Axel Honneth's Social Philosophy of Recognition : Freedom, Normativity, and Identity [1 ed.] 9781527506992, 9781527503106

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Axel Honneth’s Social Philosophy of Recognition

Axel Honneth’s Social Philosophy of Recognition: Freedom, Normativity, and Identity By

Roland Theuas DS. Pada

Axel Honneth’s Social Philosophy of Recognition: Freedom, Normativity, and Identity By Roland Theuas DS. Pada This book first published 2017 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2017 by Roland Theuas DS. Pada All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-5275-0310-0 ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-0310-6

In memory of a mentor and a good friend, Florentino Hornedo. Freedom is indeed a reality, a material reality.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgments ...................................................................................... ix List of Abbreviations ................................................................................... x Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 1.The Problem of Freedom and Normativity ......................................... 1 2.Contextualising Honneth’s Recognition Theory ................................. 6 Part One ..................................................................................................... 13 Recognition and Critical Theory 1. Recognition, Identity, and Solidarity ............................................... 14 2. Critique of History, Power, and Critique Itself ................................ 19 3. Social Struggles Towards Recognition ............................................ 30 Part Two .................................................................................................... 45 Disrespect and Recognition Theory 1. Disrespect and Recognition ............................................................. 48 2. Disrespect and Autonomous Critique: The Function of the Feedback Loop ..................................................................... 54 2. A. Experimental and Pathological Forms of Disrespect .................. 63 3. Solidarity and Ethical Life: The Trajectories of Critical Theory in Honneth’s Recognition Theory .................................................. 74 Part Three .................................................................................................. 76 From Emancipation to Social Solidarity: Freedom and Rights 1. Justifying a Formal Praxis of Social Critique .................................. 77 2. The Historical Development of Freedom ......................................... 80 3. The Realisation of Freedom in the Democratic Appropriation of the Ethical Life ........................................................................... 88 4. Solidarity in Concrete Social Freedom .......................................... 103 5. Recognising Freedom .................................................................... 130

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Part Four .................................................................................................. 133 The Freedom and Recognition of Identities and Subjectivities 1. The Impasse of Identity and Solidarity .......................................... 133 2. Kompridis’ Critique of Critical Theory ......................................... 136 3. Kompridis’ Critique of Honneth’s Recognition Theory ................ 140 4. Recognition as the Socialised Freedom of Identities ..................... 149 5. Freedom and Recognition .............................................................. 158 Part Five .................................................................................................. 159 Triangulating Identities in Freedom and Recognition 1. Confidence in Identities and their Role in Maintaining Freedom through Recognition..................................................................... 159 2. Social Freedom and Antecedent Recognition ................................ 164 3. Love and Personal Relations .......................................................... 168 4. Esteem and Market Economy ........................................................ 171 5. The Sphere of Democracy and Rights ........................................... 175 6. Some General Triangulations of Reconstructive Normative Simulations ................................................................................... 177 7. Critical Points and Perspectives with RNS .................................... 184 Summary and Conclusions ...................................................................... 188 Bibliography ............................................................................................ 196

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to extend my gratitude to the people that were instrumental in the accomplishment of this book. To begin with, I thank the guidance of my adviser, Paolo Bolaños for his extraordinary insight, lucid suggestions, and incisive criticisms; my panellists, Romualdo Abulad, Jove Jim Agues, Jovito Cariño, Franz Cortez, and Leovino Garcia, for their review of my work and their challenging criticisms; Pia Tenedero for her masterful review of my work; and my friends and colleagues from the Department of Philosophy of the University of Santo Tomas. I wish to acknowledge the support from various institutions that made this work possible. Starting from the generous financial assistance of the Commission on Higher Education's (CHED) Office of Planning, Research, and Knowledge Management (OPRKM) to the University of Santo Tomas' Faculty of Arts and Letters study grant. For this, I would like to thank CHED's chairperson, Patricia B. Licuanan, and Napoleon K. Juanillo, for supporting me in this project; the Research Center for Culture, Arts, and Humanities, for giving me the time to edit and revise my manuscript for publication. I would also like to thank our Dean from the Faculty of Arts and Letters, Michael Anthony Vasco for providing me with a paid study leave to focus my attention on accomplishing this project. For their love, patience, and support, I would finally like to thank my family. My wife Michelle for the support and inspiration; my sons, Dante and Stefan for the candid consultations and for picking my thoughts on this project; my parents, Rolando, Judith, and my siblings, Rem and Talitha for watching my back during these challenging times.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Axel Honneth (cited by page number) CoP – Critique of Power SFR – The Struggle for Recognition FRS – Freedom’s Right R – Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea RR – Redistribution or Recognition (With Nancy Fraser) G.W.F. Hegel (cited by page number) PoS – Phenomenology of Spirit Nikolas Kompridis (cited by page number) CD – Critique and Disclosure

INTRODUCTION

1. The Problem of Freedom and Normativity The main thrust of this work is to argue that normativity is an essential component of freedom in Axel Honneth’s recognition theory. In this work, I will trace the progressive development of Honneth’s recognition theory by looking at its place in the Frankfurt School’s development of social critique from his continuation of Jürgen Habermas’ project of renewing the emphasis on a social theory that renews the project of social emancipation. In this regard, Honneth’s approach has been innovative in pursuing an intersubjectivist turn towards Hegel’s early Jena writings; by drawing from the experiences of disrespect, Honneth can pinpoint the normative claims of individuals that are struggling towards the possibility of being recognised as a bearer of the norms that society itself intended to reproduce. Recognition in Honneth’s work implies not only an individual recognition of subjectivity but also a kind of dynamic social interaction in which the individual is gradually integrated into social norms and practices that give rise to a mutual intersubjectivity. The dynamics of recognition in Honneth’s theory depicts the formation of individual autonomy via the integration of the subject into social norms, which later leads to the individual’s role as a legitimate social agent. This legitimisation is not merely a coerced or reified shaping of the individual; rather, it is a form of legitimisation that the individual rationally and subjectively identifies freely with norms that govern individuality within a social environment. Honneth presents the theory of recognition to re-evaluate the possibility of assessing norms that can overcome the domination and objectification of individuals as means to an end. What takes place in Honneth’s theory is a cohesive theory of norms that is legitimised individually and subjectively because of its origin and continuous recognition of the individual. As the successor of Habermas’ directorship of the Institute for Social Research, Honneth follows Habermas’ legacy of understanding the pre-scientific conditions in which normativity finds clearer articulation as a social program of emancipation. However, unlike Habermas, Honneth does not look into the normative function of communication; rather, he pursues the experiential struggles of individuals as an impetus towards understanding their need for normative claims.

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Introduction

Through Honneth’s recognition theory, it is possible to argue for the inevitability of reification as a point of mediation in the recognition of subjects within institutions and their supposed cohesion built upon the normative preservation of individuality. This kind of reification, however, is subject to agonistic struggle, by which the effort of the misrecognised party disrupts the current state of normativity to dialectically engage society in adopting a recognitive stance towards misrecognised parties. As a part of Honneth’s comprehensive reworking of Hegel’s theory of intersubjectivity, Honneth is keen on demonstrating that the desire of individuals to be recognised in society is rooted in their socialised identity formation. In other words, as a condition of individuation, solidarity takes some precedence over individuality inasmuch as individuality is only attained through social relations. Reification in the context of the Sittlichkeit, or ethical life, carries with it a value of recognition that dynamically adapts to social cohesion and yet at the same time preserves individuality. The problem of freedom in any social and political discourse is the issue of maintaining a sense of individual autonomy while providing a cohesive sense of order in a social structure that regulates social activity. Such issue, which echoes Plato’s inception of an orderly state, is still a recurring problem within contemporary institutions. The issue at hand is the possibility of looking at social institutions as enabling forces that provide autonomy to the individual. Within the Frankfurt School tradition,1 institutions serve as a normative ground through which individuals are either oppressed or emancipated. In Georg Lukacs, there is a strong emphasis on how institutions play an oppressive role by dominating the consciousness of the masses through institutional norms. Through the instrumentalisation of theory, Lukacs notes that an ideology can take a “prescriptive and imperative character” (Lukacs, 1971, 38), in 1 The Frankfurt School of critical theory is an institution established by German philosophers exiled during the 2nd World War that developed a philosophical bent aimed at providing critical, normative, and emancipatory theories of social and cultural forces. Initially, it was founded by Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno as a form of social critique, to which Continental philosophy was utilised, particularly Marxism, Kantianism, and Hegelianism. Horkheimer, in one of his essays, argues that the status of social philosophy during his time has suffered a polemic preference for positivism, to which metaphysical concepts take prevalence over the real and social realities are dismissed (Horkheimer, 1993, 7). The goal of the Frankfurt School, as Fred Rush claims, is to erect a philosophically founded and informed school of social science that aims to displace or even oppose the scientific paradigm that dominated European social theory (Rush, 2004, 9).

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such a manner that theories become elevated to the level of “natural laws” (Lukacs, 1971, 233). The normative value of institutions in Lukacs is double-edged; in the context of the Capitalists, norms are as oppressive as their alternative in Bolshevism or Vulgar Marxism insofar as norms solidify a sense of phantom objectivity in theory. This kind of objectivity is evoked in Theodor Adorno’s reading of the enlightenment as a myth, in which nature, in our failure to dominate and harness it, becomes an ossified chimera of our thoughts. Enlightenment provides us with a utopic vision of our interaction with nature, and under the mechanism of reason, we can aptly control its fearsome force. The fear, however, becomes an irrational force to the extent that enlightenment no longer adapts to the changing dynamics of the world and thus becomes a reified force of selfimposed domination of mankind (Adorno & Horkheimer 2002, 33). The awareness of the possibility of freedom is achieved in a social context, the antinomy of order and autonomy takes a pendulous movement as it sways from emancipation through theory and praxis to domination through the reified actualisation of a theory that is understood as a natural law. In Herbert Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man (C.f. Marcuse, 2002), the repressive power of modern capitalist societies invokes a sense of control over individuals through the illusions of autonomy and freedom. For Marcuse, domination can prevail in an environment wherein one lives a life that is “comfortable, smooth, reasonable and democratic” (Marcuse, 2002, 3). Through the pacification of man’s constant need to struggle against nature (Marcuse, 2002, 57), the choices that man makes become limited and thus essentially controlled by institutions and states. In this sense, there is no longer a reflective stance on how one becomes dominated by ideology; the one-dimensionality of man’s attitude towards the social world is placed under the ambit of comfort and satiety to the extent that revolution or even dissent becomes self-discouraging. Honneth’s recognition theory is based on the normative values through which identity is established in social relations. Social interactions shape not only the individual but also the normative mechanisms upon which society is founded. The premise is that the individual’s initial subjectivity is moulded via the inscriptions of society as they initiate recognition from the transition of a self-interested me to a reflective “I” (SFR, 74- 75). For Honneth, the act of recognition begins when the individual learns how to dissociate itself from self-interest insofar as self-interest does not resolve conflicts between partners of interactions. Through his reconstruction of

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Introduction

Hegel’s notion of Sittlichkeit2 via George Herbert Mead’s philosophical anthropology, Honneth argues that the self-reflective interactions of the individual gradually expand to a broader sphere of social interactions governed by norms (SFR, 78). On this note, we find three spheres in which recognition takes place: love, respect, and esteem. In the beginning, love is the fundamental course of relation that defines the social interaction between the child and the parent. It is understood in the context of care where the helplessness of the child conditions a sense of inner-negativity, causing the child to realise that his identity is distinct from the parent, who is a separate partner of interaction. Hence, individuality must be recognised. In the second sphere, respect is recognised by the subject as it begins to form broader intersubjective relations with partners of interactions on the social level, culminating in the third sphere, wherein the intersubjective reflexivity of the individual is realised by society in the form of esteem or belongingness. On this note, this work aims to look at the tension between individual identity and how it is shaped by normativity. In this sense, the problem of freedom within normativity is identified not only in the prescription of norms in society but also on how society maintains freedom by sustaining differences and revising its already existing normative reproduction. My goal of explaining the problem of normativity and freedom in Honneth’s recognition theory can be summarily divided into five concerns, namely; (1) the role of normativity in the analysis of social structures, (2) the role of normativity in struggles for recognition, (3) the progressive function of freedom in maintaining the progressive assent of individuals towards norms, (4) the role of normativity in protecting the future possibilities of disclosure in individual subjects amidst society, and (5) the intermeshing of freedom and recognition in Honneth’s critical theory. Given the themes mentioned above, this work covers the development of Axel Honneth’s theory specifically in recognition theory, normativity, social solidarity, and freedom. My reading of Honneth’s work is guided by 2

Hegel for this matter considers ethical life or Sittlichkeit as a bridging of the gap between the social norms of society and the individual into a form of rational necessity that is recognised by the individual, to which the normative force of ethics is assented by the individual because of its subjective and rational acceptance of such norms or laws. Furthermore, the perspective of the individual subjectivity in its recognition of rights holds that such rights and its normative force work in tandem with the possibility of freedom, not in the sense of freedom as a principle of “doing whatever one wants,” rather, as a freedom that enables the individual to function harmoniously within society (Hegel, 2001, 258).

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these concepts that elaborate reconstructive re-working of Hegel’s intersubjective social philosophy. In this light, the materials that I cover are as follows: Honneth’s development of the recognition theory from the tradition of critical theory in Critique of Power;3 the development of Hegel’s intersubjective social philosophy in Struggle for Recognition;4 Honneth’s engagement with the objectification of norms in Reification;5 his debate with Nancy Fraser in Redistribution or Recognition,6 which is instrumental in Honneth’s formulation of antecedent recognition; and his latest reconstruction of Hegel’s notion of Sittlichkeit or the ethical life as a guiding principle in his analysis of democratic institutions and their role in enabling social freedom in Freedom’s Right.7 Alongside these materials, I will also consult some of Honneth’s recent writings and interviews, as well as works written by his critics and his responses. As a counterpoint, I am also going to refer to Honneth’s contemporary, Nikolas Kompridis. In Kompridis’ book Critique and Disclosure, some of the key points of critique in Honneth’s continuation of Habermas’ critical theory are taken issue with. With this, I am also going to look at Kompridis’ pointed critique against Honneth’s earlier writings on recognition theory with the intention of articulating the recent developments that Honneth has implemented in Freedom’s Right. My goal of answering the problem of normativity in freedom and recognition is to construct a model of a social theory that provides an immanent understanding of social relations as well as provide a grounded and progressive critique of social relations and the institutions that hold these together in solidarity. While this work does not provide an actual application of Honneth’s social theory, my way of assessment is based on the continuity of Honneth’s arguments with his engagement from critiques and elaborations from his recent works. Furthermore, as an alternative to applying Honneth’s recognition theory to actual social realities, my proposal in this work is to use a triangulation method of identifying social 3

Initially published in German as: Honneth, Axel 1985: Kritik der Macht. Reflexionsstufen einer kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. 4 Initially published in German as: Honneth, Axel 1992: Kampf um Anerkennung. Zur moralischen Grammatik sozialer Konflikte. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. 5 Honneth, Axel 2007: Rejoinder, in: Axel Honneth: Reification. A New Look at an Old Idea. New York: Oxford University Press, 147–159. 6 The original German title of this book is: Honneth, Axel und Nancy Fraser 2003: Umverteilung oder Anerkennung? Eine politisch–philosophische Kontroverse. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 7 Initially published in German as: Honneth, Axel 2011: Das Recht der Freiheit. Grundriß einer demokratischen Sittlichkeit. Berlin: Suhrkamp.

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Introduction

pathologies through a reconstructive normative simulation, which I will discuss in the fifth part.

2. Contextualising Honneth’s Recognition Theory The main contention of Honneth’s recognition theory is that its reconstruction depends entirely on the sense of order found in Hegel’s notion of ethical life or Sittlichkeit. In this sense, the problem of normativity is open to the possibility that the normative claims of the individual or society itself may fall prey to the possibility of reification. For Habermas, normativity is problematic when it comes detached from the social norms that it tries to regulate, and thus becomes prone to the function of objectification; what he proposes is an alternative approach that can overcome the metaphysical indifference of theory towards praxis that attempts to bridge the immanent and everyday conditions of the lifeworld towards an objective implementation of norms through communication (Habermas 1996, 7 - 8). The problem of reification in Hegel’s Sittlichkeit, in this case, requires a nuanced reading of Honneth’s theory of recognition. Freedom, as a culmination of recognition, assumes which struggles that arise from recognition or misrecognition are intrinsically directed towards a progressive appropriation of subjectivity and normativity. The fundamental assumption in my reading of Honneth’s work is that normativity in social interaction is not entirely subject to the complete and totalising effect of reification where individuation becomes impossible in the spheres of recognition. Honneth argues that if such is the case with reification, then “human sociality must have vanished completely” (R 55). In this sense, reification becomes a state in which one becomes forgetful of recognition itself (R 58). The strong emphasis on recognition allows the subject to sustain a certain kind of openness or an emphatic sense of caring upon which all forms of social interaction begin with love. This openness towards individuality is precisely the starting point of authentic social interactions, which are often misconstrued by the critics of Honneth as a reduction of the political aspect of recognition to moral psychologism. Deranty and Renault opine that the weakness in Honneth’s theory lies in the grounding of social theory in moral psychology to the extent that it neglects the issue of politics and institutions (Renault 2007, 99-100). A similar point is raised by Hedrick, claiming that Honneth’s moral psychology has the tendency to de-historicise reification (Hedrick 2014, 179). In response to

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these criticisms, I argue that Honneth’s turn to moral psychology and, inevitably, the supposed de-historicisation of reification point to a fundamental assumption that institutions have to acknowledge the individuating character of their subjects in order to maintain at least a minimal sense of social cohesion. The first sphere of recognition does not necessarily limit itself to the immediate sphere of the family; love or care, for that matter, is the prevailing character that is seminal in any institution since it accepts the individuality of persons through the recognition that they are potential partners for interaction. In an interview with Gonçalo Marcelo, Honneth further asserts that institutions are dependent on the principle that binds people together through recognition (Marcelo 2013, 211), for it is only in this initiating and binding principle that partners of interaction can engage with one another with a sense of receptivity. Furthermore, in his latest work, Freedom’s Right, Honneth further expands the idea of love and care in the seminal institutions responsible for the foundation of institutions through friendship.8 This argument proposes a potent and yet positive reconstruction of history as a progressive and dynamic process of socialisation. On one hand, Honneth is able to diagnose social pathologies anchored on existing normative practices in social interactions. On the other hand, he provides an analysis of possible emancipatory alternatives within an existing framework of normative practices and social interactions. Recognition is a key element towards the possibility of attaining freedom achieved in the solidarity of individuals within an institution. Freedom in the case of recognition derives an enabling force through the solidarity of individuals in a society in which individuals no longer pose as impediments to one another, but rather, solidarity becomes an enabling force of development within existing social structures. This utopian conception of freedom, however, is not conceived from without; rather, it is something implicit within social interactions. As Bolaños asserts, Honneth’s approach in critical theory moves our theoretical consciousness from an essentialist perspective to a “theoretico-materialist-practical” stance that is “sensitive to social realities from within and not from without” (Bolaños 2012, 24). Furthermore, the implications of freedom through recognition entail a struggle where the individual subjects himself 8

Honneth expands his initial treatment of the first sphere of recognition, proposing that love or care begins not only within the context of families. Honneth argues that this is experienced in the founding of clubs, social groups, and even sexual groups that constitute the majority of institutions that we encounter today (FRS 134-138).

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Introduction

openly to social interactions to shape, not only the norms of society but also that of the individual. In the third sphere of recognition, the realisation of freedom becomes implicit in the sense of esteem as the individual is recognised in his capacity to contribute to society through the development of his self-worth (SFR 128-129). Freedom, as Hornedo notes, ought to develop the individual and at the same time provide social-significance for his development (Hornedo 2000, 102). In the same context, Honneth’s emancipatory project of recognition is not taken from without; rather, it begins with socially established norms from which recognition and misrecognition take their value. Recent works, such as Pilapil’s Recognition: Examining Identity Struggles, follow Honneth’s emancipatory and critical framework to analyse contemporary struggles for recognition in the Philippines (Pilapil, 2015).9 Nikolas Kompridis, in his assessment of Honneth’s discourse on recognition, misses the point about social cohesion when he disputes the formal theory of good in recognition as a flawed ideal of self-realisation (Kompridis 2007, 286). Self-governance or the autonomy for self-legislation of moral norms is implicitly taken from the dynamics of social interaction. Love, as an initial sphere of recognition, situates the individual in alwaysalready existing grounds of normativity, not as a passive recipient of norms or rights but, rather, as a partner in intersubjective legislation of norms. The worry that accompanies Kompridis’ criticism that the norms of recognition itself may have a coercive force (Kompridis 2007, 287) in shaping the individual’s identity is already addressed by the fact that the normativity of recognition itself has a degree of social cohesion that allows normativity to take place. In other words, the force of coercion in recognition places the normativity of a practice in question, which provides instances of disruptions in normative expectations (SFR 137). This issue is further expatiated in the succeeding parts of this work where I address Kompridis’ criticisms of Honneth’s recent work, Freedom’s Right, by arguing that Kompridis’ notion of identity realisation through the

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Pilapil’s Recognition: Examining Identity Struggles provides a good assessment of the state of recognition theory, not only in the context of Honneth’s critical theory but also in the recent developments of the works of Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka, Seyla Benhabib, and James Tully. This work serves as an excellent introductory reading in the context of recognition theory as it is adopted by critical theorists in resolving identity disputes. A thorough review of the book could be seen in Bolaños’ “Pilapil on the Theory and Praxis of Recognition” (Bolaños 2016).

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formation of alternative “voices” (CD 57) is indeed realised in Honneth’s problematisation of moral autonomy through self-legislation (FRS 97). Despite the apparent conflict between individuality and normativity, Honneth’s dialectical treatment of recognition in Hegel’s Sittlichkeit values autonomy and freedom as the bases for social cohesion. Honneth argues that the critiques of modern societies, namely, Marxism and capitalism, are somewhat similar since they insist on strengthening individual autonomy (FRS 180 - 181). On the one hand, capitalism preserves individual autonomy by providing individual freedom from interference by the state; on the other hand, Marxism provides freedom from oppression and domination through the control of the modes of production. By preserving this individuating character of these modern critiques, he demonstrates that the possibility of a socially cohesive individuality is a necessary development in the progression of democratic institutions. Reification in this sense does not figure itself out as a simple fetishistic reduction of social relations found in Lukacs’ Marxist critique of reification in which normative practices impose as coercive laws (Lukacs 1971, 133). Honneth picks up reification as a case of misrecognition that leads to disrespect, where antecedent forms of recognition are forgotten.10 In this sense, we must not forget that normative practices imply an alwaysalready existing teleological trajectory that entails freedom as an agent and as a goal. This is primarily observed in contemporary democratic societies that are founded on the cohesion of rational self-legislating agents; in other words, the self-propagation of freedom within the context of social norms serves as a normative basis for recognition which I argue to be neither immanent nor transcendent in its appropriation since it can ease the tension between the objectivity of normativity and the sphere of subjectivity. Freedom is a redemptive form of the tension between the immanent and the transcendent. What we see in the immanence of the facticity of existence and its conflict with transcendence is its redemption through freedom. Freedom provides an alternative thought through the preservation of individuality, and yet, at the same time, retains the extrinsic reflexivity in already existing structures of norms and practices that progressively evolve into a non-reified form of social order. Kompridis’ notion of disclosure, in contrast, claims to preserve tradition and at the same time

10 Georg Lukacs also makes a similar observation in History and Class Consciousness, (Lukacs 1971, 2); See also in (R 58).

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Introduction

provides a receptive form of hearing11 the new. The new is a concept not simply from without but from within an already existing form of tradition that is heard at moments of crisis. It is a direct reaction to Habermas’ linguistic intersubjectivity (CD 5), which Kompridis claims has suffered a formulaic paradigm that objectivises normativity to the point that its disputation no longer becomes an issue (CD 17). By taking a Heideggerian stance of “rootedness,” Kompridis insists on preserving traditions over norms in favour of an assumed authenticity of self-projection. Kompridis’ position is indeed slanted towards Heidegger’s phenomenological hermeneutics, for the moments of crisis are understood in the context of fear as angst, or crises coming from without. The anticipatory nature of Kompridis’ notion of disclosure, thus, prefers to look for receptivity towards other voices that have yet to come. At this point, I think that Kompridis directs us to possibilities that project us from this crisisinducing moments not entirely from without, but rather from traditions instead of norms. In other words, Kompridis asserts that we anticipate transcendence of our factical conditions through the very conditions that we are left to begin with. On the contrary, Honneth does not specifically deal with the issue of crisis-inducing moments coming from without because his understanding of the individual or subject is not rooted in some metaphysical or abstract cogito; rather, it focuses on a sociallyshaped autonomous individual of Hegel’s Sittlichkeit. My expatiation of the relationship between recognition and freedom is divided into five main parts. The first part is dedicated to the discussion of Honneth’s turn from critical theory’s focus on domination, power, and institutions, to intersubjectivity and social philosophy. In Critique of Power, this transition is traced from Horkheimer’s program of aligning critical theory as a depiction of social realities in which emancipation becomes possible. By following the methodologies of Horkheimer, Adorno, Foucault, and Habermas, Honneth can argue that social critique ought to be based on an empirical understanding of the development of norms and how it informs and reproduces such norms in social interactions. As an alternative to Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action, Honneth proposes a reconstruction of Hegel and Mead’s intersubjective philosophical anthropology as the basis for developing the epistemological foundations for critical theory.

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Kompridis favours metaphors that refer to sound. His idea of receptivity revolves around identity in the form of voices.

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In the second part, I outline the development of Honneth’s reconstruction of Hegel’s theory based on the observable function of social struggles as a basis for the development and progression of societal norms. In this part, I will point out that the immanent foundation of recognition theory is based on the implicit understanding of respect and disrespect, and that through these experiences one can derive both critical and descriptive understanding of already existing norms that produce either solidarity or social pathologies. In the case of social pathologies, we can understand that they are pathological in two aspects—firstly, when the norm in practice no longer allows individuals to gain self-confidence based on the esteem that they acquire from their social relations, and secondly, when subjects are unable to integrate themselves into society due to the lack of recognition or their insistence on social atomism. In either case, both areas of social pathologies prove that the foundation of norms lies precisely in their capacity to create social bonds and maintain social solidarity. In the third part, I explore Honneth’s idea of social freedom in Freedom’s Right as a much-needed supplement for his recognition theory. Honneth’s reconstruction of the historical progress of democratic societies (specifically in Germany and in some parts of Europe) presents a convincing argument against the instrumentality of normativity in the theory of recognition. In this part, I outline Honneth’s discussion of the products of social freedom, namely, negative, reflexive, legal, and moral freedoms that constitute three important spheres of modern democracy. With social freedom, Honneth can assert that the sphere of private relations, economics, and democratic public sphere are all reinforced by their collective cooperation in creating a social structure of freedom that handles heteronomous identities and norms. Thus, the pursuit of individual freedom is only made possible through collective social action. In Part Four, I present a counterpoint against Honneth’s recognition theory by looking at Nikolas’ Kompridis critique of the tradition of critical theory as well as his pointed critique of Honneth’s recognition theory. In this part, I present some of Kompridis’ cogent arguments against the limitations of disclosure that have been carried over from Habermas’ critical theory to Honneth’s recognition theory. For Kompridis, the issue of critical theory’s pursuit of a pragmatic programme of critique leads to the exhaustion of normative resources necessary for generating selfconfidence in subjects in modernity. By imposing the necessity of recognition, Honneth is seen to be limiting the discourse of modernity to socially accepted forms of normativity. I present three arguments that sum up Kompridis’ critique of Honneth’s recognition theory: (1) The question

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Introduction

of the stability of normativity, (2) the unitary nature of recognition, and (3) the question of the possibility of freedom in recognition. Since Honneth does not directly answer any of Kompridis’ criticisms, I will try to reconstruct a possible response from Honneth to address Kompridis’ critique and assess whether Kompridis is correct in levelling these three points against Honneth’s recognition theory. In the fifth part, I will attempt to merge Honneth’s recognition theory with his reconstruction of social freedom in Freedom’s Right. In this part, I will locate how the four forms of recognition (love, rights, esteem, and antecedent) can intermesh with the concept of social freedom in private relations, economics, and democratic sphere. My intention in this part is to present a working model of how recognition theory supports individual freedom to accommodate and transform new and old norms into a cohesive social structure of solidarity. By doing this, I will be able to demonstrate the potential of Honneth’s work as a socio-normative critique of society.

PART ONE RECOGNITION AND CRITICAL THEORY

“You taught me language; and my profit on’t Is, I know how to curse. The red plague rid you For learning me your language!” —Caliban, Shakespeare’s The Tempest1

In this part, I retrace the trajectories of the notion of freedom and recognition in Honneth’s work. My aim is to detail and align Honneth’s discourse with the already existing works in critical theory that consider the problem of freedom and recognition. By tracing the developmental progress of Honneth’s thought, it is possible to articulate and dissect his notion of recognition with regard to how he aims at reconstructing Hegel’s sense of social freedom. It can be traced back to Honneth’s earlier essays wherein his interest clearly lies in the articulation of Hegel’s notion of ethical life as a systematic explanation of how normative developments in society are made and changed (Honneth 1988, 362). Freedom in Hegel’s ethical life (Sittlichkeit) is only realised in the perspective of social interaction (PoS 212), this potent axiom holds an explanation for both negative and positive forms of freedom. On one hand, we can find that ethical norms are shaped through an individual’s integration within society, within which the subject can form and create its consciousness, thus giving rise to a positive form of freedom. On the other hand, negative freedom arises when the subject of social interactions finds that its will and its actions are free from restrictions from external factors because its will acknowledges the same normative principles that gave rise to its consciousness. Despite the strong Kantian undertones of the ethical imperative of reason, Hegel’s conception of the ethical life does not end in a simple form of ethical conformism. As Honneth notes, there must be a commitment towards understanding how normative principles become manifested as reason (Honneth 2014, 817).

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(Shakespeare 1958, 1140)

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1. Recognition, Identity, and Solidarity Any discussion regarding the pervasive nature of morality is bound to be problematic and exclusionary when it fails to recognise the existing state of things that have always-already been there. Since morality is aimed at projecting an end or a goal, its normative presupposition is teleological insofar as it aims to direct the actions of those who subscribe to its normativity. Institutions assume a greater role in collecting and collating normative ascent towards a common goal of individuals living in a social ecology and economy. By social ecology, I am referring to the capacity of individuals to live amongst each other in a cohesive fashion that compliments singular differences as well as similarities. As a social economy, we also see the dynamics of how differences and similarities play a role in the transactions and roles that individuals demonstrate in order to achieve their individualised goals and ends. Institutions, despite their intrinsic connection with morality, also bear the burden of creating and propagating social pathologies that malign and oppress individuals intentionally or unintentionally. Social pathologies occur whenever a norm comes into conflict with the individualities of persons acting as moral agents for their own intents and purposes. As moral agents, individuals ought to be able to exercise their freedom and self-determination as they concretise a social norm. However, in a social context, it is also common and prevalent to have moral agents enacting norms that are contrary to their own sense of freedom and selfdetermination because of the historical and circumstantial factors that are already in place.2 Institutions, as enforcers and propagators of norms, must live up to the challenging task of coping with immanent and transcendent factors that inform and transform the practices of individuals under such institutions. Since institutions exercise a certain degree of rational ascent from their historicity and establishment, they should enforce their teleological purpose of achieving a sense of social cohesion on individuals who are considered rational agents. The problem with individuals, however, is that they have rationally made self-intentions and interests that may run contrary to the intentions of the institutions. Thus, the burden of institutions is to perform a delicate act of balancing the intentions of the 2

At this point, we are reminded of events such as the Nuremberg trials wherein the conflict between self-determination and duty becomes conflated when given orders by a superior. This issue of obedience and its ethical conflation has been explored in the Milgram experiment (Milgram 1963) as well as the Stanford Prison Experiment (Zimbardo 2007).

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state for the purposes of social cohesion while, at the same time, maintaining a recognitive stance towards individuals who are under them to give way to the latter’s own rational self-made intentions and interests. The teleological trajectories of normativity hinges on their ability to accept and generate their own critique as well as maintain a sense of receptivity to individuals within institutions. The danger of institutionalised normativity is the inability of the institution to maintain continuity from the institution's normative assent towards the individual assent of subjectivities insofar as the intended telos of norms are forgotten, obscured, or lost. Honneth’s theory of recognition enjoys a veritable position of articulating this nuanced character of social relations within institutions and individuals because it offers a balanced perspective of social analysis. Honneth begins with his critique of existing cultural and social critique to understand the basic normative underpinnings of critical theory. Throughout its tradition, critical theory has been in pursuit of providing a working description of the normative conditions of social practices in society, not only to provide a theoretical understanding of social pathologies but also to guide social research in establishing a viable immanent critique that leads to emancipation. Bolaños notes that there are three normative claims in critical theory (Bolaños 2016): (1) the first one asserts that reality is social; (2) the second claim is that critical theory works towards an emancipatory framework that pursues the abolition of slavery and social domination; (3) the third and last claim asserts that within this scope, critical theory’s impulse for emancipation is not limited towards proletarian sensibilities (Bolaños 2016, 85). I argue that Honneth, despite his somewhat conservative take on this tradition of critical theory, is also guided by these three normative claims. In the Critique of Power, Honneth pursues the normative issue of critical theory by investigating the normative intentions of theorists such as Adorno, Horkheimer, Foucault, and Habermas in their intention to understand the relationship between societies and social domination. Honneth is convinced that the approaches of Foucault and Habermas offer an alien appropriation of critical theory that ventures away from Adorno’s model of the critique of the domination of nature. Adorno, argues Honneth, failed to provide a model wherein social interaction and social integration becomes possible as an actiontheoretic paradigm of “struggle” and “mutual understanding” or intersubjectivity (CoP xii). Through this analysis, Honneth provides a strong theoretical foundation for Kampf um Anerkennung or “struggle for recognition” as a model of social relations in his succeeding work.

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Honneth’s theoretical focus moves towards the direction of articulating Hegel’s Jena writings, his reconstruction of Hegel’s abandoned project of recognition in the form of struggle found its articulation in Herbert Mead’s philosophical anthropology (SFR 11-130). Honneth’s aim was to salvage the intersubjectivist aspect of Hegel’s mode of socialisation with the intent of depicting social struggles as motivated by the possibility of recognition. Through his reading of Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Mead, Honneth underlines the teleological intent of social solidarity in the struggle that occurs between individuals and institutions. The intention of solidarity in institutions and social struggles characterises the need to depict an intersubjectivist articulation of Hegel’s notion of recognition to reconcile the trajectory of social criticism towards a dynamic and constantly shifting social reality. By going beyond the Habermasian project of depicting social relations through the grammar of communicative action, Honneth envisions a theoretical analysis and criticism by taking the perspective of experiences of social struggles that are not limited to a proceduralised form of rationality (Honneth 2007B, 25-26). With this agenda in mind, Honneth develops the theory of recognition by pointing out that struggles for recognition are always-already shaped by normative principles that are developed early on during the process of an individual’s introduction to society. Through this, the question of the origin of normative values as transcendent, rational, or even innate is no longer bound to the assumption of rationality that can be seen in Kantian ethics. The assumption of reason has been an important point of departure for many of Honneth’s works. The frequency of Honneth’s reference to Kantian morality as a conformist assumption of reason can be seen immediately in the first few paragraphs of most of the writings of Honneth.3 While Kant’s universalist sense of normativity may be the desired outcome of any given social relation, the demands of a categorical imperative, insisting on rational outcomes from individuals, require more than just an appeal to reason when reason can be defined, practiced, and observed in different ways. The rational assent to a sense of ethical sensibility implies that there is an already existing system that regulates social practices among individuals. Honneth’s interest in the function of normativity in Hegel’s idea of an ethical life or Sittlichkeit is an alternative 3

To note, Honneth usually begins his discussions with the issue of Kantian ethics as a dominant ethical theory when it comes to the understanding of rationality as a main principle of justice, autonomy, and recognition. C.f. the following works: (Honneth 2007B, 5), (SFR, 5), (Honneth 2007A, 129), (Honneth 1995, 271), (FRS, 2), and (Honneth 2014, 817).

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explanation that can fill the gap left by Kantian ethics.4 Not only does Honneth provide a means to explain how norms inform social practices, it also provides a perspective on how disruptions of social relations (i.e., crime) may result from the reification of norms. The identification of these disruptions of norms or “social pathologies” is an aspect of Honneth’s theoretical work that allows him to engage with the shortcomings of the Frankfurt School tradition. For example, Adorno’s critique of social pathologies and the culture industry engages with capitalism, while Marcuse criticises the one-dimensional society, and while Habermas provides a model of critique of the colonization of the lifeworld.5 Honneth notes that these pathologies exemplify a defective sense of reason, which is why the necessity of establishing a reconstructive effort to put forward a theory of recognition is in order—so as to demonstrate how reason is formed in the subjective and experiential level of the individual. Individuality plays a pivotal role in the development of Honneth’s work. In the Struggle for Recognition, Honneth was initially discouraged by Hegel’s progressive tone in Phenomenology of Spirit since the emphasis of Hegel's Jena lectures, specifically, the idea of a struggle for recognition has been substituted with a greater emphasis on the philosophy of consciousness (SFR 30, also in, 63 and 145). Hegel’s progressive tone, however, should be acknowledged as a consequence of Hegel’s focus on a possible realisation of the Sittlichkeit as a product of social interaction within a state. Honneth’s focus on the grammar and experience of struggles for recognition takes a different cue through his reading of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. In Freedom’s Right, Honneth pursues the path that he initially decided to abandon in his reading of Hegel. In this recent work, the progressive outcome of social institutions and their struggle with individuals become realised as a necessity for fortifying an uncoerced sense of cooperation between individuals and institutions.

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While Kant’s universalist ethics can point moral agents towards the proper norms by appealing to their capacity for reason, the universalist appropriation of ethics has to posit a homogenous function of reason to guide everyone as if they were following a maxim for each and every person’s own end. In the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant points out that the limitation of this form of ethics is that it does not guarantee that everyone else would follow the maxim of universality (Kant, 2002, 56). 5 (Honneth 2007B, 22) Furthermore, Honneth notes that Adorno’s focus on the domination of nature as evinced in the Dialectic of Enlightenment missed out the details of the “social” in society. C.f. (CoP, xii)

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In the following sections, I reconstruct Honneth’s articulation of freedom by tracing his original idea of social participation and cooperation in the implicit necessity of recognising freedom in the social subject. This discussion depends entirely on how Honneth articulates Hegel’s notion of recognition as a decisive point in articulating the necessity of freedom when it comes conflicted with social norms, be it legal, cultural, or individual. As a scholar, Honneth draws intensively from the discussions of his predecessors from the Frankfurt School tradition. His work identifies with Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Habermas, while at the same time drawing from a wide array of interdisciplinary theories ranging from sociology, anthropology, and psychology. Despite this, aligning Honneth’s work with the tradition of critical theory seems difficult for the following reasons: (1) Against the backdrop of the emancipatory program of critical theory, Honneth’s recognition theory espouses emancipation as a phase in which social domination becomes recognised and evaluated through already existing norms. Honneth’s aim is to provide a critique from within the system of domination since the system already contains within it a system of recognition. (2) Recognition as the heart of Honneth’s critical theory rejects the idea of a universalisable form of reason that gives norms an absolute moral foothold in institutionalising norms; it acknowledges both transcendent and immanent factors that affect the production, distribution, maintenance of norms. Honneth’s approach in providing an immanent and transcendent depiction of social norms lies in his Foucaultian approach of observing social interactions with the acknowledgement of the heteronomy of individual intentions. The similarities with Foucault, however, ends where Honneth aims for the possibility of seeing such heteronomous intentions in individuals channelled through a cooperative relationship. In other words, for Honneth, there is a teleological implication that can be read within society that supports both the maintenance and adjustment of norms to accommodate individuality. A peculiar characteristic that can be noted in his work is his careful and sensitive approach in discussing the notion of Sittlichkeit. While Honneth mentions the concept of Sittlichkeit often, it is only strictly discussed as an end or goal of recognition as a sense of a good-life. As an end or goal, the Hegelian notion of the ethical life is not to be seen here as a definitive end of every society. Honneth does not clearly point this out and only until he emphasised Hegel’s ethical life as realisable under the concrete teleological framework of institutions (FRS 59). Of further interest, here are Honneth's earlier sketches of the ethical life in the context of recognition and crime. Crime, as a point of contention, leaves us with the intimate understanding of whether the law

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acts out a form of misrecognition of individuals or the individuals committing crime are in need of further integration with society. (Honneth 1988, 364). In the same essay, Honneth concludes in the last paragraph that Hegel designates this breach of social relations as a necessary means for emancipating the individual towards a formal manifestation of freedom. Through this, revolution becomes possible when the normative principles of the law require further reconciliation as the ethical guarantor of the state (Honneth 1988, 367).

2. Critique of History, Power, and Critique Itself In the Critique of Power, Honneth outlines the early attempt of critical theory to grasp the idea of social criticism under Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of enlightenment as a domination of nature. Starting from the main thesis of the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer argue against the overwhelming confidence of reason that leads to the domination of nature (Adorno & Horkheimer 2002, 17). As opposed to myth, enlightenment presupposes certainty at the level of science without considering the unpredictable and probabilistic limitation of reason. The consequence of enlightenment thinking puts human reason at risk because it assumes the predictability and controllability of nature. Adorno and Horkheimer maintain that: Myth becomes enlightenment and nature mere objectivity. Human beings purchase the increase in their power with estrangement from that over which is exerted. Enlightenment stands in the same relationship to things as the dictator of human beings. He knows them to the extent that he can manipulate them. The man of science knows things to the extent that he can make them. Their “in-itself” becomes “for him.” In their transformation, the essence of things is revealed as always the same, a substrate of domination. This identity constitutes the unity of nature. Neither it nor the unity of the subject was presupposed by magical incantation. (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2002, 6)

The quasi-historical development of enlightenment, for Adorno and Horkheimer, traces itself from the time of myths to the age of industrial revolution. Humanity originally treated nature as if it were some divine entity with which it engages in mimetic dialogue. Myth encouraged a different relation between man and nature; it involved man treating nature as if it were a force that one can dialogue with, rather than simply a tool or an object that caters to man’s will. Man communed with nature through mimesis, an act that is attuned to the very principle of aporetic acceptance of the limited knowability or non-identical character of nature. With the

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age of enlightenment, humanity started to forget the limitations of knowledge to the extent that nature itself became simply an instrument of man’s will. The social issue at stake here with the domination of nature is how its domain became extended to human social reality. Much as we can harness the power of steam, water, and electricity to obey our whim, human enlightenment is an analogy of the domination of nature. Adorno and Horkheimer’s social concern was with the predominant attitude of the enlightenment towards how society can be directed towards human reason. Through faith in the certainty of enlightenment, history can attest to the atrocity of social domination from the horrors of the condition of labour during the industrial age of Capitalism to (but not limited to) the genocide of race in the concentration camps of Auschwitz. Honneth is interested in Adorno-Horkheimer’s analysis because the critique of the domination of nature is related to how normative expectations in society can lead not only to the possibility of critique but also to that of emancipative action. Horkheimer’s aim during the 1930’s was to take a traditional account of the sciences as a basis for social research; the goal was to deduce theoretical statements and apply them to empirically observable realities (CoP 5). The failings of social theory during the time of Horkheimer was, according to Honneth, based on the same principle that haunted the theories of the early Marx, which is the inability to account for the social process in which domination was able to take place due to the focus on labour and production (CoP 7). Horkheimer was criticised for the failure of his materialistic critique to include the experience of the struggle for recognition as an essential conduit of autonomous change and social reproduction (CoP 17). Honneth’s intention here is to provide a convincing case through which he could argue for the foundation of critical theory through the emancipative discourse of social struggles. The undeveloped potential of working out a social theory that acknowledges social struggles as a commitment to avoid prolonged strains of domination is seen through Honneth’s further dealings with the complex history of critical theory. Honneth makes further comparisons with the works of Foucault and Habermas as a missed potential in the disclosure of social struggles. One can observe that Honneth’s argumentative approach towards the critique of critical theory is aimed at the development of intersubjectivity as an emancipative source of social cohesion within the already existing and established systems of socialisation. The potential that was missed in Foucault and Habermas was the development of a concrete analysis of

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social relations wherein the idea of social struggles would be an opportunity to acknowledge the misalignment of norms towards individual subjects. The reductive representation of individuals in their societal relation, described by Adorno and Horkheimer, finds the proper articulation in Foucault’s critique of social domination. Following the trail of Adorno and Horkheimer’s attempt towards an objective sociological stance as a form of science, Foucault adopts what Honneth refers to as a “linguistic concept of culture” where scientific historical investigations present an “episteme” or discourse that determine patterns of thought within a cultural period (CoP 110). In his reading of Foucault’s critique of history as a discourse, Honneth outlines an integral problem with Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge as a methodology that provides an unbiased perspective towards history and social relations. The promise of Foucault’s theoretical model is to provide a raw, scientific, and estranged observer’s point of view of social relations (CoP 109) through which the experience of the subject becomes unmediated by the biases of the observer and is laid bare for the purposes of extracting a critical perspective in the form of a “theory of society.” These theoretical innovations are aimed at reading social interactions with the intent of understanding the function of social domination as well as providing a basis for describing the unintended consequences of such attempts towards social control. Foucault’s acknowledgement of the unintended outcomes of domination is what Petherbridge notes as a seminal foundation for Honneth’s development of the notion of power that is “lacking in Habermas’ account” (Petherbridge 2011, 10). Foucault’s turn to language and semiotics points towards the possibility of receptivity in critical theory, specifically the understanding of individual identity formation in relation to its interactions with society. Running parallel with Adorno’s critique of the domination of nature, we can find in Foucault an articulation of the formation of the subject as a product of social interactions. For example, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault presents a historical narrative of the practice of punishment, originally intended as a mode of social control, that gradually evolves into the acknowledgement of social forces that shape the individual, which in turn also shapes the structure of institutions that propagate norms. From the display of punishment (Foucault 1975, 3) because of regicide, the exposure of the criminal in stockades to the development of panoptical prison systems and its turn to reformation instead of elimination, we can see that the individual subject is not entirely helpless or voiceless in the formation of society. Foucault’s turn to linguistics and semiotics is his attempt towards developing a theory that acknowledges discourses as a

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possible avenue for understanding the normative potentials of discourses in shaping identities. Honneth takes this cue as a continuity of Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of the domination of nature, whereas the subject, for Foucault, functions as an extension of the domain of nature with which man continuously tries to grapple since human nature is found to be irrepressible (Foucault 1975, 289). Despite this, Honneth notes that Foucault, like Adorno and Horkheimer, inevitably falls prey to the system theoretic approach, which means there is a tendency in his theory to reduce social relations into reductive descriptions of social struggles as merely a result of the attempt to manipulate and control human nature (CoP 86). As a counter-science to sociology, ethnology for Foucault provides a unique perspective of overcoming the biases found in Eurocentric theories. Foucault’s intention, according to Honneth, is to learn from the investigations of these cultures so as to expose the aims and objective of European sciences and bring a critical balance to the uncontested domain of the human sciences (CoP 108). In contrast to Adorno and Horkheimer’s conception of history as a systematic form of domination of nature through society, Foucault does not agree with the “monumental” conception of history. Despite the interrogation of historical narratives as “monuments,” Foucault opts to find a methodology from which an archaeology of knowledge can be drawn. Honneth notes that Foucault’s turn to linguistics and semiology is inspired by his exposure to French literary avant-gardism (CoP 111) with the theme of the writer as a detached subject from his writing. The detachment of the subject as a theoretical foundation of social criticism implies that theoretical biases in ethnology allow the theoretician ample justifications for the theory’s epistemic validity. This opens up a possibility of a discourse that is not bent on overriding the intentions of its participants; rather, it serves as a potent perspective in which critical theory gains a descriptive tool in understanding the effects of social struggles and their effect on the formation of normative principles. Foucault’s turn to the French avant-gardist literary techniques (CoP 112) opens up the theoretical possibility in which theory becomes detached from its author or its interlocutor so as to maintain a critical distance from the theoretician’s subjectivity from the object of its investigation. This epistemic approach offers a way wherein “monumental” artefacts of history are investigated on how they can mesh with the actions of individual subjects that both influence and are influenced by such monuments. In this sense, sociological research for Honneth benefits from the self-aware critique of the sciences:

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… the problem of sociology is presented in an exact analogy to the problem of ethnology, since it is assumed that from the familiar horizon of its elaborated scientific culture sociological research encounters the “second” culture within its own society in as foreign a manner as ethnological research encounters the culture of archaic civilization. (CoP 110)

Notably, a reading of Foucault leads to a very sober and objective layout of historical data, to the extent that one no longer sees Foucault as a disinterested critic of the outcomes or trajectories of history. This strand of thought was cultivated in the growing trend of structuralists moving towards the post-structuralist appropriation of social discourse. One is reminded of Barthes’ gloss on the death of the author in literature (Barthes 1977, 142–148), Lyotard’s account of the rise of narrative legitimacy in the Postmodern Condition (Lyotard 2002, 60–67), and Derrida’s articulation of the arbitrariness of theory in his reading of Levi-Strauss’ anthropology as a critique of the human sciences (Derrida 1978, 351–370). These samples of theoretical criticism, as we can see upon further investigation, confirm Honneth’s assessment of the theoretical problems that haunt critical theory from raising a valid assessment of the social reality that it intends to investigate. While subjectivity, from the perspective of both the theoretician and the culture under study, may offer flawed and biased perspectives, we have to nonetheless accept the fact that these theoretical and subjective biases are exactly what makes the social sciences reductive in their claims of performing an immanent critique. Furthermore, Honneth argues that the ontological claim that a theory casts before the subject of investigation has to be traced back to the normative assent that came from individual subjects, where such normative assent guarantees a society’s historical unity and continuity (CoP 117). Honneth finds Foucault’s analysis to be problematic. Despite his articulation of objective theoretical basis for investigating sociological movements in history, Foucault’s ethnology6 suffers from the disintegration of the individual by eliminating the concept of a subject in his work (CoP 120). In this approach, we find that Foucault’s investigations may not be 6

Notably, the study of ethnology from the milieu of a growing interest in structuralism led to the movement of transforming the theoretical understanding of human nature or nature itself as a construct of cultural practices as opposed to the idea of a universal “human nature.” By creating a critical distance between the observer and the subject, the idea of an unbiased form of studying human nature and human culture fielded a critical awareness of how anthropology was biased in the understanding of other cultures through the scientist’s own cultural context.

