Baluchistan: Terra Incognita: A new methodological approach combining archaeological, historical, anthropological and architectural studies 9781841715131, 9781407325446

Table of contents :
Front Cover
Title Page
Copyright
Table of Contents
Authors
Transliteration
Abbreviations
PART I: LAND AND POWER
Images of a Little Known Region: A Land of Passage for Trade, Migrations and Military Operations
The Environmental Human Landscapes
Administrative Subdivisions and Tribal Structures. The Perception of the Territory between Tradition and Modernity
PART II: LAND, PEOPLE AND WATER
Water Rights as Social Contracts
The Hasni Tribe in Western Baluchistan. The Transformation of a Nomadic Tribe since the Beginning of the British Colonial Time (an Empirical Study)
Visions of Unity: The Baluch Ittehad. An Urban Voluntary Association in Baluchistan
PART III: FOCUS ON MAKRAN
International Indian Ocean Routes and Gwadar Kuh-i Batil Old Barrage in Makran
Crafts and Craftsmen in Makran - Lacquer Work
The Castles of Kech: A Society without Cities
Appendix: SKETCH NOTES ON THE FIELD
GENERAL INDEX
INDEX B: PLACE- NAMES
INDEX C: TECHNICAL TERMS

Citation preview

BAR S1141

Studies in the Archaeology and History of Baluchistan Volume I

2003 PIACENTINI FIORANI & REDAELLI (Eds)

Baluchistan: Terra Incognita A new methodological approach combining archaeological, historical, anthropological and architectural studies Edited by

Valeria Piacentini Fiorani Riccardo Redaelli

BALUCHISTAN: TERRA INCOGNITA

BAR International Series 1141 B A R

2003

Studies in the Archaeology and History of Baluchistan Volume I

Baluchistan: Terra Incognita A new methodological approach combining archaeological, historical, anthropological and architectural studies Edited by

Valeria Piacentini Fiorani Riccardo Redaelli

BAR International Series 1141 2003

Published in 2016 by BAR Publishing, Oxford BAR International Series 1141 Studies in the Archaeology and History of Baluchistan Volume 1 Baluchistan: Terra Incognita © The editors and contributors severally and the Publisher 2003 This research and its publication have been carried out under the aegis and with the financial contributions of the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Italian National Council for Research, and the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart (Milano-Italy) - within their individual programmes of scientific research and cultural cooperation. The authors' moral rights under the 1988 UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act are hereby expressly asserted. All rights reserved. No part of this work may be copied, reproduced, stored, sold, distributed, scanned, saved in any form of digital format or transmitted in any form digitally, without the written permission of the Publisher.

ISBN 9781841715131 paperback ISBN 9781407325446 e-format DOI https://doi.org/10.30861/9781841715131 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library BAR Publishing is the trading name of British Archaeological Reports (Oxford) Ltd. British Archaeological Reports was first incorporated in 1974 to publish the BAR Series, International and British. In 1992 Hadrian Books Ltd became part of the BAR group. This volume was originally published by Archaeopress in conjunction with British Archaeological Reports (Oxford) Ltd / Hadrian Books Ltd, the Series principal publisher, in 2003. This present volume is published by BAR Publishing, 2016.

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Contents Authors

ii

Transliteration

v

Abbreviations

vi

List of Plates List of Figures

Part I: Land and Power 1. Images of a Little Known Region: a Passage Land for Trade, Migrations and Military Operations (Valeria Piacentini Fiorani)

1

2. The Environmental Human Landscapes (Riccardo Redaelli)

17

3. Administrative Subdivisions and Tribal Structures. The Perception of the Territory between Tradition and Modernity (Riccardo Redaelli)

33

Part II: Land, People and Water 4. Water Rights as Social Contracts (Frank van Steenbergen)

49

5. The Hasni Tribe in Western Baluchistan. The Transformation of a Nomadic Tribe since the Beginning of the British Colonial Rule (an Empirical Study) (Fred Scholz)

59

6. Visions of Unity: the Baluch Ittehad. An Urban Voluntary Association in Baluchistan (Paul Titus)

73

Part III: Focus on Makran 7. International Indian Ocean Routes and Gwadar Kuh-i Batil Old Barrage in Makran (Valeria Piacentini Fiorani)

85

8. Trade, Migrations and Military Operations (9th – 11th Centuries AD) (Valeria Piacentini Fiorani)

119

9. Crafts and Craftsmen. Lacquer Work in Makran (Sheila Unwin)

135

10. The Castles of Kech: A Society Without Cities. Sketch Notes on the Field (Valeria Piacentini Fiorani)

143

Index of names

177

Index of place-names

183

Index of technical terms

189

i

Authors

VALERIA PIACENTINI: Chair of History and Institutions of Islamic Countries and Director of the Research Centre on the Southern System and Wider Mediterranean of the Catholic University of the S. Heart (Milano – Italy); Scientific Director of the Italian Research-Project in Baluchistan. RICCARDO REDAELLI: Assistant Professor of History and Institutions of Asia and Africa at the Catholic University of the S. Heart (Milano – Italy). FRED SCHOLZ: Professor and Head of the Centre for Development Studies at the Free University of Berlin (Germany). FRANK VAN STEENBERGEN: Advisor on water policies and institutional reforms with Arcadis Euroconsult (Netherlands). He is also in charge of Meta Meta, a company developing program management tools. PAUL TITUS: Lecturer of Anthropology at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Canterbury (Christchurch, New Zealand). SHEILA UNWIN: Member of the Italian Research-Project in Baluchistan and expert on ethnography and material culture in East Africa, the Gulf and Arabian Sea.

ii

It is with heartfelt gratitude and our greatest respect that we dedicate this book to the memory of Giuseppe Tilia. “May flights of angels sing thee to thy rest” (Hamlet, Act V Sc II)

iv

Transliteration A very simplified system has been used. Following the Printer’s line, no diacritical marks have been used. Vowels have been arabicized: a i u – â î û. Diphthongs follow the English form: ay, aw, ey. a when tâ marbûtah has been transcribed as ah in pause form, and as at in construct form. Article al has never been assimiliated, whether followed by a moon or a sun (shamsi) letter: al-Tabarî. The transliteration of the below consonants follow the English pronunciation: ‫ = ث‬th

‫ = چ‬ch

‫ = ذ‬dh

‫ = غ‬gh

‫ = خ‬kh

‫ = ج‬j

‫ = ش‬sh

‫ = گ‬g

Letter ‫ ع‬is transliterated as inverted comma. Letter ‫ ء‬is transliterated as elevated comma and is not expressed when at the beginning Place-names follow, when possible, the New Oxford Atlas prepared by the Cartographic Department of the University of Oxford. Names which have been anglicized by the addition of an English ending have not been written with diacritical marks (i.e. Umayyad, Abbasid, Sasanian). Modern and contemporary names of persons, political parties and movements follow the standard transcription in English. Names of ethnic groups and large tribes are considered as collective names, therefore only their singular form has been used.

v

ABBREVIATIONS

AION BDGS Besenval/Cartography BSOAS CHI CHIr COQDA E/I1 EHR G/PG GJ HSA IGI/PS IOR JAAS JESHO JRAI JRAS JRASB JRCAS JSAI NRS PRO PSAS RGI SAAC

Annali dell’Istituto Orientale di Napoli Baluchistan District Gazetteer Series, 10 vols., Bombay 1905-1908 (photostatic reprint from the original ed. with the title The Gazetteer of Baluchistan, 10 vols., Quetta 1986) R. Besenval, P. Sanlaville, 1990, Cartography of ancient settlements in Central Southern Pakistani Makran: New Data, in “Mesopotamia” - Rivista di Archaeolgia, Epigrafia e Storia Orientale Antica, 25 Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies The Cambridge History of India, 6 vols., Cambridge 1929The Cambridge History of Iran, 7 vols., Cambridge 1968Commissioner of Quetta Division Archives, Quetta The Encyclopedia of Islam, 4 vols., London 1913The English Historical Review J.O. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, 'Oman and Central Asia, 8 vols., Dublin (photostatic reprint from 1st. ed., Calcutta 1908 and 1913), 1986 The Geographical Journal Home Secretariat Archives, Quetta Imperial Gazetteer of India – Provincial Series India Office and Library and Records, London Journal of Asian and African Studies Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam Nuova Rivista Storica Public Record Office, London Proceeding of the Seminar for Arabian Studies Rivista Geografica Italiana International Conference on South Asian Archaeology

vi

PART I

LAND AND POWER

2

Images of a Little Known Region: a Land of Passage for Trade, Migrations and Military Operations Valeria Piacentini Fiorani

1. Terra incognita - 2. The literary evidence - 3. The Italian Historical, Archaeological and Anthropological Research Project in Makran and Kharan: a methodological approach - Acknowledgments

middle of the century, the British Empire felt the need for its own security - to build a telegraph line linking London directly with Calcutta (the Indo-European Telegraph). Functionaries instructed to “explore” and make the first map of the territory, and register the tribes who occupied it, proceeded with their task; but - what with ambushes, epidemics and famine - life was not easy for them. Around the 1870s it became necessary to define Baluchistan’s borders with Persia. New functionaries were sent off to dispatch the task in hand; the joint AngloPersian Committee, in collaboration with the representatives of the khan of Kalat, worked for some two years in difficult and very uncomfortable conditions; the mission was concluded in great haste, and the border was established by a treaty which satisfied no one. Such was the forbidding and inhospitable nature of the terrain, that London wanted matters expedited with all possible speed, avoiding any further loss of life. After which, oblivion descended yet again, with the exception of the few functionaries stationed on the coast (and the heroic wives who accompanied them, several of whose tombs can still be seen at Gwadar) and the Resident at Panjgur.

1. Terra incognita Even as recently as twenty years ago, opening the historical-geographical Oxford Atlas for Pakistan1, the region stretching along the south-western frontiers of Pakistan was overlaid with the telling words: blank area, or terra incognita. The centres of Turbat and Panjgur were marked; then, for hundreds and hundreds of square kilometres, almost as far as Quetta, the capital of Pakistani Baluchistan, there was a vast area without place-names or physical-geographical details. It would be normal to expect that in approaching the study of a region as extensive, isolated and incompletely known as was Baluchistan, there would be much convenience in having at hand some kind of atlas or updated gazetteer to which reference could be made regarding location and distribution. Conversely, the definition of “blank area”, or terra incognita, struck the Federal Functionaries as adequately defining a region of no interest except for its strategic position, that of being a “frontier zone”. For the rest - as always in recent centuries - Baluchistan was a land of wild and ruthless peoples, brigands, smugglers, mercenaries and traffickers, a land of legends and alarming tales, where much was little, and the only commodity available in plenty was tribalism, banditry and violence; to enter it meant certain death for anyone rash enough to cross its rocky gorges or immense desert wastes, where nothing was and nothing survived.

Thus it was not until the end of the nineteenth century, with the reports by Major E. Mockler and Captain A. T. Wilson, that we have the first detailed and reliable descriptions, from the physiographical, environmental and cultural points of view2. These latter two functionaries located also various archaeological sites, monumental tombs and cenotaphs, and castles, thus affording a first glimpse of a different historical dimension and giving the picture of a land - now so arid and for the most part truly desertic - which, in some more or less remote past, must have been anything but of inhospitable and uninhabited. Finally, with his expeditions of 1927 and 1932, Sir Aurel Stein was to carry out the first systematic archaeological survey of southern Baluchistan, and to provide authoritative

A marginal, frontier region, until the beginning of the 1880s it was virtually terra incognita to the English colonisers themselves. After a handful of surveys by functionaries and scholars, mainly British (amongst these for brevity’s sake I name only Henry Pottinger, William Vincent and William Ouseley, active at the beginning of the nineteenth century, followed shortly afterwards by explorations by sea undertaken by the British Naval Captains G. B. Kempthorne and A. W. Stiffe), the region was to fall once more into oblivion until, soon after the

2

E. Major Mockler, On ruins in Makran, in “JRAS”, New Series 9 (1877), pp. 121-134; Idem, On the Identification of Places on the Makràn Coast mentioned by Arrian, Ptolemy, and Marcian, in “JRAS”, New Series 11 (1879), pp. 129-154. Cf. also the reports by A. W. Hughes, The Country of Balochistan. Its Geography, Topography Ethnology and History, 1st ed. London 1877. See in particular the valuable information given by the “Baluchistan District Gazetteer Series” (BDGS), and with specific regard to the present research: R. Hughes-Buller, BDGS, Makran, Bombay 1906; Major C. F. Minchin, BDGS, Kharan, Bombay 1907; and BDGS, Jhalawan, Bombay 1907. G.P. Tate also deals with south-eastern Baluchistan, Seistan. A memoir on the History, Topography, Ruins and People of the Country, 1st ed. London 1910.

1

Oxford Atlas for Pakistan, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1981, 2nd revised impression 1983, 3rd 1984. First published as the Oxford School Atlas for Pakistan, Oxford 1959, revised and reprinted 1969,1973, 1979.

3

Baluchistan dealing with British India, “Partition”, Pakistan and its borderlands towards Iran as well as “the obscurity that in Lord Curzon’s words - has rarely lifted from these regions”.

confirmation of Mockler’s observations. Although “quasiempirical” and “very preliminary”, Stein’s report - on the basis of evidence brought to light in the course of soundings, and the study of ancient sites, funerary pottery, ceramic materials and archaeological finds traced successive stages of development, proposing new datings for the settlement of the region going back to the second - third millennium BC, and ascertained the presence of local civilizations and impressive remains of the so-called “Indus civilization”3. By so doing, he overturned chronologies and certainties in both the archaeological and anthropological fields. After this, the region was once again cast into darkness for a further three decades. In the Sixties the scholars H. Field and F. A. Khan, G. F. Dales, Cuyler Young and Rafique Mughal once again crossed the southernmost areas of Baluchistan; but theirs was a flying visit, and since their interest was in fact limited to re-tracing the archaeological route taken by Stein, they concerned themselves almost exclusively with the prehistory of the region, and their reports added nothing to the discoveries of the pioneering English scholar4. Their most important contribution was to intensify the area’s already wellestablished and notorious reputation as an inhospitable land peopled with brutal occupants. And then, we come to Beatrice De Cardi’s and J.-F. Jarrige’s archaeological reconnaissance and excavations. Their instructive reports and publications have cast fresh light on these “border lands” and undoubtedly represent remarkable new steps towards knowledge of the prehistory of the region and its links with adjoining areas and civilizations. However, they are still very partial, especially bearing in mind Baluchistan far-stretched and scattered hilly territory and its composite culture5.

Given the harsh nature of this Province, pursuing memoirs and reports in the British archives of the English functionaries dispatched to explore the region, it was thus difficult to uncover any exhaustive or convincing information beyond the data provided by the District Gazetteers. Even the guides who led those few hardy spirits were afraid to enter the steep eroded gorges of the Makran Ranges and the Black Mountains (or Siahan Kuh), or the ravined passes of the Ras Kuh and the Chagai Hills: they were unfamiliar with the tracks, wary of the treacherous winds, afraid of the impending black basaltic structures, frightened by the salty and silty desert plains in the long-stretched valleys; there were few wells, and supplies were unreliable. But of one thing they could be more than sure: jinns reigned there, the lethal miasmas and devouring fevers of the Red Desert and Talar Depression spared no one; the peoples who inhabited that godforsaken land had neither honour nor religion, and were of unrivalled ferocity. Unable to shirk the task imposed upon them by Her Majesty’s Government, the English officials had been obliged to face discomfort and great danger, with no certainty of return and without finding anything which might have made a more stable form of colonization worth attempting. Nor did Partition (1947) bring any radical change or fresh air. Be that as it may, the Italian Mission at work from 19821985 along the coastal strip of Iranian Harmuzgan and Makran6, after carefully studying those reports - dry, terse, but not devoid of interesting points - and after supplementing the available literature in both western and eastern languages (mostly Arabic and Persian) with the material evidence produced by surveys and excavations in Iran, began to harbour the conviction that a reconnaissance survey of Pakistani Makran and Kharan might lead to astonishing discoveries, and decided to take up the challenge posed by man and nature alike. In 1986 an official request was forwarded to the Government of Pakistan for a renewable “licence” for a three-year survey. This was granted in 1987, and the Italian Research-Group began to work in the field.

In the Eighties, of the nineteenth century the Oxford Atlas for Pakistan still marked this vast province as terra incognita, and its population still retained an equivocal reputation for inhospitality and cruelty, thus explaining the very scanty attention Baluchistan received in works 3

Sir Aurel Stein, An Archaeological Tour in Waziristan and Northern Baluchistan, in “Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India”, n. 37, New Delhi 1929; Idem, An Archaeological Tour to Gedrosia, first ed. 1931, New Delhi, 1982; Idem, The Indo-Iranian Borderlands: their Prehistory in the Light of Geography and of Recent Explorations, in “JRAI”, 64 (1934), pp. 179-202; Idem, Archaeological Reconnaissances in Southern Persia, in “GJ”, 83 (1934), 2 February, pp. 119-134; Idem, Archaeological Reconnaissances in North-Western India and South-Eastern Iran, London 1937; Idem, On Alexander’s Route into Gedrosia: an Archaeological Tour to Las Bela, in “GJ”, 102 (1943), nn. 5-6, Nov.-Dec., pp. 193-227. 4 Cf. H. Field, An Anthropological Reconnaissance in West Pakistan, 1955, Papers of the Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, 52, Cambridge-Mass, 1959; F. A. Khan, Fresh Light on the ancient cultures of Baluchistan and Bahawalpur, in H. Field, An Anthropological Reconnaissance in West Pakistan, 1955, Appendix A, pp. 181-209; G. F. Dales, Harappan Outposts on the Makran Coast, in “Antiquity”, 36 (1962), pp 86-92; Idem, A Search for Ancient Seaports, “Expedition” IV (1962), 2, pp. 2-10. 5 In this connection, see the “Selected Bibliography” in R. Besenval - P. Sanlaville, Cartography of Ancient Settlements in Central Southern Pakistani Makran: New Data, “Mesopotamia”, 25 (1990) (hereafter cited as Besenval/Cartography), specif. pp. 127-131.

2. The literary evidence In an extremely remote past, but one which nonetheless belongs to history, others had left their observations on those regions. Some had laid horrified emphasis on the country’s inhospitable nature, the absence of water, the 6

V. Fiorani Piacentini (ed.), Ricognizioni e Ricerche StoricoInsediamentali in Hormozgan e Makran, vol. I: C. Cattena - S. Ciccacci - C. Marinucci, Hormozgan (Iran Meridionale). Caratteristiche ambientali della fascia costiera, Roma 1987; Vol. II: Gruppi socio-tecnici e strutture politico-amministrative della fascia costiera meridionale iranica (with contributions by U. Fabietti, F. Fornara, F. Gandolfo, V. Fiorani Piacentini), Roma 1988.

4

Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: Images of a Little Known Region difficult terrain - harsh, ravine-bitten, crossed by particularly sheer mountain chains and massifs, with sawtoothed puckerings of black basaltic rock bordering whiteish hollows containing nothing but fine sand and salt deposits, almost bare of vegetation, the climate being particularly torrid in summer, freezing and scoured by wild winds in the winter months, the few river systems dry and stony for most of the year, but subject to sudden and devastating flooding when the rains came (see Plates 1.1 – 1.6). Several times during these years we have been forcefully reminded of the descriptions given by the Greek historian Arrian, in his detailed account of Alexander’s hazardous “march through Gedrosia” and “descent to the Ocean sea”. They tell of the sufferings which attended Alexander’s action, and of the heavy losses his army there suffered, giving an impressive picture of the forbidding nature of the ground. They tell of lunar landscapes, without permanent settlements, inhabited by “black and savage” peoples, whose chief activities were raiding and, on the coast, piracy; of dried up torrents, flash floods carrying men, animals and equipment before them; of poisoned wells, ambushes, epidemics, lethal attacks of dysentery... the leitmotif being the celebration of the Macedon’s courage, composure and valour in overcoming such formidable obstacles and his incomparable genius as a leader. At other times, it was as though we heard the reports of those sent by the caliphs to explore and conquer the regions to the east, and to take the law of Islam to those remote parts. Written between the end of the eighth century and the beginning of the ninth, the res gestae of the Arabs describe the extraordinary courage and pugnacious valour of the people living in those desert landscapes; many armies of Islam perished or were massacred by the lances of those treacherous peoples; there was no forage for horses or mules, the only fruit was dates, water was scarce, the terrain was stony. A frequent complaint was that a large army would not have found the wherewithal for survival, while a smaller one would inevitably have been massacred in the ambushes to which both the nature of the terrain, and the temperament of the men who lived there, so aptly lent themselves.

philosophical speculation. It was well-known for its few but excellent harbours, “where Indian and Persian merchants would stay throughout the year”, purchasing precious goods from central Asia (lapis lazuli, turquoises, rubies, agate, opals, cornelians etc.), gold, ivory and ostrich feathers from east Africa, spices and perfumes from India, pearls, horses, incense, frankincense, indigo, myrrh and dyes from Arabia, silk and brocade from China, and - a highly valued commodity - slaves of all kinds, races and provenances, beautiful young girls and graceful youths, expert in various arts and sophisticated crafts. Carefully sifted, the available literature thus gave us a vivid and detailed picture of this region. However, rather than contradicting one another, the sources could indeed be read as complementary, one image fleshing out the other: they describe a territory which, given its geographical location, has always represented a natural corridor between the Iranian plateau and its culture to the west, the Indus and its system to the east, the central Asian basin with its fabulous riches and civilizations to the north, and the Indian Ocean and the regions overlooking and/or gravitating towards that sea to the south. Because of this special geographical position, Baluchistan is a natural axis for north-south and east-west communications. It follows that in specific contexts and in a specific world order, it has played a crucial part as a major military and/or trade route; in times of disorder and subversion, on the other hand, it would retreat into autarchy, and slide into total anarchy, torn by family and tribal strife. In other words, in certain phases of its history this “frontier region” appears to play a vital strategic role for the control, especially military control, of certain areas, assuming the function of a “well-equipped fortress and bastion” (as it may have been at the time of the disruption of the Sasanian empire or during the British period); in others, it also operated as a trade route, in its turn a market-place for the absorption and exchange of the immense riches which gravitated towards it, with merchants of every race and colour, language and creed, from all part of the world, meeting in its ports and centres. Here gathered a motley, frenzied humanity engaged in business of all kinds, buying and selling the rarest and most precious merchandise7.

Other sources, however (Ammianus Marcellinus, various geographers and historians who wrote in Arabic and Persian from the ninth to the twelfth centuries, the Venetian Marco Polo himself, and, a little later, the Portuguese travellers and conquistadores of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries), have left us quite other descriptions. All concur in describing a forbidding and harsh region, because such was the configuration of its terrain, but they are equally unanimous in adding that it had been made welcoming, even hospitable and fertile, thanks to sophisticated hydraulic human interventions; lush and well-populated along the few water courses and around wells and canals (Plates 1.7 – 1.8), it also counted many settlements, primary and minor centres, with all the activities traditionally associated with a settled existence, such as flourishing agriculture, lively craftwork, active trade, and even poetical and artistic expressions and

3. The Italian Historical, Archaeological and Anthropological Research Project in Makran and Kharan: a methodological approach This was the tenuous literary trail on which the Italian Mission embarked in 1987, with the official support of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and on the basis of a Licence granted by the Federal Government of the Republic of Pakistan. The main object of its research was to verify, in situ, the 7

See ahead V. Fiorani Piacentni, Trade, Migrations and Military Operations (9th – 11th Centuries).

5

Baluchistan We chose southern Makran as our first objective for several reasons. Among these, there was a special interest bound to the studies and research so far carried out along the Iranian coastal area and the border lands of Kerman and Sistan. Moreover, there was the fact that the Oxford Atlas for Pakistan marked this district as “terra incognita”. Conversely, following the tours traced by Pottinger, Mockler, Stein and others, it was well possible to sense a territory rich in archaeological sites and ancient remains; hence a systematic search on the ground might prove to be both practicable and successful. Therefore, it became a challenging target to carry out an initial survey and fill voids and gaps. We chose as our main base Turbat - the capital-city of the Makran Division, likely the ancient city of “Kij”/”Kich” attested in written sources since the seventh century AD, the name applying to the whole territory. From there it would be possible to visit both the coastal area (including the historical sites of Ormara, Gwadar, Pasni and Jiwani) and the hinterland, that is the so called “green belt”, which stretches eastwestwards from the Kolwa depression for some 200 miles all along the Kech and Nihing rivers towards the Persian border, forming the economic backbone of the region (see Plates 1.7 – 1.8).

descriptions provided by the literature, and to outline a history of the peopling of a region, which was undeniably marginal for the great civilizations and empires which ruled it over various periods, but which - despite the harshness of its human and physiographical environment experienced periods of unquestionable splendour. According to the evidence provided by the literary sources, grandeur and misery alternated, decline bringing new waves of conquerors and invaders, desolation and anarchy, the typical activities of nomadic life - pilfering and piracy - gaining the upper hand over activities typical of urban and settled existence. Written sources, and oral tradition, too, are rich in information when referring to Baluchistan and its various regions and landscapes. However, analysing the available material more closely, it soon became clear that the data it provides would bring us only to a theoretical historical reconstruction, and to as many micro-histories and cultural models as the geographical realities existing there. In other words, it was necessary to integrate and complement such data with other evidence and by other forms of research, primary sources of no lesser importance in their turn, which would give invaluable pointers to the reading, re-reading and interpretation of both literary sources and oral tradition.

There, in an almost continuous string of oases lining the banks of the two rivers with their fields and date groves, irrigation is made possible by means of traditional systems, named locally kariz and khawr-jah. This factor added a fresh note of interest. The united waters of the Kech and Nihing rivers find their way to the sea at the bay of Gwatar; this tract is known as Dasht, and forms a natural corridor linking north-south the hinterland with the sea. Thus, it would also be possible to study how hinterland and coastal settlements interact (and interacted) on the one hand and, on the other, the relations which since very early times have linked Makran with the Arabian Peninsula leaving its mark also on their populations. In addition, such a survey seemed a necessary complement to the research dealing with unmistakable links between what is conventionally designated as “the Indus system and civilization” and the remains brought to light in Iran and Mesopotamia.

Hence the need - from a purely methodological point of view - for a multi- and strictly inter-disciplinary approach. Each discipline would follow its own particular modus operandi, working towards a final overall historical synthesis. On the operational level, the research was organised into four main areas of study, separate but closely interactive: i) archaeology; ii) history; iii) anthropology and ethnoanthropology; iv) the study of “monuments” and local architecture. To these, we added the study of the environment, the physical stage for human events that have unrolled their remarkable pattern over so many centuries, whose natural factors may have conditioned history and models of settlement - or, alternatively, been conditioned in their turn. i. The archaeological sector8

The archaeological survey of southern Makran was carried out in collaboration with a team from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the CNRS (Paris), under the direction of Dr. R. M. Besenval. The initial approach to the territory confirmed and emphasized the literary image, leading to a first map of the archaeological sites and surface pottery (1987 - 89). Botanical studies (E. Lattanzi and M. L. Leporatti) and geomorphological (P. Sanlaville, J. Evin, A. Prieur, G. Wilcox and others) have furnished a picture of the natural habitat, giving an idea of the environment and the extent of the changes which have occurred during the last few millennia, and of any anthropic impact on the environment - and vice versa.

First and foremost, we felt the necessity of considering the data provided by literature and tradition in relation to archaeology and its solid evidence and chronologies. Hence the setting up of an archaeological sector, which would carry on systematic surface reconnaissance and soundings. 8

Among the many essays and articles published over more than a decade by the various members of this sector, mention should be made of the following: R. Besenval/Cartography; E. Lattanzi, A. M. Leporatti, Flora of Hormozgan, in C. Cattena - S. Ciccacci - C. Marinucci, Hormozgan (Iran Meridionale) cit; Idem, Vegetation of Southern Makran, in “L'Informatore Botanico”, n. 2, 1991; Idem, Contribution to the knowledge of the Flora of Makran (Southern Pakistan), in “Webbia. Rivista internazionale di sistematica e fitogeografia”, 53 (1999), n.2.

The study of surface finds, the soundings and the excavations carried out at Miri Qalat and Shah-i Tump

6

Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: Images of a Little Known Region and heroines, pirs and jinns, kings, princes and princesses, sailors and pirates, invaders and brave local chiefs. Behind the veil of myth and beyond the seduction of legend it is always possible to sense a kernel, and perceive some historical reality. Hence we began to collect and record these tales, no less precious keys to the re-reading of the historical sources and no less valuable pointers to the understanding of the local society and its past and present culture (see Plates 1.9 and 1.10) (V. Piacentini Fiorani, R. Redaelli, with the collaboration of Bashir Ahmad Baluch, Ch. Kurd and Zubaida Jalal).

(1990 - 1998) have provided interesting new data, enabling us to go back to the region’s earliest phases of settlement, and allowing new chronologies. They have also given rich information concerning contacts with neighbouring civilizations and the interaction between the coastal area and the inland regions9. ii. The historical sector10 From the very start we felt the need to complement the field work with a more comprehensive investigation through the literary sources, that is to underpin the study of material and human evidence with a systematic study of the available literature, in both eastern and western languages, printed and manuscript, and being well aware of the limitations and gaps in this project. However, since the Makran-Kharan research was the prosecution of previous research-work, the starting point were the sources in Arabic referring to Parthian, Sasanian and early Islamic times. Thence we began to investigate all literature focused on “mediaeval” periods up to Europe’s appearance on this eastern stage.

The Archives would finally prove to be another invaluable support in this field. The historical group thus started a systematic trawling through files and records, both local and European (London, Paris, Leiden, Lisbon etc.), in search of precious information provided by memoirs and reports. A thorough study of the archives of Pakistani Baluchistan has been under way since 1992, beginning in its capital, Quetta, which has much unpublished material concerning the British Administration. This has enabled us to cast new light on the British policy in Baluchistan, the interaction between the Administration and the traditional local political forces, balances and imbalances, struggles and understandings between one or the other local tribal group (B. Nicolini, G. Pastori, R. Redaelli).

Our first approach to the territory brought to light unexpected striking vestiges of forts, towers, ruined walls, cairns and finely carved tomb-stones. These induced us to range also through the local oral tradition, which soon proved to be very rich and evocative: epic poems, ballads, songs telling us of a gallant world with its heroes

iii. The anthropological and ethno-anthropological sectors11.

9

Cf. Besenval/Cartography. Among the many essays and articles published over more than a decade by the various members of this sector, mention should be made of the following: V. Fiorani Piacentini (ed.), Gruppi socio-tecnici…cit, Idem, International Indian Ocean Routes and Gwadar Kuh-Batil settlement in Makran, in “NRS”, 72 (1988), n. 3 - 4; Idem, Merchants Merchandise and Military Power in the Persian Gulf (Suriyânj/Shahriyâj - Sîrâf), Atti dell'Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei – Memorie, Serie 9, Vol. III – 2, Roma 1992; Idem, Notes on the definition of the Western Borders of British India in Sistan and Baluchistan in 19th century, in B. Scarcia Amoretti - L. Rostagno (eds.), Yad-Nama. In memoria di Alessandro Bausani, 2 vols., Roma 1991, vol.I; Siraf and Hormuz between East and West: Merchants and Merchandise in the Gulf, in C. E. Davies. (ed.), Global Interests in the Arab Gulf, Exeter 1992; Idem, Makran in the Framework of Intercontinental Maritime Trade - Merchants and Merchandise Between the Indian Ocean and the West (9th-15th Centuries AD), in I. Zilli (ed.), Fra Spazio e Tempo. Studi in Onore di Luigi De Rosa, vol. I, Napoli 1995; Idem, Traces of Early Muslim Presence in Makran, in “Islamic Studies”, 35 (1996), n. 2; Idem, Missione storicoinsediamentale italiana in Harmuzgan e Makran, in Plures, Missioni archeologiche italiane. La ricerca archeologica, antropologica, etnologica, Roma 1997; B. Nicolini - R. Redaelli, Quetta: History and Archives. Note on the Archives of Quetta, in “NRS”, 78 (1994), n. 2; B. Nicolini, L’isola di Zanzibar. Storia e strategia nell’Oceano Indiano (1799-1856), Milano 1996; Idem, Unpublished Documents from the I.O.R. concerning the History of Muscat and Zanzibar during the first half of the 19th century, in “PSAS”, London 1997; Idem, The Source of Spice: Europe, Oman and Zanzibar during the XIX Century in “ARAM Periodical”, 23 (1998); R. Redaelli, Il nazionalismo balucio fra mito e nuovi assetti geopolitici, in “NRS”, 79 (1995), n.3; Idem, The Father's Bow: the Khanate of Kalat and British India (19th-20th Century), Firenze 1997; Idem (ed.), special issue on Baluchistan of the Journal Storia Urbana, with contributions by B. Nicolini, V. Piacentini, G. Pastori, R. Redaelli, F. Scholz, P. Titus, F. van Steenbergen, n.84 (1998). See also the web site of the Mission, www.Baluchistanmission-piacentini.org.

Work in this sector has advanced the study of the current settlements through the analysis of their organization, ever dependent on the water factor, a vital element and source of wealth in this arid, desolate and decidedly inhospitable desert - pre-desert environment (U. Fabietti, R. Redaelli, B. Nicolini).

10

Today, the water factor may be defined as the focal point of life in the region. It lies at the heart of both the traditional permanent models of settlement, with their sophisticated irrigation systems (the kariz, the khawr-jah and the garband or “ghabarband” - massive stone dams supporting what were or still are terraced fields - whose technology dates back certainly to pre-Christian times) and settlements still linked to forms of nomadism and

11

U. Fabietti, Anthropological Researches in Makran (Baluchistan), in “Pakistani Archaeology “ 1988; Idem, Power relations in southern Baluchistan. A comparison of three ethnographic cases, “Ethnology”, 1992, n.1; Idem, Le temps dans les sociétés “autres”: à propos des primitifs, des modernes e des Baluch, in “Social Sciences Information”, London, n.3, 1994; Idem, Il discorso del nazionalismo Baluchi. Tra ricerca dell'identità e reinvenzione della cultura, in “Etnoantropologia”, 1994; Idem, Lords of the desert, Lords of the frontier: pastoral nomadism and political centralisation in Arabia and Baluchistan, in U. Fabietti - P. Salzman (eds.), The Anthropology of Tribal and Peasant Pastoral Societies, Pavia 1995; Idem, Equality and Hierarchy: Conceptualizing Change in Southern Baluchistan, in P. Titus (ed.), Marginality and Modernity. Ethnicity and Change in Baloch Social Life, Karachi 1996; Idem, Etnografia della frontiera. Antropologia e storia in Baluchista, Roma, 1997.

7

Baluchistan iv. Monumental structures and the architectonic sector

semi-nomadism (wells, cisterns, birkahs, rainfall crops etc.)12.

Lastly, the study of the monuments, or, more precisely, of what remains of a past which is rapidly vanishing, and of its physical evidence.

Owing to the geographical nature of southern Baluchistan, surveys of traditional water systems in Makran have been carried out, together with a study of their traditional organization in terms of water-quotas, space and time (interestingly enough, a terminology with roots in old Iranian and Parthian is still in use there). Some nomadic groups in Persian Baluchistan have also been studied (F. Fornara). The organization of a traditional oasis-pattern has been analysed, on the basis of a typical local reality, that of Kalatuk in the Makran Division (U. Fabietti, F. Fornara, R. Redaelli). A study has been made of the coastal communities, whose activities traditionally linked to the sea have so far retained a definite mercantile and cosmopolitan dimension (Iranian and Pakistani Makran) (B. Nicolini, V. Piacentini Fiorani, R. Redaelli). On the other hand, Kharan’s isolation with its harsh salty planes and sandy deserts, scanty oases and steep rocky mountains, attracted our attention: the hard conditions of life there seem to have preserved codes and practices deeply rooted in a more or less remote past, helping to account for the farreaching activities that social groups have so far been able to carry out at the expenses of their neighbours to the north, east and south (G. Pastori, R. Redaelli). We have also begun the study of various local religious communities, and of their respective social, political and economic roles (the Zikris, the Zoroastrians or Parsis, the Ismailis and the Hindus in particular).

During the years 1982 - 1984, impressive remains of fortresses at Lishtan (Bandar Linghah), Minab, Harmuz, Keshm and Larak, along the southern Iranian coastal region, were surveyed, mapped and studied, as were the remains of complex hydraulic structures on the plain of Linghah, along the middle-lower course of the Rud-i Kol (Kol River), and at Jask. Caravanserais and other monuments have also been documented (domed complexes on a cross plan, in rough-hewn stone held together with mortar, and finely plastered, always associated with cisterns and tombs) along the old caravan route linking Suru with Lar, as well as an incredible viaduct, 2,700 metres long, near Demilu on the lower course of the river Kol (drawings by G. Tilia)14. From 1988 onwards we decided to carry out a monumental survey also in Pakistani Makran and Kharan. The merit of having first recognized the monumental interest of these two regions belongs to Henry Pottinger, Major E. Mockler and Sir Aurel Stein, who, having passed through there, noticed some remains: fortresses, funerary mausolea, ziarats, and “very extraordinary domed tombs of a quadrangular shape” decorated with terracotta plaques, known also as “the gunbads”. However, the want of any plan or graphic, topographic and photographic documentation, coupled with discrepancies between the notes of the British explorers and scholars, induced us to start from the coastal area where large cemeteries were reported to lie mostly abandoned - and from there to proceed north-westwards to Kharan, in search of the famous gunbads, celebrated also as the Maliks’ Tombs15.

The ethnological team has carried out the study of craft traditions (of particular interest that relating to embroidery, a craft which is still very much alive in local culture) and, through these, the bazaar - the social centre par excellence, where people barter, buy and sell, discuss day-to-day matters, foment uprisings and clinch alliances, and where, even today, master-craftsmen (ustâds) produce artefacts whose secrets have been transmitted to them down the centuries through closely guarded expertise. Special focus has been put on Makran (Sh. Paine, Sh. Unwin).

The seaboard proved to have a wealth of cemetery areas (or, as it would seem, mainly cenotaphs: places of Death), in the form of finely carved sandstone monuments; the most significant of these, at Ormara, Kalmat, Pasni, Gwadar and Jiwani, were studied and

This sector - closely inter-acting with the historical, archaeological and environmental research-groups - has led to the identification of a series of pointers which, viewed in a broader context than the strictly anthropological one, became invaluable keys to a closer interpretation of the available written sources and literature13.

14

V. Fiorani Piacentini, La fascia costiera del Harmuzgan: storia e territorio, in V. Fiorani Piacentini (ed.), Gruppi socio-tecnici…cit., pp. 117 - 156 plus 23 plates; Idem, La presa di potere sasanide nel Golfo Persico tra leggenda e realtà, in “Clio”, 20 (1984), 2, pp. 173-211; Idem, L’immagine letteraria della fascia costiera meridionale iranica (VIII-XIV sed. d. C.): appunti di storia locale, in Clelia Sarnelli Cerqua (ed.), Studi arabo-islamici in onore di Roberto Rubinacci nel suo settantesimo compleanno, Napoli 1985, pp. 279-292; Idem, The literary image of the southern coast of Iran (3rd-4th century A.H.): clues to the re-reading and analysis of regional situations and realities, in R. Ambrosini, M. P. Bologna, F. Motta, Ch. Orlandi (eds.), Scribthair a ainm n-ogaim. Scritti in memoria di Enrico Campanile, vol. I, Pisa 1997, pp. 371-396; Idem, Practice in Mediaeval Persian Government: the Surrender of the Great Cities of Khurasan to the Seljuks (AH 428-429/AD 1038-1039), in “AION”, 59 (1999). 15 Gunbad - Persian side-form for gunbaz, dome, Baluchi: gumbad. See A. V. Rossi, Iranian Lexical Elements in Brâhûî, Istituto Universitario Orientale, Seminario di Studi Asiatici - Series Minor VIII, Naples 1979, p. 194.

12 See also below, R. Redaelli, The Environmental Human Landscapes and V. Piacentini Fiorani’s articles in part III – Focus on Makran. 13 Cf. below for example Sh. Unwin, Crafts and Craftsmen. Lacquer Work in Makran and V. Fiorani Piacentini, Madîna/Shahr…cit, pp. 85107.

8

Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: Images of a Little Known Region their period. However, we have so far been unable to trace any definite indication as to their origin and chronologies, this being the object and content of a forthcoming study and a third volume of this Baluchistan series. Local information, the memories of old men and persistent oral traditions were of great help, and the monumental study has been complemented with a thorough study of the environment (the precarious nature of cultivation, and the almost total absence of irrigation systems and permanent villages) and local communities: nomadic and semi-nomadic groups nestling in the steep mountain gorges, on the one hand, and traditional ruling families on the other, first and foremost the Nawshirvanis, tireless builders of castles and forts, who have ruled Kharan for upwards of two centuries (R. Redaelli). Several mounds have been traced, too, and an archaeological survey would undoubtedly be of great support in reconstructing the region’s chronologies and its peopling, and would certainly integrate the few scanty data provided by written sources.

documented - through photographs, plans and topographic sketches - from 1989 - 1993 (by C. Alpago Novello, A. Bizzarro, A. Fiorani and G. Tilia in 1988)16. A dam, and its support system, on the rocky plateau of Gwadar (Kuh-i Batil) has been studied by V. Piacentini Fiorani (plan by G. Tilia); impressive castles and manorial structures in the oases-strip of the Kech and Nihing rivers (Sami‘, Sharak, Turbat, Miri Qalat, Pidarak, Kalatuk, Tump - today vanishing residences of the local sardars’ family), Bit and its fort in the oasis of Buleida, and Panjgur’s fortified structures form part of the study included in this volume (study by V. Piacentini Fiorani, plans and graphic documentation by A. Bizzarro and G. Tilia, architectonic study and sketches by G. Rizzi and G. Zerbato)17. Then, in 1994 - 1999, following the usual caravan tracks through bare, broken passes across the Central Makran Range and narrow rock-lined ravines up to Panjgur, and thence winding along river beds between blackish wildly cut rock walls, so high and so steep as to make a passage quite impossible in the event of rain, we entered Kharan (see Plates 2.1 –2.3). Impressed by the Gazetteers’ records and their detailed topographical notes, we carried out a first systematic “monumental” survey. Completely atypical complexes - and other ruined structures which Pottinger had seen in 1810 on his third march from Nushki down to Kharan18 - have been located in the area, and graphically, photographically and topographically documented (plans by V. Bernard, I. Brauer and F. Lodovici; study by M. Kervran and V. Piacentini Fiorani). Groups of domed buildings with squinches on a square plan, entirely in baked brick, finished and plastered, they sometimes take the form of a two-storey square burial chamber, decorated externally with a coping of terracotta plaques, in high or low relief, with geometrical designs or coarsely modelled representations of animals (camels, horses and others), and scenes of battles and hunting19. The local population refers to these complexes as the “tombs of the kings”, and they are, in effect, always associated with the concept of sovereignty and the sacred; they bear signs of various types and stages of reuse over time, and contain tombs and ossuaries. Only Brahui ballads survive to give a tenuous indication as to

“The monuments”, power and sovereignty’s striking image have not been the only target of this researchgroup. It has also carried out a study of the traditional popular architecture, minor buildings and those used for domestic purposes; of mosques and traditional places of worship (ziarat, imamzadeh and musallà), of the typical structure of the “huts” used by the nomadic - seminomadic population, and so on. Worthy of note is the marked contrast between an entrenched popular architectural tradition, yet still very much alive, on the one hand, and the precarious state of repair of what might be described as monumental structures on the other; in many cases these latter have been completely abandoned or are in total disrepair. Their decline into their current ruinous state must therefore have occurred very rapidly, as we may also see from the sharp contrast with accounts in the “travel sketchbooks” of the few English explorers who visited these places. Furthermore, these remains are becoming increasingly damaged and insubstantial from one year to the next, because of a lack of human interest, and the havoc wrought by both atmospheric agents and animals. Documenting them has been a race against time, often carried out in extremely adverse environmental and physical conditions.

16 These funerary areas are the object of a separate study, which should be included in a following volume of this Baluchistan Series. 17 Cf. V. Piacentini Fiorani, International Indian Ocean Routes and Gwadar Kuh-i Batil Old Barrage in Makran (2nd century b. Chr. - 2nd century AD), and Idem, The Castles of Kech: a Society without Cities. Sketch-Notes on the Field, in this volume, pp. 143-174. 18 H. Pottinger, Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde, first publ. London 1816, repr. by Indus Publications, Karachi 1976, p. 123. 19 See the detailed information given in the BDGS - Kharan, especially pp. 45 on. A description of these “tombs” has been published by Sh. Khurshid Hasan, Nausherwani Tombs in Kharan, Baluchistan (Pakistan), in M. Taddei and P. Callieri (eds.), South Asian Archaeology 1987 - Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference of the Association of South Asian Archaeologists in Western Europe, held in the Fondazione Giorgio Cini, Island of San Giorgio Maggiore, Venice, Roma 1990, part 2, pp. 1195-1209 (mainly based on the observations to be found in the Gazetteer, this study shows remarkable inaccuracies and has little to add to what had already been outlined by the British scholars and travellers).

Thus, the “monumental” research proved to be puzzling, suggesting times during which we may suppose southwestern Baluchistan had enjoyed a somewhat higher state of development than is found there now, and a settled life, too, with all related activities (agriculture, trade and crafts). It has revealed an important heritage, whose legacy is not exclusively artistic. Today, these surviving monuments offer a particularly poignant and clear-cut image of the life of the region in its various cultural components and historical phases, invaluable, sometimes irreplaceable, evidence of the region’s peoples, and of the artistic/cultural influences there exercised by other

9

Baluchistan “worlds” (such as Iran, central Asia and the Indian subcontinent) with their respective cultural models and religious cults and practices: a land of passage certainly, a land for trade, migration and military operations. This is a legacy which, studied in situ, and complemented with the data provided by literature and certain anthropological “keys”, also gave us a remarkably faithful picture of the settlement patterns, that find their corresponding patterns in both palatial and popular architecture. It illustrates the relations between nomadic semi-nomadic peoples and settled populations with great clarity and provides the exact measure of those between conquerors and conquered. Furthermore, it offers vivid glimpses of traditions and popular cults which have persisted over the centuries, the expression in their turn of frequently syncretic culture and of differing conceptions of sovereignty/regality, authority and power.

The programme in Pakistan was officially defined within the framework of the 1992 Italo-Pakistani scientific bilateral agreement, and re-confirmed in the spring of 1998. The general research is directed and scientifically coordinated by Professor Valeria Piacentini Fiorani Catholic University of the S. Heart, Milano - Italy; from 1987 - 94 it worked in collaboration with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Department for Cultural Affairs, and more precisely with the French Archaeological Mission in Central Asia (Mafac), under the auspices of the CNRS (Paris), and directed in the field by Dr. Roland Besenval. A number of specialists were called upon for various areas of research (ethnoanthropological, botanical and in relation to the reconstruction of the environment, architectural, historical-archival and graphic-topograpical).

After many years of study and research in the field and on paper - during which we persistently pursued these lines of method and enquiry - archaeological and monumental evidence, the data provided by written sources and literature integrated with those provided by ethnoanthropology, the reconstruction of the environment and palaeo-environment have all begun to come together and dovetail like so many tesserae in a mosaic. Their analysis has made it possible to identify yet further pointers; these in their turn have proved extremely valuable when used for a more thorough reading/re-reading of the written sources and all available literature. As a result, it has been possible to proceed with a reconstruction of Baluchistan’s history in more than purely political - dynastic terms, and to outline an initial picture of specific phases and periods concerning its life in all its various aspects and components, with the dynastic-tribal dimension fleshed out and complemented by the social, institutional, economic, religious, artistic and speculative: we are definitely facing a border land, a passage land, a natural corridor between the Iranian plateau and its culture to the west, the Indus and its system to the east, the central Asian basin with its fabulous riches and civilizations to the north, and the Indian Ocean and the regions overlooking and/or gravitating towards that sea to the south, a land for trade, migrations and military operations.

The various surveys were carried out in an initial phase in southern Makran (coastal strip and valleys of the Kech and Nihing - Turbat). Later, moving northwards, work was carried out also in the areas of Panjgur (Makran Division) and Kharan (Kharan District). But this, in turn, led to a problem: Baluchistan’s present-day partition between Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran proved an obstacle to a continuous series of surveys and comparisons which would be necessary for any real systematic study of this cultural region. Yet this did not prove totally impossible, and we have been able to assemble a series of comparative studies, albeit so far incomplete, and to put forward extremely stimulating reconstructions and working hypotheses. A further problem faced by the Mission has been the advance of technological modernization, a process which has been omni-present and irreversible for some fifteentwenty years now. The rapid fading of oral memories, customs and traditions, together with the equally rapid deterioration of any monumental evidence, makes the thorough recording of them, and their systematic documentation and analysis, more urgent than ever. Acknowledgments At this point it should be stressed that this study and research would not have been possible without the concrete and whole-hearted support of the local authorities, institutions, scholars and inhabitants, whom we would here like to mention and thank.

*** The Italian Research Project in Makran and Kharan on History and Patterns of Settlement (briefly referred to also as the Italian Historical-Anthropological Mission in Harmuzgan and Makran-Kharan) has been active since 1982, under the auspices and with the support of the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs - Department for Cultural Relations, and on the basis of a Licence granted from the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (from 1982 - 85) and the Federal Republic of Pakistan (from 1986 until the present day).

Naturally our deepest gratitude goes above all to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Department of Cultural Relations) and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs respectively of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Federal Republic of Pakistan, who have always endorsed and followed our research most cordially. We are also grateful to the National Research Council (Rome) and the Ministry for University and Scientific and

10

Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: Images of a Little Known Region Technological Research for having supported this research project and contributed to its funding.

thanks to St. Joseph’s Convent at Quetta, where we always found a smile, a haven, hospitality, warmth and affection.

We would also like to give our official thanks to the Provincial Authorities of the Government of Baluchistan - Pakistan (our special gratitude to the then Secretary General of Baluchistan, Mr. Sarwar Poonegar, a clearsighted and subtle civil servant, a Zoroastrian whose friendship and support we shall always recall as one of the most heartening of experiences, in human terms), and the Authorities of the Makran Division - Pakistan (too numerous to name, but all of whose help is deeply valued and sincerely admired).

Invaluable companions over the course of these long years were also Zubaida Jalal (appointed in October 1999 Federal Minister for Education), her remarkable family and the Female Education Trust of Mand (Turbat), and her brave husband, Mir Changheez Kurd, and very many incomparable local friends, whose commitment in the rediscovery of their cultural heritage and enthusiastic involvement in facts and events of their own history and traditions, continue to be a spur to our resolve to press on with our research and studies. Their names recur throughout the various papers, and they are very dear to us: to all, without distinction, our expressions of gratitude and personal friendship.

Naturally we are also extremely grateful to the Department of Archaeology and Museums of Pakistan, whose Licence made it possible to undertake this research, and to the no fewer than nine Field-Inspectors, who - in the name of mutual love of science - had to share with us those difficulties and discomforts, which were part of our tough and uncomfortable life in Makran.

We would also like to thank: prof. arch. Carlo Carozzi, responsible for the intelligent selection of some drawings and friendly assistance.

I would like to make personal mention of the many enthusiastic local poets and historians, with whom we were brought together by our shared love of Baluchi culture, and who enlivened many of our afternoons in Quetta at the local headquarters of the Academy of Baluchistan.

These results also owe not a little to the masterly and tenacious work of Pietro Rossi, of Turin University who, being himself a philosopher of history, decided to share the benefits of his lucid and inspired insights with the Italian Mission. How could we fail to thank him for his patient mischief?

Our special, warmest gratitude goes to the Pakistani Delegation in Rome (and the then Ambassador Abdul Waheed, who enabled us to obtain our first survey Licence), the Italian Embassy in Tehran and all the staff of the Italian Embassy in Islamabad. We were particularly moved by, and grateful for, the interest shown by H.E. Arduino Fornara, and the affectionate support given by H.E. Piero Rinaldi; both have now left their posts, but we shall never forget their unerring, indeed providential good offices. Moreover, they were the first among the foreign representatives in Islamabad to brave the crossing of the borders of Makran, and faced the discomforts of a traditionally hostile region in true pioneering fashion to come to visit the Italian Mission at work.

Naturally, our final expression of gratitude goes to the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano, for its understanding of our many and exotic needs, and for the support it has given to the organization of this researchwork.

In this context, along with the visit of H.E. Arduino Fornara, we must also make mention of that of the then Apostolic Nuncio to Islamabad, Mons. Luigi Bressan, who was good enough to accompany our Ambassador on this arduous journey; he officiated at the first Mass ever celebrated in Makran, a historic event which took place in our own camp at Turbat, and which was an occasion of deep devotion and reflection, but also had something of the moving feeling of a family gathering. Here I would also like to mention the then Archbishop of Karachi, Mons. Anthony Lobo (now Bishop of Rawalpindi and Islamabad), a tireless builder of schools and a great educator, whose warmth in our regard, and whose unflagging support in moments of need (never in short supply) were most inspiring. Lastly, particularly warm

11

Baluchistan

Plate 1.1 (Above): 1990, Makran. The tortuous dry river bed of the Nilag khawr, a tributary of the Dasht. Plate 1.2 (Below): 1990, sand dunes at Pasni.

12

Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: Images of a Little Known Region

Plate 1.3 (Above): 1988, the silty and salty lunar landscape surrounding Kuddan (Nilag khawr area). “...the difficulties of the terrain - harsh, ravined, crossed by bare blakish hillocks, particularly steep mountain chains and massifs, cut by narrow gorges winding between rock walls and sharp-crested dips...- ...the climate being particularly torrid in summer, freezing and scoured by violent winds in the winter months, the few river systems dry for most of the year, and stony, but subject to sudden and devastating flooding when rains came...” Plate 1.4 (Below): 1990, Kallag: the arid and desolate mountain region of Baluchistan, where, owing to traditional hydraulic systems, some fields amidst clumps of tamarisks and palm trees are cultivated.

13

Baluchistan

Plate 1.5 (Above): 1988, Nilag Valley: the silts were still being deposited during the 3rd millennium b. Chr. occupation (R. Besenval). Plate 1.6 (Below): 1988, Pasni region: Aggradation silty plain with saline water creek.

14

Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: Images of a Little Known Region

Plate 1.7 (Above): 1988, Sami, Kech Valley: behind the palm-groves, the broad Kech flood plain, huge glacis and the Northern Makran coastal Range. Plate 1.8 (Below): 1992, Mand: “...an almost continuous string of oases lines the banks of the Nihing and Kech rivers with their fields and date groves. There irrigation is made possible by means of traditional systems, locally named kariz and khawrjah...”.

15

Baluchistan

Plate 1.9: 1994, Pasni area. Past and present: wind-blown sand dunes resting on a Holocene lagunae formation. His Excellency Piero Rinaldi, the Italian Ambassador to Islamabad, visiting with the French Ambassador to Islamabad, H.E. Pierre Lafrançe, the Italian Historical-Anthropological Mission in Makran and Kharan.

Plate 1.10: 1994, Kulanch. Past and present: a local “bard” sings ballads describing the epic deeds performed by Baluchi warriors.

16

The Environmental Human Landscapes Riccardo Redaelli

1. The territory - 2. Peoples and history

Baluchistan’s hydrographical system is characterized mainly by the presence of rivers of a seasonal and torrential nature, as well as by numerous internal seasonal lakes, above all in Pakistani Baluchistan5. The flow of even the more important rivers, such as the Zhob to the north, and the Hingol and the system of the KechNihing to the south, varies greatly between the rainy season, when they are subject to devastating floods, and the dry , when they shrink to little more than streamlets.

1. The territory The place-name Baluchistan is used to identify a vast region, covering some 500 – 600,000 square kilometres, distinguished by complex geomorphologic features, and currently divided up among the states of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. The following areas are generally regarded as part of the geographical region of Baluchistan: (i) the Province of Baluchistan, the largest of the four provinces making up the federal state of Pakistan; (ii) much of the Iranian administrative section of Sistan-Baluchistan, in eastern Iran; (iii) a narrow desert strip of southern Afghanistan, virtually uninhabited and lacking any clear-cut administrative definition.

The dearth of water resources, together with the general scarcity of rainfall6, give water a decisive role in the region. Indeed, in an arid or semi-desert environment such as that of most of Baluchistan, the primary and principal factor for man’s intervention in so hostile a terrain is precisely the possibility of having access to water resources and exploiting them rationally. Throughout the history of the area, it has always been the shortage of water which has hindered, if not prevented, not only human settlement but even its crossing by peoples, armies and merchants, from Alexander the Great - who, together with his army, endured terrible privations on his return journey from the region of the Indus - to the first Arab expeditions of the seventh-eighth centuries7 with the commanders of the Islamic armies unwilling to venture into such hostile terrain - and the opposing armies of the Mogul and Safavid empires, down to the English themselves, who always tried to keep the number of their functionaries and soldiers in the region to a minimum.

With the exception of a few fertile plains, this vast region is characterised by rugged mountain chains reaching 3,400 meters in height, the extreme western offshoots of the mountainous complex of the Hindu Kush; by very high, arid, rocky plateaux1, by semi-desert fluvial plains, their terrain eroded and colourless, and - to the south - by erosion furrows and massive shifting sand-dunes2. Given the particular configuration of the Baluch mountain complexes, which are reminiscent of a large letter S scrawled into the territory3, oriented as they are in a north-southern east-west direction, the few negotiable mountain passes - often made impossible by the violence of seasonal torrents - have played a crucial role in the history of the region (see Fig. 2.1 and Plates 2.1 – 2.2). The Baluch passes of Bolan, Khojak and Mulah - to name but a few - have always been the only feasible routes linking the Indian sub-continent with Afghanistan and Central Asia; not by chance did control of the northern passes to Afghanistan always represent one of the pivotal points in the British plan for the creation of a north-west frontier protecting India from any possible external threat4.

Water, then, was a decisive factor, its possession always more important than ownership of land itself. Indeed, to guarantee sufficient reserves of water for survival and agricultural activities, complex systems for the collection, channelling and distribution of water were developed in Baluchistan. Wherever there were hollows or natural depressions, dams, terracing and barrages (garband) were constructed, making it possible both to conserve rainwater for seasonal harvests and to prevent this same

1

For example, the two most important cities in Baluchistan, Quetta on Pakistani territory and Zahedan on Persian, stand at 1,500 and 1,400 metres above sea level respectively. 2 For further information, cf. R. Besenval and P. Sanlaville, Cartography of Ancient Settlements in Central Southern Pakistani Makran: New Data, in “Mesopotamia”, 25 (1990), pp. 79 – 156 (hereafter Besenval/Cartography); C. Cattena - S. Ciccacci - C. Marinucci, Hormozgan (Iran Meridionale). Caratteristiche ambientali della fascia costiera, Roma 1987; IGI/PS, Baluchistan, pp. 1 - 11; G. B. Castiglioni, Appunti geografici sul Balucistan Iraniano, in “RGI”, 67 (1960), n. 2 - 3; M. L. Dames, Balochistan, in “E/I1”, vol. I, pp. 625 on. 3 IGI/PS, Baluchistan, p. 2. 4 The political and military importance of the passes and mountain systems of Baluchistan is reflected in the Baluch word often used to

indicate a “mountain pass”, namely sham (or sarsham), which can also mean frontier, political border. 5 On over two thirds of the surface of Persian Baluchistan, the waters flow inland, towards enclosed basins. Cfr. A. Valduga, Il Baluchistan persiano, aspetti geomorfologici e biogeografici, in “L'Universo”, 41 (1961), n. 4, pp. 769 - 770. 6 According to the Gazetteer of Baluchistan: “[...] Baluchistan lies outside the monsoon area and its rainfall is exceedingly irregular and scanty [...] In the highlands few places receive more than ten inches, and in the plains the average amount is about five inches, decreasing in some cases to three [...]” IGI/PS, Baluchistan, pp. 10 - 11. 7 Cf. the essay by Valeria Piacentini Fiorani, Trade, Migrations and Military Operations…, pp.119 on, in this same volume.

17

Baluchistan heavy rain from washing away the soil (see plates 2.3 – 2.6). Very common in Baluchistan are also the khawrjah, surface channels which bring to the files water from rivers or wells. The disadvantage of these systems is the high degree of evaporation which occurs under the merciless sun; much more effective - though vastly more complex and laborious-intensive - is the system of collecting and channelling underground of the waters of the piedmont aquifer strata known as kariz. In Baluchistan this system was used as an alternative to that of the garband: where the latter was used, the former was not.

ideology of free warriors, and of the predominance of the principle of descent and lineage. The social and economic stratification encouraged by the agriculture of the oases, made possible by the permanent availability of water, irrespective of the seasonal rain cycle, has thus profoundly affected traditional Baluch social relations; the resulting hierarchical and social stratification has weakened tribal links among the various Baluch groups, encouraging: i) on the one hand, the emergence of hereditary land-based aristocracies (sardars, nawabs, hakim, etc.), and the spread of patron-client relations which cut across agnatic descent; ii) on the other, the relatively unproblematic occupation of the region by the Government of India in the second half of the nineteenth century, without the bloody conflicts and obstacles which the English came up against among the bellicose Pashtun tribes of neighbouring Afghanistan9.

Such systems - highly sophisticated and of long established tradition - are typical of many areas of the Asian Middle East (but are also found in various areas of the Muslim world). Kariz are long artificial underground channels which, by exploiting the slightest inclination in the piedmont strata, enable man to divert the water along the impermeable (clayey) slopes, channelling it towards potentially fertile land, thus making possible intensive agriculture and the development of permanent settlements. The length of these underground channels can differ considerably from one kariz to another. In the oases, a dense network of secondary surface channels distributes water for the irrigation of fields divided into small plots, using a complex system of division of water quotas (called hangam in central-southern Baluchistan or anna in the North) into hours of right of use of the kariz water on the basis of the lunar calendar. The system is completed by a series of wells set at regular intervals along the course of the kariz, for the drawing of water and for the inspection and maintenance of the channel8 (see plates 2.7 – 2.10).

The great advantage of the irrigation system based on the kariz, as opposed to a system of damming and barraging for the collection of rain water, is that the kariz guarantees a constant flow of water throughout the year, albeit with seasonal variations in its flow. In arid and semi-arid environments – such as those of the region of Baluchistan, characterized as it is by scanty and irregular seasonal rainfall – the availability of constant reserves of water is the pre-condition for the creation of an oasis and the practice of intensive agriculture. Partly for this reason, rights to water quotas of a kariz are traditionally regarded as more important than ownership of the land itself, since it has no value, for agricultural purposes, unless it is associated with reserves of water. As Steenbergen notes in his work on the subject, water rights are registered separately from land rights in the official cadastre. During our various sessions of fieldwork in Baluchistan it became clear that people paid more attention to their rights to water quotas than to those connected with land. While answers to questions concerning land ownership were often vague as to the details (the extent of the land, its hereditary subdivisions, etc.), greater precision was found concerning the water quotas at their disposal. It also became evident that there was a discrepancy between ownership shares in the kariz as a construction, and rights to the water which flows through the kariz, though they continued to retain “ownership” over it.

In Baluchistan, however, these sophisticated systems for irrigated agriculture have played a role which clearly goes beyond the mere economic and environmental sphere, affecting and modifying the socio-political one as well. Indeed, the making of the kariz, the specialised techniques required for their functioning, and even more so for their constant maintenance, are all factors which have encouraged the emergence and establishment of a society which is far more stratified and hierarchised than the tribal nomadic one, which is rooted in the egalitarian 8

These traditional underground channels for the collection and channeling of water, their origins, building techniques and the social consequences of their maintenance are discussed in P. Beaumont - M. Bonine - K. McLachlan (eds.), Qanat, Kariz and Khattara: Traditional Water Systems in the Middle East and North Africa, London 1989; J. C. Wilkinson, Water and Tribal Settlement in South Eastern Arabia. A Study of the Aflaj of Oman, Oxford 1977. Cf. also the interesting studies by F. Scholz, Die physich-und sozialgeographischen Ursachen fur die Aufgabe und Erhalf der Kareze in Belutschistan, in “ Die Erde”, III (1970), n.4, pp. 302-315 and idem, Irrigation and Nomadism in Balochistan, in “Applied Sciences and Development”, 11 (1978), n. 11, pp. 90 - 111; F. van Steenbergen, Land, Water, and Ethnicity: social organization and resource management in irrigated communities in Balochistan, in P. Titus (ed.), Marginality and Modernity. Ethnicity and Change in Post-colonial Balochistan, Karachi 1996, pp. 250 - 272, and the analysis by U. Fabietti, Tempo d'acqua. Sistemi irrigui, rappresentazioni locali e modelli etnografici della sincronizzazione e della desincronizzazione sociale, in Idem, Etnografia della frontiera. Antropologia e storia in Baluchistan, Roma, 1997, pp. 99 - 122.

Generally, the regulating of the flow of water, and the management of water quotas, is the responsibility of a sort of channel “administrator”, usual known as the sarrishta (literally, head of the chain). This latter is 9

Apart from revolts and isolated cases, the English in Baluchistan found the sardars of the tribal chiefs more than willing to accept British supremacy, in exchange for allowances, fiscal benefits and - above all in exchange for the formalizing and institutionalising of their role and authority vis-á-vis the khan of Kalat. On these complex matters, cf.: R. Redaelli, The Father's Bow: the Khanate of Kalat and British India (19th – 20thcentury), Florence, 1997, particularly sections 2.2., 2.3 and 3.3. By contrast, the continual struggles between British colonial troops and Pashtun tribes in Afghanistan and on the North-West Frontier became part of the contemporary mythology of the colonial period.

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Riccardo Redaelli: The Environmental Human Landscapes

normally the owner of the largest water quota – and hence at the head of the chain of owners (issadar) - or, in the case of jointly-owner quotas, the person most respected socially. In some case, with the passing of the generation, the sarrishta is the main owner’s right-hand man. He must have a knowledge of the criteria for the apportioning of the waters of the kariz among the various owners, and ensure that they are respected; he is also responsible for the carrying out of maintenance work. The sharing out of water quotas depend by a complex system of calculations, which may vary according to place and season, and which is regarded as being linked to the phases of the moon; the hangams are apportioned among various owners over period of seven or (depending on the season) fourteen days. In centralnorthern Baluchistan, however, we find cases of the apportioning of the water (known as anna rather than hangam), still on a twelve-hour basis, but divided up into sixteen quotas, that is, over a period of eight days (sixteen days in winter)10.

Nor it is any coincidence that the “modernization” of agriculture in Baluchistan, from the 1970s onwards, had led to a decline in the number of active kariz, in favour of methods regarded as more efficient, such as water pumps, surface channels in concrete, etc. The results of this tendency have been contradictory: diesel pumps initially made it possible to cultivate larger areas, but the excessive drawing of water from the water-table has led, in many cases, to its subsequent lowering. The chaotic and initially unregulated sinking of wells has also been encouraged by easy loans13 and international development programmes, often with the installing of pumps and tube-wells near the mother-wells of a kariz. In the view of some analysts, this has contributed to the drying up of many kariz, a phenomenon found throughout the region (though this view has not gone unchallenged) 14. This phase of expansion of systems for drawing water from underground water-tables by means of mechanical pumps has sometimes ended in disaster, with the loss of the whole investment; rusty diesel pumps, the remains of concreted platforms on which they stood, etc., are not an uncommon sight in the region. Towards the end of the 1980s the provincial administration tried to halt the decline of the kariz-system, either by restricting the installing of mechanical pumps – which cannot any longer be sited near the course of a kariz or its watertable – or by encouraging the digging and activating of new kariz15.

It should also be noted that such twelve-hour water quotas are subdivided into several lesser fractions (the lowest unit being the tas or pad)11, which make possible a further sharing out of the flow of water, for instance to guarantee the irrigation of small plot of land without wastage. The kariz, in terms of its functioning, is a source of water which is energy-free: once it is built, and working, it does not require the input of animal or mechanical energy for its functioning12. But the kariz-system has also evident disadvantages. Above all, it entails a huge initial investment on the part of its owner (or, more often, on the part of a group of owners who band together for the digging of a kariz). Not only do such investments imply the availability of a very large capital, but it also takes years to build a kariz, with the use of specialist workers (kannat), using digging techniques often handed down from father to son. It is slow work, even today often done with the exclusive use of tools such as the shovel or pickaxe, and it requires a large labour force. The maintenance of a kariz, once functioning, it is more simple, but it requires constant attention, and a whole series of minor works of upkeep (to prevent tunnels from collapsing, to remove sand and mud from pipes). Lastly, seasonal variations on the flow of water in a kariz – particularly in those which are minimally maintained – may be harmful to the oasis and jeopardise the harvest, especially in outlying areas of the oasis, at the ends of the branches of the small surface channels distributing the water.

But the traditional system of the kariz has been affected less by technological developments, than by the socioeconomic changes which have occurred throughout the region. As we have said, the building and maintenance of these underground channels requires cooperation and collective action, involving whole groups of owners and investors, and a work force, specialised or otherwise. With the growth of a cash economy, and the exponential rise in workers’ emigrating to the oil-producing countries of the Gulf (which offered better-paid employment than traditional forms of labour), from the 1960s onwards labour became more expensive, and rare, even in Baluchistan. Partly thanks to the assistance offered by the programmes for agricultural development, many owners of kariz quotas, or simple land owners, began to install mechanical pumps and to open up surface wells. These new irrigation systems have intensified the “individual” aspect of irrigated agriculture, in the sense that they do not require the creation of a pool of investors, nor do they irrigate fields belonging to several owners, as they did in the case of oases dependent on the kariz. They also require less maintenance. In a word, the

10

Cf for details U. Fabietti, Tempo d'acqua. pp.51-58. cit, pp. 105-108. See also van Steenbergen’s study in this volume. In connection with root of this specific lemma see M. Grignaschi, La riforma tributaria di Hosroi e il feudalesimo sassanide, in Atti del Convegno Internazionale sul tema: La Persia nel Medioevo – (Roma, 31 marzo – 5 aprile 1970), Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Roma pp. 87-147. 12 K. McLachlan, The kariz in the Heart Basin, Afghanistan, in in P. Beaumont - M. Bonine - K. McLachlan (eds.), Qanat, Kariz and Khattara…cit, p. 260. 11

13 Cf. § 5 in F. Scholz’s study on the Hasni tribe - The tribal structures started to change (1947 – 1970) in this volume, pp. 63 on. 14 Cf. S. M. Arif, Agricultural Economy of Balochistan, Quetta, 1991, pp. 25-38 and WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority), Ground Water Levels during 1967-88 in Quetta Valley, “Basic Data Release N.1: Hydrology Project”, Quetta 1988. 15 S. M. Arif, Agricultural Economy…cit, pp. 35-36.

19

Baluchistan mechanical pumps is an implement used by the individual and no longer by the village living around the oasis, as had been the case with the kariz, whose reliable functioning was necessary to all the population. Such developments have led to a transformation in social relationships – already under way as a result of modernization, and various political changes – which has weakened the role of the owners of both land and water, in favour of a class of “nouveaux riches”, enjoying less social prestige but richer in term of liquid assets.

which probably returned - rather than migrated - to Makran and Baluchistan from eastern Kerman and Sistan around the 11th – 13th centuries, possibly following the Seljuk conquests17. I use the word “returned”, rather than “migrated”, because many works in the Arabic language by Muslim geographers and travellers (for instance Istakhrî, Ibn Hawqal and Mas‘ûdî) dating from the 10th century AD, already talk of “balûs” or “bulûs” or “balûj” peoples – in association with people referred to as Qufs or Kuj settled on the slopes of mountain areas in the region between Kerman, Makran and the sea18; alMuqaddasî mentions a people called Balus19, whilst there is also repeated mention of Baluch in connection with Kuch tribes in the Persian epic by Firdowsî, the Shâhnâmah. Be that as it may, intermarriage, continual movement, numerous invasions of the various areas of settlement, the absorption of enslaved populations generally of African origin - and a gradual attainment of cultural uniformity given by adherence to a mythicised identity, have meant that the Baluch have not constituted a homogeneous entity for centuries, if indeed they ever did constitute one in a more distant past.

In some cases, the availability of cash, together with the ending of the dictatorship of Zia ul-Haq in 1988, and the decision to hold federal and provincial elections on the basis of universal suffrage – has transformed the traditional political terms of reference16. A more diverse class of politicians has emerged, above all in southern Baluchistan: not longer bound by tribal association, and having broken away from the old leaders of the Baluch nationalism of the 1950s-‘70s. During the course of the 1990s, this group was often co-opted by the old tribal chiefs, with the clientelar apportioning of considerable development funds and resources, made available to them by the federal government and international agencies.

If we supplement the few available sources with the various Baluch ballads and traditions, we may reasonably infer that the Baluch - at the time of their abovementioned move eastwards from the eastern areas of the Iranian plateau - were a tribal nomadic people, whose main activities were raiding and banditry, divided by constant internal conflicts20. The very word “Baluch” would seem to have been used by settled peoples, both rural and urban, to refer to various nomadic tribal

In conclusion, we might sum up by saying that water, and the right to its use, is much more than a “technical matter”: it has profound social and political implications. For this reason the present volume considers the role of the water factor in Baluchistan on all levels. The paper by Frank van Steenbergen (Water Rights as Social Contracts), analyses the importance of the rights over water resources within Baluchistan’s system of socioeconomic relations. The importance of the ownership of water resources and their exploitation also emerges clearly in Valeria Piacentini Fiorani’s paper, The castles of Kech. A society without cities, on Makran and the power group of the Gichkis. Here the growth of the castle as a political-administrative centre is clearly brought out, in a region characterised by a prevalently feudal social structure, strongly hierarchised and linked to the irrigated agriculture of the kariz, as distinct from the egalitarian tribal pattern.

17 On the vexed question of the origins and provenance of the Baluch and they have been attributed with any number of origins, from Semitic to Uralo-Altaic - cf., inter alia: D. L. Dames, Balôcistân, in “E/I1”, vol. 1, pp. 627 - 630; Idem, The Baloch Race: A Historical and Ethnological Sketch, London, 1904; E. Mockler, Origin of the Baluch, in “JRASB”, 64 (1895), n. 1, pp. 30 - 36; H. Pottinger, Travels in Balochistan and Sind, Karachi (1st. ed. London 1816) 1976, pp. 268 on; P. M. Sykes, Ten Thousand Miles in Persia or Eight Years in Persia, London 1902, p. 94; R. N. Frye, Remarks on Baluchi History, “Central Asiatic Journal”, 6 (1961), pp. 44-50; I. Baloch, The problem of 'Greater Baluchistan': a study of Baluch nationalism, Stuttgart 1987 pp. 35 - 43; K. B. Bijarani Marri Baloch, Searchlights on Baloches and Balochistan, Karachi 1974. 18 Cf.: Istakhrî, Kitâb al-Masâlik wa al-Mamâlik, ed. M. J. De Goeje, Leiden, third ed. 1967, p. 164; Ibn Hawqal, Kitâb Sûrat al-Ard, ed. M. J. De Goeje, Leiden, third ed. 1966, p. 309 onwards; al-Mas‘ûdî, Kitâb al-Tanbîh wa al-Ishrâf, ed. M. J. De Goeje, Leiden, third ed. 1967, p. 90. In the various manuscripts of Istakhrî’s work the form balût is also found. Cf. also: H. M. Elliot and S. Dowson, The History of India as told by its Historians, 8 vols., vol. I. p. 417; E. Mockler, Origin of the... cit., pp. 31 - 32; V. Piacentini Fiorani, Traces of Early Muslim Presence in Makran, in “IS”, 35 (1996), n. 2, pp. 121 - 134. 19 Al-Muqaddasî, Ahsan al-Taqâsîm fî Marifat al-Aqâlîm, ed. M. J. De Goeje, Leiden, third ed. 1967, p. 478. Cf. also V. Piacentini Fiorani, Trade, Migrations and Military Operations…, pp.119 on, in this same volume. 20 C. E. Bosworth, The Kufichis or Qufs in Persian History, in “Iran”, 14 (1976), n. 9, pp. 13 on. B. Spooner, Who are the Baluch? A Preliminary Investigation into the Dynamics of an Ethnic Identity from Qajar Iran, in C. E. Bosworth and C. Hillebrand (eds.), Qajar Iran:Political, Social and Cultural Change 1800 - 1925, Edinburgh 1983, pp. 93 - 113. The traditional Baluch ballads are also very enlightening in this context, cf.: D. L. Dames, Popular Poetry of the Baloches, Quetta 1988 (photostatic reprint of the first ed., 1907); Mir Khuda Bakhsh Bijirani Marri, Searchlights on Baloches…, cit.

2. Peoples and history From the ethnographical and anthropological point of view, the region of Baluchistan is complex, characterised by marked ethnic plurality and the presence of very different models of settlement and socio-cultural structures (see Fig. 2.2). Baluchistan means the “land of the Baluch”, and indeed the Baluch are the ethnic group to be taken as a benchmark for this pluri-ethnic region straddling the Indian sub-continent, the Iranian plateau and central Asia. Among the many theories concerning the origins and provenance of these people, the most plausible is that which regards them as a group of IndoEuropean origin, though not ethnically homogeneous, 16 See R. Redaelli, Il nazionalismo balucio fra mito e nuovi assetti geopolitici, in “NRS”, 79 (1995), n. 3, pp. 651-674.

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Riccardo Redaelli: The Environmental Human Landscapes

peoples. Their presence in and control of the present-day region undoubtedly grew stronger over the centuries, favoured by the fact that Baluchistan was always a frontier region in the sense which Lattimore gave to the term: a peripheral area between Iran and the Indian subcontinent, apparently marginal, almost always poorly controlled by the central powers who claimed sovereignty over it, characterised by continual centrifugal pressure from local powers, but bound to the representatives of power centres external to the region by a complex interweaving of interests and relationships. Indeed, Baluchistan was the object of continual strife and frequent changes of occupiers, from the Hellenistic dynasties to the Hindus, from the Sasanians to the Arabs, who occupied its southern part - Makran - as early as the beginning of the eighth century; from repeated Turkish and Mongol invasions to attempts at subjugation by the Moguls and Persians.

extreme among the Pashtun), vendetta for offences against their own lineage, etc. In fact, however, ideals and ideological trappings notwithstanding, the two peoples are very different: • on a political level, the Baluch having a strong sense of hierarchical power links between the members of a tribal section and their head (sardar, nawab, hakim etc.) - links which in many parts of Baluchistan have slackened only over the last decades - while in the Pashtun world greater coercive powers are held by the assembly of the men of the tribe (the jirga) than by the individual tribal chief (who has traditionally played a role as mediator of the various interests within the tribe rather than as a real wielder of power)23; • on a social and cultural level, with the dwindling importance and role played by lineage and the ties of tribal descent; this lackening of the traditional bonds had already been noted during the course of the nineteenth century by the English functionaries, above all when the Baluch socio-tribal situation was compared with that of the Pashtun, where descent still had a pre-eminent role. This was therefore a dynamic which clearly antedated the intense process of modernisation typical of the last half century, and thus cannot be imputed to it. Clearly, however, the reforms introduced by the State of Pakistan, and the phenomena of urbanisation and modernisation, have stressed and greatly amplified a tendency already under way; • on a religious level, with deep differences in their Islamic life style, that is, of Islam as ortho-praxis. The great majority of both peoples, Pashtun and Baluch, are Sunni Muslims; but they profess this faith in different ways and, even more, differ in their attitudes towards other religions; it is not by chance that the Baluch enjoy the unenviable reputation of being “bad Muslims”. In fact, unlike other Muslim peoples of the area, they have never politicised their own religious faith, which has remained linked to the personal sphere, and to tradition, without becoming a real socio-political discriminating factor. In their political polemic against Pakistan’s dominant ethnic group the Punjabi24 - nationalist Baluch historians have recently gone out of their way to stress the Baluch’s modern and rational approach to religion. Similar opinions are also easy to find in the memoirs and documents of the English functionaries, which regularly point out the differing attitudes to religion

Over the 15th – 16th centuries, still divided into uncoordinated rival tribal groups, the Baluch clashed repeatedly for control of the uplands of central-northern Baluchistan with other peoples, the Pashtun - the chief ethnic group of Afghanistan, distinctly tribal and combative in character - and the Brahui. These latter were a people of mysterious origins, linguistically part of the Dravidian group21 and which had settled in central Baluchistan, where, over the course of the seventeenth century, they succeeded in creating a tribal proto-state which ultimately came to incorporate almost all eastern Baluchistan. From then onwards, while maintaining their own specific identity, the Brahui gradually grew closer to the Baluch, both linguistically and culturally, as well as politically, with ever closer alliances - reinforced by marriage ties - between the heads of the various tribes or tribal sections. This process of assimilation/absorption occurred only sporadically with the tribal groups of the Pashtun, in whose connection the sense of a different identity, and a deep political-cultural divide, always remained extremely strong. Both peoples apparently derived their cultural and ideological terms of reference from the same nomadic tribal world; both Pashtun and Baluch were Sunni Muslims; both Pashtunwali and Razm-i Baluch - the body of norms, values and beliefs which represented their “customs” - stress the concept of equality among free men, of honour (izzat in the Baluchi language, nang in Pashtu), understood as respect for the duties of hospitality22, the protection of women (verging on the 21 On the peculiarity of the Dravidian language spoken by the Brahui, see J. Elfenbein, The Brahui problem again, “Indo-Iranian Journal”, 25 (1983), pp.103-132; M. B. Emeneau, Brahui and Dravidian comparative grammar, University of California Publications in Linguistics n. 27, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1962 V. A. Rossi, Iranian elements in Brahui, Napoli 1979. 22 The duty of hospitality is viewed as one of the absolutely fundamental elements of both Baluch and Pashtun traditional society. F. Scholz brings this out clearly in his paper on the Hasni: failure to respect it could actually lead to the land owned by the “guilty party” being taken from him by the village community (cf. section 3) pp. 6066.

23 The in-depth analysis by Fred Scholz, The Hasni Tribe in Western Baluchistan in this volume (pp. 59-72) is extremely illuminating in connection with these processes. 24 According to the nationalist scholar I. Baloch: “[...] The Baluch people differ from those of Punjab and Sind, and from the Muslims of India in their concept of a religious state. The Baluch regard it as the individual's private affairs [...] The Baluch are not orthodox or fanatic Muslims like Persians, Pushtuns and Muslims of the Indo-Pak subcontinent [...]”. I. Baloch, The problem of... cit., pp. 69 on. For the nationalist Janmahmad: “[...] Unlike their Pakistani, Iranian or Afghan neighbours, the Baloch were never incited in the name of religion [...]”. Janmahmad, The Baloch Cultural Heritage, Karachi 1982, p. 153.

21

Baluchistan evinced by Baluch and Pashtun25.

ritual pilgrimage29 during the month of ramadan (the 27th of the month).

