Avicenna, The Healing, Logic: Isagoge : A New Edition, English Translation and Commentary of the Kitāb al-Madḫal of Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Šifāʾ [New, Translation ed.] 3110726688, 9783110726688

Table of contents :
Preface
Acknowledgements
Contents
Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition
Edition and Translation
Commentary
Treatise I
Treatise II
Appendix A
Appendix B: Unedited texts of the school of Baġdād
Bibliographical references
Index of Names
Index of the Arabic Technical Terms and Expressions

Citation preview

Silvia Di Vincenzo Avicenna, The Healing, Logic: Isagoge

Scientia Graeco-Arabica

Herausgegeben von Marwan Rashed

Band 31

Silvia Di Vincenzo

Avicenna, The Healing, Logic: Isagoge

A New Edition, English Translation and Commentary of the Kitāb al-Madḫal of Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Šifāʾ

ISBN 978-3-11-072668-8 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-072656-5 ISSN 1868-7172 Library of Congress Control Number: 2020952369 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck Printed in Germany www.degruyter.com

Preface Philologically reliable editions of some of the central philosophical texts from the Islamicate world are still missing. As Dimitri Gutas warned around a decade ago 1, this general assessment is also true of the major works of the most renowned and influential Muslim philosopher of all times, Abū Alī al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAbdallāh b. Sīnā (d. 428H/1037), known in the Latin West as Avicenna. In recent years, some projects have started with the aim of producing philologically reliable editions of Avicenna’s major summae, or of their parts: among them, the project of editing the section on Metaphysics (Ilāhiyyāt) of the Kitāb al-Šifāʾ directed by Amos Bertolacci (ERC Project PhiBor2) and Joep Lameer’s work on the edition of the Kitāb al-Išārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt3. By ‘philologically reliable’ editions, I do not exclusively refer here to fully critical editions – that is, editions based on the entire known manuscript tradition of the work. As the analytical recognition of the manuscripts of the Ilāhiyyāt of the Šifāʾ has demonstrated, Avicenna’s major summae can be preserved in hundreds of extant manuscript witnesses (in the case of the Ilāhiyyāt, more than 280), which makes the task of critically editing the text really challenging, to say the least. As a partial contribution to fill this gap, this book offers a new edition, accompanied by an English translation and a commentary, of the opening work of the Book of Healing (Kitāb al-Šifāʾ), namely the Kitāb al-Madḫal, which represents Avicenna’s most complete and extensive reworking of Porphyry’s (d. 305?) Isagoge. The text is established with the help of a stemma codicum that includes thirty-four manuscripts (eleven of which are codices descripti), the twelfth-century Latin translation, and the literal and quasi-literal quotations found in the works by two of Avicenna’s first and second-generation students, Bahmanyār and Lawkarī. The manuscripts employed in the present edition were selected after a systematic recognition, which has revealed the existence of at least 118 manuscript witnesses of the Madḫal. Two introductions precede the critical text: a ‘General Introduction’ that focuses on the traditional and innovative aspects of Avicenna’s theory of predicables, as well as on Avicenna’s methods of inquiry adopted in the Madḫal, and an ‘Introduction to the edition’ that deals with the transmission history of this work. My choice fell on the first section (fann) of the Šifāʾ, Avicenna’s philosophical masterpiece, because it is part of one of the richest and most peculiar philosophical summae by this author. Its peculiarity is given by the delicate balance between tradition and innovation, which is more evident in it than in any other Avicennian summa. The subtle interplay between tradition and innovation that permeates the entire work results from a tension between Avicenna’s need to comply with the  1 GUTAS 2010. 2 See the project’s website: http://project.avicennaproject.eu/. 3 See LAMEER 2013. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110726565-201

vi  Preface request of a literal exegesis of the Aristotelian corpus made by his students and fellow scholars and his desire to lay down his own philosophical encyclopaedia. These two contrasting exigencies arguably urged Avicenna to write a work that is one of the most faithful to the Aristotelian corpus and, at the same time, one of the most original. Avicenna’s innovations are embedded in a framework of traditional theories, most of which are presented, discussed, and sometimes refuted only in this summa. It is, therefore, clear that the Šifāʾ is the extant work by Avicenna that is most likely to provide valuable information about his sources and give us a glimpse of his intellectual exchanges with his contemporaries. For this reason, I deemed it necessary to read Avicenna’s Madḫal against the background of his direct and remote sources, even if Avicenna’s work is by no means a slavish reproduction of his predecessors. Avicenna’s reworking of his sources in the Madḫal critically engages a long and prolific tradition of Peripatetic and Neoplatonic philosophy in Greek and Arabic: readers will be provided with coordinates for orienting themselves in the intricate forest of the Greek and Arab exegetical tradition in the apparatus of the edition and in the commentary; unavoidably, the indications thereby provided are not claimed to be exhaustive. What appears to be the hallmark of the Šifāʾ – and, consequently, of its single parts – is its special connection with Avicenna’s school. In this book, I employ the term ‘school’ loosely to designate what, in reality, must have been more of an intellectual circle than a rigidly institutionalized school. According to al-Ǧūzǧānī, the Šifāʾ was commissioned by the scholars of Avicenna’s circle, and its single parts were read and discussed collectively within the school throughout the composition of the work. The genealogical analysis of the relationships between the manuscript witnesses, along with the doctrinal analysis of the text, revealed that the Madḫal, as we currently know it, may bear several traces of the active involvement of Avicenna’s students and colleagues in the very first stages of the transmission of the text. In other terms, the version of the text we are used to is a ‘school edition’, a versio vulgata of the text, that differs in a number of structural and textual points from the original Avicennian draft4. The historical and philological survey of the manuscript tradition thus proved to be an indispensable ally in the study of the text of Avicenna’s Madḫal – as well as, I suppose, in that of the other sections of the Šifāʾ. The edition offered in this book aims to make readers aware of the signs of a possible stratification of interventions on Avicenna’s original text. I hope this book will serve as a useful tool and a new starting point for future research in the field of Avicennian and post-Avicennian studies.  4 D. Gutas first suggested the existence of more recensions of Avicenna’s works for the brief treatise ‘On the supernal bodies’ (GUTAS 2010, pp. 60-61); the same issue was then raised for the Ilāhiyyāt of the Šifāʾ by A. Bertolacci (BERTOLACCI 2012b).

Acknowledgements I started writing this book as a doctoral fellow at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa and at the École Pratique des Hautes Études in Paris. First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisors, Prof. Amos Bertolacci and Prof. Maroun Aouad, for their generous and constant support: their guidance was essential as I embarked on the research and writing of this book. The research that is presented here has also greatly benefited from my collaboration with the ERC Project PhiBor (project.avicennaproject.eu/), directed by Prof. Bertolacci, and from the parallel collaboration with the ERC Project PhiC/PhASIF (phasif.fr/) directed by Prof. Aouad, which allowed me to have access to the digital reproductions of the manuscripts here employed and, on a more general level, to deepen my knowledge of the Graeco-Arabic philosophical tradition. I am also extremely grateful to all the collaborators of the two projects. I am deeply indebted to Prof. Marwan Rashed, who discussed with me several of the most delicate points of Avicenna’s text during my stay in Paris and who generously accepted to include this volume in the Scientia Graeco-Arabica collection. I also wish to thank Ziad Bou Akl, Michael Chase, Cornelia Schöck, Riccardo Strobino, and Frédérique Woerther for their generous help and useful advice on several matters related to this research. Also, I cannot but express my gratitude to Marc Geoffroy, who sadly is no more with us. My most heartfelt thanks go to Prof. Charles Genequand, who generously accepted to read a partial draft of the translation and shared with me numerous precious suggestions, and to Dr Tony Street, whose help was truly invaluable throughout the revision of the entire work and whose suggestions have definitely made it a better book. All the remaining shortcomings are my sole responsibility. My research has benefited from the possibility of spending stays in Paris (France) and Cambridge (UK) with financial support from, respectively, the Università Italo-Francese and the Hartwell Fund of the Faculty of Divinity of the University of Cambridge. My utmost sincere gratitude goes to both institutions. Finally, special thanks go to my friends and colleagues Tommaso Alpina, Alessia Astesiano, Andrea Beghini, Niccolò Caminada, Gaia Celli, Gholamreza Dadkhah, Stefano Di Pietrantonio, Jawdath Jabbour, Teymur Malikov, Daniele Marotta, Teymour Morel, Ivana Panzeca, Alfonso Quartucci, Ilenia Russo and Marco Signori for the numerous stimulating discussions on every aspect of the present research, and most of all for their friendship: it is a hard task to express how great of an opportunity their presence was for me to grow both professionally and personally. This book is dedicated to my family, for the love and unconditional support they have shown me over the years.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110726565-202

Contents The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction  xiii Introduction  xiii I An Overview of the Structure of the Kitāb al-Madḫal  xiv II Freeing Logic from Metaphysics?  xix II.1 Avicenna’s Program: A ‘De-Ontologization’ of Logic  xix II.2 Logic as an Instrument and a Science  xxi II.3 Logic as a Science: Its Epistemological Status  xxiv III Avicenna’s Theory of Predicables in a ‘De-Ontologized’ Logic  xxxvi III.1 What Are the Five Universal Predicables?  xxxvi III.2 Key Elements of Avicenna’s Theory of Predicables  xxxvi III.2.1 Aristotle’s Puzzling Definitions of the differentia  xxxvi III.2.2 The ‘Logical Question’ and the Definition of Essential Predication  xxxviii III.2.3 The ‘Ontological Question’  li III.3 The Theory of Predicables and Aristotle’s Categories  lvi III.4 The Theory of Predicables and Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstration  lix IV Concluding Remarks  lxvii Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition  lxix I The Textual Tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal  lxix I.1 A General Overview of the Manuscript Tradition  lxix I.1.1 The Extent of the Arabic Manuscript Tradition  lxx I.1.2 The Geographical Spread of the Manuscript Tradition  lxx I.1.3 Chronology  lxxii I.1.4 The Tradition of the Madḫal in Context  lxxv I.2 A Provisional List of the Manuscripts of Avicenna’s Madḫal  lxxxiii I.3 The Twelfth-Century Latin Translation  xciii I.3.1 State of the art  xciii I.3.2 Characteristics of the Latin Translation  xcv I.4 The Early Indirect Tradition: The Role of Avicenna’s Disciples  ci I.4.1 Paraphrasing the Madḫal within Avicenna’s School  cii I.4.2 Questioning the Madḫal within the School  ciii II The Edition  cvii II.1 State of the Art and Principles of the Edition  cvii II.1.1 The Selection of the Witnesses  cvii II.1.2 The Text: Orthography, Punctuation and Structure  cxi II.1.3 The Apparatus  cxii

x  Contents II.1.4 II.2 II.3 II.3.1 II.3.1.1 II.3.1.2 II.3.1.2.1 II.3.1.2.2 II.3.2 II.3.2.1 II.3.2.2 II.3.3 II.3.3.1 II.3.3.2 II.3.3.3 II.3.3.4 II.3.3.5 II.3.3.6 II.3.4 II.3.4.1 II.3.4.2 II.3.4.3 II.3.4.4 II.3.4.5 II.3.4.6 II.3.4.7 II.4 II.5 III IV IV.1 IV.2 IV.3 IV.4

Abbreviations and Sigla  cxiv Description of the Manuscripts Employed  cxiv Genealogical Classification of the Witnesses  cxxvi At the Origin of the Manuscript Tradition of the Madḫal  cxxvi The Archetype  cxxvi A ‘School Edition’ of Avicenna’s Madḫal  cxxxii Structural Modifications of the Archetype: Al-Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction  cxxxii Textual Modifications in the Archetype  cxxxiv A Bipartite Tradition  cxliii MSS α and β  cxliii MS β: An Early Stylistic Revision of the Madḫal?  cxlvi Branch α: A Genealogical Reconstruction  clii Families γ and η  clii Families δ and θ  clv MS Da and its descriptus S  clviii Family τ: The ‘Indian Branch’  clix Family λ, or ‘Bahmanyār’s Family’  clx Family ξ  clxii Branch β: A Genealogical Reconstruction  clxiii Family ε  clxiii Family ι  clxiii Family μ  clxiv Family π  clxiv Family ο, or ‘Lawkarī’s Family’  clxv Family ζ  clxvii Family ν  clxviii The Stemma Codicum  clxx Notes for a Future Critical Edition  clxxi The Translation  clxxiii Sigla and Abbreviations  clxxiv Sigla of the Manuscripts in Alphabetical Order  clxxiv Latin Abbreviations Employed in the Critical Apparatus  clxxvii Signs and Conventions Adopted in the Edition  clxxviii Signs and Conventions Adopted in the Translation  clxxviii

Edition and Translation Treatise I Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction  2 Chapter I.1  12

Contents  xi

Chapter I.2  20 Chapter I.3  30 Chapter I.4  40 Chapter I.5  50 Chapter I.6  68 Chapter I.7  78 Chapter I.8  88 Chapter I.9  100 Chapter I.10  116 Chapter I.11  128 Chapter I.12  142 Chapter I.13  160 Chapter I.14  182 Treatise II Chapter II.1  194 Chapter II.2  210 Chapter II.3  226 Chapter II.4  244

Commentary Treatise I Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction  255 Chapter I.1 – Avicenna’s Prologue to the Šifāʾ  261 Chapter I.2  271 Chapter I.3  277 Chapter I.4  282 Chapter I.5  285 Chapter I.6  294 Chapter I.7  302 Chapter I.8  306 Chapter I.9  310 Chapter I.10  319 Chapter I.11  323 Chapter I.12  328 Chapter I.13  339 Chapter I.14  349 Treatise II Chapter II.1  358

xii  Contents Chapter II.2  366 Chapter II.3  373 Chapter II.4  383 Appendix A  385 Appendix B: Unedited texts of the school of Baġdād  388 Bibliographical references Primary sources Unedited texts, manuscripts consulted  393 Editions employed (when not otherwise specified)  393 Bibliographical repertories  396 Studies  397 Index of Names  411 Index of the Arabic Technical Terms and Expressions  414

The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction Introduction The Kitāb al-Madḫal, or “Book of the Introduction/Isagoge”, is the opening work (fann) of the Logic section (ǧumlat al-manṭiq) of the Book of Healing (Kitāb al-Šifāʾ) and presents Avicenna’s most extensive reworking of Porphyry’s Isagoge. The Kitāb al-Šifāʾ has a peculiar character, due to the circumstances of its composition; if we are to believe al-Ǧūzǧānī’s report, Avicenna undertook the composition of the summa at the request of his fellow scholars, who felt the need for a systematic commentary on the Aristotelian corpus1. The result does not correspond to the original request, however: although the Šifāʾ is by far the work in which Avicenna most shows his allegiance to the previous exegetical tradition, it could hardly be defined as a literal commentary on the Aristotelian corpus. The section on Logic, of which the Madḫal is a part, preserves the core of Avicenna’s philosophy inside a structure that is remarkably traditional; the result is a constant interplay between traditional and innovative elements that is the hallmark of the entire Šifāʾ. Although not Avicenna’s only work devoted to Porphyry’s Isagoge, the Madḫal nonetheless offers a unique perspective to study Avicenna’s own developments on the theory of the predicables. This study can be fruitfully conducted from a twofold perspective, simultaneously historical and philosophical. Generally speaking, two interrelated tendencies emerge in Avicenna’s elaboration of his doctrine of the predicables: an exegetical one, in the attempt to provide a consistent exegesis of the authorities (in the specific case, Porphyry and Aristotle), and a theoretical one, in the effort to define the doctrine of the predicables within a coherent and original philosophical system. The purpose of the following General Introduction is to demonstrate the fruitful interaction between these traditional and innovative elements with regard both to the structure (section I) and the contents (sections II–III) of Avicenna’s Madḫal. In terms of the contents, this General Introduction provides a reconstruction of the salient points of Avicenna’s doctrine on the predicables (section III) within the more general framework of Avicenna’s original redefinition of the epistemological status of logic as a science (section II). The reconstruction provided hopefully succeeds in displaying the main original points within Avicenna’s doctrine of the predicables, as well as their roots in Avicenna’s dialectic with the exegetical tradition.

 1 See AL-ǦŪZǦĀNĪ, Introduction, §1.3 and AL-ǦŪZǦĀNĪ, Biography of Avicenna, p. 54.2–5. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110726565-001

xiv  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction

I An Overview of the Structure of the Kitāb al-Madḫal The Madḫal is articulated into two treatises, the first devoted to an analytical study of Porphyry’s five predicables, the second devoted to their mutual comparison. The first treatise, consisting of fourteen chapters, may be further subdivided into an introductory section (chapters 1–8) and the core of Avicenna’s exposition of the five universal expressions (chapters 9–14). The introductory section encompassing chapters I.1–8 in turn consists of two minor sections: the first (chapters I.1–4) may be defined as ‘prolegomenic’, as it deals with certain points that are part of the traditional scheme of the Late Antique prolegomena2. The second (chapters I.5–8) introduces the exposition of Porphyry’s five predicables: in chap. I.5, Avicenna begins the traditional dichotomous division of the signifying expressions aimed at attaining the five predicables. The first step is the division of the signifying expression into simple and composite: since the inquiry into the simple precedes that into the composite, Avicenna proceeds by dividing the simple expressions into universal and particular. Then, given that no scientific knowledge of particular things can be attained3, Avicenna leaves aside particular expressions and proceeds to divide the universal expression into expressions that are predicated synonymously and those that are predicated paronymously, stating that the philosophers only deal with those that are synonymously predicated. At this point, Avicenna does not proceed further in the division of the universal simple expressions that are synonymously predicated of their subject, claiming that he must depart from the “traditional path” (al-muʿtād min al-ṭuruq) in order to achieve his goals (Madḫal I.5, §4.3). Notably, this interruption in Madḫal I.5 is followed by a discussion of the meanings of ‘essential’ and ‘accidental’; chapters I.6–7 deal with two traditional ways of defining the ‘essential’, both criticized by Avicenna. Finally, the division of the expressions is taken up again in chap. I.8, from where it was interrupted in chap. I.5 with the division into essential and accidental, and the simple universal expression is divided into the five universals. Avicenna seems to have been unhappy with the traditional definitions of ‘essential’ and ‘accidental’, which may explain why he stopped the traditional division of the expressions in order to redefine these two key concepts and then divided the expressions by means of the redefined notions. In sum, chapters I.6–7 appear to form a sort of ‘Avicennian interpolation’ within the traditional introductory scheme. At the end of chapter I.8, the introductory section is concluded and the exposition of the arguments runs in parallel to Porphyry’s Isagoge up to chap.  2 In more detail, chap. 1 is an introduction to the Book of Healing, whereas chapters 2–4 are meant to be an introduction on the sciences and on logic, with an inquiry into the utility (manfaʿa) and the subject matter (mawḍūʿ) of logic. For a study of the traditional schemes of prolegomena, see MANSFELD 1994. 3 On the impossibility of defining particulars and having demonstrative knowledge of them, cf. ARIST., Met. Z15, 1039b27–1040a7.

I An Overview of the Structure of the Kitāb al-Madḫal  xv

II.3. A macroscopic exception is represented by chap. I.12, which has no parallel in Porphyry’s text (see Tab. 1 below). The chapter deals with the tripartition of the universals into logical, natural and intellectual and prior to, in and posterior to multiplicity, a subject that is diffusely covered in the Greek, Syriac and Arabic commentaries on the Isagoge4. To my knowledge, Madḫal I.12 is one of only two sections of a logical work of Avicenna devoted to the subject, the other being within the Risāla Mūǧaza fī uṣūl al-manṭiq (Appendix A, §7). Other remarkable exceptions to the parallelism with Porphyry’s Isagoge which denote Avicenna’s acquaintance with the exegetical tradition are represented by some excursus in Avicenna’s exposition that are exclusively found in the Madḫal. Madḫal I.9, §2, for instance, is a digression on definition and description introduced by the Alexandrian exegetical tradition that is absent from Porphyry’s Isagoge5. A comparison with the roughly coeval Manṭiq of the Mašriqiyyūn may help to fully appreciate the degree of adherence to the traditional scheme reached by Avicenna in the Šifāʾ. The Mašriqiyyūn may be defined as the ‘twin-work’ of the Šifāʾ, which is described in Avicenna’s Prologue (Madḫal I.1, §3.2) as being freer and less adherent to the traditional scheme than the Šifāʾ6. It may be observed that Porphyry’s exposition of the predicables is replaced in the Mašriqiyyūn by Avicenna’s own classification of them, based on their being essential, concomitant or accidental for their subjects, and by Aristotle’s exposition in the Topics; the only section devoted specifically to the genus in the Mašriqiyyūn (Manṭiq, pp. 52.4–53.12) is far closer to Aristotle’s classification of the predicables than to Porphyry’s. There is no perfect correspondence between the extended treatment of the individual predicables in the first treatise of the Madḫal of the Šifāʾ (chapters I.9–14) and the treatment that is offered in the Mašriqiyyūn, let alone the fact that the entire second treatise of the Madḫal has no precise parallel, whether in this summa or in any of the others. It may be argued that, were it not for the close adherence of the Šifāʾ to the Aristotelian corpus, Avicenna would rather not duplicate the dissertation on the universal predicables and instead prefer Aristotle’s exposition of the predicables, attempting to harmonize Porphyry’s account with it. Chapters 1–3 of the second treatise deal with the similarities and the differences between the five predicables, which is the subject of the second section on Porphyry’s Isagoge (pp. 13.9–22.13). Avicenna disproves the necessity for a dissertation on the similarities and the differences between the five universals (Madḫal II.1, §1.1), which might account for the absence of a dissertation of this kind in other

 4 See Commentary on I.12, §1.1; see also ERISMANN AND MACDOUGALL 2018, pp. 45–47 and HUGONNARD-ROCHE 2018, pp. 87–91. 5 See Commentary on I.9, §2.1. 6 See Commentary on I.1, §3.2.

xvi  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction Avicennian reworkings of the Isagoge (see Tab. 1)7. Despite Avicenna’s ungenerous judgement on the use of this second section of Porphyry’s work, the section is interesting for both historical and doctrinal reasons. From a historical standpoint, it preserves certain recognizable quotations from Porphyry’s Isagoge that allow the inference that, in all likelihood, Avicenna relied on Abū ʿUṯmān al-Dimašqī’s translation of the text8. On a doctrinal level, Avicenna’s subtle reassessment of the theory of the predicables can also be appreciated in this allegedly traditional and superfluous dissertation9. The presence of chapter II.4 at the end of the work is quite remarkable. Nothing in Porphyry’s work corresponds to it, and nor does anything in the subsequent exegetical tradition; moreover, it consists of an exposition that does not feature many parallels in other Avicennian works. To my knowledge, the closest parallel is represented by a chapter preserved in at least two manuscripts of the ʿUyūn al-Ḥikma, where it is added to the section on Logic10. The interesting point is that the subject matter of the chapter, namely the compositions among the predicables, may be  7 Only one feature shared by the five universals mentioned in chap. II.1, §1.2 is also mentioned Hidāya, p. 68.3–4 and Išārāt, p. 245.1–6, namely that they are all synonymously predicated. 8 This is the translation preserved in MS BnF ar. 2346 (the so-called ‘Arabic Organon’); witnesses of the same Arabic translation are the lemmata in the long commentary on the Isagoge by Ibn alṬayyib (IBN AL-ṬAYYIB 1975). Two other manuscript witnesses of an Arabic translation of the Isagoge are MS Berlin, SBB, Petermann 9 and MS Ambros. &105sup. (edited in BAFFIONI 2011; a study of the manuscript is provided in BAFFIONI 2012); on these manuscripts, cf. also HUGONNARD-ROCHE 2018, p. 108. Other Arabic translations of the Isagoge are attested, although no longer extant: Ibn alNadīm’s Fihrist, p. 244 reports that Ayyūb Ibn al-Qāsim al-Raqqī (d. 840 ca.) translated Porphyry’s Isagoge from Syriac into Arabic. Syriac versions of the Isagoge also circulated in the School of Baġdād: two scholia in MS BnF ar. 2346, f. 149v quote fragments of Ḥasan Ibn Suwār’s commentary on the Isagoge, in which Ibn Suwār compares the Arabic translation of al-Dimašqī with Athanasius’ Syriac translation, which he quotes in the Arabic translation of Ibn Isḥāq (see also Commentary on I.11, §4.2.1). Porphyry’s Isagoge may have first appeared in Arabic before the translations mentioned within Muḥammad Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ’s epitome on logic (see HUGONNARD-ROCHE 2018, pp. 103–105). Certain quotes from Porphyry’s Isagoge in the Madḫal allow us to argue for Avicenna’s reliance on the translation by Abū ʿUṯmān al-Dimašqī, since some peculiar mistakes that affect the translation also affect Avicenna’s quotations; on these cases, see Commentary on I.11, §4.2.1; II.1, §2.2; II.2, §2.3; II.3, §5; II.3, §7. Nearly all cases that allow such a reconstruction are in the second treatise; this is due to the fact that the second treatise proceeds by quoting or paraphrasing Porphyry’s lemmata and commenting upon them, so that the number of quotations of the text is higher. On the Syriac tradition of the work, see HUGONNARD-ROCHE 2018, pp. 74–84. 9 As an example, see the introduction of synonymous predication as a feature shared by the five predicables in Madḫal II.1, §1.2; on the significance of this innovation for Avicenna’s doctrine of the predicables, see section III.3 of the General Introduction. 10 The additional chapter at the end of the Logic of ʿUyūn al-Ḥikma is only preserved in MSS İstanbul, Ahmet III 3268 and Roma, Vat. ar. 977, according to Badawī’s note to the edition, being absent from the other witnesses employed for the edition and from Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s commentary on the ʿUyūn al-Ḥikma.

I An Overview of the Structure of the Kitāb al-Madḫal  xvii

meant to bridge the gap between the theory of the predicables in the Madḫal and the theory of demonstration in Burhān, as one of the points at stake is to determine which predicables can be assumed in the premises of the syllogisms. The presence of this dissertation at the end of the Madḫal represents almost an unicum in Avicenna’s extant works. This preliminary overview of the structure of the work shows how the need to produce a work that dealt with the main themes tackled in the reference text (in this case, Porphyry’s Isagoge) and in the exegetical tradition heavily shaped the structure and contents of the Madḫal. However, it also suggests that a systematic survey of the work can provide a privileged insight into doctrines whose exposition has few or no parallels in the rest of Avicenna’s production. Tab. 1: The structure of Avicenna’s Madḫal compared to the exegetical tradition and to Avicenna’s other main works Madḫal

Porph., Isag.

Exegetical tradition11

Avicennian parallels12

I.

…

…

…

I.

…

I.

…

I.

…

AIs, .–.; .–; EIs, .–.; .–; IṬTKĪ, altaʿālīm I–IV Cf. AIs, .–; EIs, .– .; cf. IṬTKĪ, al-taʿlīm V

Mm, .–. H, .–; Nm, .–.; Mm, .–.; IT, .–. Mm, .–; IT, .– .

I.

…

H, .–.; ʿUḤm, .–.; AIs, .–; EIs, .–.; RMm (Appendix A, §–); Nm, PsEIs, .–; cf. IṬTKĪ, al-taʿlīm V .–.; Mm, .–.; IT, .–.

I.

…

Cf. AIs, .–; EIs, .–

Cf. Mm, .–.; IT, .–

 11 The comparison is made systematically with the following works: AIs Ammon., In Isag. (AMMONIUS 1891) EIs Elias, In Isag. (ELIAS 1900) DIs David, In Isag. (DAVID 1904) PsEIs Ps.-Elias (David), In Isag. (PS.-ELIAS [DAVID] 1967) IṬTKĪ Ibn al-Ṭayyib, Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāġūǧī li-Furfūriyūs. (IBN AL-ṬAYYIB 1975) 12 The comparison is made systematically with the following works of Avicenna: H Kitāb al-Hidāya ʿUḤm Kitāb ʿUyūn al-Ḥikma, manṭiq RMm Risāla Mūǧaza fī uṣūl al-manṭiq Nm Kitāb al-Naǧāt, manṭiq Mm Mašriqiyyūn, manṭiq IT Kitāb al-Išārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt.

xviii  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction I.

I.

I. I. I.

I.

…

…

.

Cf. AIs, .–.; EIs, .– 

H, .–.; ʿUḤm, .–; RMm (Appendix A, §.; §.; §); Nm, .–.; Mm, .–.; IT, .–; .–.

.–.

AIs, .–.; EIs, .–.; DIs, .–.; IṬTKĪ, altaʿālīm VIII–IX

H, .–; ʿUḤm, .; RMm (Appendix A, §.); Nm, .– .; IT, .–.

.–.

AIs, .–.; EIs, .– .; DIs, .–.; IṬTKĪ, al-taʿālīm X–XIII

H, .–; ʿUḤm, .; RMm (Appendix A, §.–); Nm, .– .; IT, .–.

…

…

AIs, .–.; .–; .–.; .–; .– .; cf. AIs, .–; .–; RMm (Appendix A, §) EIs, .–; DIs, .–; PsEIs, .–.; IṬTKĪ, al-taʿlīm VII

I.

.–.

AIs, .–.; EIs, .– .; DIs, .–.; IṬTKĪ, al-taʿālīm XIV–XV

I.

.–.

AIs, .–.; EIs, .–.; H, .–; ʿUḤm, .–; RMm DIs, .–.; IṬTKĪ, al-taʿlīm (Appendix A, §); Nm, .– XVI .; IT, .–.

II.

.–.

AIs, .–.; EIs, .–.; DIs, .–.; IṬTKĪ, al-taʿlīm XVII

II.

.–.

AIs, .–.; EIs, .– .; DIs, .–.; IṬTKĪ, al-taʿlīm XVII

.–.

AIs, .–.; EIs, .– . [deest DIs]; IṬTKĪ, al-taʿlīm XVIII

.–

[desunt AIs, DIs]; IṬTKĪ, al-taʿlīm XVIII

.–

AIs, .–; [deest DIs]; IṬTKĪ, al-taʿlīm XVIII

.–

[desunt AIs, DIs]; IṬTKĪ, al-taʿlīm XVIII

.–.

AIs, .–; [deest DIs]; IṬTKĪ, al-

II.

H, .–; ʿUḤm, .; RMm (Appendix A, §.); Nm, .–; IT, .–.

Cf. H, .– and IT, .–

…

…

II Freeing Logic from Metaphysics?  xix

taʿlīm XVIII

II.

.–

[desunt AIs, DIs]; IṬTKĪ, al-taʿlīm XVIII

.–.

AIs, .–; [deest DIs]; IṬTKĪ, altaʿlīm XVIII

.–

[desunt AIs, DIs]; IṬTKĪ, al-taʿlīm XVIII

.–

AIs, .–.; [deest DIs]; IṬTKĪ, al-taʿlīm XVIII

.–.

[desunt AIs, DIs]; IṬTKĪ, al-taʿlīm XVIII

…

…

ʿUḤm, .–.; cf. also RMm (Appendix A, §)

II Freeing Logic from Metaphysics? II.1 Avicenna’s Program: A ‘De-Ontologization’ of Logic In a renowned programmatic statement at the beginning of the work (Madḫal I.1, §2), Avicenna stresses his intention to pursue in the Šifāʾ a clear-cut distinction between logic and metaphysics13. More precisely, Avicenna’s program consists of avoiding the intrusion of metaphysical arguments in logic that he observed in the previous and contemporary exegetical tradition. Quite interestingly, the intrusion of metaphysical subjects in a logical dissertation is precisely what Avicenna accuses Plato of in his reworking of Aristotle’s Elenchi Sophistici14. Avicenna’s plan is thus to free logic from metaphysical subject matters, although nothing is said concerning the modalities of its concrete realization. Due to their points of contact with metaphysics, the doctrine of the categories and that of the universal predicables can be expected to be most affected by a process of ‘de-ontologization’ of logic. One may speculate that Avicenna’s original program entailed first assigning the doctrine of the categories – traditionally dealt with in logic – to metaphysics, and then maintaining the doctrine of the universals in logic, where it is assigned a prominent role, after freeing it from metaphysical topics. If this was Avicenna’s original program, it was partially unattended in the Šifāʾ, where the categories are dealt with both in logic and in metaphysics, despite Avicenna’s clear dissatisfaction with this solu-

 13 The passage is also discussed in BERTOLACCI 2006, p. 272. 14 Šifāʾ, Safsaṭa II.6, p. 114.11–14, where the target of Avicenna’s attack is Plato’s Sophist. It may be worth questioning whether the contamination of logic with metaphysical subject matters was perceived by Avicenna as a distinctive mark of (Neo-)Platonic logic.

xx  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction tion15, while the section on universals in the Madḫal touches several points that pertain to metaphysics16. This may be due both to a certain allegiance to the traditional works on the subject, in which logical and metaphysical matters were deeply interrelated17, but also to a genuine tension in the definition of the reciprocal relations between logic and metaphysics18. Metaphysics in Avicenna’s system plays a foundational role with respect to the subject matter of the other sciences, and logic is no exception19. This implies a certain degree of detachment from Aristotle’s view of logic as an instrument of philosophy, since it entails providing logic with the epistemological status of a science. Much of Avicenna’s original contribution to the discipline of logic can be particularly appreciated in the Madḫal: the work contains the core of Avicenna’s program, consisting of (i) assessing the amphibious status of the discipline of logic, which is both an instrument for the other sciences and a science itself (Madḫal I.2, §2); (ii) describing its use and function as an instrument for the other disciplines (Madḫal I.3); and (iii) providing it with the epistemological status of a science, as well as defining its relation to metaphysics (Madḫal I.4). These sections of the work, together with two loci classici that are usually considered regarding Avicenna’s view on the subject matter of logic (Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt I.2 and Burhān II.6–7) and three other passages more rarely taken into account in this connection (Šifāʾ, Qiyās I.2, Mubāḥaṯāt 579–585 and Taʿlīqāt, pp. 502.4–506.12 Mousavian/167.14–168.25 Badawī)20, will be examined in what follows in order to reconstruct a more accurate portrait of the epistemological status of logic, as well as the precise role that the doctrine of universals plays within it.

 15 Cf. Šifāʾ, Maqūlāt I.1, pp. 4.15–5.11. On Avicenna’s attitude towards the dissertation on the categories in the Šifāʾ and in other works, see CAMINADA 2016, p. 197 and n. 7 and KALBARCZYK 2018, pp. 30–31. 16 See GUTAS 2014, p. 287 and pp. 300–303 (respectively, on the study of the universals and the categories in metaphysics), BERTOLACCI 2006, pp. 300–301 and BERTOLACCI 2011b, p. 37. 17 The question of whether Porphyry intended to separate the logical and the metaphysical levels in his works is still debated. On the possibility of reading into Porphyry’s Isagoge an attempt to separate logic from metaphysics, see EBBESEN 1990 and BARNES 2003; against this possibility, see CHIARADONNA 2016, p. 325, who grounds his objection in the massive presence of ontology in Porphyry’s logical works (cf. also CHIARADONNA 2008). 18 Cf. BERTOLACCI 2011b, esp. pp. 50–51. 19 BERTOLACCI 2006, pp. 272–279; Id. 2011b, p. 29. On the origin of the view of metaphysics as a founding science and its permeation in the Arabic tradition, see BERTOLACCI 2006, pp. 294–300 and Id. 2007, pp. 65–73. 20 The ground-breaking article by A. I. Sabra on this subject did acknowledge the importance of an analysis of Qiyās I.2 (SABRA 1980, p. 764), though without going through it in greater detail. On the passage of the Taʿlīqāt, see KALBARCZYK 2018, pp. 28–30 and 51–55.

II Freeing Logic from Metaphysics?  xxi

II.2 Logic as an Instrument and a Science The question concerning the status of logic is raised in Madḫal I.2, §2.3. From a purely Aristotelian perspective, logic is as an instrument for the other disciplines21; the post-Aristotelian tradition started to acknowledge logic a status that became progressively more alike to that of the other sciences, as a result of a harmonizing interpretation of the Peripatetic and the Platonic traditions. The Late Antique commentaries of Ammonius’ school account for the existence of a debate concerning the question of whether logic is an instrument or a part of philosophy. Traditionally, this subject was dealt with at the beginning of the commentaries on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics22, as in Alexander’s and Themistius’ commentaries23. An exception to the prevailing traditional pattern is represented by Olympiodorus, who dealt with the status of logic in his commentary on the Categories24. All of these commentaries from Ammonius’ school followed the same format in discussing the subject: they displayed three positions, proceeded to refute some of them to propose, finally, an alternative solution. The three positions exposed in these commentaries are: (1a) the view – ascribed to the Stoics – that logic is a part (μέρος) of philosophy; this position is very close to the second one (1b), which certain Platonic philosophers reportedly ascribed to Plato himself, namely that logic is the worthiest part (τιμιώτατον μέρος) of philosophy. The third position (2) is the traditional Peripatetic view that logic is an instrument (ὄργανον) of philosophy. The Stoics’ view that logic is a part of philosophy (1a) is refuted, together with the alleged ascription of an analogous opinion (1b) to Plato25. The Peripatetic view (2), however, is neither explicitly endorsed nor refuted. The final conciliatory position adopted is the allegedly ‘genuine’ Platonic view, which claims that logic is simultaneously both a part and an instrument of philosophy26. There is evidence that Avicenna’s contemporaries of the Peri 21 The view that logic is an instrument for the other disciplines was received by the Peripatetic tradition on the basis of passages like ARIST. Top. Θ14, 163b9–11; cf. SORABJI 2005, vol. 3, p. 32. 22 AMMON., In An. Pr., pp. 8.15–11.21; PHILOP., In Anal. Pr., pp. 6.19–9.24; ELIAS, In Anal. Pr., pp. 134.8–137.3. 23 ELIAS, In Anal. Pr., p. 134.4–7. Alexander dealt with the subject in his commentary on Prior Analytics (pp. 1.3–4.29). As for Themistius, Elias’ testimony marks the existence of a no longer extant commentary on Prior Analytics; see the note in the critical apparatus in WESTERINK 1961, p. 134: “in commentario genuino nunc deperdito”. 24 OLYMPIOD., In Cat., pp. 14.12–18.12. 25 This position is not effectively Plato’s own, and might actually derive from Plot., Enn., I.3.5.8–9, where Plotinus defines Dialectics as τίμιον μέρος of philosophy: cf. HADOT 1990, p. 187. The confusion implies that in the commentaries of Ammonius’ school the term διαλεκτική is taken as substantially synonymous of λογική, as in Philoponus’ commentary. 26 HADOT 1990, p. 187 suggests that this might be a position elaborated in the Academic tradition, partly under the influence of Stoicism; ALEXAND., In Anal. Pr. p. 2.33ff., for instance, already hints at some of his predecessors distinguishing two aspects of logic, i.e. its theorical aspect and its utility

xxii  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction patetic school of Baġdād were well acquainted with the Alexandrian dissertation on this subject: Abū l-Faraǧ Ibn al-Ṭayyib, for instance, inserted an identical doxographical dissertation on the status of logic among the introductory materials of his commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge27. Avicenna himself was evidently aware of a similar debate, as shown by his explicit reference at the end of Madḫal I.2, §2.3 to ‘disputes’ (al-mušāǧarāt) on the subject, defined as redundant and superfluous28. In the passage in question, the subject is briefly exposed, and the apparent contradiction is solved by asserting that the two views are only apparently mutually contradictory, since they presuppose two different ways of considering the domain of philosophy. The tension between the two positions – logic considered in view of its utility for theoretical and practical sciences, and logic considered as a science in its own right with a full-fledged epistemological foundation – is evident in the Šifāʾ. It is also thematized in Mašriqiyyūn, Manṭiq, p. 5.12–18, where logic is said to be one of the fundamental sciences, but is contrasted with the domains of theoretical and practical philosophy because of its instrumental nature, and ibid., p. 8.8–14, where logic is called an “instrumental science” (al-ʿilm al-ālī). Logic is a science, but its exceptional instrumental character is due to the fact that it provides the principles to acquire knowledge of the unknown (ibid., pp. 5.19–6.1). An analogous tension, albeit less explicitly thematized, is already present in al-Fārābī, according to whom logic is an instrument, but, at the same time, a science whose principles are ascertained by metaphysics; in this respect, logic has a status analogous to the natural sciences and mathematics29.

 for other disciplines, that form a prelude to the consideration of logic as both a part and an instrument of philosophy. Philoponus (In Anal. Pr., p. 9.17–20) justifies the ascription of such a view to Plato by claiming that it can be inferred from his dialogues (in the Phaedo and in the Phaedrus, logic would be a part of philosophy, whereas in Parmenides logic would be an instrument). 27 Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāġūǧī li-Furfūriyūs, pp. 26.9–27.6; at the end of the passage, Ibn al-Ṭayyib states that, with this dissertation, the introductory sections of the Alexandrians (al-Iskandariyyūn) are completed. 28 Whether Avicenna became acquainted with the debate directly, i.e. through one of the said Late Antique commentaries translated into Arabic, or indirectly, i.e. through the references to those commentaries in his contemporaries’ works, cannot be ascertained. 29 Cf. AL-FĀRĀBĪ, Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿUlūm, pp. 68.11–69.1 on the instrumental value of the rules of logic, and pp. 120.10–121.1, on logic as a science with a specific subject, whose principles are verified in metaphysics. According to al-Fārābī, logic is an instrument when employed in this way in the other parts of the science: cf. Risāla ṣudira bihi al-kitāb, p. 227.23–25. This passage is not in contrast with a more general view of logic as a science with its own subject matter and with a definite epistemological status displayed in the Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿUlūm, since it specifies that logic is an instrument when it is employed as an instrument in other sciences, which by no means entails that it cannot be considered in a different manner when it is not employed in other sciences. I would therefore be inclined not to represent al-Fārābī’s view on the status of logic as being purely Aristotelian, asserting the instrumental character of the discipline (for a different interpretation, see GERMANN 2008, pp. 9–10).

II Freeing Logic from Metaphysics?  xxiii

The problem is solved by Avicenna at the beginning of the section corresponding to Prior Analytics (Šifāʾ, Qiyās I.2, T1 below). The relation between logic as a part of philosophy and logic as an instrument is described as the relation between a more general (aʿamm) notion – logic as a part of philosophy – and a more specific one (aḫaṣṣ) – logic as an instrument of philosophy – that are not in mutual contradiction. Everything that is an instrument of science is also a part of it, but not the reverse. T1. Šifāʾ, Qiyās I.2, pp. 10.4–11.9 [(a)] You have already learned the subject matter of logic, and it has become clear to you how the error occurred in this regard. Also, you have already learned in general how logic is a part of philosophy (ḥikma) and how it is an instrument, and that there is no contradiction between those who consider it as a part and those who consider it as an instrument. [(b)] For in fact, if the subject matter of logic is assumed insofar as it is one of the existing beings and philosophy (falsafa) embraces whatever is science of the existing beings, regardless of how they are, logic is a part of philosophy that defines the states of certain beings 30 whose state and nature is to let [us] know how the unknown is acquired on account of them or how they help in this regard. Insofar as this state is something proper to some existing beings, or it is an essential accident for them, or something constitutive, this is an inquiry into the existent insofar as it is existent in a certain state; then, it is one of the sciences. But since, secondarily, this knowledge (maʿrifa) concerning this [kind of] being happens to be useful to the knowledge of other items, this knowledge, which is a certain knowledge itself, is an instrument for another knowledge; indeed, its most outstanding purpose is to be useful to another knowledge. Its being knowledge of a part of the existents coincides with its being a part of philosophy; as for its being knowledge of a part of the existents insofar as it is useful to another knowledge, that usefulness coincides with its being an instrument. [(c)] The fact that logic is a part is more general than its being an instrument. Also, it is not a part of the thing for which it is an instrument: in fact, it is not a part of that for which it is an instrument, since that is the sciences that are measured by logic and weighed by the expression 31. It is rather a part of science taken without further qualification, which embraces all those sciences. The fact of being ‘logic’ is due to its being an instrument; because of its being an instrument, a more general notion than the instrument may be also predicated of it, just like ‘animal’ may be predicated of man, insofar as he is a man, and he may be said to be ‘living’. The difference between its being a part and its being an instrument is not the difference that is between two absolutely different notions, but [that which is] between a more specific and a more general notion. Everything that is an instrument for the sciences in this way is a part of science in absolute, but not the reverse. So, this is how it should be conceived.

Section [a] in T1 quickly recapitulates Madḫal I.4, §3, and I.2, §2. Section [b] states that the domain of logical inquiry encompasses a certain class of beings, i.e. mental

 30 I.e. mental beings. 31 The objection that an instrument cannot be a part of that for which it is an instrument – so that logic cannot be considered, at one and the same time, both a part and an instrument of philosophy – had already been discussed in the Late Antique tradition: cf. PHILOP., In Anal. Pr., pp. 7.23–8.21.

xxiv  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction beings, that show how knowledge of the unknown is attained from something previously known. Among the objects studied in logic are the predicables, which form the non-declarative statements that provide conception (taṣawwur), and the declarative statements that provide assertion (taṣdīq), which are the two fundamental steps in the process of acquiring knowledge32. Considered in terms of how it studies the accidents of a certain kind of beings (more specifically, secondary intelligible meanings), logic is a science; considered in terms of its study being an essential tool for other sciences (as it grants the acquisition of sound knowledge), logic is an instrument of philosophy. As an instrument for the other sciences, logic plays a pivotal role in Avicenna’s epistemology – it is an indispensable tool in the acquisition of knowledge, a process in which human instinct alone is not able to assure the correct achievement33. The purely Peripatetic view of logic as an instrument is maintained34, but the fact that logic is an instrument of the other sciences entails its being a part of philosophy as the specific notion entails the general one (section [c] in T1).

II.3 Logic as a Science: Its Epistemological Status As a consequence of asserting that logic is a science, Avicenna must provide a sound definition of its epistemological status based on the criteria enounced in Burhān II.6, p. 155.4–10, namely that every science has a subject matter whose existence is established in a different discipline and of which the science studies the per se accidents. Hence, in order to define logic as a science, three elements must be identified: (a) its subject matter; (b) the accidents of it that are studied in logic; and (c) the science that founds the existence of the subject matter. (a) The subject matter The definition of the subject matter of logic (a) had been the object of an intense and long-lasting dispute between logicians and grammarians, which involved the fundamental issue of defining the precise boundaries of the subject of each of the two

 32 Cf. the classification of the statements that provide conception and assertion in Madḫal I.3, §2.3.1 and §2.3.2. See also MADKOUR 1934, pp. 54–56. 33 Cf. Madḫal I.3, §3.1–4 and MICHOT 2000, pp. 68*–88*. 34 For other descriptions of logic as an instrument in Avicenna’s works, cf. GUTAS 2014, pp. 316– 322. In Qiyās I.2, p. 11.9–10 Avicenna mentions “one of the excellent later philosophers (fāḍil almutaʾaḫḫirīn)” as a supporter of a purely Peripatetic view that logic is an instrument and not a part of philosophy. The identity of this anonymous philosopher is unknown: see STREET 2001, suggesting a possible identification with al-Fārābī, and BERTOLACCI 2005b, pp. 500–501. The purely Peripatetic position, considering logic as an instrument of philosophy, was also received in Late Antique Syriac philosophy; cf. e.g. the case of Paul the Persian (TEIXIDOR 1992, p. 132).

II Freeing Logic from Metaphysics?  xxv

disciplines35. The first impulse to the debate was given by the possible overlap of the subjects of logic and grammar, which both appeared to deal with expressions. Among the various different strategies employed to distinguish the approaches of the two disciplines to expressions, the best received within the school of Baġdād is based on the Late Antique commentaries of the Alexandrian school, where logic is said to deal with expressions signifying universal items, whereas expressions tout court are the object of grammar36. This distinction has led to the identification of the subject matter of logic with expressions insofar as they signify meanings, a position that is well attested in the works of the Peripatetic scholars of Baġdād37. The same position is also critically addressed by Avicenna in Madḫal I.4, §3.1. Avicenna’s answer to the problem consists of assuming meanings as the primary subject of logic, rather than expressions. Although scholarly literature often identifies the target of Avicenna’s criticism with al-Fārābī38, it may be worth examining the latter’s position on the subject in more detail. In fact, the subject matter of logic as presented in al-Fārābī’s Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿUlūm, p. 74.10–12 (cf. also Id., Šarḥ li-Kitāb Arisṭūṭālīs fī lʿIbāra, p. 18.4–9) is provided by the intelligible meanings insofar as they are signified by expressions (al-maʿqūlāt min ḥayṯu tadullu ʿalayhā al-alfāẓ) and by the expressions insofar as they signify intelligible meanings (wa-l-alfāẓ min ḥayṯu hiya dālla ʿalā al-maʿqūlāt)39. Relying on the substantial mutual correspondence between expressions and concepts presented in the Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿUlūm as the backbone of his theory, al-Fārābī went on to claim that, were it not for the difficulty of an inquiry of  35 Besides the renowned dispute between Abū Bišr Mattā and Abū Saʿīd al-Sīrāfī (on which see MAHDĪ 1970, pp. 55–83, ENDRESS 1977, p. 321, ELAMRANI-JAMAL 1983, pp. 148–163, and ADAMSON AND KEY 2015), a treatise Fī l-farq bayna naḥw al-ʿArab wa-l-manṭiq is ascribed to al-Kindī’s disciple Aḥmad Ibn al-Ṭayyib al-Saraḫṣī (cf. ENDRESS 1977, p. 320 and BIESTERFELDT 2012, p. 152). 36 ELIAS, In Isag., pp. 35.14–36.3 claims that non-signifying expressions are dealt with by the grammarians, whereas signifying ones by the logicians; cf. YAḤYĀ IBN ʿADĪ, Maqāla fī tabyīn al-faṣl bayna ṣināʿatay al-manṭiq al-falsafī wa-l-naḥw al-ʿarabī, pp. 182-181 and IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāġūǧī li-Furfūriyūs, p. 68.17–19. A different strategy was employed in AL-FĀRĀBĪ, Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿUlūm, p. 77.8–15, according to which grammarians occupy themselves with the expressions of the language of a specific community (umma), whereas logicians deal with expressions with respect to their universal aspects shared by different communities. 37 Besides YAḤYĀ IBN ʿADĪ, Maqāla fī tabyīn al-faṣl bayna ṣināʿatay al-manṭiq al-falsafī wa-l-naḥw alʿarabī, pp. 182-181 and IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāġūǧī li-Furfūriyūs, p. 68.17–19, cf. also IBN ALṬAYYIB, Tafsīr Kitāb al-Maqūlāt, p. 8.4–6, stating that the subject matter of logic is the simple expressions that signify the high genera (al-alfāẓ al-basīṭa al-dālla ʿalā al-aǧnās al-ʿawāl). Cf. ADAMSON AND KEY 2015, p. 84. 38 See, for instance, MANDOSIO 2013, p. 324, adducing al-Fārābī, Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿUlūm, p. 74.10–12. 39 This passage has been variously interpreted: BAKAR 1989, pp. 206–207 highlights al-Fārābī’s claim that logic mainly deals with intelligible meanings (see also KALBARCZYCK 2018, pp. 17–18). STREET 2015, §2.1.1, however, claims that al-Fārābī might have ultimately held that logic deals with secondary meanings, but that this passage rather resembles the doctrine rejected by Avicenna; in this connection, see also MANDOSIO 2013, p. 324.

xxvi  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction this sort, the primary object of research in logic would be the composition of intelligible meanings (al-maqṣūd awwalan huwa tarkīb al-maʿqūlāt)40. It seems that alFārābī may have viewed the study of expressions as a study functional to that of concepts. From this perspective, al-Fārābī’s position appears to have numerous facets, some of which may have set the stage for Avicenna’s theory. It is far from granted, therefore, that Avicenna had al-Fārābī’s position in mind in Madḫal I.4, §3.1. Avicenna’s view on the subject matter of logic exposed in Madḫal I.4, §3.1 is extremely innovative, although it rests on the same cornerstones upon which the previous exegetical tradition rested, namely the indispensability of expressions41 and the mutual correspondence between expressions and meanings42. Expressions are said to be necessary in two main respects: first, because they are indispensable in dialogue and interpersonal communication (al-muḫāṭaba wa-l-muḥāwara)43, and second, because they are necessarily involved in the process of discursive thought (al-rawiyya), for ordering the meanings in the mind necessarily entails that the corresponding expressions are also imagined. Since mental expressions are necessarily involved in discursive thought, the states proper to those expressions are liable to affect those of the corresponding meanings, due to the connection existing between the two; for this reason, the logician also has an interest in studying expressions44. What remains to be ascertained at this point is precisely how the study of expressions relates to the study of concepts in logic. The same question must have prompted an anonymous contemporary of Avicenna (possibly Ibn Zayla)45 to ask for clarifications on Avicenna’s apparently contradictory claim in Madḫal I.4, §3.1 that the study of expressions in logic is necessary, although it is not the subject matter of the discipline. Avicenna’s reply to the question is preserved in Mubāḥaṯāt 580–585, pp. 193–194, in a rich passage that, to my knowledge, has not yet received its due share of attention46. In T2 below, a translation of the salient parts of Avicenna’s answer is provided.

 40 Šarḥ li-Kitāb Arisṭūṭālīs fī l-ʿIbāra, pp. 25.22–26.3; cf. also ADAMSON AND KEY 2015, p. 84. 41 Madḫal I.4, §3.1, p. 44.25. 42 Madḫal I.4, §3.1, p. 46.33. 43 The same necessity of the expressions was already noted in the school of Alexandria: cf. ELIAS, In Isag., p. 35.23–26, arguing that, were it not for the necessity of expressions when teaching, logicians would not deal with expressions. 44 See also Išārāt, pp. 180–181, where Avicenna asserts that the relation (ʿilāqa) existing between expressions and meanings is also the reason why a logician ought to devote part of his efforts to the study of expressions (on this passage, see also ADAMSON AND KEY 2015, p. 89). 45 For the identification of the anonymous questioner with Ibn Zayla, cf. REISMAN 2002b, pp. 200– 201 and 246–247. 46 See Introduction to the Edition, section I.4.

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T2. Mubāḥaṯāt 580–585, p. 193.4–194.19 [580] In theoretical and practical disciplines there can be things that are dealt with primarily, so that, out of necessity, one is primarily concerned with them and only afterwards with that which falls outside the primary object (al-qaṣd al-awwalī). An example is the realization of a house, since it necessarily requires things that fall out of the main purpose, such as hiring a workman and acquiring the tools. The analogous in the sciences is that the purpose in the study of geometry are the lines, the surfaces and the real intellectual figures; then, the necessity rises to figure it out47 by lines that are not lines, straight lines that are not straight lines, circumferences that are not circumferences, so that [the mental content] is disproven. […] [584] It has been learnt that our statement: “we are called of necessity” and so on does not contradict our statement: “but the primary concern (al-šuġl al-awwalī) [in logic] is not with it”; indeed, there can be a secondary concern with it, or a partial concern, or it can be included [in the discipline] in a peculiar fashion, so that there is no proper secondary concern with it, nor any primary universal concern, nor a partial concern, but it is something indispensable and whose consideration is indispensable in view of the primary purpose of all its parts (like the examples brought to you on the use of the sensible figures and characters). So, it has been learnt that this is necessary and, yet, it is not the object of primary concern. The first [case] is like the study of conics, for it is necessary to perfect the discipline of geometry, and geometry does not deal primarily with it, but with its genus – that is, measure – for in fact, this is its subject and those are species of its subjects. [585] My discourse in the book in which I wrote extensively [i.e. the Šifāʾ] was only about the explanation of the primary subject matter (al-mawḍūʿ al-awwalī) of logic, and I clarified that it is not expressions 48. Indeed, the study of expressions is either [(a)] included in it out of necessity (like the necessity of drawing figures for sense perception), or [(b)] as a part of the subjects of the discipline, or [(c)] as a necessary concomitant (lāzim) of a part of the subjects of the discipline, or [(d)] as a necessary concomitant of the subject matter of the discipline. Whoever pondered the Book of Demonstration knows the differences among these [things], and knows that it is necessary to verify them and that necessity calls on us to know them, even if they are not the subject matter of the discipline.

Avicenna resorts to the notions of ‘primary concern’ (al-šuġl al-awwalī), ‘primary object’ (al-qaṣd al-awwalī), and ‘primary subject matter’ (al-mawḍūʿ al-awwalī)49 to distinguish between inquiries of different relevance within one discipline. This enables him to claim that, although necessary, the study of expressions is not the primary subject of logic. Paragraphs 584–585 are particularly interesting, as they offer a detailed account of how the study of an object can fall within the remit of a discipline without being its primary subject (being, rather, an object with which the discipline deals secondarily). Although Avicenna does not specify in which of the ways enumerated above the study of expressions relates to logic, my suggestion is that it is type (a) in paragraph 285. For in fact, (b) – namely that the study of expressions is part of the subject matter of logic – can be excluded because expressions are  47 Reading (p. 193.9): taḫyīl (with MSS İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi, 4894, f. 103 r and Princeton, Yahuda 308, f. 51r) instead of taḥyīl. 48 In all likelihood, this is a reference to the Madḫal of the Šifāʾ. 49 On the notion of ‘primary subject’, see EICHNER 2010 and QUARTUCCI 2017, pp. 441–467.

xxviii  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction not a species of secondary notions50; (c) and (d) – namely, being a necessary concomitant of the subject matter of logic, or at least of part of it – may instead apply to notions like being a genus, being a species and so on as necessary concomitants of universality (as will be argued in the following on the basis of T3 and T4). If this is the case, Avicenna would here be comparing the need to use expressions with the need to represent geometric figures and theorems graphically. Upon closer inspection, numerous points of analogy appear. First, both are imperfect means of conveying meanings: for the graphical representation of geometrical figures, Avicenna argues for their inadequacy in paragraph 580 in T2; for expressions, one may think of those expressions that can signify more than one meaning (homonymy)51. Second, it can be argued that in both cases such imperfections may affect the soundness of the inquiry: in the case of geometry, an inadequate geometrical representation of a figure or a theorem may lead to erroneous conclusions, as well as, in the case of expressions, phenomena like homonymy that can affect reasoning by inducing in error. It can thus be concluded that both the logician and the geometer would rather dispense with the use of expressions or graphic representations if they could, except that neither can do without them. To sum up, Avicenna ended up overturning the predominant traditional view, reducing the inquiry into expressions to a necessary, albeit instrumental inquiry of the discipline. In one of the most famous passage of the Ilāhiyyāt of the Šifāʾ, the subject matter of the discipline of logic is said to be given by the secondary intelligible meanings, which ‘depend on’ primary meanings52. In what follows, two crucial Avicennian passages (T3 and T4) that comment on this famous statement are examined. (b) The per se accidents of the subject matter A rather interesting passage from Avicenna’s Taʿlīqāt (pp. 502.4–506.12) may help in identifying more precisely the subject matter of logic and the accidents of the subject matter that are studied in the discipline53. The passage is an explanation (šarḥ) of Ilāhiyyāt I.2, pp. 10.17–11.2.

 50 This is how the study of the conics relates to geometry, according to paragraph 584: the conics are part of the subject matter of geometry because the latter is their genus (i.e. measure). 51 This is Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s example in his Šarḥ al-Išārāt (p. 181, note 2). See also ADAMSON AND KEY 2015, pp. 89–91. 52 See Ilāhiyyāt I.2, pp. 10.17–11.2 and BERTOLACCI 2006, pp. 272–273. On ‘secondary meanings’ and on the possible historical origin of this expression, which is already employed in the works of alFārābī, see SABRA 1980, pp. 753–757. On primary meanings, cf. infra, point (b). 53 The congeries of heterogeneous notes ascribed to Avicenna and transmitted under the title of Taʿlīqāt (= GS12a in GUTAS 2014, p. 427, enumerated among Avicenna’s authentic works) is not a systematic work, and it is hard to entirely rule out the possibility that some scholastic material

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T3. Taʿlīqāt, pp. 502.4–503.354 “The subject matter of logic is given by the secondary intelligibles that depend on the primary ones insofar as one is led, through them, from what is known to what is unknown” 55. The explanation of this is that a given thing has primary intelligibles, such as ‘body’, ‘animal’ and the like, and secondary intelligibles that depend on them, namely the fact that these things are universal, particular and individual. The inquiry into the establishment (iṯbāt) of [the existence of] these secondary intelligibles pertains to the science of metaphysics. They are not the subject matter of the science of logic under the respect of their existence in absolute – for the respect of their existence in absolute is established here56 (and it consists in [establishing] whether they have existence in the concrete instances or in the soul) – but according to another condition, namely that one is led by them from something [previously] known to something unknown. Establishing this condition – namely knowing that the universal can be a genus, a differentia, a species, a proprium or a common accident – pertains [again] to the science of metaphysics. Once the general universal, the specific universal [and so on] are established in the science of metaphysics, the universal57 becomes, according to this condition, subject matter of the science of logic. Then, the concomitants (al-lawāzim) and the essential accidents that occur to the universal after that are established in the science of logic.

Primary intelligibles are identified with the meanings to which secondary intelligible meanings accrue, such as, for instance, the meanings of ‘animal’, ‘man’ and so on (cf. Taʿlīqāt, p. 502.4–7)58. When conceived in mind, these meanings are apt to be universal or particular, a subject or a predicate and so on, so that secondary meanings (such as universality, particularity etc.) depend on (tastanidu ilā) them, i.e. they accrue to them. Among the examples of concomitants provided in Taʿlīqāt, p. 506.5–7 (T4 below) are being a genus, a species, a differentia and so on, which are, more specifically, concomitants of universality, that is to say part of the subject matter of logic (see S1).

 produced in Avicenna’s entourage may have been included in the collection alongside Avicenna’s own materials. JANSSENS 1997, esp. pp. 116–118, suggested a possible production of the notes gathered under the title of Taʿlīqāt in the context of Avicenna’s activity of lecturing: the notes might have been redacted by one or more of his first-generation students during Avicenna’s lessons. Be it the result of Avicenna’s own elaboration or of the scholarly activity of his entourage, the view represented in the passage of the Taʿlīqāt does not contradict Avicenna’s other scanty and allusive accounts on the subject in his certainly original works and seems worthy of consideration. 54 The passage is also translated in KALBARCZYK 2018, p. 51. 55 The passage is a quote of Ilāhiyyāt I.2, pp. 10.17–11.2. 56 I.e. in Metaphysics. 57 Reading al-kullī with Mousavian (p. 503.2) instead of al-kull as in Badawī’s edition (p. 167.23). 58 This interpretation is also proposed in EL-ROUAYHEB 2012, p. 83; an identification of the primary meanings with the categories is proposed in SABRA 1980, pp. 753–755.

xxx  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction T4. Taʿlīqāt, p. 506.5–759 Clarifying the quiddity of the universal (al-kullī), the particular (al-ǧuzʾī) and the individual (alšaḫṣī) and that of certain concomitants (al-lawāzim) of these items, like being a genus (alǧinsiyya), being a differentia (al-faṣliyya), being a species (al-nawʿiyya) and their modes, pertains to logic. Establishing their existence pertains to First Philosophy60.

The five predicables defined in the Madḫal are thus among the necessary concomitants (lawāzim) of the subject matter of logic (more specifically, of universality, to which is necessarily concomitant being either a genus, a species, a differentia, a proprium, or a common accident). In this regard, it is interesting to note that the post-Avicennian tradition was puzzled by Avicenna’s reiterated assertion that being a genus, being a species and the like are accidents that occur to primary meanings when they are conceived (cf. e.g. Madḫal I.12, §1.2). For in fact, assuming that every discipline studies the accidents of its subject matter and not the subject itself compels us to admit that the subject matter of logic includes primary meanings, of which it studies accidents like ‘genus’, ‘species’ and so on61. Understanding meanings such as ‘genus’, ‘species’ and the like as concomitants of the subject matter of logic as in T4, rather than as the subject matter itself, saves Avicenna’s theory of the subject matter of logic from similar objections. From Avicenna’s perspective, the claim that ‘genus’, ‘species’ and the like are accidents of the primary meanings in conception would not be denied – on the contrary, it is often asserted – although it should be specified that ‘genus’, ‘species’ and the like occur to primary meanings only after universality, which is the accident that accrues primarily to primary meanings. The meaning of ‘animal’ can happen to be considered in mind as a genus of ‘man’ because universality – more specifically, the universality that happens to be generality – occurs to it in conception. The possibility for universality to be either generality or speciality, etc. is granted by metaphysics, as stated in T4. Therefore, the meaning of ‘animal’ is considered as universal, then as a genus of ‘man’, so that it is correct to state, as Avicenna often does, that the fact of being a genus accrues to the primary meaning of ‘animal’ in conception, but it occurs to that meaning as a concomitant of its universality62.

 59 The passage is also translated in KALBARCZYK 2018, p. 54. 60 I.e. Metaphysics. 61 This is the objection raised by al-Ḫūnaǧī and endorsed by al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī: cf. EL-ROUAYHEB 2012, pp. 73–74 and STREET 2015, §2.1.3. 62 Al-Ḫūnaǧī and al-Kātibī failed to grasp the point of Avicenna’s theory concerning the relation between the concomitants of the secondary meanings and the primary meanings. The subsequent tradition endorsing Avicenna’s theory of the subject matter of logic made some attempts to figure out this specific aspect. Part of the subsequent tradition elaborated the view that ‘genus’, ‘species’, ‘differentia’ and so on represent a third level (al-daraǧa al-ṯāliṯa) of meanings that stem from the manipulation of secondary meanings: see, for instance, the cases of Šams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d.

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(c) Metaphysics as the ‘founding science’ of logic T3–4 clarified that the existence of the subject matter of logic, as well as the existence of the specific condition allowing the existence of the concomitants and the essential accidents of the subject matter studied in logic, are established in metaphysics, meaning that metaphysics is the science that founds the subject matter of logic (c)63. In what follows, I would suggest that, despite a certain reluctance in the scholarly tradition to read it in this way, Madḫal I.4, §3.2 might also allude to this same relation between logic and metaphysics. In Madḫal I.4, §3.2, Avicenna suggests that supporters of the view that the subject matter of logic consists of the signifying expressions failed to recognize that the actual subject – namely secondary meanings – belongs to a different class of beings, i.e. mental beings64. This mistake might have been induced, on Avicenna’s view, by the traditional classification of the sciences based on the ontological classification of their objects, as well as by the idea that two disciplines cannot share the same kind of objects. According to this classification, items that exist in external reality might be objects of the disciplines of natural philosophy and mathematics, whereas the inquiry into existence in mind and how items are conceived in it is ascribed to the domain of inquiry of “another discipline or a part of a discipline” (li-ṣināʿatin aw ǧuzʾ ṣināʿatin). The interpretation of this elusive clause is both delicate and crucial at the same time. One viable possibility is to understand that the two occurrences of ‘discipline’ in “another discipline” and “a part of a discipline” as referring to one and the same discipline, which is part of a more general one. This has led some scholars to identify the discipline at stake with psychology, which is a part of natural philosophy65, to which Avicenna would ascribe “the inquiry into the existence that is in the mind and into how conception occurs in the mind” (al-naẓar fī l-wuǧūdi allaḏī fī l-ḏihni wa-annahu kayfa yutaṣawwaru fīhi). Two main problems arise with this interpretation: first, mental representations that do not correspond to anything in external reality (i.e. meanings like ‘universal’, ‘particular’ and so on) – which are said to be the subject matter of logic when considered under a certain respect – are explicitly said to be among the objects of metaphysics in Ilāhiyyāt I.4, p. 26.3–5. The  1303) and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī (d. 1365) presented in EL-ROUAYHEB 2012, pp. 80–81 and pp. 84–87 respectively. Avicenna does not seem to have ever elaborated a theory of third-level meanings nor to have ever spoken of third meanings. 63 Even if Ilāhiyyāt I.2, pp. 14.18–15.8 only mentions natural philosophy and mathematics as instances of sciences that are subordinated to metaphysics, the same also applies to logic, as observed in BERTOLACCI 2006, p. 268 and n. 7. On the relation between logic and metaphysics, see BERTOLACCI 2006, pp. 272–284 and 300–301. 64 MADKOUR 1934, pp. 59–60 proposed an identification of these philosophers with the Stoics, then discussed in MANDOSIO 2013, p. 325 and n. 109, who identifies one of Avicenna’s possible sources in the Tenth Letter of the Iḫwān al-Ṣafāʾ. 65 As in MANDOSIO 2013, p. 331.

xxxii  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction passage states that metaphysics also ascertain how universal natures exist in both individuals and the soul. While the domain of inquiry of psychology is undeniably related to logic as far as the presence of the universal meanings in the mind is concerned, and the reference to an inquiry into how these items are conceived (waannahu kayfa yutaṣawwaru fīhi) seems to fall within the domain of psychology, the inquiry into the mental existence of these meanings which is referred to in the passage (al-naẓar fī l-wuǧūd allaḏī fī l-ḏihni) nonetheless seems to pertain to metaphysics instead66. Second, and just as important, Avicenna argues that the fact that a certain class of beings is the subject matter of both logic and this other discipline does not affect the epistemological status of logic as an autonomous science, as it is possible for a scientific discipline to share part of the subject matter of another, considering it with a certain specific respect. The possibility that two different disciplines share the subject matter that is alluded to is discussed in Šifāʾ, Burhān II.7, where Avicenna identifies three ways in which two disciplines can share the same subject matter: (1) Burhān II.7, pp. 163.12–165.2 and 168.12–13: the subject matter of one discipline can be more general and include the subject of the other discipline as a more specific part of it, as in the case of natural philosophy and medicine. Both medicine and a part of natural philosophy assume human body as a subject, although medicine studies it under a specific respect, namely its being in a state of illness or health. (2) Burhān II.7, p. 168.13–14: the two disciplines can share just a part of their two subjects, but differ in the rest, as is the case with medicine and ethics. (3) Burhān II.7, p. 168.14–15: the two disciplines can share an identical subject, though dealing with it in two different respects, as in the case of natural philosophy and astronomy, which both study celestial bodies from different perspectives.

The relation between logic and the aforementioned ‘other science’ is of type (1): logic is said to deal with a part of the subject of the other science and to consider it under a different, specific respect, namely insofar as it is useful to the acquisition of knowledge. This is arguably the same relation as that between metaphysics and the other sciences: notably, the same example of natural philosophy and medicine is employed in Ilāhiyyāt, I.2, pp. 14.18–15.8 to explain the relation between metaphysics and the other sciences. Metaphysics provides the foundation of the other sciences because it deals with their subject matters from a different point of view and because it deals with some doctrines that are dealt with improperly in other disciplines67; the particular sciences are subordinated to metaphysics68.

 66 Cf. Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt I.4, p. 26.4–5: wa-kayfa wuǧūduhā fī l-nafs; cf. also Šifāʾ, Maqūlāt I.1, p. 5.9–10: min ǧihati kayfiyyati l-wuǧūd. 67 Cf. BERTOLACCI 2006, pp. 265–266.

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According to the principles delineated in Burhān II.7, an identification of the other discipline with psychology would entail assuming that logic is a discipline subordinate to psychology, just like medicine is subordinate to natural philosophy and that psychology plays a foundational role for logic. None of the conditions mentioned are thematized elsewhere by Avicenna, as it should be expected if this were the case; on the other hand, there is plenty of evidence that a foundational role is played by metaphysics with respect to logic, as well as with respect to the other sciences. An alternative interpretation of the passage in Madḫal I.4, §3.2 may be to understand the occurrences of ‘discipline’ in the clause “another discipline or a part of a discipline” as referring to two different disciplines, i.e. respectively metaphysics and psychology as a part of natural philosophy, and to understand the rest of Avicenna’s dissertation as referring exclusively – or, at least, predominantly – to metaphysics. There are several parallels in Avicenna’s Logic for such a joint mention of metaphysics and psychology in similar contexts: for instance, in Madḫal I.5, §2.2 Avicenna assigns the investigation concerning the existence of universal meanings to “a discipline or two”, which can be identified with metaphysics and psychology69. A more striking parallel is in Šifāʾ, Maqūlāt I.1, p. 5.9–10, where Avicenna states that the study of how the categories exist (min ǧihati kayfiyyati l-wuǧūd) pertains to metaphysics, whereas their study in terms of how they are conceived in the soul (min ǧihati taṣawwur al-nafs lahā) pertains to “a part of natural philosophy that is contiguous to First Philosophy”, i.e. psychology70. To sum up, the discipline Avicenna might have predominantly had in mind in Madḫal I.4 is metaphysics, and only secondarily – insofar as it studies the process of conception – psychology. Consequently, Avicenna’s objection to his adversaries may be understood as follows: the first mistake they made was the bipartition of philosophy into sciences that study the domain of external existence and a science that studies the domain of mental existence. This bipartition may have its roots in the tripartition into objects (πράγματα), expressions (φωναί) and concepts (νοήματα) as the objects of, respectively, ontology, logic and psychology found in Simplicius’ commentary on the Categories71. According to Simplicius’ tripartition, the study of the objects of external reality would pertain to metaphysics, and the study of mental contents would fall within the competence of psychology, so that there would be no room left for the study of concepts in logic. As for Avicenna, he would not endorse this division of the objects of inquiry in the first place, since both kinds of existence may fall within the

 68 Šifāʾ, Burhān II.7, p. 165.3–7 and 11–16; cf. HASNAWI 2000, pp. 518–519, text 3 and BERTOLACCI 2006, p. 267. 69 See BERTOLACCI 2006, p. 274. 70 For the identification of this science with psychology, see also GUTAS 2014, p. 301. 71 SIMPL., In Cat., 9.8–10.5; see KALBARCZYK 2018, p. 25.

xxxiv  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction domain of metaphysics. The second mistake is thus that, even if one were to accept the adversaries’ bipartition of the philosophical sciences, they failed to recognize that the items that have a mental existence can be divided into: (a) items conceived of from the external reality; and (b) items that are in the human mind without any correspondence to the external reality, since they are not the result of conception. Both items (a-b) are the object of metaphysics72, although this does not imply that they are exclusively so; items of class (b), for instance, arguably include the secondary meanings that are the subject of logic73. Avicenna identifies the main factor that dissuaded his adversaries from admitting meanings as the subject matter of logic with the risk of an overlap between the subject matter of logic and that of another science. What assures that the subject matters of metaphysics and that of logic do not overlap is not only that the subject matter of logic does not entirely coincide with that of metaphysics, but also that the items of type (b) are the subject matter of logic under a specific respect, namely insofar as they allow us to attain knowledge of the unknown on the basis of a previously-acquired knowledge, which is not how these items are included as objects of metaphysics. Avicenna insists on his adversaries’ failure to recognize the specific respect (al-ǧiha)74 under which the subject matter of logic is exclusively its own subject matter, due to the relevance that this aspect has in defining the subject matter that pertains to logical inquiry and, consequently, defining logic as a science. Adopting this second interpretation allows us to recognize another reference to the foundational role of metaphysics with respect to logic in Madḫal I.4, §3.3. In the passage, Avicenna recalls a general epistemological principle set out in Šifāʾ, Burhān II.6, p. 155.4–10, namely that every science has a subject matter of which it studies the accidents and states, and that the study of a subject matter in itself can pertain to a discipline, whereas the study of its accidents pertains to another. As a science, logic shares with natural philosophy, mathematics, and the other sciences the fact that, unlike metaphysics, they do not study their subjects in terms of wheth-

 72 Cf. Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt I.2, pp. 12.11–13.9; Ibid., I.4, p. 26.3–5. 73 Cf. Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt I.2, pp. 10.17–11.2 and Madḫal I.2, §2.1. 74 Mandosio understands this term in a different way (MANDOSIO 2013, p. 332): “la partie en vue de laquelle elle [scil. la Logique] a été instituée”, identified by Mandosio as the section concerning the logic of judgement; this interpretation, however, is anchored to the Latin translation of the passage, which relies on an Arabic exemplar that may have been affected by a slight corruption of this point: instead of wa-lā al-ǧiha allatī bihā huwa mawḍūʿuhu (“and not the respect under which it is its [scil. the logic’s] subject”), the Arabic exemplar of the Latin translation arguably read: wa-lā al-ǧiha allatī bihā hiya mawḍūʿa (“and not the respect according to which it [i.e. the discipline of logic] is instituted”; Lat.: nec partem ad quam instituta est). Part of the responsibility for the misunderstanding of the passage is taken by the masculine suffix pronoun of mawḍūʿuhu, which refers to manṭiq instead of ṣināʿa, as one might have expected.

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er they exist. Rather, they study the per se accidents of their subjects, whereas the inquiry into their subjects themselves pertains to metaphysics75. The analysis conducted so far is intended to help achieve a more complete understanding of the relation that exists between logic and its founding science, i.e. metaphysics, and between logic and psychology, whose inquiries are tangentially related insofar as the items studied in logic accrue to primary meanings in conception and the process of conception itself is a matter of psychology. Further, the analysis has aimed at a more accurate identification of the place occupied by the five universal predicables within the inquiry pertaining to logic, and how they relate to the subject matter of the discipline (cf. the recapitulative scheme S1 below). In the following section of the General Introduction (III), an in-depth analysis of the doctrine of the universals developed in the Madḫal will be carried out. The aim of section III is to gain a better understanding of Avicenna’s purported de-ontologization of logic, taking as a test-case a doctrine that, as established in what precedes, rightfully belongs to the domain of logic. (a): The subject matter (mawḍūʿ) of logic (b): The concomitant attributes (lawāzim) of the subject matter of logic (c): The science founding the subject matter of logic (d): The discipline studying the process of conception of the mental content studied in logic

S1. The epistemological foundation of logic as a science

 75 Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt I.2, pp. 10.1–11.2.

xxxvi  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction

III Avicenna’s Theory of Predicables in a ‘De-Ontologized’ Logic III.1 What Are the Five Universal Predicables? Concerning the fundamental question on the nature of the five predicables, according to Avicenna these are relational items that signify the kind of relation existing between a predicate and its subject of predication76. There is no such thing as a genus, a species and the like in itself (fī nafsihi), but rather everything is such in relation (bi-l-qiyās) to something else77. The same meaning can play the role of any one of the five predicables with respect to a certain subject, and then another predicable with respect to a different subject, so that it can be predicated as a genus of a subject A, as a species of a subject B, as a differentia of a subject C, and so on78. Notions of this kind have a purely intellectual existence79 and correspond to the genus, species, differentia, proprium, and accident that are described as ‘logical’ in Madḫal I.12, §2.1 and in the Risāla Mūǧaza fī uṣūl al-manṭiq, §7 (Appendix A). They are accidental with respect to the primary meanings to which they accrue in mental existence, being concomitants of universality. The Late Antique exegetical tradition had demonstrated the accidentality of these meanings by showing how they fall into the so-called ‘fallacy of the accident’; for example, if ‘animal’ is a genus and ‘man’ is an ‘animal’, it does not follow that ‘man’ is also a genus80.

III.2 Key Elements of Avicenna’s Theory of Predicables81 III.2.1 Aristotle’s Puzzling Definitions of the Differentia A general classification of the predicables requires a prior definition of essential and accidental predication. The first issue Avicenna deals with in his reassessment of the system of the predicables is the exact definition of the essential predication. This is a particularly delicate subject within the Madḫal, where it is the object of a long digression that covers chapters I.5–8 and is dealt with again in chap. I.13 and II.1  76 For the exact sense of the expression ‘relational items’ in the context, cf. MALINK 2007, p. 279 and GRANIERI 2016, pp. 1–2. 77 Cf. Madḫal I.8, §5. 78 Cf. Madḫal I.8, §5; II.4, §1 and the Risāla Mūǧaza fī uṣūl al-manṭiq, §6 (Appendix A). 79 This is a Peripatetic trait of Avicenna’s doctrine of universals: universality and its concomitants only accrue to primary meanings in conception, which means that universal meanings resulting from the combination of primary meanings with universality only have a mental existence. 80 On the Late Antique interpretation of the ‘fallacy of the accident’ and on the possibility that it misunderstands Aristotle, see BÄCK 2015, pp. 155–158. On the accidentality of universality and the presence of this doctrine in the Quaestio I 11a by Alexander of Aphrodisias, see Commentary on I.12, §1.2. 81 Part of the results exposed in this section were also presented in DI VINCENZO 2015 and Ead. 2016.

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with regard to the differentia specifica. The predicative status of the differentia specifica has represented one of the major interpretative challenges faced by ancient and modern scholars, due to the compresence in Aristotle’s Organon of at least two apparently diametrically opposite views82. Both views stem from Aristotle’s attempt to explain the relationship between the genus and the differentia: (i) the first, which can be inferred from Topics Δ-Ζ83 and Categories 1–9, states that only the genus can be predicated essentially (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι), whereas the differentia is predicated in “what sort of thing is it?” (ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστι); (ii) the second, conveyed by Topics Η3–584 and Posterior Analytics, states that the differentia can be predicated essentially (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι), just like the genus. In sum, the question is whether, in Aristotle’s opinion, essential predicates include the differentia or not. The issue is complicated by the need to meet two main requirements, namely that of properly distinguishing between the genus and the differentia, but also of granting the unity of the definition composed by both predicates. These two problems may explain Aristotle’s oscillations in this regard. The first account (i) of the predicative status of genus and differentia succeeds in distinguishing the genus from the differentia, providing a clear-cut distinction of their predicative statuses, but is unable to explain adequately the unity of the definition: above all, it does not explain how the definition is predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, if its constitutive parts are predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι in the case of the genus and ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστι in the case of the differentia. The second account (ii), however, is more suitable to securing the unity of the definition as an essential predicate, since it removes the radical difference between the  82 Cf. the “Teoria I” and “Teoria II” in MARIANI 1997, p. 7. 83 The central books of the Topics clarify that the differentia is not predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι; see Top. Δ2, 122b16–17: οὐδεμία γὰρ διαφορὰ σημαίνει τί ἐστιν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ποιόν τι, καθάπερ τὸ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ δίπουν. A remarkable passage, however, is Top. Δ6, 128a20–29, in which Aristotle mentions certain unspecified philosophers (δοκεῖ τισι) who think that the differentia is predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι; Top. 128a20–29: «Since someone thinks that also the differentia is predicated of the species in ‘what is it?’, it is necessary to distinguish genus from differentia by employing the aforementioned elements; first of all, the fact that the genus is predicated of more [items] than the differentia, then the fact that it is more suitable to provide the genus as an answer to ‘what is it?’ than the differentia (‘animal’, for instance, signifies what a man is more than ‘capable of walking’) and the fact that the differentia always signifies a quality of the genus, whereas the genus does not [signify a quality] of the differentia [...]». 84 See, for example, Top. H3, 153a15–22. The passage argues that, since the definition (ὅρος) is a statement showing the essence (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) of the thing, then the predicates contained in it are also predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι of the definiendum; Aristotle then explicitly affirms that genus and differentia are predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι. See also Top. H5, 154a24–29. In this latter passage, Aristotle states again that genus and differentia are both predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι τὸ γένος καὶ αἱ διαφοραὶ κατηγοροῦνται); the context is the statement, in the incipit of H5, that it is more difficult to build (κατασκευάζειν) a definition than to demolish it (ἀνασκευάζειν), since it is not simple to infer, either autonomously or by putting questions to the interlocutors, that the parts of the definition are genus and differentia and that they are predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι.

xxxviii  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction predicative statuses of the genus and the differentia by stating that the differentia is predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι like the genus, but turns out to be unable to distinguish genus and differentia, at least on the basis of their predicative status. Two different strategies are viable to explain Aristotle’s incongruences: the first consists of ascribing different positions on the same subject to different chronological phases of Aristotle’s production (thus supposing an evolution of Aristotle’s views on the subject)85, while the other consists of trying to provide a unitary account for both views, arguing that two different senses of ‘essential predication’ might be at stake86. Leaving aside the thorny question of which of the two interpretations is the most faithful to Aristotle, it can be argued that Avicenna’s strategy, which features in the Madḫal and in other passages of the Šifāʾ, is the second one. Traditionally, the ‘logical question’ concerning the predicative status of the differentia qua part of an essential predicate (i.e. the definition) has been inextricably entangled with the ‘ontological question’ about its categorial status qua part of a substance (i.e. the definiendum)87. The problem relates especially to the differentiae of substance that should be substances, according to the assumption that the parts of a substance are substances (cf. Arist., Met. Z13), in contradiction with Arist. Cat. 3a21–22 and 33, where Aristotle explicitly opposes differentiae to substances, therefore assuming that the differentiae are not substances. In the following, I argue that Avicenna tried to apply the program of freeing logic from metaphysical subject matters to his theory of the predicables by disentangling the logical and ontological questions that had previously been dealt with as two deeply interrelated issues. Also, I will argue that some of the conceptual tools that are fundamental to Avicenna’s operation may have been borrowed from Alexander of Aphrodisias, although with important refinements. III.2.2 The ‘Logical Question’ and the Definition of Essential Predication The problem of the predicative status of the genus and the differentia qua parts of the definition was at the centre of the debate in the Late Antique reception of Aristotle. Alexander of Aphrodisias dealt with it in his commentary on book A of the Topics88, in an attempt to provide a unitary exegesis of Aristotle’s accounts of the differentia in the Categories and in the Topics.

 85 The strategy adopted, for instance, in GRANGER 1984, pp. 11–12 and MARIANI 1997. 86 The strategy adopted in MORRISON 1993. 87 The phenomenon is quite frequent in Late Antiquity; on the debate regarding the categorial status of differentiae, see MORRISON 1993, MARIANI 1997 and DE HAAS 1997, pp. 165–250 88 Another strictly related passage is the one in which Alexander comments upon Aristotle’s observation on those who claim that the differentia is predicated in ‘what is it?’ (In Top. p. 365.4–21), a passage that seems to be recalled in a Quaestio of Alexander on the differentia specifica that was translated into Arabic (cf. infra).

III Avicenna’s Theory of Predicables in a ‘De-Ontologized’ Logic  xxxix

T5. Alexand., In Top., p. 47.14–2389 The differentia is also predicated of many items differing in species, but not in ‘what is it?’ (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν), or else the definition of the genus and that of the differentia will be the same; on the contrary, as he [scil. Aristotle] says in other passages, the differentia is mostly predicated in ‘what sort of thing is it?’ (ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τι μᾶλλον κατηγορεῖται) of those things of which it is predicated as a differentia, for it explains what sort of thing they are. Hence, one must not think that what was said in the Categories concerning the fact that differentiae are predicated of a subject (καθ’ ὑποκειμένου κατηγοροῦνται) was said with regard to the ‘differentiae’ properly so called; rather, it was said of those already assumed together with matter (τῶν ἤδη συνειλημμένων τῇ ὕλῃ). In fact, everything that is predicated of a subject is predicated of it in ‘what is it?’, but if the differentiae were predicated in ‘what is it?’ they would be genera rather than differentiae.

The main problem is caused by the fact that, in the Categories, the differentia is said to be predicated of a subject (καθ’ ὑποκειμένου) but – assuming, as Alexander does in T5, that what is predicated καθ’ ὑποκειμένου of something is also predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν of that something – this entails a difficulty in distinguishing the genus and the differentia, since both are predicated essentially (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν) of their subjects. In several occurrences in the Topics, on the other hand, Aristotle states that the differentia is predicated ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν. The solution to the problem comes, for Alexander, from the account of the unity of definition provided in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Alexander distinguishes between two kinds of differentiae: the differentiae in their proper sense (αἱ κυρίως λεγομέναι διαφοραί), which are predicated in ‘what sort of thing is it?’ (ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν), and the differentiae conjoined to matter (αἱ ἤδη συνειλημμέναι τῇ ὕλῃ), which are predicated in ‘what is it?’ (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν) qua parts of the composition of genus and differentia, which is analogous to a composite of matter and form. Alexander’s solution consists of identifying two different ways of considering the differentia: Aristotle’s account in the Categories would refer to the differentia considered as being conjoined to a genus, assimilated to a form considered in its conjunction to matter, whereas Aristotle’s account in the Topics would refer to the differentia in itself, as predicated ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν. Alexander’s twofold consideration of the differentia is at work in another passage of his commentary on the Topics and in a passage of a Quaestio de differentia specifica that is only extant in the Arabic translation by al-Dimašqī90,

 89 On this passage, see RASHED 2007, p. 69 and n. 234. 90 I refer to Alexander’s Quaestio de differentia specifica edited in BADAWĪ 19782, n° 34 in GOULET AND AOUAD 1989, p. 137. It is likely a longer version of the Quaestio on the same subject edited in DIETRICH 1964 and listed as n° 29 in GOULET AND AOUAD 1989, p. 136 (on the hypothesis that the two texts are two different versions of one and the same work, see VAN ESS 1966, pp. 154–159). The manuscript tradition ascribes the Arabic version to al-Dimašqī, and preserves some notes ascribed to Abū Bišr Mattā together with Alexander’s text. On this passage, see also RASHED 2007, pp. 70–71.

xl  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction which shows several points of contact with another passage of his commentary on the Topics (T6). T6. Alexander’s Quaestio de differentia and the commentary on Aristotle’s Topics Alexand., Quaestio de differentia, p. 304.17–20 It is possible to think that Aristotle employs ‘differentiae’ in the Categories in the sense that they are conjoined to a matter (maʿa māddatin)

from his claim that they are predicated synonymously (ʿalā ṭarīqi l-ṭawāṭuʾi) of the species and of the individuals;

… but if they were predicated synonymously of what is subsumed under them, they would be also predicated of the subjects of which they are predicated according to the meaning of the quiddity (bi-maʿnā l-māhiyyati), as well as the genera and the species, and just as the genus is predicated synonymously of the species, so too it would be predicated of the differentiae.

Alexand. In Top. p. 365.4–21 Speaking of the differentia, he [i.e. Aristotle] said: “since some people think that also the differentia is predicated in what is it? (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι) of [its] species” because the differentia assumed as a complex [together with the genus] (ὡς συναμφότερος λαμβανομένη) is predicated in this manner – but not also the differentia which is separated from the matter of the complex (χωρὶς τῆς ὕλης τῆς συναμφοτέρου) –: he recalled this [differentia] also in the Categories, where he said that the individuals and the species receive the definition (τὸν λόγον) of the differentiae [i.e. the differentiae are predicated synonymously of them]. [...] The genus divided by a differentia considered as separated from matter in the substance is not predicated synonymously (συνωνύμως κατηγορεῖται) of it, since no other complex of different parts (ὅλον ἀνομοιομερὲς) is predicated in this way of each of [its] parts and this type of differentia is a part of that which is divided by it, nor is it predicated [in this way] of the species and the individual, for the part is not predicated of the entire (τοῦ ὅλου) either.

In the Quaestio, Alexander claims that the differentiae mentioned in Aristotle’s Categories are considered as conjoined to matter, for there Aristotle states that they are predicated synonymously of their subjects (Cat. 3b1–2). Otherwise, claiming that the differentiae are predicated synonymously of their subjects would entail claiming that they are predicated according to the quiddities of their subjects, just like the genera, and that the genera are synonymously predicated of the differentiae, although this claim would contradict Aristotle’s view in the Topics91. When Alexander speaks of the differentia conjoined to matter he means the differentia when consid 91 Cf. Top. Δ2, 122b18, warning against considering a differentia as a species of the genus it divides; the passage is also recalled in Avicenna’s Mašriqiyyūn, Manṭiq, p. 53.4–5.

III Avicenna’s Theory of Predicables in a ‘De-Ontologized’ Logic  xli

ered not qua pure meaning, but together with a genus, although the genus is left unspecified92. An instance is a differentia like ‘rational’, contrasted with the pure meaning of ‘rationality’, since ‘rational’ may be understood as ‘x possessed of rationality’ (‘x’ being a non-specified genus) and can be predicated synonymously of a substantial subject, whereas ‘rationality’ cannot. Besides trying to harmonize the accounts of Aristotle’s Categories and Topics, Alexander’s purpose was to avoid a total overlap of the definitions of the genus and the differentia, which would otherwise coincide. Alexander’s solution provided the subsequent exegetical tradition with a possibility of reading Aristotle in a unitary way, which is arguably the reason for its reception in Ammonius’ school in Alexandria and in the Peripatetic school of Baġdād. Elias and Philoponus, for instance, raised aporiae on the problem of explaining how the definition can be said to be predicated of the thing in ‘what is it?’ even though it consists of a genus and a differentia and the latter is predicated in ‘what sort of thing is it?’. In both cases, the solution is offered by Alexander’s distinction of the differentiae considered without the genus (καθ’ ἑαυτὰς λαμβανόμεναι χωρὶς τοῦ γένους) and predicated in ‘what sort of thing is it?’, and the differentiae taken with the genus, thus forming a new species predicated in ‘what is it?’93. An aporia similar to the one reported by Elias is also raised in Ibn al-Ṭayyib’s Commentary on the Isagoge94. I will argue that Avicenna’s theory of the predicables may preserve the core of Alexander’s solution, although with some important modifications. Alexander’s solution, if employed to account for Aristotle’s oscillation in the Organon between two different ways in which the differentia is predicated (as the subsequent exegetical tradition used it) only partly succeeds in solving the problem raised in the first place. In fact, Alexander pays a high price to achieve a unitary account of Aristotle’s

 92 See RASHED 2007, p. 69, n. 235. 93 ELIAS, In Isag., pp. 56.30–57.11 and PHILOP., In An. Post., p. 400.21–28. Philoponus refers to the differentiae as being joined to the genera as “unnamed genera” (γένη ἀνώνυμα). 94 IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāġūǧī li-Furfūriyūs, p. 129.5–14. MS BnF ar. 2346 also provides significant evidence that Alexander’s solution was applied in the school of Baġdād: the manuscript preserves two anonymous glosses on two passages of the Isagoge, which specify the different kinds of predication that the differentia has when considered as a predicable in itself, and when taken as part of the definition (edited at p. 1062, n. 4 and p. 1090, n. 4 of al-Dimašqī’s translation of Porphyry’s Isagoge). In particular, the gloss at p. 1062, n. 4 refers to Porphyry’s statement that the description of the genus can adequately distinguish it from the other four predicables, for it distinguishes the genus from the differentia because the differentia is not predicated in ‘what is it?’ like the genus (PORPH., Isag., p. 3.5–20). The gloss specifies that this is only true of the differentia when it is not considered as a part of the definition, for in that case the differentia is predicated in ‘what is it?’. The second gloss comments on Porphyry’s statement that the genus and the differentia differ in that the genus is predicated in ‘what is it?’ whereas the differentia is not (PORPH., Isag., p. 15.2–4), specifying that the differentia is also predicated in ‘what is it?’ when considered as a part of the definition.

xlii  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction theory of the differentia, namely the introduction of two different senses in which Aristotle means the term ‘differentia’ in the same logical context. Moreover, only one of the two senses can be said to be synonymously predicated of substantial subjects, whereas the other is predicated only paronymously. These considerations may have led Avicenna definitively to rule out of the logical framework the ‘pure meaning’ of the differentia, which cannot be predicated synonymously of substantial subjects. This can be argued based on a passage on the differentia of the Naǧāt (T7): T7. Naǧāt, Manṭiq, p. 16.6–7 ‘Rationality’ (al-nuṭq) is a simple95 differentia, whereas ‘rational’ (al-nāṭiq) is a composite differentia (murakkab), namely the logical differentia.

Avicenna states in T7 that the differentia can either be considered as a ‘simple differentia’ (al-faṣl al-mufrad), e.g. rationality (al-nuṭq), or as a ‘logical differentia’, e.g. rational (al-nāṭiq). This latter differentia is conceived as composite (murakkab) because ‘rational’ can be analyzed as something possessed of rationality (šayʾun lahu nuṭq). Avicenna’s distinction shows several points of contact with that proposed by Alexander: the idea of a composition of the logical differentia can be understood in a way similar to Alexander’s idea of a composition with ‘matter’, if by ‘matter’ one is to understand a non-specified genus that the differentia specifies96. Also, the terminological choice of naming the logical differentia ‘composite’ (murakkab) may betray Avicenna’s commitment to Alexander’s Quaestio de differentia, where the composition of the differentia with the matter/genus is expressed in terms of tarkīb97 (cf. also T16). As we will see later, Avicenna extends Alexander’s analysis of the differentia to all the predicables that are predicated paronymously of substantial subjects (i.e. to include, besides the differentia, also the proprium and the common accident), and posits it as the pivot of his solution to the question concerning the ontological status of the predicables. As for the predicative status of the differentia, if for Avicenna the only differentia that is taken into account in logic is the ‘composite/enmattered’ one, the problem of a consistent account of Aristotle’s theory of essential predication re-

 95 Reading mufrad as in p. 48.21–22 of Fakhry’s edition instead of muǧarrad. 96 This interpretation is compatible with Avicenna’s insistence on the point that ‘rational’ should not be understood as equivalent to ‘animal possessed of rationality’. As emerges in Madḫal II.4, §2.1, the point is relevant in order to avoid redundancies in the definition: if ‘rational’ encompassed the meaning of the genus in actuality and were equivalent to ‘animal possessed of rationality’, the clause ‘rational animal’ would be equivalent to an ill-formed clause of the sort: ‘animal animal possessed of rationality’. 97 See e.g. p. 306.11–14 in BADAWĪ 19782.

III Avicenna’s Theory of Predicables in a ‘De-Ontologized’ Logic  xliii

mains. It must be explained how the same composite differentia can be said to be predicated both in ‘what is it?’ and in ‘what sort of thing is it?’. Avicenna’s original answer to the problem consists of articulating the essential predication on two different levels, i.e. a predication in answer to ‘what is it?’ (fī ǧawābi mā huwa) that applies specifically to the signification of the quiddity (both shared and specific, so that both genera and species are predicated in this way), and a predication in the way of ‘what is it?’ (min ṭarīqi mā huwa) that embraces the predicables that are predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’ (fī ǧawābi mā huwa), as well as including the differentia qua part of the definition. In other words, the differentia considered as composite partakes, to some extent, of the predicative status of the genus with which it concurs to the constitution of a species98. The predication in answer to ‘what is it?’ (fī ǧawābi mā huwa) expresses the relationship between a predicate and the subject of which it signifies the quiddity; the predication in the way of ‘what is it?’ (min ṭarīqi mā huwa) is a more general notion that includes the first and expresses the relationship between a predicate and the subject to which it is essential99. It should be remembered that, in Avicenna’s opinion, an essential predicate does not necessarily signify the subject’s quiddity, but can also signify its essential quality and be predicated of it in answer to ‘what sort of thing is it?’, like the differentia100. Avicenna’s identification of two levels of the essential predication is meant to face three major problems: (i) to explain how the differentia can be said to accede to essential predication in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics though being predicated in ‘what sort of thing is it?’; (ii) to distinguish effectively between the genus and the differentia; and (iii) to provide a unitary account of the divisions of the predicables provided in Porphyry’s Isagoge and in Aristotle’s Topics. All three points are presented in a nutshell in T8101: T8. Šifāʾ, Ǧadal I.6, p. 55.10–18 [(i-ii)] This genus was described as predicated of many [items] which differ in species in answer to ‘what is it?’ (fī ǧawābi mā huwa). And you know that the differentia, in their definitions102, was not distinguished from the genus because [the genus] is predicated of different species, but because it is [predicated] in the way of ‘what is it?’ (min ṭarīqi mā huwa). So, if it were in the

 98 Something analogous happens with the ontological status of the composite differentia: cf. infra. On this distinction, see also SCHOECK 2016, pp. 405–410. 99 The notion of ‘essential’ is said to be more general than that of ‘signifying the quiddity’ in Madḫal I.7. 100 Cf. Madḫal I.5, §6. 101 On this passage, see also SCHOECK , pp. –. 102 Fī ḥudūdihim, i.e. in the definitions accepted by a long exegetical tradition encompassing Porphyry, the school of Alexandria and the school of Baġdād; cf. DI VINCENZO 2015, pp. 130–143.

xliv  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction nature of the differentia — as it was explained in the First Teaching103, in the context of the science of the Demonstration — and104 the differentia were apt to be [given] in answer to ‘what is it?’ (fī ǧawābi mā huwa), it would share this definition with the genus. If the definition of the genus were this one which includes the differentia, this would not prevent the differentia from being predicated in answer to ‘what sort of thing is it?’ (fī ǧawābi ayyi šayʾin huwa) insofar as it is divisive (muqassim), as well as it is predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’ (fī ǧawābi mā huwa) insofar as it is constitutive (muqawwim)105. The genus that is distinguished from the differentia would be distinguished from it106 because the genus is not apt to be said in answer to ‘what sort of thing is it?’ (fī ǧawābi ayyi šayʾin huwa) in such a way that this is [its] primary predication. [(iii)] As for the genus taken here107 [into consideration], it is something more common than both things.

Ǧadal I.6 is devoted to Aristotle’s division of the predicables. The exposition starts with a definition of the essential predicables that Aristotle mentions in the Topics (namely, the definition and the genus); a portion of the dissertation on the genus is devoted to the proper distinction between the genus and the differentia. In T8, Avicenna raises an exegetical difficulty that embraces both points (i) and (ii) simulta 103 Al-taʿlīm al-awwal: i.e. Aristotle. 104 Reading at p. 55.13: wa- (with MS Leid. Or. 4) instead of wa-annahu. In the apparatus of the Cairo ed. there is a reading annahu instead of wa-annahu ascribed to one of the Leiden manuscripts; however, as far as I could check, MS Leid. Or. 4 reports wa instead of wa-annahu, and MS Leid. Or. 84 has wa-annahu. There is, probably, a larger corruption of the text, since certain manuscripts (like MS Damad Ibrahim 824, recorded in the apparatus of the Cairo ed.) omit a larger portion of text preceding the wa-annahu. On the possibility that the syntax of this passage is affected by a later insertion in the text, cf. DI VINCENZO 2017, p. 55–60. 105 The problem is, according to Avicenna, a misconception of the differentia: the Peripatetic commentators appear to think that a species may be constituted by a divisive differentia and a constitutive one; an example of divisive differentia of ‘animal’ is ‘rational’, and examples of constitutive differentiae are ‘animate’ and ‘percipient’. The constitutive differentiae may be seen, according to the commentators, as predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι because they can be considered already conjoined to matter; they are divisive differentiae existing in a subject. 106 Reading at p. 55.17: yubāyyinuhu instead of bayānuhu. The reading bayānuhu printed in the Cairo edition yields a difficult meaning: we should translate the passage as follows: “and the explanation of the genus that distinguishes itself from differentia is in virtue of the fact that it is not apt [...]”. MSS Brit. Mus. Or. 7500 and Leid. Or. 84 both read: , which does not seem to fit the syntax of our passage if we want to preserve the bi-annahu that follows, but in those manuscripts the complete reading is: mubāyanatan annahu (considering mubāyana as an internal object of yubāyyinu, we should then translate: “and the genus that distinguishes itself from differentia in a way that consists in the fact that it is not apt [...]”). The syntax of the passage also has some problems with the reading annahu, so I would suggest that the reading mubāyana may have originated from a misunderstanding of a rasm that is attested by MS Leid. Or. 4: I found a reading in MS Leid. Or. 4, which is compatible with the reading yubāyyinuhu, which would solve both the syntactical problem and the difficulty in the interpretation. The reading bayānuhu perhaps simply originated from an accidental omission of the first letter of the rasm that, in a manuscript without diacritics, would have been identical to the second one. 107 Hāhunā: in the Topics and in Avicenna’s Ǧadal.

‫ﻣ ﺎﯾﻨﺔ‬

‫ﯨﯩﺎﯨﻨﻪ‬

III Avicenna’s Theory of Predicables in a ‘De-Ontologized’ Logic  xlv

neously: in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, the differentia is said to have access to the predication in ‘what is it?’; the genus, however, which is also predicated in ‘what is it?’, needs to be distinguished from the differentia. The last phrase of the paragraph (iii) alludes to Avicenna’s unitary interpretation of Porphyry’s and Aristotle’s classifications of the predicables. (i) One of the reasons for Avicenna’s concern with the essential predication of the differentia is Aristotle’s account of genus and differentia in the Posterior Analytics, which Avicenna deals with more extensively in the second treatise of Burhān108. T9. Šifāʾ, Burhān II.2, pp. 125.9–126.2 AFIFI; 73.4–14 BADAWĪ [(a)] ‘Essential’ (ḏātī) is said, in a way109, of everything that is predicated of the thing in the way of ‘what is it?’ (min ṭarīqi mā huwa), for it is included in its definition (dāḫil fī ḥaddihi), so that it does not matter whether you say “essential” (ḏātī) or “predicated in the way of ‘what is it?’” (maqūl min ṭarīqi mā huwa)110. This is the genus of the thing, the genus of its genus, its differentia, the differentia of its genus, its definition and every constituent (muqawwim) of the thing’s essence111, like the line for the triangle, and the point for the limited line, since it is a limited line; so it was also said in the First Teaching112. [(b)] I thus say: Before coming back to the [main] purpose, it behoves us to ascertain that the differentiae are suitable to be included in the answer [to the question] ‘what is it?’ just like the genus is (anna l-fuṣūla ṣāliḥa fī an takūna dāḫila fī ǧawābi mā huwa ṣulūḥa l-ǧinsi). Already in the First Teaching, the genus and the differentia of the species were considered to be equal to each other, as far as being included in the species’ quiddity and predicated in the way of ‘what is it?’ (min ṭarīqi mā huwa) are concerned. [(c)] Then, the last differentia mentioned in definition of the genus was posited, namely113 that the genus is predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’ (maqūl fī ǧawābi mā huwa), by which a distinction was drawn between the genus [on the one hand] and the differentia and what is not differentia [on the other]114. [(d)] From this, it is necessary that the predicate in answer to ‘what is it?’ (fī ǧawābi mā huwa) be different from the predicate in the way of ‘what is it?’ (fī

 108 For a discussion of Avicenna’s distinction between the two kinds of predication in the context of Burhān, see IBRAHIM 2013a pp. 379–431 and Id. 2013b, pp. 47–59. 109 Min ǧihatin: Avicenna is now stating a first sense in which the term ‘essential’ is employed, which is also the sense which can be applied in the Madḫal; however, the sense in which ‘essential’ must be understood in the Burhān is a broader one. After explaining this first sense, Avicenna will introduce another, saying that the term can be understood in another way (min ǧihatin uḫrā). 110 Badawī (p. 73.6) adds: “and it is included in its definition”; the clause, which sounds like an erroneous repetition, is not found in MSS Damad Ibrahim 822 and Leid. Or. 4. 111 Afifi (p. 125.11) and in the margins of MS Baḫīt 331: li-ḏāti l-šayʾi; Badawī (p. 73.7), MSS Damad Ibrahim 824 and Leid. Or. 4: li-wuǧūdi l-šayʾi. If Avicenna did write li-wuǧūdi l-šayʾi, he must have meant ‘existence’ as ‘proper existence’ (al-wuǧūd al-ḫāṣṣ), which is a synonym for ‘essence’. 112 Al-taʿlīm al-awwal: Aristotle; cf. Anal. Post., 73a34–b3. 113 I read at p. 125.16: huwa annahu, according to the reading I found attested by MSS Leid. Or. 4, Leid. Or. 84, Pococke 121, Damad Ibrahim 822 and Brit. Mus. Or. 7500, instead of bi-annahu (printed in Afifi’s edition). 114 Badawī, p. 73.12/Afifi, p. 125.16: “and what is not differentia”; but cf. MSS Damad Ibrahim 822 and Pococke 121: wa-ġayru ḏālika (“and so on”).

xlvi  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction ṭarīqi mā huwa) and that there be two differences between them, according to what we considered and explained in its place115.

The Aristotelian background of this passage is Anal. Post. A4, 73a34–b3: in paragraph (a), Avicenna defines ‘essential’ as everything that is predicated of the thing in the way of ‘what is it?’, namely, everything that is included in the thing’s definition. In paragraph (b), Avicenna opens a digression in order to ascertain whether the differentiae are apt to be given in answer to the question ‘what is it?’, as the genera are; as he declares, the question is raised on the basis of Aristotle’s consideration of the two predicables as being equally predicated in the way of ‘what is it?’ 116. The question is also closely related to the problem of redefining the notion of ‘essential’ (ḏātī) in the Madḫal, where Avicenna refutes the view that the essential is reducible to what is predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’117. In Madḫal I.7, he reports that many literalist logicians, who maintain that essential is what signifies the quiddity (aldāllu ʿalā l-māhiyyati), do not to consider the differentia as signifying the quiddity. In doing so, however, they contradict the principle of the transitivity of equivalence, because they consider the differentia as essential without considering it as signifying the quiddity, even though the essential, according to them, is precisely what signifies the quiddity. Moreover, Avicenna shows that, considering that what signifies the quiddity was commonly understood as what signifies the meaning by which the thing is what it is, one should conclude that, since the thing is what it is only in respect to all its essential attributes, the quiddity of a given thing is signified by its genus and differentia taken together in the definition (Madḫal I.7, §2). So, paragraph (b) establishes – contrary to the belief of some logicians – a feature shared by the genus and the differentia, namely that both are predicated in the way of ‘what is it?’, since both are part of the answer to the question ‘what is it?’ in the same way. The problem Avicenna faces at this point is that he can no longer base the distinction between the genus and the differentia on whether they are predicated in the way of ‘what is it?’ (min ṭarīqi mā huwa) or not, as other logicians used to. In paragraph (c), Avicenna states that the feature distinguishing the genus from the differentia is that the genus, unlike the differentia, is predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’ (fī ǧawābi mā huwa), which solves the problem of the proper distinction of the two predicables. As Avicenna concludes in paragraph (d), the predication in the way of ‘what is it?’ (min ṭarīqi mā huwa) must be distinguished from the predication in answer to ‘what is it?’ (fī ǧawābi mā huwa).

 115 A reference to Madḫal II.1, §3.4.2. 116 The precise reference of this remark of Avicenna is not evident; however, it is very likely to be a reference to the fact that in the Posterior Analytics the genus and the differentia are both considered as equally essential components of things. 117 See e.g. Madḫal I.5, §6.2.

III Avicenna’s Theory of Predicables in a ‘De-Ontologized’ Logic  xlvii

(ii) In a passage from Ǧadal III.1 (T10), Avicenna claims that the common opinion (al-mašhūr) considers the mere fact of being predicated in the way of ‘what is it?’ (min ṭarīqi mā huwa) as sufficient to distinguish the genus from the differentia: T10. Šifāʾ, Ǧadal III.1, pp. 171.13–172.1 We thus say: First, when the thing that is a differentia is commonly (fī l-mašhūr) considered in its differentiality – not with respect to what we said on the definition of the predicate in answer to ‘what is it?’ (fī ǧawābi mā huwa), but with respect of the meeting with something divided by another thing118 in such a way that people do not fail to recognize it as a differentia – then it is judged that the thing is not a genus and that it is not predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’ (fī ǧawābi mā huwa), but in answer to ‘what sort of thing is it?’ (fī ǧawābi ayyi šayʾin huwa)119, and that, according to the common opinion, it does not play the role of the genus. If the consideration is not in this manner and the other manner is obscure, it is as if the predication in the way of ‘what is it?’ (min ṭarīqi mā huwa), as regards what is predicated in the way of ‘what is it?’, was enough to establish that that thing is a genus, because the distinction between the predication in the way of ‘what is it?’ (min ṭarīqi mā huwa) and the predication in answer to ‘what is it?’ (fī ǧawābi mā huwa) is not something that the common opinion (al-mašhūr) understands.

The way Avicenna portrays the ‘common opinion’ in T10 is reminiscent of a longstanding Peripatetic tradition, encompassing Porphyry, the philosophers active in Ammonius’ school in Alexandria, and the Peripatetic school of Baġdād. Alexander held that the differentia and the genus differ only because the differentia is not predicated in ‘what is it?’ (ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι), as he stated in his commentary on the Topics, where he attempted to account for Aristotle’s claim that the differentia is generical (γενική)120. It is also clear, from the definitions of the two predicables provided in the Isagoge, that Porphyry upheld the same view: both the genus and the differentia are described as being predicated of many items differing in species, so that there is no difference between the two descriptions of the genus and the differentia apart from the fact that the genus is predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι and the differentia is predicated ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστι. The Greek and Arabic commentators on the Isagoge followed the same scheme, asserting that the genus is distinguished from the differentia because it is predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι121. Defined in this manner, however,  118 That is, the meeting of a constitutive differentia with the compound formed by the genus and a divisive differentia. 119 Reading at p. 171.15–16: wa-annahu laysa maqūlan fī ǧawābi mā huwa, bal fī ǧawābi ayyi šayʾin huwa, according to the text preserved by MSS Leid. Or. 4 and Leid. Or. 84. The Cairo edition, printing wa-annahu laysa maqūlan fī ǧawābi ayyi šayʾin huwa, has a text that is unintelligible from a logical point of view. 120 ALEXAND., In Top., pp. 38.27–39.2. 121 Cf. AMMON., In Isag., pp. 60.13–61.16; ELIAS, In Isag., pp. 57.11–58.4; DAVID, In Isag., p. 141.16– 25; PS.-ELIAS (DAVID), In Isag., praxis 31, p. 77.1–3. In a surviving fragment of his commentary, Ḥasan Ibn Suwār stated that the fact that the genus is predicated in the way of ‘what is it?’ (min ṭarīqi mā

xlviii  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction the differentia needed to be distinguished from the common accident: the schools of Alexandria and Baġdād agreed on including the differentia among the predicables that are “substantially (οὐσιωδῶς) predicated”, together with the genus and the species, in consideration of its being constitutive of the substance (συμπληρωτικὴ τῆς οὐσίας) of its subjects122. The urge to provide an adequate distinction between the genus and the differentia is also evident in Ǧadal III.4, where Avicenna implicitly recalls the distinction between the two kinds of essential predication. In T11, Avicenna complains that common opinion does not consider the differentia as predicated in the way of ‘what is it?’ like the genus; rather, this seems to be a much-disputed idea123. T11. Šifāʾ, Ǧadal III.4, pp. 201.16–202.2 Another topic deals with the distinction between the genus and the differentia. The debate on this topic is in a way completed and reaches a good solution only when the common opinion, for instance, does not prevent us from considering also the differentia as predicated in the way of ‘what is it?’, so that ‘rational’ is, according to the common opinion, suitable to be predicated in the way of ‘what is it?’ (fī ṭarīqi mā huwa) just like ‘animal’. For in fact, this is not a commonly spread opinion nowadays: indeed, this is [an idea] much opposed in the common opinion, since it is also believed that what is [given] in answer to ‘what sort of thing is it?’ (fī ǧawābi ayyi šayʾin huwa) is not [given] in answer to ‘what is it?’ (fī ǧawābi mā huwa). As for the truth, its state was already known in another place.

As Avicenna observes, the idea that the differentia is also predicated in the way of ‘what is it?’ is generally rejected in the belief that this undermines the distinction between the genus and the differentia. In T11 Avicenna argues that the common opinion fails to understand the distinction between two levels of predication that enables him to solve this conundrum. According to the common opinion, the differentia is not predicated in the way of ‘what is it?’ because what is predicated in  huwa) can distinguish the genus from the differentia, the proprium and the accident which, by contrast, are predicated in the way of ‘what sort of thing is it?’ (min ṭarīqi ayyi šayʾin huwa): cf. Ḥasan Ibn Suwār [al-Dimašqī’s translation, p. 1062, n. 2]; the same distinction is also found in IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāġūǧī li-Furfūriyūs, p. 69.9–16: in this latter case, the discussion falls within the introduction to Porphyry’s investigation of the description of genus in Isag. pp. 2.17–3.20, where Porphyry concludes that the description of the genus is neither redundant (περιττὸν) nor defective (ἐλλεῖπον), for it can properly distinguish the genus from the other four predicables. 122 Cf. AMMON., In Isag., pp. 60.13–61.16 and IBN AL-ṬAYYIB, Tafsīr K. Īsāġūǧī li-Furfūriyūs, p. 129.18– 22. In the latter passage, Ibn al-Ṭayyib raises an aporia on the problem of the overlapping in definition of the differentia and the common accident, looking for the feature that distinguishes the differentia from the common accident. The answer is that the differentia is ‘substantial’ for the thing (ǧawharī li-l-šayʾi), whereas the common accident accidentally belongs to the thing. 123 Avicenna here has in mind ARIST. Top. Δ6, 128a20–30, where Aristotle claims that, since some philosophers maintain that the differentia is predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι, it is necessary to make a clear distinction between the genus and the differentia according to other criteria.

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answer to ‘what sort of thing is it?’ cannot be predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’. The argument is valid only if “predicated in the way of ‘what is it?’” and “predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’” are employed interchangeably124. The truth to which Avicenna alludes at the end of the passage, however, consists precisely in the distinction between the predication fī ṭarīqi mā huwa and that fī ǧawābi mā huwa, so that there is in fact no contradiction in saying that the differentia is predicated in the way of ‘what is it?’ (fī ṭarīqi mā huwa) and, at the same time, in response to ‘what sort of thing is it?’ (fī ǧawābi ayyi šayʾin huwa). Overall, the passage amounts to a declaration of originality on Avicenna’s part. (iii) In addition to saving the internal coherence of Aristotle’s writings, Avicenna must also face the problem of the partial inconsistency between Porphyry’s and Aristotle’s theories of the predicables. Two points are under discussion: the first is that there is no mention of the differentia in the division of the predicables provided in the first book of Aristotle’s Topics, whereas Porphyry’s classification of the predicables includes the differentia. In this connection, one of Avicenna’s main concerns is to save Aristotle from being accused of providing a defective account of the predicables. To this end, he argues that the genus mentioned in the Topics is a wider notion encompassing both Porphyry’s genus and differentia, so that the differentia is also included in Aristotle’s division of predicables. In T12 below, Avicenna defends the Aristotelian division of predicables by arguing that, in the Topics, Aristotle named no matter what part of the meaning of the essence ‘genus’, thus signifying that both the genus and the differentia in the Porphyrean sense are included in the division of predicables. For this claim, Avicenna may have had in mind Aristotle’s claim in Top. A4, 101b18–20, within the section preceding the definition of the four predicables, that the differentia must be considered together with the genus since it is generical (γενική)125. T12. Šifāʾ, Ǧadal I.6, pp. 54.13–55.10 Then, the predicable must either be [(i)] an essential constituent, predicated in the way of ‘what is it?’ (min ṭarīqi mā huwa) — I am not saying in answer to ‘what is it?’ (fī ǧawābi mā huwa), for what is predicated in the way of ‘what is it?’ (min ṭarīqi mā huwa) is more common, as you learned126 — or [(ii)] not. [(i)] If it is essential, then it either [(i.a)] signifies a part of the essence or [(i.b)] the reality of the meaning of the essence. [(i.b)] If it signifies the reality of the

 124 Al-Dimašqī’s translation of Porphyry’s Isagoge is quite consistent in rendering the Greek ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι with the expression: min ṭarīqi mā huwa and the Greek ἐν τῷ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν with min ṭarīqi ayyi šayʾin huwa. The philosophers of the Peripatetic school of Baġdād tended to paraphrase the renderings min ṭarīqi mā huwa and min ṭarīqi ayyi šayʾin huwa of the Arabic translation as perfectly equivalent to the expressions fī ǧawābi mā huwa and fī ǧawābi ayyi šayʾin huwa: see DI VINCENZO 2015, pp. 157–160. 125 On the possible meanings of the term in the context, see ZADRO 1974, pp. 318–319, n. 5. 126 In Madḫal II.1, §3.4.2.

l  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction essence, then it is the definition (ḥadd) or a synonymous name (ism murādif), but there is no utility in a synonymous name and it is not really a predicate; so, it remains that [the predicable signifying the reality of the essence] is the definition. [(i.a)] If it is a part signifying a part of the meaning of the essence, all of this is named, in this Book 127, ‘genus’ (ǧins), for all of this shares the fact of being predicated of many [items] which differ in species in the way of ‘what is it?’ (min ṭarīqi mā huwa), like ‘animal’ and ‘percipient’ for man, for ‘animal’ is predicated of man. If man alone is assumed [as predicated] in the way of ‘what is it?’, even if it is not [given] in answer to ‘what is it?’, it does not follow, in this Book128, a contradiction between the differentia of the genus and all that we mentioned in the first fann129, because in this division of this Book [Aristotle] did not distinguish between the genus and the differentia, nor did he mention what we called in that place130 ‘genus’ as something different from the differentia; rather, he took the meaning that is common to both [predicates] and called [it] ‘genus’. So did the First Master131. This being the case, either the genus that is here defined is more common than [both] the genus and the differentia that were defined there132, or [Aristotle’s] division is defective, but this is a false statement. Indeed, the genus and the differentia are, together, predicated in the way of ‘what is it?’ (min ṭarīqi mā huwa), as you learned133, and it is suitable to answer by both when it is asked of something what it is, except that the answer by each single one of them is not complete. There is no need for me to provide you with further explanation on that, since it has already preceded134.

Each part of the meaning of the essence is thus named ‘genus’ and is predicated in the way of ‘what is it?’ (min ṭarīqi mā huwa), so that the term ‘genus’ employed in the Topics is not equivalent to Porphyry’s genus. As is also clear from section (i), Avicenna tacitly assumes the distinction between a predication in answer to ‘what is it?’ and a predication in the way of ‘what is it?’ drawn in Madḫal II.1, §3.4135. The second point under consideration is terminological: Aristotle’s definition of the genus as predicated ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι in the Topics is rendered in the Arabic translation as predicated min ṭarīqi mā huwa, i.e. in the exact same terms that denote the predication of the genus in Porphyry’s Isagoge. This expression, however, conveys two different meanings in the two cases, for in the case of Aristotle’s Topics this kind of predication also includes the differentia, which is not the case in Porphyry’s Isagoge. Avicenna thus also faces the problem of coherently interpreting Porphyry’s and Aristotle’s accounts of the differentia. The keystone of Avicenna’s coherent interpretation of the two contrasting accounts is represented, once again, by the

 127 I.e. Aristotle’s Topics. 128 Again, a reference to Aristotle’s Topics. 129 Al-fann al-awwal: i.e. Avicenna’s Madḫal. 130 Hunāka: i.e. in Avicenna’s commentary upon Porphyry’s Isagoge, namely in Madḫal. 131 Al-muʿallim al-awwal: i.e. Aristotle. 132 Hunāka: i.e. in Porphyry’s Isagoge. 133 I assume this to be a reference to Madḫal II.1. 134 In Madḫal II.1. 135 K. Gyekye interpreted Avicenna’s claim in Ǧadal that the differentia is predicated min ṭarīqi mā huwa as the result of an evolution of Avicenna’s view on this subject: see IBN AL-ṬAYYIB 1979, p. 209.

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identification of two levels of essential predication, which allows him to distinguish the genus from the differentia and, at the same time, to consider both predicates as equally essential to their species. III.2.3 The ‘Ontological Question’ Alexander’s distinction in T6 provides Avicenna with a fine tool for distinguishing between the logical and ontological levels of the inquiry into predicables, for it introduces a distinction between the ‘pure meaning’, that has a determined ontological status, and its derived meaning, which has no defined ontological status when considered on its own. If the latter is considered as ‘enmattered’, i.e. in conjunction with a non-specified bearer, its ontological status is fixed depending on that of the bearer. The question concerning the ontological status of the ‘pure meaning’ can be determined in itself; that of the derived, enmattered meaning, however, requires knowledge of the ontological status of the bearer in order to be ascertained 136. Arguably, the case of the enmattered predicable plays a pivotal role in Avicenna’s attempt to strip the ontological question from the logical one, since it shows that the ontological status is not an essential element of the predicable; as shown in T13, it is rather one of its non-essential concomitants (lāzim). T13. Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt V.6, p. 235.1–8 It must be known that the meaning of the statement that the differentiae of substance are a substance and that the differentiae of quality are a quality is that being a substance is concomitant (yalzamu) to the differentiae of substance and that being a quality is concomitant to the differentiae of quality, [but] not that there exists in the meaning of their quiddities the definition of substance in [the sense] that they are themselves substances, nor that the differentiae of quality include in their quiddities the definition of quality in [the sense] that they are qualities [in themselves]. [They do not include this] unless by ‘the differentiae of substance’ we do not mean, for example, the differentia predicated synonymously (bi-l-tawāṭuʾi) of substance, but the differentia predicated of it paronymously (bi-l-ištiqāqi) – I mean, [for instance], not ‘rational’, but ‘rationality’. This would then be as you have learned, and it would be a differentia paronymously, not synonymously. [But] true differentia is spoken of synonymously137.

Concerning the question of whether the logical differentia is a substance or an accident (a quality, for instance), Avicenna’s answer is that the differentiae in themselves do not include, in their quiddities, the definitions of substance or quality, being, therefore, none of them, properly speaking; being a substance or a quality, however, is necessarily concomitant (yalzamu) to them. ‘Rational’ as a differentia of ‘man’, for instance, is, in itself, neither a substance nor a quality (i.e. being a sub-

 136 See DI VINCENZO 2015, pp. 161–163 and BENEVICH 2017, p. 259. 137 English translation in MARMURA 2004, p. 179, modified.

lii  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction stance or a quality is extrinsic to its quiddity), but the fact is concomitant to it of being a substance possessed of rationality (see T14)138. T14. Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt V.6, p. 235.13–17 Thus, the differentia which is spoken of synonymously means something having a certain description in an unqualified [sense]. Thereafter, by way of reflection and contemplation, it becomes known that this thing with this certain description must be either a substance or a quality. An example of this is that ‘rational’ is something possessed of rationality. There is nothing in its being something possessed of rationality [that renders it] either a substance or an accident. It is, however, known extrinsically that this thing cannot but be either a substance or a body139.

To sum up, Avicenna asserts that the ontological status of the predicable cannot be determined a priori; it can only be determined when the subject of the predicable is considered along with it. An analogous theory of the non-determinability a priori of the ontological status of the predicable seems to be elaborated in Alexander’s Quaestio de differentia: T15. Alexand., Quaestio de differentia, p. 305.6–8 Concerning the differentia ‘inanimate’ said in itself (ʿalā ḥidatihi), it is not known whether it is a substance or not, for ‘inanimate’ can also be in [a category] different from substance, hence it is not a species of substance. If it is associated with substance, [on the other hand], this becomes known and it becomes one of the species [of substance] since the inanimate substance is a species of substance.

Like Alexander, Avicenna appears to endorse a homocategorial view of the ontological status of the differentia of the substance: this means that the ontological status of the differentia depends on the category of its genus and species140. One problem that may be entailed by the homocategorial view is the difficulty of explaining how the differentia relates to the genus that it divides while avoiding the undesired conclusion that the genus is predicated essentially of the differentia (which would then be like a species for it)141. Among the issues entailed by an analysis of the genusdifferentia relation in terms of a genus-species relation, there is that of assuming the genus as included in the quiddity of the differentia, so that ‘rational’ would be  138 The statement that being a substance or an accident is extrinsic to the quiddity of the differentia just applies to the logical differentiae: on this point, see also JANSSENS 2013, p. 359. This is the only sense in which ‘differentia’ is meant in logic: cf. Madḫal I.13, §6, where Avicenna declares that he is dealing in this work with the ‘logical’ differentia because the other is predicated of its subjects only paronymously. 139 English translation in MARMURA 2004, p. 180, slightly modified. 140 On the meaning of ‘homocategorial’ in this context, cf. MORRISON 1993, pp. 161–166. 141 A conclusion that would contradict ARIST., Top. Δ2, 122b18.

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equivalent to ‘animal possessed of rationality’, including its genus in the definitory statement, instead of ‘something possessed of rationality’. One of the undesired outcomes of an equivalence of this sort is that it produces redundancy in the predication: if ‘rational’ is predicated of ‘animal’, the statement “the animal is rational” is equivalent to “the animal is an animal possessed of rationality”. In order to avoid this difficulty, Avicenna recalls in Madḫal II.4, §2.1 and, more extensively, in Ilāhiyyāt V.6, pp. 232.10–235.1 a proof that may derive from Alexander’s Quaestio de differentia (p. 304.6–16) to demonstrate that, even if the differentia of the substance belongs to the category of substance, the genus cannot be predicated of it as it is of a species. The proof demonstrates that a differentia cannot be a species of the genus, otherwise each differentia would need another differentia to divide its genus and constitute it as a species; the same holds for the second differentia, and so on, in a regressum ad infinitum. The genus-differentia relation is explained through the hylomorphic model, comparing the genus to matter and the differentia to form. The analogy is actually a delicate one: the meaning of the genus/matter is described in Madḫal II.4, §2.1 as a concomitant that is not included in the meaning of the differentia/form. The same point is explained in a passage of the Mašriqiyyūn with regard to form, in a context in which the hylomorphic model explains the relation between genus and differentia (T16). T16. Mašriqiyyūn, Manṭiq, p. 21.9–17 As for the relation of the rational soul to corporeality, it is in virtue of a certain cause; the same goes for the relation of the other forms to their matters, regardless of whether they are separable or not, even if some happen to exist in the others. It will appear clear that this is not determined by [their] concept, but rather by [their] existence, and there is a difference between what is determined by the concept and what is determined by the existence. Likewise, you do not find any form assumed simply (bi-basāṭatihā) according to a given concept that determines that the realization of a matter for it should be understood from the form, even if it is necessary, outside its concept and the consideration of its existence, that is has a matter that it requires when a certain existence is presupposed, or that is necessary for it from something else. This unless you assume the form that is not simple (lā basīṭ), but insofar as a composition (tarkīb) with matter occurs to it, so that matter is not concomitant (lāzima) to its concept, but is contained (mutaḍammana) in the concept of both (fī mafhūmihimā); however, we are not talking of similar cases.

The examples of ‘rational soul’ and ‘corporeality’ are examples of what Avicenna would call ‘simple differentia’ and ‘genus’, rather than examples of the predicables genus and differentia. T16 affirms that the meaning of the genus/matter is necessarily concomitant to that of the simple differentia, because it is not included in its concept (mafhūm), nor is it determined by it, but is rather determined by the existence (wuǧūd) of the simple differentia, i.e. conjoined to a matter to constitute a rational animal. The fact that what is rational is also a body is a necessary concomitant of the fact that, unavoidably, what is rational in existence is also a body. This state-

liv  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction ment, however, works for the ‘simple differentia’ (e.g. ‘rationality’) assimilated to the form, and not for the ‘composite differentia’ predicated synonymously of its subjects. The last paragraph of T16 states that if the form is assumed as a composite with matter (min ḥayṯu tarkīb yaʿriḍu lahā maʿa al-mādda), then the meaning of matter is encompassed in the meaning resulting from both matter and form. Avicenna in this case alludes to the fact that what results from the composition of matter and form includes the meaning of matter; taking as an example ‘rational animal’, ‘animal’ is obviously included in its meaning, although it is not included in the meaning of ‘rational’ taken alone, with respect to which it is a necessary concomitant142. In sum, Alexander’s Quaestio de differentia seems to contain the core of Avicenna’s theory of the non-essentiality of the ontological status for the universal predicable. In Alexander’s intention, this analysis applied exclusively to the differentia specifica, in order to explain how it is synonymously predicated of substantial subjects. Avicenna, on the other hand, operates an extension of this distinction between simple and composite to all the paronymous predicates, also including the proprium and the common accident143. In Madḫal I.14, §2.2 Avicenna emphasizes the distinction between ‘accident’ meant as an accidental predicable (according to the logical use of the term, henceforth: accidentL) and ‘accident’ meant in opposition to substance (in the ontological sense, henceforth: accidentO). The common accident that is dealt with in logic should not be identified with the ‘ontological accident’ (accidentO) that is traditionally meant as being opposed to substance. Avicenna’s argument to distinguish between the logical accident (accidentL) – denoting a class of predicables – and the ontological accident (accidentO) – denoting a class of beings – is a reductio ad absurdum that goes as follows. Two adjectival terms like ‘eternal’ and ‘created’ are taken as common accidents of body; for, since they are neither a genus, nor a species, nor a differentia, nor a proprium for it, they meet the requirements of the third of Porphyry’s definitions for common accident (Isag. p. 13.4–5; cf. also Aristotle’s definition of accident in Top. A8, 103b17–19). Having assumed that such terms are common accidents (i.e. accidentsL) of body, Avicenna proceeds to demonstrate that they are not also accidentsO. If one were to  142 As explicitly stated in Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt V.6, pp. 232.16–233.6. On the fact that the meaning of the genus is related to that of the differentia by necessary concomitance (iltizām), see also THOM 2016, pp. 153–154. 143 This does not mean that the matter-form composition on which the genus-differentia composition is modelled is compared to a subject-accident composition: the differences between the two kinds of composition are better examined in Avicenna’s Mašriqiyyūn, Manṭiq, pp. 23.16–24.3. It rather means that the predication of the denominative predicates with respect to substantial subjects is explained on the basis of the distinction of a ‘simple/pure’ meaning from a ‘composite’ one, which may have first emerged from the analysis of the genus-differentia composition.

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assume the contrary (i.e. that ‘created’ is an accidentO), ‘body is created’ would turn out to be a synonymous (rather than paronymous) predication, since the accidentO ‘created’ is predicated of the subject ‘body’ directly, i.e. not by means of a derived term. Then, in virtue of the principle of the transitivity of synonymous predication, the following reasoning would be allowed: Created is an accidentO; Body is created;

______________

∴ Body is an accidentO.

The conclusion is absurd: from an ontological point of view, body is a substance and not an accidentO. All of this allows the conclusion that ‘created’ is an accidentL (i.e. it is an accidental predicable) without being, at the same time, an accidentO. Avicenna’s argument demonstrates that it is impossible to predicate synonymously the accidentO of the substance, whereas according to Avicenna’s interpretation of synonymous predication, this is precisely how an accidental predicable is predicated of its subject. Having proved that, despite the coincidence in the name, the notion of ‘accidentO’ in opposition to ‘substance’ cannot coincide with that of ‘accidentL’ employed by Porphyry, Avicenna goes on to prove that there is no univocal correspondence between the two notions. An accidentO cannot be a substance; on the contrary, an accidentL can either be an accidentO or a substance144 and also the opposite notion, namely that of ‘essential’, can either apply to an accidentO or a substance. The terms ‘accidental’ and ‘essential’ do not convey any information about the ontological status of the entities qualified by them, which may be either accidentsO or substances; in the Risāla Mūǧaza fī uṣūl al-manṭiq (Appendix A, §5), the point is exemplified with the terms ‘white’ and ‘whiteness’. Both ‘white’ (abyaḍ) and ‘whiteness’ (bayāḍ) are accidental to their subjects, both being accidentsL for them, or common accidents, to use Porphyry’s terminology. They differ in their ontological status, however, as ‘whiteness’ is an accidentO (more specifically, a quality), whereas ‘white’ can be a substance. The predicate ‘white’ is in fact equivalent to ‘something endowed with whiteness’, so that it signifies the accidentO inherent in a substance145. Based on the terminology employed in T17 below, it can be argued that Avicenna’s distinction between accidentO and accidentL was modelled on the distinction between simple and composite differentia146:  144 Cf. Naǧāt, p. 17.3–7. 145 Cf. Madḫal I.14, §2.1. 146 Avicenna may have been supported by the general understanding of the inherence of an accidentO in a substance as forming a compound suggested in ARIST., Met. Z4, 1029b22–23: Aristotle speaks of ‘compounds’ formed of substances and accidentso of the other categories, and the Greek

lvi  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction T17. Šifāʾ, Ǧadal I.7, pp. 70.10–11 ‘Accident’ can occur to the accident in the way the accident that is one of the five [universals] does, so that the simple of it is an accident in the sense of ‘accident’ that is opposite to ‘substance’ [i.e. an accidentO], and the composite of it (murakkabuhu) is “something provided with that accident” [i.e. an accidentL].

Avicenna’s interpretation of accidental predicables as the combination of a nonspecified subject x with the accident that inheres in it allows him to conceive accidental universals as being predicated synonymously of their subjects, so that ‘white’, for instance, is predicated synonymously of ‘man’ qua ‘thing endowed with whiteness’ and not qua whiteness147. Extending Alexander’s analysis of the differentia to the accidental predicables allows Avicenna to affirm the possibility of predicating all the five universal predicables synonymously, thus breaking the equivalence between synonymous and essential predication148 (see section III.4).

III.3 The Theory of Predicables and Aristotle’s Categories As has been stated previously, Avicenna’s theory of the predicables rests on the distinction of two levels of investigation, one logical and one ontological. This distinction is based on the assumption that the way in which a predicable is predicated of its subject can be analyzed regardless of its ontological status149. One question remains to be settled, namely how Avicenna made the system of the predicables fit into the classification of beings of Aristotle’s Categories. The answer is provided in Ǧadal I.7 (T18), which explains how every predicable relates to each category. To begin with the genus, a predicate can be a genus only with respect to the subjects that fit within its same category, regardless of which of the ten categories it fits into (Ǧadal I.7, p. 70.15–16). The same arguably goes for the species. As for the differentia, the differentia of the substance will be a substance and the differentia of the quality will be a quality (Ǧadal I.7, p. 69.13–14 and Ilāhiyyāt V.6, p. 235.1–5), since the ontological status of the predicable differentia depends on that of its bear-

 term for ‘compounds’ (σύνθετα) is rendered in the Arabic translation as murakkabāt (AVERROES, Tafsīr mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿat, vol. 2, p. 790.2). 147 Hence the relevance of Avicenna’s insistence in chap. I.14, §1.4 and §2.1 on the difference between accidents such as ‘whiteness’ that are paronymously predicated and the adjectival predicates derived from them, such as ‘white’, which are synonymously predicated of their subjects. On the difference between ‘whiteness’ and ‘white’, see also Šifāʾ, Maqūlāt II.1, p. 58.1–8. 148 Thus, he breaks with Alexander: see T5. 149 Avicenna’s operation might be supported by ARIST., Top. A9, 103b20–39, stating that what signifies what a given thing is (ὁ τὸ τί ἐστι σημαίνων) may either signify its substance or its quality or its quantity or any other of its categories.

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er, as previously shown. There seems to be, however, a possible exception to the strict homocategoriality of the differentia, since qualities can also be differentiae for another category, but not of substance (Ǧadal I.7, p. 69.15–16)150. Accidental predicables such as common accidents and propria can be either predicated of subjects that fit in their own category or in another category; with respect to substantial subjects, their predication is homocategorial in the same way as that of the differentia. T18. Šifāʾ, Ǧadal I.7, pp. 70.15–71.2 The genus in each of these ten [categories] is only a genus with respect to what is in its category. As to what occurs accidentally, it can occur accidentally to what is not in its category, so that the substance occurs accidentally to something else, like ‘man’ to ‘moving’, or it can occur to what is in its category, like ‘divisible quantity’ occurs to the ‘continuum’ and vice versa. Every category, when found in another one, is like something accidental for it; the role of the genus is only played by what is found in the [same] category.

Overall, the predications in which the subject and the predicate have different ontological statuses – i.e. one is a substance and the other an accident, rather than being both substances or both accidents – produce only accidental predications. Using the expression ‘intra-categorial’ broadly to apply to the predication in which the subject and the predicate are both substances or both accidents, and, conversely, ‘cross-categorial’ to apply to the one in which either the subject or the predicate is a substance, when the other is an accident, essential and accidental predications differ because the accidental predication can be both intra-categorial and cross-categorial, whereas the essential predication is exclusively intracategorial (see Tab. 2). Tab. 2: Essential and accidental predication in relation to intra-categorial and cross-categorial predication

Essential predicates Accidental predicates

Genus Species Differentia Proprium Accident

‘Intra-categorial’ (substance of substance; accident of accident) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

‘Cross-categorial’ (substance of accident; accident of substance) ✗ ✗ ✗ ✓ ✓

The fact that a quality can be a differentia of an item in another accidental category fits within this broad sense of intra-categoriality, since both the predicate and the

 150 Cf. ARIST., Met. Z13, 1038b23–25, denying that qualities can be parts of substances.

lviii  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction subject are accidents, although they do not belong to the exact same category (i.e. the predication is not, strictly speaking, homocategorial). The predication of the genus and the species, on the other hand, is also intra-categorial in the sense of homocategorial, as T18 shows: the genus and the species of a predicate in the category of quality, for instance, need to fit precisely in the same category of quality. Within the framework of Avicenna’s distinction of a logical and an ontological level of investigation, items that fall into the category of substance and those that fall into one of the nine categories of accidents (accidentsO) can be predicated both essentially and accidentally, as illustrated in Tab 3. Tab. 3: Avicenna’s distinction between predicative and ontological level

Essential predication Accidental predication [= accidentL]

Substance

AccidentO

[a]Syn E.g. the genus of a species with respect to its species in the category of substance (like ‘animal’ for ‘man’). [c]Syn E.g. the composition (murakkab) of the accident and the subject of inherence with respect to the subject of predication (like ‘white’ meant as ‘white thing’ for ‘Zayd’).

[b]Syn E.g. the genus of an accident with respect to the accident (like ‘colour’ for ‘whiteness’). [d]Par E.g. the pure accident with respect to a substance (like ‘whiteness’ for ‘body’).

Cases [a], [b] and [c] are synonymous predications151, whereas case [d] is a paronymous predication since the accidentO (e.g. ‘whiteness’) is paronymously predicated of the subjects that do not fit within its same category. Clearly, in the framework of Avicenna’s analysis of predicables, synonymous predication has a broader scope than essential predication, as he himself declared152. For in fact, synonymous predication rather seems to coincide with intra-categorial predication153 – which is not necessarily essential, as case [c] and Tab. 3 show – as opposed to paronymous predication, which occurs in the case of cross-categorial predication (which is only accidental: see Tab. 2). The ‘accident’ that Avicenna holds to pertain to logic is, in fact, the accidentL, namely the accidental predicable, which encompasses both Porphyry’s propria and  151 It should be noted, however, that the way in which case [c] is synonymously predicated is different from how cases [a] and [b] are. What differs is how strictly one should understand the claim that synonymous predication entails providing the subjects with both the name and the definition of the predicables. In fact, ‘thing endowed with whiteness’, rather than being a definition properly speaking, seems more to be a description of the subject. 152 See also KALBARCZYK 2018, pp. 87–92. 153 Cases [a] and [c] are, in fact, instances of substances predicated of other substances, and case [b] is an instance of an accidentO predicated of another accidentO.

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common accidents. Although the instances of case [d] are also accidental predicates and thus instances of accidentL, the propria and the common accidents dealt with in logic are only instances of case [c], since they are substances composed with an accidentO that are accidentally predicated with respect to their subjects.

III.4 The Theory of Predicables and Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstration Avicenna quietly introduces synonymous predication among the features shared by all of the five universals (Madḫal II.1, §1.2, and Išārāt, p. 245.1–6), even though this is not in any sense a quotation from Porphyry, who did not acknowledge this point154. Avicenna’s claim that the five predicables are all predicated synonymously of their subjects rests on the assumption that they fit within the rule of the transitivity of predication (the so-called ‘antepredicamental rule’) stated in Arist., Cat., 1b10– 13, according to which what is predicated of them is also predicated of their subjects155, which means that they are synonymously predicated of their subjects. The same point is made in T19 below: T19. Šifāʾ, Maqūlāt I.2, p. 15.10–15 All of the universals – not only the genus, the species and the differentia156 – are synonymously attributed to their particulars that equally participate of them. And it is not worth anything what was believed concerning the fact that only the genus, the species, and the differentia are [the predicables] that are attributed synonymously, to the exclusion of the others [i.e. proprium and common accident]. This is so because synonymy is not so because the meaning is essential, but rather because it is unique with regard to the notion, without differing. This unicity can be found [both] in what is essential and in what is accidental, like propria and common accidents.

Avicenna builds his case on the basis of his reading of Aristotle’s Categories, according to which synonymous predication is not explicitly defined as an essential predication, but rather as a kind of predication in which the subjects all share one and the same meaning. In Šifāʾ, Maqūlāt I.3, pp. 22.18–23.9, evidently relying on Arist. Cat. 1a20–b9, Avicenna states that being predicated of a subject is the distinctive feature of universals with respect to particulars, rather than being a distinction between essential and accidental predicables157. Avicenna’s assumption concerning synonymous predication was far from being universally acknowledged, since the

 154 Cf. PORPH., In Cat., p. 80.4–27. 155 See ROHR 1978, pp. 379–385; BÄCK 2015, pp. 148–151. 156 Reading lā al-ǧins wa-l-nawʿ wa-l-faṣl waḥduhā with the manuscripts instead of illā al-ǧins wa-lnawʿ wa-l-faṣl waḥduhā as in the Cairo edition. 157 On this passage, see CAMINADA 2016.

lx  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction pre-Avicennian tradition mostly endorsed the view that only the genus, the species, and the differentia specifica are synonymously predicated, insofar as they are essentially predicated of their subjects158. It seems legitimate to ask what the purpose of Avicenna’s broad interpretation of Aristotle’s predication ‘as of a subject’ (καθ’ ὑποκειμένου) is. It can be argued that Avicenna intended to save propria and common accidents from the so-called ‘fallacy of the accident’, i.e. from breaking the rule of the transitivity of the predication ‘as of a subject’ enunciated in Arist., Cat., 1b10–12. Quite evidently, the antepredicamental rule is closely related to Aristotle’s theory of demonstration159; if only essential predication were to fit within the antepredicamental rule, then only inferences based on essential predicates would be allowed, which contradicts Aristotle’s own allowance for certain accidental predications within demonstration. The per se predicates assumed in demonstrations according to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics A4 include both the essential and some of the accidental predicates (respectively, Arist., APo A4, 73a35–8 and 73a38–b6)160. In his reworking of APo A4 in Burhān II.2 (T20), after recalling Aristotle’s four senses of ‘per se’, Avicenna adds a fifth sense of per se (from now on, for the sake of brevity: per se-5)161. T20. Šifāʾ, Burhān, II.2, pp. 127.21–128.2 ‘Per se’ is also said when accidents inhere to something primarily (awwaliyyan). By ‘primarily’ I mean that [the accident] does not occur to something else and, then, occurs to the thing, but that there is no intermediate (lā wāsiṭata) between the accident and that to which it occurs, and that to which it occurs is a cause [for us] to state that it inheres in something else (as you say “white body” and “white surface”, for the surface is white per se, whereas the body is white because the surface is white).

Clearly, Avicenna’s fifth sense of ‘per se’ equally applies to essential and accidental predicates, provided that they belong primarily to their subjects162. In all likelihood,

 158 Cf. BÄCK 2000, p. 229 and n. 6; DI VINCENZO 2016, pp. 173–181. 159 On the resemblance of the structure reproduced in the antepredicamental rule to that of a Barbara syllogism, see BÄCK 2015, pp. 150–151. 160 Per se-1 predicates correspond to the constituents of the definition, i.e. the essential constitutive predicables (genus, differentia, species). As for per se-2 predicates, they seemingly include propria, which are not essential predicates in the sense of ‘essential’ employed in the Isagoge and in the Topics. Whether the so-called ‘per se accidents’ are, in Aristotle’s mind, to be exclusively identified with per se-2 features described in APo A4 or not, is still a controversial matter. It is generally held that the identification is valid (cf., among others, WEDIN 1973). The traditional identification with per se-2 features is challenged in TIERNEY 2001a and Id. 2001b, claiming that per se accidents might be so both in the sense of per se-1 and per se-2 features. On per se predicates in Avicenna’s theory of demonstration, see STROBINO 2016b and BENEVICH 2018 (pp. 124–166). 161 See in this regard BENEVICH , pp. –, also referring to this notion by ‘per se ’. 162 On the meaning of ‘primarily’ (awwaliyyan) in this context, see BENEVICH , pp. –216.

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the background of T20 is Arist., APo A4, 73b25–74a3, where Aristotle sets out three conditions for calling a predicate ‘universal’ (καθόλου), namely that it holds for every case (κατὰ παντός), per se (καθ’ αὑτὸ) and as such (ᾗ αὐτό). These three conditions grant that what holds universally of a subject also holds necessarily of it. To hold for something per se and to hold for it as such are said to be equivalent: Aristotle provides the example of the property of having the sum of the internal angles equal to two right angles (henceforth: 2R), which holds for triangles as triangles, i.e. not in virtue of any other more general or more specific property of triangles; in other words, 2R holds for triangles primarily. Since 2R belongs to triangles, it can be said to belong to some figures, although not universally; in fact, 2R cannot be proven to belong to an arbitrary figure (it does not belong to squares, for instance). Moreover, 2R only belongs primarily to triangles: 2R also belongs to the isosceles triangle, for instance, though not primarily, for the isosceles does not have 2R because it is isosceles, but because it is a triangle. 2R belongs universally to triangles since it belongs to every triangle (κατὰ παντός), per se (καθ’ αὑτὸ) and as such (ᾗ αὐτό), i.e. not in virtue of anything else, but in an immediate, primary way, simply because it is a triangle. This is arguably the sense of Avicenna’s assertion that what holds per se-5 of something belongs primarily to it, without any intermediate. Interestingly, the example provided by Avicenna for a per se-5 property in T20 is ‘white’ with respect to the surface, since white belongs to the surface primarily, not in virtue of any other cause. As a counterexample, Avicenna mentions ‘white’ with respect to the body: Avicenna implies that the surface is white primarily, whereas the body is white because its surface is white; hence, the body is not so primarily, but through the mediation of its surface. In terms of predicables, the example provided by Avicenna is that of a common accident, so that per se-5 properties arguably cover all of the five universal predicables. Aristotle’s definition of the universal in terms of holding for a subject as a whole and per se – per se being meant as in T20 – may have scaffolded Avicenna’s inclusion of those common accidents that belong primarily and to all of their subjects among per se predicates. Avicenna must have widened the scope of Aristotle’s predication as of a subject to apply it not just to essential predication (in the narrow sense of ‘essential’ that encompasses exclusively the elements of the definition), but also to per se predication (in the broad, per se-5 sense presented in T20, which includes both essential and accidental universal predicates, provided they belong to the whole subject as such, i.e. primarily)163. If so, per se-5 predicates should meet the requirements of the antepredicamental rule and not cause the fallacy of the accident. Assuming the

 163 The traditional equivalence established between Aristotle’s predication as of a subject and essential predication is also challenged by part of the recent scholarship: see BÄCK 2015, pp. 148–151 and CRIVELLI 2017, pp. 540–542.

lxii  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction example of ‘white’ as a common accident of the surface in T20, the following reasoning can be built: The surface is white [= something white];

Something white is something with a colour which pierces the vision; ______________

∴ The surface is something with a colour which pierces the vision.

As it can be observed, no fallacy occurs if ‘white’ is understood as ‘a thing x endowed with whiteness’, as Avicenna intends. ‘White’ as a predicate of the surface, though being an accidental predicate, does not break the antepredicamental rule, so that both the name and the definition of ‘white’ are also rightly predicated of its subject, for the surface can be both said to be ‘white’ and ‘a thing with a colour which pierces the vision’164. In Avicenna’s view, then, the fallacy of the accident does not necessarily affect accidental predication. Avicenna seems to be working on Aristotle’s synonymous predication to adapt it better to the theory of demonstration of the Posterior Analytics. Besides providing a consistent exegesis of Aristotle’s theories of predication and demonstration, Avicenna’s main concern is to assure the possibility to assume certain universal accidental predicates in demonstrations; in fact, if accidental predicates are not considered as predicated synonymously of their subjects, they can hardly be assumed in syllogistic inferences. The result would be that syllogistic premises would be exclusively composed of essential constitutive predicates that correspond to Aristotle’s per se-1 predicates (i.e. genus and differentia). This is a central point of Burhān II.2, where Avicenna argues against an unknown commentator who was misled by the use of the term ‘essential’ made by Porphyry in the Isagoge, where the term appears to have pretty much the same extension as the term ‘constitutive’. The unknown commentator supposedly commented on Porphyry’s Isagoge and Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, for he is blamed for understanding the term ‘essential’ as it is employed in the Posterior Analytics in the same, narrow sense in which it is used in Porphyry’s Isagoge. This misinterpretation led the commentator to produce a series of mistakes in interpreting Aristotle’s demonstrative syllogism, which Avicenna lists in T21. T21. Šifāʾ, Burhān, II.2, pp. 128.15–129.4 It has reached us that someone abstains from providing an argument on this subject because of his bad understanding, as he believes that the predicates [employed] in the demonstrations are only the constitutive ones (al-muqawwimāt). For in fact, since it is customary for him, when studying the book of the Isagoge, to call165 the constitutive ‘essential’ (ḏātiyyan), and [since]  164 “Colour which pierces the vision” is Aristotle’s definition of white: cf. Top. Γ5, 119a28–31. 165 Reading bi-an yusammā with MSS Pococke 121, f. 226r and Damad 822, f. 88v instead of bi-an yusammū (ed. ʿAfīfī) or an summiya (ed. Badawī).