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able to explain how movements of social struggles are able to give rise to the immanent critique of institutions, for they are merely acting out the impulse of the conglomerative effect of the institutional forces that shape them. Honneth wants to precisely point out that in the process of reacting towards these historical and institutional forces, the subject is not entirely a passive receiver of such forces. The abandonment of the idea of reflection found in traditional philosophy has led to a crisis in the theoretical understanding of social relations where subjects are merely reduced into cogs and gears that are guided by the normative goals of institutional forces. Thus, a philosophical view of history must be understood as a system that works itself out as a unity, only on the condition that its historical subjects are able to individually assess the normative trajectory of its continuity with their subjective individual autonomy. From this perspective, Honneth moves his theoretical critique to a discourse criticism, which can be found again in Foucault and later in Habermas’ theory of communicative action. Considering the possibility of discourse as a neutral field wherein individuals can create a framework of articulating their intentions, Honneth proceeds to his analysis of language and meaning in the framework of discourse and the possibility of its domination. Suffice to say that Foucault’s ethnological approach to sociology moves to discourse analysis to show how semiology, as an attempt of meaning, is influenced by the structures that make meaning possible. A discourse allows Foucault to show how individual subjectivity can affect the “monumental” structures of history. The individual’s biography is useful insofar as they can contribute to the discourse from an alternate perspective that may have been already compromised by the intention to dominate. Discourse then, despite its capacity to wield power, is still subject to the individuating process that made its assent possible (CoP 188). It must also be emphasised that it is important to consider Honneth’s assertion of the place of identity formation when it comes to the maintenance and administration of power in the form of domination. The state of domination, in this case, bears a similarity to the idea of hegemony that can be found in Antonio Gramsci’s thoughts.7 To put this in perspective, 7

Antonio Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony is the antagonism between the dominant group and the masses. This relationship is antagonistic in the sense that the masses may manifest signs of discontent with its rulers but nonetheless conform to the norms that are imposed upon them due to the overwhelming influence that the dominant group possesses. Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks presents two scenarios for hegemony as it is maintained by a dominant group or a ruling

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one can think of domination as an effective form of administration insofar as the conflicting sense of individuality against the administrative powers of the institution is held in its place because of the dependence of the individual on the administration. The similarity, however, ends there; for Honneth, the conflictual relationships between institutions and individuals are resolved in instances wherein the grammar of the institution is adopted so as to allow discourse between them to take place. Pilapil aptly depicts this aspect of Honneth’s recognition theory as “a testament to persons’ utter dependence on mutual relations of recognition” (Pilapil 2013, 51). Discourse, as Honneth observes in Foucault, functions in a similar fashion as monetary resource insofar as it is scant and is heavily competed upon by its social actors (CoP 143). Taking this into consideration, one might misconstrue that the distribution of power in a discourse is a field in which domination perpetually prevails. On the contrary, Honneth finds a strong intersubjective potential in recognising social struggles in discourse since it is a productive process through which subjects are able to communicate their identities in a system that can serve or be transformed into a neutral ground for identity. Language then provides a pivotal role in understanding social relations and must not be simply limited to the perspective of language as a system of domination. Honneth notes this as a fundamental flaw in Foucault’s understanding of discourse as a linguistic event that serves the interest of domination and the product of the activity of interests for domination (CoP 145). Both are incompatible with regard to how virtue formation is negotiated in a discourse since it assumes the prevalence of domination over and above the interest of articulating the need for individual subjects to claim and assert their identities as persons in need of recognition within society. The discourse, thus, becomes problematic at the onset insofar as Foucault neglects the productive aspect of discourse and simply construes language as a means through which power is distributed. Foucault's discussion of productive forces is already implicit in his work; for example, his discussions of the evolution of the system of punishment as a form of control and manipulation of the body explain how penal systems condition societal behaviour. While Foucault's observations were productive, his work suffered the same fate as Adorno's critique of enlightenment insofar as Foucault's work did not offer any practical approach that made the emancipation of the subject possible. Honneth points out further that individual subjects in Foucault's systempolitical government either through: (1) the prestige of the group that is acquired historically, or by (2) the apparatus of “state coercive power” that enforces discipline through coercive legal power (Gramsci 1971, 12–13).

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theoretic approach are reduced to mere behaviouristic and mechanistic representations of individual will (CoP 195). In other words, individuals become merely passive reactors in the play of forces that engulfs the core of their identities. Honneth further warns us of the dystopian consequences of this approach: What Foucault calls the “dark side” of the modern civilizing process Adorno and Horkheimer in the Dialectic of Enlightenment conceive as the “subterranean history” history of Europe. Apparently like Adorno, Foucault also assumes that the process of technical rationalization that determines the course of European history from below ground and is vaguely circumscribed by the period of the “Enlightenment” accelerates and intensifies to the extent that the practical realization of domination was methodologically controlled and reflexively optimized by the development of the natural sciences. As a result, both theoreticians are compelled to view the outcome of scientific activity as a whole, notwithstanding methodological characteristics and real relations, as knowledge of domination. (CoP 198)

The danger of this approach is that both neglect the social dimension of how individuals form their autonomous identity amidst the domination of these systems of administration. Individual interactions and social struggles through which norms are rectified, augmented, or even abolished are overlooked by these perspectives. This eliminates the theoretical possibility in which institutions can be affected by individuals seeking a way to disclose their identities so as to cohere with the constantly changing dynamics of society. To sum it up, Honneth notes that Adorno and Foucault have the tendency to ignore the fact that social groups support or endure the process of maintaining relations of social power through their own normative convictions (CoP 199). This means that, at the onset, power is not simply exercised institutionally as with the case of domination; it is a pervasive function that sustains discourse. As a continuation of this critical reconstruction of social theory, Honneth moves to Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action as a viable solution to the missed opportunity in looking at social struggles as a foundation and reformulation of normativity. In Habermas, the continuation of the critique of social theory proceeds with the problem of science as a justificatory process of communicating norms. Habermas proposes that science, inasmuch as it relies on a community of similar-minded individuals, requires normative presuppositions upon which their assent to truth becomes rationally conceived as justifiable. Honneth notes that this critical function in Habermas’ work takes a similar

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vein as Adorno and Foucault’s critique of domination. In place of cultural domination and disciplinary power, Habermas peruses power relation in terms of technocratic domination (CoP 249). Technocracy provides a unique epistemological perspective since it is associated with how subjects create normative discourses with nature itself.8 The technocracy thesis runs parallel with Thomas Kuhn’s notion of “paradigm shifts” insofar as these shifts in paradigm provide the necessary ontological categories that allow judgment on matters pertaining to nature (Kuhn 1970, 111–135). In these final two sections of the Critique of Power, Honneth traces the discourse of power from Adorno and Horkheimer’s notion of domination of nature to Habermas’ domination of social relations through technocracy. Furthermore, Honneth’s interest in Habermas’ work is on the possibility of presenting social struggles as (1) an immanent origin of the development of social norms through which the possibility of intersubjective openness takes place in the form of protests, strikes, boycotts, and other forms of social conflicts (CoP 275); (2) another reason for this is that Honneth wants to trace the progressive shifts in theory from Adorno-Horkheimer’s system theoretic approach to the communication theoretic approach (CoP 277). Honneth finds in Habermas a productive form wherein social interaction is not simply reduced to the force of institutions that impose their normative values on individuals; rather, we find an alternative conception of rationality through which discourse can function without any intention of domination. In Habermas, we find two different forms of social interaction. On one hand, strategic action (Habermas 1987, 150) is the intentional relations between individuals through which ends are met with the goal of achieving or dominating the interaction. One can imagine in this discourse the kind of interaction wherein individuals manoeuvre their intention and achieve their ends. This interaction is comparable to the critique of capitalism that we find in Adorno’s Culture Industry and Marcuse’s Welfare Society, wherein the intention of domination is seen either in a form of cultural products or systematic administration where normative values are maintained as ends 8

Adorno and Horkheimer's technocracy thesis is based on the understanding of technology as the essence of knowledge, mainly as a mode of knowing that seeks the domination of nature and humanity (Adorno & Horkheimer 2002, 2). By replacing the narrative of understanding reality through myths with enlightenment, humanity has sought to control and dominate nature rather than become understanding and receptive towards nature (Adorno & Horkheimer 2002, 6). As a result, the confidence of humanity towards the technological prowess that was gained from enlightenment has led humanity towards the path of objectifying not only nature but also humanity as its own end.

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to capitalistic intentions. On the other hand, communicative action (Habermas 1987, 149) is an interaction wherein a common normative presupposition provides two social actors with the necessary openness to discourse. This receptivity can be seen in how scientific paradigms, for example, are able to change and eventually achieve legitimisation from the like-minded community of individuals. Furthermore, this receptivity also takes place in instances wherein social actors reach out to normative values that require revision so as to take into consideration the identities of individuals who want to be integrated into society. For instance, within a scientific community, the opinion of one scientist could be a venue wherein opinions for or against it are made. However, Habermas notes that in instances wherein it is impossible to immediately settle a dispute or when the consensus of society breaks down, a strategic action takes place as a way of re-establishing goal direction in social institutions (Habermas 1987, 150). As we go deeper in Honneth’s reading of the progress of Habermas’ theory of communicative action, we can find some of the gaps in the appropriation of the speech act theory that was augmented to accommodate further theoretical flexibility. Habermas includes a third theoretical category where actions are not simply oriented towards purposive-rational action; it also covers all the aspects of “human rationality as internal points of reference” (CoP 287). The inclusion of aesthetics as an expression of rationality elicits the problem of distinguishing between strategic or goaloriented actions to actions that are communicative in purpose. Through this third category, the problem of distinguishing strategic from communicative action becomes a teleological issue, for the consequences of either action, may also result in the enrichment of the lifeworld as individuals begin to appropriate useful cultural products that can enrich individual will and identity formation. The theoretical value that is gained from this augmentation of Habermas’ theory results in a perspective that is no longer bound by the discourse of power since normative values are no longer viewed as a product of mere implementation and administration of dominant forces that influence the lifeworld: Habermas now calls “lifeworld” such a horizon of intersubjectively shared background assumptions in which every process of communication is already embedded. He views it as the congealed result of the act of communication for stabilizing convictions, that is, as the historical product of the interpretative efforts of preceding generations. The lifeworld furnishes the channel of everyday knowledge for orientation in which the flow of social processes of communication can continue without the threat of interruption. (CoP 288)

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With this, we see an evolutionary process wherein the rationalisation of the communicative action takes place (CoP 295). The theoretical position that Habermas offers is no longer bound by the conflict between strategic action and communicative action; differentiation from norms that are espoused as strategic forms of action become necessary in the lifeworld, inasmuch as the lifeworld benefits from the growing and progressive process of contributing to the interpretation of the lifeworld. Along with the process of differentiation comes the issue of maintaining the system by which these normative principles cohere. The lifeworld itself is dependent upon the delicate act of balancing these interests, by means of which change within society is still possible, while at the same time a sense of cohesion is maintained so as to allow a communicative action to function. In other words, if we were to look at the possibility of social change, it must occur within the lifeworld itself as a product of differentiation within the system and not from the outside: The material reproduction of the social lifeworld is supposed to be conceived as a process of, since only within its framework can the necessary purposive activities of subjects be functionally coordinated. Therefore, the change of perspective that Habermas recommends is to be understood not as a simple transition from one theoretical viewpoint to another equally meaningful viewpoint but rather as a change demanded by the structural properties of social reality itself. (CoP 92)

The maintenance of the system that Honneth sees in Habermas’ idea of the lifeworld necessitates a perspective by which social struggles are viewed as activities that allow a possible change in normative values, as such the system is able to change the structure of social reality. The theoretical position that Honneth sees in Habermas stipulates the necessity of social cohesion via integration as a means to maintain the rational system of communication in society. Without social cohesion, acquiring institutional assent from individual participants requires free and autonomous identity formation that allows adequate differentiation of subjectivity that may perceive and experience areas of institutional administration that may have been overlooked by already existing norms. By appealing to reason, normative values are thus legitimised and selfenforced because of the assent of the individuals in the shared lifeworld that acknowledges the rationality of norms. From this point on, Honneth is able to insert his theory of recognition as a supplement to Habermas’ analysis. Since social integration has been merely seen as a maintenance of the system, Honneth argues that Habermas creates two fictions in his work: (1) that domination exists as a

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reproduction of society (2) and that social interaction is made with the intention of maintaining social organisations (CoP 301). These two fictions assume that we see social interaction as entirely dependent on maintaining power relations for the sake of maintaining social order (CoP 292) (Habermas 1987, 150–152). The problem is that if we were to understand social interaction as a product of strategically placing individuals in society as functions, then we are reducing the idea of social cohesion to a form of moral conformism. While Habermas’ treatment of social differentiation has the possibility of articulating this, Honneth takes a different approach to his reading of Hobbes, Machiavelli, Hegel, and Mead. In the next section, I will present Honneth’s alternative to communicative action in the form of the theory of recognition. The theory of recognition presents a model of explaining how social struggles are able to give rise to social integration by avoiding the fiction of system maintenance as the purpose of social integration. As opposed to asserting the purpose of system maintenance as the goal of social cohesion, Honneth asserts otherwise. For Honneth, the formative process of integration begins with the immediate receptivity of the family (or in the case of his later writings, friendship) towards individuals that seek integration to a social group. Identity formation in Honneth's recognition theory is formed through the dialectical engagement of subjects’ mutual receptivity towards each other's differences. With this Honneth can free the discourse of the will and identity formation from the context of domination insofar as the family serves as the immediate sphere of care and integration of society. In addition to this, social struggles gain a stable historical basis insofar as their claims for justice through the change of norms can be traced back to the process of social integration that occurred within familial and, later, relationships of mutual trust and understanding.

3. Social Struggles Towards Recognition Given the compelling arguments for a social theory that investigates social struggles in the Critique of Power, Honneth proceeds to further craft his arguments and theoretical reconstructions in The Struggle for Recognition. Coming from his incisive discussion of Habermas’ communicative critique of domination, Honneth pursues the problematisation of individual will formation, not as a matter of enriching the lifeworld as a form of system-maintenance, but rather as a pursuit that is individually motivated by normative practices already in place at the beginning of social interactions. To further pursue this line of argumentation, Honneth goes back to the development of the notion of social solidarity as a means to an

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end of power. It is notable that in his reading, Honneth was able to show that social solidarity is not necessarily a means towards power; rather, power becomes a means towards social interaction. In Hobbes and Machiavelli, Honneth sees a gradual transformation of the notion of struggle from nature for the sake of survival to a struggle among individuals pursuing their own interests (SFR 7–10). Thus, in this case, the modern tendency of human beings to fear nature gradually shifted to the realm of avoiding and resolving conflicts within social relations to achieve solidarity. The seminal thought behind social solidarity is remarked in the beginning of Hobbes’ Leviathan as a re-thinking of social interactions beyond its reduction as a mere means-towards-an-end relationship wherein social solidarity is achieved to maintain a strong enforcement of the social contract. While the historical distance between Machiavelli and Hobbes may seem to be apt in their own political contexts, Honneth sees a strong revisionist tendency in Machiavelli’s Prince, where ethical norms are relatively abandoned or changed to maintain social order in a state. These modern developments, coupled with the increase in communications through various innovations in medieval and modern times, gave rise to the development of modern conceptions of social relations that recognise individual will formation as a starting point. These social relations of normativity provide us with the understanding of how social practices are informed, revised, and developed freely among social actors regardless of social class or institutional affinities. Honneth’s interest in this is to continue the intersubjectivist approach of Hegel’s early Jena lectures, which was abruptly abandoned in the Phenomenology of Spirit. In Honneth’s more recent essay, he cautions that Hegel’s intersubjectivist approach should be approached without the ontological presupposition of a self-realising absolute spirit (Honneth 2014, 3). I agree with Honneth insofar as social pathologies and other forms of domination can find historical justifications because of their belief in the necessity of progress (i.e., slavery, genocides, religious holy wars like the Crusades).9 Honneth’s reconstruction of Hegel’s conception of the Sittlichkeit or the ethical life is based on the possibility of individuals to purposively align their own will with the development of society. All things considered, 9

This is further evinced in Honneth’s passionate polemic against Peter Sloterdijk on the latter’s proposal to lift taxes that fund welfare programs for the poor. Sloterdijk’s argues that the state supports a form of kleptocracy in which the poor disenfranchises the working class who pays taxes (Pollman 2009).

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Honneth’s social critique via recognition differentiates itself from Habermas’ communicative action insofar as the former deals with the quasi-originary experience of the formation of normative principles that is uniquely given to individuals as soon as they enter the social world. Through Honneth’s supplementation of Habermas’ critique, social criticism gains a new vantage point from which social interactions are seen as possible sources of internal criticism of already existing normative structures that inform social practices. Notably, Honneth’s theory provides a different hermeneutic framework that goes beyond rationality insofar as he proposes an internal experiential dimension to social struggles in the form of a feedback loop with normativity.10 Not that this is entirely absent in Habermas;11 rather, it is limited in articulation insofar as Habermas is dependent on the presupposition of rationality in the interactions that govern the social actors’ disclosure of their individual intentions. In this sense, rationality can be replaced with the idea of normativity; as such, its universalisable content is not limited to the assertion of an ontological or metaphysical assumption of values. Rather, the value of rationality is constantly assessed, critiqued, and transformed as individuals become more clearly recognised for their identities as they gradually articulate themselves through social struggles. Honneth’s continuation of Habermas’ social criticism through communication eventually leads to the question of how social struggles commence as a departure from societal norms. For this purpose, Honneth goes back to Hegel’s innovative conception of intersubjectivity through the idea of social atomism, specifically rooted in the analysis of crime through the vista of the subject. Hegel, as Honneth reads him, is presenting a different case wherein social atomism is no longer seen in the 10 The notion of the feedback loop here refers to the dynamic and progressive evaluation of engagement between social actors and how they affect each other’s sense of normativity. The notion of recognition or the development of societal norms is considered as constant progressive processes that acknowledge conflicts as a mode of enlarging the scope and application of normative values. This concept will be further elaborated in Part Two. 11 Honneth further notes that Habermas is responsible for four themes in social criticism. They are as follows: (1) Habermas provided a meaningful concept of rationality, (2) a sufficient explanation and appropriation of the problem of the theory of action, (3) adequate connections between individual actions and how they affect the social order (as opposed to Foucault, the subject is not merely an entity that is behaviourally conditioned by normative forces), and finally, (4) through these three points, Habermas was able to present a diagnosis of contemporary society (Honneth & Joas 1991, 2).

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perspective of “natural law,” considering its inadequacy in providing a consistent explanation of egotistic and selfish drives (SFR 12). Given Hegel’s political motivation of bringing together a unified conception of social relations in the midst of subjective individuation, Honneth finds adequate theoretical justification in Hegel’s Jena writings. The main presupposition that holds Hegel’s political theory together is that individuals within society are held together by the necessity of cooperation inasmuch as individuals are incapable of self-sufficiency in isolation (SFR 14). Hegel’s conception of an ethical life or the Sittlichkeit is based on the provision that individual intentions, at some point in their social interaction, will converge to develop norms that can integrate individual difference where such differences are neither suppressed nor dismissed. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel further emphasises the importance of the convergence of intentions when he traces the capacity of individuals to form their individuality through the sustenance of society (nation) as a medium of differentiation (PoS 213). Through these theoretical assumptions, it is not difficult to find Hegel’s intention of depicting social relations as intrinsically guided by autonomous assent from individuals guided by the goal of cooperation. With this, we are no longer limited by the narrow trajectory of Habermas’ stipulation of social relations as an instrumental product of maintaining systemic order. At the core of Honneth’s recognition theory, the idea of social cohesion finds its imperative only in the freedom, not the necessity, of individuals to build receptive relations with partners of interaction. To think of social cohesion in terms of necessity robs our theoretical understanding of social interaction for it reduces individual experiences of subjects into modes of articulating power within society. In his reading of Hegel, Honneth begins a negative appropriation of social cohesion through the idea of crime as an intersubjective moment whereby individual experience is articulated to society as the individual (the criminal) questions the normative force of social practices. Any theoretical discussion involving Hegel’s conception of crime can only be replete with Hegel’s necessary analysis: This ideal reversal is conscience and it is only something inner, not inner and outer simultaneously; it is something subjective but not objective at the same time. The criminal has directly injured something he regards as external and foreign to himself, but in doing so he has ideally injured and cancelled himself. Inasmuch as the external deed is at the same time an inner one, the transgression committed against a stranger has likewise been committed against himself. But the consciousness of this his own destruction is a subjective and inner one, or a bad conscience. It is to that

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This long quotation from Hegel begs further examination for this brings us directly to the principles that Honneth wishes to investigate in his intersubjectivist appropriation of the theory of recognition. The topic of crime, for one, provides a salient beginning from which the topics of social pathologies and the project of social emancipation can be appropriated in Honneth’s reading. In Hegel’s conception of crime, we can see that the offended party is not limited to the scope of the party offended by the crime; rather, the offended party also includes the criminal himself/herself. The criminal, in his or her scope of offending the order of ethical life, understands his or her relation to the ethical order and is always-already aware of the crime as the disruption of the ethical order. Furthermore, what is compelling about Hegel’s conception of crime is the idea of the criminal as a subject that is autonomously willing to break the social order of norms to either defend himself or herself or be acknowledged as someone who is wronged by the ethical norms. Honneth's interest in Hegel's conception of crime is its potential emancipatory program that can allow individuals to disclose their subjective experiences and effect change towards the ethical lifeworld. Honneth notes that in contrast to the idea of an all-out struggle between individuals from the Hobbesian perspective of the Leviathan, Hegel presents a more dynamic depiction of social struggles as an elementary form of recognition (SFR 18). Identities are depicted to have an already existing normative content, which dynamically adapts varying social relations and, at the same time, shapes their own identities to fit both their own will and that of society. While Hegel may assert the fact of individual

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independence of the will, he is, nonetheless, equating it to its formative appropriation from society as an interconnected mass of social interactions (Hegel 1979, 144). Honneth investigates this formative appropriation in both its negative and positive form in Hegel’s System of Ethical Life in the three spheres, namely, the family, legal relations, and the whole of society itself. It is notable that in these three spheres, Honneth no longer talks about relations of power; rather, power or domination becomes replaced by the inability of partners of interaction to recognise the identities of individuals. This aspect of misrecognition becomes a theoretical fulcrum for Honneth to be able to argue that social struggles are not purely interested in the agonistic transfer of power, for the social conflict begins in the pre-supposition that an ethical norm has been violated in the perspective of the individual (SFR 17). Honneth’s specific focus on individual experiences of struggles within society leads to a formative understanding of social cohesion via a negative sense of freedom. As soon as the individual realises that there is a break in the ethical order of norms wherein he or she was inducted, the struggle for recognition takes place in the form of addressing the offending normative issue that impedes his or her freedom. The sense of social order usually takes place in the form of legal institutions wherein some mediate form of normative stability is maintained to keep subjects in pace with accepted norms. In an earlier essay, Honneth utilises this form of social struggle as a revolutionary means of collective action. Collective action thus becomes an effective method because norms are transformed and reconstructed when they are in tension with society's normative expectations (Honneth 1988). While the mobilisation of collective action in the case of the French Revolution might be a sufficient claim for creating social emancipation through revolt, it does not, however, provide a formative basis for social claims for recognition to take place. Through Hegel, the understanding of social struggles becomes more nuanced as it takes into consideration the formative structure of human relations into its system. Crime, then, becomes a nuanced form of articulating social pathologies embedded within already established normative values. The potent theoretical perspective from this consideration is that the criminal is already an embedded identity within society and, with this, he or she already has an implicit understanding of the established normative practices. With this effect, Honneth's assumption may provide a valid perspective wherein we could see a crime committed only in defence of the individual appropriation of norms that are in conflict with societal norms. The benefit of this perspective is that, in considering social norms,

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the idea of natural law is understood within its proper context since it no longer assumes an “overarching ontological meaning” (SFR 27). As a reaction to the Hobbesian notion of the struggle for survival, Honneth sees in Hegel a shift to a philosophy of consciousness as an alternative to the arbitrary interpretations of nature as the basis for law and the formation of the Sittlichkeit. The conception of the Sittlichkeit is based on the intersubjectivist assumption that there is an open reciprocal relation between individuals wherein individual differences are freely mediated in social relations. Honneth outlines Hegel’s notion of social relations in the order of their formation in the family, society, and the state (SFR 25). The family, for Hegel, serves as the formative receptivity whereby the immediate caregivers of the individual show undifferentiated love towards the individual, thus creating a normative value of receptivity as it is demonstrated by primary caregivers. Furthermore, the family potentially enhances the idea of cooperation that leads to cohesion through shared labour, property, and rights (SFR 39). In contrast to Hobbes, the state of nature, as the state of struggle for survival, is to some degree absent within the family. However, as Honneth notes, the family, as a social unit within the community or state, can be regarded as the starting point of social conflict when they become engaged with property or rights to dispute with other families (SFR 41). Taking this into consideration, legal relations become the next developmental phase whereby individual subjects extend their capacity for recognition to other members of society. In Hegel, the state must mediate the obligation of everyone to recognise others since it maintains order in society; furthermore, this condition of recognition is already a normative practice that is gained within the family (SFR 43). Through this mediatory function of legal norms, the perspective of crime becomes much more articulated. Crime, thus, becomes a point of awareness of misrecognition between two individuals, as opposed to the Hobbesian tendency to explain struggle in the form of maintaining and exercising power in a conflict. Honneth, at this point, makes a case for recognition by stating: The reason why the socially ignored individuals attempt, in response, to damage the others’ possessions is not because they want to satisfy their passions, but rather in order to make the others take notice of them. Hegel interprets the destructive reaction of the excluded party as an act whose real aim is to win back the attention of the other. (SFR 44)

This presumption takes into consideration, again, the already established norm of open receptivity towards others that is learned within the

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immediate social environment of the family. Through this, Honneth is able to assert the possibility of receptivity and, even in instances wherein social pathologies take place, the fundamental ground for recognition is still maintained. Recognition in this sense is not simply the ability to gain an adequate epistemic congruence with other subjectivities; moreover, it is the capacity to realise differences among social actors in terms of how they appropriate norms that inform their social practices. Whether recognition stands as a social deconstruction is, of course, another topic for further discussion. Nonetheless, it serves as a springboard for Honneth to further supplement his reconstruction of Hegel’s System of Ethical Life in the perspective of anthropology and developmental psychology. In the discussions above, it can be noted that the transformative function of social interaction is all rooted in the social struggles that occur in the formation of an individual’s identity. Beginning from the family, one already experiences a sense of social struggle as soon as the normative values of the caregiver are gradually injected in the interaction existing between the child and the family. Honneth’s turn to G.H. Mead’s anthropology is motivated by the possibility of acquiring requisite proof of the “accessibility of subjectivity” which one can assert as the value of individual subjectivity without resorting to psychical approaches of understanding human cognition (SFR 72). Furthermore, Honneth is interested in finding an empirical basis for the theory of recognition by looking into the process of identity formation through the conscious decentering of the subject’s identity so as to create a receptivity of other subjectivities: The concept of the ‘me’ that Mead uses here to characterize the result of this original relation-to-self is supposed to make it terminologically clear that individuals can only become conscious of themselves in the objectposition. For the self that one catches sight of in reacting to oneself is always what one’s interaction partner sees as his or her partner to interaction perceived, and never the current agent of one’s own behavioural expressions. Mead thus distinguishes the ‘me’—which, since it only reflects the other’s image of me, only preserves my momentary activity as something already past—from the ‘I,’ which represents the unregimented source of all my actions. The concept of the ‘I’ is meant to designate the instance of human personhood that is responsible for the creative response to action problems but that can never, as such, be glimpsed in the spontaneous activity; of course, this ‘I’ not only precedes the consciousness that one has of oneself, from the point of view of one’s partner to interaction, but also constantly refers back to the behavioural expressions contained consciously within the ‘me’ and comments on them. (SFR 74–75)

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In this sense, the unity of the “I” remains to be a fiction and, as such, the “me,” as a product of social relations, is constantly revised depending on the creative appropriation of the subject of its partner of interaction. Through Mead, Honneth is able to find an empirically sound conception of intersubjectivity in identity formation insofar as the subject becomes a subject due to the constant presence of social partners of interaction. The autonomous element in this identity forming interactions is precisely rooted in the differences of the partners of interactions who are able to depict normative practices. The image of the “I” is not entirely dependent on the static appropriation of norms; rather, it is influenced by the dynamic interplay of two factors. (1) Firstly, the subject as an “I,” does not explicitly learn the actual norm as an ontological principle; the norm is experientially appropriated through the different reactions that his or her partner of interaction reciprocates. Thus, the other dynamic factor in this case is (2) the difference that the partner of interaction is able to manifest as a reaction to the subject who is struggling to integrate with the conceived norm. The exchange is not merely a manifestation of one’s ego towards another as a form of integrating the other into the ego’s normative values. They are, in fact, trying to put one another in the second-person perspective to find the appropriate experience that will allow them to recognise one another (SFR 77). This role-playing function in Mead’s anthropology is the immanent and transcendent form wherein norms are put into practice. By transcendent, I am referring to the unity of norms that are common in social interactions (i.e., respect); by immanence, I refer to the variations and differences in which these norms are individually practised. This reflexive process contributes to the formation of a normative expectation of actions between varying sources of interaction. This play of interactions and their respective expectations is what Honneth notes as the formative process that creates the transition from childhood to the self-image of maturity (SFR 77). The mature relations that result in this identity forming process, in which the “I” is dissociated to form a concept of a “me,” moves the child into the sphere of norm-governed interactions wherein expectations are likely to be satisfied with the mature person who has a significant amount of experience in society (SFR 78). Through dissociation and reflexive roleplaying, the subject becomes integrated into society as he or she develops through experience a set or a system of intersubjective receptivity. Such receptivity allows the subject to function within society and thus acquires normative expectations of how society should interact with him or her. By fulfilling this requirement of receptivity, the subject is able to cooperate with the expectations of others and negotiate his or her expectations

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through normative practices that are already in place. A criminal then, in Honneth’s earlier explorations, will present a potent case for revising norms, insofar as the normative expectation was breached by pathological practices or is deemed insufficient in fulfilling the criminal’s normative expectations. The family is Mead’s point of departure in his anthropological appropriation of Hegel. Through love, the child experiences a receptive environment wherein the child gains enough care and respect that allows him or her to achieve a level of confidence that enables him or her to socialize with others outside the family, which then furnishes the child with a functional knowledge of conceiving a “generalised other” (SFR 80). By expanding one’s social interaction to individuals outside the family, one can make assertions that can defend the demands of the “I” in relation to the others in the social environment because of the capacity to take a receptive and decentred perspective of the collective will (SFR 83). In this case, Honneth's appropriation of Hegel through Mead finds a nuanced articulation of the idea of the struggle for recognition. By becoming exposed to varying social encounters, individuals are able to acquire new norms or re-align existing normative principles to adapt to social expectations from social partners of interaction. As the sphere of interaction grows, the generalised concept of other social actors, by means of which normativity takes effect, increases the personal autonomy of the individual in dealing with societal norms in its own interpretation or appropriation of normative expectations (SFR 84). The complex roles that an individual must play in various social relations create a unique and singular biography that constitutes the autonomy of an individual. In this case, we can no longer conceive of a Foucaultian subject that is behaviouristically compelled to act according to the institutional forces that shape and discipline its actions for, in Honneth’s theory of recognition, the subject autonomously navigates his or her own identity through practices that are rooted in the value conviction of the community, rendering the individual significant (SFR 87) insofar as the individual freely holds a similar set of value convictions of the community. Furthermore, Honneth at this point begins to lay down the means by which recognition takes place in the pattern of intersubjective receptivity. The three patterns, namely, love, rights, and solidarity, run parallel to the increasing complexity of an individual’s social interaction throughout his or her lifetime. From the family, one realises the relations of love; to the society or the extended community outside the family, one realises his or her rights; and finally, as a contributor to the propagation of normative values, the purpose of recognition finds its fulfilment in the achievement of solidarity between the individual and society. These spheres of

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reciprocal relations of intersubjectivity give way to the granting of rights and the shared orientation of individuals to values that allow cooperation (SFR 94) despite the free individuation of its social actors. Beginning with love, not simply as a restricted relation of sexual intimacy but as a broader area of primary relations of receptivity, constitutes the strong emotional attachment of subjects to one another in the sphere of familial relations (SFR 95). Honneth notes that there is a symbiotic form of self-sacrifice in which the primary caregivers of a child provide the necessary experience of love as a receptive and reciprocal relation to form an intelligible concept of relations with others (SFR 96). One may imagine a myriad of social pathologies that can come from this relationship, such as the abuse, abandonment, and other psychological Freudian complexes that may arise out of this relation, but one has to keep in mind that the mere existence of the child means that its parents or caregivers did take an effort to set-aside their own interests for the sake of raising another individual. While we may of course point to some sort of biological urge that compels parents to take care and raise the child, this only reinforces the assertion that the relationship ultimately becomes symbiotic and self-fulfilling in a sense that it reproduces normative values that already exist within the parent-child relationship. To this extent, the symbiotic relations place the ego-identities of the parents or caregivers in a dialectical process that provides a necessary feedback loop for the revision and maintenance of their identities alongside the caring love relation with the child. A baby can be an impediment to the parent or the caregiver insofar as they have to abandon their own personal concerns in order to give way to the needs of the helpless infant. This is, as Honneth would say, a learning experience for both the parent and the infant insofar as they begin to gradually adapt to each other’s needs as the infant gradually changes his or her inner urges requiring a sense of empathy on the side of the parent (SFR 99). There is also a gradual and progressive emancipatory shift when the child learns about his or her physical, intellectual, and emotional capacities; the dependency, then, that exists between the parent and the child gradually re-establishes the identities of the parent to compel the child to reciprocate the receptivity that allowed the child to become its own person (SFR 100). As the child becomes compelled to recognise the needs of its own parents or caregivers, not out of rational necessity but of emotional attachment, the child in turn learns the norms that fulfil the needs of the parents (i.e., potty training, chores, and manner by which the child behaves inside and outside the family unit). This looping process of receiving feedback and appropriating necessary intersubjective receptivity allows the child to reconfigure normative resources that allow him or her

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to adapt to different partners of interaction. From this perspective, the child gradually understands the normative importance of love as a caring receptivity towards other partners of interaction. In the next sphere, rights become established as the individual learns to expect reciprocation coming from the side of other partners of interaction. In this sphere, a broader variety of normative expectations becomes introduced to the individual as the complexities of social relations demand more receptivity to varying social roles. In this sphere, the law becomes a necessity in order to keep individuals within the historical reconstruction of norms (SFR 108). Furthermore, the sphere of rights also allows the maintenance of a generalised form of reciprocal relation by means of which instances of misrecognition can be rectified. Through the intervention of institutions in the form of law, legal relations propagate the normative expectations of a generalised reciprocity. This, however, is still within the continuity of intersubjectivity: In legal recognition, two operations of consciousness flow together, so to speak, since, on the one hand, it presupposes moral knowledge of the legal obligations that we must keep vis-à-vis autonomous persons, while, on the other hand, it is only an empirical interpretation of the situation that can inform us whether, in the case of a given concrete other, we are dealing with an entity possessed of the quality that makes these obligations applicable. For this reason, the task of situation-specific application is an inviolable component of the structure of legal recognition, precisely because it is (under modern conditions) universalistically constituted. (SFR 113)

The presupposition of a moral obligation in the form of rights establishes not only a fundamental understanding of moral responsibility within social relations but also a continuation of an embedded normative form of reciprocity found within the relationship of love. This sphere not only appeals to reason as a fundamental source of normative value judgment but also draws from the empirical situations gained through experience and emotions, which then become foundations for value judgments. While reason may serve a more stable basis for reproducing moral values in social interactions, experience presents a potent force in shaping the value judgment of an individual inasmuch as it specifically refers to his or her own system of recognition. While Honneth may not be able to provide us with a factual genesis of values, the spheres of love and rights present a dynamic depiction of how the feedback loop of values creates itself out of the changing needs of

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different individuals who are seeking for recognition. Furthermore, the necessity of establishing the genesis or the origin of values becomes unnecessary to the appeal towards social solidarity because its irretrievability and its lack of experiential assent can make the project of solidarity regress to an abstract form of reason. The benefit that we get from Honneth’s reconstructive effort is that we come into terms with autonomy as an authentic source of experiential assent to norms, and we see with it the process whereby reason is willingly understood and accepted by autonomous identities. The sphere of rights provides the necessary arbitration by which individual struggles for recognition are handled by institutions that function as mechanisms that maintain intersubjective receptivity. While institutions may not be totally free from possible social pathologies or forms of misrecognition, the experiences of its social participants and administrators ensure that the mechanism of administering norms will be open to the chain of feedback loops coming from the recipients of administrations. In cases wherein the chain of feedback loops between experiences of individuals and norms are suspended or seceded, there can always be a possible struggle that individuals may resort to, such as, revolts or other mechanisms that convey their struggle for recognition. For these reasons, Honneth finds the optimal possibility of recognition in the democratic forms of social relations (FRS 37). Since the goal of every individual in a social relation is to find fulfilment and satisfaction through recognitive interaction, the function of the sphere of rights moves us to the function of solidarity through the recognition of the value of individuals in society as they contribute their own identities in their own autonomous desire. Social esteem is earned through the freely intended actions of individuals that are meaningful for their social partners of interaction. This is a way by which individuals are able to transact their identities with society as a whole and benefit from it through the positive acknowledgement of their identities. Moreover, this also leads to a cooperative attitude towards society as a whole. Esteem, as Honneth notes, is the empirical valuation of and graduated appraisal of a person’s concrete traits and abilities, presupposing an evaluative set of traits that assesses the person’s value as better or worse (SFR 113). Social esteem is granted when a person achieves a differentiation by enacting his or her peculiar contributions within a given social setup (SFR 125). Despite the differing degree of recognition within the third sphere, Honneth notes that there is a symmetric valuation of recognition in terms of esteem. Social status in this sense allows differing types of identities to achieve recognition through esteem while, at the same time, maintaining

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solidarity through a common sense of social cohesion. Honneth further articulates this form of symmetry: The practical relation-to-self that such an experience of recognition allows individuals to attain is thus a feeling of group-pride or collective honour. Here, the individual knows himself or herself to be a member of a social group that can collectively accomplish things whose worth for society is recognised by all other members of society. In the internal relations of such groups, forms of interaction normally take on the character of relationships of solidarity, since each member knows himself or herself to be esteemed by all others to the same degree. This is because to a first approximation, ‘solidarity’ can be understood as an interactive relationship in which subjects mutually sympathize with their various different ways of life because, among themselves, they esteem each other symmetrically. (SFR 128)

In this context, we can see that Honneth can articulate the link between autonomous social individuation and differences in identity. The variety of social roles that need to be fulfilled in modern societies heightens the need for individuals to become individuated and at the same time aligned with social solidarity. Through esteem, the value of individuation is no longer attached to the idea of social atomism insofar as the possibility of symmetry could be achieved despite individual differences. This possibility is motivated by the sense of sympathy and empathy that is learned through the formative process of autonomous identity formation from the very beginning of the interactions in the sphere of love. This position provides Honneth with the theoretical flexibility that is amenable to variations of experiences and identities involved in the autonomous cohesion of modern societies. In summary, Honneth’s theoretical basis for the struggle of recognition depends largely on the autonomy of individual identity formation that gives rise to an authentic sense of social solidarity. This position is also asserted by Bolaños who argues that the strength of Honneth’s recognition theory is an improvement on Habermas’ weak philosophical anthropology by explaining the social effects of communication not simply in the context of rationality but also in the comprehensive experience of societal struggles (Bolaños 2012). While social pathologies may occur in this process, his emphasis on experience as a basis for recognition provides the necessary critical perspective that can validate rational claims of justice and normative expectations in social interactions. In the next part, I am going to outline Honneth’s take on social pathologies as a manifestation of freedom wherein normative values are investigated from the perspective of

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individual social struggles. Within these three spheres—love, rights, and solidarity—the function of an experiential feedback loop provides normative resolutions that provide solutions to social pathologies.

PART TWO DISRESPECT AND RECOGNITION THEORY

In the previous part, I discussed the theoretical underpinnings of Honneth’s recognition theory in relation to the tradition of critical theory up to his appropriation of Hegel’s intersubjectivist conception of the Sittlichkeit. In this part, my general aim is to look at the issue of social pathologies that may exist alongside or in the transitions of the three social spheres. Honneth’s treatment of social pathologies is unique insofar as the idea of autonomy displaces the reductive perspective of domination in the relations of social interactions. Revisiting the discourse of the Critique of Power, domination was the prevalent theme of critical theory inasmuch as it was in search of an emancipatory program from the social control of institutions. To the detriment of theoretical awareness, the critique of domination stretching from Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of enlightenment to Habermas’ critique of technocracy, the focus has been mainly directed towards the sources of power as opposed to the experiential struggle of the individual against such powers (Petherbridge 2011, 5). As a continuing critic of these theoretical tendencies, Honneth provides an insight into the nature of social struggles as an internally motivated critique of existing normative values. What I intend to outline in this part is Honneth’s transformation of the discourse of social pathologies as an opportunity for further understanding social struggles as a normative reconceptualization of an institutionalised recognition. Following the end of the last part, I intend to reconcile the idea of the need for symmetrical esteem with the asymmetric relations of identities in social interactions. It is interesting to note that, despite the myriad of individuating factors through which identities can be shaped autonomously in the sphere of love, rights, and esteem, the normative value of recognition persists in its valuation of intersubjective receptivity as its mutual goal for social relations. Moreover, in Honneth’s recent articulation of the concept of solidarity through cooperation (FRS 174), the cohesive potential of intersubjective receptivity becomes necessary. In this case, the problem of conformism, as Honneth had always tried to overcome, ceases to be a theoretical impediment insofar as we can trace reason through the

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experiential development of autonomous agency in the identity formation of the subject. The process of individuation is a progressive critique of existing normative practices which enhance our autonomous will formation since it opens avenues of recognising social struggles as an indication of expanding our sense of receptivity. On the other hand, our general perspective on social solidarity is also a possible avenue for understanding social pathologies. Social solidarity can become stagnant via the forgetfulness of individuals of recognition; the failure to adjust social structures towards their receptiveness of individuals can cause catastrophic forms of social pathologies. Such is the case in the lessons brought forward by Georg Lukacs’ History and Class Consciousness (Lukács 1971), wherein revolutions revert to the same form of oppression that they had fought. We are reminded of how Bolshevism, for example, became the hegemonic force of Soviet Russia, which was initially a movement that espoused the working class as the oppressed class. The forgetfulness of the historicity of such social institutions transformed an honest worker’s movement into an instrument of class-oppression despite its purported revolutionary goals. Class consciousness may provide the benefit of an organisation through the assumption of congruent experiences of oppression and disrespect; however, its organised mobilisation must find the necessity to look back and reflect on the fundamental experience of disrespect experienced by individual members. Lukács further notes this: For a class to be ripe for hegemony means that its interests and consciousness enable it to organise the whole of society in accordance with those interests. The crucial question in every class struggle is this: which class possesses this capacity and this consciousness at the decisive moment? This does not preclude the use of force. It does not mean that the class-interests destined to prevail and thus uphold the interests of society as a whole can be guaranteed an automatic victory. On the contrary, such a transfer of power can often be brought about by the most ruthless use of force (as e.g., the primitive accumulation of capital). But it often turns out that questions of class consciousness prove to be decisive in just those situations where force is unavoidable and where classes are locked in a life-and-death-struggle. (Lukács 1971, 52–53)

Lukács at this point raises the fundamental question of the telos of solidarity born out of a movement that recognises the working class but inevitably organised by the ruling party. As a parallel to this phenomenon, one can also observe that social movements in the Philippines such as the

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People’s Power1 movement proved that the emancipatory promise of the social movement meant the transition of an oligarchic power to a different set of oligarchy. Despite the successful shift of power from the ruling Marcos regime, the changes in the 1987 constitution neither acknowledge nor legitimise the collective action of revolutions.2 The interest of the People’s Power movement led to very interesting forms of social criticisms raised against the movement, one of which was the reductive tendencies of the movement to capitalise on the idea of the will of the masses, which ironically, has failed to recognise the rest of the oppressed Filipinos outside of Metro Manila. Amando Doronila further evokes this argument against the People’s Power movement: People power movements have been an Imperial Manila phenomenon. Their playing field is EDSA. They have excluded the provincianos [citizens outside Metro Manila] from their movement with their insufferable arrogance and snobbery ... ignoring the existence of the toiling masses and peasants in agrarian Philippines. (Doronila 2006)

Honneth’s application of recognition theory takes into consideration the issue of reductionist teleology not only in the scope of theoretical critique but also in the experience of misrecognised individuals. On this note, providing a political articulation of Honneth’s recognition theory is difficult to achieve because of its need to articulate specific instances of disrespect and misrecognition on the part of the individual’s specific social relations. Moreover, the need for a specific cultural, political, and legal context to which recognition theory can be applied is also inevitable since 1 The People Power, also known as the EDSA Revolution movement, is one of the recurring revolutionary practices of Philippine politics. The first People’s Power revolution was used to oust the long dictatorship of President Ferdinand Marcos from 1965 to 1986. Through its popularity, this revolutionary movement has recurred at least thrice in Philippine history through the collaboration of mass media, government and military officials, politicians, religious groups, and in some cases celebrities. It is a collaborative effort to destabilise an existing government due to its oppressive and/or corrupt reign over the Philippines. All three EDSAs utilise the mobilisation of people (residents of Metro Manila) as an instrumental impetus to ignite the desire to overthrow a government. 2 Despite the acceptance of the legitimacy of the first People Power revolution, the act of overthrowing a government is considered as a form of treason under the Philippine Constitution. Even in Corazon Aquino’s revision of the 1970 Philippine Constitution in 1987, there is neither a clause nor a provision for similar forms of revolutionary protest as a legitimate means of overthrowing an existing government. My thanks are extended to Florentino Hornedo for pointing out this fact.