Islam’s markedly a-political character in Baluchistan may have been favoured by the firmly established presence over the centuries of many communities which were either non-Muslim, such as Hindus and Zoroastrians (generally organised into small but flourishing trading communities), or Muslim sects and minorities such as the Ismailis and the Zikris. These latter26 - a community with many doctrinal and procedural peculiarities, and strongly heterodox in relation to “official” Islam - deserve a brief parenthesis at this point. They were the adherents of a movement which developed independently in southern Baluchistan (Makran), with roots probably in the 16th – 17th centuries, under the influence of a disciple of the preacher Sayyid Mohammad Jaunpuri (c. 1442 - 1505), who founded a short-lived messianic and eschatological movement in India known as Mahdawis. This religious sect expanded greatly in Makran at the beginning of the eighteenth century, when the group of the Gichkis succeeded in dominating the region, under the guidance of Mulla Murad Gichki, the Zikri’s charismatic political and religious leader27. The close link between the expansion of Gichki political power and the Zikri faith is attested by the role assumed by the mythicised figure of Mulla Murad in the current religious practices of the Zikris: they do not practise the traditional Islamic hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca but substitute it, instead, with a “devotional visit” (ziyara) to the mountain of Murad (Kuh-i Murad) near the city of Turbat, in Makran28. According to tradition, the tomb of their leader stood on this hill, and it is there that the Zikris gather on their

To return to historical events, the already-mentioned establishment of the Khanate of Kalat - dating back to 1666, with the rise of khan Mir Ahmad Khan (1666 1695), a member of the tribal sub-section of the Ahmadzai, from which all the khans of the Khanate were subsequently to come - marked the beginning of a long, in truth never completed, process of the concentration of the entire eastern region of Baluchistan around a specific political centre which the Baluch tribes - divided, and bereft of any unitary leadership - long failed effectively to counter. This is not the place for a detailed account of the complex history of the region and khanate of Kalat30. Suffice it to say that, in the mid-eighteenth century, the famous Brahui khan Nasir Khan I the Great (1749 1794/5) seized upon a particularly favourable historical moment to extend the khanate’s dominions and to reinforce its internal cohesion. The Baluch region had been under the control of the Safavids (second half of 16th century), then of the Moguls of Delhi until the middle of the following century. Since then, Baluchistan has been weakly controlled by the declining Persian empire or by the different ephemeral potentates who had come to power in Afghanistan. During the course of the eighteenth century, on the other hand, three factors enabled the khanate to carve out a space of its own as an independent political structure: • the decline of the power of the Moguls of Delhi; • the collapse of the short-lived empire of Nadir Shah (1722 - 47), recreated from the ashes of the Safavid empire; • the constant tension within the kingdom created by the first amir of modern Afghanistan, Ahmad Shah Durrani (1747 - 73), the charismatic leader of the Durrani (called Abd‘ali before him) Pashtun .

25 For example, according to Robert Sandeman, in his usual terse, straightforward language: “[...] Both [i.e.: the Baluch and Pashtun] are war-like, revengeful, predatory, but while the Patan is a republican, having little reverence for the person of his chief, the Baluch respects and obeys the head of his clan; while the Patan is bigoted and priestridden, the Baluch pays scant heed to the Sayad or the Maulavi [...]”, in T. Thornton, Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman. His Life and Work on Our Indian Frontier, Karachi 1979 (reprint from the 1st. ed., London 1895), p. 28. 26 Known as Dah by the Brahui. The term Dah means “message” and it is the word the Zikri themselves use for the Koran. The word Zikri seems to derive from zikhr, meaning the praise of the names of God and formulas for prayer in the Muslim world. The bibliography on the Zikris is minimal and often of dubious quality. Of the few relevant works I shall mention only: A. S. Ahmed, Islamic Fundamentalism, Sufism And Ethnicity In Pakistan: A Case-Study From Baluchistan, in “Journal of Central Asia”, 10 (1987), n. 1, pp. 52 - 53; Baluchistan District Gazetteer Series, vol. VII: Makran, Bombay, 1906, pp. 49 - 50; S. L. Pastner, Powers and Pirs Among the Pakistani Baluch, in “JAAS”, 13 (1978), n. 3 - 4, pp. 232-235; I. Baloch, Islam, the State, and Identity: The Zikris of Balochistan, in P. Titus (ed.), Marginality and Modernity... cit., pp. 223 - 249. 27 Cf. the paper by Valeria Piacentini on the Kech valley included in this volume, which deals with these historical events pp. 143 on. 28 Traditionally, the Zikri pilgrimage to the Kuh-i Murad was regarded as a hajj. Recently, in reply to the growing hostility towards this sect shown by the radical Pakistani Islamic groups, in order to avoid the accusation of blasphemous behavior, the Zikris themselves have begun to describe their pilgrimage as a “devotional visit” to the tomb of Mulla Murad, regarded as a pir (in point of fact, this latter practice also being regarded as somewhat unorthodox by the representatives of official Islam).

With this more favourable international situation the khans of Kalat began a process of territorial expansion to both north and south. To the north, occupying the mountainous areas and uplands hitherto controlled by Pashtun tribes - these were areas which were of particular interest to the British, in connection with the creation of a defence system for British India; to the south, stretching as far as to occupy the southern region of Makran and Las Bela. The studies by Piacentini Fiorani consider the region of Makran in detail, and it is to them that I refer the reader. In particular, the paper on the castles of Kech says more about the Gichki period, that is, the non-tribal power elite, with non-Baluch origins, which dominated the region of Makran at the time of its conquest by Nasir 29 Interestingly, non-believers are also allowed to go on this pilgrimage. I myself have performed the ziyara on two occasions, in spring 1990 and 1992, accompanied by a Zikri mullah, and carried out all the required ritual activities. 30 For an analysis of the history of the khanate of Kalat, cf. the abovementioned study by the present writer, The Father's Bow…cit. and relative bibliography. For a very brief summary of its history cf. IGI/PS, Baluchistan, cit., pp. 12 on.

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Riccardo Redaelli: The Environmental Human Landscapes

Khan I (second half of the 18th century). The regions of Makran and Las Bela - controlled by the tribal group of the Jamot, under a unitary leadership with the title of jam - are extremely interesting, since they were the areas of Baluchistan where it first emerged quite clearly that a tribal organisation based on lineage and descent, and tied to a combative, nomadic and egalitarian ideal, could be transformed - and noticeably weakened - by the process of hierarchisation and “feudalisation” encouraged by irrigation-intensive and settled agriculture (with the oasis system, the kariz, and the marginalisation of nomads and sheep-farming).

Great Game being played out in central Asia between Great Britain and the Czarist empire, and one of the pivotal points for the military defence of India. It was not economic, commercial, or mining interests which drew the British Colonial Administration to the region, but defence requirements and the need to ensure peace on its own western frontier. These, then, were the considerations and concerns which in 1876 caused the Government of India to set up a Political Agency for Baluchistan, with the appointment there of an Agent to the Governor General and Chief Commissioner - the highest British authority in the region - flanked by numerous Political Agents scattered throughout the territory, whose job it was, in practice to run the entire region, albeit usually through the system of Indirect Rule. The khanate of Kalat was kept alive, but the powers and authority of the khan were seriously compromised by the British decision to bring in their own functionaries as sole points of reference for the powerful peripheral chiefs (the sardars), who were bound to the administration by a whole series of duties and rewards, these ones in form of regularly paid monetary allowances or benefit usually called mu‘afis or jagirs (generally the former being an exemption from taxes on land, water and pastures or a gift in allowances or in kind, the latter a gift of land – with its relative income to a leader of a tribal section or lineage). This policy was to lead to the reinforcing and institutionalisation of their status and political-administrative role, the so called “sardar-i system”33.

Thus, on the death of khan Nasir Khan I (1795), a Baluchistan subject to the power of Kalat was characterized by its own marked plurality, both ethnic with Baluch, Brahui, Pashtun, and minorities of Arab, Indian and African origins, particularly in evidence along the coastal strip - and cultural and social. This plurality was evident in the very way the territory was managed and exploited, as I have tried to demonstrate in the first section of my following chapter31. From the more strictly historical point of view, the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the following saw the all too evident emergence of the limits inherent in as fragile and noncohesive a structure as the tribal proto-state of the Brahui of Kalat. Indeed, on the death of the authoritative and charismatic Nasir Khan, the centrifugal pressure exerted by the peripheral chiefs, and the traditional inter-/intratribal rivalries, brought about the rapid collapse of the central Authority: many peripheral territories were occupied by potentates from outside the region; other parts of the Khanate, such as Las Bela, Kharan and the north of Baluchistan, tried to regain their independence or to obtain almost complete autonomy, often successfully. The Brahui and Baluch sardars rose up against successive khans on several occasions, plunging the region into continual anarchy and insecurity.

The seventy or so years of British dominion over the region of east Baluchistan - the present-day Province of Pakistani Baluchistan - had a deep if sometimes scarcely perceptible influence on the history, military events, political-institutional development, culture and indeed society of this region. This temporal and spatial consistency - given that they have concerned themselves primarily with eastern Baluchistan, the part subject to British colonisation - also provides the reader with a degree of correlation between the analyses of the various aspects of the territory and of man’s action upon it, avoiding the mere juxtaposition of studies investigating different historical periods or areas too disparate to yield any sense of a whole.

This climate of tension and persistent instability was a decisive factor for the British Government of India’s definitive intervention in the Baluch region towards the 1870s, after several years of political instability and opposing views within their own colonial Administration. The central part of my article focuses upon these British concerns, on the various positions within the Colonial Government and on this latter’s need for security in the region, in particularly after Czarist expansion into Central Asia in the middle of the century32.

In 1947, with the end of British rule in the Indian subcontinent, eastern Baluchistan was soon forced to become

Since it was a frontier zone and a “crossroads” for hypothetical armies on the march from Persia, Afghanistan and Central Asia towards the Indian subcontinent, Baluchistan thus became a vital pawn in the

33

The system of British indirect administration in Baluchistan is known as the Sandeman System, after the most famous British functionary in the region, Sir Robert Sandeman, first A.G.G. in Baluchistan, who remained in this post until his death in Makran in 1892. On this controversial figure and his system of administration, cf.: T. H. Thornton, Colonel Sir Robert Sandeman… cit.; A. L. P. Tucker, Sir Robert Sandeman: Peaceful Conqueror of Baluchistan, Lahore 1979; R. I. Bruce, The Sandeman Policy as applied to Tribal Problems of Today, in “JRCAS”, 19, pp. 45 - 67. More particularly, cf. the doctoral theses by: T. A. Heathcote, British Policy and Baluchistan (1854 1876), University of London, London 1969, and D. Simanti, Strategy and Structure: a case study in imperial policy and tribal society in British Baluchistan (1876 - 1905), University of London, London 1991. Cf. Also R. Redaelli, The Father's Bow... cit., section 2.3, pp. 67 - 73.

31 See below R. Redaelli, Administrative subdivisions and tribal structures: the perception of the territory between tradition and modernity (19th - 20th century) pp. 33-50. 32 For an accurate analyses of the security policy adopted by the Government of India vis-à-vis the Russian advance in Central Asia and for the military defense of the North-West Frontier of India, see G. Pastori, La politica militare britannica in India: l’ara del Balûchistân (1870-1914), Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cagliari, 2000 (unpublished).

23

Baluchistan part of the fledgling state created for India’s Muslims, namely Pakistan. The separation of the geographical and cultural region of Baluchistan into two main parts was now sanctioned once and for all, with one Pakistani area and one under the control of Tehran, as decided upon in the second half of the nineteenth century34. The birth of Pakistan brought new political actors, new forms of authority and new power models on to the scene; these latter did not necessarily spell the end of the traditional Baluch tribal or feudal political élites, but they did oblige them to adapt thoroughly to the new context. The absorption of Baluchistan into a political amalgam dominated by a different ethnic group, the Punjabi, sporadically very aggressive towards the traditional peripheral power centres, further strengthened the Baluch feeling of “national” identity, with the development of a strong nationalist movement, notably more radical and thrusting than the first Baluch reformist and unitary movements of the beginning of the century.

of political representation and socio-economic solidarity, with the partial decline of the old, internal ties of lineage or village community, in favour of a transverse network of contacts and support. On the international level, the birth of Pakistan and its prompt dependence - through the much discussed containment pacts - on the anti-Communist block associated with the United States, were not without consequence for the region of Baluchistan. Indeed, the growing power and radicalisation of the nationalist movement offered Moscow an opportunity to attain two goals of by no means secondary importance: i) on the one hand to unsettle the pro-western defensive bastion in south Asia, represented by Pakistan, by supporting Baluch pro-independence guerrilla warfare, which had degenerated into a bloody conflict during the seventies, soon after the searing defeat undergone by Pakistan in 1971 with the loss of Bengal (which became the independent state of Bangladesh); ii) on the other, to prepare the ground for an approach to the Indian Ocean, in accordance with the traditional Russian and-Soviet strategy of seeking an outlet on to warm seas. It is not by chance that many Baluch activists were welcomed by Soviet universities and colleges, where they received not only a technical education, but also powerful ideological indoctrination, as we may infer from the pro-socialist attitude of Baluch nationalist theories, and the ideologies of the various movements in the region.

The Baluch’s perception of their territory, and of the ties which they had with it, were undoubtedly modified at a political level, as well as in terms of a sense of identity. Equally, on the social and economic plane, the traditional models of land management and settlement - whether nomadic-pastoral or agricultural-sedentary - were profoundly affected by the ruthless process of modernisation and socio-economic change, with its relentless drift towards the growth of urban centres, and the transformation of the village economy, with a slackening of community ties giving way to a process of individualisation and money-based economic activities. After the end of the state of armed conflict between the Baluch and the Pakistan federal army which characterised the seventies and, in particular, with the increase in federal or international funds for the infrastructural and economic development of Baluchistan over the last two decades, these tendencies have gathered momentum and become even more in evident. These dynamics emerge clearly from the above-mentioned articles by Scholz, on the community of the Hasni Pashtun, and by Van Steenbergen on the social importance of the rights to water. The chapter by Paul Titus, Dreams of Unity, Baluch Itehad A voluntary urban association in Baluchistan, investigates the changes which have occurred in an urban context like that of Quetta - the provincial capital of Baluchistan - in the field

The collapse of the USSR, and the end of bi-polarity, have done nothing to decrease the region’s geopolitical importance: international competition on the energy resources of Central Asia, the stand-off between the United States and Iran, and the Afghan civil war and its follow-ups continue to ensure that this apparently peripheral region maintains its historic role as passage land for trade, migrations and military operations: the crossroads of Asia, between the Indian sub-continent, the Iranian plateau and the steppes of Central Asia.

34 The thorny problem of the borders between British India and Persia was resolved in 1872 with a compromise - which cut the region inhabited mainly by the Baluch into two - known as the “Goldsmid Agreements”, after the British head of the Delegation. On these events, cf. the interesting work by Valeria Piacentini Fiorani which analyses the extensive and little-known documentation concerning them in the Persian Archives, Notes on the Definition of the Western Borders of British India in Sistan and Baluchistan in 19th century, in B. Scarcia Amoretti - L. Rostagno (eds.), Yad Nama. In memoria di Alessandro Bausani, 2 vols., Roma 1991, vol. I, pp. 189 - 203. The documentation in the British Archives is also very extensive and detailed. Cf.: IOR L/P&S/10/594 and L/P&S/10/1136. Cf. also the report by the British Commissioner for the Joint Anglo-Persian Boundary Commission, Sir F. Goldsmid, Eastern Persia: an Account of the Journeys of the Persian Boundary Commission, 1870 - 1872, London 1876; and A. P. Thornton, British Policy in Persia, 1858 - 1890, in “EHR”, 69 (1954), pp. 554 579, and LXX (1955), pp. 55 - 71.

24

Riccardo Redaelli: The Environmental Human Landscapes

Fig. 2.1: Pakistan. The main ethnic groups. The significant presence in Baluchistan of the ethnic groups of the Baluch and the Pashtun (to the North) emerges clearly from the map. (Source: Perry-Castañeda Library, University of Texas).

25

Baluchistan

Fig. 2.2: Baluchistan: Physical Map.

26

Riccardo Redaelli: The Environmental Human Landscapes

Plate 2.1 (Above): 1992, Central Makran Range. From Turbat to Panjgur: mountain pass. Plate 2.2 (Below): 1990, Makran Coastal Range. From Turbat to Pasni.

27

Baluchistan

Plate 2.3 (Above): 1988, Panjgur area. Cultivation after rain behind silty levees, in a dry drepression of Makran. Plate 2.4 (Below): 1988, Dasht basin. Ploughed soils with small levees near Kirkak.

28

Riccardo Redaelli: The Environmental Human Landscapes

Plate 2.5 (Above): 1995, Panjgur, Kuhn Qalat area: barrages and season cultivations. Plate 2.6 (Below): 1990, Tagran Khawr/Wakai area: garband system: terracing and barrages are used in order to preserve rainwater for seasonal harvests.

29

Baluchistan

Plate 2.7 (Right): 1992, Mand: series of kariz-wells near the oasis.

Plate 2.8 (Left): 1992, Mand: the underground channel of the kariz.

30

Riccardo Redaelli: The Environmental Human Landscapes

Plate 2.9 (Right): 1995, Panjgur: the surface channel from the kariz approaching the oasis

Plate 2.10 (Left): 1995, Panjgur: the surface channel inside the oasis.

31

Baluchistan

32

Administrative Subdivisions and Tribal Structures. The Perception of the Territory between Tradition and Modernity Riccardo Redaelli

political structures, and historical and cultural dynamics2: the north, the centre and the south.

1. Baluchistan in the 19th century: between the tribal and the “feudal” structure – The case of Gwadar - The case of Khudabadan - 2. The growth of British colonial power in the Baluch region - 3. The birth of Pakistan and the role of the territory in the myth of Baluch nationalism

1) It is in the region of northern Baluchistan - with the partial exclusion of the important urban centre of Quetta, which is an obvious exception in this rural socio-cultural panorama - that loyalty to the traditional tribal structure bolstered by the mythical trappings of tribal nomadism is strongest among both the Pashtun and Baluch groups3. By way of example we might take two of the largest and most intractable of Baluchistan’s tribal groups, the Marri and the Bugti, which have long been settled in the inaccessible mountain areas separating Quetta from the Punjab.

1. Baluchistan in the 19th century: between the tribal and 1 the “feudal” structure As will be clear from the brief essay on the Environmental Human Landscapes, the Baluch area has been characterised by marked ethno-cultural plurality, with the presence, on the same territory, of different peoples, or peoples differentiated internally by pronounced tribal subdivisions (cf. Fig. 2.1). Furthermore, the presence of distinct ecological niches/micro-systems, and the political fragmentation typical of the history of the region over the last century, have made any unitary treatment of Baluchistan’s complex social system highly problematic.

The marginal position occupied by agriculture based on man-made irrigation systems, the relatively minor sociopolitical importance of the “land factor”, the prevalence of semi-nomadic pastoral activities, or transhumance, the remoteness from any centralised political entity (such as the khanate of Kalat in the 18th and 19th centuries, and, later, the British Colonial Administration) all made it possible for these peoples to keep the ideals underlying the original Baluch tribal culture very much alive. Nonetheless, among the Marri and Bugti too, there have been signs of a general strengthening of the role, prestige and power of the various heads of the tribal sections which characterise the Baluch ethnic group, in contrast to other peoples of the region with strong tribal characteristics, the Pashtun groups first and foremost, among whom the importance of the tribal assembly vis-àvis the power and authority of the single leader has by and large been retained.

To put it simply - without wishing in any way to introduce over-rigid, theoretical or over-generalised typologies - one can say that, from the 18th century onwards, Baluchistan was roughly divided geographically into three parts, with different socio-

1

This paper is based on years of research in the field, and in the archives, undertaken by me as a member of the Italian Historical, Archaeological and Anthropological Research Project in Makran and Kharan, active in Pakistan from 1986. I would like to express my warmest gratitude to prof. Valeria Piacentini Fiorani for the opportunity this offered me, and for the constant help and encouragement she gave me in my work. In this connection I would also like to thank the many Members of the Mission who have succeeded one another over these years; particular thanks go to my friends and colleagues Beatrice Nicolini and Gianluca Pastori, to prof. Ugo Fabietti and Gionata Rizzi. And also to Cristina Silvani, an indefatigable archivist, whose help proved invaluable in the field of information technology; and to Rita Redaelli. It would have been impossible for me to achieve anything at all in Baluchistan - always supposing that indeed I have - without the disinterested and generous help of many friends and functionaries on the spot, and here my special gratitude goes to Dr. Taj Baluch of Turbat, Mas‘ud Gichki of Tump, the Jalal Khan family from Mand, Changeez Kurd from Quetta, the Secretaries of the provincial Ministry of Culture, Hakim Baluch and Ayyub Baluch, the former Home Secretary, Aziz Luni, and the Deputy-Secretary of the Provincial Archives of Baluchistan, Habib Ahmad Khan. I also think with particular affection of St. Joseph’s Convent in Quetta, and of the nuns who lived there, ever hospitable and eager to make me feel “at home”, especially the Mother Superior, Sarah Goss. Lastly, my thanks to my wife Cinzia and my two sons Edoardo and Andrea, both accustomed by now to being “abandoned” for long periods (though of course I hope they continue to miss me a little).

In other words, the leaders of the various power levels of the tribal sections of the Baluch people have managed to turn the political patronage-clientes relation with the members of their tribe to their own advantage; in the nineteenth century, the various nawabs, sardars, khans etc. - to name but a few of the titles most frequently found in the region - were much more than a primus inter pares, as was often the case among the neighbouring Pashtun. Indeed, they represented a power centre reliant upon ties that were clientelar and “feudal”, rather than 2

For further details concerning this subdivision, cf.: R. Redaelli, The Father’s Bow: the Khanate of Kalat and British India (19th - 20th Century), Firenze 1997, pp. 31 - 45. 3 Cf. the interesting and detailed analysis by F. Scholz in this volume, The Hasni Tribe in Western Baluchistan, and also his pioneering sociogeographical studies of central-northern Baluchistan: Baluchistan (Pakistan): Eine sozialgraphische Studie des Wandels in einem Nomadenland seit Begin der Kolonialzeit, Göttingen 1974.

33

Baluchistan linked to lineage and consanguinity. As we shall see, the rise of British colonial power over the second half of the nineteenth century helped to strengthen this tendency, as was also to happen in the other regions of Baluchistan.

marriage ties, and a rise in the forging of family ties between Brahui and Baluch. These inter-ethnic bonds were further boosted by the short historical memory of the Brahui and Baluch, which encouraged integration between individuals or family groups without any family ties, but which found themselves in some kind of relationship, whether territorial or economic. According to Frederick Barth6 , the very presence of a strong hierarchical structure within the Baluch tribal groups - characterised politically by the hierarchical patron-client relationship - enabled them culturally to absorb minority groups, or to become close to dissimilar peoples such as the Brahui. This is the case, for example, with the Gichkis of southern Baluchistan which we shall consider shortly - who were probably of Rajput origin, or with the Jagdali, a tribe originally from Sind, but nonetheless all regarded as Baluch.

2) Roughly speaking, central Baluchistan formed the central core of the territories subject, from the 17th century onwards, to the dynasty of the Ahmadzai khans, who were members of the Brahui ethnic group4. Organised according to an essentially endogamous patrilinear tribal structure, over the 17th and 18th centuries this extremely warlike ethnic group had managed to gain control of an area situated between the Mogul Empire to the east, the declining Safavid Empire to the north and the aggressive Pashtun tribes which were pushing toward the Punjab and Persia from the region of Afghanistan5. But it was above all during the long reign of the most important Brahui khan, Nasir Khan I (1749 - 93), that the tribal proto-state of the Khanate of Kalat achieved a qualitative leap, both in terms of extending the territories under its control, and in those of the organisation of its power centres. Ownership of rich agricultural areas such as the plain of Kachchi in central Baluchistan, and the indirect control of the important oases of Makran, had guaranteed the court of Kalat an agricultural and financial surplus which enabled the dynasty of the khans to consolidate their authority over the chiefs of the numerous tribal sections. Furthermore, during the reign of Nasir Khan I, the distributing of gifts, the granting of fiscal exemptions and similar favours, encouraged the consolidation of a more clearly defined and structured hierarchical sub-division within the population and the crystalising of the power relations between the peripheral chiefs and the centre in relation to the original tribal patterns.

3) Among the various areas of the Baluch region, southern Baluchistan and, in particular, the region of Makran, have been characterised by a strongly hierarchical stratification and a distinctly “feudal” type of social organisation over the territory. This tendency was intensified, at the beginning of the 18th century, by the seizing of power, in the Makrani area, by a non-Baluch group, the Gichkis. Rather than a tribe, the Gichkis were - and indeed still are - an extended family group, probably of Rajput origin, which had emigrated from northern India around the 15th century and moved slowly to end up in Makran. As mentioned in the introductory essay, despite their numerical insignificance the Gichkis had managed to seize power thanks to a shrewd policy of inter-tribal military and matrimonial alliances (above all with the powerful Baluch tribe of the Rind), and thanks to the unscrupulous exploitation of a local sect, the Zikris. The fact that the Gichkis were not really a tribe always denied them a permanent military force within the group, making them dependent on other Baluch tribes which had to provide them with tribal warriors for the defence of the Gichki castles and the territory of Makran. This weakness emerged starkly in the second half of the 19th century, when a tribal group in a phase of expansion - the Nawshirvanis, who had settled in western Baluchistan, in the region of Kharan and Persian Baluchistan - threatened the Gichkis’ traditional supremacy in Makran, playing upon this very lack of any network of military support.

The social stratification deriving from the development of irrigated agriculture, and the growth of a network of interests/obligations more firmly organised around the khan and his embryonic administrative structure, tended to weaken the egalitarian tribal ideology and the close ties of lineage and descent (zat). The position of the traditional chiefs on the various levels became increasingly established, indeed well beyond what the Brahui khans would have wished, and during the course of the nineteenth century they found themselves facing continual revolts and centrifugal pressure within the khanate. Lastly, the hereditary nature of the main tribal posts, and the need for more systematic alliances among the opposing tribal sections, encouraged exogamous

At the same time, however, the weakness of these tribal links also favoured the cultivation of permanent crops, and added to the importance of the Makrani oases, with the use of the complex system of networks for the underground channelling of the waters of the piedmont strata, the kariz7. The ownership of lands within the

4

Cf. above R. Redaelli, The Environmental Human Landscapes, pp. 20 on. Traditionally, the birth of the Khanate of Kalat is seen as dating from 1666, with the seizing of power by the khan Mir Ahmad Khan (1666 95). But it was only in the middle of the XVIII century, in the reign of Nasir Khan I (1749 - 95), that Kalat managed to free itself from the control of the Afghan amir Ahmad Shah, to whom Kalat paid tribute. Kalat had previously been a tributary of the short-lived Persian empire of Nadir Shah (1722 - 47). Cf. also my essay on The Environmental Humand Landscapes in this volume.

5

6

F. Barth, Competition and Symbiosis in North East Baluchistan, in: Process and Form in Social Life: Selected Essays of Frederik Barth, London 1981, pp. 179 - 88. 7 On these traditional underground channels for the collection and channeling of water, there is a large debate in connection with their origins, building techniques, dating and the social consequences of their

34

Riccardo Redaelli: Administrative Subdivisions and Tribal Structures oases, and more particularly the ownership of the water quotas for the kariz - without which no land could be irrigated - became the dominant factor in an ever more stratified society such as Makran, further reducing the traditional tribal ties to the advantage of a network of transverse interests linked to the various power centres which could indeed be visibly sensed in the dense network of castles and fortified houses which characterise the landscape of the valley of the Kech8.

ii) the fertile plain of Kachchi, which had been ceded by Nadir Shah (1722 - 47) - the creator of a vast but shortlived empire in central-southern Asia - to the family of the khans of Kalat, the Ahmadzais, in the middle of the 18th century, and which was therefore regarded as one of their direct possessions9. It was the possession of this same plain, and the considerable revenue which it provided, which had enabled the khan to strengthen his authority and position vis-a-vis his sardars, transforming a fluid and unstable hierarchy into a network of powers and authorities of which the khan was the institutionalised nub; iii) the mainly Brahui tribal areas of Sarawan and Jahlawan, in central Baluchistan, where the khan seemed to occupy a position of primus inter pares in relation to his sardars, who were completely autonomous in terms of government, the administration of justice and tax collecting within their own areas, although they had sworn an oath of loyalty to the khan and were obliged to provide him with fighting men for any military action whether offensive or defensive - he might decide upon; iv) the region of Las Bela, in the south-east of Baluchistan, on the borders with Sind. This was one of the more prosperous areas - by Baluch standards, needless to say - and one of the most active from the commercial point of view. Indeed, the accounts of the English explorers and travellers of the nineteenth century give a picture of a region which was basically flourishing; according to Masson, this was due above all to a policy of openness with regard to Hindu traders, and the low customs tariffs on goods in transit, both of which did much to encourage commercial expansion10. In the memoirs of his journey in 1810, Pottinger too stresses the intensive trading activities carried on at Sonmiani, the post near Bela, stressing the active role played by the Hindus: “[...] I was quite astonished to find so much trade going on [...] The trade is entirely monopolised by the Hindoos, whose indefatigable industry is conspicuous wherever they are to be met with [...]”11. These observations are further confirmed by later descriptions by functionaries and travellers, which depict a continuing state of relative well-being (albeit - according to the Gazetteer - in gradual decline) until the 20th century12.

If from the ethnic and cultural point of view the region of Baluchistan actually appears to be a plural region, with pronounced differences within it, from the governmentalpolitical point of view it seemed at first sight to enjoy greater homogeneity: indeed, from the end of the 17th century, the whole eastern part of Baluchistan - that is, the Baluchistan which to-day is part of the State of Pakistan - was under the control of the khan of Kalat. Western Baluchistan, on the other hand, was under the nominal sovereignty of the Qajar dynasty of Persia. But closer examination soon reveals a much more complex situation: the khanate of Kalat, like many other tribal proto-states, was a chaotic jumble of separate territories, ruled in different ways. With the exception of the period of the already-mentioned khan Nasir I the Great, the weak sovereigns of Kalat were never able effectively to control any areas apart from the territory directly in their possession (known as niabat), while all their other possessions were dependent on their shifting relations (of power, alliances and marriage) with the numerous tribal or “feudal” Brahui/Baluch chiefs. Before the British colonial presence was definitively established at the end of the nineteenth century, the khanate of Kalat had been subdivided into the following: i) the above-mentioned niabat, or khan's personal possessions, over which he had complete power - despite the fact that they were often administered through a representative, generally the wazir of the kingdom - and which were his main source of income; maintenance. Amongst the many studies, see are discussed in P. Beaumont - M. Bonine - K. McLachlan (eds.), Qanat, Kariz and Khattara: Traditional Water Systems in the Middle East and North Africa, London 1989; H. Goblot, Les Qanats. Une technique d’acquisition de l’eau, Paris 1973; J. C. Wilkinson, Water and Tribal Settlement in South-Eastern Arabia. A Study of the Aflaj of Oman, Oxford 1977. Cf. also the interesting studies by F. Scholz, Die physichund sozialgeographischen Ursachen fur die Aufgabe und Erhalt der Kareze in Belutchistan, in “Die Erde”, 3 (1970), n. 4, pp. 302 - 315; Idem, Irrigation and Nomadism in Balochistan, in “Applied Sciences and development”, 11 (1978), n. 11, pp. 90 – 111 and Nomadism and Colonialism. A Hundred Years of Baluchistan 1872-1972, Oxford 2002; by F. van Steenbergen, Land, Water, and Ethnicity: social organization and resource management in irrigated communities in Balochistan, in P. Titus (ed.), Marginality and Modernity. Ethnicity and Change in Post-colonial Balochistan, Karachi 1996, pp. 250 - 272, and U. Fabietti's analysis, Tempo d’acqua. Sistemi irrigui, rappresentazioni locali e modelli etnografici della sincronizzazione e della desincronizzazione sociale, in Idem, Etnografia della frontiera. Antropologia e storia in Baluchistan, Roma 1997, pp. 99 - 122. 8 On the Gichkis and Makran cf. the detailed study by Valeria Fiorani Piacentini, The castles of Kech. A society without cities, in this volume. On the problematical relationship between hierarchy and the egalitarian ideal in southern Baluchistan, cf. U. Fabietti, Uguaglianza contro gerarchia. Pensando il cambiamento, in Idem, Etnografia della frontiera...cit., pp. 123 - 160.

9

In 1740 Nadir Shah gave the fertile plain of Kachchi to the Ahmadzais in reward for their support and assistance. N. Swilder, Kalat: the political economy of a tribal chiefdom, in “American Ethnologist”, 19 (1992), n. 3, p. 558. On Nadir Shah cf. J. Fraser, The History of Nadir Shah, formerly called Thamas Kuli Khan, the Present Emperor of Persia, to which is added a Short History of the Moghol Emperors, London, 1742, 2nd. edition; L. Lockhart, Nadir Shah, London 1938; Idem, The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia, Cambridge 1958; S. Riadzada (ed.), Nadir Shah az nazar-i Khawar-shanasan (Nadir Shah in the Eyes of the Orientalists), Taban, A.H.Sh. 1339. 10 “[...] The more profitable branch of revenue, is that arising from customs on foreign goods [...]”. C. Masson, Narrative of Various Journeys in Balochistan, Afghanistan, the Punjab and Kalat, vol. IV: Kalat, Karachi 1977 (1st. edition: London 1844), pp. 296 - 307. 11 H. Pottinger, Travels in Belochistan and Sinde, Karachi 1976 (photostat reprint of the 1st. edition, London 1816), p. 11. 12 “[...] Local accounts allege that the greatest degree of prosperity and comfort was reached by the people in the time of Jam Mir Khan II about the middle of the eighteenth century, and that since then there has been, if anything, a gradual decline towards impoverishment [...]”, BDGS, Las Bela, cit., pp. 110 - 111. Cf. also T. H Thornton, Colonel

35

Baluchistan Linked to Kalat from the 1740s, Las Bela had soon loosened her ties of dependency, ultimately regaining an almost total autonomy in the second half of the nineteenth century. A series of revolts by the jam of Las Bela (the title given to the region's political head), Mir Khan II (1830 - 88), although fruitless in military terms, confirmed Las Bela’s definitive independence from Kalat, whose khans always remained the formal depositories of sovereignty, but without any coercive power; v) the western region of Kharan, on the borders of Persia, governed by the warlike tribe of the Nawshirvanis. This tribal group, whose origins are uncertain but which had now fully merged with the ethnic group of the Baluch, only sporadically subject to an external central power (such as Persian or Afghanistan), was obliged to recognise the sovereignty of the Brahui khan Nasir Khan I in the second half of the 17th century. Such recognition was little more than formal, given that the crisis which affected Kalat for most of the 19th century enabled the Nawshirvanis to free themselves completely from the khan's control. Under the leadership in particular of their nawab Mir Azad Khan (c. 1831 - 1885), they buttressed their control over this inhospitable desert region to the detriment of the other local Baluch chiefs, organising continual raids and incursions, above all at the expense of the weakened power elite of the Gichkis of Makran. These incursions were helped by the bonds and other forms of protection they enjoyed with other Nawshirvanis tribes which had settled in Persian Baluchistan, which offered a relatively safe haven for the Nawshirvani plunderers, because of the inability of the Persian Qajar dynasty to control their remote province13; vi) the region of Makran, in southern Baluchistan, had also been swallowed up by the empire of the most brilliant khan of Kalat, Nasir Khan I, who had managed to overcome the resistance of the Gichkis, who themselves had succeeded in dominating the region for decades, by means of repeated military expeditions between 1750 and 177814. Following his usual policy, Nasir Khan had not excluded the conquered traditional

local chiefs - in this case the Gichkis - from power; rather, he had preserved their prerogatives and functions, demanding only recognition of his sovereignty and a commitment to supply fighting men in case of need. However, unlike what had occurred in other conquered areas, such as Kharan and Las Bela, the khan had also insisted on the handing over of half of the taxes collected by the Gichkis, as well as setting up a na'ib as his personal representative. As in the rest of the khanate, over the 19th century Kalat had lost most of its control over the region; but internal Gichki rivalries and their weakening by other groups - primarily by the Nawshirvanis - had prevented Makran from gaining any real independence from the khanate, which continued to maintain some form of control or influence over Makrani affairs; vii) certain tribal areas in northern Baluchistan, peopled by Baluch and Pashtun tribes. The khans of Kalat had no real influence over these either, in particular over the areas occupied by the Marri and Bugti. These areas were to be the first to shake off formal control by Kalat immediately after the creation of a British Political Agency in Baluchistan in 1877; given their strategic importance for the military defence of the frontier of British India, as we shall see, they were to be acquired or leased by the British government to be put under direct British administration, assuming a legal statues not devoid of interesting consequences. The fragmentary nature of and administrative disparities in the Baluch territories were further accentuated by the khans’ policy for ensuring the loyalty of their sardars, namely, the granting of jagir and mu‘afi. The term jagir was normally used for the granting in usufruct of a piece of land unencumbered by fiscal burdens. Very often the jagirdar (the person who received the jagir) had also the rights to the revenues he could collected over it. The term mu‘afi referred to gifts of cash, food or real estate, all exempt from taxes or tariffs, the granting of water quotas for irrigation purposes, etc. These gifts might be granted by the khan to one of his sardars in the form - whether temporary or permanent - of a portion of an oasis, or of a whole village, of water for the irrigation of fields and oases, sometimes even outside the territory controlled by the sardar who was their beneficiary. In this way a network of bonds, obligations and possessions was created, scattered at random like leopards’ spots, with the various traditional chiefs vaunting rights over areas that were discontinuous but closely intertwined.

Sir Robert Sandeman. His Life and Work on Our Indian Frontier, Karachi 1979 (1st. ed.: London 1895), pp. 201 - 203, and the memoirs of the French traveller F. Balsan, who visited Las Bela in 1941: F. Balsan, De Kaboul au Golfe Persique, Paris 1949, pp. 209 - 216. 13 Western Baluchistan, and its warlike tribes, were frequently the source of serious problems for the central Persian authority. As early as the seventeenth century, for example, Baluch raids contributed to the decline of the Safavid dynasty. In practice, the Qajar never succeeded in gaining effective control of this peripheral region. According to John Ramsay, one of the more active Agents to the Governor-General in Baluchistan: “[....] For the last ten years, Persia’s hold on Persian Baluchistan, never other than shadowy, has been non-existent. The country is now a welter of petty Baluch chiefs scrambling among themselves with constantly shifting fortunes in various ways[...]”. IOR L/P & S/10/575, Ramsay in Foreign and Political Dept., 7.IV.1917. 14 According to the traditional historical accounts of the Baluch, Nasir Khan I sent no fewer than nine armed expeditions against the Gichkis before he overcame their resistance and that of their supporters once and for all. BDGS, Makran, pp. 47 - 48. In this connection cf. also Tate’s interesting translation of the manuscript by the Brahui Muhammad Sidik: P. Tate, Kalat. A memoir on the Country and Family of the Ahmadzai Khans of Kalat from a Ms. Account by the Akhund Muhammad Sidik, with Notes and Appendices from the Other Manuscripts, as well as from Printed Books, Calcutta 1896.

Throughout the Indian sub-continent, the Mogul empire made widespread use of the systems of both jagirs and mu‘afis – which, furthermore, had already been used by the various dynasties of the sultanate of Delhi (12061626). The granting of lands and fiefs, and of exemptions from taxes, were current practices at the imperial court in their dealings with the local chiefs, with the Muslim and Hindu aristocracy, with the main administrative officials and with military officers (above all those in charge of frontier regions). The Mogul emperors tried, as far as possible, to move these officials and vassals around frequently from one jagir to another, so as to avoid the 36

Riccardo Redaelli: Administrative Subdivisions and Tribal Structures jagirdar from acquiring lasting local influence, becoming too rooted in one province, and thus ultimately forming a potential threat to the imperial power15.

The case of Gwadar The important Makrani port of Gwadar17 had been an enclave of the Sultanate of Muscat since 1783, when the khan of Kalat had voluntarily handed over control of the port, and the relative fiscal revenues, to the brother of the sultan of Muscat, Sa‘id Saiyid - a fugitive from ‘Oman at that time - to ensure him a fitting livelihood18. But in 1797, Sa‘id Saiyid had managed to gain possession of the throne of ‘Oman and to return to Muscat, though maintaining control of the Makrani port, which was governed from then onwards by one of his wali, or sultan's representative19.

This was a system which, while limiting the autonomy of the outlying power, did not in fact militate in favour of good administration. Given the temporary nature of control over any one jagir, officials and nobles of the empire tended to exploit the lands they were granted to the maximum, burdening peasants, artisans and traders with crippling and arbitrary taxes. With the decline of the emperors’ power, after the death of Auragzeb in 1707, there was a tendency to increase the number of jagirs granted by the crown to the aristocracy, in an attempt to limit their centrifugal trends; such grants also gradually became permanent, rather than temporary (i.e. heritable by his heirs on the death of the jagirdar).

Gwadar's economic growth during the nineteenth century transformed this small fishing-port into the chief trading port of Makran. Inevitably, Gwadar's growing wealth attracted the attentions of the khans of Kalat, who tried to re-established their own authority over this area, both through direct military action and above all on a diplomatic level, giving a new interpretation to the grant of 1783. The real terms of this grant, in fact, had never been spelt out and, over the years, had given rise to extremely disparate interpretations: “[...] The exact nature of the grant by Nasir Khan is shrouded in an obscurity which is now probably too late to dispel, and it has in recent times become a subject of controversy [...]”20. According to the sultans of ‘Oman, Gwadar had been ceded in perpetuity to Sa‘id Saiyid by Nasir Khan I, and as a result the Makrani port was legitimately part of the dominions of the sultanate of Muscat; the khanate of Kalat, on the other hand, claimed that Gwadar had been ceded purely temporarily, as a gesture of generosity towards a refugee.

The practice, by the imperial power, of granting a jagir in exchange for the supplying of military contingents in time of war to governors, tribal chiefs or local feudal lords – who might also enjoy the fiscal revenue such jagirs provided, as well as virtually unlimited autonomy within them – is well documented throughout all western regions of the Mogul empire. The jagir system was also widely used by the chiefs of the Sikh kingdom in Punjab and Kashmir (which gained independence from the Moguls in the middle of the 19th century) 16 and by the amirs of Sind (who came under British control around the middle of the same century). Naturally enough, the khanate of Kalat too followed this tradition. In theory, the granting of a jagir did not imply the end of the khan's sovereignty over the land thus granted, but only the right of the beneficiary to its full usufruct. The weakness of the central power of Kalat, and the unfailing way in which these jagir were passed down from generation to generation, meant that the individual tribal chiefs tended to consider every kind of jagir or mu‘afi as their complete possession, untouchable, inalienable and obviously - transferable by inheritance.

The weakness of the khans during the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth, meant that this controversy was purely a marginal matter. In 1863 the installing of a British Assistant Political Agent by the Indo-European Telegraph Department, and the subsequent definition of the borders with Persia, had helped to stabilize relations between the enclave and the khan of Kalat and the Qajar court, which was claiming control of the rich port in its turn. Furthermore, the British presence lessened the possibility of other military expeditions or attacks by the warlike tribes of the region or by the khan of Kalat himself.

All this further encouraged the fragmentation of Baluch territory, and of the various forms of authority exerted over it; the tangle of rights, obligations and powers concerning one single portion of land further exacerbated the strife between the various peripheral Brahui and Baluch chiefs, and, at a higher level, between the individual sardars and the central authority represented by the khan of Kalat and his wazir. The cases of the enclave of Gwadar and the village of Khudabadan are telling examples in this connection.

Gwadar returned centre stage in discussions between Kalat and the Government of India only in 1938, when the hitherto unsolved problem of the frontiers of the enclave was posed for the British Administration, as a result of the request for a licence for the exploration of 17 Cf. R. Redaelli, The Father’s Bow...cit., section 4.3, pp. 134 - 141, and G/PG, vol. 1 - Part. J-B. 18 BDGS - Makran, pp.282-283. 19 Gwadar remained under Omanite rule until 6 September 1958, when it became part of Pakistani territory with the payment, to ‘Oman, of a recompense of three million pounds. See: Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, September 15-22, 1958, p.16378; S. A. Iqbal, Balochistan: its Strategic Importance, Karachi 1992, pp.171-172. 20 G/PG, p.602.

15 S. Lane-Poole, Mediaeval India Under Muhammedan Rule (A.D. 712-1764), Lahore 1991 (Photostat ed. From the original), pp.378 on; A. H. Hamadani, The Frontier Policy of the Delhi Sultans, Islamabad 1986, p.123. 16 CHI, vol. 6, pp. 88 on; M. S. Akhtar, Sind under the Mughuls, Karachi 1990;

37

Baluchistan and search for oil fields in Makran21. The absence of clear borders between the possessions of the khan and those of the sultan might indeed have provoked long and unpleasant wrangling should oil fields be discovered in the area of Gwadar. In this context the External Department of the Government of India asked the “officiating Agent to the Governor-General” in Baluchistan (AGG), Olaf Caroe, in January 1938 to organize a Boundary Commission with representatives from Britain, ‘Oman and the khanate of Kalat22.

The term jagir emphasized the concessionary nature of this donation, made by a superior to an inferior; as a jagir, it might be revoked at any time. The rights of Muscat were therefore limited - still according to Kalat to the surface revenue. Furthermore, for the khan of Kalat: “[...] the demarcation of the boundary is not in fact an international question of an agreement between Kalat and a Foreign State, but is more in the nature of a domestic affair of the Kalat State for the demarcation of a particular area of the State territory which has been granted by the His Highness the Khan to the Sultan of Muscat for enjoyment of the surface revenue [...]”26. The Government of India rejected this interpretation, which would clearly have been prejudicial to its own diplomatic relations with the Sultanate of Muscat at an extremely delicate historical moment, during which the control of the Persian Gulf played a vital importance. The deterioration in Europe of relations with Nazi Germany, and the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, caused the problem to be set aside once and for all.

The British officials in Baluchistan received New Delhi's proposal very coolly, aware as they were of the difficulties, rivalries and problems such an initiative might provoke. The new AGG, Parsons, was categorically opposed to the idea of a joint Boundary Commission, and expressed his doubts quite openly to the Foreign Department: “[...] Settlement of boundary is likely to be thorny question in spite of its unimportance [...] and I very much doubt if anything would come of negotiations between Khan and Sultan on any subject connected with Gwadur [...]”23. The opposition of the British officials in Baluchistan, the dragging on of negotiations with the oil companies and the worsening of the international situation caused the proposal for the settlement of the frontiers of the Omanite enclave in Makran to be put on hold.

The case of Khudabadan The case of Khudabadan is even more revealing. This village, situated in the extensive oasis system of Panjgur, a Makrani centre under the authority of the Gichki sardars, had long been administered by a wali, who lived in the local castle with a large armed escort. In that it was a jagir granted by the khan of Kalat, the nawab could not claim sovereignty over it, nor administer justice in loco, but only enjoy the agricultural and fiscal revenues deriving from it. In fact, exploiting Kalat’s weakness and the deep rifts within the Gichkis, over the course of the 19th century the aggressive Nawshirvani chiefs used Khudabadan as a launching pad to extend their own rule well beyond the area of Kharan; they even threatened Gichki power at Panjgur, before being halted by the rise of the pax britannica at the end of the century: as Robert Sandeman once more succinctly put it: “[...] using their footing in Panjgur as a starting point, the Naosherwanis have gradually [...] extended a network of influence over nearly the whole of Mekran, and if left to themselves would probably in a few years more have completely ousted the power of the Ghitchkis [...]”27.

This event, though devoid of direct consequences, did allow the last khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan to return astutely to the question of the contested sovereignty of Gwadar. He did not ask the British Administration to intervene to oblige the sultan to return Gwadar to the khanate of Kalat: the khan was perfectly aware that such a request would not be granted by the British officials, in view of the geo-strategic importance of the alliance between ‘Oman and Great Britain in the area of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. On the contrary, the khan upheld Muscat's right to occupy and control the port of Gwadar, but denied Omanite sovereignty over it. The sultan might continue to occupy the coastal town in accordance with the pattern established over the last 150 years; this right, however, did not derive from any non-existent Omanite sovereignty, but from its having been ceded, in 1783, by the khan Nasir Khan I, to a “refugee fleeing from Muscat”24: “[...] Gwadur is a jagir granted by the Khan of Kalat to a refugee of standing from and is held by Muscat in the same manner as the other jagirs are held by the Kalat Sardars [...]”25.

Indeed, shortly after the outbreak of World War II, Khudabadan was the starting point taken by the nawab of Kharan, Habibullah Khan, for a sortie to occupy certain territory in the khanate of Kalat, before Brahui reaction forced him to beat a hasty retreat towards his own fortresses (in its turn, the Kalat offensive was halted by a higher decision made by the Government of India, which wanted to avoid disorder on its own frontiers at a period as sensitive as the winter of 1939 - 40)28.

21

IOR L/P & S/12/2985. HSA R.C. Office, Basta N.23 - 2.12.P-1, N. F 621-N/37, External Dept to Caroe, 28.I.1938 and IOR L/P & S/12/2985, N.776, Foreign Dept to Parsons, 7.V.1938. 23 HSA R.C. Office, Basta N.23 - 2.12.P-1, N.72, Parsons to Foreign Dept, 12.05.1938. 24 “[...] While the Kalat State recognize that the Sultan of Muscat has established his rights of occupation in Gwadar and cannot now be turned out, they are still determined to deny that he has any sovereign rights there [...]” HSA R.C. Office, Basta N.23 - 2.12.P-1, N.5194-C, Edwards to Bedi, 15.10.1938. 25 HSA, N.2327, Khan Sharbat Khan to Edwards, 18.10.1938. Emphasis added. 22

26 HSA R.C. Office, Basta N.23 - 2.12.P-1, N.5194-C, Edwards to Bedi, cit. 27 IOR R/1/34/21 - Sandeman to Foreign Dept. N. 2554, 22.IV.1891. 28 Cf. section 5.2. - Armed confrontation between Kharan and Kalat (1939 - 40) in R. Redaelli, The Father’s Bow... cit., pp. 156 on and IOR R/1/34/67 - Report on disputes and hostilities between Kharan and the Kalat State during the year 1938 and 1939 by Edwards, 13.1.1940.

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Riccardo Redaelli: Administrative Subdivisions and Tribal Structures The British Government of India adopted this system of grants, codifying a complex mechanism for the granting of tax exemptions, allowances in cash or in kind, water quotas from the kariz for agricultural use, donations of land etc. The main aim of this policy was to bind the local tribal chiefs to the British colonial administration, securing their support and ensuring some form of control over them. Nor by chance, jagirs and mu‘afis were invariably granted “[…] subject to the usual conditions of private good behaviour as well as active public loyalty […]”29.

of the real importance of the investment on the part of the colonial administration, it was a way of keeping individuals, and their families, bound to the imperial power. For this reason, from a political point of view, the “rationalization” of such grants appeared totally undesirable. Faced with these objects, the Foreign Department withdrew the suggestion, leaving the policy of the granting of jagirs and mu‘afis unchanged. The federal Government of Pakistan abolished the jagir system only much later, with the Jagir Abolishment Act of 1965, after the end of British colonial presence33.

British officials divided mu‘afis and jagirs into various categories: grants given in perpetuity, grants given for the lifetime of the owner; grants given to native officials only for the duration of their post; grants given for the settlement of nomadic people; temporary grants and grants in cash or in goods. Plots of land granted as jagirs were also given to native military officers on their retirement from active service30.

2. The growth of British colonial power in the Baluch region The British Government of India began to take a systematic interest in Baluchistan only towards the end of 1830, in the context of the preparations for the disastrous first Anglo-Afghan war. At that time, the intrigues of the tribal chiefs, and the inexperience and the mistakes of the British functionaries and military, led the English to attack the khanate of Kalat by force, killing the khan himself, Mehrab Khan, and hundreds of Baluch warriors in a bloody battle. The British retreat from Kabul, in 1842, also led to the abandoning of Baluchistan, towards which a policy of benevolent neutrality was to be adopted for some years34.

As everywhere in India, in Baluchistan too the beneficiaries of jagirs and mu‘afis tried to have such grants made hereditary, as we see clearly from countless such requests in the provincial archives in Quetta (COQDA and HSA). However, the subdivision of jagirs and mu‘afis among such heirs meant that they were continually broken down into ever smaller units. At the beginning of the 20th century, as a result of this tendency, the colonial officials noted that the individual shares in these grants were “apt to become ridiculously small”. For this reason, in 1912 the Foreign department suggested to the AGG in Baluchistan that he “[…] continue muafis to a single heir rather than allow them to be split up into amounts too small to be of any value to the holder or to be of any service to Government in regards to their stimulating effect on such holders […]”31. This suggestion, however rational, met with a negative reception from the region’s colonial officials. There were a variety of reasons for this: firstly, it should be born in mind that in Baluchistan “the people are comparatively poor”; even a small grant might be of importance for the local population. But above all it should be remembered that “small Muafis have a sentimental value in the eyes of the people out of all proportion to their value in cash and it is therefore bad policy to resume them without any special reason”32.

However, colonial expansion in Sind and the Punjab, the Czarist advance into central Asia, and chronic instability in the Baluch region, drove the British to rethink their policy of containment - known as the Close Border Policy - and once again to embark on a far more active policy throughout the central Asian theatre, which entered history as the Forward Policy35. What worried the British Colonial Administration above all was the continual state of strife between the khan of Kalat and his unruly sardars, which jeoparised the security and stability of the western frontiers of British India. Furthermore, the setting up, between 1860 - 70, of the Indo-European Telegraph System, which linked Calcutta 33 F. van Steenbergen, Land, Water and Ethnicity: Social Organization and Resource Management in Irrigated Communities in Baluchistan, in P. Titus (ed.), Marginality and Modernity…cit, pp. 262 on. 34 The British invaded Afghanistan twice over the course of the 19th century, in 1839 and 1878, with disastrous results. Both wars were precipitated by the fears aroused by the Czarist advance into central Asia, which was perceived as a direct threat to India. I shall mention just two studies from a vast bibliography: the work by J. W. Kaye on the first Afghan war - extremely informative, though dated - History of the War in Afghanistan, 3 vols., London 1851 - 57, and the fine work by T. A. Heathcote, The Afghan Wars (1839 - 1919), London 1980. For military operations in the Baluch region during the first Anglo-Afghan war, cf. Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India. Selection from Government Records, 3 vols., Quetta 1979 (photostat reprint from the 1st. ed., 1910), especially vol. III. 35 On the consequences of this new security policy for Baluchistan, cf. R. Redaelli, The Father’s Bow..cit, pp. 62 on and related bibliography. See also T. A. Heathcote, British Policy and Baluchistan (1854-1876), Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1969; M. E. Yapp, Strategies of British India. Britain, Iran and Afghanistan, 1798-1850, Oxford 1980.

In other words, owing shares of a jagir or mu‘afis, however small, was not just of financial advantage to the owner: it also enhanced his social position among the other members of the tribal group or village. Irrespective 29

COQDA – R.C. Office, File N. 19-R3/A/51. Cf. CODQA – R.C. Office, File N. IV B-22 (1913) and HSA – AGG General Records, Basta N. 4, File N. 4.4.1890: Military jagirs - Extract from the proceedings of the Governtment of India – Military Department – n.2525-B, 01.12.1888 31 COQDA – R.C. Office, File N. 19-R3/A/51, letter from Foreign dept. to AGG, 07.10.1912. 32 COQDA – R.C. Office File N. IB B-22-68, letter from Ramsay to Wood, 19.12.1913. 30

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Baluchistan directly with London, made stability in Baluchistan more vital than ever, since a long stretch of the line ran through it, a fact which contributed to the Government of India's decision to concern itself permanently with the affairs of the region from within, and no longer through its functionaries in Sind and Punjab.

geographical junctions of any strategic-military importance, avoiding engagement in depth in the running of the remaining territory, except in completely exceptional and incidental circumstances (usually with the setting up of temporary Missions whose task was to re-establish order and security in the regions to which they were sent).

This was the start of a lively debate in the Indian Colonial Administration as to the strategies to be adopted with regard to Baluchistan, and indeed on the institutional nature of the khanate of Kalat itself. Here the policy of the colonial administration of Sind, which regarded Kalat as a “feudal” state and the khan as an independent sovereign - to be supported in his struggle against the rebellious sardars - ran counter to the view taken by the Administration of Punjab, which was coresponsible with Sind for relations with the Baluch area. According to the Punjabi functionaries, the khanate was a “federal state”36; the continuous strife was caused by the policy of the khan Khadadad Khan (1857 - 93), which was regarded as despotic and “[...] in violation of the rights and privileges of his chiefs and people [...]”. The policy which the Government of India should ideally have adopted was to interpose itself between the khan and his sardars, establishing direct relations with the latter, to the detriment of the prestige and authority of the khan.

The impact on traditional Baluch society, on its forms of authority and on the running and indeed the perception of the territory, was very profound, as may easily be imagined. First and foremost, the British proceeded to a formal and unambiguous defining of the outer frontiers of the regions, towards Persia and Afghanistan, through the setting up of special Anglo-Persian and Anglo-Afghani commissions. After a period of strenuous negotiations, in September 1872 the British Government signed a treaty, often known as the “Goldsmid agreements”, after the British head of delegation, which ratified the division of Baluchistan into a Persian area - over which Tehran had in fact very little authority - and an area known as the “Baluch confederation”, under indirect British control37. The agreement for the fixing of the frontiers with Afghanistan, drawn up in 1899 and known as the “Durand Line”, concerned the Baluch area only in part, but was extremely important for the strategic ordering of the military defence of the Empire's western frontier. Indeed, to guarantee the security and total defensibility of this frontier, the Government of India had annexed certain northern areas of Baluchistan directly to the Empire in 1879; these areas - those of Sibi, Pishin and Kurram, to be precise - had been occupied during the second Anglo-Afghan war. This limited portion of territory (a few thousand square miles) took on the name British Baluchistan cf. fig. 3.2, and there were several points of great strategic importance around it: while not proceeding to out-and-out annexation, with the Dasht Plain agreement the colonial Administration succeeded in persuading the khan of Kalat to lease them in perpetuity, on payment of an annuity of 25,000 rupees. These Leased Areas also included the village of Shal, renamed Quetta, and destined to become the main administrative centre of the region, as well as one of the largest British military cantonments in India38.

After a very long period of indecision, the Government of India gave its definitive backing to this latter political line - subsequently known as the Sandeman System signing a treaty with the khan in 1876 which ratified British dominion in the region, while maintaining the figure of the khan as a formally independent sovereign. The creation of a Political Agency for Baluchistan in 1877 sealed this line of political action: as long as the British remained in India, namely until 1947, indirect English rule in Baluchistan was never again an object of discussion (cf. Fig. 3.1). Furthermore, it should be stressed that the theory of the “federal state” lent itself far better than that of the “feudal” state to the institutional formalising and justifying of the policy of Indirect Rule, that is, the British practice of using the traditional local powers/authorities - in this case the sardars - to control a region, deploying their own peripheral functionaries as their main referents points of reference. This policy allowed the Government of India to control Baluchistan without excessively overloading its own budget. Furthermore, the main objective of the British in the region was directly to control only the few key

37 On these negotiations cf. the interesting work by Valeria Piacentini Fiorani which analyses the extensive and little-known documentation in the Persian Archives, Notes on the Definition of the Western Borders of British India in Sistan and Baluchistan in 19th. century, in B. Scarcia Amoretti, L. Rostagno (eds.), Yad Nama. In memoria di Alessandro Bausani, 2 vols., Roma, 1991, vol. I, pp. 189 - 203. The documentation in the British Archives is equally extensive and detailed. Cf.: IOR L/P&S/10/594 and L/P&S/10/1136/ Cf. also the report by the British Commissioner for the Joint Anglo-Persian Boundary Commission, Sir. F. Goldsmid, Eastern Persia: an Account of the Journey of the Persian Boundary Commission, 1870 - 1890, London 1876; and A. P. Thornton, British Policy in Persia, 1858 - 1890, in “EHR”, 69 (1954), pp. 554 579, and 70 (1955), pp. 55 - 71. 38 “[...] Mir Khudadad Khan of Kalat on behalf of himself and his heirs and successors hereby makes over and entrusts the entire management of the Quetta district and niabat absolutely and with all the rights and privileges as well as full revenue, civil and criminal jurisdiction, and all others powers of administration, to the British Government with effect from 1st April 1883 [...]” The Dasht Plain Agreement of 1883. Cf.:

36 As a matter of fact all these debates within the British administration concerning the constitutional status of the Khanate reflected the evolutionist, functionalist and markedly Eurocentric attitude of the time, and readily laid themselves open to criticism, such as the comments made in 1912 by one of the most brilliant Agents to the GovernorGeneral in Baluchistan (the highest political post in the region), Sir John Ramsay: “[...] The position of the Khan in relation to the Sardars appears to defy any definition that is not open to criticism, and has varied from time to time within wide limits[...]” IOR Ramsay to McMahon, N. 578-C, 30. VIII. 1912.

40

Riccardo Redaelli: Administrative Subdivisions and Tribal Structures The over-riding problems of security in the north-west region of Baluchistan, to which we have several times referred, also led to the English decision to adopt the system of direct rule for several areas of Baluchistan inhabited by peoples of a strongly tribal and combative character: these included the mountainous regions of the Marri and Bugti, theoretically subject to the khan of Kalat, but over which the Brahui administration had not the slightest influence. But to talk of “direct control” by the British would be inappropriate in this instance; all that the British Colonial Administration did was simply to prevent these warlike tribes from carrying out raids and incursions outside their own territories, keeping the Political Agent's involvement in the internal affairs of those tribes to a minimum.

responsibility”, that is, the collective responsibility of any one tribal section in the event of raids, hostile acts or threats to security in the region. Given that this latter principle was fundamental for the policy of British colonial security - since it acted as a formidably dissuasive force vis-a-vis the various tribes, and encouraged inter-group control of the more turbulent elements - the system was then gradually dropped over the course of the twentieth century39. Thus the establishment and consolidation of British colonial supremacy in Baluchistan did not lead to any simplification of the political-institutional diversity and complexity of the region, indeed it intensified it, with the formalising and crystallising of very disparate legal institutions. Indeed, the territory of Baluchistan was now subdivided into an intricate web of different administrative powers, authorities and systems.

Still according to the basic rules mentioned above, the British Government completed its own system of control and administration, whether direct or indirect, with the setting up, in Baluchistan, of tribal troops, mainly concerned with policing and patrolling, known as Levy Corps.

As in the period preceding the arrival of the British, the niabat, or direct personal possessions of the khan of Kalat, remained in existence; as did the areas controlled by the Baluch and Brahui sardars belonging to the territory of the khanate of Kalat, over which the khan had only indirect control (in total, some 65,000 square miles of territory).

Used by Sandeman as early as 1867, at the time when he was Deputy-Commissioner for Dera Ghazi Khan, and subsequently employed throughout Baluchistan, the Levy Corps were made up of a number of men organised as irregular troops; they were lightly armed, but had a thorough knowledge of the terrain over which they were to be deployed. They were directly answerable to British functionaries.

Furthermore, there were several territories which had won de facto independence from Kalat, such as the possessions of the jam of Las Bela and of the nawab of Kharan (the former feudal state covered some 6,000 square miles; the latter - an almost uninhabited desert area - a good 14,000). The British Colonial Administration was always uncertain about the status to be accorded to these two tribal territories: it had to juggle between the khan's desire to see his own sovereignty formally reasserted over regions which were regarded by Kalat in every respect as part of the khanate's territory, on the one hand; and, on the other, the advisability of recognising the autonomy of local chiefs such as the jam and nawab, with whom the English had useful political and administrative relations. Caught between these two conflicting pressures, the Government of India ended by adopting a policy of compromise: Kharan and Las Bela were regarded as two Feudatory States within the Baluch Confederacy governed by Kalat, that is, two states subject to the suzerainty of the khanate, which was purely formal and, in practice, totally insignificant: “[...] Kharan should be treated as entirely independent of Kalat, and the Khan of Kalat and the Chief of Kharan should be informed that the Crown Representative regarded the Chief of Kharan as a member of the Baluch confederacy, of which the Khan of Kalat is the head, but in practice the subordination of Kharan to Kalat would not for the

Alongside these formations of local militia, the Government of India also made use of the Thana System, borrowed from the Mogul empire. As used by the English towards the end of the nineteenth century, in practice this was a system for the control of frontier territory and the tribal areas with the stationing there of small permanent military postings; these garrisons were independent of the traditional local authorities (in the sense that they were neither dependent on nor answerable to the local sardars), but were financed with funds raised from the allowances which the Government of India paid to the Baluch troops in exchange for their loyalty. In fact, it amounted to a system for the punishment of tribes hostile to the British, or which threatened the security of the region; in the case of raids or military action on the part of any given tribal sector, a small garrison would be created within their territory, paid for with the funds set aside for the purpose. Unlike the Levy Corps, which is still widely used in Pakistani Baluchistan, the Thana System proved to be counter-productive since not only did it diminish the prestige and authority of the local sardars - the pillars of the system of indirect administration used by the British but it also undermined the principle of “tribal

39 Col. Terence H. Keyes was one of the most astute British functionaries in Baluchistan (Political Agent at Kalat from 1922 - 27). As he put it: “[...] The reason for giving the levy thanas the wide powers which they now gradually acquired was the incapacity of the sardars, but this incapacity was largely the result of over-interference [...]”. Keys thus advised the Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan (AGG) to exert pressure on the Government of India for their abolition. IOR L/P&S/3177, N.I-Q, Keyes to Johnston, 7.1.1923.

Appendix XV in Mir Ahmad Khan Baluch, Inside Baluchistan... cit., pp. 296 - 317, and C. U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries, 13 vols., Calcutta 1909, vol. XI, pp. 217 - 218.

41

Baluchistan present be greater than the subordination of Las Bela to Kalat or in other words, that Kharan would be under the purely formal suzerainty of Kalat [...]”40.

of the century tended to look back - however confusedly to the libertarian and irredentist principles of nationality typical of the movements inspired by Mazzini, rather than to the aggressive nationalist ideology of late nineteenth-century Europe42.

Lastly, as already mentioned, there was British Baluchistan (9,476 square miles according to the Gazetteer of Baluchistan of 1901), which was considered part of British India (see Fig. 3.2.) and hence subject to a system of direct administration completely different from that of the rest of the Baluch region; around 1883 this same type of administration was also extended to the Leased Areas and the Agency Territories, a portion of territory bordering on to British Baluchistan but much larger (c. 44,000 square miles). Formally, however, these Leased Areas did not become part of British India; the khan leased them to the Government of India without any time limit, transferring all fiscal and administrative rights but not actual ownership: “[...] The effect of the leases was to transfer to the British Government all the power of administration and jurisdictional rights exercised by a Sovereign; but since the transfer of these powers and rights was incorporated in lease deed and not in deeds of cession, the territories did not pass so as to become part of British India but remain part of Kalat State [...] inhabitants of the Leased Areas are not British subjects; they have the dual status of Kalat subjects and British protected persons [...]”41.

In Baluchistan, the first initiatives aiming for thoroughgoing political and institutional reforms on the part of the British colonial Administration were fomented by various Baluch intellectuals around the 1920s; this was basically an attempt to give Baluchistan greater administrative uniformity, and to set up some kind of elective and consultative form of representation which would acknowledge the specific nature of the area and its predominant/benchmark ethnic group. But it was only at the beginning of the following century that these demands were organised into a coherent cultural and political vision, thanks above all to the setting up of the Anjuman-e Ittehad-e Baluchistan (Association for the Unity of the Baluch and of Baluchistan) and the work of its founders, Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd (1904 - 1979) and Mir Yusuf Ali Khan Magsi (1908 - 1935). According to the Anjuman and its ideologues, Brahui and Baluch formed a single people whose mother territory Baluchistan - actually included various areas inhabited mainly by non-Baluch in Sind, in Afghanistan and in Iran. Although the frontiers which bounded the British Empire in India from Iran and Afghanistan - and which cut Baluchistan into two parts - were perceived as artificial, nonetheless the movement did not initially go as far as demanding reunification of the entire Baluch region under the control of a single independent central power; more modestly, the aims of the first nationalists focused on the creation of a constitutional government that would represent all Baluchistan under British control (British Baluchistan, Leased Areas, Khanate of Kalat and its feudatory states), the limitation of the discretionary powers of the colonial functionaries - in point of fact extremely wide-ranging - and the new political entity's adhesion to the emergent Indian federation43.

Thus the British colonial presence did not lead directly to any modernisation or rationalisation of the systems for the running and administration of the territory, with the exception of the defining of the outer frontiers between Persia and Afghanistan (which themselves ended by irreversibly sanctioning the separation between several states of the larger Baluch geographical and cultural area). Until 1947 Baluchistan continued to be subdivided into juridical regimes which were both differing and conflicting, split up among antagonistic local chiefs, often without precise administrative borders. But where the presence and spread of British culture did make a decisive impression, was in the Baluch perception of their own region, and identity, and in the politicisation of the link between ethnic identity and territory. The spread of the typically European concept of the nation state, the nineteenth-century idea of nationality and of the “natural rights” implicit in it, indeed the British imperial myth itself - positive and evolutionist - which presented colonialism as engaging in an “improving and civilising European mission” - were all factors which contributed to the rise of a nationalist movement in Baluchistan as well. However, if applied to the case of Baluchistan, the word nationalism may actually prove misleading: in point of fact, the first Baluch unitary movements of the beginning

42 For further discussion of the birth and development of the Baluch national movement, cf.: R. Redaelli, Il nazionalismo fra mito e nuovi assetti geo-politici, in “NRS”; 79 (1995), n. 4, pp. 651 - 674; cf. also: U. Fabietti, Etnografia della frontiera... cit., chapt. 6: Quando la storia accelera. Ricerca dell’identità e reinvenzione della cultura nel discorso nazionalista Baluch, pp. 160 - 186; N. Swilder, Beyond Parody: Ethnography Engages Nationalist Discourse, in P. Titus, Marginality and... cit., 168 – 190; P. Titus and N. Swidler, Knights, Not Pawns: Ethno-Nationalism and Regional Dynamics in Post-Colonial Baluchistan, “International Journal of Middle East Studies”, 32 (2000), pp. 47-69. 43 With the India Act of 1935, the English Government introduced farreaching institutional reforms in India, with the creation of a federation of Native States, whose sovereigns were represented in the Chamber of Princes and in the federal Legislature. Baluchistan was represented only by the khan of Kalat, as head of Kalat State, while no form of unitary elective assembly was envisaged for the region. There is an extensive literature on the subject; here I shall mention just three fundamental works: H. H. Dodwell (ed.), The Cambridge History of India, vol VI: The Indian Empire 1858 - 1918. With chapters on the development of Administration 1818 - 1858, new ed. enlarged and revised, New Delhi 1970, chaps. 24, 37; C.H. Philipps (ed.), The Evolution of India and Pakistan 1858 to 1947, 4 vols., London 1962, pp. 320 - 334.

40 IOR R/1/34/65, N. 585-N.39, External Dept. to Stewart, 30.III. 1949. For further discussion of the subject, cf. R. Redaelli, The Father’s Bow...cit., pp. 150 - 156. 41 During the reign of the last khan, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, the anomalous situation of the Leased Areas caused more than one disagreement between the khanate of Kalat, the British Colonial Administration and Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s Muslim League. Cf. IOR R/3/1/66.

42

Riccardo Redaelli: Administrative Subdivisions and Tribal Structures The idea of a Baluchistan organised as an independent state emerged only later, at the end of the period of British rule, and basically as a reaction to the aggressive process of territorial, political and cultural absorption pursued by the Muslim League of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, whose aim was to create a state for the Muslims of India (Pakistan), separate from Hindu India - as indeed occurred with Indian Partition in 1947. Furthermore, the ideology of the first Baluch nationalists also appears conservative from the administrative point of view and in terms of the conception of the state and of its territory. Indeed, many of the leaders of the Anjuman and of the later movements belonged to the powerful ranks of the traditional Baluch chiefs (sardars, nawabs etc.), whose power had been crystallised by the British Administration with the so-called Sardar-i System, the backbone of the above-mentioned Sandeman System which guaranteed indirect control of the region.

supported by the Baluch nationalists and by those few, including the tribal chiefs, who had any knowledge of the current regional and international political situation. But this point of view was rejected by the British colonial Administration, which regarded Baluchistan as too backward and poor to be run as an independent state, and above all which feared the possible repercussions on the unity and stability of its own Indian dominions should Kalat be allowed to opt out of the group of the Native States. But the most vehement opponent of this scheme was Muhammad Ali Jinnah's Muslim League, which - as already mentioned - was trying to build up a separate state for all the Muslims of India, and which thus considered it to be of fundamental importance that the vast Baluch region should be part of the fledgling state of Pakistan. In 1946, as the end of the colonial period approached, the British favoured direct negotiations between the khan of Kalat and representatives of the Muslim League; these negotiations - lengthy, complex and contradictory resulted in a temporary agreement: Pakistan committed itself to recognising the sovereignty of the khanate of Kalat as an independent state, deferring to future arbitration the solution of who was to inherit British Baluchistan and the Leased Areas, claimed by both parties; these were also the richest and most advanced areas of Baluchistan, as well as those of greatest strategic importance. On 15 August 1947, the khan of Kalat thus proclaimed the independence of his own state, issuing a written constitution shortly afterwards.

Whilst highly critical of the abuses, corruption and ineffectiveness of most of their sardars44, the Baluch nationalists do not seem ever to have elaborated an ideology aiming at the elimination of this traditional power caste, which was a vital hindrance to the modernizing of the administration, and to any achievement of consistency throughout Baluch territory; rather, their proposed reforms amounted to an updating of the Sardar-i System, as is clear from their opposition to the attempt by the court of Kalat to shore up its own authority at the expense of the peripheral chiefs during the 1920s45.

In fact, the khanate of Kalat's existence as an independent state was extremely short-lived: eight months later, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan was forced to ask for entry to the state of Pakistan, partly because of Jinnah's threat to send a Pakistani military contingent to occupy the khanate of Kalat, but above all because of the collapse of the support network within his own kingdom.

3. The birth of Pakistan and the role of the territory in the myth of Baluch nationalism With the British withdrawal in 1947 and the subsequent birth of Pakistan and the Indian Union, Baluchistan found itself suddenly - and forcibly - acting in a profoundly altered political-institutional situation. For years the last khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan (1933 - 1948) refused to regard his own state as one of the so-called Indian Native States, maintaining that his predecessors had drawn up specific agreements with the British Government of India as heads of an independent and sovereign political entity, historically, geographically and culturally distinct from the patchwork whole which made up the British imperial dominions in the Indian sub-continent46. Naturally enough, this stance was

The traditional chiefs of its so-called Feudatory States, Las Bela, Kharan and Makran, which had been demanding absolute independence for their small tribal proto-states from the khanate of Kalat for some time, took advantage of the dispute between the khan and Jinnah to leave the Baluch Confederacy, joining the state of Pakistan independently of Kalat47. Deprived of more than half its territory, and under military threat, the khan had no option but to give in, despite protests and attempts at resistance by the Baluch nationalists.

44 The ineffectiveness and corruption of the traditional Baluch chiefs is confirmed by the countless (and thoroughly disenchanted) reports of the British colonial functionaries, as we see clearly from the following passage: “[...] on the other hand, with few exceptions, there is no room for delusion in regard to the sardars, whose concern for the welfare of the State is subordinated to their concern for the promotion of their own interests [...]”. IOR L/P&S/12/3177, N. 248-S, Cater to Foreign Department, 27.IV.1935. 45 Cf. R. Redaelli, Il nazionalismo balucio... cit., pp. 659 - 661. 46 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan was clearly referring to the Treaty of 1876 which regulated relations between Kalat and the Government of India, and in which (Article 3) the English committed themselves “[...] to respect the independence of Khelat, and to aid the Khan [...]”. For

further details, cf. R. Redaelli, The Father’s Bow... cit., section 5.3 and 5.4. Cf. also the Memorandum of the Government of Kalat in IOR R/1/1/4923, and, for the text of the 1876 Treaty, C.U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties...cit., vol. XI, pp. 215 - 217. 47 The entry of the three feudatory states of Kalat into that of Pakistan is extremely dubious from the juridical point of view. One of the powers of the khan, as head of the Baluch Confederacy, was responsibility for foreign policy. Thus in theory Pakistan should not have been able to deal directly with the intermediate chiefs, but only with Mr Ahmad Yar Khan.

43

Baluchistan Historical events apart, what is important here is the perception which the traditional Baluch chiefs had of their territory and of their being part of a common political amalgam. The decision made by Kharan, Las Bela and Makran reveals a total incapacity to grasp the new models of power and state organization which were emerging in the region; to escape purely formal dependence on the weak khan of Kalat, they threw in their lot with the much more powerful, aggressive and centralized state of Pakistan, which was indeed to exclude them utterly from the political and administrative running of their areas at the first possible opportunity.

question, left the matter of manifestly different ethnic origins, and language, of the Baluch and Brahui, completely out of consideration, while the emphasis was placed on the elements of homology and the sharing of a common territory. The result was a stressing of the voluntaristic and self-referential character of “national feeling”, to the point indeed of embracing the recent theory of so-called “symbolic ethnicity”, which emphasized the gradual integration of different communities on a single territory49. The perception of and role played by territory, and by the frontier, was thus profoundly altered: from a confused hotch-potch of tribal and feudal potentates, the Baluch region gradually began to taken on increasingly clear-cut and important outlines and political/ identity-serving functions. It came into being as a benchmark spatial entity for a nationalist movement which, not by chance, proceeded pari passu with a loss of administrative and political autonomy by the traditional models of Baluch Authority and Power, swallowed up - but not eliminated by- by new models and new forms of organization and the defining of a territory, that of the modern state based on the European model.

These events also make it clear that a shared Baluch identity did not as yet play an important role in the political dynamics of the region, in contrast to what was to happen in the Seventies: the main political protagonists (including the khan of Kalat) still seemed to be acting according to the traditional patterns of political identification/exclusion which heightened the differences between ethnic group, single tribes and tribal sections, between the opposing portions of Baluch territory, etc. Baluchistan was indeed perceived as a spatial and cultural entity, but one still lacking any sense of political and administrative cohesion, and without any set “spatial frontier”, given that the fundamental element was not territory, but a sense of belonging to a given tribe or feudal clan. This being the case, it was relatively easy for the Pakistani leadership to split the Baluch front, occupying the entire region; fragmented, administratively diverse and internally divided as it was, Baluchistan was not even given the status of Province, like other regions making up Pakistan - Punjab, North West Frontier, Sind and Bengal (independent from 1971 as Bangladesh). Indeed, in 1955 the Confederacy of Baluch states was dissolved with the famous One Unit declaration with which the government of Pakistan brought the regions of the North-West Frontier, Sind, Punjab and Baluchistan together into one single administrative entity, with the Punjabis as the clearly predominant ethnic group. But this same imposition served to deepen the Baluch people's hostility to the Pakistani state structure, encouraging them to proceed to a thorough-going intellectual and political fleshing out of their own Baluch identity, and politicising the link between ethnic group and territory. From now on, for almost twenty years, the Baluch were to carry on an increasingly violent organised struggle for their region’s autonomy, and indeed for Baluchistan’s independence from Pakistan. This was a struggle which, if doomed to failure on the military plane, did nonetheless lead to the creation of the Province of Baluchistan in 1970, and to the elaboration of a distinctive theory of the concept of nation48. This latter, in an attempt to preserve the socio-political order of the Baluch tribes, and to get round the problem of the all too evident lack of homogeneity of the ethnic group in

49 Cf. H.J. Gans, Symbolic Ethnicity: the Future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures in America, in “Ethnic and Racial Studies”. 2 (1979), pp. 1 20. Cf. also the studies by P. Titus, Tribalism, Ethnicity, and the State in Pakistani Baluchistan: The Economics and Politics of Detribalization in an Urban Setting, Ph. D Thesis, University of California, Riverside, 1991; U. Fabietti, Etnografia della frontiera... cit., and bibliography.

48 For further details concerning these events, cf. R. Redaelli, Il nazionalismo balucio... cit., pp. 664 on.

44

Riccardo Redaelli: Administrative Subdivisions and Tribal Structures

Fig. 3.1: Baluchistan administrative subdivisions.

45

Baluchistan

Fig. 3.2: British Baluchistan.

46

Riccardo Redaelli: Administrative Subdivisions and Tribal Structures

Plate 3.1: 1992, Gwadar: ‘Omanite tower.

47

Baluchistan

Plate 3.2 (Above): 1995, Panjgur, the Khudabadan Qalat, jagir of the Nawshirvani nawab of Kharan. Fig. 3.3 (Below): Sketch planimetry of the Khudabadan Qalat (B. Vincent).

48

PART II LAND, PEOPLE AND WATER

50

Water Rights as Social Contracts Frank van Steenbergen

1. Introduction - 2. Public or private investment in water resources - 3. Water rights formation in Baluchistan: three cases - 4. Process dependent social contracts∗

made the case that secure access to a resource is a precondition for resource conservation by resource users. Despite the speculation, there is very little documentation on the process of water rights formation. The objective of this paper is to address this lacuna by describing the processes by which water rights evolved in three newly developed systems in Baluchistan. This paper first reviews the different scenarios at work in the formation of water rights (section 2), before describing three case studies from Baluchistan, all of which concerns Brahui/Baluch communities (section 3). Section 4 makes a comparison with the allocation of water entitlements in a large-scale system of Sind, the Nara Canal and summarises how different social contracts develop out of different processes of water rights formation.

1. Introduction If societies are understood as social contracts, then it is interesting to see how these contracts evolve and what parties are involved. It is against this background that this paper presents material on the formation of water rights in irrigation systems in Baluchistan. Unlike the evolution of other institutions, the formation of water rights is a conscious process. The entitlements and responsibilities associated with water rights are usually clearly defined and the precise share of the different claimants is not just of planned design but also of open bargaining. In this paper I concentrate on perennial water resources1. In Baluchistan perennial sources are small and scattered, but particularly because of this, their importance is larger than their physical presence. Assured access to scarce perennial water is a vital element in sedentary and pastoral livelihood systems alike. To put the formation of water rights in Baluchistan in perspective, this paper apart from discussing the formation of rights on the small water resources of Baluchistan, makes a contrast and discusses the evolution of water rights in a large publicly managed irrigation system in the neighbouring Sind Province.

2. Public or private investment in water resources One of the few efforts at analysing the formation of water rights was made by Coward4. Cowards use material from Nepal. He describes two different scenarios by which water rights were established. The prospective owners of the resource base the first scenario on investment in the development of the water resource themselves, as is particularly common in small indigenous irrigation systems. Coward predicts that, under the scenario of private investment, systems with distinct individual water entitlements in the shape of shares will evolve. These shares may be expressed as a proportion of the water flow, in time units or a combination thereof.

Two recent schools of thought have highlighted the importance of water rights. First, Rosegrant and Binswanger2 have written that tradable water rights are a precondition for water markets. Water markets presumably would allow a reallocation of water from low value to high value users. Secondly, Hanna et al3 have

In share systems, the specific entitlements of individuals to the common water resource are clearly defined. They usually relate to the initial investment in the development of the water resource. On this ground Coward predicts that in case of farmer-financed irrigation development the maintenance of the water resource will be comparatively easy, since the ground rules for collective action are defined with the share systems.