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there by ‘essential’ is only meant the constitutive, he presumed that ‘essential’ in the Book of the Demonstration (Kitāb al-Burhān) was the same, namely the cause (al-ʿilla). [(a1)] He said: “Not every cause, for efficient and final [causes] are not apt to be posited as the middle term of a demonstration; indeed, it is matter and what is analogous to it (namely, the genus), and form and what is analogous to it (namely, the differentia)”. [(a2)] And [he said] that the terms of the conclusions (maḥmūlāt al-maṭālib) are also the same; and that the major premise is essential only when its term is essential in the sense of ‘constitutive’ for the subject. [(a3)] He said that the middle term is essential for both the extremities in the sense of ‘constitutive’. [(b)] When he learned the division of the ‘essential’ (qismat al-ḏātī), he did not understand that the essential, in both the kinds employed166, is the term (al-maḥmūl); rather, he thought that it was what is assumed in the definition (al-maʾḫūḏ fī l-ḥaddi) and presumed that the division ran in this manner: among the essential [features], there is what is a predicate assumed in its subject’s definition [i.e. per se-1], and a subject assumed in the predicate’s definition [i.e. per se-2], and not that this predicate is essential to the subject, but that the subject [is essential to it].

Although the identity of this first commentator is unknown, we will try to contextualize the theories reported by Avicenna. The mistakes ascribed to the commentator in T21 are not found in any of the Greek Late Antique commentaries on Posterior Analytics167. Secondly, the following passage (T22) informs us that this first commentator must have had followers among the philosophers that Avicenna had seen (raʾaytu, “I saw”) reproducing the same kind of mistakes (perhaps, his contemporaries). Therefore, the first philosopher must have been a somewhat influential commentator, likely not Greek. Thirdly, the fact that he is said to have commented and interpreted the Posterior Analytics offers a terminus post quem to collocate chronologically the first commentator, for Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics remained almost unexplored by Arabic philosophers until its first Arabic translation by Abū Bišr Mattā (d. 940 ca.), considered the scholarch of the Peripatetic school of Baġdād168.  166 I think Avicenna is referring, by “in both the kinds employed” (fī kilā l-qismayni lmustaʿmalayni), to per se-1 and per se-2 predicates described in ARIST., APo A4. He means that, as in the case of per se-1 predicates, in the case of per se-2 the predicate also belongs per se to the subject, and not the reverse. 167 Only fragments of Alexander’s commentary on Posterior Analytics are extant (edited in MORAUX 1979; on the witnesses of this commentary, see Ibid., pp. 1–8); the only fully extant Late Antique Greek commentaries on the work are Themistius’ paraphrase and Philoponus’ commentary. Then, there are Eustratius’ commentary on APo B and two anonymous commentaries (one on APo B and the other on a part of APo A); see GOULET 1989, p. 439 and BRUNSCHWIG 1989, pp. 498–499. 168 Since similar positions are not preserved, to my knowledge, in any of the extant Greek commentaries on Posterior Analytics, the first commentator Avicenna refers to may well be an Arabic source. If this were the case, then a terminus post quem should be the Arabic translation of Posterior Analytics by Abū Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus; see ENDRESS 2012. This terminus post quem can be established based on the peculiar tradition of Posterior Analytics, which apparently underwent a sort of interruption: in the Syriac schools between the 5 th and the 8th century, the study of Aristotle’s Analytics stopped to APr A7. Before Mattā’s Arabic translation, a partial Syriac translation of Posterior Analytics was produced by Ḥunayn Ibn Isḥāq (d. 876), then followed by a complete Syriac translation made by Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn (d. 910). On the basis of the latter Syriac version, Mattā produced

lxiv  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction As for the second point, in T22 Avicenna refers to the philosophers that he saw being misled by the considerations of this unknown first commentator, upon whom they relied for logical matters. T22. Šifāʾ, Burhān, II.2, p. 129.5–10 I have seen (wa-qad raʾaytu) someone affiliated to knowledge (baʿḍ al-muntasibīna ilā lmaʿrifati) – among those to whose nature the interpretation of this man was more akin and who relied upon him in logic – being firmly convinced of the complex of that, to the point that the necessity of this method compelled him to say: [(i)] “Every necessary (ḍarūrī) [and] inseparable (ġayru mufāriqin) predicate is constitutive (muqawwim)”; and [to say] [(ii)] that there is no meaning belonging to the proprium that is common to the species as a whole at every time; and [(iii)] that the proprium is among the [features] whose separation is not impossible; and [(iv)] that the fact that the equilateral triangle has two equivalent angles near [its] base is a differentia, and not a proprium; and [to say] [(v)] that the fact that every triangle has [its] angles equal to two right angles is a differentia and not a proprium, and that these [features] are constitutive for their subject.

There are two fundamental mistakes that Avicenna reproaches the first commentator for in T21, and the statements ascribed to the second commentator(s) in T22 can be for the most part analyzed as consequences of the first of these two mistakes. With (a), the commentator wrongly interprets the two first senses of per se (καθ’αὑτό) enumerated by Aristotle in Posterior Analytics A4. In more detail, he assumes that ‘essential’ can only be said of those features that are constitutive of their subject, in a sense that roughly coincides with the first sense of καθ’αὑτό mentioned in APo A4169. Therefore, he concludes also that the causes assumed as the middle term of a syllogism must be essential in this sense. Furthermore, he claims that the causes assumed as middle term must be like the constitutive elements of a definition, i.e. genus and differentia, and should, therefore, be material and formal causes. Such a conclusion, which is problematic170, relies on an analogy between  his own Arabic version, preserved by MS BnF ar. 2346 (see HUGONNARD-ROCHE 1989, pp. 520–521). Avicenna’s passage could be referring to a philosopher who had studied both Porphyry’s Isagoge and Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, as Abū Bišr Mattā himself presumably did (the “Arabic Organon” MS BnF ar. 2346 preserves some marginal notes to the Posterior Analytics that are ascribed to him, while Ibn al-Nadīm ascribes to him a commentary on Posterior Analytics and al-Qifṭī, Taʾrīḫ alḥukamāʾ, p. 323 lists, among Mattā’s works, a Tafsīr kitāb Īsāġūǧī li-Furfūriyūs wa-huwa l-madḫal ilā l-manṭiq). The second commentator (or group of commentators), however, might also be more or less contemporary to Avicenna (depending on how one reads the claim that he “saw” them). On the Arabic reception of Posterior Analytics, see also MARMURA 1990, pp. 85–103. 169 ARIST., APo A4, 73a34–37. 170 The statement arguing that efficient and final causes cannot be taken as middle terms in a syllogism is, in fact, incompatible with ARIST., APo B11, where Aristotle provides a demonstration of how efficient and final causes can be assumed as the middle term of a syllogism. Note that Themistius (THEM. In APo, p. 52.1–4) rightly understood Aristotle’s claim that all the four causes can be

III Avicenna’s Theory of Predicables in a ‘De-Ontologized’ Logic  lxv

genus and matter on the one hand, and differentia and form on the other, which is also found in Porphyry’s Isagoge171. The second fundamental mistake (b) made by the first commentator is a misunderstanding of the second sense of καθ’αὑτό listed in APo A4, namely that which encompasses the features whose subjects are included in their definitions172. The commentator concludes that the subjects included in their features’ definitions can be said to hold per se of their features, whereas the Aristotelian passage should rather be interpreted the other way around, stating that the features hold per se of their subjects173. The first misunderstanding (a) strongly affects the way in which the premises of a syllogism are chosen; this is evident from the statements ascribed to the second commentator(s) (cf. Tab. 4 below). If only constitutive features essentially and necessarily belong to their subjects, then propria are ruled out as possible elements of the syllogism, for they are not constitutive features of a subject. Moreover, propria are said to be safely removed from their subjects without causing their corruption, so that all the features that appear not to be removed from their subject without causing it to cease to be are erroneously considered as essential in the sense of being ‘constitutive’ of their subject174. The ultimate consequence of this reasoning is the paradoxical statement that the fact of having the angles equivalent to two right angles (2R), rather than being a proprium, is a differentia specifica of the triangle. This latter conclusion is ascribed in Avicenna’s Risāla ilā l-wazīr Abī Saʿd to Abū lQāsim al-Kirmānī175. Speaking of al-Kirmānī in his letter, Avicenna claims that “he did not master the [notion of] ‘essential’ and he did not collect in mind its conditions”176, reporting a discussion he had with him that revealed the problems that alKirmānī had in forming a valid syllogism177. In more detail, the fifth statement (v)  assumed as the middle term in a syllogism and this statement cannot, therefore, be ascribed to him. As to Philoponus, his commentary on APo B11 is not extant. 171 Cf. PORPH., Isag., p. 11.12–17 and p. 15.6–7. Cf. also AMMON., In Isag., p. 57.23–25 and PS.-ELIAS (DAVID), In Isag., p. 56.24–33. This idea has a background in the analogy employed by Aristotle himself in Met. Z12, 1038a5–9 to explain the unity of the definition, namely the analogy between genus and the matter out of which differentiae make the forms. 172 ARIST. APo A4, 73a37–b3. 173 As far as I know, (b) cannot be ascribed to any Greek commentator: cf. THEM. In APo pp. 10.30– 11.5 and PHILOP. In APo p. 61.1–28. 174 Contrary to what Avicenna demonstrates in Madḫal I.6. 175 Abū l-Qāsim al-Kirmānī, the addressee of Avicenna’s criticism, has been identified by Y. Michot with the Abū l-Qāsim al-Kātib mentioned by al-Tawḥīdī; cf. REISMAN 2002b, p. 166. We are informed by al-Tawḥīdī (Kitāb al-Imtāʿ wa-l-muʾānasa, 1.35) of the fact that al-Kirmānī wrote a Ṣafw al-Šarḥ liĪsāġūǧī wa-Qāṭīġurīyās. 176 Risāla ilā l-wazīr Abī Saʿd, p. 17.7. 177 The discussion between Avicenna and al-Kirmānī presumably occurred in Hamaḏān, in 405H/1015, which provides us with a terminus post quem for the composition of the risāla; see MICHOT 2000, pp. 31*–32*. The purpose of the risāla was to ask for a judgement from the vizir Abū Saʿd al-Hamaḏānī.

lxvi  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction reported by Avicenna in T22 and ascribed to some commentator(s), stating that having the angles equivalent to two right angles is a differentia specifica of a triangle, for it is a constitutive feature of the triangle rather than being a property, recalls a passage of the risāla to the Vizir Abū Saʿd, where Avicenna reproaches al-Kirmānī for doing the same178. Al-Kirmānī is reported on many occasions to have struggled in distinguishing essential features from the non-essential necessary concomitants179, to the point where Avicenna felt the urge for a clarification of the subject 180. Apparently, al-Kirmānī held that a predicate can hold necessarily of its subject only if it is a constitutive essential element of its quiddity181. Tab. 4: Testimonies of the first and second commentators in T21 and T22 Frg. st commentator (a) (a) (a)

Frg. nd commentator

…

(ii)

…

(iii)

…

(iv)

…

(v)

(b)

…

(i)

Theory

Possible Identification

The mistake comes from taking as ‘essential’ only the constitutive features of the essence. [= Porphyry’s essential = Aristotle’s per se-] If only constitutive features necessarily and essentially belong to their subjects, propria do not belong to their subject in this manner. Then, it follows from (ii) that propria can be removed in imagination from their subjects. Then, (iv) and (v), that evidently contradict (iii), must be taken as constitutive features Abū l-Qāsim (i.e. differentiae specificae) al-Kirmānī In the case of APo A, per se is what is taken in the definition. Consequently, per se- are the subjects taken in the definition of the predicates.

 178 Risāla ilā l-wazīr Abī Saʿd, p. 14.10–15 = frg. (v): «He [scil. al-Kirmānī] said that the fact that the triangle has [its] angles equal to two right angles is constitutive (muqawwim) for the triangle […]». 179 Cf. Risāla ilā l-wazīr Abī Saʿd, p. 8.2–9: «Among [all] this, there is his [i.e. al-Kirmānī’s] claim that everything that is impossible not to predicate of a subject in the existence and even in the pure estimation (bi-l-tawahhum), is essential (ḏātī) for it [scil. the subject]. It is impossible not to predicate finitude of every body in existence, therefore it is essential for it [scil. the body]. I informed him of the difference between the concomitant accident (al-ʿāriḍ al-lāzim) and the essential (al-ḏātī), and I urged him to leave aside existence and to come to intellect». 180 Risāla ilā l-wazīr Abī Saʿd, p. 15.5–17. 181 The necessity of the constitutive elements was likely argued on the basis of the impossibility to separate them from their subject without causing the latter’s corruption, which might explain why Avicenna argues against this criterion in Madḫal I.6, §5–6 that some accidental features also entail by their removal the subject’s corruption. See also THOM 2016, pp. 151–152, rightly observing that, on Avicenna’s view, essential constitutive predicates represent a subclass of the necessary concomitants.

IV Concluding Remarks  lxvii

To conclude, Avicenna’s major concern may have been a reassessment of the role of accidental predicables within Aristotle’s syllogistic theory against some of his contemporaries, who likely had some connection with the Peripatetic school of Baġdād, as did Abū l-Qāsim al-Kirmānī to some extent182. In this connection, Avicenna’s extension of the scope of synonymous predication grants the validity of inferences that include accidental predicates that belong per se – i.e. primarily and not by virtue of anything else – to all of their subjects. This preserves the possibility of attaining new knowledge, which would otherwise be confined to inferences based on essential predicates, according to a notion of ‘essential’ that is far narrower than that of ‘per se’ proposed in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics183.

IV Concluding Remarks Avicenna’s programmatic statement in Madḫal I.1, §2 announced his intention to pursue a ‘de-ontologization’ of logic, which should ideally be achieved by freeing logic from the intrusion of any metaphysical subject. The limits of the actual realization of this project in the Šifāʾ are evident, and have already been abundantly observed in the Avicennian scholarship. The question that still needs a precise answer instead, is this: What traces – if any – of this initial program can be found in the Logic of the Šifāʾ. In order to ascertain whether and how Avicenna’s program was actually implemented within the Šifāʾ, we took the theory of universal predicables as a test-case. Universal predicables turned out to be fully embraced by the domain of inquiry of logic as the concomitant accidents of its subject matter, namely secondary intelligible meanings. In order to be one of the objects of Avicenna’s logic, however, the theory of predicables must be disentangled from the theory of the categories, which is assigned to metaphysics insofar as it allows a classification of the items based on their ontological status. Consequently, Avicenna devotes considerable effort to reconsidering the five universal predicables independently of their ontological status, which is viewed as a non-essential concomitant to them. The kernel of Avicenna’s operation might be traced back to Alexander of Aphrodisias’ theory of the ‘composite differentia’, namely the differentia assumed with a nonspecified matter that can be synonymously predicated of substantial subjects. Alexander’s theory rests on a ‘hylomorphic’ understanding of the interaction between the genus and the differentia assumed as predicables. Even if the genus and the  182 On al-Kirmānī’s intellectual upbringing and his connection with the Peripatetic school of Baġdād, see MICHOT 2000, pp. 18*–21*. 183 The problem with Aristotle’s inference is also noted in BÄCK 2000: more specifically, Avicenna’s solution seems to match the second interpretation in BÄCK 2000, pp. 236–237, endorsed by the author himself as a unitary interpretation of Aristotle. On the role of propria and inseparable accidents in Aristotle’s theory of the syllogism, cf. MALINK 2006, pp. 98–99.

lxviii  The Theory of Predicables in Avicenna’s Madḫal of the Šifāʾ: A General Introduction differentia are not completely assimilated with matter and form by Alexander, the analysis of the differentia as ‘composite’ with a non-specified matter/genus suggests a rapprochement of the predicable to the form. The analysis conducted so far showed that the same model also plays a relevant role in Avicenna’s logic. The first step towards a neat distinction between the logical and metaphysical levels of inquiry in Avicenna’s theory of predicables is accomplished by resorting to a hylomorphic model to explain the interaction between the genus and the differentia assumed as predicables, as suggested in Arist., Met. Z10. Avicenna’s distinction between the logical and ontological levels of inquiry anticipates several contemporary exegetical attempts along the same lines, encouraged by the perspective of attaining a unitary reading of Aristotle 184. Besides the advantage of allowing a consistent vision of Aristotle’s theory of predication and demonstration, this distinction, applied to the theory of predicables, allows us to reach a significant result, namely a more precise delineation of the boundaries of logic as a philosophical discipline. Although the implementation of Avicenna’s program in the Šifāʾ admittedly shows several limits and is far from complete, Avicenna’s programmatic statement in Madḫal I.1, §2 is not a meaningless sentence, nor is it a mere echo of Porphyry’s analogous declaration at the beginning of the Isagoge185. On the contrary, it seems to be the enunciation of one of the cornerstones of his theory of predicables in logic.

 184 See, for instance, DUERLINGER 1970, p. 197, for a similar interpretation with regard to the ontological status of the differentia specifica in Aristotle, and BÄCK 2000, p. 153–158 and 170–172. 185 PORPH., Isag., 1.14–16: «Here I shall attempt to show you how the old masters – and especially the Peripatetics among them – treated, from a logical point of view (λογικώτερον), genera and species and the items before us» (transl. BARNES 2003, p. 3).

Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition I The Textual Tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal I.1 A General Overview of the Manuscript Tradition Avicenna’s philosophical masterpiece, known under the title of Kitāb al-Šifāʾ, has had widespread dissemination over nine centuries throughout the Arabic-speaking world, and its massive manuscript tradition is a perfect testimony to the paramount importance given to the entire summa. Its opening work, namely the Kitāb alMadḫal, is no exception in this regard. However, a thorough bibliographical survey of the manuscript tradition of this major work, as well as of other works by Avicenna, is still a desideratum in Avicennian studies1. The reason for the difficulty – and, at the same time, for the relevance – of this task lies in the still imperfect catalogues of part of the public collections, along with the poor accessibility of the private collections. Bibliographical research of this kind has been recently undertaken for the section on Metaphysics (Ilāhiyyāt) of the Šifāʾ within the framework of the ERC Project: “PhiBor — Philosophy on the Border of Civilizations and Intellectual Endeavours: Towards a Critical Edition of the Metaphysics (Ilāhiyyāt of Kitāb al-Šifāʾ) of Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā)” (project.avicennaproject.eu/), directed by Amos Bertolacci. This survey revealed the picture of a manuscript tradition of the Ilāhiyyāt that amounted to more than 280 manuscripts2. The present introduction represents an attempt to fill this bibliographical gap with regard to the Kitāb al-Madḫal by presenting the provisional results of a still ongoing bibliographical survey of the manuscript tradition of this work, conducted in collaboration with the PhiBor Project. The bibliographical survey has taken as its starting point the existing inventories of Avicenna’s bibliography3, supplemented by the data provided in library catalogues; the information provided by the inventories has subsequently been implemented, updated, specified and, if necessary, corrected following an inspection of the manuscripts, or of their photographic reproductions4.

 1 As remarked in GUTAS 2010, pp. 48–49. 2 Updated provisional results are available online: project.avicennaproject.eu/index.php?id=33. 3 Such as ANAWATI 1950; ANAWATI 1974, pp. 229–262; GAL, vol. I + suppl. vol. I; DIRĀYATĪ 2010; DIRĀYATĪ 2011; ERGIN 1937; ERGIN 1956 and MAHDAVĪ 1954. A preliminary account is also offered in ANAWATI 1951. 4 All the photographic reproductions employed in this work were attained thanks to the generous help of the aforementioned ERC Project: “PhiBor” and of the ERC Project: “PhiC-PhASIF” directed by Maroun Aouad. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110726565-002

lxx  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition I.1.1 The Extent of the Arabic Manuscript Tradition The exact number of extant manuscripts that preserve the Logic of Avicenna’s Šifāʾ is still unknown. The provisional results of the present research conducted within the framework of the PhiBor Project estimate around 205 manuscripts of the section on Logic5, 118 of which preserve the first work (fann), namely the Madḫal, with the possible addition of another 11 manuscripts that preserve, according to catalogues, a not better specified part of the section on Logic and that, on closer inspection, may turn out to also preserve the Madḫal. A provisional list of the manuscript witnesses of the Madḫal found in the present survey is offered in section I.2. Thanks to this survey, our knowledge of the manuscript tradition of the Madḫal has advanced considerably with respect to the information collected in the first Avicennian bibliographies, which were published in the first half of the twentieth century. The first important bibliography, Brockelmann’s GAL (vol. I and Supplement), listed 9 of the manuscripts that are known to preserve the Madḫal; 29 manuscripts were enumerated in Ergin’s first list in 1937 (this increased to 50 in the second edition, published in 1956), and 40 in Anawati’s bibliography in 1950. The highest number of witnesses was reached in Mahdavī’s bibliography in 1954, in which 52 of the now-known manuscripts were listed6; this number was then maintained in Gutas’ bibliographic inventory in 20147. From a purely quantitative point of view, the current state of the art has more than doubled the number of known manuscript witnesses. In the following section, an analysis of the diffusion of Avicenna’s Madḫal is offered, taking into consideration both the geographical and chronological aspects. I.1.2 The Geographical Spread of the Manuscript Tradition As previously stated, the manuscript tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal amounts to at least 118 manuscripts, with the possible addition of 11 that preserve a not better specified part of the section on Logic. As shown in S1 below, almost half of the 118 certain witnesses of Avicenna’s Madḫal are preserved in public and private collections in Iran (44 out of 118 manuscripts, or 37% of the manuscript tradition); Iran is followed by Turkey (whose libraries preserve 30 out of 118 manuscripts, 25% of the manuscript tradition) and India (where 16 out of 118 manuscripts are preserved, 14%

 5 The provisional list of the manuscripts of the section on Logic of the Šifāʾ can be accessed at: project.avicennaproject.eu/index.php?id=80. 6 David C. Reisman presented a supplement to Mahdavī’s bibliography, gathering the information available in Anawati, Mahdavī and BERTOLACCI 2008, at the International Colloquium “The Manuscript Tradition of Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Šifāʾ: The Current State of Research and Future Prospects”, organized by A. Bertolacci and held in 2010 at the Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa. To my knowledge, however, it has never been published. 7 GUTAS 2014, pp. 420–422.

I The Textual Tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal  lxxi

of the manuscript tradition). These three countries are by far the largest repositories of the witnesses of this section of Avicenna’s Šifāʾ. Manuscripts are also preserved in at least 13 other countries: Afghanistan, Egypt, France, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Lebanon, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, Syria, UK, and the USA.

S1. Places of preservation of the manuscripts of Avicenna’s Madḫal

Obviously, the locations in which the manuscripts are preserved nowadays do not necessarily coincide with those in which they were copied and circulated. Although explicit information concerning the places of copying is not always available 8, there is sufficient evidence to claim that the centres that played a substantial role in the production and diffusion of the manuscript tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal were prevalently in modern-day Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and India. What is now Iran was arguably an area of vast production and circulation of the manuscripts of the Šifāʾ;

 8 This kind of information is generally recorded in the colophons of the manuscripts or in other notes, which may be absent or lost in some manuscript witnesses.

lxxii  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition among the centres that are known to have been involved in this process are Tabrīz (MS İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 823), Iṣfahān (MS İstanbul, Millet Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Feyzullah Efendi 1206), Šīrāz and Marāġa (on these two centres, see section I.1.4). Ottoman Constantinople (e.g. MS İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 909; see section I.1.4) and Baġdād (MS İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3261) are also attested in the manuscript tradition as places where Avicenna’s Madḫal was copied. As for the Indian Subcontinent, Kašmīr is explicitly mentioned in a colophon as a place of copying (MS British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, India Office Ar. 1420), and further elements – such as the copyists’ names – concur to place the copy of at least two other witnesses on the Subcontinent (namely MSS Rampur, Raza Library 3478 and 3479, copied respectively by Fadawī (or Fadwā?) Kahīmkaran Wās and ʿIzzat ʿAlī Gorakhpūrī; these names may refer to the provenance of the copyists from Khem Karan and Gorakhpur, both in Northern India)9. I.1.3 Chronology One of the main characteristics of the manuscript tradition of Avicenna’s Šifāʾ as a whole – and of the Madḫal taken singularly – is the broad chronological extension, spanning over nine centuries. The dating of the extant witnesses ranges from the twelfth10 to the twentieth century CE11, and the existence of copies from the eleventh century is attested in the colophons of their descendants 12. Based on 92 of the 118 certain witnesses of the Madḫal listed in section I.2, whose date of copying is either recorded in the colophons or conjecturally reconstructed, we are able to make some further considerations on the chronological distribution of the manuscripts (S2).

 9 For an overview of the manuscript tradition of the Šifāʾ in India, see AHMED 2012. 10 The earliest extant twelfth-century witness of Avicenna’s Madḫal known so far is MS Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Malik 4276, dating to 536H/1142. 11 Copies were produced in the twentieth century as well, such as MS Kitābḫānah-i Millī Ǧumhūriyi Islami-yi Iran 20266, copied in 1318H/1900–1, and MS Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Waṯāʾiq al-Qawmiyya 262 ḥikma wa-falsafa, copied in 1337H/1918. Finally, a colophon dating to 1343H/1924 can be found at the end of MS Kitābḫānah-i Millī Ǧumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran 1801. 12 MS Rampur, Rampur Raza Library 3477, for instance, preserves a colophon at the end of the first treatise of the Madḫal, attesting the existence of an exemplar dating to 6 Ḏū l-Ḥiǧǧa 468H/17 July 1076; on this manuscript and the witnesses that are possibly related to it, cf. section II.5.

I The Textual Tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal  lxxiii

S2. The chronological distribution of the manuscripts of Avicenna’s Madḫal

As shown in S2, there is (as we would expect) poor extant evidence of the earliest stages of the tradition; among the manuscripts dating to the 6th/12th century, there is the most ancient extant direct witness of Avicenna’s Madḫal, namely MS Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Malik 4276 (Ka in the present edition), dating to 536H/1142. The thirteenth-century manuscript production is also well attested by eleven valuable extant witnesses. The fourteenth century, on the other hand, apparently witnessed a remarkable fall in manuscript production; only two copies produced in this period appear to be extant, as opposed to the eleven dating to the preceding century and thirteen from the following century; the historical reasons for such a noticeable regression are yet to be established13. Then, following the dramatic restriction registered within the fourteenth century, the manuscript production of the Logic of the Šifāʾ flourished anew from the fifteenth century onwards. It is tempting to link the reprise of an intense manuscript production to the general renewed interest in philosophy shown by the ruling elites during the fifteenth century14; it might also be worth pondering the role that patronage may have played in providing a new im-

 13 A similar regression during the 8th/14th century is also observed in the manuscript tradition of the Ilāhiyyāt of the Šifāʾ by A. Bertolacci, who formulates the hypothesis that the Mongol invasion, which in 656H/1258 caused the fall of the ʿAbbāsid capital Baġdād, one of the most important centres of manuscript production, may have had a hugely disruptive impact on the manuscripts’ copying and circulation; see BERTOLACCI 2017–2018, pp. 273–274. 14 Cf. POURJAVADY AND SCHMIDTKE 2015, p. 253.

lxxiv  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition pulse to the books’ production. The peak of the manuscript production was reached in the seventeenth century, which reflects the climate of cultural renaissance that characterized the Safavid period15. Afterwards, the manuscript production continued until the first half of the twentieth century, although with progressively decreasing intensity; it is interesting to note that there is almost no solution of continuity between the manuscript tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal and its first printed edition published in Cairo in 195216. The Logic of the Šifāʾ has been transmitted in a variety of formats, whether by itself (in its entirety, or divided into parts), or together with other sections of the summa, or in larger-format manuscripts, with the entire summa17. As shown in S3 below, almost half of the manuscripts that preserve Avicenna’s Madḫal only contain the section on Logic18. This format is often also found in the most recent manuscripts; the publication of the Tehran Lithograph in 1303–5H/1885–7, containing the sections on Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics of the Šifāʾ, may account for the twentieth-century tendency to copy the Logic by itself, without the two other sections19. The second most common format is that of the manuscripts which contain the entire summa (27% of the manuscript tradition)20. The copies containing the section on Logic with that of Natural Philosophy (m + ṭ in S3) may also denote the existence of copies of the entire summa consisting of two volumes, the first of which contains the sections on Logic and Natural Philosophy21. Interestingly, the Logic section is also transmitted in selective copies of parts of the summa: nine copies of  15 On the “Safavid Renaissance”, see POURJAVADY AND SCHMIDTKE 2015. 16 Cf. section II.1. 17 For a detailed classification of the various formats in which the Šifāʾ and its parts were transmitted, see BERTOLACCI 2017–2018. 18 These formats correspond to the ‘selective copies’ containing either one part (ǧumla) of the work – i.e. the section on Logic in its entirety – or sections (funūn) of it, namely, points 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.1.5 in BERTOLACCI 2017–2018, p. 280. 19 That the sections included in the Tehran Lithograph were preferably not copied after its publication is demonstrated by cases like that of MS Beirut, Université St. Joseph, Bibliothèque Orientale 373, a modern copy of MS London, BLOIOC, India Office, Ar. 476 (= 1796). The entire set of MSS India Office Ar. 475–477, forming a complete Šifāʾ in three volumes, was brought to Beirut to be copied in 1890, provided by the Swiss Arabist Charles Pierre Henri Rieu (b. Geneva, 1820 – d. London, 1902), who worked at the time at the section of Oriental Manuscripts at the British Museum (see CHEIKHO 1925, pp. 122–123). The section on Logic preserved in MS India Office, Ar. 475 (= 1420), and the section on Mathematics preserved in MS India Office, Ar. 477 (= 1811), were entirely copied (respectively, MSS Beirut, BO 372 and 374); the copying of the Natural Philosophy in MS BO 373 from MS Ar. 476, however, was interrupted at Samāʿ Ṭabīʿī III.6, when the copyist became acquainted with the existence of the Teheran Lithograph, as a note in French at the end of the copy (f. 111 v) attests (cf. CHEIKHO 1925, p. 123); presumably for the same reason, the Metaphysics was not copied at all. 20 This format corresponds to the “complete compact” copy described in BERTOLACCI 2017–2018, p. 280. 21 The “complete cumulative” copies (point 1.2 in BERTOLACCI 2017–2018, p. 280).

I The Textual Tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal  lxxv

the entire summa lacking the section on Mathematics (m + ṭ + i in S3), and two lacking the section on Natural Philosophy (m + r + i in S3)22. In four cases, the section on Logic is transmitted along with the Metaphysics, which may point to the fact that these two were read and studied together; in one single case, the Logic section is paired with that of the Mathematics23.

S3. Manuscripts classified by content (m = Manṭiq; ṭ = Ṭabīʿiyyāt; r = Riyāḍiyyāt; i = Ilāhiyyāt)

I.1.4 The Tradition of the Madḫal in Context Combining the geographical and chronological data collected through the analysis of the manuscript tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal, it is possible to attempt a historical reconstruction of some of the most vibrant cultural hubs involved in the process of transmitting the work.  22 The “selective copies” containing 3 parts of the summa (point 2.1.1 in BERTOLACCI 2017–2018, p. 280). 23 The “selective copies” containing 2 parts of the summa (point 2.1.2 in BERTOLACCI 2017–2018, p. 280).

lxxvi  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition (a)

Twelfth/thirteenth-century Baġdād: the earliest stages of transmission

Present-day Iraq, particularly Baġdād, assumed a crucial role in manuscript production after becoming the capital of the ʿAbbāsid caliphate, and maintained its leading role in the production and preservation of manuscripts at least until the destructive pillage of the city by the Mongols in 1258. Baġdād is also among the centres in which the Šifāʾ was copied and transmitted already at the earliest stages of the tradition. Besides MS İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3261 – which, according to the colophon, was copied in Baġdād in 677H/1278 – there is also interesting evidence of an earlier copy produced in Baġdād in Ǧumādā II 503H/1109–10, the now-lost model of MS Najaf, Maktabat al-Imām Amīr al-Muʾminīn 1096 (dating to 1091H). This attested manuscript must have been the exemplar of at least four other manuscripts that preserve only the section on Metaphysics of the Šifāʾ with identical colophons reporting the same information about the date and location of the copying24. (b)

Thirteenth-century Marāġa: the circles of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and Bar Hebraeus25

Marāġa was arguably a very lively centre of copying and studying of the Šifāʾ during the 7th/13th century. The town witnessed a flourishing philosophical activity gathered around Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s astronomic observatory, founded in 657H/1259 under the patronage of the Īlḫānid ruler Hülegü, which represented, in D. Gutas’ words, a “cluster of philosophical activity”26. Marāġa was also an important centre for Christian thought: one of the most relevant figures in this regard is Bar Hebraeus, Maphrian of the Syriac Orthodox Church, historian and philosopher, who was lecturing there in 1272 and remained there until he died in 1286. It is presumably within his intellectual circle that the copy of MS İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 2442 (henceforth: MS A) was undertaken in Marāġa in 671H/127327.

 24 MSS Iran, Qum, Āyat Allāh ʿAllāma Ḥasan Ḥasanzadeh Āmulī Private Collection, no number; Iran, Qum, Kitābḫānah-i Masǧid-i Aʿẓam 1391; Iran, Rasht, Kitābḫānah-i Millī 37 and Iran, Mashhad, Kitābḫānah-i Āstān-i Quds-i Raḍavī 23783. The attested witness must have surely preserved the Metaphysics of the Šifāʾ, which all the five witnesses preserve; as for the other parts, such as the Logic, it is difficult to tell whether it was copied in MS Maktabat al-Imām Amīr al-Muʾminīn 1096 from the same exemplar, or from a different one. On this early ‘edition’ of the Metaphysics of the Šifāʾ, see BERTOLACCI 2017–2018. 25 A part of the subjects dealt with in this paragraph are the result of a research published in DI VINCENZO 2018a. 26 GUTAS 2002, pp. 95–96. 27 For a historical reconstruction of the cultural and intellectual milieu in which MS A was produced, see CELLI 2017–2018.

I The Textual Tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal  lxxvii

Within the entourage of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, however, must be placed the copy of at least three other manuscripts, namely MS İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2710 (henceforth: MS Nk), MS Cairo, Maktabat al-Azhar al-Šarīf, Beḫīt Collection 44988, 331 falsafa (henceforth: MS B), and MS İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 1424 (henceforth: MS C). These three thirteenth-century complete copies of the Šifāʾ arguably derive from the same exemplar (MS η in the stemma in section II.4), which very likely circulated within the school of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī in Marāġa. According to the information provided by the colophon, MS Nk was copied by ʿAbd al-Kāfī b. ʿAbd al-Maǧīd b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Tabrīzī in 666H/1267–8. An iǧāza28, reportedly issued for the copyist of MS Nk and copied on the first folio of the manuscript, informs us that the copyist was a student (tilmīḏ) of ʿAlī b. ʿUmar b. ʿAlī alKātibī al-Qazwīnī (d. 675H/1276)29, who certified that the copyist of MS Nk had read al-Kātibī’s Šarḥ ʿaqd al-ǧawāhir to him30. The iǧāza was reportedly issued by alKātibī al-Qazwīnī himself in the half of Ǧumādā I 659H/3 April – 2 May 1261, which means that the copyist of MS Nk was a student of al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī when the latter was active, together with Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, in the school of Marāġa31. The copyist of MS Nk may coincide with the ʿAbd al-Kāfī ʿAbd al-Maǧīd ʿAbīd32 Allāh who is reported to have finished copying MS İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Esad Efendi 3804 in Marāġa on 5 Šaʿbān 665H/1 May 126733. An ʿAbd al-Kāfī ʿAbd al-Maǧīd ʿAbd Allāh al-Tabrīzī also penned the colophon of MS İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayi, Ahmet III 3453/16 in 677H/1278 in Baġdād34. If the identification of the two copyists with that of MS Nk holds, then the copyist of MS Nk may have been a scholar active in Marāġa with an interest in geometry35, who moved from Marāġa to Baġdād at a later stage of his career. This latter fact may be related to a specific event in the history of the school of Marāġa, namely the transferral of a large number of scholars following Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī from Marāġa to Baġdād in 1274 CE36. According to this reconstruction, the copyist of MS Nk was a scholar initially enrolled in the school of  28 Cf. GACEK 2009, pp. 216–219. 29 Quoting the beginning of the page, l. 1: «This Book of extreme clarity was written by (bi-ḫaṭṭ) the ʿallāma student (tilmīḏ) of al-Kātibī». 30 Lines 1–9. The expression: qaraʾa ʿalayya (“he read to me”) has a technical use in similar texts; see, for instance, POURJAVADY AND SCHMIDTKE 2009. 31 AL-RAHIM 2003, p. 220. 32 This is the reading printed in ŞEŞEN 1997, p. 76. The palaeographical difference between ʿAbd and ʿAbīd is, however, minimal, and I suspect that the name reported in the catalogue could be the same of the copyist of MS Nk. 33 See KRAUSE 1936, p. 526, and ŞEŞEN 1997, p. 76. 34 RASHED 2011, p. 36 and RASHED 2013, p. 428. 35 Who is qualified in the iǧāza as sayyid al-muhandisīn (“master of the geometers”) on f. 1r in MS Nk. 36 Al-Ṭūsī’s biography reports that al-Ṭūsī himself moved, together with many of his students, from Marāġa to Baġdād shortly before his death; see IBN ŠĀKIR AL-KUTUBĪ, Fawāt al-Wafayāt, vol. 3, p. 251.

lxxviii  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition Marāġa as a student of al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī who might have joined al-Ṭūsī moving to Baġdād. Further evidence of this manuscript’s connection with the school of Marāġa is provided by another note in the first folio of MS Nk, which states that the manuscript preserves some notes written by the ʿallāma Quṭb al-Dīn al-Šīrāzī (d. 710H/1311) and that it was read to al-Šīrāzī himself37. The technical expression maqrūʾa (“read”)38 testifies again to the school’s practice of reading a work in front of a teacher in order to gain permission (iǧāza) to transmit it. The fact that MS Nk was read to Quṭb al-Dīn al-Šīrāzī, and that some of the marginalia of MS Nk are his own, proves that he at least played a role in the teaching and transmission of the text. This piece of information is of the utmost interest in order to situate MS Nk in its cultural context – by the time it was copied, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Šīrāzī was a student of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī within the school of Marāġa39; although he may well have annotated the manuscript later on, his activity on the manuscript is another clue of the connection of the manuscript with al-Ṭūsī’s school. MS C can be reconducted to the same school tradition, as it is a copy realized in 693H/1293–4 for Quṭb al-Dīn al-Šīrāzī’s personal library40. The reconstruction provided so far is further supported by the fact that the copyists of MSS Nk, B and C also copied a set of identical marginal notes that attest a collation with a manuscript belonging to Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī; the notes were presumably in their common exemplar η, which is arguably the manuscript that was collated with al-Ṭūsī’s41. (c)

Fifteenth/sixteenth-century Šīrāz, in Safavid Iran: the schools of Ǧalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī and Ṣadr al-Dīn Šīrāzī

Fifteenth-century Šīrāz was the cradle of two major philosophical schools related to the competing figures of Ǧalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (d. 908/1502–3) and Ṣadr al-Dīn alDaštakī (d. 903H/1497–8)42; the first was active in the Madrasat Dār al-Aytām, also  37 «In the margin, some of the excerpts are by the ʿallāma Quṭb al-Dīn al-Šīrāzī, and this manuscript was read (maqrūʾa) to the ʿallāma al-Šīrāzī». 38 On this expression, see GACEK 2009, p. 54. 39 Quṭb al-Dīn al-Šīrāzī’s departure from Marāġa was supposedly during his mid-thirties, between 667H/1268 and 672H/1274; see WALBRIDGE 1992, p. 13. 40 As stated in the note on f. 1r: «For the library of the great master, the high imām, the greatest, the most perfect, the most excellent and the most learned, the learned ruler of the sages, the most learned of the sons of Adam, Quṭb al-Milla wa-l-Dīn, proof of the Islām and of the Muslims, counsellor of kings and lords». See also MAHDAVĪ 1954, p. 170. When MS C was copied (1293–4), Quṭb al-Dīn al-Šīrāzī was probably active in Tabrīz; cf. WALBRIDGE 1992, p. 21 and n. 69. Although it is not explicitly stated, there is some possibility that MS C circulated in Tabrīz. 41 For a transcription and discussion of these notes, see DI VINCENZO 2018a. 42 On Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Daštakī and his philosophical disputes with Ǧalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī, see AMINRAZAVI AND NASR 2008, p. 49, and NIEWÖHNER-EBERHARD 2009, pp. 23–28.

I The Textual Tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal  lxxix

known as Madrasa-ye Begom43, whereas the descendants of the second pursued their teaching activity in the Madrasa Manṣūriyya44. Both schools played a leading role in the transmission of Avicenna’s Šifāʾ. A complete copy of the Šifāʾ, MS Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2709, was made in the Madrasat Dār al-Aytām when Ǧalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī was teaching; the madrasa is mentioned in the colophon of the section on Logic, copied on 17 Ǧumādā II 886H/22 August 1481 by an Ibn Muḥammad Zāhid al-Ḥiǧāzī al-Ḥanafī. Two other manuscripts are meanwhile related to the intellectual circle of the Madrasa Manṣūriyya, namely MSS Rampur, Raza Library, Ḥikma 112 [n. 3476]45 (henceforth: MS Ṣ) and Khvoy, Kitābḫānah-i Madrasa-i Namāzī 247 (henceforth: MS K). MS Ṣ is a fourteenth-century witness of the Šifāʾ46 owned by Ṣadr al-Dīn alDaštakī, who passed it on to his son Ġiyāṯ al-Dīn Manṣūr (d. 949H/1542), active in the Madrasa Manṣūriyya47. The manuscript then came into the possession of the latter’s son, Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Ṯānī (d. 962H/1555)48, then of the student of Ġiyāṯ al-Dīn Manṣūr, Fatḥ Allāh al-Šīrāzī (d. 997H/1589)49, who is also the author of the indexes of contents of the manuscript50. MS K must have also been related to the figure of Fatḥ Allāh al-Šīrāzī, as it was copied in Ramaḍān 986H/NovemberDecember 1578 for a ʿAbd al-Ḫāliq Ibn Muḥammad Maḥmūd from Gīlān, who was, according to the historical sources of the time, a student of Fatḥ Allāh al-Šīrāzī51. He reportedly studied MS K with Fatḥ Allāh al-Šīrāzī, collated it and corrected it; the process of correcting the manuscript ended in the month of Šaʿbān 988H/September-October 158052. (d) Mughal India The emergence of an interest in the Šifāʾ among Šīʿī circles on the Indian Subcontinent, with a special focus on Logic and Natural Philosophy, must very likely be put

 43 On Ǧalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī’s activity in the madrasa, see NEWMAN 1996 and AMINRAZAVI AND NASR 2008, pp. 36–38. 44 Instituted by Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Daštakī in 883H/1478 and named after his son Ġiyāṯ al-Dīn Manṣūr; see NIEWÖHNER-EBERHARD 2009, pp. 28–29. 45 On this manuscript, see also POURJAVADY 2011, p. 23 and n. 144 and RIZVI 2011, p. 11, n. 8. 46 The colophon at the end of the section on Logic dates to the beginning of Rabīʿ I 718H/May 1318. 47 See NIEWÖHNER-EBERHARD 2009, p. 36 and POURJAVADY 2011, pp. 24–32. 48 According to the sources, Ṣadr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Ṯānī was the younger of the two sons of Ġiyāṯ al-Dīn Manṣūr; see NIEWÖHNER-EBERHARD 2009, pp. 37–38. 49 Fatḥ Allāh al-Šīrāzī and Muṣliḥ al-Dīn Lārī (d. 979H/1571–2) were students of Ġiyāṯ al-Dīn Manṣūr in the Madrasa Manṣūriyya; see NIEWÖHNER-EBERHARD 2009, p. 36. 50 As reported in a note in Persian on p. 1, upper margin. 51 SAYYID MUḤAMMAD MAʿṢŪM BAKRĪ, Tārīḫ-i Sind, p. 215. 52 As reported in a note in Persian on p. 506.

lxxx  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition in relation to the circulation of Šīrāzī scholars53. This claim finds confirmation in the genealogical study of the manuscript tradition, which shows how the Indian witnesses of the Madḫal ultimately derive from copies owned by Šīrāzī scholars. As an example, the aforementioned MS Ṣ played a central role in the transmission of the Šifāʾ in Mughal India. Presumably brought to India by Fatḥ Allāh al-Šīrāzī, it became part of the library of the Mughal ruler Akbar (reg. 1556–1605 CE); nowadays it is preserved in Rampur Raza Library. Notably, MS Ṣ must have been the origin of an Indian branch of the manuscript tradition: according to the result of a sample collation of the Madḫal, at least two manuscripts currently preserved in India – and very likely also copied there – derive from MS Ṣ, i.e. MS Hyderabad, Osmaniya University Library, acq. 582 (dat. 13th/19th c.), preserving part of the section on Logic, and MS Rampur, Raza Library, 3478 (dat. 1267H/1850–1), preserving the entire Šifāʾ except for the section on Mathematics, whose section on Logic is penned by a Fadawī (or Fadwā?) Kahīmkaran Wās54, very likely of Indian provenance. (e)

Eighteenth-century Ottoman Constantinople55

During the first half of the eighteenth century, Constantinople was the scene of an outstanding cultural renaissance. One sign of this cultural climate is the translation project started under the patronage of the Grand Vizier Damad İbrâhim Paşa of Nevşehir, the aim of which was to provide new Arabic translations of Greek philosophical and scientific texts, at the time known only through the translations accomplished in the ʿAbbāsid period. It is against the background of this cultural vibrancy that a vast number of manuscripts circulated and were gathered in the city’s libraries; the collections gathered by Ottoman statesmen and scholars were rich and numerous, and were mostly preserved in the madrasas’ libraries. A historically important part of the manuscript tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal developed against this background. Among the most outstanding figures of learned statesmen who kept copies of the Šifāʾ in their libraries is Feyzullah Efendi (d. 1115H/1703), Müfti of Constantinople and tutor of the young Muṣṭafā II56, whose seal of waqf is on the first folio of MS Millet Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Feyzullah Efendi 120657 and whose ownership notes are found in MSS Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi,  53 As claimed in AHMED 2012, pp. 212–213. 54 See the colophon on f. 329r; the name of the copyist suggests a provenance from Punjab, in Northern India. 55 Part of the subjects dealt with in this paragraph are the result of a research first published in DI VINCENZO 2017–2018. 56 For further biographical information, see NIZRI 2010. 57 Dating to 1112H/1700–1; the waqf in the seal reports that the manuscript was bound to be kept in the madrasa instituted by Feyzullah himself. For a reproduction and transcription of the seal, see BAYRAKTAR AND KUT 1984, pp. 101–102.

I The Textual Tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal  lxxxi

Yeni Câmi 770 and 77158. Another leading figure is Abū Bakr Ibn Rustam Ibn Aḥmad al-Širwānī (d. 1135H/1722–3)59, who owned, among others, a thirteenth-century copy of the first half of the Logic of the Šifāʾ, MS Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Aşir Efendi 207. Special attention is owed to another famous book collector of the same period, Walī al-Dīn Ǧārullāh, who was a major player in the production and circulation of copies of the Logic of Avicenna’s Šifāʾ. Before acquiring the previously mentioned MS C in 1138H/1725–6, Ǧārullāh requested, in 1125H/1713, the copy of MS Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 142560, preserving the Logic and the Metaphysics of the Šifāʾ. As for the section on Logic, MS Carullah 1425 is a copy of MS Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 822, which preserves a note claiming that the manuscript was read to Avicenna himself61. We are left to wonder whether this can account for Ǧārullāh’s interest in asking for a copy of it. One of the most interesting intellectual figures from the first quarter of the eighteenth century also promoted the copying of two manuscripts of the Logic of the Šifāʾ. Asʿad Ibn ʿAlī Ibn ʿUṯmān al-Yānyawī (d. 1143H/173062), also known as Esad Efendi, showed a deep interest in the Aristotelian philosophy and its reception; he also participated in the aforementioned translation project sponsored by the Grand Vizier Damad İbrâhim Paşa63. He is known to have owned at least one manuscript of the section on Natural Philosophy of Avicenna’s Šifāʾ64, and it can be reconstructed that, as a teacher in the madrasa of Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī in Constantinople, he gave rise to the copy of the Logic of the Šifāʾ. MS İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 909, dating 29 Ǧumādā II 1134H/16th April 1722, was copied under his request by one of his students, namely Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad al-Uskūbī65. MS İs-

 58 In both cases, the note is dated 1115H/1703. 59 See FUʾĀD SAYYID 2003, pp. 19–22. 60 As stated in a note on the guard page of the manuscript in Ǧārullāh’s handwriting. 61 See section II.2, n° 12 and BERTOLACCI 2017–2018, pp. 300–303. 62 Born in Ioannina (the Ottoman Yanya), in north-western Greece, al-Yānyawī moved to Constantinople in 1098H/1686, where he was appointed as a professor in 1111H/1699. A different dating for his death (1134H/1722) is provided in GUTAS 1998, p. 175; al-Yānyawī was, however, appointed as judge of Galata in 1725 (for al-Yānyawī’s biography, see ŞAHIN 2005, pp. 349–350 and ASLAN 2006). 63 On al-Yānyawī’s activity as a translator, see KAYA 1992, ÖZERVARLI 2011 and KÜÇÜK 2013; see also GUTAS 2000b, p. 228. 64 MS İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 796. 65 Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad al-Uskūbī is also the copyist of MS İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 812 (a witness of al-Fārābī’s summaries of Aristotle’s Logic), copied in the madrasa of Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī just a year before (Ǧumādā II 1133H/1721); in the colophon, the copyist explicitly mentions Asʿad Ibn ʿAlī Ibn ʿUṯmān al-Yānyawī as his professor (ustāḏ). I owe this piece of information to Teymour Morel, who worked on the manuscript within the PhiC Project; GUTAS 1998, p. 175 mentions an Aḥmad al-Uskūbī as the copyist of MS Hamidiye 812 and al-Yānyawī’s student, based on TÜRKER 1963, pp. 151–152, 173–174.

lxxxii  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition tanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Atıf Efendi 1565, seemingly copied from the same exemplar as MS Ragıp Paşa 90966, results from the work of several scribes, who alternated in the copying. Their handwriting is also present in several marginal notes, which often quote works or translations by Asʿad al-Yānyawī, referring to him as “our professor, the philosopher Asʿad” (li-ustāḏinā al-faylasūf Asʿad), or even simply “the professor” (al-ustāḏ). In one of the several handwritings67 were copied, on 29 Ṣafar 1135H/9 December 1722, some excerpts of a commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics translated by Asʿad al-Yānyawī. Arguably, then, the manuscript was copied by some anonymous students of Asʿad al-Yānyawī, in the same milieu and at the same time as MS Ragıp Paşa 90968. Both manuscripts are particularly relevant to the study of Avicenna’s Ottoman reception, and also preserve Asʿad al-Yānyawī’s unedited notes of commentary on the text69. This very preliminary study of the manuscript tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal has made it possible to identify some of the main paths of its circulation, as well as to sketch a brief history of its transmission. Although the most diverse cultural contexts were actively involved in the transmission of Avicenna’s Madḫal, a pivotal role in this process nonetheless appears to have been played by the ‘Marāġa tradition’, for many of the most fertile intellectual environments in which the work was copied and studied trace their philosophical lineage back to Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s circle70. This is the case with the schools of Ǧalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī and Ṣadr al-Dīn alDaštakī in Šīrāz, as well as the Mughal intellectual circles within which the text was copied and studied under the direction of the scholars from Šīrāz. These geographically and chronologically distinct contexts are in fact connected to each other in a kind of ideal chain of intellectual transmission. The Šīrāzī tradition – both the part related to the Daštakī family, which promoted the Avicennian studies in the Indian Subcontinent, and that related to Ǧalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī – claimed an intellectual genealogy that ultimately traced back to Avicenna himself, including in the lineage Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Šīrāzī71.  66 See section II.5. 67 This is the handwriting that copied, for instance, the text from fol. 101r to fol. 103v. 68 For a more detailed account of the circulation of the Šifāʾ within al-Yānyawī’s school, see DI VINCENZO 2017–2018. 69 See DI VINCENZO 2017–2018, pp. 331–334. 70 There may also be a sectarian tinge in this self-proclaimed connection with the Twelver-Šīʿī circle of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī: see WISNOVSKY 2018. 71 The chain of transmission of the Daštakī tradition is mentioned by Ġiyāṯ al-Dīn Manṣūr in his Kašf al-Ḥaqāʾiq al-Muḥammadiyya; see AMINRAZAVI AND NASR 2008, pp. 48–50. As for Dawānī, he mentioned at least two different chains of transmission of this sort, one of which, according to Āghā Buzurg al-Ṭihrānī (Ṭabaqāt, vol. 4, pp. 13–14), was mentioned in an iǧāza issued for ʿAfīf al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ṣafawī (see POURJAVADY 2011, p. 5 and n. 30), whereas the other can be found in Dawānī’s iǧāza to Muʾayyadzāde preserved in MS Esad Efendi 3733 (cf. POURJAVADY 2011, p. 6 and n.

I The Textual Tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal  lxxxiii

I.2 A Provisional List of the Manuscripts of Avicenna’s Madḫal Legenda: (A) = MS recorded in ANAWATI 1950; see also ANAWATI 1951 and ANAWATI 1974, pp. 229–262. (B) = MS recorded in BROCKELMANN 1943–19492 (vol. I, p. 592) and BROCKELMANN 1937– 1942 (suppl. vol. I, p. 815). (D) = MS recorded in DIRĀYATĪ 2010. (E1) = MS recorded in ERGIN 1937, p. 22. (E2) = MS recorded in ERGIN 1956, pp. 32–33. (F) = MS recorded in DIRĀYATĪ 2011. (G2) = MS recorded in GUTAS 2014, pp. 420–421. (M) = MS recorded in MAHDAVĪ 1954. (S) = MS recorded in FUʾĀD SAYYID 1950. * = manuscript (or manuscript’s reproduction) checked. † = manuscript recorded in the catalogues and now lost. (m) = MS containing Manṭiq (section on Logic). (ṭ) = MS containing Ṭabīʿiyyāt (section on Natural Philosophy). (r) = MS containing Riyāḍiyyāt (section on Mathematics). (i) = MS containing Ilāhiyyāt (section on Metaphysics). Public libraries Aligarh (Uttar Pradesh, India) [3 MSS, 1 checked] 1) *Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 110/30 (1071H/1660–1; copyist: Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Mašhadī) [m, ṭ, r, i] (M, E2, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 61 n° 4; AHMED 2012, p. 204, n° 19) 2) Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 160/21 [m] (M, E2, G2, AHMED 2012, p. 205 n° 24) 3) Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 160/84 [m] (M, E2, G2) Baġdād (Iraq) [1 MS, lost] 4) †Khizānat Qāsim Muḥammad al-Raǧab 271 [m] Beirut (Lebanon) [1 MS, checked] 5) *Université St. Joseph, Bibliothèque Orientale 372 (1890) [m] (M, E2, G2)

 32). All these chains of transmission appear to attach themselves to pre-existing chains of transmission linking Avicenna to Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (on which, see AL-RAHIM 2003, ENDRESS 2006, pp. 410– 415 and WISNOVSKY 2013, pp. 193–199).

lxxxiv  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition Benares (India) [2 MSS, 1 checked] 6) Ǧāmiʿa Ǧawadiyya 15 (11th/17th c.) [m] 7) *Ǧāmiʿa Ǧawadiyya 95 (20 Rabīʿ al-Awwal 902H/5 December 1496 from a model copied in Ǧumādā I 693H, copyist: Ḥusayn Ibn Ḥaydar al-Riḍawī) [m] Cairo (Egypt) [3 MSS, checked]72 8) *Maktabat al-Azhar al-Šarīf, Beḫīt Collection 44988, 331 falsafa (7th/13th c.) [m, ṭ, r, i] (A, M, E2, G2)73 9) *Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Waṯāʾiq al-Qawmiyya 262 ḥikma wa-falsafa (Saturday 23 Muḥarram 1337H/29 October 1918; copyist: Maḥmūd Qāsim Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Qāsim, from an exemplar of 992H/1584, allegedly owned by the family of Muḥammad Nūr al-Dīn in Cairo) [m, ṭ, i] (A, M, E2, S, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 62 n° 16)74 10) *Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Waṯāʾiq al-Qawmiyya 894 falsafa (10th–11th/16th–17th c., copyist ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Mīr ʿAbd Allāh) [m, ṭ, r, i incompl.: Ilāhiyyāt I.8–X.5 (pp. 49.5– 455.16 of Cairo ed.), on ff. 815r–879v] (A, M, E2, S, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 63 n° 19)75 Cambridge (UK) [1 MS, checked] 11) *Cambridge University Library, Eton Pote 263 (987H/1579; copyists: Ṣāliḥ Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Ṣāliḥ al-Ǧarāyrī and Niʿmat Allāhī; place: Bīǧāpūr, India) [m, ṭ, r, i] Damascus (Syria) [1 MS, 0 checked] 12) Maktabat al-Asad al-Waṭaniyya, Asad National Library 7905 (1043H/1634; copyist: Ṣāliḥ Ibn Šarīf Ḥāmid) [m, ṭ, r, i] (BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 63 n° 22) Dublin (Ireland) [1 MS, checked] 13) *Chester Beatty Library, Arabic 3983 (vols. i-ii) (1002H/1593) [m, ṭ, r, i] Herat (Afghanistan) [1 MS, 0 checked] 14) Herat Museum Library, no number: nr. 14 in DE LAUGIER DE BEAURECUEIL 1964, p. 315 (13 Rabīʿ II 898H/10 February 1493; copyist: Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad alḪayrī al-Anṣārī) [m, ṭ, r, i]

 72 In MS Cairo, Dār al-Kutub wāʾ 3078 (Sohag 39 manṭiq) the section on Logic starts at Ǧadal V.5 (p. 284.8 Cairo ed.) onwards; see the incipit in A, p. 73. 73 It is the manuscript recorded in the Cairo edition with the siglum: . 74 It is the manuscript recorded in the Cairo edition with the siglum: . 75 It is the manuscript recorded in the Cairo edition with the siglum: .

‫ب‬ ‫دا‬ ‫د‬

I The Textual Tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal  lxxxv

Hyderabad (India) [3 MSS, 2 checked] 15) *Dār al-Kutub al-Ḫalīliyya 414 [m, ṭ, r, i] 16) *Osmaniya University Library, acq. 582 (13th/19th c.) [m_i-iii.II.2] 17) Salar Jung Museum Library 76 (1108H/1696–7) [m, ṭ_i-iii] (AHMED 2012, p. 203 n° 14) İstanbul (Turkey) [30 MSS, checked] 18) *Beyazit Kütüphanesi (form.: ʿUmūmī) 3966 [m, ṭ, r, i] (E1–2, A, M; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 63 n° 24) 19) *Beyazit Kütüphanesi (form.: ʿUmūmī) 4288 [m] (E1, A) 20) *Köprülü Halk Kütüphanesi, Fazil Ahmet Paşa 894 [m, ṭ, i] (E1–2, A, M, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 63 n° 30) 21) *Millet Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Ali Emiri 1504 (26 Šaʿbān 674H/21 February 1276) [m_i-iv] (E1–2, A, M, G2)76 22) *Millet Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Feyzullah Efendi 1206 (Muḥarram 1093H/January-February 1682; copyist: Muḥammad Wālī Ibn Mīr Ḥamat Šāh mawlānā Muḥammad Ibn Waʿī; place: dār al-ṣulṭana Iṣfahān) [m_i-iii] (E1–2, A, M, G2) 23) *Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2708 (10th/16th c. in A, p. 77) [m, ṭ, a fragment of r, i] (E1–2, A, M, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 63 n° 32)77 24) *Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2709 (17 Ǧumādā II 886H/22 August 1481 [Logic]; 897H/1491–2 [Mathematics]; 18 Šawwāl 894H/23 September 1489 [Metaphysics]; copyists: Ibn Muḥammad Zāhid al-Ḥiǧāzī al-Ḥanafī, in Dār al-Malik Šīrāz, in the Madrasat Dār al-Aytām [886H]; Aḥmad Ibn ʿAlī [897H]) [m, ṭ, r, i] (E1–2, A, M, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 64 n° 33) 25) *Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2710 (25 Rabīʿ I–25 Šawwāl 666H/21 December 1267–15 July 1268, copyist: ʿAbd al-Kāfī Ibn ʿAbd al-Maǧīd Ibn ʿAbd Allāh alTabrīzī) [m, ṭ, r, i] (E1–2, A, M, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 64 n° 34) 26) *Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Aşir Efendi 207 (al-ʿašir al-awsaṭ min Ḏī l-ḥiğğa 680H/30 March–8 April 1282; copyist: Muḥammad Ibn ʿAlī Ibn Ǧaʿfar al-Mālikī al-Baġdādī) [m_i-iv] (E1–2, A, M, G2)78 27) *Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Atıf Efendi 1565 (dat. 11th/17th c. in A, p. 75; possibly before 29 Ṣafar 1135H/9 December 1722; several anonymous copyists) [m_i-v] (E1–2, A, M, G2) 28) *Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 2442 (671H/1273 in Marāġa–674H/1276 in Ḫarbart; copyist: Amīr al-Dīn Manyūl) [m, i, ṭ, r] (E1–2, A, M, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 64 n° 40)  76 It is the manuscript recorded in the Cairo edition with the siglum: . 77 It is the manuscript recorded in the Cairo edition with the siglum: . 78 It is the manuscript recorded in the Cairo edition with the siglum: .

‫ﺎ‬ ‫ن‬ ‫ع‬

lxxxvi  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition 29) *Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 1424 (693H/1293–4; copyist: Abū Bakr ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Aḥmad Ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Tabrīzī) [m, ṭ, r, i] (E1–2, A, M, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 64 n° 44) 30) *Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 1425 (1125H/1713) [m, i] (E1–2, A, M, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 64 n° 45) 31) *Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 822 (6th–7th/12th–13th c., possibly 14th c.) [m, ṭ, r, i incompl.: on f. 355r Ilāhiyyāt X.4, p. 447.14 of Cairo ed.–end] (E1–2, A, M, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 64 n° 46) 32) *Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 823 (697H/1297–8; copyist: Šahāb al-Karmīnī; place: madrasa of Ūrḫān, in Tabrīz) [m, ṭ, r, i] (E1–2, A, M, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 47) 33) *Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 824 (824H/1421) [m] (E1–2, A, M, G2)79 34) *Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 795 (1066H/1655) [m, ṭ, i] (E1–2, A, M, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 50) 35) *Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hekimoǧlu Ali Paşa 857 (23 Ramaḍān 1102H/20 June 1691) [m, ṭ, r, i] (E1–2, A, M, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 51) 36) *Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Lâleli 2550 (1023H/1614) [m, ṭ] (E1–2, A, M, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 54) 37) *Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 909 (29 Ǧumādā II 1134H/16 April 1722, copyist: Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad al-Uskūbī, under the request of Asʿad Ibn ʿAlī Ibn ʿUṯmān al-Yānyawī; place: madrasa of Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī [in Constantinople]) [m] (M, E2, G2) 38) *Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 910 [m, ṭ, r, i] (A; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 64 n° 38) 39) *Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa 1748 (27 Raǧab 879H/16 December 1474; copyist: Hāšim ʿAlī al-Nāẓir Raʾīf [?]) [m, ṭ, i] (B, E1–2, A, M, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 55) 40) *Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 770 (18 Rabīʿ II 888H/4 June 1483; copyist: Muḥammad b. Maḥbūb b. ʿAbd Allāh) [m, ṭ, r, i] (B, E1–2, A, M, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 56) 41) *Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 771 (Rabīʿ I 885H/May–June 1480; copyist of the natural section: ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. Manṣūr b. Ismaʿīl) [m_i-v + ṭ] (E1–2, A, M, G2) 42) *Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 772 (628H/1231) [m] (E1–2, A, M, G2)80 43) *Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 773 (26 Šaʿbān 1041H/18 March 1632; copyist: Muḥammad Ibn ʿAlī al-Talwāḥī [?]) [m_i-iv] (E1–2, A, M, G2)

 79 It is the manuscript recorded in the Cairo edition with the siglum: 80 It is the manuscript recorded in the Cairo edition with the siglum:

‫س‬. ‫ى‬.

I The Textual Tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal  lxxxvii

44) *Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi, Turhan Valide Sultan 208 [m] (E1–2, A, M, G2) 45) *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3261 (10 Rabīʿ I 677H/8 August 1278 in Baġdād; copyist: ʿAbdu l-Raḥman, named (al-mulaqqab) Sayf al-Abšīḥī [?]) [m, ṭ_i] (E1–2, A, M, G2) 46) *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3262 (9th/15th c.) [m, ṭ, i] (E1, A, M, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 57) 47) *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3445 (11th/17th c. A; likely before 15th–16th c.) [m] (E1, A, M, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 59) Jerusalem (Israel) [1 MS, checked] 48) *The National Library of Israel, Yahuda’s Collection, Ar. 9 [m_i-ii.VI] (WUST 2016, pp. 48–5181) Kashan (Iran) [1 MS, checked] 49) *Fahrang va Irshad 15 (11th/17th c.) [m] (D) Khvoy (Iran) [1 MS, checked] 50) *Kitābḫānah-i Madrasa-i Namāzī 247 (Ramaḍān 986H/November–December 1578; patron: ʿAbd al-Ḫāliq Ibn Muḥammad Maḥmūd from Gīlān) [m, ṭ, r, i] (D, F) Leiden (Netherlands) [1 MS, checked]82 51) *Universiteitsbibliotheek Or. 4 (Golius Collection) (Catalogue CCO, n. 1444) (before 10th/16th c.) [m, ṭ, i] (B, A, M, E2, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 66 n° 63; BERTOLACCI 2006, Appendix A; WITKAM 2012, pp. 225–233) London (UK) [5 MSS, checked] 52) *British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections (ex: British Museum), Or. 113 (Ḏū l-ḥiǧǧa 576H/April–May 1181) [m, ṭi–iv] (M, G2)83 53) *British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, India Office Ar. 1420 (= n° 475 in the catalogue by O. Loth, p. 131) (Kashmir, 1148H/1735–6) [m] (B, M, E2, G2; AHMED 2012, p. 205, n° 26)84

 81 Description also available at: beta.nli.org.il/en/manuscripts/NNL_ALEPH003148900/NLI. 82 MS Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek Or. 84 (Golius Collection) (Catalogue CCO, n. 1445) does not preserve the Madḫal. 83 Corresponding to manuscript number 1655 in CURETON AND RIEU 1871, p. 745. 84 It is the manuscript recorded in the Cairo edition with the siglum: ; in the introduction to the edition (p. 74) and in GUTAS 2014, p. 421, it is recorded as India Office 4752.

‫ﻫـ‬

lxxxviii  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition 54) *British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Jones Collection 114 (1046H/1636) [m_i-ii.5.4, i_III.6–IV.2, r_i-ii, iv] (Bsuppl., M, E2, G2; AHMED 2012, pp. 207–208, n° 28) 55) *British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Or. 7500 (11th/17th c.) [m, ṭ, i_I-IX] (B, A, E2, M, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 67 n° 68)85 56) *Royal Asiatic Society, Arabic 58 (Rabīʿ al-Awwal 1082H/July–August 1671; copyist: Faḍl Allāh Ibn Ḥusayn Azbunī [?]) [m, ṭ, r, i] Mašhad (Iran) [6 MSS, 2 checked]86 57) Ǧāmiʿ-i Gawharšād Library 0000/1 (Ṣafar 1337H/November–December 1918; copyist: Muḥammad Ḥasan Mūsavī Iṣfahānī; place: Ḥyderābād) [m_i-ii.I.2] (D) 58) *Kitābḫānah-i Āstān-i Quds-i Razavī 1119 (11th/17th c.) [m] (D, F) 59) *Kitābḫānah-i Āstān-i Quds-i Raḍavī 22582 [m_i-ii, ṭ] (F) 60) Kitābḫānah-i Āstān-i Quds-i Razavī I 3/156 [m] (A, M, E2, G2) 61) Kitābḫānah-i Āstān-i Quds-i Razavī 490 (11th–12th/17th–18th c.) [m] (D) 62) Šayḫ ʿAlī Ḥaydar 442 (Šaʿbān 1006H/March–April 1598; copyist: ʿAbd alRaḥmān Ibn Muḥammad al-Urmawī, place of copying: Constantinople) [m, ṭ] (D) Mosul (Iraq) [1 MS, 0 checked] 63) Maktabat al-Awqāf 16 (Library 40 in the Catalogue of 1927, p. 189; ex: Madrasat Masǧid Muḥḍir Bāšī) (678H/1279–80) [2 vols; m, ṭ, r, i] (B1, A) Mount Sinai (Egypt) [1 MS, 0 checked] 64) Saint Catherine’s Monastery 579 [m_i-iv.VI.2] Najaf (Iraq) [1 MS, checked] 65) *Maktabat al-Imām Amīr al-Muʾminīn 1096 (copyist: ʿAbd al-Ḥayy Ibn ʿAbd alRazzāq Riḍawī, 1091H/1680–1 from an exemplar copied in Ǧumādā II 503H/January 1110 in Baġdād) [m, i] New Delhi (India) [1 MS, 0 checked] 66) National Museum 56.9613 (941H/1534–5) [m] Paris (France) [1 MS, checked] 67) *Bibliothèque nationale, Ar. 6829 (Ḏū l-ḥiğğa 1054H–Ḏū l-Qaʿda 1055H/January or February 1645–December or January 1646; copyist: Muḥammad Riḍā Ibn  85 It is the manuscript recorded in the Cairo edition with the siglum: . 86 MSS Kitābḫānah-i Āstān-i Quds-i Razavī IV, 3/260 and 3/261 (M, E2, G2) preserve, according to GUTAS 2014, p. 421, only the fifth fann of the section on Logic, i.e. the Burhān.

‫م‬

I The Textual Tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal  lxxxix

[marḥūm] Šāh Muḥammad Kūnbānī) [m, i] (A, E2, M, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 68 n° 84) Patna, Bihar (India) [2 MSS, 0 checked] 68) Khudā Bakhsh Oriental Public Library (Bankipur) Catalogue vol. XL, 3465 = HL 4286 [m, ṭ] (AHMED 2012, p. 202 n. 10) 69) Khudā Bakhsh Oriental Public Library (Bankipur), (Catalogue vol. XL, 3469 = HL 3561A) [m, ṭ] Pešawar (Pakistan) [1 MS, 0 checked] 70) Maktabat Dār al-ʿUlūm al-Islāmiyya 1672 [m, ṭ, r, i] (Bsuppl., A; AHMED 2012, p. 200 n. 4) Princeton (USA) [1 MS, 0 checked] 71) Princeton University Library 977 (19 Šaʿbān 1295H/18 August 1878; copyist: alḤusayn al-Arrānī al-Kašānī) [m] (MACH-ORMSBY 1987, p. 307) Qom (Iran) [4 MSS, 0 checked] 72) Maʿṣūmie 655 (14th/20th c.) [m_i-ii.I.3] (D) 73) Madrasah-i Raẓavīyah Library 52 (23 Šaʿbān 1080H/16 January 1670; copyist: Quṭb al-Dīn Muḥammad Ǧīlānī) [m] (D) 74) Marʿashī Najafī (Āyat Allāh) Library 3774 [m_i.9–ii] (D) 75) Marʿashī Najafī (Āyat Allāh) Library 8145 [m] (D) Rampur (India) [5 MSS, 3 checked] 76) *Rampur Raza Library, Ḥikma 112 [n. 3476] (718H/1318–9; copyist: Maḥmūd Ibn ʿAlī Ibn Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Kašānī) [m, ṭ, i] (B, A; AHMED 2012, p. 202, n° 7; MASSANI 1953, p. 447, nr. 13) 77) *Rampur Raza Library, 3477‫( ع‬12th/18th c. according to ʿARSHĪ 1971, vol. 4, pp. 442–443, nr. 3477) [m, ṭ, r, i] 78) *Rampur Raza Library, 3478‫( ع‬1267H/1851; copyist: Fadawī (or Fadwā?) Kahīmkaran Wās [Khem Karan in the Catalogue, fol. 329r, end of Logic] and Muḥammad Ḥāšim; see ʿARSHĪ 1971, vol. 4, pp. 442–443, nr. 3478) [m, ṭ, i] 79) Rampur Raza Library, 3479 (1293/1876, copyist: ʿIzzat ʿAlī Gorakhpūrī) [m, ṭ, r, i] five volumes (+ nr. 3480, 3481, 3482, 3483) – Logic in two parts. 80) Rampur Raza Library, 3484 (12th/18th c.) [m] St. Petersburg (Russia) [2 MSS, 0 checked] 81) Oriental Section of St. Petersburg University Scientific Library, 62 [m, ṭ] 82) Oriental Section of St. Petersburg University Scientific Library, 195 (16 Ḏū lQaʿda 1086H/1 February 1676; copyist: Muḥammad Ibn Ṭāhir Labkarī [?]) [m_iiii]

xc  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition Tehran (Iran) [30 MSS, 21 checked] 83) *Kitābḫānah-i Madrasah-i ʿĀlī-i Sipahsālār (now: Kitābḫānah-i Madrasah-i ʿĀlī-i Shahīd Muṭahharī) 1438 (20 Muḥarram 1053H/10 April 1643; copyist: Muḥammad Muḥsin Ibn Muḥammad Ḥusayn Ḫātūnābādī) [m, ṭ, r, i] (M, E2, D, F, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 70 n° 106) 84) *Kitābḫānah-i Madrasah-i ʿĀlī-i Sipahsālār (now: Kitābḫānah-i Madrasah-i ʿĀlī-i Shahīd Muṭahharī) 1439 (29 Rabīʿ I 1075H/20 October 1664; copyist: Zayn alʿĀbidīn Ibn Ḥāǧǧī Muḥammad Rāzānī) [m, ṭ, r, i] (M, E2, D, F, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 70 n° 107) 85) *Kitābḫānah-i Madrasah-i ʿĀlī-i Sipahsālār (now: Kitābḫānah-i Madrasah-i ʿĀlī-i Shahīd Muṭahharī) 8331 (1055H/1645; copyist: Faḍl Allāh Ibn Ḥusayn Nāyīnī Ilāhī) [m, ṭ, r, i] (M, E2, D, F, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 70 n° 108) 86) *Kitābḫānah-i Maǧlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 135 (Šaʿbān 871H/March 1467; copyist: ʿAlī Ibn Fatḥ Allāh al-Maʿdānī al-Iṣfahānī) [m, ṭ, i] (B, M, E2, D, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 69 n° 89) 87) *Kitābḫānah-i Maǧlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 1893 (1097H/1685) [m_i-v, r_iv] (D, F) 88) *Kitābḫānah-i Maǧlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 1895 (994H/1586) [m] (D) 89) *Kitābḫānah-i Maǧlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 1906 (old nr. 00432) [m] (D) 90) *Kitābḫānah-i Maǧlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 1907 (old n. 00431) (11th/17th c.) [m_i-iv] (D, F) 91) *Kitābḫānah-i Maǧlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 1908 (old n. 00424) (13th/19th c.) [m_i.I.5– iv incompl.] (D, F) 92) *Kitābḫānah-i Maǧlis-i Šūrā-yi Islāmī, old nr. 00158 [m_i.I.10–ix] 93) Kitābḫānah-i Maǧlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī, Ṭabāṭabāʾī 889 (7th/13th c.) [m_i] (M, E2, G2) 94) Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 34 (11th/17th c.) [m_i-iv] (D) 95) *Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 236/1 (11th/17th c.) [m] (D) 96) Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 289 (12th/18th c.) [m_i-ii] (D) 97) Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 592 (12th/18th c.) [m_i-iv] (D) 98) *Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 593/1 (14th/20th c.) [m_i-iv.I.7] (D) 99) Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān, Miškāt 241 (Šīrāz, 1075H/1664; copyist: Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-Ardistānī) [m, ṭ] (M, E2, G2) 100) *Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān, Miškāt 243 (collated with a manuscript dat. 536H, presumably MS Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Malik 4276) [m, ṭ, r, i] (A, M, E2, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 69 n° 102) 101) Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 5137 (11th/17th c.) [m] (D) 102) *Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 2288 (14th/20th c.) [m_i-iv.I.5] (D) 103) Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 1448 [m] (D) 104) Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 1449 [m, ṭ] (D) 105) *Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 6596 (1076H/1665–6; copyist: Sulṭān Muḥammad Ibn Rafīʿ al-Dīn Muḥammad Iṣfahānī; owners: ʿAbd al-Nabī Qazwīnī; Muḥammad ʿAlī Ibn Ibrāhīm) [m, ṭ, r_i-iii-iv-ii, i] (D)

I The Textual Tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal  xci

106) Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 6684/2 (12th/18th c.) [part of m_i] (D) 107) *Kitābḫānah-i Millī Ǧumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran 580 (10th/16th c.) [m, ṭ, r, i] (M, E2, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 69 n° 103) = 1326 (+ 1327) 108) *Kitābḫānah-i Millī Ǧumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran 1801 (final colophon, different hand: 1343H/1924–5; copyist: Mīrzā Yad Allāh Kaǧūrī mulaqqab bi-Naẓar Pāk; place: Tehran, madrasa Nāṣiriyya) [m] (D) 109) *Kitābḫānah-i Millī Ǧumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran 7590 (11th/17th c. [owners’ notes of the 12th/18th c.]; copyist: Muḥammad al-madʿū bi-Rabīʿ [= Muḥammad Rabīʿ Nišābūrī: Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī 1776/5 (1016H/1607–8) [?]) [m_i-ii, i] 110) *Kitābḫānah-i Millī Ǧumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran 20266 (1318H/1900–1) [m_i-iv] 111) *Kitābḫānah-i Millī Malik 1057 (9th/15th c.) [m] (M, E2, D, G2) 112) *Kitābḫānah-i Millī Malik 4276 (First decade of Ḏū l-Ḥiǧǧa 536H/4th–13th July 1142) [m_i-ii.3] (M, E2, D, G2) Private collections 113) Austin (USA), Ḥāfiẓ Farmānfarmāʾīyān Private Collection, no number (1 Ḏū lQaʿda 1060–26 Šaʿbān 1061H/26 October 1650–14 August 1651; copyist: Muḥammad Muqīm Ibn Ḥāǧǧī Pīrnūrs Zubdah) [m, r, i] (D, F) 114) Leiden (Netherlands), E. J. Brill Collection 238 (11th–12th/17th–18th c.) [m]87 115) *London (UK), Sam Fogg Collection 18770 (24 Ǧumādā I 898H/22 March 1493; copyist: ʿAbd al-Salām Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad, a.k.a. Amīn Allāh alMutaṭabbib al-Ṣādiqī al-Muršidī) [m, ṭ, r [?], i] Purchased from Christie’s. 116) Qazvin (Iran), Khāndān-i Mīr Ḥussaynā-yi Qazvīnī 135 (9th–10th/15th–16th c.) [m_i–iv.VII] (D) 117) Tehran (Iran), Asġar Mahdavī Private Collection 512 (11th–17th c.) [m] (D)88 Auctions 118) London (UK), Sotheby’s, The Shakerine Collection: Calligraphy in Qur’ans and other Manuscripts, lot 15, purchased from Christie’s London, 27 April 1993, lot 62 (dat. Ǧumādā I 897H/March-April 1492, copyist: Aḥmad Ibn ʿAlī al-Šīrāzī; patron: ʿAlā Ibn al-Ḥusayn Ibn ʿAlī al-Bayhaqī, owner of the MS in Rabīʿ I 898/January 1493; owners: Ibn al-marḥūm ʿAbd Allāh al-ṭabīb Muḥammad Naṣīr; Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ṭūsī) [m]

 87 Recorded in the catalogue of the collection KONINGSVELD AND AL-SAMARRAI 1978, p. 137. 88 Also recorded in the catalogue of the collection ASHK-E SHIRIN [forthcoming]. Another MS of the Asġar Mahdavī Private Collection is recorded in D as preserving the section on Logic, namely MS 444 (VI–VIII/XII–XIV c.), but it preserves only the fourth fann on Qiyās (this piece of information is recorded in D and in the forthcoming catalogue of the collection ASHK-E SHIRIN [forthcoming]).

xcii  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition Manuscript of uncertain content – Possibly containing Madḫal (11 MSS) Cairo (Egypt) [1 MS, 0 checked] 119) Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Waṯāʾiq al-Qawmiyya, falsafa, Ṭalʿat 342 (1092H/1619–20) [part of m + ṭ_i-iv] (A, S) İstanbul (Turkey) [1 MS, 0 found: lost?] 120) †Türk İslam Eserleri Müzesi, Çoban Mustafa Paşa Kütüphanesi 572 (E1, A, M; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 63 n° 27) Kolkata (Calcutta, Bengal, India) [1 MS, 0 checked] 121) Asiatic Society of Bengal Library, Ar. 102 (11th/17th c., from an exemplar of 469H/1076–7) [m, ṭ, r, i] (nr. L 16 in the Catalogue of 1904, p. 82; nr. 1413 in the Catalogue of 1949, vol. II, pp. 146–7) (B, A, M): = Asiatic Society of Bengal Library, Ar. 82?89 Mašhad (Iran) [2 MSS, 0 checked] 122) Private Collection ʿAbd al-Maǧīd Mawlavī 322 [part of m] (D) 123) Ǧāmiʿ-i Gawharšād Library 2175 (14th/20th c.; owner: Hāšim Qazwīnī in 1380H) [part of m] Mosul (Iraq) [1 MS, 0 checked] 124) Maktabat al-Awqāf, 16 (Library 40 in the Catalogue of 1927, p. 189; ex: Madrasat Masǧid Muḥḍir Bāšī) (678H/1279–80) [2 vols; m, ṭ, r, i] (B, A; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 68 n° 80) Patna (Bihar, India) [1 MS, 0 checked] 125) Khuda Bakhsh Oriental Public Library (Bankipur) XXI, 2223 [part of m] (E2, M, A, Bsuppl., G2)90 Qom (Iran) [1 MS, 0 checked] 126) Markaz-i Iḥyāʾ-i Mīrāṯ-i Islāmī 6085 (11th/17th c.) [m_?-v] Private collection [3 MSS, 0 checked] 127) Iran, Arak, Ḥuǧǧat al-Islām wa-l-Muslīmin Aqā Sayyid Kāzim Mīr Yaḥyā Private Collection 25

 89 See AHMED 2012, pp. 201–202, n° 6. If Ahmed is right in identifying Ar. 102 with Bengal 82, then the manuscript might only contain the fourth fann of Logic (Qiyās), as in A, p. 70. 90 MS Khudā Bakhsh Oriental Public Library (Bankipur), Catalogue vol. XXI, 2224 may preserve the second part of the section on Logic.

I The Textual Tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal  xciii

128) Tehran (Iran), Asġar Mahdavī Private Collection, no number (nr. 829 of the collection’s catalogue, p. 774) 129) Tehran (Iran), Muhīt Ṭabāṭabāʾī Private Collection

I.3 The Twelfth-Century Latin Translation I.3.1 State of the Art One of the earliest witnesses of Avicenna’s Madḫal is the twelfth-century Latin translation of the work. Known under the title ‘Logica Avicennae’, it was the first translation within the framework of a larger project aimed at translating the Šifāʾ, begun in Toledo by the Jewish translator Avendauth (Latinization of Ibn Daud, d. ca. 1180) and the philosopher Dominicus Gundissalinus (d. after 1181)91. The importance of this translation as a witness for Avicenna’s text lies in the fact that it reproduces the readings of an Arabic exemplar that, if extant, might be the earliest manuscript witness of the work. The Latin text is preserved in thirteen manuscripts92, as well as in the sixteenth-century printed edition (Tab 1 below features a list of the witnesses with the sigla employed in this Introduction).

 91 On the Toledan translation movement, see BURNETT 2011, FIDORA 2011, BERTOLACCI 2011a. On the Latin translations of Avicenna’s works, see JANSSENS 2011; on Avendauth and Gundissalinus, see: D’ALVERNY 1952 and EAD. 1954; ALONSO ALONSO 1943 and ID. 1947; POLLONI 2015 (esp. pp. 15–20), FREUDENTHAL 2016, and, focusing on Avendauth, HUDRY 2017. On the characteristics of the Latin translation of Avicenna’s Madḫal, see DI VINCENZO 2012. A few words on the authorship of the translation are required. The translation is accompanied, in part of the manuscript tradition, by an introductory letter by the translator, who presents himself as Avendeuth Israhelita, very likely the Avendeuth Israelita Philosophus that collaborated with Dominicus Gundisalvi on the translation of Avicenna’s Nafs of the Šifāʾ. An authorial ascription to Avendauth is also found in the manuscripts that preserve the translation of Madḫal I.12, which also circulated independently. Since the manuscripts that preserve the rest of the work without the letter and chap. I.12 do not present any authorial ascription, contemporary scholarship cautiously treated the translation of most of the work as anonymous. A recent contribution by D. N. Hasse and A. Büttner (HASSE AND BÜTTNER 2018) revealed a significant compatibility of the style and language of this translation with other translations by Gundissalinus. It is worth considering the possibility that the translation is the result of a collaboration between Avendauth and Gundissalinus, like the translation of Avicenna’s Nafs of the Šifāʾ, even if Gundissalinus is not explicitly mentioned as a co-author. 92 See also CHEMIN 1981–1983.

xciv  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition Tab. 1: Witnesses of the Latin translation with the sigla employed (in alphabetical order) B

Bruges, Sted. Openb. Bibl.  (th–th c.)

C

Cordoba, Bibl. capit.  (th c.)

D

Dubrovnik, Dominik. Samostan  (-V-) (th c.)

F

Paris, BnF lat.  (th c.)

G

Graz, Universitätsbibl.,  (th c.)

N

Napoli, Bibl. Nazionale VIII.E. (th c.)

M

Oxford, Merton Coll.  (th c.)

O

Oxford, Bodl. Libr., Digby  (th c.)

P

Paris, BnF lat.  (th c.)

R

Roma, Bibl. Angelica  (C..) (th c.)

V

Vat. lat.  (th–th c.)

U

Vat. lat.  (th c.)

W

Oxford, Oriel Coll.  (th c.)

Ven. 

Avicenne Perhypatetici philosophi ac medicorum facile primi opera in lucem redacta ac nuper quantum ars niti potuit per canonicos emendate, Venetiis .

The different parts of Avicenna’s Madḫal were transmitted in an inhomogeneous way within the Latin tradition. Apparently, great relevance was attributed within the Latin tradition to chapter I.12 on universals; the chapter is the only one to have also had an independent circulation, separate from the rest of the work93. The Latin translation of al-Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction and Avicenna’s Prologue (Madḫal I.1) was, by contrast, poorly transmitted: it is only preserved in two manuscripts, which also preserve a letter by Avendauth, presumably addressed to the archbishop of Toledo94. For a classification of the Latin manuscripts according to their content, see Tab. 2. A critical edition of the text of the Latin translation by Françoise Hudry has been published very recently95. The present edition of the Arabic text also benefits from Hudry’s edition of the Latin translation, departing from its text when deemed necessary on the basis of an analysis of the manuscripts.

 93 Cf. DI VINCENZO 2012. 94 Published on the basis of MS B in BIRKENMAJER 1934, pp. 314–317; on the basis of MS U in D’ALVERNY 1954, p. 32 and, finally, in BERTOLACCI 2002a, pp. 133–134. 95 AVICENNA 2018.

I The Textual Tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal  xcv

Tab. 2: Witnesses of the Latin translation classified according to their content Avicenna’s

Avendauth’s

Ǧūzǧānī’s

Chap.

*Chap.

Chap.

*Chap.

Letter

Introduction

I.–

I.

I.–II.

I.

V

…

…

…

x

U

x

x

x

x

x

x

…

…

x

B

x

x

x

x

x

…

x

x

C

x (excerpta)

x (excerpta)

x (excerpta)

G

…

…

…

x (exc.)

…

x (exc.)

x

x

…

x

x

…

…

…

x

…

x

x

R

…

…

…

…

x

…

…

O F

…

…

…

…

x

…

…

…

…

…

…

x

…

…

D

…

…

…

…

x

…

…

W

…

…

…

…

x (exc.)

…

…

N

…

…

…

x

…

x

…

P

…

…

…

x

…

x

…

M

…

…

…

x

…

x

…

Ven. 

Prologue (Chap. I.)

I.3.2 Characteristics of the Latin Translation With respect to the Arabic text, the Latin translation presents certain peculiar features that still require an in-depth study, such as the presence of double translations and explanatory additions to the text, presumably by the translator. Double translations. The study of medieval Latin translations brought to light the frequent occurrence in the manuscript tradition of double, alternative renderings of a single expression; whether these double translations originated in the course of the transmission of the texts, or were the result of the translators’ hesitation and oscillation in their choice of wording, is the subject of debate in each specific case. Simone Van Riet observed the phenomenon with regard to the Latin translations of the Nafs96, Ilāhiyyāt97 and Samāʿ Ṭabīʿī98 of the Šifāʾ. Since in some cases – such as that of the Latin translation of the Nafs – the alternative variants determined a bipartition of the manuscript tradition, Van Riet initially interpreted the phenomenon

 96 AVICENNA 1968–1972 and VAN RIET 1963, pp. 583–626. 97 AVICENNA 1977–1980. 98 AVICENNA 1992.

xcvi  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition as the result of a non-authorial second recension99. Subsequently she conceded that even if the formation of two distinct recensions is due to the manuscript tradition, both recensions may derive from a unique exemplar in which the double variants were inserted by the author100. Jules Janssens has claimed, with regard to the first treatises of Avicenna’s Physica, that the double translations may have been in the translator’s exemplar101, and Roland Hissette has similarly interpreted the cases of double readings found in the Latin translations of Averroes’ Middle Commentaries on Isagoge, Categories and De Interpretatione102. The phenomenon of these double translations can also be observed in the Latin translation of the Madḫal. Certain instances, concerning either single Arabic terms or longer passages, are attested uniformly by all the manuscripts (e.g. Tab. 3, cases 1–2 and 5), whereas others are attested in a non-uniform manner by the different manuscripts (e.g. Tab. 3, cases 3–4 and 6). In more detail, cases 1–2 show some double renderings of a single Arabic expression separated by ‘vel’ (‘or’) concordantly attested in the manuscript tradition. In both cases, one of the two renderings can be identified as that which is preferably employed by the translator; in case 1, for instance, the usual rendering for the terms that derive from the same root as yušār in other occurrences of the text is designare, whereas in case 2 the expression al-insān al-šaḫṣī – there rendered both as individuum and homo singularis – is elsewhere rendered as homo singularis (which is also the most literal rendering of the Arabic). The double translation variatur vel differt in case 3 is attested by two manuscripts, whereas the others attest variatur only; in two of these witnesses, the alternative vel differt is interlinear and marginal. Case 4 is an instance of an oscillation with regard to the translation of the Arabic ḏātī (“essential”) – rendered both as substantialis and as essentialis – which can be found in several occurrences of the same term in Madḫal I.5103. In this case, the manuscript tradition is also divided: MSS VP tend to attest substantialis, whereas the other manuscripts either preserve both translations (one as an interlinear variant, as in MS N) or preserve essentialis;

 99 VAN RIET 1963, p. 584: “nous appellerons ‘leçons doubles’ les mots, les tournures ou les phrases à propos desquels se produisent les bifurcations. L’existence des leçons doubles ne permet plus de parler de ‘la’ traduction du De Anima, sans plus. D’autre part, il n’y a pas deux traductions indépendantes l’une de l’autre, puisqu’un texte commun entoure les leçons doubles. Nous dirons plutôt qu’il y a une traduction sous deux formes différentes.” 100 See AVICENNA 1992, p. 60*: “il n’est pas contradictoire de poser, au sommet de la tradition manuscrite des deux recensions existantes, un ancêtre unique et d’accepter simultanément que les deux recensions se soient formées au cours des ans”. 101 See JANSSENS 2002, pp. 113–129 and AVICENNA 2006, p. 69*. 102 AVERROES 1996; AVERROES 2010 and HISSETTE 2010, pp. 433–455. 103 The phenomenon also concerns the occurrences of ḏāt (“essence”), variously rendered as substantia and essentia.

I The Textual Tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal  xcvii

in a few other occurrences, both the alternative renderings are juxtaposed in the text104. Case 4 also attests to the coexistence of quid est and esse rei as renderings of the Arabic māhiyya (“quiddity”); the two alternative translations are preserved separately in some manuscripts and juxtaposed in others105. Case 5 is a double translation of a passage uniformly attested by the manuscript tradition. It can be argued that the two translations presuppose a slightly different reading of the Arabic text: clause (b) appears to render al-šayʾ (aliquid in the Latin) instead of li-l-šayʾ, rendered as in aliquo in clause (a)106. Case 5 is not an isolated case: case 6 also shows two different translations – marked as (a) and (b) in Tab. 3 – of a single Arabic passage that are not uniformly attested by all the manuscripts. MSS VPN attest both the translations juxtaposed, whereas MSS UBC only preserve (b) and MSS GM only preserve (a). It should be noted that (a) and (b) surely presuppose a different Arabic text. Translation (b) corresponds to the correct Arabic text (“nor animate body is a genus for plants, angels and animals”), whereas translation (a) presupposes, perhaps, a reading of li-l-nās (“for men”) instead of li-l-nabāt (“for plants”), with the omission of al-ḥayawanāt (“animals”) in the Arabic. It can be suggested that (b) was meant as a correction of (a), which was possibly due to a corruption of the Arabic exemplar of the translator.

 104 As an attempt to explain how the alternative translations originated, it can be speculated that the possible overlap of substantialis, which is the privileged rendering for the term ḏātī in the rest of the translation, with the translation of the Arabic ǧawharī (“substantial”), may have led the translator to oscillate between substantialis and essentialis. 105 It may be objected that the manuscripts that preserve the two translations juxtaposed (quid est esse rei) might actually preserve a single rendering of the term māhiyya: quid est esse rei is, for instance, Boethius’ translation of the Greek τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι in Aristotle’s Topics, 153a15ff.; cf. Boeth. transl. Arist. Topica (AL V.1), p. 149.17ff. However, in the rest of the Latin translation of the Madḫal the Arabic māhiyya is systematically rendered as esse rei or simply esse; quid est esse rei is neither attested elsewhere as a rendering of māhiyya in the Latin translation of the Madḫal, nor in the Latin translations of Avicenna’s Nafs and Ilāhiyyāt of the Šifāʾ. More specifically, in the Latin translation of the Nafs, māhiyya is variously rendered as quid sit, essentia and substantia (AVICENNA 1968–1972, IV–V, p. 264 s.v. māhiyya and I–II–III, p. 365 s.v. māhiyya). In the Latin translation of the Ilāhiyyāt, māhiyya is translated as esse, essentia, quidditas and quid est (AVICENNA 1977–1980 – Lexiques, p. 122 s.v. māhiyya). Arguably, therefore, quid est and esse rei were conceived as two possible, substantially equivalent, translations of māhiyya. 106 See DI VINCENZO 2012, pp. 464–466.

xcviii  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition Tab. 3: Duplices lectiones in the Latin translation of Madḫal107 1. I.12, §2.1,

De qua intelligitur quod praedicatur de multis

p. 144.23–24. Cf.

differentibus specie ad interrogationem factam

AVICENNA 2018,

per quid, ita ut non exprimat vel designet1

p. 199

aliquid quod sit animal vel aliud aliquid […]. ____________

‫وﻣﻔﻬﻮﻣﻪ ٔﻧ ّﻪ اﳌﻘﻮل ﲆ ﻛﺜﲑﻦ‬ ‫ﳐﺘﻠﻔﲔ ﻟﻨﻮع ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ‬ ‫ﻣﻦ ﲑ ٔن ﺸﺎر إﱃ ﳾء ﻫﻮ‬ ‫ﺣ ﻮان ٔو ﲑ ذ‬

1. exprimat vel designet] exprimat vel designat a.c. R 2. I.12, §5.4,

Ergo cum unitas coniungitur humanitati 1,

p. 158.113–114. Cf.

fit homo singularis vel individuum in quo

AVICENNA 2018,

conveniunt omnia individua.

p. 209

____________ 1.

‫ﲆ اﻟﻮ ﻪ اﳌﺬ ﻮر‬

om. Lat.

3. I.2, §1.2.2,

Et haec autem considerantur secundum hoc

p. 22.19–20. Cf.

quod sunt id quod sunt ipsa, et consideratio

AVICENNA 2018,

earum non variatur vel differt1 in hoc quod

p. 125

expoliatae sunt.

‫ﻓﺎٕذا اﻗﱰﻧﺖ اﻟﻮ ﺪة ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ ﲆ‬ ‫اﻟﻮ ﻪ اﳌﺬ ﻮر ﺪث ﻣﳯﲈ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن‬ ّ ‫اﻟﺸﺨﴢ ا ي ﺸﱰك ﻓ ﻪ‬ ‫ﰻ‬ ‫ﴯﺺ‬ ‫وﻫﺬﻩ ﻓ ٕﺎ ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﯾُﻨﻈﺮ ٕا ﳱﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ‬ ‫اﻟﻨﻈﺮ‬ ‫ﱔ ﱔ ﻓﻼ ﯾﻔﺎرق ذ‬ ُ ‫ﳎﺮدة‬ ّ ‫اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ٕا ﳱﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ‬ َ

____________ 1. variatur vel differt] variatur NMPVG vel differt s.l. N mg. V2 variatur vel differt BU 4. I.5, §6.1,

Deinde est hic tractandum si oportet ut intentio

pp. 62.90–91. Cf.

verbi substantialis/essentialis1 sit continens

AVICENNA 2018,

intentionem verbi significantis quid est/esse

p. 145

rei2 sicut commune continet proprium aut non. ____________ 1. verbi substantialis VPNs.l. : verbi essentialis NMGBUV2

s.l.

‫ّﰒ ﻫﺎﻫﻨﺎ ﻣﻮﺿﻊ ﻧﻈﺮ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﻫﻞ ﳚﺐ‬ ‫ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻣﻌﲎ اﻠﻔﻆ ا اﰐ‬ ‫ﻣﺸ ﳣﻼ ﲆ ﻣﻌﲎ اﻠﻔﻆ ا ا ّل‬ ‫ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ اﺷ ل اﻟﻌﺎ ّم ﲆ‬ ‫اﳋﺎص ٔو ﻻ ﻜﻮن‬ ّ

|| 2. quid est] ras. post quid est V

esse rei s.l. V²N (quid est exp. N) quid est rei M quid est esse rei GBUP fort. Va.c. 5. I.7, §3.2.4,

[a] Cum autem fuerit in aliquo causa propter

p. 84.53–54.

quam illud fiat alicuius dispositionis quam

AVICENNA 2018,

habet causa, non debebit propter hoc ut habeat

p. 159

dispositionem accidentaliter: multa enim sunt huiusmodi. [b] Cum autem fuerit aliquid causa

‫وﻟ ﺲ إذا ﰷن ﻠﴚء ّ ﲠﺎ‬ ‫ﯾﺼﲑ ﲝﺎل وﻠﻌ ّ ﺗ اﳊﺎل ﳚﺐ‬ ‫ٔن ﻜﻮن ﺗ اﳊﺎل ﻟﻌﺮض‬ ‫ﻓﻜ ﲑ ﻣﻦ ا ٔﺷﯿﺎء ﲠﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻔﺔ‬

propter quam aliud fit alicuius dispositionis et

 107 The text of the Latin translation proposed here is mine. A correspondence with Hudry’s edition (AVICENNA 2018) of the text is provided; whenever the text is identical to the one I propose, the reader will find the corresponding page in Hudry’s edition without any further specification; when the text I propose differs from the one proposed in Hudry’s edition, the reader will find the indication of the corresponding page preceded by ‘Cf.’.

I The Textual Tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal  xcix

causa habet illam dispositionem, non ideo debet habere eam accidentaliter: multa enim ex rebus sunt huiusmodi. 6. I.11, §4.3,

[a] Nec corpus habens animam est genus homi-

p. 140.84–85. Cf.

num et angelorum [b] nec corpus habens

AVICENNA 2018,

animam est genus vegetabilium et angelorum

p. 193

et animalium.

‫ﺴﺎ‬

‫وﻻ اﳉﺴﻢ ذو اﻟﻨﻔﺲ‬ ‫ﻠﻨﺒﺎت واﳌﻼ ﻜﺔ واﳊﯿﻮا ت‬

____________ [a] habent VPNGM om. UBC [b] habent VPNUBC om. GM

Explanatory additions to the text. The Latin translation of Avicenna’s Madḫal also shows some additions to the Arabic text, concordantly attested in the manuscript tradition, which serve to better clarify certain references in Avicenna’s text (a couple of instances in Tab. 4 below). Case 1, for instance, explains the reference of hoc (“this”), namely the conception of something from a simple expression (ex uno verbo intelligere). Case 2 specifies that the mention of ‘man’ in that specific case refers to the species, rather than to an individual man: the specification is on point, since a distinction is introduced, in the passage, between ‘man’ as a species and ‘man’ as an individual. Tab. 4.108 1. I.4, §1, p. 40.6–

Intellectus autem saepe habetur ex uno solo

42.10. Cf. AVICENNA

verbo. […]. Cum vero addideris intellectui

2018, p. 135

esse vel non esse, iam addidisti ei alium intellectum, sicut postea declarabitur suo loco. Hoc autem, scilicet ex uno verbo1 intelligere, in paucis contingit, et praeter hoc in plerisque est diminutum et malum. _________ 1. ex uno verbo] uno verbo BU

2. I.12, §5.2.3,

Differentia autem quae est inter hominem

p. 156.101–102. Cf.

qui est species et inter individuum hominis,

AVICENNA 2018, p. 208

quod est commune non tantum nomine, sed

‫اﻟﺘﺼﻮر ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﻛﺜﲑا ﻣﺎ ﯾﻘﻊ ﲟﻌﲎ‬ ّ ‫و ٔ ّﻣﺎ‬ ‫[ وٕاذا ﻗﺮﻧﺖ ﳌﻌﲎ وﺟﻮدا‬...] ‫ﻣﻔﺮد‬ ‫ٔو ﺪﻣﺎ ﻓﻘﺪ ٔﺿﻔﺖ إﻟﯿﻪ ﻣﻌﲎ ٓﺧﺮ‬ ‫ﻛﲈ ﺳ ّﻀﺢ ﰲ ﻣﻮﺿﻌﻪ وذ‬ ‫ﰲ ﻗﻠﯿﻞ ﻣﻦ ا ٔﺷﯿﺎء وﻣﻊ ذ ﻓﻬﻮ‬ . ‫ﰲ ٔﻛﱶ ا ٔﻣﺮ ﻗﺺ رديء‬ 109

‫واﻟﻔﺮق ﺑﲔ ا ٔ ﺴﺎن ا ي ﻫﻮ اﻟﻨﻮع‬ ‫وﺑﲔ ﴯﺺ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ا ي ﯾﻌ ّﻢ ﻻ‬ ‫ ٔ ّن‬،‫ ﺑﻞ ﻟﻘﻮل ٔﯾﻀﺎ‬،‫ﻻﰟ ﻓﻘﻂ‬

 108 The text of the Latin translation proposed here is mine; the reader will also find the indication of the corresponding page in Hudry’s edition (AVICENNA 2018) preceded by ‘Cf.’. 109 The Arabic text quoted here is based on the Arabic manuscript G, whose text is affected by the same dislocation as the Latin translation. On the relation between the Latin translation and MS G, see section II.3.4.5.

c  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition etiam praedicatione de multis, hoc est: dicimus enim quod intellectus de homine qui est species est quod sit animal rationale

‫ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻩ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﺣ ﻮان‬ […] ‫ﻃﻖ‬

[…].

A preliminary comparative analysis of the Latin translation of Avicenna’s Madḫal with the Arabic text has revealed, besides a generally faithful translation of the Arabic text, some evidence of the translator’s technique, as well as his particular attention to the comprehensibility of the text. These examples of double translations concordantly attested in the manuscript tradition presented above (and perhaps also those attested differently within the different branches of the tradition) may be due to a revision of the translation accomplished by the author. The double translations attested concordantly in the manuscripts may have already been inserted in the text in the archetype of the tradition110, whereas those that are not uniformly attested may have been interlinear or marginal in the archetype or have been later added to it. Apparently, the double translations are mostly due to an indecision between two equivalent renderings (cases 1–4); however, some of them appear to be caused by uncertainty regarding the exact reading of the Arabic text (as in cases 5–6). In particular, cases 5–6 suggest an ascription of the double translation (even when not uniformly attested by all the manuscripts) to the translator himself, since a correction of the translation possibly based on a different Arabic text occurring at a later stage of the manuscript transmission is unlikely. Moreover, these cases indicate that the translation underwent a process of revision; whether such a revision was accomplished on the basis of more than just one Arabic exemplar, as case 6 in particular seems to suggest, is a possibility that should not be overlooked111. The additions exemplified in Tab. 4, which are uniformly attested in all the manuscripts, might either be ascribed to the translator, or to another figure close to him who could interpolate them in the archetype of the tradition112. The additions denote a certain effort to achieve a correct understanding of the text, as well as to  110 The existence of an archetype of the tradition is suggested by the presence of mistakes that affect all the manuscripts; for instance, in correspondence to Madḫal I.10, §2.2, p. 122.48, the Latin manuscripts all attest haec quinquemembris as a rendering of hāḏā l-taḫmīs, which may have occurred as an archetypal corruption of the original haec quinquemembris. For a different reading of the text, see AVICENNA 2018, p. 183. 111 Avendauth’s letter to the archbishop of Toledo states that al-Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction is preserved in several manuscripts (in plerisque codicibus): one might wonder whether this quick allusion to a plurality of manuscripts with which Avendauth was allegedly acquainted should be fully trusted as another clue of the use of more than one Arabic witness by the translator’s part. 112 Any figure that would have been allowed to make such modifications to the translation in the archetype would have been someone close to the translator himself, possibly collaborating with him, but there is no positive extant evidence of such a collaboration.

I The Textual Tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal  ci

provide an understandable translation of it. To attain this goal, the translator – or someone collaborating with him – may have felt the need to interpolate in the text something comparable to an explicative gloss, introduced by scilicet (cf. case 1), or further precisions (cf. case 2). On the basis of the provisional results displayed so far, it can be argued that a further, more systematic analysis of the Latin text compared with the Arabic would provide a considerable number of additional elements to cast a new light on the technique adopted in the translation of the Madḫal, as well as to establish whether the process of translation (and possibly revision) involved more than just one translator.

I.4 The Early Indirect Tradition: The Role of Avicenna’s Disciples For reasons that are yet to be ascertained, the production of textual commentaries on Avicenna’s Šifāʾ – contrary to that of his last major summa, the Kitāb al-Išārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt – had a rather late start in the 16th century CE. Prior to this, only three partial commentaries on the Šifāʾ are attested for the five centuries between the 11th and the 16th c., namely one by Ibn Zayla (d. 439H/1048)113, one by the ʿallāma al-Ḥillī (d. 726H/1325) on the section on Logic114, and one by Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606H/1210) on the section on Metaphysics115. These considerations are not meant to suggest that Avicenna’s Šifāʾ was left unstudied until the 16th century; on the contrary, the study of this work of Avicenna massively supported the exegesis of his Išārāt116. Moreover, even if textual commentaries in the most proper sense are poorly attested, the Šifāʾ was, since the earliest stages of its transmission, the object of a lively production of other kinds of exegetical materials, such as paraphrases and marginal annotations (ḥāšiyyāt). This latter textual material, which witnesses the existence of a flourishing teaching and exegetical activity surrounding the work, is progressively emerging as the study of the manuscript tradition of the work proceeds.

 113 On Ibn Zayla, see REISMAN 2002b, pp. 195–199. 114 See WISNOVSKY 2013, p. 194. A commentary on the Šifāʾ by Ibn Zayla is also attested by alNayrīzī: see POURJAVADY 2011, p. 113. 115 To my knowledge, the only source attesting a commentary by Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī on the Ilāhiyyāt is ṢALĀH AL-DĪN AL-ṢAFADĪ, Al-Wāfī bi-l-Wafayāt IV (ed. A. al-Arnā’ūṭ, T. Muṣṭafā [2000], p. 180; ed. S. Dedering [1974], p. 256), also quoted in ṢĀLIḤ AL-ZARKĀN 1963, p. 124 as a witness of a likely spurious work ascribed to al-Rāzī. The value of this attestation is rather uncertain, as al-Ṣafadī reports that Rukn al-Dīn Ibn al-Qawīʿ (according to the reading printed by al-Zarkān; Ibn al-Qawabʿ from the reading of the two editions) believed he saw, in the library of his father, a Šarḥ Ilāhiyyāt alŠifāʾ ascribed to al-Rāzī, hence his testimony is not direct. 116 See WISNOVSKY 2013, pp. 203–205.

cii  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition I.4.1 Paraphrasing the Madḫal within Avicenna’s School As for the Madḫal, it is not clear whether the two aforementioned commentaries on the section on Logic included a commentary on this fann; the commentary by the ʿallāma al-Ḥillī seemingly concerns only the second fann on the Categories (Maqūlāt)117, whereas the relevant manuscript that may preserve the commentary by Ibn Zayla must still be checked118. Hence, there is no certainty concerning the existence of a textual commentary on the first fann of the Šifāʾ at the earliest stages of the tradition of the work. The works that can be considered as the closest to a textual commentary are two paraphrases, one by the first-generation disciple of Avicenna, Bahmanyār Ibn al-Marzubān (d. 458H/1066)119, with the title Kitāb al-Taḥṣīl, and the other by Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Lawkarī (active between the 5th–6th/11th–12th centuries120) – reportedly his disciple121 – with the title Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān al-ṣidq. According to the historiographical sources, al-Lawkarī gave rise to the diffusion of the study of philosophy in the provinces of Khūrāsān122. Both works are conceived as summae of Avicennian philosophy and draw their materials from several Avicennian works, combining them in a unitary compilation. Al-Lawkarī’s Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān al-ṣidq is a still partially-unedited philosophical summa that was likely employed as a teaching manual; the section concerning Porphyry’s Isagoge, which is of great importance for the study of the textual tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal, of which it preserves several literal quotations, was edited by Ibrāhīm Dībāǧī in 1986123. Al-Lawkarī’s Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān al-ṣidq shows a twofold access to Avicenna’s texts, both direct and indirect: the work offers verbatim quotations taken both directly from Avicenna’s own works and indirectly from the quotations in Bahmanyār’s Kitāb al-Taḥṣīl124.  117 WISNOVSKY 2013, p. 203. 118 WISNOVSKY 2013, p. 203. 119 On Bahmanyār and his relation to Avicenna, see REISMAN 2002b, pp. 185–195; JANSSENS 2003 and AL-RAHIM 2009, pp. 9–14. 120 The date usually reported for al-Lawkarī’s death, i.e. 517H/1123, was provided in BROCKELMANN 1943–19492, vol. I, p. 602) on unknown basis. Although the date reconstructed for his death is uncertain, it is known from the oldest manuscript of Avicenna’s Taʿlīqāt that al-Lawkarī wrote the Fihrist (Index) of al-Taʿlīqāt in 503H/1109, which means that he was active between the second half of the eleventh and the first half of the twelfth century CE (see MARCOTTE 2006, pp. 134–138). 121 This piece of information is reported by AL-BAYHAQĪ, Tatimmat ṣiwān al-ḥikma, p. 120; there is, however, a chronological problem, since Bahmanyār died in 1066, so it is difficult to imagine alLawkarī as his student: see JANSSENS 2008. 122 AL-BAYHAQĪ, Tatimmat ṣiwān al-ḥikma, p. 120.11. 123 AL-LAWKARĪ 1986. 124 As J. Janssens pointed out, “the quotations are so literal that al-Lawkarī’s text may be used as an independent testimony, besides available manuscripts, for the establishment of the critical edition of the respective works” (JANSSENS 2008, p. 23). However, one should be aware that the section on Logic of al-Lawkarī’s Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān al-ṣidq was, as far as we know, transmitted by a single manuscript (MS Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 108). The critical

I The Textual Tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal  ciii

The present edition considers these two works by comparing them systematically with the witnesses of the direct tradition. A comparison between the passages of Avicenna’s Madḫal with their quotations in Bahmanyār’s and al-Lawkarī’s works gives us a glimpse of the readings preserved in the manuscripts of Avicenna’s Madḫal that the two authors had at their disposal. Interestingly, an analysis of the variant readings attested in the pieces of text quoted both by Bahmanyār and alLawkarī reveals that the two authors rely on two different manuscripts (except, of course, when al-Lawkarī’s quotations are based on Bahmanyār’s work). Bahmanyār (Bah in the stemma in section II.4) disposed of a manuscript that belonged to branch α of the manuscript tradition (see section II.3, point 3.5); al-Lawkarī (Law in the stemma in section II.4), on the other hand, had a manuscript of branch β of the tradition (see section II.3, point 4.5). As previously stated, the Šifāʾ was widely employed to expand and comment upon the Išārāt. This claim is also verified in the case of the Madḫal, several excerpts of which can be found quoted or paraphrased in the early commentaries on the Išārāt; some examples are the almost literal quotation of a long excerpt of Madḫal I.4, §1 in Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Šarḥ al-Išārāt (p. 11.2–11), and the abridged quotation of Madḫal I.11, §1.1 in Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s Šarḥ al-Išārāt (p. 266.7–8). Although this part of the early indirect tradition was occasionally taken into account, an in-depth, systematic analysis of it exceeds the scope of the present edition, in which preference was accorded to a systematic survey of the indirect sources that were judged to be relevant to the constitution of a critical text. The higher textual relevance ascribed to the paraphrases by Bahmanyār and al-Lawkarī is motivated by the fact that these indirect sources antedate (or are almost coeval to) the most ancient witnesses of the direct tradition of the text (i.e. MSS Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Malik 4276, London, BLOIOC Or. 113 and the twelfth-century Latin translation), and may eventually provide an insight into the readings preserved in early, now-lost manuscripts. Another indirect source employed in the present edition for analogous reasons is the correspondence between Avicenna and Ibn Zayla (see section I.4.2). I.4.2 Questioning the Madḫal within the School Among the earliest sources of quotations of Avicenna’s Šifāʾ, the Mubāḥaṯāt125 and the Taʿlīqāt stand out. These two works, which collect heterogeneous materials produced within Avicenna’s school, witness the existence of a lively interaction  edition is thus based on one witness only, and emendations of the text often had to be made by comparing it with the sources of al-Lawkarī’s quotations in the work (see the introduction to the edition by I. Dībāǧī, pp. 105–108). Our knowledge of the text of the section on Logic of al-Lawkarī’s work is, therefore, rather limited and imperfect. 125 On the tradition of the heterogeneous materials that form this work, see REISMAN 2002b.

civ  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition between the members of Avicenna’s circle and Avicenna himself, also regarding the subjects dealt with in the Šifāʾ. As for the Madḫal, the earliest indirect source of the text is the Mubāḥaṯāt. In particular, the portions of Avicenna’s Madḫal that are mentioned, quoted and commented upon in the Mubāḥaṯāt might all be fragments of a larger correspondence between Avicenna and one of his first-generation disciples and colleagues, namely Ibn Zayla126. It is generally acknowledged that Ibn Zayla had a special interest in logic; this claim is usually based on Reisman’s identification of some questions in the complex of the Mubāḥaṯāt concerning the section of the Burhān of the Šifāʾ that could be ascribed to his correspondence with Avicenna 127. In addition to this, he apparently had an interest in the classification of sciences, as can be inferred from: (i) a reply to him from Avicenna concerning a passage of the classification of the sciences in Madḫal I.2128 (henceforth referred to as “Letter to Ibn Zayla”); and (ii) a question concerning the scope of inquiry of the discipline of logic identified by Reisman as part of Avicenna’s correspondence with Ibn Zayla129, i.e. Mubāḥaṯāt 579–585, pp. 193–4130. (i) Avicenna’s Letter to Ibn Zayla focuses on a passage of Madḫal I.2 concerning the division into theoretical and practical sciences (§1.3.2), which was the object of this brief correspondence between Ibn Zayla and Avicenna131. Although the passage is not quoted verbatim, the reference can be easily identified. The issue raised by Ibn Zayla concerns the legitimacy of the use of the term naẓar (“theoretical inquiry”) when speaking of practical philosophy; the question is grounded in the more technical use of the adjective naẓarī (“theoretical”) as opposed to ʿamalī (“practical”) in the division of the sciences. (ii) The series of paragraphs numbered 579–585 is very interesting: it concerns a passage of the Madḫal that deals with the role of expressions in the study of logic, i.e. chap. I.4, §3.1. In more detail, paragraph 579 summarizes the question that was asked to Avicenna and quotes verbatim the first two lines of §3.1, p. 44.25–26 (Mub in the apparatus of the present edition), which were the object of a question asked to Avicenna, and paragraphs 580–585 preserve Avicenna’s answer to the question. Some parts of literal quotation are also recalled in paragraph 584 in Avicenna’s answer, where the author quotes the passage in question. The exact context of the question, to which Mubāḥaṯāt 580–585 preserves Avicenna’s answer, is hard to figure out from the only testimony of the Mubāḥaṯāt. As the question briefly recapitulated in Mubāḥaṯāt 579 reports, Avicenna was asked about an inconsistency that  126 On the relation that Ibn Zayla presumably had with Avicenna and on his main fields of interest, see AL-RAHIM 2009, pp. 14–16. 127 REISMAN 2002b, p. 289. 128 The letter edited in REISMAN 2002b, p. 284. 129 REISMAN 2002b, pp. 200–201 and pp. 246–247. 130 See AL-RAHIM 2009, p. 15. 131 REISMAN 2002b, p. 284.

I The Textual Tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal  cv

was remarked upon between two statements in Madḫal I.4, one claiming that necessity summons us to the study of expressions, and the other claiming that the logician is not primarily concerned with the study of expressions (§3.1). In his answer, Avicenna warns the questioner against considering the two statements of Madḫal I.4 in question as contradictory (Mubāḥaṯāt 584, p. 194.5–6), so that Mubāḥaṯāt 580–585 may seem to answer a question specifically concerning Madḫal I.4. There is, however, the possibility that Mubāḥaṯāt 579 is just an a posteriori recapitulation of the question Avicenna was originally asked, inferred from Mubāḥaṯāt 584, and not a faithful report of the original question. A passage of Faḫr alDīn al-Rāzī’s Šarḥ al-Išārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt may help us to reconstruct the actual context of Avicenna’s answer. When commenting on Išārāt, pp. 180.6–181.4, where Avicenna claims that it is necessary, for the logician, to consider also the expressions, regardless of the language, Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī reports that someone (wāḥid) wrote to Avicenna, asking him about the contradiction between this statement and what Avicenna claimed in another book (fī sāʾir al-kutub), concerning the fact that the logician is not primarily concerned with the study of expressions (almost literally quoting Madḫal I.4). The question quoted by Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī directly addresses Avicenna and is likely to be a literal quotation of the anonymous disciple’s question, of which there is no sign in the Mubāḥaṯāt. Although Avicenna’s answer is reported by Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in a very abridged form, the paraphrase of one of the core passages of Avicenna’s answer, Mubāḥaṯāt 582, can be identified based on a reference to the distinction between what is primarily an object of inquiry of a discipline (maqṣūd bi-l-qaṣd al-awwal) and what is not primarily so. The paraphrastic quotation also contains echoes of the beginning of the answer (Mubāḥaṯāt 580), for it alludes to the comparison with the tools (ālāt) that are necessary in order to build a house (see T1 below) T1. Mubāḥaṯāt 579–582, pp. 193–194

‫[ ﺳﺌﻞ ﻋﻦ ﻗﻮ ا ّٕن اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ ﺗﺪﻋﻮ إﻟﯿﻪ اﻟﴬورة‬579] ‫ّﰒ ﻗﻮ وﻟ ﺲ ﻠﻤﻨﻄﻘﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻫﻮ ﻣ ﻄﻘﻲ ﺷﻐﻞ ٔ ّوﱄ‬ .‫ٔﻟﻔﺎظ ﻓﻌﺮوض ﺑ ٔ ّن ﻫﺬا ﻇﺎﻫﺮ اﻟﺘﻨﺎﻗﺾ‬ ٔ ‫[ اﻟﺼﻨﺎﺋﻊ اﻟﻨﻈﺮﯾﺔ واﻟﺼﻨﺎﺋﻊ اﻟﻌﻤﻠﯿﺔ ﻗﺪ ﻜﻮن ﻓﳱﺎ ﻣﻮر‬580] ‫ﯾﺘﻮ ّ ﻪ ٕا ﳱﺎ اﻟﻘﺼﺪ ا ٔ ّول وﻜﻮن اﻟﺸﻐﻞ ا ٔ ّوﱄ ﻣﻮﻗﻮﻓﺎ ﻠﳱﺎ ّﰒ‬ ‫ﯾﻘﻊ إﱃ ﲑ ﻣﺎ إﻟﯿﻪ اﻟﻘﺼﺪ ا ٔ ّوﱄ ﴐورة ﻣ ﺎل ﻫﺬا ﺣﺼﻮل‬ ‫اﻟﺒ ﺖ ﻓﺎٕن ﺴﺘﺪﻋﻲ ٔﻣﻮرا ﺎر ﺔ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻐﺮض ﻠﴬورة ﻣ ﻞ‬ ّ ‫اﺳ ﺎر ا ٔ ﲑ و‬ […] ‫اﲣﺎذ ﻻت‬ ‫[ و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻻٕﻏﻔﺎل ﻓﺎٕذا ﺷﺎء ﺷﺎﻓﻬﺘﻪ ﺑﻪ وذ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﻟ ﺲ إذا‬582] ّ ‫ﰷن ﺷ ﺎ ﴐور ﰲ ﺻﻨﺎ ﺔ وﺟﺐ ٔن ﻜﻮن‬ ‫ﰻ ﴐورة ﰲ‬

Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, ŠIṬ, p. 22.2–7

‫ » ٕاﻧ ّﻚ ذ ﺮت ﰲ ﺳﺎ ﺮ اﻟﻜ ﺐ ٔ ّن‬:‫وﻛﺘﺐ إﻟﯿﻪ وا ﺪ ﻓﻘﺎل‬ ‫اﳌﻨﻄﻘﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻫﻮ ﻣ ﻄﻘﻲ ﻟ ﺲ ﺷﻐﻞ ٔ ّوﱄ ٔﻟﻔﺎظ‬ «.‫وذ ﻣ ﺎﻗﺾ ﻠ م اﳌﺬ ﻮر ﻫﻬﻨﺎ‬ ٔ ‫اﺟ‬ ‫ﻓ ٔ ﺎب ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﳚﻮز ٔن ﻜﻮن اﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﻋﻦ ا ﻟﻔﺎظ و ﺎ ﲆ‬ ‫ﻟﻜﻦ ﻻ ﻟﻘﺼﺪ ا ٔ ّول ﻓﺎ ّٕن ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ إذا ﰷﻧﺖ ﺎرﯾﺔ‬ ّ ‫اﳌﻨﻄﻘﻲ‬ ‫ﻟﻜﻦ ﻻ‬ ّ ‫ﳎﺮى ا ٔدوات وا ﻻت ﰷن ﺷﺘﻐﺎل ﲠﺎ واﺟ ﺎ و‬ .‫ﻜﻮن ذ ﻣﻘﺼﻮدا ﻟﻘﺼﺪ ا ٔ ّول‬

cvi  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition

‫اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ ذ اﻟﴚء ﺑﻞ ﳚﻮز ٔن ﻜﻮن اﳌﻘﺼﻮد ﰲ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﲎ ٔ ّﰪ ﻣﻦ ذ اﻟﴚء وﻣﻦ ﲑﻩ وﻜﻮن ﻫﻮ اﳌﻘﺼﻮد‬ .‫ا ٔ ّوﱄ‬ [579] Question on his statement that necessity

Someone wrote to him saying: «you mentioned

summons to the inquiry into the expressions,

in another book that the logician, insofar as he

then on his statement: «the logician, insofar as

is a logician, is not primarily concerned with

he is a logician, is not primarily concerned with

expressions, but this is in contradiction with

expressions», and display that this is an evident

what is mentioned here».

contradiction. [580] In theoretical and practical disciplines

He answered that the inquiry into expressions

there can be things that are dealt with primarily,

can be necessary for the logician, but not pri-

so that, out of necessity, one is primarily con-

marily. Since the expressions are like instru-

cerned with them and only afterwards with that

ments and tools, it is necessary to deal with

which falls out of the primary object. An example

them, but that is not the primary object [of the

is the realization of a house, since it necessarily

discipline].

requires things that fall out of the main purpose, such as hiring a workman and acquiring the tools […] [582] As to the negligence, I will talk about it, if one wishes. It consists in that if something is necessary in a discipline, it is not also necessary that everything necessary in the discipline coincides with that thing; on the contrary, the object in a discipline can be a more general notion [including] that thing and something else, and [that notion] is the primary object [of the discipline].

If Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī quotes the anonymous disciple’s question in the context of his commentary on the exact passage that was the starting point of the question itself, then the question is the result of this disciple’s study of Avicenna’s Išārāt, compared to the corresponding sections of the Šifāʾ (in this case, the Madḫal)132. The very existence of a correspondence between Avicenna and one of his direct disciples about passages of the Išārāt is a remarkable fact; apparently, Avicenna did not allow anyone to study the Išārāt unless under his supervision, and even the copy of the text had to be agreed upon with the author himself. The sole exception is represented by

 132 In his answer, Avicenna invites the questioner to examine what he stated in the Madḫal by referring to it as that book (question 583, p. 193.19: fa-taʾammal mā qultuhu fī ḏālika l-kitāb); this could fit well within the hypothesis that the question concerned a comparison between two passages of two different works by Avicenna.

II The Edition  cvii

Bahmanyār and Ibn Zayla, who presumably had previously studied the text with Avicenna133. The identification of this material with a letter on the Išārāt does not undermine the plausibility of Reisman’s ascription of Mubāḥaṯāt 579–585 to the correspondence between Avicenna and Ibn Zayla; on the contrary, it reinforces it, for Ibn Zayla was in fact one the few disciples allowed to study the work independently. To conclude, if Reisman’s identification is plausible and the quotation of Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī must be related to that set of questions of the Mubāḥaṯāt, then these fragments may provide a clue concerning the existence of an as yet unknown correspondence between Ibn Zayla and Avicenna on the Išārāt, in which the section of the Madḫal of the Šifāʾ was also quoted134. A general interest on Ibn Zayla’s part in the classification of sciences, together with the broader interest of Ibn Zayla in logic and a thorough knowledge of Avicenna’s works on the subject would thus be confirmed. This reconstructed correspondence, even if only fragmentary, represents one of the most ancient – if not the most ancient – indirect sources of Avicenna’s Madḫal.

II The Edition II.1 State of the Art and Principles of the Edition II.1.1 The Selection of the Witnesses So far, the only existing edition of Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Madḫal was the one printed in Cairo in 1952 (henceforth: Cairo edition) to celebrate Avicenna’s millenary, which has the great merit of publishing this work of Avicenna’s for the first time 135. The edition offered a text based on ten manuscripts (see Tab. 5 below), whose selection was not based on a preliminary assessment of their genealogical relations136. The earliest witnesses employed in the Cairo edition are four manuscripts dating to the  133 Cf. REISMAN 2002b, p. 196; for Reisman’s translation of the passage in which Avicenna sets these restrictive rules for the transmission of the Išārāt, see Ibid., p. 206. 134 The correspondence may be added to Reisman’s list in REISMAN 2002b, pp. 287–302. 135 IBN SĪNĀ 1952a. On the main features of this edition, see the general introduction to the edition (“Introduction générale”/“Muqaddimat al-Šifāʾ”) by I. Madkūr (both in French and Arabic) and BERTOLACCI 2012d. The same edition was then reprinted in Tehran in 1983 and Beirut in 1993. An allegedly new edition by Muḥammad ʿUṯmān was published in 1428H/2008 in Cairo (Maktabat al‑ṯaqāfa al‑dīniyya); this is, however, just another reprint of the aforementioned edition (see JANSSENS 2017, section ‘A. SHIFĀʾ: EDITIONS’). The text of the Cairo edition is also the one reproduced in Ömer Türker’s translation of the work into Turkish (IBN SĪNĀ 2006). The Tehran lithograph edition, which antedates the Cairo edition of the Kitāb al-Šifāʾ, does not preserve the section on Logic of the summa, of which the Cairo edition is, therefore, the first printed edition at our disposal. 136 On this point, see the introduction in IBN SĪNĀ 1952a, pp. (39)–(42), esp. p. (40).

cviii  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition 8th/13th century, and the others range from the fifteenth to the twentieth century. Although the work accomplished by the Cairo editors is in many ways meritorious, further inquiry appeared to be subsequently necessary to advance knowledge of the vast textual tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal. The present edition is not yet a fully critical edition, since it was by no means possible to gather reproductions of all the 118 (and possibly more) witnesses estimated for the Madḫal; rather, it is meant to offer a critical text based on a larger number of witnesses than that employed by the Cairo edition, together with an analysis and reconstruction of their stemmatic genealogical relations (in section II.3; see also the stemma codicum in section II.4). The edition proposed differs from the Cairo edition in three main respects. The first is the increased number of witnesses employed. The text provided in the present edition is based on 33 out of the 78 manuscripts inspected (marked with * in section I.2), 22 of which were selected to be systematically collated, while 11 were eliminated as codices descripti (a detailed description of the witnesses employed is provided in section II.2). The second is the use of the early indirect tradition of the work to reconstruct the text. Part of the vast indirect tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal antedates the earliest extant witnesses of the manuscript tradition and is able to provide new insights into the earliest stages of the tradition. The witnesses employed are the quotations of the work in Bahmanyār, al-Lawkarī and the Mubāḥaṯāt (see section I.4), along with the twelfth-century Latin translation of the work (see section I.3)137. The text of the translation, of which a critical edition is now available (AVICENNA 2018), was checked in the manuscript witnesses of the text138. The overall literal rendering of the Arabic wording makes it possible to employ this translation as a witness for the Arabic text139. The third main respect in which the present edition differs from the Cairo edition is the genealogical reconstruction of the textual tradition (sections II.3 and II.4). A note on the stemmatic relations of other manuscripts inspected, although not employed in the present edition, is also offered as a preliminary step towards a future critical edition of the work (section II.5).  137 The Cairo editors already considered the opportunity to come back, once an edition of the Latin text was established, to compare it with the Arabic text: see IBN SĪNĀ 1952a, p. (76). 138 The edition printed in Venice in 1508 is not, taken alone, an entirely reliable witness of the text, since it presents, as does any other witness of the text, several mistakes and alterations. Digital photographic reproductions of MSS Graz, Universitätsbibl., 482 (http://143.50.26.142/digbib/ handschriften/Ms.0400-0599/Ms.0482/index.html) and Paris, BnF lat. 6443 (http://gallica.bnf.fr/ ark:/12148/btv1b9065953r?rk=21459;2) are available online; my most heartfelt gratitude goes to all the libraries that allowed me to obtain photographic reproductions of the other eleven manuscripts. Particularly, I wish to thank Father Stjepan Krasić for kindly providing me with the photographic reproductions of MS Dubrovnik, Dominik. Samostan 63 (36-V-6), and Manuel Nieto Cumplido, archivist of the Cordoba cathedral, for helping me attaining a reproduction of MS Cordoba, Bibl. capit. 52. 139 On the value of the Latin translations of Avicenna’s Šifāʾ as witnesses of the text, cf. GUTAS 2010, pp. 49–50.

II The Edition  cix

For practical reasons, it was not possible to employ all of the 78 manuscripts inspected for the present edition; it appeared, therefore, necessary to set the criteria for a selection of the witnesses. The selection was made by combining the purely genealogical criterion with the chronological. As a first step, a preliminary sample collation of portions of the text assumed as test-cases was made. After this first step, it was possible to proceed with the eliminatio codicum descriptorum and eliminate certain witnesses as copies of earlier manuscripts. This step is particularly relevant, for it spares the systematic collation of copies of extant manuscripts which are of little – or no – textual value. In this case, the sample collation also revealed that one of the ten manuscripts employed in the Cairo edition, namely MS İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 824 (Dp in the stemma in section II.4), is actually a copy of a much earlier extant manuscript (B in the present edition, also employed in the Cairo edition). Since the number of manuscripts was still too high after the sample collation, however, earlier manuscripts were prioritized and chosen as representative of their families. In more detail, special attention was paid to keeping all the earliest nondescripti witnesses, covering the chronological range between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries CE, and almost all the non-descripti witnesses dating to the fifteenth century. As an ancillary criterion for the selection, witnesses that after the preliminary collation turned out to be pervasively contaminated with different branches of the tradition were preferably left aside. This is the case, for example, with two manuscripts employed in the Cairo edition, namely MSS London, BLOIOC, Or. 7500 (henceforth: M) and London, BLOIOC, India Office Ar. 1420 (henceforth: X), dating respectively to the seventeenth and to the eighteenth century. MS X, for instance, the exemplar of MS Beirut, Maktaba Šarqiyya, Université Saint-Joseph 372140, turned out to be part of the same family as MSS İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 771 and 770 (respectively, Yi and Y in the present edition)141, although its ancestor must have been quite heavily contaminated with a manuscript related to MS İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 823 (Di in the present edition); MS X itself thus also bears evidence of a further collation with a manuscript related to a third family142, resulting in some marginal variants in X. The main  140 This is a modern copy made from MS X in 1890; see before and CHEIKHO 1925, pp. 122–123. 141 With which, besides numerous peculiar textual readings, it also shares the explicit of the first treatise of the Madḫal. MS X also preserves al-Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction, which is omitted by the manuscripts of the family of YiY; according to the brief colophon at the end of the Introduction copied in MS X, however, which was reportedly already in the exemplar of MS X, the manuscript derives from a copy produced in 891H/1486–7 by a Šarīf Ibn ʿAbd al-Laṭīf al-Ḥusnī. 142 Represented by at least five manuscripts, i.e. Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Ǧumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran 1326; Kitābḫānah-i Madrasah-i ʿĀlī-i Shahīd Muṭahharī 1439; Kitābḫānah-i Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Millī 1893; İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 795, and Rampur, Raza Library 3477.

cx  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition text preserved in MS X is, therefore, a blend of at least two different families, with the addition of marginal variants derived from a third family, which is why, after its stemmatic position was assessed, it was preferably left aside, and preference was given to earlier – and less contaminated – witnesses from the same family. Table 5 below summarizes all these data and displays the manuscript witnesses on which the Cairo edition is based and those on which the present edition is based. Tab. 5: Manuscripts employed in the Cairo edition and in the present edition. Legenda:  = Manuscript employed in the present edition. d = Descriptus of a manuscript employed in the present edition. c = Heavily contaminated manuscript. Manuscripts (in chronological order)

Cairo Ed.

Present Ed.

th/th c. )

Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Malik 



Ka

)

London, BLOIOC, Or. 



Br



J



Nk



B



A



E

th/th c. )

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 

)

İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 

)

Cairo, Maktabat al-Azhar al-Šarīf, Beḫīt Collection ,  falsafa

)

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 

)

İstanbul, Millet Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Ali Emiri 

)

İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 

)

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Asir Efendi 

‫ى‬ ‫ب‬ ‫ﺎ‬



T



As

) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 



C

) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 



Di

) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 



Da

) Rampur Raza Library, Ḥikma  (nr. )



Ṣ

) İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 



To

) Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Malik 



Te

d

Dp

‫ع‬

th/th c.

 / c. th

th

) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 

‫س‬

) Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Maǧlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 



Mi

) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa 



Š

) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 



Yi

) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 



Y

) İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 



No

II The Edition  cxi

th/th c. ) İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 

‫ن‬



N

 / c. th

th

) Cairo, Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Waṯāʾiq al-Qawmiyya  falsafa

‫د‬

) Mašhad, Kitābḫānah-i Āstān-i Quds-i Razavī 

d

Q

c

M

) Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān /

d

De

) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 

d

Ye

) London, British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections,

d

O

d

An

d

S

c

X

) Hyderabad, Osmaniya University Library, acq. 

d

Os

) Rampur, Rampur Raza Library 

d

In

) London, British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Or. 

‫م‬

Jones Collection  ) Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān   / c. th

th

) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah  ) London, BLOIOC, India Office Ar. 

‫ھ‬

 / c. th

th

 / c. th

th

) Cairo, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya  ḥikma wa-falsafa

‫دا‬

Unknown dating ) Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek, Golius Or. 



G

) İstanbul, Beyazit Kütüphanesi (form.: ʿUmūmī) 

d

Za

) İstanbul, Ragıp Paşa Kütüphanesi 

d

R

II.1.2 The Text: Orthography, Punctuation and Structure The Arabic text is transmitted in the manuscripts without punctuation marks or division into paragraphs and subparagraphs. The text provided in the present edition was punctuated and articulated into paragraphs (e.g. 1), subparagraphs (e.g. 1.1), and sub-sub-paragraphs (e.g. 1.1.1) in accordance with the argument and syntax in order to help readers to understand better the logical structure of Avicenna’s reasoning. The punctuation provided here is purposely minimal; very few commas were employed, mostly semicolons, full stops, question marks and colons. The reason for this choice lies in the general intent not to add much to the text that is not transmitted by the manuscript tradition. The most faithful way to reproduce the transmitted text would have been to avoid any punctuation at all143; nonetheless, in consideration of the high degree of difficulty of some passages of the text, I deemed  143 A similar philosophy governed, for instance, M. Bouyges’ edition of Averroes’ Tafsīr on the Metaphysics (IBN RUŠD 1938–1948).

cxii  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition it useful to provide a support for readers to understand the articulation of Avicenna’s argumentation. II.1.3 The Apparatus The present edition also differs from the Cairo edition in the attention paid to the marginal commentaries found in the manuscripts, as well as to the sources and parallel passages of the text. In order to record this kind of information in the critical apparatus, the choice was made to articulate the apparatus on more levels. The edition of the Arabic text is accompanied by up to six levels of apparatus at the bottom of the page. Not all the six levels are consistently present, since their presence is tied to the necessity of conveying a piece of information that may also be absent for certain passages. The first level of apparatus, for instance, is not present for passages that are not affected by material damage or lacunae in the manuscript tradition, and for which no quotation is known in the indirect tradition. The only apparatus that is, obviously, continuously present is the critical apparatus of the variants (the fourth level). In what follows, the content and disposition of the six apparatuses are described: First level: information concerning the presence or absence of the text in both its direct and indirect witnesses. This part of the apparatus records quotations, close paraphrases in which a piece of the text can be found, and the witnesses that – either due to material damage or because of a larger lacuna within the text – omit the portion of text concerned. Second level: Greek and Arabic sources of the passage. This section of the apparatus records, in approximately chronological order, ancient Greek and Arabic passages that are likely to be sources for the doctrine of the passage. The passages are quoted by the author, title, and page and line number in the edition recorded in the bibliography; e.g. PORPH., Isag., pp. 1.18–2.10; AL-KINDĪ, Kitāb fī l-Falsafa l-Ūlā, p. 9.8–9. Third level: parallels in the author’s works. This section of the apparatus aims to place the passage in relation to other parallel passages in Avicenna’s own work (for the text of the Madḫal), or in al-Ǧūzǧānī’s work (only in the case of al-Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction). Since throughout the entire Madḫal only texts by Avicenna are mentioned in this section of the apparatus, quotations of parallel passages do not mention the author. Also in this case, the editions of the texts mentioned are specified in the bibliography. Mentions of Avicenna’s works are in the form: Šifāʾ, Qiyās I.2, p. 10.4.

II The Edition  cxiii

Fourth level: critical apparatus of the variant readings. This section of the apparatus records the variants of the Arabic manuscript witnesses, as well as those reconstructed on the basis of the Latin translation. This includes all the readings of the selected Arabic witnesses and the readings of the Latin translation, where it is possible to infer the presence of a variant reading in its lost Arabic exemplar. This is a negative apparatus, meaning that for each lemma, the manuscripts which do not attest to any variant with respect to the main text are not recorded; exceptions are occasionally made, especially for readings that attest to a revision of the text. Three main kinds of mistakes frequently occur in the manuscript tradition of an Arabic text due to the peculiarities of the Arabic writing system, namely: (1) errors of taḥrīf, due to a miswriting of the skeleton (rasm) of the word; (2) errors of taṣḥīf, due to a variation in the pointing of the same skeleton; (3) errors of taḥrīk, due to a different vocalization of the same skeleton. As a general principle, I considered as variant readings – and recorded in the critical apparatus – only those readings which showed variations in rasm (type 1 above). Spelling variants that typically rely on the copyists’ arbitrary choice – even if they do entail a variation in the rasm – are not systematically recorded in the apparatus. For example: – Abbreviations: whenever the main text had a reading, and manuscript A had the same reading in abbreviated form, the reading of manuscript A was not recorded in the apparatus (e.g. the main text: | MS A: ) – Different diacritics, or their absence: whenever the main text had a reading, manuscript A had a reading that only differed because of the diacritics (which were either different or absent), the reading of manuscript A was not systematically recorded in the apparatus (e.g. the main text: | MS A: or or ). Exceptions to this rule were occasionally made for delicate cases (for instance, the variations in the diacritics of and were systematically recorded in the apparatus). – Different or defective notations of hamza and alif madda: whenever the reading of a manuscript A differed from the main text by virtue of a different or defective notation of hamza and alif madda, it was not recorded in the apparatus (e.g. the main text: | MS A: or ). – Different or defective notations of alif: whenever the reading of a manuscript A differed from the main text in virtue of a different or defective notation of alif, it was not recorded in the apparatus (e.g. the main text: | MS A: || the main text: | MS A: ) – Affix pronouns juxtaposed rather than attached: whenever affix pronouns were found written juxtaposed rather than attached to the preceding word, it was not recorded in the apparatus (e.g. the main text: | MS A: ).

‫ﲿﯿ ﺬ‬

‫ﰮ‬

‫ﺮﻓﻊ‬

‫اﯾﯿﺔ‬

‫ﺟﺰء‬

‫ﻫﻜﺬا‬

‫ﺮﻓﻊ ﺮﻓﻊ ﺮﻓﻊ‬

‫اﻧﯿﺔ‬

‫ﺟﺰو ﺟﺰ‬

‫ﺛﻼﺛﺔ‬

‫ﻫﻜﺬى‬

‫دوﳖﺎ‬

‫ﺛﻠﺜﺔ‬

‫دون ﻫﺎ‬

Fifth level: apparatus of the marginalia. This section of the apparatus records the marginal annotations found in the manuscripts, containing either linguistic or phil-

cxiv  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition osophical observations on the text. Marginal lists of contents (e.g. lists of chapters or lists of topics) were not recorded here. Sixth level: critical note to the apparatus. This discursive note contains the editor’s philological observations on delicate and thorny philological issues. Notes of this kind are meant to support the reading of the apparatus. II.1.4 Abbreviations and Sigla All the abbreviations employed in the critical apparatus are explained in section IV.2. The sigla employed for the sources recorded in the critical apparatus are listed in section IV.1. As a general rule, Greek letters were used to refer to non-extant archetypes and sub-archetypes reconstructed on the basis of the textual errors shared by a number of extant manuscripts. Sigla consisting of one or two Latin letters refer to extant Arabic manuscripts; sigla of three Latin letters refer to indirect sources of the text (e.g. ‘Law’ standing for al-Lawkarī’s Bayān al-ḥaqq). Finally, the siglum ‘Ed.’ refers to the Cairo edition of the text. Whenever a siglum is followed by a number in apex (e.g. Ṣ2), this denotes a variant reading found in a given manuscript in a handwriting different from the copyist’s (a variant reading followed by Ṣ2 in the apparatus, for instance, is a reading found in MS Ṣ that is not written in the copyist’s handwriting). A description of all the secondary handwritings identified in the manuscripts is found in the description of the manuscript in section II.2.

II.2 Description of the Manuscripts Employed (1)

Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Malik 4276 [siglum: Ka]

COPYIST(S): Aḥmad Ibn Habbat Allāh Ibn Aḥmad Ibn al-Kazzāya. DATE: First decade of Ḏū l-Ḥiǧǧa 536H/4–13 July 1142. PLACE OF COPYING: Unknown. CONTENT: Part of Manṭiq (entire Madḫal and part of Maqūlāt, up to the third treatise). FOLIATION/PAGINATION: i + pp. 1–394 + ii. WRITING(S): Nasḫ, with diacritics and a partial vocalization; black ink both for the main text and the titles; no catchwords. Writing support: paper. NOTES: The manuscript was collated with its model (qūbila bi-aṣlihi), as referred by a note in the last folio. Ownership statements by: Abū al-Ġanāʾim Ibn Abī al-Futūḥ Ibn Saʿīd Ḥaranī in Baġdād in 563H; Manṣūr Ibn Ṯābit Qazwīnī ṭabīb ḥakīm in 630H. REFERENCES: M, D.

II The Edition  cxv

(2)

London, British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Or. 113 [siglum: Br]

COPYIST(S): Muḥammad b. Muḥammad […]144. DATE: Ḏū l-ḥiǧǧa 576H/April-May 1181145. PLACE OF COPYING: Unknown. CONTENT: Manṭiq + part of Ṭabīʿiyyāt (funūn i-iv). FOLIATION/PAGINATION: Double foliation: in Arabic numbers, i + 1–238; 281–508 + ii; modern foliation: 1–468. Quires: quinions. WRITING(S): Main handwriting: Nastaʿlīq, with diacritics and a partial vocalization; black ink both for the main text and the titles. Secondary handwriting: Br2 is the author of some marginal corrections in a brownish ink; these corrections were made by collation with another manuscript (as can be inferred, for instance, from the balaġa muqābala on f. 21v). Writing support: paper. NOTES: The manuscript shows a number of ownership notes, most of which have been erased. On the guard-page there is the seal of a Ḥusayn Ḥāmid, dating 1275H/1858–9 (maybe the Šīʿī Indian scholar Sayyid Ḥāmid Ḥusayn Mūsavī?). Afterwards, the manuscript belonged to the collector Colonel George William Hamilton (who served in India from 1823 to 1867, latterly as Commissioner in Delhi) and was, finally, purchased from his widow by the British Museum in April 1868. It was the first volume of a copy of the Šifāʾ that consisted of at least a second volume. REFERENCES: CURETON AND RIEU 1871, p. 745; M, G2. (3)

Cairo, Maktabat al-Azhar al-Šarīf, Beḫīt Collection 44988, 331 falsafa [siglum: B]

COPYIST(S): One anonymous copyist. DATE: Unknown; dating: 7th/13th c. (A, p. 70); see also IBN SĪNĀ 1952a, p. (69). PLACE OF COPYING: Unknown. CONTENT: the entire Šifāʾ. FOLIATION/PAGINATION: i-iii + ff. 1–459, pp. 460–461. WRITING(S): Nasḫ, with diacritics and a partial vocalization; black ink in the main text, red ink for titles and geometrical figures. Writing support: paper; it is severely damaged in some parts, especially at the beginning (cf. e.g. f. 18r). NOTES: The manuscript is employed in the Cairo edition with the siglum: . The text of the Šifāʾ is preceded by a table of contents in a modern handwriting (ff. 1r–14v), and a guard page with ownership notes. The funūn of the Riyāḍiyyāt follow a peculi-

‫ب‬

 144 The name of the copyist is only partially readable in the colophon of the manuscript (f. 458 v); see also CURETON AND RIEU 1871, p. 745, n° 1655. 145 Note that the dating is not entirely readable in the colophon of the manuscript (f. 458v): the 5 in 576 is conjectured in CURETON AND RIEU 1871, p. 745, n° 1655.

cxvi  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition ar order (i, iii, iv, ii). The text of the Šifāʾ is accompanied by several marginalia copied in the same handwriting as the main text; some are collational variants and corrections (marked as in the apparatus of the Cairo edition), and some others are notes of commentary, a part of which might be Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s146. REFERENCES: A, E2, M; description in the Cairo ed. of Madḫal, pp. (68)-(69), Ḫiṭāba, pp. 24–25, Šiʿr, p. 20, Mūsīqā, p. 49, and in Āl Yāsīn’s introduction to the edition of Samāʿ, p. 25.

‫ﰇ‬

(4)

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 772 [siglum: J]

COPYIST(S): at least two anonymous copyists; within the section of Madḫal, the first copied ff. 1v–9v (up to Madḫal I.10, §2.1.1, p. 120.36 of the present edition), and the second, starting from f. 10r, completed the copy of the work. Interestingly, the point in which the handwriting of the main text changes seemingly corresponds to the point in which the model from which the manuscript was copied also changes, which means that the two copyists were copying two different exemplars. DATE: āḫir Šaʿbān 628H/June-July 1231. PLACE OF COPYING: Unknown. CONTENT: Manṭiq. FOLIATION/PAGINATION: i + ff. 1–210 + ii. Quires: quinions. WRITING(S): Handwriting 1 of the main text (ff. 1v–9v): nasḫ, black ink for the main text, red ink for titles; presence of letter-pointing. Main features: retroflexed final yāʾ (occasionally); alif of prolongation with a very distinctive tail descending below the baseline; lām-alif muḥaqqaqa. Handwriting 2 of the main text (ff. 10r–37v): nasḫ, black ink for the main text, red ink for titles; smaller than handwriting 1; presence of letter-pointing and partial vocalization; šadda and sukūn frequently marked. Main features: nūn with an internal point; no tail of the alif of prolongation; lām-alif warrāqiyya. Writing support: paper. NOTES: The manuscript was employed in the Cairo edition with the siglum: . The manuscript is articulated into quinions. Ownership notes on the first folio by ʿAbd al-Muʾmin b. Fāḫir [al-Urmawī?]; Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī; ʿAbd al-Raḥman b. ʿAlī b. Muʾayyad (8 Šaʿbān 901H/1 May 1496, in Constantinople)147; Muṣṭafā b. ʿAbd al-Dīn Ilyās b. Muḥammad (Ḏū l-Qaʿda 960H/October-November 1553). REFERENCES: M; description in the Cairo ed. of Madḫal, p. (74).

‫ى‬

 146 See DI VINCENZO 2018a. 147 On Muʾayyadzāde ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Efendi (d. 922H/1516) and the role he played in the circulation of a huge number of manuscripts, see POURJAVADY 2014, p. 293; POURJAVADY, SCHMIDTKE 2015, p. 255; PFEIFFER 2015.

II The Edition  cxvii

(5)

İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2710 [siglum: Nk]

COPYIST(S): ʿAbd al-Kāfī Ibn ʿAbd al-Maǧīd Ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Tabrīzī, qualified as a student (tilmīḏ) of al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī in an iǧāza reported on the first folio148. DATE: 25 Rabīʿ I–25 Šawwāl 666H/21 December 1267–15 July 1268149. PLACE OF COPYING: Unknown; possibly Marāġa150. CONTENT: the entire Šifāʾ. FOLIATION/PAGINATION: i-vii + ff. 1–339 + viii. Quires: senions. WRITING(S): Nasḫ, black ink; headings in bold and red ink; letter pointing and very occasional vocalization. Writing support: paper. NOTES: The first folio presents a text written in a handwriting other than the copyist’s, which transcribed an iǧāza reportedly written by ʿAlī b. ʿUmar b. ʿAlī al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī (d. 675H/1276) for the copyist of the manuscript ʿAbd al-Kāfī b. ʿAbd alMaǧīd b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Tabrīzī on the first page of a copy of al-Kātibī’s Šarḥ ʿaqd alǧawāhir, in which al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī states that al-Tabrīzī had read the book to him, thus getting the permission to transmit it. The manuscript preserves several marginalia copied in the same handwriting as the main text, some of which might be ascribed to Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī; as for the other marginalia written in a different handwriting, according to a note on the first folio, some of them are by the hand of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Šīrāzī. The funūn of the Riyāḍiyyāt follow a peculiar order (i, iii, iv, ii). REFERENCES: A, E1–2, M; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 64; WISNOVSKY 2012a, p. 262. (6)

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 2442 [siglum: A]

COPYIST(S): Amīr al-Dīn Manyūl; colophon written by Buḫtanaṣar Ibn Šimʿūn the Physician, from Qalʿat al-Rūm (probably, the Nebukadnāzar Ben Shemʿūn mentioned in the last line, in Syriac, of the colophon, fol. 1r). DATE: 671H/1273–674H/1276 PLACE OF COPYING: copy started in Marāġa and terminated in Ḫarbart. CONTENT: the entire Šifāʾ. FOLIATION/PAGINATION: i-iii + ff. 1–345 + iv. WRITING(S): Nasḫ, black ink, with headings in red ink; letter pointing, no vocalization. Writing support: paper. NOTES: Madḫal has a lacuna between chap. I.5, §4.3 (p. 58.60) and chap. I.8, §2.2.1 (p. 94.56), probably due to a lacuna in the antigraph. The funūn of the Riyāḍiyyāt follow a peculiar order (i, iii, iv, ii).