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certain peculiarities of social struggles and conflict can add clarity to the weight of Honneth’s critique. Despite this, Honneth is able to provide clear and articulated basic necessities from which the theory of recognition can find adequate descriptive grounding before a critique is deployed to a specific social pathology through the three spheres of recognition. These spheres can be observed in most forms of social relations, arguably its necessity is to allow a certain degree of intersubjective openness towards individuals by means of which social solidarity becomes possible despite specific identity features and differences. The three spheres also serve as a fundamental guide to understanding the problem of social pathologies and can evaluate forms of social disrespect using existing criteria that are already in place and reproduced by the society under question. As a theoretical proposal, Honneth’s recognition theory takes up existing normative structures that are already reproduced through social interactions at the level of family, society, and esteem. It will be of help to most interlocutors that Honneth does not necessarily raise the point that certain forms of social structures are free from social forms of pathology; in fact, his entire critical theory begins from the general assumption that there is an always-already existing form of social pathology that leads to disrespect. Hence, Honneth builds upon the fundamental experience of individuals wherein they experience disrespect as a guideline for understanding normative expectations from already existing structures. It is at this point that we can discuss normative claims since the existing structure of recognition already allows some sense of normative claim through which disrespect is experienced by individuals within the existing structure. What I want to avoid here is to insinuate the idea that normative claims beyond the spheres of public social relations are covered by the recognition theory, insofar as the recognition theory is concerned with individuals that are within the system of already existing norms. The private sphere of individual life is only granted to a certain degree of freedom insofar as it does not affect others in their own private spheres. Thus, in relation to experiences of exclusion by immigrants, the effort to impose normative values external to an already existing structure will often result in an invalid normative claim by means of which the recognition of the already existing structure is disrespected.

1. Disrespect and Recognition Honneth’s early elaboration of the concept of disrespect revolves around his appropriation of Mead’s notion of identity development in the distinction

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between “I” and “me,” (SFR 74) as well as Hegel’s intersubjectivist approach towards the three spheres (SFR 31–63). The strong affinity of Honneth towards these two theories makes recognition somewhat lean towards the politics of identity, which Fraser (Fraser 2003), Deranty and Renault (Deranty & Renault 2007), as well as Kompridis (Kompridis 2007) finds ambiguous insofar as Honneth’s recognition theory presents some problem with multiculturalism. Suffice to say, however, that the spheres of recognition that Honneth espouses take an important cue from already established systems of institutionally established rights (SFR 134). While Honneth is explicit about the substantive force of rights, he does, however, specify that rights ought not simply to be enforced through universalisation. The foundation of disrespect is based on the principle that any form of socialisation involves the formation of a subject that was developed, nourished, and sustained in a system of basic intersubjective receptivity. The experience of disrespect is felt as a deprivation of recognition that destroys self-confidence as a form of practical self-relation (SFR 133). The confidence gained from the sense of self-relation is not solipsistic; rather, it occurs when one can gain a sense of belongingness to one’s immediate community through one’s appropriation of normative values (SFR 131). In other words, self-confidence is gained when one’s social role is affirmed by others. To pursue this, the normative values of one’s identity is established through varying partners of interaction, be it one’s family, friends, or the rest of society; in other words, an existing normative structure is always-already established by a social group. Normative values, despite having some semblance of universality, ought to be considered in conjunction with variations of cultural forms of social reproduction. While one culture may validate certain norms, other cultural norms may generate different normative values. This cultural difference must be stated clearly since the basis for a general understanding of recognition can be ambiguous if social criticism insists on universalised normative values. For example, in Howard Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences, the idea of an all-encompassing form of evaluating intelligence becomes differentiated through cultural norms (Gardner 2011, 7–10), to the extent that imposing a value on a cultural product that is not valued in a different culture can result in a misunderstanding of intelligence in others. In avoiding a free-floating interpretation of normative values, it is imperative that social criticism ought to direct its efforts towards identifying existing normative structures that inform and reproduce societal forms of interaction before it introduces the element of critique in its work. In other words, the task of critique in the case of

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Honneth’s recognition theory should look simultaneously at both transcendent and immanent sources of normativity. By doing this, one can see where the transcendent (or stabilised) sources of norms intersect with the immanent (or actual) sources of normativity. Disrespect, in this case, holds only a valid claim towards recognition insofar as the parties experiencing degradation of their self-confidence are already informed within the system of social reproduction of their supposed normative expectations. Disrespect occurs as a violation of an existing norm that pervades within the three spheres of recognition of love, respect, and esteem (SFR 132). Honneth’s stance is that these spheres can allow us to distinguish certain forms of disrespect since these spheres also provide the motivation for social resistance and conflict in a struggle for recognition. As I have mentioned earlier, the status of moral norms should not be viewed as a perfect utopian situation wherein conflicts and struggles are completely eliminated. Honneth is interested in how struggles for recognition push the reproduction of social norms into a progressive state since the act of struggling for recognition inevitably socialises its participants (Honneth 2014, 824). In other words, what ought to be seen in the process of understanding disrespect is that it provides a feedback loop in the reproduction of norms, allowing the norms to adapt to changes and moral claims made by individuals. For Honneth, disrespect in its most basic form occurs when a person experiences maltreatment at the level of physical integrity that deprives the person the right to dispose of his or her own body (SFR 132). Aside from physical injury, rape, and torture, this basic form of disrespect places the sense of basic selfconfidence realised in the sphere of love at the mercy of another subject destroying the sense of autonomy that is experienced through care or love. To reiterate, the intersubjective openness of the guardian or parent towards the child is part of the reciprocal process of the child’s learning process of love relationships. The child’s gradual moral formation involves the same intersubjective process of becoming open and receptive to his or her guardians or parents in acknowledging their needs much as they have already provided the needs of the child. In essence, the normative expectation of respect and disrespect is learned as soon as the child acknowledges the autonomy of his or her guardians or parents insofar as the consequences of their action either break or sustain the intersubjective relations within the family. In the second sphere, legal relations establish a normative expectation that ought to be given to individual members of society in the form of rights. In the case of disrespect, the denial of one’s self-confidence is

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broadened with the horizon of more complex forms of social relations outside the person’s family. The experience of disrespect in this second order of loss-of-confidence occurs when one’s development of identity is abruptly denied causing shame to the person. This loss of self-confidence occurs when respect is denied when rights gained from the development of a person’s identity are withheld despite their appeal to an already existing and practised normative claim. An example of this could be as simple and mundane as being cut from a line, becoming a victim of theft, or being duped by counterfeit goods. The sense of disrespect, in this case, comes from the normative expectation becoming severed from the reality that has built one’s own consciousness out of the practice of norms and as its conduit for a norm’s social reproduction. Honneth notes that there are two examples of this form of disrespect: We have initially construed the term ‘rights,’ only roughly, as referring to those individual claims that a person can legitimately expect to have socially met because he or she participates, with equal rights, in the institutional order as a full-fledged member of a community. Should that person now be systematically denied certain rights of this kind, this would imply that he or she is not being accorded the same degree of moral responsibility as other members of society. What is specific to such forms of disrespect, as exemplified by the denial of rights or by ostracism, thus lies not just in the forcible restriction of personal autonomy but also in the combination with the feeling of not enjoying the status of a full-fledged partner to interaction, equally endowed with moral rights. For the individual, having socially valid rights-claims denied signifies a violation of the intersubjective expectation to be recognized as a subject capable of forming moral judgments. (SFR 134)

This brings us back to the point that the entire notion of recognition is inevitably tied to the function of intersubjectivity that is rooted in the reception of other partners of interaction towards a sense of social solidarity that nurtured one’s own sense of self-respect. Despite this, what is missing in Honneth’s recognition theory, and yet remains implicit, is the idea of conflicting norms that result in split institutions holding varying norms. For example, organised crime has, to a certain degree, its own means of upholding norms in order to promote a sense of social solidarity amongst criminals. While a notion of social solidarity can be gleaned from Honneth’s reference to Hegel’s view of crime, this notion of social solidarity may be expanded to existing social pathologies. To some extent, organised crime has to work on the idea that what is perceived to be a denied right has to be met with some semblance of social

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organisation in order to mobilise collective action amongst individuals with the same concern regarding a perceived denied right, such as generating resources or the right practice a certain belief or way of life.3 The fascinating facet of Honneth’s recognition theory is that its allusion to crime provides us with an implied theoretical reversal, open enough to neutrally explain social movements without an immediate moral judgment. In the case of my earlier mention of the first EDSA Revolution, a perspective of crime in the context of this movement allows a critical perspective, which is generally lost depending on the current political temperament of the observer or through the forgetfulness of those who are rooted in its historicity. Suffice to say that crime is arguably a form of social movement. However, the legitimacy of crime depends on how existing institutions treat them. Moreover, one can also look at the phenomenon of organised crime, albeit in a different side of the moral spectrum, in the case of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam,4 which roughly shakes our preconception of normative practices involving solidarity as an entirely positive phenomenon. These 10 billion Philippine pesos (approximately 2.1 billion US dollars) scandal perpetuated for more or less a decade involves a very elaborate form of collective organisation that has allowed the people involved to perpetuate and reproduce a system to launder taxpayer’s funds into ghost companies and NGOs without being detected by the authorities (Burgonio 2013). Whatever reason motivated the union of businessmen and alleged politicians to create their own cabal of organised crime is for the Philippine government to find out. What is important in this case is the exemplary circumstance; the idea of disrespect provides us with a double3

Gottschalk, for example, notes that the practice of prostitution from China and Taiwan involves human trafficking that requires an organised collective collaboration from criminal organisations. This involves transporting Chinese women to Taiwan either through legitimate means (i.e., marriage) or through illegitimate means (i.e., illegal immigration) as a mean towards finding employment and a sizable income to bring back to China (Gottschalk 2009, 85– 86). This practice requires the cooperation of organised crime syndicates in China and Taiwan, as well as the cooperation of public officials willing to bend the norms of the law to accommodate this practice. 4 The Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam was an alleged government scandal that involved Philippine senators in investing government funds on ghost NGOs to take a portion of the funding. Through fabricated documentation and creative accounting, the alleged senators and the JLN Corporation, about 10 billion Philippine pesos worth of funds were used over the past 10 years to launder money on government projects that never existed. See (Carvajal 2013).

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edged critical perspective. On the one hand, the concept of shame can be elicited in the parties involved in this scam wherein a sense of disrespect is experienced by the people who have been duped by this systematic form of crime. Already, the sense of absurdity is instantly felt by anyone who realises the unfettered show of wealth that Janet Lim Napoles had displayed at the height of her criminal activities. The lavish parties, expensive properties, milk baths, and a personal servant to brush her teeth for her have drawn the ire of most Filipinos striving to get by through the day with their meagre salaries and by paying their taxes. Suffice to say that this denial of enjoyment in the sense of experiencing an improvement of the quality of one’s life for an average Filipino taxpayer is a salient example of disrespect of the second sphere. While the shame of violating the fabric of normative rights in the sphere of legal relations may not be explicit in the Philippine context, at least when the guilty party is not yet caught committing the crime, the sense of evading the responsibility is enough evidence that there is still some normative sense of shame to take the extra effort of avoiding the guilt or responsibility for the crime. What we can understand in these examples is that the experience and the projection of a possibility of disrespect are intrinsically tied to the already existing reproduction of societal norms. Despite some deviances from the existence of these norms, it still corresponds to a sense of legitimate social order from which rights are inevitably drawn. Crime, despite taking some organised form of reproduction of its norms, must submit itself to the existing legitimate norms that guarantee rights. To extend this further, we can also consider the possibility that social struggles for recognition can in turn resort to crime due to the lack of intersubjective receptivity of the institutions of the disrespected individual. While this course of action may have mixed forms of successes (e.g., EDSA Revolution), the success of the movement remains inevitably tied to the existing normative claims that are already in place. Thus, in the end, the clamour for social struggles finds relative success when it takes place within the system itself. The third form of disrespect in the sphere of esteem further generates the sense of shame in relation to the denial of the possibility of esteem that can be gained through one’s partners of interaction. As an extended effect of the loss of rights, this form of disrespect takes the ability of the individual to integrate one’s self into society due to the loss of a sense of personal dignity or honour (SFR 134). The reversal of esteem in the function of disrespect serves as a mode of insult or personal injury to the confidence of the person inasmuch as the pattern of esteem is downgraded

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from the usual moral expectation of the subject (Honneth 1992, 191).5 Esteem brings a sense of social respect in the form of belongingness in the person’s partners of interaction; thus, the denigration of self-worth not only destroys the sense of confidence but also brings about a social death due to the incapacity or the denied capacity of the person to integrate into society (Honneth 1992, 192). It is important to note here that the spheres of recognition and the corresponding forms of disrespect that can occur within the spheres occur not in a linear fashion but in a cyclical and yet progressive loop. The spheres, while they are easier to conceive linearly, should loop back to the function of care and love since the act of reciprocation inevitably becomes the fulfilment of recognition that is founded upon the basic principle of intersubjectivity—keeping in mind that, based on the theoretical presupposition of recognition theory, social solidarity is understood as the mechanism for social normativity. While it would be convenient to criticise Honneth’s recognition theory with the idea that the normativity of a social order itself is exclusionary or takes the idea of culture and the plurality of identities for granted (Kalyvas 1999, 103), one must keep in mind that the agenda of social solidarity must be worked on from a “ground-up” perspective which means historical norms have to take precedence when intersubjective receptivity is invoked. Furthermore, the role of critical social analysis in Honneth’s recognition theory should begin with a very clear and convincing depiction of existing social struggles.

2. Disrespect and Autonomous Critique: The Function of the Feedback Loop Serving as a social gauge of solidarity, disrespect can indicate further revisions in the reproduction of norms; to be more specific, it can bring about a critical perspective on how legal relations involve rights. Drawing from the history of critical theory, Honneth argues that the function of the 5

Honneth’s earlier development of the notion of disrespect has a clearer exposition of the three spheres in terms of the effect of disrespect. While the schematic diagram provided in the second to the last page of “Love, Rights, and Solidarity” in The Struggle for Recognition already articulate the effects of disrespect based on the three spheres, this article from 1992 provides a more elaborate discussion of Honneth’s idea of esteem. Furthermore, this article provides a brief outlook on normative expectations that are rooted in social utopias (following Ernest Bloch) and the concept of a “good life.”

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social reproduction of norms presents a problem in the creation of a sense of “false consciousness” (CoP 218) owed to the fact that the scientific validation through a positivist outlook can fail to adequately depict social realities. Moreover, ideology, as a representation of social struggles, may fall prey to the instrumentalisation of subjects through collective action and cultural massification. Andreas Kalvayas raises this issue as a possibility that haunts Honneth’s recognition theory: …Honneth remains silent about cases of ideological persuasion and false consciousness. He never discusses the possibility that a misrecognized and disrespected group, whose collective identity has been constructed and shaped within pervasive relations of domination, will fail to react emotionally, being deprived from any access to the appropriate linguistic and symbolic codes to argue that since there is no reaction there can be no misrecognition, omitting obvious hierarchical relations of domination and legitimating the instituting reality, or he has to admit that violated feelings do not exhaust the cause of non-material conflict, but constitute one reason, among many others, of resistance and struggle. (Kalyvas 1999, 103)

While it would be a convenient response to simply delegate Kalyvas’ criticism as a normal part of “social struggles,” it is fitting to formulate a response to the problem of disrespect as a matter of changing structural forms of relationship in an already existing system of social interactions. If I read Kalyvas’ argument correctly, he is somewhat implying that marginalised social groups that are misrecognised or are excluded from the system of recognition remain excluded in Honneth’s recognition theory. While this issue is not explicitly articulated in Honneth’s earlier works prior to Kalyvas’ criticisms, it is notable that Honneth has already tackled this issue in The Struggle for Recognition: In modern societies, therefore, social relations of symmetrical esteem between individualized (and autonomous) subjects represent a prerequisite for solidarity. In this sense, to esteem one another symmetrically means to view one another in light of values that allow the abilities and traits of the other to appear significant for shared praxis. Relationships of this sort can be said to be cases of ‘solidarity,’ because they inspire not just passive tolerance but felt concern for what is individual and particular about the person. For only to the degree to which I actively care about the development of the other’s characteristics (which seems foreign to me) can our shared goals be realized. The fact that ‘symmetrical’ cannot mean here that we esteem each other to the same degree is already clear from the essential openness to interpretation of every societal value-horizon. It is simply impossible to imagine a set of collective goals that could be fixed quantitatively in such a way that it would allow for an exact comparison of

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This long passage from the last paragraph of the chapter in The Struggle for Recognition (SFR 171) “Love, Rights and Solidarity,” emphasises the necessity of a shared normative presupposition of an existing process of recognition that allows a specific turn back to the normative system that enables the disrespected person or persons to gain visibility in their social interactions. To be specific, the disrespected individual can affirm the need for emotional support as a needy partner of interaction and can begin their integration through the first sphere of recognition. While Kalyvas does not provide examples containing certain parties or collective groups that are involved in ideological persuasion and false consciousness (i.e., specific cases of migrant discrimination, racism, sexism, etc.), it is still possible to derive a basic form of recognition that will enable needy individuals to integrate or re-integrate their identities into social solidarity. Kalyvas makes two assumptions that are deemed problematic in the context of Honneth’s recognition theory. On the one hand, he subjects moral progress to the possibility of a historical reduction of institutions, claiming that there is no more human agency capable of overcoming its overwhelming force. On the other hand, he also seems to assume that through these institutions, the autonomy of subjects under these unspecified social conditions is annihilated due to the existing dominant and hierarchical patterns of relations. In defence of Honneth’s recognition theory, these two assumptions neglect the fact that the pattern of recognition is based on the autonomy and the need for solidarity between partners of social interactions. By neglecting these two points, Kalyvas inevitably falls prey to an aporia of social hegemony, since it is under the assumption that the intention of any form of social institutions is to dominate, more importantly, so that the individuals under such institutions are incapable of experiencing any form of disrespect, starting from the sphere of care and love, up to the sphere of self-esteem. With the lack of any actual social context, the arguments presented by Kalyvas seem to make it possible to imagine that in North Korea, there are no forms of social struggles. That in the presence of a dominant institution, the citizens have no recourse to rights, nor are there any asylum seekers fleeing the country to reside in a more caring and receptive institution.

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The point of articulating these difficulties is tied to Kalyvas’ problem of how disrespect plays an important role in forming an autonomous critique of both oneself and the other. Recognition works on the basic premise that individuals are individually motivated to cohere with the intention of solidarity. Regardless of the sense of group inclusion or exclusion, there has to be an integrative goal by which a working criterion can allow new members of a group to build their own sense of selfconfidence. If one were to hypothesise a social institution that totally excludes the possibility of integration in its institution, it would be definite that such a hypothetical social institution would inevitably cease to exist. To paint a vivid depiction, one can imagine a state that is completely cut off from the rest of society to the extent that individuals are not allowed to integrate due to fear of contaminating the existing normative structure that is in place. This state would go as far as euthanizing infants because of the fear of new members that can have variations in their interpretation of normative principles. Suffice it to say that even the most reclusive social groups in modern society have, in one way or another, a system of receptivity towards the new or the different. Honneth’s reply to Kalyvas makes a brief clarification of Honneth’s depiction of moral progress within the context of social struggles which, unfortunately, has been a common ground for the unfounded criticisms levied against Honneth: A first indication of how complicated the relation [of recognition theory with discourse ethics] in fact is, in some sense, provided by the last chapter of my book, which under the title ‘Intersubjective Conditions for Personal Integrity,’ is meant to outline a formal conception of morality (Sittlichkeit) (the good life). Kalyvas refers to this concluding section but without seeing its appropriate context. This chapter fulfils the function of outlining a minimal as well as formal theory of the good life in which intersubjective preconditions of relations of recognition are sketched which can be valid as invariant preconditions for the integrity of human personality. However, because the demands on mutual recognition have grown during normative learning processes, I want to clarify in this connection that such conditions are not completely removed from historical changes. In any case, within the framework of my book such a formal conception merely takes on the function of providing a first indication of the manner in which progressive elements would be normatively distinguished from regressive elements in actual struggles for recognition. Not every act of social resistance is normatively justified because sentiments of injured recognition are expressed through it. Rather, such actual indignation and feelings of injustice can only be justified in light of an independent idea of the good

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which can designate the reasons for the legitimacy of certain demands for recognition. (Honneth 1999, 250–251)6

Honneth’s social theory provides a formal conception of Hegel’s ethical life (Sittlichkeit) not merely as a solution to the social experience of disrespect but rather as an observable principle in any form of social interaction. It is a misconception to think that Honneth takes theoretical leaps in asserting recognition as an ethical imperative; rather than prescribe a model of recognition, Honneth does not intend to supply normative viewpoints that assess every claim of recognition (Honneth 1999, 252). Moving further, the notion of disrespect as an articulation of the need for normative revisions provides us with the appropriate articulation of the three spheres in terms of its looping function. It is understandable that Honneth, in the earlier appropriation of Hegel and Mead’s intersubjective theory of social relations, had to provide a preliminary sketch of the progressive development of recognition through a person’s life-stage development like Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of moral development or Erik Erikson’s developmental stages of social interactions. Suffice to say, however, that like these theories, Honneth’s recognition theory is not limited to a linear application of development. From the sphere of care, rights, and esteem, the vision of a "good life" articulates the linear goal of recognition. In other words, inasmuch as Honneth would like to avoid continuing Hegel’s theoretical tendency to realise the “objective spirit” (Honneth, 2014, 819), it would be valid to say that recognition theory is an articulation of the continually progressive looping of social struggles in history. To be specific, the looping function of the spheres is rooted in the constant possibility of disrespect and social pathologies that continuously occur due to the dynamics of social relations involving differences, which can never be eliminated. His shift in the use of friendship as a latter articulation of love and care (Marcelo 2013, 211) provides the necessary space to articulate new forms of normative relations that are outside the sphere of the family or one’s initial caregivers. This development points out that the sphere of love and care is constantly being re-appropriated in continuing one's social relations with other individuals. This gradual articulation can be found in Honneth’s debate with Nancy Fraser, where Honneth notes that in modern societies, the liberalisation of love relationships out of the context of traditional 6

See also (SFR 171–172)

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forms of marriage (i.e., arranged marriage, for economic or cultural exchange, or class restrictions) has historically changed the notion of intimacy and intersubjective relations (RR 139). This points to a relevant appropriation of love relationship—the freedom to develop an autonomous sense of affection regardless of class or economic distinction. This new appropriation of love can lead one towards the understanding of autonomous intersubjective receptivity at the level of love and care. This is the reason why Honneth further develops the notion of friendship in bourgeois relationships seen from the gentry down to the shared experiences of the working class in the free engagement of individuals that could lead to relationships of love and care (FRS 132–223). This shift in the exploratory possibilities of engaging different partners of interaction has allowed Honneth to convincingly argue for a pattern of recognition that makes room for a critical self-evaluation of norms that are constantly subject to revision or reproduction. From love relations, the openness towards intersubjective explorations of difference, the possibility of disrespect can either be pathological or experimental (this we will explore after some remarks on disrespect). Arguing on the same line of thought with Honneth’s understanding of symmetry, I propose that the asymmetrical counterpart of the understanding of values is necessary for positing an open receptivity towards other identities. Disrespect, in this case, positing the necessity of keeping the already existing normative structure of any participant social interactions, has to be dialectically maintained in order for any partners of interaction to maintain respect within themselves. Thus, while asymmetrically opposed, beginning with, the social actors will initially have a normative value to freely and autonomously uphold while they negotiate a re-cognitive form of interaction. In this context, disrespect functions as an initial normative stance from which existing criteria of recognition becomes revised not just for the sake of maintaining one’s symmetrical identity relations with oneself in the form of self-confidence but also with the expressed intention of recognising the difference in a partner of social interaction. To understand this, we must widen the scope of interpretation in the category of disrespect in the sphere of love, which is somewhat limited to the idea of abuse and rape as far as Honneth’s earlier work is concerned (SFR, 1995). Since the basic premise to be understood here is that love and care relations begin (and do not necessarily terminate here) within the context of at least an individual that is already imbued with a sense of selfrespect, it would be necessary to take it as a clue that these fundamental norms of receptivity should face revisions in keeping up with new and

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different interaction partners. With the model offered by Honneth, either in the context of familial caregivers or friendship, the category of disrespect is necessary to promote an autonomous free-form of social solidarity that is not subject to blind conformism or hegemonic forms of domination. One of the reasons that Honneth offers the context of the family in the development of norms is rooted in the assumption that love within the family or intimate relations are usually predisposed to a kind of affection that is not concerned with the accomplishments or contributions of family members to one another (Campello 2013, 251). With this instance of an unrequited form of love and care (as a theoretical assumption), Honneth finds the basic structure to explain a hypothetical instance of explaining love and care relations. In fact, one can argue that the learning process involved in recognition has a lot to do with how individual identities play a role within a familial sphere. A child also has to be taught how to recognise the parents as needy subjects, insofar as the extended sphere of social relations will impose the same social norms on the child, for without this lesson the child will, later on, be a danger not only for society but also for himself or herself. Hence, in this sense, the denial of recognition as an initial stance of the social actors engaged in recognition serves as a fundamental foothold for autonomy and basic self-confidence. What is missing and yet is implicit in Honneth’s model of recognition is that the basic need for a practical relation-to-self is that self-confidence is an affirmation of difference. I am borrowing from two strands of thought that Honneth is cognizant of—one taken from Hegel’s account of subjectivity in the Phenomenology of the Spirit, and the other articulated in Jacques Derrida’s constructive polemic with Emmanuel Levinas in Violence and Metaphysics. For Hegel, consciousness is essentially rooted in its own ipseity, to be specific, it is in relation to others a “for itself so far as it is for another, and it is for another, so far as it is for itself” (PoS, 76). Because of the lack of finality in the certainty of consciousness (which is not limited to human consciousness but also animal consciousness) (PoS 65), one has to find the assertion of objectivity in a community (PoS 71); in other words, the certainty of the consciousness or the “I” resides in its formation and sustenance from a communal form of certainty. Thus, in the Hegelian sense of understanding consciousness, we derive identities shaped by normative principles under the practical sense of affirming one’s identity from a communal sense of recognition. With regard to the notion of disrespect, there is a pre-ethical (to borrow Derrida’s coinage) assertion of the historicity of the consciousness involving the subject that is either recognised or recognising another. Without this normative core of consciousness, identity, a notion of self-certainty, or (in Honneth’s language)

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“confidence,” there would be nothing for the recogniser (or the recognised) to draw from in terms of normativity. In the same vein, Derrida’s critique of Levinas’ prioritisation of ethics over metaphysics asserts this problem of asymmetry and symmetry in recognition theory. To begin with, Levinas’ critique of Heidegger’s ontology as a reductive and “violent” appropriation of otherness seen in Totality and Infinity asserts that there must be a due obligation of the “I” to be receptive in the phenomenological experience of the face (Levinas 1979, 96). This ethical obligation, according to Levinas, ought to precede any metaphysical reduction of the other insofar as the other’s identity, as an infinity, is irreducible. In other words, Levinas is proposing that the reduction of otherness as a thing or as merely an instrument of the ego will be tantamount to doing violence to the other. Derrida’s critique takes a different aim, far from undermining Levinas’ argument, but by precisely taking a critical reworking of the theoretical possibilities of articulating the concept of ethics as an economy of values, or more specifically an “economy of violence” (Derrida 1978, 117). Derrida’s intention in this economisation of values is to provide an epistemic point from which, through the origin of values, the other is recognised; otherwise, the value of the other will be reduced into a metaphysical prosthesis of norms. The point here is to introduce a working system that points out the problems in Levinas’ prioritisation of ethics over metaphysics. Without an epistemic foothold, the acknowledgment of already existing values to recognise the other can become detached from the autonomous formation of willing in the recognising subject. This is not to say that Levinas’ ethical imperative is not conditioned by experience; as Altez notes, Levinas’ temperament is brought by a very vivid experience of war (Altez 2007, 53) and this indeed contextualises the perspective of the addressee of recognition. But with the horrors of the Second World War, and the critique of Heidegger’s selfabsorbed Dasein, the theoretical application of Levinasian ethics can disrupt the autonomous receptivity that is found in the giver of recognition. Derrida’s case here is useful in modifying the trajectories of Levinasian ethics; by including an epistemic point of reference in identifying the source or origin of values that may activate receptivity, it is possible to find normative avenues wherein disrespect is not immediately seen as a violent act of destroying the physical integrity of the person. I acknowledge that the use of the word “disrespect” is awkward in this context, but to stay true with Honneth’s terminology we should consider disrespect as a counterpart of love as one of the initial stances of recognition.

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My assertion in this distinction is dependent on Honneth’s assertion that normative values are always-already socially reproduced; thus, individuals are already drawing from this pool of normativity as a source of their identity and their sense of self-confidence. It is important to mention that the understanding of ethical norms has to be seen as a continuous process of recognition occurring within the framework of already existing norms. Without this explicit articulation, the interpretations and reconstructions involved in using recognition theory will fail to realise the looping function found within the three spheres of recognition. Honneth’s initial and underemphasised value of the dialectical struggle for recognition may undermine the self-confidence that is necessary for the person to be both the subject and recipient of recognition.7 With the arguments that I have given earlier, my objective is to articulate the necessary asymmetries and symmetries in the progressive re-evaluation of existing norms. Love as a starting point for the basic sense of self-confidence has to be seen in parallel with the cognitive starting point of disrespect. Disrespect here is coupled with the initial stance that the giver of recognition is his or her own person with distinct identity traits and normative values. By highlighting this, we can assert that the condition for openness and receptivity towards the recipient of recognition is neither tainted by coercion nor blind conformity. With this, the problem of freedom and normativity is addressed by the free and autonomous recognition of oneself (in acknowledgement of one’s identity formation buttressed by existing partners of interaction) in the recognition of others as needy partners of interaction. I also argue for the necessity of including a cognitive sense of basic self-respect before the inclusion of a fully cognised sense of rights and esteem may take place. Honneth’s emphasis on the body as a physical source of disrespect in the sphere of love 7

Honneth’s initial treatment of the recognition theory appeared linear because of the limitations left by the first sphere of recognition. Honneth would later add two elements to his recognition theory. The first one is the revision of the first sphere by adding the function of friendship; the next one would add the function of a feedback loop. The feedback loop serves as a self-critical point of a subject’s evaluation of self in terms of the norms that have led him or her to be who he or she is now. This evaluative section allows the subject to detect any form of reification of values that he or she applies towards others and of his or her own self. This addition also responds to worries regarding false-consciousness induced by ideological tendencies. At this point, one can realise that ideological reflection is not merely something that you impose towards others; it should be realised by the subject on his or her own as he or she reflects towards interactions with other subjectivities.

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somewhat neglects the developmental potential of a progressive learning process that occurs in the course of recognition. Furthermore, Honneth’s latter development of recognition theory in response to his critics espouses an extension of the context of love from the family to the more open relationship of friendship. From this cue, I take in consideration that Honneth does indeed intend to loop the function of the three spheres of recognition. The negativity offered by the initial disrespect of otherness is not necessarily directed to the other; rather, it acts as a pre-cognitive anticipation of difference from otherness. Much as Hegel would assert that certainty is achieved with the oscillation of self-certainty of being-foritself and being-for-others (PoS 82), Honneth agrees with this positive need for identification of self-confidence with existing norms as a necessary condition of freedom and autonomy to recognise otherness (SFR 173–174).

2. A. Experimental and Pathological Forms of Disrespect Following the previous discussion, the necessity of clarifying two forms of disrespect in the sphere of care and love is now a theoretical priority that is needed to distinguish forms of disrespect in the transition from the first sphere to the sphere of rights. Honneth’s formal conception of an ethical life is rooted in the necessity of solidarity in social interactions. I must strongly note here that solidarity is not an ideology; it is a conditio sine qua non of any functioning social relations. As such, the condition of respect and disrespect is not a separate instance of recognition; distinguishing them linearly in a social relation leads one to a sequential form of understanding recognition. There is always a precondition of disrespect inasmuch as there is respect due to the fact that differences in norms taken from the formative phases of identity formation allow a certain dialectical struggle for recognition that is asymmetrical and yet symmetrical due to the condition of solidarity. One of the issues that Honneth tries to resolve as early as his work in Critique of Power and more recently in Reification is the issue of maintaining solidarity amidst the relative stability of social norms. Habermas’ position on social integrative and system integrative functions of institutionalising norms maintains a degree of social cohesion wherein communication and action among social members become purposive (Habermas 1987, 185). The caveat, however, is that Habermas’ gloss on the institutionalisation of norms is mainly directed towards the technocratic critique of production and economics as a source of domination of the lifeworld. Moreover, Honneth makes an apt observation that Habermas’ emphasis on the

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importance of perspectival change as a function of system maintenance is not merely intended for a transitory view of norms, but rather as a demand taken within the structures of social reality itself (CoP 292). Thus, in the case of system maintenance, disrespect becomes the motivational force to re-align, re-orient, or re-calibrate the normative values to acknowledge the changing structures of social reality itself from within. Honneth’s addendum of antecedent recognition in his Tanner lecture, Reification, supplements the intention of looping the function of recognition theory in the order of disrespect. Reification, a concept that has been used by Marx, Lukacs, and Adorno, just to name a few, partly refers to the objectification of the subject out of pathological societal conditions.8 Honneth, in his reading of Lukacs, aptly describes reification as: …a habit of mere contemplation and observation, in which one’s natural surroundings, social environment, and personal characteristics come to be apprehended in a detached and emotionless manner—in short, as things. (R 25)

Honneth’s reading of Lukacs takes a moderate perspective due to the notion of the social reproduction of norms. While one may see that the value of normativity is essentially “reifying” in the sense that it stabilises and automates social interaction, Honneth cautions his readers not to dismiss the strategic importance of reification in highly developed societies that demand efficiency (R 28). Following Heidegger, Honneth understands reification as an effect of an individual’s existential engagement of caring (R 32). In this context, caring refers to the subject’s tendency to interpret, habitually, a praxis that is deemed to be “correct” or functional as a way of dealing with everyday life (R 33). In the case of recognition, reification presents an evaluative stance, which is taken from a normative practice of acknowledging others in a way that affirms one’s sense of self-respect. The problem with this is that, under the same practices that fostered one’s sense of identity through open intersubjective receptivity, reification tends to forget the antecedent value of recognition. As Adorno, aptly remarks, “all reification is forgetting” (Adorno & Horkheimer 2002, 191). Honneth, too, identifies reification as a form of 8

To name a few concepts from other philosophers: Heidegger’s identification of ontotheology in the history of Western philosophy and the things-ready-to-hand; Levinas’ critique of metaphysics; Derrida’s deconstruction of logocentrism are analogues of reification. These concepts provide a fixed and stable source of values, norms, and epistemic categories that persist despite their internal contradictions and detachment from reality.

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emphatic “amnesia” or “identity thinking” (R 57), going to the extent of saying that its pathological effects on society mimic an autistic child’s perception (R 58). Following the issue of disrespect, we find notable clues for Honneth’s treatment of reification as realising the antecedent forms of recognition. Following Heidegger’s account of “care for the self” (R 71), Honneth articulates the necessity of recognition, and more importantly, selfrecognition as a form of self-care by means of which we can regard ourselves as persons worthy of articulating and disclosing ourselves (R 72). By giving ourselves over to the reified concepts and notions of our selves or of our identity, we hold ourselves as passive objects that are merely disposed to the instrumentalisation of a certain norm or ideology. Hence, following the concept of reification, disrespect can be experienced as either a loss of recognition of oneself or a loss of recognition of the other. Honneth clarifies that the form of reification that he is concerned with is focused on the objectification of social relationships (R 77). This limits our discussion to real human subjects and not anthropomorphised entities (e.g., dogs, horses, imaginary beings, etc.). Disrespect is the recognition of difference that provides the impetus for receptivity either in the context of one's relation towards the self or in the context of otherness. Without the friction of disrespect, the feedback or the resistance offered by a subjectivity towards another subjectivity is negated either through blind conformity or blind receptivity. If taken linearly, the three spheres of recognition are hobbled by the possibility of reification when esteeming valuation turns out later as a form of objectification of oneself and of the other. As a hypothetical example, one can imagine a revolutionary leader who, out of the oppressed working class, rises to take over an oppressive government, only to replace the government with its own oppressive regime. The esteem granted to the revolutionary leader subsequently objectifies his personhood as a “hero,” which later becomes a forgetfulness of his own antecedent recognition that raised him to the level of esteem that he currently enjoys. In this example, we see the necessity of looping the spheres of recognition in the level of a basic sense of self-confidence. As such, the revolutionary followers affirm themselves not merely on the existing sense of esteem already in place by normative practices; they also do so in the context of recalling their own historical grounding or entanglement with antecedent recognition. Zurn, in his recent review of Honneth’s recognition theory, proposes a fourth nonmoralised form of antecedent recognition as a requirement for the three forms of normative recognition (Zurn 2015, 46); this further supports my

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assertion that the spheres of recognition inevitably loop back to re-orient one’s sense of normativity. Disrespect in the formative sphere of love and caring relations is an assertion of differences existing among recipients of recognition. Thus, in an experimental sense (1) disrespect is the establishment of difference wherein the freedom and autonomy of recognition are not tainted by either coercion or blind conformity. In line with Honneth’s take on reification, this does not entail the self-objectification wherein one inhibits oneself from becoming a part of the reciprocal process of recognition. This preliminary form of disrespect is necessary to confirm the autonomy of a person’s self-confidence to pave the way for an unbridled sense of recognition of otherness. In other words, disrespect as a recognition of difference is the affirmation of the fact that the “I” is an “I” because of its own selective appropriation of the norms of its own social partners of interaction. In fact, one can argue that the point of genuine receptivity begins when one recognises the necessity of altering or disrespecting one’s own sense of self to give way to receiving the difference of the other. Following Honneth’s concluding remarks in the Struggle for Recognition,9 the formal conception of the Sittlichkeit revolves around the presupposition that the addressees of recognition have already been 9

“For the fact that the possibility of a positive relation to self emerges only with the experience of recognition can be interpreted as pointing to necessary conditions for individual self-realization. As in other contexts, a negative approach provides a preliminary justification: unless one presupposes a certain degree of selfconfidence, legally guaranteed autonomy, and sureness as to the value of one’s own abilities, it is impossible to imagine successful self-realization, if that is to be understood as a process of realizing, without coercion, one’s self-chosen life goals. With regard to such a process, ‘lack of coercion’ and ‘freedom’ cannot be understood simply as the absence of external force or influence, but must rather signify the lack of inner barriers as well as psychological inhibitions and fears. But this second form of freedom is to be understood, to put it positively, as a form of trust directed inward, which gives individuals basic confidence in both the articulation of their needs and the exercise of their abilities. What we have already seen, however, is that this sort of confidence, these unanxious ways of dealing with oneself, constitute aspects of a positive relation-to-self that can only be gained through the experience of recognition. To this extent, the freedom associated with self-realization is dependent on prerequisites that human subjects do not have at their disposal since they can only acquire this freedom with the help of their interaction partners. The three distinct patterns of recognition then represent intersubjective conditions that we must further presuppose, if we are to describe the general structures of a successful life.” (SFR 173–174)

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imbued with some sense of self-confidence so as to request the reorientation of norms from interaction partners. This form of disrespect is distinct insofar as its intention to maintain its difference is oriented towards maintaining at least a basic degree of self-confidence, which is necessary for facing a partner or partners of social interaction. The intent is to maintain self-confidence to autonomously find a negotiable instance in which solidarity may take place. In contrast, (2) pathological forms of disrespect stem from the refusal of the recogniser or the recipients of recognition to acknowledge the formal conception of norms, essentially withholding the possibility of social solidarity. Disrespect in its pathological sense provides a more systematic articulation of withholding recognition of a person or a group of persons through legal relations, which eventually deny the possibility of esteeming persons worthy of recognition. This form of disrespect can disrupt the possibility of social solidarity through the denial of esteem, which eventually leads to the loss of a sense of self-respect. Without a sense of self-respect, the autonomy behind the recognition of norms is tainted by domination or blind conformity. An adequate formation of autonomy should be established to provide at least a stable sense of selfrelation to self that is enough to provide friction when they are engaged with other subjectivities. With this stable sense of self-respect, the capacity of individuals to autonomously dispense care and love to others is guaranteed some semblance of freedom from coercion or domination since there is a stable reference for identity to base their own sense of normativity. I will further discuss the structure of stability for identity in part three. It is instructive to look at examples from Philippine cultural studies in understanding the relationship between pathological forms of disrespect and identity formation. In one of his essays in the philosophy of values, Pagmamahal and Pagmumura (Hornedo 1997), Florentino Hornedo highlights the struggle for recognition in the works of Philippine artists in the varying phases of Philippine colonisation in the essay entitled “The Changing Core Themes of Filipino Nationalism and their Artistic Expression.” As the title of the book aptly states in Tagalog, the values (pagmamahal) and devaluation of values (pagmumura, which also stands for swearing or cursing) manifest an orientation of normative practices that either express respect or disrespect. In the essay, Hornedo notes the struggle of the Filipinos for recognition amidst the shifting norms provided by its colonisers. Starting from the Spanish era, the Filipinos were mainly excluded from the possibility of being esteemed equally with

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their Spanish colonisers. From the denial of rights, self-confidence, and finally the ability to regard themselves as equal to the Spanish colonisers, the Filipinos felt the need to emulate the Spanish colonisers to prove to them that they are equal (Hornedo 1997, 68–69). Just as the progressive appropriation of the French revolution chiming in on their call for “egalite, fraternite, liberte,” the Filipino intellectuals were engaged in artistic and literary contests that not only matched the talents of the native Spaniard but also exceeded them in their achievements. Hornedo notes some of the significant artistic works during these times, such as, Juan Luna’s Spoliarium and Hidalgo’s The Beggars; moreover, the adoption of the costumbrismo (a reflection of one’s cultural practices) enabled writers such as Jose Rizal to write the novel El Filibusterismo as a campaign for the recognition of Filipino dignity (Hornedo 1997, 70–71). Just as this struggle for recognition was about to find some relative success, the entry of the Americans radically shifted the artistic norms of the Filipinos. The shifting aesthetic styles meant that the struggle for equal recognition from the Spanish colonisers was immediately discarded for the beautiful and idyllic sceneries painted and written in response to the new masters, forgetting the pain of recognition that they once have sought from Spain. Hornedo remarks with sad irony that the Filipinos at this point were “inspired by their alien tutor to think of cosmopolitan dreams while the colonial master made himself rich” (Hornedo 1997, 73). .

