Autopoietic organization theory: drawing on Niklas Luhmann's social system perspective 8763001039, 9788763001038

Table of contents :
1. Introduction: Niklas Luhmann's autopoietic theory and organization studies -- a space of connections
Tor Hernes and Tore Bakken
2. Communications with decisions as medium and form -- some notes on Niklas Luhmann's theory of organization
Jan Inge Jönhill
3. Organization
Niklas Luhmann
4. The macro-micro problem in organization theory: Luhmann's autopoiesis as a way of handling recursivity
Tore Bakken and Tor Hernes
5. The emergence of autopoietic organisation
Gorm Harste
6. Observing organizations: an evaluation of Luhmann's organization theory
John Mingers
7. Organisational identity in Luhmann's theory of social systems
David Seidl
8. Polyphonic organisations
Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen
9. Management within the system
Dirk Baecker
10. Luhmann and management: a critique of the management theory in Organisation und Entscheidung
Ole Thyssen
11. The undecidability of decision
Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen
12. The emergence of open-source software projects: how to stabilize self-organizing processes in emergent systems
Michèle Momer
13. Standards for care and statutory flexibility
Holger Højlund and Anders La Cour

Citation preview

Ab trakt • Liber • Copenhagen Busin

School Pre

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AUTOPOIETIC ORGANIZATION THEORY Drawing on Niklas Luhmann's Social Systems Perspective

Tore Bakken and Tor Hecnes (Eds.)

AUTOPOIETIC ORGANIZATION THEORY Drawing on Niklas Luhmann's Social Systems Perspective

ABSTRAKT • LIBER • COPENHAGEN BUSINESS SCHOOL PRESS

C Cover design: Cover illustration: Design: Printed:

Abstrakt forlagAS 2003 Designbborarorier Liu.bova Sergeev Popova: Spatial Force Construction Bokstavlaboriatoret Aa1 AS e.dit. Oslo

Chapter 3 is a uanslation ofLuhmann's chapter Organisatiun in Willi Kupper und Gunther Ortmann (Hrsg) Mikropo/irik: Rlltiot1.1tlitilt, M11,ht und Spiek in Org,,niultum, Wesrdcurscher Verlag, Opladen 1988, s. 165-185. By permission ofWestdeutscher Verlag.

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(Nonvay) 82-7935-022-5 (Sweden) 47-07219-9 (rest of the wodd) 87-630-0103-9

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Preface

The idea for this book was conceived after a conference: organised by the Norwegian School of Management in Oslo in March 2001 on the theme ofNiklas Luhmann'5 autopoietic theory and organization theory. From that conference a special issue was prepared of Nordiske Organisllljonsstudier. Whereas the contributors to that issue were all Scandinavian, other colleagues, notably from Germany and Britain, have since joined us in the effort of producing this edited volume. We are most grateful to the contributors for helping us to produce what we think is a thought provoking, insightful and novel book. We are also grateful to colleagues at the Norwegian School of Management for engaging discussions over social systems theory and phenomena of organization.

Tore Bakken and Tor Hernes Oslo, December 2002

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Contents •

Preface s 1 Introduction: Niklas Luhmann's autopoietic theory and organization studies - a space of connections 9 Tor Hemes and Tore Bakken

2 Communications with decisions as medium and form - some notes on Niklas Luhmann's theory of organization

23

Jan Inge Jonhifl

3 Organization

31

Niklas Luhmann

4 The macro-micro problem in organization theory: Luhmann,s autopoi~is as a way of handling recursivity 53 Tore Bakken and Tor Hemes

5 The emergence of autopoietic organisation

7S

Gorm Harste

6 Observing organi7.ations: An evaluation of Luhmann's organi7.ation theory 103 John Mingers

6

7 Organisational identity in Luhmann's theory of social systems 123 David

Seidl

8 Polyphonic organisations

151

Niels Akerstr0m Andersen

9 Management within the system

183

Dirk Boecker

l O Luhmann and management: A critique of the management theory in Organisation und Entscheidung 213

Ole Thyssen l l The undecidability of decision

235

Niels Akerstr0m Andersen

l 2 The emergence of open-source software projects: How to stabilize self-organizing processes in emergent systems

2S9

Michele Niomer 13 Standards for care and statutory flexibility

272

Holger H0ilund and Anders Lo Cour

Author presentations

296

7

l

Introduction: Niklas Luhmann's autopoietic theory and organization studies - a space of connections Tor Hernes and Tore Bakken

This edited volume is an attempt co explore the potential that exists between on the one hand Niklas Luhmann's autopoictic theory as applied to social systems and on the other hand the field of organization theory. From combinations between these two fields emerges a multitude of theoretical insights and empirical discoveries, some of which are present in the volwne. Ir is hoped that the book will serve essentially two purposes. First, to be an illustration of how Luhmann's autopoieric theory may be applied to the study of organization. Luhmann's work, in all its richness, is complex and appears inaccessible to many students of organization. It may therefore discourage many students from applying his insights. We think that one may benefit from his insights without necessarily going into his work in depth, and that connections between his work and organiurion theory presented. herein illustrate ways of applying his work. Second, the works presented in the book aim ro serve as stimuli for further research. Emerging phenomena related to organization ask that we experiment with different perspectives of time and space than what has been done in mainstream organization theory. Works that have emerged in European sociology over the last three decades, such as for example represented by Latour) Foucault, Elias, Bourdieu and Giddens, have shown that different conccptualiutions of organi7.ation can provide new useful insights. Luhmann·s autopoietic theory is an exciting addition to this line of works, which has yet to be explored systematically in relation to organiution theory (Hernes and Bakken 2003). The present volume is offered as one of the early steps in exploring the potential between Luhmann's autopoicsis and organiution theory. The various chapters suggest in particular how organization and organiution-related processes can be undemood through different lenses from what is done in most of existing organization theory. We attempt this project because we believe that Luhmann's autopoiesis represents a way of recasting our under-

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TOR HERNES AND TORE BAKKEN

standing of organization which raises some radical questions about our sensemaking of organization. The multitude in terms of form and substance, which the contributions in this volume reflect, derives from both the multifaceted origins and application of Luhmann's autopoiesis and to the now very broad diversity in organiution theory.

Briefly on Luhmann's autopoietic framework The very basis ofLuhmann's systems theory is that systems operate as real systems in the real world (1988:294). The assumption is not at all unfamiliar to students of organization, as schools of thought applied ro organization as diverse as Weber, Parsons, Foucault and Latour explore systemic traits in society. Organization theorists, whether they come from functionalist or interpretive schools of sociology, acknowledge the existence of systems albeit in different ways. Luhmann's radicalism lies in two assumptions about systems. First, systems are real, hence systems theory is not a mere analytical means of analysing the social world. Systems belong to the real world, becawe without them, the social world disintegrates, as it is no longer possible to distinguish what is from what is not, from what is the system and what is the environment. In other words, systems exist. Second, systems are autopoietic, i.e. self referencing. In order to exist over time they need to be able to re-produce themselves; meaning must reproduce meaning, just as actions must reproduce actions. Their re-production takes place through their connecting operations over time, which enables them to interaa with their own processes of creating meaning. "Everything that is used as a unit by the system is produced by the system itself. This applies to elements, processes, boundaries, and other structures, and last but not least, to the unity of the system itself. Autopoietic systems, then, are sovereign with respect to the constitution of identities and differences." (Luhmann 1990:3}. Whereas the existence of systems constitutes in itself an exciting basis for analysis, what makes Luhmann's treatment of systems particularly challenging, is his insistence that we make the idea of self-referencing systems compelling for analysis. Because we assume that there are systems, argues Luhmann (1995: 12), we impose on ourselves the responsibility for testing our statements about them against reality. It is this responsibility, as he sees it, that takes him almost relentlessly through a number of major questions related to the emergence, the making. the evolution and the analysis of systems. It is owing to his relentless search that a number of questions are raised that provide new insights into organiution snidies. His book Social systems written in 1984 and trans10

NIKLAS LUHMANN'S AUTOPOIETIC THEORY AND ORGANIZATION STUDIES

lated from German into English in 1995 (Luhmann 1995) is a testimony co how the exploration of systems may open up for a number of imponant questions that eventually may hdp us to recast some of the fundamentals of how we relate to the concept of organi:zation. We will briefly mention some of the most important questions that Luhmann's autopoiesis raises. First, it raises the question of the tkfinititm ofthe systems operations. While the term self-organi7.a.tion as it is understood in orgaoiution theory refers to structural autonomy, the term autopoiesis goes a bit further and emphasizes the types of operations that can be seen as being essentially internal to the system. The idea is compatible with the idea of recursivity: an autonomous or operationally closed system reproduces its own operations by the network of its own operations. This has ronsequences for organization theory, in the sense that whereas organizations have environments, connections to the environments are internal to the system, not outside it. Therefore ~ come, not from the environment, but from variations inside the system (Morgan 1986). Such an assumption not only reject.s ideas of tight coupling between organization and environment. It also draws our attention to the inner workings of the system, and in panicular how systems emerge and

evolve. Second, it raises the question of observation and distinction. The term is based on Spencer-Brown's (1969) Laws ofForm and is based on the idea that you cannot ob.serve anything without drawing a distinction. However, we perceive only the inside of the distinction, and not the outside. Observing the outside is labeled "second order observation", which takes place as we move from drawing a distinction to being an observer. In relation to organizations, for aample, Luhmann sees decisions as observations rather than actions. On this basis Luhmann can in Organisation und Entscheulung (2000: 132) say that "decisions are observations". Consisting primarily of communications, systems are operationally closed, in the sense that they can communicate about themselves and the external environment. They can be observed only from the inside (and this includes the observers of the system) and to the extent that they observe themselves from the outside, the observation takes place as iffrom the inside. Hence, to make sense of systems from the outside, we can only observe the operations performed by the system, such as in the case of organi~ zations we may choose to select the operations of decision and comunications about the decisions (Luhmann 2000). The question raises obvious points about methodology and the vantage point of the organizational researcher in it. The idea of distinction also opens up for questions; such as, what distinguishes one system from another, and under what conditions do distinctions take place. Questions of distinction offer scope for understanding aspects of

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TOR HERNES AND TORE BAKKEN

organizational identity, organizarional decision making and organizational communication. Third, it raises the question of complait.,. Social systems evolve through time due to their capacity to transform unorganized complexity into organized complexity while building the external complexity into their internal operations. A system,s capacity to internalize complexity cannot be unlimited, and beyond a certain levd of complexity, autopoiesis is not possible. A subject of study then becomes the transition of one level of complexity to another, and how new systems are formed in response to increased complexity. In rdation to organizations, the point is highly relevant, notably in cdation to understanding how organizations differentiate internally to cope with simultaneously competing institutional pressures from their environments. Fourth, it raises the question of continuity and change. According to the principle of autopoiesis, systems uphold themselves through inter-action with their own states. Without reproduction a system breaks down. On the other hand, if there is only reproduction ofexisting features of the system, the system cannot change and will remain e~tially identical over time. This problem is solved by conceptualising the rdationship between process and structure. Process, consisting of successive events over time, offers occasions for ceasing or continuing (Luhmann 1995:347), which impact on the structure of the system. On the other hand, structure presupposes self-maintenance and meaning. Therefore only events that connect to the meaning of the system will make sense in rdation to structural change. The discussion of continuity and change in relation to the relationship between prOCCM and structure offers a framework that greatly benefits the study of organizational change. The impaa of Luhmann's work on organization studies appears as yet modest compared to other sociological theories that have appeared in the past decades, such as those developed by Habermas, Foucault, Bourdieu and Latour. Some writings have appeared in past years that have been inspired by Luhmann' s work and have been directed towards selected phenomena works. However, its broader implications for studying organizations have not to our knowledge been subjected to systematic analysis. So far, organization write.rs have suggested that autopoietic theory has considerable potential, but they have not pursued the issue in depth. Morgan (1986) (referring to Maturana and Varda) suggests that the idea of self-reference has considerable potential for understanding organizations from a flux perspective. Hatch (1997:373) suggests that "(autopoiesis) has powerful implications not only for our understanding of systems, but our rdationship to ourselves, our organizations. and our theorizing efforts.,, Morgan and Hatch suggest that autopoiesis merits further devdopment in organization theory. However, apart from select applica-

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NIKLAS LUHMANN'S AUTOPOIETIC THEORY AND ORGANIZATION STUDIES

cions of Luhmann's autopoiesis to organizational phenomena and some general suggestions about its applicability, we are unable to locate works that represent a more eclectic collection of connections co be made between the two fields. We feel that time is now ripe for such an undertaking.

Luhmann's diversiiy The student engaged with Luhmann's work immediately recognizes that (s)he faces a work of great richness and diversity. Luhmann's autopoiesis, although it is a highly coherent and terminologically tight framework of analysis, embodies a number of dimensions. We could, in order to describe the dimensions, consider his work to have an "upstream" end and a "downstream'· end. The upstream end represents the stream of thoughts that influenced Luhmann over hls academic life. According co Rasmussen (2000) there are three streams in panicular that influenced and in various ways contribute to his autopoiccic systems theory. The systems thto,y influence stems from his time spent studying under Talcott Parsons at Harvard. Several of the terms used by Luhmann come from the work by Parsons. On the other hand, the influence of Parsons on his work also enabled his aitical stance towards it. According to Luhmann, his autopoietic perspective is fundamentally different from both Weber and Parsons. Weber's conception of the system, according to Luhmann, is that of a pregiven, whereas Parsons' conception is that of an analytical construct. Autopoicsis, however, supersedes the former two by showing how a system binds itself together and reproduces itself by the same binding (Luhmann 1995:175). A system viewed as an autopoietic system, for example, docs not exist in an equilibrium rdationship with its environment, but it exists through its ability to continue its operations. A second stream of influenc.e derives from biology, with the work of Chilean biologists Humbeno Maturana and Francisco Varda (Maturana and Varela 1980; Varela, Macurana and Uribe 1974), whose point of departure was the formulation of biologic.al theory as an alternative to Darwinian ecology theory. A key element of autopoiesis was that systems are not subject to environmental selection in a linear process of selection, as prescribed by classic biology models derived from Darwinism. Systems, argue Maturana and Varela, interact with themselves. Rather, systems interact recursively in the same network of reactions that produced them (Varela, Maturana and Uribe 1974:188). This means that systems are not open to their environments, as perceived in tradi... tional systems theory, but on the contrary, they are dosed, and this is what enables them to interact with themselves. In processes of c.om.munication, for

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TOR HERNES AND TORE BAKKEN

example, a receiver does not receive pare.els of information. Instead the communication takes place as he interacts with his own cognitive framework. This Leads co what is seen as maybe the most central element in Luhmann~s autopoiesis, namdy that of sdf-refercnce. It is through self-referencing that systems are able to uphold themsdves over time. The effects of such thinking are farreaching in that the assumption of stable entities is replaced with that of recursivity. Moreover dichotomies are replaced. with evolution. While Marurana and Varela expreued skepticism as to whether autopoiesis is applicable co social systems, it is to social systems that Luhmann worked for many years to apply autopoiesis. This work was done under the influence of works such as those of von Foerster (1991, 1993) on the application of recursivity in social

research. A third stream that stimulated Luhmann's autopoietic theory comes from

philosophy, and notably the influence of Husserl's phenomenology. The "reality,. in Luhmann's autopoiesis is not that of the subject and its representations, but the emerging product of systems operations. The subject is not part of the operations of the system, but forms an external environment to the system. Thus, Luhmann approaches social life by "braclc:eting" consciousness from manifestations of consciousness as the phenomenon under study is assumed to be found in the intentions of the subjects and not in their consciousneM. In the case of organization, for example, Luhmann takes decisions to represent intentions. Whereas the preference of operations over representations shows up part of the philosophical lineage of Husserl in Luhmann's work (Baecker 1999). other philosophical works present in his writings include Spencer-Brown's (1969) mathematical treatmentoflawsofform and Whitehead's (1929) philosophical work on process and reality. Consistently with these philosophical influences, Luhmann construes cognitive systems as distinction processing systems, which enables him to offer an alternative to Hegel's dialectics. .According to Luhmann, neither ontological security, nor the security of intersubjectivity can be the basis for our knowledge in modem societies. Consequently, our knowledge has to be de-ontoligiud. Another consequence is that systems become unpred.iaable historical machines (von Foerster) with an unforeseen future. According to Luhmann, for organiutions this means that one should abandon rhe idea of organizations as goal-attaining (coming to an end) based on normative-rational models, and instead work from empirical d~iptions. If one chooses the latter, one will find that organizations are unpredictable, historical systems that always operate in a present time, which it has brought forward itself These three streams outline some major influences that went into Luhmann· s work. If we look at the "downstream" side of his work, his interest was 14

NIKLAS LUHMAN N'S AUTOPOIETIC THEORY AND ORGANIZATION STUDIES

directed at a wide variety of phenomena in social life, including nine autopoietic subsystems of society: family, religion, law, politlc.s, economy, science, education, art and mass media. Niels Akerstrem Andersen's chapter on "polyphonic organizations"' in this bQOk seIVes as an illustration of how different societal systems, such as law, economic.s, politics and aesthetics come together at the level of the orga.niution. What Luhmann in a radical way wished to distance himself from is an interpretation of society with a center or apex meant to represent the whole; that is, a view where one subsystem is able to penetrate all the other subsystems in a kind of repmmtlltio identitatis. According to Luhmann, the subsystems are equal in relation to each other; none of them can demand to be the center of society, although Luhmann of course is aware of the fact that certain sul»-ystems can have a dynamic effect on the development of society. The point is, however, that there can be no totalizing system that constitutes more than the sum of each sub-system. When Luhmann as early as in his first contribution to organization theory, in Funktionm und FoJgm fomu,ln, Org11nisation from 1964, maintained that the individual cannot be a part of the system (orga.niution), but rather has to be interpreted as being a part of its environment, this must be understood in such a context. For instance, neurophysiological activity is nece.ssary for all kinds of consciousness, and individual consciousness is necessary for society; but from this, one cannot draw the conclusion that, for instance, society can be reduced to individuals as methodological individualists do (Elster 1989). Instead, Lu!unann focuses his descriptions on the fact that both consciousness and society are emergent orders with their own operation modus.