 148 See DI VINCENZO 2018a and infra. 149 Dating 660H/1262 in WISNOVSKY 2012a, p. 262. 150 For a hypothetical reconstruction of the milieu in which the manuscript circulated, see DI VINCENZO 2018a.

cxviii  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition REFERENCES: A, E1–2, M; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 64 n° 40; detailed description in CELLI 2017–2018. (7)

İstanbul, Millet Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Ali Emiri 1504 [siglum: E]

COPYIST(S): Anonymous. DATE: 26 Šaʿbān 674H/21 February 1276. PLACE OF COPYING: Unknown. CONTENT: part of Manṭiq (funūn i-iv). FOLIATION/PAGINATION: foliation: i + ff. 1–221; pagination: i + pp. 1–442. WRITING(S): Nasḫ, black ink both for the main text and the headings; headings in bold. Writing support: paper. NOTES: The manuscript is employed in the Cairo edition with the siglum: . The text of al-Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction starts abruptly (wa-qāla Abū ʿUbayd), without the introductory clause preserved in the other manuscripts. REFERENCES: A, E1, M, G2; description in the Cairo ed. of Madḫal, p. (72).

‫ﺎ‬

(8)

İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3261 [siglum: T]

COPYIST(S): ʿAbdu l-Raḥman, named (al-mulaqqab) Sayf al-Abšīḥī [?] (section on Logic only). DATE: 10 Rabīʿ I 677H/8 August 1278. PLACE OF COPYING: Madīnat al-Salām [i.e. Baġdād]. FOLIATION/PAGINATION: ff. 1–416 + i. Quires: quinions. WRITING(S): Nasḫ, black ink for the main text, headings in red ink; letter pointing, no vocalization. Writing support: paper. CONTENT: Manṭiq + part of Ṭabīʿiyyāt (fann i). NOTES: Manṭiq and Ṭabīʿiyyāt are copied in two different handwritings; the name of one of the copyists is provided in the colophon of Manṭiq (f. 339r). REFERENCES: A, E1–2, M, G2. (9)

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Aşir Efendi 207 [siglum: As]

COPYIST(S): Muḥammad Ibn ʿAlī Ibn Ǧaʿfar al-Mālikī al-Baġdādī. DATE: Al-ʿašir al-awsaṭ min Ḏī l-ḥiǧǧa 680H/30 March–8 April 1282. PLACE OF COPYING: Unknown. CONTENT: part of Manṭiq (funūn i-iv). FOLIATION/PAGINATION: ff. 1–349. Quires: quinions. WRITING(S): Nasḫ, black ink, headings rubricated. F. 6r-v is in a different paper and is also copied in a different handwriting; apparently, also the model copied changes for that section (from I.4, §2, p. 42.16 to I.5, §1.2, p. 50.7). It may be supposed that the folio was inserted to fill some gap in the manuscript. Writing support: paper.

II The Edition  cxix

‫ع‬

NOTES: The manuscript is employed in the Cairo edition with the siglum: . The text of the Madḫal presents a lacuna between chap. I.5 (p. 62.88) and the end of chap. I.9 (p. 114.110). The manuscript is organized in quaternions, and the length of the omission roughly corresponds to that of a quaternion; however, the lacuna does not correspond to a change of quire nor to a change of page in the manuscript, hence it is probably due to the loss of a quire in its antigraph. On f. 1r, there is an ownership note by the Ottoman scholar Abū Bakr b. Rustam b. Aḥmad al-Širwānī (d. 1135H/1722–3). REFERENCES: A, E1–2, M; description in IBN SĪNĀ 1952a, pp. (71)-(72). (10) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 1424 [siglum: C] COPYIST(S): Abū Bakr ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Aḥmad Ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Tabrīzī. PATRON: Quṭb al-Dīn al-Šīrāzī. DATE: 693H/1293–4. PLACE OF COPYING: Unknown. CONTENT: the entire Šifāʾ. FOLIATION/PAGINATION: ff. i-xii + ff. 1–402, 405–447, 449–467 + xiii. Quires: octonions. WRITING(S): Nasḫ, black ink. Writing support: paper. NOTES: It preserves several marginalia copied in the same handwriting as the main text, some of which might be ascribed to Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. The funūn of the Riyāḍiyyāt follow a peculiar order (i, iii, iv, ii). REFERENCES: A, E1–2, M; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 64 n° 44. (11) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 823 [siglum: Di] COPYIST(S): Šahāb al-Karmīnī. DATE: 697H/1297–8. PLACE OF COPYING: Madrasa of Ūrḫān, in Tabrīz. CONTENT: the entire Šifāʾ. FOLIATION/PAGINATION: ff. 1–28, 28bis–555, pp. 556–557 + i. WRITING(S): Taʿlīq, black ink. Writing support: paper. NOTES: The manuscript was collated (cf. e.g. in the margin, between Madḫal II.2 and II.3: balaġat al-muqābala). REFERENCES: E1–2, A, M; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 47; WISNOVSKY 2012a, p. 263.

cxx  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition (12) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 822 [siglum: Da] COPYIST(S): Anonymous. DATE: possibly 14th c., certainly before 886H/1481, as evidenced by the waqf of the Sultan Muḥammad Abū l-Fatḥ Ḫān Ġāzī, a.k.a. Mehmet II (d. 886H/1481), on the title page and on f. 1v. A date of copying in Rabīʿ I 426/January-February 1035 occurs in the colophon of the section on Music151, but it is very likely to refer to some antigraph of the witness. Dating to the 6th–7th c. H in A, p. 73. PLACE OF COPYING: Unknown. CONTENT: Manṭiq + Ṭabīʿiyyāt + Riyāḍiyyāt + a fragment of Ilāhiyyāt (f. 355r, Ilāhiyyāt X.4 (from p. 447.14 Cairo ed. to the end). FOLIATION/PAGINATION: i-v + ff. 1–355 + vi–vii. Quires: quinions. WRITING(S): Nasḫ, black ink; letter pointing, vocalization, iʿrāb, šadda, and sukūn marked. Among the main features: kāf mabsūṭa, lām-alif warrāqiyya. Writing support: paper. NOTES: The final inscription claims that this copy was read in the presence of Avicenna (qirāʾa and muqābala note, allegedly from Avicenna’s hand, dating to 3 Raǧab 422/2 July 1031, occurring at the end of the section on Mathematics, f. 354 v)152; for a detailed exam of these texts and a discussion of their authenticity, see A, pp. 73–74 and BERTOLACCI 2017–2018, Appendix B. REFERENCES: A, E1–2, M; BERTOLACCI 2017–2018. (13) Rampur Raza Library, Ḥikma 112 (nr. 3476) [siglum: Ṣ] COPYIST(S): Maḥmūd Ibn ʿAlī Ibn Muḥammad Ibn ʿAlī al-Wīḏkalī (i.e. from a village in Qāšān) DATE: Beginning of Rabīʿ I 718H/May 1318 (section on Logic). PLACE OF COPYING: Unknown. CONTENT: Manṭiq + Ṭabīʿiyyāt + Ilāhiyyāt. FOLIATION/PAGINATION: pp. 1–861 + i. WRITING(S): Main handwriting: Nasḫ, black ink; presence of letter-pointing, absence of vocalization. Among the remarkable features: abusive horizontal ligature between alif and lām; lām-alif both warrāqiyya and muḥaqqaqa. Secondary handwritings: S2 red ink, seemingly the handwriting of the rubricated faṣl at chapter beginnings. It adds marginal and interlinear corrections. Ṣ3 nastaʿlīq, black ink, seemingly belonging to the author of the collational note at the end of the section on Logic (cf. ‘Notes’); hence, the marginal and interlinear corrections added in this

 151 See Cairo ed., p. 29, and n. 1: cf. apparatus, p. 152, and Anawati, p. 74, where the date of copying is 420H. 152 Transcription in Mahdavī, p. 170, and Anawati, pp. 73–74.

II The Edition  cxxi

handwriting are presumably the result of the collation accomplished in 845H/1441. Writing support: paper. NOTES: The manuscript was owned by Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Daštakī (d. 903H/1498), and his descendants; a member of his family, Fatḥ Allāh al-Šīrāzī, presumably brought the manuscript to India; it was later lodged in the Mughal royal library, from which it was transferred to Rampur. Fatḥ Allāh al-Šīrāzī is, according to a note in Persian at the beginning, also the author of the indexes of the manuscript. Logic is called, in the colophon of the section, the “fourth part” (al-ǧuzʾ al-rābiʿ) of the Šifāʾ, even if it is placed at the beginning. According to the colophon, the model from which MS Ṣ was copied was a faulty manuscript, with several misspellings. The end of the section on Logic preserves a collation note dated 2 Ǧumādā II 845H/27 October 1441 (p. 486); reportedly, the manuscript collated was faulty as well, especially in the end of the section, whereas the beginning is considered as correct. The end of the section on Natural Philosophy (p. 771) preserves a collation note dated Muḥarram 845H/June 1441. REFERENCES: B, A; AHMED 2012, p. 202, n° 7; MASSANI 1953, p. 447, nr. 13; POURJAVADY 2011, p. 23 and n. 144; RIZVI 2011, p. 11, n. 8. (14) İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 3262 [siglum: To] COPYIST(S): Unknown. DATE: 9th/15th c. (Dating in Anawati, p. 77). PLACE OF COPYING: Unknown. CONTENT: Manṭiq + Ṭabīʿiyyāt + Ilāhiyyāt FOLIATION/PAGINATION: i + ff. 1–637r. WRITING(S): Main handwriting: Nastaʿlīq, black ink for the main text, headings in red. Letter pointing, partial vocalization. Remarkable features: sometimes lām muʿallaqa; kāf maškūla; final hāʾ maḫṭūfa. Secondary handwriting: To2 Nastaʿlīq, black ink; it adds some marginal corrections to the text, and possibly coincides with the author of a note in Persian on f. I (stating that the written folia of the manuscript are 317, without considering the blank ones). Writing support: paper. NOTES: Ownership statement on f. I of a Muḥammad Sayyid ʿAlī. REFERENCES: E1, A, M; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 57. (15) Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Malik 1057 [siglum: Te] COPYIST(S): At least three anonymous copyists; see ‘Writing(s)’. DATE: 9th/15th c.; before 1071H/1660–1. PLACE OF COPYING: Unknown. CONTENT: Manṭiq. FOLIATION/PAGINATION: i-ii + ff. 1–315, 317–322, 316, 323–326 + iii. Quires: quinions.

cxxii  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition WRITING(S): Nastaʿlīq, main text in black ink, headings in black ink and bold, titles of chapters in red ink; at least three different handwritings alternating: most of the text is written by one of the three copyists; in the section of Madḫal, ff. 9r-v and 18r-v are copied in a different handwriting (notably, in both cases it is the last folio of a quire), which also copied the section from the beginning of fifth fann (f. 165r) up to f. 186r. A third handwriting copied ff. 70r–77v. Writing support: paper. NOTES: The manuscript was owned by the Šīʿī scholar Abū l-Faḍl Bahāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Iṣfahānī (1651–1725)153, who may also be the author of part of the notes of commentary that surround the text (signed by ). Another ownership note on the title-page (the name of the owner was erased and is unreadable) is dated 1241H/1825–6, which very likely matches another ownership note after the explicit (f. 325v), dated 1241H and in which the name is erased as well. A marginal note of commentary ascribed to Ḥusayn Ardabīlī154 can be found on f. 173r. REFERENCES: M, E2, D.

‫ب‬

(16) Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Maǧlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 135 [siglum: Mi] COPYIST(S): ʿAlī Ibn Fatḥ Allāh al-Maʿdānī al-Iṣfahānī al-muštahir bi-Ṣābirī 155. DATE: Šaʿbān 871H/March-April 1467. PLACE OF COPYING: Unknown. CONTENT: Manṭiq + Ṭabīʿiyyāt + Ilāhiyyāt. FOLIATION/PAGINATION: i-ii + ff. 1–236r, iii–iv, 236v–417r, v–vi, 417v–471 + vii–ix. WRITING(S): Nastaʿlīq, black ink, headings in gold; letter pointing: present, vocalization: absent. Decorations with vegetal motifs in colours and gold on ff. 1v–2v. Systematic use of catchwords. Writing support: paper. NOTES: The manuscript is a very elegant, decorated copy, without marginal corrections or annotations. REFERENCES: B, M, E2, D, G2; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 69 n° 89.

 153 Bahāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḥasan al-Iṣfahānī (Fāḍil-i Hindī) (d. 1137H/1724–5). In the ownership note in the title-page of the manuscript, he qualifies himself as having been away from his country and from the Arab world during his youth, in the years 1071–1079H/1660–1669: this statement might refer to the period of his journeys to India, where he accompanied his father. 154 See POURJAVADY 2011, pp. 41–44. 155 This copyist appears to be the ʿAlī Ibn Fatḥ Allāh al-Maʿdānī al-šahīr bi-Ṣābirī who signed the copy of MS Dublin, Chester Beatty Library, Arabic 5412 in 885H/1480 (a copy of the Metaphysics of the Šifāʾ).

II The Edition  cxxiii

(17) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa 1748 [siglum: Š] COPYIST(S): Hāšim ʿAlī al-Nāẓir Raʾīf [?]. DATE: 27 Raǧab 879H/16 December 1474. PLACE OF COPYING: Unknown. CONTENT: Manṭiq + Ṭabīʿiyyāt + Ilāhiyyāt. FOLIATION/PAGINATION: ff. 1–837 + i. WRITING(S): Main handwriting: Nasḫ, text in black ink, chapter headings in gold; letter pointing, partial vocalization, šadda and sukūn marked, systematic use of catchwords. Among the main features: kāf mabsūṭa. Secondary handwriting: Š2 writes in nasḫ, black ink, and is the author of a few marginal corrections made after collation of another witness; cf. ff. 13v–14r, where corrections end by nusḫa, meaning that the variant was found in another manuscript. Given the readings imported, the witness collated by Š2 belonged to a different branch of the tradition. The descriptus of MS Š, i.e. MS R, seemingly does not receive the corrections made by Š 2, which might mean that they are posterior to the copy of MS R156. Writing support: paper. REFERENCES: A, B, E1–2, M; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 55. (18) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 771 [siglum: Yi] COPYIST(S): ʿAlī b. Muḥammad b. Manṣūr b. Ismaʿīl (section on Natural Philosophy only). DATE: Rabīʿ I 885H/May-June 1480. PLACE OF COPYING: Unknown. CONTENT: part of Manṭiq (funūn i-v) + Ṭabīʿiyyāt. FOLIATION/PAGINATION: i + ff. 1–545. WRITING(S): At f. 194v a different handwriting starts copying the text (from Natural Philosophy onwards); the section on Logic might have been added or vice versa and the handwriting is clearly different (likely an Iranian one). Writing support: paper. NOTES: Madḫal I.4 on the subject matter of Logic is split into two parts. Ownership notes by Sulaymān b. Yūsuf (dat. 1076H/1665-6) and Feyzullah al-Muftī (dat. 1115H/1703-4); the latter also acquired MS Y in the same year. REFERENCES: A, E1–2, M.

 156 The date of copying of this manuscript is unknown, but it is surely earlier than the 12th/18th c.; see section II.3.

cxxiv  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition (19) İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2709 [siglum: No] COPYIST(S): Ibn Muḥammad Zāhid al-Ḥiǧāzī al-Ḥanafī (section on Logic)157; Aḥmad Ibn ʿAlī (section on Mathematics)158. DATE: 17 Ǧumādā II 886H/22 August 1481 (date of the section on Logic); 897H/1491–2 (section on Mathematics); 18 Šawwāl 894H/14 September 1489 (section on Metaphysics). PLACE OF COPYING: Šīrāz, Madrasat Dār al-Aytām (section on Logic). CONTENT: the entire Šifāʾ. FOLIATION/PAGINATION: i + ff. 1–713, ii–iii, 714–784r. WRITING(S): Nasḫ with taʿlīq features [section of the Madḫal], black ink; a few headings in the section of the Madḫal are unwritten (a blank space was left for them, which were presumably meant to be rubricated, as most of them are). Writing support: paper. REFERENCES: A, E1–2, M; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 64 n° 33. (20) İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 770 [siglum: Y] COPYIST(S): Muḥammad Ibn Maḥbūb [?] Ibn ʿAbd Allāh. DATE: 18 Rabīʿ II 888H/4 June 1483. PLACE OF COPYING: Unknown. CONTENT: the entire Šifāʾ. FOLIATION/PAGINATION: ff. 1–904 + i. WRITING(S): Nasḫ, black ink, rubricated headings; letter pointing: present; vocalization: absent. Marginal and interlinear corrections seemingly in the same handwriting as the main text. Writing support: paper. NOTES: The manuscript was collated: there are several collation marks attesting this process for the section on Logic (ff. 93v, 105v, 120v and passim; cf. also f. 232r, end of the Logic section: balaġat al-muqābala, “the collation came [to this point]”). Madḫal I.4 is split into two sections, as in MS Yi. The manuscript shows an ownership note by Feyzullah al-Muftī (dat. 1115H), identical to that in MS Yi. REFERENCES: A, B, E1–2, M; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 65 n° 56.

 157 Ibn Muḥammad Zāhid al-Ḥiǧāzī al-Ḥanafī is probably not the copyist of the entire section on Logic; the first three funūn are written in a handwriting that closely resembles that of Aḥmad Ibn ʿAlī, who penned the colophon of the section on Mathematics. 158 This Aḥmad Ibn ʿAlī is presumably the same Aḥmad Ibn ʿAlī that signed in 897H/1491–2 the copy of MS Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Maǧlis-i Šūrā-yi Islāmī, 5254, which preserves the Metaphysics of the Šifāʾ, as a comparison of the two handwritings appears to confirm. Moreover, the statement of modesty that accompanies the name of the copyist in the two colophons is identical: aqallu l-ḫalīqa bal lā šayʾ fī l-ḥaqīqa (“the least of the creatures, nothing in reality”).

II The Edition  cxxv

(21) Leiden, Universiteitsbibliotheek Or. 4 (Golius Collection) [siglum: G] COPYIST(S): Several copyists, at least four159; one of them, Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḥarīr Muḥammad al-Kātib, penned the colophon of the section on Natural Philosophy (f. 298r). The Madḫal is copied by one anonymous copyist, who penned a huge portion of text between ff. 1v–119v and other folios of the following sections160. DATE: Considerably earlier than 10th/16th c. PLACE OF COPYING: Unknown. CONTENT: Manṭiq + Ṭabīʿiyyāt + Ilāhiyyāt. FOLIATION/PAGINATION: i-iii + ff. 1–339 + iv–viii. Quires: mostly quinions161. WRITING(S): old nasḫ with taʿlīq features; brown-black ink, rubricated headings, often written in a ṯuluṯ-like script162. Writing support: paper. NOTES: The manuscript shows several collation marks in the margins (balaġa; e.g. ff. 14v, 17r, 23r, 25r), and several collation notes in different handwritings163. The name of at least four owners of the manuscript can be read in the ownership notes on f. 1r, mainly dating to the 10th/16th century164. REFERENCES: B, A, M, E2; BERTOLACCI 2006, Appendix A; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 66 n° 63; WITKAM 2012, pp. 225–233. (22) İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 2708 [siglum: N] COPYIST(S): ʿAlī al-Ṣābirī. DATE: 10th/16th c.165 PLACE OF COPYING: Unknown. CONTENT: Manṭiq + Ṭabīʿiyyāt + a fragment of Riyāḍiyyāt + Ilāhiyyāt. FOLIATION/PAGINATION: i-iv + ff. 1–667r. WRITING(S): Nasḫ, text in black ink, chapter headings in red; letter pointing. Writing support: paper. NOTES: The manuscript is employed in the Cairo edition with the siglum: . REFERENCES: E1–2, A, M; BERTOLACCI 2008, p. 63 n° 32.

‫ن‬

 159 See WITKAM 2012, p. 226: “the different copyists must have worked in some sort of co-ordinated way, and in the same place and at approximately the same time”. 160 ‘Copyist 1’ in WITKAM 2012, p. 229. 161 See WITKAM 2012, p. 230. 162 See the detailed description provided in WITKAM 2012, pp. 226–227. 163 See WITKAM 2012, pp. 231–232. 164 The names are listed in WITKAM 2012, p. 228. 165 Dating in Anawati, p. 77 and IBN SĪNĀ 1952a, p. (73).

cxxvi  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition II.3 Genealogical Classification of the Witnesses II.3.1 At the Origin of the Manuscript Tradition of the Madḫal II.3.1.1 The Archetype In any attempt to provide a genealogical reconstruction of the manuscript tradition, a fundamental question needs to be settled, namely whether an archetype of the extant manuscript tradition existed or not – that is, whether the extant manuscript tradition ultimately derives from a single copy characterized by peculiar textual innovations and mistakes. The answer to this question regarding Avicenna’s Madḫal may be a positive one. Textual corruptions shared by all the manuscripts checked can be found: two cases are the addition of bi-l-tawāṭuʾ in Madḫal II.2, §2.3, p. 212.17166, and the erroneous wa-l-ǧins in Madḫal II.3, §6.1, p. 232.50 that supposedly replaced an original wa-l-faṣl in the archetype167. Overall, the manuscript tradition of the Madḫal does not show a large number of evident textual corruptions shared by all the manuscripts. In this connection, two points should be kept in mind: first, sources contemporary to Avicenna inform us that the Šifāʾ was read within the circle of Avicenna’s disciples during its composition, as well as in the presence of the author himself 168. If an archetype did exist and circulated in Avicenna’s school, such a practice may have helped to correct major issues in that copy. Second, the manuscript tradition itself shows a tendency to emend major textual issues by conjecture, so that in some cases, a single family of manuscripts may appear to avoid a mistake that affects the rest of the manuscript tradition. With these premises in mind, some more controversial cases presented below may provide further evidence of the existence of the archetype. (1) Al-Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction: A Chronological Puzzle. The first controversial case of textual corruption that affects the manuscript tradition in its entirety may be spotted in al-Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction. The passage at §I.6, dealing with the composition of the sections on Logic, Mathematics, Botany and Zoology of the Šifāʾ, presents some syntactic issues as well as a chronological problem. First, the syntax is quite intricate (cf. T2 and T3 below, column 1). The text shifts abruptly from a plural reference to hāḏihi l-kutub (“these books” 169) to a reference to the book of the Ḥayawān in the clause that immediately follows (wa-ḥāḏā fī  166 For the doctrinal problems entailed by the presence of bi-l-tawāṭuʾ, see Commentary on chap. II.2, §2.3. 167 See the note to the critical apparatus in the Edition. 168 AL-ǦŪZǦĀNĪ, Biography of Ibn Sīnā, pp. 54–56. 169 It is doubtful whether this plural can refer to the Ḥayawān and the Nabāt or not; on this problem, see GUTAS 2014, p. 33, note s.

II The Edition  cxxvii

akṯar…al-faylasūf); immediately after, it again refers to the books (wa-zāda fīhā…ziyādāt, “he made to them…some additions”), for the fīhā must refer to the books mentioned (kutub)170. Second, the final clause reporting that Avicenna was forty years old cannot possibly correspond to the date when Avicenna composed all these books, especially the Ḥayawān and the Nabāt171. According to the other information on Avicenna’s life provided by al-Ǧūzǧānī in the Introduction to the Šifāʾ and in the Biography, Avicenna reached his forties around 410H/1019–20172; however, this can hardly be the exact date of composition of the section on Logic, which was completed during Avicenna’s stay in Iṣfahān, and most importantly of the Nabāt and the Ḥayawān, which were composed after all the other sections in the year of ʿAlāʾ al-Dawla’s attack to the city of Šābūr Ḫwāst173. This attack might arguably coincide with that recorded by the historian Ibn Aṯīr in Al-Kāmil fī l-Tārīḫ (sub anno 417) for the year 417H/1026–7 when Avicenna was more or less 47 years old174. There are three possibilities to explain the odd indication provided in the Introduction of the Šifāʾ: it can be supposed that al-Ǧūzǧānī either (i) mistakenly or (ii) intentionally provided a very loose chronological indication, or (iii) that an issue occurred during the transmission of the text. I would suggest that (i) and (ii), which attribute the incorrect chronological indication to al-Ǧūzǧānī, are not entirely satisfying explanations, given that all the other chronological references he provided both in this Introduction and in the Biography are highly consistent175. In my opinion, (iii) thus seems the most likely means of explaining the phenomenon. A viable solution to this problem is to consider a corruption of the number in the archetype of the tradition176; some further elements, however, may denote a more pervasive corruption of the passage.

 170 Cf. GUTAS 2014, p. 33, note t; Gutas’ translation “expanded it” actually presupposes a reading: wa-zāda fīhi, which, although attested at least in MS Ṣ, is arguably the result of an a posteriori adjustment of the manuscript due to the intricate syntax. 171 See also GUTAS 2014, p. 33, note 15: “this number is inaccurate” and Ibid., p. 108: “His [alǦūzǧānī’s] statement that Avicenna was forty when he completed The Cure, on the other hand, is clearly either an error of calculation on Jūzjānī’s part or possibly due to the erroneous transmission of the number (forty-eight?) in the transmission of the manuscripts”. 172 Considering Biography, p. 88.4–6, where al-Ǧūzǧānī states that Avicenna’s date of birth is 370H and that he died in 428H at the age of 58. 173 See Biography, p. 66.2–4, and below, Tab. 7, column 3. 174 See also GUTAS 2014, p. 107. 175 Usually, the indications provided are quite precise: see, for instance, §1.1 of the Introduction (p. 4.11–12), where al-Ǧūzǧānī claims that he joined Avicenna when the latter was around 32 years old. This information is also consistent with al-Ǧūzǧānī’s claim to have served Avicenna for twenty-five years (Biography, p. 68.3). Considering that he stayed with him until the latter’s death, the sum roughly coincides with the 58 years recorded in Biography, p. 88.4–6. 176 As suggested in GUTAS 2014, p. 108, but also already in GUTAS 1988, p. 105.

cxxviii  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition In the passage in question, it is unclear to which books Avicenna made the ‘additions’ (ziyādāt) mentioned. The ‘additions’ recalled here may coincide with those mentioned elsewhere by Avicenna himself regarding his summary of the Almagest in the Šifāʾ (Madḫal I.1, §4.3, p. 16.31: wa-alḥaqtu bihi min al-ziyādāt baʿda al-farāġ minhu mā waǧaba […]), and by al-Ǧūzǧānī with regard to all the books of the Mathematics of the Šifāʾ in the Biography (p. 64.5–7: […] wa-awrada fī kull kitāb min alriyāḍiyyāt ziyādāt […]). Based on these parallel passages, it would be tempting to suppose that the additions of the Introduction refer to the books of Mathematics and that, consequently, the clauses concerning the Ḥayawān and the Nabāt are misplaced. In other words, this would imply supposing that the passage was affected by an erroneous textual transposition, whose solution would be rearranging the presumably corrupted paragraph as in column 2 of T2 (Arabic text in T3). The tentative solution proposed would have the advantage of restoring a text consistent with Biography, pp. 64.5–66.4 by referring the additions specifically to the books of Mathematics. Moreover, the dating in the text would only refer to the section on Mathematics, to which it could well adapt, thus solving the chronological issue. If so, the corruption results from the separation and displacement of section (c). But how did such a displacement originate? The phenomenon can be more easily explained by supposing that section (c) was not, at first, part of the text and that it was added in the margin of a copy (presumably, the archetype’s exemplar). When the archetype was copied from this manuscript, then, the marginal addition – which was likely meant to be added at the end of paragraph (b) – was erroneously split and the two halves were misplaced within paragraph (b)177. The existence of an archetypal copy affected by such a misplacement would justify the spread of the corruption in all the manuscripts. T2. (1) Introduction, §1.6 –

(2) Introduction, §1.6 –

Transmitted text

Proposed text

(3) Biography, pp. 64.5–66.4

[a] There, he dedicated himself to the Logic. Since he

[a] In Iṣfahān he dedicated himself to

had books at his disposal, he followed them and pro-

finish the Book of Healing; so, he com-

ceeded according to the order that the philosophers

pleted the Logic

observed in them, and dealt with the statements of theirs that he refuted. As a consequence, the Logic grew long and was completed in Iṣfahān. [b+c] As for the Mathemat-

[b] As for the Mathemat-

[b] and the Almagest; he had already

 177 The erroneous division of the marginal addition may have originated because the addition could have been written in two lines of text that were interpreted as two separate additions.

II The Edition  cxxix

ics,

previously

ics, he had previously

abridged Euclid, the Arithmetic, and the

composed it in the form of

he

had

composed it in the form

Music. He introduced in each book of

a summary, and he decided

of a summary, and he

[the section on] Mathematics some

to add it to the Book of

decided to add it to the

additions, of which he considered that

Healing. He also com-

Book

He

the need was compelling. As to the

of

Healing.

posed the [Book of] Ani-

completed these books

Almagest, he introduced ten theorems

mals and [that of] Plants

by adding something [of

concerning the parallax, and he intro-

and

these

his own] in them. At that

duced at the end of the Almagest things

books. Although in most

time, he was forty years

of the science of Astronomy that were

of the Book of Animals he

old.

unprecedented. He introduced in [the

completed

followed Aristotle’s own

abridgement of] Euclid of

book, he added something

some ambiguities178; in the Arithmetic,

[of his own] in the books.

some excellent properties [of numbers]

At that time, he was forty

and, in Music, some questions which

years old.

the first [philosophers] neglected. [c] He also composed

[c] Then, he finished the Book of Heal-

the [Book of] Animals

ing, with the two books of Plants and

and [that of] Plants,

Animals that were [still] lacking, since

and in most of the Book

he composed them the year ʿAlāʾ al-

of Animals he followed

Dawla made an expedition towards

Aristotle’s book.

Šābūr Ḫwāst, in the way; in the way, he also composed the Book of the Salvation.

T3. (1) Al-Ǧūzǧānī, Introduction,

(2) Al-Ǧūzǧānī, Introduc-

(3) Al-Ǧūzǧānī, Biography, pp. 64.5–

§1.6 – Transmitted text

tion, §1.6 – Proposed text

66.4

‫[ وﻫﻨﺎك اﺷﺘﻐﻞ ﳌﻨﻄﻖ وﲤﻜّﻦ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻜ ﺐ ﻓﻌﺮض ﻣﻦ ذ ٔن ﺎذاﻫﺎ‬a] ‫[واﺷﺘﻐﻞ ٕﺻﻔﻬﺎن ﺑ ﳣﲓ ﻛﺘﺎب اﻟﺸﻔﺎء ﻓﻔﺮغ‬a] ‫وﺟﺮي ﲆ ﺮﺗ ﺐ اﻟﻘﻮم ﻓﳱﺎ و ﳫّﻢ ﲆ ﻣﺎ اﺳ ﻜﺮﻩ ﻣﻦ ٔﻗﻮاﳍﻢ ﻓﻄﺎل‬ ‫ﻣﻦ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ‬ .‫اﳌﻨﻄﻖ و ّﰎ ٕﺻﻔﻬﺎن‬ ‫[ و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟﺮ ﺿﯿﺎت ﻓﻘﺪ ﰷن ﲻﻠﻬﺎ‬b+c] ‫[ و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟﺮ ﺿﯿﺎت ﻓﻘﺪ ﰷن‬b] ‫[ وا ﺴﻄﻲ وﰷن ﻗﺪ اﺧ ﴫ ٔوﻗﻠﯿﺪس‬b] ّ ‫ و ٔورد ﰲ‬.‫وا ٔرﲦﺎﻃﯿﻘﻰ واﳌﻮﺳﯿﻘﻰ‬ ‫ﰻ ﻛﺘﺎب ﲻﻠﻬﺎ ﲆ ﺳ ﻞ ﺧ ﺼﺎر ﰲ ﲆ ﺳ ﻞ ﺧ ﺼﺎر ﰲ ﺳﺎﻟﻒ‬ ‫ﻣﻦ اﻟﺮ ﺿﯿﺎت ز دات ر ٔى ٔن اﳊﺎ ﺔ ٕا ﳱﺎ ﺳﺎﻟﻒ اﻟﺰﻣﺎن ﻓﺮ ٔى ٔن ﯾﻀﯿﻔﻬﺎ اﻟﺰﻣﺎن ﻓﺮ ٔى ٔن ﯾﻀﯿﻔﻬﺎ إﱃ ﻛﺘﺎب‬  178 Gohlman (p. 67) translates the term šubahāʾ as “some geometrical figures”; against this translation see GUTAS 2014, p. 462 n. 24, translating: “some problematic passages”. It would be tempting to read this passage in parallel to Madḫal I.1, §4.3, p. 16.29, where Avicenna states that he solved certain ambiguities in his abridgements of the Elements of Euclid (wa-ḥalaltu fīhi al-šubah), and to suppose that a term such as ḥall (“solution”) has been erroneously omitted from the text of the Biography.

cxxx  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition

‫ وﺻﻨّﻒ ٔﯾﻀﺎ اﳊﯿﻮان واﻟﻨﺒﺎت‬.‫ وﻓﺮغ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺸﻔﺎء‬،‫إﱃ ﻛﺘﺎب اﻟﺸﻔﺎء‬ ‫ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﻜ ﺐ وزاد ﻓﳱﺎ ﻣﻦ ذ وﻓﺮغ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﻜ ﺐ و ﺎذى ﰲ ٔﻛﱶ‬ ‫ز دات؛ وﺑﻠﻎ ﺳﻨﻪ ﺣ ﻨﺌﺬ ﻛﺘﺎب اﳊﯿﻮان ﻛﺘﺎب ٔرﺳﻄﻮﻃﺎﻟ ﺲ‬ .‫ٔرﺑﻌﲔ‬ ‫اﻟﻔ ﻠﺴﻮف وزاد ﻓﳱﺎ ﻣﻦ ذ ز دات‬ ٔ ‫ﺣ‬ .‫وﺑﻠﻎ ﺳﻨﻪ ﻨﺌﺬ رﺑﻌﲔ‬

‫ ٔ ّﻣﺎ ﰲ ا ﺴﻄﻲ ﻓ ٔورد ﻋﴩة ٔﺷﲀل ﰲ‬.‫داﻋﯿﺔ‬ ‫ و ٔورد ﰲ ٓﺧﺮ ا ﺴﻄﻲ ﰲ ﲅ‬.‫اﺧ ﻼف اﳌﻨﻈﺮ‬ ‫ و ٔورد ﰲ ٔوﻗﻠﯿﺪس‬.‫اﻟﻬﯿﺌﺔ ٔﺷﯿﺎء ﱂ ﺴﺒﻖ ٕا ﳱﺎ‬ ‫ﺷﳢﺎء وﰲ ا ٔرﲦﺎﻃﯿﻘﻰ ﺧﻮ ّاص ﺣﺴﻨﺔ وﰲ‬ .‫اﳌﻮﺳﯿﻘﻰ ﻣﺴﺎﺋﻞ ﻏﻔﻞ ﻋﳯﺎ ا ٔ ّوﻟﻮن‬

‫[ وﺻﻨّﻒ ٔﯾﻀﺎ اﳊﯿﻮان‬c] ‫[و ّﰎ ﻛﺘﺎب اﻟﺸﻔﺎء ﻣﺎ ﻼ ﻛﺘﺎﰊ اﻟﻨﺒﺎت‬c] ‫واﳊﯿﻮان ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﺻﻨّﻔﻬﺎ ﰲ اﻟﺴﻨﺔ اﻟﱵ ﺗﻮ ّ ﻪ ﻓﳱﺎ واﻟﻨﺒﺎت و ﺎذى ﰲ ٔﻛﱶ ﻛﺘﺎب‬ ‫ اﳊﯿﻮان ﻛﺘﺎب ٔرﺳﻄﻮﻃﺎﻟ ﺲ‬.‫ﻼء ا و إﱃ ﺳﺎﺑﻮر ﺧﻮاﺳﺖ ﰲ اﻟﻄﺮﯾﻖ‬ .‫اﻟﻔ ﻠﺴﻮف‬ .‫وﺻﻨّﻒ ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﰲ اﻟﻄﺮﯾﻖ ﻛﺘﺎب اﻟﻨ ﺎة‬ (2) Chap. I.7, §3.2.5: A wrong interpolation? Another possible corruption that may have occurred at the origin of the manuscript tradition affects chap. I.7, §3.2.5 (see T4). The syntax and the content of the passage are problematic at one point, namely the clause: yakūnu ḏālika li-l-ḥassās dūna al-ḥayawān (“this belongs to percipient and not to animal”). My suggestion is that the text transmitted by all the manuscripts may be the result of a faulty interpolation that occurred in the archetype. The original text probably lacked the clause yakūnu ḏālika li-l-ḥassās dūna al-ḥayawān, which was intended as the example of a condition that followed the distinction between the genus and the differentia, namely that a feature ought to belong exclusively to one of the two (in this case, a feature that belongs to the differentia ‘percipient’ does not also belong to the genus ‘animal’). T4. Transmitted text Then, I do not exclude that there are other conditions attaching to the explanation that they ascribed to what signifies the quiddity by means of which what they call ‘genus’ or ‘species’ is distinguished from the differentia, and other conditions attaching to the distinction {[such as] this belongs to percipient and not to animal}, but this is not according to the first imposition, nor according to a transposition determined by those who employed these expressions when they began to employ them; rather, these are necessities to which this sort of disputes is committed.

‫ّﰒ ﻻ ٔﻣ ﻊ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻫﺎﻫﻨﺎ ﴍوط ٔﺧﺮى ﺗﻠﺤﻖ‬ ‫ﻟﺒﯿﺎن ا ي ﺟﻌﻠﻮﻩ ﻟ ا ّل ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ّﳣﲒ ﲠﺎ ﻣﺎ‬ ‫ﺴ ّﻤﻰ ﺴﺎ ٔو ﻧﻮ ﺎ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ وﴍوط ٔﺧﺮى‬ ،[‫ﻠﺤﺴﺎس دون اﳊﯿﻮان‬ ‫ﺗﻠﺤﻖ ﳣﯿﲒ ] ﻜﻮن ذ‬ ّ ٔ ‫ا ّٕﻻ ٔ ّن ذ ﻻ ﻜﻮن ﲝﺴﺐ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ ا ّول وﻻ ﲝﺴﺐ‬ ‫ﻧﻘﻞ ﻣ ﺼﻮص ﻠﯿﻪ ﻣﻦ اﳌﺴﺘﻌﻤﻠﲔ ﻟﻬﺬﻩ ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ ﰲ‬ ‫ ﺑﻞ ﻜﻮن اﺿﻄﺮارات ٔﳉ ٔ ٕا ﳱﺎ‬،‫ٔ ّول ﻣﺎ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﻠﻮا‬ .‫ٔﻣ ﺎل ﻫﺬﻩ اﳌﻘﺎوﻣﺎت‬

II The Edition  cxxxi

(3) Chap. II.3, §8.1: A wrong interpolation or a misunderstood correction? Chap. II.3, §8.1 critically addresses Porph., Isag., p. 20.17–18179. Avicenna’s remarks aim at restoring the correct formulation of the differentiation between the species and the proprium. The first possibility proposed (1a in T5) is to state that the species can become a proprium for something, whereas the proprium cannot be a species for anything else; however, as Avicenna states, the premise that the species can be a proprium for something else is false. After proposing a second solution (2), which is itself problematic, the passage assesses that stating that the species can be a proprium for something else, whereas the proprium cannot be a proprium for anything else, is correct (1b). Statements 1a and 1b are actually the same, but Avicenna’s judgement on the two is diametrically opposite. Arguably, the judgement on the falseness of the claim that the species can be a proprium for something else is incorrect, for it contradicts several examples of species that can be propria for something else provided by Avicenna himself (Madḫal II.4, §1 and Commentary; Al-Risāla al-Mūǧaza fī uṣūl al-manṭiq, Appendix A, §6). The problem lies in explaining the substantial reduplication produced within a few lines by the compresence of 1a and 1b and Avicenna’s problematic judgement on 1a. One possibility might be to speculate that 1b was meant to replace 1a as a correction in the archetype’s exemplar. If so, the variant may have been mistaken for an addition to the text when the archetype was copied. Another possibility is that the claim that the premise in 1a is false is an incorrect interpolation that affected the archetype of the tradition. In both cases, the oddity may account for an (authorial?) intervention on the archetype of the tradition. T5. Transmitted text (1a) If he had said that the species of something can become a proprium for something else and then that the proprium does not become the proprium of anything else, it would have been a well-formed difference, but the judgement concerning the species would have been false. […] (1b) If he had said that the species of something can become a proprium for something else whereas the proprium does not become a proprium for anything else, it would have been right.

 179 See Commentary on the passage.

‫ﻟﻜ ّﻪ ﻟﻮ ﰷن ﻗﺎل ا ّٕن اﻟﻨﻮع ﻠﴚء ﻗﺪ ﯾﺼﲑ ّﺎﺻﺔ‬ ‫اﳋﺎﺻﺔ ﻻ ﺗﺼﲑ ّﺎﺻﺔ‬ ّ ‫ﻟﴚء ٓﺧﺮ ّﰒ ﻗﺎل إن‬ ‫ﻟﻜﻦ اﳊﲂ ﰲ‬ ّ ‫ﻟﴚء ٓﺧﺮ ﲀﻧﺖ ﻣ ﺎﯾﻨﺔ ﺣﺴﻨﺔ و‬ ‫اﻟﻨﻮع ﰷذب ]…[ وﻟﻮ ﰷن ﻗﺎل ا ّٕن اﻟﻨﻮع ﻠﴚء ﻗﺪ‬ ‫اﳋﺎﺻﺔ ﻻ ﺗﺼﲑ ّﺎﺻﺔ‬ ّ ‫ﯾﺼﲑ ّﺎﺻﺔ ﻟﴚء ٓﺧﺮ و‬ . ‫ﻟﴚء ٓﺧﺮ ﲀن ﻣﺴﺘﻘ‬

cxxxii  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition A preliminary survey has demonstrated at least five instances of textual difficulty in the transmitted text of Avicenna’s Madḫal, which can be explained by supposing that the extant manuscript tradition derives from an archetype (ω2 in S4 below). The hypothesis of the existence of an archetype should be considered in light of alǦūzǧānī’s account of Avicenna’s habits in the composition of his works. Reportedly, Avicenna did not take care to draw a clean copy from his own personal draft, a task that was instead sometimes undertaken by al-Ǧūzǧānī himself180. Rather than deriving directly from the author’s copy, the manuscript tradition of the Šifāʾ may derive either from the first clean copy of the author’s draft, or from a further copy of it.

S4. The ‘moving archetype’

II.3.1.2 A ‘School Edition’ of Avicenna’s Madḫal II.3.1.2.1 Structural Modifications of the Archetype: Al-Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction There is evidence that Avicenna’s Madḫal in its original version differed in a number of structural and textual features from the version we are familiar with nowadays. Presumably, the original version underwent a series of interventions and additions in the archetype that circulated in Avicenna’s circle (ω2). As for the structural modifications, al-Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction was in all likelihood absent from the original version of Avicenna’s Madḫal and may have been added to the archetypal copy at a later date. Prior to this, the only introduction to the work was Avicenna’s Prologue, which presumably appeared without any title or chapter mark (faṣl). This can be argued on the basis of the non-uniform behaviour of the manuscript tradition, in which are recorded cases of: (i) the presence of alǦūzǧānī’s Introduction, with oscillations concerning the exact wording of the introductory and final clauses that mark the beginning and end of al-Ǧūzǧānī’s dis 180 AL-ǦŪZǦĀNĪ, Introduction, §1.2.

II The Edition  cxxxiii

course181; (ii) the presence of al-Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction, albeit without the introductory and final clauses that mark the beginning and the end of al-Ǧūzǧānī’s discourse182; (iii) the presence of al-Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction without the introductory and final phrases that mark the beginning and end of al-Ǧūzǧānī’s discourse, and Avicenna’s Prologue (corresponding to chap. I.1) without any indications of chapter or title183; (iv) the total lack of al-Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction184. This lack of uniformity in the manuscript tradition may signify that copies of the archetype were also made before the addition of al-Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction; it might also point to the fact that editorial work was made to include Avicenna’s Prologue – which was originally not a chapter and had no title185 – as the first chapter of the work, supplied with a generic title (“chapter on indicating what the book contains”). An editorial effort is also evident in the insertion of the clauses that present and delimitate al-Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction with respect to Avicenna’s own work.

 181 The introductory statement reads, with minor variations in the manuscript tradition: hāḏā Kitāb al-Šifāʾ li-l-Šayḫ al-Raʾīs Abī ʿAlī Al-Ḥusayn Ibn ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Sīnā […] wa-fī ṣadrihi kalām liAbī ʿUbayd ʿAbd Al-Wāḥid Ibn Muḥammad Al-Ǧūzǧānī (“This is the Book of Healing by the Chief Master Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn Ibn ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Sīnā […], which begins with the discourse of Abū ʿUbayd ʿAbd al-Wāḥid Ibn Muḥammad al-Ǧūzǧānī”). The final statement, on the other hand, varies more considerably in the different manuscripts, even though the content does not change substantially (more or less: “from this point, al-Ǧūzǧānī’s discourse is terminated and Avicenna’s work starts”). 182 E.g. MS E. 183 E.g. MS Aligarh, Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University 110/30: Avicenna’s Prologue is not a faṣl, and the first treatise of the work significantly begins from the following chapter. Also, in MS Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān, Miškāt 243 Avicenna’s Prologue is not marked as a chapter. 184 E.g. MSS MiYiYNoNZa employed in the present edition omit al-Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction; to these, other witnesses can be added, such as MSS Iran, Khvoy, Kitābḫānah-i Madrasa-i Namāzī 247; Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Maǧlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 1907; Kashan, Fahrang va Irshad 15 (the Introduction is added with a different handwriting); Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Ǧumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran 7590; İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Lâleli 2550; Najaf, Maktabat al-Imām Amīr al-Muʾminīn, 1096; İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hekimoǧlu Ali Paşa 857; Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 593/1; Cairo, Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Waṯāʾiq al-Qawmiyya, 894 falsafa; Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 236/1; İstanbul, Millet Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Feyzullah Efendi 1206 (al-Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction was seemingly added at a different moment in the two pages preceding Avicenna’s Prologue, written obliquely to gain space). The lack of this section in some of these manuscripts, however, may also be due to a voluntary omission. 185 Usually, Avicenna’s prologues do not have any title, and are not conceived as chapters; within the Šifāʾ, one can think of the prologue of the Samāʿ Ṭabīʿī, the prologue of Al-Afʿāl wa-l-Infiʿālāt and the prologue of the Nafs, compared to which Madḫal I.1 represents an exceptional case.

cxxxiv  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition II.3.1.2.2 Textual Modifications in the Archetype All of this suggests that the text underwent structural modifications when circulating within the circle of Avicenna’s disciples and colleagues. The alterations operated on the text are not limited to al-Ǧūzǧānī’s editorial interventions. A number of passages in Avicenna’s Madḫal are not uniformly attested in the manuscript tradition. In more detail, a small number of manuscripts appear to attest against the rest of the tradition (I) a shorter version of some passages (cases 1–2) and (II) a different phrasing of some others (case 3). To begin with (I), among the manuscripts employed in the present edition, MSS EJGTAs, together with the Latin translation and al-Lawkarī’s quotations, witness the existence of a shorter version of the text. Principal textual variations can be found in the following passages: Madḫal II.1, §1.1, p. 194.7–8; Madḫal II.1, §3.1, p. 198.34–35; Madḫal II.1, §3.1, p. 200.39–40; Madḫal II.2, §2.3, p. 212.18–19; Madḫal II.2, §4.3, p. 218.49–50. In more detail, MS G and the Latin translation systematically witness a shorter version, without preserving any of the passages in question, whereas MSS EJTAs, and arguably the exemplar owned by al-Lawkarī, preserve part of them without the others. In what follows, a couple of these cases will be examined in detail (cases 1–2 below), and I will argue for the possibility that the passages in question include certain stylistic, syntactical, or doctrinal issues that might suggest their later addition to the text186. [Case 1] Madḫal II.2, §4.3: «This difference occurs between the genus and the permanent common proprium, or between the two natures of the genus and the proprium unrestrictedly, since that [nature] is not a subject of predication, whereas this one is, I mean this convertibility. [Another] difference implied in it follows to this one [...]». Madḫal II.2, §4.3

‫ ٔو ﺑﲔ‬،‫وﻫﺬﻩ اﳌﺒﺎﯾﻨﺔ ﺑﲔ اﳉ ﺲ واﳋﺎﺻﺔ ا اﲚﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ‬ ‫ﻃﺒﯿﻌﱵ اﳉ ﺲ واﳋﺎﺻﺔ ﻣﻄﻠﻘﺎ؛ إذ ﺗ ﻻ ﲢﳣﻞ وﻫﺬﻩ‬ ‫ وﯾ ﻊ ﻫﺬﻩ ﻣ ﺎﯾﻨﺔ ﱔ ﰲ ﲷﻦ‬. ‫ ٔﻋﲏ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻌﻜﺲ‬، ‫ﲢﳣﻞ‬ [...] ‫ﺗ‬ 2

_________

‫ ﻗﺪ ﲢﳣﻞ ]ﲢﳣﻞ‬JE

1.

add. in mg. G2

s.l.

G2 || 2.

1

‫ اﻟﻌﻜﺲ — ٔو ﺑﲔ‬om. TAsG

Lat (AVICENNA 2018, pp. 246–247)187 Haec autem differentia est inter genus et proprium commune substantiale*. Post hanc autem sequitur1 alia differentia quae continetur in ea [...] _________ 1. sequitur] sequetur BU _________ *Substantiale] fort. legit ḏātiyya pro dāʾima

 186 The considerations here proposed on cases 1–2 derive from the research published in DI VINCENZO 2017; the other cases are all more extensively dealt with both in DI VINCENZO 2017 and in the notes to the apparatus of the present edition. 187 The text of the Latin translation proposed here is mine; the correspondence with Hudry’s edition (AVICENNA 2018) of the text is also provided.

II The Edition  cxxxv

Case 1: The counterpredication of propria. In this case, the clause with regard to which the two versions diverge is omitted by the Latin translation and by MSS TAsG, against the rest of the tradition. The context of the suspected passage is Avicenna’s commentary on Porphyry’s statement that “a proprium is counterpredicated of that of which it is a proprium, a genus is not counterpredicated of anything”188. Porphyry’s statement means that the proprium applies to that to which its species applies and conversely, whereas the genus does not189. Avicenna proposes, at the first stage, a restriction of the validity of the statement to those propria that are permanent and common to all of their subjects. Arguably, Avicenna intended to prevent readers from inferring that the proprium that does not always belong to its species, or not to all of it, can be counterpredicated. The suspected clause appears to be a correction to Avicenna’s own restriction, stating that Porphyry’s statement holds for the natures of the proprium and the genus in absolute (muṭlaqan), i.e. unrestrictedly, since the proprium can be counterpredicated if it permanently belongs to all the individuals of the species of which it is predicated, whereas the genus never can190. From a doctrinal point of view, the suspected passage represents a shift within Avicenna’s first intention to confine the validity of Porphyry’s statement to a certain kind of proprium. From a syntactic point of view, the last part of the relevant passage is problematic; in fact, it is rather difficult to understand the passage aʿnī hāḏā l-ʿaks (“I mean this convertibility”) within the structure of the clause, from which it appears to be detached. [Case 2] Madḫal II.1, §3.1: «As for the accident, [on the contrary], it is not in itself evident that it must necessarily have lesser extension than the genus. This is because the propria of the ten categories that we will mention later on are common accidents for the species of the categories, having not, therefore, lesser extension than the genus; on the contrary, some of them are more common and with wider extension, like the fact that substance is established according to a unique definition and does not undergo more and less is more common than substance. If someone says that this is a negative [expression] with no meaning under it, yet we can still find accidental concomitants that are more common than each category, like one and being, or like

 188 PORPH., Isag., p. 16.11–14. 189 Two things are said to “counterpredicate” (Gr. ἀντικατηγορεῖσθαι) when the one applies to everything the other applies to and conversely. Two examples of counterpredication are that of the thing and its definition (e.g. ‘human’ and ‘rational animal’, since every human is a rational animal and every rational animal is a human) and that of the thing and its proprium (e.g. ‘human’ and ‘capable of laughing’, since every human is capable of laughing and every being capable of laughing is a human). The genus and each one of its species do not counterpredicate, because the genus applies to more items than those to which each of its species applies (e.g. ‘animal’ and its species ‘human’, since every human is an animal, but not every animal is a human). 190 Certain manuscripts preserve a qad before the verb taḥtamilu (“is predicated”) referring to the nature of the proprium; the qad conveys a potential meaning in this context, so that it should be understood as “whereas this one [namely the nature of the proprium] may be/sometimes is counterpredicated”.

cxxxvi  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition created, or like motion, for it has wider extension than rational animal which, according to him, is a genus for man. The second difference [...]». Madḫal II.1, §3.1

‫و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟﻌﺮض ﻓﻠ ﺲ ﺑ ّ ﺎ ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻪ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﳚﺐ ٔن ﻜﻮن ٔﻗ ّﻞ‬ ‫ وذ ٔ ّن ﺧﻮ ّاص اﳌﻘﻮﻻت اﻟﻌﴩ اﻟﱵ‬،‫ﻣﻦ اﳉ ﺲ‬ ‫ وﻟ ﺴﺖ ٔﻗ ّﻞ ﻣﻦ‬،‫ﻧﺬ ﺮﻫﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ ﱔ ٔﻋﺮاض ﺎ ّﻣﺔ ٔﻧﻮاﻋﻬﺎ‬ ‫ ﻛﲈ ٔ ّن‬،‫ ﺑﻞ ﻣﳯﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ٔ ّﰪ و ٔﻛﱶ‬،‫اﳉ ﺲ ﰲ ﲻﻮ ﺎ‬ ّ‫ﻮن اﳉﻮﻫﺮ ﺑﺘﺎ ﲆ ﺪّ وا ﺪ ﻓﻼ ﯾﻘ ﻞ ا ٔﺷﺪ‬ ‫ ﻓﺎ ْٕن ﻗﺎل ﻗﺎﺋﻞ ا ّٕن ﻫﺬا‬.‫وا ٔﺿﻌﻒ ﻫﻮ ٔ ّﰪ ﻣﻦ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ‬ ‫ ﻓﻘﺪ ﳝﻜ ﻨﺎ ٔن ﳒﺪ ﻟﻮازم‬،‫ﺳﻠﺐ وﻟ ﺲ ﲢﺘﻪ ﻣﻌﲎ‬ ‫ ﺑﻞ‬،‫ ﰷﻟﻮا ﺪ وﰷﳌﻮﺟﻮد‬، ‫وﻋﻮارض ٔ ّﰪ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻘﻮ ﻣﻘﻮ‬ ‫ ﺑﻞ ﻣ ﻞ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻓﺎٕﳖّ ﺎ ٔﻛﱶ ﻣﻦ اﳊﯿﻮان‬،‫ﰷﶈﺪث‬ ‫ واﳌﺒﺎﯾﻨﺔ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﯿﺔ‬.‫ وﻫﻮ ﺲ ﻋﻨﺪﻩ ﻟ ٕﻼ ﺴﺎن‬،‫اﻟﻨﺎﻃﻖ‬ […]

_________ 1.

‫ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن — ﺑﻞ‬om. EJG

Lat (Cf. AVICENNA 2018, pp. 235–236)191 De accidente autem1 non ita patet per se an debeat esse minus genere. Proprietates enim decem praedicamentorum de quibus postea loquemur2 sunt accidentia communia3 speciebus eorum, et non sunt inferiores generibus4 in sua communitate. Est autem quaedam ex illis5 communior et maior6, sicut hoc7 quod substantia est ita8 fixa quod non recipit magis et minus: hoc enim communior est9 quam substantia. Si autem quis10 dixerit quod haec negatio est11, quae non continet intentionem aliquam12, possumus invenire comitantia et accidentia quae sunt communiora unoquoque praedicamentorum, sicut est unum et13 ens, et sicut incipere vel14 fieri*. Differentia autem secunda [...] _________ 1. de accidente autem] de accidente vero BU : autem om. V || 2. de quibus — loquemur om. BU || 3. de quibus postea loquemur add. BU || 4. generibus] genere BU || 5. ex illis] ex istis BU || 6. communior et maior] maior et communior BU || 7. sicut hoc om. BU || 8. est ita inv. MNPG || 9. est om. BUM || 10. quis om. BU || 11. est om. BUMNP || 12. aliquam] quicquam BU || 13. et om. BU || 14. vel] et BU _________ *sicut incipere vel fieri] duplex translatio: ar. ka-lmuḥdaṯ

Case 2: The example of “motion”. The passage aims at demonstrating that the accident does not always have a more limited extent of predication than the genus. The first example mentioned is the fact of not undergoing more and less, which belongs to more than just one of the highest genera (as it belongs to the category of substance as well as, for instance, to the category of quantity), therefore having a wider extent of predication than a genus. Then, Avicenna imagines a possible objection to the example he provided, namely that the feature mentioned (“not undergo 191 The text of the Latin translation here proposed is mine. A correspondence with Hudry’s edition (AVICENNA 2018) of the text is provided: since the text I propose differs slightly from that proposed in Hudry’s edition, the indication of the corresponding page is preceded by ‘Cf.’.

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ing more and less”) is actually a negation (salb) rather than a feature. In order to avoid such an objection, Avicenna mentions the case of certain affirmative concomitants and accidents that are more general than each category, like ‘one’ (al-wāḥid), ‘existent’ (al-mawǧūd) and ‘created’ (al-muḥdaṯ). As for ‘one’ and ‘existent’, these are the two transcendental notions predicated of all the categories192; as for ‘created’, this is also a notion that can be applied to all the items that are classified in the categories193. The whole argumentation is set at the level of the highest genera, since once it is demonstrated that a certain accident is more common than a single highest genus, no other genus with a wider extent of predication can be found to object that the accident has a smaller extent of predication than that of the other superior genus. Problems arise when one attempts to explain the mention of ‘motion’ (alḥaraka) in the suspect passage, for in fact ‘motion’ does not fit well within this list of examples, for both linguistic and doctrinal reasons: (i) first, it is the only name within a list of adjectival attributes; (ii) secondly, it is unclear how to understand the term ḥaraka in this context. (i) As for the linguistic peculiarity of ‘motion’ in the passage, this will not be taken as a decisive argument to rule out the possibility that it is actually part of the text, for it may be admitted to mean loosely al-mutaḥarrik. (ii) More challenging is the doctrinal issue. We should expect in the passage another example of a concomitant more general than each category (which is indeed the case with ‘one’, ‘existent’ and ‘created’, as previously argued); ‘motion’, however, does not appear to satisfy this requirement, in Avicenna’s view. Avicenna provides a definition of ‘motion’ in the first chapter of the second treatise of the Physics of the Šifāʾ194, and a discussion of its categorial status in the second chapter of the same treatise195, to which I will return shortly. In the section cor 192 Cf. IBN SĪNĀ, Ilāhiyyāt III.2, p. 103.7–9. 193 Muḥdaṯ should not be taken as if it solely applied to non-eternal items (to the exclusion, therefore, of the eternal substances): in fact, by the term muḥdaṯ Avicenna qualifies any item that is essentially — not temporally — posterior to the Necessary Existent (cf. IBN SĪNĀ, Ilāhiyyāt VIII.3, pp. 342.17–343.6), hence the term can be predicated of all items other than the Necessary Existent himself. It is worth recalling that, for the mature Avicenna, God is neither a substance nor an accident and, therefore, exceeds the ten categories. 194 See HASNAWI 2001, pp. 219–255. Also highlighted by Hasnawi, two senses of ‘motion’ are distinguished by Avicenna in this chapter, namely a motion that is the conceived continuity of the process of motion, from the very beginning to the end (the “movement-1” described by Hasnawi), and a motion which is the intermediary state of the mobile subject between the beginning and the end of the process (“movement-2” in Hasnawi’s article). The most proper sense of “motion” is, according to Avicenna, the second, which is also the only one to have an extra-mental existence (whereas the first is just the mental conception of the entire process of motion, and does not exist in the external reality). 195 See HASNAWI 2004, pp. 607–622.

cxxxviii  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition responding to the Categories, Avicenna criticizes a group of philosophers who believe that motion is a genus external to the ten categories, encompassing the categories of quality, quantity, and place (T6). T6. Šifāʾ, Maqūlāt II.4, p. 70.5–13 Here there occur some doubts concerning certain things that are said to exist out of these ten [categories], without being included in them, among which there are things that are more common than a number of them – like motion, for it encompasses the [categories of] quality, quantity, and place in a way. [...] Let us say: as to motion, [(a)] if it coincides with the category of passion, then it does not add a genus [to the ten categories]; [(b)] if, [on the contrary], it does not coincide with the category of passion, it is not necessary for it to be a genus; rather, it is necessary for it to be predicated of its kinds by analogy (bi-l-taškīk), and that this [element] is what prevents to consider motion as the category of passion itself, in case it is impossible. Otherwise, if there is nothing of this sort preventing [it], then the category of passion is motion itself, but [our] discourse will come back to it in its [proper] place.

In the passage, Avicenna refutes the idea, endorsed by a group of philosophers, that motion can be considered as a genus encompassing more than one category by prospecting two alternatives, namely that (a) motion in fact coincides with the category of passion, and (b) that it does not coincide with that category, albeit without being a genus, since it would otherwise be predicated of its kinds by analogy (bi-ltaškīk). The entire argument does not deal extensively with the categorial status of motion (which, in fact, is postponed to the pertinent section on Physics); its purpose is rather to reject the idea that motion may be an additional genus to the ten categories. Nonetheless, Avicenna hints in the passage at what he explains more extensively in the section on Physics, namely that motion coincides with the category of passion, which is the only possibility he takes into account for the hypothesis (a), according to which motion fits within the system of the categories. In Al-Samāʿ alṬabīʿī II.2 (T7), Avicenna introduces three views concerning the problem of how motion fits within the categories. T7. Šifāʾ, Al-Samāʿ al-Ṭabīʿī II.2, p. 93.4–8196 There has been a disagreement about motion’s relation to the categories. Some said (i) that motion is the category of passion, while others said (ii) that the term ‘motion’ applies purely equivocally to the kinds that fall under it. Still others said (iii) that the term ‘motion’ is an analogical term like the term ‘existence’, which includes many things neither univocally nor purely equivocally, but analogically (bi-l-taškīk); however, the kinds primarily included under the terms ‘existence’ and ‘accident’ are the categories [themselves], whereas the kinds included under the term ‘motion’ are certain species or kinds of the categories.

 196 Translation in MCGINNIS 2009, p. 128, modified. See also the French translation of the passage in the aforementioned HASNAWI 2004, p. 615.

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The entire chapter is basically devoted to a refutation of the second and the third views, in favour of the first197. If we were to take ‘motion’ in case 2 as an adequate example of something more general than a single category like ‘existence’ and ‘oneness’, we would thus admit a non-Avicennian view in this text. There are other elements suggesting that ‘motion’ cannot be something that exceeds a single category in the passage in case 2. The reason provided in the clause mentioning ‘motion’ is that it is more general than ‘rational animal’, which is a genus of man. This seems to rule out definitively the possibility that the phrase refers to ‘motion’ as something more general than a single category. It is likely that ‘motion’ was intended, in this context, as a rather sloppy way of meaning “moving voluntarily” (mutaḥarrik bi-l-irāda). In this sense, the example may somehow be connected to the general context of the passage, since ‘capable of moving’ is a concomitant feature that is more general than a genus, although not a highest one (i.e. not a category); this is an example of a common accident already provided by Porphyry in the Isagoge198 and elsewhere recalled by Avicenna himself199. In this sense, however, the example of ‘motion’ provided in the suspect passage is out of place, since the list of examples formed by ‘existent’, ‘one’ and ‘created’ is intended to exemplify the case of accidents and concomitants that are more universal than the highest genera. Moreover, it is not only these examples but also the entire argumentation that is built around the highest genera: one of the first examples provided is that of ‘not undergoing more or less’, which is a feature common to more than one category200. The argument of the suspect passage, being built on an intermediate genus placed at a lower level of an ideal Porphyry’s tree, is less convincing than Avicenna’s previous argument, because one could still object that there are higher genera that have a greater extent of predication than that concomitant feature, whereas it is impossible to make such an objection if the entire argument is brought at the level of the highest genera. To conclude, no matter how we understand the term ḥaraka — i.e. as motion in general or, as the suspect passage itself suggests, as  197 IBN SĪNĀ, Al-Samāʿ al-Ṭabīʿī II.2, p. 97.13–15: «Since the theories that we have displayed [so far], but not accepted, have been invalidated, there remains the truth uniquely, namely the first theory». 198 PORPH., Isag., p. 13.18–21: «Black [is predicated] both of the species of ravens and of the particulars, being an inseparable accident, moving (τὸ κινεῖσθαι) of man and horse, being a separable accident – but principally of the individuals and also, on a second account, of the items which contain the individuals». (Transl. in BARNES 2003, pp. 12–13). 199 This can be found as an example for common accidents in the early work K. al-Hidāya and in the Dānešnāme-ye ʿAlayʾi: IBN SĪNĀ, K. al-Hidāya, p. 67: «As to common accident, it is an accidental [feature] either encompassing [several] species, like ‘white’ for ‘snow’ and ‘gypsum’, or the individuals of [several] species, like ‘moving’ (ka-l-mutaḥarrik)»; IBN SĪNĀ, Dānešnāme-ye ʿAlayʾi, pp. 24–25: «[As to the accidental universal, either it belongs to one universal] or it belongs to more than one universal, like motion [belongs] both to man and to something else, and like blackness [belongs] both to raven and to something else. They call this: “common accident”». 200 Substance and quantity, for instance.

cxl  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition ‘moving voluntarily’ — the example turns out to be quite out of place in the argumentation, albeit somehow related to the general subject of the passage. Case 3: A rephrasing of a passage of Madḫal I.12? So far, the discussion has surrounded the instances of possible additions to Avicenna’s original text (I). Case 3 that is about to be presented, however, may attest to the rephrasing of a passage of Avicenna’s Madḫal (II). Among the manuscripts that present a ‘short version’ of the passages mentioned above, MSS ETAs201 may also preserve a trace of a revision of Avicenna’s text. In Madḫal I.12, §2.3, the Cairo edition (p. 67.11–14) prints a text that is attested by MSS ETAsKaB against the rest of the tradition; the text, however, repeats the same concept, even using, for the most part, an identical phrasing (T8). T8. Madḫal I.12, §2.3

‫[ وذ ٔ ّن اﳌﻌﲎ ا ي ﯾﻔﻬﻢ ﻣﻦ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﻋﻘﲇ ﻫﻮ‬1] ‫[ وذ ٔ ّن اﳌﻌﲎ‬2] .‫ﲑ اﳌﻔﻬﻮم ﻣﻦ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﻣ ﻄﻘﻲ‬ ‫ا ي ﯾﻔﻬﻢ ﻣﻦ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﻋﻘﲇ ﻻزم وﻣﻘﺎرن ﻠﻤﻌﲎ‬ ‫ا ي ﯾﻔﻬﻢ ﻣﻦ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﻣ ﻄﻘﻲ ﻟ ﺲ ﻫﻮ ﻫﻮ‬

Translation [1] This because the meaning that is understood from its being intellectual is different from what is understood from its being logical. [2] This because the meaning that is understood from its being intellectual is a necessary concomitant associated with the meaning that is understood from its being logical without being the same.

The passage explains that, although the ‘logical genus’ (i.e. the fact itself of being a genus, a species etc.) has an exclusively intellectual existence, it does not coincide with what is traditionally called “intellectual genus” (i.e. the meaning of existing things represented in the intellect, which can be conceived as a genus, or a species etc. with respect to something else). Sentences (1) and (2) are almost identical and only vary in the final part, where sentence (2) is far more specific than sentence (1). Sentence (2) is concordantly attested by all the manuscript tradition, whereas only MSS ETAsKaB preserve sentence (1). Although other reasons can be imagined for the absence of sentence (1) in most part of the manuscript tradition202, it can (at least hypothetically) be suggested that sentence (2) was meant to replace sentence (1). Sentence (2) seems to be a clearer, more explicit statement of the same concept ex-

 201 Along with MSS KaB. 202 It is possible, for instance, to argue for an accidental omission of sentence (1), facilitated by the repetition of the same incipit in both sentence (1) and (2). It should be noted, however, that this accidental omission affects the majority of the manuscripts, in both the branches of the tradition; even if the omission has a potentially polygenetic nature, this kind of explanation may turn out to be not entirely satisfying.

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pressed in sentence (1), and an eventual rewriting of sentence (1) might have been required due to the excessive elusiveness of the argument. Again, in the hypothesis of the existence of an archetypal copy, one should suppose that such a replacement was not yet fully achieved when copies began to be drawn from the archetype; rather, the process may have begun with that manuscript, as well as the supposed addition of the passages previously shown. The picture portrayed so far, although highly speculative, might explain the remains of a previous version of the text in the manuscript tradition. Cases analogous to 1–2 displayed above cannot be easily dismissed as accidental omissions affecting the short version. In some cases, it can hardly be established whether the differences between the short and long versions are due to intentional omissions in the short version or to additions in the long version, for the passages in question are apparently both syntactically and doctrinally consistent with the context203. Although it is still possible to claim that the text might have undergone a process of abridgement, this hypothesis is, however, insufficient to explain the stylistic, syntactical and doctrinal issues raised by passages such as those discussed here (cases 1–2). A major difficulty appears in the attempt to explain how such problematic passages would fit within the context if they were meant to be part of the text in the first place. Such difficulties would on the contrary be more easily solved by considering the passages in question as absent at the first stage of composition and added at a later date. The passages in question might have been copied in the text at a rather early stage of the tradition204; arguably, the process of revision and expansion of the text antedates all extant known Arabic manuscripts preserving Avicenna’s Madḫal, and appears to have been entirely achieved in the earliest extant Arabic manuscript at our disposal, namely MS Ka, dating to the first decade of Ḏū l-Ḥiǧǧa 536H/4–13 July 1142. The incorporation of these passages into the Avicennian text was, therefore, already occurring at a very early stage of transmission. In the hypothesis that there was an archetype of the tradition, one should suppose that the possible additions to Avicenna’s text were made in the margins of that exemplar, before becoming fully part of the ‘long version’, a versio vulgata of Avicenna’s text that is far more widespread than the first205. Ideally, the textual additions (cases 1–2) and modifications (case 3) shown so far, involving doctrinal expansions and alterations of the text, might be expected to have been made by the author. Although this cannot be definitively excluded, both the style and content of some of the passages analyzed represent a difficulty when

 203 As in the case of Madḫal II.1, §3.1, p. 198.34–35 and Madḫal II.2, §2.3, p. 212.18–19. 204 A partial inclusion of the textual additions within the text can be found in al-Lawkarī’s quotations. 205 Adapting to this context the expression employed in BERTOLACCI 2012b, p. 294.

cxlii  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition faced with the hypothesis that the interventions are all Avicenna’s. The traditional notion of ‘author’ – strictly referring to one single authorial figure who retains exclusive control over all of his work – may not be entirely suitable to account for the composition of the Šifāʾ. Perhaps, the possibility that the work underwent modifications that are, to some extent, the result of a collective work should be considered. A scenario of this sort may be suggested by a series of testimonies on the composition of the work. The text of the Šifāʾ was the subject of scholastic debate during Avicenna’s lifetime, a fact that can be inferred from the numerous exchanges between Avicenna and his disciples and colleagues, among which is the correspondence between Avicenna and Ibn Zayla, where the latter urged Avicenna to provide further clarifications on a passage of Madḫal I.2206. Discussions on the doctrinal intricacies of the Šifāʾ may have arisen from the reading sessions of the work that were held before the end of the composition of the entire summa and in which, as al-Ǧūzǧānī’s reports, Avicenna took part together with his disciples. Although we have little clue about the attitude of Avicenna’s disciples towards their master’s authority – and it is thus unknown to what extent they could feel entitled to introduce modifications in his own work – it can nonetheless be observed that some of Avicenna’s works were the object of non-authorial editorial interventions within Avicenna’s school. For instance, al-Ǧūzǧānī’s editorial activity on Avicenna’s works – particularly on the Šifāʾ – is well documented207. To mention but a few examples of the interventions on the Šifāʾ, one can think of the addition of his own prologue to the entire summa, as well as the quotation of an excerpt from Avicenna’s Al-Adwiya al-Qalbiyya added by al-Ǧūzǧānī between the fourth and the fifth treatise of the Kitāb al-Nafs208. It is also worth recalling that al-Ǧūzǧānī at a certain point assumed a crucial role within the transmission of Avicenna’s work, including the creation of a clean copy that was probably meant to be the archetype for the rest of the tradition209. Seemingly, the editing of a clean copy of Avicenna’s works after their composition was a task to be undertaken by Avicenna’s circle of disciples, rather than Avicenna himself210. It is, therefore, possible that Avicenna’s direct disciples played, at least to some extent, a non-marginal role in the improvement of

 206 See REISMAN 2002b, p. 284; for a translation, Ibid., p. 199. 207 As reported by al-Bayhaqī (Tatimmat ṣiwān al-ḥikma, p. 94), al-Ǧūzǧānī was responsible for the addition of a section on Mathematics to both the Kitāb al-Naǧāt and the Dānešnāme-ye ʿAlāʾī; see also BERTOLACCI 2006, pp. 37, 587–588 and AL-RAHIM 2009, p. 7. 208 See ALPINA 2017. 209 Al-Ǧūzǧānī also personally undertook, in certain cases, the copying of his master’s works; for instance, he wrote under dictation the Muḫtaṣar al-Awṣaṭ fī l-Manṭiq; cf. AL-ǦŪZǦĀNĪ, Biography of Ibn Sīnā, p. 44. 210 In the case of Avicenna’s Lisān al-ʿArab, apparently, Avicenna’s circle failed in this task, due to the poor condition of Avicenna’s first draft; evidently, the author did not draw up a clean copy of the work, according to his habits. See AL-ǦŪZǦĀNĪ, Biography of Ibn Sīnā, p. 72.

II The Edition  cxliii

their master’s work, contributing to creating a second, enlarged and modified version of the text. Their interventions may have been added to the archetype (ω2 in S5 below) once it had already been copied.

S5. The ‘moving archetype’

II.3.2 A Bipartite Tradition II.3.2.1 MSS α and β According to the provisional results of the present inquiry, the manuscript tradition of the Madḫal appears bipartite: it is divided into two branches, named α – encompassing MSS KaBrNkBAECDaṢNoN – and β – encompassing MSS JTAsDiTeToMiŠGYiY. The readings of the two branches differ in a number of passages, both due to textual errors presumably occurred in MS α and in MS β (see Tab. 6) and due to an intentional stylistic revision that may have occurred in MS β (see Tab. 7). It should be noted that, due to the numerous cases of contamination, it is difficult to find cases of textual errors in which the manuscript tradition is perfectly divided into two. In cases 4 and 7 in Tab. 6, for example, the perfect bipartition is hindered only by the presence of single contaminated manuscripts. Cases of perfect bipartition of the tradition can be observed in case 3 in Tab. 6 and with regard to the stylistic revision occurred in β, which is the subject of section II.3.2.2. below (see case 8 in Tab. 7). Moving to the analysis of some textual errors that characterize branch α, in Tab. 6, case 1, branch α shows an oscillation that is absent from β and that may be due to the coexistence of two readings in MS α, i.e. wa-l-maqūlāt…baʿḍuhā aʿamm wabaʿḍuhā aḫaṣṣ and wa-l-maqūl…baʿduhu aʿamm wa-baʿḍuhu aḫaṣṣ. MS τ probably collates or restores conjecturally a grammatically consistent reading. In case 2, the omission of the clause wa-ammā l-faṣlu is shared by all the manuscripts of family α

cxliv  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition except two (MSS BṢ)211. The omission might be due to the proximity of the title of the chapter on differentia (fī l-faṣl): the repetition of the word faṣl might have facilitated the omission; then, MS α might have adapted an original fa-inna into inna212. In case 3, on the other hand, the omission of maṯalan is shared by all the manuscripts of family α. In case 4, the reading anna l-ǧins of family α does not fit in the context. For in fact, the genus is predicated of its subject, i.e. the species, in such a way that the species is said to be the genus: ‘animal’, for instance, is predicated of ‘man’, and ‘man is an animal’ is necessarily true. The reading in α implies the reverse predication, i.e. ‘animal is a man’, which is not necessarily true. As for the errors that characterize branch β, in case 5 family β attests: ṯumma anna (“then [you do not know] that…”) against the reading bal ǧaʿala (“rather, he posited”) in α. In the passage, Avicenna complains that Porphyry introduced the notion of ontological accident (the accident as opposed to substance, dealt with in the Categories) without explaining its meaning in the Isagoge; hence, he addresses the reader stating that he does not know that notion yet (wa-lam taʿlam baʿda). Reading β connects the second part of the passage, i.e. the display of Porphyry’s definitions of common accident in the Isagoge, to the things the reader does not know yet because their explanation pertains to the Categories (assuming that anna in β depends on taʿlam), which is bizarre. Phenomena of contamination can be observed both in α and in β: MS Ṣ combined readings α and β; MSS ToŠ bear evidence of the insertion, in their antigraphs, of reading α (which was interpolated in the text in the wrong position in To and which was erroneously interpreted as a replacement of ʿalā l-manṭiq in Š). Case 6 is likely the case of a palaeographical misunderstanding of tustamarra in tusammā occurred in β. In case 7, finally, branch β preserves alinsān instead of al-ǧawhar that is attested by all the manuscripts of branch α except MS E (which preserves a hybrid reading: al-ǧawhar al-insānī, very likely due to contamination).

 211 The families of these two manuscripts present the omission. 212 An analogous omission due to the repetition of a term present in the proximate title of the chapter can be observed in MS Iran, Mašhad, Kitābḫānah-i Āstān-i Quds-i Razavī 11479, f. 88v: the clause wa-ammā l-nawʿ is accidentally omitted due to the proximity of the title of chapter V.5 of the Ilāhiyyāt “on the species” (fī l-nawʿ).

‫‪II The Edition  cxlv‬‬

‫‪Tab. 6: Textual errors of branches α and β‬‬ ‫‪Contaminated Variants‬‬

‫‪Correct‬‬

‫‪Incorrect‬‬ ‫‪Errors of α‬‬ ‫‪I., §, p. .‬‬

‫)‪(‬‬

‫]‪ [a‬واﳌﻘﻮﻻت ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻗﺪ‬ ‫ﲣﺘﻠﻒ ﻟﻌﻤﻮم واﳋﺼﻮص ﻓ ﻜﻮن‬ ‫ﺧﺺ‬ ‫ﺑﻌﻀﻪ ٔ ّﰪ وﺑﻌﻀﻪ ٔ ّ‬ ‫…‬

‫‪λξKaDa‬‬

‫‪β+τ‬‬

‫]‪ [b‬واﳌﻘﻮل ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻗﺪ‬ ‫ﲣﺘﻠﻒ ﻟﻌﻤﻮم واﳋﺼﻮص ﻓ ﻜﻮن‬ ‫ﺧﺺ‬ ‫ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ٔ ّﰪ وﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ٔ ّ‬ ‫]‪ s.l. Nk in mg. C‬واﳌﻘﻮﻻت[ ‪η‬‬ ‫‪I., §., p. .‬‬

‫…‬

‫واﳌﻘﻮﻻت ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻗﺪ ﲣﺘﻠﻒ‬ ‫ﻟﻌﻤﻮم واﳋﺼﻮص ﻓ ﻜﻮن ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ٔ ّﰪ‬ ‫ﺧﺺ‬ ‫وﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ٔ ّ‬

‫)‪(‬‬

‫ا ّٕن اﲰﻪ ﯾُﺪ ّل ﺑﻪ ﻋﻨﺪ اﳌﻨﻄﻘ ّﲔ ﲆ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﲎ‬ ‫‪λξKaBrNkDa‬‬

‫و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﻓﺎ ّٕن اﲰﻪ ﯾُﺪ ّل ﺑﻪ ﻋﻨﺪ‬ ‫اﳌﻨﻄﻘ ّﲔ ﲆ ﻣﻌﲎ‬ ‫‪β + BṢ‬‬

‫ﻓﺎ ّٕن اﲰﻪ‪...‬‬

‫‪C‬‬

‫‪I., §., p. .‬‬ ‫…‬

‫)‪(‬‬

‫ﻓﺼﺎر ﺣ ﻨﺌﺬ اﳊﯿﻮان ﻃﻘﺎ‬

‫ﻓﺼﺎر ﺣ ﻨﺌﺬ ﻣ ﻼ اﳊﯿﻮان ﻃﻘﺎ‬

‫‪α‬‬

‫‪β + Nks.l. Cmg.‬‬

‫‪IΙ., §., p. .–‬‬

‫…‬

‫)‪(‬‬

‫اﳌﺎ ّدة ﻻ ﲢﻤﻞ ﲆ اﳌﺮﻛّﺐ ﲪﻞ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﻫﻮ اﳌﺎ ّدة ﻻ ﲢﻤﻞ ﲆ اﳌﺮﻛّﺐ ﲪﻞ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﻫﻮ‬ ‫واﳉ ﺲ ﳛﻤﻞ ﲆ اﻟﻨﻮع ﲪﻞ ٔ ّن اﻟﻨﻮع‬ ‫واﳉ ﺲ ﳛﻤﻞ ﲆ اﻟﻨﻮع ﲪﻞ ٔ ّن‬ ‫ﻫﻮ‬ ‫اﳉ ﺲ ﻫﻮ‬ ‫‪εTAs‬‬

‫‪α + Te‬‬

‫اﻟﻨﻮع‬ ‫‪Cmg.‬‬

‫‪mg.‬‬

‫‪Nk‬‬

‫‪Errors of β‬‬ ‫‪I., §., p. .–‬‬

‫)‪(‬‬

‫]…[ وﻫﺬا ﳾء ﱂ ﯾﻠﺘﻔﺖ اﻟﯿﻪ ٔ ّول ﻣﻦ وﱂ ﺗﻌﲅ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺎل اﻟﻌﺮض ا ي ﻫﻮ وﱂ ﺗﻌﲅ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺎل اﻟﻌﺮض ا ي ﻫﻮ ﻧﻈﲑ‬ ‫ﻗﺪّ م ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﻫﺬﻩ اﶆﺴﺔ ﺑﻞ ﺟﻌﻞ ﲆ ﻧﻈﲑ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ وﻫﺬا ﳾء ﱂ ﯾﻠﺘﻔﺖ اﻟﯿﻪ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ وﻫﺬا ﳾء ﱂ ﯾﻠﺘﻔﺖ اﻟﯿﻪ ٔ ّول ﻣﻦ‬ ‫ٔ ّول ﻣﻦ ﻗﺪّ م ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﻫﺬﻩ اﶆﺴﺔ ﲆ ﻗﺪّ م ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﻫﺬﻩ اﶆﺴﺔ ﲆ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ﺑﻞ‬ ‫اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ّﰒ ٔ ّن ﻠﻌﺮض اﻟﻌﺎ ّم ﺪودا‬ ‫ﺟﻌﻞ ﻠﻌﺮض اﻟﻌﺎ ّم ﺪودا ﻣﺸﻬﻮرة‬ ‫اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ّﰒ ٔ ّن ﻠﻌﺮض اﻟﻌﺎ ّم ﺪودا‬ ‫ﻣﺸﻬﻮرة‬ ‫ﻣﺸﻬﻮرة‬ ‫‪γξADa‬‬ ‫‪To‬‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ﺑﻞ ﺟﻌﻞ‬ ‫ﻣﻦ‬ ‫ل‬ ‫و‬ ‫اﻟﯿﻪ‬ ‫ﯾﻠﺘﻔﺖ‬ ‫ﱂ‬ ‫ء‬ ‫ﳾ‬ ‫وﻫﺬا‬ ‫]…[‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫‪ζνJDiMiG‬‬ ‫‪Di‬‬ ‫ﻗﺪّ م ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﻫﺬﻩ اﶆﺴﺔ >…< ﺑﻞ ﺟﻌﻞ‬ ‫‪i.l.‬‬

cxlvi  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition

‫ﻠﻌﺮض اﻟﻌﺎ ّم ﺪودا ﻣﺸﻬﻮرة‬

Š

‫]…[ وﻫﺬا ﳾء ﱂ ﯾﻠﺘﻔﺖ اﻟﯿﻪ ٔ ّول ﻣﻦ‬ ‫ﻗﺪّ م ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﻫﺬﻩ اﶆﺴﺔ ﲆ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ﻗﺪ‬ ‫ﺟﻌﻞ ﻠﻌﺮض اﻟﻌﺎ ّم ﺪودا ﻣﺸﻬﻮرة‬

‫]…[ وﻫﺬا ﳾء ﱂ ﯾﻠﺘﻔﺖ اﻟﯿﻪ ٔ ّول ﻣﻦ‬ ‫ﻗﺪّ م ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﻫﺬﻩ اﶆﺴﺔ ﲆ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ّﰒ‬ ‫ﺟﻌﻞ ﻠﻌﺮض اﻟﻌﺎ ّم ﺪودا ﻣﺸﻬﻮرة‬

E

‫ﻫﺬﻩ اﳌﺒﺎﯾﻨﺔ ﺴ ّﳣﺮ ﻣ ﺎﯾﻨﺔ‬

Ṣ

()

II., §.., p. .–

‫[ ﻫﺬﻩ اﳌﺒﺎﯾﻨﺔ ﺴ ّﻤﻰ ﻣ ﺎﯾﻨﺔ‬a]

θE

β

‫ﺴ ّﻤﳱﺎ‬

Dii.l.

«haec discrepantia dicitur» Lat.

‫[ ﻫﺬا اﳌﺒﺎﯾﻨﺔ ﺴ ّﳣﺮ‬b] γA

()

II., §., p. .–

‫]…[ إذا ﰷن ﻗﺪ ﯾﻌﺮض ﻟﻐﲑ ﺗ اﳌﻘﻮ‬ ‫]…[ إذا ﰷن ﻗﺪ ﯾﻌﺮض ﻟﻐﲑ ﺗ اﳌﻘﻮ ]…[ إذا ﰷن ﻗﺪ ﯾﻌﺮض ﻟﻐﲑ ﺗ‬ ّ‫ﻣ ﻞ اﻣ ﻨﺎع ﻗ ﻮل ا ٔﺷﺪّ وا ٔﺿﻌﻒ ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ اﳌﻘﻮ ﻣ ﻞ اﻣ ﻨﺎع ﻗ ﻮل ا ٔﺷﺪ‬ ‫ﻣ ﻞ اﻣ ﻨﺎع ﻗ ﻮل ا ٔﺷﺪّ وا ٔﺿﻌﻒ ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ‬ ‫ﻣﻦ ﻟﻮازم اﳉﻮﻫﺮ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﱐ ﲆ ﺳ ﻞ وا ٔﺿﻌﻒ ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻟﻮازم ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ﲆ ﻣﻦ ﻟﻮازم اﳉﻮﻫﺮ ﲆ ﺳ ﻞ اﻟﻌﻤﻮم‬ ‫وﻟﻐﲑﻩ‬ ‫ﺳ ﻞ اﻟﻌﻤﻮم وﻟﻐﲑﻩ‬ ‫اﻟﻌﻤﻮم وﻟﻐﲑﻩ‬ γθA

β + Nks.l. Cs.l.

E

II.3.2.2 MS β: An Early Stylistic Revision of the Madḫal? The bipartition of the manuscript tradition of Avicenna’s Madḫal is also accounted for by a number of passages that might show traces of a revision of the work. More in detail, branch α appears to attest a more difficult version of the text, whereas branch β seems to preserve a plainer text with smoother syntax. In what follows, I shall refer by ‘first version’ or ‘version α’ to the version that is presumably difficilior, and by ‘second version’ or ‘version β’ to the facilior one. It should be observed that the earliest witnesses of the second version date to the thirteenth century, i.e. to the earliest phases of the tradition of which there is substantial extant evidence; moreover, the second version is also attested by the twelfth-century Latin translation of the work. The most ancient extant witness of the first version (MS Ka) is roughly coaeval to the most ancient witness of the second one. Clearly, therefore, the posteriority of one version to the other cannot be established solely on the basis of the chronological evidence provided by the extant manuscript tradition. The posteriority of the one or the other version must be inferred from a qualitative study of the variants of both.

‫‪II The Edition  cxlvii‬‬

‫‪Tab. 7: Evidence of a stylistic revision in MS β‬‬ ‫‪Contaminated Versions‬‬

‫‪Version α‬‬

‫‪Version β‬‬ ‫)‪(‬‬

‫‪I., §.., p. .213‬‬

‫وا ٔﻣﻮر اﻟﱵ ﲣﺎﻟﻂ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﲆ ﴐ ْﺑﲔ‪:‬‬ ‫وا ٔﻣﻮر اﻟﱵ ﲣﺎﻟﻂ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﲆ ﴐ ْﺑﲔ‪ :‬وا ٔﻣﻮر اﻟﱵ ﲣﺎﻟﻂ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﲆ‬ ‫ﻗﺴﻤﲔ‪ :‬ﻓﺎٕﳖّ ﺎ ٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻻ وﺟﻮد ﻟﻬﺎ ٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻻ وﺟﻮد ﻟﻬﺎ‬ ‫ﻓﺎٕﳖّ ﺎ ٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻻ وﺟﻮد ﻟﻬﺎ‬ ‫‪BC‬‬

‫‪ξνKaADa‬‬

‫‪ζιNk‬‬

‫وا ٔﻣﻮر اﻟﱵ ﲣﺎﻟﻂ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﲆ ﻗﺴﻤﲔ‪ :‬ﻗﺴﻤﲔ‬ ‫ٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻻ وﺟﻮد ﻟﻬﺎ‬ ‫‪C Y‬‬ ‫‪s.l.‬‬

‫‪mg.‬‬

‫ﴐﺑﲔ‬ ‫‪Nkmg. Tmg.‬‬

‫‪Bmg.‬‬

‫‪EṢ‬‬

‫وا ٔﻣﻮر اﻟﱵ ﲣﺎﻟﻂ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﲆ ﴐ ْﺑﲔ‬ ‫ﲆ ﻗﺴﻤﲔ‪ٕ :‬ا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻻ وﺟﻮد ﻟﻬﺎ‬ ‫‪Br‬‬

‫‪I., §., p. .‬‬

‫…‬

‫)‪(‬‬

‫ﻓﻠﻨﺘﺤﻘّﻖ ا ٓن ﺎل اﳊﺪود اﳌﺸﻬﻮرة‬ ‫ﻠﻨﻮع‬

‫ﻓﻠﻨﺘﺤﻘّﻖ ا ٓن ﺎل اﳊﺪود اﻟﱵ ﱔ‬ ‫ﻣﺸﻬﻮرة ﻠﻨﻮع‬

‫‪β+E‬‬

‫‪γθA‬‬

‫‪I., §., p. .–‬‬

‫)‪(‬‬

‫ﻓﻠ ﺲ ﯾﺬ ﺮ ]‪ٔ [...‬ﻧ ّﻪ إذا ﻗ ﻞ ﻣﺮﺗ ّﺐ ﲢﺖ‬ ‫ﻓﻠ ﺲ ﯾﺬ ﺮ ]‪ٔ [...‬ﻧ ّﻪ إذا ﻗ ﻞ ﻫﺬا اﻠﻔﻆ ﻓﻠ ﺲ ﯾﺬ ﺮ ]‪ٔ [...‬ﻧ ّﻪ إذا ﻗ ﻞ ﻫﺬا‬ ‫اﻠﻔﻆ ﻓ ﺠﺐ ٔن ﯾﻔﻬﻢ ﻣ ﻪ ﻫﺬا اﳌﻌﲎ ﻛﺬا ﻋﲏ ﻫﺬا اﳌﻌﲎ‬ ‫ﻓ ﺠﺐ ٔن ﯾﻔﻬﻢ ﻣ ﻪ ﻫﺬا اﳌﻌﲎ ٔي‬ ‫ﻣﺮﺗ ّﺐ ﲢﺖ ﻛﺬا ﻋﲏ ﻫﺬا اﳌﻌﲎ‬ ‫‪α+Š‬‬ ‫‪ζι‬‬ ‫‪mg.‬‬

‫‪ν‬‬

‫إذا ﻗ ﻞ ﻣﺮﺗ ّﺐ ﲢﺖ ﻛﺬا ٔﻋﲏ ﻫﺬا اﳌﻌﲎ‬ ‫‪Tomg.‬‬

‫‪I., §., p. .‬‬

‫)‪(‬‬

‫إﻧﻪ ﻗﺪ ﺟﺮت اﻟﻌﺎدة ﰲ ﺗﻔﻬّﻢ ﻫﺬﻩ اﶆﺴﺔ‬ ‫ٕاﻧ ّﻪ ﻗﺪ ﺟﺮت اﻟﻌﺎدة ﰲ ﺗﻔﻬّﻢ ﻫﺬﻩ اﶆﺴﺔ إﻧﻪ ﻗﺪ ﺟﺮت اﻟﻌﺎدة ﰲ ﺗﻔﻬّﻢ ﻫﺬﻩ‬ ‫اﶆﺴﺔ ٔن ﯾﻘﺎل ا ّٕن ﻣﳯﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻃﺒﯿﻌﻲ ٔن ﯾﻘﺎل ا ّٕن ﻣﳯﺎ ﻃﺒﯿﻌﯿﺎ وﻣﳯﺎ ﻣ ﻄﻘ ﺎ وﻣﳯﺎ‬ ‫ٔن ﯾﻘﺎل ا ّٕن ﻣﳯﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻃﺒﯿﻌﯿﺎ وﻣﳯﺎ‬ ‫وﻣﳯﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣ ﻄﻘﻲ وﻣﳯﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻋﻘﲇ ﻋﻘﻠﯿﺎ‬ ‫ﻣ ﻄﻘ ﺎ وﻣﳯﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻋﻘﻠﯿﺎ‬ ‫‪T‬‬

‫‪α‬‬

‫‪κε‬‬ ‫‪+ Nks.l. Ṣs.l.‬‬ ‫‪I., §., p. .–‬‬

‫…‬

‫)‪(‬‬

‫ﻣ ﻞ ٔ ّن ا ٔﺑﯿﺾ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﻣﻌﻘﻮل ﻻ ﻣ ﻞ ٔ ّن ا ٔﺑﯿﺾ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﻣﻌﻘﻮل ﻻ‬ ‫ﳛﺘﺎج ﻣﻌﻪ ٔن ﯾﻌﻘﻞ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﺛﻮب و ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﺧﺸﺐ‬ ‫ﳛﺘﺎج ٔن ﯾﻌﻘﻞ ﻣﻌﻪ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﺛﻮب و ٔﻧ ّﻪ‬ ‫ﺧﺸﺐ‬ ‫‪γλξDa‬‬ ‫‪ετTTe‬‬

‫‪‬‬ ‫‪213 The reading qismayni is lectio facilior, since it is the one employed throughout the entire chap‬‬‫‪ter; the equivalent reading ḍarbayni introduces a stylistic variation within the text.‬‬

cxlviii  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition ( ()

‫ ﻣﻌﻪ‬om. As)

I., §.., p. .–

‫ﺘﻘﻮم ﺑﻪ اﻟﺸﺨﺺ ﰲ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ؛ ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻚ ﻟﻮ‬ ّ ‫ﺘﻘﻮم ﺑﻪ اﻟﺸﺨﺺ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ؛ ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻚ ﻟﻮ ﻓ‬ ّ ‫ﺘﻘﻮم ﺑﻪ اﻟﺸﺨﺺ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ؛ ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻚ ﻟﻮ ﻓ‬ ّ ‫ﻓ‬ ّ ‫ زﯾﺪ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻄﻮﯾﻞ ]…[ ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﻻ‬:‫ﻗﻠﺖ‬ ّ ‫ زﯾﺪ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻄﻮﯾﻞ ]…[ ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﻻ‬:‫ﻗﻠﺖ‬ ‫ﯾﺘﻌﲔ‬ َ ‫ زﯾﺪ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻄﻮﯾﻞ ]…[ ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﻻ‬:‫ﻗﻠﺖ‬ َ ‫ﯾﺘﻌﲔ‬ َ ّ ‫ﰲ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﴯﺼﯿﺔ زﯾﺪ‬ ‫ﯾﺘﻌﲔ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ ﴯﺼﯿﺔ زﯾﺪ‬ ‫ﰲ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﴯﺼﯿﺔ زﯾﺪ‬ α

νJDiG ()

‫ّﰒ رﺳﻮم ﻣﺸﻬﻮرة ﻣ ﻞ ﻗﻮﳍﻢ ا ّٕن اﻟﻔﺼﻞ‬ ‫ﻫﻮ ا ي ﯾﻔﺼﻞ ﺑﲔ اﻟﻨﻮع واﳉ ﺲ و ٔﯾﻀﺎ‬ ‫ٕاﻧ ّﻪ ا ي ﯾﻔﻀﻞ ﺑﻪ اﻟﻨﻮع ﲆ اﳉ ﺲ‬ γλξBrDa

ζπ

I., §., p. .–.

‫ّﰒ رﺳﻮم ﻣﺸﻬﻮرة ﻣ ﻞ ﻗﻮﳍﻢ ا ّٕن‬ ‫ّﰒ رﺳﻮم ﻣﺸﻬﻮرة ﻣ ﻞ ﻗﻮﳍﻢ ا ّٕن‬ ‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﻫﻮ ا ي ﯾﻔﺼﻞ ﺑﲔ اﻟﻨﻮع‬ ‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﻫﻮ ا ي ﯾﻔﺼﻞ ﺑﲔ اﻟﻨﻮع‬ ‫واﳉ ﺲ و ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﻗﻮﳍﻢ ٕاﻧ ّﻪ ا ي ﯾﻔﻀﻞ ﺑﻪ واﳉ ﺲ و ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﻣ ﻞ ﻗﻮﳍﻢ ٕاﻧ ّﻪ ا ي‬ ‫ﯾﻔﻀﻞ ﺑﻪ اﻟﻨﻮع ﲆ اﳉ ﺲ‬ ‫اﻟﻨﻮع ﲆ اﳉ ﺲ‬ Ṣ εT […]

‫]…[ ﻣ ﻞ ﻗﻮﳍﻢ إن‬ κ

()

II., §., p. .

‫وﳚﺐ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﺲ اﻟﻌﺮض ﻋﺮﺿﺎ و ﺲ اﻟﻌﺮض ﳚﺐ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻋﺮﺿﺎ‬ ‫ﻻﺣﻘﺎ اﻟﻨﻮع‬ ‫ﻻﺣﻘﺎ اﻟﻨﻮع‬ α

…

β

As previously claimed, version β is systematically facilior if compared to version α. Characteristics of the second version with respect to the first are: – Smoother, easier syntax of the phrase: The second version shows a preference for the use of connectives to make the phrase more easily understandable, as in case (1), and to avoid redundancy, as in case (2). Case (4) also shows the same tendency: the partitive structure with the repetition of minhā in version β parallels the identical structure of the following phrase, which is also built on the repetition of minhā. – More elegant phrasing: In case (3), for instance, the sense stays unaltered, but the phrasing is much clearer; the structure of the hypothetical clause is more perspicuous in version β, where the particle fa- is employed. The use of the expression kaḏā (“and so on”) in version α to abridge the definition quoted is definitely compatible with the author’s usus scribendi: other analogous cases can be found in Madḫal I.13, §3.2.1, p. 168.69, where Avicenna abridges the quotation of one of the traditional definitions of differentia specifica by replacing the omitted clause with kaḏā, and in Mubāḥaṯāt 584, p. 194, where Avicenna cuts off his own quotation of Madḫal I.4, §3.1 by kaḏā214.  214 For a contextualization of this passage, see section I.4.

II The Edition  cxlix

–

–

Compliance with the grammar rules of classical Arabic: Case (8) shows the attempt at reassessing a syntactic structure “Verb-Subject-Object” instead of the peculiar order “Subject-Verb-Object” presented in version α. The word order in version α, however, emphasizes better the opposition between the genus of the constitutive differentia and the genus of the accident which is under discussion in the passage. Doctrinal concern: Case (6) in Tab. 7 might reveal a doctrinal concern behind the intervention on the text. Branch β preserves the reading: al-ḏihn alternative to the reading: al-ʿaql. Arguably, the reading in β was meant to correct Avicenna’s use of ʿaql, which is employed in the context almost interchangeably with ḏihn. The fact that Avicenna speaks of an individual meaning in the intellect might have led to emend the term ʿaql with the more general ḏihn; if the term ʿaql is understood in a narrow sense as referring to the faculty that deals with universal and abstract meanings, Avicenna’s use in the context might have caused perplexities215. However, the original reading was in all likelihood ʿaql, since the passage deals with the composition of meanings that concur to single out an individual, an operation that occurs in the intellect. Apparently, the author of version β focussed his attention on the fact that what results from the composition of several meanings is the meaning of an individual and was partly misled in his interpretation of the passage.

As for the twelfth-century Latin translation, on the whole it can be asserted that it also attests version β (Tab. 8). Sometimes, it is quite difficult to tell which of the two versions it preserves, either due to the corruptions that affect the Latin translation (as in case 5) or to the impossibility to distinguish with certainty which of two synonymous variants is rendered in the Latin translation (as in case 6, where the Latin intellectus might render either ʿaql or ḏihn). Finally, a certain degree of liberty in the translation might justify the few cases that seemingly do not attest version β (in case 7, for instance, the translator might have chosen not to translate again qawluhum to avoid redundancy).

 215 Cf. Mubāḥaṯāt 283–284 on the senses of the term ʿaql.

cl  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition Tab. 8: The Latin translation216 Case

Ed. AVICENNA 

()

AVICENNA , p. 

The Latin translation «Res autem quae commiscentur motui dividuntur

Version β

in duo quia aut in res quae non habent esse nisi quia possibile est eas admisceri motui» ()

AVICENNA , p. 

«Certificemus nunc vulgatas descriptiones

β

speciei» ()

AVICENNA , p. 

«Non enim memini […] hoc nomen sic debere

β

intelligi» ()

AVICENNA , p. 

«Usus fuit ut cum haec quinque distinguerentur

β

diceretur quod haec quodam respectu sunt naturalia et alio respectu logica et alio intellectualia» () ()

Cf. AVICENNA , pp. – «Sicut album quod in se est aliquid intellectum217 

»

Cf. AVICENNA , p. 

«[…] propter quam individuum constituatur219 in

?218 ?

intellectu. Si enim220 diceres quod Plato est longus […] non tamen describetur per illas in intellectu individualitas Platonis» ()

Cf. AVICENNA , p. ,

«Et etiam qua habundat species a genere»

α?

«Et oportet ut genus accidentis sit genus conse-

β?

note e221 ()

AVICENNA , p. 

quens ad ipsam speciem»  216 The Latin text here proposed is mine. A correspondence with Hudry’s edition (AVICENNA 2018) of the text is also provided: whenever the text is identical to the one I propose, readers will find the corresponding page in Hudry’s edition without any further specification; when the text I propose differs from that proposed in Hudry’s edition, readers will find the indication of the corresponding page preceded by ‘Cf.’ and footnotes explaining the differences between the two texts. 217 ‘In intellectu’ in AVICENNA 2018, p. 200 is the reading of one manuscript; I prefer here ‘intellectum’ concordantly attested by all the other manuscripts, which is a precise rendering of maʿqūl. 218 The portion of text corresponding to that preserving the variant reading in the Arabic is accidentally omitted in the Latin text. 219 AVICENNA 2018, p. 206 reads ‘constituetur intellectu’ as in MS O of the Latin translation; I prefer ‘constituatur in intellectu’ (corresponding to the Arabic: yutaqawwamu fī l-ḏihni), as attested by most Latin manuscripts (see notes s and t in AVICENNA 2018, p. 206). 220 AVICENNA 2018 omits ‘enim’, which is preserved by all manuscripts except for MS O of the Latin translation (on which the text of AVICENNA 2018 is based): see note u in AVICENNA 2018, p. 206. 221 The phrase “et etiam qua habundat species a genere” is omitted in many Latin manuscripts, probably because of a saut du même au même due to the repetition of ‘genere’: see AVICENNA 2018, p. 215, note e.

II The Edition  cli

As to the question concerning the time and place at which each of the two versions appeared, it still awaits a definite answer, although some considerations can be made. Although version β is later than version α, it must be placed in the early stages of the tradition. On the one hand, the nature of the modifications introduced in the second version renders the ascription of this version of the text to a scribal work quite unlikely; on the other hand, their ascription to Avicenna himself seems also quite dubious, on the basis of the exquisitely stylistic nature of most of the modifications222, and of al-Ǧūzǧānī’s account of Avicenna’s scarce care for the preservation and transmission of his own works. In this framework, the hypothesis that Avicenna himself might have accomplished a revision of his text seems less than likely. The hypothesis remains that the author(s) of version β might have either worked within Avicenna’s circle or belonged to the first generation of his students. Some possible evidence for a scholarly activity that may have stimulated modifications and improvements of the text was speculatively supposed at the origin of the manuscript tradition; in that case, the additions and modifications had not a merely formal nature. The existence of a series of mostly stylistic modifications confined to a branch of the manuscript tradition might suggest a process of editing and revision of the text accomplished by an anonymous scholar of Avicenna’s circle after the above-mentioned modifications and additions, on a manuscript other than the archetype itself; this copy arguably was the reconstructed MS β. Who the author(s) of the second version was or were, and whether such a revision of the text was urged or supported by Avicenna himself, is still a matter of inquiry.

S6. The ‘moving archetype’

 222 Apparently, only one modification has doctrinal reasons (case 6 in Tab. 12) and might be the result of a partial misunderstanding of the context.

clii  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition II.3.3 Branch α: A Genealogical Reconstruction II.3.3.1 Families γ and η A number of variants shared by MSS KaNkBC attest the existence of an exemplar γ from which the four manuscripts derive (Tab. 9, cases a-f). MS Ka, the earliest extant manuscript of the Madḫal so far, cannot be the exemplar of MSS NkBC, since the three witnesses do not share some of its textual errors223. MSS NkBC rather derive from an exemplar η that very likely circulated in Marāġa, characterized by the errors in Tab. 9, cases g-i224. Tab. 9. KaNkBC (MS γ) a) [I.3, §3.2, p. 36.47–48]

‫ٔن اﻟﺼﺎﻧﻊ ﱂ ﺴﺘﻮف‬

KaNkBC +

‫ ﻜﻮن‬in mg. NkBC : ‫ٔن اﻟﺼﺎﻧﻊ ﻻ ﻜﻮن ﻗﺪ اﺳﺘﻮﰱ‬

cett. b) [I.4, §3.3, p. 48.45] c) d) e) f)

‫ وﻻ اﳉﻬﺔ اﻟﱵ ﲠﺎ ﱔ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻬﺎ‬KaNkBC (+ s.l. Ṣ ) : ‫ وﻻ اﳉﻬﺔ اﻟﱵ ﲠﺎ ﱔ ﻣﻮﺻﻮ ﺔ‬cett. [I.6, §5.1, p. 74.46] ‫ إﺛﺒﺎت ﺎرض ﻻزم ﻠﲈﻫﯿﺔ‬KaNkBC (+ in mg. To) : ‫ إﺛﺒﺎت ﻻزم ﻠﲈﻫﯿﺔ‬cett. [I.7, §3.2.4, p. 84.53] ‫ٔوﱃ ﰲ ذ ا ﳣﯿﲒ‬ KaNkBC (+ s.l. DiS in mg. Br) : ‫ ٔوﱃ ﰲ ذ‬cett. [I.12, §2.4.1, p. 148.48] ‫ ﻻ اﻣﺴﻪ وﻻ ﺪﻩ‬KaNkBC (+ s.l. Di) : ‫ اﲰﻪ وﻻ ﺪﻩ‬cett. [II.3, §3.2, p. 230.39] ‫ ﲑ ا اﲚﺔ‬KaNkBC + s.l. Ṣ : ‫ ا اﲚﺔ‬cett. 2

2

3

NkBC (MS η) g) [I.5, §3, p. 56.51]

‫ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ ﻣ‬+ ‫ﲞﻆ اﳌﺼﻨﻒ‬

s.l. B

‫ ﲞﻂ اﳌﺼﻨﻒ ﰲ ﻣ‬in mg. C ‫ ﰲ ﻣ ﲞﻂ اﳌﺼﻨﻒ‬s.l.

Nk :

h) i)

‫ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﻓ ﻪ‬cett. ّ NkBC : ‫داﻻ ﲆ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ‬ ّ cett. [I.8, §5, p. 96.75] ‫داﻻ ﲆ ﻛﲈل ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ‬ [I.14, explicit] ‫ ﲤﺖ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﻦ ا ٔول وﻟﻮاﻫﺐ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ٔﳈﻞ اﶵﺪ واﻟﻔﻀﻞ ﻛﲈ ﻫﻮ ٔﻫ‬NkBC

NkBC (η) and A: Mutual contamination? A collates η j) [I.4, §2, p. 42.18]

‫ ﻧﻔﺲ ﺑﻨﺎﺗﯿﺔ‬NkBC ‫ ﺑﻨﺎﺗﯿﺔ‬s.l. A : ‫ﻧﻔﺲ ﻧﺒﺎﺗﯿﺔ‬

NkBC collate A k) [I.14, §2.2, p. 186.41] l) [II.3, §13, p. 240.95]

cett.

‫ ﰷ ٔﺑﯿﺾ ﻻ ﰷﻟﺒﯿﺎض‬A : ‫ ﻻ ﰷﻟﺒﯿﺎض‬add. s.l. NkC : ‫ ﰷ ٔﺑﯿﺾ‬cett. ‫ ٔول ﻣﻦ ﻛﺘﺐ ﰲ ﻫﺬﻩ اﶆﺴﺔ ا ﳫﯿﺎت ﻛﺘﺎ‬A + in mg. NkB : ‫ٔول ﻣﻦ ٔورد ﻟﻬﺬﻩ اﶆﺴﺔ‬

‫ ا ﳫﯿﺎت ﻛﺘﺎ‬cett.  223 E.g. Al-Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction, §1.4, p. 6.29: wa-kataba manṭiq al-ḫuṭba Ka: wa-kataba al-ḫuṭba cett.; Madḫal I.2, §2.2, p. 28.53: bihā Ka: bi-hāḏihi l-aḥwāl cett. 224 For a tentative reconstruction of the circulation of MS η, see section I.1.

II The Edition  cliii

MS η was arguably the object of a scholarly activity of collation: some marginal variants (in the handwriting of the copyist) and oscillations in the readings of MSS NkBC point at the presence of collational variants in MS η. Case (g) shows the presence of a variant allegedly found in the author’s copy recorded in the margins of MSS NkBC: in all of the three witnesses, the collational variant was written by the copyists of the main text, and was presumably copied from their shared exemplar225. From the marginal notes in MSS NkBC, it is also possible to argue for a collation of MS η with a manuscript owned by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī for the section on Mathematics226. Some other collational variants found in MSS NkBC are peculiar readings that are only found in MS A (see the examples in Tab. 9, cases k-l). A structural element may also reveal that MS η was collated with an ancestor of MS A: MSS ANkBC arrange the funūn the section on the Mathematics of the Šifāʾ in a peculiar order (cf. Tab. 10), which does not coincide with that which was originally intended by Avicenna, as plenty of internal evidence in Avicenna’s work demonstrates227. Some codicological evidence proves that this particular order is an innovation in MSS NkBC. MS Nk preserves a numeration of the section on Music as the twelfth fann of the entire Šifāʾ, and MS B preserves what appears to be a palaeographical corruption of “twelfth”228. In MS C as well the numeration of the fann of Music as the twelfth fann might be the reading prior to correction, since the numbering of the fann as “eleventh” that is found at f. 374r is visibly an emendation of a different previous

 225 This is not the only case in MSS NkBC: for an analogous case of a variant reportedly found in the author’s manuscript in the section of Ǧadal, see DI VINCENZO 2017, pp. 57–59. 226 See supra, section I.1 and DI VINCENZO 2018a. 227 Although the Cairo edition assumes this order to be the right one, perhaps on the basis of MS B, the correct order of the funūn of Mathematics was pointed out in MAHDAVĪ 1954, pp. 158–166, and in GUTAS 2014, p. 105 (cf. also GUTAS 1988, p. 102). Avicenna’s intentions are clear form his prologue to the section on Music, where he states: “time has come, for us, to close the section on Mathematics of Philosophy by introducing a compendium of the science of Music” (wa-qad ḥāna lanā an naḫtama al-ǧuzʾa l-riyāḍiyya min al-falsafati bi-īrādi ǧawāmiʿi ʿilmi l-mūsīqā). See also Avicenna’s own prologue to the entire K. al-Šifāʾ, where he describes the four sections of the summa (Madḫal I.1, §4.3, pp. 16.29–18.34), and states that Geometry is followed by Astronomy, which is followed, on its turn, by the Introduction to Arithmetic, so that the Mathematics are concluded with Music. To sum up, the order of the funūn Avicenna had in mind was: (1) Geometry, (2) Astronomy, (3) Arithmetic, and (4) Music. 228 MS B reports a numeration of the Music as the “eighteenth” (al-ṯāmin ʿašara) fann. This reading likely results from a palaeographical misunderstanding of “twelfth” (al-ṯānī ʿašara), which is also the reading preserved in MS Nk, due to the palaeographical similarity between al-ṯāmin and al-ṯānī. Considered that Metaphysics, which is the last fann in the manuscript, is numbered as the thirteenth fann, a numeration as the eighteenth fann would be difficult to explain otherwise.

cliv  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition reading229. Given that MSS NkBC all number the section on Metaphysics as the thirteenth fann230, Music was arguably intended to precede Metaphysics, being the last fann of Mathematics. MSS NkB also preserve some marginal notes to emend the order of the funūn of the section on Mathematics. One of these marginal notes states that Avicenna had placed the Astronomy section before the Arithmetic; since, however, the manuscript from which “this manuscript” was copied had the works of the Mathematics section in a different order, these were copied according to its order. It can be argued that neither MS η nor, supposedly, its exemplar had the section on Mathematics arranged in this way; the note found in the margins of MSS NkB (probably already present in MS η) must have been copied from a manuscript with which MS η was collated. This latter manuscript is that which presumably had the peculiar arrangement of the Mathematics section in the first place, and in the margin of which someone must have left the note on the original order; probably, it was an ancestor of MS A. Given that the copy of MS A was undertaken in Marāġa in 671H/1273231, the exemplar of MS A may well have circulated in Marāġa, where MS η could have been collated with it232. Tab. 10. Avicenna’s Order

MS A and MSS NkBC (η)

I. Geometry

I. Geometry

II. Astronomy

III. Arithmetic

Marginal Notes in MSS NkB --«The third fann of the Mathematics, about Arithmetic; the first treatise is about the properties of numbers».

III. Arithmetic

IV. Music

«The fourth fann of the Mathematics about Music, namely the twelfth fann of Kitāb al-

But cf. the title of the fann in

Šifāʾ, containing five treatises, the first of

MSS NkB:

which contains five chapters».

 229 In the title (f. 374r): al-fann al-ḥādī ʿašara, the word al-ḥādī is clearly written after rasura of another word; a clear sign of a previous reading compatible with al-ṯānī is the tašdīd placed above the letter ḥ of ḥādī, that can be explained as a trace of a previous reading ṯ. 230 The numeration of Metaphysics as the thirteenth fann (and not, as we should expect, as the twenty-second fann) let us infer that the tradition of this branch began with a manuscript deprived of the nine funūn of the section on Logic, which were, perhaps, copied from another manuscript and added to a manuscript that initially preserved only the sections on Physics, Mathematics, and Metaphysics of Avicenna’s Šifāʾ. 231 See above and CELLI 2017–2018. 232 MS A was copied some years later than MS Nk, and, obviously, it is also later than MS η; hence, it can hardly be considered the manuscript itself with which MS η was collated before MSS NkBC were copied from it.

II The Edition  clv

‫[ ﻣﻦ‬B:‫اﻟﻔﻦ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻋﴩ ]اﻟﺜﺎﻣﻦ ﻋﴩ‬ .‫ﻛﺘﺎب اﻟﺸﻔﺎء و ﻫﻮ ﰲ ﲅ اﳌﻮﺳﯿﻘﻰ‬ «The twelfth [eighteenth MS B] fann of Kitāb al-Šifāʾ, on the science of Music». IV. Music

II. Astronomy

«You should know that the Šayḫ [i.e. Avicenna] placed the Almagest before the two sciences of Arithmetic and Music in this Book, but the manuscript from which this one was copied had this order; therefore, I copied [the funūn] according to its order».

Descripti: MSS De and Dp are descripti of MS B; the Cairo editors had already suggested the possibility of a genealogical relation between MSS Dp and B233. MS An is a descriptus of MS C234. II.3.3.2 Families δ and θ The genealogical reconstruction of the rest of branch α is more challenging, due to the high level of contamination of these seven witnesses, which underwent several corrections and interpolations. The difficulty in establishing the relationship between these manuscripts is evident from the inconsistent behaviour of some of them (see Tab. 11). Tab. 11. AEṢNoN? a) [I., §., p. .–] 

‫و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﻓﺎ ّٕن اﲰﻪ ﯾﺪ ّل ﺑﻪ ﻋﻨﺪ اﳌﻨﻄﻘ ّﲔ ﲆ ﻣﻌﲎ ٔ ّول و ﲆ ﻣﻌﲎ ن وﻟ ﺲ ﺳ ﻠﻬﲈ ﺳ ﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻗ ﻠﻬﲈ‬ ‫ﰲ اﳉ ﺲ واﻟﻨﻮع إذ ﰷن اﻟﻮﺿﻊ ا ٔ ّول ﻓ ﻪ ٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﻫﻮ ﻠﺠﻤﻬﻮر واﻟﻨﻘﻞ ﻠﺨﻮ ّاص‬ 





_____________

‫ إن ]و ٔﻣﺎ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﻓﺎٕن‬KaBrNkAEDaNoN ‫ ﻓﺎٕن‬C || . ‫ ﻣ ﻠﻬﲈ ]ﻣﺎ ﻗ ﻠﻬﲈ‬εDaNoN «sicut» Lat. || . ‫ ﻓ ﻪ‬EṢ + in mg. Nk : ‫ ﰲ اﳉ ﺲ‬εDa «generis» Lat. : ‫ ﻓﳱﲈ‬KaNkBACNoN : om. ζ || . ‫إﳕﺎ ﻫﻮ‬ om. AEṢNoN ‫ إﳕﺎ‬om. BDa .

 233 IBN SĪNĀ 1952a, p. (75). 234 MS An shares all the peculiarities of MS C (see e.g. the non-polygenetic omission in Madḫal I.14, §3.3.2, p. 190.69–70, from miṯlu qawl to yuʿnā bi-qawlihi), to which it adds its peculiar errors (e.g. li-kullī instead of li-kullihi in Madḫal I.14, §1.3.1, p. 184.19).

clvi  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition AENoN? b) [I., §., p. .]

‫ ﻓ ﺪل ﻠﯿﻪ‬om. AENoN : habent cett. (‫ ﻓ ﺪل ﻠﳱﺎ‬εDa)

BrDaṢNoN (θ)?

‫ ﰲ ا ٔذﻫﺎن‬DaṢNoN (+ Te): ‫ ﰲ ا ٔوﻫﺎم‬cett. + s.l. S [I., §.., p. .] ‫ ٔﻟﻔﺎظ ٔﺧﺮ‬BrDaṢNoN : ‫ ٔﻟﻔﺎظ ٔﺧﺮى‬cett. [II., §., p. .] ‫ وﻫﺬﻩ ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﺗﻘﻊ‬BrDaṢNoN : ‫ وﻫﺬﻩ ﺗﻘﻊ ٔﯾﻀﺎ‬cett.

c) [I., §., p. .] d) e)



I will take cases (a–b) as a starting point. As previously argued, the variant at point 1 in case (a) may be one of the errors that characterize family α (conceding that MSS B and Ṣ may have restored the correct text by contamination)235. The reading at point 2 mā qablahumā (“what [was said] before the two”) is justified by the fact that Avicenna recalls his dissertation on the two senses of ‘genus’ and ‘species’, which he treated before the two senses of ‘differentia’. The reading miṯluhumā (“like the two”) attested by family ε may have originated from a palaeographical misunderstanding of mā qablahumā. Note that, on this reading, MSS DaNoN side with family ε. Point 3 is also quite interesting: the manuscript tradition presents three concurrent readings, namely fīhi (“with regard to it”), fī l-ǧins (“with regard to the genus”) and fīhimā (“with regard to both”). First, fī l-ǧins is evidently problematic, for the first imposition of the name belonged to common people in both the cases of the genus and the species, not just in the case of the genus, as this reading implies. Fīhimā is certainly a more plausible reading236, but the hypothesis that fīhimā was the original reading makes it quite difficult to explain the genesis of the readings fīhi and fī lǧins. On the contrary, both fī l-ǧins and fīhimā may be explained as two different reactions to an original fīhi that was eventually misunderstood. The original fīhi (attested in MSS EṢ) arguably referred to the clause mā qablahumā fī l-ǧins wa-lnawʿ (“what [was said] before the two with regard to the genus and the species”), but the complex wording may have facilitated the misunderstanding of fīhi, which was later understood as referring either to the genus or to the species alone. The reading fī l-ǧins, which presumably stemmed from an attempt to make the reference of fīhi explicit, is a piece of evidence of such a misunderstanding. The same holds for the reading fīhimā, which is supposedly a later adaptation of the wronglyinterpreted fīhi. This case shows an internal bipartition of family β into a family attesting the reading fī l-ǧins (identifiable with MS ε) and MSS TAs, that omit the problematic fīhi. MS Da, which normally sides with family α (cf. case 1 and section II.3.2.1), here sides with part of family β. Interestingly, this coincidence with family β

 235 MS Nk reports the right reading as an interlinear variant, written by the copyist himself: it can be argued that the variant was already in MS η and was copied in MS Nk and directly inserted in the main text in MS B. 236 It is also the reading printed in the Cairo edition.

II The Edition  clvii

occurs in Da in correspondence of a passage that may have been perceived as problematic due to the presence of the misunderstood fīhi. This textual difficulty may well have prompted to compare the antigraph of MS Da with a manuscript of family β, thus causing contamination of this passage237. Finally, point 4 presents the omission of innamā huwa; the omission is shared by MSS AEṢNoN, so that one may infer the existence of a stemmatic relation among the five manuscripts. Whether this implies the existence of an exemplar from which only MSS AEṢNoN are derived is a matter of doubt. On the one hand, no strong evidence of other textual corruptions exclusively affecting MSS AEṢNoN could be found, and MS Da shows some alteration within the same clause (it omits innamā), so that the corruption might have also affected the ancestor from which MS Da was derived. Case (b) is an omission shared by MSS AENoN, which may prove the existence of a closer stemmatic relation between MSS AENoN, to the exclusion of MS Ṣ and of MSS BrDa. To sum up, cases (a-b) above support the hypothesis of a genealogical relation with family α existing among MSS AEṢNoN and of an even closer relation among MSS AENoN to the exclusion of MS Ṣ. The reconstruction suggested by cases (a-b) is in clear contrast with cases (c-e), which support the hypothesis of a genealogical relation among MSS BrDaṢNoN and of a closer relation among MSS DaṢNoN to the exclusion of MS Br. Furthermore, both suggested scenarios are incompatible with the hypothesis of the derivation of MSS BrṢ from a common model (τ), which is supported by numerous textual evidences238. It thus appears inevitable to suppose that contamination may have concealed the presence of conjunctive errors shared by the models of MSS BrAEDaṢNoN. A reconsideration of cases (a) and (b) is therefore needed. As already claimed with regard to case (a), MSS BrDa might restore the text omitted in MSS AEṢNoN by contaminating their exemplars with a manuscript of family ε. The hypothesis of contamination may also shed new light on case (b). It is possible that the omission in case (b) affected the ancestor common to MSS BrAEDaṢNoN, and that the exemplars of MSS BrDaṢ restored by collation the omitted passage. Precisely in correspondence with the passage omitted in MSS AENoN, Da reads fa-yadullu ʿalayhā (as the manuscripts of family ε do) instead of fa-yadullu ʿalayhi, which points, once again, to a contamination of the exemplar of MS Da with a manuscript of family ε. As for MSS BrṢ, I will argue that they share a common ancestor (τ), which was almost certainly a copy heavily contaminated with some ancestor of MS E239; a remarkable piece of evidence in this connection is offered by the reduplication of paragraph §3 in Madḫal I.8 in two different positions. The pos-

 237 This possible case of contamination of the exemplar of MS Da is not isolated; see infra. 238 See section II.3.3.4. 239 See section II.3.3.4.

clviii  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition sibility that MSS BrṢ also repaired the omission in case (b) by contamination cannot be ruled out a priori. To conclude, the apparently mutually contradictory cases (a-b and c-e) may account for the existence of a manuscript δ from which MSS BrAEDaṢNoN derived, even if a demonstrable contamination of the exemplars of MSS Da and BrṢ (τ) may have partially concealed the similarities among all of them. Cases (d-e) might also account for a closer relation among MSS BrDaṢNoN and, therefore, for the possible existence of MS θ. II.3.3.3 MS Da and its descriptus S MS Da is renowned for preserving a note ascribed to Avicenna240. The manuscript was presumably copied from an exemplar that, as previously argued, might have been corrected by collation with a manuscript of family ε. Besides emendations, the exemplar of MS Da must have also presented some interpolations, which can be observed in MS Da. An example is the note interpolated in Madḫal I.4, §3.2, p. 46.41: dealing with conceived items, Avicenna elusively states that knowledge of this kind of subject pertains to a certain discipline (li-ṣināʿa), without further specification; in MS Da, an interpolated note specifies that this discipline is psychology (wa-hiya ʿilmu l-nafs). Descriptus: MS S is a descriptus of MS Da, copied under the request of Walī alDīn Ǧārullāh in 1125H/1713241, with some marginal annotations in Ǧārullāh’s handwriting. The text of the Madḫal that is preserved in MS S is a precise copy of MS Da; both the strict adherence of MS S to MS Da and Ǧārullāh’s acquaintance with MS Da can be proved with the following textual case (Tab. 12). Tab. 12. DaS [I.12, §2.4.1, p. 148.50–51]

Ǧārullāh’s marginal note, MS S, f. 10r

‫ﻗﻮ ﻛﲈ ﳚﺐ إﱃ ﻛﲈ ﳚﺐ ٔﻧﻪ ﻛﲈ ﳚﺐ ٔﻧﻪ ﯾﺼﲑ ﺟﺴﲈ ﻣﻦ ﺔ ﲪﻞ اﳊﯿﻮاﻧﯿﺔ‬ ‫ﻛﺬا وﻗﻊ ﰲ ﺴ ﺔ ﻗﺮ ٔت ﲆ ﻠﯿﻪ ﻻ ﰟ وﻻ ﺪ ﻛﲈ ﳚﺐ ٔﻧﻪ ﯾﺼﲑ ﺟﺴﲈ‬ ‫ﻣﻦ ﺔ ﲪﻞ اﳊﯿﻮاﻧﯿﺔ ﻠﯿﻪ ﰟ و ﺪ‬ ‫اﳌﺆﻟﻒ ﻟﻜ ﻪ ﻜﺮار‬ ‫وﱄ ا ﻦ‬

His statement “as it is necessary” up to “as is necessary that etc.” occurred in a manuscript read to the author, but it is a repetition. Walī al-Dīn

 240 Cf. the description of MS Da in section II.2. 241 The derivation of MS S from Da holds for the Madḫal and, possibly, for the section on Logic, but might not also hold for the section on Metaphysics preserved in MS S.

II The Edition  clix

In MS Da, the passage appears to be duplicated (in bold in the table); actually, the second occurrence of the passage is arguably a correction of the first (a correction of the final lā bi-sm wa-lā ḥadd (“neither by name, nor by definition”) into bi-sm waḥadd (“by name and definition”). The correction must have been erroneously interpolated in the exemplar of MS Da. MS S reports the text of MS Da exactly, but in the margin of f. 10r an interesting note penned by Ǧārullāh claims that, although the text, as it is, contains a repetition, it is attested in a manuscript read to the author. This note shows Ǧārullāh’s awareness of the existence of the note in MS Da claiming that the manuscript was read in the presence of Avicenna; whether his knowledge was direct (i.e. Ǧārullāh saw MS Da because it was the direct exemplar of MS S) or not (i.e. information regarding the reading note of MS Da was preserved in the exemplar of MS S, that was copied, on its turn, from MS Da), cannot be ascertained. II.3.3.4 Family τ: The ‘Indian Branch’ MSS BrṢ share a number of textual errors that demonstrate their common descendance from MS τ (some examples are displayed in Tab. 13). As can be seen from cases (a) and (e-h), some variant readings that characterize BrṢ (τ) are the result of intentional modifications of the text. Tab. 13. BrṢ (τ)

‫ وﻣﻌﺮﻓﳤﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ‬BrṢ : ‫ وﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ا ٔﻣﻮر اﻟﱵ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ‬cett. [I.2, §2.3, p. 28.63] ‫ ﻻ ﳚﺪى ﻧﻔﻌﺎ‬BrṢ : ‫ ﻟ ﺲ ﳑﺎ ﳚﺪى ﻧﻔﻌﺎ‬cett. [I.3, §1, p. 30.4] ‫ اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﺑﻪ‬BrṢ : ‫ اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﺑﻪ واﻗ ﺒﺎﺳﻪ‬cett. + s.l. Ṣ [I.8, §1.1, p. 88.4] ‫ ﲑ ﺻﺎﱀ ٔﺻﻼ‬BrṢ : ‫ ﲑ ﺻﺎﱀ ﻟ ﻻ ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ٔﺻﻼ‬cett. + in mg. Ṣ [I.12, §2.4.2, p. 150.57] ‫ ﻣﻦ ﺔ ﻫﻮ ﺲ ﻣ ﻄﻘﻲ‬BrṢ : ‫ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻫﻮ ﺲ ﻣ ﻄﻘﻲ‬cett. [I.13, §1.1, p. 160.3] ‫ ﻓﺎٕن اﲰﻪ ﻋﻨﺪ اﳌﻨﻄﻘ ﲔ ﯾﺪل‬BrṢ : ‫ ﻓﺎٕن اﲰﻪ ﯾﺪل ﺑﻪ ﻋﻨﺪ اﳌﻨﻄﻘ ﲔ‬cett. [I.14, §2.2, p. 188.48–49] ‫ واﻟﻌﺮﴈ ﻗﺪ ﻜﻮن ﺟﻮﻫﺮا وﻗﺪ ﻜﻮن ﻋﺮﺿﺎ‬BrṢ : ‫واﻟﻌﺮﴈ ﻗﺪ ﻜﻮن ﻋﺮﺿﺎ وﻗﺪ ﻜﻮن‬ ‫ ﺟﻮﻫﺮا‬cett. [II.3, §13, p. 240.95] ‫ ٔول ﻣﻦ ﻛﺘﺐ ﻟﻬﺬﻩ ا ﳫﯿﺎت اﶆﺲ ﻛﺘﺎ‬BrṢ : ‫ ٔول ﻣﻦ ﻛﺘﺐ ﰲ ﻫﺬﻩ اﶆﺴﺔ ا ﳫﯿﺎت ﻛﺘﺎ‬A + in mg. NkB : ‫ ٔول ﻣﻦ ٔﻓﺮد ﻟﻬﺬﻩ اﶆﺴﺔ ا ﳫﯿﺎت ﻛﺘﺎ‬cett.

a) [I.2, §1.1, p. 20.4–5] b) c) d) e) f) g) h)

3

3

MS Ṣ presents two notes that state that the manuscript was corrected by collation in 845H/1441, one at the end of the section on Logic and the other at the end of the

clx  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition section on Natural Philosophy242; many of the marginal variants in the manuscript must be very likely ascribed to this process of correction. A closer inspection of the marginal variants allows us to infer that the manuscript collated belonged to family γ243. Family τ may represent an ‘Indian branch’ of the manuscript tradition of the Madḫal. MS Ṣ is the copy owned by the Daštakī family and by Fatḥ Allāh al-Šīrāzī, who presumably brought the manuscript to India, where the manuscript is now preserved244. As for MS Br, nothing is known about its place of copying; before being acquired by the British Museum, it has circulated in India, where Colonel George William Hamilton purchased it in the second half of the 19th century 245. Descripti: The data provided by the sample collation identify two Indian nineteenth-century manuscripts (MSS In and Os) as being descripti of MS Ṣ246. Both MSS In and Os also preserve the indexes written in MS Ṣ by Fatḥ Allāh al-Šīrāzī before each section of the summa. II.3.3.5 Family λ, or ‘Bahmanyār’s Family’ Within family δ, a closer genealogical relation exists between MSS AE. MS E is one of the manuscripts that preserve a “shorter version” of certain passages of Madḫal247; moreover, it does not preserve the introductory clause before al-Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction248, which may be either a sign of a later omission of non-authorial material or of its absence at an earlier stage of the tradition. MS E also attests to a curious dislocation of paragraph §3 of chap. I.8. The genesis of this dislocation is obscure; it can be speculated that one of the two contiguous paragraphs involved in the dislocation – namely §2.2.4 and §3 – was originally absent from an ancestor of MS E, then integrated in the margin by collation and, finally, inserted in the text at the wrong position in the subsequent phase of copying. Unfortunately, it cannot be verified whether this dislocation affected the shared ancestor of MSS AE, since the passage falls in correspondence with a huge lacuna in MS A249. MS E shows traces of a contamination of its exemplar with variants of branch β250.  242 For further details, see the description of the manuscript in section II.2, n° 12 and BERTOLACCI 2017–2018, Appendix B. 243 Some instances in Tab. 14, cases b, d, f. 244 See the description of the manuscript in section II.2, n° 13. 245 See the description of the manuscript in section II.2, n° 2. 246 See also section 1.1. 247 Cf. section II.3.1.2.2 and DI VINCENZO 2017. 248 Corresponding to p. 1.4–6 of the Cairo edition. 249 MSS BrJṢ attest §3 twice, i.e. once in its correct place, and once as in MS E: this might point at the contamination of their ancestors with a manuscript that presented the same dislocation as MS E. 250 See, for instance, Tab. 11 above, case 6, where MS E evidently juxtaposes two different readings attested by branch α and β.

II The Edition  clxi

MS A is also a very interesting witness, whose copy was undertaken in Marāġa, probably within the circle of Bar Hebraeus. A few readings point to the possibility that the ancestor of MS A was contaminated with an ancestor of MSS NoN, or viceversa. Case d and f in Tab. 14 below both show additions shared by the three MSS; case f, in particular, shows the interpolation of a gloss aimed at explaining the clause madḫūlan fī ṭabīʿatihi (“included in its nature”) as muqawwiman limāhiyyatihi (“constitutive of its quiddity”) in the text of MSS ANoN251. It should be noted that a few variants in MSS AE coincide with variants attested in the quotations from Madḫal II.4 in Bahmanyār’s Taḥṣīl (cases b-c), which may possibly account for a stemmatic relation of Bahmanyār’s copy of the Madḫal with MSS AE. Peculiar is the agreement of MSS AE with Bahmanyār’s quotation in Taḥṣīl, p. 20.4 on the variant fīhi (“in it”) against fī māhiyyatihi (“in its quiddity”) attested by the rest of the tradition (case c below). Textual evidence is, however, too scarce to ascertain this possibility in a definite way252. Descripti: MS Ye is a descriptus of MS E, of which it reproduces all the textual peculiarities; even the blank space left in MS E (f. 39r) in Madḫal I.14, §1.4, p. 186.31 in correspondence to the word: al-mudāwima – supposedly due to a difficulty in reading the word in the model of MS E – is faithfully reproduced in MS Ye (f. 38r). Some corrections due to contamination were made directly on MS Ye253. Tab. 14. AE (λ) a) [II.3, §12.2, p. 240.94] b) [II.4, §2.1, p. 244.14]

‫ وﻗﺪ ﻋﺮﻓﺖ ﻣﺎ ﻓ ﻪ‬om. AE : habent cett. ‫ وﻻ ﯾﺪ ﻞ ﻓ ﻪ‬AE + Bahmanyār, Taḥṣīl, p. 20.4 + ‫ ﻓ ﻪ‬s.l. Ṣ : ‫وﻻ ﯾﺪ ﻞ ﰲ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺘﻪ‬

cett. c) [II.4, §2.1, p. 246.15]

‫ ﯾﻘﻮﻣﻪ‬AE ‫ﯾﻘﺮرﻩ‬

Bahmanyār, Taḥṣīl, p. 20.5 (

‫ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا‬om. AE + Bahmanyār) :

‫ ﯾﻘﻮﻣﻪ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا‬cett.

 251 The same gloss is interlinear in MSS Nk and Ṣ; MS Ṣ also adds ayḍan in case (e). MSS ANoN shared also the variant fīhimā with MSS KaNkBC in Tab. 16, case (a), point 3: the phenomenon may be due to a contamination of MSS ANoN with MSS KaNkBC, stimulated by the difficulty of the original reading. 252 There is not enough textual evidence, both due to the poor number of quotations drawn from the Madḫal in Bahmanyār’s Taḥṣīl and to the paraphrastic nature of many of them, which makes it difficult to establish whether these variants were in Bahmanyār’s manuscript or they are rather the result of Bahmanyār’s own rephrasing of the text. 253 Cf. e.g. in Madḫal I.6, §2.2, p. 68.15 the correction of al-awhām into al-aḏhān (attested by MSS DaṢNoN); in Madḫal I.6, §2.1, p. 68.9 the correction of a mistake that already affected MS E (lā alḫaṭb) into ka-l-ḫaṭb.

clxii  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition ANoN: a contamination?

‫ واﻟﻨﺤﻮ اﻟﻌﺮﰊ ٔﯾﻀﺎ‬AṢNoN : ‫ واﻟﻨﺤﻮ اﻟﻌﺮﰊ‬cett. [I.3, §4, p. 38.63] ‫ اﳌﺮوي‬ANoN + ‫ اﳌﺮوي‬s.l. Nk fort. a.c. B : ‫ اﳌﺮو ﻦ‬cett. + in mg. A [I.11, §2.2, p. 132.32] ‫ ﻣﺪﺧﻮﻻ ٔي ﻣﻘﻮﻣﺎ ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺘﻪ ﰲ ﻃﺒﯿﻌﺘﻪ‬ANoN : ‫ ٔي ﻣﻘﻮﻣﺎ ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺘﻪ‬s.l. NkṢ : ‫ﻣﺪﺧﻮﻻ ﰲ‬ ‫ ﻃﺒﯿﻌﺘﻪ‬cett.

d) [I.3, §4, p. 38.61] e) f)

254

3

II.3.3.6 Family ξ The genealogical relation between MSS NoN can be established on the basis of their shared textual innovations (e.g. cases a-c in Tab. 15). It can be excluded that the two manuscripts derive from each other, since both are affected by erroneous omissions that do not affect the other (e.g. cases c-d below: case c shows the erroneous omission of a long passage in MS No due to the repetition of the term mādda before and at the end of the clause omitted, which is not in MS N; case d presents the omission of dūna šaḫṣ that affects MS N but not MS No). The two manuscripts must, therefore, share a common exemplar (MS ξ) – arguably, an almost complete witness of the Šifāʾ which did not preserve al-Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction. MS ξ was arguably corrected and interpolated: an instance of interpolation is case b in Tab. 15, where an example drawn from Porphyry’s Isagoge (i.e. that of blackness as a common accident of the black man) is inserted in the text in both MSS NoN. Interpolations of this sort do not come as a surprise: we know that at least MS No was copied in Šīrāz, in the madrasat Dār al-Aytām, during Ǧalāl al-Dīn alDawānī’s lifetime; it is possible that its ancestor also circulated in a scholastic and intellectual context255. One of the most notable textual peculiarities that must have characterized MS ξ is the omission of the entire paragraph of Avicenna’s Prologue concerning the Easterners (Madḫal I.1, §3.2), shared by MSS NoN (case a in Tab. 15), which does not appear to be due to a mere mechanical omission. Descriptus: MS Za is a descriptus of MS N256. Tab. 15. NoN (MS ξ) a) [I.1, §3.2, p. 16.20–24] b)

‫ﻓﻌﻠﯿﻪ ﲠﺬا اﻟﻜ ﺎب‬...‫ وﱄ ﻛﺘﺎب ﲑ ﻫﺬ ﻦ اﻟﻜ ﺎﺑﲔ‬om. NoN : habent cett.+ in mg. N [I.6, §6, p. 74.58] ‫ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﺴﻮاد اﳋ ﴚ ﻓﺎٕﻧﻪ ﯾﻠﺰم ٕا ﺴﺎﻧ ﻪ ﻻ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ وﻻ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد‬NoN : ‫ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد‬cett.

 254 The variant with the singular form of the term might have originated in MSS ANoN because of the presence of the singular form al-badawī immediately following. 255 See section I.1.4, point c. 256 MS Za shares all the peculiar variants of MS N (such as the aforementioned omission of dūna šaḫṣ in case c), to which it adds mistakes of its own (such as bi-l-martaba in Madḫal I.11, §2.2, p. 132.30 instead of bi-l-murattab, attested by all the other MSS, included MS N).

II The Edition  clxiii

‫ ﻓﻌﴗ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻓﳱﺎ ﶊﻮل ٔﰪ‬NoN : ‫ ﻓﻌﴗ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻮن ﻫﺬا ٔﰪ‬cett. ‫ﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ ﻣﺎدة‬...‫ اﻟﻨﻮﻋﯿﺔ واﳊﺮﻛﺔ‬om. No : habent cett. [I.11, §2.2, p. 130.27] ‫ و ﺪﻩ‬N : ‫ و ﺪﻩ دون ﴯﺺ‬cett.

c) [II.2, §6.2, p. 222.69]

d) [I.2, §1.2.2, pp. 22.22–24.25] e)

II.3.4 Branch β: A Genealogical Reconstruction II.3.4.1 Family ε Some textual innovations only characterize part of family β, i.e. MSS JDiToMiŠYiYG, to the exclusion of MSS TAsTe (family ζ). Two hypotheses are viable to explain this phenomenon: one can either assume the existence of an exemplar (ε) common to MSS JDiToMiŠYiYG to the exclusion of family ζ, or suppose that such an exemplar did not exist and that family ζ corrected some errors of β by collation. The first solution – namely the existence of MS ε – is assumed here to be more economic. MS J is part of family ε for the section of the Madḫal that starts from I.10, §2.1.1, p. 120.36, where the model – and the copyist – of MS J change257. Tab. 16. (J)DiToMiŠYiYG (MS ε) a) [I.8, §1.3.1, p. 90.18–19] b) c) d)

‫ اﳊﺴﺎس ﻻ ﻜﻮن‬DiToMiŠYiYG : ‫ ﻻ ﻜﻮن اﳊﺴﺎس‬cett. [I.10, §2.1.2, p. 122.39] ‫اﳋﺎص‬ ّ ‫ ﳌﻌﲎ‬JDiToMiŠYiYG : ‫اﳋﺎص‬ ّ ‫ ﲟﻌﲎ‬cett. [I.13, §1.3.1, p. 162.17] ‫ ٔو ﳚﻮز‬JDiToMiŠYiYG : ‫ وٕاﻣﺎ ٔن ﳚﻮز‬cett. [I.13, §1.4, p. 164.39] ‫ ﳌﺎ اﻗﱰﻧﺖ ﳌﺎدة اﻗﱰا‬JDiToMiŠYiYG : ‫ ﳌﺎ اﻗﱰﻧﺖ ﳌﺎدة‬cett.

II.3.4.2 Family ι The existence of MS ι can be assumed on the basis of the presence of textual innovations that characterize MSS DiToMiŠG against the rest of the tradition (Tab. 17). MS J is also part of this family for the section of the Madḫal that starts from I.10, §2.1.1, p. 120.36 (see, e.g., case d in Tab. 17). Tab. 17. JDiToMiŠG (MS ι) a) [I.4, §2, p. 42.19]

‫ رﺧﻮ وﺻﻠﺐ‬DiToMiŠG «mollis vel dura» Lat. : ‫ ﺻﻠﺐ ورﺧﻮ‬cett.

 257 Cf. section II.3.4.6.

clxiv  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition b) [I.5, §6.2, p. 64.107]258 c) d)

‫ رﻓﻊ ذات ذ اﻟﴚء‬DiToMiŠG + BrṢ : ‫ رﻓﻊ ذ اﻟﴚء‬cett. [I.5, §6.3, p. 64.115] ‫ ﻻ ﺮﺗﻔﻊ ﻻ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد وﻻ ﰲ اﻟﺘﻮﱒ‬ToMiŠG in mg. JDi : ‫ ﻻ ﺮﺗﻔﻊ‬cett. [I.13, §2, p. 166.56] ‫ ﯾﻮﺻﻒ ﺑﻪ اﻟﻀ ﺎك‬JDiToMiŠG : ‫ ﯾﻮﺻﻒ ﻟﻀ ﺎك‬cett. a.c.

259

II.3.4.3 Family μ Within family ι, a closer stemmatic relation is found among MSS ToMiŠG (and J after its model changes, cf. case c in Tab. 18), which presumably derive from one exemplar (MS μ). Supposing that the content of MSS ToMiŠG faithfully reproduces that of their exemplar260, MS μ was arguably a copy of the Šifāʾ that lacked the Mathematics section. Tab. 18. ToMiŠG (MS μ) a) [I.7, §1, p. 78.5] b) c)

‫ ﺗﻌﺎرﻓﻪ اﳋﻮ ّاص‬ToMiŠG : ‫اﳋﺎص‬ ّ ‫ ﺗﻌﺎرﻓﻪ‬cett. ّ ‫ ﺟﻌﻠﻮﻩ‬ToMiŠG : ‫ ﺟﻌﻠﻮﻩ ﻟ ا ّل‬cett. [I.7, §3.2.5, p. 84.55] ‫داﻻ‬ [I.13, §3.2.1, p. 168.69] ‫ وﯾﻘﺎل ٕاﻧ ّﻪ‬JToMiŠG : ‫ وﻛﺬ ﯾﻘﺎل ٕاﻧ ّﻪ‬DiYiY : ‫ٕاﻧ ّﻪ‬ ‫وﻛﺬ‬

cett.

II.3.4.4 Family π MSS ToMiŠ are three almost coaeval witnesses that share variants presumably derived from a common exemplar, i.e. MS π. Their mutual relation cannot be described in terms of derivation of the one from the other, due to the presence singular errors in each of the three manuscripts261. Descripti: MS R is a descriptus of MS Š, of which it shares all the peculiar mistakes. The manuscript was then collated and corrected by an anonymous corrector, whose intervention on some of the mistakes derived from Š is visible262. The anonymous corrector added, in the margins of MS R, a series of variant readings, including those concerning the titles of the chapters, rewritten in the margins in red

 258 The reading in MSS DiToMiŠG seems facilior: the addition of ḏāt is suggested by the recurring use of the clause ḏāt ḏālika l-šayʾ in the two preceding lines. 259 The reading in MSS ToMiŠG is actually facilior: the specification added (lā fī l-wuǧūd wa-lā fī ltawahhum), which is not necessary for Avicenna’s argument, is induced by the argument in §6.3, where the two kinds of existence – i.e. external existence (fī l-wuǧūd) and existence in estimation (fī l-tawahhum) – are frequently recalled. 260 MS J only preserves the section on Logic. 261 Cf. e.g. Tab. 11, case 4, showing that MSS ToMi cannot possibly derive from MS Š and that MSS ŠMi cannot derive from MS To. 262 Corrections are often made in MS R by means of rasurae, deletions, and the like.

II The Edition  clxv

ink263. The anonymous corrector might have had more than one manuscript at his disposal to collate MS R with: some variants are introduced by a reference to the plurality of manuscripts that the corrector had264. Among the marginalia of MS R, there is a set of notes commenting on passages of the section on Logic that were allegedly written by Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī; these are also preserved in MSS NkBC (η)265. A terminus post quem to date the intervention of the anonymous corrector is provided by some marginal notes quoting a few lemmata of al-Qāmūs al-Muḥīṭ by alFīrūzābādī (d. 817H/1415), which allows us to state that the marginalia were copied in MS R at least after the second half of the 14th/the beginning of the 15th century. Tab. 19. ToMiŠ (MS π) a) [I.10, §1.2.1, p. 116.7]

‫ ﻓﻜﺬ ﻟﻔﻈﺔ اﻟﻨﻮع‬ToMiŠ : ‫ وﻟﻔﻈﺔ اﻟﻨﻮع‬cett. b) [I.12, §5.2.1, p. 154.93] ‫ ﻓﻼن ﻧﻔﺴﻪ‬ToMiŠ : ‫ ﻓﻼن ﺑﻌﯿﻨﻪ‬cett. c) [I.13, §1.4, p. 164.38] ‫ اﻟﱵ ﺴﻤﳱﺎ‬ToMiŠ : ‫ اﻟﱵ ﺴﻤﻰ‬cett. II.3.4.5 Family ο, or ‘Lawkarī’s Family’ The existence of MS ο is supposed on the basis of the innovations shared by MSS JG and the Latin translation. Notably, the exemplar from which al-Lawkarī drew the quotations found in the Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān al-ṣidq that do not depend on Bahmanyār’s Taḥṣīl may also belong to this family (cf. e.g. case d in Tab. 20). The manuscript that has shown the closest relation to the Latin translation so far is MS G. The Latin translation may derive from the ancestor shared by MSS JG: up to chap. I.10, §2.1.1, p. 120.36, where the model of MS J appears to change, only the relation between MSS G and the Latin translation can be observed (see, e.g., cases ab below). MSS JG likely have a closer mutual relation: among others, one of the major corruptions that presumably affected the shared ancestor of MSS JG without also affecting the Latin translation is the erroneous duplication of a clause at the beginning of  263 In Madḫal I.12 (f. 10v), for example, the two titles attest the alternative readings maʿa l-kaṯrati (in the text) and baʿda l-kaṯrati (in the margin), which means that the source of the two is different. The reading maʿa l-kaṯrati is reasonably the reading that was in the model of MS R, since the index of contents at f. 2r reports the title of chap. I.12 with this reading. Hence, the reading baʿda l-kaṯrati reported in the marginal rubric comes from a different source, as a result of collation. 264 For instance, f. 641r: mā bayna l-ʿalāmatayni fī l-nusaḫi l-mawǧūdati ʿindanā hākaḏā [...] (“what is between the two marks is [reported] in this manner in the manuscripts we have”) and f. 671r: hākaḏā fī ǧamīʿi l-nusaḫi llatī ʿindanā mā bayna l-ʿalāmatayni [...] (“in this manner is [reported] what is between the two marks in all the manuscripts we have”). 265 See DI VINCENZO 2018a.

clxvi  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition chap. I.13 (case e). It can be reconstructed that the clause fa-innahum kānū…muṭlaqan was in the margins of the exemplar of MSS JG. Presumably, the segment wa-iḏ faʿalū was also included in the clause (cf. the text in MS J), where it probably served as an indication of the place in which the clause was meant to be inserted in the text. When MS G was copied, this indication was correctly understood and the clause was placed before wa-iḏ faʿalū; when MS J was copied, the clause went slightly misplaced and wa-iḏ faʿalū was repeated. It can be observed that the Latin translation does not bear any trace of the erroneous interpolation, which is, therefore, peculiar to the exemplar of MSS JG. On the basis of the different reaction of MS G and MS J to the same situation in their exemplar, the descendance of the one from the other should be excluded. Tab. 20. GLat. [before chap. I.10] a) [I.9, §4.2.3, p. 112.81–82]

‫ وﻻ ﻟﻘ ﺎﺳﯿﺎﺗﻪ‬G «nec suum syllogismum» Lat. : ‫ وﻻ ﻟﺘ ٔﻟﯿﻔﻪ‬cett. + G

mg.

b) [I.4, §1, p. 40.6–42.9; AVICENNA 2018, p. 135266] G + Lat.

