars and political problems.174 In this way, Arnobius tries to dismantle the logic of argumentation of his adversaries by making the opposite claim. In fact, Arnobius states that the most recent military incursions on the Roman borders predate the emergence of Christianity, while recent military conquests of the Roman army can be attributed to the Christian period: And yet do we not see that in these years and seasons that have intervened, victories innumerable have been gained from the conquered ­enemy  – and that the boundaries of the empire have been extended, and that nations whose names we had not previously heard, have been brought under our power?175 171 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.5. 172 It is not accidental that Diocletians’ persecutions began with the military before being extended to Christians within the general population. Cf. Eusebius, Ecclesiastical ­History 8.1.7 ff., 8.4.2 ff.; Lactantius, Divine Institutes 4.27.4 ff.; Jerome, Chron. s.a. 301. For more detailed discussion of the period, see also C.H. Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965), 487 ff. See also M. Simmons, Arnobius of ­Sicca:  ­Religious Conflict and Competition in the Age of Diocletian (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 45 ff. 173 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.5. 174 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.13. 175 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.14.

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Atqui non videmus mediis his annis, mediisque temporibus, ex victis hostibus innumerabiles esse victorias reportatas? prolatos imperii fines, et in potestatem redactas inauditi nominis nationes? Arnobius highlights the logical contradiction in the assertion that Christians are to be blamed for military defeats, but not credited for military victories. In order to explain this fact, the apologist speculates that a balance is being achieved between the occurrence of success and failure in combat.176 In response to the allegation that Christians have caused barbarian incursions, Arnobius proceeds to inspect closely the reasoning process behind the charge that Christians are responsible for foreign invasions of the Roman borders. Arnobius responds to the claim by noting that Christians are found among both the Roman population and various barbarian nations. The apologist points to the weakness of the claim that Christians are the main factor for military loss, asserting that Christians exist among “all the nations” in equal measure.177 Arnobius questions the basis of this attack on Christianity by pointing to its self-contradiction: If the gods willed that the Alemani and the Persians should be overcome because Christians dwelt among their tribes, how did they grant victory to the Romans, when Christians dwelt among their peoples also?178 Si Alamannos, Persas idcirco voluerunt devinci, quod habitarent et degerent in eorum gentibus christiani, quemadmodum Romanis tribuere victoriam, cum habitarent et degerent in eorum quoque gentibus christiani? While Arnobius asserts that Christians are not to be blamed for the military conflict with foreign nations, he nonetheless confirms the connection between Christians and barbarians by claiming that Christians belong to all nations. Arnobius emphasizes the presence of Christians both in the ranks of Roman society and among the other nations, mentioning specifically the Alemanni, the Persians, the African tribes of Gaetuli and the Tinguitani, the Moors, the

176 Arnobius explains, “Again, certain wars were carried on contrary to our wishes. But they were afterwards compensated by victories and successes” (Rursus contra voluntatem quaedam bella administrata. Et victoriis postmodum successibisque correcta). Cf. Adversus Nationes 1.15. 177 Cf. Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.16: nationibus enim sumus in cunctis. 178 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.16.

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Nomads, and the inhabitants of Spain, Gaul, Syria and Asia.179 The stress that Arnobius places on the presence of Christians among various ethnic groups in diverse geographical regions contrasts the Romans, who are presented as being constrained and threatened by foreign nations, with the Christians, who are widely dispersed. For instance, when explaining the unique role of the Jewish messiah Jesus vis à vis other nations, the apologist claims that the gospel message was understood by different people in their various languages: Was there any of us who, when he uttered a single word, was thought by nations far removed from one another and of different speech to be using well-known sounds, and the peculiar language of each?180 Unus fuit e nobis, qui cum unam emitteret vocem, ab diversis populis, et dissona oratione loquentibus, familiaribus verborum sonis, et suo cuique utens existimabatur eloquio? Arnobius implicitly contrasts the limited influence of the Roman emperor with the universal impact of Jesus Christ, who not only has “filled the whole world” (mondum tutum repente complebat)181 but has demonstrated the “boundlessness of his name” (revelata nominis immensitate).182 To the circumcumscribed scope of the Roman state and the constricted power of the emperor, the apologist juxtaposes the universal influence and the omnipresent teachings of the Jewish messiah Jesus, as well as the presence of his followers among every nation. Contrary to the assertion that Christians are the cause for barbarian invasions, Arnobius claims the opposite and states that fewer wars have occurred as a consequence of Christianity’s existence. The apologist in fact attributes the decrease in the number of military conflicts to the beneficial influence of the Christian religion upon both individuals and societies. In support of this claim, Arnobius refers more specifically to the emotional discipline stemming from the moral precepts and religious teachings of Jesus Christ. It is noteworthy that in his defense Arnobius resorts to both Platonic and Stoic philosophical principles in contradistinction to his opponent Porphyry, who belongs to a

179 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.16. 180 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.46. 181 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.46. 182 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.46.

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d­ ifferent ­philosophical tradition of Neoplatonism.183 In this regard, he states the following: For since we, a numerous band of men as we are, have learned from His teaching and His laws that evil ought not to be requited with evil, that it is better to suffer wrong than to inflict it, that we should rather shed our own blood than stain our hands and our conscience with that of another, an ungrateful world is now for a long period a benefit of Christ, inasmuch as by His means the rage of savage ferocity has been softened, and has begun to withhold hostile hands from the blood of fellow-creature.184 Nam cum hominum vis tanta magisteriis ejus acceperimus ac legibus, malum malo rependi non oportere, injuriam perpeti quam irrogare esse praestantius; suum potius fundere, quam alieno polluere manus et conscientiam cruore: habet a Christo beneficium jamdudum orbis ingratus, per quem feritatis mollita est rabies, atque hostiles manus cohibere a sanguine cognati animantis occoepit. On the basis of these and other accusations, it is evident that the early Christians are viewed and as a dangerous and foreign element in Roman society, a construction similar to the idea of the “oriental” subjectivity in Edward Said’s analysis of western colonial literature. As Said explains, the oriental “other” is represented as the antipode of civilization and the very opposite of the prevailing western self-image by being constructed as “its contrasting image, idea, personality and experience.”185 However, instead of accepting the allegations that Christians cause military incursions and defeats, Arnobius claims that the spread of the teachings of Jesus Christ is a guarantee for peaceful coexistence among different ethnic groups and various nations. According to Arnobius, Christian moral principles not only contribute to the decrease of military conflict, but also affect the root cause for violence and aggression, namely human nature. In a similar vein, Arnobius argues for the salutary transformation of the individual under the influence of Christianity by invoking the doctrine of 183 See P. Hadot, “Neoplatonist Spirituality: Plotinus and Porphyry,” in Classical Mediterranean Spirituality: Egyptian, Greek and Roman, ed., A.H. Armstrong (New York: Crossroad, 1986), 230–249. 184 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.6. 185 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient (New York: Random House, 1994: Reprint), 2.

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the afterlife.186 He juxtaposes the Christian belief in the existence of the afterlife with broadly human fears of death, and he then claims that the Christian doctrine has a profound impact on the human psyche. For this reason, Arnobius addresses his adversaries and invites them to consider the possibility for change offered by the targeted religion: [L]et them, then, laying aside their savage and inhuman nature, return to gentler ways, that they may be ready for that which shall be given.187 tum deinde feritate atque inhumanitate depositis, resumant ingenia mitiora: ut ad illud, quod dabitur, esse possint paratae. As Arnobius turns the accusation that Christians have caused foreign invasions against the Roman persecutors themselves, so too he explains that their religious beliefs and practices are part of the solution to the problem of military aggression and warfare, rather than being its instigator. Moreover, Arnobius urges his opponents to consider adhering to Christian principles, as doing so would further the interests of the Roman Empire, rather than undermining them: But if all without exception, who feel that they are men not in form of body but in power of reason, would lend an ear for a little to His salutary and peaceful rules, and would not, in the pride and arrogance of enlightenment, trust to their own senses rather than to His admonitions, the whole world, having turned the use of steel into more peaceful occupations, would now be living in the most placid tranquility, and would unite in blessed harmony, maintaining inviolate the sanctity of treaties.188 Quod si omnes omnino, qui homines se esse non specie corporum, sed rationis intelligunt potestate, salutaribus eius pacificisque decretis aurem vellent commodare paulisper, et non fastu et supercilio luminis, suis potius sensibus, quam illius commonitionibus crederent: universus iamdudum orbis mitiora in opera conversis usibus ferri, tranquillitate in mollissima degeret, et in concordiam salutarem, incorruptis foederum sanctionibus conveniret.

186 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.32. 187 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.32. 188 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.6.

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In this manner, Arnobius not only disputes the allegation that Christians have caused foreign incursions and led to military loss for Rome, but actually turns this accusation against his opponents and attributes the blame to them instead. Political stability and peace, according to Arnobius, elude the Roman rulers not because of any failures of military preparation, but rather because of their flawed internal disposition. The apologist uses evocative language to convey his ideas and he refers to the Roman conquerors derogatively as “swollen torrent” not merely to offend his opponents but also to suggest his attitude toward the military machine of the Roman Empire.189 As the apologist argues, it is the overwhelming power of unleashed “passions” and the failure exercise “reason” on part of the Roman leadership that lead to the military conflict and destroy the fragility of peace.190 In this way, instead of pointing to the threat posed by any barbarian nations, the apologist ascribes the blame for military loss to the Romans themselves because of their own irrationality and cruelty.191 In his response, Arnobius appropriates not only Roman imperial propaganda on the civilizing power of Rome, but also Stoic philosophical principles, as he emphasizes the primacy of reason and the importance of self-control and selfmastery in the realm of human emotions.192 Furthermore, in countering the allegation that Christians have caused warfare and defeats, Arnobius highlights the inhumane and excessive treatment of Christians by the Roman authorities. In fact, the apologist ascribes to Roman officials the same qualities that are normally associated with barbarians, underscoring the savage nature of the treatment by the official state authorities of both the founder of the Christian religion and his followers. While Arnobius claims that Jesus Christ came to impart “news of utmost importance, bringing an omen of prosperity, and a message of safety to those who believe” (rei maximae nuntiator, auspicium faustam portans, et praeconium salutare credentibus),193 he juxtaposes his message of peace to his brutal treatment by the Roman authorities. 189 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.5. 190 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.6. 191 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.6. 192 If Arnobius is responding in part to Porphyry’s criticism of Christianity, it is not surprising that philosophical principles are a function of his argument against his opponent. See P. Hadot, “Neoplatonist Spirituality: Plotinus and Porphyry,” in Classical Mediterranean Spirituality: Egyptian, Greek and Roman, ed., A.H. Armstrong (New York: Crossroad, 1986), 230–249; R.M. Grant, “Porphyry among the Early Christians,” in Studia I.H. Waszink ­Oblata, eds., W. den Boer et al. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1973), 181–187. 193 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.65.

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What, I ask you, means this cruelty, what such inhumanity, but to speak more truly, scornful pride, not only to harass the messenger and bearer of so great a gift with taunting words; but even to assail Him with fierce hostility, and with all weapons which can be showered upon Him, and with all modes of destruction?194 Quaenam est ista crudelitas, inhumanitasque tanta, quinimmo, ut verius loquar, fastidiosum supercilium, nuntiatorem muneris et portitorem tanti, non tantum verborum maledictionibus scindere, verum etiam bello gravi atque omnibus persequi telorum effusionibus et ruinis? When Arnobius describes the persecutors of Jesus as possessing “fierceness” ( feritas) and “implacable hostility” (aequaliter ... hostibus) as well as a “murderous passion” (libido tam carnifex),195 he implies the same is true for his contemporaries who persecute Christians.196 To the cruel actions of the Roman authorities, Arnobius contrasts not only the essence of the message of Jesus Christ but also the salutary influence of his ethical teachings upon different people groups. Arnobius asserts that, as a result of the teachings of Jesus, the nature of originally “barbarian” nations is being completely and utterly transformed: Do not even these proofs at least give you faith to believe, viz., that already, in so short and brief a time, the oaths of this vast army have spread abroad over the earth? that already there is no nation so rude and fierce that it has not, changed by His love, subdued its fierceness, and with tranquility hitherto unknown, become mild in disposition?197 Nonne vel haec saltem fidem vobis faciunt argumenta credendi, quod iam per omnes terras in tam brevi temporis spatio inmensi nominis huius sacramenta diffusa sunt; quod nulla iam natio est tam barbari moris et mansuetudinem nesciens, quae non eius amore versa molliverit asperitatem suam et in placidos sensus adsumpta tranquillitate migraverit;

194 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.65. 195 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.65. 196 For further discussion of the persecutions of emeperor Diocletian, see M. Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca: Religious Conflict and Competition in the Age of Diocletian (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 47–93. 197 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.5.

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Arnobius asserts that the moral principles of Jesus Christ have a civilizing ­influence upon foreign nations, as well as the Roman population, which is otherwise described by him as governed by extreme and uncontrolled passions. Additionally, Arnobius contrasts the limited influence of Rome with the ­global reach of Christianity, underscoring the beneficial and universal impact of Christianity. His argument deserves a full citation, as he states the following: It [the power of Christ] has subdued the fires of passion, and caused races, and peoples, and nations most diverse in character to hasten with one accord to accept the same faith. For the deeds can be reckoned up and numbered which have been done in India, among the Seres, Persians, and Medes; in Arabia, Egypt, in Aisa, Syria; in Achaia, Macedonia, Epirus; in all islands and provinces on which the rising and setting sun shines; in Rome herself, finally, the mistress of the world, in which although men are busied with the practices introduced by king Numa, and the ­superstitious observances of antiquity, they have nevertheless hastened to give up their fathers’ mode of life and attach themselves to Christian truth.198 eas subdidit appetitionum flammas, et ad unius credulitatis assensum ­mente una concurrere gentes et populos fecit, et moribus dissimillimas ­nationes. Enumerari enim possunt, atque in usum computationis venire ea, quae in India gesta sunt, apud Seras, Persas, et Medos; in Arabia, A ­ egypto; in Asia, Syria; apud Gelatas, Parthos, Phrygas; in Achaia, Macedonia, Epizo; in ­insulis et provinciis omnibus, quas sol oriens, atque occidens lustrat; ­ipsam denique apud dominam Romam, in qua cum homines sint Numae regis ­artibus, atque antiquis superstitionibus occupati, non distulerunt tamen res patrias relinquere, et veritati coalescere christianae. Contrary to the allegations of his adversaries, Arnobius contends that the ethical teachings of Jesus Christ have an edifying effect on individuals and on nations alike. This assertion accords with imperial political propaganda of pax Romana that appeals to the civilizing impact of Roman rule on different ethnic groups, as well as peaceful coexistence of different nations under the direction of Rome. Arnobius appropriates the language and the arguments of his opponents in his defense of Christianity even while turning the very same charges against his adversaries. In this manner, he implies that the alleged purpose of 198 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.12.