∗

This study is a revised version of the article: I diritti d’acqua come contratti sociali, in “Storia Urbana”, 22 (1998), n.84. 1 Elsewhere I have discussed the formation of water rights in non perennial flood irrigation systems in Baluchistan: F. van Steenbergen, Institutional change in local water resource management: cases from Balochistan, “Netherlands Geographical Studies”, 1997, n. 220; Idem, Understanding the sociology of spate irrigation: cases from Balochistan, in “Journal of Arid Environments”, 1997, n. 35, pp. 349365. 2 M. W. Rosegrant and H. P. Binswanger, Markets in tradable water rights: potential for efficiency gains in developing-country water resource allocation, in “World Development”, 22 (1994), n. 11, pp. 16131625. 3 S. Hanna - C. Folke - K. G. Maler, Property rights and environmental resources, in S. Hanna - M. Munasinghe (eds.), Property rights and the environment: social and ecological issues, Beijer International Institute of

Coward contrasts the emergence of water shares under indigenous development with public development of irrigation systems. A different scenario is at work here that Ecological Economics and The World Bank, Washington DC 1995, pp. 15-30. 4 E. W. Jr. Coward, State and locality in Asian irrigation development: the property factor, in K. C. Nobe and R. K. Sampath (eds.), Irrigation management in developing countries: current issues and approaches, Boulder (Co) 1986, pp. 491-508.

51

Baluchistan concerns the shares in developed water resources rather than the rights to exploit new resources. The registration of water rights in developed areas is particularly common for irrigation systems in the Pashtun controlled northern districts of Baluchistan. The records often date back to the period of British rule. The background to the registration is that entitlements to water served as the formula for claims to unexploited community (shamilat) land. In the daily distribution of water within irrigation systems the registered water rights had far less significance.

results in more ambiguous “non-share” systems. Where systems are developed from general public means and no individual investments are made, the land to be irrigated is delineated, but the precise rights to the water for the landowners within the delineated area are not defined unambiguously. Because the exact water shares are not explicit, the ground rules of co-operation in maintenance of the irrigation works are not spelled out. The important point made by Coward is that social contracts are process dependent. Libecap and North develop this theme in much detail5. Libecap has drawn attention to the costs of the process of institutional change, the so-called “contracting costs”. The contracting costs are related to the degree of conflict of interests and the information on resource value and management that needs to be collected. The process of institutional change, such as the formation of resource rights is further determined by the availability of parties willing to bear the costs of changing,

3. Water rights formation in Baluchistan: three cases All three case studies discussed concern small irrigation systems, tapping the subsurface flows in riverbeds, developed in the eighties and nineties, often over an extended period. The first two case studies, Kumbri in Bolan District and Muradabad in Chagai District, concern farmer-developed systems. The third case study, Rabat in Khuzdar District, in contrast, has a history of public funding.

Below the formation of water rights in three typical small irrigation systems in Baluchistan are discussed. The systems yield between 15 to 60 litres per second, sufficient to irrigate the holding of small groups of people (less than 60 in each case). The first two case studies concern irrigation systems schemes that were developed with farmers’ private investment. In contrast, the third case study was developed from public means, resulting, as we shall see, in a protracted and complex bargaining on water rights.

Kumbri In Kumbri water resources were developed by community enterprise in the dry expanse of land called the Kachchi Plains. In 1983, a partnership of ten families of the Sheikh Husaini tribe of the Brahui ethnic group purchased a tract of land in Bolan District. Previously, members of the Kurd clan owned this land, on the banks of the non-perennial Kumbri River, but they had never developed it.

Baluchistan does not follow, unlike other areas, a system of water permits, whereby a central agency entitles a group of users to develop a water resource. Although under the Baluchistan Groundwater Rights Ordinance a law was issued that compelled farmers to obtain a permit for developing a groundwater source, this permit system was never effectively in force6. For surface water there has never been a permit procedure, but it may be argued that since formally all land, unless registered otherwise, is state property that undeveloped water resources (particularly on non developed land) would belong to the state as well. This is a purely argument, however. In Baluchistan there have been instances, in which land that was not developed previously was successfully claimed as tribal land, as soon as it developed productive value. Similarly water resources are developed, where and when possible. Any notion of government ownership is of no significance. Rights are based on the claims of the different users and in the strength of the various parties to substantiate their claim.

The members of the Sheikh Husaini clan knew of the land as, on their annual transhumance, they visited the area as land labourers and pastoralists. A purchase price of Rs 112,000 was agreed between the Kurd and the Sheikh Husaini. Another Rs 30,000 was required to have the “administrative formalities” done, evidence of the substantial cost of formally settling property rights, particularly with a bureaucracy operating on the principle of quid pro quo. The money was collected by selling part of the flock. The partnership operated on the basis of shares. These were named anna after coinage used in the past, in which sixteen annas equalled one rupee. Similarly there were sixteen shares to the property at Kumbri. The shares of the different partners were not equal, but from the outset varied. Some families subscribed for half an anna, whereas others participated for one, two and even two-and-half anna.

Interestingly, for some of the older irrigation systems in Baluchistan water rights are registered separately from land rights in the cadastre, kept by the tashildar. This

By obtaining the land, the partnership was also entitled to develop the water resources in it. The partners excavated the bed of the Kumbri River at a place where a rock outcrop forced the water to the surface. Eventually, a small perennial base flow (60 litres per second) became available. Water rights were allocated in accordance with the individual contributions to the purchase price of the land. A share of one anna equalled a twelve-hour flow in an eight-

5

G. D. Libecap, Contracting for property rights, Cambridge, 1989; D.C. North, Institutions, institutional change and economic performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 6 F. van Steenbergen, The frontier problem in incipient groundwater management regimes in Balochistan (Pakistan), in “Human Ecology”, 23 (1995), n.1, pp. 53-74.

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Frank van Steenbergen: Water Rights as Social Contracts agreement was drawn between the first two parties. Upon the successful completion of the kariz, the land and the perennial water would be divided in 32 equal shares, which were distributed as given in box 1. The hereditary tenants were not entitled to the water.

day cycle in the summer and a twenty-four hour flow in a sixteen-day cycle in the winter. The share system formed the basis for a small corporate structure. Subsequent contributions to the development of the land and water and maintenance of the facilities were also made on the basis of the anna system, in accordance with Coward's description of share systems7. First, the shareholders developed a tract of land upstream on the right bank of the river (see Fig. 4.1). Unfortunately, this land had to be abandoned soon after, because the river degraded and conveyance of water across the riverbed became difficult. As an alternative, a second and larger tract of land downstream on the left bank was developed over a period of four years. This was again done by collective enterprise. For the time being the new land was not divided. Instead an annual lottery was organised, which allocated the usufruct of the different plots to the shareholders in accordance with the size of their anna-share. The reason for not yet distributing land titles was that it was considered unreasonable if one party would get permanent rights to a more fertile stretch to the detriment of others.

Box 1: Distribution of land and water in Muradabad kariz Kariz developers (khat kash): Original landowners: Communal share of Jamaldini Sardar Khel clan: Person, co-ordinating construction of kariz and operation/ maintenance: 1 share Chief of Jamaldini tribe:

13 shares 13 shares 4 shares 1 share

Water ownership was determined not only by prior landownership or investment in the water resource, but political domination (the chief’s share) and management (the co-ordinator’s share) were to be rewarded too. A contract was drafted between the original Jamaldini landowners and the kariz developers, ratified by the local administration. The contract also specified the moment that the kariz could be considered operational, as at that time, the swap of land and water rights would take place. The kariz would be completed, when twelve hours of the continuous flow sufficed to irrigate a plot that was sown with five kilogram of wheat seed. A panel of impartial persons was to preside over the experiment.

Muradabad The second case study concerns Muradabad kariz in Chagai District. Similar to Kumbri, Muradabad was developed by private investment. The situation was more complicated as the persons that undertook the development of the water source did not own the land in the command area. The idea to develop Muradabad kariz was conceived in the early sixties. With the help of water diviners, farmers suspected an underground spring in the dry bed of a local flood drain, which could be exploited if a long vertical well, called kariz, was excavated. To develop this traditional system, a consortium was established, called khat kash (kariz diggers) consisting of sixteen persons of several local tribes.

It took twenty-three years and Rs 2,700,000 (US $ 110,000 in 1991 terms) for this moment to come. In the meantime, thirteen out of sixteen khat kash consortium members had been forced to withdraw, either no longer able to provide the required investment or having lost hope altogether. Under a clause in the original agreement, they could not transfer their share in the future kariz to outsiders. As a consequence, many people lost their investment or sold it at a nominal price to other members in the consortium. The clause was meant to keep the original group intact and avoid influential outsiders breaking in. The clause also had the important side effect of restraining participants from abandoning the undertaking and making it more attractive for others to continue, as they became the recipients of the sunk investments.

Though there was sufficient barren land in the vicinity, the only land that was really suitable for irrigation with the future gravity flow, was a tract that was already cultivated. The tract was the collective property of the Jamaldini tribe of the Baluch ethnic group (Fig. 4.2). It was however used by a group of hereditary tenants, who harvested the ephemeral run-off of the adjacent hills during sporadic rains in a low-value production system, consisting of the cultivation of sorghum and wheat. In the past, these tenants had developed the land and under customary law they had become co-owners. The land where the underground spring was located was understood to be part of Jamaldini territory, but this claim was vague. For several reasons the Jamaldini themselves were not keen on developing the kariz. Some reasons were that they were living far away; had other interests and did not want to go through the difficult process of evicting their hereditary tenants. In summary, there were three parties in Muradabad: the khat kash, the original landowners and the hereditary tenants. An

The clause nevertheless generated controversy, when the kariz approached completion. In 1988, one of the leading original consortium members, who had withdrawn in 1985, tried to bargain his way in again. The complainant put forward that he was eliminated without his consent and requested to be reinstated as a shareholder in the kariz. He managed to have the work suspended by court, pending the investigation, but ultimately the district judge did not validate his claims. Similarly, the distribution of land among the original land owners was complicated, as some of the hereditary tenants refused to be bought off or compensated with land

7

E. W. Jr. Coward, State and locality in Asian irrigation development… cit.

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Baluchistan original Hassanabad kariz shareholders were adamant that, based on this prior appropriation, they were to share in the water of the gallery. By making their claim, they transformed the right in an abandoned facility into the right in a resource, for which there was no jurisprudence either under customary or formal law. Nevertheless, the ensuing conflict was resolved with an agreement, in which a third of the flow was promised to Hassanabad, the remainder going to the left bank. Due to the failure of the gallery, this agreement was never effected.

elsewhere. The tenants hoped that they would thus also get access to the perennial water. This did not work out, but the result was that the original landowners could not reappropriate the whole area. Patches of the command area came under irrigation; other patches remained with the hereditary tenants and continued to be rain-fed. The owners of the new Muradabad kariz continued to invest in it, after the first development phase was over and land and water had been redistributed. In the second phase all contributed to the further development of kariz. For a seven year period the land would be given collectively to sharecroppers. The land rent in this seven year period was not to be appropriated by individual shareholders, but instead utilised for further excavation of the kariz, in order to increase its discharge.

Twenty-odd years later, history repeated itself. In 1984, the construction of a new gallery was planned under the Baluchistan Minor Irrigation and Agricultural Development Project. This time the situation was more complicated than in 1962, because in the meantime a few new farmers had settled in the area and had occupied land, close to the gallery site. By digging a well in the riverbed, they were irrigating small orchards on both banks of the river. The scheme as it was conceptualised by the project in 1984 unaware of the 1962 controversy - foresaw an off-take on both sides of the gallery (Fig. 4.3). To whom the water was going to, was again only clear implicitly, i.e. from the channel alignment. Channels were foreseen on both banks. The various claims to the water were not studied by the project earlier and it was, for instance, assumed that the water on the left bank would go to the farmers operating the pump and not to the Hassanabad kariz farmers, whose water source had been dry for more than thirty years.

Rabat Whereas the formation of water rights in Muradabad was marked by a certain degree of bargaining, in Rabat it was dominated by it. Twice an infiltration gallery was built in the dry Korak Manda River. In contrast to the previous two case studies of private investments, public funds were used on both occasions. The extensive controversies in Rabat exemplify that there was much more to bargain for, as claims were not matched by individual investments of the prospective rights holders and instead a range of alternative grounds were put forward for settling water rights, such as prior occupation, land rights and political standing. The controversies that marked Rabat are typical of the oftencomplicated process of settling water rights in new agencydeveloped small schemes. The worst examples are schemes that are never operated due to persistent conflicts. Baluchistan counts several such cases8.

At an early stage an interesting development took place among the farmers of Pashtkoi, the designated recipients of the water of the right bank, when an outsider was requested to become the chairman of the obligatory water users association and to co-ordinate the labour contributions of the farmers in constructing tertiary channels. The candidate was approached because of his position as a tahsildar (revenue officer) in the local administration and his contacts with the tribal elite. The Pashtkoi landowners thus obtained political influence, but at the costs of accepting that the command area was redefined to include the land of the new chairman.

The first infiltration gallery at Rabat was constructed in 1962. It failed due to a surveying error, but during its construction it generated considerable commotion. The issue was who was going to utilise the flow from the new facility. In the original design, all water was going to a group of farmers cultivating an area on the right bank, called Pashtkoi. It would have been an example of how, in agency-developed schemes, water rights are sometimes created casually as a result of socially insensitive technical decisions on the alignment of a channel or the location of an off-take. The plans for Pashtkoi however evoked violent protests of another group of farmers, who were the owners of a kariz, developed in 1948, called Hassanabad. This group had political clout, since one of the shareholders was the local tribal leader, who in 1948 had been made coowner (of a small share) to ensure his support for the project. The first well of Hassanabad kariz was situated close to the intended gallery site. Although the kariz had never been successful and had long dried up by 1962, the

In 1986, the first of a series of conflicts erupted in Rabat, signalling that bargaining for water rights had started. The shareholders to Hassanabad kariz, aware that they were about to be excluded from the water of the gallery in favour of the settlers, tried by force to prevent the contractor from working on the system. The civil authorities and the project administration were sceptic about the validity of the Hassanabad claims, but acknowledged their nuisance value. A number of options were considered to appease the kariz shareholders and finally an offer was made to provide a financial grant of Rs 200,000 in 1988 (at that time US Dollar 18,000) so that the kariz tunnel could be cleaned out again. While these options were being considered, the Pashtkoi landowners suddenly made a deal with the Hassanabad shareholders, which eased the tension for the time being. They reactivated the 1962 decision, and gave a third portion of the water to the Hassanabad shareholders.

8 Cfr. Groundwater Consult, Balochistan flood water irrigation systems, Islamabad: Royal Netherlands Embassy, 1991 and F. van Steenbergen, Changing water allocations and land use and the design of small scale irrigation systems, in “Irrigation and Drainage Systems”, 6 (1992), n. 1, pp. 149-159.

54

Frank van Steenbergen: Water Rights as Social Contracts The settlers at the head of the system were not informed, and the whole decision was dubious, since it was not clear on what authority the Pashtkoi landowners could distribute the water rights.

rights list, in which the tribal leader received four instead of eight days. The Pashtkoi landowners also agreed informally never to sell land to the tribal leader or purchase his water share, making the leaders entitlement ineffective. Yet in the end everything backfired and the tribal leader refused to endorse the list. For a while there was a stalemate, whereby, on the left bank, the water was shared between the settlers and the Hassanabad kariz owners; and on the right bank the Pashtkoi land owners utilised the proposed water shares, while using pressure to keep the pumping from the pump station under control, all living with the idea that this situation though maybe long-lasting was not the final one. Co-operation in the maintenance of the facilities was troublesome in these circumstances. Ultimately the list of water shares was agreed and endorsed. The tribal leader obtained a considerable proportion of the water rights, which he leased out, as the Pashtkoi landowners were not able to close their ranks in this regard.

Further complications took place in 1989 and concerned the right bank off-take. A large trench had to be excavated through the land of one of the settlers to accommodate a conduit to the Pashtkoi command area. This landowner, who would gain nothing from the project, obstructed the construction work. The project settled the issue by proposing (without consultation to the other future water users) a small pump station on the conduit to serve the right bank orchards of the settlers. The downstream Pashtkoi landowners had to accept this. Like in the Hassanabad case claims to hydraulic property were based not on individual investment, but on individual ability to stop public investment. None of the issues were settled satisfactorily, however. The confusion on the water rights to Rabat reached a climax in 1991, when the contractor completed the headworks and water rights had to be settled definitely, before the farmers could operate the system. The chairman of the Pashtkoi water users association was the first to make a proposal. He divided the two-third portion of the flow to which the right bank was entitled in two parts to keep the volume of water manageable at field level. He then drew up a list of all the land holdings in the command area, including the orchard of the settlers and allocated time-shares, in proportion to individual land title, though the relation was not exactly one-to-one, but strongly simplified, with different land owners grouped in different size categories and given their entitlement accordingly.

4. Process dependent social contracts The three cases bring out the differences in processes of water rights formation and make clear how social contracts are process dependent. The water rights formation in Rabat was as tedious as it gets. Contracting costs were high, as they tend to be when water rights formation is de-linked from investment in the water system. Part of the reason was the timing of the process of water rights formation. With the irrigation system in place and ready to use, stakes were extremely high and bargaining was intense. One may wonder why rights were not formed at an earlier stage. The Rabat example shows why. There was neither single authority nor a single unambiguous ground to establish rights. Several attempts were made during the construction of the irrigation works, but none was conclusive and all were in danger of being overturned by a new deal. The paradox is that, just because so much is at stake, water rights may not be formed at all. Though not in Rabat, this has happened in other newly developed systems in Baluchistan. A complication is moreover that it is not clear, unless an irrigation system is completed, how much its flow will be and hence how much water there is to distribute.

The settlers were allowed to operate their pump for a limited period every irrigation cycle, in accordance with their land right. This did not work in practice. Instead the settlers were of the opinion that they could use the pump station at will, which made water distribution downstream impossible. The result was a situation of constant tension. Similarly, the settlers on the left bank were upset to find out that the total left bank share had been totally given away to the Hassanabad shareholders. They did not accept this and their ultimate protest was the stealing of the pump engine that lifted water from the gallery on the left bank. All parties - including the civil administration - agreed that the only way out was to ask the local leader of the Zehri Brahui tribe, who was also a provincial cabinet minister, to settle the matter and ratify the water rights distribution. Without his blessing water rights would have no value.

The second part of the explanation for the intense and bitter negotiation process in Rabat was that there were many persons that had an eye on the newly developed irrigation system. Claims to the water came from a variety of sources: land rights in the command area (even though the command area was being defined and redefined in the process), prior water resource development (even though it occurred long ago and was never successful) and the ability to obstruct the work of the contractor. So there were many competitors and they had little in common. It was ultimate irony that new claims surfaced that derived directly from the resolving the costly water rights formation process itself: first the services of the revenue officer; later those of the local tribal leader. The result of the troublesome process was a compromise between antagonists. Water rights in Rabat were made to suit the various existing interests. There was constant

This, however, introduced a new complication. It soon became clear that the tribal leader was not without selfinterest himself. Although he had no land on the right bank and only a small share in Hassanabad kariz on the left bank, he demanded an excessive eight-day share in the right bank water, which came down to a quarter of the total flow. The chairman tried to manipulate matters by presenting a water

55

Baluchistan (1932), the Nara Canal System officially provided water to an area of 2.0 million hectares. In the Nara Canal, as in other canal systems in Pakistan, landowners are in principle entitled to water deliveries in proportion to the size of their land. The formula that relates land ownership to water deliveries is based on an official estimate of crop water requirements. The physical translation of these entitlements is the official dimensioning of the outlets to the watercourses, the smallest hydraulic units in the irrigation system10. I use the term entitlement here, instead of water right, because access to water is not defined independent of land ownership11 and because there are very few hard demands to be derived from the formal access to water. At the most, farmers can claim compensation for crop damage, in case water is not delivered, but this claim is of little use, if no water is provided at all, as does happen in several tail reaches if distributaries (the channels that branch of from the main canals)12. On the other hand, water entitlements in canal systems also bring little responsibilities to land owners. For land, that is irrigated, landowners have to pay a water tax (related to the crop cultivated rather than the water received). Failure to pay may lead to arrest and ultimately to the confiscation of property, but not to suspension of water supplies. In other words the relation between water shares and maintenance responsibilities that prevails in the small-scale systems in Baluchistan is absent.

tension on the distribution of water. The basis for the necessary collective responsibility in maintenance was weak. To this the formation of water rights in Kumbri and Muradabad may be contrasted. The formula for water right distribution were agreed at an early stage and essentially linked to individual investment in the development of the water resource, while - in Muradabad - also rewarding investment in management and buying influence by giving a special share to the local tribal leader. The formula was maintained till the end. This is not to say that there were no attempts to “break in” the group of water rights owners, as the difficulty with the hereditary tenants in Muradabad demonstrates. But this attempt as well as the episode with the kariz diggers that dropped out, but on completion had “second thoughts” were easily warded off. The group of water users was thus defined right from the start. They operated as a group enterprise, not only during the construction, but also subsequently in the further development of land (Kumbri) and the irrigation system (Muradabad), as well as in maintenance of the water resource. Interestingly and counter-intuitively in both socially coherent Kumbri and Muradabad newcomers settled in the area as part of the development of the water source. Prior ownership of land or water in the area was not a precondition to obtain ownership, unlike the Rabat irrigation system, where water rights were made to fit existing interests.

Over time the irrigation system changed. Water control improved with the barrages in the Indus system. The area entitled to irrigation from Nara Canal expanded to 2.6 million hectares. The canal system in fact was in constant change. Canal bed levels increased due to siltation. As a result areas that earlier were difficult to irrigate by gravity flow could now be served. Another tendency was for watercourses to be constantly reallocated. In areas, that were badly served, particular areas at the tails of distributaries, landowners managed to have their land served from other, more reliable parts of the irrigation system. There was over the years a virtual movement of watercourses away from distributaries towards main canals, although this played havoc with the hydraulics of the system.

The different processes at work in Kumbri/ Muradabad on the one hand and Rabat on the other hand serve as a supplement to Hanna et al’s point that resource rights create the basis for common resource management. It is not just the bare fact of water rights; it is also the group of cousers, defined by water rights, that determines the scope for resource management. There is a danger in the notion that unambiguous rights will solve all. Coward made the distinction between “share” and “non share” systems and predicted that in publicly developed systems non-share systems would evolve. Whereas he was right in that in publicly developed system water rights are more ambiguous, still in Rabat water shares evolved in the end. Rather than for publicly developed systems, non-share systems are characteristic for publicly managed systems. In publicly managed systems, particularly in large scale systems, water deliveries to different water users are arranged by the irrigation agency rather than being regulated among water users through water rights. Among water users as such there is no social contract9.

The right to authorise new watercourses (and hence establish a water entitlement) and the right to authorise the reallocation of water courses (and hence improve the likelihood of receiving sufficient water within an entitlement) was vested in the Canal Officer. This was a functionary of the Irrigation Department, the so-called Executive Engineer. There was a guideline that in matters 10

See also P. Strosser, Analyzing alternative policy instruments for the irrigation sector: an assessment of the potential for water market development in the Chistian Sub-division, Ph.D Thesis, Wageningen Agricultural University, 1997. 11 A forgotten clause in the Sind Irrigation Act, that is the legal basis for the irrigation operations, though makes it possible to trade water independent of land. 12 There is one example of farmers in Sind claiming the restoration of water supplies to their area. This was done through an appeal to the human rights court on the grounds that water is a human right. The Sind Irrigation Act has no such provisions.

A description of the Nara Canal System in Sind may serve to put the process of water rights formation in Baluchistan’s small perennial water resources in perspective. The Nara Canal receives its water from the Sukkur Barrage in the River Indus. At the time of commissioning Sukkur Barrage 9

Only at the level of the water course, the smallest hydraulic unit in the irrigation system, clear time shares typically regulate the distribution of water between different water users on a water course.

56

Frank van Steenbergen: Water Rights as Social Contracts of reallocating watercourses the Canal Officer would hear landowners on adjacent watercourses, but this guideline was often ignored. It may be obvious that the power of the Canal Officer, the right to give people access to water in an arid environment, was enormous. There were constant pressures to accommodate “requests”, that were not always withstood. From the seventies politicians discovered the mileage that could be made out of issuing new watercourses and reallocating existing ones. They took increasing control over the authority of the canal officers and by the nineties the new watercourses and reallocations could only materialise on their recommendation. Once given the water entitlements were almost irrevocable. Although procedures existed to issue new watercourses, there was no comparable procedure to repeal them. Only during Martial Law, when all normal legislation was suspended, watercourses were cancelled and re-relocated. In the large scale, public managed Nara Canal, water rights do not define the relations between different water users, but between water provider and water user. Water entitlements are not shares in a collective whole, but describe the service that may be expected from the Irrigation Department. The process of formation and change of water rights is external to the group of water users. The process used to be in the bureaucratic domain, but shifted to the political domain. Under these conditions one may expect little cohesion among the water users. Given the bureaucratic gains and political mileage that are made out of the water course reallocation and approval in Nara Canal, it is surprising that in none of the three cases of water right formation in Baluchistan, the Irrigation Department, or any other government department, or elected assembly members played major roles. Neither in the original approval for developing the water source, nor in the ultimate definition of shares, did these outsiders figure. The exception is the tribal leader in Rabat, but he was asked to intervene as tribal leader, not as cabinet minister at the time. It underlines the fundamental different nature of small water resource development in Baluchistan. Ultimately water is a matter of water users only. It is the property of those that use it, not of those that provide it. As a result, even in publicly developed small scale water resources, after rights are settled water users are autonomous for outside manipulation. The group of users may be cohesive or not cohesive, but the scope for external interference is limited.

57

Baluchistan

Fig 4.1 (Left): Irrigation system. Case 1: Kumbri (Author’s drawing).

Fig 4.2 (Right): Irrigation system. Case 2: Muradabad (Author’s drawing).

Fig 4.3 (Left): Irrigation system. Case 3: Rabat (Author’s drawing).

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The Hasni Tribe in Western Baluchistan. The Transformation of a Nomadic Tribe since the Beginning of the British Colonial Time (an Empirical Study) Fred Scholz

1. Preliminary remarks - 2. Historical background - 3. The beginning of the Hasni in Rarkan valley (1888 1900) – (Phase “one”) - 4. The nomadic Hasni became farmers (1900 - 1947) - (Phase “two”) - 5. The tribal structures started to change (1947 - 1970) - (Phase “three”) - 6. The individualization and the decay of the tribal community (after 1970) - (phase “four”)∗

This study does not claim to represent a pattern for all the tribes of this mountainous region. However, it is an attempt - and this is actually its aim - to prove on a concrete case how for-reaching and persistent the external influence on all life aspects of this tribe proved to be. 1. Preliminary remarks

Although there are many publications about Pakistan, as well as Pakistani written papers about this country which came into being as a consequence of the British colonial government division of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, it is surprising that a critical analysis/study of the colonial time has not taken place hitherto1. This fact is all the more remarkable, since the British influence on all the domains related to society, administration, economy and infrastructure was not only of great importance, but its effects persist until present times2. The British presence and an overall impact even within the mountainous region Baluchistan belonging to the British Indies3. The presence was reflected not solely in the completion of strategic railways or in the foundation of numerous (military) settlements, but also in the administrative organization, and was even effective in the social and economic structure of the then mostly nomad tribes. In the present contribution, the case of the Hasni living in the Rarkan valley situated north-west of Baluchistan should deal with this subject. The statements made here are based on archive studies and detailed empirical, socio-geographical field research works which could take place during 1967 and 1971, as well as on observations during two journeys to Rarkan, which were possible in 1988 and 1996.

The Hasni tribe´s origin has not been clarified unambiguously; assigning it to one of the large tribal groups creates difficulties, insofar as Pashtu, Baluchi as well as Khetrani are spoken by the Hasni, whilst Pashtun and Baluch customs and traditions are found, and hierarchical as well as democratic structures exist side by side in the organisation tribal structures4. Dames therefore regards the Hasni as an “aboriginal Indian tribe, but assimilated by the Baloches”. Duke and Jamiat Rai5, however, ascribe to them Pashtun origins. Numerous indications, which can be found in pastoral songs and stories that are still alive today, favour this theory. The Baluchistan District Gazetteer6, too, supports the Pashtun origin of the Hasni and substantiates this by numerous historical data. According to this, the origin of the Hasni tribe and its development up to the 19th century is as follows (Fig. 5.1). 2. Historical background In the 17th century, three families of the Pashtun tribe of the Tor Tarin, led by Hasan of Pishin, migrated into the tribal area of the Marri Baluch who followed a nomadic lifestyle in the region of Kahan. The Tarin were taken in by the Marri as hamsayahs (affiliated groups) and worked as shephers. After one of the Tarin women was kidnapped by the Marri, a feud broke out between them both, which the Tarin, as soon as they received support from members of their tribe who had moved down from Pishin, were able to settle to their advantage7. The Marri, who named their conquerors Hasani or Hasni after their leader Hasan, were driven out of their region. In the period following

∗

This study is a revised version of the article: La tribù Hasni nel Baluchistan occidentale. La trasformazione di una tribù nomade dall’inizio del periodo coloniale britannico: uno studio empirico, in “Storia Urbana“, 22 (1998), n.84. 1 On the other hand, in India and even in Bangladesh an intensive and critical reflection on this topic has been taking place since several years. 2 H. Bechtoldt, Indien und China. Die Alternative in Asien, München 1964. 3 Cf. F. Scholz, Belutschistan (Pakistan). Eine sozialgeographische Studie des Wandels in einem Nomadenland seit Beginn der Kolonialzeit, Göttingen 1974 and Idem, Transformation bergnomadischer Gruppen in mobile Gelegenheitsarbeiter. Eine Fallstudie aus Nord-Belutschistan, Pakistan, in “Erdkunde”, 1992, 46, pp. 14-25. See also: R. Redaelli, The Father's Bow: the Khanate of Kalat and British India (19th - 20th. Century), Firenze 1997 and P. Titus, Tribalism, Ethnicity, and the State in Pakistani Baluchistan: The Economics and Politics of Detribalization in an Urban Setting, Ph.D Thesis, University of California, Riverside 1991.

4

M. L. Dames, The Baloch race. An Historical and Ethnological Sketch, London 1904, p. 58. Cf. O. T. Duke, A historical and descriptive report of the District of Thal Chotiali and Harnai, Calcutta 1883 and R.S.D. Jamiat Rai, Report on the settlement of the Barkhan tahsil, Loralai district, Calcutta 1913. 6 BDGS, Loralai – Allahabad, pp. 105 on. 7 R. S. D. Jamiat Rai, Report on the settlement of the Duki tahsil, Loralai district, Calcutta, 1913 p. 12. 5

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Baluchistan thereupon, the Hasni developed into a powerful tribe, which, however, in 1780, was defeated by a superior allied force consisting of Marri and warriors of the Khan of Kalat8. As a closed tribal unit, they moved north into the region of Kohlu, where, again, they found themselves exposed to attacks by the Marri. Around 1800, they were finally defeated at Daola Wanga. The tribal leader (sadik) and his family were killed and the tribe was totally annihilated. Small groups of Hasni fled to Kach, Thal Chotiali (Banikot), Sibi (Gulu Shahr) and into the tribal area of the Khetran (Hasni Kot).

the Luni Pashtun was taken in 1888/89. Thus, both subtribes that hitherto had followed a nomadic lifestyle entered into a totally new stage of development, which, in the following, is going to be traced on an organisational, settlement, economic and social level. To make things clearer, let us proceed according to four cross profiles (phase “one” to “four”) that are limited in terms of time and their inner dynamic. 3. The beginning of the Hasni in Rarkan valley (1888 1900) – (Phase “one”)

As opposed to the Pashtun tribes in early times, the Hasni tribe was not structured democratically, nor was it led by an elected council of elders, but, like the Marri Baluch, displayed a patrilinear social hierarchy based on the agnatic principle of descent. Tribal leadership was hereditary and was the responsibility of a single personality who, to a large extent, possessed “despotic” power, and to whom the eldest of the subtribes, who were likewise determined agnatically, were subordinate. This structure lost its effectiveness the moment the tribe was shattered (1800), its head murdered and the Hasni driven out of the common territory which formed the basis of their economic existence. Within the individual splinter groups that were independent after 1800, the headship fell to the eldest of whichever in-group had ranked highest in the previous tribal hierarchy. Yet again, this undemocratic organisation of group leadership was still in effect when, in 1883, the Kakar Pashtun, coming from northern Baluchistan, fell upon and again drove the small Hasni groups in the area around Barkhan out of the territory they had meanwhile developed afresh9. Individual Hasni groups of the size of subtribes and families which, prior to the invasion of Kakar, had engaged in herding (nomadism) and subordinate farming, roamed for some years and settled with the Luni Pashtun in Tang Karer, Chhodi, Tabal, Tah Jamal Khan and Kach and, under British protection, in Laghari/Barkhan, Taghao and, above all, in the Rarkan Valley (Fig. 5.1).

Three remarkable occurrences stood at the beginning of the Hasni’s settling down in the Rarkan Valley. Firstly, a totally new administrative organisation that deviated in its entirety from the previous organisational tribal structure was formed, secondly, all the families settled on a selfcontained estate and, thirdly, the productive areas were distributed evenly, and the use of the grazing land in the valley and neighbouring hills was regulated. The most important innovation and the one that determined the entire subsequent development was the organisational restructuring of the two Hasni subtribes. This stood out by the fact that the families - though still classified according to traditional agnatically-based rank were placed on an entirely equal footing in all economic and organisational matters and, by way of elections, were enabled to nominate the leaders in charge of them. These elected leaders formed the council of elders which, out of its ranks, designated a leader, the malik. This organisational structure which - as already emphasised determined subsequent development decisively corresponded to that of the Pashtun tribes and is noteworthy because, hitherto, the Hasni were only acquainted, through the Marri and Khetran, with the hierarchical tribal organisation characterised by ascription. The question whether the introduction of this form of organisation was the result of British influence cannot be totally excluded; however, the model could also have been borrowed from the Pashtun that were living to the north and the west, with whose tribal structure the Hasni became acquainted through “Sayad” families which enjoyed great influence as mullahs and are said to have participated in the founding of the Rarkan from the outset (The Sayads hail from the north of Baluchistan and their organisational structure was similar to that of the Pashtun. However, they trace their descent back to origins independent of the Pashtun. They regard themselves as descendants of Fatima, daughter of the Prophet and wife of Ali). The Pashtun model is not restricted merely to the organisation of the tribe. As will yet be shown, it can also be found in the layout of the settlements. Existing documents no longer permit a conclusive explanation of

In the Rarkan Valley, two Hasni subtribes (chauths), Dheraywal and Jumiani, under the leadership of Ali Khan Silach, were accorded the right to settle by the British government, on condition that they farmed and paid over one tenth of the yield10 to the British. Possession of the valley11 that was originally supposed to have belonged to 8

Ibidem, p. 12. R. J. Bruce, The forward policy and its results; thirty five year’s work amongst the tribes on our North-western Frontier of India, London (Bombay) 1900 p. 103. 10 R. S. D. Jamiat Rai, Report on the settlement of the Duki tahsil… cit, p.12. 11 In some of the Hasni tribe’s shepherds’ songs, taking possession is extolled as a military victory over the Luni Pashtun. The fact that, after 1884, the British colonial masters subjugated the belligerent tribes, began extending the frontier road from Dera Ghazi Khan to Pishin in 1885, introduced the levy post system in 1887 and had firm control over the whole of north and north-west Baluchistan in 1889 (BDGS, Loralai – Allahabad, pp. 242 and 330) indicates that the military conquest of the Rarkan Valley by the Hasni is unlikely. It also became apparent, upon querying the elders that the Hasni became resident 9

under British protection. This dovetails with Jamiat Rai's account (R. S. D. Jamiat Rai, Report on the settlement of the Duki tahsil…cit., p. 12).

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Fred Scholz: The Hasni Tribe in Western Baluchistan the Hasni’s totally new orientation in their form of organisation.

flush floods. The western half went to the Dheraywal, and the eastern one to the Jumiani. Within each half, and parallel to the boundary line, two further ditches were dug for irrigation purposes, i.e. to distribute the flush flood water and to mark two field segments (Fig. 5.2). These segments were divided into 20 (that is, the number of families in each clan) equal plots whose area corresponded to a jora, that is, the area of arable land that can be worked with a yoke of oxen in one sowing season. Each family initially received a jora of land on the condition that they entertained a guest of the Hasni for a full day. This method of parcelling out land, which can only still be found in north-east Baluchistan with the Zarkuns Pashtun in Hosri and Warezai (District Duki)12, is called nathi after the Khetran word for guest. It is still valid today. Violating the requirement to accept guests can lead to the loss of all land rights. With the Hasni, the tribal section of the Mondwani is said to have forfeited its right to own land and live in the Rarkan because of flouting this condition. The Mondwani are no longer represented in the Rarkan (Fig. 5.4), nowadays, they live mostly in tents or simple mud huts at the foot of the mountain and, until a few years back, were geared exclusively to cattle herding.

The first actions of the elected council of elders under the leadership of Ali Khan Silach as the malik consisted of tribal settlements as well as distribution and regulation of the use of the valley’s productive area. For protection - for it was only after 1900 that Baluchistan was de facto pacified - all the Hasni families were settled as an entirety in one village. This village, which was named Rarkan, originated in a single “founding ceremony” on an isolated hill stretching eastwest in the south of the valley (Fig. 5.3). The estate was provided with an almost rectangular outer ground plan, a central street with roads leading off it at right angles, and was surrounded by a wall with fortified towers and gates. The central street (dar or bazaar) formed the main axis and divided the living areas of the two clans, the Dheraywal and Jumiani. The side streets led to the residential areas (nahala) housing the individual tribal sections. The village square (shank) where the mosque and the traditional school (madrasa) were established was almost in the estate’s geometrical centre, and if one is to believe the narrative or the elders who were questioned, the manner the settlement was established is supposed to have occurred as follows:

The individual property (sati zamin) staked out by nathi land distribution occupied the valley centre irrigated by flush floods. The remaining valley area and the adjoining hills were kept in reserve for further distribution and, up to such time, was open to all the Hasni to use as common land (tomni) (Fig. 5.3).

After the council of elders had determined the ground plan and the division into individual nahalas, the two chief tribal sections (loh) first selected their residential area in each half of the village. In accordance with their traditional higher standing in the Hasni tribe’s previous structure, the Dheraywal were alloted the southern, higher portion of the hill that inclined flatly towards north and steeply towards south. The leading tribal section (Silach) took the southwestern residential area that was exposed to the south and the west above the steep decline. According to social standing, the nahalas of the five other Dheraywal clans adjoined them. The Jumiani subtribe received the northern lower portion of the hill. The leading tribal section of the Shahani occupied a residential area in the centre of the estate.

Besides accepting guests, further conditions were attached to the possession of land. Thus (1) one tenth of the harvest had to be ceded to the British colonial government, (2) of the remaining yield, the malik received one tenth which was distributed amongst the mullah (zakat) and members of the tribe that had fallen into debt through no fault of theirs; (3) the Hasni ceded one twentieth (olag) of the harvest to the families of tradesmen (craftsmen) who, after the Hasni had established themselves in Rarkan, were gradually brought in to perform the most varied services. Although the Hasni settled in ground-bound dwellings and closed villages and came into the possession of arable land, agriculture, only feasible in the rain-fed fields (khushkaba) and total uncommon before 1888, played a subordinate role in the first phase. As herdsmen of their own herds, the Hasni, in the main, went on practising their traditional migratory animal herding (nomadism). However, incisive changes as compared to before occurred. Favourable grazing conditions brought about by a mean annual precipitation amounting to more than 350 mm in the hills and 250 to 300 mm in the valley permitted

The settling process is said to have happened as follows: Within the individual nahalas, the families of the oldest members of the respective tribal section took up residence along the central street. The remaining families’ homesteads adjoined them, staggered according to the age of the family heads. High walls separated the homesteads from each other, their size was in accordance with the number of families amongst whom each residential area had to be divided. The spatial division into two practised in the Rarkan settlement was also followed in the productive area. The council of elders divided the central, almost level valley that stretches in a north-south direction and declines slightly from north/north-west to south/south-east into two almost equal halves alongside a natural drain for

12

BDGS, Loralai – Allahabad, pp. 281 - 282; F. Scholz, Sozialgeographische Theorien zur Genese Streifenförmiger Fluren in Vorderasien, in “Tagungsberg und Wissenschaft Abeilung des Deutschen Geographentages”, Innsbruck 1976, pp. 340 ff.

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Baluchistan an increase in the herds13 and rendered superfluous the migrations over long distances (up to Mekhtar in the north, up to Sibi-Kachchi in the south) that had been necessary prior to settling in Rarkan. A livestock economy limited almost exclusively to sheep herding with migrations within the close vicinity resulted. Regulations governing the use of the pasture lands and binding upon all the Hasni were also drawn up. The spring and summer pastures extended to the peripheral hills. The autumn and winter pastures included the valley area and the foot of the peripheral hills. In the course of this, the sheep owners first drove their herds onto their harvested fields after which the entire valley was made available for grazing. There was no fixed grazing rotation (Fig. 5.6). Nowadays, the course of grazing is still within the discretion of the shepherd.

4. The nomadic Hasni became farmers (1900 - 1947) (Phase “two”)

A further remarkable phenomenon occurred in connection with migratory livestock farming (nomadism): despite fixed habitations, the Hasni clung to the familiar life in their tents. During the entire warmer season, they lived outside Rarkan, Loaf and Silach (Fig. 5.5) in tents that were pitched in the lower parts of the peripheral foothills. This is where the family members that were not required on the grazing tour stayed until the shepherds and herds returned. They only reverted to their fixed habitations in the case of danger and from the end of September to the middle of April. Otherwise, only the families of some artisans (lohars, shana), musicians (doms) and traders (hindus), who had been brought in by the Hasni to perform various services unfamiliar to the Hasni, lived in these habitations. These groups enjoyed the protection of the Hasni as hamsayahs. The artisans who, in one and the same person combined the trades of smith, wheelwright, carpenter and mason received a fixed portion of the harvest (1/20), whilst the weavers (shama) and musicians (doms) were paid individually. To a great extent, the traders (hindus) were economically independent of the Hasni, however, they enjoyed the right of using, free of tax, the bazaar shops belonging to the Hasni.

These huts consisted of a room ventilated by a sort of fanlight which were mainly resorted to for the purpose of sleeping. Adjoining this hut built of mud there was usually a windshield made of brushwood, matting or heaped-up stones behind where the cooking was done. Every family possessed one summer residence of this type whence the older children and the men sallied forth to the pastures with the herds and to work the fields for the necessary few days over a three-month period. Field labour, land cultivation, up to 1920 and only performed on khushkaba land, began after the first rainfall between July and September with ploughing which was usually repeated after further rains or surface flood irrigation. Sowing (wheat) took place in October; only in May or June, at harvest time, was labour in the fields resumed. After 1920, when millet was cultivated, which nowadays is mostly used as a summer crop, intensive labour in the fields is said to have become necessary.

The second phase is characterised by the vehement development of settlements. Apart from Silach, Loaf and Rarkan, which, with its mosque, graveyard, bazaar, as the seat of the council of elders and the partwari and the levy post instituted by the British, remained the central or mother village. Eleven subsidiary settlements in the shape of family hamlets and detached farmsteads without any sort of fortifications were established dispersed about the entire valley area, preferably along the fringes (Fig. 5.5). The first village community was expanded into a valley community. Moreover, wherever previously tents had been pitched in the summer, ground-bound scattered huts sprang up for the summer sojourn.

The external conditions for the expansion of the settlements after 1900 were shaped by the de facto security British rule brought to the land and the largely safe freedom of movement. There was no longer any compulsion to remain within the protective village community. The internal tribal structural reasons for emigration are to be found in the easing of the previous economic community at tribal section and, later, even at family level caused by individual Hasni families becoming economically independent. It thus became possible to set up numerous facilities that were necessary for economic development:

This first phase can be characterised as follows: (1) Organisationally, by the formation of a totally new (village) community with an elected council of elders, with all Hasni familities being economically and socially equal; (2) socially, by the two levels: On the one hand, the independent Hasni families having equal economic rights amongst themselves and, on the other hand, the dependent hamsayahs, the artisans, musicians and traders; (3) economically, by the transition from longrange to short-range migration livestock herding, with subordinate agriculture and (4) residentially, by the founding of the central locality of Rarkan and of two more fortified villages as well as by the introduction of nathi land distribution.

1. For one thing, the herds’ sojourn in the more immediate vicinity of the Rarkan valley all the year round required the construction of pens and cattle sheds. These sort of facilities had, up to then, only been set up occasionally in and around Rarkan because of lack of space and in the remainder of the valley because of latent threat. Now, on the areas at the foot of the hills - at some distance from the arable land - sheds and pens started to be built, as well as dwellings for the herd owners. These dwellings scarcely differed from the summer huts. The sheds and pens, however, formed an element of

13 In Rarkan and the neighbouring Taghao, which was also inhabited by the Hasni, the following increases occurred in different kinds of livestock from 1890/91 to 1912/13: Sheep and goats from 4,994 to 20,597, cattle from 516 to 1,975. Cf. R. S. D. Jamiat Rai, Report on the settlement of the Barkhan tahsil…cit.

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Fred Scholz: The Hasni Tribe in Western Baluchistan buildings and splitting up the existing farmsteads within the individual nahalas. Subsequently, what with migration, numerous farmsteads, especially the ones built on the steep southern slope of the hill, were abandoned. Neither were they, in the main, taken over by other families, so they deteriorated. This applies particularly to the living quarters of the Dheraywal subtribe. The Mondwanis left Rarkan in their entirety, and so did half of the Momianis. Their share of the dwellings passed on to the Lohars and Doms. With the Jumianis, however, expansion led to a permanent extension of the nahalas in the case of almost all the tribal sections. Then, too, three Shahani families shifted into the residential areas of other subtribes.

settlement that was new to the Rarkan valley and the models for which may be discovered with the Marri Baluch14. 2. Around 1910, aside from sheet and goat breeding which displayed a quick increase in the previous decades, cattle breeding is supposed to have been deliberately expanded. The cattle kept in the Rarkan valley and its immediate vicinity belong to the Lohani mountain race, which is characterised by a slight build, the ability to climb and brown to white-violet dapples. This cattle, which grazes in the inner valley area all the year round and is driven back into the settlements every evening, required further sheds. The new settlements provided the required space.

That is where a difference in the attitudes of both the tribes to business and settling expresses itself. The causes therefor may be sought in the differing highly ranked social position of both the subtribes in the hierarchy of the former Hasni tribe. For, whilst the Deraywal, the subtribe that previously ranked higher, continued to remain linked to independent cattle herding, which attracted greater esteem, only pursued agriculture after a limited fashion and therefore preferred to live outside the village community, the Jumianis (particularly the Shahani and Thagani families) strove consciously to off-set, by commercial success, the Naraywal’s traditional preeminence. Aside from cattle herding, they now also attached increasing importance to agriculture, especially cultivation of irrigated fields and horticulture, respectively. The improved economic position they achieved with the passage of time also reflected in the esteem the tribal population accorded to them, in as much as, for some years, they were also being elected as the leaders of the council of elders and, from 1958, to the Union Council.

Population increase in the Rarkan valley was probably the decisive incentive for settlement expansion. According to the statements of several village elders, the number of families is supposed to have increased from 40 to more than 9015 over the period 1888 to 1910. The consequences thereof can be demonstrated by the expansion of the individual nahalas in Rarkan (Fig. 5.4) and their over-occupancy, as well as by migration into the remaining valley area. Only those households which had turned exclusively to keeping livestock took part in this migration. Around 1920, you see, immediately to the north of the hill on which Rarkan had been built, the first wells were dug and land usage was therefore intensified. The first vegetable and fruit gardens developed. In consequence thereof, in numerous families, the pure livestock breeders separated from the farmers, who, however, - and this must be stressed particularly - still continued to keep animals. This dual economic orientation and year-round agricultural activity (only three months in the rain-fed lands) linked to permanent irrigation cultivation marked the start of the tenant and shepherd system. Alongside the Hasni herd and landowners, there developed subsequently, to an increasing degree, dependent tenants and hired shepherds that were initially recruited from the Hasni families and, later, almost exclusively from groups of alien tribes (for example, Hadani, Gurchani, Marri, Luni and Buzdar; up to 1965). The initial signs of stratification that were barely visible in their beginnings in the first phase took on concrete shape in phase “two”. A system similar to the feudal one, hitherto unknown to the Hasni (here landowners = Hasni, there tenants and dependent shepherds = associated groups) emerged.

The fundamental events of phase “two” can be summarised as follows: (1) organisational: easing of economic structural ties and, therewith, also of subtribal and family ties in connection with the expansion of the village into a valley community; (2) social: introduction of dependent tenants and shepherds; (3) economic: first stage of expansion of agriculture, introduction of cattle breeding and the division of the Hasni into cattle breeding families and families who, besides cattle breeding, assigned to agriculture greater importance; (4) related to settling: emergence of numerous subsidiary ground-bound summer settlements. 5. The tribal structures started to change (1947 - 197016) - (Phase “three”)

These developments led to the following changes in the mother village Rarkan (Fig. 5.4): the population increase in the first phase and at the beginning of the second led to constructional expansion over and above the original

Whilst, during the second phase, only the first beginnings of social and economic differentiation set in with the Hasni, after 1947 (specially after 1960), far-reaching

14

R. N. Pehrson, The social organisation of the Marri-Baluch, Viking Fund Publ. Anthropology, n. 43, New York 1966, p. 77. 15 In the year 1911, the population of Rarkan was 730, the number of families was around 94 (R. S. D. Jamiat Rai, Report on the settlement of the Barkhan tahsil…cit., p.20).

16 As of 1970, this phase of development is not yet completed. The results presented for this third phase can only be regarded as interim results.

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Baluchistan changes occurred that ran their course swiftly. The outer framework within which this third phase ought to be regarded is the governmental work of reform which it was attempted resolutely to effect in Pakistan after Ayub Khan took over as President. For the Hasni, the following more over-riding consequences were involved in this:

(apples, almonds, peaches, apricots, pistachios, pomegranates) were planted, with subcultures of vegetables (tomatoes, chillies, spinach, onions, radishes, potatoes, carrots, turnips, cabbage), and two or more harvests were achieved annually. Expansion and intensification of land cultivation put Hasni families in a position to produce for supra-regional markets and thereby to progress from their previous subsistence economy to a market oriented one. Consequently, a structural change also ensued with the Hasni. They limited their own activities in the fields and gardens (and in keeping livestock, too) or abandoned them altogether. Consequently, the tenancy system hitherto operated was expanded. In 1970, only 218 (68%) of 313 land owners still worked themselves. The former tenants were now joined by sharecroppers and agricultural labourers, who were recruited from groups of neighbouring tribes18.

By the main connecting road between the Punjab and south-Afghanistan being upgraded for truck and bus traffic, Rarkan, too, gained access to the markets of Loralai, Quetta, Dera Ghazi Khan and Multan (Punjab), where, above all, fruit, vegetables and wool could be sold. Moreover, Rarkan was now being visited by wholesale traders of grain, wool and livestock. This, again, caused impulses leading to economic development, for which agrarian reform created new conditions. Thus, the sinking of tubewells was subsidised, agricultural and livestock advisory centres were established, premiums were paid for the upkeep of breeding animals of the Lohani breed of cattle and the Bibrik sheep being reared here, and for the establishment of teaching, experimental and breeding farms. For the Hasni especially, important economic and social changes resulted.

Expansion of tubewell irrigation and intensive land utilisation also led to changes in livestock keeping. The private capital required by the Hasni to finance their wells was mobilised by the sale of livestock. 1960 to 1968, due to the sale of entire herds (in addition to the outbreak of a cattle disease), the number of sheep herds decreased from 120 to 69 and that of cattle herds from 48 to 34.

To improve a well facilitated by long-term, low-interest loans, interested parties had to fulfil the following conditions: They needed to have available at least 2 hectares of land and were required to undertake to plant 500 trees and maintain them for at least 5 years. They received a loan of Rs. 1,000 which covered about one fourth of the cost of construction of a well with a “Persian wheel” (Cost of scoop wheel: Rs. 1,000 to 1,400; excavation costs for well shaft according to depth: Rs. 2,000 – 3,000!).

The state attempted to counteract this decrease in livestock by paying breeding premiums for Lohani cattle and Bibrik sheep. According to information from the livestock breeding authority (Animal Husbandry Department, Quetta), there is an upward trend since 196819. Despite this decline in livestock husbandry after 1960; there was a revival in the pastoral system. For numerous Hasni families, who previously had grazed their herds of sheep themselves, now entrusted the animals to a sherik, which means a partner. This sherik does not graze the animals himself, but has shepherds (pakals) at his disposal, who, yet again, are assisted by numerous helpers, largely children. The cattle herds’ herdsmen however are still generally subordinate to the herd owner (goi). In this case, the herdsmen were previously remunerated by receiving shares of the harvest, but for several years (the exact date was not available) they receive a monetary wage (one Rupee per animal per month!).

Almost all of the land owners in Rarkan were able to fulfil these conditions. They practically fell over themselves to construct wells which, even though they had already served17 to irrigate fields since 1900, now aroused particular interest inasmuch as, with the development of the transport system, markets had become available for the high-grade produce that perished rapidly. Even the families which, in phase “two”, had devoted themselves almost exclusively to livestock farming, now increasingly displayed ambitions to cultivate the land. The 24 wells sunk up to 1960 were joined, in 1964 alone, by 42 more and, in the following years, by 15 to 20 new wells, respectively. By 1970, the number of wells had risen to 154, and the area (chahi) they irrigated expanded from 32 to 397 hectares. These 397 hectares which correspond to about one ninth of the Hasni’s parcelled out landed property were now capable of being utilised continuously and in an orderly fashion. Orchards of fruit trees having trunks of medium width

In 1970, there was a total of eight sheriks, to whom between them 90 herdsmen (pakals) were subordinate. These herdsmen, in turn, were assisted by 140 to 180 helpers (according to estimates). Of all the herdsmen 18

Since 1979 the Afghan refugees became the most important source of cheap labour. Cf. F. Scholz, Transformation bergnomadischer Gruppen in mobile Gelegenheitsarbeiter... cit. 19 Since 1979 the number of herds decreased slightly again. The reason was the great number of herds of the Afghan refugees, mostly Pashtun, who stayed now in the region during the whole year. Conflicts between them and the local shepherds happened every day.

17

In the year 1911, five wells were registered in the Rarkan valley, two of which were operated with Persian wheels and three with simple windlasses. Furthermore, 18 springs and three dammed-up torrents were also used for irrigation. The proportion of permanently irrigated land to the rainfed land was around 12 to 18 (R. S. D. Jamiat Rai, Report on the settlement of the Barkhan tahsil… cit., p. 40).

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Fred Scholz: The Hasni Tribe in Western Baluchistan taken together, 23 belonged to the Hasni themselves. Of these, only seven (predominantly Mondwanis) guarded their own herds. In relation to the number of herd keepers in Rarkan (that is 69), this corresponds to 10% and, in relation to the total number of Hasni families (313) to 2.2% only. This proportion alone clearly shows the farreaching changes that have occurred with the Hasni who previously occupied themselves solely with cattle husbandry and as herdsmen.

subsidiary settlements in the shape of hamlets and detached farmsteads, eleven of which were constructed in phase “two” and five after 1960 (Fig. 5.5). Round about these settlements which, with the exception of Rarkan, are inhabited exclusively by Hasni families. There developed gradually from initially unsettled tent camps groundbound clay huts that were occupied in the summer. With the expansion of the tenancy and herdsman system, small farm-steads that were inhabited all the year round evolved out of these, and their occupants belong almost exclusively to the class of the tenant and herdsman. Side by side with these, during the summer season - last witnesses to the Hasni’s previous way of living and settling - there are the tents and protective shades which will probably endure in the Rarkan as long as will cattle farming practised in the shape of migratory livestock keeping. Compact villages with surrounding detached farmsteads, pens, protective sheds and stray tents or protective shades form a spatial arrangement pattern that is typical for all the settlements - with the exception of Rarkan.

With the transition of the majority of the Hasni families to the class of land-herd-owners the socio-economic process of differentiation that has taken place up to the present time is not yet completed. For 43 predominantly younger men entered the civil service and were promoted to moderately good and, in part, to higher positions. The Jumiani, with 28 (the Dheraywal with 15) held a preferential share in this. Here, the greatest significance attaches to the leading subtribe of the Shahani of whom alone 17 young men hold public office. Apart from this, 27 Hasni set up for themselves as contractors as well as long-distance traders and transporters. Both these groups enter into the social structure of the Hasni as new elements, without one being able to recognise, at this point in time, the position they hold in the social hierarchy or are going to attain sometime.

2. The spatial structure of the economy is characterised by the coexistence of sheep and cattle farming, on the one hand and of rainfed and irrigated land on the other (Fig. 6). Whilst the field areas occupy the level inner valley space and the irrigated land is concentrated in the region close to the settlements, the portions of the valley interior that cannot be flush irrigated right up to the areas at the foot of the peripheral hills are set aside as pastures for cattle and reserve pastures for sheep. The area at the foot of the hills and the slopes towards the valley form the sheeps’ autumn and winter pastures, however, their spring and summer pastures are up to 30 km away in the encircling (especially western) hills. This spatial structure of the economy is typical for most of the valleys and basins in north and north-east Baluchistan, where precipitation of at least 200 to nearly 350 mm permits reasonably assured rainfed land cultivation, and favours livestock grazing on pastures nearby.

Compared to these social and economic changes from 1960 onwards, the organisational changes in this phase “three” are insignificant if one discounts the introduction of the basic democracies system which brought along no fundamental innovations for Rarkan. As regards settlements, however, the settling of the tenants and agricultural labourers in the ground-bound summer huts that had begun in the second phase continued which, on the one hand, led to the construction of new summer settlements and, on the other, to the greater part of the Hasni families staying in their compact villages during the summer months. Within the village farmsteads, this involved setting up special cooking facilities, and providing, in the free yard space, courtyard and sleeping platforms which are used during the summer months. Moreover, as a corollary to the loosening of family ties and the elimination of the compulsion to remain in the settlement within the family unit - caused by individual households becoming independent with growing prosperity - there set in, within the arable land as well as in the neighbouring mountain valleys (Fig. 5.5) a new spate of expanding settlements in the shape of small group and, particularly, detached dwellings.

3. The socio-economic differentiation of the Rarkan valley’s population manifests itself at two structurally different levels: a) The traditional hierarchy determined genealogically and agnatically is still traced right through between both the subtribes and, within them, between the clans. This handed down order is still noticeable in the ceremonial at meals, greetings, in relaying messages (halhawal) and at weddings. It does appear as though the previously prevailing endogamy of the individual subtribes had been abolished, but the union between a man who ranks lower in the traditional hierarchy with a girl of a higher ranking subtribe is still rare. However, marriages in the opposite direction are frequent. Only the man of a lower subtribe is able to marry “above himself”, whose family enjoys higher economic prestige. The chairmanship of the council of elders, too, up until a few decades ago, had been reserved exclusively for members of the Silach clan. The economically ambitious members of the Shahani

Instead of a final appraisal, let the developmental results ensuing from this phase “three” be presented by the structuring of settlements and the economic domain, as well as the socio-economic differentiation of the Rarkan valley’s population: 1. Development in terms of settlement took place from the central location of Rarkan founded in 1888 via two further fortified villages (1890, 1895) to the fortified

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Baluchistan contested this privilege of theirs. Social classification of the associated groups, who, in themselves, have yet to be differentiated inasmuch as the tenants and agricultural labourers have largely attached themselves to the Hasni and may even have become absorbed in their families, also follows this traditional order. The craftsmen and musicians, however, live for themselves and form selfcontained “fringe” groups, who merely maintain economic contact with the Hasni or the tenant families; b) in the meantime, a more open (social) order has superimposed itself on the handed-down one; it was originated by the far-reaching economic and organisational equalisation of all the Hasni, the introduction, at the start of becoming sedentary in the Rarkan valley, of being able to elect the council of elders, the gradual transfer of esteem from stock breeding to agriculture, and the chances of economic advancement thereby provided. However, this does not permit drawing up a new social hierarchy yet, unless one goes by the sequence in which individual Hasni families are called upon to entertain a guest. Since, nowadays, this procedure is in accordance with prosperity, the owners of land (irrigated land) and herds occupy the first place, followed by the owners of herd and land and the owners merely of herds, with, however, persons in public service or traders and transporters, who also possessed land and herds, being included, as well. Apparently, traditional status no longer plays a part in this sequence.

vegetables have been planted not only in the nearby markets Loralai, Rakhni and Barkan, but now deliberately also in the market places of the neightbouring Punjab, i.e. Dera Gazi Khan and Multan. The supporters of this trade are members of a family belonging to the Shahani clan (see below), who supply the merchants of the region and thereby the population of Rarkan and the neighbouring valleys with goods (food/cereals, cheap bulk goods, kerosene) from Punjab. 2. In Rarkan, like in all the valley settlements, new dwellings made of cement tiles and, at present, modern designed ones or even whole farms have been built. By this, not only that the settlement surface has been extended, but also the village and hamlet physiognomy has been substantially changed. This statement is valid especially for Rarkan which has expanded well over the original layout. The expansions which have occurred after 1900 and which were to a great extent ruined in 1970 (Fig. 5.4) have been rebuilt in the meantime. Along the asphalt street passing through from the north to the south of the western part of the valley, several boxstore bazaars and two modern gas stations (one of them belonging to the head of the Shahani clan) with garages and “hotels” have been built. Around the complex comprising schools, a dispensary and a veterinary office built in the sixties, one can see today administration buildings and farmsteads. In smaller villages such as Silach and Loaf (Fig. 5.5), the outlying huts and protective umbrellas have been converted into dwellings made of cement tiles. The summer settlements used by the village inhabitants with tents on the valley sides also represent in the meantime permanent accommodation and are inhabited almost exclusively by shepherds and agriculture labourers associated with the Hasni, partially Afghan refugees. All the valley settlements are nowadays linked to the asphalted main street by graded tracks and are provided at the least with one motorised vehicle21.

6. The individualization and the decay of the tribal community (after 1970) - (phase “four”) We will now put an end on the detailed statements about the development of the Hasni, which pointed out the spatial, economic and social change of this tribe for about one century (1888-1970). The question arises, firstly why the detailed statements end here (1970), and secondly, what has been happening since then (during almost three decades), when in Pakistan partly radical changes have taken place, which also occurred in Baluchistan.

3. Due to that, the space mobility of the Hasni has been faced with a real challenge. Still, in the first place, lack of work and earning possibilities in Baluchistan are responsible for the migration of the young, fit for work men to the big cities of Punjab, to Karachi and the gulf states. About two thirds of this age group have left Rarkan. Only about half of them go back regularly on a visit. The trend to later join close relatives increased. Above all, the money transfer from these “foreign workers” leads to the development of the settlements and the contribution of modern, stately buildings. They certainly made a definite contribution to the further relaxation of the traditional tribal relationship. Thus, for instance, they do not adapt any more to the hierarchical order for the welcome ceremony or the discussions within

In order to deal with the first question, the statements regarding the period until 1970 are based on years of field research, which ended in 1971. During the following years, the author’s research interest was focussed on other parts of Baluchistan, Pakistan and Middle East. Only in 1989 and then again in 1996 was it possible to carry out two travels (however, without intensive field studies) to the Rarkan valley20. During these two trips new evidences and information have been collected, which enable us to answer briefly to the second question: 1. The number of wells increased, as well as the surface of irrigated land, and the number of fruit-trees which in the meantime cover the valley areas like a forest. The vegetable gardening also expanded and product quality improved. Since the beginning of the eighties fruit and

21 In 1970, only one lorry existed in the whole Rarkan valley, 1934 model. The locomotion was taking place by camel or on foot. On the then not yet asphalted through road passed once a week a bus in the direction Loralai and Rakhni. Until 1970, only three members of the valley inhabitants has visited the province capital Quetta and some other towns of the Punjab.

20 The necessary official authorization for research work in Pakistan is very difficult to obtain, especially for Baluchistan.

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Fred Scholz: The Hasni Tribe in Western Baluchistan the tribe council. They also make decisions without the agreement of the rest of the tribe members, e.g. regarding the allocation of land taken on lease or the shepherds’ employment. They insist on their sons’ education and do not reject their daughters any more. It seems that in Rarkan it has been accepted in the meantime that they do not follow any more or only partially the elders’ advice.

set up and reduced the active age group. In 1996, two observations became obvious: • in the visited villages, almost only children, women and elderly men were to be seen; • field cultivation and care for the cattle herds were almost entirely in the hands of tribe strangers (mainly Afghans).

It is not exaggerated to state that the traditional relations based on tribal connections have almost completely vanished. Following economy related self interests determines nowadays unequivocally the social behaviour of the Rarkan Hasni. This development after 1970 has been clearly presented in the case of the Shahani clan leading family. The village elders’ family (chowdry) has been holding a special place within the Rarkan Hasni since several decades. This is based above all on the chowdry’s function and on his dominant and (also physically) expressed personality. At the beginning of the seventies, his economic situation was on the surface not different from that of other tribe members. Yet, as his sons grew up, he invested the long-saved fees received for his functions as village representative, member of the Tahsil council and different governmental commissions in a lorry. With that, he founded a haulage company. At the terminus of the transport route, the chowdry family maintains offices, stock places, garages and shops. In 1996 the family opened a gas station in Rarkan. The sons are involved in the business which - since a couple of years - has also been involved in commerce and keep bazaar shops in several places. In contrast to many others, they still live in a family unit. For the Rarkan niveau, they have a higher than average education and also follow their father in his outside political positions. Within the village, they are considered to have a particular commercial experience. However, they are asked for advice concerning business matters, or taken into confidence on financial matters - in a different way than their father used to be - rather by persons outside the own tribe.

As compared to 1970, the change that had taken place was clearly illustrated, in my opinion, by the fact that only few men came to the welcome meal organized for a visitor (a government representative) by the chowdry family. Nevertheless, the following day they tried a speak to the visitor in private, in order to put forward their request. In 1970 all the clan elderly would have come together and would have presented their request through the chowdry.

The position held nowadays by the chowdry family in Rarkan points unmistakably to the decline of the intertribal relationships. In my opinion, it finds expression in the huge, isolated situated property which the family built at the level of the Rarkan hill. It consists of a complex of buildings surrounded by a high wall, in the vicinity of which are a spacious guest house and several dwellings for servants. Thanks to its connections and lorries, the chowdry took profit more than the other Hasni from the exploration of crude oil/natural gas, which took place in the region around the Rarkan valley at the beginning of the nineties. Yet, for those men still able to work who remained on place, purchase possibilities came up now. As exploration activities and, as a result, employment opportunities for the Hasni were reduced after 1995, they - used to earning money quickly - are now intensively looking for employment outside the region. A further migration wave

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Baluchistan

Fig 5.1: Distribution of the Hasni tribe (Scholz, 1974).

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Fred Scholz: The Hasni Tribe in Western Baluchistan

Fig 5.2: Rarkan Valley. Land distribution (Scholz, 1974, 1976).

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Baluchistan

Fig 5.3 (Above): Village of Rarkan. Model of the original settlement (1888) (Scholz, 1974). Fig. 5.4 (Below): Village of Rarkan. The settlement in 1970 (Scholz, 1974).

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Fred Scholz: The Hasni Tribe in Western Baluchistan

Fig. 5.5: Rarkan Valley: Distribution, extent and period of formation of the settlements (Scholz, 1974).

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Baluchistan

Fig. 5.6: Rarkan Valley: Patterns of land use in the valley of Rarkan (Scholz, 1974).

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Visions of Unity: the Baluch Ittehad. An Urban Voluntary Association in Baluchistan Paul Titus

1. Aims and Activities of Baluch Ittehad - 2. Baluch Ittehad in Historical Context – 3. The Ittehad and the Nawab - 4. Baluch-Pashtun Ethnic Politics - 5. Conclusion∗

northern Baluchistan. Civil society in Quetta is characterised by a rich variety of voluntary associations including sports groups, youth groups, village and neighbourhood associations, tribal and ethnic welfare societies, trade unions, and student and political parties. These are groups one must join even when eligibility is from birth as in the case of tribal or ethnic associations. As in other developing countries such groups serve two functions. They provide support networks and they are often instruments “progressive” young men use to achieve social change2. As such they can be important agents in economic and political mobilisation at the local level and, in some cases, beyond3.

Voluntary associations seem like bubbles rising and disappearing on the surface of boiling water. It is from deeper sources that the people who stir them find their motivation, and it is at more significant levels that we must try to explain a society in which associations are no more than indicators of social problems; reflections, to be interpreted, of some aspects of the society, but epiphenomenal too, because they furnish the points of convergence of many social forces1.

The stated purpose of Baluch Ittehad is to promote the welfare and the unity of the Baluch people. Though it continues to operate today, the rally described above set a high-water mark in the public profile of Baluch Ittehad. Soon after the rally, national and international developments, would lead to party-based elections in Pakistan, the country’s first for more than a decade. With those elections, Baluch nationalist political leaders, whose activities had been more or less suppressed during the various stages of Zia ul Haq’s decade of rule, were allowed to organise freely. Their re-emergence displaced Baluch Ittehad from the public stage though it continued to function as a grass-roots community welfare organisation.

On a Friday morning in February, 1988 near Fatima Jinnah Road in the centre of Quetta, people, cars and buses are gathering at Bugti House, the urban residence of the nawab of the Bugti tribe. A public rally will take place later in the day in the town of Sibi, and Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti is to be the chief guest and speaker. Turbaned armed guards stand outside the guest room of the house. Inside the nawab is having a breakfast of hot peanuts. There is much coming and going as organisers make final arrangements for the rally. Within an hour, a colourful procession of cars, buses, mini-vans and motorcycles, many bedecked with flags or banners, begins the 150 km journey from Quetta, through the Bolan Pass to Sibi. The nawab rides in a four-wheel drive Pajero. Occasionally, out of exuberance, someone fires a Kalashnikov machine gun in the air. The firing increases as the caravan reaches Sibi and continues as it makes its way through the bazaar to the dusty football field where the rally is to take place. The crowd of more than 5,000 people is made up of both city dwellers and rural tribesmen, as evidenced by the mix of clothing and head gear. Speakers and notables are seated on a raised stage under a brightly decorated canopy (shamiana). The rally lasts several hours. Speeches in Baluchi, Brahui, and Urdu address current political issues and the situation facing the Baluch people. The last speech is by the nawab. He is greeted by long bursts of gun fire as he begins though some members of the crowd have begun to leave the scene and continue to do so during his talk.

This paper discusses the activities of Baluch Ittehad and situates the organisation in its broader historical and regional context4. Though its leaders explicitly deny 2

K. Little, West African Urbanization: A Study of Voluntary Associations in Social Change, Cambridge 1965, pp. 28-33. 3 R. Slimbach describes the activities of Baluch voluntary associations in Karachi; see R. Slimbach, Ethnic Binds and Pedagogies of Resistance: Baluch Nationalism and Educational Innovation in Karachi, in P. Titus (ed.), Marginality and Modernity: Ethnicity and Change in Post-Colonial Baluchistan, Karachi 1996 pp. 138-67. For case studies of the way voluntary associations are instrumental in developing civil society and political representation see: Barkan et al, “Hometown” Voluntary Associations, Local Development, and the Emergence of Civil Society in Western Nigeria, “The Journal of Modern African Studies”, 29 (1991), n. 3,pp. 457-80 and Sh. Ghabra, Voluntary Associations in Kuwait: The Foundation of a New System?, “Middle East Journal”, 45(1991), n. 2, pp. 199-215. Kearney briefly discusses how voluntary associations concerned with human rights or environmental politics can link up with international movements: M. Kearney, Reconceptualizing the Peasantry, Boulder (Co) 1996. 4 This paper is based largely on material gathered during fieldwork in Quetta in 1987-1988. During this time Baluch Ittehad had a highly visible presence. I followed their activities closely and had numerous interviews with the group's leaders and members. In 1995, while conducting research on other matters in Quetta, I had a single two-hour interview with the group's founder. The first period of research was funded by the American Institute of Pakistan Studies and the second by the Fulbright Foundation.

The group that organised this rally was Baluch Ittehad, a voluntary association active in Quetta and other towns in ∗ This study is a revised version of the article: Sogni d’unità: la Baluch Itehad. Un’associazione volontaria in Baluchistan, in “Storia Urbana”, 22 (1998), n.84. 1 C. Meillasoux, Urbanization of an African Community: Voluntary Associations in Bamako, Seattle 1968, p. 147.

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Baluchistan Baluch Ittehad is a political party, its vision and its activities are linked to the broader Baluch nationalist movement. Baluch Ittehad arose to address the issues facing Baluch adapting to life in an urban center at a particular historical conjuncture. Though primarily concerned with the health, education, and social welfare problems facing Baluch in the city, the middle-class leaders of Baluch Ittehad have a vision of the Baluch people that encompasses rural Baluchistan. Like other Baluch nationalists, they hold ambivalent attitudes toward the traditional tribal institutions and political figures in Baluch society. Like other ethnic political movements in Pakistan and elsewhere, their nationalist politics at times verge on ethnic chauvinism, and a key aspect of the movement is the assertive posture it has taken against the other major ethnic group in Quetta, the Pashtun.

consequences of the Baluch people’s disunity. It is a common theme with all Baluch nationalists, the most articulate of whom are situated in the newly emerging middle and working classes. At the core of their quest for unity is an irony - traditional values, loyalties and institutions are both that which makes the Baluch a distinct and separate people and the source of their weakness relative to others. This contradiction frequently puts them at odds, at least on a rhetorical level, with the tribal leaders (sardars) who embody those values and institutions. Both economic and political arguments have been put forward to explain the hierarchical social structures of Southwest Asian tribal societies such as the Baluch6. The origins of powerful tribal headmen may well lie in the nature of pastoral and small-scale agricultural production and the standing of peripheral tribal groups in pre-industrial polities. In the contemporary world, where tribal people are subsumed within ever more pervasive states, capable tribal leaders can use their standing to gain access to a variety of political and economic opportunities. In their positions of public prominence they appear both as potentially powerful patrons and as self-interested obstacles to real social development.

1. Aims and Activities of Baluch Ittehad The Arabic term ittehad means unity or alliance. It is used frequently in the titles of voluntary organizations in Baluchistan5. For these group’s the word’s grammatical usage as both noun and adjective is significant in that it both means an established group or union and the state of being unified or united. As such, unity is both an ideal and a means of achieving specific goals.

In the late 1980s members of Baluch Ittehad also saw themselves at odds with Baluch politicians. Members emphasised that Baluch Ittehad is not a political but a social welfare organisation. “Those who join of Baluch Ittehad are from all parties - the Muslim League, nationalist parties and Jami‘at-i ‘Ulema’-i Islam” an activist told me. While his statement implies tolerance for all parties, there is also animosity toward political leaders seen as out of touch with the needs of the Baluch people. Pakistan-wide parties such as the Muslim League and the Pakistan Peoples Party were viewed to have little concern for Baluch while Baluch nationalist parties lacked relevance because they were self-interested and riven with factions created by squabbles over principles and personalities. Ismail Baluch summed up this attitude: “There are no politics in Pakistan, there are no political parties. They are all frauds, they are all lies. They only spread deception in order to gain more power. None of them are for the people. It is especially the case for Baluch. No political party can face our problems”.

The purpose of Baluch Ittehad, according to its leaders, is to promote unity among Baluch in order to solve the social problems they face. My interviews and conversations with Baluch Ittehad members, as with most Baluch, invariably touched on the underdeveloped state of Baluchistan and the Baluch people. Two themes consistently arise in such discussions - the disunity of the Baluch and the injustice inherent in their economic and political relations with the government of Pakistan. Activists cite Islam, tribalism and linguistic differences as sources of disunity among Baluch, and this disunity, they assert, causes Baluch underdevelopment. This is typified by comments the founder and president of Baluch Ittehad, Ismail Baluch, made during an interview: “We formed Baluch Ittehad because for 40 years in Pakistan, and especially in Baluchistan, the political, economic and social rights of the Baluch have been denied. Pakistan gets abundant wealth from our province at the same time we are without [natural] gas, electricity, or plumbing. This deprivation, the displacement of Baluch is due to our internal divisions - tribalism, the tribal system. Because of it our strength is divided. When we are divided we can not gain our political rights, our economic rights, or any political benefits from the government of Pakistan”.

By contrast he depicted Baluch Ittehad as ready to defend the Baluch homeland (sarzemin) and solve the practical problems of the Baluch people. Quetta’s Urdu language newspapers present a forum in which individuals and organisations can express their views. Statements (bayanat) prepared by Baluch Ittehad members and printed in newspapers reveal what they see as important issues affecting Baluch. In 1987 and 1988

Baluch Ittehad is not alone in decrying the destructive 6

For ecological explanations of the hierarchical nature of tribes and their relations with settled agriculturalists see B. Spooner, The Cultural Ecology of Pastoral Nomads, Addison-Wesley Module in Anthropology No. 45, Reading, Massachusetts 1973; A. M. Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside World, Cambridge 1984 and P. Salzman, Tribal Chiefs as Middlemen: The Politics of Encapsulation in the Middle East, “The Anthropological Quarterly”, 47 (1978), pp. 203-210.

5

Examples of voluntary organizations active during the periods of my field work, which make use of the term ittehad include Anjuman Ittehad Zehri (Association for Zehri Unity), Afghan Ittehad Bus Owners, Pashtun Ittehad, Anjuman Ittehad Naujovan (Association of United Youth), and All Baluchistan Mulazmin Ittehad (All Baluchistan Employees Union).

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Paul Titus: Visions of Unity: the Baluch Ittehad - An Urban Voluntary Association in Baluchistan they repeatedly focused on such issues as the need to end tribal differences among Baluch; the high rate of unemployment; and the need to restrict refugees from Afghanistan to camps because of the problems they were causing7. In interviews Baluch Ittehad leaders expressed concern about the need for better health care, educational facilities, and support for widows and orphans. They pointed to the importance of dealing with the practical manifestation of Baluch disunity - disputes, often involving bloodshed, among members of extended families and lineages. Baluch Ittehad’s chief organiser, Malik Yar Muhammad, identified another problem. A member of the Brahui Shahwani tribe who owned agricultural land on the outskirts of Quetta, Yar Muhammad was concerned about dropping water tables, which dry out traditional irrigation channels (kariz).

land. During the riots his neighbors had attacked him, he said, and he had fled through the hills to the city. He was afraid to return to his land and complained that the current crop of apples had been stolen and his trees were dying because he could not irrigate them. He had made written requests (darkhwast) to the district commissioner and to the chief minister and home secretary of Baluchistan to address the situation. No one was willing to deal with his problem, and he was hoping Baluch Ittehad would act on his behalf. No leaders of Baluch Ittehad was present on this occasion, and I never learned whether the organization took up his case. It is, nevertheless, significant that it had developed a reputation for dealing with such problems. Baluch Ittehad also claimed to have been successful in settling several tribal disputes among Baluch. Mediation is a central concern in Middle Eastern tribal societies because once violence has broken out “there is only an indefinite range of possible violence” until someone with the appropriate standing offers his authority and honour to arbitrate the matter9. Despite the fact that arbitrating disputes can bring prestige, Swidler observed that among Baluch tribal leaders mediation is regarded as “a burdensome and potentially divisive undertaking” since one party will usually be dissatisfied with the results10. Baluch Ittehad members I interviewed were critical of the lack of interest shown by sardars is settling disputes, and of the fees they charge the parties in a dispute for their services. They were also dismissive of the Pakistani legal system, which they said is expensive because of the need to pay lawyers and often inconclusive with cases dragging on for years with no result. Baluch Ittehad, they claimed, resolved disputes in a manner that was compatible with tribal custom. Baluch Ittehad mediators did not charge fees for their efforts and they strove to reach settlements that did not rely on cash payments. It was better, they said, to establish marriages between the disputing parties because that way respect develops and the settlement will be more permanent.

It appeared in 1988 that Baluch Ittehad had few resources to carry out many practical activities on behalf of those they saw themselves representing. Had they the funds they would open clinics, orphanages, schools, and tutoring centers, Ismail Baluch and other members of the group said. They were able to point to some accomplishments, however. Malik Yar Muhammad Shahwani had donated 20,000 square feet of land to Baluch Ittehad, which had divided it among orphans and other needy people (yatim aur na char log). The group also gathered small donations (chanda) for a fund that provided medicine and blood transfusions to the poor. This was apparently arranged by Ismail Baluch who worked as a technician in Quetta’s hospital. Perhaps more significant was Baluch Ittehad's willingness to become involved in small-scale disputes. Its leaders claimed, for example, to have acted on behalf of Baluch civil servants to block their transfer to other parts of the province when it was a hardship on their families. They also claimed to have intervened with the civil administration in Kalat because Baluch there had to meet more rigorous requirements for promotion than did non-Baluch.

A family dispute in the Jemaldini tribe that had led to the death of four people was one of those Baluch Ittehad leaders said they had settled. Ismail Baluch said he and other members of his organization had made several trips to the family’s home in Noshki and had, according to Baluch custom, concluded a compromise (razinamah) between the factions. The reason the sardar had not dealt with the problem was that he himself was embroiled in a dispute with members of his lineage. Ismail Baluch said he was currently working to settle another long-standing dispute, also in the Jemaldini tribe, in which eight people had died. In another interview and in newspaper statements, members stressed the need to establish a reconciliation (masalhati) committee within Baluch Ittehad that would deal with such disputes. That they had settled some disputes indicates that Baluch Ittehad

Another case is illustrative. In August 1988 rioting in Quetta between Baluch and Pashtun caused the army to occupy the city and impose a strict curfew8. Shortly after the curfew was lifted I was interviewing Baluch Ittehad members at their central office in the city’s Satellite Town when a Baluch man arrived on the scene looking for Baluch Ittehad’s office. Invited in, he sat and told his story. The previous year he had purchased orchard land in Hanna-Urak, a Pashtun area just northeast of the city that has some of the region’s most productive agricultural 7

See the Quetta edition of Jang newspaper January 14, 1988; January 26, 1988; February 3, 1988; and June 1, 1988. Some of these statements originated not from Baluch Ittehad's central office in Quetta, but from branch offices in such towns as Nushki, Kharan, and Sibi indicating that the group has had some success in establishing a presence outside of Quetta. 8 See P. Titus, Tribalism, Ethnicity, and the State in Pakistani Baluchistan: The Economics and Politics of Detribalization in an Urban Setting, Ph.D dissertation, Anthropology Department, University of California, Riverside pp.184-88 for details on the ethnic riots in Quetta in 1988 and 1986.