I reckon from the examples above that the systematic denial of recognition implies a sustained form of disrespect of the identities of the Filipinos as a constant colony. Remarkably, the growing use of the English language just as soon as the Filipinos was about to have access to the Spanish language added further confusion in the sense of linguistic identity of the Filipinos. Hornedo emphasises that this experience has “only confirmed the Filipino’s alienation from himself and prolonged his mental infancy” (Hornedo 1997, 74). These linguistic shifts in norms have not only confused the gradual sense of self-confidence in the Filipino’s use of their native languages; it has also, in turn, alienated the sense of identity of the Filipinos. Furthermore, the politicisation of the national language (via the 1936 Commonwealth Act No. 184) to use Tagalog as the Filipino language has further created rifts between regions in the Philippines, especially among non-Tagalog speaking regions. Hornedo considers this legitimisation of Tagalog simply as a rhetoric, for the proliferation of the English language had become prevalent that students during the Commonwealth period were punished (and policed) for using their native language in school premises (Hornedo 1997, 76). The loss of the impetus to struggle for recognition is emphasised here in the shifting norms that

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ought to buttress the normative structure of recognition. The regressive factor that can be seen here is the lack of a normative condition that will allow Filipinos to struggle for their identities and earn the esteem that they need not only in the context of the colonisers but also in their own context of understanding their self-worth. Following the success of the campaign for economic development during the ’40s to the ’60s, and Marcos’ ironic campaign for social justice, the American aesthetic influence became less palatable to the Filipinos. Marcos, according to Hornedo, struggled to confront economic poverty against the backdrop of the prevalence of the few who had the capital to enslave the many (Hornedo 1997, 79). Marcos resorted later on to authoritarianism that censured much of the artistic and literary work. As a response, the so-called revolution of 1986 ensued as a shift from authoritarian politics to liberalism. The promise of freedom offered by the new 1987 Philippine Constitution did not actually solve the problem of poverty and social injustice in the country; moreover, the control of the few that remained as the liberalisation of the government simply led to a change of oligarchic control. Hornedo concludes his essay by stating that Filipino nationalism in the arts is constantly struggling to achieve recognition through economic progress; he notes that the artists have succumbed to creating art via their clientele (i.e., tourist art, light entertainment, or even nostalgia as its theme). No longer are they concerned with the problem of social justice; they are merely concerned with earning their pay or, at least, earning the minimal resources to eke out a living. Hornedo’s narrative of the development of aesthetic expression in the Philippines, against the backdrop of the country’s colonial history, reveals the confused state of norms that bred disrespect and, thereby, resulting in the dialectical shifts in the consciousness of Filipinos. Elsewhere, I have argued that the continuing search for an identity has haunted Filipino philosophers in their search for an “authentic Filipino philosophy,” to the point that they have lost the critical aspect of philosophical discourse because of the strong emphasis on the creation of an identity rather than doing philosophy (Pada 2014). Consequently, what we see in Hornedo’s essay is the absence of the ground for respect, following the lack of a sense of self-confidence, the pathological continuity of the social forces that the Philippines has been struggling to attain, its own sense of selfdignity as a relatively young independent country has given us a pathological example of disrespect. The prolonged denial of affirming a basic sense of self-confidence achieved through identity has robbed the

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Filipinos the chance to esteem itself as a person worthy of its own respect. Up to this day, evidence of the Filipinos’ lack of self-confidence can be observed in the habit of associating themselves with transnational citizens that have either migrated or cross-bred with foreign nationals to raise a sense of esteem from being plainly considered as Filipinos. In another context, Ralph Ellison’s novel Invisible Man (Ellison 1952), depicts the movement of African American’s seeking equality, just treatment, and economic opportunities. This novel plays an important role in Honneth’s writings because of its themes of alienation, disrespect, and colonisation. Honneth and Margalit’s reading of the novel brings about two concepts of invisibility, wherein the concept of recognition is understood epistemologically (Honneth & Margalit 2001, 111). The anonymous narrator of Ellison’s novel depicts himself as a man that is no longer perceived by others; he is invisible, not in a physical sense, but in a figurative sense. The prologue of the novel depicts a man that has isolated himself from society; he lives underground beneath a building without the knowledge of the building’s inhabitants. The novel depicts this anonymous man as a student who is forced to fight in boxing matches for the entertainment of white people so that he could win a college scholarship. The story contains numerous accounts of oppression and discrimination of African Americans not only by their fellow white Americans but also among themselves. This theme is specifically seen in the attempts of African American leaders in the novel depicted as playing sides with white financiers or supporters of their cause. From the president of the college, Mr. Bledsoe that the narrator has attended and expelled, to the leader of the Brotherhood, Brother Jack, who ostracised him for being “too independent” in his political speeches—the experience of betrayal and oppression is rife in the novel. One particular theme that is repeated in the novel is the idea of “serving the whites,” to which the narrator constantly refers in a dream of his grandfather. Despite the supposed emancipation of the African Americans from slavery, they are still nonetheless affected by the erasure of identities afforded by the long years of slavery. The experience of the narrator is that the sense of disrespect in this sense is turned inwardly, having no identity to support their sense of self-confidence; the African Americans in the novel still consider themselves as servants of their masters that have long given their freedom. This freedom, as we can see in the novel, does not support the sense of self-confidence necessary for the African Americans to gain their own sense of disrespect. While legally they are granted the same freedom as any white American could have, they are nonetheless socially treated as inferiors. The novel concludes with a city-wide riot following the shooting

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of one of the narrator’s colleagues; the outrage initiated by the political agenda of the Brotherhood initiated a violent mob that ransacked the surrounding business establishments. The narrator, in turn, goes into hiding, contemplating his possible return to the surface to continue enlightening his fellow African Americans. The theme of invisibility in this novel presents to us a potent argument towards the necessity of self-confidence that roots back in respect and disrespect. In the novel, despite the legal claims for rights, the identities of the African Americans are left without the proper receptivity that would allow them to gradually form their own sense of self-confidence. Invisibility, thus, is the experience of being disrespected by withholding recognition, and in this sense, we can also see that the narrator has experienced his own invisibility through his own sense of self-confidence. In Honneth and Margalit’s essay, the figurative idea of invisibility is a denial of gestural forms of affirmation (Honneth & Margalit 2001, 120). They note that the action of “seeing through” in the experience of the narrator does not have any intention of benevolent treatment; rather, it is a preparation for a hostile action. Rather than attribute the benevolent and receptive gesture that any person should acquire, the invisibility in Ellison’s novel represents a judgment of the lack of worth of a person. Thus, recognition, as evinced by Honneth and Margalit’s reading of Ellison’s novel ought to be separated from the prejudgment of a person to the addressee of recognition. Cognition is distinguished from recognition because of its initial perception of a potential addressee of recognition. Honneth and Margalit note that, in this sense, the normative implication of perception is not neutral owing to the factor of individuating circumstances of cognition (Honneth & Margalit 2001). Judgments or some pre-ethical form of disrespect are necessarily tied with the recognition of oneself and the stability gained with regard to selfconfidence as a condition for a functioning form of recognition of others. A note of caution, however, comes to mind when the idea of disrespect is extended to its pathological form. Disrespect as a pathology can be ambivalent in terms of its self-justification. Ellison’s novel makes this clear as the element of disrespect is systematic in terms of reproducing it socially and individually. The nameless narrator’s allusion to his dead grandfather’s paradoxical advice of “keeping up the good fight,” or “killing them with yesses,” or even the provocative letter in the narrator’s dream of “Keep this nigger-boy running” warns us of the pathological reduction of the experience of disrespect as an ideology that can in turn lead to one’s own self-disrespect. The ambivalence of this experience of

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invisibility in the context of the social struggle of African Americans in this novel paints a sobering realisation that without the structure that supports their identity as African Americans, they are nonetheless a prisoner of their own prison. To be explicit here, what is implied by this constant nagging reminder is that the forgetfulness of one’s identity is bound to create a personal sense of disrespect and, much more, is bound to become instrumental to the recognition of the identity of others, such as the white Americans in the novel. The grandfather refers to the intrinsic experience of the African American identity rooted in disrespect, and thus, acknowledges the normative core of slavery as their basis for identity. To gain it back, the nameless narrator has to play within the system of recognition of their slavers and make the revision of norms from within and not from the outside. That is why in the novel, the cruelty of the African-American college president, Mr. Bledsoe, is a bitter reminder of how these social struggle movements are trying to gradually gain the esteem of their historical masters. A Philippine analogue to this can be seen in Rogelio Sikat’s Impeng Negro (which roughly translates to “Impeng, the negro”), whose dark skin, owing to the racist prejudice of Philippine culture to associate dark-skin with poverty, was the source of the eponymous protagonist’s discrimination or “invisibility.” The experience leads Impen to various forms of disrespect, from being cut in line for water to being denigrated for the colour of his skin. While this serves as a fertile expression of the experience of struggles for recognition, the ending of the short story rings a hollow experience of victory. Despite beating his antagonist, Ogor, in a fist fight, Impen’s victory, as a form of achieving some sort of recognition, leaves a lot to the imagination of the reader for it does not in a progressive way express a reciprocation of recognition nor does it establish a resolution for the recognition of dignity that can be given to Impen in future instances of disrespect. Honneth adds the following caution to the cause of social struggles, citing the experiences of Neo Nazi youth Ingo Hasselbach: …the potential political consequences of the experience of social disrespect: social esteem can just as well be sought in small militaristic groups, whose code of honor is dominated by the practice of violence, as it can in the public arenas of a democratic society. The sense of no longer being included within the network of social recognition is in itself an extremely ambivalent source of motivation for social protest and resistance. It lacks any normative indication or direction that would stipulate in what ways one should struggle against the experience of disrespect and humiliation (Honneth 2007A, 77).

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Careful considerations must be taken to the treatment of social struggle movements towards their sense of solidarity, not as a splinter group of society but as the general society. The political consequences can be seen in the same line as an analogue to the organisation of crime or political regimes, strictly maintaining their normative foothold on society to maintain status and esteem which they can only bring about in their own splinter group. What matters further is how the instrumentalisation of these social struggles can bring about further forms of disrespect as a pathology. My last two examples here would be the television series in the Philippines, Nita Negrita, and the song Guilty of Being White originally performed by the band Minor Threat and later covered by the band Slayer. The show Nita Negrita presents the stereotypical Filipino theme of ascribing poverty with skin colour. While the undertones of the narrative take the intermarriage between a Filipina and an African American foreigner and the ascription of poverty to skin colour, the show neither highlights any normative value to which a person disrespected because of his or her skin colour can come into terms of integrating himself or herself to society despite his or her skin colour. Neither does the show present the necessity of skin colour with the attribute of poverty since, clearly, the show’s protagonist Nita can be of any race and still present the struggle of poverty to success in a vivid way. In the case of the song Guilty of Being White,10 we see a very interesting take on the reproduction of disrespect when it does not acknowledge the identity of the addressor for the sake of the addressee. The lyricist, Ian MacKaye, depicts his experience of growing up in Washington DC as a white minority in an environment that is predominantly consist of African Americans. The song was his experience of disrespect owing to the history of slavery in the United States of America, and owing to the racial discrimination that he experienced as a white American. While the song had an anti-racist sentiment, it was also appropriated by other bands, notably Slayer’s modification of the end of the song with “Guilty of being right” which adds racist undertones to a song that expressed anti-racist sentiment.

10

Lyrics to “Guilty of Being White” (Minor Threat version): “I'm sorry / For something I didn't do /Lynched somebody / But I don't know who / You blame me for slavery / A hundred years before I was born // I'm a convicted / Of a racist crime / I've only served / 19 years of my time // I'm sorry / For something I didn't do / Lynched somebody / But I don't know who / You blame me for slavery /A hundred years before I was born / Guilty of being white.”

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3. Solidarity and Ethical Life: The Trajectories of Critical Theory in Honneth’s Recognition Theory The desire for recognition is necessarily expressed in the experience of disrespect. It is through this revision of the trajectories of the history of critical theory that Honneth continues Habermas’ project of seeing the necessary emancipatory impetus from individuals who are seeking social solidarity. In Honneth’s essay on disrespect, we see a clear theoretical trajectory for the legacy of critical theory: …by a “critical theory of society” we mean that type of social thought that shares a particular form of normative critique with the Frankfurt School’s original program—indeed, perhaps, with the whole tradition of Left Hegelianism—which can also inform us about the pre-theoretical resource (vorwissenshaftliche Instanz) in which its own critical viewpoint is anchored extratheoretically as an empirical interest or moral experience (Honneth 2007A, 63–64). [my emphasis]

Honneth follows two trajectories from his predecessors: (1) Horkheimer’s interdisciplinary program of critical social critique grounded in the normativity of emancipation, and (2) Habermas’ communicative action theoretic, that tried to steer away from the tendency of critical theory to fixate its critical engagement with capitalism and the critique of domination. Taking his predecessors in consideration, Honneth’s focus on disrespect intends to dig deeper into the roots of Habermas’ theory of communicative action by providing an experiential basis of the grammar of social struggles (Honneth 2007A, 69–70). By doing this, Honneth is also following Horkheimer’s emancipatory program by acquiring the location of the intention for emancipation in individuals experiencing disrespect. At the experiential level, the emancipatory potential of recognition theory is profoundly informed by already existing normative values that are the sources of moral expectations (Honneth 2007A, 71). The search for a normative claim is what Honneth claims as the continuation of the programme that Horkheimer initiated and Habermas articulated. Honneth does this by investigating claims of recognition through the experience of disrespect, an approach that already presupposes yet also goes beyond the communication paradigm of Habermas (Honneth 2007A, 74). By doing this, Honneth achieves a deeper understanding of normative presuppositions and expectations that are integrated into a deeper communicative framework of experience. Going back to Kalyvas’ criticisms of Honneth’s recognition theory and the problem of coercive forces of norms, Honneth is able to maintain an adequate critical distance

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from the problem of autonomy in the framework of norms by locating disrespect in the normative expectations of the experiences of individuals that suffer disrespect. In so doing, Honneth can open up a theoretical ground wherein idealist conceptions of normativity can no longer be dependent on concepts that are detached from reality such as Rawls’ veil of ignorance or Rousseau’s state of nature. Furthermore, Honneth can articulate a formal basis for all norms, which in our theoretical interests touch the very root of recognition, and that is solidarity.

PART THREE FROM EMANCIPATION TO SOCIAL SOLIDARITY: FREEDOM AND RIGHTS

In the previous part, I have emphasised the importance of the function of disrespect as either a positive indication of identity or as a pathological and systematic denial of identity and normativity. Disrespect, as I have stipulated in both Honneth's earlier and later iterations of the recognition theory, is a necessary indicator of a stable identity that can give way to the possibility of a progressive recognition of difference. In line with Honneth's revisions of a linear recognition theory to a progressive looping feedback receptive system, identity must be understood as a manifestation of the normativity of freedom. Freedom guarantees the authenticity of normativity from domination and coercion. As opposed to imposing norms to an individual to conform blindly because of societal pressures, freedom allows the individual to selectively gather the resources that are available to his or her disposal to pursue his or her own self-realisation amidst the plurality of identities. In this part, my intention is to demonstrate the importance of sustaining freedom as a resource for individuals to sustain their identities in developing their own sense of self-confidence. By maintaining differences through the selective appropriation of norms, individuals are given more choices to pursue their own self-actualised identities. This means that individuals will have more choices available to them to select whichever possible form of self-actualisation they can achieve within society. As conflicted as it may sound, the plurality of identities, as well as the variety of norms, enhances social cohesion because identities are validated through cooperative socialisation. While it would be difficult to point out the origin or source of normative values that builds and sustains identity, it is, however, possible to understand that the goal of normative values is to maintain solidarity amidst the differences of identities.

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1. Justifying a Formal Praxis of Social Critique The difficulty of pronouncing and articulating the possibility of social solidarity in the context of an autonomous subject has been a common trajectory for critical theory’s emancipative program. Against the backdrop of social domination, it is often difficult to conceive of the practicality of solidarity. Honneth’s Critique of Power presents a historical movement of critical theory towards the realisation of emancipatory praxis that can overcome the limitations imposed by the possibility of domination. An example of this difficulty is emphasized by Adorno and Horkheimer in the Dialectic of the Enlightenment where they pronounced the domination of the “culture industry” as the denial of identities through the organized reproduction of cultural forms, thereby overwhelming our individual consciousness (Adorno & Horkheimer 2002, 96). Furthermore, Adorno’s turn to aesthetics gives us a bleak outlook on philosophy’s potential for praxis: A philosophy that tried to imitate art, that would turn itself into a work of art, would be expunging itself. It would be postulating the demand for identity, claiming to exhaust its object by endowing its procedure with a supremacy to which the heterogeneous bows a priori, as material—whereas to genuine philosophy its relation to the heterogeneous is virtually thematic. Common to art and philosophy is not the form, not the forming process, but a mode of conduct that forbids pseudomorphosis. Both keep faith with their own substance through their opposites: art by making itself resistant to its meanings; philosophy, by refusing to clutch at any immediate thing. What the philosophical concept will not abandon is the yearning that animates the nonconceptual side of art, and whose fulfilment shuns the immediate side of art as mere appearance. The concept—the organon of thinking, and yet the wall between thinking and the thought— negates that yearning. Philosophy can neither circumvent such negation nor submit to it. It must strive, by way of the concept, to transcend the concept. (Adorno 1973, 15)

Adorno’s turn to aesthetics is primarily motivated by his resistance to the instrumentality of reason; praxis, in terms of realising the emancipatory programme of critical theory, should reach out to other mediums of expression that resist the possibility of identity thinking. In his dissertation, Bolaños asserts the role of philosophical praxis in the context of the “ethics of thinking” found in the non-identical language of Adorno and Nietzsche (Bolaños 2009). Arguing against Habermas’ abandonment of Adorno’s mimetic turn, Bolaños points out that Habermas’ linguistic turn in critical theory is merely a shift in emphasis (Bolaños 2009), as

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opposed to a total shift away from early critical theory; as such, Adorno’s programme already emphasized the role of the non-identical in our use of language. The 395 times in which Habermas’ name was mentioned in Bolaños’ dissertation marks a distinct rift in the praxis of critical theory between Adorno and Habermas. Adorno’s turn to aesthetics is an expression that resists identity-thinking. It is a way to overcome the influence of domination in a formal praxis of social theory. Habermas, in contrast, decided to distinguish aesthetics from reason, fearing that the aporetic consequences of aesthetic resistance could lead to irresponsible theorizing with dire political consequences.1 To be succinct, Habermas finds this general tendency in Adorno’s critique of the instrumentality of reason: Unlike Marcuse, Adorno no longer wanted to get out of his aporia—and in this he was more consistent than Horkheimer. “Negative Dialectics” is both an attempt to circumscribe what cannot be said discursively and an admonition to seek refuge nonetheless in Hegel in this situation. It is the “Aesthetic Theory” that first seals the surrender of all cognitive competence to art in which the mimetic capacity gains objective shape. Adorno withdraws the theoretical claim: Negative dialectics and aesthetic theory can now only “helplessly refer to one another.” (Habermas 1984, 384)

To be fair with Habermas, his concern was motivated by the initial multidisciplinary track that critical theory was supposed to take following the end of the Second World War.2 Honneth, whose name was mentioned 1

In The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas accuses the shift from rationality to subjectivity espoused against the fear of domination of reason. Habermas declares: “In the discourse of modernity, the accusers raise an objection that has not substantially changed from Hegel and Marx down to Nietzsche and Heidegger, from Bataille and Lacan to Foucault and Derrida. The accusation is aimed against a reason grounded in the principle of subjectivity. And it states that this reason denounces and undermines all unconcealed forms of suppression and exploitation, of degradation and alienation, only to set up in their place the unassailable domination of rationality. Because this regime of a subjectivity puffed up into a false absolute transforms the means of consciousness-raising and emancipation into just as so many instruments of objectification and control, it fashions for itself an uncanny immunity in the form of a thoroughly concealed domination. The opacity of the iron cage of a reason that has become positive disappears as if in the glittering brightness of a completely transparent crystal palace. All parties are united on this point: These glass facades have to shatter. They are, to be sure, distinguished by the strategies they elect for overcoming the positivism of reason.” (Habermas 1987, 55-56) 2 Habermas’ motivation was as follows: “If one looks back from Adorno's late writings to the intention that critical theory initially pursued, one can weigh the

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in the same essay, was sympathetic and yet critical of Adorno and Habermas. As mentioned in Part One, Honneth saw the shortcoming of Adorno and Habermas’ approach but found converging methods that would be useful in his recognition theory. On the one hand, Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of domination and instrumentalisation of reason provides an avenue for the receptivity of social theory of undistorted forms of interaction. Meanwhile, on the side of Habermas, Honneth finds a contextual recourse to the already existing normative practices that are reproduced in social interactions, which are useful for the agenda of emancipation. From this, Honneth distils a potent theory of recognition that looks at the possibility of undistorted forms of social relations that take autonomy as a socially formed consensus of normative practices. Despite his sympathy for Adorno’s methodology, Honneth is quite clear when he states that he is the successor of Habermas. Honneth, like Habermas, also wanted to follow the pre-scientific approach that focuses on going back to understanding normativity and intersubjectivity (Honneth & Stojanov 2006). Like Habermas, Honneth found the systematic connection between intersubjectivity and aesthetics to be too weak to bear the burden of critical theory’s normative claim. Despite Honneth’s critical distance from aesthetics, it is difficult to dismiss the importance of aesthetics in his writing. Suffice to say, that despite his pronouncement, Honneth does utilise plenty of examples in literature to illustrate his point, not to mention a few references to music, specifically that of Bob Dylan (Honneth 2010). In Freedom’s Right, Honneth’s long awaited formal praxis of recognition theory finds its articulation in the reading of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. In this iteration of the recognition theory, Honneth appropriates Hegel’s premise of following existing normative practices as a progressive indicator of social change and justice. For Honneth, Hegel’s philosophy of price that the critique of instrumental reason had to pay for the aporias it consistently owns up to. A philosophy that withdraws behind the lines of discursive thought to the "mindfulness of nature" pays for the wakening powers of its exercises by renouncing the goal of theoretical knowledge, and thus by renouncing that program of "interdisciplinary materialism" in whose name critical theory of society was once launched in the early thirties. Horkheimer and Adorno had already given up this goal by the beginning of the forties, without however, acknowledging the practical consequences of relinquishing a connection to the social sciences; otherwise they would not have been in a position to rebuild the Institute for Social Research after the War. Nevertheless, as the foreword to the Dialectic of Enlightenment clearly explains, they had given up the hope of being able to redeem the promise of early critical theory.” (Habermas 1984, 385–386)

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right presents a working assessment of the goal of the good life or the Sittlichkeit as freedom is realised in various forms of social interactions. Honneth presents three main observations of freedom in the context of history, praxis, and current social struggle movements. The main contention of Freedom’s Right is that freedom is developmental when it is seen in the context of social solidarity and individual autonomy. Rather than seeing both as conflicting ends of freedom, he points out that institutions have the potential and are instrumental in enabling and realising individual freedom that is recognised and legitimised by the addressees of freedom. Honneth, like in his other works, follows the method of normative reconstruction as a method of working out existing normative principles and evaluating it against its own normative criteria. Using this approach, Honneth selectively lays out an analysis of institutions and social routines to further understand the impact of its contribution to the stabilisation and implementation of their values (FRS 6). My theoretical interest in Freedom’s Right is to find the articulation of freedom by the progressive development of receptivity in institutions and social routines. Like Habermas, Honneth believes that there is a potential in understanding the grammar of social struggles, much like communicative action, because it allows us to understand the importance of receptivity in enhancing and realising the actuality of freedom in modern and contemporary societies. Zurn remarks that Honneth’s reconstructive reading of Hegel is motivated by the assertion that social movements and political philosophy follow the common trail of understanding freedom as a modern expression of justice (Zurn 2015, 156). Following Honneth’s discussion, I will discuss freedom in three contexts, namely its historical, practical, and actual appropriation in social interactions and institutions. My reading would be guided by the thesis that institutions and social routines are progressive developments of freedom and autonomy which, in turn, enable the social reproduction of norms and institution because they are geared towards the realisation and actualisation of solidarity.

2. The Historical Development of Freedom In the context of modernity, Honneth sees the development of freedom in three stages: (a) negative freedom, (b) reflexive freedom, and (c) social freedom. Through his reading of Hobbes, Honneth elicits the idea of negative freedom as the absence of any external restriction that might

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hinder one’s “body to move naturally” (FRS 21). This negative conception of freedom provides an insight on how freedom is understood as an unrestricted form of willing and, as such, structures the basic understanding of freedom and how one ought to understand liberty in terms of forces or effects that can shape and motivate the will. From this very basic definition of freedom, Honneth can trace the development of the notion of freedom in a reflexive sense to a freedom that is realised and buttressed by social norms.

2.A. Negative Freedom and the Conception of the Non-Socialised Consciousness The development of a reflexive sense of freedom stems from the realisation of the inadequacy of Hobbes’ articulation of freedom as the lack of hindrances or restrictions. Through this, there was a greater theoretical justification towards understanding the need to clarify the forms of restrictions of freedom beyond the conception of external forces. From Hobbes, we can realise that individualism is the main problem of conceiving a state of justice wherein everyone is rendered his or her due. The problem that Honneth sees in the Hobbesian concept of justice is this minimalist conception of justice that presumes the lack of bonds or mutual affection where social solidarity is non-existent. Instead of social solidarity, what is conceived is a natural state of war with the selfish interests of individuals seeking to achieve their own preferences with the minimal form of restrictions (FRS 26). Given these conditions, the individual, in pursuit of negative freedom, may lack the self-reflection necessary to understand and reflect on his or her internal conscious state. With this, the conception of a purely selfinterested individual will seem to become impossible without further investigation of the forces that might have influenced or motivated the will to pursue goals and aspirations. Honneth makes comparisons with contemporary thinkers such as Sartre and Nozick, finding that the common trajectory of negative freedom involves a reflexive analysis of how we ought to conceive freedom via the contents of our identity and the resulting effect of freedom in shaping individual will. From Sartre’s lack of standards in justifying oneself to oneself or to others (FRS 23) to Nozick’s state of “opaque intentions” of the complexities of drives (FRS 25), we can realise that a political or institutional force is necessary if we can ever conceive a just kind of socialisation. In this case, we find ourselves, at least in the context of negative freedom, in a praxis of justice

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that tries to affirm individual drives that fulfil individual expectations (FRS 27). Zurn observes that, in this case, the kind of political system that ought to be enforced is a kind of system that engages in a social contract that tries to protect individual liberties without participating in consensual engagement or negotiations since the political or institutional force is already expected to dispense the necessary function of justice (Zurn 2015, 157–158). The lack of consensual engagement implies that the social aspect of freedom is neglected due in part to the lack of reflexive acknowledgement of social forces that shaped one’s normative principles and, at the same time, the individual’s failure to assess whether his or her actions are done out of free will or are done blindly. In the context of the Leviathan or the Prince, the use of force is legitimated by the interest to regulate the perpetual state of self-interested freedom among the members of society; this is performatively justified by the members’ submission of their basic rights. Thus, in the case of Honneth’s analysis, the resulting theoretical outcome of this period is to assume that individual freedom should be contained to such a degree that it does not interfere or impose itself upon the freedom of other individuals. In other words, the delegation of a ruler in the context of the Leviathan or the Prince relies solely on the value of regulating society and not of enhancing the personal freedom of individuals. However, in this process of delegation, the Leviathan and the Prince leave very little room for learning on the part of the governed individuals who submit themselves to the authority of a social contract. The original assumption that the social contract is considered as an end of a social institution is weak because it does not articulate a proper context for understanding the constitutive forces behind individual will and freedom. Honneth concludes with this observation: In none of these [Hobbes, Sartre, and Nozick] does the freedom of the individual entail the ability to select the aims it wishes to achieve in the world; instead, the causality of an inner nature or an anonymous spirit guides the subject’s actions and choices ‘behind its back.’ It is only by crossing this threshold that we can see the outlines of the concept embodied by the modern understanding of self-determination. This comprises two different forms of freedom, the first of which is reflexive freedom (FRS 28).

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2.B. Freedom and its Realisation in Reflexivity Reflexive freedom for Honneth is not to be mistaken as an expansion or enhanced production of negative freedom (FRS 29). Rather than conceiving it as a continuation of negative freedom, he notes that reflexive freedom is the realisation of the necessity of a subject to understand one’s intention and establish a stable sense of self-relationship-to-self (FRS Ibid.). Prior to Kant, Honneth observes that Rousseau has already developed a clear picture of this sense of autonomy by establishing real freedom as the obedience to a “self-imposed law” (FRS 30). The lack of a clear definition of the will for Rousseau, however, has been a setback that needs to be remedied by Kant’s “resolute turn to the transcendental” (FRS 32). This move distinguishes human actions from a conception of natural law to an articulated reference to universality as an inevitable and indisputable guide to autonomy. While remaining critical to the conformist tendencies of the Kantian categorical imperative, Honneth nonetheless asserts that this conformity ought to be evaluated with the idea of selfunderstanding. Despite the necessary reference of the categorical imperative to a reflexive realisation of freedom to the self and the other (i.e., treating others as ends in themselves), Honneth raises the issue of motivation and authenticity against the motive of universalisable features of reflexive freedom. Further interpretations of Rousseau have led Honneth to conclude a secondary form of understanding Rousseau’s notion of freedom by meeting the criterion of “self-realisation” as the goal of freedom (FRS 33). By including this criterion, the difficulty of aligning desires with rational willing no longer becomes an issue of moral conformism; rather, by looking at the social formation of identities and the affirmation of its preferences and emotional attachments, we can find personal motives that are rooted in the individual's choice of selfactualisation. In doing so, the stable sense of self-relationship-to-self is maintained while at the same time authentic engagements with moral autonomy are made possible beyond the perspective of conforming to reason. At this point, Honneth recalls ideas developed in the social theory of Habermas as important steps in understanding reflexive freedom. By looking at the socialised forms of communication, the subject can gain an intersubjective understanding of autonomy wherein a sense of mutual respect is gained through the recognition of other participants’ autonomy and need for self-realisation (FRS 35). Following Hegel and the theme of modernity, Honneth asserts the abandonment of the core-idea that selfidentification is entirely dependent on the process of self-discovery

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without dependencies on other standards of evaluation (FRS 36). Much like how the idea of the Cartesian cogito fails to explain the origin of the soul or the thinking subject, the process of reflection historically leads to our theoretical understanding of freedom as inevitably tied to the process of socialisation and identity formation. By following this track, it is no longer impossible to grasp a sense of self-relation-to-self as entirely dependent on reason alone since reason itself is a product of a constantly emerging process of socialisation and individual choices for selfactualisation. Freedom in this sense and in the equation of justice must be a reflexive action of anticipating and becoming receptive to the selfrealisation of others since its realisation is entirely dependent on the community of others that mutually support and respect each other’s autonomy. In the next historical phase, Honneth presents the social concept of freedom as a necessary realisation of freedom through institutional forms (FRS 41). The difficulty of understanding this process is locating the source or the origin of identity, explaining identity as a product of socialisation alone is problematic because it entails accepting a position that individuals are not free to decide their own self-realisation. Likewise, a position that argues for the existence of identity prior to socialisation is also difficult to sustain, much in the position of insisting on the existence of innate ideas. This issue is unnecessary because finding the origin of both does not necessarily lead us to the understanding of how identity and socialisation are maintained and sustained. Like the chicken and egg problem, a linear understanding of identity and socialisation merely rejects or takes a position that does not provide us with an understanding of the dynamics between identity and socialisation. Following Hegel in this dynamic of identity and socialisation, as he would argue in the case of the bud and the blossom, “each is as necessary as the other.” (PoS 2)

2.C. The Sittlichkeit and Freedom through Social Relations In this last historical phase, Honneth highlights the ability of subjects to find the capacity for self-realisation within social interactions and the formation of institutions that support moral claims to autonomy. The reflexive phase in the development of freedom stands as an acknowledgement of autonomy of the subject to exercise selectivity in the pursuit of selfrealisation. The privacy of reflexivity is guaranteed by the fact that one’s thoughts are one’s thoughts alone, and that in this contemplation, the suspension of social relation is only an internal phase that the subject experiences to consider the available normative resources at his or her

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disposal. Zurn observes that the role of reflexive freedom in the context of society is to find an evaluative stance through which the sense of selfrelationship-to-self is validated under the expectations of one’s morality and personal integrity (Zurn 2015, 161). Through social interactions, this capacity to withdraw and engage, depending on the circumstance of the individual, from social obligations and expectations, becomes a necessary function of socialisation when it comes to the autonomous assent towards evaluating normative criteria. Following Hegel, Honneth emphasises the role of understanding an objective sense of freedom outside social relations through the discursive experience of “love” or/and “friendship” (FRS 44). In this type of interaction, the sense of being determined, manipulated, or even controlled is left outside the structure of society and leads to a self-awareness through the recognition of otherness as an other (FRS Ibid.). Through this receptive practice of interaction, the objectivity of the self is realised only through the recognition that is granted by the other. The space that is given by the recipients of mutual recognition allows a sense of respect through the acknowledgement of difference as an actual starting point for realising desires, goals, or objectives, which the recipients pursue their individual self-realisation. Suffice it to say that this space allows individuals to locate and even align their authentic desires to their pursuit of self-realisation made possible with other partners of interaction. This emphasis in Hegel is what Honneth pursues to develop as an argument for the compatibility of autonomy and solidarity: Hegel believes that such reciprocal comprehensibility is ensured by the institutions of recognition, that is, by bundles of behavioural norms that ‘objectively’ integrate individuals’ aims. They ensure that subjects can recognize in the behaviour of their alter ego the desires whose fulfilment represent the condition for the fulfilment of their own. Because the individual’s striving for freedom can thus be fulfilled only within—or with the aid of—institutions, the ‘intersubjective’ concept of freedom expands once again into a ‘social’ concept of freedom. A subject is only ‘free’ if it encounters another subject, within the framework of institutional practices, to whom it is joined in a relationship of mutual recognition; only then can it regard the aims of the other as the condition for the realisation of its own aims. (FRS 45)

Honneth’s turn to the Sittlichkeit or the ethical life becomes more apparent in this statement as soon as he starts invoking the need for an institutional scaffolding to support intersubjective relations. This is made apparent in his earlier conception of the ethical life as the goal of intersubjective receptivity and the possibility of achieving social solidarity (SFR 173–174). Thus, the goal of institutions is to function as a medium

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through which complementary goals of self-realisation are achieved or negotiated amongst individuals that have different identities so as to become receptive to their specific needs. This valuation of individuals requires them to seek a common ground wherein norms are consented upon by individuals despite their differences in desires. In doing so, Honneth remarks that Hegel’s conception of the ethical life ultimately requires individual intentions on both sides to pursue “universal” aims to allow complementary fulfilment of desires (FRS 48). The consequence, therefore, should lead Hegel to develop a system through which reflexive freedom is exercised within the context of social freedom to allow individuals to formulate a conception of desires that are in line with universal or universalisable norms (FRS Ibid.). This brings us to the question of how the conception of an ethical life is made to adapt to the differences by means of which identities are formed and are shaped to pursue individual desires and intention. The role of recognition brings us back to the process in which norms are habituated and integrated into societal interactions. For without this fundamental open reception to individual difference, social integration would become impossible. Honneth’s observation of modern societies can lead us to the appreciation that the latter would be impossible without the recognition of difference. This is not to say that Honneth’s understanding of social relations is entirely positive or utopian. His intention is quite clear in The Struggle for Recognition that social integration is a necessary step in fostering an intersubjective receptivity in the achievement of solidarity. Thus, from time to time, it is expected that individuals or groups of individuals will go through struggles for recognition to align themselves and align the norms for maintaining social solidarity. At this juncture, solidarity does not necessarily become the end of social relations; it becomes the foundation for an appropriate form of individuation against the backdrop of social interactions. Socialisation ensures that a feedback loop is maintained by means of which societal norms and individual norms are given the chance to align with the help of institutional complexes of recognition (FRS 49). One cannot imagine a social relationship where one simply abandons oneself without proper recourse to existing norms. The social sphere, as we can observe, may have instances of disrespect occurring within interaction partners, but regardless of its outcome, it merely helps identify separatist or atomistic forms of individuation and allow any further action for social integration to occur. Thus, institutions serve a valuable function of maintaining and guiding social participants towards aligning individual intention and desire to compliment societal

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needs. This ultimately leads an individual to realize that his or her identity can be appreciated and esteemed freely in the social sphere. Honneth recounts Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s lack of explanation for the basis of freedom (FRS 55), for the latter does not provide the necessary explanation or even an idea of a genesis of a culture of freedom in his conception of justice. As such, Kant’s conception of justice suffers a vicious circle and fails to provide a social and institutional dimension of freedom (FRS Ibid.). Hegel’s normative reconstruction looks at the dimension of rationality as an embedded function of social relations and, more importantly, as an emotional affectivity that shapes the autonomous assent of an individual in forming a reciprocal willing of complementary norms. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel argues that the subjective will is its own object and is different from the general will, whose formal appearance manifests a phase of appropriating relations and obligations to complement its difference from the general will (Hegel 2001, 98). While Honneth emphasises the difference between subjective will and general will, he nevertheless considers their dialectical relation as a kind of equilibrium that undergirds society and history (FRS 56). Realising freedom in this sense requires conceiving an already existing social structure that supports freedom because, without this guarantee, the required autonomy necessary to reflect upon their individual wills and desires would be missing. In other words, the experience of freedom is only made possible when social structures already presuppose the entitlement of individuals towards freedom. While this may seem too optimistic on the side of Hegel and Honneth’s conception of the ethical life, it does add up to the function of recognition as an indicator of freedom through which social struggles are asserted within normative structures of relations. Following this development, Honneth further argues that the conception of an atomistic individual seems impossible to conceive without the freedom granted by social institutions (FRS 59). In summary, what we can glean from the formal praxis of Hegel and Honneth’s notion of freedom is that social freedom gives way to the possibility of reflexive and negative freedom. For without the social structure to support the concept of freedom, it would not be possible to experience freedom and develop an awareness of it. He notes further that: The more that we feel that our purposes are supported and even upheld by these spheres, the more we will be able to perceive our surroundings as a space for the development of our own personality. As beings who are

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Through this, we now have a clearer picture of Honneth’s agenda of understanding justice in the context of freedom. With social freedom, we find that individuals must be obliged not simply because of their responsibility but also because of their right to participate in shaping the norms of social recognition by participating in its reproduction and institutionalisation. Only in this light can we see the importance of Honneth’s earlier emphasis on struggles for recognition as a mode of participation towards social freedom. That when we participate and struggle for the alignment of recognition to complement our own ends and our social sphere, we can realise a sustained sense of social justice. Thus, our freedom to reflect on the contents of our consciousness achieved with socialisation enables us to articulate our sense of morality which we can then practice autonomously without restriction from external forces. Through this, Honneth sees the potential for the author of the Philosophy of Right to create a theoretical possibility of understanding how we can criticise institutions in the future in relation to our demand for social justice (FRS 61). This capacity is only made apparent if we were to read the Philosophy of Right as a transitional phase or a process that is still undergoing development and changes (FRS 62). As a concluding note, Honneth sees the realisation of the ethical life not in the absolute context of achieving a final state of social solidarity, but rather as a state of maintaining an equilibrium in sustaining freedom within social institutions.

3. The Realisation of Freedom in the Democratic Appropriation of the Ethical Life At this juncture, it is quite clear that Honneth’s agenda in Freedom’s Right is to supplement his earlier arguments in The Struggle for Recognition with an epistemic basis for a theory of justice that is rooted in social interactions. Honneth’s historical presentation of the forms of freedom derived from the theories of Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel aligns the idea of universal moral norms with an epistemic framework that draws from the validation of social institutions. In doing so, Honneth resolves the issue of reflexivity which, to begin with, was a problem with the conception of universal norms in Kant’s moral philosophy. Reflexivity,

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then, is no longer a self-contained process; it can now be viewed as a product of social engagements that are formative and progressive in the process of coming up with moral maxims that can be deemed universal by reflecting on its social implications. These social implications are inevitably tied to the capacity of individuals to become receptive to the experiences of others and their normative claims towards achieving selfrealisation with the support of the social structures that undergird their identities. The diagram for the looping process is as follows:

Fig.1

Fig. 1 reflects the feedback loop that occurs in social freedom when negative and reflexive freedoms can interact from within the private and public spheres. The goal here is to attain a cyclical evaluation of normative goals of society with the objective of individual self-realisation. In this looping process, the evaluative stance that is offered in the sphere of personal life under the reflexive freedom offered by social freedom allows the reflection of life goals and experimentation with understanding a stable relation-to-oneself. Parallel to the development of reflexive freedom, the subject is also trying to situate its own life-goals or objectives towards the norms that are created within the social sphere. In this sense, as we can see

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in the succeeding section of Honneth’s legal freedom, this looping process reciprocates to create a state of equilibrium between societal norms and the self-actualised project of realising individual goals and objectives. The contention that can be raised at this point against Honneth’s project is the recurring possibility of reification or the reduction of human identities to objectified identities. We can at this point speculate that if social reproduction is the main source of freedom, is it not possible to look at the sense of social freedom as a mere product of institutional norms being deeply ingrained in the habits of a person? Social orders or institutions are in no way self-legitimising (FRS 4); the lack of individual rapport leads to an atomistic conception of freedom and can result in a deeply problematic and pathological order of institutions. Following Hegel, Honneth is convinced that the dialectical process in which consciousness is built upon is a necessary factor in the ordering of norms within social interactions—that without support from individuals, social struggles will continue to persist to legitimise their own normative claims towards social institutions. Social freedom, thus, remains at the core of any freedom that can be conceived in social institutions. For without this function of enabling individuals to freely dispose themselves to their achievement of their own sense of self-realisation, the motivations behind their disposition to seek social integration would be negated by an atomistic conception of society. In other words, if my personal engagement towards the norms of society fails to recognise my unique identity as a possible contributor to its reproduction, then my recourse would be to turn into already existing norms that would allow me to validate my social identity. The fact that a social institution can exist, regardless of pathologies that surround its functions, means that to a certain degree some semblance of freedom is possible within that social structure. Honneth goes beyond the argument that Habermas presents in the Theory of Communicative Action by pointing out that the persistence of the existence of a social institution is not simply based on the intention to maintain the system but rather on the conviction that the people behind the system are capable of freely supporting its reproduction (FRS 4). Institutions merely guarantee a specific degree of objectivity of norms but will not persist in its reified state if it does not satisfy the autonomous consent of the individual who was entangled in the already existing societal norms. Honneth’s interest in this regard is to pursue a positive evaluation of how institutions can work out a concept of justice based on the freedoms that individuals enjoy in a social institution, for without this, the possible function of the institution

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will be hobbled by the lack of support that individuals must possess to reproduce norms. In the next series of analyses, Honneth looks at the theoretical praxis of social freedom under the context of legal and moral forms of freedom. The latter historical analyses lead us to the understanding that democratic institutions are the ones capable of supporting a system of social justice in which the autonomy and freedom of individuals are fundamental bases for social freedom. While the presupposition of freedom as a requirement for social justice may persist in Honneth’s arguments, in this section of his work, we can arrive at an understanding that freedom is not necessarily a persistent entitlement; rather, in a later progression, freedom becomes a right that is earned and maintained by social institutions and partners of social interactions. Since social institutions are the fundamental guarantor of social freedom, it will be necessary to look at the possible outcome afforded by the realisation of freedom in a legal and moral context by means of which negative and reflexive forms of freedom are realised, respectively.

3.A. The Purpose and Pathologies of Legal Freedom In the contexts of self-realisation, legal freedom is rooted in the guaranteed rights of an individual to be given his or her individual space to contemplate and even experiment with. The idea of legal freedom comes from the original notion of property ownership, where, through the auspices of already existing normative practices, an owner is guaranteed the right to freely dispose of the property according to his or her desire and will. Legal freedom is one of the epistemological point of reference that Honneth uses to argue for the existence of freedom in social relations. It is in this space that the bearers of legal rights can freely contemplate their own preferences and intentions (FRS 71). Honneth looks at these two epistemological points of reference to demonstrate that despite its capacity for disentanglement, the individual is faced with the inevitable decision of realising his or her freedom through social interaction. However, as an autonomous author of his or her own rights, the individual is ensured of autonomy by legal and moral rights. Honneth asserts that these two guarantees of the sphere of individual freedom are necessary for realising freedom and autonomy as points of reference in one’s sphere of rights (FRS 72). However, Honneth places these two forms of freedom in different ends, and I argue that legal and moral freedom are epistemic phases wherein negative and reflexive freedom are contemplated separately by the subject. To add to this remark, it is also notable that

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Honneth strictly limits these forms of freedom in the context of democratic institutions because of their capacity to support communicative forms of actions where social freedom is already in place. Legal freedom allows one to take an autonomous stance by suspending all social obligations to allow individuals a “private disclosure” of their own will towards their own selves (FRS 73). Legal freedom provides the right of the subject to freely dispose his or her own will towards the determination of goals and possible actions that are needed to acquire his or her own desire for self-realisation. One can take the example of the ownership of private property as the most basic example of legal freedom. The ownership of a car, for example, leaves me to contemplate this property in complete privacy regardless of any restrictions if it is in the proper context of the law. If I keep due diligence to the responsibilities given to the ownership of a vehicle, I have the right to freely dispose of the vehicle as I please without any interruption from the state or the government if it is within the proper context of the law. So, in this case, if I, for example, decide to lease my vehicle in a system of private leasing, the government cannot intervene in the action of my choice if I go about and fulfil any requirement that they have in this activity. Should it create a competition with other forms of transportation services, I ought to be given the freedom to freely proceed with my current choice of selfrealisation because it is outside the sphere of my contemplation. Following Hegel in the conception of “abstract right,” Honneth considers it as a function of private ownership as a means of satisfying the autonomous need to self-actualise and stabilise a sense of self-respect (FRS 73–74). Beyond the economic necessities of private ownership of property that Marx proposes, Hegel, as Honneth remarks, can explain how identities can realise their own will by having their own sense of dominion over objects that can provide a sense of identity (FRS 74). Honneth even goes as far as mentioning Virginia Woolf’s utopian conception of privacy as the right of all humans to their own rooms (FRS 75). By being able to dispense privately one’s own property, the individual forms an understanding of a negative sphere of freedom—that in place of freedom one ought to be able to examine one’s ethical self-examination (FRS 76). At this point, this is still a phase that allows individuals to practice selectivity. It can lead to practice if the individual can align his or her own self-realisation to the given normative resources at their disposal. This freedom, however, requires that one ought to be able to own a minimum amount of property to allow the individual to create the necessary contemplation regarding his or her own disclosure of will (FRS 77).

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Aside from the capacity to form an autonomous sense of exercising one’s will, the function of legal freedom also provides for the capacity of the individual to have a stable sense of self-identity or the “I” insofar as he is given the rights to enjoy the right to freedom passively without any engagement with the state, so long as their reflections remain private (FRS 79). Going further, however, the benefit of legal freedom allows the individual to have the necessary self-confidence to engage later with the social sphere, not merely as a passive receiver, but as an active addressee or author of legal norms (FRS Ibid.). This freedom, however, has some pathological consequences. Again, following the definition of a social pathology, Honneth stipulates that this form of pathology coming from legal freedom means that one is unable to rationally participate in social forms of cooperation (FRS 86). Social pathologies derived out of the context of legal freedom can be derived in two outcomes: (1) the reduction of social relations in the context of rights, and the reduction of freedom to the mere character of legal rights to the ends of the individual. (2) The second order of social pathology can also be seen in the case of apathy in the protected state of legal freedom, specifically in the context of the suspension of obligations (FRS 88). The first disorder is in the context of achieving legal rights in the context of abandoning everything in pursuit of a right denied to meet the ends of one’s will. As an example of social pathology of legal freedom, Honneth alludes to Heinrich von Kleist’s historical character of Michael Kohlhaas (FRS 88), a character that takes justice into his own hands due to the inability of the legal system to recognise and dispense his right.3 The social pathology that takes place in Kleist’s narrative is the atomisation of legal freedom applied to the social sphere through which the escalation of revenge, for the sake of justice, has violated other individual’s legal freedom. Honneth points out that the function of legal autonomy is intended for reflection wherein legal conflicts are subjectively dealt with in the contemplation of an individual to seek his or her own desire or goal. 3

Kohlhaas was a 16th-century horse vendor in Berlin who suffered a series of injustices which the legal system was unable to accommodate due to the feudal system that favoured nepotism. After the confiscation of his horses that he was supposed to exhibit in a trade fair, maltreatment of his servant, and the accidental murder of his wife, Kohlhaas decided to burn down a castle with an angry mob in a blind fit of revenge. Through a series of events, Kohlhaas inevitably succumbs to the rule of law. Facing execution, he was happy to know that his suit was accepted and is being compensated for his losses. With his horses released and in good health along with his servant, he happily accepts his fate as he is being prepared to be executed for his crimes.

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In other words, the figure of Robin Hood or the fictional Heinz from Kohlberg’s moral theory (at least in the pre-conventional level) has no right to overstep the boundaries of others to seek personal or subjective redemption regardless of their perceived right. In this sense, we should remember that Honneth’s intention is to resolve disputes in the framework of already existing norms; to add to this consideration, the context of revolt is no longer within the framework of Honneth’s theoretical presupposition. What is in place here is a resolution of conflict or dispute within the ambit of norms that led to the recognition of the social pathology in the first place. Zurn raises this issue in Honneth’s discussion of legal freedom in the context that makes legal identities aware of the existing normative principles of justice, and that the exclusion of those who ought to be included in the system of rights (i.e., minorities) has a strong claim towards juridical justice (Zurn 2015, 168). The point here is that we have a space guaranteed by legal rights to reject or accept any proposal that may directly affect the trajectories of the possibilities of selfrealisation, and in this space, we are given a chance to review whichever normative resources we can employ to navigate through different forms of legal relations. The social pathology that occurs here in this sphere is if we use these legal spheres of freedom to manipulate and ensnare other individuals within their own legal spheres to enjoy our negative sense of freedom (See Part Three, 2.A.). The lack of rational forms of negotiations or communicative action creates a disingenuous form of self-actualisation inasmuch as such action can only lead to an outcome in which legal freedom is not socially recognised as a morally acceptable manoeuvre. For example, the recent move by the CEO of the Turing pharmaceutical company, raised the cost of anti-retroviral drugs to 5000% justifying its cost on the account that the money earned from profits would be used to create better anti-retroviral drugs or drugs that are used for the maintenance of people suffering from HIV. Critics complain against Martin Shkreli’s decision to inflate a drug that costs around 1 USD to produce, sold previously at the price of 13.50 USD, and increased to the price of 750 USD following justifications of future developments for better drugs (BBC, 2015). While this may seem to be an isolated case, Shkreli argues that this has been a strategy employed by pharmaceutical companies and is quite annoyed by the fact that he has been singled out as a villain by the media (Swift, 2015). There is added pressure coming from the public and the government to decrease the price or make the drug affordable and yet at the same time maintain a stable flow of profit for the company’s intention to improve its research on antiretroviral drugs. This form of social pathology coming from legal freedom

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can be seen, not only as a motivation to utilise the law as an end for one’s means but also as a form of indifference to the moral responsibilities that an individual is subject to in the social sphere. By taking an objectifying stance, the individual in this social pathology subordinates the lifeworld by fitting in individualistic interest in generally accepted norms (i.e., law), therefore, severing the possibility of receptivity and communication with others (FRS 90). Suffice it to say that at this point, the legal freedom that was rightfully due to Shkreli’s decision to raise the prices of anti-retroviral drugs, however, in the perspective of a socially formed sense of morality, does not find recognition in the context of social freedom. This form of social pathology leads us to Honneth’s second observation of legal freedom as a source of social pathology. Moreover, this manoeuvre informs us of the limitation that legal freedom has in terms of achieving individual freedom against the backdrop of normativity. In the second case of legal freedom as a source of social pathology, Honneth notes that the rights given to an individual can also lead to an indecisive state of will or what Honneth would refer to as merely “drift[ing] along” (FRS 92). He remarks that individuals, in this case, are not simply faced with a lack of motivation to seek self-actualisation; rather, they are simply in the state of suspending their will in supporting any form of communicative obligations that are given through legal freedom (FRS 92). Furthermore, the lack of willing also comes with the problem of becoming isolated from the feeling of crisis (FRS 93), further depriving the individual a sense of urgency or even the sense of value attachments or beliefs (FRS 93). Through this apparent suspension of obligations, the individual’s misuse of the space for contemplation results in an action (or lack of action) that isolates one from realising possible forms of social integration and interaction within the communicative lifeworld. The resulting prolonged suspension afforded by legal freedom, in this case, becomes abused to the point that individuals who choose to remain isolated from obligations are supported by this withdrawal because of the legal rights that they bear. As a hypothetical example, one can imagine an overlysupportive welfare state system that takes care of jobless individuals to the degree that their government-funded stipends equal or exceed the resources earned by a minimum wage labourer. In this case, the motivation and obligation to take a profession and to sustain one’s livelihood become superseded by the convenience offered by the government. This illustration is concretised in Executive Order 129 (signed on October 15, 1993)–a reactionary law enacted by the Philippine president to counter

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“professional squatting” syndicates that have abused the free housing and land ownership programs of the Philippines. Specifically, the enactment is a response to the aftereffect of Republic Act (RA) 7279 of 1992 or the infamous “Lina law”—a welfare system of forcing unused and unoccupied lands to be redistributed to “lesser fortunate” Filipinos who might benefit from the redistribution of property. Through the lack of sustained planning and implementation of these legal freedoms afforded by Philippine law, aggravated by the continuous abuse of electoral promises of “pro-poor” and “anti-corruption” stances by Philippine politicians, these legal freedoms transformed into an uncontrollable social pathology that has sustained the livelihood of opportunistic individuals out of mendicancy. Welfare systems are supposed to reorient individuals towards their selfrealisation and place in the larger society. Thus, resources are usually made available by egalitarian states to provide them with a way to pick themselves up in situations where their integrative alignment with society becomes suddenly disrupted. The lack of more tangible examples on the side of Honneth may come as a surprise in the discussion of the second outcome of social pathologies derived from legal freedom. I suppose that at this point, Honneth wants to maintain a socially integrative stance that is made authentically possible with autonomous reflection on the side of the individual. While the space for reflection provides an effective means of deploying one’s own normative resources to validate societal norms for understanding social cohesion, it is, however, prone to legal reification (FRS 90). The problem of an autonomous assent towards normative obligations is the strong tendency to become reduced to merely playing out certain social roles (e.g., a tax payer, law abider, etc.). It is in this regard that Honneth moves on to the moral conception of freedom wherein autonomous assent becomes concrete in the perspective of personal subjectivity.