Diversity in organization theory Organization theory is a relatively young branch of social science. Being a theoretical locus for the main social sciences such as economy, political science, sociology, psychology and anthropology, it has followed. their theoretical evolution of diversification over the past decades. What was once a largely Parsonian project of imposing structure and order to create neatly analyzable entities has developed into a fidd where almost no theoretical stone is left unturned.. The diversification has been radical, to the extent that orga.niution theory has taken on qualities of cacophony, where approaches differ normatively, analytically, theoretically and epistemologically (Reed 1996:45). Burrell and Morgan (I 979) suggested more than 20 years ago that organization theory may be grouped under four major paradigms, each of which represent distinct lineages from philosophy and social science. The four paradigms identified by Burrdl 15

TOR HERNES AND TORE BAKKEN

and Morgan are as follows: the functionalist paradigm, the interpretive paradigm, the radical hwnanist paradigm and the radical structuralist paradigm. These paradigms were (and are) present in organization theory, and they span four dimensions in important debates, notably related to ontology, epistemology, hwnan nature and methodology. Some paradigms, such as functionalist theory, suggested by Burrdl and Morgan, were fully present in organization theory at the time of the appearance of their book. Others, however, were in their relatively early stages of devdopment, such as radical theory, and have developed considerably in scope and substance. Since the appearance of their book, several streams have been added, especially to the radical theory sueams, largely fuelled by works by French sociologists Foucault, Latour and Bourdieu. On the functionalist side works have also been added, notably in organizational ecology and in new institutionalism. As a result, there are per today not only a large number of diverse streams of thought present in organization theory, but each individual stream represents daborate conceptual developments. Clegg, Hardy and Nord's (1996) book Handbook oforganir4tion studie, demonstrates well the considerable theoretical development that has taken place in the field, something that is also demonstrated by Oegg' s (2002) collected volumes of papers on organization, spanning more than three quarters of a century of research. A way of coming to grips with the broad diversity of thoughts in organization studies is to son it through the lens of history. At the level of ontology, i.e. what we see as the nature of organization, there has been an evolution from focusing on its physical, instrumental aspects through the influence of social forces co the imponance of cognitive processes. Early perceptions of organiution stem from the introduction of indusuial capitalism in the West and concerns were primarily directed towards the arrangement of physical space (Hemes 2002) which, through differentiation and integration, could facilitate large scale production. Later developments.. largely associated with the Hawthorne experiments, lent focus to social forces, or the social space created in and around organization. More recent studies from the 1970s onwards have focused on the cognitive aspects of organization, as aspects such as learning, rationality and institutional forces have been brought into focw. The historical evolution of the focus of study has ac.companied other developments. It has in particular accompanied alternative ways of studying organization. Hernes and Bakken {2003) suggest that a three-pronged categorization is possible as a way of categomation. suggesting that the "epistemological foundations" of organization studies may be divided into equilibrium based, process-based and recursivity-based theories. Early works were influenced by the Parsons· frameworks of analysis, and attempted to analyse organization 16

NIKLAS LUHMANN'S AUTOPOIETIC THEORY AND ORGANIZATION STUDIES

from stable constructs .representing equilibrium conditions. To this assumption belongs constructs such as structure and norms. However, the past three decades or so have witnessed a shift towards process-based assumptions, placing the subject and scnscmaking closer to the centre of analysis. This development includes literature on sensemaking and critical approaches, notably in post modernist works. The third, recursivity-based, devdopment draws upon developments, partiwlarly in European sociology, and focuses on how processes emerge, evolve and persist in time-space. The latter development builds in various ways upon the idea of duality between, for example. actions and structure, whereby they interact recursively with one another. Fo.r a similar analysis directed at organization studies, see Reed (1997). The last two paragraphs suggest that the.re are at least two sets of developments that have taken place over time. These two sets are not, of cow-se, altogether unconnected from one another, but they have accompanied one another, partly forced upon one another, as a third set of developments has taken place; the empirical proliferation of organizational forms. A nwnber of technological and social tranformations challenge us to consider forms that have time-space characteristics that mainstream organization research has not been confronted with, and is poorly equipped to deal with. Take, for example, open source movements, such as LINUX (discussed by Michele Marner in this book), which are manifestly organizations in the sense that they channel activity towards some end. However, LINUX does not have employees, budgets or a formal structure. Its product is free, yet it does pose a challenge to one of the world's largest commercial firms, Microsoft Inc. The question poses itself whether it is a distinct "organization" with its own norms and identity, or is simply cur arbiuarily out of a larger cloth of IT technologists. Peculiar cases such as this force questions about the very location and nature of organization, not only about where its boundaries are drawn, but what actually may be said to exist within its boundaries, not to mention the nature of the boundaries themselves. Examples such as this suggest that not only are we in need of diverse analytical frameworks, but that we also are wdl advised to apply frameworks in flexible and mindful ways. When the location and the nature of the organization can no longer be treated as givens, we run the risk of making our accounts from the fidd as a prisoner, either of the empirical focus or of the analytical framework used. Imprisoning of accounts bereaves them of the revealing stories they could provide us with. A better approach, we suggest, is to let accounts oscillate between different empirical foci and frameworks and to let them take different shapes. In other wo.rds, we see reflexivity as an clement in furthering understanding in a field with few givens. Rdlexivity presupposes sizeable spaces of 17

TOR HERNES AND TORE BAKKEN

connections. The space between Luhmann's autopoietic theory and organization theory is one such sizeable space.

Space of connections in

this book

In summary, between the field of Luhmann' s autopoietic theory, on the one hand, and the fidd of organization thc:ory on the other hand, there is space with a wealth of possible connections. Connections may vary, not just in substance. but also in form and in intensity, as the chapters show. However, we will leave the reader to navigate in this spac:e of connections and make her (his) own observations. Applying Luhmann's ideas to the multifarious world of organizations and organization theory is a mental journey with many possible routes; but, we fear, very few shortcuts. Following the brief descriptions below, we invite the reader to sec out on the journey, from which we hope you will return with new insights, some of which can take organization theory yet another step funher. Now, to the chapters of the book.

Jan Inge Jonhill (chapter 2) offers what is basically a commentary on how Luhmann develops his general systems theory into the field of organization theory. Or more specifically, the connection between society and organizations. Jonhill shows how Luhmann defines the form of organization through four fundamental distinctions, membership, program, places of staff and decisions, where the last criterion determines the previous ones. Thus, Jonhlll gives an introduction to basic notions that Luhmann uses in his studies of both society and organizations. Niklas Luhmann's article "Organization" (chapter 3) is for the first time being presented in English. It was written in 1988 and it is an important contribution, because in this anide Luhmann presents his first attempt at a comprehensive theory of organizations based on the concept of autopoiesis. The article can be interpreted in many ways. First of all, it argues for a change in the way of handling rationality. Goal rationality has to be replaced by system rationality, which is more adequate when it comes to srudying organizations. In this way, the anide can be read as a contribution to a revised interpretation of rationality. This does not mean that Luhmann is denying the pcwibility of rationality, but he is looking for a more complex definition. Second, the chapter also shows how systems theory can be used not only to study macro phenomena, bur also micro phenomena in organizations, especially using the notion of "paruit" borrowed from Michel Serres.

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NIKlAS lUHMANN'S AUTOPOIETIC THEORY AND ORGANIZATION STUDIES

Tore Bakken and Tor Heroes (chapter 4) discuss how notions related to the temporality of social systems in Luhmann' s autopoiesis may apply to the notion of organttational recursivity. Their basic argument is that organi7.ation theory has partly been suspended between cwo models for theorizing. On the one hand, we find studies that abstract organi7.ational processes to the macro Level of structure and norms. On the other hand, we find studies that remain at the micro level of actions and senscmaking and where organttarion is substituted by the actions of individuals. These cwo levels are conceptually incompatible with one another and cannot readily be oombined, except by a recursive approach such as that offered by Luhmann's autopoietic framework. Bakken and Hernes' chapter is an attempt at moving some notions ofLuhrnann's autopoiesis into the theoretical debate in organization theory.

Gorm Hante (chapter 5) applies the oonc.ept of self-reference to the study of one of the documented early attempts at organization in modern history, namely the introduction of public administration in l 7ch and 18 1h century France. Harste uses the case to argue that public organization emerged as an essentially self-observing and self-correcting system. Here the use of Luhmann' s idea of distinction becomes important, as systems are seen as developing through the formation of codes; codes that were themselves codified through historically emergent processes, where the formation of an administrative system thus emerges as a distinction from legal and theologic:a.l systems.

John Mingers (chapter 6) offers a critical view of Luhmann's autopoietic framework in a discussion of some of its c.entral notions. The chapter responds to concerns about the application of Luhmann' s autopoesis to organizations and raises questions about notions such as self-reference, decisions and boundaries. Notwithstanding the radical character of the framework, which alerts us to a number of important insights, Mingers points out that the idea of autopoiesis is not easily applied in organizational research. Further, he argues that the limitation of systems to networks of communications tends to Limit the analysis of system operations to the exclusion of individual actions. Mingers explores the framework's connectivity to other epistemological foundations of organizational research, and finds that it has compatibilities with Giddens' structuration theory.

David Seidl (chapter 7) applies Luhmann's autopoiesis to a prominent and timely topic in organh:ation theory, which is that of organizational identity. His discussion centres on three pertinent questions in relation to organiza~ tional identity. First, what may be considered the unity of the organization? In other words, what are the autopoietic operations that constitute the organization in time and spac.e. Second, what distinguishes one organization from lQ

TOil HERNES AND TORE BAKKEN

another? Can we, fur example, find distinction in terms of the differentiating and integrating operations of the organization? The question is connected to Luhmann's tenet that systems evolve through integrating and differentiating operations. Third, how does an organi7.ation perceive itself? This last question I is connected to the idea of observation in Luhmann s autopoietic framework, whereby we cannot observe the identity of an organization, but rather how it communicates about its identity. Seid.l's chapter recasts central questions about organizational identity, not just about the nature of identity, but also how we approach identity analytically. Nids Akersterm Andersen (chapter 8) develops the idea of "polyphonic orga~ nizations" as a means of understanding how an organization may simultaneously respond to diverse systems in its external environment. It addresses the tendency for organizations in society to "explode" beyond their boundaries and take on functions that they may not originally have been intended to take on. The question of responding to multiple sources has been raised most nota~ bly by writers in new institutionalism, In this chapter, Akerstrem Andersen offers a ~temic way of analyzing the phenomenon, suggesting polyphonic that organizations develop multiple systems which respond to external functional systems. such as law, economics, politics and aesthetics. The differentiation of organiz.ations into sub-systems that address systems in the external environment has consequences for a number of aspects of organization, including reflexivity, strategy, communication and codifications.

Dirk Baecker (chapter 9) suggests an approach to management within a sociological and systems theory of organization, which derives from SpencerBrown,s logic of form. Using "re-enuy• as a key construct, he points out that leadership extends beyond the management of an organization. It gives the organization the ability to cope as a matter of routine with all kinds of uncertainty, but also re-introduces this dement of uncenainty into the organization. It also makes it the object of decisions that can be addressed in terms of human resources and structure. Ole Thyssen (chapter 10) takes a critical stance regarding Luhmann's work as he looks at it through the lens of management studies. Luhmann gave precedence to the system of c.ommunication over the individual actor, which in his framework is seen as environment for the system rather than as part of it. This tenet has earned him severe criticism, and Thyssen's chapter explores how his autopoietic framework accounts for management in organizations. Thyssen is

20

NIKLAS LUHMANN'S AUTOPOIETIC THEORY AND ORGANIZATION STUDIES

critical to Luhmann·s concept of constructing social systems on the basis of only one mode of operation, that is, communication, because this prevents us from understanding the very core of management and leadership brought forth by individuals. Niels .Akenthlm Andersen (chapter 11) explores the very nature of decisions. Luhmann' s notion of autopoiesis is based on the idea of systems as essentially systems of communication and decision making. Akerstmm Andersen bases himsdf partly upon this work in bringing decision making centre stage as the main focus of organizing processes. Drawing on works by Spencer~Brown and von Foerster, Akerstrem Andersen derives three paradoxical statements about decisions. The use of irony and humour in Luhmann' s work comes out in this analysis, where he shows how paradoxes of decisions are solved through what .Akerstr0m Andersen refers to as "deparadoxification,,; a form of strategy for ignoring the paradox in order for communication to continue unchallenged.

Michele Momer (chapter 12) applies the idea of connectivity of communications· in analysing a veiy special kind of organization> namely communities referred to as "Open-source software projects•, in this case LINUX. Such communities conform poorly to the concept of organi7.ation, as they have no membership, there are no economic rewards and there is no formal structure that binds activity in time and space. Momer asks what enables stabilization of such communities and concentrates on the communication and systemic memory, which hdps explain how such communities are able co exist over time and space. Luhmann's work comes out in this chapter as the conceptualization of the connecting operations of communication that enable autopoicsis.

Holger Hejlund and Anders LaCour (chapter 13), in their paper on public reform in organizations. show how attempts at reducing complexity at one level in a social care organization led inadvertently to an increase in complexity at another level. The example suggests that, contrary to beliefs that complexity can be done away with through rationalization, it does not go away, but presents itself at another level of organi7.ation. The perspective taken is "Luhmannian" in that organization is seen as a way of internalising complexity in the external environment. Empirically, the case represents a study of unintended consequences of attempts at public reform.

21

TOR HERNES AND TORE BAKKEN

References Burrell, Gibson and Gareth Morgan ( 1979) SocwkJgica/ paradigms anJ organizational a,uzlym. Aldershot: Gower. Clegg, Stewart R, Cynthia Hardy and Walter R Nord (1996) (eds.) Handbook of

organization studies. London: Sage. Clegg, Stewart (2002) Central cu"ents in orgamzati(Jn studies. London: Sage. Elster, Jon (1989) Nuts and bolts for the soda/ sciences. Cambridge: c.ambridge University Press. Hatch, Mary Jo (1997) Organization theory- nu,tlern, symbolic and postmoaem perspmives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hemes, Tor (2002) Organiution as evolution of space, in B. Czarniawska and

G. Sevon (eds.) N(Jrthnn lights organization theory. Oslo: Abstrakc, Liber, Copenhagen Business School Press Hemes, Tor and Tore Bakken (2003) Implications of self-reference: Niklas Luhmann's autopoiesis and organization theory. OrpnizaJU>n Stutlies, forthcoming, Luhmann, Niklas (1964) Funlrtionm und Fo/gmfor,na/er Organis11tion. Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt. Luhmann, Niklas (1971) Politische Planung. Opladen: Wescdeutscher Verlag. Luhmann, Niklas (1990) Essays on st!f-,eftrmct. New York: Columbia Univcrsity

Press. Luhmann, Niklas (1988) Neuerc Entwicldungen in der Systemtheorie. Merkur 42.

294-300. Luhmann, Niklas (1995) Soda/ systems. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Luhmann, Niklas (1995) Interview with professor Niklas Luhmann (by Ole Thysscn) Cybemdics & Human Knowing vol 3, no. 2. 23~27. Luhmann, Niklas (2000) D,,ganisation und Entschridung. Opladen: Wescdeutscher Verlag. Marurana, Humberto and Francisco Varela (1980} Autoptnesis and cognition. Dordrccht. Reidel. Morgan, Gareth ( 1986) I,mzges oforganization. London: Sage. Rasmussen, Jens (2000) lntroduktion cil N. Luhmann Sociale sysrcmer: Grundrids ti/ en a/men teori. K.iJbenhavn: Hans Reitzel Reed, Michael (1997) In of duality and dualism: Rethinking agency and structure in organizational analysis. Orga11iution Studies 18( l): 21-42. Spencer-Brown, George (1969) Laws of.form. London: George Allen and Unwin. Varela. Francisco. Humberto Maturana and Ricardo Uribe (1974) Autopoiesis. The organiucion of living systems, its characterization and a model. BioSystems 5, 4. 187-196.

pnwe

22

2

Communications with decisions as medium and form - some notes on Niklas Luhmann's theory of organization Jan Inge Jonhill

From a sociological viewpoint, widespread use of organized communications and actions is a distinctive feature of modem society. The distinctiveness of organised communications implies that most of w are included in several organizations, while being excluded from aJl other organizations to which we do not belong, i.e. in &ct most organiutions. In other words, for all persons there is a distinction between inclusion and exclusion as regards the organizations of society. On the other hand, if we define society as a communicative system, we are included in it for as long as we are alive. To the sociological theory of organization since Max Weber it is evident that the study of organization includes not solely the organization itself, its internal problems and issues between organizations, but also the social and societal context in which every organization operates, and which it must relate to as its environment. When trying to deal with this theme, on the one hand, in terms of society using organizations and being dependent on organiutions, and on the other hand, in terms of innwnerabJe interactions between persons that presupposes organizations to be fulfilled, one realizes that this contextualization cannot be a trivial thing. By means of adapted concepts, it may lead ro fruitful problematizatio~ for theoretical as well as for empirically oriented organizational research. The German sociologist Niklas Luhmann {1927-1998) is one of those who carried on this tradition of thought from, among others, Max Weber, in his further devdopment of the theory to an organiution theory of his own. Luhmann does this by using his sociological systems theory as a theoretical approach and inuoducing methods developed by himsel£ In Luhmann's systems theory, social systems are communicative systems, which relate themselves to their mvironments. Through the concept of ""topoiesis, it is emphasized that

23

JAN INGE JONHILL

such systems permanently construct and reproduce both their structure and their elements. C.Ommunicacive systems operate as closed systems, however cognitively open and strueturally coupled to each other they are. Thus systems 1 theory focuses on problems oflimits , but also on, for example, the capacity or lack of capacity for learning. Having published more than 70 books and 400 anides, Luhmann is unsurpassed in modern sociology. His works include general sociological theory as well as innumerable special areas of research. Despite the fact that Luhmann reasonably should be counted among the most imponant social scientists of the 20th century, most of his works are not yet translated. That is one reason for his significance and reputation internationally not being on a level with his contribution. The number of translations into English is however increasing, and the same goes for translations to other languages. Luhmann' s destiny could at this point be compared to Max Weber's. The works of Weber first attained their actual central placing in the social sciences in Europe included.ing Germany, via American translations and introductions (by Talcott Parsons and others). Luhmann's contributions on organization theory began with his doctoral thesis Funktio~n und Folgm formllkr Organisation ('Function and effectiveness of formal organization•) published in 1964. Later, when he passed to general sociology and the theory of society as his main themes, he emphasized the importance of organizations. However, organizations are now more explicitly connected to their societal context, meaning above all that they are related to the differentiation of society. From the end of the 1980s and onwards, Luhmann wrote extensive works on society's economy, science, systems of law, an, religion and politics, and in addition a magnum opus on the general theory of 1 society, Die G~seJ/schaft tier Gese/Jschaft {"Socicty s society", Luhmann 1997). And in 2000 his most important work on organization theory Organisation und Entschdtlungwas published posthumously ("Organization and Decision·; Luhmann 2000). 2 In chis short introduction, I will ny to shed light on a few aspects ofLuhmann's complex organization theory. The development of organizational research has led to a diversification of the research field. In an article written at the end of the 1970s, also under the title Organisation und Entschddung r"'Organization and Decision»; Luhmann 1 As concerns the organization~ system and it:!'! environment. see Karl E. Weick on "'boundary

problems" (Weick 1969). 2 As is shown below, Luhmann used the title '"Organization and Decision,. already in a text first published in 1978. By char is also implied that Luhmann lw not borrowed and turned around the ride ofJames G. March's book D«isio,ar tmd. Orgttniulions, first published in 1988. Besides and to go into derails, Luhmann does not use the plural form in his tide, by that giving accent to his focus on the conceptual. But otherwise Luhmann gives several references ro March.