9

P. Dresch, Tribes, Government and History in Yemen, Oxford, p. 99. N. Swidler, The Political Structure of a Tribal Federation: The Brahui of Baluchistan, Ph.D. dissertation, Anthropology Department, Columbia University, 1969, p. 138. 10

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Baluchistan major Baluch section of Karachi13. Impressed with their activities, Ismail Baluch offered to start a branch of the organization in Quetta, to which they agreed. He claims he then received no support from them so he kept the name but made it an autonomous organization. Members of the Baluch Ittehad Rabta Committee disputed this. In their version, after they agreed he would start a branch of their organization in Quetta, they did not hear from him again.

leaders had built up a degree of legitimacy. It did not appear to me that the organization had solved a large number of such cases, however. When I left Quetta, at the end of 1988, nearly a year after our initial interviews, it had not yet established its reconciliation committee, and in our 1995 interview Ismail Baluch said the group no longer involved itself in such disputes. An interesting extension of Baluch Ittehad’s willingness to act as a mediator in disputes was its effort to mediate between two factions of the Baluch Students Organization (BSO) in 1987. A radical splinter group, BSO-Sohb, had split from the main body of the BSO. BSO-Sohb was led by Kahur Baluch, and it was thought to be responsible for the shooting of a Baluch student at Quetta’s Bolan Medical College and, some months later, the assassination of a prominent former leader of the BSO, Fida Ahmed, in Turbat. Along with several voluntary associations from Karachi11 Baluch Ittehad attempted to mediate between the two factions. According to Baluch Ittehad its efforts were unsuccessful because Kahur refused to negotiate. Baluch Ittehad detailed these events in a flyer distributed in Quetta, which also denounced Kahur as a rebel and conspirator against the Baluch people.

2. Baluch Ittehad in Historical Context A fuller understanding of Baluch Ittehad comes from viewing the organization against the backdrop of the growth and development of the broader Baluch nationalist movement and in the context of events in Pakistan in the 1980s. Anthropological descriptions of social life in rural Baluchistan suggest the primacy of relations of kinship and patronage and ideologies of honour. Baluch nationalism encompasses and to an extent incorporates these local concerns. Articulated first relative to the conditions imposed by the colonial regime and later by post-colonial successor states, Baluch nationalism includes a range of political ideologies and visions of an ideal future. Nationalist demands range from more political and economic autonomy within existing states to the unification of everyone who can even remotely be considered Baluch in a greater Baluchistan.

Despite its claim to eschew politics, Baluch Ittehad put considerable energy into organizing street marches and rallies in the late 1980s. Some, such as an incident in which the group blocked traffic on the main road into Quetta to protest the death of a Baluch youth while in police custody, were small-scale events12. Others, in particular street marches and rallies were major, and when Ismail Baluch told me the history of Baluch Ittehad in an interview, these were landmark events in the narrative. He described years of attempting to bring a message (pegham) to the Baluch people. He made pamphlets, which he distributed first in Quetta then in Kalat, Khuzdar, Panjgur and Karachi. He said his first rally, in February 1986, attracted only 21 people. He continued his organizing, making some headway by gaining the support of Malik Yar Muhammad. His second rally, in June 1987, attracted thousands. Afterwards, Baluch Ittehad gained enough active members to establish a “cabinet” of leaders. Ismail Baluch claimed the group’s third rally, a march along Quetta’s Sariab Road in July 1987, was the largest ever held in Baluchistan’s history.

Inayataullah Baluch14 has sketched the emergence of modern Baluch nationalism in the early decades of the 20th century. He identifies two tendencies within the early movement, a revolutionary, group aligned with the Soviet Union and a constitutional, reformist group. The former included Baluch who participated in Soviet efforts to consolidate their rule in Central Asia and delegates to the 1920 Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku. Though not personally prominent in Baluchistan, the revolutionary nationalists influenced those involved in the reformist movement15. The reformist movement was led by men such as Abdul Aziz Kurd, son of a civil servant, and Yosuf Ali Magsi, son of the sardar of the Magsi tribe. In 1929 they formed the Anjuman-i-Ittehad Baluchistan (Organization for the Unity of Baluchistan), which pursued a reformist path to constitutional change and an independent Baluchistan. In a 1932 conference in Jacobabad, the Anjuman passed resolutions requesting the Baluch in different administrative units of India be united in a single

It appears that Ismail Baluch modeled Baluch Ittehad on a Karachi-based voluntary association, Baluch Ittehad Rabta (Liaison) Committee. During his visit to Karachi he met with leaders of the group, whose activities included promoting education and organizing against unemployment and the spread of narcotics in Lyari, a

13

In May 1987 I conducted an interview in Karachi with the president of the Baluch Ittehad Rabta Committee, Anwar Bhaijan, and several members of the organisation. They said the organization began in 1984 and claimed it had 57 branches in Karachi. See also R. Slimbach, Ethnic Binds and Pedagogies of Resistance...cit., p. 164. 14 I. Baloch, The Emergence of Baluch Nationalism, “Pakistan Progressive”, 3 (1980), n. 3-4, pp. 8-24; Idem, The problem of ‘Greater Baluchistan’: A Study of Baluch Nationalism, Stuttgart 1987; Idem, Islam, the State, and Identity: The Zikris of Balochistan, in P. Titus (ed.), Marginality and Modernity...cit., pp. 223-249. 15 I. Baloch, The problem of...cit., pp. 148-50.

11 These included Anjuman Bidari Baluch and Insedad-e-Manashiat Lyari, a coalition of groups dedicated to stopping the spread of drugs. See R. Slimbach, Ethnic Binds and Pedagogies of Resistance...cit., p. 156 for a brief description of the activities of these two groups. In the same article he presents statements from BSO-Sohb leaders. 12 The protest was described in a Baluch Ittehad statement published in Jang (April 16, 1988).

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Paul Titus: Visions of Unity: the Baluch Ittehad - An Urban Voluntary Association in Baluchistan province, customary tribal law be modernized and Islamicized, and steps be taken to raise the level of education among Baluch, including girls16. The Anjuman later evolved into a political party, the Kalat State National Party (KSNP). The KSNP had the support of the intelligentsia and some officials in the government of Kalat, the portion of Baluchistan that retained nominal independence under the British. The KSNP worked for reforms in Kalat and opposed the sardars and the political system that gave them far reaching powers in their tribal areas17. During the decolonization of India, most Baluch nationalists advocated an independent Baluch state.

Khair Bukhsh Marri, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, and Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti - were either leaders, or in the case of Bugti, a key patron of the NAP22. All these men but Bizenjo had considerable stature in Baluch society because they were the heads of major tribes23. They gave added weight to the nationalist movement, which to that point had been led primarily by activist intellectuals. Their presence in the nationalist movement coincided with the growth of mass education and mass communication in Baluchistan. Inspired by the Baluchi literary movement, which had grown apace with the nationalist movement, and angered by Pakistan’s heavyhanded treatment of Baluch leaders during the martial law period of the late 1950s and early 1960s, students joined the nationalist movement24. The Baluch Students Organization, formed in 1967, established a pervasive presence in Baluch areas and has been an active political player as well as a training ground for two generations of Baluch leaders25.

This pattern was to continue in the post-colonial era. Nationalists, some with an explicit left-wing political program, initially opposed inclusion within Pakistan. Once it was a fait accompli they advocated democratic reforms, creation of an autonomous Baluch province, and promotion of Balochi language and culture18. The Baluch nationalist movement, like other nationalist movements in Pakistan, lacked cohesion and structure until the government of Pakistan created “One Unit” in 1955. One Unit merged the provinces and princely states of West Pakistan into a single administrative unit having representative parity with the eastern wing of the country19. Baluch nationalists objected to the move because it curtailed Baluch political autonomy and replaced a legal system based on Baluch custom with the Pakistani legal code. One Unit had two effects, it provoked a range of nationalist and left-leaning parties to unite in a single organization, the National Awami Party (NAP), and it provided a target at which they directed their activities for more than a decade20. As a national alliance of parties, the NAP’s program was broad and addressed both national and international issues. Of special importance to West Pakistanis in the NAP was dissolution of One Unit in favor of four ethnically defined provinces21.

The uniformity of political opinion in Baluchistan during this and other periods should not be exaggerated. Despite the growth of Baluch nationalism and the cross-tribal support it drew, independent sardars generally dominated at the local level. Islam too has been a powerful political force in Baluchistan. The Islamic party Jami‘at-i ‘Ulema’-i-Islam (JUI) draws wide-spread grass roots support from its network of mosques and madrasas and its strong showing in electoral politics often make it a group to be reckoned with in Baluchistan’s provincial assembly. Nevertheless, it was the NAP that prevailed in Pakistan’s first open elections and Baluch nationalism that has been the determining factor in Baluch politics since then. The first elections were held in 1970 after the nationalists’ campaign against One Unit bore fruit and the government divided West Pakistan into its current four provinces. With the support of independents and the JUI, the NAP was able to form a government once the situation settled following the secession of East Pakistan. The dismissal of this government less than a year later and the arrest of NAP leaders set off Baluchistan’s four-year armed insurgency. As with the Baluch ethno-nationalist movement in general, there were two groups among the guerrillas: those with tribal ties to the imprisoned leaders

Politicians who were to be pivotal in Baluch politics over the next four decades - Ghous Bukhsh Bizenjo, Nawab 16

Ibidem, pp. 149-54. Ibidem, pp.155-56; Janmahmad, Essays on Baluch National Struggle in Pakistan, Quetta 1989, p. 170. 18 P. Titus and N. Swidler, Knights, Not Pawns: Ethno-Nationalism and Regional Dynamics in Post-Colonial Baluchistan, “International Journal of Middle East Studies”, 32 (2000), pp. 47-69. 19 R. LaPorte, Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision-Making in Pakistan, Berkeley 1975, p. 50. 20 The creation of One Unit created a series of political alliances. In 1956 the Baluch nationalist party Ustaman Gal joined the Pakistan National Party, a coalition of ethno-nationalist and left-leaning parties in West Pakistan which included Wrore Pashtun, Sindhi Awami Mahaz, the Azad Party, the Sind Hari Committee, and Khudai Khidmatgar. Cf. A. Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defense, Cambridge 1990, p. 257. The following year the Pakistan National Party joined with the left-wing of the East Pakistanibased Awami League and several smaller groups to form the National Awami Party. R. Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-1958, Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad, pp. 216-9. 21 The NAP also called for the military government to hold open elections and advocated land reforms, nationalization of industry, and an end to Pakistani participation in the Western military pacts CENTO and SEATO. 17

22

Later affiliated with the NAP, Akbar Bugti was initially associated with the Republican Party, a splinter from the Muslim League. With Republican Party support, he was briefly Minister of the Interior in the central government when the prime minister, Firoz Khan Noon, attempted to salvage his government by expanding his cabinet a month prior to Pakistan's first military coup in October, 1958 (COQDA 1S/58). Never an outright member of the NAP, Bugti was an active supporter and financial backer of the party. P. Titus, Whither the Tigers?, Introduction to S. Matheson, The Tigers of Baluchistan, Karachi 1997, p. xvii. 23 P. Titus, Political Alignment of Baluchi Sardars in Relation to the Government of Pakistan, “Newsletter of Baluchistan Studies”, 7 (1990), pp. 59-67. 24 Janmahmad, Essays on Baluch...cit., pp. 215-16. 25 One of the BSO leaders Harrison interviewed in 1978, Habib Jalib, was elected to Baluchistan's provincial assembly in 1997. Cf. S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, New York 1981, pp. 84-86.

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Baluchistan and those with an ideological commitment to the nationalist cause. In the areas controlled by the two imprisoned sardars, Marri and Mengal, the fighters were virtually all from their tribes. In other areas they were mixed26.

their leaders. During the third stage, 1983-1988, Zia and the military attempted to draw civilians into government while maintaining ultimate authority. This they did through local body, provincial, and national elections conducted on a non-party basis. Later restrictions on political parties were loosened somewhat.

While the central government actively undermined Baluchistan’s NAP government, an important reason for its fall was rifts among party leaders. A key element in Islamabad’s case against the NAP was Nawab Akbar Bugti’s public statement that he had himself conspired with NAP officials to obtain foreign arms for creating an independent Baluchistan, a claim denied by other NAP leaders27. Bugti became governor when the NAP government was dismissed. During the period of their incarceration and the guerrilla war, further divisions within the NAP leadership emerged. When they were released at the end of 1977, there was a split between Baluch and non-Baluch leaders of the NAP, with the Baluch leaders forming their own party, the Pakistan National Party (PNP). It too then splintered. Bizenjo retained control of the PNP, and, with Pakistan under martial law and most political activities suppressed, Mengal and Marri went into self-imposed exile28.

These briefly were the political circumstances that set the stage for Baluch Ittehad’s appearance and brief period of prominence. After decades of organizing, Baluch nationalism was an established political ideology with solid support among growing numbers of educated and urbanized Baluch, in large part because its economic and political demands - such as greater representation for Baluch in the provincial administration - would create opportunities for them. Baluch Ittehad’s vision and rhetoric are squarely situated in the nationalist movement. At the juncture of the early and mid 1980s, the nationalist movement was in a weakened state, however. It was shaken and divided as a result of the guerrilla war and key leaders were absent. After the official end of martial rule in December 1985 the central government had begun to relax the restrictions on political expression but the activities of political parties were still limited. Baluch Ittehad was explicitly not a political party, but a social welfare movement, albeit one that framed its community activities in nationalist terms. It thus avoided confronting both the government and established political parties, while it operated in a public way to address Baluch concerns for unity and development.

General Zia’s decade of direct and indirect military rule created the conditions that gave rise to Baluch Ittehad. Noman suggests Zia’s rule can be divided into three distinct stages29. The first lasted from the initial coup in 1977 until the judicial execution of Zulfikar Bhutto in 1979, during which the martial law government maneuvered to avoid elections and eliminate Bhutto. The second stage, 1979-1983, was a period of harsh direct rule by the military in which “Pakistan was being gradually transformed into a theocratic state with authoritarian connotations”. The military government established powerful military courts, restricted the press, banned political parties, and in many cases imprisoned

3. The Ittehad and the Nawab Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti gave speeches at the two large rallies organized by Baluch Ittehad, and he appeared to be an important draw for the crowds attending them. The relationship was mutually beneficial. The presence of a major tribal and political leader gave added depth and legitimacy to the fledgling organization, while the nawab gained increased visibility through its events. Though he had fallen out with his colleagues in the National Awami Party (NAP), Bugti maintained a nationalist stance, advocating greater autonomy and a more resources for Baluchistan. In 1988 most of his old rivals for political leadership were either dead or in exile and the nawab was in a good position to take on a dominant role at a time when politics were coming into the open for the first time in a decade. His relationship with Baluch Ittehad must be seen in this context.

26

One of the guerrilla groups operating in these areas was led by Khair Jan, a former head of the BSO, another by Shaista Khan, nephew of a famous nationalist poet. In interviews conducted in 1995 Khair Jan said his band of about 300 guerrillas included men from the Mengal, Bizenjo, Sasoli, Zehri, Muhammad Hasni, Rind, and Summalani tribes. Shaista Khan said those with him included men from the Mengal, Badini, Sasoli, and Pirkani tribes. P. Titus and N. Swidler, Knights, Not Pawns...cit., p. 61. 27 Janmahmad, Essays on Baluch...cit., pp. 301-02. For the government's case against the NAP see the White Paper on Baluchistan, Rawalpindi: Government of Pakistan, 1974. Academic accounts of the NAP government are generally skeptical of the government's version of events. See, for example, Sh. Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-1977. New York 1980, p. 96; Kh. Bin Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change, New York 1980 pp. 115-7; S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow...cit., pp. 34-5; and H. A. Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan, Lahore 1986, p. 213. 28 S. Harrison, In Afghanistan’s Shadow...cit., p.89; Janmahmad, Essays on Baluch...cit., pp. 293-94. Mengal went to London where he eventually joined with other Pakistani ethno-nationalists to form the Sindhi-Pashtun-Baluch Front, which advocated turning Pakistan into a confederation of states: S. J. Ahmed, Confederation: Rah Najat ya Rah Farar, Karachi 1988, pp. 199-203. Marri, the most militant of the Baluch nationalist leaders, went to Kabul where he and his group of armed supporters kept the separatist vision alive. 29 O. Noman, Pakistan: Political and Economic History Since 1947, London 1990.

In an interview nawab Bugti said Baluch Ittehad had the potential to develop as had the Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM - National Muhajir Front) the organization of Indian immigrants that began as a largely student-run social welfare organization, but became a political force in the cities of Sind during the local body elections of December, 1987. The analogy was not an apt one, however. The MQM was the first group to attempt to organize Muhajirs on an ethnic basis, while, as described above, those efforts have been going for decades among Baluch. There was little empty space on the spectrum of 78

Paul Titus: Visions of Unity: the Baluch Ittehad - An Urban Voluntary Association in Baluchistan Baluch politics for Baluch Ittehad to fill if it moved from a focus on its community welfare activities to overt politicking.

whose position is structurally similar but also hereditary). Motebar settle disputes, reach decisions based on group consensus, and transmit the sardar’s requests or orders32. In the urban context Baluch Ittehad along with some other organizations and student groups fulfills these functions by mobilizing people at the grass-roots level and in turn gains greater status by ties to prominent tribal/political figures. As in tribes, top political leaders are concerned with relations between Baluch and the outside world and the complicated equations of alliances and conspiracies which are the stuff of Pakistani politics, while Baluch Ittehad gears its activities and contacts toward the immediate concerns of their constituents33.

The rise of Baluch Ittehad coincident with the nawab’s presence at their rallies led many people in Quetta to see the organization as his creation. They claimed he somehow stood behind it and manipulated it. Both he and Baluch Ittehad leadership denied this. There is evidence to support their autonomy from one another. It includes the corroborated story of the visit to Karachi and contact with Baluch Ittehad (Rabta Committee). Also the two reacted quite differently to the riots of August, 1988. The nawab took a concilliatory stance and while Baluch Ittehad was more militant. Subsequently Baluch Ittehad supported a strike (pehiya jam) by Baluch transporters on September 5 to protest the government’s reaction to the riots but the nawab opposed it.

4. Baluch-Pashtun Ethnic Politics Despite its self-proclaimed program of working on behalf of disadvantaged Baluch, some saw Baluch Ittehad as a negative force because of its anti-Pashtun rhetoric. A typical remark from those ambivalent about the group (both Baluch and non-Baluch) was that Baluch Ittehad existed only to promote Baluch interests against those of Pashtun, and, if members of the organization sincerely cared for gaining Baluch rights, they would join one of the political parties that have been struggling against the government for years.

What should we make of the large crowds that attended some Baluch Ittehad rallies? In addition to the committed, political rallies in Pakistan, especially those addressed by major personalities, attract the curious and the bored30, and do not always reflect the political strength of the hosts. Soon after Baluch Ittehad’s February, 1988 rally in Sibi the political landscape again began to change quickly with President Zia ul Haq’s dismissal of the Junejo government, Zia’s death three months later, and the government’s subsequent decision to hold elections with the participation of political parties31. Because Baluch Ittehad lacked both tribal connections and the widespread organizing power of the Baluch Students Organization (BSO), the value of association with the nascent movement disappeared. Nawab Bugti drew closer to the mainstream of the Baluch nationalist movement represented by the BSO and its affiliate, the Baluch National Youth Movement. He eventually entered into an electoral alliance with them and a number of sardars. Baluch Ittehad stayed neutral during the elections maintaining its stance that it is an organization open to those of all political persuasions who want to work for the social welfare of the Baluch people.

The Baluch Ittehad president himself identified tensions with Pashtun as a reason of the growing strength of his organization. He said several times in our 1988 interviews that the first priority of Baluch Ittehad is to defend the Baluch homeland, a statement that was directed primarily at Pashtun.

The relationship between a political leader such as nawab Bugti and a grass-roots organization like Baluch Ittehad has parallels with that between sardars and mid-level tribal leaders, motebar and takkri. Baluch Ittehad fills a role similar to that of motebar who achieve status through their connections within the village or village section, and through their personal ties to the sardar (unlike the takkri

“The Pashtun hate us. Baluch Ittehad has become as strong as it is because of the opposition to us. Actionreaction. Pashtun have cursed our leaders. They have conspired against us, they have raised their voice against us, they have raised slogans on the roads against us: ‘Death to Baluchistan’, and ‘[A Pashtun province] from Chitral to Bolan’. The basic point is that they have spoken against our lands.” In part, this statement refers to Pashtun nationalists’ demand that the government of Pakistan create a Pashtun province (Pashtunistan) by joining the Pashtun parts of Baluchistan with the North West Frontier Province. Though some Baluch are sympathetic to this demand, Baluch Ittehad strongly opposed it34. Baluch Ittehad’s stance against Pashtun is also part of a more general tension between Baluch and Pashtun extending from the fact that access to a range of

30 E. Duncan, Breaking the Curfew: A Political Journey through Pakistan, London 1989, p. 127. 31 Less than a month after the rally Pakistan's prime minister, Muhammad Khan Junejo assembled the leaders of the country's 19 political parties for a round table conference on the Geneva Accords, the framework for the Soviets' withdrawal from Afghanistan. Despite the fact that President Zia ul Haq, vehemently opposed the accords, all but three hard-line Islamic parties wanted Pakistan to sign them. This put Junejo on a collision course with Zia, leading to his dismissal in April, 1988 and ultimately Pakistan's first party based elections in more than a decade. Cf. D. Cordovez – S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal, New York 1995, pp. 259-60.

32 N. Swidler, The Political Structure of a Tribal Federation...cit., pp. 138 and 142-44. 33 P. Salzman, Tribal Chiefs as Middlemen...cit. 34 Not all Baluch are opposed the Pashtun of Baluchistan either forming an independent province or amalgamating with the NWFP. The late Ghous Bukhsh Bizenjo supported such moves, for example. There are a number of extremely sensitive issues that would be raised should such a step be taken, notably the boundaries of the new province and the status of Quetta with its mixed Baluch and Pashtun population. One informant, a long-time Baluch nationalist, said the Pashtun could have Quetta. Its too vulnerable to attack, he reasoned, saying “we'll build our capital in Khuzdar”.

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Baluchistan benefits in Baluchistan - seats in national and provincial assemblies, posts in the bureaucracy and government run enterprises, entrance to colleges and universities - is seen to be a zero sum game based on ethnic affiliation. The rhetoric of both Baluch and Pashtun is similar in this regard and focuses on claims that their own numbers are misrepresented in census figures and therefore they are missing out on their fair share of opportunities in these institutions. At the same time, most assert that they are not opposed to the people of the other ethnic group, only certain leaders or bureaucrats who create these conditions in order to divide and weaken the two groups.

The reactive nature of ethnic politics in Quetta at that time is further illustrated by the fact that in response to the success of Baluch Ittehad, a group of Pashtun created its antithesis, Pashtun Ittehad. Formed in September 1987, Pashtun Ittehad was led by Aurangzeb Jogezai, an uncle of the nawab of the large Pashtun Jogezai tribe. Many of the concerns of Pashtun Ittehad mirrored those of Baluch Ittehad. Pashtun Ittehad members spoke about the need to establish unity and end tribal differences in order to obtain Pashtun rights in Baluchistan37. They also likened themselves to social workers, criticized tribal leaders for not solving disputes, and contrasted their organization to the established political parties38. Pashtun Ittehad was concerned about the ethnic balance of power in Baluchistan, and the president complained that Pashtun are under-represented in the census and therefore in the political assemblies and bureaucracy. “In the 1960s the ratio of government servants was Pashtun 70 percent and Baluch 30 percent, in the 70s it became 50/50. Now in the 1980s Pashtun are only 40 percent and the rest are Baluch”. Similar to Baluch Ittehad spokesmen, the Pashtun Ittehad president insisted his organization was not opposed to the Baluch people. He blamed the situation facing the Pashtun on Punjabis and the central government. They had created divisions between the two ethnic groups in order to prevent them from making a united effort to gain their “rights”, he said. Pashtun Ittehad was never as prominent as Baluch Ittehad, and like it, was displaced into obscurity by the resurrection of party-based politics in 1988.

Thus Ismail Baluch and other members of Baluch Ittehad emphasized that they are not opposed to the Pashtun people but to the small group (tola) that wants to break up Baluchistan. This referred primarily to the Pashtunkwa Milli Avami Ittehad, the pre-party formation that has since become the Pashtunkwa Milli Avami Party or Pashtunistan National Peoples Party (PMAP). Led by the son of Baluchistan’s pre-eminent Pashtun nationalist, Abdul Samad Khan Achakzai, one of the central demands of the PMAP is the creation of a Pashtun province. Ismail Baluch’s observation that his group’s support grew out of a Baluch response to the actions of Pashtun nationalists is in line with a school of thought in anthropology that argues ethnicity is a reactive phenomenon in which identity is articulated or acted out relative to equivalent “others”35. Members of ethnic groups judge themselves and their deprivation or privilege not in absolute terms but relative to others, and their actions will be largely determined by perceived changes in their or the other’s state. The way Baluch Ittehad grew reflects this reactive process.

A question arises as to what steps Baluch Ittehad is willing to take to defend its perception of the Baluch homeland or Baluch interests. The chronic low-grade tensions between Pashtun and Baluch occasionally flares into violence and on one occasion there were charges Baluch Ittehad was involved in starting a serious conflict. On August 13, 1988 rioting broke out in Quetta’s bus stand and spread to other parts of the city. The incident that sparked off the conflict was an attack on a Pashtun owned and operated bus driving on the Quetta-Karachi route. The bus was ambushed south of Mastung, about 50 kilometers from Quetta, and during the attack the driver was killed. On the day of the attack Baluch Ittehad held a rally in Mach, a town in the Bolan Pass, about 50 kilometers to the east of Mastung. The head of the Pashtun transporters union that brought the driver's body back to Quetta said that witnesses had identified Baluch Ittehad members among those who made the attack. Baluch Ittehad leaders denied the organization was in any way involved in the incident but they said that it was possible its members had participated as individuals.

Similar to the situation in the Soviet Union following the collapse of communism, when martial law ended in Pakistan in December 1985, the new openness led to public expression of ethnic and regional differences which had been exacerbated by martial law36. Toward the end of 1986 bloody ethnic riots erupted in Quetta, as they did in Karachi on a much larger scale. It was in this new climate of openness and ethnic tension that Baluch Ittehad began to develop a following. The June 1987 march and rally which put the organization on Baluchistan’s political map took place six months after the Quetta riots and several weeks after a large rally organized by Pashtunkwa Milli Awami Ittehad, during which demonstrators fired guns and raised slogans calling for Pashtunistan. It appears that the political vacuum in Baluch nationalist politics created by the set backs of the 1970s established the conditions in which a new outsider group articulated the attitude of a segment of the Baluch population concerned about the ethnic balance of power in Baluchistan.

37

The president of Pashtun Ittehad emphasized this point: “We did not make Pashtun Ittehad against anybody, we made it so that all Pashtun are one. We should become Pashtun to solve our problems, to take our rights from other tribes or nations. The only solution to our problems in not to be Kakar, Achakzai or Ghilzai, Bareach or Nurzai, only to be Pashtun...The day we finish this zai and khel, become united Pashtun, and take our rights in Pakistan, that day Pashtunistan is made.” Zai and khel are suffixes attached to the names of an ancestor who thus gives his identity to a tribe or lineage. 38 P. Titus, Tribalism, Ethnicity, and the State in Pakistani Baluchistan...cit., pp.220-23.

35 M. Moerman, Ethnic Identification in a Complex Civilization: Who Are the Lue?, “The American Anthropologist”, 67 (1968), p. 161; F. Barth, Introduction, in F. Barth (ed.), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference, Boston 1969, pp. 9-38. 36 E. van Hollen, Pakistan in 1986, in “Asian Survey”, 28 (1987), n. 2, p. 148.

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Paul Titus: Visions of Unity: the Baluch Ittehad - An Urban Voluntary Association in Baluchistan One of the underlying causes of the tensions between Baluch and Pashtun in Baluchistan over the past two decades has been the presence of large numbers of Afghan refugees, most of whom are Pashtun. At the peak of the civil war in the late 1980s about three and a half million people left Afghanistan to seek refuge in Pakistan. Around 20 per cent of them, around 700,000 people, settled in Baluchistan. Most lived in camps in the northern Pashtun part of the province but there were some large camps in Baluch areas and many refugees left the camps to live and work in Quetta and other centers. Relations between the refugees and Pakistanis were by and large good because of the large volumes of international aid, shared ethnic ties in the case of Pashtun, and the religious importance given those who flee their homes in the name of Islam. There were no epidemics, little malnutrition, and relatively little overt conflict between Pakistanis and refugees. Nevertheless the sheer size of the refugee population and the length of their stay added to the serious economic, political, and social stresses in Baluchistan. Problems related to the refugees included environmental degradation and deforestation due to increased demands for water, pasture, and firewood; proliferation of powerful automatic weapons; and growing heroin addiction. In Quetta refugees set up squatter camps on unoccupied lands and there were some conflicts with land owners. Refugees also moved into the local economy, often working for wages lower than local workers were willing to accept. Even as the UN began to put pressure on refugees to leave its camps in the early 1990s the number of refugees in Quetta continued to grow as people moved into the city to avoid returning to Afghanistan where conflict persisted.

including Turbat, Khuzdar, Mastung and Jatpat.39.

Nushki,

Taftan,

Sibi,

In 1995 Baluch Ittehad maintained both its social welfare and its political activities, and Ismail Baluch continued to stress the need for Baluch unity in order to address the big issues confronting them. During a three-hour long interview and meal at his home he was particularly concerned that Baluch were not getting their fair share of the opportunities available through the central government - permits to travel overseas for work or education, positions in the bureaucracy or such governmental enterprises as the railways, gas and electricity departments, Pakistan International Airlines, and the military. These advantages went primarily to residents of Punjab or the Northwest Frontier. Though more Baluch were in the provincial bureaucracy than ever before, they were under-represented in key decision making posts, and the province still lacked technical, arts, and agricultural colleges, he said. From his remarks it appeared that the main activities of Baluch Ittehad continued to be to promote Baluch social welfare. He said the organization had established a blood bank, and provided poor children with medicine. Baluch Ittehad was making it possible for 300 children to attend school by supplying books, and school fees. The month before our interview the group had provided Rs. 25,000 to each of four orphans so they could meet marriage expenses40. Funding for these activities came from donations (chanda), Rs. 10 per month from party members and larger amounts from wealthier individuals. Baluch Ittehad had the support of some politicians, and one former minister in the provincial government, Abdul Karim Nausherwani, was donating an ambulance, he claimed. While it maintained its focus on providing support to those in need, Baluch Ittehad had abandoned its efforts at meditation and dispute resolution.

During the 1980s many Baluch nationalists argued that the refugees should be restricted to refugee camps and during the 1990s there were calls for all Pakistan identity cards issued over the previous decade be revoked and the refugees repatriated. The president of Baluch Ittehad linked the problem with Pashtun to the presence of the Afghan refugees. Another of the organization's officers saw elaborate connections between the refugees and the Western superpowers, which he said are using them to divide and weaken the Baluch in order to gain access to their lands.

In the political arena, Baluch Ittehad had joined an odd coalition of groups known as the Baluch Salvation Front (BSF). Largely the initiative of Nawab Khair Bukhsh Marri, the BSF included the nawab’s own political group, Baluch Haq Tawar, and several factions of fractured Baluch nationalist parties, including a splinter of the Pakistan National Party and the Akhtar Mengal faction of the Baluch National Movement. The BSF also included factions of two Islamic parties, Jami’at-i Islami and Jami’at-i ‘Ulema’-i Islam. At the time of our interview the BSF was in formation and Ismail Baluch and another member of Baluch Ittehad were on the supreme council. Members were not allowed to discuss the activities of the group, which never appeared to amount to much in any case. At least one participant in the front, BNM Akhtar group, later dropped out of the coalition, and in its first year it made little impact on the public scene.

5. Conclusion As per Meillasoux’s observation quoted at the beginning of this paper, Baluch Ittehad in 1987 and 1988 was a point of convergence of many social forces. These included internal dynamics within Baluch society, particular events in the Baluch nationalist movement, economic and political developments in the state of Pakistan, relations with other local ethnic groups, and the Afghan civil war. Yet Baluch Ittehad has proved to be less ephemeral than Meillasoux’s quote might suggest. Though it would never again have the prominence it had in 1988, Baluch Ittehad did not dissipate into Baluchistan’s arid atmosphere. In fact, Ismail Baluch claimed the group gained branches in other towns

In 1995 Ismail Baluch sounded a much more conciliatory 39 It was not possible to check on the validity of this claim or on the level of activity of any of the branches he mentioned. 40 At the time of the research $1 US = Rs30.

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Baluchistan tone toward Pashtun, saying that differences between Baluch and Pashtun were created by outsiders to divide them. He was nevertheless still opposed to the presence of Afghan refugees in Baluchistan. They had, he said, brought crime, drugs, and arms to the province, and not only did they now have identity cards and certificates of local residence, there were cases of refugees getting employment in governmental bodies. Refugees had also captured the wholesale medicine market, and some were selling counterfeit medicine. “We request the government and the United Nations that the refugees be sent home without force by the same honourable means they were brought to this country”, he said. A new development in Ismail Baluch’s thinking in 1995 was linking Baluch Ittehad to the non-governmental organization (NGO) movement. Baluch Ittehad would be the ideal organization to work with foreign NGOs in health, education or technical projects, he said. Baluch Ittehad can thus be seen as the undertaking of an enterprising individual or group of individuals whose starting point is the day to day issues facing Baluch in Baluchistan’s only urban center. They perceive those issues in the broader social context that frames them, and to the extent that they can, they seek to act in that broader context in order to address them.

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Paul Titus: Visions of Unity: the Baluch Ittehad - An Urban Voluntary Association in Baluchistan

Plate 6.1 (Above): 1988, Sibi. The crowd at a meeting of the Baluch Ittehad. Plate 6.2 (Below): 1988, Sibi: nawab Akhbar Bugti speaking to the crowd.

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Baluchistan

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PART III FOCUS ON MAKRAN

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International Indian Ocean Routes and Gwadar Kuh-i Batil Old Barrage in Makran Valeria Piacentini Fiorani

through Central Asia were still important for economic and cultural contacts between the two regions, various sources enable us to assert that there was a resumption and further development of trading activities carried out by sea-routes, and a Sasanian policy aiming at guaranteeing the renewal and development of the settlements of the coasts and of the towns gravitating on the sea, by means of new internal and external balances: a policy of mercantile expansionism which was to lead inevitably to conflict with the Roman Empire, the other main party in the commercial traffic between east and west.

Introduction — 1. The theme of the sea in epic and historical sources relating to the first centuries AD — 2. International maritime trade: a broad-based political design — 3. An unprecedented volume of trade in the Sasanian maritime order. — 4. The “meeting-points” of eastern and western merchants along the Indian Ocean routes. — 5. Kuh-i Batil (or Batil-Kuh) barrage at Gwadar. Introduction* “...” “and there arrived messengers to him from the king of Kûshân, the king of Tûrân and the king of Makrân, with their submission. Then Ardashîr marched from Gûr to Bahrayn and laid siege to its king Sanâtruq, until he in direst straits threw himself down from the wall of the fortress and perished. Then he returned to Ctesiphon, stayed there for some time, and crowned his son Sâbûr during his own lifetime”1

Undoubtedly the advent of the Sasanian dynasty at the beginning of the third century AD marks a turning point in political and military international equilibriums. But this does not necessarily mean that before the Sasanians trade between east and west did not flourish. The flow of far eastern goods towards the Mediterranean basin - and vice-versa - is a very long and very old story, which had been going on for centuries, or millennia, through different routes, through different political and military power-systems, and mediators, and through different carriers as well, but virtually without any break in continuity. The Sasanians simply gave new impulse to this long distance international trade, by means of a centralized coordinated maritime policy, based on a strong and well structured state apparatus, based in its turn on a precise position of advantage gained in the eastern seas since the very establishment of the dynasty3, a maritime policy possibly due to and reinforced by the difficult and precarious situation in which they found themselves along their north-east borders in the regions of Central Asia.

This brief statement is actually the most concise and precise information on the conclusion of Ardashîr’s political and military career up to the complete reunification of the various regions bordering the Gulf and its eastern waters, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The policy of the founder of the Sasanian dynasty has already been discussed elsewhere: a broad-based political design, in whose context the rule of the Gulf and of the eastern seas assumed a centrality of its own, and where many of his enterprises appear preordained and concerted in this direction2. Although the land routes *

The substance of this paper was presented as a lecture at the International Conference of Sindi Adab, at Hyderabad University, on the 3rd February, 1988, and later published in “Nuova Rivista Storica”. The following text is a revised and updated version. I wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Roland M. Besenval of the Centre National de la Rechèrche Scientifique (Paris) in recognition of his collaboration in the course of the archaeological researches carried out in Makran by the Italian Historical, Archaeological and Anthropological Mission. I have largely benefited from his experience and precious contribution to the archaeological aspects which are dealt with in this study, especially in § 5. I feel here obliged to express my scholarly respect to the late Francesco Gabrieli, whose valuable advice …and personal ‘hospitable’ library…have been special friends to me in the course of my research-work. Graphic plans, sketch plans and maps are by my late old friend Giuseppe Tilia, whose valuable assistance we miss very much, and whose precious suggestions and useful information we nevertheless wish to acknowledge here with a special dedication. The photographic material has been provided by Alessandro Fiorani, whose exemplary collaboration has been greatly appreciated. 1 Al-Tabarî, Kitâb al-Mulûk wa al-Rusul, ed. M. J. de Goeje, Leiden 1879-1893, vol. I, pp. 819-820 (hereafter cited as Kitâb al-Mulûk). 2 V. Piacentini Fiorani, La presa di potere sasanide sul Golfo Persico fra leggenda e realtà, in “Clio”, 20 (1984), n. 2, pp. 173-211; V. Piacentini Fiorani, Ardashîri Pâpakân and the wars against the Arabs:

1. The theme of the sea in epic and historical sources relating to the first centuries AD The Kârnâmak i Artakhshîr i Pâpakân - a short novel in Pahlavi probably written in the reign of Hormîzd I4 working hypotheses on the Sasanian hold of the Gulf, in “PSAS”, 15 (1985), pp. 57-77. In connection with this specific topic see endnote (1). 3 For a first updated overall approach to the political Sasanian history of Iran, see R. N. Frye, The Political History of Iran under the Sasanians, in CHIr, vol. III/1, pp. 116-180, and given bibliographical notes ibidem, vol. III/2, pp. 1293-1295. For a maritime Sasanian policy, see below § 1, and endnotes (10) and (11). 4 Kârnâmak i Artaxsêr i Pâpakân, ed. and trans. by A. Pagliaro, in A. Pagliaro, Epica e Romanzo nel Medioevo Persiano, Firenze 1927 (hereafter cited as Kârnâmak), pp. 23 on. Cf. also the ed. by K. A. Nosherwan, Kârnâmak-î Artakhshîr-î Pâpakân, Memoirs of the King Ardashîr... The Pehlevi Text transliterated in Roman characters and translated into Gujrati, Bombay 1895-1896. A useful translation with still masterly notes and comments is that by Th. Nöldeke, in E. Bezzenberger, Beiträge zur Kunde der Indogermanischen Sprachen,

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Baluchistan of the sea”: it was the year 228 AD; in 225 AD - having killed Ardavân in battle - Ardashîr had been crowned King of Kings of Êrânshahr (Shâhinshâh-i Êrân).

gives us a full account of Ardashîr’s descent to the coast: “Ardashîr took the route leading to the coast, and advanced in such a way that some peoples of Persis - who had rebelled against Ardavân - offered him riches, property and their own persons, showing him obedience and performing an act of submission”. Among these was a nobleman, a certain Bânak of Isfahân, who was encamped with his six sons and a large army not far from a place which was later to be called Râmisht Ardashîr; the son of Pâpak feared that Bânak wished to wage war on him, but the latter approached in a quite different spirit and made a solemn oath of submission. “After this, Ardashîr left Bânak - continues the Kârnâmak - and insisted on carrying on alone as far as the sea-shore” ... “And when he saw it with his own eyes, he raised thanks to God in his thoughts; then he laid the foundations of a city, which is called Bukht Ardashîr, and he ordered the fires of Vahrâm to be established on the beach; thence he returned towards Bânak and his horsemen and made preparations for an army”5: the struggle for power had just begun.

Which shores and which sea? History and epic record Mihrak as “ruler over the Ardashîr Kkûrreh”, which is a well known Sasanian administrative region on the Iranian coast of the Persian Gulf to the north of Carmania (Kerman). But what about the legend of Haftânbukht? No personal name, no place name enable us to identify the large kingdom of this powerful ruler. Without going into a thorough analysis of the myth and of the legend - which has already been done elsewhere8 - a working hypothesis had also been advanced on the possible location of the domains of this Haftânbukht in some coastal area either in Carmania or to the south of this region. But interest has not been focused on these episodes simply because of the epic’s fascination. Beyond embellishments of legend and the veil of myth, it is possible to see a definite political will at work in all its prosaic historical reality. On this specific subject, on Ardashîr’s broad-based maritime political design, we shall come back a little later. What we wish to stress here is that if we analyse the action of Ardashîr I in the light of what the available literary sources to day offer to us namely Tabarî’s chronicle and his abridged version Ibn al-Athîr, implemented and integrated with other sources, for instance Pahlavi inscriptions, numismatics, seals and clay sealings etc. (see below) - they allow us to reconstruct in more precise lines the policy pursued by the founder of the Sasanian dynasty from his very first steps up to his death. And - as already stated - beyond the evocative poetry of the Shâhnâmah and the fascination of the epic of the Kârnâmak, the moves of this prince, from his journey down to the sea onwards, reveal a political design which may well go beyond adventure and raiding for purposes of booty, a design which might well be defined as a positive ‘seizing of power’ and ‘control of the sea’. And Ardashîr’s wars against the Arabs of the Peninsula - at the end of his reign - which seem to have led the Sasanian army to the distant lands of Yemen give to the sea, again, a central role in the general political context of the time: the sea, or, better, the seas. It will become a dominant theme and it will occur again and again, repeatedly, until the disruption of the Sasanian power and its state apparatus, long after the celebrated battles of al-Qâdisiyyah and Nihâvend.

This is a very short, almost marginal episode in the broad context of the wars which were to follow to the east and west. But it gives a vivid glimpse, going beyond legend, of the sense of this dynasty’s link with the sea right from its very origin. The theme of the sea, the coasts, the Gulf and the Ocean return hauntingly and insistently both in epic and in historical sources. Ardashîr’s “descent to the sea shore” was to be followed later by the violent and bloody encounters he had with two other rulers of the coasts: Mihrak of the Ardashîr Kkûrreh, and another king with the Parthian name of Haftânbukht (or Haftavâd, in the Shâhnâmah by Firdowsî. Haftânbukht is the name reconstructed by Nöldeke from Tabarî’s text6). Both the Kârnâmak and the Shâhnâmah provide us with a detailed account of the struggle between Ardashîr and Haftânbukht, “the invincible lord of the coasts, master of numerous castles, father of seven sons and one lovely daughter”, who ruled over a large region inhabited by wild tribes - excellent and brave warriors - who worshipped a drake (kirm) in the powerful fortress of Kulâl, on the slopes of a steep mountain near the sea coast, at whose feet lay a large and flourishing town. The two texts do not fail also to record Ardashîr’s final victory, which enterprise the son of Pâpak accomplished by employing courage and treachery7. The epic concludes: “with this last action, the first Sasanian king gained full control of the shores and

On the theme of the sea, we do have some references in historical literature (see Arabic texts and plates 7.1 - 7.2). The most reliable source is the well known chronicle by al-Tabarî, the Kitâb al-Mulûk wa al-Rusul, and - along the lines laid down by him - the chronicle by Ibn al-Athîr, Al-Kâmil fî al-Târîkh9. Tabarî clearly draws on reliable

vol. IV, 1878, pp. 22 on. In regard to this “most popular book” cf. J. P. De Menasce, Zoroastrian Pahlavi Writings, in CHIr, vol. III /2, pp. 1187-1188. 5 Kârnâmak...cit., pp. 33-34. 6 Th. Nöldeke, Geschichte der Perser und der Araber zur Zeit der Sasaniden, aus der Arabischen Chronik des Tabarî, Leiden 1879, p. 11 n (1), n (4); in the Shâhnâmah by Firdowsî the name of this ruler is “Haftavâd”, that means ‘The One of the seven Sons’, and in the legend he did have seven sons. 7 Firdowsi, Shâhnâmah, F. Gabrieli ed. and trans., Torino 1969, pp. 505-516. Kârnâmak... cit., pp. 36-44.

8 V. Piacentini Fiorani, Haftânbokht e Mihrak: la discesa sasanide al Golfo Persico fra leggenda e realtà, in R. Traini (ed.), Studi in onore di Francesco Gabrieli nel suo ottantesimo compleanno, Roma 1984, pp. 323-339; cf. also W. B. Henning, Ein persischer Titel im Altaramaïschen, in M. Black and G. Fohrer (eds.), In Memoriam Paul Kahle, Berlin 1968, pp. 138-145. 9 Tabarî, Kitâb al-Mulûk...cit., vol. I, pp. 813-822 et infra. Ibn al-Athîr,

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: International Indian Ocean Routes and Gwadar Kuh-i Batil Old Barrage in Makran Armenian and Syriac sources are of little help on this subject, being of secondary importance for the geographical area and the period here concerned.

traditions, as can be seen in the precision and accuracy with which he transcribes into Arabic personal names and place-names of the Parthian and Sasanian periods. The brief mention in Ibn al-Athîr’s chronicle repeats Tabarî’s version almost word by word, moving away from it only in details.

When necessary, comparison with material in Greek and Latin has been made, of great use especially when the Roman Empire is involved: such material clearly reveals how broad-based Sasanian maritime policy was16.

Then we have another source, the Nihâyat al-Irab fî Akhbâr al-Furs wa al-‘Arab by an anonymous author, which is extremely interesting on the subject. Its historical value has been discussed on more than one occasion10; but as far as this topic is concerned, it does contain several points which should certainly be taken into consideration (for instance when the campaigns of Ardashîr I against the Arabs of the Peninsula are dealt with). Dînawarî’s Kitâb al-Akhbâr al-Tiwâl is a faithful abridged version of the Nihâyat11.

And, when possible, comparison has been made with other available evidence, such as archaeological, monumental, numismatic, ceramic, sigillographic, etc. As far as these last are concerned, a closer approach to historiography allows us to see that, all in all, the mentioned historical sources in Arabic are ‘court history’, which follows the classic pattern of annalistic presentation. It contains extremely valuable material which, however, must be used with caution, and always analysed through a critical lens for the information it provides. It follows that this material must be integrated – when possible – with evidence from other disciplines, each discipline making strict use of its own modus operandi. In this connection, archaeological evidence which is emerging all along the seaboard of the Sasanian East - may undoubtedly add new elements, which compared with the available literature (both with its traditions and its silences and/or omissions), provide invaluable new data and become, in their turn, just as many historical sources.

Brief mention of Sasanian enterprises on the sea are also found in Hamzah al-Isfahânî and in Ibn al-Balkhî’s Fârsnâmah, the only neo-Persian source of any importance for this note; however, the matter is dealt with in very few words, giving poor information and making no substantial contribution except for the chronological reconstruction of events12. Oddly enough al-Tha‘âlibî says nothing at all about Ardashîr I’s expedition against the Arabs, though he has plenty to say about the expedition carried out by Shâpûr II13. Other Persian sources, both literary, epigraphic and others, are of considerable assistance, in particular the trilingual inscription at the so-called “Ka‘bah of Zoroaster” - used basically in the transcription of A. Maricq14, and the Pahlavi Shahristânhâ-i Êrânshahr, used in Markwart’s edition15.

In this respect, it is well known that in the last two-three decades there have been recent finds, which throw new light on events involving the Gulf, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean - and their bordering lands during the early centuries AD 17. 2. International maritime trade: a broad-based political design

Al-Kâmil fî al-Târîkh, ed. Törnberg, vol. I, p. 273 et infra. 10 Nihâyat al-Irab fî Akhbâr al-Furs wa al-‘Arab, Ms Qq 225, fol. 91, lines 13 et infra; compare with Ms Taylor 23298, foll. 92-3 et infra. With regard to the historical value of this work as independent source, see endnote (2). See plate 7.2. 11 Dînawarî, Ahmad Dâ’wd, Kitâb al-Akhbâr al-Tiwâl, I. Kratchkovsky ed. with preface, variants and index, Leiden 1912, pp. 44-47 et infra. 12 Ibn al-Balkhî, Fârsnâmah, G. Le Strange and R. A. Nicholson eds., E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Ser., n.s. 1, London 1921, pp. 19-20. Hamzah al-Isfâhânî, Chronology, ed. and tr. J. M. E. Gottwald, Leipzig 18441848, text p. 48 (tr. p. 34) et infra. 13 Al-Tha‘âlibî, Ghurar Akhbâr Mulûk al-Fars (Histoire des Rois des Perses), text and trans. by H. Zotenberg, Amsterdam 1979 (repr. from the Paris ed. 1900), pp. 513-520. 14 A. Maricq, Rechèrches sur les Res Gestae Divi Saporis, Bruxelles 1952; Idem, Res Gestae Divi Saporis, in “Syria”, 35 (1958), pp. 295360 (repr. with revisions in Idem, Classica et Orientalia - extrait de Syria 1955-62, Paris 1965, pp. 37-101). Cf. also P. Gignoux, L’inscription de Kartir à Sar Mashad, in JA (1969), pp. 387-418; and M. Sprengling, Third Century Iran. Sapor and Kartir, Chicago 1953. Sasanian inscriptions will be contained in the “Corpus Inscriptionum Iranicarum”, to be published in London and now in progress; a preliminary glossary has been prepared by P. Gignoux, Glossaire des inscriptions pehlevies et parthes, London 1972. On Sasanian history and historiography through Sasanian inscriptions, see in particular Z. Rubin, Epigraphy and the historiography of the Sasanian empire, paper read at the “International Conference on Current Research in Sasanian Archaeology and History”, Durham, 3rd November, 2001, (Proceedings in “JESHO” - in press) and given sources and extensive bibliographical references. 15 J. Markwart, Shahristânhâ i Êrânšahr - A Catalogue of the Provincial Capitals of Êrânšahr, Pahlavi text, version and comm. by J. Markwart,

It will be useful to start here by making some brief comments on the role assumed by sea routes in the context of the international trade carried on between Asia, Africa and the Mediterranean basin. Since the Hellenistic period, besides the overland routes better known as the great ‘caravan silk routes’ dominance was attained by the sea routes: the Indian Ocean with its two western branches, the Persian Gulf sea-route to Syria, and the Red Sea route, which around the Arabian Peninsula and through the Red Sea touched the ports from South Arabia to Egypt18. The Romans had ed. G. Messina, in “Analecta Orientalia”, 3, Roma 1931, pp. 14, 64 et infra. 16 In this connection, rich documentation and extensive bibliographical references can be found in: Z. Rubin, The Reforms of Khusro Anushirwan, in A. Cameron (ed.), The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East... cit., pp. 227-297. Cf. also below, and bibliography given in CHIr., vol. III/2. 17 See below endnote (3). 18 See J.-C. Gardin, Les relations entre la Méditerranée et la Bactriane dans l’Antiquité, d’aprés des données ceramologiques inédites, in: De l’Indus aux Balkans - Recueil Jean Deshayes, Editions Rechèrche sur les Civilisations, Paris 1983, pp. 447-460 (and given bibliography), and

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Baluchistan that this long-distance trade was draining Roman financial resources (Tacitus, Annals, II, 33), in Rome high demand for eastern goods never ceased, and trade with India and East Africa flourished22.

early encountered the issue of the eastern trade network. Despite having to make several attempts to achieve direct contacts with far-eastern rulers (at least three embassies from Indian kings reached Augustus19), they did succeed in establishing long-lasting diplomatic relations.

It has been suggested that the eastern Trajanic-Hadrianic policy during the second century AD, aggressive and expansionistic towards Parthia, towards the Nabataean kingdom (which was finally annexed in 106 AD) and towards the Red Sea itself (the Roman control over the Red Sea harbours on the Egyptian side, and later on the prominence of Alia), was the result of an imperial strategy carried on by the Flavian-Antonine dynasties, tending to absorb remaining client-states and change illdefined borders in the East: the great dream to re-enact the conquests of Alexander the Great by securing the lands behind the imperial advance, a pre-planned military and strategic policy23. But all this may also be seen in a different light, as a lucid design to gain security and control of the key-points of the main trade routes between east and west: a broad-based Roman economic policy. In this context, it seems likely too, that the building of new roads (such as Via Nova Trajana in the first two decades of the second century, and Via Hadriana only a few years later), as well as the reorganization of the province of

Antiochus the Great of Syria was probably the last ‘eastern Mediterranean’ ruler to maintain any direct contact with India20. As a consequence, in order to ensure a regular flow of the precious eastern goods to the Roman Empire, Augustus’ successors undertook a policy aiming at the maintenance of a firm control and security in the eastern Roman provinces, at the weakening of the Parthian power by occasional military expeditions, and at the hold over the trade outlets of the eastern Mediterranean21. Despite the claims - and complaints A. Kurt and S. H. Sherwin-White (eds.), Ellenism in the East, London 1987 (and given bibliographical references). See also below endnote (4). Special focus on ancient navigation in the Indian Ocean and the prominent role played by the Gulf during the Hellenistic period, both on the economic and strategic relations of the Seleucid kingdoms with India, has been placed by J.-F. Salles: J.-F. Salles (ed.), L’Arabie et ses mers bordières. I. Itinéraires et voisinages,Traveaux de la Maison de l’Orient Méditerranée, 16, Lyon 1988; Idem, The Arab-Persian Gulf under the Seleucids, in A. Kurt and S. H. Sherwin-White (eds.), Hellenism in the East…cit., pp. 75-109; Idem, Hellenistic Seafaring in the Indian Ocean. A Perspective from Arabia, in H. P. Ray and J.-F. Salles (eds.), Tradition and Archaeology…cit., pp. 293-309 and given bibliographical references. See also - among the many and remarkable studies on the subject - V. Begley and R. D. Puma (eds.), Rome and India. The Ancient Sea Trade, University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin 1991, repr. New Delhi 1992; U. Finkbeiner (ed.), Materialen zur Archäologie der Seleukiden und Partherzeit im südlichen Babylonien und im Golfgebeit, Deutches Archaeologisches Institut, Abteilung Baghdad, E. Wasmuth Verlag Tübingen 1993; M.-F. Boussac and J.-F. Salles, Athens, Aden, Arikamedu. Essays on the interralations between India, Arabia and the Eastern Mediterranean (repr. of Topoi 3 - 1993), Manohar publ., New Delhi 1995; A. Invernizzi and J.-F. Salles (eds.), Arabia Antiqua. Hellenistic Centres around Arabia, IsMEO - Serie Orientale, Roma 1993. Of specific relevance in connection with the subject dealt here, are the data emerging from recent and ongoing excavations and surveys all along the eastern shores of the Arabian Peninsula (at Failaka, for instance, Sharax, el-Dur, Umm al-Qaiwan, Shabwa in Yemen, Socotra island, etc.), which also allow us to put forward the hypothesis of a link between the decline of large and wealthy Hellenistic settlements in this region and the historically attested Azd tribal migrations into this coastal area from South-West Arabia (D. T. Potts, The Arabian Gulf in Antiquity…cit.; M. Mouton, La Peninsule d’Oman de la fin de l’âge du fer au début de la période sassanide (250 av. JC - 350 ap. JC), Thèse de Doctorat. Université de Paris I (Pantheon - Sorbonne), 1992. See also previous note, and below p. 91. To be pointed out an oral Makrani tradition, too, referring to an Azd migration even towards the Makran coastal area and, namely, to Gwadar Kuh-i Batil. 19 M. P. Charlesworth, Roman Trade with India: a Resurvey, in: P. R. Coleman-Norton (ed.), Studies in Roman Economic and Social History in Honour of Allan Ch. Johnson, Princeton 1951, pp. 131-143 (spec. p. 141). See also above and below endnotes (4), (5) and (6). 20 R. C. Majumdar, India and the Western World, in R. C. Majumdar (ed.), The History and Culture of the Indian People, vol. II: The Age of Imperial Unity, Bombay 1931, p. 617. See also M. Rostovtzeff, Zur Geschichte des Ost-und-Südhandels im Ptolomaisch Römische Aegypten, in “Archiv für Papyrusforschung und verwandte Gebiete”, 4 (1907-1908), pp. 308-309; Idem, Foreign Commerce of Ptolemaic Egypt, in “Journal of Economic and Business History”, 4 (1932), p. 741; Idem, Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World, Oxford 1941, 3 vols.; G. W. Murray, Troglodytica: the Red Sea littoral in Ptolemaic times, in “GJ”, 133 (1967), 1, p. 32; A. B. Lloyd, Necho and the Red Sea: some considerations, in “Journal of Egyptian Archaeology”, 63 (1977), p. 146. See also below endnote (5). 21 See D. Kennedy, The East (The Eastern Frontiers), in J. Wacher (ed.), The Roman World, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London - New

York 1987, 2 vols., vol. I, pp. 266-299. Cf. also E. J. Bickerman, Chronology of the ancient World, London 1968 (on the beginning of the Arsacids, see the divergent views of J. Wolski, The decay of the Iranian empire of the Seleucids and the chronology of the Parthian beginning, in “Berytus”, 12 (1956-1957), 1, pp.35-52); Idem, The Seleucid Period, in CHIr., vol. III/1, pp. 3-20; A. D. H. Bivar, The Political History of Iran under the Arsacids, in CHIr., vol. III/1, pp. 21-99; L. Raditsa, Iranians in Asia Minor, in CHIr., vol. III/1, pp. 100-115 - and bibliographical references in CHIr., vol. III/2, pp. 1289-1292. 22 As early as the times of Augustus and Tiberius (lst century AD), the Romans, having inherited such a situation and failing to achieve complete control over South Arabia, established their control over the Red Sea harbours on the Egyptian side (see also above, and below endnotes (4) and (5)). The Coptos tariff (90 AD) may indicate that a kind of protective transport service was available there; in this respect cf. M. Speidel, The Eastern Garrisons under Augustus and Tiberius, in Studien zu den Militargrenzen Röms, Bonn-Köln 1977, vol. II, pp. 511515; D. G. Hogarth, The Classical Inscriptions, in: Sir W. F. Petrie (ed.), Koptos, London 1896, p. 32. It seems that it is possible to attest that Indian tradesmen - or even an Indian colony - was established in Alexandria during the 1st century AD: R. C. Majumdar, India and the Western World...cit., p. 625. A. Maiuri, Statuetta eburnea di arte indiana a Pompei, in “Le Arti”, 1 (1938-1939), pp. 11-15 (and E. C. L. During Caspers, The Indian Ivory Figurine from Pompei. A Reconsideration of its Functional Use, in H. Härtel (ed.), South-Asian Archaeology Berlin 1979...cit., pp. 341-353). On this subject see also: Z. T. Fiema, The Roman annexation of Arabia: a general perspective, in “The Ancient World”, 15 (1987), nos. 1-2, pp. 25 on spec. pp. 32 on and n (48). Cf. below endnote (6). 23 As for the reign of Trajan, there is information about the construction of the Nile-Red Sea canal (Ptolemy, Geography, IV, 5: 54), the Trajanic fleet on the Red Sea (Eutropius, VIII, 3; Hieronymus, Ad Eusebii Chron., II: 220). The ancient designation of Mare Rubrum caused considerable controversy, especially in a passage from Tacitus (Annales, II, 61: 2 ); for discussion on this topic see M. G. Rashcke, New Studies in Roman Commerce with the East, in “Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt”, 2 (1978), note 925, and notably J. Beaujeu, Le Mare Rubrum de Tacite et le problème de la chronologie des Annales, in “Revue d’Études Latines”, 38 (1960). G. W. Bowersock has advanced the hypothesis - based on a passage from Strabo (Strabo, 16. 4. 21) - that the temporary annexation of the Nabataean kingdom and the short-lived province of Arabia are to be considered as a cautionary act to counterbalance the individual unreliability of Herod’s successors across the Jordan: G. W. Bowersock, Roman Arabia, Cambridge 1983, pp. 54-56. See also below endnote (7).

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: International Indian Ocean Routes and Gwadar Kuh-i Batil Old Barrage in Makran Arabia, the strengthening of military and diplomatic ties with client-states (such as Palmyra, who emerged in the mid-third century as the major political power of this area24, and Hatrâ in Mesopotamia) may well imply the consolidation of an economic policy, whose aims were not confined to the increasing of the ‘internal’ trade or to the exploitation of the various local mines and quarries. An economic policy - backed up also by a military and strategic policy (the cohorts of Legio III Cyrenaica finally withdrawn to Arabia and some auxiliary units moved to Judea; Legio VI Ferrata concentrated in Arabia as well, and Legio II Trajana only with some auxiliary troops left in Egypt25) – based on economic interests going beyond the confines of the new province of Syria and Mesopotamia, affecting more distant territories and further distant seas.

his “descent to the sea shores” with the subsequent unification of the coast and complete subjection of Carmania (after having defeated its king Balash = Vaeagash/Vologeses, a typical Parthian name) and the districts of Ardashîr Khûrreh and Shâpûr. The second step was the extension and consolidation of this power northwards, by the control of territories bordering on, or gravitating towards, the sea: Arrajân, Ahvâz, Mesene and the Asôrestân. Lastly, we have the conquest of what might be defined as ‘security beyond the Gulf’, that is the above mentioned expedition against the Arabs of the Peninsula.

The third century AD opens with the reign of Septimius Severus (193-211), who is a resolute pursuer of the aggressive expansionistic policy of his predecessors in the East (a victorious campaign against the Parthians, 197-199 AD; the reorganization of Syria - where he spent several years; the emergence of Palmyra, which was privileged by this Roman family26). But the beginning of the third century AD coincides also with the rise of the Sasanians in the East, which event marks the opening of a new chapter in the struggle for mastery in the international east-west trade: the Roman Empire is no longer facing the Parthian ‘petty kings’ of the coast, a power split into too many factions, weakened by internal struggles and local rivalries, by strong peripheral autonomies and pressures of restless tribes. The Roman Empire is now facing a new strong centralized power, and the clash between the two Empires becomes unavoidable, as was also inevitable a change in the international equilibriums.

According to the literature we know that a tribal restlessness had revealed itself towards the coastal Arab strip of the Gulf, densely populated in the Parthian epoch, rich in harbours and active ports of call, and flourishing centres27. These same tribal movements had brought about a situation of economic crisis and political instability, probably aggravated - if not directly caused by the decline of a strong unified and centralised power with the breaking up of the Parthian Empire. Moreover, new data emerging from excavations and surveys carried on since the last two-three decades of the twentieth century along the eastern shores of the Arabian Peninsula suggest the hypothesis of a link between the decline of large and wealthy Hellenistic settlements in this region (such as Thaj, Mlayha and the still unidentified Gerrha, characterising the region’s peopling from the 3rd-4th century BC until the 1st-2nd century AD) and the historically attested Azd tribal migrations into this coastal area from South-West Arabia. By the 3rd century there is no evidence for substantial sedentary occupation anywhere in East Arabia, the local population being largely nomadic/semi-nomadic or settled in small groups living in huts villages28.

It is interesting to dwell upon this subject, because of the importance and relevance of this action in the subsequent Sasanian policy.

At this point it will be useful as well to make some brief comments on the role assumed by the new Iranian dynasty, and on the frontline position in which it found itself in the territorial reunification of the empire. If we reflect on the historical reconstruction of the initial stages of the seizure of power by Ardashîr I as briefly outlined above, and supplement that nucleus of historical reality which can be read behind the veil of epic with the chronicles of the mentioned Arab and neo-Persian historians, and - lastly - if we make use of epigraphic and other available evidence, it is possible to pinpoint some events which may be significant in reconstructing the political design of this first Sasanian king.

It is therefore possible that one of the causes - or at least an incidental reason - for this military expedition of the son of Pâpak against the Arabs can be seen as deriving from the need to re-establish order again in a region which was assuming truly central importance in the frame of the new policy embarked on by the Sasanian dynasty. Which fact sufficiently explains also imperial Rome’s political design at outflanking, via the Red Sea and Southern Arabia, the mounting power of the new Persian centralized power29.

The first stages through which Ardashîr seized power were the conquest of the central districts of Persis, then

Tabarî’s account is very concise but no less meaningful:

24 On Palmyra and its role see Shafiq Abou Zayd (ed.), Palmyra and the Aramaeans, ARAM series vol. n. 7, Peters, Leuven 1995 (Proceedings of the International Conferences held at Oxford, 1989, and Harvard, 1995). See also below note (26) and endnote (9). 25 See below endnote (8). 26 D. L. Kennedy, The Frontier Policy of Septimius Severus: new evidence from Arabia, in Roman Frontier Studies 1979, BAR International Series 71, 1980, pp. 886 et infra; Idem, The East...cit., pp. 283-286. See also below endnote (9).

27

See specifically endnote (7). D. T. Potts, The Arabian Gulf in Antiquity, 2 vols., Oxford 1990, specif. vol. I; M. Mouton, La Peninsule d’Oman de la fin de l’âge du fer au début de la période sassanide (250 av. JC - 350 ap. JC), Thèse de Doctorat - Univeristé de Paris I (Pantheon - Sorbonne), 1992; D. Kennet, An Archaeological Study of the Sasanian...cit. Cf. also below endnote (7). 29 Cf. CHIr., vol. III/2: G. Widengren, Sources of Parthian and Sasanian History, pp. 1261 on, and below endnotes (5) to (9). 28

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Baluchistan using all available means to foster the resumption of urban life and of all activities connected with it, in the way of seafaring, trade, handicrafts, agriculture.

Ardashîr was in Gûr when messengers arrived from the kings of Kûshân, Tûrân and Makrân, with their submission; then he marched to al-Bahrayn, defeated its king Sanâtrûq, and returned to Ctesiphon. On the other hand, there is the long passage which the Nihâyat al-Irab devotes to Ardashîr’s wars against the Arabs; Dînawarî gives a similar but abreviated account. Historical tradition is anything but unanimous on this last expedition of Ardashîr. But from a careful rereading of the texts, significant elements emerge: the version of the Nihâyat does not clash with that of Tabarî, and makes it quite possible to envisage some form of Sasanian political influence from the times of Ardashîr in a region, a coastal region, directly opposite the already controlled regions of Kirmân and Makrân, the latter rich in densely populated cities and well protected ports, and extremely active in trade with Sind, southeast Asia and the east African coasts. This is no longer only a hypothesis. It is made more plausible and concrete by the consideration that all the regions mentioned in the Nihâyat al-Irab are the same ones which we now know to have been particularly interested in intercontinental trade and to have had close contacts with the Iranian-Mesopotamian world; it is also of some significance that the names of the Arab kings are not imaginary, but all belong to tradition. One may believe that the anonymous author of the Nihâyat allowed himself some legendary embellishments and an intentionally epic tone in a clearly “Arabocentric” vision of history, but this does not diminish the historical value of this source: the first written evidence of a Sasanian interest outside the waters of the Persian Gulf going back to such an early period30.

To sum up, Ardashîr completed the reunification of the various regions of the kingdom, extending his sovereignty to east and west as far as countries which had never recognized the Arsacids, and created a political organism destined to last for over four hundred years, whose main features can be defined, in the still appropriate words of A. E. Christensen, as a strong centralization and the creation of a State Church32. In this newly established context - and considering the precarious and difficult military situation along the northeastern borders in the regions of Central Asia33 - the sea was to have a very precise role to play, linked to the resumption of trade and the impressive volume that this soon reached along the land and the sea-routes linking Central and Eastern Asia, Southeast Asia, the coasts of East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula with the Levant and the Mediterranean basin with its civilizations. As is well known, the Sasanians were to try to secure for themselves the role of great intermediaries in this vast trading network; and - as is also well known and already stated - one of the great parties in this world of trade had always been the Roman Empire. In this specific respect, control and security as well as the rule of the seas assumed a centrality of its own. For the Sasanians, to attain military and political control of the “eastern seas”, that is the Indian Ocean and its two western branches the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, would also mean dominion over the commercial searoutes. In other words, it was the premise once again to seize mercantile supremacy, whether direct or indirect, from the Roman Empire, which had won it anew with the disintegration of the Parthian Empire.

And these were all military operations. But the sources also record other undertakings going back to the times of the founder of the Sasanian dynasty. These were the foundation - or rebuilding - of cities and ports, palaces and gardens, temples (chahâr-tâq) and fires (âtashgâh); and again: dikes (garbands), canals (qanats), wells (birkahs), bridges, roads and other public works; such were carried out throughout the kingdom, but it is well to stress that the whole coastal area of the Sasanian empire recurs in texts and inscriptions with particular insistence31.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the causes 32

A. E. Christensen, L’Iran sous les Sassanides...cit., p. 97. Cf. also G. Gnoli, Politica religiosa e concezione della regalità sotto i Sassanidi, in Atti del Convegno Internazionale sul tema: La Persia nel Medioevo (Roma, 31 marzo - 5 aprile 1970), Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Roma 1971, pp. 225-251; Idem, An historical perspective of Zoroastranism from its origins to the Sassanian period, in G. Gnoli, Zoroaster’s Time and Homeland, Istituto Universitario Orientale Seminario di Studi Asiatici, Series Minor vol. 7, Napoli 1980, specif. pp. 199-225. 33 Along the north-eastern borders of Êrânshahr, in the regions of Central Asia, difficulties were due to the migrations of Turkish tribes from their original Altaic regions, to the presence of the Ephtalites (see A. Herrmann, Die Hephtaliten und ihre Beziehungen zu China, in Asia Major, 1925, vol. II; and G. Widengren, Xosrau Anôširvân, les Hephtalites et les peuples Turcs...cit.), and to the Kûshâns (cf. also below endnote (10)). See also H. W. Haussig, Das Problem der Herkunft der Hunnen, in Materialia Turcica, 3 (1977); Idem, Theophylaktes Exkursus über die skythischen Völker, in “Byzantion”, 1953. An important source on this period and the Turkish khans in Central Asia is Menander Protector, Exc. de Legatibus, ed. de Boor, pp. 1-13, 26-30, 193, 194 et infra, with specific reference to the agreements between Byzantium and the khans. No less relevant source in connection with agreements and understandings between the Sasanian princes and rulers and the Ephtalites is al-Tha‘âlibî’s Ghurar...cit. On the Ephalities in part. See M. Kevran’s research and studies.

If we consider both aspects (the military activities and the “civil” undertakings), we have here a design, a policy which cannot be reduced to purely military operations and expeditions with the aim of pillage. It all implies a broader political design, the wish to return to promotion of that mercantile life which - in the past - had been one of the most distinctive features of the Iranian world, 30

See V. Fiorani Piacentini, Ardashîr i Pâpakân and the Wars against the Arabs...cit., and below: extracts from Arabic texts (Plates 7.2). 31 N. Pigulevskaja, Les villes de l’état iranien aux époques parthe et sassanide (Contribution à l’histoire sociale de la Basse Antiquité), Paris 1963; O. Reuther, Sasanian Architecture, in A. U. Pope and P. Ackerman, A Survey of Persian Art, 6 vols. (text pp. 1-2817), 1st ed. Oxford - London - New York 1938-1939 (repr. 12 vols., Tokyo 19641965), pp. 493 on. See also the many references in the quoted inscriptions (e.g. the “Ka‘bah of Zoroaster” and the “Paikuli” inscriptions); cfr. also Markwart’s Êrânshahr (n. 15) and bibliographical references given at endnote (3) et infra.

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: International Indian Ocean Routes and Gwadar Kuh-i Batil Old Barrage in Makran Hagar, where he found the Tamîms, the Bakr b. Wâ’îl and the ‘Abd al-Qays: the massacre of these tribes was such that their blood became a large river. Then he reached the Yamâmah, where he massacred its population and poisoned the wells. Thence, he moved towards the lands of the Bakrs and of the Taghlîbs, between the Irânshahr and the Rûmigân; the repression of the revolt was no less harsh and violent. The only country which was not attacked by Shâpûr was the Yemen, because - according to the writer of the Ghurar - the mulûk of those countries were in good relationships with the King of Kings of Îrân, and made solemn oaths of submission to him. There is mention of Yemen also in Ferdowsî’s Shâhnâmah.

of the wars which had already flared up in the reign of Ardashîr I between the Roman Empire and its clientstates on the one side, and the Sasanian Empire and its buffer state of al-Hîrah on the other (they have been discussed elsewhere34). Even without excluding an ideological basis (a specular conception of “power” and “sacral kingship”, identical and therefore mutually destructive, as is amply documented by Greek literature of the sixth-seventh centuries AD35), on a more concrete level the struggle between the two empires can also be seen as a rivalry for control of trade routes between east and west, a struggle for conquest on the part of the Sasanians, and of defence on the part of the Romans, of the monopoly of all trade between Asia, Africa and the Mediterranean basin.

According to the same author, al-Tha‘âlibî, Shâpûr, after his expedition against the Arabs, undertook the foundation - or re-building - of towns, canals, dams, bridges, roads, etc. (according to the well known literary topos) not only in the Sawâd or in other lands which he had devastated during his wars against the Arabs, but also in the Makrân and in the Hind37. Al-Tha‘âlibî reports also that, in the fifth century AD, the Sasanian king Vahrâm V (421-438) married an Indian princess and received as part of the dowry the city of Daybul (which is usually identified with the site of Banbhore, about 60 kms from Karachi38). This large maritime empire was to be institutionalized by Khusraw I Anûshîrwân (531-579), whose military and administrative reforms in the sixth century AD also affected the coastal regions of the Sasanian empire, giving a legal system to the Sasanian order and control of the seas39. Finally, we know that during the reign of Khusraw II Aparvîz (591-628), the Sasanians imposed their control even on Aden, and that they had a factory in Sri Lanka40.

It will be a policy tenaciously and coherently pursued under the whole Sasanian dynasty until its very end; a policy that - even if never really fought by sea - has its crucial key-points “on the seas” and “along the seas”. It is a policy that we can relate to a fleet and a chain of huge, massive sea-front fortresses: Qal‘at Bahrayn, Qatif, Kush, Suhar, Rustaq, Qusayr, Qasr Rida’, Tell Abu Sh‘af cover the eastern frontiers of the Gulf; Siraf, Rishahr, Qays, Lishtan, Harmuz, Jask, Tiz, Armabil (...and possibly some massive structures brought to light by Monique Kervran at the mouth of the Indus river) are among the main guardians of the western and most eastwards littorals. And one is also justified in seeing Ardashîr I, the son of Pâpak, as the able and farsighted promoter of this policy. 3. An unprecedented volume of trade in the Sasanian maritime order The policy promoted by Ardashîr I was to be consolidated by his son and heir, Shâpûr I (241-272 AD), and by Shâpûr II (309-379), who undertook a new drastic expedition against the Arabs of the Peninsula, which gained this king the nickname of Dhû al-Aktâf (“the One of the Shoulders”)36. According to the chronicle of alTha‘âlibî, which is the most detailed and exhaustive of all, Shâpûr moved from Gûr/Fîrûzâbâd against the Iyâdits, on the borders of the Sawâd; then, with a large army, he crossed the sea and reached al-Khatt, where he did fight and win its population, slaughtering the peoples of al-Bahrayn; afterwards, he reached (fa warada) al-

37 Al-Tha‘âlibî, Ghurar... cit, pp. 329-330. Cf. also al-Tabarî, Kitâb alMulûk...cit., vol. I, pp. 839-840. In the said Arabic sources, there is also mention of deportation of rebellious Arab tribes, or of the prisoners that Shâpûr had captured during his campaigns, towards regions of the same nature and kind as the original ones, such as Darin and Hagar along the coasts of the Arabian Peninsula, and Fars, Kerman and Makran along the Iranian shores. 38 See below § 4, specifically p. 96, and note (50). 39 With specific regard to Khusraw I’s reforms and his maritime policy, see below endnote (10). If this assumption is right, both on the basis of literary sources and archaeological evidence, it is also possible to seek a connection between the systemic structure of the Sasanian status apparatus and the role played within this structure by the Great Families. Cf. for instance the studies recently carried on by R. Gyslen and his paper The Great Families in the Sasanian empire: some sigillographic evidence, read at the International Conference on “Current Research in Sasanian Archaeology and History”, held at Durham, 3rd - 4th November, 2001. Concerning the events during the reign of Khusraw I Anûshîrwân and his politico-administrative and military reforms, there exists a rich literature based on Pahlavi, Arabic, Syriac and Armenian sources, complemented by archaeological, numismatic and epigraphic evidence. Of specific interest is the Sîrat Anôshirvân in Ibn Miskawayh, Tajârib al-Umâm, in: H. F. Amedroz and D. S. Margoliouth, (eds.), The Eclipse of the cAbbâsid Caliphate, 6 vols., Oxford 1920-1921, vol. I; more reliable than the Sîrat is the Nihâyat al-Irab, it gives precious information on the legal order in the Sasanian empire during Khusraw I’s reign. See below endnote (10), p. 105. 40 See the “photographic image” of the Sasanian empire during the reign of Khusraw II Aparvîz in J. Markwart, A Catalogue of the Provincial Capitals of Êrânšahr... cit. See also Al-Thacâlibî, Ghurar...cit., pp. 687 on; al-Tabarî, Kitâb al-Mulûk...cit., vol. I, pp. 1008-1009, 1042, 1037,

34 See V. Fiorani Piacentini, La presa di potere sasanide sul Golfo Persico... cit., pp. 177 on. 35 A. Pertusi, La Persia nelle fonti bizantine del secolo VII, in Atti del Convegno Internazionale sul tema: La Persia nel Medioevo - (Roma, 31 marzo - 5 aprile 1970), Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Roma 1971, pp. 605-632; Idem, I principi fondamentali della concezione del potere a Bisanzio. Per un commento al dialogo Sulla Scienza Politica attribuito a Pietro Patrizio (VI secolo), in “Bollettino dell’Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio Muratoriano”, 80 (1968), pp. 1-23. The most relevant document concerning the idea of “basileia” as “state institution” - very similar to the sacral “kingship” in ancient Iran - is Justinian’s Novella VI. 36 Al-Tabarî, Kitâb al-Mulûk...cit., vol. I, pp. 836-839; al-Tha‘âlibî, Ghurar... cit., pp. 513-520; Hamzah al-Isfâhânî, Chronology...cit., text pp. 51-52, trans pp. 37-8; Nihâyat al-Irab...cit., ff. 229-230. Mas‘ûdî, Murûj al-Dhahab... cit., vol. II: pp. 175-181; Bal‘amî, Târîkh-i Bal‘amî, ed. Tehrân 1341 AH sh./1961-1962 AD, pp. 908-909.

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Baluchistan positive conquest of territories too distant and inhabited by too different populations, which, at a later stage, might become too difficult to hold and to control both from a military and an administrative point of view. And this “indirect rule” was exerted through pacta - or agreements - with princes of territories external to the Persian Gulf, whether they were sovereigns of South Arabian countries or the lords of Makrân and Sind (see Tabarî on this purpose).

With the military and political reunification and reorganization of the empire, a new order was also imposed on the reunified seas. In view of the possible dating of the settlement of Kuh-i Batil (see below), the chronological period dealt with in this paper goes as far as the reign of Khusraw I. Moreover, Khusraw’s reforms radically changed the structure of the Sasanian states apparatus, determining a stronger Sasanian presence and hold on the peripheral regions with military and economic relevance for the life of the empire. Such a subject is totally beyond the topic of this study. But, as far as the preceding period is concerned, I have always purposely used the term “control” and not that of “conquest”. This implies that if we analyse the policy of the Sasanian kings from the very beginning of the dynasty until Khusraw I’s reforms it is easy to observe that they constantly pursued the control of the Persian Gulf and of the Arabian Sea, when necessary also through military expeditions, which did not necessarily mean military conquest or annexation of new territories bordering the sea: the Sasanian maritime order, Ardashîr I’s great political design as previously outlined.

The Nihâyat provides us with a further and no less interesting element when it deals with the peace negotiations between Ardashîr I and the king of Yemen: it gives us the content of these particular agreements. We have already mentioned the restlessness of the nomadic tribes, who had begun to infiltrate from the heart of the Arabian Peninsula towards its eastern coasts and towards the fertile pastures at the mouth of the Tigris and Euphrates, exerting - as we know from other sources strong warlike pressure against those borders and against the Roman borders of the provinces of Syria and Arabia at the same time42. And the control of these tribes and peoples was essential in order to guarantee order and prosperity on the coasts. According to the Nihâyat, the peace agreed with the Arab kings of Yemen, Hijâz and Tihâmah was based on the following terms: Ardashîr gave them security and confirmed them in their government over their peoples; in turn, they were to secure order in their respective kingdoms and also towards the neighbouring nomadic tribes against pillaging and raiding along the seaboard with cities, harbours and cultivated areas. It is very likely that the other agreements concluded between the Sasanian kings and other local rulers - mentioned without details in the literary sources - did not largely differ in content from this one: under the “protection” of the King of Kings, they safeguarded the security of the coasts against the ruthless and restless tribes of the hinterland43.

From a careful re-reading of the texts mentioned, and with specific reference to the Nihâyat al-Irab, it is possible to assert that this source has some independent information to offer, which is new and reliable, material that - provided it is carefully sifted - can be turned to good use for a more fully documented historical reconstruction of this “maritime order”, supplementing but not contradicting - Tabarî’s meagre information and other literary sources. Furthermore, the Nihâyat gives also supporting evidence to the archaeological, numismatic, sigillographic and epigraphic finds (see the late A. F. L. Beeston, W. W. Müller, N. M. LöWick, von Wissmann, D. T. Potts, Ch. Robin, R. Boucharlat, J.-F. Salles, R. Gyslen, M. Kervran, B. de Cardi, G. R. D. King, D. Kennet, etc.), while the latter in turn fit with and confirm its information in all its essentials.

And in this new order, obviously trade immediately began to flourish together with the revival of urban life, and it soon reached an unprecedented volume and variety in the goods which were exchanged.

Namely I refer to the passage of the Nihâyat concerning “those countries which lie between ‘Uman, al-Bahrayn, the Yamâmah and the Hagar”, to the coalition of the Arab kings under the leadership of the king of Yemen, and lastly - to the peace negotiations between Ardashîr I and the Yemenite king41. Here, this text provides us with an important and enlightening example of what the “Sasanian control of the seas” might have been: when necessary, a military expedition to restore order in rebellious regions bordering the sea, and then agreements with the local rulers in order to secure stability in the same region. It is the same political line followed by Shâpûr II one century later. In other words it does not seem illogical to infer that the Sasanians, concerned in securing their maritime supremacy, wanted to guarantee the flank of an important region by adopting a flexible policy of “indirect rule” - rather than by means of a

Here we have other and no less interesting sources: the Latin writer and officer Ammianus Marcellinus, and the Greek officer and historian Procopius. Ammianus Marcellinus, in the fourth century, gives a lively description of the Persian Gulf, rich in castles and harbours, where shipping was frequent44. Procopius is a brilliant and brave Greek officer posted to Aksum at the time of the Emperor Justinian in 332 AD, in order to organize, with the alliance of the Negus, an overseas expedition to Makran and to Sind aimed at outflanking the economic predominance and supremacy of the 42 V. Fiorani Piacentini, Roman Fortifications in Southern Hawrân...cit., and endnotes. 43 See also above pp.87-89. It is well to stress again that this source is particularly valuable for the period preceding Khusraw I’ reforms. As is well known to scholars, for the later Sasanian period we have other and no less precious literary and archaeological evidence. 44 Ammianus Marcellinus, Res Gestae, XXII, 6, 11.

et infra. See also below endnote (10) and (11), pp. 105 on. 41 See Arabic texts, plates 7.1 and 7.2, pp. 113-114.