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the Roman presence and occupation is fulfilled successfully by the Christian religion, and not by the Roman armies, official representatives, or military ­garrisons. The apologist seems to suggest that while the Roman state’s express goal of achieving peace can be met by propagating Christianity, actual Roman military and political activity has the opposite result. Beyond criticizing the Roman rulers for their unwarranted military activities and for their indulgence in manslaughter, the apologist attacks other cultural manifestations of unbridled passions and of the desire for killing, such as public spectacles and games. He describes Roman identity as “barbarian” not only in reference to their acquisitive aspirations, but also in reference to common cultural and social practices. Specifically, Arnobius attacks the custom of public games at the amphitheater, which he sees as a place of “blood and open wickedness, in the one of which they should see men devoured and torn in pieces by wild beasts, and themselves slay others for no demerit but to please and gratify the spectators.”199 Additionally, Arnobius criticizes the tradition of distributing meat in the market place where “they should tear the flesh of wretched animals, some snatch one part, others another, as dogs and vultures do, should grind them with their teeth, and give to their utterly insatiable maw, and that, surrounded by faces so fierce and savage.”200 In his critique of these practices, Arnobius compares the behavior of people in the amphitheater and in the market place to the activity of animals, especially on account of the cruelty exhibited in these public places. For instance, Arnobius makes a reference to the “fierce passions” (feritatis affectibus) exhibited in these public events.201 The apologist underlines the fact that public spectacles intensify the barbaric character of the Roman people in so far as they add elements of pleasure and enjoyment to the violence that is already present in society. Therefore, it is not only official persecutions and military campaigns that are regarded as manifesting Romans’ “barbarian” character and inherent aggression, but also their cultural practices, including religious holidays and public festivities. In this way, Arnobius manages to demonstrate that barbarism and savagery characterize different aspects of Roman culture and society both during times of peace and during war. 199 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.41: loca sanguinis, et publicae impietatis; ex quibus in altero mandi homines cernerent, et bestiarum laniatibus dissipari; interficere se alios nullius ob meriti causam, sed in gratiam voluptatemque sessorum. 200 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.41: in altero vero animalium miserorum discerperent viscera, alias aliae raperent, ut canibus mos est et vulturibus, portiones, subigerent dentibus, et crudelissimo ventri darent, et in tam saevis atque horridis moribus. 201 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.41.

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Arnobius: Christianity as “Barbarian” Religion As Christians are charged with causing foreign invasions and military defeats, so is the Christian religion regarded as quintessentially “barbarian” by Arnobius’ opponents. Arnobius mentions that the founder of Christianity is alleged to be a practitioner of magic and is associated with Egypt. Arnobius reports some of the charges against Jesus when he cites his adversaries: Jesus was a magician. He effected all these things by secret arts. From the shrines of the Egyptians he stole the names of angels of might, and the religious system of a remote country.202 magus fuit, clandestinis artibus omnia illa perfecit: Aegyptiorum ex adytis angelorum potentium nomina, et remotas furatus est disciplinas. Arnobius specifies that as Jesus is viewed as a practitioner of magic derived from a foreign religious tradition, so too Christianity is perceived by his contemporaries as both a “new” (novellam… religionem) and “barbarian” (barbaros ritus)203 religious phenomenon in its origin and its nature: For as to that with which you have been taunting us, that our religion is new, and arose a few days ago, almost, and that you could not abandon the ancient faith which you had inherited from your fathers, and pass over to barbarous and foreign rites, this is urged wholly without reason.204 Nam quod nobis obiectare consuestis, novellam esse religionem nostram, et ante dies natam propemodum paucos, neque vos potuisse antiquam et patriam linquere, et in barbaros ritus peregrinosque traduci, ratione istud intenditur nulla. Despite expressly intending to rebut the allegation that Christianity is barbarian in its origin and essence, Arnobius demonstrates that many new and foreign gods have been incorporated in the Roman religious establishment throughout its development.205 In order to substantiate this point, he mentions the Egyptian deities Serapis and Isis, as well as a number of other foreign 202 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.43. 203 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.66. 204 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.66. 205 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.73.

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deities.206 In response to the description of the Christian religion as being both “new” and “barbarian,” the apologist proceeds to show that the distinguishing mark of Roman religion is precisely its constant change and its barbarization with imported deities from other nations. In this way, he tries to introduce a mark of equivalence between Roman religious traditions on the one hand and Christianity on the other. The critique of the novelty and barbarity of Roman religions is particularly sharp in the period of the composition of Adversus Nationes, during which the emperor Diocletian, a military man of humble Dalmatian origin, consecrates the Tetrarchy and introduces a novel and orientalizing imperial theology, which designates himself (Augustus of the East) as Jovius, or son of Jupiter, and Maximian (Augustus of the West) as Herculius, the son of Hercules.207 The counter-accusions on part of the Christian apologists apply equally to the history of development of the Roman religious system and to the comtemporary period during the reign of Diocletian, who introduces many political and religious transformations. In his defense of Christianity, the apologist hurls the very same accusations against the Roman religious traditions that are launched against Christians, namely, the charges of irreligion, impiety, novelty and barbarism. For instance, he questions the worship of Roman impersonal deities, and in a manner similar to his opponents, ridicules the very notion of these alleged divine powers: We would ask you, and you above all, O Romans, lords and princes of the world, whether you think that Piety, Concord, Safety, Honor, Virtue, Happiness and other such names, to which we see you rear altars and splendid temples, have divine power, and live in heaven?208 Interrogare vos libet, ipsosque ante omnia Romanos dominos rerum ac principes, utrumne existimatis Pietatem, Concordiam, Salutem, Honorem, Virtutem, Felicitatem, caeteraque huiusmodi nomina, quibus aras videmus a vobis cum magnificis exaedificatas delubris, vim habere divinam, coelique in regionibus degere? While Christians are blamed for introducing novel religious ideas and practices, Arnobius claims that the Roman people can be properly called “fathers of new religions and powers,”209 as they invent new divinities and introduce 206 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.73. 207 Cf. A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire 284–602 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1964), i. 40. 208 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 4.1. 209 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 4.11.

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their worship with impunity. Arnobius remarks that as Romans introduce new gods and goddesses, they also adopt novel means of worship, such as the use of wine and incense.210 As Arnobius’ fellow Christians are accused of impiety and sacrilege, so too does he in turn accuse the Romans of being offenders of the gods due to their mistaken views and practices.211 Furthermore, in response to the charge that Christians cause divine indignation and punishment, Arnobius recasts the gods of Rome in light of the notion of the “barbarian” and turns the arguments of his opponents against them and their divinities.212 According to the apologist, Roman deities, similarly to those who worship them, have “base feelings” (affectus ... turpes) and indulge in anger and revenge.213 It is noteworthy that Arnobius compares Roman deities to humans on the basis of their “instability” (levitas), as well as to animals on the basis of their cruelty.214 Arnobius draws an analogy between the ancestral divinities on the basis of their emotional disposition to animals and he writes: For, to be angry, what else is it than to be insane, to rave, to be urged to the lust of vengeance, and to revel in the troubles of another’s grief, through the madness of a savage disposition? Your gods, then, know, are subject to and feel that which wild beasts, which monstrous brutes experience, which the deadly plant natrix contains in its poisonous roots.215 Quid est enim aliud irasci, quam insanire, quam furere, quam in ultionis libidinem ferri, et in alterius doloris cruces, efferati pectoris alienatione bacchari? Hoc ergo dii magni norunt, perpetiuntur, et sentiunt, quod f­ erae, quod belluae, quod mortiferae continent venenato in dente natrices. The experience and manifestation of extreme human emotions, as well as the analogy with the animal world, are important aspects of the Roman notion of the “barbarian” and it is not surprising that Arnobius resorts to these in launching his counter arguments. In his counter-accusations against the prevailing Roman views of the gods216 and religious practices, Arnobius resorts to the charge of barbarism by mimicking his opponents and boomeranging the 210 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 7.21. 211 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 4.30. 212 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.17. 213 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.17. 214 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.17. 215 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.17. 216 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 3.1–20.

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very same allegations that they direct against his co-religionists. For example, ­Arnobius criticizes the Roman conception of the gods, who are not only conceived in bodily forms, but are also ascribed a gender and described as engaging in human passions.217 The apologist notes that Jupiter is described in terms of his cruelty and violence towards human beings,218 in addition to committing incest with his mother and daughter,219 and that Venus is associated with acts of adultery.220 It is not accidental that Arnobius accuses Jupiter of sexual immorality, such as licentiousness and incest, as Jupiter represents Augustus Diocletian in the new imperial theology, and the accusation thus connects Diocleian to the image of the barbarian in Greco-Roman literature. Emperor Diocletian undertakes major moral reforms by introducing bans on incestuous marriages, proscribing polygamy and sexual incontinence and targeting adultery, among other measures.221 In his response to the critics of Christianity, Arnobius questions the rational basis of the actual allegation that the spurned divinities may inflict punishment on the Roman population. On the one hand, he finds objectionable the characterization of the deities as subject to emotions, drives and mental excitement, which suggest their anthropomorphic and animalistic features rather than their divinity.222 On the other hand, the apologist criticizes the logical foundation of the assertion that these scorned divinities are prone to punishing not only and exclusively the offenders, but rather everyone in the community.223 The apologist also contrasts the Roman notion of divinity with his own understanding of what constitutes genuine divine nature. According to Arnobius, the “true gods” are not subject to fleeting emotions and destructive impulses, and are incapable of inflicting pain and suffering on others.224 217 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 3.1–20. 218 See Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 7.43. It should be noted that Arnobius does not accept his opponents’ objection that the stories related to the Roman pantheon should be read in allegorical fashion (Cf. Adversus Nationes 5.32) or are not originally Roman (Cf. Adversus Nationes 5.24), as both Arnobius and his opponent identify and acknowledge the barbarian element in these stories. 219 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 5.22. 220 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 5.19. 221 For a discussion of Diocletian’s edicts regarding marriage, see H. Chadwick, “The Relativity of Moral Codes: Rome and Persia in Late Antiquity,” in Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition, eds., W.R. Schoedel and R. Wilkens (Paris: Beauchesne, 1979), 135–153. 222 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.17–18. 223 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.21 ff. 224 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.23.

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Arnobius discredits the charge of barbarism leveled against Christians by undermining the notion of the divine that animates the accusations, as well as normatively Roman ideas of human and divine interaction. Arnobius concludes that the entities worshipped by the Roman people cannot be divine because they are subject to change and therefore to death, in addition to being influenced by violent emotions.225 In fact, Arnobius’ attack on the accepted Roman religions is in direct response to Porphyry’s criticism of Christianity, which highlights the human aspects of Jesus and consequently accuses Christians of a mistaken conception of divinity. These are precisely the arguments that Arnobius turns against Roman religions per se.226 In addition to defining the Roman religious system in terms of its foreign infiltrations, Arnobius characterizes the sacred rites of the Roman population, such as the rites of Bacchanalia and the festival of Cybele, as analogously barbarian. When referring to the Bacchanalia, Arnobius marks the extreme religious fervor that accompanies the manifestation of the worship of the Greek god Bacchus in the following manner: We shall pass by the wild Bacchanalia also, which are named in Greek Omophagia, in which with seeming frenzy and the loss of your senses you twine snakes about you; and, to show yourselves full of the divinity and majesty of the god, tear in pieces with gory mouths the flesh of loudly-bleating goats.227 Bacchanalia etiam praetermittamus immania, quibus nomen Omophagiis Graecum est, in quibus furore mentito, et sequestrata pectoris sanitate, circumplicatis vos anguibus, atque ut vos plenos Dei numine ac maiestate doceatis, caprorum reclamantium viscera, cruentatis oribus dissipatis. Arnobius comments on the abandon and the apparent excessive manner in which religious celebrations are conducted, as well as the exhibition of phalli,228 and the “filthy mysteries” (foedis ... mysteriis) during which acts of sexual immorality allegedly occur.229 In addition to characterizing mystery religions as cruel, disorderly and barbarous, the apologist also comes to describe the more common and traditional practice of pagan sacrifice in a similar m ­ anner. 225 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.18. 226 Cf. A. Harnack, Porphyrius, “Gegen die Christen,” 15 Bücher: Zeugnisse, Fragmente und ­Referate (Berlin: Verlag der Königl, 1916). 227 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 5.19. 228 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 5.19. 229 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 5.20.

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It should be noted that the issue of traditional Roman sacrifice is particularly relevant to the persecution during Diocletian’s reign, as the Fourth Edict concerns the obligatory offering of sacrifice, which was enforced in Arnobius’ homeland in North Africa.230 When he launches a critique of the religious use of animal sacrifice, Arnobius not only denigrates the assumption that animal offerings can impact the divinities, but he also ridicules the Romans for conceiving that the gods partake in “a banquet of blood” and “take and share in with dogs.”231 Arnobius compares both the religious activity of the Romans, as well as the alleged participation of the gods as comparable to the actions of “goats” and “dogs.”232 In order to make his criticism of the practice of sacrifice more poignant, Arnobius goes as far as to personify an animal to be offered and creates an imaginary soliloguy. In this literary monologue, it is the animal that accuses humans of cruelty and points to the savagery (saevum) and barbarism (barbarum) imbedded in the Roman religious tradition: Is not this, then, cruel, monstrous and savage? Does it not seem to you, O Jupiter, unjust and barbarous that I should be killed, that I should be slain, that you may be soothed, and the guilty find impunity?233 Ita istud non ferum, non immane, non saevum est? non tibi, o Jupiter, iniustum videtur et barbarum, me occidi, me caedi, ut fias tu placidus, et ut scelerosis contingat impunitas? Therefore, it is the whole of Roman religion, its gods, its institutions, and its functionaries that are presented by Arnobius in terms of the “barbarian.” In his attempt to demonstrate the inhumane and barbaric characteristics, origins and practices of the Roman state religion, Arnobius indirectly responds to the allegation that Christianity is both new and foreign in its origin. When he emphasizes extravagant Roman religious rituals and the cruel nature of the pagan divinities, Arnobius suggests that Roman religion is itself “barbarian.” ­Arnobius systematically undermines the foundations of Roman religion in 230 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 7.1–32. Simmons, for example, argues that Arnobius writes during the time of the persecution and at the point when the Fourth Edict is enforced, as it takes a significant segment of his treatise. For further discussion of this issue, see M. Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca: Religious Conflict and Competition in the Age of Diocletian (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 84 ff. 231 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 7.15. 232 Cf. Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 7.15 ff. 233 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 7.9.

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Books iv–vii of his Adversus Nationes, dismantling the Roman views of the gods and various expressions of religious practice, such as temples, images, sacrifices, et cetera. In addition, Arnobius attacks the credibility of the writings of both historians234 and poets235 as sources for the prevailing conceptions of the gods, while also denying the necessity for temples,236 images,237 and sacrifices.238 In this manner, the apologist shows the inconsistency in the treatment of Christians and the proponents of traditional Roman religions and demonstrates that Christians ought not to be classified as anti-Roman. Arnobius: The Charge of Barbarism and Social Status Christians are called barbarian by Arnobius’ opponents not only in connection with the unfamiliar and foreign religious practices that they introduce to Roman society, but also in reference to their perceived lack of literacy and low social class. For instance, in objecting to Christian scripture, Arnobius’ adversaries refuse to take it seriously because of its authorship and content. The apologist quotes his adversaries, who are criticizing the biblical texts on the basis of the ignorance of the composers: But they were written by unlearned and ignorant men, and should not therefore be readily believed.239 Sed ab indoctis hominibus et rudibus scripta sunt, et idcirco non sunt facili auditione credenda. Arnobius not only accepts this unflattering characterization of the authors of the Bible, but uses the same assertion to deny the possibility that “men of simple mind” (mente simplici) could have falsified historical accounts and biblical records.240 The apologist does not deny this allegation per se but instead uses this assertion in order to support the authority and validity of scripture. ­Arnobius claims that the literary product of the authors who did not know “how to trick out their tales with meretricious arguments (ignara lenociniis ampliare)”241 is devoid of any additions, alterations and inventions. 234 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 5.1 ff. 235 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 4.35. 236 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 6.3. 237 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 4.9. 238 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 7.1 ff. 239 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.58. 240 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.58. 241 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.58.