24

COMMUNICATIONS WITH DECISIONS AS MEDIUM AND FORM

1981) Luhmann summed up developments during the 20th. century in three main points: 1. Organization theory and theory of society are separated. The environment of organizations, or the relations concerning societal relevance, becomes to organization theory something "'outside", something that must not be considered. 2. Economic organization theory and sociological organization theory have developed separately, having different main problems in focus. 3. In relation to organizational sociology, economic organization theory and research have shown a greater orientation towards actual problems. This can be observed particularly in the interest of the last-mentioned of the connections between organization and decision. Luhmann shows this with reference to, among others, the works of Herbert Simon. 3

Luhmann points out that the lack of interest in questions of societal relations, as well as the split of organi7.ation theory, is unsatisfying. This self-critical view on the state of theory forms, in sh.on, the point of departure of Luhmann's sociological theory of organization and decision. In Luhmann's perspective, the concept of organi7.ation includes firms as well as organizations ronnected to politics, as well as the system of law, etc., that are usually referred to as institutions and administration (or in the German and Scandinavian languages "Verwaltungen" and "farvaltningar" respectively). Besides, voluntary organizations (associations) must be assigned under the roncept of organization. Thus, the firm. the institution and the voluntary organization are seen as variants of the sorilll form of org1tnwitio11. Although Weber used another and somewhat unclear terminology; as well to himself, these variants belong to the same type of social relation. Weber wed the term "'Verband" as a more general term to designate definite types of relatively closed relations, distinguished by I) rules for access to the organization, 2) specific goals ("Zwecken), and 3) what he called the administrative staff (Weber 1968). In similar terms as Weber, Luhmann defines the form of organization through four fundamental distinctions: 1) Membership; one may always, and empirically, decide if a person belongs to or does not belong to a definite organization, 2) Program; organizations always have definite delimited goals, "conderuing" the communication through the conditioning of a person's behaviour and acting on the basis of roles, 3) Places and staff; to realize their programs,

3 For worlu offering wcfu1 problcmatizarion, see March &: Olsen t 979 and Brunsson 198 5 respectively.

25

JAN INGE JONHILL

organizations have efficacious persons at specified positions, 4) Decisions; the function of the organization is to make and implement decisions. The fourth and last-mentioned criterion decides, in fact. all those previous to it. I will return to Luhmann's radical concept of decision below. But first I will discuss briefly the fundamental question regarding how to define the concept of organization. As with several other fundamental concepts in the social sciences, there is disagreement here. The fact that large parts of organizational research today are divided into, on the one hand the study of the firm as organization, and on the other hand the study of institutions, is primarily a condition of a tradition-burdened disciplinary division between business economics organization research and the sociological and the political sciences' research on public institutions. In addition there are the ·pure" empirical research traditions that contribute to making this division permanent. From a sociological perspective, obseivations show that as one may justify a division between the firm and the institution, one may as well divide on the one hand, firms of different types according to size, branch, structure of ownership, etc. On the other band, one may divide institutions according to function, financial sources, etc., e.g. in typical public administration, military and police adminisuation, research institutions, hospitals:, administration regulated through social legislation, in tax financed and fee financed administration. And if we add the attribute "culture", we get an additional multiplier to the number of types of organized communication. The same is true, moreover, as concerns for example, the theory of society. We may observe differences between the "Swedish society" and the "Norwegian society" or the "British society''. But as related to for example the "American society" these differences are maybe not very important. Or one may talk about, for example, the typical Scandinavian society (related to the province in the very south ofSweden) against the typical Stockholmian society. Using such a concept of society one may as well talk about different wdl-known streets in New York in terms of different societies. From the perspective of systems theory this is not fruitful. It is obvious that the issue here is how co construct and lay out the concepts, and more precisely an issue of the rdationship between generalization and specification. As concerns society, Luhmann has thoroughly argued that modem society is one and only one, and that it is only meaningful to talk about one world society, which in its turn is differentiated according to different conditions, to the system of politics (at least up to now) according to nation states, to the system of economy, according to branch, sector etc., to the system of science, according to academic discipline, etc.

26

COMMUNICATIONS WITH DECISIONS AS MEDIUM AND FORM

The fact that economy, politics. science, as well as different types of organizations, concern incomparable or heterogeneous rdations is obvious. But to general theory it is here an issue of the principle of functional analysis, namely to compare the dissimilar with respect to comparable forms Gonhill 1997). For organizations one finds from chis perspective a number of empirical designations justifying a general concept for those social forms of organizing fulfilling the above mentioned criteria. Such a concept should on the other hand not include all kinds of orderly activity. .Already Weber makes a clear distinction between social rdation and organi7.a.rion. With this definition, e.g. the family may not be viewed as an organization. As a cogently defined social form, the organization is not at all a comprehensive concept synonymous with order, comprised of e.g. machines, organisms, brains or cultures (cf. Morgan 1986). Etymologically the word organization is connected to "organism". The same goes for the often used term corporation, which refers to "corpus" (Latin) i.e. body. Karl Marx (in Capital, vol. 1, chapt. 11) used the term corporation to designate work organization in a rudimentary sense. Chester Barnard used the wider concept "co-operative systems" (Barnard 1938). However, in a general sense the semantics, i.e. how a concept is and could be attributed a cenain signification in a definite tradition of thought, is always more relevant than the

etymology. With the criterion of dedsum, the function of organizations is to make and implement decisions. Luhmann relates these to "classic.s" of the theory of organization and of management, such as Chester Barnard, Herbert Simon and James March. (See, for example, Barnard 1938, March and Simon 1958; March 1988.) On this basis, he develops a radically new- organization theory, taking as its point of departure his systems theoiy approach, where the concept of decision takes on a different dimension in the context of the organization and its environment, as compared to the former theory of decision. What is a decision? The answer is a paradox, maintains Luhmann (Luhmann 2000). First of all decision making is a form of communication limiting conri,,gmcy. To be precise, decisions are made in what could be designated a contingency room: before the decision is made, this room is open, or in other words there are other possibilities; after the decision is made it is dosed, or in other words there were other possibilities. Luhmann concludes with reference to Simon char with decision premises a certain control of the decision process is made possible. And chis control the organization (obviously) itself decides upon. On the whole~ decisions can only be 11llJM on the basis of other decisions within the same system. As organized events decisions thus cannot occur as individual events.

27

JAN INGE JONHILL

Organizations then are established through decisions. Membership is decided through decisions. The program of an organization is formulated in decisions. Places and staff are appointed. through decisions by decision-qualified persons. Every decision in an organization is thus based upon other decisions. An organization that no longer makes decisions, ceases to be an organization. In this sense decisions function as a peculiar medium of communication for organizations. Through decisions the form of organization is also established: ifit is about e.g. a joint-stock company, a research organization or a coun of law. Taken together. the type of organization and the operation, which thus is appointed by decisions. assigns the individual organization its individuality Qonhlll 1997). Organizations may be said to have as their task the reduction of uncertainty. This absorption of uncwtainty, however, results in an inner binding of the organization to its own views. And that naturally runs the risk of making the organization far too self-centred, and thereby less sensible to events in its environment... The emergence of modern society is tantamount to a number of changes of fundamental forms of communication, differentiation and organizing in the whole of society, although the changes in the field of economy and politics are perhaps most conspicuous. The market economy implies; on the one hand, the development of the form of money as medium, which calls for appropriate organizations. On the other hand it calls for changes and extensions of the organizing of production and distribution. Modern democracy on the one hand calls for organized power constdlations with politically (and not militarily) managed transfers of power, and on the other hand a basic change in the organizing of stare power. In premodern societies, man as an individual person was tightly coupled to an organization, as in medieval Europe: the navy, the army or the monastic system. Once a member of the military or a rdigious organization, in the normal case one is always a part of that organization for the rest of one's life. However, in modern society persons are as a general rule loosely coupled to a countless number of organizations. In his theory of differentiation Luhmann shows that the function systems, e.g. the system of economy. the system of politics, the system of science, the system of law, etc., are independent of each other, but dependent on organizations in their operations. However, organizations may also operate between the

4 The concept of 11lnorptior, of1t,u-nr11;nty originates from March & Simon 1958. Luhmann uses it in a more precise way as a scruccural concept

28

COMMUNICATIONS WITH DECISIONS AS MEDIUM AND FORM

function systems, and thus contribute in reconciling problems connected to their autonomy, chiefly in the form of negotiating systems. No function system may consist of only one organization. That would contravene a number of conditions of contingency and complexity presupposed in modern society. The increased complexity,. as concerns those communications based upon organizing and decision-making, does not mean less need for organizing. Not least the society,s management of risks puts large demands on organizing. The tendencies of the last decades towards more "flatn, flexible and network-like organizations do not indicate "'the end of organized capitalism" as Scot Lash and John Urry have assened (Lash & Urry 1987). The organizations of today pur demands on a corresponding complexity in the analysis. The organization theory, further elaborated. by Luhmann on a systems theoretical basis, is an approach which could usefully be more thoroughly tested, examined and discussed by organizational researchers.

References Bacckcr, Dirk (1999) OrganisMitJn als System. Frankfurt AM: Suhrkamp Barnard, Chester I (1938) Thefondions ofthe ex«utive. Cambri~, Mass.: Harvard University press (16, ed. 1964). Brull5SOn, NiJs ( 1985) The imzti()nal 1Jrganis4tion./rr4tiontdity as a basisfo, o,ganiutional action and ,htlnp. Chichester: Wtley & Sons. J6nhill. Jan Inge (1997) Samhiil./et som systnn och Jess eltologislta omvarld. En stuaie i Ni/rim Luhmanns socu,Jogisu systmlJWJri. Lund: Sociologiska institutionen. La.sh, Scott & Urry, John (1987) The end ofo,ganir.N/ capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press. Luhmann, Nildas (1964) Funllionm unJ Folgm fo1'1'1Udn Organisation. Berlin~ Duncker & Humblot.

Luhmann, Niklas (1981) Organisation und Entschcidung, in Luhmann Sflao/ogrsche Aujltliirung 3: Sozilzks Systnn. Ga~chtlft. Organislztion. Opla.den: Westdeutscher Verlag (orig. as a separate publication, 1978).

Luhmann, Niklas (1997) Die GnJlschaftdn GaeUschaft 1-11. Frankfurt AM: Suhrkamp. Luhmann, Niklas (2000) Otg1111istzti011 und Entschndwng. Opladcn: Westdcutscher

Verlag. March, James G (1988) Decisions 4114 organi7Jztians. Oxford: Basil Blackwell March. James G & Simon, Herbert (1958) Orgllniutions. New York etc: J Wiley & Sons.

March, James G & Olsen, Johan P (1979) Ambiguity and choice in organizations. Oslo etc: Scandinavian University Press (2nd. ed).

29

JAN INGE JONHILL

Marx, Karl (1973) Das X.pillll Berlin: Dietz Verlag (orig, 1867). Morgan, Gareth (1986) l1114ges ofo,ga.nization. London: Sage.

Weber, Max (1968) Economy11ndsociny, vol. I. New York: Bedminster Press (orig. 1919). Weick. Karl E (1969) Th~ socudpsycholog, oforganizing. Reading, USA: Addison-

Wesley.

30

3

Organization Niklas Luhmann

Theoretical research on organizations is overwhelmingly connected to rationality theoretical premises. The researcher either introduces his own presumably scientific, or intentionally generally valid, rationality concepts and tests how far the organization structurally and operationally corresponds to them. The criticism of organizations is then given the aim of increasing the level of rationality. This research orientation is typically based on optimisation models. Altemativdy, the researchers assumes that the organizations itself strives towards rationality. The orgaofaation is conceived as a system oriented towards aims, and as capable of selecting both the adequate means and implementing the necessary programme to resist attempts to introduce a formal system of authority. That may entice research to focus on the resulting informal organization, resistance, "perverted effects,,, distortions, dysfunctions or discrepancies between the declared and the real aims. & a contrast both to the prevailing approaches found in enterprise economics and sociological research on organizations, questions arise concerning the origins of the rationality concept, the introduction of the conceptual outline, the limitations (are they uncontrollable?) that have co be included, and the reasons why precisely organizations (from another perspective often refereed to as bureaucracies) are assumed to display a panicular rationality, and at the same time a particular problematic afFmity to rationality. In order to explore this question, the rationality premises should be excluded from the research approach. If not, the defm.ition of organization will result in a connec1 tion between organi:zation and rationality. Nevenhdcss, if this operation is to be performed, the patient will die - an unavoidable outcome if the prevailing understanding of organiution is the point of reference. We are therefore faced with the question of whether an organization concept devoid of rationality, a 1 This interest can be added ro "difference thcorcdcal" research particularly prevalent in France, as wdl as to much of what Husserl grouped under the heading •life world". A discussion of rhc prob-lematic aspects of"scnse• will provide a starring point. For this purpose, take a look at how "sense" is analysed by Bernard Wadenfds in /11 din Nttun tkr Le/Jnuwelt, Frankfun 1985.

31

NIKlAS lUHMANN

concept not referring to aims or means, optimisation, rdative yield superiority, or formal hierarchies, is possible at all. If the answer is yes, I assume this muse be based on a common systems theoretical basis and only if it can come up with a sufficient structure when exchanged with rationality premises. The enquiry presented below is an attempt to do this. It is based on the assumption that social systems in general, and without exception, constitute themselves as self-referential autopoietic systems, an assumption equally valid in the case of organised social systems. 2 Autopoietic systems produce the demenrary units they consist of through the very network of these elementary units . Thus, they pervade what co them consrirutes a unit while at the same time being adjusted co reproduction. Albeit this can only cake p.lac.e in an environment and on the basis of materials, incentives and disturbance particular to the environment. From this theoretical basis, organised social systems can be understood as systems made up ofdmsions, llnd cllpttble oft:omplmng the decisions that mizkt them up, through the d«isions thllt 1NZ!te them up. Decision is not understood as a psychological mechanism, but as a matter of communication, not as a psychologic.al event in the form of an internally conscious definition of the self, but as a social event. That makes it impossible to state that decisions already taken still have to be communicated. Decisions are rommunications; something that dearly does not preclude that one can communicate about decisions. Only in this sense can organizations be regarded as social systems made up of decisions and decisions alone, and what is more, only of decisions that they cake themselves. Based on what may be regarded as decisions and exactly because of this, can a concriburion to the production of other decisions be made. Organizations are autonomous, irrespective of whether they can adapt their decision-making contents to their environment or not. They can be differentiated as recursive, closed systems where decisions are made with other decisions taken into consideration. Based on a procedlll'C of appropriating decisions from the environment, delineation is conducted enabling the system to be perceived and treated as such by the surroundings. Based on the assumption of a self-referential closure, all external references used in the system must be understood as internal operations. Thus, there are no examples of external "sources" of authority, but the possibility that authority is systemically internal, assuming excellent access to natural resources, important customers or political bodies or banks, cannot be excluded. Likewise, no additional criteri~ i.e. goals ("Zweckc"), are at play. Criteria are nothing but arguments that may be applied successfully or not, in the internal

2 A more defailcd analysis can be found in Niklas Luhmann, Sot&iale Sysmne: Gruntirijf ei11n- allgemtintn Thtorit, Frankfurt t 984.

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ORGANIZATION

systemic communication. In other words, everything depends on what is explicitly or implicitly drawn upon when decisions are made. There is no such thing as an independent reality that may influence an organization directly. As a dosed system for decision-making, an organization may only be ~ defined based on its own decisions. It can only learn by irsel£ At the same time, it will draw upon the very structures it has organised in order to specify expecp cations that ensure that acts, and this includes all kinds of acts, may be dealt with as decisions by the system. 3 That may come as an unpleasant surprise later on, especially if it concerns subdivisions. One behaved as always, and suddenly it becomes clear that chis was a decision, or the surroundings treat you as if you 4 had chosen to neglect something. This makes it additionally advantageous to be occupied with complex decisions. Not least since the many aspects of complexity may reveal acceptable reasons for the decision making. Clearly, that puts the decision maker in a situation marked by constant stress - meaning that the time available for decision making is too brief, taking the complexity of the decision into account. Difficult decisions ace therefore easy decisions and stress a prerequisite for adequate procedures since it nevertheless remains impossible to decide what actually would be required. Since organizations are systems for recursive decision making, it is to be expected that already extensive research s will show that significant structures are included in the subsequent preoccupation of previous decisions, or respcctivdy in the provision for future possibilities of the retrospective preoccupation of currently pressing decisions. In chis connection, the problem of functioning as catalyst for the structure formation may appear as a pleasant or unpleasant surprise. Being perc.eived as the one who already knew what the consequences would be beforehand - i.e. being able to estimate whether the successes and the failures are a lesser evil relative co the alternatives - will be valued by every deci3 Compare the production of decisions through expectations as found in Niklas Luhmann, '"Soz.iologiscbe Aspckte des F.nucheidungsverhaken•, Die Bmid,nuirtschaft, 44 (1984), 591-603. 4 This would cequue a f.u more detailed invatigation. but a hypothesis begging to be taken into account concerns aactly this recurrence in the production of decisions together with a layout for expectations based on the respective mandates aod it also leaves decisions to subdivisions, which to a considerable ex.rent decides the actual strocrure of preferences of the organizational system. Under these conditions. first of all you have to •drop your precautions•. 5 Sec Baruch Fischhoff & Ruth Beyth, -1 knew it would happen', Remembered Probabilities of Once-Future Things", 0,:"11irJuiuruJ behaviour "",J Hunutn Pnfomu,rire, 13 ( 1975), 1-16; Baruch Fischoff, "Hindaight-Foresighc: The Efh:ct of Ouu:omc Knowledge on Judgment under Uncerta'mty,",jfllmllll ufFxpmmm111/ Ps]d,oll,gy, 1 (1975), 288-299; for de-biasing see Daniel Kahneman/ Paul Slovic/Amos Tvcrsky (cdsJ judgmmt undn Unat111m1J: H~rotic and Biasts, Cambridge England 1982, 422-444; J. Richard Harrison/James G. March. "Decision Making and Posrdedsion Surprise'", AJministrdtiw Sciara Qwz,1,rlJ 29 (1984), 26-42; Bernard Goitein, "The Danger of Disappearing Poscdecision Surprise: Cnmment on Harrison and March: Decision Making and Postdecision Surprise, Adminislrllliw Sama Qwrtng 29 (1984), 410-413.