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: International Indian Ocean Routes and Gwadar Kuh-i Batil Old Barrage in Makran 4. The “meeting points of eastern and western merchants” along the Indian Ocean routes

Sasanians in international trade. In his De Bello Persico, he records that the Negus did send a fleet to the ports of Sind and Makran “so that he might acquire silk from the Indians and then sell it to the Romans”, but - he bitterly complains with the words of the defeated Roman - when the ships arrived, they found there the Persians “absolute masters of the market ... and they had to leave emptyhanded because the Persian merchants were permanently stationed in the ports where the ships of the Indians are accustomed to call, and they habitually buy the whole cargo”45.

Archaeological research - carried out mainly during these last twenty/thirty years - have provided us with further evidence through the identification of some of the most important head-harbours placed on the routes of this long-distance trade of the Indian Ocean, harbours that we can correctly call (using the words of Cosmas Indicopleustes) “the meeting points of eastern and western merchants” from Persia, Ethiopia, Sind and even farther regions (like Tsinista = China), and other places of export. Here, goods like silk, aloes, cloves, timber, sandalwood and so forth passed on to Persia, Homerite (Yemen) and Adoulis (Ethiopia).

The agreements with the Negus are well documented, as are the attempts of Justinian to reach the silk road from the north through the Euro-Asiatic steppes and by agreements with the Turkish khâns46.

Undoubtedly, one of the most important and prominent participants in the network of overseas trade which extended from the mouth of the Tigris and Euphrates to Aden and at least to Sri Lanka (see quoted Cosmas Indicopleustes) was Daybul on the Indus delta. As far as the Persian Gulf is concerned - that is the western searoute to the Levant - archaeological evidence today is very rich: al-Bahrayn, Qatif, Darin, Kush, Suhar Darabgird, Rustaq, Khatt, Hagar, Rishahr, Siraf, Lishtan, Harmuz(still on terrafirma), Tiz, etc48. But between the Gulf and the Indian subcontinent it is less abundant, due to different factors. First of all, many entrepôts did not have port facilities and consisted mainly of roadsteads. Secondly, according to our sources many of them were mainly meeting points, where trade was conducted in temporary godowns; or, according to the above quoted texts, in these ports there was only a small-scale coasting which did not participate in the great overseas commercial traffic. Thirdly, tribal nomadic movements and/or migrations towards the coastal areas - as attested both by written sources and archaeological data certainly disturbed settled life and its traditional patterns, allowing us to advance the hypothesis of a link between the decline of large and wealthy settlements, the exodus of local communities and an increase in piracy. Lastly, another important factor (in D.Whitehouse’s opinion, the most convincing) is the ecological situation of these coasts; monsoon rains or other ecological factors may have caused erosion of many coastal sites; the coastline as well as the coastal physical environment - may have changed, with obvious consequent difficulties in locating sites and coastal settlements. Moreover, it must be stressed that, so far, systematic reconnaissance of these coasts has not been carried out; and whenever it has been, such research is far from being easy or... speedy. It needs to be supported and integrated with an accurate study of the ecological factors which may have affected the environment and human settlements over the course of centuries ...if not millennia49.

These two Latin authors give us a brief but relatively complete view of the maritime life along the Ocean routes, and of the intensive trade and transactions which took place in the harbours along these routes. This trade may be correctly called inter-continental and international, where convoys moved East-West and West-East along the monsoon routes, and carriers made fortunes by importing and exporting raw materials, like timber, teak and sandalwood, and manufactured goods, such as silk from China, gold and silver brocade from Persis, perfumed oils, resin, or other precious items like precious and semi-precious stones (lapis-lazuli, turquoise, cornelian), dyes, ivory, pearls of rare beauty, porcelain and pottery, horses, amber, spices, mangrove poles, ostrich feathers and eggs, slaves, etc. from Africa, India and the Far-East to the Mediterranean basin via the Persian Gulf and/or the Red Sea. It is historically ascertained that in the new Sasanian order trade developed in an unprecedented manner. One of the most important factors (to quote Chaudhuri47) was the monsoon, a weather system of seasonal winds which, in the Arabian Sea, blow from the North-East in summer providing optimum conditions for sailing quickly from Western Asia to India, and from the South-West in winter, ensuring a speedy return: monsoons make transoceanic voyages fairly easy, instead of coasting (see Fig.7.2). Obviously, voyaging on this scale involved the risks of piracy and shipwreck. However, the new Sasanian maritime policy - aimed at providing security, too somewhat reduced the risk of piracy, while improved shipbuilding and sailing technology lessened the possibility of shipwreck.

45

Procopius, De Bello Persico, I, 20. Still convincing in this connection, and extensively documented, are the studies by N. V. Pigulevskaja, Vizantija i Iran na rubeze VI i VII vekov, Moscwa-Leningrad 1946; Idem, Vizantija na putjach v Indiju, Moscwa-Leningrad 1931. Cf. also above and note (33). 47 K. N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: an Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750, Cambridge 1985, pp. 21-33. Cf. also Idem, Asia before Europe. Economy and Civilisation from the Rise of Islam to 1750, Cambridge 1990. 46

48 See above, and below specifically endnotes (3), (7) and (8). Cf. also D. Whitehouse, Sîrâf - Final Report: The Wider Context, The British Institute of Persian Studies ed. (so far in preparation), and D. Kennet’s Ph.D. thesis, An Archaeological Study... cit. (and given bibliography). 49 On Makrani - Sindi eco-cultural coastal regions, environmental changes and a relationship between landscape degradation and peopling, see below endnote (12). It must be stressed that this is the first

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Baluchistan data and information. More difficult is its pre-Islamic history. According to the Periplus, a port of the Indus delta served as outlet for commodities from up country; it mentions lapis-lazuli (from Afghanistan), musk (from the Himalayas), indigo and other expensive items: a gateway community, which owed its existence to the profits of trade between the interior (which produced commodities) and the ports of the Arabian Sea (which provided markets and manufactured goods to exchange with commodities). And again, later on, we find Daybul mentioned as “dowry” of the Indian princess married to the Sasanian king Vahrâm V: a most valuable and precious dowry, if al-Tha‘âlibî records it in his chronicle, which gives us the idea of the expansion and volume that this long-distance maritime trade had reached in the fifth century AD51. It is also a perfect reflection of the tenaciously pursued Sasanian policy of mercantile supremacy and economic encirclement through the control of the seas, through pacta and understandings with local rulers, and also by means as well of marriage links. In any case, from other literary sources, we know that the fame of Daybul, before and at the time of the Arab conquest, was as great as the importance of its harbour and the value of the goods which were there contracted and exchanged to east and west, even encouraging overseas expeditions aimed at raiding and pillaging the wealth of its storehouses. The Fathnâmah-i Sind, leaving aside its legendary embellishments and tales, gives us vivid and realistic images of this city with its local society and population, dignitaries and rulers52.

Nevertheless, the literature is very rich in names and toponyms. We have also seen the account of Procopius and his description of the active trade carried on in the many harbours of Sind and Makran, but their identification is still far from being completed. However, if literature cannot assist us, archaeological evidence has provided us with some significant information. The miscellaneous surface finds and soundings so far carried out demonstrate the presence of minor and major sites all along the coastal area of Makran and Sind (surveys by R. Besenval and M. Kervran, 1987 on), and point to prolonged periods of occupation. But we do have at least two main archaeological sites, Banbhore and Mantai in Sri Lanka, which allow us to have two points - and very important ones - in the network of the Ocean sea-routes. Banbhore stands among desolate salt flats on the banks of the Gharo Creek, a former branch of the Indus delta, about 60 kms east of Karachi and 40 kms from the present coastline. Banbhore is generally identified as Daybul, the first city of Sind to fall into Muslim hands (in 712 AD) and a major port until the beginning of the second century of the Hijrah. After exploration soundings by Leslie Alcock in 1951, the Department of Archaeology of Pakistan began large-scale excavations in 1958, directed first by F. A. Khan and later by Rafique Mughal. The excavations have not been completed and the outstanding evidence brought to light is still largely unpublished50. The archaeological work has however revealed that Banbhore had already been occupied in the Scytho-Parthian period (1st century BC - 2nd century AD). The ancient site stretches for several square kms, showing impressive remains dominated by a large, planned, walled complex, with huge ramparts and circular towers, littered with imported pottery: Chinese porcelain, stoneware, Islamic pottery and coarse ware from the Gulf. If we assume that Banbhore is the ancient harbour called Daybul in Arabic sources (Debol, in Persian), then its Islamic history is easy to reconstruct due to historical and geographic literature in Arabic and Persian of the 8th - 10th centuries AD, which is rich in

Farther south, the second most important entrepôt which has been investigated archaeologically is Mantai (Mahatittha) in north-west Sri Lanka (Perera, 1952; Willetts, 1961-1962; Carswell, 1975-1977 and 19901991; Prickett, 1980-1990 etc.). Its position was unique: a port, closely connected with the capital, well placed to 51 According to the version given by al-Tha‘âlibî, Vahrâm V defeated the great enemy of one of his dearest friends, the King of Sind, Shankalat. In order to demonstrate his gratitude to Vahrâm, Shankalat gave his pretty young daughter in marriage to the Sasanian king, and, with the princess, Vahrâm received as part of the dowry “the city of Daybul, the Makrân and bordering regions, and rich gifts such as a great quantity of gold and silver objects, perfumes, ivory, silk and damasks”. This episode, even if we take it as a legendary undertaking, is nevertheless significant, because it gives a vivid glimpse of the marriage links and the strict relations between Iran, Makran and Sind, and the close connections between their respective rulers and populations. Al-Tha‘âlibî, Ghurar... cit., pp. 360-364; see also alTabarî, Kitâb al-Mulûk...cit., vol. I, p. 868. The “overseas expedition” referred to is that of Mughîrah Ibn Abî al‘Âs, linked to the first years AH: according to Balâdhurî’s chronicle, Mughîrah came back victorious and loaded with precious booty; according to a later chronicle in Persian, the Fathnâmah-i Sind (see following note and below endnote (13)), he was killed in the course of the battle which raged before Daybul. See al-Balâdhurî, Ahmad b. Yahyâ, Kitâb Futûh al-Buldân, M. J. de Goeje ed., Leiden 1886, 2 vols., vol. I, p. 431; ‘Alî b. Hamîd b. Abû Bakr al-Kûfî, Fathnâmah-i-Sind. Being the Original Record of the Arab Conquest of Sind (712-15 A.D.) Known later by such names as ‘History of Dahar son of Chach’, ‘Tarikh-i-Fath-i Sind alias Chachnama’, ‘Tarikh-i Qasimi’, or simply as ‘Chachnama’, N.A. Baloch ed., Institute of Islamic History, Culture and Civilization - Islamic University, Islamabad 1403/1983 (hereafter cited as Fathnâmah), p. 52. 52 On the Fathnâmah-i-Sind and the information it provides, see below endnote (13), p. 108.

peopling, see below endnote (12). It must be stressed that this is the first systematic approach to the studying of the shores of Makrani and Sindi regions, of their morphology and dynamics, and of the changes which may have taken place in the course of millennia affecting both environment and human settlements. 50 The site of Banbhore has been visited also by D. Whitehouse and N. Chittick (whose reports are respectively lodged with the British Institute of Persian Studies, London, and the British Institute of History and Archaeology in Eastern Africa, Nairobi). Brief and far from exhaustive studies have been published in this connection by F. A. Khan and R. Mughal. See in particular F. A. Khan, A preliminary report on the recent archaeological excavations at Banbhore, Anjuman Press Department of Archaeology and Museums, Karachi 1960 (1st ed.). On the major role which this outlet and harbour may have played within the trade networks of the time, cf. also H. P. Ray and J.-F. Salles (eds.), Tradition and Archaeology...cit., with specific regard to H. P. Ray, A. Rougeulle and M. Kervran’s contributions (H. P. Ray, Maritime Archaeology and the Indian Ocean: an overview, ivi, pp. 1-10; M. Kervran, Indian Ceramics in Southern Iran and Eastern Arabia: Repertory, Classification and Chronology ivi, pp. 37-58; A. Rougeulle, Medieval Trade Networks in the Western Indian Ocean (8-14th cent.): Some Reflections from the Distribution Pattern of Chinese Imports in the Islamic World ivi, pp.159-180, and various given bibliographical references). See also above § 3, pp. 93 on and endnotes in reference.

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: International Indian Ocean Routes and Gwadar Kuh-i Batil Old Barrage in Makran control trade not only between Sri Lanka and the mainland of India, but also between Western and EasternAsia and, in the case of the latter, it is possible that it held a monopoly53.

Manda mainly); M. C. Horton, H. T. Wright and other scholars have carried on such research leading to new archaeological discoveries and further data56. Despite problems of chronology, all the sites so far discovered along the coasts of East Africa deal with Islamic trade and confirm that merchants from the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and Oman were already active in these waters in the eighth-ninth centuries AD. Very little can so far be said for preceding epochs. However, the archaeological evidence brought to light allows us to deduce also a “pre-Islamic” phase of active Oceanic trade conducted according to precise models: a mobile and mercantile society which came to terms with the new times, the new lords and the new balances of power.

At the other end of the monsoon trade there is East Africa. The Periplus and Ptolemy’s Geography provide a picture of monsoon trade between coastal settlements and merchants from southern Arabia and the Red Sea, who came for ivory, turtle shell, ostrich feathers and other exotic goods, in exchange for metal tools, weapons and simply luxury items. In the literature, the first mention of regular long-distance trade with East Africa comes in the 8th century AD, with the earliest Islamic sources (Akhbâr al-Sîn wa al-Hind, and Mas‘ûdî54); but the Sasanian presence in Aden and on the island of Socotra shows that contacts must have begun at a considerably earlier date than the first unequivocal evidence (Ricks, 1970). Moreover, we know that contacts with East Africa via the Arabian Peninsula and/or the Red Sea had existed since more ancient times, as we know that the Romans had always had a large share in the Red Sea trade towards East Africa, India, the subcontinent and the Far East polities (see above). Systematic exploration and excavations were carried out by the late J. S. Kirkman (Gedi, Pemba, Mafia, Malindi, Kilepwa, etc.)55, and, more recently, by the late H. N. Chittick (Kilwa and

5. Kuh-i Batil (or Batil-Kuh) barrage at Gwadar This has been a necessarily short, rapid outline of the maritime trade in the first centuries AD: a prosperous and flourishing network of coastal and monsoon trade, which, from the Gulf (and/or the Red Sea) extended to Aden, Daybul as far as Sri Lanka and, it seems according to recent discoveries, even farther to the Comoro Islands57. We are definitely dealing with well established direct trade networks. In this framework and context we can also fit the finding of a settlement at Gwadar, on a small plateau called Kuhi Batil, during the first season of field-work by the Italian Historical, Archaeological and Anthropological Research-Project in Makran (February-March 1987). The following notes depict the situation as we found it in 198758 (see Fig. 7.3).

53 On Mantai, see above pp. 89 on and below endnote (11). It seems that this far-eastern trade reached the Comoro Islands, where archaeological discoveries enable us to put forward new working hypotheses also on early pre-Islamic links between Makran, Madagascar and the eastern coast of Africa. See paper read by C. Allibert (Lyon) and P. Vérin (Paris) at the Colloquium “Indian Ocean in Antiquity” - London - on the 8th July, 1988: The early pre-islamic culture of the Comores Islands: links with Madagascar and the east coast of Africa; and the “South Asian Archaeology Conference, 1991” (Proceedings: A. J. Gail and G. J. R. Mevissen, Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference...cit.). See also D. Whitehouse, Abbasid Maritime Trade: Archaeology and the Age of Expansion, in “Rivista degli Studi Orientali”, 59 (1985), pp. 339-347, specif. pp. 339-34 1, and below n (57) and endnotes (10) and (11). 54 Akhbâr al-Sîn wa al-Hind, by an anonymous author, with an addition by Abû Zayd (d. 916 AD), text and tr. by E. Sauvaget, Paris 1948: the book contains the travel notes of a merchant, one Suleyman, who embarks on the coasts of the Persian Gulf and makes various journeys to India and China. Al- Mas‘ûdî, Murûj al-Dhahab, text and tr. by C. Barbier de Meynard and Pavet de Courteile, 9 vols., Paris 1861-1877. The Author, finding himself in Basrah in 303 AH/915 AD, tells how he met a man called Abû Zayd Muhammad; Mas‘ûdî describes him as an educated man, who had left his native country - Sîrâf - to come to live in Basrah, a cosmopolitan mercantile city and navigators’ meetingpoint. Mascûdî too, tells of a journey made forty years earlier by an Arab of Basrah to India and China, also recorded by the above mentioned Abû Zayd. Cf. also Ibn Khurdâdhbih, Kitâb al-Masâlik wa al-Mamâlik, ed. C. Barbier de Meynard, in “Journal Asiatique”, VI ser., vol. V, 1865: the author describes the route from Basrah to China: pp. 60 on; it is virtually a compendium of what is found in the Akhbâr. 55 Concerning the exploration and excavations carried out by J. S. Kirkman in East Africa, see his paper: J. S. Kirkman, Some conclusions from archaeological excavations on the coast of Kenya, 1948-1966, in H. N. Chittick and E. Rotberg (eds.), East Africa and the Orient, New York 1975 (Nairobi Conference, 1967), and Th. H. Wilson, James Kirkman and East African Archaeology - Bibliography of James Kirkman, in “Paideuma” - Mitteilungen zur Kulturkunde n. 28, Wiesbaden 1982, pp. 3-8. Recent discoveries leading to different conclusions have been made by Mark Horton (Oxford); see his paper at the Colloquium “The Indian Ocean in Antiquity” - London, cit.: PreIslamic evidence from the eastern coast of Africa and given bibliography endnote (11).

The present town of Gwadar is situated at the southern end of a flat and narrow isthmus of sandy ground which 56 H. N. Chittick between 1960 and 1965 directed a systematic programme of conservation and excavations at Kilwa, Tanzania; and from 1965 to 1970 dug at Manda, Kenya. See H. N. Chittick, Kilwa: an Islamic Trading City on the East African Coast, 2 vols., Memoir n. 5 of the British Institute of History and Archaeology in East Africa, Nairobi 1974; Idem, The book of the Zenj and the Mijikenda, in “International Journal of African Historical Studies”, 9 (1976), pp. 68-73; Idem, Manda - Excavations at an Island Port on the Kenya Coast, Memoir n. 9 - The British Institute in Eastern Africa, Nairobi 1984. See also M. Horton’s studies on the topic of pre-Islamic settlements on the coasts of East Africa and M. C. Horton, Shanga. The archaeology of a Muslim trading community on the coast of East Africa, Memoirs of the British Institute in Eastern Africa, Memoir n. 14, London 1996), and H. T. Wright’s research on the Comoro Islands and their oceanic trading activity (H. T. Wright, Early Seafarers of the Comoro Islands: the Dembeni Phase of the 9th-10th centuries AD, in “Azania”, 19 (1984), pp. 13-59; Idem, Early Islam. Oceanic Trade and Town Development on Nzwani: the Comorian Arcipelago in the 11th-15th Centuries AD, in “Azania”, 27 (1992), pp. 81-128. Although these studies refer essentially to “Islamic” periods, they provide us with precious archaeological evidence which allows us to deduce a pre-Islamic phase of active Oceanic trade according to precise models: a mobile and mercantile society which came to terms with the new times and lords. See also above and D. Kennet’s study and bibliography in D. Kennet, An Archaeological Study...cit. See also below endnote (11). 57 Until the 1980s, it was still a working hypothesis, hotly debated. However, it has great relevance within the framework of this large inter-oceanic trade. See above notes (53) and (56). 58 See the first Interim Report complete with drawings, map-sketches and photos, in “Pakistan Archaeology”, 23 (1989), and “Besenval/Cartography”, pp. 96-98.

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Baluchistan splendour, which occupied the slopes of the rocky cliffs to the south of Gwadar town, stretching eastwards to the beach. It was no surprise to find the domed shrines (or gunbads61) duly honoured as a place of local worship, marked by the supposed resting place of a saint. But this subject is part of a separate volume within this same series (vol. ii: The Places of Death, BAR, Oxford).

joins a steep rocky headland some nine miles long to the main shore line. The headland affords shelter in roadsteads for such craft as can enter the shallow bays on either side of the isthmus. The sea around swarms with fish, and, up to the eighties, fishing - as well as traditional boat and ship-building - were still among the main industries of Gwadar, outlet to the sea of its hinterland and active port of call along the coasting and monsoon trade routes59.

Then, at a distance of about three miles proceeding northwestwards from the town up the track which leads to Pishukan, and across recent sand-dune formations, a barrage (“The Dam”) in earth and stones has been recently constructed. This reservoir collects mainly rainwater, this area having been credited with a somewhat greater rainfall than the rest of the coastal region. It allows some cultivation to be carried out, on patches of dammed fields, and provides the town with some water supplies: a striking contrast with another barrage (“The Old Dam”), a massively constructed embankment which rises on the rocky headland, entirely built of large blocks of stone, which soon attracted our attention for its evident engineering skill. Up to 1987, the latter was certainly utilized, as shown by the surrounding luxuriant oasis and its intensive cultivation, and by the strings of donkeys descending with water skins from the rocky plateau to Gwadar town (see Fig. 7.4 and Plates 7.3 – 7.8).

Gwadar town in 1987 still bore a special Arabian look and flavour, with its characteristic atmosphere and lively bazaar, the camel market and the fly-infected fish-market, the old traditional Ismaili quarter, the small ancient abandoned fort built on the top of a debris mound in the middle of mean lanes, and the modern fort guarding the approach to the town from the narrow isthmus (see Plate 7.3). The British Assistant Political Agent’s residence, built on a sandy hillock to the north of the eastern bay, overlooked the old town and the harbour, stern symbol of British Power and Authority in those remote regions; at its foot, in a private courtyard, was still to be found a cross surrounded by a few British tombs, including that of a brave Lady, who came to share fortunes and misfortunes with her husband in a lonely outpost of this British Limes60. The picturesque harbour, with its palmmat huts and gentle traditional houses, and those few monumental remains were the image of a political, economic and cultural entity of its own. They seemed an apt illustration of what life might have been like at the prosperous time of Gwadar’s 18th-early 20th century relations with the sultans of Masqat - when in this cityemporium merchants and peoples of every colour, race and religion used to meet, bargain, sell, buy, exchange their merchandise, seek refuge from their enemies, or come for seasonal exciting “hunting parties”. On that first inspection, our attention was captured by a Buddhist stupa, which still stood intact inside the Ismaili quarter, a telling presence and symbol of that cosmopolitan society. Another no less significant piece of evidence and no less telling image of the peoples who lived - and died - there, and of their enterprises as distant as the Malabar Coast, Zanzibar, or the Persian Gulf, was given by the shrines (some of them domed and decorated with arabesque carvings, others only ruins thrown to the ground) and the vast cemetery area with its tombs and memorial stones in carved slabs of sandstone, picturesque relics of a past

However, when we returned for further investigation in 1992, old Gwadar town was already on the wane, its typical “Arabic” houses adorned with teakwood carved altanas and bamboo ceilings were being flatted down and replaced by new grandiose “manours” in cement, sophisticatedly adorned with familiar big blocks of wellcut stone, evidently removed from their ancient sites and re-used to build anew this futuristic city, the result being a shocking contrast with the evocative centre we had visited just a few years before, and with the incisive images and anecdotes given by travellers and historical sources, which in the past two centuries had made this maritime outlet and entrepôt a positively legendary reality. In 1992 we were definitely faced with a great change: massive concrete pillars had replaced the teakwood columns; plundered antiquities no longer in situ were scattered everywhere, or re-employed in the masonry courses of new walls; a new shipyard and a solid jetty were giving new impetus to overseas trade; the ancient sites had been carefully bulldozered and an imposing (as well as improbable) football stadium now stood where once we had been able to visit (and record) the remains of an old cemetery with its shrines, memoirs and tombs in carved sandstone slabs; a power-station and various new military quarters to the south of the eastern bay and high up in the eastern part of the rocky plateau gave to this new Gwadar town a varnish of solid modernity.

59 The Makran Gazetteer - IGI/PS - Makran, pp. 289 et infra - provides us with a precise image of old Gwadar town and its life, putting the number of the fishing boats belonging to Gwadar in 1905 at 646, in addition to 23 large native craft. Referring to the population, then recorded at about 4.350 persons, some 3.700 were Mêds, practically a fishing folk (ibid. p. 286). Of great relevance is a comparison of these data with those reported by Sir M. Aurel Stein in: An Archaeological Tour to Gedrosia, repr. from 1st ed. 1931, Cosmo Publications, New Delhi 1982, pp. 71-74. Cf. also Major Mockler’s notes, On ruins in Makran, in “JRAS” ( 1877), p. 133 et infra. 60 Two grave slabs commemorating English women dating from the mid of the 19th century and a smaller square slab commemorating a child were found in the compound of Zikri housing, close to the eastern shore. Nearby is a pillar some 3 mts. high surmounted by a stone cross. In this connection, see Sheila Unwin’s 1990-1992 field-report, regularly lodged with the Federal Department for Archaeology and Museums, Karachi - Pakistan.

61 Gunbad - Persian side-form for gumbaz, dome, Baluchi: gumbad. See A. V. Rossi, Iranian Lexical Elements in Brâhûî, Istituto Universitario Orientale, Seminario di Studi Asiatici - Series Minor VIII, Naples 1979, p. 194.

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: International Indian Ocean Routes and Gwadar Kuh-i Batil Old Barrage in Makran But leaving aside the monumental remains of old Gwadar town - evocative image of a cosmopolitan society and of past glory - and turning to the main subject of this paper, that is “The Old Dam”, or Kuh-i Batil barrage, as we actually saw it for the first time in 1987 (when we graphically, topographically and photographically recorded it), it must be stressed that in 1992 this monument, too, was no longer in situ, its main body completely broken, the large blocks of stone removed and re-utilized elsewhere, the gap filled up with earth, straw and pebbles. Whether the destruction was due to an exceptional flood or was intentional, we were not able to determine. However, notwithstanding human depredations and/or natural ravages, the few scattered remains which were still lying around did not appear to diminish that imposing reality which first fascinated us and induced us to make a closer inspection and a more accurate analysis of these remarkable finds. The drawings illustrating the structural elements of the old dam and the main features of the site now become distinctly important, since they are the only surviving material evidence of a site which may have held considerable importance and significance in the past. Moreover, they allow us also to re-consider the local tradition on the dating of this barrage, advancing new hypotheses which do not contrast with the chronological framework outlined above and may thus confirm the general evidence in connection with waves of migration, seafaring and maritime activity.

1987. This wall stretched from one rocky bank of the Ghorab Khaur to the other. The preserved was 37 mts.; the original wall was 54 mts. The height above the ground was 2.50 mts. In the middle of the wall there was an overflow which went right through the bulk of the stonework (see Plates 7.6 – 7.8, and Fig. 7.4: the sketchmap of the dam, as graphically and photographically documented in 1987 by G. Tilia and A. Fiorani). Leaving aside human dilapidation, we are thus facing a hydraulic system, whose functions could have been: a) a buttress: to regulate the water and prevent erosion of the soil of the oasis during heavy rainfall; b) a dam: to limit the loss of water through the Ghorab Khaur and to maintain the water-level in the sediments of the oasis; c) a storage - reservoir, due to the great capacity of the basin. The technical skill applied is very important for the dating of this monument. The facing of the wall is made of big blocks of well-cut stone with bossage, organized in courses (20 to 40 cms in height), regularly bond-stoned for cohesion with the rubble-stone work behind. All the cut-stone blocks of a single course are bound with tenon and mortise joints. A regular set-back every three courses is made on the elevation of the front of the wall. The depth of the front row of cut-stone is 70 cms.; for example, the size of one of the biggest blocks is: 137 cm by 33 cms in height and 43 cms in depth. The weight of this block is likely to be at least 350-400 kg!!!

From the end of the sandy plain occupied by the cemetery area, a steep ascent of about 500 mts leads up the slope of the promontory to a small plateau, known by the name of Batil. As already said, the present harbour of Gwadar lies on the tombolo which links the coast to a rocky peninsular platform; parallel with the coast line, this huge, long promontory faces south to the open sea of the Gulf of ‘Oman (see Plate 7.3).

Behind the cut-stone front, and linked with it, a rubblestone bulk of about 4-5 mts buttresses the entire structure (see Fig. 7.4). A. M. Stein, who visited this site in 1928, reports the local opinion which dates the dam to the Portuguese occupation of Gwadar, that is about the 16th-17th century AD62. But the technical features of this monument allow us to propose a different dating. This particular kind of work in cut-stone and this particular kind of drafting are typical of a period which runs from the second century BC to the second-third century AD; it is wide-spread in classical Mediterranean architecture. On the contrary, some specific details such as the bond with tenon and mortise joints in cut-stone are completely unknown in Mediterranean architecture. According to the views - and according to the experience of the archaeologist, Dr. M. R. Besenval, who has been working in South Yemen - the Gwadar Kuh-i Batil building presents the same technique employed in similar Yemenite buildings both from the engineering and from the architectural points of view (see - for instance - the masonry, the skill of the workers, etc.)63. On this basis, it may be possible to date the Kuh-i Batil dam as contemporaneous with the hydraulic systems of the South Arabian kingdoms, which - we know from recent archaeological discoveries - had

In the centre of this platform, there is an internal depression dominated by this small plateau called Kuh-i Batil, which forms a sink-shaped basin where the rainwater streaming down the surface of the barren platform is drained and collects. This basin has natural drainage towards the southern cliffs through a gorge, the Ghorab Khaur (khawr) (see Fig. 7.3). This natural geographic configuration - which creates a great concentration of water despite the modest yearly rainfall - together with the presence of sediments on the flat bottom of the basin, allows the intensive cultivation of an oasis, a unique pattern not only on the barren surface of the platform. This oasis is well organized on two or three different levels of large horizontal cultivated terraces maintained by wall-buttresses in rough stone. This organization also allows the water to stagnate and be preserved by percolating through the sediments (see Plates 7.4 and 7.5). At one extremity of the Ghorab Khaur gorge - the “bottle-neck” of the present oasis - there is a dam, which bars the passage. To the south of this gorge, a long wall which has partly collapsed to the east - still stood in

62

M. A. Stein, An Archaeological Tour to Gedrosia... cit., pp. 73-74. Cf. also IGI/PS - Makran pp. 280 on 63 “Besenval/Cartography”, pp. 96-98.

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Baluchistan reached truly unprecedented technological standard64.

AD. Working hypotheses on the dissolution of the Sasanian state apparatus along the eastern seaboard of the Arabian Peninsula, in “PSAS”, 32 (2002). Cf. also G. Widengren, The establishment of the Sasanian dynasty in the light of new evidence, in Atti del Convegno Internazionale sul tema: La Persia nel Medioevo (Roma, 31 marzo - 5 aprile 1970), Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Roma 1971, pp. 719 on. On the effort of the Sasanians to control the Gulf and on the role of this dynasty as leading power in the western waters of the Indian Ocean, see also D. Whitehouse and A. Williamson, Sasanian Maritime Trade, in “Iran”, 11 (1973), pp. 29-49.

This dam in Gwadar - so far - constitutes an unicum in Pakistan and neighbouring areas. The hypothesis of a South Arabian presence in Makrân is quite plausible. But - considered in a broader context - this dam with its oasis is undoubtedly new evidence of the links and contacts between the different countries bordering or gravitating on the Arabian Sea, participants in the great inter-oceanic trade and related seafaring activity. In other words, it is a new link - among the many others still missing - in the long chain of overseas trade and relations. And to conclude, a short colourful note to this technical account. While spending a quiet peaceful evening in the white village of Dasht Kuddan, in the very heart of Makran, having tea with the local pir and a renowned savant, Anwar Shah, and listening to the fascinating old stories of this enthralling old region, we happened to ask about Gwadar and its old dam and settlement. Anwar Shah smiled kindly at the local tradition relating the dam to the Portuguese occupation, and entered into a long evocative legend. Many centuries ago, more than one millennium ago, a powerful Arab tribe roaming the southern regions of the Arabian Peninsula, due to local unrest and to political and radical ecological changes (sic), abandoned its homeland in Yemen. The tribe was that of the Azd - well known in all historical sources; a large group of them came to Makran and settled at Gwadar, on that precise rocky platform, which today is commonly called Kuh-i Batil. And there these Azd people organized themselves according to their traditions and to their culture; theirs is the dam, according to Anwar Shah, theirs is the skill and technology in cultivating the dusty, barren, dry land, which was thence converted into a flourishing orchard. The legend, once again - if read through the evocative veil of the epic - fits perfectly with the archaeological evidence and with our historical reconstruction.

New glimpses on this topic can be found in more than one well documented study, archaeological evidence complementing literary sources, such as those given by C. Hardy-Guilbert, M. Kervran, H. P. Ray, A. Rougeulle, D. T. Potts, J.-F. Salles, etc. See in particular A. Cameron (ed.), The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East. States, Resources and Armies. Papers of the Third Workshop on Late Antiquities and Early Islam, Princeton 1995 (which deal essentially with strategies and ensuing clashes between the Roman/Byzantine empire and the Sasanians and the rising Islamic power, aimed at the control of the Gulf’s western waters, too. See also above, § 2, and below endnotes (4) and (5)), and H. P. Ray and J.-F. Salles (eds.), Tradition and Archaeology. Early Maritime Contacts in the Indian Ocean - Proceedings of the International Seminar “Techno-Archaeological Perspectives of Seafaring in the Indian Ocean, 4th cent. B.C. - 15th cent. A.D., New Delhi, February 28 - March 4, 1994”, Manohar publs., New Delhi 1996 - and given bibliographical references. With regard to the presence of a Sasanian fleet as the major guarantee of this maritime politico-military dimension, the data provided by literary sources are very poor, and scholars must necessarily integrate them with data provided by other disciplines, such as – first and foremost – archaeology and related sciences, which may provide in their turn invaluable pointers to the reading, re-reading and interpretation of the available literature. In this respect, during these last two-three decades new archaeological evidence has been brought to light, allowing us to sift anew the literary sources – especially the Futûh genre – as briefly illustrated in this study (see below endnote (3)). This topic is dealt with in a specific study, part of the second volume of this “Baluchistan” series.

ENDNOTES Endnote (1) With specific regard to the policy of Ardashîr I as a broad-based political design in whose context control of the eastern seas assumed a centrality of its own, see V. Piacentini Fiorani, Ardashîr i Pâpakân and the wars against the Arabs: working hypotheses on the Sasanian hold of the Gulf, in “PSAS”, 15 (1985), pp. 57-77; and Idem, Arab expeditions overseas in the seventh century

Endnote (2) The historical value of the Nihâyat al-Irab fî Akhbâr alFurs wa al-‘Arab has been disputed. Mario Grignaschi expressed serious doubts about its reliability and that of the sources used by the anonymous author, the Pseudo Asma‘î, who gives the impression of re-working his sources in more than one passage (see M. Grignaschi, La Nihayatu-l-Arab, Damascus 1969; Idem, La riforma tributaria di Hosrô I e il feudalesimo sassanide, in Atti del Convegno Internazionale sul tema: La Persia nel Medioevo...cit., pp. 87-147). The problem of the origin of the Nihâyat is still unsolved; for instance, in the section concerning the wars of Ardashîr I against the Arabs,

64 See for instance the papers read at the “Seminar for Arabian Studies”, 1986 and 1987. Of great interest for comparisons with Kuh-i Batil dam are the studies and the research carried out by prof. J. Schmidt (Bonn) and his collaborators on the irrigation system of Marib, etc. Of specific relevance in connection with the subject dealt with here, are the studies carried out by T. J. Wilkinson, especially when referring to Arabian and Yemenite hydraulic techniques and systems (PSAS et alia). With regard to literature, cf. the study by J.-F. Salles, L ‘Arabie et ses mers bordiers: itinéraires et voisinages, in Séminaire de rechèrche 1985-1986 sous la direction de Jean-François Salles, GS - Maison de l’Orient, Lyon 1988, pp. 75-102; D. Whitehouse, Abbasid Maritime Trade...cit.; Idem, Sasanian and Islamic Glazed Pottery (in preparation), in Sîrâf, 11; Idem, Chinese and South-East Asian Ceramics (in preparation), in Sîrâf, 12.

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: International Indian Ocean Routes and Gwadar Kuh-i Batil Old Barrage in Makran some phrases are reminiscent of Ibn Qutaybah (after 889 AD), who, in his turn, is believed to have made use of Ibn al-Muqaffa‘'s Siyar al-Mulûk (that is the Khudaynâmak).

Conference held in Bahrayn in 1983 (Proceedings: D. T. Potts (ed.), New Studies in the Archaeology and Early History of Bahrayn, Berlin 1983, and Shaikha Haja Ali Al-Khalifa and M. Rice (eds.), Bahrain through Ages. The Archaeology, London - Sidney 1986); the International Symposium held in Turin in 1985, on “Common Ground and Regional Features of the Parthian and Sasanian World” (Proceedings in: “Mesopotamia”, 22 (1987)); the International Colloquium held in Göttingen in 1987 (Proceedings: K. Schippmann, A. Herling, J.-F. Salles, Hrsg., Verlag Marie L. Leirdof, Golf-Archaeologie. Mesopotamien, Iran, Kuweit, Bahrain, Vereignite Arabische Emirate und Oman, Göttingen 1991); the International Colloquium held in London at The British Museum, July 1988, on “The Indian Ocean in Antiquity”; the International Seminar held at New Delhi, 28th February - 4th March, 1994, on “Techno-Archaeological Perspectives of Seafaring in the Indian Ocean, 4th cent. B.C. - 15th cent. A.D.” (Proceedings: H. P. Ray and J.-F. Salles, Tradition and Archaeology. Early Maritime Contacts in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi 1996); the International Conference held in Durham - Department of Archaeology, University of Durham, November 2001, on “Current Research in Sasanian Archaeology and History” (Proceedings in “JESHO”, 2002). Of specific relevance in connection with the topic dealt with in this paper are: Dr. Mu‘awiyyah Ibrâhîm’s communications on archaeological surveys carried on since 1997 along the Umani coastal strip (“PSAS” - and unpublished reports lodged with the Sultan Qabus University - Department of Antiquity, in Arabic); the reports of the excavations carried out by S. Farid, D. Kennet, M. Beech and A. Parker at Kush, Ras al-Khaymah - UAE (“PSAS” - and unpublished reports lodged with the National Museum of Ras al-Khaymah, 1997 – 1998); C. Hardy-Guilbert’s studies on early Islamic period in the Gulf (1991), and C. Hardy-Guilbert and A. Rougeulle’s archaeological surveys in Yemen (see specif. C. Hardy-Guilbert, Dix ans de rechèrche archéologique sur la période Islamique dans le Golfe (1977-1987), in: Documents de l’Islam Médiéval. Nouvelles Perspectives de Réchèrche. Actes de la Table Ronde organizée par le CNRS, Paris, Mars 1988, Institute Française de Archéologie Orientale du Caire, 1991: pp. 131-192; C. Hardy-Guilbert and A. Rougeulle, Ports islamiques du Yemen prospections archéologiques sur les côtes Yemenites (1993-1995), in “Archéologie Islamique”, 7 (1997), pp. 147-196); M. Kervran’s excavations and surveys carried out all along this Sasanian East from Bahrayn and Suhar to the mouth of the Indus system (M. Kervran, Fortresses, entrepôts et commerce: une histoire à suivre depuis les rois sassanides jusqu’aux princes d’Ormuz, in Itinéraires d’Orient. Hommages à Claude Cahen, Res Orientales, Paris 1994 vol. VI, pp. 325-350 and related bibliographical references; Idem, Indian ceramics in Southern Iran and Eastern Arabia: repertory, classification, chronology, in H. P. Ray and J.-F. Salles (eds.), Tradition and Archaeology...cit., pp. 37-58); D. Potts’s excavations and research in connection with the Arabian world (D. T. Potts (ed.), Arabia the Blest. Studies in Arabian Archaeology, CNI Publications,

As a matter of fact, the solemn tone of this anonymous text, as well as some references, may well correspond to what the style of the Khudaynâmak must have been. But these are just hypotheses. Nonetheless, in my opinion it is wrong to ignore this source. It must be used with due caution, but it has been possible to show that - as far as our topic is concerned - it gives information which is not found elsewhere, and does not conflict with, but may be regarded as complementing that obtainable from other historical sources (Dînawarî, for example, see above p.89). E. G. Browne and A. E. Christensen do not consider the text of the Nihâyat as an independent source. Widengren, on the other hand, has had the opportunity of demonstrating the reliability of some of its tradition on more than one occasion. See E. G. Browne, Some Accounts on the Arabic Work entitled “Nihàyatu’l-irab fì akhbàri’l-Furs wa’l-‘Arab”, in “JRAS”, 1900, pp. 195 on and especially p. 258; A. E. Christensen, L’Iran sous les Sassanides, repr. Osnabrück 1971 (from 2nd ed. Copenhagen - Paris 1944), p. 70. Contra, G. Widengren, Establishment of the Sasanian Dynasty...cit., p. 713, pp. 720-722; see also his Der Feudalismus im alten Iran, Studia Ethnographica Uppsaliensia, 1-5, Uppsala 1969, p. 16; Idem, Xosrau Anôširvân, les Hephtalites et les peuples turcs, in “Orientalia Suecana”, 1 (1952), pp. 6994. Cf. CHIr., vol. III/2, p. 1281, 1283. Endnote (3) It is well known to scholars that in the last two-three decades of the twentieth century there were many finds (archaeological, ceramic, numismatic, epigraphic, sigillographic etc.) which may throw new light on events involving the Gulf, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean - and their bordering and/or gravitating on regions. The list would be too long and, necessarily, far from exhaustive. Therefore, I will restrict myself to a few purely indicative references. See, for instance, the new evidence and information provided by papers given in the course of specialized Conferences and Symposia, such as the annual Seminar for Arabian Studies (and related Proceedings/PSAS), which has taken place regularly since 1970; the International Conference on South Asian Archaeology (and related Proceedings/SAAC); the international colloquia focused also on pre- early-Islamic periods organised by the ARAM Society for SyroMesopotamian Studies (Oxford), regularly published in its Periodical (ARAM) and related special volumes. Moreover, precious information was given – among the many occasions - in the course of the Conference on Oman Studies held in Muscat, November 1980 (Proceedings in “JOS”, 6 (1983), 2 vls.); the “Réunion de travail” held in Lyon, December 1982 (Proceedings: R. Boucharlat and J.-F. Salles (eds.), Arabie orientale, Mésopotamie et Iran méridional de l’âge du Fer au début de la période islamique, Editions Rechèrche sur les Civilisations 37, Paris 1984); the International 101

Baluchistan Copenhagen 1988; Idem, The Arabian Gulf in Antiquity, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1990, 2 vols.); T. Sasaki and H. Sasaki’s excavations at Julfar and Jazirah al-Hulayla (Ras al-Khaimah, U.A.E., 1988 – 1997 seasons, in “Bulletin of Archaeology”, The University of Kanazawa); A. Williamson’s surveys and studies (A. Williamson, Sohar and Omani Seafaring in the Indian Ocean, Muscat 1973; A. Williamson and D. Whitehouse, Sasanian Maritime Trade... cit.); D. S. Whitcomb’s studies on the Gulf and the Red Sea referring to Sasanian/early Islamic periods (cfr. specif. D. S. Whitcomb, The archaeology of Oman: a preliminary discussion of the Islamic periods, in “JOS”, 1 (1975), pp. 123-157; Idem, The Archaeology of al-Hasa oasis in the Islamic period, in “Atlal”, 2 (1978), pp. 311336; Idem, Qasr-i Abu Nasr and the Gulf, in R. Boucharlat and J.-F. Salles (eds.), Arabie orientale, Mésopotamie et Iran méridional... cit., pp. 331-337; Idem, Bushire and the Angali Canal, in “Mesopotamia”, 22 (1987), pp. 311-336; D. Whitcomb and J. H. Johnson, Quseir al-Qadim 1978: Preliminary Report, Cairo American Research Center in Egypt, 1979); Idem, Quseir al-Qadim 1980: Preliminary Report, Undena Publications, Malibu 1982; D. Whitehouse’s interim reports on Siraf (1968 – 1974 excavation seasons, in “Iran”, 6-10 (1968-1972), 12 (1974); Idem, The Congregational Mosque and Other Mosques from the Ninth to the Twelfth Centuries - Siraf III, The British Institute of Persian Studies, London n.d.), his survey at Kish (“Iran”, 14 (1976), pp. 46-47) and Banbhore (preliminary reports lodged with the British Museum, London); J. C. Wilkinson’s researches in literary sources (J. C. Wilkinson, Arab-Persian land relationships in late Sasanid Oman, in “PSAS”, 3 (1973), pp. 40-51; Idem, The Julanda of Oman, in “JOS”, 1 (1975), pp. 97-108; Idem, Suhar (Sohar) in the Early Islamic Period: the Written Evidence, in M. Taddei (ed.), South Asian Archaeology 1977, Napoli 1979, vol. II, pp. 887-907); P. M. Costa and T. J. Wilkinson surveys (P. M. Costa and T. J. Wilkinson, The Hinterland of Suhar, in “JOS”, 9 (1987)); etc.

On the northern waters of the Gulf and gravitating on regions, see for example B. Finster and J. Schmidt, Sasanidische und Frühislamische Ruinen im Iraq, in “Baghdader Mitteilungen”, 8 (1976); A. Northedge, A. Bamber, M. Roaf, Excavations at ‘Ana’, Qal‘a Island. Iraq, in “Archaeological Reports” 1(1988); A. Northedge and D. Kennet, The Samarra Horizon, 1994. In this more general frame, see the archaeological and ceramic reexamination of Qal‘at Bahrayn and the Babar Temple and connected datings. Cf. also footnotes (14), (15) and (16). An interesting methodological approach to this topic (“archaeological history”) is represented by Derek Kennet’s Ph. D. thesis: D. Kennet, An Archaeological Study of the Sasanian and Islamic Periods in Northern Ras al-Khaimah (U.A.E.), School of Oriental and African Studies, London 2000, 3 vols. (unpublished), aiming at outlining a model of complex interaction between different levels of economic processes and historical events in the Gulf and Indian Ocean (see also the rich and updated bibliography, vol. 2). Lastly, of specific relevance in this connection is the programme carried out by the Center for Documentation and Research - Presidential Court, U.A.E. - aimed at the identification of Archival materials on Arab history in the Archives of the world, which may provide first hand evidence complementing and integrating the archaeological and non archaeological data. With specific regard to the Indian Ocean, and archaeological finds, see above § 3 and § 4, and below endnotes (10) and (11). Endnote (4) Special focus on ancient navigation in the Indian Ocean and the prominent role played by the Gulf during the Hellenistic period, both on the economic and strategic relations of the Seleucid kingdom with India, has been given by J.-F. Salles: J.-F. Salles (ed.), L’Arabie et ses mers bordières. I. Itinéraires et voisinages, Traveaux de la Maison de l’Orient Méditerranéen, 16, Lyon 1988; Idem, The Arab-Persian Gulf under the Seleucids, in A. Kurt and S. H. Sherwin-White (eds.), Ellenism in the East...cit., pp. 75-109; Idem, Hellenistic Seafaring in the Indian Ocean. A Perspective from Arabia, in H. P. Ray and J.-F. Salles (eds.), Tradition and Archaeology...cit., pp. 293-309 and given bibliographical references. See also - among the many and remarkable studies on the subject - P. Högemann, Alexander der Grosse und Arabien, München 1985; V. Begley and R. D. Puma (eds.), Rome and India. The Ancient Sea Trade, University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin 1991, repr. New Delhi 1992; U. Finkbeiner (ed.), Materialen zur Archäologie der Seleukiden- und Partherzeit im südlichen Babylonien und im Golfgebeit, Deutches Archaeologisches Institut, Abteilung Baghdad, E. Wasmuth Verlag Tübingen 1993; M.-F. Boussac and J.F. Salles, Athens, Aden, Arikamedu. Essays on the interrelations between India, Arabia and the Eastern

Trade patterns of the Gulf have been masterly outlined also through numismatic evidence by the late Nicholas Löwick (N. M. Löwick, Recent coin finds in the Arabian Peninsula, in “PSAS”, 2 (1971), pp. 41-44; Idem, Trade patterns of the Persian Gulf in the light of recent coin evidence, in D. K. Kouymjian (ed.), Near Eastern Numismatics, Iconography, Epigraphy and History. Studies in Honour of George C. Miles, Beirut 1974, pp. 319-333; Idem, The Sinaw hoard of early Islamic silver coins, in “JOS”, 6 (1983), vol. 2, pp. 199-230; Idem, Siraf - The Coins and Monumental Inscriptions, Siraf XV - The British Institute of Persian Studies, London 1985). Sasanian numismatics are summarized by R. Göbl, Sassanian Numismatics, Brunswick 1971 and given extensive bibliography. References on seals and clay sealings may be found in the relevant bibliographical references of CHIr., vol. III/2, in particular pp. 13271328, and, specif., see P. Gignoux, Catalogue des sceaux, camées et bulles sassanides de la Bibliothèque Nationale et du Musée du Louvre, Paris 1978.

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: International Indian Ocean Routes and Gwadar Kuh-i Batil Old Barrage in Makran Mediterranean (repr. of Topoi 3/ - 1993), Manohar publs., New Delhi 1995; A. Invernizzi and J.-F. Salles (eds.), Arabia Antiqua. Hellenistic Centres around Arabia, IsMEO - Serie Orientale, Roma 1993. Of specific relevance in connection with the subject dealt here, are the data emerging from recent and ongoing excavations and surveys all along the eastern shores of the Arabian peninsula (at Failaka, for instance, Sharax, Qal‘at Bahrayn, el-Dur, Umm al-Qaiwan, Shabwa in Yemen, Socotra island, etc.), which also allow us to put forward the hypothesis of a link between the decline of large and wealthy Hellenistic settlements in the region (characterising the occupation from the 3rd-4th century B.C. until the 1st-2nd century AD) and the historically attested Azd tribal migrations into this coastal area from South-West Arabia (D. T. Potts, The Arabian Gulf in Antiquity...cit.; M. Mouton, La Peninsule d’Oman de la fin de l’âge du fer au début de la période sassanide (250 av. JC - 350 ap. JC), Thèse de Doctorat - Univeristé de Paris I (Pantheon - Sorbonne), 1992. See also above pag. 5 and previous endnote, Lastly, and in connection with tribal migrations, it is worthwhile recalling an oral Makrani tradition, too, referring to an Azd migratory movement as far as Makran coastal area, namely to Gwadar Kuh-i Batil (see above, § 4 and § 5).

inevitable; the latter - we know from Diodorus (Diodorus, III, 43) - not only controlled the caravan-routes from Southern Arabia, but also apparently tried to impose their control on the sea-borne trade to the ports of the eastern Red Sea and threatened Ptolemaic navigation by acts of piracy. It has to be noted, however, that the Gulf of Suez was then rarely used for commercial shipping, not only because of the Nabataean threat, but mostly because of the difficult navigation due to strong N-W winds there and unfavourable currents. According to Strabo (Strabo, XVI, 4: 23) this was one of the main reasons why Aelius Gallus lost much of his fleet there during his expedition to Arabia Felix (in this specific regard cf. J. Retsö, Where and what was Arabia Felix?, in “PSAS”, 30 (2000), pp. 188-192, in particular endnote (4)). Endnote (6) Concerning the Roman trade beyond the eastern frontiers, see A. J. Parker, Trade within the Empire and beyond the frontiers, in J. Wacher (ed.), The Roman World...cit., vol. II, pp. 635-653 spec. pp. 650 on; M. G. Raschke, New Studies in Roman Commerce with East...cit., spec. p. 670; Idem, The role of oriental commerce in the economies of the Eastern Mediterranean in the Roman Period, in “Archaeological News”, 8 (1979), nos. 2-3, pp. 68-77; N. Groom, Frankincense and Myrrh. A Study of the Arabian Incense Trade, London 1981; L. Casson, Rome’s trade with the East: the sea voyage to Africa and India, in “Transactions of the American Philological Association”, 110 (1980), pp. 21-36. As stated above, according to Dio Cassius and to Tacitus, this trade with the east was a constant drain on Roman resources (see also D. Kennedy, The East... cit., p. 280); it consisted mainly in “exotic and luxury imports”, such as frankincense and myrrh (see N. Groom, quoted), Chinese silk and damask (which reached even far north-western provinces: N. Crummy, Colchester Archaeological report, 2: The Roman small finds from excavations in Colchester: 1971-1979, Colchester 1983, p. 148; J. P. Wild, Camulodunum and the silk road, in “Current Archaeology”, 93 (1984), pp. 298-299); pepper (in the Roman period white and black pepper was obtained from the Malabar region of South India, modern Kerala) and another quality of pepper called “long pepper”, used in medicine, which came from north-west India; peppercorns etc. Other items imported were: ivory and perhaps animals from east Africa via Nubia; precious and semiprecious stones from near eastern deserts (see above pp. 90 on and n. (23)); frankincense and myrrh from South Arabia (the Arabia Eudaimon of Eusebius and Diodorus, Diodorus: 5. 41, 4; 42. 2, 3-4); or gems (lapis-lazuli, turquoise, cornelian etc.) and slaves. It is interesting to note the important role of the Jews of Babylonia in this long distance trade; on this subject see J. Neusner, A History of the Jews in Babylonia, Leiden 1969, spec. vol. I: The Parthian Period, pp. 94 ff.; and S. Safrai and M. Stern (eds.), The Jewish people in the first century AD, Amsterdam 1976, vol. II: Economic Life in Palestine, pp. 631 on.

Endnote (5) With specific regard to Roman embassies towards the Indian kings cf. also G. W. Bowersock, A report on Arabia Provincia, in “Journal of Roman Studies”, 61 (1971); Idem, La Mésène (Maisân) Antonine, in: T. Fahd (ed.), L’Arabie pré-islamique et son environnement culturel, Actes du Colloque de Strasbourg, 1987, Brill, Leiden 1989, pp. 159-168; M. G. Raschke, New Studies in Roman Commerce with the East, in H. Temporini (ed.), Aufstieg und Niedergand der Römischen Welt, II, 9, 2, New York-Berlin 1978, pp. 604-1361; H. Temporini (ed.), M. G. Angeli Bertinelli - I Romani oltre l’Eufrate nel II secolo d.C. (le province di Assiria, di Mesopotamia e di Osroene), in H. Temporini (ed.), Aufstieg und Niedergand der Römischen Welt...cit., 1, pp. 3-45; J.-F. Salles, Découvertes du Golfe arabo-persique aux époques greque et romaine, in “Revue des Etudes Anciennes”, 94 (1992), 1-2, pp. 79-97; S. E. Sidebotham, Ports of the Red Sea and the Arabian-Indian Trade, in V. Begley and R. D. Puma, Rome and India...cit., pp. 12-38; Idem, Roman Economic Policy in the Erythra Thalassa, 30 B.C.-A.D. 217, Mnemosyne Suppl. 91, Brill, Leiden 1996 (and given bibliographical references). See also the CHIr., vols. III/1 and III/2. As for Antiochus the Great’s eastward maritime policy see above § 2, and notes (20) and (21). Cf. also D. Musti, Lo Stato dei Seleucidi, in “Studi classici e orientali”, Pisa, 15 (1966), pp. 61-179, and the evidence brought to light in the course of recent excavations along the Egyptian Red Sea littoral (as announced in the communications given at the Colloquium “The Indian Ocean in Antiquity”, The British Musuem, 4th - 8th July, 1988, and following publications).

Recent research has been carried out by scholars such as J. Zarins (Springfield), D. M. Dixon (London), M. Kervran (Paris), J-F. Salles (Lyon), D. T. Potts

Conflict between the Ptolemies and the Nabataeans was 103

Baluchistan (Copenhagen), J. E. Cribb and P. Turner (London), S. E. Sidebotham (Newark) with specific regard to the emergence of South Arabian states, trade in the Indian Ocean, Roman interests in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. See specifically the above mentioned Colloquium in London (The British Museum - 4th - 8th July, 1988) “The Indian Ocean in Antiquity”, and previous endnote.

gardens. We also know that a tribal restlessness had revealed itself around the second century AD, bringing about a situation of depopulation and economic crisis, probably aggravated - if not yet caused - by the decline of a strong unified power with the breaking up of the Parthian Empire, allowing us to put forward the working hypothesis that, by the time of Ardashir’s undertakings overseas, the Arabian coastal area was controlled by different local rulers with Parthian names.

Endnote (7) As far as the Trajanic-Hadrianic aggressive policy is concerned, see D. Oates and J. Oates, Ain Sinu: a Roman frontier post in Northern Iraq, in “Iraq”, 21 (1959), pp. 207-242; G. W. Bowersock, Roman Arabia... cit., notably pp. 84-85; E. N. Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, Baltimore 1976, chapter II; D. J. Kennedy, Legio VI Ferrata: the annexation and early garrison of Arabia, in “Harvard Studies in Classical Philology”, 84 (1980), pp. 286-288. See also: F. E. Peters, The Nabataeans in the Hawran, in “Journal of American Oriental Society”, 97 (1977), p. 275; Idem, Romans and Bedouins in Southern Syria, in “Journal of Near Eastern Studies”, 37 (1978), p. 318; G. W. Bowersock, Roman Arabia...cit., p. 82 et infra. Contra: Z. I. Fiema, The Roman annexation of Arabia...cit., pp. 26 ff. , and J. C. Mann, Power, Force and the Frontiers of the Empire, review of The Grand Strategy... by Luttwak, in “Journal of Roman Studies”, 69 (1979), p. 180.

The Parthian presence has also been confirmed archaeologically at many points on the Arabian coast of the Gulf and eastern Arabia (D. B. Doe, B. de Cardi, D. T. Potts, J.-F. Salles, M. Kervran, R. Boucharlat, B. Vogt, etc.), and along the Iranian shores, too (CHIr., vol. III/1 and vol. III/2). Even the tradition gives us the names of local rulers with distinctively Parthian names, such as the above mentioned Haftânbukht (see above § 1) and Sanâtrûq (see below), Arabic version of the Parthian name of Sntrwq. Of a Parthian presence there is also notable evidence in Makran, all along the coastal and southern region - which data do not contradict the literary image (Besenval/Cartography; V. Fiorani Piacentini, Ardashîr i Pâpakân and the Wars against the Arabs...cit., pp. 66 on). See the international symposium held in Turin (June, 1985) on the theme “Common Ground and Regional Features of the Parthian and Sasanian World”, Proceedings in “Mesopotamia”, 22 (1987). Very interesting is also the lecture given by D. T. Potts, The Parthian presence in the Gulf, at the International Colloquium “The Indian Ocean in Antiquity”, The British Museum, London, 6th July, 1988, and note (28). Cf. E. Haerinck, La céramique en Iran pendent la période Parthe (circa 250 av. JC - circa 250 ap. JC). Typologie, cronologie et distribution, in “Iranica Antiqua”, suppl., Ghent 1983, which study and documentation provide us with a “photographic image” of Parthian presence - and sites - in Iran.

As far as Trajan’s Parthian War is concerned, it is possible to advance some doubts that the annexation of Arabia was a preliminary step towards the Parthian War: see F. A. Lepper, Trajan’s Parthian War, Oxford 1948, notably p. 180; M. G. Rashcke, New Studies in Roman Commerce with the East...cit., (n) 925. In any case, whatever reason stood behind Trajan’s final push southwards in 116-117, it has been demonstrated that the campaigns of 114-115 created a well-defined and defensible border along the Khabur-Jebel Sinjar line with a northern extension probably to Lake Van: F. A. Lepper, Trajan’s Parthian War...cit., pp. 153-154 and chapter VIII. On the Roman limes, valuable and documented glimpses are also given by A. Maricq, Vologésias, l’emporium de Ctésiphon, in “Classica et Orientalia”, Paris 1965, pp. 113-125; Idem, Hatra de Sanatrouq, in “Classica et Orientalia”, Paris 1965, pp. 1-16; Idem, La province d’Assyrie crée par Trajan. A propos de la guerre parthique de Trajan, in “Classica et Orientalia”, Paris 1965, pp. 103-111. For an overall review and synthesis of the Roman/Byzantine - Parthian/Sasanian relationships and general bibliographical references, see CHIr., vol. III/2, specif.: part 4: W. Eilers - D. M. Lang W. Watson - O. Kurz - N. Garsoïan - C. E. Bosworth - A. von Gabain, Iran and her Neighbours, pp. 481 - 624, and given bibliographies in CHIr., vol. III/2.

It is hard to dismiss, therefore, such unanimous tradition and material evidence on some kind of Parthian presence at least in the Gulf, if not farther east. Even if we cannot hypothesize a centralised political Parthian unity, it is possible to hypothesize the presence of different local Parthian rulers, who controlled the sea trade to a certain degree, and resisted the growing influence of Ardashîr I, refusing him submission. Endnote (8) Regarding in particular the security of areas behind the Roman imperial advance, it is to be noted that Trajan tended not to annex client states without serious reasons, at least in the first phase of his eastern campaigns, and especially when their loyalty could be proven. It is thus interesting to note that in the great revolt against Trajan in Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine and Egypt, there is no evidence of any break of loyalty or rebellion except in the newly acquired province of Arabia. The Jewish revolt in Mesopotamia would seem to be part of a general uprising of the local population (see on the subject: Sh. Applebaum, Prolegomena to the Study of the second Jewish Revolt (132-135), in “British Archaeological

From literature (in Arabic and classical sources as well, such as Diodorus, Strabo, Eusebius etc.) we know that the south-eastern coastal Arab seaboard was described in the first centuries BC. as a fertile and rich region, abounding in well-built cities and villages, domestic animals, pasture for animals, rivers, orchards and 104

Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: International Indian Ocean Routes and Gwadar Kuh-i Batil Old Barrage in Makran Reports”, Supplement 7, Oxford 1977 (based mainly on Dio Cassius; Appian, Hist. Rom., Syriaca; Eusebius, Chron.; Hieronimus Chron.; Epiphanius, Lib. de mensuribus et ponderibus; Xiphilinus; Michael Syriacus; etc.). Contra, G. W. Bowersock, A Roman perspective on the Bar Kochba War, in W. Scott Green (ed.), Approaches to Ancient Judaism, vol. II, 1978, pp. 131142; and again contra: Sh. Applebaum, Points of view on the Second Jewish Revolt, in “Scripta Classica Israelica”, 7 (1983-1984), pp. 77-87: review of Bowersock’s A Roman Perspective...cit.

well as of the hoards of 2nd century Roman coins found in northern India, the hypothesis has been advanced that the Palmyrenes had established direct contacts with the Kushani rulers. See f.i.: R. E. M. Wheeler, Roman contact with India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, in: W. F. Grimes (ed.), Aspects of Archaeology in Britain and Beyond, London 1951, pp. 345-381 and notably p. 353; J. Starcky, Palmyra, Paris 1952, pp. 79-80, p. 74; H. Seyrig, Ornamenta Palmyrena Antiquiora, in “Syria”, 21 (1940), p. 290; Idem, Palmyra and the East, in “Journal of Roman Studies”, 40 (1950), p. 6; Shafiq Abou Zayd (ed.), Palmyra and the Aramaeans...cit.; and CHIr. vol. III/1 (specif. Part 4: Iran and her Neighbours, pp. 481624 and bibliographical references) and vol. III/2 (Part 5: Institutions, pp. 627-818). See also D. Whitehouse and A. Williamson, Sasanian Maritime Trade...cit., p. 30. The evidence brought to light by recent ongoing excavations at Sehwan (Sind - Pakistan) under the scientific direction of Dr. M. Kervran (1998 -) is of the utmost interest and relevance in connection with this topic and the Kushans’ role within the framework of intercontinental trade.

Most detailed discussion on the disposition of the military troops in Arabia can be found in the above quoted studies. See also: A. S. Anderson, The Imperial Army, in J. Wacher (ed.), The Roman World...cit., vol. I: pp. 89 on, and M. Speidel, The Roman Army in Arabia, in: H. Temporini (ed.), Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt...cit., vol. II, pp. 687-730. See also G. W. Bowersock, The Annexation and Initial Garrison of Arabia, in “Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphie”, 5 (1970), pp. 37-47; D. J. Kennedy, Legio VI Ferrata...cit.; Idem, The East (the frontiers)...cit., spec. pp. 280 on; Z. T. Fiema, The Roman Annexation of Arabia...cit., pp. 28 ff.; Idem, Roman Inscriptions from the Siq of Petra - Remarks on the Initial Garrison of Arabia, in “Annual of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan”, 30 (1986), pp. 199-206 plates pp. 458-460; J. W. Eadie, Artifacts of Annexation: Trajan’s Grand Strategy and Arabia, in: J. W. Eadie and J. Ober (eds.), The Craft of the Ancient Historians. Studies in honour of Chester G. Starr, Washington D. C. 1985, p. 409 on; L. J. F. Keppie, The Legionary Garrison of Judaea under Hadrian, in “Latomus”, 32 (1973), pp. 859-864.

On the other hand, Palmyrene interest in the Red Sea trade is already attested in the second century AD; a working hypothesis has been advanced that they had established a “guild” with headquarters in Coptos: M. P. Charlesworth, Roman Trade with India...cit., p. 133. Privileges had been granted to Palmyra by Hadrian: see M. Sartre, Bostra. Inscriptions grecques et latines de la Syrie, Tome XIII, fasc. 1, nos. 9001-9472, Paris 1982, namely inscription no. 9107. We are perfectly aware that the above cited references are purely indicative and far from being exhaustive. See also Shafiq Abou Zayd (ed.), Palmyra and the Aramaeans, ARAM series vol. n. 7, Peters, Leuven 1995 (Proceedings of the International Conferences held at Oxford, 1989, and Harvard, 1995).

The policy of Hadrian in the area hardly brought any substantial changes. See: D. J. Kennedy, The East...cit., pp. 280 on; Z. T. Fiema, The Roman Annexation of Arabia...cit., notably pp. 30 on and bibliography. Interesting archaeological evidence supports this thesis, see for instance D. S. Whitcomb and J. Johnson, Quseir al-Qadim, 1978. Preliminary Report, Cairo 1979; and AlAnsary, Qaryat al-Fan. A portrait of Pre-Islamic Civilization in Saudi Arabia, Riyadh 1982. Cf. also V. Fiorani Piacentini, Roman Fortifications in Southern Hawrân: Notes from a Journey and Historical Working Hypotheses, in Studi in Memoria di Maria Nallino nel Decimo Anniversario della Morte, special number “Oriente Moderno”, 64 (1984), 1-6, Roma - Istituto per l’Oriente, pp. 121-139.

Endnote (10) If the assumption of Khusraw I’s reorganisation and institutionalisation of a Sasanian maritime order is right, both on the basis of literary sources and archaeological evidence, it is also possible to seek a connection between the systemic structure of the Sasanian status apparatus and the role played within this structure by the Great Families of the Empire. Cf. for instance the studies recently carried on by R. Gyslen and his paper The Great Families in the Sasanian empire: some sigillographic evidence, read at the International Conference on “Current Research in Sasanian Archaeology and History”, held at Durham, 3rd - 4th November, 2001 (proceedings in “JESHO”, 2002 ).

The memorial stele of Legio III Cyrenaica has been reused as a structural internal corner stone of the perimetral wall of the Umaiyyad Mosque at Basrah (Hawran) – which I personally visited in 1982.

Concerning the events during the reign of Khusraw I Anûshîrwân and his politico-administrative and military reforms, there exists a rich literature based on Pahlavi, Arabic, Syriac, Armenian and Persian sources, complemented by archaeological, numismatic, epigraphic and sigillographic evidence. Of specific interest is the Sîrat Anôshirvân in Ibn Miskawayh, Tajârib al-Umâm, in: H. F. Amedroz and D. S. Margoliouth (eds.), The

Endnote (9) During the first and second centuries AD, the Palmyrenes virtually monopolized the eastern trade routes along the Euphrates to the Persian Gulf. According to stylistic analysis of the objects of exchange and architectural features found in Palmyra and sites in northern India, as 105

Baluchistan Eclipse of the ‘Abbâsid Caliphate, 6 vols., Oxford 19201921, vol. I; more reliable than the Sîrat is the Nihâyat al-Irab, which gives precious information on the legal order in the Sasanian empire during Khusraw I’s reign. See on this subject V. Fiorani Piacentini, The literary image of the Southern Coast of Iran (3rd-4th Century A.D.): clues to the re-reading and analysis of regional situations and realities. (Madînah/Shahr - Qaryah/Deh Nâhiyah/Rustâq), in: R. Ambrosini - M. P. Bologna - F. Motta - Ch. Orlandi (eds.), Scribthair a ainm n-ogaim. Scritti in memoria di Enrico Campanile, Pacini publ., Pisa 1997, 2 vols, vol. I: pp. 371-396; and Z. Rubin, The Reforms of Khusro Anushirwan, in A. Cameron (ed.), The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East, vol. III: States, Resources and Armies. Papers of the Third Workshop on Late Antiquities and Early Islam, Princeton 1995, pp. 227-297 (and exhaustive references to various available sources); cf. also Idem, Epigraphy and historiography...cit. Cf also the documented studies by Sh. Kuyayama in “Journal Asiatique”, 1991, n.3-4 and in “Annals of the Institute for Research in Humanities”, Kyoto Univ., 34 (1999), pp 25 on.

no less precious data and information which allow us to infer local realities - as so many patterns - also concerning a transitional period, namely that from Sasanian dominion on these peripheral eastward regions to the Arab military conquest, following the disruption of the Sasanian state apparatus, and the reorganization of these fluid regions within an Islamic order.

Archaeological data brought to light by recent - and, in some cases, still ongoing - excavations complement and integrate the literary image and the meagre information given by historiography, providing us with a vivid cartographical image of this vast dominion. Cf. for instance Cheng Te-K’un, Archaeology in Sarawak, Cambridge 1969; R. M. Brown, The Ceramics of SouthEast Asia, their Dating and Identification, 2nd ed., Oxford 1988; J. Carswell, China and Islam in the Maldive Islands, in “Transactions of the Oriental Ceramic Society”, 41 (1975-1976), pp. 121-207; Idem, China and Islam. A Survey of the Coast of India and Ceylon, in “Transactions of the Oriental Ceramics Society”, 42 (1977-1978), pp. 25-68; Idem, Chinese Ceramics from Attaippidy in Sri Lanka, in: A Ceramic Legacy of Asia’s Maritime Trade. Song Dynasty Guangdong Wares and Other 11th to 19th Century Trade Ceramics found on Tioman Island, Malaysia, Southeast Asia Ceramic Society, 1985, pp. 31-47; J. Carswell - M. Prickett, Mantai 1980: a Preliminary Investigation, in: “Ancient Ceylon”, 5 (1984), pp. 3-80; J. Guy, Oriental Trade Ceramics in South East Asia, 9th to 16th Century, Oxford 1986; Idem, Oriental Trade Ceramics in South East Asia, 9th to 16th Century, Oxford 1990; M. Kervran, Indian Ceramics in Southern Iran and Eastern Arabia.... cit., pp. 37-58, in: H. P. Ray and J.-F. Salles (eds.), Tradition and Archaeology... cit., pp. 37-58; A. Rougeulle, Medieval Trade Networks in the Western Indian Ocean (8th-14th cent.)...cit., pp. 159-180; J. V. P. Rao - D. Kennet - J. Howell, Paithan 1996-1998. An interim report on the first three seasons of excavations, 1998 - unpublished report lodged with the Archaeological Survey of India; cf. also A. Wink, Al-Hind. The Making of the Indo-Islamic World, 2 vols., vol. I: Early Medieval India and the Expansion of Islam, 7th-11th Century, Leiden 1990. The above quoted studies - like those cited in the following endnote - are mostly concerned with early Islamic-mediaeval Islamic phases. However, within this more general framework, the authors provide us with

In connection with Sri Lanka more than one well documented contribution is available. Cf. S. Bandaranayake - L. Dewaraja - R. Silva and K. D. G. Wimalaratne (eds.), Sri Lanka and the Silk Road of the Sea, Colombo 1990, and the “South Asian Archaeology Conferences”, in particular the SAAC, 1991 (Proceedings: A. J. Gail and G. J. R. Mevissen (eds.), Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference of the Association of South Asian Archaeology in Western Europe, held in Berlin 1-5 July, 1991, Stuttgart 1993, in particular H. P. Ray, East Coast Trade in Peninsular India (c. 200 B.C. to A.D. 400), ivi pp. 573-584)). Of specific relevance in connection with the subject of this paper are the studies by O. Bopearachchi - with specific regard to the “Hellenistic/Greco-Bactrian” and “Roman” periods -, S. Banadaranayake, J. Carswell, V. Begley, P. L. Gupta, B. J. Perera, M. Prickett, H. P. Ray, R. Silva etc. (cf. for example O. Bopearachchi, Seafaring in the Indian Ocean: Archaeological Evidence from Sri Lanka, in H. P. Ray and J.-F. Salles, Tradition and Archaeology...cit., pp. 59-78 and given bibliography ivi, pp. 74-78; J. Carswell, The excavation of Mantai, in “Ancient Ceylon”, 7 (1990), pp. 17-28; Idem, The Port of Mantai, in V. Begley and R. D. De Puma (eds.), Rome and India...cit., pp. 197-203; B. J. Perera, The Foreign Trade and Commerce of Ancient Ceylon, in “The Ceylon Historical Journal” (1952), pp. 100-119, 192-204, 301320, 14-22; M. Prickett, Excavations at Mantai 1980: a Preliminary Report of the Field-Director, Cambridge, Mass., 1980; Idem, Sri Lanka’s Foreign Trade before A.D.: Archaeological Evidence, in K. M. de Silva - S. Kiribamune - C. Silva (eds.), Asian Panorama: Essays in Asian History, Past and Present, 1990, pp. 151-180; M. Prickett - Fernando, Mantai - Mahatittha: the Great Port and Entrepôt in Indian Trade, in S. Bandaranayake - L. Dewaraja - R. Silva - K. D. G. Wimalaratne (eds.), Sri Lanka and the Silk Road of the Sea...cit., pp. 115-122.

See also below following endnote (11). Endnote (11) With regard to Khusraw II’s reign (598-628) and peripheral eastern regions, we have a photographic image in J. Markwart, A Catalogue of the Provincial Capitals... cit., and some information in literary sources, especially in al-Tabarî’s Kitâb al-Mulûk wa al-Rusul, and alTha‘âlibî’s Ghurar. In this context, it is worthwhile mentioning also the Nihâyat al-Irab fî Akhbâr al-Furs wa al-‘Arab, which is extremely interesting (see above endnote (2)), and the Fathnâmah-i-Sind (see below endnote (13)). On the Indian Ocean, we also have rich archaeological evidence. (Cf. also previous endnote (10)).

Concerning studies, research and archaeological work 106

Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: International Indian Ocean Routes and Gwadar Kuh-i Batil Old Barrage in Makran along the Eastern coast of Africa, we refer essentially to the late J. S. Kirkman (cf. his paper, Some conclusions from archaeological excavations on the coast of Kenya, 1948-1966, in H. N. Chittick and E. Rotberg (eds.), East Africa and the Orient, New York 1975 (Nairobi Conference, 1967), and Th. H. Wilson, James Kirkman and East African Archaeology - Bibliography of James Kirkman, in “Paideuma” - Mitteilungen zur Kulturkunde n. 28, Wiesbaden 1982, pp. 3-8); and H. N. Chittick. Recent discoveries leading to different conclusions have been made by M. Horton (Oxford) (cf. his paper at the Colloquium “The Indian Ocean in Antiquity” - London, cit.: Pre-Islamic evidence from the eastern coast of Africa). H. N. Chittick between 1960 and 1965 directed a systematic programme of conservation and excavations at Kilwa, Tanzania; and from 1965 to 1970 dug at Manda, Kenya. See H. N. Chittick, Kilwa: an Islamic trading city on the East African Coast, 2 vols., Memoir n. 5 of the British Institute of History and Archaeology in East Africa, Nairobi 1974; Idem, An archaeological reconnaissance in the Horn: the British Somali Expedition 1975, in “Azania”, 11 (1976), pp. 117-133; Idem, The book of the Zenj and the Mijikenda, in “International Journal of African Historical Studies”, 9 (1976), pp. 68-73; Idem, Manda - Excavations at an Island Port on the Kenya Coast, Memoir n. 9 - The British Institute in Eastern Africa, Nairobi 1984; H. N. Chittick and R. I. Rotberg (eds.), East Africa and the Orient, Africana Press, New York 1975.

periods, they provide us with precious archaeological evidence which allows us to deduce a pre-Islamic phase of active Oceanic trade according to precise models: a mobile and mercantile society which came to terms with the new times and lords. Cf. also D. Whitehouse, East Africa and maritime trade of the Indian Ocean, A.D. 8001500, in B. Scarcia Amoretti, Islam in East Africa: New Sources...cit., pp. 411- 424; the focus of this author’s paper is the long stretch of coast extending from Somalia to Mozambique, which Mark Horton terms “the Swahili Corridor”. See also above note (56) and D. Kennet’s study and given bibliography in D. Kennet, An Archaeological Study...cit., vol. 11. Endnote (12) On Makrani - Sindi eco-cultural coastal regions, their development and eventual relationships between landscape degradation and peopling, it needs to be pointed out that on this specific subject - i.e. the physical environment and the factors which may have affected and/or influenced in Makran and Sind the coastal “ecocultural” patterns (environment and human settlements) -, since the 1980s two distinct research groups have been carrying on systematic field-work. In Makran, the Italian Historical, Archaeological and Anthropological Research-Project in Makran (under the scientific direction of Valeria Piacentini Fiorani Catholic University of the S. Heart of Milano, and on the basis of a Licence granted by the Federal Government of Pakistan) has been carrying out systematic environmental studies since 1987. In charge of the geomorphological study was P. Sanlaville (University of Lyon 2 - Maison de l’Orient Méditerranéen) with the collaboration of R. Besenval (Centre National de la Rechèrche Scientifique Paris, in charge of the archaeological sector of the project), M. L. Leporatti and E. Lattanzi (Rome University “La Sapienza”). In this connection see Introduction: V. Piacentini, Images of a little known region, specif. pp. 6-7 and given bibliographical reference; P. Sanlaville, Geomorphological Data, in “Besenval/Cartography”, pp. 82-86.

On the topic of pre-Islamic settlements on the coasts of East Africa, see also M. Horton’s studies (M. C. Horton, The Swahili Corridor, in “Scientific American”, 257 (1987), pp. 86-93; Idem, Shanga. The archaeology of a Muslim trading community on the coast of East Africa, Memoirs of the British Institute in Eastern Africa, Memoir n. 14, London 1996; Idem, The Islamic Conversion of the Swahili Coast, 750-1500; some archaeological and historical evidence, in B. Scarcia Amoretti (ed.), Islam in East Africa: New Sources. Archives. Manuscripts and Written Historical Sources. Oral History. Archaeology, Herder, Roma 2001, pp. 449469 and given bibliographical references; Idem, Zanzibar and Pemba: Archaeological Investigations of an Indian Ocean Archipelago, British Institute in Eastern Africa, London - forthcoming), J. E. G. Sutton’s research (J. E. G. Sutton, Kilwa in the early fourteenth century: Gold trade, monumental architecture and Sunnî conformity at the southern extremity of dâr al-Islâm, in B. Scarcia Amoretti, Islam in East Africa: New Sources...cit., pp. 425 - 448 and given bibliography; Sutton’s overview of Kilwa and related sites appeared in volume 33 of “Azania”), and H. T. Wright’s research on the Comoro Islands and their oceanic trading activity (H. T. Wright, Early Seafarers of the Comoro Islands: the Dembeni Phase of the 9th-10th centuries AD, in “Azania”, 19 (1984), pp. 13-59; Idem, Early Islam. Oceanic Trade and Town Development on Nzwani: the Comorian Arcipelago in the 11th-15th Centuries AD, in “Azania”, 27 (1992), pp. 81-128).

In Sind, since the 1990s the Mission Archéologique Française au Sind - Pakistan (under the scientific direction of Monik Kervran, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Française) has been carrying out a systematic study of the Indus delta and its “eco-cultural” zones, in close connection with the two sites of Banbhore (generally identified with the ancient Daybul site) and Sehwan (unpublished reports lodged with the Department of Archaeology and Museums of the Federal Government of Pakistan, Karachi). The coastal region of Makran appears very poor in water. Parallel to the coast-line runs the steep Southern Makran Range, giving life to various eco-cultural regions: the mountainous area, the plains, the coastal area proper, and the sand-dune fields. Swamps, lagoons, khawrs, sabkha deposits and sand-dune fields make both settlement and landing very difficult. Nevertheless, according to the literature and other available sources, it is well attested

Although these studies refer essentially to “Islamic” 107

Baluchistan that this same region played an important role in the history – both ancient and more recent - of Makran, of its bordering regions, and of other regions gravitating on or bordering the Arabian Sea (see also the following chapter).

and the rise of new petty rulers and kingdoms in these peripheral regions. Few systematic attempts have been made to classify the information it gives, to analyse either its material or traditions (matn and isnâd), or to establish its origin and its sources. However, without entering into the debate, which has been done elsewhere, it can be said that - provided the information given by al-Kûfî is always carefully sifted, and leaving aside some positively fairytale accounts and the classical topoi of this historical genre - the nucleus of the traditions reported in this chronicle does not contradict the early Arabic historiography (in particular, it does not contradict alBalâdhurî’s dry account). On the contrary, it perfectly complements it. A special dimension of this eastern world emerges, with its structure and the various forces dominating it, its mercantile dimension, political and religious power systems, giving space to the working hypothesis that the author might have had access to the lost chronicles by al-Madâ’inî and to the Indian tradition as well. V. Piacentini Fiorani, Arab expeditions overseas in the seventh century AD...cit.; Idem, History and historiography: the court genre in Arabic and the Fathnâmah-i-Sind, paper read at the International Conference “Current Research in Sasanian Archaeology and History”, held at Durham, 3rd-4th November, 2001 (“JESHO”, in press) and given bibliography. Cf. also below, following chapter.

