Australian Evidence a Principled Approach to the Common Law and Uniform Acts [6 ed.] 9780409333671, 0409333670

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Australian Evidence a Principled Approach to the Common Law and Uniform Acts [6 ed.]
 9780409333671, 0409333670

Table of contents :
Full Title
Copyright
Preface
Acknowledgments
Table of Cases
Table of Statutes
Table of Contents
Chapter One: The Fundamental Principles
A Procedural Perspective
The object of procedural rules
The nature of material facts: past events
Discovering Past Events
The correspondence theory of knowledge
The inferential process: Wigmorean analysis
Probability theory
Outline
Mathematical probabilities
Classical probabilities
Frequency probabilities
Subjective probabilities
The equations of mathematical probability
Problems with conceptualising probabilities mathematically
Mathematical probabilities and the standard of proof
The non-mathematical approach: ‘inductive probabilities’ and ‘best explanations’
A correct probability approach?
The Procedural Environment
General considerations
The common law adversary trial
Structuring the Rules of Evidence
Synopsis
Chapter Two: The Trial Process
The Process in Outline
Sources of process
The ambit of process
Pre-trial process
Trial process
Appeal
Following verdict
Interlocutory appeals in criminal cases
The Essential Tasks of the Trial Court
The reception of evidence
Two fundamental principles
The nature of relevance
Relevance and admissibility
Discretion
Nature and function at trial
The residual exclusionary discretions
Efficiency, time and cost
Fairness
Public policy
Determining the reception of tendered evidence
Party waiver of rules of admissibility
A ‘case to answer’
Proof
Degrees of proof
The civil standard: balance of probabilities
The criminal standard: beyond reasonable doubt
Distinguishing the civil and criminal standards
Directing the jury on the criminal standard
To which facts does the criminal standard apply?
Challenging unreasonable verdicts and applying the proviso
Proof on the voir dire
Conclusion: the inductive approach
The Ambit of Evidential Rules
Chapter Three: Character
Introduction
Common law approaches to unreliable evidence
Character evidence: one exclusionary principle
Character defined in terms of propensity/tendency
Reasons for excluding evidence of propensity/tendency
The multi-relevance of character evidence
Prosecution Evidence Revealing the Accused’s Incriminating Propensity or Tendency
The law in principle — an exclusionary presumption
The evolution of the common law exclusionary rule
The ambit of the common law exclusionary rule
Discreditable conduct
Discreditable conduct tendered as propensity
Relationship evidence
Other non-propensity uses
HML v R: the ambit unresolved
Justifying exceptional admissibility
Justification in principle
Striking similarity
Specifying a required probative value: the Pfennig test
Applying the Pfennig test
Conclusion: the common law rule and the exclusionary principle
Legislation affecting the exclusionary principle
The uniform legislation
Tendency reasoning
Coincidence reasoning
The nature of ‘probative value’ under ss 97, 98 and 101
‘Significant probative value’
‘Probative value substantially outweighing prejudicial effect’
Western Australia
South Australia
Queensland
Determining probative strength: facts in issue
Procedural matters
Determining admissibility: notice
Determining admissibility: onus
Evidence upon which admissibility may be determined
Multiple counts
Inadvertent disclosure
Directions to the jury
Defence Evidence Revealing a Co-accused’s Incriminating Propensity
Cross-examination of an Accused Disclosing Propensity
The accused as a witness: two problems
Modification of the privilege against self-incrimination
Limiting cross-examination revealing the accused’s character
The purpose of the legislative compromise
The form of the compromise
The extent of the prohibition under the Criminal Evidence Act
The first exception: matters establishing facts in issue
The remaining exceptions: procedural issues
The second exception: good character in issue
The third exception: imputations against the character of the prosecutor or prosecution witnesses
The fourth exception: evidence against a co-accused
Evidence of Accused’s Propensity Tendered by the Defence
Bad character of the accused
Good character of the accused
The nature and purpose of good character evidence
Rebutting evidence of good character
Directing the jury where good character raised
Evidence Revealing the Propensity of a Third Party
Defence evidence revealing the character of third parties
The character of complainants in sexual assault cases
Evidence Revealing Propensity in Civil Actions
Where a party’s character is a material fact in issue
Other evidence revealing the propensity of a party
Evidence revealing the disposition of third parties
Conclusion
Chapter Four: Unreliable Evidence: Corroboration and Related Rules
Introduction
Rules of ‘exclusion’
Rules requiring confirmation or warning
Testimony Requiring Mandatory Corroboration
Testimony Requiring a Mandatory Corroboration Warning
The nature of the warning and the testimony embraced by it
Accomplices
Police testimony of disputed confessions
Testimony Requiring Warning Only as a Matter of Practice
Children
Sexual assault complainants
Agents provocateurs (entrapment)
Identification evidence
The nature and risks of identification testimony
The requirement to warn
The warning: factors relevant to the reliability of identification evidence
Discretionary exclusion of identification evidence
The exclusionary rules in the Uniform Acts
The effect of supporting evidence on the obligation to warn
The cumulative effect of identification evidence
The admissibility of out-of-court assertions of identity and pictures used for identification
Other unreliable testimony
The Nature of Corroborative Evidence
Independence
Implication in the crime charged
Mutual corroboration
Functions of Judge and Jury: Directing the Jury
Where corroboration or a corroboration warning is mandatory
Where a warning is required as a matter of practice to avoid a miscarriage of justice
Conclusion
Chapter Five: The Adversary Context
Access to Information
Introduction
Rules giving access to information
Civil cases
Criminal cases
The Nature of Rules Restricting Access to Information
Adversary Restrictions Upon Access to Information
Legal professional privilege (client legal privilege)
Two privileges
The communications (advice) privilege
Lawyers and clients
Legal professional advice
Confidentiality
Bona fides
Communication made for the dominant purpose of legal advice
Material collected for litigation
Limits to legal professional privilege
Copies of documents
Client’s privilege: waiver
Only the communication or work-product is protected
The privilege is a bar to access, not a rule of admissibility
The public policy limit
Statutory removal of the privilege
Claims to privilege: some procedural points
Legal professional privilege and other rules and privileges preventing disclosure
Conclusion
The privilege in aid of settlement
Justification
Scope
Costs
Criminal cases
Waiver: whose privilege?
Proceedings in which privilege may be claimed
Secondary evidence of privileged admissions
Public policy limits
Negotiations between estranged spouses
Alternative dispute resolution
The privilege against self-incrimination
Introduction: the adversary rationale
Incompetence of accused and spouse as witnesses for the prosecution
The accused
The accused’s spouse
The accused’s right to silence
The privilege of the accused not to testify on oath for the defence
Comment and direction upon the accused’s failure to testify on oath
The privilege of the accused to remain silent when questioned before trial
The privilege of citizens to refuse to provide answers or to produce documents that are self-incriminatory
Scope
Punishment, penalty, forfeiture and ecclesiastical censure
Claiming the privilege
Legislation affecting the privileges
The immunity of judges and jurors from testifying on the reasons for decisions
Two adversary restrictions upon the tender of evidence
The evidentiary rule flowing from the doctrine of res judicata
The rule in Hollington v Hewthorn
Public Policy Restrictions Upon Access to Information
Introduction
Parliamentary privilege
Restrictions protecting marriage and family relationships
Restrictions protecting other confidential relationships
At common law
Under legislation
Scope and nature
Priest–penitent
Doctor–patient
Counsellors and complainants of sexual assault
Professional confidential relationships and journalists’ sources
Public interest immunity
General nature
The public interests involved
Nature of immunity
Contents claims
Class claims
Striking the balance: the procedural problems
The rejection of otherwise admissible evidence on grounds of public interest
Chapter Six: Party Presentation and Prosecution
Introduction
Burden of Proof: Nature and Incidence
Evidential and persuasive burdens
The incidence of the burdens in criminal cases
The incidence of the burdens in civil cases
Legislative allocation of the burdens of proof
Presumptions
No Case to Answer
Theory
Criminal cases
Civil cases
The significance of the opponent’s failure to call evidence
Material Facts Determined from Information Presented by the Parties
Theory
The courts’ power to call witnesses
Court intervention into the calling and questioning of witnesses
Judicial notice
Chapter Seven: The Testimonial Emphasis
Introduction
Documentary Evidence
Definition
Authentication
Tender of original
Real Evidence
Testimonial Evidence
Outline
Witnesses testify upon oath
Testimonial formalities
The testimony of children and other vulnerable witnesses
Formalities and competency
Formalities and credit
Witnesses testify to facts, not opinions
The rule and its rationale
Observational inferences
Example: sobriety and consequent capacity
Expert assistance in drawing inferences: a functional approach
Threshold tests at common law for expert knowledge
Liberal relevancy
Sufficient reliability determined by the court
General acceptance within the relevant scientific community: Frye and Daubert
Current Australian position
At common law
Under the uniform legislation
Ad hoc experts
Two illusory tests of admissibility
Common knowledge
Ultimate issues and legal standards
Procedural aspects
Adversarial presentation of expert testimony
Establishing the admissibility of expert testimony: the voir dire
Form of expert assistance
Establishing primary facts through admissible evidence
General expertise not subject to proof
The opinions of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander groups under the uniform legislation
Facts and inferences are ultimately decided by the trier of fact
Witnesses testify orally from memory
Memory and its refreshment
In-court refreshment of memory
Out-of-court refreshment of memory
Prior statements of witnesses
General rule: prior consistent statements inadmissible
Exception: prior statements rebutting alleged invention
Exception: prior statements identifying accused
Recent complaints in sexual assault cases
Statements induced by hypnosis
Questioning witnesses
Examination-in-chief
Scope and purpose: the bolster rule
The prohibition against leading questions
Hostile and unfavourable witnesses
Cross-examination
The right to cross-examine
Issue cross-examination: introducing evidence
Issue cross-examination: satisfying the rule in Browne v Dunn
Credibility cross-examination
Pursuing credit/credibility beyond cross-examination the general prohibition
Exceptions to the general rule
Cross-examination on documents
Re-examination
Chapter Eight: Hearsay
Scope of the Hearsay Rule
Rationale and definition
Out-of-court ‘statements’
Statements tendered as assertions
Narrative statements
Assertions part of the res gestae
Assertions of knowledge, belief and intention
Assertions of physical sensation and health
The availability of the maker of an out-of-court statement
Machine-generated information
Exceptions to the Hearsay Prohibition
Common Law (and Related Statutory) Exceptions
The so-called res gestae exceptions: spontaneous statements
Out-of-court statements by persons since deceased (or otherwise unavailable)
Statements against interest
Statements in the course of duty
Statements as to public or general rights
Statements by relatives as to pedigree
Dying declarations
Post-testamentary statements by testators about the contents of their wills
Statements in public documents
Admissions and confessions
Terminology and the rationale for a hearsay exception
Defining admissions and confessions
Personal knowledge of admitted facts
Self-serving statements
Parties and their privies: vicarious admissions and confessions
Vicarious admissions and confessions: the co-conspirator rule
Confessions and admissions in criminal cases
The rules and their rationale
The voluntariness requirement
The fairness discretion
Unfairness as the unacceptable risk of wrongful conviction
Unfairness as procedural impropriety
The public policy discretion
Criminal investigations: standards of propriety
Excluding for impropriety
Appeals
Determining the reception of confessions: the voir dire
Statutory Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule
Introduction
The English approach and its variations
Legislation based on the Evidence Act 1938 (UK)
Legislation derived from the Criminal Evidence Act 1965 (UK)
Other legislation admitting hearsay evidence in criminal cases
Business records
A more liberal approach to documents: South Australia
Computer output
Bankers’ books and other books of account
Transportation documents
The Uniform Legislation
The definition of hearsay
Exceptions to the prohibition
First-hand hearsay
Business records
Other exceptions
Index

Citation preview

Australian Evidence A Principled Approach to the Common Law and Uniform Acts 6th edition

Australian Evidence A Principled Approach to the Common Law and Uniform Acts 6th edition Andrew Ligertwood LLB (Hons) (Adelaide), BCL (Oxford) Emeritus Fellow in Law, The University of Adelaide

Gary Edmond BA (Hons) (Medal) Wollongong, LLB (Hons) Sydney, PhD Cambridge Professor, School of Law, The University of NSW, Research Professor, Law School, Northumbria University, and Chair, Evidence-based Forensics Initiative

LexisNexis Butterworths Australia 2017

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Ligertwood, Andrew.

Title: Edition: ISBN: Notes: Subjects: Other Authors/Contributors:

Australian evidence : a principled approach to the common law and Uniform Acts. 6th edition. 9780409333664 (pbk). 9780409333671 (ebk). Includes index. Evidence (Law) — Australia — Cases. Edmond, Gary, author.

© 2017 Reed International Books Australia Pty Limited trading as LexisNexis. 1st edition, 1988; 2nd edition, 1993; 3rd edition, 1998; 4th edition 2004 (reprinted 2008); 5th edition 2010 (reprinted 2013 and 2014). This book is copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), no part of this publication may be reproduced by any process, electronic or otherwise, without the specific written permission of the copyright owner. Neither may information be stored electronically in any form whatsoever without such permission. Inquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Typeset in Helvetica Neue LT Std and Bembo Std. Printed in China. Visit LexisNexis Butterworths at www.lexisnexis.com.au

Preface As the aim of this work is to provide a principled exposition of evidence laws in Australia, the explanation in this Preface of the scope of the work has undergone little change since the first edition (1988). But, with five of the eight jurisdictions having now passed ‘uniform evidence legislation’ and legislatures in every Australian jurisdiction continuing to be active in the field of evidence reform, the temptation is now even greater to regard the subject as simply one of statutory interpretation, with all the technical arguments that such an approach entails. However, the High Court continues to emphasise that legislation requires interpretation in the context of fundamental common law principles, so-called principles of legality, assumed to be accepted by legislatures unless expressly modified. These principles are embodied in common law adversarial process whereby parties initiate and defend proceedings, and are most developed in the context of the accusatorial criminal trial. In turn the outcome of process necessarily depends (in the absence of agreement) upon the proof of facts, and the proof of facts is the concern of evidence laws. It is this context, proof of facts through adversarial trial, that explains not only common law rules of evidence but, it is argued, remains essential to the understanding and interpretation of statutory developments. The statutory framework remains far from uniform, even where so described. While the organisation and sequence of sections in the Uniform Acts are largely consistent, there remain many differences in content. Furthermore, these Acts do not purport to be a comprehensive evidential code, and disparate legislation exists in every jurisdiction seeking to reform other matters directly impacting upon the use of evidence (for example, legislation protecting complainants of sexual assault from excessive cross-examination, legislation modifying the procedures whereby children and vulnerable witnesses place their evidence before the court, and the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) seeking to ensure that directions about the use of evidence are communicated more simply to juries). In addition, in those jurisdictions not party to the uniform scheme there have been many important legislative reforms to the common law (for example, seeking to reform the common law’s approach to the admissibility of an accused’s other misconduct), with no attempt at uniform content or expression.

Yet despite this legislative complexity the fundamental purpose of evidence laws remains clear, the pursuit of factual rectitude in application of the rule of law. This quest necessarily underlies every trial. Evidence incapable of assisting with rectitude should not be considered (the basis of the discussion of forensic science evidence in Chapter 7), and the exclusion of evidence that is so capable demands justification (Chapter 5 discussing where policies extraneous to rectitude affect access to and tender of evidence). Legislation needs to be interpreted where possible to achieve these ends. This is not to assert the perfection of the process which currently underlies our common law evidential regimes in Australia (for example, its dependence upon party control, oral adversarial examination of witnesses and its current assumptions about the cognitive abilities of witnesses and jurors), only that this process remains the basis of those regimes and provides the appropriate principled perspective for their explanation. Indeed, recent revelations concerning the quality of much forensic science evidence and the way that evidence has been presented and understood in criminal proceedings raise difficult questions about the effectiveness of conventional rules and procedures as well as the way legal institutions engage with scientific and technical forms of knowledge and advice. Thus the principled structure of previous editions has not required change to accommodate cases decided and legislation passed since the last edition. The devil remains in the detail and ensuring that it does not distract from the fundamental object of the exercise. For the text presented we take joint responsibility, although for those familiar with the last edition the Edmond influence in widening references to academic discussion of fundamental assumptions, and providing critical comment upon forensic science evidence, will be apparent. In researching and preparing the current text we are indebted to Jarrad Napier, a final year student at The University of Adelaide, for his enthusiastic assistance in supplying us with (the many) evidence cases reported since the last edition and updating legislation as required. Many thanks also to our editor Annabel Adair for tidying our text so professionally, and to Jocelyn Holmes for her enthusiastic support for the project. Our publishing schedule required the manuscript to be submitted in January and it attempted to state the law as available on Australia Day 2017. However, in these days of instant publication we have been able to modify page proofs to

include references to selected later cases. The frustration of not being able to include decisions in cases raising important evidence points currently before the High Court remains. Andrew Ligertwood and Gary Edmond 12 April 2017

Acknowledgments The authors and publishers are grateful to the holders of copyright in material from which extracts appear in this work, particularly to the following: Little Brown & Co Penguin Books The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales While every care has been taken to establish and acknowledge copyright, the publishers tender their apologies for any accidental infringement. They would be pleased to come to a suitable arrangement with the rightful owners in each case.

Table of Cases References are to paragraph numbers 396 Bay Street Port Melbourne, Re [1969] VR 293 …. 5.191

A A (A child), Re (2000) 115 A Crim R 1 …. 8.100 A Child v Andrews (1994) 12 WAR 552 …. 2.49 A v Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532 …. 5.216, 5.223, 5.252 — v Maughan [2016] WASCA 128 …. 1.53, 2.29, 5.146, 5.183 — v Z (2007) 212 FLR 255; [2007] NSWSC 899 …. 5.5 Abdel-Hady (“SA”) v R [2011] NSWCCA 196 …. 2.12 Abdul-Kader v R [2007] NSWCCA 329 …. 7.158, 7.83, 7.123, 7.134 Abolos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167 …. 2.14 Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority v Maurice (1986) 10 FCR 104 …. 5.7, 5.83, 5.85, 5.221, 5.225, 5.226, 5.238, 5.242, 5.254 Abrahamson v R (1994) 63 SASR 139 …. 8.22, 8.33 Accident Insurance Mutual Holdings Ltd v McFadden (1993) 31 NSWLR 412 …. 5.166, 5.169, 5.172, 5.174, 8.174 Adam v R (2001) 207 CLR 96 …. 2.23, 3.90 Adami v R (1959) 108 CLR 605 …. 7.10 Adelaide Brighton Cement v South Australia (1999) 75 SASR 209 …. 5.234, 5.251, 5.252 Adelaide Chemical and Fertilizer Co Ltd v Carlyle (1940) 64 CLR 514 …. 8.37, 8.38 Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd v Spalvins (1998) 152 ALR 418 …. 5.19, 5.58 Adidas AG v Pacific Brands Footwear Pty Ltd (No 3) [2013] FCA 905 …. 7.56, 8.49

Adler v ASIC [2003] NSWCA 131 …. 7.66 Adsteam Building Industries Pty Ltd v Queensland Cement & Lime Co Ltd (No 4) [1985] 1 Qd R 127 …. 5.164 AE v R [2008] NSWCCA 52 …. 3.48, 3.58, 3.62 Agassiz v London Tramway Co (1872) 21 WR 199 …. 2.22 Age Co Ltd, The v Liu [2013] NSWCA 26 …. 8.112 Ahern v R (1988) 165 CLR 87 …. 8.101, 8.114, 8.116, 8.117, 8.118, 8.119, 8.120 Ainsworth v Burden [2005] NSWCA 174 …. 2.29 Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade [1983] 2 AC 394 …. 5.218, 5.229, 5.242, 5.247, 5.249 Aitken v Neville Jeffries Pidler Pty Ltd (1991) 33 FCR 418 …. 5.10 AJ v R (2011) 32 VR 614; [2011] VSCA 215 …. 5.15 — v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 228 …. 3.63, 3.71 AJE v Western Australia (2012) 225 A Crim R 242; [2012] WASCA 185 …. 2.87, 3.63, 3.75, 5.118 Ajodha v The State [1982] AC 204 …. 2.42, 8.101, 8.161, 8.166 AK v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438; [2008] HCA 8 …. 2.14, 4.57 Akins v Abigroup Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 539 …. 5.58 Al Fayed v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2002] EWCA 780 …. 5.65 Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542 …. 2.42, 8.170 Albu v R (1995) 65 SASR 439 …. 4.53, 5.258 Alchin v Commissioner for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 …. 7.81, 7.82, 7.93, 7.149, 7.151, 7.152, 7.153, 7.155 Alcoa Australia Ltd v McKenna (2003) 8 VR 45 …. 7.137 Alcoa of Australia Ltd v Apache Energy (No 6) [2014] WASC 287 …. 5.53 Aldersea v Public Transport Corp (2001) 3 VR 473 …. 7.40 Alderson v Booth [1969] 2 QB 216 …. 8.147 — v Clay (1816) 1 Stark 405; 171 ER 511 …. 7.18

Alexander v Manley (2004) 29 WAR 194 …. 7.82 — v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 …. 4.3, 4.59, 4.64, 4.65, 4.66, 4.67, 4.74, 7.94, 7.95, 7.96, 8.54, 8.55 Alexander, Re; Ex parte Ferguson (1944) 45 SR (NSW) 64 …. 6.18 Alexander (a pseudonym) v R [2016] VSCA 92 …. 3.58, 3.61 Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners (No 2) [1974] AC 405 …. 5.205, 5.231 Al-Hashimi v R (2004) 181 FLR 383; [2004] WASCA 61 …. 4.64 Ali v R (2005) 214 ALR 1; [2005] HCA 8 …. 2.49, 3.78 Alister v R (1983) 154 CLR 404 …. 5.216, 5.217, 5.218, 5.234, 5.242, 5.247, 5.248, 5.249, 5.251 — v — (1984) 154 CLR 404 …. 2.43, 5.5, 5.12, 7.153 Allen v R (2013) 39 VR 629; 235 A Crim R 40; [2013] VSCA 263 …. 4.10, 4.28, 4.104 Allianz Australia Ltd v Sim [2012] NSWCA 68 …. 7.62 Allied Interstate Qld Pty Ltd v Barnes (1968) 118 CLR 580 …. 8.107, 8.108 Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [1983] 1 NSWLR 1 …. 7.129, 7.130, 7.131 Allitt v Sullivan [1988] VR 621 …. 5.81 Allphones Retail Pty Ltd v ACCC (2009) 259 ALR 354; [2009] FCA 980 …. 5.10 Allstate Life Insurance Co v ANZ Banking Group (1995) 57 FCR 360 …. 5.85 — v — (No 6) (1996) 64 FCR 79; 137 ALR 138 …. 6.70, 7.61 — v — (No 32) (1996) 136 ALR 627 …. 7.38 Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S [2008] FCA 559 …. 2.31, 7.66, 7.69, 7.71 Alqudsi v R (2016) 90 ALJR 711; [2016] HCA 24 …. 2.7 AM v R (2006) 164 A Crim R 558; [2006] NTCCA 18 …. 3.151 — v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 196 …. 4.49 AM & S Europe Ltd v Commission of the European Communities [1983] QB

878 …. 5.22 158, 1.38, 1.42, 2.63, 2.67, 6.5 Amaca Pty Ltd v CSR Ltd [2015] VSC 582 …. 7.80, 7.81, 7.82, 8.196 — v King (2011) 35 VR 280; [2011] VSCA 447 …. 7.62 Amaca Pty Ltd (formerly James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd) v Hannell (2007) 34 WAR 109; [2007] WASCA Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden [2002] NSWCA 419 …. 7.19, 7.76 Amann Aviation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1988) 19 FCR 223 …. 5.199 Amcor Ltd v Barnes [2011] VSC 341 …. 5.31 Ames v Nicholson [1921] SASR 224 …. 7.86 AMEV Finance Ltd v Artes Studios Thoroughbreds Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 486 …. 5.103 Amoe v DPP (Nauru) (1991) 103 ALR 595 …. 3.108 Ampolex v Perpetual Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd (1995) 37 NSWLR 405 …. 5.57 — v — (1996) 40 NSWLR 12 …. 5.58 — v — (1996) 70 ALJR 603 …. 5.58 Ancher, Mortlock, Murray and Woolley Pty Ltd v Hooker Homes Pty Ltd [1971] 2 NSWLR 278 …. 7.60 Anchor Products Ltd v Hedges (1966) 115 CLR 493 …. 6.25 Andasteel Constructions Pty Ltd v Taylor [1964] VR 112 …. 5.211 Andelman v R (2013) 38 VR 659; 227 A Crim R 81; [2013] VSCA 25 …. 2.14, 3.54, 3.68, 4.9 Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1877) 2 Ch D 644 …. 5.23 — v Western Australia (2014) 46 WAR 363; [2014] WASCA 137 …. 4.47, 4.48 Andrews v R (1992) 60 A Crim R 137 …. 3.33, 4.85 Andrijich v D’Ascanio [1971] WAR 140 …. 2.64 Aneve Pty Ltd v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2005] NSWCCA 441 …. 7.20 Angel v Hawkesbury City Council [2008] NSWCA 130 …. 7.41 Anglim and Cooke v Thomas [1974] VR 363 …. 8.104

Angliss v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 162 …. 4.48, 4.49 Anglo Czechoslovak and Prague Credit Bank v Janssen [1943] VLR 185 …. 6.60 Ankin v London and NE Ry Co [1930] 1 KB 527 …. 5.229 Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes [1976] Ch 55 …. 5.9, 5.19, 5.146, 5.157, 5.176 AOTC Ltd v McAuslan (1993) 47 FCR 492 …. 6.47 Aouad v R (2011) 207 A Crim R 411; [2011] NSWCCA 61 …. 4.70 Apand Pty Ltd v Kettle Chip Co Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 474 …. 6.45 APC v Western Australia (2012) 224 A Crim R 59; [2012] WASCA 159 …. 3.63 Application of Cannar Re Eubanks [2003] NSWSC 802 …. 5.59 Application of the Attorney General for New South Wales dated 4 April 2014, The [2014] NSWCCA 251 …. 1.53, 5.209 Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim [1989] 1 WLR 565 …. 5.164 Ardrey v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 154 …. 2.38 Argyle Brewery Pty Ltd v Darling Harbourside (Sydney) Pty Ltd (1993) 48 FCR 1 …. 5.43 Aristocrat Technologies Aust Pty Ltd v Global Gaming Supplies Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 21 …. 3.159 Armstrong v Western Australia (2012) 220 A Crim R 274; [2012] WASCA 42 …. 2.49, 8.41 Arno v Forsyth (1986) 9 FCR 576 …. 5.80 Arno, Re; Ex parte Forsy (1985) 9 FCR 557 …. 5.80 Arnotts Ltd v TPC (1990) 24 FCR 313 …. 8.49 Aroutsidis v Illawarra Nominees Pty Ltd (1990) 21 FCR 500 …. 3.156 Arthurs v Attorney-General (Northern Ireland) (1971) 55 Cr App R 161 …. 4.63 Ashby v Commonwealth (No 2) (2012) 203 FCR 440; [2012] FCA 766 …. 5.214 Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] 4 All ER 193 …. 5.10 Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd v Anglo-Persian Oil Co Ltd [1916] 1 KB 822 ….

5.223 Aslett v R [2009] NSWCCA 188 …. 4.61 Assistant-Treasurer v Pacific Airways Ltd (2009) 259 ALR 203; [2009] FCAFC 105 …. 5.40, 5.51 Atholwood v R (2000) 110 A Crim R 417 …. 3.37 Atkins v R [2009] EWCA Crim 1876 …. 7.52 Atkinson, In the Marriage of (1997) 21 Fam LR 279 …. 5.168, 5.169, 5.177 Atkinson v T & P Fabrications Pty Ltd (2001) 10 Tas R 57 …. 5.52 Atra v Farmers and Graziers Co-op Co Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 281 …. 8.174 Attorney-General v Bowman (1791) 2 Bos & Pul 532; 126 ER 1423 …. 3.154 — v Clough [1963] 1 QB 773 …. 5.205 — v Good (1825) M’Cle & Yo 286; 148 ER 421 …. 8.26 — v Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch 91; 154 ER 38 …. 7.140, 7.143 — v Kaddour and Turkmani [2001] NSWCCA 456 …. 5.205 — v Mulholland [1963] 2 QB 477 …. 5.205, 5.206 — v Wheeler (1944) 45 SR (NSW) 321 …. 8.93 — (ACT); Ex rel Olaseat Pty Ltd v ACT Minister for Environment (1993) 115 ALR 161 …. 6.14, 6.18 — (Cth) v Tse Chu-Fai (1998) 193 CLR 128 …. 6.60 — (Hong Kong) v Wong Muk Ping [1987] AC 501 …. 4.100 — (NSW) v Chidgey (2008) 182 A Crim R 536; [2008] NSWCCA 65 …. 5.5, 5.12 — v Findlay (1976) 50 ALJR 637 …. 5.12 — v Smith (1996) 86 A Crim R 308 …. 5.205 — v Stuart (1994) 34 NSWLR 667 …. 5.216, 5.223, 5.242, 5.245 — (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500 …. 5.22, 5.26, 5.29, 5.33, 5.68, 5.82 — v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475 …. 5.33, 5.38, 5.47, 5.51 — (Tas) v Wright (2013) 22 Tas R 322; [2013] TASCCA 14 …. 2.37, 4.58 — (Vic) v Riach [1978] VR 301 …. 5.160, 5.171

Attorney-General’s Guidelines (1982) 74 Cr App R 302 …. 5.14 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1977), Re [1979] WAR 45 …. 8.109 — (No 1 of 1983) [1983] 2 VR 410 …. 2.50, 6.33 Attorney-General’s Reference No 1 of 1989; R v Brown [1990] Tas R 46 …. 6.9, 6.18 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1979) (1979) 69 Cr App R 411 …. 7.82 Attwood v R (1960) 102 CLR 353 …. 2.20, 3.85, 3.91, 3.93, 3.95, 3.97, 3.108, 3.129, 3.130 Aubertin v Western Australia (2006) 33 WAR 87; [2006] WASCA 229 …. 4.83, 4.87 Audsley v R [2014] VSCA 321 …. 2.28 Austotel Management Pty Ltd v Jamieson (1995) 57 FCR 411 …. 5.92, 5.97, 5.103 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 …. 6.72, 6.73 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 1) [2012] FCA 1355 …. 7.8 — v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (2009) 259 ALR 541; [2009] FCA 1075 …. 5.90 — v Amcor Printing Papers Group Ltd (2000) 169 ALR 344 …. 6.39, 6.40 — v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (1998) 81 FCR 526 …. 5.28 — v Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd (2009) 174 FCR 547; [2009] FCAFC 32 …. 5.23, 5.28, 5.41, 5.49, 5.53, 5.55 — v Cathay Pacific Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1101 …. 5.54 — v CC (NSW) (1999) 52 FCR 375 …. 3.154 — v Chats House Investments Pty Ltd (1996) 142 ALR 177 …. 5.162 — v George Weston Foods Ltd (2003) 129 FCR 298 …. 5.58 — v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 794 …. 2.19, 8.117 — v Pratt (No 3) (2009) 175 FCR 558 …. 8.94, 8.95 — v Telstra (2000) 96 FCR 317 …. 5.55 — v World Netsafe (No 2) (2002) 119 FCR 307 …. 8.29, 8.112, 8.114

Australian Crime Commission v Stoddart (2011) 244 CLR 554; [2011] HCA 47 …. 5.165 Australian Federal Police v XYZ (2015) 123 SASR 274; [2015] SASC 113 …. 5.12 Australian Granites Ltd v Eisenwerk Hensel Bayreuth Dipl-Ing Burkhardt GmbH [2001] 1 Qd R 461 …. 6.60 Australian Hospital Care v Duggan (No 2) [1999] VSC 131 …. 5.26 Australian Medic-Care Company Ltd v Hamilton Pharmaceutical Pty Ltd (No 4) (2008) 170 FCR 9 …. 8.199 Australian Petroleum Pty Ltd v Parnell Transport Industries Pty Ltd (1998) 88 FCR 537 …. 8.199 Australian Postal Corporation v Digital Post Australia [2013] FCAFC 153 …. 7.56 Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Gorman [1973] VR 570 …. 8.114 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v 4WD Systems Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 850 …. 3.159 — v Active Super Pty Ltd (2015) 235 FCR 181; [2015] FCA 342 …. 7.8 — v Adler [2001] NSWSC 1168 …. 2.8, 2.9 — v Citigroup Global Markets Aust Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 157 FCR 310; [2007] FCA 121 …. 2.26, 2.42 — v Healey (2011) 196 FCR 291; [2011] FCA 717 …. 6.39 — v Hellicar (2012) 286 ALR 501; [2012] HCA 17 …. 2.62, 6.52 — v Lindberg (2009) 261 ALR 207; [2009] VSCA 234 …. 5.61, 5.81 — v Managed Investments Pty Ltd (No 7) [2015] 2 Qd R 32; [2014] QSC 72 …. 2.29, 3.158, 8.176 — v P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd (2008) 169 FCR 227; [2008] FCAFC 123 …. 2.215, 5.216 — v Plymin (2002) 4 VR 168 …. 5.162, 5.171 — v Rich (2004) 213 ALR 338; [2004] NSWSC 1062 …. 2.42 — v — [2005] NSWCA 152 …. 7.66

— v — (2005) 216 ALR 320; [2005] NSWSC 417 …. 2.32, 7.8, 7.19, 7.125 — v — [2006] NSWSC 643 …. 7.153 — v — (2006) 235 ALR 587; [2006] NSWSC 826 …. 2.9 Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominee Ltd (1995) 18 ACSR 459 …. 2.50 — v McLeod (2000) 22 WAR 255 …. 7.60 — v Zarro (No 2) (1992) 34 FCR 427 …. 5.205, 5.216, 5.224, 5.244 Australian Statistician, The v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (2008) 36 WAR 83; [2008] WASCA 34 …. 5.224, 5.238, 5.254 Avanes v Marshall (2007) 68 NSWLR 595 …. 5.58, 5.59 Avis v R [2002] WASCA 250 …. 2.12 AW v R [2009] NSWCCA 1 …. 4.49 AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382; [2006] FCA 571 …. 5.23, 5.27 — v — (No 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30; 234 ALR 651; [2006] FCA 1234 …. 5.30 Axon v Axon (1937) 59 CLR 395 …. 6.26 Aydin v R (2010) 28 VR 588; [2010] VSCA 190 …. 2.29 Aytugrul v R (2012) 247 CLR 170; [2012] HCA 15 …. 1.44, 2.31, 2.70, 6.65, 6.73, 7.67, 7.71 Azarian v Western Australia (2007) 178 A Crim R 19; [2007] WASCA 249 …. 2.49, 2.71, 4.84, 4.105 Azizi v R (2012) 224 A Crim R 325; [2012] VSCA 205 …. 8.197 Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50; 179 ALR 349 …. 2.12, 2.50, 5.106, 5.116, 5.118, 5.119, 5.120, 5.121, 5.122, 5.123, 5.124, 5.127, 5.130, 5.131, 5.132, 6.46

B B, In the Marriage of (1988) 91 FLR 105 …. 7.125 B v Dentists Disciplinary Tribunal [1994] 1 NZLR 95 …. 7.3 B v R (1992) 175 CLR 599 …. 2.49, 2.87, 3.35, 3.36, 3.73, 3.125, 4.102 B (child) v Potts (1992) 59 A Crim R 136 …. 8.133

Babcock v Canada (Attorney General) [2002] 3 SCR 3 …. 5.251 Babic v R (2010) 28 VR 297; [2010] VSCA 198 …. 6.8 Baddams v Thomas (1984) 34 SASR 420 …. 6.2 Bailey v ABC [1995] 1 Qd R 476 …. 5.85 Bain v R [2009] NZSC 16 …. 2.23, 7.48 Baini v R (2012) 246 CLR 469; [2012] HCA 59 …. 2.14 — v — (No 2) [2013] VSCA 157 …. 2.14 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 …. 5.22, 5.23, 5.27, 5.34, 5.41, 5.49, 5.60, 5.72, 5.74, 5.79 — v Evans (1987) 77 ALR 565 …. 5.49 — v R (2012) 245 CLR 632 …. 8.6, 8.77, 8.78 Balabel v Air India [1988] Ch 317 …. 5.27 Bale v Mills (2011) 81 NSWLR 498; [2011] NSWCA 226 …. 7.131 Balnaves v Smith [2008] 2 Qd R 413; [2008] QSC 215 …. 5.51 Bank of NSW v Signorini [1966] Qd R 322 …. 6.38 Bank of Valetta PLC v NCA (1999) 165 ALR 60 …. 7.38 — v — [1999] FCA 109 …. 5.164 Bannister v Bowen (1985) 82 FLR 406 …. 6.18 — v R (1993) 10 WAR 484 …. 7.140 — v Walton (1993) 30 NSWLR 699 …. 2.69 Bannon v R (1995) 185 CLR 1 …. 8.6, 8.42, 8.56, 8.61, 8.68, 8.74, 8.77, 8.78, 8.170 Barbarian Motor Cycle Club v Koithan (1984) 35 SASR 481 …. 5.6 Barbaro v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 30 …. 8.108 Barbosa v Di Meglio [1999] NSWCA 307 …. 7.60 Barca v R (1975) 133 CLR 82 …. 5.138, 5.139 Barefoot v Estelle 463 US 880 (1983) …. 1.5 Barker v R (1994) 127 ALR 280 …. 5.266

Barkway v South Wales Transport Co Ltd [1949] 1 KB 54 …. 8.174, 8.176 Barrett v South Australia (1994) 63 SASR 208 …. 6.14 Barry v Police [2009] SASC 295 …. 6.56, 8.106 Barton v R (1980) 147 CLR 75 …. 5.13, 6.30 Basto v R (1954) 91 CLR 628 …. 8.166 Bataillard v R (1907) 4 CLR 1282 …. 5.118 Bater v Bater [1951] P 35 …. 2.60, 2.69 Batlow Packing House and Cool Stores Co-op v Commonwealth and Dominion Line (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 314 …. 8.93 Battistatos v RTA (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256 …. 2.29 Battle v Attorney-General [1949] P 358 …. 8.85 Baulch v Lyndoch Warnambool Inc (2010) 27 VR 1; [2010] VSCA 30 …. 2.49, 7.131 Bax Global (Australia) Pty Ltd v Evans (1999) 47 NSWLR 538; [1999] NSWSC 815 …. 5.146, 5.157 Bayeh v New South Wales (1999) 108 A Crim R 364 …. 5.166 Bayley v R [2016] VSCA 160 …. 2.31, 4.65 Bayliss v Cassidy (No 2) [2000] 1 Qd R 464 …. 5.51, 5.53 BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499; [2012] HCA 9 …. 2.18, 2.21, 3.12, 3.21, 3.34, 3.38, 3.40, 3.50 BC v R [2015] NSWCCA 327 …. 3.8, 3.12, 3.62, 3.40, 3.71 BC (by her litigation guardian BD) v Australian Red Cross Society (1991) …. 5.238 Beames v Police (2002) 135 A Crim R 447; [2002] SASC 405 …. 4.12, 4.49 — v R (1980) 1 A Crim R 239 …. 7.15 Beattie v Ball [1999] 3 VR 1 …. 7.131 Beatty, In the Estate of [1919] VLR 81 …. 8.93 Beck and Smith v R [1984] WAR 127 …. 3.147 Beckett v R [2014] NSWCCA 305 …. 2.37, 8.94

Bective Station Pty Ltd v AWB (Aust) Ltd [2006] FCA 1596 …. 3.159 Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac (1998) 86 FCR 215 …. 5.58 Bell v Bell [1970] SASR 310 …. 5.104 — v David Jones Ltd (1949) 49 SR (NSW) 223 …. 7.18 Bell, Re; Ex parte Lees (1980) 146 CLR 141 …. 5.31, 5.68, 5.69 Bellemore v Tasmania (2006) 16 Tas R 364; 170 A Crim R 1 …. 2.35, 3.35, 3.56, 3.136, 7.108 Bellevue Crescent Pty Ltd v Marland Holdings Pty Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 364 …. 7.65 Benbrika v R (2010) 29 VR 593; [2010] VSCA 281 …. 2.72 Bendix Autolite Corp v Midwesco Enterprises Inc 486 US 888 (1988) …. 3.41 Benecke v NAB (1993) 35 NSWLR 110 …. 5.57 Beneficial Finance Corp v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (1991) 31 FCR 523 …. 5.248 Bennett v Collett (1986) 40 SASR 426 …. 4.12 — v Police [2005] SASC 167 …. 7.43 — v — [2005] SASC 415 …. 7.43 — v Western Australia (2012) 223 A Crim R 419; [2012] WASCA 70 …. 3.63 Benney v Dowling [1959] VLR 237 …. 6.31 Bentley v Cooke (1784) 3 Dougl 422; 99 ER 729 …. 5.200 — v Nelson [1963] WAR 89 …. 5.97 Berger v Raymond Sun Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 625 …. 3.158 Berjak (Victoria) Pty Ltd v Peerless Processing Co Pty Ltd [1963] VR 515 …. 8.174 Bernes v Filz (1997) 6 Tas SR 450 …. 4.85 Bessela v Stern (1877) 2 CPD 265 …. 8.98 Betfair v Racing NSW (No 7) (2009) 260 ALR 538; [2009] FCA 1140 …. 5.89 Betts v Hardcastle (2000) 23 WAR 559 …. 4.12, 4.20 Bevan v Western Australia (2012) 43 WAR 233; [2012] WASCA 153 …. 7.25

Beverland v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 2 …. 3.37, 3.63, 3.75 BHP Olympic Dam Pty Ltd v Bluestone Apartments Pty Ltd (2013) 115 SASR 586; [2013] SASC 64 …. 5.27 Biala Pty Ltd v Mallina Holdings Ltd [1990] WAR 174 …. 5.97 Birks v Western Australia (2007) 33 WAR 291; [2007] WASCA 29 …. 4.33, 7.23 Bishop v R (2013) 39 VR 642; [2013] VSCA 273 …. 3.108, 3.130, 3.134, 3.136 Bissett v Deputy State Coroner (2011) 83 NSWLR 144; [2011] NSWSC 1182 …. 5.85 BJS v R (2013) 231 A Crim R 537; [2013] NSWCCA 123 …. 3.61, 3.62, 3.71, 7.110 Black v R (1993) 68 ALJR 91 …. 4.34 — v Walker [2000] NSWSC 983 …. 2.19 Black and Decker Inc v Flymo Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 753 …. 5.55 Blackie v Police [1966] NZLR 910 …. 7.42 Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 …. 5.187 Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63; 98 ER 969 …. 2.63, 2.67, 6.20, 6.52 Blatchford v Dempsey [1956] SASR 285 …. 6.60 Blewitt v R (1988) 62 ALJR 503 …. 7.115 Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd [1942] 2 KB 253 …. 5.159 Bohdal v R (1987) 24 A Crim R 318 …. 2.49 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 …. 7.52 Boles v Esandra Finance Corp Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 666 …. 5.187 Bolton v Western Australia (2007) 180 A Crim R 191; [2007] WASCA 277 …. 3.146, 3.147 Bond Media Ltd v John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd (1988) 16 NSWLR 82 …. 8.105 Bond v ABT (1988) 19 FCR 494 …. 6.54 — v Tuohy (1995) 56 FCR 92 …. 5.155, 5.172 Boonudnoon v R (2002) 172 FLR 111; [2002] WASCA 313 …. 2.72, 4.88

Booth v Bosworth (2001) 114 FCR 39 …. 2.50, 6.45 Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd v CFMEU (No 2) [2015] VSC 459 …. 8.46 Borowski v Quayle [1966] VR 382 …. 7.40, 7.71 Boston v Bagshaw and Sons [1966] 1 WLR 1134 …. 5.185 Bottomley, Ex parte [1909] 2KB 14 …. 7.117 Bowskill v Dawson [1954] 1 QB 288 …. 8.174 Boyer (a pseudonym) v R [2015] VSCA 242 …. 4.9, 4.10, 8.198 Boyes v Collins (2000) 23 WAR 123 …. 5.46 Boyre v Cafred Pty Ltd (1984) 4 FCR 367 …. 3.156 Bracegirdle v Bailey (1859) 1 F & F 536; 175 ER 842 …. 7.124 Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (unreported, 1951) …. 2.69 Brain v Preece (1843) 11 M & W 773; 152 ER 1016 …. 8.83 Brandi v Mingot (1976) 12 ALR 551 …. 6.45 Brannigan v Davison [1997] AC 238 …. 5.164 Braslin v Tasmania [2011] TASCCA 14 …. 4.54, 4.61 Brauer v O’Sullivan [1957] SASR 185 …. 6.35 Bray v R [2014] VSCA 276 …. 2.15, 2.26, 2.32, 3.12 Braysich v R (2011) 243 CLR 434; [2011] HCA 14 …. 3.128, 6.2, 6.8, 6.14 Brebner v Bruce (1950) 82 CLR 161 …. 6.69 — v Perry [1961] SASR 177 …. 5.172, 5.174 Breedon v Kongras (1996) 85 A Crim R 472 …. 6.23 Breen v R (1976) 50 ALJR 534 …. 7.99 — v Sneddon (1961) 106 CLR 406 …. 6.72 Brewer v Castles (No 3) (1984) 52 ALR 581 …. 5.81 Brewster v Sewell (1820) 106 ER 672 …. 7.18 Bridge v R (1964) 118 CLR 600 …. 5.118 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 …. 1.38, 2.64, 2.65, 2.66, 2.67, 2.69

— v — …. 7.131 Brimblecombe v Duncan; Ex parte Duncan [1958] Qd R 8 …. 6.8 Brimnes, The [1973] 1 All ER 769; [1973] QB 929 …. 1.14, 1.17, 2.60 Briscoe v Briscoe [1968] P 501 …. 6.54 British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Secretary, Department of Health and Aging (2011) 281 ALR 75; [2011] FCAFC 107 …. 5.199 British Coal Corp v Dennis Rye Ltd (No 2) [1988] 1 WLR 1113 …. 5.55, 5.65 British Steel Corp v Granada Television [1981] AC 1096 …. 5.10, 5.150, 5.205, 5.206 Brockway v Pando (2000) 22 WAR 405 …. 7.130 Bromley v R (1986) 161 CLR 315 …. 4.6, 4.12, 4.18, 4.19, 4.29, 4.36, 4.41, 4.59, 4.76, 4.77, 4.78, 4.104, 7.35 Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v International Litigation Funding Partners (Aust) Ltd (No 2) (2009) 256 ALR 416; [2009] FCA 449 …. 5.33 Brooks v Medical Defence Association of WA (1999) 94 FCR 164 …. 5.43 — v Police (2013) 116 SASR 234; [2013] SASC 81 …. 2.90, 5.130 — v R (2012) 36 VR 84; [2012] VSCA 197 …. 3.73, 4.83 Bropho v Western Australia (No 2) [2009] WASCA 94 …. 1.32, 2.87, 7.64 Brown v Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 187 ALR 714; [2001] FCA 596 …. 5.90 — v — (2001) 47 ATR 143 …. 7.137 — v — (2002) 119 FCR 269; [2002] FCA 318 …. 2.42, 5.90, 8.165 — v Foster (1857) 1 H & N 736; 156 ER 1397 …. 5.60 — v R (1913) 17 CLR 570 …. 2.72, 8.37, 8.38 — v — [1980] Tas SR 61 …. 7.130 — v — [2006] NSWCCA 69 …. 2.32, 4.10 — v Western Australia (2011) 207 A Crim R 533 …. 8.6 Browne v Dunn (1894) 6 R 67 …. 2.8, 6.68, 7.75, 7.95, 7.129, 7.130, 7.131, 7.132, 7.144, 7.145

BRS v R (1997) 191 CLR 275 …. 3.21, 3.34, 3.73, 3.106, 3.107, 3.135, 3.136, 3.137, 4.43, 4.93, 4.95 Brunskill v Sovereign Marine and General Insurance Co Ltd (1985) 62 ALR 53 …. 2.14 Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854 …. 2.12 Bryant v R (2011) 205 A Crim R 531; [2011] NSWCCA 26 …. 3.54, 3.68 BSJ v R (2012) 35 VR 475; [2012] VSCA 93 …. 3.60 BT Australasia Pty Ltd v New South Wales (1996) 140 ALR 268 …. 5.19, 5.83 — v NSW (No 7) (1998) 153 ALR 722 …. 5.59 BTR Engineering (Australia) Ltd (formerly Borg Warner Australia Ltd) v Patterson (1990) 20 NSWLR 724 …. 5.174 Buchanan, Re [1964–5] NSWR 1379 …. 5.205 Buchanan v Jennings (AG of New Zealand intervening) [2005] 1 AC 115; [2005] 2 All ER 273 …. 5.199 Buchwald v R (2011) 38 VR 199; [2011] VSCA 445 …. 7.131 Buck v R [1983] WAR 372; (1982) 8 A Crim R 208 …. 4.82 Bugg v Day (1949) 79 CLR 442 …. 7.49, 7.138 Buiks v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 194 …. 3.63 Bulejcik v R (1996) 70 ALJR 462; 185 CLR 375 …. 2.8, 4.56, 4.57, 5.156 Bulk Materials (Coal Handling) Services Pty Ltd v Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 689 …. 5.49, 5.56 Bull v R (2000) 201 CLR 443 …. 3.147, 8.9, 8.28, 8.46, 8.47 Bulstrode v Trimble [1970] VR 840 …. 7.130, 7.131 Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54 …. 2.27, 2.32, 2.33, 2.36, 2.37, 4.67, 5.62, 5.256, 5.265, 5.266, 8.123, 8.140, 8.141, 8.146, 8.156, 8.158 Burke (a pseudonym) v R (2013) 40 VR 161; [2013] VSCA 351 …. 5.124, 8.108 Burlinson v Police (1994) 75 A Crim R 258 …. 2.71 Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Bank of England [1980] AC 1090 …. 5.216, 5.220, 5.229, 5.249, 5.252 Burnell v British Transport Commission [1956] 1 QB 187 …. 5.51, 7.81, 7.119

Burns v Joseph [1969] Qd R 130 …. 6.53 — v Lipman (1974) 132 CLR 157 …. 6.75 — v R (1975) 132 CLR 258 …. 2.85, 8.163, 8.166 Burnside Sub-Branch RSSLA Inc v Burnside Memorial Bowling Club Inc (1990) 58 SASR 324 …. 8.186 Burrell v R [2007] NSWCCA 65 …. 2.28, 7.123 — v — [2009] NSWCCA 163 …. 2.85, 7.122, 7.123 Burrough v Martin (1809) 2 Camp 112; 170 ER 1098 …. 7.79 Bursill v Tanner (1885) 16 QBD 1 …. 5.60 Burton v Police (2004) 88 SASR 152 …. 2.32 BUSB v R (2011) 248 FLR 368; [2011] NSWCCA 39 …. 5.205 Busby v Thorn EMI Programmes Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 461 …. 5.145, 5.173 Bush v R (1993) 115 ALR 654 …. 2.8 Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 …. 7.15, 7.16, 7.17, 7.19, 7.24, 7.56 Butler v Board of Trade [1971] Ch 680 …. 5.64 — v R (2011) 34 VR 165; [2011] VSCA 417 …. 4.93, 5.131 Butterworth v Butterworth and Englefield [1920] P 126 …. 3.163 Buttes Gas and Oil Co v Hammer (No 3) [1980] 3 WLR 668 …. 5.43, 5.48, 5.51, 5.55 Button v R (2002) 25 WAR 382 …. 3.140, 8.6, 8.77 Buttsworth v R (2004) 29 WAR 1 …. 2.87

C C v Minister of Community Welfare (1989) 52 SASR 304 …. 7.35 — v N (2007) 215 FLR 131 …. 7.66 — v T (1995) 58 FCR 1 …. 5.168 C plc v P (Secretary of State for the Home Department Intervening) [2006] Ch 549 …. 5.146 Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd [2006] FCA

363 …. 7.59 — v — [2007] FCAFC 70 …. 7.59 — v — (No 2) [2006] FCA 364 …. 2.48 Cadwallader v Bajco Pty Ltd (2001) 189 ALR 370 …. 7.65 Cahill v CFMEU (No 2) (2008) 170 FCR 357; [2008] FCA 1292 …. 6.39, 6.40 Cain v Glass (1985) 3 NSWLR 39 …. 5.68 — v — (No 2) (1985) 3 NSWLR 230 …. 5.12, 5.15, 5.205 Calcraft v Guest [1898] 1 QB 759 …. 5.26, 5.49, 5.61, 5.63, 5.65 Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333 …. 5.98 Calderwood v SCI Operations Pty Ltd (1995) 130 ALR 456 …. 5.154 Callanan v B [2005] 1 Qd R 348 …. 5.165 Callander v R (2004) 144 NTR 1 …. 5.143, 5.144 Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd v State Pollution Control Commission (1991) 25 NSWLR 118 …. 5.150, 5.154, 5.155, 5.157 Camden v McKenzie [2008] 1 Qd R 39 …. 2.13 Camilleri v Wilkinson (1983) 35 SASR 270 …. 2.8 Campbell v R (2014) 312 ALR 129; [2014] NSWCCA 175 …. 2.87, 7.59 Candacal Pty Ltd v Industry Research & Development Board (2005) 223 ALR 284; [2005] FCA 649 …. 5.26 Cannon v Tahche (2002) 5 VR 317 …. 5.15 Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd v Andreason [2005] NSWSC 579 …. 3.159 Capar v Commissioner of Police (1994) 34 NSWLR 715; 74 A Crim R 428 …. 5.29, 5.30 Carbone v NCA (1994) 126 ALR 79 …. 5.46 Carbotech Australia Pty Ltd v Yates [2008] NSWSC 1151 …. 5.5, 5.19 Carew v Carbone (1991) 5 WAR 1 …. 5.15 Carey v Korda (2012) 45 WAR 181; [2012] WASCA 228 …. 5.71 — v R (1986) 30 CCC (3d) 498 …. 5.251 Carey and R, Re (1984) 7 CCC (3d) 193 …. 5.216

Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner and Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 …. 6.60 Carlton and United Breweries v Cassin [1956] VLR 186 …. 8.93 Carmody v Mackellar (1997) 76 FCR 115 …. 5.76, 5.81 Carnell v Mann (1998) 89 FCR 247 …. 5.28, 5.47, 5.58 Carr v R (1988) 165 CLR 314 …. 4.31, 4.41 — v — [2002] TASSC 60 …. 4.102, 4.103, 8.99 — v Western Australia (2007) 176 A Crim R 555; [2007] HCA 47 …. 4.33 Carroll v R (2002) 213 CLR 635 …. 5.188, 5.190 — v — [1964] Tas SR 76 …. 3.101 Carter v Hayes (1994) 61 SASR 451 …. 5.12 — v Managing Partner, Northmore Hale Davey and Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121 …. 5.22, 5.23, 5.27, 5.30, 5.31, 5.68, 5.70, 5.82, 7.150 Cartwright v W Richardson and Co Ltd [1955] 1 All ER 742; [1955] 1 WLR 340 …. 7.119, 8.173 Carusi v Housing Commission [1973] VR 215 …. 5.211, 8.173 Casey v R [2016] NSWCCA 77 …. 7.123 Casley-Smith v District Council of Stirling (1989) 51 SASR 447 …. 5.10, 5.252 — v FS Evans and Sons Pty Ltd (1988) 49 SASR 339 …. 6.67 — v — (No 2) (1988) 49 SASR 332 …. 2.42 — v FS Evans and Sons Pty Ltd and DC of Stirling (No 1) (1988) 49 SASR 314 …. 7.51, 7.66 Cassebohm v R (2011) 109 SASR 465; [2011] SASCFC 29 …. 4.51 Castle v R; Bucca v R (2016) 227 CLR 57; [2016] HCA 46 …. 2.14, 3.64 Cavanett v Chambers [1968] SASR 97 …. 6.47, 6.66, 6.67, 7.42, 7.60 CB v Western Australia (2006) 175 A Crim R 304; [2006] WASCA 227 …. 2.71 CDJ v VAJ (No 1) (1998) 197 CLR 172 …. 2.29 Cecez v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 344; [2007] WASCA 260 …. 4.6, 4.77, 4.78 Ceedive Pty Ltd v May [2004] NSWSC 33 …. 8.200

Century Yuasa Batteries Pty Ltd v Martin [2002] FCA 722 …. 3.159 Cesan v DPP (Cth) (2007) 174 A Crim R 385; [2007] NSWCCA 273 …. 4.88 Cesan v R; Mas Rivadavia v R (2008) 236 CLR 358; [2008] HCA 52 …. 2.14 Chadwick v Bowman (1886) 16 QBD 561 …. 5.43, 5.48 Chaina v Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust (No 9) [2013] NSWSC 212 …. 5.57 Challis v Western Australia (2014) 237 A Crim R 283; [2014] WASCA 8 …. 5.118 Chamber v Bernasconi (1843) 1 C, M & R 347; 149 ER 1114 …. 8.83 Chamberlain v Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 28 FCR 21 …. 5.187 — v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 164 CLR 502 …. 5.187 — v R (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521 …. 1.10, 1.11, 1.34, 2.14, 2.78, 2.79, 2.80, 2.81, 2.82, 2.83, 2.86, 2.90, 4.3, 7.75, 7.135 Chambers v Jobling (1986) 7 NSWLR 1 …. 2.14 Chandrasekera (alias Alisandiri) v R [1937] AC 220 …. 8.12 Chapman v Allan and Draper (1999) 74 SASR 274 …. 5.100 — v Luminis Pty Ltd (2000) 100 FCR 229 …. 5.222, 5.226, 5.254, 7.19 — v — (No 2) [2000] FCA 1010 …. 2.2 — v — (No 5) [2001] FCA 1106 …. 7.73 Chappell v Ross and Sons Pty Ltd [1969] VR 376 …. 8.114 Charara v Commissioner of Police (2008) 182 A Crim R 64; [2008] NSWCA 22 …. 5.156 Cheatley v R [1981] Tas R 123 …. 3.136 Cheddar Valley Engineering Ltd v Chaddlewood Homes Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 820 …. 5.94, 5.100 Chedzey v R (1987) 30 A Crim R 451 …. 2.70, 2.72, 4.56 Cheney v R (1991) 28 FCR 103 …. 3.140, 7.151 Cherry Lane Pty Ltd, Re (1988) 17 ALD 1 …. 2.69 Chidiac v R (1991) 171 CLR 432 …. 2.14, 4.3, 4.13, 4.102

Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police v McNally [2002] 2 Cr App R 37 …. 5.205 Chief Executive Officer of Customs v El Hajje (2005) 224 CLR 159 …. 6.22 — v Labrador Liquor Wholesale Pty Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 161; 201 ALR 1; [2003] HCA 49 …. 6.8 Chiou Yaou Fa v Morris (1987) 46 NTR 1 …. 7.24 Chisari v R (No 2) [2006] NSWCCA 325 …. 7.80 Chocalaterie Guylian NV v Registrar of Trade Marks [2009] FCA 891 …. 8.49 Choi v R [2007] NSWCCA 150 …. 4.20, 8.117 Choo v Quinn (1984) 11 FCR 217 …. 5.34 Chotiputhsilpa v Waterhouse [2005] NSWCA 295 …. 7.23 Christian v R (2012) 223 A Crim R 370; [2012] NSWCCA 34 …. 3.73, 5.49, 5.139 Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 …. 8.147 Christophers v R (2000) 23 WAR 106 …. 4.49, 7.112 — v — [2003] WASCA 214 …. 4.49 Christos v R [2013] VSCA 202 …. 7.16 Chugg v Pacific Dunlop Ltd (1990) 170 CLR 249 …. 6.14, 6.18 Church of Scientology of California v DHSS [1979] 1 WLR 723 …. 5.224, 5.254 Cicchino v R (1991) 54 A Crim R 358 …. 4.59 Citibank Ltd, Re [1989] 1 Qd R 516 …. 5.26 Clambake Pty Ltd v Tipperary Projects Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 35 WAR 394 …. 7.71 Clark Equipment Credit of Australia Ltd v Como Factors Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 552 …. 6.48, 6.68 Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 …. 7.44, 7.45, 7.55 Clarke v R (1993) 71 A Crim R 58 …. 4.65 — v — [2013] VSCA 206 …. 4.39

Clarkson v DPP [1990] VR 743 …. 5.15 Clay v R [2014] VSCA 269 …. 8.198 Clayton v Hardwick Colliery Co Ltd [1915] WN 395 …. 6.75 Cleland v R (1982) 151 CLR 1 …. 2.27, 2.29, 3.69, 5.256, 5.266, 8.121, 8.123, 8.124, 8.140, 8.143, 8.154, 8.160 Clements, Dunne & Bell Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (2001) 188 ALR 515; [2001] FCA 1858 …. 5.30 Clifford v Clifford [1961] 1 WLR 1274 …. 7.138 — v R (2004) 12 Tas R 415 …. 4.61 Coates v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 142 …. 2.88 Cockerill v Collins [1999] 2 Qd R 26 …. 5.71 Cojuangco v John Fairfax and Sons Ltd (No 2) [1991] Aust Torts Rep ¶81-068 …. 5.10 Col v R (2013) 237 A Crim R 67; [2013] NSWCCA 302 …. 7.123 Cole v Dyer (1999) 74 SASR 216 …. 5.53 — v Elders Finance Co [1993] 2 VR 356 …. 5.47 Coleman v Zanker (1992) 58 SASR 7 …. 5.266, 8.149 Collaroy Beach Club Ltd v Haywood [2007] NSWCA 21 …. 2.26 Collaton v Correl (1926) SASR 87 …. 7.84 Collie v Police (2013) 115 SASR 281; [2013] SASC 15 …. 2.90, 5.130 Collins v Northern Territory (2007) 161 FCR 549; 232 ALR 483; [2007] FCAFC 152 …. 6.60 — v R (1980) 31 ALR 257 …. 5.266, 8.128, 8.131, 8.133, 8.140, 8.143, 8.152, 8.156, 8.159, 8.162 — v — [2006] NSWCCA 162 …. 4.63 Colquhoun v R (No 1) [2013] NSWCCA 190 …. 3.56, 3.64 Commissioner for Government Transport v Adamcik (1961) 106 CLR 292 …. 6.76, 7.43, 7.47, 7.49, 7.51, 7.74 Commissioner for Metropolitan Police v Hills [1980] AC 26 …. 3.121

Commissioner for Motor Transport v Collier-Moat Ltd (1959) 60 SR (NSW) 238 …. 8.26 Commissioner for Railways v Murphy (1967) 41 ALJR 77 …. 7.22 — v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564 …. 5.5 Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Young (1962) 106 CLR 535 …. 7.15, 7.25 Commissioner for Taxation v Donoghue (2015) 237 FCR 316; [2015] FCAFC 183 …. 5.64 Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Cox (1989) 40 A Crim R 447 …. 5.164 — v McMillan (1987) 13 FCR 7 …. 5.181 — v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501; 141 ALR 545 …. 5.22, 5.23, 5.28, 5.30, 5.32, 5.34, 5.35, 5.43, 5.44, 5.45, 5.46, 5.48, 5.60, 5.61, 5.64, 5.81 Commissioner of Police v Justin (1991) 55 SASR 547 …. 5.181, 5.183 Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Guo (2016) 69 AAR 74; [2016] FCAFC 62 …. 2.2, 5.220 — v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2007) 70 NSWLR 643; [2007] NSWCCA 366 …. 5.254 Commissioner of Taxation v Coombes (1999) 92 FCR 240 …. 5.60 — v Rio Tinto Ltd (2006) 151 FCR 341; [2006] FCAFC 86 …. 5.57 Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Hatfield (1992) 34 FCR 190 …. 5.188 Commissioner of the Police Service v NIRTA [2002] 1 Qd R 364 …. 5.65 Commonwealth v CFMEU (2000) 98 FCR 31 …. 5.236, 5.239 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Cooke [2000] 1 Qd R 7 …. 5.46, 5.49 Commonwealth Freighters Pty Ltd v Sneddon (1959) 102 CLR 280 …. 6.72 — v Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46 …. 2.69 Commonwealth v Northern Land Council (1991) 30 FCR 1 …. 5.242, 5.247, 5.254 — v — (1993) 176 CLR 604 …. 5.220, 5.228, 5.235, 5.240, 5.247, 5.251, 5.254

— v Vance (2005) 158 ACTR 47; 224 FLR 243; [2005] ACTCA 35 …. 5.26, 5.199 — v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1 …. 7.64 Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing & Allied Services Union of Australia v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2007) 162 FCR 466 …. 2.64 Compagnie Financiere du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Co (1883) 11 QBD 55 …. 5.7, 5.242 Compaq Computer Australia Pty Ltd v Howard Merry (1998) 157 ALR 1 …. 6.39, 6.40 Compass Airlines Pty Ltd, Re (1992) 35 FCR 447 …. 5.71, 5.75 Complete Technology Pty Ltd v Toshiba (Australia) Pty Ltd (1994) 124 ALR 493 …. 5.53 Comptroller of Customs v Western Electric Co Ltd [1966] AC 367 …. 8.57, 8.103 Comptroller-General of Customs v Disciplinary Appeal Committee (1992) 35 FCR 466 …. 5.145, 5.183 Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd v Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees’ Union (No 2) (1987) 15 FCR 64 …. 8.43 Condo v R (1992) 62 A Crim R 11 …. 2.72 Connelly v DPP [1964] AC 1254 …. 2.47 Connor v Blacktown District Hospital [1971] 1 NSWLR 713 …. 3.161 Considine v Lemmer [1971] SASR 39 …. 6.3, 6.22 Constable v Constable [1964] SASR 68 …. 5.104 Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 25 …. 8.57 — v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 37; [2015] HCA 21 …. 5.154, 5.156 Controlled Consultants Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs [1984] VR 137 …. 5.150 — v — (1985) 156 CLR 385 …. 5.145, 5.146, 5.150, 5.152, 5.156, 5.180,

5.181, 5.183 Conway v R (2000) 98 FCR 204 …. 3.54, 3.56, 3.57, 3.62, 4.23, 8.66, 8.82, 8.197 — v — (2002) 209 CLR 203 …. 2.14, 4.20, 4.41, 4.42, 4.80, 4.102, 4.103, 4.104 — v Rimmer [1968] AC 910 …. 5.228, 5.229, 5.230, 5.252 Conwell v Tapfield [1981] 1 NSWLR 595 …. 7.7, 7.16, 7.24 Cook v Pasminco (No 2) (2000) 107 FCR 44 …. 5.60 — v R (1998) 126 NTR 17 …. 2.23 — v — (2000) 22 WAR 67 …. 2.42 Coonawarra Penola Wine Industry Association Inc and Geographical Indications Committee [2001] AATA 844 …. 7.64 Cooper, Re (1876) 2 VLR (I) 82 …. 7.11 Cooper v Bech (No 1) (1975) 12 SASR 147 …. 5.10 — v — (No 2) (1975) 12 SASR 151 …. 7.49 — v R (1961) 105 CLR 177 …. 3.67 — v Slade (1858) 6 HLC 746; 10 ER 1488 …. 2.58 — v van Heeren [2007] 3 NZLR 783 …. 5.89 Copland v Bourke [1963] P & NGLR 45 …. 5.75 Copper Industries Pty Ltd v Hill (1975) 12 SASR 292 …. 6.38, 6.39 Corbett v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 97 …. 4.83, 4.88 Corke v Corke and Cook [1958] P 93 …. 7.88 Cornelius v R (1936) 55 CLR 235 …. 8.126 Cornwall v Richardson (1825) Ry & Mood 305; 171 ER 1029 …. 3.154 Cornwell v R (2007) 231 CLR 260; [2007] HCA 12 …. 3.83, 3.87, 5.180 Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319 …. 5.22, 5.72, 5.73, 5.75 Cory v Bretton (1830) 4 Car & P 462; 172 ER 783 …. 5.94 Coshott v Burke [2013] FCA 513 …. 5.98

Costello v Random House Pty Ltd (1999) 137 ACTR 1 …. 7.65 Cotic v R [2000] WASCA 414 …. 2.85, 4.88 Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Archer (2008) 72 NSWLR 236; [2008] NSWCA 164 …. 5.57 — v Franklin [2014] NSWCA 329 …. 8.196 — v Power (2008) 71 NSWLR 451; [2008] NSWCA 135 …. 5.123 Cowan v Bunnings Group Ltd [2014] QSC 301 …. 1.38, 1.42, 2.63 Coward v Motor Insurer’s Bureau [1963] 1 QB 259 …. 8.76 Cox v New South Wales (2007) 71 NSWLR 225; [2007] NSWSC 471 …. 7.28, 8.66 — v R [2002] WASCA 358 …. 8.133, 8.153 — v — [2015] VSCA 28 …. 3.61 — v Salt (1994) 12 WAR 12 …. 6.32, 6.33 Crabbe v R (1984) 11 FCR 1 …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.136 Craig v R (1933) 49 CLR 429 …. 4.58 Crampton v R (2000) 206 CLR 161 …. 2.49, 4.41, 4.46, 4.47, 4.48 Crawford Earthmovers v Fitzsimmons (1972) 4 SASR 116 …. 6.22, 8.93 Crease v Barrett (1835) 1 Cr M & R 919; 149 ER 1353 …. 8.84 Credland v Knowler (1951) 35 Cr App R 48 …. 4.87 Cremer v SA Police (1994) 61 SASR 594 …. 4.33 Crescent Farm (Sidcup) Sports Ltd v Sterling Offices Ltd [1972] Ch 553 …. 5.26, 5.29, 5.49 Criminal Justice Commission v Connolly (1997) 91 A Crim R 323 …. 5.34 — v Parliamentary Civil Justice Commissioner (2001) 124 A Crim R 1 …. 5.198 Crisafio v R (2003) 27 WAR 169; [2003] WASCA 104 …. 4.48, 4.49 Crnisanin v Logan (1972) 4 SASR 340 …. 7.79 Crocker v R (2013) 39 VR 668; [2013] VSCA 318 …. 2.14 Crofts v R (1996) 186 CLR 427; 139 ALR 455 …. 3.72, 4.46, 7.107 Crosthwaite v City of Elizabeth (1989) 51 SASR 105 …. 7.130

— v Loader (1995) 77 A Crim R 348 …. 6.23 Crowley v Willis (1992) 110 FLR 194 …. 3.130 Crown Glass & Aluminium Pty Ltd v Ibrahim [2005] NSWCA 195 …. 6.66 CSR Ltd v Maddalena (2006) 224 ALR 1; [2006] HCA 1 …. 2.14 Cubillo v Commonwealth (2000) 174 ALR 97 …. 2.65, 6.45 Culley v Silhouette Health Studios Pty Ltd (1966) 2 NSWR 640 …. 3.161 Cullis v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd [1970] WAR 170 …. 8.174 Cumberland v R [2006] NSWCCA 377 …. 4.61 Curlex Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Carlingford Australia General Insurance Ltd [1987] 2 Qd R 335 …. 5.51 Currie v Dempsey [1967] 2 NSWR 532 …. 6.12 Curtis v R [1972] Tas SR 21 …. 7.9 Cutts v Head [1984] Ch 290 …. 5.89, 5.98 CV v DPP [2014] VSCA 58 …. 3.61, 3.70 Cvetkovic v R [2010] NSWCCA 329 …. 8.200 CW v R [2010] VSCA 288 …. 3.58, 3.61

D D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171 …. 5.66, 5.205, 5.221, 5.224, 5.238, 5.254 D (Infants), Re [1970] 1 WLR 599 …. 5.104 D (Minors), Re [1993] 2 WLR 721 …. 5.104 Daintry, Re; Ex parte Holt [1893] 2 QB 116 …. 5.89 Dair v Western Australia (2008) 36 WAR 413; [2008] WASCA 72 …. 3.25, 3.63 Dairy Farmers Co-operative Milk Co Ltd v Acquilina (1963) 109 CLR 458 …. 7.81 Dalleagles Pty Ltd v Australian Securities Commission (1991) 4 WAR 325 …. 5.22, 5.27, 5.33, 5.47 Dallison v Caffery [1965] 1 QB 348 …. 5.15 Daniel v Western Australia (1999) 94 FCR 537; [1999] FCA 1541 …. 5.225

— v — (2000) 173 ALR 51 …. 8.199 — v — (2000) 178 ALR 542 …. 7.73 — v — (2001) 186 ALR 369 …. 8.112 Daniels v Western Australia [2000] FCA 1334 …. 7.54 — v — (2012) 226 A Crim R 61; [2012] WASCA 213 …. 3.63 Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543 …. 5.22, 5.23, 5.30, 5.71, 5.73, 5.74, 5.154, 5.160, 5.183 DAO v R (2011) 81 NSWLR 568; [2011] NSWCCA 63 …. 2.15, 3.12, 3.59 Darby v Ousley (1856) 1 Hurl & Nor 1; 156 ER 1093 …. 7.153 Darkan v R (2006) 227 CLR 373 …. 2.72 Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; 85 ALJR 694; [2011] HCA 21 …. 7.54, 7.55, 7.66 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc 43 F 3d 1311 (1995) …. 7.52, 7.53, 7.54 — v — 509 US 579; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993) …. 7.46, 7.50, 7.52, 7.53, 7.54 David Symes & Co Ltd v Mather [1977] VR 516 …. 2.29, 3.158 Davidovic v R (1990) 51 A Crim R 197 …. 8.115, 8.117, 8.118, 8.120 Davidson v R [2009] NSWCCA 150 …. 2.85, 2.89 Davie v The Lord Provost, Magistrates and Councillors of the City of Edinburgh (1953) SC 34 …. 7.54, 7.66 Davies and Cody v R (1937) 57 CLR 170 …. 4.3, 4.54, 4.59, 4.64, 4.66, 7.94 Davies and Davies v Nyland and O’Neil (1974) 10 SASR 76 …. 5.89, 5.95, 5.99, 5.101, 8.98 Davies v DPP [1954] AC 378 …. 4.5, 4.17, 4.19, 4.24, 4.25, 4.26, 4.27, 4.28, 4.30, 4.100 — v Taylor [1974] AC 207 …. 2.60 Davy, Re [1935] P 1 …. 8.85 Daw v Toyworld (NSW) Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 25 …. 7.8, 7.69 Dawson v R (1961) 106 CLR 1 …. 2.72, 3.111

— v R (1990) 2 WAR 458 …. 4.64, 4.65, 4.74 Day v Dyson [1965] VR 165 …. 8.107 — v Perisher Blue Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 110 …. 3.49, 7.79 Dayman v Simpson [1935] SASR 320 …. 7.129, 7.131 De B v De B [1950] VLR 242 …. 7.103 De Gioia v Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd (1941) 42 SR (NSW) 1 …. 6.43 De Jesus v R (1986) 68 ALR 1 …. 3.71 De Rosa v Western Australia (2006) 32 WAR 136 …. 2.71 De Rose v South Australia [2002] FCA 1342 …. 8.84 De Silva v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 236 A Crim R 214; [2013] VSCA 339 …. 7.112 Dean v R (1995) 65 SASR 234 …. 2.73, 6.33 Decker v State Coroner (NSW) (1999) 46 NSWLR 415 …. 2.2 Demirok v R (1977) 137 CLR 20 …. 2.41, 2.42, 7.30 Dennis v AJ White & Co [1916] 2 KB 1 …. 6.75 Denovan’s Application, Re [1957] VR 333 …. 5.185 Denver v Cosgrove (1972) 3 SASR 130 …. 6.60 Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Law Institute of Victoria (2010) 27 VR 51; [2010] VSCA 73 …. 5.221 Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v McCauley (1996) 22 Fam LR 538 …. 2.2 — (Cth) v Robinswood Pty Ltd (2001) 24 WAR 284 …. 8.61 Derbas v R (2012) 221 A Crim R 13; [2012] NSWCCA 14 …. 5.205 — v — [2007] NSWCCA 118 …. 4.10 Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No 8) [1991] 1 WLR 73 …. 5.54 — v — (No 10) [1991] 1 WLR 660 …. 5.51 Derbyshire v Gilbert (2006) 31 WAR 558; [2006] WASCA 13 …. 5.5 Destanovic and Tangaloa v R [2015] VSCA 113 …. 3.78 Devala Provident Gold Mining Co, Re (1883) 22 Ch D 593 …. 8.113