3.B. Moral Freedom Moral freedom, in contrast with legal freedom, considers the reflexive self-imposed obligations that an individual has in his or her social relations. Unlike legal freedom, moral freedom does not enjoy the same degree of institutionalisation of legal freedom (FRS 96). It does, however, share the same character of suspending social obligations for the sake of reorienting one’s normative resources for self-realisation. The basis of moral freedom, as Honneth stipulates, comes from the formulations of Kant’s categorical imperative, specifically, the universalisable character of a self-imposed moral code (FRS 97–98). The important thing to note here

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is that Honneth is now placing an emphasis on the non-institutionalised character of autonomous will formation as a basis for justifying an action that places the individual in a secure position to achieve self-realisation. Again, in contrast to legal freedom, the normative resources are no longer taken from already existing and institutionalised norms; rather, the point of reflection is personal and subjective since the individual tries to anticipate the effects of his or her own willing: The concept of ‘self-legislation’ at the heart of the idea of moral autonomy means that when subjects reflexively examine their intentions, they cannot help but obey universal laws that recognize all other subjects as ends in rational break with the forces of nature, being ‘free’ implies turning mere impulses and drives into rational reasons; it means acting on the basis of the impartial perspective of morality. (FRS 100)

This sphere of freedom means that despite our initial entanglements with norms that are instituted or otherwise, we are still under the obligation to legislate and enact our own sense of morality. Moral freedom further supports Honneth’s case of an autonomous assent towards norms when it is viewed in the perspective of individual rejection or evaluation of moral principles. Moral freedom, much like legal freedom, provides the individual space to formulate moral principles that are self-legislated. For Honneth, the conception of moral autonomy tries to overcome any forms of rationalisation or psychologisation of behaviour insofar as these effects ought to be reflected on autonomously by the individual (FRS 95). The reflexive character of moral freedom implies that one not only has to think moral norms in the context of its possible universalisation; one also must recognise the fact that others may also realise this possibility of a universal norm independently of their own accord. With this, Honneth observes that human dignity becomes secularised to the extent that one sees dignity in the other person on the account that they are capable of self-determination, and thus exercise a degree of rational autonomy as ends in themselves (FRS 99). Following Kant, Korsgaard, and Habermas, Honneth argues that the determination of our action implies that we are already obeying such selfimposed laws, while these moral-determinations are already taken from our entanglement with the circumstances of our practical identity (FRS 101). As with Korsgaard, Honneth agrees that we cannot avoid viewing the humanity in ourselves as an end in itself (FRS Ibid.). Zurn makes the following observation in Honneth’s notion of moral freedom:

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Part Three Whether it is a process of applying the categorical imperative to maxims of actions a la Kant or a process of justifying action norms before an unlimited communication community a la Habermas, the process of moral evaluation ultimately depends on our always-already accepting the rules and practices of our given social world. In short, despite the pretensions of moral autonomy, individuals cannot morally self-legislate the whole social world; much of that social world must be accepted as meaningful and binding if our moral evaluation is to have any bite in the first place. (Zurn 2015, 171)

At this point, what we can see in Honneth’s conception of moral freedom is a socialised conception of moral autonomy. Despite our entanglement with cultural forces that have always-already made our understanding of norms possible, our abstraction of the possible universalisation of our will can become a solipsistic practice if there is no formal sense of validating its possible universalisation. This capacity for self-legislation further enhances our capacity to conceive a possible rejection or negotiation of existing norms insofar as we can make sense of existing moral norms and constructively propose new systems of norms (FRS 104). In conjunction with recognition theory, the notion of the struggle for recognition can be conceived through the realisation that certain moral norms ought to be rejected because of their inherent contradiction to reason or to their projection of individuals as ends in themselves. Despite this emancipatory possibility, which can strongly support Honneth’s initial claims in recognition theory, Honneth clarifies that there are still limitations and social pathologies that can result from this form of freedom. The limitations behind the possibility of moral freedom are based on the foundation of the entanglement of individuals in an already existing culture of reason. As such, one of the requirements that Honneth stipulates in this form of freedom is the existence of mutual practices of recognition as a requirement for a stabilised relation-to-self to support moral autonomy within social interactions (FRS 105). Without a stable sense of self that can be mutually recognised (at least to the extent of recognising the possibility of reason in every person), the possibility of coming to terms with justifying one’s morally determined actions would be difficult to assert towards partners that are unwilling to recognise their communicative capacities. Following this, Honneth’s (A) first restrictions on moral freedom stem from the culture of reason that “moral autonomy” is socially accepted as a form of social interaction “in which subjects assume that there their partners in interactions are willing and able to come to reasoned judgments, and thus, enable each other to take a moral stance” (FRS 106).

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(B) The second limitation comes in the form of receptivity. Insofar as we can acknowledge the capacity of individuals to think of the moral justifications of their actions, we must also be willing to permit them to articulate whichever principle they deem to be right (FRS Ibid.). He further argues that the appeal of individuals to an articulation of a conscience implies that the subject is not simply invoking the right to have one, but also that there is a willingness to justify their individual capacity to act (FRS 107). (C) The third and final limitation of moral freedom gives us an idea of Honneth’s subtle dialectical formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative. In this limitation, it follows that through this process of communication, the capacity to validate an individual moral justification implies that there is also an intersubjective capacity to take perspectives in justifying the varying moral justifications offered by the multitude of social partners of interaction. The idea is that since we are both capable of viewing ourselves and the others as ends in themselves, we can also take different perspectives to view them neutrally or impartially (FRS 107108). Honneth is not presupposing an idealised detached “view from nowhere” (FRS 108); rather, he is proposing that despite the historical awareness, we should be able to detach from concrete attachments and obligations and not from institutional arrangements that are already in place (FRS Ibid.). In other words, we may be able to adopt a perspective of impartiality; however, it does not necessarily mean that we can fully detach from the norms that are already deployed to allow the necessary functions of social relations to take place. For example, we may form various moral objections and affirmations to the recent Philippine Reproductive Health Bill or RA 10354; we can take various perspectives such as the moral conviction that birth control and early sexual education are morally reprehensible for certain reasons, but we should always remember that these moral justifications must be capable of convincing others of their communicative rationality regardless of their individual subjective condition. To sum this up, Honneth intends to uphold the communicative aspect of moral freedom as a social integrative function of moral freedom. Without this goal in mind, the tendencies of moral freedom can also lead towards social pathologies and atomism. Because of moral freedom, Honneth notes two forms of social pathologies that can arise from a misaligned conception of moral freedom. Again, just like the previous conceptions of social pathologies, what we must be aware of is the possible trajectory of freedom to elicit social

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atomisation in terms of its objectifying stance and its isolationist tendencies. He further notes: In the protective space of legal freedom, we retreat into ourselves with the consent of all others, but in the reflexive moratorium represented by moral self-legislation we must arrive at an intersubjectively justifiable solution to conflicts, which means that our individual decisions always have effects on others. The value of moral freedom thus goes beyond that of legal freedom. The former merely entitles us to change our lives without being disturbed by others, while the latter entitles us to exercise influence on the public interpretation of moral norms. (FRS 112–113)

There are two possible consequences of moral freedom as a social pathology. In the first instance, (A) it can be a blindness towards the facticity of norms which can lead to a blind moralism; on the other instance, (B) it can also lead to a morally justified form of terrorism (FRS 114) that leads to consequences in which the universality of the moral imperative overrides the respect for individual moral autonomy. In both cases, we can see a strong sense of objectification of individual ends that no longer acknowledge the respect that ought to be granted to any individual capable of communicative reasoning. Zurn remarks that in the first form of this social pathology, we encounter the figure of the moral saint who simply bears the burden of responsibility as a means for its ends (Zurn 2015, 171). Honneth characterises the moral saint as an individual that is unable to detach from his or her moral role and, thus, mistakes socialisation as an objective moral role (FRS 115) that neither recognises his or her own facticity nor the facticity of others. The failure in this regard is the inability to assume a critical outlook on the nature of moral obligation (FRS Ibid.). One can imagine the following hypothetical scenarios: an overly altruistic welfare system and a parent who wants to completely isolate his children from the unsavoury realities of this world. In both examples, we can imagine the danger of excessive altruism not only in the context of its recipient but also in that of the altruist. In the first instance, we can think of the consequences of an overly altruistic welfare system to be extremely demanding of the efforts of taxpayers; moreover, such a scenario does not help in motivating recipients to become productive themselves which could be unfair to those who pay their taxes. In the other example, a parent whose altruistic care and concern for his children are faced with the consequences of depriving oneself the satisfaction of autonomy and, at the same time, he also deprives his children the autonomy that they need to develop to face the realities of life as they mature.

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Through the lack of the capacity of the subject to decentre himself or herself (FRS 116), the dialectical process of communicating moral justifications is nullified by the inability of the subject to put himself or herself in the position of the other, thus, leading to an atomistic or individualist conception of moral freedom. Moreover, in the second example, the idea of moral freedom becomes unhinged with the desire to universalise moral imperatives without considering already existing norms and the entanglements of those who are already within the system. The case of moral terrorism, despite the variety of available examples, is illustrated in the case Ulrike Meinhof and the Red Army Faction in Germany (FRS 119). Honneth refers to the activities of the Red Army Faction as a moral and political form of terrorism because the group’s separatist activities advocated the remilitarisation of the West German government (FRS Ibid.). Meinhof’s fanaticism led to a series of militant action, from a prison escape to a series of bank robberies which were supposedly justified because of Meinhof’s desire to bring back some freedoms that Germany was deprived of because of the Second World War. Honneth’s fascination with Meinhof lies precisely in the fact that Meinhof’s decision to abandon her integrative roles in society as a journalist, as a mother, and as a law-abiding citizen, for the sake of her moral fanaticism, has led to an abstracted form of a fictional other that would agree to her ideology and rise to the call of revolution. This is to say that despite the moral conviction of Meinhof, her ideology was isolated from the recognition of existing norms as possible avenues for resolving conflict within the lifeworld. The idea of change in the form of either a revolution or revision of norms has to be seen in the perspective of internal change. The case of moral freedom resulting in moral terrorism is pathological in the sense that it attempts to impose change within the system externally; thus, not only does it compromise the already existing system of norms, it also violates the capacity of individuals to reject a moral imperative or, as Honneth aptly refers to it—the “violation of social rationality” (FRS 113). In a related development for Germany’s re-arming, an anti-terrorist group was created to counter terrorist activities after the September 5, 1972, terrorist attack in Munich. The creation of the GSG-9 (Grenzschutzgruppe 9 der Bundespolizei) is a good example of how moral entanglements are resolved within already existing norms. Due to the constitutional laws of post-Second World War Germany, the German Military was prohibited from taking actions within German soil. Following the proposal to train the German police to counter terrorist activities, we can see a practical resolution of legislating the freedom of

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the German police to create GSG-9 as a workaround in the existing postwar German constitution. From this perspective, we can see that Honneth’s intention in examining these forms of freedoms and their possible realisation is to have a practical and formal articulation of Hegel’s objective spirit. It is crucial at this point that the idea of Hegel’s objective spirit in Honneth’s work is not merely understood as a terminal point of convergence in which every individual agrees to the ethical system in place; rather, it should be taken as a progressive development whose end is not necessarily met. Instead, the objective spirit is a state of equilibrium that is constantly developed through constant social participation and solidarity. To conclude this section, we can now see Honneth’s supplementation of his recognition theory with a concept of freedom that is inevitably intertwined with a social concept of justice. As a supplement to recognition theory, Honneth is now able to argue that the function of recognition can indeed avoid the problem of objectification, reification, and domination from the simple fact that contemporary democratic societies can provide the adequate social scaffolding for the realisation of freedom. I am convinced that in Honneth’s writings, there is a consistent tendency for him to argue the formative and progressive nature of freedom and recognition inasmuch as his writings give way to an authentic and empirical attempt at looking at social structures as a normative basis for the realisation of solidarity. This motive is precisely anchored on the universal desire of individuals and social groups to invoke their experience of disrespect as a normative basis for arguing against its presence in society. While the social structure of recognition acknowledges the fact that intersubjective receptivity is a requirement and the foundation for the possibility of reaching the equilibrium between solidarity and social atomism, we, nevertheless, cannot find in Honneth’s works that receptivity is the exclusive responsibility of either one party, neither the giver nor the receiver. While it is not strongly emphasised in Honneth’s work, this has caused some theoretical problems in the criticisms raised against Honneth’s recognition theory. If freedom were to be considered as an essential cornerstone of a society that seeks to live out the possibility achieving the good life, the ethical life, or the Sittlichkeit, it should autonomously consider the responsibility behind the right to recognise and the right to be recognised. In other words, the freedom behind the function of recognition to disclose identities must not only be supported by the addressees of recognition; it must also be reciprocally recognised as an autonomous function by the addressee, meaning that it can be withheld or

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given depending on the individual choice of the giver of recognition. At this point, Honneth’s discussion moves towards the argument that social freedom is already realised in existing modern forms of social and institutional relations.

4. Solidarity in Concrete Social Freedom In this section, I am going to outline Honneth’s examples of how freedom is embodied by actual forms of social and institutional realities. In the following discussion, I will demonstrate that Honneth can construct a convincing argument in which the idea of a struggle for recognition is realised in existing social and institutional relations, arguing further that these struggles have progressively changed social and institutional relations that lead to a more cohesive state of affairs in society. Honneth divides the social spheres into three different areas of social interaction by means of which freedom and solidarity are actualized, namely the (a) sphere of personal relations, (b) the sphere of the market economy, and (c) the sphere of democratic will formation. Honneth arranges each sphere and its dialectical triads in such a way that interactions can progressively achieve equilibrium. For example, in the case of personal relations, he follows the movement of friendship evolving into intimate relations and reaching its equilibrium in the family. From this point, the cyclical pattern is established as soon as the interaction leads to the development of identities that are individuated from the interaction and yet inextricably tied to the aforementioned triadic system. Just like his recognition theory, a perspective of linear progression will not do justice to Honneth’s conceptualisation of these spheres of interaction; hence, we must keep in mind that the social participants in these forms of interaction are constantly reproducing their own norms out of their constant development through interactions. At this point, one can see the obvious pattern like Hegel’s conception of a subject born out of the constant struggle between the sceptic and stoic patterns of consciousness, as these opposing patterns of consciousness provide both critical self-assessment and the necessary self-stabilisation of consciousness. Honneth is consistent in arguing for the positive aspect of the normative patterns of social interaction (PoS 123). Rather than suggest that we throw away the systems that are responsible for the social pathologies that we encounter, Honneth finds ways in which we can understand, appreciate, and further develop the progressive developments that have occurred in the last 200 years. This does not mean that Honneth is completely oblivious to the pathological

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effects of the ordering of social interactions. On the contrary, he is well aware of the limitations and pathologies created by the achievements of contemporary societies. This becomes apparent when we move on to the discussion of labour as a socialised form of freedom. While Honneth attempts to provide a detailed account of the progress of these manifestations of freedom in the social sphere, I will attempt to simplify the key points that he has articulated in his research since the context of his discussion is limited to developed democracies focusing mostly on European societies.

4.A. Personal Relations The three spheres of social freedom in Honneth’s work are depicted in the light of Herbert Mead’s the “I” and the “Me,” signifying the solidarity of social interactions as the “We” of social freedom. Honneth covers three types of personal relations wherein the formation of intersubjective receptivity between two parties is primarily developed, namely, (a) friendship, (b) intimate relations, and (c) families. Revisiting his debate with Fraser, we will notice that Honneth provides a deeper articulation of the first sphere of recognition in the form of love and care relations (RR 146). This development looks at the socially integrative act of forming confidence in the varying context of an interaction partner. Not only does this function lead the subject towards self-realisation, it also serves as an authentic starting point for sustaining solidarity. In friendship, there is an implicit rule that is followed by interaction partners who are freely disposed towards becoming open to one another. Honneth begins tracing the origin of social freedom in friendship in the development of a bourgeois notion of free-association regardless of class, status, or even the division of labour (FRS 132). Through the gradual free-play of socialisation between the classes, there has been a growth of practices and noninstitutionalised moral codes that were followed. Honneth further argues: We often hear that friendship cannot be said to represent an ‘institution’ in the sociological sense because it does not possess a self-reproducing structure, thus making its identity entirely dependent on self-understanding of the persons involved. (FRS 134)

Friendship historically begins in the relations of persons within the same social class and with the same interest in mind (FRS 136). One can imagine the collective union of friends from work, from common social circles, and even in the context of gender, wherein the common connection

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allows a shared understanding of each one’s lifeworld. Moreover, Honneth notes that the development of friendship gives people the space to suspend their economic calculations and interest to give way to receptivity (FRS 136). Moving from this friendship meant that there was a learning process of understanding informal rules that are based on benevolence and sympathy towards peers (FRS 137). Honneth further observes that the premodern form of social connection was made between same-sex individuals who attained a sense of camaraderie based on sexual division. One can imagine then the contemporary bars and pubs where men talk about their problems at home or work or the kind of conversations that women would engage in when they are shopping for clothes or having their hair styled in a salon. As class distinctions became more relaxed and interaction partners became more varied, men and women begin to engage in relations of friendship (FRS 138) without the expectation of romance, sex, or even marriage in mind. This broadening of horizon means that rules, despite their informality and lack of institutional control, are proliferated among interaction partners and are tailored for everyone’s sensitivity and emotional needs: Subjects intuitively master the normative rule that ‘true’ friends owe each other the willingness to attend to their respective concerns and consult on difficult decisions; that they treat each other’s secrets with discretion and not pass such information on to others with advice and care; and that they should offer sympathy even if they disagree with the other’s decision. (FRS 138)

The social freedom that we enjoy in the experience of friendship is the capacity to become vulnerable and even receptive to the nature of our interaction partners as needy individuals since their reciprocal actions to return these same expectations to us, allow us to simply be ourselves as needy individuals. In other words, with friends, we become entrusting in our disclosure of our desires without the fear of aversion from the other (FRS 140). Much like the function of legal and moral freedom, friendship allows a suspension of roles in the public sphere that allows us a unique opportunity to explore and relate to ourselves as well as others while at the same time restricting ourselves by choice to allow the reception of different subjectivities (FRS Ibid.). This is not to say, however, that the idea of friendship is completely free from forms of instrumentalisation or objectification. Honneth notes that in the “privatistic orientation” towards career opportunities and the circumstances of daily life, the authenticity of friendship can also be compromised (FRS 140–141). In fact, the complexities

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of subjectivities are one of the reasons why Derrida provokes the issue of the purity of the notion of friendship with the statement “Oh my friends, there is no friend” (Derrida 1993, 26). Whether friendship is ultimately reconcilable with the purpose of identifying intentions or altruism is, however, a learning process for Honneth. Honneth’s understanding of friendship, much like any social interaction, is a continuously learned process of mutual receptivity. Like Derrida’s critique of the metaphysical stance of identities, Honneth’s evaluation of friendship relations progresses beyond instances of identity reductive episteme or simply what Honneth refers to as reification. Furthermore, despite the possibility that relations of friendship can be reduced to mere cronyism, camaraderie, or instrumentalities of ends (FRS 141), relations of friendship can become self-correcting as long as there is a mutual willingness from both parties for receptivity. Friendship, thus, for Honneth is a resilient foundation by means of which a democratic ethical life can take place (FRS Ibid.), that despite the increasing level of atomisation and individuation experienced in the context of labour, economics, and politics, friendship can still be an authentic and solidaristic form of interaction that maintains social freedom. In the next form of personal relationships, Honneth explores intimate relations as a form of a democratised engagement of both heterosexual and homosexual couples (FRS 142). One of the key assertions that Honneth makes is the gradual progressive changes in intimate relations that further allow individuals to practice and experiment with their identities. Starting from Hegel’s suggestion of freedom in dispensing affection in marriage (FRS 143), Honneth traces the legitimacy of relations between both heterosexual and homosexual partners. Initially thought of as a function of marriage, intimate relations were given freedom in modernity through the recognition of mutual affection as an important basis for marriage (FRS Ibid.). Going back to the institution of marriage, initial relations were usually instrumental to certain objectives, such as the distribution of labour, exchange of goods, and even the creation of political and economic bonds between families. The realisation of the need for mutual intimacy can be seen in the need for upper-class men (and perhaps, women) to satisfy their needs outside marriage (FRS Ibid.), not only in the context of sex but also in the context of mutual intimacy. An analogue to this is the common practice of concubinage of Filipinos that are of Chinese descent or with Filipino wives (non-Chinese descent) where the Filipino wife can take economic roles within the family in the absence of the “pure” Chinese wife (Chu 2010, 363). This practice is often taken under the context of arranged marriages within the so-called “pure Chinese” Filipino citizens, perhaps to overcome the formality of social interactions within their racial

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community. In fact, the formality of marriages in the Philippines, particularly with the lack of divorce and the expensive alternative of annulment, has made the act of concubinage prevalent despite the hefty legal penalties imposed upon this act. Honneth notes that these tendencies later made progressive movements in modernity that allowed marriages to gradually break free from material calculations; moreover, gender equality became prevalent as women gradually took various roles in society (FRS 144). Women, in this sense, could rebel against established norms that prevented them from exercising their right to intimacy. Furthermore, progress in the social struggles of the 1960’s (i.e., Women’s Suffrage Movement) led to more freedoms that allowed greater receptivity to mutual intimacy rather than simple societal role assignments via traditional sexual categories. This progression in contemporaneous settings has allowed a greater opportunity for experimentation and intersubjective receptivity in which personal identity is mutually disclosed and developed through intimate relations. Through these developments, we can now see that in some societies same-sex relations are not only tolerated but also supported by law (FRS 145). The practice of freeing up and democratising intimate relations has played a very important role in addressing gender and sexual roles not merely in the context of reproduction but also within the bounds of labour and production. Women today, despite some instances of wage discrepancies, enjoy a broader sense of freedom in choosing from a broader spectrum of self-realising activities beyond the usual sexual boundaries that used to be limited to child care and homemaking. Honneth notes that the proliferation of contraceptives, increase in integration in labour practices, divorce laws in some countries, and flexible social roles have progressively developed an integrative role in becoming receptive to the needs of women (FRS Ibid.). Likewise, in the case of homosexuals, more room was made for the recognition of their autonomous choices for experimenting with their sexual intimacy, as same-sex relations are becoming more acceptable and even legally recognised by some societies. To this extent, old taboos regarding sexuality have been legally accepted, functioning within the framework of consent (FRS 147). In fact, the American manual for psychiatry, or the DSM (Diagnostic Statistical Manual) has been revised wherein, now, homosexuality is no longer classified as a mental illness as opposed to its first iteration in 1952.4 One example of this acceptance can be seen in England’s National Health Services inclusion of sex-change operations as a right of its citizens to opt 4

At the time of writing, the DSM is in its fifth iteration.

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for gender reassignment surgery. Since its implementation in 1995, more than a thousand people have availed of this service where 10 million pounds has been shouldered by U.K. taxpayers (Condron 2009). What is important in Honneth’s observation is that we are becoming more aware of intimacy as an autonomous form of mutual recognition and social solidarity. The exercise of social freedom in this sense increases the capacity of individuals to pursue forms of self-realisation that are inevitably rooted in the interactions that a person might encounter in a diversified society. The tolerance and acceptance of these alternative practices of intimacy can sometimes go beyond the control of legal institutions. In the Philippines, the practice of cohabitation and concubinage has been a commonly accepted norm, to the point that individuals are no longer ashamed of publicly declaring polygamy despite its 5 to 12-year prison sentence. While these observations may seem to depict Honneth’s evaluation of social freedoms in groundless and frivolous forms of intimacy, we must understand that he is looking at instances wherein norms are transformed through the communicative efforts of individuals to integrate socially within their respective spheres of interaction. In the examples that Honneth provides in Freedom’s Right, we can clearly see that the intention is to show how certain forms of struggles for recognition have been successful over time in proliferating an autonomy of identities within the already existing norms of their respective life worlds. Likewise, in my use of Philippine-based examples, we can see avenues wherein societal norms can be evaluated or even aligned to deal with existing social pathologies. Going further in Honneth’s observations of social freedom in existing democratic societies, we can now see how the sphere of friendship and intimacy play an important role in the development of authentic and consented relations in which implicit norms are established to realign individual asymmetries. The ability to engage and disengage in a relationship provides the necessary freedom for individuals to reflect on their orientation towards self-realisation. Despite this, Honneth is still aware that the capacity to withdraw from these previously mentioned forms of relations can still be an avenue through which lasting bonds of intimacy may be broken (FRS 154). For this reason, Honneth moves on to the families as a lasting reciprocal form of social solidarity. In the third sphere of Honneth’s triangulation of personal relations, the involvement of a third-party among adult relations (i.e., children) adds an additional layer of responsibility where intimate relations are mediated

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(FRS Ibid.). In other words, the inclusion of a child (biological or adopted) in the equation of intimate relation (be it heterosexual or homosexual) provides the foundation for a lasting form of solidarity within the context of the ethical life. In the context of modern families, Honneth notes that the interplay between families provides a suitable basis for the progressive development for social freedom, as children become gradually recognised as an independent partner of interaction within the family. He further notes, in the Hegelian sense, that the child in a modern family is no longer treated as “an sich,” rather, he or she is a “für sich” in the sense that the child is a part of the triad (FRS 158). In Hegel’s terms, an sich refers to the potential of a thing, while für sich refers to the actual or the actuality of the thing. In other words, the child in this form of interaction is not merely passive in receiving the norms of communication and action in the family; the child is an actual participant in the sense that he or she also contributes to the forces that shape the consciousness of the participants. In this third sphere, Honneth tries to extract the historical development of the child’s role within the family from its beginning as a mere recipient of care (FRS 157) and parental fixations on order and obedience (FRS 158), to becoming an “independent entity” that possesses its own voice (FRS Ibid.). Honneth also notes the transition of familial structures from a patriarchal assignment of labour to women as primary caretakers and “homemakers” to “partners” as significant historical transitions within the structure of the family (FRS 160). Accordingly, he observes that the most significant transformation in this partnership is the involvement of the father in the “affective, caring socialisation process” that was initially seen as a maternal responsibility (FRS 161). He also attributes this shift in familial care to two changes in modern families, one of which is the introduction of divorce in familial relations where other members of the family are still willing to maintain a form of cooperation despite the failure of marriage (FRS 162). Another developmental change is the extension of permanent intimate relations to the children, children-in-law, and grandchildren of the married couple (FRS Ibid.). Furthermore, the additional benefit of technologies allows a sustained contact between family members regardless of their spatial distance that can be easily traversed by transportation or various forms of communication (FRS 163). These changes have further solidified the structures of intimate relations in the context of the family, which is further increased by the freedom of families to control the number of children that they have, thus increasing the willingness of family members to cooperate in child rearing (FRS Ibid.). Further developments also involve the willingness of parents,

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particularly the father, to suspend career opportunities to devote more time and care for their children (FRS 165). What captures Honneth’s attention is the voluntary willingness of reciprocation that can be observed in modern families as a potential for developing a sense of cooperation among social participants. He notes that the act of caregiving that the parents provide often gets reciprocated in their late-adult stage where children are willing to take care of their parents. Likewise, the reciprocal triadic relations also transform the parent to a receptive subject that tries to reach intersubjective receptivity with children by “playing” with them and relieving themselves of the circumstances of their age and role (FRS 171). What we can see here is the change from a patriarchal or matriarchal overseeing of children to the transformation of friendship between parent and child, which results in a fulfilment of normative expectations and feelings that create a lasting attachment (FRS 166). This cyclical pattern of care and love in this triadic relationship of families involves the lasting and voluntary cycle of care, which reflects the cooperative realisation of social freedom and intersubjective receptivity. Honneth further remarks: This cyclical phenomenon, which Hegel and his contemporaries could not even imagine, because the life expectancy did not allow it, provides a measure of consolation that might not reconcile us with death, but nevertheless relieves us of some of its graveness. By becoming the ‘parents’ of their parents, adult children symbolize the cycle of life at a level of human sociality. This is not to say that this caring return to the start of the parent’s life can remove the solitude and fear surrounding death, but perhaps this peculiar force of de-realization [Derealisierung] can create the healing and consoling illusion that our life within the circle of the family will return to its beginning and thus find a proper conclusion. If we see an element of freedom here, a measure of relief from the oppressive solitude and fear of death, then this is also due to the intersubjective practices that were initially institutionalized in the modern family. This has become one of the few places where subjects can receive secular consolation, since they are able, at least in their imaginations, to see themselves as part of an eternal whole. (FRS 172)

In this lucid and poetic depiction of familial relations, Honneth provides us with a potent justification of parental care in the context of human sociality. While this may strike one as an idealistic musing on the side of Honneth, this structure of care has become more prevalent in most countries that foster tighter bonds not only within the nuclear family itself but also within the extended family. As surprising as it sounds, even countries such the United States, which usually fosters independence of

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adults, has moved to the tendency of supporting parents in their old age as opposed to the usual practice of delegating them to retirement homes (Patten 2013). With the rising state of inflation and economic crises, the justification for a cyclical tripartite structure of care within the family becomes more attractive and sensible for the newer generation of late adult parents and middle adult children to have stronger familial ties. In the Philippines, the norm for parental care in their late life is often considered as a responsibility and duty of their children, owing to the close emotional and economic bond of children with their parents. Modern life today, for Honneth, finds greater justification in gaining consent for some form of financial redistribution for this kind of family as it promotes a greater sense of cooperation and cohesion (FRS 173). On this note, we now move on to the sphere of the market economy as the second manifestation of social freedom.

4.B. Morality in the Economics of Market Relations By establishing the importance of the family in the development and sustenance of social freedom, Honneth proceeds to look at the nature of relations of cooperation in the context of market economics by providing a normative reconstruction of its moral assumptions. Following this, Honneth discusses the relational aspect of the market economy and their effects on consumption and labour. A peculiar characteristic found in the market economy is the lack of an explicit normative core that can be seen in personal relations (FRS 177). Historically, economics as a system of production and consumption in capitalist systems are determined through the function of supply and demand (FRS 178). The law of supply and demand seems to imply that there is no specific normative basis for the direction of consumption and production, meaning that it is entirely indifferent to the moral considerations and ethical forms of embedding values (FRS Ibid.). In this context, production simply takes place according to the demand of its consumers while at the same time labour, as the economic outcome for the demand for consumption is entirely dependent on the increase or lack of demand for a certain product. The issue that interests Honneth in this area is how cooperative actions in the history of modern capitalist societies have led to the development of moral norms within the market economy. By proving the existence of moral norms amidst the function of supply and demand, we can look at progressive tendencies for solidarities between capitalists, consumers, and labourers, as well as point out some areas wherein possible social pathologies, can occur.

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Capitalism for Honneth is an economic system that “owes its existence historically to massive intervention of the state” were reactionary movements came to liberate individual freedom to practice and pursue self-interested calculation that is free from state control (FRS 179). The general assumption behind capitalism is that by allowing self-interested pursuits of entrepreneurs, the state inevitably creates a system of production of goods and services provided by private individuals who earn profits by investing in the process of production. In this enterprise, private individuals are motivated to participate in economic modes of production by the fact that they earn a profit from such transactions. By reducing state intervention and acknowledging the freedom of individuals to invest their capital, the state can sustain the needs of the consumers and provide sources of livelihood through the employment of individuals in the production of goods. Capitalism not only has a long history of success in economics; it also has a reputation for exploiting the social freedoms involved in consumption and labour. On the one hand, consumption can be entirely controlled to the extent that prices of products can be manipulated in collusion to maximise profit. On the other hand, labour can also be controlled to the point that, despite the freedom of workers to engage or disengage in the process of production, their subsistence is economically held hostage by the structure imposed by the owners of the means of production. Honneth sees the theoretical underpinning of this critique of capitalism in Karl Marx and Adam Smith. Both thinkers are oriented towards the opportunities that allow individual freedom to be achieved, and yet both have opposed conclusions in realising individual freedom (FRS 180). Honneth asserts that in the case of Marx, the value of freedom in capitalism only covers legal forms of freedom and, consequently, may hold the freedom of choice in labour by controlling the availability of labour itself (FRS 181). In the case of Smith, the achievement of selfrealisation through the free enterprise of capitalism is made possible if subjects have previously “taken up a beneficent and trusting attitude toward each other” (FRS 182). For Smith, healthy forms of competition can benefit the production of goods and make them affordable through the motivation of profit. However, this does not account for the possibility of strategic forms of action that dominate and control the supply and demand of goods. Despite the seeming absence of norms that regulate these relationships insofar as egocentric needs are concerned, Smith’s intentions were conceived in the precondition that solidarity exists within the sphere of the market. The absence of morality or the state of “anomie,” as Honneth remarks in his reading of Durkheim, occurs when the capitalist market is

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robbed of normative values that support commonly shared “norms of solidarity” (FRS 187). The problem with the Marxist critique of capitalism, however, is that it seems to forget the explicit circumstance in which capitalism ought to thrive with the ideas of solidarity required by Smith, Hegel, and Durkheim (FRS Ibid.). Following Karl Polanyi and Talcott Parsons, Honneth argues that the interconnectedness of market and social relations implies the need for norms that ensure fair and benevolent treatment of all (FRS 189), for, without this safeguard, the capitalist economic order will not be able to reproduce itself. In other words, the order in which economic actors and entities can interact socially is on the complementary nature of the freedom that they enable in one another. A worker, for example, gains a livelihood by contributing to the process of production; the capitalist dispenses the necessary capital to provide jobs for the labourer, which, in turn, provides the material needs of society. The cooperative function of the market means that if there is a presence of deviation from the complementary form of interactions between these forces, then attempts would be made to correct it because the autonomous will of these individuals will greatly affect the continuity of the reproduction of norms in the market. For example, if the labourers are treated poorly and given inadequate forms of compensation, a strike might occur that will cripple the supply of goods and services. Likewise, in the case of the capitalist, without the proper incentive for them to earn a profit, their investment in the means of production will be withheld or withdrawn. In the same case, the deprivation of satisfaction on the side of the consumers (who in turn might also be labourers) will result in a discontinuity of consumption and can greatly affect the profit of the capitalist and the availability of work for the labourers. Thus, despite the deviation from moral norms, we can always observe the rootedness of these three actors in the market economy as morally vested in each other: Expressed in terms of recognition, this means that economic actors must have recognized each other as members of a cooperative community before they can grant each other the right to maximize individual utility. And the degree of these negative freedoms must be measured in terms of their reconcilability with the requirements of antecedent recognition. (FRS 192)

In other words, considering the cooperative function of this community, the realisation of their freedom lies in the complementary recognition of each one’s role in the market economy. Antecedent forms of recognition grant these individuals the normative resources that allow a reconciliation in immanent changes in their interaction. For example, the demands for increased protection of workers, consumer rights, and

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economic bailouts are all examples of cooperative desires to keep these actors functional and motivated to contribute and cooperate in the market economy. Since the critique of capitalism is always aimed at the accusation of capitalists’ state of anomy in their self-interested desire to gain and accumulate wealth, Honneth moves his normative reconstruction towards the two market actors, namely consumption and labour. In consumption, we see an equation occurring between the needs and esteem. Honneth remarks that these two areas of consumption reflect the kind of satisfaction where consumers can recognise and be recognised for the products that they consume. Evolving primarily from the basic needs, to private needs that emphasise comfort, to the quality of becoming esteemed for its own sake, consumer goods grant individuals a sense of identity (FRS 199). Notwithstanding the sense of self-confidence gained from providing the basic needs, consumer goods also provide the necessary class distinction or esteem by its capacity to differentiate identities on the level of resources that are available to a person. On another note, consumption also provides us with a complementary understanding of our relational activities with production (FRS 200). A consumer should have, for example, a source of livelihood to earn the resources for consumption. Likewise, in the process of earning a livelihood, the consumer also participates in the production of other goods or services that can benefit consumers. This intertwined structure is exactly the reason why the market economy cannot be divorced entirely from its moral implication. The failure, for example, of privatisation of public transportation in the Philippines, specifically with the competing markets of the Grab services and existing taxi companies, lies precisely in the blindness of business owners, consumers, and the government to recognise the interconnectedness of their roles in the market. While consumers complain about the prices and the quality of services, they forget that despite these high prices, the labourer in the form of the driver is barely earning from his or her work because the majority of the earnings go to the public utility vehicle’s5 business operator. Meanwhile, as the operator demands a higher rent rate, the driver is forced to work 12 to 24-hour shifts just so he could bring home enough money to feed his family. The failure of the government lies 5

To contextualise, in the Philippines, any transport system that could be hired is referred to as a public utility vehicle. While the name implies public use, it does not necessarily mean that these vehicles are owned by the government. They could be owned and operated by the government, a private entrepreneur, or a private corporation.

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in its inability to see these interconnections and take preventive measures that control or regulate the condition of labour. The lack of foresight is immediately seized by the Grab company, offering their services as a network of rentable cars, with slightly higher price, but with more decent comfort, safety, and convenience which are very attractive to consumers. The Grab company has significantly captured the market by taking advantage of the hapless situation of taxi drivers and the weakness of the state; this has profoundly influenced the behaviour not only of consumers but also of labourers who are enterprising enough to take a loan on a vehicle and pay it through their earnings with the Grab company. What we can learn from this is that self-interestedness must necessarily be aligned with cooperation to successfully fulfil the already existing normative expectations underneath the structure of cooperation. What makes this situation problematic is the legal freedom built into this structure of normative practices. On the one hand, existing normative practices guarantee certain forms of freedom for the participants, namely, that the taxi drivers as labourers are free to choose the gainful employment of their choice; meanwhile, the business operators are also legally free to make the arrangement of employment with their drivers, and the consumers are also legally free to decide on which transport service they want to patronise. These legal freedoms, despite the intention of allowing the participants to align their own means of achieving forms of self-realisations (i.e., getting to work on time, earn enough profit from the business, and find gainful employment as a driver), can be subject to social pathologies that are disintegrative and undermine the moral norms that would provide the proper intersubjective feedback loop that would recognise the situations of the social participants. At this juncture, we could say that the purpose of freedom to engage in these social interactions does not only validate the moral sovereignty of participants as a form of “human dignity,” but, moreover, the freedom accorded to these social actors of the market economy is there to ensure that interests and mutual cooperation are authentically assented by its participants. It is interesting to note that the Grab company offers a much more integrative solution to the social pathology that has been plaguing the public transport system, and this is evinced by the consumers who continue to patronise such services.6

6

Furthermore, the exacerbation of constant self-interests, coupled with the lack of foresight of the Philippine government, has made the radical privatisation of transport hailing system more popular in the recent times. We can see that the

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In the previous example, we can see the inextricable connection of necessary cooperation among market actors. Honneth points out the consumer’s need for recognition, not simply as an individual need, but one where esteem is also achieved through the consumption of goods and services. Going back to the presupposition of the basic needs as required products of consumption, Honneth marks the importance of the changes in the esteeming qualities of consumption as a reflection of misdevelopments in the market economy (FRS 203). Following Hegel’s moral economism, Honneth looks at the role of the state as a protector of consumers if the market begins to exploit the lack of information and discursive mechanisms available to consumers (FRS 205). Honneth cites a number of issues that can be associated with this necessity of protecting consumers. On the one hand, advertising and its psychology of consumption can greatly affect the consumer behaviour of consumers, thus making them vulnerable to the strategic action of influencing consumers to purchase goods as “needs” (FRS 206). On the other hand, the market can also be a social space of interaction that requires “fair” treatment of consumers because of their dependencies on products that are necessary for everyday life (i.e., food regulation and inspections) (FRS 207). Honneth further argues the importance of the sphere of consumption and the moral implications it has in the social sphere: In the tradition of moral economism, the market for consumer goods can be understood as an institutionalised relation of mutual recognition, provided that the relationship between sellers and consumers contributes to the complementary realization of each party’s legitimate interests. Therefore, consumers can only realize their freedom to satisfy their existing structure of normative integration in its poorest implementation in the existing transport system in the actual preference of consumers to pay higher fees just to accomplish the normative expectation of safe, reasonable, and prompt transport system. The fact that the common colloquialism of the word “Filipino time” is already remarked by the Filipino linguistic ethnologist Leonardo Mercado as the “unpunctuality” of Filipinos (Mercado 1974, 107) is further made true by the difficulty of acquiring proper transport system in the Philippines. This is not to say that this case is an isolated phenomenon in the Philippines; there are plenty of transport hailing systems in the world that are recently seeing success because of the dissatisfaction of consumers towards traditional modes of public transportation. Recently, in France, the transport hailing company Über, which takes a similar model as the Grab company, has been under heavy criticism from traditional transport groups because of its popularity and the profit it gained from taking the customers of traditional taxi services (BBC, January 27, 2016). This was triggered by a heavy protest from French taxi firms and drivers who blocked a major road in Paris for a strike (BBC, January 26, 2016).

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individual interests by offering companies an opportunity for profit maximization through consumer demand on the market. Conversely, companies can only maximize profits by actually producing the goods that consumers demand. But none of these variables is determined by the market itself—neither the profit margin of companies, nor the kind of needs that can be satisfied on the market, nor the means for awakening needs, nor the manner in which consumption is realized. (FRS 208)

Historically, the market economy can function by considering the moral implications of its consumers as mutually regarded entities that support the successful endeavour of any capitalistic system. Antecedent forms of recognition can be observed as a socially integrative function of the market to accommodate the consumer’s needs, not just as an objective source of profit but also as a source of feedback in which improved consumer satisfaction of needs can result in cohesive forms of realising the identities of everyone involved in the market economy. Honneth provides plenty examples of these movements in the 19th and 20th century, from the “bread riots” that demand the availability of elementary commodities, and the creation of consumer cooperatives (FRS 209), the shift of material to non-material aspects of consumption such as the use of an SUV as a symbol of status (FRS 217), and the use of market research as a penetration of consumer identities and targeted advertisement (FRS 219). This points to the relevant and constant struggle between consumer and producer to integrate with one another towards a moral norm of market economics. This is not to say that there are no ethical problems traded along the way; in fact, Honneth paints a very pessimistic picture of consumer culture. He refers to the culture industry that is forewarned by Horkheimer and Adorno, as well as Arendt, as the lamentably forgotten critical diagnosis of the broader population (FRS 211–212). Over the course of his arguments, Honneth concludes that the problem of consumerism as a disintegrative culture that inhibits social freedom is rooted in the lack of public discourse that can exercise long-term influence on the needs of consumers (FRS 221). To continue, Honneth moves on to the labour market because of its potential in empowering the consumer to earn the resources that they need to purchase products and services (FRS 222). The labour market represents the final connection in Honneth’s triangulation of the market economy since it holds the key role in determining the capacity of consumers to interact with the market economy. The objectifying activity of labour—objectifying in the sense that it actualises their desire for self-realisation—depends on the esteeming function that it grants to modern humans (FRS 223). In his reading of

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Hegel, Honneth notes that this is a sector of human interaction that is prone to exploitation and must be protected via government intervention (FRS Ibid.). Historically, we can look back as far as the guild system in Medieval Europe as an example of cooperative collaborations between manufacturers, artisans, and craftsmen who controlled the market economy by taking into their hands the production, training, and distribution of goods in the market. Guilds were responsible for influencing the social side of the market by being personally attached to a social community, thereby directly becoming in contact with the modes of production and the consumers that purchased their goods. With the rise of the industrial revolution, the market economy took a turn in its system of production by mechanising the process of production and gradual elimination of labourers due to the efficiency offered by new technologies. For example, the fabric manufacturing industry no longer relied on actual human hands that needed to be trained, apprenticed, and deployed to certain areas of the country to gain further mastery of the craft as a journeyman. This shift in the market economy has somewhat deprived people of their meaningful way of articulating their desire for self-realisation since their craft or their labour was already deemed redundant by the technologies that proved to be more efficient, productive, and profitable for capitalists who invested their resources in these technologies. In this light, what we can see from this shift is the gradual disintegration of the cooperative structure of the market economy. The consequence of this historical development leads us to the under-nourishment of the labour sector as it begins to assert its own moral demands and expectation against capitalist modes of production. Honneth, at this juncture, begins to trace the development of counteractive or “counter moves” (FRS 191) initiated by the labourers and the state using unions, self-help organisations, and NGOs. Of course, we are reminded at this point about the degrading conditions of labour seen in the early stages of the industrialisation of Europe, more specifically in the depiction of England by Marx and Engels. The labourers, being deprived of meaningful and gainful work through their profession, had to abandon their work due to the heavy competition posed by capitalist modes of production, employing themselves in factories and performing menial, repetitive, and sometimes dangerous forms of work just to gain the minimum amount of resources for survival. Reminiscent of Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique of enlightenment, we see in these phases of market economy the regression of man to the natural struggle for survival amidst nature. The difference, however, is that nature is no longer the oppressor, but human agency. The progressive observations that Honneth made involved two major modifications in the labour aspect of the market

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economy—the capacity of workers to organise and, at the same time, the intervention of the state through the welfare system that buttressed the instability of the labour market to protect the dignity of the labourers and provide them the necessary resources to recuperate from economic uncertainties (FRS 230-232). These social innovations protected labourers from being exploited by creating a discursive system that allowed them to struggle for the recognition of workers and negotiate their rights through existing channels of legal and moral communication. Suffice it to say, that this modern innovation protected workers from economic uncertainties through various means such as the steady progression of labour through training, adjustment of wages for inflation, bonuses, and even paidvacations—all for the benefit of maintaining harmonious and selfmotivated relations within the labour market (FRS 241). The picture depicting the solidarity between the labourer and the market economy is far from being positive. The dismal reality behind the labourers’ constant need to struggle for recognition is that they also develop self-esteem through the power of consumption. The capacity to consume is directly related to work or one’s source of income. Beer bread, for example, was one of the major forms of compensation that factory workers received in exchange for labour, but through the gradual discovery of cheaper and more efficient substitutes, such as coffee and tea, beer bread was gradually replaced by caffeinated drinks that made workers more alert and productive. Further misdevelopments also occurred in history, as Honneth notes; for example, the narrow and much more wellpaid strata of office workers have created class distinctions between manual labour and specialised labour (FRS 237). Moreover, the diversification of the labour market has made the popularity of unions decline. These class distinctions had a profound effect on the pursuit of meaningful employment for labourers (FRS 241). Despite the intervention of certain states that allowed affordable and sometimes free forms of education, education was still inaccessible to most labourers. For example, in the United States, despite the benefit of a 12-year free and state-funded education, higher forms of education that made better-paying jobs were still inaccessible due to the disparity between salaries and the cost of education. An estimate of the average projected cost of college education per year for 2018 ranges from 28,000 USD for public colleges, to 59,000 USD for private colleges or universities (Onink 2015). In the Philippines, despite the similar structure of providing free basic public education, the difference in quality between public and private education meant that public school-educated children had fewer chances of acquiring higher

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education in public universities due to the latter’s competitive standards that cater mostly to private school-educated children. The social disintegration that is at work in these examples provide us with the perspective that the relationship between the market, the consumer, and the labourer is a constant struggle of preserving the interest of the three. Honneth proposes that by socialising the institution of the market, one can adequately satisfy the needs of the three actors to not only pursue their individual advantages but also collaborate as a cooperative institution that is receptive to each other’s needs (FRS 249). This is of course not entirely impossible if we look at certain socialised forms of market relations. A good example that can be given is the American automobile company Saturn. Saturn Corporation was the subsidiary trademark given by the American automobile firm General Motors. The idea behind the company is to provide competitive and innovative products in the automobile industry that satisfied the worker, customer, and the investors. The Saturn Company built its business model of socialising the work place; workers, on one hand, are given the freedom and flexibility to choose their shifts, participate in decisions regarding the marketing and production of automobiles, share company profits on top of their salaries, and be protected by the United Automobile Workers Union (UAW). These practices not only established a very amiable working environment but also captured dedicated customers that were very happy with the service and the quality of their products. Despite this realisation of a utopian appropriation of a socialised capitalistic business model, the company inevitably suffered a closure following its competition against its mother company General Motors (GM) as well as the economic bailout given by the government to GM (Hanna 2010). This decision led to the inevitable demise of Saturn Corporation in 2010. In this example, we can see that companies and labourers can have amicable and socialised relations inevitably leading to the success of corporations in their pursuit of profit. Companies such as Google and Microsoft, for example, follow the same track by providing a socialised paradigm of managing the workforce for increased productivity and profit (Picciotto 2011, 436). As a final note to the discussion of the market economy and its moral normativity, Honneth stipulates: Nevertheless, in light of this discontinuous and yet easily recognizable progress of social reforms across the generations, it seemed possible to grasp the gradual reform of the labour market as a social project supported by a broad agreement with the social-moral view of the capitalist economy. Equality of opportunity had to be improved, degrading forms of

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monotonous and gruelling labour had to be abolished and the wage labourer’s right to co-determination in the workplace had to be expanded, all because people basically and tacitly, if not explicitly, shared the belief that the economic market should benefit all participants. Conscience seemed to dictate that the market should be understood as an institution of social freedom. If it is true, for which there are many indications, that over the last few decades the responsibility for success in the market economy has been strongly individualized, such that it is no longer ‘we,’ but he or she who is responsible for his or her own economic success, then this would suggest precisely this background normative conviction has been abandoned. (FRS 250)

Within the context of Honneth’s notion of freedom, we see the necessity of moving further towards the unification of shared interests of individuals in articulating their needs and participating in a discursive resolution of their lifeworld. In this case, the importance of collective action, in the function of unions and self-help organisations, leads us to the idea that there is an implicit sense of collective organisation that leads to the building of consensus and action in the lifeworld of the market economy. To complete the triangulation, Honneth moves on to the important sphere of democracy as a space in which social freedom is developed along with its implementation and reproduction through constitutional state and an active political culture. It is in this line that we can see the interconnected nature of social freedom when the sphere of private relations and market economy finds an articulation of its rights through the uncoerced and willful participation of individuals in a democratic form of communicative action.