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sion maker. The tendency towards retrospective inclusion of decisions in the information presently available surely has psychological origins and may be con6 firmed on the basis of comparative culture. From a purely statistical viewpoint, decisions aiming for unfeasible results are more prone to disappointments, also when they have been based on rational alculations. 7 In general, that may be due to a systemic lack of exploitation of possibilities for learning, and to a meta-rational avoidance of rationally representational risk. Now, if decisions were differentiated under systemically imposed ex:peaation stress and subsequently led to the emergence of an autopoietic system, one may assume that a temporary recursivity of the decision will have a structurally formative importance, Autopoiesis requires only a decision to be taken. While at the same time, related systemically internal problems somewhat independent from the requirements imposed by the environment may influenc.e how it is taken. Closely related are the needs to estimate the modo exacti fururi of decisions and the additional need to introduce safeguards against the danger that it may appear differently. The concept of autopoirtic organizational systems is independent of the question how extensively an organization is dependent on the systems prevailing in the environment - insofar as the surroundings leave a sufficient scope for the alternatives the system may interpret as scope for decision making. Apart from that, this conceptual choice leaves the question of rationality open. We do nor preclude that organizations avail themselves of certain ends ("Ziele"), and rules in the acquisition of means to achieve ends (e.g. views concerning costs), in order to identify themselves. But we leave this question to the clarification of singular cases (or the formation of an organization typology) and maintain only as a basis that an organization exists only as long as its autopoiesis continues and decisions are reproduced from decisions. How and to what extent it avails itself of certain rationality premises in order to direct itsdf; and what happens when these attempts are enforced, are secondary questions, Likewise, whether an external observer would judge the organization as rational and the measures he would apply in doing so, are of lesser importance. This is because all this presupposes that the decision making is continued from moment to moment, and this is like in the case of brains and all other forms of autopoietic systems an "all-or-nothing-at-all" question. 8 The organization remains or it remains not it cannot remain only to a certain degree.

6 See Bernhard Goitein/Mordccha.i Rotcnbe..g, •protestantism and Retrospective Labelling: A Cross-Cultural Study in Person Perception", Human Rrilztions 30 (19n), 487-497. 7 See Harrison/March op.cit. 8 "The activity of the neutron is an all-or-none process" as ph~ by Warren S. McCuJloch, Embodimmts ofthe MjnJ, c.ambridgc Mass. 1965, p. 22, and based on rhis "'The circuic must be closed to be purposive•, p. 41.

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11

Accordingly. the question what decisions in organizations "are" (and correspondingly what they "are not"), must primarily be answered by referring to the system which by irself is organized. as a decision making system. A decision is thus everything a system regards as decision. This may nor satisfy an external observer, especially if he has the impression the organization has been negligent, for instance failed co pay sufficient attention to environmental protection. Thus, one may say: To the observer this represents an omission ("Unterlassung"), whereas to the organization it is not. This insight into the relativity of the system will immediately result in imponant insights into the consequences. In this manner the futility (and consequently the tenacity) of systemically external expectations and appeals lacking access to the internal network of decision products are rendered comprehensible (e.g. failing to take environmentally protective measures). Nevertheless, for a theory that wants to observe the difference between external and internal perspectives, it does not suffice to rely on system relativity. Certainly, what occasionally is perceived and treated as decisions, is decided by the system. But above all, how decisions may be distinguished from other systems (for instance from common human behaviour or natural events) must likewise be specified theoretic.ally (i.e. correctly or falsely according to the measures set by scientific criteria). The fact that decisions concern events occurring at a fixed point in time and 9 then disappear also belongs to insights that are as undisputed as successful. The constituent elements making up an organization are therefore not sustainable. This problem is not due to their continuance, but their reproduction. This reproduccion cannot merely be a repetition or replication (like a dying cell being replaced with its spatial or functional equivalent). Always making identical decisions (although it may be worthwhile to decide that an old decision is refreshed mentally) is obviously pointless. The continuous reproduction requires new, and simultaneously other occasional decisions - hence discontinuity; hence reasons for discontinuity; hence "tumultuous surroundings". When a decision is not durable, but merely happens (or does not happen), it cannot be changed. It will disappear at the point in time marked or defined by itself. That cannot be altered. The common talk that decisions must be or are changed is therefore vague and conceals an important problem. That prob9 If you accept already that social systems, jll.S( like consciousneu-based systems are only made up of events, this assumption is unavoidable. See Niklas Luhmann "Soziale Sysrcme ... "' loc.cit. especially p.387 ff. and by the same, "Die Autopoiesis des BewuBcseins, Sozi4/e ~It, 36 (1984), 402-

446.

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lem is: what exactly can be changed? Based on this question, the general amazement and irritation over the fact chat so lirrle can be changed may be extricated from its ideological confines. This is simply because it is quite natural that hardly anything can be changed since an organization consists of elements that disappear as soon as they emerge. Thus, the fact that it cannot be changed, but may provide a cause for new decisions to surface, remains equally valid here. That the question, ''what may be changed and how", cannot be answered or taken ad absurdum, remains relevant. Still, we realise that we have to clarify the preliminary question, the thcoty has several weaknesses. It does not appear to be an entirely satisfactory application of the underlying theory of autopoiesis and, moreover, it is far from dear that auropoiesis, as a biological theory, could be applied to social systems. As a theory of the social world, Luhmann remains exclusively at the levd of the operations of networks of communications. While this may be a significant level of analysis, the theory largdy ignores the shaping of individual social behaviour by the wider social system, and the generation of communications by individuals. In the context of organizations, this leads to a very reductive analysis purely in terms of networks of decisions. It may nevertheless be the case that Luhmann' s work does offer interesting insights and could be combined with other theories in a &uitful way.

l l9

JOHN MINGERS

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Verl. Lyotard. Jcan-Fran~is (1983): Le differend. Paris: Minuit. Machiavelli, Niccolo (1532) II prindpt. Macksey, Richard, and Eugenio Donato (eds.) (1970) The languages ofcriticism and the scimc~s ofma.n: the struct1'ralist controvmy. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins

Press. Malik, Frcdmund (1996) Strllt,:gu des Managm,mts ltomp/exn- Systeme: Ein Beitrag zur Managnnmt-Kybernetik evolusioniirer Systnn~. 5•h ed., Bern: Haupt. Malik, F redmund (2000) Fiihmi. Lnstm. Lebm: Wirksllmes Managemmt for rine neue 7.eit. Stuttgart: Deutsche V crlagsanstalt

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Luhmann and management: A critique of the management theory in Organisation und Entscheidung Ole Thyssen

Introduction In the systems theory of Niklas Luhmann, it is possible to observe an ambivalence, because Luhmann on the one hand puts forward radical statements, based on his theoretical program, and on the other hand softens up these statements with common sense statements. This ambivalence is also present in his theory of organizations, where the function of management - and the manager - is dissolved in a theory of absorption of uncertainty. And absorption of uncertainly takes place everywhere in an organization, it does not follow hierarchical patterns. The strongly polemical presentation makes his analysis onesided and forces him to compensate with a relapse to rejected theories. This is a function of the ambition of Luhmann to construct social systems on the basis of one and only one mode of operation, oamdy communication. At the same time, it is possible to deconstruct this deconstruction of management by showing that in Luhmann's magnum opus on organizations, Organimtion und Entschtiding, management does make a difference. The structuralist trend in Luhmann's theory,. making persons a trick in the communication and a construction of an observer, misrepresents the function of management, which is to represent the unity of an organization. If a person is a construction of another person, ic is hard to account for the dynamics of the communication, which is also dependent of the individual will. On the basis of this critique, which is solely based on Luhmann 's Organir.ation und Entscheidung and does not take account of the devdopment of his theory of organizations, some more general questions are asked - whether Luhmann's theory is able to present a convincing picture of the role of che individual in social systems, and whether his basic concept of communication is not flawed with an unavoidable mental dimension, namely the component of understanding.

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Organisation und Entscheidung was last worked on by Luhmann in 1995. Ir circulated as manuscript until it was published two years after he died (Luhmann 2000). Luhmann began his professional career as bureaucrat and his academic career as organization theorist. It is not surprising. thus, that organization theory holds a central position in his theory about social systems in which "organizatio~is one type of social system next to "interaction" and "society". However, the text rdates to the subject matter in an oddly exterior way. First of all, Luhmann follows his own paths of observation, and secondly, the abstraction-lcvd is high, which he coyly sees as counter-acting the much too concrete consultancy literature and its management advice. Luhmann' s ambition is to develop a theory capable of assimilating a higher degree of contingency and complexity, which leads to stronger abstractions so that practice cannot recognize itself in the theory (Luhmann 2000: 428). His contribution does not consist in concrete analyses but in a proposalfor a new organu:ational semantics. & a social system, organfaations operate in the medium of ... communication". The special characteristics of organizations are that they 1. Are based on a distinction between members and non-members, 2. Direct their communication at decisions and 3. Do not hold simple binary codes like those of the function systems. They have no simple+ and-. Rather, the decision premises constitute the functional equivalent to the codes of the function systems. Luhmann takes the heroic step of constructing the system of" organization,, from one mode of operating. This enables him to observe with such a degree of abstraction that all tangible organizational operations become variable (Luhmann 2000: 64fl). & an example, an organization can make use of hierarchy but has to simultaneously be aware of different alternatives. Luhmann does not define hcterarchy but the labyrinth in opposition to the classical hierarchy. A labyrinthine order does not exclude hierarchies but entails the possibility of short-circuiting or evading them (Luhmann 2000: 420ff). Nevertheless, Luhmann maintains that in handling its own complexity an organization has no alternatives to the hierarchy no matter how many times it has been rhetoric.ally shot down (Luhmann 2000: 19ff). However, its function is nor to provide control. All the "good sruff' of classic.al organization theory such as causality and rationality are contingent functions and Luhmann wants to dig deeper in order to investigate how they are conditioned and which alternatives are available. In the re..d.escriprion of the system of "'organization" we can trace a duality in Luhmann in which he presents radical claims derived from his program of observation while simultaneously abstaining from following through on his claims, 1 but instead tames than with common sense claims. A similar double concept can be found in his rdations to radical constructivism which he finds theoretically

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enticing, but useless in practical terms because it leads to a collapse of the distinction between self-reference and external reference (Luhmann 2000: 464, 470). At the same rime though, his entire theoretical construction implies radical constructivism because an autopoietical system is only able to relate to itself and has to construct its external environment through internal operations. His highly polemical exposition makes his analysis one-sided and forces him to compensate by means of a number ofrelapses to the rejected theories. I will suppon this assertion based on the theme of "management". Luhmann takes radical measures and dissolves the management function in a theory about decisions seen as absorption of uncertainty whose dispersion is not hierarchically based. Organi7.ations are produced and reproduced when communication is directed at decision and closes operatively on this basis (Luhmann 2000: 63). It does not suffice to note that Luhmann sees the function of management as more important than the manager as person. The very function of management is marginalised to the theoretic.al periphery. It is the system more than the person which makes decisions; and, in effect, the decision maker becomes a mere shadow who either makes decisions that have already been made or becomes entirely superfluous, an exterior adornment. Although Luhmann is not structuralist, the theory of autopoiesis entails a related tendency to let the system take over the actor. Below, I am going to deconsttuct Luhmann's deconstruction of the management phenomenon and related phenomena such as individual, power, and reason. Luhmann' s thesis is that organizations are autopoietical systems of communication in which the central point and driving force is the decinon. I will criticiz.e Luhmann' s theory of decision making and at the same time point out certain problems inherent in the concept of communication that Luhmann defines as medium for social systems. And in order to drive my point to its very conclusion, I am not going to speak of management as function but about the manager as person and with a partirular eye for the manager who makes decisions for the orgaorzation as a whole. The point of departure is an inconsistency, which allows Luhmann to advance radical claims while simultaneously preventing his theory from disintegrating in the empty outbidding of radicalism. Luhmann's text contains a prejudice that materializes as an aversion against action, against the individual, and against reason, and which leads his theory astray. In the same way that his voice grows thin and sharp when he encounters normative prejudices, he turns polemic and fierce when he comes across theo~ ries which define as central the individual and its reason. The polemics leads to a theoretical one-sidedness where Luhmann exaggerates the powerlessness of 1 I have elaborated this critique in "Luhmann and epistemology", in print.

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the manager, the impossibility of action, rhe ubiquity of decision and the unreason of reason. This leaves him without an acceptable answer to simple questions that he himself raises: how is the unity of an organization represented and instigated.? How does a self-description or a decision become binding? What is the difference between a competent and an incompetent manager? Why docs Luhmann choose to write about organizations? Maybe simply, as with his aesthetia;-in order to fill a void in a theoretical program which is to conclude in a universal systems theory. He himself does not aspire do obtain anything except for the installation of his theoretical passion for seeing through and re-describing une passion inuti./e - which he finds in the organization and which an observer can find in him. Why the mobilization of this kind of skepticism which he in the end does not subscribe to himself? Luhmann's faith in unreason is as one-sided as Habermas' reverse faith in reason. In the end, his theory about organizations results in evolution, which is either an empty word signifying that something happens - in Luhmann's expression, theory deficiency (Luhmann 2000: 346) in which the organi7.arion depends on itself in "fatal loops,t and therefore cannot be controlled in its evolution (Luhmann 2000: 379). Or that what happens is observed functionally in relation to alternatives and is therefore maintained or rejected on pragmatic reasons. But why are random changes favored, not desired ones, when organizations, as it is, contain an "explosive mix of order and contingency", that is, when both sides of this distinction are active? Why the penchant for the dissolution of reason when reason is merely one side of a distinction which Luhmann himself has to make use of in order to convince himself and his readers?

Classical management theory The counterpart to Luhmann's decision theory is rheory ofrationality, which is continuowly criticii.ed in consent with March and Weick, and theory ofaction, which is routinely criticized with routine hints at Habermas. 1. Critiqw of mana.gmient as handling of rationality. In classical organization theory with its focw on rationality, hierarchy> control, and decision-maker, arbitrariness is concentrated. in a peak from where sensible means are organised toward ends beyond reason. Luhmann's rather uncontroversial counter-argument is that it is nnpirit:Jly untrue that behavior in organizations is rational and that the assenion of reason rests on theoretically wiconvincing assumptions about information as both complete and manageable. When rationality becomes a norm, all organizational activities become a deviation so that one has to wonder how organizations manage to live with themselves.

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More interestingly, Luhmann wants to use his thesis about autopoiesis to render superfluous the premise about rationality while creating for himself a space for the development of a new notion of rationality. 2. Critu,ue ofmanagement as IICtion. Theory of action, acoording to Luhmann, overemphasizes a single moment in communication, namdy the utterance (Luhmann 2000: 148). This is a curious argument since Luhmann accepts that i ~ the utterance that defines communication as communication because information is not automatically communicated information and because understanding is invisible from the perspective of the communication. The utterance is the social component of the communication. Luhmann asserts that theory of action overemphasit.CS the individual and that an individual, organizationally speaking, is not a Vollmensch but a person defined as structure in the organization's communication. Against the focus on the individual in theoiy of action, Luhmann installs systems theory and its focus on the system. We will address this attempt later.

The organization as an autopoietical system Seeing an organization as an autopoietical system raises a number of questions. The basic distinction is the difference between system and environment. To an organization, the environment is "as it is,. (Luhmann 1992: 171) and is simultaneously a product of the organizational observation. The environment is a "filling of the system's external reference and permits a redirection of uncomfortable reasons that can be seen as "given". Since an organization is only able to observe, decide, and remember through people the question arises as to how this "redirection" takes place. The organizational sensitivity toward its environment is highly selective and largely indifferent (Luhmann 2000: 70). The environment cannot be meticulously mapped out or "assumed". Rather, it must be im4gined (Luhmann 2000: 78), which opens up for questions about how it happens in a way that is binding for the orgaoi:iation. When an organization is to assure itself of reality, it cannot compare reality with its own observation of reality since reality is only accessible through observation. Instead, it must test the resistance in own operations against own operations (Luhmann 2000: 217), which means that the reality test becomes resistance, which opens up for questions about what defines resistance. In Luhmann's distinction between "institution" and "organization" (Luhmann 1992a: 90ff) an institution has traditional ends and means and can presuppose loyalty so that management coincides with administration. An organization, 11

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in turn, provides a frame for change and career paths so that goals, means and loyalty cannot be taken for granted. This creates contingency and thereby attention directed towards the decisions of management. They are interesting because they are expected to change and hence call for justifications. Modem societies are dominated by the organizational form, which raises a problem about management not only in private, but also in public organizations in which management 2 is traditionally viewed as a suspect exercise of power. In his theory about organizations, Luhmann seeks to undermine the claim that organizations can be underscood with concepts such as subject, nature, truth, and reason. Since all organizational elements consist of transient events,

the continuous change of the organization is "existentially guaranteed" (Luhmann 2000: 330). The focus of organizational communication is the decision as a means to extend its autopoiesis. How an organization comes into existence does not interest Luhmann and what a decision is remains a mystery (Luhmann 2000: 456), that is, a paradox - a word which easily and often slips into Luhmann's writing because he considers parado.x::y to be "sovereign" (Luhmann 2000: 55) even when locked up in its palace and surrounded by predators. le is a given - included as excluded. It is the Satz von Grunde of the theory. its transcendental condition. Logically, a paradox is a blockage. Bur to Luhmann, who works with what he calls a "natural epistemology" (Luhmann 1990: 16) a paradox signifies a systemic condition which does not let itself be blocked by paradoxy (Luhmann 1990: 8). Something always happens, also when the system is logically paralyzed under the Medusa gaze of parad.oxy. The scandal of the paradox fades when Luhmann routindy "deparadoxifics" and "unfolds" paradoxes so that a social system contracts habits and traditions although this requires that "undecidable" decisions be made. I am going to track a number of points in which Luhmann's radical assertion about the absence of reason, control, and power is met, in his own text, with counter-assenions that are motivated by the fact that Luhmann's text needs to be relevant as a description of organizations. A radical thesis is developed by daylight but is brought to a heel in the twilight by a relapse to common sense. The purpose is not to place Luhmann's text in a large context with other texts, neither by other authors nor by himself, but to trace the interplay between a tendency and a counter-tendency in Organisation und Entscheidung. 2 Luhmann's eumples are usually taken from public rather than private organiutions. le is conceivable to imagine that Luhmann, by choosing his eumples from the domain in which the idea of institution is most strongly demarcated, has made it easy for himself co reject the '"management'" phe~ nomenon as insigni.6c.ant. When ends, means, and lines of communication are presupposed, the

manager has the lease latitude and experiences the greatest powerlessness.

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The rondusion is that Luhmann,s book about organiutions is not entirely suc~ful because he gets carried away by his own polemics so that he is forced to make corrections without the correction becoming visible on the theoretical level.

