Bangladesh Background and Perspectives

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Bangladesh Background and Perspectives

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13.7. 74





General Editor :


Dr. L. M. Singhvi


Background and Perspectives

Editor : Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap Assistant Editor :

Dr. R. S. Kapuria

The Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, New Delhi





Publishing .



23, Daryaganj, Delhi-6 (India)

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First Published, 1971

©) The Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary




Printed in India at Saraswati Printing Press, Maujpur, Shahdara, Delhi-32; and Published by National Publishing House, 23, Daryaganj, Delhi-6.




**They have money, they have influence, they have the capacity to use force against the people. History, however, testifies that determined people can successfully resist and overcome such forces of oppression.”


Mujibur Rehman



Dr. Subhash C. Kashyap, Director, The Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, New Delhi. PART


Shri M. C. Chagla, Union Minister Youth Services.




of Parliament ; formerly Affairs,



Dr. L. M. Singhvi, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India ; formerly Member of Parliament. Shri

V. K.




of Parliament;

formerly Union Minister of Defence. Professor Rasheeduddin Khan,

and Head, Centre


for the Study

of Parliament

of Political Develop-

ment, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Shri Rathy Sawhny, Retired Brigadier, Indian Army. Shri M. C. Setalvad, Member of Parliament ; formerly Attorney-General of India. Shri K. G. Saiyidian, of Education.

formerly Secretary, Union Ministry

Shri C. K. Daphtary, Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India ; formerly Attorney-General ofIndia.

Shri Dilip Mukerjee, Chief of the Bureau, of India, New Delhi. Shri Ajit Bhattacharjea, Ahmedabad.

Editor, The

The Times

Times of India,

Shri Ashok V. Desai, Senior Economist, National Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi. Shri Girilal Jain, Resident Editor, The Times of India, New Delhi.

PREFACE Grave political, moral and legal issues are wrapped up in Bangla Desh today. The tragedy of genocide in Bangla Desh transcends the frontiers of that geographical region. The conscience of the world cannot long remain hushed or muted, nor can the world afford to turn a blind eye and a deaf ear to what is happening in Bangla Desh.

The present volume is the outcome of a symposium meeting held by the Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies on ‘Recognition of Bangla Desh—Legal, Political and Moral Issues’. It was an unusual meeting both because of the eminence of the galaxy of distinguished speakers and the extraordinary interest evinced by a large elite audience. Iam happy to be able to present the symposium discussion in the form of a book for a wider reading public. An introductory chapter, a short bibliography, a press digest and a few maps and other useful appendices have been added to give a more complete picture of the subject matter. I need hardly add the usual caveat that the views expressed at the symposium and included in this volume are those of the contributors and the Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies is not responsible for them.

New Delhi, May, 1971.

L. M. Singhvi General Editor and Executive Chairman, The Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Acknowledgements are due to :

The Times of India for allowing the reproduction of three articles ‘Birth of a Nation’, ‘India and Bangla Desh’, and ‘Stakes in Bangla Desh’ first published in their columns





3 and April 22,

respectively as also for three cartoons April 4, April 9 and April 20, 1971.


published on

The Tribune for allowing the reproduction of the article ‘A Case for Recognition of Bangla Desh’ first published in their columns on April 19, 1971. Young Indian for allowing the reproduction of excerpts from Hanna Papanek’s research study on ‘Sources of Economic Exploitation of East Bengal” from its issue of April 15, 1971.

The Hindustan Times for allowing the reproduction of eight photographs which appeared in their columns on different dates. The four maps included in the study are based on Economic Geography of East Pakistan by Nafis Ahmed, Oxford, 1968. Dr. R.S.

Kapuria, Assistant


I.C.P.S., shared

much of the burden in preparing the study in record seeing it through the press most expeditiously.

time and

The bibliography at the end of the study has been compiled by Shri S. C. Biswas and Shrimati A. Chunkath of the I.C.P.S. Library.

Shri Dharam Vir Gajre and Shri N. K. Jain of the J.C.P.S. research staff helped in the preparation of press digest and notes: on political parties respectively.

CONTENTS Contributors Preface Acknowledgements


vi Vii




Bangla Desh—An Introduction and A Study in Background. Subhash C. Kashyap PART




Bangla Desh and Conscience of the World M. C. Chagla East Bengal in Flames : Moral, Political and Legal Issues L. M. Singhvi Recognition and International Law V. K. Krishna Menon Limits of Political Obligation Rasheeduddin Khan A Case for Recognition of Bangla Desh Brig. Rathy Sawhny Recognition : Expediency versus Emotion M. C. Setalvad Upsurge of Unity K. G. Saiyidian India Should Give Lead C. K. Daphtary

1—6 7—13 14—20 21—27 28—32 33—35 36—38 39—42

9. 10. 11. 12.

India and Bangla Desh Stakes in Bangla Desh The Unfinished Revolution Birth of A Nation

Dilip Mukerjee Ajit Bhattacharjea Ashok V. Desai Girilal Jain

43—48 49—53 54—64



A. B. €. D.

Excerpts from the U.N. Charter Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide U.N. Documents on Genocide Round-up of Reactions (a) Official Reactions

(i) Text of the Resolution

E. F. G.

H. I.


83—96 97—102 103—126

adopted by

Parliament (ii) Prime Méinister’s remarks in Parliament (b) Indian Press and the People (c) Reactions Abroad Some Major Political Parties in East Bengal Text of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s Radio Broadcast on 28th October, 1970 An Autobiography of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman Awami League’s Six-Point Programme

Sources of Economic Bengal



of East

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Bangla Desh is the name given to East Bengal? by its: people who are engaged in a bitter Struggle for defending

freedom and democracy in their land.


On December 7, 1970, the first ever general elections based adult franchise were held in Pakistan. The elections were for a National Assembly which was to draft a Constitution for

Pakistan. ‘.



Contesting the elections on a six-point programme?

Bengal, later renamed


Pakistan, was carved out of the

pre¢-partition province of Bengal. The Sylhet district of Assam was added to it. First enunciated on February 12, 1966, the six points of the Awami League programme were: (1) The Constitution should provide for a Federation of Pakistan in the true sense on the basis of the Lahore Resolution and for a Parliamentary form of Government based on the supremacy of a directly elected Legislature on the basis of universal adult franchise. (2) The Federal Government shall





subjects—defence and foreign affairs—

with all residuary subjects vested in the federating States. (3) There should be either two separate freely convertible cur-


for the two


or one








which inter alia included the demand for provincial autonomy, the Awami League Party under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was returned with a clear majority winning 160 out of the total of 300 seats in the National Assembly. In East Bengal, the Awami League won all but two seats (160 out of 162). It was naturally expected that in the best traditions of parliamentary democracy, in deference to the unequivocal wishes of the people and in keeping with official promises, the leader of the majority party in the Assembly, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman would be called upon to become the Prime However, Minister and form a representative government. this did not happen ; popular hopes were belied. The first

* meeting of the National Assembly scheduled for March 3, was postponed sine die. The people in East Bengal, more united than ever, under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, rose in protest against this arbitrary act. The historic noncooperation movement started by the Awami League leader followed. West Pakistan army units moved in to suppress the movement, martial law was imposed and many peaceful demonstrators were shot dead. But, the movement continued unabated. In vast areas of East Bengal, it was reported that only the Citizens’ Committees set up by Sheikh Mujibur

Rehman provided an effective administration. In the face of such realities, General Yahya Khan relented and proposed convening of the Assembly on March 25, 1971. The Awami League expressed its willingness to join in the deliberations of the Assembly subject to the fulfilment ofits conditions, viz., that

_thegmartial law be lifted, troops ordered back to barracks, an enquiry held in the killings of demonstrators, and elected repre-

sentatives empowered to act on their behalf. General Yahya Khan personally went to Dacca for talks with the Awami reserve banks to prevent inter-wing flight of capital. (4) The power of taxation and revenue collection shall be vested in the federating units. The Federal Government will receive a share to meet its financial obligations. (5) Economic disparities between the two wings shall disappear through a series of econom ic, fiscal

and legal reforms, (6) A militia or para-military force must be created in East Pakistan which at present has no defenc e of its own.




League leader. However, the show of goodwill, friendliness and desire to settle differences on a negotiating table soon turned out to be mere rouse for gaining time for pouring in more troops and heavy armaments from West Pakistan. On March 25, the negotiations came to an abrupt end. General Yahya Khan charged the Sheikh with committing an ‘act of treason’. The machinery of repression was let loose and a reign of terror unleashed. All political activities in Pakistan were banned and the Awami League was completely outlawed. Martial law was again clamped down, strict press censorship imposed and all foreign correspondents from East Bengal expelled. The people rose as one manin defence of their democratic rights to be governed by their own freely elected representatives and to live in freedom under a system and a Political regime of their own choosing. It is this struggle which is raging in East Bengal. On March 28, the Swadhin Bangla Desh radio announced the formation of a provisional government of Bangla Desh headed by the ‘liberation army’ Chief Major Zia Khan. Subsequently, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was named the President and Syed Nazrul Islam the Vice-President of a six-member The Awami League leader, Taj uddin Ahmed Government. was sworn in as the Prime Minister and five others as memOn April 17, 1971 Bangla Desh was probers of the Cabinet. claimed a Republic with Nazrul Islam as the Acting President. Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmed announced that the Bangla Desh



just an idea, not a dream, but a


hard reality and that it exists and is functioning within Bagla Desh territory’,


Whether one—according to one’s own predilections—calls the



a civil



ment, a popular uprising, a secessionist

revolt, a resistance move-



a revolu-

tion, the fact remains that the West Pakistani armies are fighting the people of East Bengal merely to deny the transfer of power to the duly elected representatives of the people. They 3.

As reported in the newspapers.



majority are obviously fighting against the known will of the st the of the people of the whole of Pakistan and certainly again In the unanimous verdict of the entire people of East Bengal. li process they are indulging in large-scale genocide of the Benga people, committing inhuman atrocities, and brutalities, thereby perpetrating deep human misery and suffering. These then, are, in short, the facts and the immediate background of the developments in East Bengal. However, in order to appreciate the transformation of the image of ‘East Bengal’ as an essential part of Pakistan into that of Bangla Desh struggling for freedom and democracy, it would be necessary to go beyond the immediate background of the conflict. A quick look at history would suffice to show that the conflict is not new and that its roots lie deep in the basic cultural, geographical and traditional differences of the two wings of Pakistan, in the continued economic exploitation of East Bengal by West Pakistan and, in fact, in the very concept and origin of Pakistan as a theocratic State based, as it was, on the pernicious two-nation theory, on the mere commonality of religion as against all other diversities, and, above all, on hatred between communities sharing a common heritage and inhabiting the same land. Almost from the very beginning of Pakistan, East Repeated protests have Bengal had been a reluctant partner. been raised against attempts to destroy the separate cultural identity of East Bengal and to subject it to colonial treatment.

and economic exploitation.


have been made


struggle waged again and again for justice to the people, for equality of rights, for freedom and democracy and for provinMany violent repressions have been faced and cial autonomy. sacrifices made but the struggle has continued in one form or the Other and the indomitable will of the people of Rabindranath . Tagore’s ‘Sonar Bangla’* has remained unsuppressed.