DF Lyons Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1991) 100 ALR 468 …. 3.156 Dhanhoa v R (2003) 217 CLR 1; 199 ALR 547; [2003] HCA 40 …. 4.61, 4.88 Di Lena v Western Australia (2006) 165 A Crim R 482; [2006] WASCA 162 …. 3.63 Dibbs v R (2012) 225 A Crim R 195; [2012] VSCA 224 …. 3.12 Dickman v R [2015] VSCA 311 …. 2.37, 4.65, 4.67 Diehm v Director of Public Prosecutions (Nauru) (2013) 303 ALR 42; [2013] HCA 42 …. 6.52 Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292 …. 2.29, 7.35 Dillon v R [1982] AC 484 …. 6.28 Dimkovski v Ken’s Painting and Decorating Services Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 50 …. 5.28 Dingle v Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia (1989) 23 FCR 63 …. 5.23, 5.46 Director General Department of Community Services v D (2006) 66 NSWLR 582; [2006] NSWSC 827 …. 5.214 Director General, Department of Community Services; Sophie, Re [2008] NSWSC 1268 …. 5.69 Director of Public Prosecutions v A and BC Chewing Gum Ltd [1968] 1 QB 159 …. 7.58, 7.60 — v Bass [2016] VSCA 110 …. 4.57 — v Blake [1989] 1 WLR 432 …. 8.153 — v Boardman [1975] AC 421 …. 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 3.15, 3.18, 3.20, 3.21, 3.22, 3.24, 3.25, 3.26, 3.30, 3.39, 3.42, 3.44, 3.58, 3.64, 3.67, 3.70, 3.73, 4.97 — v Butay (2001) 124 A Crim R 41 …. 5.143 — v Carr [2002] NSWSC 194 …. 2.37, 5.261, 5.263 — v Ciantar [2006] VSCA 263 …. 2.88 — v Cole (1994) 100 NTR 1 …. 6.2, 6.16, 6.21, 6.22 — v Cook [2006] TASSC 75 …. 4.33

— v DJC (2012) 36 VR 33; [2012] VSCA 132 …. 2.15, 2.26, 4.67 — v Donnelly & Reed [2006] VSC 423 …. 8.168 — v Farr (2001) 118 A Crim R 399; [2001] NSWSC 3 …. 2.27, 2.36, 2.37 — v Faure [1993] 2 VR 497 …. 4.77 — v Finnegan [2011] TASCCA 3 …. 2.26 — v Galloway [2014] VSCA 272 …. 2.15, 5.19, 5.70 — v Garrett (a pseudonym) [2016] VSCA 31 …. 7.122, 7.123 — v Hester [1973] AC 296 …. 4.4, 4.16, 4.19, 4.38, 4.81, 4.97, 4.102, 4.103 — v JG (2010) 220 A Crim R 19; [2010] NSWCCA 222 …. 1.1, 7.110, 7.111, 7.112 — v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 …. 2.25, 3.9, 4.16, 4.19, 4.97, 4.100, 4.103 — v Lawson (2012) 226 A Crim R 138; [2012] VSC 526 …. 6.33 — v Leonard (2001) 53 NSWLR 227 …. 8.100 — v Lynch (2006) 16 Tas R 49; 166 A Crim R 327; [2006] TASSC 89 …. 2.14, 2.31, 4.69 — v Marijancevic (2011) 33 VR 440; [2011] VSCA 355 …. 2.26, 2.37 — v Martin (a Pseudonym) [2016] VSCA 219 …. 2.15, 3.56 — v MD (2010) 29 VR 434; [2010] VSCA 233 …. 2.37 — v Moore (2003) 6 VR 430 …. 2.37, 5.264 — v Morgan [1976] AC 182 …. 3.142, 3.143, 6.6, 6.9 — v Nicholls [2001] NSWSC 523 …. 7.98 — v P [1991] 2 AC 447 …. 3.20, 3.44 — v Ping Lin [1976] AC 574 …. 8.129 — v Riley (2007) 16 VR 519 …. 2.37, 5.264 — v Smiles (1993) 30 NSWLR 248 …. 5.200 — v Smith [1961] AC 290 …. 6.25 — v Stonehouse [1978] AC 55 …. 2.12 — v Tamcelik (2012) 224 A Crim R 350 …. 2.27

— v Toomalatai (2006) 13 VR 319 …. 8.131 — v United Telecasters of Sydney Ltd (1990) 168 CLR 594 …. 6.18 — v Walsh [1990] WAR 25 …. 5.97 — (NSW) v Alderman (1998) 45 NSWLR 526 …. 8.155 — v Gramelis [2010] NSWSC 787 …. 6.66 — v Wililo (2012) 222 A Crim R 106; [2012] NSWSC 713 …. 6.54 Director of Public Prosecutions Reference under s 693A of the Criminal Code: Y, Re (1998) 100 A Crim R 166 …. 2.11 Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas) v Cook (2006) 166 A Crim R 234 …. 8.100, 8.168 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v BB; DPP v QN (2010) 29 VR 110; [2010] VSCA 211 …. 8.53, 8.197 — (Vic) v McEwan (No 2) (2012) 221 A Crim R 421; [2012] VSC 170 …. 7.149 — (Vic) v Debono (2012) 225 A Crim R 585; [2012] VSC 476 …. 5.242, 5.243 Director, Office of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2013] FCAFC 8 …. 7.144 Distillers Co v Times Newspapers [1975] QB 613 …. 5.53, 5.85 District Council of Mallala v Livestock Markets Ltd (2006) 94 SASR 258; [2006] SASC 80 …. 5.78, 5.105 District Council of Prospect, Re a by-law made by the; Ex parte Hill [1926] SASR 326 …. 6.75 Divall v Mifsud [2005] NSWCA 447 …. 5.54 Dixon v McCarthy [1975] 1 NSWLR 617 …. 2.45 Dixon’s Stores Group Ltd v Thames Television plc [1993] 1 All ER 349 …. 5.94 DJS v R [2014] NSWCCA 77 …. 3.71 DJV v R [2008] NSWCCA 272 …. 2.87 DKA v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 44 …. 3.12, 3.63 Dobler v Halverson [2007] NSWCA 335 …. 7.38 Dobson v Morris (1986) 4 NSWLR 681 …. 8.43, 8.47

Dodd v Western Australia (2014) 238 A Crim R 72; [2014] WASC 13 …. 4.87 Dodds v R [2009] NSWCCA 78 …. 7.54, 7.56, 7.79, 7.80 Doe v R [2008] NSWCCA 203 …. 2.71 Doe d Gilbert v Ross (1840) 7 M & W 102; 151 ER 696 …. 7.18 Doe d Mudd v Suckermore (1836) 5 Ad & E 703; 111 ER 1331 …. 7.10, 7.40 Doe d Thompson v Hodgson (1840) 113 ER 762 …. 7.18 Doggett v R (2001) 208 CLR 343 …. 4.5, 4.41, 4.47, 4.48, 4.49, 4.100 Dolan v Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corp (1993) 42 FCR 206 …. 5.168 Dolling-Baker v Merrett [1990] 1 WLR 1205 …. 5.7, 5.242 Domican v R (1992) 173 CLR 555 …. 4.54, 4.56, 4.57, 4.59, 4.60, 4.63, 4.71, 4.72, 4.73, 4.78, 4.79, 4.102, 4.103 Dominguez v R (1985) 63 ALR 181 …. 2.82 Donaldson v Harris and Hamood (1973) 4 SASR 299 …. 5.84 — v Western Australia (2005) 31 WAR 122; [2005] WASCA 196 …. 3.63, 3.70, 3.71 — v — (2007) 176 A Crim R 488; [2007] WASCA 216 …. 3.129, 3.136 Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207 …. 2.50, 2.55, 3.52, 4.19, 4.85, 4.86, 4.95, 6.31, 6.33 Donnini v R (1972) 128 CLR 114 …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.137 Donoghue v Terry [1939] VLR 165 …. 6.18, 6.20, 6.43 Doran Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq), Re (2002) 168 FLR 116; [2002] NSWSC 215 …. 2.2, 5.57 Douglass v R [2012] HCA 34 …. 2.71 Dover v Doyle (2012) 34 VR 295; [2012] VSC 117 …. 6.25 Dowe v R [2009] NSWCCA 23 …. 2.37, 4.53 Dowling v Bowie (1952) 86 CLR 136 …. 6.8, 6.14, 6.16, 6.18, 6.19 Downs Irrigation Co-op Association Ltd v National Bank of Australasia Ltd [1983] 1 Qd R 130 …. 2.8, 2.9

Doyle v R [2014] NSWCCA 4 …. 6.57, 7.83 DRE v R (2006) 164 A Crim R 400 …. 4.49 Driscoll v R (1977) 137 CLR 517 …. 2.29, 2.30, 2.32, 7.9, 7.119, 7.151, 8.167 DS v R (2012) 221 A Crim R 235; [2012] NSWCCA 159 …. 2.71 DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Intertan Inc (2003) 127 FCR 499 …. 5.50, 5.57 DSJ v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth); NS v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (2012) 215 A Crim R 349; [2012] NSWCCA 9 …. 3.60, 3.61, 3.70 DTS v R [2008] NSWCCA 329 …. 2.71, 2.87, 4.44 Dubai Bank Ltd v Galadari [1990] Ch 98 …. 5.43, 5.48 — v — (No 7) [1992] 1 WLR 106 …. 5.43, 5.48 Dublin, Wicklow and Wexford Railway Co v Slattery (1878) 3 App Cas 1155 …. 2.50 Duchess of Kingston’s Trial (1776) 20 How St Tr 355 …. 5.205 Duff v R (1979) 39 FLR 315 …. 3.140 Duff Development Co v Kelantan [1924] AC 797 …. 6.60 Duke v Duke (1975) 12 SASR 106 …. 7.10, 7.40 — v R (1989) 180 CLR 508; 83 ALR 650 …. 4.31, 8.140 Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Pilmer (1994) 63 SASR 364 …. 2.29, 2.36, 3.158, 8.92 — v Young (No 1) (1990) 54 SASR 498 …. 8.174, 8.185 — v — (No 3) (1990) 55 SASR 11 …. 8.184 Duke of Buccleugh v Metropolitan Board of Works (1872) LR 5 HL 418 …. 5.184 Duke of Wellington, Re [1947] Ch 506 …. 6.70 Dumoo v Garner (1997) 7 NTLR 129; (1998) 143 FLR 245 …. 8.133, 8.142, 8.152, 8.153 Duncan, dec’d, Re [1968] P 306 …. 5.22 Duncan v Cammell Laird & Co Ltd [1942] AC 624 …. 5.216, 5.218, 5.220, 5.223, 5.229, 5.247

Dunesky v Elder (1992) 35 FCR 429 …. 5.26 Dunks v R [2014] NSWCCA 134 …. 7.93 Dunsmore v Elliott (1981) 26 SASR 496 …. 7.24 Dunstall v R …. 5.264 Dunstan v Orr [2008] FCA 31 …. 5.69 Dupas v R (2012) 40 VR 182; 218 A Crim R 507; [2012] VSCA 328 …. 2.19, 2.28, 2.30, 2.31, 3.90, 4.3, 4.23, 4.65, 4.67, 7.43, 7.58, 7.112, 7.135, 7.136 Dupont v Chief Commissioner of Police (2015) 295 FLR 283; [2015] FamCAFC 64 …. 5.19 Dura (Australia) Constructions Pty Ltd v Hue Boutique Living Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 99 …. 7.54 Durani v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 172 …. 2.24 Durham v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 121 …. 5.139 Durston v Mercuri [1969] VR 507 …. 7.17 DW v R (2014) 239 A Crim R 192; [2014] NSWCCA 28 …. 8.155 Dwyer v Collins (1852) 155 ER 1104 …. 7.18 Dyer v Best (1866) LR 1 Exch 152; 4 H & C 189 …. 7.79 Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285; 192 ALR 181; [2002] HCA 45 …. 2.12, 2.50, 4.46, 4.47, 4.48, 5.15, 5.118, 5.120, 5.124, 5.132, 5.133, 6.43, 6.46, 6.56, 7.131 Dyett v Jorgensen [1995] 2 Qd R 1 …. 2.9 Dyson v Pharmacy Board of NSW (2000) 50 NSWLR 523 …. 7.65

E E, In the Marriage of (1978) 31 FLR 171 …. 7.103 E, Re (1976) 1 SASR 179 …. 2.69 E v Australian Red Cross (1991) 31 FCR 299 …. 7.58 Eade v R (1924) 34 CLR 154 …. 4.84, 4.87, 7.101 Eagles v Orth [1976] Qd R 313 …. 7.49, 7.71

Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 …. 2.43, 3.33, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109, 3.130, 3.132, 3.133, 3.137, 4.54, 4.56, 7.19, 7.56 — v R (2000) 203 CLR 1 …. 2.49 Ebber v Isager [1995] 1 Qd R 150 …. 5.187 Edmeades v Thames Board Mills [1969] 2 QB 67 …. 5.8 Edwards v Brookes (Milk) Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 795 …. 8.114 — v R (1993) 178 CLR 193 …. 2.85, 2.88, 4.12, 4.83, 4.85, 4.86, 4.87, 4.88, 4.93, 5.138 Edwards and Osakwe v DPP [1992] Crim LR 576 …. 8.69, 8.88 Egan v Bott [1985] VR 787 …. 2.44 — v Chadwick (1999) 46 NSWLR 563 …. 5.68, 5.218 Egart v Deal [1994] 2 Qd R 117 …. 4.12, 4.33 Eichsteadt v Lahrs [1961] Qd R 457 …. 3.161 El Bayeh v R (2011) 31 VR 305; [2011] VSCA 44 …. 2.29 Elbourne v Troon Pty Ltd [1978] VR 171 …. 5.211 Electricity Trust of SA v Mitsubishi (1991) 57 SASR 48 …. 5.34 El-Haddad v R (2015) 88 NSWLR 93; [2015] NSWCCA 10 …. 3.54, 3.61, 3.68 Elias v R [2006] NSWCCA 365 …. 3.141 Ella v R (1991) 103 FLR 8 …. 2.49 Elliott v Tippett (2008) 20 VR 195; [2008] VSC 175 …. 5.211 Ellis v Deheer [1922] 2 KB 113 …. 5.185 — v Home Office [1953] 2 QB 135 …. 5.229 — v R (2010) 30 VR 428; [2010] VSCA 302 …. 4.88, 5.138 Elomar v R (2014) 300 FLR 323; [2014] NSWCCA 303 …. 3.56, 3.75, 8.116, 8.118 El-Zayet v R (2014) 88 NSWLR 556; [2014] NSWCCA 298 …. 5.58 Em v R (2007) 232 CLR 67; [2007] HCA 46 …. 2.33, 2.34, 2.35, 2.36, 2.37, 4.33, 5.259, 8.127, 8.133, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.155

Employment Advocate v Williamson (2001) 111 FCR 20 …. 2.37, 2.64 Enoch and Zaretzky, Re; Bock and Co’s Arbitration [1910] 1 KB 327 …. 6.48, 6.50 Environmental Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477 …. 5.108, 5.150, 5.153, 5.154, 5.157, 5.160, 5.162 EPA v Unomedical Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWLEC 111 …. 7.23 Epiabaka v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 150 ALR 397 …. 2.2 ER v Khan [2015] NSWCCA 230 …. 5.212, 5.213 Eric Preston Pty Ltd v Euroz Securities Ltd (2009) 175 FCR 508; [2009] FCA 240 …. 5.52, 5.58 ES v R [2010] NSWCCA 197 …. 3.56 Eschenko v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2005] FCA 1772 …. 7.19 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; 168 ALR 123; [1999] HCA 67 …. 5.19, 5.22, 5.23, 5.24, 5.33, 5.35, 5.36, 5.41, 5.47, 5.49, 5.83, 5.206, 5.208 — v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10 …. 5.85 Etherton v Western Australia (2005) 30 WAR 65; [2005] WASCA 83 …. 2.71 Evans v Chief Constable of Surrey [1988] QB 588 …. 5.231, 5.249 — v F [1964] SASR 130 …. 3.67 — v John Fairfax and Sons Ltd (1992) 110 FLR 411 …. 5.7 — v R (2007) 235 CLR 521; [2007] HCA 59 …. 2.14, 2.23, 4.9, 4.57, 4.69, 7.23, 7.41 Everard v Opperman [1958] VR 389 …. 6.16, 6.18, 6.19, 6.21 Evgeniou v R (1964) 37 ALJR 508 …. 6.34, 6.35 Ewart v Royds (1954) 72 WN (NSW) 58 …. 7.18 Ewin v Vergara (No 2) (2012) 209 FCR 288; [2012] FCA 1518 …. 5.177 Executive Director of Health v Lily Creek International Pty Ltd (2000) 22 WAR 510 …. 7.61

Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 303; [2013] HCA 46 …. 5.54, 5.58, 5.65

F Fagan, Re; Ex parte Hamilton [1966] 2 NSWR 732 …. 2.45 Fair Work Ombudsman v Valuair Ltd (2014) 314 ALR 499; [2014] FCA 404 …. 8.108 Fairmount Investments and Southwark London Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1976] 1 WLR 1255 …. 1.1 Fallon v Calvert [1960] 2 QB 201 …. 6.53 Familic v R (1994) 75 A Crim R 229 …. 2.85, 2.87, 2.89, 3.66, 4.32 Fang v R [2010] NSWCCA 254 …. 6.3 Farey v Burvett (1916) 21 CLR 433 …. 6.72 Farkas v R [2014] NSWCCA 141 …. 2.4 Farnaby and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission, Re [2007] AATA 1792 …. 5.23 Farquharson v R [2012] VSCA 296 …. 7.49 Farrell v R (1998) 194 CLR 286 …. 7.43, 7.44, 7.58, 7.112 Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Webb (1996) 39 NSWLR 601 …. 5.49 Fattal v R [2006] NSWCCA 359 …. 8.119 FB v R [2011] NSWCCA 217 …. 6.58, 7.124 FDP v R [2008] NSWCCA 317 …. 2.27, 2.46, 2.87, 3.33 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Citibank (1989) 20 FCR 403 …. 5.22, 5.49, 5.81 — v Pratt Holdings (2003) 195 ALR 717 …. 5.23, 5.37, 5.41, 5.52 Feiler v McIntyre [1974] 2 NSWLR 268 …. 8.96 Ferris v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 54 …. 3.63 Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593; [2001] HCA 72 …. 2.29, 3.25, 3.57, 4.56, 4.57,

4.58, 4.61, 4.62, 4.63, 4.67, 7.94 Feuerheerd v London General Omnibus Co Ltd [1918] 2 KB 565 …. 5.26 FGC v Western Australia (2008) 183 A Crim R 313; [2008] WASCA 47 …. 4.38, 4.43, 4.46, 4.49 FH v McDougall [2008] SCC 53 …. 2.65 Field v Commissioner for Railways for New South Wales (1957) 99 CLR 285 …. 5.89, 5.93, 5.95, 5.102 — v Gent (1996) 67 SASR 122 …. 4.14 Filipowski v Nikolaus (2004) 136 LGERA 157; [2004] NSWLEC 432 …. 5.68 Filippou v R (2015) 256 CLR 47; [2015] HCA 29 …. 2.4, 2.7, 4.12 Finance and Guarantee Co Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1970) 44 ALJR 368 …. 8.113 Fingleton v Lowen (1979) 20 SASR 312 …. 8.22 — v R (2005) 227 CLR 166; [2005] HCA 3 …. 2.49 Finn v Lemmer (1991) 55 SASR 455 …. 5.187 Fitzgerald v R (1992) 106 FLR 331 …. 2.49 — v — (2014) 88 ALJR 779; [2014] HCA 28 …. 1.44, 2.70, 2.90 Fitz-Gibbon v Wily [1998] FCA 1193 …. 8.192 FJL v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 8 …. 4.49 Flavel v South Australia (2008) 102 SASR 404 …. 7.66 Fleming v R [2009] NSWCCA 233 …. 4.48, 4.54 Fletcher Timber Ltd v Attorney-General [1984] 1 NZLR 290 …. 5.242, 5.244, 5.251 Flinders Medical Centre v Waller (2005) 91 SASR 378 …. 7.74 Flora v R (2013) 233 A Crim R 320; [2013] VSCA 192 …. 4.93 Flower and Hart v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 163 ALR 744 …. 7.130 Flowers v R (2005) 189 FLR 423; [2005] NTCCA 5 …. 8.108 FMJ v R [2011] VSCA 308 …. 8.130

Folbigg v R [2007] NSWCCA 371 …. 5.185 Foletta v Merri Creek Quarry Pty Ltd [1951] VLR 149 …. 8.93 Folkes v Chadd (1782) 3 Dougl 157; 99 ER 589 …. 2.22, 7.43 Foo v R (2001) 161 FLR 279 …. 8.155 — v — (2001) 167 FLR 423 …. 4.20, 4.102 Forbes v Samuel [1913] 3 KB 706 …. 7.17 Foreign Media v Konstantinidis [2003] NSWCA 161 …. 7.19 Forrest v Normandale (1973) 5 SASR 524 …. 5.139 Fort Dodge Australia Pty Ltd v Nature Vet Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 501 …. 5.59 Fortson v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2008) 100 SASR 162 …. 7.64 Foster v R (1993) 113 ALR 1 …. 2.32, 8.138, 8.139, 8.140, 8.143, 8.156 Fox v General Medical Council [1960] 1 WLR 1017 …. 7.92 — v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 …. 2.14 — v Star Newspapers [1900] AC 19 …. 6.37 Framlingham Aboriginal Trust v McGuiness and Chatfield [2014] VSC 241 …. 8.200 Fraser Henleins Pty Ltd v Cody (1944) 70 CLR 100 …. 8.112 Freeman v Griffiths (1976) 13 SASR 494 …. 6.62, 6.69 French v Scarman (1979) 20 SASR 333 …. 5.264 Frijaf v R [1982] WAR 128 …. 8.163 Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir, 1923) …. 7.46, 7.50, 7.51, 7.52, 7.53, 7.136 Furnell v Betts (1978) 20 SASR 300 …. 6.3

G G v H (1994) 181 CLR 387; 68 ALJR 860 …. 2.58, 2.60 Gabriel v R (1997) 76 FCR 279 …. 3.72, 3.104, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132, 3.134, 3.135 Gaetani v Trustees of the Christian Bros (1988) Aust Torts Rep ¶80-156 …. 2.69

Gaggin v Moss [1984] 2 Qd R 513 …. 8.93 Gaio v R (1960) 104 CLR 419 …. 8.52, 8.53 Galafassi v Kelly (2014) 87 NSWLR 119; [2014] NSWCA 190 …. 5.90 Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSWLR 263 …. 6.58 Gallagher v Cendak [1988] VR 731 …. 6.22 Gallagher v R [2015] NSWCCA 228 …. 2.37 Gallant v R [2006] NSWCCA 339 …. 3.107, 3.134, 3.136, 3.138 Galler v Galler [1954] P 252 …. 4.75 Galvin v R [2006] NSWCCA 66 …. 4.20 Gambro Pty Ltd v Fresenius Medical Care Australia Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1828 …. 7.54 Ganin v NSW Crimes Commission (1993) 70 A Crim R 417 …. 5.182 Garcin v Amerindo Investment Advisers Ltd [1991] 4 All ER 655 …. 7.3 Gardiner v R (2006) 162 A Crim R 233; [2006] NSWCCA 190 …. 3.68, 4.61, 4.63 Gardner v Duve (1978) 19 ALR 695 …. 8.108 Gardner, Re (1967) 13 FLR 345 …. 8.30 Garratt’s Ltd v Thangathurai [2002] NSWSC 39 …. 5.59 Garrett v Nicholson (1999) 21 WAR 226 …. 2.84, 7.131 Garrett v R (1977) 139 CLR 437 …. 5.190 Garven v Quilty (1988) 148 FLR 273 …. 6.56 Gas Corporation v Phasetwo Nominees Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 773 …. 7.56, 8.49 Gately v R (2007) 232 CLR 208; [2007] HCA 55 …. 2.14, 7.21, 7.34 Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1982) 43 ALR 313 …. 3.156 Gatland v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1968] 2 QB 279 …. 6.16 Gattelaro v Westpac Banking Corp (2004) 204 ALR 258; [2004] HCA 6 …. 6.65 GBT v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 19 …. 4.46, 4.49 Gedeon v R (2013) 280 FLR 275; [2013] NSWCCA 257 …. 2.37

GEH v R (2012) 228 A Crim R 32; [2012] NSWCCA 150 …. 3.150 General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp Ltd v Tanter [1984] 1 WLR 100 …. 5.51 General Electric v Joiner 522 US 136 (1997) …. 7.52 George Doland Ltd v Blackburn Robson Coates & Co (a firm) [1972] 1 WLR 1338 …. 5.51 Gerard and Co Pty Ltd, Ex parte (1944) 44 SR NSW 370 …. 8.112 Ghebrat v R [2011] VSCA 299 …. 8.194 Giallombardo v R [2014] NSWCCA 25 …. 4.44 Gibson v R [2001] TASSC 59 …. 1.22, 2.87, 7.43 Gilbert v R (2000) 201 CLR 414; [2000] HCA 15 …. 2.13 Gilham v R (2007) 73 NSWLR 308; [2007] NSWCCA 323 …. 5.190 Gilham v R (2012) 224 A Crim R 22; [2012] NSWCCA 131 …. 5.190, 6.52, 6.55, 7.51, 7.65 Gill v R [1999] WASCA 68 …. 2.71 Gillespie v Steer (1973) 6 SASR 200 …. 7.82 Gillett v Murphy [2001] NSWCA 199 …. 7.23 Gillies v Downer EDI Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1323 …. 5.58, 5.59 Gilligan v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1990) 101 FLR 139 …. 5.216, 5.223, 5.244, 5.252 Gilmore v EPA; Tableland Topdressing v EPA [2002] NSWCCA 399 …. 2.27 Gilson v R (1991) 172 CLR 353 …. 2.58 Gipp …. 4.43 Gipp v R (1998) 194 CLR 104 …. 3.34, 3.36 Gipp v R (1998) 194 CLR 106 …. 2.87, 3.21, 3.66, 3.73 Gittany v R [2016] NSWCCA 182 …. 7.43, 7.58, 7.112, 7.136 Glass v Tasmania (2013) 22 Tas R 466 …. 3.73 Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd v Arthur Andersen [2002] 1 Qd R 233; [2001] QCA 115 …. 5.26

Glennon v R (1994) 179 CLR 1 …. 2.14, 2.29, 5.141 Global Funds Management (NSW) Ltd v Rooney (1994) 36 NSWLR 122 …. 5.26 GO v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 132 …. 7.31 Gobby v CWA (1991) 7 SR (WA) 203 …. 5.37 Goddard v Nationwide Building Society [1987] QB 670 …. 5.64, 5.65, 5.66, 5.85 Godfrey v Woolworths (WA) Ltd (1998) 103 A Crim R 336 …. 7.15, 7.18 Goldberg v Ng (1995) 185 CLR 83 …. 5.22, 5.52, 5.53 Goldman v The Ferry Kameruka [1971] 1 NSWLR 393 …. 8.93 Goldsmith v Newman (1992) 65 A Crim R 563 …. 5.13 Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 …. 7.140, 7.141 Golf Lynx v Golf Scene (1984) 59 ALR 343 …. 5.9, 5.10 Gonzales v R (2007) 178 A Crim R 232; [2007] NSWCCA 321 …. 2.46, 8.167 Goodrich Aerospace Pty Ltd v Arsic (2006) 66 NSWLR 186 …. 2.14 Goodwin v Nominal Defendant (1979) 54 ALJR 84 …. 2.58 Goody v Odham’s Press [1967] 1 QB 333 …. 3.153 Gordon v Carroll (1975) 27 FLR 129 …. 7.117 Gordon v Ross [2006] NSWCA 157 …. 8.112 Gordon-King v R [2008] NSWCCA 335 …. 7.93 Gough v Braden (1991) 55 A Crim R 92 …. 6.22 Government Insurance Office of NSW v Bailey (1992) 27 NSWLR 305 …. 6.47 GPI Leisure Corp Ltd (in liq) v Yuill (1997) 42 NSWLR 225 …. 5.90, 5.94 GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15 …. 7.117, 7.124 Graham v Police (2001) 122 A Crim R 152 …. 7.118 Graham v R (1998) 195 CLR 606 …. 5.143, 7.79, 7.83, 8.198 Granada Tavern v Smith [2008] FCA 646 …. 2.64 Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 …. 5.22, 5.33, 5.34, 5.36, 5.38, 5.48, 5.78,

5.169 Grant v R (1975) 11 ALR 503 …. 2.73 Grayden v R [1989] WAR 208 …. 7.10 Grbic v Pitkethly (1992) 38 FCR 95 …. 4.12, 4.64, 4.73 Great Atlantic Insurance Co v Home Insurance Co [1981] 1 WLR 529 …. 5.51 Great Southern Managers (in liq) v Clark (2012) 36 VR 308; [2012] VSCA 207 …. 5.57 Greaves v Aikman (1994) 74 A Crim R 370 …. 2.47, 4.57 Green (a Pseudonym) v R [2015] VSCA 279 …. 3.141 Green v R (1971) 126 CLR 28 …. 2.71, 2.72 Green v R (1999) 161 ALR 648; [1999] HCA 13 …. 4.20, 4.80, 4.83, 4.102, 4.103, 4.104 Green v Wilden Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 105 …. 6.39 Greenough v Eccles (1859) 5 CB (NS) 786; 144 ER 315 …. 7.118 Greenough v Gaskell (1833) 1 My & K 98; 39 ER 618 …. 5.27 Greensill v R (2012) 37 VR 257; [2012] VSCA 306 …. 4.51 Gregory and Sharwood v R (1983) 151 CLR 566 …. 3.142, 3.143, 3.144 Gregory v Philip Morris Ltd (1988) 80 ALR 455 …. 5.94 Grew v Cubitt [1951] 2 TLR 305 …. 8.52 Grey v R (2001) 184 ALR 593; 75 ALJR 1708; [2001] HCA 65 …. 5.15 Greyhound Australia Pty Ltd v Deluxe Coachlines Pty Ltd (1986) 11 FCR 592 …. 5.5, 5.239 Griffen, Re (1887) 8 LR (NSW) 132 …. 5.28 Griffin v Constantine (1954) 91 CLR 136 …. 6.72 Griffin v Pantzer (2004) 137 FCR 209 …. 2.2, 5.146, 5.156 Griffis v R (1996) 67 SASR 170 …. 6.48, 6.51, 7.33 Griffith v Australian Broadcasting Commission [2003] NSWSC 483 …. 7.19 Griffith v R (1937) 58 CLR 185 …. 3.29 Griffiths v ANZ (1990) 53 SASR 256 …. 8.189

Griffiths v R (1994) 125 ALR 545 …. 6.3 Griffiths v Wood (1994) 62 SASR 204 …. 6.47 Grills v R (1996) 70 ALJR 905 …. 3.150 Grimley v R (1995) 121 FLR 282 …. 4.33, 8.168 Grinham, Ex parte; Sneddon, Re (1961) 61 SR (NSW) 862 …. 5.183 Grofam Pty Ltd v ANZ (1993) 45 FCR 445 …. 5.26 Grofam Pty Ltd v MacAuley (1994) 121 ALR 22 …. 5.173 Grosser v SA Police (1994) 63 SASR 243 …. 2.8, 6.47, 7.22 Groundstroem v R [2013] NSWCCA 237 …. 4.49 Grubisic v Western Australia (2011) 41 WAR 524; [2011] WASCA 147 …. 4.85, 7.39 Grundy v Lewis [1998] FCA 1537 …. 7.76 GSA Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd v Constable [2002] 2 Qd R 146 …. 5.26, 5.34, 5.37, 5.43 Guardian Royal Exchange v Stuart [1985] 1 NZLR 596 …. 5.34 Guide Dog Owners’ & Friends’ Association Inc v Guide Dog Association of NSW & ACT (1998) 154 ALR 527 …. 7.38, 7.41, 7.61 Guinness Peat Properties Ltd v Fitzroy Robinson Partnership [1987] 1 WLR 1027 …. 5.54, 5.65 Gumana v Northern Territory [2005] FCA 50 …. 7.64, 8.84, 8.200 Gundersen v Miller [1936] SASR 206 …. 4.36 Guthrie v Spence [2009] NSWCA 369 …. 8.29 Gutierrez v R [1997] 1 NZLR 192 …. 7.130 Guy and Finger v R [1978] WAR 125 …. 8.52, 8.53 Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police (2008) 234 CLR 532 …. 5.217

H H, SA v Police (2013) 116 SASR 547; [2013] SASCFC 86 …. 7.34, 8.129

H Stanke & Sons Pty Ltd v Von Stanke (2006) 95 SASR 425; [2006] SASC 308 …. 5.61, 5.65 Ha v R [2014] VSCA 335 …. 7.23 Habib v Nationwide News Ltd (2010) 76 NSWLR 299; [2010] NSWCA 34 …. 8.131 Haddara v R (2014) 43 VR 53; [2014] VSCA 100 …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.29, 2.35, 2.37, 4.56, 8.100 Haidari v R [2015] NSWCCA 126 …. 2.46, 2.49, 7.38, 7.41 Haije v R [2006] NSWCCA 23 …. 4.57 Haines v Guthrie (1884) 13 QBD 818 …. 8.85 Hajar v R [2015] VSCA 233 …. 3.138 Haj-Ismail v Madigan (1982) 45 ALR 379 …. 5.224, 5.244 Hales v Kerr [1908] 2 KB 601 …. 3.155, 3.161 Hall v R [1971] 1 WLR 298 …. 5.134, 5.139 — v Western Australia (2013) 232 A Crim R 107; [2013] WASCA 165 …. 2.46, 3.63 Hally v Starkey [1962] Qd R 474 …. 7.137 Halverson v Dobler [2006] NSWSC 1307 …. 7.64 Hamilton v Ah Fayed [1999] 3 All ER 317 …. 5.198 — v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 486 …. 5.145, 5.171, 5.180, 5.181, 5.182 Hamod v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2006] NSWCA 243 …. 7.41 Handley v Baddock [1987] WAR 98 …. 5.41 Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 165 A Crim R 151; [2006] NSWCCA 373 …. 2.30, 2.31, 2.32, 2.83, 7.10, 7.43 Haque v Commissioner of Corrective Services (2008) 216 FLR 271 …. 8.199 HAR v Western Australia (No 2) [2015] WASCA 249 …. 3.146, 7.137 Harbours Corporation of Queensland v Vessey Chemicals Pty Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 60; 67 ALR 100 …. 5.85, 5.234, 5.251, 5.254 Hardie Finance Corp Pty Ltd v CCD Australia Pty Ltd (1995) 67 FCR 594 …. 5.42

Harding v Williams (1880) 14 Ch D 197 …. 8.189 Hare v Riley [1974] VR 638 …. 5.211 Hargan v R (1919) 27 CLR 13 …. 4.19 Hargraves v R (2011) 245 CLR 257; [2011] HCA 44 …. 2.12, 2.71, 4.76 Harman v Western Australia (2004) 29 WAR 380; [2004] WASCA 230 …. 2.71 Harmony Shipping Co SA v Saudi Europe Line Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 1384 …. 5.60 Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 …. 3.13, 3.14, 3.21, 3.26, 3.30, 3.31, 3.37, 3.42, 3.45, 3.46, 3.51, 3.52, 3.56, 3.57, 3.64, 3.66, 8.72 Harrington v Lowe (1996) 136 ALR 42 …. 5.94 — v North London Polytechnic [1984] 1 WLR 1293 …. 5.10 Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893 …. 7.56, 7.64, 7.66 Harris v AGC (1984) 38 SASR 303 …. 6.3 Harris v — [1952] AC 694 …. 3.14, 3.66, 3.69 — v R [1988] Tas R 31 …. 5.141 — v — (1990) 55 SASR 321 …. 4.87, 4.88 — v — (2005) 158 A Crim R 454 …. 8.197 — v Tippett (1811) 2 Camp 637; 170 ER 1277 …. 7.140 Harris (a Pseudonym) v R (2015) 44 VR 652; [2015] VSCA 112 …. 3.20, 3.58, 3.61 Harris Scarfe Ltd v Ernst & Young (No 4) [2005] SASC 443 …. 5.7 Harrison v Flaxmill Road Foodland Pty Ltd (1979) 22 SASR 385 …. 2.8, 6.62 Hart v Lancashire and Yorkshire Rail Co (1869) 21 LT 261 …. 2.21 Hartogen Energy Ltd v Australian Gas Light Co (1992) 109 ALR 177 …. 5.34, 5.36, 5.40, 5.78, 5.244 Harvey v Police (2006) 95 SASR 357; [2006] SASC 222 …. 4.53 — v Smith-Wood [1964] 2 QB 171 …. 7.119, 8.173 Hatziparadissis v GFC (Manufacturing) Pty Ltd [1978] VR 181 …. 7.82

Hawthorn Glen Pty Ltd v Aconex Pty Ltd (No 1) [2007] FCA 2010 …. 7.129 Hay v Mitchell [1973] 2 NSWLR 736 …. 7.17 Hayslep v Gymer (1834) 1 Ad & El 162; 110 ER 1169 …. 8.31 Hayward v Whitbread [1966] SASR 1 …. 6.18 He Kaw Teh v R (1985) 157 CLR 523 …. 6.8, 6.9 Health & Life Care Ltd v Price Waterhouse (1997) 69 SASR 362 …. 5.28 Health Insurance Commissioner v Freeman (1998) 88 FCR 544 …. 5.26 Heanes v Herangi (2007) 175 A Crim R 175; [2007] WASC 175 …. 3.49, 7.79 Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125; [2008] HCA 36 …. 5.53, 5.76, 5.85 Heatherington v R (1994) 179 CLR 370 …. 8.168 Hehir v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1982] 1 WLR 715 …. 5.216 Heid v Connell Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 629 …. 5.187 Helal v McConnell Dowell Constructors (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 3) (2011) 285 ALR 281; [2011] FCA 1344 …. 6.39 Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691 …. 2.64 Henderson v Queensland (2014) 89 ALJR 162; [2014] HCA 52 …. 2.65 — v Richardson (1996) 5 Tas R 375 …. 6.28 Henley v Henley [1955] P 202 …. 5.104 — v Tu [2009] ACTSC 37 …. 7.59 Henman v Lester (1862) 12 CB (NS) 776; 142 ER 1347 …. 7.153 Hennessy v BHP (1926) 38 CLR 342 …. 5.184 Henry Coxon, The (1878) 3 PD 156 …. 8.83 Henschke and Co v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1561 …. 7.65 Herbert v R (1982) 62 FLR 302 …. 8.108 Herijanto v Refugee Review Tribunal (2000) 170 ALR 379 …. 5.184 — v — (No 2) (2000) 170 ALR 575; 74 ALJR 703 …. 5.184 Hermanus v R [2015] VSCA 2 …. 4.46 Heron v R (2003) 197 ALR 81 …. 2.49

Herring v US 555 US (2009) …. 2.37 Hesse Blind Roller Co Pty Ltd v Hamitoski [2006] VSCA 121 …. 6.45 Hetherington v Brooks [1963] SASR 321 …. 7.79, 7.80, 7.82 Hevi Lift (PNG) Ltd v Etherington [2005] NSWCA 42 …. 7.66 Heyward v Bishop [2015] ACTCA 58 …. 2.37 HG v R (1999) 197 CLR 414; [1999] HCA 2 …. 3.146, 3.147, 3.150, 7.53, 7.54, 7.55, 7.65, 7.66 Hickey v R [2002] WASCA 321 …. 3.48 Hickman v Taylor 329 US 495 (1947) …. 5.23, 5.43 Hicks v R (1920) 28 CLR 36 …. 4.19, 4.38 Higgins v Parker (1984) 35 SASR 229 …. 2.8, 6.62 — v R [2007] NSWCCA 56 …. 8.142 Higham v Ridgway (1808) 10 East 109; 103 ER 717 …. 8.76, 8.80 Hill v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1990] 1 WLR 946 …. 5.193 — v R [2003] WASCA 177 …. 3.149 Hillier and Carney v Lucas (2000) 81 SASR 451 …. 7.66, 8.186 Hills, In the Estate of [2009] SASC 176 …. 6.23, 6.25 Hillstead v R [2005] WASCA 116 …. 7.66 Hilton v Lancashire Dynamo Nevelin Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 952 …. 8.173 Hindrum v Lane [2014] TASFC 5; (2014) 242 A Crim R 400 …. 6.8 Hinton v Mill (1991) 57 SASR 97 …. 2.49 Hirst v Police (2006) 95 SASR 260; [2006] SASC 244 …. 3.25, 4.73 HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 …. 2.12, 2.13, 2.85, 2.87, 3.7, 3.17, 3.21, 3.28, 3.29, 3.31, 3.35, 3.36, 3.38, 3.42, 3.45, 3.46, 3.50, 3.51, 3.53, 3.56, 3.58, 3.61, 3.64, 3.66, 3.69, 3.74, 7.89, 7.116, 7.140, 8.72 Ho v Powell (2001) 51 NSWLR 572 …. 2.63, 2.67, 6.20, 6.45, 8.194 Hoare v O’Neill (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 882 …. 5.103 Hobbs v Hobbs and Cousens [1960] P 112 …. 5.33 — v Tinling [1929] 2 KB 1 …. 3.153

Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292 …. 2.45, 3.21, 3.30, 3.39, 3.42, 3.44, 3.45, 3.46, 3.48, 3.49, 3.50, 3.52, 3.58, 3.60, 3.62, 3.63, 3.64, 3.65, 3.67, 3.70, 3.71, 4.98 Hocking v Bell (1945) 71 CLR 430 …. 2.50 Hodgson v Amcor Ltd (No 4) (2011) 32 VR 568; [2011] VSC 269 …. 5.58 Hodgson, Re; Beckett v Ramsdale (1885) 31 Ch D 177 …. 4.75 Hoefler v Tomlinson (1995) 60 FCR 452 …. 5.87, 5.96 Hogan v ACC (2010) 240 CLR 651; [2010] HCA 21 …. 5.85 Holcombe v Coulton (1988) 17 NSWLR 71 …. 2.49 Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149 …. 6.59, 6.64, 6.65, 6.75 — v Sammon (1972) 4 SASR 1 …. 5.5 Hollingham v Head (1858) 4 CB(NS) 388; 140 ER 1135 …. 2.21, 3.155, 3.158, 3.161 Hollington v Hewthorn [1943] KB 587 …. 5.186, 5.191, 5.192, 5.193, 5.194 Holloway v McFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470 …. 2.58, 2.64, 8.13, 8.96, 8.109 — v Victoria [2015] VSC 526 …. 5.12 Home Office v Harman [1983] 1 AC 280 …. 5.53, 5.85 Honeysett v R (2014) 253 CLR 122; [2014] HCA 29 …. 4.56, 7.24, 7.40, 7.43, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.65 Hong Kong Bank of Australia Ltd v Murphy (1992) 28 NSWLR 512 …. 5.92 — v Murphy [1993] 2 VR 419 …. 5.34, 5.54, 5.57 Hood Sweeney Technology Pty Ltd v Equant Aust Pty Ltd [2009] SASC 298 …. 5.10 Hooker Corp Ltd v Darling Harbour Authority (1987) 9 NSWLR 538 …. 5.54, 5.65 Hooper v Kirella Pty Ltd (1999) 96 FCR 1 …. 5.10 Horman v Bingham [1972] VR 29 …. 6.60 Horne v Comino [1966] Qd R 202 …. 8.103 — v Milne (1881) 7 VLR 296 …. 2.19

Horrell v R (1997) 6 NTR 125 …. 4.88 Horsman v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 190 …. 3.25, 3.63 Hoskyn v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] AC 474 …. 5.200 Hospitals Contribution Fund of Australia Ltd v Hunt (1983) 76 FLR 408 …. 5.234, 5.251 Hothnyang v R [2014] VSCA 64 …. 3.31 House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 …. 2.15, 2.26, 2.31, 3.12, 3.62, 3.105, 5.267, 8.159 Houston v Crannage [1990] WAR 11 …. 5.13 Howard, Estate of (1996) 39 NSWLR 409 …. 6.23 Howglen Ltd, Re [2001] 1 All ER 376 …. 5.10 Howson v R (2007) 170 A Crim R 401; [2007] WASC 83 …. 4.88 Hoy v R [2002] WASCA 275 …. 8.77 Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 314 …. 8.112 Hoyts Pty Ltd v Burns (2003) 77 ALJR 1943 …. 7.38 HP v R (2011) 32 VR 687; [2011] VSCA 251 …. 5.190 Hrysikos v Mansfield (2002) 5 VR 485 …. 7.152 Hua Wang Bank Berhad v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 7) [2013] FCA 1020 …. 5.223 Huges (a Pseudonym) v R (2013) 238 A Crim R 345; [2013] VSCA 338 …. 3.104, 3.108, 3.109 Hughes v Biddulph (1827) 4 Russ 190; 38 ER 777 …. 5.33 — v National Trustees Executors and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 134 …. 2.47, 8.45 — v R [2015] NSWCCA 330 …. 3.12, 3.60, 3.62 — v — [2016] HCATrans 201 …. 3.60 Hui Chi-ming v R [1992] 1 AC 34 …. 5.192 Hummerstone v Leary [1921] 2 KB 664 …. 6.40 Hunt v Russell and De Pinto (1995) 63 SASR 402 …. 5.5

— v Wark (1986) 40 SASR 489 …. 5.12, 8.155 — v Watkins (2000) 49 NSWLR 508 …. 6.37 — v Western Australia (2008) 189 A Crim R 248 …. 4.49 Hunter v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529 …. 5.187, 5.188, 5.192 — v Mann [1974] QB 767 …. 5.206 — v Police (2011) 111 SASR 411 …. 7.120 Hurd v Zomojo Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 148 …. 2.69 Hutt, Bell & Jeffrey v R (1988) 37 A Crim R 432 …. 3.67 HW Thompson Building Pty Ltd v Alien Property Services Pty Ltd (1983) 48 ALR 667 …. 3.156

I I Waxman and Sons Ltd v Texaco Canada Ltd (1968) 67 DLR(2d) 295 …. 5.88, 5.101 IBM Global Services Australia Ltd, Re [2005] FCAFC 66 …. 7.19, 7.20 IBM United Kingdom Ltd v Prima Data International [1994] 4 All ER 748 …. 5.157 Ibrahim v Pham [2007] NSWCA 215 …. 3.154 Idoport Pty Ltd v NAB (2000) 50 NSWLR 640 …. 2.3, 6.70, 7.60, 7.61 — v — [2001] NSWSC 123 …. 7.66 — v — [2001] NSWSC 222 …. 5.31 — v — [2001] NSWSC 529 …. 7.38, 7.41 Ilioski v R [2006] NSWCCA 164 …. 4.61, 4.69 IMM v R [2014] NTCCA 20 …. 2.31 — v — (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 …. 2.18, 2.19, 2.23, 2.31, 2.32, 2.52, 2.53, 3.58, 3.60, 3.61, 3.70, 4.58, 4.68, 4.98, 4.100, 7.54, 7.55, 7.135 Imnetu v R [2006] NSWCCA 203 …. 2.73 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Caro [1961] 1 WLR 529 …. 1.1

Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cornwall (1993) 116 ALR 97 …. 5.205 Indigo Financial Money Pty Ltd v Bolivar Road Pty Ltd (2010) 108 SASR 120; [2010] SASCFC 29 …. 2.14 Ingot v Macquarie (No 4) [2005] NSWSC 90 …. 8.110 Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (2006) 67 NSWLR 91; [2006] NSWSC 530 …. 2.2, 5.23 Ingram v Ingram [1956] P 390 …. 5.191 Inspector Campbell v Hitchcock [2003] NSWIRComm 148 …. 7.8 Interchase Corp Ltd, Re (1996) 68 FCR 481; 21 ACSR 375 …. 2.2, 5.75 Interchase Corporation Ltd (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Queensland) Pty Ltd (No 1) [1999] 1 Qd R 141 …. 5.28 Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1991) 102 ALR 379 …. 8.49 — v — (1992) 111 ALR 577 …. 8.49 International Business Machines Corp v Phoenix International (Computers) Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 413 …. 5.54 Isherwood v Tasmania (2010) 20 Tas R 375; [2010] TASCCA 11 …. 7.27, 7.79 ISJ v R (2012) 38 VR 23; [2012] VSCA 321 …. 7.83, 7.102, 8.198 Istel (AT & T) Ltd v Tully [1993] AC 45 …. 5.157, 5.172 Italiano v Barbaro (1993) 114 ALR 21 …. 8.43, 8.115 ITC Ltd v Video Exchange Ltd [1982] Ch 431 …. 5.62

J J v L & A Services Pty Ltd [1995] 2 Qd R 10 …. 5.238, 5.254 — v R [1989] Tas R 116 …. 3.70, 4.98 J Boag and Son Brewing Ltd v Bridon Investments Pty Ltd (2001) 10 Tas R 26 …. 7.152, 7.153 JA McBeath Nominees Pty Ltd v Jenkins Development Corp Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 121 …. 5.103 Jacara Pty Ltd v Auto-Bake Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 417 …. 2.28, 3.159

— v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51; [2000] FCA 1886 …. 3.55, 3.60, 3.154, 3.156, 3.159, 3.161, 7.137 — v — (2000) 185 ALR 463 …. 7.137 Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446 …. 5.187 — v Lithgow City Council [2008] NSWCA 312 …. 2.60, 7.41 — v Wells (1985) 5 FCR 296 …. 5.246, 5.247 Jacobsen v Rogers (1995) 182 CLR 572 …. 5.205, 5.218, 5.238 Jacobson v Suncorp Insurance [1991] 2 Qd R 46 …. 7.118 — v United States 503 US 540 (1992) …. 4.53 Jadwan Pty Ltd v Porter (No 2) (2004) 13 Tas R 219; [2004] TASSC 126 …. 5.94 Jaffarie v Director General of Security [2014] FCAFC 102 …. 5.244 Jager v Lynch (2003) 12 Tas R 195 …. 8.149 Jago v District Court of NSW (1989) 168 CLR 23 …. 2.29, 4.46 Jamal v R (2012) 223 A Crim R 585; [2012] NSWCCA 198 …. 2.30, 2.43, 7.23, 8.96 James v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1985) 9 FCR 448 …. 6.37, 6.38, 6.40 — v — (1986) 64 ALR 347 …. 6.37, 6.38, 6.40 — v Keogh [2008] 101 SASR 42 …. 7.64 — v Launceston City Council (2004) 13 Tas R 89 …. 7.54 — v R [2013] VSCA 55 …. 2.49 Jango v Northern Territory (No 2) [2004] FCA 1004 …. 7.56, 7.73 — v — (No 4) (2004) 214 ALR 608; [2004] FCA 1539 …. 7.66, 8.29 Jarrett v R (2014) 86 NSWLR 623; [2014] NSWCCA 140 …. 4.45, 4.51, 7.21 Jarvie v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [1995] VR 84 …. 5.205 Jarvis (1756) 1 East 643n; 102 ER 249 …. 6.15, 6.16, 6.17, 6.18 Jayasena v R [1970] AC 618 …. 6.2, 6.8, 6.16, 6.22 JB v R [2012] NSWCCA 12 …. 8.153

J-Corp Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers (1992) 38 FCR 452 …. 5.23, 5.46 J-Corp Pty Ltd v ABLFU of WA (No 2) (1992) 38 FCR 458 …. 6.39, 6.40 JCS v Tasmania [2014] TASCCA 6 …. 4.20 JDK v R [2009] NSWCCA 76 …. 2.87, 7.116 Jenkins v R (2004) 211 ALR 116; [2004] HCA 57 …. 4.19, 4.23, 4.27, 4.29, 4.30 — v WMC Resources Ltd (1999) 21 WAR 393 …. 6.23 Jetopay Pty Ltd v Ocean Marine Mutual Insurance Association (Europe) OV (1999) 95 FCR 570 …. 7.66 Jetset Properties v Eurobadalla Shire Council [2007] NSWLEC 198 …. 7.64 JG v R [2014] NSWCCA 138 …. 3.61 Jingellic Minerals No Liability v Beach Petroleum (1991) 55 SASR 424 …. 2.8 JJB v R (2006) 161 A Crim R 187; [2006] NSWCCA 126 …. 4.46, 4.48, 4.49 JLS v R (2010) 28 VR 328; [2010] VSCA 209 …. 3.61 JMA Accounting Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 211 ALR 380 …. 5.81 John Fairfax and Sons Ltd v Cojuangco (1988) 165 CLR 346 …. 5.10 John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Abernathy [1999] NSWSC 826 …. 5.31 John v Humphreys [1955] 1 All ER 793 …. 6.19 Johnson v Poppeliers (2008) 20 VR 92; 190 A Crim R 23; [2008] VSC 461 …. 5.12 — v R (1976) 136 CLR 619 …. 6.8 Johnston v Jackson (1880) 6 VLR (L) 1 …. 5.100 — v Morien [2006] WADC 46 …. 5.89 Jokic v Hayes (1990) 53 SASR 530 …. 4.64 Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635 …. 3.85, 3.91, 3.92, 3.93, 3.94, 3.108, 3.125 — v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 …. 2.50, 2.56, 2.58, 2.63, 2.64, 5.121, 5.133, 6.20, 6.36, 6.37, 6.38, 6.43, 6.44, 6.45

— v Kaney [2011] UKSC 3 …. 7.64 — v Metcalfe [1967] 1 WLR 1286 …. 8.52 — v Multiple Sclerosis Society of Victoria [1996] 1 VR 499 …. 7.21 — v National Coal Board [1957] 2 QB 55 …. 6.58 — v R (1997) 191 CLR 439 …. 2.14, 4.13 — v — (1997) 71 ALJR 538 …. 7.100 — v — (2009) 254 ALR 626; [2009] HCA 17 …. 3.77 — v Sutherland Shire Council [1979] 2 NSWLR 206 …. 8.12, 8.13, 8.110 Jonkers v Police (1996) 67 SASR 401 …. 8.131 Jorgensen v News Media (Auckland) Ltd [1969] NZLR 961 …. 5.193 Joseph Constantine SS Line Ltd v Imperial Smelting Corp [1942] AC 154 …. 6.13 Joseph Hargreaves Ltd, Re [1900] 1 Ch 347 …. 5.229 Jovanovic v R (2007) 172 A Crim R 518; [2007] TASSC 56 …. 2.72, 4.88 JP v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2015] NSWSC 1669 …. 7.43, 7.64

K K v R (1992) 34 FCR 227 …. 2.87, 3.36, 4.19, 4.93 Ka Chung Fung v R [2007] NSWCCA 250 …. 3.136 Kailis v R (1999) 21 WAR 100 …. 3.32, 3.73, 3.74 Kalbasi v Western Australia (2013) 235 A Crim R 541; [2013] WASCA 241 …. 7.49, 7.53, 7.65, 7.66 Kamleh v R (2005) 213 ALR 97 …. 8.42, 8.47, 8.78 Kanaan v R [2006] NSWCCA 109 …. 4.9, 4.23, 4.24, 4.27, 4.45, 6.57 Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 698 …. 5.31, 5.49 Kanthal Australia Pty Ltd v Minister for Industry, Technology and Commerce (1987) 14 FCR 90 …. 5.85, 5.254 Karam v R [2015] VSCA 50 …. 8.27 Karina Fisheries Pty Ltd v Mitson (1990) 26 FCR 473 …. 5.81

Karmot Auto Spares Pty Ltd v Dominelli Ford (Hurstville) Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 560 …. 8.184 Katsilis v BHP (1976) 72 LSJS 338 …. 6.19 — v — (1978) 52 ALJR 189 …. 6.6, 6.20, 6.43 Kau Wong v R [1983] WAR 80 …. 4.84 Kaye v Hulthen [1981] Qd R 289 …. 5.48 KC v R (2011) 32 VR 61; [2011] VSCA 82 …. 7.131 Kelleher v R (1974) 131 CLR 534 …. 4.6, 4.12, 4.18, 4.19, 4.29, 4.38, 4.40, 4.59, 4.62, 7.101 Keller v R [2006] NSWCCA 204 …. 7.54 Kelly v R (1994) 12 WAR 405 …. 4.33, 8.149 — v — (2004) 218 CLR 216; [2004] HCA 12 …. 4.34, 8.99, 8.129, 8.168 Kennedy v Baker (2004) 135 FCR 520 …. 5.81 — v — (1883) 23 Ch D 387 …. 5.43, 5.48 — v — (2004) 142 FCR 185; 208 ALR 424; [2004] FCAFC 337 …. 5.22, 5.40, 5.81 Kennedy and Cahill, Re the Marriage of (1995) FLC ¶92-605 …. 2.49 Kent v Scattini [1961] WAR 74 …. 6.60 — v Wotton & Byrne Pty Ltd (2006) 15 Tas R 264; [2006] TASSC 8 …. 6.60, 6.65, 7.59 Kerr v R [1980] WAR 21 …. 2.41 Kerrisk v The North Queensland Newspaper Co Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 398 …. 5.10 Kerrison, Re; Ex parte Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1990) 101 ALR 525 …. 2.64 Kerrison, Re; Ex parte Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1991) 27 FCR 271 …. 2.64 Kessing v R [2008] NSWCCA 310 …. 8.57 Key International Drilling Company Ltd v TNT Bulkships Operations Pty Ltd [1989] WAR 280 …. 5.54

KH v R [2014] NSWCCA 294 …. 7.123 Khan v R [1971] WAR 44 …. 4.15, 4.25, 4.26 Kheir v R (2014) 43 VR 308; [2014] VSCA 200 …. 4.56, 4.57, 7.56 Kilby v R (1973) 129 CLR 460 …. 4.45, 7.99, 7.100, 7.107 Killick v R (1981) 147 CLR 565 …. 2.8 King v AG Australia (2002) 121 FCR 480 …. 5.51 — v R (1986) 15 FCR 427 …. 5.139, 5.140, 5.144 — v — (1996) 16 WAR 540 …. 5.264 — v — (2003) 215 CLR 150; [2003] HCA 42 …. 6.14 Kingston v State Fire Commission (1998) 8 Tas R 152 …. 5.54, 5.65 Kirch Communications Pty Ltd v Gene Engineering Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 485 …. 7.64 KJM v R (No 2) (2011) 33 VR 11; [2011] VSCA 268 …. 3.12 KJR v R (2007) 173 A Crim R 226; [2007] NSWCCA 165 …. 4.49 KJS v R [2014] NSWCCA 27 …. 2.13, 3.35, 3.56, 3.73 Klein v Bell [1955] 2 DLR 513 …. 5.150 — v Bryant [1998] ACTSC 89 …. 2.36 Klemenko v Huffa (1978) 17 SASR 549 …. 8.133 Klewer v Walton [2003] NSWCA 308 …. 2.31 KLM v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 73 …. 2.49 KMJ v Tasmania (2011) 20 Tas R 425; [2011] TASCCA 7 …. 2.31, 3.60 Knight v R (1992) 175 CLR 495 …. 2.73 Knight v Jones; Ex parte Jones [1981] Qd R 98 …. 3.140 Knowles, Re [1984] VR 751 …. 3.140 Knowles v R [2015] VSCA 141 …. 2.37, 2.49, 7.34 KNP v R [2006] NSWCCA 213 …. 4.54 Kolalich v DPP (1991) 173 CLR 222 …. 6.31 Kong v Kang [2014] VSC 28 …. 5.100

Konigsberg (a bankrupt), Re; Ex parte the Trustee v Konigsberg [1989] 3 All ER 289; [1989] 1 WLR 1257 …. 5.49, 5.57 Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Products Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 76 FCR 151; [2000] FCA 876 …. 2.28 Korean Air Lines v ACCC (No 3) (2008) 247 ALR 781; [2008] FCA 701 …. 5.90, 5.94 Korgbara v R (2007) 71 NSWLR 187; 170 A Crim R 568; [2007] NSWCCA 84 …. 4.3, 4.56, 4.63, 7.24 Kosian v R (2013) 237 A Crim R 156; [2013] VSCA 357 …. 7.58 Kossenberg v Kossenberg (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 358 …. 4.75 Kozul v R (1981) 147 CLR 221 …. 7.21, 7.23 Krasniqi v R (1993) 69 A Crim R 383 …. 2.72 Kriss v City of South Perth [1966] WAR 210 …. 3.161 KRM v R (2001) 206 CLR 221 …. 3.34, 3.56, 3.74, 3.137, 4.43 KS v Veitch (No 2) (2012) 84 NSWLR 172; [2012] NSWCCA 266 …. 5.207, 5.209, 5.213 Kuczborski v Queensland [2014] HCA 46 …. 6.14 Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael 526 US 137 (1999) …. 7.52, 7.54 Kurgeil and Kurgeil v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (1990) 54 SASR 125 …. 7.139, 7.140, 7.149 Kutschera v R [2010] NSWCCA 150 …. 4.24 Kyluk Pty Ltd v Chief Executive Office of Environment and Heritage [2013] NSWCCA 114 …. 7.66

L L v Lyons (2002) 56 NSWLR 600 …. 5.17 — v Tasmania (2006) 15 Tas SR 381; [2006] TASSC 59 …. 3.12, 3.62 La Fontaine v R (1976) 136 CLR 62 …. 2.72, 2.73 Lackovic v Insurance Commission (WA) (2006) 31 WAR 460 …. 2.14 Lafite v Samuels [1972] SASR 1 …. 2.38

Lafone v Griffin (1909) 25 TLR 308 …. 7.18 Lake Cumberline Pty Ltd v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (1994) 126 ALR 58 …. 5.51 Lalchan Nanan v The State [1986] AC 860 …. 5.185 Lam Chi-ming v R [1991] 2 AC 212 …. 8.131 Lamereaux & Noirot (2008) 216 FLR 432; [2008] FamCAFC 22 …. 6.47 Lancaster v R [1989] WAR 83 …. 3.71 Land Securities plc v Westminster City Council [1993] 4 All ER 124 …. 5.184 Lander v Mitson (1988) 83 ALR 466 …. 5.81 Landini v New South Wales [2007] NSWSC 259 …. 2.19, 8.119 Lane v Hales (2000) 155 FLR 102 …. 5.130 — v R (2013) 241 A Crim R 321; [2013] NSWCCA 317 …. 7.122 Lanford v General Medical Council [1990] 1 AC 13 …. 3.20 Langbein v R [2008] NSWCCA 38 …. 7.83, 8.198 Langford v Cleary (No 2) (1998) 8 Tas R 52 …. 5.97 Lapthorne v R [1989] WAR 207 …. 7.99 Latcha v R (1998) 127 NTR 1 …. 7.43 Latorre v R (2012) 226 A Crim R 319; [2012] VSCA 280 …. 2.8, 4.56 Lau v R (1991) 6 WAR 30 …. 2.42 Law v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 193 …. 2.65 Law Institute of Victoria v Irving [1990] VR 411 …. 5.238 Law Institute of Victoria Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 224 FLR 37; [2009] VSC 55 …. 5.218, 5.224, 5.238 Lawless v R (1979) 142 CLR 659 …. 5.15 Lawrence v R (1981) 38 ALR 1 …. 2.8 — v — [1933] AC 699 …. 2.43 Lawson v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 212 …. 8.77 Laxy v IBM Australia Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 79 …. 7.131 LBC v Western Australia [2011] WASCA 201 …. 2.49

Leary v FCT (1980) 32 ALR 221 …. 5.27 Lebon v Lake Placid Resort Pty Ltd [1995] 1 Qd R 24 …. 5.10 Lederberger v Mediterranean Olives Financial Pty Ltd (2012) 38 VR 509; [2012] VCA 262 …. 8.31 Lee, Application of (2009) 212 A Crim R 442; [2009] ACTSC 98 …. 2.37 Lee v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 305 …. 7.8 — v Napier (2013) 301 ALR 663; [2013] FCR 236 …. 6.6 — v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196; [2013] HCA 39 …. 1.53, 5.15, 5.145, 5.146, 5.183, 6.8, 8.148 — v R (1998) 195 CLR 594 …. 7.69, 8.194 — v — (2014) 253 CLR 455; [2014] HCA 20 …. 1.53, 2.14, 2.29, 2.35, 5.107, 5.108, 5.183, 6.8, 6.55, 8.148 Lee-Wright v Police (2010) 109 SASR 96; [2010] SASC 353 …. 8.149 Legal Services Commission v JHW (2012) 223 A Crim R 534; [2012] SASCFC 47 …. 5.50, 5.78 Legge v Edmonds (1855) 25 LJ Ch 125 …. 8.109 Lenehan v Queensland Trustees Ltd [1965] Qd R 559 …. 8.174, 8.176 Leonard v R (2006) 67 NSWLR 545; 164 A Crim R 374; [2006] NSWCCA 267 …. 2.87, 3.36, 3.56, 3.57, 3.75 Lewis v R (1987) 88 FLR 104; 29 A Crim R 267 …. 7.43, 7.49, 7.51 — v R (1998) 20 WAR 1 …. 6.52, 8.118 Lexcray v Northern Territory (2015) 292 FLR 447; [2015] NTSC 11 …. 5.96 Leydon v Tomlinson (1979) 22 SASR 302 …. 2.8, 6.62, 7.11, 7.130 LFG v Western Australia (2015) 48 WAR 178; [2015] WASCA 88 …. 2.7, 3.63 LGM v CAM [2011] FamCAFC 195 …. 5.166 Li v R (2003) 139 A Crim R 28; [2003] NSWCCA 290 …. 2.30, 4.56, 4.57, 7.48, 7.56 Liberato v R (1985) 159 CLR 507 …. 2.71 Libke v R (2007) 230 CLR 559; 235 ALR 517; [2007] HCA 30 …. 2.14, 6.55,

7.124 Lifeplan Australia Friendly Society Pty Ltd v Ancient Order of Foresters in Victoria Friendly Society Ltd (2013) 115 SASR 223; [2013] SASC 5 …. 5.10 Lilley (dec’d), Re [1953] VLR 98 …. 2.46 Lindsay v R (2015) 255 CLR 272; [2015] HCA 16 …. 2.14 Ling v The Police (1996) 90 A Crim R 376 …. 5.14 Lipohar v R (1999) 200 CLR 485; [1999] HCA 65 …. 2.43 Liquorland (Australia) Pty Ltd v Anghie [2003] 7 VR 27 …. 5.57 Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 85 ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36 …. 2.18, 7.41, 8.196, 8.199 Liu v Fairfax Newspapers Ltd (2012) 84 NSWLR 547; [2012] NSWSC 1352 …. 5.90, 5.92, 5.96, 5.99 Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206 …. 5.217 LK v Commissioner of Police (2011) 81 NSWLR 26; [2011] NSWSC 458 …. 5.17 Llewellyn v Finn and Collins (1994) 74 A Crim R 519 …. 5.12 — v Police (2005) 91 SASR 418 …. 8.39 Lloyd v Centurian Roller Shutters Pty Ltd (1994) 10 SR(WA) 202 …. 5.46 Lloyd v Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co Ltd [1914] AC 733 …. 8.14, 8.43 Lloyd-Groocock v Police (2008) 102 SASR 465; [2008] SASC 313 …. 6.16, 6.18 LMD v R [2012] VSCA 164 …. 8.198 Lo Presti v R (1994) 68 ALJR 477 …. 6.58 Lobban v R [1995] 2 Cr App R 573 …. 3.77, 3.79 — v — (2001) 80 SASR 550 …. 2.65 Lock v Lock [1966] SASR 245 …. 5.104 Lockwood v Police (2010) 107 SASR 237; [2010] SASC 120 …. 6.58 Lodhi v R (2007) 179 A Crim R 470; [2007] NSWCCA 360 …. 5.223 Lomman v R [2014] SASCFC 55 …. 4.21

Longman v R (1989) 168 CLR 79 …. 4.6, 4.21, 4.37, 4.41, 4.43, 4.44, 4.45, 4.46, 4.47, 4.48, 4.49, 4.50, 4.51, 4.76, 4.77, 4.79, 7.107, 7.112 Lopes v Taylor (1970) 44 ALJR 412 …. 2.58, 2.64, 6.75, 8.108 Lord Ashburton v Pape [1913] 2 Ch 469 …. 5.63 Lovegrove Turf Services Pty Ltd v Minister for Education [2003] WASC 213 …. 5.50, 5.53 Low v R (1978) 23 ALR 616 …. 6.35 Lowe v Lang [2000] NSWSC 309 …. 7.77 Lowery v R [1974] AC 85 …. 3.77, 3.80, 3.81, 3.82, 7.136 Lubrizol Corp v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 957 …. 5.43 Luckies v Ripley (No 2) (1994) 35 NSWLR 283 …. 5.87, 5.94 Lui Mei Lin v R [1989] AC 288 …. 3.120, 7.150, 8.78 Luna (a pseudonym) v R [2016] VSCA 10 …. 2.29, 8.197 Lustre Hosiery v York (1935) 54 CLR 134 …. 8.105 Luxton v Vines (1952) 85 CLR 352 …. 2.69 Lyell v Kennedy (1884) 27 Ch D 1 …. 5.43 Lym International Pty Ltd v Chen [2008] NSWSC 1110 …. 2.32

M M v R (1994) 117 FLR 200 …. 6.8, 6.9 — v — (1994) 181 CLR 487; 69 ALJR 83 …. 2.14, 4.13, 7.35, 7.105 MA v R (2011) 31 VR 203; [2011] VSCA 13 …. 2.15, 4.68 — v — (2013) 40 VR 564; [2013] VSCA 20 …. 7.112 Macdonnell v Evans (1852) 11 CB 930; 138 ER 742 …. 7.15 Macgillivray, In the Estate of [1946] 2 All ER 301 …. 8.90 Mackay Sugar Co-op Association Ltd v CSR Ltd (1996) 63 FCR 408; 137 ALR 183 …. 5.85, 5.254 Mackenzie, Re; Ex parte Whitelock [1971] 2 NSWLR 534 …. 2.42 Mackrell v Western Australia (2008) 190 A Crim R 43; [2008] WASCA 228 ….