Communication, observation, and action There is something peculiar about Luhmann's concept of communication. On the one hand, communication is a closed process that is both inaccessible to the conscious mind and unbound by reality. Communication is an autonomous and closed process (Luhmann 1985: 205). On the other hand, it is difficult to understand how communication is able to continue itself without a dynamics that originates outside of the communication, that is, the "information processing units" that must exist prior to the communication (Luhmann 1985: 191)3• At the same time, the last component of the communication understanding - is not pan of the communication since understanding happens with the recipient." The problem is that communication i~lfc,annot do anything and depends; therefore, on its environment, primarily psychic systems that can understand and perceive. It is not convincing just to claim that communication communicates. Luhmann might have been able to solve this problem with his notion of structural linking if the problem were less profound. Communication, as it is, happens neither in the consciousness of the sender nor with the recipient but between them (Thyssen 2000: 166 ff). It does not link up with perception but still takes place within a medium of perception. With his concept of communication Luhmann seems to hypostatiu: a process, which on one the hand radically excludes psychic systems and on the other hand inevitably has to include 3 This js compatible with these uruts being shaped by the communication daey partake in, so th.at Luhmann can talk about "co-evolution". 4 Luhmann loc:alius the component "undemanding• in the psychic system. By doing so he seems to undermine his thesis of a dear-cut boundary between consciousness and communication. As a solmion, some thcorisu have uied to define understanding on the basis of rhe next step in the communication, chat is, its Ansmlms. But this behavioristic solution creates new problems. Even if undecstanding in many eYeryday situations is tested immediately in the succeding communicacion, it is not pomble to idmt:ijj understanding and rcacrion. This would mean that no reaction meant no understaoding. A third solution, which Lihmann himselfis exploring. is to fonnaliu the concept of understanding in the same manner as he has formalized the concept ofomervarion, that is, reduced its normal meaning.Just as "obseIVation" may be defined as "handling a distinction in order to indicate one of its sides", so "undersranding" may be defined as '"handling the disrinccion between information and utterance", so dw under· standing is jwt undemanding chat communication has tami pbcc. not understanding of what has been communicated. However, such a reductlon of me nonnal meaning of wxlcrscanding will raise the que.tion whether Luhmann's CORCqJt ofcommunicarion has anything to do with communication.

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OLE THYSSEN

them because the dynamics and transfer of the communication from one condition to the other has to be comprehensive. The communication needs to include that which it has excluded and is at the same time unable to do so. The problem is solved outside the strictly communicative context but with immediate implications for that context. Boch sender and recipient bring in their own experience of the communication as well as their perception of the other side, not merely as a structure in the communication but as psychic systems with a background, sore spots, and motives. Luhmann speaks of "tact acrobatics"(Luhmann 2000: 98). Luhmann tries to circumvent the difficulty through a formal definition of the fundamental concept of"obsetvarion" as merdy a question of managing a difference. But observation requires an observer, which brings Luhmann in close contact with theory of action. For that reason his definition of observation is so broad that it includes the common difference between observing and aaing. The result, however, is that the concept of action is depleted.. It is obvious that action includes observation. It is obvious that observation is an activity and not - as in British empiricism - a passivity. And it is obvious that there exists a kind of conceptual stagnation in the relationship between action, choice, and goal. That is why action as a final concept is replaced by observation (Luhmann 2000: 147). But the consequence is that action becomes a simplified structure in the communication and loses its own causality. This increases the difficulty of explaining where communication derives its dynamics from. Even though observation justifies action - and several other things (Luhmann 2000: 126)action contains something extra that Luhmann becomes blind to when defining action as a simplifying trick in the communication that concerns ascription. Action becomes passivity, an ascription by another observer. le becomes not a composition but decomposition. 5 If observation is to manage a difference in order to ihdicate one side of the difference, then action contains the additional element that one side of the difference has to not only be signified and indicated but also realised. That requires a kind of effort different &om mere observation. Even if one defines the person as a structure in the communication, this structure still depends on the efforts of the person. It is not given, not even by virtue of its position. The problem is not solved by cros&ng from observation to decision. Observation becomes decision when the form of "alternative" is wed (Luhmann 2000: 132ff). Alternatives are panirular forms in which both sides are ~ible. There is not an indicated versus a non-indicated side but two paralld indications, which are,

5 C[ Niklas Luhmann. 1985: 193, in which it is said that communication is "decomposed" through action.

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however. made asymmetrical by the decision. This rcsu.lts in a double l.KERSU0M ANDERSEN

that "'we" must reach precisely this decision now while we can still be at the foreground and both be recognised. and influenc:e the decision.

The organisational system as unfolded paradoxy I have argued I) that decision is a particular form composed by the unity of fixed and open contingency in relation to social expectations, 2) that the form of decision installs a parado:x::y in all decision communication, 3) that, as a result, decision communication can be studied as the empirical unfolding of this paradoxy as sundry attempts to make undecidable questions appear decid· able. Where does this take us? How about the concept of organisation? The typical approach to organisations in organisation theory is ontological. Usually, one seeks to answer the question of what an organisation is. One attempts to define the organisation as organisation as something given, a con· stant, which then allows for the study of various organisational variables: structure. culture, strategy, inner and outer complexity, etc. including the comparison of different organisations. The communication-theoretical approach, on the other hand, makes it possible to extend the problem of the organisation beyond ontology. Rather than asking what, we might then ask how an organisation emerges. The only needed assumption is the fact that organ· isational systems are formed around decision communication. Or in other words: organisations are nothing but the concomitant bi-prodw:t of the unfolding paradoxy ofthe farm ofdecision. All other questions concerning the clements and characteristics of organisations are empirical. With the above definition, we do not need to characterise organisations through predefined phenomena and dements such as culture, structure, or management. Organisations and their ele~ ments are created through the decision communication when decisions confirm decisions and transform them into premises for decisions. "What" an organisa· cion is and consists of is a consequence of how organisations deparadoxify decisions and turn them into premises for decisions. The intricate point is that organisational systems create themselves through decisions, and through decisions it is defined what a decision is. As the productive operation of the system, therefore, decision creates itsdf as well. This is the autopoiesis of organisations. Organisational dements are always products of the unfolding of the paradoxy of decision, which amounts to saying that organisations are created on the basis of the impossibility of decisions. A decision makes itsdf by deciding on premises for decisions and the organisational system emerges through the decision of these premises. How a premise becomes a premise is an open question that varies from organisation to

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organisation, but the historical conditions of the organisations· constructions of premises is also changed through the change of the language, the semantics, available to decision communication. As an example, "culture", "values", and "spirit" are rather new concepts to organisational self~iprion that become available when a decision turns something into a premise for decision. Nevertheless, I want to emphasise four typical premises: an organisational system decides its limit as a limit for the validity of decisions through the establishment of membership. including the definition of membership and of who can be a member. An organisational system decides its purpose by deciding on some kind of program for what its decisions are going to be about even if the objective premise for decision is not necessarily particularly precise or obvious. The third element is differentiation and co-ordination of "actions," for example in the shape of tasks, positions, and staffwhich constitute the social premise for decision. And finally the form ofdecision is a premise for decision that has to be decided in order for the organisation to establish its limit, its program, and its staff. The autopoiesis of the organisation is illusuated below with decision as the autopoietical operation:

The organisational system

Membership (organisation of limit for validity of decisions)

I

Program (01'9anisation of fact and themes)

I

Positions and staff (organisation of the social dimension)

•

Decision (organisation of the communicative operation)

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But arc: organisations completely closed? They are completely closed in the sense that all their elements are premises for decisions, which, in order to be premises for decisions, must themselves have been decided. However, this closure also opens up the organisation, although never to the point that something "foreign" might penetrate the organisation. Organisations are open in the sense that they can communicate about the environment and thereby observe the environment. But they always observe the world &om the perspective of a defined horiwn that determines what they can and cannot see, and they are never able to see what they cannot see. 1bis can be formulated differently: decision communication can obtain information about the world but information is nothing in itsel£ It is not an essence. Information is, in the words of Bateson, a difference that makes a difference for a subsequent event (Bateson 1972). Thar is, information is always systems relative. Information cannot simply cross the organisational boundary (Luhmann 2000a: 15-22). They are not external inputs but must be produced as information by the organisational system itsel£ When we are dealing with decision communication, information is always a difference which makes a difference in relation to a subsequent decision communication, that is, it functions as a specific type of premise for decision - and as mentioned above, premises are always already decided premises.

The relationship between organisation theory and organisations The purpose of this kind of contra-intuitive exposition of decisions and organisation is to facilitate guiding principles for observation of the second order. In the end, systems theory is no more than a program for the observation of observations and their blind spots. In this sense systems theory is also highly reductionistic. Its only object is observation. This simple foundation, however, is what brings on complexity at the level of empirical analysis. Precisely because systems theory strives for the concrete at the level of the concrete - observations as observation not reduced to something else - does conceptual precision become so significant. Without a high level of precision, second-order observation is reduced to first-order observation. One is swallowed up by the languages of the different areas. One takes to every-day abstractions that appear concrete because of their familiarity: people act; decisions are individual choic.es and thus also acts; organisations are; an organisation has a culture, etc. In other words, one needs an incredible level of conceptual precision if one

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THE UNDECIDA&ILITV OF DECISION

chooses observations and their concepts as object; otherwise one ends up merging with the observed. In other words: Luhmann's theory about decision and organisation is not a theory about what decisions are, what an organisation is. or why organisations reach particular decisions. It is nor a theory of explanations and probably nor even a theory of understanding. The theory merely serves as program for the observation of how organisations emerge through observations. Thus, rather rhan a theory in the classical sense, Luhmann's theory represents a program and an analytical strategy for the way second-order observers may condition their way of seeing in order for organisational communication to appear as observable observations. But what is the epistemological interest in this kind of approach? What does this kind of decision- and organisation theory offer? It can pose impractical questions to practice. From a systems theoretical perspective organisation theory may observe the observations of organisations and expose their blind spots. A systems-theoretical organisation theory is able to represent as contingent and artificial that which organisations consider neceMary and natural (Luhmann 1993c: 226). In this sense, a systems-theoretical organisation theory works in the opposite direction from organisations. Whereas organisations in their strategies to deparadoxify decisions need to make freedom look like restraint by referring to "necessity" and to "the nature of things", systems theory is able to reproduce "natural" and "necessary" as contingent decisions. At a time when new truisms are introduced on a daily basis. when there exists an enormous market for all sorts of management concepts, when prospects of the furore have become a commodity as wdl as a management technology, the most practical research strategy might be one that asks questions about the naturalness of these concepts and future prospects. Moreover, it might be practical for the organisations that impractical questions are put to them concerning their concepts, their view of the external environment, social technologies, and conc.cpts and practices in general? For aample: •

How did the "new economy" appear as semantics and become installed as natural? What does the "new economy" pave and obstruct the way for respectively? How is it assigned meaning in the decision communication of different organisations? How does the concept "new economy~ open a battle about organisations' assignment of status on the time dimension as a sign of the past and the future respectivdy where it makes perfect sense to call a billion dollar business transaction a dinosaur while a similar deficit in an IT-company can also represent foresight?

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•

How do organisations deparadoxify decisions th.rough internal construe· cions of their external environment? How do they introduce the environ· ment as natural and as external imperative? What are the effects on an or· ganisation if it becomes too conscious of its own boundary with the environment and realises the conringency of the construction of relevant environment? How does an organisation become a stranger within its own space when having a repenoire of alternative figures of argumentation and environment constructions at its disposal (Andersen 2000a)? • How do organisations seek to represent themselves within themselves? How are the conditions for self-description changed in an organisation when not only top management but the entire staff of an organisation is expected to be in charge? When defining management as a self-relation everywhere in the organisation, how can management then be identified as a delimited sub-system? How do organisations emerge at all when each individual "selfmanaging employee'' is expected co form his own picture of the organisational unity. which produces organisations that represent themselves within themselves through countless different unities? (Andersen 2000b, Andersen & Born 2001). • How is the "complete employee" produced as semantic trick? Which mechanisms of in- and exclusion employ "the complete employee" in relation to the psychic systems? Which kind of conversational order is installed in the name of" dialogue" in so called conversarional systems such as performance reviews, progress reports, and ambition dialogues (Andersen & Born 2001)? • How do conditions for decision communication change when organisations see their environment as increasingly complex, undefined, and turbulent and refer to flexibility and constant change as the stable essence of the organisation? Which conditions for communication occur when adaptability replaces stability in the distinction between stability and change? (Andersen & Born 2000). These types of question are refined when seen th.rough a Luhmannian eye. Here, the Luhmannian universe offers a flexible and expansive analytical-strategic apparatus (Andersen 1999 & 2002) while also providing the researcher with a kind of immune response to the intuitive insights of the fidd.

References Andersen, Niels Akcrstrem (1999) Diskursive analysatraugier - Foucault, Kosetkck, Ladt,~ Luhmann, Nyt fra Samfundsvidcnskabernc, K0benhavn.

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Andersen, Niels Akerstmm (2002) Discursive llnlllytiaJ smztegits- Fou,ault, Koseiteck, Lac'4u, Lulmuznn, Bristol: Policy Press. forthcoming. Andersen, Niels Akerscrem (2000a) Public Market- Political Firms, Acta Sociologica, vol.43, no. 1. p. 12-17 Andersen, Niels Akcrscrem (2000b) Political Administration, MPP Working Paper, No. 5, Dcpanmcnt of Management, Politics and Philosophy, Copenhagen Business School. Andersen, Nids Akcrstrem & Born, Asmund (2000) Complexity and Change: Two Semantic Tricks in the Triumphant Oscillating Organization, Systnn Practice and Action R~earch, Vol. 13, No 3. Andersen, Nids Akcrscrem & Born, Asmund (2001) /Gtrlighed og om.stilling, Nyt &a

Samfundsvidenskabcme, Kebcnhavn. Bateson, Gregory (1972) Sups to an ecolog, ofmind. collected essays in anthropol0t,7, psychiatry, evolution and epistnnolog,, Northvale, n. j. Cyert, Richard & March, James (1963) A Behavioral theory ofthe firm, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. Cronen, Vernon E. & Pearce, W. Barnett (I 980) Communication. "ctir:m, mtanin& The creation ofsot:ial realities, New York: Pracgcr. Cronen, Vernon E., Chen, Victoria & Pearce, W. Barnett (1988) Coordinated Management of Meaning, in Kim, Young Yun & Gudykunst, William B. (eds): Theories in intncultural communication, London: Sage. Croncn, Vernon E. & Pearce, W. Barnett (1981) Logical force in interpersonal communication: A new concept of the necessity in social behavior, Communication, vol. 6, p. 5-67. Derrida, Jacques (1992) Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority, in Conell, Rosenfeld &: Carlson (red): Deconstruction and the possibility ofjustict, N cw York: Routledge. Derrida, Jacques ( l 996) Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism in Mouffi:, C. (red): Deconstruction and pragmatism, Routledge, London.Feldman, Martha S. & March, James G. (1981) Information in Organisations as signal and symbol, Administrative Science Q,u,rtnly. vol 26, p. 171-186. Foerster, Heinz von {1989) Warhncmung, in Baudrillard, J., Borhringer, H. Flusser, V., Foerster, H., Friedrich, K.. & Weibel, P.: Philosophim tkr neuen Technologie, Berlin: Mervc Verlag. p 27-41. Foerster, Heinz von (1992) Ethics and Second-order Cybernetics, in Cybernetics Cl" Human Knowing, vol 1, No. 1, Aalborg. p. 9~19. Hosking, Dian-Marie, Daehler, Peter & Gergen, Kenneth]. (1995) Managemmtand organiution -rdatio1141 alternatiws to ;rufjviJUfl/ism, Avcbwy, Aldcrshot. Kirkeby, Ole Fogh (2000) MaNlgnnmt philosophy-a radi~al-normative perspective-, Berlin: Springer. Luhmann, Niklas (1982) World-Time and System History Th~ Differentiation of Society, New York: Columbia University Press. Luhmann, Niklas (1988a) Frauen, Manner und George Spencer-Brown, Zeitschriftftir Sozio/ogie, Stuttgart: Enke Verlag, vol. 17, no. I.

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Luhmann. Niklas (1988b): Erkmntnisals KDnstruktwn, Bcnteli Verlag. Bern.: Luhmann, N., 1998: Erkcndclsc som konscrukcion i Hermansen, M. (red): Fra

'4ringms horisont, Klim, Arhus. Luhmann, Niklas (1990a) The Cognitive Program of Constructivism and a Reality that Remains Unknown, Krohn, E. (ed): Selforganiutwn. Potraitofa Scientific Revolution, Kluwer Academic Publishers. Luhmann, Niklas ( 1990b) The Autopoicsis of Social Systems. Luhmann: F.ssays on Self-Reference, Columbia University Press. Luhmann, Niklas (1993a) Die Paradoxic des Entscheidcns, Vnwaltungs-Archiv. Zeitschrift.for Vn'Waltungskhre. Vn'Wllltung.srechtund Verwaltungspolitik, 84. Band, heft 3. p. 287-299. Luhmann, Niklas (1993b) Deconstruction as Second-Order Observing, New Liurary History, 24. p. 763-782. Luhmann, Nildas (1993c) Was ist der Fall und Was steckt dahinter? Die Zwei Soziologien und die Gcsellschafsthcorie, Zntschrift fiir Sozwlogie, jg. 22, heft 4. Luhmann, Niklas ( 1995a) Why Systems Theory?, Cybntia & Human Knowing, vol 3,

no.2. Luhmann. Niklas (1995b) Sodalsystmu, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Luhmann, Niklas (I 996) On the scientific context of the concept of communication,

Sod4/ Sdenct Informlllion, London: Sage, p. 257~267. Luhmann, Niklas (2000a) The relllity ofthe mass media, Cambridge: Polity Press. Luhmann, Niklas (2000b) Organisation.und En'1Cheidung, Wiesbaden: Westdeucscher Verlag. March, James G. (1997) Understanding how decisions happen in organizations Shapira, Zur (ed) Organizatumal tkcision making, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Maturana, Humbeno (1981) Autopoicsis, Zeleny, M (red): Autopoiesis: A Theory of Living Organisation, New York: Nonh Holland. Morgan, Gareth ( I 997) Images oforganization, 2. ed, Thousand Oaks, Cal.: Sage. Recd, Michael. & Hugheds, Michael (eds) (1992) Rtthinlting O,g4nization, London: Sage. Shannon, Claude E. & Weaver, Warren (1963) The Mathmu1ti,al Theory of Communication, Chicago: University of Illinois Press. Spcnccr·Brown, George (I 969) Laws ofForm, London: George Allen and Unwin

LTD. Westenholz., Ann (1993) Paradoxical thinking and Change in the Frames of Reference, Organir.asion Studies, vol 14, p. 37-58. Westenholz, Ann ( 1999) From a logic pcrspecitve to a Paradox Perspective in the Analysis ofan Employee owned Company, Economic and industrial Dmwcracy, vol 20,no.4 p. 503-534.

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The emergence of open-source software projects: How to stabilize self-organizing processes in emergent systems Michele Marner

Introduction This chapter draws on Ni.klas Luhmann's theory of social systems in order to develop a framework for the systematic analysis of emergent open-source software projects. It describes open-source software projects as interactive systems displaying a number of characteristic organizational features. Using this as its starting point, the ch.apter develops different factors that stabilize the emergent self-organizing processes in open-source software projects. Open-source software projects represent a figurative example of organizational emergence. A loosely coupled collaboration of developers communicating decentrally via the Internet either evolves under a given set of circumstances into a more or less stable organizational form or simply disappears. But what kind of organizational form do these emerging projects with no formal members and continuously changing panicipants represent? What ace the circumstances that influence the stabilii.ation or disappearance of emergent open-source software projects? The theoretical exploration of open-source software is still in its early stages (for example Lakhani/von Hippel, 2000; Harhoff/Henkd/von Hippel, 2000; Lernerffirole, 2001; McGowan, 2001; Moglen, 1999; von Hippel, 2001). Up until now, rather micro-economic based theories have been used to explain the existence of open-source software projects. They explain the incentives of users and developers to participate in open-source software projects (directly or indirectly) with more or less rational choic.es from an individual point of view using a static focus. The question remains, however, what kind of organizational form do emergent open-source software projects represent, and why do certain open-source software projects evolve and become institutionalised whereas others do not. In order co answer these questions, this chapter

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describes the self-organizing mechanisms of emergent open-source software projects from the super-individual point of view whilst adopting at the same time a more dynamic perspective of the process. Niklas Luhmann's sociological systems theory provides a useful theoretical basis on which to do this. The emergence of open-source software projects is described and analysed in four consecutive parts: in the first part the emergence of the open-source software phenomenon and open-source software projects in general are briefly described. Subsequently, the basic ideas behind sociological systems theory are explained. From this point of view, open-source software projects are described as interactive systems. In a third part, systems theory serves as a foundation for the actual analysis and explanation of factors that stabilize the emergence of open-source software projects. The final part discusses the results of that analysis and suggests further research topic.s.