Cett.

‫وﻟ ﺲ ﳚﻮز ٔن ﻜﻮن ﳾء ّ ﻟﴚء ﰲ ﺎﻟﱵ ﺪﻣﻪ وﻟ ﺲ ﳚﻮز ٔن ﻜﻮن ﳾء ّ ﻟﴚء ﰲ ﺎﻟﱵ ﺪﻣﻪ‬ ‫اﻟﺘﺼﻮر ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﻛﺜﲑا ﻣﺎ ﯾﻘﻊ ﲟﻌﲎ ﻣﻔﺮد ﻓﺎٕذا ﱂ ﯾﻘﻊ‬ ّ ‫[ ﻓﻘﺪ ٔﺿﻔﺖ إﻟﯿﻪ ﻣﻌﲎ ٓﺧﺮ ووﺟﻮدﻩ و ٔ ّﻣﺎ‬...] ‫ووﺟﻮدﻩ ﻓﺎٕذا ﱂ ﯾﻘﻊ ﳌﻔﺮد‬ ‫[ ﻓﻘﺪ ٔﺿﻔﺖ إﻟﯿﻪ ﻣﻌﲎ ٓﺧﺮ وذ ﻛﲈ ﺳ ّﻀﺢ‬...] ‫اﻟﺘﺼﻮر ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﻛﺜﲑا ﻣﺎ ﯾﻘﻊ ﲟﻌﲎ ﻣﻔﺮد وذ ﻛﲈ ﺳ ّﻀﺢ ﳌﻔﺮد‬ ّ ‫و ٔ ّﻣﺎ‬ ‫ﰲ ﻣﻮﺿﻌﻪ‬ ‫ﰲ ﻣﻮﺿﻌﻪ‬ 1

2

____________ 1.

‫ﲟﻌﲎ ﻣﻔﺮد‬...‫ و ٔﻣﺎ‬exp. p.c. G || 2. ‫ وذ‬exp. p.c. G

«sed impossibile est aliquid esse causam alterius sive habeat esse, sive non. Intellectus autem saepe habetur ex uno solo verbo. Si autem unum non sufficit […] iam addidisti ei alium intellectum, sicut postea declarabitur suo loco».

 266 The text of the Latin translation proposed here is mine. The correspondence with Hudry’s edition (AVICENNA 2018) of the text is also provided.

II The Edition  clxvii

JGLat. [after chap. I.10] c) [I.12, §5.2.3, p. 156.104]

‫ ﻧﻮ ﺎ‬cett. + J

‫ إذ ﻜﻮن ﻧﻮ ﺎ‬JG «aliquando enim est species» Lat. : ‫إذ اﳊﯿﻮان اﻟﻨﺎﻃﻖ ﻗﺪ ﻜﻮن‬

mg.

d) [II.4, §1, p. 244.5]

‫ ﻓﻠ ﺲ ﻣﺎ‬JG + Y

2mg.

+ Lawkarī (p. 175.5) «unius generis» Lat. :

‫ ﻓﻠ ﺴﻪ‬cett.

e) [I.13, §1.1, p. 160.5–7; AVICENNA 2018, p. 211267] G

Cett. + Lat.

ّ ‫ﰻ ﻣﻌﲎ ّﳣﲒ ﺑﻪ ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ ا ٔ ّول ﻓﺎٕﳖّ ﻢ ﰷﻧﻮا ﺴ ّﻤﻮن‬ ّ ‫ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ ا ٔ ّول ﻓﺎٕﳖّ ﻢ ﰷﻧﻮا ﺴ ّﻤﻮن‬ ‫ﰻ ﻣﻌﲎ ّﳣﲒ ﺑﻪ ﳾء ﻋﻦ‬ ّ ّ ‫ﳾء ﻋﻦ ﳾء ﴯﺼﯿﺎ ﰷن ٔو ﳇّﯿﺎ ﻓﺼﻼ ّﰒ ﻧﻘﻠﻮﻩ ﺑﻌﺪ ﳾء ﴯﺼﯿﺎ ﰷن ٔو ﳇﯿﺎ ﻓﺼﻼ ﻓﺎٕﳖّ ﻢ ﰷﻧﻮا ﺴ ّﻤﻮن‬ ‫ﰻ ﻣﻌﲎ ّﳣﲒ‬ ّ ‫ذ إﱃ ﻣﺎ‬ […] ‫ﳣﲒ ﺑﻪ اﻟﴚء ﰲ ذاﺗﻪ وٕاذ ﻓﻌﻠﻮا ﻫﺬا‬ […] ‫ﺑﻪ اﻟﴚء ﻣﻄﻠﻘﺎ وٕاذ ﻓﻌﻠﻮا ﻫﺬا‬ 1

2

____________ 1.

‫ ﰒ ﻧﻘﻠﻮﻩ ﺑﻌﺪ ذ إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﳣﲒ ﺑﻪ اﻟﴚء ﰲ ذاﺗﻪ‬add. in mg. G ‫ﻣﻄﻠﻘﺎ‬...‫ ﻓﺎٕﳖﻢ‬exp. p.c. G

|| 2.

«cuius prima positio est haec cum dicitur quod differentia est qua differt aliquid ab aliquo sive sit singulare sive universale. Secunda vero positio est cum dicitur esse

J

ّ ‫ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ ا ٔ ّول ﻓﺎٕﳖّ ﻢ ﰷﻧﻮا ﺴ ّﻤﻮن‬ ‫ﰻ ﻣﻌﲎ ّﳣﲒ ﺑﻪ ﳾء ﻋﻦ‬ ّ ‫ﳾء ﴯﺼﯿﺎ ﰷن ٔو ﳇّﯿﺎ ﻓﺼﻼ ّﰒ ﻧﻘﻠﻮﻩ ﺑﻌﺪ ذ إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﳣﲒ ﺑﻪ‬ ّ ‫اﻟﴚء ﰲ ذاﺗﻪ وٕاذ ﻓﻌﻠﻮا ﻓﺎٕﳖّ ﻢ ﰷﻧﻮا ﺴ ّﻤﻮن‬ ‫ﰻ ﻣﻌﲎ ّﳣﲒ ﺑﻪ‬ […] ‫اﻟﴚء ﻣﻄﻠﻘﺎ وٕاذ ﻓﻌﻠﻮا ﻫﺬا‬

differentia omnis intentio qua differt aliquid ab aliquo substantialiter. Postquam igitur sic factum est […]».

1

____________ 1.

‫ﻓﻌﻠﻮا‬...‫ ﻓﺎٕﳖﻢ‬exp. p.c. J

II.3.4.6 Family ζ MSS TAsTe descend from one exemplar, MS ζ (cf. Tab. 21, cases a-c). MS J is also part of family ζ for the first section of the Madḫal (from the beginning up to I.10, §2.1.1, p. 120.36); in this part, MS J shares the exemplar of MS T (see S7 below and Tab. 21, cases d-h). Afterwards, the handwriting of the main text changes in MS J, as well as the model copied: from I.10, §2.1.1, p. 120.36 on, there are no more innovations exclusively shared by MSS JT, whereas innovations exclusively shared by MSS JG are found. The Cairo editors’ supposition of a stemmatic relation between MS J and MS As (respectively, ‫ ى‬and ‫ ع‬in the Cairo ed.) holds true for the section preceding the change of exemplar in MS J268.

 267 The text of the Latin translation proposed here is mine. The correspondence with Hudry’s edition (AVICENNA 2018) of the text is also provided. 268 See IBN SĪNĀ 1952a, p. (75).

clxviii  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition Tab. 21. JTAsTe [before chap. I.10, §2.1.1, p. 120.36]

‫ ﻣﺮة ٔو ﻣﺮارا ﻛﺜﲑة‬JTAsTe : ‫ ﻣﺮة ٔو ﻣﺮارا‬cett. [I.5, §4.2, p. 56.54] ‫ ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ‬JTAsTe + τ: ‫ ﻛﻘﻮ‬cett. [I.10, §1.3, p. 120.26] ‫ ﻣﻦ ﲑ ﺲ‬JTAsTe + Ṣ : ‫ ﻣﻦ ﲑ ﲡ ﺲ‬cett. + As

a) [I.3, §3.3, p. 36.52] b) c)

269

s.l.

JT [before chap. I.10, §2.1.1, p. 120.36] d) [I.1, §1, p. 12.6] e) f) g) h)

‫ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ اﳌﺜ ﺖ‬JT : ‫ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ اﳌﺮﺗﺐ‬cett. + J [I.1, §3.2, p. 16.21] ‫ اﻟﴫﱖ‬om. JT : ‫ اﻟﺮ ٔي اﻟﴫﱖ‬cett. [I.5, §3, p. 56.48] ‫ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ اﳌﺮﺐ ٔﯾﻀﺎ‬JT : ‫ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ اﳌﺮﺐ‬cett. [I.8, §5, pp. 96.79–98.80] ‫ ﻟﻘ ﺎس إﱃ ا ٔﻣﻮر ا ي ﻫﻮ ٔﰪ ﻣﳯﺎ‬JT : ‫ﻟﻘ ﺎس إﱃ ا ٔﻣﺮ ا ي ﻫﻮ ٔﰪ ﻣ ﻪ‬ [I.9, §4.1, p. 108.63] ‫ ﺗﻌﺮض ﻠﺤﯿﻮان‬JT : ‫ ﻛﲈ ﺗﻌﺮض ﻠﺤﯿﻮان‬cett. mg.

Madḫal, from the beginning to I.,

Madḫal, from I.,

§.., p. .

§.., p. . to the end

ζ

σ J

recte.

ζ

κ T

T

As

Te Q

κ As

O

Te Q

O

S7. The change of model in MS J

II.3.4.7 Family ν Family ν consists of manuscripts dating from the end of the 15th c. onwards. Among the most peculiar features shared by these manuscripts there is a conscious lexical reworking of the text. In more detail, the manuscripts bear evidence of a systematic adaptation of the loanwords of Greek origin, like falsafa, modified into ḥikma, or like the title of Euclid’s Elements, Kitāb al-Usṭuqussāt, modified into Kitāb al-Uṣūl. In general, all the terms connected to Greek disciplines were also changed. Particularly worthy of interest is the modification of manṭiq into mīzān: the term mīzān – meaning literally ‘balance’ – came to be employed as an equivalent of manṭiq as a result of the metaphorical use of the expression ʿilm al-mīzān (‘science of balance’) to qual-

 269 Ǧins is a banalization of the rarer form: taǧannus, which matches the occurrence of yataǧannasu a few lines below the passage (§2.1.2, p. 122.41).

II The Edition  clxix

ify the discipline of logic270 (the custom had an Avicennian basis271 and became widespread in consequence of the massive impact of al-Ġazālī’s works on the teaching system of the madrasa). The fact that the two expressions are considered as equivalent in family ν may contribute to contextualize the common ancestor within the framework of the post-Ġazālian reception of Avicenna. The lexical modification appears to be systematic up to chap I.2 (p. 20.6): it can be argued that it is part of a process of revision that was originally conceived as systematic, although it was never accomplished. A second feature characterizing the family is the subdivision of Madḫal. I.4 (“on the subject matter of logic”) into two chapters, one of which specifically devoted to expressions. Finally, another remarkable structural feature is the lack of al-Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction, which also entails the omission of the introductory formula of chap. I.1: «the Chief Master Abū ʿAlī l-Ḥusayn Ibn ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Sīnā said». It is possible that the formula was felt as redundant and of little use in the absence of a transition from al-Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction to Avicenna’s text. MS Y preserves marginal variants and corrections (see case b in Tab. 22, in which the omitted text is restored in the margin); some of these marginal variants are probably derived from a manuscript related to MS E (cf. cases d-e below: in case d, a variant peculiar to MSS AE is added in the margins of MS Y, whereas in case e an interpolation that affects the text of MS E is added in the margin of MS Y). Tab. 22. YiY (MS ν)

‫ وٕا ّن اﳌﻨﻄﻘﻲ ﯾﺘﳫّﻢ‬YiY : ‫ وٕا ّن اﳌﻨﻄﻘﻲ ٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﺻﻨﺎﻋﺘﻪ ٔن ﯾﺘﳫّﻢ‬cett. [I.5, §1.3.1, p. 50.10] ‫ اﳌﻘﺼﻮد ﺑﻪ‬om. YiY add. in mg. Y : habent cett. [I.9, §2.4, p. 104.37] ‫ وٕا ّﻣﺎ ﺑﻌﯿﺪ ﻟﺘﻘ ﯿﺪ ذات اﻟﴚء‬YiY : ‫ وٕا ّﻣﺎ ﺑﻌﯿﺪ‬cett.

a) [I.4, §3.2, p. 46.35] b) c)

Y: a possible contamination with E d) [I.13, §1.4, p. 164.35] e)

‫ ﰷﻟﻨﺎﻃﻖ‬AE in mg. Y : ‫ ﰷﻟﻨﻄﻖ‬cett. [I.12, §2.2, p. 146.32] ‫ٔي اﻟﴚء ا ي ﺴ ّﻤﻰ ﺴﺎ ﻃﺒﯿﻌﯿﺎ وﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ﯾﺼﻠﺢ ٔن ﯾﺼﲑ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ ﺴﺎ ﻣ ﻄﻘ ﺎ ﻟ ﺲ ﻫﻮ‬ ‫ﰲ اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﯿﺎت ﲜ ﺲ ٔي ﲜ ﺲ ﻫﻮ ذا وا ﺪة ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة ﰲ اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﯿﺎت ﺗﻮ ﺪ ﰲ ٔﺷ ﺎص ﻓ ﻜﻮن ﺴﺎ ﻟﻬﺎ ﺑﻞ ﻻ وﺟﻮد ﻟﻬﺎ‬ ‫ ا ّٕﻻ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ‬add. E in mg. Y a.c.

 270 AL-ĠAZĀLĪ, Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa, p. 13: «The science of logic is the rule (qānūn) by which the right definition and syllogism are distinguished from the false ones, and by which the certain science (al-ʿilm al-yaqīnī) is distinguished by what is not certain. It is like a balance and a measure for all the sciences (al-mīzān wa-l-miʿyār li-l-ʿulūm kullihā); thus, in the case of anything that is not weighed by means of the balance (bi-l-mīzān), it cannot be distinguished the preponderance (alruǧḥān) from the defect (al-nuqṣān)». A similar definition of logic is found in AL-ĠAZĀLĪ, Miʿyār alʿilm fī l-manṭiq, pp. 59–60. 271 Cf. Šifāʾ, Qiyās I.2, p. 14.10–11.

clxx  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition II.4 The Stemma Codicum

II The Edition  clxxi

II.5 Notes for a Future Critical Edition MSS RaAt: The ‘Ottoman branch’ of family η It can be reconstructed that, besides MSS NkBC, another manuscript was copied from MS η, that is, the now-lost exemplar of MSS Ra (n° 37 in section I.2) and At (n° 27 in section I.2). The two manuscripts are mutually-related copies of the Logic of the Šifāʾ produced in the first half of the 18th c. CE in İstanbul, within the school of Asʿad Ibn ʿAlī Ibn ʿUṯmān al-Yānyawī272. These copies were the object of a quite intense scholarly activity of correction and annotation within the madrasa of Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī. Family ν Family ν is a large family, of which MSS YiY are the earliest known dated witnesses. It consists of at least 13 manuscripts ranging from the 15th century CE to the 19th, which include: the aforementioned MSS YiY; MSS Bo (n° 7 in section I.2); K (n° 50 in section I.2); Fa (n° 49 in section I.2); Ma (n° 90 in section I.2); V (n° 109 in section I.2); Ho (n° 35 in section I.2); L (n° 36 in section I.2); Nj (n° 65 in section I.2); Ti (n° 98 in section I.2); X (n° 53 in section I.2), and its descriptus Jo (n° 5 in section I.2). MS Bo, dating 20 Rabīʿ I 902H/5 December 1496, has a colophon at the end of the first four funūn of Logic (presumably copied from its exemplar) that records the dating: 11 Ǧumādā I 693H/16 April 1294. Although there is no way to establish it with certainty, this might be the date of copying of the exemplar of family ν. Family ξ Another fifteenth-century manuscript is part of family ξ, namely MS Sf (n° 115 in section I.2). Among other textual variants, it shares with MSS NoN the peculiar omission of §3.2 of Avicenna’s Prologue (Madḫal I.1), that is restored in the margin of MS Sf only at a second moment. Family π At least three other manuscripts should be added to the witnesses of family π, namely MSS Ts (n° 47 in section I.2), Su (n° 44 in section I.2), and F (n° 20 in section I.2). Family IHaṬShRzVoW and the exemplar dating to 468H/1076: The ‘Nishapur family’ Another family of branch β consists of a group of seven manuscript witnesses, i.e. MSS I (n° 107 in section I.2), Ha (n° 34 in section I.2), Ṭ (n° 84 in section I.2), Sh (n°  272 On these two manuscripts and their mutual relation, see DI VINCENZO 2017–2018 and DI VINCENZO 2018a, p. 46.

clxxii  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition 87 in section I.2), Rz (n° 77 in section I.2), Vo (n° 88 in section I.2), and W (n° 108 in section I.2). MS Rz, presumably an eighteenth-century copy, preserves a colophon at the end of Madḫal I.14 recording the date: 6 Ḏū l-Ḥiǧǧa 468H/17 July 1076; all the other manuscripts of the family share an identical colophon, albeit omitting the date. The colophon probably refers to the date of copying of the exemplar of all seven manuscripts, which was a very early copy of the Madḫal. Based on the additional information provided in other similar colophons, the exemplar might be a copy of the entire Šifāʾ produced in Nishapur in 468–9H/1076–7273. MSS EYe and MS P MS P (n° 67 in section I.2) shares peculiar textual variants with MSS EYe, but also shows signs of correction by collation with family ν: an instance of the peculiar innovations that characterize family ν imported in P is the split of Madḫal I.4 into two chapters. MSS PaAlZ MSS Pa (n° 83 in section I.2), Al (n° 1 in section I.2), and Z (n° 100 in section I.2) are three seventeenth-century copies of the Šifāʾ, which are very likely derived from one exemplar affected by a lacuna between Madḫal I.4, §3.2, p. 46.35 and Madḫal I.5, §1.2, p. 50.6 that also affects the three manuscripts. MS Z preserves a note of collation, stating that the witness was collated with a manuscript dating 536H, which is also the exact date of copying of MS Ka employed in the present edition; the possibility that the exemplar of collation of MS Z coincides with MS Ka is also reinforced by the fact that the marginal variants introduced in Z effectively match with readings attested in family γ.

 273 See the reconstruction in BERTOLACCI 2017–2018. Perhaps, another witness may be added to these manuscripts, namely MS Kolkata, Asiatic Society of Bengal, Ar. 102 (n° 121 in section I.2), but at present I could not see it, nor could I check its photographic reproduction.

III The Translation  clxxiii

III The Translation Besides several piecemeal translations focusing on specific chapters or passages of the text274, Avicenna’s Madḫal has, to my knowledge, at least three recent complete translations in a modern language, namely a Turkish translation by Ömer Türker published in 2006275; a Russian translation by Mardoni and Nazaryev published in 2010276; and an English translation by Allan Bäck published in 2019277. All three translations are based on the text of the Cairo edition. The choice to translate the entire work anew is motivated by the desire to provide a translation that matches the newly edited text. In principle, the English translation that is here offered purports to be as adherent as possible to the Arabic text of the present edition; sometimes, this is done at the cost of some awkwardness. Homogeneity in the translation of technical philosophical vocabulary is pursued: a lexicon of the translation of the main expressions is also provided at the end of the volume. The only intended deviations from the text are represented by the addition of words or expressions that are implied by the Arabic text and that are deemed necessary to secure the intelligibility of the translation; all addition is enclosed in square brackets. The English translation is subdivided into paragraphs and subparagraphs with recapitulative titles (in bold between square brackets) to help readers follow the structure of Avicenna’s argumentation; this division parallels that of the facing Arabic text to facilitate comparison between the translation and the original version. The corresponding pages of the Cairo edition are also indicated in the margin of both the translation and the Arabic text (in the form: Q1/ ‫ق‬١).

 274 Complete or partial translations of chap. I.1 are available in French (MADKOUR 1934, pp. 22–23), English (GUTAS 1988, pp. 50–54 and GUTAS 2014, pp. 42–46), Italian (BERTOLACCI 2005c, pp. 614–616), and Portuguese (ATTIE FILHO 2007, pp. 19–23 and pp. 280–87). Chap. I.2 has an English translation (MARMURA 1980, pp. 239–251) and a partial French one (JAMBET 2009); the same goes for chap. I.3, which also has an English translation (ROSENTHAL 1975, pp. 78–81) and a partial French translation (IBN SĪNĀ 2000, pp. 69*–72*). Chapter I.12 is translated in English and discussed in MARMURA 1979 and chapters I.14 and II.1 had partial English translations (respectively, DI VINCENZO 2016, Appendix A and DI VINCENZO 2015, Appendix). JANSSENS 1991, p. 6 also records a Persian translation of chapters I.1–5 by A. Ahrām published in Sophia Perennis, 12 (75), pp. 23–27. Several shorter passages are also translated in BENEVICH 2018 (in German) and KALBARCZYK 2018 (in English). 275 IBN SĪNĀ 2006. 276 IBN SĪNĀ 2010. 277 IBN SĪNĀ 2019.

clxxiv  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition

IV Sigla and Abbreviations IV.1 Sigla of the Manuscripts in Alphabetical Order In the following list, the sigla adopted for the manuscripts employed in the edition and their descripti are provided in alphabetical order; for each manuscript, the corresponding number in the list supplied in section I.2 is also indicated in the last column. Sigla

Description

N° in sect. I.

Families of witnesses α

Family of MSS KaNkBCEABrṢNoNDa + Bah

β

Family of MSS DiToŠMiJGYiYTTeAs + Lat + Law

γ

Sub-family of α including MSS KaNkBC

δ

Sub-family of α including MSS BrEADaṢNoN + Bah

ε

Sub-family of β including MSS DiToŠMiJGYiY + Lat + Law

ζ

Sub-family of β including MSS (J)TAsTe

η

Sub-family of γ including MSS NkBC

θ

Sub-family of δ including MSS BrDaṢNoN

ι

Sub-family of ε including MSS DiToŠMiJG + Lat + Law

κ

Sub-family of ζ including MSS AsTe

λ

Sub-family of δ including MSS EA + Bah

μ

Sub-family of ι including MSS ToŠMiJG + Lat + Law

ν

Sub-family of ε including MSS YiY

ξ

Sub-family of θ including MSS NoN

ο

Sub-family of μ including MSS JG + Lat + Law

π

Sub-family of μ including MSS ToŠMi

ρ

Sub-family of ο including MSS JG + Lat

σ

Sub-family of ζ including MSS TJ (for the first part of the work)

τ

Sub-family of θ including MSS BrṢ

Manuscripts A

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya 

An

Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān 

As

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Aşir Efendi 

  

IV Sigla and Abbreviations  clxxv

Sigla

Description

B

Cairo, Maktabat al-Azhar al-Šarīf, Beḫīt Collection , 

N° in sect. I. 

falsafa Br

London, British Museum, Or. 



C

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 



Da

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 



De

Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān /



Di

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 



Dp

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Damad İbrahim Paşa 



E

İstanbul, Millet Yazma Eser Kütüphanesi, Ali Emiri 



G

Leiden, Universiteitsbibl. Or.  (Golius Collection)



In

Rampur, Rampur Raza Library, 



J

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 



Ka

Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Malik 

Mi

Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Maǧlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 



N

İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 





Nk

İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 



No

İstanbul, Nuruosmaniye Kütüphanesi 



O

London, British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Jones



Os

Hyderabad, Osmaniya University Library, acq. 



Q

Mašhad, Kitābḫānah-i Āstān-i Quds-i Razavī 



R

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 



S

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Carullah 



Š

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Şehid Ali Paşa 



Ṣ

Rampur Raza Library, Ḥikma  (nr. )



T

İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 



Collection 

Te

Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Malik 

To

İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 

 

Y

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 



Ye

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 



Yi

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi 



Za

İstanbul, Beyazit Kütüphanesi (form.: ʿUmūmī) 



clxxvi  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition Sigla

Description

N° in sect. I.

Editions Bah

Bahmanyār’s Kitāb al-Taḥṣīl (BAHMANYĀR )

Ed.

Cairo edition of Avicenna’s Madḫal (IBN SĪNĀ a)

Lat

Latin translation of Avicenna’s Madḫal (AVICENNA  modified and checked against the Latin manuscripts and the Arabic text)

Law

Al-Lawkarī’s Bayān al-ḥaqq (AL-LAWKARĪ )

In the list below, the sigla occasionally employed for other manuscripts in this introduction are recorded in alphabetical order; again, the corresponding number in the list provided in section I.2 is indicated for each manuscript in the last column. Sigla

MSS

N° in sect. I.

Al

Aligarh, Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh Muslim University /

At

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Atıf Efendi 

Bo

Benares, Ǧāmiʿa Ǧawadiyya, 

Ca

Cambridge University Library, Eton Pote 



Ch

Dublin, Chester Beatty Library, Arabic  (vols. i-ii)



D

Cairo, Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Waṯāʾiq al-Qawmiyya,  falsafa



F

İstanbul, Köprülü Halk Kütüphanesi, Fazil Ahmet Paşa 



Fa

Kashan, Fahrang va Irshad 



Ǧ

Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Ǧumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran, 

Ha

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hamidiye 



Ho

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Hekimoǧlu Ali Paşa 



Hy

Hyderabad, Dār al-Kutub al-Ḫalīliyya, 

I

Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Ǧumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran  =  +

  



 

 Ir

Jerusalem, The National Library of Israel, Yahuda’s Collection, Ar. 



Jo

Beirut, Maktaba Šarqiyya, Université Saint-Joseph 

K

Khvoy, Kitābḫānah-i Madrasa-i Namāzī 



L

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Lâleli 



Lo

London, Royal Asiatic Society, Arabic 



M

London, British Library, Oriental and India Office Collections, Or.





 Ma

Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Maǧlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 



IV Sigla and Abbreviations  clxxvii

Me

Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Maǧlis-i Shūrā-yi Islāmī 



Mo

Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Maǧlis-i Šūrā-yi Islāmī, old nr. 



Nj

Najaf, Maktabat al-Imām Amīr al-Muʾminīn, 



P

Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, Ar. 



Pa

Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Madrasah-i ʿĀlī-i Shahīd Muṭahharī 



Qr

Mašhad, Kitābḫānah-i Āstān-i Quds-i Raḍavī, 



Ra

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ragıp Paşa 



Rz

Rampur, Rampur Raza Library, 



Sf

London, Sam Fogg Collection, 



Sh

Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Millī 



Su

İstanbul, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Yeni Câmi, Turhan Valide Sul-



tan  Ṭ

Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Madrasah-i ʿĀlī-i Shahīd Muṭahharī 



Ti

Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān /



Ts

İstanbul, Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Kütüphanesi, Ahmet III 



V

Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Ǧumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran 

Vo

Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Millī 

W

Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Millī Ǧumhūri-yi Islami-yi Iran 

X

London, BLOIOC, India Office Ar. 

Z

Tehran, Kitābḫānah-i Markazī-yi Dānišgāh-i Tihrān, Miškāt 

    

IV.2 Latin Abbreviations Employed in the Critical Apparatus Latin

English

a.c.

before correction

add.

addition

exp.

expunction/deletion

fort.

perhaps

i.l.

between the lines

in mg.

marginal variant/addition

 278 For the Arabic technical terminology, see GACEK 2007.

Arabic278

‫ﻗ ﻞ اﻟﺘﺼﺤﯿﺢ‬ ‫زاﺋﺪة‬ ‫ﴐب‬ ‫ﻇﻦ‬ ّ ٔ ‫ﻣﻜ ﻮب ﺑﲔ اﻟﺴﻄﻮر‬ ‫ﻣﻜ ﻮب ﰲ اﻟﻬﺎﻣﺶ‬

clxxviii  Editing Avicenna’s Madḫal: Introduction to the Edition om.

omission

p.c.

after correction

praem.

addition before the clause at stake

s.l.

above the line

scripsi

I wrote (in case of editorial interventions against the manuscript tradition)

sic

sic

vacuum

blank space

‫ﺳﻘﻄﺔ‬ ‫ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﺘﺼﺤﯿﺢ‬ ‫زاﺋﺪة ﻣﻘﺪّ ﻣﺔ ﻠﻠﻔﻆ‬ ‫ﻣﻜ ﻮب ﻓﻮق اﻟﺴﻄﺮ‬ ‫ﻛﺘ ﻪ‬ ‫ﻛﺬا‬ ‫ﺑﯿﺎض‬

IV.3 Signs and Conventions Adopted in the Edition [] ()

Text attested by the manuscript tradition but judged as possibly spurious. Number between brackets: number of the paragraph; articulation of the contents of the chapter.

‫ق‬١٢

Arabic number with ‘ ’ in the margin: corresponding page in the Cairo edition.

‫ق‬

IV.4 Signs and Conventions Adopted in the Translation []

Addition by the translator made to secure the intelligibility of the translation.

{}

Translation of words preserved in the manuscripts that are suspect to be spurious.

Q

Number preceded by ‘Q’ in the margin: corresponding page in the Cairo edition.

| Edition and Translation

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110726565-003

‫‪‬‬

‫ﺴﻢ ﷲ اﻟﺮﲪﻦ اﻟﺮﺣﲓ‬ ‫اﶵﺪ رب اﻟﻌﺎﳌﲔ وﺻﻼﺗﻪ ﲆ ﶊﺪ و ٔﲨﻌﲔ‬ ‫]ﻫﺬا ﻛﺘﺎب اﻟﺸﻔﺎء ﻠﺸﯿﺦ اﻟﺮﺋ ﺲ ٔﰊ ﲇ اﳊﺴﲔ ﻦ ﻋﺒﺪ ﷲ ﻦ ﺳ ﺎ — ﻟﻘﺎﻩ ﷲ ﻣﺎ ﯾﻠﯿﻖ ٕﺣﺴﺎﻧﻪ‬ ‫— وﰲ ﺻﺪرﻩ م ٔﰊ ﻋﺒﯿﺪ ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﻮا ﺪ ﻦ ﶊﺪ اﳉﻮز ﺎﱐ‪[.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬ﻗﺎل ٔﺑﻮ ﻋﺒﯿﺪ‪ٔ :‬ﲪﺪ ﷲ ﲆ ﻧﻌﻤﻪ و ٔﺳ ٔ اﻟﺘﻮﻓ ﻖ ﳌﺮﺿﺎﺗﻪ و ٔﺻﲆ ﲆ ﻧ ﻪ ﶊﺪ و ‪ .‬وﺑﻌﺪ‪ :‬ﻓﻘﺪ‬ ‫ﰷﻧﺖ ﳏ ّﺒﱵ ﻠﻌﻠﻮم اﳊﳬﯿﺔ ورﻏﺒﱵ ﰲ اﻗ ﺒﺎس اﳌﻌﺎرف اﳊﻘ ﻘ ﺔ دﻋﺘﺎﱐ إﱃ ا ٕﻻ ﻼل ﺑﺒــﻼدي واﳌﻬﺎﺟــﺮة‬ ‫ﺴﺘﻘﺮ اﻟﺸﯿﺦ اﻟﺮﺋ ﺲ ٔﰊ ﲇ — ٔدام ﷲ ٔ ﻣــﻪ — ﻣــﻦ اﻟﺒــﻼد إذ ﰷن ﻣﺎ وﻗــﻊ ا ّٕﱄ ﻣــﻦ ــﱪﻩ‬ ‫إﱃ ﻣ ّ‬ ‫وﻋﺮض ّﲇ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻪ ﯾﻘ ﴤ اﳌﯿﻞ إﻟﯿﻪ ﻋﻦ ﺳﺎ ﺮ ﻣﻦ ﯾﺬ ﺮ ﲠﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ وﯾﻌﱱى إﱃ ﻫﺬﻩ اﶺ ‪ .‬وﻗﺪ‬ ‫ﰷن ﺑﻠﻐﲏ ﻣﻦ ﱪﻩ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﺮ ﰲ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﻌﻠﻮم وﻫﻮ ﺪث ﱂ ﺴﺘﻮ ﺑﻪ اﻟﺸﺒﺎب وﻻ ٔرﰉ ﲆ اﻟﻌﻘﺪ ﻦ ﻣﻦ‬ ‫‪ٕ ] MS C is‬ﺣﺴﺎﻧﻪ…ﻟﻘﺎﻩ‬

‫‪] Al-Ğūzğānī’s Introduction is not preserved in mss. MiYiYNoN. ‬اﳉﻮز ﺎﱐ ‪… ‬ﷲ ‪‬‬ ‫‪barely readable.‬‬ ‫‪, Autobiography, p. ..‬‬

‫‪S‬‬

‫‪] I‬اﻟﻌﻤﺮ ‪… ‬وﻗﺪ ‪‬‬

‫ﻠﯿﻪ ﺗﻮﳇﺖ وٕاﻟﯿﻪ ٔﻧ ﺐ ]اﻟﺮﺣﲓ… ﺴﻢ ‪‬‬ ‫وﺑﻪ ‪ add. T‬و اﻟﻌﻮن واﻟﻌﺼﻤﺔ واﻟﺘﻮﻓ ﻖ ‪ Br‬ﻣﻮﻓﻖ ﻠﯿﻪ ﺗﻮﰻ ﻓ ﺎن ‪ add. BEd.‬وﻣﺎ ﺗﻮﻓ ﻘﻲ إﻻ‬ ‫‪ٔ om. A‬ﲨﻌﲔ ‪ … ‬ﺴﻢ | ‪ add. Š om. To‬وﺑﻪ اﻟﺜﻘﺔ ‪ add. C‬رب ﴪ ﺑﻠﻄﻔﻚ ﲤﻢ ﺑﻔﻀ ‪ add. Te‬وﺑﻪ ﺳﺘﻌﺎﻧﺔ ‪ٔ add. As‬ﻋﻮد واﺳﺘﻌﲔ‬ ‫‪ add. in mg.‬اﶵﺪ رب اﻟﻌﺎﳌﲔ وﺻﻠﻮﺗﻪ ﲆ ﶊﺪ ﻧ ﻪ و ٔﲨﻌﲔ ‪ E om. et‬رب ﴪ و ٔﻋﻦ ] ٔﲨﻌﲔ…اﶵﺪ | ‪ٔ praem. Ṣ‬ﻣﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ ]اﶵﺪ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ add. JTTo‬ﻧ ﻪ ]ﶊﺪ | ‪ Ṣ‬واﻟﺼﻠﻮة ‪ NkC‬واﻟﺼﻠﻮة واﻟﺴﻼم ‪ JBTToŠ‬وﺻﻠﻮﺗﻪ ‪ Da‬وﺻﻠﻮاﺗﻪ ]وﺻﻼﺗﻪ | ‪ Di‬اﶵﺪ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ وﻗﺪس ‪G² om. κBr‬‬ ‫اﻟﺮﺋ ﺲ | ‪ om. E‬اﳉﻮز ﺎﱐ ‪… ‬ﻫﺬا | ‪ٕ om. Di‬ﺣﺴﺎﻧﻪ…ﻫﺬا ‪ٔ om. et add. s.l. Ṣ ‬ﲨﻌﲔ | ‪ praem. Da‬ﺳﯿﺪ ‪ praem. Ṣ‬ﻧ ﻪ‬ ‫]ﺻﺪرﻩ | ‪ Di‬ﰲ ]وﰲ ‪ κBrAToŠG ‬رﲪﻪ ﷲ ‪ BC‬رﴈ ﷲ ﻋﻨﻪ ‪ Nk‬رﲪﺔ ﷲ ﻠﯿﻪ ‪ٕ om. KaṢ‬ﺣﺴﺎﻧﻪ…ﻟﻘﺎﻩ | ‪ Br‬ﻠﺮﺋ ﺲ ‪om. KaB‬‬ ‫‪ praem. Nk praem. in mg. To‬وﻫﻮ ﻫﺬا ]ﻗﺎل ‪ add. Nk ‬رﲪﻪ ﷲ ]اﳉﻮز ﺎﱐ | ‪ om. Br‬و ٔﺳ ٔ ‪ٔ … ‬ﰊ | ‪ Di‬ﺻﺪر اﻟﻜ ﺎب‬ ‫‪ JT‬ﶊﺪ ﻧ ﻪ ]ﻧ ﻪ ﶊﺪ | ‪ Di‬ﺳﯿﺪ ا ٔﻧ ﺎء ]ﻧ ﻪ | ‪ Br‬ﻟﺰﻣﺎﻧﻪ ‪ J‬ﳌﺮﺿﺎﲥﺎ ]ﳌﺮﺿﺎﺗﻪ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ‬ﻧﻌﻤﻪ ‪ et‬ﻧﻌﲈﺋﻪ ]ﻧﻌﻤﻪ | ‪ add. Di‬ﺳﺒ ﺎﻧﻪ وﺗﻌﺎﱃ ]ﷲ‬ ‫‪ ToŠ‬ﻼء اﻟﻮﻃﻦ ‪ G‬ﻼ اﻟﻮﻃﻦ ]ا ٕﻻ ﻼل ﺑﺒﻼدي | ‪ Br‬د ﺎﱐ ‪ E‬دﻋﺘﲏ ]دﻋﺘﺎﱐ | ‪ i.l. G‬اﺳﺘﻔﺎد ]اﻗ ﺒﺎس ‪] vacuum BrTo ‬وﺑﻌــﺪ‬ ‫] ﲇ | ‪ om. Br‬اﻟﺒﻼد… ٔﰊ ‪ κ ‬اﳌﻬﺎﺟﺮة ‪ JT‬و ﺎﺟﺮﰐ ]واﳌﻬﺎﺟﺮة | ‪ Br om. κ‬ا ﻼﰐ ﻟ ٕﻼ ﻼل ﺑﺒﻼدي ‪ in mg. ToG‬ا ٕﻻ ﻼل ﺑﺒﻼدي‬ ‫] ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﺮ ‪ٔ T ‬ﺣﺴﻦ ﷲ ﺗﻮﻓ ﻘﻪ ‪ٔ Da‬ﺣﺴﻦ ﷲ إﻟﯿﻪ ‪ κEDiToŠG‬رﲪﻪ ﷲ ‪ ٔ om. γJAṢ‬ﻣﻪ… ٔدام | ‪ add. Di‬اﳊﺴﲔ ﻦ ﻋﺒﺪ ﷲ ﻦ ﺳ ﺎ‬ ‫‪ٔ a.c. As‬ﰉ ] ٔرﰉ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. Ṣ‬ﻻ ]وﻻ | ‪ E‬ﺴ ﻖ ] ﺴﺘﻮ | ‪ om. Br‬ﰲ | ‪ٔ Br‬ﻧﻪ ﺮة ‪ٔ in mg. A‬ﻧﻪ ﺮ ‪non legitur et‬‬ ‫‪ Br‬ﺘﺪ ﻦ ‪ in mg. C‬اﻟﻌﻘﺪ ﻦ ‪ BCToTeŠ‬ﻋﻘﺪ ﻦ ‪ s.l. Nk‬ﻋﻘﺪ ﻦ ‪ Ka‬اﻟﻌﻘﺪﺗﲔ ]اﻟﻌﻘﺪ ﻦ | ‪ Br‬رﰊ‬ ‫‪] MS Di introduces a general presentation of the structure of the Book of Healing before al‬اﻟﺸﻔﺎء…ﻫﺬا ‪‬‬‫‪Ǧūzǧānī’s Introduction:‬‬

‫ﻛﺘﺎب اﻟﺸﻔﺎء ﯾﻨﻘﺴﻢ ٔوﻻ إﱃ ٔرﺑﻊ ﲨﻞ اﳌﻨﻄﻘ ﺎت واﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﯿﺎت واﻟﺮ ﺿﯿﺎت واﻻٕﻟﻬﯿﺎت ﻓﺎﳌﻨﻄﻘ ﺎت ﺴﻌﺔ ﻓ ﻮن اﻟﻔﻦ ا ٔول ﰲ اﳌﺪ ﻞ وﻫﻮ ﻣﻘﺎﻟﺘﺎن ا ٔول‬ ‫ٔرﺑﻊ ﻋﴩ ﻓﺼﻼ واﻟﺜﺎﱐ ٔرﺑﻊ ﻓﺼﻮل ]‪[...‬‬ ‫‪] This clause, which is preserved with minor variations in all the manuscripts, is absent‬اﳉﻮز ﺎﱐ ‪… ‬ﻫﺬا‬

‫‪from MS E. Clearly, it is intended to mark the beginning of Avicenna’s text. If it is the result of an‬‬ ‫‪editorial process posterior to the composition of the work, it must however have occurred during‬‬ ‫— ‪Avicenna’s lifetime, since the eulogy after his name — modified or omitted in certain manuscripts‬‬ ‫‪is usually employed for living people.‬‬ ‫‪ ٔ ] For evident reasons, the manuscript tradition either omitted or adapted the eulogy after‬ﻣــﻪ… ٔدام ‪‬‬ ‫‪Avicenna’s death, but traces of eulogies usually employed for living people can be found, such as‬‬ ‫‪adāma Allāh ayyāmahu, surviving in MS Pa, and aḥsana Allāh ilayhi and aḥsana Allāh tawfīqahu,‬‬ ‫‪preserved, respectively, in MSS Di and T.‬‬

[Al-Ğūzǧānī’s Introduction] In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. Praise be to God, the Lord of the Worlds, and His prayers on Muḥammad and all his family. {This is the Book of Healing by the Chief Master Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn Ibn ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Sīnā — may God give him what suits his righteousness! — which begins with the discourse of Abū ʿUbayd ʿAbd al-Wāḥid Ibn Muḥammad al-Ğūzǧānī.}

[. The composition of the Book of Healing] [.. Avicenna’s youth and the meeting with al-Ǧūzğānī] Abū ʿUbayd said: I praise His grace, ask Him to grant success in all that pleases Him and pray for His Prophet Muḥammad and His family. Then: My love for the philosophical sciences and my desire to attain true knowledge prompted me to leave my country and emigrate towards the country in which the Chief Master Abū ʿAlī — may God prolong his days! — lived, since the news I got about him and the discourses of him that were reported to me made me propend for him rather than others who are renowned in this discipline and who affiliate to this domain1. I had heard about him that he was an expert in these sciences, even though he was still a young man in his youth who had not reached his twenties2, and that he had written

 The term ğumla is understood as referring to a “set, or group [of sciences]” in G , p. , note b.  Before H/, assuming as Avicenna’s birthdate the year H/– provided by alĞūzğānī in the Biography (p. .). The Latin translation has “forty (XL) years”, instead of “twenty years (lit.: two decennies of [his] life)”; this statement of al-Ğūzğānī’s might recall Avicenna’s claim to have mastered completely all the sciences when he was  years old (Autobiography, p. .), so that it can be argued that the reading of the Latin translation is possibly the result of a mistake.

‫م اﳉﻮز ﺎﱐ‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫اﻟﻌﻤﺮ و ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﻛﺜﲑ اﻟﺘﺼﺎﻧﯿﻒ ا ّٕﻻ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﻗــﻠﯿﻞ اﻟﻀــﻦ ﲠﺎ واﻟﺮﻏﺒــﺔ ﰲ ﺿــﺒﻂ ﺴﺨــﻬﺎ‪ .‬ﲿـﻘّﺖ رﻏﺒــﱵ ﰲ ﻗﺼــﺪﻩ‬ ‫وﻣﻼزﻣ ﻪ واﻻٕﳊﺎح ﻠﯿﻪ و ﻟ س ﻣ ﻪ ٔن ﳞ ّﱲ ﻟﺘﺼﻨﯿــﻒ و ٔﻫـ ّﱲ ﻟﻀﺒــﻂ ﻓﳰﻤﺘــﻪ وﻫــﻮ ﲜــﺮ ﺎن وﺳــﻨﻪ‬ ‫ﻗﺮﯾﺐ ﻣﻦ اﺛﻨ ﲔ وﺛﻼﺛﲔ ﺳﻨﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫اﻟﺘﴫف ﰲ ﲻ وﻗﺪ ﺷﻐﻞ ذ ٔوﻗﺎﺗﻪ ﻓﻼ ٔ ﳤﺰ ا ّٕﻻ اﻟﻔﺮص اﳋﻔﺎف‬ ‫)‪ (.‬وﻗﺪ ﺑﲇ ﲞﺪﻣﺔ اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺎن و ّ‬ ‫واﺳ ﳣﻠﯿﺘﻪ ﻓﳱﺎ ﺷ ﺎ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ واﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﯿﺎت‪ .‬وٕاذا دﻋﻮﺗﻪ إﱃ اﻟﺘﺼﺎﻧﯿﻒ اﻟﻜ ﺎر وٕاﱃ اﻟﴩوح ٔ ﺎل ﲆ‬ ‫ﻣﺎ ﲻ ﻣﻦ اﻟﴩوح وﺻﻨّﻔﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻜ ﺐ ﰲ ﺑﻼدﻩ وﻗﺪ ﰷن ﺑﻠﻐﲏ ّﺗﻔﺮﻗﻬﺎ وﺸ ّﳤﺎ وﺿﻦ ﻣﻦ ﳝ ﺴ ﺔ‬ ‫ﳛﺮر ﻣﻦ ا ﺳﺘﻮر‬ ‫ﻣﳯﺎ ﲠﺎ‪ .‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻓﲅ ﻜﻦ ﻣﻦ ﺎدﺗﻪ ٔن ﳜﺰن ﻟﺘﺼﻨﯿﻔﻪ ﺴ ﺔ ﻛﲈ ﱂ ﻜﻦ ﻣﻦ ﺎدﺗﻪ ٔن ّ‬ ‫ٔو ﳜﺮج ﻣﻦ اﻟﺴﻮاد وٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﳝﲆ ٔو ﻜ ﺐ اﻟ ﺴ ﺔ وﯾﻌﻄﳱﺎ ﻣﻠﳣﺴﻬﺎ ﻣ ﻪ‪ .‬وﻣﻊ ذ ﻓﻘﺪ ﺗﻮا ﺮت ﻠﯿﻪ اﶈﻦ‬ ‫و ﺎﻟﺖ ﻛﺘﺒﻪ اﻟﻐﻮاﺋﻞ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬ﻓ ﻘ ﺖ ﻣﻌﻪ ﺪّ ة ﺳﻨﲔ ٔﻧﺘﻘﻞ ﻓﳱﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺟﺮ ﺎن إﱃ اﻟﺮي وﻣﻦ اﻟــﺮي إﱃ ﳘــﺬان‪ .‬وﺷــﻐﻞ ﺑــﻮزارة‬ ‫اﳌ ﴰﺲ ا و وﰷن اﺷﺘﻐﺎ ﺑﺬ ﺣﴪة ﻠﯿﻨﺎ وﺿﯿﺎ ﺎ ﻟﺮوز ﺎر ‪ .‬وﰷن ﻗﺪ وﻫــﻦ اﻟــﺮ ﺎء ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﰲ‬ ‫ﲢﺼﯿﻞ ﺗﺼﺎﻧﯿﻔﻪ اﻟﻔﺎﺋﺘﺔ ﻓﺎ ﳣﺴﻨﺎ ﻣ ﻪ ٕا ﺎدﲥﺎ ﻓﻘﺎل‪ّ ٔ :‬ﻣﺎ ﺷﺘﻐﺎل ٔﻟﻔﺎظ وﴍ ﺎ ﻓ ٔﻣﺮ ﻻ ﺴﻌــﻪ وﻗــﱵ‬ ‫]اﻟﻜ ﺎر… وٕاذا ‪] Material damage in MS B. ‬اﳋﻔﺎف…ذ ‪] Material damage in MS B. ‬ﲞﺪﻣﺔ ‪ … ‬ﻟﻀﺒﻂ ‪‬‬ ‫‪] Due to a material damage, in‬ا و ‪] Material damage in MS B. ‬ﻣ ﻪ وﻣﻊ ‪Material damage in MS B. ‬‬ ‫‪MS Š the name al-Dawla is not readable, and the eulogy following it is only partially readable.‬‬ ‫‪ّ ٔ ] Material damage in MS Š.‬ﻣﺎ… ٕا ﺎدﲥﺎ ‪] Material damage in MS Š. ‬وﻫﻦ…ﻟﺮوز ﺎر‬ ‫‪, Šifāʾ, Safsaṭa II.,‬‬

‫‪S‬‬

‫‪] Cf. I‬وﻗﱵ… ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪, Autobiography, pp. .–.. ‬‬

‫‪S‬‬

‫‪] I‬ﲠﺎ ‪… ‬وﺿﻦ ‪‬‬ ‫‪p. .–.‬‬

‫‪, Biography,‬‬ ‫‪] A -Ğ‬اﻟــﺮي… ٔﻧﺘــﻘﻞ ‪, Biography, p. .–. ‬‬ ‫‪] A -Ğ‬واﻟﻄﺒﯿــﻌﯿﺎت ‪… ‬ﻓــﻼ ‪‬‬ ‫‪] A -Ğ‬ﻟــﺮوز ﺎر ‪… ‬وﺷــﻐﻞ | ‪pp. .–..‬‬ ‫ ‪ ] A‬ﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﯿﺎت ‪ … ‬وﰷن ‪, Biography, p. .–. ‬‬‫‪Ğ‬‬ ‫‪, Biography, p. .–.‬‬ ‫‪ ToŠ a.c.‬واﻻٕﳊﺎف ]واﻻٕﳊﺎح ‪ om. et add. s.l. J ‬ﰲ | ‪ om. Br‬رﻏﺒﱵ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ‬ﲿﻘﺖ ‪ et‬ﲿﻘﻘﺖ ‪ ζKaBAC‬ﲿﻘﻘﺖ ]ﲿﻘّﺖ ‪‬‬ ‫ﳚﺐ ]ﺑﲇ ‪ om. et add. s.l. As ‬ﺳﻨﺔ | ‪ Br‬وﺛﻠﺚ ]وﺛﻼﺛﲔ ‪ Br ‬واﻟﻀﺒﻂ ]و ٔﻫ ّﱲ ﻟﻀﺒﻂ | ‪ Ṣ‬ﺑ ٔن ] ٔن | ‪ Br‬واﻻٕﳊﺎق ‪NkBE‬‬ ‫ﳤﻦ ‪ add. C‬ﻣ ﻪ ] ٔ ﳤﺰ | ‪ As‬ذاك ]ذ | ‪ Br‬وﯾ ﻘﻞ ]وﻗﺪ ﺷﻐﻞ | ‪ a.c. To‬ﻗﺪ ‪ KaNkADiDaTeŠ‬ﻗﺪ ]‪‬وﻗﺪ | ‪ Br‬ﺪﻣﻪ ]ﲞﺪﻣﺔ | ‪Br‬‬ ‫‪ ٔ om. et add.‬ﺎل | ‪ BrJT‬واﻟﴩوح ]وٕاﱃ اﻟﴩوح | ‪ٔ As‬و إﱃ ]وٕاﱃ | ‪ om. Da‬ﻓﳱﺎ | ‪ G‬و ﺴ ﳣﻠﯿﻪ ‪ JTṢ‬ﻓﺎﺳ ﳣﻠﯿﺘﻪ ]واﺳ ﳣﻠﯿﺘﻪ ‪Br ‬‬ ‫ﺗﻔﺮﻗﻬﺎ وﺸ ّﳤﺎ | ‪ Br‬وﺿﻌﻪ ]وﺻﻨّﻔﻪ ‪s.l. C ‬‬ ‫ﻣﳯﺎ ﺴ ﺔ ]ﻣﳯﺎ ‪ … ‬ﺴ ﺔ | ‪ As‬اﻟﻜ ﺐ ]ﳝ | ‪ Br‬ﺗﻔﺮﻗﻬﺎ وﺸﳤﺎ ‪ Nk‬ﺸ ﳤﺎ وﺗﻔﺮﻗﻬﺎ ] ّ‬ ‫‪ BrEd.‬ﻟﻨﻔﺴﻪ ‪] non legitur B deest As‬ﻟﺘﺼﻨﯿﻔﻪ | ‪ٔ  om. κ‬ن…ﳜﺰن | ‪ Br‬اﻟﺸﯿﺦ ]ﻫﻮ ‪ A om. Br ‬ﲠﺎ ﺴ ﺔ ‪EDiToŠG‬‬ ‫‪ Br‬وﻗﻊ ]وﻣﻊ | ‪ iter. E‬ﻣ ﻪ | ‪ Nk‬ﳣﺴﻬﺎ ]ﻣﻠﳣﺴﻬﺎ | ‪ Br‬وﻜ ﺐ ] ٔو ﻜ ﺐ | ‪ λBrDiTeG‬إﳕﺎ ]وٕاﻧ ّﲈ ‪ om. et add. in mg. Ka ‬ﻣﻦ‬ ‫‪ add.‬ﻗﺪس ﷲ رو ﻪ ورﴈ ﻋﻨﻪ ]ا و ‪ Br ‬وﻣ ﻪ ]وﻣﻦ اﻟﺮي | ‪ in mg. Ka‬ﻣ ﻪ ]ﻣﻌﻪ ‪ om. Br ‬اﻟﻐﻮاﺋﻞ ‪ Br ‬ﺗﻮا ﺮ ]ﺗﻮا ﺮت‬ ‫‪ +‬ﲠﺎ ‪ in mg. Nk non legitur et‬ﲠﺎ ‪ s.l. +‬ﺑﺬ ‪ KaNkC‬ﺑﻪ ]ﺑﺬ | ‪ add. Br‬رﲪﻪ ﷲ ‪ add. κDa‬ﻗﺪس ﷲ رو ﻪ ‪EToG fort. Š‬‬ ‫‪ KaC‬ﺴﻌﻬﺎ ] ﺴﻌﻪ | ‪ Br‬اﻟﻔﺎﺋﺖ ]اﻟﻔﺎﺋﺘﺔ ‪ Ṣ ‬وﻗﺪ ﰷن ﻗﺪ وﻫﻦ ‪ ToG‬وﻗﺪ ﰷن وﻫﻦ ]وﻫﻦ… ‪‬وﰷن | ‪ in mg. B‬ﺑﻪ‬

‫‪ in mg. Da²‬روز ﺎر ﻣﻌﺮب روزﰷر ﲟﻌﲎ ا ٔ م ‪ in mg. J²‬ﻣﻌﺮب روزﰷر ]ﻟﺮوز ﺎر‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪),‬روزﮔﺎر( ‪] Rūzǧār corresponds to the Persian rozgār‬ﻟﺮوز ﺎر‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪“time”.‬‬

‫‪٢‬ق‬

Al-Ğūzǧānī’s Introduction  5

many works, except that he would take little care of them and had little interest in preserving their copies. My wish to join and follow him and [my] constant request and solicitation to him to occupy himself with composing [other works], whose preservation would be my responsibility, were fulfilled: I joined him when he was in Ğūrǧān; he was [then] almost thirty-two years old3.

[.. Avicenna’s stay in Ǧūrǧān] He was burdened with the service to the Sulṭān and the administration of his Q2 business, which occupied his time; so, I had just a few occasions to ask him to dictate something on logic and natural philosophy. When I asked him for great works and commentaries, he remitted [me] to the commentaries and the books he had composed in his country, but I had heard that they were scattered and dispersed and that those who owned a copy of them kept it [from others]4. As for him, he was not used to keeping a copy for himself, as well as he was not used to writing down a copy from the holograph or to draw a copy from the draft; raher, he would just dictate or write the copy and give it to whomever had requested it. Moreover, a series of disgraces occurred to him and calamities destroyed his books.

[.. Avicenna’s stay in Hamaḏān: the beginning of the Book of Healing] I stayed with him for several years; meanwhile, I moved from Ğūrǧān to Rayy5, [then] from Rayy to Hamaḏān. He was in charge as a minister of King Šams alDawla6, which was a source of distress for us and a waste of our time. Also, the hope of attaining his lost works had become feeble, so we asked him to rewrite them anew.

 Around H/–.  Al-Ğūzğānī might refer to the case, mentioned by Avicenna himself in his Autobiography (pp. .–.), of the Kitāb al-Ḥāṣil wa-l-Maḥṣūl and the Kitāb al-Birr wa-l-Iṯm, both composed in Buḫārā for Abū Bakr al-Baraqī, who reportedly did not allow anyone to draw a copy of the two works, of which he detained the only existing exemplar.  In Rayy, Avicenna joined the service of Mağd al-Dawla, and wrote the Kitāb al-Maʿād (Biography, pp. .–.).  On the various vicissitudes that occurred to Avicenna as a minister of Šams al-Dawla, see Biography, p. .–.

‫م اﳉﻮز ﺎﱐ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫وﻻ ﺗ ﺸﻂ ﻧﻔﴘ‪ .‬ﻓﺎٕن ﻗ ﻌﱲ ﲟﺎ ﯾﺘ ﴪ ﱄ ﻣﻦ ﻋﻨﺪي‪ ،‬ﲻﻠﺖ ﻟﲂ ﺗﺼﻨﯿــﻔﺎ ﺎﻣــﻌﺎ ــﲆ اﻟﱰﺗـ ﺐ ا ي‬ ‫وﺣﺮﺿﻨﺎ ﲆ ٔن ﯾﻘﻊ ﻣ ﻪ ﺑﺘــﺪاء ﻟﻄﺒﯿــﻌﯿﺎت ﻓﴩع ﰲ ذ وﻛــﺘﺐ‬ ‫ﯾﺘّﻔﻖ ﱄ‪ .‬ﻓ ﺬﻟﻨﺎ ﻣ ﺎ اﻟﺮﺿﺎ ﺑﻪ ّ‬ ‫ﻗﺮﯾﺒﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻋﴩﻦ ورﻗﺔ؛ ﰒ اﻧﻘﻄﻊ ﻋﻨﻪ ﻟﻘﻮاﻃﻊ اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺎﻧﯿﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬وﴐب ا ﻫﺮ ﴐ ﺗﻪ وا ﱰم ذ اﳌ و ٓ ﺮ ﻫــﻮ ٔن ﻻ ﯾــﻘﲓ ﰲ ﺗـ ا و وﻻ ﯾــﻌﺎود ﺗـ‬ ‫اﳋﺪﻣﺔ وز ﻦ ٔ ّن ﺣ ﯿﺎط ﻓ اﺳﺘﺤ ّﺒﻪ ﻣﻦ ذ ٔن ﺴﺘﱰ ﻣﺮﺗﻘ ﺎ ﻓﺮﺻﺔ ﻧﻔﺼﺎل ﻋﻦ ﺗ ا ر‪.‬‬ ‫ﻓﺼﺎدﻓﺖ ﻣ ﻪ ﻠﻮة وﻓﺮا ﺎ اﻏﺘﳮﺘﻪ و ٔ ﺬﺗﻪ ﺑ ﳣﲓ ﻛﺘﺎب اﻟﺸﻔﺎء و ٔﻗ ﻞ ﻫﻮ ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻪ ﲆ ﺗﺼﻨﯿﻔﻪ إﻗ ﺎﻻ ﲜــﺪ‬ ‫وﻓﺮغ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﯿﺎت واﻻٕﻟﻬﯿﺎت ﻼ ﻛﺘﺎﰊ اﳊﯿﻮان واﻟﻨﺒﺎت ﰲ ﻣــﺪّ ة ﻋﴩــﻦ ﯾــﻮﻣﺎ ﻣــﻦ ــﲑ رﺟــﻮع إﱃ‬ ‫ﻛﺘﺎب ﳛﴬﻩ وٕاﻧ ّﲈ اﻋﳣﺪ ﻃﺒﻌﻪ ﻓﻘﻂ‪ .‬وﴍع ﰲ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ وﻛﺘﺐ اﳋﻄﺒﺔ وﻣﺎ ﯾﺘّﺼﻞ ﲠﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬ﰒ إن ٔﻋﯿﺎن ﺗ ا و ﻧﻘﻤﻮا ﻠﯿﻪ اﺳ ﺎرﻩ واﺳ ﻜﺮوا ﻋﺰﻣــﻪ ﰲ اﳌﻔﺎرﻗــﺔ وﻇﻨّـﻮا ٔﻧّــﻪ ﳌﻜ ــﺪة ٔو‬ ‫ﳌﲈ ٔة ﺟ ﺒﺔ ﻣﻌﺎدﯾﺔ وﺣﺮص ﺑﻌﺾ ﻠﺺ ﺪﻣﻪ ﲆ ﺗﻮرﯾﻄﻪ ﰲ ﻠﻜﺔ ﻟﯿﻔﻮز ﲟﺎ ﻋﻨﺪﻩ ﻣﻦ ﻣ ﺎع ا ﻧﯿﺎ‬ ‫ﻓﺪ ّل ﻠﯿﻪ ﻃﻼﺑﻪ — وﰷﻧﻮا ﳑﻦ ﺳﻠﻒ ﻋﻨﺪﱒ ﺻﻨﺎﺋﻊ ﲢﺮم ﻠﳱﻢ ﻗﺼﺪﻩ ﻻٕﳛﺎش ﻟــﻮ ﰷﻧـﻮا ﻠﻤﻌــﺮوف‬ ‫] ﺑﺘــﺪاء ﻟﻄﺒﯿــﻌﯿﺎت ‪] Material damage in MS Š. ‬ﱄ ‪ … ‬ﺎﻣــﻌﺎ | ‪] Material damage in MS Š.‬ﲟﺎ…ﺗ ﺸــﻂ ‪‬‬ ‫‪] Material damage in‬ﲠﺎ…ﻛﺘﺎب ‪] Material damage in MS B. ‬ﻣﺪّ ة…اﳊﯿﻮان ‪Material damage in MS Š. ‬‬ ‫‪] Material damage in MS B.‬وﺣﺮص…ﺟ ﺒﺔ ‪MS B. ‬‬ ‫‪] A -Ğ‬اﳌـــ …وﴐب ‪‬‬ ‫‪] A -Ğ‬اﻟﺸـــﻔﺎء ‪… ‬وز ـــﻦ ‪, Biography, p. .–. ‬‬ ‫‪, Biography,‬‬ ‫‪] A -Ğ‬ﻓﻘــﻂ ‪… ‬و ٔ ﺬﺗــﻪ ‪pp. .–.. ‬‬ ‫‪] A -Ğ‬ﲠﺎ…وﴍع ‪, Biography, p. .–. ‬‬ ‫‪,‬‬ ‫‪] A -Ğ‬ﻣﻌﺎدﯾــﺔ ‪… ‬ﰒ ‪Biography, p. .–. ‬‬ ‫ ‪] A‬ﻓــﺮد ﺎن ‪ … ‬ﻓــﺪ ّل ‪, Biography, p. .–. ‬‬‫‪Ğ‬‬ ‫‪, Biography, pp. .–..‬‬ ‫]ﻣ ﺎ ‪ Te ‬اﻟﱵ ]ا ي | ‪ Br‬ﱂ ]ﻟﲂ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. T‬ﻣﻦ | ‪ Br‬ﺴﲑ ]ﯾﺘ ﴪ | ‪ κ‬ﺒﲑ ] | ‪ κ‬ﺗ ﺸﻄﻪ ]ﺗ ﺸﻂ | ‪ iter. To‬وﻻ ‪‬‬ ‫وﺣﺮﺿﻨﺎ | ‪ om. BrDa‬ﺑﻪ | ‪ in mg. To‬ﻣ ﺎ اﻟﺮﺿﺎ ﺑﻪ ‪ ToŠ‬اﻟﺮﺿﺎ ﲟﺎ ﻣﲎ ﺑﻪ ‪ s.l. G‬ﲟﺎ ‪ et‬اﻟﺮﺿﺎ ﻣﲎ ﺑﻪ ]ﺑﻪ…ﻣ ﺎ | ‪ Br‬ﻣﻦ‬ ‫‪ّ DaTeŠG in mg.‬‬ ‫‪ Br‬ﻟﺘﻠﺴﯿــﻌﯿﺎت ] ﻟﻄﺒﯿــﻌﯿﺎت | ‪ Br‬وﺣــﺮﻣ ﻨﺎ ‪ [parum clare] Ṣ‬ودﻋﯿــﻨﺎ ‪ γλJTAsDiToEd.‬وﺣﺮﺻــﻨﺎ ]‪To «insistendo» Lat.‬‬ ‫‪ ADiDaToŠG‬وز ﻦ ‪ Br ‬ﯾﻌﺎدﻩ ]ﯾﻌﺎود | ‪ add. κBrEDaToŠG‬رﲪﻪ ﷲ ]اﳌ | ‪ Br‬ﻓﺎ ﱰم ]وا ﱰم ‪ Br ‬اﻠﻄﺎﻧﯿﺔ ]اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺎﻧﯿﺔ ‪‬‬ ‫ذ … ّٔن | ‪ّٔ om. NkB‬ن | ‪ Te parum clare As‬ور ﻦ ‪ γτJETEd. in mg. DiTo²‬ور ﻦ إﱃ ]‪in mg. J «estimabat» Lat.‬‬ ‫‪ om. Br‬اﻟﺸﻔﺎء | ‪ NkA in mg. G‬ووا ﺬﺗﻪ ]و ٔ ﺬﺗﻪ | ‪ Br‬ﻏﺘﳮﺘﻪ ]اﻏﺘﳮﺘﻪ | ‪ Br‬ﻠﻔﺔ ] ﻠﻮة ‪ κ ‬ﻟﻼﻧﻔﺼﺎل ] ﻧﻔﺼﺎل | ‪om. Br‬‬ ‫إﳕﺎ ]وٕاﻧّــﲈ | ‪ Br‬ﳛﴬﺗــﻪ ]ﳛﴬﻩ ‪ om. et add. in mg. J ‬واﻟﻨــﺒﺎت | ‪ add. Br‬اﻟﺸــﻔﺎء ‪ κ‬ﻛــﺘﺎب ]ﻛــﺘﺎﰊ ‪ Br ‬اﻗـ ﻞ ﻻ ] ٕاﻗـ ﺎﻻ‬ ‫‪ Ka‬ﻣ ﻄﻖ اﳋﻄﺒﺔ ]اﳋﻄﺒﺔ | ‪ add. Br‬ﰲ اﻟﻨﻂ ]اﳌﻨﻄﻖ | ‪ Br‬ﻓﴩع ]وﴍع | ‪ in mg. G‬ﻃﺒﻌﻪ ‪] non legitur et‬ﻃﺒﻌﻪ | ‪λBrToŠG‬‬ ‫ﳌﲈﻻت ‪ Nk‬ﳑﺎ ٔة ]ﳌﲈ ٔة ‪ Br ‬وﳌﲈ ٔة ]ﳌﲈ ٔة ‪ٔ … ‬و | ‪ JTAsToG‬ﻓﻈﻨﻮا ]وﻇﻨّﻮا | ‪ Ṣ‬ﻋﯿﺎن ] ٔﻋﯿﺎن ‪ κ ‬ﯾﺘﻌﻠﻖ ]ﯾﺘّﺼﻞ | ‪ Br‬اﳌﻨﻄﺒﺔ‬ ‫‪ Ṣ‬وﰷن ]وﰷﻧﻮا | ‪ Ka‬ودل ]ﻓﺪ ّل ‪ J ‬ﲥﻠﻜﺔ ] ﻠﻜﺔ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. A‬ﰲ ﻠﻜﺔ | ‪ om. T‬ﻠﺺ | ‪ T‬ﳉﻨﺒﺔ ]ﺟ ﺒﺔ | ‪ToŠ‬‬ ‫‪ in mg. ToG‬ﻟﻮ ﰷﻧﻮا ‪ ToŠG in mg. J‬وﰷﻧﻮا ]ﻟﻮ ﰷﻧﻮا | ‪ κ‬وﲢﺮم ]ﲢﺮم | ‪ om. JT add. in mg. J‬ﻋﻨﺪﱒ | ‪ om. A‬ذا ﺮﻦ ‪… ‬وﰷﻧﻮا‬ ‫‪i.l.‬‬

‫ٔي ﲅ ‪ [cf. al-Ğawharī, Tāğ al-luġa wa-ṣiḥāḥ al-ʿarabiyya, p. ] in mg. Di‬ﲱﺎح زﻛﻨﺘﻪ ٔي ﻠﻤﺘﻪ ]وز ــﻦ‬

‫‪‬‬ ‫‪Da‬‬

‫وﺣﺮﺿــﻨﺎ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ّ ] On the reading ḥarraḍnā (“we urged”) instead of ḥariṣnā (“we desired”), as printed in the‬‬ ‫‪Cairo edition, see also G‬‬ ‫‪, p. , note m.‬‬ ‫‪] Reading zakina an (“he sensed, he knew”) instead of rakana ilā an (“he relied on”) as in‬وز ــﻦ ّٔن ‪‬‬ ‫‪the Cairo ed. (p. .). The reading zakina is difficilior (the term stimulated a number of‬‬ ‫‪lexicographic marginal notes in the manuscript tradition).‬‬

‫‪٣‬ق‬

Al-Ğūzǧānī’s Introduction  7

He replied: “I do not have enough time and I am not willing to occupy myself with words and to comment upon them. If you content yourselves with that which comes easily to me from my own knowledge, I will compose for you a comprehensive work arranged as it comes to me”. We gave him our consent on that and urged him to start with natural philosophy. He started with that writing approximately twenty folios; then, he was interrupted by administrative disruptions.

[.. The composition of natural philosophy, metaphysics and the beginning of logic] The fate dealt its strokes and carried away that King7. Avicenna preferred not to dwell in that region and not to come back to that service, as he sensed that, among what he deemed recommendable in that [situation], it was wiser for him to hide waiting for an occasion to leave that country8. I found that he had spare time in isolation, and I availed the opportunity to urge him to complete the Book of Healing. He eagerly applied himself to its composition, and finished the natural philosophy and the metaphysics (except for the two books on Animals and on Plants) in twenty Q3 days, without recurring to any available book and relying exclusively on his own nature. [Then], he started the logic, writing the introductory speech and what follows.

[.. The seclusion in the fortress of Fardaǧān] Afterwards, the notables of that reign became resentful against him because he hid, and criticized his decision to leave, presuming that it was in view of some machination or conspiracy of the enemies’ faction. Someone close to him who was at his service wanted to involve him in peril to take possession of his material goods; thus, he denounced him to his persecutors (who were among those which he had benefited so much that, had they been mindful of the benefits they had received,

 In H/: according to the Biography (p. .–), Šams al-Dawla died during a military expedition due to severe colic.  According to the Biography (p. .), Avicenna was hosted in the house of a certain Abū Ġālib.

‫م اﳉﻮز ﺎﱐ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ذا ﺮﻦ — ووﻗﻔﻬﻢ ﲆ ﻣﲀﻧﻪ ﻓﺎﺳﺘﻮﺛﻖ ﻣ ﻪ ٕﯾﺪا ﻪ ﻗﻠﻌﺔ ﻓﺮد ﺎن وﺑﻘﻲ ﲠﺎ ﻗﺪر ٔرﺑﻌﺔ ٔﺷــﻬﺮ رﯾـ ﺗﻘـ ّـﺮر‬ ‫ٔﺳﺒﺎب ﺗ اﻟﻨﺎﺣ ﺔ ﲆ ﻓﺼﻞ ﻣﻦ ا ٔﻣﺮ و ر ﻬﺎ اﳌﻨﺎزﻋﻮن‪ .‬ﻓ ٔﻓﺮج ﻋﻨﻪ وﺳﲓ ﻣــﻌﺎودة اﻟــﻮزارة ﻓﺎﻋﺘــﺬر‬ ‫واﺳ ﳣﻬﻞ ﻓﻌﺬر‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬وﻫﻨﺎك اﺷﺘﻐﻞ ﳌﻨﻄﻖ وﲤﻜّﻦ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻜ ﺐ ﻓﻌﺮض ﻣﻦ ذ ٔن ﺎذاﻫﺎ وﺟﺮي ﲆ ﺮﺗ ﺐ اﻟﻘﻮم‬ ‫ﻓﳱﺎ و ﳫّﻢ ﲆ ﻣﺎ اﺳ ﻜﺮﻩ ﻣﻦ ٔﻗﻮاﳍﻢ ﻓﻄﺎل اﳌﻨﻄﻖ وﰎ ٕﺻﻔﻬﺎن‪ .‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟﺮ ﺿﯿﺎت ﻓﻘﺪ ﰷن ﲻﻠﻬﺎ ﲆ‬ ‫ﺳ ﻞ ﺧ ﺼﺎر ﰲ ﺳﺎﻟﻒ اﻟﺰﻣﺎن ﻓﺮ ٔى ٔن ﯾﻀﯿﻔﻬﺎ إﱃ ﻛﺘﺎب اﻟﺸﻔﺎء‪ .‬وﺻﻨّﻒ ٔﯾﻀﺎ اﳊﯿـﻮان واﻟﻨــﺒﺎت‬ ‫وﻓﺮغ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﻜ ﺐ و ﺎذى ﰲ ٔﻛﱶ ﻛﺘﺎب اﳊﯿﻮان ﻛــﺘﺎب ٔرﺳــﻄﻮﻃﺎﻟ ﺲ اﻟﻔ ﻠﺴــﻮف وزاد ﻓــﳱﺎ ﻣــﻦ‬ ‫ذ ز دات وﺑﻠﻎ ﺳﻨﻪ ﺣ ﻨﺌﺬ ٔرﺑﻌﲔ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (‬وﻏﺮﴈ ﰲ اﻗ ﺼﺎص ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﻘﺼﺺ ٔن ﯾﻮﻗــﻒ ــﲆ اﻟﺴـ ﺐ ﰲ إﻋﺮاﺿــﻪ ﻋــﻦ ﴍح ا ٔﻟــﻔﺎظ وﰲ‬ ‫اﺧ ﻼف ﻣﺎ ﺑﲔ ﺮﺗ ﻪ ﻟﻜ ﺐ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ وﻣﺎ ﺑﲔ ﺮﺗ ﻪ ﻟﻜ ﺐ اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﯿﺎت واﻻٕﻟﻬﯿﺎت و ٔن ﯾﺘﻌ ّﺠﺐ ﻣﻦ اﻗ ﺪارﻩ‬ ‫ﲆ ﺗﺼﻨﯿﻔﻪ ﻣﺎ ﺻﻨّﻔﻪ ﻣﻦ ﻛﺘﺐ اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﯿﺎت واﻻٕﻟﻬﯿﺎت واﳌﺪّ ة ﻋﴩون ﯾﻮﻣﺎ واﻟﻜ ﺐ ﺎﺋﺒﺔ ﻋﻨﻪ وٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﳝﲇ‬

‫‪] Material damage in MS B.‬اﻟﺰﻣﺎن ‪… ‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪‬‬ ‫‪, Šifāʾ, Ḥayawān I., p. .–.‬‬ ‫‪, Biography, p. .–.‬‬ ‫‪-Ğ‬‬ ‫‪,‬‬

‫‪ٔ ] A‬رﺑﻌﲔ ‪… ‬وﺻـﻨّﻒ‬

‫‪S‬‬

‫‪] I‬اﻟﻔ ﻠﺴﻮف…و‬

‫ﺎذى ‪‬‬

‫‪ٔ ] A -Ğ‬ﺷــﻬﺮ… وﺑﻘــﻲ ‪‬‬ ‫‪] A -Ğ‬اﳌﻨﺎزﻋﻮن ‪ … ‬رﯾ | ‪, Biography, p. ..‬‬ ‫‪] A -Ğ‬اﻟﺸــﻔﺎء ‪… ‬وﻫــﻨﺎك ‪‬‬ ‫‪, Biography, p. .–; p. .–. ‬‬ ‫‪Biography, p. .–.‬‬

‫ﲠﺎ | ‪ ToŠG‬ﻓﺮدﻣﺎن ‪ in mg. ηJToTeG‬ﻓﺮد ﺎن ‪ ζη‬ﻓﺮوز ﺎن ‪ KaṢ‬ﻓﺮور ﺎن ]ﻓﺮد ﺎن | ‪ KaT‬واﺳﺘﻮﺛﻖ ]ﻓﺎﺳﺘﻮﺛﻖ | ‪ T‬و ٔوﻗﻔﻬﻢ ]ووﻗﻔﻬﻢ ‪‬‬ ‫ﺗﻘﺮر | ‪ om. Da‬ﻗﺪر | ‪ JEd.‬ﻓﳱﺎ ‪om. Ka‬‬ ‫ﻋﻨﻪ ]وﺳﲓ | ‪ Br‬وﺮ ﻬﺎ ‪ As‬و زﻟﻬﺎ ]و ر ﻬﺎ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ‬اﻟﻨﺎﺣ ﺔ ‪ et‬ا و ]اﻟﻨﺎﺣ ﺔ ‪ Nk ‬ﺗﻘﺮرت ] ّ‬ ‫وﰷﻧﻮا ﳑﻦ ‪ om. et‬ﻓﻌﺬر ‪ add. A ‬ﻓﻌــﺬر ]ﻓﺎﻋﺘــﺬر | ‪ Br‬ﻓﺎﻋﺘــﺬر اﻟــﻮزارة ]اﻟــﻮزارة ﻓﺎﻋﺘــﺬر | ‪ a.c. E‬اﳌــﻌﺎودة ]ﻣــﻌﺎودة | ‪add. Da‬‬ ‫‪ praem. Ka‬ﻗﺪ ]ﲻﻠﻬﺎ | ‪ KaEEd.‬ﺑ ٔﺻﳢﺎن ] ٕﺻﻔﻬﺎن ‪ A ‬ﺎدﻫﺎ ] ﺎذاﻫﺎ | ‪ λJT‬وﻫﻨﺎ ]وﻫﻨﺎك ‪ Te ‬ﯨﻌﺬر ‪ add. A‬ﺳﻠﻒ‪...‬ذا ﺮﻦ‬ ‫‪ om. KaDa‬اﻟﻔ ﻠﺴﻮف | ‪ٔ γκA in mg. To s.l. Ṣ‬رﺳﻄﺎﻃﺎﻟ ﺲ ] ٔرﺳﻄﻮﻃﺎﻟ ﺲ ‪ DiToTeŠG ‬اﻟﻨﺒﺎت واﳊﯿﻮان ]اﳊﯿﻮان واﻟﻨﺒﺎت ‪‬‬ ‫‪ κ‬ﻓﻔﻲ ]وﰲ | ‪ EToTeŠ‬ﴍوح ]ﴍح ‪ om. et add. in mg. E ‬ﺣ ﻨﺌﺬ ‪ s.l. Ṣ ‬ﻓﳱﺎ ‪ τ‬ﻓ ﻪ ]ﻓﳱﺎ | ‪om. et add. in mg. JC‬‬ ‫‪ ToŠG‬وا ﳯﺮة ]واﳌﺪّ ة | ‪ add. s.l. A‬ﰲ ‪ add. s.l. vel in mg. η‬ﻛﺘﺐ ‪ γṢ‬ﻣﻦ ‪ E‬ﰲ ‪ ToTeŠG‬ﻟﻜ ﺐ ]ﻣﻦ ﻛﺘﺐ | ‪ om. T‬ﻣﺎ ﺻﻨّﻔﻪ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ κλDaToŠG a.c. Di‬إﳕﺎ ]وٕاﻧ ّﲈ | ‪ in mg. ToG‬واﳌﺪة‬ ‫‪ٔ ] The passage presents a few issues; see the Introduction to the edition, section II...‬رﺑﻌﲔ ‪… ‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪‬‬ ‫‪point .‬‬

‫‪٤‬ق‬

Al-Ğūzǧānī’s Introduction  9

they ought not to pursue and oppress him), and informed them about the place where he [hid]. They secured against him by taking him to the fortress of Fardaǧān, where he stayed for four months, until the situation of that region resolved into a solution of the contention and the opponents abandoned the region9. Avicenna was freed and offered to be restored as a minister, but he asked to be excused from that and to take a respite, which was accorded to him.

[.. The account of the composition of the sections of Logic, Mathematics, Zoology and Botany] There10, he dedicated himself to the Logic. Since he had books at his disposal, he followed them and proceeded according to the order that the philosophers observed in them, and dealt with the statements of theirs that he refuted. As a consequence, the [section on] Logic grew long and was completed in Iṣfahān11. As for the Mathematics, he had previously composed it in the form of a summary, and he decided to add it to the Book of Healing. He also composed the [Book of] Animals and [that of] Plants and completed these books. Although in most of the Book of Animals he followed Aristotle’s own book, he added something [of his own] in the books. At that time, he was forty years old12.

[. The purpose of al-Ǧūzǧānī’s account] My purpose in telling this story is that one grasps the reason why Avicenna Q4 avoided composing a literal commentary and why the order he followed in the books on logic and the one he followed in the books on natural philosophy and metaphysics differ. [My purpose] is also that one admires his ability in the composition of the  Namely, until the withdrawal of ʿAlāʾ al-Dawla and the return of Tāǧ al-Dawla to Hamaḏān together with Avicenna; cf. Biography, p. .–.  Still in Hamaḏān, in the house of al-ʿAlawī; see Biography, p. .–.  On Avicenna moving to Iṣfahān, to the court of ʿAlāʾ al-Dawla, see Biography, p. .–.  Around H/–; however, this can hardly be the exact date of composition of the section of Logic, completed afterwards, during Avicenna’s stay in Iṣfahān, and, most of all, of the K. al-Nabāt and the K. al-Ḥayawān, composed after all the other sections, in the year in which ʿAlāʾ al-Dawla attacked the city of Šābūr Ḫwāst (see Biography, p. .–). This attack is arguably the one recorded by Ibn Aṯīr, Al-Kāmil fī l-Tārīḫ (sub anno ) for the year H/– (when Avicenna was more or less  years old). The problem with such a dating was already remarked in G , p. , who suggested either a mistake by al-Ğūzğānī’s part or a corruption occurred in the manuscript tradition which could have affected the number here provided. I would suggest that a mistake from al-Ğūzğānī’s part is a less satisfying explanation, given that all the other chronological references he made both in this Introduction and in the Biography are consistent and quite precise; see the note to the critical apparatus.

‫م اﳉﻮز ﺎﱐ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ﻠﯿﻪ ﻗﻠﺒﻪ اﳌﺸﻐﻮل ﲟﺎ ﻣﲏ ﺑﻪ ﻓﻘﻂ‪ .‬وﺳﯿ ﺪ اﳌﺘ ٔ ّﻣﻞ ﻟﻬﺬا اﻟﻜ ﺎب ﺑﻌﲔ ﻋﺘــﺒﺎر ﻣــﻦ اﻟﻨــﻜﺖ واﻟﻨـﻮادر‬ ‫واﻟﺘﻔﺮﯾﻌﺎت واﻟﺒﯿﺎ ت ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﳚﺪﻩ ﰲ ﲨ ﻛﺘﺐ اﻟﺴﺎﻟﻔﲔ‪ .‬وﷲ اﳌﻮﻓﻖ ﳌﺎ ﻓ ﻪ اﳋﲑة‪.‬‬ ‫]وﻣﻦ ﻫﺎﻫﻨﺎ اﺑﺘﺪاء اﻟﻜ ﺎب و م ٔﰊ ﲇ اﳊﺴﲔ ﻦ ﻋﺒﺪ ﷲ ٔﺣﺴﻦ ﷲ إﻟﯿﻪ‪[.‬‬

‫‪] Material damage in MS As.‬اﻟﻜ ﺎب و‬

‫م ‪‬‬

‫‪ om. et add. in‬ﲨ | ‪ in mg. A‬اﻟﺘﻔﺮﯾﻌﺎت ‪ AToTe‬واﻟﺘﻌﺮﯾﻔﺎت ]واﻟﺘﻔﺮﯾﻌﺎت ‪ To ‬اﻟﻨﻜﺔ ]اﻟﻨﻜﺖ | ‪ praem. s.l. To‬ﻣﻦ ]ﻗﻠﺒﻪ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ in mg. To‬وﻣﻦ ﻫﻬﻨﺎ ‪ B‬وﻣﻦ ﻫﺬا ‪ EToŠG in mg. B‬وﻫــﺬا ]وﻣــﻦ ﻫﺎﻫــﻨﺎ ‪ Ed. ‬اﳋــﲑ ]اﳋــﲑة | ‪ om. Ṣ‬اﳋــﲑة…وﷲ | ‪mg. Ka‬‬ ‫]و م | ‪ T‬اﻟ م ]اﻟﻜ ﺎب | ‪ Ṣ‬وﻣﻦ ﻫﻬﻨﺎ اﺑﺘﺪاء م اﻟﺸﯿﺦ ‪ in mg. Di‬وﻣﻦ ﻫﻬﲈ ‪ et‬وﻫﺬا اﺑﺘﺪاء اﻟﻜ ﺎب ‪ A‬ﻣﻦ ﻫﺎﻫﻨﺎ م اﻟﺸﯿﺦ ]إﻟﯿﻪ…وﻣﻦ‬ ‫‪ praem. Da‬اﻟﺸﯿﺦ اﻟﺮﺲ ‪ٔ om. E‬ﰊ ﲇ | ‪ s.l. B‬و ‪ et‬ﻣﻦ م ‪ in mg. Nk‬ﻣﻦ م ‪ +‬وﻫــﺬا م ‪ KaJTCTe fort. As‬ﻣــﻦ م‬ ‫إﻟﯿﻪ… ٔﺣﺴﻦ | ‪ add. JNkTCDa‬ﻦ ﺳ ﺎ ]‪‬ﷲ | ‪ om. Br‬ﷲ…اﳊﺴﲔ | ‪ κToŠG‬اﻟﺸﯿﺦ اﻟﺮﺲ ]‪‬ﷲ… ٔﰊ | ‪ praem. Nk‬اﻟﺸﯿﺦ‬ ‫‪ ToG‬رﲪﻪ ﷲ وﻏﻔﺮ واﶵﺪ رب اﻟﻌﺎﳌﲔ ‪ BC‬رﴈ ﷲ ﻋﻨﻪ ‪ Nk‬رﲪﺔ ﷲ ﻠﯿﻪ ‪ κBrEŠ‬رﲪﻪ ﷲ ‪om. Ka‬‬ ‫‪] MS A inserts a general presentation of the structure of Logic at the end of al-Ǧūzǧānī’s‬اﳋــــﲑة ‪‬‬ ‫‪Introduction:‬‬

‫ﰒ ﳌﺎ ﻠﻤﺖ ﯾﻘ ﻨﺎ ٔن ﺗﻔﺼﯿﻞ ا ٔﺑﻮاب ﰲ ﺻﺪور اﻟﻜ ﺐ وﯾﺘ ﲔ اﻟﻐﺮض ﻓﳱﺎ ﺰﯾﺪ ﰲ ﻋﺮض ﻃﺎﻟﱯ اﻟﻌﲅ ﲆ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﻋﳯﺎ اﺳ ﻮﯾﺖ ٔن ٔﴍح ذ ﺮ ﻓ ﻮن‬ ‫ا ٔﻗﺴﺎم و ﺪد اﳌﻘﺎﻻت ﻟﯿﻜﻮن ﺗﺬ ﺮﻩ ﻠﻤﺘ ٔﻣﻞ ﻓ ٔﻗﻮل إن ﻫﺬا اﻟﻌﲅ ﺸ ﳣﻞ ﲆ ٔرﺑﻊ ﲨﻞ وﱔ اﳌﻨﻄﻘ ﺎت واﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﯿﺎت واﻟﺮ ﺿﯿﺎت واﻻٕﻟﻬﯿﺎت ]‪.[...‬‬

Al-Ğūzǧānī’s Introduction  11

books on natural philosophy and metaphysics in the space of [only] twenty days, with no book at hand, solely under the dictation of his own heart grieved by afflictions. Those who study this Book with [careful] consideration will find precious remarks, corollaries and explanations that they will not be able to find in all the books of the predecessors. God grants the success in [all] good deed. {From here on, the book and discourse of Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn Ibn ʿAbd Allāh — may God favour him! — begin.}

‫]اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ا ٔول[‬ ‫ﻓﺼﻞ ﰲ اﻻٕﺷﺎرة إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﺸ ﳣﻞ ﻠﯿﻪ اﻟﻜ ﺎب‬

‫‪‬‬

‫)‪ (‬ﻗﺎل اﻟﺸﯿﺦ اﻟﺮﺋ ﺲ ٔﺑﻮ ﲇ اﳊﺴﲔ ﻦ ﻋﺒﺪ ﷲ ﻦ ﺳ ﺎ ٔﺣﺴﻦ ﷲ إﻟﯿﻪ‪ :‬وﺑﻌﺪ ﲪﺪ ﷲ واﻟﺜﻨﺎء‬ ‫ﻠﯿﻪ ﻛﲈ ﻫﻮ ٔﻫ واﻟﺼﻠﻮة ﲆ ﻧ ﻪ ﶊﺪ و اﻟﻄﺎﻫﺮﻦ‪ .‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن ﻏﺮﺿﻨﺎ ﰲ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻜ ﺎب ا ي ﺮﺟﻮ ٔن ﯾُﻤﻬﻠﻨﺎ‬ ‫اﻟﺰﻣﺎن إﱃ ﺧﳣﻪ وﯾﺼﺤﺒﻨﺎ اﻟﺘﻮﻓ ﻖ ﻣﻦ ﷲ ﰲ ﻧ َﻈﻤﻪ ٔن ﻧﻮد ﻪ ﻟــﺒﺎب ﻣﺎ ﲢﻘّــﻘ ﺎﻩ ﻣــﻦ ا ٔﺻــﻮل ﰲ اﻟﻌﻠــﻮم‬ ‫اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔ ﺔ اﳌ ﺴﻮﺑﺔ إﱃ ا ٔﻗﺪﻣﲔ اﳌﺒ ﺔ ﲆ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ اﳌﺮﺗ ّﺐ اﶈﻘّﻖ وا ٔﺻﻮل اﳌﺴﺘ ﻄﺔ ٔﻓﻬﺎم اﳌﺘﻌﺎوﻧﺔ ﲆ‬ ‫اﳊﻖ ا ِﳤﺪة ﻓ ﻪ زﻣﺎ ﻃﻮﯾﻼ ﺣﱴ اﺳﺘﻘﺎم ٓﺧﺮﻩ ﲆ ﲨ اﺗ ّﻔﻘﺖ ﻠﳱﺎ ٔﻛﱶ ا ٓراء وﳗــﺮت ﻣﻌــﻬﺎ‬ ‫إدراك ّ‬ ‫ﻏﻮاﳾ ا ٔﻫﻮاء‪ .‬وﲢـﺮﯾﺖ ٔن و ِد ــﻪ ٔﻛــﱶ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ــﺔ و ٔن ٔﺷــﲑ ﰲ ﰻ ﻣﻮﺿــﻊ إﱃ ﻣﻮﻗــﻊ اﻟﺸ ﳢــﺔ و ٔ ﻠّــﻬﺎ‬ ‫ٕﯾﻀﺎح اﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ ﺑﻘﺪر اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ و ٔورد اﻟﻔﺮوع ﻣﻊ ا ٔﺻﻮل إﻻ ﻣﺎ ٔﺛﻖ ﻜﺸﺎﻓﻪ ﳌﻦ اﺳ ﴫ ﲟﺎ ﻧ ُّﺒﴫﻩ َوﲢﻘّﻖ‬

‫‪] Mubāḥaṯāt, Letter to Kiyā, p. .–.‬ا ٔﺻﻮل…و ٔورد ‪] Nağāt p. .–. ‬اﻟﻄﺎﻫﺮﻦ ‪ … ‬وﺑﻌﺪ ‪‬‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫‪ om. ν‬إﻟﯿﻪ…ﻗﺎل ‪ μLat.E in mg. Y ‬ﻛﺘﺎب اﻟﺸﻔﺎء ]اﻟﻜ ﺎب | ‪ Mi‬اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ا ٔول ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﻦ ا ٔول ﻣﻦ اﶺ ا ٔوﱃ ]ﻓﺼﻞ‬ ‫‪ ηκμBrA om.‬رﲪﻪ ﷲ ]إﻟﯿﻪ… ٔﺣﺴﻦ | ‪ om. Ka‬إﻟﯿﻪ…اﳊﺴﲔ | ‪ om. C‬ﷲ… ٔﺑﻮ | ‪ om. Ka‬اﻟﺮﺋ ﺲ | ‪ om. E‬ﲇ…اﻟﺸﯿﺦ‬ ‫]ﻓﺎ ّٕن | ‪ om. ζι‬اﻟﻄﺎﻫﺮﻦ | ‪ KaNkADa‬واﻟﺼﻼة ]واﻟﺼﻠﻮة | ‪ JT‬ﲟﺎ ]ﻛﲈ ‪ om. A ‬اﻟﻄﺎﻫﺮﻦ ‪ … ‬وﺑﻌﺪ | ‪ s.l. Y‬و ‪ Yi‬ﺑﻌﺪ ]وﺑﻌﺪ | ‪EDiṢ‬‬ ‫‪ ν om.‬اﳊﳬﯿﺔ ‪ π‬اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ ]اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔ ﺔ ‪ A ‬ا ٔﺻﻞ ]ا ٔﺻﻮل | ‪ in mg. E‬ﺣﻘﻘ ﺎﻩ ظ ]ﲢﻘّﻘ ﺎﻩ | ‪ add. Di‬ﺳﺒ ﺎﻧﻪ ]ﷲ ‪ Di ‬ﻣﻦ ]ﰲ | ‪ A‬إن‬ ‫اﳊﻖ ‪  … ‬ﲆ | ‪ in mg. J‬اﳌﺮﺗﺐ ‪ JT‬اﳌﺜ ﺖ ]اﳌﺮﺗ ّﺐ | ‪κλξDiDaG add. in mg. Di‬‬ ‫]ا ِﳤﺪة ‪ّ om. DiToŠG add. in mg. Di ‬‬ ‫‪ add. in mg. E‬اﺗﻔﻘﺖ و ]ﲨ | ‪ add. DiToŠG‬ﲆ إدراك اﳊﻖ ]ﻃـﻮﯾﻼ | ‪ ν‬ﻓــﳱﺎ ]ﻓ ــﻪ | ‪ γκπJDaEd. non legitur Br‬ا ﳤــﺪ‬ ‫]اﻟﻔﺮوع | ‪ Ṣ‬اﳊﻘ ﺔ ]اﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ | ‪ As‬ﰲ اﯾﻀﺎح ] ٕﯾﻀﺎح ‪ JYi ‬ﻣﻮﺿﻊ ‪ Da‬وﻗﻊ ]ﻣﻮﻗﻊ | ‪ Yi‬ﻣﻮﻗﻊ ]ﻣﻮﺿﻊ | ‪ om. No‬ا ٔﻫﻮاء ‪ Da ‬وﳗﺮ ]وﳗﺮت‬ ‫‪ T‬ﻣﺎ ]ﲟﺎ | ‪ ξ‬ﯾﺒﴫ ]اﺳ ﴫ | ‪ Di‬اﺗﻔﻖ ] ٔﺛﻖ | ‪ in mg. Ṣ²‬اﻟﻔﺮوع ﻣﻊ ا ٔﺻﻮل ‪ Ṣ‬ا ٔﺻﻮل ﻣﻊ اﻟﻔﺮوع ]ا ٔﺻﻮل…اﻟﻔﺮوع | ‪ A‬ﻟﻔﺮوع‬

‫‪‬‬

‫ٔي ﻓ ﻣﺪ ﻞ ﰲ ﲅ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ وﻟ ﺲ ﻣ ﻪ ٔﻣﺎ ﻣﺪ ﻠﯿﺔ ﻣﺎ ذ ﺮ ﻓ ﻪ ﻓ ﻪ ﻓﻈﺎﻫﺮ و ٔﻣﺎ اﻧﻪ اﳌﺒﲔ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ﻓ ٔن اﳌﻨﻄﻖ إﳕﺎ ﻫﻮ اﳌﻌﺮف ]اﻟﻜ ﺎب…ﰲ‬ ‫‪ … ‬وا ٔﺻﻮل ‪ٔ i.l. Di ‬ي ﻫﺬا اﻟﻜ ﺎب ]اﻟﻜ ﺎب | ‪ in mg. Te‬واﳊ ﺔ وا ﳫﯿﺎت ﻣ ﺎدئ ﻠﻤﻌﺮف وﻫﺬا اﻟﻔﻦ إﳕﺎ ﯾﺒﺤﺚ ﻋﻦ ا ﳫﯿﺎت ﻻ ﲑ ب ه‬ ‫اﳊﻖ‬ ‫ﳛﳣﻞ ٔن ﯾﺘﻌﻠﻖ اﳉﺎر ﲟﺘﻌﺎوﻧﺔ وﻜﻮن اﳌﻌﲎ ا ٔﺻﻮل اﳌﻨ ﺴﻄﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻜ ﺐ ٔو اﳌﻔﻀ اﳌﻨ ﺴﻄﺔ ﲆ ا ٔذﻫﺎن اﻟﱵ اﻧ ﺴﺎﻃﻬﺎ ﺎﻧﻨﺎ وﺴ ﺐ ا ٔﻓﻬﺎم ] ّ‬ ‫اﳌﺘﻌﺎوﻧﺔ اﻟﱵ ﯾﻌﲔ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﺑﻌﻀﺎ ﲆ إدراك اﳊﻖ وا ﺎﻧﺔ ﺑﻌﺾ ا ٔﻓﻬﺎم ﺑﻌﻀﺎ ﲆ إدراك اﳊﻖ ﲟﻌﲎ ﺗﻌﻠﲓ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﺑﻌﻀﺎ وﺗﺬﻛﲑﻩ ٕا ﻩ وﱒ ﺑﻌﺾ اﳌﻘﺪﻣﺎت اﻟﱵ‬ ‫ﻋﻘﻞ ﻋﳯﺎ ا ٓﺧﺮ إﱃ اﻟﱵ ٔدر ﻬﺎ ﻫﻮ وﳛﳣﻞ ٔن ﯾﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﳌﺴﺘ ﻄﺔ وﻜﻮن ﻣ ﻌﻠﻖ اﳌﺘﻌﺎوﻧﺔ ﻣﻘﺪرا وﻜﻮن اﳌﻌﲎ ا ٔﺻﻮل اﻟﱵ اﻧ ﺴﻄﻪ ﲆ إدراﻛﻪ ٔي ﲆ‬ ‫اﻟﻈﺎﻫﺮ ٔن ﯾﻘﺎل ﳗﺮت ﻣﳯﺎ ﻛﲈ ﻻ ﻧﻌﲏ وﻟﻌ ﻣﻦ ]ا ٔﻫﻮاء ‪… ‬وﳗﺮت ‪ in mg. Te ‬ﳤﺎ واﳌﺮاد ﻧ ﺴﺎﻃﻬﺎ ﻠﯿــﻪ اﺑ ﺎﺋــﻪ ــﻠﳱﺎ وﲢﻘ ﻘــﻬﺎ ب ه‬ ‫‪ in mg. Te‬ﺗﺼﺤﯿﻒ ا ﲀﺗﺐ ٔو ﯾﻘﺎل ﻣﻌﻨﺎ إﻧﻪ ﳗﺮت ﻏﻮاﳾ ﻫﻮاء ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻠﲈء ٔو ﻣﻦ ﺗ اﶺ ﻣﻌﻬﺎ ٔي ﻣﻊ ﲢﻘﻘ ﺎ و ﳤﺎء ٕا ﳱﺎ‬

‫‪] Certain manuscripts read: “the Book of Healing” instead of “the book”. “The Book of‬اﻟ ــــﻜ ﺎب ‪‬‬ ‫‪Healing” may result from a later modification in most of the manuscripts that preserve it: MSS ToMiŠ‬‬ ‫‪all have a list of contents before chap. I., and in all those lists the title of chap. I. reads: “the book”.‬‬ ‫‪The discrepancy between the title announced in the list of contents and that in the main text may‬‬ ‫‪mean that “the Book of Healing” appeared in this branch of tradition at a second moment.‬‬ ‫‪] This clause is omitted by a branch of the manuscript tradition, which also lacks al‬إﻟﯿـــــﻪ…ﻗﺎل ‪‬‬‫‪Ǧūzǧānī’s introduction. See the Introduction to the edition, section II.....‬‬

‫‪٩‬ق‬

C

[I.]

[. The composition of the Book of Healing: its purpose and method] The Chief Master Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn Ibn ʿAbd Allāh Ibn Sīnā — may God favour Q9 him! — said: Praise and commend be to God as He deserves, and prayer on His prophet Muḥammad and his pure family. Our purpose in this Book — which we hope we will be given the time to conclude and that the success [granted] by God accompany us in its composition — is to set down in it the gist of the principles, which we have ascertained in the philosophical sciences related to the ancients, grounded in the ordered and verified theoretical inquiry, and of the principles drawn by means of the acts of comprehension1 which cooperate in the apprehension of the truth, having put a great effort in it for a long time, until its end culminated over the complex on which most of the views agreed; at the same time, the wraps of the arbitrary opinions were left behind. I tried to set down in it most of the discipline, to point in each passage to that which causes uncertainty, and to solve it by elucidating the truth in the best possible way. I also tried to provide the corollaries along with the principles, except when I am sure that they can be discovered by whoever is able to

 Concerning this translation of the Arabic afhām, see M p. , n. .

, p.  and G

,

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ا ٔول ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ُﺼﻮرﻩ ٔو ﻣﺎ ﻋﺰب ﻋﻦ ذ ﺮي وﱂ ﯾَﻠُﺢ ﻟﻔﻜﺮي‪ .‬واﺟﳤﺪت ﰲ اﺧ ﺼﺎر ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ ــﺪا وﳎﺎﻧﺒــﺔ اﻟﺘﻜـﺮار‬ ‫ﻣﺎ ﻧ ّ ِ‬ ‫ٔﺻﻼ إﻻ ﻣﺎ ﯾﻘﻊ ﻠﻄﺎ ٔو ﺳﻬﻮا وﺗﻨﻜّ ﺖ اﻟﺘﻄﻮﯾﻞ ﰲ ﻣ ﺎﻗﻀﺔ ﻣﺬاﻫﺐ ﻠﯿﺔ اﻟﺒﻄﻼن ٔو ﻣﻜﻔ ﺔ اﻟﺸﻐﻞ ﲟﺎ‬ ‫ّﻧﻘﺮرﻩ ﻣﻦ ا ٔﺻﻮل و ّﻧﻌﺮﻓﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻮاﻧﲔ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (‬وﻻ ﯾﻮ ﺪ ﰲ ﻛﺘﺐ اﻟﻘﺪﻣﺎء ﳾء ﯾﻌﺘﺪّ ﺑﻪ ا ّٕﻻ وﻗﺪ ّ‬ ‫ﲷﻨّﺎﻩ ﻛﺘﺎﺑﻨﺎ ﻫﺬا‪ .‬ﻓﺎٕن ﱂ ﯾﻮ ﺪ ﰲ اﳌﻮﺿﻊ اﳉﺎري‬ ‫ٕﺛﺒﺎﺗﻪ ﻓ ﻪ اﻟﻌﺎدة‪ُ ،‬و ِ ــﺪ ﰲ ﻣﻮﺿــﻊ ٓﺧــﺮ ر ٔﯾﺖ ٔﻧــﻪ ٔﻟﯿــﻖ ﺑــﻪ‪ .‬وﻗــﺪ ٔﺿــﻔﺖ إﱃ ذ ﳑّﺎ ٔدرﻛﺘــﻪ ﺑﻔﻜــﺮي‬ ‫ﺣﺐ‪.‬‬ ‫وﺣﺼﻠﺘﻪ ﺑﻨﻈﺮي وﺧﺼﻮﺻﺎ ﰲ ﲅ اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﺔ وﻣﺎ ﺑﻌﺪﻫﺎ وﰲ ﲅ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ﳌﻦ ٔ ّ‬ ‫وﻗﺪ ﺟﺮت اﻟﻌﺎدة ﺑ ٔن ﺗﻄﻮل ﻣ ﺎدئ اﳌﻨﻄــﻖ ﺑ ٔﺷــﯿﺎء ﻟـ ﺴﺖ ﻣ ﻄﻘ ــﺔ وٕاﻧّــﲈ ﱔ ﻠﺼﻨﺎ ــﺔ اﳊﳬﯿــﺔ‪ٔ ،‬ﻋــﲏ‬ ‫اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ ا ٔوﱃ‪ ،‬ﻓ ﺠﻨّ ﺖ ٕا ﺮاد ﳾء ﻣﻦ ذ وٕاﺿﺎ ﺔ اﻟﺰﻣﺎن ﺑﻪ و ٔ ّﺧﺮﺗُﻪ إﱃ ﻣﻮﺿﻌﻪ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬ﰒ ر ٔ ُ‬ ‫ﯾﺖ ٔن ٔﺗﻠﻮ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻜ ﺎب ﻜ ﺎب ٓﺧﺮ ٔ ّﲰﯿﻪ ﻛﺘﺎب اﻠﻮاﺣﻖ ﯾ ّﱲ ﻣﻊ ﲻﺮي وﯾُ ّﺆرخ ﲟﺎ ﯾﻔﺮغ ﻣ ﻪ‬ ‫ﰲ ّ‬ ‫ﰻ ﺳﻨﺔ ﻜﻮن ﰷﻟﴩح ﻟﻬﺬا اﻟﻜ ﺎب وﻛﺘﻔﺮﯾﻊ ا ٔﺻﻮل ﻓ ﻪ وﺴﻂ اﳌﻮﺟﺰ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻌﺎﻧﯿﻪ‪.‬‬ ‫‪] Material damage in MS Br.‬ﻣ ﺎدئ ‪… ‬ﰲ ‪‬‬

‫‪] Material damage in MS Br.‬ذ‬

‫… ٔﺿﻔﺖ ‪‬‬

‫‪] Šifāʾ, Safsaṭa II., p. .–.‬ﻣﻮﺿﻌﻪ ‪… ‬وﻗﺪ ‪] Šifāʾ, Samāʿ Ṭabīʿī, p. .–.. ‬اﻟﺒﻄﻼن… وﺗﻨـﻜّ ﺖ ‪‬‬ ‫‪] Šifāʾ, Maqūlāt III., p. .; ibid. III., p. .–; Šifāʾ, Qiyās II., p. .–; ibid.‬ﻣﻌﺎﻧﯿﻪ ‪… ‬ﰒ ‪‬‬ ‫‪II., p. .; ibid. III., p. .–; ibid. VII., p. .–; ibid. VII., p. .–; ibid.‬‬ ‫‪VIII., p. .; ibid. IX., p. .; Šifāʾ, Safsaṭa II., p. .–; Šifāʾ, Hayʾa, p. .–; ibid.,‬‬ ‫‪p. .; Šifāʾ, Mūsīqā VI., p. .–; Šifāʾ, Samāʿ Ṭabīʿī, IV., p. .–; Šifāʾ, Ḥayawān X.,‬‬ ‫‪p. .–; Nağāt, Logic, chap. , p. .–.; Manṭiq al-Mašriqiyyīn, p. .–.‬‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫ُﺼﻮرﻩ | ‪ Di‬ﲟﺎ ]‪‬ﻣﺎ‬ ‫]وﳎﺎﻧﺒﺔ | ‪ om. C‬ﺪا | ‪ ν om. Br‬ﺮي ‪ E‬ﰲ ﻓﻜﺮي ]ﻟﻔﻜﺮي | ‪ ν‬ﻓﻜﺮي ]ذ ﺮي | ‪ ξ‬وﻣﺎ ] ٔو ﻣﺎ | ‪ Yi‬ﻧﺒﴫﻩ ]ﻧ ِّ‬ ‫‪ٔ add. Ṣ et exp. Ṣ²‬و ﺑ ﻪ اﻟﱪﻫﺎن ‪ T‬ﺑ ﻪ اﻟﱪﻫﺎن ‪ J‬ﻜﻔ ﻪ اﻟﺸﻐﻞ ]ﻣﻜﻔ ﺔ اﻟﺸﻐﻞ | ‪ om. C‬ﻣــﺬاﻫﺐ | ‪ Ed.‬ﺧــﻄ ٔ ] ﻠــﻄﺎ ‪ J ‬وﳎﺎﺑﻨــﺔ‬ ‫ﻧﻘﺮرﻩ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ EDi‬و ﺪﺗﻪ ] ُو ِ ﺪ ‪ in mg. Di s.l. Y ‬ﲡﺪ ‪ E s.l. Ṣ‬ﲡﺪﻩ ]‪‬ﯾﻮ ﺪ | ‪ Br‬وٕان ]ﻓﺎٕن | ‪ JT‬ﻣﻦ ]‪‬ﰲ ‪ p.c. Y ‬ﻧﻘﺮرﻩ ‪ Yi‬ﻧﻘﺮر ] ّ‬ ‫‪ Da‬ﺑﻌﺪﻩ ]ﺑﻌﺪﻫﺎ ‪ To ‬ﻓ ‪ EDaṢYNo‬ﻣﺎ ]ﳑّﺎ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. Ṣ²‬ﺑﻪ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. Te‬ر ٔﯾﺖ ٔﻧﻪ | ‪ s.l. Y‬و ﺪﺗﻪ‬ ‫ٔﺣﺐ | ‪ s.l. Y‬اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ‪ ν‬اﳌﲒان ]اﳌﻨﻄﻖ‬ ‫‪ s.l.‬اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ‪ ν‬اﳌﲒان ]اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ‪ add. in mg. JNk om. γζνEṢ ‬ﳌﻦ ٔﺣﺐ ‪ No‬ﳌﻦ ٔوﺟﺐ ]ﳌﻦ ّ‬ ‫‪ Y‬اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ ] ﻠﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ | ‪ p.c.? Y‬وٕاﳕﺎ ‪ Yi‬و ]وٕاﻧ ّﲈ | ‪ i.l. Y‬ﻣ ﻄﻘ ﺔ ‪ ν‬ﻣﲒاﻧﯿﺔ ]ﻣ ﻄﻘ ــﺔ | ‪ om. ν add. in mg. Y‬ﻟـ ﺴﺖ | ‪ N‬اﻟﻨﻄــﻖ ‪Y‬‬ ‫ﻛﺘﺎب | ‪ٔ J‬ﺗﺒﲆ ] ٔﺗﻠﻮ ‪ iter. C ‬إﱃ | ‪ Br‬ﻓ ﻪ ‪ s.l. As‬ﺑﻪ | ‪ praem. Yi‬ﻋﻦ ] ٕا ﺮاد ﳾء | ‪ in mg. Y‬اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ ‪ ν‬اﳊﳬﺔ ]اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ ‪‬‬ ‫ﺆرخ | ‪om. τ‬‬ ‫‪ in‬وﻛﺘﻔﺮﯾﻊ ‪ ξKaT‬وﻟﺘﻔﺮﯾﻊ ]وﻛﺘﻔﺮﯾﻊ | ‪ om. Yi add. p.c. Y‬ﰲ ‪ s.l. Y ‬ﻣ ﻪ ‪ ν‬ﻋﻨﻪ ]ﻣ ﻪ | ‪ BrDi‬ﻣﺎ ]ﲟﺎ | ‪ As‬ﯾﻮرخ ]وﯾُ ّ‬ ‫‪ iter. J‬ا ٔﺻﻮل | ‪ ToŠG‬وﻛﺘﺪرﯾﻊ ‪mg. ToG‬‬ ‫اﻟﻼم ﰲ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ ﳛﳣﻞ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻠﳣﺪﯾﺪ ﻜﻮن إﺷﺎرة إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﺳﺒﻖ ﻣﻦ ﻟﺒﺎب ا ٔﺻﻮل اﳌﺬ ﻮرة وﻫﺬا ﻫﻮ اﻟﻈﺎﻫﺮ ٔن ]اﻟﻘـﻮاﻧﲔ ‪ … ‬واﺟﳤــﺪت ‪‬‬ ‫ﻜﻮن ﻠ ﺪ ﻦ ٔي ٔﻛﱶ ٔﻓﺮاد اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ ٔو ٔﻛﱶ ﻣ ﺎﺣﳤﺎ وﻫﺬا ﻣ ﲎ ﲆ ٔن اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ إﳕﺎ ﱔ اﳊﳬﺔ اﻟﻨﻈﺮﯾﺔ واﻟﻌﻤﻠﯿﺔ وﻣﺎ ﺪا ﻟ ﺲ ﺑﻌﲅ وﻻ ﺻﻨﻌﺔ ﻛﲈ ﻗﺎل‬ ‫اﻟﻘﺎﺋﻞ‪ٔ » :‬ﳞﺎ اﻟﻘﻮم ا ي ﰲ اﳌﺪرﺳﺔ ﳇﲈ ﺣﺼﻠﳣﻮﻩ وﺳﻮﺳﺔ ﲅ ﻧﺒﻮد ﲑ ﲅ ﺎﺷﻘﻰ ﻣﺎﺑﻘﯽ ﺗﻠﺒ ﺲ اﺑﻠ ﺲ ﺷﻘﯽ«‪ .‬وﳛﳣﻞ ٔن ﻜﻮن اﻟﻼم ﻟﻼﺳﺘﻐﺮاق ٔﯾﻀﺎ‬ ‫‪ in‬ﲆ ﻣﺬﻫﺒﲔ ﳚﻮز دﺧﻮل ﻻم ﺳﺘﻐﺮاق ﲆ اﰟ اﳉ ﺲ وﻗﺎل اﳌﻌﲎ ﲆ ﰻ ﺗﻘﺪ ﺮ و ٔ ﲆ وﻫﻮ ٔﱐ ٔودﻋﺖ ﰲ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻜ ﺎب ٔﻛﱶ ﻣ ﺎﺣﺚ اﳊﳬﺔ‬ ‫‪ in mg. A‬ﺗ ﻜﺖ ٔي ﲡﻨ ﺖ ]وﺗﻨﻜّ ﺖ ‪mg. Te ‬‬ ‫‪] The modification of manṭiq into mīzān in MSS YYi is systematic up to the beginning of chap.‬اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ‪‬‬ ‫‪I.. The term mīzān (literally: “balance”) came to be commonly employed as an equivalent of manṭiq‬‬ ‫‪as a result of al-Ġazālī’s metaphorical use of the expression ʿilm al-mīzān (“science of balance”) to‬‬ ‫‪refer to logic (Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa, p. ). The analogy between logic and balance is also attested in‬‬ ‫‪Avicenna’s works (cf. e.g. Šifāʾ, Qiyās I., p. .–).‬‬

‫‪١٠‬ق‬

Chapter I.1  15

see and ascertain what we display, or when my memory fails me and they are not clear to my thought. I put a great effort into abridging the expressions and in avoiding repetition at all, except when it occurred by mistake or fault. Also, I refrained from dwelling upon the refutation of some doctrines that are evidently false or for which it is sufficient to deal with the principles that we established and the rules that we made [the reader] know.

[. The relation of the Book to the philosophical tradition] It cannot be found in the books of the Ancients anything that was accounted a Q10 matter of importance that we did not include in this book of ours. If it cannot be found in the place in which it is customary to establish it, it is to be found in another place that I deemed more suitable for it. I [also] added to that something that I acquired by my own reflection and that I attained by my theoretical inquiry, especially with regard to the science of nature and what is after it2, but [also] with regard to the science of logic, for those who wish. It is customary to extend the principles of logic with things that do not pertain to logic, belonging rather to the sapiential discipline, that is, First Philosophy; I avoided to introduce anything of this [in logic] and to waste time on it, postponing its exposition to its place.

[. The relation of the Book of Healing to other works by Avicenna] [.. The Book of Healing and the Appendices] Then I deemed it appropriate to make another book follow this one: I will call it Book of the Appendices3, it will end with my life and be updated with all that will be accomplished each year. It will be like an explanation of this book, a deduction of the corollaries from the principles contained in it and an extension of the concise [exposition] of its meanings.

 I.e. Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics.  Book of the Appendices (Kitāb al-Lawāḥiq): the nature and content of this work are obscure; see Commentary.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ا ٔول ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫)‪ (.‬وﱄ ﻛﺘﺎب ﲑ ﻫﺬ ﻦ اﻟﻜ ﺎﺑﲔ ٔوردت ﻓ ﻪ اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ ﲆ ﻣﺎ ﱔ ﰲ اﻟﻄﺒﻊ و ﲆ ﻣﺎ ﯾﻮﺟ ﻪ اﻟﺮ ٔي‬ ‫ﺷﻖ ﻋﺼﺎﱒ ﻣﺎ ﯾُﺘﻘﻰ ﰲ ﲑﻩ وﻫﻮ‬ ‫اﻟﴫﱖ ا ي ﻻ ﺮاﻋﻰ ﻓ ﻪ ﺎﻧﺐ اﻟﴩﰷء ﰲ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ وﻻ ﯾُﺘﻘﻰ ﻓ ﻪ ﻣﻦ ّ‬ ‫ﻛﺘﺎﰊ ﰲ اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ اﳌﴩﻗ ﺔ‪ .‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻜ ﺎب ﻓ ٔﻛﱶ ﺴﻄﺎ و ٔﺷﺪّ ﻣﻊ اﻟﴩﰷء ﻣﻦ اﳌﺸّ ﺎﺋﲔ ﻣﺴﺎ ﺪة‪ .‬وﻣﻦ‬ ‫اﳊﻖ ﲆ ﻃﺮﯾﻖ ﻓ ﻪ ّ‬ ‫ﺮض ﻣﺎ إﱃ‬ ‫اﳊﻖ ا ي ﻻ َﻣ ْﺠ َﻤ َ ﺔ ﻓ ﻪ ﻓﻌﻠﯿﻪ ﺑﻄﻠﺐ ذ اﻟﻜ ﺎب؛ وﻣﻦ ٔراد ّ‬ ‫ٔراد ّ‬ ‫اﻟﴩﰷء وﺴﻂ ﻛﺜﲑ وﺗﻠﻮﱖ ﲟﺎ ﻟﻮ ﻓُﻄﻦ اﺳ ُﺘﻐﲏ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻜ ﺎب ا ٓﺧﺮ ﻓﻌﻠﯿﻪ ﲠﺬا اﻟﻜ ﺎب‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬وﳌّﺎ اﻓ ﺘﺤﺖ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻜ ﺎب اﺑﺘﺪ ٔت ﳌﻨﻄﻖ وﲢﺮﯾﺖ ٔن ٔ ﺎذي ﺑﻪ ﺮﺗ ﺐ ﻛﺘﺐ ﺻﺎﺣﺐ اﳌﻨﻄــﻖ‬ ‫و ٔوردت ﰲ ذ ﻣﻦ ا ٔﴎار واﻠﻄﺎﺋﻒ ﻣﺎ ﲣﻠﻮ ﻋﻨﻪ اﻟﻜ ﺐ اﳌﻮﺟﻮدة‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ّ (.‬ﰒ ﺗﻠﻮﺗﻪ ﻟﻌﲅ اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﻲ ﻓﲅ ﯾﺘّﻔﻖ ﱄ ﰲ ٔﻛﱶ ا ٔﺷﯿﺎء ﳏﺎذاة ﺗﺼﻨﯿﻒ اﳌ ُ ْﺆﰎ ﺑﻪ ﰲ ﻫــﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ــﺔ‬ ‫وﺗﺬاﻛﲑﻩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻠﻠﺖ ﻓ ﻪ ُ‬ ‫)‪ّ (.‬ﰒ ﺗﻠﻮﺗﻪ ﻟﻬﻨﺪﺳﺔ ﻓﺎﺧ ﴫت ﻛﺘﺎب ا ٔ ْﺳﻄﻘﺴﺎت ٔوﻗﻠﯿﺪس اﺧ ﺼﺎرا ﻟﻄﯿﻔﺎ و ُ‬ ‫اﻟﺸ َﺒﻪ‬ ‫واﻗ ﴫت ﻠﯿﻪ‪ّ .‬ﰒ اردﻓ ﻪ ﺧ ﺼﺎر ﻛﺬ ﻟﻜ ﺎب ا ﺴﻄﻲ ﰲ اﻟﻬﯿﺌﺔ ﯾﺘﻀ ّﻤﻦ ﻣﻊ ﺧ ﺼﺎر ﺑﯿﺎ وﺗﻔــﻬ‬ ‫و ٔﳊﻘﺖ ﺑﻪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺰ دات ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﻔﺮاغ ﻣ ﻪ ﻣﺎ وﺟﺐ ٔن ﯾﻌﲅ ّ‬ ‫اﳌﺘﻌﲅ ﺣﱴ ﯾ ُ ِﱲ ﺑﻪ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ وﯾﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﻓ ﻪ ﺑــﲔ‬ ‫ا ٔﺣﲀم اﻟﺮﺻﺪﯾﺔ واﻟﻘﻮاﻧﲔ اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﯿﺔ‪ّ .‬ﰒ ﺗﻠﻮﺗُﻪ ﺧ ﺼﺎر ﻟﻄﯿــﻒ ﻟــﻜ ﺎب اﳌــﺪ ﻞ ﰲ اﳊﺴﺎب‪ّ .‬ﰒ ﺧـﳣﺖ‬ ‫‪ّ ] The ink vanished in MS Ṣ.‬‬ ‫ﺮض …ﻃﺮﯾﻖ ‪‬‬ ‫‪] Šifāʾ, Samāʿ Ṭabīʿī, p. .–.‬وﺗﺬاﻛﲑﻩ ‪ّ … ‬ﰒ ‪] Manṭiq al-Mašriqiyyīn, p. .–. ‬اﳌﴩﻗ ﺔ ‪… ‬وﱄ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ add. νAMiŠ mg.N‬ﻠﯿﻪ ]ﱔ | ‪ JT‬ﻛﲈ ] ﲆ ﻣﺎ | ‪ ν‬اﳊﳬﺔ ]اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ | ‪ E‬ﻫﺬﻩ ]ﻓ ﻪ | ‪ om. ξ add. in mg. N‬اﻟﻜ ﺎب ‪… ‬وﱄ ‪‬‬ ‫]اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ | ‪ om. Ṣ‬ﰲ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ | ‪ Di mg.N‬اﻟﺼﺤﯿﺢ ‪ om. JT‬اﻟﴫﱖ ‪ om. et add. s.l. Di ‬ﰲ | ‪ add. Ṣ‬ﻠﳱﺎ ‪add. i.l. NkTo‬‬ ‫ﺷﻖ | ‪ κ‬ﻓﻼ ]وﻻ | ‪ Br‬اﻟﺼﻨﻌﺔ‬ ‫‪ in mg. B‬اﳊﳬﺔ ‪ s.l. Nk‬اﳊﳬﺔ ]اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ | ‪ mg. N‬ﻛﺘﺎب ]ﻛﺘﺎﰊ ‪ in mg. Yi ‬ﻣﻦ ﺷﻖ ‪ et‬ﳾء ]ﻣﻦ ّ‬ ‫‪ EYi‬ﺑﻪ ‪ et s.l. Y‬ﺑﻪ ] | ‪ ν‬إﱃ ﻣﺎ ]ﲟﺎ ‪ s.l. B om. Br ‬ﻣﺎ ‪ A mg. N ‬ﳁﻦ ]وﻣﻦ | ‪ Yi‬ﻣﻦ ]ﻣﻊ | ‪ ν‬اﳊﳬﺔ ‪ in mg. C‬اﳊﳬﯿﺔ‬ ‫ﳌﻨﻄﻖ ‪ ν‬ﳌﲒان ] ﳌﻨﻄﻖ | ‪ κToŠG‬ﻓﺎﺑﺘﺪ ٔت ]اﺑﺘﺪ ٔت ‪ om. Ka ‬ا ٓﺧﺮ | ‪ praem. A iter. As‬ذ ]‪‬اﻟﻜ ﺎب | ‪ ι‬ﻻﺳﺘﻐﲏ ]اﺳ ُﺘﻐﲏ‬ ‫‪ s.l. Y‬اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ‪ ν‬اﳌﲒان ]اﳌﻨﻄﻖ | ‪ om. Da‬ﺻــﺎﺣﺐ | ‪ Di‬اﺑــﻨﺎذي ] ٔ ﺎذي | ‪ add. Ṣ‬ﻓ ــﻪ ‪ add. s.l. Y‬ﻓ ــﻪ ]وﲢـﺮﯾﺖ | ‪in mg. Y‬‬ ‫‪ i.l. Te‬اﳌﻘ ﺪى ‪ T‬اﳌﻌﱰ ]اﳌُﺆْ ﰎ | ‪ No‬ﳏﺎذات ]ﳏﺎذاة ‪ add. Br ‬ﰲ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻔﻦ ]اﳌﻮﺟــﻮدة | ‪ iter. T‬ﻋﻨــﻪ | ‪ τ‬ﻓ ٔوردت ]و ٔوردت ‪‬‬ ‫‪ i.l.‬ﻣﻀﻤﻦ ]ﯾﺘﻀ ّﻤﻦ | ‪ G‬اﻟﻜ ﺎب ]ﻟﻜ ﺎب ‪ iter. As ‬ﻓ ﻪ | ‪ i.l. Y‬ا ٔﺳﻄﻘﺴﺎت ‪ ν‬ا ٔﺻﻮل ]ا ٔ ْﺳﻄﻘﺴﺎت | ‪ add. Br‬ﻓ ﻪ ]ﻓﺎﺧ ﴫت ‪‬‬ ‫‪ s.l.‬ﻣﻦ | ‪ om. Br‬ﺑﻪ ‪ N ‬وﺗﻌﻠﲈ ]وﺗﻔﻬ | ‪ κμE p.c. Y‬ﺗﻔﻬ وﺑﯿﺎ ]ﺑﯿﺎ وﺗﻔﻬ | ‪ G‬ﻓ ﻀﻤﻦ ‪ in mg. C‬ﻓ ﻀﻤﻦ ‪ in mg. B‬ﻣ ﻀﻤﻦ ‪Nk‬‬ ‫‪ ξYi‬ﻣﻦ ‪ i.l. T om. κ‬ﺑﲔ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. Br‬ﻓ ﻪ | ‪ Ed.‬ﺗﱲ ]ﯾ ُ ِﱲ | ‪ ζιNkCṢ‬ﯾﻌﻠﻤﻪ ]ﯾﻌﲅ | ‪ٔ T‬وﺟﺐ ]وﺟﺐ | ‪J‬‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫ﺷﻖ اﻟﻌﺼﺎ ﻛﻨﺎﯾﺔ ﻋﻦ ﺧ ﻼف ﰲ ٔﻣﺮ اﺟﳣﻊ ﻠﯿﻪ ﻗﻮم ﻛﲈ ﯾﻘﺎل ﰲ اﳋﻮارج‪ :‬ﯾﻨﻔﻮا ﻋﺼﺎ اﳌﺴﻠﻤﲔ ٔي اﻧﻌﺎ ﻢ واﺟ ﻋﻬــﻢ وا ﺸــﻘﺖ ]ﺷـ ّـﻖ ﻋﺼﺎﱒ‬ ‫ﶍ ﺔ ﶍﺞ ‪ [Lisān al-ʿArab, II.] in mg. A‬ﶍﺞ اﻟﺮ ﻞ ﰲ ﱪﻩ إذا ﱂ ﯾﺒ ﻪ ] َﻣ ْﺠ َﻤ َ ﺔ ‪ in mg. Te ‬اﻟﻌﺼﺎ ٔي ﺗﻔﺮق ﺟ ع ب ه‬ ‫‪ Di‬اﻟﺮ ﻞ ﰲ ﱪﻩ إذا ﱂ ﯾﺒﲔ ﻣﺎ ﰲ ]***[‬

‫‪] Paragraph . about Avicenna’s Falsafa Mašriqiyya is absent from MSS NoN (in MS‬اﻟﻜ ﺎب ‪… ‬وﱄ ‪‬‬ ‫‪N it is integrated in the margin). Notably, this is the only section of Avicenna’s prologue to deal with a‬‬ ‫‪work different from the Šifāʾ (except for paragraph . on the Kitāb al-Lawāḥiq, which is, however,‬‬ ‫‪strictly related to the Šifāʾ).‬‬ ‫‪] The substitution of falsafa with ḥikma is part of the lexical revision that is systematic up to‬اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔ ــﺔ‬ ‫‪chap. I. in MSS YYi.‬‬

‫‪١١‬ق‬

Chapter I.1  17

[.. The Book of Healing and the Eastern Philosophy] I also have another book besides these two, in which I introduced philosophy as it is in [its own] nature and according to what a frank point of view requires, without caring to side with the colleagues in the discipline or fearing to dissent with their community like in other books: it is my book on Eastern Philosophy. As to the present book, it is more extended and more in accordance with the Peripatetic colleagues. Whoever seeks the truth without any obscurity4, must look for that book5; whoever, [on the other hand], seeks the truth with some concession to the colleagues, a great extent and an allusion to that which, if understood, would make the other book superfluous, must [look for] this book6.

[. The contents of the Book] [.. Logic] When I began this book, I started with [the section on] logic, in which I tried to Q11 parallel the order of the books of the Master of logic7, and I set forth in it the secrets and the subtleties that are not found in the existing books.

[.. Natural Philosophy] Then, I made [the section on] natural science follow it8. In most cases, I could not proceed in parallelism with the work of the [philosopher] that is followed as an example in this discipline9 and with his Hypomnemata.

[.. Mathematics] Then, I made geometry follow it. I made a subtle abridgement of Euclid’s Book of the Elements, and solved the ambiguities in it, confining myself to this. Then, I  Mağmağa: the word gave rise, in the manuscript tradition, to marginal annotations referring to the lexicographic tradition (in mss. ADi, quoting the Lisān al-ʿArab s.v. mağmağ). In Lisān al-ʿArab, more in detail, the term mağmağa is referred to the confusion and obscurity that are produced in the text of a book by alterations of the original readings (vol. II, pp. –).  I.e. the Eastern Philosophy (Falsafa Mašriqiyya).  I.e. the Šifāʾ.  I.e. Aristotle.  I.e. the section on Logic.  I.e. Aristotle.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ا ٔول ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ﺻــﻨﺎ ﺔ اﻟﺮ ﺿــﯿﲔ ﺑﻌــﲅ اﳌﻮﺳــﯿﻘﻰ ــﲆ اﻟﻮ ــﻪ ا ي ا ﻜﺸــﻒ ﱄ ﻣــﻊ ﲝﺚ ﻃـﻮﯾﻞ وﻧﻈــﺮ دﻗ ــﻖ ــﲆ‬ ‫ﺧ ﺼﺎر‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ّ (.‬ﰒ ﺧﳣﺖ اﻟﻜ ﺎب ﻟﻌﲅ اﳌ ﺴﻮب إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﺔ ﲆ ٔﻗﺴﺎﻣﻪ ووﺟﻮﻫﻪ ﻣﺸﺎرا ﻓ ﻪ إﱃ ُﲨَﻞ‬ ‫ﻣﻦ ﲅ ا ٔ ﻼق واﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﺎت إﱃ ٔن ٔﺻﻨّﻒ ﻓﳱﺎ ﻛﺘﺎ ﺎﻣﻌﺎ ﻣﻔﺮدا‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (‬وﻫﺬا اﻟﻜ ﺎب وٕان ﰷن ﺻﻐﲑ اﳊﺠﻢ ﻓﻬﻮ ﻛﺜﲑ اﻟﻌﲅ وﲀد ﻻ ﯾﻔﻮت ﻣ ٔ ّﻣ وﻣ ﺪ ّﺮﻩ ٔﻛﱶ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ إﱃ‬ ‫ز دات ﱂ ﲡﺮ اﻟﻌﺎدة ﺴﲈﻋﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻛﺘﺐ ٔﺧﺮى‪.‬‬ ‫و ٔول اﶺﻞ اﻟﱵ ﻓ ﻪ ﻫﻮ ﲅ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ وﻗ ﻞ ٔن ﴩع ﰲ ﲅ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ﻓ ﺤﻦ ﺸﲑ إﱃ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﻫــﺬﻩ اﻟﻌﻠــﻮم‬ ‫إﺷﺎرة ﻣﻮﺟﺰة ﻟﯿﻜﻮن اﳌﺘﺪ ّﺮ ﻟﻜ ﺎﺑﻨﺎ ﻫﺬا ّ‬ ‫ﰷﳌﻄﻠﻊ ﲆ ُﲨَﻞ ﻣﻦ ا ٔﻏﺮاض‪.‬‬

‫‪ٔ om. et‬ن | ‪ a.c. B‬ا ٔ ﻼ ]ا ٔ ﻼق ‪ Ṣ ‬وﺟﻮﻫﻪ ‪ Ṣ‬وﺟﻮﻩ ]ووﺟﻮﻫﻪ | ‪ Da‬و ] ﲆ ‪ Br ‬ﻜ ﺎب ‪ om. et add. s.l. Ṣ²‬ﺑﻌﲅ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ add. et del. Ka om. et‬ﻣﻔﺮدا ]ﻛﺘﺎ | ‪ ικNkDaN om. et add. in mg. Ṣ‬ﻓ ﻪ ]ﻓﳱﺎ | ‪ٔ ATYi‬ﺿﯿﻒ ] ٔﺻﻨّﻒ | ‪add. s.l. Ṣ‬‬ ‫‪ s.l. Y‬اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ‪ ν‬اﳌﲒان ]‪‬اﳌﻨﻄﻖ | ‪ EDiTe om. Yi‬ا ي ]اﻟﱵ ‪ s.l. Ṣ² ‬اﻟﻌﲅ ‪ Ṣ‬اﻟﻨﻔﻊ ]اﻟﻌﲅ | ‪ No‬ﺒﲑ ]ﻛﺜﲑ ‪add. s.l. Te ‬‬ ‫‪ Yi‬ﻓ ﺸﲑ ] ﺸﲑ | ‪ in mg. To add. in mg. Y‬ﻓ ﺤﻦ ‪ et‬ﻫﺬﻩ ‪ Da om. νDiŠG‬ﳓﻦ ]ﻓ ﺤﻦ | ‪ in mg. Y‬اﳌﻨﻄــﻖ ‪ ν‬اﳌـﲒان ]‪‬اﳌﻨﻄــﻖ‬ ‫‪ εBrETCTeNo‬ﰷﳌﺘﻄﻠﻊ ] ّ‬ ‫ﰷﳌﻄﻠﻊ | ‪ om. No‬ﻫﺬا ‪ om. κ exp. G ‬ﻫﺬﻩ‬

Chapter I.1  19

completed it with an analogous abridgement of the Book of the Almagest on astronomy which includes, despite the abridged form, [also] some clarification and instruction. After completing it, I [also] made some additions that the student ought to know to perfect10 the discipline by them and to establish with regard to them a correspondence between the judgements based on [astronomical] observations and the natural laws. Then, I made a subtle abridgement of the Book of the Introduction to Arithmetic follow this one. Finally, I closed mathematics with the science of music, in the way that was disclosed to me after long research and minute inquiry, in the form of an abridgement.

[.. Metaphysics] Then, I closed the book with the science concerning what is after nature11, according to its sections and aspects, providing in it an indication of the complexes of ethics and politics, until I compose on these subjects a single comprehensive book12.

[. Concluding remarks on the nature of the Book of Healing] This book, though small in size, is large with regard to the science [it contains], and most of the discipline will hardly be missed by whoever considers it attentively and ponders it up to the additions that it is not customary to learn from other books. The first of its sections is the science of logic. Before we start with it, we ourselves shall briefly indicate what these sciences are, so that he who ponders this book of ours becomes like he who gets acquainted with the complexes of the purposes.

 Reading yutimma bihi instead of tatimma bihi, according to an emendation already proposed by G .  That is, Metaphysics.  Apparently, the book on Ethics and Politics here announced was not composed.

‫]اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ[‬ ‫ﻓﺼﻞ ﰲ اﻟﺘﻨ ﻪ ﲆ اﻟﻌﻠﻮم واﳌﻨﻄﻖ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫)‪ (.‬ﻓ ﻘﻮل ا ّٕن اﻟﻐﺮض ﰲ اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ ٔن ﯾُﻮﻗَﻒ ﲆ ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ ا ٔﺷﯿﺎء ﳇّﻬﺎ ﲆ ﻗﺪر ﻣﺎ ﳝﻜﻦ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ٔن‬ ‫ﯾﻘﻒ ﻠﯿﻪ‪ .‬وا ٔﺷﯿﺎء اﳌﻮﺟﻮدة ٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔﺷﯿﺎء ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة ﰲ ا ٔﻋﯿﺎن ﻟ ﺲ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ﺧ ﯿﺎر وﻓﻌﻠﻨﺎ وٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔﺷﯿﺎء‬ ‫وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ﺧ ﯿﺎر وﻓﻌﻠﻨﺎ‪ .‬وﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ا ٔﻣﻮر اﻟﱵ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﺴﻢ ا ٔ ّول ﺴ ّﻤﻰ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﺔ ﻧﻈﺮﯾﺔ وﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ا ٔﻣﻮر اﻟﱵ‬ ‫ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﺴ ّﻤﻰ ﻓﻠﺴﻔﺔ ﲻﻠﯿﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫واﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ اﻟﻨﻈﺮﯾﺔ ٕاﻧ ّﲈ اﻟﻐﺎﯾﺔ ﻓﳱﺎ ﳬﯿﻞ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﺑ ٔن ﺗﻌﲅ ﻓﻘﻂ واﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ اﻟﻌﻤﻠﯿﺔ ٕاﻧ ّﲈ اﻟﻐﺎﯾﺔ ﻓﳱﺎ ﳬﯿﻞ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ‬ ‫ﻻ ﺑ ٔن ﺗﻌﲅ ﻓﻘﻂ ﺑﻞ ﺑ ٔن ﺗﻌﲅ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻌﻤﻞ ﺑﻪ ﻓ ﻌﻤﻞ‪ .‬ﻓﺎﻟﻨﻈﺮﯾﺔ ﺎ ﳤﺎ اﻋﺘﻘﺎد ر ٔي ﻟ ﺲ ﺑﻌﻤﻞ واﻟﻌﻤﻠﯿــﺔ ﺎ ــﳤﺎ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ر ٔي ﻫﻮ ﰲ ﲻﻞ ﻓﺎﻟﻨﻈﺮﯾﺔ ٔ ْوﱃ ﺑ ٔن ﺗُ َﺴﺐ إﱃ اﻟﺮ ٔي‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (..‬وا ٔﺷﯿﺎء اﳌﻮﺟﻮدة ﰲ ا ٔﻋﯿﺎن اﻟﱵ ﻟ ﺲ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ﺧ ﯿﺎر وﻓﻌــﻠﻨﺎ ﱔ ﻟﻘﺴﻤــﺔ ا ٔوﱃ ــﲆ‬ ‫ْ‬ ‫ﻗﺴﻤﲔ‪ ٔ :‬ﺪﻫﲈ ا ٔﻣﻮر اﻟﱵ ﲣﺎﻟﻂ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ واﻟﺜﺎﱐ ا ٔﻣﻮر اﻟﱵ ﻻ ﲣﺎﻟﻂ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻣ ﻞ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ واﻟﺒﺎرئ‪.‬‬ ‫‪, Iḥṣāʾ al-‬‬

‫‪-F‬‬

‫‪] Cf. A‬ﲻﻠﯿﺔ ‪ … ‬وا‬

‫‪ ] Cf. A -K‬ﻠﯿﻪ ‪… ‬اﻟﻐﺮض ‪‬‬ ‫ٔﺷﯿﺎء ‪, Kitāb fī l-Falsafa l-Ūlā, p. .–. ‬‬ ‫‪ʿUlūm, p. .–; Id., Risāla ṣudira bihā al-Kitāb, p. .–.‬‬

‫‪] Dānišnāmah-yi ʿAlāʾī, Ilāhiyyāt‬ﲻﻠﯿــﺔ ‪ … ‬وا ٔﺷــﯿﺎء ‪] Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt I., p. .–.. ‬اﻟــﺮ ٔي ‪… ‬ﻓ ﻘــﻮل ‪‬‬ ‫‪] Risāla fī Aqsām al-ʿUlūm al-ʿAqliyya,‬ﲻﻠﯿــﺔ ‪ … ‬وﻣﻌﺮﻓــﺔ ‪p. .–.; Manṭiq al-Mašriqiyyīn, p. .–. ‬‬ ‫‪] Risāla fī Aqsām al‬اﻟﺮ ٔي ‪ … ‬واﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ | ‪] Manṭiq al-Mašriqiyyīn, p. .–.‬ﻓ ﻌــﻤﻞ ‪ … ‬واﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔــﺔ ‪p. .. ‬‬‫‪] Risāla fī Aqsām‬ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺔ ‪ … ‬وا ٔﺷﯿﺎء ‪ʿUlūm al-ʿAqliyya, p. .–; Šifāʾ, Nafs V., pp. .–.. ‬‬ ‫‪al-ʿUlūm al-ʿAqliyya, p. .–..‬‬ ‫ا ٔﻋﺮاض ‪ πDiDa‬ﲆ ا ٔﻏﺮاض ﰲ اﻟﻌﻠﻮم ] ﲆ اﻟﻌﻠﻮم | ‪ Mi‬اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﻦ ا ٔول ﻣﻦ ﲨ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ‪ Y‬اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ]ﻓﺼﻞ ‪‬‬ ‫ﻟ ٕﻼ ﺴﺎن ‪ om. et‬ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن | ‪ C‬ﺣﻘ ﻘﺔ ]ﺣﻘﺎﺋﻖ | ‪ ν‬اﳊﳬﺔ ]اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ ‪ ξADa ‬وﰲ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ‪ ν‬واﳌﲒان ]واﳌﻨﻄﻖ | ‪ add. in mg. JNkBG‬ﰲ‬ ‫ﻼ ﺴﺎن ‪in mg. Te‬‬ ‫]وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ‪ om. N ‬وﻓﻌﻠﻨﺎ ‪ … ‬وٕا ّﻣﺎ | ‪ om. κBEd. exp. Ṣ²‬ﰲ ا ٔﻋﯿﺎن | ‪ add. κ‬ﰲ ا ٔﻋﯿﺎن ]اﳌﻮﺟﻮدة ‪ As ‬ﻟ ٕ‬ ‫… ‪‬وﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ | ‪ i.l. Y‬ﻓﻠﺴﻔﺔ ‪ ν‬ﺣﳬﺔ ]ﻓﻠﺴﻔﺔ | ‪ om. G‬ا ٔﻣﻮر… ‪‬اﻟﱵ | ‪ om. Br‬اﻟﱵ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. J‬وﻓﻌﻠﻨﺎ | ‪ To‬ﺟﻮﻫﺎ‬ ‫‪ om. et add. in‬ﻻ ‪… ‬ﺑ ٔن | ‪ ν‬واﳊﳬﺔ ]‪‬واﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ ‪ i.l. Y ‬ﻓﻠﺴﻔﺔ ‪ ν‬ﺣﳬﺔ ]ﻓﻠﺴﻔﺔ ‪ in mg. Ṣ ‬وﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ا ٔﻣﻮر اﻟﱵ ‪ τ‬وﻣﻌﺮﻓﳤﺎ ]‪‬اﻟﱵ‬ ‫‪ om. et add. in mg.‬ﺑﻞ…ﻻ ‪ iter. No ‬اﻟﻨﻔﺲ | ‪  om. et add. in mg. Da‬ﳬﯿﻞ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ | ‪ ν‬واﳊﳬﺔ ]‪‬واﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ | ‪mg. G‬‬ ‫‪ add. et‬ﺑ ٔن ]‪‬ﺗﻌﲅ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. J om. et add. s.l. N‬ﺑ ٔن | ‪ om. et add. s.l. Br‬ﺑﻞ | ‪ a.c. Ka‬ﺗﻌﻤﻞ ]‪‬ﺗﻌﲅ | ‪Ṣ²‬‬ ‫‪ om. et add. s.l. To²‬ر ٔي ‪ JT ‬واﻟﻨﻈﺮﯾﺔ ]ﻓﺎﻟﻨﻈﺮﯾﺔ | ‪ in mg. Ṣ²‬ﻓ ﻌﻤﻞ ‪ Ṣ‬ﻓﻘﻂ ]ﻓ ﻌﻤﻞ | ‪ Ed.‬ﻣﺎ ﯾُﻌﻤﻞ ‪ om. No‬ﻣﺎ ﺗﻌﻤﻞ | ‪exp. J‬‬ ‫‪ in mg. Y‬ﻣ ﺎ وﻓﻌﻞ ‪ JDiToŠG‬ﺧ ﯿﺎر ﻣـ ﺎ وﻓــﻌﻞ ] ﺧ ــﯿﺎر وﻓﻌــﻠﻨﺎ | ‪ s.l. N‬ﺧ ــﯿﺎر ‪ et‬ﺑﻘــﺪرﺗﻨﺎ ] ﺧ ــﯿﺎر ‪ EDa ‬واﻟﻨﻈﺮﯾــﺔ ]ﻓﺎﻟﻨﻈﺮﯾــﺔ‬ ‫‪ add. N‬ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ]واﻟﺒﺎرئ | ‪ Ṣ‬اﻟﺒﺎرئ واﻟﻌﻘﻞ ]اﻟﻌﻘﻞ واﻟﺒﺎرئ ‪‬‬ ‫‪] MSS DaDiToMiŠ preserve the title in the form faṣl fī l-tanbīh ʿalā al-aġrāḍ fī l-ʿulūm wa‬واﳌﻨﻄﻖ…ﻓﺼﻞ ‪‬‬‫‪l-manṭiq (“chapter on directing the attention towards the purposes of the sciences and logic”), and‬‬ ‫‪MSS JNkBG add al-aġrāḍ fī in the margin, likely by collation. In the indices of contents transmitted‬‬ ‫‪by the manuscript tradition, the title of the second chapter is always mentioned as faṣl fī l-tanbīh ʿalā‬‬ ‫‪l-ʿulūm wa-l-manṭiq, even in MSS DaDiToMiŠ. The variant reading might be a later modification of the‬‬ ‫‪title based on Avicenna’s mention of the “purpose of philosophy” at the very beginning of the‬‬ ‫‪chapter.‬‬

‫‪١٢‬ق‬

C

[I.]

[. Theoretical and practical philosophy]

[.. Objects and purposes of theoretical and practical philosophy] We will thus say that the purpose in philosophy is to understand the real Q12 essences of all things, as far as man is able to understand. Existing things are either things that exist in the concrete instantiations whose existence is not by our choice and action or things whose existence depends on our choice and action. The knowledge of the things that belong to the first division is called ‘theoretical philosophy’, whereas the knowledge of the things that belong to the second division is called ‘practical philosophy’. The aim of theoretical philosophy is perfecting the soul only insofar as the soul knows. The aim of practical philosophy is perfecting the soul not only insofar as it knows, but rather insofar as it knows that by virtue of which it acts and, thereby, acts. The aim of theoretical [philosophy] is the firm belief in a view which does not involve an action, whereas the aim of practical [philosophy] is the knowledge of a view which does involve an action. So, theoretical [philosophy] is worthier to be put in relation to the view [than practical philosophy].