It must be stressed that this is the first systematic approach to studying the seaboard of the Makrani and Sindi regions, their morphology and dynamics, and the changes which may have taken place in the course of millennia affecting both environment and human settlements. See below V. Piacentini Fiorani, Trade, migrations and military operations, pp. 119-134. Endnote (13) With regard to Makran and Sind, and in particular with specific regard to Daybul’s pre- early Islamic history, we have also another source - in Persian - which is hotly debated and challenged by scholars (the list of those involved in such debate includes excellent names like H. M. Elliot and J. Dowson, R. C. Majumdar, S. D. Goitein, I. H. Qureshi, F. Gabrieli, P. Hardy, A. Schimmel, Y. Friedmann... and the writer), that is the above cited Fathnâmah-i Sind. Leaving aside legendary tales, the information provided by this later chronicle does not fundamentally diverge from that provided by the classical annal-writing in Arabic (above all al-Tabarî, alBalâdhurî, al-Tha‘âlibî and Ya‘qûbî), its minute account giving us vivid and realistic images of local realities: the grandeur and beauty of the city with its bastions, temples and palaces, the opulence of its bazaar and the liveliness of its harbour, the cosmopolitan society living there, local dignitaries and mighty rulers and peoples from all parts of the world coming and meeting to buy and sell precious merchandise. This same chronicle provides us with a wealth of details, too, when narrating its conquest by Muhammad b. al-Qâsim, and the pacta concluded between conquerors and conquered. Without entering into further details, it can be said that in 613 AH/1216 AD, in Sind, a local scholar named ‘Alî b. Hamîd b. Abû Bakr al-Kûfî came across an Arabic manuscript on the early history of the Arab conquest of Sind. As recorded by al-Kûfî himself in his introduction, the manuscript had remained preserved with an illustrious family of qadis of Aror and Bakhar in Sind (Fathnâmah cit., p. 5). Aware of the manuscript’s relevance and considering that it was in Arabic, al-Kûfî undertook the difficult task of translating it into Persian in order to circulate the chronicle (Fathnâmah cit., pp. 4-10). AlKûfî does not mention neither the specific title of the original Arabic chronicle nor the name of its author and his sources, thus giving life to an everlasting debate in connection with the reliability of this book as an independent source. In my opinion, it is not right to ignore it and completely dismiss its reliability. There is no doubt that this chronicle is the most extensive and exhaustive account of the Arab invasion of Sind and provides us with the last glimpses of a Sasanian rule to the East, vividly depicting the crumbling and disintegration of the centralized Sasanian state apparatus, 108

Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: International Indian Ocean Routes and Gwadar Kuh-i Batil Old Barrage in Makran

Fig. 7.1: Gwadar and the Makrani coast facing the Arabian Sea.

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Fig. 7.2: The Indian Ocean and the monsoon sea-routes.

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: International Indian Ocean Routes and Gwadar Kuh-i Batil Old Barrage in Makran

Fig. 7.3: Gwadar town and the rocky plateau.

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7.4: The dam of the Kuh-i Batil plateau: front-view, with the over-flow, plan of the horizontal bonding and general plan of the dam.

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: International Indian Ocean Routes and Gwadar Kuh-i Batil Old Barrage in Makran

1) Al-Tabarî, Kitâb al-Rusul wa al-Mulûk, Cairo, Dâr al-Ma‘ârif, 1961, vol. 2, p. 41.

2) Ibn al-Athîr, Al-Kâmil fî al-Tārîkh, Cairo/Misr, Idârat al-tibâ‘a al-Munîriyya, 1348 h., vol. 1, p. 223.

3) Al-Dînawarî, Kitâb al-Akhbâr al-Tiwâl, Leiden, Brill, 1888, p. 45.

Plate 7.1: EXTRACTS FROM ARABIC TEXTS

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Nihâyat al-Irab fî Akhbâr al-Furs wa al-‘Arab, Mss Qq 225 compared with Ms. Taylor 23298 (From La Persia nel Medioevo, Atti del Convegno Internazionale sul tema, Roma 1970 - Roma, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei).

Plate 7.2: EXTRACTS FROM ARABIC TEXTS

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: International Indian Ocean Routes and Gwadar Kuh-i Batil Old Barrage in Makran

Plate 7.3: 1987, Gwadar, on its sand spit (tombolo), seen to the North from the top of the rocky peninsular platform of Kuh-i Batil.

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Plate 7.4 (Above): 1987, Gwadar. The sink-shaped basin in the internal depression of Kuh-i Batil: the Ghorab Khawr and, in the background, the dam. Plate 7.5 (Below): 1987, Gwadar. The dam: the “bottle-neck” of the present oasis to the south.

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: International Indian Ocean Routes and Gwadar Kuh-i Batil Old Barrage in Makran

Plate 7.6: 1987, Gwadar. The dam stretching from one rocky bank of the Ghorab Khawr to the other.

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Plate 7.7 (Above): 1987, Gwadar. Details of the cut-stone blocks of the dam, bound with tenon and mortise joints. Plate 7.8 (Left): 1987, Gwadar. The overflow in the middle of the wall

118

Trade, Migrations and Military Operations (9th - 11th Centuries AD) Valeria Piacentini Fiorani

1. The worldwide context: Ibn Hawqal’s Bahr al-Fârs 1.1. Siraf and the mercantile dominion of Shiraz - 1.2. The mercantile and cosmopolitan dimension of the Seas: the Merchant Families vis-à-vis the Turkish reality - 2. Focus on Makran - 2.1. Boundary region and passage land for military operations – 2.2. The mercantile dimension: a mobile, cosmopolitan and active society 2.3. Regional realities and social structure

Lastly, when referring to Makran, one must also bear in mind the intrinsic character of this region, that is its twofold dimension: the coastal dimension and its environment, and the hinterland, the two being distinct structural realities, and not necessarily always interacting. 1. The worldwide context: Ibn Hawqal’s Bahr al-Fârs

Opening remarks 1.1. Siraf and the mercantile dominion of Shiraz The following study aims at highlighting the role played by Makran (the Makrân/Mukrân of the geographers in Arabic of the 9th-10th centuries AD) as one of the main participants in the network of overseas trade during the first centuries of Islam. It was a trade which extended from the mouths of the Tigris and the Euphrates to Aden, to the eastern coasts of Africa, and to South-East Asia, and touched cities and harbours that were to become legendary for the activity of their merchants and the fabulous riches there accumulated. Among these, Siraf, Qays,and Harmuz largely predominated along with Fal, Khunj and Lar by the Iranian shores, Masqat, Tibi, Qalhat, Suhar, Julfar and Qatif just to mention some entrepôts by the Arabian shore, and Salalah and Aden facing the Indian Ocean, Daybul, Qandâbîl and Armâbîl on the Arabian Sea. It was a worldwide, intercontinental trade, which was to give the regions bordering and/or gravitating on the sea a centrality, a character and a culture of their own, too, which was to be definitely mercantile and cosmopolitan.

Siraf was a maritime city, a very rich emporium (bulayd and bandar as Yâqût calls it), that arose artificially on the parched Iranian coast around 200 kms. south of Bushire, a coast which, unimaginably inhospitable, was made hospitable and even fertile thanks to delicate and complex human interventions (such as dams, canals, acqueducts, wells, cisterns). Like that of all ports of its kind, Siraf’s life was closely linked to broader mercantile interests. Its history cannot therefore exclude the history of the city (or cities) of which it was the chief port and outlet, and of the region of which this same city was the political and economic capital. Finally, given its maritime position, it cannot exclude the history of the other maritime centres with which its interests became intertwined ever more closely during the course of years. The fortunes of Siraf are therefore intimately tied to those of the Fârs and its capital-city, Shiraz, which, with the advent of the Buyids, became one of the most splendid cities of its epoch, the capital-city of one of the most wealthy and splendid provinces of the Muslim world. And indeed, this was the cause of the rise of this emporium (beginning 9th century) and then, slowly, of its decline (end of the 10th century), until it returned to being a small fishing and coasting centre (13th and following centuries), whose pearl fishing and shipyards continued to attract a specialized workforce1.

But, at the same time, Makran’s geographical configuration, and its crucial position as the main natural route east-west and west-east, north-south and south-north gave to this natural axis a strategic role, too, that of military “boundary” of the bordering macroregions, or ‘corridor’ for military operations eastwards and westwards. A frontier region - certainly - but also a land of passage for military operations. The history and life of Makran cannot therefore exclude either this special dimension, and the historical events which affected and altered the life and history of its neighbouring state realities.

Islamic Siraf was brought to light again by excavations carried out from 1969 to 1975 by the British Institute of Persian Studies, supported by the British Museum, the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation of Lisboa, the British Academy, the Ashmolean Museum and the Royal Scottish Museum (Edinburgh), under the direction of Dr. David

It follows that one cannot focus on Makran and its mercantile/military dimension without taking into consideration a broader context and the various actors military, political-institutional and economic as well that ruled and controlled the immense volume of business revolving around this remote and marginal land.

1 Ibn al-Balkhî, Fârs-nâmah, G. Le Strange and R. A. Nicholson (eds.), E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series n. 1, London 1921, p. 136.

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Baluchistan Whitehouse. These excavations gave life and material evidence to the literary image of the written sources2.

century geographers, al-Istakhrî (d. 915 AD c.), Ibn Hawqal and al-Muqaddasî (10th century AD). Their rich material, complemented and integrated with the archaeological evidence, today allows us to outline a vivid image and portrait of this important harbour and outlet of the Gulf, and of the central role it played for several decades in the maritime trade between the Indian Ocean and the West.

The oldest literary evidence of Islamic Siraf - “threshold of East and West” - is to be found in the Akhbâr al-Sîn wa al-Hind, written in 237 AH/851 AD by an anonymous writer, with additions by a certain Abû Zayd Hasan alSîrâfî (d. 916 AD)3. This chronicle was subsequently drawn upon by Ibn Khurdâdhbih, Ibn al-Faqîh, Ibn Rûstah4, al-Mas‘ûdî 5, al-Marwazî6 and Yâqût7. Probably al-Idrîsî, too, must at least have known of its existence, as well as Abû al-Fidâ’, Hamdullâh Mustawfî Qazvînî (d. 628 AH/1238 AD) and Ibn al-Wardî (d. 861 AH/1457 AD)8, etc. The most telling sources are however the 10th

A modest settlement of fishermen nestling on a strip of arid shore, scorched by the sun and swept by wild winds, not far from the present day village of Taheri, Siraf had become - in the space of a few years - the splendid cityport and outlet to the sea of the powerful Shiraz and its even more powerful merchant lords. And here a special dimension emerges.

2

Concerning Siraf, archaeological finds have largely integrated intriguing literary evidence, allowing us to reconstruct the very essence and role of one of the most splendid and renowned entrpôts of the time. Systematic excavations have been carried out by David Whitehouse. Cf. in this respect the Interim Reports from 1968 to 1974 in “Iran Journal of the Institute of Persian Studies”, 6-10 (1968-1972), 12 (1974), and D. Whitehouse, Chinese stoneware from Siraf: the earliest finds, in South Asian Archaeology 1973; Idem, Islamic Glazed Pottery in Iraq and in the Persian Gulf: the 9th and 10th Centuries, in “AION” , 39 (n.s. 29) (1979); Idem, Siraf: The Congregational Mosque and other Mosques from the Ninth to the Twelfth Centuries, The British Institute of Persian Studies - Final Report series, n.3, London s.d. See also ibidem, N. M. Löwick, Siraf: The Coins and Minumental Inscriptions, n. 14, London 1985. Cf. M. Tampoe, Maritime Trade between China and the West - An Archaeological Study of the Ceramics from Siraf (Persian Gulf), 8th to 15th Centuries A.D., BAR International Series n. 555, Oxford 1989. See also above previous chapter: V. Piacentini Fiorani, International Indian Ocean Routes... Kuh-i Batil, and given endnotes, in particular endnotes (3), (10) and (11). With specific regard to the history of Siraf according to literary sources, see V. Fiorani Piacentini, Merchants - Merchandise and Military Power in the Persian Gulf (Sûriyânj/Shahriyâj - Sîrâf), Atti della Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei - Classe di Scienze Morali, Storiche e Filosofiche, Memorie, ser. IX, vol. III - fasc. 2, Roma 1992, pp. 105-191. The basic structure of Iranian political life and the economic forces as a de facto distinct power are outlined in V. Fiorani Piacentini, Practice in Mediaeval Persian Government: the Surrender of the Great Cities of Khurasan to the Seljuks (AH 428-429/AD 10381039), in “AION”, 59 (1999), pp. 38-68 and given sources and bibliographical references; Idem, Merchant Families in the Gulf. A Mercantile and Cosmopolitan Dimension: the Written Evidence (1113th Centuries AD), in “ARAM”, 11-12 (1999-2000), pp. 143-157. 3 Akhbâr al-Sîn wa al-Hind, by an Anonymous Author, with additions by Abû Zayd (d. 916 AD), text - trans. and ed. by J. Sauvaget, Paris 1948, 2 vols. 4 Ibn Khurdâdhbih, Kitâb al-Masâlik wa al-Mamâlik, (846-885 c. AD), ed. and trans. by C. Barbier de Meynard, in “Journal Asiatique”, VI ser., vol. 5, 1865, p. 60. Ibn al-Faqîh, Compendium Libri Kitâb alBuldân, ed. M. J. De Goeje, Leiden 1885, p. 9, 11. Ibn Rûstah, AlA‘lâq al-Nafîsah, ed. M. J. De Goeje, Leiden 1892, p. 96 et infra (Itineraries from Sin and Hind towards al-Basrah), p. 154. 5 Al-Mas‘ûdî, Murûj al-Dhahab, (first half 10th century AD), text and trans. C. Barbier de Meynard et A. J. Pavet de Courteille, 9 vols., Paris 1861 - 1877. This Author, too, draws largely from Abû Zayd, whom probably he met in al-Basrah. 6 Al-Marwazî, Sharaf al-Zamân Tâhir Marwazî on China, the Turks and India, London 1942. Al-Marwazî does not add anything new to the Itineraries by Ibn Rûstah. 7 Yâqût, Mu‘jam al-Buldân, ed. F. Wüstenfeld, 6 vols., Leiden 1866, vol. 3; ed. C. Barbier de Meynard, repr. Amsterdam 1979, pp. 331-333. 8 Al-Idrîsî, Opus Geographicum, ed. E. Cerulli, G. Levi Della Vida, L. Petech, G. Tucci, A. Bombaci, U. Rizzitano, R. Rubinacci, L. Veccia Vaglieri, Neapoli - Romae 1970, 9 vols., vol. 4: p. 379, 403, 405, 410411. Referring to Siraf, al-Idrîsî draws largely on Ibn Hawqal (see below), adding nothing new or relevant. Abû al-Fidâ’, Géographie d’Aboulféda, ed. M. Reinaud, 3 vols., Paris 1848, specif. vol. II/1: pp.

It is well known that the flourishing of this splendid emporium coincides with the re-organisation of traditional Iranian society under new political and military forces. At the start of the 10th century this process came within a system reaching its peak under the dominion of the Buyids (320-454 AH/932-1062 AD): a military aristocracy from the Caspian Sea. In this specific context, two points have special relevance: • the emergence and predominance of a mercantile class; • the overseas military initiatives of these Dailamite lords (namely ‘Imâd al-Dawlah, 934 AD, ‘Adud alDawlah, 949 AD, and ‘Imâd al-Dîn Abî Kâlîjâr, 10271048 AD). The Buyid overlords were a dominant military caste (to use the words of Heribert Busse9) supported by a formidable army made up of foreign elements and mercenary troops. They had the Strength (al-Shawkah) to fight and to win, to conquer and defend the conquered regions. Yet, to rule these same regions (and to obtain the necessary revenues to pay the Army), they needed to rely on the local population, to come to terms with the local traditional social classes, to find new delicate equilibriums and balances of power with the conquered peoples. The sharp political sense of ‘Imâd al-Dawlah gave him immediate insight into and clear perception of the contingent situation. His successors carried on with his political lines with great lucidity. It was in this precise context that the great Merchant Families were to reemerge. Public affairs and business were de facto and de jure in the hands of the traditional class, who made up the traditional social and cultural milieu of urban life all along the Gulf shores, both Iranian and Arabic10.

27-28, and vol. II/2: p. 91, 92, 93, 94, 95 and 96. Hamdullâh Mustawfî Qazvînî, Nuzhat al-Qulûb, ed. G. Le Strange, Leiden 1915-1919, 2 vols. 9 H. Busse, Iran under the Buyids, CHIr, vol. 4, Cambridge 1975, pp. 250 on. 10 See also V. Piacentini Fiorani, Practice in Mediaeval Persian Government... cit.; Idem, Merchant Families in the Gulf...cit.

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: Trade, Migrations and Military Operations (9th - 11th Centuries AD) Thus, the scorched strip of land near Taheri would soon be transformed into an oasis, fertile and luxuriant as a result of artificial water-collecting systems. And there, the financial and economic power of these merchant-lords would engineer the magnificent city-emporium of Siraf. Well defended by city walls, ramparts and bastions, “it equalled Shiraz in size and splendour” (to quote Istakhrî), and “rivalled even al-Basrah in wealth and volume of trade” (to quote Muqaddasî)11. These same authors give richly detailed descriptions of the opulence of its bazaar and storehouses, full of extremely valuable merchandise natural products and artefacts of rare beauty coming not only from throughout the Fârs but from all parts of the world - and of the liveliness of its artisanal life12. They tell of the impressiveness of the Friday Mosque, The “Great Mosque”, with its elegant teakwood (saj13) columns, of the grandeur of its houses and palaces “of several storeys and built of teakwood (saj) and of another wood imported from the country of the Zanj (Bilâd alZanj)”14 - the comfortable residence of those very merchants who financed the immense volume of the international trade of which Siraf was one of the main intermediaries of the time. Here, the most precious goods were traded, that came from China, India, Central Asia, the eastern coasts of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, from Syria and the Mediterranean basin. In this bandar, merchants of every colour, race, religion, coming from every corner of the known world, used to meet, bargain, sell, buy and exchange their precious merchandise15.

The same writers devote many pages also to the Sirafi merchants, who were the real protagonists of the life of Siraf and of the seas. The merchants-bankers of Fârs predominated. At Siraf they owned their grandiose houses, only seasonal residences where they used to come and stay when convoys arrived from East and West, leaving loaded with all the commodities in demand at distant markets. The writers record pithy anecdotes which make these merchants positively legendary figures. For instance, the Abû Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Umar al-Sîrâfî, whose stores were bursting with precious stones and perfumes, or the millionaires like Râmisht of Siraf, whose income amounted to millions of dirhâms, and whose warehouses - to be found at all ports of call along the monsoon and coasting trade routes - were among the richest so far known16. These merchants “used their capital to equip every convoy which traded with Sind, Hind, China and the Zanguebar”, as Ibn Hawqal says. Yet the core of their power was based on the Iranian continent. From Shiraz and other prominent centres of the Fârs they ruled their immense economic and financial empire. Positive dynasties, they would survive the swift decline of the local port of Siraf. They retained the nisbah “al-Sîrâfî”, but they lived at Shiraz, the centre of their true power being at the time the capital-city of the Fârs. There, they had come to terms with the Buyid Lords. It is very likely that the earthquake of 997 recorded by Yâqût heavily damaged Siraf, its buildings, the water canals and the harbour’s structures. But the real demise of this port came with the end of the Buyids, the great patrons and mecenates of Fârs. However, this did not mark the end of the Merchant Families, just as it did not mark the end of their power. These were families who had immense riches and properties ‘in goods and estates’ at Siraf. Here they had their seasonal residence to which as we are told - they used to come to be present at the arrival and departure of convoys, to administer the land possessions they owned there, to give orders to their representatives (wkalâ', sing. wakîl) and brokers (sarrâfûna, sing. sarrâf).

11 Al-Istakhrî, Kitâb al-Masâlik wa al-Mamâlik, ed. M. J. De Goeje, Leiden 1870, p. 97, 127. Cf. also Ibn Hawqal, Kitâb Sûrat al-Ard, ed. M. J. De Goeje, Leiden 1873, p. 198. Al-Muqaddasî, Ahsan al-Taqâsîm fî Ma‘rîfat al-Aqâlîm, ed. M. J. De Goeje, Leiden 1877, p. 426. 12 Al-Istakhrî, Kitâb al-Masâlik....cit., p. 133 on; Ibn Hawqal, Kitâb Sûrat al-Ard...cit., pp. 39-40 and 198-200; al-Muqaddasî, Ahsan alTaqâsîm...cit., pp. 442 et infra. 13 Saj - given by Steingass as a Sanskrit root saka - is the teak-tree: F. Steingass, Persian-English Dictionary, fourth impression, London 1957, p. 638. Cf. also R. Traini (ed.), Vocabolario Arabo-Italiano, Roma - Istituto per l’Oriente 1966- 1973, 3 vols., vol. 2: p. 540: tek quercia indiana (tectona grandis L.). 14 When Yâqût visited Siraf at the beginning of the 13th century, he observed the state of desolation of the city, but nonetheless he notes: “I saw remains of notable buildings and of a beautiful mosque adorned with teakwood columns”, Yâqût, Mu‘jam al-Buldân...cit., p. 332. Istakhrî mentions three mosques built at Siraf (Istakhrî, Kitâb alMasâlik....cit., p. 106), which does not contradict the archaeological evidence (see D. Whitehouse, Siraf: the Congregational Mosque and other Mosques...cit.). With regard to the palaces - or manours - see alIstakhrî, Kitâb al-Masâlik....cit., p. 127; Ibn Hawqal, Kitâb Sûrat alArd...cit., pp. 39-40; al-Muqaddasî, Ahsan al-Taqâsîm...cit., p. 426. Cf. also Abû al-Fidâ’, Géographie...cit., p. 96. Istakhrî provides us with a particularly lively description of the opulence of the city of Siraf in his time, and states that one merchant had spent as much as 30.000 dînâr for the building of a certain palace. 15 See specifically al-Muqaddasî, Ahsan al-Taqâsîm...cit., pp. 426-427, and p. 442 et infra. This Author gives a minute description of the goods which were traded at Siraf, coming from all ports of the known world of the time. Cf. also Ibn al-Balkhî, Fârs-nâmah...cit., pp. 136-137. Telling evidence of this cosmopolitan and mercantile dimension, and of its diachronical reality, are also the data (coins and monumental inscriptions) collected and published by N. M. Löwick, The Coins and Monumental Inscriptions, The British Institute of Persian Studies Siraf XV, London 1985. These well complement and integrate the literary evidence.

When, at the end of the 10th century, new dynastic upheavals occurred on the Iranian plateau, defeating and 16 The history of Abû Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Umar al-Sîrâfî is integrated later into Ibn Hawqal’s work, and dates from the 12th century AD. Râmisht of Siraf was a well-known figure of his time, mentioned in the most varied sources (historical and otherwise). Abû al-Qâsim Râmisht ibn al-Husayn ibn Shîrawaghî ibn al-Husayn ibn Ja‘far of the province of Fârs - as he is recorded on his tombstone, lost but transcribed by alShaybî (Brockelmann, II, p. 222) - died around 1140 AD. He was a merchant of incalculable wealth and legendary fame, a well-known benefactor and pious man, mentioned by several authors in connection with the gift of a hospice at Mecca. He is also mentioned in al-Fâsî (Shifâ’ al-Gharâm fî Akhbâr al-Balad al-Harâm, ed. Cairo 1955, vol. 1, p. 103), and in Ibn Zuhayrah, Al-Jâmi’ al-Latîf fî Fadl Makka wa Ahli-hâ wa Binâ’ al-Bayt al-Sharîf, Cairo 1922, p. 107. He is also mentioned by Ibn al-Athîr, Ibn Jubayr and others. See the very short but documented note by S. M. Stern, Râmisht of Sîrâf, a merchant millionaire of the twelfth century, in “JRAS”, 1967, pp. 10-14.

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Baluchistan crushing the Buyids’ military supremacy, largely contributing to the decline of Siraf, too, the power of the great Merchant Families did not come to an end. They emigrated and rebuilt their economic empire elsewhere.

life. Agriculture, already seriously compromised by depopulation and by the effort of providing supplies for an army of great proportions and permanently in arms, was completely annihilated. Land taxes were levied on the basis of irrigated lands and not on the amount of crops. Years of droughts followed, bringing famine and plague, which starved and decimated, sowing further death and adding more desolation amidst towns and villages: “...there is no longer a single drop of milk or one ounce of fat - mourns ‘Utbî - and the region is shorn flat as the palm of a hand”19.

The process of identification between merchant class, landowners and administrative functionaries being completed by that time17, such families were rapidly becoming - within set limits - the real shaping forces behind all fortunes and misfortunes of the provinces bordering or gravitating on these seas. Thus, they would become the organising force and the true protagonists of the life of the great banadir and bulayd which dominated the life of these eastern seas.

And so, when - due to devastating incursions of Turkish bands - communications with Siraf began to be too dangerous and, finally, were interrupted, then the gradual exodus of its ‘economic’ population began.

These merchants with their legendary riches - which concentrated capital, trade and landed property in their hands - did not constitute just a trading and international financial power. Also learned figures, shrewd politicians, and respected qadis, they had in their hands immense de facto power, and such power would enable them to rule and/or condition for centuries the political life of the Gulf and all geographical regions revolving around this sea. For at least three-four centuries, they would be the de facto power which ruled the life of the Gulf and of the geographical area dependent upon it.

Colonies of Sirafis - with their wealth and net of influential connections as yet still intact, with their international range of business still very active - would be found in numerous ports and emporia all along the Gulf and its hinterland (and not limited to this area alone): Qays, Khûnj, Fâl, Lâr, Harmûz (still on terrafirma), Qatîf, Julfar, Qalhat, Tîbî, Sûhâr, Rustâq, Masqat, Aden...and even farther afield, along the shores of the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, and westwards to the Mediterranean basin20.

1.2. The mercantile and cosmopolitan dimension of the Seas: the Merchant Families vis-à-vis the Turkish reality

They still retained in their hands immense de facto power, and such power would enable them to come to terms with and control for centuries the new military powers ruling also the Gulf region. Their nisbah “al-Sîrâfî” would become a sort of legendary symbol of their glorious past, when - having abandoned one or another decayed centre or harbour - they would rebuild their economic and political empire elsewhere. Their sarrafs and wakils represented a definite presence in the main ports and outlets throughout the international trade network. Given these contacts, they could survive the political turnovers and the decline of one or another centre, settling elsewhere and starting a new life and fortune somewhere else in the Gulf region.

When, at the turn of the century, the first systematic expeditions of Seljuk and Turkmen groups began to lay waste Khurasan and, thrusting even deeper into the region, reached the sea shores with even more devastating effects, the military power of the time - the Ghaznavid sultan - did not succeed in re-establishing internal order nor in preventing new attacks. The rich and so far unspoilt province of Fârs, too, was not to escape the Turkmen lust for plunder, the region experiencing the horrors of war and depredation, the country being laid waste in its turn by the Oghuz tribes and other no less rapacious nomadic groups (especially Kurds, Balûs and Shabânkarâ’îs)18. The final result was the decline of urban

According to the available literature (Wâqidi, Narshakhî, Sam‘ânî, Gardîzî and Bayhaqî above all21), the

17 See specifically V. Piacentini Fiorani, Practice in Mediaeval Government...cit., and Idem, Merchant Families in the Gulf...cit. 18 Alp Arslan’s army marched into Fârs after besieging Jîruft (459 AH/1067 AD). Isfahan and the surrounding region had already suffered severely when Tughril Beg beleaguered the city in 442 AH/1050-1051 AD. A similiar fate was averted in Shiraz by the local governor. However, in the end, sharp dissension among Abû Kâlîjâr’s sons marked - with the disruption and collapse of the Dailamite dynasty - the end of Buyid dominion in what had been the cultural heart of their power and glory. A primary source in this respect is the chronicle by Muhammad ibn Ibrâhîm, Târîkh-i Seljuqiyyân-i Kirmân, ed. M. T. Houtsma, Leiden 1886, pp. 4-10. Cf. also Ibn al-Athîr, Al-Kâmil fî alTârîkh, ed. C. J. Tornberg, Leiden 1851-1876, vol. 9, pp. 349-350.; Ibn al-Balkhî, Fârs-nâmah...cit., pp. 136-137; Bayhaqî, Târîkh-i Bayhaqî, ed. A. Bahmânyâr, Tehran 1317 AH sh./1938 AD, pp. 78-83. In Arabic the Baluch are called Balûs/Bulûs, and are mentioned together with a people called Qufs, with a characteristic voiceless spirant s for the corresponding Iranian plosive ch (Kûfich), and sometimes with the Kurds. According to R. N. Frye, Kûfich probably is a generic term for mountaineer (MP kôfîk; OP *Kaufaka, Av. Kaofa):

R. N. Frye, Remarks on Baluchi History, “Central Asiatic Journal”, 6 (1961), pp. 44-50, specif. pp. 46-47. See also below § 2.1 and note (28). 19 Al-‘Utbî, Al-Târîkh al-Yamînî, al-Qahira 1286/1869 (pers. trans. Tehran 1334 AH sh./1995 AD), p. 158. 20 See J. Aubin, La ruine de Sîrâf et les routes du Golfe Persique aux XIème et XIIème siècles, in “Cahiers de Civilisation Médiévale”, 10-12 (1959), 2-3, pp. 295-301; Idem, La sourvie de Shilau et la route du Khûnj-o-Fâl, in “Iran”, 7 (1969), pp. 21-37; V. Fiorani Piacentini, Merchants - Merchandise and Military Power...cit., specif. pp. 163 on; Idem, Merchant Families in the Gulf...cit. 21 al-Wâqidî, Abû ‘Abd Allâh Muhammad, Kitâb al-Maghâzî, ed. A. von Kremer, Calcutta 1855-1856; Narshakhî, Abû Bakr Muhammad, Târîkh-i Bukhârâ, ed. C. Schefer, Paris 1892; Sam‘ânî, Abû al-Qâsim Ahmad ibn Mansûr, Kitâb al-Ansâb, ed. D. S. Margoliouth, Leiden London 1912; Gardîzî, Abû Sa‘îd, Zayn al-Akhbâr, ed. M. Nâzim, Berlin 1928; Bayhaqî, Abû al-Fadl, Târîkh-i Mas‘ûdî, ed. Q. Ghânî and ‘A. A. Fayyâd, Tehran 1324 AH sh./1945 AD, 3 vols.; Idem, Târîkh-i

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: Trade, Migrations and Military Operations (9th - 11th Centuries AD) continental state of anarchy and institutional chaos following the break down of Ghaznavid dominion in Iran did not entail the death of urban life and of its structure. The causes are probably to be sought once more in the very structure of the urban life itself, and in particular in the attitude of its social and economic classes and their different reaction towards the arrival of new conquerors, as well as in their capability of adapting their policy to the new individual realities22.

virtually returned to the dimension of a small village renowned for its shipyard - new political equilibriums were established, which definitely brought to the fore new centres and new powers: Fâl, Khûnj, Lâr, Kâzirûn, Abzar, Qays and Harmûz emerge along the Iranian shore. But beyond the supremacy of these new centres there is still the overall predominance of the same Merchant Families who had forged the history and destiny of Buyid Fârs and Shiraz with their riches and cunning.

The new Turkish Lords, being concerned above all in conquering an empire and enlarging it through the military acquisition of ever more territories, delegated to others the institutional and administrative control and care of the conquered provinces. Thus, we can see the kuttâb emerge again. Similarly, we also see the completion of the gradual, increasing identification between merchant class, landowners and administration officials. This was already under way at the end of the Samanid rule (892 AD c.), from which the powerful families of the Seljuk viziers were to emerge several decades later - and later on the Il-Khanids, too, would take on the same functionaries. And thus, along with the kuttâb we can see these merchant-families emerging again, those same merchant-families who predominated at Shiraz at the time of Buyid splendour.

During the 10th and the 11th centuries we are thus faced with the image of a positive mobile, cosmopolitan and active mercantile society: the Sirafis, the Falis and the Abzaris (who gained access to public offices and were among the most reputed qadis of the time), the Kazirunis (whose support for the Buyid seizure of power in Fârs has already been underlined elsewhere24), the rising fortune of the Laris (a powerful tariqah), and the Tibis are among the most outstanding and imposing families of the time, who gave renewed prosperity to both shores of the Gulf, and renewed centrality to all crafts and commercial activities during the Seljuk period. Convoys moved East-West and West-East along the monsoon routes. Coasting was lively and active. Carriers made fortunes by importing and exporting precious items such as raw materials (like timber, teak, mangrove poles), manufactured goods (such as silk and brocade), or other precious items like precious and semi-precious stones (lapis-lazuli, turquoise, carnelian etc.), ivory, porcelain and pottery, spices, amber, ostrich feathers, pearls of every size and of the rarest beauty, horses, slaves etc. from Africa, India and the Far-East to the Mediterranean basin and its civilisations.

Rich landowners, able and capable merchants and financial administrators, astute entrepreneurs, Wassâf and the Fârs-nâmah talk at length about them, proving the vitality of the trading tradition of the Fârs, which went well beyond the period of ‘economic stagnation’ of the Seljuk governorship and civil wars along the Arabian coast23. Thus, combining economic and political prestige, they could exercise ever tighter control over their mercantile empire and the political-military power of their time. The systemic structure of power underwent a brisk turnover, the Turkish - and Mongol-Turkish - element emerging and finally having the upper hand. But the regional balance of powers would not be drastically altered. Emigration and movements of population were unceasing in the Gulf, and whenever there was disruption in one place or another, families moved with even greater facility. Thus, between the second half of the 11th century and the second half of the 12th - by which time Siraf had

2. Focus on Makran 2.1. Boundary region and a land of passage for military operations During the 10th century Siraf reached the apogee of its prosperity, being among those cities privileged to mint silver, too. In this precise mercantile worldwide context we can also fit Makran: a land for trade, migrations and military operations. As already stated above, we must keep in mind the twofold dimension of the region, that is: • the seaboard, with its minor and major ports of call, one of the main participants in the mercantile network of the time. Its importance was well known to the world at peace and at war, both through active trading contacts there, and because it offered excellent

Bayhaqî, ed. Sa‘îd Nafîsî, Tehran 1319-1333 AH sh./ 1940-1953 AD, 3 vols.; Bayhaqî, Zahîr al-Dîn Abû al-Hasan ‘Alî ibn Zayd, Târîkh-i Bayhaq...cit. 22 Specific analysis of the events which occurred in the forty years of Ghaznavid rule in Iran, and the evolution of the systemic structure of given social realities, is to be found in: V. Piacentini Fiorani, Practice in Mediaeval Persian Government...cit., pp. 52 on. 23 Trade along the Arabian coast at the time was experiencing a period of notable decadence due both to civil wars - which were lacerating the region - and the Fatimid competition - which had temporarily diverted a large part of the mercantile traffic from the Gulf to the Red Sea - as is well attested also by archaeological excavations, material evidence well complementing literary data. See B. Lewis, The Fâtimids and the Route to India, in “Revue de la Faculté des Sciènces Economiques de l’Université d’Istanbul”, 11 (1953), pp. 112-123.

24

V. Piacentini Fiorani, Merchant Families in the Gulf... cit., specif. pp. 151 on. See in particular Ibn al-Mujâwir, Târîkh al-Mustahsîr, ed. O. Löfgren, Leiden 1951, I vol., p. 43 et infra; Mu’în al-Dîn Junayd alShîrâzî, Shadd al-Izâr, eds. Qazvînî and Eqbâl, Tehran 1327 AH sh./1958-1959 AD, p. 61, 215, 421, 427-428, 517-527 et infra. See also the well documented study by A. Eqtedârî, Lâristân-i Kuhnah, Tehran 1344 AH sh./1955-1956 AD.

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Baluchistan opportunities for piracy and raiding expeditions, too. The port-emporium of Daybul, the target in its turn of the unfortunate raid commanded by Mughîrah ibn Abî al-‘Âs, was particularly important at the time and controlled - with the Indus system - an immense volume of trade25. • the hinterland, with its ruthless peoples nestling in the inhospitable gorges of the Ranges, its ‘green belt’ delimited by “the River” (al-Tabarî’s al-Nahr) and punctuated by luxuriant palmgroves and orchards, its bazaars crammed full with goods and other valuable merchandise, the latter also being the product of a local skilled craft.

The first Arab overseas expeditions under the aegis of Islam are reported as occurring around the year 11 or 15 of the Hijrah, during the caliphate of ‘Umar ibn alKhattâb (634-644). According to Tabarî, under the command of Hakam ibn ‘Amrû al-Taghlîbî, the Muslim army penetrated as far as Makran and arrived at the River, where it joined combat with the local peoples. But Hakam did not cross the River, and remained on this side. The king of Sind arrived with a great army, unexpectedly crossed the River, combat was fierce on both sides until Hakam gained the upper hand and drove the king of Sind back across the River, himself remaining with his army on the west bank. Yet still according to Tabarî, it was after this episode that ‘Umar forbade any further undertaking across the River or any other overseas expedition, because “he held the sea in great fear”29 .

The author of the Fathnâmah-i-Sind informs us about an ambitious Brahman prince of Sind, who, taking advantage of the internal disorder of the neighbouring empire and of the power vacuum brought about by the collapse of its central political authority, promptly turned to the West, extending his authority so far as to include Makran - a disputed frontier region. Tabarî, Balâdhurî and the Fathnâmah provide us with unanimous accounts and traditions. The third, complementing the first two, refers in details to Chach’s expedition towards Kirman: “...between Makrân and Kirmân there is a wide river, and here Chach pitched camp. At this spot, and along the river, Chach ibn Silâ’ij planted numerous palm trees, decreeing that the river and surrounding palm-groves would be the extreme limits of his kingdom, marking the boundary between Makrân and Kirmân”26. So that, when we come to the first expeditions of the Arabs under the aegis of Islam, then - in the same chronicles - we find mention again of “the River” (the al-Nahr of the Arab court historians, and the Jû’î - or running stream - of the Fathnâmah-i-Sind) and of those regions to the north where a fierce and still un-subjected population lived in arms: the Ahl al-Qiqân, in the Bilâd al-Qiqân, according to the Arab chroniclers, or the Mardum-i Kûh-i Kikânân of the Fathnâmah, renowned for their beautiful white horses27, settled in the Ard-i Mardum-i Kûh-i Kikânân not distant from the Kûh-i Kurdân28.

Nor did things change with the accession of ‘Uthmân to the caliphate, although Tabarî gives 29-30 AH as the date of another military expedition to Makran, aimed at reestablishing once again the River as the border between the Arab domains and the Sind. This river firmly remained the eastern limit of Arab advance eastwards, all military operations being by that time concentrated to the north-eastern Khurasanian theatre. It has already been stressed elsewhere how, to Arab explorers of the 8th century AD dispatched into those 432), the caliph ‘Alî had appointed Hârith ibn Murrah al-‘Abdî on the Indian front by the end of 38 AH or at the beginning of 39 AH, where he achieved memorable victories. However, it was in 42 AH that he, along with his forces, perished in a battle against the Kikânân. This is stated on the authority of Hudhalî, that is Abû Bakr al-Hudhalî, one of the first generation of the great Muslim chroniclers, who was one of the most reputed scholars on the history of the eastern lands of the Caliphate. Cf. also Yâqût, Mu‘jam al-Buldân after Balâdhurî; this chronicler states, however, that it was in 47 AH that ‘Abdullâh ibn Sawwâr attacked Qayqânân (=the capital city of the Ahl al-Qîqân), where Turks had gathered in considerable strength; here he and most of his army perished in battle. 28 Fathnâmah-i-Sind...cit., p. 10, 55. 29 Tabarî, Târîkh...cit., I, pp. 2707-2709: this chronicler’s account is particularly detailed and meaningful. He reports on caliph ‘Umar who constantly forbade any military action to be taken by sea against Sind. He states that it was 23 AH (when caliph ‘Umar was still alive) when Hakam ibn ‘Amrû al-Taghlîbî - Muslim commander on the Makran front - took action against the local peoples who had broken the River Treaty. He attacked and pursued them up to the River (al-Nahr), but did not cross it over and stopped on this side. While the Muslim army was encamped there, the enemy crossed over the River in force and attacked the army of Islam. As a result, long drawn battles were fought and the enemy was finally defeated, the Muslims advanced again up to the River. Hakam ibn ‘Amrû al-Taghlîbî then sent Sûhâr al-‘Abdî to report to ´Umar on whose enquiries Suhâr gave a brief report on the miseries of Makran, its landscapes and ruthless inhabitants (similar to what is ascribed to Hakam - Hukaym or Hakîm - ibn Jabâlah). On hearing this report - always according to al-Tabarî - Caliph ‘Umar decided against sending any expedition against Sind, and also ordered his general Hakam ibn ‘Amrû al-Taghlîbî to stay on this side of the River and never to cross over to the other side, because he had the sea in great fear. And again, a similar episode is reported by this same historian in connection with 29-30 AH, when the caliph Uthmân sent a new expedition under the command of ‘Ubaydallâh ibn Mu‘amar alTamîmî to restore order along the Makrani border, giving strict orders not to cross the River or to undertake any sea expedition against Sind: Tabarî, Târîkh...cit., I, pp. 2829 on. Cf. also Balâdhurî, Futûh alBuldân...cit., p. 432, and above note (26).

25

See also above, V. Piacentini Fiorani, Intercontinental Indian Ocean Routes..., specif. § 4, § 5 and see endnote (13), p.108. For Mughîrah ibn Abî al-‘Âs raid, see in particular the Fathnâmah-i Sind...cit., p. 52, and Balâdhurî, Futûh al-Buldân...cit., pp. 431-432. Both chronicles begin the description of the Arab incursions to Sind with this tradition, that is, the dispatch of a raiding enterprise. 26 Fathnâmah-i Sind...cit., pp. 34-35. See also Tabarî, Târîkh...cit., I, pp. 2707-2709, and ibid. pp. 2829 - 2831: it was the year 29 AH when the caliph ‘Uthmân finally decided to take action against the Sindhian ruler, and despatched ‘Ubaydallâh ibn Mu‘amar al-Tamîmî, who defeated and annihilated the enemy - that is Chach’s forces - on the Makran side of the River (al-Nahr) and advanced up to the River again. This last episode is given also by the Fathnâmah (Fathnâmah-i Sind...cit., pp. 52-54), but the traditionists’ chain is weak, the Battle of the River is reported as occurring in the very last days of ‘Umar’s caliphate, thence ‘Uthmân sent a punishing expedition against Sind; moreover this account is connected with Jabalah’s story (cf. also. Balâdhurî, Futûh al-Buldân...cit., p. 432). 27 Fathnâmah-i Sind...cit., p. 10, 55-56, 57 on. Actually, in Sindhi Kaykân means an excellent horse. According the folklore and local oral poetry, the best breeds - still called Kaykanaian horses - came from the northern Sarawan part of Kalat. See also Balâdhurî, Futûh...cit., p. 432, 433, 434. According to Balâdhurî (Balâdhurî, Futûh al-Buldân...cit., p.

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: Trade, Migrations and Military Operations (9th - 11th Centuries AD) remote and largely unknown territories, Makran appeared as a barren land, scorched by the sun, unimaginably inhospitable, inhabited by extremely pugnacious and ruthless peoples. There was no forage for horses and mules, the only fruit was dates, water was scarce, the landscape was rocky and stony. The most frequent complaint was that a large army would not have found provisions to survive while a small contingent would inevitably have been massacred in ambushes to which both the nature of the terrain, and the temperament of the men who lived there, so aptly lent themselves. And actually many armies of Islam perished, massacred by those treacherous peoples.

hinterland, torn apart by tribalism and internal rifts under the sovereignty of a foreign brahman ruler, military operations and incursions limited to raids and border violations which yielded rich booty but also might reverse into bloody defeats, on the one hand. And on the other, we have the seaboard, facing the “Bahr al-Fârs”31, where trade was still carried on in its harbours and emporiums, celebrated for the prodigious wealth of goods produced and traded in the region. This is the framework, as minutely recorded in the res gestae of the Arabs, and well complemented by the later Persian source, the Fathnâmah-i Sind, which - beyond the usual embellishments of such a genre - does not, however, contradict either the silences of the Arab historiography or the evidence provided by other sources, such as archaeology, numismatics et alia. When we arrive at the 8th century, and Muhammad ibn al-Qâsim’s expedition, we have once again a clear perception of these two dimensions: quick flashes and very few data to be extrapolated from all available sources. However, the accounts of battles, raids, quick retreats, pursuits, surrendering pacta, rebellions, conquests and subjections provide us with an initial local image, that of a great mobility in space, strong tribalism, and a stratified society in the hinterland. Conversely, piracy and trade predominated along the seaboard within a cosmopolitan, no less mobile and mercantile context. Two distinct realities.

These sour reports depict the hinterland, and its local reality as it appeared to these first enterprising explorers, whose main object was to inform the Caliph on the possibility of transforming that west-east natural corridor with its greenery and palm-groves into a military base for further expeditions into neighbouring territories30. Thus we are facing a positive twofold dimension, which always characterised the history and life of this area: the 30 As stressed above, due to its crucial geographical position as the main natural route connecting the Iranian plateau with the Indus plain and system, and Central Asia with the Indian Ocean, at the time of the great eastward Arab military campaigns (7th-8th centuries AD) Makran represented at one and the same time a “military boundary” and a “major port and outlet”. More than one “explorer” was sent by the caliphs to report on those remote and little known lands. Concerning the first Arab undertakings and final conquest of Makran, we have a rich historiographic genre pertaining to the Kutub al-Futûh. Balâdhurî (d. 892 AD) has left us a dry but no less vivid account of the Makrani campaigns up to Muhammad ibn al-Qâsim al-Thaqafî‘s expedition. Ya‘qûbî devotes a few pages to Muhammad ibn al-Qâsim, his account being only an abridged version of al-Balâdhurî’s chronicle. Al-Tabarî (839-923 AD) devotes a richly detailed description to the Arab conquest of the north-eastern regions (the Mâ warâ’ al-Nahr), neglecting this no less important front of the Arab military campaigns to the east. Another great - though later - Arab historian, Ibn al-Athîr, provides us with a faithful but very brirf account, which is another abridged version of al-Balâdhurî's Futûh al-Buldân. Referring also to the renowned Arab adab, such as the Kâmil and the Kitâb al-Aghânî, these do not give us further information. Reference to Islamic historiography must include another work, largely debated but - in my personal opinion - no less important: the Fathnâmah-i Sind. It pertains to the “epic vein” - typical of Persian and Indian literature after the 11th century AD - narrating heroic deeds, where myth, fairy-tales and history meet and intertwine. It is a work which centres on the life of the brahman ruler Chach, and contains important passages on the campaigns fought by the Arabs and by Muhammad ibn al-Qâsim “the most valiant among the most valiant heroes of his time”. Despite its often “bombastic” and rhetorical style, this latter source may provide us with valuable information. It does not contradict al-Balâdhurî’s chronicle and his lucid and effective narrative of events. On the contrary, carefully sifting reality from legend, this work provides us with precious details which fit and integrate the Arab historiographic literature, becoming an excellent complement, especially when it refers to some social aspects of local society and life, regions, cities, places, etc. Cf. in this respect V. Piacentini Fiorani, Arab expeditions overseas in the seventh century A.D. Working hypotheses on the dissolution of the Sasanian state apparatus along the eastern seaboard of the Arabian Peninsula, in “PSAS” 32 (2002); Idem, History and Historiography: the Court Genre in Arabic and the Fathnâmah-i Sind, in “JESHO”, 2002 (forthcoming). See also above, V. Piacentini Fiorani, International Indian Ocean Routes..., specif. endnote (13), p. 108. On this subject I shall return in the following numbers of this series.

But at the start of the 9th century, Makran is a recomposed region, the hinterland actively interacting with the coastal lands within a new mercantile worldwide dimension, whose close relationship is well documented by the geographers of the time. And this new reality takes us back to Siraf and the Shirazi order. 2. 2. The mercantile dimension: a mobile, cosmopolitan and active society However, beyond the narrative of military events, and carefully sifting reality from legend, this same historiographic genre provides us with some information on the local life and society as it appeared to court historiography at the start of the 8th century: renowned cities with their merchant-colonies, bazaars full of valuable merchandise, idols, temples and powerful religious dignitaries, impressive palm-groves which had no equal in the world in extension and derived products. We find specific mention of Kech (Kich/Kij), a city “which equalled in size and splendour the most important and renowned cities of Sind”. Here we find specific reference to Quzdâr/Khuzdar and to Kanzpûr/Panjgur32, with its shrines, pîrs and palm-groves, and with its powerful ‘priests’ coming to terms with Chach first, and with the Arabs later on, and negotiating the amân with 31

In connection with this definition see below, and notes (36) and (40). And its numerous variants such as Panjpûr/KanzpûrQanzbûr/Fannazbûr-Fanzbûr/Kanjpûr, etc. 32

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Baluchistan both. Here we find, too, the narrative of the fierce resistance put up by the Ahl al-Qiqân (the above mentioned Mardum-i Kûh-i Kikânân33), the Mêds’ outflanking manoeuvres34, and the Jats’ expeditions and incursions by sea and at sea35. A few glimpses of a marginal frontier region, which however provide us with an insight into what happened in Makran and what the local realities and patterns of life were.

Istakhrî, Ibn Hawqal, Muqaddasî, Ibn Rûstah and the Anonymous Author of the Hudûd al-‘Âlam provide us with a lively description of the region, which they call “al-Mukrân”36. It is a large balad, delimited by the Indus river (the Mihrân) to the east, and by Kîrmân and Sijistân to the west, bordered by the other districts of Tûrân - with its capital-city (qasabah) of Quzdâr -, Multân, Hind and Sind proper. Its shores face the Bahr al-Fârs.

These, in fact, are positive precious details which perfectly fit and integrate another literary genre, the geographical one, which becomes in its turn an excellent complement to the historical genre.

Preliminarily, and before entering into further detail, two specific points deserve special attention: 1. we can see that the Muslim geographers of the time always distinguish the Sind from the Hind, with the toponym Sind approximately identifying present-day Baluchistan and the lower regions of the Indus system up to Arôr; 2. the definition given to the sea that delimited the coastal strip of the region, that is the Bahr al-Fârs: “the Bahr al-Fârs starts from Qulzum as far as Âbâdân - writes Ibn Hawqal - then it crosses the mouth of the Tigris up to the coast where Manrubân is, and as far as Jannabah. It then passes the point of the Fârs at Sîrâf and continues right to the coast of Harmûz, beyond the Kirmân; then to Daybul and the coast of Multân, which is part of the coast of Sind”37.

But apart from the few glimpses recalled above, according to our sources we may say that, all in all, during the 8th century the military aspect prevails, tribal and nomadic/semi-nomadic movements and/or migrations certainly disturbing settled life and its traditional patterns. The military dimension of the hinterland emerges with great vividness: the Belt and its passages are a positive natural corridor, where the Makrani population put up fierce resistance against the Armies of Islam and the Arabs. As far as these last are concerned, Makran’s hinterland, delimited by the River, is a passage land for conquest and control, the natural base for military operations towards the opulence of the Indus plain and its fabulous riches.

The same authors paint - beyond the sharp description of the moon-like landscapes of Makran with its black rocky hills, steep slopes ravined by devastating rainfall, scorched by the sun and the hot summer wind (the gwat) an incisive picture of the active life of the region.

The seaboard lives its own life, within a maritime and mercantile dimension and context. Daybul, notwithstanding everything, still dominates.

By that time, Makran’s hinterland - no longer a barren land devastated by military campaigns and institutional chaos - was rich in densely populated cities and minor centres surrounded by orchards, gardens and cultivated fields. Along the coastal strip passing convoys called at well-sheltered harbours. Here flourished activities of all kinds related to urban life, as well as an extremely active land and sea-trade, too, with the Iranian world, with Central Asia, with the bordering districts of Tûrân, Multân, Sind and its glorious capital-city of alMansûrah38, and with other centres of the Hind and Sind

Then, within the framework of the new Arab military order, things begin to evolve and change. Makran did not lose its centrality. On the contrary, the region gained a new political, economic and strategic relevance: threshold of East and West, according to an extensive literature starting from the 9th century with precise reference to this newly acquired status. 33

See above § 2. 1 p. 124, and notes (27) and (28). Balâdhurî, Futûh al-Buldân...cit., p. 433, 434; Fathnâmah-i Sind...cit., pp. 56 -61. Both chronicles ascribe to the Mêds and to their outflanking manoeuvres the Arabs’ defeats. See also above, and note (27). 35 Fathnâmah-i-Sind...cit., pp. 98, 166 (“the Jats/Juts and others settled to the west of the Indus”, who fought heavily against Muhammad ibn al-Qâsim). This chronicle provides us with rich information in connection with this tribe and its movements. Actually, in this respect, we have also other sources. At the beginning of the 12th century, for example, we find that Siraf and its districts were in the hands of a tribal chief, Abû al-Qâsim, of the Jat tribe: Ibn al-Balkhî, Fârs-nâmah...cit., p. 136. Wassâf, Târîkh-i Wassâf...cit., pp. 174-175. Wassâf mentions a certain Abû Dulaf as Amir of the Jat tribe, dating his life to a later period. He praises the courage and generosity of this chief. During the excavations carried out at Siraf in 1968, one very interesting inscription was brought to light, where the name of one of the Jat tribal chiefs at the end of the 12th century occurs. See D. Whitehouse, Excavations at Siraf - Second Interim Report, in “Iran” (1969), 7, p. 44. Cf also N. M. Löwick, The Coins...cit., pp. 88-89 (and his interpretation of the said inscription). 34

36 Istakhrî, Kitâb al-Masâlik...cit., pp. 170-171, 172, 177-180; Ibn Hawqal, Kitâb Sûrat al-Ard...cit., pp. 226, 231-235, 287; alMuqaddasî, Ahsan al-Taqâsîm....cit., pp. 258, 475-476, 478, 484-485; Ibn Rûstah, Al-A‘lâq al-Nafîsah... cit., p. 96, 97; Hudûd al-‘l’Alam, by anonymous author, ed. V. Minorsky with preface by V. V. Barthold, Oxford 1937, text pp. 122-123, comm. pp. 371-373. 37 One would be tempted to give to this definition an economic dimension in close connection with the political reality of the moment. In other words, one may be tempted to see a systemic mercantile structure of its own imposing its own rules over the seas and bordering regions: the Bahr al-Fârs, which included not only the Persian Gulf, but also the Indian Ocean as far as Sind - according to Ibn Hawqal and the Red Sea: Ibn Hawqal, Kitâb Sûrat al-Ard...cit., p. 36. Cf. also Istakhrî, Kitâb al-Masâlik...cit., pp. 28-29; Yâqût, Mu‘jam alBuldân...cit., p. 84; Ibn Rûstah, Al-A‘lâq al-Nafîsah...cit., p. 93. See also above § 1: The worldwide context..., p. 119, and below note (40). 38 Referring to al-Mansûrah, the site has been surveyed and excavated by Ahmad Nabi Khan, former Director General of the Federal Department for Archaeology and Museums, Karachi - Pakistan. See

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: Trade, Migrations and Military Operations (9th - 11th Centuries AD) as far as to China (the “al-Sîn” of this geographical literature). And at the other end of the monsoon routes there were the Arabian peninsula, the coasts of East Africa (the Bilâd al-Zanj) and Mahatittha39. Then, through the Persian Gulf or the Red Sea, the traded items could reach the Levant and the Mediterranean basin.

The Hudûd al-‘Âlam provides us with other details in connection with the local artisanal life, which was active and lively as well: “...the region has few amenities - it states - but numerous merchants are found in it. The country produces skins (pûst), leather (charm), red abank, shoes (na‘layn), dates (khurmâ’) and sugar-candy (panîdh)”46.

Undoubtedly, Makran stands out as one among the prominent participants in the network of overseas trade.

These same authors give us the names of the most important and prominent localities of Makran, their distances and itineraries, all quoted after Istakhrî with some variants and a noteworthy tendency to Iranicize the placenames. Tîz is “an important harbour on the sea-route to al-Basrah, where the ships are accustomed to call”47. Kîz/Kîs/Kîj/Kij is a very large city “half the size of Multân”... “the residence of the ruler of Makrân”48. However, according to Istakhrî the largest town of Makran is Fannazbûr (vars. Fanzbûr, Fannajbûr, Bannajbûr, Fanjûr...likely the present day city of Panjgûr49): “...and there, there is a fort (qasr) - states Muqaddasî - surrounded by a trench”50. This placename occurs also in the Fathnâmah-i Sind, in connection with the wars between the Brahman ruler Chach and the Persians51. Minor centres, but no less relevant along the land caravan routes, are Dizak, Rask, Fuhlafharah, Isfâq (or Iskâf in Istakhrî), Bind, Bih, Qasrqand (the Kushk-i Qand of Muqaddasî)...and the fabulous cities of Qanbalî and Armâbîl52.

And undoubtedly, too, this is a worldwide context, over which Siraf and the mercantile power of Shiraz, the “Shirazi” families, dominated by imposing their own rules40. When the geographers describe Makran and its life, they unanimously give us the lively picture of a prosperous region, where cities had beautiful houses and many mosques, and “where it was possible to meet people coming from every region of the world: from al-Basrah and from the Fars, from Khurasan, Kirman and Sijistan, people from Balkh and Samarqand in Central Asia, or from every district of the Hind and Sind”41. The local population - they say - spoke fârsî and a local dialect that Istakhrî calls Makrî42. According to Muqaddasî, who wrote his book one century later circa, these people were Balûsî, even if large communities of Persians and Hindis were settled in the main centres and harbours of the region, both in the hinterland and along the coastal strip43. They wore rich colourful local costumes44. Their religion was generally Muslim, although it was well possible to meet Hindus, Kufr and Zardushts (Zoroastrians)45 .

Ahmad Nabi Khan, Al-Mansurah. A Forgotten Arab Metropolis in Pakistan, Department for Archaeology and Museums - Karachi 1990. 39 See above, V. Piacentini Fiorani, International Indian Ocean Routes... specif. § 4 p. 90, and endnotes (11) and (12). 40 It is precisely in connection with the ninth century that we can find in all available literature precise reference to “Shirazi” migrations' towards the eastern coasts of Africa. It gave life to a thorny and hotly debated question, in which we find excellent names such as J. Kirkman, N. Chittick, M. Horton etc. In the mercantile context of the time, given the supremacy and mobility of Fârs merchants under Buyid military force and order, and within the special cosmopolitan framework just outlined above, one would be tempted to give to the “Shirazi migrations” phenomenon a regional and economic dimension more than a merely political one or view it as an act of conquest and dominion. Here again, one could see a systemic mercantile structure of its own imposing its own rules over the seas and bordering regions. It is interesting, too, to recall the definition of the Bahr al-Fârs given in the 9th and 10th centuries: the sea of Fârs included not only the Persian Gulf, but also the Indian Ocean as far as Sind - according to Ibn Hawqal - and the Red Sea. See: Ibn Hawqal, Kitâb Sûrat al-Ard...cit., p. 36); cf. also Istakhrî, Kitâb al-Masâlik...cit., pp. 28-29; Yâqût, Mu‘jam al-Buldân...cit., p. 84; Ibn Rûstah, Al-A‘lâq al-Nafîsah...cit., p. 93. See also above § 1, p 119. 41 Ibn Hawqal, Kitâb Sûrat al-Ard...cit., pp. 231-232. 42 Istakhrî, Kitâb al-Masâlik...cit., p. 177. 43 Al-Muqaddasî, Ahsan al-Taqâsîm....cit p. 478. 44 Istakhrî, Kitâb al-Masâlik...cit., p. 177. 45 Al-Muqaddasî, Ahsan al-Taqâsîm....cit., p. 479. Istakhrî, Kitâb alMasâlik...cit., p. 177, 178.

46

Hudûd al-’Âlam...cit., p. 122. Istakhrî, Kitâb al-Masâlik...cit., p. 171; Ibn Hawqal, Kitâb Sûrat alArd...cit., p. 233; al-Muqaddasî, Ahsan al-Taqâsîm....cit., p. 478 (this author qualifies Tîz as a “great” harbour); Hudûd al-’Âlam...cit., p. 123; see also Ptolemy, VI, 8. In connection with this toponym and the site, cf. M. A. Stein, Archaeological Reconnaissance in North-Western India and South-Eastern Iran, London 1937, pp. 87 on: “The old port of Tiz”. 48 Istakhrî, Kitâb al-Masâlik...cit., p. 171, 177 (“The prince of Mûkrân lives in the city of Kîz - vars. Kîs/Kîj - which is very large around half the size of Multân”); Ibn Hawqal, Kitâb Sûrat al-Ard...cit., p. 223 (“the city of Kîz, half the size of Multân, is the residence of the ruler of Mûkrân”); al-Muqaddasî, Ahsan al-Taqâsîm....cit., p. 475; Hudûd al’Âlam...cit., p. 123. Ibn Hawqal notes that this ruler was an Arab, whose name was ‘Isà ibn Madan. 49 Istakhrî, Kitâb al-Masâlik...cit., p. 170. Cf. also Ibn Hawqal, Kitâb Sûrat al-Ard...cit., p. 233, and above note (32). 50 Al-Muqaddasî, Ahsan al-Taqâsîm....cit., p. 478. 51 Fathnâmah-i-Sind...cit., text p. 34 (mss. vars. Kanzbûr/Kanzpûr; see also above note (32) ). 52 According to Istakhrî, these two placenames are Qanbalî and Armâ'il (Istakhrî, Kitâb al-Masâlik...cit., p. 171). See Ibn Hawqal, Kitâb Sûrat al-Ard...cit., p. 224 ('Qanbalî and Armâbîl, two great cities'); Al-Muqaddasî, Ahsan al-Taqâsîm....cit., p. 478; Hudûd al’Âlam...cit., p. 123. 47

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Baluchistan Some of these place-names can be easily identified. Tîz is the present day Tîz (Ptolemy, VI, 8: Τ±σα), which is situated in the bay of Chahbahar53. Kîz/Kîj is Kech, as the present area of Turbat is still called. Fannazbûr - with its numerous variants - is the present day Panjgûr area (city and surrounding territory, with its palmgroves, oases and scattered villages, where imposing remains of monuments and large sites still underline the central role played by this centre in the course of centuries if not millennia). Isfâq is the present day Ispâk (isp-asp/asb: a Parthian root?) south of Bampur. Dizak is the present name of a small centre situated south-west of Jâlk.

coasting and trans-oceanic - could take place in their harbours untouched, and they would remain among the safest and most sought after emporiums for convoys coming from India and the Far East, or from the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa loaded with merchandise for the Near East and the Mediterranean basin: the twofold dimension of Makran, the seaboard and its hinterland. It has already been discussed elsewhere the lack of systematic reconnaissance of Makrani and Sindi coastal physical environment, where - in the course of centuries...if not millennia - monsoon rains or other physical/anthropic factors may have easily caused erosion of many sites. However, as also already outlined, some research work has been carried out and still is under way57.

Thence we come to the city of Qanbalî: “...it lies at the distance of half a farsakh [around three kilometres54]on the way between Daybul and Qandâbîl in Makran”55 (see the general map of Makrani coastal region facing the Arabian Sea, Fig. 7.1 at the beginning of Part III – Focus on Makran). On the two place-names of Qanbalî and Armâbîl there exists a rich literature, which I refer to. Nevertheless, it is tempting to advance a working hypothesis on the basis of the archaeological and geomorphological surveys carried out by the Italian Historical, Archaeological and Anthropological Research-Project in Makran and Kharan in the course of the 1987, 1988 and 1989 field-seasons. Special attention has been dedicated to the coastal region, and in particular to the Pasni area. In the literature, Qandâbîl is always mentioned as an important centre and harbour-emporium along the sea trade-route to Daybul56, and it is always associated with Armâbîl, another prominent centre along the trade-route to Daybul, placed on the borders of Makran with Sind proper. All consulted geographical works dwell on these ports, both in connection with the caravan routes which linked them with the hinterland, and as ‘set stages’on the sea trade routes with Sind, China (alSîn) and the eastern coast of Africa. Furthermore, when invasions, wars, piracy, tribal and family rivalries upset the political order on the mainland, these two centres due to their location - would be marginally affected by these upheavals. Thriving commercial traffic - both

Coming to Makran and to the subject dealt with, actually the seaboard appears very poor in water. Parallel to the shoreline runs the eroded and ravined Southern Makran Range, whose slopes give life to various eco-cultural systems: the hilly and rocky one, the plains with their thick deposits of silt, the sand-dunes, and the coastal strip proper. Here, swamps, lagoons, khawrs with their salt deposits, sabkha deposits and recent sand-dune fields make both settlement and landing very difficult. Nevertheless, geo-morphological and archaeological research-work, carried out between present day Ormara and Jiwani/Gwattar Bay, has brought us to focus on the Pasni area (Fig. 8.1 – Pasni area: archaeological sites). No doubt Pasni is a recent toponym, which we find as such for the first time in Ibn Mâjid under the spelling of “Basanî”, when, at the start of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese fleet faced Makran and its coastal strip58. But apart from that historical event, well documented in both Arabic and Portuguese sources, this area has all the requisites of a favourable position: a well sheltered harbour with fresh water provided by a khawr, the present day Shadi Kaur, undoubtedly a natural harbour on the way to Sind and along the monsoon trans-oceanic routes. The surveys carried out have brought to light major and minor sites, thus revealing the presence of a large settled

53

See M. A. Stein, Archaeological Reconnaissances in India and South-Eastern Iran...cit., p. 87. 54 The Persian form farsang (mediaeval latin parasangus, i.e. parasango, engl. parasang) corresponds to the mediaeval-Arabic farsakh, pl. farâsikh. It is a measure of length which is “the equivalent of the distance covered by a donkey over one hour”, i.e. roughly 2 modern leagues or 12.000 cubits, about 6 kms. 55 With specific regard to Qandâbîl, cf. also the Fathnâmah-iSind...cit., text p. 35, 53, 63, 92, and Balâdhurî, Futûh al-Buldân...cit., p. 435 in connection with the Banu ‘Ilâfîs’ rebellion, their flight to Sind and Mujjâ‘ah’s pursuit to Qandâbîl. The problems - still largely unsolved - connected with itineraries across Mukrân/Makrân are many and arduous. See on this subject J. Markwart, Shahristan-ha-i Êrânsahr - A Catalogue of the Provincial Capitals of Êrânsahr, Pahlavi text, vers., comm. by J. Markwart in “Analecta Orientalia”, 3 (1933), Roma, pp. 177-199; H. Cousens, The Antiquities of India, Calcutta 1926, vol. 46 of the “Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India”; N. G. Majumdar, Explorations of Sind, ibid. vol. 48, Calcutta 1934; M. A. Stein, Archaeological Reconnaissances in India and South-Eastern Iran...cit., pp. 77 on. Cf. also Anderson, Bibliotheca Indica, 1852. 56 See above, V. Piacentini Fiorani, International Indian Ocean routes..., specif. § 4 pp. 95, and endnotes (3) and (12).

57 The inhospitable Makrani landscape has already been underlined elsewhere. See in this respect V. Piacentini Fiorani, Images of a little known region.. and Idem, International Indian Ocean Routes..., specifically endnote (12) pp. 107-108. 58 Among the harbours of Makran that carry on overseas activities, Mâjid mentions one “Basanî”, that we may identify with Pasni. In the adjoining area there is a mound, the Siyah-i Kuh - or Black Hills, where the locals still show the ruins of an ancient city which they call “the Portuguese City”. According to local oral tradition, it was a large settled area, well-sheltered at the mouth of a khawr, surrounded by many villages. Here, people and merchants of every race, colour and religion used to meet. Dealings between men who came from all over the world took place in its bazaar, and precious commodities in demand on the Eastern and Western markets were frantically exchanged. A few years later - local memory continues - this same city was conquered by the army of the Portuguese Affonso d’Albuquerque, and from then on it was to be marked also on Portuguese maps. Ahmad ibn Mâjid al-Najdî, Kitâb al-Fawâ’id fî Usûl al-Bahr wa al-Qawâ’id, ed. G. R. Tibbetts, Oriental Translation Fund, n.s., vol. XLII, London 1981, p. 212, pp. 213-214. Cf. also Besenval/Cartography, specifically p. 94 ('Siahi Kuh/old Pasni').

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: Trade, Migrations and Military Operations (9th - 11th Centuries AD) area that, according to the collected miscellaneous surface material, points to various prolonged periods of human occupation. Their identification is far from being certain; however we do have some huge sites under sanddunes formations and along the ancient shoreline which might also (but not only) be dated as “Islamic”59. Thus, once again archaeological evidence may certainly add new data, which, compared with literature, provide invaluable new clues and become in their turn as many historical sources. In this respect, the archaeological evidence and the geo-morphological reconstruction of the ancient coast-lines may well fit with the various “historical” occupational phases, and once again complement - without contradicting - both written sources and oral tradition. And in this respect, it is tempting to advance the working hypothesis that Qandâbîl might be located somewhere in the present Pasni area, natural harbour and main natural outlet to the sea of the rich hinterland and of that Green Belt stretching east-west in the Kech/Kîj region, where surface surveys and soundings have revealed a rich and prolonged “Islamic/earlyIslamic” occupation (see Fig. 8.2 Kech and Buleida Valleys: archaeological sites and Fig. 8.3: Nihing Khawr System: archaeological sites).

well - whether at war or at peace - were a complex and pluralistic social area, and this pluralism, together with the presence of different but interchangeable models of adaptation, seems to constitute the cultural response made over the millennia by the peoples of this region to the ever-changing conditions of the context in which they found themselves having to act. A context which also involved what Frederic Barth calls “ the raucous host of others with strange ideas and alien costumes, visiting, working, conquering, settling, enticing with partnerships to fabulous cargoes, or arriving themselves as cargoes of stripped humanity, yet with the invitation to fashion social relationships ”61. All these data taken together allow us to go deeper into such analysis. Terms and definitions used in the consulted literature acquire a very precise institutional content when considered within the historical and political framework of the moment, that is the 9th-10th centuries AD. I specifically refer to such terms as bandar, qaryah/dih, qasabah, madînah and rustâq/nâhiyah. This topic has been discussed on more than one occasion62. The Arabic term madînah and the Persian one shahr, usually translated as “city”, are synonymous and usually designate those centres which were seats of a political and/or administrative power, whether central or local. Kech/Kij, for example, was a city (madînah/shahr), a very large city “half the size of Multân... the residence of the ruler of Makrân”; Kech, however, was also “a large area (rustâq/nâhiyah), where were to be found many villages, running water and kariz, and active craft life”63. This situation is particularly evident in the geographical literature, which in its turn does not conflict with the historical texts. All in all, they give us a vivid description of Makran, a lucid vision of the organization of the territory, where the city is understood not only as a flourishing centre in the broader context of intercontinental trade, renowned crafts and intellectual activities, but also as the political-administrative centre of a given territory (the Kech, in our case) in a relation of close economic and cultural interaction and integration with the territory surrounding it and gravitating on it. A symbiotic reality between city and “villages” (qaryah dih/pl. dih-hâ), these latter being often a plurality of

2.3. Regional realities and social structure To sum up, it is possible to state that - during the 9th and 10th centuries - Makran was far from being a barren and desolated region. On the whole, data from all available literature - well complemented with the evidence acquired in situ in the course of the surveys carried out by the Italian Research-Project in Makran and Kharan - provide us with lovely frescoes, almost photographic images, of a flourishing region, densely populated, rich in artisanal activities60. If not one of the most prominent participants, certainly Makran was a lively actor in the network of overseas trade, that overseas trade tenaciously pursued by Shiraz and its merchant families through pacta and understandings with various local rulers, and also by means of shrewd marriage links. Such images are both evocative and crude, short notes that - beyond the oleographic picture - allow us to become aware also of social realities of that humanity. In the above outlined framework, the cities of Makran retain a very special characterof their own: there flourished an active life, cosmopolitan and mercantile, where people of different cultures and religions could coexist, trade and settle, too.

61 F. Barth, Sohar: Culture and Society in an Omani Town, Baltimore 1983, p. 248. 62 See in particular V. Piacentini Fiorani, Madîna/Shahr, Qarya/Deh, Nâhiya/Rustâq. The city as political-administrative institution: the continuity of a Sasanian model, in “Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam“, 17 (1994), pp. 85-107; Idem, The literary image of the southern coast of Iran (3rd-4th century AH). Clues to the re-reading and analysis of regional situations and realities, in R. Ambrosini, M. P. Bologna, F. Motta, Ch. Orlandi (eds.), Scribthair a ainm n-ogaim. Scritti in memoria di Enrico Campanile, Pacini - Pisa 1997, vol. I, pp. 371-396. 63 Istakhrî, Kitâb al-Masâlik...cit., p. 171, 177 (“The prince of Mûkrân lives in the city of Kîz - vars. Kîs/Kîj - which is very large around half the size of Mûltân”); Ibn Hawqal, Kitâb Sûrat al-Ard...cit., p. 223 (“the city of Kîz, half the size of Mûltân, is the residence of the ruler of Makrân”); al-Muqaddasî, Ahsan al-Taqâsîm....cit., p. 475; Hudûd al‘Âlam...cit., p. 123. See also above and note (47).

In the historical and geographical literature this reality shines out. Makran’s hinterland and the coastal region as 59 Besenval/Cartography pp. 85-86 (geomorphological data by P. Sanlaville), pp. 91-96 (first results from the archaeological survey by R. Besenval) and map II (Pasni archaeological sites). 60 See in particular the Hudûd al-’Âlam...cit., p. 122, and below Sheila Unwin’s contribution: Crafts and craftsmen. Laquer work in Makran. See also Sh. Unwin’s valuable reports regularly lodged at the end of each field-season with the Federal Department for Archaeology and Museums, Karachi - Pakistan.

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Baluchistan micro-settlements, jointly co-existing in a given homogeneous geographical area around a central administrative nucleus: Kij city and its surrounding villages, orchards and cultivated fields, or Panjgûr/Fannazbûr city - along one of the most important caravan routes - with its lush expanses of palms and gardens and villages64.

increasing weakness of the empires of the moment, they repeatedly pushed southwards, coming down along the caravan routes, attacking towns, laying waste, raiding, plundering, and seriously compromising settled life and all its traditional related activities, every blade of grass pulled up as fodder for the herds and troops of the invaders.

Beyond all this, let us consider once again the available literature, in order to see which other clues it provides when texts are read anew, and regional as well as social institutional realities are analysed. Hand in hand with the geographical genre we have the historical sources of the time. The minutely detailed accounts of the struggles between various princes and ethnic groups may become as many inside views - besides the information supplied on dynastic struggles - which give us equally important elements on the various ethnic-cultural components, on their models of life, policies and strategies, the institutional asset and local evolutionary trends.

And here, once again, we may well perceive the twofold dimension of Makran. On the sea coast, some harbours would overcome the general decline of the region, the steep Makrani ranges being their natural defence. Well protected shelters for the convoys coasting or coming from China, Hind, Sind and Africa, privileged by their own centrality along the sea monsoon routes, these ports were not annihilated by the nomads’ fury, and could carry on some activity within the broader context of the moment. Piracy, on the other hand, enjoyed a brisk revival, the Makrani lagoons being excellent nests for pirates and adventurers 66.

Apart from the already mentioned ‘Utbî, valid information in this respect can be found in the works by Muhammad ibn Ibrâhîm, Waqîdî, Narshakhî, Sam‘ânî, Gardîzî and Bayhaqî, Hamdullâh Mustawfî Qazvînî, Ibn al-Balkhî and Wassâf, among many others. Then, provided the information that this court genre gives us is always carefully sifted, we may single out another characteristic of the regional social institutional realities: the persistence of a structural system, namely the “village community”, and its collective responsibility for the payment of taxes, public services, etc.65. This would remain the basic cell of the local society before and long after the Arab conquest, and beyond all dynastic and political upheavals, a living feature of Makran social reality, both along the seaboard and in the hinterland, a living feature of its traditional patterns of settlement visà-vis the nomadic world.

In the hinterland, settled life was, instead, greatly affected. References to Makran are not frequent in the literature of the period, the Belt playing again its traditional role as frontier region, border and corridor for migrations and military operations. Court historians and geographers do not pay much attention to a marginal frontier region, a desolate land now inhabited by wild nomadic groups, a land renowned for its moon-like environment, barren and inhospitable. The life and economy of a region which, as little as half a century earlier, had been one the main participants along the great inter-continental trade routes, was completely exhausted. And yet, this did not mean that urban life disappeared completely, and with it its traditional model and the social institutions on which it had always traditionally depended.

Thus, we are dealing with a positive reality, the village community. This was to survive the various waves of conquest as the conditions at the north-western and northeastern borders deteriorated at the start of the eleventh century, and the poverty and depopulation of the countryside increased, hastening along with it also the decline of urban centres, both large and small, and of their economic and productive activities as well. The village community was to survive also the ravages of ruthless nomadic tribes coming from Central Asia, lured by the reputation of cities and villages, and the wealth lying piled in their storehouses. Profiting from the

Although undergoing a swift decline, it did not suffer a collapse, and was to re-emerge again. One must also take into consideration that the various new Lords, being concerned above all in conquering and enlarging their new dominions, here, too, delegated to “others” the institutional control and care of the lands. With a more accurate analysis of the written sources one cannot fail to note that the organization of the territory began to change as well as the social milieu, ethnically increasingly heterogeneous, where the Turkish and Mongol-Turkish elements were by now dominant. And indeed, in the light of the surveys carried out in situ, the evidence which has emerged unambiguously speaks louder than literature, whose silence and omissions

64 See specifically below, the following study by V. Piacentini Fiorani, The Castles of Kech: a Society without Cities, pp. 143 on. 65 Social and institutional realities in Makran and Kharan closely recall the institutional situation in Khurasan during the 10th-11th centuries AD, although one must always keep in mind Kharan and Makran’s special political role, that of border-regions of the empires of the moment, especially after the break-down of Samanid rule and the Ghaznavid seizure of power. See V. Piacentini Fiorani, Practice in Mediaeval Government...cit., and given sources and bibliography, pp. 64-68.

66 See in particular the Jat/Jut-ân tribe, and its enterprising expansion into the Gulf up to Siraf at the end of the 11th century-12th century. Cf. also above p. 126 and note (35).

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: Trade, Migrations and Military Operations (9th - 11th Centuries AD) become in their turn telling pointers, and a picture begins to take shape67.

and related activities flourished again in Makran, well documented in the literature of the time: ports and cities are beautiful, active and renowned for their cosmopolitan life. “Here - states again Ibn Mâjid - Indians live mixed with Persians, and the Arabs call at the ports of Makran with their ships to and from East and West up to Africa”69.

The main trade route ending at Ghazna would cross the present day Kharan and Panjgur areas, enter Sijistan, cross Khurasan and, using the traditional “routes of the steppes” (the turûq al-mafâzat of Istakhrî, Ibn Hawqal and Muqaddasî), pass through and meet in the main urban centres of the Iranian plateau, eventually leading to the Gulf and the Arabian Sea. There, there were still cities (Kech/Kij, Panjgur/Fannazbur/Fanzbur, Ispak, Tiz et alia). These had a castle (qalat/mîrî)68, in such a position as to have control of access routes and passes and to check any other movement. They also had the function of protecting the “villages” with their communities, standing as imposing elements which would offer protection and shelter against the instability of the environment and, in particular, against the unrest of nomadic semi-nomadic peoples now roaming about the region. It reflects, to a certain extent, the underlying, real structure of Makrani society in general and of traditional Makrani society in particular, as it emerges from contemporary literature and archaeological data, without any striking difference between past and present times.

Despite the increasingly massive European presence, the effects of the traditional economic systemic structure that is, the village community and the city-village symbiotic reality - were soon to be felt in the extraordinary development of craftsmanship and craft production, well recorded in the same literature. And to these crafts, and to their deeply-rooted tradition, as already minutely described in the 10th century by the anonymous author of the Hudûd al-‘Âlam, we wish to dedicate the following chapter.

Once again, it is difficult to pursue such an analysis only on the basis of a silent literature. It is equally difficult to specify the exact relationship between the new Lords and their bands on the one hand, and the so to speak preexisting settled “economic” population, on the other. This can only be inferred through an assessment of the events recorded in dynastic chronicles or using later compilations, complemented by other non-literary sources, which methodological approach takes us back to anthropology and archaeology. And if the available material does not allow us to draw a picture complete in every detail, it nonetheless enables us to formulate an initial working hypothesis. As already stated, the state of anarchy and institutional chaos did not entail the death of urban and settled life. The caravan routes were diverted, and itineraries changed once again, but urban life did not come to an end. The causes are probably to be sought in the very structure of the local model of life and its reaction to the arrival of the new invaders and conquerors, as well as in their capability of adapting their policy to new individual realities. Thus, beyond theoretical principles of power and authority, the mere logic of pragmatic political-social balances prevailed. However, at the start of the fifteenth century, in spite of strong local tribalism and particularisms, and notwithstanding a marked confrontation between settled population and semi-settled/nomadic peoples, within Harmûz’ order and supremacy, a settled urban-rural life 67 Besenval/Cartography cit., cf. specif. Pidarak area, pp. 107-108; Mand-Tump-Kalatuk-Goburd-Pullabad-Kalatuk-Turbat-Shahrak-SamiHoshab areas, pp. 108-118; Buleda valleys, pp. 118-121; Panjgur oasis. 68 mîrî: prince’s dwelling, especially “the khan’s castle”. Pers.: belonging to a prince. Cf A.V.Rossi, Iranian lexical elements in Bhrahui cit., H. 852, p.237.

69

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Ahmad ibn Mâjid al-Najdi, Kitâb al-Fawâ’id...cit., p. 214.

Baluchistan

Fig. 8.1: Pasni area: archaeological sites (from Besenval/Cartography, Map. II)

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: Trade, Migrations and Military Operations (9th - 11th Centuries AD)

Fig. 8.2: Kech and Buleida valleys: archaeological sites (from Besenval/Cartography, Map. VI)

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Fig. 8.3: Nihing Khawr system: archaeological sites (from Besenval/Cartography, Map. V)

Baluchistan

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Crafts and Craftsmen in Makran - Lacquer Work Sheila Unwin

1. Introduction. – 2. Lacquer work – 3. Makran

monsoon and coasting trade. Surveys have been conducted all along the coastal area from Ormara to Jiwani, including Pasni.

1. Introduction (Valeria Piacentini Fiorani)

On the whole, we may say that up to the nineties of the nineteenth century, crafts were active, the traditional way of life persisted, the community demanded and produced the simple artefacts which have been in use for generations. However, a decline in production might be expected once development programmes are adopted and strong impulse would be given to the impending and unavoidable modernisation process. Urgency was therefore emphasised, in order to carry out our research before development and modern techniques would disturb the traditional way of life in this region, or the old age of the last craftsmen would bring to an end memory and tradition as well5.

“The region has few amenities, but numerous merchants are found in it. The country produces skins (pust), leather (charm), red abank, shoes (na‘layn), dates (khurmâ') and sugar-candy (panîdh)”1. Whilst sitting in homes or compounds recording crafts, or whilst travelling in the field, many fascinating topics reveal themselves which are not directly connected with the study of crafts and material culture. Thus, our study is evolving into a social survey rather than one dedicated to crafts2. The restrictions imposed by the need to ensure security of the group, either as a whole or as individuals, coupled with the lack of transport, have meant that certain areas are so far unrecorded. However, rural and nomadic-seminomadic areas in the hinterland and coastal centres have been investigated (recording and interpreting) and some results have been achieved, in an endeavour to build up as full a picture as possible of local tradition and traditional costumes, and related society3.

We were still facing a cosmopolitan and pluralistic society, frantically active, manufacturing, importing and exporting raw materials and various items, a crossroad and meeting point along caravan routes and dusty tracks. There, it was possible to meet people coming also from distant regions, from Khurasan, Kîrmân, Harmuzgan, Sistan, Central Asia, too, people from every district of Sind or from the Arabian Peninsula and the Eastern coasts of Africa6. Recalling the words used by that anonymous author of the 11th century to depict Makran, we may well agree with him that: “the region has few amenities, but numerous merchants are found in it. The country produces skins (pust), leather (charm), red abank, shoes (na‘layn), dates (khurmâ’) and sugar-candy (panîdh)”.