Tagore’s well-known song ‘Amar

Sonar Bangla’ (our golden land Bengal) has been accepted as the national anthem of Bangla Desh.







Suggestions for the establishment of a separate territorial identity for Muslims outside or within the Indian Federation were first advanced by Britishers and not by Indian Muslims.® However, at the Allahabad session of the Muslim League in December, 1930, Sir Mohammad Iqbal, the eminent poet philo‘ssopher proposed in his Presidential Address the creation of a separate political entity consisting of Muslim majority provinces He said : in the North-West. “I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-government within the British Empire or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at least of NorthWest India.

“The proposal was put forward before the Nehru Committee. They rejected it on the ground that, if carried into effect, it would give a very unwieldy state.” The name ‘Pakistan’

was not used by Iqbal and

the proposed

entity was visualized as a part of the Indian Federation. Iqbal thought that once the Indian Muslims were guaranteed full and equal

politic of






of development




the body



prove ‘the best defenders ofIndia’. Interestingly enough, Sir Mohammad Iqbal’s proposal did not include Bengal or any part thereof iin the proposed political entity of Muslim majority provinces. In any case, Sir Mohammad Iqbal’s proposals were rejected by the Muslim League. On the other hand, Jinnah’s Fourteen Points® which were accepted not only by the Muslim 5.

See Sharifuddin Pirzada, Evolution of Pakistan,

All Pakistan


Division, Lahore, 1963 cited by A.G. Noorani. ‘Genesis of Bangla

Desh Turmoil’, Indian Express, April 25, 1971.


The Fourteen Points were based on the decisions of the All Parties Muslim Conference held in Delhi in January, 1929 under the





League but also by other Muslim groups and organizations inter alia included the demands for provincial autonomy and deve!lopment of various languages. Actually it were these fourteen points which were submitted to the Round Table Conference of 1930 in London.

The earliest referenceto the term ‘Pakistan’ is to be found in a scheme outlined in the early 1930’s by astudent at the Cambridge University in England. The name of the student was Choudhuri Rehmat Ali.? Nobody, not even the Muslim League leaders,

the scheme seriously at the time. took

During the Round Table

Conferences in London, at a session of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the White Paper proposals on August 1, 1933, Reginald Craddock asked the delegation of Indian Muslims led by Yusuf Ali to comment on the scheme of Rehmat Ali. Yusuf Ali’s reply was that it was a student’s scheme, which no responsible person had put forward. Mohammad Zafrullah Khan, who was a delegate to the Joint Parliamentary Committee and who later became an outstanding spokesman forPakistan, significantly remarked : ‘“‘We have already had the reply that it was a student’s scheme and there is nothing in it’.

Yusuf Ali added, ‘‘we have

considered it chimerical and impracticable.’’® What is, however,

of the greatest significance from the point of view of the present discussion is the fact that the firstscheme for the establishment of Pakistan outlined by Rehmat Ali did not seek to include Bengal or any part thereof in the territory of the proposed State of Pakistan even though the sponsor of the scheme—Rehmat Ali—was himselfa Bengali. Thus, by the time of the coming into force of the Government of India Act, 1935 neither Jinnah nor Presidentship 7.

of Aga


at the initiative of the U.P. Muslim

leaders Liaquat Ali Khan and Mohammad Shafi. Also speltas ‘Rahmat Ali’. The scheme was contained in aleaflet issued On January 28, 1933. It was signed by Rehmat Ali and couple of others.


The White Paper outlining proposals for constitutional reforms in


India was issued in March, 1933. The proposals examined by a Joint Parliamentary Committee. S. Sen, The Birth of Pakistan, Calcutta, 1955, pp.



133-35 and B. Shiva Rao (Ed.), The Framing of India’s constitution, Study Volume, 1968, p. 21. Also see Noorani, op. cit,




_f any other Muslim leader of any stature had backed the demand .


for Pakistan. Even the Muslim League, in fact, was not prepared

to go beyond the Fourteen Points. It isalso

a fact of history that before


1940’s, the

Muslim League as a party was not really very strong in the Muslim support,

majority strangely

provinces. Its bastions of power and enough, were provinces like U.P. where

the Muslims were in a minority. In the first general elections held in 1937 under the Government of India Act, 1935, the Muslim League failed to vindicate its stand of being the sole

representative of Muslim opinion in India inasmuch as it did not have much success in Punjab, Bengal, Sind and the N.W.F.P., where the Muslims constituted the majority of the population. The performance of the Muslim League in Bengal was hardly encouraging. It was the Praja Party under the leadership of Fazlul Haq which captured the imagination of the people with a strong programme for tenants’ welfare. The concept of a separate state (or states) of Pakistan with some parts from eastern India really began to_take shape only from the Muslim League resolution adopted at its Lahore session on March 23, 1940. The resolution laid down certain basic principles for the framing of a constitution for the future governance of India. It inter alia said :

‘*“No constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., the geographically continuous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute ‘independent states’ in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and soverign’’.'°


Italics added for emphasis.




The resolution further proposed adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards for minorities in these units in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them. The resolution empowered the Working Committee of the

Muslim League to frame the full constitution in accordance with these basic principles ‘‘providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as might be necessary’’3 aie aneetee mesa eaeape Nea

as ee

The resolution was open to_ different interpretations and was in fact interpreted differently even by the League and other Muslim leaders

at that


However, it was clear from the

resolution that Jinnah had in mind the establishment of not one Pakistan or one state but presumably two _independent. states,

‘one in the West and the othéf"


East of India.

Also, it

is obvious that the constituent units (presumably meaning the provinces) of each of the two states were intended to be automonous.



Abo Pakistan was born on August 14, 1947 under the proviraat 7sions of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 passed by the British '

Parliament. The Act incorporated the basic terms of the British Government Policy Statement of June 3, 1947. The June 3

: plan—also

known as the Mountbatten

_Plan—for the first time

recognized the inevitability of the partition of the country and

/ also the inevitability of the partition of Bengal and the Punjab. It inter alia proposed that the provincial legislat ive assemblies of

Bengal and the Punjab would meet in two parts, one representing the ‘Muslim “majority districts and the other the rest of the

provinces, the members of the two

parts of each legislative

11. Ibid., see Gwyer and Appadorai, Speeches and Docum ents on the Indian Const itution, Vol. II, p. 443,



Volume, op. cit., Pp. 32-33 and Pirza da, op. cit.

op. cit., Study



assembly sitting separately would or not the provinces should be majority of either part decided in would follow. It was further laid of partition



if any

be empowered to vote whether partitioned and, if a simple favour of partition, division down that before the question members




meeting of all the members (excluding European members) would be held at which a decision would be taken on the issue as to which Constituent Assembly the province as a whole would join if it was decided by the two parts to remain united, and that in the event of partition being decided upon each part of the legislative assembly would on behalf of the areas it represented decide whether it would join the existing Constituent Assembly or the new assembly for Muslim majority areas; also if there was to be partition the boundaries of the new provinces ‘would be officially demarcated by a boundary commission.

Lord Mountbatten explaining the revised British plan, announced that with the acceptance of the Muslim League demand for the partition of India, the argument that certain provinces should also be partitioned was unassailable. The British Government was ready and anxious to transfer power at the earliest possible moment to one or two governments of British India on the basis of dominion status. August 15, 1947 ‘was mentioned by Lord Mountbatten as the date for the proposed transfer of power.1*2, Nehru accepted the Mountbatten plan for the partition of India into two States as something that had become inevitable. Ina broadcast message on June 3, 1947,

Nehru spoke with a touch of sadness in his voice and said : *‘For generations we have dreamt and struggled for a free, independent and united India, the proposal to allow certain parts to secede, if they so will, is painful for any of us to contemplate. Nevertheless, I am convinced that our present decision is right one even from the larger view-point.’’!%


See V. P. Menon, The Transfer of Power, p. 382.


Shiva Rao, op. cit., Documents, Vol. I, p. 527-28.



So far as the Muslim Council of the League gave full the principles of the plan as all the necessary further steps.


League was concerned, the authority to Jinnah to accept a compromise and to take Finally the League accepted

- the plan and it was in pursuance of this plan that @ | separate dominion of Pakistan was constituted with effect. : from August 14, 1947.

It included

territories of East Bengal

and West Punjab, the province of Sind, the North-West Frontier Province, British Baluchistan and the Sylhet district of Assam. Legal sanction for Pakistan accompanied by the conferment of dominion status was contained in the Indian Independence Act, } 1947, Thus what Curzon had failed to accomplish some four . decades earlier,14 Mountbatten did with remarkable ease and finesse.



The total area of the new State of Pakistan created in 1947 came to 365,529 sq. miles and according to the 1951 data it had a Population of 75,842,000'5. West Pakistan comprised 310,403 sq. miles, 7.c., roughly 85 per cent of the territory of Pakistan, and East Pakistan 55,126 sq. miles. Although the area of East Pakistan is thus considerably smaller than that of West Pakistan, its population is much larger ; in 1961 it had 50,840,235




54 per cent

of the whole

population of the country, while the population of West Pakisse came to 42,880,378. While the density of population in “| West Pakistan was only 138 per sq. mile, it was as high as ae ee



The reference is to the first partition of Bengal in 1905. provoked

a nation-wide movement and

This had

finally the partition had

to be undone in 1911. It. is interesting to note that the 1905 partition of Bengal was also on more or less the same lines as the 1947 partition. The result and presumably the purpose in either case was also the same, i.e., to divide Bengal on communal lines Separating the Muslim majority areas of East Bengal from the rest of Bengal.

15. |According to the 1961 census, Pakistan had a total population of 93,720,613. ’



It becomes even more alarming per sq mile in East Pakistan. West when it is realized that most of the urban areas are in PakisPakistan. The ratio of urban population between West Pakistan tan and East Pakistan is roughly 9 : 2 with West 5°19 per having 22°5 per cent urban population as against only Table 11° shows the area and the cent of East Pakistan. ty of population of East and West Pakistan, the respective densi population, and percentage of urban population etc.



Population by Sex, Density and Urban Population 1961 census East Pakistan

Area in sq. miles


West Pakistan




Population: Both Sexes

50,840, 235

















Population per sq. mile Urban Population :

Population Percentage

oe ae


West and East Pakistan

also differ as


regards the com-

According to a study of the position of the inhabitants. USSR Academy of Sciences’, a distinguishing feature of East Pakistanis ‘“‘the homogeneity of its poplation as far as nationality is concerned,” for 98 per cent of its inhabitants are 16. 17.

Compiled from Pakistan Statistical Year Book, 1968, p. 3. Y. V. Gankovsky and L. R. Gordon—Polonskaya, A History of Pakistan, Moscow, 1964. 1n the preparation of the present paper, the author has drawn rather freely from this excellent study. The debt is gratefully acknowledged.