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However, it is not only the credibility of the authors and the veracity of the written text that are under question. According to Arnobius’s adversaries, the style of the Bible is equally subject to disapproval. Arnobius reports their ­objection to the style of the biblical text, which is cast in a similar vein as the criticism of its content. He quotes the detractors of scripture, stating: “But the language is mean and vulgar” (Trivialis et sordidus sermo est).242 In fact, Arnobius quotes one of the critics, who describes the biblical style in terms of its literary deficiencies and “barbarism” as follows: Your narratives, my opponent says, are overrun with barbarisms and solecisms, and disfigured by monstrous blunders.243 Barbarismis, solaecismis obsitae sunt, inquit, res vestrae, et vitiorum deformitate pollutae. Critics of Christianity describe the religion as barbarian in its foreign origin, but also employ the term “barbarism” to describe perceived deficiencies of its foundational textual corpus. In response, the apologist downplays the importance of Latin diction and grammar, such as correct accentuation or conjunction of words, in favor of properly understanding the meaning of a text: For how, I ask, does it interfere with or retard the comprehension of a statement, whether anything be pronounced smoothly or with uncouth roughness? whether that have the grave accent which ought to have the acute, or that have the acute accent which ought to have the grave? Or how is the truth of a statement diminished, if an error is made in number, or in case, in preposition, participle, or conjunction?244 Quid enim officit, o quaeso, aut quam praestat intellectui tarditatem, utrumne quid glabre, an hirsuta cum asperitate promatur? inflectatur quod acui, an acuatur quod oportebat inflecti? aut que minus id, quod dicitur, verum est, si in numero peccatur, aut casu, propositione, participio, conjuctione? Arnobius discounts the significance of proper Latin grammar and pronunciation, claiming that linguistic rules are human constructions that are “not 242 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.58. 243 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.59. 244 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.59.

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i­ ndispensable to all persons for the use of forming their language.”245 In addition to pointing to examples of common mistakes in spoken and written Latin, he also asserts that Latin language as such is imperfect, as its rules contain many exceptions and irregularities.246 Arnobius defends Christians on the basis of this condition of the Latin language, which, according to him, predisposes Christians and non-Christians alike to grammatical mistakes. In his defense of Christian scripture, Arnobius emphasizes the contrast between Christians, on the one hand, who are not concerned with the trappings of language and easily commit solecisms and barbarisms, and their opponents who are well versed in oratory. Arnobius describes his opponents as especially preoccupied with minor grammatical matters and sophistry rather than the truth: Because you are skilled in declining verbs and nouns by cases and tenses, and in avoiding barbarous words and expressions; because you have learned either to express yourselves in harmonious and orderly and fitlydisposed language, or know when it is rude and unpolished; because you have stamped on your memory the Fornix of Lucilius, and Marcyas of Pomponias; because you know what the issues to be proposed in lawsuits are, how many kinds of cases of there are, how many ways of pleading, what the genus is, what the species...247 Quia per casus et tempora declinare verba scitis et nomina, quia voces ­barbaras, soloecismosque vitare, quia numerosum, et instructum, compositumque sermonem, aut ipsi vos nostris efferre, aut incomptus cum fuerit, scire; quia Fornicem Lucilianum, et Marsyam Pomponii obsignatum memoria continetis; quia quae sint in litibus constitutiones, quot causarum ­genera, quot dictionum, quid sit genus, quid species... The allegation that Christians are unsophisticated and uncouth in both speaking and writing designates not merely a lack of formal training but also the lack of political power and social status.248 Mastery of Latin language and rhetoric is an indication of education, but more importantly it is a sign of membership in the empowered elite, who have the authority to indict, persecute and 245 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.59. 246 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.59. 247 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.6. 248 For further discussion, see Donald L. Clark, Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), 262 ff.

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punish.249 Arnobius also notes that in addition to their excellence in Latin language, literature and oratory, his opponents are well versed in logic and philosophy, as he attempts to deny the inadequacy of “enthymemes” and “syllogisms” to communicate the truth.250 The fact that contemporary Christians, as well as the authors of the biblical texts, are perceived as “barbarous” with respect to their verbal capacity and literary expression indicates not only insufficient education but also lack of qualification for “the public assemblies, for lawsuits, for the forum and the courts of justice.”251 These public realms are reserved for the Roman elites, marked by their mastery of the Latin language and their formal training in Latin literature and oratory that the majority of Christians admittedly did not possess. This claim can also explain Arnobius’ insistence on the derogatory and derisive attitude toward Christians, who are ridiculed by their opponents, rather than taken as social equals.252 The jests directed toward his fellow Christians can be explained not only as responding to their innovative religious ideas and foreign practices, but also as expressing the social distance between the followers of Christianity and their critics.253 Furthermore, Arnobius contrasts literary style and actual content, as well as philosophy and oratory, in order to defend the veracity of Christian scripture. In his apology, he implies that “truth” and “style” are mutually contradictory and describes his adversaries as concerned with the external artifice rather than the veracity of a text: For truth never seeks deceitful polish, nor in that which is well ascertained and certain does it allow itself to be led away into excessive prolixy. Syllogisms, enthymemes, definitions, and all those ornaments by which men seek to establish their statements, aid those groping for the truth but do not mark its features. But he who really knows the subject under discussion, neither defines, nor deduces, nor seeks the other tricks of words by which the audience is wont to be taken in, and to be beguiled into a forced assent to a proposition.254 249 See W. Martin Bloomer, Latinity and Literary Society at Rome (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 38–72. 250 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.11. 251 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.59. 252 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.8–14. 253 For instance, Arnobius addresses his adversaries: “But perhaps those seem to you weakminded and silly, who even now are uniting all over the world, and joining together to assent with that readiness of belief at which you mock.” Cf. Adversus Nationes 2.6. 254 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 1.58.

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Numquam enim veritas sectata est fucum, nec quod exploratum et certum est, circumduci se patitur orationis per ambitum longiorem. Collectiones, ­enthymemata, definitiones, omniaque illa ornamenta, quibus ­fides ­quaeritur assertionis, suspicantes adjuvant, non veritatis liniamenta demonstrant. Caeterum qui scit, quid sit illud quod dicitur, nec definit, nec colligit, neque alia sectatur artificia verborum, quibus capi consueti sunt audientes, et ad consensum rei circumsctriptionis necessitate traduci. Arnobius employs a conventional opposition between the two essential elements of a text – its stylistic features and its actual meaning – in order to downplay the allegations of barbarism against the Bible. Arnobius also compares Christianity to ancient philosophy because both have rejected the “refinement of style” and purposefully adopted a “vulgar meanness” to communicate valuable lessons, rather than merely conveying a mastery of linguistic rules and rhetorical principles.255 The parallel that he draws between Christianity and ancient philosophy is not accidental, for he undergirds his entire apologetic work with the assumption that Christianity should be viewed through the lens of philosophy, rather than being presented as analogous to Roman religious ideas and practices. Arnobius most likely chooses to identify Christianity with ancient philosophy, and specifically with Platonism, in order to respond Porphyry’s deployment of Neoplatonism, and more broadly to argue for the credibility of the new religion.256 To this end, Arnobius refers to a number of Plato’s dialogues, calling the ancient philosopher’s thoughts “worthy of God” and the man himself “the divine Plato.”257 For instance, ­Arnobius explains the Christian belief in life after death by referring to passages in Plato’s dialogues.258

255 Arnobius justifies his parallel between Christianity and philosophy: “we know that some who have devoted themselves to philosophy, not only disregarded refinement of style, but also purposefully adopted a vulgar meanness when they might have spoken with greater elegance and richness, lest they might impair the stern gravity of speech and revel rather in the pretentious show of the sophists.” (maxime cum sciamus etiam quosdam sapientiae deditos, non tantum abiecisse sermonis cultum, verum etiam, cum possent ornatus atque uberius eloqui, trivialem studio humilitatem secutos, ne corrumperent scilicet gravitatis rigorem, et sophistica se potius ostentatione iactarent.) Cf. Adversus Nationes 1.59. 256 See P. Hadot, “Neoplatonist Spirituality: Plotinus and Porphyry,” in Classical Mediterranean Spirituality: Egyptian, Greek and Roman, ed., A.H. Armstrong (New York: Crossroad, 1986), 230–249; R.M. Grant, “Porphyry among the Early Christians,” in Studia I.H. Waszink Oblata, eds., W. den Boer et al. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1973), 181–187. 257 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.36. 258 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.13–16.

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He also engages in a lengthy speculative discussion on the nature of the soul organized around Platonic ideas.259 The apologist demonstrates his familiarity with Plato’s writings by relating some of Plato’s concepts to specific Christian beliefs.260 By using the language of acclaimed philosophical ideas in antiquity, Arnobius aims to show to his opponents the readiness of Christians to face persecutions and punishments, which are not seen as an ultimate threat to life but rather as a pathway to a higher dimension of reality. Arnobius specifically alludes to Platonic thought when qualifying the tortures inflicted upon Christians as being incursions upon “shadows and forms, so far you free us from pressing and heavy chains, and cutting our bonds, make us fly to the light.”261 The imagery of the human body as a prison and the description of death as allowing complete freedom from any physical limitations, in addition to constituting a flight to a higher realm, resonate with Platonic metaphysics and support Arnobius’ broader argument. Arnobius also explains the Christian belief in the resurrection and in the adjudication of divine justice by pointing out parallels in Plato’s philosophical works. For instance, the apologist refers to the idea of punishment of the human soul that Plato propounds, as well as to the philosopher’s insinuation of the destruction and rebirth of the world.262 In countering the mockery of Christian doctrines, Arnobius reminds his critics that they too have similar “beliefs and entertain similar hopes” to those of his co-religionists.263 On the one hand, the apologist seeks a common ground with his opponents in order to gain respectability by refuting the charge of “folly”264 and demonstrating the rational basis of Christian beliefs. On the other hand, Arnobius has specific adversaries in mind, when he identifies his addressees as those who “zealously follow Mercury, Plato and Pythagoras”265 and appeals to the authority of one of these individuals in defense of Christianity. It should be noted that although Porphyry is certainly one of the main opponents that Arnobius has in mind in countering critique of Christianity, the apologist also refers to a group of “new men” (viri novi) who are most likely closely associated with Porphyry and come from the same intellectual and 259 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.36–53. 260 For example, Arnobius is able to justify the Christian belief in the immortality of the souls through a reference to Plato’s Theoetetus, where the philosopher encourages the soul to flee the earthly realm and to strive to reflect on the divine. Cf Adversus Nationes 2.13. 261 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.77. 262 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.13–14. 263 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.34. 264 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.34. 265 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.13.

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social circle.266 By analogizing Christianity and ancient philosophy, Arnobius tries to align Christian religious ideas with philosophical concepts in order to carve a space for the acceptance of the Christian religion within a broader spectrum of accepted Roman beliefs and practices. For this reason, he appeals to the plurality of new concepts in ancient philosophy as justification for the novel ideas that Christianity offers.267 This analogy with philosophy allows Arnobius to combat the charge of barbarism vis à vis the Christian religion, while also pleading for the acceptance and toleration of Christians in Roman society. In particular, emphasizing points of commonality between Christian doctrine and Platonic philosophy casts the Christian religion as respectable and beneficial to Roman society, rather than as a foreign and endangering phenomenon. The more speculative approach that Arnobius adopts in his apologetic writings leads him to highlight doctrinal matters and points of commonality with Neoplatonism, a philosophy that was highly regarded at the time, rather than simply accepting the critics’ claims that Christianity was incongruous with Roman culture and society. 5.3

Lactantius and the Charge of Barbarism

Lactantius’268 multi-volume work the Divine Institutes is the most expressly asserted effort on part of an early Christian writer to respond cogently to various 266 Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.11 ff. See A.-J. Festugière, “La Doctrine des viri novi sur l’origine et le sort des âmes” in Mémorial Lagrange. École biblique et archéologique franc̜aise (Paris: Gabalda, 1949), 97–132; P. Courcelle, “Les Sages de Porphyre et les viri novi d’Arnobe,” rel 31 (1953), 294–317. 267 Cf. Arnobius, Adversus Nationes 2.10 ff. 268 For background information on Lactantius, see René Pichon, Lactance: Étude sur le mouvement philosophique et religieux sous le règne de Constantin (Paris: Hachette, 1901); Jacques Fontaines and Michel Perrin, eds., Lactance et son temps: Recherches actuelle (Paris: Beauchesne, 1978); Elizabeth D. Digeser, The Making of a Christian Empire: Lactantius and Rome (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); Arne Soby Christensen, Lactantius the Historian: An Analysis of De Mortibus Persecutorum (Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen, 1980); James Stephenson, “Life and Literary Activity of Lactantius,” StPatr 4 (1961): 497–503; W.H.C. Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965); Ramsay MacMullen, Roman Government’s Response to Crisis, a.d. 235–337 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire, 284–602 (London: Blackwell, 1964); T.D. Barnes, The New Empire of Diocletian and Constantine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Simon Corcoran, The Empire of the Tetrarchs: Imperial Pronouncement and Government, a.d. 284–324 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966); Fergus Millar, The Roman Empire and Its Neighbors (London: Duckworth, 1981).

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allegations and to consciously improve on the existing Christian apologetic tradition.269 As someone writing a comprehensive and systematic apologetic treatise by following in the footsteps of other Christian authors before him, Lactantius is aware of the fact that the Christian religion is criticized both by highly educated Roman elites and by the lower classes, as he states: “it is either an object of contempt to the learned because it has not suitable defenders, or is hated by the unlearned because of its natural severity” (eaque vel contemptui doctis est, quia idoneis assertoribus eget, vel odio indoctis, ob insitam sibi austeritatem).270 In the prologue to his voluminous treatise, Lactantius concedes that Christianity lacks appropriate “defenders”271 and, consequently, expresses his intention to compose an apology which in its form, content and style is adequate to the task. Although he is cognizant of the negative perception of Scripture and its interpreters,272 as well as of other early Christian texts, Lactantius clearly situates his Divine Institutes within the trajectory of apologetic literature,273 and aims to both correct and improve on the existing Christian apologetic tradition. Admittedly, Lactantius has carefully studied the works of his predecessors and has reflected on different aspects of these texts before committing himself to writing his systematic treatise. The apologist claims that he has analyzed various features of their writings, such as literary form, style, content, method of argumentation, and proof. For example, Lactantius criticizes Tertullian’s Apology as merely refuting charges raised against Christians, and thus as failing to lay out a positive system of Christian beliefs and practices.274 In addition, Lactantius finds Tertullian’s composition unpolished in its literary style and obscure in its meaning.275 The Divine Institutes is 269 Cf. Lactantius, Divine Institutes 1.1; 5.1; 5.4. 270 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 1. Preface. 271 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 1. Preface. 272 As a Christian apologist, Lactantius understands that as his opponents do not take ­seriously Christian scripture because of its poor style, so too they do not accept the explications of interpreters of the biblical texts, who are similarly seen as ignorant and ­unlearned. Cf. Divine Institutes 5.1. 273 Lactantius mentions the works of Minucius Felix, Septimuius Tertullian, Cyprian (Cf. ­Divine Institutes 5.1, 4) and Theophilus (Cf. Divine Institutes 1.23). 274 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.4. 275 Cf. Lactatntius, Divine Institutes 5.1. In addition, Lactantius makes a remark with regard to Minucius Felix’s Octavius that although the work has merits, it is insufficient in its length and detail (Cf. Divine Institutes 5.1). Likewise, Lactantius is critical of Cyprian’s apologetic discourse in which he refutes the allegations of Demetrianus on the basis of Christian scripture, in stead of on the basis of logical arguments, as he realizes that Cyprian’s opponent is not likely to accept arguments founded upon the testimony of Christian scripture that is regarded as “vain, fictitious and false” on the first place (Cf. Divine Institutes 5.4).