5.144 MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 …. 2.27, 2.40, 2.42, 2.44, 2.45, 2.46, 2.47, 2.91, 7.7, 8.101, 8.160, 8.161, 8.162, 8.163, 8.165, 8.166 Madafferi v The Age Company Ltd [2015] VSC 687 …. 5.214 Maddison v Combe (1981) 26 SASR 523 …. 2.8 — v Goldrick [1976] 1 NSWLR 651 …. 5.12, 5.41, 7.18, 7.152 Magellan Petroleum Australia Ltd v Sagasco Amadeus Pty Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 37 …. 5.85, 5.254 Magill v R (2013) 42 VR 616; [2013] VSCA 259 …. 2.85, 8.166 MAH v R [2006] NSWCCA 226 …. 7.123 Maher-Smith v Gaw [1969] VR 371 …. 2.64 Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397; [2008] HCA 1 …. 2.9, 2.12, 5.116 Maiden Civil Pty Ltd, In the Matter of [2012] NSWSC 1618 …. 7.8 Maisel v Financial Times (1915) 84 LJKB 2145 …. 3.153 Majinski v Western Australia (2013) 226 A Crim R 552; [2013] WASCA 10 …. 7.117 Mak v Police [2008] SASR 324 …. 3.136 Makin v Attorney-General (NSW) [1894] AC 57 …. 3.13, 3.14, 3.15, 3.16, 3.17, 3.18, 3.22, 3.23, 3.28, 3.30, 3.31, 3.39, 3.42, 3.44, 3.47, 3.58, 3.64, 3.140, 8.72, 8.134 Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705 …. 7.54, 7.56, 7.64, 7.65, 7.66, 7.68 Mallard v R [2003] WASCA 296 …. 7.136, 7.146 — v — (2005) 224 CLR 125; 157 A Crim R 121 …. 5.15 Mallinson v Scottish Australian Investment Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 66 …. 7.18 Mallows, Re [1926] WALR 62 …. 4.75 Malone v Smith (1946) 63 WN (NSW) 54 …. 6.60 Maloney v R (2013) 252 CLR 168; [2013] HCA 28 …. 6.2, 6.72 Mamo v Surace (2014) 86 NSWLR 275; [2014] NSWCA 58 …. 2.49

Managers of the Metropolitan Asylum District v Hill (1882) 47 LT(NS) 29 …. 3.158, 3.161 Manchester Brewery Co Ltd v Coombs [1901] 2 Ch 608 …. 8.13 Mancorp Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Pty Ltd (1991) 57 SASR 87 …. 5.49, 7.81 Manenti v Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board [1954] VLR 115 …. 2.21, 2.29, 3.158, 3.161 Manly Council v Byrne [2004] NSWCA 123 …. 6.45 Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1 …. 5.22, 5.23, 5.24, 5.47, 5.50, 5.52, 5.56, 5.57, 5.58, 5.61 Mansell v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 140 …. 3.63 Mansour v Standard Telephone and Cables Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 205 …. 8.174 Manwell Pty Ltd v Dames and Moore Pty Ltd (2001) ATPR ¶41-845; [2001] QCA 436 …. 2.8 Mapp v Stephens [1965] NSWR 1661 …. 7.92 Marcel v Commissioner of Police [1992] Ch 225 …. 5.172 March v Stramare (1991) 171 CLR 506 …. 7.54 Marcus Clark and Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1952) 87 CLR 177 …. 6.72 Marelic v Comcare (1993) 121 ALR 114 …. 6.47, 7.131 Markby v R (1978) 140 CLR 108 …. 3.21, 3.22, 3.30, 3.66 Markovina v R (1996) 16 WAR 354 …. 3.26, 4.102, 7.17 — v — (No 2) (1997) 19 WAR 119 …. 4.20 Marks v Beyfus (1890) 25 QBD 494 …. 5.205, 5.224 Marks v National & General Insurance Co Ltd (1993) 114 FLR 416 …. 5.187 Marr (Contracting) Pty Ltd v White Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (1991) 32 FCR 425 …. 5.187 Marriott v Chamberlain (1886) 17 QBD 154 …. 5.6 Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1155 …. 7.76 — v — [1999] NSWSC 284 …. 5.253

Martin v New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 337 …. 3.154 — v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 …. 2.20 — v Police [2015] SASC 41 …. 5.133 — v R (2010) 28 VR 579; [2010] VSCA 153 …. 2.72 — v Tasmania (2008) 190 A Crim R 77; [2008] TASSC 66 …. 4.9 Martine v R [2015] ACTCA 38 …. 2.37 Martinez v Western Australia (2007) 172 A Crim R 389; [2007] WASCA 143 …. 2.71, 2.88, 4.86, 4.88, 4.93 Marwey v R (1977) 138 CLR 630 …. 6.8 Mason v R (1995) 15 WAR 165 …. 3.31 Master Builders Association v Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees Union of Australia (No 2) (1987) 14 FCR 479 …. 5.150 Masterman Homes Pty Ltd v Palm Assets Pty Ltd (2009) 261 ALR 382; [2009] NSWCA 234 …. 7.131 Mather v Morgan [1971] Tas SR 192 …. 7.84 Matta v R (1995) 119 FLR 414 …. 5.185 Matthews v Chicory Marketing Board (Vic) (1938) 60 CLR 263 …. 6.72 — v R [1973] WAR 110 …. 3.108 — v SA Police (1996) 65 SASR 516 …. 7.15 — v SPI Electricity (Ruling No 17) [2013] VSC 146 …. 7.152 — v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (Ruling No 32) [2013] VSC 630 …. 7.64 — v SPI Electrical Pty Ltd (Ruling No 35) [2014] VSC 59 …. 7.8 Matusevich v R (1977) 137 CLR 633 …. 3.100, 3.101, 3.103, 3.113, 3.119, 3.120, 3.123 Matuska v Ali (1987) 71 ACTR 23 …. 5.5, 5.10 Maugham v Hubbard (1828) 8 B & C 14; 108 ER 948 …. 7.81 Mawaz Khan v R [1967] 1 AC 454 …. 4.87, 8.26, 8.96, 8.99 Mawson v R [1967] VR 205 …. 6.58 Maxwell v DPP [1935] AC 309 …. 3.84, 3.92, 3.107

May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654 …. 2.50, 6.20, 6.30, 6.43 Mayor and Corporation of Bristol v Cox (1884) 26 Ch D 678 …. 5.41, 5.43 Mazinski v Bakka (1979) 20 SASR 350 …. 2.36, 5.255 MB v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 160 …. 4.49 McCartney v R (2012) 38 VR 1; 226 A Crim R 274; [2012] VSCA 268 …. 2.26, 3.12, 4.68 McCaskill v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 66 …. 5.48 McCool v McCool [2008] NSWSC 748 …. 2.20 McDermott v R (1948) 76 CLR 501 …. 2.29, 2.32, 5.136, 8.122, 8.126, 8.128, 8.129 McDonald v Camerotto (1984) 36 SASR 66 …. 2.8, 6.62 — v R (2014) 43 VR 152 …. 3.56 — v — [2013] VSCA 128 …. 8.96 McFadden v Snow (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 8 s …. 5.103 McGavin v R [2014] NSWCCA 171 …. 4.23 McGee v Gilchrist-Humphrey (2005) 92 SASR 100 …. 5.146, 5.182 McGreevy v DPP (1972) 57 Cr App R 424 …. 2.73 McGregor v McGregor [2012] FamCAFC 69 …. 6.65, 7.63 — v Stokes [1952] VLR 347 …. 8.22, 8.32, 8.34 McGuiness v Attorney-General (Vic) (1940) 63 CLR 73 …. 5.205 McIlwraith McEarcharn Operations Ltd v CE Heath Underwriting and Insurance (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) [1995] 1 Qd R 363 …. 5.34 McKay v Hutchins and Fire and All Risks Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 1 Qd R 533 …. 8.173 — v Page and Sobloski (1972) 2 SASR 117 …. 7.49 — v R (1936) 54 CLR 1 …. 8.105 McKeever v McGee; Ex parte McGee [1995] 1 Qd R 623 …. 6.22 McKellar v Smith [1982] 2 NSWLR 950 …. 8.146, 8.153, 8.156 McKey v R (2012) 219 A Crim R 227; [2012] NSWCCA 1 …. 4.88

McKinley v McKinley [1960] 1 WLR 120 …. 5.184 McKinney and Judge v R (1991) 171 CLR 468 …. 4.12, 4.22, 4.32, 4.33, 4.34, 8.105, 8.168 McLellan v Bowyer (1961) 106 CLR 95 …. 7.120 McLennan v Taylor (1966) 85 WN (Pt 1) NSW 525 …. 2.47 McMahon v Cooper [1989] 2 Qd R 8 …. 5.12, 5.34 McNee v Kay [1953] VLR 520 …. 4.23, 4.27, 4.29 McNeill v R (2008) 168 FCR 198 …. 8.154 McQuaker v Goddard [1940] 1 KB 687 …. 6.62, 6.66, 6.71 MDO (a child) v McKinlay (1984) 31 NTR 1 …. 8.152 Mead v Mead (2007) 235 ALR 197; [2007] HCA 25 …. 5.60 Meade v R [2015] VSCA 171 …. 4.56, 7.56 Meadon Pty Ltd v Nommack (No 247) Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 200 …. 5.56 Meadow v General Medical Council [2007] QB 462 …. 7.64 Medici v R (1995) 79 A Crim R 582 …. 5.185 Mees v Roads Corporation (2003) 128 FCR 418; [2003] FCA 306 …. 5.199 Mehesz v Redman (No 2) (1980) 26 SASR 244 …. 6.23, 6.28, 7.24 Meko v R (2004) 146 A Crim R 131 …. 4.93 Melbourne v R (1999) 198 CLR 1 …. 3.107, 3.130, 3.134, 3.136, 3.137 Melendez-Diaz v Massachusetts 129 S Ct 2527 (2009) …. 7.25, 7.64 Meltend Pty Ltd v Restoration Clinics of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 145 ALR 391 …. 5.19, 5.54, 5.58, 5.83 Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria [1998] FCA 1606 …. 7.56, 7.64 Menzies v Australian Iron and Steel Ltd and Hill (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 62 …. 6.40 Mercantile Mutual Insurance (NSW Workers Compensation) Ltd v Murray [2004] NSWCA 151 …. 5.49 Mercer v Denne [1905] 2 Ch 538 …. 8.84

Meredith v Innes (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 104 …. 7.152, 7.155 Merrall v Samuels (1971) 2 SASR 378 …. 5.138 Merritt & Roso v R (1985) 19 A Crim R 360 …. 5.139 Meteyard v Love (2005) 65 NSWLR 36; [2005] NSWCA 444 …. 2.3, 5.37, 5.39 Metricon Homes Pty Ltd v Barrett Property Group Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 46 …. 7.23 Metropolitan Railway Co v Jackson (1877) 3 App Cas 193 …. 6.38 Mexborough (Earl of) v Whitwood UDC [1897] 2 QB 111 …. 5.160, 5.161, 5.162 Meyer v Hall (1972) 26 DLR (3d) 309 …. 7.125 MFA v R (2002) 213 CLR 606 …. 2.14 MGICA (1992) Ltd v Kenny and Good Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 135 ALR 743 …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.81 Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls [2008] NSWSC 1230 …. 5.164 Michaels v R (1995) 184 CLR 117 …. 8.147 Mickelberg v R [1984] WAR 191 …. 8.101 Mickelberg and Mickelberg v Director of Perth Mint [1986] WAR 365 …. 5.187, 5.191, 5.192, 5.193 Mid-City Skin Cancer and Laser Centre Pty Ltd v Zahedi-Anarak [2006] NSWSC 615 …. 7.41 Middencorp v Electric Co Pty Ltd v Law Institute of Victoria (1993) 93 ATC 5041 …. 5.218 Middleton v R (1998) 19 WAR 179 …. 4.33, 8.47, 8.108 Mifsud v Campbell [1991] 2 NSWLR 725 …. 2.67 Miladinovic v R (1993) 47 FCR 190 …. 2.49, 4.57 Miles v R (2014) 240 A Crim R 524; [2014] NSWCCA 72 …. 2.71 Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd and Commonwealth (1971) 17 FLR 141 …. 7.40, 7.72, 7.73, 8.71, 8.84 Milisits v South Australia (2014) 119 SASR 538; [2014] SASCFC 67 …. 5.238

Miller v Minister of Pensions (1947) 63 TLR 474 …. 2.58 — v R (1995) 13 WAR 504 …. 7.105 — v — [2015] NSWCCA 206 …. 2.23, 4.57 — v — (2016) 334 ALR 1; [2016] HCA 30 …. 2.14 Mills v Western Australia (2008) 189 A Crim R 411; [2008] WASCA 219 …. 4.63 Milne v Pope and Belair Cellars Pty Ltd (1972) 4 SASR 45 …. 8.173 Milojevic v Roh Industries Pty Ltd (1991) 56 SASR 78 …. 5.187 Minassian v Minassian [2010] NSWSC 708 …. 7.19 Minet v Morgan (1873) LR 8 Ch App 361 …. 5.27 Minniti v R (2006) 159 A Crim R 394; [2006] NSWCCA 30 …. 2.85, 2.88, 2.89 Mister Figgins Pty Ltd v Centrepoint Freeholds Pty Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 23 …. 3.156, 3.158, 3.161 Mitchell v R [2008] NSWCCA 275 …. 4.63 Mitsubishi Electric Pty Ltd v VWA (2002) 4 VR 332 …. 5.23, 5.41, 5.43 MJH v Western Australia (2006) 33 WAR 9 …. 7.143, 7.149 MK v R [2014] NSWCCA 274 …. 7.30 — v Victorian Legal Aid (2013) 40 VR 378; [2013] VSC 49 …. 2.29 ML Ubase Holdings Co Ltd v Trigem Computer Inc (2007) 69 NSWLR 577; [2007] NSWSC 859 …. 5.59 MLB v R (2010) 203 A Crim R 575; [2010] NTCCA 11 …. 7.34, 7.99 MM v R (2012) 232 A Crim R 303; [2012] ACTCA 44 …. 3.33 MM Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Port Stephens Council (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 243 …. 2.42, 2.45 Moffa v R (1977) 138 CLR 601 …. 6.8 Mole v Mole [1951] P 21 …. 5.104 Moloney v Western Australia [2006] WASCA 193 …. 4.105 Momcilovic v R (2011) 245 CLR 1; [2011] HCA 34 …. 6.14

Monfries v MTT [1970] SASR 521 …. 8.174 Monroe v Twisleton (1802) Peake Add Cas 219; 170 ER 250 …. 5.200 Montecatini’s Patent, Re (1973) 47 ALJR 161 …. 8.170 Mood Music Publishing Co Ltd v De Wolfe Ltd [1976] Ch 119 …. 3.9, 3.158, 3.161 Mooney v James [1949] VLR 22 …. 7.117, 7.126, 7.137 Moor v Moor [1954] 2 All ER 458 …. 7.117 Moore v Giofrelle [1952] ALR 1049 …. 5.191 — v Skinner (1990) 101 FLR 152 …. 7.80 Moran v Amoret Installations Pty Ltd [2000] NSWCA 106 …. 7.69 — v Moran (No 9) [2000] NSWSC 219 …. 7.76 Moreay Nominees Pty Ltd v McCarthy (1993) 10 WAR 293 …. 5.57 Morgan v Babrock and Wilcox Ltd (1929) 43 CLR 163 …. 7.18 — v R [2011] NSWCCA 257 …. 6.58 — v — [2016] NSWCCA 25 …. 4.56, 7.56 Morley v National Insurance Co [1967] VR 566 …. 8.174 — v R (1999) 152 FLR 13 …. 2.71 Morris v R (1987) 163 CLR 454 …. 2.14, 4.3, 6.33, 7.35, 7.119, 7.151, 8.136, 8.166 Morrison v Kiwi Electrix Pty Ltd (1998) 19 WAR 482; 103 A Crim R 312 …. 2.50, 2.54, 6.32, 6.33 Mortimer v M’Callan (1840) 151 ER 320 …. 7.18 Mortimore v Brown (1970) 122 CLR 493 …. 5.181 Moti v R (2011) 245 CLR 456; [2011] HCA 50 …. 2.29, 2.36 Mouroufas v R [2007] NSWCCA 58 …. 3.134, 4.61 Mowday v Western Australia (2007) 176 A Crim R 85; [2007] WASCA 165 …. 6.25 Moyna v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2003] 4 All ER 162 …. 2.12 M’Queen v Great Western Railway Co (1875) LR 10 QB 569 …. 6.43

Mudway v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd [1988] 2 NZLR 283 …. 5.37 Muldoon v R [2008] NSWCCA 315 …. 4.57, 7.54, 8.57 Mule v R (2005) 221 ALR 85; 156 A Crim R 203; [2005] HCA 49 …. 8.108 Mullen v Hackney London Borough Council [1997] 1 WLR 1103 …. 6.60 — v R (1938) 59 CLR 124 …. 6.8 Muller v Linsley & Mortimer [1996] PNLR 74 …. 5.89 Mulley v Manifold (1959) 103 CLR 341 …. 5.7 Mulvihill v R [2016] NSWCCA 259 …. 4.86, 8.96 Munce v Vinidex Tubemakers Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 235 …. 6.2, 6.5, 6.6 Mundey v Askin [1982] 2 NSWLR 369 …. 5.199, 8.98 Mundine v Brown (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 515 …. 8.199 Mundraby v Commonwealth (2001) 184 ALR 737 …. 5.43 Munro v R [2014] ACTCA 11 …. 2.31, 2.83 Murdoch v R (2007) 167 A Crim R 329; [2007] NTCCA 1 …. 2.30, 4.56, 4.74, 7.40, 7.43 — v Taylor [1965] AC 574 …. 3.100, 3.119, 3.120, 3.122 Murdoch (a Pseudonym) v R (2013) 40 VR 451; [2013] VSCA 272 …. 2.31, 3.13, 3.20, 3.57, 3.60 Murphy v R (1989) 167 CLR 94 …. 7.29, 7.31, 7.43, 7.44, 7.53, 7.59, 7.60, 7.136, 7.146 — v R (1994) 62 SASR 121 …. 4.56, 4.88, 7.96 Murray v R (2002) 211 CLR 193; 189 ALR 40 …. 2.71 — v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 18 …. 4.56 Murray-Oates v Jjadd Pty Ltd (1999) 76 SASR 38 …. 8.174 Murrell v R [2014] VSCA 334 …. 2.84 Musarri v R (2006) 32 WAR 19 …. 3.26 Mutemeri v Cheesman [1998] 4 VR 484 …. 6.60 Mutual Life Insurance Co v Hillmon 145 US 285 (1892) …. 8.47 MWJ v R (2005) 222 ALR 436; 80 ALJR 329 …. 7.130, 7.131

Myers v DPP [1965] AC 1001 …. 7.3, 8.4, 8.6, 8.11, 8.30, 8.52, 8.61, 8.170, 8.172, 8.189

N Nagan v Holloway [1996] 1 Qd R 607 …. 5.23, 5.46 Nalberski v R (1989) 44 A Crim R 434 …. 7.125 NAR v PPC1 (2013) 224 A Crim R 535; [2013] NSWCCA 25 …. 5.213 Narkle v R (2001) 23 WAR 468 …. 7.140, 7.149 Narrier v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 191 …. 3.72 Nasrallah v R; R v Nasrallah [2015] NSWCCA 188 …. 7.56 Nast v Nast and Walker [1972] 2 WLR 901 …. 5.159 Nathan v MJF Constructions [1986] VR 75 …. 5.10 National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu (1999) 47 NSWLR 309 …. 7.8, 7.19 National Crime Authority v Gould (1989) 23 FCR 191 …. 5.244 — v S (1991) 29 FCR 203 …. 5.49, 5.75, 5.77 National Employers’ Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd v Waind [1978] 1 NSWLR 372 …. 5.5, 7.18 — v — (1979) 141 CLR 648 …. 5.41, 5.84 National Justice Compania Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (The ‘Ikarian Reefer’) [1993] 2 Ll LR 68 …. 7.64 National Mutual Life v Godrich (1909) 10 CLR 1 …. 5.211 National Mutual Life Association v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) (2001) 183 ALR 700 …. 5.194 National Tertiary Education Industry Union v Commonwealth (2001) 111 FCR 583 …. 5.236 National Vegetation Management Solutions Pty Ltd v Shekar Plant Hire Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 3 …. 5.89 Natta v Canham (1991) 32 FCR 282 …. 7.140 Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 67 ALJR 170 …. 2.58, 2.64, 2.65, 2.66

Nederlandse Reassurantie Groep Holding NV v Bacon & Woodrow (a firm) [1995] 1 All ER 976 …. 5.27 Neill-Fraser v Tasmania [2012] TASCCA 2 …. 2.85, 2.87 Nembhard v R (1982) 74 Cr App R 144 …. 8.88 — v — [1982] 1 All ER 183 …. 7.125 Neowarra v Western Australia (2003) 205 ALR 145; [2003] FCA 1399 …. 7.54, 7.66, 7.73 Nesterczuk v Mortimore (1965) 115 CLR 140 …. 2.64, 6.3 Nestorov v R [2002] WASCA 356 …. 4.88 Network Ten Ltd v Capital Television Holdings Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 275 …. 5.52 Neubecker v R (2012) 34 VR 369; [2012] VSCA 58 …. 3.56 Neville v R (2004) 145 A Crim R 108; [2004] WASCA 62 …. 4.57 New Cap Reinsurance Corp Ltd (in liq) v Renaissance Reinsurance Ltd [2007] NSWSC 258 …. 5.42 New South Wales v Betfair Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 160 …. 5.26, 5.27 — v Hunt (2014) 86 NSWLR 226; [2014] NSWCA 47 …. 7.131 — v Jackson [2007] NSWCA 279 …. 5.28, 5.35, 5.43 — v Kuru [2007] NSWCA 141 …. 3.49, 7.79 — v Public Transport Ticketing Corp (No 3) (2011) 81 NSWLR 394; [2011] NSWCA 200 …. 2.254 New South Wales Crime Commission v Cassar (2012) 224 A Crim R 448; [2012] NSWSC 1170 …. 7.8 New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board v Master and Sons Pty Ltd [1986] 1 NZLR 191 …. 5.150 Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co v Court of Coal Mines Regulations (1997) 42 NSWLR 351 …. 5.39 Newis v Lark (1571) 2 Plowden 403; 75 ER 609 …. 2.58 Newton v Pieper [1968] 1 NSWR 42 …. 8.174 Nezovic v Minister for Immigration (2003) 203 ALR 33 …. 8.93

Nguyen v R (2002) 26 WAR 59; [2002] WASCA 181 …. 4.56 — v — (2007) 180 A Crim R 267; [2007] NSWCCA 363 …. 4.56, 7.41, 7.56 — v — (2012) 267 FLR 344; [2012] ACTCA 24 …. 2.13 — v — [2017] NSWCCA 4 …. 7.41, 7.56 NH v Director of Public Prosecutions (2016) 90 ALJR 978; [2016] HCA 33 …. 2.14, 5.185 Nichia Corporation v Arrow Electronics Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) (2016) 240 FCR 13; [2016] FCA 466 …. 8.196 Nicholas v Bantick (1993) 3 Tas R 47 …. 5.187, 5.188, 5.192 — v R (1998) 193 CLR 173 …. 1.4, 2.36, 4.53 Nicholl and Dowling; Ex parte Lehmann (1989) 40 A Crim R 185 …. 5.12 Nicholls v R; Coates v R (2005) 219 CLR 196; 213 ALR 1; [2005] HCA 1 …. 4.32, 4.33, 7.133, 7.139, 7.141, 7.143, 7.149, 8.97, 8.99, 8.168 Nichols v Police (2005) 91 SASR 232 …. 7.29 Nickmar Pty Ltd v Preservatrice Skandia Insurance Ltd (1985) 3 NSWLR 44 …. 5.23, 5.34, 5.37, 5.43, 5.48, 5.78 Nicola v Ideal Image Development Corp (2009) 261 ALR 1 …. 6.70 Nigro v Secretary to the Dept of Justice [2013] VSCA 213 …. 2.64 Nikolaidis v R [2008] NSWCCA 323 …. 7.102 Ninness v Walker (1998) 143 FLR 239 …. 6.55 NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank (1999) 161 ALR 576 …. 7.65 Nodnara Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 140 FLR 336 …. 2.19 Nokia Corporation v Cellular Line Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 726 …. 7.41 — v Truong [2005] FCA 1141 …. 7.41, 7.56 Nolan v Nolan (2003) 10 VR 626; [2003] VSC 121 …. 4.75 NOM v DPP [2012] VSCA 198 …. 2.62, 2.64 Nominal Defendant v Clements (1960) 104 CLR 476 …. 7.92, 7.93 — v Hook (1962) 113 CLR 641 …. 8.109

Noor Mohamed v R [1949] AC 182 …. 3.66, 3.69 Normandale v Rankine (1972) 4 SASR 205 …. 7.42 Normanshaw v Normanshaw and Measham (1893) 69 LT 468 …. 5.205 Norrie v NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] NSWCA 145 …. 6.65, 6.71, 6.73 North Sydney Leagues Club Ltd v Synergy Protection Agency Pty Ltd (2012) 83 NSWLR 710; [2012] NSWCA 168 …. 6.23, 7.19 North West Salt Co Ltd v Electrolytic Alkali Co Ltd [1914] AC 461 …. 1.1 Norton v R (2001) 24 WAR 488 …. 8.147, 8.149 Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133 …. 5.10, 5.230 Noto v Western Australia (2006) 168 A Crim R 457; [2006] WASCA 278 …. 3.37, 3.63, 3.75 Novacic v Cooper (1973) 1 ACTR 99 …. 7.17 Nowell v Palmer (1993) 32 NSWLR 574 …. 8.76, 8.110 NRMA Ltd v Morgan (No 2) [1999] NSWSC 694 …. 5.58 NSW Bar Association v Archer (No 7) [2005] NSWADT 223 …. 7.8 NSW Crime Commission v Z (2007) 231 CLR 75; [2007] HCA 7 …. 5.60 NSW Food Authority v Nutricia Australia Pty Ltd (2008) 72 NSWLR 456; [2008] NSWCCA 252 …. 5.71, 5.160 NT v R (2012) 225 A Crim R 102; [2012] VSCA 213 …. 8.53 Nudd v R (2006) 225 ALR 161; [2006] HCA 9 …. 2.49 Numoo v Garner (1998) 7 NTLR 129 …. 2.36 Nye v NSW (2002) 134 A Crim R 245 …. 8.199

O Obacelo Pty Ltd v Taveraft Pty Ltd (1986) 10 FCR 518 …. 6.48, 6.50 Ocean Marine Mutual Insurance Association (Europe) OV v Jetoplay Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1463 …. 7.14, 7.64 O’Chee v Rowley (1997) 150 ALR 199 …. 5.198

O’Connell v Adams [1973] Crim LR 113 …. 7.131 O’Connor v R [2007] NSWCCA 266 …. 7.76, 7.80 — v Stevenson (1988) 13 IPR 145 …. 3.156 Office of Fair Trading v IBA Healthcare Ltd [2004] 4 All ER 1103 …. 6.6 Ofulue v Bossert [2009] UKHL 16 …. 5.89, 5.94 Ogle v Comboyuro Investments Pty Ltd (1976) 136 CLR 444 …. 2.20 Oke v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (2007) 168 A Crim R 503 …. 5.81 O’Kelly v Dalrymple (1993) 45 FCR 145 …. 7.74 O’Leary v Lamb (1973) 7 SASR 159 …. 8.174, 8.186 — v R (1946) 73 CLR 566 …. 3.31, 8.35, 8.72 Ollerton v R (1989) 40 A Crim R 133 …. 8.104 Omar v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 198 …. 4.63 O’Meara v Dominican Fathers [2003] ACTCA 24 …. 7.19 — v R [2006] NSWCCA 131 …. 4.69 — v Western Australia (2013) 235 A Crim R 209; [2013] WASCA 228 …. 2.8 Omychund v Barker (1744) 1 Atk 21; 26 ER 15 …. 7.28 O’Neil, Re [1972] VR 327 …. 8.85 O’Neon v R (1991) 52 A Crim R 144 …. 4.59, 4.62, 4.71 Onerati v Phillips Constructions Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 750 …. 5.187 Orchard v Spooner (1992) 28 NSWLR 114 …. 7.80 Ordukaya v Hicks [2000] NSWCA 180 …. 2.32 Osland v R (1998) 197 CLR 316 …. 7.44, 7.51, 7.58 — v Secretary to the Department of Justice (2008) 234 CLR 275; [2008] HCA 37 …. 5.51, 5.58 O’Sullivan v R (2012) 233 A Crim R 449; [2012] NSWCCA 45 …. 3.147 — v Stubbs [1952] SASR 61 …. 6.20 — v Waterman [1965] SASR 150 …. 7.79

Ouwarkerk v Whalan (1986) 41 SASR 287 …. 5.134 Owen v Edwards (1983) 77 Cr App R 191 …. 7.84 Owner v Bee Hive Spinning Co Ltd [1914] 1 KB 105 …. 7.18

P P v R (1993) 61 SASR 75 …. 3.108, 3.112, 3.113 Pace v R [2014] VSCA 317 …. 4.70 Pacific Century Production Pty Ltd v Netafim Australia Pty Ltd [2004] 2 Qd R 422; [2004] QCA 63 …. 5.10 Packer v Cameron (1989) 54 SASR 246 …. 6.45 — v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1985] 1 Qd R 275 …. 5.33, 5.60 Paddock v Forrester (1842) 3 Man & G 903; 133 ER 1404 …. 5.94 Page v McKensey [2002] NSWSC 570 …. 5.187 — v R [2015] VSCA 537 …. 3.58, 3.61 Paine v R [1974] Tas SR (NC) 117 …. 4.19 Paino v Paino [2008] NSWCA 276 …. 7.66 Palermo, The (1883) 9 PD 6 …. 5.43 Palios Meegan & Nicholson Holdings Pty Ltd v Shore (2010) 108 SASR 31; [2010] SASCFC 21 …. 2.64, 3.161 Pallante v Stadiums Pty Ltd (No 2) [1976] VR 363 …. 8.61 Palmer v R (1998) 193 CLR 1 …. 2.49, 2.71, 7.124, 7.140 Palos Verdes Estates Pty Ltd v Carbon (1992) 6 WAR 223 …. 6.62 Pan Pharmaceuticals Ltd (in liq) v Selim [2008] FCA 416 …. 7.56 Panda v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 5 …. 3.75 Pantorno v R (1989) 166 CLR 466 …. 1.1, 6.69 Papakosmas v R (1999) 196 CLR 297 …. 2.23, 2.29, 2.30, 2.31, 2.32, 2.49, 7.93, 7.99, 7.102, 8.194 Papazoglou v R (2010) 28 VR 644; [2010] VSCA 201 …. 7.133 — v — (2014) 244 A Crim R 114; [2014] VSCA 194 …. 5.185

Pappas v New World Oil Developments (1993) 43 FCR 594 …. 5.168 Papson v Woolworths (Victoria) Pty Ltd (2000) 9 Tas R 261 …. 5.211 Paric v John Holland Constructions Pty Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 505 …. 7.131 — v — (1985) 62 ALR 85 …. 7.68 Park v Citibank Savings Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 219 …. 7.3 — v White (1995) 21 MVR 504 …. 5.266 Parker v Comptroller-General of Customs (2007) 243 ALR 574 …. 8.156 — v — (2009) 252 ALR 619; 83 ALJR 494; [2009] HCA 7 …. 2.27, 2.37, 5.258 — v — [2007] NSWCCA 348 …. 2.37 — v Espinoza (1996) 85 A Crim R 336 …. 4.12 — v Police (2002) 81 SASR 240; [2002] SASC 30 …. 2.32 — v R (1963) 111 CLR 610 …. 6.8, 6.25 Parkin v O’Sullivan (2009) 260 ALR 503; [2009] FCA 1096 …. 5.223, 5.232, 5.244 Parkview Qld Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2012] NSWSC 1599 …. 5.57 Parsons v R [2016] VSCA 17 …. 3.136 Pascoe v Divisional Security Group Pty Ltd (2007) 209 FLR 197; [2007] NSWSC 211 …. 5.154, 5.166 Pate (a pseudonym) v R [2015] VSCA 110 …. 8.198 Patel v Comptroller of Customs [1966] AC 356 …. 8.30, 8.57 Paul v DPP (1990) 90 Cr App R 173 …. 6.75 Pavey, In the Marriage of (1976) 10 ALR 259 …. 4.11, 4.75 Pavitt v R (2007) 169 A Crim R 452; [2007] NSWCCA 88 …. 7.92, 8.125, 8.155 Payless Superbarn (NSW) Ltd v O’Gara (1990) 19 NSWLR 551 …. 7.130 Payne v Crawford (1992) 3 Tas R 360 …. 1.38, 2.62, 2.67 — v Harrison [1961] 2 QB 403 …. 6.41 — v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191 …. 5.168

Peacock v R [2008] NSWCCA 264 …. 7.116 Pearce v Button (1985) 8 FCR 388 …. 2.36, 5.62, 5.255 Pearmine v R [1988] WAR 315 …. 7.131 Pearsall v R (1990) 49 A Crim R 439 …. 2.29, 4.66 Pearse v Sommers [1992] 28 NSWLR 492 …. 7.91 Pease v R [2009] NSWCCA 136 …. 4.30 Peatling, Re [1969] VR 214 …. 6.25, 6.26, 6.27 Peet & Co Ltd v Rocci [1985] WAR 164 …. 3.156 Pemble v R (1971) 124 CLR 107 …. 2.47 Penney v R (1998) 155 ALR 605 …. 2.87 Pennington v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 98 …. 4.88 Pennington (dec’d) (No 2), Re [1978] VR 617 …. 8.85 People v Carney [1955] IR 324 …. 4.101 — v Collins 438 P 2d 33 (1968) …. 1.21, 1.25 — v Donovan 279 NYS 2d 404 (1967) …. 4.53 People (Attorney-General), The v Casey (No 2) [1963] IR 33 …. 4.75 Perera v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 507 …. 8.53 Perez v R [2008] NSWCCA 46 …. 4.49 Perish v R [2016] NSWCCA 89 …. 2.27, 2.46 Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v Boulton (1994) 33 NSWLR 735 …. 7.60 Perry v New Hampshire 565 US 228 (2012) …. 4.65 — v R (1981) 28 SASR 417 …. 3.70 — v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 …. 3.14, 3.21, 3.22, 3.23, 3.24, 3.30, 3.39, 3.42, 3.44, 3.46, 3.52, 3.69 Pertl v Kahl (1976) 13 SASR 433 …. 6.28 Peters v R (1987) 23 A Crim R 451 …. 8.150, 8.159 Peterson (a Pseudonym) v R [2014] VSCA 111 …. 2.31, 4.69

Petty v R (1994) 13 WAR 372 …. 3.34, 4.49 Petty and Maiden v R (1991) 173 CLR 95 …. 5.121, 5.135, 5.137, 5.139, 5.141, 5.142, 5.143 Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461; [1995] HCA 7 …. 3.6, 3.12, 3.13, 3.17, 3.21, 3.22, 3.27, 3.28, 3.29, 3.30, 3.31, 3.32, 3.34, 3.37, 3.38, 3.41, 3.42, 3.44, 3.45, 3.46, 3.47, 3.51, 3.52, 3.53, 3.58, 3.62, 3.63, 3.64, 3.70, 3.97 PGM v R (2006) 164 A Crim R 426; [2006] NSWCCA 310 …. 3.108, 3.131, 3.134 Phelan v Black (1971) 56 Cr App R 257 …. 6.53 Phelps v Gothachalkenin [1996] Qd R 503 …. 4.64 Phillips v R (1985) 159 CLR 45 …. 2.30, 3.101, 3.103, 3.105, 3.111, 3.113, 3.114, 3.116, 7.138 — v — (2006) 225 CLR 303; [2006] HCA 4 …. 3.21, 3.39, 3.42, 3.44, 3.45, 3.47, 3.48, 3.50, 3.51, 3.66 — v — [2015] SASCFC 67 …. 2.71, 7.155 Phillon v R [1978] 1 SCR 18 …. 7.136 Physiotherapy Board of SA v Heywood-Smith (2008) 101 SASR 573 …. 7.44 Pickering v Edmunds (1994) 63 SASR 357 …. 5.57 Piddington v Bennett and Wood Pty Ltd (1940) 63 CLR 533 …. 7.140, 7.141 Pihiga Pty Ltd v Roche (2011) 278 ALR 209; [2011] FCA 240 …. 5.96, 5.97, 5.103 Pikos v Bezuidenhout (2004) 145 A Crim R 544; [2004] QCA 178 …. 6.60 PIM v Western Australia (2009) 40 WAR 489; [2009] WASCA 131 …. 2.87, 3.63, 3.75 Pinkstone v R [2003] WASCA 66 …. 7.131, 8.47 Pinta v R [1999] WASCA 125 …. 4.74 Pioneer Concrete (NSW) Pty Ltd v Webb (1995) 18 ACSR 418 …. 5.56 Piszczyk v Bolton (1984) 38 SASR 330 …. 2.8, 6.62 Pitkin v R (1995) 130 ALR 35 …. 4.13, 4.56, 4.65, 4.73 Pitman v Byrne [1926] SASR 207 …. 4.83

Pitts v Adney [1961] NSWR 535 …. 5.103 Plaintiff B 60 of 2012 v Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade (2013) 306 ALR 478; [2013] FCA 1303 …. 5.223 Plato Films Ltd v Speidel [1961] AC 1090 …. 3.129, 3.153 Players Pty Ltd (in liq) (receivers appointed) v Clone Pty Ltd (2013) 115 SASR 547; [2013] SASCFC 25 …. 5.30, 5.46, 5.55, 5.76, 5.85 Pledge v Roads & Traffic Authority (2004) 78 ALJR 572 …. 7.23 Plunkett v Bull (1915) 19 CLR 544 …. 4.11, 4.75 PNJ v DPP (2010) 27 VR 146; [2010] VSCA 88 …. 3.60, 3.61 Police v Barber (2010) 108 SASR 520; [2010] SASC 329 …. 7.66 — v Beck (2001) 79 SASR 98 …. 5.17 — v Butcher (2014) 119 SASR 509; [2014] SASC 85 …. 6.28 — v Dodd (2004) 88 SASR 130 …. 6.22 — v Dunstall (2015) 256 CLR 403; [2015] HCA 26 …. 2.27, 2.29, 2.32 — v Fountaine (1999) 74 SASR 26 …. 2.32 — v Hall (2006) 95 SASR 482; [2006] SASC 281 …. 2.29, 2.32, 2.36, 2.37, 5.264 — v Jervis (1998) 70 SASR 429 …. 2.29, 2.32, 2.36, 5.264 — v Jervis; Police v Holland (1998) SASR 1 …. 8.158 — v Kyriacou (2009) 103 SASR 243 …. 6.46 — v Leo (2006) 94 SASR 496; [2006] SASC 144 …. 6.33, 6.35 — v Sherlock (2009) 103 SASR 147; [2009] SASC 64 …. 2.29 — v Tupe [1999] SASC 314 …. 6.31 Police Service Board v Morris & Martin (1985) 156 CLR 397 …. 5.145, 5.146, 5.160, 5.162, 5.180, 5.181, 5.183 Pollard v R (1992) 176 CLR 177 …. 5.267, 8.140, 8.143, 8.156, 8.157, 8.168 — v — (2011) 31 VR 416; [2011] VSCA 95 …. 4.88, 4.93 Pollentine v Attorney-General (Qld) [2014] HCA 30 …. 1.5 Pollitt v R (1992) 174 CLR 558 …. 4.27, 4.32, 4.76, 4.77, 4.79, 4.97, 8.2, 8.5,

8.6, 8.9, 8.17, 8.28, 8.29, 8.61, 8.66, 8.68, 8.114 Pollock v Wellington (1996) 15 WAR 1 …. 7.68 Polycarpou v Australian Wire Industries Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 49 …. 2.29, 2.36, 3.158 Pomery v Rural Hotels Pty Ltd and Ellison (1973) 5 SASR 191 …. 8.111 Pooraka Holdings Pty Ltd v Participation Nominees Pty Ltd (1989) 52 SASR 148 …. 5.238 — v — (1991) 58 SASR 158 …. 8.92 Pope v Ewendt (1977) 17 SASR 45 …. 6.47, 6.60, 6.61, 6.63, 6.75, 7.22 Popovic v Derks [1961] VR 413 …. 4.87 Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589 …. 5.187 Porteous v Dorn (1974) 45 DLR (3d) 596 …. 8.85 Porter v Kolodzeij [1962] VR 75 …. 6.23, 6.28, 7.24, 7.25 Portland Manufacturers Ltd v Harte [1977] QB 306 …. 6.41 Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277 …. 5.71 — v R (2013) 39 VR 655; [2013] VSCA 291 …. 8.66 Potts v Miller (1940) 60 CLR 22 …. 8.170 Power v R (2014) 43 VR 261; A Crim R 553; [2014] VSCA 146 …. 7.123, 7.125, 8.78, 8.194 Powercor Australia Ltd v Perry (2011) 33 VR 548; [2011] VSCA 239 …. 5.27 Powers v R [2000] NTCCA 2 …. 4.64, 4.74 Pownall v Conlan Management Pty Ltd (1995) 12 WAR 370 …. 7.68, 7.71 PPC v Williams (2013) 238 A Crim R 25; [2013] NSWCCA 286 …. 5.213 PQ v Australian Red Cross Society [1992] 1 VR 19 …. 7.71 Practice Note (No 1 of 2004) (2004) 8 VR 475 …. 4.88 Practitioners of the Supreme Court, Re [1980] 26 SASR 275 …. 8.174 Prasad v Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1991) 101 ALR 109 …. 8.26 Prashar v R (1989) 1 WAR 190 …. 6.34, 6.35

Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357; 207 ALR 217 …. 5.19, 5.22, 5.23, 5.33, 5.36, 5.37, 5.38 Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd [1995] 1 AC 321 …. 5.199 Prentice v Collins (No 4) [2002] FCA 1215 …. 6.39, 6.40 — v Cummins (No 5) (2002) 124 FCR 67; [2002] FCA 1503 …. 6.39, 6.44, 6.66, 6.69 Prestage and Shearing v R [1976] Tas SR 16 …. 7.79 Preston v Western Australia (2012) 220 A Crim R 347; [2012] WASCA 64 …. 3.63 Prestwood v Shuttleworth (1985) 39 SASR 125 …. 5.201 Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81 …. 2.44, 2.45, 7.120, 7.151 — v Earl Torrington (1703) 1 Salk 285; 91 ER 252 …. 8.83 — v McCabe; Ex parte Price [1985] 2 Qd R 510 …. 5.149 Prince v Samo (1838) 7 Ad & El 627; 112 ER 606 …. 7.156 Protean (Holdings) Ltd v American Home Assurance Co [1985] VR 187 …. 6.38, 6.39, 6.40, 6.42, 6.44 Prus-Grzybowski v Everingham (1986) 44 NTR 7 …. 5.51 Public Transport Authority of WA v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (2007) 34 WAR 239; [2007] WASCA 151 …. 5.23, 5.28, 5.46, 5.49 Puchalski v R [2007] NSWCCA 220 …. 8.197 Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164 …. 6.2, 6.3, 6.5, 6.6, 6.11 Pye v Butterfield (1864) 5 B & S 829; 122 ER 1038 …. 5.160, 5.161 Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328 …. 5.74, 5.145, 5.146, 5.148, 5.149, 5.150, 5.152, 5.159, 5.160, 5.161, 5.162, 5.180, 5.181

Q Qantas v TWU (2011) 280 ALR 503; [2011] FCA 470 …. 8.112 Qantas Airways Ltd v Gama [2008] FCAFC 69 …. 2.64 Qing An v R [2007] NSWCCA 53 …. 7.21

Quad Consulting Pty Ltd v David R Bleakley & Associates Pty Ltd (1990) 27 FCR 86 …. 5.89, 5.100 Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Haynes [1959] AC 743 …. 2.20 Quality Publications Australia Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2009] FCA 1293 …. 5.36 Qualtieri v R (2006) 171 A Crim R 463; [2006] NSWCCA 95 …. 3.36, 3.54, 3.56, 3.73, 3.74, 3.75 Queanbeyan City Council v ACTEW Corporation Ltd (2008) 253 ALR 121; [2008] FCA 1983 …. 5.234 Queen Caroline, The Trial of (1820) 2 Brod & Bing 286; 129 ER 976 …. 7.15, 7.149, 7.153, 7.155 Queensland Independent Wholesalers Ltd, Re (1995) ATPR 41-438 …. 7.64 Queensland Law Society Inc v Albietz [2000] 1 Qd R 621 …. 5.51 Quenchy Crusta Sales Pty Ltd v Logi-Tech Pty Ltd [2002] SASC 374 …. 5.7 Question of Law Reserved (No 1 of 1998) (1998) 70 SASR 281 …. 2.37, 5.81, 5.261 Question of Law Reserved (No 1 of 2000) (2000) 113 A Crim R 272 …. 5.212, 5.213 Question of Law Reserved (No 2 of 1997) (1998) 98 A Crim R 544 …. 7.33 Question of Law Reserved (No 3 of 1997) (1998) 70 SASR 555 …. 8.77, 8.78 Question of Law Reserved (No 3 of 1998) (1998) 71 SASR 223 …. 8.57 Question of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 1 of 1993) (1993) 59 SASR 214 …. 4.21, 4.37, 4.41, 7.101 Questions of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 2 of 1993) (1993) 61 SASR 1 …. 2.50, 2.54, 6.32 Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371 …. 2.3, 2.31, 7.38, 7.54, 7.66, 7.69, 7.70

R R v AB [2001] NSWCCA 496 …. 3.36, 3.56, 3.62 — v Abadom [1983] 1 WLR 126 …. 7.43, 7.71

— v Abbey [2009] ONCA 624 …. 7.52 — v Abbott [1955] 2 QB 497 …. 6.34, 6.35 — v Abdallah [2001] NSWCCA 506 …. 4.88, 7.131 — v Abdullah [1999] NSWCCA 188 …. 5.205 — v Abraham (1998) 70 SASR 575 …. 2.71 — v Abusafiah (1991) 56 A Crim R 424 …. 2.49 — v Accused [1992] 1 NZLR 257 …. 7.3 — v Adam (1999) 47 NSWLR 267 …. 7.79, 7.83, 8.198 — v — (1999) 106 A Crim R 510; [1999] NSWCCA 189 …. 2.88 — v Adams (No 2) [1998] 1 Cr App R 377 …. 1.22, 1.26, 1.42 — v Adams [1996] 2 Cr App R 467 …. 1.22, 1.26, 1.33, 1.42, 2.66, 2.70 — v Adcock [2016] QCA 264 …. 8.181 — v Addison (1993) 70 A Crim R 213 …. 8.115 — v Adler (2000) 52 NSWLR 451; [2000] NSWCCA 357 …. 4.57 — v Agar (1990) 90 Cr App R 318 …. 5.205 — v Age (2011) 257 FLR 85; [2011] NTSC 104 …. 8.149, 8.152 — v AH (1997) 42 NSWLR 702 …. 3.56, 3.62, 3.75 — v Ainsworth (1991) 57 A Crim R 174 …. 8.133, 8.143, 8.147, 8.156 — v Aitchison (1996) 90 A Crim R 448 …. 4.45 — v Ajax (1977) 17 SASR 88 …. 8.146, 8.152, 8.153 — v AJS (2005) 12 VR 563 …. 2.12 — v Akbulat (1993) 69 A Crim R75 …. 4.85 — v Albu (1995) 64 SASR 319 …. 4.53, 5.258 — v Aldridge (1990) 20 NSWLR 737 …. 7.42, 7.138 — v Alexander [1975] VR 741 …. 2.46, 7.82, 7.84, 7.86 — v — [1994] 2 VR 239 …. 5.139 — v Alexandridis (1994) 76 A Crim R 391 …. 4.61 — v Alexandroaia (1995) 81 A Crim R 286 …. 2.26

— v Algar [1954] 1 QB 279 …. 5.200 — v Ali [1996] 2 VR 49 …. 2.65 — v — (2001) 122 A Crim R 498; [2001] NSWCCA 218 …. 4.73 — v — (No 2) (2005) 13 VR 257; [2005] VSCA 302 …. 4.86 — v ALJ (2000) 117 A Crim R 370 …. 2.71, 2.72 — v Allen [1988] VR 736 …. 7.130 — v — (2011) 109 SASR 396; [2011] SASCFC 40 …. 2.12, 8.108 — v Allen and Evans [1965] 2 QB 295 …. 4.102 — v Allingham [1991] 1 Qd R 429 …. 3.142 — v Ambrosoli (2002) 55 NSWLR 603; [2002] NSWCCA 386 …. 2.31, 8.66, 8.197 — v Ames [1964] NSWR 1489 …. 2.30, 7.24 — v AN (2000) 117 A Crim R 176 …. 3.57 — v Anders (2009) 20 VR 596; [2009] VSCA 7 …. 7.33 — v Anderson (1929) 21 Cr App R 178 …. 7.151, 7.152 — v — (1991) 57 A Crim R 143 …. 8.152, 8.154 — v — [2000] 1 VR 1 …. 3.33, 7.51, 7.54, 7.60 — v — (2001) 127 A Crim R 116 …. 2.72 — v Andrews (1982) 2 NSWLR 116 …. 3.136 — v — [1987] 1 Qd R 21 …. 3.33 — v — [1987] AC 281 …. 8.39, 8.41, 8.66, 8.67, 8.69, 8.88, 8.89 — v — [2003] NSWCCA 7 …. 3.56, 3.62 — v — (No 3) (2005) 92 SASR 442; [2005] SASC 298 …. 2.44, 5.170, 5.202 — v Anic, Stylianiou and Suleyman (1993) 68 A Crim R 313 …. 8.47 — v Anthony [1962] VR 440 …. 4.26, 6.34 — v Anunga (1976) 11 ALR 412 …. 8.152, 8.156 — v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563 …. 6.48, 6.51, 6.52, 6.53, 6.54, 6.55, 6.57 — v Appleby (1996) 88 A Crim R 456 …. 3.73

— v Armstrong (1990) 54 SASR 207 …. 3.42, 3.44 — v Armstrong; Ex parte King [1985] 2 Qd R 178 …. 2.50 — v Arnott (1995) 79 A Crim R 275 …. 8.86 — v — (2009) 26 VR 490; [2009] VSCA 299 …. 8.133, 8.136 — v Arundell [1999] 2 VR 228 …. 2.71, 4.49 — v Arvidson [2008] NSWCCA 135 …. 2.31 — v Asciak [1990] WAR 120 …. 4.30 — v Asfour (1991) 60 A Crim 409 …. 4.32 — v Ashton (1999) 108 A Crim R 200 …. 7.120 — v Asquith (1994) 72 A Crim R 250 …. 2.71 — v Associated Northern Collieries (1910) 11 CLR 738 …. 5.147, 5.162 — v Astill (1992) 63 A Crim R 148 …. 8.56, 8.69 — v Atef Fathakka Nouh Yussef El Zarw (1991) 58 A Crim R 310 …. 5.190 — v ATM [2000] NSWCCA 475 …. 3.75 — v Atroushi [2001] NSWCCA 406 …. 3.62 — v Austin (1979) 21 SASR 315 …. 8.159 — v Aylen (1987) 47 SASR 254 …. 8.189 — v Ayoub [2004] NSWCCA 209 …. 4.26 — v Azar (1991) 56 A Crim R 414 …. 8.128, 8.132, 8.133 — v Aziz [1982] 2 NSWLR 322 …. 4.59, 4.67, 4.74 — v — [1996] AC 41 …. 3.130, 3.136, 3.137, 3.138, 8.108 — v B, AM (2015) 124 SASR 176; [2015] SASCFC 174 …. 3.64, 7.34 — v B, FG (2013) 115 SASR 499; [2013] SASCFC 24 …. 4.88 — v B, J [2009] SASC 110 …. 4.49 — v Baden-Clay (2016) 334 ALR 234; [2016] HCA 35 …. 1.11, 2.14, 2.25, 2.90 — v Baffigo [1957] VR 303 …. 7.80 — v Bagshaw (1984) 78 Cr App R 163 …. 7.35

— v BAH (2002) 5 VR 517 …. 7.21 — v Baines [1909] 1 KB 258 …. 5.5 — v Bajic (2005) 12 VR 155; [2005] VSCA 158 …. 2.71 — v Baker (1912) 7 Cr App R 252 …. 3.108 — v — (2000) 78 SASR 103 …. 4.103 — v — [2001] NSWCCA 151 …. 4.26, 4.27 — v Ball [1911] AC 47 …. 3.17, 3.24, 3.25, 3.26, 3.29, 3.36, 3.40, 3.42 — v Baltensperger (2004) 90 SASR 129 …. 7.104 — v Bandiera and Licastro [1999] 3 VR 103 …. 4.88 — v Bank of Montreal (1962) 36 DLR (2d) 45 …. 5.150 — v Banks (1916) 12 Cr App R 74 …. 7.153 — v Banner [1970] VR 240 …. 8.131 — v Bara (1998) 106 A Crim R 1 …. 8.152 — v Barbaro (1993) 32 NSWLR 619 …. 7.96 — v Barbaro and Rovero (2000) 112 A Crim R 551 …. 7.98 — v Baring (2005) 155 A Crim R 326; [2005] SASC 262 …. 4.88 — v Barker (1975) 65 Cr App R 287 …. 2.55 — v Barnes (2008) 182 A Crim R 56; [2008] VSC 66 …. 6.33 — v Baron Von Russen (1995) 77 A Crim R 566 …. 8.28 — v Barrett (2007) 16 VR 240; [2007] VSCA 95 …. 4.88, 4.93, 5.138, 8.108 — v Barrington [1981] 1 WLR 419 …. 3.29 — v Barrow [2001] 2 Qd R 525 …. 4.89, 4.95 — v Barry [1984] 1 Qd R 74 …. 7.43 — v Bartels (1986) 44 SASR 260 …. 4.57, 4.59 — v Bartle (2003) 181 FLR 1 …. 3.108 — v Bartlett [1996] 2 VR 687 …. 7.47, 7.51, 7.58, 7.149, 8.159 — v Barton [1973] 1 WLR 115 …. 5.68, 5.70 — v — [2006] NSWSC 1494 …. 2.30

— v Basha (1989) 39 A Crim R 337 …. 5.13 — v Bashir [1969] 3 All ER 692 …. 3.142, 3.143 — v Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658 …. 4.82, 4.85, 4.95, 4.97, 4.102 — v Bastan [2009] VSCA 157 …. 3.33 — v Bauer [2006] 1 Qd R 420; [2005] QCA 305 …. 3.146 — v BBR [2010] 1 Qd R 546; [2009] QCA 178 …. 7.30 — v BCQ (2013) 240 A Crim R 153; [2013] QCA 388 …. 2.87 — v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 …. 2.30, 7.92, 7.102, 8.194 — v BDX [2009] VSCA 28 …. 7.58, 7.112, 7.142 — v Beattie (1996) 40 NSWLR 155; 89 A Crim R 393 …. 2.28, 4.9, 4.22, 4.34, 7.137 — v — (2001) 127 A Crim R 250; [2001] NSWCCA 502 …. 2.23 — v Beck [1982] 1 All ER 807 …. 4.26, 4.28, 4.30, 4.76, 4.102 — v — [1990] 1 Qd R 30 …. 8.108 — v Beckett [2011] 1 Qd R 259; [2009] QCA 196 …. 3.77 — v Bedfordshire (Inhabitants) (1855) 4 E & B 335 …. 8.84 — v Bedingfield (1879) 14 Cox CC 341 …. 8.37 — v Bedington [1970] Qd R 353 …. 7.153 — v Beech (1978) 20 SASR 410 …. 3.107, 3.116, 3.140 — v Beggs [1989] Crim LR 898 …. 3.44 — v Begie [1992] Crim LR 301 …. 3.151 — v Béland [1987] 2 SCR 398 …. 7.136 — v Belford and Bound (2011) 208 A Crim R 256; [2011] QCA 43 …. 3.77 — v Beljajev [1984] VR 657 …. 5.138, 5.139, 5.140, 5.144 — v Bell (1994) 77 A Crim R 213 …. 4.33, 8.147 — v — [2002] NSWCCA 2 …. 3.134, 3.135 — v Bellino and Conte (1992) 59 A Crim R 322 …. 4.102 — v Benbrika (Ruling No 23) (2008) 221 FLR 122; [2008] VSC 137 …. 5.254

— v Benecke (1999) 106 A Crim R 282; [1999] NSWCCA 163 …. 4.57, 7.54, 8.57 — v Benfield [1997] 2 VR 491 …. 4.88 — v Bennett (2004) 88 SASR 6 …. 4.71 — v Bennett and Clark (1986) 44 SASR 164 …. 5.134, 5.267, 8.148, 8.154, 8.157 — v Bennett and Vaughan (1998) 100 A Crim R 228 …. 7.65 — v Benz (1989) 168 CLR 110 …. 4.57, 8.5, 8.6, 8.16, 8.40, 8.41, 8.68, 8.70, 8.85 — v Berry and Wenitong (2007) 17 VR 153; [2007] VSCA 202 …. 1.26, 2.87, 4.88 — v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 …. 2.87, 3.31, 3.34, 3.35, 3.36, 3.73, 3.74, 3.150, 6.46 — v BFB (2003) 87 SASR 278 …. 4.47, 4.49 — v Bigeni (1990) 47 A Crim R 363 …. 4.62 — v Bikic [2001] NSWCCA 537 …. 5.169, 5.172 — v Bilick and Starke (1984) 36 SASR 321 …. 6.32 — v Birch (1994) 74 A Crim R 585 …. 7.125 — v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 …. 2.49, 7.131 — v Bishop [1975] QB 274 …. 3.140 — v Bisht (2013) 234 A Crim R 309; [2013] QCA 238 …. 7.33 — v BJC (2005) 13 VR 407; [2005] VSCA 154 …. 2.71, 3.36 — v Bjordal (2005) 93 SASR 237; [2005] SASC 422 …. 7.53, 7.66 — v Blake and Tye (1844) 6 QB 126; 115 ER 49 …. 8.115 — v Blastland [1986] AC 41 …. 8.2, 8.42, 8.43, 8.47, 8.77, 8.78 — v Blayney and Blayney [2002] SASC 192 …. 8.168 — v Blick [2000] NSWCCA 61 …. 2.31 — v Bliss (1837) Ad & El 550; 112 ER 577 …. 8.84 — v Blobel [2001] SASC 374 …. 2.9, 3.136

— v Board of Inland Revenue; Ex parte Goldberg [1989] QB 267 …. 5.43 — v Bodsworth [1968] 2 NSWR 132 …. 8.132 — v Bond [1906] 2 KB 389 …. 2.20, 3.66, 3.67 — v — (1996) 16 SR(WA) 207 …. 7.125 — v Bondareff, Usachov and McCabe (1999) 74 SASR 353 …. 8.142, 8.143, 8.156 — v Bonnick (1977) 66 Cr App R 266 …. 6.3 — v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45 …. 7.44, 7.53, 7.66 — v Bonython-Wright (2013) 117 SASR 410; [2013] SASCFC 87 …. 3.64 — v Boskovitz [1999] NSWCCA 437 …. 3.62 — v Bosman (1988) 50 SASR 365 …. 8.131, 8.160 — v Bouquet (1962) 62 SR (NSW) 563 …. 5.140 — v Bourchas (2002) 133 A Crim R 413 …. 2.4 — v Bowhay (No 3) [1998] NSWSC 660 …. 2.30 — v Boyes (1861) 1 B & S 311; 121 ER 730 …. 5.171 — v Boykovski and Atanasovski (1991) 58 A Crim R 436 …. 6.58 — v Boyle (2009) 26 VR 219; [2009] VSCA 289 …. 2.72 — v Bradshaw (1978) 18 SASR 83 …. 3.67, 6.3, 7.21, 7.82, 8.133 — v Brady (1980) 2 A Crim R 42 …. 8.104 — v — (2005) 92 SASR 135; [2005] SASC 277 …. 6.33 — v Bragg (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 436 …. 7.151 — v Braham and Mason [1976] VR 547 …. 5.28 — v Braum (1983) 21 NTR 6 …. 4.23 — v Brdarovski (2006) 166 A Crim R 366; [2006] VSCA 231 …. 4.84, 6.58 — v Brennan [1999] 2 Qd R 529 …. 4.88 — v Bridgman (1980) 24 SASR 278 …. 8.96 — v Briggs (1987) 24 A Crim R 98 …. 2.50, 2.54, 6.32, 6.33 — v Britten (1989) 51 SASR 567 …. 4.3, 4.67

— v Britton [1987] 1 WLR 539 …. 7.82 — v Brooks (1998) 44 NSWLR 121 …. 7.30 — v Brophy [1982] AC 476 …. 3.85, 8.165 — v Brotherton (1992) 29 NSWLR 95 …. 4.57 — v Brougham (2015) 122 SASR 546; [2015] SASCFC 75 …. 2.14 — v Brown (1975) 10 SASR 139 …. 6.9 — v — [1960] VR 382 …. 3.113 — v — [1977] Qd R 220 …. 7.28 — v — [1990] VR 820 …. 3.78 — v — [1995] 1 Qd R 287 …. 2.71 — v — [2004] VSCA 59 …. 7.79 — v Brown (Winston) [1998] AC 367 …. 5.15 — v Browne-Kerr [1990] VR 78 …. 2.91, 7.7, 7.10 — v Browning (1991) 103 FLR 425 …. 2.51, 2.55, 6.30 — v — (1992) 94 Cr App R 109 …. 4.56 — v Brownlee (1999) 105 A Crim R 214 …. 8.119 — v Brownlow [2003] SASC 262 …. 3.101, 3.105 — v Brownlowe (1987) 7 NSWLR 461 …. 4.56, 4.57 — v Bruce (1987) 61 ALJR 603 …. 5.121 — v — [1988] VR 579 …. 5.121, 5.140 — v — [1975] 1 WLR 1252 …. 3.122 — v Bryant (No 2) [1956] St R Qd 570 …. 7.81, 7.86 — v Bryce [1994] 1 Qd R 77 …. 4.93 — v Bryce (No 2) (2014) 240 A Crim R 471; [2014] NSWSC 498 …. 3.141 — v Buchanan [1966] VR 9 …. 8.136 — v Buckett (1995) 132 ALR 669 …. 2.49 — v Buckley (1873) 13 Cox CC 293 …. 8.47 — v — (2004) 10 VR 215; [2004] VSCA 185 …. 2.71, 8.166

— v Bueti and Morrissey (1997) 70 SASR 370 …. 4.57 — v Bunevski [2002] NSWCCA 19 …. 8.78 — v Bunting (2002) 84 SASR 378 …. 5.15, 5.26, 5.50, 5.68 — v — [2003] SASC 250 …. 5.13 — v — (2004) 92 SASR 146; [2004] SASC 235 …. 2.30 — v Bunting and Wagner (2005) 92 SASR 241 …. 2.13 — v Burchielli [1981] VR 611 …. 4.59, 4.62, 4.64, 4.67, 4.73 — v Burns (1883) 9 VLR 191 …. 2.19 — v Burns (1999) 107 A Crim R 330 …. 2.12, 3.33, 7.131 — v — [2003] NSWCCA 30 …. 7.137 — v Burns and Collins (2001) 123 A Crim R 226 …. 3.37 — v Burr (1988) 37 A Crim R 220 …. 4.87 — v Burt [2000] 1 Qd R 28 …. 8.131, 8.155 — v Burton (2013) 237 A Crim R 238; [2013] NSWCCA 335 …. 2.31, 3.60, 3.143, 8.155 — v Butler [2010] 1 Qd R 325; [2009] QCA 111 …. 7.43 — v — (No 2) (1991) 57 A Crim R 460 …. 4.33 — v Butterwasser [1948] 1 KB 4 …. 3.128 — v Buttery (1988) 145 LSJS 223 …. 2.69 — v Buzzacott (2010) 107 SASR 564; [2010] SASC 234 …. 8.86 — v BWT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241 …. 4.6, 4.43, 4.48 — v Byczko (No 1) (1977) 16 SASR 506 …. 3.142, 4.19, 4.28, 4.102, 7.101 — v — (No 2) (1977) 17 SASR 460 …. 4.84, 4.102 — v Byczko and McCloud (1982) 30 SASR 578 …. 8.159 — v Byrnes and Hopwood (1996) 20 ACSR 260 …. 8.72 — v Byster (2001) 80 SASR 373 …. 7.88, 8.106 — v C (1991) 59 A Crim R 46 …. 3.149 — v — (1993) 60 SASR 467 …. 5.202, 7.43, 7.51, 7.53, 7.58, 7.108, 7.136,

7.158 — v — (1993) 67 A Crim R 562 …. 5.254 — v — [2005] 3 NZLR 92 …. 5.185 — v C, CA [2013] SASCFC 137 …. 3.64, 3.75 — v — [2015] SASCFC 143 …. 2.12, 3.64, 3.70 — v C, CN (2013) 117 SASR 64; [2013] SASCFC 44 …. 3.64 — v C, G (2013) 117 SASR 162; [2013] SASCFC 83 …. 3.64 — v C, RE [2015] SASCFC 32 …. 5.213 — v Cahill (1985) 61 ACTR 7 …. 5.12 — v Cain (1994) 99 Cr App R 208 …. 3.138 — v Caine (1993) 68 A Crim R 233 …. 7.30 — v Cakovski (2002) 133 A Crim R 18 …. 7.122 — v — (2004) 149 A Crim R 21; [2004] NSWCCA 280 …. 2.28, 3.141 — v Calabria (1982) 31 SASR 423 …. 8.174, 8.185 — v Calides (1983) 34 SASR 355 …. 2.71 — v Callaghan [1994] 2 Qd R 300; [1993] QCA 419 …. 7.88, 8.106 — v — (2001) 4 VR 79; 124 A Crim R 126; [2001] VSCA 209 …. 2.40, 4.57, 4.67, 7.65 — v Calway (2005) 157 A Crim R 322; [2005] VSCA 266 …. 4.88 — v Camelleri [1922] 2 KB 122 …. 7.103 — v Cameron [1990] 2 WAR 1 …. 7.58 — v Camilleri (2001) 127 A Crim R 290; [2001] NSWCCA 527 …. 2.73, 4.57, 7.40, 7.131 — v — (2007) 169 A Crim R 197 …. 8.146, 8.156 — v — (2007) 68 NSWLR 720; [2007] NSWCCA 36 …. 5.266 — v Campbell [1956] 2 QB 432 …. 4.38 — v — (2007) 175 A Crim R 79; [2007] VSCA 189 …. 4.65, 4.66 — v Campbell and Greig (1999) 109 A Crim R 174 …. 2.25

— v Cannings [2004] EWCA Crim 1 …. 7.52 — v — [2004] 2 Cr App R 7 …. 3.58 — v Cao [2004] NSWCCA 61 …. 7.51 — v Carabott (2002) 132 A Crim R 355 …. 4.30, 4.77 — v Carbone (1989) 50 SASR 495 …. 2.49, 2.71, 2.72 — v Cardamone (2007) 171 A Crim R 207; [2007] VSCA 77 …. 4.88 — v Carney [2016] QCA 2 …. 4.93 — v Carpenter (2011) 249 FLR 432; [2011] ACTSC 71 …. 4.70 — v Carr (2000) 117 A Crim R 272 …. 4.46, 4.76 — v — [2005] NSWCCA 439 …. 4.58, 4.63 — v Carranceja and Asikin (1989) 42 A Crim R 402 …. 3.77, 3.79, 4.25 — v Carr-Briant [1943] KB 607 …. 2.58, 6.22 — v Carroll (1985) 19 A Crim R 410 …. 3.29, 7.43, 7.47, 7.51 — v — (2013) 234 A Crim R 233; [2013] NSWSC 1031 …. 4.65 — v Carter (1995) 86 A Crim R 17 …. 3.78 — v — (2001) 1 VR 175 …. 8.155 — v — [2003] 2 Qd R 402 …. 2.49 — v — (2014) 241 A Crim R 522; [2014] QCA 120 …. 7.33 — v Carusi (1997) 92 A Crim R 52 …. 4.67 — v Cashion (2013) 115 SASR 451; [2013] SASCFC 14 …. 3.64 — v Cassar and Sleiman [1999] NSWSC 436 …. 7.19, 7.56 — v — (No 28) [1999] NSWSC 651 …. 7.19, 7.79 — v Cavanagh (1972) 56 Cr App R 407 …. 6.54 — v Cavkic (2005) 12 VR 136 …. 2.70, 2.72 — v — (No 2) (2009) 28 VR 341; [2009] VSCA 43 …. 4.56, 4.57 — v CBL and BCT [2014] 2 Qd R 331; (2014) 240 A Crim R 492; [2014] QCA 93 …. 2.29, 5.139, 7.151 — v CBM [2015] 1 Qd R 165; [2014] QCA 212 …. 3.73

— v Cengiz [1998] 3 VR 720 …. 5.130 — v Central Criminal Court; Ex parte Francis & Francis [1989] AC 346 …. 5.30 — v Cervelli [1998] 3 VR 776 …. 5.130 — v Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153 …. 4.23, 5.110, 8.118, 8.119, 8.120 — v — [2002] NSWCCA 512 …. 2.31 — v Challinger [1989] 2 Qd R 352 …. 5.185 — v Chalmers [2013] 2 Qd R 175; [2011] QCA 134 …. 7.30 — v Chan (1992) 28 NSWLR 421 …. 6.22 — v — (2002) 131 A Crim R 66; [2002] NSWCCA 217 …. 3.62, 4.9 — v Chandler [1976] 1 WLR 585 …. 5.139 — v Chang (2003) 7 VR 236; 140 A Crim R 573; [2003] VSCA 149 …. 4.88 — v Chaouk; AG (Vic) (2013) 40 VR 356; [2013] VSCA 99 …. 2.29 — v — [1973] QB 774 …. 4.83 — v Chapman (2001) 79 SASR 342 …. 2.36 — v Charlie (1995) 121 FLR 306 …. 4.33, 8.168 — v Chatzidimitrious [2000] 1 VR 493 …. 2.72 — v Chee [1980] VR 303 …. 3.69 — v Cheema [1994] 1 WLR 147 …. 4.26 — v — (1993) 98 Cr App Rep 195 …. 4.97 — v Chekeri (2001) 122 A Crim R 422; [2001] NSWCCA 221 …. 5.190 — v Chen [1993] 2 VR 139 …. 4.85, 4.100, 7.7 — v Cheng (1977) 63 Cr App R 20 …. 7.82 — v — (1999) 48 NSWLR 616 …. 2.14, 6.30 — v — [2015] SASCFC 189 …. 4.37, 7.34 — v Chevathen and Dorrick (2001) 122 A Crim R 441 …. 3.33, 3.39 — v Chhay (1994) 72 A Crim R 1 …. 7.51 — v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1995] AC 274 …. 5.230 — v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 …. 2.8, 2.9, 3.94, 7.82, 7.128, 7.153, 7.157

— v Chisnell [1992] Crim LR 507 …. 7.82 — v Chrimes (1959) 43 Cr App R 149 …. 4.101 — v Christie [1914] AC 545 …. 2.27, 2.29, 2.30, 2.31, 2.32, 2.35, 2.39, 3.12, 3.28, 3.38, 3.41, 3.53, 3.158, 3.159, 5.138, 5.188, 7.95, 7.99, 7.135, 8.101, 8.124 — v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26; 167 A Crim R 504; [2006] VSCA 263 …. 4.86, 4.88, 4.93, 6.23, 6.28 — v Ciesielski [1972] 1 NSWLR 504 …. 8.109 — v Cittadini [2008] NSWCCA 256 …. 3.75 — v Clark (1996) 91 A Crim R 46 …. 4.64, 4.67 — v — (2001) 123 A Crim R 506; [2001] NSWCCA 494 …. 2.23, 2.30, 2.31, 2.32, 3.33, 3.56, 3.57, 4.9, 4.10, 4.23, 4.24, 4.25, 4.100, 7.125, 8.29 — v — (2005) 13 VR 75; [2005] VSCA 294 …. 2.46 — v — [2006] EWCA Crim 231 …. 7.52 — v Clarke (1817) 2 Stark 241; 171 ER 633 …. 3.142, 3.143 — v — (1997) 97 A Crim R 414 …. 4.61, 5.139, 8.131, 8.149 — v — [2001] NSWCCA 223 …. 2.23 — v Clarke; Ex parte Attorney-General [1999] QCA 438 …. 8.99 — v Clay (1851) 5 Cox CC 14 …. 3.143 — v Cleal [1942] 1 All ER 203 …. 4.19 — v Climas (1999) 74 SASR 411 …. 7.28 — v Clough (1992) 28 NSWLR 396 …. 4.6, 4.76 — v Clout (1995) 41 NSWLR 312 …. 4.56 — v Clowes [1992] 3 All ER 440 …. 5.238 — v Clune (No 1) [1975] VR 723 …. 7.156 — v — (No 2) [1996] 1 VR 1 …. 4.56, 4.73 — v Clune [1982] VR 1 …. 4.59, 4.62, 4.64, 4.66, 4.67, 4.74 — v Clyne [1985] 2 NSWLR 740 …. 8.155 — v Clynes (1960) 44 Cr App R 158 …. 4.19, 4.102

— v Cockcroft (1870) 11 Cox CC 410 …. 3.142, 3.143 — v Cockley [1984] Crim LR 429 …. 6.35 — v Coe [2002] NSWCCA 385 …. 4.61, 7.97 — v Cokar [1960] 2 QB 207 …. 3.92, 3.97 — v Colby [1999] NSWCCA 261 …. 3.29, 3.48, 3.54, 3.55, 3.58, 3.62 — v Coll (1889) 25 LR Ir 522 …. 7.93 — v Collie [2005] SASC 148 …. 2.43 — v Collie, Kranz and Lovegrove (1991) 55 A Crim R 139 …. 4.30 — v Collins (1960) 44 Cr App R 170 …. 7.18 — v — (1976) 12 SASR 501 …. 7.58 — v — (1989) 43 A Crim R 170 …. 3.71 — v Colquhoun [2009] SASC 138 …. 7.118 — v Compton (2013) 237 A Crim R 177; [2013] SASCFC 134 …. 2.72 — v Congressi (1974) 9 SASR 257 …. 3.122 — v Connell, Lucas and Carter (No 1) (1992) 8 WAR 518 …. 3.78 — v Constantinou (1990) 91 Cr App R 74 …. 4.74, 7.95 — v Cook [1959] 2 QB 340 …. 3.101 — v — [1987] QB 417 …. 4.74, 7.95 — v — (2000) 110 A Crim R 117 …. 3.33, 3.71, 3.73 — v — [2004] NSWCCA 52 …. 2.30, 3.125, 8.96 — v — (2006) 95 SASR 201; [2006] SASC 231 …. 6.22 — v Cooney [2013] NSWCCA 312 …. 8.144 — v Cooper (2007) 175 A Crim R 94; [2007] ACTSC 74 …. 7.28, 7.30 — v Coote (1873) LR 4 PC 599 …. 5.167 — v Corak and Palmer (1982) 30 SASR 404 …. 3.85, 3.91, 3.97, 3.118 — v Corbett [2002] NSWCCA 402 …. 7.158 — v Corish (2006) 96 SASR 207; [2006] SASC 369 …. 5.133 — v Cornwell (2003) 57 NSWLR 82 …. 7.16, 7.19

— v Correia (1996) 15 WAR 95 …. 3.31, 3.71 — v Corrigan (1998) 74 SASR 454 …. 2.87, 3.36 — v Cosgrove and Hunter (1988) 34 A Crim R 299 …. 2.82 — v Coss [2016] QCA 44 …. 2.71 — v Costi (1988) 48 SASR 269 …. 2.72, 7.131 — v Costin [1998] 3 VR 659 …. 2.71, 4.49 — v Cotton (1990) 19 NSWLR 593 …. 8.150, 8.153 — v Coulman (1927) 20 Cr App R 106 …. 3.108 — v Courtney-Smith (No 2) (1990) 48 A Crim R 49 …. 2.12, 3.107, 3.130 — v Covill (2000) 114 A Crim R 111 …. 2.71 — v Cowan (2013) 237 A Crim R 388; [2013] QSC 337 …. 3.65, 8.131 — v Cowan; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2016] 1 Qd R 433; [2015] QCA 87 …. 2.37, 5.258, 8.129, 8.131, 8.135, 8.155 — v Cowie; Ex parte Attorney-General [1994] 1 Qd R 326 …. 7.34 — v Cox [1972] Qd R 366 …. 7.120 — v — [1986] 2 Qd R 55 …. 4.28, 8.108 — v Cox and Railton (1884) 14 QBD 153 …. 5.29 — v Coyne [1996] 1 Qd R 512 …. 5.143 — v Craig [1975] 1 NZLR 597 …. 5.49 — v Crawford [1965] VR 580 …. 3.108 — v — [1989] 2 Qd R 443 …. 3.78 — v — (2015) 123 SASR 353; [2015] SASCFC 112 …. 4.65 — v Crisologo (1998) 99 A Crim R 178 …. 2.28 — v Crooks [2001] 2 Qd R 541 …. 5.139, 8.149 — v Crossman [2011] 2 Qd R 435; [2011] QCA 126 …. 2.43, 7.22 — v Crouch (1850) 4 Cox CC 163 …. 7.56 — v Crowther-Wilkinson [2003] NSWSC 44 …. 8.99 — v Crupi (1995) 86 A Crim R 229 …. 4.56, 4.61, 5.267

— v Crupi (1996) 86 A Crim R 229 …. 8.157 — v Cuenco (2007) 16 VR 118; [2007] VSCA 41 …. 4.88 — v Cumes (1990) 102 FLR 113 …. 5.139, 8.131, 8.149, 8.156 — v Cumming (1995) 86 A Crim R 156 …. 4.88 — v Cummins (2004) 10 VR 15; [2004] VSCA 164 …. 2.87, 3.37 — v Cunningham (1992) 61 A Crim R 412 …. 6.58 — v Curran (2008) 100 SASR 71 …. 7.131 — v Curran and Torney [1983] 2 VR 133 …. 8.108 — v Curtis [2009] SASC 266 …. 4.64 — v Cvitko (2000) 159 FLR 403 …. 8.156 — v D (1996) 86 A Crim R 41 …. 3.138 — v — (1998) 71 SASR 99 …. 2.85, 4.85 — v — [2008] ACTSC 82 …. 4.65, 4.69 — v Da Silva [1990] 1 WLR 31 …. 7.79, 7.85, 7.121 — v Dalley (2002) 132 A Crim R 169; [2002] NSWCCA 284 …. 2.37 — v Dam (1986) 43 SASR 422 …. 2.55, 2.72 — v Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750 …. 6.50, 6.51, 6.53, 6.58 — v Dann [2000] NSWCCA 185 …. 3.146 — v Darby (1982) 148 CLR 668 …. 3.78 — v Daren and Tange [1971] 2 NSWLR 423 …. 7.9 — v Darmody (2010) 25 VR 209; [2010] VSCA 41 …. 8.66 — v Darrington and McGauley [1980] VR 353 …. 3.77, 3.79, 3.82 — v Darrington and McGauley [1980] VR 353 …. 7.58, 7.60 — v Darwiche (2006) 166 A Crim R 28; [2006] NSWSC 924 …. 4.65, 4.70, 7.98 — v Dastagir (2013) 118 SASR 83; [2013] SASCFC 109 …. 4.56, 7.40, 7.56 — v Dastagir (2013) 224 A Crim R 570; [2013] SASC 26 …. 4.56, 7.40, 7.56 — v Dat Quoc Ho (2002) 130 A Crim R 545 …. 4.86

— v Davidson (1991) 54 SASR 580 …. 5.266 — v Davidson and Moyle; Ex parte Attorney-General [1996] 2 Qd R 505 …. 8.155 — v Davies [1962] 3 All ER 97 …. 7.42, 7.60 — v — [1984] 3 NSWLR 572 …. 6.58 — v — [1985] 3 NSWLR 276 …. 7.107 — v — (2005) 11 VR 314; [2005] VSCA 90 …. 4.66 — v Davis (1975) 60 Cr App R 157 …. 3.122 — v — [1999] NSWCCA 15 …. 5.130 — v Dawes [1992] 2 Qd R 435 …. 2.8 — v Dawson-Ryan (2009) 104 SASR 571 …. 3.48 — v Day (2000) 115 A Crim R 80 …. 3.116 — v — (2002) 82 SASR 85 …. 8.168 — v Daylight (1989) 41 A Crim R 354 …. 8.89 — v DBA (2012) 219 A Crim R 408; [2012] QCA 49 …. 7.99 — v DBB [2013] 1 Qd R 188; [2012] QCA 96 …. 2.49 — v DBG (2002) 133 A Crim R 227 …. 4.48 — v DD [2000] 2 SCR 275 …. 7.52 — v — [2007] VSCA 317 …. 3.73 — v DDC (2004) 11 VR 129; [2004] VSCA 230 …. 3.73 — v DDR [1998] 3 VR 580 …. 2.87, 3.36 — v De Angelis (1979) 20 SASR 288 …. 3.143, 3.144, 3.146, 3.147 — v De Cressac (1985) 1 NSWLR 381 …. 4.74, 5.172 — v de Vere [1982] QB 75 …. 3.132 — v Deakin [1995] 1 Cr App R 471 …. 2.42, 7.30 — v Debs [2005] VSCA 66 …. 7.43 — v Debs and Roberts [2005] VSCA 66 …. 8.89 — v Deering (1986) 43 SASR 252 …. 4.64, 4.67, 4.74

— v Degnan [2001] 1 NZLR 280 …. 5.190 — v Delgado-Guerra [2002] 2 Qd R 384 …. 2.87, 3.42 — v Dellapatrona and Duffield (1993) 31 NSWLR 123 …. 2.88 — v Demeter [1995] 2 Qd R 626 …. 4.64, 5.131 — v Demir [1990] 2 Qd R 433 …. 5.205 — v Demirok [1976] VR 244 …. 3.78 — v Deng [2001] NSWCCA 153 …. 8.149 — v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation; Ex parte Briggs (1987) 13 FCR 389 …. 5.157, 5.166 — v Derbas (1993) 66 A Crim R 327 …. 4.6, 4.33 — v Derby Magistrate’s Court; Ex parte B [1996] 1 AC 487 …. 5.68 — v Deriz (1999) 109 A Crim R 329 …. 2.71 — v Devine (1985) 18 A Crim R 185 …. 8.167 — v Dewhirst (2001) 122 A Crim R 403 …. 8.155, 8.156 — v Dickinson [2007] VSCA 111 …. 2.88 — v Dickson [1983] 1 VR 227 …. 4.59, 8.96 — v Dimian (1995) 83 A Crim R 358 …. 3.150 — v Ditroia and Tucci [1981] VR 247 …. 3.122 — v Dixon (1992) 28 NSWLR 215 …. 8.131 — v DJT [1998] 4 VR 784 …. 2.71, 7.91 — v Do (1990) 54 SASR 543 …. 4.89 — v Dodd (2002) 135 A Crim R 32; [2002] NSWCCA 418 …. 4.54, 4.58, 4.63 — v Doe (1987) 31 CCC (3d) 353 …. 7.136, 7.146 — v Doheny and Adams [1997] 1 Cr App R 369 …. 1.22, 1.26, 1.42 — v Dolan (1992) 58 SASR 501 …. 3.73, 5.134, 8.149 — v Domican and Thurgar (1989) 43 A Crim R 24 …. 3.78 — v Domokos (2005) 92 SASR 258 …. 3.31 — v Donnelly (1997) 96 A Crim R 432 …. 8.129