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= Nations have chosen to act as it is borne out by one or two of recognising new nations. This



examples, given in an article which appeared some time back in The Statesman. The author has given the instances of America, of Russia and of two other nations. These nations have gone to the length of recognising not only states which had not earned independence or declared independence, but nations which had not even come into existence as independ ent nations in order to encourage them to be independent, so that it may be to serve their own ends. Take the insta nce of America recognising Panama as an independent State when it was at war


its parent State, Columbia

integral part at that time.

of which Panama

It recognised

was an

and fought in aid of

Panama so as to liberate it from Columbia. Thus there is no settled rule of international law. It has always beena question of policy for the particular State to decide whether it shall or

shall not recognise a new State as an independ ent State.

But, how does a State act in making its deci sion ? It does

not act out of feelings of pity or sympathy or admiration. The policy of a nation is dictated mainly and prim arily by its own interests. Those in charge of the affairs of the Government of this country have to take very careful deci sions. They have to consider first what the effect of recognit ion of Bangla Desh would be, for example, on the internal affairs of our country.

There are States in our own country which had asked for independence and which have threatened to secede from our country. That is one aspect the Government of India has to consider.

Another, probably a graver aspect, is the consideration that recognition of Bangla Desh as an ind ependent country would mean our immediately going to war with Pakistan. Pakistan

cannot but regard it as an act o war. Immediate ly we recognise Ban

gla Desh as an independent State, and as has been suggested, we have to render it all possible aid including arms aid, which would inevitably mean a war with Pakistan. Those in charge of the affairs of our country have to consider whether it iszwise, advisable and proper for us to land ourselves into such a situation with Pakistan.






with those Yet a further consideration, which may weigh try, will be the who are in charge of the affairs of our coun a recognition will question of the repercussions which such We have got two cause in our relations with other countries. of which did not powerful neighbours on our borders one ession against our hesitate, not long ago, to lauch an aggr borne in mind by country. These considerations have to be try. It is not those who are in charge of the affairs of our coun vehemently for us standing here on this platform to advocate not aware of the and with fervour recognition because we are We have not facts on which we can judge matters of policy. her the action got the facts which can enable us to decide whet try , and that is will be wise from the point of view of our coun cy in the matter the only point of view which should govern poli and recognise a of recognition. We should not go forward we may not want country and thereby invite situations which to my mind is the or which may be difficult for us to meet. That main consideration.

us Questions of recognition have been dealt with by vario

of policy. They ‘States from time to time purely as matters interest. have been decided with reference to their own self-

free, There is no doubt that Bangla Desh is entitled to a thinking citizen democratic and independent existence. Every what Bangla Desh should, therefore, do what he can to support

is fighting for in whatever



way he can.

saying that India,

But that is very diffe-

merely because she sympathises

it has put up with Bangla Desh, or she admires the great fight

Pakistan, or she against the brutal military might of West immediately accord admires its ideals, should go forward and be left to those recognition to Bangla Desh. That decision must who know better,

to those who


the affairs of the

ion. Let them State and have the necessary facts and informat recognition. decide whether they should or should not give





There come times in th e life of almost everyo ne when either he must speak ou t the truth or he cannot honourably resolve with himself. I find that I am more or les s in that state. of mind. What has East Pakistan

done ? Has it organise d a revolt through the major sector of the population agains t a minor sector ; and ation army?

not even against a sector but against a small occup= -. I feel the situation wh ich East Pakistan fac es.

Indo-Pakistan relations. longed negotiations were

But, as it transpired, all these promerely a facade and a ca mouflage to

—— it — oS

a =




fortify East Pakistan with armsand ammunition from West Pakistan. For 23 years, according to United Nations Yearbooks as well as other international documents, East Pakistan

has been mercilessly exploited and now in an unprecedented kind of election carried out under the auspices of the Central Government of Pakistan,



it is worth, the


Bengalis demonstrated a type of unanimity and strength which is almost unparallelled in history. The West Pakistani-dominated Central Government found that there was no possibility of creating any ‘quislings’ amongst the East Bengalis for the purpose of organising some kind of an internal opposition. The West Pakistan Government thought that the only way in which they could keep their hold on East Pakistan was to use the military force. The possession of East Pakistan appears to be a case of life and death for the West Pakistanis. They get most of their foreign exchange from East Pakistan. They get a great deal of power and position which they enjoy in the - world, because they had with them or they have had with them over the years 75 millions of Bengalis. If East Pakistan secedes from West Pakistan, which possibility appears inevitable, the latter are bound to be reduced to a very insignificant position.

In the course of liberation movement going on in East Pakistan two very remarkable developments can be pointed out. First, the people of East Pakistan, facing guns and cannons and bullets and braving aerial warfare and tanks, and machine gun fire, half-armed or unarmed have organised a kind of passive civil resistance to begin with and eventually active resistance against the great army

of West


Secondly, in India,

which has for a long time been divided and kept aloof in various ways from people in Pakistan, party because of the policies they have pursued, there has been evidently an upsurge of feeling and unity of thought against what is being done by the military regime of West Pakistan in the East Pakistan area. Everyone, however, realises that this is not merely a legal or constitutional issue. Whatis being done in East Pakistan

is to try not

only to decimate the

entire population

but to



destroy the future of East Pakistan. General Tikka Khan is. reported to have said: ‘It is true that East Pakistan has a much larger proportion at present, but I would see that this majority is not retained.”” In the wake of their massive attack to crush the struggle, the Military Government of West Pakistan bundled out every single foreign correspondent from East Pakistan, whether belonging to a friendly country or belonging to what they may regard as enemy country. Not only this, the military



their notes,

their papers and

their cameras. If somebody looking at the state of things in Fast Pakistan, imagines that the main object of the military

regime of West Pakistan was to teach East


they would



Pakistanis a lesson

and to see to it that their

atrocities were kept hidden from the eyes of the world, would that be a very unjustifiable conclusion to draw ? If the Position

is such, there is every justification for our expressing our solidarity and support with the suffering people of East Pakistan.

There was a very famous Greek poet who once said = “Wherever there is a beautiful woman in this part of the world,

she is a relation of mine’’.

I cannot

imagine that


audacity. I can say that wherever there is a suffering individual, wherever there is pain, wherever there is exploitation, wherever there is tyranny, wherever there is an attempt to suppress the truth with force, every sufferer in the world is a brother and Sister of mine. It does not matter to me whether that is done

in India or in Pakistan or in China or in Israel or in Arabia. Unless we make a common cause with the people who have been unduly deprived of their liberty, of their rights of birth and of their rights of freedom, we cannot appease our own conscience and we cannot live honourably with ourselves.




Cc. K. DAPHTARY three The freedom struggle going on in Bangla Desh has These aspects important aspects—legal, political and moral. times difficult to necessarily overlap each other and it is some first two aspects disentangle the one from the other. While the no underlining. have their own relevance, the third requires

fied, ought to be The world conscience, if not already horri h has exceeded horrified at the carnage in East Pakistan whic

all previous occurrences of its kind in the world.

t in power It isnot just a question of the Governmen er of a section of suppressing a revolt ; it is not merely a matt atisfaction with people voicing and acting in aid of their diss Pakistan. Itis a certain aspects of the Government in West icate a particular case where there is a deliberate attempt to erad ever a particular people, a particular culture and to do away for are fighting have way of thought. It is not as if only those who have been bombed, been killed, but towns, villages and cities cents have been fired with napalm bombs and millions of inno



sacrificed. But, in addition, there has been a deliberate picking out of certain categories of people, including the intel lectuals and the children with the far-sighted view of keeping the East Pakistani subject suppressed for ever. In the preva iling state

of affairs in East Pakistan, there can be no doub t about the moral aspect. It is a crime of the worst kind against humanity.

The comparative silence of various nations in this particular situation may, however, appear to be Strange. But, surely, they are in a position where each of them has a skeleton in the closet. These nations are in no posit ion themselves to point to the mote in the neighbour’s eye when they cannot see the beam in their own. So they, like the levites, will pass by on the other side. But the position of India is wholly different.

It may be that if Indid’can give a lead and recognise Bangla Desh, the others will cast aside their timidity and follow


It has, however, to be borne in mind that once there is recognit

ion, leave aside the subtleties of de fact o recognition or de jure recognition, it must be a step towards giving concrete aid, military aid and other Support to Bangla Desh. The question that naturally arises jis whether sentiment should outweigh the more practical considerations. The question, to put it quite crudely, is : should India safe guard her self-interest or Should she go to the rescue of a whole people fighting for Survival? There are many considerations which may concern the lay minds but are surely of concern to those who are in power. But the prospect of a possible war with Pakistan is one that has to be carefully cons idered.

We can express our horror. We can express our oneness with the struggle of Bangla Des h. Are we to do so in order to overpower the better judgment of those who may

knowing better? ments.

perhaps be

There is no question of alienatin g any senti-

So far as Pakistan is concerned, nothing further is needed to alienate her. It has bee

n consistently hostile to Ind ia. It has spurned the hand of fri endship held out to them. It is the essence of their policy that a hatred for our country sho uld be kept alive. It js perhaps the ir only safeguard against variou s




weaknesses in their policies and behaviour towards India. There-

fore, there is no question of being afraid of alienating our neighbour. If Indiais afraid that Pakistan would blame her for her active support to the valiant people of Bangla Desh, they have already started blaming us for what is happening in East like may also

There is no reason then not to deserve it. It is Bengal. the vegetarian and the teetotaller who have gout. One well ask : if you are going to get gout asa vegetarian as as a teetotaller, why not have a drink, get gout and deserve


At the same time, the consequences of a war would not They may spread to anbe merely limited to one neighbour. other neighbour, who has hitherto maintained, what the papers silence’’, though at the same time call, ‘“‘an inscrutable coming forward with enormous material aid in support of Pakistan.

What of other nations that have supplied arms to Pakistan? Inthe newspapers it was reported : ‘‘No ; No ; this is within the limits of what arms were supplied for by the U. S. A.” It is no doubt surprising and shocking to read it. Even if the U.S.A. was satisfied that arms which were being supplied to Pakistan were not to be used for the purpose of genocide, they cor the Great Britain or the others who act as merchants of death from time to time would have still provided the necessary arms However, these considerations are beside and ammunition. the point.

While there is no doubt that everyone abhors the killing, the destruction and the fury of revenge in Bangla Desh, should India, unreservedly at this time, throw ourselves on the side of Bangla Desh when the situation isin doubt? The answer

would be ‘Yes’. May be that the sentiment is overrunning our Bot are we to wait and see who is going to win commensense. the fight and see it won or lost before we put our bet ? Surely, this is the time if we are to do good atall to the suffering humanity, we ought to take the lead and recognise Bangla



Desh. If our country with its history of association with Bangla Desh, with a community of culture and with a community of language, takes a bold step at this stage, the others will inevitably follow us in quick succession.