Diversification of production has been connected with what we may consider a crucial feature of Makrani culture: mobility in space. Mobility seems to constitute a crucial element in understanding local society and culture, a means of adaptation both to ecological and political conditions, a heritage of tribalism, which characterised the economic and political life till very recent times. Social stratification still plays a central role in the social-political life of the region. An initial attempt has also been made to reconstruct on a micro-scale level the historical process that contributed to give life to another crucial element of Makrani social structure: the village community, its actioninteraction with the life of the castle, alliance systems and the formation of patron-client relations4. Within this broader framework, the bazaar comes in as the core of the region’s life, and craftsmen and handicrafts stand as eloquent elements of this structure with its deeply rooted traditions.

To these items - still to be found as such in the region (leather and leather-working - like leather embroidered sandals, bandoliers, belts, tiles, palm-groves, dates and their products, special sandals of palm leaf still largely in use, sugar-candy, halwâ’ and all types of sweet...) - we can add a great variety of other crafts: embroidery, weaving (flat woven carpets and rugs), felt rugs, spinning of wool, nets (used for hunting and fishing), the work of luri smiths (to be found in all areas, often working by the side of the road, with or without shelter), jewellery (large anklets, earrings, pendants, necklaces, brooches to fasten the neck of the traditional embroidered dresses, nose-rings, headbands etc.), traditional boat-building and fishing industries, housing and palm-mats (doors, windows and frames used to be of wood, and inside the mats were often interwoven with threads of black goat hair in decoration). The interior of these houses resembles, on a smaller scale, that of more substantial houses, with many shelves holding plates and other precious possessions. Along the coastal area, old fishing nets were frequently draped around the matting compound walls, also used as fencing for stock7. In Gwadar, Pasni and Ormara there were numerous carved door centrepieces and lintels, some finely carved posts supporting upper verandas in the main bazaar8, and showing close similarity to those where families of

Four main areas were selected and studied in the hinterland: Turbat and its environs, Kalatuk, Dasht Kuddan, Tump-Mand, plus visits to the Panjgur district, Buleida and Pidarak. Gwadar with its harbour, the Ismaili quarter and active environmental area well represented the coastal habitats, revealing itself a precious source covering the full extent of handicrafts which were so far being carried on, and a no less precious basis for further research in connection with the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, and ensuing impacts due to a still active

1 Hudûd al-‘Âlam, by anonymous author, ed. V. Minorsky with preface by V. V. Barthold, Oxford 1937, p. 122. 2 See also above Valeria Piacentini Fiorani, Images of a Little Known Region…, especially pp. 7 on. 3 From Sheila Unwin’s 1990-1992 field-report. 4 See in this regard the following study by Valeria Piacentini Fiorani, The Castles of Kech: a Society without City, pp. 143 on.

5

From Sheila Unwin’s 1993-1995 field-reports. See also V. Piacentini Fiorani articles in part III - Focus on Makran. 7 This type of housing was formerly widespread in Makran, as evidenced by the BDGS – Makran, p.65. 8 See also Judith Aldrick, The Nineteenth-century Carved Wooden Doors of the East African Coast, Azania, 1990. 6

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Baluchistan Isma‘ili origin were still resident9); pulleys for wells (chah) and water channels (kariz), saddles, ploughs, basketry,...and the mystique of man’s control over snakes, which are feared and venerated at one and the same time (the man with such a power is locally called jâwgî)10.

*** 2. Lacquer work Lacquer work is the art of applying coloured substances to furniture and smaller objects, both decorative and utilitarian, in order to create a glossy surface. It may be applied by brush or by pressing a solid stick of lacquer against an object on a revolving lathe, the friction causing the lacquer to melt and adhere.

And here we come to lacquer work. It is carried out by traditional methods, in a workshop at Turbat. Its products are quite fashionable and highly in demand all over Makran: the telling symbol of a mobile society and commercial traffic, of a lively local life and its skilled craft, a land where people of different culture and religion coexist with strange ideas and alien costumes, visiting, working, settling.

The origins of lacquer lie in China, the earliest fine objects being recorded in the fourth or third century BC Introduction to Japan, via Korea, took place in the sixth century AD where, developed and refined, it reached an artistic climax in the nineteenth century. Its popularity in Europe, where it began to be exported in the late seventeenth century, created a demand which outstripped supply. This resulted in the production in the West of a type of varnish and the processing known as “japanning”, which, however, was inferior in quality to anything stemming from the Far East, which is known as “true lacquer”11.

It is to be underlined that the following glossary in brackets, are the result of personal communication to Sheila Unwin from two local craftsmen. Transcriptions are a well known crux for all compilers of lexical works and glossaries drawing from areas where contacts with surrounding/intertwining regions and cultures are very strong and deeply rooted in tradition. In these regions lexical borrowings are common and linguistic stratification is an intimate feature of an area characterized by effective mobility in space, as is the Makrani reality. Here, one must always keep in mind the role and impact of Perso-Arabic and north-Indian cultures in the local lexical concretisations, too. Therefore, reflecting on how much subjectivity would be involved...and mistakes are obvious, the published transcriptions-transliterations follow the local graphic documentation - however very unsatisfactory - according to a “neutral” standard system (Ar. graphic shape in the case of lexical items from the Arab-Persian culture) without any phonetic reference to the local language/dialect and contact languages, possible areal phonological affinities, etc.. Obviously, many doubts remain on distributional features with relevant phonemic significance and semantics, and we do hope that a more systematic investigation may be carried on by expert linguists or ethnolinguist researchers (comparative lexical research in Baluchi and Sindi, for example, Baluchi within the Iranian family, etymologies, Brahui items and influence, Kurd elements - possibly in connection with Brahui unetymologised lexemes, Brahui contacts with the pre-Baluchi Iranian language of N.W type, etc.). At the present state, we are perfectly aware that the criterion adopted in this study is a very poor and provisional solution. The information collected (due also to the unsatisfactory status of our sources) does not allow for any further studying or analysis; nevertheless, the data here collected seem to point out many details of Iranian Prs. phonemic possibly common to large East Prs. areas. I am deeply indebted to the precious suggestions kindly offered by colleagues and scholars. In particular, I have found of great support the studies carried out by the late professor Georg Morgenstierne and by professor J. Elfenbein, and the minute and analytical research work still carried on by professor Adriano V. Rossi, of the Oriental Institute of Naples, on Iranian lexical elements in Brahui, Baluchi, Persian.

True lacquer is obtained from the resin of a tree, Rhus vernicifera, indigenous to China. Lacquered objects from China and Japan are produced by the application of many coats of the refined resin, which are brushed on to the carcass of the object to be decorated, usually of wood. This, when dry and set, may be painted, inlaid or carved. Lacquer may also be used as a varnish12. In the Indian subcontinent lacquer is derived from the secretions of certain scale insects, chiefly Tachardia lacca13, which suck the juice of several species of host trees; this is then deposited on them as waxy incrustations. These deposits, after processing, resemble sealing wax, which can be softened and applied by brush, or formed into sticks for lathe work. According to Birdwood14, lac work, as it is called in the subcontinent, was in the nineteenth century practised throughout this area, higher class work such as furniture being made in the larger towns, whilst smaller items - bangles, toys, walking sticks, playing cards etc. - were produced virtually everywhere, even by unsettled jungle tribes. Lacquering involving the lathe is called “lac-turney”15. Articles can be lacquered in plain colours or decorated more intricately. The application of several layers of different colours upon which the craftsman scratches designs with a chisel whilst the lathe turns, the depth of 11 Colliers Encyclopaedia, MacMillan Educational Co., London 1985, vol. 14, p. 242. 12 O. R. Impey and M. Tregear, Oriental Lacquer, Ashmolean Museum, Oxford 1983, p. iii. 13 H. F. MacMillan, Tropical Planting and Gardening, London 1954, pp. 396, 397. 14 George C. M. Birdwood, The Arts of India, repr. from 1880 ed., The Reprint Press Jersey, C. I., 1986, p. 223. 15 Aman Nath and Francis Wacziarg, Arts and Crafts of Rajasthan, Ahmedabad 1982, p. 217.

9

The tradition of carved doors and surrounds is prevalent all around the Indian Ocean, some of the finest examples to be found in Zanzibar. For further details see Sheila Unwin’s 1990-1992 handicraft report, lodged with the Federal Department for Archaeology and Museums, Karachi Pakistan. 10 Sheila Unwin’s valuable reports in connection with her hard work on crafts and traditional handicraft in Makran, Baluchistan, at the start of each field-season have been regularly lodged with the Federal Department for Archaeology and Museums, Karachi - Pakistan.

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Sheila Unwin: Crafts and Craftsmen. Lacquer Work in Makran

3. Makran

the cut determining the colour and the design desired, is known as “naqshi work”. Other techniques are termed zigzag, fire and cloud16. A marbled effect can also be created by the random application of different colours, which are combined by rubbing over with a bamboo stick17.

In a simple form lacquer work is still carried on here, where in Dannuk village near Turbat a family of traditional lac workers, originally from Dasht Kuddan some fifty miles away, use the bow lathe to turn and colour bed legs, quilt stands, cradles, pestles and mortars, well pulleys, hangers for cradles, milk funnels and other useful domestic articles. They work in their home compounds for the local market, but also cover a wider area by travelling with their equipment from village to village (“mobility in space” - see above).

Areas renowned for lacquer work include, in Pakistan, Dera Ismail Khan (North West Frontier Province), and the provinces of Sind and Punjab18. In India, Udaipur (Rajastan), Chennapatra (Karnataka), the Banni area of Kutch, Junagadh and Sankheda (all in Gujarat), Ratnagiri (Maharashtra), and Bihar, Orissa and Punjab.

In 1987 two family members, Mohamed Hasham and his cousin Meherali Sumar, established a workshop (dukkân) in Turbat bazaar, equipped with an electrically driven lathe (tîr)27. There, in addition to traditional pieces, they use their imagination to produce unusual articles which they display outside their workshop: small tables and stands with brightly coloured striped legs, and articulated snakes with head and body segments ingeniously joined with wire; they will also make items to order (fig. 2).

Different areas had their own specialities - furniture with lustrous finish attained by the addition of tinfoil into the lacquer is still made in Sankheda near Baroda (now Vadodara), for example19, whilst in the nineteenth century sophisticated lidded round boxes with naqshi work, some having ivory knobs, came from Sind and were exported to Europe20. Papier maché objects are also lacquered; in the nineteenth century the best quality was said to come from Kashmir21.

However, despite the introduction of electricity, which has brought about certain changes in traditional equipment, the techniques remain unchanged, and the craft continues on an artisan, non-industrial level. The craftsman (ustâd) can still operate both techniques.

Lacquer work has also been reported in Southeast Asia, Mexico and South America22, the Maldive Islands23, the Middle East24, and in Iran, though Hans Wulff, in his authoritative publication on the crafts of Iran, does not mention it25. Migration across the Indian Ocean spread this work to East Africa, where it is still practised on Pemba Island, north of Zanzibar, and at Siyu on Pate island in the Lamu archipelago of Kenya. This craft continues, but the quality is diminished, owing to the inability nowadays to procure the resins and colour materials which were in the past imported from the subcontinent26.

The wood used is Tamarix gallica (gaz), which grows in the Dasht, Nihing and Kech areas. The lacquer is obtained from a mixture of two resins: one from a local tree, Zizyphus jujuba (konâr), the second from a tree of the Punjab (riâl), possibly Picea Smitheana, a conifer of Afghanistan, known there as riân (or rayyan)28. This resin is bought in powder form in Karachi. To obtain resin from the konâ tree, the bark is cut, from which the sap will flow. This is heated, poured into a muslin cloth and squeezed into a receptacle. This liquid, known as drûj, is reserved for use, the solids which remain are discarded. When cold and set, the drûj is broken up. In 1989 the price of konâr resin was 100 rupees per kilo, riâl resin being only 20 rupees. More riâl than konâr is used in the lacquer mixture.

16 Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay, Handicrafts of India, Indian council for Cultural Relations, New Delhi 1975, p. 18. 17 B. H. Baden Powell, Handbook of Manufacture and Arts of the Punjab, Lahore 1872, p. 212. 18 F. Saeed, Traditional Furniture of D.I. Khan, Lok Virsa Research Centre, Islamabad, 1988. 19 Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay, Handicrafts of India...cit., p. 19. 20 George C. M. Birdwood, The Arts of India...cit., p. 226. 21 Ibid., p. 226. 22 Colliers Encyclopaedia...cit., p. 242. 23 J. de V. Allen, Siyu in the 18th and 19th Centuries, in “Transafrican Journal of History”, 1979, nos. 1-2, p. 18. O. R. Impey and M. Tregear, Oriental Lacquer...cit., p. iii. 24 O. R. Impey and M. Tregear, Oriental Lacquer...cit., p. iii. 25 Hans E. Wulff, The Traditional Crafts of Persia, Massachussets Institute of Technology, Cambridge Mass., 1966. 26 At Siyu two craftsmen (Swahili – fundi) remained in 1990. The island is reached by a boat journey of three hours from Lamu, and thereafter, depending on tides, a half hour walk through beach, mangroves and bush, to Siyu village. Fundis Mzee Shahibu Fundi and Mwenye Aboudi Mohamed demonstrated their work to me, which is similar in all aspects to that operating in Makran. In the past round lidded boxes (Swahili – mkakasi) large and small, were made. Today the work is confined to legs for stools which are covered in calf or goatskin. The wood used is a type of mangrove (Swahili – utu) and the colours are black, yellow, red and occasionally green. The resin and colouring materials, which previous to the Zanzibar revolution of 1964 came from India, are not now available, thus oil paint applied with a brush whilst the lathe turns provides the colouring (fig.1).

The lacquer is prepared as follows: (a) A small fire is lit and the two resins are placed in a dish (fig. 1). (b) A stubby stick is rubbed into the mixture and held over the flames (fig. 2) so that it begins to melt. (c) The soft lacquer is now combined with more riâl powder (fig. 3) and reheated. This process is repeated until both resins are amalgamated to a toffee-like consistency. (d) This is placed on a smooth stone, more riâl is added, it is kneaded again and reheated (fig. 4). 27

Lathe, back piece of frame: tîr, side piece of frame: dokkăn. Royal Botanic Garden, Kew, England. Personal communication from Economic and Conservation Section, 1990. 28

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Baluchistan (e) The lacquer is now flattened on the stone; powdered colouring, bought in the bazaar, is poured into the centre, and the sides are folded over to contain it (fig. 5). (f) The coloured mixture is kneaded (fig. 6), folded over the end of a stick and reheated (fig. 7). (g) It is kneaded again and more colour added, the procedure being repeated until the desired colour and consistency are reached. The lacquer is finally shaped into a flattened sausage shape and cut into sticks (fig. 8). It is ready for use in ten minutes. Basic colours are red, green, blue, yellow, black and silver. (h) Colours may be varied by the addition of broken pieces of old lacquer into newly mixed material (fig. 9). This is folded, heated and kneaded as before to obtain the required colour (fig. 10).

the right hand side, serving as a rest for the gouge, and is steadied by both feet31. The bow string (band) is prepared from a doubled length of thick thread, secured round one of the pins on the lathe and twisted by hand (fig. 13). It is bound to the wooden handle of the bow, and may have a tightening lever (qabzûk) attached to the handle. The string is wound round the wood to be turned, which is then fixed between the two centres (fig. 14). Turning and colouring proceed as previously described. The string is dampened from time to time when in use. Thin oil is applied to the wood to facilitate chiselling. To make a hollow item such as a small lidded box, a piece of wood is cut to a rough shape with an adze. Since it is impractical to use a bow to turn such a short item a drive shaft is improvised. This takes the form of a turned wooden shaft. One end is held by the right centre pin, the other having a flat end with four sharpened nails to grip the object to be turned which is attached to the left centre pin (fig. 15). When shaped and coloured the inside is gouged out. In order to facilitate this, the left hand pin is angled to make room for the gouge, which is applied to cut away the inside. When the box is ready, its base, which has been attached to the wooden extension on the lathe, is cut away with a saw, leaving a smooth surface (fig. 16). The lid is made in a similar manner (fig. 17). It is detached from time to time to see if it fits the box32.

In the Turbat workshop an electric lathe is used (fig. 11). The piece of wood to be turned is fixed horizontally between two centres and revolved by means of a drive belt. The craftsman applies a gouge (nihû) to the areas to be cut away as the wood turns, and when it is the desired shape, he smooths it, still turning, with fine sandpaper. To colour, sticks of lacquer pressed against the revolving wood melt with the friction and adhere. To polish, first a flat piece of wood with a concave head about 2½cm wide (kanzâg) is pressed against the revolving item, and a final rub with a small folded palm leaf frond (pîsh) achieves an ultimate gloss.

Gouges are sharpened as necessary on a whetstone (wahnâg) obtained from Lahore.

Traditional wood turning as carried out in Dannuk is executed with a bow lathe (kamanâg), the strings of the bow (band) being twisted round the piece of wood to be turned29. By “sawing” the bow to and fro with the right hand, and applying a gouge to the rotating wood, it is cut as required. Colouring is applied in a similar way. The materials required for this work are very simple, and the lathe is quickly set up. Two pieces of wood, one flat and narrow, approximately 150cm long, the other some 6½cm square and about 90cm in length are placed at right angles to each other on the ground, the latter laid over the former, which is steadied by a long nail (killâ or meh) driven through it into the earth at its free end (fig. 12). The squared wood (tâng) has two nicks some 65 - 70cm from the angle30. In the outer, deeper nick, a pointed iron pin is fixed with bent nails and wedges of wood to lie in a horizontal position facing inwards. A square wooden upright approximately 12cm high is set up some 45cm opposite, into which is driven a similar iron pin. These are the centres for the turning (mûrgîch). On the inner nick an iron bar runs parallel with, and in front of, the wood to be turned. It rests on the ground on

31

H. E. Wulff, The traditional Crafts...cit., p. 91 gives diagram of lathe and bow as used in Iran, which is similar. 32 I wish to thank Mohamed Hassan and Meherali Sumar in Makram, and Mzee Shahibu Fundi and Mwenye Aboudi Mohamed in Kenya for so willingly demonstrating their techniques; also Badal-Khan Baloch, Nigel A. Collett, Zobaida Jalal, Faisaldad Kakar and Janmohamed Karim Buksh for assistance with interpretation, and Alan Taylor for technical terms and advice.

29

Lever for bow: qabsûk. The term tâng is used both for wood with nicks and wooden upright with pin. 30

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Sheila Unwin: Crafts and Craftsmen. Lacquer Work in Makran

Makrani lacquer work in Turbat workshop

African lacquer work: stool in a house at Siyu, Kenya.

Fig.1. Mixing resins on plate

Fig.2. Heating mixed resins on stick

Fig.3. Amalgamating partially heated and dry resins

Fig.4. Heating and melting fully amalgamated resins

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Baluchistan

Fig.5. Placing powdered colour in centre of flattened heated lac

Fig.6. Mixing colour into heated lac

Fig.7. Heating coloured lac

Fig. 8. Cutting prepared lac into sticks

Fig.9 Adding melted green lac to yellow to make a lighter green stick

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Fig.10. Newly mixed piece of light green lac

Sheila Unwin: Crafts and Craftsmen. Lacquer Work in Makran

Fig.11. Meherali Sumar working on electrical lathe, Turbat

Fig.12. Dannuk. Preparing frame of the lathe

Fig.14. Meherali Sumar operating lathe with bow

Fig.13. Preparing string for bow

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Baluchistan

Fig.15. Small box fixed to lathe

Fig.16. Cutting away base of box

Fig.17. Polishing lid with wooden stick

Fig.18 Finished boxes

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The Castles of Kech: a Society without Cities Valeria Piacentini Fiorani

1. Landscapes and models of settlement - 2. The castles of the Lord: “the Oriental royal economies…and the great agricultural enterprises” - 3. The city, or “bureaucracy...one of the hardest social forms to dislodge” -

This latter area, that is the Kech/Kej, might well be described as the backbone of the vast Makrani region. Roughly speaking, Kech is a Y-shaped valley, defined by the course of two rivers and their confluence to the sea4. It takes the form of a narrow green strip of fertile irrigated land with luxuriant palm groves and cultivated fields, stretching for some 400 kilometres parallel to the coast line, comprising a practically unbroken string of villages on both banks. This is the so-called Green Belt of Makran. The two streams which are its life-blood are respectively the Kech proper, which flows sluggishly down from the swampy brackish depression of Kulwa in the east, and the Nihing, a healthier water-course fed by Iranian rainfall and the internal basins of Sistan to the west. At their confluence, some 70 kilometres from the present-day Irano-Pakistani border, the Kech and the Nihing form the Dasht, a wide river-system dry and stony for most of the year, which, cutting its way southwestwards through steep rocky hills, opens up into a large, bare, alluvial flat plain, the filling of which is deeply eroded, with cultivated patches still mainly dependent on rainfall, and with a still scanty settled population. With its odd mat-huts and traditional houses and mosque, Kuddan ranks high among the few more or less permanently inhabited localities of this stretch of land5. The Dasht then swings abruptly to the south/south east, cuts perpendicularly through the last mountain

1. Landscapes and models of settlement After the conquest of Makran by the khan of Kalat, Nasir Khan I, at the end of the eighteenth century, Makran became part of this khanate as one of its Feudatory States; officially, however, the Government of India never recognised it as such, referring to it simply as the “southwestern and maritime division of the Kalat State in Baluchistan”1. However, at the end of the nineteenth century Makran was the largest administrative subdivision of the khanate of Kalat2. Consequently, it should have been administered jointly by three sardars and a na’ib, with this latter representing the khan, who was entitled to 50% of the revenue from the various harvests. But, the policy of the main local family - the Gichkis - and the social situation in the region, made Makran a completely atypical case. Probably of Indian Rajput origins, but originally from the East, thanks to a shrewd policy of matrimonial alliances and a special skill in winning support from the British colonial Administration, the Gichkis - a non-tribal group, and hence structurally weak in the region’s social context managed to maintain the family’s role as a ruling power elite. It was thus that they managed to keep the three posts of official sardars of the region in the family, namely those of sardar of Tump, sardar of Panjgur and sardar of Kech3.

4

For a geographical-geomorphological description of the Makrani region, with specific focus on its configuration and the impact on human settlements, cf. R. Besenval – P. Sanlaville, Cartography of Ancient Settlements in Central Southern Pakistani Makran: New Data, in “Mesopotamia”, 25 (1990) (hereafter Besenval/Cartography), pp. 79156. Cf. also C. Cattena, S. Ciccacci, C. Marinucci, Hormozgan (Iran Meridionale). Caratteristiche ambientali della fascia costiera, Roma 1987; CHIr vol. I, pp. 81 on. Very useful data are furnished in the Gazetteer of Makran cit., pp. 1-33 and annexed detailed information. Cf. also above pp. 17 on. 5 In the course of the 1987-1989 field-seasons, the Italian Historical, Archaeological, and Anthropological Research-Project in Makran – collaborating with the French archaeological group under the direction of R. Besenval, has been able to carry on a systematic survey of the Dasht area, whose main sub-areas (the area of Nilag khawr, the wide flat area right to the Dasht river, and the slopes at the foot of the hilly range delimitating the southern and north-eastern edge of the Dasht system) have revealed important archaeological remains. The filling of the Dasht flat sedimentary area provides a soil which is particularly fertile. Thus, we have a region which may have a crucial agricultural importance (connected with irrigation and dry farming). The archaeological sites being discovered and documented are now proving the density and antiquity of the settlements, confirming Mockler’s and Stein’s brief visits and notes, and also underlining Dasht’s crucial role in various phases and periods of its history and life. With regard to this area’s archaeological importance, cf. in particular the already quoted Besenval/Cartography, specif. maps III-V and pp. 100 on. See also above Plates 1.1 – 1.8.

1

BDGS, Las Bela, p. 1; BDGS, Kharan, p. 1; BDGS, Makran, p.1. The habit of referring to Makran as an autonomous Feudatory State of the Kalat khanate came into being only after the end of British colonial dominion, i.e. in 1946-1947. However this had strictly political implications, as part of the action taken by Muhammad Ali Jinnah to break down the resistance of the Khan of Kalat and force him to merge with the fledgling independent state of Pakistan, by exacerbating internal rivalries. Cf. R. Redaelli, The Father’s Bow: the Khanate of Kalat and British India (19th-20th Century), Firenze 1997, pp. 86-89, and the relevant documentation and records in Quetta Archives (COQDA) and London Public Record Office (IOR). 2 According to the Census of India of 1931, Makran covered no less than 23.269 square miles; the Gazetteer of Makran for 1906 estimates its surface area at 26.000 square miles. The figure given for its population – which is approximative, as those of all censuses in such regions necessarily are – was 68.000: respectively 12.746 souls for Turbat, and 9.727 for Tump and Mand on the Nihing River. 3 For a full historical and historical-institutional excursus on this subject, cf. R. Redaelli, The Father’s Bow… cit., pp. 87 on, with relevant bibliography and documentation.

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Baluchistan territories which lie beyond are no less horrendous”7. Some years later, according to another account: “…Here is little water, the fruit is bad, the brigands are fearless; if it has but few soldiers, an army is destined to be exterminated; if many, these latter are bound to die of hunger”8. This is the so-called “lament” of Salamah, quoted in all the relevant texts and still alive in local memory. It is emblematic of the dejection felt not only by the Arabs, but by all foreigners on viewing the Makran Ranges and their moonlike landscape: “If you are many you die of hunger; if few, you expose yourselves to mortal peril”9.

slopes, and then flows out into the wide Gwatar Bay, near Jiwani. Here, where the sweet water mingles with the salt seawater, there are lush mangrove swamps, in striking contrast to the rest of this eroded, lunar coastal region, and affording a particularly rich natural habitat. The territory of Kech extends in an east-west direction, some 120 kilometres from this coast-line; it is bordered by two mountain chains orientated east-west - the Makran Coastal Range and the Central Makran Range - the last eastern slopes of the Iranian Zagros. These basaltic configurations act as virtually impassable barriers rising to north and south: natural walls of rock and hard calcareous sandstone, black and jagged, steep and bare, scorching hot in summer, cloven by ice and frost during the short winter season, they are constantly lashed by violent winds, and eroded by whitish whirlwinds of dust. Their slopes - rough and arid – scored by atmospheric agents and leached by violent downpours, have taken on weirdly contorted shapes. Small patches of silty and barren waste stretch in between ranges of hillocks used for cultivation (either khushkaba, or, where springs exist, by irrigation channels), while elsewhere the level surface is broken by decomposed ridges cropping out from the alluvial deposit of fine clay. A few small valleys, scooped out by the fury of wadis in spate, run perpendicularly along the Ranges, making communication possible with the adjacent regions; long and extremely narrow, the beds of these natural passages, carved out of the rock, are difficult to negotiate, since they are strewn with boulders, and are either sandy and silted-up, or stony - when not subject to sudden devastating floods: a present-day challenge to four-by-fours, in the past they were used - at great risk - by caravans of mules and camels, proceeding in single file, affording excellent terrain for ambushes and banditry. See Fig 2.2 p. 26, and Plates 2.1-2.10.

With such natural boundaries, the plain of Kech - with its blossoming orchards and brilliant greenery, sudden scent of flowering fruit-trees and swirling of brightly coloured birds - offers a striking contrast with the surrounding arid and bare mountainous landscape, where black, white and endless shades of grey are the dominant colours. In this region’s hostile habitat no cultivation is possible without human hydraulic installations. Where the desert habitat ends and gardens flourish, we may clearly witness man’s ingenuity, scientific knowledge and technological knowhow in exploiting the existing resources; and, above all, his skill in exploiting the main - and real - resource available, namely water, through sophisticated, traditional and undoubtedly age-old works for its collection, drainage and retention through terracing (garband systems), wells (chah), and underground and open air channels, locally named kariz and khawr-jah10. Life has flourished wherever anthropic interventions have controlled the violence of the waters, diverted, regulated and bent them to human needs. In such places the desert has bloomed; a mere cane-brake often marks the border between the exuberant green of the oasis, and rocky, pebble-strewn nothingness dotted with occasional shrubs; then come salt, clay, sand and layers of silt.

Beyond the rocky steep ranges of the first mountainous areas, the last outliers of the Makran Coastal Range consist of lower but highly eroded cliffs cut by deep river valleys, breaking up in a confused cluster of small ridges and plateaux of dry desert hollows. Then, all along the coastal area, gypsum and saline incrustations caused by sudden evaporation of rainwater, fine thick silts and recent formations of sand-hills and mobile dunes, and barrier beaches isolating long marshy lagoons constitute dangers to anyone venturing into this landscape, and make this latter region even more hostile and inhospitable than the hilly and mountainous ones6. In the words of the Arabs dispatched in the far-off decades of the seventh century to reconnoitre those remote and unknown regions: “This is a land where the plains are mountains, the water is tears, the fruit consists of nothing other than a handful of dates, and the people are utterly lawless; bad things are plentiful, the only thing in which the place abounds is dearth; what little there is is wretched, and the

6

7

According to the Arab historian al-Tabarî, this was the report sent by Sûhâr al-‘Abdî to the caliph Umar: Tabarî, Târîkh al-Rusul wa alMulûk, ed. M. J. deGoeje, repr. Leiden 1967, p. 2707. 8 Still according to the Arab chronicler al-Tabarî, this was the personal account given by another Arab envoy - a certain Hakam ibn Jabâlah al‘Abdî, also deputed to collect information on Makran, Sind and Hind – to the caliph Uthman on his return from the mission. See al-Tabarî, Târîkh al-Rusul wa al-Mulûk…cit., pp. 2829 on. Cf. also Abû Bakr alKûfî, Fathnâmah-i-Sind. Being the Original Record of the Arab Conquest of Sind, ed. and notes by N. A. Baloch, Islamabad 1983, pers. text pp. 52-54; Balâdhurî, Kitâb Futûh al-Buldân, ed. M. J. de Goeje, repr. Leiden 1886, p. 432. On the first Arab expeditions to Sind at the end of the seventh century AD, see the study by V. Piacentini Fiorani, Arab expeditions overseas (7th century A.D.). Working hypotheses concerning the dissolution of the Sasanian state apparatus along the eastern seaboard of the Arabian Peninsula, in “PSAS” (2002). 9 Sinân ibn Salamah al-Hudhalî was sent by the caliph with an army to conquer Makran and outflank the Ahl-i Ard-i Kikânân’s stubborn resistance to the advancing armies of Islam. Makran was also viewed as an ideal base for future operations to the East. Sinân stayed there for two years and then withdrew with what remained of his expedition corps. See Balâdhurî, Kitâb Futûh al-Buldân…cit., p. 433, 434; Fathnâmah-i-Sind… cit., pers. text pp. 56-61, and above p. 124. 10 Cf. above R. Redaelli, The Environmental Human Landscapes. Spec. pp. 17-20, and Plates 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.10.

Cf. Besenval/Cartography, in particular pp. 82-86.

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: The castles of Kech: a society without cities resting-places of the warriors who died fighting to save their hallowed ancestral institutions from the enemies of its people. Or again, going down to the sea from the Kech valley along a winding dusty caravan route, and crossing a first rugged chain of mountains, with the chilling depression of Talar opening before us, white with silt, dotted with long, black, saw-toothed basaltic crests, local legend here gleefully sees the Turkish army, turned to stone by the gods, moved by the pietas and devotions of a holy man; such is the fitting end of all invaders, but in particular it is the end deservedly met with by the most feared and treacherous invader of all, the Turk, whose nomadic and undisciplined soldiery was the bringer of nothing but violence and destruction, blood and death; the ravished virgin, the child or old man killed without mercy, men and women massacred even if unarmed; villages torched, fields and crops devastated, every blade of green pulled up as fodder for the herds and troops of the invader, behind whose armies all that remained was desert and nothingness.

It was precisely such man-made techniques, and the works to which they gave rise, that transformed (and continue to transform) a rough and hostile natural landscape, fashioning it to human needs and living conditions. It was precisely these human forms of technology which marked - and continue to mark - the boundary between oasis and desert, between two specific models of life closely linked to these environments, that is, the model of sedentary life, dependent on irrigated agriculture, and the model of nomadic/semi-nomadic life linked to mainly pastoral economies and a precarious agriculture dependent on seasonal rainfall: two landscapes and two models of life, in a state of constant mutual tension. With its traditions, and its spirits, the area’s lively and enduring oral culture has bequeathed us a store of evocative images vividly depicting the splendour of ancient warrior peoples, their codes of honour and chivalry, and their hunter-shepherd societies; they also conjure up the rhythms of a life marked by the seasons’ regular progression within a settled agricultural society11. They clearly convey the tension between these different models of life, and the struggle that inevitably ensues, the final outcome being the survival of one or the other.

As Marc Bloch puts it, “in every literature, society always contemplates its own image”12; thus by turning to the literary context where these myths were born, and to the political-social environment which favoured their spread and perpetuation, it is possible to move beyond the veil of legend and oral epic, and discern a nucleus of historical reality filtered through tradition. These images, as fantastical as they are evocative, give a glimpse of the strife, the tension and the struggle between sedentary life and nomadic life, and are set in stone for ever, just as are the incompatibility between these two models of life, and the precarious balance to which they sometimes gave rise. Furthermore, there can be no doubt that, together with the memory (however distorted) of remote events, credible traces of more than one tradition drawing upon the truth of the past are also discernible in these epics. It has been historically ascertained that, over the course of the life of this region, on several occasions and even before the arrival of Islam, peoples of Turkish ethnos and culture poured into these valleys from the north, sweeping through them and occupying them, turning them into conquered territory, to be despoiled for the feeding and payment of their own armies; with their sights on the Indus and its rich river system, or on the Iranian plateau and its famed cities, for these peoples Kech was one of several transit corridors, possibly the main eastwest/north-south axis. At the same time, its “green belt” offered a precious store of water and provisions for the invaders, and rich pasture for their herds and flocks. Local history perpetuates the memory of these moments in its songs and romances; its ballads contain images of warlike virtues, of death and honour; the collective imagination has set these images in the rocks of its mountains and, with the myth of its own heroes and their enemies, has also perpetuated a model of life deeply alien to its own, transfiguring it through legend so as to

In the indented and eroded environment of the Makran Ranges, where rocky peaks merge with hard calcareous sandstone formations, popular memory still perceives embodiments of the figures, and valour of warrior princes; it identifies caves where virtuous princesses sought refuge in solitude to withstand the violence of the barbarian invader; it venerates “sanctuaries” of pious and devout shaykhs, whose wisdom and holiness saved humanity from greater ills; it peoples this landscape with the monstrous bodies of wild beasts and dragons, a terrifying image-hoard of famine and pestilence. Alternatively, as at Mand, it interprets, and honours, the successions of circular or oval-shaped stone cairns as the 11

In recent years, the local “sage”, Bashir Ahmad Baloch of Solband (an oasis in the Kech valley, adjoining the oasis of Kalatuk to the west), formerly a Federal and Provincial official and President of the Academy of Baluchistan, has begun to collect and record Kech’s main traditions, stories and poems, and has kindly allowed me to see them. My personal thanks to him, as well as my deep admiration for his invaluable and patient work as a sensitive interpreter of local memories. Together with the wealth of information and material collected by the Academy of Baluchistan, my drivers have proved no less valuable sources of stories, particularly those tales and legends which sprang from the ever fertile imagination of Jam Muhammad of Ghenna (Miri Qalat – Turbat); the songs of local “bards”, including the well-known Anwar Shah, a sensitive friend of the Tagrani group of Dasht Kuddan; and the “poets” linked to the Gichki family, who would enliven long Friday afternoons with their songs, accompanied by the melancholy sound of the sitar, celebrating the epic deeds of their sardars. The passionate survey of his lands made by the late Khajji Jalal Khan, of the Rind family of Mand – stone by stone, with each tumulus, inscription and graffito taking on the meaning of a page of local history – is an equally precious contribution to the understanding of this region’s oral tradition and its symbols. My deepest gratitude to all of them for having engaged me in events which still resonate in the life of this valley, with deeds glorious and inglorious, with the myths and legends of a heroic past revisited through their own codes of chivalry. I thank them all, affectionately and nostalgically.

12

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Marc Bloch, La società feudale, repr. Einaudi, Torino, 1982, p. 122.

Baluchistan highlight, by contrast, values and virtues of its own model, culture and “champions”.

Notes on the Field, Plates 10.12 – 10.14). This historical turnabout occurred around 1730 – 4015.

Jinns and spirits of nature still live and whisper in this lunar landscape, wandering among rocks and deserts, peeking from behind trees and stones, taking on the shape of animals or sensed in the breath of the winds; benign and malignant, good and evil alike, all these invisible beings anxiously participate in man’s anxieties.

Leaving aside the religious events which underlay this new conquest16, it is interesting to refer in the abstract to the nature of the power relations established between these new and foreign conquerors and the local conquered peoples: relations which were destined to become crystallized into a thorough-going political, institutional and economic system. With various ups and downs - marked by bloody inter-family and inter-tribal rivalries, incursions, abductions and pillaging by bands coming from elsewhere - this system was nonetheless to regulate the life of Kech and the adjoining region of Panjgur for some two and a half centuries, including the colonial period17.

2. The castles of the Lord: “the Oriental royal economies…and the great agricultural enterprises”13 Even today, the narrow green strip of Kech is known as the Green Belt of Makran. It is a marginal region in relation to Baluchistan, but particularly homogeneous from the geographical point of view. Its landscapes have been marked by the peoples who settled there, and its natural habitat, conversely, has strongly conditioned the life of those who populated this special region and their models of settlement.

memory, and it indicates the great antiquity with which Brahui and Baluch belief invests these remains. While we cannot here discuss the interesting topic of the dating of such dams and the hydraulic system they gave life to, one point should be underlined: such laborious constructions must have been undertaken to meet the agricultural needs of a population far denser and far more settled than the present one. Moreover, they represent striking vestiges of a past life and model of settlement utterly different from the present-day one and quite distinct from the kariz culture. In this connection see also above, R. Redaelli, The Environmental Human Landscapes, pp. 17-20. 15 BDGS, Makran, pp. 47-49. Cf. also R. Redaelli, The Father’s Bow… cit., pp. 105 on. 16 I am referring to the Zikri religion, a Muslim sect whose adherents were to play a key role in the seizing of power first by the Buleidi Maliks, and then by the Gichkis. Both these “dynasties/families” depended on the Zikri communities for support (military, too) and popular consensus to their power and authority. The coming to power of the Buleidis coincided chronologically with the sect’s establishment in Makran. 17 The region of Panjgur borders on the Kech to the north – it is virtually part of it from a purely geographical and geo-morphological point of view – and is separated from this valley by another chain of the Makran Ranges, namely the Central Makran Range (see Fig. 7.1, p. 109). From the Kech Belt it is possible to reach Panjgur and the adjoining region passing through gaunt serrated hill chains, a stony desolation of much eroded ridges, where sand-dunes and salt crusts cover the soil below. One of the main gateways is through Parom to the west, a dried up salt marsh whose soft surface offers ideal going for cars. The fort of Diz-Parom still stands on an archaeological mound at the foot of the wide gravel glacis descending towards the south-western edge of the “Kap”. The village of Diz Parom lies near the eastern end of this portion of the Parom basin where the head of the salt marsh narrows to a couple of miles and room is left for scrub-covered ground all along the foot of the hills, forming part of the Central Makran Range, which encloses this basin to the south. From here, a gently sloping ground extends for more than twenty miles westwards to the watershed marking the present-day border with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Nothing has changed since the official definition of this borderline more than one century ago (1872 . On this latter subject see also note 36). Here there is good grazing and even patches of khushkaba cultivation, the whole area being still inhabited by nomadic/seminomadic peoples living in their typical, mobile huts. Several prehistoric mounds rise not far from the Fort, and deserve a closer and more accurate archaeological survey. Driving eastwards, it is possible to reach Panjgur and its oasis, the chief northern oasis of Makran, watered by the Rakhshan River, which follows a east-westward course from Nag, through miles and miles of barren desolate landscape interrupted only by small patches of precarious cultivation at the mouth of small side valleys with potentially fertile alluvium. Otherwise, even today the main road south-north follows old tracks, through high mountain passes and very tortuous narrow gorges up to Buleida, then descending from the ranges over stony plateaux. The flood beds which furrow the Rakhshan River itself and its “confluent wadis” are too deeply cut into the valley bottom to allow for safe driving, or any cultivation and

The Talar depression and its “petrified army” to day breathe life into another tale, half-way between myth and reality: when the Gichkis fought for supremacy in Makran, it was Talar which witnessed the pitched battle that saw the army of the Buleidis defeated and destroyed, and the triumph of Malik Dinar and, along with it, the triumph of Gichki power14 (cf. below Appendix – Sketch 13

Max Weber, Economia e Società, Pietro Rossi ed., Edizioni di Comunità, Milano, 1974, vol. I, p. 388, 391. 14 The tombs of the Maliks of Buleida are still clearly visible just as one leaves the village-oasis of Mianaz along the caravan route for Zamuran, towards the village of Nivano (see Plate 10.14b). These Maliks settled in this area in late mediaeval times and after. Burial cairns in stone, more or less circular in shape, the Buleidis’ graves are marked by basalt slabs with roughly sketched inscriptions, standing in a low-walled enclosure made of rough-hewn stone held together with mortar, originally plastered. The tombs are orientated in the traditional orthodox Muslim direction. The inscriptions – mostly in the form of rough graffiti – still bear the names of these petty rulers and of their battles and warlike undertakings. The “Memorandum on Makran” by col. E. Ross, p. 35, mentions the existence of a tomb at Sami, in the Kech valley on the right bank of the river eastward to Turbat, recorded by an inscription as having been engraved at the time of Shah Bilar, the uncle of the last Buleida sovereign, Shah Kasim (for historical outlines on this dynasty, see the BDGS, Makran, pp. 47-49). This funerary group, set on the top of a hill, dominates the astonishing surrounding landscape, a criss-cross of greater and smaller valleys carved out by the wadis through the steep barren stony slopes of the Makran Range (see Plate 10.14). It is interesting to note, that here the Kech traditional irrigation systems, namely the khawr-jahs and the kariz, are not to be found, but only terracing, based on a complex and articulated system of garbands, or stone-built barrages, for the collecting and diverting of the rainfall, and to protect the cultivated “terraces” from flooding and leaching, with the addition of wells and drainage channels. Mostly ruined, decayed and abandoned, such garbands are locally known also as ghabar-bands. They constitute a quite distinct different pattern of “land and water organization”, which is widely used in Zamuran, all around the most relevant archaeological sites, and still in use in some scanty areas there (for example, at Nivano); similar stone-built irrigation works can be found in great number also over Kharan (in EriKallag valley, for instance), Kolwa and Jahlawan. This local designation of ghabar-bands ascribes such solid stone barrages to the Gabrs or Zoroastrians. This tradition is still largely popular in the local

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: The castles of Kech: a society without cities Built up on ancient mounds of debris - which constitute their substructures and ramparts – qalats and miris dominate the surrounding territory: Sami, Sharak, Kech/Shah-i Tump, Miri Qalat, Kalatuk, Tump, Pidarak, Bit, Panjgur, etc19. Outer fortified circumvallations in mud-brick, reinforced with massive bastions protected with pebbles, wooden tie-beams and powerful keeps, adjoin the inner fort with its towers and walls, standing out against the sky, looming over the green of the oases and the hostile desert landscape which encircles the cultivated area. Visible from a great distance, they dominate oases and orchards; they dominate the sweeping vistas of the Belt to east and west; they dominate the two walls of rocky mountains which delimit and define their territory to north and south; from their high vantage point they dominate every gorge and possible access to the plain. They tower over the villages which surround cultivated fields, palm groves and orchards, and which make up in their turn so many rural units of settlement belonging to the castle and the power which resides there, the castle giving its name to the territory under its dominion20 (cf. infra, Travel note-book, Kalatuk).

One of the most remarkable and emblematic remnants of this past is a series of “castles” (qalat), the manors of the Gichki sardars, whose structures stand all along the Belt, this great natural east-west highway, punctuating and highlighting moments of real history and life. As we have said, the notes which follow draw inspiration from specific elements of local architecture - that is these fortified citadels, locally named qalats and miris, and the organization of the territory as a castle-village system. It is a positive reality which enables us to infer a model, and to describe a situation which still obtained at the time of Partition (1947), and for several decades thereafter18.

settled life. Then, suddenly, the track opens up at Panjgur. Panjgur was the former seat of the Assistant Political Agent to Makran and Commandant of the Makran Levy Corps, whose headquarters were at Chitkan – the centre of the whole oasis (the old building is still there, and in use as headquarters of the Makran Scouts). Panjgur owes much of its centrality and importance to its permanent supply of water for irrigation. The configuration of the ground from the point where, some miles above Sarikhoran, the Rakhshan River emerges from a confined bed into a wide flat plain, must have affected human settlement and peopling since very early times, permanent cultivation being facilitated “if” and “when” both water resources and a potentially fertile soil have been exploited by human ingenuity and skill. Kariz culture is present here, and nowadays it is exploited to the full. Throughout the green patch of farms which form the oasis of Panjgur, we noted that modernity and traditional past still coexist: cultivators’ huts and mud hovels are almost invariably placed far apart from each other and always within individual plots of ground “outside” and surrounding the farm proper, where the several annual crops are raised amidst luxuriant clumps of date palm-trees: village-units and feudal Lords, the same pattern to be found all along the Kech – Nihing rivers system. The archaeological surveys have brought to light more than one relevant site and mound dating back (according to surface material) to “Harappan” and pre-proto-historic times. Literary sources referring to the Arab conquest of these eastern “lands” provide us with telling evidence of the “historical” relevance of this region from pre-Islamic periods to the Middle Ages. Then it came under sovereignty of the Buleidis (brigand-princes who controlled both the Kech and Panjgur regions, keeping firm control of all the main access passes), up to the Gichkis’ seizure of power. For the most recent and important historical events, and a more thorough historical-tribal and institutionaladministrative analysis in connection with both the local traditional organization and its inter-action with other tribal-family groups (such as the Nawshirvanis) and British Administration, cf. once again R. Redaelli, The Father’s Bow…cit., pp.110 on. This latter is a study of particular importance because the so-far unpublished documentation drawn on by the Author, and quoted verbatim, makes it possible to support the analysis attempted here, as well as the reconstruction of a “model”. 18 As has already been said, the accompanying sketches are an integral part of this study. They illustrate the following notes, and are no less significant than the literary sources and archive records. The rate at which these monumental structures are becoming derelict, both for natural and human causes, make the topographic, graphic and photographic documentation carried out by the Italian team particularly valuable. The reading of these ruins – fading remains of a vanished system – and of the territory of which they were integral part, becomes more problematic with every passing year. The “field-sketches” are by two architects, Gionata Rizzi and Gianni Zerbato, who worked with the Italian Historical, Archaeological and Anthropological Research Group in 1991; the drawings and plans of Kalatuk, of the castle-village oasis system, and of Tump are by Angela Bizzarro and Giuseppe Tilia, who have worked with the Italian team since the very beginning of our fieldwork in 1986. They shared our emotions, our difficulties and our risks, but also our satisfactions, our sense of triumph… and our many local friendships. My affection, gratitude and appreciation to all of them.

19 The surveys carried out from 1987 – 1997 by the Italian Historical, Archaeological and Anthropological Mission in Makran, with the collaboration of Dr. Roland Besenval (CNRS, Paris) in charge of the archaeological sector of the research, have provided us with new reliable evidence concerning with the Kech’s peopling and related chronologies (see Besenval/Cartography). Of the remaining ruined castles, known by the local generic designation of Miri (the ruler’s palace), Miri Qalat is certainly the most interesting (see Plates 10.1 – 10.3). It rises about half a mile from the right bank of Kech river, about five miles to the north-west of present day Turbat. Newly constructed kariz have once more brought water for irrigation, and luxuriant palm groves and fields now reach to the very foot of the Miri. It is an imposing pile, built and re-built by the efforts of successive rulers to an elevation of about 300mts at its highest point. Cf. also Sir Aurel Stein, An Archaeological Tour to Gedrosia…cit, pp. 54-55, and Besenval/Cartography, pp.114-115 (archaeological soundings on selected sites have been here carried out by R. Besenval and his team, which made it possible to solve some chronological problems and re-visit traditional dating). 20 There is no reason to suppose that the occupation’s conditions were essentially any different during earlier periods. The main modern castles re-use pre-existing structures, in many cases datable to as early as the 5th millennium BC (if not earlier), when all along the Kech flourished local civilizations – certainly pre-dating and then contemporary with the so-called Indus civilization – based on forms of urban/proto-urban life. This situation may convincingly be explained by the nature of the surrounding environment, which, as geomorphological and environmental/paleo-environmental studies have shown, has remained largely unchanged over the last few millennia. In this context, it follows that the “anthropic factor” has played a crucial role, remaining pre-eminent, and conditioning the population (and depopulation) of this region, characterized by marked aridity, low annual rainfall and scarce vegetation mainly concentrated along the river beds. The mountains are particularly bare, probably due to human over-exploitation (according to P. Sanlaville’s study, cit., p. 81). In such a habitat, water assumes an absolutely vital importance. No settled life based on agriculture is possible without hydraulic installations. Water can be exploited for agricultural purposes only where and when it is accompanied by irrigation techniques for its collection, channelling, distribution and damming, in order to prevent sudden and devastating floods from washing away the crops. As already mentioned, in some areas sophisticated barraging and terracing techniques can be found on the mountain slopes along the wadis beds, apparently replacing the kariz – khawr-jah one (see above note n.13). One explanation for the re-use of earlier structures is that this system spared the new Lords the need to build ramparts and bastions anew,

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Baluchistan peoples mostly living in the mountains. Dense agglomerations of dwellings or huts may still be found in such localities; here cultivation is dependent on rainfall and is necessarily practised over small areas, the economic resources being linked to pastoral activities…and banditry: the jangalis, as the inhabitants of certain mountainous regions of Makran are still called - such as the peoples of Bal Nigwar around Panodi, the peoples roaming in the hills and ranges to the north and south of Tump, or in Zamuran, and the hilly-mountainous areas around Buleida - warrior peoples, brave fighters and active raiders, quite distinct from the dominant local families such as the Rind, the Tagranis, the Gichkis, and so on23.

We have a “feudal” society, to use a category and definition typical of the West and western culture. But we are also in the presence of a society without cities21. The history of the Kech castles is the history of a powersystem based on the control of fortified mounds which, in their turn, control a specific territory dependent on them. Within this territory, human settled life is (as it was in the past, too) organized into villages, so many small and subordinate structural units where an indigenous population resides, whose economic resources are mainly linked to family handicraft and agricultural activities carried out exclusively with the help of permanent irrigation assured by numerous kariz and channels, and, in certain regions, sophisticated barraging and terracing22.

The Gichkis’ taking of power at the start of the eighteenth century may therefore be read as these agricultural peoples’ “need for support” from a power which was also strong in military terms, and which would protect and safeguard their life and traditional culture from a hostile surrounding environment. During the period of the Buleidi domination, this state of tension and insecurity had reached such a pitch that it was easy for these petty princelings from the East to oust the Buleidi rulers, sophisticated shi‘ite brigands and merciless leviers of taxes, whose ferocious internal power struggles, and continual incursions to north and south, had completely unsettled and subverted the region’s traditional order. Alternating between guile and force, the Gichki family wheedled its way into Kech with support from the agricultural population. Once they had gained the upper hand over the Buleidis, they also easily won the consensus of a population loyal to its own religious creed (Zikri); they then speedily and effectively replaced Buleidi power, and the Buleidi system of relations, with their own. Thus Authority and Power settled in castles, and within the boundary walls of these castles they established a thorough-going and distinct political system, which also assured them of military control of the region. Although continuing to live in “village units”, the agricultural population would become thoroughly dependent on the castle in a sort of two-way relationship, which de facto would deeply affect the local pattern of life and mould all subsequent history down to the present day.

The history of these castles is also indissolubly linked to the chronic state of insecurity and tension which persisted (and still persists) between this settled-agricultural world of the river valleys, and the nomadic/semi-nomadic and enabled them to start from an already established position of dominance. Moreover, the geography of the territory and the hostility of the surrounding environment forced the new rulers into such dominant positions, for defensive reasons, and in order to exert a firmer control over their domains. Possibly, too, it implied a desire, on the part of new and foreign conquerors-rulers, to convey further legitimacy upon their Authority through a degree of sacral continuity with the past, a hallowed past, memories of whose heroic-epic deeds, as we have seen, are still alive to-day. 21 “The relationship between city and politics emerges clearly from the very etymology of the second term, which – as is well known – derives from the Greek lemma polis, which refers to the city not just as a physical structure, but basically as a political system” (P. Rossi, La città come istituzione politica, in P. Rossi (ed.), Modelli di città. Strutture e funzioni politiche, Torino 1987, p.5, repr. Edizioni di Comunità, Torino 2001, p.5). This quotation from Pietro Rossi may help to clarify the way I am using here the term “city”, namely, as referring to a political and administrative system, its political role within a given society and in specific social and political contexts. It is with this meaning, therefore, that I use the term city in this study. As I have also said, what follows does not set out to be an analysis aiming at any historical reconstruction (an urban history or a history of city architecture, or the political/dynastic history of the region), nor a comparative analysis based on western models; rather, it seeks to deduce a local model which, although necessarily abstract, will nonetheless conform to a degree with the actual historical reality and its various shades and situations. 22 With regard to artisan life and local craft, see the study by Sh. Unwin, Crafts and craftsmen. Laquer Work in Makran, in this volume. As for agriculture, bearing in mind the studies carried on by R. Besenval and the geo-morphological approach adopted by P. Sanlaville, as already stated there is no reason to suppose that these occupation’s conditions were essentially different during earlier periods, particularly if we take into account the long-established tradition of the local hydraulic techniques still in use, the amount of alluvium annually deposited by canal irrigation from the river, and the fertility of this soil. The archaeological survey and surface finds have provided us with solid proof in this connection: “…on the alluvial plain flow the Kech and some tributaries like the Nihing (coming from the west) and the Gish (from the east). The water derived from the permanent rivers…or coming from kariz cut through the alluvial beds makes it possible to irrigate gardens and palm-groves established on the narrow and discontinuous lower terrace. Apparently, the availability of arable soil, was the limiting factor rather than the water resources, but the irrigation technique probably existed since at least the third millennium B.C., given the numerous sites dating back to this period (Miri Qalat, Sami, Shah-i-Tump, etc…”: Besenval/Cartography, p. 84, et infra). See also supra, notes n.4, n.7 and n.20, pp. 146-148.

Thus gradually, and through firm control of all water supplies present on their territory and the connected water-system, the Gichkis built up “feudal estates” of their own24. 23

On the basis of archaeological reconnaissance and anthropological research-work, we may also assume that similar conditions of village and occupation already prevailed in these areas in very early times. Moreover, Arab chroniclers and geographers of the “Futûh” period, and mediaeval literature provide us with telling evidence of this condition: Balâdhurî, Tabarî, Tha‘âlibî, the Fathnâmah-i-Sind, for instance, as weel as Istakhrî, Ibn Hawqal and Muqaddasî and the anonymous author of the Hudûd al-‘Âlam among the geographers (see above: V. Piacentini Fiorani, Trade, Migrations and Military Operations (9th – 11th centuries AD), pp. 119 on) 24 See above, R. Redaelli, The Environmental Human Landscapes, § 2 and Idem, Administrative Subdivisions and Tribal Structures, §. 1.

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: The castles of Kech: a society without cities The architectural features of these castles - characterized by several concentric circles of walls - and the organization of the surrounding territory - built on the oasis and an outer ring of villages - are the concrete reflection and illustration of this local society’s character and its internal articulation, and of the various power relations which would be established under Gichki dominion.

Thus, and in this same context, through agnatic relations, and hybrid understandings with the mountain warrior tribes (the custom of wet-nursing is still widely practised to-day), they gradually developed also an independent military force, clearly distinct from the agricultural population, which enabled them to re-create a system of balances - and economic alliances - between two antithetical worlds and models of life. It also allowed them - and the point is worth stressing - to square an economic circle: by drawing the local warrior peoples into their orbit, and involving them in a degree of profitsharing, they managed to secure the region’s economic independence, since they had complete control of it. This was a factor which worked in favour of the dominant lineage and allied lineages, but it also implied a certain structural weakness for the region as a whole, in that it crystallised social relations and prevented society from developing towards any form of urban life until extremely recent times.

Within the circle of its walls, apart from the prince himself and his family, the qalat also housed the court and the Lord’s personal services, with the walled enclosures thus including inside quarters and manorial chambers, lodgings for the sardar’s military escort, workshops with their own work forces, as well as cisterns, wells and warehouses for food stores, stabling and so on. The military lodgings and various workshops were usually situated in the outermost block. This area “produced safety”, that is it guaranteed safety, and personal protection, for the prince and the population resident in the territory gravitating on the castle; it also provided the requirements of the sardar’s family, who had no need to go to the bazaar, since trade and the disposal of surplus goods occurred within these outermost walls. As the sardar consolidated his power position and influence, and interchange developed, this third fortified enclosure also housed an audience hall for official gatherings, combined with a “guest house”. The hall is generally an impressive vaulted space (ivan), usually built in baked-brick, well plastered and lavishly decorated with niches, terracotta plaques, stuccoes and frescoes (cf. Sketch Notes on the Field, Pidarak, Sami and Kalatuk, Plates 10.4a, 10.9, 10.16 and 10.17)26. The second walled enclosure usually contained the servants’ quarters, and those of the household staff and various dignitaries. A narrow entrance (sometimes a chicane) protected by a powerful entrance door and massive corner bastions and/or towers, flanked by rooms for the sardar’s personal guard, led to the innermost lodgings, the fort proper, for the sardar and his family27. Here he received “friends” and “foes”, plotted, made and unmade alliances, and marriages.

The castles of these local petty princelings thus assumed the functions of capital-cities - in the sense of politicaladministrative centres on which the surrounding territory was dependent and towards which it also economically gravitated. In point of fact, further analysis will reveal that the distinguishing feature of the Kech system is its regime of “economic autarky”. This may largely be explained by the habitat described above: the region’s geo-morphological configuration, and the difficulties of communication due to both natural… and human obstacles. Thus here we have an economy which has been autonomous for most of its existence, with very meagre opportunities for trading, save during those periods when a strong Authority acting with full Powers ruled the country. Otherwise, this inhospitable environment has led to an emphasis on the local traditional structures, such as the village-unit and its administrative-institutional model (basically represented by the village council, or anjumân-i rustâq/anjumân-i deh, by the authority of the village elder, the mîr or the râ’is-i anjumân, and by the administration of local justice according to traditional laws and customs), based on an apparatus of “domestic” services, often highly specialized (such as embroidery, lacquer-work, goldsmithery, the engraving and working of silver, weaving, leatherwork and embroidery on leather etc.). The Luris, or blacksmiths, make up a sort of sub-caste with a history of their own, with remote and tainted origins25. This apparatus of this work-force produces most of the community’s requirements in terms of goods and personal services. The land provides most of the necessary raw materials. Trading occurs when surpluses need to be disposed of, or to provide goods which can in no way be produced neither locally or autonomously.

26 These ivans, or audience halls, are among the very few local architectural structures in backed-brick. They are often associated with “prayer rooms” or “domestic” mosques. Such buildings closely reproduce the architectural features of manorial structures (old and new) typical of Sistan and Iranian Baluchistan, to which I have often drawn attention. In some cases, they are also telling examples of the cultural influence exercised by Iran on the domed structure serving as Darbar hall and guest house. According to the elders’ memory, they had been built and decorated by Persian masons and painters (Kalatuk, Sami, Panjgur etc.). This tradition makes good sense if we bear in mind the close lineage connections between all these rulers and peoples of “Iranian” stock and Iranian culture. 27 The outer walls are usually re-built in solid stamped clay or mud brick masonry on the top of ancient debris mounds. Where they have suffered from erosion (rainfall or other), breaches have been repaired with stone work. In the walls higher up, delimiting the inner fort proper, courses of large water-worn stones and pebbles set aslant alternate with sun-dried brick work. The latter method of construction alone has been used for the towers and walls of these inner fortresses. The former method can still be frequently found in modern structures all over Makran, for defensive houses or other.

25 With regard to the “Luris”, their mythical origins and present-day wandering and semi-nomadic life, see V. Minorsky (L. P. ElwellSutton), Lûlî, in “E/12”, 5: 816b, CD-Rom ed.

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Baluchistan as we have said, was a political and administrative component (the Southern-Western and Maritime Division of the Kalat State in Baluchistan)29.

The fields were tilled by the agricultural population living in the villages. They received protection from their sardar, and could take refuge in his fortress-citadel in times of external threat. Should a quarrel with other villages or strife with other sardars arise, their own sardar would give them support and administer justice. In return, they would provide quotas of agricultural produce and perform various services.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the organization of geographical space continued to be the reflection of this precise concept of Authority, and its correlated Powers, and of the ensuing political-administrative model within a well delimited territory. As we have also said, this fact may be explained by the well proven adaptability and malleability of these local Lords, and by their ability as political leaders, at once merciless and cunning when they needed the support of the traditional local forces, or win the “benevolence” of the colonial power. It has been historically ascertained that they were well aware that this latter was above all interested in maintaining order and security in this frontier region, which was indeed inhospitable and marginal, but also crucial for the British Empire and its struggle for mastery and the international play of balances in the Asian sub-continent30.

Moreover, where a castle stands, there craftsmen usually go, to provide for the needs of the lord’s domestic administration, and that of his court. They would also settle in the nearest villages, and move with their whole mobile workshop to meet all requirements as they arose. With the growth of the sardar’s landed property, forces of slave labour - sometimes, but not necessarily, in the employ of an intermediary - began to tend his fields. Quotas of agricultural produce were variously set aside for the needs of the sardar and his court, for the intermediary and his “slaves” and servants’ families28.

If in one sense this structure is reminiscent of that of England, and its Gentry, in the Middle Ages - a Gentry which also lived in their own castles “outside the urban centres” - ultimately producing a real dichotomy between Authority and Power, in the Kech region this dichotomy never arose, since the Gichki power system never allowed society to evolve and develop towards urban forms and their related social and economic structures.

Without going into greater detail, it is interesting to note that this structure has been more or less maintained, without evolving and, as we have said, without developing into an urban society. The sardar’s revenues derived largely from levies and agricultural activities (the region’s palm-groves, and their produce, are still world famous). Trade generated only a small amount of revenue in cash, since individual activities outside the Kech-Panjgur region were minimum. Tax collecting, on the other hand (mostly on produce, tolls and certain transit goods) provided a not inconsiderable income. Indeed, throughout the history of Kech, there is no shortage of wars with the Khan of Kalat in connection with the allocation of certain tolls, and for the post of tax-collector. Lastly, among the sardar’s revenue we must also include the proceeds from theft and banditry. Much of the revenues thus obtained were reinvested in agricultural activities and water quotas.

The domestic community of the sardar never evolved in the direction of any form of “bureaucratisation” or “professionalism”. There are no “book-keeping” registers or recorded accounts of separate estates held in the name of the collective society, apart from family ones. Indeed, family relations and matrimonial alliances tend to favour the maintaining of the unity of family possessions. The solidarity of the family underpins the debts of the individual, and the expulsion of any one member from the family group is a positive legal action, of the greatest social relevance and political weight. The solidarity of the extended family prevails over all other social and institutional relations, and involves the entire territory, continuing to form the connective network underlying all its relationships.

The essential structures of this system were left untouched by the colonial regime, even when this latter strengthened the proto-state of Kalat, of which Makran,

The “castle” was, and remained, the only centre of Power and Authority, the only political-institutional and administrative centre of a given territory; and the territory thus identified continued to be economically dependent on those keeps and those bastions, relying on the sardar’s castle for its security and defence, with the result that territory, villages and castle all ultimately shared a single place-name. Such a total identification still constitutes a feature of the area, the last symbolic vestige of a form of administration raised to the level of a cultural system for over two and a half centuries.

28

The problem of slave labour – both for domestic purposes and for certain work on the landed properties – is extremely complex, and closely linked to that of the slave trade: since the earliest times, the region has been a rallying point and sorting centre for a lucrative trade in human resources coming mainly from the coasts of Africa. It proved something of a headache for the British Administration, both because of the continual internal disputes to which it gave rise (cf. for example the rivalries between various Rind groups), and because of England’s delicate position after it had proclaimed the abolition of the slave trade and slavery itself in the eighteenth century. In this respect see V. Piacentini Fiorani – R. Redaelli, L’Islamic District Paradigm e il gioco dei poteri in Asia centrale e nell’India britannica, in “Clio”, 29 (1993), n. 4, and n. 28 infra. The Quetta Archives contain much documentation (memoranda by British Officials and records) on this subject, for which cf. B. Nicolini – R. Redaelli, Quetta: History and Archives. Note on a survey of the Archives of Quetta, in “NRS”, 78 (1994), 3, specif. p. 411-412.

29 30

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See supra, note n.1 Cf. again R. Redaelli, The Father’s Bow…cit., pp. 89 on.

Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: The castles of Kech: a society without cities Gesellschaft might easily be adapted to fit certain IndoPersian societies, where we are actually dealing with a cultural context with a mainly urban base, and specific political conditions35. But if we move to Kech-Makran and the above described political-institutional reality, and its social environment, we can see that the conditions or pre-conditions for such development were entirely lacking. Nor were such conditions to develop during the British colonial period.

3. The city, or “bureaucracy...one of the hardest social forms to dislodge”31 In a way, it might be said that – vis-à-vis this social and economic structure - English colonization in India acted as a revolutionary force. Almost paradoxically, faced with the village system, the administrative system imported by the British acted as a stimulus to revolution, which was to trigger off a movement which would lead towards a new order in which innovation, technical/technological change and productive development were also to assume strategic functions for the growth of a different political and institutional reality. Karl Marx had sensed as much, as we may see from his correspondence from London with the New York Daily Tribune in the 1850s32.

The tireless tribal policy pursued by Sandeman, and Simla’s steadfast opposition to greater British involvement, finally won the day36. Thus no British administrative model ever penetrated Makran, nor any ‘”bureaucratic” apparatus, nor any form of capitalist economy; still less did any indigenous social stratum of European “culture” develop there.

Here it may be interesting briefly to analyse the role played by the British colonial Administration, and the ensuing “bureaucratisation” process, with specific reference to the power-structure above described in the Kech-Makran region.

The British colonial Administration continued to concentrate its regional policy on the khanate of Kalat, though in the second half of the nineteenth century this latter was going through an umpteenth crisis of structural weakness which had brought it to the brink of collapse, if not of extinction. The Gichki sardars were quick to exploit this to the full, establishing themselves as the political élite of the Kech-Panjgur territory. In other words, by making local powers less flexible through a complex system of appointment and confirmation, the Sandeman System offered the Gichkis a formal breach, enabling them to insinuate themselves into the power game. And they had no hesitation in their political choices. They proved malleable and obliging vis-à-vis the British Administration, and sensitive and adaptable vis-àvis the traditional local forces, on whom, when occasion demanded, they could rely to keep their power intact, even to strengthen it to the detriment of that of the khan of Kalat, upon whom they continued nominally to be

In India, the British introduced bureaucracy as the means of transforming a society based on a community-order into a political-social systemic structure based on a rational order. But they did not act directly, nor did they drastically interfere in the traditional power-system reversing long established balances and customs; they institutionalised a flexible system which would operate indirectly, through understandings and compromises of various kinds with local traditional authority, the main object being that of setting up a bureaucratic apparatus, which would be “impersonal” and efficient at one and the same time, fit to keep order and law throughout their colonial dominion. The British policy and its “ratio” puts us in mind of Max Weber’s lucid analysis on the structural forms of power and the might of the modern bureaucratic apparatus, especially when he states that “once it is fully in place, bureaucracy is one of the hardest social forms to dislodge”33. In coherent conclusion of this assumption, Weber adds a pregnant remark: “… even when the enemy occupies a given territory, under his rule a system of rationally organized civil servants may continue to function perfectly, with a mere change of the organs at the top; this is in the interest of all those involved including above all the enemy himself”34. Weber’s detailed discourse on a modern bureaucracy and its political power presupposes the existence of the “city”, and of the specific social and economic conditions implicit in it. The situation illustrated by the German scholar in his well-known treaty Wirtschaft und

35

Ibidem, p. 290. This, for example, was the great strength (and power) of the Iranian “city”, the typical symbol of a culture bordering KechMakran to the west. On several occasions over the course of its history, the city with its own specific social-administrative structure was able to reverse conquests and power relations between conquerors and conquered. Cf. V. Piacentini Fiorani, La città islamica, in P. Rossi (ed.), Modelli di città… cit., pp. 223 on and the recent study by V. Piacentini Fiorani, Practice in Mediaeval Persian Government: the Surrender of the Great Cities of Khurasan to the Seljuks (AH 428429/AD 1038-1039), in “AION”, 59 (1999), 1-4 pp. 38-46. 36 On the British political choices and the Sandeman System there is a vast literature, though it varies greatly in its quality and objectivity. The study by T. H. Thornton, Col. Sir Robert Sandeman. His Life and Work on our Indian Frontier, photostatic repr. from the original ed. London 1895, Karachi 1979, is still an important source on Sandeman’s life and activity. On the impact of Sandeman’s tribal policy and the pre-existing Sardar System in Baluchistan, cf. the already mentioned work by R. Redaelli, The Father’s Bow… cit., pp. 88 on et infra. In my view, Redaelli’s analysis – backed up by exhaustive field-work, complemented in its turn by a scholarly study of the still largely unpublished correspondence in the Archives of Quetta (QOCDA) and London (IOR) – is convincing, and certainly more realistic in its conclusions than the analysis and arguments put forward by Nina Swindler in her otherwise valuable studies, for example N. Swindler, The Political Structure of a Tribal Federation: the Brahui of Baluchistan, Ph.D. thesis, Columbia Un., New York 1960; Idem, Kalat, the political economy of a tribal kingdom, in “American Ethnologist”, 19 (1992), n.3.

31 Max Weber, Economia e Società… cit., vol. II: Sociologia del potere, p. 289. 32 Cf. P. Rossi, Il ruolo dell’Europa: origini e declino di un’asimmetria, in: A. Ruberti (ed.), Europa a confronto. Innovazione, tecnologia e società, Roma - Bari 1990, esp. pp. 422-423 (“La sfida europea e la risposta delle società extra-europee”). 33 Max Weber, Economia e Società cit., vol. II, p. 289. 34 Ibidem, p. 290.

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Baluchistan dependent37. That is to say, they were concerned essentially with conserving and perpetuating “their own” system, and the benefits and privileges it entailed, and were unconcerned about - or had no perception of - the disadvantages which would result, in the medium/longterm, from a growing cultural gap between their old world and this new expanding Europe, in search of fresh sources of supplies and new markets. Pursuit of their goal caused them to forge particularly close links with the British Lion, which earned them a privileged position and a recognised social rank (a sort of institutional formalization of their presence in Kech and at Panjgur), including bureaucratic-patrimonial posts of a fiscal nature (the right to collect certain taxes), without prejudice to their land-based “patrimonialism” and the local traditional power-system based on the village-territory structure.

the British functionaries’ tireless mediating activity was no longer adequate for the solving of the continuous local disputes, and the centre decided upon military intervention, this essentially took the form of cautionary expeditions, rapid exemplary sorties aimed primarily at re-establishing the Union Jack’s Power and Prestige, and then at restoring local order through newly elaborated understandings, which would not impinge on traditional balances and, at the same time, would secure the western borders from raids or violations on the one hand, and the smooth functioning of the telegraph line, on the other39. Thus, the Sandeman System structured and institutionalised a power system based on the control of dominating fortified centres, which in their turn would control a specific adjoining territory dependent upon them, colonial bureaucracy in its turn being the most solid guarantee of order and security. On this territory, the settled population continued to live in their villages - so many minor and subordinate social-economic units; the jangalis, vigorous and enterprising peoples, nestled in the

As a result, the sardars’ position of power remained extremely strong. Along with it, the castle perpetuated its own political, economic and social function both on the local and the regional level, a guarantee, in its turn, of order and stability for England and the East India Company.

Here it is worth mentioning that an armed guard is still mounted, in the present-day barracks of the Makran Scouts at Mand, over the graves of two British officers killed during an operation to stifle arms trading by a group of bandits trans-passing from Persian territory. 39 Prior to the laborious defining of the borders between British India, Persia and the khanate of Kalat in 1872 (V. Piacentini Fiorani, Notes on the Definition of the Western Borders of British India in Sistan and Baluchistan in the 19th Century, in B. Amoretti Scarcia - L. Rostagno (eds.), Yad-Nama. In memoria di Alessandro Bausani, Roma 1991, vol. I, pp.189-203), and even later, English functionaries and Sandeman himself had repeatedly intervened as mediators to quell revolts and settle interminable inter-infra-tribal disputes. Here brief mention might be made of: I. the action taken by Sir Charles MacGregor in 1877, shortly after the borders had been defined, which averted the outbreak of a conflict between Azad Khan of Kharan and the sardar of Panjgur; II. the expeditions by Sir Robert Sandeman in 1882-1884 in the wake of new disputes between Mir Nauruz Khan, the son of the previous ruler of Kharan, and the same sardar of Panjgur; III. the continual disputes, clashes and retaliation wars between the various Rind lineage groups of Mand, Gwadar and Zamuran, which required English intervention on more than one occasion; IV. the continual claims of the Nawshirvanis of Kharan, which seriously jeopardised the already shaky khanate of Kalat, forcing the British colonial Administration to further supporting action; and so on. But the tireless work of excellent officials did not always succeed in staving off direct military action. Between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, England was forced into paying numerous “visits”, including those of 1883-1884 (following disagreements between the Nawshirvanis of Kharan and the Gichkis of Panjgur), of 1890-1891 and 1894 (following further disputes between the Rinds of Mand and the Persian Rind), and those of 1895-1896 (occasioned by disputes with the Persian governor of Bampur). The largest scale expedition was without any doubt the one carried out in 1898, after the revolt of Mir Mehrab Khan Gichki, who allied himself with the Nawshirvanis for the occasion (cf. infra and following note). Apart from an extensive literature dating from the period (memoirs, personal accounts, travel notebooks, etc.), and a rich archival documentation (still largely unexplored), cf. in particular the Gazetteer of Makran cit., pp. 54 on. Significant information in this context is given by the military diary of Cpt. A.H. Mason, D.S.O., R.E. concerning the Zhob Field Force: Cpt. A.H. Mason, Operations of the Zhob Field Force under Major-General Sir G.S. White K.G.B., K.C.I.E., V.C.,in 1890, and Tochi Field Force, 1897-1898, and Report and Diary of the Mekran Expeditions, photostatic reprint from the original ed. 1892-1902, Nisa Traders, Quetta, s.d..

This was an understanding which was staunchly respected by both parties. When this order was violated either by rivalry between the khan of Kalat and his “vassals”, or by bids for power and supremacy among the Gichki sardars themselves, the British sedulously avoided direct involvement, having recourse to various subsidiary instruments to re-establish order and guarantee the security of their own interests in that region, these latter amounting – broadly speaking - to the building, and smooth running, of the famous London-Calcutta telegraph line, the repression of a flourishing slave trade and that of a no less intensively active arms trade directed towards Afghanistan and originating in ‘Oman and Iran38. When

37

On this fraught period, too, cf. R. Redaelli, The Father’s Bow… cit., pp. 90-92. This author gives a documented analysis of the ability with which the Gichki sardars always managed to safeguard their own position in the Kech region and at Panjgur. Their policy of loyalty to England, and their shrewd matrimonial alliances with the khan of Kalat’s family, the Ahmadzais, allowed them to rule their domains, and, well protected within the walled enclosures of their castles, to levy taxes and raise other revenue from their own landed estates and various activities. Political relations between the Gichki family and the Kalat khanate were further strengthened in December 1931, when Mir Muhammad Azam Jan (1931-1933), the third son of Khudadad Khan, who had a Gichki mother and was very knowledgeable about Makran and its “affairs”, was appointed as the new khan of Kalat after the death of the elderly Mahmud Khan. 38 Cf. also R. M. Burrell, Arms and Afghans in Makran: an Episode in Anglo-Persian Relations, 1905-1912, in “BSOAS”, 49 (1986), 1, pp. 824; V. Piacentini Fiorani – R. Redaelli, L’Islamic District Paradigm…cit., pp. 609-640; Ch. E. Davies, Britain, Trade and Piracy: the British Expeditions against Ras al-Khayma of 1809-1810 and 1819-1820, in Ch. E. Davies (ed.), Global Interests in the Arab Gulf, Exeter 1992, pp. 29-66. The arms trade as a whole constitutes a page – albeit a minor one – in the history of the “Great Game” between the British Empire and Czarist Russia, then in full swing, the final target being control of Afghanistan, the gateway and threshold to Central Asia as well as to the subcontinent and British India.

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: The castles of Kech: a society without cities (see Fig. 7.1, p. 109). Its territory consists of vast marshy lagoons41 alternating with stony barren plateaux, silted up desert depressions, fluvial deposits and clay, gypsum and scrub-covered sand dunes42, long beaches and sandy spits linking steep rocky islands to the coast43. Almost bare of vegetation, virtually devoid of permanent water resources, the coastal areas have a history of their own, peripheral in relation to the rest of the mainland, the events of which have scarcely affected their life, if at all. This region has, and has had over the centuries, a life of its own, projected on to the sea, a decidedly maritime existence of trade - and piracy. At certain periods it was at the centre of intense inter-continental and trans-oceanic trade; its bays sheltered harbour settlements of primary importance, and a pluralistic and cosmopolitan society flourished there carrying out prosperous activities, and coastal and overseas relations44. At others, in particular when trade routes were diverted, life in the region inevitably declined; owing to the isolation and the hard conditions of life, the population emigrated, and the rest withdrew into itself, carrying on some fishing and minor coastal trade. This, together with the inhospitable character of the country, probably helps to account for the far-reaching reputation of its peoples as fierce raiders and fighters: within this hostile context, piracy prevailed and was organized into a variety of piratical activities which were elevated to positive political and economic system45. The British period brought a revolution to this coast, accompanied by social and institutional changes. Strategic interests (control of the seas, security along the Persian-Indian border, and the construction of the famous telegraph line), and more direct commercial involvement,

folds of the mountain-chains, as so many nominally subordinate fighting units: the result was a precious balance of power, whose functioning was essentially based on the flexibility of the colonial bureaucratic apparatus and the cleverness of a few British officials. At this point, in connection with the “landscapes” outlined above, a further distinction should be made between hinterland and coastal areas. In Kech–Panjgur particularly vital historical and cultural traditions came together in a strange mixture of ethnical elements, which would however retain their own individual identity. The “revolts” of the colonial period the most memorable being that of Mir Mehrab Khan Gichki in 1898, which entered local epic and is immortalised in the graffitos of the oasis of Pidarak40 - all too clearly reveal these heterogeneous cultural elements, with their dramatic tribal divisions, deeply rooted in a body of barely compatible codes and traditions. The system, however, seemed to work under the sardars’ established political-social order, becoming crystallised in perpetuity. Here we have a glaring difference with the Kech composite human environment; we have a most glaring difference, which is represented by the “ecological niche” that stretches all along the Makrani coastal area; notwithstanding their efforts, this was never subject to Gichki power and the sardars’ political-social system, and its population never intermingled with them. Here, events unfolded following completely different trends. A narrow tongue of land, the Makrani seaboard is protected to the rear by a particularly hostile environment, with low broken hillocks which constitute the last ravined slopes of the Southern Makran Range

41 Barrier beaches isolating gradually filled long lagoons, such as Kalmat and Ormara areas, or vast lagoons with mangrove, gradually filled and becoming sebkhas. Cf. specif. Besenval/Cartography, pp. 8586. 42 Gravel or sand beaches, more recent to the south, particularly in the Dasht and Basol deltas, and at Pasni, with its typical sand-dunes landscape, alternating with vast plains of gypsum and salt. Ibidem, Fig. 8.1, p.132. 43 The tombolo formations, typical of Gwadar and Ormara. See above, V. Piacentini Fiorani, Kuh-i Batil Old Barrage, Plate 7.3, Fig. 7.3, and Fig. 3, p. 111. 44 Following archaeological surveys and geo-morphological studies carried out by the Italian Archaeological, Historical and Anthropological Mission in Makran, direct evidence is at present available with regard to navigation both along the coast of Makran and overseas, and the role played by this coastal region since prehistoric times in establishing and maintaining relations between the Indus system and its civilization and the territories adjoining the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Gulf, including Mesopotamia. In this connection, see Besenval/Cartography, pp. 85-86 (the geomorphological perspective) and pp. 91-100 (the archaeological survey: first results), and previous chapters. 45 The enterprises which made the Makrani sailors famous have been carried out by the Meds. Since early Islamic times, using their native craft they sought their fortune all along the coastal strips of the Arabian Sea and adjoining “waters” as far away as the Malabar Coast, Zanzibar and the Gulf. Their various activities and expeditions have been recorded by Tabarî, Balâdhurî and other chroniclers in Arabic and in Persian. Other groups who settled along this coastal stretch, recorded by written sources in Arabic and in Persian, are represented by the Jats, whose enterprising activity as sailors, raiders and pirates reached the ancient harbours of Qays and Siraf – evidence of this can be found also in a tomb inscription studied and published by N. Löwick, and the Kalmatis, well-known for their piracy.

40 In 1987 there was still a small shrine at Darma Gol, one of the villages in the Pidarak oasis. It was a square-shaped domed room in rough-hewn stone, plastered and held together with mortar, where Mir Mehrab Khan Gichki was said to be buried. In the adjacent cemetery, crowned by a ruined stone wall, some slabs with rough inscriptions in Persian recorded the battle against the English, and listed the “families” who fought and died alongside Mehrab Khan in the anti-British revolt – in primis the various Nawshirvani allies. Baluch nationalism has recently made much of the episode, embellishing the uprising with fantastical details. Along the present-day track leading from Pidarak to Turbat through a deeply eroded, stony plateau, visitors are shown a flat stretch of land, which an oral ballad identifies as the field of the battle which flared up between the Baluch “coalition” and the British army. Here, several stone tumuli can be seen, too, which local pietas regards as the tombs of the British officers who died in this battle. One particularly evocative epic tells of the terrible clash between the two enemy forces (their number inflating as the legend grows in importance), embellished with heroic deeds: the British, ambushed by the Baluch, despite having the sun in their eyes, fought with courage, discipline and determination, but gradually fell one by one. At this point the ballad attains a high-flown solemnity as it commemorates the death of this valiant neo-champion of Baluch nationalism, who succeeded in uniting and galvanizing profoundly differing tribes and peoples, and who bravely met his destiny at the hands of the wrathful English, fighting like a lion. For bibliographical references, cf. the previous note, and also the above-mentioned report and diary by Capt. A. H. Mason on the “Mekran Expeditions”. The architectural structure of this small mausoleum has been drawn by G. Rizzi and G. Zerbato (cf. Sketch Notes on the Field, Plate 10.4a).

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Baluchistan these local lords. Thus it answered a very specific need, that of asserting the autonomy of a new system and model of life, based on social “westernisation” and a “westernised” urban life, as opposed to other models of Power-Authority or other traditional political, institutional, social and economic systems.

implied for the Union Jack different political choices and tactics. This meant reforms, namely the introduction of technological innovations (such as fishing as main local industry, and fishing markets, shipyards, local naval dockyards, military and meteorological bases, etc.) and the specialized work forces to man them. Thus, here the British rule introduced an Administration and created a Bureaucracy, which brought about important changes (in Jiwani, Pasni and Ormara, for example; Gwadar remained a case apart46, each centre representing a separate reality also from an urban point of view).