— v Dookhea [2016] VSCA 67 …. 2.72 — v Doolan [1962] Qd R 449 …. 8.101 — v Doran (1972) 56 Cr App R 429 …. 2.8 — v Dossi (1918) 13 Cr App R 158 …. 4.19 — v Doyle [1967] VR 698 …. 4.65, 4.74 — v — [2014] NSWCA 4 …. 2.87 — v Drake (2013) 233 A Crim R 588; [2013] QCA 222 …. 7.33 — v Drollett [2005] NSWCCA 356 …. 2.23, 4.63 — v — [2005] NSWCCA 356 …. 7.41, 7.56 — v Drozd (1993) 67 A Crim R 112 …. 5.13 — v Drummond (No 2) [2015] SASCFC 82 …. 2.24 — v Dubois [1966] QWN 25 …. 7.105 — v Dudko [2002] NSWCCA 336 …. 7.19 — v Dudley [2004] EWCA Crim 3336 …. 7.23 — v Duke (1979) 22 SASR 46 …. 2.29, 4.19, 4.28, 4.102 — v Duncan (1981) 83 Cr App R 359 …. 8.108 — v — (2011) 109 SASR 479 …. 2.90 — v Duncan and Perre [2004] NSWCCA 431 …. 4.69, 8.153 — v Dungay [2001] NSWCCA 443 …. 2.37, 8.148 — v Dunn (2006) 94 SASR 177; [2006] SASC 58 …. 2.12 — v Dunphy (1994) 98 Cr App R 393 …. 7.35 — v Dunwoody (2004) 212 ALR 103; [2004] QCA 413 …. 2.9 — v Duong (2001) 110 SASR 291; [2011] SASC 121 …. 8.41 — v — [2002] 1 Qd R 502 …. 8.168 — v Duong, Sem and Huynh (2011) 110 SASR 291; [2011] SASC 121 …. 8.41 — v Dupas (No 2) (2005) 12 VR 601; [2005] VSCA 212 …. 3.44 — v — (No 3) (2009) 28 VR 380; [2009] VSCA 202 …. 2.29, 4.76 — v Durbin [1995] 2 Cr App R 84 …. 3.136

— v DWB (2008) 20 VR 112 …. 2.87 — v DWH [1999] NSWCCA 255 …. 7.92 — v E (1996) 39 NSWLR 450 …. 2.71, 4.84, 7.101 — v E J Smith [1984] 1 NSWLR 462 …. 4.57 — v — (1987) 7 NSWLR 444 …. 4.57 — v E, DJ (2012) 112 SASR 225; [2012] SASCFC 6 …. 4.21, 4.85 — v Eade [2000] NSWCCA 369 …. 2.27 — v Eades [1972] Crim LR 99 …. 7.145 — v Easom (1981) 28 SASR 134 …. 4.59, 4.63 — v Easton (1988) 144 LSJS 107 …. 8.147 — v Echo (1997) 6 NTLR 51 …. 8.152 — v Edelsten (1990) 21 NSWLR 542; 51 A Crim R 397 …. 2.26, 2.29, 5.266 — v Edwards (1997) 94 A Crim R 204 …. 5.188 — v — (2009) 255 ALR 399; [2009] HCA 20 …. 2.29 — v — [1975] 1 QB 27 …. 6.19 — v — [1991] 2 All ER 266 …. 3.140 — v Edwin (No 2) (2013) 277 FLR 14; [2013] ACTSC 84 …. 2.37 — v EF (2008) 189 A Crim R 463; [2008] VSCA 213 …. 2.87, 3.34 — v El Adl [1993] 2 Qd R 195 …. 4.77, 4.86 — v El-Azzi [2004] NSWCCA 455 …. 7.137 — v El-Hayek [2004] NSWCCA 25 …. 3.57 — v Elhusseini [1988] 2 Qd R 442 …. 3.78 — v El-Kheir [2004] NSWCCA 461 …. 2.26, 3.104, 3.106, 3.107, 3.108, 3.109, 3.130, 3.137, 4.57, 4.63, 7.40, 7.56 — v Ellem (1994) 75 A Crim R 370 …. 2.71 — v Elliott (1996) 128 FLR 172 …. 5.29, 5.30 — v — (1996) 185 CLR 250 …. 2.40 — v — (SC (Vic), Vincent J, 6 May 1996, unreported) …. 8.97, 8.99, 8.131,

8.154 — v Ellis [1910] 2 KB 746 …. 3.108 — v — (1992) 58 SASR 117 …. 8.149 — v — (1998) 100 A Crim R 49 …. 4.88, 5.130 — v — (2003) 58 NSWLR 700; [2003] NSWCCA 319 …. 3.58, 3.62 — v — (2010) 107 SASR 94; [2010] SASC 118 …. 3.44 — v Elms [2004] NSWCCA 467 …. 8.74, 8.197 — v Elsom (1975) 12 SASR 416 …. 3.67, 3.70 — v Elwarthy (1867) LR 1 CCR 103 …. 7.18 — v Ensor [1989] 2 All ER 586 …. 2.49 — v EO (2004) 8 VR 154 …. 4.49 — v Ernst [1984] VR 593 …. 8.117 — v Errigo (2005) 91 SASR 80 …. 8.77, 8.184 — v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442 …. 6.58, 7.123, 8.99, 8.129, 8.198 — v Etherington (1982) 32 SASR 230 …. 3.31 — v Evan (2006) 175 A Crim R 1; [2006] QCA 527 …. 4.64, 4.65, 4.71 — v Evans [1964] VR 717 …. 6.49 — v — (1985) 38 SASR 344 …. 4.87 — v Ewens [1967] 1 QB 322 …. 6.19 — v Ewing [1983] QB 1039 …. 2.91 — v Eyres (1977) 16 SASR 226 …. 8.146 — v F (1995) 83 A Crim R 502 …. 2.71, 7.51, 7.58, 7.108, 7.158 — v — (2002) 128 A Crim R 126; [2002] NSWCCA 125 …. 3.58, 3.62 — v F, AD [2015] SASCFC 130 …. 3.64 — v Fahad (2004) 146 A Crim R 169; [2004] VSCA 28 …. 4.56, 4.63 — v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30 …. 7.58 — v Falconer Atlee (1973) 58 Cr App R 348 …. 2.55 — v Falealili [1996] 3 NZLR 664 …. 3.136

— v Familic (1994) 75 A Crim R 229 …. 8.106 — v Fang (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 1784 …. 7.30 — v Fannon and Walsh (1922) 22 SR NSW 427 …. 4.74 — v FAR [1996] 2 Qd R 49 …. 7.34 — v Farquharson (2009) 26 VR 410; [2009] VSCA 307 …. 2.88, 7.49 — v Farr (2001) 118 A Crim R 399; [2001] NSWSC 3 …. 8.160, 8.168 — v Faure and Corrigan [1978] VR 246 …. 6.34 — v Fazio (1997) 69 SASR 54 …. 7.71 — v FD [2006] NSWCCA 31 …. 7.23 — v FE [2013] NSWSC 1692 …. 8.150, 8.156 — v Ferguson (1909) 2 Cr App R 250 …. 3.108 — v — (1994) 75 A Crim R 31 …. 7.34 — v — (2000) 117 A Crim R 44 …. 2.11 — v Fernandes (1996) 133 FLR 477 …. 3.29 — v Fernando [1999] NSWCCA 66 …. 3.117, 3.122, 7.41, 8.144 — v Field; Ex parte White (1895) 64 LJMC 158 …. 6.74 — v Fieldhouse (1977) 17 SASR 92 …. 8.146, 8.154 — v Finn (1988) 34 A Crim R 425 …. 4.59, 4.62 — v — (2014) 119 SASR 207; [2014] SASCFC 46 …. 4.51 — v Firman (1989) 52 SASR 391 …. 8.22, 8.33 — v Fisher [2009] VSCA 100 …. 6.47 — v Fitzgibbon (1885) 11 VLR 232 …. 3.143 — v FJB [1999] 2 VR 425 …. 2.87, 3.73 — v Flaherty (2002) 133 A Crim R 42 …. 8.168 — v Flannery [1969] VR 586 …. 4.84 — v Fleming; R v Maher [2017] SASC 16 …. 3.31, 3.64 — v Flesch (1987) 7 NSWLR 554 …. 2.70, 2.72 — v Fletcher [1998] 2 Qd R 437 …. 2.87

— v — (2005) 156 A Crim R 308; [2005] NSWCCA 338 …. 3.12, 3.59 — v Flood [1999] NSWCCA 198 …. 4.28 — v Flynn [2008] 2 Cr App R 266 …. 7.56 — v Foggo; Ex parte Attorney-General (1989) 2 Qd R 49 …. 7.82 — v Folbigg [2003] NSWCCA 17 …. 3.50, 3.58, 3.62, 8.21 — v Foley (1984) 13 A Crim R 29 …. 6.54 — v — [2000] 1 Qd R 290 …. 7.131 — v Fong [1981] Qd R 90 …. 7.58, 7.136 — v Ford (2009) 201 A Crim R 451; [2009] NSWCCA 306 …. 2.31 — v Forde (1986) 19 A Crim R 1 …. 3.80, 3.125, 7.136 — v Fordham (1997) 98 A Crim R 359 …. 3.56 — v Forgione [1969] SASR 248 …. 4.30, 4.52 — v Forster [2016] QCA 62 …. 1.44 — v Fortunato (2003) 137 A Crim R 453; [2003] SASC 4 …. 3.101 — v Fountain and Tootell (2001) 124 A Crim R 100 …. 4.100 — v Fouyaxis (2007) 99 SASR 233; [2007] SASR 335 …. 2.72, 4.88 — v Fowler (1985) 39 SASR 440 …. 7.58, 7.60, 7.67 — v — (SC (NSW), 15 May 1997, unreported) …. 7.138 — v — [2000] NSWCCA 142 …. 7.122, 7.123 — v — (2003) 151 A Crim R 166; [2003] NSWCCA 321 …. 2.87, 4.10, 4.27, 7.79 — v Fox [2000] Qd R 334 …. 3.97 — v — (No 2) [2000] 1 Qd R 640 …. 4.61 — v FP (2007) 169 A Crim R 318; [2007] QCA 97 …. 4.84 — v Fragomeli [2008] SASC 96 …. 8.35 — v Francis (1874) 12 Cox CC 612 …. 3.11 — v Franco [2006] VSCA 302 …. 2.71 — v — (2009) 105 SASR 446; [2009] SASC 370 …. 2.82, 3.37

— v Frangulis [2006] NSWCCA 363 …. 4.33, 8.94, 8.142 — v Franklin (2001) 119 A Crim R 223; [2001] VSCA 79 …. 2.37, 2.85, 2.88, 4.88, 8.155 — v Franks (1999) 105 A Crim R 377 …. 2.14 — v Fraser (1995) 65 SASR 260 …. 7.92 — v Fraser [2004] 2 Qd R 544; [2004] QCA 92 …. 5.259, 8.155 — v Frawley (1993) 69 A Crim R 208 …. 8.29 — v Frazer [2002] NSWCCA 59 …. 8.95 — v Freeman [1980] VR 1 …. 4.84 — v — [1980] VR 1 …. 7.105, 7.106 — v French (2012) 114 SASR 287; [2012] SASCFC 118 …. 7.30 — v Fricker (1986) 42 SASR 436; 23 A Crim R 147 …. 3.93, 3.125, 3.135 — v Frugtniet [1999] VCSA 58 …. 7.65 — v — [1999] VSCA 58 …. 2.40 — v Frugtniet and Frugtniet [1999] 2 VR 297 …. 8.156 — v FTG (2007) 15 VR 685; [2007] VSCA 109 …. 3.140, 7.133 — v Fuller (1994) 34 NSWLR 233 …. 3.108, 3.109, 3.134 — v Funderburk [1990] 1 WLR 587 …. 7.137, 7.140 — v Furney (1964) 20 ABC 166 …. 5.60 — v Fyffe [1991] 2 VR 72 …. 2.90 — v G [1994] 1 Qd R 540 …. 2.71 — v — (1996) 88 A Crim R 489 …. 3.34, 3.73 — v — [2005] NSWCCA 291 …. 8.100 — v G, AP (2014) 119 SASR 125; [2014] SASCFC 43 …. 5.201 — v G, F, S, and W [1974] 1 NSWLR 31 …. 8.96 — v G, GT (2007) 97 SASR 315; [2007] SASC 104 …. 3.6, 4.88 — v GAC (2007) 178 A Crim R 408; [2007] NSWCCA 315 …. 3.54, 3.59, 3.62

— v GAE [2000] 1 VR 198 …. 3.71 — v Galbraith (1981) 73 Cr App R 124 …. 6.33 — v — [1981] 1 WLR 1039 …. 2.55 — v Gale; R v Duckworth (2012) 217 A Crim R 487; [2012] NSWCCA 174 …. 2.15, 3.42, 3.58 — v Galea [2004] NSWCCA 227 …. 7.137 — v Gallagher [2001] NSWSC 462 …. 7.43 — v Galli [2001] NSWCCA 504 …. 1.22, 1.26, 2.67, 7.43 — v Galluzo (1986) 23 A Crim R 211 …. 4.89 — v Gangemi (1997) 17 SR (WA) 176 …. 4.33 — v Gao [2003] NSWCCA 390 …. 4.57, 8.100 — v GAR [2003] NSWCCA 224 …. 4.45 — v Garbett (1847) 1 Den 236; 169 ER 277 …. 5.167 — v Gardner (2001) 123 A Crim R 439; [2001] NSWCCA 381 …. 2.23, 7.40 — v Garofalo [1999] 2 VR 625 …. 5.15 — v Garrett (1988) 50 SASR 392 …. 3.33 — v Garth (1990) 49 A Crim R 298 …. 2.82 — v — (1994) 73 A Crim R 215 …. 8.133 — v GAS [1998] 3 VR 862 …. 3.26 — v Gassy (No 3) [2005] SASC 496 …. 2.87 — v Gathercole [2016] QCA 336 …. 6.55 — v Gaudion [1979] VR 57 …. 7.15 — v Gay [1976] VR 577 …. 2.46 — v Gazard (1838) 8 Car & P 595; 173 ER 633 …. 5.184 — v Gbojueh (2009) 103 SASR 545 …. 2.14 — v GEA (2002) 131 A Crim R 54 …. 4.48 — v Gee (2000) 113 A Crim R 376; [2000] NSWCCA 198 …. 3.54, 7.97 — v — [2012] SASCFC 86 …. 2.43

— v Geesing (1984) 39 SASR 111 …. 7.113, 7.136 — v — (1985) 38 SASR 226 …. 8.131, 8.137 — v Gemmill (2004) 8 VR 242 …. 7.47 — v George and Price (1981) 4 A Crim R 12 …. 5.118 — v Georgiev (2001) 119 A Crim R 363; [2001] VSCA 18 …. 2.12, 3.37, 3.73 — v GH (2000) 105 FCR 419 …. 8.96, 8.97, 8.100, 8.160, 8.162 — v Gibb and McKenzie [1983] 2 VR 155 …. 3.77, 3.79 — v Gibbons [1971] VR 79 …. 8.104 — v Gibson (1887) 18 QBD 537 …. 2.46 — v — (1989) 42 A Crim R 265 …. 3.71 — v — (1999) 110 A Crim R 180 …. 2.73 — v — [2002] NSWCCA 401 …. 2.30, 6.52, 6.57 — v Gilbert (1977) 66 Cr App R 237 …. 5.140 — v Gillard (No 3) (2000) 78 SASR 279 …. 3.116 — v Gillard and Preston (1999) 76 SASR 76 …. 5.12 — v Gillespie (1967) 51 Cr App R 172 …. 7.153 — v Gilmore [1977] 2 NSWLR 935 …. 4.56, 7.7, 7.43, 7.48, 7.49, 7.52 — v Giovannone [2002] NSWCCA 323 …. 7.19 — v — [2013] NSWSC 1503 …. 2.7 — v Gittany (No 3) (2013) 238 A Crim R 149; [2013] NSWSC 1670 …. 2.29, 5.15, 5.49 — v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317; [2001] NSWCCA 413 …. 1.22, 1.32, 2.30, 2.31, 7.43, 7.62 — v Glasby (2000) 115 A Crim R 465 …. 7.122 — v Glastonbury (2012) 115 SASR 37; [2012] SASCFC 141 …. 4.25, 4.28 — v Glencourse (1995) 78 A Crim R 256 …. 4.77 — v Glennon (No 3) (2005) 12 VR 421; [2005] VSCA 262 …. 3.73 — v Glossop [2001] NSWCCA 165 …. 7.110

— v Glover (1987) 46 SASR 310 …. 3.78 — v — [1991] Crim LR 48 …. 8.69, 8.88 — v Glusheski (1986) 33 A Crim R 193 …. 2.11 — v Godstone Rural District Council [1911] 2 KB 465 …. 5.33 — v Golder [1960] 1 WLR 1169 …. 7.119 — v Goodall [1982] VR 33 …. 4.56, 4.64, 4.67 — v Goode [1970] SASR 69 …. 4.59, 4.63, 4.71 — v Gordon (1999) 108 A Crim R 356 …. 3.42 — v Gordon and Gordon (1991) 57 A Crim R 413 …. 3.11, 7.24 — v Gould (2014) 243 A Crim R 205; [2014] QCA 164 …. 4.56 — v Gouldren [1993] 2 Qd R 534 …. 8.72 — v Gover (2000) 118 A Crim R 8 …. 8.61, 8.197 — v GPP (2001) 129 A Crim R 1 …. 4.49 — v Grant (2001) 127 A Crim R 124 …. 8.61 — v — [1996] 2 Crim App R 272 …. 3.25, 4.73 — v — [2009] SCC 32 …. 2.37 — v Gray [1965] Qd R 373 …. 5.167 — v Greatbanks [1959] Crim LR 450 …. 3.143 — v Grech [1997] 2 VR 609 …. 3.73 — v Greciun-King [1981] 2 NSWLR 469 …. 5.118, 5.119 — v Green (1939) 61 CLR 167 …. 2.30 — v — (2001) 78 SASR 463 …. 4.12, 4.49 — v — (2002) 4 VR 471 …. 8.166 — v Greenham [1999] NSWCCA 8 …. 3.56 — v Greenwood [1962] Tas SR 319 …. 7.103 — v Grey (1989) 88 Cr App R 375 …. 5.194 — v Griffin [1971] Qd R 12 …. 7.105 — v — [1998] 1 Qd R 659 …. 7.34

— v Griffith (1995) 79 A Crim R 125 …. 7.40 — v Griffiths [1930] VLR 204 …. 4.65 — v Grosser (1999) 73 SASR 584 …. 3.33, 4.88 — v GTN (2003) 6 VR 150 …. 4.48, 4.49 — v Gudabi (1984) 1 FCR 187 …. 8.152, 8.153, 8.159 — v Gudgeon (1995) 133 ALR 379 …. 4.53, 5.258 — v Guildhall Justices; Ex parte DPP (1983) 78 Cr App R 269 …. 5.205 — v Gujanovic (No 2) (2002) 130 A Crim R 179 …. 8.47 — v Gulder (1986) 8 NSWLR 12 …. 3.78 — v Gulliford (2004) 148 A Crim R 558; [2004] NSWCCA 338 …. 4.84, 4.85 — v Gum [2007] SASC 311 …. 8.184 — v Gun; Ex parte Stephenson (1977) 17 SASR 165 …. 3.144, 3.145, 7.137 — v GVV (2008) 20 VR 395; 194 A Crim R 242; [2008] VSCA 170 …. 3.73, 4.46, 4.49, 4.86 — v GW (2016) 90 ALJR 407; [2016] HCA 6 …. 4.13, 4.14, 4.39, 4.77, 7.30, 7.36 — v H [1995] 2 AC 597 …. 3.49, 3.70, 4.98 — v H, T (2010) 108 SASR 86; [2010] SASCFC 24 …. 7.99, 7.107 — v Haak (2012) 112 SASR 315; [2012] SASCFC 19 …. 4.37 — v Haas (1986) 22 A Crim R 299 …. 2.50, 6.33 — v Hackett [2006] VSCA 138 …. 4.63 — v Haddad (2000) 116 A Crim R 312; [2000] NSWCCA 351 …. 2.37, 5.261, 5.264 — v Hadlow [1992] 1 Qd R 440 …. 2.45, 7.120 — v Hagarty [2004] NSWCCA 89 …. 2.87 — v Haidley and Alford [1984] VR 229 …. 7.58, 7.60, 7.68, 4.59, 4.64, 4.67, 4.73 — v Hajistassi (2010) 107 SASR 67; [2010] SASC 111 …. 3.140 — v Hall (1988) 36 A Crim R 368 …. 4.13

— v — [1952] 1 KB 302 …. 3.66 — v — [2001] NSWSC 827 …. 7.7, 7.19, 7.40 — v Hallam and Karger (1985) 42 SASR 126 …. 8.146, 8.149, 8.156 — v Halliday [2009] VSCA 195 …. 2.87 — v Halpin [1975] QB 907 …. 8.91, 8.92 — v Halse (1980) 25 SASR 510 …. 8.156 — v Hamilton (1993) 68 A Crim R 298 …. 3.101, 3.109, 3.134, 3.138 — v Hammond (1941) 28 Cr App R 84 …. 8.163 — v Hamood (1987) 45 SASR 90 …. 4.67 — v Hamra [2016] SASCFC 130 …. 2.14, 2.38, 6.32 — v Handlen (2010) 247 FLR 261; [2010] QCA 371 …. 2.11 — v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359; [2000] NSWCCA 503 …. 2.12, 5.124, 5.127, 5.130, 5.131, 7.7, 7.10, 8.21, 8.27, 8.192, 8.193 — v Hanrahan [1967] 2 NSWR 717 …. 3.143, 7.142 — v Hansen (2002) 84 SASR 54; [2002] SASC 208 …. 2.7, 2.14, 4.46 — v Harbach (1973) 6 SASR 427 …. 3.78, 7.125 — v Harding [1989] 2 Qd R 373 …. 2.42, 7.30 — v Harker [2004] NSWCCA 427 …. 3.68 — v Harm (1975) 13 SASR 84 …. 4.59, 4.71, 6.69 — v Harmer (1987) 28 A Crim R 35 …. 3.140 — v Harrington [1998] 3 VR 531 …. 7.143 — v Harris (1971) 1 SASR 447 …. 4.59, 4.71 — v — (1979) 21 SASR 561 …. 3.67 — v Harris (1995) 64 SASR 85 …. 5.139, 8.149 — v — (No 3) [1990] VR 310 …. 4.57 — v — [2006] 1 Cr App R 5 …. 3.58 — v Harrison [1966] VR 72 …. 7.81, 7.82 — v Harry (1986) 86 Cr App R 105 …. 8.22, 8.33

— v Harry; Ex parte Eastway (1985) 39 SASR 203 …. 5.13 — v Hart (1932) 23 Cr App R 202 …. 7.131 — v — (1977) 17 SASR 100 …. 2.91, 8.154 — v — [1979] Qd R 8 …. 5.139, 8.146, 8.149, 8.156 — v Hartwick, Hartwick and Clayton (2005) 14 VR 125 …. 3.31 — v Harvey (1858) 8 Cox 99 …. 5.184 — v — (NSWCCA, 11 December 1996, unreported) …. 7.41 — v Hasler; Ex parte Attorney-General [1987] 1 Qd R 239 …. 8.134 — v Haslett (1987) 90 FLR 233 …. 5.13 — v Hastings (2003) 85 SASR 256 …. 8.168 — v Hatton (1977) 64 Cr App R 88 …. 3.122 — v Haughbro (1997) 142 FLR 415 …. 2.27, 2.36 — v Hawes (1994) 35 NSWLR 294 …. 7.140, 7.153 — v Hawi (No 2) (2011) 216 A Crim R 64; [2011] NSWSC 1648 …. 5.205 — v — (No 9) (2011) 216 A Crim R 90; [2011] NSWSC 1655 …. 5.205 — v Hayden and Slattery [1959] VR 102 …. 7.120 — v Haydon (No 5) [2005] SASC 19 …. 5.49 — v Hayes [1977] 2 All ER 288; (1976) 64 Cr App R 194 …. 7.28 — v Hayler and Henry (1988) 39 A Crim R 374 …. 4.19 — v Hayles (1990) 54 SASR 549 …. 4.59, 4.62, 4.64, 4.65 — v He and Bun (2001) 122 A Crim R 487 …. 4.5, 4.100 — v Heading (2011) 111 SASR 32; [2011] SASCFC 107 …. 3.72 — v Healy [2016] QCA 334 …. 2.37 — v Heaney (1998) 100 A Crim R 450 …. 5.260 — v Heaney [1992] 2 VR 531 …. 5.266, 5.267, 8.148, 8.157, 8.168 — v Heaney and Walsh [1998] 4 VR 636 …. 8.134, 8.155, 8.168 — v Heginbotham [2008] QCA 47 …. 4.27 — v Hein (2013) 117 SASR 444; [2013] SASCFC 97 …. 8.142, 8.154, 8.163

— v Hellwig [2007] 1 Qd R 17; [2006] QCA 179 …. 7.33 — v Helmhout [2000] NSWSC 185 …. 8.129 — v — [2001] NSWCCA 372 …. 2.35, 2.37, 8.129, 8.144 — v Helps [2016] SASCFC 154 …. 8.106 — v Hembury (1994) 73 A Crim R 1 …. 3.101 — v Hemmelstein [2001] NSWCCA 220 …. 3.51, 8.47 — v Henderson (1984) 37 SASR 82 …. 2.44, 7.120 — v Hendrie (1985) 37 SASR 581 …. 8.43, 8.44, 8.47 — v Heness [2009] SASC 243 …. 5.138, 5.141 — v Hennessey (1978) 68 Cr App R 419 …. 5.205 — v Hennig [2015] SASCFC 150 …. 3.64 — v Henry (1968) 53 Cr App R 150 …. 4.19, 4.103 — v Hentschel [1988] VR 362 …. 4.57, 4.74, 7.95, 7.96 — v Hepworth and Fearnley [1955] 2 QB 600 …. 2.69 — v Herring (1994) 74 A Crim R 72 …. 4.32, 4.76 — v Hewitt [1998] 4 VR 862 …. 2.71, 4.46, 7.107 — v Heyde (1990) 20 NSWLR 234 …. 4.85, 4.87 — v Heyes (2006) 12 VR 401 …. 4.86 — v Hickman (1993) 60 SASR 415 …. 7.158 — v Hill (1851) 2 Den 254; 169 ER 495 …. 7.35 — v Hill; Ex parte DPP (Cth) (2011) 212 A Crim R 359; [2011] QCA 306 …. 4.89 — v Hillier (2007) 228 CLR 618; [2007] HCA 13 …. 2.83 — v Hills (1988) 86 Cr App R 26 …. 4.89 — v Hilton [1972] 1 QB 421 …. 3.84, 3.123, 5.111, 7.124 — v Hines (1991) 24 NSWLR 737 …. 2.49 — v — (No 2) (2014) 242 A Crim R 316; [2014] NSWSC 990 …. 7.3 — v Hinschen [2008] QCA 145 …. 3.136

— v Hinton (1999) 150 FLR 20 …. 8.99 — v — (2000) 155 FLR 139 …. 3.62 — v Hinz [1972] Qd R 272 …. 6.8 — v Hirst (2013) 116 SASC 300; [2013] SASCFC 54 …. 4.88 — v Hissey (1973) 6 SASR 280 …. 3.33, 8.29 — v Hoare (1966) 50 Cr App R 166 …. 140 — v Hoch (1988) 32 A Crim R 443 …. 3.44 — v Hodge (1987) 48 SASR 91 …. 7.125 — v — [2002] NSWCCA 10 …. 5.144 — v Hodgkiss (1836) 7 Car & P 298; 173 ER 132 …. 3.132 — v Hogan [2001] NSWCCA 292 …. 7.122 — v Holden (1990) 52 A Crim R 32 …. 3.78 — v Holloway (2014) 239 A Crim R 108; [2014] ACTSC 54 …. 3.149 — v Holmes (1871) LR 1 CCR 334 …. 3.142, 3.143 — v — [1953] 2 All ER 324 …. 7.60 — v Holt and Merriman (1996) 87 A Crim R 82 …. 8.28 — v Holy Trinity, Kingston upon Hull (Inhabitants) (1827) 7 B & C 611; 108 ER 851 …. 7.18 — v Home Secretary; Ex parte Khawaja [1984] AC 74 …. 2.64, 2.69 — v Honner [1977] Tas SR 1 …. 7.58 — v Hood [1968] 1 WLR 773 …. 5.185 — v Hook (1858) Dears & B 606; 169 ER 1138 …. 4.4 — v Hopper [2005] VSCA 214 …. 4.48 — v Horry (1949) NZLR 791 …. 3.29, 3.67 — v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte Bennett (No 2) (1994) 99 Cr App R 123 …. 5.14 — v Horsfall (1989) 51 SASR 489 …. 2.30, 4.3, 7.29, 7.35, 7.110 — v Horton (1998) 45 NSWLR 426 …. 8.99

— v Horvath (1979) 93 DLR (3d) 1 …. 7.113 — v Houston (1982) 8 A Crim R 392 …. 7.121 — v Howard (2005) 156 A Crim R 343; [2005] VSCA 235 …. 4.88 — v — [2005] NSWCCA 25 …. 7.40, 7.41 — v Howe [1958] SASR 95 …. 3.140 — v Howes (2000) 2 VR 141 …. 7.131 — v Howick [1970] Crim LR 403 …. 4.64 — v HRA (2008) 183 A Crim R 91 …. 7.104, 7.106 — v Hsing (1991) 25 NSWLR 685 …. 4.53, 8.155 — v Hudson [2016] QCA 80 …. 8.61 — v Hughes (1989) 42 A Crim R 270 …. 2.12 — v Hugo and Nasko (2000) 113 A Crim R 484 …. 4.88 — v Huisman and Shiells [1999] VSCA 170 …. 2.84 — v Humble [2009] SASC 51 …. 4.49, 7.104 — v Humphrey (1999) 72 SASR 558 …. 2.30, 7.43 — v Humphries [1972] 2 NSWLR 783 …. 5.118 — v Hunt (1994) 76 A Crim R 363 …. 4.85 — v — [1987] AC 352 …. 6.2, 6.8, 6.14, 6.16, 6.19, 6.21 — v Hunter [1956] VLR 31 …. 7.118, 7.120 — v Hunter and Daebler (1989) 51 SASR 158 …. 5.144 — v Hush; Ex parte Devanny (1932) 48 CLR 487 …. 6.22 — v Hutchinson (1990) 53 SASR 587 …. 7.120 — v Hyatt [1998] 4 VR 182 …. 4.49 — v Hytch (2000) 114 A Crim R 573 …. 8.47 — v IA Shaw [1996] 1 Qd R 641 …. 7.117 — v IAS (2004) 89 SASR 159; [2004] SASC 240 …. 2.29 — v Ignjatic (1993) 68 A Crim R 333 …. 2.49 — v IK (2004) 89 SASR 406; [2004] SASC 280 …. 2.87, 3.35

— v Inamata (2003) 137 A Crim R 510; [2003] NSWCCA 19 …. 4.58, 4.63 — v Independent Broad-Based Anti-Corruption Commissioner (2016) 256 CLR 459; [2016] HCA 8 …. 1.53, 5.108, 5.146, 5.183, 6.8 — v Inhabitants of Worth (1843) 4 QB 132; 114 ER 847 …. 8.76 — v Inston (2009) 103 SASR 265; [2009] SASC 89 …. 3.48, 4.6, 4.49 — v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321 …. 5.138, 5.139, 5.256, 8.28, 8.140, 8.142, 8.149 — v Irlam; Ex parte Attorney-General [2002] QCA 235 …. 2.72 — v J (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 …. 7.47, 7.51, 7.58, 7.66, 7.108, 7.155, 7.158 — v — (No 2) (1994) 13 WAR 346 …. 7.111 — v — (No 2) [1998] 3 VR 602 …. 3.73 — v J, AP (2012) 113 SASR 529; [2012] SASCFC 95 …. 7.30 — v — (2013) 118 SASR 150; [2013] SASCFC 121 …. 4.37 — v J, JA (2009) 105 SASR 563; [2009] SASC 401 …. 7.21, 7.34, 7.99, 8.108 — v J, SM (2013) 117 SASR 535; [2013] SASCFC 96 …. 7.142 — v Jabarula (1984) 11 A Crim R 131 …. 8.152, 8.153 — v Jack (1894) 15 LR (NSW) 196 …. 7.152, 7.153 — v Jackson (1987) 8 NSWLR 116 …. 5.199 — v Jacobi (2012) 114 SASR 227; [2012] SASCFC 115 …. 2.29 — v Jacobs and Mehajer (2004) 151 A Crim R 452; [2004] NSWCCA 462 …. 4.23 — v Jacquier (1979) 20 SASR 543 …. 4.25, 7.118 — v Jafary [2016] NSWDC 41 …. 5.144 — v Jamal (2000) 116 A Crim R 45 …. 4.64 — v Jamison, Elliot and Blessington (1992) 60 A Crim R 68 …. 4.27 — v Jansen [1970] SASR 531 …. 4.102 — v — (2001) 80 SASR 590 …. 7.95 — v Jarrett (1994) 62 SASR 443; 73 A Crim R 160 …. 6.23, 6.28, 7.43, 7.51, 7.53

— v — [2012] NSWCCA 81 …. 8.136 — v Jarvis (1867) LR 1 CCR 96 …. 8.131 — v Jassar (2013) 233 A Crim R 510; [2013] QCA 115 …. 8.108 — v Jeffrey (1991) 60 A Crim R 384 …. 4.86 — v Jenkyns (1993) 32 NSWLR 712; 71 A Crim R 1 …. 7.53, 7.111 — v Jensen [2009] VSCA 266 …. 6.52 — v Jimmy Butler (No 1) (1991) 57 A Crim R 451 …. 8.152, 8.153 — v JJT (2006) 67 NSWLR 152; [2006] NSWCCA 283 …. 5.122 — v J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR 600 …. 7.52 — v Jobling [2012] 1 Qd R 573; [2011] QCA 31 …. 5.190 — v John [1973] Crim LR 113a …. 4.64 — v John Loe (No 1) [1969] PNGLR 12 …. 8.131 — v Johns (1992) SASC 12–13 (Bollen J, 26 August 1992, unreported) …. 3.144 — v — (1999) 110 A Crim R 149 …. 8.101, 8.161 — v Johnson (1979) 22 SASR 161 …. 6.34, 6.35 — v — (2004) 89 SASR 294; [2004] SASC 241 …. 4.56, 4.77 — v Johnson, Sonnet and Paisley (2001) 126 A Crim R 395 …. 5.119 — v Johnston (1986) 43 SASR 63 …. 4.18 — v — (1998) 45 NSWLR 362 …. 2.71, 4.6, 4.49 — v — [2004] NSWCCA 58 …. 3.104, 4.26 — v Joiner [2002] NSWCCA 354 …. 3.58 — v Jones [1970] 1 NSWR 190 …. 8.131 — v — (1998) 72 SASR 281 …. 2.43 — v — (2002) 2 Cr App R 128 …. 2.43 — v — (2006) 161 A Crim R 511; [2006] SASC 189 …. 4.77, 4.82 — v Jones and Waghorn (1991) 55 A Crim R 159 …. 3.78 — v Josifoski [1997] 2 VR 68 …. 3.31, 3.36, 4.49 — v Jovanovic (1997) 42 NSWLR 520 …. 2.71

— v JS [2007] NSWCCA 272 …. 2.14 — v JTB [2003] NSWCCA 295 …. 7.30 — v Judge (General Sessions of the Peace), County of York; Ex parte Corning Glass Works of Canada Ltd (1970) 16 DLR (3d) 609 …. 5.155 — v Jung [2006] NSWSC 658 …. 7.46, 7.54 — v Juric (2002) 4 VR 411 …. 8.155 — v — [2003] VSCA 382 …. 2.87 — v JX [2016] QCA 240 …. 5.185 — v K (1984) 14 A Crim R 226 …. 8.128 — v — (1991) 161 LSJS 135 …. 5.15 — v — (1992) 59 A Crim R 113 …. 4.97 — v — (2003) 59 NSWLR 431 …. 5.185 — v K, MC [2009] SASC 141 …. 3.35 — v Kai-Whitewind [2005] EWCA Crim 1092 …. 7.52 — v — [2005] 2 Cr App R 31 …. 3.58 — v Kalajzich and Orrock (1989) 39 A Crim R 415 …. 4.93 — v Kallis [1994] 2 Qd R 88 …. 2.30, 8.134, 8.168 — v KAN [2016] QCA 108 …. 2.87 — v Kanaan [2005] NSWCCA 385 …. 2.49 — v Kanaveilomani [1995] 2 Qd R 242 …. 5.131 — v Karam (1995) 83 A Crim R 416 …. 4.53, 5.258 — v Karapandzk (2008) 184 A Crim R 320; [2008] SASC 126 …. 2.7 — v Karger [2001] SASC 64 …. 7.43, 7.51, 7.53, 7.65 — v — (2002) 83 SASR 135 …. 1.20, 1.22, 1.26, 1.42, 2.67, 2.87, 7.43 — v Karounos (1995) 63 SASR 451 …. 2.11 — v Karunaratne (1989) 44 A Crim R 191 …. 4.89 — v Kaye [1983] 2 Qd R 202 …. 5.200 — v KDY [2008] VSCA 104 …. 2.71

— v Keane (1994) 99 Cr App R 1 …. 5.223 — v Kearley [1992] 2 AC 228 …. 8.4, 8.22, 8.33 — v — [1992] 2 AC 345 …. 8.33 — v Kearney (2013) 118 SASR 335; [2013] SASCFC 148 …. 4.65 — v Kehagias, Leone and Durkic [1985] VR 107 …. 4.98 — v Kelly [1958] VR 412 …. 7.42 — v — (1975) 12 SASR 389 …. 8.57 — v — (2002) 129 A Crim R 363; [2002] WASCA 134 …. 4.64 — v Kemble [1990] 1 WLR 1111 …. 7.28 — v Kempster (1989) 90 Cr App R 14 …. 5.194 — v Kennedy (1997) 94 A Crim R 341 …. 5.13 — v — (2000) 118 A Crim R 34 …. 7.118 — v Keogh (No 2) (2014) 121 SASR 307 …. 2.14 — v — (No 3) (2014) 121 SASR 410; [2014] SASCFC 137 …. 8.187 — v Kerim [1988] 1 Qd R 426 …. 4.93 — v Kesisyan [2003] NSWCCA 259 …. 4.48 — v KG (2001) 54 NSWLR 198 …. 7.112 — v Khalil (1987) 44 SASR 23 …. 8.149 — v Khazaal [2012] HCA 26 …. 6.2, 6.8 — v Kiah (2001) 120 A Crim R 365 …. 8.155 — v Killick (1979) 21 SASR 321 …. 8.146 — v — (1980) 24 SASR 137 …. 7.130 — v King [1965] 1 WLR 706 …. 5.135 — v — (1975) 12 SASR 404 …. 4.57 — v — [1983] 1 WLR 411 …. 5.60 — v — (1995) 78 A Crim R 53 …. 7.105 — v Kingston [1986] 2 Qd R 114 …. 5.12, 7.84, 7.154 — v — [2008] QCA 193 …. 8.168

— v Kirby [2000] NSWCCA 330 …. 4.69, 7.23 — v Kirkby [2000] 2 Qd R 57 …. 5.194 — v Kissier (2011) 212 A Crim R 121; [2011] QCA 223 …. 2.7 — v Kite (1992) 60 A Crim R 226 …. 5.188 — v Kneebone (1999) 47 NSWLR 450 …. 6.49, 6.52, 6.57, 7.123 — v Knigge (2003) 6 VR 150 …. 7.33, 7.34 — v Knight [1966] 1 WLR 230 …. 4.84 — v — (2001) 160 FLR 465; 120 A Crim R 381 …. 5.156, 8.100 — v — [2005] NSWCCA 241 …. 4.9 — v KNP (2006) 67 NSWLR 227 …. 7.158 — v Koelman [2000] 2 VR 20 …. 2.83, 2.85, 2.87, 8.155 — v Koenig (2013) 229 A Crim R 108; [2013] SASC 42 …. 8.181 — v Kola [2001] SASC 448 …. 2.40 — v Komornick [1986] VR 845 …. 6.55 — v Konstandopoulos [1998] 4 VR 381 …. 4.88 — v Kooyman and Brydson (1979) 22 SASR 376 …. 4.84 — v Koppen (1975) 11 SASR 182 …. 3.72 — v Kostaras [2002] SASC 326 …. 3.34 — v — (No 2) (2003) 143 A Crim R 254 …. 5.118 — v Kostic (2004) 151 A Crim R 10; [2004] SASC 406 …. 4.65 — v Kotzmann [1999] 2 VR 123 …. 2.84, 2.85, 2.86, 2.87, 4.56, 7.54 — v — (No 2) (2002) 128 A Crim R 479 …. 2.84 — v KRA [1999] 2 VR 708 …. 3.71 — v Krausz (1973) 57 Cr App R 466 …. 3.142, 3.143 — v Kuster (2008) 21 VR 407; [2008] VSCA 261 …. 4.85, 7.121 — v Kypri (2002) 5 VR 610 …. 4.33 — v Kyriacou [2000] SASC 312 …. 2.49 — v Kyu Hyuk Kim (1998) 104 A Crim R 233 …. 7.3

— v L, GA [2015] SASCFC 166 …. 6.58 — v LAH [2016] QCA 82 …. 4.7 — v Laing [2008] QCA 317 …. 4.63 — v Lal Khan (1981) 73 Cr App R 190 …. 2.42, 7.28 — v Lam (2001) 121 A Crim R 272 …. 4.64, 7.65, 7.95 — v — (Ruling No 6) [2005] VSC 280 …. 7.121 — v — (Ruling No 8) [2005] VSC 282 …. 7.121 — v — (Ruling No 9) [2005] VSC 283 …. 7.121 — v — (Ruling No 18) [2005] VSC 292 …. 2.88, 4.86 — v Lambert (2000) 111 A Crim R 564 …. 4.65 — v — [2001] UKHL 37; [2002] 2 AC 545; [2001] 2 Cr App R 511 …. 6.8, 6.14, 6.19, 6.21 — v Lancaster [1998] 4 VR 550 …. 8.156 — v Lancefield [1999] VSCA 176 …. 2.73 — v Landells [2000] VSCA 84 …. 2.87 — v Lander (1989) 52 SASR 424 …. 4.13, 4.89 — v Landmeter (2015) 121 SASR 522; [2015] SASCFC 3 …. 3.64, 7.99 — v Landon (2011) 109 SASR 216; [2011] SASCFC 12 …. 7.58, 7.59 — v Lane (1996) 66 FCR 144 …. 4.20 — v — (2011) 221 A Crim R 309; [2011] NSWCCA 157 …. 4.83 — v Langford [1990] Crim LR 653 …. 5.205 — v Lars (aka Larsson); Da Silva and Kalanderian (1994) 73 A Crim R 91 …. 2.40, 6.58 — v Larson and Lee [1984] VR 559 …. 8.146, 8.156 — v Latif and Shahzad [1996] 2 Cr App R 92 …. 4.53 — v Lau (1991) 6 WAR 30 …. 7.30, 7.35, 7.36 — v Laurie [1987] 2 Qd R 762 …. 7.58 — v Lavery (1978) 19 SASR 515 …. 8.147

— v — (2013) 116 SASR 242; [2013] SASCFC 46 …. 2.71 — v — (No 2) (1979) 20 SASR 430 …. 5.134, 7.155, 8.154 — v Law (2001) 122 A Crim R 542; [2001] NSWCCA 291 …. 5.123, 5.127 — v — (2008) 182 A Crim R 312; [2008] NTCCA 4 …. 5.12 — v Lawrence (1980) 32 ALR 72 …. 3.136 — v — [1980] 1 NSWLR 122 …. 6.8 — v — [2002] 2 Qd R 400; [2001] QCA 441 …. 3.140, 7.140 — v Lawson (1990) 90 Cr App R 107 …. 5.15 — v — [1996] 2 Qd R 587 …. 4.32 — v — [2000] NSWCCA 214 …. 7.69, 7.70 — v Laz [1998] 1 VR 453 …. 2.71 — v Le (2002) 54 NSWLR 474 …. 7.122, 7.123 — v — [2000] NSWCCA 49 …. 3.62, 7.79 — v — [2001] NSWSC 174 …. 2.26, 7.122 — v Le Blowitz [1998] 1 Qd R 303 …. 4.89 — v Le Broc (2000) 2 VR 43 …. 4.88 — v Leak [1969] SASR 172 …. 2.71 — v Lear [1998] 1 VR 285 …. 3.101 — v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133 …. 2.27, 2.29, 2.32, 2.34, 4.67, 8.126, 8.131, 8.134, 8.140 — v — (1989) 42 A Crim R 393 …. 7.68 — v — (2000) 50 NSWLR 289 …. 5.212 — v — [2005] VSC 167 …. 8.96 — v — (2007) 71 NSWLR 120; [2007] NSWCCA 71 …. 6.8 — v Leroy [1984] 2 NSWLR 441 …. 8.57 — v LeRoy and Graham [2000] NSWCCA 302 …. 4.69 — v Leslie [1989] 2 Qd R 378 …. 3.78 — v Lester (2008) 190 A Crim R 468; [2008] QCA 354 …. 8.29, 8.181

— v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; [1999] NSWCCA 287 …. 2.30, 4.57, 5.127 — v — [2012] NSWSC 1451 …. 8.147 — v Leung and Wong (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; [1999] NSWCCA 287 …. 7.40, 7.41, 7.56 — v Lewis (1998) 103 A Crim R 305 …. 3.115 — v — [2000] 1 VR 290 …. 8.155 — v Lewis-Hamilton [1998] 1 VR 630 …. 5.15 — v Leyland Justices; Ex parte Hawthorn [1979] QB 283 …. 5.15 — v LHH (2002) 132 A Crim R 498 …. 8.152 — v Li (2003) 140 A Crim R 288 …. 4.3, 4.42 — v — [1993] 2 VR 80 …. 8.133 — v — [2003] NSWCCA 407 …. 3.75 — v Liddy [2002] SASC 19 …. 3.44, 3.48 — v Lillyman [1896] 2 QB 167 …. 7.100, 7.104 — v Lindsay [1970] NZLR 1002 …. 8.57 — v — (1977) 18 SASR 103 …. 4.91, 4.92 — v — (2014) 119 SASR 320; [2014] SASCFC 56 …. 2.12 — v Linnane (1979) 32 SASR 72 …. 8.154 — v Liristis [2004] NSWCCA 287 …. 7.131 — v Lisoff [1999] NSWCCA 364 …. 2.26, 2.30, 2.31, 3.8 — v Lister [1981] 1 NSWLR 110 …. 6.54 — v Little (1976) 14 SASR 556 …. 2.40 — v Little (2013) 231 A Crim R 145; [2013] QCA 223 …. 7.33 — v — [2008] NSWDC 311 …. 2.29 — v Livingstone [1987] 1 Qd R 38 …. 3.140, 7.140 — v Lo Presti [1992] 1 VR 696 …. 6.58 — v Loader (2004) 89 SASR 204 …. 2.71, 4.86 — v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24; [2000] SASC 48 …. 2.29, 2.32, 2.36, 2.37,

5.262, 5.264 — v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 …. 2.27, 2.30, 3.31, 3.33, 3.34, 3.56, 3.57, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 8.66 — v Lockyer (1996) 89 A Crim R 457 …. 2.31, 3.61, 3.82 — v Lodhi (2006) 163 A Crim R 526 …. 8.101 — v Loguancio (2000) 1 VR 235 …. 2.85, 2.87, 3.74 — v Lomman (2014) 119 SASR 463; [2014] SASCFC 55 …. 7.30 — v Long and McDonnell (2002) 137 A Crim R 263; [2002] SASC 426 …. 3.11, 3.26, 3.33, 3.37, 3.42, 3.74, 4.27 — v Longford (1970) 17 FLR 37 …. 3.66 — v Lonie and Groom [1999] NSWCCA 319 …. 4.28, 4.30, 4.52 — v Loosely [2001] 4 All ER 897 …. 4.53 — v Lopatta (1983) 35 SASR 101 …. 3.136, 5.140 — v Louden (1995) 37 NSWLR 683 …. 8.118, 8.119 — v Lovett [1973] 1 All ER 744 …. 3.100, 3.109, 3.113, 3.119 — v Lowe (1997) 98 A Crim R 300 …. 4.34, 4.56 — v LRG [2006] VSCA 288 …. 2.83 — v LSS [2000] 1 Qd R 546 …. 3.34, 7.143 — v LTP [2004] NSWCCA 109 …. 7.107 — v Lucas [1973] VR 693 …. 6.49, 6.54 — v — [1981] 1 QB 720 …. 4.83, 4.87, 4.88 — v — [1992] 2 VR 109 …. 2.29, 7.43, 7.53 — v Luezkowski (1990) 54 SASR 169 …. 3.33 — v Luisi [1964] Crim LR 605 …. 4.84 — v Lumsden [2003] NSWCCA 83 …. 3.62, 7.137 — v Lunt (1987) 85 Cr App R 241 …. 3.44 — v Luttrell [2004] 2 Cr App R 31 …. 7.52 — v Lyndon (1987) 31 A Crim R 111 …. 7.35

— v Lyons (1889) 15 VLR 15 …. 2.44, 7.30 — v M (1993) 67 A Crim R 549 …. 3.147, 3.150 — v — (1994) 72 A Crim R 269 …. 3.136, 8.108 — v — (2002) 135 A Crim R 324 …. 8.155 — v M, RB [2007] SASC 207 …. 2.83, 2.87 — v Maarroui (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 757 …. 4.59 — v Mabbott [1990] WAR 323 …. 8.104 — v Macaskill (No 1) (2001) 81 SASR 152 …. 6.32 — v — (No 2) (2001) 81 SASR 155 …. 4.24, 4.77 — v Macecek [1960] Qd R 247 …. 3.132 — v MacFarlane [1993] 1 Qd R 202 …. 8.72 — v MacFie (No 2) (2004) 11 VR 215; [2004] VSCA 209 …. 4.27, 7.118 — v Madigan [2005] NSWCCA 170 …. 2.28, 2.30, 4.57, 7.40, 7.56 — v Madobi (1963) 6 FLR 1 …. 8.86 — v Maguire [1992] 2 WLR 767 …. 5.15 — v Mai (2000) 119 A Crim R 327; [2000] NSWCCA 517 …. 5.124, 5.127 — v Maiolo (No 2) (2013) 117 SASR 1; [2013] SASCFC 36 …. 3.64, 3.75, 4.51 — v Major and Lawrence [1998] 1 Qd R 317 …. 4.82, 4.84, 4.93 — v Makanjoula and E [1995] 2 Cr App R 469 …. 4.19 — v Maklouf [1999] NSWCCA 94 …. 4.70 — v Maladinovic (1992) 60 A Crim R 206 …. 7.16 — v Maleckas [1991] 1 VR 363 …. 2.82 — v Mandica (1980) 24 SASR 394 …. 3.136 — v Manh (1983) 33 SASR 563 …. 4.59, 4.63, 4.67 — v Mankotia [1998] NSWSC 295 …. 8.66, 8.197 — v Mann (1972) 56 Cr App R 750 …. 5.143 — v Manning (2014) 239 A Crim R 348; [2014] QCA 49 …. 3.65 — v Manser (1934) 25 Cr App R 18 …. 4.15

— v Mansfield [1977] 1 WLR 1102 …. 2.55 — v Manunta (1989) 54 SASR 17 …. 7.129, 7.131 — v Manwaring [1983] 2 NSWLR 82 …. 3.136, 7.104, 7.105 — v Maqsud Ali [1966] 1 QB 688 …. 8.59 — v Marijancevic (1993) 70 A Crim R 272 …. 4.57 — v Markovina (1996) 93 A Crim R 149 …. 8.170 — v — (1997) 19 WAR 119 …. 7.82 — v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82 …. 2.14 — v Marsh [2000] NSWCCA 370 …. 3.62, 3.74 — v — [2005] NSWCCA 331 …. 2.23, 7.40, 7.56 — v Marshall (2000) 113 A Crim R 190 …. 4.65 — v Martelli (1995) 83 A Crim R 550 …. 4.53, 5.258 — v Martin [1956] VLR 87 …. 4.65 — v — (1996) 65 SASR 590 …. 7.92 — v — [1992] 1 NZLR 313 …. 5.138 — v — (2002) 134 A Crim R 568 …. 8.78 — v — (2007) 99 SASR 213; [2007] SASC 336 …. 2.40, 6.8 — v — (No 2) (1997) 68 SASR 419 …. 7.88 — v — (No 4) (2000) 78 SASR 140 …. 6.47 — v MAS (2013) 118 SASR 160; [2013] SASCFC 122 …. 4.21 — v Maslen and Shaw (1995) 79 A Crim R 199 …. 7.137 — v Mason (1911) 7 Cr App R 67 …. 7.60, 7.67 — v — [1988] 1 WLR 139 …. 8.154 — v — (2000) 77 SASR 105 …. 5.205 — v Massey (1994) 62 SASR 481 …. 7.58 — v — [1997] 1 Qd R 404 …. 3.34, 4.85 — v — [2009] ACTCA 12 …. 4.70 — v — [2016] ACTSC 108 …. 5.205

— v Masters (1992) 26 NSWLR 450 …. 8.115, 8.118, 8.119 — v Mateiasevici [1999] 3 VR 185 …. 3.73 — v Mathers (1988) 38 A Crim R 423 …. 3.77 — v Matthews (1984) 36 SASR 503 …. 3.33 — v — (1990) 58 SASR 19 …. 8.29, 8.46 — v — [1999] 1 VR 534 …. 7.104 — v Matthews and Ford [1972] VR 3 …. 4.102, 7.15, 7.120 — v — [1973] VR 199 …. 5.185 — v Matthey (2007) 17 VR 222; [2007] VSC 398 …. 3.58 — v Maurangi (2001) 80 SASR 308 …. 3.78, 3.101 — v Mayfield (1995) 63 SASR 576 …. 3.71 — v Mazzolini [1999] 3 VR 113 …. 2.71, 4.49 — v Mazzone (1985) 43 SASR 330 …. 2.91, 7.7, 7.10 — v MBV (2013) 227 A Crim R 49; [2013] QCA 17 …. 4.86 — v MBX [2014] 1 Qd R 438; [2013] QCA 214 …. 4.46, 4.49, 4.78 — v MC [2009] VSCA 122 …. 4.88 — v McBride (1983) 34 SASR 433 …. 3.77 — v McCarthy (2015) 124 SASR 190 …. 2.38 — v McCarthy and Ryan (1993) 71 A Crim R 395 …. 4.66, 4.67 — v McClintock [2010] 1 Qd R 354; [2009] QCA 175 …. 2.13 — v McConnon [1951] SASR 22 …. 4.90 — v McCourt (1993) 69 A Crim R 151 …. 6.60 — v MCD [2014] QCA 326 …. 4.48 — v McDonald (1995) 84 A Crim R 508 …. 4.13, 4.21, 4.37, 4.41 — v — (2002) 128 A Crim R 228; [2002] ACTSC 39 …. 4.64, 4.69 — v — [2011] SASCFC 57 …. 2.73 — v McDonnell and Armstrong; Ex parte Attorney-General [1988] 2 Qd R 189 …. 5.164

— v McDowell [1997] 1 VR 473 …. 7.131 — v McFarlane [1992] 1 NZLR 495 …. 5.223 — v McFelin [1985] 2 NZLR 750 …. 7.112 — v McGillivray (1993) 97 Cr App R 232 …. 7.9 — v McGrane [2002] QCA 173 …. 8.181 — v McGregor [1984] 1 Qd R 256 …. 7.82 — v McHardie [1983] 2 NSWLR 733 …. 2.43, 4.56, 7.48 — v McInnes (1989) 90 Cr App R 99 …. 4.94, 4.95, 4.96 — v McIntyre (2000) 111 A Crim R 211 …. 2.49 — v — [2001] NSWSC 311 …. 7.43 — v McIvor (1883) 4 LR (NSW) 43 …. 7.11 — v McKellar [2000] NSWCCA 523 …. 4.70 — v McKenna (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 345 …. 8.96 — v McKenzie-McHarg (2008) 189 A Crim R 291; [2008] VSCA 206 …. 2.87, 3.74 — v McKeon (1986) 31 A Crim R 357 …. 4.86 — v McKnoulty (1995) 80 A Crim R 28 …. 3.31 — v McLachlan [1999] 2 VR 553 …. 4.25, 4.100, 7.120, 7.131 — v McLaughlan (2008) 218 FLR 158; [2008] ACTSC 49 …. 8.128, 8.129 — v McLean (1967) 52 Cr App R 80 …. 8.52 — v McLean and Funk; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 231 …. 4.3, 4.23, 5.110 — v McLellan [1974] VR 773 …. 5.156 — v Mcleod (1992) 61 A Crim R 465 …. 5.266 — v — [1995] 1 Cr App R 591 …. 3.109 — v McNamara [1987] VR 855 …. 5.138, 5.139, 5.140, 5.143 — v McNeil (No 1) (2007) 209 FLR 124 …. 8.129, 8.154 — v McNeill (2008) 184 A Crim R 467; [2008] FCAFC 80 …. 2.3

— v McNiven [2011] VSC 397 …. 8.129 — v McRae (1995) 80 A Crim R 380 …. 8.46 — v MDB [2005] NSWCCA 354 …. 7.93 — v MDR [2002] SASC 336 …. 8.168 — v Meade (2013) 233 A Crim R 40; [2013] VSC 250 …. 8.144, 8.147, 8.149, 8.168 — v Mearns [2005] NSWCCA 396 …. 3.36 — v Medina (1995) 84 A Crim R 316 …. 4.53, 5.258 — v Meier (1982) 30 SASR 126 …. 7.29 — v Meissner (1994) 76 A Crim R 81 …. 5.205 — v Melasecca (1994) 74 A Crim R 210 …. 5.223 — v Melrose [1989] 1 Qd R 572 …. 4.86 — v Mendoza [2007] VSCA 120 …. 4.65 — v Mercer (1993) 67 A Crim R 91 …. 4.83 — v Merlino [2004] NSWCCA 104 …. 2.85 — v Merrett, Piggott and Ferrari (2007) 14 VR 392 …. 6.8 — v Merritt [1999] NSWCCA 29 …. 2.85 — v Merritt and Roso (1985) 19 A Crim R 360 …. 8.149, 8.159 — v Middleton (2000) 114 A Crim R 141 …. 2.71 — v Midwinter (1971) 55 Cr App R 525 …. 4.19 — v Miladinovic (1992) 109 ACTR 11; 60 A Crim R 206 …. 4.57, 4.67, 8.61, 8.68 — v Milakovich [2004] NSWCCA 199 …. 7.123 — v Milat (1996) 87 A Crim R 446 …. 7.43 — v Miletic [1977] 1 VR 593 …. 7.107 — v — [1997] 1 VR 593 …. 4.46 — v Millar (1998) 103 A Crim R 526 …. 7.138, 7.142 — v Miller [1952] 2 All ER 667 …. 3.77, 3.78

— v — (1980) 25 SASR 170 …. 3.72 — v — (2008) 103 SASR 174; [2008] SASC 331 …. 6.8 — v Mills and Poole [1998] AC 382 …. 5.15 — v Minuzzo and Williams [1984] VR 417 …. 8.117, 8.118 — v Mirza [2004] 1 AC 1118; [2004] 1 All ER 925 …. 5.185 — v Mitchell (1892) 17 Cox CC 503 …. 7.125 — v — (2007) 174 A Crim R 52; [2007] QCA 267 …. 4.88, 4.93 — v MJJ; R v CJN (2013) 117 SASR 81 …. 2.87, 3.64 — v Mlaka [1971] VR 385 …. 4.15 — v MM (2000) 112 A Crim R 519 …. 2.71, 2.87, 3.57, 3.72, 3.74, 3.75 — v — [2014] NSWCCA 144 …. 3.54, 3.56, 3.75 — v MMJ (2006) 166 A Crim R 501; [2006] VSCA 226 …. 5.139 — v Moffat [2000] NSWCCA 174 …. 8.129 — v Mogg (2000) 112 A Crim R 417 …. 2.12, 3.140 — v Moghal (1977) 65 Cr App R 56 …. 8.47 — v Mohammadi (2011) 112 SASR 17; [2011] SASCFC 154 …. 6.58 — v Mokbel (2010) 249 FLR 169; [2010] VSCA 11 …. 2.43 — v — (2012) 222 A Crim R 377; [2012] VSC 86 …. 2.37 — v Molloy (2008) 102 SASR 452 …. 2.71 — v Moore (1972) 56 Cr App R 373 …. 8.131 — v — (1995) 77 A Crim R 577 …. 7.154 — v — [1999] 3 NZLR 385 …. 5.190 — v Moran and Mokbel [1999] 2 VR 87 …. 5.130 — v Morgan (1875) 14 Cox CC 337 …. 8.86 — v — [1978] 1 WLR 755 …. 4.38 — v — (1993) 30 NSWLR 543 …. 3.150 — v — [2009] VSCA 225 …. 7.16 — v Morris (1995) 78 A Crim R 465 …. 2.29

— v Morris; Ex parte AG [1996] 2 Qd R 68 …. 7.34 — v Morrisson [1999] 1 Qd R 397 …. 2.65 — v Morrow (2009) 26 VR 526; 213 A Crim R 530; [2009] VSCA 291 …. 2.13, 7.130, 7.131 — v Mostyn (2004) 145 A Crim R 304; [2004] NSWCCA 97 …. 3.31 — v Movis (1994) 75 A Crim R 416 …. 3.71 — v MRW (1999) 113 A Crim R 308 …. 7.102 — v Muller [1996] 1 Qd R 74 …. 4.38 — v — (2013) 273 FLR 215; [2013] ACTA 15 …. 7.30 — v Munce [2001] NSWSC 1072 …. 8.130, 8.134 — v Munday (No 1) [2016] VSC 26 …. 8.129 — v Mundine (2008) 182 A Crim R 302; [2008] NSWCCA 55 …. 4.68 — v Muniz [2016] QCA 210 …. 2.71 — v Murch and Logan (2014) 119 SASR 427; [2014] SASCFC 61 …. 2.28, 3.79 — v Murcott (2005) 31 WAR 198 …. 8.168 — v Murdoch (No 1) (2005) 195 FLR 362; [2005] NTSC 75 …. 4.65, 4.74 — v — (No 4) (2005) 195 FLR 421; [2005] NTSC 78 …. 4.56 — v Murphy (1985) 4 NSWLR 42 …. 3.107, 3.130, 3.136 — v — (1986) 5 NSWLR 18 …. 5.198 — v — (1995) 85 A Crim R 286 …. 4.66, 4.67 — v — (1996) 66 SASR 406 …. 5.134, 8.140, 8.149 — v — [2000] NSWCCA 297 …. 4.63 — v Murray (1982) 7 A Crim R 48 …. 7.146 — v — (1987) 11 NSWLR 12; 30 A Crim R 315 …. 2.71, 4.43, 4.44, 4.77 — v — (1999) 108 A Crim R 430 …. 2.71, 4.66 — v — [2016] QCA 342 …. 4.93 — v Mursic [1980] Qd R 482 …. 7.151 — v Murtagh and Kennedy (1955) 39 Cr App R 72 …. 2.69

— v Muscot (1713) 10 Mod Rep 192; 88 ER 689 …. 4.4 — v Musolino (2003) 86 SASR 37 …. 7.140, 7.149 — v Mustafa (1976) 65 Cr App R 26 …. 3.57 — v — (2005) 91 SASR 62 …. 7.104 — v Myers [1998] AC 124 …. 8.78 — v N Ltd [2009] 1 Cr App R 3 …. 2.51, 6.30 — v N, GF & N, SG [2010] SASC 7 …. 3.79 — v N, RC (2012) 112 SASR 399; [2012] SASCFC 37 …. 4.51 — v Nagawalli [2009] NTSC 25 …. 8.168 — v Naidinovici [1962] NZLR 334 …. 7.82 — v Namie [2011] QCA 304 …. 4.63 — v Narula (1985) 22 A Crim R 409 …. 8.159 — v Nassif [2004] NSWCCA 433 …. 3.59 — v Nation [1954] SASR 189 …. 4.52, 7.155 — v Naudi [1999] NSWCCA 259 …. 5.143, 5.144 — v Navorolli [2010] 1 Qd R 27; [2009] QCA 49 …. 4.83 — v Naylor [2013] 1 Qd R 368; [2012] QCA 116 …. 8.129 — v NE [2004] 2 Qd R 328; [2003] QCA 574 …. 2.49 — v Neal, Regos and Morgan [1947] ALR 616 …. 7.117, 7.121 — v Neilan [1992] 1 VR 57 …. 2.72 — v Nelson [2004] NSWCCA 231 …. 8.128 — v Ng (2002) 5 VR 257 …. 5.139, 8.149 — v Ngatikaura (2006) 161 A Crim R 329; [2006] NSWCCA 161 …. 3.26, 3.37, 3.56, 3.75 — v Ngo (2001) 122 A Crim R 467 …. 8.99 — v — (2003) 57 NSWLR 55; [2003] NSWCCA 82 …. 4.73, 7.3 — v Ngo and Le [2002] SASC 373 …. 3.37 — v Nguyen [1989] 2 Qd R 38 …. 7.119

— v — [1989] 2 Qd R 72 …. 7.125 — v — [1999] 1 VR 457 …. 8.47 — v — [2000] 1 Qd R 559 …. 2.45 — v — [2000] NSWCCA 285 …. 4.63 — v — [2002] NSWCCA 403 …. 2.25 — v — [2003] NSWSC 1068 …. 4.54 — v — [2008] ACTSC 40 …. 8.22, 8.33 — v — [2009] SASC 91 …. 8.187 — v — (2013) 117 SASR 432; [2013] SASCFC 91 …. 2.37 — v Nicholas [1988] Tas SR 155 …. 7.10 — v — [2000] 1 VR 356 …. 8.156 — v Nieterink (1999) 76 SASR 56; [1999] SASC 560 …. 2.87, 3.32, 3.34, 3.35, 3.38, 3.53, 3.64, 3.66, 3.73, 3.74 — v Ninnal (1992) 109 FLR 203 …. 8.152 — v NKS [2004] NSWCCA 144 …. 3.56 — v NM [2013] 1 Qd R 374; [2012] QCA 173 …. 7.99 — v Noakes (1986) 42 SASR 489 …. 8.154 — v Nobes (2001) 120 A Crim R 18 …. 6.56 — v Noll [1999] 3 VR 704 …. 7.43 — v Norfolk (2002) 129 A Crim R 288 …. 3.72, 3.109 — v Norton [1910] 2 KB 496 …. 5.138 — v Nottinghamshire Justices; Ex parte Bostock [1970] 1 WLR 1117 …. 5.104 — v Nowaz (1976) 63 Cr App R 178 …. 7.18 — v NRC (No 2) (2001) 124 A Crim R 580 …. 7.135 — v NZ (2005) 63 NSWLR 628; [2005] NSWCCA 278 …. 7.19, 7.21 — v O’Brien (1996) 66 SASR 396 …. 6.53, 6.54 — v OC [2015] NSWCCA 212 …. 1.53 — v O’Callaghan [1976] VR 676 …. 7.43, 7.47

— v O’Connor [2003] NSWCCA 335 …. 8.74 — v OGD (1997) 45 NSWLR 744 …. 5.127 — v — (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433; [2000] NSWCCA 404 …. 3.62, 3.73, 3.106, 3.127, 3.135 — v O’Keefe [2000] 1 Qd R 564 …. 2.87 — v Olasiuk (1973) 6 SASR 255 …. 6.58 — v Oliver [1944] KB 68 …. 6.19 — v Oliverio (1993) 61 SASR 354 …. 3.99 — v — (1994) 70 A Crim R 5 …. 2.49 — v Omar (1992) 58 A Crim R 139 …. 3.31, 4.57 — v Omarjee (1995) 79 A Crim R 355 …. 4.49 — v O’Meally [1952] VLR 499 …. 8.82, 8.83 — v — (No 2) [1964] Qd R 226 …. 3.57 — v O’Neill (1988) 48 SASR 51 …. 4.28, 4.30 — v — [1996] 2 Qd R 326 …. 4.33, 8.155 — v — [2001] VSCA 227 …. 7.16 — v Ong [2001] SASC 437 …. 2.71 — v — (2007) 176 A Crim R 366; [2007] VSCA 206 …. 4.57, 4.71 — v O’Reilly [1967] 2 QB 722 …. 4.19, 4.102 — v — (1975) 13 SASR 68 …. 3.66 — v Orgles [1993] 4 All ER 533 …. 5.185 — v Ortega-Farfan (2011) 215 A Crim R 251; [2011] QCA 364 …. 5.138 — v Orton [1922] VLR 496 …. 7.153 — v O’Sullivan and Mackie (1975) 13 SASR 68 …. 7.24, 3.136, 3.137 — v Osborne [1905] 1 KB 551 …. 7.100, 7.104 — v — [2009] VSCA 88 …. 2.87 — v Osbourne [1973] QB 678 …. 7.96 — v Ostojic (1978) 18 SASR 188 …. 8.133

— v Owen (1991) 56 SASR 397 …. 2.73 — v P (1991) 57 A Crim R 211 …. 2.40 — v — (2001) 53 NSWLR 664; [2001] NSWCA 473 …. 2.2, 5.69, 5.71 — v — [2008] 2 Cr App R 6 …. 6.33 — v PAB (2008) 1 Qd R 184 …. 3.34 — v Pachonick [1973] 2 NSWLR 86 …. 7.84, 7.85 — v Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191 …. 2.72, 4.19 — v Palaga (2001) 80 SASR 19 …. 3.37 — v Palazoff (1986) 43 SASR 99 …. 3.136 — v Palmer [1981] 1 NSWLR 209 …. 4.56, 4.63 — v Panagiotidis (1991) 55 SASR 172 …. 4.100 — v Pangallo (1989) 51 SASR 254 …. 8.50 — v Panozzo (2007) 178 A Crim R 323; [2007] VSCA 245 …. 4.93 — v Pantoja (1996) 88 A Crim R 554 …. 2.29, 2.87, 4.3, 7.43, 7.51, 7.53 — v Papamitrou (2004) 7 VR 375; [2004] VSCA 12 …. 3.71 — v Papoulias [1988] VR 858 …. 8.155 — v Paraskava (1983) 76 Cr App R 162 …. 5.15 — v Parenzee (2007) 101 SASR 456 …. 6.60, 7.51, 7.52 — v — [2007] SASC 143 …. 6.60, 7.51, 7.52 — v Parker (1990) 19 NSWLR 177 …. 8.133, 8.136 — v Parkes (1976) 64 Cr App R 25 …. 5.139 — v — (2003) 147 A Crim R 450; [2003] NSWCCA 12 …. 2.26, 7.122, 7.123 — v Parkinson [1990] 1 Qd R 382 …. 7.119 — v Parsons (2004) 145 A Crim R 519; [2004] VSCA 92 …. 4.25, 4.28 — v Parsons; R v Brady [2015] SASCFC 183 …. 2.71 — v Pascoe (2004) 90 SASR 505 …. 7.28 — v Patel (1981) 73 Cr App R 117 …. 8.26 — v Pateman [1984] 1 Qd R 312 …. 2.8

— v Pathare [1981] 1 NSWLR 124 …. 6.58 — v Patsalis and Spathis (No 4) [1999] NSWSC 715 …. 3.56, 3.57, 3.62 — v — (No 10) (1999) NSWSC 990 …. 7.122, 7.123 — v Patterson [1962] 2 QB 429 …. 6.22 — v Patton (1995) 80 A Crim R 595 …. 4.49 — v Paul [1920] 2 KB 183 …. 5.111 — v Payne [1950] 1 All ER 102 …. 4.23, 5.110 — v Peach [1990] 1 WLR 976 …. 4.4 — v Peake (1974) 9 SASR 458 …. 7.105 — v — (1996) 67 SASR 297 …. 2.87, 3.31, 3.33 — v Pearce [1999] 3 VR 287 …. 3.74 — v — [2001] NSWCCA 447 …. 8.149 — v Pektas [1989] VR 239 …. 8.120 — v Pelly (2015) 122 SASR 84; [2015] SASCFC 25 …. 6.55 — v Penny (1997) 91 A Crim R 288 …. 4.65, 4.67 — v Perara-Cathcart [2017] HCA 9 …. 2.12, 3.64 — v Percerep [1993] VR 109 …. 5.267, 8.157 — v Perrier (No 1) [1991] 1 VR 697 …. 3.109, 3.131, 3.132 — v Perry [1970] 2 NSWR 501 …. 4.25 — v — (No 2) (1981) 28 SASR 95 …. 8.11 — v — (No 3) (1981) 28 SASR 112 …. 8.184 — v — (No 4) (1981) 28 SASR 119 …. 8.184, 8.187 — v Peters and Heffernan (1996) 88 A Crim R 585 …. 4.53, 5.258 — v Petroulias (2006) 182 A Crim R 1; [2006] NSWSC 1422 …. 2.40, 2.45 — v Petroulias (No 22) (2007) 213 FLR 293; 176 A Crim R 309; [2007] NSWSC 692 …. 5.26, 5.68 — v Pettigrew (1980) 71 Cr App R 39 …. 7.12 — v PFD (2001) 124 A Crim R 418; [2001] VSCA 198 …. 2.12, 3.73

— v Pfennig (No 1) (1992) 57 SASR 507 …. 4.56, 5.139, 8.149 — v — (No 3) (1993) 60 SASR 271 …. 4.56 — v Pfitzner (1976) 15 SASR 170 …. 8.104 — v — (1996) 66 SASR 161 …. 8.128, 8.133, 8.136 — v Phair [1986] 1 Qd R 136 …. 7.155 — v Phan (1990) 54 SASR 561 …. 3.42 — v — (2001) 53 NSWLR 480; [2001] NSWCCA 29 …. 5.139, 8.131, 8.149 — v Phillips (1936) 26 Cr App R 17 …. 7.143 — v — [1997] 1 VR 558 …. 5.119 — v Phuong [2001] NSWSC 115 …. 2.37 — v Pidoto (2006) 14 VR 269; [2006] VSCA 185 …. 6.75 — v — [2009] VSCA 166 …. 2.87 — v Pieterson and Holloway [1995] 2 Cr App R 11 …. 8.57 — v Piller (1995) 86 A Crim R 249 …. 3.78 — v Pipe (1967) 51 Cr App R 17 …. 4.23, 5.110 — v Pisano [1997] 2 VR 342 …. 4.93 — v Pitman (1985) 38 SASR 566 …. 4.84, 4.85 — v Pitt (1967) 68 DLR (2d) 513 …. 7.76, 7.114 — v Pitts (No 1) [2012] NSWSC 1652 …. 8.126 — v PKS (NSWCCA, 1 October 1998, 9–10, unreported) …. 3.130 — v Place (2015) 124 SASR 467; [2015] SASCFC 163 …. 7.99 — v Playford [2013] 2 Qd R 567; [2013] QCA 109 …. 8.135 — v Plevac (1995) 84 A Crim R 570 …. 8.69 — v — [1999] NSWCCA 351 …. 2.87 — v PLK [1999] 3 VR 567 …. 2.71, 3.74 — v PLV (2001) 51 NSWLR 736 …. 7.112, 7.144 — v PMC (2004) 11 VR 175; [2004] VSCA 225 …. 5.190, 5.194, 7.143 — v Pohl (2014) 244 A Crim R 56; [2014] QSC 173 …. 2.37

— v Polkinghorne (1999) 108 A Crim R 189; [1999] NSWSC 704 …. 2.27, 8.197 — v Pollitt (1990) 51 A Crim R 227 …. 4.64 — v Portelli (2004) 10 VR 259 …. 3.140 — v Porter [2002] SASC 347 …. 8.154 — v — (2003) 85 SASR 581 …. 5.118, 5.123 — v Post and Georgee [1982] Qd R 495 …. 2.45, 3.84, 3.85, 8.164 — v Potts (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 340 …. 8.79, 8.197 — v — (No 4) [2016] ACTSC 370 …. 2.54 — v Power (1996) 87 A Crim R 407 …. 4.86, 4.93, 4.103 — v PP (2002) 135 A Crim R 575; [2002] VSC 523 …. 3.140 — v — [2002] VSC 530 …. 8.52 — v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161 …. 2.12, 2.51, 2.55, 6.31, 6.33, 6.35 — v — [2009] SASC 131 …. 7.131 — v Prater [1960] 2 QB 464 …. 4.26, 4.30, 4.76 — v Preston [1961] VR 761 …. 4.59 — v — (1997) NSWCCA (9 April 1997, unreported) …. 3.36 — v — (2013) 116 SASR 522; [2013] SASCFC 69 …. 4.57, 4.64 — v Pretorius [2010] 1 Qd R 67; [2009] QCA 58 …. 3.73 — v Preval [1984] 3 NSWLR 647 …. 4.87 — v Priest (2011) 246 FLR 341; [2011] ACTSC 18 …. 4.53 — v Priestley and Mason (1985) 19 A Crim R 388 …. 3.77 — v Pringle [2017] SASCFC 9 …. 3.64 — v Pritchard [1991] 1 VR 84 …. 8.168 — v Prosser (1993) 70 A Crim R 391 …. 2.50 — v PS [2004] QCA 347 …. 3.51 — v Punj (2002) 132 A Crim R 595; [2002] QCA 333 …. 2.71, 2.72 — v Quach (2002) 137 A Crim R 345; [2002] NSWCCA 519 …. 3.26, 3.56,