DILIP MUKERJEE nt on The unanimous resolution adopted by Parliame ort to the March 31, 1971 pledging India’s wholehearted supp irms the reality people of East Bengal makes history. It conf divisions in the of a national consensus, cutting across the many think and act country’s political life. If the Indian people can indication that together in moments of crisis, this is the surest s make them divisive pulls are much weaker than the Jeremiah out to be. use support The unanimity was not easy to achieve beca movement raises for what seems at first sight a secessionist West Bengal, and of complex issues. The thought of troubled debated the merits of Kashmir, worried many M.P.s as they Some of them feared supporting Sheikh Mujibur Rehman. give rise to dangerous that the resistance in Bangla Desh might the Pakistani military ideas in India. It is more than likely that

such a fear would be junta itself acted on the premise that on entertained and that this would


a restraining




India’s response. But once again, it made a serious miscalculation, as it did in 1965,

The doubts were soon drowned in an upsurge of emotion as horror piled upon horror in Eas t Bengal. More than that, the realisation grew that the Ind ian context is totally different from Pakistan’s Tendering pointless a comparison between the desperate fight in Bangla Desh against brutal and ruthless military despots and India’s federa l problems. The checks and balances of a parliamentary democr acy have been totally missing from Pakistan’s political life . In the absence of any safety valve an explosion was only to be expected there. Any such development

is ruled out in India where Parliament and national parties provide a tried and tested mechanism for handling regional grievances.

This is not to suggest that this cou ntry has solved all its problems of national integration. There are some obvious danger spots, and these need to be frankly identified. Ignoring the dangers does no good ; safety lies in meeting the challenges fully and in good time. It will not do to forget, for exa mple, that only six years ago the State of Madras was the scene of Vietnam-style immolations over the language issu e. Nagaland was the scene of pretty heavy fighting between insurgents and security forces until 1964. An insurgency of sorts persists in the Mizo Hills and the adjoining districts of Tripura and Manipur. Above all, there is

the problem of Kashmir

Indian Union is stil] being que stioned valley.


its place in the

by some elements in the

These problem areas represent different facets of the difficulties of national consolida tion. But what has already been achieved justifies the con fidence that India has acquired the instruments as well as the skill to prevent future explosion s. Hopefully, wisdom will not be lacking to meet new situation s as they arise. Complacency is not warranted, but there is no aoers n for exaggerated fears eit her.

i rer,






Threats to national unity fall into two categories : the problems arising in the heartland are different from those posed by the areas on the periphery. To the first category belong the conflicts between the Centre and the areas which are unquestionably a part of the national mainstream like Tamil Nadu or West Bengal. The quarrels stem mainly from the unfinished taks of redefining Centre-State relations to suit changing conditions. Twenty years ago when the founding fathers wrote the Constitution, the thought uppermost in their mind was to insure against the danger of national disintegration. This is. why they gave the Centre overriding political and financial powers. We still need a strong Centre, though for different reasons. Reserve political powers are still necessary to tide over unexpected situations, such as those arising in some of the States as a result of the indecisive elections of 1967 and 1969. But the way in which these reserve powers are exercised needs to be regulated through new conventions to make sure that they are not abused for partisan ends. In U.P. in November 1970, West Bengal in 1967, the Governor’s actions were certainly not beyond reproach. Charges of arbitrariness arising from misuse of powers can erode and even damage the whole federal concept. The


in West

Bengal is arguing that as the largest

party it should have been given the first chance to form a government, but this was refused on the ground that a majority of MLAs elected last month

were against it.

The refusal was

valid in this case—as it was in Orissa where the Governor rejected a similar plea by the New Congress. But this did not prevent Mr. Manoranjan Hazraanew MP belonging to the CPM, from making the charge in Parliament this week that the Centre is determined to frustrate the democratic verdict of the people of West Bengal and foist on them a government of its choosing in ‘‘colonial’’ style. Arbitariness on New Delhi’s part in the past gives the charge a certain plausibility in West Bengal, which has obliged even a person like Prof. Hiren Mukerjee of the CPI to warn the Centre about it.



The CPM’s argument in effect is that a bourgeois Centre cannot possibly tolerate a government run by militant communists. In 1967, the United Front ministries accused New Delhi of denying a fair share of food supplies to Kerala and West Bengal as part of an overall toppling strategy. Following this Mr. E. M. S. Namboodiripad raised the demand that Kerala should have the first claim on the foreign exchange it earns. This was nothing but tub-thumping to build up an anti-Centre sentiment. But the country cannot afford to ignore the lesson

that it needs better and more efficient agencies through which the Centre and the States can arrive at agreed decisions on difficult problems such as food distribution in a year of shortage. If such agencies are set up it will leave little scope for the kind of anti-Centre rhetoric which the CPM and others adopt

for their own

political ends.

Their attempts to project Centre-

State problems as facets of class conflict must be defeated—but on the political plane, and by fair means. The last qualification is specially necessary. This alone can Strengthen the commitment of the Indian people to democratic processes. It is only thus that the advocates of instant revolution can be denied a purchase in Indian politics.

Above all, the Centre needs to establish its political neutrality vis-a-vis all parties operating within the democratic framework. Even against those who take to extra-parliamentary methods, the fight will have to be conducted primarily on the political plane, with the ballot box Serving as the final arbiter. This may seem a tall order, but as West Bengal has




as the one

attempted in 1967 to get

rid of the first United Front ministry) are self-defeating. It is equally


to work

out a new



financial relations so that the resources availabl e to the States correspond to the responsibilities they have to bear. It is not

necessary to do this by ceding part of the Centre’s powers of

taxation to the States,


this will reduce

the scope for

redistribution that now takes place from the richer units to the



But the modalities of redistribution need looking into poorer. to do away with the least trace of suspicion about the Centre Some progress has been made in this playing favourites. direction by evolving new norms for the distribution of Plan grants, but this can be



It is best

to do this

now while we have a strong Centre, instead of leaving it toa later day when weakness in New Delhi may lead to needless distortions. In dealing with problems of the remote and peripheral areas like Nagaland or Mizo Hills, the need is to strengthen their sense of belonging, and to assure them that they will Excellent results have been remain masters in their own house. obtained in Nagaland since 1962 when it was made a State on its own. Trouble broke out in the Mizo Hills, largely because it was totally neglected.

Sensibly, the nation’s leaders have begun to see the difference between separatism and secessionism. They have lately been willing to concede statehood fairly liberally. The _ emergence of Meghalaya in 1969 marks the beginning of this new trend, although some in the ruling party were opposed to this on the ground that a separate unit for the hill people involved a security risk. Those with longer memories may recall that the same kind of nonsense was voiced, sotto voce, in relation to Punjab. There are special provisions in the Constitution

guard the local customs

and ways

to safe-

of life of the tribal people.

The basic intention of Article 370 was the same in relation to In any case, quite a few Kashmiris will want to Kashmir. review their ideas about Pakistan after the brutalities the military has perpetrated to impose its will on the Bengalis. If this can happen to the 75 million people, who constitute the majority of Pakistan’s population, the three million Kashmiri Muslims can scarcely want to entrust their fate to a power-mad junta which has again called off the democratic experiment to perpetuate itself in power.



Once Bangla Desh becomes a fact, it will become impossible to link the India-Pakistan conflict at the State level to the unfortunate tradition of Hindu-Muslim antagonism. This wilt

deprive West Pakistan of one of the stock arguments it employs

to explain away its refusal to live as a good neighbour. But more important is the fact that it will also cut the ground from under the feet of both Hindu and Muslim chauvinists. This will be a helpful development in relation not only to Kashmir but the whole sub-continent.






The people of East Bengal have held out for nearly two months against the total armed force that a military regime, strengthened for over two decades by armed assistance from America, Russia and China, has been able to mount against them. They have had to fight not only against the entire range of modern weapons—jet fighter-bombers, tanks, artillery—but

also against a plan to liquidate anyone capable of leading, administering, inspiring, educating or developing an autonomous society or of healing their wounds.

Never in recent history have the odds been so one-sided, more so if 23 years of colonial exploitation by West Pakistan is taken into account. Never have a people seemed less equipped

to resist oppression, and never has a dictatorship utilised all the forces of persecution and destruction available to it in our times so brutally to crush and terrorise a people. It is difficult to comprehend such callous

behaviour from


people who were part of Ind ia less than 25 years ago. Consequently, there are many her e who still hesitate to face the facts, especiall wards to make

y those who

feel it necessary to lean ove r back-

sure that they are



influenced by a crude bias against Pakistan, and others who have no con ception

of military destructiveness.

But numerous eyewitness accounts,

backed by films and photographs, given by person s who can Possibly have no bias

indiscriminate killings of Bengali civilians and the “it ’s bloody good fun” attitude of a We st Pakistani Major—add up toa campaign of organised ter ror and repression of whic h the Nazis would have been proud. The purpose of making these points is not to sta nd in judgment over the Yahya Khan regime or to make a case for genocide hearings by an international tribunal on the model of the one that tried the Ge rman war criminals at Nuremberg, This is not the time for that. Nor is it necessary now to go

modern weapons) the me dieval savagery perpet rated by Timur or Nadir Shah ona co nquered people, irresp ective of their religion. The Purpose is to establish the right of the people of East Bengal not only to set up their own Bangla Desh but also to expect recognition an d whatever assistance they require to live freely in it. The rig ht has been established in blood in the last four weeks as convin cingly as it was establis hed by popular vote five months ago.

Nevertheless they have received

neither the internatio recognition nor the as nal sistance that they dese rv e. And now it appears that they may not be able to win their Struggle unassisted at least in the fore seeable future.

There has


increasing evidence now that the West

Pakistan army of occu pation

in Bangla Desh

has regrouped



and received enough reinforcements ‘and supplies to turn the tide against the popular resistance forces. Armoured of air-supplied out been able to venture have units cantonments again to occupy and terrorise smaller towns and communications




all, the Pakistan


Force has received enough fuel and ammunition to bomb and ‘strafe defenceless towns and villages at will. Helicopters contributed by foreign countries to assist cyclone victims have been re-equipped to mow the people down.

If the build-up continues unchecked, the hopes of an early ‘victory for the emerging Bangla Desh—aroused during the arly days when the West Pakistan forces were low on fuel and ammunition and reeling under the impact of a massive popular resistance they never expected—will be frustrated.

will Apart from extending the suffering and devastation, this demoenhance the attendant risks of enforced collaboration,

walisation and an extremist bid for leadership.

Thus it is now that the moment of crisis has arrived for phase “Bangla Desh—with all its implications for India. The phase of mass, enthusiastic popular resistance is passing ; the of co-ordinated, sustained




all militarised

determined -warfare against an occupation army that is clearly And Bangla Desh is not to stake all to stay on has come.

ance equipped to win this kind of war decisively without assist cut off. from outside unless West Pakistani reinforcements are

It would have been best if at least a few countries had Desh. But zecognised and rushed to the assistance of Bangla and signs of is spite of the sympathy aroused by Press reports the military concern in Moscow and Washington over what been done to regime in Pakistan is doing, nothing positive has There are many reasons for organise international assistance. what indifferent this : ranging from the cynicism of a world some of governments to tales of brutality in distant lands to the fears The key operative reason, holding down restive populations. that any vital however, is that governments do not think national

interest is served

by assisting

Bangla Desh

at this



Stage : and that it is wiser,

therefore, to sit on the fence until

one side or the other attains conclu sive superiority.