[.. Beings that do not exist because of human choice or action] [... A classification of this kind of beings] Things that exist in the concrete instantiations whose existence does not depend on our choice and action are, [in turn], divided by a first division into two: [(a)] one of which [consists of] the things that are mixed with motion; [(b)] the second [consists of] the things that are not mixed with motion, like the Intellect and the Creator.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫وا ٔﻣﻮر اﻟﱵ ﲣﺎﻟﻂ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﲆ ﴐ ْﺑﲔ‪ٕ :‬ا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻻ وﺟﻮد ﻟﻬﺎ ا ّٕﻻ ﲝﯿﺚ ﳚﻮز ٔن ﲣﺎﻟﻂ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻣ ﻞ‬ ‫ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ واﻟﱰﺑﯿﻊ وﻣﺎ ﺷﺎﺑﻪ ذ وٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻟﻬﺎ وﺟﻮد ﻣﻦ دون ذ ‪ .‬ﻓﺎﳌﻮﺟﻮدات اﻟﱵ ﻻ وﺟﻮد ﻟﻬﺎ ا ّٕﻻ‬ ‫ﲝﯿﺚ ﳚﻮز ﻠﳱﺎ ﳐﺎﻟﻄﺔ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﲆ ْ‬ ‫ﯾﺼﺢ ﻠﳱﺎ ٔن ُﲡﺮد‬ ‫ﻗﺴﻤﲔ‪ٕ :‬ا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻻ ﰲ اﻟﻘﻮام وﻻ ﰲ اﻟﻮﱒ ّ‬ ‫ﯾﺼﺢ ــﻠﳱﺎ ذ ﰲ اﻟــﻮﱒ دون اﻟﻘـﻮام ﻣـ ﻞ‬ ‫اﻟﻔﺮﺳﯿﺔ وٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ّ‬ ‫ﻋﻦ ﻣﺎدّة ﻣﻌ ّﯿﻨﺔ ﺼﻮرة ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ و َ‬ ‫ﯾﺼﺢ ٔن‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮرﻩ إﱃ ٔن ُﳜ َّﺺ ﺑﻨﻮع ﻣﺎدّة ٔو ﯾُﻠْﺘﻔﺖ إﱃ ﺎل ﺣﺮﻛﺔ‪ .‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ا ٔﻣﻮر اﻟﱵ ّ‬ ‫اﻟﱰﺑﯿﻊ ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﻻ ُ ْﳛ ِﻮج ّ‬ ‫ﯾﺼﺢ‬ ‫ﲣﺎﻟﻂ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ وﻟﻬﺎ وﺟﻮد دون ذ ﻓﻬﻲ ﻣ ﻞ اﻟﻬﻮﯾﺔ واﻟﻮ ﺪة واﻟﻜﱶة واﻟﻌﻠّﯿﺔ‪ .‬ﻓ ﻜﻮن ا ٔﻣﻮر اﻟﱵ ّ‬ ‫ﲱ َﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮب وٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻻ ﻜﻮن ﲱّﳤُ ﺎ ّ‬ ‫ﻠﳱﺎ ٔن ﲡﺮد ﻋﻦ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﲱّﳤُ ﺎ ّ‬ ‫ﲱ َﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮب ﺑﻞ‬ ‫ﻜﻮن ﲝﯿﺚ ﻻ ﳝﺘﻨﻊ ﻟﻬﺎ ذ ﻣ ﻞ ﺎل اﻟﻮ ﺪة واﻟﻬﻮﯾﺔ واﻟﻌﻠّﯿﺔ واﻟﻌﺪد ا ي ﻫﻮ اﻟﻜﱶة‪.‬‬ ‫اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ٕا ﳱﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ‬ ‫)‪ (..‬وﻫﺬﻩ ﻓ ٕﺎ ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﯾُﻨﻈﺮ ٕا ﳱﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﱔ ﻓﻼ ﯾﻔﺎرق ذ‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫اﻟﻨﻈﺮ َ‬ ‫ﳎﺮدة ﻓﺎٕﳖّ ﺎ ﻜﻮن ﻣﻦ ﲨ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ا ي ﻜﻮن ﰲ ا ٔﺷﯿﺎء ﻻ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﰲ ﻣﺎدّة‪ ،‬إذ ﱔ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ﱔ ﱔ ﻻ ﰲ ﻣﺎدّة؛ وٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﯾُﻨﻈﺮ ا ﳱﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻋﺮض ﻟــﻬﺎ ﻋــﺮض ﻻ ﻜــﻮن ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟــﻮد إﻻ ﰲ اﳌﺎدّة‪.‬‬ ‫ﯾﺼﺢ ّ‬ ‫وﻫﺬا ﲆ ْ‬ ‫ﺗﻮﳘﻪ ٔن ﻜﻮن إﻻ ﻣﻊ ﺴ ﺒــﺔ إﱃ اﳌﺎدّة اﻟﻨﻮﻋﯿــﺔ‬ ‫ﻗﺴﻤﲔ‪ٕ :‬ا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ذ اﻟﻌﺮض ﻻ ّ‬ ‫ﻄﻘﺴﺎت وﰲ‬ ‫واﳊﺮﻛﺔ — ﻣ ﻞ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ اﻟﻮا ﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻫﻮ ر ٔو ﻫﻮاء وﰲ اﻟﻜ ﲑ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻫﻮ ْﺳ ّ‬ ‫اﻟﻌ ّ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﻣ ﻼ ﺣﺮارة ٔو ﺮودة وﰲ اﳉﻮﻫﺮ اﻟﻌﻘﲇ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻫﻮ ﻧﻔﺲ ٔي ﻣ ﺪ ٔ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ ﺑﺪن‪،‬‬ ‫ﻓﺎٕﳖﺎ إﻣﺎ ] ٕا ّﻣﺎ | ‪ Br‬ﴐﺑﲔ ﲆ ﻗﺴﻤﲔ ‪ mg. BC s.l. Y‬ﻗﺴﻤﲔ ‪ in mg. NkT s.l. Ṣ²‬ﴐﺑﲔ ‪ ζιNkEṢ‬ﻗﺴﻤﲔ ‪ a.c. Y‬اﻟﴬﺑﲔ ]ﴐ ْﺑﲔ ‪‬‬ ‫ﰲ ]‪‬ﻟﻬﺎ | ‪ Da‬واﳌﻮﺟﻮدات ]ﻓﺎﳌﻮﺟﻮدات | ‪ As a.c. Te‬وﺟﻮد ﻟﻬﺎ ]ﻟﻬﺎ وﺟﻮد | ‪ add. G‬اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ﻣ ﻞ ]‪‬ﻟﻬﺎ | ‪ A‬ﺷ ٔﻧﻪ ]ﺷﺎﺑﻪ ‪ζηιEd. ‬‬ ‫‪ exp.‬ﻓﺎٕﳖﺎ ‪ ζηιṢEd.‬ﻓﺎٕﳖﺎ إﻣﺎ ] ٕا ّﻣﺎ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. T‬اﳊﺮﻛﺔ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. To‬ﳐﺎﻟﻄﺔ ‪ add. et exp. Yi ‬اﳋﺎرج‬ ‫ﻟﻬﺎ ] ﻠﳱﺎ ‪ As ‬اﻟﻌﻠﯿﺔ ]ا ٔﻣﻮر | ‪ Yi‬ﻓﻬﻮ ]ﻓﻬﻲ ‪ κ ‬ﻓ ٔﻣﺎ ]و ٔ ّﻣﺎ | ‪] Š‬ﳚﻮز ﺣ ﻨﺌﺬ[ ﳚﻮز ح ] ُ ْﳛ ِﻮج ‪ add. KaJT ‬ﻛﺬ ]ذ ‪Ṣ² ‬‬ ‫‪ om. et add.‬اﻟﻮﺟﻮب… وٕا ّﻣﺎ | ‪ Ka‬واﻟﺜﺎﱐ ]وٕا ّﻣﺎ | ‪ add. κ‬ﰷﻟﻌﻘﻞ واﻟﺒﺎرئ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ]‪‬اﻟﻮﺟﻮب | ‪ mg. C‬ﻠﳱﺎ ‪ et‬ﻟﻬﺎ ‪ i.l. Nk om. Yi‬ﻟﻬﺎ ‪Y‬‬ ‫اﻟﻬﻮﯾﺔ ]اﻟﻮ ﺪة واﻟﻬﻮﯾﺔ | ‪ om. ν‬ﺎل | ‪ٔ i.l. Y‬ي ‪ٔ praem. EYi‬ي ]ﻣ ﻞ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ²‬ﻟﻬﺎ ‪ Ṣ‬ﻠﳱﺎ ‪ Yi om. Ka‬ﻓﳱﺎ ]ﻟﻬﺎ ‪in mg. To ‬‬ ‫اﻟﻨﻈﺮ | ‪ Da‬وﻻ ]ﻓﻼ | ‪ J‬إﻣﺎ ]ﻓ ٕﺎ ّﻣﺎ ‪ om. et add. s.l. G ‬ﻫﻮ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. E‬واﻟﻌﻠّﯿﺔ | ‪ ν‬واﻟﻮ ﺪة‬ ‫‪ om. et add.‬ذ‬ ‫ُ‬ ‫ٕﳖّ‬ ‫اﻟﻨﻈﺮ | ‪in mg. DiTe om. G‬‬ ‫]‬ ‫اﻟﺼﺤﯿﺢ‬ ‫‪J‬‬ ‫‪om.‬‬ ‫‪EToŠ‬‬ ‫‪‬‬ ‫ﻜﻮن‬ ‫ﺎ‬ ‫ﺎ‬ ‫ﻓ‬ ‫]‬ ‫ﻜﻮن‬ ‫ﳕﺎ‬ ‫ا‬ ‫و‬ ‫‪Da‬‬ ‫ﻜﻮن‬ ‫ٕﻧﻪ‬ ‫ﺎ‬ ‫ﻓ‬ ‫‪Mi‬‬ ‫|‬ ‫اﻟﻨﻈﺮ‬ ‫‪om.‬‬ ‫‪et‬‬ ‫‪add. s.l. To²‬‬ ‫ٕ‬ ‫َ‬ ‫‪ add. Ṣ et exp. Ṣ²‬ﻓﺎٕﻧﻪ ‪ add. i.l. T‬ﻓﺎٕﻧﻪ ] ْ‬ ‫ﻗﺴﻤﲔ ‪ Ed. ‬وﺟﻮد ]اﻟﻮﺟﻮد | ‪ om. Yi‬ﻋﺮض | ‪ om. No‬ﺣ ﺚ ‪ μ ‬اﻟﱵ ]ا ي‬ ‫‪ κ‬وﻫﻮاء ] ٔو ﻫﻮاء | ‪ JT‬و ﳊﺮﻛﺔ ]واﳊﺮﻛﺔ ‪ om. No ‬ﻣﺎدّة ‪… ‬اﻟﻨﻮﻋﯿﺔ | ‪ Y‬ﺴ ﻪ ] ﺴﺒﺔ | ‪ٔ  om. N‬ن ﻜﻮن | ‪ G‬ﺗﻮﱒ ] ّ‬ ‫ﺗﻮﳘــﻪ‬ ‫ﻄﻘﺴﺎت‬ ‫] ٔو ﺮودة | ‪ Te‬ﻣ ﻞ ‪ add. in mg. As‬ﻣ ﻞ ‪ om. DaN om. et‬ﻣ ﻼ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. J‬ﺣ ﺚ ‪ Y ‬اﺳﻄﻘﺼﺎت ] ْﺳ ّ‬ ‫‪ κ‬وﺮودة‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫ٔي اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ]اﻟﻘﻮام ‪ in mg. NkB ‬ﯾﻌﲏ ٔن اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ ا ٔوﱃ ﰷﻧﺖ ﲆ ﺳ ﻞ ا ٔﺳﲈء اﳌﺸﻜﻜﺔ إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﲢﳤﺎ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻌﺎﱐ وﻛــﺬ ﻫــﺬﻩ ]ﴐﺑـ ْـﲔ‬ ‫‪ٔ i.l. Nk‬ي ﺳﺎ ﺮ اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﯿﺎت ]اﳊﺮﻛــﺔ ‪… ‬ا ٔﻣــﻮر ‪ٔ in mg. Nk ‬ي ﺳــﺎ ﺮ اﻟﻬﻨﺪﺳــﯿﺔ وا ٔرﲦﺎﺳــﯿﺔ ]اﻟﱰﺑﯿــﻊ ‪ … ‬ﻣـ ﻞ | ‪ s.l. N‬ﻟﻔــﻌﻞ‬ ‫ﳎﺮدة ‪ s.l. T ‬ﰷﻟﻌﻘﻞ واﻟﺒﺎرئ ]‪ّ ‬‬ ‫ﲱ َﺔ اﻟﻮﺟﻮب ‪‬‬ ‫‪ i.l. Nk‬ﰷﻟﻌﻘﻞ واﻟﺒﺎرئ ﻋﺰ اﲰﻪ ] ّ‬ ‫‪] The clause allaḏī huwa al-kaṯra places the ʿadad that is mentioned here in relation to‬اﻟﻜﱶة… واﻟﻌﺪد ‪‬‬ ‫‪the kaṯra mentioned in the previous occurrence of an identical list (miṯlu al-huwiyyati wa-l-waḥdati‬‬ ‫‪wa-l-kaṯrati wa-l-ʿilliyyati). One may wonder whether this is a later addition intended to highlight the‬‬ ‫‪parallelism between the two lists; if so, it should be earlier than the archetype, as it is preserved by‬‬ ‫‪all the witnesses here taken into account.‬‬

‫‪١٣‬ق‬

Chapter I.2  23

[(a)] The things mixed with motion are [further] divided into two kinds: either [(a.1)] they do not have any existence except insofar as they can be mixed with motion1, like humanity, squareness and the like, or [(a.2)] they have an existence apart from that. [(a.1)] The existing things that do not exist except insofar as they can be mixed with motion are [further] divided into two: either [(a.1.1)] they are such that they cannot be abstracted from a designated matter either in subsistence or in Q13 estimation, like the form of humanity and that of horseness, or [(a.1.2)] they are such that this is possible for them in estimation though not in subsistence, like squareness, since its conception does not require the proper assignation of a [certain] kind of matter or the consideration of a [certain] state of motion. [(a.2)] The things which can be mixed with motion, even though they have an existence apart from that, are like being, unity, multiplicity and causality. Thus, the things that are suitable to be abstracted from motion are such that their suitability is either out of necessity or not, being rather in such a way that this is not impossible for them, like the state of unity, being, causality and number which is multiplicity. [... The theoretical inquiry into the things that can be abstracted from matter] These [things] are subject to inquiry either [(1)] insofar as they are what they are, so that this theoretical inquiry does not differ from the theoretical inquiry into them insofar as they are abstracted, since they pertain to the complex of theoretical inquiry that regards things not insofar as they are in a matter (since, insofar as they are what they are, they are not in a matter); or [(2)] insofar as an accident that only exists in matter occurs in them. This is further divisible into two: either [(2.i)] the estimation of that accident can only occur with a relation to the specific matter and to motion — like the inquiry into the one insofar as it is fire or air, [or the inquiry] into the many insofar as they are the elements, into the cause insofar as it is, for instance, heat or coldness, and into the intellectual substance insofar as it is soul, namely the

 Note that a different reading and translation of the passage is suggested in M , p. , n. . However, the clause yağūzu an tuḫāliṭa l-ḥaraka is paralleled by the clause yaṣiḥḥu an tuḫāliṭa l-ḥaraka, which allows us to read it according to its plain sense: “they can be mixed with motion”.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫وٕان ﰷن ﳚﻮز ﻣﻔﺎرﻗ ﻪ ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ — وٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ذ اﻟﻌﺮض وٕان ﰷن ﻻ ﯾﻌﺮض إﻻ ﻣﻊ ﺴ ﺒــﺔ إﱃ ﻣﺎدّة‬ ‫وﳐﺎﻟﻄﺔ ﺣﺮﻛﺔ ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﻗﺪ ﺗ ّ‬ ‫ُﺘﻮﱒ ٔﺣﻮا و ُﺴ ﺎن ﻣﻦ ﲑ ﻧﻈﺮ ﰲ اﳌﺎدّة اﳌﻌﯿﻨﺔ واﳊﺮﻛﺔ اﻟﻨﻈــﺮ اﳌــﺬ ﻮر —‬ ‫ﻣ ﻞ اﶺﻊ واﻟﺘﻔﺮﯾﻖ واﻟﴬب واﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ واﻟﺘ ﺬ ﺮ واﻟﺘﻜﻌﯿﺐ وﺳﺎ ﺮ ا ٔﺣﻮال اﻟﱵ ﺗَﻠْ َﺤــﻖ اﻟﻌــﺪد ﻓﺎ ّٕن ذ‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮر ذ‬ ‫ﺤﺮﻛﺔ ﻣ ﻘﺴﻤﺔ ﻣﻔﱰﻗﺔ ﳎﳣﻌﺔ — وﻟﻜﻦ ّ‬ ‫ﯾﻠﺤﻖ اﻟﻌﺪد وﻫﻮ ﰲ ٔوﻫﺎم اﻟﻨﺎس ٔو ﰲ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدات ﻣ ّ‬ ‫ﲡﺮدا ﻣﺎ ﺣﱴ ﻻ ُﳛﺘﺎج ﻓ ﻪ إﱃ ﺗﻌﯿﲔ ﻣﻮا ّد ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫ﯾﺘﺠﺮد ّ‬ ‫ﻗﺪ ّ‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮرا وﻗﻮاﻣﺎ‬ ‫)‪ (..‬ﻓ ٔﺻﻨﺎف اﻟﻌﻠﻮم ٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﺗ ﺎول إذن اﻋﺘﺒﺎر اﳌﻮﺟﻮدات ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﰲ اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ّ‬ ‫وﺗﺘﻌﻠّﻖ ﲟﻮا ّد ﳐﺼﻮﺻﺔ ا ٔﻧﻮاع وٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﺗ ﺎول اﻋﺘﺒﺎر اﳌﻮﺟﻮدات ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﻣﻔﺎرﻗﺔ ﻟﺘـ ﺗﺼـ ّـﻮرا ﻻ‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮرا‪.‬‬ ‫ﻗﻮاﻣﺎ وٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﺗ ﺎول اﻋﺘﺒﺎر اﳌﻮﺟﻮدات ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﻣﻔﺎرﻗﺔ ﻗﻮاﻣﺎ و ّ‬ ‫ﻓﺎﻟﻘﺴﻢ ا ٔول ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻠﻮم ﻫﻮ اﻟﻌﲅ اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﻲ؛ واﻟﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻌﲅ اﻟﺮ ﴈ اﶈﺾ و ﲅ اﻟﻌﺪد اﳌﺸﻬﻮر‬ ‫ﻣ ﻪ و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﻃﺒﯿﻌﺔ اﻟﻌﺪد ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻫﻮ ﺪد ﻓﻠ ﺲ اﻟﻌﲅ؛ واﻟﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻌﲅ اﻻٕﻟﻬ ﻲ‪ .‬وٕاذ‬ ‫اﳌﻮﺟﻮدات ﰲ اﻟﻄﺒﻊ ﲆ ﻫﺬﻩ ا ٔﻗﺴﺎم اﻟﺜﻼﺛﺔ ﻓﺎﻟﻌﻠﻮم اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔ ﺔ اﻟﻨﻈﺮﯾﺔ ﱔ ﻫﺬﻩ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (..‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ اﻟﻌﻤﻠﯿــﺔ ﻓ ٕﺎ ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﺗﺘﻌﻠّــﻖ ﺑﺘﻌــﻠﲓ ا ٓراء اﻟــﱵ ﺗ ﻈــﻢ ﺳــﺘﻌﲈﻟﻬﺎ اﳌﺸﺎرﻛــﺔ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿــﺔ‬ ‫اﻟﻌﺎﻣ ﺔ وﺗ َُﻌﺮف ﺑﺘﺪﺑﲑ اﳌﺪﯾﻨﺔ وﺴ ّﻤﻰ ﲅ اﻟﺴﯿﺎﺳﺔ؛ وا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ذ اﻟﺘﻌﻠّــﻖ ﲟﺎ ﺗ ﻈــﻢ ﺑــﻪ اﳌﺸﺎرﻛــﺔ‬ ‫ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ اﳋﺎﺻﯿﺔ وﺗُﻌﺮف ﺑﺘﺪﺑﲑ اﳌﲋل؛ وٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ذ اﻟﺘﻌﻠّﻖ ﲟﺎ ﺗ ﻈﻢ ﺑﻪ ﺎل اﻟﺸﺨﺺ اﻟﻮا ﺪ ﰲ‬ ‫‪] Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt I.,‬ﻫ ــﺬﻩ ‪… ‬ﻓ ٔﺻ ــﻨﺎف ‪] Šifāʾ, Samāʿ Ṭabīʿī I., pp. .–.. ‬ﻧﻮﻋﯿ ــﺔ ‪ … ‬وٕا ّﻣﺎ ‪‬‬ ‫‪] Risāla fī Aqsām al-ʿUlūm‬ﻫﺬﻩ ‪… ‬ﻓﺎﻟﻘﺴــﻢ ‪p. .–; Dānišnāmah-yi ʿAlāʾī, Ilāhiyyāt p. .–.. ‬‬ ‫‪al-ʿAqliyya, p. .–; ibid., p. .–..‬‬ ‫‪] Manṭiq al-Mašriqiyyīn,‬اﳌــــــﲋل ‪… ‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪‬‬ ‫‪] Risāla fī Aqsām al-ʿUlūm al-ʿAqliyya, p. .–.; Dānišnāmah-yi‬اﻻٕﻟﻬﯿــﺔ ‪… ‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ | ‪p. .–.‬‬ ‫‪] Manṭiq‬ا ٔ ﻼق ‪ … ‬وٕا ّﻣﺎ ‪] Letter to Ibn Zayla, p. .–. ‬اﳋﲑ ‪… ‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ | ‪ʿAlāʾī, Ilāhiyyāt p. .–..‬‬ ‫‪al-Mašriqiyyīn, p. .–.‬‬ ‫‪ add.‬واﻟﺘﻠﻜ ﺐ ‪ om. et‬واﻟﺘﻜﻌﯿﺐ | ‪ A‬واﻟﺘ ﺪﯾﺪ ]واﻟﺘ ﺬ ﺮ ‪ exp. Ṣ² ‬و ‪ ξτATY‬واﻟﻨﻈﺮ ]اﻟﻨﻈﺮ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. Ka‬ﺣﺮﻛﺔ ‪‬‬ ‫إﻣﺎ ]‪‬ﰲ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. G‬اﻟﻌﺪد ‪ om. BrAs iter. No om. et add. in mg. Y ‬اﻟﻌــﺪد ‪… ‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن | ‪in mg. To‬‬ ‫‪ in mg. NkC s.l. Ṣ :‬ﻣﻔﱰﻗﺔ ‪ γAṢMi‬ﻣ ﻔﺮﻗﺔ ﳎﳣﻌﺔ ‪ JEd.‬ﻣ ﻔﺮﻗﺔ وﳎﳣﻌﺔ ‪ ζNo‬ﻣﻔﱰﻗﺔ وﳎﳣﻌﺔ ‪ ν‬ﳎﳣﻌــﺔ ﻣ ﻔﺮﻗــﺔ ]ﻣﻔﱰﻗــﺔ ﳎﳣﻌــﺔ | ‪praem. κ‬‬ ‫‪ νCDa‬إذا ]إذن | ‪ add. κ‬إذا ]اﻟﻌﻠﻮم | ‪ ξJToŠ‬و ٔﺻﻨﺎف ]ﻓ ٔﺻﻨﺎف ‪ in mg. G ‬ﻋﯿ ﺔ ]ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺔ | ‪ om. TC‬ﻓ ﻪ ‪ s.l. G ‬واﻟﻌﺮض‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮرا | ‪ om. et add. in mg. Y‬ﱔ ‪… ‬ﰲ | ‪om. κBr‬‬ ‫‪ add. Yi‬وﺗﻮﻫﲈ ]وﻗﻮاﻣﺎ | ‪ N‬ﺗﺼﻮر ‪ in mg. E‬ﺗﺼﻮرا ‪ ζλMiYiG‬وﺟﻮدا ] ّ‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮرا ﻻ ﻗﻮاﻣﺎ وٕاﻣﺎ ٔن ﺗ ﺎول اﻋﺘﺒﺎر اﳌﻮﺟﻮدات ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﻣﻔﺎرﻗﺔ ‪ om. et‬ﻣﻔﺎرﻗﺔ ‪… ‬ﻟﺘ | ‪ om. et add. i.l. J‬ﱔ | ‪ٔ iter. As‬ن ‪‬‬ ‫واﻟﻘﺴﻢ ]ﻓﺎﻟﻘﺴﻢ ‪ om. Ṣ et add. in mg. Ṣ ‬ﻗﻮاﻣﺎ… وٕا ّﻣﺎ | ‪ A‬إﻣﺎ ]وٕا ّﻣﺎ ‪add. in mg. Nk²T om. et add. in mg. Br ‬‬ ‫‪ Br ‬اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﻲ ]اﻟﺮ ﴈ | ‪G‬‬ ‫ﻓﻌﻠﻮم ]ﻓﺎﻟﻌﻠﻮم ‪ a.c.] Y ‬ﻓﺎٕذا ‪ p.c. [fort.‬ﻓﺎٕذ ‪ κYi‬ﻓﺎٕذا ‪ τT‬ﻓﺎٕذن ‪ DaToMi‬وٕاذا ]وٕاذ | ‪ ν‬ﺑﺬ ]‬ ‫ﻓ ٔﻣﺎ ]و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪ in mg. Ṣ² ‬اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔ ﺔ اﻟﻨﻈﺮﯾﺔ ‪ Ṣ‬اﳊﳬﯿﺔ ‪ κJ‬اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ اﻟﻨﻈﺮﯾﺔ ‪ B‬اﻟﻨﻈﺮﯾﺔ اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔ ﺔ ]اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔ ﺔ اﻟﻨﻈﺮﯾﺔ | ‪ a.c Te‬ﻓﺎﻟﻌﻠﻮم ‪ sed‬ﻓﻌﻠﻮم ‪As‬‬ ‫اﳌﲋل ‪ … ‬وا ّﻣﺎ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ²‬اﻟﻌﺎﻣ ﺔ ‪ κλJDaṢYi om. T‬اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ]اﻟﻌﺎﻣ ﺔ ‪ a.c. G ‬ﻓﺎٕن ]ﻓ ٕﺎ ّﻣﺎ ٔن | ‪ s.l. Di‬و ﻟﻬﻲ ]اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ اﻟﻌﻤﻠﯿﺔ | ‪Di‬‬ ‫‪ om. Yi om.‬ﺑﻪ ‪… ‬اﳌﺸﺎرﻛﺔ | ‪ praem. JṢ : om. et add. in mg. To‬ﺎل ]اﳌﺸﺎرﻛﺔ | ‪ κG‬ﻣ ﻪ ]ﺑﻪ | ‪om. et add. in mg. Y‬‬ ‫ﻓﺎٕﻣﺎ ]وٕا ّﻣﺎ | ‪ κṢ‬اﳋﺎﺻﺔ ]اﳋﺎﺻﯿﺔ ‪ add. in mg. Br ‬ذ اﻟﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﲟﺎ ﯾ ﻈﻢ ﺑﻪ ﺎل اﳌﺸﺎرﻛﺔ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ اﳋﺎﺻﺔ****** ٔن ﻜﻮن ذ اﻟﺘﻌﻠﻖ ‪et‬‬ ‫‪η‬‬

‫‪ٔ in mg. NkB‬ي إذا اﻋﺘﱪ ﻣﻘﺎرﻧﺔ اﻟﴚء ]ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ‪ … ‬وٕا ّﻣﺎ ‪‬‬

‫‪ i.l. N‬اﳊﺮﻛﺔ ]ﻟﺘ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪١٤‬ق‬

Chapter I.2  25

principle of the motion of a body, even if it is separable in itself. Or, [(2.ii)] even if that accident only occurs with a [certain] relation to a matter and a mixing with motion, its states may be represented in estimation and be plainly understood without inquiring into the designated matter and into motion in the way mentioned above — like addition and subtraction2, multiplication and division, finding the square root and the cube and the other states that attach to number, since that attaches to number when it is [represented] in human estimative faculties or in existing things that are moved, divided, separated and assembled — but the concep- Q14 tion of this can be abstracted in a certain way, so that no designation of specific matters is needed.

[.. A classification of the sciences paralleling the classification of beings] [... The classification of theoretical sciences] Consequently, the kinds of sciences can: [(1)] deal with the consideration of existents insofar as they are in motion both in conception and in subsistence, depending on matters that properly belong to the species; or [(2)] deal with the consideration of existents insofar as they are separable from motion in conception though not in subsistence; or [(3)] deal with the consideration of existents insofar as they are separable [from motion] both in subsistence and in conception. [(1)] The first class of sciences is natural science; [(2)] the second is pure mathematical science, and the widely-known science of number which is part of it, for the knowledge of the nature of number insofar as it is a number does not pertain to this science3; and [(3)] the third is metaphysical science. Since existents are divisible by nature into these three classes, the theoretical philosophical sciences are these ones. [... The classification of practical sciences] As for practical philosophy, it concerns either the teaching of the views used for the organization of the public human association, in which case it is known as the regulation of the city and is called ‘science of politics’; or it concerns that by which the private human association is organized, being known as ‘economics’; or it concerns that by which the condition of the single individual is regulated in view of

 Avicenna refers to addition and substraction according to the Indian style (al-ğamʿ wa-l-tafrīq alHindī) in Šifāʾ, Riyāḍiyyāt, Ḥisāb IV, p. .  The study of the number qua number pertains to Metaphysics, whereas Mathematics studies its accidents; cf. Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt I., p. .– and ibid. I., p. .–. More in detail, Ilāhiyyāt III. is specifically devoted to ascertain the ontology of numbers.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫زﰷء ﻧﻔﺴﻪ وﺴ ّﻤﻰ ﲅ ا ٔ ﻼق‪ .‬وﲨﯿﻊ ذ ٕاﻧ ّﲈ ُﲢﻘّﻖ ﲱّﺔ ﲨﻠﺘﻪ ﻟﱪﻫﺎن اﻟﻨﻈﺮي و ﻟﺸﻬﺎدة اﻟﴩﻋﯿﺔ‬ ‫وﳛﻘّﻖ ﺗﻔﺼﯿ وﺗﻘﺪ ﺮﻩ ﻟﴩﯾﻌﺔ اﻻٕﻟﻬﯿﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫اﳊﻖ واﻟﻐﺎﯾﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ اﻟﻌﻤﻠﯿﺔ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ اﳋﲑ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (..‬واﻟﻐﺎﯾﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ اﻟﻨﻈﺮﯾﺔ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ّ‬ ‫اﻟﺘﺼﻮر ﻓ ﻜﻮن ﻟﻬﺎ اﻋﺘﺒﺎرات ﺛﻼﺛﺔ‪:‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬وﻣﺎﻫﯿﺎت ا ٔﺷﯿﺎء ﻗﺪ ﻜﻮن ﰲ ٔﻋﯿﺎن ا ٔﺷﯿﺎء وﻗﺪ ﻜﻮن ﰲ ّ‬ ‫اﻋﺘﺒﺎر اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﲟﺎ ﱔ ﺗ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ــﲑ ﻣﻀﺎﻓــﺔ إﱃ ٔ ــﺪ اﻟﻮﺟــﻮد ﻦ وﻣﺎ ﯾﻠﺤﻘــﻬﺎ ﻣــﻦ ﺣـ ﺚ ﱔ ﻛــﺬ ؛‬ ‫ﲣﺺ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ذ ؛ واﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﻟﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ‬ ‫واﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﻟﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﰲ ا ٔﻋﯿﺎن ﻓ ﻠﺤﻘﻬﺎ ﺣ ﻨﺌﺬ ٔﻋﺮاض ّ‬ ‫ﲣﺺ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ذ ﻣ ﻞ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ واﳊ َ ْﻤﻞ وﻣ ﻞ ا ﳫﯿﺔ واﳉﺰﺋﯿﺔ ﰲ‬ ‫اﻟﺘﺼﻮر ﻓ ﻠﺤﻘﻬﺎ ﺣ ﻨﺌﺬ ٔﻋﺮاض ّ‬ ‫ﱔﰲ ّ‬ ‫اﶵﻞ وا اﺗﯿﺔ واﻟﻌﺮﺿﯿﺔ ﰲ اﶵﻞ و ﲑ ذ ﳑّﺎ ﺳﺘﻌﻠﻤﻪ؛ ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﻟ ﺲ ﰲ اﳌﻮﺟــﻮدات اﳋﺎرﺟ ــﺔ ذاﺗﯿــﺔ وﻻ‬ ‫ﻋﺮﺿﯿﺔ ﲪﻼ وﻻ ﻮن اﻟﴚء ﻣ ﺘﺪ ٔ وﻻ ﻮﻧﻪ ﱪا وﻻ ﻣﻘﺪّ ﻣﺔ وﻻ ﻗ ﺎﺳﺎ وﻻ ﲑ ذ ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬وٕاذا ٔرد ٔن ﻧﺘﻔﻜّﺮ ﰲ ا ٔﺷﯿﺎء وﻧﻌﻠﻤﻬﺎ ﻓ ﺤﺘﺎج ﴐورة إﱃ ٔن ﻧ ُﺪ ِ ﻠﻬﺎ ﰲ اﻟﺘﺼـ ّـﻮر ﻓ ﻌــﺮض ﻟــﻬﺎ‬ ‫ﴐورة ا ٔﺣـﻮال اﻟــﱵ ﻜــﻮن ﰲ اﻟﺘﺼـ ّـﻮر ﻓ ــﺤﺘﺎج ﴐورة إﱃ ٔن ﻧــﻌﺘﱪ ا ٔﺣـﻮال اﻟــﱵ ﻟــﻬﺎ ﰲ اﻟﺘﺼـ ّـﻮر‬ ‫وﺧﺼﻮﺻﺎ وﳓﻦ ﺮوم ﻟﻔﻜﺮة ٔن ﺴﺘﺪرك ا ﻬﻮﻻت و ٔن ﻜﻮن ذ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت‪ .‬وا ٔﻣﻮر ٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﻜﻮن‬ ‫ﳎﻬﻮ ﻟﻘ ﺎس إﱃ ا ﻫﻦ ﻻ ﳏﺎ وﻛﺬ إﳕﺎ ﻜﻮن ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺔ ﻟﻘ ﺎس إﻟﯿﻪ‪ .‬واﳊﺎل واﻟﻌﺎرض ا ي ﯾﻌﺮض‬ ‫اﻟﺘﺼﻮر‪ .‬وان ﰷن ﻣﺎ ﻟﻬﺎ ﰲ ذاﲥﺎ‬ ‫ﻟﻬﺎ ﺣﱴ ﻧ ﻘﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻌﻠﻮ ﺎ إﱃ ﳎﻬﻮﻟﻬﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺎل و ﺎرض ﯾﻌﺮض ﻟﻬﺎ ﰲ ّ‬ ‫‪] Quoted in Lawkarī, Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān al-ṣidq, pp. .–..‬اﻟﻐﺮض ‪… ‬وﻣﺎﻫﯿﺎت ‪‬‬

‫‪] Manṭiq al-‬ذ ‪… ‬وﻣﺎﻫــﯿﺎت‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪] Risāla fī Aqsām al-ʿUlūm al-ʿAqliyya, p. .–.‬اﳋــﲑ… ‪‬واﻟﻐﺎﯾــﺔ ‪‬‬ ‫‪Mašriqiyyīn, p. .–; Išārāt, p. .–.‬‬

‫وﺟﻮب ]ﲨﻠﺘﻪ | ‪ om. N‬ﲱّﺔ | ‪ N‬ﺗﺘﺤﻘﻖ ‪ A‬ﯾﺘﺤﻘﻖ ] ُﲢﻘّﻖ | ‪ٕ om. et add. s.l. Te‬اﻧ ّﲈ | ‪ in mg. B‬ذﰷ ‪ ToŠN‬ذﰷء ‪ A‬دﰷ ]زﰷء ‪‬‬ ‫‪ٔ E‬و ﻟﺸﻬﺎدة ‪ Da‬واﻟﺸﻬﺎدة ]و ﻟﺸﻬﺎدة | ‪ add. a.c. Ṣ‬اﻟﺸﺨﺺ اﻟﻮا ﺪ ‪ N‬ﲨﻠﺘﻪ وﺟﻮﺑﻪ ‪ No‬وﲨﻠﺘﻪ وﺟﻮﺑﻪ ‪ i.l. C‬وﺟﻮﺑــﻪ ‪praem. s.l. Nk‬‬ ‫ٔﻋﯿﺎن ‪ Ṣ ‬ﻓﺎﻟﻐﺎﯾﺔ ]‪‬واﻟﻐﺎﯾﺔ ‪ No ‬ﻟﴩﻋﯿﺔ ] ﻟﴩﯾﻌﺔ | ‪ TeMiG‬وﲢﻘ ﻘﻪ ‪ AsDi‬وﲢﻘﻘﻪ ]وﺗﻘﺪ ﺮﻩ ‪ As ‬ﻟﺸﻬﺎدة ‪ Di‬و ﻟﺸــﻬﺎدات‬ ‫ﻓ ﻠﺤﻘﻬﺎ ﺣ ﻨﺌﺬ ٔﻋﺮاض ﲣﺺ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ ‪ om. et‬ذ …ﻓ ﻠﺤﻘﻬﺎ ‪ om. Law ‬ﱔ…ﺗ | ‪ Te‬ﻠﲈﻫﯿﺔ ]‪‬اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ‪ Law ‬ا ٔﻋﯿﺎن ]ا ٔﺷﯿﺎء‬ ‫ﺗ ‪ add. πTDi in mg. G a.c. Ṣ‬ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﰲ ا ٔﻋﯿﺎن ]ذ | ‪ٔ κ‬ﯾﻀﺎ ]ﺣ ﻨﺌﺬ | ‪ add. in mg. G‬ذ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﰲ ا ٔﻋﯿﺎن‬ ‫ﲣﺺ | ‪ om. KaTC‬ﺣ ﻨﺌﺬ ‪ add. Law ‬اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ‬ ‫‪ om. et‬اﶵﻞ ‪ … ‬ﰲ | ‪ a.c. Di‬ﺣ ﻨﺌﺬ ]ذ | ‪ As om. C s.l. Te‬وﲣﺺ ] ّ‬ ‫‪ om. et‬ﻣ ﺘﺪ ٔ ‪ ζτLawKaDiG ‬اﳋﺎر ﺔ ]اﳋﺎرﺟ ﺔ | ‪ a.c. G‬ﰲ اﳌﻮﺟﻮد ]‪‬ﰲ | ‪ Law‬ﺴﺘﻌﻤ ‪ ξ‬اﺳﺘﻌﻤ ]ﺳﺘﻌﻠﻤﻪ ‪add. s.l. N ‬‬ ‫وﻧﻈﻤﻬﺎ ‪ J om. T‬وﻓ ﻌﻠﻤﻬﺎ ]وﻧﻌﻠﻤﻬﺎ ‪ s.l. Nk ‬ﻻ ‪ et‬و ]‪‬وﻻ | ‪ KaNk‬و ]‪‬وﻻ | ‪ ξ‬ﻮﻧﻪ ﻣﻘﺪﻣﺔ ]ﻣﻘﺪّ ﻣﺔ | ‪ om. Br‬ﻮﻧﻪ | ‪add. s.l. N‬‬ ‫…ﻓ ﺤﺘﺎج | ‪ in mg. Te‬اﻟﱵ…ﻓ ﺤﺘﺎج | ‪ G‬ﻓ ﻌﺮض ﻓ ﺤﺘﺎج ]ﻓ ﺤﺘﺎج | ‪ om. ν‬ﻜﻮن | ‪ s.l. Ṣ²‬ا ٔﺣﻮال ‪ Ṣ‬ا ٔﻋﺮاض ]‪‬ا ٔﺣﻮال ‪Law ‬‬ ‫اﻟﺘﺼﻮر‬ ‫‪ To‬ﻜﻮن ]ﻟﻬﺎ | ‪ add. T‬ﻧﺪ ﻠﻬﺎ ﰲ اﻟﺘﺼﻮر ﻓ ﻌﺮض ﻟﻬﺎ ﴐورة ا ٔﺣﻮال اﻟﱵ ﻜﻮن ﰲ اﻟﺘﺼﻮر ﻓ ﺨﺘﺎج ﴐورة إﱃ ٔن ] ٔن | ‪ّ  om. No‬‬ ‫اﻟﺘﺼﻮر‬ ‫] ﻟﻔﻜﺮة | ‪ s.l. Ṣ²‬ﺮوم ‪ Ṣ‬ﺮﯾﺪ ] ﺮوم | ‪ om. Law‬وﺧﺼﻮﺻﺎ ‪ add. To ‬ﻓ ﺨﺘﺎج ﴐورة إﱃ ٔن ﯾﻌﺘﱪ ا ٔﺣﻮال اﻟﱵ ﻟﻬﺎ ﰲ اﻟﺘﺼﻮر ]‪ّ ‬‬ ‫ٕا ﳱﺎ ]إﻟﯿﻪ | ‪ om. ν add. s.l. Y‬إﳕﺎ ‪ a.c. Di ‬ﺗ ‪ in mg. E‬ﺗ ‪ τDaNo‬ﺗ ]ذ | ‪ Ṣ‬ﻧﺪرك ] ﺴﺘﺪرك | ‪ MiŠ‬ﻟﻔﻜﺮ ‪ A‬ﻟﻔﻄﺮة‬ ‫‪ Br‬ﻣﻦ ]‪‬ﰲ | ‪ N‬ﻣﻦ ﳎﻬﻮﻟﻬﺎ إﱃ ﻣﻌﻠﻮ ﺎ ]ﳎﻬﻮﻟﻬﺎ…ﻣﻦ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. B‬ﻟﻬﺎ ‪Law ‬‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫اﳊﻖ‬ ‫ﻫﺬا ﻟ ﺲ ﺗﻘﺴ ﻟﲑد اﳌﻘﺴﻢ ﳚﺐ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻣﻐﺎ ﺮ ﻗﺴﺎﻣﺔ ﻓ ﻠﺰم ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻠﲈﻫﯿﺔ اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ]ﺛﻼﺛﺔ…وﻣﺎﻫﯿﺎت ‪ٔ i.l. Di ‬ي اﳊﻘﺎﺋﻖ ] ّ‬ ‫ٓﺧﺮ ﲑ اﻟﺜﻼﺛﺔ ﺑﻪ ﯾﺼﻠﺢ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻣﻘﺴﲈ وﻟ ﺲ ﺑﻞ ﻫﻮ اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﻠﲈﻫﯿﺔ ﺑﺜﻼﺛﺔ اﻋﺘﺒﺎرات ﻛﲈ ﻗ ﻞ ﰲ ﻗﻮﳍﻢ اﳌﺮﺗﺒــﺔ إﻣﺎ ﴩط ﳾء ٔو ﴩط ﻻ ٔو ﻻ‬ ‫اﻟﺘﺼﻮر ‪ … ‬واﻋﺘﺒﺎر ‪ in mg. Te ‬ﴩط‬ ‫‪ … ‬ﻣﻦ | ‪ٔ in mg. NkB‬ي إذا اﻋﺘﱪت اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﺗﻠﺰ ﺎ ﻟﻮازم ﻓ ﻜﻮن ﺑﻪ ﻣ ﻄﻘ ﺎ ] ّ‬ ‫ٔ‬ ‫ﺣ‬ ‫اﻟﺘﺼﻮر‬ ‫]‬ ‫ﻋﯿﺎن‬ ‫ا‬ ‫ﰲ‬ ‫ﱔ‬ ‫ﺚ‬ ‫ﻣﻦ‬ ‫ﻟﻬﺎ‬ ‫اﻋﺘﺒﺎر‬ ‫و‬ ‫‪ٔ in mg. NkB‬ي ﺗﻌﺘﱪ ﻣﻌﻘﻮ ﺣﺴﺐ ﻣﺎ ﯾﻠﺤﻘﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﻛﺬ‬ ‫ّ‬

‫‪١٥‬ق‬

Chapter I.2  27

the integrity of his own soul, and is called ‘science of ethics’. The validity of this whole domain [of inquiry] is certified only by means of theoretical demonstration and by the testimony of the law, whereas its division and assessment [as particular subdomains] are certified by the divine law. [... Concluding remarks on the aim of theoretical and practical philosophy] The aim of theoretical philosophy is knowledge of the truth, whereas the aim of practical philosophy is knowledge of the good.

[. Logic] [.. Three ways to consider quiddities] The quiddities of things can either be in concrete instantiations or in conception, Q15 so there are three ways to consider them: [(1)] a consideration of the quiddity insofar as it is that quiddity, without being related to either of the two existences and apart from what might attach to it insofar as it is like that; [(2)] a consideration of it insofar as it is in concrete instantiations, so that, whereupon accidents proper to that existence of the quiddity attach to it; or [(3)] a consideration of it insofar as it is in conception, so that, whereupon accidents proper to that existence of the quiddity attach to it, like being a subject of predication and a predicate, like universality and particularity in predication, essentiality and accidentality in predication and other things you will learn; for in fact, there is neither essentiality nor accidentality in predication in external existents, nor something being a subject of predication or a predicate, or a premise or a syllogism, or anything else.

[.. The necessity of knowing the states of the quiddities in conception in order to acquire knowledge of the unknown] If we want to reflect upon things and know them, we necessarily need to introduce them in conception. Then, the states that are in conception necessarily occur to them, so that we necessarily need to consider the states that belong to them in conception, especially should we wish to supply the unknown things by reflection, and this [process] starts from known things. Things are inevitably unknown only in relation to the mind, as well as they are known only in relation to it. The accidental state that occurs in them so that we move from what is known to that which is unknown of them is an accidental state occurring to them in concep-

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا ﻣﻊ ذ ﳁﻦ اﻟﴬورة ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻟﻨﺎ ﲅ ﲠﺬﻩ ا ٔﺣﻮال و ٔﳖّ ﺎ ﰼ ﱔ وﯿﻒ ﱔ وﯿﻒ ﺗُﻌﺘﱪ ﰲ‬ ‫ﻫﺬا اﻟﻐﺮض‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬و ٔ ّن ﻫﺬا اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﻟ ﺲ ﻧﻈﺮا ﰲ ا ٔﻣﻮر ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة ٔ ﺪ ﳓﻮي اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ْﻦ اﳌﺬ ﻮر ْﻦ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺑﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﯾﻨﻔﻊ ﰲ إدراك ٔﺣﻮال ذﯾﻨﻚ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻦ‪َ ،‬ﳁﻦ ﻜﻮن اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔــﺔ ﻋﻨــﺪﻩ ﻣ ــﻨﺎو ﻠﺒــﺤﺚ ﻋــﻦ‬ ‫ا ٔﺷﯿﺎء ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة وﻣ ﻘﺴﻤﺔ إﱃ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻦ اﳌﺬ ﻮر ﻦ ﻓﻼ ﻜﻮن ﻫﺬا اﻟﻌﲅ ﻋﻨﺪﻩ ﺟﺰءا ﻣﻦ‬ ‫اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ وﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻫﻮ ﻓﻊ ﰲ ذ ﻓ ﻜﻮن ﻋﻨﺪﻩ ﰲ اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ‪ .‬و َﻣﻦ ﻜﻮن اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ ﻋﻨﺪﻩ ﻣ ﻨﺎو ﲁّ‬ ‫ﲝﺚ ﻧﻈﺮي وﻣﻦ ّ‬ ‫ﰻ و ﻪ ﻜﻮن ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﻫﺬا ﻋﻨﺪﻩ ﺟﺰءا ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ و ﻟﺴﺎ ﺮ ٔﺟﺰاء اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ‪ .‬وﺳﲋﯾﺪ‬ ‫ﻫﺬا ﴍ ﺎ ﻓ ﺑﻌﺪ‪.‬‬ ‫واﳌﺸﺎﺟﺮات اﻟﱵ ﲡﺮي ﰲ ﻣ ﻞ ﻫﺬﻩ اﳌﺴ ٔ ﻓﻬﻲ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺒﺎﻃﻞ وﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﻀﻮل‪ّ ٔ .‬ﻣﺎ ﻣــﻦ اﻟــﺒﺎﻃﻞ ﻓ ٔﻧّــﻪ ﻻ‬ ‫ﺗﻨﺎﻗﺾ ﺑﲔ اﻟﻘﻮﻟﲔ ﻓﺎ ّٕن ّ‬ ‫ﰻ وا ﺪ ﻣﳯﲈ ﯾﻌﲏ ﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ ﻣﻌﲎ ٓﺧﺮ؛ و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﻀﻮل ﻓﺎ ّٕن اﻟﺸــﻐﻞ ﺑ ٔﻣـ ﺎل‬ ‫ﻫﺬﻩ ا ٔﺷﯿﺎء ﻟ ﺲ ﳑّﺎ ُﳚﺪى ﻧﻔﻌﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬وﻫﺬا اﻟﻨﻮع ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﻫﻮ اﳌﺴ ّﻤﻰ ﲅ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ وﻫﻮ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ ﻫــﺬﻩ ا ٔﻣــﻮر اﳌــﺬ ﻮرة ﻣــﻦ ﺣـ ﺚ‬ ‫ﯾﺘ ٔدّى ﻣﳯﺎ إﱃ ٕا ﻼم ا ﻬﻮل وﻣﺎ ﯾﻌﺮض ﻟﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﻛﺬ ﻻ ﲑ‪.‬‬

‫‪] Šifāʾ, Qiyās I., pp. .–..‬ﻧﻔﻌﺎ ‪… ‬و‬

‫ٔ ّن ‪‬‬

‫‪ a.c.‬ﰼ وﱔ ]ﰼ ﱔ | ‪ C‬وٕاﳕﺎ ]و ٔﳖّ ﺎ | ‪ Ka‬ﲠﺎ ]ﲠﺬﻩ ا ٔﺣﻮال | ‪ add. E‬اﻟﻐﺮض ]ذ | ‪ Br‬ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا ٔﯾﻀﺎ ] ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا | ‪ٔ om. Law‬ﯾﻀﺎ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ KaBrBCDaEd. s.l. Ṣ²‬اﻟﻌﺎرض ‪ ζλξNkṢ‬اﻟﻌﺮض ]‪ εLaw‬اﻟﻐﺮض ‪ As ‬ﯾﺼﲑ ]ﺗُﻌﺘﱪ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. T‬وﯿﻒ ﱔ | ‪To‬‬ ‫اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ]اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ْﻦ اﳌﺬ ﻮر ْﻦ | ‪ λTeG‬اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ]اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ْﻦ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. N‬ﳓﻮي | ‪ Br‬اﻟﻄﺮﯾﻖ ]اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ‪ s.l. Di ‬اﻟﻌﺎﱊ ‪in mg. Te‬‬ ‫‪ om. Da‬اﳌﺬ ﻮر ﻦ | ‪ om. Br‬اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻦ ‪ J ‬اﳌﻮﺟــﻮد ﻦ ]اﻟﻮﺟــﻮد ﻦ | ‪ in mg. As‬ﯾﻨﻔــﻊ ‪ et‬ﻧﻔــﻊ ‪ A‬ﺗ ﻔــﻊ ]ﯾﻨﻔــﻊ ‪ s.l. Ṣ² ‬اﳌــﺬ ﻮر‬ ‫‪ s.l.‬ﻠﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ ]ﰲ اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ | ‪ om. No‬ﻋﻨﺪﻩ ‪ As | … ‬ﻓﻌﺔ ] ﻓﻊ | ‪ κ‬ﱔ ‪ om. Nk‬ﻫﻮ | ‪ praem. in mg. As‬ﺑﻞ ‪ et‬ﻣﻦ ]وﻣﻦ ‪‬‬ ‫اﻟﻌﲅ ‪ Ṣ‬ﻫﺬا اﻟﻌﲅ ‪ٔ om. As‬ﯾﻀﺎ ‪ٔ om. et add. s.l. Nk‬ﯾﻀﺎ ‪ εEDaTe‬ﻫﺬا ٔﯾﻀﺎ ] ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﻫﺬا ‪ As ‬ﰻ ] ﲁّ | ‪ ν‬ﻣ ﻨﺎوﻻ ]ﻣ ﻨﺎو | ‪Ṣ‬‬ ‫‪ κY‬ﻓ ٔن ]‪‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن ‪ ξKaJATṢ ‬ﻓﺎٕﻧﻪ ]ﻓ ٔ ﻧ ّﻪ | ‪ om. et add. i.l. As‬ﻣ ﻞ ‪ ŠY ‬وﺳﱰﯾﺪ ]وﺳﲋﯾﺪ | ‪ٔ add. s.l. Ṣ²‬ﯾﻀﺎ ‪exp. et‬‬ ‫‪ Š‬ﳚﺮى ] ُﳚﺪى | ‪ om. T‬ﳑّﺎ | ‪ τ‬ﻻ ]ﻟ ﺲ ﳑّﺎ | ‪ To‬وﻟ ﺲ ]ﻟ ﺲ ‪ in mg. B s.l. Ṣ² ‬ﲟﺜﻞ ‪ s.l. NkC‬ﺑ ٔﻣ ﺎل ‪ KaJNkCDa‬ﲟﺜﻞ ]ﺑ ٔﻣ ﺎل‬ ‫ﱔ | ‪ Br‬وﳑﺎ ]وﻣﺎ | ‪ Ka‬ﲅ ] ٕا ﻼم ‪ٔ i.l. Y ‬ﺣﻮال ]ا ٔﻣﻮر ‪ in mg. To ‬ﻧﻔﻌﺎ ‪ et‬ﺷﯿ ٔ ‪ s.l. Di‬ﻣﻌﺎ ‪ i.l. et‬ﻧﻔﻌﺎ ‪ et‬ﺷﯿ ٔ ‪ νEŠG‬ﺷﯿ ٔ ]ﻧﻔﻌﺎ‬ ‫‪ om. T‬ﻻ ﲑ | ‪ in mg. Y‬ذ ‪ NoGEd.‬ﻛﺬ ‪ JTDi‬ﱔ ذ ‪ s.l. NkC‬ﻛﺬ ‪ γE‬ذ ‪ Yi‬ﻫﻮ ﻛﺬ ]ﻛﺬ‬

‫‪١٦‬ق‬

Chapter I.2  29

tion. If what belongs to them in their essence exists with that as well, then it is necessary, for us, to have knowledge of these states, how many they are, how they are and how they are considered with regard to this purpose.

[.. Logic as a part or an instrument of philosophy] Since this theoretical inquiry is not a theoretical inquiry concerning things insofar as they exist in one of the two aforementioned kinds of existence, but rather insofar as it is useful for the apprehension of the states of these two [kinds of] existence, then: who holds that philosophy deals with the inquiry into things insofar Q16 as they are existent and divisible into the two aforementioned [kinds of] existence, this science will not be, according to him, a part of philosophy, and — insofar as it is useful for that — it will be, according to him, an instrument of philosophy. Whoever, [by constrast], holds that philosophy deals with every theoretical inquiry under every respect, will consider that logic too is a part of philosophy and, [at one and the same time], an instrument for the other parts of philosophy; we shall expand on this explanation later on4. The disputes occurring in questions like those are redundant and superfluous. They are redundant because there is no contradiction between the two clauses, for each of the two means by ‘philosophy’ something different; they are superfluous because dealing with such things is not useful.

[.. Concluding remarks on logic] This sort of theoretical inquiry is called ‘science of logic’, and it is the theoretical inquiry into these aforementioned things insofar as one arrives, from them, to make what is unknown known, and [into] what occurs to them insofar as they are like this and not in a different way.

 In Šifāʾ, Qiyās I..

‫]اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ[‬ ‫ﻓﺼﻞ ﰲ ﻣ ﻔﻌﺔ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫)‪ (‬ﳌّﺎ ﰷن اﺳﺘﻜﲈل ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ﻣﻦ ﺔ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ٕا ﺴﺎن ذو ﻋﻘﻞ — ﲆ ﻣﺎ ﺳ ّﻀﺢ ﰲ ﻣﻮﺿﻌﻪ —‬ ‫اﳊﻖ ٔ ﻞ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ واﳋﲑ ٔ ﻞ اﻟﻌﻤﻞ ﺑــﻪ واﻗ ﺒﺎﺳــﻪ وﰷﻧﺖ اﻟﻔﻄــﺮة ا ٔوﱃ واﻟﺒﺪﳞــﺔ ﻣــﻦ‬ ‫ﻫﻮ ﰲ ٔن ﯾﻌﲅ ّ‬ ‫ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن و ﺪﻫﲈ ﻗﻠﯿﻠﱵ اﳌﻌﻮﻧﺔ ﲆ ذ وﰷن ّﻞ ﻣﺎ ﳛﺼﻞ ﻣﻦ ذ ٕاﻧّــﲈ ﳛﺼﻞ ﻻﻛـ ﺴﺎب وﰷن‬ ‫ﻫﺬا ﻛ ﺴﺎب ﻫﻮ اﻛ ﺴﺎب ا ﻬﻮل وﰷن ِ‬ ‫ﻣﻜﺴ ُﺐ ا ﻬﻮل ﻫﻮ اﳌﻌﻠﻮم‪ ،‬وﺟﺐ ٔن ﻜﻮن ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ﯾ ﺪئ‬ ‫ٔ ّوﻻ ﻓ ﻌﲅ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﯿﻒ ﻜﻮن اﻛ ﺴﺎب ا ﻬﻮل ﻣﻦ اﳌﻌﻠﻮم وﯿﻒ ﻜﻮن ﺎل اﳌﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت واﻧﺘﻈﺎ ﺎ ﰲ ٔﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ‬ ‫ﺣﱴ ﺗُﻔ ﺪ اﻟﻌﲅ ﻬــﻮل ٔي ﺣــﱴ‪ ،‬إذا ـﺮﺗ ّ ﺖ ﰲ ا ﻫــﻦ اﻟـﱰﺗ ّﺐ اﻟـﻮاﺟﺐ ﻓ ﻘـ ّـﺮرت ﻓ ــﻪ ﺻــﻮرة ﺗـ‬ ‫اﳌﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﲆ اﻟﱰﺗ ﺐ اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ‪ ،‬اﻧﺘﻘﻞ ا ﻫﻦ ﻣﳯﺎ إﱃ ا ﻬﻮل اﳌﻄﻠﻮب ﻓﻌﻠﻤﻪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺼﻮر ﻓﻘﻂ ﺣــﱴ‪ ،‬إذا ﰷن اﰟ ﻓ ُ ِﻄــﻖ ﺑــﻪ‪،‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬وﻛﲈ ٔ ّن اﻟﴚء ﯾُﻌﲅ ﻣﻦ و ﲔ — ٔ ﺪﻫﲈ ٔن ﯾ ُ َﺘ ّ‬ ‫ﲤﺜ ّﻞ ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻩ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ وٕان ﱂ ﻜﻦ ﻫﻨﺎك ﺻﺪق ٔو ﻛﺬب ﻛﲈ إذا ﻗ ﻞ ٕا ﺴﺎن ٔو ﻗ ﻞ اﻓﻌﻞ ﻛﺬا ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻚ إذا‬ ‫اﻟﺘﺼﻮر ﺗﺼﺪﯾﻖ ﻓ ﻜﻮن‪،‬‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮرﺗﻪ‪ .‬واﻟﺜﺎﱐ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻣﻊ ّ‬ ‫وﻗﻔﺖ ﲆ ﻣﻌﲎ ﻣﺎ ﲣﺎﻃﺐ ﺑﻪ ﻣﻦ ذ ﻛﻨﺖ ّ‬ ‫إذا ﻗ ﻞ ﻣ ﻼ ا ّٕن ّ‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮر ﻣﻌﲎ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻘﻮل ﻓﻘﻂ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﺻﺪّ ﻗﺖ‬ ‫ﰻ ﺑﯿﺎض ﻋﺮض‪ ،‬ﱂ ﳛﺼﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬا ّ‬ ‫ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﻛﺬ ‪ .‬ﻓ ٔ ّﻣﺎ إذا ﺷــﻜﻜﺖ ٔﻧّــﻪ ﻛــﺬ ٔو ﻟ ــﺲ ﻛــﺬ ﻓﻘــﺪ ﺗﺼـ ّـﻮرت ﻣﺎ ﯾــﻘﺎل ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻚ ﻻ ّ‬ ‫ﺸﻚ ﻓـ ﻻ‬ ‫ﺗﺘﺼﻮرﻩ وﻻ ﺗﻔﻬﻤﻪ وﻟﻜ ّﻚ ﱂ ﺗﺼﺪّ ق ﺑﻪ ﺑﻌﺪ و ّ‬ ‫ﰻ ﺗﺼﺪﯾﻖ ﻓ ﻜﻮن ﻣﻊ ﺗﺼـ ّـﻮر وﻻ ﯾﻨﻌﻜــﺲ‪ .‬واﻟﺘﺼـ ّـﻮر ﰲ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫‪. APo a–b.‬‬

‫‪] A‬اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ‪ … ‬وﰷن ‪‬‬

‫‪] Al-Muḫtaṣar al-awṣaṭ fī l-manṭiq, p. .; Šifāʾ, Nafs V., p. .–; ibid.,‬واﻗ ﺒﺎﺳــــــﻪ ‪ … ‬ﳌّﺎ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ ] Al-Muḫtaṣar al-awṣaṭ fī l-manṭiq,‬ﻻﻛ ـ ﺴﺎب ‪… ‬وﰷﻧﺖ ‪pp. .–.; Ilāhiyyāt I., p. .–. ‬‬ ‫‪] Išārāt,‬ﻓﻌﻠﻤﻪ ‪… ‬وﺟﺐ ‪] Šifāʾ, Burhān I., p. .–; ibid. pp. .–.. ‬اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ‪ … ‬وﰷن ‪p. .–. ‬‬ ‫‪pp. .–..‬‬ ‫‪] Šifāʾ, Burhān I., p. .–.‬ﻓﻌﻠﻤـــــﻪ ‪ٔ … ‬ي ‪‬‬ ‫‪ ] Išārāt,‬ﻬـــــﻮل ‪… ‬وﻛـــــﲈ ‪‬‬ ‫‪] Šifāʾ, Burhān I., p. .–.‬ﯾﻨﻌﻜﺲ…و ّ‬ ‫ﰻ ‪pp. .–.. ‬‬ ‫‪ E om. et add. in‬ﻛﲈ ] ﲆ ﻣﺎ | ‪ s.l. J‬ﰷن ‪ Y ‬اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ‪ Mi‬اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﻦ ا ٔول ﻣﻦ ﲨ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ]ﻓﺼﻞ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ om. et add. s.l. ṢN‬ﰲ ‪ A‬ﺑ ٔن ]ﰲ ٔن | ‪ om. ν‬ﻫﻮ ‪ٕ add. Di ‬ا ﺸﺎء ﷲ ﺗﻌﺎﱃ ]ﻣﻮﺿﻌﻪ | ‪ Br‬ﻣﻦ ]ﰲ | ‪ Ed.‬ذ ] | ‪mg. G‬‬ ‫‪ add.‬اﻟﻐﺮﺰﯾﺔ ]واﻟﺒﺪﳞﺔ | ‪ add. τ‬ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ ]اﻟﻔﻄﺮة | ‪ Yi‬وﰷن ]وﰷﻧﺖ | ‪ in mg. To om. τ add. s.l. Ṣ‬واﻗ ﻨﺎﺋﺔ ‪ ET‬واﻗ ﻨﺎﯾﺔ ]واﻗ ﺒﺎﺳﻪ‬ ‫‪ Ed.‬ﻗﻠﯿﲇ ]ﻗﻠﯿﻠﱵ | ‪ a.c. To‬وﻫﲈ ]و ﺪﻫﲈ ‪ om. τ add. in mg. Ṣ ‬ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ‪… ‬ﻣﻦ | ‪ add. Yi‬اﻟﻐﺮﺰة ‪κY add. in mg. Ṣ‬‬ ‫‪ et‬ﻣﻜ ﺴﺐ ‪ TDiDaṢ‬ﻣﺎ ﺑﻪ ﻜ ﺴﺐ ] ِ‬ ‫ﻣﻜﺴ ُﺐ ‪ add. et exp. Nk ‬ﳛﺼﻞ ﻣﻦ ذ ] ٕاﻧ ّﲈ | ‪ iter. a.c. Ṣ‬ذ … | ‪ Nk‬ﻓﲀن ]‪‬وﰷن‬ ‫‪ٔ om. κBrJDa om. et add.‬ي ‪ s.l. Te  om. MiG ‬ﻣ ﺘﺪ ٔ ]ﯾ ﺪئ | ‪ κ‬ﻣﺎ ﻜﺴﺐ ‪ MiNo s.l. Ṣ²‬ﻣﻜ ﺴﺐ ‪ in mg. J‬ﻣﻜﺴﺐ‬ ‫‪ om. ν add. in mg.‬ﺗ | ‪ KaBrYi‬ﺻﻮر ]ﺻﻮرة | ‪ s.l. Ṣ‬وﺗﻘﺮرت ]ﻓ ّﻘﺮرت | ‪ ξKaDiMiŠY s.l. Ṣ²‬اﻟﱰﺗ ﺐ ]اﻟﱰﺗ ّﺐ | ‪in mg. T‬‬ ‫‪ A‬ﻓﻌﻞ ]اﻓﻌﻞ ‪ Br ‬ﻗﺪ ﯾﻌﲅ ]ﯾُﻌﲅ ‪ add. Br ‬ا ﻬﻮل ]اﳌﻄﻠﻮب | ‪ Da‬اﻟـﱰﺗﺐ ]اﻟﱰﺗـ ﺐ | ‪ κDaNo‬اﳌﻌﻘــﻮﻻت ]اﳌﻌﻠــﻮﻣﺎت ‪Y ‬‬ ‫وﻗﺪ ]ﻓﻘﺪ | ‪ E‬ﺷﳫﺖ ]ﺷﻜﻜﺖ | ‪ κμνξEDa‬و ٔﻣﺎ ]ﻓ ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪ om. et add. s.l. Ṣ ‬ﻣ ﻼ ‪ add. JT ‬ﻗﺪ ]ﻛﻨﺖ | ‪ om. Da‬ﻣﻌﲎ ‪‬‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮر | ‪ om. et add. s.l. N‬ﺑﻌﺪ | ‪ in mg. Nk‬واﻠﻔﻆ ]وﻟﻜ ّﻚ ‪KaEd. ‬‬ ‫‪ A‬ﺗﺼﻮرﻩ ] ّ‬

‫‪١٧‬ق‬

C

[I.]

[. Knowledge is attained by acquisition] The perfection of man, with respect to the fact that he is a man, possessed of intellect — as it will be explained to you in its place1 — consists in knowing the truth for the sake of itself and the good for the sake of both doing and acquiring it, and man’s first natural disposition and intuition alone is of little help in this [regard]. Q17 Most of what is realized for him from this is only realized by acquisition, and this acquisition is the acquisition of the unknown, and what makes it possible to acquire the unknown is the known. It is therefore necessary for man to start by first knowing how he acquires the unknown from the known, and what the state of known things and their arrangement in themselves are such that they provide knowledge of the unknown, that is, so that, when they are arranged in the mind in the required way and the form of those known things is fixed in the mind in the required arrangement, the mind moves from them to the unknown which is the object of the inquiry, and knows it.

[. Conception and assertion] [.. How things are known or unknown] [(a)] A thing is known under two respects: [(a.1)] the first consists in its conception only, so that, provided that it has a name by which it is expressed, its meaning is represented in the mind even if there is neither truth nor falsity, like when it is said ‘man’ or ‘do this’, since when you understand the meaning of [the expression] addressed to you, you have conceived it. [(a.2)] The second consists in that, along with the conception, there is an assertion, so that when you are told, for instance: ‘every whiteness is an accident’, not only you attain from this the conception of the meaning of this statement, but you also give assertion to the fact that it is so. As to when you doubt whether it is so or not, you have conceived what is said, for you do not doubt about what you do not conceive nor understand, but you have not yet

 In Šifāʾ, Nafs V..

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ﻣ ﻞ ﻫﺬا اﳌﻌﲎ ﯾﻔ ﺪك ٔن ﳛﺪث ﰲ ا ﻫــﻦ ﺻــﻮرة ﻫــﺬا اﻟﺘ ٔﻟﯿــﻒ وﻣﺎ ﯾﺆﻟّــﻒ ﻣ ــﻪ ﰷﻟﺒــﯿﺎض واﻟﻌــﺮض‪.‬‬ ‫واﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ ﻫﻮ ٔن ﳛﺼﻞ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ ﺴﺒﺔ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻮرة إﱃ ا ٔﺷﯿﺎء ٔﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ٔﳖّ ﺎ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻘــﺔ ﻟــﻬﺎ واﻟﺘﻜــﺬﯾﺐ‬ ‫اﻟﺘﺼﻮر واﻟــﺜﺎﱐ ﻣــﻦ ــﺔ اﻟﺘﺼــﺪﯾﻖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﳜﺎﻟﻒ ذ — ﻛﺬ اﻟﴚء ُﳚﻬَﻞ ﻣﻦ و ﲔ‪ ٔ :‬ﺪﻫﲈ ﻣﻦ ﺔ ّ‬ ‫ﰻ وا ﺪ ﻣﳯﲈ ﻻ ﳛﺼﻞ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎ ا ّٕﻻ ﻟﻜﺴﺐ وﻜﻮن ﺴﺐ ّ‬ ‫ﻓ ﻜﻮن ّ‬ ‫ﰻ وا ﺪ ﻣﳯﲈ ﲟﻌﻠﻮم ﺳﺎﺑﻖ ﻣ ﻘــﺪّ م‬ ‫وﲠﯿﺌﺔ وﺻﻔﺔ ﻜﻮن اﳌﻌﻠﻮم ٔ ﻠﻬﺎ ﯾ ﻘﻞ ا ﻫﻦ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﲅ ﲠﺎ إﱃ اﻟﻌﲅ ﻬﻮل‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬ﻓﻬﺎﻫﻨﺎ ﳾء ﻣﻦ ﺷ ٔﻧﻪ ٔن ﯾﻔ ﺪ اﻟﻌــﲅ ﻬــﻮل ﺗﺼـ ّـﻮرﻩ وﳾء ﻣــﻦ ﺷـ ٔﻧﻪ ٔن ﯾﻔ ــﺪ اﻟﻌــﲅ ﻬــﻮل‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮر ﳾء اﰟ ﺎﻣــﻊ ٔو ﱂ‬ ‫ﺗﺼﺪﯾﻘﻪ‪ .‬وﱂ ﲡﺮ اﻟﻌﺎدة ﺑ ٔن ﯾُﻔﺮض ﻠﻤﻌﲎ اﳉﺎﻣﻊ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻠﻤﻪ ﯾﻔ ﺪ ﲅ ّ‬ ‫ﯾﺒﻠﻐﻨﺎ ٔ ّن ﻣ ﻪ ﺪّ ا وﻣ ﻪ رﺳﲈ وﻣ ﻪ ﻣ ﺎﻻ وﻣ ﻪ ﻼﻣﺔ وﻣ ﻪ اﺳﲈ‪ ،‬ﲆ ﻣﺎ ﺳ ّﻀﺢ ‪ ،‬وﻟ ﺲ ِﻟﲈ ﺸﱰك‬ ‫ﻓ ﻪ اﰟ ﺎ ّم‪ .‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟﴚء ا ي ﯾﱰﺗ ّﺐ ٔ ّوﻻ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎ ﰒ ﯾُﻌﲅ ﺑﻪ ﲑﻩ ﲆ ﺳ ﻞ اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ ﻓﺎ ّٕن ذ اﻟﴚء‬ ‫ﺴ ّﻤﻰ ﯿﻒ ﰷن ﲩّﺔ ﳁﻨﻪ ﻗ ﺎس وﻣ ﻪ اﺳﺘﻘﺮاء وﻣ ﻪ ﲤﺜﯿﻞ وﻣ ﻪ ٔﺷﯿﺎء ٔﺧﺮى‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (..‬ﻓﻐﺎﯾﺔ ﲅ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ٔن ﯾﻔ ﺪ ا ﻫﻦ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﻫﺬ ﻦ اﻟﺸﯿ ﲔ ﻓﻘﻂ وﻫﻮ ٔن ﯾﻌﺮف ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﯿﻒ‬ ‫ﻠﺘﺼﻮر ﺣﱴ ﻜﻮن ُﻣ ّ ِﻌﺮﻓﺎ ﺣﻘ ﻘﺔ ذات اﻟﴚء؛ وﯿﻒ ﻜﻮن ﺣﱴ ﻜﻮن ّ‬ ‫داﻻ‬ ‫ﳚﺐ ٔن ﻜﻮن اﻟﻘﻮل اﳌُﻮ ِﻗﻊ ّ‬

‫‪ ] Quoted in Lawkarī, Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān al-ṣidq, pp. .–..‬ﲑﻩ ‪… ‬ﯾﻔ ﺪ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ٔ ] Al-Muḫtaṣar al-awṣaṭ fī‬ﺧــﺮى ‪ … ‬ﻓــﻬﺎﻫﻨﺎ ‪ ] Šifāʾ, Burhān I., pp. .–.. ‬ﻬــﻮل ‪… ‬ﻓ ﻜــﻮن ‪‬‬ ‫‪ ] Cf. Išārāt, p. .–.‬ﺎ ّم ‪… ‬وﱂ ‪l-manṭiq, p. .–; cf. Manṭiq al-Mašriqiyyīn, pp. .–.. ‬‬ ‫‪] Nağāt p. .–.; Manṭiq‬اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ‪… ‬ﻓﻐﺎﯾﺔ ‪ٔ ] Išārāt, p. .–; ibid., p. .–. ‬ﺧﺮى ‪… ‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪‬‬ ‫‪al-Mašriqiyyīn, pp. .–..‬‬ ‫] ُﳚﻬَﻞ ‪ mg. Te ‬ﻣ ﻪ ظ ‪ et‬ﻣﳯﺎ ‪ ιAs‬ﻣﳯﺎ ‪ A‬ﻫﺬﻩ ‪ s.l. NkC‬ﻣﳯﲈ ‪ νE‬ﻣﳯﲈ ]ﻣ ﻪ | ‪ om. JDa‬ﻫﺬا | ‪ om. et add. s.l. No‬ﻣ ﻞ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ iter. a.c. Ṣ‬ﻜﻮن | ‪ om. et add. in mg. T‬وﺻﻔﺔ | ‪ JTYi‬ﲠﯿﺌﺔ ]وﲠﯿﺌﺔ ‪ om. et add. in mg. J ‬ﺴﺐ ‪ EN ‬ﳛﺼﻞ‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮرﻩ | ‪ om. Š‬ﳾء ‪  om. G ‬ﻬﻮل ‪ … ‬ﻬﻮل | ‪ om. ν add. in mg. Y‬ﲠﺎ…ﻣﻦ | ‪ τJ‬اﻧﺘﻘﻞ ]ﯾ ﻘﻞ‬ ‫‪ّ om. et add. s.l.‬‬ ‫‪ in mg.‬ﺎم ] ﺎﻣﻊ | ‪ om. A‬ﳾء | ‪ٔ add. in mg. G‬ن ‪ π‬ﺣ ﺚ ٔن ]ﺣ ﺚ ‪ om. et add. in mg. Da ‬‬ ‫ﻬﻮل…ﺗﺼﻮرﻩ | ‪Y‬‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫اﰟ ]اﺳﲈ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. Ṣ‬وﻣ ﻪ ﻼﻣﺔ | ‪ Y‬رﰟ ]رﺳﲈ | ‪ Y om. No‬ﺪ ] ّﺪا | ‪ ν‬إﻻ ٔن ] ٔ ّن ‪ om. a.c. To ‬ﱂ | ‪C‬‬ ‫| ‪ ξEDaG‬و ﲆ ] ﲆ | ‪Y‬‬ ‫‪ om. κ‬اﻟﴚء | ‪ Ed.‬ﺎم ﺎﻣﻊ ‪ s.l. Ṣ²‬ﺎم ‪ Ṣ in mg. NkBT‬ﺎﻣﻊ ] ﺎ ّم ‪om. et add. s.l. Ṣ² ‬‬ ‫‪ No‬اﳌﺮﻓﻊ ]اﳌُﻮ ِﻗﻊ | ‪ om. Yi‬اﻟﻘﻮل | ‪ Br‬ﯾﻘﻮل ]‪ ‬ﻜﻮن ‪ٔ Nk ‬ﻧﻪ ]‪ٔ ‬ن | ‪ٔ add. Law‬ﻋﲏ اﳊﺪ واﻟﻘ ﺎس ‪ om. et‬ﻓﻘﻂ ‪‬‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫ﻟ ﺲ اﳌﺮاد ٔن اﻟﻌﲅ ﯾﻨﻘﺴﻢ إﱃ اﻟﺘﺼﻮر ﻦ وٕاﻻ ﱂ ﻜﻦ اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ ﺎﴏة ﻓﺎٕن اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ ﻫﺬﻩ ﲅ ﲆ ﻣﻘ ﴣ ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻔﻪ وﻫﻮ ﻟ ﺲ ﺷ ﺎ ]ﻟﻬﺎ… واﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ‬ ‫‪ [Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Šarḥ al-Maṭāliʿ, vol.‬ﻣﳯﺎ ﺑﻞ اﳌﺮاد اﻟﻌﲅ ﳛﺼﻞ ﲆ اﻟﻮ ﲔ وﺣﺼﻮ ﲆ و ﻪ ٓﺧﺮ ﻻ ﯾﻨﺎﰲ ذ ش ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻊ‬ ‫ﻓﺎٕن ﻗ ﻞ ﻓﻌﲆ ﻫﺬا ﻜﻮن اﻟﻌﲅ ﻣ ﻘﺴﲈ إﱃ ﺛﻼﺛﺔ ٔﻗﺴﺎم ﺗﺼﻮر ﺳﺎذج وﺗﺼﻮر ﻣﻌﻪ ﺗﺼﺪﯾﻖ ]ذ ‪ … ‬واﻟﺘﻜﺬﯾﺐ | ‪I, pp. –] in mg. Te‬‬ ‫وﺗﺼﻮر ﻣﻌﻪ ﻜﺬﯾﺐ ﻗﻠﻨﺎ اﳌﺮاد ﻟﺘﻜﺬﯾﺐ ﻜﺬﯾﺐ اﻟ ﺴﺒﺔ اﻻٕﳚﺎﺑﯿﺔ وﻫﻮ اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ ﻟ ﺴﺒﺔ اﻟﺴﻠﺒﯿﺔ ﻓ ﻨﺪرج ﰲ ﻣﻄﻠﻖ اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ اﻟﺸﺎﻣﻞ ﳍﲈ ش ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻊ‬ ‫ﻟــﻌﻞ اﺻــﻄﻼح اﻟﻘــﻮل اﻟﺸﺎرح ]اﰟ ﺎ ّم ‪[cf. Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Šarḥ al-Maṭāliʿ, vol. I, pp. –] in mg. Te ‬‬ ‫‪ i.l.‬وﻗﻮل اﻟﺸﺎرح ﻻ ﯾﻘﻊ ﺑ ٔن ﰟ ﺑﻪ ﳣﲓ وﻗﻮل اﻟﺸﺎرح ﻣﺮﺐ ] ٔﺧﺮى… ‪‬وﻣ ﻪ ‪ in mg. As² ‬واﳌﻌﺮف واﻟﺘﻌﺮﯾﻒ ﻟ ﺲ ﰲ زﻣﺎن اﻟﺸﯿﺦ اﻟﺮﺋ ﺲ‬ ‫‪ in mg. B‬و ﺪت ﰲ ﺴ ﺔ ﻣﺼﺤ ﺔ ﻣﻦ ﻟﻔﻈﻪ ٔﻧﻪ إﱃ ﻗﻮ وﱂ ﻜﻮن ﻣﴬو ﻠﯿﻪ اﻟﻘﲅ ] ﻜﻮن ‪ٔ … ‬ﻧ ّﻪ ‪Di ‬‬

‫‪١٨‬ق‬

Chapter I.3  33

given assertion to it (every assertion coming with a conception, but not the reverse). The conception of such meaning helps you to produce in the mind the form of this composition and of that by which it is composed, like ‘whiteness’ and ‘accident’. Assertion consists in realizing in the mind the relation of this form to the things themselves with regard to the fact that the form corresponds to them, whereas denial is the opposite. [(b)] Similarly, the thing is unknown in two ways: [(b.1)] first, with respect to conception; [(b.2)] secondly, with respect to assertion. Both of them2 are realized as known only by acquisition, and the acquisition of each one of them [is Q18 attained] by means of something previously known and by means of a disposition and an attribute that belong to that known thing, by virtue of which the mind is moved from knowing them to know the unknown.

[.. Distinction between what produces conception and what produces assertion] There is something whose conception can provide knowledge of the unknown, and something [else] whose assertion can provide knowledge of the unknown. It is not customary to assign a comprehensive name to the comprehensive meaning as far as its knowledge provides knowledge of the conception of something, or it was not transmitted to us, because definition, description, example, sign and name [all] come under [this meaning], as it will be clarified to you, yet the [meaning] that they share has no common name3. As to what is first classified as known, and by means of which, then, something else is known by way of assertion, it is called, no matter how it is, ‘proof’, which can be syllogism, induction, analogy or other things.

[.. The two aims of logic] [... Knowledge of what produces conception] The aim of the science of logic is to provide the mind with knowledge of these two things only: [first,] that man knows [(aa)] how a statement that produces conception should be in order to make the reality of the thing’s essence known4; [(ab)] and

 I.e. the thing unknown with respect to both conception and assertion.  This remark is puzzling, for Avicenna states the opposite in K. al-Išārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt p. .– and Manṭiq al-Mašriqiyyīn, p. .–, where he refers to the use of calling what produces conception “explanatory statement” (qawl šāriḥ); see Commentary.  I.e. Definition (ḥadd).

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ﻠﯿﻪ وٕان ﱂ ﯾ ُ َﺘﻮﺻﻞ ﺑﻪ إﱃ ﺣﻘ ﻘﺔ ذاﺗﻪ؛ وﯿﻒ ﻜﻮن ﻓﺎﺳﺪا ُﻣﺨ ّﯿِﻼ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﯾﻔﻌﻞ ذ وﻻ ﻜﻮن ﯾﻔﻌﻞ ذ ‪،‬‬ ‫و ِﻟﻢ ﻜﻮن ﻛﺬ وﻣﺎ اﻟﻔﺼﻮل اﻟﱵ ﺑ ﳯﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (..‬و ٔﯾﻀﺎ ٔن ﯾﻌﺮف ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﯿﻒ ﻜﻮن اﻟﻘﻮل اﳌﻮ ِﻗﻊ ﻠﺘﺼــﺪﯾﻖ ﺣــﱴ ﻜــﻮن ﻣــﻮﻗﻌﺎ ﺗﺼــﺪﯾﻘﺎ‬ ‫ﯾﺼﺢ اﻧﺘﻘﺎﺿﻪ؛ وﯿﻒ ﻜﻮن ﺣﱴ ﻜﻮن ﻣﻮﻗﻌﺎ ﺗﺼــﺪﯾﻘﺎ ﯾــﻘﺎرب اﻟﯿــﻘﲔ؛ و ﯿــﻒ ﻜــﻮن‬ ‫ﯾﻘ ﻨﯿﺎ ﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ ﻻ ّ‬ ‫ﲝﯿﺚ ﯾُ َﻈ ّﻦ ﺑﻪ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﲆ ٕا ﺪى اﻟﺼﻮرﺗﲔ وﻻ ﻜﻮن ﻛﺬ ﺑﻞ ﻜﻮن ﻃﻼ ﻓﺎﺳﺪا؛ وﯿﻒ ﻜﻮن ﺣــﱴ‬ ‫ﻇﻦ وﻣ ﻞ ﻧﻔﺲ وﻗ ﺎ ﺔ ﻣﻦ ﲑ ﺗﺼﺪﯾﻖ َﺟ ْﺰم؛ وﯿﻒ ﻜﻮن اﻟﻘــﻮل ﺣــﱴ ﯾ ُ َﺆ ِ ّــﺮ ﰲ اﻟﻨﻔــﺲ ﻣﺎ‬ ‫ﯾﻮﻗﻊ ﻠﯿﻪ ّ‬ ‫ﯾﺆ ّﺮﻩ اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ واﻟﺘﻜﺬﯾﺐ ﻣﻦ إﻗﺪام واﻣ ﻨﺎع واﻧ ﺴﺎط واﻧﻘ ﺎض ﻻ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﯾﻮﻗﻊ ﺗﺼﺪﯾﻘﺎ ﺑﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ‬ ‫ﳜ ّﯿﻞ ﻓﻜ ﲑ ﻣﻦ اﳋﯿﺎﻻت ﯾﻔﻌﻞ ﰲ ﻫﺬا اﻟﺒﺎب ﻓﻌﻞ اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ‪ ،‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻚ إذا ﻗﻠﺖ ﻠــﻌﺴﻞ ٕاﻧّــﻪ ُﻣـ ّـﺮة ﻣﻘ ﺌــﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫اﻟﺒﺘّﺔ ﻛﲈ ﺗﻨﻔﺮ ﻟﻮ ﰷن ﻫﻨﺎك ﺗﺼﺪﯾﻖ ٔو ﺷ ﻪ ﺑﻪ ﻗﺮﯾﺐ ﻣ ﻪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻧﻔﺮت اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﺔ ﻋﻦ ﺗﻨﺎو ﻣﻊ ﻜﺬﯾﺐ‬ ‫وﻣﺎ اﻟﻔﺼﻮل ﺑ ﳯﺎ و ِﻟﻢ ﰷﻧﺖ ﻛﺬ ‪ .‬وﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ ﳛﺘﺎج ﻣ ﻌﻠّﻤﻬﺎ اﻟﻘﺎﺻﺪ ﻓﳱﺎ ﻗﺼﺪ ﻫــﺬ ﻦ اﻟﻐﺮﺿــﲔ إﱃ‬ ‫ﻣﻘﺪّ ﻣﺎت ﻣﳯﺎ ﯾ ُ َﺘﻮﺻﻞ إﱃ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ اﻟﻐﺮﺿﲔ وﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ ﱔ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻠﺘﺼﻮر و ّﲩــﺔ ﻣﻮﻗﻌــﺔ ﻠﺘﺼــﺪﯾﻖ ا ّٕﻻ ٔ ّن ذ‬ ‫)‪ (.‬وﻗﺪ ﯾﺘّﻔﻖ ﻟ ٕﻼ ﺴﺎن ٔن ﯾ ﻌﺚ ﰲ ﻏﺮﺰﺗﻪ ﺪّ ُﻣﻮ ِﻗﻊ ّ‬ ‫ﻜﻮن ﺷ ﺎ ﲑ ﺻﻨﺎﻋﻲ وﻻ ﯾُﺆ َﻣﻦ ﻠﻄﻪ ﰲ ﲑﻩ‪ .‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﻟﻮ ﰷﻧﺖ اﻟﻐﺮﺰة واﻟﻘﺮﳛﺔ ﰲ ذ ﳑّﺎ ﻜﻔ ﻨﺎ ﻃﻠﺐ‬ ‫اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ ﻛﲈ ﰲ ﻛﺜﲑ ﻣﻦ ا ٔﻣﻮر ﲀن ﻻ ﯾﻌﺮض ﻣﻦ ﺧ ﻼف واﻟﺘﻨﺎﻗﺾ ﰲ اﳌﺬاﻫﺐ ﻣﺎ ﻋﺮض وــﲀن‬ ‫‪] Material damage in MS Br.‬ﻛﺬ‬

‫… و ِﻟﻢ ‪‬‬

‫‪] Šifāʾ, Burhān I.,‬ﻓﺎﺳـــﺪا ‪ … ‬وﯿـــﻒ ‪] Šifāʾ, Burhān I., p. .–; –. ‬اﻧﺘﻘﺎﺿـــﻪ ‪… ‬و ٔﯾﻀﺎ ‪‬‬ ‫‪… ‬وﯿﻒ ‪َ ] Šifāʾ, Burhān I., p. .–; p. .. ‬ﺟ ْﺰم ‪… ‬وﯿﻒ ‪p. .–; pp. .–.. ‬‬ ‫‪] Qānūn‬واﻧـ ـ ﺴﺎط واﻧ ــﻘ ﺎض ‪] Nağāt p. .–; Šifāʾ, Burhān I., p. .–; ibid., I., p. .–. ‬ﻣ ــﻪ‬ ‫‪] Šifāʾ, Nafs IV., pp. .–.; Nağāt, p. .–; ʿUyūn‬ﻣ ﻪ ‪… ‬ﻓﻜ ﲑ ‪I.i.VI., p. .–. ‬‬ ‫‪al-Ḥikma, al-Manṭiq, pp. .–..‬‬ ‫‪] Risāla fī Aqsām al-ʿUlūm al-ʿAqliyya,‬رام ‪… ‬وﻗــــــﺪ ‪‬‬ ‫‪] Nağāt, p. .–.‬رام ‪… ‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ‪p. .–. ‬‬ ‫] ﻜﻮن | ‪ in mg. Ṣ‬وﱂ ﻜﻮن ‪ Ṣ in mg. Te‬وﱂ ﻜﻦ ﻛﺬ ]ﻛﺬ … و ِﻟﻢ ‪ om. As ‬ذ | ‪ Law‬ﻓﻼ ]وﻻ | ‪ As‬ﻣ ﺨﯿﻼ ] ُﻣﺨ ّﯿِﻼ ‪‬‬ ‫ﺑ ﳯﺎ ‪ et‬ﺑ ﳯﲈ ]ﺑ ﳯﺎ | ‪ om. T‬اﻟﱵ | ‪ a.c. To‬و ٔﻣﺎ ‪ add. i.l. Nk‬ﱔ ]وﻣﺎ | ‪ G‬ﰻ ذ ‪ Ed.‬ذ ‪ Da‬ﰻ ذ ﻛﺬ ]ﻛﺬ | ‪ JTTo‬ﻜﻦ‬ ‫‪ ν‬وﻻ ]ﻻ | ‪ Law‬ﯾﻘ ﻨﺎ ]ﯾﻘ ﻨﯿﺎ ‪ No ‬اﳌـﺮﻓﻊ ‪ om. C‬اﳌﻮ ِﻗــﻊ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. To‬ﯿــﻒ ‪in mg. J om. et add. s.l. Ṣ ‬‬ ‫‪ add. Ṣ et exp. Ṣ²‬رﲟﺎ ]ﺑﻞ | ‪ ٔ E‬ﺪ ] ٕا ﺪى | ‪ om. Law‬ﺑﻪ | ‪ KaBr s.l. Ṣ²‬ﺣﱴ ]ﲝﯿﺚ ‪ add. Nk ‬ﻣﻌﲎ ﻜــﻮن ]‪ ‬ﻜــﻮن‬ ‫ﻇﻦ | ‪ κ‬ﻜﻮن ﯾﻮﻗﻊ ]ﯾﻮﻗﻊ ‪‬‬ ‫‪‬ﻣﻦ | ‪ om. Law‬واﻟﺘﻜﺬﯾﺐ | ‪ Law‬ﯾﺆﺮ ]ﯾﺆ ّﺮﻩ ‪ Law ‬ﻜﻮن ﻣﺆ ﺮا ]ﯾُ َﺆ ِ ّﺮ | ‪ add. κμνE s.l. Ṣ²‬ﺑﻪ ] ّ‬ ‫‪ i.l. NkC‬ﻠﻌﺴﻞ ‪ KaJNkTC‬ﰲ اﻟﻌﺴﻞ ] ﻠﻌﺴﻞ | ‪ Law‬ﰲ ﻫﺬا اﻟﺒﺎب ﯾﻔﻌﻞ ]اﻟﺒﺎب…ﯾﻔــﻌﻞ | ‪ Mi‬وﻛﺜــﲑ ‪ κ‬ﻓــﻜ ﲑا ]ﻓــﻜ ﲑ ‪om. C ‬‬ ‫ﺷـ ﳱﺎ ]ﺷـ ﻪ | ‪ om. Law‬اﳌﻨﻄــﻖ ‪ٔ … ‬و | ‪ add. Ṣ et exp. Ṣ²‬اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌــﺔ ]ﺗﻨﻔــﺮ | ‪ Law‬اﻟﻄﺒــﻊ ]اﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌــﺔ | ‪ Law‬ﻧﻔــﺮ ]ﻧﻔــﺮت ‪‬‬ ‫‪ om.‬ﻣ ﻪ | ‪ in mg. Te‬ﻗﺮﯾﺐ ‪ٔ praem. ad‬و ‪ DiŠG‬ﺑﻪ ﻗﺮﯾﺒﺎ ‪ add. s.l. To‬ﺑﻪ ﻗﺮﯾﺒﺎ ‪ om. et‬ﺑﻪ ﻗﺮﯾﺐ | ‪ Br‬ﺷ ﳱﻪ ]ﺷ ﻪ ﺑﻪ | ‪DiToŠG‬‬ ‫]ﻓﳱﺎ | ‪ add. Br‬ﻓﳱﺎ ]ﳛﺘﺎج | ‪ add. a.c. No‬ﱔ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ]اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ | ‪ To‬ﰷن ]ﰷﻧﺖ | ‪ κπ‬اﻟﱵ ﺑ ﳯﺎ ‪ in mg. J‬ﺑ ﳯﺎ ‪ et‬ﺑ ﳯﲈ ]ﺑ ﳯﺎ ‪C ‬‬ ‫… ‪‬ﰲ | ‪ s.l. N‬اﻟﻘﺮﳛﺔ ‪ et‬واﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﺔ ]واﻟﻘﺮﳛﺔ ‪ JYi ‬ﻜﻮن ذ ] ﻜﻮن ‪… ‬ذ | ‪ in mg. G‬ﻋﻦ ‪ i.l. To‬ﻋﻦ ‪ Mi‬ﻋﻦ ]ﰲ ‪ E ‬ﻣﳯﺎ‬ ‫‪ T‬ا ٔﺣﻮال ]ا ٔﻣﻮر ‪ om. κ ‬اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ ‪… ‬ﻃﻠﺐ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ‬ﻜﻔ ﺎن ] ﻜﻔ ﻨﺎ | ‪ DaMi‬ﳑﺎ ﻜﻔ ﻨﺎ ‪ κνEDiToŠG‬ﳑﺎ ﻜﻔ ﻨﺎ ﰲ ذ ] ﻜﻔ ﻨﺎ‬ ‫‪ T‬ﯾﻌﺮض ]ﻋﺮض | ‪ γY‬ﺧ ﻼﻓﺎت ] ﺧ ﻼف‬ ‫‪ٔ i.l. Di‬ي اﻟﻔﺮوق ]اﻟﻔﺼﻮل ‪‬‬

‫‪١٩‬ق‬

Chapter I.3  35

how it is so that it signifies the thing’s essence, even if one does not attain the reality of the thing’s essence by it5; [(ac)] and how it is false, giving the impression of doing this without [actually] doing so6, and why [this statement] is so and what the differences are between [these cases]. [... Knowledge of what produces assertion] [Secondly, the aim of logic] is also that man knows [(ba)] how a statement conducing to assertion is so that it produces an assertion that is truly certain and cannot be invalidated7; [(bb)] how it is in order to produce an assertion close to certitude8; [(bc)] how it is in such a way that it is believed to be in one of [these] two forms without [actually] being so, being rather invalid and false9; [(bd)] how it is in order to produce an opinion, an inclination of the soul and a persuasion, yet without a categorical assertion10; and [(be)] how a statement is that produces on the soul the same effect as assertion and denial in proposing and denying, expanding and Q19 contracting [the soul]11, not insofar as it produces an assertion, but rather insofar as it [makes us] imagine [to do so], for many imaginations do in this regard what the assertion does, since when you say of honey that it is a vomitive bile, nature abstains from taking it, despite an absolute denial of that [imagination], as it would abstain if there were an assertion [on what is imagined] or something similar and close to it12. [The aim of logic is also that man knows] what the differences between them are, and why they are so. Whoever intends to learn this discipline and pursues in it these two purposes needs [some] premises from which he attains knowledge of the two purposes; this discipline is logic.

[. The use of the discipline of logic in the acquisition of knowledge] [.. Inadequacy of human natural disposition to acquire sound knowledge] It may happen that a definition that produces conception and a proof that produces assertion arise in a man’s innate disposition, except that this is not by the discipline [of logic], outside the domain of which one is not safe from error. If innate

 I.e. Description (rasm).  I.e. Incomplete definition and incomplete description: cf. Burhān I..  I.e. Demontrative syllogism (qiyās burhānī).  I.e. Dialectic syllogism (qiyās ğadalī).  I.e. Sophistic syllogism (qiyās sūfisṭāʾī).  I.e. Rhetoric syllogism (qiyās ḫaṭābī).  It is a reference to the Stoic view according to which imaginations may generate an expansion or a contraction of the soul.  I.e. Poetic syllogism (qiyās šiʿrī).

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن اﻟﻮا ﺪ ﻻ ﯾﻨﺎﻗﺾ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ وﻗ ﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ وﻗﺖ إذا اﻋﳣﺪ ﻗﺮﳛﺘﻪ‪ .‬ﺑﻞ اﻟﻔﻄﺮة ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ ﲑ ﰷﻓ ﺔ ﰲ ذ‬ ‫ﻣﺎ ﱂ ﻜ ﺴﺐ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ ﻛﲈ ٔﳖّ ﺎ ﲑ ﰷﻓ ﺔ ﰲ ﻛﺜﲑ ﻣﻦ ا ٔﻋﲈل ا ٔﺧﺮ‪ ،‬وان ﰷن ﯾﻘﻊ ﰲ ﺑﻌﻀــﻬﺎ ٕاﺻــﺎﺑﺔ‬ ‫ﺮﻣ ﺔ ﻣﻦ ﲑ رام‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬وﻟ ﺲ ٔﯾﻀﺎ إذا ﺣﺼﻠﺖ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ ﳌﺒﻠﻎ ا ي ﻟ ٕﻼ ﺴﺎن ٔن ﳛﺼﻞ ﻣﳯﺎ ﰷﻧﺖ ﰷﻓ ﺔ ﻣﻦ ّ‬ ‫ﰻ‬ ‫و ﻪ ﺣﱴ ﻻ ﯾﻐﻠﻂ اﻟﺒﺘّﺔ‪ ،‬إذ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ ﻗﺪ ﯾﺬﻫﺐ ﻋﳯﺎ وﯾﻘﻊ اﻟﻌﺪول ﻋﻦ اﺳﺘﻌﲈﻟﻬﺎ ﰲ ﻛﺜﲑ ﻣﻦ ا ٔﺣﻮال ﻻ‬ ‫ٔ ّن اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ﲑ ﺿﺎﺑﻄﺔ و ﲑ ﺻﺎدّة ﻋﻦ اﻟﻐﻠﻂ‪ .‬ﻟﻜ ّﻪ ﻗﺪ ﯾﻌﺮض ﻫﻨﺎك ٔﻣﻮر ٔ ﺪﻫﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺔ ٔ ّن‬ ‫اﻟﺼﺎﻧﻊ ﻻ ﻜﻮن ﻗﺪ اﺳﺘﻮﰱ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ ﻜﲈﻟﻬﺎ؛ واﻟﺜﺎﱐ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﻜﻮن ﻗﺪ اﺳﺘﻮﻓﺎﻫﺎ‪ ،‬ﻟﻜ ّﻪ ﰲ ﺑﻌﺾ اﳌﻮاﺿﻊ ٔﳘﻠﻬﺎ‬ ‫واﻛﺘﻔﻰ ﻟﻘﺮﳛﺔ؛ واﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﻗﺪ ﯾﻌﺮض ﻛﺜﲑا ٔن ﯾﻌﺠﺰ ﻋﻦ اﺳﺘﻌﲈﻟﻬﺎ ٔو ﯾﺬﻫﺐ ﻋﳯﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬ﲆ ٔﻧ ّﻪ وٕان ﰷن ﻛﺬ ﻓﺎ ّٕن ﺻﺎﺣﺐ اﻟﻌﲅ إذا ﰷن ﺻﺎﺣﺐ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ واﺳﺘﻌﻤﻠﻬﺎ ﱂ ﻜﻦ ﻣﺎ ﯾﻘﻊ‬ ‫ﻣﻦ اﻟﺴﻬﻮ ﻣ ﻞ ﻣﺎ ﯾﻘﻊ ﻟﻌﺎد ﺎ‪ .‬وﻣﻊ ذ ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ إذا ﺎود ﻓﻌﻼ ﻣﻦ ٔﻓــﻌﺎل ﺻــﻨﺎﻋﺘﻪ ﻣـﺮارا ﻛﺜــﲑة ﲤﻜّــﻦ ﻣــﻦ‬ ‫ﺗﺪارك إﻫﲈل‪ ،‬إن ﰷن وﻗﻊ ﻣ ــﻪ ﻓ ــﻪ‪ّ ٔ ،‬ن ﺻــﺎﺣﺐ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ــﺔ‪ ،‬إذا ٔﻓﺴــﺪ ﲻـ ﻣــﺮة ٔو ﻣـﺮارا ﲤﻜّــﻦ ﻣــﻦ‬ ‫ﺳﺘﺼﻼح‪ ،‬ا ّٕﻻ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻣ ﻨﺎﻫﯿﺎ ﰲ اﻟﺒﻼدة‪ .‬ﻓﺎٕذا ﰷن ﻛﺬ ﻓﻼ ﯾﻘﻊ اﻟﺴﻬﻮ ﰲ ّﻤﺎت ﺻﻨﺎﻋﺘﻪ اﻟﱵ‬ ‫ﺗﻌ ّﯿﻨﻪ اﳌﻌﺎودة ﻓﳱﺎ‪ ،‬وٕان وﻗﻊ ﺳﻬﻮ ﰲ ﻧﻮاﻓﻠﻬﺎ‪.‬‬

‫اﳌﺘﻌﺮﺑﲔ ‪ّ ٔ  … ‬ن ‪‬‬ ‫…ﻟﻜ ّﻪ ‪ّ ] Quoted in Lawkarī, Bayān al-ḥaqq bi-ḍimān al-ṣidq, pp. .–.. ‬‬ ‫‪] Material‬ﲻ ـ …ﻓ ــﻪ ‪… ] Material damage in MS Ṣ. ‬اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ــﺔ ‪ ] Material damage in MS Ṣ. ‬ﻟﻘﺮﳛــﺔ ‪‬‬ ‫‪] Material damage in MS Ṣ.‬ﺳﻬﻮ…ﺗﻌ ّﯿﻨﻪ ‪damage in MS Ṣ. ‬‬ ‫‪, Risāla ṣudira bihā al-Kitāb, p. .–.‬‬

‫‪ ] Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt I.,‬ﻟﻘﺮﳛ ــﺔ ‪ … ‬واﻟ ــﺜﺎﱐ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪-F‬‬

‫‪] A‬ﻧﻮاﻓﻠﻬﺎ ‪… ‬‬

‫‪] Al-Muḫtaṣar al-awṣaṭ fī l-manṭiq, p. .–.‬رام‬

‫ﲆ ‪‬‬

‫‪… ‬ﺑﻞ ‪‬‬ ‫‪p. .–.‬‬

‫‪ om. et add. in mg. Di‬إﺻﺎﺑﺔ | ‪ praem. s.l. G‬ﻗﺪ ‪ To‬ﻗﺪ ﯾﻘﻊ ]ﯾﻘﻊ ‪ s.l. Ṣ² ‬ﺑﻞ ‪ Ṣ‬ﻓﺎٕن ]ﺑﻞ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. Ṣ‬وﻗ ﺎ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ praem.‬ﯾﺒﻠﻐﻪ و ‪ ToMi‬ﯾﺒﻠﻐﻪ وﳛﺼﻞ ]ﳛﺼﻞ | ‪ٔ s.l. Ṣ‬ن ‪ٔ Ṣ‬ﻧﻪ ] ٔن | ‪ٔ om. θA add. s.l. Ṣ²‬ﯾﻀﺎ ‪ i.l. Di ‬ﺮﻣ ﺔ ‪ et‬ﻟﺮﻣ ﺔ ] ﺮﻣ ﺔ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ E‬إﻻ ]‪‬ﻻ | ‪ in mg. Di‬اﻟﻌﺪول ‪ et‬اﻟﻌﻮدل ‪ A‬ﻟﻌﺪول ]اﻟﻌﺪول | ‪ p.c. As‬ﯾﺬﻫﻞ ‪ ToŠG‬ﯾﺬﻫﻞ ]ﯾﺬﻫﺐ | ‪ A‬إذا ]إذ ‪in mg. JDiG ‬‬ ‫ٔن اﻟﺼﺎﻧﻊ ﱂ ]اﺳﺘﻮﰱ ‪ّٔ  … ‬ن | ‪ om. γθAEd.‬ﻗﺪ | ‪ i.l. Ṣ‬ﺻﺎدة ‪ Ṣ‬ﺻﺎدرة ]ﺻﺎدّة ‪ i.l. Ṣ² ‬ﻻ ٔن ‪ٔ ζνπṢNo‬ن ]‪ّٔ ‬ن ‪ … ‬ﻻ‬ ‫ﻗﺪ ]‪ ‬ﻜﻮن | ‪ٔ γDaMiEd.‬ن ] ٔﻧ ّﻪ ‪ٔ Ed. ‬ن ﻜﻮن اﻟﺼﺎﻧﻊ ﱂ ﺴﺘﻮف ‪ s.l. Ṣ²‬ﱂ ﺴﺘﻮف ‪ٔ η‬ن ‪ add. in mg. post‬ﻜﻮن ‪ γ‬ﺴﺘﻮف‬ ‫‪ … ‬ﺻﺎﺣﺐ | ‪ om. J‬ﻛﺬ … ﲆ ‪ p.c. As ‬ﯾﺬﻫﻞ ]ﯾﺬﻫﺐ | ‪ om. ν add. in mg. Y‬ﻋﳯﺎ… ٔو ‪ om. N ‬ﻗﺪ | ‪ N‬ﻜﻮن‬ ‫ﺻﻨﺎﻋﯿﺔ ‪ Da‬ﺻﻨﺎ ﺔ ]ﺻﻨﺎﻋﺘﻪ | ‪ a.c. To‬ﺎد ] ﺎود | ‪ add. et exp. To‬ﰷ ]ﻣﺎ ‪ praem. Law ‬ﻫﺬﻩ ]اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ | ‪ iter. a.c. To‬ﺎود‬ ‫ﺳﻬﻮا ‪ in mg. J‬ﺳﻬﻮا ﻓ ﻪ ‪ om. BrJ‬ﻓ ﻪ ‪ Br ‬ﯨﺪارك ﳣﻜ ﻪ إﻫﲈﻻ ‪ Ṣ‬ﯾﺪرك ﳣﻜ ﻪ إﻫﲈﻻ ]إﻫﲈل ‪… ‬ﲤﻜّﻦ | ‪ As‬ﻣﻦ ٓراء ]ﻣﺮارا | ‪AsMiNo‬‬ ‫‪ om. Law | om. et add. s.l. To‬اﶺ ‪… ‬ﻓﺎٕذا | ‪ τ‬وٕاذا ]ﻓﺎٕذا ‪ add. ζ ‬ﻛﺜﲑة ]ﻣﺮارا | ‪ praem. in mg. DiG‬ﺳﻬﻮا ‪ π‬ﻓ ﻪ‬ ‫‪ in mg. B‬ﻧﻮاﻓ ‪ ελξDa‬ﻧﻮاﻓ ]ﻧﻮاﻓﻠﻬﺎ ‪ MiNo ‬ﺻﻨﺎﻋﯿﺔ ]ﺻﻨﺎﻋﺘﻪ | ‪ّ om. C‬ﻤﺎت | ‪ s.l. Nk‬اﻟﺴﻬﻮ ‪ ζBrNkC‬ﺳﻬﻮ ]اﻟﺴﻬﻮ‬

‫‪٢٠‬ق‬

Chapter I.3  37

disposition and inclination, in this as in many [other] matters, could dispense us with studying the discipline, then the controversies and contradictions with regard to [various philosophical] doctrines that do occur would not occur, nor would one and the same man fall in contradiction time after time with himself when relying on his natural inclination. Human natural disposition is not sufficient for that, so long as the discipline is not acquired, just as it is not sufficient in many other activities, even if in some of them there might be a lucky guess.

[.. Cases of inadequacy of logic to acquire sound knowledge] Nor is it the case that, if man has achieved the discipline to the extent any man can, it is adequate in every case against him falling into error at all. For sometimes one departs from the discipline and, in many circumstances, desists from employing it, but not because the discipline in itself does not preserve or prevent [him] from error. Rather, [several] things may happen, first, because he who applies the discipline has not fully acquired it in its entirety; second, even if he has fully acquired it, in Q20 some places he neglects it and contents himself with [his] natural inclination; third, it often happens that he is unable to employ it or wanders away from it.

[.. Advantages for those who master the discipline of logic] However, even if it is so, the oversights that crop up for whoever masters [this] science, if he masters the discipline and puts it to use, are not like [the oversights] that occur to one who has never learned it. Moreover, if [the master of this science] goes back over one of the actions pertaining to his discipline many times, he will be able to compensate for any inattention, should it occur to him. [This is] because if the master of the discipline spoils his work one or many times, he is [however] able to correct it, unless he is extremely stupid. This being the case, no oversight will affect him in the important topics of his discipline that he is obliged to repeat, even if oversights affect [some] secondary subjects.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺚ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫وﻟ ٕﻼ ﺴﺎن ﰲ ﻣﻌﺘﻘﺪاﺗﻪ ٔﻣﻮر ّﻤﺔ ﺪّ ا و ٔﻣﻮر ﺗﻠﳱﺎ ﰲ ﻫ م‪ .‬ﻓﺼﺎﺣﺐ ﺻﻨﺎ ﺔ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ﯾﺘ ٔ ّﰏ ٔن ﳚﳤﺪ‬ ‫ﰲ ﺗ ٔ ﯿﺪ ا ٔﻣﺮ ﰲ ﺗ اﳌﻬ ّﻤﺎت ﲟﺮاﺟﻌﺎت َﻋ ْﺮض ﲻ ﲆ ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻪ‪ .‬واﳌﺮاﺟﻌﺎت اﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﯿﺔ ﻓﻘﺪ ﯾُﺒﻠﻎ ﲠﺎ ٔﻣﺎن‬ ‫ﻣﻦ اﻟﻐﻠﻂ ﳈﻦ ﳚﻤﻊ ﺗﻔﺎﺻﯿﻞ ﺣﺴﺎب وا ﺪ ﻣﺮارا ﻟﻼﺳﺘﻈﻬﺎر ﻓﱱول ﻋﻨﻪ اﻟﺸﳢﺔ ﰲ ﻋﻘﺪ اﶺ ‪.‬‬ ‫ﲞﺎﺻﯿﺔ ﻜﻔ ﻪ اﻟــﻜﺴﺐ‪ .‬وﺴ ﺒــﺔ ﻫــﺬﻩ‬ ‫)‪ (‬ﻓﻬﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ ﻻ ﺑﺪّ ﻣﳯﺎ ﰲ اﺳﺘﻜﲈل ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ا ي ﱂ ﯾﺆﯾّﺪ ّ‬ ‫اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ إﱃ اﻟﺮوﯾّﺔ اﻟﺒﺎﻃﻨﺔ اﻟﱵ ﺴ ّﻤﻰ اﻟﻨﻄﻖ ا ا ﲇ ﻛ ﺴﺒﺔ اﻟﻨﺤــﻮ إﱃ اﻟــﻌﺒﺎرة اﻟﻈﺎﻫــﺮة اﻟــﱵ ﺴ ّﻤــﻰ‬ ‫ﻟﻜﻦ اﻟﻌﺮوض ﻟ ﺲ ﯾﻨﻔﻊ ﻛﺜﲑا ﰲ ﻗﺮض اﻟﺸﻌﺮ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ا وق‬ ‫اﻟﻨﻄﻖ اﳋﺎر وﻛ ﺴﺒﺔ اﻟ َﻌ ُﺮوض إﱃ اﻟﺸﻌﺮ‪ّ .‬‬ ‫اﻟﺴﻠﲓ ﯾﻐﲎ ﻋﻨﻪ واﻟﻨﺤﻮ اﻟﻌﺮﰊ ﻗﺪ ﺗﻐﲎ ﻋﻨﻪ ٔﯾﻀﺎ اﻟﻔﻄــﺮة اﻟﺒﺪوﯾــﺔ‪ .‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ﻫــﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ــﺔ ﻓــﻼ ﻏــﲎ ﻋــﳯﺎ‬ ‫ﻟ ٕﻼ ﺴﺎن اﳌﻜ ﺴﺐ ﻠﻌﲅ ﻟﻨﻈﺮ واﻟﺮوﯾّﺔ‪ ،‬ا ّٕﻻ ٔن ﻜــﻮن ٕا ﺴﺎ ﻣﺆﯾّــﺪا ﻣــﻦ ﻋﻨــﺪ ﷲ ﻓ ﻜــﻮن ﺴ ــﻪ إﱃ‬ ‫اﳌﺘﻌﺮﺑﲔ‪.‬‬ ‫اﳌﺮو ّﻦ ﺴﺒﺔ اﻟﺒﺪوي إﱃ ّ‬

‫]اﻟﻨﺤﻮ… ‪‬اﻟﱵ ‪] Material damage in MS Ṣ. ‬اﶺـ … ﻓــﱱول ‪] Material damage in MS Ṣ. ‬ﲟـﺮاﺟﻌﺎت…ﺗ ٔ ﯿــﺪ ‪‬‬ ‫‪] Material damage‬ﷲ… ٕا ﺴﺎ ‪] Material damage in MS Ṣ. ‬اﻟﻌﺮﰊ ‪… ‬ا وق ‪Material damage in MS Ṣ. ‬‬ ‫‪in MS Ṣ.‬‬ ‫اﳌﺘﻌﺮﺑﲔ ‪… ‬وﺴﺒﺔ ‪‬‬ ‫‪, Iḥṣāʾ al-ʿUlūm, p. .–; ibid., p. .–; ibid., p. .–; ibid.,‬‬ ‫‪ّ ] A -F‬‬ ‫‪p. .–; Id., Risāla ṣudira bihā al-Kitāb, p. .–.‬‬ ‫‪] Kitāb fī l-Nafs ʿalā sunnat al‬اﻟﻜﺴﺐ…ﻓﻬــﺬﻩ ‪] Al-Manṭiq al-Mūǧaz, p. .–. ‬اﶺـ ‪… ‬ﻓﺼﺎﺣﺐ ‪‬‬‫;‪] Al-Muḫtaṣar al-awṣaṭ fī l-manṭiq, p. .–‬اﳌﺘﻌ ـ ّـﺮﺑﲔ ‪… ‬ﻓﻬ ــﺬﻩ | ‪iḫtiṣār, chap. , pp. .–..‬‬ ‫‪Nağāt p. .–.‬‬ ‫ﻼ ﺴﺎن ‪‬‬ ‫]ﻋ َْﺮض | ‪ add. in mg. As‬إذا ]ﲟﺮاﺟﻌﺎت | ‪ add. et exp. E‬ﻣﻘﺪﻣﺎت ]ﺗ ٔ ﯿﺪ ‪ Te ‬ﻣﻌﯩﺪاﯨﻪ ]ﻣﻌﺘﻘﺪاﺗﻪ | ‪ AṢ‬ﻓﻠ ٕﻼ ﺴﺎن ]وﻟ ٕ‬ ‫ﻻ ]ﱂ | ‪ a.c. G‬ﺳﺘﻜﲈل ]اﺳﺘﻜﲈل ‪ om. Da ‬ﻋﻨﻪ | ‪ om. ν add. s.l. Yi‬وا ﺪ | ‪ Br‬ﳚﻌﻞ ]ﳚﻤﻊ | ‪ om. E‬ﻣﻦ ‪ s.l. Y ‬ﺑﻌﺮض‬ ‫‪ om. et‬اﻟﻌﺮوض… إﱃ | ‪ To‬وﺴﺒﺔ ]وﻛ ﺴﺒﺔ | ‪ No‬ﻧﻄﻖ ]اﻟﻨﻄﻖ ‪ T ‬اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ]اﻟﻨﻄﻖ ‪ ξ ‬ﯾﺆﯾﺪﻩ ‪ add. Law‬ﻣﻦ ﻋﻨﺪ ﷲ ]ﯾﺆﯾّﺪ | ‪T‬‬ ‫ﻟﻜﻦ | ‪add. in mg. Ka‬‬ ‫وﻛﺬ ]اﻟﺒﺪوﯾﺔ… واﻟﻨﺤﻮ | ‪ om. Nk‬ﻋﻨﻪ ‪ om. et add. in mg. Da ‬اﻟﺸﻌﺮ…ﰲ | ‪ a.c. Ṣ‬وﻟﻜﻦ ] ّ‬ ‫‪ νE‬ﻓﳱﺎ ]ﻋﳯﺎ | ‪ add. Ṣ et exp. Ṣ²‬ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ ]اﻟﻔﻄﺮة | ‪ٔ om. Ṣ‬ﯾﻀﺎ | ‪ٔ add. ξAṢ‬ﯾﻀﺎ ]اﻟﻌﺮﰊ | ‪ Law‬اﻟﻔﻄﺮة اﻟﺒﺪوﯾﺔ ﻗﺪ ﺗﻐﲎ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻨﺤﻮ‬ ‫اﳌﺮوي ‪ s.l. Nk‬اﳌﺮوي ]اﳌﺮو ّﻦ ‪ add. Di ‬ﺳﺒ ﺎﻧﻪ وﺗﻌﺎﱃ ‪ add. J‬ﻋﺰ و ﻞ ]ﷲ | ‪ٕ T‬ا ﺴﺎ ] ٕا ﺴﺎ | ‪ A‬و ﻟﺮوﯾﺔ ]واﻟﺮوﯾّﺔ ‪ Di ‬ﻋﻨﻪ‬ ‫‪ Law‬اﻟﺒﺪوﯾﲔ ]اﻟﺒﺪوي | ‪ ṢTe‬ﻛ ﺴﺒﺔ ] ﺴﺒﺔ | ‪ s.l. Br‬اﳌﺮو ﻦ ‪ et‬اﳌﺮوي ‪ ξ‬اﳌﺮوي ‪ in mg. A‬اﳌﺮو ﻦ ‪ et‬اﳌﺮوي ‪a.c.? B‬‬ ‫‪ in mg. Y‬اﳌﺮو ﻦ اﳌﻔﻜﺮﻦ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺮوﯾﺔ ]اﳌﺮو ّﻦ ‪‬‬

Chapter I.3  39

A man’s convictions include very important things and some others of secondary importance. The master of the discipline of logic can work to double-check a result with regard to those important topics by methodically going back over his work. Sometimes by those means one reaches a [measure of] security against error, like one who adds up the elements of a single calculation many times out of precaution, until the doubt on the result of the addition disappears.

[. Conclusion on the necessity of logic] This discipline is necessary in order to perfect the man who is not supported by a special quality freeing him from the need for acquiring [knowledge]. The relation of this discipline to the internal reflection that is called ‘inner speech’ is like the relation of grammar to the external expression that is called ‘exterior speech’, and like the relation of prosody to poetry. Prosody, however, is not very useful in writing poetry, for good taste does not need it, nor does the Bedouin’s nature need Arabic grammar [in order to speak Arabic]. Whoever acquires the science through theoretical inquiry and reflection does need this discipline, unless he is a man supported by God so that his relation to those who reflect is the same as that of the Bedouin to those who try to learn Arabic.

‫]اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ[‬ ‫ﻓﺼﻞ ﰲ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع اﳌﻨﻄﻖ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫)‪ (‬ﻟ ﺲ ﳝﻜﻦ ٔن ﯾ ﻘﻞ ا ﻫﻦ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻌﲎ وا ﺪ ﻣﻔﺮد إﱃ ﺗﺼــﺪﯾﻖ ﴚء ﻓﺎ ّٕن ذ اﳌــﻌﲎ ﻟ ــﺲ ﺣــﲂ‬ ‫وﺟﻮدﻩ و ﺪﻣﻪ ﺣﻜﲈ وا ــﺪا ﰲ ٕاﯾــﻘﺎع ذ اﻟﺘﺼــﺪﯾﻖ‪ .‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧّــﻪ إن ﰷن اﻟﺘﺼــﺪﯾﻖ ﯾﻘــﻊ ﺳـﻮاء ﻓــﺮض اﳌــﻌﲎ‬ ‫ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا ٔو ﻣﻌﺪوﻣﺎ ﻓﻠ ﺲ ﻠﻤﻌﲎ ﻣﺪ ﻞ ﰲ إﯾﻘﺎع اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ ﺑﻮ ﻪ‪ّ ٔ ،‬ن ﻣﻮ ِﻗﻊ اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ ﻫﻮ ّ اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ‬ ‫وﻟ ﺲ ﳚﻮز ٔن ﻜﻮن ﳾء ّ ﻟﴚء ﰲ ﺎﻟﱵ ﺪﻣﻪ ووﺟﻮدﻩ‪ .‬ﻓﺎٕذا ﱂ ﯾﻘﻊ ﳌﻔﺮد ﻛﻔﺎﯾﺔ ﻣﻦ ﲑ ﲢﺼﯿﻞ‬ ‫وﺟﻮدﻩ ٔو ﺪﻣﻪ ﰲ ذاﺗﻪ ٔو ﰲ ﺎ ‪ ،‬ﱂ ﻜﻦ ﻣﺆد إﱃ اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ ﺑــﻐﲑﻩ؛ وٕاذا ﻗـﺮﻧﺖ ﳌــﻌﲎ وﺟــﻮدا ٔو‬ ‫ﺪﻣﺎ ﻓﻘﺪ ٔﺿﻔﺖ إﻟﯿﻪ ﻣﻌﲎ ٓﺧﺮ‪.‬‬

‫‪] The ink‬ذ … ﴚء‬

‫| ‪] Quoted in Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Šarḥ al-Išārāt, p. .–.‬ﻣﺆﻟّﻔـــﺔ ‪ … ‬ﻟ ـــﺲ ‪‬‬ ‫‪vanished in MS Ṣ.‬‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫‪ om. τ add. s.l. Br‬ﻣﻔﺮد | ‪ Br‬وﻟ ﺲ ]‪‬ﻟ ﺲ ‪ Y ‬اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ ‪ Mi‬اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﻦ ا ٔول ﻣﻦ ﲨ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ]ﻓﺼﻞ‬ ‫]ﺣﻜﲈ وا ﺪا | ‪ om. et add. in mg. To‬ﺣﻜﲈ…وﺟﻮدﻩ ‪ om. et add. s.l. Di ‬اﳌﻌﲎ | ‪ T‬وٕان ]ﻓﺎ ّٕن | ‪ BrJNkBAEd.‬ﳾء ] ﴚء‬ ‫‪‬اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ ‪… ‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ | ‪ om. No‬إﯾﻘﺎع ‪… ‬ذ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. To‬ذ | ‪ praem. et exp. Di‬وﳌﻌﻨﺎ ]وا ﺪا | ‪ Ka‬ﺣﲂ وا ﺪ‬ ‫ﺑﻮ ﻪ ]‪‬اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ²‬ﻣﻮﻗﻊ ‪ add. s.l. Nk add. in mg. C‬ﻣﺎ ﯾﻮﻗﻊ ‪ ιξEṢ‬ﻣﺎ ﯾﻮﻗﻊ ]ﻣﻮ ِﻗﻊ ‪ ι ‬إذا ]إن | ‪om. et add. in mg. Br‬‬ ‫و ٔﻣﺎ اﻟﺘﺼﻮر ﻓﺎٕﻧﻪ ﻛﺜﲑا ﻣﺎ ﯾﻘﻊ ﲟﻌﲎ ]ووﺟﻮدﻩ | ‪ ζνLat.N‬وﺟﻮدﻩ و ﺪﻣﻪ ] ﺪﻣﻪ ووﺟﻮدﻩ ‪ As ‬ﻠﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ ]‪‬اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ | ‪ μ‬ﻓﻬﻮ ]ﻫﻮ | ‪add. Da‬‬ ‫] ﺪﻣﻪ | ‪ Yi‬وﺟﻮد ]وﺟﻮدﻩ ‪ in mg. Y ‬وﻻ ‪ in mg. E‬ﱂ ‪ et‬ﻻ ]ﱂ | ‪ in mg. E‬ﻓﺎٕذا ‪ et‬ﻓﺎٕذن ]ﻓﺎٕذا | ‪ add. Lat.G exp. p.c. G‬ﻣﻔﺮد‬ ‫‪ et‬وﻻ ‪ praem. et del. G‬وٕان ‪ πDi‬ﻓﲅ ‪ KaBrC‬وﱂ ]ﱂ | ‪ ωEd.‬ﺎ ‪ scripsi :‬ﺎ ] ﺎ | ‪ Br‬وﰲ ] ٔو ﰲ | ‪ Br‬داﯨﯩﺎ ]ذاﺗﻪ | ‪ Yi‬ﺪم‬ ‫اﳌﻌﲎ ] ﳌﻌﲎ | ‪ ζτ‬ﻓﺎٕذا ]وٕاذا | ‪ ν‬ﺑﻌﯿﻨﻪ ]ﺑﻐﲑﻩ | ‪ To‬ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ]ﻣﺆد | ‪ in mg. E om. et add. s.l. Yi‬ﻜﻦ ‪ et‬ﻜﻮن ] ﻜﻦ | ‪ in mg. E‬ﱂ‬ ‫‪ν‬‬

‫ﻜﻮن ] ٓﺧﺮ ‪ … ‬ﻟ ﺲ ‪‬‬

‫إﳕﺎ ﻻ ﻜﻮن اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ ﲟﻌﲎ ﻣﻔﺮد ٔن ا ي ﯾﻮﻗﻊ اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ ﳛﺘﺎج ٔن ﻜﻮن ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﺻﺎدﻗﺎ ﻛﲈ ٔن ا ي ﯾﻮﺟﺐ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﳛﺘﺎج ٔن‬ ‫‪ in mg. N‬ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا واﳊﲂ ﲆ اﻟﴚء ﺑ ٔﻧﻪ ﺻﺎدق ﻫﻮ اﳊﲂ ﻠﯿﻪ ﺑ ٔﻧﻪ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد وذ ﯾﻀﯿﻒ إﻟﯿﻪ ﻣﻌﲎ ﻧﯿﺎ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻓ ﻻ ﯾﻘﻊ اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ ﲟﻌﲎ ﻣﻔﺮد ك‬ ‫ﺎﺷﯿﺔ إﳕﺎ ﻻ ﻜﻮن اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ ﲟﻌﲎ ﻣﻔﺮد ٔن ا ي ﯾﻮﻗﻊ اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ ﳛﺘﺎج ٔن ﻜﻮن ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﺻﺎدﻗﺎ ﻛﲈ ٔن ا ي ﯾﻮﺟﺐ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﳛﺘﺎج ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻣﻮﺟــﻮدا‬ ‫‪… ‬ﻓﺎٕذا ‪ in mg. Te ‬واﳊﲂ ﲆ اﻟﴚء ﺑ ٔﻧﻪ ﺻﺎدق ﻫﻮ اﳊﲂ ﻠﯿﻪ ﺑ ٔﻧﻪ ﻣﻮﺟﻮد وذ ﯾﻀﯿﻒ إﻟﯿﻪ ﻣﻌﲎ ﻧﯿﺎ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻓ ﻻ ﯾﻘﻊ ﳌﻔﺮد ﺗﺼﺪﯾﻖ‬ ‫ﻗﺎل ﻼل ا ﻦ ا واﱐ ﰲ رﺳﺎ ٔﳕﻮذج اﻟﻌﻠﻮم ﻓ ﻪ ﲝﺚ ٔﻣﺎ ٔوﻻ ﻓ ٔﻧﻪ ﻣ ﻘﻮض ٕﻓﺎدﺗﻪ اﻟﺘﺼﻮر ﻓﺎٕن اﳌﻘﺪﻣﺎت ﺎرﯾﺔ ﻓﳱﺎ و ٔﻣﺎ ﻧﯿﺎ ﻓ ٔ ﻧﻘﻮل ﻫﺬا ] ٓﺧﺮ‬ ‫اﳌﻔﺮد ﺑﻮﺟﻮدﻩ ا ﻫﲏ رﲟﺎ ﯾﻔ ﺪ اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ ﻣﻦ ﲑ ٔن ﯾﺼﺪق ﺑﻮﺟﻮدﻩ ﻓ ﻪ ﻛﲈ ﰲ إﻓﺎدﻩ اﻟﺘﺼﻮر ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻪ ﻓﻈﻬﺮ ٔن ﻣﺎ ذ ﺮﻩ ﻣﻐﺎﻟﻄﺔ وﻣ ﻞ ذ ﻏﺮﯾﺐ ﻋﻦ ﻣ‬

‫‪[Ǧalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī, Unmūḏāğ al-ʿUlūm, p. ] in mg. Te‬‬

‫‪.‬ﰲ ﺎ ﻣﻦ ٔﺣﻮا‬

‫‪] Cf. Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Šarḥ al-Išārāt, p. .:‬‬

‫ﺎ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪٢١‬ق‬

C

[I.]

[. Conception and assertion in relation to simple and composite meanings] It is not possible for the mind to be moved from a single simple meaning to the Q21 assertion of anything, since the judgement concerning the existence and the nonexistence of that meaning is not a single judgement in conducing to that assertion. In fact, if the assertion occurs no matter whether the meaning is assumed to be existent or non-existent, the meaning has no role in making the assertion occur in any respect, since what makes the assertion occur is the cause of the assertion and it is not possible for anything to be the cause of something [else] in both the states of its non-existence and its existence. If the simple [meaning] does not suffice [for it] without realizing its existence or non-existence, in itself or in a certain state, it does not lead to the assertion of anything else; if you associate with the meaning either existence or non-existence, you put another meaning in relation to it.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫اﻟﺘﺼﻮر ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﻛﺜﲑا ﻣﺎ ﯾﻘﻊ ﲟﻌﲎ ﻣﻔﺮد — وذ ﻛﲈ ﺳ ّﻀﺢ ﰲ ﻣﻮﺿﻌﻪ — وذ ﰲ ﻗﻠﯿﻞ ﻣﻦ‬ ‫و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ّ‬ ‫ﻠﺘﺼﻮر ﰲ ٔﻛﱶ ا ٔﺷﯿﺎء ﻣﻌﺎن ﻣﺆﻟّﻔﺔ‪ .‬و ّ‬ ‫ﰻ‬ ‫ا ٔﺷﯿﺎء وﻣﻊ ذ ﻓﻬﻮ ﰲ ٔﻛﱶ ا ٔﻣﺮ ﻗﺺ رديء‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ اﳌﻮ ِﻗﻊ ّ‬ ‫ﰻ ٔﺷﯿﺎء ﻛﺜﲑة ﻓﻔﳱﺎ ٔﺷﯿﺎء وا ﺪة ﻓﻔــﻲ ّ‬ ‫ﺗ ٔﻟﯿﻒ ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﲈ ﯾﺆﻟّﻒ ﻣﻦ ٔﻣﻮر ﻛﺜﲑة و ّ‬ ‫ﰻ ﺗ ٔﻟﯿــﻒ ٔﺷــﯿﺎء وا ــﺪة‪.‬‬ ‫واﻟﻮا ﺪ ﰲ ّ‬ ‫ﰻ ﻣﺮﻛّﺐ ﻫﻮ ا ي ﺴ ّﻤﻰ ﺴﯿﻄﺎ‪ .‬وﳌّﺎ ﰷن اﻟﴚء اﳌﺆﻟّﻒ ﻣﻦ ــﺪّ ة ٔﺷــﯿﺎء ﺴ ﺘــﺤﯿﻞ ٔن‬ ‫ﺎﳊﺮي ٔن ﻜﻮن اﻟﻌﲅ ﳌﻔﺮدات ﻗ ﻞ اﻟﻌﲅ ﳌﺆﻟّﻔﺎت‪.‬‬ ‫ﺗﻌﺮف ﻃﺒﯿﻌﺘﻪ ﻣﻊ اﳉﻬﻞ ﺑ ﺴﺎﺋﻄﻪ‪ ،‬ﻓ ّ‬ ‫)‪ (‬واﻟﻌﲅ ﳌﻔﺮدات ﻜﻮن ﲆ و ﲔ‪ٕ :‬ا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻠﲈ ﲠﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﻣﺴﺘﻌﺪّ ة ٔن ﯾﺆﻟّــﻒ ﻣــﳯﺎ‬ ‫اﻟﺘ ٔﻟﯿﻒ اﳌﺬ ﻮر وٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻠﲈ ﲠﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﻃﺒﺎﺋﻊ و ٔﻣﻮر ﯾﻌﺮض ﻟﻬﺎ ذ اﳌﻌﲎ‪ .‬وﻣ ﺎل ﻫﺬا ٔ ّن‬ ‫اﻟﺒ ﺖ ا ي ﯾﺆﻟّﻒ ﻣﻦ ﺧﺸﺐ و ــﲑﻩ ﳛــﺘﺎج ﻣﺆﻟّﻔــﻪ إﱃ ٔن ﯾﻌــﺮف ﺴﺎﺋــﻂ اﻟﺒـ ﺖ ﻣــﻦ اﳋﺸﺐ واــﻠﱭ‬ ‫ﻟﻜﻦ ﻠﺨﺸﺐ واﻠﱭ واﻟﻄﲔ ٔﺣﻮ ﺴ ﳢﺎ ﺗﺼﻠﺢ ﻠﺒ ﺖ وﻠﺘ ٔﻟﯿﻒ و ٔﺣﻮ ٔﺧﺮى ﺎر ﺔ ﻣﻦ‬ ‫واﻟﻄﲔ‪ّ .‬‬ ‫ذ ‪ .‬ﻓ ٔ ّﻣﺎ ٔ ّن اﳋﺸﺐ ﻫﻮ ﻣــﻦ ﺟﻮﻫــﺮ ﻓ ــﻪ ﻧﻔــﺲ ﻧﺒﺎﺗﯿــﺔ و ٔ ّن ﻃﺒﯿﻌﺘــﻪ ّﺎرة ٔو ردة ٔو ٔ ّن ﻗ ﺎﺳــﻪ ﻣــﻦ‬ ‫اﳌﻮﺟﻮدات ﻗ ﺎس ﻛﺬا‪ ،‬ﻓﻬﺬا ﻻ ﳛﺘﺎج إﻟﯿﻪ ﱐ اﻟﺒ ﺖ ٔن ﯾﻌﻠﻤﻪ‪ .‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ٔ ّن اﳋﺸﺐ ﺻﻠﺐ ورﺧﻮ وﲱﯿﺢ‬ ‫ﺴﻮس و ﲑ ذ ‪ ،‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﳑّﺎ ﳛﺘﺎج ﱐ اﻟﺒ ﺖ إﱃ ٔن ﯾﻌﻠﻤﻪ‪.‬‬ ‫وﻣ ّ‬ ‫‪ om. et add. i.l. Nk‬ﰲ ‪ τ ‬وﰲ ]‪‬ﰲ | ‪ om. τKa‬وذ | ‪ om. πLat.DiDa exp. G‬وذ | ‪ om. Lat.G‬ﻣﻔﺮد…و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ om. et add. in mg.‬ﺗ ٔﻟﯿﻒ | ‪ ξ‬ذ ] ّ‬ ‫ﰻ ‪ praem. No ‬و ]ﻣﻌﺎن | ‪ No‬ا ٔﻛﱶ ]‪ٔ ‬ﻛﱶ | ‪ (?) praem. et exp. Yi‬ﺷﯿﺎء ] ﻗﺺ‬ ‫‪ٔ ηLat.DaEd. mg.‬ﻧﻪ إﻣﺎ ] ٕا ّﻣﺎ ‪ om. N ‬ﺑ ﺴﺎﺋﻄﻪ ‪ om. et add. s.l. As ‬ﺪّ ة | ‪ om. No‬ﺴ ّﻤﻰ | ‪ om. Yi‬ﻣﺮﻛّﺐ ‪To ‬‬ ‫‪ Te‬ذ ﻫﺬا ‪ a.c.?) As‬ذ ﻫﺬا( ‪ p.c.‬ذ ﻫﻮ ‪ praem. et exp. T‬ذ ]ﻫﺬا | ‪ praem. C‬ﻣﳯﺎ ]ﱔ | ‪ om. τ‬ﲠﺎ ‪ٔ s.l. Ṣ ‬ﻧﻪ ‪To‬‬ ‫‪ praem.‬ﻜﻮن ]ﯾﻌﺮف | ‪ om. JT om. et add. s.l. Te‬إﱃ | ‪ Br‬وﻃﲔ وﻟ ﺲ ‪ om. λνDaG om. et add. in mg. Di‬و ﲑﻩ ‪‬‬ ‫اﻟﻄﲔ…ﻟﻜﻦ ‪ E iter. As ‬ﺴﺎﺋﻄﺔ ] ﺴﺎﺋﻂ | ‪Yi‬‬ ‫]واﻠﱭ واﻟﻄﲔ | ‪ Da‬ﻠﱭ واﳋﺸﺐ ] ﻠﺨﺸﺐ واﻠﱭ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. JY‬و‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫و ٔﺣﻮال ‪ add. s.l. Nk‬و ‪ٔ et‬ﺣﻮ ]و ٔﺣﻮ | ‪ BrJTAs‬واﻟﺘ ٔﻟﯿﻒ ]وﻠﺘ ٔﻟﯿﻒ | ‪ٔ s.l. Ṣ‬ﺣﻮ ‪ٔ ντEAs‬ﺣﻮال ] ٔﺣﻮ | ‪ γN‬واﻟﻄﲔ واﻠﱭ‬ ‫و ]‪ٔ ‬و | ‪ Yi‬ﻓﺎٕن ]و ّٔن | ‪ add. s.l. A‬ﺑﻨﺎﺗﯿﺔ ‪ η‬ﺑﻨﺎﺗﯿﺔ ]ﻧﺒﺎﺗﯿﺔ | ‪ّٔ  om. A‬ن | ‪ As‬و ٔﻣﺎ ]ﻓ ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪ BrJT ‬ﻋﻦ ]ﻣﻦ | ‪ٔ Ka‬ﺣﻮ ‪ντETAs‬‬ ‫‪ add.‬و ‪ٔ et‬ﻣﺎ ]و ٔ ّﻣﺎ | ‪ praem. JTTe‬إﱃ ] ٔن | ‪ Br‬ﻓﻬﻮ ]ﻓﻬﺬا | ‪ add. s.l. Da‬ﻗ ﺎس ‪ Ṣ ‬إﱃ ]‪‬ﻣﻦ | ‪ّٔ  om. ξKaBrYi‬ن | ‪ιṢ‬‬ ‫‪ٔ Ṣ‬و ﲱﯿﺢ ‪ A‬ﲱﯿﺢ ]وﲱﯿﺢ | ‪ Ṣ‬ﺻــﻠﺐ ٔو رﺧــﻮ ‪] Lat.‬رﺧــﻮ وﺻــﻠﺐ[ »‪ ι «mollis vel dura‬رﺧــﻮ وﺻــﻠﺐ ]ﺻــﻠﺐ ورﺧــﻮ | ‪s.l. Yi‬‬ ‫ﺴﻮس ‪‬‬ ‫ﳑّﺎ | ‪ om. Br‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ | ‪ٔ AsṢ‬و ﲑ ]و ﲑ | ‪ٔ Ṣ‬و ﻣ ﺴﻮس ‪ A‬ﻣ ﺴﻮس ‪ KaNo‬وﻣ ﺸﻮش ‪ EYi‬وﻣ ﺸﻮش ‪ add. i.l. Di‬وﻣﺴﻮس ]وﻣ ّ‬ ‫‪ add. As‬ﻣﻦ ﱐ اﻟﺒ ﺖ ]ﯾﻌﻠﻤﻪ | ‪ Br‬إﻟﯿﻪ ]إﱃ | ‪ om. N‬إﱃ ‪ om. νEAs add. in mg. Y‬إﱃ… ﱐ | ‪om. ν add. s.l. Y‬‬

‫ا ﲅ ٔن ﻣﻮﺿﻮع اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ﻫﻮ اﳌﻌﺎﱐ اﳌﻌﻠﻮﻣﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﺗ ٔد ﳤﺎ إﱃ ا ﻬﻮل اﻟﺘﺼﻮري ٔو اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻘﻲ ٔﻣﺎ ﻮﻧﻪ ﻣﻌﺎﱐ ﻓﻈﺎﻫﺮ ٔن اﻟﻐــﺮض ]ﻣﺆﻟّﻔــﺔ ‪… ‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ‬ ‫اﻛ ﺴﺎب ا ﻬﻮﻻت ﻣﻦ اﳌﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت وﱔ ﻣﻌﺎﱐ ﻻ ٔﻟﻔﺎظ و ٔﻣﺎ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﻋﻦ ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ ﻓﻠ ﺲ ﺧﻮ ﻓ ﻪ ﺑﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﯾﻮﻗﻒ اﻻٕﻓﺎدة و ﺳــﺘﻔﺎدة ﻠﯿــﻪ و ٔﻣﺎ‬ ‫اﻋﺘﺒﺎر اﻟﺘ ٔﻟﯿﻒ ﻓﺎٕن اﳌﻮﺻﻞ إﱃ اﻟﺘﺼﺪﯾﻖ ﻻ ﻜﻮن إﻻ ﻣﺆﻟﻔﺎ إذ ﻟﻮ ﰷن ﻣﻔﺮدا ﳌﺎ ﯾﺘ ٔدي وﺟﻮدﻩ و ﺪﻣﻪ وٕاﻻ ﲀن اﻟﴚء وﺟﻮدا و ﺪﻣﺎ ﻠﯿﻪ ﻟﴚء وﻫﻮ ﳏﺎل‬ ‫ﯾﻌﲏ ا ﻻ ﲆ اﻟﺘﺼﻮر ﺑﻠﻔﻆ ]ﻓﻬﻮ ‪ in mg. Te ‬ﻓﺎٕذا اﻋﺘﱪ ﻣﻊ ٔ ﺪﻫﲈ ﰷن ﻣﺆﻟﻔﺎ واﳌﻮﺻﻞ إﱃ اﻟﺘﺼﻮر وٕان ﺻﺎر إﻓﺮادﻩ ﻟﻜ ﻪ ﰲ ا ٔ ﻠﺐ ﻗﺺ ردئ‬ ‫‪ i.l. Di‬ﻣﻔﺮد‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪] The syntax of the clause is slightly problematic, and part of the manuscripts react‬ا ٔﺷﯿﺎء ‪ … ‬وذ ‪‬‬ ‫‪to the peculiar syntax of the transmitted text. One may wonder whether the clause kamā sayattaḍiḥu‬‬ ‫‪laka fī mawḍiʿihi was rather intended to be added after the ensuing wa-ḏālika. If so, the passage in‬‬ ‫‪this form would result from a wrong insertion of the clause in the archetype: the clause might have‬‬ ‫‪been added in the margin of the archetype’s model, accompanied by the ‘signal word’ wa-ḏālika to‬‬ ‫‪show the exact position of the insertion; then, when the archetype was copied, the indication might‬‬ ‫‪have been misunderstood.‬‬

‫‪٢٢‬ق‬

Chapter I.4  43

Conception often comes about by means of a simple meaning — this [is] as will be explained to you in its place1 — but this [happens] with regard to a few things [only]. Moreover, this in most cases is defective and imperfect. What brings conception about in most cases is rather composite meanings. Every composition is composed of several things, and each of [those] several things contains single things so that every composition contains single things. The single that is contained in every compound is what is called ‘incomposite’. Since it is impossible to know the nature of something that is composed of a number of things being ignorant of its incomposite [parts], it behoves that the knowledge of the simple [meanings] precede the knowledge of the composite ones.

[. How simple meanings are studied in logic] Knowledge of simple [meanings] is under two respects: it is either knowledge of them insofar as they are apt for the composition mentioned to be composed out of them, or knowledge of them insofar as they are natures and things to which that Q22 meaning occurs. An example of this is: the builder of a house composed out of wood and other [things] needs to know the incomposite components of the house, such as the wood, the brick and the clay. But the wood, the brick and the clay have some states because of which they are apt to [form] the house and the composition and other states irrelevant to that. As to the fact that the wood is [formed] by a substance with a vegetative soul, that its nature is hot or cold, and that, with respect to the [other] beings, it is so and so: these are things that the housebuilder does not need to know. [On the other hand,] the fact that the wood is hard or soft, sound or rotten and so on, pend among the things that the housebuilder does need to know.

 Namely in Šifāʾ, Burhān I., p. .–.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫وﻛﺬ ﺻﻨﺎ ﺔ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ‪ ،‬ﻓﺎٕﳖّ ﺎ ﻟ ﺴﺖ ﺗﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ ﻣﻔــﺮدات ﻫــﺬﻩ ا ٔﻣــﻮر ﻣــﻦ ﺣـ ﺚ ﱔ ــﲆ ٔ ــﺪ ﳓــﻮي‬ ‫اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ا ي ﰲ ا ٔﻋﯿﺎن وا ي ﰲ ا ٔذﻫﺎن وﻻ ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﰲ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺎت ا ٔﺷﯿﺎء ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﻣﺎﻫــﯿﺎت‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ‬ ‫ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﶊﻮﻻت وﻣﻮﺿﻮ ﺎت وﳇّﯿﺎت وﺟﺰﺋﯿﺎت و ﲑ ذ ﳑّﺎ ٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﯾﻌﺮض ﻟﻬﺬﻩ اﳌﻌﺎﱐ ﻣﻦ ﺔ ﻣﺎ‬ ‫ﻗﻠﻨﺎﻩ ﻓ ﺳﻠﻒ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ ﻓﻬﻮ ٔﻣﺮ ﺗﺪﻋﻮ إﻟﯿﻪ اﻟﴬورة وﻟ ﺲ ﻠﻤﻨﻄﻘﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻫﻮ ﻣ ﻄﻘﻲ ﺷﻐﻞ‬ ‫ٔ ّول ٔﻟﻔﺎظ ا ّٕﻻ ﻣﻦ ﺔ ا ﺎﻃﺒﺔ واﶈﺎورة‪ .‬وﻟﻮ ٔﻣﻜﻦ ٔن ﯾ ُ ّ‬ ‫ﺘﻌﲅ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ﺑﻔﻜــﺮة ﺳــﺎذ ﺔ ٕاﻧّــﲈ ﺗُﻠﺤــﻆ ﻓــﳱﺎ‬ ‫اﳌﻌﺎﱐ و ﺪﻫﺎ ﲀن ذ ﰷﻓ ﺎ؛ وﻟﻮ ٔﻣﻜﻦ ٔن ّﯾﻄﻠﻊ اﶈﺎور ﻓ ﻪ ﲆ ﻣﺎ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﲝﯿ ٔﺧﺮى ﲀن ﯾﻐﲎ‬ ‫ﻟﻜﻦ ﳌّﺎ ﰷﻧﺖ اﻟﴬورة ﺗﺪﻋﻮ إﱃ اﺳﺘﻌﲈل ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ‪ ،‬وﺧﺼﻮﺻﺎ وﻣﻦ اﳌﺘﻌ ّﺬر ﲆ اﻟﺮوﯾﺔ‬ ‫ﻋﻦ اﻠﻔﻆ اﻟﺒﺘّﺔ‪ .‬و ّ‬ ‫ٔن ﺮﺗ ّﺐ اﳌﻌﺎﱐ ﻣﻦ ﲑ ٔن ﺗﺘﺨ ّﯿﻞ ﻣﻌﻬﺎ ٔﻟﻔﺎﻇﻬﺎ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﲀد ﻜﻮن اﻟﺮوﯾﺔ ﻣ ﺎ ﺎة ﻣﻦ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ذﻫﻨﻪ ﺑ ٔﻟﻔﺎظ‬ ‫ﻣ ﺨ ّﯿ ‪ ،‬ﻟﺰم ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻟ ٔ ﻟﻔﺎظ ٔﺣﻮال ﳐﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﲣﺘﻠﻒ ٔ ﻠﻬﺎ ٔﺣﻮال ﻣﺎ ﯾﻄﺎﺑﻘﻬﺎ ﰲ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻌﺎﱐ ﺣﱴ‬ ‫ﯾﺼﲑ ﻟﻬﺎ ٔﺣﲀم ﻟﻮﻻ ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ ﱂ ﻜﻦ‪ ،‬ﻓﺎﺿﻄﺮت ﺻــﻨﺎ ﺔ اﳌﻨﻄــﻖ إﱃ ٔن ﯾﺼــﲑ ﺑﻌــﺾ ٔﺟـﺰاﲛﺎ ﻧﻈـﺮا ﰲ‬

‫‪ٔ ] The passage is the object of Mubāḥaṯāt –, pp. –.‬ﻟﻔﺎظ ‪… ‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ʾ, Al-‬‬

‫‪-Ṣ‬‬

‫‪] Cf. Iḫ‬اﻟﺒﺘّﺔ ‪… ‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ‬

‫‪] Cf. A -F‬ﺳﻠﻒ ‪… ‬وﻛﺬ ‪‬‬ ‫‪, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, p. .–. ‬‬ ‫‪Risāla al-ʿāšira, chap. , p. .–.‬‬

‫‪‬‬ ‫| ‪] Šifāʾ, Maqūlāt I., p. .–.‬ا ٔذﻫﺎن ‪… ‬وﻛـــــﺬ‬ ‫‪] Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt I.,‬ﺳـــــﻠﻒ ‪… ‬وﻛـــــﺬ‬ ‫ـﻦ ‪pp. .–.. ‬‬ ‫‪] Šifāʾ, Maqūlāt I.,‬ا ٔﻟــﻔﺎظ ‪ … ‬ﻟــﺰم ‪] Išārāt, pp. .–.. ‬ا ٔﻟــﻔﺎظ ‪ … ‬وﻟﻜـ ّ‬ ‫‪pp. .–..‬‬ ‫‪ praem. A‬و ]ﻣــﻦ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. Y‬ﻓﺎٕﳖﺎ ‪ om. Yi‬ﺗﻨﻈــﺮ…ﻓﺎٕﳖّ ﺎ | ‪ No‬وٕاﳕﺎ ٔن اﳋﺸﺐ ﻛــﺬ ‪ ζντKaEC‬ﻓﻜــﺬ ]وﻛــﺬ ‪‬‬ ‫وﺟﺰﺋﯿﺎت وﳇﯿﺎت ]وﳇّﯿﺎت وﺟﺰﺋﯿﺎت ‪ om. et add. s.l. Ṣ ‬ﱔ | ‪ praem. et exp. No‬ﺔ ]ﺣ ﺚ | ‪ No‬اﳌﻮﺟﻮد ]اﻟﻮﺟــﻮد ‪‬‬ ‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﳋﺎﻣــﺲ ‪ vacuum praem. Yi‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟﻨﻈــﺮ ‪ AsYi ‬ﻗــﻠﻨﺎ ]ﻗــﻠﻨﺎﻩ ‪ٕ om. ν add. in mg. Y exp. p.c. Ṣ ‬اﻧّــﲈ | ‪JTTe‬‬ ‫اﶈﺎورة وا ﺎﻃﺒﺔ ]ا ﺎﻃﺒﺔ واﶈﺎورة | ‪ Yi‬اﶈﺎﻓﻈﺔ ]ا ﺎﻃﺒﺔ | ‪ٔ Mub.‬وﱄ ] ّٔول ‪ om. Br ‬ﻫﻮ | ‪ s.l. N‬ﰲ | ‪praem. et exp. Y‬‬ ‫ـﻦ ‪ To ‬ﻣــﻐﲎ ]ﯾــﻐﲎ | ‪ A‬ﻓــﳱﺎ ]ﻓ ــﻪ | ‪ om. Yi‬ذ ‪AsDa ‬‬ ‫‪ AAs‬ﻣﻦ ]وﻣﻦ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. Br‬ﳌّﺎ | ‪ Br‬ﻟﻜﻦ ]وﻟﻜـ ّ‬ ‫‪ Yi‬ﻧﻈﺮ ]ﻧﻈﺮا | ‪ om. As‬إﱃ | ‪ٔ T‬ﻟﻔﺎظ ]ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ ‪ om. As ‬ﳐﺘﻠﻔﺔ | ‪ TAs‬ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ ]ﻟ ٔﻟﻔﺎظ ‪ٔ A ‬ﻟﻔﺎﻇﺎ ] ٔﻟﻔﺎﻇﻬﺎ ‪‬‬ ‫ﺷﱰاك ]واﶈﺎورة ‪… ‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪‬‬

‫ﺎﺷﯿﺔ ٔي ﻟﺰﻣﺖ اﻟﴬورة إﱃ ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ إذ ﯾﺘﻐﲑ ٔﺣﲀم ﻠﻤﻌﺎﱐ ٔﺷﯿﺎء ﺮﺟﻊ إﱃ ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ ﻣﻦ اﺧ ﻼف ﻫﻮ ﻟﻮﻻ ﲠﺎ ﰲ‬ ‫‪ in mg. Te‬واﻟ ﺸﻜ ﻞ و ﲑﻫﲈ ﻣﻦ ٔﺣﻮال دﻻ ﳤﺎ ﻛﲈ ﳜﺘﻠﻒ ٔﺣﲀم ﻣﻌﺎﱐ ﻟﻔﻈﺔ اﻟﻌﲔ ﳇﻮ ﲠﺎ دﻻ ﲆ ٔﺷﯿﺎء ﳐﺘﻠﻔﺔ‬

‫‪] The manuscripts of family ν present a chapter break here, presumably to mark the start‬ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ…و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪‬‬ ‫‪of a chapter on expressions. In MS Yi a blank space is left before the clause wa-ammā al-naẓar,‬‬ ‫‪according to the usual way to mark the beginning of a new chapter in this manuscript (arguably, the‬‬ ‫‪blank space was left in order to pen faṣl with a different ink). In MS Y the section is introduced by al‬‬‫‪faṣl al-ḫāmis (“fifth chapter”), then deleted after correction. This subdivision of chap. I. attributes‬‬ ‫‪special relevance to the question of whether expressions are the subject matter of logic or not.‬‬

‫‪٢٣‬ق‬

Chapter I.4  45

So too for the discipline of logic, since it does not inquire into simple things insofar as they are in one of the two ways of existence, [that is,] the one that is in the concrete instantiations and the one that is in minds, nor [does it inquire into] the things’ quiddities insofar as they are quiddities. Rather, [it inquires into meanings] insofar as they are predicates and subjects, universals and particulars and other [states] that only occur to these meanings in the way that we said in what went before2.

[. Logic and the inquiry into expressions] [.. The necessity to study expressions does not entail that they are the primary concern of logic] Inquiry into expressions is something to which we are called of necessity, but the logician, insofar as he is a logician, is not primarily concerned with expressions, except in view of communication and debate. Were it possible to learn logic by means of a simple thought in which meanings alone are considered, then this would be enough; were it possible for the interlocutor in a debate to bring forth what is in his soul by means of another device, he would not need any expression at all. But since we are called of necessity to use expressions, especially because it is impossible for reflection to order meanings without their expressions being imagined together with them, and reflection is almost an inner conversation by a man’s part with his own mind by means of imagined expressions, it necessarily follows that expressions have different states by virtue of which the states of the meanings that correspond to them in the soul differ, so that the meanings acquire [certain] statuses Q23 that would not be there if the expressions were not there. [Because of these things],

 See Madḫal I., §..