3.57, 3.62 — v Quesada (2001) 122 A Crim R 218 …. 7.58 — v Quinn and Bloom [1962] 2 QB 245 …. 7.23 — v R (1989) 18 NSWLR 74 …. 6.33 — v — (1991) 57 A Crim R 39 …. 6.33 — v R, GJ (2009) 105 SASR 506; [2009] SASC 371 …. 5.213 — v Radford (1993) 66 A Crim R 210 …. 2.46, 4.61, 8.56 — v Rae [2008] QCA 385 …. 3.38 — v RAG [2006] NSWCCA 343 …. 7.30 — v Rahme [2001] NSWCCA 414 …. 8.78, 8.131 — v Rajakaruna (No 2) (2006) 15 VR 592 …. 2.73 — v Randall [2004] 1 Cr App R 26 …. 3.77, 3.79 — v Randell [1999] TASSC 78 …. 3.32, 3.48 — v Ravindra [1997] 3 NZLR 242 …. 3.129 — v Rayner [1998] 4 VR 818 …. 4.88, 4.102 — v — [1998] VSC 263 …. 7.17 — v Reardon, Michaels and Taylor (2002) 186 FLR 1; [2002] NSWCCA 203 …. 4.27, 6.31, 7.122 — v Reci (1997) 70 SASR 78 …. 5.15, 5.52 — v Redd [1923] 1 KB 104 …. 3.108, 3.132 — v Redpath (1962) 46 Cr App R 319 …. 4.84 — v Reeves (1992) 29 NSWLR 109 …. 2.72, 5.143, 5.144 — v Reid [1989] Crim LR 719 …. 3.120 — v — (1999) NSWCCA 258 …. 8.167 — v Reiner (1974) 8 SASR 102 …. 7.68 — v Renzella [1997] 2 VR 88 …. 4.85, 4.88 — v Reynolds [1950] 1 KB 606 …. 2.42 — v Reynolds [2015] QCA 111 …. 4.37, 4.44, 8.106

— v RH [2005] 1 Qd R 180 …. 7.99 — v RHMcL [1999] 1 VR 746 …. 2.87, 3.34, 3.36 — v Rice [1963] 1 QB 857 …. 8.30 — v — [1996] 2 VR 406 …. 4.85, 4.88 — v Richards (2002) 128 A Crim R 204 …. 5.124 — v Richardson [1971] 2 QB 484 …. 7.84, 7.85 — v — [1989] 1 Qd R 583 …. 3.145, 3.147 — v Richardson and Longman [1969] 1 QB 299 …. 3.107, 3.137, 7.142, 8.84 — v Rickard (1918) 13 Cr App R 140 …. 7.56 — v Ridgeway [1983] 2 NSWLR 19 …. 4.19, 4.40, 7.101 — v — (1998) 71 SASR 73 …. 5.267 — v Rigney (1975) 12 SASR 30 …. 4.26, 4.29 — v — [2005] SASC 264 …. 3.31, 6.57 — v Riley (1887) 18 QBD 481 …. 3.142, 3.143 — v — (1979) 70 Cr App R 1 …. 4.102 — v Riscuta and Niga [2003] NSWCCA 6 …. 4.3, 4.57, 7.40, 7.56 — v Rivkin [2004] NSWCCA 7 …. 7.112 — v RJC (NSWCCA, 18 August 1998, unreported) …. 3.107, 3.136 — v Roads [1967] 2 QB 108 …. 5.185 — v Roba (2000) 110 A Crim R 245 …. 8.155, 8.156 — v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161 …. 7.52 — v Roberts [1936] 1 All ER 23 …. 3.121 — v — (2011) 111 SASR 100; [2011] SASCFC 117 …. 2.46 — v — (2004) 9 VR 295; [2004] VSCA 1 …. 5.166, 7.143 — v Robertson (1997) 91 A Crim R 388 …. 3.48, 3.49 — v — [1998] 4 VR 30 …. 4.49 — v — [2015] QCA 11 …. 8.66 — v Robertson; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 262 …. 7.99, 7.104,

7.106 — v Robinson [1994] 3 All ER 346; (1994) 98 Crim App R 370 …. 7.144, 7.158 — v — (1995) 80 A Crim R 358 …. 7.35 — v — (1996) 89 A Crim R 42 …. 8.156, 8.159 — v — [1999] NSWCCA 172 …. 3.136 — v Robson (1972) 56 Cr App R 450 …. 7.7 — v Rockford (2015) 122 SASR 391; [2015] SASCFC 51 …. 2.37 — v Rodley [1913] 3 KB 468 …. 3.29 — v Rodriguez (1997) 93 A Crim R 535 …. 2.71 — v Rogan (1916) 35 NZLR 265 …. 3.66 — v Rogers (1995) 1 Cr App R 374 …. 8.75, 8.76 — v — [1950] SASR 102 …. 8.86 — v Rogerson; R v McNamara (No 24) [2016] NSWSC 105 …. 7.79 — v Roissetter [1984] 1 Qd R 477 …. 2.46, 7.105 — v Rollason and Jenkins; Ex parte A-G [2008] 1 Qd R 85; [2007] QCA 65 …. 5.13 — v Romeo (1982) 30 SASR 243 …. 7.130, 8.30 — v Ronen (2004) 211 FLR 258; [2004] NSWSC 1283 …. 5.155 — v — (No 2) (2004) 211 FLR 268; [2004] NSWSC 1284 …. 5.177 — v — (No 4) (2004) 211 FLR 297; [2004] NSWSC 1290 …. 5.177 — v Rooke (CCA (NSW), 2 July 1997, unreported) …. 8.130 — v Rose (1993) 69 A Crim R 1 …. 7.9, 7.79 — v — (2002) 55 NSWLR 701; [2002] NSWCCA 455 …. 2.14, 3.75, 3.104, 3.108, 3.114, 3.115, 4.27, 7.56, 8.192 — v — (No 10) [2001] NSWSC 1060 …. 4.54 — v Rosemeyer [1985] VR 945 …. 4.98, 4.103 — v Roughan and Jones (2007) 179 A Crim R 389; [2007] QCA 443 …. 3.77, 3.78, 3.92

— v Roughley, Marshall and Heywood (1995) 78 A Crim R 160 …. 2.30, 7.53, 7.110 — v Router (1977) 14 ALR 365 …. 5.139 — v Rowe (1998) 71 SASR 389 …. 5.258 — v — (2001) 50 NSWLR 510 …. 8.168 — v Rowley (1986) 23 A Crim R 371 …. 2.40, 4.67, 4.73 — v Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520; 169 ER 1497 …. 3.106, 3.128, 3.129, 3.130, 3.132, 8.84 — v Royce-Bentley [1974] 1 WLR 535 …. 4.27 — v RR [2009] NTSC 44 …. 8.152 — v RTB [2002] NSWCCA 104 …. 2.24, 7.69 — v Rudd (1948) 32 Cr App R 138 …. 5.111 — v — (2009) 23 VR 444; [2009] VSCA 213 …. 8.106, 8.108 — v Runjanjic and Kontinnen (1991) 56 SASR 114 …. 7.43, 7.51, 7.53, 7.58, 7.136 — v Rusmanto (1997) 6 NTLR 68 …. 5.244 — v Russell (1968) 52 Cr App R 447 …. 4.26 — v — [1971] 1 QB 151 …. 3.121 — v — [1977] 2 NZLR 20 …. 4.74 — v Russo (2004) 11 VR 1 …. 2.71, 4.88 — v RW (2008) 18 VR 666; 184 A Crim R 388; [2008] VSCA 79 …. 4.46, 4.49 — v Ryan (1964) 50 Cr App R 144 …. 5.140 — v — (1984) 55 ALR 408 …. 8.114 — v — (2013) 33 NTLR 123; 234 A Crim R 299; [2013] NTSC 54 …. 8.69, 8.197 — v — (No 7) (2012) 218 A Crim R 384; [2012] NSWSC 1160 …. 7.21 — v S (1953) 53 SR(NSW) 460 …. 8.96 — v — [1995] 1 Qd R 558 …. 7.131

— v — (1991) 5 WAR 391 …. 2.87, 3.36 — v — (1998) 103 A Crim R 101 …. 3.73, 7.143 — v — (2000) 113 A Crim R 429 …. 2.30 — v — [2001] QCA 501 …. 3.44, 3.71 — v — (2002) 129 A Crim R 339 …. 7.105 — v — (2002) 132 A Crim R 326 …. 8.106 — v S and J (1983) 32 SASR 174 …. 8.152 — v S, G (2011) 109 SASR 491; [2011] SASCFC 48 …. 1.44, 2.90 — v S, PC (2008) 189 A Crim R 446; [2008] SASC 285 …. 3.28 — v SAB (2008) 20 VR 55; [2008] VSCA 150 …. 2.71 — v Sadaraka [1981] 2 NSWLR 459 …. 5.140, 5.144 — v Sadler (2008) 20 VR 69; [2008] VSCA 198 …. 2.87, 3.38, 3.73 — v Sahin (2000) 115 A Crim R 413 …. 2.37 — v Sailor [1994] 2 Qd R 342 …. 7.105 — v Salahattin [1983] 1 VR 521 …. 5.139 — v Salama [1999] NSWCCA 105 …. 4.27 — v Salameh (1985) 4 NSWLR 369 …. 7.9 — v Saleam (1989) 16 NSWLR 14; 41 A Crim R 108 …. 5.12, 7.155 — v Salerno [1973] VR 59 …. 2.87, 3.25, 4.73 — v Saloman [2006] QCA 244 …. 3.136 — v Saltan [2002] NSWCCA 423 …. 4.105 — v Sam (No 14) [2009] NSWSC 561 …. 7.19 — v Sandford (1994) 33 NSWLR 172 …. 5.13 — v Sang [1980] AC 402 …. 4.53 — v Saragozza [1984] VR 187 …. 7.105 — v Saraya (1994) 70 A Crim R 515 …. 7.35 — v Sargent (2001) 80 SASR 184 …. 5.130 — v Saric [1982] Qd R 360 …. 3.102

— v Sartori [1961] Crim LR 397 …. 2.91 — v Saunders [1965] Qd R 409 …. 7.103, 7.104, 7.105 — v Savage [1970] Tas SR 137 …. 8.86 — v Savory (1942) 29 Cr App R 1 …. 3.132 — v Savvas (1991) 55 A Crim R 241 …. 4.32 — v Savvas Stevens and Peisley (1989) 43 A Crim R 331 …. 5.254 — v Sawyer-Thompson (Ruling No 1) [2016] VSC 316 …. 5.42 — v SBB (2007) 175 A Crim R 449; [2007] QCA 173 …. 4.88 — v Scarrott [1978] QB 1016 …. 3.44 — v SCD [2013] QCA 352 …. 8.106 — v Schaeffer (2005) 13 VR 337; [2005] VSCA 306 …. 4.33, 8.142 — v Schafferius [1977] Qd R 213 …. 7.68 — v Schiavini (1999) 108 A Crim R 161 …. 8.168 — v Schlaefer (1984) 37 SASR 207 …. 4.19, 4.28, 4.38, 4.84, 4.85 — v — (1992) 57 SASR 423 …. 2.42, 2.44, 7.28, 7.30 — v Schneidas (No 2) (1981) 4 A Crim R 101 …. 7.130 — v Schuller [1972] QWN 94 …. 3.84, 3.123, 7.124 — v Schuurs [1999] QSC 176 …. 2.29 — v Schwarz [1923] SASR 347 …. 8.76 — v Sciberras [2003] SASC 104 …. 3.34, 3.73 — v SCO & SCP [2016] QCA 248 …. 2.87, 3.38 — v Scopelliti (1981) 34 OR (2d) 524 …. 3.140 — v Scott (1996) 137 ALR 347 …. 2.49 — v Sean Lydon (1987) 85 Cr App R 221 …. 8.30 — v Sehan (Yousry) (1914) 11 Cr App R 13 …. 7.153 — v Seidkofsky [1989] 1 Qd R 655 …. 7.119 — v Seigley (1911) 6 Cr App R 106 …. 6.53 — v Seivers [2004] NSWCCA 462 …. 2.25

— v Sekrst [2016] SASCFC 127 …. 4.88 — v Seller, R v McCarthy (No 3) [2014] NSWSC 1290 …. 2.29 — v Semyraha [2001] 2 Qd R 208; [2000] QCA 303 …. 3.84, 3.85 — v Semyraha [2001] 2 Qd R 208; [2000] QCA 303 …. 8.163, 8.164 — v Serrano (No 5) (2007) 16 VR 360 …. 2.43 — v Serratore (1999) 48 NSWLR 101; [1999] NSWCCA 377 …. 8.29, 8.66 — v — [2001] NSWCCA 123 …. 3.31, 3.62 — v SG (2011) 250 FLR 337; [2011] NTSC 44 …. 7.34 — v SH [2011] ACTSC 198 …. 7.122, 7.123 — v Shalala (2007) 17 VR 133 …. 2.46 — v Shamouil (2006) 66 NSWLR 228 …. 2.19, 2.31 — v Shannon (1987) 47 SASR 347 …. 4.64, 4.67 — v Sharp (1983) 33 SASR 366 …. 8.154, 8.162 — v — [1988] 1 WLR 7 …. 8.108 — v — (2003) 143 A Crim R 344; [2003] NSWSC 1117 …. 5.28 — v Shaw (1991) 57 A Crim R 425 …. 6.54 — v — (1995) 78 A Crim R 150 …. 7.117 — v Shea (1978) 18 SASR 591 …. 7.82 — v Sheehan (1999) 153 FLR 326 …. 6.22 — v Sheehy [2005] 1 Qd R 418 …. 2.40 — v Sherrin (No 2) (1979) 21 SASR 250 …. 4.28, 4.40, 4.87, 4.102, 4.103 — v Shone (1983) 76 Cr App R 76 …. 8.26 — v Sica (2012) 224 A Crim R 146; [2012] QSC 5 …. 8.133 — v — (2013) 232 A Crim R 572; [2013] QCA 247 …. 8.135, 7.51 — v — [2014] 2 Qd R 168; (2013) 232 A Crim R 572; [2013] QCA 247 …. 2.7, 4.56 — v Sievers (2004) 151 A Crim R 426 …. 4.93 — v Silverlock [1894] 2 QB 766 …. 7.43

— v Simmons (1997) 68 SASR 81; 93 A Crim R 32 …. 2.44, 7.28 — v — (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 189 …. 8.142, 8.154 — v Sims [1946] KB 531 …. 2.38, 3.66 — v Singh (1977) 15 SASR 591 …. 7.79 — v Singleton (1994) 72 A Crim R 117 …. 7.51 — v Sitek [1988] 2 Qd R 284 …. 7.16, 7.76 — v SJB (2002) 129 A Crim R 572 …. 4.48 — v SJC [2015] QCA 123 …. 8.66 — v SJRC [2007] NSWCCA 142 …. 2.26, 2.31 — v Skaf (2004) 60 NSWLR 86; [2004] NSWCCA 37 …. 5.185, 7.23 — v Skaf, Ghanem and Hajeid [2004] NSWCCA 74 …. 3.108, 4.67 — v Sleiman [2003] NSWCCA 231 …. 8.89 — v Small (1994) 33 NSWLR 575 …. 4.32, 4.34, 4.87, 4.102 — v Smart [1983] 1 VR 265 …. 8.189 — v Smith (1915) 11 Cr App R 229 …. 3.13 — v — [1964] NSWR 537 …. 8.109 — v — [1981] 1 NSWLR 193 …. 8.95 — v — (1983) 33 SASR 558 …. 4.56 — v — [1984] 1 NSWLR 462 …. 7.96 — v — [1987] VR 907 …. 2.28, 7.55, 7.58, 7.136, 7.146 — v — (1990) 51 A Crim R 434 …. 8.118 — v — (1992) 58 SASR 491 …. 8.128, 8.133 — v — (1996) 86 A Crim R 398 …. 5.267, 8.138, 8.157 — v — (1998) 71 SASR 543 …. 5.123 — v — (1999) 47 NSWLR 419; [1999] NSWCCA 317 …. 4.63, 7.38 — v — (2000) 116 A Crim R 1 …. 2.28 — v — [2005] 2 All ER 29; [2005] 1 WLR 704 …. 5.185 — v — [2015] 2 Qd R 452; [2014] QCA 277 …. 2.13

— v Smith and Turner (No 2) (1995) 64 SASR 1 …. 3.33, 3.73 — v SMS [1992] Crim LR 310 …. 3.151 — v Solomon (2005) 92 SASR 331; [2005] SASC 265 …. 4.56, 7.56 — v Solomon and Thumbler (1958) 25 WWR 307 …. 7.125 — v Soma (2001) 22 A Crim R 537 …. 7.151 — v — (2003) 212 CLR 299 …. 2.8, 2.9, 2.49, 7.128, 7.151 — v Sonnet (No 2) (2011) 220 A Crim R 199; [2011] VSC 551 …. 2.35 — v Sood [2007] NSWCCA 214 …. 2.31 — v — (Ruling No 3) [2006] NSWSC 762 …. 7.122 — v Sopher (1993) 74 A Crim R 21 …. 7.43, 7.51, 7.53 — v Sorby [1986] VR 753 …. 2.82, 4.100, 4.102 — v Soteriou (2013) 118 SASR 119; [2013] SASCFC 114 …. 3.37, 3.64 — v Sotheren [2001] NSWSC 204 …. 2.37 — v Souleyman (1996) 40 NSWLR 712 …. 7.122, 7.123 — v — (SC (NSW), 5 September 1996, unreported) …. 7.112 — v Southammavong; — v Sihavong [2003] NSWCCA 312 …. 2.72 — v Sparkes (1996) 88 A Crim R 194 …. 4.56, 4.74, 7.53, 7.95, 7.110 — v Sparks (2014) 121 SASR 132; [2014] SASCFC 122 …. 3.146 — v Sparrow (2009) 104 SASR 120 …. 4.65 — v Spencer (1985) 80 Cr App R 264 …. 7.35 — v — [1987] AC 128 …. 4.19, 4.46, 4.76 — v — (2000) 113 A Crim R 252 …. 8.142, 8.152 — v Spero (2006) 13 VR 225; 161 A Crim R 13; [2006] VSCA 58 …. 4.63, 4.71 — v Spinks (1981) 74 Cr App R 263 …. 8.109 — v Spiteri [2004] NSWCCA 321 …. 7.133 — v Spurge [1961] 2 QB 205 …. 6.19 — v ST (1997) 92 A Crim R 390 …. 4.87

— v Stackelroth (1996) 86 A Crim R 438 …. 7.125, 8.61 — v Stafford (1976) 12 SASR 501 …. 8.149, 8.156 — v — (1976) 13 SASR 392 …. 5.139, 8.146 — v — [2009] QCA 407 …. 8.104 — v Stalder [1981] 2 NSWLR 9 …. 3.106, 3.130, 3.131, 3.135 — v Stanbouli (2003) 141 A Crim R 531; [2003] NSWCCA 355 …. 6.75 — v Stanley [2004] NSWCCA 278 …. 4.64 — v — [2015] 1 Qd R 118; [2014] QCA 116 …. 2.14 — v Stannard (1962) 48 Cr App R 81 …. 4.76 — v Starecki [1960] VR 141 …. 8.133, 8.136 — v Starr [1969] QWN 23 …. 5.139, 7.103 — v Starrett (2002) 82 SASR 115 …. 4.12, 4.21, 7.30, 7.31 — v Stead (1992) 62 A Crim R 40 …. 4.53 — v Stephenson [1976] VR 376 …. 2.21, 2.28 — v — (1978) 18 SASR 381 …. 4.91, 4.92, 4.93 — v Stergiou (2004) 147 A Crim R 120; [2004] WASC 172 …. 3.146, 3.147, 3.149 — v Sterling; R v McCook [2014] NSWDC 199 …. 7.41, 7.56 — v Stevenson (2000) 23 WAR 92 …. 7.30, 7.31 — v Stewart [1993] 2 Qd R 322 …. 4.104 — v — (2001) 52 NSWLR 301 …. 4.9, 4.23, 4.105, 7.107 — v Stiles (1990) 50 A Crim R 13 …. 8.136 — v Stockwell (1993) 97 Cr App R 260 …. 4.56, 7.52 — v Storey (1978) 140 CLR 364 …. 3.92, 5.190 — v — [1998] 1 VR 359 …. 2.65 — v Story (2004) 144 A Crim R 370; [2004] SASC 32 …. 4.64 — v Stott (2000) 116 A Crim R 15 …. 4.56, 4.64 — v — (2011) 111 SASR 346; [2011] SASCFC 145 …. 6.32

— v Stoupas [1998] 3 VR 645 …. 7.100 — v Straffen [1952] 2 QB 911 …. 3.17, 3.24, 3.25, 3.26, 3.40, 3.42, 3.44, 3.58, 3.62 — v Strausz (1977) 17 SASR 197 …. 5.138, 8.101 — v Stronach [1988] Crim LR 48 …. 3.108 — v Strudwick and Merry (1994) 99 Cr App R 326 …. 7.59 — v Stuart [1959] SASR 144 …. 5.114 — v Su (1995) 129 FLR 120 …. 3.79, 5.118, 6.55, 8.99, 8.115 — v — [1997] 1 VR 1 …. 8.106 — v Suarwata [2008] ACTSC 140 …. 7.30 — v Suckling [1999] NSWCCA 36 …. 2.36, 8.144 — v Sukkar [2005] NSWCCA 54 …. 3.26, 8.119 — v Sullivan [1923] 1 KB 47 …. 6.53 — v — (1966) 51 Cr App R 102 …. 5.140 — v — [2003] NSWCCA 100 …. 4.23 — v Summers [1990] 1 Qd R 92 …. 2.72 — v Sumner; R v Fitzgerald (2013) 117 SASR 271; [2013] SASCFC 82 …. 8.41 — v Sumpton [2014] NSWSC 1432 …. 8.144, 8.154 — v Surrey [2005] 2 Qd R 81; [2005] QCA 4 …. 5.124 — v Surujpaul [1958] 1 WLR 1050 …. 8.103 — v Suteski (2002) 56 NSWLR 182; [2002] NSWCCA 509 …. 2.32, 8.75, 8.79, 8.82, 8.194 — v — (No 4) [2002] NSWSC 218 …. 2.31, 8.82 — v Sutton [1986] 2 Qd R 72 …. 2.55 — v — (1986) 5 NSWLR 697 …. 4.87 — v — (l990) 159 LSJS 96 …. 7.96 — v — (1992) 94 Cr App R 70 …. 7.79, 7.121 — v — (No 2) (1983) 32 SASR 553 …. 3.8

— v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159; 151 ALR 98 …. 2.26, 2.29, 2.31, 2.32, 2.33, 2.34, 2.36, 2.37, 4.33, 5.139, 5.259, 5.260, 5.267, 8.121, 8.123, 8.124, 8.125, 8.128, 8.134, 8.139, 8.142, 8.143, 8.144, 8.146, 8.149, 8.155, 8.156, 8.158 — v SWC (2007) 175 A Crim R 71; [2007] VSCA 201 …. 2.71 — v Swift (1999) 105 A Crim R 279 …. 4.53 — v Syed [2008] NSWCCA 37 …. 7.158 — v Symonds [2002] 2 Qd R 70 …. 3.115 — v Szabo [2000] NSWCCA 226 …. 3.136 — v Szach (1980) 23 SASR 504 …. 7.155, 8.42, 8.78, 8.154 — v T (1998) 71 SASR 265 …. 2.42, 7.28, 7.30 — v — (1999) 74 SASR 486 …. 4.49 — v — [2001] NSWCCA 210 …. 8.150 — v — [2010] EWCA Crim 2439 …. 7.71 — v T and M; Ex parte Attorney-General [1999] 2 Qd R 424 …. 8.150, 8.155 — v T, T (2004) 90 SASR 567 …. 5.202 — v T, WA (2013) 118 SASR 382; (2014) 238 A Crim R 205; [2014] SASCFC 3 …. 4.51, 6.58, 7.124 — v TA [2003] NSWCCA 191 …. 2.23 — v TAB [2002] NSWCCA 274 …. 2.87, 3.36, 3.54, 3.56, 3.74, 3.130 — v Tahere [1999] NSWCCA 170 …. 4.69 — v Taka [1992] 2 NZLR 129 …. 5.185 — v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; [2006] NSWCCA 167 …. 2.30, 4.3, 4.56, 6.58, 7.24, 7.40, 7.43, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56 — v Tang, Dang and Quach [1998] 3 VR 508 …. 8.156 — v Tanner (2006) 96 SASR 70; [2006] SASC 320 …. 2.8 — v Taouk [2005] NSWCCA 155 …. 4.33, 8.97, 8.99 — v Taousanis [2001] NSWSC 74 …. 4.67 — v Taranto; R v Freeman [1999] NSWCCA 396 …. 4.9

— v Tartaglia (2011) 110 SASR 378 …. 2.83 — v Tastan (1994) 75 A Crim R 498 …. 5.5 — v Taufahema (2007) 228 CLR 232; [2007] HCA 11 …. 2.49 — v Taylor [1999] ACTSC 47 …. 8.130, 8.149 — v — [2003] NSWCCA 194 …. 2.28 — v — (2004) 8 VR 213; [2004] VSCA 98 …. 3.74, 4.86, 4.93 — v — (No 2) (2008) 18 VR 613; 184 A Crim R 77 …. 4.49 — v — [2008] ACTSC 52 …. 4.65 — v Te [1998] 3 VR 566 …. 4.53 — v Tedesco [2003] SASC 79 …. 3.34, 3.73 — v Teitler [1959] VR 321 …. 4.17, 4.18, 4.26 — v Telfer [2004] NSWCCA 27 …. 3.134 — v Telford (1996) 86 A Crim R 427 …. 7.24 — v Templeton [2004] QCA 338 …. 7.43 — v The Stipendiary Magistrate at Southport; Ex parte Gibson [1993] 2 Qd R 687 …. 5.205 — v Theophanous (2003) 141 A Crim R 216; [2003] VSCA 78 …. 5.199 — v Theos (1996) 89 A Crim R 486 …. 4.56 — v Thomas (1959) 43 Cr App R 210 …. 4.28, 4.103 — v — (1989) 40 A Crim R 89 …. 4.24 — v Thomas [1970] VR 674 …. 5.139, 8.101 — v Thomason (1999) 139 ACTR 21 …. 4.64, 4.67, 4.69 — v Thompson [1951] SASR 135 …. 3.142 — v — [1962] 1 All ER 65 …. 5.185 — v — [1966] QWN 47 …. 3.136 — v — [1982] QB 647 …. 8.61 — v — (1992) 57 SASR 397 …. 3.73, 4.93, 4.97 — v — (2008) 21 VR 135; [2008] VSCA 144 …. 7.130, 7.131

— v Thomson [1912] 3 KB 19 …. 8.47 — v Thornley [1998] 3 VR 888 …. 3.73 — v Thornton (1980) 3 A Crim R 80 …. 5.118 — v Thynne [1977] VR 98 …. 7.81, 7.117, 7.119, 7.121, 7.151 — v Tichowitsch [2007] 2 Qd R 462 …. 4.45, 7.21 — v Tikos (No 2) [1963] VR 306 …. 2.12 — v Tilley [1985] VR 505 …. 7.43 — v Tillott (1995) 38 NSWLR 1 …. 7.53, 7.110, 7.111 — v Tissington (1843) 1 Cox CC 48 …. 3.143 — v TJB [1998] 4 VR 621 …. 3.71, 3.73 — v TJF (2001) 120 A Crim R 209 …. 7.102, 8.129, 8.130 — v To (2002) 131 A Crim R 264; [2002] NSWCCA 247 …. 4.65, 4.69, 7.43 — v To and Tran (2006) 96 SASR 1 …. 8.149 — v Tofilau (No 2) (2006) 13 VR 28; [2006] VSCA 40 …. 3.73 — v Toki (2000) 116 A Crim R 536 …. 8.66 — v — (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536; [2000] NSWSC 999 …. 2.31, 2.87, 3.57, 3.62 — v Tompkins (1977) 67 Cr App R 181 …. 5.61 — v Toumer (1991) 56 A Crim R 221 …. 8.166 — v TP; R v SBA [2007] QCA 169 …. 3.79 — v Tracey (2005) 93 SASR 101 …. 8.133 — v Tran (1990) 50 A Crim R 233 …. 2.29, 7.40, 7.43 — v — [2000] 2 Qd R 430 …. 4.63 — v — (2007) 214 FLR 21 …. 2.85 — v Tran & Tran [2009] SASC 327 …. 4.77, 4.100 — v Tran and To (2006) 96 SASR 8 …. 3.78, 5.120 — v Tran and Tran (2011) 109 SASR 595; [2011] SASCFC 51 …. 2.71 — v Trigg [1963] 1 WLR 305 …. 4.19

— v Trimboli (1979) 21 SASR 577 …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.136 — v Tripodi [1961] VR 186 …. 4.87 — v — (1961) 104 CLR 1 …. 4.98, 8.101, 8.114, 8.115, 8.116, 8.117 — v — [2002] SASC 420 …. 8.168 — v Tripodina & Morabito (1988) 35 A Crim R 183 …. 2.49 — v Trochym [2007] 1 SCR 239 …. 7.52, 7.113 — v Tropeano (2015) 122 SASR 298; [2015] SASCFC 29 …. 7.17, 7.24 — v Trotter [1977] Tas SR 133 …. 7.149 — v — (1992) 58 SASR 223; 60 A Crim R 1 …. 8.147, 8.149 — v Truong (1996) 86 A Crim R 188 …. 8.129, 8.131, 8.155, 8.158 — v TSR (2002) 5 VR 627; [2002] VSCA 87 …. 2.9, 5.15 — v Tugaga (1994) 74 A Crim R 190 …. 2.30, 4.3, 4.23, 4.64, 4.67 — v Turnbull [1977] QB 224 …. 4.62, 4.63, 4.73 — v Turnbull and Davidson (1985) 17 A Crim R 370 …. 4.28, 4.101 — v Turner (1816) 5 M & S 206; 105 ER 1026 …. 6.19 — v — (1944) KB 463 …. 3.111 — v — (1975) 61 Cr App R 67 …. 4.23 — v — [1975] QB 834; (1974) 60 Cr App R 80 …. 7.55, 7.58, 7.68, 7.136 — v — (2000) 76 SASR 163 …. 4.56, 4.71, 4.74, 7.96 — v — (No 13) [2001] TASSC 104 …. 8.96, 8.99 — v Turney (1990) 52 SASR 438 …. 3.28 — v Turnsek [1967] VR 610 …. 4.102 — v Tyler [1994] 1 Qd R 675 …. 4.30, 4.52 — v TZ (2011) 214 A Crim R 316; [2011] QCA 305 …. 3.107 — v UC [2008] QCA 194 …. 2.87, 3.38 — v Uittenbusch (2012) 219 A Crim R 562; [2012] QSC 89 …. 8.66, 8.197 — v Uljee [1982] 1 NZLR 561 …. 5.28, 5.61 — v Ulman-Naruniec [2001] SASC 317 …. 4.88

— v Umanski [1961] VR 242 …. 7.143, 7.149 — v Ung (2000) 173 ALR 287 …. 8.47 — v Upton (2007) 209 FLR 487 …. 4.53 — v Usher (2014) 119 SASR 22; [2014] SASCFC 32 …. 7.99 — v V (1998) 100 A Crim R 488 …. 2.9, 2.71, 7.140 — v Vale (2001) 120 A Crim R 322; [2001] WASCA 21 …. 2.37, 8.155 — v Van Beelen (1972) 6 SASR 534 …. 7.9, 7.79 — v — (1973) 4 SASR 353 …. 2.66, 2.75, 2.76, 2.77, 2.78, 2.79, 2.80, 2.81, 2.83, 7.43, 7.65, 7.135 — v — (1974) 9 SASR 163 …. 8.74, 8.77 — v — (2016) 125 SASR 253; [2016] SASCFC 71 …. 2.14, 2.75, 2.77, 2.78, 2.79, 2.80, 2.83, 5.192 — v Van Der Zyden [2012] 2 Qd R 568; [2012] QCA 89 …. 2.49, 2.71 — v Van Dyk [2000] NSWCCA 67 …. 3.134, 7.41 — v Varley (1982) 75 Cr App R 242 …. 3.122 — v Vaughan (1997) 98 A Crim R 239 …. 5.124 — v Velevski (No 2) (1997) 93 A Crim R 420 …. 7.122 — v Vella (2006) 14 VR 592 …. 7.82 — v Veneman [1970] SASR 506 …. 8.96 — v Venn-Brown [1991] 1 Qd R 458 …. 8.155 — v Verolla [1963] 1 KB 285 …. 5.200 — v Versac (2013) 227 A Crim R 569; [2013] QSC 46 …. 2.37 — v Vidic (1986) 43 SASR 176 …. 8.72 — v Villar; R v Zugecic [2004] NSWCCA 302 …. 5.120 — v Vincec (1990) 50 A Crim R 203 …. 4.62 — v Visser [1983] 3 NSWLR 240 …. 2.46 — v — (2000) 9 Tas R 285 …. 5.130, 5.131 — v Vlies [2016] QCA 276 …. 7.99

— v VN (2006) 15 VR 113; [2006] VSCA 111 …. 3.6, 3.36, 3.74, 4.88 — v Vollmer [1996] 1 VR 95 …. 3.33, 8.148, 8.154, 8.168 — v Von Einem (1985) 38 SASR 207 …. 3.28, 3.140, 8.43 — v Vonarx [1999] 3 VR 618 …. 2.87, 3.32, 3.34, 3.36, 3.73 — v Vu [2005] NSWCCA 266 …. 4.27 — v Vuckov (1986) 40 SASR 498 …. 2.45, 3.84, 3.85, 3.91, 3.98, 8.155, 8.162, 8.164 — v Vye (1993) 97 Cr App R 134 …. 3.136, 3.138 — v W [1996] Qd R 573 …. 7.105 — v W, GC (2006) 96 SASR 301; [2006] SASC 376 …. 5.213 — v W, PK [2016] SASCFC 5 …. 4.51 — v WAF and SBN [2010] 1 Qd R 370; [2009] QCA 144 …. 2.7 — v Wainwright (1875) 13 Cox CC 171 …. 8.47 — v — (1925) 19 Cr App R 52 …. 4.74 — v Walbank [1996] 1 Qd R 78 …. 8.161 — v Walden (1986) 41 SASR 421 …. 5.13 — v Waldman (1934) 24 Cr App R 204 …. 3.132, 3.132 — v Walker (1993) 61 SASR 260 …. 7.9, 7.149, 7.152 — v Wallace (2008) 100 SASR 119; [2008] SASC 47 …. 3.51 — v Wang [2007] VSCA 296 …. 7.107 — v Wanganeen (1988) 50 SASR 433 …. 5.121 — v — (2006) 95 SASR 226; [2006] SASC 254 …. 4.77 — v Wannan (2006) 94 SASR 521 …. 3.142, 3.147, 7.104 — v Warast (1991) 54 A Crim R 351 …. 3.136 — v Ward (1981) 3 A Crim R 171 …. 5.60, 7.68 — v — (1993) 96 Cr App R 1; [1993] 1 WLR 619 …. 5.15, 7.59 — v Ware (1994) 73 A Crim R 17 …. 4.24 — v Warner (1988) 49 SASR 125 …. 8.149

— v Warrell [1993] 1 VR 671 …. 8.133, 8.152, 8.153 — v Warren (1994) 72 A Crim R 74 …. 4.13, 7.35 — v Warsap (2010) 106 SASR 264 …. 4.37 — v Waters [2002] ACTSC 13 …. 8.130 — v Watkins (1989) 50 SASR 467 …. 8.148 — v — (2005) 153 A Crim R 434; [2005] NSWCCA 164 …. 3.54, 3.62 — v Watson (1817) 2 Stark 116; 171 ER 591 …. 7.17 — v — [1987] 1 Qd R 440 …. 7.58 — v Watts [1983] 3 All ER 101 …. 3.109 — v — [1992] 1 Qd R 214 …. 7.16 — v WB (2009) 23 VR 319 …. 7.111 — v Weatherstone (1968) 12 FLR 14 …. 7.82, 7.93, 7.152, 7.154 — v Webb (1974) Crim LR 159 …. 7.86 — v Wedd (2000) 115 A Crim R 205 …. 2.88, 3.130, 3.136 — v Weetra (1993) 93 NTR 8 …. 8.153 — v — (2010) 108 SASR 232; [2010] SASCFC 52 …. 8.108 — v Weiss (2004) 8 VR 388; [2004] VSCA 73 …. 4.25 — v Weisz (2008) 189 A Crim R 93; [2008] QCA 313 …. 4.41, 4.102 — v Welch [1992] Crim LR 368 …. 5.143 — v Welden (1977) 16 SASR 421 …. 7.118 — v Welsh (1996) 90 A Crim R 364 …. 7.69, 8.194 — v — [1999] 2 VR 62 …. 5.194, 7.125, 8.109 — v Wenitong [2007] VCSA 202 …. 7.65 — v West (1971) 18 FLR 333 …. 5.167 — v — [1992] 1 Qd R 227 …. 7.33 — v West London Youth Court; Ex parte N [2000] 1 All ER 823 …. 8.53 — v Western (2015) 124 SASR 38; [2015] SASCFC 148 …. 3.64 — v Weston-super-Mare Justices; Ex parte Townsend [1968] 3 All ER 225 ….

3.101 — v Westwell (1976) 62 Cr App R 251 …. 7.86 — v Whalen (2003) 56 NSWLR 454 …. 4.54 — v Whitaker (1976) 63 Cr App R 193 …. 4.76 — v Whitbread (1995) 78 A Crim R 452 …. 7.58 — v Whitby (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 441 …. 7.39, 7.42 — v White [1998] 2 Qd R 531 …. 3.34 — v — [2003] NSWCCA 64 …. 7.122 — v — (2007) 17 VR 308; [2007] VSC 471 …. 5.254 — v — (2008) 102 SASR 35; [2008] SASC 265 …. 4.71 — v Whitehead (1866) LR 1 CCR 33 …. 7.35 — v — [1929] 1 KB 99 …. 4.84 — v Whitmore [1999] NSWCCA 247 …. 7.92 — v Whyte [2006] NSWCCA 75 …. 7.41, 7.105 — v Wildy (2011) 111 SASR 189; [2011] SASCFC 131 …. 2.88, 4.86 — v Williams (1976) 14 SASR 1 …. 5.134, 6.3, 8.149 — v — (1978) 19 SASR 423 …. 4.30, 4.52 — v — (1981) 4 A Crim R 441 …. 3.136 — v — [1983] 2 VR 579 …. 4.59, 4.62, 4.64 — v — [1987] 2 Qd R 777 …. 4.87 — v — [1988] VR 261 …. 4.41 — v — [1989] 1 Qd R 601 …. 7.32 — v — (1999) 104 A Crim R 260; [1999] NSWCCA 9 …. 2.12 — v — [2010] 1 Qd R 276; [2008] QCA 411 …. 4.84, 5.89 — v — [2001] 2 Qd R 442 …. 7.115, 7.123 — v Williamson [1972] 2 NSWLR 281 …. 8.108 — v Willmot; Ex parte Attorney-General [1987] 1 Qd R 53 …. 4.14 — v Wills (1985) 39 SASR 35 …. 7.28, 7.36

— v Willshire (1881) 6 QBD 366 …. 6.28 — v Wilson (1973) 58 Cr App R 304 …. 4.84 — v — (1986) 42 SASR 203 …. 2.72 — v — (1988) 47 SASR 287 …. 4.26 — v — [1998] 2 Qd R 599 …. 6.51, 6.52, 6.54 — v — [1999] SASC 377 …. 4.74 — v — (2005) 62 NSWLR 346 …. 5.124 — v Wilton (2013) 116 SASR 392; [2013] SASCFC 60 …. 5.185 — v Winfield (1939) 27 Cr App R 139 …. 3.109, 3.134 — v Winner (1995) 79 A Crim R 528 …. 4.77 — v Winning [2002] WASCA 44 …. 3.79, 3.80 — v Witham [1962] Qd R 49 …. 2.87, 3.36 — v Wood (1982) 76 Cr App R 23; [1982] Crim LR 668–9 …. 7.12, 8.59 — v — [1974] VR 117 …. 6.35 — v Wood and Parker (1841) 5 Jur 225 …. 3.132 — v Woods (1991) 103 FLR 321 …. 8.168 — v — (2008) 102 SASR 422 …. 2.71 — v Woolley (1989) 42 A Crim R 418 …. 4.93 — v WRC [2002] NSWCCA 210 …. 3.50, 3.58 — v Wright [1969] SASR 256 …. 3.84, 8.163, 8.164 — v — [1980] VR 593 …. 7.39 — v — (1992) 60 A Crim R 215 …. 4.67 — v — (1999) 3 VR 355; [1999] VSCA 145 …. 2.49 — v WS (2000) 78 SASR 33 …. 7.33 — v WSP [2005] NSWCCA 427 …. 4.48, 4.49 — v Wurch (1932) 58 CCC 204 …. 4.83 — v Wurramara (2011) 213 A Crim R 440; [2011] NTSC 89 …. 7.35 — v XY (2010) 79 NSWLR 629; [2010] NSWCCA 181 …. 8.198

— v — (2013) 84 NSWLR 363; [2013] NSWCCA 121 …. 2.26, 2.31, 3.60 — v Y (1995) 81 A Crim R 446 …. 7.58 — v Y, DB (2006) 94 SASR 489; [2006] SASC 141 …. 4.88 — v — (2006) 96 SASR 180; [2006] SASC 289 …. 5.213 — v Yates [1970] SASR 302 …. 4.84, 7.101 — v Yates [2002] NSWCCA 520 …. 2.31 — v — [2002] NSWCCA 520 …. 7.43, 7.97 — v Ye (2000) 116 A Crim R 347; [2000] NSWCCA 401 …. 6.3 — v Ye Zhang [2000] NSWSC 1099 …. 8.126, 8.129, 8.130, 8.131, 8.163 — v Yeates [1992] 1 NZLR 421 …. 3.72 — v Yeo [1951] 1 All ER 864 …. 5.200 — v Yildiz (1983) 11 A Crim R 115 …. 7.58 — v YL [2004] ACTSC 115 …. 5.203 — v Young [1923] SASR 35 …. 4.89 — v — [1998] 1 VR 402 …. 7.105 — v — (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 …. 5.205, 5.206, 5.208, 5.213, 5.215, 5.221, 5.223, 5.224 — v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 …. 6.8 — v Yuill [1948] VR …. 3.67 — v Z [1990] 2 QB 355 …. 7.30 — v — [2000] 2 AC 483 …. 5.190 — v Zaidi (1991) 57 A Crim R 189 …. 3.71 — v Zammit (1999) 107 A Crim R 489; [1999] NSWCCA 65 …. 2.12, 2.30 — v Zampaglione (1981) 6 A Crim R 287 …. 5.185 — v Zappavigna [2015] SASCFC 8 …. 3.64 — v Zappia (2002) 84 SASR 206 …. 5.12 — v Zecevic [1986] VR 797 …. 3.107, 3.136, 6.8 — v Zhang (2005) 227 ALR 311; [2005] NSWCCA 437 …. 3.59, 3.68

— v Zheng (1995) 83 A Crim R 572 …. 4.83, 4.87 — v Zielinski [1950] 2 All ER 1114 …. 4.28 — v Zilm (2006) 14 VR 11 …. 4.88 — v Zion [1986] VR 609 …. 8.155 — v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91 …. 4.93, 7.130, 8.143 — v Zullo [1993] 2 Qd R 572 …. 4.57 — v Zurita [2002] NSWCCA 22 …. 3.130, 3.134, 3.135, 3.137 R (Kelly) v Warley Magistrates’ Court [2008] 1 WLR 2001 …. 5.41 RA v R [2007] NSWCCA 251 …. 7.30 Rabin v Mendoza and Co [1954] 1 WLR 271 …. 5.93, 5.94 Ragg v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria (2008) 18 VR 300; [2008] VSC 1 …. 5.13 Raimondi v R [2013] VSCA 194 …. 8.194 Ralph and George v R (1988) 37 A Crim R 202 …. 4.13 Ramsay, Re (1870) LR 3 PC 427 …. 5.99 Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642 …. 7.43, 7.68, 7.69, 8.50 Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited v AstraZeneca AB [2013] FCA 368 …. 7.64 Randell v Rockliff (1999) 9 Tas R 85 …. 5.51 Rank Film Distributors Ltd v ENT Ltd (1994) 4 Tas R 281 …. 5.56 — v Video Information Centre [1982] AC 380 …. 5.146, 5.156, 5.157, 5.163, 5.174 Rann v Olsen (2000) 76 SASR 450 …. 5.199 Ratten v R [1972] AC 378 …. 8.10, 8.15, 8.16, 8.23, 8.39, 8.40, 8.41, 8.66, 8.67, 8.69, 8.89 Raunio v Hills (2001) 116 FCR 518 …. 5.28 Rawcliffe v R (2000) 22 WAR 490 …. 6.56, 7.156 Razzak v R [2008] NSWCCA 204 …. 7.123 RBK v R [2004] WASCA 216 …. 4.48 Read v Bishop of Lincoln [1892] AC 644 …. 6.60

Redfern v Redfern [1891] P 139 …. 5.147 Redman v Klun (1979) 20 SASR 343 …. 6.23, 6.28, 7.24 Redpath v Hadid [2004] NSWCA 295 …. 3.75, 7.137 Reeves (a Pseudonym) v R (2013) 41 VR 275; [2013] VSCA 311 …. 2.71, 3.60, 3.61 Reference of a Question of Law (No 1 of 1999) (1999) 106 A Crim R 408 …. 4.20 Refrigerated Express Lines (Australasia) Pty Ltd v Australian Meat and Livestock Corp (1979) 42 FLR 204 …. 5.160, 5.166 Registrar, Court of Appeal v Craven (1994) 126 ALR 668 …. 5.166, 5.169, 5.172, 5.174 Registrar, Supreme Court of South Australia v Zappia (2003) 86 SASR 388; [2003] SASC 276 …. 5.166 Rehn v Australian Football League (2003) 225 LSJS 378 …. 5.7 Reichelt v Lewis (1986) 23 A Crim R 284 …. 5.63 Reid v Howard (1995) 184 CLR 1; 131 ALR 609 …. 5.145, 5.157, 5.171, 5.173, 5.206 — v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367 …. 7.75, 7.129, 7.130, 7.137 — v R [1990] 1 AC 363 …. 4.62 Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517 …. 2.64 Residues Treatment and Trading Co Ltd v Southern Resources Ltd (1989) 52 SASR 54 …. 2.51, 8.92 Revesz v Orchard [1969] SASR 336 …. 8.106, 8.108 Reynolds, Re; Ex parte Reynolds (1882) 20 Ch D 294 …. 5.169 Reynolds v Bogan Holdings (1984) 36 SASR 193 …. 2.8, 6.62, 6.69 Reza v Summerhill Orchards Ltd (2013) 37 VR 204; [2013] VSCA 17 …. 7.131 RGM v R [2012] NSWCCA 89 …. 7.116 RH v R (2014) 241 A Crim R 1; [2014] NSWCCA 71 …. 3.6, 3.60 Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds [1985] 2 All ER 712 …. 2.60 Rhoden v Wingate [2002] NSWCA 165 …. 2.19, 7.68

Rice v Chute (1995) 119 FLR 181 …. 5.12 — v Connolly [1966] 2 QB 414 …. 5.135, 8.147 — v Tricouris (2000) 110 A Crim R 86 …. 4.53 Rich v AG (NSW) [2013] NSWCA 419 …. 5.177 — v ASIC (2004) 220 CLR 129; [2004] HCA 42 …. 5.160, 5.162 — v Harrington (2007) 245 ALR 106; [2007] FCA 1987 …. 5.26 — v R (2014) 43 VR 558; [2014] VSCA 126 …. 6.52, 8.118 Richards v Macquarie Bank Ltd (No 2) (2012) 301 ALR 494; [2012] FCA 1403 …. 3.154, 3.159 Richardson v R (1974) 131 CLR 116 …. 6.55 — v Schultz (1980) 25 SASR 1 …. 7.49 Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 234 …. 5.42, 5.49 Riddick v Thames Board Mills [1977] QB 881 …. 5.85, 5.167, 5.169 Ridgeway v R (1995) 184 CLR 19 …. 2.29, 2.36, 2.37, 4.53, 5.257, 5.258, 5.263, 8.154, 8.155 Riley v R [2011] NSWCCA 238 …. 8.136 — v Western Australia (2005) 30 WAR 525 …. 1.22, 1.42 Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Ltd [2003] FCA 933 …. 8.199 Rio Tinto Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2006) 235 ALR 127 …. 5.49 Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electric Corp [1978] AC 547 …. 5.150, 5.169, 5.171 Riseley v R [1970] Tas SR 41 …. 6.35 Ritchie v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 134 …. 6.56, 8.106, 8.108 Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 158 …. 2.47, 8.49 — v — (No 4) (1987) 14 NSWLR 100 …. 5.22 — v — (Nos 15 & 16) (1987) 14 NSWLR 107 …. 6.60 — v — (No 21) (1988) 14 NSWLR 128 …. 7.15 — v — (No 22) (1988) 14 NSWLR 132 …. 5.28, 5.46, 5.49

Rivers v Fuller; Ex parte Rivers [1977] Qd R 97 …. 7.9, 7.17 RJP v R (2011) 215 A Crim R 315; [2011] VSCA 443 …. 3.75 RL Ralston, In the Estate of (SC(NSW), No 109245/96, 12 September 1996, unreported) …. 1.21 Roach v Page (No 11) [2003] NSWSC 907 …. 2.31, 2.32, 7.70 — v R (2011) 242 CLR 610; [2011] HCA 12 …. 3.17, 3.30, 3.31, 3.36, 3.38, 3.65, 3.75 Roads & Traffic Authority of NSW v Tetley [2004] NSWSC 925 …. 7.14 Roberts v Burns Philp Trustee Co Ltd (1985) 5 NSWLR 72 …. 8.75, 8.81, 8.174 — v Oppenheim (1884) 26 Ch D 724 …. 5.51 Robert Bax & Associates v Cavenham Pty Ltd [2013] 1 Qd R 476; [2012] QCA 177 …. 2.14, 2.47 Robin v Police (2002) 81 SASR 253; [2002] SASC 33 …. 2.32 Robinett v Police (2000) 78 SASR 85 …. 2.37, 5.263 Robinson v R (1995) 13 WAR 451 …. 4.49 — v — (1996) 15 WAR 191 …. 8.77 — v — (1999) 197 CLR 162; [1999] HCA 42 …. 4.7, 4.41, 4.44 — v — [2006] NSWCCA 192 …. 4.48, 4.76, 4.104, 4.105 — v — (No 2) (1991) 102 ALR 493 …. 2.71, 4.26, 4.76 — v South Australia (No 2) [1931] AC 704 …. 5.220, 5.237 — v Stern [1939] 2 KB 260 …. 8.174 — v Woolworths Ltd (2005) 64 NSWLR 612; [2005] NSWCCA 426 …. 2.37, 2.71 Robson v REB Engineering Pty Ltd [1997] 2 Qd R 102 …. 5.7 Rochfort v TPC (1982) 153 CLR 134 …. 5.7, 5.150, 5.155 Rodden v R [2008] NSWCCA 53 …. 3.36 Rodgers v Rodgers (1964) 114 CLR 608 …. 5.94, 5.104 Rodway v R (1990) 169 CLR 515 …. 4.41, 7.28

Rogers v Home Secretary [1973] AC 388 …. 5.216, 5.224, 5.227, 5.229, 5.231 — v — (1994) 181 CLR 251 …. 5.188 — v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 …. 7.52 Rogerson v R (1992) 65 A Crim R 530 …. 2.73 Rolfe v R [2007] NSWCCA 155 …. 4.39 Rook v Maynard (1993) 126 ALR 150 …. 8.59 Rose v Abbey Orchard Property Investments Pty Ltd [1987] Aust Torts Reports ¶80-121 …. 2.60 Rosebanner Pty Ltd v Energy Australia (2009) 223 FLR 460; [2009] NSWSC 43 …. 5.89 Roser v R (2001) 24 WAR 254 …. 4.65, 4.66, 4.67, 4.74 Rosomen Pty Ltd (t/as Shell Fairview Park) v Shell Co of Australia Ltd (1997) 144 ALR 497 …. 6.39, 6.42 Rossi Pty Ltd v Ballymore Tower Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 167 …. 5.10 Roux v ABC [1992] 2 VR 577 …. 5.7, 5.48, 5.78, 5.155 Rowen v Cornwall (No 5) (2002) 82 SASR 152 …. 5.199 Royal Women’s Hospital v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria (2006) 15 VR 22; [2006] VSCA 85 …. 5.205, 5.211, 5.221, 5.224 Royall v R (1991) 172 CLR 378 …. 8.96 Rozenes v Beljajev (1994) 126 ALR 481 …. 7.110 — v — [1995] 1 VR 533 …. 2.29, 2.30, 2.35, 4.3, 4.23, 5.110, 8.136 RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620 …. 2.12, 2.50, 5.116, 5.120, 5.127, 5.128, 5.130, 5.131, 6.46 RRS v R (2013) 231 A Crim R 168; [2013] NSWCCA 94 …. 4.75 RST v WA [2016] WASCA 59 …. 7.58 Rumping v DPP [1964] AC 814 …. 5.200, 5.204 Rural Export & Trading (WA) Pty Ltd v Hahnheuser [2007] FCA 1535 …. 8.115 Rush & Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council [1989] AC 1280 …. 5.89, 5.91, 5.92, 5.97, 5.101, 5.102

Russell v R [2016] VSCA 196 …. 2.15 — v Western Australia (2011) 214 A Crim R 326; [2011] WASCA 246 …. 3.77 Ryan v ETSA (No 2) (1987) 47 SASR 239 …. 8.184, 8.185, 8.186 — v R (1967) 121 CLR 205 …. 6.8 — v Victoria [2015] VSCA 353 …. 5.215, 5.223, 5.231 Rylands v R [2008] NSWCCA 106 …. 7.66 Rytir and Discrimination Commissioner, Re (1996) 44 ALD 427 …. 5.26

S S, Re [1948] VLR 11 …. 5.164 S v Boulton (2006) 151 FCR 364; [2006] FCAFC 99 …. 5.165, 5.221 — v McC [1972] AC 24 …. 5.8, 5.138 — v R (1989) 168 CLR 266 …. 2.38, 3.42 S and R, In Marriage of (1998) 149 FLR 149 …. 7.3 SAAB-Scania Australia Pty Ltd and Collector of Customs, Re (1990) 11 AAR 247 …. 2.69 Sabek v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 195 …. 3.139 Saffron v DPP (1989) 16 NSWLR 397 …. 6.31 — v FCT (1992) 109 ALR 695 …. 5.172 Sagar v O’Sullivan [2011] FCA 182 …. 5.232 Saint v Holmes (2008) 170 FCR 262; [2008] FCA 987 …. 5.184 Salsbury v Woodland [1970] 1 QB 324 …. 7.22 SAM v Western Australia (No 2) [2016] WASCA 64 …. 2.49, 7.131 Sampson, Ex parte (1966) 66 SR (NSW) 501 …. 7.39 Samuels v Flavel [1970] SASR 256 …. 7.60 Santo v R [2009] NSWCCA 269 …. 6.57 Sanchez-Sidiropoulos v Canavan [2015] NSWSC 1139 …. 7.64 Sandersan v Nicholson [1906] VLR 371 …. 7.18

Sanderson v Bank of Queensland [2016] QCA 137 …. 5.13 Sands v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd (2009) 104 SASR 452; [2009] SASC 215 …. 8.29, 8.184 Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 …. 1.1, 2.46, 5.66, 5.78, 5.169, 5.199, 5.205, 5.216, 5.217, 5.220, 5.228, 5.232, 5.233, 5.238, 5.239, 5.243, 5.244, 5.247, 5.252, 5.254 Santos v R (1987) 61 ALJR 668 …. 8.148, 8.149 Saoud v R (2014) 87 NSWLR 481; [2014] NSWCCA 136 …. 2.31, 3.12, 3.54, 3.61, 3.66 Sarah Getty Trust, Re [1985] QB 956 …. 5.60 Sargent v Massachusetts Accident Co 29 NE 2d 825 (1940) …. 2.67 Saunders v Australian Federal Police (1998) 160 ALR 469 …. 5.33 — v R (2004) 149 A Crim R 174 …. 8.198 Savanoff v Re-Car Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 219 …. 7.152, 7.155 Savage v Chief Constable of Hampshire [1997] 1 WLR 1061 …. 5.216, 5.223, 5.224 Sayer v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 132 …. 5.205 Sbec v Secretary, Department of Immigration (2012) 291 ALR 281; [2012] FCA 277 …. 5.232 Scalise v Bezzina [2003] NSWCA 362 …. 7.130 Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 121; 171 ALR 594 …. 6.25, 6.43 Schmerber v California 384 US 757 (1966) …. 5.156 Schneider v Leigh [1955] 2 QB 195 …. 5.49 Schreuder (as executor of the will of Murray) v Murray (no 2) (2009) 260 ALR 139; [2009] WASCA 145 …. 5.49 Schwark v Police (2011) 111 SASR 451; [2011] SASC 212 …. 7.44, 7.61 Science Research Council v Nasse [1980] AC 1028 …. 5.7, 5.78, 5.83, 5.242, 5.243, 5.249

Scott v Harris 127 S Ct 1769 (2009) …. 1.47 — v Killian (1985) 40 SASR 37 …. 4.12, 4.30, 4.52 — v Numurkah Corporation (1951) 91 CLR 300 …. 7.22, 7.23 — v Sampson (1882) 8 QBD 491 …. 3.153 — v R [1989] AC 1242 …. 7.125 — v Scott [1913] AC 417 …. 5.254 Scruby v R (1952) 55 WAR 1 …. 4.15 Seely Nominees Pty Ltd v ELAR Initiations UK Ltd (1990) 96 ALR 468 …. 5.164 Sell v R (1995) 15 WAR 240 …. 4.33, 4.49, 5.134, 8.149 Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262; [2000] NSWCA 29 …. 1.38, 1.42, 2.46, 2.63, 2.67, 7.43, 7.56 — v McNeil [2006] NSWCA 158 …. 7.38 Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 …. 3.108, 3.111 Semaan v R (2013) 39 VR 503; [2013] VSCA 134 …. 3.20, 3.61 Semple v Noble (1988) 49 SASR 356 …. 7.15 Senat v Senat [1965] P 172 …. 7.82, 7.154 Sepulveda v R [2006] NSWCCA 379 …. 4.48 Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2005] FCA 864 …. 5.56 — v — (2005) 225 ALR 672; [2005] FCA 1551 …. 5.26 — v — (No 8) [2005] FCA 1348 …. 2.31 — v — (No 10) (2005) 227 ALR 704; [2005] FCA 172 …. 5.58, 5.59 Sevic v Roarty (1998) 44 NSWLR 287 …. 5.58 Seyfang v GD Searle and Co [1973] 1 QB 148 …. 5.206 Seymour v ABC (1977) 19 NSWLR 219 …. 7.130 — v Attorney-General (Cth) (1984) 1 FCR 416 …. 8.128, 8.146, 8.155 — v R [2006] NSWCCA 206 …. 2.49, 3.134 SH v R (2012) 83 NSWLR 258; 222 A Crim R 43; [2012] NSWCCA 79 …. 7.30

Sharp v Rangott (2008) 167 FCR 225; [2008] FCAFC 45 …. 6.48, 6.49, 6.50 — v Rodwell [1947] VR 82 …. 5.200 Sharpe v ABLF (WA Branch) [1989] WAR 138 …. 2.43, 5.164 Sharrett v Gill (1993) 65 A Crim R 44 …. 4.12 Sharwood v R [2006] NSWCCA 157 …. 7.25, 7.64 Shaw v David Syme & Co [1912] VLR 336 …. 5.43, 5.48 — v R (1952) 85 CLR 365 …. 2.8 — v Wolf (1998) 163 ALR 205 …. 2.65 Shaw Savill and Albion Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1940) 66 CLR 344 …. 6.60 Shea v TruEnergy Services Pty Ltd (No 5) (2013) 303 ALR 230; [2013] FCA 937 …. 5.58, 5.59 Sheehan v R (2006) 163 A Crim R 397; [2006] NSWCCA 233 …. 4.48, 4.49 Sheen v R [2011] NSWCCA 259 …. 4.44 Sheldon v Sun Alliance Australia Ltd (1989) 53 SASR 97 …. 2.64, 3.156, 3.157, 3.161 — v Sun Alliance Ltd (1988) 50 SASR 236 …. 3.156, 3.158 Shenton v Tyler [1939] Ch 620 …. 5.204 Shepherd v R (1990) 170 CLR 573 …. 1.9, 1.11, 2.12, 2.73, 2.75, 2.78, 2.83, 2.87, 2.88, 2.89, 3.40, 3.63, 3.64, 3.75, 4.85, 4.88, 8.101 Sherman v US 356 US 369 (1958) …. 4.53 Sherrard v Jacob [1965] NI 151 …. 7.39 Short v Lee (1821) 2 Jac & W 464; 37 ER 705 …. 8.76 Shultz v R [1982] WAR 171 …. 7.43, 7.58 Sibanda v R (2011) 33 VR 67; [2011] VSCA 285 …. 5.139 Siebel v R (1992) 58 SASR 558 …. 5.118 Sills v Brown (1840) 9 Car & P 601; 173 ER 16 …. 7.60 Simic v R (1980) 144 CLR 319 …. 3.107, 3.136 Simon v R [2002] WASC 329 …. 8.133 Sinclair v R (1946) 73 CLR 316 …. 2.32, 2.40, 7.35, 8.131, 8.133, 8.136

Singh v DPP (NSW) (2006) 164 A Crim R 284; [2006] NSWCCA 333 …. 3.135, 4.10 — v R [2011] VSCA 263 …. 8.66 Sio v R [2016] HCA 32 …. 8.66, 8.79, 8.80, 8.83, 8.193, 8.197 SKA v R (2011) 243 CLR 400; [2011] HCA 13 …. 2.14 — v — [2012] NSWCCA 205 …. 2.87, 3.33, 4.44 Skipworth v R [2006] NSWCCA 37 …. 7.83, 8.198 Skone v Skone [1971] 1 WLR 812 …. 5.159 Skyways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1984) 57 ALR 657 …. 7.43 Slater v Western Australia [2009] WASC 144 …. 8.168 Slatterie & Pooley (1840) 151 ER 579 …. 7.18 Slipper v Magistrates Court of the ACT (2014) 179 ACTR 1; [2014] ACTSC 85 …. 5.199 Sloan v R [2015] NSWCCA 279 …. 1.44, 2.90 SLS v R [2014] VSCA 31 …. 3.60 Smallwood v Spurling (1983) 141 DLR (3d) 395 …. 5.218 Smart v Tasmania [2013] TASCCA 15 …. 2.72 Smith v Advanced Electrics Pty Ltd [2003] 1 Qd R 65 …. 7.131 — v Eurobodalla Shire Council [2004] NSWCA 479 …. 7.66 — v Joyce (1954) 89 CLR 529 …. 8.105 — v R (1990) 50 A Crim R 434 …. 8.119, 8.120 — v — (1990) 64 ALJR 588 …. 2.28, 7.112, 7.136 — v — (2001) 206 CLR 650; [2001] HCA 50 …. 2.19, 2.23, 2.25, 2.30, 2.32, 2.49, 4.56, 7.24, 7.38, 7.40, 7.41, 7.55, 7.56 — v — (2003) 138 A Crim R 403; [2003] WASCA 57 …. 3.31 — v — (2007) 35 WAR 201 …. 3.71 — v — R [2015] VSCA 256 …. 2.49, 3.138 — v Rapid Transit Inc 58 NE 2d (1945) …. 2.67 — v Western Australia (2000) 98 FCR 358 …. 5.225

— v — (2014) 250 CLR 473; [2014] HCA 3 …. 5.185 — v — (No 2) [2016] WASCA 136 …. 5.185 Sneddon v Stevenson [1967] 1 WLR 1051 …. 4.30, 4.52 Sobh v Police Force of Victoria [1994] 1 VR 41 …. 5.12, 5.16 Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola UEE v Lundquist [1991] 2 QB 310 …. 5.146, 5.164 Societe Francaise Hoechst v Allied Colloids Ltd [1992] FSR 66 …. 5.22 Sodeman v R (1936) 55 CLR 192 …. 6.8 Sokolowskyj v R (2014) 239 A Crim R 528; [2014] NSWCCA 55 …. 3.61 Solicitor, Re a [1992] 2 WLR 552 …. 5.192 Somerville v Australian Securities Commission (1995) 131 ALR 517; 13 ACLC 1527 …. 5.41 Song v Ying (2010) 79 NSWLR 442 …. 5.177 Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 …. 5.145, 5.146, 5.150, 5.156, 5.166, 5.171, 5.174, 5.180, 5.181, 5.182 Sorrells v US 287 US 435 (1932) …. 4.53 Soteriou v R [2013] VSCA 328 …. 8.129 South Australia v Peat Marwick Mitchell (1995) 65 SASR 72 …. 5.53, 5.56 South Australia Co v City of Port Adelaide [1914] SALR 16 …. 8.113 South Shropshire DC v Amos [1986] 1 WLR 1271 …. 5.94 Southern Cross Airline Holdings Ltd (in liq) v Arthur Anderson & Co (1998) 84 FCR 472 …. 5.49, 5.58 Southern Cross Commodities Pty Ltd v Crinis [1984] VR 697 …. 5.60 Southern Cross Mine Management Pty Ltd v Ensham Resources Pty Ltd [2006] 2 Qd R 145 …. 7.153 Southern Equities v Arthur Anderson (No 10) (2002) 82 SASR 53; [2002] SASC 128 …. 8.184 — v Bond (No 2) (2001) 78 SASR 554 …. 8.174 Southern Equities Pty Ltd v Arthur Anderson (No 11) (2002) 82 SASR 63; [2002] SASC 148 …. 8.185

Southern Equities Corp Ltd (in liq) v Arthur Anderson and Co (No 5) [2001] SASC 335 …. 5.7 Southern Equities Corporation Ltd v West Australian Government Holdings Ltd (1993) 10 WAR 1 …. 5.23, 5.28, 5.41, 5.46 Southland Coal Pty Ltd (rec & mgrs apptd) (in liq), Re (2006) 203 FLR 1; [2006] NSWSC 899 …. 5.27 Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co v Quick (1878) 3 QBD 315 …. 5.33 Sovereign v Bellavista [2000] NSWSC 521 …. 5.58, 5.59 Spalding v Radio Canberra Pty Ltd (2009) 224 FLR 440; [2009] ACTSC 26 …. 5.49, 7.76 SPAR Licensing Pty Ltd v MIS QLD Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 1116 …. 8.192 Sparnon v Arpand Pty Ltd (1996) 138 ALR 735 …. 5.35, 5.41 Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) v Bank of New Zealand (1991) 26 NSWLR 711 …. 5.49, 5.75 Spencer v Commonwealth (2012) 206 FCR 309; [2012] FCAFC 169 …. 5.236, 5.244 Sportsbet Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 3) [2009] FCA 1283 …. 5.89 Spotless Group Ltd v Premier Building and Consulting Group Pty Ltd (2006) 16 VR 1; [2006] VSCA 201 …. 5.52 Spruill v R [2008] NSWCCA 39 …. 3.141 Spence v Demasi (1988) 48 SASR 536 …. 6.45, 8.108 Spika Trading Pty Ltd v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd (SC (NSW), 3 October 1985, unreported) …. 7.64 Spurling v R [2006] NSWCCA 2 …. 8.150 SPW v Western Australia (2012) 220 A Crim R 301; [2012] WASCA 41 …. 7.106 Sreckovic v R [1973] WAR 85 …. 6.8 SS v Australian Crime Commission [2009] FCA 580 …. 7.14 Stack v WA (2004) 29 WAR 526 …. 7.137 Stafford v R (1993) 67 ALJR 510 …. 2.71

Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd v Antico (1993) 36 NSWLR 87 …. 5.33, 5.47 Stanhill Consolidated Ltd, Re [1967] VR 749 …. 5.55 Stanley v Service to Youth Council Inc (No 2) (2014) 317 ALR 141; [2014] FCA 644 …. 3.154 Stanoevski v R (2001) 202 CLR 115; [2001] HCA 4 …. 2.26, 3.104, 3.109, 3.132, 3.136, 7.23, 7.79, 7.122 Stapleton v Chief of Army [2009] ADFDAT 2 …. 4.12 Starkey v R [1988] 2 Qd R 294 …. 3.143, 3.144, 3.151 State v La Page (1876) 57 NH 245 …. 2.20 — v Skipper (1994) 637 A 2d 1101 …. 1.32 State Bank of New South Wales v Lawrence (Cohen J, 1987, unreported) …. 7.146 State Bank of South Australia v Barrett (1995) 64 SASR 73 …. 5.56 — v Ferguson (1995) 64 SASR 232 …. 5.76 — v Smoothdale No 2 (1995) 64 SASR 224 …. 5.53, 5.55 State Drug Crime Commission v Larsson (1991) 53 A Crim R 131 …. 5.75 — (NSW) v Chapman (1987) 12 NSWLR 447 …. 5.13 State Government Insurance Commission v Laube (1984) 37 SASR 31 …. 1.38, 1.42, 2.61, 2.62, 2.63, 2.67 State Rail Authority of NSW v Smith (1998) 45 NSWLR 382 …. 5.97 — v Brown (2006) 67 NSWLR 540; [2006] NSWCA 220 …. 7.130, 7.137 Statue of Liberty, The [1968] 2 All ER 195 …. 8.59 Steadman v R (No 1) [2013] NSWCCA 55 …. 3.56 Steele, Re; Ex parte Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Clayton Utz (1994) 119 ALR 716 …. 5.81 Steffen v Ruben [1966] 2 NSWR 622 …. 7.68 Steinhauser v Davies (1994) 3 Tas R 258 …. 2.46 Stenhouse v Coleman (1944) 69 CLR 457 …. 6.72

Stephanopoulos v Police (2001) 79 SASR 91 …. 5.17 Stephens v R (1985) 156 CLR 664 …. 7.9, 8.167 Steve v R (2008) 189 A Crim R 68; [2008] NSWCCA 231 …. 2.49, 3.90, 7.80 Stevens v McCallum [2006] ACTCA 13 …. 8.198 Stevenson v Yasso (2006) 163 A Crim R 1; [2006] QCA 40 …. 6.18, 6.21 Stirland v DPP [1944] AC 315 …. 2.46, 3.84, 3.92, 3.109, 3.134 Stockland Constructions Pty Ltd v Coombs [2004] NSWSC 333 …. 7.41 Stokes v R (1960) 105 CLR 279 …. 3.145 Straker v R (1977) 15 ALR 103 …. 5.138 Strauss v Police (2013) 115 SASR 90; [2013] SASC 3 …. 4.62, 4.65 Stretton v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) (2015) 231 FCR 36; [2015] FCA 559 …. 5.199 Strong v Woolworths Ltd [2012] HCA 5 …. 2.62, 2.64 Stubley v Western Australia (2011) 242 CLR 374; [2011] HCA 7 …. 3.42, 3.51, 3.66 Sturla v Freccia (1880) 5 App Cas 623 …. 8.91 Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 965 …. 7.6, 8.9, 8.28 Sugden v Sugden (2007) 70 NSWLR 301; [2007] NSWCA 312 …. 5.28, 5.59 — v St Leonards (Lord) [1876] 1 PD 154 …. 8.90 Sullivan v Gordon (1999) 47 NSWLR 319 …. 6.60 Sumitomo Corp v Credit Lyonnais Rouse Ltd [2002] 4 All ER 68 …. 5.45 Sumner v Booth [1974] 2 NSWLR 174 …. 7.10 — v R (2010) 29 VR 398; [2010] VSCA 221 …. 4.89 Summers v Moseley (1834) 2 Cr & M 477; 149 ER 849 …. 7.124 Suresh v R (1998) 102 A Crim R 18; [1998] HCA 23 …. 2.49 Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 …. 2.87, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 3.21, 3.22, 3.24, 3.25, 3.30, 3.42, 3.44, 3.46, 3.52, 3.58, 3.69, 3.71 — v — [1978] WAR 94 …. 4.59 Sussex Peerage case (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85; 8 ER 1034 …. 8.76

Sutcliffe, In the Marriage of (1988) 93 FLR 377 …. 6.6 Sutherland v Cooley (1898) 24 VLR 410 …. 7.11 SVI Systems Pty Ltd v Best and Less Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1507 …. 5.58 Swain v R [2015] NSWCCA 176 …. 2.14 — v Waverley Municipal Council (2005) 220 CLR 517 …. 2.14 SWV Pty Ltd v Spiroc Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 668 …. 5.97 Sydney Airports Corporation Ltd v Singapore Airlines Ltd [2005] NSWCA 47 …. 5.27, 5.35 Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd [2002] FCAFC 157 …. 2.19, 7.54, 7.64, 7.66, 7.68

T T (A Child) v R (1998) 20 WAR 130 …. 8.29, 8.47 T v Waye (1983) 35 SASR 247 …. 8.146, 8.153 Ta v R [2011] NSWCCA 32 …. 7.117 Tabe v R (2005) 225 CLR 418; [2005] HCA 59 …. 6.8 Taber v R [2007] NSWCCA 116 …. 8.197 Talbot v NRMA Ltd [2000] NSWSC 603 …. 5.69 — v The Police (2001) 80 SASR 279 …. 5.15 Taleb v R [2015] NSWCCA 105 …. 2.26, 4.68 Talukder v Dunbar [2009] ACTSC 42 …. 2.2, 2.4 Tambree v Travel Compensation Fund [2004] NSWCA 24 …. 3.159 Tann v Schild (1990) 54 SASR 523 …. 5.266 Tarong Energy Corporation Ltd v South Burnett Regional Council [2010] 1 Qd R 575; [2009] QCA 265 …. 5.52 Tasmania v B [2006] TASSC 110 …. 3.48 — v Bosworth (2005) 13 Tas SR 457 …. 2.43 — v Challender [2007] 16 Tas R 339 …. 8.144, 8.168 — v Crane [2004] TASSC 80 …. 2.37

— v Farmer (2004) 48 A Crim R 99; [2004] TASSC 104 …. 3.48, 3.58, 3.62 — v Finnigan (2011) 21 Tas R 116; [2011] TASSC 74 …. 5.190 — v Hall (2013) 238 A Crim R 42; [2013] TASSC 75 …. 2.37 — v L [2004] TASSC 86 …. 3.48 — v — (2013) 232 A Crim R 123; [2013] TASSC 47 …. 2.31, 3.60, 3.71 — v S [2004] TASSC 84 …. 3.48, 3.58, 3.62 — v Standage (2012) 238 A Crim R 294; [2012] TASSC 88 …. 3.61 — v Stebbings (2015) 248 A Crim R 128; [2015] TASSC 9 …. 8.154 — v Stojakovic [2008] TASSC 48 …. 8.128 — v W (No 2) (2012) 227 A Crim R 155; [2012] TASSC 48 …. 3.61 — v Woodberry (2012) 225 A Crim R 510; [2012] TASSC 89 …. 8.129 — v Y [2007] TASSC 112 …. 3.48, 3.58 Tasmanian Seafoods Pty Ltd v MacQueen (2004) 12 Tas R 436 …. 5.49 Tate v Johnson (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 492 …. 6.38 Tate Access Floors Inc v Boswell [1991] Ch 512 …. 5.164 Taylor v Chief Constable [1986] 1 WLR 1480 …. 7.16 — v Chief Constable of Cheshire [1986] 1 WLR 1479 …. 8.59 — v Harvey [1986] 2 Qd R 137 …. 2.29, 3.156 — v Hayes (1990) 53 SASR 282 …. 6.46 — v R (1978) 22 ALR 599 …. 7.74 — v Taylor [1967] P 25 …. 6.27 TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Anning (2002) 54 NSWLR 333 …. 7.68 Telstra Corp v Australis Media Holdings (1997) 41 NSWLR 147 …. 5.39 — v — (No 1) (1997) 41 NSWLR 277 …. 5.19 — v — (No 2) (1997) 41 NSWLR 346 …. 5.58 — v BT Australasia Pty Ltd (1998) 85 FCR 152 …. 5.59 — v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 568 …. 7.56 Tenstat v Permanent Trustee (Aust) Ltd (1992) 28 NSWLR 625 …. 5.89