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t­ herefore a comprehensive and thought-out attempt on part of Lactantius to produce a culminating work of Christian apologetics in the Latin language that both follows in the tradition of his predecessors and complements those texts composed in the first three centuries of the common era.276 In contrast to earlier Christian apologists writing in Greek and in Latin, Lactantius states that the purpose of an apology is not simply to refute charges from outsiders, but also to provide necessary explanation and proper instruction for insiders. As a result, the content of the apologetic text is of paramount importance to him for both educational and polemical purposes.277 This is why he chooses a different genre for his work than other apologists in order that it might provide a comprehensive presentation of the Christian religion and include arguments that are supported by the textual evidence in ancient Greek and Latin literary sources, rather than merely relying on biblical references.278 Lactantius situates his treatise within the genre of “institutes” (institutiones),279 a type of work used in antiquity most often to set out the first

Nonetheless, Lactantius singles out Cyprian’s work as superior to his predecessors by virtue of his eloquent and persuasive style. Cf. Divine Institutes 5.1, 4. 276 While it seems appropriate that Lactantius identifies himself as someone belonging to the North African apologetic tradition, when he comments on the merits, as well as the problems, of his predecessors, Felix, Tertullian and Cyprian, it is surprising that he never mentions the work of Arnobius. Arnobius’ work, despite its inherent problems due to the author’s superficial knowledge of Christianity, bears a striking resemblance to Lactantius’ work in that it relies heavily on the literature of the opponents’ side, rather than on Christian scripture. Both Lactantius and Arnobius draw upon non-Christian sources in their defense of Christian beliefs and practices, as well as in launching an attack on the Roman religious system. In this aspect, the two works are very similar and would therefore suggest that some indirect influence has been effected by Arnobius’ treatise, if it had been known to Lactantius. The significant difference between the two apologists is that while Lactantius relies on Greco-Roman sources in order to provide a summary of the Christian religious system and explain it to his opponents in familiar terms, Arnobius proceeds to dismantle the Roman religious and philosophical system. While methodologically they remain similar, the two apologists strive to achieve different goals, as Lactantius is primarily occupied with the defense of Christianity and Arnobius with the offense of Roman religions. For the date of Arnobius’ work, see Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca: Religious Conflict and Competition in the Age of Diocletian (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 93. For further commentary on the lack of information in Lactantius’ Divine Institutes of Arnobius’ work, see Elizabeth D. Digeser, The Making of a Christian Empire: Lactantius and Rome (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 10. 277 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 1.1. 278 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.4. 279 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 1.1. On his use of non-Christian sources, see A. Goulon, “Les Citations des poètes latins dans l’oevre de Lactance” in Lactance et son temps: ­Recherches

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principles and foundations of a particular field, such as law, rhetoric or philosophy.280 He explains that for the purposes of his discussion of “religion and divine things” (de religione ... rebusque divinis)281 he considers the format and the content, as well as the style of the literary work to be of utmost importance. He suggests that his qualifications as a teacher of rhetoric allow him to undertake successfully the task of writing an appropriate apology: Therefore, because there have been wanting among us suitable and skillful teachers, who might vigorously and sharply refute public errors, and who might defend the whole cause of truth with elegance and copiousness, this very want incited some to venture to write against the truth, which was unknown to them.282 Ergo quia defuerunt apud nos idonei peritique doctores, qui vehementer, qui acriter errores publicos redarguerent, qui causam omnem veritatis ornate copioseque defenderent: provocavit quosdam haec ipsa penuria, ut auderent scribere contra ignotam sibi veritatem. As Lactantius sets out to correct, to instruct and to inform his opponents about the foundations of the Christian system of religious doctrines and practices, he deems it important for his apology to be in an elevated literary style283 because he considers the style of composition to be crucial for achieving successful persuasion: [F]or although the truth may be defended without eloquence, as it often has been defended by many, yet it needs to be explained, and in a measure discussed, with distinctness and elegance of speech, in order that it

actuelle, eds., J. Fontaine and M. Perrin (Paris: Beauchesne, 1978); M.-L. Guillaumin, “L’Exploitation des Oracles Sybillins par Lactance et par le ‘Discourse à l’assemblée des saints” in Lactance et son temps: Recherches actuelle, eds., J. Fontaine and M. Perrin (Paris: Beauchesne, 1978); Louis Swift, “Arnobius and Lactantius: Two Views of the Pagan Poets,” TAPhA 96 (1965): 439–448. 280 Cicero, De Natura Deorum 1.4.8; Seneca, De Benificiis. 2.20.2; Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria Pr. 4–5.25. For analysis of Lactantius’ genre of composition, see J.-C. Fredouille, “L’Apologétique chrétienne antique: Naissance d’un genre littéraire,” REAaug 38 (1992): 219–234. 281 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 1.1. 282 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.2. 283 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.4.

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may flow with greater power into the minds of men, being both provided with its own force and adorned with the brilliancy of speech.284 ... quae licet possit sine eloquentia defendi, ut est a multis saepe defensa; tamen claritate ac nitore sermonis illustranda, et quodammodo disserenda est, ut potentius in animos influat et vi sua instructa, et luce orationis ornata. As a teacher of rhetoric, Lactantius is concerned not only with the content of his treatise, but also with its methods of exposition and argumentation, and its style, all of which he considers to be integral aspects of a successful defense of the cause of Christianity. Lactantius addressees his work to the learned critics of Christianity in general and, more specifically, to two prominent and vocal critics of the period. The scholarly consensus is that one of these unnamed individuals here is the Neoplatonist Porphyry, who had a significant role in the state-sponsored persecutions during Diocletian’s rule in his capacity of an informant and advisor to the emperor.285 This first unnamed opponent is identified by the apologist as “the high priest of philosophy” (antistitem ... philosophiae)286 and described as someone who was not only well-known in the province of Bithynia, but also connected with official state authorities.287 Lactantius reports that this individual has produced three books against Christians. The Neoplatonist ­philosopher Porphyry targeted Christianity and composed several critical works during his lifetime. Lactantius explains the extent to which this critic tried to affect negatively the public opinion and the Roman authorities, when he states: This man, in truth, who overthrew his own arguments by his character, or censured his character by his arguments, a weighty censor and most keen accuser against himself, at the very same time in which a righteous people were impiously assailed, vomited forth three books against the Christian religion and name; professing, above all things, that it was the 284 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 1. Preface. 285 For arguments in support of this thesis, see H. Chadwick, The Sentences of Sextus (Cambridge, uk: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 141–143. See also R.L. Wilken, “Pagan Criticism of Christianity: Greek Religion and Christian Faith,” in Early Christian Literature and the Classical Intellectual Tradition, eds., W. Schoedel and R. Wilken, 117–134. Paris: Beauchesne, 1979), 130 ff. 286 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.2. 287 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.2.

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office of the philosopher to remedy the errors of men, and to recall them to the true way, that is to the worship of the gods...288 Hic vero, qui suas disputationes moribus destruebat, vel mores suos disputationibus arguebat, ipse adversus se gravis censor, et accusator acerrimus, eodem ipso tempore, quo justus populus nefarie lacerabatur, tres libros evomuit contra religionem nomenque christianum: professus ante omnia philosophi officium esse erroribus hominum subvenire, atque illos ad veram viam revocare; id es, ad cultus deorum ... Although Lactantius makes no direct reference to the three volumes by the anonymous philosopher, it can be safely assumed that Porphyry’s polemical writings inspire Lactantius’ apologetic treatise. Most likely, Lactantius’ apologetic work comes as a direct response to these antagonistic writings, especially because they were particularly damaging during the time of intensified state-wide persecutions initiated by emperor Diocletian.289 The only piece of ­specific information that Lactantius provides about his nameless pagan critic is the motive behind his polemical works, namely the purported obligation of the Bithynian philosopher to save the lives of Christians from destruction and his desire to guide them to embrace Roman religion.290 In addition to Porphyry, Lactantius mentions another opponent also located in Bithynia who possessed legal authority in his capacity of a judge and who had orchestrated persecutions against Christians.291 According to Lactantius, his second opponent, who is most probably the local official Hierocles,292 produced two books “not against the Christians, lest he might appear to assail 288 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.2. 289 For further discussion of Lactantius’ response to Porphyry’s arguments against Christian scripture and religion, see E. Digeser, The Making of a Christian Empire: Lactantius and Rome (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 7–18; Mark Edwards, “The Flowering of Latin Apologetic: Lactantius and Arnobius,” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire, eds., Mark Edwards, Martin Goodman and Simon Price (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 198–201. 290 On Porphyry’s program of incorporation of the Christian god into the Roman pantheon, see Digeser’s commentary in connection with philosophical monotheism and Neoplatonism. Cf. E. Digeser, The Making of a Christian Empire: Lactantius and Rome (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 6–7, 64–90. 291 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.2. 292 Eusebius, who also responds to Hierocles’ criticism of Christianity, explains in greater detail his arguments in his polemical treatise Against Hierocles. See Micheal Frede, “­Eusebius’ Apologetic Writings,” in Apologetics in the Roman Empire, eds., Mark Edwards, ­Martin Goodman and Simon Price (Oxford: Oxford University, 1999), 231–240.

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them in a hostile manner, but to the Christians, that he might be thought to consult for them with humanity and kindness” (composuit enim libellos duos, non contra Christianos, ne inimice insectari videretur, sed ad Christianos, ut humane ac benigne consulere putaretur).293 The apologist specifies the attempt of this state representative not only to demonstrate the contradictions inherent in Christian scripture but also to ascribe inconsistencies to the uneducated followers of Jesus.294 Lactantius indicates that one of Hierocles’ main objectives against the Bible is the fact that it had not been written by educated and literate persons, who would normally hold more credibility. He makes the following comments in reference to this adversary of the Christian faith: For he [Hierocles] says that some of them [disciples of Jesus] made gain by the craft of fisherman, as though he took it ill that some Aristophanes or Aristarchus did not devise the subject.295 nam quosdam eorum piscatorio artificio fecisse quaestum: quasi aegere ­ferret, quod illam rem non Aristophanes aliquis aut Aristarchus commentatus sit. According to Lactantius, Hierocles refers to the apostles as menial laborors who earned their living by being “fisherman,”296 a manual profession that is generally looked down upon by someone with a high social position. Despite these criticisms, Lactantius does not deny the lack of formal training of Jesus’ disciples and, instead, uses this allegation to argue for the reliability of Scripture. The apologist contends that, as a result of their low level of education, the authors of the New Testament lacked the “desire of inventing” (fingendi voluntas) and therefore reported correctly occurrences without any falsification.297 Furthermore, Lactantius turns the allegation that the authors of the biblical texts were not learned against his adversary, when he claims that philosophers disagree with one another due to their capacity to fabricate and to invent.298 In opposition to Hierocles’ assertion of disagreements in the biblical texts, Lactantius claims that Christian Scripture is both true and consistent.299 293 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.2. 294 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.2. 295 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.2. 296 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.2. 297 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.3. 298 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.3. 299 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.3.

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Hierocles’ allegation that the earliest followers of Jesus Christ and the authors of the New Testament were unlearned is indicative of the prevailing perception of Christians as belonging to the lowest strata of Roman society. Additionally, Hierocles accuses Jesus and his followers in Judea of committing crimes, when he claims that Jesus had gathered “a band of nine hundred men” who allegedly committed robberies and crimes and that, as a consequence, he was put to trial and condemned to death.300 In this way, Hierocles identifies the founder of the illegitimate and marginal religious movement as a criminal, who organized a dangerous faction and posed a significant threat for the social order. In addition to characterizing the founder of Christianity as a person outside the law, Hierocles also describes Jesus as a magician due to the miracles that he had performed.301 The identification of Jesus with magicians is significant in so far as the practitioners of magic, similar to criminals, were regarded with suspicion in the ancient world.302 By indicating that the founder of the Christian religion and his followers endangered the status quo and, as a result, were put to trial and persecuted, Hierocles seems to insinuate an analogy to the contemporary situation in Bithynia, where Christians are similarly singled out and convicted by the Roman officials.303 From the negative descriptions of the authors of Scripture, of Jesus himself and of his earliest followers, it becomes clear that Christians were perceived as having inferior education and low social class, as well as posing potential dangers to the political order. It is precisely in this context that Lactantius chooses to respond to the numerous allegations against Christians and to counteract the charges that individuals like Hierocles and Porphyry, as well as other critics, leveled against the early Christian community.304 Lactantius: The Charge of Barbarism and Early Christian Rhetoric Unlike his predecessors Tertullian and Arnobius, Lactantius does not indicate explicitly in his apologetic and polemic works that Christians were described by outsiders as being “barbarian.” Lactantius does not mention this barbarizing characterization in his discussion of Porphyry’s and Hierocles’ critiques of Christianity. Nonetheless, the apologist does include Hierocles’ profile of 300 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.3. 301 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.3. 302 On charges of magic in the Roman empire, see Ramsay MacMullen, Enemies of the Roman Order (Eugene, or: Wipf and Stock, 2001; Reprint), 95–127. 303 W.H.C. Frend, Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965), 477 ff. 304 On the date of composition of Lactantius’ work, see Elizabeth Digeser, “Lactantius and Constantine’s Letter to Arles: Dating the Divine Institutes” jecs 2 (1994): 33–52.

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the Christian movement as comprising a lower-class and marginal group in Roman society, and of the founder of Christianity as a practitioner of magic; the latter charge is commonly associated in the ancient Roman sources with foreign practices and, therefore, it does indicate the presence of barbarizing tropes.305 Despite the lack of a specific citation in Lactantius’ works indicating that Christians were indeed identified as being barbarian, the significance of the concept of barbarism in Lactantius’ apologetic writings suggests that such a designation is operative in the background.306 The absence can be attributed to the particular style and nature of the Divine Institutes, which is less polemical than earlier apologetic works and, as such, does not rely as extensively on actual quotations from and specific references to the apologist’s opponents.307 Lactantius’ express purpose in the Divine Institutes is to summarize Christian doctrine and, as a result, he avoids hostile argumentation and open antagonism in favor of a more conciliatory tone towards critics of Christianity. Nonetheless, Lactatntius employs the trope of barbarism in criticizing ­Roman ­institutions and traditions, suggesting that such a charge was also brought against contemporary Christians.308 In addition to his primary occupation with the presentation of the Christian religious system, Lactantius also attacks the existing religious and cultural institutions and employs the notion of the barbarian in order to dismantle the foundations of existing Roman political, religious, and social edifice. Lactantius: Roman Religions and the Charge of Barbarism The concept of barbarism is operative throughout Lactantius’ critique of Roman religion in his Divine Institutes. In this treatise, the apologist argues that 305 Cf. Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.2. The fact that Arnobius mentions the charge in several different contexts (see previous section), in addition to the two apologists being contemporaries, who respond to the events in North Africa at the beginning of the fourth century, makes such an assumption plausible. This assumption is further strengthened by the fact that the two respond to the critique of Porphyry and design their apologetic works in such a way as to address some of the same allegations against Christians. 306 The notion of the “barbarian” is particularly prominent in his polemic treatise On the Manner in Which the Persecutors Died, in which Lactantius addresses the aftermath of the state persecutions of Christians. For an explication of this polemical text, see section below in this chapter. 307 This apologetic text stands in stark contast to Tertullian’s extensive quotations from his opponents in his rebuttal of charges against Christians. For further commentary, see the first part of this chapter focusing on Tertullian’s rhetoric and response to the charge of barbarism. 308 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 1.15 ff.