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ٔﺣﻮال ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ‪ .‬وﻟﻮﻻ ﻣﺎ ﻗﻠﻨﺎﻩ ﳌﺎ اﺣ ﺎﺟﺖ ٔﯾﻀﺎ إﱃ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻟﻬﺎ ﻫــﺬا اﳉــﺰء وﻣــﻊ ﻫــﺬﻩ اﻟﴬورة‪ ،‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن‬ ‫اﻟ م ﲆ ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ اﳌﻄﺎﺑﻘﺔ ﳌﻌﺎ ﳱﺎ ﰷﻟ م ﲆ ﻣﻌﺎ ﳱﺎ‪ ،‬ا ّٕﻻ ٔ ّن وﺿﻊ ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ ٔﺣﺴﻦ ﲻﻼ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ﻓ ﺳﻮى ذ ﻓﻼ ﲑ ﰲ ﻗﻮل ﻣﻦ ﯾﻘﻮل ا ّٕن اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ﻣﻮﺿﻮ ﻪ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ‬ ‫ﺗﺪ ّل ﲆ اﳌﻌﺎﱐ وٕا ّن اﳌﻨﻄﻘﻲ ٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﺻﻨﺎﻋﺘﻪ ٔن ﯾﺘﳫّﻢ ﲆ ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﺗﺪ ّل ﲆ اﳌــﻌﺎﱐ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﳚﺐ‬ ‫ﺘﺼﻮر ا ٔﻣﺮ ﲆ اﻟﻨﺤﻮ ا ي ذ ﺮ ﻩ‪ .‬وٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﺗﺒ ّ ﰲ ﻫﺬا َﻣﻦ ﺗﺒ ّ‬ ‫ﺸﻮش ﺴ ﺐ ٔﳖّ ﻢ ﱂ‬ ‫وﺸﻮش َﻣﻦ ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ٔن ﯾ ُ ّ‬ ‫ِّ‬ ‫ﳜﺘﺺ ﺑﻪ إذ و ﺪوا اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﲆ ﳓﻮﻦ‪:‬‬ ‫ﳛﺼﻠﻮا ﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ ﻣﻮﺿﻮع اﳌﻨﻄﻖ واﻟﺼﻨﻒ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻮﺟﻮدات ا ي ّ‬ ‫وﺟﻮد ا ٔﺷﯿﺎء ﻣﻦ ﺎرج ووﺟــﻮدﻫﺎ ﰲ ا ﻫــﻦ‪ .‬ﲾﻌﻠـﻮا اﻟﻨﻈــﺮ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟــﻮد ا ي ﻣــﻦ ﺎرج ﻟﺼﻨﺎ ــﺔ ٔو‬ ‫ﺘﺼﻮر ﻓ ﻪ ﻟﺼﻨﺎ ــﺔ ٔو ﺟــﺰء ﺻــﻨﺎ ﺔ وﱂ‬ ‫ﺻﻨﺎ ﺎت ﻓﻠﺴﻔ ﺔ واﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ا ي ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ و ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﯿﻒ ﯾُ ّ‬ ‫ُﺼﻮرت ﰲ ا ﻫــﻦ ﻣﺴ ﺘــﻔﺎدة ﻣــﻦ ﺎرج وٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔﻣــﻮر‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ﯾﻔﺼﻠﻮا ﻓ ﻌﻠﻤﻮا ٔ ّن ا ٔﻣﻮر اﻟﱵ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ ٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔﻣﻮر ﺗ ّ‬ ‫ﺗﻌﺮض ﻟﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ ﻻ ُﳛﺎذي ﲠﺎ ٔﻣﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺎرج‪ .‬ﻓ ﻜﻮن ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﻫﺬ ﻦ ا ٔﻣﺮﻦ ﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ‪ّ ،‬ﰒ‬ ‫ﯾﺼﲑ ٔ ﺪ ﻫﺬ ﻦ ا ٔﻣﺮﻦ ﻣﻮﺿﻮ ﺎ ﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ﻣﻦ ﺔ ﻋﺮض ﯾﻌﺮض ‪ .‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ٔ ّي ﻫﺬ ﻦ ا ٔﻣﺮﻦ ذ‬ ‫ﻓﻬﻮ اﻟﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ؛ و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ٔ ّي ﺎرض ﯾﻌﺮض ﻓﻬﻮ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﯾﺼﲑ ِ‬ ‫ﻣﻮﺻﻼ إﱃ ٔن ﲢﺼﻞ ﰲ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﺻﻮرة ٔﺧﺮى‬ ‫ﻋﻘﻠﯿﺔ ﱂ ﻜﻦ ٔو ﻓﻌﺎ ﰲ ذ اﻟﻮﺻﻮل ٔو ﻣﺎ ﯾﻌﺎوق ذ اﻟﻮﺻﻮل‪.‬‬ ‫‪] Cf. Y ḥ I ʿA , Maqāla fī tabyīn al-faṣl bayna ṣināʿatay al-manṭiq al-falsafī wa-l‬اﳌﻌﺎﱐ ‪… ‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪‬‬‫‪naḥw al-ʿarabī, p. , par. ; cf. I‬‬ ‫‪-Ṭ‬‬ ‫‪, Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāġūğī, p. .–; Cf. A -F‬‬ ‫‪, Iḥṣāʾ‬‬ ‫‪al-ʿUlūm, p. .–.‬‬ ‫‪ add. s.l.‬ﻓﻼ ] ﲑ ‪ om. No ‬ﻣﻌﺎ ﳱﺎ…ﰷﻟ م ‪ AsṢN ‬ﻣﻊ ]وﻣﻊ | ‪ As‬ﻗﻠﻨﺎ ‪ p.c. J‬ﻗﻠﻨﺎ ‪ a.c. et‬ﻗﻠﺖ ]ﻗﻠﻨﺎﻩ | ‪ om. No‬ﻣﺎ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ A‬ﯾﺘﻌﲅ ]ﯾﺘﳫّﻢ | ‪ٔ om. ν‬ن… ٕاﻧ ّﲈ | ‪ om. NkṢ iter. T add. in mg. Ṣ‬اﳌﻌﺎﱐ… وٕا ّن ‪ om. et add. in mg. Te ‬ﰲ | ‪Mi‬‬ ‫وﺸﻮش | ‪ٔ ηJTTeEd.‬ن ا ٔﻣﺮ ]ا ٔﻣﺮ ‪ s.l. N ‬اﳌﻌﺎﱐ | ‪ٔ add. s.l. Y‬ﳖﺎ ]ﺣ ﺚ‬ ‫ﺸﻮش | ‪ νG‬وﺷﻮش ] ّ‬ ‫ﻣﻦ ﺷﻮش ‪َ om. No‬ﻣﻦ ّ‬ ‫‪ add. BrN‬ﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ ]اﳌﻨﻄﻖ | ‪ om. N‬ﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ ‪ Br ‬ﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ ﱂ ﳛﺼﻠﻮ ] ﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ ‪… ‬ﱂ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. Nk‬ﺴ ﺐ | ‪νG‬‬ ‫اﳌﻮﺟﻮد ]اﻟﻮﺟــﻮد | ‪ No‬و ــﺪ ]و ــﺪوا | ‪ i.l. Y‬ﺣـ ﺚ ‪ a.c. et‬إذا ‪ TN‬إذا ]إذ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ‬ﳜﺘــﺺ ‪ Ṣ‬ﳜــﺺ ]ﳜﺘـ ّـﺺ | ‪ μEAs‬اﻟــﱵ ]ا ي‬ ‫ووﺟﻮد ﲠﺎ ﰲ ‪ om. et‬ﻣﻦ… ‪‬ﻣﻦ | ‪ νπADiṢ‬ﻟ ٔ ﺷﯿﺎء ]ا ٔﺷﯿﺎء ‪ s.l. Ṣ² ‬ﳓﻮﻦ ‪ τ‬و ﲔ ]ﳓﻮﻦ | ‪ s.l. Nk‬اﳌﻮﺟﻮد ‪JATṢTeEd.‬‬ ‫‪ πKaJEṢYN‬ووﺟﻮد ﻟﻬﺎ ]ووﺟﻮدﻫﺎ | ‪  om. No‬ﺎرج…ووﺟــﻮدﻫﺎ | ‪ add. in mg. G‬ا ﻫــﻦ ﲾﻌﻠـﻮا اﻟﻨﻈــﺮ ﰲ اﳌﻮﺟــﻮد ا ي ﻣــﻦ ﺎرج‬ ‫‪ νEAs‬ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ]ا ي… ‪‬ﰲ | ‪ praem. A‬ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ]‪‬ﰲ ‪ om. νE ‬ا ي | ‪ add. TTe‬ا ي ‪ add. et exp. J‬ا ي ]اﻟﻨﻈﺮ‬ ‫]‪ٔ ‬ﻣﻮر | ‪ add. et exp. Di‬ﰷﻟﻌﻤﻮم واﳋﺼﻮص ]‪‬ا ﻫﻦ ‪ Br ‬ﻧﻪ ‪ Ṣ‬ﻓﺎٕﻧﻪ ‪ νEAs s.l. Ṣ‬و ٔﳖﺎ ]و ٔﻧ ّﻪ | ‪ in mg. E‬واﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ا ي‬ ‫‪ om. et‬ﻣﻦ | ‪ٔ No‬ﻣﺮا ] ٔﻣﺮ | ‪ om. ξ‬ﲠﺎ | ‪ٔ T‬ن ]ﻻ | ‪ٔ add. As‬ﻋﺮاض ]ﻟﻬﺎ ‪ٔ s.l. Ṣ² ‬ﻣﻮر ‪ٔ Ṣ‬ﻣﻮر ]‪ٔ ‬ﻣﻮر | ‪ٔ s.l. Ṣ²‬ﻣﻮر ‪ٔ Ṣ‬ﻣﻮر‬ ‫ﻋﺮض ] ﺎرض ‪ Ṣ s.l. Ṣ² ‬ﻟﻬﺎ ] | ‪ om. et add. in mg. C‬ﯾﻌﺮض ‪ add. Da ‬وﱔ ﲅ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ]ﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ | ‪add. s.l. Di‬‬ ‫ﻋﻘﻠﯿﺔ ‪ٔ om. Yi ‬ﺧﺮى | ‪ Br‬ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻻ ] ِ‬ ‫ﻣﻮﺻﻼ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. Yi‬ﯾﺼﲑ | ‪ Da‬ﻓﺎٕﻧﻪ ]ﻓﻬﻮ ٔﻧ ّﻪ | ‪] add. AsDiDaṢ‬ﯾﻌﺮض | ‪C‬‬ ‫ٔو ﻣﺎﻧﻌﺎ ﯾﻌﺎوق ذ اﻟﻮﺻﻮل ] ٔو ﻣﺎ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ²‬اﻟﻮﺻﻮل ‪ AsṢ‬اﻟﺘﻮﺻﻞ ‪ add. in mg. To‬اﻟﻮﺻــﻮل ‪ νEToŠG‬اﻟﺘﻮﺻــﯿﻞ ]‪‬اﻟﻮﺻــﻮل | ‪om. N‬‬ ‫‪ om.‬اﻟﻮﺻﻮل… ‪ٔ ‬و | ‪ add. in mg. C‬ظ ٔو ﻣﺎﻧﻊ ﯾﻌﺎوق ذ اﻟﻮﺻﻮل ‪ٔ add. in mg. B‬ي ﻣﺎﻧﻌﺎ ﯾﻌﺎوق ذ اﻟﻮﺻﻮل ‪add. in mg. Nk‬‬ ‫‪ i.l. Ṣ²‬اﻟﻮﺻﻮل ‪ Ṣ‬اﻟﺘﻮﺻﻞ ]‪‬اﻟﻮﺻﻮل | ‪ζνρBrMi om. et add. in mg. Di exp. Ṣ²‬‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫ﺎﺷﯿﺔ ﯾﻌﲏ ٔن اﳋﻠﻔﺔ ﰲ إﻓﻬﺎم ا ﺎﻃﺒﺔ ﻣﻌﺎﱐ ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ اﳌﻄﺎﺑﻘﺔ ﻟﻬﺎ ﰲ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﰷﳋﻠﻔﺔ ﰲ إﻓﻬﺎﻣﻪ اﳌﻌﺎﱐ اﻟﱵ ﰲ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﻣﻦ دون ]ﲻﻼ ‪… ‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن‬ ‫‪ in mg. Te‬ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ ﻟﻮ ﯾﻮﺻﻞ إﱃ ذ ﺑﻨﻮع ﻣﻦ اﳌﻮاﻓﻘﺔ و ﺻﻄﻼح إﻻ ٔن وﺿﻊ ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ وﺟﻌ إﱃ ذ ٔﺣﺴﻦ ﲻﻼ ﻣﻦ ﳾء ٓﺧﺮ‬

‫‪] The omission of this clause by saut du même au même may have occurred in β; an‬اﻟﻮﺻ ــﻮل… ‪ٔ ‬و ‪‬‬ ‫‪ancestor of MSS ToŠ might have restored the omitted text by collation, as it happens in MS Di, where‬‬ ‫‪it is added in the margin.‬‬

‫‪٢٤‬ق‬

Chapter I.4  47

the discipline of logic must count among its parts an inquiry into the states of the expressions. Were it not for what we said, logic would not need to have such a part and with such a necessity, since the discussion concerning the expressions which correspond to their meanings is like the discussion concerning their meanings, except that imposition of expressions is better with regard to [our] practice.

[.. Refutation of the view that the inquiry into expressions is the subject matter of logic] Moreover, there is no good in the claim of those who state that the subject matter of logic is the inquiry into expressions insofar as they signify meanings, and that the discipline of the logician precisely consists in talking about expressions insofar as they signify meanings. On the contrary, the state of affairs must be conceived as we mentioned. Those who were confused and perplexed on this were so only because they did not really determine the subject matter of logic and the class of existents to which it belongs. They found that existence is in two ways, [namely], an existence of the things in external reality, and an existence in the mind. They therefore assigned the inquiry into existence that is in external reality to one or more philosophical disciplines, and the inquiry into existence that is in the mind and into how conception occurs in the mind to a discipline3 or to a part of [another] discipline4, not having differentiated or come to know that things that are in the mind are either things that are conceived in the mind and acquired from external reality, or things which, insofar as they are in the mind, happen to have nothing corresponding to them in external reality. The knowledge of both these things pertains to a discipline5, then one of these two things becomes a subject matter for the discipline of logic with respect to an accident that occurs to it. As to which of these two things it is, it is the second member of the division; as to which accident occurs [to it], it is either that it leads to the realization in the soul of another intellectual form that was not there before, or that it is useful or an obstacle in attaining [a new intellectual form]. Q24

 I.e. Metaphysics: cf. Ilāhiyyāt I., p. .–. The existence in the mind (al-wuğūd allaḏī fī l-ḏihni) of the objects of logic is established in metaphysics.  I.e. A part of natural philosophy, namely psychology; cf. also Maqūlāt I., p. .–, where knowledge of the categories with respect to their conception in the soul is said to pertain to a part of natural philosophy that is contiguous to the metaphysics, i.e. psychology.  I.e. Metaphysics: cf. Ilāhiyyāt I., pp. .–..

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫)‪ (.‬ﻓﻠ ّﻤﺎ ﱂ ُ ّﳣﲒ ﻟﻬﺆﻻء ﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ ﻣﻮﺿــﻮع ﺻــﻨﺎ ﺔ اﳌﻨﻄــﻖ وﻻ اﳉﻬــﺔ اﻟــﱵ ﲠﺎ ﻫــﻮ ﻣﻮﺿــﻮ ﻪ‪ ،‬ﺗﺘﻌﺘﻌـﻮا‬ ‫وﺗﺒ ّ وا‪ .‬و ٔﻧﺖ ﺳﺘﻌﲅ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻫﺬا ﺑﻮ ﻪ ٔﺷﺪّ ﴍ ﺎ ٔ ّن ﲁّ ﺻﻨﺎ ﺔ ﻧﻈﺮﯾــﺔ ﻣﻮﺿــﻮ ﺎ و ٔﳖّ ﺎ ٕاﻧّــﲈ ﺗﺒــﺤﺚ ﻋــﻦ‬ ‫ٔﻋﺮاﺿﻪ و ٔﺣﻮا ‪ .‬وﺗﻌﲅ ٔ ّن اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ ذات اﳌﻮﺿﻮع ﻗﺪ ﻜﻮن ﰲ ﺻﻨﺎ ﺔ واﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ ﻋﻮارﺿﻪ ﻜــﻮن ﻣــﻦ‬ ‫ﺻﻨﺎ ﺔ ٔﺧﺮى‪ .‬ﻓﻬﻜﺬا ﳚﺐ ٔن ﺗﻌﲅ ﻣﻦ ﺎل اﳌﻨﻄﻖ‪.‬‬

‫‪Šifāʾ, Burhān II.,‬‬

‫] ٔﺧـــــﺮى ‪ … ‬وﺗﻌـــــﲅ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪] Šifāʾ, Burhān II., p. .–.‬و ٔﺣـــــﻮا ‪… ‬و ٔﻧﺖ ‪‬‬ ‫‪pp. .–.; ibid., p. .–.‬‬

‫ﱔ ﲠﺎ ]ﲠﺎ ﻫﻮ | ‪ add. ι‬ﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ ]اﳌﻨﻄﻖ | ‪ (?) add. et del. Di‬اﻟﻄﺒﺖ ]ﺻﻨﺎ ﺔ | ‪ om. ι add. s.l. Di‬ﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ | ‪ Br‬ﳍﻢ ]ﻟﻬﺆﻻء ‪‬‬ ‫وﺗﺒ ]وﺗﺒ ّ وا ‪] Lat. ‬ﻣﻮﺿﻮ ﺔ[ »‪ γ s.l. Ṣ² «instituta est‬ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻋﻬﺎ ]ﻣﻮﺿﻮ ﻪ | ‪ γζλνLat.DiṢNoEd. om. MiG‬ﱔ ]ﻫﻮ | ‪Br‬‬ ‫‪ praem.‬ﻗﺪ ]‪ ‬ﻜﻮن | ‪ T‬ﻓﺎﻟﻨﻈﺮ ]واﻟﻨﻈﺮ | ‪ om. et vacuum rel. Da‬ﻗﺪ | ‪ om. Br‬و ٔﺣﻮا ‪ٕ om. As ‬اﻧ ّﲈ | ‪ Ṣ‬ﺗﻌﲅ ]ﺳﺘﻌﲅ | ‪Yi‬‬ ‫‪ Br‬ﰲ ]ﻣﻦ | ‪μ‬‬ ‫‪ [cf. al-Ğawharī, Tāğ al-luġa‬اﻟﺘﻌﺘﻌﺔ ﰲ اﻟ م واﻟﱰدد ﻓ ﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺣﴫ ٔو ﻋﻲ ووﻗﻊ اﻟﻘﻮم ﰲ ﺗﻌﺎﺗﻊ إذا وﻗﻌﻮا ﰲ ٔراﺟ ﻒ وﲣﻠﯿﻂ ]ﺗﺘﻌﺘﻌﻮا ‪‬‬ ‫ﻋﺮوض ﻣﻌﲎ اﳋﺼﻮص واﻟﻌﻤﻮم ﰲ اﳌﻌﲎ اﳌﺘﺼﻮر )اﻟﺘﺼﻮر ‪ (C‬ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ ] ٔﻋﺮاﺿﻪ ‪wa-ṣiḥāḥ al-ʿarabiyya, p. ] in mg. Te ‬‬ ‫‪ in‬ﺣﺼﻞ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﻓ ﻪ ﺻﻮرة ﰲ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ وﱔ ﺻﻮرة اﻟﻌﻤﻮم ﰲ ﳾء ٔو ﻣﺎ ﯾﻔﺎرق ذ ﯾﻌﲎ اﳌﺎﻧﻊ ﻣﻦ ﺣﺼﻮل ذ اﻟﺘﺼﻮر ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻤﻮم ﻟﻜﻮﻧﻪ ﺟﺰءا ﳐﺼﺎ ﺑﻮا ﺪ‬

‫‪mg. η‬‬

Chapter I.4  49

[.. Concluding remarks on the subject matter of logic] Since these [philosophers] did not really discriminate either the subject matter of the discipline of logic, or the respect under which it is its subject matter, they stammered and were confused. After this, you will know through a more efficient explanation that each theoretical discipline has a subject matter, and that it only inquires into the accidents and states of its subject matter6. You will also know that the inquiry into the subject matter itself can pertain to a discipline, whereas the inquiry into its accidents can pertain [to the domain] of another discipline7. And this is what you need to know about the state of logic.

 See Šifāʾ, Burhān II., p. .–.  See Šifāʾ, Burhān II., pp. .–. and p. .–.

‫]اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﳋﺎﻣﺲ[‬ ‫ﻓﺼﻞ ﰲ ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻒ اﻠﻔﻆ اﳌﻔﺮد واﳌﺆﻟّﻒ وﺗﻌﺮﯾﻒ ا ﳫّﻲ واﳉﺰﰄ وا اﰐ واﻟﻌﺮﴈ وا ي ﯾﻘﺎل ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ‬ ‫ﻫﻮ وا ي ﻻ ﯾﻘﺎل‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫)‪ (.‬وٕاذ ﻻ ﺑﺪّ ﻟﻨﺎ ﰲ اﻟﺘﻌﻠﲓ و ّ‬ ‫اﻟﺘﻌﲅ ﻣﻦ ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ ﻓ ٕﺎ ّ ﻧﻘﻮل ا ّٕن اﻠﻔﻆ ٕا ّﻣﺎ ﻣﻔﺮد وٕا ّﻣﺎ ﻣﺮ ّﻛﺐ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬واﳌﺮﻛّﺐ ﻫﻮ ا ي ﻗﺪ ﯾﻮ ﺪ ﺟﺰء ﯾﺪ ّل ﲆ ﻣﻌﲎ ﻫﻮ ﺟﺰء ﻣــﻦ اﳌــﻌﲎ اﳌﻘﺼــﻮد ﶺـ دﻻ‬ ‫ات ﻣ ﻞ ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن وﰷﺗﺐ ﻣﻦ ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ﰷﺗﺐ‪ ،‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن ﻟﻔﻈﺔ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ﻣ ﻪ ﺗﺪ ّل ﲆ ﻣﻌﲎ وﻟﻔﻈﺔ‬ ‫ﰷﺗﺐ ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﺗﺪ ّل ﲆ ﻣﻌﲎ و ّ‬ ‫ﰻ وا ﺪ ﻣﳯﲈ ﺟﺰء ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ﰷﺗﺐ وﻣﻌﻨﺎﻩ ﺟﺰء اﳌﻌﲎ اﳌﻘﺼﻮد ﻣﻦ ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ‬ ‫ﻈﻦ ٔ ّن اﳊﻲ ﻣ ﻪ ﻣ ﻼ دا ّل ٕا ّﻣﺎ ﲆ ﲨ‬ ‫ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ﰷﺗﺐ دﻻ ﻣﻘﺼﻮدة ﰲ اﻠﻔﻆ ﻟ ﺲ ﻛﲈ ﻧﻘﻮل ﺣ ﻮان ﻓ ُ ّ‬ ‫اﳌﻌﲎ وٕا ّﻣﺎ ﲆ ﺑﻌﺾ ﻣ ﻪ‪ ،‬ﻟﻮ ﰷن ﻣﻦ ﲑ ٔن ﰷن ﯾﻘﺼﺪ ﰲ إﻃﻼق ﻟﻔﻈﺔ اﳊﯿﻮان ٔن ﯾــﺪ ّل اﳊــﻲ ﻣ ــﻪ‬ ‫ﺗ اﻻ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (..‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﳌﻔﺮد ﻓﻬﻮ ا ي ﻻ ﯾﺪ ّل ﺟﺰء ﻣ ﻪ ﲆ ﺟﺰء ﻣﻦ ﻣﻌﲎ ا ﲁّ اﳌﻘﺼﻮد ﺑﻪ دﻻ ات ﻣ ﻞ‬ ‫ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن‪ ،‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن اﻻٕن واﻟﺴﺎن ﻻ ّ‬ ‫ﯾﺪﻻن ﲆ ﺟﺰ ٔ ﻦ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻌﲎ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ﻣﳯﲈ ﯾ ٔﺗﻠﻒ ﻣﻌﲎ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن‪ .‬وﻻ‬

‫] ﲆ ‪… ‬ﲨ‬

‫‪] Material damage in MS Ṣ. ‬ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن…ﻣﳯــﲈ ‪] Material damage in MS Ṣ. ‬ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ‪… ‬اﳌﻘﺼــﻮد ‪‬‬ ‫‪] Material damage in MS Ṣ.‬اﳌﻘﺼﻮد…ﻣﻦ ‪Material damage in MS Ṣ. ‬‬

‫‪] Cf. E‬ﻣﺮﻛّﺐ… وٕاذ ‪ 11‬‬ ‫‪] Cf. A‬ﻣﺮﻛّﺐ…ﻓ ٕﺎ ّ | ‪, In Isag., p. .–.‬‬ ‫‪ … ‬واﳌﺮﻛّﺐ ‪., De Int., a–. ‬‬ ‫‪] Cf. A -F‬ا ﻻ ‪ … ‬واﳌﺮﻛّﺐ | ‪ ] Cf. A ., De Int., b–.‬ات‬ ‫…و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪, Fuṣūl, p. .–. ‬‬ ‫‪] Cf. A ., Poet., a–; A‬اﳌﻔــﺮدة ‪… ‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ | ‪ ] Cf. A ., De Int., a–.‬ات‬ ‫‪., In De‬‬ ‫‪Int., p. .–; A -F‬‬ ‫‪, Fuṣūl, p. .–; Id., Šarḥ li-Kitāb Arisṭūṭālīs fī l-ʿIbāra,‬‬ ‫‪p. .–.‬‬ ‫] ات…و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪] Manṭiq al-Mašriqiyyīn, p. .–. ‬اﳌﻔﺮدة ‪ … ‬واﳌﺮﻛّﺐ | ‪] Nağāt, p. .–.‬اﻠﻔﻆ ‪ … ‬واﳌﺮﻛّﺐ ‪‬‬ ‫‪] Išārāt,‬اﳌﻔـــــﺮدة ‪… ‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ | ‪] Nağāt, pp. .–..‬ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ‪… ‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ | ‪Šifāʾ, ʿIbāra I., p. .–.‬‬ ‫‪] Šifāʾ, ʿIbāra I.,‬اﳌﻔـــﺮدة ‪… ‬وﻻ ‪] Šifāʾ, ʿIbāra I., pp. .–.. ‬ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ‪… ‬ﻣـــ ﻞ | ‪p. .–.‬‬ ‫‪p. .–.‬‬ ‫ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻒ ]وﺗﻌﺮﯾﻒ | ‪ add. a.c. No‬ﻣﻦ ]واﳌﺆﻟّﻒ | ‪ Y‬اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﳋﺎﻣﺲ ‪ Mi‬اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﳋﺎﻣﺲ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﻦ ا ٔول ﻣﻦ ﲨ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ]ﻓﺼﻞ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ s.l. Ka | om. Yi‬ﻗﺪ | ‪ C‬ﻓﺎﳌﺮﺐ ]واﳌﺮﻛّﺐ ‪ om. Ṣ ‬ا ّٕن ‪ No ‬ا ي ]وا ي | ‪ om. Ṣ‬واﳉﺰﰄ | ‪om. et add. in mg. Ṣ‬‬ ‫‪ om. et‬ﰷﺗﺐ ‪… ‬وﻣﻌﻨﺎﻩ | ‪ νEAs‬ﰻ ]و ّ‬ ‫ﰻ | ‪ٔ s.l. DaG‬ﯾﻀﺎ ‪ G ‬وﻟﻔﻆ ]وﻟﻔﻈﺔ | ‪ s.l. Da‬ﻣ ﻪ | ‪ As‬ﺑﻞ ]ﻓﺎ ّٕن ‪ TTe ‬و ﶺ ] ﶺ‬ ‫ﻼ ﺴﺎن ]ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ‪ No ‬ﲜﺰء ]‪‬ﺟﺰء | ‪add. in mg. G‬‬ ‫ﻈﻦ ّٔن | ‪ om. Lat.‬ا ﻻ ‪… ‬ﻟ ﺲ | ‪ iter. N‬دﻻ | ‪ E‬ﻟ ٕ‬ ‫‪ om. ν add. in‬ﻓ ُ ّ‬ ‫ظ ﻛﻨﺖ ]‪‬ﰷن | ‪ As‬وﻟﻮ ]ﻟﻮ ‪ As ‬ﲨﻞ ]ﲨ | ‪ No‬ﻣﺎ ] ٕا ّﻣﺎ | ‪ No‬دا ]دا ّل | ‪ C‬اﳊﯿﻮان ]اﳊﻲ | ‪ّٔ om. et add. s.l. Di‬ن | ‪mg. Y‬‬ ‫‪ om. ν‬ﺗ ‪ om. ν ‬ﻣ ﻪ | ‪ add. ν‬ﻣ ﻪ ]ﯾﺪ ّل | ‪ٔ  om. Yi‬ن | ‪ om. Da‬اﳊﯿﻮان | ‪ KaTo‬ﻟﻔﻆ ]ﻟﻔﻈﺔ | ‪in mg. Di om. BrN‬‬ ‫ﲆ | ‪ om. N‬ﻻ | ‪ om. Nk‬ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ﻓﺎ ّٕن ‪ om. ν add. in mg. Y ‬اﳌﻘﺼﻮد ﺑﻪ | ‪ J‬اﳌﻌﲎ ]ﻣﻌﲎ | ‪ s.l. Nk‬ﺟﺰء ‪add. s.l. Y ‬‬ ‫‪ om. Lat.‬ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن…ﻣﳯﲈ | ‪ om. N‬ﻣﻦ | ‪om. As‬‬

‫‪٢٥‬ق‬

C

[I.] ,

,

‘

?’

[

,

],

]

[

[. Classification of the expressions into simple and compound] [.. Introduction to the classification] Since we cannot avoid [employing] expressions when teaching and learning, let us say that the expression is either simple or compound.

[.. Compound expressions] The compound is that which may have a part signifying per se a meaning that is a part of the meaning intended by the complex, like when we say ‘man’ and ‘writer’ [as parts] of ‘the man is a writer’, for the expression ‘man’ in it signifies a meaning, and so does the expression ‘writer’, and each one of the two is a part of our statement ‘the man is a writer’, and the meaning of each one of them is a part of the meaning intended by ‘the man is a writer’ with a signification inteded by the expression. [This] is not like when we say ‘ḥayawān’ and it is presumed that the ḥay in it, Q25 for instance, either signifies the whole meaning or a part of it, if it is such that, when the word ‘ḥayawān’ is articulated, the ḥay in it is not meant to signify in this way1.

[.. Simple expressions] [... The parts of the simple expression do not signify per se a part of the whole meaning] The simple [expression] is that none of whose parts signifies per se a part of the meaning of the whole intended by it, like when we say ‘insān’2, for in and sān do not

 This precision is required because the term ḥayy is not just a part of the term ḥayawān (“animal”), but might also signify it itself another meaning, like “living”, or even “animal”, as in the Arabic translations from the Greek, where it is often employed as a rendering for the Greek ζῷον.  I.e. “man, human”.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﳋﺎﻣﺲ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ﯾُﻠ َﺘﻔﺖ ﰲ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ إﱃ اﻟﱰﯿﺐ ا ي ﻜﻮن ﲝﺴﺐ اﳌﺴﻤﻮع إذا ﰷن ﻻ ﯾﺪ ّل ﺟﺰء ﻣ ﻪ ﲆ ﺟﺰء ﻣﻦ‬ ‫اﳌﻌﲎ‪ ،‬ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ ﻋﺒﺪ ﴰﺲ إذا ٔرﯾﺪ ﺑﻪ اﰟ ﻟﻘﺐ وﱂ ﺮد ﺑﻪ ﻋﺒﺪ ﻠﺸﻤﺲ‪ .‬وﻫﺬا و ٔﻣ ﺎ ﻻ ﯾﻌﺪّ ﰲ ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ‬ ‫اﳌﺆﻟّﻔﺔ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﰲ اﳌﻔﺮدة‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (..‬واﳌﻮﺟﻮد ﰲ اﻟﺘﻌﻠﲓ ا ٔﻗﺪم ﻣﻦ رﰟ ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ اﳌﻔﺮدة ٔﳖّ ﺎ ﱔ اﻟﱵ ﻻ ﺗﺪ ّل ٔﺟﺰاؤﻫﺎ ــﲆ ﳾء‪.‬‬ ‫واﺳ ﻘﺺ ﻓﺮﯾﻖ ﻣﻦ ٔﻫﻞ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﻫﺬا اﻟﺮﰟ و ٔوﺟﺐ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﳚﺐ ٔن ﺰاد ﻓ ﻪ ٔﳖّ ﺎ اﻟﱵ ﻻ ﺗﺪ ّل ٔﺟﺰاؤﻫﺎ ﲆ‬ ‫ﳾء ﻣﻦ ﻣﻌﲎ ا ﲁّ إذ ﻗﺪ ﺗﺪ ّل ٔﺟﺰاء ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ اﳌﻔﺮدة ﲆ ﻣﻌﺎن ﻟﻜﳯّ ﺎ ﻻ ﻜﻮن ٔﺟﺰاء ﻣﻌﺎﱐ اﶺ ‪ .‬و ٔ‬ ‫ٔرى ٔ ّن ﻫﺬا ﺳ ﻘﺎص َﻣﻦ ﻣﺴ ﻘﺼﻪ ﺳﻬﻮ و ٔ ّن ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﺰ دة ﲑ ﳏﺘﺎج ٕا ﳱﺎ ﻠﺘﳣﲓ ﺑﻞ ﻠﺘﻔﻬﲓ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺣﻖ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻌﲎ ﻻ ﳚﺎوزﻩ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ‬ ‫)‪ (..‬وذ ٔ ّن اﻠﻔﻆ ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻪ ﻻ ﯾﺪ ّل اﻟﺒﺘّﺔ؛ وﻟﻮﻻ ذ ﲀن ﲁّ ﻟﻔﻆ ّ‬ ‫ٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﯾﺪ ّل ٕ رادة اﻟﻼﻓﻆ‪ ،‬ﻓﻜﲈ ٔ ّن اﻟﻼﻓﻆ ﯾﻄﻠﻘﻪ ّ‬ ‫داﻻ ﲆ ﻣﻌﲎ ﰷﻟﻌﲔ ﲆ ﯾ ﻮع اﳌﺎء ﻓ ﻜﻮن ذ دﻻﻟﺘﻪ؛‬ ‫ّﰒ ﯾﻄﻠﻘﻪ ّ‬ ‫داﻻ ﲆ ﻣﻌﲎ َاﺧﺮ ﰷﻟﻌﲔ ﲆ ا ﯾﻨﺎر ﻓ ﻜﻮن ذ دﻻﻟﺘﻪ‪ .‬ﻓﻜﺬ إذا ٔ ﻼﻩ ﰲ إﻃﻼﻗﻪ ﻋﻦ‬ ‫ا ﻻ ﺑﻘﻲ ﲑ دا ّل وﻋﻨﺪ ﻛﺜﲑ ﻣﻦ ٔﻫﻞ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﲑ ﻟﻔﻆ‪ ،‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن اﳊﺮف واﻟﺼــﻮت‪ ،‬ﻓـ ٔﻇـ ّـﻦ‪ ،‬ﻻ ﻜــﻮن‬ ‫ﲝﺴﺐ اﻟﺘﻌﺎرف ﻋﻨﺪ ﻛﺜﲑ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻨﻄﻘ ّﲔ ﻟﻔﻈﺎ ٔو ﺸ ﳣﻞ ﲆ دﻻ ‪ .‬وٕاذا ﰷن ذ ﻛﺬ ﻓﺎﳌﺘﳫّﻢ ﻠﻔﻆ‬ ‫اﳌﻔﺮد ﻻ ﺮﯾﺪ ٔن ﯾﺪ ّل ﲜﺰﺋﻪ ﲆ ﺟﺰء ﻣﻦ ﻣﻌﲎ ا ﲁّ وﻻ ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﺮﯾﺪ ٔن ﯾﺪ ّل ﲜﺰﺋﻪ ﲆ ﻣﻌﲎ َاﺧﺮ ﻣــﻦ‬ ‫ﺷ ٔﻧﻪ ٔن ﯾﺪ ّل ﺑﻪ ﻠﯿﻪ وﻗﺪ اﻧﻌﻘﺪ ﺻﻄﻼح ﲆ ذ ‪ .‬ﻓﻼ ﻜﻮن ﺟﺰؤﻩ اﻟﺒﺘّﺔ ّ‬ ‫داﻻ ﲆ ﳾء ﲔ ﻫﻮ‬ ‫ﻟﻘﻮة ﲔ ﳒﺪ اﻻٕﺿﺎﻓﺔ اﳌﺸﺎر ٕا ﳱﺎ وﱔ ﻣﻘﺎرﻧﺔ ٕارادة اﻟــﻘﺎﺋﻞ دﻻ ﲠﺎ‪ .‬و ﶺـ‬ ‫ﺟﺰؤﻩ ﻟﻔﻌﻞ‪ ،‬ا ﻠّﻬ ّﻢ ا ّٕﻻ ّ‬ ‫]اﻟﺮﰟ…اﻟﻨﻈــﺮ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪] Material damage in MS Ṣ.‬ا ٔﻟــﻔﺎظ…ﻻ‬

‫‪] Material damage in MS Ṣ. ‬اﻟﱰــﯿﺐ…اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ــﺔ ‪‬‬ ‫‪Material damage in MS Ṣ.‬‬

‫‪] Cf. A‬دﻻ ‪… ‬ﻓﻜﺬ‬

‫‪-F‬‬ ‫ ‪ ] A‬ﻟﻔﻌﻞ ‪… ‬ﻓﻼ ‪, Šarḥ li-Kitāb Arisṭūṭālīs fī l-ʿIbāra, p. .–. ‬‬‫‪, Šarḥ li-Kitāb Arisṭūṭālīs fī l-ʿIbāra, p. .–.‬‬

‫‪] Manṭiq al-Mašriqiyyīn, p. .–.‬ذ‬

‫‪‬‬ ‫‪F‬‬

‫‪… ‬ﻓﺎﳌﺘﳫّﻢ ‪‬‬ ‫‪‬‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫‪ om. E‬ﻣــﻦ | ‪ Nk‬ﺟــﺰء ﻣ ــﻪ ﻻ ﯾــﺪل ]ﻣ ــﻪ…ﻻ | ‪ exp. Y‬اﳌﺴﻤــﻮع… ﻜــﻮن | ‪ om. NkYi‬ﻜــﻮن | ‪ om. et add. s.l. Br‬إﱃ‬ ‫‪ om. No‬ﻋﺒــﺪ | ‪] om. γξBrDaToEd. add. s.l. Nk exp. Ṣ²‬ﺑــﻪ | ‪ om. Y‬ﺑــﻪ | ‪ add. et exp. E‬اﳌﻘﺼــﻮد ]اﳌــﻌﲎ‬ ‫ﻣﻦ ‪ in mg. Nk‬ﰲ ‪ et‬ﻣﻦ ]ﰲ | ‪ in mg. To‬وﻫﺬا ‪ s.l. Nk in mg. C‬ﻓﺎٕن ذ ‪ μ‬ﻓﺎٕن ذ ‪ Di‬وٕان ذ ]وﻫﺬا | ‪ E‬اﻟﺸﻤﺲ ] ﻠﺸﻤﺲ‬ ‫واﳌﻮﺟﻮدة ]واﳌﻮﺟﻮد ‪ Ka ‬اﳌﻔﺮد ]اﳌﻔﺮدة | ‪ om. ToŠ‬ﰲ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. Nk‬ﰲ…اﳌﺆﻟّﻔﺔ ‪ add. in mg. C ‬ﻣﻦ ‪κKaJA‬‬ ‫واﺳ ﻘﺾ ]واﺳ ﻘﺺ ‪ٔ add. N ‬ﺻﻼ ]ﳾء | ‪ om. Ṣ‬ﱔ اﻟﱵ | ‪ TTeNo‬إﳕﺎ ‪ exp. Ṣ²‬ﻫﻮ ‪ praem. ιṢ‬ﻫﻮ ] ٔﳖّ ﺎ | ‪ λν‬ﰲ ]ﻣﻦ | ‪No‬‬ ‫‪ om. et‬اﳌﻔﺮدة | ‪ No‬ﻓﺪل ]ﻗﺪ ﺗﺪ ّل ‪ om. et add. in mg. Y ‬اﻟﱵ | ‪ A‬و ٔوﺟ ﻮا ]و ٔوﺟﺐ | ‪ om. Yi‬ﳾء ‪ … ‬واﺳ ﻘﺺ | ‪No‬‬ ‫‪ om. et‬ﻟﻔﻆ | ‪ add. N‬ﲆ ﻣﻌﲎ ]ﯾﺪ ّل | ‪ٔ As‬ن ] ّٔن ‪ a.c. G ‬ﻫﺬا ]ﻫﺬﻩ | ‪ Di‬ﻓﺎٕن ]و ّٔن ‪ N ‬ﻣﻌﲎ ]ﻣﻌﺎﱐ | ‪add. in mg. Ka‬‬ ‫‪ٓ add.‬ﺧﺮ ]ﻣﻌﲎ | ‪ add. τ‬رة ]ﯾﻄﻠﻘﻪ | ‪ Te‬اﻠﻔﻆ ]‪‬اﻟﻼﻓﻆ | ‪ Br‬وﻛﲈ ]ﻓﻜﲈ ‪ T ‬اﳌﻌﺎﱐ ]اﳌﻌﲎ | ‪ add. i.l. To‬ﻣﻦ | ‪add. s.l. N‬‬ ‫]ﻓﻜﺬ | ‪ om. To‬دﻻﻟﺘﻪ… ّﰒ ‪ No ‬ﻻﻟﺘﻪ ]دﻻﻟﺘﻪ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. Ṣ‬ﰷﻟﻌﲔ ‪  … ‬ﲆ | ‪J‬‬ ‫‪ BC‬وﻛﺬ ‪ DiMi‬ﻓ‬ ‫اﻟﻌﺎرف ]اﻟﺘﻌﺎرف ‪ B ‬ﳑﺎ ]ﻓ | ‪ٔ om. Br‬ﻫﻞ | ‪ Di‬ﻋﻨﺪ ]وﻋﻨﺪ | ‪ Yi‬ﱔ ]ﺑﻘﻲ ‪ Br ‬ﻣﻦ ]ﻋﻦ | ‪ NkAŠGEd.‬ﻛﺬ ‪ a.c. J‬وﻛﺬ‬ ‫ٔن ‪ ν ‬واﳌﺘﳫﻢ ]ﻓﺎﳌﺘﳫّﻢ | ‪ om. et add. i.l. To‬ﻛﺬ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. NkṢY om. J‬ذ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ‬إذ ظ ] ٔو | ‪To‬‬ ‫ﺑﻪ ‪ add. et exp. Y ‬إذ ] َاﺧﺮ | ‪ٔ Ka‬ن ﺮﯾﺪ ]‪‬ﯾﺪ ّل … ‪ ‬ﺮﯾﺪ | ‪ٔ om. Br‬ﯾﻀﺎ | ‪ G‬ﺟﺰ ٔ ] ﲆ ﺟﺰء | ‪ om. et add. in mg. J‬ﯾﺪ ّل‬ ‫ﺑﻪ ]ﲠﺎ | ‪ N‬و ٔﻧﻪ ]دﻻ ‪ Ka ‬ﻣﻌﲔ ‪ add. in mg. C‬ﻣﻌﲔ ] ﲔ | ‪ٓ add. s.l. Di‬ﺧﺮ ]ﳾء | ‪ A‬ﻓﻘﺪ ]وﻗﺪ | ‪om. et add. s.l. Di‬‬ ‫‪ٔ a.c. Ṣ‬و ﶺ ]و ﶺ | ‪ξEd.‬‬

‫‪٢٦‬ق‬

Chapter I.5  53

signify two parts of the meaning of ‘insān’ out of which the meaning of ‘insān’ is composed. In this discipline, one does not take into account the composition that is by virtue of the audible [expression] when a part of it does not signify a part of the [whole] meaning, like when we say: ‘ʿAbdu Šams’, if a surname is meant by this and not a servant of the Sun. This and similar things are not considered among the composite expressions, but rather among the simple [ones]. [... Defence of the Aristotelian definition of simple expressions] The description of simple expressions that is found in the most ancient teaching3 consists [of stating] that they are those [expressions] whose parts do not signify anything4. A group of philosophers5 found this description defective, and claimed that it was necessary to add in it that they are [those expressions] whose parts do not signify anything of the meaning of the complex, since the parts of simple expressions can signify [several] meanings, but they are not parts of the meanings of the complex. I think that this reproach of theirs is an oversight, and that this added condition is not required to make [the description] complete, but rather to make it more readily comprehensible. [... Conventional character of language] This is because the expression in itself does not signify at all; otherwise, each expression would have a share of the meaning that it would not exceed. On the contrary, [an expression] only signifies according to the speaker’s intention so that, as the speaker emits it as signifying a [certain] meaning, like ʿayn [signifying] the source of water, this is its signification; then he emits it as signifying another meaning, like ʿayn signifying the dīnār, and that is its signification. So too when [the speaker] deprives it, in its emission, of any signification, it stays without signifying [anything] and, according to many philosophers, without even being an expression Q26 since, on account of a customary usage among many logicians, the letter and the sound, as I presume, are not expressions, nor do they include any signification. If this is the case, he who emits a simple expression does not intend to signify by a part of it a part of the meaning of the complex, nor does he intend to signify by a part of it another meaning that could be possibly signified by that [expression] (convention on this matter having already been settled). So, its part, as far as it is its part, does not signify anything at all in actuality, unless it is so in potentiality, when we find the indicated relation, namely the connection to the speaker’s intention by which the

 I.e. In Aristotle’s works.  Cf. Arist., De Interpr., a–.  The identity of this group is uncertain; for a tentative identification, see Commentary.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﳋﺎﻣﺲ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ إن د ّل ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﲈ ﯾﺪ ّل ﻻ ﲔ ﻣﺎ ﻜﻮن ﺟﺰءا ﻣﻦ اﻠﻔﻆ اﳌﻔﺮد‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ إذا ﰷن ﻟﻔﻈﺎ ﻗﺎﲚﺎ ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻪ؛ ﻓ ٔ ّﻣﺎ وﻫــﻮ‬ ‫ﺟﺰء‪ ،‬ﻓﻼ ﯾﺪ ّل ﲆ ﻣﻌﲎ اﻟﺒﺘّﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬ﻓﺎﻠﻔﻆ ٕا ّﻣﺎ ﻣﻔﺮد وٕا ّﻣﺎ ﻣﺮﻛّﺐ وﻗﺪ ُ ِﲅ ٔ ّن اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ اﳌﻔﺮد ﻗ ﻞ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ اﳌﺮﻛّﺐ‪ّ .‬ﰒ اﻠﻔﻆ اﳌﻔﺮد‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮرﻩ اﺷﱰاك اﻟﻜﱶة ﻓ ﻪ ــﲆ‬ ‫ٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻩ اﻟﻮا ﺪ ا ي ﯾﺪ ّل ﻠﯿﻪ ﻻ ﳝﺘﻨﻊ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ّ‬ ‫اﻟﺴﻮﯾﺔ ﺑ ٔن ﯾﻘﺎل ﲁّ وا ﺪ ﻣﳯﻢ ٕاﻧ ّﻪ ﻫﻮ اﺷﱰﰷ ﲆ در ﺔ وا ﺪة — ﻣ ﻞ ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن‪ ،‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن ﻣﻌﲎ‬ ‫ﰲ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ وذ اﳌﻌﲎ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﻟﺰﯾﺪ وﻟﻌﻤﺮو وﳋﺎ ﲆ و ﻪ وا ــﺪ ٔ ّن ّ‬ ‫ﰻ وا ــﺪ ﻣﳯــﻢ ٕا ﺴﺎن‪ .‬وﻟﻔﻈــﺔ‬ ‫اﻟﻜﺮة اﶈﯿﻄﺔ ﺑﺬي ﻋﴩﻦ ﻗﺎ ﺪة ﻣ ﻠّﺜﺎت‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﻟﻔﻆ اﻟﺸﻤﺲ واﻟﻘﻤﺮ و ﲑ ذ ّ‬ ‫ﰻ ﻣﳯﺎ ﯾﺪ ّل ﲆ ﻣﻌﲎ ﻻ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ﰷﻟﻜﺮة اﳌﺬ ﻮرة‪ٔ ،‬و ﰷن ﳝﺘﻨﻊ ذ‬ ‫ﳝﺘﻨﻊ ّ‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮرﻩ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ ﻣﻦ اﺷﱰاك ﻛﱶة ﻓ ﻪ‪ ،‬وٕان ﱂ ﯾﻮ ﺪ ﻣ ﻼ ﻟﻔﻌﻞ ّ‬ ‫ﺴ ﺐ ﺎرج ﻋﻦ ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﻠﻔﻆ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﰷﻟﺸﻤﺲ— وٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻩ اﻟﻮا ﺪ ﲝــﯿﺚ ﳝﺘﻨــﻊ ﰲ ا ﻫــﻦ‬ ‫اﶈﺼﻞ اﻟﻮا ﺪ اﳌﻘﺼﻮد ﺑﻪ‪ ،‬ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ زﯾﺪ ﻓﺎ ّٕن ﻟﻔﻆ زﯾﺪ وٕان ﰷن ﻗﺪ ﺸﱰك ﻓ ﻪ‬ ‫إﯾﻘﺎع اﻟﴩﻛﺔ ﻓ ﻪ‪ٔ ،‬ﻋﲏ ﰲ ّ‬ ‫ﻛﺜﲑون ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﲈ ﺸﱰﻮن ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ اﳌﺴﻤﻮع؛ و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻩ اﻟﻮا ﺪ ﻓ ﺴ ﺘﺤﯿﻞ ٔن ﳚﻌﻞ وا ﺪ ﻣ ﻪ ﻣﺸﱰﰷ ﻓ ﻪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻓﺎ ّٕن اﻟﻮا ﺪ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻌﺎﻧﯿﻪ ﻫﻮ ذات اﳌﺸﺎر إﻟﯿﻪ وذات ﻫﺬا اﳌﺸﺎر إﻟﯿﻪ ﳝﺘﻨﻊ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ ٔن ﳚﻌﻞ ﻟﻐﲑﻩ‪ ،‬ا ﻠّﻬ ّﻢ‬ ‫ا ّٕﻻ ٔن ﻻ ﺮاد ﺰﯾﺪ اﻟﺒﺘّﺔ ذاﺗﻪ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﺻﻔﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺻﻔﺎﺗﻪ اﳌﺸﱰك ﻓﳱﺎ‪ .‬ﻓﻬــﺬا اﻟﻘﺴــﻢ‪ ،‬وٕان ﱂ ﲤﺘﻨــﻊ اﻟﴩﻛــﺔ ﰲ‬ ‫ﻣﺴﻤﻮ ﻪ‪ ،‬ﻓﻘﺪ ﳝﺘﻨﻊ ٔن ﯾﻮ ﺪ ﰲ اﳌﻌﲎ اﻟﻮا ﺪ ﻣﻦ اﳌﺪﻟﻮل ﺑــﻪ ﻠﯿــﻪ ﴍﻛــﺔ‪ .‬ﻓﺎﻟﻘﺴــﻢ ا ٔ ّول ﺴ ّﻤــﻰ ﳇّـ ّﯿﺎ‬ ‫واﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﺴ ّﻤﻰ ﺟﺰﺋ ّﯿﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬و ٔﻧﺖ ﺗﻌﲅ ٔ ّن ﻣﻦ ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﲆ ﺳ ﻞ اﻟﻘﺴﻢ ا ٔ ّول وﻣﻦ اﳌﻌﺎﱐ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﲆ ﺳ ﻞ ﻣــﻌﲎ‬ ‫اﻟﻘﺴﻢ ا ٔ ّول وﻫﻮ اﳌــﻌﲎ ا ي اﳌﻔﻬــﻮم ﻣ ــﻪ ﰲ اﻟﻨﻔــﺲ ﻻ ﲤﺘﻨــﻊ ﺴ ــﻪ إﱃ ٔﺷــﯿﺎء ﻛﺜــﲑة ﺗﻄﺎﺑﻘــﻬﺎ ﺴ ﺒــﺔ‬ ‫‪, Kitāb Īsāġūğī ay al-Madḫal, p. .–.‬‬

‫‪., De Int., a–; A -F‬‬

‫‪] A‬ﺟﺰﺋ ّﯿﺎ ‪ّ … ‬ﰒ ‪‬‬

‫‪] Šifāʾ, Burhān II., pp. .–.; Ilāhiyyāt V., pp. .–.; Nağāt,‬ﰷﻟﺸﻤـــــﺲ ‪ّ … ‬ﰒ ‪‬‬ ‫‪] Šifāʾ, Samāʿ‬ﰷﻟﺸﻤــﺲ ‪… ‬ﺑﻞ ‪p. .–; Manṭiq al-Mašriqiyyīn, p. .–; Išārāt, p. .–. ‬‬ ‫]ﺟﺰﺋ ّﯿﺎ ‪ … ‬وٕا ّﻣﺎ | ‪] Šifāʾ, Burhān II., p. .–; Išārāt, p. .–.‬ﴍﻛﺔ ‪ … ‬وٕا ّﻣﺎ ‪Ṭabīʿī, p. .–. ‬‬ ‫‪Nağāt, pp. .–.; Manṭiq al-Mašriqiyyīn, p. .–.‬‬ ‫‪ Yi‬ﻗ ﻞ ]ﻗ ﻞ | ‪ ξYiEd.‬واﻠﻔﻆ ]ﻓﺎﻠﻔﻆ ‪ om. et add. in mg. To ‬اﳌﻔﺮد | ‪ Br‬ﻻ ﻜﻮن ] ﻜﻮن | ‪ om. Br‬ﻻ | ‪ ζ‬ﻓﺎٕﻧﻪ ]ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﲈ ‪‬‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮرﻩ | ‪ a.c. Y‬ﻻ ﯾﺪل ]ﯾﺪ ّل ‪‬‬ ‫‪ in‬اﺷﱰاك ‪ ṢG om. et‬اﺷﱰاك ‪ om. DaYi‬اﺷﱰﰷ | ‪ Da‬ﻣﳯﺎ ]ﻣﳯﻢ ‪ ζλνBrDiṢ²ToŠN ‬ﯾﺘﺼﻮرﻩ ] ّ‬ ‫‪ om.‬ﻣ ﻠّﺜﺎت ‪ … ‬وﻟﻔﻈﺔ | ‪ E‬وﻟﻔﻆ ]وﻟﻔﻈﺔ | ‪ BrDa‬و ﺎ ]وﳋﺎ | ‪ τJEDaMiŠ‬وﲻﺮو ]وﻟﻌﻤﺮو | ‪ νEMiG‬ذ ]وذ ‪mg. Y ‬‬ ‫ﰷﻟﻜﺮة اﳌﺬ ﻮرة | ‪ ηBrEd. p.c. Ṣ‬ﳝﻨﻊ ]‪‬ﳝﺘﻨﻊ ‪ ζ ‬ﻣﳯﲈ ]ﻣﳯﺎ | ‪ add. BrJTTe‬وا ﺪ ] ّ‬ ‫ﰻ | ‪ ζιENo‬ﻟﻔﻈﺔ ]ﻟﻔﻆ ‪Lat. ‬‬ ‫‪ّ om. Lat.‬‬ ‫اﶈﺼﻞ… ‪‬ﻓ ﻪ ‪ νBEd. ‬ﲝﯿﺚ ‪ om. Ka‬اﻟﻮا ﺪ ﲝﯿﺚ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. No‬ﻋﻦ ‪ٔ T ‬و إن ﰷن ‪ κ‬وٕان ﰷن ] ٔو ﰷن‬ ‫‪ّ om. ν add.‬‬ ‫]‪‬ﻓ ﻪ | ‪ om. JTAs‬ﻗﺪ | ‪ ζιBCṢN‬ﻟﻔﻈﺔ ]ﻟﻔﻆ | ‪ add. s.l. C om. ν‬ﻣ ﻪ ‪ ι‬ﻣ ﻪ ]ﺑﻪ | ‪ s.l. Y om. Yi‬ﺪ ‪ et‬اﻟﻮا ]اﻟﻮا ﺪ | ‪in mg. Y‬‬ ‫ﻓﺬات ]وذات ‪ s.l. Ṣ ‬ﻣ ﻪ ‪ ξṢ‬ﻣﳯﻢ ]ﻣ ﻪ | ‪ T‬وا ﺪا ]وا ﺪ | ‪ add. No‬ﺑﻪ ]ﳚﻌﻞ | ‪ add. ζ‬ﻓ ﻪ ] ﺸﱰﻮن ‪ ξJTDiṢMiŠYG ‬ﻓﳱﺎ‬ ‫وﻫﺬا ‪ Yi‬ﻫﺬا ]ﻓﻬﺬا | ‪ om. ξ‬ﻓﳱﺎ | ‪ No‬ﺻﻔﺎت ]ﺻﻔﺎﺗﻪ | ‪ Br‬ذاﺗﻪ اﻟﺒﺘﺔ ]اﻟﺒﺘّﺔ ذاﺗﻪ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. Ṣ‬ﺮاد | ‪ om. J‬ﻻ ‪T ‬‬ ‫]و ٔﻧﺖ ‪ s.l. Nk om. Ṣ ‬ﺴ ّﻤﻰ ‪ γ ‬واﻟﻘﺴﻢ ]ﻓﺎﻟﻘﺴﻢ | ‪ om. ζ‬ﻣﻦ ‪ om. et add. in mg. Ṣ ‬ﳝﺘﻨﻊ ‪… ‬اﻟﴩﻛﺔ | ‪AEd.‬‬ ‫‪ om.‬ﻣــﻌﲎ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. To‬اﻟﻘﺴــﻢ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ²‬ﰲ ‪ i.l. To‬ﻣــﻦ ‪ scr. A‬ﰲ ‪ del. et‬ﻣــﻦ ‪ νDiDaToG‬ﰲ ]ﻣــﻦ | ‪ C‬ﻓ ٔﻧﺖ‬ ‫‪ add. s.l. Nk add. in mg. C‬ﳝﻨﻊ ‪ DiMiŠYG‬ﳝﻨﻊ ]ﲤﺘﻨﻊ ‪τNkYiG add. s.l. Br ‬‬

‫‪٢٧‬ق‬

Chapter I.5  55

signification occurs. In sum, if [the expression] signifies, it signifies not as far as it is a part of the simple expression, but rather if it is an expression subsisting in itself; as to when it is [merely] a part, it does not signify any meaning at all.

[. Universal and particular simple expression] [.. Classification of the simple expression into universal and particular] The expression is either simple or compound, and it has been already learned that the inquiry into the simple precedes the inquiry into the compound6. Furthermore, the single meaning that the simple expression signifies is either [(a)] in such a way that it is not impossible in the mind, by virtue of its conception, that many [items] share it equally, by virtue of the fact that it is said of each one of them that it is so to the same degree, like ‘man’, for it has a meaning in itself, and that meaning corresponds to Zayd, ʿAmr and Ḫālid in the same way, since each one of them is a man. And every expression [like] the expression ‘sphere containing [a solid] formed by twenty triangular faces’, or the expression ‘Sun’, and ‘Moon’, and so forth signifies a meaning whose conception in the mind does not prevent many from sharing it. [This is so] even if no instance [of such sharing] can be actually found, like the sphere just mentioned, or such sharing can be prevented by a cause extrinsic to the concept of the expression itself, like the Sun; or [(b)] its meaning is in such a way that it is impossible in the mind that sharing occurs in it, I mean in the single [mean- Q27 ing] acquired that is intended, like ‘Zayd’, for, even if many can share the expression ‘Zayd’, they only share it on account of the audible [expression]; as to its single meaning, it is impossible to consider [this] single [meaning] as shared [by many items]. In fact, one among its [several] meanings is a certain ostensible [individual], and this certain ostensible [individual] cannot be ascribed in the mind to anything else, at least unless by ‘Zayd’ one does not mean the individual itself, but one of his shared attributes. In this case, even if it is not impossible that [something else] share in the audible [expression], it may well be impossible that [something else] share the single meaning of that by means of which it is signified. The first class is called ‘universal’, whereas the second is called ‘particular’.

[.. Universal expression and universal meaning] You know that, among expressions, there is what is as of the first class, as well as among meanings there is what is as of the meaning of the first class, namely the

 In Madḫal I., §.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﳋﺎﻣﺲ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ﻣ ﺸ ﳇﺔ‪ .‬وﻻ ﻠﯿﻚ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ٔﻧﺖ ﻣ ﻄﻘﻲ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﯿﻒ ﻜﻮن ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟ ﺴﺒﺔ وﻫﻞ ﻟﻬﺬا اﳌﻌﲎ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻫﻮ‬ ‫وا ﺪ ﻣﺸﱰك ﻓ ﻪ وﺟﻮد ﰲ ذوات ا ٔﻣﻮر اﻟﱵ ﺟﻌﻠﺖ ﻟﻬﺎ ﴍﻛﺔ ﻓ ﻪ و ﶺ وﺟــﻮد ﻣــﻔﺎرق ﺎرج ــﲑ‬ ‫ا ي ﰲ ذﻫﻨﻚ ٔو ﯿﻒ ﺣﺼﻮ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ‪ .‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ ﻫﺬﻩ ﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ ٔﺧﺮى ٔو ﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺘﲔ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (‬ﻓﻘﺪ َ‬ ‫ﻠﻤﺖ ٔ ّن اﻠﻔﻆ ٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻣﻔﺮدا وٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻣﺆﻟّﻔﺎ و ٔ ّن اﳌﻔﺮد ٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﳇّ ّﯿﺎ وٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن‬ ‫ﻜﻮن ﺟﺰﺋ ّﯿﺎ‪ .‬وﻗﺪ َ‬ ‫ﻠﻤﺖ ٔ ّ ٔوﺟ ﻨﺎ ﺗ ٔ ﲑ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ اﳌﺮﻛّﺐ‪.‬‬ ‫وا ﲅ ٔﯾﻀﺎ ٔ ّ ﻻ ﺸﺘﻐﻞ ﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﰲ ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ اﳉﺰﺋﯿﺔ وﻣــﻌﺎ ﳱﺎ‪ ،‬ﻓﺎٕﳖّ ﺎ ــﲑ ﻣ ﻨﺎﻫﯿــﺔ ﻓ ــﺤﴫ وﻻ ﻟــﻮ ﰷﻧﺖ‬ ‫ﻣ ﻨﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﰷن ﻠﻤﻨﺎ ﲠﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﺟﺰﺋﯿﺔ ﯾﻔ ﺪ ﻛﲈﻻ ﺣﳬﯿﺎ ٔو ﯾﺒﻠﻐﻨﺎ ﺎﯾﺔ ﺣﳬﯿﺔ‪ ،‬ﻛــﲈ ﺗﻌــﲅ ﻫــﺬا ﰲ‬ ‫ﻣﻮﺿﻊ اﻟﻌﲅ ﺑﻪ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ا ي ﳞ ّﻤﻨﺎ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﻓ ﻪ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ اﻠﻔﻆ ا ﳫّﻲ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬و ٔﻧﺖ ﺗﻌﲅ ٔ ّن اﻠﻔﻆ ا ﳫّﻲ ٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﯾﺼﲑ ﳇّﯿﺎ ﺑ ٔ ّن ﺴﺒﺔ ﻣﺎ — ٕا ّﻣﺎ ﻟﻮﺟﻮد وٕا ّﻣﺎ ﺑﺼ ّ ﺔ ّ‬ ‫اﻟﺘﻮﱒ —‬ ‫إﱃ ﺟﺰﺋﯿﺎت ﳛﻤﻞ ﻠﳱﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬واﶵﻞ ــﲆ و ــﲔ‪ :‬ﲪﻞ ﻣـﻮاﻃ ٔة‪ ،‬ﻛﻘــﻮ زﯾــﺪ ٕا ﺴﺎن ﻓﺎ ّٕن ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ﶊــﻮل ــﲆ زﯾــﺪ ﳊﻘ ﻘــﺔ‬ ‫واﳌﻮاﻃ ٔة‪ ،‬وﲪﻞ اﺷﺘﻘﺎق‪ ،‬ﺎل اﻟﺒﯿﺎض ﻟﻘ ﺎس إﱃ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﯾﻘﺎل ا ّٕن ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ٔﺑﯿﺾ ٔو ذو ﺑﯿﺎض‬

‫‪] A‬واﳌﻮاﻃ ٔة ‪… ‬ﲪﻞ ‪‬‬ ‫]اﳌﻮﺿﻮع ‪… ‬وﲪﻞ ‪., Cat., a–; Top., a–; ibid., b–a. ‬‬ ‫‪A‬‬ ‫‪., Cat., a–; ibid., a–.‬‬ ‫]ﻟﻬﺬا | ‪ٔ No‬و ﻫﻞ ]وﻫﻞ | ‪ٔ praem. in mg. G‬ن ﺗﻌﲅ ‪ٔ praem. Mi‬ن ﺗﻌﲅ ] ٔﻧ ّﻪ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ in mg. To‬ﻟﻬﺬا ‪et‬‬ ‫‪ om. et‬ﻫﻮ | ‪MiŠ‬‬ ‫‪ γBrEd. om.‬و ﺎرج ] ﺎرج | ‪ C‬ﰲ اﶺ ]و ﶺ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ‬ﻓﳱﺎ ‪ praem. To‬ﲑ ]‪‬ﻓ ﻪ | ‪] s.l. As‬ﻓ ﻪ ‪add. in mg. As ‬‬ ‫‪ T‬اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ ]ﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ | ‪ νEG‬ﻟ ﻫﻦ ]ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ | ‪ Ka‬وﯿﻒ ] ٔو ﯿﻒ ‪ Da ‬و ﲑ ‪ in mg. To‬ــﲑ ‪ ξBrAAsToMi‬ﻋــﻦ ] ــﲑ | ‪Da‬‬ ‫ٔﯾﻀﺎ | ‪ ζιτDa‬ﻓﺎ ﲅ ]وا ﲅ ‪ٔ add. JT ‬ﯾﻀﺎ ]اﳌﺮﻛّﺐ ‪ٔ  om. To ‬ن | ‪ّٔ om. N‬ن اﻠﻔﻆ ‪ γνBrDaTo ‬ﺻﻨﺎﻋﺘﲔ ]ﻟﺼﻨﺎﻋﺘﲔ‬ ‫‪ om. et add. in‬وﻻ ]وﻻ ﻟﻮ | ‪ ToŠ‬ﻓ ﺨﴫﻩ ]ﻓ ﺤﴫ | ‪ om. et add. i.l. Di‬و ]وﻣﻌﺎ ﳱﺎ | ‪ To‬اﳕﺎ ] ٔ ّ | ‪om. JTṢ add. in mg. Ṣ‬‬ ‫‪ ζ‬وﯾﺒﻠﻐﻨﺎ ] ٔو ﯾﺒﻠﻐﻨﺎ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. N‬ﻛﲈﻻ | ‪ praem. Di‬ﻻ ‪ BrANo‬ﯾﻔ ﺪ ]ﯾﻔ ﺪ | ‪ om. Yi‬ﺣ ﺚ ‪ TYNo ‬وﻟﻮﻻ ‪mg. Di‬‬ ‫ﲞﻂ ‪ et‬ﰲ ﻣ ‪ add. in mg. C‬ﲞﻂ اﳌﺼﻨﻒ ﰲ ﻣ ‪ add. s.l. Nk‬ﰲ ﻣ ﲞﻂ اﳌﺼﻨﻒ ]ﻓ ﻪ | ‪ νE‬ﳞﻤﻚ ]ﳞ ّﻤﻨﺎ ‪ om. E ‬ﺣﳬﯿﺔ‬ ‫‪ om. et add. in mg. Ṣ‬ﻣﻮاﻃ ٔة ‪ νEDa ‬ﻠﯿﻪ ] ﻠﳱﺎ ‪ Yi ‬ﺑﺼﯿﻌﺔ ]ﺑﺼ ّ ﺔ ‪ om. J ‬ﻫﻮ | ‪ Ed.‬ﰲ ﻣ ‪ add. s.l. B‬اﳌﺼﻨﻒ‬ ‫‪ in mg. NkB s.l. C‬ﻟﻘ ﺎس ‪ γBr s.l. Ṣ²‬ﻟ ﺴﺒﺔ ‪ om. et add. in mg. To‬ﻟﻘ ﺎس ‪ ζτ ‬ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ ]ﻛﻘﻮ‬ ‫‪] MSS NkBC attest in this point a variant fī miṯlihi, allegedly by the author (bi-ḫaṭṭ al-muṣannif).‬ﻓ ﻪ ‪‬‬ ‫‪A few lines below, the manuscript tradition diverges with regard to the position of the clause fī‬‬ ‫‪miṯlihi; one may wonder whether the confusion is due to the presence of a scarcely intelligible‬‬ ‫‪marginal correction in the archetype. As to the note referring to an authorial variant, it is not an‬‬ ‫‪isolated case: MSS NkB preserve at least another note claiming that a certain passage was different in‬‬ ‫‪the author’s manuscript (fī nusḫat al-muṣannif) in correspondence of Ǧadal I., p. .–.‬‬

‫‪٢٨‬ق‬

Chapter I.5  57

meaning for whose concept in the soul a relation of conformity with many things to which it corresponds is not impossible. But you are not obliged, insofar as you are a logician, [to know] how this relation is; nor if this meaning, insofar as it is one and shared, has an existence in the things themselves to which a share in this meaning is ascribed, and, in general, a separated and external existence which is different from that which is in your mind; nor how it obtains in the mind. In fact, the inquiry into these things belongs to another discipline, or to two7.

[. Exclusion of particular expressions] You have already learned that the expression can either be simple or composite, and that the simple can either be universal or particular. You have also learned that we deemed it necessary to postpone the inquiry into the compound8. You should further know that we are not concerned with the inquiry into the particular expressions and their meanings, since they are not finite in a way that they can be circumscribed, and, even if they were finite, our knowledge of them, insofar as they are particular, would not provide us with perfect knowledge, nor Q28 would it allow us to reach wisdom’s final end, as you will know in the place devoted to the knowledge of it9, but that the inquiry that concerns us is knowledge of the universal expression.

[. The universal expression] [.. The universal expression and its subjects of predication] You know that the universal expression is universal only because it has a certain relation — either in the existence or by virtue of a valid estimation — with the particulars of which it is predicated.

[.. Distinction between synonymous and paronymous predication] Predication is under two respects: [it is either] a synonymous predication, like ‘Zayd is a man’, for man is predicated of Zayd by [his] essence and synonymously, or

 Scil. Metaphysics and psychology.  Cf. Madḫal I., §.  Cf. Avicenna’s refusal to deal with accidental beings, which are infinite, in Ilāhiyyāt II., and his considerations on the knowledge of universal and particular things by the part of the Necessary Existent in Ilāhiyyāt VIII..

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﳋﺎﻣﺲ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫وﻻ ﯾﻘﺎل ٕاﻧ ّﻪ ﺑﯿﺎض‪ .‬وٕان اﺗ ّﻔﻖ ٔن ﻗ ﻞ ﺟﺴﻢ ٔﺑﯿﺾ وﻟﻮن ٔﺑﯿﺾ ﻓﻼ ﳛﻤﻞ ﺪّ اﶈﻤﻮل ﲆ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع‪ .‬وٕاﻧ ّﲈ‬ ‫ﻏﺮﺿﻨﺎ ﻫﺎﻫﻨﺎ ﳑّﺎ ﳛﻤﻞ ﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ﰷن ﲆ ﺳ ﻞ اﳌﻮاﻃ ٔة‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬ﻓﻠﻨﺬ ﺮ ٔﻗﺴﺎم ا ﳫّﻲ ا ي ٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﯾ ﺴﺐ إﱃ ﺟﺰﺋﯿﺎت ﻣﻮاﻃ ٔة ﻠﳱﺎ وﯾﻌﻄﳱﺎ ﰟ واﳊﺪّ ‪ .‬ﻟﻜ ّــﻪ ﻗــﺪ‬ ‫ﺗﻀﻄﺮ إﺻﺎﺑ ﺎ ﻟﺒﻌﺾ ا ٔﻏﺮاض ٔن ﻻ ﺴ اﳌﻌﺘﺎد ﻣﻦ اﻟﻄﺮق ﰲ ﻗﺴﻤﺔ ﻫﺬﻩ ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ ﰲ ٔ ّول ا ٔﻣﺮ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺑﻞ ﻧﻌﻮد إﻟﯿﻪ ﻧﯿﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬ﻓ ﻘﻮل ا ّٕن ﲁّ ﳾء ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﻫﻮ ﲠﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ وﱔ ﺣﻘ ﻘ ﻪ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﱔ ذاﺗﻪ‪ .‬وذات ّ‬ ‫ﰻ ﳾء وا ﺪ رﺑّﲈ‬ ‫ﰷن ﻣﻌﲎ وا ﺪا ﻣﻄﻠﻘﺎ ﻟ ﺲ ﯾﺼﲑ ﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﲟﻌﺎن ﻛﺜﲑة إذا اﻟﺘ ٔﻣﺖ ﳛﺼﻞ ﻣﳯﺎ ذات ﻠﴚء وا ــﺪة‪،‬‬ ‫وﻗﻠّﲈ ﲡﺪ ﻟﻬﺬا ﻣﻦ اﻟﻈﺎﻫﺮات ﻣ ﺎﻻ‪ ،‬ﻓ ﺠﺐ ٔن َُﺴ ّﲅ وﺟﻮدﻩ‪ .‬ورﺑّﲈ ﰷن وا ــﺪا ﻟ ــﺲ ﲟﻄﻠــﻖ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﺗــﻠﺘﱦ‬ ‫ﺣﻘ ﻘﺔ وﺟﻮدﻩ ﻣﻦ ٔﻣﻮر وﻣﻌﺎن إذا اﻟﺘ ٔﻣﺖ ﺣﺼﻞ ﻣﳯﺎ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ اﻟﴚء‪ .‬ﻣ ﺎل ذ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن‪ ،‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﳛﺘﺎج ٔن‬ ‫ﻜﻮن ﺟﻮﻫﺮا وﻜﻮن اﻣ ﺪاد ﰲ ٔﺑﻌﺎد ﺗﻔﺮض ﻓ ﻪ ﻃﻮﻻ وﻋﺮﺿﺎ وﲻﻘﺎ‪ ،‬و ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻣﻊ ذ ذا ﻧﻔــﺲ‪،‬‬ ‫و ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﻧﻔﺴﺎ ﯾﻐﺘــﺬي ﲠﺎ وﳛـ ّـﺲ وﯾﺘﺤـ ّـﺮك ٕﻻرادة؛ وﻣــﻊ ذ ﻜــﻮن ﲝــﯿﺚ ﯾﺼﻠــﺢ ٔن ﯾﺘﻔﻬّــﻢ‬ ‫اﳌﻌﻘﻮﻻت و ّ‬ ‫ﯾﺘﻌﲅ ﺻﻨﺎ ﺎت وﯾﻌﻠّﻤﻬﺎ‪ ،‬إن ﱂ ﻜﻦ ﺎﺋﻖ ﻣﻦ ﺎرج ﻻ ﻣــﻦ ﲨـ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿــﺔ‪ .‬ﻓﺎٕذا اﻟــﺘ ٔم ﲨﯿــﻊ‬ ‫ﻫﺬا‪ ،‬ﺣﺼﻞ ﻣﻦ ﲨﻠﳤﺎ ذات وا ﺪة ﱔ ذات ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن‪.‬‬ ‫ـﺤﺼﻞ ﲠﺎ وا ــﺪ وا ــﺪ ﻣــﻦ ا ٔﺷـ ﺎص ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿــﺔ و ﳣـ ّـﲒ ﲠﺎ‬ ‫)‪ّ (.‬ﰒ ﲣﺎﻟﻄﻪ ﻣﻌﺎن و ٔﺳﺒﺎب ٔﺧﺮى ﯾﺘـ ّ‬ ‫ﴯﺺ ﻋﻦ ﴯﺺ — ﻣ ﻞ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻫﺬا ﻗﺼﲑا وذاك ﻃﻮﯾﻼ‪ ،‬وﻫﺬا ٔﺑﯿﺾ وذاك ٔﺳﻮد — وﻻ ﻜﻮن‬ ‫‪ ] Here starts a lacuna in MS A, which affects the rest of chap. I., chapters I.– entirely and‬ﻧــﯿﺎ ‪‬‬ ‫‪part of chap. I. (I., p. .–I., p. . Cairo ed.).‬‬

‫‪] Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt V.,‬ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ‪… ‬ورﺑ ّــﲈ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪] Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt V., pp. .–..‬وﺟ ــﻮدﻩ‬

‫‪… ‬وذات ‪‬‬ ‫‪p. .–.‬‬

‫‪ add. in mg.‬ﰲ ﻣ ]ﳛﻤﻞ | ‪ om. ζA‬وﻟﻮن ٔﺑﯿﺾ | ‪ As‬إن ﺟﺴﻢ ]ﺟﺴﻢ | ‪ No‬ﻗ ﻠﺖ ]ﻗ ﻞ | ‪ rel. As‬إﻧﻪ ‪ٕ vacuum post‬اﻧ ّﻪ ‪‬‬ ‫ﺪ اﶈﻤﻮل ﰲ ]اﳌﻮﺿﻮع | ‪ add. ιξA‬ﰲ ﻣ ]اﶈﻤﻮل | ‪ s.l. Ṣ‬ﺪ ‪ in mg. To‬ﲪﻞ ‪ EDaṢEd.‬ﲪﻞ ] ﺪّ | ‪ add. ζτKa‬ﰲ ﻣ ‪NkY‬‬ ‫‪ om. et‬ﳛﻤﻞ | ‪ in mg. E‬ﳑﺎ ‪ λ‬ﲟﺎ ]ﳑّﺎ | ‪ s.l. EṢ²‬ﻏﺮﺿﻨﺎ ‪ EṢY‬ﯨﻌﲎ ‪ A‬ﺗﻌﲏ ]ﻏﺮﺿﻨﺎ ‪ Br ‬إﳕﺎ ]وٕاﻧ ّﲈ | ‪ add. Da‬ﻣ ﲆ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع‬ ‫‪ٕ om. et add.‬اﻧ ّﲈ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. G‬ﻣﻮاﻃ ٔة…ﻓﻠﻨﺬ ﺮ ‪ iter. Nk  34‬ﻣﺎ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. Y‬ﻫﻮ | ‪add. in mg. Ka‬‬ ‫‪ JTMiŠG‬اﻟﻄﺮﯾﻖ ]اﻟﻄﺮق | ‪ Yi‬ﰲ ]ﻣﻦ | ‪ Br‬إﱃ ٔن ] ٔن | ‪ٕ T‬ﺻﺎﺑ ﺎ ]إﺻﺎﺑ ﺎ ‪ κ ‬ﻠﯿﻪ ] ﻠﳱﺎ | ‪ praem. Mi‬ﺴﺒﺔ ]ﻣﻮاﻃ ٔة | ‪s.l. E‬‬ ‫‪ in mg.‬ﻓﺮﲟﺎ ‪ ξτY‬ورﲟﺎ ]رﺑّﲈ | ‪ Br‬وا ﺪ ]‪‬ﳾء | ‪ om. N‬ﱔ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. κ‬ﻫﻮ ‪… ‬وﱔ ‪ om. Yi ‬ﻧﯿﺎ ‪ … ‬ﰲ‬ ‫ﻟﴚء ‪ As‬ﴚء ‪ JETG‬اﻟﴚء ] ﻠﴚء | ‪ To‬ﳌﻌﺎن ]ﲟﻌﺎن | ‪ om. et add. in mg. To‬ﯾﺼﲑ | ‪ om. ν exp. Ṣ²‬ﻣﻌﲎ ‪As s.l. Ṣ ‬‬ ‫ﻣ ﻼ ]ﻣ ﺎﻻ | ‪ s.l. Ka‬ﰲ ‪ η‬ﰲ ]ﻣﻦ | ‪ in mg. BC s.l. Nk‬ﻟﻬﺬا ‪ ζηιN‬ﻟﻬﺎ ]ﻟﻬﺬا | ‪ in mg. Te‬وﻗ ﻞ ﻣﺎ ]وﻗﻠّﲈ ‪ As ‬وا ﺪ ]وا ﺪة | ‪Te‬‬ ‫‪ Ṣ‬ذات اﻟﴚء ]اﻟﴚء | ‪ J‬وٕاذا ]إذا ‪ Ka ‬وﻟ ﺲ ]ﻟ ﺲ | ‪ Yi‬وا ــﺪ ]وا ــﺪا | ‪ G‬ﯾ ﺴــﲅ ] َُﺴـ ّـﲅ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ²‬ﻣ ــﻼ ‪ in mg. C‬ﻣـ ﺎﻻ ‪et‬‬ ‫‪ om. Da‬ذا | ‪ ] add. Da‬ﻜﻮن | ‪ p.c. Y‬ﻓ ﻜﻮن ‪ add. in mg. Nk‬و ٔن ‪ ι‬و ٔن ﻜﻮن ]وﻜﻮن | ‪  om. No‬ﻜﻮن…ﺟﻮﻫﺮا ‪‬‬ ‫‪ G‬ﻣﻊ ٕﻻرادة ‪ ζνπEDiDa‬ﻣﻊ ا ٕﻻرادة ] ٕﻻرادة | ‪ Ka‬ﻧﻔﺲ ‪ om. et add. in mg. Nk‬ﻧﻔﺴﺎ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. Ṣ‬ﻧﻔﺴﺎ…و ٔن ‪‬‬ ‫ﯾﺘﻌﲅ | ‪ ξBrEDiDaG mg. Y‬وﯾﻌﲅ ‪ in mg. BC‬ﯾﻌﲅ ]و ّ‬ ‫‪ om. ν‬ﺎﺋﻖ… و ّ‬ ‫ﯾﺘﻌﲅ ‪ s.l. Nk in mg. C ‬ﯾﻔﻬﻢ ‪ To‬ﯾﻔﻬﻢ ]ﯾﺘﻔﻬّﻢ | ‪om. N‬‬ ‫ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ ﻓﺎٕذا | ‪ a.c. N‬ﻻ ]ﱂ | ‪ٔ Te‬و ﯾﻌﻤﻠﻬﺎ ‪ ETAsDiToGN in mg. JṢ²Y‬وﯾﻌﻤﻠﻬﺎ ]وﯾﻌﻠّﻤﻬﺎ | ‪ ξ‬اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺎت ]ﺻﻨﺎ ﺎت | ‪add. in mg. Y‬‬ ‫‪ in mg. C‬و ‪ s.l. Nk‬و ]و ّ‬ ‫ﳣﲒ | ‪ No‬وا ﺪة ]‪‬وا ﺪ | ‪ٔ om. As‬ﺧﺮى ‪ om. Yi ‬ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ ‪… ‬ﻓﺎٕذا | ‪om. et add. in mg. Nk‬‬ ‫‪ No‬وذ ]‪‬وذاك | ‪ om. Mi‬ﻣ ﻞ | ‪ νEŠG‬ﻣﻦ ﴯــﺺ ‪ add. s.l. To‬ﻣــﻦ ﴯــﺺ ‪ om. et‬ﻋــﻦ ﴯــﺺ ‪ E ‬ﻓ ﳣــﲒ ‪ KaJTTe‬ﳣــﲒ‬ ‫‪ G‬وذ ]‪‬وذاك‬

‫‪٢٩‬ق‬

Chapter I.5  59

a paronymous predication, like the state of whiteness with respect to man, for it is said ‘the man is white’ or ‘[the man is] endowed with whiteness’, but it cannot be said ‘man is whiteness’. Should it be said ‘a body is white’ and ‘a colour is white’, the definition of the predicate would not be predicated of the subject. Our purpose here for what is predicated is only that which is [predicated] synonymously.

[.. Scientific inquiry deals with synonymously predicated universals] Let us recall the sections of the universal that is only synonymously related to particulars, and that provides them with [its] name and definition. Sometimes, however, achieving some of [our] goals compels us not to walk along the traditional path when dividing these expressions at the outset; but we will come back to it subsequently10.

[. The quiddity and the essential quality] [.. Two kinds of quiddities: (i) a quiddity resulting from a single meaning and (ii) a quiddity resulting from the combination of several meanings] We will thus say that each thing has a quiddity by virtue of which it is what it is, namely its essential truth, that is, its essence. The essence of each single thing is sometimes [(i)] a single, absolute meaning that is not what it is by virtue of several meanings from which, once they are gathered, a single essence is realized for the thing, but an example of this is rarely found among things we perceive; its existence must be conceded [for the moment]11. Sometimes [(ii)] [the essence of each single thing] is a single [meaning] not absolutely, and the reality of its existence is rather Q29 the result of the combination of [several] things and meanings from which, once they are gathered, the quiddity of the thing is realized. An instance of this is man, for he needs to be a substance and to have extension in dimensions that are supposed for him in length, breadth and depth, and, in addition to this, to have a soul, which needs to be a soul by means of which he is nourished, has perception and can move voluntarily; besides this, he needs to be such that he is able gradually to apprehend the intelligibles, to study and to teach disciplines (unless there is an external impediment that does not belong to the complex of humanity). So, when this whole [complex of meanings] is gathered, a single essence, which is the essence of man, is realized from their complex12.  Namely in Madḫal I..  It is the quiddity of immaterial things.  It is the quiddity of material things.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﳋﺎﻣﺲ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ﳾء ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ ﲝﯿﺚ‪ ،‬ﻟﻮ ﱂ ﻜﻦ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا ات اﻟﺸﺨﺺ وﰷن ﺑﺪ ﲑﻩ‪ ،‬ﻟﺰم ﻣ ﻪ ٔن ﯾﻔﺴﺪ ٔ ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ‬ ‫ﻫﺬﻩ ٔﻣﻮر ﺗ ﻊ وﺗﻠﺰم‪ .‬وٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﻜﻮن ﺣﻘ ﻘﺔ وﺟﻮدﻩ ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓ ﻜﻮن ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ ّ‬ ‫ﻟﻜﻦ‬ ‫ﰻ ﴯﺺ ﱔ ٕ ﺴﺎﻧ ﻪ‪ّ ،‬‬ ‫ﺗﺘﺤﺼﻞ ﻣﻦ ﯿﻔ ﺔ وﳈّﯿﺔ و ﲑ ذ ‪.‬‬ ‫ٔﯾ ّ ّ ﻪ اﻟﺸﺨﺼﯿﺔ ّ‬ ‫)‪ (.‬وﻗﺪ ﻜﻮن ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﻣﻦ ا ٔوﺻﺎف ٔوﺻﺎف ٔﺧﺮى ﲑ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ ﺸﱰك ﻓﳱﺎ اﻟﻨﺎس ﻣﻊ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫ﺑﻞ ﻜﻮن ﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ ٔوﺻﺎﻓﺎ ﻟ ٕﻼ ﺴﺎن اﻟﻌﺎ ّم‪ ،‬ﻜﻮﻧﻪ ﻃﻘﺎ ٔي ذا ﻧﻔﺲ ﻃﻘﺔ وﻣـ ﻞ ﻮﻧــﻪ ﺿــﺎﺣﲀ ﻟﻄﺒــﻊ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻟﻜﻦ ﻮﻧﻪ ﻃﻘﺎ ٔﻣﺮ ﻫﻮ ٔ ﺪ ا ٔﻣﻮر اﻟﱵ‪ ،‬ﳌّﺎ اﻟﺘ ٔﻣﺖ‪ ،‬اﺟﳣﻊ ﻣﻦ ﲨﻠﳤﺎ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن‪ ،‬و ﻮﻧﻪ ﺿﺎﺣﲀ ﻟﻄﺒﻊ ﻫﻮ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ٔﻣﺮ‪ ،‬ﳌّﺎ اﻟﺘ ٔﻣﺖ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ ﲟﺎ اﻟﺘ ٔﻣﺖ ﻣ ﻪ‪ ،‬ﱂ ﻜﻦ ﺑــﺪّ ﻣــﻦ ﻋﺮوﺿــﻪ ﻻزﻣﺎ؛ ﻓﺎ ّٕن اﻟﴚء‪ ،‬إذا ﺻــﺎر ٕا ﺴﺎ‬ ‫ﲟﻘﺎرﻧﺔ اﻟﻨﻔﺲ اﻟﻨﺎﻃﻘﺔ ﳌﺎدّﺗﻪ‪ٔ ،‬ﻋﺮض ﻠﺘﻌ ّﺠﺐ اﳌﻮﺟﺐ ﰲ ﻣﺎدّﺗﻪ ﻫﯿﺌﺔ اﻟﻀ ﻚ‪ ،‬ﻛﲈ ٔﻋﺮض ٔﻣﻮر ٔﺧﺮى‬ ‫ﻣﻦ اﳋ ﻞ واﻟﺒﲀء واﳊﺴﺪ و ﺳﺘﻌﺪاد ﻠﻜ ﺎﺑﺔ وﻗ ﻮل اﻟﻌﲅ ﻟ ﺲ وا ﺪ ﻣﳯﺎ‪ ،‬ﳌّﺎ ﺣﺼﻞ‪ٔ ،‬ﻋﺮض اﻟﴚء‬ ‫ﳊﺼﻮل اﻟﻨﻔﺲ اﻟﻨﺎﻃﻘﺔ ‪ .‬ﻓ ﻜﻮن ﺣﺼﻮل اﻟﻨﻔﺲ اﻟﻨﺎﻃﻘــﺔ إذن ﺳــﺎﺑﻘﺎ ﻟــﻬﺎ وﯾـ ّﱲ ﺑــﻪ ﺣﺼــﻮل ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿــﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫وﻜﻮن ﻫﺬﻩ ﻟﻮازم ﺑﻌﺪﻫﺎ إذا اﺳﺘ ﺘﺖ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ‪ ،‬ﱂ ﻜﻦ ﺑﺪّ ﻣﳯﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬ﻓﻘﺪ ﻻح ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬا ٔ ّن ﻫﺎﻫﻨﺎ ذا ﺣﻘ ﻘ ﺔ ﻠﴚء و ٔن ٔوﺻﺎﻓﺎ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﺗــﻠﺘﱦ ﻣ ــﻪ وﻣــﻦ ــﲑﻩ‬ ‫ﺣﻘ ﻘﺔ اﻟﴚء وﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﻋﻮارض ﻻ ﺗﻠﺰم ذاﺗﻪ ﻟﺰوﻣﺎ ﰲ وﺟﻮدﻩ وﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﻋﻮارض ﻻزﻣﺔ ﰲ وﺟﻮدﻩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﳁﺎ ﰷن ﻣﻦ ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ ا ﳫّﯿﺔ ﯾﺪ ّل ﲆ ﺣﻘ ﻘﺔ ذات ﳾء ٔو ٔﺷﯿﺎء ﻓﺬ ﻫــﻮ ا ا ّل ــﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿــﺔ‪ ،‬وﻣﺎ ﱂ‬ ‫ﻜﻦ ﻛﺬ ﻓﻼ ﻜﻮن ّ‬ ‫داﻻ ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ‪ .‬ﻓﺎٕن د ّل ﲆ ا ٔﻣﻮر اﻟﱵ ﻻ ﺑﺪّ ﻣﻦ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻣ ﻘﺪّ ﻣﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد‬ ‫ﲆ ذات اﻟﴚء ﺣﱴ ﻜﻮن ﻟﺘﺌﺎ ﺎ ﳛﺼﻞ ذات اﻟﴚء وﻻ ﻜﻮن اﻟﻮا ﺪ ﻣﳯﺎ و ﺪﻩ ذات اﻟﴚء وﻻ‬ ‫اﻠﻔﻆ ا ا ّل ﻠﯿﻪ ﯾﺪ ّل ﲆ ﺣﻘ ﻘﺔ ذات اﻟﴚء ﻜﲈﻟﻬﺎ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﲆ ﺟﺰء ﻣ ﻪ؛ ﻓﺬ ﯾ ﻐﻲ ٔن ﯾﻘﺎل اﻠﻔﻆ‬

‫]و ﻮﻧــﻪ… ﲨــﻠﳤﺎ ‪ ] Material damage in MS Ṣ. ‬ﳊﻘ ﻘــﺔ…ﺑﻞ ‪ٔ ] Material damage in MS Ṣ. ‬ﯾ ّ ّ ــﻪ ‪… ‬ﱔ ‪‬‬ ‫‪] Material damage‬ﻓ ﻜﻮن…ﳊﺼﻮل ‪] Material damage in MS Ṣ. ‬ﰲ… ‪ٔ ‬ﻋﺮض ‪Material damage in MS Ṣ. ‬‬ ‫‪] Material damage in MS Ṣ.‬ﻫﺬا…ﻓﻘﺪ ‪in MS Ṣ. ‬‬ ‫ﻫﻮ ]ﱔ | ‪ Da‬ﻓﻜﻮن ]ﻓ ﻜﻮن | ‪ add. Ṣ‬ﻓﻘﻂ ‪ BrAsDa‬ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ ] ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ | ‪ N‬ﺗ ﻌﻬﺎ ]ﺗ ﻊ ‪ add. a.c. Ṣ ‬ذات اﻟﺸﺨﺺ ] ٔ ‪‬‬ ‫ٔﯾﻀﺎ ‪ add. et exp. Yi ‬ﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ او ﻣﻌﺎ ]ذ | ‪ N‬ﳈﯿﺔ وﯿﻔ ﺔ ] ﯿﻔ ﺔ وﳈّﯿﺔ | ‪ νAs‬اﻧ ﻪ ‪ Ed.‬إﻧ ﻪ ] ٔﯾ ّ ّ ﻪ ‪ٕ Br ‬ا ﺴﺎﻧ ﻪ ] ٕ ﺴﺎﻧ ﻪ | ‪Di‬‬ ‫‪ add.‬ﻧﻄﻖ ]ذا | ‪ in mg. Ṣ‬ﻣ ﻞ ‪ et‬ﻮﻧﻪ ‪ γBrEd.‬ﻣ ﻞ ﻮﻧﻪ ‪ As‬ﻟﻜﻮﻧﻪ ‪ in mg. NkB‬ﻜﻮﻧﻪ ] ﻜﻮﻧﻪ ‪ٔ N | om. DaNo ‬ﯾﻀﺎ ]‬ ‫‪ E‬ﲟﻔﺎرﻗﺔ ]ﲟﻘﺎرﻧﺔ ‪ iter. J ‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن | ‪ om. et add. in mg. Y‬اﻟﺘ ٔﻣﺖ…ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ ‪ om. Yi ‬ﻫﻮ | ‪ om. As‬ﻟﻄﺒﻊ ‪a.c. No ‬‬ ‫وﻟ ﺲ ]ﻟ ﺲ | ‪ As‬وا ﰷء ]واﻟﺒﲀء ‪ٔ om. et add. in mg. B ‬ﺧﺮى | ‪ Br a.c. Ṣ‬ﻋﺮض ‪ G‬ا ﱰض ]‪ٔ ‬ﻋﺮض | ‪ As‬ا ﱰض ]‪ٔ ‬ﻋﺮض‬ ‫| ‪ As‬ﺤﺼ ــﻮل ]ﳊﺼ ــﻮل ‪ τ ‬ﻋ ــﺮض ‪ As‬وا ــﱰض ] ٔﻋ ــﺮض | ‪ As‬وا ــﺪا ]وا ــﺪ | ‪μBr‬‬ ‫إذا ]إذن | ‪om. ξKaJTAs‬‬ ‫ذات ]ﺣﻘ ﻘﺔ ‪ As ‬ﺣﻘ ﻘﺔ ]ﺣﻘ ﻘ ﺔ | ‪ add. et del. To‬ﻣﳯﺎ ]ﻻح ‪ Š ‬ﰒ ]ﱂ | ‪ εξEDa‬ﺑﻌﺪﻩ ]ﺑﻌﺪﻫﺎ ‪JBCDiDaṢTeŠGN ‬‬ ‫]ﻻزﻣﺔ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. JṢ om. N‬ﻋﻮارض…ﻻ | ‪ om. ζμνLat.DaNo add. p.c. J add. s.l. Y‬ﻻ | ‪add. s.l. Ṣ‬‬ ‫‪  om. et add. in mg.‬ﲆ ‪ T ‬اﻟﴚء ‪ a.c. E‬اﻟﴚء ]ﳾء ‪ praem. ζθνπLat.NkDi praem. s.l. G | om. To ‬ﲑ‬ ‫‪ J‬ﻜﻮن ]ﯾﻘﺎل | ‪ As‬ﻜﲈ ] ﻜﲈﻟﻬﺎ ‪ om. Da ‬ﻣﻦ | ‪Te‬‬

‫‪٣٠‬ق‬

Chapter I.5  61

[.. Accidental attributes mixed with the individual’s quiddity] Then, other meanings and causes are mixed with this, by virtue of which each human individual is realized, and by virtue of which each individual is distinguished from the other — like the fact that this one is short whereas that one is tall, and that this one is white whereas that one is black — but none of these things is such that, if it did not belong to the essence of the individual and there were, instead of it, some other [feature], it would follow that [the essence of the individual] is corrupted because of this [fact]; on the contrary, these are rather things coming after and following [the establishment of the individual essence]. The reality of its existence is only by virtue of [its] humanity, so that the quiddity of each individual is by virtue of its humanity, but which individual it actually is is determined by quality, quantity and so forth.

[.. Accidental attributes of the species] The individual can also have as attributes other attributes other than humanity that people share besides humanity: they are actually attributes that belong to the common man, like his being rational, namely possessor of a rational soul, and like his being laughing by nature. But his being rational is one of the things from the complex of which, when they are gathered, man results as a combination, and the fact that he is laughing by nature is something that inescapably follows when humanity is assembled from its components. In fact, when the thing becomes a man by virtue of the association of the rational soul with its matter, it is prone to the Q30 wonder that provokes in its matter the condition for laughter, as well as being prone to other things, like shame, crying, envy, being apt to write and to acquire knowledge, none of which, when realized, is such that the thing is exposed by it to the realization of the rational soul. The realization of the rational soul, then, precedes them, and the realization of humanity is complete by virtue of it, whereas these [other things] are necessary concomitants that necessarily follow once humanity is established.

[.. Classification of the universal expressions based on their signification of the quiddity] It has become clear to you from this that there is [(a)] a real essence belonging to the thing, and that it has attributes, [(b)] from some of which and something else the reality of the thing is assembled, and that [(c)] some of them are accidents that do not necessarily follow to its essence in its existence, and some [others] are accidents that necessarily follow to it in its existence.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﳋﺎﻣﺲ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ا اﰐ اﻟﻐﲑ ا ا ّل ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ‪ .‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ﻣﺎ ﯾﺪ ّل ﲆ ﺻﻔﺔ ﱔ ﺎر ﺔ ﻋﻦ ا ٔﻣﺮﻦ — ﻻزﻣــﺔ ﰷﻧﺖ ٔو ــﲑ‬ ‫ﻻزﻣﺔ — ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﯾﻘﺎل ﻟﻔﻆ ﻋﺮﴈ وﳌﻌﻨﺎﻩ ﻣﻌﲎ ﻋﺮﴈ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ّ (.‬ﰒ ﻫﺎﻫﻨﺎ ﻣﻮﺿﻊ ﻧﻈﺮ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﻫﻞ ﳚﺐ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻣﻌﲎ اﻠﻔﻆ ا اﰐ ﻣﺸ ﳣﻼ ﲆ ﻣﻌﲎ اﻠﻔﻆ ا ا ّل‬ ‫اﳋﺎص ٔو ﻻ ﻜﻮن‪.‬‬ ‫ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ اﺷ ل اﻟﻌﺎ ّم ﲆ ّ‬ ‫ﻓﺎ ّٕن ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ ﻟﻔﻆ ذاﰐ ﯾﺪ ّل ﲆ ﻟﻔﻆ ﳌﻌﻨﺎﻩ ﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ ذات اﻟﴚء وﻣﻌﲎ ذات اﻟﴚء ﻻ ﻜﻮن ﻣ ﺴﻮ إﱃ‬ ‫ﯾﻈﻦ ٔ ّن ﻟﻔﻆ ا اﰐ ٕاﻧ ّﲈ ا ٔوﱃ ﺑﻪ ٔن‬ ‫ﳊﺮي ٔن ّ‬ ‫ذات اﻟﴚء‪ٕ :‬اﻧ ّﲈ ﯾ ﺴﺐ إﱃ اﻟﴚء ﻣﺎ ﻟ ﺲ ﻫﻮ‪ .‬ﻓﻠﻬﺬا ّ‬ ‫ﺗﻘﻮم اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﻼ ﻜﻮن اﻠﻔﻆ ا ا ّل ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ذاﺗﯿﺎ‪ ،‬ﻓﻼ ﻜﻮن ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ذاﺗﯿﺎ‬ ‫ﺸ ﳣﻞ ﲆ اﳌﻌﺎﱐ اﻟﱵ ّ‬ ‫ﻟﻜﻦ اﳊﯿﻮان واﻟﻨﺎﻃﻖ ﻜﻮ ن ذاﺗﯿﲔ ﻟ ٕﻼ ﺴﺎن‪ .‬ﻓﺎٕن ﱂ ﳚــﻌﻞ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ذاﺗــﯿﺎ ﻟـ ٕﻼ ﺴﺎن ﲟﺎ ﻫــﻮ‬ ‫ﻟ ٕﻼ ﺴﺎن‪ّ ،‬‬ ‫ٕا ﺴﺎن‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﻟﺸﺨﺺ ﴯﺺ‪ ،‬ﱂ ﳜﻞ ٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﺴ ﻪ اﺗﯿﺔ إﱃ ﺣﻘ ﻘﺔ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ اﻟﺸﺨﺺ وذ ﻫــﻮ‬ ‫ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ٔﯾﻀﺎ‪ ،‬وٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﺴ ﻪ ﲠﺎ إﱃ اﶺ اﻟﱵ ﲠﺎ ﯾ ﺸﺨّﺺ‪ ،‬ﻓ ﻜﻮن ﻟ ﺲ ﻫﻮ ﻜــﲈ ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﻫــﻮ‬ ‫ﺟﺰء ﳑّﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣ ﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻫﻮ ﲨ ‪ .‬ﲿﯿ ﺬ ﯾﻌﺮض ٔن ﻻ ﻜﻮن اﳊﯿﻮان واﻟﻨﺎﻃــﻖ وا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن وﻣﺎ ﳚــﺮي‬ ‫ﳎﺮاﻫﺎ ذاﺗﯿﺎ ﻟﺸﺨﺺ ﴯﺺ ﻓﻘﻂ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ا ٔﻣﻮر اﻟﻌﺮﺿﯿﺔ ٔﯾﻀﺎ‪ ،‬ﻣ ﻞ ﻟﻮﻧﻪ و ﻮﻧﻪ ﻗﺼﲑا و ﻮﻧﻪ اﻦ ﻓﻼن وﻣﺎ‬ ‫ﻣﻘﻮﻣﺔ ﻠﺠﻤ ‪ .‬ﲿﯿ ﺬ ﻻ ﻜﻮن ﻟ ٕﻼ ﺴﺎن ﻣﻦ ﺣـ ﺚ ﻫــﻮ‬ ‫ﳚﺮي ﻫﺬا ا ﺮى ﻗﺪ ﻜﻮن ذاﺗﯿﺔ‪ٔ ،‬ﳖّ ﺎ ٔﺟﺰاء ّ‬ ‫ذاﰐ ﻠﺸﺨﺺ ا ّٕﻻ ﻣﺎ ﻟﻬﺬﻩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻟﻜﻦ ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ ذاﰐ‬ ‫)‪ (.‬ﻓﻬﺬﻩ ا ٔﻓﲀر ﺗﺪﻋﻮ إﱃ ٔن ﻻ ﻜﻮن ا اﰐ ﻣﺸ ﳣﻼ ﲆ اﳌﻘﻮل ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ‪ّ ،‬‬ ‫— وٕان ﰷن ﲝﺴﺐ ﻗﺎﻧﻮن اﻠﻐﺔ ﯾﺪ ّل ــﲆ ﻫــﺬا اﳌــﻌﲎ اﻟ ﺴــﱯ — ﻓ ٕﺎﻧّــﻪ ﲝﺴﺐ اﺻــﻄﻼح وﻗــﻊ ﺑــﲔ‬ ‫اﳌﻨﻄﻘ ّﲔ ﯾﺪ ّل ﲆ ﻣﻌﲎ ٓﺧﺮ‪ .‬وذ ٔ ّن اﻠﻔﻆ ا ﳫّﻲ‪ ،‬إذا د ّل ﲆ ﻣــﻌﲎ‪ ،‬ﺴ ــﻪ إﱃ اﳉـﺰﺋﯿﺎت اﻟــﱵ‬ ‫ﺗﻌــﺮض ﳌــﻌﻨﺎﻩ ﺴ ﺒــﺔ ﳚﺐ‪ ،‬إذا ﺗُـ ُـﻮ ّﳘﺖ ــﲑ ﻣﻮﺟــﻮدة‪ٔ ،‬ن ﻻ ﻜــﻮن ذات ذ اﻟﴚء ﻣــﻦ اﳉـﺰﺋﯿﺎت‬

‫‪ ] Here starts a lacuna in MS As, which affects the rest of chap. I., chapters I.– entirely and‬ﲆ ‪‬‬ ‫‪almost entirely chapter I. (I., p. .–I., p. . Cairo ed.).‬‬ ‫ﻓﺎٕﳖﺎ ]ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ‪ om. To ‬ﻻزﻣﺔ ‪ … ‬ﰷﻧﺖ | ‪ Br‬ا ٔﻣﺮ ]ا ٔﻣﺮﻦ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. J om. Br‬ﱔ | ‪ om. C‬ﻣﺎ | ‪ EṢ‬ﲑ ]اﻟﻐﲑ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ praem.‬وﻫﻮ ] ٔﻧ ّﻪ | ‪ om. N‬ﻣﻮﺿﻊ ﻧﻈﺮ ‪ τJETDaTe ‬وﳌﻌﻨﺎﻫﺎ ]وﳌﻌﻨﺎﻩ | ‪ BrJETDa‬ﻟﻬﺎ ] | ‪ DiYi in mg. Ṣ‬ﻓﺎٕﳕﺎ ‪BrJETDaTeG‬‬ ‫‪ om. et‬اﻟﴚء ‪… ‬وﻣﻌﲎ | ‪ Br‬ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻩ ]ﳌﻌﻨﺎﻩ | ‪ No‬ﰲ ذاﰐ ٔي ]ذاﰐ ‪ Yi ‬ﻠﻌﺎم ]اﻟﻌﺎ ّم ‪] om. Br ‬اﻠﻔﻆ | ‪πJTTe i.l. Ṣ‬‬ ‫وﻻ ]‪‬ﻓﻼ ‪ّٔ om. JTTe ‬ن | ‪ a.c. E‬ﻟﻬﺬا ]ﻓﻠﻬﺬا | ‪ om. No‬ﻟ ﺲ | ‪ praem. s.l. Y‬ذات ]‪‬اﻟﴚء ‪add. in mg. ToG ‬‬ ‫ﺴﺎن…ﻟﻜﻦ ‪ add. a.c. No ‬اﻠﻔﻆ ا ال ]‪ ‬ﻜﻮن | ‪γEd.‬‬ ‫‪ om.‬ذاﺗﯿﺎ ﻟ ٕﻼ ﺴﺎن | ‪ om. J‬ﻟ ٕﻼ ﺴﺎن | ‪ om. et add. in mg. YN‬ﻟ ٕﻼ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ﺴ ﳤﺎ ] ﺴ ﻪ ‪ om. Yi ‬إﱃ | ‪ add. et exp. Yi‬ﲠﺎ إﱃ اﶺ اﻟﱵ ﲠﺎ ﯾ ﺸﺨﺺ ] ﺴ ﻪ | ‪ om. No‬ﴯﺺ ‪et add. in mg. Br ‬‬ ‫اﻟﻨﺎﻃــﻖ ]واﻟﻨﺎﻃــﻖ | ‪ om. J om. et add. i.l. Yi‬ﻫــﻮ ‪ om. ETTe exp. Ṣ ‬ﻫــﻮ | ‪ add. BrE a.c. Ṣ om. Yi‬ﺸــﲑ ‪Di‬‬ ‫ﻼ ﺴﺎن ‪ Di ‬و ]‪‬و ﻮﻧﻪ | ‪ Nk‬ﻮﻧﻪ ]ﻟﻮﻧﻪ | ‪ٔ om. DaṢ add. in mg. Ṣ‬ﯾﻀﺎ | ‪ ξ‬ﳎﺮاﻫﲈ ]ﳎﺮاﻫﺎ ‪γνξEṢEd. ‬‬ ‫‪ BrDi‬ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ]ﻟ ٕ‬ ‫‪ Ka‬ﻣﻦ ]ﺑﲔ | ‪ om. ξτJTTe add. in mg. Ṣ²‬وﻗﻊ ﺑــﲔ | ‪ s.l. Da‬وﻗــﻊ ‪ om. et add. s.l. Ṣ ‬ﻻ ‪ om. BrTo ‬ﻫــﻮ‬ ‫‪ om. et add. in‬ذ | ‪ Di‬ﻣﻮﺟﻮد ]ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة | ‪ Ṣ om. Da‬ﯾﻔﺮض ‪ add. in mg. To‬ﺗﻌﺮض ‪ et‬ﺗﻔﺮض ]ﺗﻌﺮض ‪ٔ Y ‬ن ] ٔ ّن ‪‬‬ ‫‪ om. et add. in mg. Da‬اﻟﴚء ‪… ‬ﻣﻦ | ‪mg. J‬‬

‫‪٣١‬ق‬

Chapter I.5  63

[(a)] Those universal expressions that signify the real essence of one or more things are what signifies the quiddity [of the thing], whereas [(b)] what is not like this does not signify the quiddity. If, then, it signifies the things that must inescapably precede in existence the essence of the thing, so that the essence of the thing is realized by their being assembled, no single one of these [components] is the essence of the thing, nor does the expression that signifies it signify the reality of the essence of the thing in its perfection, but rather [just] a part of it; this should be called the essential expression that does not signify the quiddity. [(c)] What signifies an attribute that does not fall within these two cases — be it necessarily concomitant or not — is called ‘accidental expression’, and its meaning [is called] ‘accidental meaning’.

[. The relation between the meanings of ‘essential’ and ‘signifying the quiddity’] [.. Problem of establishing whether ‘essential’ includes ‘signifying the quiddity’ or not] There is here, however, a matter of inquiry, namely whether it is necessary that the meaning of the essential expression include the meaning of the expression signifying the quiddity as the general includes the specific or not. Q31 In fact, our statement ‘essential expression’ signifies an expression whose meaning has a [certain] relation to the essence of the thing, but the meaning of the essence of the thing is not related to the essence of the thing [itself]: it is only related to the thing what is not the thing itself. [(1)] Therefore it behoves to presume that the essential expression is the [expression] most entitled to include the meanings that constitute the quiddity, but the expression signifying the quiddity is not essential, so that man is not essential to man, but animal and rational are both essential to man. [(2)] If man is not taken to be essential to man insofar as it is a man, but rather to each single individual, then, either [(2.1)] its relation of essentiality is to the reality of the quiddity of the individual, which is also man, or [(2.2)] its relation of essentiality is to the complex [of that] by virtue of which it becomes an individual, so that it is not in its entirety, but a part of that from which it comes, insofar as it is a complex. Then, it happens that not only animal, and rational, and man and the like are essential to each single individual, but also the accidental features, like its colour, its being short, its being the son of so-and-so and what is similar are essential, since they are constitutive parts of the complex. Hence, the man, in so far as he is essential to the individual, has nothing else than what this [complex] has.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﳋﺎﻣﺲ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ﯾﺼﺢ ّ‬ ‫ﺗﻮﱒ رﻓﻊ ﻫﺬا‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ٔ ّن رﻓﻊ ﻫﺬا‬ ‫ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا‪ ،‬ﻻ ٔ ّن ذات ذ اﻟﴚء ﳚﺐ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﺮﻓﻊ ٔ ّوﻻ ﺣﱴ ّ‬ ‫ﻣﻮﺟِ ﺐ رﻓﻊ ذ اﻟﴚء‪ ،‬ﺳﻮاء ﰷن ٔ ّن ﻫﺬا اﳌﺮﻓﻮع ﻫﻮ ﺣﻘ ﻘﺔ ذاﺗﻪ ٔو ﰷن ﻫﺬا اﳌﺮﻓﻮع ﳑّﺎ ﲢﺘﺎج إﻟﯿﻪ‬ ‫ﯿﺘﻘﻮم؛ ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﯾﻘﺎل ذاﰐ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺣﻘ ﻘﺔ ذاﺗﻪ ﻟ ّ‬ ‫ﯾﺼﺢ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ٔو ﰲ ّ‬ ‫اﻟﺘﻮﱒ ٔن ﻜﻮن اﻟﴚء اﳌﻮﺻﻮف ﺑﻪ ﺎﺻﻼ ﻣﻊ‬ ‫)‪ (.‬ﻓﺎٕن ﱂ ﻜﻦ ﻫﻜﺬا وﰷن ّ‬ ‫ﯾﺼﺢ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد وﻟﻜﻦ ﻟ ﺲ رﻓﻌﻪ ﺳ ﺐ رﻓﻌﻪ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ٕاﻧّــﲈ ﻻ ﯾﺼـ ّـﺢ ذ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟــﻮد ٔ ّن‬ ‫رﻓﻌﻪ‪ٔ ،‬و ﰷن ﻻ ّ‬ ‫ﯾﺼﺢ ا ّٕﻻ ٔن ﻜﻮن ذ ارﺗﻔﻊ ٔ ّوﻻ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﺣﱴ ﻜﻮن رﻓﻌــﻪ ﶺـ ﻟ ــﺲ ﺳـ ﺐ رﻓﻌــﻪ‪ ،‬ﻓﻬــﻮ‬ ‫رﻓﻌﻪ ﻻ ّ‬ ‫ﻋﺮﴈ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻓ ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﳌﺮﺗﻔﻊ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﲀﻟﻘ ﺎم واﻟﻘﻌﻮد وذ ﳑّﺎ ﴪع رﻓﻌﻪ؛ وﰷﻟﺸﺒﺎب ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﯾﺒﻄﺆ رﻓﻌﻪ؛ وﻛﻐﻀﺐ اﳊﻠﲓ‬ ‫ﻓﺎ ّٕن ذ ﺴﻬﻞ ٕازاﻟﺘﻪ؛ وﰷﳋﻠﻖ ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﯾﺼﻌﺐ ٕازاﻟﺘﻪ‪ .‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﳌﺮﺗﻔﻊ ﰲ اﻟﻮﱒ دون اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻓﻜﺴﻮاد اﳊ ﴚ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻣﻌﺮﺿﺎ ﻠﺘﻌ ّﺠﺐ واﻟﻀـ ﻚ‪ ،‬وﻫــﻮ ﻮﻧــﻪ‬ ‫و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ا ي ﻻ ﺮﺗﻔﻊ وﻻ ﺮﻓﻊ رﻓﻊ اﻟﺴ ﺐ ﻓﻜﻜﻮن ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ﺑﻄﺒﻌﻪ ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ﲵ ﰷ ﻟﻄﺒﻊ‪ .‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﻻ ﳚــﻮز ٔن ـﺮﻓﻊ ﻋــﻦ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟــﻮد‪ ،‬ﻓﺎٕن ﺗُـ ُـﻮ ّﱒ ﻣـﺮﻓﻮ ﺎ ﻓﺎ ّٕن ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿــﺔ ﻜــﻮن‬ ‫ﻣﺮﻓﻮ ﺔ ﻻ ٔ ّن رﻓﻊ ا ٔﻋﺮاض ﻟﻄﺒﻊ ﻟﻬﺬا اﳌﻌﲎ ﻫﻮ ﺳ ﺐ رﻓﻊ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﻻ ﯾﺘ ٔ ّﰏ ٔن ﺮﻓﻊ ا ّٕﻻ ٔن‬ ‫ﻜﻮن ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ ٔ ّوﻻ ﻣﺮﻓﻮ ﺔ‪ ،‬ﻛﲈ ٔﳖّ ﺎ ﻟ ﺴﺖ ﺳ ﺎ ﻟﺜﺒﻮت ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ ﺳ ﺐ ﻟﺜﺒﻮﲥﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬ﻓﻘﺪ ن اﺧ ﻼف ﻣﺎ ﺑﲔ ﺴﺒﺔ اﳊﯿﻮان واﻟﻨﺎﻃﻖ وا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن إﱃ ا ٔﺷ ﺎص وﺑﲔ ﺴﺒﺔ ا ٔﻋﺮاض‬ ‫ٕا ﳱﺎ‪ .‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن اﻟ ﺴﺒﺔ ا ٔوﱃ إذا رﻓــﻌﳤﺎ ٔوﺟﺐ رﻓﻌــﻬﺎ رﻓــﻊ اﻟﺸﺨــﺺ؛ و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟ ﺴ ﺒــﺔ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﯿــﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓ ﻔــﺲ رﻓﻌــﻬﺎ ﻻ‬ ‫ﯾﻮﺟﺐ رﻓﻊ اﻟﺸﺨﺺ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﻣﳯﺎ ﻣﺎ ﺮﺗﻔﻊ وﻣﳯﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﳚﻮز ٔن ﺮﺗﻔﻊ ٔو ﺮﺗﻔﻊ اﻟﺸﺨﺺ؛ و ٔ ّﻣﺎ رﻓﻌﻬﺎ‪ ،‬ﻓﻼ ﺮﻓﻊ‬ ‫اﻟﺸﺨﺺ اﻟﺒﺘّﺔ‪.‬‬

‫]ذ ‪ّ om. Yi ‬‬ ‫ﺗﻮﱒ | ‪ MiŠG‬رﻓﻊ ] ﺮﻓﻊ | ‪ om. JNo‬ذات | ‪ٔ MiŠ‬ن ] ّٔن | ‪ Br et a.c. E‬إﻻ ]ﻻ | ‪ Br‬ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة ]ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا ‪‬‬ ‫ﻟﯿﺘﻘﻮم ‪ٔ … ‬و | ‪ om. TTe‬ﻫﻮ | ‪ّ ٔ om. JTṢTe‬ن | ‪ om. No‬اﻟﴚء | ‪ T‬ذاك ‪ praem. ιBr et a.c. Ṣ‬ذات‬ ‫‪ٔ Nk‬و ﺟﺰء ﯾﺘﻘﻮم ﺑﻪ ] ّ‬ ‫ﻟﯿﺘﻘﻮم ‪ EN ‬ﻣﺎ ‪ Da‬ﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ]ﳑّﺎ‬ ‫‪ add. π add. in mg.‬ذ ]‪ّ ‬‬ ‫ﯾﺼﺢ ‪ٔ N ‬و ﰷن ‪ G‬ﻓﲀن ]وﰷن | ‪ Br‬وٕان ]ﻓﺎٕن ‪ add. π ‬ﺑﻪ ] ّ‬ ‫ﻋﺮض ]ﻋﺮﴈ ‪ٔ om. et add. s.l. Ṣ² ‬وﻻ ‪ γξBrJTDaTe‬ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ٔوﻻ ]ﻧﻔﺴﻪ… ّٔوﻻ | ‪ٔ Ka‬ن ﯾﻘﻊ ]ارﺗﻔﻊ ‪ Yi ‬ﺮﻓﻌﻪ ]‪‬رﻓﻌﻪ | ‪G‬‬ ‫‪ s.l. Ṣ‬وذ ﳑﺎ ‪ ξ‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧــﻪ ﳑﺎ ‪ add. in mg. J‬وذ ‪ et‬ﳑﺎ ‪ εE‬وذ ﳑﺎ ]ﻓ ٕﺎﻧّــﻪ | ‪ ξDa‬ﻣﺎ ]ﳑّﺎ | ‪ Ṣ‬ﻓــﺬ ]وذ ‪ s.l. Ṣ² ‬ﻋــﺮﴈ ‪et‬‬ ‫‪ om. et add. in mg.‬اﻟﻮﱒ دون | ‪ i.l. Y‬ﻓﺎٕن ‪ et‬وذ ﳑﺎ ‪ ιBrE‬ﻓﺎٕن ذ ]ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ | ‪ Te‬ﻓﺎٕﻧﻪ ‪ add. s.l. Ṣ‬ﳑﺎ ‪ γTEd.‬ﻓﺎٕن ]ﻓﺎ ّٕن ذ ‪‬‬ ‫ﻻ | ‪ KaṢ‬ﺿﺎﺣﲀ ] ّ‬ ‫ﲵ ﰷ ‪ JTṢYi om. No ‬ﺮﻓﻊ ]رﻓﻊ | ‪ add. μ add. in mg. JDi‬ﻻ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد وﻻ ﰲ اﻟﺘﻮﱒ ] ﺮﺗﻔﻊ ‪Nk ‬‬ ‫‪ om. N‬ﻻ | ‪ No‬ﲠﺬا ‪ Ka‬ﻬﺬا ‪ C‬ﻟﻬﺬا ‪ et in mg.‬ﻬﺬا ]ﻟﻬﺬا | ‪ No‬ﻣـﺮﻓﻮ ﺎ ]ﻣﺮﻓﻮ ــﺔ ‪ Yi ‬ـﺮﺗﻔﻊ ] ـﺮﻓﻊ | ‪om. et add. s.l. E‬‬ ‫] ٔوﺟﺐ | ‪ om. G‬اﻟ ﺴﺒﺔ ‪ E ‬وﻋﻦ ]وﺑﲔ | ‪ٔ add. μξBrJEDa a.c. Ṣ add. in mg. CY‬ﯾﻀﺎ ]وا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ‪ٔ Te ‬ﻧﻪ ] ٔﳖّ ﺎ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ om.‬اﻟﺸﺨﺺ ‪… ‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ | ‪ add. in mg. Š s.l. Ṣ²‬رﻓﻌﻬﺎ ‪ om. θνEDiToŠGEd.‬رﻓﻌﻬﺎ | ‪ٔ in mg. Š‬وﺟﺐ ‪ٔ νBrToŠG‬وﺟ ﺖ‬ ‫‪‬ﻣﺎ | ‪ E‬وﻣ ﻪ ]وﻣﳯﺎ | ‪ Ṣ‬ﺮﻓﻊ ]‪ ‬ﺮﺗﻔﻊ | ‪ E‬ﻣ ﻪ ]ﻣﳯﺎ | ‪ om. No‬رﻓﻊ ‪ om. et add. in mg. G ‬اﻟ ﺴﺒﺔ | ‪et add. in mg. Nk²‬‬ ‫‪ om. Lat.G‬اﻟﺒﺘّﺔ ‪… ‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ | ‪ Yi‬ﺮﻓﻊ ]‪ ‬ﺮﺗﻔﻊ | ‪ٔ om. et add. in mg. Nk om. C‬و ﺮﺗﻔﻊ | ‪ Mi‬إذ ] ٔو | ‪om. et add. s.l. Š‬‬ ‫‪ Yi‬ﺮﺗﻔﻊ ] ﺮﻓﻊ | ‪add. in mg. G‬‬

‫‪٣٢‬ق‬

‫‪٣٣‬ق‬

Chapter I.5  65

[.. Further considerations on the meaning of ‘essential’] These considerations call for [the conclusion that] the essential does not [only] include what is given in answer to the question ‘what is it?’, but when we say ‘essential’ — even though according to linguistic norms it signifies this relative meaning — according to the technical convention of the logicians, it signifies another meaning. This is because, when the universal expression signifies a meaning, its relation to the particulars occurring to its meaning is such that it is necessary, when it is represented in the estimative faculty as non-existent, that the essence of that thing does not exist among the particulars, not because it is necessary for the essence of that thing Q32 to be removed at first, so that it is possible to represent the removal of this in the estimative faculty, but rather because the removal of this makes the removal of the thing necessary, no matter whether it is because this [thing] removed is its real essence, or [because] this [thing] removed is among [the things] that its real essence needs in order to be constituted; this is said ‘essential’.

[.. Considerations on the meaning of ‘accidental’] If this is not the case, and [(a)] it is possible in existence or in estimation that the thing characterized by it obtains in spite of its removal, or [(b)] [if this is] not possible in existence, but its removal is not the cause of the removal of the thing itself, and it is not possible in existence only because its removal is not possible unless the [thing] itself is first removed, so that its removal for the complex is not the cause of the removal of the thing, then it is accidental. [(a.1)] What is removed in existence is like standing and sitting (being something whose removal is fast), or like youth (whose removal is slow), and like the rage of the mild (whose removal is easy), or like the character (whose removal is hard). [(a.2)] What is removed in estimation but not in existence is like the blackness of the Ethiopian. [(b)] What is neither removed nor removes in the way of a cause is like man being by [his own] nature prone to wonder and laughter (being laughing by nature). In fact, it is not possible to remove [this feature] from man in existence and if it is represented as removed [from man] in estimation, then humanity is removed, not because the removal of the accidents that belong by nature to this meaning is the cause of the removal of humanity, but because this feature cannot be removed unless after humanity is first removed, as these features are not the cause of the subsistence of humanity, but rather humanity is the cause of their subsistence.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﳋﺎﻣﺲ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫وٕاذا ﰷن ا ٔﻣﺮ ﲆ ﻫﺬﻩ اﳉﻬﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﺎ اﰐ ﺸ ﳣﻞ ﲆ ا ا ّل ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (‬ﻓﻘﺪ اﺗ ّﻀﺢ ٔ ّن اﻠﻔﻆ اﳌﻔﺮد ا ﳫّﻲ ﻣ ﻪ ذاﰐ ﯾﺪ ّل ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ وﻣ ﻪ ذاﰐ ﻻ ﯾﺪ ّل ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ وﻣ ﻪ‬ ‫ﻋﺮﴈ‪.‬‬

‫‪om. et add. in‬‬

‫ﲆ ا ا ّل | ‪ μ s.l. Ṣ²‬ﻣﺸ ﳣﻞ ] ﺸ ﳣﻞ‬

‫|‬

‫‪ Ka‬ﻓﺎﻟﻼﰐ ]ﻓﺎ اﰐ | ‪ Ṣ‬اﶺ ]اﳉﻬﺔ | ‪ μνJETDaṢTeNo‬ﻓﺎٕذا ]وٕاذا‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪mg. To om. Mi‬‬

Chapter I.5  67

[.. Concluding remarks on the way ‘essential’ includes ‘signifying the quiddity’] It has become clear that there is a certain difference between the relation of animal, rational and man to individuals and the relation of the accidents to them. If you remove the first relation, it entails the removal of the individual, whereas the removal of the second relation does not entail the removal of the individual. Rather, among [this second sort of] feature there is what is removed, and what cannot be Q33 removed lest the individual is removed; as to their removal [itself], it does not at all remove the individual. If the matter is according this aspect, then the essential includes what signifies the quiddity.

[. Concluding classification of the simple universal expression] It has already become clear to you that the simple universal expression can be essential and signifying the quiddity, or essential, without signifying the quiddity, or accidental.

‫]اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎدس[‬ ‫ﻓﺼﻞ ﰲ ﺗﻌﻘّﺐ ﻣﺎ ﻗﺎ اﻟﻨﺎس ﰲ ا اﰐ واﻟﻌﺮﴈ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫ﻣﻘﻮم‪ّ ،‬ﰒ ﱂ ُﳛﺼﻞ وﱂ ّﯾﺒﲔ ٔﻧ ّﻪ‬ ‫ﻣﻘﻮم واﻟﻌﺮﴈ ﲑ ّ ِ‬ ‫)‪ (‬ﻗﺪ ﻗ ﻞ ﰲ ا ﳣﯿﲒ ﺑﲔ ا اﰐ واﻟﻌﺮﴈ ا ّٕن ا اﰐ ّ ِ‬ ‫ﯾﺼﺢ ّ‬ ‫ﺗﻮﳘﻪ ﻣﺮﻓﻮ ﺎ ﻣــﻊ ﺑــﻘﺎء اﻟﴚء واﻟﻌــﺮﴈ‬ ‫ﻣﻘﻮم‪ .‬وﻗ ﻞ ٔﯾﻀﺎ ا ّٕن ا اﰐ ﻻ ّ‬ ‫ﻣﻘﻮﻣﺎ ٔو ﲑ ّ‬ ‫ﯿﻒ ﻜﻮن ّ‬ ‫ﯾﺼﺢ ّ‬ ‫ﺗﻮﳘﻪ ﻣﺮﻓﻮ ﺎ ﻣﻊ ﺑﻘﺎء اﻟﴚء‪.‬‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫اﳌﻘﻮم ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﲈ ﯾ ﺎول‬ ‫)‪ (.‬ﻓ ﺠﺐ ٔن ُﳓ ّﺼﻞ ﳓﻦ ﲱّﺔ ﻣﺎ ﻗ ﻞ ٔو اﺧ ﻼ ﻓ ﻘﻮل‪ّ ٔ :‬ﻣﺎ ﻗﻮﳍﻢ ا ّٕن ا اﰐ ﻫﻮ ّ‬ ‫ﻠﻤﺖ ﻣﺎ ﯾﻌﺮض ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬا‪ ،‬ا ﻠّﻬ ّﻢ ا ّٕﻻ‬ ‫ﻣﻘﻮم ﻟﻐﲑﻩ‪ .‬وﻗﺪ َ‬ ‫اﳌﻘﻮم ّ‬ ‫ﻣﺎ ﰷن ﻣﻦ ا اﺗﯿﺎت ﲑ دا ّل ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﻓﺎ ّٕن ّ‬ ‫ﳌﻘﻮم ﻣﺎ ﻻ ﯾﻔﻬﻢ ﻣﻦ ﻇﺎﻫﺮ ﻟﻔﻈــﻪ‪ ،‬وﻟﻜـ ّـﻦ ﯾﻌﻨــﻮن ﺑــﻪ ﻣﺎ ﻋﻨ ـ ﺎ اﰐ‪ .‬ﻓ ﻜﻮﻧـﻮا ٕاﻧّــﲈ ٔﺗـﻮا ﰟ‬ ‫ٔن ﯾ َ ْﻌﻨﻮا ّ‬ ‫ﴏف ﻋﻦ ﺳﺘﻌﲈل ا ٔ ّول وﱂ ﯾﺪ ّل ــﲆ اﳌــﻌﲎ ا ي ﻧــﻘﻞ إﻟﯿــﻪ‪ .‬و ﻜــﻮن اﳋــﻄﺐ ﰲ اﳌﻘـ ّـﻮم‬ ‫ﻣﺮادف ُ ِ‬ ‫ﰷﳋﻄﺐ ﰲ ا اﰐ وﻜﻮن ﺎ ﺔ ّ‬ ‫ﰻ وا ﺪ ﻣﳯﲈ إﱃ اﻟﺒﯿﺎن وا ﺪة‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻋ دﱒ ﲆ ٔﻣﺮ اﻟﺮﻓﻊ ﰲ ّ‬ ‫اﻟﺘﻮﱒ ﻓ ﺠﺐ ٔن ﺗﺘﺬﻛّﺮ ﻣﺎ ٔﻋﻄﯿﻨﺎك ﺳﺎﻟﻔﺎ ٔ ّن اﳌــﻌﲎ ا ﳫّــﻲ ﻗــﺪ‬ ‫ﻜﻮن ٔوﺻﺎف ﳛﺘﺎج ٕا ﳱﺎ ٔ ّوﻻ ﺣﱴ ﳛﺼﻞ ذ اﳌﻌﲎ وﻜﻮن ٔوﺻﺎف ٔﺧــﺮى ﺗﻠﺰﻣــﻪ وﺗ ﻌــﻪ إذا‬ ‫ﺻﺎر ذ اﳌﻌﲎ ﺎﺻﻼ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻓ ٔ ّﻣﺎ ﲨﯿﻊ ا ٔوﺻﺎف اﻟﱵ ﳛﺘﺎج ٕا ﳱﺎ اﻟﴚء ﺣــﱴ ﲢﺼﻞ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺘــﻪ‪ ،‬ﻓﻠــﻦ ﳛﺼﻞ ﻣﻌﻘــﻮﻻ ﻣــﻊ ﺳــﻠﺐ ﺗـ‬ ‫ا ٔوﺻﺎف ﻣ ﻪ‪ .‬وذ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﻗﺪ ﺳﻠﻒ ٔ ّن ﻟ ٔ ﺷﯿﺎء ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺎت و ٔن ﺗ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺎت ﻗﺪ ﻜﻮن ﻣﻮﺟــﻮدة ﰲ‬ ‫ا ٔﻋﯿﺎن وﻗﺪ ﻜﻮن ﻣﻮﺟﻮدة ﰲ ا ٔوﻫﺎم و ٔ ّن اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﻻ ﯾﻮﺟﺐ ﻟﻬﺎ ﲢﺼﯿﻞ ٔ ﺪ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻦ و ٔ ّن ّ‬ ‫ﰻ وا ﺪ‬ ‫ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻦ ﻻ ﯾﺜ ﺖ ا ّٕﻻ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺛﺒﻮت ﺗ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ و ٔ ّن ّ‬ ‫ﰻ وا ﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻦ ﯾﻠﺤﻖ ﳌﺎﻫﯿــﺔ ﺧـﻮ ّاص‬ ‫‪] Material damage in MS Ṣ.‬ﻣﻦ ‪ّ … ‬‬ ‫ﰻ ‪‬‬ ‫‪] Cf. Išārāt, p. .–.‬وا‬

‫اﳌﻘﻮم… ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪‬‬ ‫ﺪة ‪… ‬ا ﻠّﻬ ّﻢ ‪ّ ] Cf. Šifāʾ, Burhān II., p. .–; p. .–. ‬‬

‫‪ om. et add.‬واﻟﻌﺮﴈ… ا ّٕن | ‪ E‬ﻋﻦ ]ﺑﲔ ‪ Y ‬اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎدس ‪ Mi‬ﻓﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎدس ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﻦ ا ٔول ﻣﻦ ﲨ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ]ﻓﺼﻞ ‪‬‬ ‫ﻣﻘﻮم واﻟﻌﺮﴈ ]ا اﰐ | ‪ om. Yi‬ا ّٕن | ‪ ν‬وﻗﺪ ﻗ ﻞ ]وﻗ ﻞ | ‪ τEDaN‬و ﲑ ] ٔو ﲑ ‪ s.l. Ṣ² ‬ﯾﺒﲔ ‪ TṢNoEd.‬ﯾﺘ ﲔ ] ّ‬ ‫ﯾﺒﲔ | ‪in mg. To‬‬ ‫‪ om. Yi‬ﻣﺎ ﯾﻌﺮض | ‪ BrTTeG‬ﻓﻘﺪ ]وﻗﺪ ‪ JT ‬و ] ٔو ‪ om. K ‬اﻟﴚء ‪ … ‬واﻟﻌﺮﴈ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. J‬ﺑﻘﺎء | ‪add. No‬‬ ‫ﻓ ﻜﻮﻧﻮن ]ﻓ ﻜﻮﻧﻮا | ‪ s.l. Ṣ‬ﻋﻨ ﺎ ‪ τJTTe‬ﯾﻌﲎ ]ﻋﻨ ﺎ | ‪ EDiDaN‬ﻣ ﻪ ]ﺑﻪ | ‪ Di‬ﻻ ﻣﺎ ]ﻣﺎ ﻻ ‪fort. om. [«(iam nosti) hoc»] Lat. ‬‬ ‫‪ Da‬ﺗ ﻌﻪ وﺗﻠﺰﻣﻪ ]ﺗﻠﺰﻣﻪ وﺗ ﻌﻪ ‪ praem. νJTe ‬ﻣﻦ ] ّٔن ‪ om. N ‬وا ﺪ | ‪ E‬ﻻ اﳋــﻄﺐ ]ﰷﳋــﻄﺐ ‪ Br ‬ﰷٕﳕﺎ ] ٕاﻧّــﲈ | ‪BrDa‬‬ ‫‪ om. et add. in mg. J‬ﳛﺼﻞ…ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺘﻪ | ‪ add. E‬ﻣﻌﻘﻮﻻ ]ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺘﻪ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. Ka‬ﺣﱴ | ‪ praem. Ṣ‬ذ ]اﻟﴚء ‪‬‬ ‫‪ om. et add. in‬اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺎت…و ٔن | ‪ No‬ا ٔﺷﯿﺎء ]ﻟ ٔﺷﯿﺎء | ‪ om. TTe‬ﻣ ﻪ ‪ om. E ‬ﻣﻌﻘﻮﻻ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. To‬ﳛﺼﻞ‬ ‫‪ add. Ṣ‬ﰷن ]‪‬و ّٔن | ‪ Ṣ‬ﻓﺎٕن ]‪‬و ّٔن | ‪ s.l. Ṣ²‬ا ٔوﻫﺎم ‪ ξDaṢTe‬ا ٔذﻫﺎن ]ا ٔوﻫﺎم | ‪ Da‬و ]وﻗﺪ ‪ Yi ‬اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ]اﳌﺎﻫــﯿﺎت | ‪mg. Di‬‬ ‫ﰻ وا ﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻦ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﺧﻮاص وﻋﻮارض ﻜﻮن ﻠﲈﻫﯿﺔ ‪ om. Lat.G‬ﻠﲈﻫﯿﺔ ‪… ‬و ٔ ّن | ‪ om. J‬ﺗ‬ ‫| ‪ om. Yi‬اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻦ…ﯾﺜ ﺖ ‪‬‬ ‫اص | ‪ JTTe‬اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ] ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ | ‪ No‬اﳌﻮﺟﻮﺑﲔ ]‪‬اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻦ | ‪add. in mg. G‬‬ ‫‪ C‬ﺧﻮاﺻﺎ ]ﺧﻮ ّ‬

‫‪٣٤‬ق‬

[I.]

C

[. Two traditional criteria to define the ‘essential’] [(i)] It has been argued in distinguishing the essential from the accidental that the essential is constitutive and the accidental is non-constitutive, though it has not been determined nor has it been clarified what it is to be constitutive or nonconstitutive. [(ii)] It has also been argued that it is not possible to represent in estimation the essential as removed with the thing remaining, whereas it is possible to represent in estimation the accidental as removed with the thing remaining.

[. Inquiry into the traditional criteria to define the ‘essential’] [.. ‘Essential’ as ‘constitutive’: the first traditional criterion] Hence, it is necessary that we ourselves determine whether what is claimed is sound or not, so: Their claim that the essential is the constitutive [(i)] only covers the essential [features] that do not signify the quiddity, for the constitutive is constitutive of something else. But you have already learned what follows from this1, unless they mean by ‘constitutive’ what is not understood by the literal sense of its expression, but rather mean by it what we mean by ‘essential’. So they will have conformed with a synonymous name that was diverted from [its] first usage and that did not signify the meaning to which it is [now] applied. Discussing what is [to be deemed] ‘constitutive’ is like discussing what is ‘essential’, and the need for clarification of each is the same.

[.. The ‘essential’ cannot be removed in estimation: the second traditional criterion] As to their reliance on the matter of removal in estimation, you must recall what Q34 we taught you in the preceding discussion, [namely] that the universal meaning can have [(a)] attributes that are primarily required for that meaning to be realized, and [(b)] some other attributes that follow it as necessary concomitants when that meaning comes to be realized.

 In Madḫal I., §..

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎدس ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫وﻋﻮارض ﻜﻮن ﻠﲈﻫﯿﺔ ﻋﻨﺪ ذ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد وﳚﻮز ٔن ﻻ ﻜﻮن ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ا ٓﺧﺮ‪ .‬ورﺑّﲈ ﰷﻧﺖ ﻟﻮازم‬ ‫ﺗﻠﺰﻣﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ‪ ،‬ﻟﻜـ ّـﻦ اﳌﺎﻫﯿــﺔ ﻜــﻮن ﻣ ﻘـ ّـﺮرة ٔ ّوﻻ ّﰒ ﺗﻠــﺰ ﺎ ﱔ‪ .‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن اﻻﺛﻨ ﯿــﺔ ﺗﻠــﺰ ﺎ اﻟﺰوﺟ ــﺔ‬ ‫واﳌﺜﻠّﺚ ﯾﻠﺰﻣﻪ ٔن ﻜﻮن زوا ﻩ اﻟﺜﻼث ﻣﺴﺎوﯾﺔ ﻟﻘﺎﲚﺘﲔ ﻻ ٔ ﺪ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻦ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﻣ ﻠّﺚ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻣﻘﻮﻣﺎت ﻣ ﻘﺪّ ﻣﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﱂ ﲢﺼﻞ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ دون ﺗﻘﺪّ ﺎ‪ .‬وٕاذا‬ ‫)‪ (.‬وﻫﺬﻩ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ إذا ﰷن ﻟﻬﺎ ّ‬ ‫ﺗﺘﻘﻮم ﺑﻪ‬ ‫ﱂ ﲢﺼﻞ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ‪ ،‬ﱂ ﲢﺼﻞ ﻣﻌﻘﻮ وﻻ ﻋﯿﻨﺎ‪ .‬ﻓﺎٕذن إذا ﺣﺼﻠﺖ ﻣﻌﻘﻮ ‪ ،‬ﺣﺼﻠﺖ وﻗﺪ ﺣﺼﻞ ﻣﺎ ّ‬ ‫ﺗﺘﻘﻮم ﺑﻪ‪ .‬ﻓﺎٕذا ﰷن ذ ﺎﺻﻼ ﰲ اﻟﻌــﻘﻞ‪ ،‬ﱂ ﳝﻜــﻦ اﻟﺴــﻠﺐ ﻓ ــﺠﺐ ٔن‬ ‫ﰲ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﻣﻌﻬﺎ ﲆ اﳉﻬﺔ اﻟﱵ ّ‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮر اﻟﴚء ﲝﯿﺚ ﻻ ﳚﻬﻞ وﺟﻮدﻫﺎ وﻻ ﳚﻮز ﺳﻠﳢﺎ ﻋﻨﻪ ﺣﱴ ﺗﺜ ﺖ‬ ‫اﳌﻘﻮﻣﺎت ﻣﻌﻘﻮ ﻣﻊ ّ‬ ‫ﻜﻮن ﻫﺬﻩ ّ‬ ‫اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ ﻣﻊ رﻓﻌﻬﺎ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ ﻟﻔﻌﻞ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬وﻟﺴﺖ ٔﻋﲏ ﲝﺼﻮﻟﻬﺎ ﰲ اﻟﻌﻘﻞ ﺧﻄﻮرﻫﺎ ﻟﺒﺎل ﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻓﻜ ﲑ ﻣــﻦ اﳌﻌﻘــﻮﻻت ﻻ ﻜــﻮن ﺎﻃــﺮة‬ ‫ﻣﻘﻮﻣﺔ ﻟﺒﺎل ﺣﱴ ﻜﻮن ﻫﺬﻩ ﳐﻄﺮة‬ ‫ﻟﺒﺎل‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ٔﻋﲏ ٔﳖّ ﺎ ﻻ ﳝﻜﻦ ﻣﻊ إﺧﻄﺎرﻫﺎ ﻟﺒﺎل وٕاﺧﻄﺎر ﻣﺎ ﱔ ّ ِ‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮرﻫﺎ‪ٔ ،‬ﻋــﲏ‬ ‫ﻟﺒﺎل وذ ﳐﻄﺮا ﻟﺒﺎل ﻟﻔﻌﻞ ٔن ﺴﻠﳢﺎ ﻋﻨﻪ ٔﻧ ّﻚ ﲡﺪ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺎﻟﯿﺔ ﻋﳯﺎ ﻣﻊ ّ‬

‫‪] Material damage in MS Ṣ.‬اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ‪… ‬ﺣﱴ ‪] Material damage in MS Ṣ. ‬ﰷن…اﻟﱵ ‪‬‬

‫‪] Išārāt, p. .–.‬ﺗﻘ ّﺪ‬

‫ﺎ…وﻫﺬﻩ ‪‬‬

‫ﻟﻜﻦ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ | ‪ G‬ﺗﻠﺰ ﺎ ]ﺗﻠﺰﻣﻪ ‪ νG ‬ﻟﻬﺎ ]‪ om. I | ‬ﰲ | ‪ νBr p.c. G‬ﻟﻬﺎ ]‪ in mg. E | ‬ﻃﺎرﯾﺔ ] ﻠﲈﻫﯿﺔ | ‪ C‬وﻋﻮارﺿﺎ ]وﻋﻮارض ‪‬‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫‪] om. et add. s.l.‬زوا ﻩ ‪ add. et exp. Ka ‬اﻟﺰوﺟ ﺔ ]‪‬ﺗﻠﺰ ﺎ | ‪ om. Lat.G add. i.l. G‬ﱔ… ّﰒ | ‪om. et add. in mg. Br‬‬ ‫ﰷﻧﺖ ]ﰷن ‪ Te ‬ﻣﺎﻫﯿــﺔ ]ﻣ ـﻠّﺚ | ‪ ٔ s.l. Ṣ‬ــﺪ ‪ ٔ Ṣ‬ﻞ ] ٔ ــﺪ | ‪] Lat.] om. ιEDa‬اﻟﺜــﻼث[ »‪ γνξJTTe «tres‬اﻟﺜــﻼث | ‪G‬‬ ‫]ﻓﺎٕذا ‪ om. TTe ‬ﻣﻌﻘﻮ ﺣﺼﻠﺖ | ‪ BrJBCDiN‬ﻓﺎٕذا ]ﻓﺎٕذن ‪ add. et exp. J ‬وٕاذا ﱂ ﲢﺼﻞ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ دون ﺗﻘﺪ ﺎ ]ﺗﻘﺪّ ﺎ | ‪νKaBṢ‬‬ ‫‪ om.‬ا ﻫﻦ…ﻣﻊ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. Nk‬ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ ‪ add. s.l. DaN  om. et add. s.l. Ṣ ‬ذ | ‪ μνEDa‬وٕاذا‬ ‫‪  om. et add. in mg.‬ﻟﺒﺎل ‪ N ‬ﻓﻜ ﲑا ]ﻓﻜ ﲑ | ‪  om. JC‬ﻟﺒﺎل ‪ … ‬ﻟﻔﻌﻞ | ‪ praem. et del. To om. Ṣ‬ﰲ ] ﻟﻔﻌﻞ ‪N ‬‬ ‫]ﳐﻄﺮة | ‪ ν‬ﻫﺬا ]ﻫﺬﻩ | ‪  om. et add. in mg. G‬ﻟﺒﺎل ‪… ‬ﺣﱴ | ‪ Yi‬ﻟﻬﺎ ‪ٔ E | add. s.l. Da‬ﻧﻪ ] ٔﳖّ ﺎ | ‪ om. YiN‬ﺑﻞ | ‪Ṣ²‬‬ ‫‪ om.‬ﻋﻨﻪ | ‪  om. Lat.G add. in mg. G‬ﻟﻔﻌﻞ… ٔن | ‪ No‬وذاك ]وذ | ‪  om. et add. in mg. Y‬ﻟﺒﺎل…وذ ‪ ν ‬ﳐﻄﺮا‬ ‫‪ Š add. s.l. Y‬ﻋﻨﻪ ]ﻋﳯﺎ | ‪ν add. s.l. Y‬‬

‫‪٣٥‬ق‬

Chapter I.6  71

No thing can be realized as intelligible with the negation of the complex of attributes that the thing requires to realize its quiddity. For you have already learned2 that things have quiddities, and that those quiddities are sometimes existent in concrete instantiations, sometimes in estimation, and that it is not necessary for the quiddity to be realized in [either] one of the two [kinds of] existence, and that each of the two [kinds of] existence is established only after that quiddity is established, and that in each one of the two [kinds of] existence [certain] properties and accidents attach to the quiddity [itself] which belong to the quiddity in that [kind of] existence and which may [also] not belong to it in the other [kind of] existence. Sometimes the thing has some concomitants that follow it with regard to [its] quiddity, but the quiddity is fixed first, then they follow it. Being even follows duality, and having three angles equal to two right angles follows triangle, not because of one of the two [kinds of] existence, but because it is a triangle.

[. The quiddity and its constituents] [.. The quiddity cannot remain in the mind with the negation of its constitutive features] If this quiddity has [certain] constitutive [elements] that precede [it] insofar as it is a quiddity, it is not realized as a quiddity unless [those constitutive elements] precede it. And if it is not realized as a quiddity, then it is realized neither as an intelligible nor as a concrete instantiation. If it is realized as an intelligible, it is realized and its constituents have been realized together with it in the intellect, in the way they constitute it. If it obtains with intellect, [its constitutive elements] cannot be negated of it, so that these constitutive [elements] are necessarily intellected with the conception of the thing, in that their belonging to it is not unknown, and it is impossible to negate them of it so that the quiddity is established in the mind in spite of their actually being removed with mind.

[.. The realization in the intellect] By ‘their realization in the intellect’, I do not mean that they actually come to mind, for many of the intelligibles do not come to mind, but I mean that it is impossible for them to be negated of it with their coming to mind and with the notification to the mind of the thing they constitute, so that [both] these [constitu- Q35 ents] and that [thing] actually come to mind, as if you found the quiddity actually

 In Madḫal I., §..