Teper v R [1952] AC 480 …. 8.2, 8.21 Tepper v Di Francesco (1984) 38 SASR 256 …. 2.50, 6.35 — v Kelly (1987) 45 SASR 340 …. 6.22 Teubner v Humble (1963) 108 CLR 491 …. 2.20 Thannhauser v Westpac Banking Corp (1991) 31 FCR 572 …. 7.43, 7.60 Thatcher v Charles (1961) 104 CLR 57 …. 8.98 — v R (1987) 39 DLR (4th) 275 …. 1.27 Theodoropoulas v Theordoropoulas [1964] P 311 …. 5.102 — v R [2015] VSCA 364 …. 8.106 Theophilus v Police (2011) 110 SASR 420 …. 7.131 The Queen’s Case (1820) 2 Brod & Bin 284; 129 ER 976 …. 7.149, 7.153, 7.155 Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd v Terokell Pty Ltd [1993] 2 Qd R 341 …. 5.56 Thomas v Austen (1823) 1 LJ (OS) KB 99 …. 5.95 — v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 2 WLR 593 …. 7.142 — v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307 …. 6.60, 6.71, 6.73 — v Mowbray (2007) 237 ALR 194 …. 1.5 — v R (1960) 102 CLR 584 …. 2.58, 2.72 Thomas v Van Den Yssel (1976) 14 SASR 205 …. 7.130 Thomas, Re; Queensland Trustees Ltd v Thomas [1932] St R Qd 57 …. 8.93 Thomason v Council of the Municipality of Campbelltown (1939) 39 SR (NSW) 347 …. 5.55, 5.57 Thompson v Bella-Lewis [1997] 1 Qd R 429 …. 5.168 Thompson v Kovacs [1959] VR 229 …. 6.28 — v R (1986) 13 FCR 165 …. 7.23 — v R (1989) 169 CLR 1 …. 3.21, 3.24, 3.30, 3.42, 3.44, 3.46 — v — [1918] AC 221 …. 3.17, 3.66 Thompson and Wran v R (1968) 117 CLR 313 …. 3.57

Thorp v Abbotto (1992) 106 ALR 239 …. 6.31, 6.33 Thrasyvoulos Iounnou v Papa Christophoros Demetriou [1952] AC 84 …. 8.174 Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [2002] 4 All ER 881 …. 5.10 — v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6) [2005] 1 AC 610; [2005] 4 All ER 948 …. 5.22, 5.23, 5.27 Tickell v Trifleska (1990) 24 NSWLR 548 …. 5.34 Tieu v R [2016] NSWCCA 111 …. 3.104 Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 654 …. 2.31 — v — [2008] NSWSC 657 …. 8.112 Timbery v R (2007) 180 A Crim R 232; [2007] NSWCCA 355 …. 4.20, 4.42, 4.102 Timbury v Coffee (1941) 66 CLR 277 …. 6.60 Tims v Police [2008] SASC 141 …. 4.12 Tirango Nominees Pty Ltd v Dairy Vale Foods Ltd (1998) 83 FCR 397 …. 5.58 — v — [1998] FCA 724 …. 5.58 Tiver v Tiver [1969] SASR 40 …. 5.6 TKWJ v R (2002) 212 CLR 124; 193 ALR 7; [2002] HCA 46 …. 2.14, 2.40, 2.49, 3.101, 3.104, 3.127, 3.133 TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks (1979) 23 ALR 345; 53 ALJR 267 …. 1.19, 1.38, 1.42, 2.58, 2.60, 2.64, 2.67 Tofilau v R (2007) 231 CLR 396; [2007] HCA 39 …. 2.37, 4.53, 5.258, 8.101, 8.123, 8.124, 8.128, 8.131, 8.132, 8.133, 8.154, 8.155 Tomlin v Standard Telephones and Cables Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1378 …. 5.97 Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd (2015) 89 ALJR 750; [2015] HCA 28 …. 5.188 Tongahai v R (2014) 241 A Crim R 217; [2014] NSWCCA 81 …. 7.23 Tony Azzi (Automobiles) Pty Ltd v Volvo Car Australia Pty Ltd (2007) 71 NSWLR 140; [2007] NSWSC 375 …. 5.98 Toohey v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1965] AC 595 …. 7.43, 7.136, 7.145

Toussaint v AG of St Vincent and the Grenadines [2008] 1 All ER 1; [2008] 1 WLR 2825 …. 5.199 Townley v Minister, Land and Water Conservation (NSW) (1997) 76 FCR 401 …. 5.59 Trade Practices Commission v Abbco Iceworks Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 96 …. 5.154, 5.160, 5.162 — v Allied Mills Industries Pty Ltd (No 3) (1981) 55 FLR 174 …. 8.112 — v Ampol Petroleum (Victoria) Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 316 …. 5.34, 5.41, 5.46 — v Arnotts (1989) 88 ALR 69 …. 5.94 — v Arnotts Ltd (No 5) (1990) 21 FCR 324 …. 7.43, 7.67 — v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd (1995) 58 FCR 426 …. 5.7 — v George Weston Foods Ltd (No 2) (1980) 43 FLR 55 …. 6.39 — v Heating Centre (1984) 4 FCR 197 …. 8.114 — v International Technology Holdings Pty Ltd (1995) 31 IPR 466 …. 5.26 — v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (1979) 40 FLR 83 …. 8.108 — v Port Adelaide Wool Co Pty Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 645 …. 5.19, 5.83 — v Sterling (1979) 36 FLR 244 …. 5.23, 5.33 — v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 1 FCR 172 …. 5.150 — v — (1984) 56 ALR 647 …. 5.49, 7.81, 7.151, 8.92, 8.105, 8.112, 8.113, 8.173, 8.174 Traderight (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland [2013] NSWSC 211 …. 5.58 Tran and Chang v R [2016] VSCA 79 …. 4.56, 7.56 Tran v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [1998] 4 VR 294 …. 6.52 Transport and General Insurance v Edmondson (1961) 106 CLR 23 …. 7.91 Transport Industries Insurance Co Ltd v Longmuir [1997] 1 VR 125 …. 2.69 Transport Minister v Garry [1973] 1 NZLR 120 …. 7.131 Transport Publishing Co Pty Ltd v Literature Board of Review (1956) 99 CLR 111 …. 7.44, 7.58

Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (1992) 108 ALR 335 …. 5.187 Trevorrow v South Australia (No 4) (2006) 94 SASR 64; [2006] SASC 42 …. 5.54, 5.61, 5.65, 5.216 Trimcoll Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2007] NSWCA 307 …. 7.8, 7.14 Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd v Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 395 …. 5.150, 5.169, 5.171 Tru Floor Service Pty Ltd v Jenkins (No 2) (2006) 232 ALR 532; [2006] FCA 632 …. 6.38, 6.39, 6.40 Trudgett v R (2008) 182 A Crim R 253; [2008] NSWCCA 62 …. 4.54, 4.57, 4.63 Trudgian v Western Australia (2006) 33 WAR 163; [2006] WASCA 271 …. 5.178 Trueman v DPP (Cth) (2007) 99 SASR 431 …. 6.68 Truscott, Re [2007] ONCA 575 …. 1.10 Trustees of Christian Brothers v Cardone (1995) 130 ALR 345 …. 2.49 Trylow v Commissioner of Taxation [2004] FCA 446 …. 3.75, 3.159 Trzesinski v Daire (1986) 44 SASR 43 …. 2.44, 5.170, 5.202 Tsang Chi Ming v Uvanna Pty Ltd (1996) 140 ALR 273 …. 8.53 Tsang v DPP (Cth) (2011) 35 VR 240; [2011] VSCA 336 …. 7.35, 8.116, 8.117, 8.118, 8.120 Tucker v Oldbury UDC [1912] 2 KB 317 …. 8.76 Tuite v R [2015] VSCA 148 …. 1.20, 2.30, 2.31, 6.65, 7.40, 7.43, 7.50, 7.54, 7.55, 7.65, 7.71 Tulic v R (1999) 91 FCR 222 …. 2.71, 5.119, 5.124, 5.130 Tully v R (2006) 231 ALR 712; [2006] HCA 56 …. 2.12, 2.87, 3.66, 4.41, 4.43, 4.44, 4.50, 4.77 Tumahole Bereng v R [1949] AC 253 …. 5.120 Turf Enterprises Pty Ltd, Re [1975] Qd R 266 …. 5.100

Turnbull v Alm [2004] NSWCA 173 …. 7.23 Turner v Jenolan Investments Pty Ltd (1985) 7 ATPR ¶40,571 …. 3.156 TWL v R (2012) 222 A Crim R 445; [2012] NSWCCA 57 …. 3.31

U Ugle v R (1989) 167 CLR 647 …. 7.99 ULV Pty Ltd v Scott (1990) 19 NSWLR 190 …. 7.60 Unilever plc v Procter and Gamble Co [2001] 1 All ER 783; [2000] 1 WLR 2436 …. 5.89, 5.96, 5.103 Union Bank of Australia v Puddy [1949] VLR 242 …. 6.38, 6.39 United States v Llera Plaza II 188 F Supp 2d 549 (2002) …. 4.56 United States of America v Fabrizio 445 F Supp 2d 152 (2006) …. 7.12 —v — 463 F Supp 2d 111 (2006) …. 7.12 — v Scheffer 523 US 303 (1998) …. 7.136 Unsted v Unsted (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 495 …. 7.22 Unsworth v R [1986] Tas SR 173 …. 3.78 — v Tristar Steering and Suspension Australia Ltd [2007] FCA 1081 …. 5.54 Urban Transport Authority (NSW) v Nweiser (1991) 28 NSWLR 471 …. 2.8, 7.140 US v White 322 US 694 (1943) …. 5.150, 5.152 Uzan v R [2015] VSCA 292 …. 3.62

V Vairy v Wyong Shire Council [2002] NSWSC 881 …. 7.23 Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568 …. 2.49 Vallance v R (1961) 108 CLR 56 …. 6.25 Valoutin Pty Ltd v Furst (1998) 154 ALR 119 …. 8.199 Van Beelen, Re (1974) 9 SASR 163 …. 2.21, 2.78, 2.79, 2.80, 2.83, 5.13, 5.15 Van Den Hoek v R (1986) 161 CLR 158 …. 6.8

Van der Meer v R (1988) 35 A Crim 232 …. 5.134 — v — (1988) 82 ALR 10 …. 8.131, 8.147, 8.149, 8.154 Van Vliet v Griffiths (1978) 19 SASR 195 …. 7.76, 7.110, 7.114 Vance v McCormack (2004) 154 ACTR 12; [2004] ACTSC 78 …. 5.26 Vardas v South British Insurance Co Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 652 …. 5.33, 5.47, 5.48 Vasil v NAB Ltd (1999) 48 NSWLR 207 …. 5.146 Velevski v R (2002) 187 ALR 233; [2002] HCA 4 …. 2.83, 2.85, 2.88, 6.55, 7.51, 7.53, 7.54, 7.55, 7.59, 7.60, 7.75 Velkoskiv R (2014) 45 VR 680; [2014] VSCA 121 …. 2.31, 2.46, 2.49, 3.20, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.75 Ventouris v Mountain (No 2) [1992] 1 WLR 887 …. 8.173 Ventouris v Mountain [1991] 1 WLR 607; [1991] 1 Ll R 441 …. 5.43, 5.48 Verge v Devere Holdings Pty Ltd (2009) 258 ALR 464; [2009] FCA 832 …. 5.89 Verry v Watkins (1836) 7 Car & P 308; 173 ER 137 …. 3.163 Vetrovec v R (1982) 136 DLR (3d) 89 …. 4.18, 4.19, 4.26 Vic Hotel Pty Ltd v DC Payments Australasia Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 101 …. 5.57 Vickers v R (2006) 160 A Crim R 195; [2006] NSWCCA 60 …. 2.26, 2.31 Victoria v Brazel (2008) 181 A Crim R 562; [2008] VSCA 37 …. 5.232 — v Seal Rocks Victoria (Australia) Pty Ltd (2001) 3 VR 1 …. 5.216, 5.217 Vines v Djordjevitch (1955) 91 CLR 512 …. 6.14, 6.16, 6.18 Violi v Berrivale (2000) 173 ALR 518 …. 5.255 Viro v R (1978) 141 CLR 88 …. 6.8 Visy Industries Holdings Pty Ltd v ACCC (2007) ATPR 42-184; [2007] FCAFC 147 …. 6.55 Vo v R (2013) 39 VR 543; [2013] VSCA 225 …. 2.12 Vocisano v Vocisano (1974) 130 CLR 267 …. 7.118, 7.119, 7.122, 8.40, 8.69, 8.89

Vokalek v Commonwealth (2008) 101 SASR 588 …. 7.60 VOT v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 102 …. 3.147, 3.149

W W v Egdell [1990] Ch 359 …. 5.60 — v R (2001) 115 FCR 41; 189 ALR 633 …. 3.58, 3.62 — v R (2006) 16 Tas R 1 …. 2.72, 3.90 WA Newspapers Ltd v Bond [2009] WASCA 127 …. 5.10, 5.205, 5.206 Wade v R (2006) 164 A Crim R 583; [2006] NSWCCA 295 …. 4.49 Wade (a pseudonym) v R (2014) 239 A Crim R 29; [2014] VSCA 13 …. 7.16, 7.17, 7.19 Wah v R (2014) 239 A Crim R 42; [2014] VSCA 7 …. 3.106, 3.108, 3.130, 3.134 Wahi v R [2015] VSCA 132 …. 3.136 Wakeley v R (1990) 64 ALJR 321 …. 7.137 Waldie v Cook (1988) 91 FLR 413 …. 6.25 Waldridge v Kennison (1794) 1 Esp 143; 170 ER 306 …. 5.89 Walford v DPP (2012) 82 NSWLR 215; [2012] NSWCCA 290 …. 4.69 Walker v Marklew (1976) 14 SASR 463 …. 8.146, 8.153 — v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630 …. 2.47, 7.18, 7.83, 7.153, 7.154 — v Wisher (1889) 23 QBD 335 …. 5.89, 5.98, 5.100 Walsh v Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd (No 4) (1994) 14 ACSR 653 …. 5.76 — v Wilcox [1976] WAR 62 …. 7.15 Walt Disney Productions Ltd v H John Edwards Publishing Co Pty Ltd (1954) 55 SR (NSW) 162 …. 8.93 Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378; [1993] HCA 77 …. 2.29 Walton v R (1989) 166 CLR 283 …. 8.5, 8.6, 8.9, 8.14, 8.18, 8.20, 8.29, 8.40, 8.41, 8.46, 8.47, 8.48, 8.61, 8.66, 8.67, 8.68, 8.69, 8.193 Ward v HS Pitt & Co [1913] 2 KB 130 …. 8.76, 8.81

Wardrope v Dunn [1996] 1 Qd R 224 …. 5.57 Warman International Ltd v Envirotech Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 11 FCR 478 …. 5.157 Warming v O’Sullivan [1962] SASR 287 …. 7.42 Warnecke v Equitable Life Assurance Society of the US [1906] VLR 482 …. 5.211 Warneke v Pope [1950] SASR 113 …. 5.183 Warner v Women’s Hospital [1954] VLR 410 …. 5.55 Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531 …. 2.14 — v Warren [1997] QB 488 …. 5.184 Washer v R (2007) 234 CLR 492 …. 5.190 Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54; 71 ALR 673 …. 5.22, 5.23, 5.26, 5.27, 5.33, 5.34, 5.36, 5.40, 5.60, 5.77, 5.82 Waters Motors Pty Ltd v Cratchley [1964] NSWR 1085 …. 7.151 Waters v Sunday Pictorial Newspapers Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 967 …. 3.153 Watson v AWB Ltd (No 2) (2009) 259 ALR 524; [2009] FCA 1047 …. 5.216, 5.242, 5.244, 5.252, 5.254 — v Cammell Laird & Co Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 702 …. 5.43, 5.48 Watt v Miller [1950] 3 DLR 709 …. 8.76 Watts v Rake (1960) 108 CLR 158 …. 6.5 Waugh v British Railways Board [1980] AC 521 …. 5.23, 5.34, 5.43 Waugh v R [1950] AC 203 …. 5.124 Wayne Lawrence Pty Ltd v Hunt [1999] NSWSC 1044 …. 5.59 WBJ v Police (2001) 79 SASR 364 …. 5.205 WC v R [2015] NSWCCA 52 …. 2.46 WEA Records Ltd v Visions Channel 4 Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 721 …. 5.254 Weal v Bottom (1966) 40 ALJR 436 …. 7.43, 7.44, 7.47, 7.65 Weatherall v Whalan (1989) 50 SASR 319 …. 2.8 Webb and Hay v R (1994) 181 CLR 41 …. 2.71, 3.78, 4.18, 4.19, 4.26, 4.29,

4.30 Webbie v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1968) 12 FLR 271 …. 7.82, 7.93, 7.151, 7.152 Webster v James Chapman & Co [1989] 3 All ER 939 …. 5.54, 5.65 — v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598 …. 6.14 Weiss v R (2005) 224 CLR 300 …. 2.14, 2.70, 2.90, 4.3, 4.10, 4.17, 4.72, 6.35, 7.74 Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217 …. 2.50, 5.119, 5.120, 5.123, 5.124, 5.125, 5.127, 5.128, 5.129, 5.130, 5.131, 6.46, 8.162 Weller, Office of Fair Trading v El Homsi [2009] NSWSC 282 …. 6.16, 6.18 Wendo v R (1963) 109 CLR 559 …. 2.91 — v Rogers [1984] 2 NSWLR 422 …. 6.31 — v — [2002] NSWSC 921 …. 2.8 — v — (No 10) (1987) 8 NSWLR 398 …. 7.82, 7.155 West v Government Insurance Office of NSW (1981) 148 CLR 62 …. 2.60, 2.64 Western Australia v Atherton [2009] WASCA 148 …. 3.63, 3.75 — v Bowen (2006) 32 WAR 81 …. 3.71 — v Burke (2011) 42 WAR 124; [2011] WASCA 190 …. 2.53 — v Christie (2005) 30 WAR 514; [2005] WASC 214 …. 5.242, 5.254 — v Gibson (2014) 243 A Crim R 68; [2014] WASC 240 …. 8.132, 8.152, 8.153, 8.156 — v Lovett (2012) 225 A Crim R 363; [2012] WASC 177 …. 3.63 — v May (2011) 215 A Crim R 199; [2011] WASC 365 …. 8.149, 8.155 — v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (1994) 54 FCR 144 …. 5.221, 5.225 — v Montani (2007) 182 A Crim R 155; [2007] WASCA 259 …. 6.32, 6.33, 8.88 — v Osborne [2007] WASCA 183 …. 3.63 — v Pollock [2009] WASCA 96 …. 2.12

— v Rayney (2011) 42 WAR 383; [2011] WASC 326 …. 2.7 — v Rayney (No 3) [2012] WASC 404 …. 2.90 — v Silich (2011) 43 WAR 285; [2011] WASCA 135 …. 7.49, 8.133 — v Southern Equities Corp Ltd (1996) 142 ALR 597 …. 5.92, 5.100 Western Australian Museum v Information Commissioner (1994) 12 WAR 417 …. 5.218 Western Australian Trustee Executor and Agency Co v O’Connor (1955) 57 WALR 25 …. 8.83 Western v DPP [1997] 1 Cr App R 474 …. 8.108 Westpac Banking Corporation v 789TEN Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 321 …. 5.33 Wetherall v Harrison [1976] QB 773 …. 6.74 WFS v R (2011) 33 VR 406; [2011] VSCA 347 …. 3.33, 3.36, 3.56, 3.75 Wheeler v Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675 …. 5.37, 5.38, 5.43, 5.205 White v Venus [1968] SASR 83 …. 8.174 White Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (in liq) v White [2005] NSWCA 173 …. 2.31 White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower and Hart (1998) 156 ALR 169 …. 7.130 Whitehorn v R (1983) 152 CLR 657 …. 2.14, 6.31, 6.33, 6.52, 6.54, 6.55, 8.105 Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246 …. 7.64 Whitsed v R [2005] WASCA 208 …. 7.51 Wiedemann v Walpole [1891] 2 QB 534 …. 8.98 Wiest v DPP (1988) 86 ALR 464 …. 5.187 Wiki v Atlantis Relocations (NSW) Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 174 …. 7.74 Wilde v R (1988) 164 CLR 365 …. 2.14 Willett v Belconnen Soccer Club (2007) 212 FLR 203; [2007] ATCSC 41 …. 5.54 Williams v Nicoski [2003] WASC 131 …. 5.89

— v — (1986) 161 CLR 278 …. 5.266, 8.143, 8.147, 8.149 — v — (2000) 119 A Crim R 490 …. 8.66, 8.197 — v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509 …. 2.29 Willis v Magistrates Court (Vic) (1996) 89 A Crim R 273 …. 7.120 — v R (2001) 25 WAR 217 …. 8.6, 8.106, 8.108 — v — [2016] VSCA 176 …. 2.29 Wilson v Buttery [1926] SASR 150 …. 2.50 — v County Court of Victoria (2006) 14 VR 461; [2006] VSC 322 …. 5.141 — v Deputy State Coroner (1995) 124 FLR 388 …. 5.166 — v R (1970) 123 CLR 334 …. 2.20, 3.31, 3.33, 3.36, 3.56, 8.24, 8.29 — v R [2006] NSWCCA 217 …. 7.79, 7.92 Wimbridge v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 196 …. 4.65 Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244 …. 4.6, 4.35, 4.58, 4.62, 4.63, 4.64, 4.65, 4.66, 4.67, 4.70, 4.74, 6.67, 7.58, 7.95, 7.136 Witham v Holloway (1995) 69 ALJR 847 …. 2.69 WLC v R (2007) 210 FLR 378; [2007] NTCCA 6 …. 4.82, 4.97 — v — [2007] NTCCA 11 …. 3.36 Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1969] VR 323 …. 7.91, 7.155 Wolper v Poole (1972) 2 SASR 419 …. 7.67 Wong Kam-Ming v R [1980] AC 247 …. 3.84, 3.85, 8.163, 8.165 Wong v R (2001) 207 CLR 584; 185 ALR 233; [2001] HCA 64 …. 6.75 Wood v Desmond (1958) 78 WN (NSW) 65 …. 7.151 — v Mackinson (1840) 2 Mo & Rob 273; 174 ER 286 …. 7.124 — v R (2012) 84 NSWLR 581; [2012] NSWCCA 21 …. 4.64, 7.23, 7.64 — v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 179 …. 3.63, 3.71 Woodhouse v Hall (1980) 72 Cr App R 39 …. 8.25, 8.33, 8.34 Woodroffe v NCA (1999) 168 ALR 585 …. 5.242, 5.245

Woods v DPP (WA) (2008) 190 A Crim R 356 …. 7.68, 7.71, 8.50 — v Multi-Sport Holdings (2002) 208 CLR 460; 186 ALR 145 …. 6.59, 6.72, 6.73 Woollahra Municipal Council v Westpac (1994) 33 NSWLR 529 …. 5.53 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 162 …. 6.3, 6.8, 6.14, 6.15, 6.16, 6.19, 6.23 — v — [1935] AC 462 …. 1.36, 2.58 Woolway v Rowe (1834) 1 Ad & E 114; 110 ER 1151 …. 8.110 Woolworths Ltd v BP plc (No 2) [2006] FCAFC 132 …. 8.49 Woon v R (1964) 109 CLR 529 …. 4.88, 5.138, 5.139 Work Cover Authority (NSW), (General Manager) v Law Society of New South Wales (2006) 65 NSWLR 502; [2006] NSWCA 84 …. 5.27 Wright v Doe d Tatham (1837) 7 Ad & El 313; 112 ER 488 …. 8.11, 8.18 Wright v Wright (1948) 77 CLR 191 …. 2.64 Wright, Re; Hegan v Bloor [1920] 1 Ch 108 …. 8.31 WS v Gardin (2015) 48 WAR 494; [2015] WASC 97 …. 3.63 WSJ v R [2010] VSCA 339 …. 4.63 Wundowie Foundry Pty Ltd v Milson Foundry Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 474 …. 5.26 Wyatt v R (1992) 35 FCR 422 …. 5.117

X X v Australian Crime Commission (2004) 212 ALR 596; [2004] FCA 1475 …. 5.164 X v McDermott (1994) 123 ALR 226 …. 5.183 X v Y (No 1) [1954] VLR 708 …. 5.211 X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92; [2013] HCA 29 …. 1.53, 5.108, 5.122, 5.145, 5.146, 5.177, 5.183, 5.209, 6.8, 8.148 X Ltd v Morgan-Grampion (Publishers) Ltd [1991] 1 AC 1 …. 5.205 XY, Re; Ex parte Haes [1902] 1 KB 98 …. 5.162 Xypolitos v R [2014] VSCA 339 …. 2.49, 5.139, 8.108

Y Yamirr v Northern Territory (1998) 82 FCR 533 …. 8.84 Yates Property Corporation v Boland (1998) 85 FCR 84 …. 7.65 Yeldham v Rajski (1989) 18 NSWLR 48 …. 5.184 Yisrael v District Court of NSW (1996) 87 A Crim R 63 …. 5.138, 5.139 Yokogawa Aust Pty Ltd v Alstom Power Ltd [2009] SASC 377 …. 5.57, 5.89, 5.92, 5.100 Youkhana v R [2013] NSWCCA 85 …. 8.197 Young v Lusted (2011) 20 Tas R 98; [2011] TASSC 22 …. 4.64 — v Queensland Trustees Ltd (1956) 99 CLR 560 …. 6.13 — v Quin (1985) 4 FCR 483 …. 5.218, 5.223, 5.224, 5.241, 5.245 — v R [2016] VSCA 149 …. 2.84 Yuill v Yuill [1945] P 15 …. 6.58

Z Z, Re (1996) 134 FLR 40 …. 2.2 Zafiropoulos v Registrar-General (1980) 24 SASR 133 …. 5.9 Zaknic Pty Ltd v Svelte Corporation Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 171 …. 3.61, 3.155 Zammit v Western Australia (2007) 34 WAR 302 …. 3.71 Zanatta v McCleary [1976] 1 NSWLR 230 …. 5.184 Zanet v Hentchke (1988) 33 A Crim R 51 …. 5.266 Zanetti v Hill (1962) 108 CLR 433 …. 6.32 Zanon v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 91 …. 5.183 Zantiotis, In the Marriage of (1993) 113 ALR 441 …. 6.47 Zaphir v R [2009] NSWCCA 124 …. 3.134 Zappia v Registrar of the Supreme Court (2004) 90 SASR 193; [2004] SASC 375 …. 5.166, 5.169, 5.171, 5.174, 5.203 Zentai v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2010] FCA 252 …. 5.51 Zis v Bland [1962] WAR 137 …. 6.18

Zoneff v R (2000) 200 CLR 234; [2000] HCA 28 …. 2.13, 4.88

Table of Statutes References are to paragraphs

COMMONWEALTH Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 …. 2.2 s 33A …. 7.3 Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 s 21E …. 5.180 Australian Federal Police Act 1979 s 12F …. 8.155 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 s 68 …. 5.180 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 Pt III Div 3 …. 8.148 Bankruptcy Act 1966 …. 2.2, 5.146 s 77 …. 5.81 s 77C …. 5.155 s 81(11AA) …. 5.180 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 s 49 …. 8.93 Civil Aviation Act 1988 s 27(2) …. 6.22 Commonwealth Constitution s 80 …. 2.7 s 118 …. 6.70 Competition and Consumer Act 2010

s 76 …. 5.162 s 77 …. 5.162 s 83 …. 5.194 s 155(7B) …. 5.74 s 159 …. 5.180 s 161 …. 5.180 Constitution s 16(3) …. 5.199 s 92 …. 8.107 s 109 …. 5.19 Corporations Act 2001 …. 5.33, 5.150 s 124 …. 5.150 s 597(12) …. 5.180 s 597(12A) …. 5.180 s 1316A …. 5.150 Crimes Act 1914 Pt 1AA …. 5.17 Pt 1AB …. 4.53, 5.17 Pt 1AC …. 5.17 Pt 1ACA Div 2 …. 5.205 Pt 1AD …. 7.33 Pt 1AD Div 5 …. 7.34 Pt 1AD Div 5A …. 7.34 Pt 1AE …. 7.3 Pt 1C …. 4.33, 5.17, 8.148, 8.149, 8.168 Pt 1D …. 5.17 s 3E …. 5.81 s 3W …. 8.147

ss 3ZM–3ZQ …. 4.58, 4.65, 4.68 s 3ZM(3) …. 4.69 s 3ZM(4) …. 4.69 s 3ZM(6)(l) …. 4.65 s 3ZO …. 4.70 s 3ZP …. 4.70 s 3ZQN …. 5.71 s 3ZQO …. 5.71 s 10 …. 5.80, 5.81 s 15D …. 6.22 s 15YE …. 7.33 ss 15YF-15YH …. 7.33 s 15YNE …. 7.33 s 15YQ …. 7.33 ss 23A–23V …. 8.148 s 23A(6) …. 4.33, 8.149, 8.168 s 23B(2) …. 8.147 s 23F …. 5.134, 8.149 s 23G …. 4.33 s 23H …. 8.151 s 23K …. 8.150 s 23U …. 8.97, 8.168 s 23V …. 4.33, 8.97, 8.168 Criminal Code Act 1995 …. 6.9 Pt 2.2 …. 6.9 Pt 2.3 …. 6.9 Pt 2.6 …. 6.2, 6.8, 6.21 Pt 5.3 …. 8.148

Div 9 s 13.3 …. 6.8 s 7.1 …. 6.23 s 7.2 …. 6.23 s 7.3(3) …. 6.8 s 9.1 …. 3.142 s 13.1(2) …. 6.8 s 13.2(2) …. 6.8 s 13.3 …. 3.142 s 13.3(2) …. 6.9 s 13.3(3) …. 6.16, 6.17 s 13.3(6) …. 6.8 s 13.3(4) …. 6.3 s 13.4 …. 6.8, 6.14, 6.16 s 13.5 …. 6.21 s 268.14 …. 3.142 s 268.102 …. 4.14 Evidence Act 1995 …. 2.2, 2.3, 2.25, 2.28, 2.50, 3.3, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.12, 3.17, 3.31, 3.33, 3.40, 3.43, 3.49, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.63, 3.64, 3.68, 3.69, 3.70, 3.82, 3.83, 3.85, 3.87, 3.88, 3.90, 3.91, 3.93, 3.96, 3.99, 3.101, 3.104, 3.106, 3.107, 3.108, 3.109, 3.112, 3.118, 3.119, 3.120, 3.122, 3.127, 3.129, 3.131, 3.133, 3.135, 3.136, 3.137, 3.139, 3.141, 3.145, 3.152, 3.153, 3.154, 3.156, 3.159, 3.160, 3.162, 3.165, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, 4.22, 4.27, 4.30, 4.35, 4.36, 4.39, 4.48, 4.54, 4.55, 4.56, 4.57, 4.59, 4.63, 4.64, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 4.78, 4.79, 4.98, 4.101, 4.102, 4.105, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, 5.24, 5.26, 5.27, 5.31, 5.35, 5.36, 5.39, 5.40, 5.43, 5.47, 5.49, 5.66, 5.67, 5.69, 5.77, 5.83, 5.84, 5.86, 5.92, 5.97, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102, 5.108, 5.118, 5.120, 5.134, 5.135, 5.139, 5.144, 5.154, 5.161, 5.169, 5.175, 5.176, 5.177, 5.184, 5.190, 5.194, 5.201, 5.202, 5.203, 5.204, 5.207, 5.208, 5.214, 5.218, 5.241, 5.247, 5.253, 5.254, 5.266, 6.1, 6.23, 6.57, 6.65, 6.66, 6.68, 6.77, 7.4, 7.8, 7.14, 7.20, 7.23, 7.26, 7.28, 7.30, 7.34, 7.35, 7.36, 7.54, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.66, 7.71, 7.73, 7.76, 7.78, 7.79, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.91, 7.93, 7.94, 7.95, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 7.113,

7.115, 7.116, 7.118, 7.124, 7.128, 7.134, 7.137, 7.141, 7.142, 7.143, 7.147, 7.148, 7.153, 7.158, 8.6, 8.8, 8.11, 8.12, 8.13, 8.22, 8.27, 8.28, 8.35, 8.48, 8.55, 8.57, 8.59, 8.62, 8.63, 8.65, 8.66, 8.69, 8.79, 8.81, 8.85, 8.87, 8.89, 8.90, 8.100, 8.106, 8.108, 8.112, 8.113, 8.114, 8.119, 8.125, 8.126, 8.127, 8.144, 8.146, 8.156, 8.161, 8.162, 8.163, 8.169, 8.171, 8.172, 8.173, 8.191, 8.196 Ch 3 …. 2.45 Ch 4 …. 2.48 Ch 5 …. 2.48 Pt 1.2 …. 2.2 Pt 2.1 Div 1 …. 2.48 Pt 2.1 Div 2 …. 2.48 Pt 3.1 …. 2.48 Pt 3.2 …. 8.93, 8.198 Pt 3.2 Div 2 …. 8.62, 8.195 Pt 3.2 Div 3 …. 8.199 Pt 3.4 …. 8.94, 8.100, 8.101, 8.198 Pt 3.6 …. 3.12, 3.106, 3.135, 3.153 Pt 3.7 …. 3.108, 7.122 Pt 3.8 …. 3.5, 3.90, 3.104, 3.108 Pt 3.9 …. 2.48, 4.2, 4.54, 4.55, 4.63 Pt 3.10 …. 2.48, 5.19 Pt 3.10 Div 1 …. 5.19 Pt 3.10 Div 1A …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.214 Pt 3.10 Div 1C …. 5.19, 5.207 Pt 3.10 Div 3 …. 5.19 Pt 3.11 …. 2.29, 2.31, 2.48, 8.196 Pt 4.6 Div 1 …. 7.14, 7.26 Pt 4.6 Div 2 …. 7.13

Pt 4.6 Div 3 …. 6.70 Div 2 …. 5.19, 8.198 Div 3 …. 8.195, 8.200 s 4 …. 2.2 s 4(1) …. 2.2, 5.24 s 4(1)(d) …. 2.4 s 4(2)–(4) …. 2.4 s 4(5)(a) …. 2.2 s 4(5)(b) …. 2.2 s 5 …. 2.2, 6.70, 7.14 s 8 …. 2.3 s 8(1) …. 2.2 s 9(3)(a) …. 6.23 s 10 …. 5.199 s 11 …. 7.124, 7.137 s 11(1) …. 6.48 s 11(2) …. 1.53, 2.29 s 12 …. 2.3, 3.83, 5.112, 5.115, 5.176, 5.200, 5.201 s 13 …. 4.14, 7.28, 7.30 s 13(1) …. 7.30 s 13(2) …. 7.30 s 13(3) …. 7.28, 7.30 s 13(5) …. 7.30 s 13(6) …. 7.30 s 13(8) …. 7.30, 7.31 s 14 …. 7.30 s 15(2) …. 5.199 s 16 …. 5.184

s 16(1) …. 5.185 s 17 …. 3.83, 8.126 s 17(2) …. 5.112 s 17(3) …. 5.112, 5.115 s 18 …. 2.26, 5.165, 5.201 s 19 …. 5.201 s 20 …. 2.12, 2.50, 5.115, 5.118, 5.120, 5.128, 5.129, 5.202, 8.126 s 20(2) …. 2.12, 5.120, 5.123 s 20(3) …. 5.132, 5.201 s 20(4) …. 2.12, 5.201 s 20(5) …. 5.120, 5.201 s 21 …. 5.115, 5.201, 5.202, 7.28 ss 21–24A …. 7.28 s 21(3a) …. 5.201 s 23 …. 7.28 s 24(2) …. 7.28 s 24A …. 7.28 s 26 …. 6.48, 7.115, 7.124, 7.137 ss 26–29 …. 7.115 s 26(a) …. 7.3 s 27 …. 3.84, 7.115, 7.124 s 28 …. 7.115 s 29 …. 6.58 s 29(2) …. 7.115 s 30 …. 7.30, 7.35 s 31 …. 7.30, 7.35, 8.12 s 31A(1)(b) …. 5.216 s 32 …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.79, 7.82, 7.83, 7.86

s 32(1) …. 7.79 s 32(2) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b)(i) …. 7.79 s 32(3) …. 7.80 s 32(4) …. 7.81 s 33 …. 5.26, 5.49, 7.76, 7.80 s 33(2)(a) …. 7.80 s 34 …. 7.76, 7.77, 7.84, 7.86, 7.112 s 35 …. 7.81, 7.82, 7.83, 7.154 s 37 …. 5.26, 7.115, 7.117, 7.126 s 37(1)(b) …. 7.117 s 38 …. 6.49, 6.57, 7.97, 7.118, 7.122, 7.123, 8.194 s 38(3) …. 7.122 s 38(4) …. 7.122 s 38(6) …. 7.122 s 38(7) …. 7.118, 7.122 s 39 …. 7.82, 7.156 s 40 …. 7.124 s 41 …. 2.46, 3.83, 3.145, 3.152, 7.33, 7.115, 7.137 s 42 …. 7.115, 7.126 s 43 …. 7.83, 7.97, 7.148, 7.149 s 44 …. 7.153 s 45 …. 7.82, 7.152 s 45(4) …. 7.82 s 46 …. 7.75, 7.129, 7.130 s 47(2) …. 7.19 s 48 …. 7.8, 7.56, 8.199

s 48(1) …. 7.19, 7.56 s 48(1)(c) …. 7.24, 7.56 s 48(1)(d) …. 7.19 s 48(2) …. 7.19 s 48(3) …. 7.19 s 48(4) …. 7.19 s 49 …. 7.19, 8.133 s 51 …. 7.19, 7.82 s 52 …. 7.20, 7.21 s 53 …. 7.23 s 53(1) …. 7.23 s 53(2) …. 7.23 s 53(2)(a) …. 2.43 s 53(3) …. 7.23 s 53(3)(d) …. 7.23 s 53(4) …. 7.23 s 53(5) …. 7.23 s 54 …. 7.23 s 55 …. 2.18, 2.19, 2.23, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.60, 3.141, 4.3, 4.100, 7.40, 7.41, 7.44, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.66, 7.116, 7.146, 8.95 s 55(1) …. 2.23, 2.24, 5.144, 7.54, 7.103 s 55(2) …. 2.19, 7.137 s 56 …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.28, 2.32, 7.44, 7.52, 7.66 s 56(1) …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.23, 2.27, 2.29, 2.46, 7.7, 7.8, 7.10, 8.27, 8.192 s 56(2) …. 7.54 s 57 …. 2.19, 7.8, 7.52, 8.194 s 57(1) …. 2.23, 7.8 s 57(1)(b) …. 2.19, 7.68

s 58 …. 7.8, 7.14, 8.199 s 58(1) …. 2.23 s 59 …. 2.46, 7.98, 8.8, 8.27, 8.57, 8.96, 8.99, 8.169, 8.192, 8.194, 8.199 s 59(1) …. 7.3, 8.8, 8.11, 8.19, 8.21, 8.22, 8.23, 8.24, 8.25, 8.26, 8.27, 8.28, 8.33, 8.44, 8.50, 8.53, 8.192, 8.193 s 59(2A) …. 8.27 s 60 …. 2.31, 2.39, 2.46, 4.1, 7.69, 7.70, 7.71, 7.72, 7.73, 7.81, 7.83, 7.91, 7.93, 7.97, 7.102, 7.123, 7.134, 7.151, 8.28, 8.29, 8.50, 8.71, 8.105, 8.194 s 60(1) …. 8.194 s 60(2) …. 7.69 s 60(3) …. 7.81, 8.105, 8.165 s 61 …. 8.195 s 62 …. 8.62, 8.66, 8.75, 8.79, 8.81, 8.83, 8.195, 8.196 s 62(1) …. 8.196 s 62(2) …. 8.196 s 63 …. 7.69, 7.98, 8.89, 8.196 s 63(2) …. 8.74, 8.85, 8.90 s 64 …. 7.69, 7.83, 7.93, 7.98, 8.169, 8.196 s 64(2) …. 7.76, 7.113, 8.85 s 64(4) …. 7.76, 8.196 s 65 …. 7.34, 8.66, 8.74, 8.83, 8.181, 8.193, 8.197 s 65(1)(b) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(c) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(d) …. 8.66 s 65(2) …. 8.82, 8.197 s 65(2)(a) …. 8.82, 8.83 s 65(2)(b) …. 8.29, 8.35, 8.39, 8.50, 8.66, 8.69, 8.75, 8.89, 8.197 s 65(2)(c) …. 7.98, 8.35, 8.50, 8.61, 8.89, 8.197

s 65(2)(d) …. 8.29, 8.75, 8.79, 8.80, 8.197 s 65(3) …. 8.53, 8.197 s 65(3)–(6) …. 8.197 s 65(7) …. 8.79 s 65(8) …. 8.63, 8.74, 8.197 s 65(9) …. 8.63, 8.197 s 66 …. 4.74, 7.34, 7.41, 7.79, 7.83, 7.93, 7.97, 7.98, 7.99, 7.102, 8.106, 8.169, 8.198 s 66(2) …. 7.76, 7.102, 7.113 s 66(2A) …. 7.79, 7.83, 8.198 s 66(3) …. 8.198 s 66(4) …. 7.76 s 66A …. 8.29, 8.31, 8.35, 8.42, 8.44, 8.46, 8.49, 8.50, 8.195, 8.198 s 67 …. 5.18, 8.74, 8.75, 8.82, 8.89, 8.90, 8.196, 8.197 s 68 …. 8.196 s 69 …. 7.13, 8.93, 8.182, 8.199 s 69(3) …. 8.199 s 69(4) …. 8.26, 8.199 s 70 …. 8.57, 8.190, 8.200 ss 70–75 …. 8.200 s 70(1) …. 8.30 s 71 …. 8.200 s 72 …. 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 73 …. 8.85, 8.200 s 74 …. 8.200 s 74(1) …. 8.84 s 74(2) …. 8.84 s 76 …. 2.23, 2.30, 7.38, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 8.49, 8.200

s 77 …. 2.31 ss 77–79 …. 7.38 s 78 …. 4.57, 7.41, 7.42, 7.56, 7.105 s 78(a) …. 7.41 s 78(b) …. 7.41 s 78A …. 7.73, 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 79 …. 2.23, 7.40, 7.41, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.58, 7.59, 7.64, 7.66, 8.71 s 79(1) …. 7.14, 7.41, 7.42, 7.44, 7.52, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.65, 7.66, 7.73, 7.108 s 79(2) …. 4.39, 7.45, 7.51, 7.54, 7.58, 7.62, 7.136 s 79(3) …. 7.136 s 80 …. 6.70, 7.44, 7.57, 7.59, 7.61 s 80(a) …. 7.62 s 80(b) …. 7.53, 7.55, 7.58, 7.65, 7.136 s 81 …. 5.144, 8.94, 8.108, 8.165, 8.194 s 81(2) …. 8.108 s 82 …. 8.99, 8.105 s 83 …. 8.78 s 83(1) …. 8.78 s 83(2) …. 8.78 s 83(3) …. 8.78 s 84 …. 5.135, 8.78, 8.96, 8.97, 8.99, 8.100, 8.126, 8.127, 8.131, 8.137, 8.160 s 84(1) …. 8.126 s 85 …. 5.135, 8.97, 8.99, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.130, 8.131, 8.134, 8.136, 8.137, 8.160, 8.162, 8.163 s 85(1) …. 8.126, 8.129 s 85(1)(b) …. 8.130 s 85(2) …. 8.126, 8.129, 8.130

s 85(3) …. 8.126, 8.128, 8.130 s 85(3)(a) …. 8.129 s 85(3)(b) …. 8.129, 8.130 s 86 …. 8.97, 8.167, 8.168 s 87(1) …. 8.112, 8.119 s 87(1)(a) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(b) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(c) …. 8.115, 8.117, 8.118 s 87(2) …. 8.114, 8.117 s 87(2)(c) …. 8.117 s 88 …. 7.7, 8.101 s 89 …. 5.139, 5.141, 5.142, 8.98, 8.126 s 89(1) …. 5.144 s 89(2) …. 5.144 s 89(4) …. 5.144 s 90 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.32, 2.33, 2.34, 2.35, 8.97, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.131, 8.134, 8.135, 8.136, 8.137, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.154, 8.160, 8.162 s 91 …. 5.194 s 92(2) …. 5.194 s 92(3) …. 5.194 s 93 …. 5.194 s 93(c) …. 5.190 s 94(1) …. 3.58, 3.152 s 94(3) …. 3.153 s 95 …. 3.11, 3.54, 3.75, 3.82, 3.106, 3.107, 3.135, 4.1 s 97 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 2.87, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.17, 3.26, 3.32, 3.36, 3.37, 3.40, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60,

3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 ss 97–98 …. 5.18 ss 97–100 …. 3.160 s 97(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 97(1)(b) …. 3.61 s 98 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.23, 3.25, 3.39, 3.40, 3.49, 3.54, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 s 98(1) …. 3.58 s 98(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 98(1)(b) …. 3.60 s 99 …. 3.9, 3.68 s 100 …. 3.9, 3.68, 3.125 s 101 …. 2.15, 2.31, 2.37, 2.87, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.36, 3.37, 3.39, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.127, 3.139, 3.156, 3.159 s 101(2) …. 3.59, 3.60, 3.62, 3.82, 3.127 s 101A …. 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 3.108, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112, 7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.139, 7.140 s 102 …. 2.46, 3.58, 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112, 7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.137, 7.139 s 103 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.135, 3.145, 3.152, 3.162, 7.97, 7.116, 7.133, 7.137, 7.139 s 103(1) …. 3.83, 3.84, 7.133, 7.137, 7.142 s 104 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.108, 5.115 s 104(2) …. 3.90, 3.114 s 104(3) …. 3.90, 3.104 s 104(3)(b) …. 7.112, 7.144

s 104(4) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.110, 3.112 s 104(5) …. 3.110, 3.112 s 104(6) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.113, 3.117, 3.120, 3.122, 3.123 s 106 …. 7.83, 7.116, 7.133, 7.142, 7.149 s 106(1) …. 7.141, 7.143 s 106(2) …. 7.141, 7.142, 7.143 s 106(2)(a) …. 7.143 s 106(2)(b) …. 7.138, 7.142 s 106(2)(c) …. 7.148 s 106(2)(d) …. 7.112, 7.144 s 106(2)(e) …. 7.142 s 107 …. 7.97, 7.98 s 108 …. 7.90, 7.93, 7.116, 7.133, 7.156 s 108(1) …. 7.97, 7.158 s 108(3) …. 4.74, 7.97, 7.102, 7.158 s 108(3)(a) …. 7.93, 7.152 s 108(3)(b) …. 7.91, 7.92, 7.106 s 108A …. 7.97, 7.98, 7.133, 8.196, 8.199 s 108B …. 7.133 s 108C …. 4.39, 7.51, 7.58, 7.108, 7.133, 7.136, 7.144, 7.146 s 108C(1) …. 7.110, 7.112 s 110 …. 3.82, 3.83, 3.90, 3.106, 3.108, 3.109, 3.127, 3.129, 3.130, 3.134, 3.135, 3.137 s 110(1) …. 3.107 s 110(2) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 110(3) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 111 …. 3.82, 3.108, 7.136 s 112 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.100, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109, 3.130, 3.132, 3.135

s 113 …. 4.69 s 114 …. 2.46, 2.48, 4.58, 4.64, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 5.26, 7.94 s 114(1) …. 4.69 s 114(2) …. 4.69 s 114(2)(c) …. 4.70 s 114(5) …. 4.70 s 115 …. 4.58, 4.64, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74 s 115(3) …. 4.70 s 115(4) …. 4.70 s 115(7) …. 4.70 s 115(8) …. 4.70 s 116 …. 4.10, 4.54, 4.59, 4.61, 4.63, 4.69 s 116(1) …. 4.61 s 116(2) …. 4.59 s 117 …. 5.22, 5.26, 5.28, 5.37, 5.49, 5.58 s 117(1) …. 5.26 s 118 …. 5.24, 5.25, 5.27, 5.28, 5.31, 5.39 ss 118–119 …. 2.46, 2.48 ss 118–120 …. 5.35, 5.47, 5.48, 5.49 s 118(a) …. 5.28, 5.39 s 118(b) …. 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 118(c) …. 5.19, 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 119 …. 5.24, 5.42, 5.43 ss 119–120 …. 5.46 s 120 …. 5.24, 5.42 s 121 …. 5.69 s 122 …. 5.19, 5.54, 5.56, 5.58, 5.59 s 122(1) …. 5.58, 5.59

s 122(2) …. 5.58, 5.59, 5.100 s 122(3) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(a) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(b) …. 5.58 s 122(4) …. 5.58, 5.59 s 122(5) …. 5.58 s 122(5)(a)(i) …. 5.52 s 122(5)(b) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(5)(c) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(6) …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.81 s 123 …. 5.19, 5.70, 5.216 s 124 …. 5.49, 5.57, 5.58 s 125 …. 5.31 s 125(1)(a) …. 5.31 s 125(1)(b) …. 5.31 s 125(2) …. 5.31 s 126 …. 5.59 s 126K …. 5.19 s 127 …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.210 s 127(1) …. 5.208 s 127(3) …. 5.208, 5.210 s 127A …. 5.19 s 127B …. 5.19 s 128 …. 3.87, 5.19, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177, 5.216, 8.164 s 128(1) …. 5.155, 5.176 s 128(1)(a) …. 5.164 s 128(2) …. 5.169 s 128(4)(a) …. 5.164

s 128(10) …. 3.83, 3.87, 5.180 s 128(12)–(14) …. 5.179 s 128A …. 5.19, 5.146, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177 s 129 …. 5.184, 5.185 s 129(4) …. 5.185 s 130 …. 5.205, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218, 5.222, 5.223, 5.226, 5.231, 8.79 s 130(1) …. 5.216, 5.222, 5.243 s 130(2) …. 5.216 s 130(3) …. 5.241 s 130(4) …. 5.222 s 130(4)(a) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(b) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(c)–(e) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(e) …. 5.205 s 130(5) …. 5.253 s 130(5)(d) …. 5.254 s 131 …. 5.87, 5.88, 5.90, 5.94, 5.95, 5.96, 5.98, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102, 5.105, 5.214 s 131(1) …. 5.88, 5.94, 5.95, 5.97 s 131(2) …. 5.88 s 131(2)(a)–(c) …. 5.100 s 131(2)(d) …. 5.90, 5.100 s 131(2)(f) …. 5.97 s 131(2)(g) …. 5.100, 5.103 s 131(2)(h) …. 5.98 s 131(2)(i) …. 5.92, 5.96 s 131(2)(j) …. 5.96 s 131(2)(k) …. 5.96

s 131(3) …. 5.96 s 131(4) …. 5.96 s 131(5) …. 5.88, 5.90 s 131(5)(b) …. 5.99 s 131A …. 5.19, 5.24, 5.67, 5.70, 5.90, 5.102, 5.176, 5.208, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218 s 131A(1) …. 5.49 s 132 …. 5.166, 5.167 s 133 …. 5.78, 5.169, 5.247 s 135 …. 2.27, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.127, 3.159, 7.41, 7.55, 7.59, 7.64, 7.73, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 8.144, 8.194 ss 135–137 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.32, 2.35, 3.11, 3.90, 3.133, 4.3, 7.124, 7.134, 8.29, 8.127, 8.193 ss 135–138 …. 2.27, 4.55 s 135(a) …. 7.55 s 136 …. 2.31, 2.39, 3.69, 3.79, 3.137, 7.41, 7.69, 7.73, 7.93, 7.102, 8.194 s 137 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.26, 2.27, 2.30, 2.31, 2.35, 2.46, 2.48, 2.70, 3.12, 3.54, 3.59, 3.60, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.104, 3.125, 3.127, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 7.41, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.67, 7.93, 7.102, 7.108, 7.110, 7.111, 7.112, 7.135, 8.96, 8.127, 8.134, 8.144, 8.159, 8.194 s 138 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.33, 2.35, 2.36, 2.37, 2.46, 2.48, 4.58, 4.68, 4.70, 4.74, 5.62, 5.134, 5.255, 5.258, 5.261, 5.264, 5.265, 5.267, 8.126, 8.127, 8.135, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.155, 8.158, 8.159, 8.160, 8.162 s 138(2) …. 8.127, 8.144, 8.155 s 138(3) …. 2.37 s 138(3)(f) …. 2.37 s 139 …. 5.134, 8.126, 8.149 s 139(2) …. 8.149 s 139(5) …. 8.149 s 140 …. 2.64

ss 140–141 …. 2.58 s 142 …. 2.12, 2.45, 2.91, 3.69, 5.31, 5.35, 7.8, 7.65 s 142(1) …. 8.160 s 143 …. 6.69, 6.70 s 144 …. 6.60, 6.65, 6.71, 6.73, 6.77, 7.54, 7.59, 7.71 s 144(2) …. 6.66 s 144(4) …. 6.66 s 145 …. 6.60 s 146 …. 6.23, 7.13, 7.19, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 ss 146–147 …. 7.13, 7.26 s 147 …. 7.13, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 s 148 …. 7.11 s 149 …. 7.9 s 150 …. 7.11 s 151 …. 7.11 s 152 …. 7.11 s 153 …. 7.11 ss 153–159 …. 8.93 s 154 …. 7.11 s 155 …. 7.11 s 156 …. 7.11, 8.91 s 157 …. 7.11 s 158 …. 7.11 s 159 …. 7.11 s 161 …. 7.14, 8.200 s 162 …. 8.200 s 164 …. 4.9, 4.42, 4.45, 4.99, 4.102, 4.106 s 164(1) …. 4.4, 4.12

s 164(2) …. 4.4, 4.12, 4.14 s 164(3) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.12, 4.20, 4.22, 4.41 s 164(4) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.20 s 164(6) …. 4.7, 4.20 s 165 …. 4.10, 4.11, 4.23, 4.27, 4.28, 4.34, 4.36, 4.42, 4.45, 4.52, 4.75, 4.78, 4.79, 4.100, 4.102, 4.106, 7.93, 7.102, 7.112, 7.123, 8.193, 8.198 s 165(1) …. 4.24, 4.34, 4.36 s 165(1)–(4) …. 4.9 s 165(1)(a) …. 8.120 s 165(1)(b) …. 4.54, 4.56 s 165(1)(c) …. 4.39, 4.77 s 165(1)(d) …. 4.24, 4.27, 4.30, 4.52 s 165(1)(e) …. 4.76 s 165(1)(f) …. 4.22, 4.33, 4.34, 8.168 s 165(1)(g) …. 4.75 s 165(2) …. 4.5, 4.9, 4.10, 4.12, 4.33, 4.36, 4.52, 4.75, 4.100, 4.101, 4.105, 8.120 s 165(3) …. 4.9, 4.100, 7.123, 7.125 s 165(4) …. 4.9, 4.59 s 165(5) …. 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.22, 4.30, 4.34, 4.36, 4.39, 4.41, 4.54, 4.100 s 165A …. 4.36, 4.37, 4.39, 7.31 s 165A(1) …. 4.10, 4.39 s 165A(1)(a) …. 4.20 s 165A(2) …. 4.39 s 165B …. 4.36, 4.51 s 166 …. 7.8, 8.199 s 166(g) …. 5.194 s 167 …. 5.18, 5.194, 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 7.25, 7.64

ss 170–173 …. 7.26 s 171 …. 7.19 s 176 …. 7.61 s 177 …. 7.64 ss 178–179 …. 5.194 s 182 …. 7.14 s 183 …. 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 8.199, 8.200 s 184 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 185 …. 2.2 s 186 …. 2.2 s 187 …. 2.2, 5.154 s 189 …. 2.12, 2.40, 7.120 s 189(1) …. 8.163 s 189(2) …. 2.42, 8.163 s 189(3) …. 8.129, 8.130, 8.163 s 189(4) …. 2.42, 5.168, 7.30 s 189(5) …. 2.42 s 189(6) …. 2.45, 3.83, 3.87, 8.164 s 189(7) …. 2.45, 8.162 s 189(8) …. 2.45, 8.163, 8.165 s 190 …. 2.46, 2.48, 5.26 s 190(1) …. 2.48 s 190(2) …. 2.48 s 190(3) …. 2.48, 6.68 s 191 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 192 …. 2.26, 2.40, 2.42, 3.104, 3.132, 7.23, 7.93, 7.112, 7.122 s 192(2) …. 3.109, 7.79 s 192A …. 2.40, 3.104, 3.132, 5.12

s 192A(c) …. 3.132, 5.19, 5.26 s 193 …. 7.14, 7.19, 7.26, 7.64 Sch …. 7.28 Dictionary …. 2.19, 4.54, 4.69, 7.5, 7.19, 7.73, 7.116, 7.140, 8.12, 8.21, 8.27, 8.100, 8.129, 8.192 Dictionary Pt 1 …. 8.94 Dictionary Pt 2 …. 7.19 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 1 …. 8.199 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 4 …. 8.66, 8.196 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 7 …. 7.122 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 8 …. 5.40 Dictionary cl 4(2) …. 8.196 Dictionary cl 6 …. 8.196 Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 Ch 3 …. 7.3 Evidence Regulations 1995 cl 6 …. 3.68 Excise Act 1901 s 144 …. 6.22 Family Court Rules O 30 r 2AAA …. 7.3 Family Law Act 1975 …. 2.2 Pt 2 Div 2 …. 5.104, 5.105 Pt 2 Div 3 …. 5.105 s 60CA …. 2.2 s 69ZT …. 2.2 s 69ZV …. 2.2 s 100(1) …. 5.200

s 102 …. 8.93 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 s 27 …. 7.3 s 30AA(1)(c) …. 2.14 s 30AA(1)(d) …. 2.14 s 30AJ …. 2.14 s 30CA …. 2.15 s 30CB …. 2.14 s 44 …. 7.28 ss 47–47C …. 7.3 s 50 …. 5.85 s 53A …. 1.3 s 53B …. 5.105 Federal Court Rules 1979 O 11 r 5 …. 6.3 O 11 r 16 …. 6.36 O 15 r 7 …. 5.84 O 15A r 3 …. 5.10 O 15A r 6 …. 5.10 O 18 …. 8.95 O 20 r 2 …. 6.36 O 22 …. 6.37 O 32 r 4(1) …. 6.48 O 34 …. 6.48 Federal Court Rules 2011 …. 1.54 Pt 7 …. 5.10 Pt 14 …. 5.8 Pt 20 …. 5.6

Pt 21 …. 5.6 Pt 23 …. 5.8 Pt 24 …. 5.5 Pt 28 …. 1.3 r 7.22 …. 5.10 r 14.01 …. 5.10 r 14.03 …. 5.78 r 20.12 …. 5.7 r 20.14 …. 5.7 r 23.01 …. 7.64 r 23.15(g) …. 7.64 Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 r 15.04 …. 6.48 Federal Rules of Evidence …. 7.52 r 401 …. 7.52 r 402 …. 7.52 r 702 …. 7.52, 7.54 Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 s 31(1) …. 6.8 Freedom of Information Act 1982 …. 5.27, 5.40, 5.218, 5.232 s 37(1)(a) …. 5.16 High Court Rules 2004 Pt 27 r 9 …. 6.36 Pt 27 r 10 …. 6.37 r 24.02 …. 5.5 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 s 263 …. 5.81, 5.218 Inspector-General of Taxation Act 2003

s 16(1) …. 5.71 James Hardie (Investigations and Proceedings) Act 2004 …. 5.71 Judiciary Act 1903 s 68 …. 2.7 s 77F …. 7.28 s 79 …. 2.2, 5.19 Marriage Act 1961 s 94(7) …. 4.14 s 111A …. 4.14 National Crime Authority Act 1984 …. 5.75 National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 …. 2.43, 5.216, 5.217, 5.223, 5.247, 5.252, 5.254 Native Title Act 1993 …. 7.40, 7.73 s 82 …. 7.40, 7.73 s 82(1) …. 8.84 Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 s 16(3) …. 5.199 Patents Act 1990 s 200(2) …. 5.26 s 217 …. 7.64 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 s 202 …. 5.71 Royal Commissions Act 1902 s 6A(2) …. 5.180 s 6A(3) …. 5.180 Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 …. 8.155 s 45 …. 5.76 Trade Practices Act 1974 …. 5.148

s 76 …. 5.162 s 77 …. 5.162 s 155 …. 5.74 s 155(7B) …. 5.74

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY Bail Act 1992 s 13 …. 8.147 s 14 …. 8.147 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1997 s 65 …. 8.93 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 s 139M …. 5.194 Court Procedure Rules 2006 Pt 2.6 Div 9 …. 8.95 Pt 2.6 r 409 …. 6.3 Pt 2.8 …. 5.6 Pt 2.9 …. 5.8 Pt 2.11 Div 6 …. 6.37 Pt 2.12 …. 5.8 Pt 2.12 Div 3 …. 5.8 Pt 2.15 Div 4 …. 7.64 Pt 6.9 …. 5.5 r 425 …. 6.36 r 601 …. 5.19 rr 605–607 …. 5.7 r 650 …. 5.10 r 660 …. 5.10

r 1227 …. 5.76 r 1243 …. 5.76 Crimes Act 1900 Pt 10 …. 5.17 Subdiv 10.7.2 …. 8.150 s 54 …. 3.142 s 56 …. 3.34 s 186 …. 4.33, 8.149, 8.168 s 212 …. 8.147 ss 233–237 …. 4.58, 4.65, 4.68 s 233(4) …. 4.69 s 233(6)(l) …. 4.65 s 235 …. 4.70 s 264 …. 3.71, 3.78 s 264 …. 2.40 s 288 …. 2.8, 5.14 s 294 …. 2.11 ss 421–430 …. 2.14 s 434B …. 3.71 Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000 …. 5.17 Crimes (Protection of Witness Identity) Act 2011 Pt 2 …. 5.205 Criminal Code 2002 s 25 …. 6.23 s 26 …. 6.23 s 58 …. 6.17 ss 702–704 …. 4.14 Civil Procedure Rules 2006

r 1508 …. 2.11 Evidence Act 1971 s 28(2) …. 7.119 s 65 …. 8.170 s 72 …. 8.61 Evidence Act 2011 …. 2.2, 2.25, 2.28, 2.50, 3.3, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.12, 3.17, 3.31, 3.33, 3.40, 3.43, 3.49, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.63, 3.64, 3.68, 3.69, 3.70, 3.82, 3.83, 3.85, 3.87, 3.88, 3.90, 3.91, 3.93, 3.96, 3.99, 3.101, 3.104, 3.106, 3.107, 3.108, 3.109, 3.112, 3.118, 3.119, 3.120, 3.122, 3.127, 3.129, 3.131, 3.133, 3.135, 3.136, 3.137, 3.139, 3.141, 3.145, 3.152, 3.153, 3.154, 3.156, 3.159, 3.160, 3.162, 3.165, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, 4.22, 4.27, 4.30, 4.35, 4.36, 4.39, 4.48, 4.54, 4.55, 4.56, 4.57, 4.59, 4.63, 4.64, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 4.78, 4.79, 4.98, 4.101, 4.102, 4.105, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, 5.24, 5.26, 5.27, 5.31, 5.35, 5.36, 5.39, 5.40, 5.43, 5.47, 5.49, 5.66, 5.67, 5.69, 5.77, 5.83, 5.84, 5.86, 5.92, 5.97, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102, 5.108, 5.118, 5.120, 5.134, 5.135, 5.139, 5.144, 5.154, 5.161, 5.169, 5.175, 5.176, 5.177, 5.184, 5.190, 5.194, 5.201, 5.202, 5.203, 5.204, 5.207, 5.208, 5.214, 5.218, 5.241, 5.247, 5.253, 5.254, 5.266, 6.1, 6.23, 6.57, 6.66, 6.68, 6.77, 7.4, 7.8, 7.14, 7.20, 7.23, 7.26, 7.28, 7.30, 7.34, 7.35, 7.36, 7.54, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.66, 7.71, 7.73, 7.76, 7.78, 7.79, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.91, 7.93, 7.94, 7.95, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 7.113, 7.115, 7.116, 7.118, 7.124, 7.128, 7.134, 7.137, 7.141, 7.142, 7.143, 7.147, 7.148, 7.153, 7.158, 8.6, 8.8, 8.11, 8.12, 8.13, 8.22, 8.27, 8.28, 8.35, 8.48, 8.55, 8.57, 8.59, 8.62, 8.63, 8.65, 8.66, 8.69, 8.79, 8.81, 8.85, 8.87, 8.89, 8.90, 8.100, 8.106, 8.108, 8.112, 8.113, 8.114, 8.119, 8.125, 8.126, 8.127, 8.144, 8.146, 8.156, 8.161, 8.162, 8.163, 8.169, 8.171, 8.172, 8.173, 8.191, 8.196 Ch 3 …. 2.45 Ch 4 …. 2.48 Ch 5 …. 2.48 Pt 1.2 …. 2.2 Pt 2.1 Div 1 …. 2.48 Pt 2.1 Div 2 …. 2.48 Pt 3.1 …. 2.48

Pt 3.2 …. 8.93, 8.198 Pt 3.2 Div 2 …. 8.62, 8.195 Pt 3.2 Div 3 …. 8.199 Pt 3.4 …. 8.94, 8.100, 8.101, 8.198 Pt 3.6 …. 3.12, 3.106, 3.135, 3.153 Pt 3.7 …. 3.109, 7.122 Pt 3.8 …. 3.5, 3.90, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109 Pt 3.9 …. 2.4, 4.2, 4.54, 4.55, 4.63 Pt 3.10 …. 2.48, 5.19 Pt 3.10 Div 1 …. 5.19 Pt 3.10 Div 1A …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.214 Pt 3.10 Div 1C …. 5.19, 5.207 Pt 3.10 Div 3 …. 5.19 Pt 3.11 …. 2.29, 2.31, 2.48, 8.196 Pt 4.6 Div 1 …. 7.14, 7.26 Pt 4.6 Div 2 …. 7.13 Pt 4.6 Div 3 …. 6.70 Div 2 …. 5.19, 8.198 Div 3 …. 8.195, 8.200 s 4 …. 2.2 s 4(1) …. 2.2, 5.24 s 4(1)(d) …. 2.4 s 4(2)–(4) …. 2.4 s 8 …. 2.3 s 9 …. 2.3 s 9(2)(b) …. 6.23 s 10 …. 5.199 s 11 …. 7.124, 7.137

s 11(1) …. 6.48 s 11(2) …. 1.53, 2.29 s 12 …. 2.3, 3.83, 5.112, 5.115, 5.176, 5.200, 5.201 s 13 …. 4.14, 7.28, 7.30 s 13(1) …. 7.30 s 13(2) …. 7.30 s 13(3) …. 7.28, 7.30 s 13(5) …. 7.30 s 13(6) …. 7.30 s 13(8) …. 7.30, 7.31 s 14 …. 7.30 s 15(2) …. 5.199 s 16 …. 5.184 s 16(1) …. 5.185 s 17 …. 3.83, 8.126 s 17(2) …. 5.112 s 17(3) …. 5.112, 5.115 s 18 …. 2.26, 5.165, 5.201 s 19 …. 5.201 s 20 …. 2.12, 2.50, 5.115, 5.118, 5.120, 5.128, 5.129, 5.202, 8.126 s 20(2) …. 2.12, 5.120, 5.123 s 20(3) …. 5.132, 5.201 s 20(4) …. 2.12, 5.201 s 20(5) …. 5.120, 5.201 s 21 …. 5.115, 5.201, 5.202, 7.28 ss 21–24A …. 7.28 s 21(3a) …. 5.201 s 23 …. 7.28

s 24(2) …. 7.28 s 24A …. 7.28 s 26 …. 6.48, 7.115, 7.124, 7.137 ss 26–29 …. 7.115 s 26(a) …. 7.3 s 27 …. 3.84, 7.115, 7.124 s 28 …. 7.115 s 29 …. 6.58 s 29(2) …. 7.115 s 30 …. 7.30, 7.35 s 31 …. 7.30, 7.35, 8.12 s 31A(1)(b) …. 5.216 s 32 …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.79, 7.82, 7.83, 7.86 s 32(1) …. 7.79 s 32(2) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b)(i) …. 7.79 s 32(3) …. 7.80 s 32(4) …. 7.81 s 33 …. 5.26, 5.49, 7.76, 7.80 s 33(2)(a) …. 7.80 s 34 …. 7.76, 7.77, 7.84, 7.86, 7.112 s 35 …. 7.81, 7.82, 7.83, 7.154 s 37 …. 5.26, 7.115, 7.117, 7.126 s 37(1)(b) …. 7.117 s 38 …. 6.49, 6.57, 7.97, 7.118, 7.122, 7.123, 8.194 s 38(3) …. 7.122 s 38(4) …. 7.122

s 38(6) …. 7.122 s 38(7) …. 7.118, 7.122 s 39 …. 7.82, 7.156 s 40 …. 7.124 s 41 …. 2.46, 3.83, 3.145, 3.152, 7.33, 7.115, 7.137 s 42 …. 7.115, 7.126 s 43 …. 7.83, 7.97, 7.148, 7.149 s 44 …. 7.153 s 45 …. 7.82, 7.152 s 45(4) …. 7.82 s 46 …. 7.75, 7.129, 7.130 s 47(2) …. 7.19 s 48 …. 7.8, 7.56, 8.199 s 48(1) …. 7.19, 7.56 s 48(1)(c) …. 7.24, 7.56 s 48(1)(d) …. 7.19 s 48(2) …. 7.19 s 48(3) …. 7.19 s 48(4) …. 7.19 s 49 …. 7.19, 8.133 s 51 …. 7.19, 7.82 s 52 …. 7.20, 7.21 s 53 …. 7.23 s 53(1) …. 7.23 s 53(2) …. 7.23 s 53(2)(a) …. 2.43 s 53(3) …. 7.23 s 53(3)(d) …. 7.23

s 53(4) …. 7.23 s 53(5) …. 7.23 s 54 …. 7.23 s 55 …. 2.18, 2.19, 2.23, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.60, 3.141, 4.3, 4.100, 7.40, 7.41, 7.44, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.66, 7.116, 7.146, 8.95 s 55(1) …. 2.23, 2.24, 5.144, 7.54, 7.103 s 55(2) …. 2.19, 7.137 s 56 …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.28, 2.32, 7.44, 7.52, 7.66 s 56(1) …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.23, 2.27, 2.29, 2.46, 7.7, 7.8, 7.10, 8.27, 8.192 s 56(2) …. 7.54 s 57 …. 2.19, 7.8, 7.52, 8.194 s 57(1) …. 2.23, 7.8 s 57(1)(b) …. 2.19, 7.68 s 58 …. 7.8, 7.14, 8.199 s 58(1) …. 2.23 s 59 …. 2.46, 7.98, 8.8, 8.27, 8.57, 8.96, 8.99, 8.169, 8.192, 8.194, 8.199 s 59(1) …. 7.3, 8.8, 8.11, 8.19, 8.21, 8.22, 8.23, 8.24, 8.25, 8.26, 8.27, 8.28, 8.33, 8.44, 8.50, 8.53, 8.192, 8.193 s 59(2A) …. 8.27 s 60 …. 2.31, 2.39, 2.46, 4.1, 7.69, 7.70, 7.71, 7.72, 7.73, 7.81, 7.83, 7.91, 7.93, 7.97, 7.102, 7.123, 7.134, 7.151, 8.28, 8.29, 8.50, 8.71, 8.105, 8.194 s 60(1) …. 8.194 s 60(2) …. 7.69 s 60(3) …. 7.81, 8.105, 8.165 s 61 …. 8.195 s 62 …. 8.62, 8.66, 8.75, 8.79, 8.81, 8.83, 8.195, 8.196 s 62(1) …. 8.196 s 62(2) …. 8.196

s 63 …. 7.69, 7.98, 8.89, 8.196 s 63(2) …. 8.74, 8.85, 8.90 s 64 …. 7.69, 7.83, 7.93, 7.98, 8.169, 8.196 s 64(2) …. 7.76, 7.113, 8.85 s 64(4) …. 7.76, 8.196 s 65 …. 7.34, 8.66, 8.74, 8.83, 8.181, 8.193, 8.197 s 65(1)(b) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(c) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(d) …. 8.66 s 65(2) …. 8.82, 8.197 s 65(2)(a) …. 8.82, 8.83 s 65(2)(b) …. 8.29, 8.35, 8.39, 8.50, 8.66, 8.69, 8.75, 8.89, 8.197 s 65(2)(c) …. 7.98, 8.35, 8.50, 8.61, 8.89, 8.197 s 65(2)(d) …. 8.29, 8.75, 8.79, 8.80, 8.197 s 65(3) …. 8.53, 8.197 s 65(3)–(6) …. 8.197 s 65(7) …. 8.79 s 65(8) …. 8.63, 8.74, 8.197 s 65(9) …. 8.63, 8.197 s 66 …. 4.74, 7.34, 7.41, 7.79, 7.83, 7.93, 7.97, 7.98, 7.99, 7.102, 8.106, 8.169, 8.198 s 66(2) …. 7.76, 7.102, 7.113 s 66(2A) …. 7.79, 7.83, 8.198 s 66(3) …. 8.198 s 66(4) …. 7.76 s 66A …. 8.29, 8.31, 8.35, 8.42, 8.44, 8.46, 8.49, 8.50, 8.195, 8.198 s 67 …. 5.18, 8.74, 8.75, 8.82, 8.89, 8.90, 8.196, 8.197 s 68 …. 8.196

s 69 …. 7.13, 8.93, 8.182, 8.199 s 69(3) …. 8.199 s 69(4) …. 8.26, 8.199 s 70 …. 8.57, 8.190, 8.200 ss 70–75 …. 8.200 s 70(1) …. 8.30 s 71 …. 8.200 s 72 …. 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 73 …. 8.85, 8.200 s 74 …. 8.200 s 74(1) …. 8.84 s 74(2) …. 8.84 s 76 …. 2.23, 2.30, 7.38, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 8.49, 8.200 s 77 …. 2.31 ss 77–79 …. 7.38 s 78 …. 4.57, 7.41, 7.42, 7.56, 7.105 s 78(a) …. 7.41 s 78(b) …. 7.41 s 78A …. 7.73, 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 79 …. 2.23, 7.40, 7.41, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.58, 7.59, 7.64, 7.66, 8.71 s 79(1) …. 7.14, 7.41, 7.42, 7.44, 7.52, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.65, 7.66, 7.73, 7.108 s 79(2) …. 4.39, 7.45, 7.51, 7.54, 7.58, 7.62, 7.136 s 79(3) …. 7.136 s 80 …. 6.70, 7.44, 7.57, 7.59, 7.61 s 80(a) …. 7.62 s 80(b) …. 7.53, 7.55, 7.58, 7.65, 7.136 s 81 …. 5.144, 8.94, 8.108, 8.165, 8.194

s 81(2) …. 8.108 s 82 …. 8.99, 8.105 s 83 …. 8.78 s 83(1) …. 8.78 s 83(2) …. 8.78 s 83(3) …. 8.78 s 84 …. 5.135, 8.78, 8.96, 8.97, 8.99, 8.100, 8.126, 8.127, 8.131, 8.137, 8.160 s 84(1) …. 8.126 s 85 …. 5.135, 8.97, 8.99, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.130, 8.131, 8.134, 8.136, 8.137, 8.160, 8.162, 8.163 s 85(1) …. 8.126, 8.129 s 85(1)(b) …. 8.130 s 85(2) …. 8.126, 8.129, 8.130 s 85(3) …. 8.126, 8.128, 8.130 s 85(3)(a) …. 8.129 s 85(3)(b) …. 8.129, 8.130 s 86 …. 8.97, 8.167 s 87(1) …. 8.112, 8.119 s 87(1)(a) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(b) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(c) …. 8.115, 8.117, 8.118 s 87(2) …. 8.114, 8.117 s 87(2)(c) …. 8.117 s 88 …. 7.7, 8.101 s 89 …. 5.139, 5.141, 5.142, 8.98, 8.126 s 89(1) …. 5.144 s 89(2) …. 5.144

s 89(4) …. 5.144 s 90 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.32, 2.33, 2.34, 2.35, 8.97, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.131, 8.134, 8.135, 8.136, 8.137, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.154, 8.160, 8.162 s 91 …. 5.194 s 92(2) …. 5.194 s 92(3) …. 5.194 s 93 …. 5.194 s 93(c) …. 5.190 s 94(1) …. 3.58, 3.152 s 94(3) …. 3.153 s 95 …. 3.11, 3.54, 3.75, 3.82, 3.106, 3.107, 3.135, 4.1 s 97 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 2.87, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.17, 3.26, 3.32, 3.36, 3.37, 3.40, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 ss 97–98 …. 5.18 ss 97–100 …. 3.160 s 97(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 97(1)(b) …. 3.61 s 98 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.23, 3.25, 3.39, 3.40, 3.49, 3.54, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 s 98(1) …. 3.58 s 98(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 98(1)(b) …. 3.60 s 99 …. 3.9, 3.68 s 100 …. 3.9, 3.68, 3.125 s 101 …. 2.15, 2.31, 2.37, 2.87, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.36, 3.37, 3.39, 3.54, 3.55,