4.C. Democracy and the Formation of the “We” Honneth traces back the gradual progression of democracy in the developments that occurred in Europe during the 19th century, as well as noting earlier developments of the notion of a “public sphere” in clubs, pubs, and literary circles in England (FRS 255–256). These social spaces allowed individuals from various classes to freely discuss their sentiments and interests ranging from art to politics. These public spaces, despite the dominance of males and members of the bourgeoisie, freely invited interested participants to share their thoughts and opinions on matters that interested them (FRS Ibid.). This development, for Honneth, is seminal in the creation of the principle of public opinion, which is free and uncoerced space in which members of the community could openly discuss and argue issues about government activity and how it affects the well-being of the community (FRS 256–257). Through this activity, we can see a growing

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enthusiasm and desire of individuals to participate in the communal effort of understanding and criticise the existing norms implemented by the state or government. Further developments in history, however, show the increase and decrease of the will of the public to participate in these social manifestations of freedom through the formation of democratic will. For example, Honneth observes the development of public participation regarding government matters during the French Revolution, which resulted in the formulation of universal human rights (FRS 258). Following this development, which of course has been influential not only in Europe but the rest of the world, the establishment of a common normative proposal of rights became popular in most democratic societies. The normative structure of the three rights derived from these movements led to liberties that were instrumental in sustaining and reproducing the public sphere. Honneth notably sees the right to free speech and public forum as an instrumental component for the right to vote (FRS 259). This invited further participation of individuals from varying classes, which then led to a gradual shift to the inclusion in the public sphere of landed property lords, workers, and eventually women. Despite these developments, however, there are some notable issues that were seen in the formation of the public sphere. For example, in Europe, there is a growing sense of nationalism enhanced by a cohesive but also exclusionary public sphere where ethnic minorities are viewed as a threat or competition (FRS 267). Honneth, for example, recalls the Dreyfus controversy as an explicit example of anti-Semitic public opinion when the French-Jewish artillery officer, Alfred Dreyfus, was falsely tried for treason while suffering a series of discriminatory actions from the military due to his Jewish roots. Citing Durkheim, Honneth sees the tendency of seeing the growth of patriotism as an expression of self-love (FRS Ibid.), which often leads to an aggressive form of nationalism that seeks conflict with another group. Further examples would, of course, lead us to the discussion of German National Socialism at the beginning of the Second World War where autonomous and uncoerced public sphere embraced fascism as part of public will formation (FRS 278). The issue of exclusion is part of the developmental phases of public will formation. In this context, Honneth attempts to assess the issues of migration and transnational citizenship. Through Durkheim, Honneth argues that societal self-love can be ultimately directed towards a goal of a universalised sense of human justice that instead of seeking to become the most powerful, wealthy, and organised society, they can also become the

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“most just in the best moral condition” (FRS 267). Since societies are born out of the mutual cooperation of different individuals with different cares and concerns that desire recognition, it would only make sense if a society exercises its social freedom in order to find means where societal integration becomes more inclusive. He further adds: … that all government is the result of a cognitive effort, based on observation and supervision, to find intelligent solutions to social problems. In Durkheim’s terminology, therefore, the state is the specialised ‘organ of social thought.’ But as he goes on to claim, this thought process will take place under highly restrictive conditions as long as political isolation prevents those in charge from getting a clear enough picture of the social problem at hand. (FRS 268)

Differences, in this case, help promote a variation in perspectives where alternative solutions to social problems could be sought. In thinking of possible ways to elicit a broader consensus in public will formation, Honneth turns to Dewey’s analysis of media. With the growth of technologies starting from printing, radio, television, and the internet, Honneth sees a broader avenue for participation in the lifeworld through the social spaces that these technologies have enabled. From the “moral superiority” that Durkheim sees in democracy, Honneth turns to Dewey for the “art” of presenting issues through various means of communication (FRS 272). By fostering open and participative forms of debate, discussion, and argumentation within the community, the realisation of a “We” in the public sphere becomes possible since these contributions allow societies to perfect their communities (FRS 274). The caveat for these developments, however, is that the access and the formation of these mediums of public will formation are also subject to influence and coercion by interested parties. Noting, for example, Adorno and Horkheimer’s notion of the “culture industry” (FRS 273), we can see that the various forms of media, especially news media, can be motivated to present information that only benefits the media network. The danger that Honneth sees in this is the gradual development of apathy among the populace as democracies continue to become oriented towards profit (FRS 271). Another danger that we can see in this proliferation of media is the growing disconnect of individuals from public will formation. Through constant exposure and bombardment of information, individuals may become desensitised through the abstractions that are delivered by these forms of media. Making sense of the art of communication also means that one should be vigilant in the type of information that is made available through these institutions. For example, news coming from CNN can be

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covered in a different light by other media agencies such as BBC, AlJazeera, DWTV, and even RT. While fears of an overarching control of the media as an agency of information dissemination in the public sphere may be a threat to the development of the concept of a “We” (FRS 286), we are quite fortunate today that technology has allowed us to view alternative sources of information. Going back to the issue of exclusion, the right of women to vote is one of the important developments in the will formation of the public. Through this, we can see more progressive means of acknowledging the rights of individuals to participate in the social sphere (FRS 287). We can see in this case that old systems and mechanisms that are used to exclude other members of society are gradually being exhausted of their rational assent, much like Honneth’s argument against the inevitability of homosexual marriages (FRS 150). We can witness more inclusive societies if rational forms of communications are established in the public sphere. By empowering them through participative forms of communication in the democratic process, not only do the women’s movements gain additional traction in their normative claims, they also, in turn, open the receptivity of the public sphere in accepting cultural minorities (FRS 289). Furthermore, with the internet as a free space for public discussion, the success and institutionalisation of NGOs and other global organisations become pervasive as their reach is no longer bound by distance and time (FRS 300). While all these might seem to spell a very bright future for the possibilities of democratic forms of will formation, Honneth notes that these mechanisms are yet to become sufficient for them to be totally integrated into the public sphere (FRS 290). Honneth lists six conditions for integration: 1. The first requirement is the legal transformation of the “bourgeoisie” public sphere into a democratic public (FRS Ibid.). This means that the class restriction should no longer be a factor in deciding whether one can or cannot participate in the democratic public sphere. 2. The second requirement is the necessity of having a public communicative space that transcends class in which different groups can participate in the political decisions made for the public sphere (FRS Ibid.). This can further guarantee that diverse participants can now freely participate openly without fear of discrimination or violence due to conflicts of interests.

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3. The third requirement invokes the use of media where information regarding the opinions of the public can have diverse positions (FRS 291). In other words, the dissemination of information must both become wide reaching and at the same time provide a variety of perspectives that can overcome common interests such as political, economic, and social entanglements. 4. For the fourth requirement, the citizens ought to be willing to provide free resources in the “preparation of audience-related events in which opinions of various groups are presented” (FRS Ibid.). Honneth emphasises that even in the condition in which the media can clearly re-concretise communicative interactions, there must always be a strong sense of willingness on the part of the participants to provide their own resources (FRS 292). 5. The last condition is the sustained effort to maintain a sense of a “political culture” in which the feeling of solidarity becomes “an elementary precondition for revitalizing the democratic public” (FRS Ibid.). Without this, the problem of apathy can leave the public sphere empty or “hollow” (FRS Ibid.). 6. The members of society who supplement each other in their communicative exchange of views must feel that the products of their will formation are effective enough to be practised in social reality (FRS 304). At this point, Honneth also invokes the necessity of linking the democratic sphere to the necessity of having appropriate forms of livelihood to guarantee a non-coercive form of exchange of opinions within the public sphere (FRS 293). This connection can, in the long run, further develop the sphere of personal relations insofar as an improved market and a democratic public sphere can inevitably benefit the quality of personal relations by removing impediments that can entangle individuals. Honneth sees plenty of potential on the internet or, as he puts it—the “World Wide Web” (FRS 303)—as the public sphere that has the potential to satisfy these requirements (FRS 300). Through the internet, economic, political, and intellectual requirements are somewhat diminished, democratizing accessibility to a broader social sphere. In fact, Honneth states that even participants with makeshift English skills can immediately participate and contribute to the development of ideas and opinions (FRS 301). The only caveat to the internet as a public sphere is its lack of “rudimentary controls on rationality” because of its capacity to disengage at will and its capacity to have anonymous participants join into its activities (FRS Ibid.). While Honneth does not specifically touch on forms of “internet-based communications,” in the “World Wide Web” his

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reservations in this form of public space lie in the issue of the availability of computers and the “digital divide” (FRS 302). He likens the potential of the internet with the growing trend of mass tourism, which can be instrumental in the development of openness and receptivity for “multiculturalism” in which informed sources of opinions are not simply derived from second-hand experience (FRS 303). In the end, Honneth is ambivalent towards the potential of the internet as a medium for the will formation of the public sphere. On one hand, he sees the strong advantage of the internet as a boundless form of public interaction which benefits the democratic public sphere. On the other hand, the unrestrained capacity of the internet to disrupt national democracies and affirm further stratification between classes may inevitably lead to the decline of participatory action from the populace, as well as promote further social atomism within the democratic sphere (FRS Ibid.). The burden, of course, in this contradictory outcome of the formation and reproduction of the public sphere lies on the issue of adapting to the growing variations and differences between classes that have access to this public space. Honneth notes that if these forms of information dissemination find some exclusion in its reach, it would only further the democratic self-legislation of one group and decrease its capacity towards others that are incapable of accessing this publicly relevant information on political issues (FRS 304). To supplement this problem, Honneth proposes a sixth requirement for the exercise of freedom in the democratic sphere, which not only strengthens the possibility of the first two requirements but also adds an epistemological component to the democratic sphere. Suffice to say that, in Honneth’s perspective, the only way in which the triangulation of the private, market, and democratic spheres can successfully implement freedom is for these three sectors to actively participate in the process of will formation. Without the active participation of these three spheres, the social sphere will simply be dominated by legal norms or, worse, norms at the subjective or micro level. Likewise, in this implementation of freedom in the social sphere, the issue of exclusion only promotes further stagnant values that are neither adaptive to the immanent requirements of social reality nor capable of creating an unforced sense of solidarity within the state. At this point, we can fully make sense of Honneth’s discussion of the relation between legal freedom and the reflexive action of moral freedom. The process of realising freedom in the democratic sphere is no longer simply dependent on the mechanism of legal norms to elicit solidarity

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amongst its populace. As we have seen earlier, legal norms can only provide the space for individuals to align themselves with the social sphere by suspending existing obligations7 and reflecting on its possible alignment to the lifeworld as discussed in 3.A. In terms of social pathologies, legal freedom can be both coercive and atomistic insofar as the legal space for contemplation can be exploited to the extent that individuals can simply objectify their normative obligations within the context of negative freedom. In other words, legal freedom in its articulation in the sphere of democracy can be detrimental to its participative requirement if individuals are simply passive. Honneth finally reaches the critical aspect of his normative reconstruction of the democratic sphere. By giving a thorough historical reconstruction of the events in the last 200 years of Western European democracies, Honneth can investigate the disintegrative tendencies of European democracies, specifically, the social pathology of passivity in the participation of citizens in the democratic process. He views the role of the state or the constitution of democratic societies as a neutral mechanism for implementing legal norms and further comments that, “the result of public opinion and will formation is not a hypothetical unity that state authorities merely need to put into practice, nor is it so empirically unreliable that it needs to be made more rational through representation” (FRS 305). The importance, thus, of the moral freedom of individuals to self-legislate is dependent upon the participation that they have in the public sphere, the purpose of which is to implement and monitor any disputable actions that the state can have against their own freedom and rights. Moreover, this function of the state as an organ of reason must be maintained at the level of individual participation by maintaining the freedom of its citizens to freely form their own opinions regarding the activities of the state. Honneth’s position, as with his earlier normative reconstructions, is that this situation is not an idealised concept that has yet to find its realisation in the public sphere (FRS 306). With the success of the French Revolution in allowing individual citizens to gain the right to public participation, we can agree to some degree that current developments in modern democracies are derived from the participatory activity of individuals in the public sphere. In other words, if there is no communicative desire to express dissent and demand normative assent through the public 7

This suspension of obligations refers to 3.A. as a personal exploration of normative resources that will allow the subject to select which norm is suitable to acquire self-realisation.

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sphere, the justification of the state to proceed in its actions is an affirmation of apathetic individuals. Thus, if citizens, for example, simply decide to ignore their capacity to influence the state, then the state simply continues to proliferate more injustices using legal means. Another issue that besets Honneth’s normative reconstruction is the problem of objectified self-love in the form of nationalism. I have already illustrated earlier the exclusionary tendencies of nationalism. Going back to the formation of nation states and their respective national identities after the French Revolution, Honneth looks at the development of public will formation supplemented by welfare state systems that made it possible to allow free forms of communication with the aid of stabilising both the sphere of private and market economy (FRS 313). These developments, as Honneth notes, might not be all-encompassing (i.e., there were some nation states that had voting restrictions but, nonetheless, were on the way to satisfying the sixth criteria for a functional public sphere). However, the First World War created serious conditions that impeded the progress of social solidarity in the formation of the public sphere. While constitutional forms of governmental control existed in certain nation states, their difference with regard to their specific choice of leadership (i.e., Monarchies vs. Authoritarian Dictatorship) leads us to a further issue of transnationalism and multiculturalism (FRS 314). The German Empire, despite its basic democratic constitution, can deploy its populace to engage in military conflict for the sake of expanding its ambitions (FRS Ibid.). This is where the issue of solidarity becomes problematic with regard to nationalism. To understand the actions of the Germans during the First World War, Honneth turns to Freud’s “Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.” According to Freud, it was easy of the Prussian state to mobilize its citizens because the latter was not able to reflexively separate their subjective perspectives and their collective will (FRS 315). In this perspective, we can see the danger of a collective group that has become insular and thus regressive in its dealings with its social and political environment. This danger means that these individuals can be moulded into a controllable mass where disruptions are made impossible because of the homogeneity of their consciousness (FRS 316). The loss of reflexivity, in this case, means that the populace can be instrumentalised by the state. By the end of the First World War and the humiliating implementation of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was even more prone to this instrumentalisation (FRS 218). What we can see here is the inevitable interlocking of nations and perhaps the progressive realisation of global and transnational communities. In the context of Honneth’s

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analysis, we can sum up the issue of instrumentalisation of a nation as a lack of reflexivity and critical distance from Germany’s “structural bias” (FRS 320) or what Marcuse aptly calls one-dimensionality. Moreover, the stabilised legal system during these times has somewhat propagated the apathetic behaviour of its citizens, thereby leaving the organs of the state to manipulate their actions. Following the events of the Second World War, the formation of the United Nation has been instrumental in reforming these structural biases, particularly, the claim of sovereignty of nation states that might seek the same ambitions of the Second World War-era Germany (FRS 323). This development, however, leads Honneth to the sixth requirement of a democratic public sphere—the question of disenchantment with the effectivity of the democratic sphere (FRS 325). Despite these implementations, and of course the gradual formation of the European Union, the realisation of the necessity of diversity in the formation and sustenance of the public sphere becomes more pressing when borders become gradually erased by immigration and integration. Moreover, the growing cost of maintaining a welfare state and the emergence of financial crises in the global economy can somewhat point to a failing democratic sphere (FRS 325). These problems further exacerbate the growing disenchantment of individuals to turn away from statemediated politics as the growing economic power of the market gains more power to lobby self-interested goals in legislation (FRS Ibid.). For this reason, Honneth asserts that the power of the state is not all encompassing when it comes to influencing the state of affairs in the private and market sphere of freedom (FRS 329). Two other considerations go against the inadequacy of the legal norms or constitutional forms of democratic implementation. First is that we can have the tendency to lose track of the progression of the democratic public sphere and our dependence on it (FRS Ibid.). The forgetfulness of the foundation of legislative initiatives can make us forget that the function of the state is to implement the will of the public social sphere. However, there is the tendency to think that the Constitution is greater and more sovereign than the struggle of the people to realise their freedom. What we can see, following Honneth’s reflections, is that the state is again simply an organ of the people and, as such, if no attempt or effort is made to influence or criticise this organ, it will inevitably fall into the control of self-interested parties that come from either the private sphere or the market sphere. Honneth’s final proposal is the pursuit of a Political Culture, a culture in which the public can freely engage with varying opinions and perspectives, especially the ones that can challenge and reformulate the

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legal or constitutional component of the state. When confronted with the disenchantment for the effectiveness of forming public will, we can say that the issue lies with the combined efforts of the populace to confront existing norms and use its resources to address current political, social, and economic issues. Honneth’s normative reconstructions bring us to this realisation by making us aware that society has the capacity to change, and this is always-already latent within our capacity to recognise one another as parts of a “We” that can bring change to the system. This is not to say that Honneth is evoking movements to jump into some radical form of revolution. In reality, we are constantly in the process of encountering these revolutions. The only question is: “Are we willing to participate?”

5. Recognising Freedom In summary, Honneth’s appropriation of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right signifies his intention to overcome the initial difficulties that were seen in his recognition theory. By starting with the main presupposition that freedom is realised through the guiding principles of norms, Honneth can show that the foundation of democratic institutions lies in the recognition of freedom within the cohesive interactions of individuals in the private, market, and democratic spheres. Through his normative reconstruction of the series of developments and conflicts within the modern history of Western Europe, Honneth firmly believes that the critical potential of freedom can only be made possible with an inclusive, receptive, and participatory populace. Combined with the historical and theoretical conception of freedom, Honneth can extract the development of autonomy from two poles, namely, reflexive and negative freedom. Through their manifestation in the public spheres as moral freedom and legal freedom, the triangulation of the possibility of social freedom happens when both moral and legal freedom engage in a dialectical feedback loop. This critical mechanism provides the theoretical diagnosis for determining whether developments, in the realisation of ethical life, belong to the side of moral and legal freedom or social freedom. Combined with the three spheres mentioned earlier, we can develop an adequate picture of the triangulation of freedom. Here is my schematic interpretation of Honneth’s idea of social freedom:

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Fig.2

In Fig.2 we can see the representation of the three spheres and the triangular support from the action of social freedom. Following Honneth’s normative reconstruction, I argue that the three internal components within every sphere are only made possible when social freedom is manifested in their interaction. As we have seen earlier, the sphere of private interactions will meet the requirements of social freedom if the market economy supports its stability through material sustenance and at the same time the protection of its rights through the democratic sphere. For the sphere of the market economy, the support of the private sphere where consumers, labourers, and capitalists interact is needed to develop cooperation in their pursuit of self-interests. Moreover, the role of the democratic sphere is to maintain the autonomy of the parties through legal means to preserve an equilibrium of cooperation as an arbitrator of the spheres. Finally, the democratic sphere finds its sustenance and cooperative assent with the active participation of the private sphere and the resources that the market economy can provide to maintain its function.

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Honneth’s presentation of the development of the democratic public sphere also provides us with a critical perspective on the importance of inclusion in the realisation of social freedom within nation states. We learn from extreme forms of nationalism during Germany’s involvement in the First and Second World War the fact that a closed-off and exclusionary form of solidarity, as well as a homogenised culture, can result in catastrophic tragedy in which excluded groups can become victims of violence in the pursuit of sovereignty. What is left in this analysis is the integration of Honneth’s recognition theory. By including the three spheres of recognition and the recent addition of antecedent forms of recognition, we can further develop a complementary reconstruction of Honneth’s goal of articulating Hegel’s ethical life in contemporary democratic societies. For this discussion, I will dedicate Part Five of this work in combining the concepts from recognition theory and Honneth’s Freedom’s Right. For now, a pressing issue that needs to be discussed is Honneth’s position on identity politics and the development of identities within the framework of recognition. Through the additional theoretical concepts that I have elaborated in this part, my aim is to find a resolution between Honneth’s new theoretical developments and his critics.

PART FOUR THE FREEDOM AND RECOGNITION OF IDENTITIES AND SUBJECTIVITIES

In Part Three, I presented the cooperative function of the spheres of personal relations, market economy, and democratic sphere as a mechanism of enabling and expanding social freedom. Moreover, these spheres not only serve as an evidence of freedom, they also embody the fact that social freedom is an already existing condition of most societies. I have noted in Part Three that through the diversity of identities in society, one can find avenues to sustain and expand possibilities of selfactualisation and social cohesion. The integrative function of these spheres of social interaction follows a definite societal norm of allowing individuals to pursue social affirmation of their identities. Following this, freedom is not necessarily opposed to the possibility of social solidarity; rather, by enriching the freedom of the individual to self-actualise, the enrichment of social interactions further strengthens the capacity of norms to integrate diverse identities. In this part, I will assess Nikolas Kompridis’ critique of Honneth’s recognition theory, specifically through Honneth’s earlier works such as The Struggle for Recognition and Redistribution or Recognition. The goal of this part is to present Kompridis’ critique and assess whether his criticisms are still valid against Honneth’s recent iteration of his recognition theory. While Honneth, at the time of this writing, has yet to respond to Kompridis, my task is to present how Honneth indirectly resolves Kompridis’ potent criticisms against the earlier iteration of recognition theory.

1. The Impasse of Identity and Solidarity Through the recent developments in Honneth’s recognition theory and his normative reconstruction of freedom in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, we find a renewal of the normative claims of critical theory. There are specific nuances and problems that should be clarified first if one is able to

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extract Honneth’s valuable analysis. To begin with, Honneth’s writing style can be difficult to understand since he does not make clear distinctions between theory and praxis. Through his sparse examples of social realities, one can assume that there are instances that he provides in his earlier works that he is trying to convey a social depiction of how identities are formed through social interactions evinced by his reading of Herbert Mead, Talcott Parsons, and Emile Durkheim. On the other hand, his clear Hegelian tendencies often imply that he is trying to reconstruct theoretical paradigms to supplement the necessity of recognition in his social theory. Despite this, I am convinced that Honneth’s motive is to provide a theoretical foundation for a social theory that has an adaptable means of understanding the formation and reproduction of norms through social interactions. This consistent theme is evident at the beginning of his research in the legacy of critical theory found in the Critique of Power. A secondary concern that readers might notice is that Honneth seems to be complacent in the chronological ordering of recognition. One might notice that Honneth does not specifically state whether the process of recognition could turn to either a progressive or regressive trajectory. Moreover, Honneth does not specify which moment takes place in recognition, whether it is a moment of achieving disrespect, respect, or an equilibrium of both. Following the criticisms of his readers such as Nikolas Kompridis, Jean-Philippe Deranty, and Emmanuel Renault, Honneth’s location of the moment or instance of recognition is indeed difficult to pinpoint because of his refusal to locate a specific moment in the process of recognition. Even in his most recent reply to the reception of Freedom’s Right, Honneth maintains that the normative intention of his work is to provide a general guideline of reasons that are anchored on modernity that can be beneficial or detrimental to freedom (Honneth 2013, 39). In contrast to Deranty and Renault’s insistence on the emphasis of the “political moment of recognition” (Deranty & Renault 2007, 93) and Kompridis’ demand for a specific end of recognition (Kompridis 2007, 284), Honneth takes the instances of recognition as a process that fulfils the constant progression and development of norms. The difficulty that Honneth faces from his critics can be explained by two peculiar qualities of his work. (1) On the one hand, the task of aligning the long-standing tradition of critical theory to his agenda of explaining the basis and necessity of social solidarity requires a strong reconstructive effort to compare, contrast, and even reshape the original trajectories of his predecessors. This observation does not escape Kompridis’ watchful eye and, with this ambiguity, he declares that this has made Honneth’s project as unrecognizable as either social philosophy or

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political philosophy (Kompridis 2004, 332). This difficulty is somewhat problematic in Honneth’s work for, on one hand, Honneth tries to provide a theoretical basis that will equip social philosophy with the necessary considerations in understanding normative practices in social relations. On the other hand, while Honneth provides the necessary descriptive tools, he is also at the same time drawing his critique of normativity from the theoretical observations that he conducts. At best, we can at the moment think that Honneth is trying to construct a social philosophy that can lead to the normative understanding of political philosophy. (2) The second peculiar quality of Honneth’s work is his reluctance to provide specific outcomes of praxis regarding recognition theory’s successes or failures. Despite the publication of Freedom’s Right, which gives us plenty of historical examples of conflicts and social struggles, Honneth still withholds the specific outcome of locating cooperation within the interactions of the personal, market, and democratic spheres. The reason for this perhaps lies in his divergence from Hegel’s notion of a “universally self-realising spirit” (Honneth 2014, 818), a reluctance that is quite unusual since he attempts to justify the universality of recognition and freedom. In other words, Honneth seems to protect individual forms of self-realisation by dissociating the end or goal of recognition with universalised claims of recognition. Through this reluctance, Honneth justifies the necessity of uncoerced and autonomous individuation as a feature of his social philosophy. Individual identity, to begin with, does not receive a strong elaboration in Honneth’s earlier works. For example, the formative process that the sphere of love can embed an intersubjectivist tendency in individuals is always guided by the fact that its end is always for the good of social solidarity (C.f. SFR). Meanwhile, in Freedom’s Right, we can find a refreshing treatment of the importance of differences in identities when Honneth follows Freud’s analysis of German solidarity during the First World War (C.f. FRS). While it is possible to excuse Honneth from the difficulty of eliciting a sense of individual identity, we cannot ignore the importance that identity formation plays in the development of uncoerced and autonomous individuals in his reconstruction of the democratic sphere. Moreover, the potent criticisms of Kompridis regarding the insufficiency of Honneth’s social philosophy pose important questions regarding the actual meaning of recognition and the adequacy of social relations in disclosing individual identity. For this matter, this part will be a brief overview of Kompridis’ critique of critical theory as well as Honneth’s recognition theory. By following this, my intention is to clarify and open new avenues that will help us understand Honneth’s agenda for social

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philosophy and offer a counterbalance to the somewhat “positivistic” tendencies1 that surround his continuation of critical theory’s emancipatory program.

2. Kompridis’ Critique of Critical Theory Kompridis has a different evaluation of critical theory’s idea of social philosophy and emancipation. To begin with, Kompridis is opposed to the project of redeeming the continuation of rationality in Habermas’ project. Moreover, he thinks that the distinction that Habermas makes with art, morality, and science is not merely foundationalist at its core, but also artificial insofar as it compartmentalises the normative expectations of its emancipatory project (Kompridis 2004, 329–330). Critical of the tendencies of Habermas’ critical theory, Kompridis insists that the legacy of disclosure has become problematic with the loss of the Romantic vision that it once had. Honneth’s project is, in some sense, similar to Kompridis’ project of a reflexive disclosure; in fact, some of Kompridis’ ideas regarding freedom and disclosure precede Honneth’s ideas regarding individuation, freedom, and solidarity. Kompridis’ Critique and Disclosure attempt to re-align Habermas’ critical theory to the dismissed potentials of Heidegger’s phenomenological hermeneutics. Kompridis’ critique of Habermas may be summarized in the following points: (1) Habermas, for Kompridis, takes a formulaic conception of social normativity by approaching disclosure in the context of linguistic practices, which has resulted in a shift in the ability of a critical theory to understand itself (CD 17). Kompridis’ fear is that Habermas’ shift to linguistics may place critical theory in the precarious position of objectifying or reifying tendencies (CD 21) that may limit its disclosive capacity. (2) Following Habermas’ attempt to reconcile critical theory with the objective of achieving and restoring rational discourse, Kompridis is hostile to Habermas’ dismissal of the alternative sources of reflective disclosure, particularly the division of art, ethics, and science—thereby subjugating alternative sources of disclosure to rationality. For Habermas, the reason for this apparent dismissal was seen in critical theory’s abandonment of the “interdisciplinary materialism” in Adorno’s shift to mimesis as a reaction to modernity (Habermas 1984, 285). Habermas overlooked the potential of the discursive possibilities of critical theory, reducing them to philosophies of consciousness. Habermas 1

In Zurn’s assessment of Honneth’s critical theory, he remarks on the common tendency of Honneth to be “whiggish” or “pollyannish.” These tendencies, of course, refer to the progressive tendencies or positive outlook (respectively) of Honneth’s social philosophy (Zurn 2015, 193).

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wishes to revive the function of reason to guide discourses in communicative practices that either describe facts, invoke normative rules or principles, or express states of minds. The communicative aspect of these actions discloses the purposive and rational creation of discourses whereas art, morality, and science are supposedly linked by these common agenda. For Habermas, without the intention to communicate reason, these discursive areas (art, morality, and science) face the serious consequence of becoming detached and unmediated through the sceptical approaches against culture, society, and the person. This consequence is one of Habermas’ important arguments in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: In the modern world, “value spheres” have been differentiated out from each of these moments—namely, on the one hand, art, literature, and a criticism specialized in questions of taste, around the axis of worlddisclosure; and, on the other hand, problem-solving discourses specialized in questions of truth and justice, around the axis of intramundane learning processes. These knowledge systems of art and criticisms, science and philosophy, law and morality, have become the more split off from ordinary communication the more strictly and one-sidedly they each have to do with one linguistic function and one aspect of validity. (Habermas 1987, 339)

For Kompridis, Habermas neglects modernity’s sense of timeconsciousness since the attunement of discourse assumes a discontinuity of tradition for the sake of achieving critique. While Habermas intends to bring to the fore the “value spheres” solidaristic function of critique by aligning them with reason, Kompridis thinks otherwise. If there is no longer any confidence for the individual to pursue ideas that are beyond the reach of what is already normatively at hand, then the tradition of critique finds its energies depleted as it deals with its own matters and issues without a vision of a good life or a vision of romanticism. Romanticism is based on the assertion that despite the conflicts and exhaustion of energies we encounter in modernity, we still hold on to the traditions that have made our everyday practices prevail. This is not to say that Romanticism is without the power of critique; rather, it is critical insofar as it is receptive to the alternative possibilities that affirm our normative expectations bound in time and in history. Kompridis further asserts: In my view, romanticism is not just some superseded period of cultural history; it is the frequently unacknowledged position from which we engage in a critical, time-sensitive interpretation of the present. To ask the

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question “What is critical theory for in times of need?” is to romanticize it; it is to ask the question of critique romantically. “Is there a way alternative to the romantic to ask this question? If you do not produce such an alternative; and nevertheless, you desire to keep hold of the question; then you will have not only to conclude that we are not beyond the demands of romanticism, but you will have to hope that the demands of romanticism are not beyond us.” …Having arrived after the meltdown, we do not begin with something solid that we watch helplessly or joyfully melt into air; we begin with fluidity, uncertainty, and chaos. Having lived fluidity, uncertainty, and chaos for some time now, we understand better than before that modernity is exhausting, not only because of the accelerating pace of change and exponential compression of time, but also because living with fluidity, uncertainty, and chaos is just that much harder, that much more disorienting, that much more exhausting, than living through the change from a solid to a fluid form of life. There is far less exhilaration, and far more exhaustion. (CD 275–276)

To put it briefly, Kompridis is against the reductive tendencies of Habermas’ critique of modernity because the latter dismisses discourses that are not attuned to a formal praxis of reason. Nevertheless, I acknowledge that both Kompridis and Habermas are reacting to the tendency of discourses that are geared towards the over-valorisation of the “subject,” “culture,” and the “individual.” However, while Habermas, as Kompridis notes, makes progress in enhancing the idea of intersubjectivity by rational and linguistic forms of communication (CD 45), this progress tends to identify the possibility of disclosure within a rational resolution of a problem or a conflict. While it may seem that Kompridis is disagreeing entirely with Habermas’ critique of modernity, it is notable that Kompridis supports the possibility of rational discourse in modernity. Kompridis takes a nuanced stance in the academic trend of postmodernism in philosophical discourses: I am attempting to release this philosophical tradition from the interpretive grip of postmodernism and ironism with which it has come to be so closely identified—indeed, so-called ‘continental’ philosophy has become more or less synonymous with postmodernism (or postmodern scepticism). But at the same time, I reject the assumption shared by postmodernists and critical theorists alike, that post-Kantian European philosophy is split along the purported ‘battle lines between Nietzsche and Hegel.’ Thus, clarifying the ethical-practical basis of critique also involves an ongoing reinterpretation of the European philosophical tradition. For the sake of convenience, I give my alternative to ironist critique the name transformative critique, through which I would like to identify and clarify the normative demands of the practices of critique. (Kompridis 2000, 38)

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What makes Kompridis digress from Habermas’ communicative reason is the abandonment of alternative sources of discourse that may appear to be incompatible with communicative reason. In other words, what Kompridis is developing is a critique of Habermas’ gloss on modernity’s tendency to narrow its scope of practical orientation within the bounds of reason. It must be mentioned, however, that both philosophers are critical of discourses that emphasise individual self-justification over collective and public forms of justification. At this point, I wish to emphasise the significance of Kompridis’ notion of “receptivity” in his critical reading of Honneth’s development of the intersubjective aspect of Habermas’ project. It would be of interest here to mark out that Kompridis’ critique has in some ways anticipated the trajectories of Honneth’s recognition theory in The Struggle for Recognition. In fact, the arguments for receptivity to become more inclusive in discursive practices through the enlargement of freedom (CD 49-50) have already been initiated by Kompridis prior to Honneth’s publication of Freedom’s Right. The difference in their approaches, however, is seen in Kompridis’ ontological approach and with Honneth’s sociological appropriation of Hegel’s theory of intersubjectivity. Both agree with Habermas’ intersubjective turn towards philosophy, and both are cognizant of the limitations of Habermas’ critique of modernity. For my own purpose, I wish to examine whether Honneth’s development of recognition theory can answer the critical questions that Kompridis poses against Honneth’s theoretical and Habermasian tendencies. While both thinkers share the same trajectories, they have different approaches in anticipating intersubjective possibilities of identities. On the one hand, Honneth prefers the alignment of normative practices with their derivation and deviation from existing social practices; on the other hand, Kompridis approaches normative possibilities in terms of reflective forms of disclosure. What is surprising with the Honneth-Kompridis relation is that, despite Kompridis’ best efforts to criticise Honneth’s recognition theory, Honneth has yet to reply to the former’s criticisms. Reading Honneth’s more recent works alongside Kompridis’ criticisms allows us to assess probable replies to Kompridis’ critique. What I will attempt in the following discussion is to lay down the unengaged polemic raised by Kompridis and provide an appreciation of its sharp insights that are levelled against Honneth’s works. Also, by doing this, we can assess how Honneth could reply, albeit hypothetically.

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3. Kompridis’ Critique of Honneth’s Recognition Theory Kompridis’ critique of Honneth’s recognition theory can be summarily understood as an issue of how these two thinkers differ in their understanding of immanent critique. However, because both are influenced by Habermas, they are aware of the discursive problems that come from the development of the “philosophy of the subject.” As such, they are aware of how subjectivities are addressed, recognised, and anticipated in terms of pinpointing an adequate basis for normativity. Looking at the problem of how Kompridis and Honneth address this discursive problem is a key to understanding the distinct features of their work. On the one hand, Kompridis looks at the ontological features of disclosure in the subject’s capacity to gain sufficient confidence in self-understanding. On the other hand, Honneth approaches this problem with participative forms of social disclosure where normativity is enriched with the discursive willingness of subjects to engage in asserting and struggling for their recognition. Kompridis takes a reconstructive stance in developing Heidegger’s world disclosure as a response to Habermas’ critique of modernity. Honneth, for his part, capitalises on the intersubjective limits of Habermas’ linguistic project by going back to the experiences of recognition. My intention is to inspect Kompridis’ two critical essays on Honneth’s recognition theory, namely, “From Reason to Self-Realisation?” and “Struggling Over the Meaning of Recognition.” These papers present sharp and pointed criticisms of Honneth’s recognition theory from The Struggle for Recognition to Redistribution and Recognition. Kompridis’ critique of Honneth’s recognition theory tackles the issue of how normativity is understood and how recognition functions as a disclosive moment of intersubjectivity. In “From Reason to SelfRealisation?,” Kompridis criticises the ambiguity of Honneth’s reference to normativity as a moment in which “pre-theoretical disclosure” of identities is revealed in a “relatively stable” ground for understanding critique (Kompridis 2004, 327). The problem with this approach, for Kompridis, lies in the ambiguity and inconsistency of the concept of normativity in the mode of practices of subjects appealing to stable normative expectations (Kompridis 2004, 327). Kompridis’ assessment of Honneth’s appeal to a seemingly stable basis for normativity presupposes that there is a unitary structure in understanding feelings of injustices that can trigger the need for subjects to struggle for recognition, rendering Honneth’s model of critique to be a mixture of “quasi-anthropological” appeal to the normativity of everyday practices and the construction of a historicist justification of progress and development (Kompridis 2004,

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328). In other words, Honneth must make the theoretical assumption that the notion of normativity should be appealed to by heteronomous subjects whose call for recognition somewhat results in a coherent and consistent end. Furthermore, Honneth’s recognition theory, for Kompridis, seems to appeal to the historical facticity of normativity’s ability to progressively adapt to the changes of subjectivities since anthropologically (and sociologically), we are bound to the material condition of social interactions that shape our normative expectations. This is problematic for Kompridis precisely because the idea of normative expectations must be arbitrarily assumed and, even more problematic was the conception of its “relative” stability (Kompridis 2004, 329). Because of this, Kompridis sees the problem of differentiation in Honneth’s recognition theory to be limited by the arbitrary distinction left by esteeming functions of normativity. Moreover, Kompridis criticises the distinctions made in the spheres of recognition (love, law, and achievement) as arbitrary differentiations that are reminiscent of Habermas’ spheres of cultural action (science, morality, and art) (Kompridis 2004, 329). Kompridis, at this point, is worried about the future possibilities of disclosure in Honneth’s recognition theory, since they are limited by the distinctive spheres of recognition like Habermas’ spheres of cultural action (science, morality, and art). His challenge to Honneth’s recognition theory is precisely focused on how Honneth can prove the relative stability of normative expectations without compromising the possibilities of forming new cultural resources in “times of crisis and normative disorientation” (Kompridis 2004, 330). To clarify this, what Kompridis is trying to criticise is the reductive tendency of Honneth’s recognition theory, specifically the tendency to ignore the problems behind “relatively” stable and perhaps homogeneous, normative expectations. While Kompridis is explicit in his support of Honneth’s turn from reason to self-realisation contra Habermas (Kompridis 2004, 330), Kompridis, however, does not advocate the transition to the theory of recognition. He further argues: So what can be gained from such an abrupt break with critical theory’s past? Can the proposed change of normative paradigm from reason to selfrealisation deliver normative resources that exceed the critical potential of reason? Can the turn to self-realisation provide a normative perspective from which we can formulate a more effective response to the decline of cultural self-confidence and to the foreclosure of the future? (Kompridis 2004, 331)

True to his Heideggerian theoretical roots, Kompridis argues for the importance of historicity as a resource for building a sense of self-

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confidence, especially in relation to cultural products that the subject can transform and build his or her future possibilities for disclosure. Contra Honneth, Kompridis likewise finds the spheres of relation stifling if not arbitrary due to the focused insistence on specific forms of recognition. Because of Honneth’s intention to find out effective and already practised forms of normativity, there is a strong possibility that other latent norms may be considered ineffective or rendered “pathological.” This is one of the reasons why Kompridis considers others2 as more deserving of the discourse of critical theory precisely because they have a stronger claim to its tradition of renewing and transforming reason. What Kompridis contests are the availability and scarcity of normative resources, which refer to options or alternatives that can realise an individual's projection of himself or herself for self-realisation. In other words, a normative resource is a resource that allows one to be other than one's self. In this case, subjects that are now at the forefront of their claims for normativity due to their unique position of exclusion from current normative structures are those which Kompridis considers as rightful claimants to critical theory:3 …philosophy and the social sciences have made the classical distinction between ‘critical’ and ‘traditional’ theory far less salient than before it has also become more difficult to distinguish critical theory from other models of social and cultural critique, particularly since some of these also lay claim (and may be more entitled) to the name ‘critical theory’—for example, feminist theory, queer theory, critical race theory, post-colonial theory and so on. (Kompridis 2004, 325)

The reason why these theoretical models are much more entitled to the tradition of critical theory is the fact that they could transform the 2

By “others,” Kompridis refers to the other of subjectivity or, simply put, someone that is other than oneself. The nuance behind Kompridis’ somewhat loose use of the word “others” can be traced to Heidegger and Hegel’s formulation of intersubjectivity and identity formation. In the case of Heidegger, the vocabulary of “mineness” [Jemeinigkeit] refers to the inherited nature of the world with others. On the part of Hegel, the other is exactly what constitutes the intersubjective self insofar as one can only “be with oneself in one’s other.” (CD 55) 3 Roughly speaking, by “claimants” I am referring to those that are on the margins or are at the periphery of critique. Much like the concept of the “other” for Kompridis, these claimants are those who ought to be heard because of their disadvantaged status. These “others” ought to be given the proper normative resource to provide critique towards culture insofar as they provide alternative resources that are not readily available to society. This entails the possibility of opening critical theory to the “others,” not only as mere recipients of critique but also as critics of culture.

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discourse of reason to raise normative claims that would stabilise their foothold as legitimate subjects of recognition. If one were to consider these subjects and the normative claims that they had two hundred years ago, it is their remarkable progress that validates their claim towards normativity that we should look up and consider. On a related note, this context also validates Kompridis’ opposition towards the medicalised language of critical theory, specifically the use of the word “pathology” (CD 273), since it assumes that the possibility of disclosure in these currently unviable practices are unworthy of a future for reason to be considered as alternatives to existing social practices. While the intention of critical theory was to find a universalised avenue of disclosing social realities, it must face the challenge of presenting immanent critique as a sociologically realisable reality (Kompridis 2004, 333). In doing so, Honneth’s critical theory limits the normative resources of the subject’s capacity to find avenues of disclosure that can provide adequate confidence and a hope for a future. Touching the problem of formal praxis once more, we can see that Kompridis’ concern is not simply limited to how the future of possibilities is protected for the sake of critique; he is also espousing a preservation of normative practices that were once discarded or perhaps set aside by more effective and pragmatic norms. The motivation for this is Kompridis’ effort to salvage Heidegger’s philosophical project of disclosure from Habermas’ critique of Heidegger’s flirtation with Nazism (CD 16). This is not to say that Kompridis is sympathetic to Heidegger’s Nazi past; rather, his attempt to do so is motivated by the fact that despite Heidegger’s catastrophic Nazi past, there is still much to appropriate from his work. Analogically, we are reminded of Adorno’s “cat burglar” who salvages the house of philosophy for ideas of singular importance to use it for other possibilities of appropriation (or perhaps sell it for some cash); in other words, Adorno here calls for a renewed appropriation of philosophy (even on the verge of theft) to achieve its actuality (Adorno 1977, 133). Finally, to add to this analogue, even in the paradigm of scientific discourse, Thomas Kuhn also attests to the usefulness of paradigms despite their tendency to be delegitimised or discredited by opposing paradigms (Kuhn 1970, 112). Following this critique, Kompridis’ fear is that a certain point in critical theory’s Habermasian turn (which Honneth is a product of) will deplete the normative resources of the tradition. This is a possibility that Kompridis sees in both Habermas and Honneth:

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Part Four Already Nietzsche had an inkling of the consequences of unbridled unmasking, regarding it as a pathological manifestation of “bad taste,” the aim of which is to expose everything, to strip naked all that confronts and confounds it. Quite unexpectedly, critique has been much more successful in undermining the hopes of the Enlightenment than in justifying them. It has shaken rather than fostered confidence in our norms and ideals, giving us compelling reason to doubt our capacity to shape the meaning of our individual lives and to determine the appropriate norms of our collective form of life. But in the course of this process of global unmasking, critique has exhausted itself. It has exhausted its critical energies, and depleted its normative resources. Critique is not a self-sustaining practice. It is as dependent on the self-reflective renewal of its semantic and normative resources as any other cultural practice, as any form of life. (CD 252) My worry is that Honneth’s well-intentioned reformulation of critical theory will deplete rather than replenish its critical content. Indeed, I very much doubt that he can sustain this break and at the same time present his project as both a continuation and renewal of critical theory. Any deep break in a tradition of inquiry faces the problem of how to reintegrate in new form that from which it has broken. In Honneth’s case, the break in question raises the problem of how to re-inherit critical theory’s LeftHegelian legacy. Given the nature of the break Honneth has proposed, that problem is almost dissolved since Honneth’s proposal leaves us with so very little legacy to inherit (Kompridis 2004, 331).