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎدس ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ﺗﺼﻮر اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ‪ .‬وٕاذا ﰷن ﻛﺬ ﻓﺎﻟﺼﻔﺎت اﻟﱵ ﺴ ّﻤﳱﺎ ذاﺗﯿﺔ ﻠﻤــﻌﺎﱐ اﳌﻌﻘــﻮ ﳚﺐ ﴐورة ٔن‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮرﻫﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺗﺘﺼﻮر اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ دون ﺗﻘﺪّ م ّ‬ ‫ﺗُﻌﻘﻞ ﻠﴚء ﲆ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻮ ﻪ إذ ﻻ ّ‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮر اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﻓ ﻪ وﻻ ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﱔ ﻣﻊ‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮ ُرﻫﺎ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ ّ‬ ‫)‪ (.‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ﺳﺎ ﺮ اﻟﻌﻮارض ﻓﺎٕذ ﻟ ﺴﺖ ﳑﺎ ﯾﺘﻘﺪّ م ّ‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮر اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ — ﺑﻞ ﱔ ﺗﻮاﺑﻊ وﻟﻮازم ﻟ ﺴﺖ ﳑّﺎ ﳛﻘﻖ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﳑّﺎ ﯾﺘﻠــﻮ اﳌﺎﻫﯿــﺔ — ﻓﺎﳌﺎﻫﯿــﺔ ﺗﺜـ ﺖ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫دوﳖﺎ‪ .‬وٕاذا ﺛﺒ ﺖ دوﳖﺎ‪ ،‬ﱂ ﯾﺘﻌﺬر ٔن ﺗﻌﻘﻞ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ وٕان ﱂ ﺗﺘﻘﺪّ م ٔو إن ﱂ ﯾﻠﺰم ﺗﻌﻘﻠﻬﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬وﻗﺪ َ‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮرت اﻟﴚء ﻟﻔــﻌﻞ ﻣﻠﺤــﻮﻇ ًﺎ إﻟﯿــﻪ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻠﻤﺖ ٔﱐ ﻟﺴﺖ ٔﻋﲏ ﲠﺬا اﻟﺘﻌﻘّﻞ ٔن ﻜﻮن‪ ،‬إذا ّ‬ ‫اﳌﻘﻮﻣﺎت ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﻟﻔﻌﻞ‪ ،‬ﻓﺮﺑّﲈ ﱂ ﺗﻠﺤﻆ ا ٔﺟﺰاء ﺑﺬﻫﻨﻚ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ٔﻋﲏ ﲠــﺬا‬ ‫ﻜﻮن ﻣﻊ ذ‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮرت ٔﻓﺮاد ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ﯾﺼﺢ‬ ‫ٔﻧ ّﻚ إذا ٔﺧﻄﺮت ا ٔﻣﺮﻦ ﻣﻌﺎ ﻟﺒﺎل ﱂ ﳝﻜ ﻚ ٔن َ ْﺴﻠﺐ ا ي ﻫﻮ ِّ‬ ‫ﻣﻘﻮم ﻋﻦ ا ي ﻫﻮ ﻣﻘﻮم ﺳﻠﺒﺎ ّ‬ ‫ﯾﻘﻮﻣﻪ ﻓ ﻪ‪ .‬ﻓﺎٕذا ﰷن ﻛﺬ ﻓ ﺠﺐ ٔن ﻻ ﳝــﻜ ﻚ‬ ‫اﳌﻘﻮم ﲟﺎﻫﯿﺘﻪ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ ﻣﻦ دون وﺟﻮد ﻣﺎ ّ ِ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﻪ وﺟﻮد ّ‬ ‫ﺳﻠﺒﻪ ﻋﻨﻪ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﺗﻌﻘﻞ وﺟﻮدﻩ ﻻ ﳏﺎ ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟﻌﻮارض ﻓﻼ ٔﻣ ﻊ ﲱّﺔ اﺳﺘ ﺎﺗﻚ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ ﻣﻌﲎ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ وﻻ ﺗﻌــﻘﻞ وﺟــﻮدﻫﺎ ﻠﲈﻫﯿــﺔ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ‬ ‫ﺴﻠﳢﺎ ﺳﻠﺒﺎ ﰷذ ‪ .‬وﻻ ٔوﺟﺐ ذ ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﰲ ّ‬ ‫ﰻ اﻟﻌﻮارض ﻓﺎ ّٕن ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻮارض ﻣﺎ ﯾﻠﺰم اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﻟﺰوﻣﺎ ٔ ّوﻟﯿﺎ‬ ‫ﺑ ِ ّ ﺎ ﻟ ﺲ ﺑﻮاﺳﻄﺔ ﺎرض ٓﺧﺮ‪ ،‬ﻓ ﻜﻮن ﺳﻠﺒﻪ ﻋﻦ اﳌﺎﻫﯿــﺔ ﻣــﻊ اﺳــﺘ ﺎت اﳌﺎﻫﯿــﺔ وٕاﺧﻄﺎرﻫــﲈ ﻣــﻌﺎ ﻟــﺒﺎل‬ ‫ﻣﺴ ﺘﺤﯿﻼ إذا ﰷن ﻟ ﺲ ﺴ ﺐ وﺳﻂ ﺑ ﻪ وﺑ ﻪ‪ .‬وذ ﻣ ﻞ ﻮن اﳌﺜﻠّﺚ ﲝــﯿﺚ ﳝﻜــﻦ ٕاﺧـﺮاج ٔ ــﺪ‬ ‫ٔﺿﻼ ﻪ ﲆ ﺳﺘﻘﺎﻣﺔ ﺗﻮﻫّﲈ‪ٔ ،‬و ﻣﻌﲎ ٓﺧﺮ ﳑّﺎ ﺸﺒﻪ ﻫﺬا ﳑّﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺎرض ‪ .‬وﻗﺪ ﳝﻜﻦ ٔن ﻜﻮن وﺟﻮد‬

‫‪] Manṭiq al-Mašriqiyyīn, p. .–.‬ﻗﺎﲚﺘﲔ ‪… ‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪‬‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮ ُرﻫﺎ | ‪ Ṣ²‬ﻓﺎٕذ ‪ Ṣ‬إذ ‪ T‬ﻓﺎٕذن ‪ Š‬ﻓﺎٕذا ]ﻓﺎٕذ | ‪ ξ‬ﻓ ٔﻣﺎ ]و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪ Br ‬اﻟﴚء ] ﻠﴚء ‪ Br ‬إذ ] ٔن | ‪ N‬ﻓﺎٕذا ]وٕاذا ‪‬‬ ‫‪ J‬ﯾﺘﺼﻮر ﺗﻘﺪ ﺎ ]ﯾﺘﻘﺪّ م ّ‬ ‫‪ τ‬واﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ]ﻓﺎﳌﺎﻫﯿــﺔ | ‪ om. E om. et add. s.l. Ṣ‬ﳑّﺎ | ‪ No‬ﯨﯩﻔــﻖ ]ﳛﻘــﻖ | ‪ om. E‬ﱔ | ‪ praem. et exp. No‬وﻻ ]‪‬ﺑﻞ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ add. in mg.‬ﯾﺒﻌﺪ ‪ ιKaBTe‬ﯾﺒﻌﺪ ]‪ θJNkETCYi p.c. Y‬ﯾﺘﻌ ّﺬر | ‪ om. et add. in mg. DaTo‬دوﳖﺎ… وٕاذا | ‪ E‬ﻓﺎٕذا ‪ ν‬وٕاذ ]وٕاذا ‪‬‬ ‫‪ γξτJETTeYi‬ﰲ ﻫﺬا ]ﲠﺬا ‪ om. et add. s.l. Ṣ ‬ﱂ | ‪ om. Di‬ﯾﻠﺰم… ٔو | ‪ Br‬وٕان ] ٔو إن | ‪ add. in mg. Di‬ﯾﺘﻌﺬر ‪NkC :‬‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮرت ‪ add. s.l. Nk add. in mg. C ‬ﲠﺬا‬ ‫ا ٓﺧﺮ ]ا ٔﺟﺰاء | ‪ٔ om. G‬ﯾﻀﺎ | ‪ praem. Da om. N‬ﻣﻊ ] ٔﻓﺮاد | ‪ Te‬ﺗﺼﻮرات ] ّ‬ ‫‪ om. et add. in mg.‬ﻣﻘﻮم…ﻋﻦ | ‪ iter. a.c. Ṣ‬ﻋﻦ ا ي ‪ om. N ‬ﲠﺬا | ‪ add. et exp. Yi‬ﱂ ﯾﺘﻌﺬر ٔن ﯾﻌﻘﻞ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ]ﺑﺬﻫﻨﻚ | ‪T‬‬ ‫‪ om. et‬ﲱّﺔ ‪ om. N ‬ﻓ ﻪ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. To‬وﺟﻮد | ‪ Br‬ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ ‪ νπDiDaTe‬ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺘﻪ ]ﲟﺎﻫﯿﺘﻪ | ‪ om. To‬ﻣﻌﻪ ‪B ‬‬ ‫‪ om. et‬ﻣﻦ | ‪ٔ BrE‬ﯾﻀﺎ ذ ]ذ ٔﯾﻀﺎ | ‪ add. Br‬ﳇﯿﺎ ]ﺳﻠﺒﺎ ‪ om. Lat.G ‬ﻣﻌﲎ | ‪ om. N‬ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ | ‪add. i.l. Yi s.l. Br‬‬ ‫‪ MiG‬ﻟﻬﺎ ] | ‪ praem. Br‬ﻫﻮ ‪ add. JTṢTeEd.‬ﻫﻮ ]ﻟ ﺲ | ‪ JETG‬إذ ]إذا ‪ iter. T ‬ﻟ ﺲ ‪ّٔ om. To ‬وﻟﯿﺎ | ‪add. in mg. G‬‬ ‫وﺑ ﳯﺎ ]وﺑ ﻪ | ‪ om. T‬وﺑ ﻪ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ‬ﺑ ﳯﺎ ‪ K‬ﺑ ﳯﺎ ]ﺑ ﻪ | ‪ Br‬ﺑﻮﺳﻂ ] ﺴ ﺐ وﺳﻂ | ‪ No‬ﻟﺴ ﺐ ] ﺴ ﺐ | ‪s.l. To om. τ add. s.l. Ṣ²‬‬ ‫‪ ξDa‬ﻓﻬﺬا ]ﻫﺬا | ‪ ξDa‬ﺸﳢﻪ ] ﺸﺒﻪ ‪ ٔ om. ξ ‬ﺪ | ‪ praem. DiTo‬ﻻ ]ﳝﻜﻦ | ‪ E‬وﺑﲔ ذ ‪ Nk‬ﻓﺬ ]وذ | ‪MiŠG s.l. To‬‬

‫‪٣٦‬ق‬

Chapter I.6  73

devoid of them with being conceived (I mean the quiddity being conceived in the mind). Since this is the case, it is absolutely necessary for the attributes that we call essential for the intelligible meanings to be intellected for the thing in this manner, for the quiddity is not conceived in the mind unless their conception precedes.

[. The quiddity and the features that are consequent on it] [.. The quiddity can be conceived without those attributes whose conception follows the quiddity’s conception] Since the other accidents are neither among the things whose conception in the mind precedes the conception of the quiddity in it, nor are they together with the conception of the quiddity — on the contrary, they are appositions and concomitants that are not among the things that verify the quiddity, but rather among the things that follow the quiddity — the quiddity is established without them. Since [the quiddity] is established without them, it is not impossible that the quiddity is intellected even if they are not intellected before or after [it].

[.. The sense of ‘intellection’] You have already learnt that I do not mean by this ‘intellection’ that, when you conceive the thing in actuality as an object of consideration, you also conceive, besides this, its single constituents in actuality, for sometimes you do not consider the parts with your mind. On the contrary, I mean by this that, when you notify to [your] mind the two things together, it is impossible for you to negate what is constitutive of that to which it is constitutive, in a way that, in spite of this, the existence in the mind of what is constituted by virtue of its quiddity is preserved [even] without the existence in the mind of what constitutes it. If it is so, then it must be impossible for you to negate the one of the other; on the contrary, the existence of the one is inevitably intellected as belonging to the other.

[. Distinction between accidents that are primary concomitants and accidents that are concomitants in a mediate way] [.. Demonstration of the existence of the two kinds of concomitants] As for the accidents, I do not deny that you can correctly establish in the mind the meaning of the quiddity without conceiving their existence as belonging to the quiddity, on the contrary, you would deny it falsely. [However], I do not affirm it with

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎدس ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫اﻟﻌﺎرض ﺑﻮاﺳﻄﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﺎٕذا ﱂ ﲣﻄﺮ ﺗ اﻟﻮاﺳﻄﺔ ﻟﺒﺎل ٔﻣﻜﻦ ﺳﻠﺒﻪ‪ ،‬ﻣ ﻞ ﻮن ّ‬ ‫ﰻ زاوﯾﺘﲔ ﻣﻦ اﳌﺜﻠّﺚ ٔﺻﻐﺮ‬ ‫ﻣﻦ ﻗﺎﲚﺘﲔ‪.‬‬ ‫وﻟﻮﻻ ﲱّﺔ وﺟﻮد اﻟﻘﺴﻢ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﳌﺎ ﰷﻧﺖ ﻟﻮازم ﳎﻬﻮ ‪ ،‬وﻟﻮﻻ ﲱّﺔ اﻟﻘﺴﻢ ا ٔ ّول ﳌﺎ ﰷن ﻣﺎ ّﻧﺒﲔ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻣﻦ‬ ‫اﳌﺘﻮﺳﻂ إن ﰷن ﻻ ﺰال ﻜﻮن ﻻزﻣﺎ ﻠﲈﻫﯿﺔ ﲑ ﺑَـ ِ ّـﲔ‬ ‫ﺑﺘﻮﺳﻂ ﳾء ﺣﻘّﺎ‪ .‬وذ ٔ ّن ّ‬ ‫إﺛﺒﺎت ﻻزم ﻠﲈﻫﯿﺔ ّ‬ ‫اﳌﻘﻮﻣﺎت‪ ،‬ﺻﺎر اﻟﻼزم ا ﻬﻮل‪ ،‬ﻛﲈ ﺗﻌﲅ‪ ،‬ﻻزﻣﺎ ﻟﻬﺬا‬ ‫اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻟﻬﺎ‪ ،‬ذﻫﺐ ا ٔﻣﺮ إﱃ ﲑ ﳖﺎﯾﺔ‪ .‬وٕان ﰷن ﻣﻦ ّ‬ ‫ﻣﻘﻮم وﰷن ﻻزﻣﺎ ٓﺧﺮ ا ٔﻣﺮ ﺑﻼ واﺳﻄﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫اﳌﻘﻮم ّ‬ ‫ﻣﻘﻮم ّ‬ ‫ﻣﻘﻮﻣﺎ إذ ّ‬ ‫اﳌﻘﻮم ﻻ ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ﰠ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ ٔن ّ‬ ‫)‪ (.‬ﳁﺎ ﰷن ﻣﻦ اﻠﻮازم ﲑ ِ ّﺑﲔ ﻠﴚء ّ‬ ‫ﯾﺘﻮﱒ اﻟﴚء ﻣﺮﻓﻮ ﺎ ﻋﻨﻪ ذ اﻟﻼزم ﻣــﻦ‬ ‫ﯾﺼﺢ ﻣﻦ ﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺔ وﱂ ّ‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮرﻩ ﻗﺪ ﳛﺼﻞ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ ﻣﻊ ﺳﻠﺐ اﻟﻼزم ﻋﻨــﻪ ﻟﻔــﻌﻞ واﻋﺘــﺒﺎر ﻫــﺬﻩ‬ ‫ٔ ّﻣﺎ ﺔ اﻟﺼ ّ ﺔ ﳁﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ٔ ّن ّ‬ ‫اﻟﺼ ّ ﺔ واﳉﻮاز ﲝﺴﺐ ا ﻫﻦ اﳌﻄﻠﻖ‪.‬‬ ‫و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ﺔ ﺳﺘ ﺎ ﻓ ٔن ﯾُ ّ‬ ‫ﺘﻮﱒ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﳚﻮز ٔن ﻟﻮ ﰷن ﳛﺼﻞ ﰲ ا ٔﻋﯿﺎن وﻗﺪ ﺳﻠﺐ ﻋﻨﻪ ﻓﳱﺎ اﻟﻼزم ﺣﱴ‬ ‫ﯾﺼﺢ ٔن ﻟﻮ ﰷن ﻜﻮن ﻫﺬا اﻟﺸﺨﺺ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا وﻻ اﻟﻨﺪب ا ي ﻟﺰﻣــﻪ ﰲ ٔﺻــﻞ اﳋﻠﻘــﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻜﻮن ﻣ ﻼ ﻛﲈ ّ‬ ‫ﯾﺼﺢ ٔﯾﻀﺎ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﰷن ﻜﻮن ﻫﺬا اﳌﺜﻠّﺚ ﻣﻮﺟﻮدا وﻻ زاوﯾﺘﺎﻩ ٔﻗ ّﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺎﲚﺘﲔ‪ .‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن ﻫﺬا ّ‬ ‫اﻟﺘﻮﱒ ﻓﺎﺳﺪ ﻻ‬ ‫ﻓﺼﺎر ّ‬ ‫ﳚﻮز وﺟﻮد ﺣﳬﻪ وﻟ ﺲ ﰷﳌﺬ ﻮر ﻣﻌﻪ‪ ،‬واﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﺼ ّ ﺔ واﳉﻮاز ﲝﺴﺐ ذﻫﻦ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ﻠﻤﻮﺟﻮد‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (‬ﻓﻘﺪ ن ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬا ٔ ّن ﻣﻦ اﻟﺼﻔﺎت ﻣﺎ ﯾﺼـ ّـﺢ ﺳــﻠﺒﻪ وﺟــﻮدا‪ ،‬وﻣــﳯﺎ ﻣﺎ ﯾﺼـ ّـﺢ ﺳــﻠﺒﻪ ﺗــﻮﻫّﲈ ﻻ ﰲ‬ ‫ﯾﺼﺢ‬ ‫ﯾﺼﺢ ﺳﻠﺒﻪ ﺑﻮ ﻪ وﻫﻮ ﺎرض‪ ،‬وﻣﳯﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻻ ّ‬ ‫ﯾﺼﺢ ﺳﻠﺒﻪ ﺗﻮﻫّﲈ ﻣﻄﻠﻘﺎ‪ ،‬وﻣﳯﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻻ ّ‬ ‫اﻟﻮﺟﻮد‪ ،‬وﻣﳯﺎ ﻣﺎ ّ‬

‫‪] Išārāt, pp. .–..‬واﺳﻄﺔ ‪ … ‬وﻟﻮﻻ ‪‬‬ ‫ﯾﺘ ــﲔ ]ﻧﺒـ ّـﲔ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ‬ﻣﺎ ‪ Ṣ‬ﳑﺎ ]ﻣﺎ | ‪ praem. νBr‬وﺟــﻮد ]‪‬اﻟﻘﺴــﻢ | ‪ ξ‬و ]‪‬وﻟــﻮﻻ | ‪ T‬و ]‪‬وﻟــﻮﻻ ‪ YiG ‬اﻟــﻘﺎﲚﺘﲔ ]ﻗﺎﲚﺘــﲔ ‪‬‬ ‫ﺑﺘﻮﺳﻂ | ‪ add. γEd. add. in mg. To‬ﺎرض ]إﺛﺒﺎت ‪ om. et add. s.l. Br ‬ﺑﻌﺪ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ²‬ﺗﺒﲔ ‪DiṢMiŠYG‬‬ ‫‪ praem.‬ﻻ ] ّ‬ ‫‪ add. in mg.‬ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ ‪ om. TTeG add. in mg. G‬ﳾء ‪ in mg. E‬ﳾء ﺣﻘﺎ ‪ et‬ﺑﲔ ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ ﺣﻘﺎ ]ﳾء ﺣﻘّﺎ | ‪ praem. s.l. Nk‬ﺑﻌﺪ ‪MiG‬‬ ‫‪ BEd. in mg. Di‬ا ﳯﺎﯾﺔ ]ﳖﺎﯾﺔ | ‪ No‬ﰲ ]إﱃ | ‪ Nk‬ﻫﺐ ]ﻟﻬﺎ ذﻫﺐ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ²‬ﻟﻬﺎ ‪] εEDaṢ‬ﻟﻬﺎ ‪ add. Br ‬ﰲ ذ اﻟﴚء ‪Y‬‬ ‫‪] praem. G om. et add.‬ﺑﻼ | ‪ٓ Nk‬ﺧﺮ ] ٓﺧﺮ | ‪] add. θνπJE exp. Ṣ²‬ﻻزﻣﺎ ‪ om. et add. in mg. G ‬ا ٔﻣﺮ ‪… ‬ﻟﻬﺬا‬ ‫‪ om. ξKaBrJNkETDaTeG add. i.l. G‬ﻗﺪ ‪ٔ om. Y ‬ﻣﺎ ﺔ اﻟﺼ ﺔ ‪ in mg. sed‬اﻟﻼزم ‪ … ‬ﻣﻦ | ‪ Br‬ﻓ ﺼﺢ ] ّ‬ ‫ﰠ ‪s.l. K ‬‬ ‫ﻣﻄﻠﻘﺎ ]اﳌﻄﻠﻖ | ‪ om. et add. i. l. N‬اﻟﺼ ﺔ و ]اﻟﺼ ّ ﺔ واﳉﻮاز ‪ add. s.l. Da ‬ﻋﻨﻪ | ‪ DiMiŠ‬ﯾﺘﺤﺼﻞ ]ﳛﺼﻞ | ‪add. s.l. JNk‬‬ ‫‪ del. C‬ﻜﻮن ‪ٔ et‬ن ﻜﻮن ﻟﻮ ﰷن ]‪ ‬ﻜﻮن…ﻟﻮ | ‪ٔ E‬ﻧﻪ ] ٔن ‪ iter. N ‬ﰲ | ‪ om. JTTe‬ﻟﻮ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ‬ﺑ ٔن ]ﻓ ٔن ‪ Te ‬اﳌﻄﺎﺑﻖ ‪Yi‬‬ ‫‪] Lat.‬اﻟﻌــﺠﺐ؟[ »‪ s.l. Ṣ² «admiratione‬اﻟﻨــﺪب ‪ Ka‬ﻠﺘــﺪﺑﲑ ‪ Š‬اﻟﻨــﺪب ‪ EṢG in mg. To p.c. ex‬اﻟﺒــﺪن ‪ Mi‬اﻟﺒــﺪن ‪ p.c. ex‬اﻟﻨــﺪب‬ ‫‪ٔ εLat.‬ن ﻟﻮ ] ٔﻧ ّﻪ | ‪ٔ om. Lat.G add. in mg. G‬ﯾﻀﺎ | ‪ om. DiMiG add. s.l. DiMi‬ﻓﺼﺎر ‪ om. et add. in mg. K ‬ﻟﺰﻣﻪ‬ ‫‪ om. BE om. et‬ﻣﻌﻪ… وﻟ ﺲ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. ToN‬وﺟﻮد ‪ add. s.l. G ‬ﻓﺎٕن ‪ εTTe s.l. Ṣ²‬ﻟﻜﻦ ]ﻓﺎ ّٕن | ‪ add. s.l. Mi‬ﻫﺬا‬ ‫ﻠﻮﺟﻮد ‪ ξTṢYi‬ﻠﻮﺟﻮد ] ﻠﻤﻮﺟﻮد | ‪ praem. in mg. G‬ﲑ ]ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ | ‪ om. Yi‬ذﻫﻦ | ‪ Br‬ﺪم ]ﻫﺬﻩ | ‪ s.l. C‬خ ‪add. in mg. BrNk‬‬ ‫‪] νξEDaṢ‬ﻻ | ‪ in mg. ToŠ‬اﻟﺼﻔﺎت ‪ et‬اﻟﻌﻮارض ‪ E‬اﻟﻌﻮارض ]اﻟﺼﻔﺎت | ‪ add. Di‬اﻟﻌﻮارض ] ّٔن | ‪ om. G‬ﻣﻦ…ﻫﺬا ‪i.l. Di ‬‬ ‫‪] add.‬ﺳﻠﺒﻪ | ‪ add. ξ‬ﺴﻮاد اﳋ ﴚ ﻓﺎٕﻧﻪ ﯾﻠﺰم ٕا ﺴﺎﻧ ﻪ ﻻ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ وﻻ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ]اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ‪praem. TMi praem. et exp. J ‬‬ ‫‪ om. ξ‬ﻣﺎ | ‪ om. C‬ﺳﻠﺒﻪ ‪… ‬ﺗﻮﻫّﲈ | ‪ add. No‬ﻜﻮن ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ﰲ ﻣﲀن وﳓﻮﻩ ]ﺗﻮﻫّﲈ | ‪et exp. J add. T‬‬

Chapter I.6  75

regard to all the accidents, for among the accidents there is [(i)] what is primarily [and] manifestly a necessary concomitant of the quiddity without the mediation of any other feature occurring [to it], whose negation of the quiddity is impossible when the quiddity is established and they are both notified together to the mind, since it does not belong to it because of [something] intermediate between the one and the other. This is like the fact that the triangle is such that it is possible to extend in estimation one of its sides in a straight line, or [like] another similar meaning among Q36 what occurs to it. [(ii)] It is possible for the accidental feature to exist by virtue of something intermediate in a way that, when that intermediate [element] does not occur to the mind, its negation is possible, like the fact that any two angles of the triangle are less than two right angles. If the existence of the second kind [of features] [(ii)] were not possible, there would not be unknown concomitants, whereas if the [existence of the] first kind [of features] [(i)] were not possible, then what we will explain to you later about establishing a necessary concomitant of the quiddity through the mediation of something [else] would not be true. This is because if [at a certain point] the intermediate [element] does not cease to be a necessary concomitant of the quiddity that does not belong to it manifestly, the thing goes on infinitely. If it is among the constitutive [features], the unknown concomitant, as you know, becomes a necessary concomitant of this constitutive [feature], [but] not constitutive [for it] (since the constitutive for the constitutive is [something] constitutive), and, lastly, it is a concomitant without [any] intermediate [element].

[.. Possibility and impossibility of the negation of mediated concomitants] As to what was among the concomitants that belong to the thing non-manifestly, that concomitant could be represented in estimation as removed from the thing under a certain respect, whereas this was impossible under [another] respect. Regarding [its] possibility, this is so because its conception sometimes obtains in the mind even though [its] necessary concomitant is actually negated of it, and the consideration of this possibility and admissibility is on account of the absolute mind. Regarding [its] impossibility, it consists in representing in estimation that it is possible for it to be realized in the concrete instantiations even though the necessary concomitant has already been negated of it in them, so that, for instance, as it is possible for this individual, if ever, to exist even without the scar that became his concomitant when he first came to be, it is also possible for this triangle to exist even if two of its angles are not less than two right angles. For in fact, this estimation is false [and] its status cannot possibly exist, unlike what was mentioned with it, because the consideration of this possibility and admissibility is on account of a mind that corresponds to what exists.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎدس ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ﺳﻠﺒﻪ وﻫﻮ ذاﰐ ﻟﻜﻦ ّﳣﲒ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﺎرض ﺑ ٔ ّن ا ﻫﻦ ﻻ ﯾﻮﺟﺐ ﺳﺒﻖ ﺛﺒﻮت ﻣﺎ ا اﰐ ذاﰐ ﻗ ﻞ ﺛﺒــﻮت‬ ‫ا اﰐ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ رﺑّﲈ ٔوﺟﺐ ﺳﺒﻖ ﺛﺒﻮت ا اﰐ‪ .‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟﻌﺮﴈ ﻓﺎ ّٕن ا ﻫﻦ ﳚﻌ ﻟﯿﺎ‪ ،‬وٕان وﺟﺐ وﱂ ﯾ ﺴﻠﺐ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (‬ﻓﻘﺪ اﺗ ّﻀﺢ ﯿﻒ ﱂ ُﳛ ّﺼﻞ ﻣﻌﲎ ا اﰐ واﻟﻌﺮﴈ ﻣﻦ اﻗ ﴫ ﲆ اﻟﺒﯿﺎﻧﲔ اﳌﺬ ﻮر ﻦ‪.‬‬

‫رﲟﺎ ‪ Ṣ‬إﳕﺎ ]رﺑّﲈ ‪ add. in mg. G ‬ﻗ ﻞ ﺛﺒﻮت ‪ om. et‬ﻗ ﻞ | ‪ om. C‬ﺛﺒﻮت ‪… ‬ﻣﺎ | ‪ No : om. Yi‬ﳣﲒﻩ ] ّ‬ ‫ﳣﲒ | ‪ Ka‬وﻟﻜﻦ ]ﻟﻜﻦ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ T‬اﻟﺘﺒﺎﯾﻨﲔ ]اﻟﺒﯿﺎﻧﲔ | ‪ om. BrTTe‬ﱂ ‪ Ed. ‬اﻟﻌﺮض ]اﻟﻌﺮﴈ | ‪ om. νξLat.EDiDaG‬ﺛﺒﻮت | ‪s.l. Ṣ²‬‬

‫‪٣٧‬ق‬

Chapter I.6  77

[. New classification of the predicables based on the possibility or impossibility of negating them of their subjects] [In sum,] it has become clear to you from this that there are: [(1)] attributes whose negation is possible in existence; [(2)] attributes whose negation is possible in estimation [but] not in existence; [(3)] attributes whose negation is possible in the absolute estimation; [(4)] attributes whose negation is impossible under a [certain] respect, and that is accidental; [(5)] and attributes whose negation is impossible, and that is essential, but is distinguished from the accidental because the mind does not Q37 require to establish what [the subject] with respect to which the essential is essential is before establishing the essential [itself]; on the contrary, it sometimes requires that the essential is established first. As to the accidental, the mind posits it as consequent, even if it is necessary and cannot be negated.

[. Conclusion] [Finally], it has appeared clear to you how those who confined themselves to the explanations mentioned above did not realize the meaning of essential and accidental.

‫]اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ[‬ ‫ﻓﺼﻞ ﰲ ﺗﻌﻘّﺐ ﻣﺎ ﻗﺎ اﻟﻨﺎس ﰲ ا ا ّل ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫)‪ (‬ا ّٕن ا ا ّل ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﻗﺪ ﻗ ﻞ ﻓ ﻪ ٕاﻧ ّﻪ ﻫﻮ ا ا ّل ﲆ ذاﰐ ﻣﺸﱰك ﯿﻒ ﰷن‪ ،‬وﱂ ﯾﺒﻠﻐﻨﺎ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ٔﺷﺪّ‬ ‫ﴍ ﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬا‪ .‬ﻓﻠﻨﻨﻈﺮ ا ٓن ﻫﻞ اﳌﻔﻬﻮم ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻠﻔﻈﺔ ﲝﺴﺐ اﻟﺘﻌﺎرف اﻟﻌﺎ ّﻣﻲ ﻫﻮ ﻫــﺬا اﳌــﻌﲎ ٔو ﻻ‬ ‫اﳋﺎص واﺗ ّﻔﻘﻮا ﻠﯿﻪ ﺴ ﻞ اﻟﻨﻘﻞ ﯾﺪل ﻠﯿﻪ‪ .‬ﻓ ٕﺎ ّ إذا ﻓﻌﻠﻨﺎ ﻫﺬا‪ ،‬اﺗ ّﻀﺢ ﻟﻨﺎ ﻏﺮض ﺒﲑ‪.‬‬ ‫وﻫﻞ ﻣﺎ ﺗﻌﺎرﻓﻪ ّ‬ ‫)‪ّ ٔ (‬ﻣﺎ اﳌﻔﻬﻮم ﲝﺴﺐ اﻟﺘﻌﺎرف اﻟﻌﺎ ّﻣﻲ ﻓﻠ ﺲ ﯾﺪ ّل ﻠﯿﻪ‪ .‬وذ ٔ ّن ا ا ّل ﲆ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ اﻟﴚء ﻫﻮ ا ي‬ ‫ﯾﺪ ّل ﲆ اﳌﻌﲎ ا ي ﺑﻪ اﻟﴚء ﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ واﻟﴚء ٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﯾﺼﲑ ﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﲝﺼــﻮل ﲨﯿــﻊ ٔوﺻــﺎﻓﻪ ا اﺗﯿــﺔ‬ ‫ﲣﺺ ٔﯾﻀﺎ‪ .‬ﻓﺎ ّن ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ﻟ ﺲ ﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺑ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﺣ ـﻮان‪ ،‬وٕا ّﻻ ـﲀﻧﺖ اﳊﯿﻮاﻧﯿــﺔ ﲢﺼﻞ‬ ‫اﳌﺸﱰك ﻓﳱﺎ واﻟﱵ ّ‬ ‫ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎﻧﯿﺔ‪ .‬ﻧﻌﻢ‪ ،‬اﳊﯿﻮاﻧﯿﺔ ﳏﺘﺎج ٕا ﳱﺎ ﰲ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ‪ ،‬وﻟ ﺲ ّ‬ ‫ﰻ ﻣﺎ ﳛﺘﺎج إﻟﯿﻪ ﰲ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﳾء‬ ‫ﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻜﻮن ﻫﻮ ا ي ﳛﺼﻞ ﲝﺼــﻮ و ــﺪﻩ اﻟﴚء ﻫــﻮ ﻣﺎ ﻫــﻮ‪ .‬ﻓﺎٕذا ﰷن ﻛــﺬ ‪ ،‬ﱂ ﻜــﻦ ا اﰐ‬ ‫اﳋﺎص و ﺪﻩ ﻫﻮ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ اﻟﴚء‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﺟﺰء ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺘﻪ‪ .‬واﻟﻌﺠﺐ ٔ ّن ﺟﲈ ﺔ‬ ‫ﻣﺸﱰك ﻠﴚء ﻣﻊ ﲑﻩ و ﺪﻩ وﻻ ّ‬ ‫اﳋﺎص ّ‬ ‫داﻻ ﲆ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ذاﰐ وﻫﻮ‬ ‫ﳑّﻦ ﺮى ٔ ّن ا اﰐ وا ا ّل ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ وا ﺪ ﻻ ﳚﻌﻞ ا اﰐ ّ‬ ‫ا ي ﺴ ّﻤﯿﻪ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻓﺼﻼ؛ ﻓﻬﺬا ﻫﺬا‪.‬‬ ‫اﳋﺎص‪ ،‬ﻓﻬــﻮ ٔ ّ ﳒــﺪ‬ ‫ﺗﻌﺮف اﳊﺎل ﰲ ا ا ّل ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﲆ ﺳ ﻞ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ واﻟﺘﻌﺎرف ّ‬ ‫)‪ (.‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ّ‬ ‫اﳊﺴﺎس وﻣﺎ‬ ‫اﳊﯿﻮان واﳊﺴﺎس ﶊـﻮﻟﲔ ــﲆ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن واﻟﻔــﺮس واﻟﺜــﻮر‪ّ ،‬ﰒ ﳒــﺪ ٔﻫﻞ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ــﺔ ﳚﻌﻠــﻮن ّ‬ ‫ﳚﺮي ﳎﺮاﻩ ﻣﻦ ﲨ ٔﻣﻮر ﺴ ّﻤﻮﳖﺎ ﻓﺼﻮﻻ ٔﻣﻮر ﺴ ّﻤــﻮﳖﺎ ٔﺟ ﺎﺳــﺎ ذاﺗﯿــﺔ‪ّ ،‬ﰒ ﻻ ﳚﻌﻠــﻮﳖﺎ ﻣــﻦ ﲨـ ﻣﺎ‬ ‫‪] Šifāʾ, Ğadal‬ﻫﻮ ‪… ‬ا ا ّل‬

‫| ‪] Nağāt, pp. .–..‬ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺘﻪ ‪ّ ٔ … ‬ﻣﺎ ‪ ] Nağāt, p. .–.  2‬ﺒﲑ ‪ … ‬ا ّٕن ‪‬‬ ‫‪] Išārāt, p. .–.‬وا ﺪ ‪ … ‬واﻟﻌﺠﺐ ‪I., p. .. ‬‬

‫‪ praem. Yi‬ﻫﻮ ] ٕاﻧ ّﻪ ﻫﻮ | ‪ om. JTTe‬ﻓ ﻪ ‪ Y ‬اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ ‪ Mi‬اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﻦ ا ٔول ﻣﻦ ﲨـ اﳌﻨﻄــﻖ ]ﻓﺼﻞ ‪‬‬ ‫اﳋﺎص ‪ٔ εηBr ‬م ] ٔو | ‪ praem. E‬ﲆ ]‪‬ﻫﺬا | ‪ No‬ﻫﺬا ]ﻫﺬﻩ ‪‬‬ ‫‪  om. To‬ﻠﯿﻪ | ‪ JTTe‬ﻗ ﯿﻞ ] ﺴ ﻞ | ‪ μ‬اﳋﻮاص ‪ BrDa‬اﳋﺎﺻﺔ ] ّ‬ ‫‪‬‬ ‫‪ s.l. N‬و ]وذ ‪ Ṣ ‬ﻛﯩ ‪ in mg. Di‬ﻛﺜﲑ ‪ ημξJTYi‬ﻛﺜﲑ ] ﺒﲑ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ‬ﻋﺮﺿﺎ ]ﻏﺮض | ‪ praem. Ṣ‬ﻓﻘﺪ ]اﺗ ّﻀﺢ | ‪ Br‬ذ ]ﻫﺬا‬ ‫]ﳏﺘﺎج ‪ om. Y ‬ﻫﻮ | ‪ εJETṢTe‬وا ي ]واﻟﱵ ‪ s.l. N ‬اﻟﴚء ]واﻟﴚء ‪ Da ‬ﻠﴚء ]اﻟﴚء | ‪ Da‬اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ]ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ | ‪ٔ C‬ن ] ٔ ّن‬ ‫‪ Ṣ‬وٕاذا ]ﻓﺎٕذا | ‪ om. Ed.‬ﻣﺎ | ‪ T‬واﻟﴚء ]اﻟﴚء | ‪ om. J‬ﻫﻮ ‪ om. et add. s.l. Di ‬ﰲ | ‪ s.l. C‬ﻫﻮ | ‪ ξTTe‬ﳜــﺘﺎج‬ ‫‪ om.‬و ﺪﻩ ‪ JTToTeMi et a.c. Š‬ﻫﻮ و ﺪﻩ ]و ﺪﻩ ﻫــﻮ | ‪ in mg. Y‬و ــﺪﻩ ‪ νDa s.l. Ṣ²‬ﰲ ــﺪﻩ ]‪‬و ــﺪﻩ | ‪ G‬اﳌﺸــﱰك ]ﻣﺸــﱰك ‪‬‬ ‫]ﻻ | ‪ To‬ا ال ]وا ا ّل ‪ J ‬ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ اﻟﴚء ‪ DaṢ‬ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ ]ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺘﻪ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. Di om. et add. in mg. B‬و ﺪﻩ ‪νξLat.EDaG‬‬ ‫]ﻫــﺬا | ‪ J om. τ add. in mg. Ṣ‬وﻫــﺬا ]ﻓﻬــﺬا ‪ ιE ‬ذاﰐ ]ذاﰐ | ‪] Lat.‬وﻻ[ »‪ G «et non‬وﻻ ‪ add. s.l. Nk‬وﻻ‬ ‫ﺗﻌﺮف ‪… ‬ﻫﺬا | ‪] Lat.‬ﻫﺬاء ‪«stultitia» [fort.‬‬ ‫ا ال ‪ add. et‬و ٔﻣﺎ ﺗﻌﺮف ]اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ‪ add. s.l. Š ‬ﻫﺬا ‪ّ om. To om. a.c. et‬‬ ‫ذاﺗﯿﺎ ]ذاﺗﯿﺔ ‪ٔ DiNo ‬وﻣﺎ ]وﻣﺎ | ‪ Br‬ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ ]اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ﺔ | ‪ p.c. K‬ﱂ ] ّﰒ ‪ s.l. NkB in mg. C ‬إﳕﺎ ] ٔ ّ | ‪ add. s.l. Š‬ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ‬ ‫‪ p.c. E‬ﳚﻌﻠﻮن ‪ μξEDa‬ﳚﻌﻠﻮﻧﻪ ]ﳚﻌﻠﻮﳖﺎ | ‪ add. s.l. Nk in mg. C‬وﻻ ‪ ι‬وﻻ ] ّﰒ ﻻ | ‪DiDaToMiG a.c. Š‬‬ ‫‪in mg. NkB‬‬

‫ٔي ٔن ) ٔن‪ (B ،- :‬ا اﰐ اﳋﺎص ﰷن ٔوﱃ ﺑ ٔن ﯾﺪل ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﻣﻦ ا اﰐ اﳌﺸﱰك‬

‫اﳋﺎص ‪‬‬ ‫] …ﻻ ‪ٔ i.l. Di ‬ي اﻟﻌﻠﲈء ] ّ‬

‫‪٣٨‬ق‬

C

[I.]

[. Two senses of ‘signifying the quiddity’] Concerning what signifies the quiddity, it was said that it is what signifies whichever shared essential, and no better explanation than this one was transmitted to us. Let us now inquire whether the concept of this expression according to the common understanding is [precisely] this meaning or not, and whether that which the elite understood and upon which they agreed by tradition signifies it or not. In doing so, a great purpose will be disclosed to us.

[. First, common sense of the expression ‘signifying the quiddity’] As to the concept according to [its] common understanding, it does not signify this [meaning]. This is because what signifies the thing’s quiddity is that which signifies the meaning by virtue of which the thing is what it is, but the thing only becomes what it is by the realization of the complex of its shared essential attributes and also of [the attributes] that properly belong [to the thing]. For, in fact, man is not what it is because he is an animal, otherwise animality could realize humanity. Sure, animality is necessary [for man] in order to be what he is, but not everything that is necessary for the thing in order to be what it is is [also] that by whose sole realization the thing is realized as it is. This being the case, then, neither the essential [feature] that the thing shares with something else, nor the [feature] that properly belongs [to Q38 the thing] are, taken alone, the quiddity of the thing, but rather a part of its quiddity. What is astonishing is that the group [of philosophers]1 who hold that the essential and what signifies the quiddity are the same does not consider the proper essential [feature] as signifying the quiddity of that to which it is essential (this is what we will call afterwards ‘differentia’); and that is it [about this subject].

[. Second sense of ‘signifying the quiddity’, established by the elite] [.. Exposition of the view with critical remarks] Trying to know the state of what signifies the quiddity according to the second imposition and to the proper understanding [of the elite], it consists in that we find

 The identity of this group is uncertain; see Commentary.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ﰻ ﻣﺎ ﻜﻮن ّ‬ ‫ﺴ ّﻤﻮﻧﻪ ٔﺟ ﺎﺳﺎ وﳚﻌﻠﻮن ّ‬ ‫داﻻ ــﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿــﺔ ﻟﻌــﺪّ ة ٔﺷــﯿﺎء ﳐﺘﻠﻔــﺔ ـ ﺴﺎ ﻟــﻬﺎ‪ .‬وﻛــﺬ ﺎل‬ ‫ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن واﻟﻨﺎﻃﻖ ﻟﻘ ﺎس إﱃ ٔﺷ ﺎص اﻟﻨﺎس‪ ،‬ﻓ ﺠﻌﻠﻮن ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ﯾﺪ ّل ﻠﳱﺎ ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ وﻻ ﳚﻌﻠﻮن اﻟﻨﺎﻃﻖ‬ ‫ﻧﻮ ﺎ ﻠﺤﯿﻮان دون اﻟﻨﺎﻃﻖ‪ .‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن اﻟﴚء ا ي ﯾﻘﻮﻟﻮن ٕاﻧ ّﻪ دا ّل ﲆ ا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ‬ ‫ﻛﺬ وﳚﻌﻠﻮن ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن‬ ‫ا اﺗﯿﺔ اﳌﺸﱰﻛﺔ ﳚﻌﻠﻮﻧﻪ ﺷ ﺎ ﲑ ا ا ّل ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ا اﺗﯿﺔ اﳌﺸﱰﻛﺔ‪ .‬وﻻ ﳚﻌﻠﻮن اﻟﴚء اﻟﻮا ــﺪ ﺻــﺎﳊﺎ‬ ‫ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻟﻘ ﺎس إﱃ ٔﺷﯿﺎء ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ وﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ‪ ،‬ﺣﱴ ﻜﻮن ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﺸﱰك ﻓ ﻪ ﻫﻮ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﻟﻬﺎ‪ ،‬وﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ‬ ‫ّﳣﲒ ﺑﻪ ﻋﻦ ٔﺷﯿﺎء ٔﺧﺮى ﻫﻮ ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ ﻟﻬﺎ‪ ،‬ﺣﱴ ﻜﻮن اﻟﴚء اﳌﻘﻮل ﲆ اﻟﻜﱶة ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﺸﱰك ﻓ ﻪ اﻟﻜﱶة‬ ‫ﺴﺎ ٔو ﻧﻮ ﺎ‪ ،‬وﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ّﳣﲒ ﺑﻪ ﻓﺼﻼ ﻓ ﻜﻮن ذ اﻟﴚء ﻟﺘ ا ٔﺷﯿﺎء ﺴﺎ ٔو ﻧــﻮ ﺎ‪ ،‬وﻣــﻊ ذ‬ ‫ﯾﻘﻮم اﳉ ﺲ‪ ،‬إن ﰷن ﺴﺎ‬ ‫ﻜﻮن ﻟﻬﺎ ﻓﺼﻼ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ إذا و ﺪوا ﺴﺎ‪ ،‬ار دوا ﺷ ﺎ ٓﺧﺮ ﻟﯿﻜﻮن ﻓﺼﻼ ّ ِ‬ ‫ﯾﻘﻮﻣﻪ؛ وﻛﺬ إذا و ﺪوا ﻧﻮ ﺎ ﻃﻠﺒﻮا ﺷ ﺎ ﻣﻦ ذاﺗﻪ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ‪ .‬وﻟﻮ ﰷن اﻟﴚء ٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﻫﻮ دا ّل ﲆ‬ ‫ﻓﺼﻞ ّ‬ ‫اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﺣﱴ ﻫﻮ ﺲ وﻧﻮع ٔﻧ ّﻪ دا ّل ﲆ ذاﰐ ﻣﺸﱰك ﻓ ﻪ‪ ،‬ﲀن ا ٔﻣﺮ ﲞﻼف ﻫﺬﻩ ا ٔﺣﲀم‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (..‬وﻫﺎﻫﻨﺎ ﻣﻮاﻧﻊ ٔﺧﺮى ﻋﻦ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻣﺎ ﻗﺎﻟﻮﻩ ﻣﻦ ﻮن ا ا ّل ﲆ ذاﰐ ﻣﺸﱰك ّ‬ ‫داﻻ ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ‬ ‫ﯿﺘﺨﺼﺺ ﺑﻪ ﻣﺎ ﺴ ّﻤﻮﻧﻪ ﺴﺎ وﻧﻮ ﺎ ﰲ ﻮﻧﻪ ّ‬ ‫داﻻ ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ‪ ،‬وﻫﻮ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﳚﺐ‬ ‫ﺣﻘّﺎ‪ .‬ﻓﺎٕن زاد ٔ ﺪﱒ ﴍﻃﺎ ﻟ ّ‬ ‫ٔن ﻜﻮن ٔ ّﰪ ا اﺗﯿﺎت اﳌﺸﱰﻛﺔ ﻣﻀﻤﻮ ﰲ ا ﻻ اﻟﱵ ﻟ اﰐ اﳌﺸﱰك — وذ ا ٔ ّﰪ ﻫﻮ ا ٔ ّﰪ ا ي ﻻ‬

‫‪] Material damage in MS Ṣ.‬ﻣﺎ…ﻣﻮاﻧﻊ ‪] Material damage in MS Ṣ. ‬ﻫﻮ…ﻧﻮ ﺎ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ om. νξBrJETDaTe om. et add.‬ﻟﻬﺎ | ‪ Br‬ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ ]اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ | ‪ ] Lat.‬ﺴﺎ ‪ٔ ] «genus» [fort.‬ﺟ ﺎﺳﺎ | ‪ νBrK‬ﺴﻤﻮﳖﺎ ] ﺴ ّﻤﻮﻧﻪ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ praem. et exp. B ‬اﻟﻨﺎﻃﻖ ] ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ | ‪ E‬ﻠﻨﺎس ]اﻟﻨﺎس ‪ Nk ‬ﻓﻜﺬ ]وﻛﺬ | ‪s.l. DiṢ‬‬ ‫‪ μξNkDaṢK om. J‬ﻛﺬ ]‬ ‫‪ om. et‬اﳌﺸﱰﻛﺔ…ﳚﻌﻠﻮﻧﻪ | ‪ om. ξ‬ا اﺗﯿﺔ ‪ CG ‬ﻧﯿﺔ ‪ Ed.‬اﻻٕﻧﯿﺔ ]‪ JTDiDaToŠYN‬ا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ | ‪ rel. Yi‬دون ‪ vacuum post‬دون‬ ‫‪ٔ ] Lat.‬ﯾﯿﺔ ‪ CG «quale esse» [scil.‬اﻧﯿﺔ ‪ Ed.‬إﻧﯿﺔ ]‪ٔ JTDaToŠYN‬ﯾ ّ ّﯿــﺔ ‪ s.l. NkB ‬ﻓــﻼ ‪ εθEC‬ﻓــﻼ ]وﻻ | ‪add. in mg. Ṣ‬‬ ‫ﱔ ]ﻫﻮ | ‪ EYG in mg. Di‬ﻓﳱﺎ ]ﻓ ﻪ | ‪ Ed. «conveniunt» Lat.‬ﺸﱰك ] ﺸﱰك | ‪ om. et add. in mg. Di‬ﻜﻮن ‪… ‬ﻣﻦ‬ ‫ا ٔﺷﯿﺎء ] ٔﺷﯿﺎء | ‪ Ed. «differunt» Lat.‬ﳣﲒ ] ّ‬ ‫ﳣﲒ ‪ p.c. C ‬ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ]ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ | ‪ om. Yi‬ﻓ ﻪ ‪… ‬ﻫﻮ | ‪EYG in mg. Di s.l. C‬‬ ‫ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ]‪‬ﻧﻮ ﺎ ‪ٔ ] Lat. ‬ﯾﯿﺔ ‪ G «quale esse» [scil.‬اﻧﯿﺔ ‪ٔ C‬ﻧﯿﺔ ‪ Ed.‬إﻧﯿﺔ ]‪ٔ JDaToŠN‬ﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ | ‪ in mg. CDi‬ﱔ ‪ EG‬ﱔ ]ﻫﻮ | ‪N‬‬ ‫ﯾﻘﻮم | ‪ Br‬ﻜﻮن ]ﻟﯿﻜﻮن | ‪  om. et add. in mg. G‬ﺴﺎ…ار دوا ‪ Br ‬ﻜﻮن ]ﻓ ﻜﻮن | ‪ Ka‬ﻓ ﻪ ]ﺑﻪ | ‪add. a.c. Ṣ‬‬ ‫ﻟﯿﻘﻮم ] ّ ِ‬ ‫ٔو[ »‪ٔ Mi «aut species‬و ﻧﻮع ]وﻧﻮع | ‪ in mg. G‬ﺣﱴ ‪ et‬ﲔ ‪ p.c. Š‬ﲔ ‪ a.c. et‬ﺣﱴ ‪ Mi‬ﲔ ]ﺣﱴ ‪ Ye ‬اﳊﺲ ]اﳉ ﺲ | ‪EYe‬‬ ‫‪ add. γμ‬ﻓ ﻪ ]ﻣﺸﱰك | ‪ add. i.l. Š‬ﲤﻨﻊ ‪ Mi‬ﲤﻨﻊ ‪ DiTo‬ﲤﻨﻊ ﻋﻦ ]ﻋﻦ | ‪ T‬ﻓﻬﻬﻨﺎ ]وﻫﺎﻫﻨﺎ ‪ om. ṢMi add. s.l. Ṣ² ‬ﻓ ﻪ | ‪] Lat.‬ﻧﻮع‬ ‫‪ Yi‬اﳌﺸﱰك و ]اﳌﺸﱰﻛﺔ ‪ٔ p.c. G ‬و ﻧﻮ ﺎ ‪ٔ Mi‬و ﻧﻮ ﺎ ]وﻧﻮ ﺎ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ²‬ﺑﻪ ﻣﺎ ‪ Ṣ‬ﲟﺎ ]ﺑﻪ ﻣﺎ | ‪ No‬ﴍط ]ﴍﻃﺎ | ‪ ٔ a.c. E‬ﺪﻫﲈ ] ٔ ﺪﱒ ‪‬‬ ‫وذ ا ٔ ّﰪ | ‪ in mg. Y‬وﻫﻮ ]وذ | ‪ C‬اﳌﺸﱰﻛﺔ ‪ s.l. Nk om. B‬اﳌﺸﱰﻛﺔ ]اﳌﺸﱰك | ‪ EDi‬ا ي ]اﻟﱵ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ²‬ﻣﻀﻤﻮ ‪ Ṣ‬ﻣﻀﻤﻨﺎ ]ﻣﻀﻤﻮ‬ ‫‪ s.l. Ṣ²‬ﻫﻮ ‪ om. Lat.Di‬ا ٔﰪ ‪ om. τJT‬ﻫﻮ ا ٔ ّﰪ | ‪ om. Lat.Mi‬ا ٔ ّ‬ ‫ﰪ | ‪ add. in mg. G‬ذ ‪om. EG‬‬ ‫‪ can support both the reading al-anniyya/al-inniyya printed in the Cairo edition‬ﯨﯩﺔ ‪] The rasm‬ا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ ‪‬‬ ‫‪and the reading al-ayyiyya chosen in the present edition; see the Commentary and B‬‬ ‫‪a, pp. –.‬‬

‫‪٣٩‬ق‬

Chapter I.7  81

animal and percipient both predicated of man, horse and bull; then, we find that the specialists of the discipline place percipient and the like among the complex of things which they call ‘differentiae’ of things which they call ‘essential genera’, then they do not place them among the complex of what they call ‘genera’, although they consider everything that signifies the quiddity for a number of different things as a genus for them. So too for the state of man and rational with respect to human individuals, so that they consider man as signifying them with regard to their quiddity, but they do not consider rational in the same way, and, for this [reason], they consider man as a species of animal, but not rational. For, in fact, they consider the thing that, they say, signifies the shared essential quality as not signifying the shared essential quiddity. They do not consider the same one thing as apt to be, in relation to [different] things, an essential quality and a quiddity, so that it is a quiddity insofar as [things] share it, and an essential quality for them insofar as it is that by which [things] are distinguished from other things (so that the thing that is predicated of the plurality is a genus or a species insofar as the plurality shares it, and a differentia insofar as [the plurality] is differentiated by it, being for those things a genus or a species and, besides this, also a differentia). On the contrary, when they find a genus, they look for something else to be a constitutive differentia of the genus, if the genus has a constitutive differentia; likewise, when they find a Q39 species they look for something that is, in itself, the differentia. But if the thing only signified the quiddity in such a way to be a genus and a species because it signifies a shared essential [feature], then [this] state of affairs would contradict these judgements.

[.. Critical analysis of the second sense] [... Possible alternative formulation] There are other objections to the truth of their claim that what signifies the shared essential [feature] signifies the quiddity. If one of them adds a condition to apply properly to what they call ‘genus’ and ‘species’ with regard to its signifying the quiddity, namely that it is necessary that the most common of the shared essentials

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ﯾﺪ ّل ﲆ ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ ٔﺻﻼ‪ ،‬ﺣﱴ ﻜﻮن اﻟﻔﺮق ﺑﲔ ا ٔﻣﺮﻦ ٔ ّن ا ا ّل ﲆ ا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ ﻫﻮ ا ي ﳫّﯿﺘﻪ وﻛﲈ ﻫﻮ ﯾﺪ ّل‬ ‫ﲆ ا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ‪ .‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ﻫﺬا ا ي ﯾﺘﻀ ّﻤﻦ ا ﻻ ﲆ ٔ ّﰪ ا اﺗﯿﺎت اﳌﺸﱰﻛﺔ ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﲈ ﯾﺪ ّل ﲆ ا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ ﻟﻌﺮض‪ٔ ،‬ﻧ ّﻪ‬ ‫ﯾﺪ ّل ﲜﺰء ﻣ ﻪ دون ﺟﺰء ﰷﳊﯿﻮان‪ ،‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ وٕان ّﲤﲒ ﺑﻪ ٔﺷﯿﺎء ﻋﻦ اﻟﻨﺒﺎت‪ ،‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﻟ ﺲ ذ ﲜﻤﯿﻊ ﻣﺎ ﲝﺼﻮ‬ ‫ﺣﺴﺎس وﻫﺬا ﻫﻮ ا ا ّل ﲆ ا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ‬ ‫اﳊﯿﻮان ﺣ ﻮان‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﴚء ﻣ ﻪ‪ .‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﻻ ﯾﻔﻌﻞ ذ ﺑ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﺟﺴﻢ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﺑ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ّ‬ ‫ٔ ّوﻻ و ٔ ﯾﺪ ّل اﳊﯿﻮان ﲆ ا ﳣﯿﲒ وا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓ ﻜﻮن اﳊﯿﻮان ﻟ ﺲ اﺗﻪ ﺻــﺎﳊﺎ ــﻠﳣﯿﲒ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﲜــﺰء ﻣ ــﻪ‪،‬‬ ‫اﳊﺴﺎس ﻛﺬ اﺗﻪ — ﻓ ﻘﻮل ا ّٕن ﻫﺬا ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﳫّﻒ ﲑ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﲓ‪.‬‬ ‫وﻜﻮن ّ‬ ‫ﺧﺺ ﻣﺎ ﯾﺪ ّل ﲆ‬ ‫)‪ّ ٔ (..‬ﻣﺎ ٔ ّوﻻ ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﻟﻮ ﰷن ﻛﺬ ﲀن‪ ،‬إذا ٔ ﺬ ٔ ّﰪ اﳌﻌﺎﱐ ﰷﳉﻮﻫﺮ وﻗﺮ ّ ﺑﻪ ٔ ّ‬ ‫اﻟﴚء ﻓﻘﻠﻨﺎ ﻣ ﻼ ﺟﻮﻫﺮ ﻃﻖ‪ ،‬ﲀن ﻜﻮن ّ‬ ‫داﻻ ﲆ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ وﰷن ﻜــﻮن ﻧــﻮع ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ٔو ﺴــﻪ وﰷن‬ ‫ﻜﻮن ﺪّ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ٔو ﺪّ ﺴﻪ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﺟﻮﻫﺮ ﻃﻖ‪ .‬وﻟ ﺲ ﻛﺬ ﻋﻨــﺪﱒ؛ ﺑﻞ ــﺪّ ﻩ ٔﻧّــﻪ ﺣ ـﻮان ﻃــﻖ‬ ‫وﻟ ﺲ اﳊﯿﻮان واﳉﻮﻫﺮ وا ﺪا وﻣﻦ اﶈﺎل ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻠﴚء اﻟﻮا ﺪ ﺪّ ّم ﺣﻘ ﻘﻲ ا ّٕﻻ اﻟﻮا ﺪ‪ .‬وٕان ﳫّﻔﻮا‬ ‫ٔن ﯾﻮﺟ ﻮا ﻣﻊ اﳌﺸﱰك ا ٔ ّول ﺳﺎ ﺮ اﻟﱵ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺳﻂ ﲆ اﻟﱰﺗ ﺐ ﳇّﻪ‪ ،‬ﻓﻘﺪ ﺣﺼﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻧﺬﻫﺐ إﻟﯿﻪ ﻣﻦ ٔن‬ ‫ا ا ّل ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﳚﺐ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻣﺸ ﳣﻼ ﲆ ﻛﲈل اﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ‪ .‬ﻓ ﻜﻮن ﺣ ﻨﺌﺬ ﻫﺬا اﻟﺘﳫّﻒ ﯾﺆدي إﱃ ٔن ﻻ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ﳛﺘﺎج إﱃ ﻧﻘﻞ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻠﻔﻈﺔ ﻋﻦ اﳌﻮﺿﻮع ﰲ اﻠﻐﺔ إﱃ اﺻﻄﻼح ن‪ ،‬ﻓ ٕﺎ ّ‬ ‫ﺳﻨﻮﰣ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻌﺪ ٔ ّن اﺳﺘﻌﲈل‬ ‫ﯾﺘﻌﻮق‪.‬‬ ‫ﯾﺘﻌﻮق ﻣﻌﻬﺎ ﻣﺎ ّ‬ ‫ﻫﺬﻩ اﻠﻔﻈﺔ ﲆ ﻣﺎ ﱔ ﻠﯿﻪ ﳛﻔﻆ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ ا ٔ ّول ﻟﻬﺎ ﻣﻊ اﺳ ﳣﺮار ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮﻩ اﻟﱵ ّ‬

‫‪., Top., VI., a–.‬‬

‫‪] Manṭiq al-Mašriqiyyīn, p. .–.‬اﻟﻮا‬

‫‪ ] Cf. A‬ﻃﻖ ‪ّ ٔ … ‬ﻣﺎ ‪‬‬

‫ﺪ…وﻣﻦ ‪ ] Cf. Risāla fī l-Ḥudūd, p. .–. ‬ﻃﻖ ‪ّ ٔ … ‬ﻣﺎ ‪‬‬

‫ا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ | ‪  om. Br‬ﲆ | ‪ om. Yi‬ﺣﱴ | ‪ٔ ] Lat.‬ﯾﯿﺔ ‪ CṢ «quale quid» [scil.‬اﻧﯿﺔ ‪ Ed.‬إﻧﯿﺔ ]‪ٔ JDaŠN‬ﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ | ‪  om. Yi‬ﲆ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ BCṢ «quale quid» [scil.‬ﻧﯿﺔ ‪ Ed.‬اﻻٕﻧﯿﺔ ]‪ JDiDaŠ‬ا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ ‪] Lat. ‬ا ٔﯾﯿﺔ ‪ BC «quale quid» [scil.‬ﻧﯿﺔ ‪ Ed.‬اﻻٕﻧﯿﺔ ]‪DaŠ‬‬ ‫‪ τBC «quale quid» [scil.‬ﻧﯿﺔ ‪ Ed.‬اﻻٕﻧﯿﺔ ]‪ DiDaŠN‬ا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ | ‪ Mi‬إﳕﺎ ‪ To‬ﻓﺎٕﳖﺎ ]ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﲈ | ‪ om. Te‬ﻫﺬا | ‪ Br‬ﻓ ٔﻣﺎ ]و ٔ ّﻣﺎ | ‪] Lat.‬ا ٔﯾﯿﺔ‬ ‫]ﺣ ﻮان ‪ add. in mg. ToG ‬ﺣﺼﻞ ]ﲝﺼﻮ | ‪ JTTe‬د ]ذ | ‪ μ‬ﻣﻦ ]ﻋﻦ | ‪ iter. a.c. Ka‬اﻟﻨﺒﺎت… ‪‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ‪] Lat. ‬ا ٔﯾﯿﺔ‬ ‫وا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ | ‪ No‬ﲤﯿﲒ ]ا ﳣﯿﲒ ‪] Lat. ‬ا ٔﯾﯿﺔ ‪ CṢ «quale quid» [scil.‬ﻧﯿﺔ ‪ Ed.‬اﻻٕﻧﯿﺔ ]‪ DaŠ‬ا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ | ‪ Š‬ﻟﴚء ] ﴚء | ‪ Yi‬ﺣ ﻮا‬ ‫‪ Br‬ﻋﻨﻪ ]ﻣ ﻪ | ‪ Br‬ﺑﺬاﺗﻪ ] اﺗﻪ | ‪ٔ praem. T‬ن ﻫﺬا ]‪‬اﳊﯿﻮان | ‪] Lat.‬وا ٔﯾﯿﺔ ‪ τC «quale quid» [scil.‬و ﻧﯿﺔ ‪ Ed.‬واﻻٕﻧﯿﺔ ]‪DaŠ‬‬ ‫‪ Ka‬ﰷن ] ﲀن ‪ τBEEd. ‬ﻓ ٔﻧﻪ ]ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ‪ N ‬ﳫﻒ ٔﯾﻀﺎ ] ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﳫّﻒ | ‪ٔ om. Br‬ﯾﻀﺎ | ‪ iter. To‬ا ّٕن | ‪ٔ add. Br‬ﯾﻀﺎ ]ﻓ ﻘﻮل ‪‬‬ ‫‪  om. et‬ﻃﻖ… وﻟ ﺲ ‪  om. N ‬ﻜﻮن | ‪ μνENo‬ﻓﲀن ]‪‬وﰷن | ‪ add. in mg. Nk‬ﲀن ﺪا ﻟ ٕﻼ ﺴﺎن ‪  om. et‬ﻃﻖ ‪ … ‬ﲀن‬ ‫‪ om. et add. in mg. NkC om. νξE om.‬ﻣﻦ | ‪ Ed.‬ﯾﻮ ﻮا ]ﯾﻮﺟ ﻮا ‪ E ‬ﻓﺎٕن ]وٕان | ‪ a.c. J‬ﺪ ]‪‬اﻟﻮا ﺪ ‪add. in mg. Br ‬‬ ‫‪ Yi‬اﳌﻮﺿــﻊ ]اﳌﻮﺿــﻮع | ‪] «significans esse» add. Lat.‬اﻠﻔﻈــﺔ ‪ No ‬اﻟﺘﳫﯿــﻒ ]اﻟﺘﳫّــﻒ ‪et add. s.l. Di exp. Ṣ² ‬‬ ‫‪ om. et add. in‬ﰲ | ‪ in mg. G‬اﺳ ﳣﺮارﻩ ‪ et‬اﺷ ]اﺳ ﳣﺮار | ‪ om. BrDa add. in mg. Da‬ﻟﻬﺎ ‪ a.c. E ‬ﺻﻄﻼح ]اﺻﻄﻼح‬ ‫‪ Da‬ا ي ]اﻟﱵ | ‪ Y‬اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ‪ praem. in mg. B :‬ﲨﯿﻊ ‪ praem. NkC‬ﲨﯿﻊ ]اﻟﻮﺟﻮﻩ | ‪mg. J om. TG‬‬

‫ﯾﺪل ﳫﯿﺘﻪ وﻛﲈ ﻫﻮ ﻠﳱﺎ و ٔﰪ ا اﺗﯿﺎت ﰷﳊﯿﻮان ﯾﺪل ﲆ ا ٔﯾﯿﺔ ﻟﻌﺮض ٔﻧﻪ ﯾــﺪل ﲜــﺰء ﻣ ــﻪ ﻓﻬــﻮ ﯾﻘــﻮل ﻣﺸ ـﳣﻞ ﶺﻠﻬــﲈ ٔن ]‪‬ا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿــﺔ ‪ … ‬ﳫّﯿﺘــﻪ‬ ‫اﳊﺴﺎس ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﯾﺪل ﲆ ا ٔﯾﯿﺔ ﲜﺰء ﻣ ﻪ ٔﻧﻪ ﻻ ﯾﺪل ﻠﳱﺎ ﺑ ٔﻧﻪ ﺟﺴﻢ وﻻ ﺑ ٔﻧﻪ ﺣ ﻮان ﺑﻞ ﺑ ٔﻧﻪ ذو ﻗﻮة دراﻛﺔ ﻟﻜﺬا واﻟﺜﺎﱐ ٔن اﳊﯿﻮان إﳕﺎ ﳝﲒ اﳊﯿﻮاﻧﯿﺔ ﻓﻘﻂ وﱔ‬ ‫‪ in mg. NkBN‬ﻣﻌﲎ وا ﺪ ﻓ ٔﺑﻄﻞ ﲠﺬ ﻦ ﻣﺎ ﻓﺮﻗﻮا ﺑﻪ ﻣﻦ اﳊﯿﻮان واﳊﺴﺎس ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻓﺮﻗﻮا ﺑ ﳯﲈ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪٤٠‬ق‬

Chapter I.7  83

be contained in the signification of the shared essential — being that ‘most common’ the most common [feature] that does not signify the essential quality at all, so that the difference between the two is that what signifies the essential quality is that which signifies it entirely and as it is. As to this [fact] that the signification contains the most common of the shared essentials, it signifies the essential quality only by accident, since it signifies a part of it and not the other, like animal, for, even if certain things are differentiated from plants by it, this does not happen because of all of that by the realization of which an animal is an animal, but rather because of something of it. In fact, this is not attained because it is a body, but rather because it is percipient, and this is what signifies the essential quality primarily and, by virtue of that, animal [also] signifies the distinction and the essential quality, so that animal is not apt to differentiate by its essence, but rather on account of one of its parts, whereas percipient is in this way by its essence — then we say that this as well is an unnatural and incorrect way to explain [this matter]. [... First argument of the refutation of the possible alternative formulation] First, because, were it so, then if we took the most common meaning, like substance, connected to it something more specific which signifies the thing and said, for instance, ‘rational substance’, this would signify the quiddity, being the species of man or its genus, and the definition of man or the definition of its genus would be ‘rational substance’. But it is not like that, according to them; rather, its definition is that it is a rational animal, being animal and substance not the same, and it is impossible for one thing to have a complete, true definition other than [its own] one. If they strived to bring on, besides the first shared [essential], also the Q40 others that are in the middle of the whole arrangement, it has already been attained what we hold regarding the necessity for what signifies the quiddity to encompass the complete real essence [of the thing]. Thus, this unnatural explanation leads [to conclude] that there is no need of transferring this expression from the [sense] established in the [Arabic] language to a second conventional use, since we will clarify afterwards that the use of this expression as it is constantly preserves its first imposition with regard to the aspects with which [certain things] are prevented.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫اﳊﺴﺎس ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﺣﳬﻪ ﺣﲂ اﳊﯿﻮان‪ ،‬و ٔﻧ ّﻪ‬ ‫)‪ (..‬وﺑﻌﺪ ﻫﺬا ﳇّﻪ ﻓﺎ ّٕن ذ ﯾﻔﺴﺪ ﺑﻮﺟﻮﻩ ٔﺧﺮى‪ ،‬ﻣﳯﺎ ٔ ّن ّ‬ ‫ﳏﺼﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻌﺎن ﺎ ّﻣﺔ و ّﺎﺻﺔ‪ ،‬و ٔ ّن اﳌﻌﺎﱐ اﻟﻌﺎ ّﻣﺔ ﻓ ﻪ‪ ،‬ﻜﻮن اﳉﺴﻢ ٔو اﻟﴚء ذا ّﻗﻮة ٔو ﺻﻮرة ٔو‬ ‫ٔﯾﻀﺎ ّ‬ ‫ﺧﺺ ﻣﳯﺎ‪ ،‬وﻫﻮ ﻮن اﳉﺴﻢ ٔو اﻟﴚء ذا ّﻗﻮة ّدراﻛﺔ ﻠﺸﺨﺼﯿﺎت ﲆ‬ ‫ﯿﻔ ﺔ ﻻ ﲤﯿﲒ ﲠﺎ‪ٕ ،‬اﻧ ّﲈ ّﲤﲒ ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ ٔ ّ‬ ‫ﺳ ﻞ ﻛﺬا‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (..‬وﻣﳯﺎ ٔ ّن اﳊﯿﻮان‪ ،‬وٕان ﰷن ﻻ ّﳝﲒ ﲜﺰء ﻣﻦ ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻩ ﰷﳉﺴﻢ ّ‬ ‫وﳝﲒ ﲜﺰء ﰷﳊﺴﺎس‪ ،‬ﻓﻠ ﺲ ﺳ ﻠﻨﺎ‬ ‫ﰲ ﻫﺬا ﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﻫﺬا اﻟﺴ ﻞ وﻻ ﻧﻈﺮ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻨﻈــﺮ‪ .‬وذ ٔ ّ ٕاﻧّــﲈ ﻧﻨﻈــﺮ ﰲ اﳊﯿـﻮان ﻣــﻦ ﺣـ ﺚ ﻫــﻮ‬ ‫ﺣ ﻮان‪ ،‬واﳊﯿﻮان ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻫﻮ ﺣ ﻮان ﳾء وا ﺪ‪ ،‬وﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻫﻮ ذ اﻟﻮا ــﺪ ﻻ ﳜﻠــﻮ ٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﳝـ ّـﲒ‬ ‫ا ﳣﯿﲒ ا ي ﻋﻦ اﻟﻨﺒﺎت ٔو ﻻ ّﳝﲒ‪ .‬ﻓﺎٕن ﱂ ّﳝﲒ وﺟﺐ ٔن ﻜﻮن اﻟﻨﺒﺎت ﺸﺎرك اﳊﯿﻮان ﰲ ٔﻧّــﻪ ﺣ ـﻮان‪،‬‬ ‫وﻫﺬا ﻠﻒ‪ .‬وٕان ّﻣﲒ‪ ،‬ﻓﻘﺪ ﺻﺪر ﻋﻨﻪ ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺣ ﻮان ﺗَ َﻤﲒ‪ ،‬وٕان ﰷن ﻗﺪ ﯾﺼﺪر ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﻋﻦ ﺟﺰء ‪ ،‬وﰷن‬ ‫اﳉﺰء ّ ٔوﱃ ﰲ ذ ‪ .‬وﻟ ﺲ إذا ﰷن ﻠﴚء ّ ﲠﺎ ﯾﺼﲑ ﲝﺎل وﻠﻌ ّ ﺗ اﳊﺎل‪ ،‬ﳚﺐ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﺗ‬ ‫اﳊﺎل ﻟﻌﺮض‪ ،‬ﻓﻜ ﲑ ﻣﻦ ا ٔﺷﯿﺎء ﲠﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻔﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ّ (..‬ﰒ ﻻ ٔﻣ ﻊ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻫﺎﻫﻨﺎ ﴍوط ٔﺧﺮى ﺗﻠﺤﻖ ﻟﺒﯿﺎن ا ي ﺟﻌﻠﻮﻩ ﻟ ا ّل ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ّﳣﲒ ﲠﺎ‬ ‫ﻠﺤﺴﺎس دون اﳊﯿﻮان[‪،‬‬ ‫ﻣﺎ ﺴ ّﻤﻰ ﺴﺎ ٔو ﻧﻮ ﺎ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ وﴍوط ٔﺧﺮى ﺗﻠﺤﻖ ﳣﯿﲒ ] ﻜﻮن ذ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ا ّٕﻻ ٔ ّن ذ ﻻ ﻜﻮن ﲝﺴﺐ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ ا ٔ ّول وﻻ ﲝﺴﺐ ﻧﻘﻞ ﻣ ﺼﻮص ﻠﯿﻪ ﻣﻦ اﳌﺴﺘﻌﻤﻠﲔ ﻟﻬﺬﻩ ا ٔﻟﻔﺎظ‬ ‫ﰲ ٔ ّول ﻣﺎ اﺳﺘﻌﻤﻠﻮا؛ ﺑﻞ ﻜﻮن اﺿﻄﺮارات ٔﳉ ٔ ٕا ﳱﺎ ٔﻣ ﺎل ﻫﺬﻩ اﳌﻘﺎوﻣﺎت‪.‬‬

‫‪ om. et add. s.l.‬ﯾﻔﺴﺪ | ‪ add. s.l. NkṢ²‬ﳇﻪ ‪ add. εJETTeNo‬ﳇﻪ ]ذ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. J‬ﳇّﻪ | ‪ No‬ﺑﻌﺪ ]وﺑﻌﺪ ‪‬‬ ‫ﳏﺼﻞ ‪ DiṢ ‬و ٔﯾﻀﺎ ٔﻧﻪ ] ٔﯾﻀﺎ ‪… ‬و ٔﻧ ّﻪ | ‪N‬‬ ‫‪ G‬ﳣﲒ ]ﲤﯿﲒ ‪ّ om. et add. in mg. Di ‬ﻗﻮة ‪ٔ  … ‬و | ‪ JETDiToTe‬ﳛﺼﻞ ] ّ‬ ‫ٔ ّ ‪ T ‬ﳣﲒ ] ّﳝﲒ ‪ E ‬ﻣ ﻪ ]ﻣﳯﺎ | ‪ iter. a.c. J‬ﲟﺎ ﻫﻮ | ‪ TG‬ﳣﲒ ‪ add. s.l. Nk‬ﳣﲒ ] ّﲤﲒ | ‪ّ om. No‬ﲤﲒ …ﲠﺎ | ‪ Y‬ﻟﻬﺎ ‪ om. E‬ﲠﺎ‬ ‫ذاك ]ذ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. Nk om. Ka‬ﻫﻮ ‪ om. To ‬ﰲ | ‪ٕ om. et add. in mg. Y‬اﻧ ّﲈ | ‪om. et add. s.l. To‬‬ ‫‪ om. et add. s.l. NkBṢ² om.‬ﻗﺪ | ‪ G‬ﲤﯿﲒ ]ﺗَ َﻤﲒ | ‪ s.l. N‬و ]وﻫﺬا ‪ Yi ‬ﳚﺐ ]وﺟﺐ | ‪ّ  om. No‬‬ ‫ﳝﲒ …ﻓﺎٕن ‪KaNk ‬‬ ‫‪ add. γEd. add. s.l. DiṢ² add. in mg. Br‬ا ﳣﯿﲒ ]ذ ‪ Yi a.c. To ‬ﺟــﺰء ‪ Ka‬ﺣﺮﻛــﻪ ]ﺟــﺰء | ‪ٔ om. E‬ﯾﻀﺎ | ‪ξKaBr‬‬ ‫اﻟﺒﯿﺎن ‪ om. Lat.‬ﻟﺒﯿﺎن ‪ JTDiTe ‬وﻛﺜﲑ ]ﻓﻜ ﲑ | ‪ E om. To‬ﺑﻌﺮض ] ﻟﻌﺮض ‪ Te | ّ  om. et add. s.l. Ṣ ‬اﻟﴚء ] ﻠﴚء‬ ‫‪ Da‬ﺗ ]ذ | ‪ praem. et exp. E‬ﻜﻦ ] ﻜﻮن | ‪ Br‬ا ﳣﯿﲒ ] ﳣﯿﲒ | ‪ πDi‬ﻣﻦ ]ﻋﻦ ‪ μ ‬د ‪ νξKaJTDaTe‬ا ال ]ﻟ ا ّل | ‪Br‬‬ ‫ﻗﺪ ‪ μν‬ﻗﺪ ٔﳉ ٔت ‪ JTCDi s.l. Ṣ²‬ﻗﺪ ٔﳉ ٔ ] ٔﳉ ٔ | ‪ om. et add. i.l. N‬ﺑﻞ | ‪ Mi‬اﺳﺘﻌﻤﻠﻮﻫﺎ ]اﺳﺘﻌﻤﻠﻮا ‪ add. i.l. N ‬ﻜﻮن ]وﻻ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ i.l. Y‬ﻣﻌﺎرﺿﺎت ]اﳌﻘﺎوﻣﺎت | ‪ٔ Ṣ‬ﳉ ٔت ‪praem. s.l. B om. N‬‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫ٔي ٔن ) ٔن‪ (B ،- :‬ﺣﲂ اﳊﺴﺎس وﺣﲂ اﳊﯿﻮان وا ﺪ ﰲ ٔن ﰻ وا ﺪ ﻣﳯﲈ ﻣﻀﻤﻦ ٔﰪ ذاﰐ و ٔﺧﺼﻪ ﻓﻠﻮ ﰷن اﳊﯿﻮان د ﲆ ]اﳊﯿﻮان… وﺑﻌﺪ‬ ‫‪ in mg. NkB‬اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ٔ ﻞ ٔﻧﻪ ﯾﺘﻀﻤﻦ ذاﺗﯿﺎ ٔﰪ ﲀن اﳊﺴﺎس ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﯾﺪل ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ٔﻧﻪ ﯾﺘﻀﻤﻦ ﻣ ﻞ ذ وﻫﻮ ﻻ ﳚﻌﻠﻮن اﳊﺴﺎس د ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ‬

‫‪] The Latin translation prensents two renderings of this passage; see the Introduction‬اﻟﺼﻔﺔ ‪ … ‬وﻟ ﺲ ‪‬‬ ‫‪to the edition, section I.., point  in Tab. .‬‬ ‫‪] On the possibility that this clause was interpolated in the archetype, see the‬اﳊﯿـــــﻮان… ﻜـــــﻮن ‪‬‬ ‫‪Introduction to the edition, section II..., point .‬‬

‫‪٤١‬ق‬

Chapter I.7  85

[... Second argument of the refutation] Besides all this, that [theory] is vain under other respects, among which the fact that the status of percipient coincides with the status of animal, and that it is also realized from common and proper meanings, and that the common meanings in it (like body or thing having a potentiality, a form or a quality by means of which no differentiation occurs) are only differentiated by virtue of what is more specific than them, namely the fact that the body or the thing have a capacity to apprehend individual things in this way. [... Third argument of the refutation] Among them there is [also] the fact that, even if animal is not differentiated by a part of its meaning, like body, whereas it is differentiated by [another] part [of it], like percipient, this is not our way to consider [this matter] and to inquire [into it]. This is because we only inquire into animal insofar as it is an animal, and animal insofar as it is an animal is a single thing, and insofar as it is that single [thing], inevitably it is either differentiated as it is from plants, or it is not. If it is not, then plants must share with animal the fact of being an animal, which is false. If it is differentiated, then a differentiation derives from it insofar as it is an animal, even if it can also derive from a part of it, being that part a first cause in that [process of differentiation]. If the thing has a cause by which it comes to be in a certain state and the cause has that state, it is not necessary for [the thing] to have that state by accident, for many things are in this manner. [... Possible conditions to distinguish the genus and the species from the differentia] Then, I do not exclude that there are other conditions attaching to the explana- Q41 tion that they ascribed to what signifies the quiddity by means of which what they call ‘genus’ or ‘species’ is distinguished from the differentia, and other conditions attaching to the distinction {([such as] this belongs to percipient and not to animal)}, but this is not according to the first imposition, nor according to a transposition determined by those who employed these expressions when they began to employ them; rather, these are necessities to which this sort of disputes is committed.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺴﺎﺑﻊ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫)‪ (‬وٕاذا و ﺪ ﰲ ﻇﺎﻫﺮ اﳌﻔﻬﻮم ﻣﻦ ﻟﻔﻆ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ﯾﻘﻊ ﺑﻪ اﺳ ﺘﻐﻨﺎء واﻗ ﺼﺎر‪ ،‬ﰷن اﳌﺼﲑ ﻋﻨﻪ إﱃ ــﲑﻩ‬ ‫ﻠﺤﻖ و ﱰاف ﺑﺬﻫﺎب ذ ﲆ ﻣﻦ‬ ‫ﴐ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﺠﺰ وﻣﻦ اﻠ ﺎج ا ي ﺗﺪﻋﻮ إﻟﯿﻪ ا ٔﻧﻔﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻻٕذ ﺎن ّ‬ ‫ﱂ ﳜﻄﺮ ﺑﺒﺎ ﻣﺎ ٔورد ﻩ ﻣﻦ اﳌﺒﺎﺣﺚ إﱃ ﲔ ﺳﲈﻋﻬﺎ‪.‬‬

‫‪ in mg. Nk‬ﻋﻦ ‪ et‬ﻣﻦ ‪ μJET‬ﻋﻦ ]‪‬ﻣﻦ‬

‫‪T ‬‬

‫ﲑ ] ﲑﻩ‬

‫|‬

‫‪ p.c. (?) E‬ﻋﻨﻪ‬

‫| ‪ om. Ṣ‬ﻣﺎ | ‪ EDiToMiYiG a.c. Š‬ﻋﻦ ]ﻣﻦ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ add. Te‬وﷲ ٔ ﲅ ‪ To‬ﺳﲈﻋﻬﲈ ]ﺳﲈﻋﻬﺎ ‪‬‬

Chapter I.7  87

[. Conclusion: the literal understanding of an expression, if satisfying, is preferable] If it is found that the literal understanding of an expression does not need [any further specification] and is already satisfying, it is a sort of weakness and obstinacy to move from it to another one to which the refusal to submit to the truth leads, together with [the refusal] to recognize that this is lost on anyone who had not in mind the objects of research that we mentioned until he learned them.

‫]اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻣﻦ[‬ ‫ﻓﺼﻞ ﰲ ﻗﺴﻤﺔ اﻠﻔﻆ اﳌﻔﺮد ا ﳫّﻲ إﱃ ٔﻗﺴﺎﻣﻪ اﶆﺴﺔ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫)‪ (.‬ﻧﻘﻮل ا ٓن ٕاﻧ ّﻪ ﻗﺪ ّﺗﺒﲔ ٔ ّن اﻠﻔﻆ اﳌﻔــﺮد ا ﳫّــﻲ ٕا ّﻣﺎ ذاﰐ وٕا ّﻣﺎ ﻋــﺮﴈ و ٔ ّن ا اﰐ ــﻠﴚء ٕا ّﻣﺎ‬ ‫ﺻﺎﱀ ﻟ ﻻ ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﺑﻮ ﻪ وٕا ّﻣﺎ ﲑ ﺻﺎﱀ ﻟ ﻻ ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ٔﺻﻼ‪ .‬وا ا ّل ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﯾﺪ ّل‬ ‫ﲆ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﳾء وا ﺪ ٔو ٔﺷﯿﺎء ﻻ ﲣﺘﻠــﻒ اﺧ ــﻼﻓﺎ ذاﺗــﯿﺎ وٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜــﻮن دﻻﻟﺘــﻪ ــﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿــﺔ ٕاﻧّــﲈ ﱔ‬ ‫ﲝﺴﺐ ٔﺷﯿﺎء ﲣﺘﻠﻒ ذواﲥﺎ اﺧ ﻼﻓﺎ ذاﺗﯿﺎ‪ .‬ﻣ ﺎل ا ٔ ّول ﻟﻔﻈﺔ اﻟﺸﻤﺲ إذا وﻗﻌﺖ ﲆ ﻫﺬﻩ اﳌﺸﺎر ٕا ــﳱﺎ‬ ‫وﻟﻔﻈﺔ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن إذا وﻗﻌﺖ ﲆ زﯾﺪ وﲻﺮو؛ وﻣ ﺎل اﻟﺜﺎﱐ دﻻ ﻟﻔﻈﺔ اﳊﯿﻮان إذا وﻗﻌﺖ ﲆ اﻟﺜﻮر واﶵﺎر‬ ‫واﻟﻔﺮس ﻣﻌﺎ‪ ،‬ﻓﺴ ٔل ﺳﺎﺋﻞ ﻣ ﻼ‪ :‬ﻣﺎ ﻫﺬﻩ ا ٔﺷﯿﺎء؟ ﻓﻘ ﻞ‪ :‬ﺣ ﻮا ت‪ ،‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن ﻟﻔﻈﺔ اﳊﯿﻮان ﺗﺪ ّل ــﲆ ﻛــﲈل‬ ‫ﺣﻘ ﻘﳤﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻫﻮ ﻣﺴﺌﻮل ﻋﻦ ﲨﻠﳤﺎ وﻣﻄﻠﻮب ﻛﻨﻪ اﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻟﻬﺎ ﻟﴩﻛﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬واﻟﻔﺮق ﺑﲔ اﻟﻮ ﲔ ٔ ّن اﻟﻮ ﻪ ا ٔ ّول ﻜﻮن ّ‬ ‫داﻻ ﲆ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ اﶺ وﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ ّ‬ ‫ﰻ وا ــﺪ‪ :‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن ﻟﻔﻈــﺔ‬ ‫ﳜﺘﺺ ّ‬ ‫ﰻ‬ ‫ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ﺗﺪ ّل ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﲆ ﻛﲈل اﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ ا اﺗﯿﺔ اﻟﱵ ﻟﺰﯾﺪ وﲻﺮو وٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﯾﻔﻀﻞ ﻠﳱﺎ وﳜﺮج ﻋﳯﺎ ﻣﺎ ّ‬ ‫وا ﺪ ﻣﳯﲈ ﺑﻪ ﻣﻦ ا ٔوﺻﺎف اﻟﻌﺮﺿﯿﺔ‪ ،‬ﻛﲈ ﻗﺪ ﻓﻬﻤﺘﻪ ﳑّﺎ ﻗ ﻞ ﺳﺎﻟﻔﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟﻮ ﻪ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻚ ﺗﻌﲅ ٔ ّن اﳊﯿﻮاﻧﯿــﺔ و ــﺪﻫﺎ ﻻ ﻜــﻮن دا ّ ــﲆ ﻣﺎﻫﯿــﺔ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن واﻟﻔــﺮس و ــﺪﻫﺎ‬ ‫ﻓﻠ ﺲ ﲠﺎ و ﺪﻫﺎ ّ‬ ‫ﰻ وا ﺪ ﻣﳯﲈ ﻫﻮ ﻫﻮ وﻟ ﺲ ٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﯾﻔﻀﻞ ﻠﳱﺎ ﻟﻌﺮﺿﯿﺎت‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﻟﻔﺼــﻮل ا اﺗﯿــﺔ‪ .‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ‬ ‫ا ي ﻟﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﻟﴩﻛﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﻠﻔﻈﺔ اﳊﯿﻮان ﺗﺪ ّل ﻠﯿﻪ‪.‬‬ ‫اﳊﺴﺎس ﻓ ﺪ ّل ﲆ ﺟﺰء ﻣﻦ ﲨ ﻣﺎ ﺸ ﳣﻞ ﻠﯿﻪ دﻻ ﻟﻔﻈﺔ اﳊﯿﻮان ﻓﻬﻮ ﺟﺰء ﻣﻦ ﻛﲈل‬ ‫)‪ (..‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ّ‬ ‫ﻟﻜﻦ ﻟﻘﺎﺋﻞ ٔن ﯾﻘﻮل ٕاﻧّــﻪ ﻻ‬ ‫ﺣﻘ ﻘﳤﺎ اﳌﺸﱰك ﻓﳱﺎ دون ﲤﺎ ﺎ؛ وﻛﺬ ﺎل اﻟﻨﺎﻃﻖ ﻟﻘ ﺎس إﱃ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن‪ّ .‬‬ ‫‪ ] Manṭiq al-‬ﻟﴩﻛﺔ ‪… ‬وﻣـ ﺎل‬

‫‪] Manṭiq al-Mašriqiyyīn, p. .–; Išārāt, p. .–. ‬وﲻــﺮو ‪ … ‬ﻣـ ﺎل ‪‬‬ ‫‪Mašriqiyyīn, p. .–; Išārāt, p. .–.‬‬

‫‪ٔ JY in mg. G‬ﻗﺴﺎم ] ٔﻗﺴﺎﻣﻪ | ‪ om. Lat.‬ا ﳫّﻲ | ‪ Mi‬اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻣﻦ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﻦ ا ٔول ﻣﻦ ﲨ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ‪ Y‬اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻣﻦ ]ﻓﺼﻞ ‪‬‬ ‫وٕاﻣﺎ ﲑ ]ﺑﻮ ﻪ | ‪ٔ N‬ن ﯾﺼﻠﺢ ]‪‬ﺻﺎﱀ ‪ om. TTe ‬ﻠﴚء | ‪ٔ Yi‬و ]وٕا ّﻣﺎ | ‪om. Lat.‬‬ ‫| ‪ٕ om. Ka‬اﻧ ّﻪ ‪ٔ ] Lat. ‬ﻗﺴﺎم[ »‪«partes‬‬ ‫… ‪‬ﻟ ﻻ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. G‬اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ…ﺑﻮ ﻪ | ‪ om. No‬اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ…ﺑﻮ ﻪ | ‪ add. To a.c. Te‬ﺻﺎﱀ ﻟ ﻻ ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﺑﻮ ﻪ‬ ‫‪ E‬ﻫﻮ ]ﱔ | ‪ Ed.‬دﻻ ]دﻻﻟﺘﻪ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. Di‬ذاﺗﯿﺎ ‪ … ‬وٕا ّﻣﺎ ‪ٔ om. Nk ‬ﺻﻼ | ‪ om. τ add. in mg. Ṣ‬اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ‬ ‫وﻗﻊ ]‪‬وﻗﻌﺖ | ‪ om. γDa add. s.l. NkDa add. in mg. B‬ﻟﻔﻈﺔ ]وﻟﻔﻈﺔ ‪ om. No ‬ﻟﻔﻈﺔ ‪… ‬اﻟﺸﻤﺲ | ‪ٔ E‬ﺷﯿﺎء ]ﲝﺴﺐ ٔﺷﯿﺎء ‪‬‬ ‫‪… ‬اﻟﺜﻮر | ‪ add. et exp. E‬ﲆ ]اﳊﯿﻮان | ‪] Lat.‬ﻟﻔﻈﻪ ‪ DiṢ «huius nominis» [fort.‬ﻟﻔﻆ ]ﻟﻔﻈﺔ | ‪ JT‬ﻣ ﺎل ]وﻣ ﺎل | ‪γJTṢTe‬‬ ‫‪ No‬ﻣــﻦ ]ﻣﺎ | ‪ E‬وﺳـ ٔل ]ﻓﺴ ٔل | ‪ N‬وا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ]واﻟﻔــﺮس ‪] Lat. ‬واﻟﻔــﺮس واﶵﺎر واﻟﺜــﻮر[ »‪] «de equo et asino et bove‬واﻟﻔــﺮس‬ ‫‪ s.l. Ṣ‬ﻋــﳯﺎ ‪ γBrEd. om. et‬ﻋــﳯﺎ ]ﻋــﻦ | ‪ add. in mg. J‬ﱔ ‪ ηιEDa s.l. Ṣ om. et‬ﱔ ]ﻫــﻮ ‪ MiG ‬ﱔ ﺣ ـﻮا ت ]ﺣ ـﻮا ت‬ ‫ﳜﺘﺺ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. Yi‬ﻋﳯﺎ | ‪ Mi‬اﳊﻘ ﻘ ﺔ ]اﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ ‪ add. ToMiG ‬ﻣﳯﺎ ]وا ﺪ ‪ add. Br ‬ﻟﻬﺎ ‪ G‬ﳁﻄﻠﻮب ]وﻣﻄﻠﻮب‬ ‫‪ّ iter.‬‬ ‫ﻻ ﻜﻮن و ﺪﻫﺎ ] ﻜﻮن… ‪‬و ﺪﻫﺎ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. Di‬اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ‪ ν ‬ﻋﻦ ]ﻣﻦ | ‪ om. YiN‬ﺑﻪ | ‪ νṢ‬ﻣﳯﺎ ‪ in mg. G‬ﻣﳯﺎ ]ﻣﳯﲈ ‪T ‬‬ ‫‪ om. et add.‬ﻣﳯﲈ | ‪ iter. EṢ‬وا ﺪ | ‪ To‬ﲠﲈ ]ﲠﺎ | ‪ Ka‬وﻟ ﺲ ]ﻓﻠ ﺲ ‪ τTDiToTeMi ‬و ﺪﻫﲈ ‪ νJEDaNo‬و ﺪﻩ ]‪‬و ﺪﻫﺎ | ‪εE‬‬ ‫‪ JTe‬ﻓﻠﻔﻆ ]ﻓﻠﻔﻈﺔ | ‪ No‬ﳍﲈ ]ﻟﻬﺎ ‪ No ‬ﰲ ﻟﻔﺼﻮل ] ﻟﻔﺼﻮل | ‪ Y‬ﻠﳱﲈ ] ﻠﳱﺎ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ‬ﯨﻔﻀ ]ﯾﻔﻀﻞ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ‬إﳕﺎ ‪ Ṣ‬ا ] ٕاﻧ ّﲈ | ‪s.l. Ṣ‬‬ ‫]وﻛﺬ ‪] Lat. ‬ﻟﻔﻈﻪ ‪ τKa «huius nominis» [fort.‬ﻟﻔﻆ ]ﻟﻔﻈﺔ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ Br‬و‬

‫‪٤٢‬ق‬

[I.]

C

[. The essential expression that signifies the quiddity] [.. Classification of what signifies the quiddity] Now we say: It has already appeared clear to you1 that the simple universal expression is either [(a)] essential or [(b)] accidental, and that what is essential to the thing is either [(a.1)] apt to signify the quiddity under a [certain] respect, or [(a.2)] it is not apt to signify it at all. [(a.1)] What signifies the quiddity either [(a.1.1)] signifies the quiddity of a single thing or that of [several] things that do not differ essentially2 [(a.1.2)] or it signifies the quiddity only with regard to things whose essences differ essentially3. An example of the first [case] [(a.1.1)] is the expression ‘Sun’ when it applies to this ostensible [Sun], and the expression ‘man’ when it applies to Zayd and ʿAmr; an example of the second [case] [(a.1.2.)] is the signification of the expression ‘animal’ when it applies to the bull, the donkey and the horse all together, so that one might ask, for instance, “what are these things?” and the answer would be: “animals”, for the expression ‘animal’ signifies their complete essential reality insofar as it is asked of the whole group and what is sought is the core essential Q42 reality that they share.

[.. Differences between the two ways of signifying the quiddity] The difference between the two aspects consists in that the first [(a.1.1)] signifies the quiddity of the complex and, [at the same time], that of each one [of the instantiations]: for, in fact, the expression ‘man’ signifies as well the complete essential reality of Zayd and ʿAmr, and only the accidental attributes that properly belong to each one of the two exceed it[s scope] and go beyond it, as you have understood from what was stated before4. As to the second aspect [(a.1.2)], you know that animality alone does not signify the quiddity of man and horse taken alone, and each one of them is not what it is by virtue of animality alone, nor does it exceed it[s scope] only by virtue of [its] accidental features, but rather by virtue of [its] essential differentiae. As to the quiddity that belongs to it in a shared manner, the expression ‘animal’ signifies it.    

In Madḫal I., §. I.e. The lowest species. I.e. The genus. In Madḫal I., §..

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻣﻦ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ـﺤﺴﺎس‪ ،‬وﻛــﲈ ٔﻧّــﻪ ﻻ ﻜــﻮن اﳊﯿـﻮان ا ّٕﻻ ﺟﺴــﲈ ذا ﻧﻔــﺲ‪ ،‬ﻛــﺬ ﻻ ﻜــﻮن‬ ‫دﻻ ﻠﺤﯿﻮان ا ّٕﻻ وﻣ ﻠــﻬﺎ ﻠـ ّ‬ ‫اﳊﺴﺎس ا ّٕﻻ ﺟﺴﲈ ذا ﻧﻔﺲ‪.‬‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫)‪ (..‬ﻓ ﻘﻮل ﰲ ﺟﻮاﺑﻪ ا ّٕن ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ ا ّٕن اﻠﻔﻆ ﯾﺪ ّل ﲆ ﻣﻌﲎ ﻟ ﺲ ﲆ اﻟﻮ ــﻪ ا ي ﻓﻬﻤﺘــﻪ‪ٔ ،‬ﻋــﲏ ٔن‬ ‫اﳌﺘﺤﺮك إذا د ّل‪ ،‬ﱂ ﻜﻦ ﺑــﺪّ‬ ‫ﻜﻮن إذا د ّل اﻠﻔﻆ ﱂ ﻜﻦ ﺑﺪّ ﻣﻦ وﺟﻮد ذ اﳌﻌﲎ‪ .‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻚ ﺗﻌﲅ ٔ ّن ﻟﻔﻆ ّ‬ ‫ﳏﺮك‪ ،‬وﻟﻔﻈﺔ اﻟﺴﻘﻒ‪ ،‬إذا دﻟّﺖ‪ ،‬ﱂ ﻜﻦ ﺑﺪّ ﻣﻦ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻫﻨﺎك ٔﺳﺎس‪ .‬وﻣﻊ ذ‬ ‫ﻣﻦ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻫﻨﺎك ّ‬ ‫اﶈﺮك‪ ،‬وﻟﻔﻈﺔ اﻟﺴﻘﻒ ﻣﻔﻬــﻮ ﺎ ودﻻ ــﳤﺎ ا ٔﺳــﺎس‪ .‬وذ ٔ ّن‬ ‫اﳌﺘﺤﺮك ﻣﻔﻬﻮ ﺎ ودﻻ ﳤﺎ ّ‬ ‫ﻻ ﻧﻘﻮل ا ّٕن ﻟﻔﻈﺔ ّ‬ ‫اﳌﻌﲎ ﲆ ﺳ ﻞ اﻟﻘﺼﺪ ا ٔ ّول‪ .‬ﻓﺎٕن ﰷن ﻫﻨﺎك ﻣــﻌﲎ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﲎ دﻻ اﻠﻔﻆ ﻫﻮ ٔن ﻜﻮن اﻠﻔﻆ اﺳﲈ‬ ‫ٓﺧﺮ ﯾﻘﺎرن ذ اﳌﻌﲎ ﻣﻘﺎرﻧﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺎرج‪ ،‬ﺸﻌﺮ ا ﻫﻦ ﺑﻪ ﻣﻊ ﺷﻌﻮرﻩ ﺑﺬ اﳌﻌﲎ ا ٔ ّول‪ ،‬ﻓﻠ ﺲ اﻠﻔــﻆ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫داﻻ ﻠﯿﻪ ﻟﻘﺼﺪ ا ٔ ّول‪ .‬ورﺑّﲈ ﰷن ذ اﳌﻌﲎ ﶊﻮﻻ ﲆ ﻣﺎ ُﳛﻤﻞ ﻠﯿﻪ ﻣﻌﲎ اﻠﻔﻆ‪ ،‬ﳈﻌﲎ اﳉﺴﻢ ﻣــﻊ‬ ‫اﳌﺘﺤﺮك‪.‬‬ ‫ﻣﻌﲎ ّ‬ ‫اﶈﺮك ﻣﻊ ّ‬ ‫اﳊﺴﺎس؛ ورﺑّﲈ ﱂ ﻜﻦ ﶊﻮﻻ ﳈﻌﲎ ّ‬ ‫)‪ (..‬واﳌﻌﲎ ا ي ﯾ ﺎو اﻠﻔﻆ ﻻ ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﻜﻮن ﲆ و ﲔ‪ ٔ ،‬ﺪﻫﲈ ٔ ّوﻻ وا ٓﺧﺮ ﻧﯿﺎ‪ّ ٔ .‬ﻣﺎ ٔ ّوﻻ‬ ‫اﳊﺴﺎس؛ و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ﻧﯿﺎ ﻓﻜﺪﻻﻟﺘﻪ ﲆ اﳉﺴﻢ‪ ،‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن‬ ‫ﻓﻜﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ اﳊﯿﻮان‪ ،‬ﻓﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﯾﺪ ّل ﲆ ﲨ اﳉﺴﻢ ذي اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ّ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﲎ اﳉﺴﻢ ﻣﻀ ّﻤﻦ ﰲ ﻣﻌﲎ اﳊﯿﻮاﻧﯿﺔ ﴐورة‪ ،‬ﳁﺎ د ّل ﲆ اﳊﯿﻮاﻧﯿﺔ اﺷ ﳣﻞ ﲆ ﻣﻌﲎ اﳉﺴﻢ ﻻ ﲆ ٔﻧ ّﻪ‬ ‫ﺸﲑ إﻟﯿﻪ ﻣﻦ ﺎرج‪ .‬ﻓ ﻜﻮن ﻫﺎﻫﻨﺎ دﻻ ﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ ٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔ ّوﻟﯿﺔ وٕا ّﻣﺎ ﻧﯿﺔ‪ ،‬ودﻻ ﺎرﺟ ﺔ‪ ،‬إذا د ّل اﻠﻔﻆ ﲆ‬ ‫ﻣﺎ ﯾﺪ ّل ﻠﯿﻪ‪ ،‬ﻋﺮف ا ﻫﻦ ٔ ّن ﺷ ﺎ ٓﺧﺮ ﻣﻦ ﺎرج ﯾﻘﺎرﻧﻪ وﻟ ﺲ دا ﻼ ﰲ ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﻠﻔﻆ دﺧﻮل اﻧﺪراج‬ ‫وﻻ دﺧﻮل ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ‪.‬‬

‫‪] Išārāt,‬ا ٔﺳــﺎس ‪ … ‬واﳌــﻌﲎ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫اﳌﺘﺤــﺮك ‪… ‬ﻓ ﻘــﻮل ‪‬‬ ‫‪ّ ] Nağāt, pp. .–.; Išārāt, pp. .–..‬‬ ‫‪ ] Taʿlīqāt, p. .–.‬ﺎرج ‪… ‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪p. .–. ‬‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫اﳊﺴﺎس ‪ … ‬ﻻ | ‪ To‬دﻻ ﳤﺎ ]دﻻ‬ ‫‪ add. et exp. J‬ﻠﯿﻪ ]‪‬د ّل ‪  om. et add. in mg. Br ‬ﲆ ‪ ε ‬اﳊﺴﺎس ﻻ ﻜﻮن ] ّ‬ ‫وﻟﻔﻆ ]وﻟﻔﻈﺔ | ‪ٔ  om. et add. in mg. J‬ن ﻜﻮن ‪ To ‬ﻓﺎٕن ]ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻚ | ‪ om. J‬اﳌﻌﲎ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. Ṣ‬ﻣﻦ ‪… ‬وﺟﻮد‬ ‫ﳤﺎ…اﶈﺮك | ‪ Br‬ﻟﻔﻆ ]ﻟﻔﻈﺔ ‪ om. Yi ‬ا ٔﺳﺎس ‪… ‬وﻣﻊ | ‪ NkC‬ﻫﻬﻨﺎ ‪ KaB‬ﻫﺎﻫﻨﺎ ]‪‬ﻫﻨﺎك | ‪ om. Yi‬ﺑﺪّ | ‪ Ka‬دل ]دﻟّﺖ | ‪Ka‬‬ ‫‪‬ودﻻ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫‪‬‬ ‫‪ om. et add. s.l. Yi‬ﻫﻨﺎك | ‪ C‬وﻫﻮ ]ﻫﻮ | ‪ a.c. EYi‬ا ﻻ ]دﻻ ‪ N ‬وﻣﻔﻬﻮ ﺎ ] ﻣﻔﻬﻮ ﺎ | ‪ٔ NkCDiMi‬و ﻟﻔﻈﺔ ]وﻟﻔﻈﺔ | ‪om. No‬‬ ‫‪ om. et add. in‬ﶊﻮﻻ ‪ … ‬ﲆ | ‪ a.c. No‬ﻠﯿﻪ ] ﲆ ﻣﺎ | ‪ a.c. No‬ود ] ّ‬ ‫داﻻ ‪ in mg. NkC ‬ﻓ ﺸﻌﺮ ] ﺸﻌﺮ ‪ Br ‬ﻫﺎﻫﻨﺎك‬ ‫اﶈﺮك | ‪ add. N‬ﲆ ﻣﺎ ﳛﻤﻞ ﻠﯿﻪ ]ﶊﻮﻻ | ‪ om. JTṢTe‬ﻣﻌﲎ ‪] «intentio alterius nominis» Lat. ‬ﻣﻌﲎ اﻠﻔﻆ | ‪mg. Br‬‬ ‫] ّ‬ ‫اﳉﺴﻢ ذي ]‪‬‬ ‫ﯾ‬ ‫اﳌﺘﺤﺮك | ‪ Ka‬اﳌﺘﺤﺮك‬ ‫ﻣﻊ‬ ‫‪om.‬‬ ‫‪No‬‬ ‫‪‬‬ ‫اﳌﻌﲎ‬ ‫و‬ ‫…‬ ‫ﺎو‬ ‫‪om.‬‬ ‫‪et‬‬ ‫‪add.‬‬ ‫‪in‬‬ ‫‪mg.‬‬ ‫‪Br‬‬ ‫‪‬‬ ‫ﻓﻜﺪﻻﻟﺘﻪ‬ ‫]‬ ‫ﻻﻟﺘﻪ‬ ‫ﻓ‬ ‫‪No‬‬ ‫‪‬‬ ‫اﳉﺴﻢ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫‪ praem. Da‬ﻣﻌﲎ ]‪‬اﳊﯿﻮاﻧﯿﺔ | ‪  om. et add. s.l. N‬ﲆ | ‪ N‬اﳊﯿﻮان ]‪‬اﳊﯿﻮاﻧﯿﺔ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. G‬ﻣﻀ ّﻤﻦ ﰲ | ‪ G‬اﻟﻨﻔﺲ‬ ‫‪ CṢ‬ﺎر ﺔ ] ﺎرﺟ ﺔ | ‪ om. τ add. in mg. Ṣ add. i.l. Br‬ودﻻ | ‪ J‬وٕاﻣﺎ ] ٕا ّﻣﺎ | ‪ τ‬ﺎر ﺎ ]ﻣﻦ ﺎرج ‪ om. Br ‬ﻻ | ‪ N‬اﳊﯿﻮان‬ ‫‪ in mg. Š «principale vel‬ﺗﻄﺎﺑﻖ ‪ BrMiYiG‬ﺗﻄﺎﺑﻖ ]ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻖ ‪ Ṣ ‬ﯾﻔﺎرﻗﻪ ‪ N‬ﯾﻨﺎو ]ﯾﻘﺎرﻧﻪ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. N‬ﻠﯿﻪ ‪a.c. Br ‬‬ ‫‪coaequale» (sic omnes codd., sed fort. corrigendum: parile vel coaequale) Lat.‬‬

‫‪٤٣‬ق‬

Chapter I.8  91

[.. Possible objection and Avicenna’s answer] [... Objection] ‘Percipient’ signifies a part of the complex of what the signification of the expression ‘animal’ includes, so that it is a part of its complete shared essential reality, and not its totality; so too for the state of rational in relation to man. Someone may claim, however, that animal has no signification unless percipient has a similar [signification], and just as animal is nothing but an animate body, so too percipient is nothing but an animate body. [... Answer] In answer to this, we reply that when we say that the expression signifies a meaning, it is not in the way you understood it, that is, that when the expression signifies [a meaning], inevitably that meaning is present. For you know that when the expression ‘moved’ signifies, there is inevitably [something] moving [what is moved], and [that] when the expression ‘roof’ signifies, there is inevitably a support [for the roof]. In spite of this, we do not say that the concept and signification of the expression ‘moved’ is the [thing] moving [it], nor that the concept and signification of the expression ‘roof’ is what holds it up. This is because the meaning of the signification of an expression is that the expression is in the first place a name for that meaning. If there is another meaning that is extrinsically associated with that Q43 meaning, the mind is aware of it when thinking of the first meaning; so the expression does not signify [that meaning] in the first place. Sometimes the meaning is predicated of that of which the meaning of the expression is predicated, as the meaning ‘body’ with the meaning ‘percipient’; sometimes, [on the other hand], it is not predicated, like the meaning ‘moving’ with ‘moved’. [... Digression on the three ways of signifying the essence] The meaning that the expression comprehends by signification is also under two respects, one [(i)] primarily, and the other [(ii)] secondarily. As to [the one signified] primarily [(i)], it is like our saying ‘animal’, for it signifies the complex of the percipient animate body; as to [the one signified] secondarily [(ii)], it is like the expression’s signification of body, since the meaning of body is necessarily contained in the meaning of animality, so that what signifies animality includes the meaning of body not by an extrinsic designation. There is then an essential signification, [which is] either primary [(i)] or secondary [(ii)], and a signification of the extrinsic [(iii)] [which is such that], when the expression signifies something, the mind knows that something else extrinsic is associated with it, yet not intrinsic to the concept of the expression by way of inclusion or by way of correspondence.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻣﻦ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫وﳓﺼ ‪ ،‬ﺟﻌﻠﻨﺎ ا ﻻ اﻟﱵ ﻟ ٔ ﻟﻔﺎظ ﲆ ﺛﻼﺛﺔ ٔو ﻪ‪ :‬دﻻ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻘــﺔ‪ ،‬ﻛــﲈ‬ ‫ﻓﺎٕن ٔرد ٔن ﳔﺘﴫ ﻫﺬا ﳇّﻪ ّ‬ ‫اﳊﺴﺎس؛ ودﻻ ﺗﻀ ّﻤﻦ‪ ،‬ﻛﲈ ﺗﺪ ّل ﻟﻔﻈﺔ اﳊﯿﻮان ﲆ اﳉﺴﻢ؛‬ ‫ﯾﺪ ّل اﳊﯿﻮان ﲆ ﲨ اﳉﺴﻢ ذي اﻟﻨﻔﺲ ّ‬ ‫ودﻻ ﻟﺰوم ﻛﲈ ﺗﺪ ّل ﻟﻔﻈﺔ اﻟﺴﻘﻒ ﲆ ا ٔﺳﺎس‪.‬‬ ‫ﺣﺲ؛‬ ‫اﳊﺴﺎس ﻫﻮ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﳾء ّ‬ ‫)‪ (..‬ﻓﺎٕذا ﰷن ﻛﺬ ‪ ،‬ﻓﻠﲊﺟﻊ إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﳓﻦ ﻓ ﻪ ﻓ ﻘﻮل ا ّٕن اﳌﻔﻬﻮم ﻣﻦ ّ‬ ‫اﳊﺴﺎس ﲆ اﳉﺴﻢ دﻻ ﻟﺰوم‪.‬‬ ‫ّﰒ ﻣﻦ ﺎرج ﻣﺎ ﻧﻌﲅ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﳚﺐ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﺟﺴﲈ وذا ﻧﻔﺲ‪ ،‬ﻓ ﻜﻮن دﻻ ّ‬ ‫ﺣﺴﺎس‬ ‫و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﳊﯿﻮان ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﲈ ﻧﻌﲏ ﺑﻪ ﲝﺴﺐ ﺻﻄﻼح ا ي ٔﻫﻞ ﻫــﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻨﺎ ــﺔ ٔﻧّــﻪ ﺟﺴــﻢ ذو ﻧﻔــﺲ ّ‬ ‫اﳊﺴﺎس ﲆ ﺳ ﻞ‬ ‫ﻓ ﻜﻮن دﻻﻟﺘﻪ ﲆ ﻛﲈل اﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ دﻻ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻘﺔ و ﲆ ٔﺟﺰاﲛﺎ دﻻ ﺗﻀ ّﻤﻦ‪ .‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ دﻻ ّ‬ ‫اﳌﻄﺎﺑﻘﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﲈ ﱔ ﲆ ﺟﺰء ﻓﻘﻂ؛ و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ا ﲁّ وﺳﺎ ﺮ ا ٔﺟﺰاء‪ ،‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﲈ ﺗﺪ ّل ﻠﳱﺎ ﲆ ﺳـ ﻞ ا ﻠــﺰوم وﻟﺴــﻨﺎ‬ ‫ﻧﺬﻫﺐ ﻫﺎﻫﻨﺎ ﰲ ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ ﻟﻔﻆ دا ّل إﱃ ﻫﺬا ا ﳮﻂ ﻣﻦ ا ﻻ ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻓﻘﺪ ّﺗﻘﺮر ٔ ّن اﻠﻔﻆ ا ا ّل ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ وﯿﻒ ﻫﻮ؛ وﻣﻦ ﻫﺎﻫﻨﺎ ﺰول اﻟﺸﳢﺔ اﳌﺬ ﻮرة‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬ﻓ ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻠﻔــﻆ ا اﰐ ــﻠﴚء ا ي ﻻ ﯾــﺪ ّل ــﲆ ﻣﺎﻫﯿــﺔ ﻣﺎ اﻋﺘــﱪ ذاﺗ ــﻪ ﻻ ﺴ ـ ﻞ ﴍﻛــﺔ وﻻ‬ ‫ﺧﺼﻮص ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﻻ ﳚﻮز ٔن ﻜﻮن ٔ ّﰪ ا اﺗﯿﺎت اﳌﺸﱰﻛﺔ وٕا ّﻻ ّل ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿــﺔ اﳌﺸﱰﻛــﺔ ﺑﻮ ــﻪ‪ .‬ﻓﻬــﻮ إذن‬ ‫ﺧﺺ ﻣ ﻪ‪ ،‬ﻓﻬﻮ ﺻﺎﱀ ﳣﯿﲒ ﺑﻌﺾ ﻣﺎ ﲢﺘﻪ ﻋﻦ ﺑﻌﺾ‪ ،‬ﻓﻬﻮ ﺻﺎﱀ ﻟ ٔ ﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ‪ .‬ﻓﲁّ ذاﰐ ﻻ ﯾﺪ ّل ﺑﻮ ــﻪ ــﲆ‬ ‫ٔ ّ‬ ‫ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ اﻟﴚء ﻓﻬﻮ دا ّل ﲆ ا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫اﳊﺴﺎس‪ ،‬وٕان َر ّذﻟﺖ ﻮﻧﻪ‬ ‫)‪ (..‬ﻓﺎٕن ﻗﺎل ﻗﺎﺋﻞ ا ّٕن ا ي ﯾﺼﻠﺢ ﻟ ٔ ﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ ﻫﻮ ﺑﻌﯿﻨﻪ ﯾﺼﻠﺢ ﻠﲈﻫﯿﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫داﻻ ﲆ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن واﻟﺜــﻮر واﻟﻔــﺮس ﲝﺎل ﺧﺼــﻮص ٔو ﴍﻛــﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻚ ﻻ ــﺮ ّذل دﻻﻟﺘــﻪ ــﲆ ﻣﺎﻫﯿــﺔ‬ ‫ﻣﺸﱰﻛﺔ ﻠﺴﻤﯿﻊ واﻟﺒﺼﲑ واﻟﻼﻣﺲ‪ .‬ﻓﻠ ﺲ ﳚﺐ ٔن ﻜــﻮن ا اﰐ ﯾﻨﻘﺴــﻢ إﱃ ﻣﻘــﻮل ﰲ ﺟـﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫــﻮ‬ ‫وﻣﻘﻮل ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ٔ ّي ﳾء اﻧﻘﺴﺎﻣﺎ ﲆ ٔن ﻻ ﯾﺪ ﻞ ٔ ﺪﻫﲈ ﰲ ا ٓﺧﺮ‪ .‬و ﱂ ﯾﺘ ّﲔ ٔﻧ ّﻪ‪ ،‬إذا ﰷن‬ ‫‪] Cf. Išārāt, pp. .–.; Risāla fī l-Ḥudūd, pp. .–..‬ا ﻻ‬

‫‪… ‬ﻓﺎٕذا ‪‬‬

‫]ﻓﺎٕذا ‪ Br ‬ﻟﻔﻆ ]ﻟﻔﻈﺔ ‪ KaBrNk ‬ﻟﻔﻆ ]ﻟﻔﻈﺔ | ‪ add. s.l. C‬ﻟﻔﻆ ‪ om. et‬ﻟﻔﻈﺔ… ‪‬اﳊﯿﻮان ‪ ιE ‬وﺟﻮﻩ ] ٔو ﻪ | ‪ Br‬ﻓﺎٕذا ]ﻓﺎٕن ‪‬‬ ‫»‪] «corpus habens animam‬ﻧﻔﺲ…ﺟﺴﲈ | ‪ Mi‬ﺗﻌﲅ ‪ E‬ﯾﻌﲅ ]ﻧﻌﲅ | ‪ om. G‬ﻣﺎ | ‪ Ed. om. et add. s.l. C‬ﰎ ] ّﰒ ‪ Yi ‬وٕاذا‬ ‫‪ JT‬ﻟ ﲁ ]ا ﲁّ | ‪ add. μ add. in mg. Ṣ‬ﻣ ﻪ ]ﺟﺰء | ‪ E‬إﳕﺎ ]‪‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﲈ ‪ om. E ‬ﻫﺬﻩ | ‪ DaMiYi‬ﯾﻌﲎ ]ﻧﻌﲏ ‪] Lat. ‬ﺟﺴﲈ ذا ﻧﻔﺲ[‬ ‫ﺗﻘﺮر ‪ N ‬ﻓﻘﻂ ]ﻟﻔﻆ ‪‬‬ ‫]ﺧﺼﻮص ‪ … ‬ﻻ | ‪ add. a.c. Ṣ | om. Yi‬إذا ]ﻣﺎ ‪ om. E ‬ﻫﻮ | ‪ om. To‬ا ا ّل | ‪ No‬ﺗﻘﺮ ] ّ‬ ‫‪ om. et add. in mg. Ṣ‬اﳌﺸﱰﻛـــﺔ… وٕا ّﻻ | ‪ٔ om. et add. s.l. Di‬ن ‪«nec ut genus nec ut species» Lat. ‬‬ ‫إذن ﺻﺎﱀ ]‪‬ﺻﺎﱀ | ‪ add. in mg. Ṣ‬ﻓﻬﻮ إذن ﯾﺼﻠﺢ ﳣﯿﲒ‪...‬ﻋﻦ ﺑﻌﺾ ‪ om. et‬ﺑﻌﺾ… ‪‬ﻓﻬﻮ ‪ ξ ‬إذا ]إذن | ‪] add. No‬اﳌﺸﱰﻛﺔ‬ ‫ﻼﻧﯿﺔ ]ﻟ ٔ ﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ | ‪ s.l. Y‬ﺻﻠﺢ ]‪‬ﺻﺎﱀ | ‪ T‬ﻠﳣﯿﲒ ‪ a.c. E‬ﻠﳣﯿﲒ ] ﳣﯿﲒ | ‪ in mg. Ṣ‬إذن ﯾﺼﻠﺢ ‪ N‬إذا ﺻﺎﱀ ‪νNo‬‬ ‫‪ τNo «quale‬ﻟﻼﻧﯿﺔ ‪ Ed.‬ﻟ ٕ‬ ‫ﺴﺎﺋﻞ ]ﻗﺎﺋﻞ ‪] Lat. ‬ا ٔﯾﯿﺔ[ »‪ KaṢ «quale quid‬ا ٔﻧﯿﺔ ‪ Ed.‬اﻻٕﻧﯿﺔ ]ا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ ‪ add. s.l. ṢY ‬ﻣﺎ ]ﺑﻮ ﻪ | ‪] Lat.‬ﻟ ٔﯾﯿﺔ[ »‪quid‬‬ ‫ﻼﻧﯿﺔ ]ﻟ ٔ ﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ | ‪No‬‬ ‫‪ in mg.‬اردت رذﻟﺖ ‪ et‬ارذﻟﺖ ‪َ ] p.c. KaG‬ر ّذﻟﺖ | ‪ Br‬ﺻﺎﱀ ]‪‬ﯾﺼﻠﺢ | ‪] Lat.‬ﻟ ٔﯾﯿﺔ[ »‪ Ṣ «quale quid‬ﻟﻼﻧﯿﺔ ‪ Ed.‬ﻟ ٕ‬ ‫‪] Lat.‬واﻟﻔﺮس واﻟﺜﻮر[ »‪ εJETTe «et equi et bovis‬واﻟﻔﺮس واﻟﺜﻮر ]واﻟﺜــﻮر واﻟﻔــﺮس | ‪ a.c. G‬اﳌﺎﻫﯿــﺔ ]‪‬ﻣﺎﻫﯿــﺔ ‪ٔ DiTe ‬رذﻟﺖ ‪Y‬‬ ‫ﳐﺼﻮص ]ﺧﺼﻮص | ‪] «ad modum generis vel speciei» Lat.‬ﴍﻛﺔ…ﲝﺎل | ‪ No‬وﲝﺎل ]ﲝﺎل | ‪ a.c. Ṣ‬واﻟﻔﺮس واﻟﺜﻮر واﶵﺎر‬ ‫‪ Ṣ‬ﻣﻘﻮاب ]ﻣﻘﻮل | ‪ JTTe‬وﻟ ﺲ ]ﻓﻠ ﺲ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. To‬ﻣﺸﱰﻛﺔ ‪ om. Br ‬دﻻﻟﺘﻪ | ‪ add. a.c. E‬ﻮﻧﻪ ] ﺮ ّذل | ‪Ṣ‬‬ ‫‪ Yi‬ﯾﺪل ]ﯾﺪ ﻞ | ‪ٔ Te‬ﻧﻪ ] ٔن | ‪ JT‬ﲆ ٔﻧﻪ ‪ om. et add. s.l. B om. C‬ﲆ ٔن | ‪ add. JToMi‬ﻫﻮ ]ﳾء | ‪ T‬ﻣﻘﻮل ]وﻣﻘﻮل ‪‬‬ ‫‪ ιYi‬وﻛﺬ ]و‬

‫‪٤٤‬ق‬

Chapter I.8  93

If we wish to sum it all up and go over it, we consider the signification of the expressions under three respects: [(i)] a signification of correspondence, like ‘animal’ signifies the complex of the percipient animate body; [(ii)] a signification of containment, like the expression ‘animal’ signifies the body; [(iii)] [finally], a signification of concomitance, like the expression ‘roof’ signifies what holds it up. [... Conclusion of Avicenna’s answer] This being the case, let us return to what we were dealing with, and say that the concept of percipient is that it is something provided with perception; then, we know from something extrinsic that it must be a body and animate, so that percipient signifies the body by concomitance. By ‘animal’ we only mean — on account of the convention among the specialists of this discipline — that it is a percipient animate body, so that it signifies the complete essential reality by correspondence and its parts by containment. The signification of percipient by way of correspondence has Q44 to do with only a part [of the meaning]; as to the entire [meaning] and the other parts, it only signifies them by way of concomitance. Here, however, we do not mean by ‘signifying expression’ this kind of signification. It has been established what the expression signifying the quiddity is and how it is; henceforth, the ambiguity which was mentioned disappears.

[. The essential expression which does not signify the quiddity] [.. The essential expression which does not signify the thing’s quiddity signifies its essential quality] The expression that is essential to the thing which does not signify the quiddity of that for which it is considered as essential either in a shared or in a proper manner5 cannot be the most common of the shared essentials, otherwise it would signify the shared quiddity in one respect. It should then be more specific than that, and apt to differentiate a part of what is [subsumed] under it from the rest, so that it is apt to the essential quality. Every essential that does not signify the thing’s quiddity in any way signifies [its] essential quality.

 I.e. The differentia specifica.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻣﻦ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫اﻟﴚء ّ‬ ‫داﻻ ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﻠ ﺲ ﺑﺪا ّل ﲆ ا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﯾﻠﺰﻣﻚ ﻣﺎ ٔﻟﺰﻣﺖ اﻟﻘــﻮم‪ ،‬ﻓ ﻘــﻮل ‪ّ ٔ :‬ﻣﺎ اﻟ ﺸـ ّﻜﻚ‬ ‫اﳌﻘﺪّ م ﻓ ﻨ ّﻞ ﺑ ٔن ﯾﻌﺮف ٔ ّ ﻻ ﳕﻨﻊ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ دا ّل ﲆ ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ ٔﺷﯿﺎء ّ‬ ‫داﻻ ﲆ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ ٔﺷﯿﺎء ٔﺧﺮى‪،‬‬ ‫اﳊﺴﺎس ﻣ ﻼ ّ‬ ‫داﻻ ﲆ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ ّﺎﺻﺔ ٔو ﻣﺸﱰﻛﺔ ﻟ ٕﻼ ﺴﺎن واﻟﻔﺮس‬ ‫ﺑﻞ رﺑّﲈ ٔوﺟ ﻨﺎ ذ ‪ٕ .‬اﻧ ّﲈ ﳕﻨﻊ ٔن ﻜﻮن ّ‬ ‫اﳊﺴﺎس‬ ‫اﳊﺴﺎس ﰲ ا اﺗﯿﺔ ﻟـ ٕﻼ ﺴﺎن واﻟﻔــﺮس واﻟﺜــﻮر‪ .‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن ّ‬ ‫واﻟﺜﻮر ﻛﺪﻻ اﳊﯿﻮان ﻣﻊ ﻣﺸﺎرﻛﺔ اﳊﯿﻮان ّ‬ ‫ذاﰐ ﻣﺸﱰك ﻟﻌﺪّ ة ٔﺷﯿﺎء‪ ،‬ﻛﲈ ٔ ّن اﳊﯿﻮان ذاﰐ ﻣﺸﱰك ﻟﻬﺎ‪ٕ .‬اﻧ ّﲈ ﳕﻨﻊ ﺣﻜﲈ ٓﺧﺮ ﻓ ﻘﻮل إﳖّ ﲈ ﺑﻌﺪ ﺷﱰاك‬ ‫ﰲ ا اﺗﯿﺔ اﳌﺸﱰك ﻓﳱﺎ‪ ،‬ﯾﻔﱰﻗﺎن ﻓ ﻜﻮن اﳊﯿﻮان و ﺪﻩ ﻣﳯﲈ ّ‬ ‫داﻻ ﲆ ﻣﺎﻫﯿــﺔ ﻣﺸﱰﻛــﺔ ﻟ ٔﻣــﻮر اﻟــﱵ ﻫــﲈ‬ ‫ذاﺗﯿﺎن ﻟﻬﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (..‬وﳚﺐ ٔن ﺗﻌﲅ ٔ ّ ‪ ،‬إذا ﻗﻠﻨﺎ ﻟﻔﻆ ذاﰐ‪ ،‬ﻋﻨ ﺎ ذاﺗﯿﺎ ﻟﴚء‪ّ .‬ﰒ ﻧﻘﻮل ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ ٔو ﲑ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﻓ ﻌﲏ‬ ‫اﻟﴚء ﻻ ﲑﻩ‪ .‬وٕاذا ﻠﯿﻨﺎ ﻋــﻦ ﻫــﺬا ﻓ ﻜــﻮن ﻣﺎ ﻫــﻮ ٔﺑﻌــﺪ ﻣــﻦ ﻫــﺬا‪ :‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن ا اﰐ‬ ‫ﺑﺬ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﻛﺬ‬ ‫ﻠﴚء‪ ،‬ﰷﻠﻮن ﻠﺒﯿﺎض‪ ،‬ﻗﺪ ﻜﻮن ﻋﺮﺿﯿﺎ ﻟﴚء ٓﺧﺮ‪ ،‬ﻛﲈ ﻫﻮ ﻠﺠﺴﻢ‪ .‬وﻫﺬا ﻻ ﯾــﻮﺟﺐ ﻣ ــﻊ ﻗـﻮﻟﻨﺎ ا ّٕن‬ ‫ا اﰐ ﻻ ﻜﻮن ﻋﺮﺿﯿﺎ‪ ،‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن ﻏﺮﺿﻨﺎ ﯾﺘﻮ ّ ﻪ إﱃ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﻻ ﻜﻮن ﻋﺮﺿﯿﺎ اﻟﴚء ا ي ﻫﻮ ذاﰐ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (..‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟ ﺸﻜّﻚ ا ٓﺧﺮ‪ ،‬ﻓ ﻨ ّﻞ ﺑ ٔن ﻧﻘﻮل ٕا ّ ﻧﻌﲏ ا ّل ﲆ ا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ ﻣﺎ ٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﺻﻠﻮ ﻪ ﻟ ٔ ﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ ﻓﻘﻂ‬ ‫ﻣﻘﻮم‬ ‫ﻣﻘﻮم ﳣّﻢ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﻣﺸﱰﻛﺔ ٔو ّﺎﺻﺔ؛ ﺑﻞ ﲆ ﻣﻌﲎ ّ‬ ‫دون اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ‪ ،‬ﺣﱴ ٕاﻧ ّﻪ ﻻ ﻜﻮن دﻻﻟﺘﻪ ﲆ ﻣﻌﲎ ّ‬ ‫ﳜﺺ‪ .‬ﻓﺎٕذا ﻗﻠﻨﺎ ا ا ّل ﲆ ا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ ﻋﻨ ﺎ ﻫﺬا اﳌﻌﲎ‪.‬‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫)‪ (..‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن ﺸﻜّﻚ ﻣ ﺸﻜّﻚ واﺳ ﺎن ﺎل ﻗﻮل اﳊﯿﻮان ﲆ اﻟﺴﻤﯿﻊ واﻟﺒﺼﲑ واﻟﻼﻣﺲ ﻫﻞ ﻫﻮ ﻗﻮل‬ ‫ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ٔو ﻟ ﺲ‪ ،‬وﯿﻒ ﳚﻮز ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻣﻘﻮﻻ ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ‪ ،‬ﻓ ﻜﻮن ﻫﺬﻩ ٔﻧـﻮاع اﳊﯿـﻮان‬ ‫‪ ] Here starts again the text of MS A after the lacuna.‬ﺷﱰاك ‪‬‬

‫ﻓﻨ ّ‬ ‫ﻞ ‪ ι ‬اﻟ ﺸﻜ ﻚ ]اﻟ ﺸﻜّﻚ | ‪] Lat. | om. J‬ا ٔﯾﯿﺔ[ »‪ ṢYi «quale quid‬ﻧﯿﺔ ‪ Ed.‬اﻻٕﻧﯿﺔ ]ا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ | ‪ T‬ﺗﺪل ‪ JNo‬ﯾﺪل ]ﺑﺪا ّل ‪‬‬ ‫‪ om. Ka‬ﺑﻞ ‪ KaNkE ‬دال ] ّ‬ ‫داﻻ | ‪ٔ ] Lat.‬ﯾﯿﺔ[ »‪ CṢYi «quale quid‬اﻧﯿﺔ ‪ Ed.‬إﻧﯿﺔ ] ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ | ‪ T‬ﳕﺘﻨﻊ ]ﳕﻨﻊ | ‪ ν‬ﺑ ٔ ] ٔ ّ | ‪om. No‬‬ ‫ٔو ﻣﺸﱰﻛﺔ‪...‬ا اﺗﯿﺔ ‪ om. et‬اﳊﯿﻮان ‪ٔ … ‬و | ‪ om. Lat.‬واﻟﺜﻮر ‪ٔ … ‬و | ‪ CNo‬ﺎﺻﯿﺔ ] ّﺎﺻﺔ | ‪ om. Br‬ﻣ ﻼ | ‪ٔ iter. T‬ن ﻜﻮن‬ ‫ا ات ]ا اﺗﯿﺔ | ‪ om. G‬ﰲ | ‪ s.l. Nk‬ﻣﻊ | ‪ iter. a.c. J‬واﻟﺜﻮر…ﻛﺪﻻ | ‪ E‬دﻻ ]ﻛﺪﻻ | ‪ om. Yi‬واﻟﺜﻮر ‪add. in mg. G ‬‬ ‫ﻓ ﻜﻮن ‪ ιEDaYi ‬وﻧﻘﻮل ]ﻓ ﻘﻮل | ‪ fort. p.c. Mi‬ﻓ ٕﺎ إﳕﺎ ‪ٕ DiToŠ‬ا إﳕﺎ ‪ praem. in mg. B‬ﻓ ٕﺎ ‪ٕ s.l. Nk‬ا ‪ νE‬ﻓ ٕﺎ إﳕﺎ ] ٕاﻧ ّﲈ ‪Di ‬‬ ‫»‪] «esse illud substantiale‬ﻧﻘﻮل | ‪ praem. JTTe‬ﻟﻔﻈﺎ ]ذاﺗﯿﺎ | ‪ٔ τ‬ﻧﻪ ‪ C  ّ ٔ om. To‬ﳍﲈ ]ﻟﻬﺎ ‪ Yi ‬دال ] ّ‬ ‫داﻻ | ‪om. Ka‬‬ ‫]‪‬ﻫﺬا | ‪ Yi‬ﻋﻦ ]ﻣﻦ | ‪] vacuum Ka‬ﻫﺬا | ‪ Te‬ﺎﻧ ﺎ ] ﻠﯿﻨﺎ | ‪ π‬ﻻ ﲑ ‪ E‬ﻻ ﻟﴚء ﲑﻩ ]ﻻ ﲑﻩ ‪ Di ‬و ﲑ ] ٔو ﲑ | ‪add. Lat.‬‬ ‫]ذاﺗﯿﺎ[ »‪] «substantiale‬ﻋﺮﺿﯿﺎ ‪ om. et add. in mg. To ‬ا اﰐ | ‪] add. Lat.‬ا اﰐ[ »‪ add. DiG «substantiale‬ا اﰐ‬ ‫‪ νBrDa a.c. Nk‬ذاﰐ ] ذاﰐ | ‪ p.c. Š | om. JṢ‬ﻋﺮﺿﯿﺎ ]ﻏﺮﺿﻨﺎ | ‪ add. in mg. To‬ﻓﺎٕن ﻋﺮﺿﯿﺎ ‪ om. et‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن ﻏﺮﺿﻨﺎ ‪Lat. ‬‬ ‫ٕا إﳕﺎ ‪ Da‬إﳕﺎ ] ٕا ّ | ‪ E‬ﻓ ﻨ ـ ]ﻓ ﻨ ـ ّ‬ ‫ﻞ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. N‬ا ٓﺧــﺮ | ‪ πDi‬اﻟ ﺸــﻜ ﻚ ‪ a.c. Nk‬اﻟﺸــﲁ ‪ G‬اﻟﺸﻚ ]اﻟ ﺸ ـﻜّﻚ ‪‬‬ ‫ﻼﻧﯿﺔ ]ﻟ ٔ ﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ | ‪] Lat.‬ا ٔﯾﯿﺔ[ »‪ τYiNo «quale quid‬ﻧﯿﺔ ‪ Ed.‬اﻻٕﻧﯿــﺔ ]ا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿــﺔ | ‪νEDiToŠ‬‬ ‫]ﻟ ٔﯾﯿﺔ[ »‪ τ «quale quid‬ﻟﻼﻧﯿﺔ ‪ Ed.‬ﻟ ٕ‬ ‫ﻣﻘﻮم | ‪ om. E‬ﻣﻌﲎ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. Nk‬ﻻ ‪Lat. ‬‬ ‫)‪ in mg. T «(intentio‬ﻣﻘﻮم ‪ et‬ﻣﻔﻬﻮم ‪ s.l. Ṣ‬ﻣﻘﻮم ‪ DaṢNo‬ﻣﻔﻬﻮم ]‪ّ ‬‬ ‫ﻣﻘﻮم… ﳣّﻢ | ‪] + «ex nomine» add. Lat.‬ﻣﻔﻬﻮم[ »‪intellecta‬‬ ‫ﻣﻘﻮم | ‪ّ  om. et add. in mg. J‬‬ ‫‪ a.c. Ṣ‬ﻣﻔﻬﻮم وﻣﻘﻮم ‪ّ  om. ξ‬‬ ‫ﻓﺎٕذ ﻗﺪ ﯾﺘ ﲔ ﻫﺬا ﻓ ﻘﻮل إن ا اﰐ ا ال ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﯾﻘﺎل اﳌﻘﻮل ﰲ ]اﳌﻌﲎ | ‪] Lat.‬ا ٔﯾﯿﺔ[ »‪ τCYi «quale quid‬ﻧﯿﺔ ‪ Ed.‬اﻻٕﻧﯿﺔ ]ا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ ‪‬‬ ‫ﻓﺎٕذ ﻗﺪ ﯾﺘ ﲔ ﻫﺬا ﻓ ﻘﻮل إن ا اﰐ ا ال ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﯾﻘﺎل ‪ add. JE‬ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ وا اﰐ ا ال ﲆ ا ٔﯾﯿﺔ ﯾﻘﺎل اﳌﻘﻮل ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ٔي ﳾء ﻫﻮ و ٔﳝﺎ ﻫﻮ‬ ‫ﻣﻘﻮل ]‪‬ﻗﻮل | ‪] Lat.‬اﳊﺴﺎس ‪] «sensibilis» [scil.‬اﳊﯿﻮان | ‪ s.l. Di‬ﻣ ﺸﻜّﻚ ‪ add. τ ‬اﳌﻘﻮل ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ٔي ﳾء ﻫﻮ وٕاﳝﺎ ﻫﻮ‬ ‫‪] Lat.‬اﳊﺴﺎس ‪] «sensibilis» [scil.‬اﳊﯿﻮان | ‪ add. et exp. J‬ﻗﻮل ]‪‬ﻫﻮ ‪ToMi ‬‬

‫‪٤٥‬ق‬

Chapter I.8  95

[.. The signification of the quiddity and the signification of the essential quality] [... Possible objection concerning the genus’ differentiae and Avicenna’s answer] If someone said: «What is apt [to signify] the essential quality is itself [also] apt [to signify] the quiddity because, even if you dispute that percipient signifies the quiddity of man, bull and horse in a proper or shared manner, you do not dispute that it signifies the shared quiddity of hearing, seeing and touching. Hence, the essential must not be divided into predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’ and predicated in answer to ‘what sort of thing is it?’ in such a way that the one does not fall under the other. For this reason, it was not clear to you that, when something signifies the quiddity, it does not signify the essential quality; rather, what you imposed on the group [of philosophers] imposes itself on you», we would reply to him: as to the first doubt, it is solved by knowing that we do not deny that what signifies the essential quality of [certain] things signifies the quiddity of other things, quite the opposite, sometimes we [even] affirm it. We only deny that percipient, for instance, signifies a proper or shared quiddity that belongs to man, horse and bull like animal does, sharing the essentiality of man, horse and bull with the percipient animal. For, in fact, percipient is a shared essential to a number of things, just like Q45 animal is. We only deny another judgement and say that, after partaking in the shared essentiality, they separate, so that animal alone signifies a shared quiddity that belongs to the things for which they are both essential. [... Remark on the meaning of essential in relation to the subject] You should know that, when we say: ‘essential expression’, we mean essential to something. Then we say: ‘quiddity’ or ‘not-quiddity’, and by this we mean that it is so for that thing and nothing else. Since we are free of this [obstacle], there will be something more remote than this [from the common sense]: what is essential to something, like colour for whiteness, may be accidental to another thing, like colour for body. This, however, does not imply that we cannot state that the essential is not accidental, for what we intend is that it is not accidental to that same thing to which it is essential. [... Remark on the meaning of signifying the essential quality] The other doubt is solved by saying that we mean by signifying the essential quality what is only apt [to signify] the essential quality and not the quiddity [as well], so that it does not signify a constitutive meaning that completes the shared or proper quiddity; rather, it signifies a constitutive meaning that belongs properly [to something]. So when we say: ‘signifying the essential quality’ we mean this meaning.

 

‫ق‬٤٦

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻣﻦ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫ ٔ ّن اﳊﯿﻮان ٔ ّﰎ‬،‫اﳊﺴﺎس ﻣﻘﻮﻻ ﻠﳱﺎ ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ‬ ّ ‫و ٔﻣﻮرا ﳐﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﻣ ﺒﺎﯾﻨﺔ ٔﯾﻀﺎ — ﲿﯿ ﺬ ﻻ ﻜﻮن‬ ‫دﻻ ؛ وﯿﻒ ﻻ ﻜﻮن ﻛﺬ وﻫﻮ ٔﳈﻞ ﶊﻮل ﲆ ﻣﺎ ﳓﻤ ﻠﯿﻪ ﻟﴩﻛﺔ؟— ﻓ ﺠﺐ ٔن ﯾ ﻈــﺮ ﻫــﺬا‬ .‫ وذ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻓﺼﻮل‬،‫اﳌ ﺸﻜّﻚ ٔﺻﻮﻻ ﻧﻌﻄﳱﺎ ٕا ّ ﻩ ﰲ ﲪﻞ اﳉ ﺲ ﲆ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ‬ ‫( ﻓﺎٕذ ﻗﺪ ّﺗﺒﲔ ﻫﺬا ﻓ ﻘﻮل ا ّٕن ا اﰐ ا ا ّل ﲆ اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﯾﻘﺎل اﳌﻘﻮل ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ وا اﰐ ا ا ّل‬) .‫ﲆ ا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ ﯾﻘﺎل اﳌﻘﻮل ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ٔ ّي ﳾء ﻫﻮ ﰲ ذاﺗﻪ ٔو ٔﯾّﲈ ﻫﻮ‬ ،‫( و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟﻌﺮﴈ ﻓﺮﺑّﲈ ﰷن ّﺎﺻﺎ ﺑﻄﺒﯿﻌﺔ اﶈﻤﻮل ﻠﯿــﻪ ﻻ ﯾﻌــﺮض ﻟــﻐﲑﻩ ﰷﻟﻀـ ّ ﺎك وا ــﲀﺗﺐ ﻟـ ٕﻼ ﺴﺎن‬) .‫ وﺴ ّﻤﻰ ﻋﺮﺿﺎ ﺎ ّﻣﺎ‬،‫ ورﺑّﲈ ﰷن ﺎرﺿﺎ وﻟﻐﲑﻩ ﰷ ٔﺑﯿﺾ ﻟ ٕﻼ ﺴﺎن وﻟﻐﲑﻩ‬.‫وﺴ ّﻤﻰ ّﺎﺻﺔ‬ ّ ‫ وٕا ّﻣﺎ‬،‫داﻻ ــﲆ ﻣﺎﻫﯿــﺔ ٔ ّﰪ وﺴ ّﻤــﻰ ـ ﺴﺎ‬ ّ ‫ﰻ ﻟﻔﻆ ﳇّﻲ ذاﰐ ٕا ّﻣﺎ‬ ّ ‫( ﻓ ﻜﻮن‬) ‫داﻻ ــﲆ ﻣﺎﻫﯿــﺔ ٔﺧـ ّـﺺ‬ ّ ‫ وٕا ّﻣﺎ‬،‫وﺴ ّﻤﻰ ﻧﻮ ﺎ‬ ،‫ و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ا ﳫّﻲ اﻟﻌﺮﴈ ﻓ ﻜﻮن ٕا ّﻣﺎ ّﺎﺻﯿﺎ وﺴ ّﻤﻰ ّﺎﺻﺔ‬.‫داﻻ ﲆ ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ وﺴ ّﻤﻰ ﻓﺼﻼ‬ ‫ ﻓﲁّ ﻟﻔﻆ ﳇّﻲ ٕا ّﻣﺎ ﺲ وٕا ّﻣﺎ ﻓﺼﻞ وٕا ّﻣﺎ ﻧﻮع وٕا ّﻣﺎ ّﺎﺻﺔ وٕا ّﻣﺎ ﻋﺮض‬.‫وٕا ّﻣﺎ ﻣﺸﱰﰷ ﻓ ﻪ وﺴ ّﻤﻰ ﻋﺮﺿﺎ ﺎ ّﻣﺎ‬ ّ ‫ وﻻ ﻟﻘ ﺎس إﱃ‬،‫ وﻫﺬا ا ي ﻫﻮ ﺲ ﻟ ﺲ ﺴﺎ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ‬.‫ﺎ ّم‬ ‫ ﺑﻞ ـ ﺴﺎ ﻟﺘـ ا ٔﻣــﻮر‬،‫ﰻ ﳾء‬ ّ ‫ وﻛﺬ اﻟﻨﻮع ﻟ ﺲ ﻫﻮ ﻧﻮ ﺎ ﰲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ وﻻ ﻟﻘ ﺎس إﱃ‬.‫اﻟﱵ ﺸﱰك ﻓ ﻪ‬ ‫ ﺑﻞ ﻟﻘ ﺎس إﱃ ا ٔﻣﺮ‬،‫ﰻ ﳾء‬  ‫اﰐ‬

‫ … وا‬ ‫ﻫﻮ‬]

Cf. A -F

, Al-alfāẓ al-mustaʿmala fī l-manṭiq, p. .–.

 ‫اﰐ‬

‫ … وا‬ ‫ﻫﻮ‬] ʿUyūn al-Ḥikma, al-Manṭiq, p. ., , Nağāt, pp. .–..



‫ و ٔﻣﻮر ]و ٔﻣﻮرا‬E | ‫ وﻣ ﺒﺎﯾﻨﺔ ]ﻣ ﺒﺎﯾﻨﺔ‬TŠ | ‫ و ٔﯾﻀﺎ ] ٔﯾﻀﺎ‬εξJECṢ ‫ و‬s.l. Nk | ‫ و ٔن ] ٔ ّن‬Di  ‫ ﻓﻜ ﻒ ]وﯿﻒ‬G | ‫ ﻛﺬ‬om. J ‫ ﳓﻤﻞ ]ﳓﻤـ‬KaJB ‫ ﳛﻤﻞ‬νNkCToMiG ‫ ﻤﻞ‬BrDiTe | ‫ ﻠﯿﻪ‬om. ξEDa | ‫ ﯾﻨﻈﺮ ]ﯾ ﻈﺮ‬Yi  ‫ و ٔﺣﻮ ] ٔﺻﻮﻻ‬add. NkEd. ‫ و ٔﺣﻮ‬add. in mg. BCṢG  ‫ ﻓﺎٕذا ]ﻓﺎٕذ‬ιN ‫ وٕاذ‬BTTe | ‫ …ﻓﺎٕذ‬ ‫ﻫﻮ‬ om. BrE | ‫ ﻗﺪ‬om. ιṢN | ‫ ﺑﲔ ] ّﺗﺒﲔ‬Ṣ | ‫ﻫﺬان ]ﻫﺬا‬ No | ‫« ]اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ‬esse et quid est» Lat.  ‫ اﻻٕﻧﯿﺔ ]ا ٔﯾ ّ ّﯿﺔ‬Ed. ‫ ﻧﯿﺔ‬DaṢ «quale quid» [‫ ]ا ٔﯾﯿﺔ‬Lat. | ‫ ٔو‬om. et add. s.l. C | ‫ﻫﻮ… ٔو‬] ‫ و ٔﳝﺎ ﻫﻮ‬J ‫ و ٔي ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ‬ξ ‫ ٔو ٔي ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ‬Ed. | ‫ﻫﻮ‬] ‫ ﰲ ذاﺗﻪ‬add. Ṣ  ‫ ﰷن‬om. E | ‫ وا ﲀﺗﺐ‬om. et add. in mg. Ka  ‫ ﰷن‬om. et add. in mg. Ṣ | ‫وﻟﻐﲑﻩ‬] ‫ ٔو ﻟﻐﲑﻩ‬Da | ‫وﻟﻐﲑﻩ‬] ‫ و ﲑﻩ‬ι  ‫ ﻣﻔﺮد ]ﻟﻔﻆ‬add. a.c. E | ‫ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ‬ …  ‫ ﲆ‬om. ّ om. et add. in mg. Ka | ‫ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ‬] ‫ ﻛﲈل ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ‬η  ‫داﻻ‬ ّ ] ‫ دال‬T | ‫ إﻧﯿﺔ ] ٔﯾّﯿّﺔ‬Ed. ‫ اﻧﯿﺔ‬Ṣ «quale esse» No | ‫ ﲆ‬ …  ‫داﻻ‬ [‫ ] ٔﯾﯿﺔ‬Lat. | ‫ﺎﺻﯿﺎ‬ ّ ] ‫ ﺎﺻﺎ‬DiG ‫ ﺎﺻﺎ ﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﺔ وا ﺪة‬Ṣ  ‫ ﻓ ﺴﻤﻰ ]وﺴ ّﻤﻰ‬λνξπDiDaṢ | ‫ ﻋﺮﺿﺎ‬om. ξDiDa ‫ ﻋﺮﺿﯿﺎ‬T | ‫ﺎﻣﺔ ] ﺎ ّﻣﺎ‬ Di | ّ‫ وﰻ ]ﻓــﲁ‬To  ‫ ا ي‬om. et add. s.l. N | ‫ ــﺲ ﻟ ــﺲ‬om. et add. in mg. Ṣ | ‫ …ﻟﺘ ـ‬ ‫ اﻟــﱵ‬iter. Te  ‫]وﻛﺬ‬ ‫ و‬Br | ‫ ﻟ ﺲ اﻟﻨﻮع ]اﻟﻨﻮع ﻟ ﺲ‬εE | ‫ ﻫﻮ‬om. εJETṢ | ‫ ﻟﻘ ﺎس‬] ‫ ﻫﻮ‬praem. s.l. G | ‫إﱃ‬ …  ‫ٔﻣﺮ ا ي ﻫﻮ ]ﻣ ﻪ‬ ‫ ٔﰪ ﻣ ﻪ‬Di ‫ ا ٔﻣﺮ ا ي ﻫﻮ ٔﰪ ﻣ ﻪ‬No ‫ إﱃ ا ٔﻣﻮر ا ي ﻫﻮ ٔﰪ ﻣﳯﺎ‬JT fort. a.c. Ṣ ‫ إﱃ ا ٔﻣﻮر اﻟﱵ ﻫﻮ ٔﰪ ﻣﳯﺎ‬γAEd. fort. p.c. Ṣ ‫إﱃ ا ٔﻣﺮ‬ ‫ ا ي ﻫﻮ ٔﰪ ﻣﳯﺎ‬BrTe 

‫ ﰲ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺮاﺑﻊ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﯿﺔ ﺣ ﺚ ﻗﺎل وﻻ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﻧﻮ ﺎ ﻠ ﺲ وٕاﻻ ﻻﺣ ﺎج إﱃ ﻓﺼﻞ ٓﺧﺮ إﱃ ٓﺧﺮﻩ ]ﻓﺼﻮل…وذ‬in mg. Te

 ‫ …ﻓﺎٕذ‬ ‫ﻫــــــﻮ‬] In MS E, paragraph  precedes paragraph ... MSS BrJṢ, probably due to contamination, preserve paragraph  twice, i.e. once in the same position as the rest of the tradition, and once before paragraph .. (in MSS BrṢ, the first occurrence is also affected by an accidental omission). The position of par.  in MS E is peculiar: the passage is intended to be the conclusion of the section that deals with the essential predicates, but par. .., which deals with a specific question concerning the differentiae of the genus and essential predication, comes after it in MS E, thus being excluded from the discussion on essential predicates. One might wonder whether the misplacement is a clue of a later insertion of either par. .. (which seems to be a self-standing unit) or par.  in the model of MS E, which might have lacked one of the two passages.





Chapter I.8  97

[... Reply to the objections concerning the differentiae of the genus] If someone doubts and tries to clarify whether the state of the predication of animal of hearing, seeing and touching is that of a predication in answer to ‘what is it?’ or not, and how it can be predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’ so that these are species of animal and different, distinct things as well (then, percipient is not predicated of them in answer to ‘what is it?’, since animal signifies [it] in a more complete way; how can it be otherwise, given that it is the most complete predicate for that of which we predicate it in a shared way?), this [man] who doubts should look closely at the principles we provide him with concerning the predication of the genus with respect to the differentia, which will be after [some] chapters6.

[. Definition of the essential expression that signifies the quiddity and that signifies the essential quality] This having been clarified, we will thus say that the essential that signifies the Q46 quiddity is said to be: the predicate in answer to ‘what is it?’, and the essential that signifies the essential quality is said to be: the predicate in answer to ‘what sort of thing is it in its essence?’ or ‘which thing is it?’.

[. The accidental expression] Sometimes, the accidental is proper to the nature of the subject of which it is predicated, without occurring to anything else, like laughing and capable of writing for man, and it is called proprium. Sometimes it occurs to [its subject] and to something else [too], like white for man and something else, and is called common accident.

[. Conclusion on the division of the universal expression] Every universal essential expression can signify a more common quiddity, being called genus, or a more specific quiddity, being called species, or an essential quality, being called differentia. The universal accidental [expression] can either be proper, being called proprium, or shared, being called common accident. [In conclusion], every universal expression is a genus, or a differentia, or a species, or a proprium or a common accident. That which is a genus is not a genus in itself, nor is it so in relation to everything; rather, it is a genus for those things that share it. Likewise, the  In Madḫal II., §..

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺜﺎﻣﻦ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫اﳋﺎﺻــﺔ ٔﯾﻀﺎ ٕاﻧّــﲈ ﱔ‬ ‫ا ي ﻫﻮ ٔ ّﰪ ﻣ ﻪ‪ .‬وﻛﺬ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﻫﻮ ﻓﺼﻞ ﻟﻘ ﺎس إﱃ ﻣﺎ ّﳣﲒ ﺑﻪ ﰲ ذاﺗﻪ‪ .‬و ّ‬ ‫ّﺎﺻﺔ ﻟﻘ ﺎس إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﯾﻌﺮض ﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﺘﻪ و ﺪﻩ؛ وﻛﺬ اﻟﻌﺮض ٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﻫﻮ ﻋﺮض ﺎ ّم ﻟﻘ ﺎس إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﯾﻌﺮض‬ ‫ﻻ و ﺪﻩ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻓﻠﻨﺘﳫّﻢ ا ٓن ﰲ ّ‬ ‫ﰻ وا ﺪ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ ﻧﻔـﺮادﻩ‪ّ ،‬ﰒ ﻟﻨﺒــﺤﺚ ﻋــﻦ ﻣﺸﺎرﰷﲥﺎ وﻣ ﺎﯾــﻨﺎﲥﺎ ــﲆ ﺣﺴﺐ اﻟــﻌﺎدة‬ ‫اﳉﺎرﯾﺔ‪ ،‬ﺳﺎﻟﻜﲔ ﻓ ﻪ ﻣﺴ اﶺﺎ ﺔ‪.‬‬

‫ﻻ ‪ add. ξ ‬اﻟﻌﺎم ‪ add. s.l. DiG‬اﻟﻌﺎم ]اﻟﻌﺮض | ‪ Te‬و ﺪﻫﺎ ‪ om. N‬و ﺪﻩ | ‪ Ṣ‬ﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﺔ ]ﻟﻄﺒﯿﻌﺘﻪ ‪ No ‬ﻣﻦ ]ﰲ | ‪ To‬ﳝﲒ ] ّ‬ ‫ﳣﲒ ‪‬‬ ‫ﰲ ]ﻓ ﻪ ‪ in mg. C ‬ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ ‪ s.l. Nk‬ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ ‪ γξBrDaEd.‬ﻣﳯﺎ ]ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ | ‪ iter. JṢTe om. A‬وا ﺪ ‪om. et add. s.l. Da ‬‬ ‫‪ om. et add. in mg. J‬ﻣﺴ | ‪ N‬ﻓﳱﺎ ‪KaTDaGEd.‬‬

Chapter I.8  99

species is not a species in itself, nor in relation to everything, but rather in relation to the thing that is more common than that. Likewise, the differentia is only a differentia in relation to that which is differentiated in its essence by it. Also, the proprium is only a proprium in relation to that to whose nature it occurs exclusively; likewise, the accident is only a common accident in relation to that to which it occurs not exclusively. Let us now talk about each one of them singularly taken7, and then investigate their shared features and differences8, according to the customary use, following in that the path of the community [of philosophers].