But this is not true of India. It cannot afford to stand by and watch the sufferings of the people of East Bengal. It has much to gain if a viable friendly Bangla Desh emerges ; it has even more to lose if West Pakistan effectively reoccupies thearea or if the fighting degenerat es into a protracted guerilla.

of the issue.

Already over

have crossed the border story.

200,000 men,

women and children

and this is only the beginn in fogf the-

Thus it is essential for Ind ia to do whatever is requ ired to. end the war in favour of Bangla Desh governed by the politi-

The major gains to Indi a in the emergence of a Viable: Bangla Desh include :


A potential enemy on bo th its borders will be repl aced: by a far weaker enemy on one side and a frie nd'on the other,


The Kashmir question will be rid of What re mains ofits sting, domestic as well as international.


The claim of secular democracy to be the best govern-. ing system for multiracial developing countries will be strengthened > and the myth of an enduring nationhood based on religion will be expl oded.





Thecynical role of China, which has come out in support of the military regime in Islamabad, in the region will be exposed and countered. The appeal for aid addressed to India by Maulana Bhashani, the veteran leftist East Bengal leader who was regarded as pro-Chinese, shows the shift in sentiment caused by Peking’s reaction.

If Bangla Desh goes under, or the struggle becomes confused, the pendulum will swing in the opposite direction. The Pakistan-China axis against India will be strengthened. Peking’s policies will be regarded as irresistible, secularism and democracy will be on the retreat and India will have a chaotic, embittered and impoverished population of some 75 million on its eastern border.

Assistance need not mean direct involvement of the Indian armed forces in the fighting in Bangla Desh. Such involvement may infact do more harm than good. But short of direct involvement, much can be done to help the forces of popular “resistance without detracting from its true character as a war of national independence.

Those who fear that any open assistance to Bangla Desh may encourage some regional party leaders here to press for more powers for the States are being needlessly panicky. If the fact that Bangla Desh represents a movement involving the rights of more than half of Pakistan’s total population is kept to the fore, the issue falls into the right perspective. A more correct appreciation is that the upheaval in East Bengal shows what can happen if a democratic balance between federal and regional needs is not evolved in the way that India has evolved it, despite the impatience of those who would have preferred to see a more authoritarian New Delhi forcing the pace.




We became independent in 1947, that was not, however, the end of colonialism in this sub -continent. Colonialism in its pristine form continues in Bangla Desh, and its people are fighting the battle we fought a centur y ago. British colonialism reached its heyday in the late nineteenth century. By that time, British industrialists had developed a jute industry in India which exported to all the

industrial countries of the world, and enabled Britain to import far more of their goods than it could finance with its exports to them. By means of its imperi al hegemony, Britain exported goods to India which it found difficult to sell elsewhere. In this way, Britain used its Pos session of India to attain a far higher standard of living and growth rate than it could eve r have done by its own efforts.

Many Indians of that time saw the process, many more suffered it, and some like Dadabhai Naoroji and Ro mesh





Chunder Dutt tried to articulate it, albeit with an inadequate Quite recently, the mechaunderstanding of the mechanism.


has been

clearly illuminated by S. B. Saul in his ‘Studies

in International Trade’.

The mechanism of Pakistani colonialism in East Bengal On the basis of the raw jute that became is strikingly similar. surplus when Partition separated it from the jute mills of Calcutta, Pakistani industrialists set up a jute industry in East Bengal which began to export all over the world. In the 1960s, East Bengal accounted for some 60 per cent of Pakistan’s exports. But it received only 30 per cent of Pakistan’s


To put it differently, East Bengal exported to the world about Rs. 600 crores worth of goods in 1960-64, and received about the same value in return. West Pakistan exported about Rs. 400 crores worth; in return it received Rs. 1,400 crores worth

of goods,


It appropriated about



then, foreign aid to Pakistan


of it financed by aid.

of the foreign aid.



less significant, and

jute goods have risen rapidly to finance an increasing proportion of West Pakistan’s imports. In the same period, West Pakistan exported to East Bengal Rs. 200 crores worth of goods more than it imported: They were exported at prices far above international prices. Take, for instance, cotton textiles, a major export of West Pakistan to East

In 1965, the wholesale price of bleached long cloth in Bengal. 1°70 a metre, against Rs. 1°17 in Rs. Chittagong was

Abmedabad; and textiles are not particularly cheap in India. The cloth sold in East Bengal was made out of cotton which cost Rs. 230 a quintal in Karachi, against Rs. 270 in Bombay.

The hostility of Pakistan towards India entailed particularly heavy costs to East Bengal. The cessation of trade by Pakistan stopped annual exports of about Rs. 5 crores worth of fish to Calcutta and raised

the price of coal

to Rs. 150—three times the price in Calcutta.

in Chittagong




The Government of Pakistan system atically discriminated against East Bengal. In 1965-66, for instance, the provincial government of West Pakistan spe nt Rs. 177 crores, while that of East Bengal spent Rs. 90 crores. To finance the expenditure, West Pakistan received grants fro m the central government of Rs. 23 crores ; the government in the East got a mere Rs. 3 crores. The government of West Pakistan earned anothe r Rs. 18 crores out of irrigation schemes financed largely by the central government. By that year, irrigation had bee n extended to a mere 23,000 acres in Eas t Bengal and yielded no rev enue.

Over three-quarters of the import licences have consistently gone to West Pakistan. Since Pakistan imports most of its industrial machinery, the import policy has favoured the industrialisation of West Pakist an at the cost of the East. In the first 18 months of Pakist an’s Third Five-Year Plan, industrial investment worth Rs. 224 crores was sanctione d. Two-thirds of it went to Wes t Pakistan. Of the foreign exchange allotted, 70 per cent wen t to West Pakistan.

The result was that while per capita income grew by 15 per cent in the West bet ween 1950-54 and 1960-64, it did not rise at all in the East. At the end of the period, the per capita inc

ome in East Bengal was a qua rter less than in West As Stephen Lewis’s study cle arly shows, in Spite of the fact that Fast Bengal sav ed a larger part of its inc ome and exported a far larger part of its Production, it was get ting less investment and imports, and its growth was effective ly thwarted. Pakistan.

It was this system of exploitat ion that Sheikh Mujibur Rehman protested against. To end it, he asked for basically two things : autonomy in for eign trade Policy and powe r to control industry and finance. As the entire history of coloni alism shows, however, an imp erial power never lets a colony go unless the costs of holding it come to exceed the benefits. In trying to repress Bangla Des h, President Yahya Khan is following the traditions of the past two centuries.





He has chosen a particularly vile combination of colonialism and Nazism for precept. And in fighting him, the people of Bangla Desh are fighting battles that we fought only a quarter century ago. Our nationalism has surely not so rusted cold in the meanwhile, that we can betray our neighbour with hearts.

y Contrary to common belief, Pakistan is not essentiall larger ‘supplying its army in Bangla Desh by air. A much occurred by movement of material, and perhaps also of men, Alh. ships which reached Chittagong about the end of Marc ered by though the unloading of the ships has been hamp determined


and the refusal of dock labour to work,

stock-piles it seems likely that the Pakistan army has sufficient forces may jn the east to last a few weeks at any rate. Local ; but the over‘suffer shortages owing to difficulty of transport _all supply situation is not critical. to supply its In the longer run, Pakistan will endeavour divisions that are army by sea ; and it has the capability. The supplied if they ‘reported to be in Bangla Desh would be well The National received shipments of 10,000 tons a month. about ten times as Shipping Corporation of Pakistan carries lies to Chittagong ‘much and, in fact, can carry military supp to that route, if it and Chalna without diverting any tonnage ceases to carry all civilian goods.

army’s logistiParadoxical as it may seem, the Pakistan much more serious cal difficulties within Bangla Desh are Firstly, convoys between than between it and West Pakistan. towns



to interception

by liberation



night of fighting. suffered serious disruption in the first fort ng refinery has made it Secondly, the damage to the Chittago import it. Thirdly, the necessary to economise on petrol and to r scale yet, has made destruction of bridges, though on a mino railways have ceased to - some routes unusable. Fourthly, the because the liberation function because the staff have left and tions. forces until recently held key railway junc



As a result, the Pakistan army transport.




has been forced to use air

there are difficulties.

Firstly, aviation

fuel is far more expensive and is required in far larger quantities than motor gasolene. Secondly, the capacity of a garrison to send air reinforcements depends on the maximum size of aircraft that can land on its Strip. Since most strips are short




the scale of air movements has.

been restricted. Air transport has had to be supp lemented by airdrops. Thirdly, maintenance problems, thou gh probably not important yet, are likely to become increasingly serious.

Thus, internal transport is the Achillies’ heel of the Pakistan army. It has not been a Serious problem hitherto.

because of the extravagant use of aircraft which, however, can-not last long. The monsoon will make communications far

more difficult ; and if the liberation forces shift their strategy from the occuption of towns and encirclement of cantonments. to disiruption of the lines of communication, they will gradu ally immobilise the Pakistan army.

The civilian trade between West Pakistan and East Bengali will virtually cease. This will entail shor tages of gunny bags,. matches and paper in West Pakistan. But more important, it will entail a severe cutback in the output and employment of the West Pakistan textile industry ; for almo st half its output. used to be exported to East Bengal.

The depression in the West Pakistan textile industry will be matched by a scarcity of cloth in the East. But far more serious will be a shortage of basic foo ds, for East Bengal im-ports over 10 per cent of its foodgrain requirements and morethan half its requirements of edible oils. It is already suffering a serious shortage of cigarettes, as it is heavily dependent on tobacco imports from West Paki stan. The problems of East Bengal are likely to be serious and cannot but have a Strong impact on India, However, when Bangla Desh thr ows Pakistan off its back. it will then be the only country in this part of the world which.






balance its trade and live without foreign aid,


independence, together with the fact that it will have won its freedom with blood and sweat, will give it a political style of its own.

With few inefficient industries to protect, Bangla Desh can afford liberal trade policies, so unlike the berserk autarky It will import many industrial goods, of India and Pakistan. minerals and fuels. By replacing high-cost imports from West Pakistan with imports from the cheapest sources, Bangla Desh will improve its terms of trade and save foreign exchange. Its savings rate exceeded 12 per cent in 1963-64 and the removal of West Pakistani exploitation could certainly raise this. With a high savings rate and a healthy balance appreciably. of trade, Bangla Desh could attain a growth rate of 5-6 per cent a year, if not more. Pakistan,









ments difficulties. By insulating itself from outside competition in East Bengal, Pakistan used to export industrial goods. there, and earn a trade surplus of about Rs. 50 crores a year. In addition it probably received another Rs. 50 crores from the profits of the textile mills, jute mills, paper mills, banks and insurance companies owned by West Pakistanis. Soa minimum worsening of the balance of payments of Rs. 100 crores. is on the cards and would entail cutting down imports by about a quarter.