3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.127, 3.139, 3.156, 3.159 s 101(2) …. 3.59, 3.60, 3.62, 3.82, 3.127 s 101A …. 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 3.109, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112, 7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.139, 7.140 s 102 …. 2.46, 3.58, 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112, 7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.137, 7.139 s 102(2) …. 3.109 s 103 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.135, 3.145, 3.152, 3.162, 7.97, 7.116, 7.133, 7.137, 7.139 s 103(1) …. 3.83, 3.84, 7.133, 7.137, 7.142 s 104 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.109, 5.115 s 104(2) …. 3.90, 3.114 s 104(3) …. 3.90, 3.104 s 104(3)(b) …. 7.112, 7.144 s 104(4) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.110, 3.112 s 104(5) …. 3.110, 3.112 s 104(6) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.113, 3.117, 3.120, 3.122, 3.123 s 106 …. 7.83, 7.116, 7.133, 7.142, 7.149 s 106(1) …. 7.141, 7.143 s 106(2) …. 7.141, 7.142, 7.143 s 106(2)(a) …. 7.143 s 106(2)(b) …. 7.138, 7.142 s 106(2)(c) …. 7.148 s 106(2)(d) …. 7.112, 7.144 s 106(2)(e) …. 7.142 s 107 …. 7.97, 7.98 s 108 …. 7.90, 7.93, 7.116, 7.133, 7.156 s 108(1) …. 7.97, 7.158

s 108(3) …. 4.74, 7.97, 7.102, 7.158 s 108(3)(a) …. 7.93, 7.152 s 108(3)(b) …. 7.91, 7.92, 7.106 s 108A …. 7.97, 7.98, 7.133, 8.196, 8.199 s 108B …. 7.133 s 108C …. 4.39, 7.51, 7.58, 7.108, 7.133, 7.136, 7.144, 7.146 s 108C(1) …. 7.110, 7.112 s 110 …. 3.82, 3.83, 3.90, 3.106, 3.108, 3.109, 3.127, 3.129, 3.130, 3.134, 3.135, 3.137 s 110(1) …. 3.107 s 110(2) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 110(3) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 111 …. 3.82, 3.108, 7.136 s 112 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.100, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109, 3.130, 3.132, 3.135 s 113 …. 4.69 s 114 …. 2.46, 2.48, 4.58, 4.64, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 5.26, 7.94 s 114(1) …. 4.69 s 114(2) …. 4.69 s 114(2)(c) …. 4.70 s 114(5) …. 4.70 s 115 …. 4.58, 4.64, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74 s 115(3) …. 4.70 s 115(4) …. 4.70 s 115(7) …. 4.70 s 115(8) …. 4.70 s 116 …. 4.10, 4.54, 4.59, 4.61, 4.63, 4.69 s 116(1) …. 4.61 s 116(2) …. 4.59

s 117 …. 5.22, 5.26, 5.28, 5.37, 5.49, 5.58 s 117(1) …. 5.26 s 118 …. 5.24, 5.25, 5.27, 5.28, 5.31, 5.39 ss 118–119 …. 2.46, 2.48 ss 118–120 …. 5.35, 5.47, 5.48, 5.49 s 118(a) …. 5.28, 5.39 s 118(b) …. 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 118(c) …. 5.19, 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 119 …. 5.24, 5.42, 5.43 ss 119–120 …. 5.46 s 120 …. 5.24, 5.42 s 121 …. 5.69 s 122 …. 5.19, 5.54, 5.56, 5.58, 5.59 s 122(1) …. 5.58, 5.59 s 122(2) …. 5.58, 5.59, 5.100 s 122(3) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(a) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(b) …. 5.58 s 122(4) …. 5.58, 5.59 s 122(5) …. 5.58 s 122(5)(a)(i) …. 5.52 s 122(5)(b) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(5)(c) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(6) …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.81 s 123 …. 5.19, 5.70, 5.216 s 124 …. 5.49, 5.57, 5.58 s 125 …. 5.31 s 125(1)(a) …. 5.31

s 125(1)(b) …. 5.31 s 125(2) …. 5.31 s 126 …. 5.59 s 126K …. 5.19 s 127 …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.210 s 127(1) …. 5.208 s 127(3) …. 5.208, 5.210 s 127A …. 5.19 s 127B …. 5.19 s 128 …. 3.87, 5.19, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177, 5.216, 8.164 s 128(1) …. 5.155, 5.176 s 128(1)(a) …. 5.164 s 128(2) …. 5.169 s 128(4)(a) …. 5.164 s 128(10) …. 3.83, 3.87, 5.180 s 128(12)–(14) …. 5.179 s 128A …. 5.19, 5.146, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177 s 129 …. 5.184, 5.185 s 129(4) …. 5.185 s 130 …. 5.205, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218, 5.222, 5.223, 5.231, 8.79 s 130(1) …. 5.216, 5.222, 5.243 s 130(2) …. 5.216 s 130(3) …. 5.241 s 130(4) …. 5.222 s 130(4)(a) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(b) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(c)–(e) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(e) …. 5.205

s 130(5) …. 5.253 s 130(5)(d) …. 5.254 s 131 …. 5.87, 5.88, 5.90, 5.94, 5.95, 5.96, 5.98, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102, 5.105, 5.214 s 131(1) …. 5.88, 5.94, 5.95, 5.97 s 131(2) …. 5.88 s 131(2)(a)–(c) …. 5.100 s 131(2)(d) …. 5.90, 5.100 s 131(2)(f) …. 5.97 s 131(2)(g) …. 5.100, 5.103 s 131(2)(h) …. 5.98 s 131(2)(i) 5.92, 5.96 s 131(2)(j) …. 5.96 s 131(2)(k) …. 5.96 s 131(3) …. 5.96 s 131(4) …. 5.96 s 131(5) …. 5.88, 5.90 s 131(5)(b) …. 5.99 s 131A …. 5.19, 5.24, 5.67, 5.70, 5.90, 5.102, 5.176, 5.208, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218 s 131A(1) …. 5.49 s 132 …. 5.166, 5.167 s 133 …. 5.78, 5.169, 5.247 s 135 …. 2.27, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.127, 3.159, 7.41, 7.55, 7.59, 7.64, 7.73, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 8.144, 8.194 ss 135–137 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.32, 2.35, 3.11, 3.90, 3.133, 4.3, 7.124, 7.134, 8.29, 8.127, 8.193 ss 135–138 …. 2.27, 4.55 s 135(a) …. 7.55

s 136 …. 2.31, 2.39, 3.69, 3.79, 3.137, 7.41, 7.69, 7.73, 7.93, 7.102, 8.194 s 137 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.26, 2.27, 2.30, 2.31, 2.35, 2.46, 2.48, 2.70, 3.12, 3.54, 3.59, 3.60, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.104, 3.125, 3.127, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 7.41, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.67, 7.93, 7.102, 7.108, 7.110, 7.111, 7.112, 7.135, 8.96, 8.127, 8.134, 8.144, 8.159, 8.194 s 138 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.33, 2.35, 2.36, 2.37, 2.46, 2.48, 4.58, 4.68, 4.70, 4.74, 5.62, 5.134, 5.255, 5.258, 5.261, 5.264, 5.265, 5.267, 8.126, 8.127, 8.135, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.155, 8.158, 8.159, 8.160, 8.162 s 138(2) …. 8.127, 8.144, 8.155 s 138(3) …. 2.37 s 138(3)(f) …. 2.37 s 139 …. 5.134, 8.126, 8.149 s 139(2) …. 8.149 s 139(5) …. 8.149 s 140 …. 2.64 ss 140–141 …. 2.58 s 142 …. 2.12, 2.45, 2.91, 3.69, 5.31, 5.35, 7.8, 7.65 s 142(1) …. 8.160 s 143 …. 6.69 s 144 …. 6.60, 6.65, 6.71, 6.73, 6.77, 7.54, 7.59, 7.71 s 144(2) …. 6.66 s 144(4) …. 6.66 s 145 …. 6.60 s 146 …. 6.23, 7.13, 7.19, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 ss 146–147 …. 7.13, 7.26 s 147 …. 7.13, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 s 148 …. 7.11 s 149 …. 7.9 s 150 …. 7.11

s 151 …. 7.11 s 152 …. 7.11 s 153 …. 7.11 ss 153–159 …. 8.93 s 154 …. 7.11 s 155 …. 7.11 s 156 …. 7.11, 8.91 s 157 …. 7.11 s 158 …. 7.11 s 159 …. 7.11 s 161 …. 7.14, 8.200 s 162 …. 8.200 s 164 …. 4.9, 4.42, 4.45, 4.99, 4.102, 4.106 s 164(1) …. 4.4, 4.12 s 164(2) …. 4.4, 4.12, 4.14 s 164(3) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.12, 4.20, 4.22, 4.41 s 164(4) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.20 s 164(6) …. 4.7, 4.20 s 165 …. 4.10, 4.11, 4.23, 4.27, 4.28, 4.34, 4.36, 4.42, 4.45, 4.52, 4.75, 4.78, 4.79, 4.100, 4.102, 4.106, 7.93, 7.102, 7.112, 7.123, 8.193, 8.198 s 165(1) …. 4.24, 4.34, 4.36 s 165(1)–(4) …. 4.9 s 165(1)(a) …. 8.120 s 165(1)(b) …. 4.54, 4.56 s 165(1)(c) …. 4.39, 4.77 s 165(1)(d) …. 4.24, 4.27, 4.30, 4.52 s 165(1)(e) …. 4.76 s 165(1)(f) …. 4.22, 4.33, 4.34, 8.168

s 165(1)(g) …. 4.75 s 165(2) …. 4.5, 4.9, 4.10, 4.12, 4.33, 4.36, 4.52, 4.75, 4.100, 4.101, 4.105, 8.120 s 165(3) …. 4.9, 4.100, 7.123, 7.125 s 165(4) …. 4.9, 4.59 s 165(5) …. 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.22, 4.30, 4.34, 4.36, 4.39, 4.41, 4.54, 4.100 s 165A …. 4.36, 4.37, 4.39, 7.31 s 165A(1) …. 4.10, 4.39 s 165A(1)(a) …. 4.20 s 165A(2) …. 4.39 s 165B …. 4.36, 4.51 s 166 …. 7.8, 8.199 s 166(g) …. 5.194 s 167 …. 5.18, 5.194, 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 7.25, 7.64 ss 170–173 …. 7.26 s 171 …. 7.19 s 176 …. 7.61 s 177 …. 7.64 ss 178–179 …. 5.194 s 182 …. 7.14 s 183 …. 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 8.199, 8.200 s 184 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 187 …. 5.154 s 189 …. 2.12, 2.40, 7.120 s 189(1) …. 8.163 s 189(2) …. 2.42, 8.163 s 189(3) …. 8.129, 8.130, 8.163 s 189(4) …. 2.42, 5.168, 7.30

s 189(5) …. 2.42 s 189(6) …. 2.45, 3.83, 3.87, 8.164 s 189(7) …. 2.45, 8.162 s 189(8) …. 2.45, 8.163, 8.165 s 190 …. 2.46, 2.48, 5.26 s 190(1) …. 2.48 s 190(2) …. 2.48 s 190(3) …. 2.48, 6.68 s 191 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 192 …. 2.26, 2.40, 2.42, 3.104, 3.132, 7.23, 7.93, 7.112, 7.122 s 192(2) …. 3.109, 7.79 s 192A …. 2.40, 3.104, 3.132, 5.12 s 192A(c) …. 3.132 s 193 …. 7.14, 7.19, 7.26, 7.64 Sch …. 7.28 Dictionary …. 2.19, 4.54, 4.69, 5.19, 5.26, 7.5, 7.19, 7.73, 7.116, 7.140, 8.12, 8.21, 8.27, 8.100, 8.129, 8.192 Dictionary Pt 1 …. 8.94 Dictionary Pt 2 …. 7.19 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 1 …. 8.199 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 4 …. 8.66, 8.196 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 7 …. 7.122 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 8 …. 5.40 Dictionary cl 4(2) …. 8.196 Dictionary cl 6 …. 8.196 Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 …. 5.213 Ch 2 …. 7.33 Ch 4 …. 7.33

Pt 4.2.2A …. 7.34 Pt 7.2 …. 7.33 Div 4.2.5 …. 5.207 s 13 …. 7.33 s 38D …. 7.33 s 40K(3) …. 7.21 s 40V …. 8.61 ss 49–53 …. 3.146 ss 59–61 …. 5.212 s 60 …. 5.213 s 61 …. 5.213 s 62 …. 5.213 s 64 …. 5.213 s 69 …. 4.41 s 71 …. 4.45, 7.100, 7.107 ss 90–92 …. 5.85 Family Provision Act 1969 s 22 …. 8.45 Freedom of Information Act 1989 …. 5.232 s 37(1)(a) …. 5.16 Human Rights Act 2004 …. 1.48, 6.14, 8.124 s 22(2)(i) …. 5.145 s 28 …. 6.14 Juries Act 1967 s 42C …. 5.185 Legal Aid Act 1977 s 13(2) …. 5.26 Listening Devices Act 1992 …. 8.155

Magistrates Court Act 1930 …. 6.31 Pt 3.4 Div 3.4.4 …. 2.5 Div 3.10.2-2A …. 2.14 ss 89–96 …. 5.12 s 90 …. 5.13 s 90AA …. 5.13 ss 105A–108 …. 5.12 Oaths and Affirmations Act 1984 s 7 …. 7.28 s 14 …. 7.28 s 17 …. 7.28 Partnership Act 1963 s 19 …. 8.110 Road Transport (Alcohol and Drugs) Act 1977 s 41 …. 7.25 Supreme Court Act 1933 s 37E(4) …. 2.15 s 37O …. 2.14 s 37S …. 2.15 s 37S(6) …. 2.14 s 68B …. 2.7, 6.35 s 68C …. 6.35

NEW SOUTH WALES Bail Act 2013 s 43 …. 8.147 Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 s 29 …. 5.209

Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 s 5 …. 6.23 s 13 …. 8.150 Civil Liability Act 2002 Div 6 …. 7.52 s 50 …. 7.38 Civil Procedure Act 2005 …. 7.64 Pt 4 …. 1.3 s 56 …. 7.64 s 57(1) …. 2.49 s 71 …. 5.85 s 87 …. 5.19, 5.176 Community Justice Centres Act 1983 s 28(4) …. 5.105 s 28(5) …. 5.105 Companies (New South Wales) Code 1981 …. 5.72 Pt VII …. 5.72 Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 …. 5.85 Crimes Act 1900 s 23(4) …. 6.8 s 61HA …. 3.142 s 61I …. 3.142 s 61J …. 3.142 s 61JA …. 3.142 s 66EA …. 3.34 ss 327–339 …. 4.14 s 341 …. 5.135 s 407 …. 5.200

s 408(1) …. 8.170 s 413B …. 3.108 s 417 …. 6.16 s 417A …. 6.16 s 419 …. 6.8 Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 s 23 …. 2.14 s 56 …. 2.14 s 57 …. 2.14 s 77(1)(b) …. 2.14 s 78 …. 2.14 ss 99–106 …. 2.14, 5.190 s 107 …. 2.14 s 108 …. 2.14 Crime Commission Act 1985 ss 39, 39A …. 5.180 s 18B(4) …. 5.60 s 40 …. 5.207 Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000 …. 5.17 Criminal Appeal Act 1912 Pt 3 …. 2.14 s 5 …. 2.14 s 5A …. 2.15 s 5F …. 2.15 s 6 …. 2.14 Criminal Appeal Rules 1986 r 4 …. 2.49, 5.124 Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 …. 5.183

ss 13A, 31D(3) …. 5.180 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 …. 6.31 Ch 3 Pt 2 …. 2.5, 5.12, 6.31 Ch 3 Pt 3 Div 3 …. 5.13 Ch 4 Pt 2 Div 2 …. 5.14 Ch 6 Pt 5 Div 2 …. 5.207 Ch 6 Pt 5 Div 3 …. 7.34 Ch 6 Pt 5 Div 4 …. 7.34 Ch 6 Pt 6 Div 1 …. 7.33 Ch 6 Pt 6 Divs 1-3 …. 7.34 Ch 6 Pt 6 Div 4 …. 7.33 Ch 6 Pt 6 Div 5 …. 7.33 s 21(2) …. 3.71 s 29(1) …. 3.71 s 29(3) …. 3.71, 3.78 s 62 …. 6.31 s 66 …. 6.31 s 71 …. 2.43 ss 71–96 …. 5.13 s 72 …. 2.43 s 130 …. 2.40, 5.12 s 130A …. 2.40 ss 132–133 …. 2.7, 6.35 s 133 …. 2.7, 4.12 ss 134–142 …. 5.14 s 139 …. 5.13 s 140 …. 5.13 s 150 …. 2.8, 5.14

s 152 …. 5.14 s 159 …. 2.7 s 160 …. 2.11 s 164A …. 5.14 s 183 …. 5.14 s 196 …. 2.43 s 281 …. 4.33, 8.97, 8.168 s 284 …. 8.61 ss 284–289 …. 8.61 ss 291–291C …. 5.85 s 293 …. 3.146 s 293(4)(a) …. 3.147 s 293(4)(a)(i) …. 3.150 s 294(2) …. 4.45, 7.100, 7.107 s 294A …. 7.33 s 294AA …. 4.41 ss 294B–294D …. 7.33 s 294B(7) …. 7.33 s 296 …. 5.212 s 299A …. 5.212 s 299B …. 5.212 s 299D(1)(a) …. 5.213 s 299D(1)(b) …. 5.213 s 299D(1)(c) …. 5.213 s 299D(3) …. 5.212 s 299D(4) …. 5.212 s 306X …. 7.33 s 306Z …. 7.21

s 306ZI …. 7.33 s 306ZL …. 7.33 Sch 3 Pt 2 cl 3(2) …. 4.14 Criminal Records Act 1991 s 16 …. 7.142 Defamation Act 2005 s 42 …. 5.194 Evidence Act 1905 Pt IIIA …. 8.184 Evidence Act 1995 …. 2.2, 2.25, 2.28, 2.50, 3.3, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.12, 3.17, 3.31, 3.33, 3.40, 3.43, 3.49, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.63, 3.64, 3.68, 3.69, 3.70, 3.82, 3.83, 3.85, 3.87, 3.88, 3.90, 3.91, 3.93, 3.96, 3.99, 3.101, 3.104, 3.106, 3.107, 3.108, 3.109, 3.112, 3.118, 3.119, 3.120, 3.122, 3.127, 3.129, 3.131, 3.133, 3.135, 3.136, 3.137, 3.139, 3.141, 3.145, 3.152, 3.153, 3.154, 3.156, 3.159, 3.160, 3.162, 3.165, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, 4.22, 4.27, 4.30, 4.35, 4.36, 4.39, 4.48, 4.54, 4.55, 4.56, 4.57, 4.59, 4.63, 4.64, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 4.78, 4.79, 4.98, 4.101, 4.102, 4.105, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, 5.24, 5.26, 5.27, 5.31, 5.35, 5.36, 5.39, 5.40, 5.43, 5.47, 5.49, 5.66, 5.67, 5.69, 5.77, 5.83, 5.84, 5.86, 5.92, 5.97, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102, 5.108, 5.118, 5.120, 5.134, 5.135, 5.139, 5.144, 5.154, 5.161, 5.169, 5.175, 5.176, 5.177, 5.184, 5.190, 5.194, 5.201, 5.202, 5.203, 5.204, 5.207, 5.208, 5.214, 5.218, 5.241, 5.247, 5.253, 5.254, 5.266, 6.1, 6.23, 6.57, 6.66, 6.68, 6.77, 7.4, 7.8, 7.14, 7.20, 7.23, 7.26, 7.28, 7.30, 7.34, 7.35, 7.36, 7.54, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.66, 7.71, 7.73, 7.76, 7.78, 7.79, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.91, 7.93, 7.94, 7.95, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 7.113, 7.115, 7.116, 7.118, 7.124, 7.128, 7.134, 7.137, 7.141, 7.142, 7.143, 7.147, 7.148, 7.153, 7.158, 8.6, 8.8, 8.11, 8.12, 8.13, 8.22, 8.27, 8.28, 8.35, 8.48, 8.55, 8.57, 8.59, 8.62, 8.63, 8.65, 8.66, 8.69, 8.79, 8.81, 8.85, 8.87, 8.89, 8.90, 8.100, 8.106, 8.108, 8.112, 8.113, 8.114, 8.119, 8.125, 8.126, 8.127, 8.144, 8.146, 8.156, 8.161, 8.162, 8.163, 8.169, 8.171, 8.172, 8.173, 8.191, 8.196 Ch 3 …. 2.45 Ch 4 …. 2.48 Ch 5 …. 2.48

Pt 1.2 …. 2.2 Pt 2.1 Div 1 …. 2.48 Pt 2.1 Div 2 …. 2.48 Pt 3.1 …. 2.48 Pt 3.2 …. 8.93, 8.198 Pt 3.2 Div 2 …. 8.62, 8.195 Pt 3.2 Div 3 …. 8.199 Pt 3.4 …. 8.94, 8.100, 8.101, 8.198 Pt 3.6 …. 3.12, 3.106, 3.135, 3.153 Pt 3.7 …. 3.109, 7.122 Pt 3.8 …. 3.5, 3.90, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109 Pt 3.9 …. 2.48, 4.2, 4.54, 4.55, 4.63 Pt 3.10 …. 2.48, 5.19 Pt 3.10 Div 1 …. 5.19 Pt 3.10 Div 1A …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.214 Pt 3.10 Div 1B …. 5.207 Pt 3.10 Div 1C …. 5.19, 5.207 Pt 3.10 Div 3 …. 5.19 Pt 3.11 …. 2.29, 2.31, 2.48, 8.196 Pt 4.6 Div 1 …. 7.14, 7.26 Pt 4.6 Div 2 …. 7.13 Pt 4.6 Div 3 …. 6.70 Div 2 …. 5.19, 8.198 Div 3 …. 8.195, 8.200 s 4 …. 2.2 s 4(1) …. 2.2, 5.24 s 4(1)(d) …. 2.4 s 4(2)–(4) …. 2.4

s 8 …. 2.3 s 9 …. 2.3 s 9(2)(b) …. 6.23 s 10 …. 5.199 s 11 …. 7.124, 7.137 s 11(1) …. 6.48 s 11(2) …. 1.53, 2.29 s 12 …. 2.3, 3.83, 5.112, 5.115, 5.176, 5.200, 5.201 s 13 …. 4.14, 7.28, 7.30 s 13(1) …. 7.30 s 13(2) …. 7.30 s 13(3) …. 7.28, 7.30 s 13(5) …. 7.30 s 13(6) …. 7.30 s 13(8) …. 7.30, 7.31 s 14 …. 7.30 s 15(2) …. 5.199 s 16 …. 5.184 s 16(1) …. 5.185 s 17 …. 3.83, 8.126 s 17(2) …. 5.112 s 17(3) …. 5.112, 5.115 s 18 …. 2.26, 5.165, 5.201 s 19 …. 5.201 s 20 …. 2.12, 2.50, 5.115, 5.118, 5.120, 5.128, 5.129, 5.202, 8.126 s 20(2) …. 2.12, 5.120, 5.123 s 20(3) …. 5.132, 5.201 s 20(4) …. 2.12, 5.201

s 20(5) …. 5.120, 5.201 s 21 …. 5.115, 5.201, 5.202, 7.28 ss 21–24A …. 7.28 s 21(3a) …. 5.201 s 23 …. 7.28 s 24(2) …. 7.28 s 24A …. 7.28 s 26 …. 6.48, 7.115, 7.124, 7.137 ss 26–29 …. 7.115 s 26(a) …. 7.3 s 27 …. 3.84, 7.115, 7.124 s 28 …. 7.115 s 29 …. 6.58 s 29(2) …. 7.115 s 30 …. 7.30, 7.35 s 31 …. 7.30, 7.35, 8.12 s 31A(1)(b) …. 5.216 s 32 …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.79, 7.82, 7.83, 7.86 s 32(1) …. 7.79 s 32(2) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b)(i) …. 7.79 s 32(3) …. 7.80 s 32(4) …. 7.81 s 33 …. 5.26, 5.49, 7.76, 7.80 s 33(2)(a) …. 7.80 s 34 …. 7.76, 7.77, 7.84, 7.86, 7.112 s 35 …. 7.81, 7.82, 7.83, 7.154

s 37 …. 5.26, 7.115, 7.117, 7.126 s 37(1)(b) …. 7.117 s 38 …. 6.49, 6.57, 7.97, 7.118, 7.122, 7.123, 8.194 s 38(3) …. 7.122 s 38(4) …. 7.122 s 38(6) …. 7.122 s 38(7) …. 7.118, 7.122 s 39 …. 7.82, 7.156 s 40 …. 7.124 s 41 …. 2.46, 3.83, 3.145, 3.152, 7.33, 7.115, 7.137 s 42 …. 7.115, 7.126 s 43 …. 7.83, 7.97, 7.148, 7.149 s 44 …. 7.153 s 45 …. 7.82, 7.152 s 45(4) …. 7.82 s 46 …. 7.75, 7.129, 7.130 s 47(2) …. 7.19 s 48 …. 7.8, 7.56, 8.199 s 48(1) …. 7.19, 7.56 s 48(1)(c) …. 7.24, 7.56 s 48(1)(d) …. 7.19 s 48(2) …. 7.19 s 48(3) …. 7.19 s 48(4) …. 7.19 s 49 …. 7.19, 8.133 s 51 …. 7.19, 7.82 s 52 …. 7.20, 7.21 s 53 …. 7.23

s 53(1) …. 7.23 s 53(2) …. 7.23 s 53(2)(a) …. 2.43 s 53(3) …. 7.23 s 53(3)(d) …. 7.23 s 53(4) …. 7.23 s 53(5) …. 7.23 s 54 …. 7.23 s 55 …. 2.18, 2.19, 2.23, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.60, 3.141, 4.3, 4.100, 7.40, 7.41, 7.44, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.66, 7.116, 7.146, 8.95 s 55(1) …. 2.23, 2.24, 5.144, 7.54, 7.103 s 55(2) …. 2.19, 7.137 s 56 …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.28, 2.32, 7.44, 7.52, 7.66 s 56(1) …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.23, 2.27, 2.29, 2.46, 7.7, 7.8, 7.10, 8.27, 8.192 s 56(2) …. 7.54 s 57 …. 2.19, 7.8, 7.52, 8.194 s 57(1) …. 2.23, 7.8 s 57(1)(b) …. 2.19, 7.8 s 58 …. 7.8, 7.14, 8.199 s 58(1) …. 2.23 s 59 …. 2.46, 7.98, 8.8, 8.27, 8.57, 8.96, 8.99, 8.169, 8.192, 8.194, 8.199 s 59(1) …. 7.3, 8.8, 8.11, 8.19, 8.21, 8.22, 8.23, 8.24, 8.25, 8.26, 8.27, 8.28, 8.33, 8.44, 8.50, 8.53, 8.192, 8.193 s 59(2A) …. 8.27 s 60 …. 2.31, 2.39, 2.46, 4.1, 7.69, 7.70, 7.71, 7.72, 7.73, 7.81, 7.83, 7.91, 7.93, 7.97, 7.102, 7.123, 7.134, 7.151, 8.28, 8.29, 8.50, 8.71, 8.105, 8.194 s 60(1) …. 8.194 s 60(2) …. 7.69

s 60(3) …. 7.81, 8.105, 8.165 s 61 …. 8.195 s 62 …. 8.62, 8.66, 8.75, 8.79, 8.81, 8.83, 8.195, 8.196 s 62(1) …. 8.196 s 62(2) …. 8.196 s 63 …. 7.69, 7.98, 8.89, 8.196 s 63(2) …. 8.74, 8.85, 8.90 s 64 …. 7.69, 7.83, 7.93, 7.98, 8.169, 8.196 s 64(2) …. 7.76, 7.113, 8.85 s 64(4) …. 7.76, 8.196 s 65 …. 7.34, 8.66, 8.74, 8.83, 8.181, 8.193, 8.197 s 65(1)(b) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(c) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(d) …. 8.66 s 65(2) …. 8.82, 8.197 s 65(2)(a) …. 8.82, 8.83 s 65(2)(b) …. 8.29, 8.35, 8.39, 8.50, 8.66, 8.69, 8.75, 8.89, 8.197 s 65(2)(c) …. 7.98, 8.35, 8.50, 8.61, 8.89, 8.197 s 65(2)(d) …. 8.29, 8.75, 8.79, 8.80, 8.197 s 65(3) …. 8.53, 8.197 s 65(3)–(6) …. 8.197 s 65(7) …. 8.79 s 65(8) …. 8.63, 8.74, 8.197 s 65(9) …. 8.63, 8.197 s 66 …. 4.74, 7.34, 7.41, 7.79, 7.83, 7.93, 7.97, 7.98, 7.99, 7.102, 8.106, 8.169, 8.198 s 66(2) …. 7.76, 7.102, 7.113 s 66(2A) …. 7.79, 7.83, 8.198

s 66(3) …. 8.198 s 66(4) …. 7.76 s 66A …. 8.29, 8.31, 8.35, 8.42, 8.44, 8.46, 8.49, 8.50, 8.195, 8.198 s 67 …. 5.18, 8.74, 8.75, 8.82, 8.89, 8.90, 8.196, 8.197 s 68 …. 8.196 s 69 …. 7.13, 8.93, 8.182, 8.199 s 69(3) …. 8.199 s 69(4) …. 8.26, 8.199 s 70 …. 8.57, 8.190, 8.200 ss 70–75 …. 8.200 s 70(1) …. 8.30 s 71 …. 8.200 s 72 …. 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 73 …. 8.85, 8.200 s 74 …. 8.200 s 74(1) …. 8.84 s 74(2) …. 8.84 s 76 …. 2.23, 2.30, 7.38, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 8.49, 8.200 s 77 …. 2.31 ss 77–79 …. 7.38 s 78 …. 4.57, 7.41, 7.42, 7.56, 7.105 s 78(a) …. 7.41 s 78(b) …. 7.41 s 78A …. 7.73, 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 79 …. 2.23, 7.40, 7.41, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.58, 7.59, 7.64, 7.66, 8.71 s 79(1) …. 7.14, 7.41, 7.42, 7.44, 7.52, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.65, 7.66, 7.73, 7.108 s 79(2) …. 4.39, 7.45, 7.51, 7.54, 7.58, 7.62, 7.136

s 79(3) …. 7.136 s 80 …. 6.70, 7.44, 7.57, 7.59, 7.61 s 80(a) …. 7.62 s 80(b) …. 7.53, 7.55, 7.58, 7.65, 7.136 s 81 …. 5.144, 8.94, 8.108, 8.165, 8.194 s 81(2) …. 8.108 s 82 …. 8.99, 8.105 s 83 …. 8.78 s 83(1) …. 8.78 s 83(2) …. 8.78 s 83(3) …. 8.78 s 84 …. 5.135, 8.78, 8.96, 8.97, 8.99, 8.100, 8.126, 8.127, 8.131, 8.137, 8.160 s 84(1) …. 8.126 s 85 …. 5.135, 8.97, 8.99, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.130, 8.131, 8.134, 8.136, 8.137, 8.160, 8.162, 8.163 s 85(1) …. 8.126, 8.129 s 85(1)(b) …. 8.130 s 85(2) …. 8.126, 8.129, 8.130 s 85(3) …. 8.126, 8.128, 8.130 s 85(3)(a) …. 8.129 s 85(3)(b) …. 8.129, 8.130 s 86 …. 8.97, 8.167 s 88 …. 8.101 s 87(1) …. 8.112, 8.119 s 87(1)(a) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(b) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(c) …. 8.115, 8.117, 8.118

s 87(2) …. 8.114, 8.117 s 87(2)(c) …. 8.117 s 88 …. 7.7 s 89 …. 5.139, 5.141, 5.142, 8.98, 8.126 s 89(1) …. 5.144 s 89(2) …. 5.144 s 89(4) …. 5.144 s 89A …. 4.88, 5.14, 5.109, 5.134, 5.139, 5.140, 5.141, 5.142, 5.144, 5.167, 8.126, 8.154 s 90 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.32, 2.33, 2.34, 2.35, 8.97, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.131, 8.134, 8.135, 8.136, 8.137, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.154, 8.155, 8.160, 8.162 s 91 …. 5.194 s 92(2) …. 5.194 s 92(3) …. 5.194 s 93 …. 5.194 s 93(c) …. 5.190 s 94(1) …. 3.58, 3.152 s 94(3) …. 3.153 s 95 …. 3.11, 3.54, 3.75, 3.82, 3.106, 3.107, 3.135, 4.1 s 97 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 2.87, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.17, 3.26, 3.32, 3.36, 3.37, 3.40, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 ss 97–98 …. 5.18 ss 97–100 …. 3.160 s 97(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 97(1)(b) …. 3.61 s 98 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.23, 3.25, 3.39, 3.40, 3.49, 3.54, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82,

3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 s 98(1) …. 3.58 s 98(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 98(1)(b) …. 3.60 s 99 …. 3.9, 3.68 s 100 …. 3.9, 3.68, 3.125 s 101 …. 2.15, 2.31, 2.37, 2.87, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.36, 3.37, 3.39, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.127, 3.139, 3.156, 3.159 s 101(2) …. 3.59, 3.60, 3.62, 3.82, 3.127 s 101A …. 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 3.109, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112, 7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.139, 7.140 s 102 …. 2.46, 3.58, 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112, 7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.137, 7.139 s 102(2) …. 3.109 s 103 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.135, 3.145, 3.152, 3.162, 7.97, 7.116, 7.133, 7.137, 7.139 s 103(1) …. 3.83, 3.84, 7.133, 7.137, 7.142 s 104 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.109, 5.115 s 104(2) …. 3.90, 3.114 s 104(3) …. 3.90, 3.104 s 104(3)(b) …. 7.112, 7.144 s 104(4) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.110, 3.112 s 104(5) …. 3.110, 3.112 s 104(6) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.113, 3.117, 3.120, 3.122, 3.123 s 106 …. 7.83, 7.116, 7.133, 7.142, 7.149 s 106(1) …. 7.141, 7.143 s 106(2) …. 7.141, 7.142, 7.143

s 106(2)(a) …. 7.143 s 106(2)(b) …. 7.138, 7.142 s 106(2)(c) …. 7.148 s 106(2)(d) …. 7.112, 7.144 s 106(2)(e) …. 7.142 s 107 …. 7.97, 7.98 s 108 …. 7.90, 7.93, 7.116, 7.133, 7.156 s 108(1) …. 7.97, 7.158 s 108(3) …. 4.74, 7.97, 7.102, 7.158 s 108(3)(a) …. 7.93, 7.152 s 108(3)(b) …. 7.91, 7.92, 7.106 s 108A …. 7.97, 7.98, 7.133, 8.196, 8.199 s 108B …. 7.133 s 108C …. 4.39, 7.51, 7.58, 7.108, 7.133, 7.136, 7.144, 7.146 s 108C(1) …. 7.110, 7.112 s 110 …. 3.82, 3.83, 3.90, 3.106, 3.108, 3.109, 3.127, 3.129, 3.130, 3.134, 3.135, 3.137 s 110(1) …. 3.107 s 110(2) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 110(3) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 111 …. 3.82, 3.108, 7.136 s 112 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.100, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109, 3.130, 3.132, 3.135 s 113 …. 4.69 s 114 …. 2.46, 2.48, 4.58, 4.64, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 5.26, 7.94 s 114(1) …. 4.69 s 114(2) …. 4.69 s 114(2)(c) …. 4.70 s 114(5) …. 4.70

s 115 …. 4.58, 4.64, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74 s 115(3) …. 4.70 s 115(4) …. 4.70 s 115(7) …. 4.70 s 115(8) …. 4.70 s 116 …. 4.10, 4.54, 4.59, 4.61, 4.63, 4.69 s 116(1) …. 4.61 s 116(2) …. 4.59 s 117 …. 5.22, 5.26, 5.28, 5.37, 5.49, 5.58 s 117(1) …. 5.26 s 118 …. 5.24, 5.25, 5.27, 5.28, 5.31, 5.39 ss 118–119 …. 2.46, 2.48 ss 118–120 …. 5.35, 5.47, 5.48, 5.49 s 118(a) …. 5.28, 5.39 s 118(b) …. 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 118(c) …. 5.19, 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 119 …. 5.24, 5.42, 5.43 ss 119–120 …. 5.46 s 120 …. 5.24, 5.42 s 121 …. 5.69 s 122 …. 5.19, 5.54, 5.56, 5.58, 5.59 s 122(1) …. 5.58, 5.59 s 122(2) …. 5.58, 5.59, 5.100 s 122(3) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(a) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(b) …. 5.58 s 122(4) …. 5.58, 5.59 s 122(5) …. 5.58

s 122(5)(a)(i) …. 5.52 s 122(5)(b) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(5)(c) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(6) …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.81 s 123 …. 5.19, 5.70, 5.216 s 124 …. 5.49, 5.57, 5.58 s 125 …. 5.31 s 125(1)(a) …. 5.31 s 125(1)(b) …. 5.31 s 125(2) …. 5.31 s 126 …. 5.59 s 126A …. 8.147 s 126B …. 5.214 s 126B(4) …. 5.214 s 126E …. 5.85 s 126H …. 5.208 s 126K …. 5.19, 5.214 s 127 …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.210 s 127(1) …. 5.208 s 127(3) …. 5.208, 5.210 s 127A …. 5.19 s 127B …. 5.19 s 128 …. 3.87, 5.19, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177, 5.216, 8.164 s 128(1) …. 5.155, 5.176 s 128(1)(a) …. 5.164 s 128(2) …. 5.169 s 128(4)(a) …. 5.164 s 128(10) …. 3.83, 3.87, 5.180

s 128(12)–(14) …. 5.179 s 128A …. 5.19, 5.146, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177 s 129 …. 5.184, 5.185 s 129(4) …. 5.185 s 130 …. 5.205, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218, 5.222, 5.223, 5.231, 8.79 s 130(1) …. 5.216, 5.222, 5.243 s 130(2) …. 5.216 s 130(3) …. 5.241 s 130(4) …. 5.222 s 130(4)(a) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(b) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(c)–(e) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(e) …. 5.205 s 130(5) …. 5.253 s 130(5)(d) …. 5.254 s 131 …. 5.87, 5.88, 5.90, 5.94, 5.95, 5.96, 5.98, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102, 5.105, 5.214 s 131(1) …. 5.88, 5.94, 5.95, 5.97 s 131(2) …. 5.88 s 131(2)(a)–(c) …. 5.100 s 131(2)(d) …. 5.90, 5.100 s 131(2)(f) …. 5.97 s 131(2)(g) …. 5.100, 5.103 s 131(2)(h) …. 5.98 s 131(2)(i) …. 5.92, 5.96 s 131(2)(j) …. 5.96 s 131(2)(k) …. 5.96 s 131(3) …. 5.96

s 131(4) …. 5.96 s 131(5) …. 5.88, 5.90 s 131(5)(b) …. 5.99 s 131A …. 5.19, 5.24, 5.67, 5.70, 5.90, 5.102, 5.176, 5.208, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218 s 131A(1) …. 5.49 s 132 …. 5.166, 5.167 s 133 …. 5.78, 5.169, 5.247 s 135 …. 2.27, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.127, 3.159, 4.57, 7.41, 7.55, 7.59, 7.64, 7.73, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 8.144, 8.194 ss 135–137 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.32, 2.35, 3.11, 3.90, 3.133, 4.3, 7.124, 7.134, 8.29, 8.127, 8.193 ss 135–138 …. 2.27, 4.55 s 135(a) …. 7.55 s 136 …. 2.31, 2.39, 3.69, 3.79, 3.137, 7.41, 7.69, 7.73, 7.93, 7.102, 8.194 s 137 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.26, 2.27, 2.30, 2.31, 2.35, 2.46, 2.48, 2.70, 3.12, 3.54, 3.59, 3.60, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.104, 3.125, 3.127, 4.57, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 7.41, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.67, 7.93, 7.102, 7.108, 7.110, 7.111, 7.112, 7.135, 8.96, 8.127, 8.134, 8.144, 8.159, 8.194 s 138 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.33, 2.35, 2.36, 2.37, 2.46, 2.48, 4.57, 4.58, 4.68, 4.70, 4.74, 5.62, 5.134, 5.255, 5.258, 5.261, 5.264, 5.265, 5.267, 8.126, 8.127, 8.135, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.155, 8.158, 8.159, 8.160, 8.162 s 138(2) …. 8.127, 8.144, 8.155 s 138(3) …. 2.37 s 138(3)(f) …. 2.37 s 139 …. 5.134, 8.126, 8.149 s 139(2) …. 8.149 s 139(5) …. 8.149 s 140 …. 2.64 ss 140–141 …. 2.58

s 142 …. 2.12, 2.45, 2.91, 3.69, 5.31, 5.35, 7.8, 7.65 s 142(1) …. 8.160 s 143 …. 6.69 s 144 …. 6.60, 6.65, 6.71, 6.73, 6.77, 7.54, 7.59, 7.71 s 144(2) …. 6.66 s 144(4) …. 6.66 s 145 …. 6.60 s 146 …. 6.23, 7.13, 7.19, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 ss 146–147 …. 7.13, 7.26 s 147 …. 7.13, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 s 148 …. 7.11 s 149 …. 7.9 s 150 …. 7.11 s 151 …. 7.11 s 152 …. 7.11 s 153 …. 7.11 ss 153–159 …. 8.93 s 154 …. 7.11 s 155 …. 7.11 s 156 …. 7.11, 8.91 s 157 …. 7.11 s 158 …. 7.11 s 159 …. 7.11 s 161 …. 7.14, 8.200 s 162 …. 8.200 s 164 …. 4.9, 4.42, 4.45, 4.99, 4.102, 4.106 s 164(1) …. 4.4, 4.12 s 164(2) …. 4.4, 4.12, 4.14

s 164(3) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.12, 4.20, 4.22, 4.41 s 164(4) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.20 s 164(6) …. 4.7, 4.20 s 165 …. 4.10, 4.11, 4.23, 4.27, 4.28, 4.34, 4.36, 4.42, 4.45, 4.52, 4.75, 4.78, 4.79, 4.100, 4.102, 4.106, 7.93, 7.102, 7.112, 7.123, 8.193, 8.198 s 165(1) …. 4.24, 4.34, 4.36 s 165(1)–(4) …. 4.9 s 165(1)(a) …. 8.120 s 165(1)(b) …. 4.54, 4.56 s 165(1)(c) …. 4.39, 4.77 s 165(1)(d) …. 4.24, 4.27, 4.30, 4.52 s 165(1)(e) …. 4.76 s 165(1)(f) …. 4.22, 4.33, 4.34, 8.168 s 165(1)(g) …. 4.75 s 165(2) …. 4.5, 4.9, 4.10, 4.12, 4.33, 4.36, 4.52, 4.75, 4.100, 4.101, 4.105, 8.120 s 165(3) …. 4.9, 4.100, 7.123, 7.125 s 165(4) …. 4.9, 4.59 s 165(5) …. 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.22, 4.30, 4.34, 4.36, 4.39, 4.41, 4.54, 4.100 s 165A …. 4.36, 4.37, 4.39, 7.31 s 165A(1) …. 4.10, 4.39 s 165A(1)(a) …. 4.20 s 165A(2) …. 4.39 s 165B …. 4.36, 4.51 s 165B(2) …. 4.51 s 165B(7) …. 4.51 s 166 …. 7.8, 8.199 s 166(g) …. 5.194

s 167 …. 5.18, 5.194, 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 7.25, 7.64 ss 170–173 …. 7.26 s 171 …. 7.19 s 176 …. 7.61 s 177 …. 7.64 ss 178–179 …. 5.194 s 182 …. 7.14 s 183 …. 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 8.199, 8.200 s 184 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 187 …. 5.154 s 189 …. 2.12, 2.40, 7.120 s 189(1) …. 8.163 s 189(2) …. 2.42, 8.163 s 189(3) …. 8.129, 8.130, 8.163 s 189(4) …. 2.42, 5.168, 7.30 s 189(5) …. 2.42 s 189(6) …. 2.45, 3.83, 3.87, 8.164 s 189(7) …. 2.45, 8.162 s 189(8) …. 2.45, 8.163, 8.165 s 190 …. 2.46, 2.48, 5.26 s 190(1) …. 2.48 s 190(2) …. 2.48 s 190(3) …. 2.48, 6.68 s 191 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 192 …. 2.26, 2.40, 2.42, 3.104, 3.132, 7.23, 7.93, 7.112, 7.122 s 192(2) …. 3.109, 7.79 s 192A …. 2.40, 3.104, 3.132, 5.12 s 192A(c) …. 3.132

s 193 …. 7.14, 7.19, 7.26, 7.64 Sch …. 7.28 Dictionary …. 2.19, 4.54, 4.69, 5.19, 5.26, 7.5, 7.19, 7.73, 7.116, 7.140, 8.12, 8.21, 8.27, 8.100, 8.129, 8.192 Dictionary Pt 1 …. 8.94 Dictionary Pt 2 …. 7.19 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 1 …. 8.199 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 4 …. 8.66, 8.196 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 7 …. 7.122 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 8 …. 5.40 Dictionary cl 4(2) …. 8.196 Dictionary cl 6 …. 8.196 Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998 …. 7.3 Evidence Regulations 2005 cl 5 …. 3.68 cl 6 …. 3.68 Freedom of Information Act 1989 …. 5.232 Sch 1 cl 4(1)(a) …. 5.16 Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 ss 26, 37 …. 5.180 Jury Act 1977 s 55F …. 2.13 s 68B …. 5.185 Justices Act 1902 s 41(6) …. 6.31 Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act 1997 …. 2.37, 4.53 s 28 …. 5.205 Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 …. 5.17

Pt 9 …. 8.148 Pt 9 s 111 …. 8.147 s 99 …. 8.147 s 122(1) …. 8.149 s 123 …. 4.33 Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Regulations 2005 Pt 3 Div 3 …. 8.150, 8.152 reg 33 …. 8.151 Listening Devices Act 1984 …. 8.142 Oaths Act 1900 ss 11A–13 …. 7.28 Partnership Act 1892 s 15 …. 8.110 s 67(1) …. 8.110 Road Transport Act 2013 s 109 …. 7.25 Succession Act 2006 s 100 …. 8.45 Surveillance Devices Act 2007 …. 8.155 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 …. 5.19 Pt 5 …. 5.6 Pt 5 r 2 …. 5.10 Pt 5 r 3 …. 5.10 Pt 5 r 4 …. 5.10 Pt 12 Div 1 …. 6.37 Pt 13 r 1 …. 6.36 Pt 14 r 28 …. 6.36 Pt 17 …. 8.95

Pts 21–22 …. 5.6 Pt 21 r 2 …. 5.7 Pt 21 r 3 …. 5.7 Pt 23 …. 5.8 Pt 23 r 8 …. 5.8 Pt 29 r 6 …. 2.11 Pt 29 r 10 …. 6.39 Pt 29 r 29.8 …. 6.37 Pt 29 r 29.9 …. 6.37 Pt 31 Div 2 …. 5.8 Pt 31 Div 2 Subdiv 4 r 31.37 …. 7.64 Pt 31 Div 5 …. 7.64 Pt 31 rr 24–26 …. 7.64 Pt 31 r 28 …. 5.76 Pt 31 r 46 …. 6.48 Pt 31 Sch 7 …. 7.64 Pt 33 …. 5.5 r 1.8 …. 5.78 r 3 …. 5.6 r 14.10 …. 6.3 r 21.1(2) …. 5.7 r 21.2(3)(a) …. 5.7 r 29.10 …. 6.37 r 31.54 …. 7.64 Witness Protection Act 1995 s 26 …. 5.85

NORTHERN TERRITORY

Aboriginals Ordinance 1918–1947 …. 6.19 Bail Act 1982 s 16 …. 8.147 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 s 44 …. 8.93 Criminal Code Act 1983 s 32 …. 3.142, 6.8, 6.9 s 38 …. 6.23 s 43BU …. 6.17 s 43BV …. 6.17 s 47(2) …. 4.14 s 98 …. 4.14 s 120 …. 4.14 s 131A …. 3.34 s 192 …. 3.142 s 309 …. 3.71 s 331 …. 2.8, 5.14 s 331A …. 5.14 s 331B …. 5.14 s 341 …. 3.71 s 350 …. 3.71, 3.78 s 360(1) …. 5.115 s 361 …. 2.43 s 363 …. 2.7, 2.11 s 379 …. 3.66, 8.95 s 408 …. 2.15 s 410 …. 2.14 s 411 …. 2.14

s 414(2) …. 2.14 s 414(5) …. 2.14 s 440 …. 6.21 Sch 1 s 431(a) …. 2.14 Sch 4 …. 2.7 Defamation Act 2006 s 39 …. 5.194 Evidence Act 1939 Pt 5 …. 7.3 Pt IVA …. 5.217 s 12 …. 5.207 s 17 …. 5.85 s 21(3) …. 7.84 s 21A …. 7.33 ss 21A–21C …. 7.33 s 21A(1) …. 7.34 s 21A(3) …. 7.33 s 21B …. 7.34 s 21B(2)(a) …. 7.34 s 21B(2)(b) …. 7.34 s 21E …. 7.34 s 26E(1) …. 7.34, 7.99 s 26E(3) …. 7.34, 7.99 s 56 …. 5.212 ss 56–56G …. 5.207 s 56C …. 5.212 s 56D …. 5.212 s 57 …. 5.85

s 58 …. 5.85 Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 …. 2.2, 2.25, 2.28, 2.50, 3.3, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.12, 3.17, 3.31, 3.33, 3.40, 3.43, 3.49, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.63, 3.64, 3.68, 3.69, 3.70, 3.82, 3.83, 3.85, 3.87, 3.88, 3.90, 3.91, 3.93, 3.96, 3.99, 3.101, 3.104, 3.106, 3.107, 3.108, 3.109, 3.112, 3.118, 3.119, 3.120, 3.122, 3.127, 3.129, 3.131, 3.133, 3.135, 3.136, 3.137, 3.139, 3.141, 3.145, 3.152, 3.153, 3.154, 3.156, 3.159, 3.160, 3.162, 3.165, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, 4.22, 4.27, 4.30, 4.35, 4.36, 4.39, 4.48, 4.54, 4.55, 4.56, 4.57, 4.59, 4.63, 4.64, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 4.78, 4.79, 4.98, 4.101, 4.102, 4.105, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, 5.24, 5.26, 5.27, 5.31, 5.35, 5.36, 5.39, 5.40, 5.43, 5.47, 5.49, 5.66, 5.67, 5.69, 5.77, 5.83, 5.84, 5.86, 5.92, 5.97, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102, 5.108, 5.118, 5.120, 5.134, 5.135, 5.139, 5.144, 5.154, 5.161, 5.169, 5.175, 5.176, 5.177, 5.184, 5.190, 5.194, 5.201, 5.202, 5.203, 5.204, 5.207, 5.208, 5.214, 5.218, 5.241, 5.247, 5.253, 5.254, 5.266, 6.1, 6.23, 6.57, 6.66, 6.68, 6.77, 7.4, 7.8, 7.14, 7.20, 7.23, 7.26, 7.28, 7.30, 7.34, 7.35, 7.36, 7.54, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.66, 7.71, 7.73, 7.76, 7.78, 7.79, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.91, 7.93, 7.94, 7.95, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 7.113, 7.115, 7.116, 7.118, 7.124, 7.128, 7.134, 7.137, 7.141, 7.142, 7.143, 7.147, 7.148, 7.153, 7.158, 8.6, 8.8, 8.11, 8.12, 8.13, 8.22, 8.27, 8.28, 8.35, 8.48, 8.55, 8.57, 8.59, 8.62, 8.63, 8.65, 8.66, 8.69, 8.79, 8.81, 8.85, 8.87, 8.89, 8.90, 8.100, 8.106, 8.108, 8.112, 8.113, 8.114, 8.119, 8.125, 8.126, 8.127, 8.144, 8.146, 8.156, 8.161, 8.162, 8.163, 8.169, 8.171, 8.172, 8.173, 8.191, 8.196 Ch 3 …. 2.45 Ch 4 …. 2.48 Ch 5 …. 2.48 Pt 1.2 …. 2.2 Pt 2 Div 3 …. 8.199 Pt 2.1 Div 1 …. 2.48 Pt 2.1 Div 2 …. 2.48 Pt 3.1 …. 2.48 Pt 3.2 …. 8.93, 8.198 Pt 3.2 Div 2 …. 8.62, 8.195

Pt 3.4 …. 8.94, 8.100, 8.101, 8.198 Pt 3.6 …. 3.12, 3.106, 3.135, 3.153 Pt 3.7 …. 3.109, 7.122 Pt 3.8 …. 3.5, 3.90, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109 Pt 3.9 …. 2.48, 4.2, 4.54, 4.55, 4.63 Pt 3.10 …. 2.48, 5.19 Pt 3.10 Div 1 …. 5.19 Pt 3.10 Div 1A …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.214 Pt 3.10 Div 1C …. 5.19, 5.207 Pt 3.10 Div 3 …. 5.19 Pt 3.11 …. 2.29, 2.31, 2.48, 8.196 Pt 4.6 Div 1 …. 7.14, 7.26 Pt 4.6 Div 2 …. 7.13 Pt 4.6 Div 3 …. 6.70 Div 2 …. 5.19, 8.198 Div 3 …. 8.195, 8.200 s 4 …. 2.2 s 4(1) …. 2.2, 5.24 s 4(1)(d) …. 2.4 s 4(2)–(4) …. 2.4 s 8 …. 2.3 s 9 …. 2.3 s 9(2)(b) …. 6.23 s 10 …. 5.199, 5.199 s 11 …. 7.124, 7.137 s 11(1) …. 6.48 s 11(2) …. 1.53, 2.29 s 12 …. 2.3, 3.83, 5.112, 5.115, 5.176, 5.200, 5.201

s 13 …. 4.14, 7.28, 7.30 s 13(1) …. 7.30 s 13(2) …. 7.30 s 13(3) …. 7.28, 7.30 s 13(5) …. 7.30 s 13(6) …. 7.30 s 13(8) …. 7.30, 7.31 s 14 …. 7.30 s 15(2) …. 5.199 s 16 …. 5.184 s 16(1) …. 5.185 s 17 …. 3.83, 8.126 s 17(2) …. 5.112 s 17(3) …. 5.112, 5.115 s 18 …. 2.26, 5.165, 5.201 s 19 …. 5.201 s 20 …. 2.12, 2.50, 5.115, 5.118, 5.120, 5.128, 5.129, 5.202, 8.126 s 20(2) …. 2.12, 5.120, 5.123 s 20(3) …. 5.132, 5.201 s 20(4) …. 2.12, 5.201 s 20(5) …. 5.120, 5.201 s 21 …. 5.115, 5.201, 5.202, 7.28 ss 21–24A …. 7.28 s 21(3a) …. 5.201 s 23 …. 7.28 s 24(2) …. 7.28 s 24A …. 7.28 s 26 …. 6.48, 7.115, 7.124, 7.137

ss 26–29 …. 7.115 s 26(a) …. 7.3 s 27 …. 3.84, 7.115, 7.124 s 28 …. 7.115 s 29 …. 6.58 s 29(2) …. 7.115 s 30 …. 7.30, 7.35 s 31 …. 7.30, 7.35, 8.12 s 31A(1)(b) …. 5.216 s 32 …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.79, 7.82, 7.83, 7.86 s 32(1) …. 7.79 s 32(2) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b)(i) …. 7.79 s 32(3) …. 7.80 s 32(4) …. 7.81 s 33 …. 5.26, 5.49, 7.76, 7.80 s 33(2)(a) …. 7.80 s 34 …. 7.76, 7.77, 7.84, 7.86, 7.112 s 35 …. 7.81, 7.82, 7.83, 7.154 s 37 …. 5.26, 7.115, 7.117, 7.126 s 37(1)(b) …. 7.117 s 38 …. 6.49, 6.57, 7.97, 7.118, 7.122, 7.123, 8.194 s 38(3) …. 7.122 s 38(4) …. 7.122 s 38(6) …. 7.122 s 38(7) …. 7.118, 7.122 s 39 …. 7.82, 7.156

s 40 …. 7.124 s 41 …. 2.46, 3.83, 3.145, 3.152, 7.33, 7.115, 7.137 s 41(1) …. 7.138 s 41(2) …. 7.138 s 41(4) …. 7.138 s 41(6) …. 7.138 s 41(8) …. 7.138 s 42 …. 7.115, 7.126 s 43 …. 7.83, 7.97, 7.148, 7.149 s 44 …. 7.153 s 45 …. 7.82, 7.152 s 45(4) …. 7.82 s 46 …. 7.75, 7.129, 7.130 s 47(2) …. 7.19 s 48 …. 7.8, 7.56, 8.199 s 48(1) …. 7.19, 7.56 s 48(1)(c) …. 7.24, 7.56 s 48(1)(d) …. 7.19 s 48(2) …. 7.19 s 48(3) …. 7.19 s 48(4) …. 7.19 s 49 …. 7.19, 8.133 s 51 …. 7.19, 7.82 s 52 …. 7.20, 7.21 s 53 …. 7.23 s 53(1) …. 7.23 s 53(2) …. 7.23 s 53(2)(a) …. 2.43

s 53(3) …. 7.23 s 53(3)(d) …. 7.23 s 53(4) …. 7.23 s 53(5) …. 7.23 s 54 …. 7.23 s 55 …. 2.18, 2.19, 2.23, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.60, 3.141, 4.3, 4.100, 7.40, 7.41, 7.44, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.66, 7.116, 7.146, 8.95 s 55(1) …. 2.23, 2.24, 5.144, 7.54, 7.103 s 55(2) …. 2.19, 7.137 s 56 …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.28, 2.32, 7.44, 7.52, 7.66 s 56(1) …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.23, 2.27, 2.29, 2.46, 7.7, 7.8, 7.10, 8.27, 8.192 s 56(2) …. 7.54 s 57 …. 2.19, 7.8, 7.52, 8.194 s 57(1) …. 2.23, 7.8 s 57(1)(b) …. 2.19, 7.68 s 58 …. 7.8, 7.14, 8.199 s 58(1) …. 2.23 s 59 …. 2.46, 7.98, 8.8, 8.27, 8.57, 8.96, 8.99, 8.169, 8.192, 8.194, 8.199 s 59(1) …. 7.3, 8.8, 8.11, 8.19, 8.21, 8.22, 8.23, 8.24, 8.25, 8.26, 8.27, 8.28, 8.33, 8.44, 8.50, 8.53, 8.192, 8.193 s 59(2A) …. 8.27 s 60 …. 2.31, 2.39, 2.46, 4.1, 7.69, 7.70, 7.71, 7.72, 7.73, 7.81, 7.83, 7.91, 7.93, 7.97, 7.102, 7.123, 7.134, 7.151, 8.28, 8.29, 8.50, 8.71, 8.105, 8.194 s 60(1) …. 8.194 s 60(2) …. 7.69 s 60(3) …. 7.81, 8.105, 8.165 s 61 …. 8.195 s 62 …. 8.62, 8.66, 8.75, 8.79, 8.81, 8.83, 8.195, 8.196

s 62(1) …. 8.196 s 62(2) …. 8.196 s 63 …. 7.69, 7.98, 8.89, 8.196 s 63(2) …. 8.74, 8.85, 8.90 s 64 …. 7.69, 7.83, 7.93, 7.98, 8.169, 8.196 s 64(2) …. 7.76, 7.113, 8.85 s 64(4) …. 7.76, 8.196 s 65 …. 7.34, 8.66, 8.74, 8.83, 8.181, 8.193, 8.197 s 65(1)(b) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(c) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(d) …. 8.66 s 65(2) …. 8.82, 8.197 s 65(2)(a) …. 8.82, 8.83 s 65(2)(b) …. 8.29, 8.35, 8.39, 8.50, 8.66, 8.69, 8.75, 8.89, 8.197 s 65(2)(c) …. 7.98, 8.35, 8.50, 8.61, 8.89, 8.197 s 65(2)(d) …. 8.29, 8.75, 8.79, 8.80, 8.197 s 65(3) …. 8.53, 8.197 s 65(3)–(6) …. 8.197 s 65(7) …. 8.79 s 65(8) …. 8.63, 8.74, 8.197 s 65(9) …. 8.63, 8.197 s 66 …. 4.74, 7.34, 7.41, 7.79, 7.83, 7.93, 7.97, 7.98, 7.99, 7.102, 8.106, 8.169, 8.198 s 66(2) …. 7.76, 7.102, 7.113 s 66(2A) …. 7.79, 7.83, 8.198 s 66(3) …. 8.198 s 66(4) …. 7.76 s 66A …. 8.29, 8.31, 8.35, 8.42, 8.44, 8.46, 8.49, 8.50, 8.195, 8.198

s 67 …. 5.18, 8.74, 8.75, 8.82, 8.89, 8.90, 8.196, 8.197 s 68 …. 8.196 s 69 …. 7.13, 8.93, 8.182, 8.199 s 69(3) …. 8.199 s 69(4) …. 8.26, 8.199 s 70 …. 8.57, 8.190, 8.200 ss 70–75 …. 8.200 s 70(1) …. 8.30 s 71 …. 8.200 s 72 …. 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 73 …. 8.85, 8.200 s 74 …. 8.200 s 74(1) …. 8.84 s 74(2) …. 8.84 s 76 …. 2.23, 2.30, 7.38, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 8.49, 8.200 s 77 …. 2.31 ss 77–79 …. 7.38 s 78 …. 4.57, 7.41, 7.42, 7.56, 7.105 s 78(a) …. 7.41 s 78(b) …. 7.41 s 78A …. 7.73, 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 79 …. 2.23, 7.40, 7.41, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.58, 7.59, 7.64, 7.66, 8.71 s 79(1) …. 7.14, 7.41, 7.42, 7.44, 7.52, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.65, 7.66, 7.73, 7.108 s 79(2) …. 4.39, 7.45, 7.51, 7.54, 7.58, 7.62, 7.136 s 79(3) …. 7.136 s 80 …. 6.70, 7.44, 7.57, 7.59, 7.61 s 80(a) …. 7.62

s 80(b) …. 7.53, 7.55, 7.58, 7.65, 7.136 s 81 …. 5.144, 8.94, 8.108, 8.165, 8.194 s 81(2) …. 8.108 s 82 …. 8.99, 8.105 s 83 …. 8.78 s 83(1) …. 8.78 s 83(2) …. 8.78 s 83(3) …. 8.78 s 84 …. 5.135, 8.78, 8.96, 8.97, 8.99, 8.100, 8.126, 8.127, 8.131, 8.137, 8.160 s 84(1) …. 8.126 s 85 …. 5.135, 8.97, 8.99, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.130, 8.131, 8.134, 8.136, 8.137, 8.160, 8.162, 8.163 s 85(1) …. 8.126, 8.129 s 85(1)(b) …. 8.130 s 85(2) …. 8.126, 8.129, 8.130 s 85(3) …. 8.126, 8.128, 8.130 s 85(3)(a) …. 8.129 s 85(3)(b) …. 8.129, 8.130 s 86 …. 8.97, 8.167 s 87(1) …. 8.112, 8.119 s 87(1)(a) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(b) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(c) …. 8.115, 8.117, 8.118 s 87(2) …. 8.114, 8.117 s 87(2)(c) …. 8.117 s 88 …. 7.7, 8.101 s 89 …. 5.139, 5.141, 5.142, 8.98, 8.126

s 89(1) …. 5.144 s 89(2) …. 5.144 s 89(4) …. 5.144 s 90 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.32, 2.33, 2.34, 2.35, 8.97, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.131, 8.134, 8.135, 8.136, 8.137, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.154, 8.160, 8.162 s 91 …. 5.194 s 92(2) …. 5.194 s 92(3) …. 5.194 s 93 …. 5.194 s 93(c) …. 5.190 s 94(1) …. 3.58, 3.152 s 94(3) …. 3.153 s 95 …. 3.11, 3.54, 3.75, 3.82, 3.106, 3.107, 3.135, 4.1 s 97 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 2.87, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.17, 3.26, 3.32, 3.36, 3.37, 3.40, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 ss 97–98 …. 5.18 ss 97–100 …. 3.160 s 97(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 97(1)(b) …. 3.61 s 98 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.23, 3.25, 3.39, 3.40, 3.49, 3.54, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 s 98(1) …. 3.58 s 98(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 98(1)(b) …. 3.60 s 99 …. 3.9, 3.68

s 100 …. 3.9, 3.68, 3.125 s 101 …. 2.15, 2.31, 2.37, 2.87, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.36, 3.37, 3.39, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.127, 3.139, 3.156, 3.159 s 101(2) …. 3.59, 3.60, 3.62, 3.82, 3.127 s 101A …. 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 3.109, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112, 7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.139, 7.140 s 102 …. 2.46, 3.58, 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112, 7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.137, 7.139 s 102(2) …. 3.109 s 103 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.135, 3.145, 3.152, 3.162, 7.97, 7.116, 7.133, 7.137, 7.139 s 103(1) …. 3.83, 3.84, 7.133, 7.137, 7.142 s 104 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.109, 5.115 s 104(2) …. 3.90, 3.114 s 104(3) …. 3.90, 3.104 s 104(3)(b) …. 7.112, 7.144 s 104(4) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.110, 3.112 s 104(5) …. 3.110, 3.112 s 104(6) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.113, 3.117, 3.120, 3.122, 3.123 s 106 …. 7.83, 7.116, 7.133, 7.142, 7.149 s 106(1) …. 7.141, 7.143 s 106(2) …. 7.141, 7.142, 7.143 s 106(2)(a) …. 7.143 s 106(2)(b) 7.138, 7.142 s 106(2)(c) …. 7.148 s 106(2)(d) …. 7.112, 7.144 s 106(2)(e) …. 7.142 s 107 …. 7.97, 7.98

s 108 …. 7.90, 7.93, 7.116, 7.133, 7.156 s 108(1) …. 7.97, 7.158 s 108(3) …. 4.74, 7.97, 7.102, 7.158 s 108(3)(a) …. 7.93, 7.152 s 108(3)(b) 7.91, 7.92, 7.106 s 108A …. 7.97, 7.98, 7.133, 8.196, 8.199 s 108B …. 7.133 s 108C …. 4.39, 7.51, 7.58, 7.108, 7.133, 7.136, 7.144, 7.146 s 108C(1) …. 7.110, 7.112 s 110 …. 3.82, 3.83, 3.90, 3.106, 3.108, 3.109, 3.127, 3.129, 3.130, 3.134, 3.135, 3.137 s 110(1) …. 3.107 s 110(2) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 110(3) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 111 …. 3.82, 3.108, 7.136 s 112 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.100, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109, 3.130, 3.132, 3.135 s 113 …. 4.69 s 114 …. 2.46, 2.48, 4.58, 4.64, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 5.26, 7.94 s 114(1) …. 4.69 s 114(2) …. 4.69 s 114(2)(c) …. 4.70 s 114(5) …. 4.70 s 115 …. 4.58, 4.64, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74 s 115(3) …. 4.70 s 115(4) …. 4.70 s 115(7) …. 4.70 s 115(8) …. 4.70 s 116 …. 4.10, 4.54, 4.59, 4.61, 4.63, 4.69

s 116(1) …. 4.61 s 116(2) …. 4.59 s 117 …. 5.22, 5.26, 5.28, 5.37, 5.49, 5.58 s 117(1) …. 5.26 s 118 …. 5.24, 5.25, 5.27, 5.28, 5.31, 5.39 ss 118–119 …. 2.46, 2.48 ss 118–120 …. 5.35, 5.47, 5.48, 5.49 s 118(a) …. 5.28, 5.39 s 118(b) …. 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 118(c) …. 5.19, 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 119 …. 5.24, 5.42, 5.43 ss 119–120 …. 5.46 s 120 …. 5.24, 5.42 s 121 …. 5.69 s 122 …. 5.19, 5.54, 5.56, 5.58, 5.59 s 122(1) …. 5.58, 5.59 s 122(2) …. 5.58, 5.59, 5.100 s 122(3) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(a) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(b) …. 5.58 s 122(4) …. 5.58, 5.59 s 122(5) …. 5.58 s 122(5)(a)(i) …. 5.52 s 122(5)(b) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(5)(c) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(6) …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.81 s 123 …. 5.19, 5.70, 5.216 s 124 …. 5.49, 5.57, 5.58

s 125 …. 5.31 s 125(1)(a) …. 5.31 s 125(1)(b) …. 5.31 s 125(2) …. 5.31 s 126 …. 5.59 s 126K …. 5.19 s 127 …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.210 s 127(1) …. 5.208 s 127(3) …. 5.208, 5.210 s 127A …. 5.19 s 127B …. 5.19 s 128 …. 3.87, 5.19, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177, 5.216, 8.164 s 128(1) …. 5.155, 5.176 s 128(1)(a) …. 5.164 s 128(2) …. 5.169 s 128(4)(a) …. 5.164 s 128(10) …. 3.83, 3.87, 5.180 s 128(12)–(14) …. 5.179 s 128A …. 5.19, 5.146, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177 s 129 …. 5.184, 5.185 s 129(4) …. 5.185 s 130 …. 5.205, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218, 5.222, 5.223, 5.231, 8.79 s 130(1) …. 5.216, 5.222, 5.243 s 130(2) …. 5.216 s 130(3) …. 5.241 s 130(4) …. 5.222 s 130(4)(a) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(b) …. 5.223

s 130(4)(c)–(e) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(e) …. 5.205 s 130(5) …. 5.253 s 130(5)(d) …. 5.254 s 131 …. 5.87, 5.88, 5.90, 5.94, 5.95, 5.96, 5.98, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102, 5.105, 5.214 s 131(1) …. 5.88, 5.94, 5.95, 5.97 s 131(2) …. 5.88 s 131(2)(a)–(c) …. 5.100 s 131(2)(d) …. 5.90, 5.100 s 131(2)(f) …. 5.97 s 131(2)(g) …. 5.100, 5.103 s 131(2)(h) …. 5.98 s 131(2)(i) …. 5.92, 5.96 s 131(2)(j) …. 5.96 s 131(2)(k) …. 5.96 s 131(3) …. 5.96 s 131(4) …. 5.96 s 131(5) …. 5.88, 5.90 s 131(5)(b) …. 5.99 s 131A …. 5.19, 5.24, 5.67, 5.70, 5.90, 5.102, 5.176, 5.208, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218 s 131A(1) …. 5.49 s 132 …. 5.166, 5.167 s 133 …. 5.78, 5.169, 5.247 s 135 …. 2.27, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.127, 3.159, 7.41, 7.55, 7.59, 7.64, 7.73, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 8.144, 8.194 ss 135–137 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.32, 2.35, 3.11, 3.90, 3.133, 4.3, 7.124, 7.134, 8.29, 8.127, 8.193

ss 135–138 …. 2.27, 4.55 s 135(a) …. 7.55 s 136 …. 2.31, 2.39, 3.69, 3.79, 3.137, 7.41, 7.69, 7.73, 7.93, 7.102, 8.194 s 137 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.26, 2.27, 2.30, 2.31, 2.35, 2.46, 2.48, 2.70, 3.12, 3.54, 3.59, 3.60, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.104, 3.125, 3.127, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 7.41, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.67, 7.93, 7.102, 7.108, 7.110, 7.111, 7.112, 7.135, 8.96, 8.127, 8.134, 8.144, 8.159, 8.194 s 138 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.33, 2.35, 2.36, 2.37, 2.46, 2.48, 4.58, 4.68, 4.70, 4.74, 5.62, 5.134, 5.255, 5.258, 5.261, 5.264, 5.265, 5.267, 8.126, 8.127, 8.135, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.155, 8.158, 8.159, 8.160, 8.162 s 138(2) …. 8.127, 8.144, 8.155 s 138(3) …. 2.37 s 138(3)(f) …. 2.37 s 139 …. 5.134, 8.126, 8.149 s 139(2) …. 8.149 s 139(5) …. 8.149 s 140 …. 2.64 ss 140–141 …. 2.58 s 142 …. 2.12, 2.45, 2.91, 3.69, 5.31, 5.35, 7.8, 7.65 s 142(1) …. 8.160 s 143 …. 6.69 s 144 …. 6.60, 6.65, 6.71, 6.73, 6.77, 7.54, 7.59, 7.71 s 144(2) …. 6.66 s 144(4) …. 6.66 s 145 …. 6.60 s 146 …. 6.23, 7.13, 7.19, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 ss 146–147 …. 7.13, 7.26 s 147 …. 7.13, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 s 148 …. 7.11

s 149 …. 7.9 s 150 …. 7.11 s 151 …. 7.11 s 152 …. 7.11 s 153 …. 7.11 ss 153–159 …. 8.93 s 154 …. 7.11 s 155 …. 7.11 s 156 …. 7.11, 8.91 s 157 …. 7.11 s 158 …. 7.11 s 159 …. 7.11 s 161 …. 7.14, 8.200 s 162 …. 8.200 s 164 …. 4.9, 4.42, 4.45, 4.99, 4.102, 4.106 s 164(1) …. 4.4, 4.12 s 164(2) …. 4.4, 4.12, 4.14 s 164(3) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.12, 4.20, 4.22, 4.41 s 164(4) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.20 s 164(6) …. 4.7, 4.20 s 165 …. 4.10, 4.11, 4.23, 4.27, 4.28, 4.34, 4.36, 4.42, 4.45, 4.52, 4.75, 4.78, 4.79, 4.100, 4.102, 4.106, 7.93, 7.102, 7.112, 7.123, 8.193, 8.198 s 165(1) …. 4.24, 4.34, 4.36 s 165(1)–(4) …. 4.9 s 165(1)(a) …. 8.120 s 165(1)(b) 4.54, 4.56 s 165(1)(c) …. 4.39, 4.77 s 165(1)(d) …. 4.24, 4.27, 4.30, 4.52

s 165(1)(e) …. 4.76 s 165(1)(f) …. 4.22, 4.33, 4.34, 8.168 s 165(1)(g) …. 4.75 s 165(2) …. 4.5, 4.9, 4.10, 4.12, 4.33, 4.36, 4.52, 4.75, 4.100, 4.101, 4.105, 8.120 s 165(3) …. 4.9, 4.100, 7.123, 7.125 s 165(4) …. 4.9, 4.59 s 165(5) …. 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.22, 4.30, 4.34, 4.36, 4.39, 4.41, 4.54, 4.100 s 165A …. 4.36, 4.37, 4.39, 7.31 s 165A(1) …. 4.10, 4.39 s 165A(1)(a) …. 4.20 s 165A(2) …. 4.39 s 165B …. 4.36, 4.51 s 166 …. 7.8, 8.199 s 166(g) …. 5.194 s 167 …. 5.18, 5.194, 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 7.25, 7.64 ss 170–173 …. 7.26 s 171 …. 7.19 s 176 …. 7.61 s 177 …. 7.64 ss 178–179 …. 5.194 s 182 …. 7.14 s 183 …. 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 8.199, 8.200 s 184 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 187 …. 5.154 s 189 …. 2.12, 2.40, 7.120 s 189(1) …. 8.163 s 189(2) …. 2.42, 8.163

s 189(3) …. 8.129, 8.130, 8.163 s 189(4) …. 2.42, 5.168, 7.30 s 189(5) …. 2.42 s 189(6) …. 2.45, 3.83, 3.87, 8.164 s 189(7) …. 2.45, 8.162 s 189(8) …. 2.45, 8.163, 8.165 s 190 …. 2.46, 2.48, 5.26 s 190(1) …. 2.48 s 190(2) …. 2.48 s 190(3) …. 2.48, 6.68 s 191 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 192 …. 2.26, 2.40, 2.42, 3.104, 3.132, 7.23, 7.93, 7.112, 7.122 s 192(2) …. 3.109, 7.79 s 192A …. 2.40, 3.104, 3.132, 5.12 s 192A(c) …. 3.132 s 193 …. 7.14, 7.19, 7.26, 7.64 Sch …. 7.28 Dictionary …. 2.19, 4.54, 4.69, 5.19, 5.26, 7.5, 7.19, 7.73, 7.116, 7.140, 8.12, 8.21, 8.27, 8.100, 8.129, 8.192 Dictionary Pt 1 …. 8.94 Dictionary Pt 2 …. 7.19 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 1 …. 8.199 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 4 …. 8.66, 8.196 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 7 …. 7.122 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 8 …. 5.40 Dictionary cl 4(2) …. 8.196 Dictionary cl 6 …. 8.196 Family Provision Act 1970

s 22 …. 8.45 Information Act …. 5.232 Juries Act s 49A …. 5.185 Justices Act 1928 ss 153–155 …. 8.61 Local Court (Civil Procedure) Act s 16 …. 1.3 Local Court (Criminal Procedure) Act Pt V Div 1 …. 2.5, 5.12, 5.13, 6.31 s 60AG …. 2.8, 5.14 ss 60AM-60AO …. 5.14 s 152 …. 8.61 s 163 …. 2.14 Local Government Act 1993 s 200 …. 6.69 Misuse of Drugs Act s 31(3) …. 4.53 s 32 …. 4.53 Oaths, Affirmations and Declarations Act Pt 2 …. 7.28 s 5 …. 7.28 Partnership Act 1997 s 19 …. 8.110 Police Administration Act 1978 Pt VII …. 5.17 Pt VIII Div 6 …. 8.148 Pt VIII Div 6A …. 8.148

s 123(1) …. 8.147 ss 136–138 …. 8.148 s 138(h) …. 4.33 s 138(j) …. 4.33 ss 139–142 …. 8.97, 8.168 s 140 …. 4.33, 8.149 s 142 …. 4.33 Police (Special Investigative and Other Powers) Act Pt 4 …. 5.205 Rules of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory of Australia r 86.08 …. 2.49 Sexual Offences (Evidence and Procedure) Act s 4(5) …. 7.100, 7.107 s 4 …. 3.146 s 4(5)(a) …. 4.41 s 4(5)(b) …. 4.45 s 5 …. 7.33 Supreme Court Act s 26 …. 7.64 s 53 …. 2.15 s 83A …. 1.3 Supreme Court Rules O 23 rr 1–2 …. 6.36 O 25 …. 6.37 O 33 …. 5.76 O 35 …. 8.95 O 44 …. 5.76 O 48.13 …. 1.3