Open-source software and organizational emergence The past few years have seen a dramatic growth in the number of open-source software projects in existence, the most prominent example being the LINUX operating system. The section below describes briefly the open-source software phenomenon, and the following section outlines the emergence of open-source software projects using the devdopment of LINUX as a concrete example.

The opm-source software phenomenon Open-source software is software that opens source code, source code being a set of instructions that devdopers write when creating programs. The so-called open-source movement believes that source code is a public good and therefore should be accessible to all. In most cases, both the executables and source code are available free of charge on the Internet, and anyone is allowed to copy the programs concerned, modify them, and redistribute the modified versions. The open-source phenomenon only seriously took off in the early eighties, when MIT researcher Richard Stallman (Stallman, 1998) established the GNU project with the aim of creating an open and free version of UNIX. The project yielded a host of imponant tools that were later merged with LINUX to produce a fully fledged operating system. To protect the work, Stallman founded the Free Software Foundation (FSF) and drafted the General Public License (GPL) chat LINUX and many other projects operate under to this day. The license aims to prevent the commercialisation of cooperatively developed software, and users and devdopers are not allowed to place their own license restrictions on the refined software. Stallman terms this "copyleft" - a play on

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THE EMERGENCE Of OPEN-SOURCE SOFTWARE PROJECTS

the word "copyright". Over the years, further license agreements have been drawn up, forming the legal background co the evolution of open-source software {McGowan, 2001; Moglen, 1999). In recent years, the open-source phenomenon has assumed a pivotal role in mainstream tasks such as Web browsing and e-mail, and the Internet in general is heavily reliant on open-source software. DNS (Domain Name System) and Sendmail are both open-source projects. Yahoo! relies on an open-source operating system (FreeBSD) and open-source Web server software (Apache) using an open-source scripting language (Perl} to deliver dynamic content to desktops.

The emergence ofopen-source software projects Normally, an open-source project comes to life as a result of a single idea dreamt up by a programmer or user over a problem that he or she is facing. This problem is then shared with others (possibly along with the solution) via the Internet, for example in a newsgroup or mailing-list. Interested users point out errors and make suggestions for improvement to the so-called "leader", normally the initiator of the open-source project, who then deddes whether the improvements should be implemented or not. As the open-source project grows, it usually splits into sub-systems, each sub-system having its own leader. The different groups of programmers work independently on different software modules. Almost all communication takes place via mailing-lists or via freely accessible Internet newsgroups. LINUX, the free operating system and presumably rhe best known opensource software project of all also evolved in this fashion. Because of his dissatisfaction with existing operating systems, twenty-one year old Linus Torvalds programmed a kernel resembling UNIX (Torvalds, 2001). Following its publication on the Internet, LINUX attracted the attention of thousands of interested users and developers across the world who, in turn, suggested. improvements and pointed out errors they had encountered. when making use of the system. Open-source projects require devdopers to write code either alone or in groups, make this code available over the Internet. solicit feedback on it from other developers, then modify the code before sharing it with others for general use. Each developer is free to work on any panicular aspect of the program, his choice normally being determined by his skills, experience and interests (Kuwahara, 2000). No formal membership is required, nor does a formal hierarchy exist (McGowan, 2001, p. 253). Nevertheless, LINUX relies on four structural layers comprised of the leader, the "trusted lieutenants", the "pool of

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devdopers"' and the "open-soucce community". The "trusted lieutenants" (Dafermos, 2001, p. 41) consist of a dozen developers that have carried out considerable work on a particular part of LINUX. Over an extended period of time, and as quasi project leaders, they are responsible for the maintenance of its kernel which contains the core processes of the software. They have to clearly and logically justify their decisions and these can be challenged by any other developer or user. Many other open-source projects exist besides LINUX. and descriptions of them and the participating dcvdopers can be found on the Internet on different Web-sites, such as (for example sourceforge.net). Whereas LINUX is an example of an emerging open-source project that evolves and survives, many other open-source projects vanish as quickly as they come into existence. At sourceforge.net, for example, hundreds of open-source projects exist only for a number of days, weeb, or months, one reason for chis being that the original intention of the project lies in solving some small developmental problem, which, once solved, renders the corresponding project meaningless. But projects also vanish without any problem having been solved or without even having been stancd.

A systems theory understanding of emergent open-source software projects Up until now, organizational research on open-source software projects has concenuated on the incentives of unpaid devdopers have to participate in open-source projects when acting ration~y (Lerner/Tirole, 2000; 2001). Whereas those motivational aspects have been thoroughly investigated., all attempts at explaining the coordination of open-source software projects have up until now proved unsuccessful. Even though both market- and hierarchical elements can be found in open-source software projects, neither prices nor authority in the classical sense are used as coordination mechanisms within them. Some less economically oriented authors stress the importance of a shared culture when describing developers' self-organization within opensource software projects (Markus er aJ., 2000; Ljungberg, 2000; Dafermos, 2001), but fail to come up with a corresponding theoretical framework. Furthermore, any analysis of emergent open-source software projects must take into consideration the dynamic nature of the self-organizing processes within chem. One way to consider their dynamic character while simultaneously avoiding the rational choice paradigm is to analyze their emergence from a systems theoretical view. If this is done, emergent open-source software projects

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can be described as .interactive systems that still display some characteristic features of organizations.

The exp/,anatory power ofsocial systems theory The social systems theory developed by Niklas Luhmann (1984; 1995; 1997) focuses on communication. According to Luhmann (1984; 1995), communication is the basic element of social systems, synthesized. from utterance (including all physical movements as well as speech or writing), information, and understanding. Representing social operations, they cannot be identified wich intentions and actions of individuals. With the focus on communications, theorizing depans from the rational choice paradigm. Social systems, in Luhmann's opinion, are not systems of actions expressing the thoughts and behaviour of individual actors, but systems of communications in which the communication itself determines what further communications occur. Decisions as a special kind of communication are no longer rational choices, and are only recognised as such when they result in other decisions having to be made. This view opens up new opportunities for research on the emergence of open-source software projects in particular, and on self-organizing processes in emergent systems in general. Much previous work on open-source software projects has focused on the motivations and intentions of actors. Social systems theory does not ignore cognitions and intentions, but interpret.s social systems as products of communication, and not cognitive psychic systems. Communication requires interaction between at least two individuals, and this in turn results in a shifting of focus away from analysis of the individual to analysis of the social relationships between individuals apressed by their communication. Unlike micro-economic based paradigms, Luhmann' s approach does not concentrate on existence, but on change and modification. In his bdief, the existence of systems is not the normal state of affairs but an exception in need of an explanation. Communication consists of fleeting events that couple with each other, with system reproduction occurring by means of the permanent coupling of typical communication events. Systems, accordingly, do not represent permanent structures, but instead constantly reproduce themselves by means of rhe execution of their operations. This self-reproducing (autopoietic) process in turn allows the system itself to determine whether and for which reamns communications change the system, generating random mutations and From these selecting the ones to be applied. This perspective~ therefore, is one that takes into account the dynamic nature of emergent open-source software

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projects, seeing them as loosely coupled and constantly changing collaborations of developers communicating decentrally via the Internet.

Opm-sourct software projects as interactive systems The organizational form of open-sourc.e software projects is difficult to define. This is because they are permanently re-configurating systems with "blurred" boundaries (Badaracco, 1988; Powell, 1990, p. 297), their participants continuously changing. Participants are not formal members, but are nevertheless allowed to participate in decision-making. According to Luhmann, opensource software projects probably would not be organizations but "merdy" interactive systems, nevertheless displaying a number of typical organizational characteristics. Using his terminology (Luhmann, 1995), interaction refers co communication between those present, and interactive systems emerge when several individuals engage in related communication and perceive the fact that they are engaged in communication. When presenc.e ends the system ends (see also Kieserling, 1999). Actually, in open-sourc.e software projects panicipants are not present in a classical sense. They are present in the form of perceiving each other via Internet. In principle, they have the possibility to follow each and every communication because of its documentation in mailing-lists or newsgroups. Interactive systems require an attentive core. This, in tum, can be constituted, for example, of a common subject. The subject provides the system with a structure, as the boundaries of the subject regulate participants' contributions (Luhmann, 1975, p. 24), and those who do not participate in its devdopment 1 cannot influence it. This functional selectivity, integrating participants ability of attention and remembering turns time co structure, i.e. this limited ability to participate essentially creates the structure of the interactive system. In open-source software projects common subjects are quite typical of communication. They play an important part in modularly structuring the project. Nevenheless, some characteristics exhibited by open-source software projects are more typical of organizations than of interactive systems. According to Luhmann (2000, pp. 51-52), organizations are autopoietic systems that consist of decisions as a specific kind of communication. Supplement.ary to ordinary communications, decisions express the fact that somebody had the right, authority or other good reasons to decide (Luhmann, 2000, p.142). Decisions are made by members. Although without formal members, in opensource software projects not only do decisions occur, but even decision programs exist. A further feature of open-sourc.e software projects that is usually the preserve of organizations lies in its ability to communicate outwardly usually via the 264

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project leader. In only this way can the environment recognize open-source software projects as systems. That would not be possible for interactive systems (Luhmann, 1997, p. 834).

Stabilizing emergent open-source software projects Characterizing emergent open-source software projects as interactive systems highlights their volatile nature. Some factors, however, do stabilize their emergent self-organizing patterns. A number of open-source software projects such as LINUX seem to go on forever, others vanish as quickly as they come into being regardless of whether they have achieved their original aim. Social sys... rems theory serves as a useful theoretical basis when searching for these stabilizing factors. According to Luhmann, communication connectivity stabilizes emergent systems. Another stabilizing force lies in the systemic memory.

The connectivity ofcommunications: Accessibility and modularity Assuming that a social system consists of communications lined up next to each other in a particular context, the connectivity of developers~ communications becomes a significant factor for the emergence and stabilization of selforganizing processes in open-source software projects. Connectivity refers to the inherent potential of communications to be perceived and succeeded by other communications. Luhmann speaks in addition of the Hparadox of the unity of the before and the after" (Luhmann, 2000, p. 56), with the connectivity of communication as one pre-requisite for the reproduction and, therefore, the survival of the system. Fulk et al. (1996) define connectivity in a similar manner, but from a more individualistic point of view, as the ability of defined publics to directly communicate with each ocher. Two factors that influence the connectivity of communications are (a) their accessibility and (b) their

modularity. (a) Accessibility ofcommunications: One pre..-requisite for communication connectivity is the accessibility of communications or, in Luhmann words, their perceptibility. Accessibility can be understood as a pan of the phenomenon Fulk et al. (1996) described as "communality". They define communality as the ability of each member to contribute to, access, and use a jointly held database. In open-source software projects all discussions are openly accessible via mailing-lists or newsgroups, and everyone has at least the possibility to read through the communications of others. Communications are shared freely with rhe inner and outer communities, and thousands of developers have access to, and can engage in the conversations that rake place. They can also

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communicate directly with every other member of the project (Dafermos 2001, p. 58) and the flow of information reaches all those interested in it. Accessibility requires that the communications are understandable to potential users and devdopers. In the case of highly successful open-source software projects such as LINUX, the software is understandable to the point of being a commodity. There must be a critical mass of interested users who are in turn software developers (Torvalds 1998), as when the product is used, it must also be tested for bugs and usability. One single person (or even a group of individuals sharing the same technical goal) cannot take into consideration all the uses a large user community is likely to make of a general-purpose product. (b) Thmuztic Mod"'4rity of Communication: Another factor that improves communication connectivity is its thematic modularity. According to Luhmann (2000, p. 59), communication can be functionally distinguished and simultaneously structured via subjects, each subject differing from the next and consequently structuring comm unication. The structure of subjects, in turn, determines the degree of communication connectivity and can be improved by thematic modularity. Discussing the "architecture of complexity", Simon (1962) already identified modularity as a specific logical process which improves the dynamic evolution of a complex system towards a new equilibrium in the evolving context. He showed how dramatically more stable the modular-levds principle is in evolving from elementary constituents compared to other processes with the same number of elements. According to Simon, one important aspect of modularity is the concept he termed "near-decomposability". Schilling (2000) later described this as "separability", and put as simply as possible, it refers to the degree co which the behaviour of a system at any one level is free of the lowerlevel interactions and the degree to which its interactions are irrelevant to higher system levels. Continuing in this frame of mind, what makes the parallel decentralised self-organizing processes of open-source software development feasible is the modular design of the software. Only piecemeal built software allows devdopers to work independently on the various components (Moody, 2001, p. 14 and p. 82), and modularity of this kind allows changes to be implemented without any risk of their having a negative impact on other parts of the kernd. Accordingly, modularity results in LINUX being extremely flexible (Torvalds, 1999, pp. 38-39). However, this does not mean that extensions are possible without the module structure being affected. The frame of the software, its interfaces, and its currently existing structure determine the scope that exists for further devdopmenc; but the fact that the degree of scope that exists is con-

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srantly changing does explain why the software must be invented anew even in spite of its modularity. Furthermore, the flexibility resulting from modularity is only of value if the modules can be integrated again (Schilling, 2000). Integration in turn depends on the frame in which the different modules are loca1:ed, and ideally should be determined at the project's inception. In the case of LINUX, for c:umple, Linus Torvalds built the initial module frame and is still responsible for the reintegration and functioning of modules. Parnas (1972) and Parnas et al. (1985) explicitly opcrationalised Simon's concept, thereby highlighting the advantages of modular designs in software devdopmenc: Firstly, modularity reduces complexity and consequently decreases the overall time spent developing the software. Different modules can be assigned co designers specializing in different fields. Secondly, modularity implies greater product flexibility: modules can be changed, moved, and substituted independently from each other thanks to standard interfaces. Thirdly, a modular structure results in a better understanding of the project by potential users and developers. Thematic modularity leads to a modular project hierarchy, with managers and relevant teams assigned individual modules. At the top of open-source software projects, for example, stands a core team usually including the project initiator, and this core team, in turn, decides which project leaders are to be responsible for the development of individual modules. The project design must be as modular and simple as possible to facilitate digital collaboration.

Systemic memory: Documentation and decision-making programmes According to Luhmann (1995; 1997; 2000), the systemic memory represents one way in which to stabilize the system, The systemic memory places the results of past selections at the system's disposal (Luhmann~ 1997, p. 44-45), and monitors every system information processing operation, deciding what is and what is not to be retained. Usually, the memory function within organizations is maintained to a large extent by individuals. However, in the case of open-source software projects, this would result in it being a wildly fluctuating memory, reflecting the volatile nature of the project's membership. Instead the systemic memory of open-source software projects lies in the docummtlltion and 111·chiving of the code devdopment in mailing-lists or newsgroups. Decisian-making programmes represent another aspect of the systemic memory. (a) Documentation andArlhiving-. Written communication represents the most important component of Max Weber's model of bureaucracy (Weber, 1972). According to him, written files represent the starting point of the modern

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organization. whereas, according co Luhmann (2000, p. 215), normal organizations are able to make conscious use of both oral and written communication. Within open-source software projects written communication, however via the Internet, again predominates. Documentation creates a systemic memory (Luhmann, 2000, p. 159), and therefore stabilires social systems. The memory documents every piece of information processed and determines which communications are to be retained. The memory enables a sdecrive re-utilization of the irretrievable past (Luhmann, 2000, p. 152· 154), and whilst communications are tied to certain moments and cannot be repeated (a piece of information can surprise only once), documentation allows communication to be reproducible, and therefore increases the probability of it being followed by other communications. In open-source software projects Internet communication is almost invariably documented. Documented in mailing-lists and newsgroups, every communication contributes to the systemic memory. All communications within open-source software systems are reproducible at all times and accessible to all that find them of interest. Consequently, communication regarding the development of the source code can be noted and commented upon. (b) Decision-Making Program11Us: The mailing-lists and newsgroups of opensource software projects contain only electronic files rdating to the current project These files are open to all. but cannot be an anchor for the common construction of reality (Luhmann, 1997, pp. 46-47). Instead, a decisionmaking programme can act as a substitute anchor representing a certain core of the open-source software project. According to Luhmann (2000, p. 257), decision programmes define che conditions under which decisions are held to be objectively correct. They structure the systemic memoty (Luhmann, 2000, p. 275) and determine what is to be retained and what can be discarded. As a coarse frame for the discrimination between remembering and forgetting, decision programmes are indispensable - particularly if participants are in a continuous state of flux as in the case of open-source software projects. Without well functioning decision systems, open•source software projects would struggle co survive, as they play a vital role in structuring the systemic memory. Decision programmes give rise to systemic intrinsic causality, and whether applied (be it correctly or wrongly) or not, always cause results to be arrived at in the system. This constructed intrinsic causality in the system in turn allows it to be independent of its environment. Luhmann (2000, p. 263·271) differentiates between conditional and purpose programmes. Being conditional pr()grammes, decision-making rules in

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open-source software projects determine when and how decision procedures are run. Usually, in open-source software projects, decision programmes exist for decisions and communications concerning mailing, debugging, and programming in terms of 'bug formats' or 'hackerguides'. Furthermore, in other open-source software projea.s exist voting systems for important decisions like changes in source code. W rinen formal guidelines lay down the exact procedure and are subject to scrutiny by everyone on the corresponding Websites. Although not as compact as those of organizational management systems, these rules nevertheless fonn a decision-making framework. This decisionmaking framework plays an important role in stabilizing every emergent opensource software project, especially because users and developers of the opensource software are not bound by contract, nor are they required to adopt any formal role, all contributions being voluntary.