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the Roman people are comparable to other nations, claiming that they not only possess qualities normally associated with barbarians, but that they often surpass barbarians in exhibiting these characteristics. In reference to Roman religion in particular, Lactantius explains its genesis with the traditional veneration of dead ancestors and especially of deceased rulers.309 Lactantius compares this practice to that of various ethnic groups, like the Moors, the Egyptians, the Macedonians and others, and notes that, while the latter tend to deify their kings, the Romans worship their emperors.310 Furthermore, in connection with the origin of the Roman deities and the practice of deification of the emperors, the apologist alludes to the profoundly political nature of the prevalent religious system in the Roman Empire.311 Lactantius emphasizes this important connection between the religious and the political spheres not only to undermine the ideological underpinnings of existing Roman religious traditions, by pointing to the human aspect of the Roman pantheon, but also to demonstrate the vested interest of the elites in propagating and promoting this public system of worship.312 It is noteworthy that the apologist criticizes 309 Lactantius points to two major motives in the generation of gods, namely the desire on part of the Roman populace to confer honor to a deceased person of prominent position and the desire of the successors of the deceased to obtain divine heritage. He also indicates that there is a deliberate political act to support religious establishments and it stems from the vested interest of a specific group of privileged individuals in order to maintain its power in society. Cf. Divine Institutes 1.15. 310 Lactantius refers to a number of barbarian peoples in Divine Institutes 1.15. 311 In Divine Institutes 1.15, Lactantius points to the political orchestration of different religious practices and comments on the fact that it is “by decrees [that] religious honors began to be paid” to the emperors. 312 In her analysis of Lactantius’ treatment of Roman religions, E. Digeser points to the poignant critique of Diocletian’s innovative religious program by the association of Roman gods Jupiter and Hercules. Cf. The Making of a Christian Empire: Lactantius and Rome (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 20–28. For more information on this subject, see also Fergus Millar, “The Imperial Cult and the Persecutions,” in Le Culte des souverains dans l’Empire Romain: Sept exposés suivis de discussions, ed., Willem den Boer (Vandouvres-­Geneva: Francke, 1973), 162–164; Alan Wardman, Religion and Statecraft among the Romans (Baltimore: John Hopkins University, 1982); James Rives, Religion and Authority in Roman Carthage from Augustus to Constantine (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995) 253; Ramsay MacMullen, Christianizing the Roman Empire (a.d. 100–400) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 32–38, 135–136; Stephen Williams, Diocletian and the Roman Recovery (London: bt Batsford, 1985), 34–70; William Seston, Dioclétien et la tétrarchie (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1946), 54–62, 185–190, 213–221; S.R.F. Price, Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Duncan Fishwick, The Imperial Cult in the Latin West: Studies in the Ruler Cult of the Western Provinces of the Roman Empire (Leiden: Brill, 1987–92).

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the foundation of the existing Roman religious establishment, when he points to the problematic character of some of the deified emperors. For example, Lactantius protests the veneration of Julius Caesar and others who are equally guilty of murder. He explains: Among the Romans, Julius was made a god because it pleased a guilty man, Anthony; Quirinus was made a god, because it seemed good to the shepherds, though one of them was a murderer, the other the destroyer of his country. But if Anthony had not been a consul, in return for his services toward the state Caius Caesar would have been without the honor even of a dead man, and that too by the advice of his father-in-law Piso, and his relative Lucius Caesar, who opposed the celebration of the funeral, and by the advice of Dobella the consul, who overthrew the column in the forum, that is, his monuments, and purified the forum.313 Apud Romanos deus Julius, quia hoc scelerato homini placuit Antonio; deus Quirinus, quia hoc pastoribus visum est: cum alter gemini fratris extiterit, alter patriae parricida. Quod si consul non fuisset Antonius, C. Caesar pro suis in rempublicam meritis etiam defuncti homnis honore caruisset, et ­quidem consilio Pisonis soceri, et L. Caesaris propinqui, qui vetabant funus ­fieri, et Dolabellae consulis, qui columnam in foro, id est, tumulum ejus ­everit, ac forum expiavit. According to the ancient sources, Julius Caesar was not addressed during his lifetime as a god, and in fact it was Diocletian, who was the first Roman ruler to demand to be addressed as “god” (deus) and to allow others to worship him as such during his reign as an emperor (augustus).314 The precedent that Domitian set by allowing himself to be addressed during his lifetime as “lord and god” (dominus et deus),315 broke with the practice of earlier rulers, like Julius Caesar who, even though he had been previously deified by the Senate on the request of Mark Anthony, did not overstep the boundary between human and divine. Lactantius’ critique is pointed both at the traditional emperor cult that has been in place for several centuries and at the religio-political innovations that Diocletian inaugurates. In addition to identifying the origin of both foreign and Roman deities with the veneration of deceased rulers, Lactantius also refers to the importance of maintaining the established political systems. 313 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 1.15. 314 Sextus Aurelius Victor, De Caesaribus 39. 315 Suetonius, Domitian 13.

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At  the end of the third and beginning of the fourth century in the Roman Empire, the political and religious reforms of Diocletian are indeed very closely connected with the division of power in the Roman Tetrarchy being mirrored by a new political theology: Jupiter is proclaimed to be Diocletian’s divine ­father and Hercules, Jupiter’s son by the mortal woman Alcmene, to be ­Maximian’s divine father, indicating his subordinate position in the tetrarchy. As each Augustus adopted a Caesar, i.e. Maximian adopted Constantius and ­Diocletian adopted Galerius, they too joined the two divine houses and became respectively Herculian and Jovian. After Diocletian and Maximian decided to retire in 305, Constantius and Galerius were promoted to become Augusti and adopted in turn Severus and Maximian Daia as their respective subordinate Caesars.316 In his critique of the Diocletianic religio-political ideology, Lactantius connects the prevalent Roman religious practices with both the political arena and the military interests of the state. Furthermore, in this veiled critique of contemporary political realities, Lactantius alludes to the dubious circumstances surrounding Diocletian’s rise to power. Emperor Diocletian, who latinized his original name Diocles only after he assumed power, was born in Illyria and rose to prominence through a successful military career. Diocles had served as a commander of the household guard (domestici) of the emperor Carus, who was initially succeeded by his sons Numerian and Carinus following his death in 283. However, it was under suspicious circumstances that after Numerian died, Diocles was chosen by a group of officers as his successor, while Carinus was assassinated a year later. Lactantius suggests that Diocletian assumed the title of Roman emperor through a skillful manipulation of army factions.317 Furthermore, in identifying specific qualities of the rulers that are worshipped by the Romans, the apologist emphasizes the importance of military conquest and victory. He writes: What is the case of our countrymen? Are they wiser? For they despise the valor in an athlete, because it produces no injury; but in the case of a king, because it occasions widely spread disasters, they so admire it as to 316 For analysis of the Roman Tetrarchy, see J. Rufus Fears, “The Cult of Jupiter and Roman Imperial Ideology” anrw 2.17.1 (1981), 115–119; T.D. Barnes, The New Empire of Diocletian and Constantine (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 49–56, 160–162; A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire (London: Blackwell, 1964), 40; J.H.W.G. Liebeschuetz, “Religion in the Panegyrici Latini” in From Diocletian to the Arab Conquest: Change in the Later Roman Empire, ed., J.H.W.G. Liebeschuetz (Northampton, Mass.: Aldershot, 1990), 391–394; Stephen Williams, Diocletian and the Roman Recovery (London: bt Batsford, 1985), 59–69. 317 See A.H.M. Jones, The Later Roman Empire (London: Blackwell, 1964), i. 16 ff.

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imagine that brave and warlike generals are admitted into the assembly of the gods, and that there is no other way to immortality than to lead armies, to lay waste the territory of others, to destroy cities, to overthrow towns, to put to death or enslave free peoples. Truly the greater number of men they have cast down, plundered, and slain, so much the more noble and distinguished do they think themselves; and ensnared by the show of empty glory, they give to their crimes the name of virtue.318 Quid nostri, num sapientiores? qui athleticam quidem virtutem contemnunt, quia nihil obest: sed regiam, quia late solet nocere, sic admirantur, ut fortes et bellicosos duces in deorum coetu locari arbitrentur; nec esse ullam aliam ad immortalitem viam, quam exercitus ducere, aliena vestare, urbes delere, oppida excidere, liberos populos aut trucidare, aut subjicere servituti: videlicet quo plures homines afflixerint, spoliaverint, occiderint, eo se nobiliores, et clariores putant, et inanis gloriae specie capti, sceleribus suis nomen virtutis imponunt. Lactantius highlights the uniquely Roman religious tradition of emperor worship and underscores the importance of military institutions for both the ­political and the religious arenas of his contemporary society. Accordingly, what characterizes the Roman practice of deification is not celebrating the excellence, valor or virtue of exceptional individuals, as he claims is the actual practice of barbarian nations,319 but rather the willingness to shed blood and to inflict suffering in order to accrue political power and military success. Lactantius points to the inherent contradiction between acts of violence ­being celebrated in Roman religious life and the reality that such extreme actions would ordinarily threaten the social fabric. The apologist confronts his opponents with this paradox embedded in the Roman religious establishment, posing the following questions: “If immortality can be obtained in no other way than by bloodshed, what will be the result if all shall agree to live in harmony?... Shall no one, then, be worthy of heaven?” (Si aliter immortalitas parari non potest, nisi per sanguinem, quid fiet, si omnes in concordiam consenserint? ... Num igitur nemo erit coelo dignus?).320 In highlighting this intrinsic paradox, Lactantius emphasizes the aggression and brutality that mark the Roman religious system, in an attempt to differentiate it from its barbarian analogues. According to Lactatntius, other nations have more humane understandings of 318 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 1.18. 319 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 1.15. 320 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 1.18.

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deification than do the Romans, who believe that the divine sphere can be ­accessed through acts of destruction and devastation of both animal and human life. Lactantius also criticizes other aspects of popular Roman religious traditions, such as offering sacrifices and participating in mysteries, and contrasts them to their foreign counterparts. For instance, the apologist refers to the practice of human sacrifice by the inhabitants of Cyprus, Taurus, and Gaul as examples of barbarism and savagery.321 While he expresses no surprise at the existence of human sacrifice among various barbarian groups, Lactantius notes the contradiction inherent in the fact that the Roman people practiced the same. Lactantius identifies the Roman emperor Hadrian as introducing the practice of human sacrifice to Jupiter.322 While the apologist finds the practice of human sacrifice objectionable both in the case of barbarians and Romans, he considers that the former alone can be excused on the basis of their ignorance, as well as the nature of their religious practices. When comparing Romans and barbarian nations vis à vis the practice of human sacrifice specifically, he explains: But this is not so much a matter of surprise with respect to barbarians, whose religion agrees with their character. But are not our countrymen, who have always claimed for themselves the glory of gentleness and civilization, found to be more inhuman by these sacrilegious rites? For these ought rather to be considered impious, who, though they are embellished with the pursuit of liberal training, turn aside from such refinement, than those, who, being ignorant and inexperienced, glide into evil practices from their ignorance of those which are good.323 Sed de Barbaris non est adeo mirandum, quorum religio cum moribus congruit. Nostri vero, qui semper mansuetudinis et humanitatis gloriam sibi vindicarunt, nonne sacrilegis hic sacris immaniores reperiuntur? Hi enim potius scelerati sunt habendi, qui, cum sint liberalium disciplinarum studiis expoliti, ab humanitate desciscunt, quam qui rudes et imperiti ad mala facinora bonorum ignoratione labuntur. Not only does the apologist partially excuse the practice of human sacrifice among different foreign groups due to their lack of education and civilization, 321 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 1.21. 322 Cf. Lactantius, Divine Institutes 1.21. 323 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 1.21.

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but he also describes the ancient Latin custom of sacrificing infants to Saturn as barbarous and cruel. Lactantius points to the fact that unlike the barbarians’ practice of offering strangers as victims for sacrifice, the Roman ancestors gave up their own children, as well as occasionally offering Vestal Virgins.324 This fact makes the act of human sacrifice among Romans more abominable than that of other nations, who seem to exhibit more compassion for their own. Lactantius describes this particular religious practice in terms of the concept of the “barbarian” when he writes the following in reference to the Roman people: For I cannot find language to speak of the infants who were immolated to the same Saturn, on account of his hatred of Jupiter. To think that men were so barbarous, so savage, that they gave the name of sacrifice to the slaughter of their own children, that is, to a deed so foul, and to be held in detestation by the human race; since without any regard to parental affection, they destroyed tender and innocent lives, at an age which is especially pleasing to parents, and surpassed in brutality the savageness of beasts, which – savage as they are – still love their offspring! O incurable madness!325 Nam de infantibus, qui eidem Saturno immolabantur propter odium Jovis quid dicam, non invenio; tam barbaros, tam immanes fuisse homines, ut parricidium suum, id est tetrum atque execrabile humano generi facinus, sacrificium vocarent: cum teneras atque innocentes animas, quae maxime est aetas parentibus dulcior, sine ullo respectu pietatis extinguerent, immanitatemque omnium bestiarum, quae tamen foetus suos amant, feritate superarent! O dementiam insanabilem! While Lactantius describes the people of Tauris as “a fierce and inhuman nation” (inhumanam et feram gentem)326 because of their practice of sacrificing strangers to Diana, he characterizes the sacrifice of infants by the Latins not only as barbarous but also as bestial and cruel behavior. He views this ancient practice as inhumane and as equivalent to the actions of savage animals. Furthermore, Lactantius criticizes the Roman people and their Latin ancestors because of the crimes committed by them as pious acts, as well as other religious rites that entail the shedding of human blood, including the self-mutilation of 324 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 1.21. 325 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 1.21. 326 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 1.21.

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individuals.327 In this way, Lactantius depicts Roman gods and religious practices as not only comparable to those of barbarian nations but also as even more violent and counternormative. It is precisely through the ancient concept of the “barbarian” that he attacks Roman religion in general and emperor deification in particular, as they are firmly embedded in the existing political and military system. This is especially true during the reign of Diocletian, which saw the establishment of a new political and religious regime in the guise of the Roman Tetrarchy, later leading to the reign of both Constantius and his successor Constantine. Lactantius: The Roman Justice System and the Charge of Barbarism Along with criticizing Rome’s ancestral traditions and religious establishment, Lactantius links two important aspects of Roman society: its religious structures and its judicial system, especially as they relate to the position of Christians in the early fourth century.328 The apologist invokes familiar Roman stories and ideologemes, such as the positing of a prior “golden age” during Saturnus’ reign, and understands the current state of Roman society as resulting from the dissolution of the earlier idyllic period.329 More specifically, Lactantius describes the emblematic golden age during the rule of Saturnus as a period marked by the existence of monotheism, justice, order and peace: And this is not to be regarded as a poetic fiction, but as the truth. For, while Saturnus reigned, the religious worship of the gods not having yet been instituted, nor any race being yet set apart in the belief of its divinity, God was manifestly worshipped. And therefore there were neither dissensions, nor enmities, nor wars.330 Quod quidem non pro poetica fictione, sed pro vero habendum est. Saturno enim regnante, nondum deorum cultibus institutis, nec adhuc ulla gente ad divinitatis opinionem consecrata, Deus utique colebatur. Et ideo non erant neque dissentiones, neque inimicitiae, neque bella. According to Lactantius, the cessation of this initial idyllic stage in the history of humanity is marked by the banishment of Saturnus from heaven and his arrival in Latium. The act of exile caused by Saturnus’ son, Jupiter, inaugurates 327 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 1.21. 328 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.5 ff. 329 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.5. 330 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.5.