It was now that the city arrived in Kech de facto and de jure. And it arrived as a force for the disruption of a specific system. The urbanization and bureaucratisation of Kech now began in earnest. Of necessity, at first such urbanization was enforced, with a bureaucracy imposed from the centre (functionaries included). Now Turbat, the capital city of the Makran Division of Baluchistan, was born. At this point the forces so perceptively analysed by Max Weber were set in motion. Urbanization and bureaucratisation brought with them education, modernization, various technologies, economic resources, and mobility, all phenomena which began to eat away at Kech’s economic autonomy, bringing about new structural features and, along with these, a new dichotomy, which, for a certain period, amounted to outand-out diarchy.

As a result, from the second half of the nineteenth century the history of the coast took a course that was virtually autonomous in relation to that of the hinterland; increasingly tenuous threads linked the coastal areas to the Kech region, which did not influence its culture or affect its traditional model of life, as they might well have done; and vice versa. In the rest of Kech-Panjgur, the sardar system - a pre-urban organization of a tribal type continued to prevail, drawing renewed strength from its “economic autarky”47 and the closed “castle-village” circle. The urbanization of Kech thus dates from an extremely recent and undoubtedly post-colonial phase of its history, and is crucially linked to the dismantling of the sardar system.

That is to say, for a time, the Castle retained its own particular powers and functions, institutional power included; the result was a diarchy between the central Administration and the traditional local institutional system, with conflicting claims to supremacy, ambiguous understandings and various alliances.

At the moment of Partition, power - de jure and de facto was still in the hands of the Gichki sardars, and in their castles, which, as we have said, also functioned as economic-political centres. As we have said, too, this was the legacy handed down by British colonialism.

The Islamization of the region - it too now under way for some twenty years - was a further factor destined to lead to the dismantling of the pre-existing system. Islamization, too, was enforced and promoted from the centre; it was an unknown quantity in the region, which had been dominated for centuries by the Zikri creed and patterns of devotion, accustomed to collaborating and cohabiting with other religious communities. Alongside the central bureaucratic apparatus, this Islam-factor rigorously orthodox - also implied a new order from the political, institutional, social and economic point of view. An integral part of the state’s urban administrative apparatus, it became the symbol of the power of bureaucracy within the state structure. The new Mosque, all gleaming marble and decoration, fitted up with all those means of communication which technology now puts at the service of religion, standing alongside the much more modest traditional Mosque (in sun-dried brick and stone, but utterly characteristic of local culture), seemed to swallow up not just this latter, but the entire old system of social relations.

It thus seems correct to see the birth of a city-based system, with being the “city” understood as the politicaladministrative centre of a given territory, as dating from a period going back not much more than some twenty years ago. It was born of the need to crush the power of the sardars; and of the need for a central and centralized political-administrative and social system with which to shatter the “feudal” system set up and consolidated by 46

The town of Gwadar was situated at the southern end of a flat narrow isthmus of sandy ground, which joins the steep rocky plateau some 18 kms long to the main shoreline. Up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, the town of Gwadar and its territory extended in an arc up to the foot of the hills from a coastal base measuring around 60 kms. Since the last quarter of the eighteenth century it had belonged to the Sultan of Masqat. The sea around Gwadar swarms with fish, and fishing became Gwadar’s main industry. We have important evidence of Gwadar’s overseas relations through archaeological finds (since prehistoric times, see Besenval/Cartography, specif. pp. 96-98), literature, archive records, oral tradition, etc. Particularly significant is the architecture of the old city, including within its walled enclosure the so-called Ismaili Quarter, where a Buddhist “stupa” was still in situ in 1987, when we first visited this area. Much about the old town of Gwadar, its bazaar and the fort overlooking the approach to the city from the narrow isthmus, have a distinctly “Arabian” look and flavour, the symbol of its lively maritime dimension and active overseas relations. See also above, V. Piacentini Fiorani, Kuh-i Batil Old Barrage, specif. pp. 97 on.. 47 Cf. supra, § 2, pp. 146-150.

Now revolt broke out in Kech-Makran, and also along the seaboard where the Zikri communities were particularly well-organized and numerous (especially at Ormara and Gwadar).

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Valeria Piacentini Fiorani: The castles of Kech: a society without cities Violent unrest in '86 - 87 led to new and more pragmatic decisions.

Over the space of a few years, Turbat has become a sprawling great city; all architectural memory of its past is rapidly disappearing; destroyed by the heedlessness of modern man, and atmospheric agents, the old buildings are promptly and aggressively replaced by the thrusting architecture of bureaucracy and technology. According to unofficial statistics, the city has some 100.000 inhabitants. To-day the place-name Turbat is used to designate a very extensive area, including numerous villages, so many minor and subordinate units dependent upon this political-administrative centre, yet still surviving and living on in the new economic and social relational structures created by the city. Although it is now firmly established in official bureaucracy, the placename Turbat has still not really entered local parlance, and is used alongside other traditional ones, such as Shahi-Tump, or Kech/Kej. Faced with reality, present-day nationalism is eager to affirm the memory of its past: Turbat is indeed Turbat, but the name slips in and out of usage, and, for its own cultural reasons, a new local intelligentsia re-proposes the place-name “Kech” (or its “arabized” form “Kîj”), a glorious reminder of the region’s glorious past, when Kech was “the Kech”, a large running stream and an extensive territory, whose name symbolises pride and honour, fierce resistance and a dogged fight against all aggression and invasion. Aware that the closed circle of the “castle-village partnership”, which had ruled the life of the region for centuries, has now been broken once and for all, the new Makrani nationalism is eager to solder it together again into a new ideological autonomy.

Willy-nilly, the situation was developing and irreversibly changing; the process set in train from the centre through Federal functionaries, as able as they were biddable, was now gaining ground at extraordinary speed. This bureaucratisation process had indeed acted as a “revolutionary catalyst” for a new pattern, in which innovation, technological change and productive development were also to assume strategic roles in the evolution of a different political and institutional system. Bureaucratisation, pervasive also in the religious sphere, had acted positively as the most efficient means of transforming a society based on community-order into a political-social structure based on a rational order. At first, Castle, Mosque and Administrative Buildings continued to exist, indeed to loom, side by side, the very symbol of two distinct principles of Authority and Power still coexisting, with their respective roots in differing traditions and systems. Then, gradually, the Mosque began to prevail; the Administration stayed in its Buildings, “bureaucracy, once fully in place, [being] one of the hardest social forms to dislodge”; but the Castle the symbol of a system which had had its day - was now left standing empty. Grasping the realities of the situation, the sardars had come out of their castles and entered the city, with that realism which had always distinguished the political behaviour of the Gichki family (still foreign in its heart of hearts). Stealthily, flexibily and obligingly they tiptoed out of their manors and entered stealthily, flexibly and obligingly this new world with its new rules and order. Treacherous and adaptable, they did not hesitate to take their place in the modern world of scientific knowledge and technological know-how. Decisions and choices now varied and diversified in tandem with the gradual diversification of the regional economy, and the march of modernity and bureaucratisation.

But the present-day system of relations - admittedly aggressive, both on the political and on the administrative, economic and military levels - has not expunged the memory of the past of this remarkable region. Today, the peoples of Kech are undoubtedly a society in rapid transition and transformation, in search of a new cultural model, ideally modern and traditional at one and the same time, a cultural model with its roots deep in the local humus, capable of adapting the incontrovertible needs of the new times to the virtues and glories of earlier days. The past is revisited, discovered anew and set in stone for times present and to come. Memory of these earlier days is enshrined in epic songs and popular ballads; it persists and is further reinforced by evocative images “carved” into the rocky hills edging these moonlike plateaux. Such phenomena reflect the Kech people’s absolute and indispensable need to “capture” the memory of a system which is dead, or at least is dying; the need “to contemplate their own image” in the region’s phantasmagoric landscape.

Such castles as have been left unscathed by events, and which human or natural frenzy have so far spared, still loom massively over the surrounding landscape in all their ruined might and majesty. Notwithstanding the ravages of some thirty years and local depredations , they are a haunting memory; they are the image - today somewhat faded and dilapidated - of a formidable local élite, and of the system to which this latter gave life. The pitted towers, the crumbling bastions and ramparts, the splendid sumptuously decorated audience halls ransacked of all that could be removed, the backed bricks having been carried off to strengthen well-heads or kariz, or to build new irrigation channels - are so many signs of the fleeting nature and evanescence of certain structures of power, and of the speed and urgency with which the present is inexorably pressing, developing new and different forms.

The symbols of this past - which stretches back for centuries, indeed millennia - are many and varied, as the impressive archaeological remains being discovered in the region are now proving, particularly those of Miri Qalat and Shah-i-Tump. The castles of Kech are a mere dot in this vast fresco, and one which is becoming increasingly faint both architecturally and in local

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Baluchistan memory. Where the ruins have not been eaten into by farms, fields and crops, where the violence of natural phenomena has not swept away buttresses, walls and towers, the Administration has stepped smartly in, building within these walled enclosures the spanking-new Offices of its modernity and might. Although it has walked in on tiptoe, it has found only empty spaces. But this is not surprising, because the sardars, who inhabited and enlivened those courts with the splendour of their system, walked out and left them quite some time ago.

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Appendix SKETCH NOTES ON THE FIELD “The relation between city and politics emerges clearly from the very etymology of the second term, which, as is wellknown, derives from the Greek world “polis”, meaning the city not just as physical structure, but also and more importantly as political organization”, to quote the words of Pietro Rossi in an introductory essay to the volume Modelli di città (Torino, Einaudi, 1987, repr. Torino, Edizioni di Comunità, 2001). Bearing this conceptual definition in mind, the preceding notes aim to deduce a local “model”, which, although necessarily abstract, might to some degree correspond to this region’s historical reality and its various situations in all their complexity. In this connection certain architectural features - such as the castles of Kech and the physical organization of the castle-village system have provided valuable clues to the reading of a local historical process and its power-structures, making it possible to draw a picture of the social and economic relations which developed within and around these fortified citadels, and of the power relations associated with them. Thus we have a fresco of a positive system - a political, institutional and economic systemic structure - which was to regulate life in Kech and Panjgur for over two and a half centuries, indeed until after the end of the colonial period. From a strictly methodological point of view, the accompanying graphic documentation is an integral part of this article. It gives the “ideal dimension” of a power-process with its typical power-structures, taking the form of “sketch notes on the field” (to use a term dear to English officials and functionaries of the nineteenth century on reconnaissance missions to these remote frontiers). The authors of the sketches and drawings are, in alphabetical order, Angela Bizzarro, Gionata Rizzi, Giuseppe Tilia and Gianni Zerbato. Alessandro Fiorani was a sensitive and invaluable photographer. My warmest gratitude to all my fellow adventurers and romantic dreamers for their precious assistance. The italic captions to the sketches, together with comments and notes to his 1991 travel notebook, are by the architect Gionata Rizzi.

***

Plate 10.1: Miri Qalat (Turbat) seen from South-East corner Plate 10.2 (next page): drawing of Miri Qalat Plate 10.3 (page 159): Miri Qalat - hypothetical reconstruction of the fortress (G. Rizzi - A. Zerbato)

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159

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Plate 10.4a (previous pages): 1991, fort of Pidarak: audience hall and “guest-room”. Plate 10.4b (previous pages): 1991, Pidarak oasis: Darma Gol. The mausoleum of Mir Mehrab Khan Gichki.

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Plate 105: 1991, Pidarak.

161

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Plates 10.4a, 10.5, 10.6, 10.7, 10.8 (This and previous pages): 1991, Pidarak. 1991, Pidarak: the castle. Situated in a particularly luxuriant oasis, it stands on the top of an ancient debris mound; according to local tradition this Miri was built in 1837 and remained in use until the twenties of the following century. Now seriously dilapidated, it is entirely in adobe, with the exception of fairly regular courses of pebble cladding, still clearly visible on the massive curvilinear bastion. The original ground plan is still recognizable: the keep is built up against the 80 mts long inner curtain, with two bastions protecting the chicane entrance. The outer curtain forms a sort of false curtain of some seven metres, with a gate to the north-east. There are remains of a third circle of walls with a “guest-room” inside them, in adobe finely plastered, with delicate internal and external decoration, now in a very poor state of repair (G. Rizzi - A. Zerbato). Pidarak castle: the keep. Its south-west façade, lightly decorated, has survived more or less intact. Quadrangular in plan, its structure is a truncated pyramid. It has a room with large windows on the first floor, and a platform protected by a parapet with narrow vertical embrasures on the second.

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Plate 10.8.a (above): 1991, Pidarak: the castle and the surrounding oasis. Plate 10.8b (right): Wali Muhammad, one of the trusty Baluch Levy Corps guarding the Mission. Plate 10.9 (following page): 1991, Sami‘ castle: “guest-room” and prayer-hall.

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165

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Plate 10.10 Above: 1991, Tump castle. Left: 1990, plan and section of Tump castle (A. Bizzarro - G. Tilia, 1990). The Tump castle is an adobe building on an ancient debris mound and pebble foundations. The building as a whole is in an advanced state of decay, though the keep, with its square ground plan and inward-sloping walls, is still intact. The general plan seems conceived for defence: a first entrance gate leads to a basse court well protected; a second gate leads to an inner space flanked by various small buildings, which adjoins to the north the majestic keep. Tump has been one of the three headquarters of the Gichki sardars in Makran since the eighteenth century. Plate 10.11: 1991, sketch plan of the Tump castle.

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Plate 10.12: 1991, Buleida: the fort.

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Plate 10.13: 1991, Buleida: the fort.

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Plates 10.12, 10.13 (previous pages), 10.14a: 1991, Buleida: the fort. Built on the edge of a rocky cliff overlooking the oasis, it is now an imposing ruin in adobe on a regular diamond-shaped plan. The two surviving towers are the only examples of circular bastions found in Makran. The surviving parts of the boundary walls have embrasures and imply the original presence of battlements. Traces of buildings and a well can still be seen within the perimeter of the hill. Plate 10.14b: 1990, Buleida. The tombs of the Buleida Maliks.

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Plate 10.15: 1990-1991, Kalatuk. An imposing castle still overlooks the articulated asset of the surrounding oasis (following Plates 10.16, 10.17, 10.18). “[...] Thus Power and Authority installed themselves in castles, and in these castles they established a virtually independent political system, which also assured them of military control of the surrounding territory. While continuing to live in the villages, the agricultural population was dependent on the castle in a sort of partnership which has marked its subsequent history down to our own day [...] The architectural articulation of these castles - characterised by several concentric walled enclosures - and the organization of the territory - centred on the oasis and a circle of surrounding villages - are tantamount to a three-dimensional illustration of the way these societies were structured, and of the various power relations which were established by Gichki rule... [...]” (V. Piacentini Fiorani)

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Plates 10.16, 10.17: 1987, Kalatuk: the two photographs show the remains of an adobe fortification. In all likelihood the fort was similar in shape and size to that of Pidarak; the keep is rectangular in plan, with sloping walls, giving access to the platform up a small wooden ladder. Unlike the one at Pidarak, the “audience hall” (drawing by A. Bizzarro - G. Tilia, Plates 10.17 – 10.19), closely reproduces architectural features which reminds Persian culture in the vaulted hall, finely plastered, and decorated with niches; traces of paintings and stuccoes can still be seen. In backed brick, it is situated inside the second curtain. Terracotta tiles, with traces of painting in the interior, crown the building outside. This “odd” decoration seems to symbolize the meeting of two civilizations (one from the East – the Rajput Indian origin of the Gichki family - and the other from the West – the sophisticated Persian culture of this ruling élite), both foreign to the region and quaintly hybridised. The building is in a very poor state of preservation.

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Plate 10.18: Kalatuk, the old Mosque (see Plate 10.19, point D.)

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Plate 10.19: Kalatuk, the castle system.

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176

GENERAL INDEX

The system of transliteration requires more than a word or two of explanation. Throughout the book, and in particular with regard to tribes, peoples, personal-names, titles, offices, officials and place-names, the transliteration has been modified to conform with the local practice and, when possible, with the New Oxford Atlas. Technical terms may appear both in their conventional English (or Anglicised) form in a rigorous transliteration as Iranian/Arabic names in accordance with the criterion in premise. The indication m.c. stays for “modern colloquialism”, and shows that the term is taken from recent writings or conversations. This does not necessarily imply that it is of modern coinage, but simply that it occurs in current colloquial or conversational use. We are fully aware of the limits of this index and its phonemic-etymologic transcription, which is not and could not hope to be complete, especially when considering the etymologic material of technical terms (phonemic and lexical subsystems of the languages, lexicographical contacts with other languages, etc.) and a formal, anti-semantic approach. However, we felt that this material should be put at the disposal of other researchers, even though it should be considered as highly provisional. It is to be hoped that the specialist will make allowances for such inconsistencies that do occur, and which should not, however, disturb the general reader.

Ahl al-Qiqân, 124, 124 n.27, 126 see also Index B, sub voce “Bilâd Ahl al-Qiqân” Ahl-i Ard-i Kikânân, 124, 144 n.9 see also Index B, sub voce “Bilâd Ahl-i Ard-i Kiqânân” Ahmad Shah Durrani, 22, 34 n.5 Ahmadzai power, 22, 34, 35 tribe, 22, 34, 35 n.9, 152 n.37 see also “Baluch, history” and “Kalat” Akhbâr al-Sîn wa al-Hind, 95 n.54, 120 Akhbar Khan, Bugti, see Bugti al-‘Abdî, see Hârith al-‘Abdî al-Hudhalî, Abû Bakr, 124 n.27 al-Hudhalî, Sinân ibn Salamah, see Sinân ibn Salamah alHudhalî al-Kûfî, compiler of the Fathnâmah-i-Sind, see‘Alî ibn Hamîd ibn Abû Bakr al-Kûfî Al-Nahr, see Index B, sub voce Nahr (al-) al-Sîrâfî, 121 see also “Abû Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Umar al-Sîrâfî” al-Tamîmî, ‘Ubaydallâh ibn Mu’amar, see ‘Ubaydallâh ibn Mu’amar al-Tamîmî Alexander the Great, 5, 17, 90 ‘Alî ibn Abî Tâlib, the fourth caliph, 60, 124 n.27 ‘Alî ibn Hamîd ibn Abû Bakr al-Kûfî, compiler of the Fathnâmah-i-Sind, 108 see also “Fathnâmah-i-Sind” All Baluchistan Mulazmin Ittehad, political movement, 74 n.5 see also “Baluch, nationalism” Alp Arsaln, Seljuq, 122 n.18 amir/amîr, the title - a commander, a chief, a person of rank, 34 n.5, 37 Ammianus Marcellinus, 5, 94, 95 Anjuman Bidari Baluch, political movement, 76 n.11 see also “Baluch, nationalism” Anjuman-e Ittehad-e Baluchistan, political movement,

INDEX A PERSONAL NAMES - DYNASTIES - PEOPLES TRIBES etc. (Figures in italics indicate office/officials, political movements/parties, etc).

Abd‘ali, Pashtun confederacy, see Durrani ‘Abd al-Qays, 93 ‘Abdullâh ibn Sawwâr, 124 n.27 Abdul Karim Nawshirvani, see Nawshirvani, Abdul Karim Abî Kâlîjâr, see Abû Kâlîjâr, ‘Imâd al-Dîn, Bûyid, 120 Abû al-Qâsim, chief of the Jat tribe, 126 n.35 Abû al-Qâsim Râmisht ibn al-Husayn ibn Shîrawaghî ibn al-Husayn ibn Ja‘far, of the province of Fârs, 121 n.16 Abû Bakr al-Kûfî, see ‘Alî ibn Hamîd ibn Abû Bakr alKûfî, compiler of the Fathnâmah-i-Sind Abû Bakr Ahmad ibn ‘Umar al-Sîrâfî, 121, 121 n.16 Abû Bakr al-Hudhalî, 124 n.27 Abû Dulaf, amîr of the Jat tribe, 126 n.35 Abû Kâlîjâr, ‘Imâd al-Dîn, Bûyid, 120, 122 Abû Zayd Hasan al-Sîrâfî, 120 see also “Akhbâr al-Sîn wa al-Hind” Abû Zayd Muhammad, 95 n.54 Abzaris, merchant family, 123 Achakzai, Abdul Samad Khan, 80 ‘Adud al-Dawlah, Bûyid, 120 Aelius Gallus, expedition to Arabia Felix, 103 Affonso d’Albuquerque, 128 n.58 Afghan Ittehad Bus Owners, political association, 74 n.5 see also “Baluch nationalism” Afghan peoples, 21 n.24 refugees, 64 n.19, 66, 75, 81-82 177

42-43, 76-77 see also “Baluch, nationalism” Anjuman Ittehad Naujovan, 74 n.5 see also “Baluch, nationalism” Anjuman Ittehad Zehri, 78 n.26 Antiochus the Great, of Syria, 90 Anwar Shah, Baluch pir and bard, 100, 145 n.11 Arabs Ardashîr and Shâpûr wars against-, 92, 93, 93 n.37, 94, 100 classical literature in Arabic (geographers, historians/historiography), 5, 20, 88-89, 93, 93 n.39, 94, 97, 97 n.54 et passim, 100-101, 105, 106, 108, 120, 120 ns.3-8, 124 et passim, 144, 144 ns.7-9; * see plates: 113-114 7.1 and 7.2 conquests, 17, 21 expeditions overseas (7th – 8th centuries AD), 123125, 144, 144 ns.7-9 tribes, 91, 100 Ardashîr, first Sasanian emperor, 87, 88, 91, 92, 94, 100, 104 Ardavân, Parthian prince, 88 Arsacids, 92 Arrian, 5 Augustus, Roman emperor, 90, 90 n.22 Ayyub Khan, 64 Azad Khan Nawshirvani, see Nawshirvani, Azad Khan, nawab of Kharan Azd, Arab tribe, 90 n.18, 91, 100, 103 Badini, tribe, 78 n.26 Bakr ibn Wâ’il, 93 Bakr, Arab tribes, 93 Balâsh, Arsacid ruler, 91 see also “Valagash/Vologeses” Baluch Haq Tawar, political movement, 81 see also “Baluch, nationalism” Baluch Ittehad, political movement, 73-82 see also “Baluch, nationalism” Baluch confederacy, 40, 42-44 culture, 9-11, 20, 21-22, 33-35, 59, 100, 125-127, 129-131, 135-138, 143-156 * see plates: 16 1.10, 157-175 10.1-10.19; * see figures: 139-142 1-18 see also Index B, sub voce “Kech” “Makran” “Panjgur” ethnic groups, 18-24, 33-34, 51, 53, 59, 73, 75; * see 25 fig.2.1 history, 18-24, 33-44, 87-175 see also “Balûs” “British, colonial administration” “Brahui” “Gichki” “Kalat” “Nawshirvani”; Index B, sub voce “Baluchistan” “Buleida” “Gwadar” “Kech” “Makran” “Panjgur” language, 17, 21 nationalism, in modern ages, 19, 24, 42-44, 73-82, 152 n.39, 153, 153 n.40 see also “Anjuman” “Baluch Ittehad” territory, 3-11, 20-22, 34-37, 107-108, 128, 143-146, 153-154 * see figures: 25 2.1, 45 3.1, 46 3.2, 109 7.1, 111 7.3 water rights, 51-58 see also Index B, sub voce “Baluchistan” and

Index C, sub voce “kariz” Baluch, Ismail, 74-76, 80-82 see also “Baluch Ittehad” “Baluch, nationalism” Baluch Kaur, 76 see also “Baluch, nationalism” Baluch National Movement, political movement, 81 see also “Baluch, nationalism” Baluch Salvation Front, political movement, 81 see also “Baluch, nationalism” Baluch Students Organisation, political movement, 76, 78-79 see also “Baluch, nationalism” Baluchistan Groundwater Rights Ordinance, 52 Minor Irrigation and Agricultural Development Project, 54 see also “Baluch, water rights” and Index B, sub voce “Baluchistan” Balûs, 20, 122, 122 n.18, 127 see also “Baluch, history" Balût, var. for Balûs, 20 n.18 see also “Baluch, history” Bânak of Isfahan, 88 Bareach, tribe, 80 n.37 BSF, see Baluch Salvation Front Bashir Ahmad Baloch of Solband, Baluch scholar and poet, 7, 145 n.11 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, 78 Bizenjo, tribe, 78 n.26 Bizenjo, Ghous Bukhsh, 77-79, 79 n.34 see also “Baluch, nationalism” Bloch, Marc, 145 Brahui culture, 9, 21, 146 n.14 ethnic groups, 21-23, 34-35, 51, 52 history, 21-23, 34-37 territory, 21, 41 see also “Baluch” “British, colonial administration” “Kalat” Brahui Shahwani, tribe, see Shahwani British archives, 7, 39 colonial administration, 4, 7, 17-23, 33-44, 59-60, 62, 143, 146-147 n.17, 150 n.28, 151 et passim, 153-154; * see figures: 45 3.1, 46 3.2 empire, 3, 7, 18, 22, 23, 37-39, 40, 143 n.1, 150, 152 n.38, 153 n.40; * see 164 pl.10.8b military power, 23, 39-41 BSO, see Baluch Students Organisation Bugti, tribe, 33, 36, 41, 73 Bugti, Akbar Khan, 73, 77-79, 83 p.62 see also “Baluch Ittehad” and “Baluch, nationalism” Buleidi archaeological sites, 133 fig.8.2 dominion, 146 n. 14, 146 n.16, 147 n.17 maliks, 146, 146 n.14, 146 n.16, 147 n.17 graves, 146 n.14; * see 170 pl.10.14b see also Index B, sub voce “Buleida” Bulûs, 20, 122 n.18 see also “Balûs” Bûyid military regime/power, 119, 120, 121-122, 122 n.18, 123, 127 n.40 178

Buzdar, tribe, 63 Chach, ibn Silâ’ij, rule and wars against the Arabs, 124125, 124 ns.26-29, 125, 125 n.30, 127 Coptos, tariff, 90 n.21 Curzon, Lord George Nathaniel, 4 Czarist Russia, 23, 39, 152 n.38 Dah, 22 n.26, see Zikri, Dheraywal, subtribe, 60-61, 63, 68 Durand, line, 40 Durrani, Pashtun confederation, 22 Ephtalites, see Hephthalites Falis/Fâlîs, merchant family, 123 Fârsnâmah, Persian chronicle, 89 n.12, 121, 123 et passim, 126 n.35 Fârs-nâmah, see Fârsnâmah, Fathnâmah-i-Sind, 96, 96 ns.51-52, 106, 108, 124-125, 124 n.26 et passim, 125 n.30, 126 n.35, 127, 144 ns.8-9 see also “Abû Bakr al-Kûfî” Fatima/Fâtimah, daughter of the Prophet Muhammad, 60 Fâtimids, and the route to India, 123, 123 n.23 Fida Ahmed, 76 see also “Baluch, nationalism” Firoz Khan Noon, 77 n.22 Futûh al-Buldân, literary genre, 100 et passim, 123-125, 125 n.30, 126 Gabrs, see Zoroastrians Ghabr (m.c.), Arabic form for Gabr, a Zoroastrian, see Zoroastrian Ghaznavids, 122 dominion in Iran, 122-123, 123 n.22, 130 n.65 Ghilzai, Pashtun confederation, 80 n.37 Ghous Bukhsh Bizenjo, see Bizenjo Gichki castles, 22 power relations/power-system, 19, 22, 34, 36, 38, 146-156 * see plates: 157-175 (castle/oasis system) rulers/sardars, 22, 34, 36, 38, 143, 145 n.11 see also “Baluch, history” and “British, colonial administration” Gichki, Malik Dinar, 146 Gichki, Mir Mehrab Khan, 152 n.39, 153, 153 n.40 Gichki, Murad, 22, Ghitchki, 38 see Gichki Goldsmith, agreement, 24 n.34, 40 Greek, literature Gurchani, tribe, 63 Habib Jalib, 77 n.25 Habibullah Khan, nawab of Kharan, see Nawshirvani, Habibullah Khan Hadani, tribe, 63 Hadrian, roman emperor, 90, 104, 105 Haftânbukht, 88, 104 Haftâvâd/ Haftavâd, 88, 88 n.6, see Haftânbukht Hakam (Hukaym/ Hakîm) ibn Jabâlah al-‘Abdî, see Ibn Jabâlah Hakam ibn ‘Amrû al-Taghlîbî, Muslim commander of the Makran front, 124, 124 n.29 hakim/hâkim, title, 18, 21 Hârith ibn Murrah al-‘Abdî, 124 n.27 Hasan of Pishin, 59 Hasani, tribe, 59 see Hasni Hasni

language, 59 origins, 59-60; * see 68 fig.5.1 social transformation, 60-67; * see 71 fig.5.5 territory, 60-61; * see figures: 69 5.2, 72 5.6 tribe, 21 n.22, 59-67, 78 n.26 Hellenism Parthian period and dynasties, 90 et passim, 90 n.18, 106 Seleucid period and dynasties, 89 et passim, 89-90 n.18, 102-103, 106 archaeological sites and settlements, 89-90 n.18, 91, 106 Hephthalites, 92 Hijâz, king of -, 94 Hindoos, see Hindu Hindu community, 8, 21, 35, 62 religious groups, 127 Hormîzd I, Sasanian emperor, 87, Hudhalî, see Sinân ibn Salamah al-Hudhalî Hudhalî, see Abû Bakr al-Hudhalî Hudhalî, see al-Hudhalî ibn al-Qâsim, see Muhammad ibn al-Qâsim al-Thaqafî Hudûd al-‘Âlam, 127, 131, 135, et passim Ibn al-Balkhî, see Fârsnâmah Ibn Hawqal, Bahr al-Fârs, 119-123 see also Index B, sub voce “Bahr al-Fârs” Ibn Jabâlah, Hakam (Hukaym/ Hakîm) ibn Jabâlah al‘Abdî, 124 ns.26-29, 144 n.8 Ibn Mâjid, Ahmad Ibn Mâjid al-Najdî, 128, 128 n.58, 131 Il-Khanids, 122, 123 ‘Imâd al-Dawlah, Bûyid, 120 ‘Imâd al-Dîn Abî Kâlîjâr, see Abû Kâlîjâr, ‘Imâd al-Dîn, Bûyid, 120 Inayatullah Baluch, see Baluch Inayatullah India Act, 42 n.43 see also “Baluch, history” and “British” Insedad-e -Manashiat Lyari, 76 n.11 see also “Baluch, nationalism” ‘Isà ibn Madan, 127 Ismail Baluch, see Baluch, Ismail Ismaili community, 8, 22, 135 quarter at Gwadar, 98, 135, 154 Ismâ‘îlism, see Ismaili Iyâdits, 93 Jabâlah, see Hakam/Hukaym/ Hakîm ibn Jabâlah Jadgali, tribe, 34, Jalal Khan Khajji Rind, Baluch, 145 n.11 jam, title - properly, name of an ancient king of Persia often identified with Solomon or Alexander the Great, thence “a monarch” “a king”. Nowadays, it is used both as a title (Jam of Las Bela) and a personal name (Jam Muhammad), 35 n.12, 36, 41 Jam Muhammad of Ghenna, 138 n.32, 145 n.11 Jamaldini, tribe, 53, 75 Jami‘at-i ‘Ulema’-i Islam, 74, 77, 81 Jami‘at-i Islam, 81 Jamot, tribe, 22 Jats, 126, 126 n.35, 130 n.66, 153 n.45 Jaunpuri Mohammad, 22 Jinnah, Muhammad Ali, see Muhammad Ali Jinnah Jogezai, Aurangzeb, 80 179

JUI see Jami‘at-i ‘Ulema’-i Islam Junejo, Muhammad Khan, 79, 79 n.31 Jumiani, subtribe, 60-61, 63, 65 Justinian, Byzantine emperor, 93 n.35, 94 agreements with the Turkish khans, 95 Juts, see Jats Ka‘ba-yi Zardusht, Sasanian monument and inscription, 92, see also Zoroaster Kakar, tribe, 60, 80 n.37 Kalat, khanate, 20-23 administration, 33-44, 150 et passim feudatory states, 35-36, 41-44, 143; * see 45 fig.3.1 wars, 21-23, 38, 60, 143 et passim see also “Khan, of Kalat” “Baluch-” “British, colonial administration”; Index B, sub voce “Baluchistan-” Kalat State National Party, 77 see also “Baluch, nationalism” Kalmatis, 153 n.45 Karim Nawshirvani, see Abdul Karim Nawshirvani Kârnâmak i Artakhshîr i Pâpakân, 87 et passim, KSNP, see Kalat State National Party Kazirunis/ Kâzirûnis, merchant family, 123 khan/khân, 3, 18, 22-23, 33-44, 60, 143 Khan, of Kalat, 3, 18, 22-23, 34-44, 60, 150-152 Khudadad Khan, 40 n.38, 152 n.37 Mahmud Khan, 152 n.37 Mehrab Khan, 39 Mir Ahmad Khan, 22, 34 n.5 Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, 34, 38, 42 n.41, 43-44 Mir Muhammad Azam Jan, 152 n.37 Nasir Khan I the Great, 22-23, 34-38, 143 Khetran, tribe, 59, 66 Khudadad Khan, see Khan, of Kalat Kûshân, king of -, 87, 92, Khudaynâmak, 101 Khusraw I Anûshîrwân, Sasanian emperor, 93, 93 n.39, 94, 94 n.43, 105-106 Khusraw II Aparvîz, Sasanian emperor, 93, 93 n.40, 106 Kikânân, see Mardûm-i Kûh-i Kikânân Kuch, 20 Kûfich, people, 122 n.18, see also Qufs Kurds people/groups 122, 122 n.18 Brahui tribe, 52 Kurd, Mir Abdul Aziz, 42, 76 see also “Anjuman” and “Baluch, nationalism” Kushans, 105 Kutub al-Futûh, literary genre, see Futûh al-Buldân Lâris, tariqah and economic/political power, 123 Luni, tribe, 60, 63 Luris, craftsmen, 135, 149 Magsi, tribe, 76 Magsi, Mir Yusuf Ali Khan, 42, 76 see also “Anjuman” and “Baluch, nationalism” Mahdawi, sect, 22, Mahmud Khan, of Kalat, see Khan, of Kalat malik/mâlik, the title - a possessor, lord, master, proprietor, also a king Makrân, king of -, 92 Malik Dinar, see Gichki, Malik Dinar Malik Yar Muhammad, 75-76 see also “Baluch, nationalism” Maliks of Buleida, see Buleidi

Marco Polo, 5 Mardum-i Kûh-i Kikânân, 124, 124 n.27, 126 see also “Ahl al-Qiqân” Marri, tribe, 33, 36, 41, 59-60, 63 Marri, Khair Bukhsh, 77-78, 81 Marx, Karl, 151 Mêds, 125, 126, 126 n.34, 153 n.45 Meherali Sumar, 137 Mehrab Khan, see Khan, of Kalat Mengal, tribe, 78 n.26 Mengal, Akhtar, 81 Mengal, Ataullah, 77-78 Mihrak, of the Ardashîr Khûrreh, 88 mir/mîr, the title, for Arabic Amîr (see supra sub voce) - a chief, a leader, the head of a family; nowadays, it is used both as a title and a personal name: see below. Mir Abdul Aziz Kurd, see Kurd Mir Ahmad Khan, see Khan, of Kalat Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, see Khan, of Kalat Mir Azad Khan, see Azad Khan, nawab of Kharan Mir Khan II, jam of Las Bela, 35 n.12, 36 Mir Mehrab Khan, Gichki, see Gichki, Mir Mehrab Khan Mir Muhammad Azam Jan, see Khan, of Kalat Mir Nauruz Khan, Nawshirvani, see Nawshirvani Mir Yusuf Ali Khan Magsi, see Magsi Mogul, empire, 17, 21-22, 34, 36-37, 41 Mohamed Hasham, 137 Momiani, subtribe, 63 Mondwani, subtribe, 59, 63, 65 motebar/mutabârr, mutual in conferring benefits, 79 MQM, political movement/party, see Muhajir Qawmi Mahaz Mughîrah ibn Abî al-‘Âs, 96 n.51, 124, 124 n.25 Muhajir Qawmi Mahaz, political movement/party, 78 Muhammad Ali Jinnah, 42 n.41, 43, 143 n.1 Muhammad Azam Jan, see Khan, of Kalat Muhammad Hasni, see Hasni, Muhammad ibn al-Qâsim al-Thaqafî, Arab general, 125, 125 n.30, 126 n.35 Muhammad Khan Junejo, see Junejo, Muhammad Khan Murad Gichki, see Gichki Muslim League, 42 n.41, 43, 74, 77 n.22 Mwenye Aboudi Mohamed, 137 n. 26 Mzee Shahubu Fundi, 137 n. 26 na’ib/nâ’ib, title/office, lieutenant, viceroy, deputy, 36, 143 Nabatean, kingdom/kings, 90, 90 n.23, conflicts with the Ptolomies, 103 Nadir Shah, Persian emperor, 22, 34-35, 34 n.5 Naosherwanis, 38, see Nawshirvani tribe NAP, see National Awami Party Naraywal, subtribe, 63 Nauruz Khan, Nawshirvani, see Nawshirvani, Mir Nauruz Khan Nasir Khan I the Great, see Khan, of Kalat National Awami Party, 77-78 nawab, title, 18, 21, 33, 38, 41, 43, 73, 76-79 Nawshirvani power, 36, 38, 48 territorial expansion, 36, 38-39 tribe, 9, 34, 36, 38, 147 n.17, 152 n.39 * see 47 pl.3.2 and fig.3.3 (castle of KhudabadanPanjgur) 180

Nawshirvani, Abdul Karim, 81 Nawshirvani, Azad Khan, nawab of Kharan, 36, 152 n.39 Nawshirvani, Habibullah Khan, nawab of Kharan, 38 Nawshirvani, Mir Nauruz Khan, 152 n.39 Negus, the title of the ruler of Ethiopia, 94, 95 Nihâyat, see Nihâyat al-Irab fî Akhbâr al-Furs wa al‘Arab Nihâyat al-Irab fî Akhbâr al-Furs wa al-‘Arab, Arab chronicle, 89 et passim, 92, 93 n.36, 94, 106 origins and historical value, 100-101 * see ms. Arabic text, 114 pl.7.2 Nurzai, tribe, 80 n.37 Oghuz tribes, 7, 122 Pahlavi, inscriptions/numismatics/seals, etc., 88 Pakistan National Party, 77 n.20, 78, 81 Pakistan Peoples Party, 74 Palmyra rulers, 105 trade, 105 PNP, see Pakistan National Party Pâpak, father of Ardashîr I beginnings of the Sasanian dynasty, 87 et passim see also “Ardashîr” PPP, see Pakistan Peoples Party Parsi, 8, see Zoroastrian Parthian culture, 8, 104 empire, 90, 92 et passim, 104 rulers, 91, 104 settlements in the Gulf, if not farther east, 91, 104 wars with the Romans, 104 Pashktoi, tribe, 54-55 Pashtun culture, 59-61 ethnic group, 18, 21-23, 33, 36, 59-60, 64 n.19, 74-75, 79, 80, 82 nationalism, 74-81 see also “Baluch, nationalism” and “Pashtun Ittehad” territory, 22, 77-81; * see 25 fig.2.1 Pashtun Ittehad, 74 n.5 see also “Baluch, nationalism” and “Pashtun, nationalism” Pashtun Kakar, see Kakar Pashtunkwa Milli Awam Ittehad, 80 Pashtunkwa Milli Awami Party, 80 Patan, 21 n.25 see Pashtun Persian empires, 21, 22, 34, 40 historical sources, 89 et passim Anglo-Indian-Persian borders, 3, 24 n.34, 40, 152, 152 n.39, 153 pir/pîr, an old man - a spiritual guide(m.c.), 7, 100, 125 Pirkani, tribe, 78 n.26 PMAP see Pashtunkwa Milli Awami Party Procopius, 94-95, 96 Punjabi, population, 21, 24, 80 Pushtun, 21 n.24, see Pashtun qadi/qâdî, functions and position in the administration, 108 (of Bakhar and Aror in Sind), 123 Qajar, empire, 35, 37 Qufs, people, 20, 122 n.18 Râmisht of Sîrâf, 121

see also “Abû al-Qâsim Râmisht ibn Husayn ibn Shîrawaghî ibn al-Husayn ibn Ja‘far” Ramsay, John, 36 Republican Party, 77 n.22 Rind, tribe, 34, 78 n.26, 145 n.11, 148, 150 n.28, 152 n.39 Roman empire, 87, 89-93 eastern policy, 90-93, 94-95, 104 et passim Flavian-Antonine dynasties, 90 Trajanic-Hadrianic policy, 90, 104-105 trade in the east and beyond, 90, 90-91 ns.18-26, 92, 103-104 Sâbûr, son of Ardashîr - king of kings of Iran and nonIran, 87, see Shâpûr I Sadik, 60 Safavid, empire, 17, 22, 34, 36 n.13 Sa‘id Saiyid, 37 Salamah, see Sinân ibn Salamah al-Hudhalî Samanid, rule, 123, 130 n.65 Sanâtrûq, Parthian feudal ruler in the Arabian Peninsula, 87, 92, 104 Sandeman, Robert, 21, 23, 41, 151, 152 n.39 Sandeman System, 23, 40-41, 43, 151-153, 151 n.36, 152 n.39 see also “Baluch, history” and “British, colonial administration”; Index B, sub voce “Baluchistan-” sardar/sardâr (Ir.), chief - the head of a tribe/a family group, 9, 18, 21, 23, 33, 35, 39-41, 43, 74-77, 78-79, 143 power-system in Makran, 34, 36, 148-150 its disruption, 38, 151-156 see also “Baluch, history” and “British, colonial administration”; Index B, sub voce “Baluchistan” “Kech” “Makran” Sasanian empire/dominion, 5, 21, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 105-106 maritime interests and trade, 87, 89, 93, 92-95 et passim, 100, 105-107 military supremacy, 92-95 et passim policy, 87-100 Sasoli, tribe, 78 n.26 Sayad, family, 60 Seleucid kingdom, 102 et passim see also “Hellenism” Seljuks/Seljuqs, 17, 122-123 see also “Alp Arslan, Seljuq” and “Tughril Beg, Seljuq” Shabânkarâ’îs, 122 Shah Bilar, malik of Buleida, 146 n.14 see also “Buleidi” Shah Kasim, malik of Buleida, 146 n.14 see also “Buleidi” Shahani, subtribe, 61, 63, 65-67 Shâhnâmah, by Firdowsî, 88 et passim, 93 Shâhpûr I, Sasanian emperor, 87 Shâhpûr II, Sasanian emperor, 89, 93, 93 n.37, 94 Shaista Khan, 78 n.26 Shankalat, Indian ruler, 96 n.51 Shahwani, tribe, 75 shaykh, the title, pious and devoted man (m.c.), 145 Sheikh Husaini, tribe, 52 Sikh, community, 37 181

Silach, Ali Khan, 60-61 Silach, family, 61, 65 Sinân ibn Salamah al-Hudhalî, see al-Hudhalî, 144, 144 n.9 Sind Irrigation Act, 56 n.11-12 see also “Baluch, water rights” Sindhi-Pashtun-Baluch Front, 78 n.28 see also “Baluch, nationalism” Sirafi, colonies, 122-123 Sîrat Anôshirvân, 93 n.39 et passim Suhâr al-‘Abdî, 124 n.29, 144 n.7 sultan/sultân, the title, 28 Summalani, tribe, 78 n.26 Taghlîb, tribe, 93 al-Taghlîbî, Hakam ibn ‘Amrû al-Taghlîbî, see Hakam ibn ‘Amrû al-Taghlîbî Tagrani, group, 145 n.11, 148 tahsildar/tahsîldâr, the official, namely “a collector of revenue”, 52, 54 tahsildari/tahsîldârî, the office of a revenue collector administrative sub-division, see tahsildar/tahsîldâr takkri, 79 Tamîm, Arab tribe, 93 Thagani, subtribe, 63 al-Thaqafî, Muhammad ibn al-Qâsim, see Muhammad ibn al-Qâsim al-Thaqafî Tiberius, Roman emperor, 90 n.22 Tibis/ Tîbîs, merchant family, 123 Tihâmah, king of -, 94 Tor Tarin, tribe, 59 Trajan, Roman emperor, 90, 104 Trajan’s policy in the east, 104-105 Tughril Beg Muhammad, Seljuq sultan, 122 n.18 Tûrân, king of -, 87, 92 Turks political dominion/rulers, 145 turkish-speaking groups, 92 n.33, 95, 122, 130, 130, 145 see also “Seljuks”, and “Türkmen” Türkmen /Turkmen groups, 122 ‘Ubaydallâh ibn Mu’amar al-Tamîmî, 124 n.26, 124 n.29 ‘Umar ibn al-Khattâb, the second caliph, 124, 124 n.26, 124 n.29, 144 n.7 Ustaman Gal, political movement, 77 n.20 ‘Uthmân ibn ‘Affân, the third caliph, 124, 124 n.26, 124 n.29, 144 n.8 Vaegash, Arsacid ruler, see Balash Vahrâm, yazad of victory, 88 Vahram V, Sasanian emperor, 93, 96, 96 n.51, Vaeagash, see Vologeses Vologeses/ Valagash, see Balash, Arsacid ruler, 91 wali/wâlî, the official - one who exercises jurisdiction or authority, 37-38 Warezai, tribe, 61 wazir/wazîr, the official, 35, 37 Weber, Max,146-156 bureaucracy..., 151-156 the castles of the Lord, 146-150 Yemen, king of -, 94 Zanj, people, 121, 127 see also Index B, sub voce “Bilâd al-Zanj” Zardusht, 127, see Zoroastrian Zarkun, tribe, 61

Zehri, tribe, 55, 78 n.26 Zia ul Haq, 20, 73, 78-79 Zikri compound at Gwadar, 98, 98 n.60 political role, 22, 34, 146 n.16, 148, 154 religion, 22, 146 n.16, 154 religious community, 8, 22, 34, 146 n.16, 154 see also “Baluch, history” Zoroastrian religious group, 8, 127, 146 n.14 see also “Gabr” and “Ghabr” Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, see Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali

182

methodological approach/research sectors, 5-10 Baluchistan/Balûchistân Iranian Baluchistan, 8, 17, 34, 36 Kalat khanate, 20-23, 33-44, 143, 146 et passim Pakistani Baluchistan - general, 17-24, 33-44, 51, 55-57, 59-61, 65-66, 73-82, 135 * see figures: 26 2.2 (General Baluchistan), 109 7.1 (the Makrani coast), 110 7.2 (the monsoon routes), 111 7.3 (Gwadar tombolo and the rocky plateau) - irrigation schemes, 6, 18-20, 34-35, 52-55, 6465, 92, 129 et passim, 144-145, 146 n.14, 146-147 n.17 (kariz culture vis-à-vis the garband culture) * see plates: 13 1.4, 15 1.7-1.8, 28-29 2.3-2.6, 30-31 2.7-2.10, 58 4.3, 175 10.19 see also Index C, sub voce “garband” “kariz” and “khawr-jah” - landscapes, 6-10, 123-124, 126-129, 143-146 et passim • khawrs/river-valley systems, 60 et passim, 99 et passim, 128 et passim, 143-144, 143 n.5, 146-147 n.17 * see plates: 12-13 1.1-1.3, 14 1.5 (Nilag khawr), 29 2.6 (Tagran khawr), 116-117 7.4-7.6 (Ghorab khawr); * see figures: 69 5.2 (Rarkan Valley), 132 8.1 (Pasni area), 133 8.2 (Kech and Buleida valleys), 134 8.3 (Nihing khawr system) • oases, 38 (the system), 129-131(Makrani reality in the middle ages), 143-144, 146-148 (the Kech system), 146-147 ns.17 and 19 et passim (Panjgur system), 146 n.14 (Buleida system) * see plates: 13 1.4, 15 1.7-1.8, 175 10.19 • mountains, 17, 124, 128, 130, 143-146, 146147 n.17 * see plates: 13 1.4, 27 2.1-2.2 see also Makran Ranges • seaboard, 4, 6, 9-10, 14, 16, 95-96, 95 n.49, 96 n.50, 97-100 (Gwadar), 107-108, 123-124, 128, 130, 153-154, 154 n.42, 154 n.53 * see also figures: 109 7.1, 110 7.2, 111 7.3, 132 8.1; * see also plates: 12 1.2, 14 1.6, 16 1.9, 115 7.3 (Gwadar city on its tombolo) see also “Gwadar” “Jiwani” “Ormara” and “Pasni” - the territory and its organisation: • antiquity, 95-97, 95 n.49, 146 n.14, 146-147 n.17, 147 n.20, 148 ns.22-23, 153 n.44, 154 n.46 *see also figures 132 8.1 (Pasni area, archaeological sites), 133 8.2 (Kech and Buleida valleys - archaeological sites), 134 8.3 (Nihing khawr system, archaeological sites) • middle ages, 123-128, 129-131, 143-145, 144 ns.8-9, 148 n.23, 153 n.45 see also “Bahr al-Fars” “Kech” and “Makran” • British colonial administration, 23-24, 36-37, 39-43, 151-152 et passim, 153-156

INDEX B PLACE- NAMES Âbâdân, 126 Abzar, 123 Aden, 93, 95, 97, 119, 122 Adoulis, 95 Afghanistan, 10, 17, 21-23, 34, 36, 39-40, 42, 64, 75, 81, 96, 152, 152 n.38, 137 see also Index A, sub voce “Afghan” Africa east African coasts, 5, 92, 95, 97, 97 ns.53-55-56, 106-107, 119, 121, 123, 127 n.40, 135 trade, 89, 93, 123, 127, 128, 130-131 Ahvâz, 91 Aksum, 94 Alia, 90 Arabia Arabia Felix, 103 Arabian Peninsula, 5, 6, 89, 90 n.18, 91, 92, 94, 97, 100, 104, 121, 127, 128, 135 Roman province of -, 90, 90 ns.22-23, 91, 94, 104105 the Sasanians and the Arabian kingdoms, 99-100 South Arabia, 89, 100, 103, 104, 119 the seaboard, 120, 123, 123 n.23 Arabian Sea, 87, 89, 94, 95, 96, 100, 101, 108, 119, 122, 131, 135, 153 ns. 44-45 * see also 109 fig.7.1 Ardashîr Khûrreh, 88, 91 Ard-i Mardum-i Kûh-i Kikânân, 124 see also Index A, sub voce “Mardum-i Kûh-i Kikânân” Armâbîl, 93, 127, 127 n. 52, 128 Armâ’îl, 127 n. 52 Aror/Arôr, 108, 126 Arrajân, 91 Asia Central Asia, 5, 10, 17, 23, 24, 76, 87, 92, 92 n.33, 121, 125 n.30, 130, 135, 152 n.38 Eastern Asia, 92, 97 South-East Asia, 92, 119, 137, 150 Western Asia, 95, 97 trade, 89, 93, 95, 97 see also Index A, sub voce “Afghan” “Baluch-” and “Persia” Asôrestân, 91 Babylonia, the Jews of-, 103 see also “Asôrestân” Bahr al-Fârs, 119-123, 125-127, 126 n.37, 127 n.40 see also Index A, sub voce “Ibn Hawqal” Bahrayn (al-), 87, 93, 94, 95 Qal‘at Bahrain, 93 Bakhar, in Sind,108 Baku, 76 Bal Nigwar, 148 Balkh, 127 Baluchistan, - the Italian Research Project (1987-2003), 3-11 183

borders, 3, 24 n.34, 40, 152, 152 n.39, 153 * see 46 fig.3.2 see also Index A, sub voce “sardar” (the system), and Index C, sub voce “mu‘afi” “jagir” - population/human landscapes, 20-23, 59-67, 144-146, 146 n.20, 146-150, 153-154 (“the castlevillage circle” in Makran) * see figures: 25 2.1, 68-72 5.1-5.6, 175 10.19; * see plates: 157-174 10.1-10.18 see also Index A, sub voce “sardar” Bampur, 128, 152 n.39 Banbhore, 93, 96, 96 n.50 Bandar Linghah, 8 Bangladesh, 24, 44 Banikot, 60 Bannajbûr/ Fannajbûr/ Fannazbûr/ Fanjûr/Fanzbûr, classical Arabic vars., 127 see also “Panjgur” Banni, 137 Barkhan, 60, 66 Baroda, 137 Basanî, 128, 128 n.58 see also “Pasni” Basol, river, 153 n.42 Basrah (al-), 97 n.54, 121, 127 Basrah, in Hawran - memorial stele of the Legio III Cyrenaica, 105 Batil-Kuh/Bâtil-Kûh, see Kûh-i Bâtil Bela, city, 35 see also “Las Bela” Bengal, 24, 44 Bih, 127 Bihar, 137 Bilâd al-Qiqân, 124 see also Index A, sub voce “Ahl al-Qiqân” Bilâd Ahl-i Ard-i Kikânân, see also Index A, sub voce “Ahl-i Ard-i Kiqânân” Bilâd al-Zanj, 121, 127 see also “Zanj” Bind, 127 Bit, village unity, the castle/fort of - in Buleida, 9, 147 * see plates 168-170 10.12-10.14a Bolan district, 52, 79 pass, 17, 73, 80 Black Mountains, 4 Bukht Ardashîr, city, 88 Buleida, 9, 129, 136, 146, 146 n.17, 148 archaeological sites, 146 n.14, * see 133 fig.8.2 castle, * see plates 168-170 10.12-10.14a tombs of the Buleida Maliks, * see 170 pl.10.14b see also Index A, sub voce “Buleidi” Bushire, 119 Calcutta, 3, 39, 152 Carmania, 88, 91 Caspian Sea, 120 Chagai district, 52-53 hills, 4 Chahbahar, 128 Chennapatra, 137 Chhodi, 60

China relations and trade, 5, 95, 97 n.54, 121, 127, 130, 136 see also “Sin (al-)” Chitkan (Panjgur oasis - seat of the Political Assistant and Commandant of the Makran Levy Corps), 146 n.17 Chitral, 79 Comoro Islands migrations and trade, 97 n.53, 97 n.56 Ctesiphon, 87 Daola Wanga, 60 Dannuk, 137 Darabgird/Dârâbjird, 95 Darin, 95 Darma Gol, 153 n.40; * see 160 pl.10.4b Dasht archaeological sites,137, 143 n.5 river/system 6, 40, 143-144, 143 n.5, 153 n.42 * see plates 12 1.1, 28 2.4 Dasht Kuddan, the village, 100, 135, 137, 145 n.11 Daybul/Daybûl, 93, 95, 96, 96 n.51, 108, 119, 124, 126, 128 Debol, Persian form Daybul, 96 see also “Daybul” Delhi, 22, 36 Demilu, 8 Dera Ghazi Khan, 41, 60 n.11, 64, 66 Dera Ismail Khan, 137 Duki, district, 61 Diz Parom, 146 n.17 Dizak, 127, 128 Egypt Roman policy, 90, 90 n.22, 91 et passim, 104 and the Seleucid empire, 89 el-Dur, the archaeological site, 90 n.18, 103 Êrânshahr, see Iranshahr Eri-Kallag valley, 146 n.14 see also Index C, sub voce “garband” Ethiopia, 95 Euphrates, 94, 95, 119 Europe, 136, 137, 152 Failaka, the archaeological site, 90 n.18, 103 Fal/Fâl, 119, 122, 123 Fanjûr, classical Arabic, ms. var., 127 see also “Panjgur” Fanzbûr, classical Arabic, ms. var., 125 n.32, 127, 131 see also “Panjgur” Fannajbûr, classical Arabic, ms. var., 127, 128 see also “Panjgur” Fannazbûr, classical Arabic, ms. var., 125 n.32, 127, 129, 131 see also “Panjgur” Fars/Fârs, 93 n.37, 119, 120, 121-123, 122 n.18, 126, 127 see also “Bahr al-Fârs” Fîrûzâbâd/Gôr, 93 Fuhlafharah, 127 Gedi, 97 Gedrosia, 5 Gerrha, 91 Gharo Creek, 96 Ghazna, 131 Ghorab Khaur, at Gwadar/Kuh-i Batil, 99 et passim * see plates: 116 7.4, 117 7.6 and 111 fig.7.3 Gish, 148 n.22; * see 133 fig.8.2 184

Great Britain, see Index A, sub voce “British-” Green Belt (the), of Makran, 126, 129, 130, 143-144, 145, 146, 146 n.17, 147 see also “Dasht” “Kech, eco-cultural region” “Nihing, river/system” Gujarat, 137 Gulf - Persian/Arabic Gulf, 19, 38, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 100-102, 104, 122, 123, 126 n.37, 127, 130 n.66, 131 Gulu Shahr, 60 Gûr, 87, 93 see also “Fîrûzâbâd/Gôr” Gwadar, 3, 6, 8, 9, 33, 37-38, 97-108, 153 n.43 (tombolo formation) *see figures: 109 7.1, 111 7.3; plate: 115 7.3 British tombs, 3, 98, 98 n.60 Buddhist stupa, 98, 154 n.46 gunbads, 98, 98 n.61 harbour, 98, 98 n.60, 154 n.46; * see also 115 pl.7.3 Ismaili quarter, 98, 135 new dam, 98 old barrage, 99-100 * see figure: 112 7.4; plates: 116-118 7.4-7.8 Omanite enclave, 37-38; * see also 47 pl.3.1 town, 97-100, 154, 154 n.46; * see figures: 111 7.3, 115 7.3 Zikri compound, 98 n.60 Gwadur, 38 see also “Gwadar” Gwatar Bay, 6, 128, 143 Gwattar, bay, 128 see also “Gwatar” Hagar, 93, 94, 95 Hanna-Urak, 75 Harmuz/Harmûz, 8, 93, 95, 122-123, 126, 131 Harmuzgan/Harmûzgân, 4, 10, 135 Hasni Kot, 60 Hassanabad, kariz, 54-55 Hatrâ, 91 Hawran, 105 Hijâz, king of-, 94 Himalayas, 96 Hind, 93, 121, 126-127, 130 Hindu Kush, 17 Hingol, river, 17 Hîrah (al-), 93 Homerite, 95 Hosri, 61 India British India, 4, 23, 24, 34, 39-40, 42-43, 59, 76-77, 151, 152 ns.38-39 Indian Union, 43 subcontinent, 10, 20, 21, 23, 24, 36, 136, 137 trade/diplomatic contacts • in antiquity, 5, 90 et passim, 89-90 n.18, 90 n.19 and n.20, 95, 97, 97 n.54, 102-103 • in the middle ages, 121, 123, 128 Indian Ocean, 5, 10, 38, 87, 88, 89, 92, 100-103, 105, 106-107, 119, 122, 125 n.30, 126 n.37, 135, 135 n.9, 137, 153 n.44 and the monsoon sea-routes, 110 fig.7.2 Indus, river/system, 5, 56, 93, 95, 124, 125 n.30, 126 n.35, 145, 147 n.20, 153 n.44

civilization, 4, 5, 125 n.30, 147 n.20, 153 n.44 Iran, 4, 6, 10, 17, 21, 24, 42, 96 n.51, 105, 137, 149 n.26, 151, 151 n.35, 152 coastal region, 6, 8, 88, 93 n.37, 119, 120 plateau, 5, 10, 20, 125 n.30, 131, 145 upheavels-incursions 121-122 see also “Baluchistan” and “Persia”; Index A, sub voce “Persian, empires” Iranshahr/Êrânshahr, 88, 92 n.33, 93 Isfahan, 122 n.18 Isfâq, 127, 128 see also “Iskâf” Iskâf, 127 see also “Isfâq” Ispâk, 128, 131 Jacobabad, 76 Jahlawan, 35, 146 n.14 Jâlk, 128 Jannabah, 126 Japan, 136 Jask, 8, 93 Jatpat, 81 Jebel Sinjar, 104 Jiroft/Jîruft, 122 n.18 Jiwani, 6, 8, 128, 135, 144, 154 Judea, 91 Julfar, 119, 122 Junagadh, 137 Kabul, 39, 78 n.28 Kach, 34, 35, 60 Kachchi, 34, 35 n.9, 52, 62 Kahan, 59 Kalat, 77, 124 n.27 district, 75-76 the khanate (1666-1948), 18, 22, 23, 33-44, 143, 150, 151, 152, 152 ns.37-39 see also “Baluchistan and Index A, sub voce “Baluch, history” and “Kalat-” Kalatuk, 8, 9, 135, 145 n.11, 147, 149; * see 133 fig.8.2 the castle/oasis * see plate 175 10.19; and its political system, * see plates 171-175 10.15-10.19 Kallag, 13 pl. 1.4 Kalmat, 8, 153 n.41 Kanjpûr, ms. var., 125 n.32 see also “Panjgur” Kanzbûr, ms. var. for Panjgûr, 127 n. 51 see also “Panjgur” Kanzpûr, ms. var., 125, 125 n.33, 127 n.52 see also “Panjgur” Karachi, 66, 76, 80, 136 n.10, 137 Karnataka, 137 Kashmir, 37, 137 Kâzirûn, 123 see also Index A, sub voce “Kâzirûnis” Kech archaeological sites, 137, 147 ns.19-20, * see 133 fig.8.2 see also Index C, sub voce “miri/ mîrî” castles, 22, 143-156 city, 125, 128, 131, 154 eco-cultural region, 10, 126, 129, 130, 143-146, 147, 147 ns. 17 and 20, 153 * see plates 15 1.7-1.8 185

see also Green Belt (the) economic-political system in the middle ages, 129131, 155 political-administrative region, 10, 143 (sardar of -) river, 6, 9, 17, 35, 43, 145, 147 n.19 the sardar system: 143-150 * see plates: 157-174 10.1-10.19 the British colonial Administration vis-à-vis the sardar power system, 151-156 see also mss. vars. “Kîch” “Kîj/Kij” “Kîs” “Kîz” Kenya, 97 n.56, 137 Kerala, 103 Kerman/Kirmân, 6, 20, 88, 92, 93 n.37, 124, 126, 127, 135 Keshm, island, 8 Khabur (-Jebel Sinjar) line, 104 Kharan, Italian Research Project, 3–11, 129 et passim methodological approach/research sectors, 5-10 Kharan, 8, 9, 10 et passim, 23, 34, 36, 38, 41-44, 75 n.7, 130 n.65, 131, 146 n.14, 152 n.39 the tombs of the kings, 9 see also “Baluchistan” and Index A, sub voce “Baluch, history” “Kalat, feudatory states” “Nawshirvani” Khatt (al-), 93 Khelat, 43 n.46 see also “Kalat” Khetran, 60 Khojak, pass, 17 Khudabadan, 33, 37-38; * see 48 pl. 3.2 - fig.3.3 Khunj/Khûnj, 122, 123 Khurasan/Khurâsân, 122, 124, 127, 130 n.65, 131, 135 Khuzdar/Khuzdâr, 79 n.34, 81, 125 Khuzdar district, 52, 76 see also “Quzdâr” Kich/Kîch, 6, 125 see also “Kech” Kij/Kîj, the city and its surrounding villages and orchards, 6, 125, 127, 127 n.48, 128, 129, 129 n.63, 131, 143, 155 see also “Kech” Kilepwa, 97 Kilwa, 97, 107 Kirmân, see Kerman Kîs, the city, 127, 127 n.48, 129 n.63 see also “Kech” Kîz, the city, 127, 127 n.48, 128, 129 n.63 see also “Kech” Kohlu, 60 Kol, river, 8 Kolwa, 6, 146 n.14 Korak Manda, river, 54 Korea, 136 Kuddan, 143; * see 13 pl.1.3 see also “Dasht Kuddan” Kuh-i Batil/Kûh-i Bâtil, Gwadar - Baluchistan, 9, 87-118 et passim, 90 n.18, 94 old barrage, 97-100 * see figures: 111 7.3, 112 7.4; * see plates: 115 7.3, 116 7.4-7.5, 118 7.7-7.8 Kûh-i Kikanân, 126 see also Index A sub voce “Mardum-i Kûh-i Kikanân”

Kûh-i Kurdân, 124 Kuh-i Murad, 22 Kulâl, fortress of -, 88 Kulanch, Makrani depression, 16 pl.10 Kumbri, 52-53, 56, 58 fig.4.2 see also Index A sub voce “Baluch, water rights” Kurram, 40 Kush, the archaeological site, 93 Kûshân, 87 Kushk-i Qand, 127 Kutch, 137 Laghari/Barkhan, 60 Lahore, 138 Lamu, archipelago, 137, 137 n. 26 Lar/Lâr, 8, 119, 122, 123 see also Index A, sub voce “Lâris” Larak, island, 8 Las Bela, 22-23, 35-36, 41-44 see also “Baluchistan” and Index A, sub voce “Baluch, history” “Kalat, feudatory states” Linghah, see Bandar Linghah Lishtân, 8, 93, 95 Loaf, 62, 66 London, 3, 40, 78 n.28, 152 Loralai, 64, 66 n.24 Lulwa, depression, 143 Lyari, 76 Mâ warâ’ al-Nahr, Transoxiana, 125 n.30 Mach, 80 Madagascar, 97 n.53 Mafia, 97 Maharashtra, 137 Mahatittha, 96, 127 Makran, Italian Research Project, 3–11, 129 et passim, 146-147 ns.18-20 et passim methodological approach/research sectors, 5-10 Makran/Makrân, 85-175 et passim; * see figures 45 3.1, 109 7.1 - administrative sub-division, 6, 10, 37, 42-44, 143, 154 - land for trade and military operations, 123-131 • in antiquity, 87, 92, 93, 93 n.37, 94, 95, 96, 96 n.51, 97 n.53, 100, 104, 108 • in the middle ages, 123-131 - society and culture, 21-22, 126-127, 129-131, 144146 • lacquer work, 135-138, 137 n. 26, * see 139-142 figs.1-18 • slave and arms trade, 150, 150 n.28, 152 ns.3839 et passim - territory: • eco-cultural regions, 3-11, 20-22, 34-37, 95 n.49, 107-108, 125-127, 128, 128 n.57, 130, 143-146, 145 n.11, 153-154 • in historical/geographical sources, 123-125, 125 n.30, 126-129, 153 ns.44-45 • the sardar power-system, 39-43, 148-156, * see Appendix, plates: 157-175 10.1-10.19 see also “Baluchistan” “Kech” “Panjgur” “Mekran”; Index A, sub voce “Baluch-” “Kalat” and “British, colonial administration” Makran Ranges, 4, 107, 124, 128, 130, 145; * see 26 fig.2.2 186

Central Makran Range, 9, 144, 146 n.17; * see 109 fig.7.1, 27 pl.2.1 Makran Coastal Range, 15, 144; * see plates: 15 1.7, 27 2.2 Southern Makran Range, 128, 153 Malabar coast, 98 Maldive, islands, 137 Malindi, 97 Mand, 11, 135, 143 n.2, 145, 145 n.12 * see plates: 15 1.8, 30 2.7-2.8 and 134 fig.8.3 Manda, 97, 97 n.56 Manrubân, 126 Mansûrah (al-), 126, 126 n.38 Mantai, 89, 96, 97 n.53 Marib, 100 n.64 Masqat, 122 see Muscat Mastung, 80, 81 Mecca, 121 n.16 Mediterranean, basin, 87, 89, 90, 93, 95, 121-123, 127, 128 Mekhtar, 62 Mekran, 38 see also “Makran” Mesene, 91 Mesopotamia, 6, 91, 92, 104 Mianaz, 146 n.14 Mihrân, 126 Minab/Mînâb, 8 Miri Qalat, archaeological site and the castle, 6, 9, 147, 147 ns. 19-20, 155; * see plates: 157-159 10.1-10.3 and 133 fig.8.2 Mlayha, 91 Mukrân/Mukran (al-), 126 see also “Makran” “Gwadar, Omanite enclave” Mulah, pass, 17 Multan/Mûltân, 64, 66, 126, 127, 129, 129 n.63 Muradabad, 52-54, 56; * see 58 fig.4.2 see also Index A, sub voce “Baluch, water rights” Muscat, 37-38, 119 see also “Gwadar, Omanite enclave” Nag, 146 n.17; * see 133 fig.8.2 Nahr (al-), “the River”, boundary and treaty, in alTabarî’s chronicle, 124, 124 n.26, 124 n.29, 126 Nara Canal, 51, 56-57 Nepal, 51 New Delhi, 38 Nihâvend, the battle of -, 88 Nihing, river/system, 6, 9, 10, 17, 129, 143, 143 n.2, 147 n.17, 148 n.22 archaeological sites, 129, 137; * see134 fig.8.3 Nilag, river/system, 12, 13, 14, 129, 143 n.5 khawr, * see plates:12-13 1.1-1.3 valley, * see plate: 14 1.5 Nile and the Red Sea canal, 90 n.23 Nivano, 146 n.14, * see figures 133 8.2, 134 8.3 North-West Frontier Province, 18, 23 n.32, 44, 78, 81, 137 Nubia, 103 Nushki, 9, 75 n.7, 81 ‘Oman, 37-38, 94, 97, 128, 152 Orissa, 137 Ormara, 6, 8, 128, 135, 153 n.41, 153 n.43, 154 Palestine, revolt against Trajan, 104

Pakistan, 3-10, 17, 21, 23-24, 33, 35, 39, 43-44, 56, 59, 64, 66, 73-74, 76-81, 136 n.10, 137 Palmyra, 91, 91 n.24, 105 see also Index A, sub voce “Palmyra-” Panjgur/Panjgûr archaeological sites, 146-147 n.17 city/oasis, 3, 9, 10, 38, 76, 125, 125 n.32, 127, 128, 129, 131, 135, 143 n.1, 147 * see plates: 28 2.3, 29 2.5, 31 2.9-2.10; 48 3.2 and fig. 3.3 (Khudabadan Qalat) region/eco-cultural system, 10, 38, 131, 146-150, 146147 n.17, 153, 157 sardar of -, 143 see also “Bannajbûr” “Fannajbûr” “Fannazbûr” “Fanjûr” “Fanzbûr” “Panjpûr” Panjpûr, 125 n.32 see also “Panjgur” Panodi, 148 Parom, a dried up salt marsh to Panjgur, 146 n.17 Parthia, see Index A, sub voce “Parthian-” Pashtunistan, 80 see also Index A, sub voce “Pashtun, nationalism” Pasni, harbour and surrounding region, 6, 8, 135, 153 n.42, 154 * see plates: 12 1.2, 14 1.6, 16 1.9 area and archaeological sites, 128-129, 128 n.58, 128 n.59; * see 132 fig.8.1 see also “Basanî” Pate, island, 137 Pemba, 97, 137 Persia, 3, 23, 24, 34 n.34, 36-37, 40, 42, 152 n.39 see also “Gulf, Persian” and Index A, sub voce “Persian” Persis, 91, 95 Pidarak, 9, 135, 147, 149, 153, 153 n.40; * see plates 161-164: 10.4-10.8a (castle/oasis and “audiencehall/darbar”) and 133 fig.8.2 Pishin, 40, 60 n.11 Pishukan, 98 Punjab, 21 n.24, 33, 34, 37, 39-40, 44, 64, 66, 81, 137 see also Index A, sub voce “Baluch, history” and “British, colonial administration” Qâdisiyyah (al-), the battle of -, 88 Qal‘at Bahrayn, the monument and archaeological site, 93, 102, 103 Qalhât, 119, 122 Qanbalî, 127, 127 n.52, 128, 128 n.55 Qandâbîl, 119, 128, 128 n.55, 129 Qanzbûr, classical Arabic, ms. var., 125 n.32 see also “Panjgûr” Qasr Ridâ’, 93 Qasrqand, 127 Qatîf, 93, 95, 119, 122 Qayqânân, the capital city of the Ahl al-Qîqân, 124 n.27 Qays, the island, 93, 119, 122-123 Quetta, 3, 7, 11, 17, 33, 39, 40, 64, 66 n.21, 73-76, 79 n.34, 80, 81 Qulzum, 126 Qusayr, 93 Quzdâr, 125, 126 Rabat, 52, 54-57, 58 fig. 4.3 see also Index A, sub voce “Baluch, water rights” Rajastan, 137 187

Rakhni, 66 Rakhshan, river, 146 n.17, 147 n.17 Râmisht Ardashîr, 88 Rarkan system/valley, 59-67; * see figures: 68 5.1, 69 5.2, 71 5.5, 72 5.6 village, 61-67; * see figures: 70 5.2-5.3 Ras Kuh, 4 Rask, 127 Ratnagiri, 137 Red Desert (the-), Kharan, 4 Red Sea and the Roman policy, 89, 90, 90 ns.22-23, 91, 92 trade, 89 et passim, 95, 97, 101-103, 123 n.23, 126 n.37, 127 Rishahr, 93, 95 Rud-i Kol, see Kol river Rûmigân, 93 Rustâq, 93, 95, 122 Samarqand, 127 Sami/Sami‘, 9, 146 n.14 (Buleidi graves), 147, 149 * see plates 15 1.7, 165 10.9 and 133 fig.8.2 Sankheda, 137 Sarawan, 35 Sarikhoran, Panjgur system, 147 n.17 Sawâd, 93 Sehwân, the archaeological site, 105 Shabwa, the archaeological site in Yemen, 90 n.18, 103 Shadi Kaur/Shadi Khawr, 128; * see 132 fig.8.1 Shah-i Tump, 6, 147, 154, 155 Shal, 40, see Quetta Shâpûr, the district, 91 Sharak, 9, 147 and 133 fig.8.2 Sharax, the archaeological site, 90 n.18, 103 Shiraz/Shîrâz, 119, 119-123, 122 n.18, 127 Siahan Kuh, 4 Sibi, 40, 60, 62, 73, 75 n.7, 79, 81 Sijistan/Sijistân, 126-127, 131 see also “Sistan” Silach, 62, 66 Simla, 151 Sîn (al-), 127, 128 see also “China” Sind, 21 n.24, 92, 94, 95, 95 n.49, 96, 96 n.51, 97 n.54, 107, 121, 124-126, 126 n.37, 127, 128, 130, 135, 137 see also “Chach, ibn Silâ’ij, rule and wars against the Arabs” British colonial period, 34-35, 37, 39-40, 42-44, 51, 56 see also Index A, sub voce “Baluch, history” and “British, colonial administration” eco-cultural coastal regions, 107-108 Siraf/Sîrâf, 93, 95, 119-123, 126, 126 n.35, 127, 130 n.66, 143 n.45 Sistan/ Sistân, 6, 20, 135, 143 Sistan-Baluchistan, 17 Siyah-i Kuh, the archaeological site near Pasni, 128 n.58 Siyu, 137, 137 n. 26 Socotra, island, 90 n.18, 97, 103 Solband, 145 n.11 133 fig.8.2 Sonmiani, 35 Soviet Union, 80 soviet strategy in Baluchistan, 24, 76

see also Index A, sub voce “Baluch, nationalism” Sri Lanka, 93, 95, 96-97 Suez, Gulf of, 103 Suhar/Sûhâr, 93, 95, 119, 122 Sukkur, barrage, 56 Suleyman, range, 26 fig.2.2 Suru, 8 Syria, Roman province, 89, 91, 94, 104, 121 Tabal, 60 Taftan, 81 Taghao, 60, 62 n.13 Tagran, khawr,* see 29 pl.2.6 Tah Jamal Khan, 60 Taheri, 120, 121 Talar, depression, 4, 145, 146 Tang Karer, 60 Tehran, 24, 40 Tell Abu Sh‘af, the archaeological site, 93 Thaj, 91 Thal Chotiali, 60 Tîbî, 122 see also Index A, sub voce “Tîbîs” Tigris, 94, 95, 119, 126 Tihâmah, king of-, 94 Tîz/Tiz, 93, 95,127, 127 n.50, 128, 131 Tsnista, 95 Tump, 9, 135, 143; * see 134 fig.8.3 (sardar of-), 143 n.2, 147 castle * see plates 166-167 10.10-10.11 Tûrân, 87, 126 Turbat, 3, 6, 9, 10, 22, 76, 81, 128, 135, 136, 137, 138, 143 n.2, 146 n.14, 147 n.19, 153-155;* see 133 fig.8.2 Udaipur, 137 Umm al-Qaiwan, the archaeological site, 90 n.18, 103 United States of America, 24 see also Index A, sub voce “Baluch, nationalism” Vadodara, 137 Van, lake, 104 Yamâmah, 93, 94 Yemen, 88, 93, 94, 95, 100 king of-, 94 Zagros, 144 Zahedan, 17 Zamuran, 146 n.14, 148; * see 134 fig.8.3 Zanguebar, 121, see also “Bilâd al-Zanj” Zanj, bilad al-, see Bilâd al-Zanj Zanzibar, 98, 135 n.9,137, 137 n. 26, 153 n.45 Zhob, river, 17

188

* see plates: 15 1.8, 30 2.7-2.8, 31 2.9, 175 10.19 see also Index A, sub voce “Baluch, water rights” and Index B, sub voce “Baluchistan, irrigation schemes” kaykân/kaykanaian (m.c. Sindhi, excellent horse), breeds, 124 n.27 see also Index A, sub voce “Mardum-i Kûh-i Kikânân” khat kash (m.c.), consortium for the digging of a kariz, 53 khawr-jah/khawr-jâh (m.c.), 6, 7, 17-20, 144-145, 146 n.14, 147 n.20 see plates: 15 1.8, 31 2.10 khurmâ’ (m.c.), dates,127, 135 khushkaba, cultivation, 61-62, 144, 146 n.17 killâ (m.c.), 138 see also “meh” konâr (Zizyphus jujuba Mill.), tree, 137 Levy Corps, 41, 62, 146 n.17; * see plate 164 10.8b see also Index A, sub voce “British, empire” lohani, cattle, 63, 64 lohar, see shana masalhati, reconciliation, 75 meh (m.c.), 138 see also “killâ” miri/mîrî, belonging to a prince - castle, 131, 131 n.68, 147, 147 n.19 castle-village system, 147-150 mkakasi (m.c. Swahili - round lidded box), 137 n. 26 mu’afi/mu‘âfi, 23, 36-37, 39 mûrgîch (m.c.), 138 musallà, 9, na‘layn, shoe, 127, 135 nahalah (m.c.), 61, 63 nang, 21 naqshi (m.c. - decorative motif in lacquer work), 137 nathi (m.c.), hospitality, 61, 64 niabat, 35, 41 see also Index A, sub voce “na’ib/nâ’ib” nihû (m.c.), 138 olag (m.c.), crop share, 61 pad (m.c.), water quota, 19 pakal (m.c.), shepherd, 64 panîdh, sugar-candy, 127, 135 partwari, 62 pashtunwali, 21 pegham, message, 76 pîsh (m.c.), 138 pûst, skin, 127, 135 qabsûk (m.c.), 138 n. 29 qabzûk (m.c.), 138 qalat/qal‘at, castle, 131, 147, 149 see also “miri/mîrî” qanât, 92 razinamah, 75 razm-i Baluch, 21 rayyan, conifer, 137 Rhus vernicifera, 136 riâl (m.c.), Punjabi tree - possibly Picea Smitheana, 137 riân (m.c. - conifer of Afghanistan), 137 saj/sâj, Indian oak (Tectona Grandis L.f.), teakwood, 121 sarrâf - sarrâfûna, broker, 121, 122 sarrishta (m.c.), administrator of the kariz, 18-19 sarsham, see sham sarzemin, 73-74

INDEX C TECHNICAL TERMS abank, red abank, 127, 135 almâs (m.c.), chisel, 138 altana, architectonic features at Gwadar, 98 anna (m.c.), water quota, 18-19, 52-53 âtashgâh, 92 bazâr, the bazaar, 8, 61, 66, 135 bibrik, sheep, 64 birkah, reservoir of water - pool, 8, 92 chah/châh, well - pit, 64, 135 chahâr-tâq, 92 charm, skin - leather,127, 135 chauth (m.c.), subtribe/lineage, 60 chowdry, village helder’s family, 61 dar (m.c.), central street, 61 darbar/darbâr, hall, 149 n.26 * see plates: 172 10.16, 173 10.17 (Kalatuk), 160 10.4a (Pidarak) darkhwast, written request, 76 dom (m.c.), musician, 62 dokkân (m.c.), side piece of frame, 137 n. 27 drûj (m.c.), 137 farsakh, a parasang, 128 farsang, Persian form for farsakh, see fundi (m.c. Swahili – craftsman), 137 n. 26 garband, a mound - dam - barrage or any enclosure of water, 7-8, 17-18, 92, 144-145, 146 n.14; * see 29 pl.2.6 see also Index A, sub voce “Baluch, water rights” and Index B, sub voce “Baluchistan, irrigation schemes” gabr-band (m.c. – Arabic: ghabar-band), see garband gaz (Tamarix gallica L.), 137 goi (m.c.), herd owner, 64 gumbad, see gunbad gumbaz, see gunbad gunbad, cupola - dome, 8 domed shrines, 8, 98, 98 n.61 gwat/gwât (m.c.), air, breeze, the south wind, 126 halhawal/hâlhawâl (m.c.), 65 hamsayah/hamsâyah, affiliated group, 59, 62 hangam/hangâm, water quota, 18-19 harrât (m.c.), saw, 138 imamzadeh/imâmzâdeh, 9, issadar (m.c.), owner of a water quota, 19 ivan/ivân, 149, 149 n.26; * see plates: 10.4, 10.9, 10.16, 10.17 izzat (m.c.), 21 jagir/jâgîr, 23, 36-39 jagirdar/ jâgîrdâr, 37 jangali/jangalî (m.c.), living in a forest, 148, 152-153 jâwjî (m.c.), 136 jinn, 7, jirga, 21 jora (m.c.), 61 kamanâg (m.c.), bow lathe, 138 kannat/kannâs (m.c.), specialised worker in kariz, 19 kanzâg (m.c.), piece of wood, 138 kariz/karez (m.c.), 6, 7, 17-20, 23, 34, 39, 53-56, 75 129, 135, 144-145, 146 n.14, 147 ns.19-20, 148, 148 n.22 189

sati zamin (m.c.), individual land, 61 sham (m.c.), mountain pass - border, 17 shama (m.c.), weaver, 62 shamiana, decorated canopy, 73 shamilat (m.c.), unexploited community land, 52 shana (m.c.), artisan, 62 shank (m.c.), village square, 61 sherik (m.c.), commercial partner, 64 shawkah, strength/force - military force, 120 sitar, 145 n.11 Tachardia lacca, 136 tâng (m.c.), 138, 138 n. 30 tariqah/tarîqah, confraternity, 123 see also Index A, sub voce “Lâris” tas/tâs, water quota, 19 Thana System, 41 see also Index A sub voce “British, colonial administration” tîr (m.c.), 137, 137 n.27 tomni (m.c.), common land, 61 ustâd (m.c. - master-craftsman), 8, 137 utu (m.c. Swahili-African species of mangrove), 137 n.26 wakîl - wkalâ’, legal representative of a Merchant, 121122 wahnâg (m.c.), 138 zat (m.c.), lineage, 34 ziarat/ziyârat-gâh, place of pilgrimage/devotional visit, 8, 9 zikhr, 22 ziyâra, devotional visit, 22

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