 In chapters I.–.  In chapters II.–.

‫]اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻊ[‬ ‫ﻓﺼﻞ ﰲ اﳉ ﺲ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫)‪ (.‬ﻓ ﻘﻮل ا ّٕن اﻠﻔﻈﺔ اﻟﱵ ﰷﻧﺖ ﰲ ﻟﻐﺔ اﻟﯿﻮ ﻧ ّﯿﲔ ﺗﺪ ّل ﲆ ﻣﻌﲎ اﳉ ﺲ ﰷﻧﺖ ﺗﺪ ّل ﻋﻨــﺪﱒ ﲝﺴﺐ‬ ‫اﻟﻮﺿﻊ ا ٔ ّول ﲆ ﲑ ذ ‪ّ ،‬ﰒ ﻧ ُ ِﻘﻠﺖ ﻟﻮﺿﻊ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ إﱃ اﳌﻌﲎ ا ي ﺴ ّﻤﻰ ﻋﻨﺪ اﳌﻨﻄﻘ ّﲔ ﺴﺎ‪ .‬وﰷﻧﻮا‬ ‫ٔوﻟﺌﻚ ُﺴ ّﻤﻮن اﳌﻌﲎ ا ي ﺸﱰك ﻓ ﻪ ٔﺷ ﺎص ﻛﺜﲑة ﺴﺎ‪ ،‬ﻣ ﻞ و ﳤﻢ ﰷﻟﻌﻠﻮﯾﺔ‪ٔ ،‬و ﺑ ﳤﻢ ﰷﳌﴫﯾﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻓﺎ ّٕن ﻣ ﻞ اﻟﻌﻠﻮﯾﺔ ﰷﻧﺖ ﺴ ّﻤﻰ ﻋﻨﺪﱒ ﰟ اﳉ ﺲ ﻟﻘ ﺎس إﱃ ٔﺷ ﺎص اﻟﻌﻠﻮﯾّﲔ؛ وﻛﺬ اﳌﴫﯾﺔ ﰷﻧﺖ‬ ‫ﺴ ّﻤﻰ ﻋﻨﺪﱒ ﺴﺎ ﻟﻘ ﺎس إﱃ ٔﺷ ﺎص اﳌﻮﻟﻮد ﻦ ﲟﴫ ٔو اﻟﺴﺎﻛﻨﲔ ﲠﺎ‪ .‬وﰷﻧﻮا ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﺴ ّﻤﻮن اﻟﻮا ــﺪ‬ ‫اﳌ ﺴﻮب إﻟﯿﻪ ا ي ﺸﱰك ﻓ ﻪ اﻟﻜﱶة ﺴﺎ ﳍﻢ‪ ،‬ﻓﲀن ﲇ ﻣ ﻼ ﻋﻨــﺪﱒ ُﳚــﻌﻞ ـ ﺴﺎ ﻠﻌﻠـﻮﯾّﲔ وﻣﴫ‬ ‫ﺴﺎ ﻠﻤﴫﯾّﲔ‪ .‬وﰷن ﻫﺬا اﻟﻘﺴﻢ ٔوﱃ ﻋﻨﺪﱒ ﳉ ﺴﯿﺔ‪ّ ٔ ،‬ن ﻠﯿﺎ ﺳ ﺐ ﻟﻜﻮن اﻟﻌﻠﻮﯾﺔ ﺴﺎ ﻠﻌﻠﻮﯾّﲔ‪،‬‬ ‫ﯾﻈﻦ ٔ ّن اﻟﺴ ﺐ ٔوﱃ ﻻﰟ ﻣﻦ اﳌﺴـ ّﺐ إذا واﻓﻘــﻪ ﰲ‬ ‫وﻣﴫ ﺳ ﺐ ﻟﻜﻮن اﳌﴫﯾﺔ ﺴﺎ ﻠﻤﴫﯾّﲔ‪ .‬و ّ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻩ ٔو ﻗﺎرﺑﻪ‪ .‬وﺸ ﺒــﻪ ٔﯾﻀﺎ ٔﳖّ ــﻢ ﰷﻧـﻮا ﺴ ّﻤــﻮن اﳊــﺮف واﻟﺼــﻨﺎ ﺎت ٔﻧﻔﺴــﻬﺎ ٔﺟ ﺎﺳــﺎ ﻠــﻤﺸﱰﻛﲔ ﻓــﳱﺎ‪،‬‬ ‫واﻟﴩﻛﺔ ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﺴﺎ‪.‬‬

‫‪ ] P‬ﻠــﻤﴫﯾّﲔ ‪… ‬وﰷﻧ ـﻮا ‪‬‬ ‫‪., Isag., pp. .–. (cf. A‬‬ ‫‪. Met. Δ a–); A‬‬ ‫‪., In Isag.,‬‬ ‫‪pp. .–.; E‬‬ ‫‪, In Isag., pp. .–.; I‬‬ ‫‪-Ṭ‬‬ ‫‪, Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāġūğī, pp. .–..‬‬ ‫‪ ] Cf. A‬ﺴﺎ ‪… ‬وﺸﺒﻪ ‪‬‬ ‫‪., In Isag., pp. .–.; E‬‬ ‫‪, In Isag., p. .–; P .-E‬‬ ‫‪(D‬‬ ‫‪),‬‬ ‫‪In Isag., p. .–.‬‬ ‫‪ ] Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt V., p. .–.‬ﺴﺎ ‪… ‬ﻓ ﻘﻮل ‪‬‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ν‬اﻠﻐﺔ ]ﻟﻐﺔ ‪] vacuum Br ‬ﰲ اﳉ ﺲ | ‪ Mi‬اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻊ ﻣﻦ اﳌــﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ ﻣــﻦ اﻟﻔــﻦ ا ٔول ﻣــﻦ ﲨـ اﳌﻨﻄــﻖ ‪ Y‬اﻟــﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺘﺎﺳــﻊ ]ﻓﺼﻞ‬ ‫‪ٔ in mg. Ṣ‬وﻟﺌﻚ ‪ٔ Ṣ‬وﻻ ] ٔوﻟــﺌﻚ ‪ λDaṢTe ‬ﻓﲀﻧـﻮا ‪ εξ‬ﻓــﲀن ‪ J‬وﰷن ]وﰷﻧـﻮا | ‪ s.l. To‬إﱃ ‪ νπDi in mg. G ‬اﻟﯿﻮ ﻧﯿــﺔ ]اﻟﯿــﻮ ﻧ ّﯿﲔ‬ ‫ﻣ ﻞ ‪ add. A ‬ﻛﺜﲑون ‪ BrEDiTe‬ﻛﺜﲑون ]ﻛﺜﲑة | ‪ add. s.l. G‬ﻋﻨﺪﻩ ]ﻓ ﻪ | ‪ add. et exp. E‬اﳌﺸﱰك ]اﳌﻌﲎ | ‪ ξYi‬ﺴﻤﻰ ] ُﺴ ّﻤﻮن‬ ‫‪ add. et‬اﻟﱵ ‪ γEDaṢY‬و ﻟﻘ ﺎس ] ﻟﻘ ﺎس | ‪ om. J‬ﻋﻨﺪﱒ | ‪ γξBrDa‬ﰷن ]‪‬ﰷﻧﺖ | ‪ add. ν‬ﻣ ﻼ ‪ add. J‬ﻋﻨﺪﱒ ]اﻟﻌﻠﻮﯾﺔ | ‪om. TeYi‬‬ ‫واﻟﺴﺎﻛﻨﲔ ] ٔو اﻟﺴﺎﻛﻨﲔ | ‪ Ṣ‬اﳌﻮ ﻦ ‪ in mg. G‬اﳌﻮﻟﻮد ﻦ ‪ et‬اﳌﻮ ﻦ ]اﳌﻮﻟﻮد ﻦ | ‪ Br‬ﺴﻤﻰ ‪ N‬ﻋﻨﺪﱒ ﺴﻤﻰ ‪ om. E‬ﺴ ّﻤﻰ ﻋﻨﺪﱒ ‪exp. Di ‬‬ ‫]ﻣ ﻼ ﻋﻨﺪﱒ | ‪ Di‬ﻠﯿﺎ ﺮم ﷲ و ﻪ ‪ add. μνE‬رﴈ ﷲ ﻋﻨﻪ ] ﲇ | ‪ om. Te‬ﳍﻢ | ‪ G‬اﻟﱵ ]ا ي ‪ Te ‬ﺴﻤﻮن ٔﯾﻀﺎ ] ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﺴ ّﻤﻮن | ‪Te‬‬ ‫] ٔوﱃ ﻋﻨﺪﱒ | ‪ add. λTDaṢ‬ﰷن ‪ s.l. Y‬ﰷن ]اﻟﻘﺴﻢ ‪ Di ‬وﻣﴫا ]وﻣﴫ | ‪ُ om. Ṣ‬ﳚﻌﻞ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. N‬ﻣ ﻼ ‪ ιT‬ﻋﻨﺪﱒ ﻣ ﻼ‬ ‫اﳌﴫﯾﺔ…ﺳ ﺐ | ‪ A‬ﻣﴫا ]وﻣﴫ ‪ No ‬ﻟﻜﻦ ]ﻟﻜﻮن | ‪ add. Di‬ﺮم ﷲ و ﻪ ] ﻠﯿﺎ | ‪ ν‬ﰟ اﳉ ﺲ ] ﳉ ﺴﯿﺔ | ‪ JTṢTe‬ﻋﻨﺪﱒ ٔوﱃ‬ ‫ﯾﻈﻦ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. To‬ﻠﻤﴫﯾّﲔ | ‪om. et add. in mg. Y‬‬ ‫‪ A‬ﻗﺎرﻧﻪ ]ﻗﺎرﺑﻪ ‪ MiEd. : «putabant» Lat. ‬وﻧﻈﻦ ]و ّ‬ ‫‪ om. Ṣ‬ﻧﻔﺴﻬﺎ ‪] add. No ‬وﺸﺒﻪ‬

‫‪٤٧‬ق‬

C

[I.]

[. The meanings of ‘genus’] [.. The senses of ‘genus’ employed in Greek] We will thus say: The expression that in Greek signified the meaning of genus Q47 signified, for the Greeks, something else by first imposition; then, it was applied by second imposition to the meaning that the logicians call ‘genus’. Those [philosophers] used to call the meaning that several individuals share — such as their descendance (like being an ʿAlid) or their provenance (like being Egyptian) — ‘genus’, for they called by the name of genus things like being an ʿAlid in relation to the individuals of the ʿAlids; likewise, they called being Egyptian a genus in relation to the individuals born in Egypt or living there. They also used to call the one [thing] to which [the individuals] are related [and] that multiplicity shares a genus for the individuals, so that, for instance, they considered ʿAlī as a genus for the ʿAlids, and Egypt as a genus for the Egyptians. According to them, this kind [of things] was worthier of the status of genus, since ʿAlī is the cause of the fact that being an ʿAlid is a genus for the ʿAlids, and Egypt is the cause of the fact that being Egyptian is a genus for the Egyptians, and the cause is presumed to be worthier of the name [of genus] than what is caused whenever it corresponds to it with regard to its meaning or it is almost equivalent to it. Seemingly, they would also call ‘genera’ the crafts and the arts themselves for the [individuals] that share them; the fact itself of sharing them [was called] genus too.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻊ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫)‪ (.‬ﻓﻠ ّﻤﺎ ﰷن اﳌﻌﲎ ا ي ﺴ ّﻤﻰ ا ٓن ﻋﻨﺪ اﳌﻨﻄﻘ ّﲔ ﺴﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻌﻘﻮل وا ﺪ ﺴﺒﺔ إﱃ ٔﺷﯿﺎء ﻛﺜﲑة‬ ‫ﺸﱰك ﻓ ﻪ‪ ،‬وﱂ ﻜﻦ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ ا ٔ ّول اﰟ‪ ،‬ﻧ ُ ِﻘﻞ ﻣﻦ اﰟ ﻫــﺬﻩ ا ٔﻣــﻮر اﳌ ﺸﺎﲠــﺔ اﰟ‪ ،‬ﻓﺴ ّﻤــﻲ‬ ‫ﺴﺎ‪ .‬وﻫﻮ ا ي ﯾﺘﳫّﻢ ﻓ ﻪ اﳌﻨﻄﻘ ّﻮن ّ‬ ‫وﺮﲰﻮﻧﻪ ﺑ ٔﻧ ّﻪ اﳌﻘﻮل ﲆ ﻛﺜﲑﻦ ﳐﺘﻠﻔﲔ ﻟﻨﻮع ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬وﻗ ﻞ ٔن ﴩع ﰲ ﴍح ﻫﺬا اﻟﺘ ﺪﯾﺪ‪ ،‬ﻓ ﺠﺐ ٔن ُﺸﲑ إﺷﺎرة ﺧﻔ ﻔﺔ إﱃ ﻣﻌﲎ اﳊــﺪّ واﻟــﺮﰟ‪،‬‬ ‫وﻧﺆﺧّﺮ ﲢﻘ ﻘﻪ ﻟﴩح إﱃ اﳉﺰء ا ي ﴩح ﻓ ﻪ ﺎل اﻟﱪﻫﺎن‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬ﻓ ﻘﻮل إن اﻟﻐﺮض ا ٔ ّول ﰲ اﻟﺘ ﺪﯾﺪ ﻫﻮ ا ﻻ ﻠﻔﻆ ﲆ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ اﻟﴚء‪ .‬ﻓﺎٕن ﰷن اﻟﴚء ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻩ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﲎ ﻣﻔﺮدا ﲑ ﻣﻠﺘﱦ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻌﺎن‪ ،‬ﻓﻠﻦ ﯾﺼﻠﺢ ٔن ﯾﺪ ّل ــﲆ ذاﺗــﻪ ا ّٕﻻ ﺑﻠﻔــﻆ ﯾ ـ ﺎول ﺗـ ا ات و ــﺪﻫﺎ‬ ‫وﻜﻮن ﻫﻮ اﲰﻪ ﻻ ﲑ‪ ،‬ﻓﻼ ﻜﻮن ﻣﺎ ﴩح ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺘﻪ ﺑ ٔﻛﱶ ﻣﻦ ﻟﻔﻆ ﻫﻮ اﰟ‪ .‬ورﺑّﲈ ٔﰏ ﰟ ﻣﺮادف‬ ‫ﻟﻜﻦ دﻻ ﰟ إذا ﱂ ﺗُﻔﺪ ﻠﲈ ﲟﺠﻬﻮل‪ ،‬اﺣ ﯿﺞ إﱃ ﺑﯿﺎن ٓﺧﺮ ﻻ ﯾ ﺎول ذاﺗﻪ‬ ‫ﻻﲰﻪ ﻜﻮن ٔﻛﱶ ﴍ ﺎ ‪ّ .‬‬ ‫ﻓﻘﻂ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﯾ ﺎول ﺴﺒﺎ وﻋﻮارض وﻟﻮاﺣﻖ وﻟﻮازم اﺗﻪ إذا ﻓُﻬﻤﺖ ﺗ ّﻪ ا ﻫﻦ ﺣ ﻨﺌﺬ ﳌﻌﻨﺎﻩ ﻣ ﺘﻘﻼ ﻣﳯﺎ إﱃ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻩ‪ٔ ،‬و ﯾﻘ ﴫ ﲆ اﻟﻌﻼﻣﺎت دون اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﻼ ﯾ ﻘﻞ ٕا ــﳱﺎ و ــﲆ ﻣﺎ ﻫــﻮ ٔﻗــﺮب إﱃ ﻓﻬــﻤﻚ ﰲ ﻫــﺬا‬ ‫اﻟﻮﻗﺖ‪ .‬ﳁﺜﻞ ﻫﺬا اﻟﴚء ﻻ ﺪّ ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﻟﻔﻆ ﴩح ﻟﻮاﺣﻘﻪ ﻣﻦ ٔﻋﺮاﺿﻪ وﻟﻮازﻣﻪ‪.‬‬

‫‪] Material damage in MS Ṣ.‬ﻧ ُ ِﻘﻞ‬ ‫‪] Cf. A‬اﻟﴚء…ﻓ ﻘﻮل ‪., In Isag., p. .–. ‬‬ ‫‪., Top. I., b–a.‬‬ ‫‪., In Isag., p. .–; P .-E‬‬ ‫‪(D‬‬ ‫‪), In Isag., p. .–.‬‬

‫‪‬‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫‪] Cf. A‬واﻟﺮﰟ…وﻗ ﻞ‬ ‫‪] Cf. A‬ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺘﻪ ‪… ‬ﻓﺎٕن‬

‫ا ٓن ‪ add. LawG‬ا ٓن ]اﳌﻨﻄﻘ ّﲔ | ‪ om. LawG om. et add. in mg. Y‬ا ٓن ‪ om. ET‬ﺴ ّﻤﻰ ا ٓن | ‪ om. et add. i.l. J‬ا ي ‪‬‬ ‫»‪] «in lingua‬ا ٔ ّول…ﰲ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. N‬ﰲ | ‪ in mg. G‬ﻓﳱﺎ ]ﻓ ﻪ ‪ Te a.c. Ṣ ‬و ] | ‪ A‬وﻫﻮ ]ﻫﻮ | ‪ add. ET‬ﺴﻤﻰ‬ ‫…ﻣﻦ | ‪ ] add. Lat.‬ﺴﻤﻰ ﺑﻪ ا ٔﻣﻮر اﳌ ﺸﺎﲠﺔ ‪] «quo appellarentur ea quae sunt inter se similia» [scil.‬اﰟ | ‪Lat.‬‬ ‫‪ iter. a.c.‬وﻫﻮ ا ي | ‪ om. et add. s.l. C‬ﺴﺎ ‪ ṢTe ‬ﺴﻤﻰ ‪ νTN‬ﻓ ﺴﻤﻰ ]ﻓﺴ ّﻤﻲ | ‪ πDa‬اﳌﺸﺎﲠﺔ ]اﳌ ﺸﺎﲠﺔ | ‪ om. Lat.‬اﰟ‬ ‫‪ٔ add. Law‬ي ﻟﺼﻮر واﳊﻘﺎﺋﻖ ا اﺗﯿﺔ ] ﻟﻨﻮع | ‪ٔ Br‬ﻧﻪ ‪ add. Law‬ﻫﻮ ]ﺑ ٔﻧ ّﻪ | ‪ّ om. et add. in mg. Yi‬‬ ‫وﺮﲰﻮﻧﻪ | ‪ om. J‬ﻓ ﻪ | ‪Di‬‬ ‫‪ Yi om. Ṣ‬وﻫﻮ ]ﻫﻮ | ‪ praem. τTe‬ﻣﻌﲎ ]اﻟﺘ ﺪﯾﺪ | ‪ Te‬ﻣﻦ ]ﰲ | ‪ om. λξDa‬إن ‪ Br ‬ﻓﻼ ﺑﺪ ]ﻓ ــﺠﺐ | ‪ E‬ﴍع ]ﴍح ‪‬‬ ‫ذ ]ﺗ | ‪ Yi‬ﯾﺼﺢ ]ﯾﺼﻠﺢ | ‪ om. N‬ﻣﻌﲎ ‪ ν ‬ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ اﻟﴚء ‪ ιE‬ﻣﻌﲎ اﻟﴚء ]اﻟﴚء ﻣﻌﻨﺎﻩ | ‪ ν‬ﰷﻧﺖ ]ﰷن | ‪ om. No‬اﻟﴚء…ﻓﺎٕن‬ ‫‪ om. et add.‬ﻫﻮ | ‪ γEd.‬وﻻ ]ﻓﻼ | ‪ G‬اﰟ ‪ γπJTEd.‬اﲰﻬﺎ ]اﲰﻪ | ‪ BrJTTe‬ﻓ ﻜﻮن ]وﻜﻮن ‪ ξBrEYi ‬و ﺪﻩ ]و ﺪﻫﺎ | ‪ιξEṢ‬‬ ‫‪ om. Yi‬ﺣ ﻨﺌﺬ ‪] «significatio» Lat. ‬ﺑﯿﺎن | ‪ Yi‬اﻠﻔــﻆ ] ﰟ ‪] Lat. ‬اﲰــﻪ ‪] «nomen eius» [scil.‬اﰟ | ‪i.l. To‬‬ ‫‪] «sicut tu‬اﻟﻮﻗﺖ ‪… ‬و ﲆ | ‪ C‬وﻻ ﲆ ]و ﲆ | ‪ To‬ﻓﻠﲈ ]ﻓــﻼ | ‪ T‬اﻟﻌﻼﻣــﺔ ]اﻟﻌــﻼﻣﺎت ‪] «ad intentiones» Lat. ‬ﳌــﻌﻨﺎﻩ‬ ‫] ٔﻋﺮاﺿﻪ | ‪ om. E‬ﻣﻦ | ‪ E‬ﻣﻦ ﻟﻮاﺣﻘﻪ ]ﻟﻮاﺣﻘﻪ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. J‬ﺑﻞ ‪ om. et add. s.l. Di ‬ﻫﻮ | ‪modo» Lat.‬‬ ‫‪ Da‬ﻋﻮارﺿﻪ‬

‫‪٤٨‬ق‬

Chapter I.9  103

[.. The sense of ‘genus’ employed by the contemporary logicians] Since the meaning that is nowadays called ‘genus’ by the logicians is a single concept which has a relation to several items that share it, and [since] it had no name by first imposition, a name derived from that of those things that resemble it was applied to it, and it was called ‘genus’. This is what logicians talk about and describe as predicated of many [items] which differ in species in answer to ‘what is it?’1.

[. Digression on definition and description] [.. Introduction to the digression] Before we start explaining this definitory process, we ought to provide a quick Q48 indication concerning the meaning of definition and description, postponing its ascertainment by explanation to the section in which we shall explain the state of the demonstration2.

[.. Defining a simple and a composite meaning] We will thus say that the first purpose in defining is to signify the thing’s quiddity by means of the expression. If the meaning of the thing is a simple one which is not composed of [several] meanings, its essence is only apt to be signified by an expression that encompasses that essence alone, that is, its name and nothing else, for the thing has nothing to explain its quiddity better than the [single] expression that is [its] name. Sometimes [another] name which is more effective in explaining it is provided in substitution of its own name. But when the signification of the name does not provide knowledge of the unknown, another explanation is required which does not encompass its essence only, but [also] relations, accidental features, attachments and concomitants to its essence that [are such that], when they are understood, the mind is aware right away of its meaning, moving from them to its meaning, or it confines itself to the signs without [knowing] the quiddity (so that it does not move towards it) and to what is closer to your understanding at the present moment. Such a thing has no definition; rather, it has an expression explaining its accidents and concomitants that attach to it.

 Quoting Porph., Isag., p. .–, with some slight divergences with respect to the Arabic translation by al-Dimašqī (p. .–).  Namely in Burhān IV.–, in the chapters specifically devoted to the definition.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻊ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫و ٔ ّﻣﺎ إن ﰷن ﻣﻌﲎ ذاﺗﻪ ﻣﺆﻟّﻔﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻌﺎن‪ ،‬ﻓ ﺪّ وﻫﻮ اﻟﻘﻮل ا ي ﯾُﺆﻟّــﻒ ﻣــﻦ اﳌــﻌﺎﱐ اﻟــﱵ ﻣــﳯﺎ ﲢﺼﻞ‬ ‫ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺘﻪ ﺣﱴ ﲢﺼﻞ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺘﻪ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺧﺺ ا اﺗﯿﺎت ﻟﴚء ٕا ّﻣﺎ ﺴﻪ وٕا ّﻣﺎ ﻓﺼ ‪ ،‬ﲆ ﻣﺎ ﳚﺐ ٔن ﻧﺘ ّﻪ ﳑّﺎ ﺳﻠﻒ ذ ﺮﻩ —‬ ‫)‪ (.‬و ٔ ّن ٔ ّ‬ ‫ﻓ ٔ ّﻣﺎ ﻓﺼﻞ اﻟــﻔﺼﻞ و ــﺲ اﳉ ــﺲ وﻣﺎ ﯾــﱰﻛّﺐ ﻣــﻦ ذ ‪ ،‬ﻓﻬــﻮ ﺑﻮاﺳــﻄﺔ‪ ،‬وﻫــﻮ ﰲ ﲷــﻦ اﳉ ــﺲ‬ ‫واﻟﻔﺼﻞ— ﻓ ﺠﺐ ٔن ﻜﻮن اﳊﺪّ ﻣﺆﻟّﻔﺎ ﻣﻦ اﳉ ﺲ واﻟﻔﺼﻞ‪ .‬ﻓﺎٕذا ٔﺣﴬ اﳉ ﺲ اﻟﻘﺮﯾﺐ واﻟﻔﺼﻮل اﻟﱵ‬ ‫ﺗﻠﯿﻪ‪ ،‬ﺣﺼﻞ ﻣﳯﺎ اﳊﺪّ ‪ ،‬ﻛﲈ ﻧﻘﻮل ﰲ ﺪّ ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ٕاﻧ ّﻪ ﺣ ﻮان ﻃﻖ‪ .‬ﻓﺎٕن ﰷن اﳉ ﺲ ﻻ اﰟ ‪ٔ ،‬ﰏ ٔﯾﻀﺎ‬ ‫ﺣﺴﺎس‪ّ ،‬ﰒ ٔﳊﻖ ﺑﻪ ﻃﻖ؛ وﻛﺬ‬ ‫ﲝﺪّﻩ‪ ،‬ﻛﲈ ﻟﻮ ﱂ ﻜﻦ ﻠﺤﯿﻮان اﰟ ٔﰏ ﲝﺪّ ﻩ ﻓﻘ ﻞ ﺟﺴﻢ ذو ﻧﻔﺲ ّ‬ ‫ﻣﻦ ﺎﻧﺐ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻓﺎﳊﺪّ ﶺ ﺸ ﳣﻞ ﲆ ﲨﯿﻊ اﳌﻌﺎﱐ ا اﺗﯿﺔ ﻠﴚء ﻓ ﺪ ّل ﻠﯿﻪ ٕا ّﻣﺎ دﻻ ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻘﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﻌــﲆ اﳌــﻌﲎ اﻟﻮا ــﺪ‬ ‫اﳌﺘﺤﺼﻞ ﻣﻦ اﶺ ‪ ،‬وا ّﻣﺎ دﻻ ﺗﻀ ّﻤﻦ‪ ،‬ﻓﻌﲆ ا ٔﺟﺰاء‪.‬‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫)‪ (.‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟﺮﰟ ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﲈ ﯾﺘﻮ ّ ﺑﻪ ٔن ﯾﺆﻟﻒ ﻗﻮل ﻣﻦ ﻟﻮاﺣــﻖ اﻟﴚء ﺴﺎوﯾــﻪ‪ ،‬ﻓ ﻜــﻮن ﶺﯿــﻊ ﻣﺎ ﯾــﺪ ﻞ‬ ‫ﲢﺖ ذ اﻟﴚء ﻻ ﻟﴚء ﲑﻩ‪ ،‬ﺣﱴ ﯾــﺪ ّل ﻠﯿــﻪ دﻻ اﻟﻌﻼﻣــﺔ‪ .‬و ٔﺣﺴــﻦ ٔﺣـﻮا ٔن ُـﺮﺗ ّﺐ ﻓ ــﻪ ٔ ّوﻻ‬ ‫ﺲ‪ٕ ،‬ا ّﻣﺎ ﻗﺮﯾﺐ وٕا ّﻣﺎ ﺑﻌﯿﺪ‪ّ ،‬ﰒ ﯾﺆﰏ ﲜﻤ ٔﻋﺮاض وﺧﻮ ّاص‪ .‬وٕان ﱂ ﯾﻔﻌﻞ ذ ﰷن ٔﯾﻀﺎ رﺳــﲈ‪ .‬ﻣـ ﺎل‬ ‫ﺘﺼﺐ اﻟﻘﺎﻣﺔ‪ ،‬دي اﻟ ﴩة‪ ،‬ﲵّﺎك‪ٔ ،‬و ﺗﺬﻛّﺮ ﻫﺬﻩ‬ ‫ذ ٔن ﯾﻘﺎل ا ّٕن ا ٕﻻ ﺴﺎن ﺣ ﻮان ﻋﺮﯾﺾ ا ٔﻇﻔﺎر‪ ،‬ﻣ ُ‬ ‫دون اﳊﯿﻮان‪.‬‬

‫‪., In‬‬

‫‪, In Isag., p. .–; P‬‬

‫‪] Cf. A‬اﳊﯿـ ـﻮان ‪… ‬و ٔﺣﺴ ــﻦ ‪‬‬ ‫‪., In Isag., p. .–; D‬‬ ‫‪Anal. Post., p. .–; Ibid., pp. .–..‬‬

‫‪ om. et add. in mg. Ka‬ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺘﻪ…ﺣﱴ ‪ a.c. Te ‬ﲢﺼﻞ ﻣﳯﺎ ]ﻣﳯﺎ ﲢﺼﻞ | ‪ Ṣ‬ﻓﻬﻮ ]وﻫﻮ | ‪ٔ om. et add. s.l. Y‬ﻣﺎ ]و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ om. et‬اﻟﻔﺼﻞ و ﺲ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ‬ﻓﺼﻞ ‪ τTe‬ﺲ ]ﻓﺼﻞ | ‪ KaE‬و ٔﻣﺎ ]ﻓ ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪ Nk | om. E ‬ﻧﺜ ﻪ ]ﻧﺘ ّﻪ | ‪ om. Lat.‬ﻟﴚء ‪‬‬ ‫| ‪add. s.l. N‬‬ ‫‪ add. a.c. Ṣ‬وﱔ ﰲ ﲷــﻦ اﳉ ــﺲ واﻟــﻔﺼﻞ ]‪‬واﻟــﻔﺼﻞ ‪ BrATDaTe ‬وﱔ ]وﻫــﻮ | ‪ G s.l. Ṣ‬ﻣﳯــﲈ ]ﻣــﻦ ذ‬ ‫‪‬‬ ‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ…ﻓ‬ ‫ﺠﺐ‬ ‫‪ om. et‬ﻟﻮ ‪ٔ om. J ‬ﯾﻀﺎ | ‪ Ṣ‬اﳉﺴﻢ ]اﳉ ﺲ | ‪ To‬وٕان ]ﻓﺎٕن ‪ A ‬اﺧ ﴫ ] ٔﺣﴬ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. Da‬و‬ ‫] ﻠﯿﻪ | ‪ om. λξ‬ﻓ ﺪ ّل ﻠﯿﻪ | ‪ νπBrDiTe‬وﯾﺪل ]ﻓ ﺪ ّل | ‪ EDi‬واﳊﺪ ]ﻓﺎﳊﺪّ ‪ om. et add. in mg. J ‬اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ‪add. in mg. J ‬‬ ‫‪] «principali» (sic omnes codd., sed fort. corrigendum: parili) Lat.‬ﻣﻄﺎﺑﻘﺔ | ‪ in mg. C‬ﻠﳱﺎ ‪ i.l. NkB‬ﻠﳱﺎ ‪ εDa‬ﻠﳱﺎ‬ ‫‪ Te «quae‬ﻣﺴﺎوﯾﺔ ] ﺴﺎوﯾﻪ | ‪ DaN‬ﻠﴚء ]اﻟﴚء | ‪ ι‬ﻓ ﻪ ]ﺑﻪ | ‪ in mg. Ṣ‬ﯾﺘﻮ ﺎ ﺑﻪ ٔن ﯾﺆﻟﻒ ‪ Ṣ‬ﯾﺘﻮﻟﻒ ]ﯾﺆﻟّﻒ…ﯾﺘﻮ ّ | ‪ J‬ﻓ ٔﻣﺎ ]و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪‬‬ ‫اص | ‪ add. ν exp. p.c. Y‬ﻟﺘﻘ ﯿﺪ ذات اﻟﴚء ]ﺑﻌﯿﺪ ‪ JT ‬ﯾﱰﺗﺐ ] ُﺮﺗ ّﺐ | ‪ G‬وﻻ ]ﻻ ‪ ] Lat. ‬ﺴﺎوﯾﻪ[ »‪sunt ei paria‬‬ ‫]وﺧﻮ ّ‬ ‫‪ om. et add. s.l. JṢ‬ا ّٕن ‪] «sed vitiosa» add. Lat. ‬رﺳــﲈ | ‪ٔ om. Da‬ﯾﻀﺎ | ‪ γξBrTEd.‬ﻓﺎٕن ]وٕان | ‪ Te‬وﻋ ـﻮارض‬ ‫ﺘﺼﺐ | ‪ om. No‬اﳊﯿﻮان ‪… ‬ﻋﺮﯾﺾ‬ ‫‪ T‬وﺗﺬ ﺮ ‪ Ka‬وﯾﺬ ﺮ ] ٔو ﺗﺬﻛّﺮ | ‪ add. Te‬ﻟﻄﺒﻊ ]ﲵّﺎك | ‪ G‬ﻣ ﻨﺼﺐ ]ﻣ ُ‬

‫‪٤٩‬ق‬

Chapter I.9  105

If the meaning of its essence is composed of [several] meanings, it has a definition, that is, the statement composed of the meanings out of which its quiddity is realized, so that its quiddity is realized.

[.. The definition] Since the most proper of the essential [features] of the thing is either its genus, or its differentia, according to that to which we must draw your attention among what was mentioned before — as for the differentia of the differentia, the genus of the genus and what is composed out of that, it belongs to the thing in a mediate way and is contained in the genus and the differentia — the definition must be composed of the genus and the differentia. So, when the proximate genus is supplied together with the differentiae following it, the definition is realized from them, as we say about the definition of man that it is “rational animal”. If the genus has no name, its definition is also supplied, as well as if there were no name for animal, its definition Q49 would be supplied and it would be said: “percipient animate body”, then ‘rational’ would be attached to it; so too for the differentia. Overall, the definition includes all the essential meanings of the thing and signifies them either by a signification of correspondence, signifying the single meaning realized from [their] complex, or by a signification of containment, signifying [its] parts.

[.. The description] By the description one only intends to compose a statement equivalent to the thing out of the attributes that attach to it, so that it applies exclusively to everything that comes under that thing, in such a way that it signifies it as a sign. Its best condition consists in that a genus — either proximate or remote — is first arranged in it, then the complex of accidents and propria is supplied. Even if this is not done, the statement is still a description. An example of that is that man is either said to be an animal with broad nails, upright, with skin showing, laughing, or these [attributes] are mentioned without [mentioning] animal.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻊ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫)‪ (..‬ﻓﺎﳌﻘﻮل ﰲ ﴍح اﰟ اﳉ ﺲ ﻫﻮ ﰷﳉ ﺲ ﻠﴚء ا ي ﺴ ّﻤﻰ ﺴﺎ‪ .‬ﳁﻦ اﳌﻘﻮل ﻣﺎ ﯾﻘﺎل ﲆ‬ ‫وا ﺪ ﻓﻘﻂ‪ ،‬وﻣ ﻪ ﻣﺎ ﯾﻘﺎل ﲆ ﻛﺜﲑﻦ‪ ،‬ﻓ ﻜﻮن اﳌﻘﻮل ﲆ ﻛﺜﲑﻦ ﰷﳉ ﺲ ا ٔﻗﺮب؛ و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﳌﻘﻮل ﻻ ﲆ‬ ‫ﻛﺜﲑﻦ‪ ،‬ﻓﻼ ﯾ ﺎول اﳉ ﺲ‪ّ .‬ﰒ اﳌﻘﻮل ﲆ ﻛﺜﲑﻦ ﯾ ﺎول اﶆﺲ اﳌﺬ ﻮرة‪ ،‬ا ّٕﻻ ٔ ّ ﳌّﺎ ﻗﻠﻨﺎ ﳐﺘﻠﻔﲔ ﻟﻨﻮع ﰲ‬ ‫ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ اﺧ ّﺺ ﳉ ﺲ‪ .‬وﻧﻌﲏ ﺘﻠﻔﲔ ﻟﻨﻮع ا ﺘﻠﻔﲔ ﰲ اﳊﻘﺎﺋﻖ ا اﺗﯿﺔ‪ ،‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن اﻟﻨــﻮع ﻗــﺪ ﯾــﻘﺎل‬ ‫ﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ ّ‬ ‫ﰻ ﳾء ﰲ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺘﻪ وﺻﻮرﺗﻪ ﲑ ﻣﻠﺘﻔﺖ إﱃ ﺴ ﻪ إﱃ ﳾء ٓﺧﺮ‪ ،‬ﺧﺼﻮﺻﺎ إذا ﰷن ﯾﺼـ ّـﺢ ﰲ‬ ‫ﻟﻘﻮة‪ٔ ،‬و اﺣ ل ّ‬ ‫اﻟﺘﻮﱒ؛ وﻟ ﺲ‬ ‫ا ﻫﻦ ﲪ ﲆ ﻛﺜﲑﻦ ﺸﱰك ﻓ ﻪ ﻟﻔﻌﻞ ٔو ﻻ ﺸﱰك ﻓ ﻪ ﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺑﻞ ّ‬ ‫ﳛﺘﺎج ﰲ ﲢﻘ ﻖ اﳉ ﺲ إﱃ ٔن ﯾُﻠﺘﻔﺖ إﱃ ﳾء ﻣﻦ ذ ‪ .‬وٕاذا ﰷﻧﺖ ٔﺷﯿﺎء ﳐﺘﻠﻔﺔ اﳌﺎﻫــﯿﺎت‪ّ ،‬ﰒ ﻗـ ﻞ‬ ‫ﻠﳱﺎ ﳾء ٓﺧﺮ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻘﻮل‪ ،‬ﰷن ذ اﻟﴚء ا ٓﺧﺮ ﺴﺎ‪ .‬واﻓﻬﻢ ﻣﻦ ﻗـﻮﻟﻨﺎ ا ّٕن ﻫــﺬا اﻟﴚء ﯾــﻘﺎل ــﲆ‬ ‫ﻫﺆﻻء اﻟﻜ ﲑﻦ ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ٔ ّن ذ ﲝﺎل اﻟﴩﻛﺔ ﻛﲈ َ‬ ‫ﻠﻤﺖ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (..‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟﻔﺼﻞ ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﲑ ﻣﻘﻮل ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺑﻮ ﻪ‪ .‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟﻨﻮع ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﻟ ﺲ ﻣﻦ ﺣـ ﺚ ﻫــﻮ ﻧــﻮع‬ ‫ﻣﻘﻮﻻ ﲆ ﳾء ﻗﻮﻻ ﲠﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻔﺔ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﻣﻘﻮﻻ ﻠﯿﻪ‪ .‬ﻓﺎٕن اﺗ ّﻔﻖ ٔن ﻗ ﻞ ﻫﻮ ﺑﻌﯿﻨــﻪ ﻫــﺬا اﻟﻘــﻮل ﻓﻘــﺪ ﺻــﺎر‬ ‫ﺴﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫ﻓ ٕﺎ ّ ﯾﻠﺰﻣ ﺎ ٔن ّ‬ ‫ﻧﻌﲅ ﰲ اﳊﺪود اﻟﱵ ﻟ ٔ ﺷﯿﺎء ا ا ﰲ اﳌﻀﺎف ٔ ّ ﺮﯾﺪ ﲠﺎ ﻮﳖﺎ ﻟﴚء ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﻟﻬﺎ‬ ‫ﻣﻌﲎ اﳊﺪود‪ ّ ٔ ،‬ﳌّﺎ ﻗﻠﻨﺎ ﻫﺬا اﳊﺪّ ﻠ ﺲ‪ ،‬اﺳ ﺸﻌﺮ ﰲ ٔﻧﻔﺴﻨﺎ ز دة ﯾﺪ ّل ﻠﳱﺎ ﻗﻮﻟﻨﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻫﻮ‬ ‫‪, In Isag.,‬‬

‫‪., Isag., pp. .–.; A‬‬ ‫‪., In Isag., pp. .–.; E‬‬ ‫‪, Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāġūğī, pp. .–..‬‬

‫‪-Ṭ‬‬

‫‪…  ] Cf. P‬ﻓﺎﳌﻘــﻮل ‪‬‬ ‫‪pp. .–.; I‬‬

‫‪ ] «sicut id quod vocatur genus» [fort.‬ﺴﺎ…ﰷﳉ ﺲ | ‪ C‬وﰷﳉ ﺲ ]ﰷﳉ ﺲ | ‪ om. Lat.G add. in mg. G‬ﻫﻮ ﰷﳉ ﺲ ‪‬‬ ‫ﳁﻦ[ »‪] «praedicatum enim aliud est de multis aliud de uno solo‬ﻛﺜﲑﻦ ‪… ‬ﳁﻦ | ‪] Lat.‬ﰷﻟﴚء ا ي ﺴﻤﻰ ﺴﺎ‬ ‫‪ in mg. T‬اﳉ ﺲ ‪ No‬اﳉ ﺲ ]اﶆﺲ | ‪ om. Yi‬ﯾ ﺎول ‪ om. ET ‬ﻻ ‪] Lat. ‬اﳌﻘﻮل ﻣﺎ ﯾﻘﺎل ﲆ ﻛﺜﲑﻦ وﻣ ﻪ ﻣﺎ ﯾﻘﺎل ﲆ وا ﺪ ﻓﻘﻂ‬ ‫ﳊﻘﺎﺋﻖ ]ﰲ اﳊﻘﺎﺋﻖ ‪ Yi ‬ﻛﲈ ]ﳌّﺎ | ‪] «genus et cetera de quinque universalibus» Lat.‬اﶆــﺲ اﳌــﺬ ﻮرة | ‪ Br‬اﶆﺴــﺔ‬ ‫‪  om. et‬ﻟﻔﻌﻞ… ‪ٔ ‬و | ‪ Ṣ‬ﻓﳱﺎ ]‪‬ﻓ ﻪ | ‪ iter. J‬ﲆ ‪ Br ‬ﺴﺒﺔ ﳾء ] ﺴ ﻪ | ‪ No‬اﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ ]ﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ ‪ s.l. E ‬ﰲ ‪γBrEEd. p.c. G‬‬ ‫‪ om.‬ﻫﺬا اﻟﻘﻮل ‪ om. et add. in mg. J ‬ﳾء | ‪ add. Mi‬إﱃ ﺴ ﻪ ]ﯾُﻠﺘﻔﺖ | ‪ om. Ṣ²‬اﳉ ﺲ ‪add. in mg. Y om. ToTe ‬‬ ‫] ّٔن ‪ s.l. NkDi ‬إﻧﻪ ‪ add. ν‬إﻧﻪ ‪ add. et exp. G‬إﻧﻪ ]‪‬اﻟﴚء | ‪ CYi‬ﰲ ‪ om. Y‬ا ّٕن | ‪ γξEd.‬ﻓﺎﻓﻬﻢ ]واﻓﻬﻢ | ‪et add. in mg. Br‬‬ ‫‪] «quoniam hoc non debet fieri nisi cum interrogatur de multis simul non de‬اﻟﴩﻛﺔ… ّٔن | ‪ٔ Di‬ي ٔن ‪ٔ G‬ي‬ ‫ﻫﻮ ]ﻟ ﺲ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. Ṣ‬ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ | ‪ λξKaBrTDaTe‬ﻓ ٔﻣﺎ ]‪‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪ Š ‬ﳊﺎل ]ﲝﺎل | ‪unoquoque eorum per se» Lat.‬‬ ‫ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ‪ in mg. G‬ﺑﻌﯿﻨﻪ ‪ et‬ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ]ﺑﻌﯿﻨﻪ | ‪ ] «sed praedicatur de eo aliter» Lat.‬ﻠﯿﻪ…ﺑﻞ ‪ٔ C ‬ﻧﻪ ﻫــﻮ ]‪‬ﻫــﻮ | ‪add. Te‬‬ ‫‪] «Debes autem scire quod nihil habet genus et‬اﳊﺪود ‪… ‬ﻓ ٕﺎ ّ ‪ om. et add. in mg. J ‬ﻓﻘﺪ ﺻﺎر | ‪νξπDiDa‬‬ ‫‪speciem quae pertinent ad relationem nisi ex hoc quod habet intentionem diffinitionis eorum» Lat.‬‬ ‫ﻫﺬا | ‪ s.l. N‬ﳌﺎ ‪ et‬إذا ]ﳌّﺎ | ‪ Ka‬ﳇﻬﺎ ] ٔ ّ ‪ Di ‬وﻟﻬﺎ ]ﻟﻬﺎ | ‪ om. YiN‬ﱔ | ‪ Te‬ﻠﴚء ]ﻟﴚء | ‪ om. et add. in mg. To‬ﻮﳖﺎ‬ ‫‪ τTe‬ﻧﻔﻮﺳﻨﺎ ] ٔﻧﻔﺴﻨﺎ | ‪om. Di‬‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫‪ٔ in mg. N‬ي ﻟﻔﻈﺔ اﳌﻘﻮل اﳌﺬ ﻮرة ﰲ ﺪ اﳉ ﺲ ]اﳉ ﺲ…ﻓﺎﳌﻘﻮل | ‪ٔ in mg. AC‬ي ﻟﻔﻈﺔ اﳌﻘــﻮل اﳌــﺬ ﻮرة ﰲ ــﺪ اﳉ ــﺲ ]اﰟ…‪113‬‬ ‫ﰲ ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻒ اﳉ ﺲ ﺣ ﺚ ﯾﻌﺮف ﺑ ٔﻧﻪ اﳌﻘﻮل ﲆ ﻛﺜﲑﻦ إﱃ ٓﺧﺮ ﻣﺎ ذ ﺮ و ٔﺷﺎر ﺑﻘﻮ ﰲ ﴍح اﰟ اﳉ ﺲ إﱃ ٔﻧﻪ ﻟ ﺲ ﻣﺎ ذ ﺮ ﰲ ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻔﻪ ] ﺴﺎ…ﻓﺎﳌﻘــﻮل‬ ‫‪ in mg. Te‬ﺪا ﻛﲈ ٔﺷﺎر إﻟﯿﻪ ﻓ ﺳﯿﺎﱄ وﺑﻘﻮ ﰷﳉ ﺲ إﱃ ٔﻧﻪ ﻟ ﺲ ﺴﺎ ﯾــﻘ ﻨﺎ ﳉـﻮاز ٔن ﻜــﻮن ﻋﺮﺿــﺎ ﺎﻣﺎ ﻟ ﺴ ﺒــﺔ إﱃ ا ــﳫﯿﺎت اﶆﺴــﺔ ب ه‬ ‫‪ in mg. Te‬اﳉ ﺲ اﻟﻘﺮﯾﺐ ﻫﻮ اﳌﻘﻮل واﻟﺒﻌﯿﺪ ﻫﻮ اﳌﻔﻬﻮم ب ه ]ﰷﳉ ﺲ ا ٔﻗﺮب ‪‬‬

‫‪٥٠‬ق‬

Chapter I.9  107

[. Verification of the description of the genus] [.. How the genus is distinguished by the other essential expressions] [... How the genus is distinguished from the species] ‘Predicated’ in the explanation of the name ‘genus’ is like the genus for the thing that is called ‘genus’. Among what is predicated, there is what is predicated of one [item] only and what is predicated of many [items], and ‘predicated of many [items]’ is like the proximate genus; what is not predicated of many [items] does not encompass the genus. Furthermore, ‘predicated of many [items]’ encompasses the five [expressions] that were mentioned before, but since we say “which differ in species in answer to ‘what is it?’ ”, it properly applies to the genus. By ‘which differ in species’ we mean which differ in the essential realities, for species can be said of the reality of each thing with regard to its quiddity and form without considering its relation to anything else — especially since it can be predicated in the mind of many [items] that do share it actually or that do not share it actually, but potentially, or [since] it is allowed in the estimation; but there is no need to consider anything of this in order to ascertain the genus. Whenever there are things which differ in the quiddities, then another thing is predicated of them in this way, that other thing is a genus. You should understand from our statement that this thing is predicated of Q50 those many [items] in answer to ‘what is it?’ that this is in a shared way, as you know3. [... How the genus is distinguished from the species and the differentia] The differentia is not predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’ under any respect. As to the species, insofar as it is a species it is not predicated of the thing in this way; on the contrary, it is a subject of predication. Should it happen to be itself predicated in this way, then it would become a genus. It behoves us to teach, concerning the definitions of the things that fall under [the category] of the relative, that we mean by them that they belong to something insofar as they have the meaning of the definitions, as well as, when we predicate this definition of the genus, we are ourselves aware of an addition that would be

 See Madḫal I., §.–.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻊ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ﳜﺺ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻌﺪ ﰟ اﻟﻨﻮع ﻓﺴﺘﻌﲅ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﻻ ﯾﻘﺎل ﲆ ﻛﺜﲑﻦ ﳐﺘﻠﻔﲔ‬ ‫ﻛﺬ ﻟﻮ ﴏﺣ ﺎ ﲠﺎ‪ .‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟﴚء ا ي ّ‬ ‫ﻟﻨﻮع ﺑﻞ ﻟﻌﺪد‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﻟﻌﺮﺿﯿﺎت ﻓﻼ ﯾﻘﺎل ﳾء ﻣﳯﺎ ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ‪ ،‬ﻓﻼ ﳾء ﲑ اﳉ ﺲ ﻣﻮﺻﻮﻓﺎ ﲠﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻔﺔ‪،‬‬ ‫و ّ‬ ‫ﰻ ﺲ ﻣﻮﺻﻮف ﲠﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻔﺔ‪َ ّ ٔ ،‬ﺣ ّﺼﻠﻨﺎ ﻣﻌﲎ ﻫﺬا اﳊﺪّ ‪ ،‬وﺟﻌﻠﻨﺎ ﻟﻔﻆ اﳉ ﺲ اﺳﲈ ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬وﻗﺪ ﯾﻌﺮض ﻫﺎﻫﻨﺎ ﺷﺒﻪ ﻣﻦ ذ ٔﻧ ّﻪ‪ ،‬إن ﰷن ﻠ ﺲ ﳾء ﰷﳉ ﺲ وﻫﻮ اﳌﻘــﻮل ــﲆ ﻛﺜﲑــﻦ‪،‬‬ ‫ﰷن ﻠ ﺲ ﺲ‪ ،‬إذا ﻗ ﻞ اﳉ ﺲ ﲆ اﳌﻘﻮل ﲆ اﻟﻜ ﲑﻦ ا ي ﻫﻮ ﺴﻪ وﰷن اﳉ ﺲ ﻣﻘﻮﻻ ــﲆ‬ ‫اﳉ ﺲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ‪ .‬ﻓ ﻘﻮل ﰲ ﺟﻮاﺑﻪ ا ّٕن اﳌﻘﻮل ﲆ اﻟﻜ ﲑﻦ ﯾﻘﺎل ﲆ اﳉ ﺲ ﻛﻘﻮل اﳉ ﺲ ﻧﻔﺴــﻪ‪ ،‬واﳉ ــﺲ‬ ‫ﰻ ﻣﻘﻮل ﲆ ﻛﺜﲑﻦ ﺲ‪ ،‬و ّ‬ ‫ﯾﻘﺎل ﻠﯿﻪ ﻻ ﻛﻘﻮل اﳉ ﺲ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﻛﻘﻮل اﻟﻌﺮض ‪ .‬إذ ﻟ ﺲ ﯾﻘﺎل ا ّٕن ّ‬ ‫ﰻ ﻣﺎ‬ ‫ﻫﻮ ﺲ ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﲈ ﯾﻘﺎل ﲆ ّ‬ ‫ﰻ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺲ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ اﳌﻘﻮل ﲆ ﻛﺜﲑﻦ ﺗﻌﺮض اﳉ ﺴﯿﺔ ﻋﻨﺪ اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﻣﺎ‪،‬‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫ﰻ ﻫﺬا ﻋﻦ ﻗﺮﯾﺐ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻛﲈ ﺗﻌﺮض ﻠﺤﯿﻮان اﳉ ﺴﯿﺔ ﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﻣﺎ‪ .‬وﻫﻮ اﻋﺘﺒﺎر اﻟﻌﻤﻮم ﲝﺎل‪ ،‬وﻛﲈ ﴩح‬ ‫ﺧﺺ ﻗﺪ ﯾﻘﺎل ﲆ ا ٔ ّﰪ ﻻ‬ ‫ﻣﻘﻮﻣﺔ ﻠﺤﯿﻮان اﻟﺒﺘّﺔ‪ .‬وﻻ ﳕﻨﻊ ٔن ﻜﻮن اﳌﻌﲎ ا ٔ ّ‬ ‫ﻣﻦ ﲑ ٔن ﻜﻮن اﳉ ﺴﯿﺔ ّ‬ ‫ﲆ ﳇّﻪ؛ وﻟﻮ ﰷن اﳉ ﺲ ﯾﻘﺎل ﲆ اﳌﻘﻮل ﲆ اﻟﻜ ﲑــﻦ ﻗــﻮل اﳌﻘــﻮل ــﲆ ﻛﺜﲑــﻦ ــﲆ اﳉ ــﺲ ــﲀن‬ ‫ﺷﻄﻄﺎ ﳏﺎﻻ‪.‬‬ ‫ردت ٔن ﲢﺪّ اﻟﻨﻮع ﺸﺒﻪ ٔن‬ ‫)‪ (..‬وﳑّﺎ ﺸﻜّﻚ ﻫﺎﻫﻨﺎ اﺳﺘﻌﲈل ﻟﻔﻈﺔ اﻟﻨﻮع ﰲ ﺪّ اﳉ ﺲ‪ .‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻚ إذا ٔ َ‬ ‫ﻻ ﲡﺪ ﺑﺪّ ا ﻣﻦ ٔن ﺗﺪ ﻞ ﻓ ﻪ اﰟ اﳉ ﺲ‪ ،‬ﻛﲈ ﯾُﺒﲔ ﺑﻌــﺪ‪ ،‬إذ ﯾــﻘﺎل إن اﻟﻨــﻮع ﻫــﻮ اﳌـﺮﺗ ّﺐ ﲢﺖ‬

‫‪, In Isag., p. .–.‬‬

‫‪] Cf. E‬ﺑــﯿﺎن ‪… ‬وﳑّﺎ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪] Cf. E‬ﻧﻔﺴــﻪ ‪… ‬وﻗــﺪ ‪‬‬ ‫‪, In Isag., p. .–.‬‬ ‫‪] P‬اﳉ ﺲ ‪ … ‬إذ ‪‬‬ ‫‪., Isag., p. ..‬‬

‫]ﻣﻮﺻﻮﻓﺎ | ‪ Ka‬ﻓ ٔﻣﺎ ]و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪ om. Br ‬ﻻ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. Ṣ‬ﻣﻦ ﺑﻌﺪ | ‪ om. Nk‬ﻣﻦ | ‪ No‬ﻓ ٔﻣﺎ ]و ٔ ّﻣﺎ | ‪ Ka‬ﲠﺬا ]ﲠﺎ ‪‬‬ ‫إذا ]إن | ‪ Yi‬ﯾﻌﱰض ]ﯾﻌﺮض ‪ Ṣ ‬ﻟﻔﻈﺔ ]ﻟﻔﻆ | ‪ J‬ﳛﺼﻠﻨﺎ ] َﺣ ّﺼﻠﻨﺎ | ‪ om. BrNo‬اﻟﺼﻔﺔ…و ّ‬ ‫ﰻ ‪ a.c. Y ‬ﻣﻮﺻﻮف ‪ ιτTeYi‬ﻣﻮﺻﻮف‬ ‫]اﻟﻜ ﲑﻦ | ‪ π‬وٕاذا ‪ ντKaADaTeNo‬إذ ]إذا | ‪ om. E‬وﰷن… ﻠ ﺲ ‪ A ‬وﻫﺬا ]وﻫﻮ | ‪ s.l. Nk‬إن ‪KaNkBTeGEd. in mg. C‬‬ ‫»‪ i.l. J «quod est supra se‬ﺲ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ‪ et‬ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻪ ]‪‬ﻧﻔﺴﻪ | ‪ πDiY‬ﺲ ]‪‬اﳉ ﺲ ‪ τBCDi ‬ﻓﲀن ‪ μJ‬ﰷن ]وﰷن | ‪ No‬ﻛﺜﲑﻦ‬ ‫‪ om. NkBEd.‬ﻧﻔﺴﻪ | ‪ Ka‬ﻛﻘﻮﻟﻨﺎ ]ﻛﻘﻮل | ‪ DiYi‬ﻛﺜﲑﻦ ]اﻟﻜ ﲑﻦ | ‪ iter. a.c. E‬ا ّٕن اﳌﻘﻮل | ‪ om. Da‬ﰲ ﺟﻮاﺑﻪ | ‪] Lat.‬ﻓﻮﻗﻪ ‪[fort.‬‬ ‫‪ … ‬ﺲ | ‪ et exp. G‬ﻠﯿﻪ ‪ νπτJDiDaTe‬ﻠﯿﻪ ] ‪ add. a.c. E ‬ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ‪ Ka‬ﻓﺎﳉ ﺲ ]واﳉ ﺲ | ‪ add. in mg. B‬ﻧﻔﺴﻪ‬ ‫و ‪ et‬ﻫﻮ ]وﻫﻮ | ‪ add. s.l. J‬ﻛﲈ ]ﺗﻌﺮض | ‪ om. JT‬ﻛﲈ ‪ G ‬ﺲ ] ﺲ | ‪ om. Te |  s.l. Nk‬ﻫﻮ ‪ om. Lat. ‬ﻛﺜﲑﻦ‬ ‫‪ Te‬ﰻ ]ﳇّﻪ ‪ Te ‬ﯾﻄﻠﻖ ]ﯾﻘﺎل | ‪ Ed. : «negamus» Lat.‬ﳝﻨﻊ ]ﳕﻨﻊ ‪ّ om. JETYiN om. et add. s.l. Di ‬‬ ‫ﰻ | ‪s.l. Y‬‬ ‫‪ C‬وﻣﺎ ]وﳑّﺎ ‪ Te ‬ﳌﺎ ﰷن ] ﲀن | ‪ ξEd.‬اﻟﻜ ﲑﻦ ]ﻛﺜﲑﻦ | ‪  om. et add. in mg. B‬ﲆ | ‪ EYG‬ﻛﺜﲑﻦ ]اﻟﻜ ﲑﻦ | ‪ Di‬ﯾﻘﺎ ]ﯾﻘﺎل‬ ‫ﯾﺘ ﲔ ]ﯾُﺒﲔ ‪ om. et add. in mg. Te ‬اﻟﻨﻮع ‪ … ‬ﺸﺒﻪ | ‪ Te‬ﻟﻔﻆ ]ﻟﻔﻈﺔ | ‪ Da‬ﻫﻨﺎ ]ﻫﺎﻫﻨﺎ | ‪ νKaBrJTDaTeMi‬ﺸﲁ ] ﺸﻜّﻚ‬ ‫‪ πDi‬ﻣﻦ ﺑﻌﺪ ]ﺑﻌﺪ | ‪ṢMi |  om. To‬‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫إذا ﺪد اﳉ ﺲ ٔ ﺪ ﰲ ﺪﻩ ﻣﻌﲎ ﯾﻌﻤﻪ و ﲑﻩ وﻫﻮ اﳌﻘﻮل ﲆ ﻛﺜﲑﻦ إذ ذ ٔﻋﲏ اﳌﻘﻮل ﲆ ﻛﺜﲑﻦ ﻗﺪ ﯾــﻘﺎل ٔﯾﻀﺎ ــﲆ ]‪‬ﻧﻔﺴــﻪ ‪… ‬وﻗــﺪ‬ ‫ا ٔﻋﺮاض وﺷ ﺎ ﳜﺼﻪ وﻫﻮ ا ﺘﻠﻔﲔ ﻟﻨﻮع ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻓ ٔ ﺬ ﻫﺬا اﳌﻌﲎ ﰲ ﺪ اﳉ ﺲ ٔﻧﻪ ﺲ واﳌﻌﲎ اﳋﺎص ٔﻧﻪ ﻓﺼﻞ وﳓﻦ ﰲ ﻃﻠﺐ‬ ‫‪ in mg. NkBN‬ﺪ اﳉ ﺲ وﻗﺪ ٔ ﺬ اﳉ ﺲ ﻓ ﻪ ﻓ ٔ ٔ ﺬ اﳉ ﺲ ﰲ ﺪ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ وﻫﻮ )وﻫﺬا ‪ (N‬ﳏﺎل‬

‫‪٥١‬ق‬

Chapter I.9  109

signified by stating: ‘insofar as it is such’, if we stated it explicitly. As to the thing to which the name ‘species’ will be properly applied after, you will know that it is not predicated of many [items] which differ in species, but in number.

[.. How the genus is distinguished from the accidental expressions] As to the accidental [features], none of them is predicated in answer to ‘what is it?’, and nothing but the genus is qualified in this way, whereas every genus is qualified in this way, since we attained the meaning of this definition and we posited the expression ‘genus’ as its name.

[. Reasons why the genus has not a definition in a strict sense] [.. First reason: the genus has not a genus] Some ambiguities may occur here, consisting in that, if the genus has something like the genus, that is, ‘predicated of many [items]’, the genus has a genus, since ‘genus’ is predicated of ‘predicated of many [items]’, which is its genus, and the genus is predicated of the genus itself. We will thus say, in answer to it, that ‘predicated of many [items]’ is predicated of the genus as the genus itself, whereas ‘genus’ is predicated of it not as a genus, but rather as an accident. In fact, it is not said that Q51 everything that is predicated of many [items] is a genus, and everything that is a genus is only predicated of everything to which it belongs as a genus, but being a genus occurs to ‘predicated of many [items]’ under a certain consideration, as well as, under a certain consideration, it occurs to animal. [This consideration] is the consideration of being common in a certain condition — as we will soon explain to you all of this4 — but being a genus is not constitutive of animal at all. We do not dispute that the most proper meaning might be predicated of the most common, though not of the whole of it; but if ‘genus’ were predicated of ‘predicated of many [items]’ in the way ‘predicated of many [items]’ is predicated of the genus, this would be vain [and] absurd.

 In Madḫal I., §..

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻊ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫اﳉ ﺲ و ﻫﲈ ّ‬ ‫ﻠﻤﺘﻌﲅ ﳎﻬﻮل‪ ،‬وﺗﻌﺮﯾﻒ ا ﻬﻮل ﻬﻮل ﻟ ﺲ ﺑﺘﻌﺮﯾﻒ وﻻ ﺑﯿﺎن‪ ،‬و ّ‬ ‫ﰻ ﲢﺪﯾﺪ ٔو رﰟ ﻓﻬﻮ‬ ‫ﺑﯿﺎن‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (..‬وﻗﺪ ٔﺟ ﺐ ﻋﻦ ﻫﺬا ﻓﻘ ﻞ ٕاﻧ ّﻪ ﳌّﺎ ﰷن اﳌﻀﺎﻓﺎن ٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﺗــﻘﺎل ﻣﺎﻫﯿــﺔ ّ‬ ‫ﰻ وا ــﺪ ﻣﳯــﲈ ﻟــﻘ ﺎس إﱃ‬ ‫ﰻ وا ﺪ ﻣﳯﲈ ﰲ ﺑﯿﺎن ا ٓﺧﺮ ﴐورة‪ ،‬إذ ﰷن ّ‬ ‫ا ٓﺧﺮ‪ ،‬وﰷن اﳉ ﺲ واﻟﻨﻮع ﻣﻀﺎﻓﲔ‪ ،‬وﺟﺐ ٔن ﯾﺆ ﺬ ّ‬ ‫ﰻ‬ ‫وا ﺪ ﻣﳯﲈ ٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﻫﻮ ﻫﻮ ﻟﻘ ﺎس إﱃ ا ٓﺧﺮ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (..‬ﻓﻬﺬا اﳉﻮاب ﻫﻮ ز دة ّ‬ ‫ﺷﻚ ﰲ ٔﻣﻮر ٔﺧﺮى ــﲑ اﳉ ــﺲ واﻟﻨــﻮع ﺸــﲁ ﻓــﳱﺎ ﻣﺎ ﺸــﲁ ﰲ‬ ‫اﳉ ﺲ واﻟﻨﻮع‪ .‬وز دة اﻻٕﺷﲀل ﻟ ﺴﺖ ﲝ ّﻞ‪ .‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن اﶈﻘّﻖ ﯾﻘﻮل‪ُ :‬ور ّد ﺪود اﳌﻀﺎﻓﺎت ــﲆ ــﺪّ اﳉ ــﺲ‬ ‫وﻋﺮﻓﲏ ٔﳖّ ﺎ إذا ﰷﻧﺖ ﳎﻬﻮ ﻣﻌﺎ ﻓﻜ ﻒ ﯾُﻌﺮف اﻟﻮا ﺪ ﻣﳯﺎ ٓﺧﺮ؟ و ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﻓﺎ ّٕن ﻣﻦ ﺷ ٔن اﳊ ّﻞ ٔن‬ ‫واﻟﻨﻮع ّ‬ ‫ﺗﻘﺼﺪ ﻓ ﻪ ﻣﻘﺪّ ﻣﺎت ّ‬ ‫اﻟﺸﻚ ﻓ ﻨﻜﺮ ﲨﯿﻌﻬﺎ ٔو وا ﺪة ﻣﳯﺎ‪ .‬وﻟ ﺲ ﰲ اﳊ ّﻞ ا ي ٔوردﻩ ﻫﺬا اﳊﺎ ّل ﺗﻌـ ّـﺮض‬ ‫ﻟﴚء ﻣﻦ ﺗ اﳌﻘﺪّ ﻣﺎت‪ ،‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﱂ ﯾﻘﻞ إن اﳉ ﺲ واﻟﻨﻮع ﻟ ﺴﺎ ﻣﻌﺎ ﳎﻬﻮﻟﲔ ﻋﻨﺪ اﳌﺒﺘﺪئ ّ‬ ‫اﳌﺘﻌﲅ‪ ،‬وﱂ ﯾﻘﻞ‬ ‫ٕاﻧ ّﻪ إذا ﻋ ُّﺮف ّ‬ ‫ﰻ وا ﺪ ﻣﳯﲈ ٓﺧﺮ وﻫﻮ ﳎﻬﻮل ﻓﻠ ﺲ ﻫﻮ ﺗﻌـﺮﯾﻒ ﳎﻬــﻮل ﲟﺠﻬــﻮل‪ ،‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن ﻫــﺬا ﻻ ﳝﻜــﻦ‬ ‫ٕا ﲀرﻩ‪ .‬وﻻ ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﺴﻮغ ٕا ﲀر اﻟﺜﺎﻟﺜﺔ وﱔ ٔ ّن ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻒ ا ﻬﻮل ﻬﻮل ﻟ ﺲ ﺑ ﺎن‪ ،‬وﻻ اﻟﱰﺗ ﺐ ا ي ﻟﻬﺬﻩ‬

‫‪., In Isag.,‬‬ ‫‪, Scholia in‬‬

‫‪] P‬ا ٓﺧــﺮ ‪… ‬وﻗــﺪ ‪‬‬ ‫‪., Isag., p. .– (based on Arist., Top., a–); cf. A‬‬ ‫‪pp. .–.; E‬‬ ‫‪, In Isag., p. .–; D‬‬ ‫‪, In Isag., p. .–; A‬‬ ‫‪Isag., p. .–; Ibid., p. .–.‬‬

‫…وﰷن | ‪ٓ E‬ﺧﺮ ]‪‬ا ٓﺧﺮ ‪ Ka ‬اﳌﻀﺎﻓﺎت ]اﳌﻀﺎﻓﺎن | ‪ٕ om. No‬اﻧ ّﻪ ‪ add. et exp. Di ‬ﻣﻌﺮوف ]ﻟ ﺲ | ‪ Ka‬ﻓ ﻫﲈ ]و ﻫﲈ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ om.‬ﻫــﻮ | ‪ om. Yi‬ﻫــﻮ ﻫــﻮ ‪ om. et add. s.l. Ṣ ‬ﺑــﯿﺎن | ‪ γJT‬اﻟﻨــﻮع واﳉ ــﺲ ]اﳉ ــﺲ واﻟﻨــﻮع | ‪ om. No‬ا ٓﺧــﺮ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ E‬ﻓﳱﲈ ]ﻓﳱﺎ | ‪ّ om. et add. s.l. Ṣ‬‬ ‫ﺷﻚ | ‪ om. T‬اﳉﻮاب | ‪ νDiṢToG‬وﻫﺬا ]ﻓﻬﺬا ‪KaJATCDaTeYN om. et add. s.l. Ṣ ‬‬ ‫‪‬‬ ‫‪ EDiToŠYi‬ﻟ ﺲ ]ﻟ ﺴﺖ | ‪ ξ‬إﺷﲀل ]اﻻٕﺷﲀل | ‪ om. et add. in mg. Y‬واﻟﻨﻮع ‪… ‬وز دة ‪ٔ add. s.l. Di ‬ﻣﺮ ] ﰲ | ‪ A‬ﻣﳯﺎ‬ ‫وﻋﺮﻓﲏ ‪ Te ‬اﳌﻀﺎﻓﲔ ‪ s.l. Ṣ‬اﳌﻀﺎﻓﺎت ‪ Ṣ‬اﳌﻀﺎﻓﺎن ]اﳌﻀﺎﻓﺎت | ‪ Di‬ﻓﺰد ‪ πE‬وزد ‪ Da‬زد ] ُور ّد‬ ‫‪ٔ s.l. Ṣ‬ﳖﺎ ‪ٔ Ṣ‬ﳖﲈ ] ٔﳖّ ﺎ | ‪ Te‬وﻏﺮﴈ ] ّ‬ ‫ﻣﻦ | ‪ To‬وٕان ]ﻓﺎ ّٕن | ‪ AṢ‬ﻣﳯﲈ ]ﻣﳯﺎ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. Nk‬ﯾُﻌﺮف | ‪ om. Ṣ‬ﻣﻌﺎ | ‪ Te‬ﳎﻬﻮﻟﲔ ]ﳎﻬﻮ | ‪ Te‬ﰷ ]ﰷﻧﺖ | ‪ Da‬إن ]إذا‬ ‫‪ om. et‬ﰲ | ‪ s.l. Di‬ﻣﻌﺎ ‪ E‬ﲨﯿﻌﺎ ]ﲨﯿﻌﻬﺎ | ‪ Yi‬ﻓ ﺬ ﺮ ‪ in mg. Di‬ﻓ ﻨﻜﺮ ‪ et‬ﻓ ﺬ ﺮ ]ﻓ ﻨﻜﺮ | ‪ Te‬ﻓﳱﺎ ‪ add. s.l. G‬إﱃ ]ﻓ ﻪ ‪om. Br ‬‬ ‫]ﻋ ُّﺮف ‪ٔ Br ‬و اﳌﺘﻌﲅ ‪ DiToŠNo‬ﻠﺘﻌﲅ ‪ T‬ﻠﻤﺘﻌﲅ ] ّ‬ ‫ﺗﻌﺮض | ‪ ξ‬ﻫﺬﻩ ]ﻫﺬا | ‪ٔ Te‬وردوﻩ ] ٔوردﻩ | ‪add. s.l. J‬‬ ‫اﳌﺘﻌﲅ ‪ٔ Ka ‬ن ﯾﻌﺮض ] ّ‬ ‫‪ Ṣ‬وﻫﻮ ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﻻ ]وﻻ ٔﯾﻀﺎ ‪ a.c. No ‬ا ﻌﻮل ]‪‬ﳎﻬﻮل | ‪ om. Nk‬ﻫﻮ | ‪ A‬ﻣﳯﺎ ]ﻣﳯﲈ | ‪ om. Yi‬وا ﺪ | ‪] a.c. No‬ﻋﺮض ‪ [scil.‬ﻋﺮص‬ ‫ﻟ ﺲ | ‪ No‬ﲟﺠﻬﻮل ] ﻬﻮل | ‪ TTe‬ﺗﻌﺮف ]ﺗﻌﺮﯾﻒ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. Y om. ξADaYi‬وﱔ | ‪ٔ om. et add. in mg. Ka‬ﯾﻀﺎ‬ ‫‪ om. et add. in mg. Ṣ‬ﺑ ﺎن‬

‫‪٥٢‬ق‬

Chapter I.9  111

[.. Second reason: the problem of the reciprocal definition of genus and species] [... The problem] Among the causes of doubt there is the use of the expression ‘species’ in the definition of the genus. If you want to define the species, apparently you cannot but introduce in it the name of the genus — as it will be clarified to you afterwards5 — since you are told that the species is what is subsumed under the genus6, but both of them are unknown to anyone attempting to learn [them], and making the unknown known by means of something unknown does not make it known nor clarifies it, whereas every definition or description is a clarification. [... Porphyry’s solution to the problem] An answer to this [issue] was provided7 by saying that, since the quiddity of each of the two relative [terms] can only be expressed in relation to the other, and since the genus and the species are two relative [terms], each of the two must be necessarily assumed in the clarification of the other, for each of the two is what it is only in relation to the other. [... Refutation of Porphyry’s solution] This answer increases the doubt about things other than the genus and the species, with regard to which is obscure what is [also] obscure in the case of the genus and the species, and increasing the obscurity is not solving [the problem]. Anyone wishing to ascertain the truth will say: “reconduct the definitions of the relative [terms] to the definition of the genus and the species and let me know how the one is known by means of the other, if they are [both] simultaneously unknown”. Furthermore, the solution [of the problem] should target the premises of the doubt Q52 and refute all of them, or [at least] one of them. But in the solution that this man8 proposed there is no objection to any of those premises, for he did not say that the genus and the species are not both simultaneously unknown for anyone who starts to learn [them], nor did he claim that if each of the two is known by means of the other which is unknown, this is not making something unknown known by means of something [also] unknown, as this is indisputable. Also, the third [premise], namely that making the unknown known by means of the unknown is not a clarification, cannot be disputed, nor can the fact that the arrangement of these premises does not  In §... See also al-Fārābī’s alternative definition of ‘species’ in Madḫal I., §.  According to one of Porphyry’s definitions of the species.  This is a reference to Porph., Isag. p. .–; the argument was more fully developed and discussed in the Late-Antique commentaries of the school of Alexandria.  I.e. Porphyry.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻊ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ﯾﺘﻌﺮض ﳌﻘﺪّ ﻣﺔ ﻣــﻦ ﻗـ ﺎس ّ‬ ‫اﻟﺸﻚ وﻻ‬ ‫اﳌﻘﺪﻣﺎت ﲑ ﻣﻮﺟﺐ ﻟﺼ ّ ﺔ اﳌﻄﻠﻮب ﲠﺎ‪ .‬ﻓﺎٕذا ﰷن ﻫﺬا اﳊﺎ ّل ﱂ ّ‬ ‫ﻟﺘ ٔﻟﯿﻔﻪ ﻓﲅ ﯾﻌﻤﻞ ﺷ ﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (..‬و ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﻓﻘﺪ وﻗﻊ ﻓ ﻪ ﻠﻂ ﻋﻈﲓ وﻫﻮ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﱂ ّﳝﲒ ﻓ ﻪ اﻟﻔﺮق ﺑﲔ ا ي ﯾﻌﺮف ﻣﻊ اﻟﴚء وﺑﲔ ا ي‬ ‫ﯾﻌﺮف ﺑﻪ اﻟﴚء‪ .‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن ا ي ﯾﻌﺮف ﺑﻪ اﻟﴚء ﻫﻮ ﳑّﺎ ﯾﻌﺮف ﺑﻨﻔﺴﻪ وﯾﺼﲑ ﺟﺰءا ﻣــﻦ ﺗﻌـﺮﯾﻒ اﻟﴚء إذا‬ ‫ٔﺿﯿﻒ إﻟﯿﻪ ﺟﺰء ٓﺧﺮ ﺗُﻮﺻﻞ إﱃ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ اﻟﴚء وﻜﻮن ﻫﻮ ﻗﺪ ﻋﺮف ﻗ ﻞ اﻟﴚء‪ .‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ا ي ﯾﻌﺮف ﻣــﻊ‬ ‫اﳌﻌﺮﻓﺎت ﻠﴚء ﻣﻌﺎ ﻋُﺮف اﻟﴚء وﻋﺮف ﻫﻮ ﻣﻌﻪ‪ .‬وﻻ ﻜﻮن‬ ‫اﻟﴚء ﻓﻬﻮ ا ي إذا اﺳ ﳣّﺖ اﳌﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﺑﺘﻮاﰲ ّ‬ ‫اﳌﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﺑﻪ ﺴﺒﻖ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ اﻟﴚء ﺣﱴ ﯾﻌﺮف ﺑﻪ اﻟﴚء‪ ،‬ﻓﺬ ﻻ ﻜﻮن ﺟﺰءا ﻣــﻦ ﲨـ ﺗﻌـﺮﯾﻒ اﻟﴚء‪.‬‬ ‫ﺗﻌﺮف اﻟﴚء‪ ،‬واﻟﻮا ﺪ ﻣﳯﺎ ﻜﻮن ّ‬ ‫داﻻ ﲆ ﺟﺰء‬ ‫ﺗﻌﺮف اﻟﴚء ﻣﺎ ﱂ ﲡﳣﻊ ﻣﻌﺎ‪ ،‬ﱂ ّ‬ ‫ﻓﺎ ّٕن ٔﺟﺰاء اﶺ اﻟﱵ ّ‬ ‫ﻣﻦ اﳌﻌﲎ ا ي ﻠﴚء ﻓﻘﻂ‪ .‬ﳁﺎ داﻣﺖ ا ٔﺟﺰاء ﺗﺬ ﺮ وﱂ ﺴﺘﻮف ﲨﯿﻌﻬﺎ ﻜﻮن اﻟﴚء ﺑﻌﺪ ﳎﻬﻮﻻ؛ ﻓﺎٕذا‬ ‫ﺗﻮاﻓﺖ ﻋﺮف اﻟﴚء ﺣ ﻨﺌﺬ وﻋﺮف ﻣﺎ ﯾﻌﺮف ﻣﻊ اﻟﴚء‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (..‬واﳌﻀﺎﻓﺎت ٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﺗﻌﺮف ﻣﻌﺎ ﻟ ﺲ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﯾﻌﺮف ﻟﺒﻌﺾ ﻓ ﻜﻮن ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﻗ ﻞ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ اﻟﺒﻌﺾ‪،‬‬ ‫ﻻ ﻣﻊ ﻣﻌﺮﻓ ﻪ‪ .‬و ﶺ ﻣﺎ ﯾﻌﺮف ﻣﻊ اﻟﴚء ﲑ ا ي ﯾﻌﺮف ﺑﻪ اﻟﴚء؛ ﻓﺎ ّٕن ا ي ﯾﻌﺮف ﺑﻪ اﻟﴚء ﻫﻮ ﰲ‬ ‫ﻇﻦ ٔﻧ ّﻪ‬ ‫اﳌﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﻗ ﻞ اﻟﴚء‪ .‬وﻛﺬ ﻓ ٕﺎ ّ ﻧﻘﻮل ا ّٕن اﳌﺘﻀﺎﯾﻔﺎت ﻻ ﲢﺪّ ﲆ ﻫﺬﻩ ا ﺎزﻓﺔ اﻟﱵ ٔوﻣ ٔ ٕا ﳱﺎ َﻣﻦ ّ‬ ‫اﻟﺸﻚ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﰲ ﲢﺪﯾﺪﻫﺎ ﴐب ﻣﻦ ّ‬ ‫ﳛ ّﻞ ﻫﺬا ّ‬ ‫اﻟﺘﻠﻄﻒ ﺰول ﺑﻪ ﻫﺬا ﻧﻐﻼق‪ ،‬وﻟﻬﺬا ﻣﻮﺿﻊ ﺑﯿﺎن ٓﺧﺮ‪.‬‬ ‫و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ﻣ ﺎ ﰲ اﻟﻌﺎ ﻞ‪ ،‬ﻓﻬﻮ ٔﻧ ّﻚ إذا ﺳ ِﺌﻠﺖ‪ :‬ﻣﺎ ا ٔخ؟ ﱂ ﺗﻌﻤﻞ ﺷ ﺎ إن ٔﺟ َﺖ ٕاﻧ ّﻪ ا ي ٔخ؛ ﺑﻞ ﺗﻘﻮل‬

‫‪] Nağāt, p. .–; Risāla fī l-Ḥudūd, pp. .–.; Manṭiq al-Mašriqiyyīn,‬ﻣ ــﻌﺎ ‪ … ‬واﳌﻀﺎﻓﺎت ‪‬‬ ‫‪pp. .–.; Išārāt, pp. .–..‬‬ ‫وﻻ ﻟﺘ ٔﻟﯿﻔﻪ ‪ et‬وﻻ ﻟﻘ ﺎﺳﯿﺎﺗﻪ ]ﻟﺘ ٔﻟﯿﻔﻪ ‪… ‬وﻻ | ‪ om. B‬ﳌﻘﺪّ ﻣﺔ | ‪ Y‬اﳊﻞ ‪ in mg. G‬اﳊﻞ ]اﳊﺎ ّل | ‪ E‬ﻓﺎٕن ‪ γ‬وٕاذا ]ﻓﺎٕذا | ‪ C‬ﻣﻮﺟ ﺔ ]ﻣﻮﺟﺐ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ om. et add. s.l. N‬ﺑﲔ | ‪ om. Yi‬ﻋﻈﲓ | ‪ Da‬ﻗﺪ ]ﻓﻘﺪ ‪] Lat. ‬وﻻ ﻟﻘ ﺎﺳــﯿﺎﺗﻪ[ »‪in mg. G «nec suum syllogismum‬‬ ‫‪ٓ om.‬ﺧﺮ | ‪ om. No‬إﻟﯿﻪ ‪ E ‬ﻣﺎ ]ﳑّﺎ | ‪ add. et exp. Yi‬اﳊﲂ ]‪‬ﺑﻪ ‪ om. No ‬اﻟﴚء ‪ … ‬وﺑﲔ | ‪ a.c. Nk‬ا ﻬﻮل ]‪‬ا ي‬ ‫‪ add. in mg.‬ﻗ ﻞ اﻟﴚء ]‪‬اﻟﴚء | ‪ om. et add. s.l. G‬ﻫﻮ | ‪ Ṣ‬ﻜﻮن ‪ γ‬ﻓ ﻜﻮن ]وﻜﻮن | ‪ To‬ﯾﻮﺻﻒ ]ﺗُﻮﺻﻞ | ‪et add. in mg. J‬‬ ‫اﳌﻌﺮﻓﺎت | ‪ add. Mi‬ﺑﻪ ‪ J‬اﺳ ﳣﻤﺖ ]اﺳ ﳣّﺖ | ‪ Br‬ﻫﻮ ]ﻓﻬﻮ ‪ Ṣ ‬ﻓ ٔﻣﺎ ]و ٔ ّﻣﺎ | ‪Ka om. Yi‬‬ ‫وﻫﻮ ]‪‬اﻟﴚء | ‪ s.l. Ṣ‬اﳌﻌﺮﻓﺎت ‪ Ṣ‬اﻟﻌﺮﻓﺎن ] ّ‬ ‫‪ E‬وذ ]ﻓــﺬ ‪ Da ‬ﻓــﻼ ]وﻻ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. J‬ﻫــﻮ | ‪add. et exp. Ka‬‬ ‫‪ add. a.c. E‬ﺗﻌـﺮﯾﻒ ]ﻣــﻦ | ‪ DiMi‬ﻓـ‬ ‫‪ add.‬اﳌﻌﺮﻓﺎت ‪ add. in mg. B‬اﳌﻌﺮﻓﺎت ‪ add. KaNkC‬اﳌﻌﺮﻓﺎت ]ﺗﻮاﻓﺖ ‪ N ‬وٕاذا ]ﻓﺎٕذا ‪ Mi ‬ﻣﳯﲈ ]ﻣﳯﺎ | ‪ om. No‬اﻟﴚء ‪‬‬ ‫]‪‬ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ | ‪ Da‬ﯾﻌﺮف ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ]ﺑﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﯾﻌﺮف | ‪ in mg. Di‬اﳌﻌﺮﻓﺎت ]واﳌﻀﺎﻓﺎت ‪ s.l. Ṣ ‬ﻣﺎ ‪ Ṣ‬ﲟﺎ ]ﻣﺎ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ‬ﺗﻮاﻓﺖ ‪ Ṣ‬ﺗﻮاﻓﻘﺖ ‪s.l. Š‬‬ ‫]وﻛﺬ | ‪ add. et exp. E‬واﳉﻬﺎ ]اﳌﻌﺮﻓﺔ ‪ add. et exp. Nk ‬اﻟﴚء ]ﻓﺎ ّٕن ‪ add. Ed. ‬ﻓ ﻜﻮن ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ اﻟﺒﻌﺾ ]اﻟﺒﻌﺾ | ‪ J‬ﻣﻌﺮﻓﳤﺎ‬ ‫‪ om. et‬ﺑﯿﺎن | ‪ om. Y‬ﺑﻪ | ‪ om. A‬ﰲ ‪ Di ‬اﳌﻀﺎﯾﻔﺎت ]اﳌﺘﻀﺎﯾﻔﺎت | ‪ s.l. Nk‬ا ّٕن | ‪ Yi‬وﻻ ﻛﺬ ‪ s.l. Nk‬و ‪ ξπADa‬و‬ ‫‪ τ‬ا ٔخ ] ٔخ | ‪ s.l. Nk‬ﺑ ٔﻧﻪ ‪ εJDa‬ﺑ ٔﻧﻪ ] ٕاﻧ ّﻪ | ‪ add. Ṣ‬ﻣﺎ ]إذا | ‪ Br‬ﻓﻬﻮ ‪ Ṣ‬ﻓﺎٕﻧﻚ ]ﻓﻬﻮ ٔﻧ ّﻚ | ‪ Yi‬ﻫﻮ ]ﻓﻬﻮ ‪add. s.l. N ‬‬

‫‪٥٣‬ق‬

Chapter I.9  113

determine the validity of what is sought by them. Since he did not object to any of the premises of the syllogism of the doubt, not [even] to its composition, this man did not achieve any result. [... Avicenna’s distinction between what is known together with the thing and that by means of which the thing is known] On this issue, a huge mistake was also made, namely, that the difference between what is known together with the thing and that by means of which the thing is known has not been grasped. For, in fact, that by means of which the thing is known is something known in itself; [then], it becomes a part of the definition of the thing and, when another part is added to it, it leads to the knowledge of the thing, having been already known before the thing [itself]. What is known together with the thing is that which, once one has complete knowledge [of the thing] by achieving completely what makes the thing known, at one and the same time the thing is known and, together with it, it is known [as well]. The knowledge of what is known together with the thing does not precede the knowledge of the thing so that the thing is known by means of it, for that is not a part of the complex that makes the thing known. For the parts of the complex [of the elements] that make the thing known do not make the thing known as long as they are not put together, and the single of them signifies only a part of the meaning of the thing. As long as the parts [of that complex] are mentioned but not brought together, the thing is still unknown; when [the said complex] is achieved, then the thing is known, and what is known together with it is also known. [... Porphyry’s mistake in defining relative terms] Relative [terms] are only known together, and the one is not known by means of the other so that the knowledge of the one precedes the knowledge of the other rather than coming along with it. To sum up, what is known together with the thing is different from that by means of which the thing is known, since that by means of Q53 which the thing is known is prior in knowledge to the thing. Likewise, we say that relative [items] are not defined with the same carelessness showed by the man who thought having solved this ambiguity; on the contrary, there is a sort of subtlety in their definition, by virtue of which this obscurity ceases to be, but there is another place to explain that9. An immediate example of this is that, if you are asked: “what is the brother?” you do not achieve any result if you reply that he is someone who has a brother; rather, you say that he is someone whose father is himself [also] the father of another man who is said to be his brother, so that you supply parts of a clarification none of which is defined by means of the other relative [term]. When you

 In Šifāʾ, Maqūlāt IV.–.

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﺘﺎﺳﻊ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ٕاﻧ ّﻪ ا ي ٔﺑﻮﻩ ﻫﻮ ﺑﻌﯿﻨﻪ ٔﺑﻮ ٕا ﺴﺎن ٓﺧﺮ ا ي ﯾﻘﺎل ٕاﻧ ّﻪ ٔﺧﻮﻩ‪ ،‬ﻓ ٔﰏ ﺑ ٔﺟﺰاء ﺑﯿﺎن ﻟ ﺲ وا ﺪ ﻣﳯﺎ ﻣ ﺪّ دا‬ ‫ﳌﻀﺎف ا ٓﺧﺮ‪ .‬ﻓﺎٕذا ﻓﺮﻏﺖ‪ ،‬ﻜﻮن ﻗﺪ دﻠﺖ ﲆ اﳌﺘﻀﺎﯾﻔﲔ ﻣﻌﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (..‬وٕاذ ﻗﺪ ّﺗﻘﺮر ٔ ّن ﻫﺬا اﳊ ّﻞ ﲑ ﻣﻐﻦ ﻓﻠﲊﺟﻊ ﳓﻦ إﱃ ﺣ ﺚ ﻓﺎرﻗ ﺎﻩ‪ .‬ﻓ ﻘﻮل ا ّٕن ﲢﺪﯾﺪ اﳉ ﺲ ﯾ ّﱲ‬ ‫وٕان ﱂ ﯾﺆ ﺬ اﻟﻨﻮع ﻓ ﻪ ﻧﻮ ﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻀﺎف إﻟﯿﻪ‪ ،‬ﺑﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻫﻮ ا ات؛ ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻚ إذا ﻋﻨ ﺖ ﻟﻨﻮع‬ ‫اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ واﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ واﻟﺼﻮرة — وﻗــﺪ ﯾــﻌﲎ ﺑــﻪ ذ ﻛﺜـﲑا ﰲ ﺎدﲥــﻢ — ﱂ ﻜــﻦ اﻟﻨــﻮع ﻣــﻦ اﳌﻀﺎف إﱃ‬ ‫اﳉ ﺲ‪ .‬ﻓﺎٕذا ﻋﻨ ﺖ ﺘﻠﻔﲔ ﻟﻨﻮع ا ﺘﻠﻔﲔ ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ واﻟﺼﻮرة‪ّ ،‬ﰎ ﲢﺪﯾﺪ اﳉ ﺲ‪ .‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻚ إذا ﻗﻠﺖ ا ّٕن‬ ‫اﳉ ﺲ ﻫﻮ اﳌﻘﻮل ﲆ ﻛﺜﲑﻦ ﳐﺘﻠﻔﲔ ﳊﻘﺎﺋﻖ واﳌﺎﻫﯿﺎت واﻟﺼﻮر ا اﺗﯿﺔ ﰲ ﺟـﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫــﻮ‪ّ ،‬ﰎ ﲢﺪﯾــﺪ‬ ‫اﳉ ﺲ وﱂ ﲢﺘﺞ إﱃ ٔن ﺗ ٔ ﺬ اﻟﻨﻮع ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻀﺎف ﻓ ﻮردﻩ ﰲ ﺪّ ﻩ‪ ،‬وٕان ﰷﻧﺖ اﻻٕﺿﺎﻓﺔ ﺗﻨﺪرج ﰲ‬ ‫ذ اﻧﺪرا ﺎ ﻻ ﻜﻮن ﻣﻌﻪ ﺟﺰء اﳊﺪّ ﻣ ﺪّ دا ﶈﺪود ﳊﺪّ ‪ّ ٔ .‬ﻣﺎ ﻧﺪراج ﻓ ٔ ﻧ ّﻚ إذا َ‬ ‫ﻗﻠﺖ‪ :‬ﻣﻘﻮل ــﲆ‬ ‫ا ﺘﻠﻒ ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ‪َ ،‬‬ ‫ﺟﻌﻠﺖ ا ﺘﻠﻒ ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﻣﻘﻮﻻ ﻠﯿﻪ‪ ،‬وﻫﺬﻩ إﺷﺎرة إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﻋﺮض ﻟــﻬﺎ ﻣــﻦ ا ٕﻻﺿــﺎﻓﺔ‪ .‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ‬ ‫ٔﻧ ّﻚ ﱂ ﲡﻌﻞ ﺟﺰء اﳊﺪّ ﻣ ﺪّ دا ﶈﺪود ﳊﺪّ ‪ ،‬ﻓ ٔ ّن ﺟــﺰء اﳊــﺪّ ﻫــﻮ اﳌﺎﻫﯿــﺔ ٔو ﳇﯿــﺔ ﲣﺎﻟــﻒ ﳌﺎﻫﯿــﺔ؛‬ ‫واﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ‪ ،‬وا ﳫﯿﺔ ا ﺎﻟﻔﺔ ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﲑ ﻣ ﺪّ دة ﳉ ﺲ‪ .‬ﻓ ﻜﻮن ﻗﺪ ﺪدت اﳉ ــﺲ‬ ‫ﻟﻘﻮة ﻣﻌﻪ ﲆ ﲢﺪﯾﺪ اﻟﻨﻮع ا ي ﯾﻀﺎﯾﻔﻪ ﻣﻦ ﲑ ٔن ﺟﻌﻠﺘﻪ ﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻫﻮ‬ ‫ﺪّ ا ﳢﺖ ﰲ ٓﺧﺮﻩ و ّ‬ ‫ﻣﻀﺎف ﺟﺰء ﺪّ ﻩ‪.‬‬ ‫و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ﴍح ﻫﺬا اﻟﺘﺪﺑﲑ ﰲ اﳊﺪود اﻟﱵ ﻠﻤﺘﻀﺎﯾﻔﺎت‪ ،‬و ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﱂ ﯾ ﻐﻲ ٔن ﻜــﻮن ﻫﻜــﺬا و ﯿــﻒ ﳛﺼﻞ ﻣﻌــﻪ‬ ‫ﻣﺮا ﺎة ﻣﺎ ﲁّ وا ﺪ ﻣﻦ اﳌﺘﻀﺎﯾﻔﲔ ﻣﻦ ّﺎﺻﯿﺔ اﻟﻘﻮل ﻟﻘ ﺎس إﱃ ا ٓﺧﺮ‪ ،‬ﻓﺴﱰى ذ ﰲ ﻣﲀن ٓﺧﺮ‪.‬‬ ‫‪ ] Here starts again the text of MS As after the lacuna.‬ﻠﻤﺘﻀﺎﯾﻔﺎت ‪‬‬ ‫‪ ] Hidāya, p. .–.‬ﺪّﻩ ‪ … ‬وٕاذ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ π‬ﻣ ﺪا ‪ A‬ﻣ ﺪد ]ﻣ ﺪّ دا | ‪ JT‬ﻣﳯﲈ ]ﻣﳯﺎ | ‪ E‬وا ﺪا ]وا ﺪ | ‪] add. ṢYi‬ﯾﻘﺎل | ‪ٔ Ṣ‬ب ‪ٔ No‬ﺑﻮﻩ ] ٔﺑﻮ | ‪ iter. E om. τ‬ﻫﻮ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ om. Yi‬ﻗﺪ | ‪ G‬وٕاذا ]وٕاذ ‪ om. Te ‬ﻣﻌﺎ | ‪ Ṣ‬ﻋﺮﻓﺖ ‪ in mg. No‬ﻓﺮﻏﺖ ‪ et‬ﻋﺮﻓﺖ ]ﻓﺮﻏﺖ | ‪ in mg. Š‬ﻓﺎٕذا ﻋﺮﻓﺖ ]ﻓﺎٕذا ﻓﺮﻏﺖ ‪‬‬ ‫‪] «et‬واﳊﻘ ﻘﺔ ‪ om. No ‬ﻋﻨ ﺖ ‪ … ‬ﻟﻨﻮع | ‪ EṢ‬ﯾﻮ ﺪ ]ﯾﺆ ﺬ ‪ in mg. C ‬ﻓﻠﲊﺟﻊ ‪ s.l. Nk‬ﻓﻠﲊﺟﻊ ‪ γλξṢ‬ﻓﲊﺟــﻊ ]ﻓﻠﲊﺟــﻊ‬ ‫‪ γBrEd.‬وٕاذا ]ﻓﺎٕذا ‪ a.c. E ‬ﺎﲥﻢ ‪ νDiToŠ‬ﺎداﲥﻢ ] ﺎدﲥــﻢ | ‪ s.l. Ṣ‬وﻗــﺪ ﯨــﻌﲎ ‪ Ṣ‬ﻗــﺪ ﯨﻌ ــﻦ ]وﻗــﺪ ﯾــﻌﲎ | ‪veritas rei» Lat.‬‬ ‫واﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ]واﳌﺎﻫﯿﺎت | ‪ iter. B‬ﻫﻮ ‪ add. et exp. To ‬ﻧﻮع ‪ TMi‬اﻟﻨﻮع ]‪‬اﳉ ﺲ | ‪ add. No‬ا اﺗﯿﺔ ]واﻟﺼﻮرة | ‪ A‬ا ﺘﻠﻔﲔ ] ﺘﻠﻔﲔ‬ ‫ﻓﺎٕﻧﻚ إذا ﻗﻠﺖ إن اﳉ ﺲ ﻫﻮ اﳌﻘﻮل ﲆ ]اﳉ ﺲ ‪ٔ τ ‬و اﻟﺼﻮر ‪ add. a.c. Yi‬ﰎ ﲢﺪﯾﺪ ]واﻟﺼﻮر | ‪ٔ τ‬و اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺎت ‪ Yi‬ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ‪a.c. To‬‬ ‫‪ om. J‬ﳊ ّﺪ | ‪ in mg. To‬ﻣ ﺪدا ‪ et‬ﻣ ﺪا ‪ a.c. Di‬ﻣ ﺪا ]ﻣ ﺪّ دا ‪ om. τJTTe add. s.l. Ṣ ‬إﱃ | ‪ add. a.c. No‬ﻛﺜﲑﻦ‬ ‫] ــﲆ | ‪ ξ‬ﻣﻘــﻮﻻ ]ﻣﻘــﻮل | ‪ A‬ﻓﺎٕﻧﻚ ]ﻓـ ٔ ﻧ ّﻚ | ‪ ] «(relatio) quae hic intelligitur» add. Lat.‬ﻧــﺪراج | ‪ τJATTe‬و ٔﻣﺎ ] ٔ ّﻣﺎ‬ ‫]وﻫﺬﻩ | ‪ Da‬ﻠﳱﺎ ‪ s.l. Y‬ﻠﯿﻪ ‪ et‬ﻠﳱﺎ ] ﻠﯿﻪ | ‪ om. ξ‬‬ ‫َ‬ ‫ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ…ﺟﻌﻠﺖ | ‪ Ka‬اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ]‪ ‬ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ‪] add. Lat. ‬ﻛﺜﲑﻦ[ »‪«multis‬‬ ‫‪ To om.‬و ﶈﺪود ] ﶈﺪود | ‪ To‬ﻣ ﺪا ]ﻣ ﺪّ دا | ‪ N‬اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ]‪‬اﳊﺪّ | ‪ A‬ﲢﺼﻞ ]ﲡﻌﻞ | ‪ Ṣ‬إن ﱂ ]ﱂ ‪ BrJTe ‬ﳍﲈ ]ﻟﻬﺎ | ‪ No‬وﻫﺬا‬ ‫واﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ‪ KaJT om. C ‬اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ] ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ | ‪ om. Lat.‬ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ ‪ٔ … ‬و | ‪ om. et add. in mg. Yi‬اﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ | ‪ A‬ﻓﺎٕن ]ﻓ ّٔن | ‪Br‬‬ ‫]ﻣ ّﺪدة | ‪ JT‬ﻠﲈﻫﯿﺔ ] ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ | ‪ exp. Y‬ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ… وا ﳫﯿﺔ | ‪ٔ E‬و ا ﳫﯿﺔ ]وا ﳫﯿﺔ | ‪ KaEDiG‬ﻫﻮ ]ﱔ | ‪om. et add. in mg. Ka‬‬ ‫‪ G‬ﻠﻨﻮع ]اﻟﻨﻮع | ‪ in mg. C‬و ‪ KaNkCG‬ﻟﻘﻮة ]و ّﻟﻘﻮة | ‪ Ka‬ﺗ ﳢﺖ ] ﳢﺖ ‪ No ‬ﺪث ] ﺪدت | ‪ a.c. To‬ﻣ ﺪة ‪ p.c. E‬ﻣ ﺪد‬ ‫]ﳛﺼﻞ | ‪ ξ‬ﯾ ﻊ ]ﯾ ﻐﻲ | ‪ G‬ﻓﺎٕﻧﻪ ]و ٔﻧ ّﻪ | ‪ Te‬ﻠﻤﻀﺎﻓﺎت ] ﻠﻤﺘﻀﺎﯾﻔﺎت | ‪ Ka‬ﻓ ٔﻣﺎ ]و ٔ ّﻣﺎ ‪ A ‬ﺪ ] ﺪّ ﻩ ‪ om. Br ‬ﻫﻮ | ‪ Ka‬ﺔ ] ﲑ‬ ‫ﻓﺴﲑ ‪ A‬ﺴﲑ ‪ in mg. C‬ﻓﺴﲑد ‪ in mg. B‬ﻓﺴﱰى ‪ νBDiDaṢMiŠG‬ﻓﺴﲑد ]ﻓﺴﱰى | ‪ ζA‬ا ٔﺧﺮى ]ا ٓﺧﺮ | ‪ om. N‬وا ﺪ ‪ E ‬ﳚﻌﻞ‬ ‫‪To‬‬

‫‪٥٤‬ق‬

Chapter I.9  115

have completed [the answer], you have signified the two relative [terms] simultaneously. [... Avicenna’s redefinition of the genus] Since it has already been established that this solution is not satisfying, let us come back to where we departed. We will thus say that the definition of the genus is complete even if the species is not assumed in it as a species insofar as it is relative to it, but insofar as it is the essence. For if you mean by ‘species’ the quiddity, the reality and the form (which is often the case, in their custom10), the species is not one of the [terms that are] relative to the genus. If you mean by ‘which differ in species’ differing in the quiddity and the form, you have a complete definition of the genus. For, if you say that the genus is predicated of many [items] which differ in realities, quiddities and essential forms in answer to ‘what is it?’, the definition of the genus is complete and you do not need to assume the species insofar as it is a relative [term] and to introduce it in its definition, even if the relation is included in that in such a way that it does not entail that a part of the definition is defined by means of what is defined by the definition [itself]. As to its being included [in that], this is because, when you say: “predicated of [items] which differ in the quiddity”, you consider ‘which differ in the quiddity’ as the subject of predication, and this points at the relation that occurs to them. As to the fact that you do not consider a part of the definition as defined by means of what is defined by the definition [itself], this is because the part of the definition is the quiddity or the universality that differs in the quiddity, and neither the quiddity insofar as it is a quiddity, nor the universality which differ in the quiddity are defined by the genus. Therefore, you have defined the genus by a definition in which, along with it, you allude ultimately and poten- Q54 tially to the definition of the species that is relative to it without actually considering it, insofar as it is relative, as a part of its definition. As for the explanation of this procedure concerning the definitions of the relative [terms], why it is necessary that it be in this way and how one attains with it a consideration of the predication proper to each of the two relative [terms] with respect to the other, you will see that in another place11.

 I.e. in the custom of the Greeks. The Greek εἶδος may have similar meanings, which are also recalled by Avicenna in the beginning of chap. I. (§.).  In Šifāʾ, Maqūlāt IV..

‫]اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﻌﺎﴍ[‬ ‫ﻓﺼﻞ ﰲ اﻟﻨﻮع وو ﻪ اﻧﻘﺴﺎم ا ﳫّﻲ إﻟﯿﻪ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫)‪ (.‬واﻟﻨﻮع ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﻗﺪ ﯾﻘﺎل ﰲ ﻟﻐﺔ اﻟﯿﻮ ﻧ ّﯿﲔ ﲆ ﻣﻌﲎ ﲑ ﻣﻌﲎ اﻟﻨﻮع اﳌﻨﻄﻘﻲ‪ .‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن اﻠﻔﻆ ا ي ﻧﻘﻠﺘﻪ‬ ‫اﻟﻔﻼﺳﻔﺔ اﻟﯿﻮ ﻧ ّﯿﻮن ﲾﻌﻠﺘﻪ ﳌﻌﲎ اﻟﻨﻮع اﳌﻨﻄﻘﻲ ﰷن ﻣﺴﺘﻌﻤﻼ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺿﻊ ا ٔ ّول ﻋﻨﺪ اﻟﯿﻮ ﻧ ّﯿﲔ ﲆ ﻣﻌﲎ‬ ‫ﺻﻮرة ّ‬ ‫ﰻ ﳾء وﺣﻘ ﻘ ﻪ اﻟﱵ ذ دون ﳾء ٓﺧﺮ‪ .‬ﻓﻮ ﺪوا ﺻــﻮرا وﻣﺎﻫــﯿﺎت ﻟ ٔ ﺷــﯿﺎء اﻟــﱵ ﲢﺖ‬ ‫ﳜﺘﺺ ّ‬ ‫ﰻ وا ﺪ ﻣﳯﺎ ﲠﺎ ﻓﺴ ّﻤﻮﻫﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﻛﺬ ٔﻧﻮا ﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫اﳉ ﺲ ّ‬ ‫)‪ (..‬وﻛﲈ ٔ ّن ﻟﻔﻈﺔ اﳉ ﺲ ﰷﻧﺖ ﺗ ﺎول اﳌﻌﲎ اﻟﻌﺎ ّﻣﻲ واﳌﻌﲎ اﳌﻨﻄﻘﻲ وﻟﻔﻈــﺔ اﻟﻨــﻮع ﻣﻄﻠــﻘﺎ ﺗ ـ ﺎول‬ ‫اﳌﻌﲎ اﻟﻌﺎ ّﻣﻲ واﳌﻌﲎ اﳌﻨﻄﻘﻲ‪ ،‬ﻓﻜﺬ ﻟﻔﻈﺔ اﻟﻨﻮع اﳌﻨﻄﻘﻲ ﺗ ـ ﺎول ﻋﻨــﺪ اﳌﻨﻄــﻘ ّﲔ ﻣــﻌﻨﯿﲔ‪ ٔ ،‬ــﺪﻫﲈ ٔ ّﰪ‬ ‫ﺧﺺ‪ .‬ﻓ ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﳌﻌﲎ ا ٔ ّﰪ‪ ،‬ﻓﻬﻮ ا ي ﺮوﻧﻪ ﻣﻀﺎﯾﻔﺎ ﻠ ﺲ‪ ،‬وﳛﺪّ وﻧﻪ ﺑ ٔﻧ ّﻪ اﳌﺮﺗ ّﺐ ﲢﺖ اﳉ ﺲ ٔو‬ ‫وا ٓﺧﺮ ٔ ّ‬ ‫اﳋﺎص ﻓﻬﻮ ا ي رﺑّﲈ ّﲰﻮﻩ‬ ‫ا ي ﯾﻘﺎل ﻠﯿﻪ اﳉ ﺲ و ﲆ ﲑﻩ ات‪ ،‬وﻣﺎ ﳚﺮي ﻫﺬا ا ﺮى‪ .‬و ٔ ّﻣﺎ اﳌﻌﲎ ّ‬

‫‪ٔ ] Summarized in Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, Šarḥ al-Išārāt, p. .–.‬ﻧﻮا‬ ‫]‬

‫ات ‪… ‬اﳌﺮﺗ ّﺐ‬

‫‪., Isag., p. .–. ‬‬

‫ﺎ ‪ … ‬واﻟﻨﻮع ‪‬‬

‫‪ٓ ] P‬ﺧﺮ ‪… ‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن‬

‫‪ٔ ] P‬ﻧﻮا ﺎ ‪… ‬ﻓﻮ ﺪوا ‪., Isag., pp. .–.. ‬‬ ‫‪., Isag., p. .–. Cf. A‬‬ ‫‪., In Isag., p. .–.‬‬

‫‪‬‬ ‫‪P‬‬

‫‪] Šifāʾ, Ilāhiyyāt V., p. .–.‬اﳌﻨﻄﻘﻲ… واﻟﻨﻮع ‪‬‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫‪ μE‬ﻗﺪ ﯾﻘﺎل ٔﯾﻀﺎ ]ﯾﻘﺎل… ٔﯾﻀﺎ ‪ om. κ ‬إﻟﯿﻪ | ‪ Mi‬اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﻌﺎﴍ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻔﻦ ا ٔول ﻣﻦ ﲨ اﳌﻨﻄﻖ ‪ Y‬اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﻌﺎﴍ ]ﻓﺼﻞ‬ ‫‪ i.l. Di‬اﻟﱵ ]ا ي | ‪ i.l. Di‬اﻠﻔﻆ ‪ et‬اﻠﻔﻈﺔ ]اﻠﻔﻆ | ‪ om. κ‬اﻟﻨﻮع | ‪ om. ζBr‬ﻣﻌﲎ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. Y‬اﻟﯿﻮ ﻧ ّﯿﻮن ‪ … ‬ﲆ‬ ‫‪ in‬ﺴﺘﻌﻤﻞ ‪ s.l. Nk‬ﺴﺘﻌﻤﻞ ‪ εζ‬ﺴﺘﻌﻤﻞ ]ﻣﺴﺘﻌﻤﻼ | ‪ No‬اﳌﻌﲎ ]ﳌﻌﲎ | ‪ Yi‬اﻟﯿﻮ ﻧﯿﺔ ‪ JET‬اﻟﯿﻮ ﻧﯿﲔ ]اﻟﯿﻮ ﻧ ّﯿﻮن | ‪ A‬اﻟﻔﻠﺴﻔﺔ ]اﻟﻔﻼﺳﻔﺔ ‪‬‬ ‫‪‬اﻟﱵ | ‪] Lat.‬و ﻠﻘ ﻪ[ »‪ i.l. AsDi «et eius compositioni‬وﺣﻘ ﻘ ﻪ ‪ et‬و ﻠﻘ ﻪ ‪ TTeYiG‬و ﻠﻘ ﻪ ]وﺣﻘ ﻘ ﻪ ‪ No ‬ﻋﻨﻪ ]ﻋﻨﺪ | ‪mg. C‬‬ ‫ﻓﻜﺬ ﻟﻔﻈﺔ ‪ a.c. G‬ﳇﻔﻈﺔ ]وﻟﻔﻈﺔ | ‪ κ‬ﰷن ]ﰷﻧﺖ | ‪ κ om. Yi‬ﻟﻔﻆ ]ﻟﻔﻈﺔ ‪ JTAs ηBrAEd. ‬ﻟﻬﺎ ذ ] ذ | ‪ Te‬ﻟﻬﺎ ] | ‪s.l. J‬‬ ‫‪ iter. To‬اﻟﻨــﻮع ‪… ‬ﻣﻄﻠــﻘﺎ | ‪ Ka‬ﻠﻨــﻮع ]اﻟﻨــﻮع | ‪ om. et add. in mg. Y‬اﳌﻨﻄﻘــﻲ ‪ … ‬وﻟﻔﻈــﺔ | ‪ Te‬ﻓﻠﻔﻈــﺔ ‪ i.l. As‬و ‪ et‬ﻓﻠﻔﻈــﺔ ‪π‬‬ ‫ﻓﻜﺬ ﻟﻔﻄﺔ اﻟﻨﻮع اﳌﻨﻄﻘــﻲ ]‪‬اﳌﻨﻄﻘــﻲ ‪] Lat. ‬ﰷﻧﺖ ﺗ ـ ﺎول ‪ praem. εBrNkBEd. in mg. C «continebat» [scil.‬ﰷﻧﺖ ]‪‬ﺗ ـ ﺎول‬ ‫]اﳌﻨﻄﻘ ّﲔ | ‪ Ṣ‬ﻓ ‪ Te‬و ‪ i.l. As‬ﻓﻜﺬ ‪ et‬و ‪ T‬وﻛــﺬ ]ﻓﻜــﺬ | ‪ add. Nk om. N‬ﺗ ـ ﺎول اﳌــﻌﲎ اﻟــﻌﺎﱊ واﳌــﻌﲎ اﳌﻨﻄﻘــﻲ‬ ‫‪ Ṣ‬و ﲆ ﲑﻩ اﳉ ﺲ ] ﲑﻩ…اﳉ ــﺲ | ‪ iter. Yi‬ﯾــﻘﺎل ‪ ξ ‬ﻣــﻌﲎ ]اﳌــﻌﲎ ‪ om. et add. in mg. Ṣ ‬ﻣــﻌﻨﯿﲔ | ‪ a.c. E‬اﳌﻨﻄﻘ ــﻮن‬ ‫اﳋﺎص | ‪ add. J‬ﻣﻦ ﻃﺮﯾﻖ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ] ات‬ ‫‪] Lat.‬رﲰﻮﻩ ‪ّ ] «describunt» [fort.‬ﲰﻮﻩ | ‪ Mi‬ا ٔﺧﺺ ] ّ‬

‫‪] Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s paraphrase of this passage in Šarḥ al-Išārāt, p. .– supports the‬وﺣﻘ ﻘ ــﻪ ‪‬‬ ‫‪reading ḥaqīqatuhu against ḫilqatuhu.‬‬

‫‪٥٥‬ق‬

C

[I.]

[. The term ‘species’] [.. The first meaning of ‘species’ in Greek and its technical application in logic] ‘Species’ too can be said, in Greek, according to a meaning other than that of logical species. For the expression that the Greek philosophers transposed and applied to the meaning of the logical species was employed by first imposition, among the Greeks, for the meaning of the form of each thing and its essential reality, which belongs to that [thing] exclusively. Then, they found forms and quiddities that belong to the things that are [subsumed] under the genus, all of which properly belong to [those] things, and they called them, insofar as they are such, ‘species’.

[.. Two senses of species employed in logic] [... A more general and a more specific meaning] As well as the expression ‘genus’ encompassed [both] the general meaning and the logical one and the expression ‘species’ without qualification encompasses [both] the general and the logical meaning, likewise the expression ‘logical species’ encompasses, according to the logicians, two meanings, one more general and the other more proper. The most general meaning is the one that they consider as relative to the genus and that they define as ‘subsumed under the genus’ or ‘that of which the genus is predicated not exclusively and essentially’, and so on. The proper

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﻌﺎﴍ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫ﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﻣﺎ ﻧﻮع ا ٔﻧﻮاع‪ ،‬وﻫﻮ ا ي ﯾﺪ ّل ﲆ ﻣﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﻣﺸﱰﻛﺔ ﳉﺰﺋﯿﺎت ﻻ ﲣﺘﻠﻒ ﺑ ٔﻣﻮر ذاﺗﯿﺔ‪ .‬ﻓﻬﺬا اﳌﻌﲎ‬ ‫ﯾﻘﺎل ﻧﻮع ﳌﻌﲎ ا ٔ ّول‪ ،‬إذ ﻻ ﳜﻠﻮ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد ﻣﻦ وﻗﻮ ﻪ ﲢﺖ اﳉ ﺲ‪ ،‬وﯾﻘﺎل ﻧﻮع ﳌﻌﲎ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (..‬وﺑﲔ اﳌﻔﻬﻮﻣﲔ ﻓﺮق — وﯿﻒ ﻻ وﻫﻮ ﳌﻌﲎ ا ٔ ّول ﻣﻀﺎف إﱃ اﳉ ﺲ و ﳌﻌﲎ اﻟــﺜﺎﱐ ــﲑ‬ ‫ﺗﺼﻮرﻩ ﻣﻘﻮﻻ ﲆ ﻛﺜﲑﻦ ﳐﺘﻠﻔﲔ ﻟﻌﺪد ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ إﱃ‬ ‫ﻣﻀﺎف إﱃ اﳉ ﺲ؟ — ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﻻ ﳛﺘﺎج ﰲ ّ‬ ‫ٔن ﻜﻮن ﳾء ٓﺧﺮ ٔﯾﻀﺎ ٔ ّﰪ ﻣ ﻪ ﻣﻘﻮﻻ ﻠﯿﻪ‪ .‬وﻣﻌﲎ اﻟﻨﻮع ﻟﻮ ﻪ ا ٔ ّول ﻟ ﺲ ﰷﳉ ﺲ ﳌﻌﲎ اﻟﻨﻮع ﻟﻮ ﻪ‬ ‫ﻣﻘﻮﻣﺎ ‪ ،‬إذ ﻗﺪ ﳚﻮز ﰲ ّ‬ ‫اﻟﺘﻮﱒ ٔن ﻻ ﻜﻮن اﻟﴚء ا ي ﻫﻮ ﻧﻮع ﲠــﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻔــﺔ‬ ‫اﻟﺜﺎﱐ‪ .‬وذ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ﻟ ﺲ ّ‬ ‫ﻧﺘﺼﻮر ﳇّﯿﺎ ﻫﻮ ر ٔس ﻟ ﺲ ﲢﺖ ﳇّﻲ ٓﺧﺮ‪ ،‬وﻫﻮ ﻣــﻊ ذ‬ ‫ﻧﻮ ﺎ ﻟﺼﻔﺔ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﯿﺔ‪ ،‬إذ ﻻ ﳝﺘﻨﻊ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ ٔن ّ‬ ‫ﻟ ﺲ ﳑّﺎ ﯾﻨﻘﺴﻢ ﻟﻔﺼﻮل‪ ،‬ﰷﻟﻨﻘﻄﺔ ﻋﻨﺪ ﻗﻮم‪ .‬وﻣﺎ ﰷن ﺣﳬﻪ ﻫﻜــﺬا و ــﲆ ﻫــﺬﻩ اﻟﺼــﻮرة و ﺎز رﻓﻌــﻪ ﰲ‬ ‫ّ‬ ‫اﻟﺘﻮﱒ‪ ،‬ﱂ ﻜﻦ ﻛﲈ ﻠﻤﺖ ذاﺗﯿﺎ‪ ،‬وﻣﺎ ﱂ ﻜﻦ ذاﺗﯿﺎ ﱂ ﻜﻦ ﺴﺎ؛ ﺑﻞ إن ﰷن ﻻ ﺑــﺪّ ﻓﻬــﻮ ﺎرض ﻻزم ‪.‬‬ ‫وﻗﺪ ﯾﻘﺎل ﻟﻬﺬا ﻧﻮع ا ٔﻧﻮاع‪ ،‬وﻟ ﺲ اﳌﻔﻬﻮم ﻣﻦ ﻮﻧﻪ ﻧﻮع ا ٔﻧﻮاع ﻫﻮ اﳌﻔﻬﻮم ﻣﻦ ﻮﻧﻪ ﻧﻮ ﺎ ﲟﻌﲎ ٔﻧّــﻪ ﻣﻘــﻮل‬ ‫ﲆ ﻛﺜﲑﻦ ﳐﺘﻠﻔﲔ ﻟﻌﺪد ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ — وﯿﻒ وﻣﻦ ﺣـ ﺚ ﻫــﻮ ﻧــﻮع ا ٔﻧـﻮاع؟ — ﻓﺎ ّٕن اﻟﻨــﻮع‬ ‫اﳌﻄﻠﻖ ﰷﳉ ﺲ ودا ﻞ ﰲ ﲢﺪﯾﺪﻩ وﻫﻮ ﺑﻪ ﻣﻀﺎف إﱃ ٔﻧﻮاع ﻓﻮﻗﻪ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ّ (.‬ﰒ ﻟﺴﺖ ٔﺣﻘّﻖ ٔ ّن ٔ ّي اﻟﻮ ﲔ ﻫﻮ ﰲ اﺻﻄﻼح اﳌﻨﻄﻘ ّﲔ ٔﻗﺪم‪ .‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ ﻻ ﯾﺒﻌﺪ ٔن ﻜﻮن ٔ ّول ﻧﻘﻞ‬ ‫اﰟ اﻟﻨﻮع ٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﻫﻮ إﱃ ﻫﺬا ِ‬ ‫اﳌﻄ ّﻞ ﲆ ا ٔﻓﺮاد؛ ّﰒ ﳌّﺎ ﻋﺮض ٔن ﰷن ﻠﯿﻪ ﺎ ّم ٓﺧــﺮ‪ّ ،‬ﲰــﻲ ﻮﻧــﻪ ﲢﺖ‬ ‫اﻟﻌﺎ ّم ﲠﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻔﺔ ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺔ‪ .‬وﻻ ﯾﺒﻌﺪ ٔﯾﻀﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ا ٔﻗﺪم ﻫﻮ اﳌﻌﲎ ا ٓﺧﺮ‪ :‬ﻓﻠ ّﻤﺎ ﰷن ﻫﺬا اﳌﻌﲎ ﯾﻠﺰﻣﻪ ٔن‬ ‫‪., Isag., p. .–.‬‬

‫‪] P‬ﻫﻮ…ﻣﻘﻮﻻ ‪‬‬

‫‪] «pluribus» [sed fort. corrigendum: «particularibus»] Lat.‬ﳉ ـﺰﺋﯿﺎت | ‪ G‬ﻣــﻦ ا ٔﻧ ـﻮاع ]ا ٔﻧ ـﻮاع | ‪ No‬ﲟــﻮع ]ﻧــﻮع ‪‬‬ ‫‪ om. et add. in mg.‬ﻣ ﻪ ‪… ‬ﻣﻘﻮﻻ ‪ om. et add. in mg. Da ‬اﳉ ﺲ ‪… ‬و ﳌﻌﲎ | ‪ om. To‬إﱃ ‪ NkB ‬ﻋﻦ ]ﻣﻦ ‪‬‬ ‫ﻣﻘﻮﻣﺎ ‪ Ed. ‬ﲟﻌﲎ ]ﳌﻌﲎ | ‪ Ka‬اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ]ا ٔ ّول | ‪ٔ om. Yi‬ﯾﻀﺎ ‪To ‬‬ ‫‪] «id ... non habeat» [fort.‬اﻟﴚء | ‪ a.c. Yi‬ﻣﻘﻮ ] ّ‬ ‫‪ om. et add.‬ﻫﻮ ]وﻫﻮ | ‪ٓ om. Lat.‬ﺧﺮ | ‪ A‬وﻫﻮ ]ﻫﻮ ‪] «in hoc modo primo» Lat. ‬ﲠﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻔﺔ | ‪)] Lat.‬ﻻ ﻜﻮن( ﻠﴚء‬ ‫ﲪــ ]‪)] Lat.‬وﻣﺎ ﰷن( ﺣﳬــﻪ )ﻫﻜــﺬا( ‪ KaNkCMiG in mg. JBTo «et quod est huiusmodi» [scil.‬ﺣﳬــﻪ ‪s.l. N ‬‬ ‫]‪‬ﱂ ‪ Di ‬اﻟﺼﻔﺔ ]اﻟﺼﻮرة | ‪ٔ As‬و ﲆ ‪ Ka‬ﲆ ]و ﲆ | ‪ Mi‬ﻫﺬا ]ﻫﻜﺬا | ‪ in mg. NkCG‬ﲪ ‪ No‬ﲨ ‪ζλνBrBDiDaToŠNEd.‬‬ ‫‪ om.‬ﻧﻮع ‪ … ‬ا ٔﻧﻮاع ‪ add. E | om. ζ ‬ﻣﻦ ]ﺑﺪّ | ‪  om. et add. in mg. As‬ﻜﻦ | ‪ add. in mg. Ṣ‬ﻓﻘﻂ ]‪‬ذاﺗﯿﺎ | ‪ G‬وﱂ‬ ‫‪ Br‬وﻫﻮ ﻣﻦ ‪ om. et add. s.l. C‬و ]وﻣﻦ | ‪ i.l. As‬و ‪ et‬ﻓﻜ ﻒ ‪ JT‬ﻓﻜ ﻒ ]وﯿﻒ | ‪ om. DiDa‬ﻟﻌــﺪد ‪et add. in mg. G ‬‬ ‫‪ in‬اﳌﻨﻄﻘ ﲔ ‪ et‬اﳌﻨﻄﻘﲔ ]اﳌﻨﻄﻘ ّﲔ | ‪ّٔ om. ADaNo‬ن | ‪ٔ in mg. Y‬ﺣﻘﻖ ‪ٔ δνKaJ‬ﲢﻘﻖ ] ٔﺣﻘّﻖ ‪ٔ ξ ‬ﻧﻪ ‪ om. BC add. s.l. B‬ﺑﻪ ‪‬‬ ‫‪ [parum‬اﳌﻄﻠﻖ ‪ Ed.‬اﳌﻄﻠﻖ ] ِ‬ ‫اﳌﻄ ّ‬ ‫ﻞ ‪ in mg. To ‬ﻧﻘﻞ ‪ et‬ﻣﺎ ﻧﻘﻞ ‪ MiŠG‬ﻣﺎ ﻧﻘﻞ ]ﻧﻘﻞ | ‪ a.c. Y‬ﻋﻦ ٔن ] ٔن | ‪ٔ om. N‬ﻗﺪم | ‪mg. Di‬‬ ‫ﲰﻲ | ‪] Lat.‬اﳌﻄﻞ ‪ κ «id quod est supra» [scil.‬اﳌﻘﻮل ‪ a.c.] G‬اﳌﻄﻞ ‪clare; fort.‬‬ ‫اﳉ ﺲ اﻟﻌﺎم ]اﻟﻌﺎ ّم ‪ ζλṢToŠG ‬ﺴﻤﻰ ] ّ‬ ‫‪ a.c. Y‬ﻗﺪام ]ا ٔﻗﺪم | ‪ٔ om. J‬ﯾﻀﺎ | ‪ ToŠ‬ﻓﻼ ]وﻻ | ‪ s.l. As‬ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺘﻪ ‪ et‬ﻧﻮ ﻪ ]ﻧﻮﻋﯿﺔ | ‪Ka‬‬ ‫‪‬‬

‫ﯾﻌﲏ ٔن اﻟﻨﻮع ا ٔول وﻫﻮ اﳌﺮﺗﺐ ﲢﺖ اﳉ ﺲ ﻻ ﳝﻜﻦ ﺑﴬورة ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ ﻣﺎ ﱂ ﯾﺘﺼﻮر ﻣﻌﻪ ﳾء ٔﰪ ﻣ ﻪ وﳾء ٔﺧﺺ ﻣﳯﺎ ﺗﻘﻮﻣﺎﻧﻪ ]اﻟﺜﺎﱐ ‪… ‬ﻓﻬﺬا‬ ‫ﺴﺎ ﲠﺬﻩ اﻟﺼﻔﺔ و ﳌﻌﲎ اﻟﺜﺎﱐ وﻫﻮ ا ي ﻻ ﻜﻮن ﺴﺎ ﻻ ]***[ ا ﻫﻦ ﻣﻦ ﺗﺼﻮرﻩ ﻣﻦ دون ﺗﺼﻮر ﳾء ٔﰪ ﻣ ﻪ ]***[ ٔﻧﻪ ﻻ ﯾﻠﺘﻔﺖ اﻟﺒﺘﺔ إﱃ ٔن‬ ‫]***[ ﺑﻞ ﯾ ٔ ﺬﻩ ﻣﻌﲎ ﳇﯿﺎ ﲢﺘﻪ ﺟﺰﺋﯿﺎﺗﻪ ﻓﺎٕذن ﻟ ﺲ اﳊﯿﻮان ﻣﻘﺎوﻣﺎ ٔﻧﻪ ﳚﻮز ٔن ﺮﻓﻊ ]***[ ﺗﺼﻮرﻩ وﻣﺎ ﻻ ﺎ ﺔ إﻟﯿﻪ ﰲ وﺟﻮدﻩ اﳊﯿـﻮان ﯾﻌﻤــﻪ و ــﲑﻩ‬ ‫وﻻ ﻟﻮ ﰷن ذ ﲑ ﺎ ﺰ ﰲ اﻟﻮﺟﻮد وﺟﺐ ٔن ﻜﻮن اﻟﻨﻮع ﳌﻌﲎ ا ٔول ﺴﺎ ] ٓﺧﺮ ‪… ‬وﻣﻌﲎ ‪ in mg. Di ‬وﺗﺼﻮرﻩ ﰲ ا ﻫﻦ ﻓﻠ ﺲ ذاﺗﯿﺎ‬ ‫ﻠﴚء اﻟﻨﻮع ﳌﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﺜﺎﱐ إذ ﻟ ﺲ ذ اﳌﻔﻬﻮم ﺟﺰء ﻫﺬا اﳌﻔﻬﻮم وﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﳉ ﺲ ﻻ ﳏﺎ ﺟﺰء ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﻨﻮع وﰲ ذ ﻛﻔﺎﯾﺔ و ٔﻣﺎ اﻋﺘﺒﺎر اﻟﻮﺟﻮد واﻟﺘﻮﱒ ﻓﻐﲑ‬ ‫‪ in mg.‬ﻓﻊ ﰲ ذ وٕاﳕﺎ ﯾﻌﺘﱪ ﴍوط اﳉ ﺲ ﻋﻨﺪ اﻟﻨﻮع ﻓﻘﻂ وﻻ ٔﯾﻀﺎ ﻣﻌﲎ اﳉ ﺲ ﺲ ﳌﻌﲎ اﻟﻨﻮع وﻻ ﺎم وٕاﻻ ﲀن ﰻ ﻧﻮع ﺴﺎ وﻟ ﺲ ﻛﺬ‬

‫‪N‬‬

‫‪٥٦‬ق‬

Chapter I.10  119

meaning is the one that they would call, under a certain respect, ‘species of species1’: Q55 it is what signifies a shared quiddity that belongs to particulars that do not differ in essential things. This meaning is called ‘species’ according to the first meaning, as it inevitably falls under the genus in the existence; [otherwise], it is also called ‘species’ according to the second meaning. [... Differences between the two senses of species] There is a difference between the two concepts — and how could there not be, given that, according to the first meaning, the species is relative to the genus, whereas according to the second meaning it is not? — In fact, conceiving it as predicated of many [items] which differ in number in answer to ‘what is it?’ does not require that there be anything else more common that is predicated of it. The meaning of ‘species’ under the first respect is not like the genus with respect to the meaning of ‘species’ under the second respect. This is because it is not constitutive for it, since the thing that is a species in this way may not be a species in the second way in estimation, given that it is not impossible to conceive in the mind a universal that is at the top under which no other universal is subsumed and which is not among the things that are divided by differentiae (like the point, according to a group [of philosophers])2. That whose status is such and in this way and whose removal in the estimation is possible is not, as you know3, essential, and what is not essential is not a genus; if it is necessary, it is rather a concomitant accident for it. Sometimes it is called ‘species of species’, but the concept of its being a species of species does not coincide with that of its being a species in the sense that it is predicated of many [items] which differ in number in answer to ‘what is it?’ — how could it [coincide with that], given that it is a species of species? — for the species in the unqualified sense is like a genus for it and is included in its definition, by which it is related to the species above it.

[.. Difficulty in determining which of the two senses is earlier than the other] I have not verified which of the two aspects came earlier in the convention of the logicians. It is not impossible that the first traditional use of the name ‘species’ only [applied] to this [species] that stands above singular [things]; then, since it happened to have another general [item] above it, the fact of being [subsumed] under a general [item] in this way was called ‘speciality’. It is not even impossible, [however,] that the Q56

 I.e. Porphyry’s most special species (εἶδος εἰδικώτατον).  Avicenna might refer to the atomists: the same doctrine is more extensively exposed in al-Fārābī, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, pp. .–..  Cf. Madḫal I..

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﻌﺎﴍ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫وﳜﺘﺺ ﰲ إﺿﺎﻓﺎﺗﻪ ﻟﻨﻮﻋﯿﺔ ﻓﻘﻂ ﻣﻦ ﲑ ﲡ ّﺲ‪ ،‬ﺟﻌﻞ ٔوﱃ ﰟ اﻟﻨﻮﻋﯿﺔ‪ ،‬و ّﲰﻲ ﻣﻦ‬ ‫ﻜﻮن ﻧﻮع ا ٔﻧﻮاع ّ‬ ‫ﺣ ﺚ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻼﺻﻖ ﻟ ٔ ﺷ ﺎص ﻧﻮ ﺎ ٔﯾﻀﺎ‪ .‬وﻫﺬا ﳾء ﻟ ﺲ ﳝﻜ ﲏ ﲢﺼﯿ ‪ ،‬وٕان ﰷن ٔﻛﱶ ﻣ ﲇ ﻫﻮ إﱃ‬ ‫ٔ ّن ٔ ّول اﻟ ﺴﻤﯿﺔ وﻗﻊ ﲝﺴﺐ اﻋﺘﺒﺎر اﻟﻨﻮع اﳌﻀﺎﯾﻒ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (..‬ﻟﻜ ّﻪ ﳚﺐ ﻠﯿﻨﺎ ٔن ّ‬ ‫ﻧﻌﲅ ٔ ّن اﻟﻨﻮع ا ي ﻫﻮ ٔ ﺪ اﶆﺴﺔ ﰲ اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ ا ٔوﱃ ﻫــﻮ ﺑ ٔ ّي اﳌــﻌﻨﯿﲔ‬ ‫ﻧﻮع‪ .‬ﻓ ﻘﻮل ٕاﻧ ّﻪ ﻗﺪ ﳝﻜﻦ ٔن ﲣﺮج اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ ا ّﻤﺴﺔ ﲆ و ﻪ ﯾ ﺎول ّ‬ ‫ﰻ وا ﺪ ﻣﳯﲈ دون ا ٓﺧﺮ‪ .‬ﻓ ٕﺎﻧ ّﻪ إذا‬ ‫ﻗ ﻞ ا ّٕن اﻠﻔﻆ ا ﳫّﻲ ا اﰐ ٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻣﻘﻮﻻ ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ٔو ﻻ ﻜﻮن‪ ،‬واﳌﻘﻮل ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ٕا ّﻣﺎ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻣﻘﻮﻻ‬ ‫ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ اﳌﺸﱰﻛﺔ ﺘﻠﻔﲔ ﻟﻨﻮع ٔو ﺘﻠﻔﲔ ﻟﻌﺪد دون اﻟﻨﻮع‪ ،‬ﰷن ﻗﺴﻤﺔ اﳌﻘﻮل ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ﺗ ـ ﺎول اﳉ ــﺲ‬ ‫واﻟﻨﻮع اﳌﻼﺻﻖ ﻟ ٔ ﺷ ﺎص‪ .‬ﻓ ﻀﯿﻊ اﻋﺘﺒﺎر اﻟﻨﻮع ﳌــﻌﲎ ا ي ﻜــﻮن ٕﻻﺿــﺎﻓﺔ إﱃ اﳉ ــﺲ ﰲ اﻟﻘﺴﻤــﺔ‬ ‫ا ٔوﱃ‪ .‬ﺑﻞ ﯾﻨﻘﺴﻢ ﺑﻌﺪ ذ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻘﻮل ﲆ ﻛﺜﲑﻦ ﳐﺘﻠﻔﲔ ﻟﻨﻮع ﰲ ﺟﻮاب ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ إﱃ ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻛﺬ‬ ‫وﻻ ﯾﻘﺎل ﻠﯿﻪ ﻣ ﻞ ذ — ﻓ ﻜﻮن ا ي ﺴ ّﻤﻰ ﺴﺎ ﻓﻘﻂ — وٕاﱃ ﻣﺎ ﻜﻮن ﻣﻘﻮﻻ ﲆ ﻛﺜﲑﻦ وﯾﻘﺎل‬ ‫ﻠﯿﻪ ٓﺧﺮ ﻫﺬا اﻟﻘﻮل ﻓ ﺼﲑ ﲠﺬا ﻋﺘﺒﺎر ﻧﻮ ﺎ‪ .‬ﻟﻜﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ ﻻ ﲣﺮج ﻃﺒﯿﻌﺔ اﻟﻨﻮﻋﯿﺔ ﳌﻌﲎ اﳌﻀﺎف‬ ‫ﻣﻄﻠﻘﺎ؛ ﺑﻞ ﲣﺮج ﻗﺴﲈ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﻨﻮﻋﯿﺔ ﲠﺬا ﻋﺘﺒﺎر‪ ،‬وﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ﰷن ـ ﺴﺎ و ﻧﻮﻋﯿــﺔ‪ ،‬وﲣــﺮج ﻃﺒﯿﻌــﺔ‬ ‫اﳋﺎص ﺳﺎﳌﺎ ﲱﯿ ﺎ‪.‬‬ ‫اﻟﻨﻮع ﻻﻋﺘﺒﺎر ّ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫]و ّﲰﻲ | ‪ s.l. As «generalitate» Lat.‬ﲡ ﺲ ‪ ζJṢEd.‬ﺲ ]ﲡ ّﺲ | ‪] s.l. As‬إﺿﺎﻓ ﻪ ‪ [scil.‬ﻓ ﻪ ]إﺿﺎﻓﺎﺗﻪ | ‪ Br‬ﲆ ‪ s.l. J‬ﰲ‬ ‫‪ om. et add.‬إﱃ | ‪ om. Mi‬ﻫﻮ | ‪ om. Br‬ﻫﻮ ‪ Br ‬وﺴﻤﻰ ‪ in mg. C‬ﻓﺴﻤﻲ ‪ s.l. Nk‬ﻓﺴﻤﻲ ‪ λξπDiDaYi‬ﻓﺴﻤﻲ ‪ Y‬ﻓ ﺴﻤﻰ‬ ‫‪ om. et‬ﻗﺪ ‪ om. N ‬ﻠﯿﻨﺎ | ‪ Br‬ﻟﻜ ﺎ ]ﻟﻜ ّﻪ ‪ N ‬اﳌﻀﺎف ‪ in mg. C‬اﳌﻀﺎﯾﻒ ‪ et‬اﳌﻀﺎف ]اﳌﻀﺎﯾﻒ | ‪ A‬وﻗﻮع ]وﻗﻊ ‪s.l. To ‬‬ ‫‪ add.‬ﯾ ﺎول ]‪ ‬ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ | ‪ om. Lat.‬واﳌﻘﻮل ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ | ‪ s.l. As‬ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ‪ et‬اﺗﯿﺔ ]‪ ‬ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ ‪ add. E ‬اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ ]ا ّﻤﺴﺔ | ‪add. s.l. T‬‬ ‫ٔو ‪ et‬وا ﺘﻠﻔﲔ ] ٔو ﺘﻠﻔﲔ | ‪  om. et add. in mg. Ṣ‬ﺘﻠﻔﲔ… ﻟﻨﻮع | ‪  om. et add. in mg. Y‬ﳌﺎﻫﯿﺔ…اﳌﺸﱰﻛﺔ ‪a.c. No ‬‬ ‫‪ om.‬ﰲ ‪ J‬ﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ ]ﰲ اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ | ‪ om. et add. s.l. N‬ا ي | ‪ To‬وﯨﺼﻨﻊ ‪ κλξJṢMiŠYi‬وﯾﻀﯿﻊ ]ﻓ ﻀﯿﻊ ‪ A ‬ﳐﺘﻠﻔﲔ ]‪ ‬ﺘﻠﻔﲔ | ‪i.l. As‬‬ ‫‪ om.‬ﳌﻌﲎ اﳌﻀﺎف | ‪ Ed.‬ﻫﺬا ]ﲠﺬا ‪ om. Br ‬ﻫﻮ… إﱃ | ‪ s.l. As‬ﯾﻨﻘﺴﻢ ‪ et‬ﯾﻘﺴﻢ ‪ T‬ﯾﻘﺴﻢ ‪ J‬ﻓﻘﺴﻢ ]ﯾﻨﻘﺴﻢ ‪et add. s.l. Di ‬‬ ‫ﺑﺬا ‪ NkC‬ﯨﺪا ‪ J‬ﲠﺬﻩ ]ﲠﺬا | ‪ ξKa‬ﻗﺴﻢ ]ﻗﺴﲈ | ‪ add. et exp. As‬ﺑﻞ ]ﲣﺮج ‪ om. C ‬اﻟﻨﻮﻋﯿﺔ ‪ … ‬ﳌﻌﲎ | ‪et add. in mg. Ṣ‬‬ ‫‪ om. et add. in mg. Y‬ﺴﺎ | ‪ s.l. As‬ﺑﺬ ‪KaB‬‬ ‫ﻟﻌﺪد ]اﳌﻌﻨﯿﲔ ‪‬‬

‫]ﲱﯿ ﺎ ‪… ‬ﻟﻜﻦ ‪ٔ in mg. Nk ‬ي اﻟﻨﻮع ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻀﺎف إﱃ اﳉ ﺲ واﻟﻨﻮع ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻘﻮل ﲆ ﻛﺜﲑﻦ ﳐﺘﻠﻔﲔ‬ ‫ﯾﻌﲏ إذا ﰷﻧﺖ اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ ﻛﺬ ﱂ ﳜﺮج اﻟﻨﻮع اﳌﻀﺎﯾﻒ ﻣﻄﻠﻘﺎ ﺑﻞ ﳜﺮج ﻣﳯﺎ ﺑﻘﺴﻤﺔ ﻧﯿﺔ ﯾﻮﻗﻊ ﲆ ٔ ﺪ ﻗﺴﻤﳱﺎ وﻫﻮ ﻣﺎ ذ ﺮﻩ و ٔﻣﺎ اﻟﻨﻮع اﳌﻼﺻﻖ ﻓ ﺨﺮج ﻣــﻦ‬ ‫‪ in mg. Di‬اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ ا ٔوﱃ ﲱﯿ ﺎ‬

Chapter I.10  121

earlier [of the two] is the other meaning: given that this meaning is necessarily a species of species and is only characterized in its relations by speciality, without becoming a genus, it was considered as worthier of the name ‘speciality’ and, insofar as it is contiguous with the individuals, it was also called ‘species’. But this is something that I cannot ascertain, even if I am more inclined [to think] that the name was first assigned in view of the relative species.

[. Attempt to determine which of the two meanings of species is one of the five universals] [.. The division into the five expressions may produce one sense of species at a time] [... The division that produces the meaning of the most special species] Anyway, it behoves us to teach which of the two meanings is the one according to which the species that is one of the five [expressions] in the first division is a species. Let us say that the division into five may possibly bring out [the species] under a respect that concerns each of the two [meanings] without the other. For, if it is said that the universal essential expression is either predicated with regard to the quiddity or not, and [that] what is predicated with regard to the quiddity can be predicated with regard to the shared quiddity that belongs to [items] which differ in species or to [items] which differ in number but not in species, then the division of what is predicated with regard to the quiddity encompasses the genus and the species that is contiguous to the individuals. The consideration of the species in the meaning that is related to the genus is thus lost in the first division. But what is predicated of many [items] which differ in species in answer to ‘what is it?’ is further divided into that which is such and of which nothing similar is predicated — this is what is only called ‘genus’ — and that which is predicated of many [items in this way] and of which something else is predicated in the same way so that, under this consideration, it becomes a species. This division does not, however, bring out the nature of speciality according to the relative meaning in the unqualified sense; it rather brings out a section of this speciality according to this consideration, and this is what was a genus and had a speciality, whereas it brings out completely and correctly the nature of the species in the proper consideration. [... The division that produces the relative species only] It may also be possible to produce a division in order to bring out the species in the most common meaning, and that the species in the proper meaning results in the second [stage of the] division, so that what is a species is either a species of species

‫اﻟﻔﺼﻞ اﻟﻌﺎﴍ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻘﺎ ا ٔوﱃ‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪‬‬

‫‪ ‬‬

‫اﳋﺎص ﰲ اﻟﻘﺴﻤــﺔ‬ ‫)‪ (..‬وﻗﺪ ﳝﻜﻦ ٔن ﯾﻘﺴﻢ ﲝﯿﺚ ﳜﺮج اﻟﻨــﻮع ﲟــﻌﲎ ا ٔ ّﰪ‪ ،‬ﻓ ﻜــﻮن اﻟﻨــﻮع ﲟــﻌﲎ ّ‬ ‫اﻟﺜﺎﻧﯿﺔ‪ ،‬ﺣﱴ ﻜﻮن ﻣﺎ ﻫﻮ ﻧﻮع ٕا ّﻣﺎ ا ي ﻫﻮ ﻧﻮع ا ٔﻧﻮاع ا ي ﯾﻌــﺮض ٔن ﻜــﻮن اﻟﻨــﻮع ﳌــﻌﲎ ا ي‬ ‫ﺧﺺ‪ ،‬وٕا ّﻣﺎ ا ي ﻫﻮ ﻧﻮع ﯾﺘ ّﺲ‪.‬‬ ‫ﳒﻌ ٔ ّ‬ ‫)‪ (..‬ﻟﻜ ّﻚ إذا ﻗﺴﻤﺖ ا ﳫّﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﻫﻮ ﳇّﻲ ﻓ ٔوﱃ ﻋﺘﺒﺎرات ﺑﻪ ٔن ﺗﻘﺴﻤﻪ ﻗﺴﻤﺔ ﻜﻮن‬ ‫ﻟﻘ ﺎس إﱃ ﻣﻮﺿﻮ ﺎﺗﻪ اﻟﱵ ﻫﻮ ﳇّﻲ ﲝﺴﳢﺎ‪ .‬ﻓﻬﻨﺎ ﯾﺬﻫﺐ اﻟﻨﻮع ا ي ﳌﻌﲎ ا ٔ ّﰪ‪ ،‬وٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﳛﺼﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻌﺪ‬ ‫اﳋﺎص‪.‬‬ ‫ﻋﺘﺒﺎر ن‪ .‬وﻫﻨﺎ ﯾﺼﲑ اﻟﻨﻮع اﳌﺸﻌﻮر ﺑﻪ ٔ ّوﻻ ﻫﻮ اﻟﻨﻮع ﳌﻌﲎ ّ‬ ‫وٕان ﱂ ﺮاع ﻫﺬا — ﺑﻞ روﻋﻲ ٔﺣﻮال ا ﳫّﯿﺎت وﻋﻮارﺿﻬﺎ ﻓ ﺑ ﳯﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺣ ﺚ ﱔ ﳇّﯿﺔ‪ ،‬ﻣ ﻞ اﻟﺰ دة ﰲ‬ ‫اﻟﻌﻤﻮم واﳋﺼﻮص اﻟﱵ ﻟﺒﻌﻀﻬﺎ ﻋﻨﺪ ﺑﻌﺾ‪ ،‬ﻻ ﻋﻨﺪ اﳉﺰﺋﯿﺎت — ﺧﺮج اﻟﻨﻮع اﳌﻀﺎف‪ ،‬ﲆ ﻣﺎ ﻧﻮردﻩ‬ ‫ﻋﻦ ﻗﺮﯾﺐ‪.‬‬ ‫)‪ (.‬وﻟ ﺲ ﳚﺐ ٔن ﻜﻮن ﻫﺬا اﻟﺘﺨﻤ ﺲ ﻣﺸ ﳣﻼ ﲆ ّ‬ ‫ﰻ ﻣﻌﲎ ﻜﻮن إﻟﯿﻪ ﻗﺴﻤﺔ ا ﳫّﻲ؛ ﻓﺎ ّٕن اﻟﴚء‬ ‫ﻗﺪ ﯾﻨﻘﺴﻢ ٔﻗﺴﺎﻣﺎ ﻗﺴﻤﺔ ّﻣﺔ‪ ،‬وﺗﻔﻠﺖ ﻣﳯﺎ ٔﻗﺴﺎم ٔﺧﺮى ٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﺗ ٔﰐ ﺳﻠﳰﺔ ﺑﻘﺴﻤﺔ ٔﺧﺮى‪ .‬ﻓﺎ ّٕن اﳊﯿﻮان‪،‬‬ ‫إذا ﻗﺴﻤﺘﻪ إﱃ ﻃﻖ و ٔﲺﻢ‪ ،‬ﱂ ﻜﻦ ا ّٕﻻ ﻗﺴﻤﲔ‪ ،‬و ٔﻓﻠﺖ اﳌﺸﺎء واﻟﻄﺎ ﺮ‪ ،‬واﺣ ﺎج إﱃ اﺑﺘﺪاء ﻗﺴﻤﺔ‪.‬‬ ‫ﺘﻌﴪ وﻧﻘﻮل ا ّٕن ﻫﺬﻩ اﻟﻘﺴﻤﺔ ا ّﻤﺴﺔ ﳚﺐ ٔن ﺸ ﳣﻞ ﲆ ّ‬ ‫ﰻ ﻣﻌﲎ ﻜﻮن ﻣﻦ ٔﻗﺴﺎم‬ ‫وﻟ ﺲ ﳚﺐ ٔن ﻧ ّ‬ ‫ﺘﻌﴪ اﺷﱰاك ﻗﺴﻤﲔ ﻣ ﺒﺎﯾﻨﲔ ﰲ اﰟ وﻫﻮ‬ ‫ا ﳫّﻲ واﻋﺘﺒﺎراﺗﻪ‪ .‬ﺑﻞ ﳚﺐ ٔن ﺗﻌﲅ ٔﻧ ّﻪ ٕاﻧ ّﲈ ﳛﻤﻞ ﲆ ﻫﺬا اﻟ ّ‬ ‫اﰟ اﻟﻨﻮع‪ .‬ﺑﻞ ا ٔﺣﺮى ٔن ﻧﻘﻮل ا ّٕن ﻫﺬﻩ اﶆﺴﺔ إذا ﲢﺼﻠﺖ ﺣﺼﻞ ﻣﻦ اﳌﻨﺎﺳﺒﺎت اﻟﱵ ﺑ ﳯﺎ ٔﻣــﺮ ٓﺧــﺮ‬

‫‪] Išārāt, p. .–.‬اﻟﻨﻮع ‪ … ‬وﻟ ﺲ ‪‬‬ ‫اﻟﺜﻠﺜﺔ ]اﻟﺜﺎﻧﯿﺔ ‪ εEd. in mg. NkC ‬ﳌﻌﲎ ]‪‬ﲟﻌﲎ | ‪ N‬وﻜﻮن ]ﻓ ﻜﻮن | ‪ Br‬ﻣﻌﲎ ‪ πYi‬ﳌﻌﲎ ‪ p.c. J‬ﳌﻌﲎ ‪ a.c. et‬ﳌﻌﲎ ]‪‬ﲟﻌﲎ ‪‬‬ ‫]ﳒﻌ ‪ i.l. Di om. Ṣ ‬اﳉ ﺲ ]اﻟﻨﻮع | ‪ om. No‬ﻧﻮع ‪… ‬ا ٔﻧﻮاع | ‪ om. Yi‬ا ي ﻫﻮ | ‪ om. et add. in mg. Di‬ﻧﻮع… ٕا ّﻣﺎ | ‪T‬‬ ‫ٔﺧﺺ | ‪ Ed.‬ﳚﻌ ‪ N‬ﺟﻌ ‪ G «quam posuimus» Lat.‬ﳒﻌ ‪ exp. et‬ﳚﻌ‬ ‫‪ add. Yi‬اﻟﻨﻮع ]وٕا ّﻣﺎ | ‪ Di‬ا ٔﺧﺺ ‪ a.c. J‬ا ي ٔﺧﺺ ] ّ‬ ‫‪… ‬ﻓ ٔوﱃ | ‪ To‬ﻓﺎ ٔوﱃ ]ﻓ ٔوﱃ ‪ TAsNo ‬ﳉ ﺲ ‪ Da et a.c. E‬اﳉ ﺲ ]ﯾﺘ ّﺲ | ‪ om. Nk‬ﻫﻮ ‪ om. et add. in mg. G‬ا ي ﻫﻮ‬ ‫‪ C‬ﻓﺎٕن ]وٕان ‪ A ‬اﻋﺘﺒﺎر ] ﻋﺘﺒﺎر ‪ om. et add. s.l. N ‬ﺑﻌﺪ | ‪ om. J s.l. G‬ا ي ‪ T ‬ﻣﻘﺴﻤﺔ ]ﺗﻘﺴﻤﻪ | ‪ iter. No‬ﳇّﻲ‬ ‫‪ NkTC «ostendemus‬ﯨﻮردﻩ ‪ Y‬ﺗﻮردﻩ ]ﻧﻮردﻩ | ‪ No‬ذ ] ‪ s.l. As ‬ﳇﯿﺔ ‪ et‬ﰻ ]ﳇّﯿﺔ | ‪ ξ‬ﺑ ﳯﲈ ‪ A‬ﺑ ﺎﻫﺎ ]ﺑ ﳯﺎ | ‪ Ṣ‬روﻋﯿﺖ ]روﻋﻲ‬ ‫‪[varia lectio: ostendetur]» Lat.‬‬ ‫>‪] «haec quinquemembris» [fort. «haec