Honneth’s manoeuvre to change the trajectory of critical theory, by shifting its focus to the distinction between social, political, and moral philosophy, has been short-sighted for Kompridis (Kompridis 2004, 332– 333). At this point, it is important to understand that this criticism only limits itself to the scope of Honneth’s writing from The Struggle for Recognition to his engagement with Nancy Fraser’s Redistribution or Recognition?. Kompridis notes that this internality is irreducible insofar as critical theory is not simply dealing with “some determinate object ‘out there’ whose conditions of possibility can be exhaustively stated: the conditions under which an idea of the good can be realised are internal, not external to the good” (Kompridis 2004, 334). This indeterminacy of the idea of a “good” becomes complicated when the issue of indeterminacy and heterogeneity is added to the scope of recognition (Kompridis 2004, 335). Since solidarity in social interactions presupposes a shared normative ideal of a “good,” the tendency of looking at alternative sources of reflection on what the “good” means becomes pragmatic and restrictive to the possibility of disclosure.

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Going back to Kompridis’ dissatisfaction with the use of “medicalised” concepts for social critique, Honneth’s assertion of the stability of norms as a basis for social justice and critique can indeed be problematic when faced with the growing heteronomy and plurality of subjectivities. The idea of social pathologies, despite the problems that it currently poses to critique, does not necessarily guarantee a neutral social diagnosis. Kompridis makes an analogical difference between a physician and a social critic. The physician is in a better diagnostic position because she can make the diagnosis despite suffering the same disease, while the social critique cannot attain the same objectivity (Kompridis 2004, 339). Furthermore, while a medical condition can be verified by numerous opinions and investigations, the social critic has only the epistemological resources of the recipient of his or her critique for verification (Kompridis 2004, 340). For Kompridis, it is not simply a matter of getting the “right” form of social order or normativity in the crosshairs of the social critic; rather, it is a more complicated task of eliciting a self-critical consciousness out of society to let them balance their own “continuity” and “discontinuity” of their reflective traditions (Kompridis 2004, 344). At this point, Kompridis refers to Honneth’s Left-Hegelian heritage by looking at the intersubjective mechanism of recognition and the act of affirmation. Honneth’s equation of recognition as affirmation creates problems with how social pathologies ought to be understood. Kompridis claims that in Hegel’s intersubjective recognition theory, misrecognition is nuanced by the fact that it serves as instances of learning on both dialectical ends. Thus, it is highly contrived to use “social pathology” or “mis-recognition” in the context that this pre-empts a determined trajectory for normative values (Kompridis 2004, 346–347). Kompridis notes that unlike the social mechanisms from which Hegel’s recognition theory finds contextualisation, Hegel’s social philosophy was not complicated by modernist conceptions of democracy, plurality, and diverse cultural backgrounds. If one were to think of recognition as an affirmation, then the learning process for Kompridis is annulled and left at the mercy of existing norms to validate one’s claims, further limiting the freedom-enlarging possibilities of self-disclosure (Kompridis 2004, 348– 349). Just like Habermas’ imposed limitation of the communicative reason for art, science, and morality, Kompridis finds this limitation on Honneth’s social validation of the claims of recognition. Ironically, Kompridis assumes a Habermasian stance of lifeworld enriching possibilities in areas wherein Habermas and Honneth focus their theoretical analyses on the possibilities of social solidarity. This is not to say that Kompridis is against the idea of social solidarity itself; what he insists, however, is a

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broader sense of receptivity from which the future of critique is sustained by becoming more self-critical and reflective in plotting trajectories for normativity. The idea that recognition serves as an affirmation of identity limits the potential of self-disclosure insofar as it seeks only the effective means of resolving the struggle for recognition. To be specific, Kompridis raises the issue of losing one’s “voice” or, even more, the incapacity of subjects to even have a “voice” (Kompridis 2007, 282). Not only does this limit the scope of how subjects are recognised; it also limits the possibilities that the subject can explore its own reflective capacities. For Kompridis, the gravity of the situation points to the dependencies of recognition itself, which becomes an issue in determining the freedom that we ought to have for our identities: The point of all this is not that misrecognition is really good for us, and so we need not worry so much about being misrecognized; the point is that recognition and misrecognition underdetermines our identities and our sense of ourselves as agents. Our power to shape our identities and exercise our agency does not strictly depend on receiving in advance the appropriate form of recognition. We are able to do so, over and over again, despite the denial or absence of such recognition. Furthermore, as I interpret Hegel, the experience of misrecognition does not necessarily entail a form of injustice. It can be the occasion of a transformative and critical encounter with another. (Kompridis 2007, 283)

At this point, the worry that accompanies Kompridis’ concern is with how recognition can be instrumentalised as a mechanism for controlling identities by restricting their capacity for disclosure. Kompridis further argues that recognition in Honneth’s case can become overburdened by normative expectations that cannot be addressed by a unitary and formalised process of recognition, to the extent that Kompridis asserts that a full and complete recognition is merely a chimera (Kompridis 2007, 287). Thus, in the issue of the demands of recognition for justice, recognition may end up as a situation of “we can’t get no satisfaction”4 (Kompridis 2007, 287). This burden, of course, does not entail that Kompridis is entirely put off by the difficulties involved in recognition 4

The concept of “satisfaction” for Kompridis has been instrumental in expressing the state of normative expectations that we encounter in modernity. He notes that the “fragility” of our subjectivity is often vulnerable to the promises of normative expectations that are not met or are violated, to the point that these expectations eventually lead to a misrecognition of the self. See (CD 229)

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theory. On the contrary, he agrees with Honneth’s empirical manoeuvre as a viable form of recognition (Kompridis 2007, 288). The last problem that requires careful consideration is Kompridis’ critique of the idea of freedom within the system of recognition itself. Not only is recognition a matter of individual freedom; it is also a matter of freedom in terms of the availability of normative resources for disclosure. If the normative resources for disclosing the recognition of identities of individuals are severely limited to the standard everyday practices afforded by the law and the culture of the individual, one finds the exploration of possible identities restricted. As an example, with the limitations in mind of this context, one can think of the legal and cultural norms practised in certain cultures. In the case of legal norms, the legality of divorce and gay marriage is an exemplary case of these restrictions. Homosexual relations, as of this writing, are illegal in 74 countries (Fenton 2016). Despite the growing acceptance of homosexuality or the LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual) practices in many countries, those who are living in countries that have this restriction have less access to normative resources that can actualise instances of self-realisation for their identities. For example, homosexual couples will be denied the legal recognition of their partnership in countries that prohibit these relations. In the context of the Philippines, for example, access and right to shared resources, an extension of employee benefits to the dependent partner, social welfare benefits, medical benefits, and the possibility of parenthood through adoption are restricted. A graver case could also be made with the status of divorce in the few countries that do not subscribe to this legal procedure. For example, in the Philippines, the legal status of divorce is peculiar in contrast to the accepted practice of marriage annulment. The difference between divorce and annulment is that the former is a contract that dissolves the marriage voluntarily by both husband and wife; the latter is done by declaring the marriage void because of the breach of marriage contract.5 While most of the conditions for annulment are straightforward, the commonly used 5

The common breaches of the contract are as follows: the party involves one minor, lack of authority by the person officiating the marriage, absence of a marriage license, bigamous or polygamous marriages, a case of mistaken identity, failure to register previous annulments or absolute nullity of marriage, incestuous marriage, violation of public policy (e.g., marriage between adopted children by the same adopter), and psychological incapacity.

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reason for annulment is psychological incapacity.6 This condition for annulment makes the interpretation of the law for annulment flexible for couples with an irreconcilable difference, much like a divorce, whereby couples have the options to legally dissolve the marriage as long as the incapacity is recorded and certified through legal agencies. Though this may sound as if both divorce and annulment are similar in the Philippines, the truth is that the process of annulment is much more economically and psychologically demanding to execute. Not only are the legal costs of annulment prohibitive for the average working and non-working individuals;7 the legal process is also lengthy (from 6 months to several years). Thus, in a scenario where a housewife has no recourse to economic resources, she will inevitably be denied of the option to go out of an abusive marriage because of the prohibitive expense of pursuing an annulment of marriage. This is further exacerbated by the fact that divorce is only valid for Muslim citizens of the Philippines. In the case of cultural norms, one can think of the norms practised in the Philippines regarding circumcision or even the prevalent practise of Female Genital Mutilation or FGM in Africa. These practices are informed and reproduced within these cultures as normative expectations that are associated with social identities. These cases limit the freedom of exploring sexual identities in instances where an alternative could make a difference with one’s own self-actualisation. As with circumcision in the Philippines, FGM in Africa is a largely accepted ritual for passage to adulthood. Both are initiated by the sexes concerned and, in the same case, the move to medicalise these practices has only provided these practices with some semblance of legitimacy. While the practice of circumcision in the Philippines does not strongly impede the freedom of sexual identities of individuals, the case of FGM is much more severe because it limits the satisfaction of women and their sexual identities. Moreover, because of societal pressures, people who are forced into these practices of genital mutilation have very little options to opt out of the practice because of the risk of becoming ostracised or excluded from various forms of social

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Psychological incapacity falls on the criteria of the following: the incapacity to take care of basic marital obligations, neglect, irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, physical abuse, addiction, sexual infidelity, sexual deviancy, and abandonment. 7 The costs range from 150,000 Philippine Pesos to 500,000 Philippine Pesos. The average annual salary of a Filipino worker as of 2015 according to the World Bank is 177,000 Philippine Pesos.

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interaction. As a final point for Kompridis’ critique, here is his position regarding freedom and recognition: Thus, recognition becomes a matter of freedom and not just a matter of justice or identity, and misrecognition an unjustifiable curtailment of our freedom to govern ourselves. Since the struggle over the norms of recognition is at the same time a struggle over what it means to recognize and be recognized, there can be no final or perfect state of recognition in whose projected normative light we should understand the shortcomings or imperfections of our current practices or forms of recognition. (Kompridis 2007, 287)

The issue that comes with Kompridis’ critique is the unavoidable consequences of objectification of normativity that comes with the act of recognition itself. The challenge to Honneth’s recognition theory is how we can address the possibility of allowing recognition to take place in the context of freedom of the subjects that recognise and are recognised. To recap, here are the three points that must be addressed in Kompridis’ critique of Honneth’s recognition theory: (1) the question of the stability of normativity in Honneth’s recognition theory, (2) the limitations of how normativity is understood due to its unitary application in recognition, and (3) the possibility of freedom in recognition.

4. Recognition as the Socialised Freedom of Identities In the absence of Honneth’s reply to Kompridis, I will present in the ensuing discussions what I would imagine as Honneth’s reply. While there is no direct engagement by Honneth, I will locate the possible responses to the first two points raised above in The Struggle for Recognition, Redistribution or Recognition, and Reification, while the third point will be addressed by Freedom’s Right.

4.A. Response to the First Point As opposed to Kompridis’ observation, it is contestable that Honneth was referring to a fixed sense of normative “stability.” In fact, as Kompridis’ citation shows, the statement was “relatively stable” insofar as norms are entirely arbitrary to the subjects. However, what was not made explicit in Honneth’s work was the necessity of relative stability in norms that pass the criterion of his Hegelian vision of the Sittlichkeit as the ground for Honneth’s utopian vision. Honneth’s reference to the Sittlichkeit is not just an assumption of an over-arching metaphysical

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principle that guides moral norms in its praxis and reproduction; it functions as an empirical basis for guiding social interactions that are individually substantiated by social participants. As early as the Critique of Power, Honneth has gradually aligned his own version of critical theory with this Hegelian vision. He notes this as part of his criticism of Habermas: …the intersubjective process of understanding is developed until today in the distorted form of a moral struggle between social classes which as the “recurring dialectic of ethical life,” gradually removes the superfluous forms of social domination and enlarges the possibility of an undistorted communication. This conflictual process of communicative rationalization also underlies the process of the rationalization of purposive-rational action (that is, the development of productive forces), since the institutional organization of all social domains of tasks is regulated in the interaction of social groups. (CoP 277)

The purposive function of reason, for Honneth, should not be misconstrued as an all-encompassing mode of disclosure. The “relative stability” of norms refers to the domain of reason where collective social action and participation are required. As far as Honneth is concerned, Kompridis’ critique is somewhat misplaced because it assumes that recognition is an immediate curtailment of normative resources for the individual. To add to this, Kompridis is not clear as to whether he is projecting his criticism towards individual forms of recognition or socialised forms of recognition. To go back to Kompridis’ citation, we can be guided by examining Honneth’s statement in Redistribution or Recognition: The justice or well-being of a society is proportionate to its ability to secure conditions of mutual recognition under which personal identityformation, hence individual self-realization, can proceed adequately. Of course, we should not think of this normative turn as a simple inference from the objective functional requirements of an ideal form of social coexistence. Rather, the demands of social integration can only be understood as referring to the normative principles of a political ethics because, and to the extent that, they are mirrored in the expectations of socially integrated subjects. But if this assumption is valid—and I am convinced that a great deal of evidence speaks for it, some of which I referred to in section one—then such a transition seems to me justified: in the choice of the basic principles by which we want to orient our political ethic, we rely not merely on empirically given interests, but rather only on those relatively stable expectations that we can understand as the subjective expression of imperatives of social integration. It is perhaps not entirely wrong to speak here of “quasi-transcendental interests” of the

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human race; and possibly it is even justified to talk at this point of an “emancipatory” interest that aims at dismantling social asymmetries and exclusions. (RR 174) [my emphasis]

With Honneth’s idea of a “relatively stable” sense of normativity, we must understand that his sociological analysis is based on the principle that norms are always-already reproduced and practised by participants in a social community. What Honneth merely proposes is the bare minimum of social integration that allows social actors to interact. By “bare minimum” I am referring to at least a working familiarity where individuals can validate their claims for recognition. I cannot, for example, proceed to a company that I am not employed in and demand a raise, nor can I force a country to accept me as one of its own without appealing to its already existing practices of citizenship. While this may sound conflicting with the interest of exclusion and inclusion, it must be understood that intersubjectivity should work both ways. If the “Other” is unwilling to negotiate or compromise to understand the norms of the social group that it wants to participate in, then no intersubjectivity will be able to take place because a common ground is absent. Likewise, as mentioned in Freedom’s Right, the lack of heteronomy of discourses can be detrimental to the reflexive capacity of social groups that are isolated from other identities (FRS 315). The functionality of norms cannot be refuted in its most basic aspects; otherwise, society would not have any possible function without some semblance of a common goal or objective orientation to guide and enrich individual interests. While it should be understood that norms can provide a “relatively stable” basis for goals that serve the purpose of social solidarity, it must also be understood that this form of solidarity is going to fracture if it fails to recognise individual subjectivities. Having an interest in the possibility of social solidarity means that norms are only relatively stable insofar as they are assented and reproduced by autonomous individuals that enforce and follow them. This has been one of the motives of Honneth’s key arguments in The Struggle for Recognition, that any prevailing or existing social order should be founded on the possibility of recognising differences. The mechanism that enables this form of recognition is based on the experiential call of excluded individuals in their struggle for recognition. Thus, if we were to look at the foundation of Honneth’s critical theory, we should understand that the struggle for recognition is an internal critique of individuals who are already within the minimum amount of social integration to have normative claims within society itself.

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The idea of a “relatively stable” form of normativity becomes possible since it assumes an interest that is shared within social groups, enough to make it functional and yet, at the same time, allow revisions in normative practices. While this does not entail a vicious cycle in existing validated norms, it does allow a cyclical pattern that can either be progressive or regressive in terms of sustaining solidarity in social groups. On this account, we might also find interest in how Honneth’s recognition theory addresses excluded or non-integrated identities within the sphere of the Sittlichkeit. Referring to the earlier arguments that I have made, exclusion is only made possible if individuals or subjects refuse a common point in intersubjectivity. In other words, the possibilities of inclusion in social groups should be negotiated within the existing system of norms. Critique then takes a more nuanced and effective stance. One must be within the system itself before critique can take place because only then can criticism be made effective—if the critique is initiated by someone who is already within the system.

4.B. Response to the Second Point Kompridis takes issue with the unitary form of recognition that could possibly result in the depletion of normativity. Contrary to Kompridis’ view, Honneth understands that the process of validation is always undergoing constant revisions. This is made possible by the constant willingness of subjects to participate in social discourse. While Honneth’s initial stance of struggling for recognition may paint a violent Hegelian picture of life and death dialectics, Honneth disagrees with this kind of rendition of recognition theory. In Paul Ricoeur’s reading of Honneth’s The Struggle for Recognition, Ricoeur points out his dissatisfaction with Hegel and Honneth’s choice of words: I want to think of this section as a dialogue with him [Honneth], where my contribution will run from some complementary to a few critical considerations, which will in turn open the way to an argument directed against the exclusive emphasis on the idea of a struggle, in favour of a search for more peaceful experiences of recognition. (Ricoeur 2005, 186)

For the rest of Ricoeur’s reading of Honneth’s The Struggle for Recognition, Honneth feels as if the reading was limiting the idea of “struggle” in his vocabulary. Furthermore, while struggles can indeed take a violent turn, it does have a broader application in everyday practices that can be understood as instances of learning and realisation. Honneth articulates this further in an interview:

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But I have a much more positive conception of struggle. When I was reading Ricoeur I was surprised that he seemed to take struggle as being something close to war. The opposition he’s working with is war and peace. This is not how I am thinking. You see, I take struggle as being an enormously productive force in our human lifeworld. And it takes thousands of forms. It starts with the young baby, who is struggling against his or her parents. It’s what’s happening in classrooms in different forms. It slowly changes the way we understand the principle of recognition, the way we understand ourselves, and it slowly helps to make our societies normatively better. So, the first difference is that I have a productive, positive understanding of struggle. I’m more interested in the small, everyday forms of struggle and not in the big struggles which are, I think, what Ricoeur has in mind. The second aspect to which I am opposed is that what he describes as ‘bad infinity’ I would describe as productive infinity. And in this—in what concerns the productivity of infinity—I think I must be closer to Derrida than I am to Ricoeur, because I contend that these norms of recognition, be it equality, be it love—have a normative surplus, an inbuilt normative demand, that we will never really be able to fully institutionalize. But this means that we as human beings have a permanent demand imposed on ourselves, a demand to make things better. And I don’t see why that should be considered bad…. The systematic point is that Ricouer believes that we should think of recognition first as a onesided act of grace—something like the gift—whereas I think that this is what comes second. I would always put reciprocal forms of recognition first. This means that we should understand recognition as something that is happening between subjects, not strictly from one subject to the other. So recognition is in itself a mutual, reciprocal interaction. (Marcelo 2013, 217) [my emphasis]

Now whether Ricoeur’s criticisms can be levelled against Honneth’s choice of words may be debatable in an aesthetic context. However, as Honneth points out in the interview, the idea of struggle is progressive and mutual. Honneth’s idea of “struggle” balances itself out as an immanent need that affirms the ontological fact that human beings are “needy” individuals and require specific forms of recognition (SFR 99) to the extent that “we can’t get no satisfaction” becomes an impetus to seek “productive infinity.” To suppose that the ontological neediness of individuals as a given requires mutuality of recognition, and I think that Honneth’s choice of wording (Kampf or recognition) sufficiently depicts a broad array of social interactions. Bolaños further notes that Ricoeur’s criticism of Honneth attempts to depoliticise recognition through peaceful and non-violent means poses a naïve and somewhat idealistic view of resolving social conflicts (Bolaños 2016, 112). On a related note, the idea of a productive activity involved in struggles brings us back to the issue of

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normative surplus that could confront Kompridis’ criticisms. Much of the normative surplus is either progressive or regressive; regardless of the outcome, much can be learned in the historicity of social struggles (See Part Three). Recognition at this point does bring about resources for disclosure. Because of the necessity of social interactions and integration in society, the mutuality of recognition forces a confrontation between social actors who demand certain needs; the consequences, for better or for worse, become a learning process. In his lecture in Reification, Honneth confronts this discursive problem with the notion of antecedent forms of recognition. In this act of recognition, the subject looks back at the consequences of being too focused on the objective set by norms and reflects upon the alternative possibilities that could have been achieved through a different perspective. To illustrate this, I think that Honneth’s example of a game of tennis players (despite his antecedent regret for using this example) can provide the appropriate context: An example of this phenomenon might be the tennis player who, in her ambitious focus on winning, forgets that her opponent is in fact her best friend, for the sake of whom she took up the game in the first place. The way in which her goal becomes independent of the context in which it originated is, in my opinion, one of the two patterns according to which we can make sense of how reification comes about: we stop attending to the fact of antecedent recognition, because in the course of our practices the purpose of observing and cognizing our surroundings asserts its independence, so to speak, to such a degree that it banishes everything else to the background. Second, a series of thought schemata that influence our practices by leading to a selective interpretation of social facts can significantly reduce our attentiveness for meaningful circumstances in a given situation. (R 59)

In this apt example, we find Honneth contemplating a progressive possibility where recognition takes place prior to reification. While it is arguable that Honneth gives out a kind of objectifying stance that is analogous to that of the Nuremberg Trials wherein one looks at the objective as an order (to the extent of saying Befehl ist Befehl or an “order is an order”), it does, however, look at the reflective stance that people can take as a form of responsibility and accountability for their actions. This is not to say that there was no due process to avoid the situation, for, in reality, these objectifying instances happen as a consequence of objectified action. What is important is that our entanglements with social interactions allow us to confront the consequences of our actions and reflect on future possibilities. In relation to Kompridis’ critique of a unitary conception of recognition, we need to look at Honneth’s arguments against Fraser’s

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claim to distinguish economic and cultural identity claims. Fraser sees economics as a powerful force that shapes the way identities are valued in each society and sees the distinct symbolic effect of cultural recognition as a uniquely different phenomenon (RR 64–66). Furthermore, for Fraser, the issue of economic redistribution cannot be merely conflated with recognition since recognition can, in some instances, be symbolic while cultural forms of recognition may neglect or even mock the economic aspects of redistribution. For example, one might find the attempt to recognise women by eliminating the humiliating tendencies that they are exposed to in pornography but not see the economic consequence of taking away a profession from women (RR 65). On the economic side of things, redistributing goods as a way of accommodating the unemployed can be stigmatising in terms of the recognition that they project through welfare (RR 65). For Fraser, the approach seems to point to an imperative of taking a two-pronged understanding of how economics and recognition affect one another; there is no redistribution without recognition and no recognition without redistribution. Fraser proposes a form of perspectival dualism where the issue of redistribution and recognition are seen not as conflicting but rather as separate intersecting interests between economics and cultural identity (RR 93). As we can see from Fraser’s argument, the two-pronged approach requires social changes on both ends. This means that both economic and cultural forms of distribution should find complementary approaches in addressing social issues; otherwise, the capacity of material and cultural resources to handle social issues will become lopsided. For Honneth, this issue can be addressed without creating a dichotomy between cultural identities and economics. While Honneth does not explicitly state that recognition is the silver bullet for curing economic or cultural woes, he does, however, see that in the process of socialisation, the surplus of normative resources gained from engaging in struggles for recognition involves the increase in quality of social integration (RR 174– 175). To invoke his emphasis on social solidarity and integration, Honneth’s point is far from arguing a unitary concept of recognition but, rather, what he sees is a plurality of forms of recognition that address different aspects of social issues. Furthermore, Honneth is more concerned with seeing how a plurality of norms, identities, and interests can support one another with the common agenda of social solidarity. In The Struggle for Recognition, this agenda is made clear by his intention to see a formal conception of an ethical state in Hegel’s Sittlichkeit by addressing social processes that provide us with the critical understanding of how social

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struggles move both subjects and societies towards a certain direction (SFR 171). This direction, implies, in some sense, an understanding of an end-state or a vision of a working society that recognises the modern conception of individuality and autonomy. Guided by this agenda, Honneth’s recognition theory can address pluralistic conceptions of identities working in conjunction with a state that collaborates with the immanent criteria and requirements of its members (SFR 171). The accusation of a unitary form of recognition is difficult to see in Honneth’s critical theory since he places a strong emphasis on the development surpluses that we acquire from social struggles, and these are not merely understood in a “narrow sense of morality” (SFR 171). Rather, struggles for recognition ought to be understood as progressive expansions of intersubjectivity guided by the goal of achieving a sense of “good life” (SFR 172). Honneth sees the problem of moral conformism connected to the issue of domination and reification; hence, as a solution, his proposal in The Struggle for Recognition is to include the material conditions that make self-realisation possible: Our approach departs from the Kantian tradition in that it is concerned not solely with the moral autonomy of human beings but also with the conditions of self-realization in general. Hence, morality, understood as the point of view of universal respect, becomes one of several protective measures that serve the general purpose of enabling a good life. But in contrast to those movements that distance themselves from Kant, this concept of the good should not be conceived as the expression of substantive values that constitute the ethos of a concrete tradition-based community. Rather, it has to do with the structural elements of ethical life, which from the general point of view of the communicative enabling of self-realization, can be normatively extracted from the plurality of all particular forms of life. (SFR 172)

We can see that Honneth is trying to propose a solution that mitigates both sides of material and normative reproductions of social interactions. On the one hand, he sees norms as a necessary foundation for any social relations; on the other hand, he is also affirming that the material reproduction of norms can also be transformed to enable an intersubjective critique of stabilised notions of the “good life.” As I have mentioned in the previous parts, this agenda is served by providing an immanent perspective of societal norms: on how they inform, operate, and reproduce progressively or pathologically. While Honneth may sound ambiguous in his position regarding which norms ought to be validated in society, his seeming ambiguity is justified by his nuanced perspective on norms. What I see in his attempt is to produce a progressive understanding of normativity

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through recognition against the backdrop of the idea that historicity is discontinuous. What is persistent in his work is the sense of feeling that all forms of social pathologies, misrecognition, and exclusion can be resolved once we start looking for ways to open up and be receptive to individual differences. Unlike other philosophers of intersubjectivity and infinite moral responsibilities, Honneth pursues a pragmatic path of asserting the mutuality of responsibilities in intersubjectivity. Again, Honneth’s choice of the word Kampf or struggle is not without merit, for if we look at Honneth’s Hegelian roots, intersubjectivity never comes by without friction. While it may be possible to impose social mechanisms that may lubricate the passage of understanding in society, recognition and intersubjectivity will always have to look back and respect the autonomy of individuals who play out their part in society. In Honneth’s case, social friction is a learning experience that greatly enhances the quality of social interactions when mutually addressed. The important component in maintaining this productive friction is to ensure the freedom and autonomy of the subjects involved in social interactions, which leads us to the third response that can be generated as a reply to Kompridis’ critique.

4.C. Response to the Third Point The question of how recognition can give rise to the possibility of supporting and enhancing freedom may seem difficult to conceive against the backdrop of inevitable instances of reification or objectification. Despite the presence of these contrived situations, Honneth considers this as the most important component of recognition. As Honneth would argue in The Struggle for Recognition, the autonomy of individuals in social interactions must be protected to guarantee a free interplay of intersubjectivity. Furthermore, in Freedom’s Right, the freedom of individuals in social interactions enables an authentic form of recognition to take place. For better or worse, these interactions allow a degree of reflexivity where the recogniser and the recognised are engaged in a mutual position of receptivity. While, to some extent, these arguments remind us of Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action, we have to understand that Honneth’s appeal is different in terms of its epistemological basis. While Habermas understands reason as a form of a shared communicative agency of norms, Honneth’s appeal takes a primal form of intersubjective experience. This sense of experience is derived from an individual’s already existing grasp of norms that played a role in the development his or her identity. Identity then becomes a model of freedom that is authenticated by an individual’s experience of respect or disrespect. What

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is also notable in Honneth’s recognition theory is the resiliency of his conception of critique that neither creates a moral imperative nor imposes a specific kind of goal other than to envision a solidaristic conception of a good life, thereby avoiding atomistic tendencies of individuation. This foothold allows Honneth’s theoretical formalism to stand firm on the acceptance of social solidarity and receptivity as an indisputable social given in any critique of society. Honneth does not deny that the context of his normative reconstruction of freedom in Freedom’s Right is limited to modern societies, and to be specific, European democracy in the past 200 years (FRS viii).

5. Freedom and Recognition Despite Kompridis’ criticisms aimed at the reduction of freedom, Honneth has been able to show certain mechanisms in modern democracies that pave the way to a progressive enlarging of the freedom of individuals in the sphere of private relations, economics, and democratic will formation. As a probable response to Kompridis, Honneth adds legal and reflexive freedoms that are guaranteed by social institutions to be contributory to the development of a sense of freedom in individuals. At this point, what Honneth lacks in depicting the ontological condition of human subjectivity, he compensates by providing an undeniable depiction of social relations that is rooted in autonomy and solidarity. By understanding that freedom, in turn, enlarges the capacity of subjects in social relations to become more receptive, we can find resolution in Kompridis’ criticism that Honneth’s recognition theory “depletes” the normative resources of critical theory. What is lacking in Honneth’s Freedom’s Right is the intermeshing of the concept of recognition and freedom against the backdrop of the normativity in social relations. This, I will cover in the next part.

PART FIVE TRIANGULATING IDENTITIES IN FREEDOM AND RECOGNITION

In Part Four, I have covered some of the criticisms levelled against Honneth’s recognition theory through Nikolas Kompridis’ critique of the tradition of critical theory. Following his worry with Habermas’ formalistic outlook with critical theory, Kompridis investigates Honneth’s recognition theory and finds three issues with the concept of recognition. Firstly, Kompridis was concerned with Honneth’s claim of stability in recognition theory. This is a concern that is well intentioned but unnecessary because Honneth is agnostic to the absolute goal or determination of recognition. Recognition is only stable insofar as it mutually serves the disclosure of identities. Second, Kompridis worries about the unitary application of recognition or the formalised forms of recognition that can both instrumentalise and restrict possibilities of a disclosure. Through antecedent forms of recognition, Honneth demonstrates that despite the restriction imposed by existing norms, consequent reflection allows subjects to learn from previous cases of misrecognition or recognition. The last concern that was raised by Kompridis was the problem of freedom in recognition. In the course of, recognition, freedom is manifested through the experience of disrespect or respect that either denies or affirms the identity of the individual. In this part, I intend to articulate the connections and progressions of Honneth’s recognition theory from the Struggle for Recognition towards his more recent work, Freedom's Right. My goal is to locate the spheres of recognition within specific spheres of social interactions stipulated from Freedom’s Right.

1. Confidence in Identities and their Role in Maintaining Freedom through Recognition One of the defining features of Honneth’s idea of freedom lies in the six general requirements that he proposes in Freedom’s Right. These

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requirements ensure the open participation of members of society in a democratic public sphere that can allow inclusivity and participation to flourish. As stipulated in Part Three, the following requirements have been mentioned: 1. The first requirement is the legal transformation of the “bourgeois” public sphere into a democratic sphere (FRS 290), which emphasizes the lifting of class restrictions in any individual’s participation in a democratic sphere. 2. The second requirement is the support for public will formation by establishing and maintaining public communicative spaces that are open for everyone regardless of class differences or distinctions (FRS 290). By providing these spaces for the public, the democratic public sphere guarantees not only the participation of its members but also a diversity of opinions and thoughts that can enrich and broaden the horizon of public will. Moreover, this also guarantees that the public will formation of the members is going to be protected from violence and discrimination due to conflicts of interests that may arise between individuals and groups within such public space. 3. The third requirement is the utilization of media in the dissemination of information regarding the diverse positions of social participants, to allow the public sphere to have access to pertinent information (FRS 291). In doing so, the public will be informed about the possible positions or opinions that they can adopt to enable them to align their individual forms of selfrealisation to the available resources of disclosure and normativity. Again, these requirements stipulate that the dissemination should become both wide-reaching and heteronomous, to avoid vested interests rooted in political, economic, and social entanglements. 4. In the fourth requirement, Honneth calls for the voluntary participation of the citizens and their willingness to provide the necessary resource to accommodate these events that contribute to the enrichment of public will formation (FRS 291). This voluntary participation means that the public must also be willing to volunteer and provide the necessary resources for the dissemination of information and the continuity of diverse discourses (FRS 292). 5. The fifth condition is the sustenance of the public’s effort to maintain a diverse and working “political culture” in which solidarity becomes “an elementary precondition for revitalizing the democratic public” (FRS 292). For Honneth, this active participation

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of the public sphere prevents social apathy brought about by the lack of participation and freedom to participate. 6. The sixth and last requirement calls for the mutual supplementation of the members of society to maintain effectivity and confidence among themselves and give rise to an effective will formation (FRS 304). This last requirement means that the confidence of the people is internally derived from their willingness to support one another, not simply because of common interests and shared goals but also because they are a society that respects differences through solidaristic forms of discursive communication. In relation to Kompridis’ accusation of the “depletion” of normative resources, discussed in the previous chapter, the sixth requirement mentioned above provides an ample response. When Honneth invokes the idea of solidarity, he does not necessarily imply a sense of empathy or sympathy for the experiences of others. As an important aspect of his social philosophy, Honneth’s take on solidarity implies a mutual sense of action and respect among members of society that are entangled with their respective lifeworlds. In one of his interviews, Honneth states that the notion of solidarity is beyond the concept of “agape” or love: So we have two notions of solidarity, which are in tension with each other, and in order to avoid that tension, I normally try to reduce the notion of solidarity only to the community, which shares a certain goal, and the members of which are trying to reach that goal. And for that other form of solidarity, I am rather using words like pity, sympathy, or even Nächstenliebe, which is partly the translation of agape. So I make a clear distinction there, and I think it helps a little bit to avoid confusion as to what we are speaking of, because it’s necessary to avoid that confusion. Take Durkheim who is interested in studying the shift in kind of solidarity. I think he uses solidarity also more in my sense, namely, as having nothing to do with sympathy or pity, or with Nächstenliebe or agape, but it is based on forms of cooperation, then he calls it organic solidarity, if they are based on more flexible forms of cooperation, then he calls it mechanistic forms of solidarity. (Campello & Iorio 2013, 250)

By clarifying this concept of solidarity, Honneth can limit the normative expectations of his work. Although this might seem detrimental to the agenda of his intersubjectivist approach, it does, however, make his formal conception of Hegel’s ethical life realizable and free from the burden of an all-encompassing sense of infinite responsibility. This interview answers a host of problems that were levelled against Honneth’s

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recognition theory.1 Honneth’s statement clarifies the understanding and expectations that are implicit with the goal of recognition as a form of realising solidarity within social interactions. For, on the one hand, the burden of recognition as a mutual goal of solidarity can be located in the resolution and formation of actions towards a common goal or shared concern, be it a conflict among social actors or a conflict that requires mutual action (e.g., natural calamities, economic crises, etc.). On the other hand, the progressive nature of solidarity, through recognition, does not necessarily imply a positive outcome that results in some odd form of perpetual social solidarity. Notably, what Honneth implies in these instances are the moments where social struggles can elicit a learning situation for resolving conflict and negotiating normative practices that can result in a progressive understanding of our historical entanglement with already existing norms. Identities, as we can see in Honneth’s normative reconstructions in Freedom’s Right, are potent caches of normative resources by means of which freedom is further enriched. This is done through the practice of recognition, which provides constant possibilities of solidarity in social relations. While Honneth seems to paint a positive picture of solidarity in Freedom’s Right, his intention was to provide a progressive outlook on the effects of social struggles under the foothold of freedom. Honneth does not necessarily deny the regressive aspects of the 200-year history of a democratic European culture in Freedom’s Right. In fact, a close reading of the Freedom’s Right will give one an idea that this progress of freedom is only made possible by the identification of conflicts and the purposive participation of individuals in engaging such conflicts. As Honneth observes in the problem of homogenised identities, the issue of contrary or opposing norms being suppressed or blocked out from the participation to democratic will formation can result in catastrophes similar to the Nazi holocaust (FRS 315). Thus, in this sense, solidarity is not enough as a formula for a successful continuing sustenance of the ethical society; the willful participation of individuals from diverse positions is necessary because the collective lifeworld draws its normative resources from this participation. Guaranteeing the diversity of identities, however, is a challenging problem for social philosophy. On one hand, one should look at 1

From Kompridis’ worry of over-burdening the notion of recognition (Kompridis 2007, 287) to Zurn’s criticism of Honneth’s Pollyannish tendency to view social struggles progressively (Zurn 2015, 193)

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mechanisms that enable deliberate inclusion of the members of a social group. On the other hand, one also must maintain a public sphere that is free from the possibilities of coercion or domination. To add to the complication and challenges of social philosophy, the issue of recognising diverse identities can be deemed problematic due to the misalignment or difference of subjectivities that might not be shared by a stranger or an excluded individual. As mentioned in Part Four, Honneth’s position is quite firm in the idea of the mutuality of recognition—that it is not a onesided action where a subject merely affirms its other (Marcelo 2013, 217). To demonstrate Honneth’s position, we must align his formulations and revisions of recognition theory with the idea of social freedom. In doing so, we will be able to see why social solidarity is possible despite the diversity of individual identities. The mechanism of social freedom allows identities to explore possibilities of “self-relationship to self” or explorations of possible identities and, through that, the subject learns that his or her identity can be realised in his or her continuous participation in society. This means that the continuity of the process of self-understanding is neither compromised nor concluded. Instead, what we have is a process where the subject can renew itself amidst the changes that he or she experiences in society. That being said, I do not refer to the simple solution of conformity that can be guided by impeccable and absolute universal “moral” norms. Rather, in Honneth’s case, the norms are realised in the collective effort of individuals to engage in an autonomous formation and revision of existing norms. This Hegelian bent in Honneth’s work enables his social philosophy to cover for both freedom and normativity, no longer as conflicted ends of ethics but as intertwined elements that allow a “critique from within” or an immanent critique that can be simultaneously descriptive and normative. In this part, I will merge Honneth’s recognition theory with his notion of freedom in Freedom’s Right. My goal is to provide a systematic overview of how the spheres of recognition are aligned with Honneth’s reconstruction of the spheres of social interaction. In doing so, I will provide a triangulation of social freedom’s function in providing areas of recognition within the spheres of private relations, market economy, and democratic will formation. Coupled with Honneth’s addition of antecedent recognition, social freedom provides the necessary point of feedback looping where the spheres of democracy and recognition are evaluated and subject to critique. This will be guided by my schematic in Fig. 3.

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Fig. 3

2. Social Freedom and Antecedent Recognition The core of freedom and recognition in democratic societies lies in the capacity of antecedent recognition and social freedom to provide individuals with the capacity to reflect not only on their social entanglements (e.g., duties, responsibilities, etc.) but also on their autonomous decision to pursue their own individual sense of selfrealisation. This core sustains the possibility of critique and reflection at the centre of the private sphere, the sphere of market economy, and the democratic sphere. Each of the spheres of recognition function is a mode of mutually affirming the recognition of identities within the private, market, and democratic spheres. Antecedent recognition is taken from

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Honneth’s rejoinder in Reification, as a “spontaneous, nonrational recognition of others as fellow human beings” (R 152) where a “remembering” or a recognition of previous normative values is invoked. Honneth further asserts that this kind of recognition implies that “whether we like it or not, we pre-predicatively concede the other a relationship-to-self, which like our own relationship-to-self, is directed toward the realisation of personal goals” (R 154). As such, the actual function of antecedent recognition is a mechanism where the considerations regarding solidarity are individually and autonomously reflected upon by the individual, resulting in the realignment with others and society as a whole. I assert that this function of antecedent recognition ought to be understood in tandem with the idea of social freedom since the antecedent capacities of recognition are clearly manifested in the spheres of social interaction in enabling social freedom. Following Hegel, Honneth asserts that freedoms, such as the capacity to deny norms that conflict with the normative expectations of the individual find their legitimation in legal freedom and moral freedom (FRS 58). Furthermore, Honneth’s historical treatment of the modes of freedom coming from social freedom insists that negative, reflexive, legal, and moral forms of freedom can indeed be traced to the already given and established autonomy granted by social freedom (FRS 61). Honneth’s purpose for using a historical reconstruction, in this case, is to prove that these freedoms were already made possible due to the capacity of social freedom to enable autonomous individual choices in reaching one’s sense of self-realisation. To put social freedom in perspective, we should understand that individual autonomy itself plays out a significant role in the establishment of normative structures that guide and inform actions. Thus, as a collective, individuals are capable of destroying or building the normative principles that can inform and guide human interactions. Going back to the core function of antecedent recognition and social freedom, we can see in Fig. 3, a function of “feedback looping,” which utilises both the space to contemplate one’s entanglements with the social elements of recognition and, at the same time, weighs judgment in the form of responsibility afforded by moral freedom. Again, these two modes of freedom are distinct insofar as legal freedom merely provides the space for subjects to contemplate their relation to norms and institutionalised laws as a resource for achieving self-realisation (FRS 73). Meanwhile, moral freedom provides the individual normative resources that are free from the confines of legal freedom, thus, allowing the self-legislation of morals (FRS 99). These two important modes of freedom constitute the capacity of a subject to look at his or her antecedent circumstances and make decisions based

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on the criteria of moral and legal freedom. While this may sound circular, the circularity should be understood in terms of a “loop” that spirals into a “coil” that produces surpluses of normative resources learned by participating subjects in antecedent forms of recognition. One can imagine a coiled wire as an analogy: While the wire moves in circles, its axis of rotation remains the same in one dimension, while the other dimension expands through the constant looping function. While it might be contended that these normative surpluses might be deemed by Honneth as progressive, one should understand that these surpluses of normative resources (See Part Four 4.B.) produced by the feedback loop can be either progressive or regressive, depending on the circumstances of historicity. What is important, however, is that we see these historical surpluses as a possible resource in renewing our perspective of norms and that from a historical perspective, we can see a connection between previous norms and current norms. One can see in Honneth’s treatment of the 200 years of the history of Europe’s progressive and regressive developments of freedom in Freedom’s Right an example of how feedback looping occurs in the development of normativity. For better or for worse, the surplus generated by the looping function can generate an abundant amount of normative resources which somewhat addresses Kompridis’ contention about the depletion of normative resources in recognition theory. What concerns Honneth is the material and actual possibility of social freedom that can bring about a formal realisation of Hegel’s vision of the Sittlichkeit. We should remember that his position is to work on existing conditions where the Sittlichkeit is realised. To do so, Honneth sees the existing condition of democratic societies as a bearer of the potential to reach this goal. To locate this cohesive aspect of recognition and freedom, one needs to look at existing conditions of social freedom to realise the capacity of individuals to form their own understanding of their position in society and how society can enable their individual formulation of their selfrealisation. The material condition which I refer to does not simply imply the same material or economic conditions that Fraser was insisting in her debate with Honneth;2 rather, the material condition itself is the actualised 2

Fraser in Redistribution or Recognition argues that there should be a two-pronged approach in dealing with the politics of redistribution and recognition (RR 26). Fraser insists that the recognition of identities and the redistribution of material resources should be simultaneously resolved to meet the demands of social justice. Fraser insists that by taking these separately, one withholds social justice from individuals. While Honneth accepts the demands of social justice, he finds that

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and formed will of the people to engage and participate in maintaining receptivity to the changes and differences brought about by a heteronomy of identities. The connection that must be established here is between antecedent recognition and social freedom on the one hand, and the spheres of private relations, market economy, and democratic social interactions on the other. This can be done by locating Honneth’s initial three spheres of recognition (love, rights, and esteem) in the spheres of the private relations, democratic sphere, and economics, respectively, as points of correspondence. These spheres of relations in democratic societies, as Fig. 4 shows, can be seen as avenues for recognition. I am considering these spheres of recognition as dependent upon the function of social freedom enabling individuals to reflect and discern the available resources that they have and that the society has in store for them, while at the same time, allow them to look back at the consequences of objectifying their relations with others. By merging these spheres of recognition and freedom, we can now look at the normative expectations of certain areas of social interaction where solidarity is made possible. While we look at the cohesive role of recognition and freedom, it is also notable to look at the relations of the spheres of social interactions as mutually sustaining areas of interaction. As I have mentioned in Part Three, these spheres are common areas where individuals are able to participate and engage with one another in their pursuit of individual forms of self-realisation. While Honneth did not clearly articulate the relationship between the three basic spheres of recognition and the spheres of private relationships, economics, and democracy in Freedom’s Right, I wish to argue that these spheres are related since we can identify their specific normative expectations. For this reason, I will present a model of how these spheres of recognition and social interactions converge in their normative expectations.

Fraser’s distinction can become problematic when “legal equality” is concerned (RR 136). For Honneth, the question of equality in terms of legal rights should be established from within the social structure itself, and not as an external agency that demands the recognition of identity and economic resources. As an external demand, individuals that claim rights to recognition bypass the reciprocal feature of social relations that create further exhaustion of both normative and economic resources.