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a new era characterized by the end of monotheistism, the division of humankind, and the creation of social injustices. Lactantius describes this abrupt change in the following manner: For the worship of God being taken away, men lost the knowledge of good and evil. Thus the common intercourse of life perished from among men, and the bond of human society was destroyed. Then they began to contend with one another, and to plot, and to acquire for themselves glory from the shedding of human blood.331 Sublata enim Dei religione, boni quoque ac mali scientiam perdiderunt. Sic hominibus intercidit communitas vitae, et diremptum est foedus societatis humanae. Tum inter se manus conserere coeperunt, et insidiari, et gloriam sibi ex humano sanguine comparare. According to Lactantius, the decline from this originally monotheistic system and just society leads to the proliferation of a multiplicity of gods and to the rise of social evils. In addition to the overturn of the worship of Saturnus, the end of the golden age leads to the “overthrow and removal of justice”332 and the creation of “unequal and unjust laws,” as well as to tyrannical rule, military conflict, enslavement of peoples, and plunder of property.333 As Lactantius builds his defense of Christianity’s legitimacy, societal treatment and judicial procedure, it is not surprising that he evaluates contemporary religious practices and the judicial system together. It is important to note that Diocletian’s rule is marked not only by thoroughgoing changes in the political and religious spheres, but also in the arena of Roman law. Although in 212 Caracalla de jure extended Roman citizenship and thus legal jurisdiction to all the inhabitants of the state, making obsolete peregrinite law, Diocletian attempts to impose state-wide religious unity and de facto enforce legal uniformity. For instance, in order to exterminate the continued application of peregrinite law, Diocletian introduces two new codifications of imperial rescripts, namely the Codex Gregorianus in 291–92 and Codex Hermogenianus in 295, as well as direct legislation, like the law of May 295 on the standardization of Roman marriage and annulment of all other forms of marriage. The effective universalization of Roman law, which only begins with Caracalla’s edict issued in 212, has important implications for Christians and for the universalization of Roman religion 331 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.5. 332 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.5. 333 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.6.

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more broadly, which itself is closely associated with Roman citizenship and law. The legal measures taken against Christians during the reign of Diocletian include the following: the loss of civil rights; the surrender of scripture and church buildings in February of 303; the arrest of clergy in the summer of 303; the possibility for obtaining freedom only if offering sacrifice before November of 303; and the requirement of offering sacrifice in 304. These edicts issued by the emperor indicate that Christians were effectively stripped of their Roman citizenship, as Roman law and religion constitute important aspects of Romanitas.334 Nonetheless, it should be mentioned that, in spite of his criticism of contemporary Roman judicial, political and religious systems, Lactantius tries to underscore the common threads between Christianity and the Roman religion, by highlighting similarities between them and suggesting the existence of a universal god. By connecting Christianity to the Roman notion of a past golden age, Lactantius implicitly indicates its potential benefit to society and ability to represent Roman ideals. This two-pronged strategy indirectly succeeds at drawing similarities and continuities, as well as distinctions and discontinuities between traditional Roman religion and Christianity.335 Furthermore, Lactantius analyzes the Roman system of justice, which he claims originates from religion and is based on the principle of “equity” (aequitas) and, in spite of the existence of laws, he asserts that Roman society lacks justice.336 He contrasts Christians, on the one hand, who purportedly practice equity without any regard for social distinctions, like that between rich and poor, or between slave and free, and Romans, on the other, who allegedly ignore equity in their attempt to accumulate riches and honors at the expense of others.337 Lactantius distinguishes the Christian community, which exhibits not only justice but also ethical virtues, like care for the orphan, the stranger, 334 For further discussion, see Fritz Schultz, Principles of Roman Law, trans., Marguerite Wolf (Oxford: Clarendon, 1936), 135; Id., History of Roman Legal Science (Oxford: Clarendon, 1946), 287. See also Stephen Williams, Diocletian and the Roman Recovery (London: bt Batsford, 1985), 142–145; Simon Corcoran, The Empire of the Tetrarchs: Imperial Pronouncement and Government, a.d. 284–342 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), 40–42; Tony Honoré, Emperors and Lawyers (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994), 180–184. For the religious aspects of Diocletian’s reform of Roman law, see James Rives, Religion and Authority in Roman Carthage from Augustus to Constantie (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 256–257; Elizabeth Digeser, The Making of a Christian Empire: Lactantius and Rome (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 46–55. 335 See Elizabeth Digeser, The Making of a Christian Empire: Lactantius and Rome (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 56–63. 336 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.15. 337 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.16.

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and the needy, from contemporary Roman society that, according to him, is founded upon unjust and cruel acts. For Lactantius, the Roman people “are to be accounted as savage beasts who injure man; who, in opposition to every law and right of human nature, plunder, torture, slay and banish.”338 The apologist asserts that Roman justice is in fact based on utility, rather than on equity, and it justifies the Roman state’s predation upon other nations.339 Moreover, he specifies that the interest of the Roman Empire necessitates the breach of justice and of the common human bond, as it requires aggression towards other civic and ethnic groups.340 As he explains that the very existence and success of the Roman state hinge upon continued warfare for the sake of acquiring money, land and riches, Lactantius claims that the two concepts of Romanitas and humanitas are therefore rendered mutually exclusive.341 He castigates the whole of the Roman societal order representing a self-serving and annihilating force not only towards Christians per se, but also towards the rest of the humankind. The apologist asribes the qualities of injustice and inhumanity not only to the specific adversaries and persecutors that are addressed in the Divine Institutes, namely Porphyry and Hierocles, but also to Roman society as a whole. In connection with Roman attitudes toward other ethnic groups, Lactantius draws a parallel between Christians and barbarians because of the brutal treatment of both by the Roman authorities. Lactantius emphasizes the extreme cruelty of the Roman officials in persecuting Christians and compares their treatment to that of barbarian peoples. In his account of the persecution of Christians in the province of Bithynia, he points to the methods of torture and punishment applied to Christians and describes the Roman “victory” over Christians as a military triumph over a “barbarian” nation. He explains: And thus, in devising modes of punishment, they think of nothing else besides victory. For they know that this is a contest and a battle. I saw in Bithynia the prefect wonderfully elated with joy, as though he had subdued some nation of barbarians...342 Itaque in excogitandis poenarum generibus, nihil aliud quam victoriam cogitant. Sciunt enim certamen esse illud, et pugnam. Vidi ego in ­Bythynia 338 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 6.10. 339 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.17. 340 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 6.6. 341 Cf. Lactantius, Divine Institutes 6.10–11. 342 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.11.

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praesidem gaudio mirabiliter elatum, tamquam barbarorum gentem aliquam subegisset... Christians in Bithynia are regarded just like barbarians and their mistreatment by the Roman authorities is identified by Lactantius as exemplifying extreme cruelty. When Lactantius identifies the individual who persecutes Christians, he describes the Roman official as having “nothing belonging to man except the features and the eminent figure” (nihil, nisi lineamenta et summam figuram gerunt).343 When the apologist voices his objection to the savage methods of punishment of his co-religionists, he compares the acts of the persecutors to those of “beasts” (bestiae)344 and he even claims that they are “more cruel than [beasts]” (ipsi saeviores).345 As Lactantius identifies the attitude of the Roman officials toward Christians as analogous to their attitude towards barbarian nations, so too he chooses to describe their persecutors in barbarizing terms. In explicating the acts of gratuitous violence against Christians, Lactantius compares the behavior of the official Roman persecutors to that of beasts in foreign lands, asking: “For what Caucasus, what India, what Hyrcania ever nourished beasts so savage and so bloodthirsty?” (Nam quis Caucasus, quae India, quae Hircania tam immanes, tam sanguinarias unquam bestias aliut?).346 Lactantius attempts to demonstrate how both concepts, Romanitas and barbaria, are constructed on a rhetorical and ideological basis. The post-colonial critic Edward Said makes a parallel formulation of the idea of the “Oriental” as the antipode of “Europe,” observing that the inhabitants of the East are never seen as citizens but rather as “problems” which have “to be solved, or confined ... or taken over.”347 Said also observes that the concept of the Oriental, which is analogous to the barbarian other in antiquity, is associated both with Arabs and with native “elements in Western society (delinquents, the insane, women, the poor) having in common an identity best described as lamentably alien.”348 In addition to identifying the acts of the persecutors with animal brutality, the early Christian apologist compares their actions to those of “barbarians” in so far as they use force and torture, rather than reason, as a means of persuasion. 343 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.11. 344 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.11. 345 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.11. 346 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.11. 347 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient (New York: Random House, 1994; Reprint), 207. 348 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient (New York: Random House, 1994; Reprint), 207.

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Lactantius’ deployment of the notion of the barbarian in his polemic writings aims to subvert the polarity of the ancient concepts of Romanitas and barbaria instead of reifying the two as binary opposites. He writes: Is there, then a bad mind in those who, against every law of humanity, against every principle of justice, are tortured, or rather, in those who inflict on the bodies of the innocent such things, as neither the most cruel robbers, nor the most enraged enemies, nor the most savage barbarians have ever practiced?349 In iisne mala mens est, qui contra jus humanitatis, contra fas omne lacerantur? an potius in iis qui ea faciunt in corporibus innocentum, quae nec ­saevissimi latrones, nec iratissimi hostes, nec immanissimi barbari ­aliquando fecerunt? Lactantius identifies the aggressiveness and the cruelty of the Roman state officials and persecutors not only in terms of the animalistic, the savage and the beastly,350 but also in terms of the irrational and the “barbarian,” as these various connotations of this concept are interconnected. The fact that Lactatnius is accusing his Roman adversaries of barbarism on several counts most likely indicates the use of this same accusation against Christians themselves, as is also attested by other early Christian apologists, like Arnobius, who also addresses Porphyry and responds specificially to his charge of barbarism. Nonetheless, the polemical thrust of Lactatnius’ writings is even more pronounced in his later work De Mortibus Persecutorum, to which we turn next. Lactantius: The Roman Emperors and the Charge of Barbarism In his treatise De Mortibus Persecutorum (On the Manner in Which the Persecutors Died), Lactantius elaborates in much greater detail than he does in his Divine Institutes on the actions of the persecutors and, in his polemic against them, he resorts to the accusation of barbarism. In this highly charged text, the apologist focuses on the imperial court and the main personages that are connected with the official persecutions of Christians in the period from the reign of Nero in the mid-first century to Constantine, who issued the Edict of Milan in the beginning of the fourth century and formally acknowledged 349 Lactantius, Divine Institutes 5.20. 350 See also Lactantius’ cursory remark in reference to the divine revenge of the persecutors, whom he characterizes in stark terms as “evil monsters” (bestias malas) and as “ravenous and voracious wolves.” Cf. Divine Institutes 5.24.

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religious freedom for all the citizens of the empire.351 Lactantius emphasizes that the Roman emperors were in fact the main instigators of the persecutions of Christians and he castigates them as being barbaric and cruel. For example, Lactantius asserts about Maximian (Galerius) that by virtue of his origin and his nature, this co-emperor of Diocletian encapsulates the essence of “barbarism.” Lactantius elaborates in detail this claim by stating that Galerius was not a true Roman, as follows: In this wild beast there dwelt a native barbarity and a savageness foreign to Roman blood, and no wonder, for his mother was born beyond the Danube, and it was an inroad of the Capri that obliged her to cross over and take refuge in New Dacia. The form of Galerius corresponded to his manners. Of stature tall, full of flesh, and swollen to a horrible bulk of corpulency; by his speech, gestures, and looks, he made himself a terror to all that came near him.352 Inerat huic bestiae naturalis barbaries, efferitas a Romano sanguine aliena; non mirum, cum mater eius Transdanuviana infestantibus Carpis in ­Daciam novam transiecto amne confugerat. Erat etiam corpus moribus congruens, status celsus, caro ingens et in horrendam magnitudinem diffusa et inflata. Denique et verbis et actibus et aspectu terrori omnibus et formidini fuit. Lactantius identifies not only Galerius’ biological descent, but also his physical features and his character as being “barbarian.” Despite the fact that he is chosen as Diocletian’s son-in-law and co-ruler, Galerius is portrayed as antithetical to Roman identity and culture primarily due to his foreign-born mother.353 Moreover, the apologist asserts that Galerius initiated persecutions against Christians because of his mother’s extreme religiosity and strong influence on him.354 While Galerius is described as savage and beast-like on ­account of his 351 For more information on this period, see Fergus Millar, The Emperor in the Roman World (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977); Clifford Ando, Imperial Ideology and Provincial Loyalty in the Roman Empire. Classics and Contemporary Thought 6 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). 352 Lactantius, De Mortibus Persecutorum 9. 353 For further information on the foreign origins of some of the Roman emperors in late antiquity, see Ramsay MacMullen, Enemies of the Roman Order (Eugene, or: Wipf and Stock, 2001; Reprint), 192–241. 354 Lactantius, De Mortibus Persecutorum 11.

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foreign origin and barbarous nature, his mother is represented as “exceedingly superstitious” (admodum superstitiosa).355 The radical religiosity and irrational emotionality exemplified by Galerius’ mother, on the one hand, and the excessive brutality embodied by Galerius, on the other, represent two opposite meanings of the Roman concept of the “barbarian.”356 In Lactantius’ poletimcal treatise, these two aspects of the notion of the barbarian inform his description of the main initiators of the official persecutions of Christians in imperial Rome. Furthermore, Lactantius criticizes Galerius for his barbarous behavior vis à vis the population of the empire as a whole and Christians in particular. The apologist elaborates on Galerius’ anti-Roman attitude by describing his treatment of the people as “slaves” in the manner of the Persian rulers357 and attributes his mistreatment of Roman citizens to his military experience in Persia. According to Lactantius, Galerius assumed the attitude of Persian rulers toward their population and attempted to “establish it in the Roman dominions” by importing foreign practices and purposefully barbarizing Roman territories.358 Lactantius highlights both the ethnic origin and the dominant personality of Galerius in order to shed light on his attitude towards Christians, as well as all the rest of the Roman populace. Similarly, when Lactantius expounds on Galerius’ military incursions into Rome, the apologist ridicules his foreign origin by explaining that the emperor brought an insufficient army due to his lack of familiarity with the city of Rome. Lactantius comments on the paradox that one of the official rulers of the Roman state appears to be unfamiliar with the capital city of the empire, when he writes: Probably, having never seen Rome, he imagined it to be little superior in size to those cities with which he was acquainted.359 Quippe qui numquam viderat Romam aestimaretque illam non multo esse maiorem quam quas noverat civitates. 355 Lactantius, De Mortibus Persecutorum 11. 356 For the two opposite poles of the Roman notion of the “barbarian,” one associated with femininity, irrationality and superstition and the other associated with virility, aggressiveness and brutality, see the analysis of these usages in Latin literature in Y. Dauge, Le Barbare: Recherches sur la conception romaine de la barbarie et de la civilisation (Bruxelle: Latomus, 1981), 393–449. 357 Lactantius, De Mortibus Persecutorum 21. 358 Lactantius, De Mortibus Persecutorum 21. 359 Lactantius, De Mortibus Persecutorum 27.