If, in addition, foreign aid were also to diminish it would place Pakistan in great difficulty. Between a third and a half of Pakistan’s imports has been financed by aid in recent years. West Pakistan has been getting three-quarters of all import licences. Hence it is likely that more than a half of its imports was financed by aid. After the war, the political weight of Pakistan might well shrink and East Bengal, the less developed but more populous territory, can no longer be used to: attract aid. Hence aid might well go down from the recent level of $ 500 million a year to $ 200-300 million. If it does,



the total fall in Pakistan


imports will be about 50 per cent.

Devaluation will be inevitable ; but it will not solve lem. Imports will have to be cut drastically.

the prob-

Which imports will be cut ? The major groups of Pakistani imports are mineral oil and coal, chemicals, drugs and medicines ; vehicles ; machinery and metals. Of these, mineral oil and coal come from Pakistan’s allies, viz., Iran and China,

who might be expected to extend liberal credits for continuation of these imports. Imports of chemicals and drugs are essential and difficult to cut. Vehicle imports cannot be curtailed drastically in the absence of domestic import substitutes. Hence the heaviest cuts will fall on imports of industial machinery ; and a cut back in steel imports will entail a fall in domestic machinery production and construction. Hence the growth rate of Pakistan’s industry will be serverely reduced. There are other factors pointing in the same direction. The cessation of textile exports to East Bengal will bring a serious depression to West Pakistan’s textile industry : and the textile industry has been the mother of many industries in West Pakistan, for industrialists have been reinvesting profits made in textiles in a wide range of other industries.

Thus, West Pakistan is heading for serious troubles and a period of very slow growth, if any. in an unreflective moment, predicted that Bangla be a mendicant nation. The description will turn Pakistan much better.

economic Newsweek, Desh will out to fit

Bangla Desh has received unstinted support from —in words.

When it comes to doing something,


people of all

Shades of opinion, from extreme right to extreme left, find satisfactory reasons for doing nothing. Every theology enjoins inaction.

However, we wish to point out the costs of inaction. For it is likely that by doing nothing we might, in the long run, come to incur far higher economic and social costs than the




highest possible costs we might incur by acting. The costs are basically of two kinds : costs related to immigration, and costs related to inflation which any war situation generates. The only economic objectives of Pakistani occupation of Bangla Desh can be that the production and exports of jute

goods should be safeguarded, and that the costly army establishment in the East should be supported by local resources.

But Pakistan’s rulers are quite innocent of economics. In their military text-books, they have read that the quickest way of subduing a hostile people is mass terror—wide-spread slaughter, loot and arson. They have read of the campaigns of Attila and Genghis Khan, Timur Lang and Nadirshah, Sherman in the Confederate States, Germans in Russia and Russians in Germany. They forgot that this technique was used successfully

only by armed hordes on quick loot-gathering expeditions or operating to cut the supply lines of conventional armies, and never by an occupying colonial army fighting unorthodox forces with diffused supply lines.

So, Pakistan is bound eventually to forfeit its objectives in East Bengal, and pull out. In the meanwhile, its tactics are bound to create considerable economic insecurity and distress in East

Bengal ; and the longer Pakistan greater the disruption will be.


to occupy

it, the

The immediate impact on India will be a massive influx of refugees. They have started coming already. Some 2,58,000

have been officially counted sofar. These migrants have just come from border areas which have been invaded or bombed. Many more people from further inside the country would be on the way. This is prior to any wide-spread

disruption of economic

life, The jute economy of East Bengal is dislocated beyond repair : the effects of the dislocation will be felt over the next six months. Thousands of people, dependent on jute production, will be out of work. They will try to make their way towards




India. West Pakistan is certainly unlikely to feed them, and will probably think it a very clever move to push them to India.

Next, East Bengal has in recent years been importing over a million tons of foodgrains a year, comprising over 10 per cent At present the two ports of East Bengal of its food supply. are not even in a position to handle the imports required by the Pakistan




is quite out of the

of foodgrains

The war is also likely to reduce

the rice output of

East Bengal. Even if the shortfall in foodgrain availability were to be just 20 per cent, it would cause a major famine. The consequent emigration to India, which might start six months hence, might be in millions. We might be faced with a population movement on the scale of 1947 and 1948; and this time there will be no emigration to make room for The minimum cost of maintaining two million immigrants. people would be Rs. 100 crores a year—as much as the cost of the 1965 war with Pakistan. And the burden would not be for ust a year : it would be a recurring one.

The potential influx of refugees also has an awkward The greatest disorganisation has geographical dimension. occurred in Eastern



fertile, commercialised

jute belt between Sylhet and Chittagong. Refugees from that area would stream into the eastern tip of India—Tripura, This is a relatively undeveloped, Mizoland and Meghalaya. sparsely populated area, and provisions for the refugees will have to come from regions further west. The nearest industrial area, Calcutta, is 500 miles away ; and the road and rail con-

nections with the rest of India are tenuous. Hence an influx of refugees will create serious problems of logistics. If supplies

to that area are not stepped as needed, there will be either serious economic distress or pronounced local inflation there.

Socially, the absorption of refugees into the working population in the last 20 years has proved a most difficult

process. Industrial wages in the Calcutta lowest of those

in the industrial


region are among the of India, and





wages have tended to fall. Unemployment has been particularly serious. The contribution of refugees from East Bengal to serious crimes in Calcutta, including political crimes, is noticeable. In the general conditions of labour surplus prevailing in

the eastern region, a large influx of refugees would create social unrest that it would take decades to overcome. The danger of inflation and scarcity applies to the whole of eastern India, and is independent of refugees. The industrial production and imports of East Bengal are at a standstill, and Pakistan is neither capable nor willing to supplement the supplies. Commercial supplies of salt, matches, petrol, cigarettes, etc., are already being attracted into the liberated areas of Bangla Desh ; the demand will increase considerably as time goes on. The Pakistan army itself finds it very costly to supply itself from West Pakistan, and would undoubtedly like to develop clandestine supplies from India. The Bangla border, being thickly peopled and poor in communications, has always been difficult to police, and has permitted the smuggling of even low-value

goods like jute into India. In the ensuing unsettled conditions, it will be much more difficult to prevent the movement of goods into East Bengal, even were the Government inclined to do so. Incipient inflation may be a good thing, for industry and trade. But, it is certainly likely to be resented by the general population, and will contribute to industrial unrest.

Jt is quite clear to every one that Pakistan is fighting a war in circumstances that could not be less favourable toit. It is also clear that Pakistan believes India to have buttressed, if not inspired, the uprising in Bangla Desh.

In the present situation, Pakistan finds it highly unpalatable that the people of Bangla Desh rose and stood up against it ; itis more consistent with Pakistan’s self-respect to regard India as a major villain. The possibility cannot, therefore, be ruled out that Pakistan will look for ways of attacking or embarrassing India thinking, however mistakenly, that it will thereby relieve the pressure onits forces inthe East. The




political, diplomatic and other means at its disposal can be visualised easily. It would be very foolish for India to formulate es in policy on the assumption that Pakistan will endure revers the East mutely.

drift. This, in effect, is the case against complacency and ourselves There is no way open to us asa country to insulate ; their from the calamity befallen on the people of Bangla Desh ision sufferings will visit themselves upon us. The costs of indec The costs can be will eventually mount to hundreds of crores. Bangla avoided only if Pakistan can be persuaded to leave Desh alone.

local the shell had after Army

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of Dacca_ after being

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GIRILAL JAIN Pakistan might not have been saved as one country even if General Yahya Khan had agreed toend martial law and transfer power to the elected representatives of the people, to begin with, at the provincial level. But hopefully. some kind of confederal solution might have emerged. East Bengal might have been content with something less than complete sovereignty and agreed to a fairly high degree of economic co-operation.

But by instituting a reign of terror in a most


Yahya Khan did not even warn Sheikh manner—General Mujibur Rehman that his demands were totally unacceptable and that unless he climbed down the consequences would be grave —the hard-faced menin Islamabad have not only made sure that East Pakistan will break away in course of time but also sowed the seeds of a major, perhaps an unmanageable, political crisis in West Pakistan as well.

No one can say how long the West


troops will




take to put down the active and, in the case of the East Pakistan Rifles, armed resistance and whether they will fully succeed in this miserable enterprise. But assuming that they do, how does the military junta propose to rule over the 75 million people who have shown beyond a shadow of doubt that they are a nation ? The legitimacy of governmental authority is as vital in empires as in nation-States in our day. The British empire in India for instance could not surive for long once the intelligentsia and the people began to challenge its legitimacy. The imperial authority was effective only so long as the elite as well as the masses respected it and believed, rightly or wrongly, that it brought certain advantages to them in spite of its exploitative character. Since it cannot be disputed that Pakistan is an empire and not a nation-State and that the people in East Bengal no longer recognise the legitimacy of Islamabad’s authority, it follows that the latter cannot restore the status quo ante, however much

force it might use and that it cannot hold down a sullen and embittered populace by the force of arms without making itself bankrupt in the process. It is difficult to say whether East Bengal will become another Vietnam or Algeria. But the question is not as pertinent as some believe it to be. The same is true of the other question whether the Gandhian techniques of non-violent struggle can avail against a heartless military machine. The crux of the matter is that the East Bengalis have become a nation and that General Tikka Khan’s legions can only strengthen their resolve to assert their identity. Since no empire today can be run for the benefit of the imperial power without the cooperation of a large section of the colonial people in question, East Bengal will in future be a big drag on West Pakistan.

It is, therefore, only a matter of time

Islamabad reconciles itself to the loss of East Bengal.




Since the rise of nationalism in East Bengal has been a long-drawn-out process, it will be arbitrary to fix a point when A\ll that can be said is it can be said to have become mature. that the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965, the overthrow of the Ayub regime in March 1969 and the general election in December 1970 were the most significant milestones in the province’s march towards nationhood.

The Muslims in united Bengal in the years before partition were so preoccupied with the problem of asserting themselves vis-a-vis fellow Hindu Bengalis, that they failed to acquire in a feeling of separate indentity vis-a-vis their co-religionists Mr. other parts of the country. Some of their leaders like at the Sohrawardy developed grave misgivings about partition But even then they could not think in terms of an last minute. accidental independent East Bengal. Their failure was neither and selfnor personal. It reflected the lack of self-awareness leadership and confidence among the East Bengali Muslim intelligentsia. of separate The East Bengalis began to acquire a sense Pakistan Governcultural identity in the early fifties when the first general election ment tried to impose Urdu on them. In the the only political in 1954 they swept aside the Muslim League, relic of pre-partition ‘symbol of one Pakistan, though itself a parties to power. politics, and returned a united front of local ght more in terms ‘But men like the late Mr. Fazlul Huq thou those of complete of renewing links with India than in sovereignty.

signs of a new selfEast Bengali nationalism showed akistan war in 1965. It was awareness at the time of the Indo-P ng common


knowledge by then that West

exploited East


Punjab had all alo

diverted its foreign exchange

n re in the services and foreig sha per pro its it ied den earnings, ship market. But the local leader aid and treated it as a captive vinced 5 war for the first time con 196 The n. dow ed cow felt l stil miry machine was not as for ita mil ani ist Pak t Wes the it that It was only then that East m. the to ed ear app dable as it had



Bengali leaders began to speak in a different and more confident. voice. The Sheikh formulated and announced his six-point autonomy programme in 1966.