Discussion This chapter described communication connectivity and systemic memory as important stabilizing faaors within emergent open-source software projects. From an organizational point of view, the stabilizing impaa of the described factors results from their coordinative influence. Communication conncaivity and systemic memory are able ro reduce the overall need for coordination and therefore make the sclf-organiu.rion of developers easier. The accessibility and modularity of communication (as aspects of connectivity) and its reproducibility (resulting from the systemic memory) clearly result in a degree of information transparency, and from a political point of view, this transparency reduces the attractiveness ofpolitical games. Thus information transparency pushes rhe political aspects of decision-making proc.esses into the background. What counts is the quality of the argument and not the power of special interests. Possibly this is the reason for the absence of both classic hierarchical and market mechanisms within open-source software projects. In addition to the factors highlighted in this chapter with reference to systems theory, other stabilizing conditions also exist within emergent opensource software projects. One important stabilizing &cror is a culture that encourages people to conttibute and share, which is in turn stabilized by institutional frameworks. One example is the General Public License (GPL) previously referred to. Additional stabilizing factors include trust, reputation and solidarity. These "soft" mechanisms of integration are able to "symmetrise" communication and have implications with regard to the availability of truth, normative rightness of activities, authenticity of subjects and the usefulness of 269

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coherence and understanding. Another stabilizing factor is the nature of the project leader. As promoter of the project, (s)he must not only be a technical innovator but also a competent leader. Further research should analyze these latter factors and their influence on stabilizing self.organizing processes in emergent open-source software projects.

References Bardaracco, Joseph L., Jr. ( 1988) Changing forms of the corporation, pp. 67-91 in: J. R. Meyer/J. M. Gustafson (eds.) The U.S. business corporation. An institution in transition, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger. Dafermos, George (2001) Management and virtual decentralized networks: The Linux project. MA Thesis of Durham Business School, Durham 2001, http:// opcnsourcc.mit,edu/onlinc_papcrs.php (edited 27 th November 200 I). Fulk, Janet, Andrew Flanagin, Mark Kalman, Tony Ryan, and Peter R. Monge ( 1996) Connective and communal public goods in interactive communication systems. Communication Theory 6: 60-87. Harhoft Diecmar, Joachim Henkel and Eric von Hippel (2000) Profiting from voluntary information spillovers: How users benefit by freely revealing their innovations. MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper 4125, July 25, 2000. Hippel, Eric von (2001) Innovation by User C.Ommunitics: Learning from opensource software. Sloan Management &view 42: 82-86. Kicserling, Andre ( 1999) Kommunikation unter Anwesendm: Studim uber lnttraktionssystnne. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Lakhani, Karim and Eric von Hippel (2000) How open source software works: Free user-to-user assistance, MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper 4117. Lerner, Josh and Jean Tirolc (2000) The simple economics of open source. Working Paper 7600. National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, th http://www.nbcr.org/papcrs/w7600 (edited 12 March 2001). Lerner, Josh and Jean Tirole (2001) The open source movement: Key research questions. European Economic Rev-iew 46: 819-826. Ljungberg, Jan (2000) Open source movements as a model for organising. European Journal ofInformation Systems 9: 208-216. .. Luhmann, Niklas (1984) Soziak Systeme: Grundrij! ~iner allgnneinm Theorie. Frankfurt am Main: suhrkamp. Luhmann, Niklas (1995) Social systems. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Luhmann, Niklas (1997) Die GeseOschllft dn' Ges~/Jxh11.ft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkarnp. Luhmann, Niklas (2000) Organisation und Entscheidung. Opladen/Wiesbadcn: Wcstdeurscher Verlag. Markus, M. Lynne, B. Manville and C.E. Agrcs, C.E. (2000) What makes a vinual organiution work? Sloan Managnnmt &view, Fall: 13-26.

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McGowan, David (2001) Legal implications of open source software. Univtrsity of Illinois Law &vino I: 241-304. Moglen, Eben (1999) Anarchism triumphant: free software: and the death of copyright. First Mond4.y 4http://firstmonday.org/i~ues.html (edited 2nd August 2001). Moody, Glyn (2001) Rebel code: Linux and the open source revolution. Perseus Publishing. Markus, M. Lynne, Brook ManvHle and Carole E. Agrcs (2000). Parnas, David Lorge (1972) On the criteria to be used in decomposing systems into modules. Communicatiom ofthe ACM 15( 12): 1053-1058. Parnas, David Lorge, Paul C. Clements, and David M. Weiss (1985) The modular structure of complex systems. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 11 (3). Powell, Walter W. (1990) Neither market nor hierarchy: network forms of organization, pp. 295-336 in; Larr L. Cummings/Barry M. Scaw (eds.): &search in D,ganizational Behavior. VoL 12, Greenwich, C.Onn.: Jai Press. Schilling, Melissa A. (2000) Toward a general modular systems theory and its application to interfirm product modularity. Acl.lllemy ofMttn4gemtnt &view 25(2): 312-334. Simon, Herbert (1962) The archirecrure of complexity. Prou~dings ofthe Amtrican Philosophy Society, 106: 467-482. Stallman, Richard (1998) The GNU-Project, accessible at hccp://www.gnu.org/gnu/ the-gnu-project.html, 1998 (edi ced 27th November 2001). Torvalds, Linus (1999) The Linux edge. Communicatiom ofthe ACM 42 (4): 38-39. Torvalds, Linus (2001) Just for Fun: The story ofan accidmtial revolutionary. HarperBusincss. Weber, Max ( 1964) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Band I, Koln/Bcrlin.

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Standards for care and statutory flexibility Helger H0jlund and Anders La Cour

Introduction This chapter discusses public reforms within the framework of Danish local government. Its aim is primarily empirical although it uses Niklas Luhmann's organisation theory as a theoretical backdrop for the analyses. The chapter focuses on a range of reforms that have been carried out in the sector for eldercare in recent years and uncovers how unexpected dilemmas follow the reforms. This happens despite the fact that the reforms are based on faxed standards and definite procedures.

Change as point of reference for observation Today social scientists and organisation theorists speak of change in the welfare state and its organisations. Some enthusiastically proclaim that we face greater changes than ever before. Others critically suggest that change has just become one of the great buzzwords of the present. Both sides grasp their part of the story but fail to see that the discussion is not as new as it might seem considering its range and intensity. Already I 0-15 years ago> or 30 years for that matter> change was discussed. extensivdy. Without overstating the case, one can fairly conclude that one of the most stable features throughout these years has been the ongoing discussion about change (Antonsen & J0rgensen 2000; Esmark 1999; Green-Pedersen 1999; lzgreid & Pedersen 1999; Ejersbo 1996; Brunsson & Olsen 1993; Brunsson et al. 1989; Bentzon 1988). If we look at the most recent initiatives from the political quarters, they, too, are characterised. by their consistent focus on reorganisation and development. As it is stated in the introduction to a proposition by the Danish government a couple of years ago (Ministry of Finance 2000), it is time to take "new steps and define new guidelines" after the completion of the initiatives from "The Getting On Programme"' from 1998. Today, these guidelines have already been defined. Thus, in January 2001, the Danish government issued its

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prognoses for a sustainable future. Still, these prognoses indicate that conscious choices and consistent policies are part of the ongoing reforms. The future has co be safeguarded by reforms in the present - not because there is any cause for distrusting the current development; which is (as emphasised six times in the introduction) good, but because the challenges are massive (as is also emphasised six times) (Ministry of Finance 2001: 1-6). The Government acts enthusiastically and with great haste. New proposals for change are suggested. The proposals constantly change in nature as well as in perspective. In less than four years the Government has succeeded in predicting, effecting, and defining new guidelines for the development of the welfare stare. In the sectors of the welfare state planners have to deal with the haste of the politicians. Here, initiatives are pursued that can manage the turbulent surroundings. On the one hand they satisfy the political claims for continuous development, on the other they protect the sectors from drowning in changing

expectations. Thls chapter does not concentrate on the political side of the reforms incited in the wdfare sectors but rather on their wider implications for the understanding of welfare. 1 The analyses will focus on one single sector: that is the sector for eldercare. Here rather drastic organisational reorganisations have taken place within the past three decades (H0jlund 2000). We do not analyse all aspects of these changes but keep to a few. For example we do not analyse how old people,s homes were closed down in the 1980s under political slogans of "hdp to selfhelp" (Platt 1992, Hansen & Platt 1995). We also will not analyse the direct effects of the 1990-sloga.ns of "outsourcing and greater involvement of volunteer org.mizations,, (la C.our 2002a, Ministry of Social Affairs 1997; Andersen 1996). These changes are taken to be the important backdrop of the initiatives addressed in the chapter. In fact, they are of critical importance. The sector for eldercare went through significant changes during those decades: its foundation was changed, its target group redefined, and its administration transformed. Taken together, these changes heightened the inner complexity of the sector. They made visible the contingency of its most imponant d.ecis.ions and challenged. its demarcation lines to the environment. All in all, they gave rise to intense speculation concerning the core and identity of the sector. And precisely this identity speculation presents the most significant background for the reforms we are going to address. Because the ddercare sector found it increasingly problematic to explain what actually characterised its core I For analyses which, despite their differenc perspectives, have in common that they are based on the communications of "'the political", we refer co Andersen & Born 2001; Schmidt 1999: 243 - 266; and Dahler-Larsen 1998. For more tradi1ional politic.al-scientific analyses of institutional change$ one might read Blom-Hansen et al. 1998.

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services, people began doubting whether it was (or ever had been) possible to formulate what elderCaJ"e actually was. Unity was about to disintegrate and it became highly important co be able to describe the inner proceaes of the sector by means of an unambiguous and collective vocabulary. The capacity for selfdescription obtained value in itself and above all it became increasingly important to be able to reach identical decisions through identical arguments everywhere in the sector. The similarity of language and decision making procedures was thought to rebuild the declining identity of the sector. Or so at least it was hoped. Two reforms from the end of the 1990s became predominant in these attempts to standardise and formalise the eldercare to unity. However, before we approach the actual analyses, we will present a brief overview of the historical evolution of the Danish sector for ddercare.

Historical processes of differentiation Not until the act on "home help" of 1949 does home care obtain an actual position as an independent welfare sector, bur from this point on the secrols

legal constitution is strengthened by several laws. In the 1950s and 1960s we can observe a reorientation ofits tasks: being mainly directed at elderly and disabled people. From the beginning of the 1970s, the sector is consolidated as an independent domain with specially trained professions, independent work routines, rules, and administration (H0jlund & la Cour 2001: foodnote 2). Seen in general, the differentiation processes of the home care sector have resulted in increased specialisation and firmer administration of the sector's main services. The internal oomplexity has grown over the years and at the same rime the sector has obtained a solidification of its particularity. This can be perceived from the perspective of factual, tempor.d, and social dimensions, respectI·ve1y. 2 If we begin with the foau.al dimension, it is imponant co note that in the first years, home care is exclusively specified as help for housewives with natural househeeping tasks. Thw, the right to define the substantial content of the tasks lies with the ben~ciarics. This is not changed until the implementation of a number of reforms in the early 1970s, where subsequently the home care workers (or rather, the inspectors) rake over the right to define the tasks. Moreover, the tasks become classified and specialised (until then they were only divided into "care services" and "practical aid services"). Today, this specialisa-

------. --~~ 2 For a further elaboration of the three dimensions of meaning. see Luhmann (Luhmann 1997: 136ft).

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tion has evolved into a differentiated system of inspection in which trained inspectors estimate the need of the elderly people and allocate the services (H0jlund 2001). From a temporal perspective, the differentiation of the home care sector can be seen as a increasing fixation of its temporal structures. In the first years the structures are rclativdy capacious. The specification of the time consumption is general and, in reality, the allocation of services is without termination premises. Once given, the services are given for life (through continual aid). Thus, there is no formulation of temporal procedures in relation to the execution of tasks or to the premises for evaluation and re-evaluation of the services. Not until the late 1970s were temporal conc:eptualisations established in the sector. Whereas the work up until this point had been organised around one single difference (the difference between "temporary" and "permanent,. aid), over the course of the 1970s more complex forms of time fixation are developed (Dahl 2000a: 221ff). Today, tcmporality is highly differentiated both in practical and administrative terms. All municipalities have established procedures for their service evaluations. In some municipalities the duration of each specific pan of the service is decided on the basis of gwding time standards. A few municipalities actually use bar code systems in their planning3 (Fuglsang 2000; Jyllands Posten 3.10. 2000). From a social perspective, the same picture can be seen as in the factual and temporal dimension: that is a home care sector evolving from low to high complexity. In the early period the relationship between provider and recipient is not established as a dichotomy. The public representative merdy plays the role of replacement for the housewife - a tempor3.ry' substitution (doubling) of the role. Nor until the increased professionalism of home care does an actual division into provider and recipient occur. At this moment the social content of the two roles moves from duplication to complementarity. This complementarity can be defined as having a certain unity of difference. The recipients are defined as having their own (individual) needs, moreover requirements are defined that exceed general helplessness. For example, requirements are formulated concerning panicipation, devdopment, and adaptation.~ The providers, i.e. the home care, are trained as autonomous professionals. The professional status consolidates their authority and underpins their right to define services.

3 The bar code systems enable the home help to register, while in the home of the dderly, standardised services have been provided. This is subsequently stored on a computer. 4 This happens from the early 1970s (Dahl 2000a: 20 lff), but the tendency has been strengthened in re whereas formerly it was mainly tied to the factual and social dimensions. As concerns the social dimension, this change can be seen as a double-sided deprivation of the home care workers and the elderly people. Their situational authority is transferred to the catalogues, where it is prefixed by the authority of the sdentific codes and paragraphs. The communication of need is moved from the social horizon of the elderly people and care workers to a reservoir of objectified. sociality. To conclude, "shared language" heralds an increased degree of visibility in home care but only on suictly defined premises. In practical terms the changed premises imply that the rationality relating to the actual care is changed. In relation to the administrative level the changes produce a rationality gain as the accumulation and dispersion of information is programmed and systematised. But at the same time the authority of the decision making is moved. The locus of care is no longer fixed ro the mutual judgement between the home care workers and the elderly people but to shared catalogues and care statistics. The shared coJlection of information sustains a new care culture that leans more on administrative matter-of-fuctness and less on day-to-day rationality. From a fact-oriented perspective this entails the occurrence of blind spoti where the decisions that cannot be standardised are located. They cannot be communicated through the fixed codes of "shared language" and neither can their non-communication. The home care sector is blind to the fact that such blind spots may even exist within the decision making structures. To para-

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phrase a well known formulation from Luhmann, the home c.are sector cannot see, chat it cannot see, what it cannot see. Seen from a social perspective the changes imply that the authority structure of the care is loosened from its attachment to the daily interactions of the care workers and the elderly people. This loosening produces blind spots where the social co-ordination is located. This co-ordination (and the social decision making related to it) remains hidden to the administrators and politicians. They herald the objectifying and visibility-producing possibilities of the new welfare technology, and rest their understanding of the decision making processes on the ideal saying: politicians do decision making and administrators (including care workers) implement wilfully. The outline of the new conditions for home care is as follows: most importantly, "shared language" causes home care to enter a standardised linguistic structure in which shared concepts, creation of knowledge, and procedures surrounding the decision making form the development. This facilitates harmony but also entails new conflicting elements. On the one hand, the basic decision making of the area is deparadoxified7, but at the same time new blind spots turn up. Thus, although the standards protect against external pressure and strengthen the internal cohesion, "shared language" might prove to produce new and unforeseen conflicts. This happens if the program does not manage to create a link between the explicit premises for decision making and the sector's 8 culture. If it fails to do this, the language will be up against both factual and social arguments. This will slow down the flow of decision making, and extra resources will have to be set aside to prove the usefulness of the language.

The Contract Sheet Reform Bdow, a standardisation/formalisation initiative will be discussed that was introduced into the home care sector with the k.t on Social Service of 1995. 6 This is a fundamental concept in l.Aahmann's theory and is discussed on several occasions in ..Or~ ganimion und Entscheidung" (Luhmann 2000b). In the context of organisational decisions, the concept draws attention to the fact that decisions always represent rcstriaions wirhin a space of possibility: restrictions which simultaneoUsly create concomitant blind spots of undecidability which the organisation cannot see (and cannot see that they cannot see). 7 The concept of dqarlld'1!xifiation is a fundamental systems,,theorctical concept which is dis· cussed in various contexts, from an organisational pcnpectivc (Luhmann 1993). In this context the concept is used to illustrate the way that the sector fur home care, by aeat.ing programs for iu decision making. displaces (deparadoxifics) the paradmes related to its decision making. 8 In a system-theoretical sense culture can be seen as the non-decided premises for the decision making of the sector.

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The law stated that the care is to be defined at the time of inspection and subsequently confirmed. in a formal contract between the elderly people and the home care system (Ministry of Social Affairs 1995). In fact, the assignment of services within a formalised framework is nothing new. There has always been some degree of administtative control on the formulation of needs and assignment of services in eldercace (Dahl 2000a: 162ft). What is new, is the form of the formalisation: the contract-like agreements. The rationale behind the agreements is two-sided. On one hand the aim is to signal recognition and protection of the individual elder, on the other the hope is that the agreements will guard the system against backbreaking negotiations on a day-to..day basis. The possibility of referring to fixed procedures and delimited situations for negotiating the services facilitates a certain degree of continuity in the planning. A high level of information ensures that all involved parties know the conditions. The conflict potential is reduced. The contract sheets indicate a formalisation as well as an individualisation of the rdationship between the elderly people and the home care system. The formalisation rests on a normative judicial ideal of protecting the elders against casual treatment. The direct form of agreement points in the direction of individual accountability, while the formal framework points in the direction of everybody's equality before the Law. This doubleness creates tensions between the individual focus and the shared basis of the agreements. These tensions can be seen in the situation of inspection, which is suspended between two poles: on one hand, a concrete consideration of the elderly person, and on the other hand, a universal assessment made on a professional basis. The decision making is based on expert opinion while also allowing for the elderly people to acrually participate in it - insoluble tensions are created. The professional measures for decision making (based on professional standards and objective criteria) form a contrast to the subjective and situational self-evaluation done by the elderly people. The contract sheets introduce fundamental changes into home care that can be analysed in the three meaning dimensions introduced earlier. From a social perspeaive it appears that the relations between the home care workers and the elderly people are formalised and tied explicitly to an authority outside the care situation. In other words: The contract sheets juridicify the sociality surrounding the care situation, and by doing so it changes its rationality. From being based on a reciprocal relationship of crust the rationality is replaced by a contract-like rationality which bases itself on an abstract faith in objective decision making procedures and formal contract forms. This rationality stabilises the decision making. bur it also makes it less sensitive to situational factors. The stability is changed, or rather the premises for the stabilisation of the deci-

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sion making are changed. From being based on the personal relationship between the elderly people and the care workers, it is now tied to the administrative rdationship between the elderly people and the system as such. In rdation to temporality, the contract sheets change the coding of the "before" and the "after" of the care situation. Where "before" up until the agreements implies the specificity of the care ("we have always done it this way"), the agreements turn "before" into an indefinite reservoir of unspecificity that can always be changed by new agreements . .& regards the "after," a turning can be seen as weU. Up until the agreements "after" is an open reseIVoir of nor yet realised possibilities, fixing it in agreements attaches it to a defined space of possibilities. This pre-fixation of the "after" is intriguing. First of all, it changes the manageability of the future. Second, it leads to a momentary speed gain. The question is, however, to what extent the increased administrative control as well as the speed gain are chewed up by co-ordination procedures established in order to pick up exceptions. If an extended apparatus has to be defined for the management of daily fluctuations, the contract sheets will slow down the process rather than speed it up. First of all, standardised. measures are required for deciding when a change in the state of health of the dders can be regarded as sufficiently significant to lead to changes in the agreements, and, second, time consuming procedures must be set in motion to change the time assignments, The more necessary it is to schedule for re-inspections, the more resources have to be put aside for the de-fixation of the pre-fixed temporality. The inherent paradox consists in the fact that heightened predefinition of the care situation heightens the need for re-definition of instruments/procedures. The more detailed fixation of time-use, the more topics to discuss for the involved parties. The intention to guard against future surprises entails being surprised by discussions of the present. The above also applies to the factual dimension. Here, contrary to all inten· tions, the detailed specification of the care produces new latent subjects of dispute. Rather than definitively changing the care decisions from being, in principle. undecidable to being, in fact, simple calculations, the contractualised decision making is made increasingly tied to its inherent impossibility. The detailed specifications of the contract sheets (or what could be called the positivity of the decision making) inadvertently produces self-contingency since they cannot escape communicating their other side (their negativity). The greyness of the unactualised possibilities is communicated along with the brightness of what has actually been decided. Rather than fixing the choice between alternatives (as was the hope), by turning the decision making processes into unproblematic and formalised calculation processes, the contract sheets are introducing potential conflicts into the decision making processes -

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whenever the level of specificity is raised in one dimension, it simultaneously raises the non-specified. conflict potential in the other. The content of the care is consolidated in formal writings, but rather than reducing the potential for conflict it actualises new conflict potentials. Moreover, the fact that the wrinen agreements establish the risk of a more static care is in itself a potential theme of conflict. The formalisation brought. on by the contract sheets replaces the situational judgement concerning the care with a predefined logic of decision making. Less authority is entrusred to the home care workers and the elderly people. The locus of judgement is moved from the care situation to the agreement situation. A responsibility of acruality is replaced by a responsibility of formalisation. The formalisation produces heightened visibility but also invisibility. Blind spots occur in situations where the care workers and the elderly people decide to deviate from the contract sheets. The rule-following of the contract sheets is formalised through second-order paragraphs, while rule-deviation receives a status of non-articulation. The difference between decision- and non-decision making - or rather the difference between deciding and deciding to deviate from prior decisions - is dislocated. Prior decision making is made easier but later deviations more unlikely.