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The characterization of Galerius as a quintessential barbarian is completed by his culpability for causing “Romans to fight Rome” (Romani milites Romam), while pillaging and plundering the rest of Italy, as if it were a foreign territory marked for occupation rather than protection.360 The description of the cruelty exercised by the Roman army led by Galerius against Roman citizens and territory is belabored by the apologist, and it deserves a full citation: So the parts of Italy through which that pestilent band took its course were wasted, all things pillaged, matrons forced, virgins violated, parents and husbands compelled by torture to disclose where they had concealed their goods, and their wives and daughters; flocks and herds of cattle were driven off like spoils taken from barbarians. And thus did he, once a Roman emperor, but now the ravager of Italy, retire into his own territories, after having afflicted all men indiscriminately with the calamities of war. Long ago, indeed, and at the very time of his obtaining sovereign power, he had avowed himself the enemy of the Roman name and he proposed that the empire should be called, not the Roman, but the Dacian empire.361 Vastata est igitur ea pars Italiae qua pestiferum illud agmen incessit, ­expilata omnia, mulieres corruptae, virgines violatae, extorti parentes et mariti, ut filias, ut coniuges, ut opes suas proderent. Abactae tamquam de barbaris praedae pecorum ac iumentorum. Hoc modo se ad sedes suas recepit, cum Romanus quondam imperator, nunc populator Italiae, hostiliter universa vexasset. Olim quidem ille ut nomen imperatoris acceperat, hostem se Romani nominis erat professus, cuius titulum ­immutari volebat, ut non Romanum imperium, sed Daciscum cognominaretur. According to Lactantius, Galerius not only treats the Roman population as if they were foreign enemies, but he also tries to annihilate and barbarize the Roman Empire by turning it into a “Dacian” state through both military aggression and increase of taxes. Lactantius claims that Galerius attempts to “devour” (devorare) the empire through the harsh imposition of permanent taxes on the Roman people.362 Likewise, the apologist claims that Diocletian, Galerius’ co-ruler, has “overturned” (subvertit) the Roman Empire due to his unprecedented ­reorganization 360 Lactantius, De Mortibus Persecutorum 27. 361 Lactantius, De Mortibus Persecutorum 27. 362 Lactantius, De Mortibus Persecutorum 26.

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and wholesale political reform by establishing the regime of the Tetrarchy and allowing the sharing of imperial power.363 Lactantius makes note of the massive transformation in the state administration due to its partitioning into four quarters, as well as the persistence of economic problems.364 According to Lactantius, the erosion of the unified power of the Roman state due to Diocletian’s innnovations is facilitated by the choice of his “barbarian” co-ruler, i.e. Maximian (Galerius). As Lactantius claims, Diocletian, together with Galerius and the other members of the Tetrarchy, ultimately succeeds in “ruining” the state (rem publicam ... everteret) rather than strengthening the power of the Roman Empire.365 Additionally, Lactantius reports that Galerius includes in the shared government of the empire a semi-barbarian and a relative of his, Daia (Maximin).366 The apologist ridicules Galerius’ choice for a Caesar by describing Daia as unfamiliar with the civil and military affairs of the Roman Empire.367 Daia is characterized as a true barbarian because of his uncouthness resulting from his natural inclinations and character, as well as his former lifestyle of a shepherd in the wild forests. Furthermore, Daia is portrayed as exhibiting uncontrollable “barbarian desire” (barbarem libidinem) and an overwhelming “lust for debauching women” (corrumpendi cupiditas).368 Lactantius highlights the extreme nature of Daia’s passions and describes them as being “blind and unbridled” (caeca et effrenata).369 In addition to Daia’s alleged indulgence in lewdness, he is also castigated for his cruelty vis à vis Christians. Lactantius reports that Daia instructed the local officials to perform bodily mutilations, although forbidding the killing of Christians: So the confessors for the faith had their ears and nostrils slit, their hands and feet lopped off, and their eyes dug out of the sockets.370 Itaque confessoribus effodiebantur oculi, amputabantur manus, pedes detruncabantur, nares vel auriculae desecabantur.

363 Lactantius, De Mortibus Persecutorum 7. 364 Lactantius, De Mortibus Persecutorum 7. 365 Lactantius, De Mortibus Persecutorum 9. 366 Lactantius, De Mortibus Persecutorum 18. 367 Lactantius, De Mortibus Persecutorum 19. 368 Lactantius, De Mortibus Persecutorum 38. 369 Lactantius, De Mortibus Persecutorum 38. 370 Lactantius, De Mortibus Persecutorum 36.

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The apologist succeeds in creating a profile of Daia as a barbarian on the basis of his ethnic origin and personal character, including his untamed libido and his savagery. Moreover, Lactantius comments on Daia’s deleterious impact on the Roman state in reference to the infiltration of the imperial court by other foreigners, who have allegedly followed his behavior.371 The apologist comments not only on the outrageous conduct of Daia and of his circle of supporters, but he also laments that other foreigners have had a powerful presence at the very center of the imperial government. The oppression and violence by these barbarous individuals are felt not only by Christians, who are targeted by Daia’s religious reforms,372 but also by the inhabitants of the eastern provinces on a larger scale. Lactantius explicates: It was ill for humankind, that men who had fled from the bondage of barbarians should thus come to lord it over the Romans. Environed by such guards, Daia oppressed and insulted the Eastern empire.373 ... malo generis humani, ut illi barbarum servitutem fugientes in Romanos dominarentur. His satellitibus et protectoribus cinctus orientem ­ludibrio habuit. It is evident that the connection between the barbarian personages and the  state-sponsored persecutions of Christians is drawn carefully throughout the entire treatise De Mortibus Persecutorum. Lactantius consistently ­exposes the imperial rulers as quintessentially “barbarian” not only with regard to their ethnicity, but also their attitudes, traits and actions, and he underlines the foreign characteristics of the Roman government. The anti-Roman nature of the imperial rulers is contrasted to the representation of Christians as innocent victims, who are subject to the inhuman treatment by the state officials. In this way, Lactantius juxtaposes the blameless Christians with the barbaric and savage Roman emperors. Lactantius’ description of the persecutors in his De Mortibus Persecutorum stands in stark contrast to the presentation of the followers of Christ. The apologist claims that the conversion of individuals to Christianity in the Roman Empire effected the broad dissemination of gospel teachings and the actual transformation of barbarian peoples. He explains, as follows: And in the times that followed, while many well-deserving princes guided the helm of the Roman empire, the church suffered no violent assaults 371 Lactantius, De Mortibus Persecutorum 38. 372 Lactantius, De Mortibus Persecutorum 36. 373 Lactantius, De Mortibus Persecutorum 37.

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from her enemies, and she extended her hands unto the east and unto the west, insomuch that now there was not any the most remote corner of the earth to which the divine religion had not penetrated, or any nation of manners so wild that did not, by being converted to the worship of God, become mild and gentle.374 ... secutis que temporibus, quibus multi ac boni principes Romani imperii clavum regimenque tenuerunt, nullos inimicorum impetus passa manus suas in orientem occidentemque porrexit, ut iam nullus esset terrarum angulus tam remotus quo non religio dei penetrasset, nulla denique natio tam feris moribus vivens, ut non suscepto dei cultu ad iustitiae opera mitesceret. In contradistinction to the characterization of persecutors as irrational, cruel and anti-Roman, Lactantius purports that the spread of Christianity offers a viable alternative to military expansion, as its teachings have a beneficial influence on all ethnic groups and foreign nations, being positively affected and transformed by it. While in his apologetic treatise the Divine Institutes Lactantius addresses indirectly the charge of barbarism as a response to his critics and the opponents of Christianity, in his polemic work De Mortibus Persecutorum, he successfully turns the charge of barbarism into a counter-charge that not only exculpates Christians but also presents them as paragons of Roman citizenship.375 This rhetorical strategy is understandable as Lactantius aims to legitimize the Christian movement and to normalize it as part of the status quo.376 Lactantius turns the charge of barbarism against Roman emperors and state officials in order to justify the existence and toleration of Christianity, as well as to present Christians as the true citizens of the Roman state. In his treatise De Mortibus Persecutorum Lactantius subverts the representation of Christianity as essentially a barbarian and dangerous religion and instead casts the Roman authorities and state as such. Rather than presenting Christians as a marginal religious group threatening the larger social body, Lactantius characterizes the center of political power, and especially the Tetrarchy of Diocletian, as the one overturning the traditional Roman order. In his De Mortibus Persecutorum, he interprets 374 Lactantius, De Mortibus Persecutorum 3. 375 While the Divine Institutes were written some time between 305 and 310, De Mortibus Persecutorum has been completed already by this date. On the relative dating of Lactantius’ works, see T.D. Barns, “Lactantius and Constantine,” jecs 63 (1973): 29–46. 376 On Lactantius’ reformulation of the ideal state in the Ciceronian and Ulpian legal tradition, see E. Digeser, The Making of a Christian Empire: Lactantius and Rome (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 56–62.

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the persecutions of Christians as leading to an ultimate reward for their unjust suffering as a result of divine justice. Furthermore, Lactantius claims that the barbaric officials of the Roman state are eventually punished by God in innumerable harsh ways that parallel and reflect their own inhumane treatment of others.377 According to Lactantius, the harmful influence from foreign or antiRoman rulers on the Roman state is repealed due to the just punishment of the perpetrators. Consequently, he casts the Christian religion as ushering the restoration of Romanitas by eliminating the deleterious barbarian elements in the epicenter of Roman politics and a returning to historical ideals of Roman governance and citizenship. This favorable stance on the part of the Latin apologist is not surprising, as he becomes directly involved in the imperial court of Constantine during a time of significant changes in the political and religious life of the Roman people both before and after the official legitimization of Christianity, marked by the signinig of the Edict of Milan in 313 by Constantine and Licinius, the co-emperors of the West and the East. Conclusion As has been demonstrated from the writings of the three Latin apologists, Tertullian, Arnobius and Lactantius, Christians were not only perceived as a distinct religious group that posed a potential danger to the Roman status quo but were also often seen and represented as being “barbarian.” The array of meanings of the term barbarian in these writings, similar to the writings of the Greek apologists, covers a wide semantic range. In the apologetic writings of Tertullian, the term “barbarian” refers specifically to the foreign name “Christian” that designates the new religious formation. It is my contention that the designation “barbarian” in Tertullian’s apologetic writings is to be understood in relation to other charges leveled against Christians that are often associated with the Greco-Roman notion of barbarism, such as human sacrifice, cannibalism, incest, criminality, treason, atheism, animality, and monstrosity. The fact that the opponents of the Christian movement levelled such charges is in keeping with the perception of different foreign groups in antiquity. Tertullian’s own use of the charge of barbarism in his debate with Marcion demonstrates that this allegation is employed not only by outsiders against Christians but also among various Christian groups themselves. The notion of the barbarian, as it appears in Tertullian’s apologetic and polemic writings, represents 377 For instance, see De Mortibus Persecutorum 33 for the excruciating detail of Lactantius’ description of Galerius’ death.

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the extremes of perceiving and portraying the “barbarian” as the “other” in Roman society. The construction of the barbarian as the “other” in Tertullian’s Apology is in fact parallel to Edward Said’s formulation of the “Oriental” as the “antetype of Europe” that is opposed to it by its “radical difference.”378 As Said demonstrates, the image of Europe is characterized as being “rational, virtuous, mature, ‘normal,’” while that of the Oriental is stigmatized as being “irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, ‘different’” in relation to it.379 According to Tertullian, Christians are not only castigated as quintessentially anti-Roman and are denied access to Romanitas, but they are also assigned to the animalistic and subhuman realm outside the parameters of human civilization. The concept of the “barbarian” reaches fantastic and unrealistic dimensions that reveal the sheer implausibility of the charge itself and the highly rhetorical nature of its use in Tertullian’s works. The identification of Christians with extreme activities and excessive qualities takes on an exaggerated and hightened form that should not nonetheless conceal its rhetorical-ideological function in the apologetic corpus. In the writings of the Latin apologist Arnobius the term “barbarian” in relation to Christians is used to highlight the foreign origin of the new-fangled religion, as well as the political and military threat, and the low social class that its followers represent.380 According to Arnobius, in addition to being associated with potential treason and possible political insurgency, Christians are seen as being related to foreign nations that threaten the territorial integrity of the empire. It is therefore not only with respect to their threat to the socioreligious fabric of the empire, but also with respect to the territorial integrity of the Roman state that Christians are identified as being enemies of the political order, or barbarians par excellence. When arguing against the designation of Christianity as a “barbarian” religion, Arnobius turns the charge of barbarism into a counter-charge and argues that Roman religions demonstrate some of the same behaviors that are alleged against Christians, including human sacrifice, sexual immorality, innovation, and others. In countering the charge of foreign invasions and military defeats, Arnobius turns once again the charge 378 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient (New York: Random House, 1994; Reprint), 17. 379 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient (New York: Random House, 1994; Reprint), 40. 380 In his elaboration on the western concept of the Oriental, Edward Said notes the association that exists between the “other” as the external and the foreign form of threat (the Oriental) and as the internal and the native one, such as the child, the poor, women, et cetera. See Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient (New York: Random House, 1994; Reprint), 207.

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of barbarism into a counter-charge and posits that while the Roman army is responsible for military conflicts, Christian teachings ameliorate the savage nature of foreign nations and transforms them into the paragon of Romanness. Furthermore, Arnobius does not deny the profile of Christians as consisting of people of inferior education and lower social class. When he explains the inadequate style and barbarism of Christian scripture, for instance, he invokes the classical opposition between rhetoric and philosophy and aligns Christianity with the superior category of philosophy. Despite the attempts of Arnobius either to turn the allegation of barbarism into a counter-accusation or to represent it as an advantageous trait of the new religion, it is evident in his apologetic treatise that the association of Christians with the notion of the “barbarian” is prominent, although its designations do not fully overlap with the more radical accusations encountered in Tertullian’s writings. Unlike in Tertullian’s and Arnobius’ apologetic texts, where the charge of barbarism is verbally stated and addressed, Lactantius’ apologetic treatise the Divine Institutes does not explicitly mention it. This fact may be partially attributed to the fact that his sophisticated literary work Divine Institutes is less polemical and more conciliatory in nature. Nonetheless, in Lactantius’ polemical treatise De Mortibus Persecutorum, a text that is directly connected with the persecutions of Christians in the empire, the prominence of the charge of barbarism against the Roman rulers and state officials connected with the public trials and persecutions of Christians suggests that this same charge was also raised against Christians. In this polemic text, Lactantius associates Roman rulers with foreign ethnic origin, superstition, cruelty, licentiousness, as well as other characteristics that normally pertain to the Roman idea of the barbarian. Additionally, in his Divine Institutes he points to a variety of barbaric features represented in the established Roman religions, such as the deification of cruel and tyrannical rulers, the practice of human sacrifice, and the alleged sexual immorality of the practitioners of mystery religions. In this multi-volume apologetic text, Lactantius also characterizes the Roman judicial system and society as a whole as exhibiting inhumanity and cruelty. In both his apologetic and polemic works Lactantius stresses the anti-Roman, or barbarian, character of Roman religion, society and state and instead he represents Christianity as the return to the original monotheist religion of Rome, as well as ethical principles of human behavior and a just legal system. In this way, Lactantius turns the charge of barbarism against the Roman rulers on all counts, while he defines Christians as the embodiment of true Romannness. His apologetic and polemical writings, therefore, strongly suggest that while he defends Christians against the charge of barbarism, which is also found in Tertullian’s and Arnobius’ apologies, Lactantius accuses the Roman emperors and the ­majority of the

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population of the same charge. This conclusion is warranted by the presence and the prominence of the notion of the barbarian, especially in his polemic against the opponents and the persecutors of the Christian religion. In their response to the charge of barbarism leveled against early Christians, Tertullian, Arnobius and Lactantius do not only try to demonstrate that Christianity captures and exemplifies authentic Romanitas, but they also assert that the existing Roman religious, judicial, and political systems embody the pure essence of barbarism. The Latin apologists claim that the Christian religion is capable of transforming all the foreign nations into civilized and peaceful allies of the Roman people by enabling a personal and societal transformation. The three North African apologists manage to turn successfully the charge of barbarism into a counter-accusation, as well as to properly situate Christianity within the fold of Roman society.