It is, however, significant that the struggle against the autocratic Ayub regime in the winter of 1968 began not in East Bengal but in West Pakistan under the leadership of Mr. Zulfigar Ali Bhutto. The student community in Dacca jumped into the fray only when it had good reasons to believe that the self-appointed Field Marshal had Jost the will to rule and that the military junta, too, was by no means united behind him. But its intervention was decisive. It not only brought down the Ayub regime but also convinced at least a fairly strong and influential section of the ruling-bureaucratic elite in Islamabad that it could no longer run the country in the old fashion. That alone can explain General Yahya Khan’s decision to hold elections at all. The rest is a familiar story. The people in East Bengal converted the general election last December into a referendum on the issue of the six-point programme and gave the Sheikh the kind of mandate no democratic leader has ever received. No one can deny that by doingso the East Bengali people announced their arrival on the world scene as a nation.

During the entire subsequent crisis Mr. Bhutto has acted as the spokesman and agent of the hawks in the military establishment. But he must be a very short-sighted man indeed if he does dot




a people

become a nation, any

attempt to destroy their resistance can only steel their determination to assert their independence, and that in the process. of denying the East Bengali people their due, he has also made. sure that there will be no change-over to democratic rule in. West Pakistan as well.

Mr. Bhutto owed his electoral success last December to his

role not only asa champion West Punjab but also as an

of the anti-Indian sentiment in opponent of military rule. By

identifying himself with the enemies of East Bengal’s autonomy,



he has, albeit unwittingly, negated his second role. This cannot but reduce his stature and compromise his position in West Pakistan itself. West Punjabi chauvinism has lacked credibility in the eyes of large sections of Pathans,

Baluchis and

Sindhis in the past

whenever it has sought legitimacy in terms of hatred of India. It cannot become any more acceptable to them now that it seeks to justify itself in terms of bitter opposition to the legitimate aspirations of their co-religionists in East Bengal. The predominantly West Punjabi rulers in Islamabad thus face a triple crisis. East Bengal is in revolt ; the Pathans, the Baluchis and the Sindhis are bound to resent strongly the indefinite postponement of the promise of at least limited selftule and the intelligentsia in West Punjab itself cannot possibly reconcile itself for long to the denial of civil liberties. Its disillusionment will be complete when it realises that a war on the people of East Bengal isa drain on the resources of West Pakistan and that the anti-Indian hysteria is an exercise in - futility.

There can be honest differences of opinion on whether the emergence of a semi-independent East Bengal ina confederal set-up would have been such a traumatic experience for West Pakistan that it might have found it difficult to hold together. But what West Pakistan faces nowisa far graver crisis. The two-nation theory on which Pakistan is based is dead as an ideology and Pakistan cannot, therefore, survive for long as a physical reality. Whatever Mr. Bhutto and his ilk may say, the present wave of terror in East Bengal represents the last gasp of a dying empire where rulers have never realised what they were up against, much less shown the capacity and wisdom to transform their empire into a multi-nation State.



ya ‘


= ered!





: , 74°













We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which nd ; twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to manki and



to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better — se ndards of life in a larger freedom. And for these ends ~

to practise tolerance


live together

in peace



* «Eyerymans, United Nations, U.N. Publication, N.Y., 1968, pp. 553-564.




another as good neighbours, and

to unite our security; and







to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest; and

to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples. Article I

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end : to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the princ iples of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace; 2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to Strengthen universal peace; 3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all] without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion ;and


To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations

in the attainment of these common










Article 10

any questions or any The General Assembly may discuss present Charter or relating matters within the scope of the any organs provided for in the to the powers and functions of present






in Article 12, may

bers of the United Nations Mem the to ons ati end omm rec e mak both on any such questions or or to the Security Council or to matters. Article II

consider the general 1. The General Assembly may maintenance of international principles of cooperation in the principles governing disarmapeace and security, including the aments, and may make recomment and the regulation of arm principles to the Members or mendations with regard to such h. to the Security Council or to bot

discuss any questions 2. The General Assembly may international peace and security relating to the maintenance of er of the United Nations, mb Me any by it ore bef t brough a or by a state which is not or by the Security Council, e s in accordance with Articl Member of the United Nation 12, ept as provided in Article exc , and 2, aph agr par 35, h regard to any such questions may make recommendations wit or to the Security Council to the state or states concerned on on which action is necessary sti que h suc y An h. bot to or ty Council by the General uri Sec the to ed err ref be shall discussion. Assembly either before or after

y call the attention of the 3. The General Assembly ma er which are likely to endang s ion uat sit to l nci Cou Security ty. international peace and securi l Assembly set forth in this era Gen the of rs we po e Th 4. eral scope of Article 10. Article shall not limit the gen




Article 24


In order to ensure prompt and effe ctive action by the United Nations, its Members con fer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the mai ntenance of international peace and security, and agree tha t in Carrying out its duties under this Tesponsibility the Sec urity Council acts on their behalf. Article 26

In order to promote the establish ment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s hum an and economic resources, the Security Council shall be respon sible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Sta ff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments, Article 33


The parties to any dispute,

the continuance of which is likely to endanger the mainte nance of international peace and security, shall,

first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliat ion, arbitration, judicial set tlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council sha ll, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means. Article 34

The Security Council may inv estigate situation which might lead to international to a dispute, in order to determ ine Whether the dispute or situation is likely to endanger international peace and security.

any dispute, or any friction or give rise the continuance of the maintenance of









Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34 to the attention of the Security Council Assembly.

or of the General

2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter. Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.


In making

recommendations under

this Article the

Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court. Article 37


Should the parties to a dispute

of the nature referred

to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to




take action under Article 36 or to recommend settlement as it may consider appropriate.

such terms of

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute. Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance

with Articles 41

and 42, to main-

tain or restore international peace and security. Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, before making the recommendathe Security Council may, for in tions or deciding upon the measures provided Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such

provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, The Security claims, or position of the parties concerned. Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures. Article 4]

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of

These may the United Nations to apply such measures. include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other



of means relations.







and the severance




Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international Such action may include demonstrations, peace and security. blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations. Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to of international peace and contribute to the maintenance security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements,

armed forces,


and facilities,

rights of passage, necessary for the purpose international peace and security.


of maintaining

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided. Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force, it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under


43, invite



if the



desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member’s armed forces.




Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined,









agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee. Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee. Article 47

There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council’s military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employments and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament. Article 48

The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the Unite d Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any Other state, whether a






Member of the United Nations or





not, which finds itself con-

fronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems. Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs









Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security. Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements

or by such regional

tive of the states concerned Council.

agencies either on the initia-

or by reference

from the Security




Article 53

The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in pargraph 2 of this Article provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

B CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE* In its resolution 96 (I) of 11 December 1946 the General Assembly affirmed that ‘‘genocide is a crime under international law which the civilized world condemns’’, and requested the Economic and Social Council to undertake the necessary studies with a view to drawing up a draft convention on the crime of genocide to be submitted to the second regular session of the Assembly.’

The Economic and Social Council, by resolution 47 (IV), of 28 March 1947, instructed the Secretary-General to prepare In accordance a draft convention on the crime of genocide. ‘with this resolution the Secretary-General prepared a draft contransmitted on 7 July 1947 to vention (E/447) which was Member Governments for comments and which, together with * United Nations, Yearbook on Human Rights for 1948. 1950 pp. 482-486. 1. See Yearbook on Human Rights for 1947, p. 461.

U.N., N.Y¥+s



comments received, was submitted to the second regular session. of the General Assembly.

By resolution 180 (II) of 21 November 1947, the Assembly reaffirmed its former resolution on the crime cide and requested the Economic and Social Council to the work on genocide, including the study of the draft tion prepared by the Secretariat."

General of geno-continue conven--

Section I






Acting upon resolution 180 (II) of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, by resolution 117 (VI) of 3 March (E/777).

1948, established an Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide: The text of the resolution reads as follows :

The Economic and Social Council,

Taking cognizance of General Assembly resolution 180 (II) of 23 November


Requests the Members of the United Nations which have not yet done so to transmit at the earliest possible data their comments on the draft Convention prepared by the Secretary-General (document E/477) ;

Establishes an ad hoc Committee composed of the follow-ing members of the Economic and Social Council: China, France, Lebanon, Poland, the United states of America, the-

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Venezuela ; Instructs the

Committee :

(a) To meet at the Headquarters of the United


in order to prepare the draft convention on the crime of genocide in accordance with the above-mentioned 1. See Yearbook on Human Rights for 1947, p. 527,



resolution of the General Assembly, and to. submit this draft convention, together with the recommendation of the Commission on Human Rights thereon to the next session of the Economic and Social Council ; and,

(b) To take into consideration in the preparation of the draft convention, the draft convention prepared by the Secretary-General, the comments of the Member Governments




drafts on the matter Government ;



by any

and other


Requests the Secretary-General to take appropriate measures to enable the Committee to carry out effectively the tasks entrusted to it. The Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide met in Lake Success from 5 April to 10 May 1948 and prepared a Report (E/794) containing a draft Convention on the Prevention and PunishThe text of the draft convenment of the Crime of Genocide. tion reads as follows :

PREAMBLE The High Contracting Parties, Declaring that genocide is a grave crime against mankind which is contrary to the spirit and aims of the United Nations and which the civilized world condemns ; Having been profoundly shocked by many recent instances of genocide ;

Having taken note of the fact that the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in its judgment of 30 September1 October 1946 has punished under a different legal description certain persons who have committed acts similar to those which the present Convention aims at punishing ; and '



Being convinced that the prevention and punishment of genocide requires international cooperation ,

Hereby agree to prevent and punish the crime as hereinafter provided: Art. II. In this Convention ‘genocide’ means any of the following deliberate acts committed with the intent to destroy a national, racial, religious or political group, on grounds of the national or racial origin, religious belief, or political opinion of

its members :

1. Killing members of the group ;

2. Impairing the physical integrity of members of the group;

3. Inflicting on members of the group conditions of life aimed at causing their deaths ;



4. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group. Art. III. In this Convention ‘genocide’ any deliberate act committed with the intent to language, religion, or culture of a national, racial group on grounds of the national or racial origin belief of its members such as :

also means. destroy the or religious or religious

1. Prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse or in schools, or the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the group ; 2. Destroying or preventing the use oflibraries, museums, schools, historical monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and objects of the group.

Art. 1V.

The following acts shall be punishable :

(a) Genocide as defined in articles II and III :




Conspiracy to commit genocide ;

(c) Direct incitement in public (or in private) to commit apa (whether such incitement be successful or not) ; (d) Attempt to commit genocide ; (e)

Complicity article.

in any

of the acts enumerated

in this

Art. V. Those committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article IV shall be punished whether they are heads of State, public officials or private individuals.

Art. VI. The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact the necessary legislation in accordance with their constitutional procedures to give effect to the provisions of this Convention.