New threats to unity The recent development within the home care sector has given rise co criticism from various sources. A number of single cases have circulated in the media in which elderly people have not been given the help to which they fdt legally enti~ tied,9 and interest groups have given voice to discontent. Especially the DanAge Aswciation has been vigorous. Two years ago they got involved in legal proceedings on behalf of a number of elderly people whose home care had been denied them without staturo.ry individual evaluation. Lardy DanAge has come out with a study showing that the elderly people fail to make use of existing complaint procedures because they fear the reaction from the local authority. Different castigators of the welfare state have taken part in the debate as well. Thus, people like Hanne Reintoft (1998) and the former Social Democratic minister of social affairs Bent Rold Andersen have contributed critic.al comments in the media and in book publications. In 1999, with heavy media coverage, Bent Rold Andersen resigned from the Social Democratic Party as a 9

Several illustrative eumples can be mentioned. One of che more speaacular ones concerned an

old lady in Arhus who was cold tha.c: the home care was not allowed to dust her house because of aU her knick-knacks.

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protest against the social deterioration he was witnessing in the sector for elder.. care. And in a book &om 1999 and in subsequent articles he criticises the Danish politics of home care for being characterised by what he calls a servic.emanagement culture (Andersen 1999, 2001). In research, the development in the sector for home care has given rise to critical analyses (Vidcnscenter p.1 zldreomridet 2001; Fuglsang 2000; Dahl 2000b). This is most explicitly seen in an empirical study from 1999 (Hansen et al. 1999) in which the standardisations are criticised for creating decision making structures that are not sensitive to the requests made by the elderly people regarding the devdopment. The study compares the organisation of care in two municipalities and comes to the conclusion that only a minority of the home care workers are contact-orientated and exercise companionship while even fewer are interested in the elders and their particular life stocy (Hansen et al. 1999: 14). The straight forward conclusion of the study is that the capacity for flexibility on the part of the home care workers would increase satisfaction with the service among the elderly people. The conclusion of this study is elaborated in a subsequent pamphlet with the telling title "Flexible home care is wonh its weight in gold" (AKF 1999). The pamphlet stresses a wish among elders for flexible home care, that is, home care in which the care workers listen to the immediate needs of the dderly people and dare to depart from the predefmed descriptions of the job. The pamphlet poses a more fundamental question about whether the social aspect has been given the appropriate attention and weight through the changes of the last fifteen years (AKF 1999:3). Two main issues stand out if we try to sum up the points of criticism put forward in the media and in research on ddercare; firstly, critical statements are launched concerning the local interpretation of the "act on social service" (Ministry of Social Affairs 195 5; 1997) and, second, criticism is voiced towards the standardisation tendencies in home care in recent years. Both issues are sustained by a thorough criticism of the restrictions laid down on the daily encounter between the home care workers and the elderly people.

The law on flexible home care In the politicai system the minister of social affairs strives to put a damper on the criticism put forward in the media concecning home care. The mutual irri10 tations produce cumulative conflict spirals, and something has to be done. In the spring of 2000 he decides to establish a range of hearings concerning the 10

For theoretical clarifications of the concept of irritation (Luhmann 1997).

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lack of flexibility in eldercare. Ar. this point in time media criticism is heated to an extent, implying that immediate action must be taken. He uses the hearings as a way of demonscratlng political responsiveness. A range of specific questions are put on the agenda: attitudes toward the daily work pressure; questions on cutbacks; and questions concerning the care culture of the sector. In one of the main conclusions from the hearings the problem is posed like this: "The staff is too stressed and do noc have time for social interaction and care ... Many elderly people feel that they have been misled and that they are victims of arbitrary decision making. Moreover, the limited possibility for improvisation regarding rhe care is a source of irritation. And rhe fact chat the staff can only spend a carefully defined number of minutes with each individual is a direct provocation in the eyes of many elderly people," (Ministry of Social Affairs 2000a: 3).

The hearings on eldercare bring co light a fundamental discontent within the care sector. Professional arguments are presented which maintain that home care is characterised by values and norms, which are incompatible with the regulatory demands advanced in particular by the administrative authorities of the local settings. .& it is stated more or less explicitly, the administrative ethos of visibility and certainty are incompatible with the demands for dignity and respect that home care workers are met with in the homes of the elderly people (Social Kritik 1999; Videnscenter p:1 zldreomr!det 2001; Ministry of Social

Affairs 2000a).

In response to the general debate in the media and the specific criticism brought out at the hearings, the Minister of Social Affairs submits a proposal in the fall of 2000 which is subsequently passed and takes effect on April I, 2001 (Ministry of Social affairs 2000b). The Act, affectuated, is named "Act on Flexible Home Carl', and its purpose is to give rise to a more flexible organisation and execution of the home care. The Act intents to allow for a greater degree of user-involvement while at the same time authorising the home care worker's decision making authority. Specifically, the Act contains preliminary proposals for a number of changes of the decision making premises regarding home care. Each municipality is obliged to allow their old citizens to replace the agreed services with other scrvic.es, but only on special occasions. & stated in the Ministry's notes following the Act, the ddcrly people might in particular cases opt not to receive parts of the deaning, in favour of a service not included in the local care catalogues {Ministry of Social Affairs 2000b). The Act guarantees the elderly

11 Five hearings took place; one national hearing in Copenhagen March 2 and four local hearings around the country (Ministry of Social Aff.ain 2000).

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people the possibility of choosing such services: for example companioned walks, special shopping services, and letter writing. In the evecy day situation it is the home care workers who decide whether it is justifiable or not to depart from the normal scace of things. This means that it is the responsibility of the home care workers, therefore, to estimate from visit to visit the extent to which it is acceptable co depart from the granted services in favour of individual wishes. The Act on flexibility does not change the fact that the municipalities are still responsible for providing the eld~rly people with the nec.essary help. It is specified, however, that the home care workers make the specific (situational) judgements. Moreover, it is specified, that the no further expenditures are expected from implementing the Act. This implies that when a different service is asked for, it can be granted only at the expense of the pred.efmed services (Ministry of Social Affairs 2000b).

Law as a political rescue manoeuvre The "Act on flexible home care" can be seen as the political system's exercise of its right to influence the decision making structures of the home care sector. Basically, it aims at de-bureaucratising a situational decision making that in the first place is non-bureaucratisable. This can only be done through the paradoxical act of formalising the possibility of depaning from formality. The every day decision making is given a hollow right to informality. On the surface ofit, the elderly people and the care workers can &eely choose to depan from formalised and professional conclusions reached in the context of the inspection and sealed in the contract agreements, but good reasons have to be given (especially if something goes wrong). Soon their joint sctdement (to disregard existing settlements) can turn against them. They will have to come up with good reasons for being free to decide not to decide. Seen in general, the Act on flexibility is a political response to the internal and external pressure on the home care sector that has been seen in recent years. The reaction is both, therefore> a response to the irritations from the public, the media, and the scientific system, and an expression of an attempt to parch up the side effects of the numerous reforms in the sector for eldercare in the 1990s. In that way the Act represents a political rescue manoeuvre to dissolve paradoxes, but also a rescue manoeuvre that creates new paradoxical side effects in the field. More specifically, the Act paradoxically represents a positive answer to the criticism of home care while simultaneously sustaining the fundamental decision making structures that gave rise to this criticism. By doing

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this, the bill inadvertently ends up substantiating some of the basic paradoxes that relate to the daily decision making of che sector. Most importantly, tensions occurs between the visible settlements reached at the inspections and the invisible decisions to depart from this settlement reached in the everyday situations. These tension ace realised. as a tensions between a professional (and formalised) judgement and a situational judgement that is only visible to the home care workers and the dderly people. Moreover, a conflict of interest is intensified in relation to the formation of expectations among the elderly people. To be more specific, a pressure of expectations is created. The expectations of the elderly people basically concern a wish for individualised care, and the problem is that they work contrary to the general decision making structures implemented these years. This means that the new expectations almost by definition have to be disappointed. The management of expectations, which is installed by "shared language" and the contracr sheets, is based on management by predefinition and not on management by situational sensitivity and reflexivity. This means that the home care workers, independently, and without suppon from the general decision making structures of the area, have to handle the pressure of expectations from the dderly people. And, even worse, the pressure of expectation is (since it is un-articulated and therefore invisible) boundless or at least uncontrollable. The highly ambitious management at the administrative levd corresponds to an unmanageableness on the practical level. And it is by no means hard to imagine the risks run by the care workers, who choose to evade the professionally based settlements in order to respond co the needs articulated in the actual situation. Because this decision making is exclusively tied to their personal judgement, they cannot escape being held accountable for the implications chat such an evasion might have. This risk of being held responsible is not sustained by strict rules (as for the inspectors and the inspection situations). It is informal and omnipresent - no safe procedures or formaiised rules. For the home care worker the pressure of expectations creates role confusion. First of all, because the new flexibility, expected, iris heavily dependent on the individual home care worker to be able to decide when the pre-programmed decision making are to be evaded. Second, because the home care workers are met with new expectations from the elderly people, the confusions are most clearly seen as unavoidable confusions in the handling of the difference between being a person and being a professional. Or more precisely: the form of person/professional re-enters itsdf on the professional side of the distinction. As a professional the care worker has to take on a flexibility that is originally tied to her/him as a person. In other words, the home care worker has to be able to switch between the sides (and this ability is based on a per288

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sonal intuition or judgmental power which includes a flexible capacity for deciding to decide to either switch or be fixed, that is, to ascribe decisions to either side of the difference).

A flexible capacity The Act. on flexible home care installs a kind of decision-buffer mechanism in the daily home care, but also plac.es the care workers as wdl as the dderly people in an impossible situation. Concerning the care worker the decisionbuffer is tied to expectations concerning a special switching capacity, i.e. a capacity of switching freely between a non-professional role of empathy and a professional role of rule following. Since this switching capacity is assigned ro the individual qualities of the home care worker, and since this personal ability has not been professionalised, it will remain a blind spot in the administrative • )2 expectations. As concerns the elderly people, the buffer capacity is tied to expectations concerning a switching capacity as well. The dderly people are expected to be able to switch from a passive role of receiving the care to an active role of deciding it. This expectation implies bringing self-observation and thus individual situational definitions into the communication. The switching capacity implies that they manage different ways of making themselves visible: different ways that can be quite contradictory. In some situations, they must actively expose themselves, in other situations they must appear passive and in basic need of care. This alternation between active self-exposure and passive reception can be seen as switching between two sides of the same difference, that is, the difference between basic and extra coverage of needs. It is important in this context to understand that the old people run a risk by switching between the two sides. In order to cover their extra needs, they need to act in a way that simultaneously defines them as un-cntitled to the coverage of their basic needs. They must deviate from their basic needs in order to obtain something extra, in other words, they must perform the paradoxical act of simultaneously acknowledging being "non-basically-in-need• and being "extra-in-need". If one considers the fact that the dderly people have no legal claim to be heard but can only partake in the decision-making process if the home care workers find it appropriate, it becomes a risky strategy for them to write off their basic needs in order to, possibly, obtain the extra coverage. 12

It should be added that a professionalisarion would not solve the problem either, as it would not

be able to escape re-entry p a ~ as well (bur reversed).

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Conclusion As shown, the "Act on flexible home care" cannot be said to represent a fundamental change of direction in the sector for home care. The Act represents a political rescue manoeuvre based on a political logic rather than on professional ideas from within the ddercare. Thus, it installs a political flexibility rather than a professional one. The Act maintains the space for political manoeuvring and holds great signal value, but has less power of actually directing the home care in a more flexible direction. In other respects, the direction has been evident within eldercare. Reforms have led the sector towards formalisation and standardisation of its decision making structures. The intentions guiding these reforms have been that they can gather and stabilise eldercare around a range of specific decision making programs and procedures. And as it has been illustrated, these intentions have been tied to some fundamental intentions of absorbing the insecurity, that goes along with the sector's identity and potentiality. The ability of the reforms to absorb insecurity is not unambiguous, however. As this chapter demonstrates, the reforms have installed new insecurities into ddercare with respect to both its identity and its potentiality. This is especially due to the fact that the reforms have nurtured an old and conflict-ridden difference between the sector's non-aniculated care values and its formal regulatory structure - a conflict-ridden difference between the sector's undecided and decided premises for decision making. If we are to point to some conclusions regarding the use ofLuhmann's systems theory, we must start by emphasising the relativdy humble position given to theory in the chapter. The main intention has been to do empirical analysis and second to dcvdop conceptual tools for this. Nor that the analyses could nor have been carried forth without the use of systems theory, on the contrary, the article illustrate how the perspective can contribute to organisation theory and welfare analyses, two areas in which systems theory generally have not had a noticeable impact. 13 This ought to suggest the significant possibility for further development of systems theory through empirical application. Such an application-orientated. development could evolve in combination with other perspectives within organisation theory. This has not been done explicitly in this chapter but we believe to have SUfZested certain paths in the text- recurring themes and questions in organisation theory as such. The most 13 For analyses of the welfare state see Luhmann 1981, Luhmann 1999 and some sections in Luhmann 2000c. For particular analyses of the social sector see D. Baecker 1994 and S. Moe 1997 plus a number of German discussions following D. Baecker's anicle from 1994 (Bommes &: Scherr 2000).

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obvious paralld is to {nco)institutional organisation theory (Brunsson & Olsen 1998; Scott 1995; Scott & Meyer 1994; Powd & DiMaggio 1991; March & Olsen 1989). 14 As an example, N. Brunsson and J.P. Olsen's analyses of the reforming organisation (Brunsson & Olsen 1993) contain several related perspectives co the analyses in the present chapter. Similarly, one will find parallels in Brunsson and Jacohsson's studies of standardisation (Brunsson & Jacobsson et el. 1998; 2000). In both cases organisational reforms - their development and rationality - are identified as ambiguous phenomena that might even possess the characteristics of irrationality (Brunsson 1984; R0vik 1992). But in what special way does the systems theoretical perspective contribute? We believe that the chapter points in, at least, three directions: first of all, systems theory enables us to observe the way that reforms constitute a paradoxicaJ necessity for organisations. As demonstrated by means of the eldercare reforms, organisations need to manage their internal complexity, and this is obtained through reform programs and second-order regulations. The paradox is, however, that these contingency-reducing intentions plant the seeds for new contingency in the organisations. Second, Luhmann' s concepts can be used to radicalise the observation that organisations stake their identity in the oscillation between the creation of connections to and delimitation from the environment. In the case of eJdercare, this identity was formed in the space of tension between decided and undecided premises for decision, that is, in the space between explicit standardisation initiatives and an implicit care culture. This points ro the third and maybe most significant possibility created by the systems theoretical perspective. Using systems theory it becomes possible to radicalise the observation that organisations, like other social systems, consist of communications alone (Luhmann 2000a), and that these communications (their development and the development in the ways in which they are handled) are of critical importance to interactions in the environment of the organisations (Kieserling 1999: 335ff, la Cour 2002a; 2002b). As became clear in the sector for eldercare, the conditions for the daily interactions between the home care workers and the elderly people changed when the ways in which they were communicated in the organisations changed. Having emphasised these three specific contributions, it should be noted in conclusion rhar, evidently, not everything is observable from the perspective of systems theory. Like other perspectives systems theory has its blind spots. Ir

14 It should be pointed our that Luhmann &equcntly refers co theorists from this nadition (Luh· mann 2000b; Luhmann 1997: 826ft).

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cannot escape producing invisibilities when shedding light on particular characteristics of reality. In the sector for eldercare light was shed by means of standardisations; we perform it through theory. This enables us to analysis that maintain a certain level of complexity, and, moreover, it allows us to create analysis that project a space of meaning different from existing ones. This way of cultivating specific characteristics of reality represents a scientific necessity as

well as contingent freedom. The necessity hinges on the fact that otherwise nothing can be seen or discussed rationally, and the freedom expresses the fact that yet another theoretical perspective could have been chosen - that something else could have been observed and analysed. Consequently, this chapter is not to be read as the only true theory about the way the sector for eldercare is or should be. The chapter merely enlightens a segment of reality. This segment could have appeared differently had it been lightened up with different guiding contrasts than those chosen, and the legitimacy of the chapter, therefore, is merely a question of its inquiring about existing truisms within the elder care sector in order to illustrate that they could have been different.

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Author presentations

Dirk Haecker (Dr. rer. pol.) is Professor of Sociology at the University of Witten/Herdecke, Germany. His research areas are sociological theory, theory of society and culture, organiz:ation research and management teaching. He has published., inur alia, Die Form des Unternehmens (Frankfurt am Main: 2 Suhrkamp, 1993, 1999), Postheroisches Management (Berlin: Merve, 1994), Organisation als System (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999), Wozu Kultur? (Berlin: Kadmos, 2000, 22001), Wozu Systeme? (Berlin: !