Chapter 6

Epilogue This study presents an analysis of the allegation that Christians are “barbarian” by examining a selection of early Christian apologetic texts from the second, third and beginning of the fourth century. The textual analysis of the charge of barbarism in the apologetic literature has been divided into two parts, Greek and Latin, not only because of the linguistic and semantic differences in the conceptualization of the notion of “barbarism” in the two languages but also on account of the two parallel apologetic traditions that emerge in the eastern and western territories of the Roman Empire during that period of time. In my analysis of the charge of barbarism, I have examined both sides of the forensic context: First, since there are virtually no surviving accusatory texts from the critics of early Christianity that testify directly to the charge of barbarism, I have ventured to reconstruct its meaning and function to the extent that the Christian apologetic texts allow, as these contain numerous citations from and references to the accusatory documents. Second, I have taken into account the contemporary definitions, perceptions and representations of the Greco-­Roman concept of the “barbarian” in antiquity in order to properly contextualize the early Christian apologetic and polemic discourse. Third, I have analyzed a select number of Greek and Latin Christian apologetic texts in order to present the large array of responses given to the charge of barbarism, some of which adamantly deny it and others openly embrace it. In my close reading of the works of Justin, Tatian, Clement, Origen and Eusebius in the Greek and of Tertullian, Arnobius and Lactantius in the Latin, I have demonstrated that the charge of barbarism conveys a wide variety of different meanings: it designates foreign ethnicity and tongue, as well as incest, sexual immorality, human sacrifice, cannibalism, political insurgency, military threat, low social class, inadequate education, intellectual ­inferiority, and physical ­deformity among others. In these apologetic texts, the notion of the “barbarian” points to rhetorical mechanisms of marginalization and othering on part of the accusers, as well as attempts for self-defense and self-­definition on part of the early Christian authors. Although some of the apologists choose to define the notion of the barbarian in a positive light by re-­defining it in reference to Christians per se, the negative connotations of the charge of barbarism r­ emain evident in these texts. As has been demonstrated, in the Greek Christian apologetic literature the tendency on the part of the apologists is to try to align the Christian communities with the concept of barbarian, although

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it is re-cast by them in very positive terms. In the Latin Christian apologetic tradition, in contrast to its Greek counterpart, the tendency on the part of the apologists is to deny the validity of the charge of barbarism and to equate Christianity with the notion of Romanitas instead. In conjunction with the analysis of the charge of barbarism in the early Christian apologetic texts, I have also outlined the concept of “barbarism” and literary representations of “barbarians” in the contemporary and near-­ contemporary Greco-Roman literature. This presentation is necessitated not only by the fact that the notion of the barbarian in the early Christian apologetic corpus is informed by the ancient idea of barbarism in the contemporary Greco-Roman context, but also by the fact that the actual accusatory documents of the critics of early Christians are no longer extant. The close reading of both Greek and Latin texts from the period of the first century bce to the third century ce reveals multiple meanings and various contexts that attend the use of the concept of the barbarian in the ancient Mediterranean world and, in this way, helps to better understand the charge of barbarism in the Christian literature, as it was leveled by outsiders. In my presentation of the Greco-Roman notion of the “barbarian,” I have chosen to include the writings of Roman, Greek, and other authors, such as the Syrian Lucian, in order to provide the multi-faceted nature and the complex cultural context of the Greco-Roman concept of barbarism. In my analysis of these sources as they relate to the notion of the “barbarian,” I have demonstrated that the construction of the ancient idea of barbarism is conditioned by the particular socio-historical circumstances and the rhetorical-ideological purposes of the different authors. The concept of the “barbarian” has an important function in the writings of Romans, Greeks and others in the period, as various groups in the multi-ethnic context of the Roman Empire attempt to define their own identity and positionality in society. In my study of the GrecoRoman sources, I have shown that the meaning of the concept of the barbarian constantly changes and shifts, in accordance with the particular context and authorial purpose, instead of it remaining constant or consistent. Nonetheless, the multiple valences of the term “barbarian” in the ancient Greek and Roman literature are predominantly accusatory, negative and divisive. Notwithstanding whether the notion of the barbarian refers to mere linguistic and ethnic difference, to military danger and political instigation, or to any other aspects commonly associated with it, it serves as an ideological and rhetorical tool for the demarcation and opposition of the dominant and powerful Roman selfimage and its barbarian “other.” From the writings of Greek authors, as well as from those of the Syrian Lucian of Samotasa, it becomes evident that disempowered and marginalized

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groups in Roman society were designated as “barbarian,” irrespective of their attempt to re-define the concept and invest it with other meanings. It is precisely in the wider cultural context and existing ancient rhetorical tradition that the charge of barbarism is to be understood. Similar to other minority groups perceived and labeled as “barbarian,” Christians too are compelled to address the charge of barbarism and to articulate their group identity in light of it. In their response to and re-conceptualization of the allegation of barbarism in its multiple valences, Christians draw on existing forensic practices and rhetorical ploys, as they too employ the same charge raised against them not only as a counter-charge against their opponents, but also for the purpose of their own self-definition and self-articulation. The analyses and explications of the process of formulation of the “other” provided by post-colonial critics and theorists E. Said, G. Spivak, H. Bhabha and J. Kristeva provide a helpful lens for the examination of the notion of the “barbarian” in early Christian literature.1 In the context of an imperial and multi-ethnic society, early Christians are perceived as being barbarian and are castigated in the category of the “other” vis à vis the larger society. When early Christian apologists address the allegation that Christians are “barbarian” and are attributed qualities proper to it, they respond to it and come to re-formulate their individual and group identity in light of it. As a result, while some early Christian apologists turn the designation “barbarian” from an accusation into a counter-charge, others use it as marker of their self-identification and selfarticulation. As it is significant to recognize that Christians are demarcated as the barbarian “other” from the standpoint of the larger Greco-Roman society, it is also important to understand how and why the notion of the “barbarian” becomes central in the self-definition and self-formation of early Christians. This in-depth examination of the concept of barbarism and the forensic context of its use in the early Christian apologetic literature, therefore, contributes to the better understanding of these texts, in particular, and to the critical reading and unmasking of rhetorical-ideological tools for alienation and marginalization in both the ancient and the modern contexts.

1 Cf. Edward Said, Orientalism: Western Representations of the Orient (New York: Random House, 1994; Reprint); Gayatri Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak? Speculations on a Widow Sacrifice,” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, eds., Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271–315; Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994); Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, trans., Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).

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Index Alexander, L. 39 Ancient Rhetoric 29–33 Animality, Animals Seneca 90–92 Tertullian 230–2 Apology (genre) 34–40 Aristides 2–3, 98–104 Aristotle 29–32 Arnobius 247–73, 301–2 Assyria/ Assyrians Dio Chrysostom 116–117 Atheism Athenagoras 4 Justin 140 Tertullian 243–5 Athenagoras 3–4 Athens Aristides 99–104 Atticism Tatian 150–52 Babylon Dio Chrysostom 117 Barbarian Philosophy Tatian 150–3 Clement of Alexandria 164–175 Eusebius 201 Barnes, T.D. 213, 219, 236 Benko, S. 177–8 Bhabha, H. 10, 50–54, 147, 159, 164, 176, 196, 202 Britons 80–1 Buell, D. 7, 21, 163, 173, 235 Byron, G. 7 Cannibalism Tatian 159–160 Eusebius 204 Tertullian 223, 226–8 Caesar, Julius 63, 65–72 Caracalla Lactantius 289 Cicero 30–31, 72–79 Celsus 177–194 Chadwick, H. 174, 177–8 Clement of Alexandria 163–176 Constantine Lactantius 300 Cynics Lucian 124 Tatian 156 Daia (Maximin) Lactantius 297–9 Dauge, Y. 218, 220, 223, 227, 231, 295 Digeser, E. 275, 278, 282, 290, 299 Dio Chrysostom 104–111

Diocletian Arnobius 248, 264, 266 Lactantius 277–84, 288–290, 293, 298–9 Domitian Lactantius 283 Droge, Arthur 18–19, 145, 151, 154, 164 Edwards, M. 37–38, 39–40, 212, 278 Egypt, Egyptian Origen 185, 189 Tertullian 231 Arnobius 261–2 Eusebius of Caesarea 5–6, 34–36, 195–206 Epistle to Diognetus 1–2 First Peter 1 Fojtik, John E. 21–22 Frede, M. 178, 180 Galerius Lactantius 293–98 Gauls 66–72 Germans 67–68, 81–83, 88 Grant, R.M. 34–35, 148, 159, 176 Greek Education/ Paideia Clement 175–7 Eusebius 199–201 Greek Ethnicity Aristides 3 Eusebius 5 Justin 137–8 Tatian 148–52 Greek Language Tatian 150–3 Greek Philosophy Justin 138–140 Tatian 151–2 Clement 167–174 Origen 183–191 Eusebius 197, 201–2 Greek terms for ethnic designation: ἀλλόϕυλοι (strangers) Eusebius 6, 196 ἀλλογενεῖς (aliens) Eusebius 6, 196 βαρβάρος (barbarian) Epistle to Diognetus 1 Aristides 3 Justin 130–45 Tatian 146–60 Clement 163–75 Origen 176–94 Eusebius 5, 195–205 δῆμος (people) Justin 134

335

Index ἔθνος (people, nation) 1 Peter 1 Aristides 3 Athenagoras 4 Eusebius 5, 199, 206 Justin 133 γένος (race, generation, nation) 1 Peter 1 Aristides 2 Epistle to Diognetus 1 Eusebius 5, 197 Justin 130, 134, 136, 137, 141 Clement 173 Origen 183–4 λαὸς (people) 1 Peter 1 Justin 132–133 Clement 173 παρεπιδήμος (exile) 1 Peter 1 παροίκος (resident alien, sojourner) 1 Peter 1 Epistle to Diognetus 1 ξένος (foreigner, stranger) Epistle to Diognetus 1 Lucian 122 φῦλον (tribe) – Justin 133 Eusebius 203 Hebrew Bible Clement 166 Origen 182–4, 190 Eusebius 201 Hebrew prophets Origen 182 Hierocles Lactantius 278–80 Human Sacrifice Eusebius 202–4 Tertullian 222–226 Lactantius 286 Hunt, E. 147, 149, 150–1 Imperial Cult Tertullian 237 Lactantius 282–6 Incest Eusebius 204 Tertullian 223, 229–30 Infanticide Tertullian 222–226 Lactantius 287 Jew/ Jews/Jewish Aristides 3 Justin 132–135, 137–8 Clement 170–1 Origen 181–6 Eusebius 196–202 Tertullian 233, 242

Judaism Origen 178–86 Eusebius 201–2 Tertullian 233, 242 Justin Martyr 130–146 Kristeva, J. 10, 54–57, 184, 195, 218 Latin terms of ethnic designations: barbarus Caesar 65–72 Cicero 72–79 Seneca 86–94 Tacitus 79–86 Tertullian 212–46 Arnobius 248–72 Lactantius 293–300 externos (foreingers) Cicero 66 exules (exiles) Tertullian 241 hostes (enemy) Tertullian 238–9, 243 Arnobius 250, 253 Lactantius 298 gentes (clan, tribe, nation) Tertullian 242–3, 246 Arnobius 253, 259 Lactantius 288, 292 genus (kind, class, group) Tertullian 235, 242, 243 Lactantius 287, 298 natio, nationes (nation, people, race) Tertullian 242 Arnobius 252–3, 258 Lactantius 299 peregrinos (alien, foreigner) Arnobius 261 plebs (plebians, lower classes) Tertullian 237 polulus (people) Arnobius 253, 259 Lactantius 285 vulgus (masses, people) Tertullian 237 Lactantius 36–37, 273–299, 302–3 Lieu, Judith 21 Logos Justin 141–3 Tatian 156–7 Clement 171 Lucian of Samotasa 120–8 MacMullen, Ramsay 17, 217, 280, 294 Magic Origen 186 Arnobius 261 Lactantius 280

336

Index

Maximian Lactantius 293–8 McGowan, A. 222, 228 Moses Justin 139, 144 Tatian 154–5, 154 Clement 169–70 Mosaic philosophy Clement 170

Roman Pantheon/ Religion Justin 144–5 Tatian 159–62 Eusebius 202–3 Tertullian 226, 236–7, 243–5 Arnobius 262–6 Lactantius 281–88

New Testament Eusebius 196–8 Lactantius 278–80

Said, E. 9, 45–48, 191, 218, 232, 255, 292, 301 Schüssler-Fiorenza, E. 36–38 Scripture Clement 166 Origen 182–4, 190 Eusebius 201 Arnobius 267–70 Lactantius 279–80 Second Sophistic Tatian 151 Sedition/ Treason Origen 191–2 Tertullian 236 ff. Scythian 88, 108, 122, 204, 222, 226 Simmons, M.B. 247–8, 252 Spivak, G. 9–10, 48–50, 147 Socrates Justin 141–145 Stoicism Arnobius 255–7 Stroumsa, Guy 20, 164, 178, 181 Syria, Syrian Lucian 121–3 Tatian 160–2 Swain, Simon 151

Origen 35–37, 176–195 Persecutions Tertullian 221–2 Arnobius 248, 266, 272 Lactantius 277–80, 291–2, 293–9 Philosophy Justin 138–140 Tatian 150–2 Clement 167–8 Arnobius 270–1 Philostratus 111–120 Plato Justin 139, 143–145 Clement 167–8, 171 Origen 189–90 Arnobius 271–2 Porphyry Eusebius 196 Arnobius 250, 254, 265, 272 Lactantius 277–8 Price, Simon 40 Pythagoras Clement 168 Quintilian 33 Rhetoric Tatian 153–5 Arnobius 270–1 Rhetorica ad Herrennium 33 Rives, James 222, 225 Roman Law Tatian 158 Tertullian 219–221 Lactantius 288–290

Tacitus 79–86, 233 Tatian 146–162 Tertullian 35, 212–47, 300–1 Waszink, J.H. 17–18, 160–1, 164 Wilken, R.L. 177, 184 Women Tacitus 80–82, 85 Seneca 90–92 Dio Chrysostom 110–111 Young, Francis 19, 38–39