Art. VII. Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article IV shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed or by a competent international tribunal, Art. VIII. 1. A party of this Convention may call upon any competent organ of the United Nations to take such action as may be appropriate under the Charter for the prevention and suppression of genocide. A party to this Convention may bring to the attention of any competent organ of the United Nations any case) of violation of this Convention. 2.

Art. IX. 1. Genocide


the other

acts enumerated in

article IV shall not be considered as political crimes fore shall be grounds for extradition. 9.

Each party to this Convention pledges

and there-

itself to grant

extradition in such cases in accordance with its laws and treaties in force.





Art. X, Disputes between the High Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice provided that no dispute shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice involving an issue which has been referred to and is pending before or has been passed upon by competent international criminal tribunal. Art, XI. The present Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall bear the date of——.

Art. XH.

1. The present Convention shall be open


31— 194— for signature on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State to which an invitation to sign has been addressed by the General Assembly.

The present Convention shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations. 2. After 1— 194— the present Convention may be acceded to be on belalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State that has received an invitation as aforesaid.


of accession



Secretary-General of the United Nations.




Art, XIII. 1. The present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the receipt by the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations of not less than twenty instruments of ratification or accession. 2. Ratification or accession received after the Convention has come into force shall become effective as from the nineti eth

day foliowing the date of deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.



Art. XIV. 1. The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of five years dating from its entry into force. 2. It shall remain in force for further successive periods of five years for such Contracting Parties that have not denounced it at least six months before the expiration of the current period. 3. Denunciation shall be effected by a written notifica‘tion addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.



Should the number of parties to this Conven-

tion become less than sixteen as a result of denunciations, the “Convention shall cease to have effect as from the date on which

‘the last of these denunciations shall become operative.

Art, XVI. 1. Upon receipt by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of written communications from one-fourth -of the number of High Contracting Parties, requesting consideration of the revision of the present Convention and the transmission of the respective requests to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General shall transmit such communications to the “General Assembly. 2. The General Assembly shall decide if any, to be taken in respect of such requests.

upon the


Art. XVII. The Secretary-General of the United Nations ‘shall notify all Members of the United Nations and non-member States referred to in article XII of all signatures, ratifications and accessions received in accordance with articles XII and XIII, of the date upon which the present Convention has come into force, of denunciations received in accordance with article XIV, of the abrogation of the Convention effected as provided by article XV, and of requests for revision of the Convention made in accordance with article XVI.

Art. XIX. The present Convention shall be registered by ‘the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the date of its coming into force.




Section II THE


At its seventh session, the Economic and Social Council decided, by resolution 153 (VII) of 26August 1948, to transmit

to the third session of the General Assembly the draft Conven-

tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, together with the records of its own proceedings on the subject.

The General Assembly,

on the basis of the report of its:

Sixth Committee, adopted on 9 December 1948, resolutiom 260 (III) concerning the prevention and punishment of the

crime of genocide. The resolution was divided into three partsdealing respectively with the text of the Convention on the Prevention



of the


of Genocide, the

Question of an International Criminal Jurisdiction, and the application of the Convention on Genocide with respect to Dependent Territories. A.

The Text of the Convention on the Prevention Punishment of the Crime of Genocide


By resolution 260 (III) A, the General Assembly approved the following Convention on Genocide and proposed it for signature and ratification or accession in accordance with its article XI. The text of the Convention reads as follows : The High Contracting Parties,

Having considered the declaration made by Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 11 December 1946, that genocide is a crime under law, contrary to the spirit and aims of the United condemned by the civilized world ;

the General 96 (I) dated international Nations and

Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide




inflicted great losses on humanity ; and Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from Such an odious scourge, international cooperation is required ;

Hereby agree as hereinafter provided.

Art. J.

The Contracting


confirm that genocide,

whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, isa crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.

Art. II. In the present Convention, ‘genocide’ means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such : (a)

Killing members of the group ;


Causing serious bodily or mental of the group ;

harm to members.

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part ; (d)

Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group ;

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Art. III,

The following acts shall be punishable :

(a) Genocide ; (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide ;

(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide ;




(d) Attempt to commit genocide ; (e) Complicity in genocide. Art. IV. Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals. Art. V. The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article JII. Art. VI. Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction. Art. ViJ. Genocide and the other acts enumerated in article III shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition. The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in force. Art. VIII, Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acis of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III.

Art. 1X. Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present




Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the Internationa l Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.

Art. X. The present Convention of whic h the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authen-.

tic, shall bear the date of 9 December 1948,

Art. XI, The present Convention shall be open until 31 December 1949 for signature on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any non-member State to which an invitation to sign has been addressed by the General Assembly.

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instru-

ments of ratification shall be deposited General of the United Nations.


the Secretary-

After 1 January 1950, the present Conv ention may be acceded to on behalf of any Member of the Unit ed Nations and of any non-member State which has received an invitation as aforesaid. Instruments of accession shall be Secretary-General of the United Nations.




Art. XII. Any Contracting Party may at any time, by notification addressed to the Secretary-Genera l of the United Nations, extend the application of the present Convention to

all or any of the territories for the conduct of whose foreign

relations that Contracting Party is responsible.

Art. XII.

On the day when the first twenty


of ratification of accession have been deposited, the SecretaryGeneral shall draw up a procesverbal and transmit a copy of it to each Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-

Member States contemplated in article XI. Art. XIV.

The present Convention shall remain in effect



for a period of ten years force.

as from


the date of its coming into

It shall thereafter remain in force for successive periods of five years for such Contracting Parties as have not denounced it at least six months before the expiration of the current period. Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. If, as a result of denunciations, the number of Art. XV. Parties to the present Convention should become less than sixteen, the Convention shall cease to be in force as from the date on which the last of these denunciations shall become effective.

Art. XVI. A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any Contracting Party by means of a notification in writing addressed to the SecretaryGeneral.

The General


shall decide upon the steps, if

any, to be taken in respect of such request. Art. XVII. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all Members of the United Nations and the non-

member States contemplated in article XI of the following : (a) Signatures,




received in

accordance with article XI ;

(b) Notifications received in accordance with article XII ; (c) The date upon which the present Convention into force in accordance with article XIII ;

(d) Denunciations XIV ;


in accordance


with article



(e) The abrogation of the Convention in accordance with article XV ;


Notifications XVI.







The original of the present Convention shall

‘be deposited in the archives of the United Nations.

A certified copy of the Convention

shall be transmitted

to all Members of the United Nations and to the non-member States contemplated in article XI.

Art. XIX. The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the date of its coming into force.


The Question of an International Criminal Jurisdiction

By resolution 260 (III) B, the General Assembly invited the International Law Commission to study this question in connection with the Convention on Genocide. The text of the resolution reads as follows :

The General Assembly Consid-ring that the discussion of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide has raised the question of the desirability and possibility of having persons international charged with genocide tried by a competent tribunal.

Considering that, in the course of development of the international community, there will be an increasing need of an international judicial organ for the trial of certain crimes under international law. Invites

the International



the desirability and possibility of establishing an







judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes over which jurisdiction will be conferred upon that organ by international conventions. Requests the International

Law Commission, in carrying

out this task, to pay attention to the possibility of establishing: a Criminal Chamber of the International Court of Justice.

C. Application of the Convention Dependent Territories

on Genocide


respect to

By resolution 260 (II1) C, the General Assembly recommended that ‘‘Parties to the Convention on the Prevention and Pun‘siment of the Crime of Genocide which administer dependent territories should take such measures as are necessary and feasible to enable the provisions of the Convention to be extended to those territories as soon as possible’.



Nae a a


RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED ON THE | REPORTS OF THE SIXTH COMMITTEE : ON / 16TH NOVEMBER, 1950 AT THE ’ 305TH PLENARY MEETING 478(V) RESERVATIONS TO MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS The General Assembly Having examined the report! of the Secretary-General regarding reservations to multilateral conventions ;

Considering that certain reservations to the Convention* on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide have been objected to by some States ; 1.

/ 2.

Official Records, General Assembly, Fifth Session, A/1372. document 56, item Committe, Annexes, Agenda

See Resolution 260A (Il).





Considering that the International Law Commission is studying the whole subject of the Law of treaties including the question of reservations!; Considering

that different




have been expressed during the fifth session of the General Assembly, and particularly in the Sixth Committee? ;

1. Requests theInternational Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on the following questions : “In so far as concerns the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the event of a State ratifying or acceding to the Convention subject to a reservation made either on ratification or on accession, or onn signature followed by ratification:


Can the reserving State be regarded as being a party to© the Convention while still maintaining its reservation is objected to by one or more of the parties to the Convention but not by others ?


If the answer to question (i) is in the affirmative, what is [the effect of reservation as between the> Teserving

pate mele





Vv’ iii,


The parties which object to the reservation ?


Those which accept etc. ?

What would be the legal effect as regards the answers to question (i) if an objection to a reservation is made:


By a signatory which has not yet ratified ?


By a State entitled to sign or accede but has not yet done so ?”’

1. 2.

Ibid., Fifth Session, Supplement No. 12, paragraphs 160-164. Ibid., Sixth Committee, 217th-225th meetings.




2. SBevites the International Law Commission: i


Inthe course of its tii on the codification of the law of treaties, ‘fo. study the question. of reservations to multilateral conventions both from the point of view of codification and from that of the progressive development of international law ; to give priority to this study and to report thereon, especially as regards multilateral conventions of which the Secretary-General is Pl the depository, this report to be considered by the General Assembly at its sixth session ;


In connection with this study, to take account of all the views expressed during the fifth session of the General Assembly and particularly in the Sixth Committee;

3. Instructs the Secretary-General, pending the rendering of the advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice, the reciept of a report from the International Law Commission and further action by the General Assembly, to follow his prior practice with respect to the notification and solicitation of approvals thereof, all without prejudice to the legal effect of objections to reservations to conventions as it may be recomamended by the General Assembly at its sixth session.




The General Assembly Bearing in mind the provisions of its resolution

478(v) of




16th November, 1950 which (1) requested the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion regarding reservations to the Convention on thé Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and (2) invited the International Law Commission to study the question of reservations to multilateral Conventions ;

Noting the Court’s advisory opinion’ of 28th May, 1951 and the Commission’s Report? both rendered pursuant to the said resolution;

(1) Reconynends that organs of the United Nations, specialized agencies and States should, in the course of preparing Multilateral Conventions, consider the insertion therein of provisions relating to the admissibility or non-admissibility of reservations and to the effect to be attributed to them ;

(2) Recommends to all States that they be guided in regard to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 18th May, 1951;


Requests the Secretary-General :


In on of the

relation to reservations to the Convention. the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime Genocide, to conform his practice to advisory opinion of the Court of 28th May,



In respect

of future


under the auspices of the United which he is the depository :




concluded Nations of

To continue to act as depository in connec-. tion with the deposit of documents contain-

See Document A/1874.



ment No. 9.








ing reservations or objections, without passing upon the legal effect of such documents ; and


To communicate the text of the such documents relating to reservations or objections } to all States concerned, leaving it to each

1) Se







legal consequences