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3. Love and Personal Relations Love in Honneth’s The Struggle for Recognition is the formative phase where recognition facilitates the learning of basic norms from which gradual social integration becomes possible. One of the prominent features of this sphere of recognition is the uncoerced openness and receptivity of the social actors, to the extent that this sphere can be mistakenly identified as an exclusive function of child-parent (or guardian) interactions. Following Honneth’s development of love relations to a broader and expanded category of friendship (RR 139), we can locate a renewable trajectory of norms in the process of social integration by looking at friendship as an expanded domain of uncoerced receptivity and mutuality. In Freedom’s Right, Honneth traces the beginning of friendship relations as a form of receptivity and openness towards individual differences that are outside the domain of institutionalised relations. In other words, friendship relations transcend the traditional boundaries of blood relations, class, cultural, and economic differentiation where heterogeneous individuals can openly exchange varying forms of normative expectations. As Honneth notes in Freedom’s Right, these relations were made possible in public spaces such as pubs, coffee houses, and other places of socialisation that allowed a relaxed sense of social engagement sans the limitations imposed by social entanglements. I find the convergence of personal relationships and the sphere of love/care/friendship to be appropriate. On the one hand, we see the mechanism of antecedent recognition enabling individuals to re-learn and re-integrate social relations in instances where they are unfamiliar with normative practices in the community. On the other hand, this also addresses the issue of how individuals, who suffer the effects of social pathologies, can learn how to re-align or re-orient themselves in the existing order of norms. Furthermore, the sphere of personal relations allows individuals to experiment and explore the possibilities of self-realisation through socialisation via mutually willing and receptive social partners. The relations of family, friendship, and intimate relations are all geared towards maintaining different kinds of receptiveness to differences, and each has a corresponding degree of normative expectations regarding the social bonds that they accrue. For example, while family relations can be considered as the most basic starting point of personal relations, these relations should be receptive enough to address the different identities that it introduces through child-rearing (biological or adopted)—Infants and children are already differentiated by their lack of experience in social interactions. Moreover, the basic component of familial relations is only

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made possible by more complex relations of friendship and intimate relations since they constitute the basic unit of partnership in the establishment of families. Personal relations serve a very important role in the everyday practice of recognition. Since personal relations are points of learning and receptivity for individuals, they produce a surplus of normative resources for stabilising identities. Moreover, personal relations also provide alternative sources of self-realisation where identities are gained through the exploration of difference from other participants of this sphere. While this sphere can sustain individual confidence to pursue self-realisation in the democratic sphere and the sphere of market economy, the sphere of personal relations is nonetheless also dependent on the material sustenance and institutional protection provided respectively by the market economy and the democratic sphere. The interconnectedness of these spheres of social interactions is made prominent by the fact that disruptions in the normative expectations found in the economic and democratic spheres can disrupt the recognition within the sphere of private relations. For example, if the democratic sphere cannot produce laws that protect the sanctity of relations of families, friendships, and intimate relations, then social pathologies can arise in the form of disrespect. Let us suppose hypothetically that women and children are considered as properties of men, then pathologies such as child abuse, rape, and even racial discrimination can take place. These social pathologies compromise the foundation of socialisation and solidarity. Moreover, in the case of the market economy, the failure to materially allow individuals to support themselves with the necessary livelihood will also compromise the capacity of individuals to socially integrate. For example, if the material conditions of employment, consumption, and the capacity to propagate resources become limited or constricted to the point that individuals in this hypothetical state no longer have recourse to the basic necessities of life, their personal relations will also degrade. Families might seek means of earning income that is degrading to their sense of personhood, such as, prostitution or even crime. In the Philippines, the proliferation of cyber-sex prostitution of underage children has often been traced back to the pressure of the parents to force their own children to sell their bodies as a means of earning income for the family (De Leon 2013). Viewing the interrelated nature of the spheres of social interactions allows us to view Honneth’s recognition theory in both the micro and macro levels. On the one hand, we can locate normative expectations as well as social pathologies within certain points in the spheres of social

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interaction. On the other hand, we are also able to locate certain deficiencies in the normative resources provided by their interrelated spheres. In the examples above, we can see a connection that locates the possible means by which antecedent recognition can remedy social freedoms that have been violated. By this remedy, what we can imply is the capacity of individuals to reflect upon the normative resources that they have through legal freedom and at the same time look at how it affects one’s moral standpoint through one’s own sense of self-realisation. What gives power to these social spheres is the capacity of individuals to elevate discourse within the spheres of private relations, economics, and democracy. Without the mutual support of these spheres, social pathologies can occur since normative resources would be constrained, restricted, and excluded from the normative claims of individuals. Furthermore, what we can learn from these interactions, in both the micro and macro perspectives, is that individuals must actively participate and engage with one another in discourse to maintain or, at times, revise their normative claims. While Honneth does not claim a revolutionary form of social movement, he does look at the possibility of social change from within. I think that the emancipatory potential of this perspective, while neither poetic nor romantic, hold a stable and viable potential for initiating changes from within society itself. The beauty, however, of Honneth’s immanent critique is that it provides a descriptive assessment of how normativity is attained through socialisation to the extent that there is no complex call for ontological renewals, transcendental moralism, or cultural valuations involved from the outside. One can argue to a certain degree that Honneth’s critical theory is simply a description of existing social practices because these practices are already at work in current social interactions and institutionalisation of norms. The material or empirical character of Honneth’s social philosophy has a strong potential in broadening the understanding of the “everydayness” character of individual interactions that can be expanded from both micro and macro levels. As with any institutionalised system of social relations, the potential for change and revision of norms lies with our constant and watchful engagement with their function. With these considerations in mind, I now move to my discussion of how the spheres of recognition triangulate their capacities for selfrealisation in the spheres of social interaction of market economy and democracy. To reiterate once more, these spheres are dependent on each other. I will now proceed to the relationship between Market Economy and the recognition sphere of esteem.

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4. Esteem and Market Economy Following Durkheim and Honneth, an atomistic conception of the spheres of social interaction can give rise to the perspective of anomie or lack of moral guidance or moral direction. A key concept that can be derived from the understanding of anomie is the division of labour that is often attributed to the capitalist modes of production (See Part Three, 4.B.). One’s ignorance of the macro perspective in the chain of interdependence in production or any social interaction may lead to the selfish achievement of individual ends. Zurn notes that in Honneth’s discussion of the market economy in Freedom’s Right, the latter assumes a pessimistic tone when it comes to the diagnosis of market economy’s normative potentials. Zurn even thinks that Honneth is incapable of finding social freedom in contemporary market economies (Zurn 2015, 181–182). In contrast to Zurn, I argue that Honneth’s tone is mostly tempered by Durkheim and Marx’s analysis of the condition of labour and consumption in capitalist economies. The reason for my digression is that Zurn did not take a closer look at the development of Honneth’s arguments, specifically in the part where Honneth refers to the division of labour as a problem on its own precisely because of its mode of coordinating norms as opposed to cooperating to meet the expectation of norms (FRS 197). By isolating the social consequences of the market economy, we can only have a partial perspective of its ends or goals which would somewhat overshadow the normative resources that the market economy needs. Following Durkheim, we can see that by dividing the labour of the spheres of social interactions, we can observe a state of anomie when these spheres no longer see their interrelation with one another, which leads to the state of anomie (Durkheim 2013, 287). Durkheim understands anomie as a lack of cooperation (as opposed to coordination, since the latter implies a mechanistic movement) of bodies that ought to supplement one another in solidarity to maintain their function: Since a body of rules is the definite form taken over time by the relationships established spontaneously between social functions, we may say a priori that a state of anomie is impossible wherever organs in solidarity with one another are in sufficient contact, and in sufficiently lengthy contact. Indeed, being adjacent to one another, they are easily alerted in every situation to the need for one another and consequently they experience a keen, continuous feeling of their mutual dependence. For the same reason, exchanges between them occur easily; being regular, they occur frequently; they regulate themselves and time gradually effects the task of consolidation. Finally, because the slightest reaction can be felt

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I wish to emphasize again that the sphere of the market economy is dependent upon the resources that are provided by the spheres of personal relations and democracy, for the latter spheres provide the necessary normative resources required to sustain market economy preventing its collapse. Durkheim’s analysis of anomies in the division of labour presents a potent avenue for Honneth to insert the recognition sphere of esteeming because of its capacity to sustain the material fulfilment of individual needs for self-realisation. This means that the apparatus of the market economy’s dependence on personal relations and democracy relies on the stability of these spheres to provide a steady flow of labour and consumption. Moreover, the struggle for recognition in the form of esteem socialises the forms of consumption and labour to the extent that the moral character of the market economy can no longer be isolated from the other spheres of social interactions. We can see the progressive character of the development of normative resources in the sphere of the market economy when it is viewed in cooperation, and not merely in coordination, with the other spheres. For example, the esteeming quality of labour and consumption affects the quality of personal relations that can be had by individuals which, at the basic level, affects everyday conditions of recognition. Working conditions, while imperfect in most situations, are nonetheless gaining traction in recognising the effect it has on individuals. Thus, for Honneth, labour unions and even self-help organisations are developed to socialise the market economy. We can even argue that the capitalist system of providing feedback loops for eliciting antecedent recognition has a greater potential in the contemporary market as opposed to feudal and authoritarian societies. The reason for this is that labourers and consumers are observed to have better rights today, and the feedback loop (supposing that the disrespected individuals are willing to undergo the process) is much faster and effective in producing contact and stimuli.

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The progressive character of the market economy is notable, but this was only made possible through a series of recognitive struggles. The problem of liberalising the market economy also contributes to the state of anomie if the market economy is understood and practised as a detached social apparatus for dividing labour. That is why Honneth finds it necessary to modify Hegel and Durkheim’s position of expecting normativity to highlight the cooperative efforts of individuals in the process of improving the parameters of the market economy (FRS 183). Honneth can demonstrate the capacity of individuals in bringing forth a sense of moral character that is embedded in the socialised nature of market economies. For example, the role of institutions and NGOs in instigating moral changes to protect consumers as well as labourers plays a prominent role in the re-alignment of norms (FRS 198–253). Taken in the context of social solidarity, the recognition of individuals as consumers, labourers, and capitalists articulate the necessity of esteem in their interactions. The function of esteeming in the achievements of these three participants of the market economy allows them to materially sustain individual and social needs. As Honneth mentions (FRS 200), consumption takes a precedent form of socialisation in which individuals, aside from sustaining their material needs, find self-confidence and identity in consumption. Moreover, we also see that labour for Honneth is necessary for fulfilling a sense of self-realisation to the point that the protection of labourers poses a common interest in sustaining both the production and consumption of goods (FRS 229). That is why labour unions, self-help organisations, clubs, and cooperatives are always in the process of enhancing the conditions of work (FRS 232). These forms of interventions are effective in maintaining a socialised form of recognition since labourers can engage one another and create discourse regarding the normative expectations that they can have from their employers and from the state. Honneth is convinced that this socialisation is important to the extent that institutionalising social welfare may have the unwanted consequence of dissociating labourers from socialisation (FRS 232). Esteem is vital to the capacity of individuals to reach their own pursuit of self-realisation through work and consumption. Moreover, it also contributes to the realisation of capitalism, not in the context of its dominating or oppressive tendency, but rather in providing incentives for individuals to invest (or even risk) their capital for the possibility of profit. With the perspective of interrelation and mutual solidarity, the state of anomie could be reduced or even eliminated, if the participative engagement of all the social actors in the market economy (and the spheres of social interaction as well) is constantly renewing their claims for

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recognition and revising the functionality of norms. We can look at the rise of Corporate Social Responsibility, for example, as a notable progressive development in the socialisation of the market economy. Corporate Social Responsibility recognises the need for esteem not only of labourers or consumers but also other stakeholders that are affected in the sphere of social relations. At this juncture, the question of the intention of the capitalist to “redistribute” or cooperate no longer should be guided by the question of egocentric and self-interested desires for, in its effect, the increase in quality of recognition of labourers and consumers can lead to profitability. Given the above, we can identify two problems in relation to the state of anomie in the market economy. Firstly, from the perspective of the individual, the amoral tendencies of the market economy can be recognised when its operation is isolated from the spheres of personal relations and democracy. Moreover, they can also take a dissociated and atomistic stance within the sphere of market economy, wherein labourers work only with the intention of earning their wages, consumers purchasing products and services simply for the satisfaction that they bring, and capitalists investing capital with the sole purpose of increasing the profitability of their investments. Secondly, from the perspective of a theoretician, a disconnected and discontinuous look at the individual areas of the market economy provides a lopsided or unbalanced critique of its participants. For example, if we lean towards the agenda of criticising the capitalists for their inadequate treatment and compensation of labourers, we may also neglect the fact that their interrelated participation in the market economy also affects the other actors’ need for self-realisation. The same is true with the other social actors; if we press on the importance of consumer rights against that of capitalists and labourers, we will, in turn, alienate these parties’ interest in self-realisation. We should remember that through the interconnection of these social actors, the fulfilment of their own sense of self-realisation is made possible through their mutual cooperation. Thus, we ought not to try and eliminate interests of selfrealisation between labourers, consumers, and capitalists, because these interests provide these individuals with their own autonomous motive to mutually recognise each other’s contribution to mutual self-realisation. The function of esteeming in the sphere of market economy happens when individual freedom is mutually realised by the labourer, consumer, and capitalist. Honneth claims this realisation of individual freedom as the premise for the work of Marx and Smith, which he refers to as the “Marx problem” and the “Smith Problem” (FRS 181). The problem with Marx

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and Smith, however, is their failure to articulate the integrative aspect of labour, capital, and consumption as a socialised network of interdependent individuals. For Marx, the focus has been too fixated with enhancing the condition of the labourers and consumers, while Smith, on the other hand, is fixated with the interest of expanding the individual freedom of the capitalist. Honneth states that the problem with Marx and Smith lies with Marx’s fixation on the structural deficiency of capitalism, while Smith suffers the difficulty of giving an appropriate description of the market economy (FRS 363). From these deficits, two issues arise. Firstly, the connection between the labourer, consumer, and capitalist, when taken separately as merely independent units, will inevitably cause social pathologies in their interactions. Secondly, if the market economy is detached and independent, it will deplete its own normative resources. Thus, in this regard, we can agree, to some extent, with Marx’s contemptuous tone when he invokes “free labour.” For it is precisely in the mutuality of recognition of these social actors in the sphere of market economy and their partnership with the sphere of personal relations and democracy that we find the normative resources to “materially” support the individual freedoms of social participants in the market economy. Again, to emphasise the interconnections within the spheres of social interactions, let us suppose that the sphere of democracy does not participate or cooperatively engage with the market economy in forming norms. This can result in the exploitation of labour, diminished rights of consumers, and even the loss of interest and motivation from the capitalists. Furthermore, if the market economy is not regulated by the democratic sphere, then private relations are also affected. There is, of course, a whole array of social pathologies that can be triangulated with the formulation of my reconstructive normative simulations. The point of this exercise is to provide us with the antecedent and precedent forms of projecting possible outcomes of disrupting the spheres of recognition and freedom. Moreover, the triangulation of social pathologies can begin either with the sphere that is struggling for recognition due to disrespect or at specific spheres that are suffering certain forms of a deficit and anticipate the trajectory of social pathologies that it will generate. Moving further, I will now proceed with the discussion of the democratic sphere.

5. The Sphere of Democracy and Rights In the following, I will be delving into the relationship between democracy and rights. In this sphere, we will be able to triangulate the

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location of renewable normative resources that are generated through the participation and engagement of social actors in the spheres of private relations and market economy. Echoing Kompridis’ worries with the depletion of normative resources in modernity (Kompridis 2007, 287), we can surmise that in the spheres of social interaction, these resources can be renewed as long as there is a constant cooperation among social players. The separation of spheres of social interaction could lead to the depletion of normative resources, which also means overburdening these spheres with expectations that they could not fulfil. To some degree, Kompridis is correct in warning us about this possibility. Nevertheless, we can argue against Kompridis due to his failure to point out which area or sphere of recognition takes the burden of normative expectations. Instead, what he equates with recognition is the possibility of full-recognition as an impossibility (Kompridis 2007, 287). The sphere of democracy fits the function of rights in the sphere of recognition insofar as rights generate and reproduce norms that inform the actions of individuals in their everyday social interactions. Through social freedom and antecedent recognition, we can see an autonomous transformation and renewal of the normative resources of the democratic sphere through the engagement of individuals in transforming public will, negotiating the legitimacy of their individual claims, and maintaining a participative political culture. As bearers of rights that are reproduced through constant socialisation, the legitimacy of one’s claim towards normative resources comes from the constant effort of the participants to realign and negotiate their normative claims with already existing norms. Notably, the heteronomy of participants in this sphere enriches the normative resources available to the public because of the variation of normative claims that require legitimisation. A notable point comes into mind when Honneth points out that a homogenous kind of democracy is detrimental to the enrichment of normative resources due to the lack of contrary or differing claims. If we revisit the conditions in Germany under the Treaty of Versailles after World War One, we can observe that the homogeneity of ego-association has been detrimental to the reflexivity of its citizens (FRS 315–317). The sphere of democracy is responsible for protecting the individual rights of persons, where the possibility of inclusion is realised through the proper normative resources integrated into already existing norms. Again, to emphasise the participatory nature of democratic societies, participation in democratic will formation should be understood in the context of mutual recognition among participants who respect one another as

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autonomous bearers of rights. Not only does this require the willingness of individuals to engage with one another, but democratic discourse also should be maintained institutionally by providing the adequate freedom for individuals to convene and freely exchange ideas and normative stances. The sphere of democracy ought to harbour mutual attitudes of recognition precisely because it is the main source of reproducing and informing the actions of the social actors in their interactions. Notably, an individual demanding recognition should understand that socialisation is not simply a one-way process. It is earned by undergoing a process of discursive engagement with other individuals that have different self-interests and intentions in reaching their own self-realisation. What is gained from struggles of recognition is the surplus of normative resources and the capacity of dialectical interactions to reproduce and even transform these normative resources. Thus, in contrast to Ricoeur’s critique of the violent character of struggle, Honneth understands struggles for recognition as opportunities for individuals to gain their self-confidence and establish solidarity. In the democratic sphere, rights are given to individuals to engage in uncoerced interactions as part of their struggle for the recognition of their identities. This sphere, however, should be corroborated by the spheres of private relations and market economy. To be more specific, identity formation is based on personal relationships via the family, friendships, and intimate relations. Moreover, the stability afforded by the esteeming qualities of one’s labour, consumption, and engagement with capitalist systems of the market economy can provide the adequate material needs for the development of self-esteem. It must be mentioned that material resources coming from the sphere of the market economy need not translate to monetary resources; they can also come in the form of time, which should be stabilised assuming that the basic necessities of life are already available through the cooperative efforts of the market economy.

6. Some General Triangulations of Reconstructive Normative Simulations What I propose to do in the following is to provide a Reconstructive Normative Simulation (RNS) of how these spheres interact and affect an individual’s sense of integration in or disintegration from society. In doing so, we can look at the idea of how uncoerced sense of solidarity can be built from the socialising activity of engagements in these spheres of social interaction and recognition. Through this, we can also locate areas

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of normative deficits by looking at non-participating areas of the sphere or areas that are cut off or inaccessible to individuals. Following Honneth’s heavy use of literary characters, I intend to create these “fictional” or “hypothetical” characters as a demonstration of social pathologies that can occur in instances where recognition is withheld, thereby impeding freedom and self-realisation.3 While hypothetical examples are abundant, it does not necessarily mean that we can idealize recognition through them. In other words, I agree with Kompridis that full recognition is indeed a chimera (Kompridis 2007, 287). However, even though full recognition is not possible, the struggle for solidarity will persist. Unlike Honneth’s literary examples drawn from actual literary works, in the following RNS examples, I will present fictional characters of my own concoction (Elise, Diego, and Nolan) that are symptomatic of the social pathologies that result from the separation of the spheres of social interaction and recognition.

6.1. “Elise” and the Deficit in the Sphere of Personal Relations and Care / Love Elise is a woman born from a broken and wealthy family. Her father was a well-known and well-paid lawyer. This wealth, however, has made her family complacent with the cares and concerns of earning a living, to the point that her family members were living in excesses of luxury and vice. This conflict has alienated Elise’s father, making him adopt a second family, which allowed him to correct the mistakes of his original family. Consequently, Elise’s immediate family no longer benefited from the interactions with their father, yet they continued to wallow in their vices. Elise’s father eventually suffers a stroke and dies; unbeknownst to Elise’s 3

This has been a common practice with Honneth’s literary references to explain various forms of social pathologies and to represent the experience of disrespect and social struggles. To name a few, Honneth refers to Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man (Ellison 1952) as an intimate experience of disrespect and misrecognition (Honneth & Margalit 2001), the 16th century novelist’s Heinrich von Kleist’s account of Michael Kohlhaas’ experience of legal freedom (FRS 81), and apathy from social commitments through Benjamin Kunkel’s Indecision (FRS 93). These literary characters serve as an interesting simulation of social experiences of pathologies. While it is possible to produce a case study using the method of longitudinal research to track down progressions and regressions in triangulating social pathologies, for the moment, I think that it is more important to rely on simulated situations as an exercise of intersubjectivity because it also helps us diagnose our own internal understanding of socialisation.

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family, her father had secretly transferred his wealth to his second family. After the depletion of their inheritance, Elise and her family were forced to look for work and they moved in with their immediate relatives. While staying with relatives, Elise was exposed to drug use and was subsequently molested by her uncle, getting her pregnant and forcing her to leave the household. Since she did not finish school, it was a challenge for Elise to find a decent job; she continues to drink and do drugs while living in slums, accepting odd jobs just so she could support her child and pay the rent. In a stroke of luck, Elise’s moderate intelligence has allowed her to secure a job as a tourist guide, which one day led her to meet her first husband. Despite being married, it was difficult for Elise to abandon her old habits. She secretly spent her husband’s money for drugs and lost some to gambling. Fed up with her drug addiction, Elise’s husband abandons her, leaving behind two more offspring to care for. With three children and a worsening drug addiction to support, Elise turned to prostitution. In the following years, Elise remarried several times, but, while she mothered children during each marriage, her marriages did not last long. In her senior years, Elise relied on support from her children and relatives and from scavenging in the streets, but because she was not able to overcome her old habits, she was not able to sustain a harmonious relationship with her children and relatives. In this RNS, we can see a continuing deficit in Elise’s personal relations as a source of her social pathology. On a broader scope, it would be of interest if we can also reconstruct the possible pathologies that her children might have experienced under her care, not simply for the sake of pointing out antecedent forms of disrespect and misrecognition but also to point out why some of her children were able to overcome their entanglements with social pathologies. At this point, however, by focusing on Elise’s own identity formation and engagement with her social partners of interaction, we can point out that the deficits in her social integration are caused by a poor series of personal relations that eroded her selfconfidence. Starting from the gradual dissociation with her father’s choice to have a second family to her sexually abused history, her life gradually spirals into a broader series of pathological relationships that later on resulted in estrangement with her own family. She is unable to form deep bonds with her children because of her failed marriages and worsening drug addiction. Moreover, she is unable to gain self-esteem at the level of the market economy because she is not able to find a decent job.

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In real life, we encounter the likes of Elise every day and even engage them in social interaction. However, we never consider their circumstances as opportunities for receptivity that strike our normative expectations, which we may invoke or fine-tune. The challenge that these characters also face is their inability to use their own voice to communicate how they suffer because of the lack of normative resources that they require. The issues that Elise confronted were brought about by the lack of engagement on her part and on the part of other social actors that surrounded her. What I want to point out in this exercise is not only a sense of mutual intersubjectivity but also a sense of cooperative and social accountability on the part of any participant.

6.2. “Diego” and the Deficit in the Sphere of Democracy and Rights In the following, we will look into the character of Diego as an individual who experienced certain deficits in the sphere of rights and democracy due to the unique cultural arrangement of his environment. Diego comes from a rural province of his country that is prominently known for a certain type of religion. He comes from a poor family and has very little chance of finding education and employment, other than working on agricultural lands or engaging in occasional fishing and hunting for their daily sustenance. Diego was a very religious child and, at an early age, he decided to join the prominent religious institution in his province. This opportunity was what Diego needed to get out of poverty; not only will he get the education that he wanted, he will also have the opportunity to, later on, gain steady employment from the religious institution as one of its administrators. Unfortunately, despite the bright future offered by this religious institution, Diego was constantly abused sexually by the members of the religious institution. Diego, at one point, decides to seek legal measures to protect himself and prosecute his abusers. Despite seeking legal help, Diego was left with death threats and an uncooperative legal system that favoured the religious institution because of their economic interest in the country. At the end of their long battle for justice, Diego was given the choice of continuing the lawsuit against the religious institution and face coercion and possible “accidents” should he persist, or he could simply drop the case and earn a certain sum of money. Frustrated with the justice system, Diego chose to take the compensation so that he could finish his studies and make something out of himself. Diego eventually finished his studies and

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became a successful lawyer. His personal experiences provided the reason for Diego to excel in his profession. Despite being a very valuable member of society, Diego had problems keeping his personal relations intact. He had the constant urge to affirm his sexuality as a man and, thus, had trouble maintaining exclusive personal relations with women. After a failed marriage, Diego engaged in several affairs with women, even to the point of breaking up marriages because of his entanglement with married women. Despite these hyper sexual tendencies, Diego's family and children understood his circumstances and were very supportive, even tolerating these deficiencies in personal relations because of their father’s strong commitment to provide for their needs and help others through his profession. In this RNS, we see a progressive outlook of someone who has been damaged in the sphere of democracy and rights. Rather than becoming reactive to the circumstances, Diego took the initiative to build himself out of the terrible circumstance of losing his voice as a bearer of rights. The consequence, however, may have also damaged Diego’s relationship with others in the sphere of personal relations and love. The damaged selfconfidence started early on in the life of Diego and has broken his capacity to sustain a meaningful and intimate relationship(s) with others because of the self-doubt that Diego has with himself. The irony in this story is that despite giving voice to those that need them, Diego could not find his own voice to claim recognition.

6.3. “Nolan” and the Deficit in the Sphere of Market Economy and Esteem Following our RNS with “Diego,” we realise that the social accountability of triangulating social pathologies does not merely lie with every individual’s engagement with other social actors. We also need to look at the issue of institutional engagement where social accountability can be made present in objectified forms of normativity. Diego’s case was a product of social pathologies coming from the deficits of normative resources that were needed at the moment that they were required. Nevertheless, Diego could overcome the disrespect of his identity in a progressive way. In this third RNS, what I will be presenting is a deficit in the sphere of esteem and market economy. The character “Nolan” will be situated in a context that becomes progressively difficult to resolve without social and

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institutional resources to support his struggle. Nolan’s narrative comes from a man who is entangled in a web of social relations that expect multiple sources of normative resources. I will show that the outcomes that can arise in situations, wherein the deficit is in the sphere of market economy and esteem, generate an extreme condition of social pathology. Nolan is an heir to a medium-sized textile business operated by his family for three generations. Being the eldest, Nolan was immediately given the responsibility to run the business in which he has gained proficiency managing. Following a series of successes in marketing and operating the textile plant, Nolan brought steady income and a life of comfort to his family, including his six siblings who were dependent on the success of the family business. In a series of events following an economic crisis, the textile industry suffered a decline in demand due to the cheaper import of foreign goods. Nolan, not only has to deal with this loss of business with the local distributors, he also has to deal with his ailing parents who were suffering from cancer caused by their many years of working in the factories. To save his parents and pay compensation for the workers who also suffered the same ailment, Nolan had to divest his properties and his family business just to settle the lawsuits and provide the necessary funds for his parents’ cancer treatment. Having sold off most of the company’s properties and assets, Nolan had to deal with his siblings’ claim for their share of the remainder of the company’s leftover fortune. He had to convince his siblings to pool out their funds to have one final shot at saving his parents. In this last effort, however, Nolan’s parents turned in for the worse and died during the process of excising the tumours from their lungs. With plenty of medical bills to pay due to the poor healthcare program of the government, Nolan was not only burdened with heavy debt incurred from his parents’ medical bills; he also had to contend with his siblings’ demand to compensate them for the loss of funds that was supposed to be their inheritance. As a compromise, Nolan had to work with what was left from his textile business to compensate his siblings for their loss and at the same time provide adequate resources for his own family to survive. Following this, Nolan had to resort to some creative forms of accounting in order to minimise the company’s tax expenses and at the same time meet the demands of his family and siblings who had their own financial needs. To keep the family business afloat, Nolan resorted to tax evasion, but the government would eventually catch up with him. To make things

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worse, he would eventually suffer from the same ailment that his parents had. Because Nolan was unable to work and keep the family business afloat, his siblings abandoned him. Not having enough funds to care for Nolan, his children are now burdened with raising sufficient funds to pay his medical bills. In this simulation, we can see that without the adequate support of the other spheres of social interaction, the normative resources of the market economy can inflict considerable harm on individual personal relations. To add to this complication, the lack of support from the democratic sphere, where rights and economic resources are supposed to be protected, further leads to the atomisation of the subject. Nolan lost much of his normative resources to the point that he no longer had recourse to anything or anyone other than his immediate family. Moreover, if we proceed further into the simulation, we might also find a continuity of pathological developments in Nolan’s social interactions assuming that things turn out for the worse for him. While intersubjectivity is a requirement for achieving solidarity, it is not, in the case of Honneth and Hegel, the end of finding a formalised praxis of the Sittlichkeit. Intersubjectivity has the potential to bring us to the condition of receptivity, which is crucial if we are to engage with the development of norms. Achieving solidarity, on the other hand, is another matter that requires its social participants to collectively maintain uncoerced interaction. Struggles for recognition can allow this condition to happen because of the affirmation of difference through a dialectical encounter. That is not to say that these dialectical encounters are entirely violent in nature, but they do involve a conflictual engagement insofar as the encounter involves a “contact” of consciousness. In Nolan’s case, his failure to dialectically engage with his social partners in interaction and his struggle to maintain the economic stability of the textile business made him hostage to the social entanglements that he had. As we can see in this example, the mutuality of recognition must account for the struggle of both parties to be recognised as individuals with needs. The failure of Nolan lies with the fact that he did not attempt to assert his identity before his social partners. Thus, in the same manner, Nolan has allowed his social partners of interaction to erode the very sense of self-confidence that he needed for himself. This behaviour is dangerous, not only for the subject itself but also for the subject’s interaction partners. As we can see from Nolan’s scenario, he has deprived his siblings the capacity to learn how to operate the business

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when he entirely took upon himself the task of running his parent’s textile business. Furthermore, his decision to continue his parent’s cancer treatment, while noble, was not able to acquire autonomous assent from his siblings. In doing so, his partners of social interactions were deprived of the responsibilities and the learning opportunities that Nolan took upon himself to undertake. As I have emphasised in Part Two, the importance of developing self-confidence through social interaction is a requirement for achieving mutual recognition between social actors. The dissolution of self-confidence in this example provides us with the picture of a nonmutual and self-sacrificial relationship that Nolan has with his social partners of interaction. Despite the noble effort of providing for his parents, siblings, and family, Nolan took a disintegrative stance by taking all the burdens of sustaining everyone’s needs, leaving nothing for him in the sphere of esteem to make it worthwhile for his existence.

7. Critical Points and Perspectives with RNS While the RNS shows us some semblance of the needs of individuals to integrate and mutually recognise one another in a free and uncoerced negotiated forms of normativity, the limits of RNS are determined only by how far we can stretch our imagination to place ourselves in someone else’s shoes. Moreover, it is possible to further complicate the RNS by showing multiple forms of deficit, excesses, and entanglements that can provide varying contexts for understanding freedom, normativity, and recognition. The caveat, however, is that by becoming fixated with the outcomes of RNS, one might eventually end up presenting a reductive tendency of understanding social interactions. While an elaborate typology can be made from the criteria of deficits and excesses of normative resources, the problem of representing entanglements poses a greater challenge of indeterminacy due to variations of cultures, identities, as well as institutional norms that can be derived in different contexts. The purpose of the RNS is to present scenarios where we can understand how the process of norm formation as a resource in social interaction takes place amidst the demands of recognition. What we can see here is that, in the event that there is a deficit in normative resources, the individual actors can find ways of supplementing these deficits for the purpose of achieving individual ends and goals. If an individual, for example, is faced with a very heavy burden of balancing out the deficits of his or her normative resources, he or she may do so at the cost of alienating further those deficit sources of normative resources. The fear that I share with Honneth’s recognition theory is that in the process of supplementing the

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required normative deficits, one may turn to disintegrative forms of achieving self-realisation at the cost of others that are also drawing from the same pool of normative resources. Just like Hegel and Honneth’s take on crime and intersubjectivity, our failure to recognise the implicit call for recognition of individuals that are seeking recognition can only place more stress on the normative resources that we all need. This is not to say that these normative resources are simply out there for the taking by those who need it; that is why there will always be a burden if everyone does not take a part in replenishing such resources from the pool that everyone draws from. We can only give as much as we can take, and either leave more for those who need these resources, or give more when we do not need these normative resources. The danger of just merely doling out normative resources for those in need of recognition is that the pool of resources will eventually dry up, leaving the rest of those who need it wanting for more normative resources. This danger of depleting the normative resources that everyone needs is holistic; while everyone is entitled to draw from this resource, everyone is also expected to contribute to its renewal. The failure to do so would end up forcing others to take a disintegrative role of sustaining one’s own normative resources without contributing back to the pool. That is why objectification or reification becomes a constant problem in any form of social interaction, regardless of whether we look at it in the perspective of modernity or imagine it existing in the idea of postmodernity. The interconnected nature of social interactions demands both stability and flexibility to respond mutually to struggles of recognition. The goal is to attain some degree of solidarity where dissociation and disintegration from the lifeworld are mitigated to prevent the depletion of normative resources. In the scale of a group, institutional, and collective forms of social pathologies, triangulating their sources of normative deficits poses some interesting consequences to the idea of crime and intersubjectivity. The problem of reification or objectification, while unavoidable, can serve as a learning moment that can remedy possibilities of avoiding or mitigating their effects. Since normativity can bring with it unintended or even intended consequences of reification, the need for stronger participatory engagement in the spheres of social interactions and recognition becomes pressing. The gap between solidarity and self-interest can only worsen when we see no further reason for cooperating and coordinating our identities and our need for self-realisation with the other spheres of interaction. While post-modern narratives have been greatly stressing the importance of receptivity to otherness and difference, we also need to look at how we can dispense the resources for receptivity and

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normativity while it starts to run dry from the rights and demands of those who need these resources. The call for solidarity is not simply a call for empathy or sympathy; what it requires is a collective understanding of how differences in identities can contribute to the replenishment of the normative resources that everyone needs. Intersubjective receptivity is only one step towards realising solidarity in society; what it further needs is a cooperative and mutual engagement to participate and replenish what was taken from the pool of normative resources that we need. Honneth’s recognition theory is a potent proposal to build a better future from what we have now. What we can learn from Honneth’s development of recognition theory is that freedom is a factor that should be considered as an important source and consumer of normative resource that society needs. His formal conception of the Sittlichkeit or the ethical life is a call for solidarity that is necessary for the continued existence of society. The Sittlichkeit is not a goal but a bridge towards solidarity, a path for individuals with different identities and normative expectations. Maintaining social cohesion requires a cooperative engagement that necessitates individual receptivity and mutual recognition of freedom between social participants. Honneth’s recognition theory brings us back to the formative process of understanding how normativity is reproduced, reconstituted, and deconstructed within the context of socialisation. As such, Honneth does not propose an alternative form of reason; rather, he points us back to the activity of self-realisation as a form of reason. It is an activity that is not taken externally from the process of socialisation. Rather, it is a product of learning through the process of socialisation. I am opposed to Kompridis’ generalisation of Honneth’s critique as a shift from reason to self-realisation, insofar as selfrealisation itself leads back to the formation of reason. This looping process is one of the things that we should be reminded of in Honneth’s work, precisely because morality in practice is understood and manifested through the series of normative engagements or struggles for recognition that transforms autonomous subjectivities towards cooperative forms of solidarity. To conclude this part, I want to remark that Honneth’s work is a tacit reminder that socialisation pervades even the most isolated and solipsistic discourse on ethics, which is dependent on at least a minimum amount of socialisation. For neither rules nor principles are necessary if an individual is left on his or her own. Suffice it to say that, in any form of social struggles, the resources for resolving them are plentiful as long as individuals engage with one another in a dialectical and cooperative form

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of achieving normativity. That being said, social pathologies may continue to exist, but alongside its existence, social solidarity will always hold individuals together as accountable and responsible resources in resolving social pathologies.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. Summary Like all theories, Honneth’s treatment of recognition from Hegel and Mead’s intersubjectivist approach requires a comprehensive methodology in depicting actual conditions of social reality. As such, as we can glean from the above parts, the problem of normativity in recognition and freedom necessitates an understanding of mutual solidarity to find the proper triangulation of individuals as well as institutions in realising the possibility of the ethical life or the Sittlichkeit. Realising the possibility of the ethical life does not mean that the state of struggling for recognition and the renewal of normative resources do not give way to social order. This is because any form of social order is not merely a goal that is attained momentarily or achieved as a definite end to social pathologies. Social order is a process that requires maintenance and constant struggle due to the fact that differences will always prevail in any socialised forms of interaction. As such, we always have to deal with the effects of its “morning after” experience. In this sense, we can see the appropriateness of Honneth’s depiction of recognition as a struggle, precisely because it is a constant play of balancing out the social order with individual differences in everyday interactions. While it can be said that Honneth’s theory offers nothing new in depicting social interactions as a struggle, it is precisely in this perspective that we come to terms with the forgetfulness of the mutuality of intersubjectivity. Honneth’s critique of the Frankfurt School tradition of critical theory depicts his renewal of this tradition by moving beyond the critique of the domination of nature from Adorno and Horkheimer, and grounding Habermas’ theory of communicative action in the level of experience. Honneth’s reading of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Habermas provides an outlook of the theoretical interest and consequences of isolating critical theory in the perspective of power relations and domination. By focusing on the power of institutions to control and dominate social interactions, we leave out the important normative resources of individuals that struggle over the possibility of being recognised with their own normative claims. In Part One, we can see that Honneth’s attempt to look at the extreme poles of social interactions shows that the disintegrative attempt of critical

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theory to understand social pathology within the confines of domination and power. As an alternative, Honneth also shows the extreme pole where individual subjectivity is able to form itself in these interactions of power through his reading of Foucault’s dissociated conception of a subject. This tendency of Foucault’s intention to create an unbiased and unmediated understanding of the subject paints a picture of the problem of theory achieving formal praxis. In both cases, neither of these two poles articulates the experience of social struggle as a formative and progressive transformation of existing norms. The failure to articulate this normative potential of renewing the resources of critical theory became Honneth’s motivation to go back to Hegel’s Jena writings. By providing the element of intersubjectivity in the creation of norms, Honneth reconstructs Hegel’s recognition theory by providing the elements of experience, rather than linguistics, as the basis for revising and reviewing already existing norms. The three spheres of love, rights, and esteem provide the normative foundation for any social interaction where norms are developed and reproduced. These spheres represent the forms of interaction that individuals have within society. Care and love are the intersubjective openings where subjects are dialectically engaged in a mutual process of affirming and learning their self-identities through the reciprocal engagement of norms. Meanwhile, in the sphere of rights, individuals are integrated into a society and are able to invoke their normative claims which guide and direct social activities towards the respect and esteem that they require. Finally, esteem refers to the communal affirmation of one’s difference where the subject becomes mutually affirmed by the community because of his or her contributions to society. While these spheres represent positive and progressive movements, in theory, Honneth is also aware of their potential as indicators of disrespect. In Part Two, I emphasised that the function of disrespect is to call out instances where norms are either violated or are in need of adjustment. Disrespect, as I point out in Part Two, ought to be received as a positive call where struggles for recognition are engaged and acknowledged by social participants. Furthermore, disrespect is an indication of the need to re-project the trajectories of already existing norms in order to accommodate immanent changes brought about by the social interactions of subjects. What I find important in disrespect is the assertion that subjects also require a degree of self-confidence where social interactions are engaged by participants with a sense of autonomy. The importance of this assertion lies in the awareness that normativity, when left to the function of blind conformity to the social order, results in a domination of the social subjects rather than an authentic assent to their affirmation of

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norms. Disrespect, in this sense, represents the experience of autonomy insofar as the resistance of integration with norms indicate that the form of solidarity is not forced on the subjects’ consciousness. The possibility of normativity in this perspective shows that freedom is not antithetical to the development and reproduction of norms precisely because the effort to struggle over the recognition of an individual is met by the resistance of differences from its partner of social interaction. The partner of interaction gives off resistance to the subjectivity of the individual because the necessary process of engaging and negotiating the differences in normative expectations affirm their capacity to self-legislate their own norms. This means that in the process of struggling for recognition, one resists becoming objectified when participating in mutual interaction with others. This dynamic process of recognition implies that subjects are neither fixated nor permanently attached to their normative expectations. As Honneth adds in Reification, we look back and contemplate antecedents where objectification is questioned, revised, and adjusted to suit the current circumstances that we experience. This addition aptly referred to as antecedent recognition, provides the contemplative phase where our already existing norms are revisited, modified, and aligned with current trajectories for self-realisation. The normative resources that make this freedom possible are seen in Part Three as the cooperative function of the spheres of personal relations, market economy, and democracy as a manifestation of social freedom in every individual’s desire to integrate with society. This social integration is not forced on the subject; rather, it is understood as the resource that makes it possible for the subject to realise its own identity. Social freedom is thus a product of the cooperative collaboration of the spheres of social interaction, enabling subjects to align or plot their own paths towards self-realisation offered by diverse forms of interactions in private relations, market economy, and democracy. From this understanding of freedom, it is possible to realise differences as an important resource for reproducing and enriching normativity through different struggles for recognition. Contrary to the idea that normativity merely brings a conformist attitude in responding to the duties and obligation of existing norms, we see a dynamic interplay between subjectivities that freely collaborate in renewing the normative potential of norms that guide our social interactions. This cooperative depiction of social freedom implies that the spheres of personal relations, market economy, and democracy are interconnected in such a way that they contribute to the normative resources that they need to sustain in order to provide social freedom for the individuals. This gives us a deeper

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understanding of social pathologies and how they contribute to the atomisation of individuals’ integrative participation in society. For if a sphere of social interaction is deprived of resources, the effects are manifested as social pathologies. For example, a deficit in the sphere of democracy can pathologically create conditions of social atomisation in the market economy and personal relations because of the lack of legal norms that would regulate economic expectations and protect social bonds. By bringing out the salient features of these social pathologies, we can come to an understanding of the importance of solidarity against the backdrop of differences. Furthermore, we also realise through Honneth’s Freedom’s Right that the heteronomy of identities provides alternative ways of creating norms that diversify possible ways by which individuals realise themselves through their social interactions. With this point in mind, we can also come to terms with the potent criticisms against Honneth’s recognition theory. In Part Four, I outlined Nikolas Kompridis’ criticisms of Honneth’s renewal of critical theory by assessing Kompridis’ criticisms of the depletion of normative resources through recognition theory’s insistence on normativity. Normativity, for Kompridis, is difficult to stabilise because of the constant changes in the subjects involved in reproducing and assenting to such norms. Moreover, if recognition gives rise to the affirmation of identities, the possibility of fully disclosing our identities will remain as an impossible possibility for, after all, we are already having difficulties in understanding ourselves. I have shown in Part Three how Honneth is able to address this with his addendum of antecedent recognition and the normative reconstruction that he provides in Freedom’s Right. Recognition is a continuous process where normative claims are developed, not from without but from already existing norms that inform and guide social activity. With this in mind, we can see that the relative stability of norms only remains stable with the assent of heteronomous individuals that see the possibility of self-realisation within already existing norms. Norms in this sense are not meant to be objectified above the claims of subjects that claim them and reproduce them; rather, they are instrumental in preserving possibilities of self-realisation among subjects in society. This means that normativity is not a unitary principle that is permanently embedded in the consciousness of social subjects. Rather, it is always in the process of transformation in order to maintain social cohesion and allow subjects to freely realise their own forms of selfactualisation. The criticism of depleting the normative resources for selfrealisation can only be made against Honneth’s recognition theory if the spheres of social interactions are isolated from one another. By failing to see the interconnected nature of social cooperation guided by freedom, it is

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indeed possible to say that the normative resources of our society can be depleted by a limited form of affirming identities based on a unitary conception of recognition. Following Honneth, Kompridis’ claim is no longer valid in the context of social freedom because the normative resources are constantly renewed with the cooperative function of the spheres of social interaction. Furthermore, by complementing these spheres of social interaction with the spheres of recognition and antecedent recognition, we can see that social struggles will constantly intervene for the sake of realigning and re-reproducing the already existing norms that cause social pathologies. Finally, in Part Five, I present this complementary connection of the spheres of social interaction and recognition, by triangulating social pathologies in the form of deficits in the pool of normative resources. By merging these sets of spheres, we can demonstrate the necessity of cooperation within the spheres and, at the same time, provide adequate theoretical perspective in understanding the normative claims of individuals through recognition. To further demonstrate this function, I have presented some examples through the method of Reconstructive Normative Simulations as a thought experiment in situating deficits in normative resources and their possible consequences. My approach was to provide fictionalised instances that can exemplify the reproduction of social pathologies and, in some instances, provide a simulation of how they cope with these deficits. While the RNS may not present an exhaustive simulation of these conditions of deficit or, even possibly, the excesses as well as circumstantial entanglements of individuals in society, my aim was to insinuate further formulations for future applications in the field of sociology, anthropology, political philosophy, and even literature. My hope is that future developments in Honneth’s recognition theory could be taken in order to provide a fully articulated typology of the effects of social pathologies directed towards social atomisation within the spheres of social interactions. Despite this, caution must be taken in reducing the function of RNS as an evaluation of social pathologies, for these typologies have the tendency to reduce social relations into normative criteria that are rigid and objectifying. What is important in the use of RNS is that we are able to project possibilities of disintegration and atomisation of the lifeworld that create deficits in the normative resources required by the spheres of social interaction. What is notable in Honneth’s recognition theory is his convergence of freedom and normativity as complementary elements towards achieving social solidarity.

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2. Conclusion To complete the circle of this work, I now turn to the specific concepts explored in the last five parts. (1) For the first part, the theoretical foundation of Honneth’s recognition theory relies on the already existing norms that inform and guide our activities in social interactions. Following the tradition of critical theory, Honneth addresses the existing trend of the Frankfurt School’s engagement with the critique of domination and power as a basis for providing an intersubjectivist approach in finding a mutual ground between individuals and norms to address the issue of social atomisation. By looking into the potential of social struggles to express themselves beyond Habermas’ pragmatic communicative approach, Honneth is able to provide a renewal of critical theory by drawing on existing elements of critique in order to re-envision Hegel’s Sittlichkeit. The importance of normativity is an empowering of subjects in realising that norms are products of their involvement in society and not the other way around. For the second part, (2) disrespect points to the basic normative intention of individuals to seek and struggle for recognition by claiming already existing rights that are given to them by socially reproduced norms. Disrespect, despite its unappealing and negative character, provides us with the necessary impetus to understand that individuals find realisation and stability of their identities within the function of norms as a guide and as a source of critique. Furthermore, it emphasises the fact that socialisation is necessary for social integration. Moreover, in disrespect, we can see that there is an anticipation of normative expectations from a shared or at least already established order of norms that make the recognition of individuals possible. It is in this sense that we are also able to further argue that recognition can be realised by individuals without forcing them or coercing them to conform to societal norms. For the third part, we can observe the necessity of maintaining freedom alongside social solidarity and normativity. (3) In Freedom’s Right, Honneth shows that normativity creates the possibility of realising freedom through the cooperative realisation of norms in social interactions, specifically in the sphere of private relations, market economy, and democracy. Through freedom, individuals can realise that their individual differences in self-realisation are only made possible by the fact that they are able to draw the normative resources from social freedom to cooperatively realise their identities. It is from this pool of normative resources generated by the spheres of social interaction that

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they can have the freedom to explore and at the same time influence normativity. In turn, the successful realisation of identities provides avenues where individuals further participate not simply to acquire their normative expectations but also to contribute back to the pool that made them who they are. Furthermore, we realise in Honneth’s Freedom’s Right that the diversity of subjectivities can give rise to a broader and richer pool of normative resources by means of which individuals can further realise their identities. Freedom, thus, makes it possible for subjects to participate and cooperate in the spheres of social interactions without fear of domination or coercion due to their foothold in already existing norms. For the fourth part, we come to the understanding that the diversity of identities is necessary in maintaining a sense of social order. This is made necessary not only for the sake of allowing subjectivities to have access to various forms of self-actualisation but also for the sake of providing an authentic sense of autonomy to individuals. (4) Honneth’s critical theory emphasises both the autonomy and social affirmation of individual identities through their realisation that the recognition of their differences depends on the mutual cooperation with other identities within society. As mentioned above, the mutuality of recognition depends on the autonomous reciprocity of normative resources provided by the spheres of social interaction. Normativity requires freedom so as to diversify the kinds of present and future participants to adapt to immanent changes in social reality. A diversified society means that the individuals are given the normative space and resources to experiment with their self-realised identities and make it relevant to society. This urgent need for diversification is an answer to the problem of critical theory and modernity’s loss of hope and utopian vision. Freedom and recognition ensure that solidarity in social relations is neither coerced nor forced. For the fifth part, (5) recognition provides the normative basis for solidarity while freedom ensures that the societal differences between individuals are maintained. When freedom and recognition are merged, the authenticity of solidarity is established by providing normativity with the necessary resources to realise its possibility. Freedom ensures the authenticity of solidarity within society while recognition maintains the possibility for individuals to have the appropriate mechanisms to respond to normative claims. With the above premises in mind, I now turn to the main question of this work: “Why is normativity an essential component of freedom in Honneth’s recognition theory?” I argue that normativity is essential insofar

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as freedom and recognition need it as a resource in social interactions. As a resource for freedom, normativity provides the proper conditions that guide material, economic, and social realities. As a resource for recognition, normativity provides the basis for the validity and invalidity of individual claims. Without normativity, the basis for informing and reproducing our actions in society would not find the proper place where it is validated and accepted by others, due to the lack of a common ground where mutuality and intersubjectivity can take place. Without freedom, normativity would be subject to blind conformism, which would also affect the process of recognition and can give rise to the domination and coercion of hapless subjects that rely on the diversity of possibilities of self-realisation. Furthermore, by removing recognition, normativity and freedom become an exclusionary mechanism of society that is bound to deplete their resources due to their homogeneity of possibilities of selfrealisation.

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