O 49.01 …. 6.48 r 13.04 …. 6.3 rr 29.01–33.13 …. 5.6 r 29.02 …. 5.7 r 32.03 …. 5.10 r 32.05 …. 5.10 r 32.07 …. 5.10 r 33.01 …. 5.8 r 37.01 …. 5.8 r 42.02 …. 5.5 r 44.01 …. 5.8 r 49.01 …. 2.11 r 81A.16 …. 5.13 Surveillance Devices Act 2007 …. 8.155 Traffic Act 1987 s 29AAU …. 7.25 Youth Justices Act 2005 s 15 …. 8.150 s 18 …. 8.150

QUEENSLAND Bail Act 1980 s 7 …. 8.147 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 2003 s 44 …. 8.93 Civil Liability Act 2003 s 22 …. 7.38 Crime and Corruption Act 2001

ss 190, 192, 194 (2), 197 …. 5.180 Criminal Code Act 1899 Ch 62 Div 3 …. 5.13 Ch 62 Div 4 …. 5.13 s 24 …. 3.142, 6.8, 6.9 s 29 …. 6.23 s 52 …. 4.14 s 125 …. 4.14 s 195 …. 4.14 s 229B …. 3.34 ss 348–349 …. 3.142 s 546 …. 8.147 s 567 …. 3.71 s 568 …. 3.71 s 590A …. 2.8, 5.14 ss 590A–590C …. 5.14 s 590AA …. 5.12 s 590AA(2)(e) …. 2.40 s 590AA(4) …. 2.15 s 590AB …. 5.13 s 590AB(1) …. 5.13 s 590AB(2) …. 5.13 s 597A …. 3.71 s 597A(1AA) …. 3.49, 3.65, 3.71 s 597B …. 3.71, 3.78 ss 614–615E …. 2.7, 6.35 s 615 …. 2.7 s 617 …. 2.43

s 619 …. 2.7, 2.11 s 632 …. 4.7, 4.12, 4.20, 4.37, 4.41 s 632(3) …. 4.7, 4.10, 4.20, 4.41, 7.31 s 644 …. 3.66, 8.95 s 668B …. 2.15 s 668D …. 2.14 s 668E …. 2.14 s 669A(2) …. 2.14 s 669A(5) …. 2.14 ss 678–678K …. 2.14, 5.190 s 695A …. 5.85 Sch 1 s 672A(a) …. 2.14 Criminal Law Amendment Act 1894 s 10 …. 8.99, 8.126, 8.129 Criminal Law (Rehabilitation of Offenders) Act 1986 …. 7.142 Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 s 4 …. 3.146, 7.99, 7.101 s 4A(4) …. 4.45, 7.100, 7.107 Defamation Act 2005 s 42 …. 5.194 Drug Misuse Act 1986 …. 4.33 s 46 …. 5.205 s 47 …. 5.205 s 57(d) …. 6.8 ss 119–120 …. 5.205 Evidence Act 1977 …. 3.85, 7.29, 7.34, 8.180 Pt 2 Div 4 …. 8.181 Pt 2 Div 4A …. 8.181

Pt 2 Div 4A Subdiv 1 …. 7.34 Pt 2 Div 4A Subdiv 3 …. 7.34 Pt 2 Div 5 …. 5.205 Pt 3A …. 7.3 Pt 5 Div 6 …. 7.18 Pt 7 …. 7.18 s 3 …. 8.175 s 5 …. 8.188 s 5(1) …. 8.176 s 7(2) …. 5.200 s 8 …. 3.83, 5.165, 5.201 s 8(1) …. 3.84, 3.85, 5.115 s 9 …. 7.28, 7.29 s 9A …. 7.29 s 9B …. 7.28, 7.29 s 9B(2) …. 7.28 s 9C …. 7.29, 7.31, 7.108 s 9D(2)(a) …. 7.36 s 9E …. 7.33 s 10 …. 5.175 s 14(1)(a) …. 5.161, 5.175 s 14(2) …. 5.84 s 15 …. 3.83, 5.115 s 15(1) …. 3.85, 5.180 s 15(2) …. 3.91, 3.102 s 15(2)(a) …. 3.97 s 15(2)(b) …. 3.97 s 15(2)(c) …. 3.107

s 15(2)(d) …. 3.110, 3.117 s 15A …. 7.142 s 16 …. 7.138 s 17 …. 7.118 s 17(1) …. 7.118 ss 18–19 …. 7.148 s 20 …. 7.137 ss 20–21 …. 3.145 s 21 …. 7.33, 7.137 s 21A …. 7.33 s 21A(2) …. 7.33 s 21A(2)(e) …. 7.34 s 21A(6)(b) …. 7.34 s 21A(8) …. 7.33 ss 21AA–21AX …. 7.33 s 21AV …. 5.85 s 21AW …. 7.33 s 21AW(2) …. 7.33 s 21E(2) …. 5.205 s 21M …. 7.33 s 21N …. 7.33 s 21O …. 7.33 s 23 …. 8.61 s 41 …. 7.11 s 42 …. 7.11 s 42A …. 7.11 s 43 …. 6.69 s 48 …. 6.69

s 51 …. 7.18, 8.91 s 59 …. 7.10 s 60 …. 7.9 s 61 …. 7.9 s 62 …. 7.11 s 67 …. 6.70 s 68 …. 6.70 s 74 …. 8.93 ss 78–82 …. 5.194 s 80 …. 5.194 s 81 …. 5.193 s 83 …. 8.189 ss 83–91 …. 8.189 s 85 …. 8.189 s 92 …. 8.175, 8.182 s 92(1) …. 8.176 s 92(4) …. 8.175 s 93 …. 8.180, 8.182 s 93A …. 7.33, 7.34, 8.181 s 93B …. 7.34, 8.74, 8.79, 8.81, 8.181 s 93B(1)(b) …. 8.66 s 93B(2)(a) …. 8.66 s 93B(2)(c) …. 8.75 s 93C …. 8.79, 8.181 s 94 …. 8.175, 8.176, 8.180 s 95 …. 7.13, 7.26, 8.176, 8.188 s 95(1) …. 8.188 s 95A …. 7.13, 7.26

ss 96–103 …. 8.175 s 97 …. 8.180 s 98 …. 8.176 s 101 …. 7.81, 7.151, 8.177, 8.181 s 101(1)(a) …. 7.119 s 101(1)(b) …. 7.91 s 103 …. 8.169 s 129A …. 6.68 s 130 …. 2.29, 3.38, 3.65, 8.181 s 131A …. 7.35 s 132 …. 4.14 s 132A …. 3.12, 3.49, 3.65, 3.70, 3.71 s 132B …. 3.12, 3.38, 3.65 s 132C …. 2.4 Sch 3 …. 8.175, 8.182 Freedom of Information Act 1992 …. 5.232 s 42(1) …. 5.16 s 42(2)(iv) …. 5.16 Jury Act 1995 s 52(2) …. 2.43 s 59A …. 2.13 s 70 …. 5.185 Justices Act 1886 …. 6.31 Pt 4 Div 12 …. 2.5 Pt 9 Div 1 s 222 …. 2.14 s 76 …. 6.16 s 83A …. 5.14 ss 104–134 …. 5.12

s 110A …. 5.13 s 111 …. 8.45 s 142 …. 2.43 Oaths Act 1867 s 17 …. 7.28 ss 17–19 …. 7.28 ss 18–19 …. 7.28 Partnership Act 1891 s 18 …. 8.110 Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 …. 5.17 Ch 11 …. 4.53 Ch 14 Pt 1 …. 8.147 Ch 15 …. 8.148 s 416 …. 8.126 s 418 …. 4.33 s 419 …. 4.33 s 420 …. 8.151 s 421 …. 8.150 s 422 …. 8.152 s 423 …. 8.152 s 424-426 …. 8.148 s 431 …. 5.134, 8.149 ss 436–439 …. 4.33, 8.97, 8.168 s 617 …. 4.58, 4.65, 4.68 Police Powers and Responsibilities Regulation 2012 cl 45(3) …. 4.65 reg 37 …. 8.149 Sch 10 …. 8.149

Sch 10 Pt 6 Div 1 …. 4.58, 4.68 Sch 10 Pt 6 Div 2 …. 4.58, 4.65, 4.68 Sch 10 Pt 6 Div 3 …. 4.58, 4.68 Police Service Administration Act 1990 s 4.9 …. 4.58 Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 s 80(15) …. 7.25 s 80(15A) …. 7.25 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 Ch 7 …. 5.6 Ch 9 Pt 3 …. 6.37 Ch 9 Pt 4 …. 1.3 Ch 11 Pt 5 …. 5.8 r 151 …. 6.3 r 171 …. 6.36 rr 186–190 …. 8.95 r 211 …. 5.7, 5.242 r 214 …. 5.7 r 229 …. 5.10 r 242 …. 5.10 r 250 …. 5.8 r 391 …. 6.48 r 392 …. 7.3 r 414 …. 5.5 r 423(d) …. 7.64 r 425 …. 6.48 r 429 …. 5.76 r 429J …. 7.64

r 501 …. 7.64 r 547 …. 5.8 Youth Justice Act 1992 s 29 …. 8.150

SOUTH AUSTRALIA Acts Interpretation Act 1915 s 10 …. 6.69 Bail Act 1985 s 5(1)(e) …. 8.147 s 6(3) …. 8.147 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 s 46 …. 8.93 Civil Liability Act 1936 s 40 …. 7.38 s 41 …. 7.38 Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1978 s 8(1)(b) …. 4.14 Criminal Investigation (Covert Operations) Act 2009 Pt 2 …. 4.53 Pt 4 …. 5.205 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 7 …. 4.14 s 10 …. 4.14 s 15(5) …. 6.8 s 15C …. 6.8 s 34L(5) …. 4.21 ss 46–48 …. 3.142

s 50 …. 3.34 s 76 …. 4.14 s 131(5) …. 6.8 s 242(4) …. 4.14 ss 271–273 …. 5.17 s 278(1) …. 3.71 s 278(2) …. 3.71, 3.78 s 278(2a) …. 3.71 s 285A …. 2.40, 5.12 ss 285BA–285BC …. 5.14 s 285BA(7) …. 5.14 ss 285BB–285C …. 5.14 s 285C …. 2.8, 5.14 s 288A …. 2.7 s 288B …. 2.11 ss 331–339 …. 2.14, 5.190 s 350 …. 2.15 s 351 …. 2.14 s 351A(2)(c) …. 2.14 s 352 …. 2.14 s 352(1)(ab) …. 2.14 s 352(1)(b) …. 2.15 s 352(1)(c) …. 2.15 s 353 …. 2.14 s 353A …. 2.14 s 354A …. 2.15 s 361 …. 2.43 s 369(1)(a) …. 2.14

Sch 11 …. 5.135 Conciliation Act 1929 s 3 …. 1.3 Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Act 2007 …. 5.17 District Court Act 1991 s 32 …. 1.3 s 32(3) …. 5.105 District Court Civil Rules 2006 Ch 10 …. 1.3 Evidence Act 1929 …. 4.37, 6.33, 7.29, 8.181 Pt 3 Div 3 …. 3.12 Pt 4 Div 4 …. 7.18 Pt 6C …. 7.3 Div 9 …. 5.213 s 4 …. 7.33 ss 6–12 …. 7.28 s 6(2) …. 7.28 s 6(3) …. 7.28 s 9(1) …. 7.28, 7.29 s 9(2)(b) …. 7.29 s 9(3) …. 7.30 s 9(4) …. 4.21, 7.31, 7.36 s 12A …. 4.37, 7.31 s 12A(2) …. 4.21, 4.37 s 12AB …. 7.34 ss 12AB–14A …. 7.33 s 13 …. 7.33 s 13(7) …. 7.33

s 13A …. 7.33 s 13A(12) …. 7.33 s 13B …. 7.33 s 13BA …. 7.34 s 13BA(6) …. 7.33 s 13C …. 7.34 s 13D …. 7.34 s 14 …. 7.35 s 14A …. 7.35 s 16 …. 5.200 s 18 …. 3.83, 5.115 s 18(1) …. 5.112 s 18(1)(b) …. 5.118 s 18(1)(c) …. 3.85, 5.180 s 18(1)(d) …. 3.91 s 18(1)(d)(i) …. 3.97, 3.98 s 18(1)(d)(ii) …. 3.107 s 18(1)(d)(iii) …. 3.110, 3.112 s 18(1)(d)(iv) …. 3.97, 3.117 s 18(1)(V) …. 3.85 s 18(1)(VI) …. 3.91 s 18(1)(VI)(a) …. 3.97, 3.98 s 18(1)(VI)(b) …. 3.107 s 18(1)(VI)(ba) …. 3.112 s 18(1)(VI)(c) …. 3.97, 3.117 s 18(2) …. 3.85, 3.110, 3.112 s 18(3) …. 3.110, 3.112 s 18A …. 5.115

s 21 …. 5.165, 5.201 s 22 …. 7.137 ss 22–25 …. 3.145 s 23 …. 7.137 s 24 …. 7.137 s 25 …. 7.33, 7.137, 7.138 s 25(5) …. 7.138 s 26 …. 7.138 s 27 …. 7.118 s 28 …. 7.148 s 29 …. 7.148 s 30 …. 7.10 s 31 …. 7.9 s 34 …. 3.66, 8.95 s 34A …. 5.194 s 34AB …. 4.54, 4.63, 4.65 s 34AB(1) …. 4.65 s 34AB(2) …. 4.65, 4.68 s 34AB(3) …. 4.54, 4.59, 4.61, 4.62 s 34AB(4) …. 4.54, 4.59 s 34AB(5) …. 4.65 s 34C …. 8.173, 8.188 s 34CA …. 4.57, 7.34 s 34CB …. 4.51 s 34D …. 4.37, 7.34, 8.173 s 34D(2) …. 4.84 s 34E …. 7.9 s 34F …. 7.11

s 34G …. 8.173 s 34G(2)(a) …. 8.169 s 34G(2)(b) …. 8.85 s 34K …. 8.61 s 34KA …. 8.66, 8.74, 8.181 ss 34KA–34KD …. 7.34 s 34KB …. 8.181 s 34KC …. 6.33, 8.181 s 34KD …. 2.28, 8.181 s 34J …. 8.61 s 34L …. 3.146 s 34L(2)(b) …. 3.146 s 34L(5) …. 4.21, 4.41 s 34E …. 7.9 s 34F …. 7.11 ss 34KA–34KD …. 7.34 s 34M(2) …. 4.45, 7.100, 7.107 s 34O …. 3.64 s 34P …. 2.87, 3.31, 3.64 s 34P(1) …. 3.64 s 34P(2) …. 3.64 s 34P(2)(a) …. 3.64, 3.69 s 34P(2)(b) …. 3.64 s 34P(3) …. 3.64 s 34P(4) …. 3.64, 3.68 s 34P(5) …. 3.64, 3.68 s 34Q …. 3.64 s 34R …. 2.87, 3.64

s 34R(1) …. 3.75 s 34S …. 3.49, 3.64, 3.70, 3.71 s 35 …. 6.69 ss 36–39 …. 7.11 s 37 …. 6.69 s 37A …. 6.69 s 37B …. 6.69 s 39 …. 7.18, 8.91 s 42 …. 8.184 s 45 …. 7.14, 8.30, 8.190 s 45A …. 8.183, 8.184, 8.187 s 45B …. 8.174, 8.183, 8.187 s 45C …. 8.187 ss 46–51 …. 8.189 s 52 …. 7.14, 8.174, 8.183, 8.185, 8.186, 8.187 s 52(3) …. 8.186 s 52(6) …. 8.185 s 53 …. 7.14, 8.182, 8.183, 8.184, 8.186, 8.187 s 53(2) …. 8.186 s 54 …. 7.14, 8.200 s 56 …. 7.13, 7.26, 8.188 s 57 …. 7.18, 7.82, 7.86, 8.187 s 59E(4) …. 7.3 s 59J …. 6.68 s 63 …. 6.70 s 64 …. 6.60, 6.67 s 67C …. 5.87, 5.99, 5.100, 5.105, 5.214 s 67C(1) …. 5.101

s 67C(2)(a)–(c) …. 5.100 s 67D …. 5.213 ss 67D–67F …. 5.207 s 67F(2) …. 5.213 s 67F(2)–(4) …. 5.212 s 67F(7) …. 5.213 s 69 …. 5.85 s 69A …. 5.85 Evidence Regulations 2007 reg 3AA …. 4.65 Family and Community Services Act 1972 s 140 …. 4.14 s 245 …. 5.201 s 246 …. 5.104 Freedom of Information Act 1991 …. 5.232 s 12 …. 5.16 Juries Act 1927 s 7 …. 2.7, 6.35 s 57 …. 2.13 Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 …. 8.155 Local Government Act 1999 Ch 14 Pt 3 …. 6.69 Magistrates Court Act 1991 s 27 …. 1.3 s 38(1) …. 6.48 s 42 …. 2.15 s 42(1)k …. 2.14 Magistrates Court Rules 1992 …. 5.14

r 8 …. 5.14 r 26 …. 5.14 Partnership Act 1891 s 15 …. 8.110 s 65 …. 8.110 Road Traffic Act 1961 s 47K …. 7.25 Royal Commission Act 1917 …. 5.146 Summary Offences Act 1953 s 5 …. 6.16 ss 67–82 …. 5.17 s 74C …. 8.168 ss 74C–74G …. 8.97, 8.168 s 75 …. 8.147 s 78 …. 8.148 s 79A …. 5.134, 8.148 s 79A(1)(b)(iii) …. 8.149 s 79A(1a) …. 8.150 s 79A(1b) …. 8.150 s 79A(3) …. 8.149 ss 74C–74G …. 4.33 s 79A …. 4.33 Summary Procedure Act 1921 …. 6.31 Pt 5 Div 2 …. 5.12 Pt 5 Div 4 …. 2.5 s 56 …. 6.16 ss 62–62C …. 2.43 s 104 …. 5.13

ss 104–107 …. 5.13 s 107(1) …. 6.31 Supreme Court Act 1935 s 65 …. 1.3 s 65(6) …. 5.105 s 67 …. 7.64 Supreme Court Rules 1987 r 38 …. 5.76 Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 Ch 7 Pt 8 …. 8.95 Ch 10 …. 1.3 r 10 …. 6.48 r 32 …. 5.10 r 104 …. 6.36 rr 107–108 …. 6.37 r 117 …. 6.48 r 118 …. 6.48 r 136 …. 5.7, 5.242 rr 136–152 …. 5.6 r 146 …. 5.10 r 149 …. 5.8 rr 153–155 …. 5.8 rr 159–161 …. 5.8 r 160 …. 5.76, 7.64 r 172 …. 5.5 r 208 …. 7.64 r 213 …. 7.64 r 271(3) …. 5.76

Supreme Court Rules (Criminal) 2014 rr 58–59 …. 5.13 Victims of Crime Act 2001 s 22(3) …. 4.14 Young Offenders Act 1993 …. 5.205 s 5 …. 6.23 s 14 …. 8.150

TASMANIA Acts Interpretation Act 1931 s 39 …. 6.69 s 39A …. 6.69 Civil Liability Act 2002 s 22 …. 7.38 Criminal Code Act 1924 s 2A …. 3.142 s 14 …. 3.142, 6.8, 6.9 s 18 …. 6.23 s 27 …. 5.17, 8.147 s 60(1) …. 4.14 s 67(3) …. 4.14 s 96 …. 4.14 s 125A …. 3.34 s 136 …. 4.41 s 185 …. 3.142 s 311(2) …. 3.71 s 326 …. 3.71 s 350(1)(a) …. 6.31

s 350(1)(ab) …. 6.31 s 361A …. 2.40, 5.12 s 363 …. 3.71, 3.78 s 368A …. 2.8, 5.14 s 369 …. 2.43 s 371 …. 2.7, 2.11 s 371A …. 7.100, 7.107 ss 387–388 …. 2.15 s 388AA(3) …. 2.14 ss 390–397AF …. 2.14, 5.190 s 401 …. 2.14 s 401(2)(b) …. 2.14 s 402 …. 2.14 s 402(2) …. 2.14 s 402(5) …. 2.14 s 402A …. 2.14 Sch 1 s 419(a) …. 2.14 Criminal Law (Detention and Interrogation) Act 1995 s 4 …. 8.148 s 4(3) …. 8.147 s 6 …. 4.33 Defamation Act 2005 s 42 …. 5.194 Evidence Act 1910 s 81F …. 8.170 s 81K …. 8.87, 8.170 Evidence Act 2001 …. 2.2, 2.25, 2.28, 2.50, 3.3, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.12, 3.17, 3.31, 3.33, 3.40, 3.43, 3.49, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.63, 3.64,

3.68, 3.69, 3.70, 3.82, 3.83, 3.85, 3.87, 3.88, 3.90, 3.91, 3.93, 3.96, 3.99, 3.101, 3.104, 3.106, 3.107, 3.108, 3.109, 3.112, 3.118, 3.119, 3.120, 3.122, 3.127, 3.129, 3.131, 3.133, 3.135, 3.136, 3.137, 3.139, 3.141, 3.145, 3.152, 3.153, 3.154, 3.156, 3.159, 3.160, 3.162, 3.165, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, 4.22, 4.27, 4.30, 4.35, 4.36, 4.39, 4.48, 4.54, 4.55, 4.56, 4.57, 4.59, 4.63, 4.64, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 4.78, 4.79, 4.98, 4.101, 4.102, 4.105, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, 5.24, 5.26, 5.27, 5.31, 5.35, 5.36, 5.39, 5.40, 5.43, 5.47, 5.49, 5.66, 5.67, 5.69, 5.77, 5.83, 5.84, 5.86, 5.92, 5.97, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102, 5.108, 5.118, 5.120, 5.134, 5.135, 5.139, 5.144, 5.154, 5.161, 5.169, 5.175, 5.176, 5.177, 5.184, 5.190, 5.194, 5.201, 5.202, 5.203, 5.204, 5.207, 5.208, 5.214, 5.218, 5.241, 5.247, 5.253, 5.254, 5.266, 6.1, 6.23, 6.57, 6.66, 6.68, 6.77, 7.4, 7.8, 7.14, 7.20, 7.23, 7.26, 7.28, 7.30, 7.34, 7.35, 7.36, 7.54, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.66, 7.71, 7.73, 7.76, 7.78, 7.79, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.91, 7.93, 7.94, 7.95, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 7.113, 7.115, 7.116, 7.118, 7.124, 7.128, 7.134, 7.137, 7.141, 7.142, 7.143, 7.147, 7.148, 7.153, 7.158, 8.6, 8.8, 8.11, 8.12, 8.13, 8.22, 8.27, 8.28, 8.35, 8.48, 8.55, 8.57, 8.59, 8.62, 8.63, 8.65, 8.66, 8.69, 8.79, 8.81, 8.85, 8.87, 8.89, 8.90, 8.100, 8.106, 8.108, 8.112, 8.113, 8.114, 8.119, 8.125, 8.126, 8.127, 8.144, 8.146, 8.149, 8.156, 8.161, 8.162, 8.163, 8.169, 8.171, 8.172, 8.173, 8.191, 8.196 Ch 3 …. 2.45 Ch 4 …. 2.48 Ch 5 …. 2.48 Pt 1.2 …. 2.2 Pt 2.1 Div 1 …. 2.48 Pt 2.1 Div 2 …. 2.48 Pt 3.1 …. 2.48 Pt 3.2 …. 8.93, 8.198 Pt 3.2 Div 2 …. 8.62, 8.195 Pt 3.2 Div 3 …. 8.199 Pt 3.4 …. 8.94, 8.100, 8.101, 8.198 Pt 3.6 …. 3.12, 3.106, 3.135, 3.153 Pt 3.7 …. 3.109, 7.122

Pt 3.8 …. 3.5, 3.90, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109 Pt 3.9 …. 2.48, 4.2, 4.54, 4.55, 4.63 Pt 3.10 …. 2.48, 5.19 Pt 3.10 Div 1 …. 5.19 Pt 3.10 Div 1A …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.214 Pt 3.10 Div 1C …. 5.19, 5.207 Pt 3.10 Div 3 …. 5.19 Pt 3.11 …. 2.29, 2.31, 2.48, 8.196 Pt 4.6 Div 1 …. 7.14, 7.26 Pt 4.6 Div 2 …. 7.13 Pt 4.6 Div 3 …. 6.70 Div 2 …. 5.19, 8.198 Div 3 …. 8.195, 8.200 s 4 …. 2.2 s 4(1) …. 2.2, 5.24 s 4(1)(d) …. 2.4 s 4(2)–(4) …. 2.4 s 8 …. 2.3 s 9 …. 2.3 s 9(2)(b) …. 6.23 s 10 …. 5.199 s 11 …. 7.124, 7.137 s 11(1) …. 6.48 s 11(2) …. 1.53, 2.29 s 12 …. 2.3, 3.83, 5.112, 5.115, 5.176, 5.200, 5.201 s 13 …. 4.14, 7.28, 7.30 s 13(1) …. 7.30 s 13(2) …. 7.30

s 13(3) …. 7.28, 7.30 s 13(5) …. 7.30 s 13(6) …. 7.30 s 13(8) …. 7.30, 7.31 s 14 …. 7.30 s 15(2) …. 5.199 s 16 …. 5.184 s 16(1) …. 5.185 s 17 …. 3.83, 8.126 s 17(2) …. 5.112 s 17(3) …. 5.112, 5.115 s 18 …. 2.26, 5.165, 5.201 s 19 …. 5.201 s 20 …. 2.12, 2.50, 5.115, 5.118, 5.120, 5.128, 5.129, 5.202, 8.126 s 20(2) …. 2.12, 5.120, 5.123 s 20(3) …. 5.132, 5.201 s 20(4) …. 2.12, 5.201 s 20(5) …. 5.120, 5.201 s 21 …. 5.115, 5.201, 5.202, 7.28 ss 21–24A …. 7.28 s 21(3a) …. 5.201 s 23 …. 7.28 s 24(2) …. 7.28 s 24A …. 7.28 s 26 …. 6.48, 7.115, 7.124, 7.137 ss 26–29 …. 7.115 s 26(a) …. 7.3 s 27 …. 3.84, 7.115, 7.124

s 28 …. 7.115 s 29 …. 6.58 s 29(2) …. 7.115 s 30 …. 7.30, 7.35 s 31 …. 7.30, 7.35, 8.12 s 31A(1)(b) …. 5.216 s 32 …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.79, 7.82, 7.83, 7.86 s 32(1) …. 7.79 s 32(2) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b)(i) …. 7.79 s 32(3) …. 7.80 s 32(4) …. 7.81 s 33 …. 5.26, 5.49, 7.76, 7.80 s 33(2)(a) …. 7.80 s 34 …. 7.76, 7.77, 7.84, 7.86, 7.112 s 35 …. 7.81, 7.82, 7.83, 7.154 s 37 …. 5.26, 7.115, 7.117, 7.126 s 37(1)(b) …. 7.117 s 38 …. 6.49, 6.57, 7.97, 7.118, 7.122, 7.123, 8.194 s 38(3) …. 7.122 s 38(4) …. 7.122 s 38(6) …. 7.122 s 38(7) …. 7.118, 7.122 s 39 …. 7.82, 7.156 s 40 …. 7.124 s 41 …. 2.46, 3.83, 3.145, 3.152, 7.33, 7.115, 7.137 s 42 …. 7.115, 7.126

s 43 …. 7.83, 7.97, 7.148, 7.149 s 44 …. 7.153 s 45 …. 7.82, 7.152 s 45(4) …. 7.82 s 46 …. 7.75, 7.129, 7.130 s 47(2) …. 7.19 s 48 …. 7.8, 7.56, 8.199 s 48(1) …. 7.19, 7.56 s 48(1)(c) …. 7.24, 7.56 s 48(1)(d) …. 7.19 s 48(2) …. 7.19 s 48(3) …. 7.19 s 48(4) …. 7.19 s 49 …. 7.19, 8.133 s 51 …. 7.19, 7.82 s 52 …. 7.20, 7.21 s 53 …. 7.23 s 53(1) …. 7.23 s 53(2) …. 7.23 s 53(2)(a) …. 2.43 s 53(3) …. 7.23 s 53(3)(d) …. 7.23 s 53(4) …. 7.23 s 53(5) …. 7.23 s 54 …. 7.23 s 55 …. 2.18, 2.19, 2.23, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.60, 3.141, 4.3, 4.100, 7.40, 7.41, 7.44, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.66, 7.116, 7.146, 8.95 s 55(1) …. 2.23, 2.24, 5.144, 7.54, 7.103

s 55(2) …. 2.19, 7.137 s 56 …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.28, 2.32, 7.44, 7.52, 7.66 s 56(1) …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.23, 2.27, 2.29, 2.46, 7.7, 7.8, 7.10, 8.27, 8.192 s 56(2) …. 7.54 s 57 …. 2.19, 7.8, 7.52, 8.194 s 57(1) …. 2.23, 7.8 s 57(1)(b) …. 2.19, 7.68 s 58 …. 7.8, 7.14, 8.199 s 58(1) …. 2.23 s 59 …. 2.46, 7.98, 8.8, 8.27, 8.57, 8.96, 8.99, 8.169, 8.192, 8.194, 8.199 s 59(1) …. 7.3, 8.8, 8.27, 8.57, 8.96, 8.99, 8.169, 8.192, 8.194, 8.199 s 59(2A) …. 8.27 s 60 …. 2.31, 2.39, 2.46, 4.1, 7.69, 7.70, 7.71, 7.72, 7.73, 7.81, 7.83, 7.91, 7.93, 7.97, 7.102, 7.123, 7.134, 7.151, 8.28, 8.29, 8.50, 8.71, 8.105, 8.194 s 60(1) …. 8.194 s 60(2) …. 7.69 s 60(3) …. 7.81, 8.105, 8.165 s 61 …. 8.195 s 62 …. 8.62, 8.66, 8.75, 8.79, 8.81, 8.83, 8.195, 8.196 s 62(1) …. 8.196 s 62(2) …. 8.196 s 63 …. 7.69, 7.98, 8.89, 8.196 s 63(2) …. 8.74, 8.85, 8.90 s 64 …. 7.69, 7.83, 7.93, 7.98, 8.169, 8.196 s 64(2) …. 7.76, 7.113, 8.85 s 64(4) …. 7.76, 8.85 s 65 …. 7.34, 8.66, 8.74, 8.83, 8.181, 8.193, 8.197

s 65(1)(b) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(c) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(d) …. 8.66 s 65(2) …. 8.82, 8.197 s 65(2)(a) …. 8.82, 8.83 s 65(2)(b) …. 8.29, 8.35, 8.39, 8.50, 8.66, 8.69, 8.75, 8.89, 8.197 s 65(2)(c) …. 7.98, 8.35, 8.50, 8.61, 8.89, 8.197 s 65(2)(d) …. 8.29, 8.75, 8.79, 8.80, 8.197 s 65(3) …. 8.53, 8.197 s 65(3)–(6) …. 8.197 s 65(7) …. 8.79 s 65(8) …. 8.63, 8.74, 8.197 s 65(9) …. 8.63, 8.197 s 66 …. 4.74, 7.34, 7.41, 7.79, 7.83, 7.93, 7.97, 7.98, 7.99, 7.102, 8.106, 8.169, 8.198 s 66(2) …. 7.76, 7.102, 7.113 s 66(2A) …. 7.79, 7.83, 8.198 s 66(3) …. 8.198 s 66(4) …. 7.76 s 66A …. 8.29, 8.31, 8.35, 8.42, 8.44, 8.46, 8.49, 8.50, 8.195, 8.198 s 67 …. 5.18, 8.74, 8.75, 8.82, 8.89, 8.90, 8.196, 8.197 s 68 …. 8.196 s 69 …. 7.13, 8.93, 8.182, 8.199 s 69(3) …. 8.199 s 69(4) …. 8.26, 8.199 s 70 …. 8.57, 8.190, 8.200 ss 70–75 …. 8.200 s 70(1) …. 8.30

s 71 …. 8.200 s 72 …. 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 73 …. 8.85, 8.200 s 74 …. 8.200 s 74(1) …. 8.84 s 74(2) …. 8.84 s 76 …. 2.23, 2.30, 7.38, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 8.49, 8.200 s 77 …. 2.31 ss 77–79 …. 7.38 s 78 …. 4.57, 7.41, 7.42, 7.56, 7.105 s 78(a) …. 7.41 s 78(b) …. 7.41 s 78A …. 7.73, 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 79 …. 2.23, 7.40, 7.41, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.58, 7.59, 7.64, 7.66, 8.71 s 79(1) …. 7.14, 7.41, 7.42, 7.44, 7.52, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.65, 7.66, 7.73, 7.108 s 79(2) …. 4.39, 7.45, 7.51, 7.54, 7.58, 7.62, 7.108, 7.136 s 79(3) …. 7.108, 7.136 s 79A …. 7.108 s 80 …. 6.70, 7.44, 7.57, 7.59, 7.61 s 80(a) …. 7.62 s 80(b) …. 7.53, 7.55, 7.58, 7.65, 7.136 s 81 …. 5.144, 8.94, 8.108, 8.165, 8.194 s 81(2) …. 8.108 s 82 …. 8.99, 8.105 s 83 …. 8.78 s 83(1) …. 8.78 s 83(2) …. 8.78

s 83(3) …. 8.78 s 84 …. 5.135, 8.78, 8.96, 8.97, 8.99, 8.100, 8.126, 8.127, 8.131, 8.137, 8.160 s 84(1) …. 8.126 s 85 …. 5.135, 8.97, 8.99, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.130, 8.131, 8.134, 8.136, 8.137, 8.160, 8.162, 8.163 s 85(1) …. 8.126, 8.129 s 85(1)(b) …. 8.130 s 85(2) …. 8.126, 8.129, 8.130 s 85(3) …. 8.126, 8.128, 8.130 s 85(3)(a) …. 8.129 s 85(3)(b) …. 8.129, 8.130 s 85A …. 4.33, 8.97, 8.168 s 86 …. 8.97, 8.167 s 87(1) …. 8.112, 8.119 s 87(1)(a) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(b) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(c) …. 8.115, 8.117, 8.118 s 87(2) …. 8.114, 8.117 s 87(2)(c) …. 8.117 s 88 …. 7.7, 8.101 s 89 …. 5.139, 5.141, 5.142, 8.98, 8.126 s 89(1) …. 5.144 s 89(2) …. 5.144 s 89(4) …. 5.144 s 90 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.32, 2.33, 2.34, 2.35, 8.97, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.131, 8.134, 8.135, 8.136, 8.137, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.154, 8.160, 8.162 s 91 …. 5.194

s 92(2) …. 5.194 s 92(3) …. 5.194 s 93 …. 5.194 s 93(c) …. 5.190 s 94(1) …. 3.58, 3.152 s 94(3) …. 3.153 s 95 …. 3.11, 3.54, 3.75, 3.82, 3.106, 3.107, 3.135, 4.1 s 97 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 2.87, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.17, 3.26, 3.32, 3.36, 3.37, 3.40, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 ss 97–98 …. 5.18 ss 97–100 …. 3.160 s 97(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 97(1)(b) …. 3.61 s 98 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.23, 3.25, 3.39, 3.40, 3.49, 3.54, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 s 98(1) …. 3.58 s 98(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 98(1)(b) …. 3.60 s 99 …. 3.9, 3.68 s 100 …. 3.9, 3.68, 3.125 s 101 …. 2.15, 2.31, 2.37, 2.87, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.36, 3.37, 3.39, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.127, 3.139, 3.156, 3.159 s 101(2) …. 3.59, 3.60, 3.62, 3.82, 3.127 s 101A …. 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 3.109, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112, 7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.139, 7.140

s 102 …. 2.46, 3.58, 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112, 7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.137, 7.139 s 102(2) …. 3.109 s 103 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.135, 3.145, 3.152, 3.162, 7.97, 7.116, 7.133, 7.137, 7.139 s 103(1) …. 3.83, 3.84, 7.133, 7.137, 7.142 s 104 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.109, 5.115 s 104(2) …. 3.90, 3.114 s 104(3) …. 3.90, 3.104 s 104(3)(b) …. 7.112, 7.144 s 104(4) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.110, 3.112 s 104(5) …. 3.110, 3.112 s 104(6) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.113, 3.117, 3.120, 3.122, 3.123 s 106 …. 7.83, 7.116, 7.133, 7.142, 7.149 s 106(1) …. 7.141, 7.143 s 106(2) …. 7.141, 7.142, 7.143 s 106(2)(a) …. 7.143 s 106(2)(b) …. 7.138, 7.142 s 106(2)(c) …. 7.148 s 106(2)(d) …. 7.112, 7.144 s 106(2)(e) …. 7.142 s 107 …. 7.97, 7.98 s 108 …. 7.90, 7.93, 7.116, 7.133, 7.156 s 108(1) …. 7.97, 7.158 s 108(3) …. 4.74, 7.97, 7.102, 7.158 s 108(3)(a) …. 7.93, 7.152 s 108(3)(b) …. 7.91, 7.92, 7.106 s 108A …. 7.97, 7.98, 7.133, 8.196, 8.199

s 108B …. 7.133 s 108C …. 4.39, 7.51, 7.58, 7.108, 7.133, 7.136, 7.144, 7.146 s 108C(1) …. 7.110, 7.112 s 110 …. 3.82, 3.83, 3.90, 3.106, 3.108, 3.109, 3.127, 3.129, 3.130, 3.134, 3.135, 3.137 s 110(1) …. 3.107 s 110(2) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 110(3) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 111 …. 3.82, 3.108, 7.136 s 112 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.100, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109, 3.130, 3.132, 3.135 s 113 …. 4.69 s 114 …. 2.46, 2.48, 4.58, 4.64, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 5.26, 7.94 s 114(1) …. 4.69 s 114(2) …. 4.69 s 114(2)(c) …. 4.70 s 114(5) …. 4.70 s 115 …. 4.58, 4.64, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74 s 115(3) …. 4.70 s 115(4) …. 4.70 s 115(7) …. 4.70 s 115(8) …. 4.70 s 116 …. 4.10, 4.54, 4.59, 4.61, 4.63, 4.69 s 116(1) …. 4.61 s 116(2) …. 4.59 s 117 …. 5.22, 5.26, 5.28, 5.37, 5.49, 5.58 s 117(1) …. 5.26 s 118 …. 5.24, 5.25, 5.27, 5.28, 5.31, 5.39 ss 118–119 …. 2.46, 2.48

ss 118–120 …. 5.35, 5.47, 5.48, 5.49 s 118(a) …. 5.28, 5.39 s 118(b) …. 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 118(c) …. 5.19, 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 119 …. 5.24, 5.42, 5.43 ss 119–120 …. 5.46 s 120 …. 5.24, 5.42 s 121 …. 5.69 s 122 …. 5.19, 5.54, 5.56, 5.58, 5.59 s 122(1) …. 5.58, 5.59 s 122(2) …. 5.58, 5.59, 5.100 s 122(3) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(a) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(b) …. 5.58 s 122(4) …. 5.58, 5.59 s 122(5) …. 5.58 s 122(5)(a)(i) …. 5.52 s 122(5)(b) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(5)(c) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(6) …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.81 s 123 …. 5.19, 5.70, 5.216 s 124 …. 5.49, 5.57, 5.58 s 125 …. 5.31 s 125(1)(a) …. 5.31 s 125(1)(b) …. 5.31 s 125(2) …. 5.31 s 126 …. 5.59 s 126K …. 5.19

s 127 …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.210 s 127(1) …. 5.208 s 127(3) …. 5.208, 5.210 s 127A …. 5.19, 5.207 s 127B …. 5.19, 5.207 s 127B(1) …. 5.212 s 128 …. 3.87, 5.19, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177, 5.216, 8.164 s 128(1) …. 5.155, 5.176 s 128(1)(a) …. 5.164 s 128(2) …. 5.169 s 128(4)(a) …. 5.164 s 128(10) …. 3.83, 3.87, 5.180 s 128(12)–(14) …. 5.179 s 128A …. 5.19, 5.146, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177 s 129 …. 5.184, 5.185 s 129(4) …. 5.185 s 130 …. 5.205, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218, 5.222, 5.223, 5.231, 8.79 s 130(1) …. 5.216, 5.222, 5.243 s 130(2) …. 5.216 s 130(3) …. 5.241 s 130(4) …. 5.222 s 130(4)(a) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(b) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(c)–(e) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(e) …. 5.205 s 130(5) …. 5.253 s 130(5)(d) …. 5.254 s 131 …. 5.87, 5.88, 5.90, 5.94, 5.95, 5.96, 5.98, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102,

5.105, 5.214 s 131(1) …. 5.88, 5.94, 5.95, 5.97 s 131(2) …. 5.88 s 131(2)(a)–(c) …. 5.100 s 131(2)(d) …. 5.90, 5.100 s 131(2)(f) …. 5.97 s 131(2)(g) …. 5.100, 5.103 s 131(2)(h) …. 5.98 s 131(2)(i) …. 5.92, 5.96 s 131(2)(j) …. 5.96 s 131(2)(k) …. 5.96 s 131(3) …. 5.96 s 131(4) …. 5.96 s 131(5) …. 5.88, 5.90 s 131(5)(b) …. 5.99 s 131A …. 5.19, 5.24, 5.67, 5.70, 5.90, 5.102, 5.176, 5.208, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218 s 131A(1) …. 5.49 s 132 …. 5.166, 5.167 s 133 …. 5.78, 5.169, 5.247 s 135 …. 2.27, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.127, 3.159, 7.41, 7.55, 7.59, 7.64, 7.73, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 8.144, 8.194 ss 135–137 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.32, 2.35, 3.11, 3.90, 3.133, 4.3, 7.124, 7.134, 8.29, 8.127, 8.193 ss 135–138 …. 2.27, 4.55 s 135(a) …. 7.55 s 136 …. 2.31, 2.39, 3.69, 3.79, 3.137, 7.41, 7.69, 7.73, 7.93, 7.102, 8.194 s 137 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.26, 2.27, 2.30, 2.31, 2.35, 2.46, 2.48, 2.70, 3.12, 3.54, 3.59, 3.60, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.104, 3.125, 3.127, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69,

4.70, 7.41, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.67, 7.93, 7.102, 7.108, 7.110, 7.111, 7.112, 7.135, 8.96, 8.127, 8.134, 8.144, 8.159, 8.194 s 138 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.33, 2.35, 2.36, 2.37, 2.46, 2.48, 4.58, 4.68, 4.70, 4.74, 5.62, 5.134, 5.255, 5.258, 5.261, 5.264, 5.265, 5.267, 8.126, 8.127, 8.135, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.155, 8.158, 8.159, 8.160, 8.162 s 138(2) …. 8.127, 8.144, 8.155 s 138(3) …. 2.37 s 138(3)(f) …. 2.37 s 139 …. 5.134, 8.126, 8.149 s 139(2) …. 8.149 s 139(5) …. 8.149 s 140 …. 2.64 ss 140–141 …. 2.58 s 142 …. 2.12, 2.45, 2.91, 3.69, 5.31, 5.35, 7.8, 7.65 s 142(1) …. 8.160 s 142A …. 6.16 s 143 …. 6.69 s 144 …. 6.60, 6.65, 6.71, 6.73, 6.77, 7.54, 7.59, 7.71 s 144(2) …. 6.66 s 144(4) …. 6.66 s 145 …. 6.60 s 146 …. 6.23, 7.13, 7.19, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 ss 146–147 …. 7.13, 7.26 s 147 …. 7.13, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 s 148 …. 7.11 s 149 …. 7.9 s 150 …. 7.11 s 151 …. 7.11 s 152 …. 7.11

s 153 …. 7.11 ss 153–159 …. 8.93 s 154 …. 7.11 s 155 …. 7.11 s 156 …. 7.11, 8.91 s 157 …. 7.11 s 158 …. 7.11 s 159 …. 7.11 s 161 …. 7.14, 8.200 s 162 …. 8.200 s 164 …. 4.9, 4.42, 4.45, 4.99, 4.102, 4.106 s 164(1) …. 4.4, 4.12 s 164(2) …. 4.4, 4.12, 4.14 s 164(3) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.12, 4.20, 4.22, 4.41 s 164(4) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.20 s 164(6) …. 4.7, 4.20 s 165 …. 4.10, 4.11, 4.23, 4.27, 4.28, 4.34, 4.36, 4.42, 4.45, 4.52, 4.75, 4.78, 4.79, 4.100, 4.102, 4.106, 7.93, 7.102, 7.112, 7.123, 8.193, 8.198 s 165(1) …. 4.24, 4.34, 4.36 s 165(1)–(4) …. 4.9 s 165(1)(a) …. 8.120 s 165(1)(b) …. 4.54, 4.56 s 165(1)(c) …. 4.39, 4.77 s 165(1)(d) …. 4.24, 4.27, 4.30, 4.52 s 165(1)(e) …. 4.76 s 165(1)(f) …. 4.22, 4.33, 4.34, 8.168 s 165(1)(g) …. 4.75 s 165(2) …. 4.5, 4.9, 4.10, 4.12, 4.33, 4.36, 4.52, 4.75, 4.100, 4.101, 4.105,

8.120 s 165(3) …. 4.9, 4.100, 7.123, 7.125 s 165(4) …. 4.9, 4.59 s 165(5) …. 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.22, 4.30, 4.34, 4.36, 4.39, 4.41, 4.54, 4.100 s 165A …. 4.36, 4.37, 4.39, 7.31 s 165A(1) …. 4.10, 4.39 s 165A(1)(a) …. 4.20 s 165A(2) …. 4.39 s 165B …. 4.36, 4.51 s 166 …. 7.8, 8.199 s 166(g) …. 5.194 s 167 …. 5.18, 5.194, 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 7.25, 7.64 ss 170–173 …. 7.26 s 171 …. 7.19 s 176 …. 7.61 s 177 …. 7.64 s 177B …. 7.11 s 177C …. 7.11 s 177D …. 7.11 s 177E …. 7.11 ss 178–179 …. 5.194 s 181A …. 8.61 s 182 …. 7.14 s 183 …. 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 8.199, 8.200 s 184 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 187 …. 5.154 s 189 …. 2.12, 2.40, 7.120 s 189(1) …. 8.163

s 189(2) …. 2.42, 8.163 s 189(3) …. 8.129, 8.130, 8.163 s 189(4) …. 2.42, 5.168, 7.30 s 189(5) …. 2.42 s 189(6) …. 2.45, 3.83, 3.87, 8.164 s 189(7) …. 2.45, 8.162 s 189(8) …. 2.45, 8.163, 8.165 s 190 …. 2.46, 2.48, 5.26 s 190(1) …. 2.48 s 190(2) …. 2.48 s 190(3) …. 2.48, 6.68 s 191 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 192 …. 2.26, 2.40, 2.42, 3.104, 3.132, 7.23, 7.93, 7.112, 7.122 s 192(2) …. 3.109, 7.79 s 192A …. 2.40, 3.104, 3.132, 5.12 s 192A(c) …. 3.132 s 193 …. 7.14, 7.19, 7.26, 7.64 s 194A …. 8.61 s 194J …. 5.85 s 194M …. 3.146 s 194M(6) …. 3.147 Sch …. 7.28 Dictionary …. 2.19, 4.54, 4.69, 5.19, 5.26, 7.5, 7.19, 7.73, 7.116, 7.140, 8.12, 8.21, 8.27, 8.100, 8.129, 8.192 Dictionary Pt 1 …. 8.94 Dictionary Pt 2 …. 7.19 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 1 …. 8.199 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 4 …. 8.66, 8.196

Dictionary Pt 2 cl 7 …. 7.122 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 8 …. 5.40 Dictionary cl 4(2) …. 8.196 Dictionary cl 6 …. 8.196 Evidence (Audio and Visual Links) Act 1999 …. 7.3 Evidence (Children and Special Witnesses) Act 2001 …. 7.33 s 5 …. 7.34 s 6 …. 7.34 s 6A …. 7.34 s 8 …. 7.33 s 8(2)(b)(iia) …. 7.34 s 8(2)(b)(iib) …. 7.34 Evidence Regulations 2002 cl 5 …. 3.68 Forensic Procedures Act 2000 …. 5.17 Freedom of Information Act 1991 …. 5.232 Pt XI Div 1 …. 2.14 s 28(1) …. 5.16 Juries Act 2003 s 43 …. 2.13 Justices Act 1959 …. 6.31 Pt VI …. 2.5 s 34 …. 8.147 Listening Devices Act 1991 …. 8.155 Partnership Act 1891 s 20 …. 8.110 s 79 …. 8.110 Road Safety (Alcohol and Drugs) Act 1970

s 25 …. 7.25 Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 s 37 …. 7.64 Supreme Court Rules 2000 Pt 12 …. 6.37 Pt 13 …. 5.6 Pt 13 Div 2 …. 8.95 Pt 20 …. 1.3 r 227(4) …. 6.3 r 259 …. 6.36 r 382 …. 5.7 r 403C …. 5.10 r 403E …. 5.10 r 403FA …. 5.10 rr 436–442 …. 5.8 rr 494–500F …. 5.5 rr 514–517 …. 5.8 r 516 …. 5.76 r 560 …. 7.64 r 569 …. 6.48 r 574 …. 7.64

VICTORIA Bail Act 1977 s 10 …. 8.147 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 s 46 …. 8.93 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 …. 1.48, 6.14, 8.124

s 7 …. 6.14 s 25(k) …. 5.145 Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 s 344 …. 6.23 Civil Procedure Act 2010 s 65K …. 7.64 s 65M …. 7.64 s 65Q …. 7.64 Confiscation Act 1997 …. 8.95 Crimes Act 1958 Subdiv 30A …. 8.148 s 9AC …. 6.8 s 9AD …. 6.8 s 34C …. 3.142, 6.9 s 38 …. 3.142 s 47A …. 3.34 s 61(2) …. 4.41 s 61(3) …. 4.41 ss 314–315 …. 4.14 s 372 …. 3.71 s 398A …. 3.38 s 459 …. 5.17, 8.147 s 459A …. 5.17 s 464(1) …. 8.147 ss 464A–464B …. 8.148 s 464A(3) …. 8.149 s 464C …. 4.33 s 464E …. 8.150

s 464G …. 4.33, 8.97, 8.168 s 464H …. 4.33, 8.97, 8.168 ss 464–464ZL …. 5.17 s 465 …. 5.17 Criminal Procedure Act 2009 …. 5.13, 5.14 Ch 4 …. 2.5, 5.12, 5.13, 6.31 Ch 8 Div 4 …. 7.33 Pt 3.2 Div 2 …. 5.14 Pt 3.2 Div 3 …. 5.14 Pt 3.3 Div 10 …. 2.43 Pt 4.4 …. 5.13 Pt 4.11 …. 5.13 Pt 5.5 Div 2 …. 5.13 Pt 6.1 …. 2.14 Pt 8.2 Div 3 …. 7.33 Pt 8.2 Div 4 …. 7.33 Pt 8.2 Div 5 …. 7.33, 7.34 Pt 8.2 Div 6 …. 7.33, 7.34 Pt 8.2 Div 7 …. 7.34 s 51 …. 2.8, 5.14 s 54 …. 5.13 s 66 …. 6.30, 6.35 s 69 …. 6.34 s 72 …. 6.17 ss 73–75 …. 2.11 ss 80–87 …. 2.43 s 97(d) …. 5.13 s 110 …. 5.13

s 111 …. 5.13 s 141(4) …. 6.31 s 177(6) …. 6.31 s 179 …. 5.13 ss 179–181 …. 5.12 s 183 …. 5.14 s 185 …. 5.13 s 189 …. 5.14 s 190 …. 2.8, 5.14 s 193 …. 3.71, 3.78 s 194 …. 3.71 s 198 …. 8.61 s 199 …. 5.12 ss 199–205 …. 2.40 s 224 …. 2.7 s 225 …. 2.7 s 226 …. 6.30, 6.35 s 227 …. 2.14, 4.6 s 229 …. 6.34 s 231 …. 2.7 s 233(2) …. 2.8 s 233(3) …. 2.8 s 237 …. 5.14 s 276 …. 2.14, 4.10 ss 295–297 …. 2.15 s 297(1)(b) …. 2.15 s 302 …. 2.15 s 308 …. 2.14

s 327(1)(a) …. 2.14 ss 327A–327S …. 2.14, 5.190 ss 329–330 …. 2.43 ss 339–352 …. 3.146 s 343 …. 3.147 s 349 …. 3.146 ss 353–358 …. 7.33 s 358 …. 7.33 s 361 …. 7.33 s 375 …. 7.33 s 375A …. 7.33 s 382 …. 7.33 s 404 …. 5.14 s 416 …. 5.13 Sch 1 r 5 …. 3.71 Defamation Act 2005 s 42 …. 5.194 Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1986 s 50 …. 4.53 Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 s 21L …. 5.105 s 21M …. 5.105 s 149A …. 8.95 Evidence Act 2008 …. 2.2, 2.25, 2.28, 2.50, 3.3, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.12, 3.17, 3.31, 3.33, 3.40, 3.43, 3.49, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.63, 3.64, 3.68, 3.69, 3.70, 3.82, 3.83, 3.85, 3.87, 3.88, 3.90, 3.91, 3.93, 3.96, 3.99, 3.101, 3.104, 3.106, 3.107, 3.108, 3.109, 3.112, 3.118, 3.119, 3.120, 3.122, 3.127, 3.129, 3.131, 3.133, 3.135, 3.136, 3.137, 3.139, 3.141, 3.145, 3.152, 3.153, 3.154, 3.156, 3.159, 3.160, 3.162, 3.165, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.9,

4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, 4.22, 4.27, 4.30, 4.34, 4.35, 4.36, 4.39, 4.48, 4.54, 4.55, 4.56, 4.57, 4.59, 4.63, 4.64, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 4.78, 4.79, 4.98, 4.101, 4.102, 4.105, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, 5.24, 5.26, 5.27, 5.31, 5.35, 5.36, 5.39, 5.40, 5.43, 5.47, 5.49, 5.66, 5.67, 5.69, 5.77, 5.83, 5.84, 5.86, 5.92, 5.97, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102, 5.108, 5.118, 5.120, 5.134, 5.135, 5.139, 5.144, 5.154, 5.161, 5.169, 5.175, 5.176, 5.177, 5.184, 5.190, 5.194, 5.201, 5.202, 5.203, 5.204, 5.207, 5.208, 5.214, 5.218, 5.241, 5.247, 5.253, 5.254, 5.266, 6.1, 6.23, 6.57, 6.66, 6.68, 6.77, 7.4, 7.8, 7.14, 7.20, 7.23, 7.26, 7.28, 7.30, 7.34, 7.35, 7.36, 7.54, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.66, 7.71, 7.73, 7.76, 7.78, 7.79, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.91, 7.93, 7.94, 7.95, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 7.113, 7.115, 7.116, 7.118, 7.124, 7.128, 7.134, 7.137, 7.141, 7.142, 7.143, 7.147, 7.148, 7.153, 7.158, 8.6, 8.8, 8.11, 8.12, 8.13, 8.22, 8.27, 8.28, 8.35, 8.48, 8.55, 8.57, 8.59, 8.62, 8.63, 8.65, 8.66, 8.69, 8.79, 8.81, 8.85, 8.87, 8.89, 8.90, 8.100, 8.106, 8.108, 8.112, 8.113, 8.114, 8.119, 8.125, 8.126, 8.127, 8.144, 8.146, 8.156, 8.161, 8.162, 8.163, 8.169, 8.171, 8.172, 8.173, 8.191, 8.196 Ch 3 …. 2.45 Ch 4 …. 2.48 Ch 5 …. 2.48 Pt 1.2 …. 2.2 Pt 2 Div 3 …. 8.199 Pt 2.1 Div 1 …. 2.48 Pt 2.1 Div 2 …. 2.48 Pt 3.1 …. 2.48 Pt 3.2 …. 8.93, 8.198 Pt 3.2 Div 2 …. 8.62, 8.195 Pt 3.4 …. 8.94, 8.100, 8.101, 8.198 Pt 3.6 …. 3.12, 3.106, 3.135, 3.153 Pt 3.7 …. 3.109, 7.122 Pt 3.8 …. 3.5, 3.90, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109 Pt 3.9 …. 2.48, 4.2, 4.54, 4.55, 4.63 Pt 3.10 …. 2.48, 5.19

Pt 3.10 Div 1 …. 5.19 Pt 3.10 Div 1A …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.214 Pt 3.10 Div 1C …. 5.19, 5.207 Pt 3.10 Div 3 …. 5.19 Pt 3.11 …. 2.29, 2.31, 2.48, 8.196 Pt 4.6 Div 1 …. 7.14, 7.26 Pt 4.6 Div 2 …. 7.13 Pt 4.6 Div 3 …. 6.70 Div 2 …. 5.19, 8.198 Div 3 …. 8.195, 8.200 s 4 …. 2.2 s 4(1) …. 2.2, 5.24 s 4(1)(d) …. 2.4 s 4(2)–(4) …. 2.4 s 8 …. 2.3 s 9 …. 2.3 s 9(2)(b) …. 6.23 s 10 …. 5.199 s 11 …. 7.124, 7.137 s 11(1) …. 6.48 s 11(2) …. 1.53, 2.29 s 12 …. 2.3, 3.83, 5.112, 5.115, 5.176, 5.200, 5.201 s 13 …. 4.14, 7.28, 7.30 s 13(1) …. 7.30 s 13(2) …. 7.30 s 13(3) …. 7.28, 7.30 s 13(5) …. 7.30 s 13(6) …. 7.30

s 13(8) …. 7.30, 7.31 s 14 …. 7.30 s 15(2) …. 5.199 s 16 …. 5.184 s 16(1) …. 5.185 s 17 …. 3.83, 8.126 s 17(2) …. 5.112 s 17(3) …. 5.112, 5.115 s 18 …. 2.26, 5.165, 5.201 s 19 …. 5.201 s 20 …. 2.12, 2.50, 5.115, 5.118, 5.120, 5.128, 5.129, 5.202, 8.126 s 20(2) …. 2.12, 5.120, 5.123 s 20(3) …. 5.132, 5.201 s 20(4) …. 2.12, 5.201 s 20(5) …. 5.120, 5.201 s 21 …. 5.115, 5.201, 5.202, 7.28 ss 21–24A …. 7.28 s 21(3a) …. 5.201 s 23 …. 7.28 s 24(2) …. 7.28 s 24A …. 7.28 s 26 …. 6.48, 7.115, 7.124, 7.137 ss 26–29 …. 7.115 s 26(a) …. 7.3 s 27 …. 3.84, 7.115, 7.124 s 28 …. 7.115 s 29 …. 6.58 s 29(2) …. 7.115

s 30 …. 7.30, 7.35 s 31 …. 7.30, 7.35, 8.12 s 31A(1)(b) …. 5.216 s 32 …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.79, 7.82, 7.83, 7.86 s 32(1) …. 7.79 s 32(2) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b)(i) …. 7.79 s 32(3) …. 7.80 s 32(4) …. 7.81 s 33 …. 5.26, 5.49, 7.76, 7.80 s 33(2)(a) …. 7.80 s 34 …. 7.76, 7.77, 7.84, 7.86, 7.112 s 35 …. 7.81, 7.82, 7.83, 7.154 s 37 …. 5.26, 7.115, 7.117, 7.126 s 37(1)(b) …. 7.117 s 38 …. 6.49, 6.57, 7.97, 7.118, 7.122, 7.123, 8.194 s 38(3) …. 7.122 s 38(4) …. 7.122 s 38(6) …. 7.122 s 38(7) …. 7.118, 7.122 s 39 …. 7.82, 7.156 s 40 …. 7.124 s 41 …. 2.46, 3.83, 3.145, 3.152, 7.33, 7.115, 7.137 s 41(1) …. 7.138 s 41(2) …. 7.138 s 41(4) …. 7.138 s 41(6) …. 7.138

s 41(8) …. 7.138 s 48(1)(f) …. 7.19 s 42 …. 7.115, 7.126 s 43 …. 7.83, 7.97, 7.148, 7.149 s 44 …. 7.153 s 45 …. 7.82, 7.152 s 45(4) …. 7.82 s 46 …. 7.75, 7.129, 7.130 s 47(2) …. 7.19 s 48 …. 7.8, 7.56, 8.199 s 48(1) …. 7.19, 7.56 s 48(1)(c) …. 7.24, 7.56 s 48(1)(d) …. 7.19 s 48(2) …. 7.19 s 48(3) …. 7.19 s 48(4) …. 7.19 s 49 …. 7.19, 8.133 s 51 …. 7.19, 7.82 s 52 …. 7.20, 7.21 s 53 …. 7.23 s 53(1) …. 7.23 s 53(2) …. 7.23 s 53(2)(a) …. 2.43 s 53(3) …. 7.23 s 53(3)(d) …. 7.23 s 53(4) …. 7.23 s 53(5) …. 7.23 s 54 …. 7.23

s 55 …. 2.18, 2.19, 2.23, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.60, 3.141, 4.3, 4.100, 7.40, 7.41, 7.44, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.66, 7.116, 7.146, 8.95 s 55(1) …. 2.23, 2.24, 5.144, 7.54, 7.103 s 55(2) …. 2.19, 7.137 s 56 …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.28, 2.32, 7.44, 7.52, 7.66 s 56(1) …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.23, 2.27, 2.29, 2.46, 7.7, 7.8, 7.10, 8.27, 8.192 s 56(2) …. 7.54 s 57 …. 2.19, 7.8, 7.52, 8.194 s 57(1) …. 2.23, 7.8 s 57(1)(b) …. 2.19, 7.68 s 58 …. 7.8, 7.14, 8.199 s 58(1) …. 2.23 s 59 …. 2.46, 7.98, 8.8, 8.27, 8.57, 8.96, 8.99, 8.169, 8.192, 8.194, 8.199 s 59(1) …. 7.3, 8.8, 8.11, 8.19, 8.21, 8.22, 8.23, 8.24, 8.25, 8.26, 8.27, 8.28, 8.33, 8.44, 8.50, 8.53, 8.192, 8.193 s 59(2A) …. 8.27 s 60 …. 2.31, 2.39, 2.46, 4.1, 7.69, 7.70, 7.71, 7.72, 7.73, 7.81, 7.83, 7.91, 7.93, 7.97, 7.102, 7.123, 7.134, 7.151, 8.28, 8.29, 8.50, 8.71, 8.105, 8.194 s 60(1) …. 8.194 s 60(2) …. 7.69 s 60(3) …. 7.81, 8.105, 8.165 s 61 …. 8.195 s 62 …. 8.62, 8.66, 8.75, 8.79, 8.81, 8.83, 8.195, 8.196 s 62(1) …. 8.196 s 62(2) …. 8.196 s 63 …. 7.69, 7.98, 8.89, 8.196 s 63(2) …. 8.74, 8.85, 8.90 s 64 …. 7.69, 7.83, 7.93, 7.98, 8.169, 8.196

s 64(2) …. 7.76, 7.113, 8.85 s 64(4) …. 7.76, 8.196 s 65 …. 7.34, 8.66, 8.74, 8.83, 8.181, 8.193, 8.197 s 65(1)(b) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(c) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(d) …. 8.66 s 65(2) …. 8.82, 8.197 s 65(2)(a) …. 8.82, 8.83 s 65(2)(b) …. 8.29, 8.35, 8.39, 8.50, 8.66, 8.69, 8.75, 8.89, 8.197 s 65(2)(c) …. 7.98, 8.35, 8.50, 8.61, 8.89, 8.197 s 65(2)(d) …. 8.29, 8.75, 8.79, 8.80, 8.197 s 65(3) …. 8.53, 8.197 s 65(3)–(6) …. 8.197 s 65(7) …. 8.79 s 65(8) …. 8.63, 8.74, 8.197 s 65(9) …. 8.63, 8.197 s 66 …. 4.74, 7.34, 7.41, 7.79, 7.83, 7.93, 7.97, 7.98, 7.99, 7.102, 8.106, 8.169, 8.198 s 66(2) …. 7.76, 7.102, 7.113 s 66(2A) …. 7.79, 7.83, 8.198 s 66(3) …. 8.198 s 66(4) …. 7.76 s 66A …. 8.29, 8.31, 8.35, 8.42, 8.44, 8.46, 8.49, 8.50, 8.195, 8.198 s 67 …. 5.18, 8.74, 8.75, 8.82, 8.89, 8.90, 8.196, 8.197 s 68 …. 8.196 s 69 …. 7.13, 8.93, 8.182, 8.199 s 69(3) …. 8.199 s 69(4) …. 8.26, 8.199

s 70 …. 8.57, 8.190, 8.200 ss 70–75 …. 8.200 s 70(1) …. 8.30 s 71 …. 8.200 s 72 …. 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 73 …. 8.85, 8.200 s 74 …. 8.200 s 74(1) …. 8.84 s 74(2) …. 8.84 s 76 …. 2.23, 2.30, 7.38, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 8.49, 8.200 s 77 …. 2.31 ss 77–79 …. 7.38 s 78 …. 4.57, 7.41, 7.42, 7.56, 7.105 s 78(a) …. 7.41 s 78(b) …. 7.41 s 78A …. 7.73, 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 79 …. 2.23, 7.40, 7.41, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.58, 7.59, 7.64, 7.66, 8.71 s 79(1) …. 7.14, 7.41, 7.42, 7.44, 7.52, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.65, 7.66, 7.73, 7.108 s 79(2) …. 4.39, 7.45, 7.51, 7.54, 7.58, 7.62, 7.136 s 79(3) …. 7.136 s 80 …. 6.70, 7.44, 7.57, 7.59, 7.61 s 80(a) …. 7.62 s 80(b) …. 7.53, 7.55, 7.58, 7.65, 7.136 s 81 …. 5.144, 8.94, 8.108, 8.165, 8.194 s 81(2) …. 8.108 s 82 …. 8.99, 8.105 s 83 …. 8.78

s 83(1) …. 8.78 s 83(2) …. 8.78 s 83(3) …. 8.78 s 84 …. 5.135, 8.78, 8.96, 8.97, 8.99, 8.100, 8.126, 8.127, 8.131, 8.137, 8.160 s 84(1) …. 8.126 s 85 …. 5.135, 8.97, 8.99, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.130, 8.131, 8.134, 8.136, 8.137, 8.160, 8.162, 8.163 s 85(1) …. 8.126, 8.129 s 85(1)(b) …. 8.130 s 85(2) …. 8.126, 8.129, 8.130 s 85(3) …. 8.126, 8.128, 8.130 s 85(3)(a) …. 8.129 s 85(3)(b) …. 8.129, 8.130 s 86 …. 8.97, 8.167 s 87(1) …. 8.112, 8.119 s 87(1)(a) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(b) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(c) …. 8.115, 8.117, 8.118 s 87(2) …. 8.114, 8.117 s 87(2)(c) …. 8.117 s 88 …. 7.7, 8.101 s 89 …. 5.139, 5.141, 5.142, 8.98, 8.126 s 89(1) …. 5.144 s 89(2) …. 5.144 s 89(4) …. 5.144 s 90 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.32, 2.33, 2.34, 2.35, 8.97, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.131, 8.134, 8.135, 8.136, 8.137, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.154, 8.160, 8.162

s 91 …. 5.194 s 92(2) …. 5.194 s 92(3) …. 5.194 s 93 …. 5.194 s 93(c) …. 5.190 s 94(1) …. 3.58, 3.152 s 94(3) …. 3.153 s 95 …. 3.11, 3.54, 3.75, 3.82, 3.106, 3.107, 3.135, 4.1 s 97 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 2.87, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.17, 3.26, 3.32, 3.36, 3.37, 3.40, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 ss 97–98 …. 5.18 ss 97–100 …. 3.160 s 97(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 97(1)(b) …. 3.61 s 98 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.23, 3.25, 3.39, 3.40, 3.49, 3.54, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 s 98(1) …. 3.58 s 98(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 98(1)(b) …. 3.60 s 99 …. 3.9, 3.68 s 100 …. 3.9, 3.68, 3.125 s 101 …. 2.15, 2.31, 2.37, 2.87, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.36, 3.37, 3.39, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.127, 3.139, 3.156, 3.159 s 101(2) …. 3.59, 3.60, 3.62, 3.82, 3.127 s 101A …. 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 3.109, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112,

7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.139, 7.140 s 102 …. 2.46, 3.58, 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112, 7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.137, 7.139 s 102(2) …. 3.109 s 103 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.135, 3.145, 3.152, 3.162, 7.97, 7.116, 7.133, 7.137, 7.139 s 103(1) …. 3.83, 3.84, 7.133, 7.137, 7.142 s 104 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.109, 5.115 s 104(2) …. 3.90, 3.114 s 104(3) …. 3.90, 3.104 s 104(3)(b) …. 7.112, 7.144 s 104(4) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.110, 3.112 s 104(5) …. 3.110, 3.112 s 104(6) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.113, 3.117, 3.120, 3.122, 3.123, 7.83, 7.116, 7.133, 7.142, 7.149 s 106(1) …. 7.141, 7.143 s 106(2) …. 7.141, 7.142, 7.143 s 106(2)(a) …. 7.143 s 106(2)(b) …. 7.138, 7.142 s 106(2)(c) …. 7.148 s 106(2)(d) …. 7.112, 7.144 s 106(2)(e) …. 7.142 s 107 …. 7.97, 7.98 s 108 …. 7.90, 7.93, 7.116, 7.133, 7.156 s 108(1) …. 7.97, 7.158 s 108(3) …. 4.74, 7.97, 7.102, 7.158 s 108(3)(a) …. 7.93, 7.152 s 108(3)(b) …. 7.91, 7.92, 7.106 s 108A …. 7.97, 7.98, 7.133, 8.196, 8.199

s 108B …. 7.133 s 108C …. 4.39, 7.51, 7.58, 7.108, 7.133, 7.136, 7.144, 7.146 s 108C(1) …. 7.110, 7.112 s 110 …. 3.82, 3.83, 3.90, 3.106, 3.108, 3.109, 3.127, 3.129, 3.130, 3.134, 3.135, 3.137 s 110(1) …. 3.107 s 110(2) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 110(3) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 111 …. 3.82, 3.108, 7.136 s 112 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.100, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109, 3.130, 3.132, 3.135 s 113 …. 4.69 s 114 …. 2.46, 2.48, 4.58, 4.64, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 5.26, 7.94 s 114(1) …. 4.69 s 114(2) …. 4.69 s 114(2)(c) …. 4.70 s 114(5) …. 4.70 s 115 …. 4.58, 4.64, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74 s 115(3) …. 4.70 s 115(4) …. 4.70 s 115(7) …. 4.70 s 115(8) …. 4.70 s 116 …. 4.10, 4.54, 4.59, 4.61, 4.63, 4.69 s 116(1) …. 4.61 s 116(2) …. 4.59 s 117 …. 5.22, 5.26, 5.28, 5.37, 5.49, 5.58 s 117(1) …. 5.26 s 118 …. 5.24, 5.25, 5.27, 5.28, 5.31, 5.39 ss 118–119 …. 2.46, 2.48

ss 118–120 …. 5.35, 5.47, 5.48, 5.49 s 118(a) …. 5.28, 5.39 s 118(b) …. 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 118(c) …. 5.19, 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 119 …. 5.24, 5.42, 5.43 ss 119–120 …. 5.46 s 120 …. 5.24, 5.42 s 121 …. 5.69 s 122 …. 5.19, 5.54, 5.56, 5.58, 5.59 s 122(1) …. 5.58, 5.59 s 122(2) …. 5.58, 5.59, 5.100 s 122(3) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(a) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(b) …. 5.58 s 122(4) …. 5.58, 5.59 s 122(5) …. 5.58 s 122(5)(a)(i) …. 5.52 s 122(5)(b) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(5)(c) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(6) …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.81 s 123 …. 5.19, 5.70, 5.216 s 124 …. 5.49, 5.57, 5.58 s 125 …. 5.31 s 125(1)(a) …. 5.31 s 125(1)(b) …. 5.31 s 125(2) …. 5.31 s 126 …. 5.59 s 126K …. 5.19

s 127 …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.210 s 127(1) …. 5.208 s 127(3) …. 5.208, 5.210 s 127A …. 5.19 s 127B …. 5.19 s 128 …. 3.87, 5.19, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177, 5.216, 8.164 s 128(1) …. 5.155, 5.176 s 128(1)(a) …. 5.164 s 128(2) …. 5.169 s 128(4)(a) …. 5.164 s 128(10) …. 3.83, 3.87, 5.180 s 128(12)–(14) …. 5.179 s 128A …. 5.19, 5.146, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177 s 129 …. 5.184, 5.185 s 129(4) …. 5.185 s 130 …. 5.205, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218, 5.222, 5.223, 5.231, 8.79 s 130(1) …. 5.216, 5.222, 5.243 s 130(2) …. 5.216 s 130(3) …. 5.241 s 130(4) …. 5.222 s 130(4)(a) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(b) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(c)–(e) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(e) …. 5.205 s 130(5) …. 5.253 s 130(5)(d) …. 5.254 s 131 …. 5.87, 5.88, 5.90, 5.94, 5.95, 5.96, 5.98, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102, 5.105, 5.214

s 131(1) …. 5.88, 5.94, 5.95, 5.97 s 131(2) …. 5.88 s 131(2)(a)–(c) …. 5.100 s 131(2)(d) …. 5.90, 5.100 s 131(2)(f) …. 5.97 s 131(2)(g) …. 5.100, 5.103 s 131(2)(h) …. 5.98 s 131(2)(i) …. 5.92, 5.96 s 131(2)(j) …. 5.96 s 131(2)(k) …. 5.96 s 131(3) …. 5.96 s 131(4) …. 5.96 s 131(5) …. 5.88, 5.90 s 131(5)(b) …. 5.99 s 131A …. 5.19, 5.24, 5.67, 5.70, 5.90, 5.102, 5.176, 5.208, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218 s 131A(1) …. 5.49 s 132 …. 5.166, 5.167 s 133 …. 5.78, 5.169, 5.247 s 135 …. 2.27, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.127, 3.159, 7.41, 7.55, 7.59, 7.64, 7.73, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 8.144, 8.194 ss 135–137 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.32, 2.35, 3.11, 3.90, 3.133, 4.3, 7.124, 7.134, 8.29, 8.127, 8.193 ss 135–138 …. 2.27, 4.55 s 135(a) …. 7.55 s 136 …. 2.31, 2.39, 3.69, 3.79, 3.137, 7.41, 7.69, 7.73, 7.93, 7.102, 8.194 s 137 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.26, 2.27, 2.30, 2.31, 2.35, 2.46, 2.48, 2.70, 3.12, 3.54, 3.59, 3.60, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.104, 3.125, 3.127, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69,

4.70, 7.41, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.67, 7.93, 7.102, 7.108, 7.110, 7.111, 7.112, 7.135, 8.96, 8.127, 8.134, 8.144, 8.159, 8.194 s 138 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.33, 2.35, 2.36, 2.37, 2.46, 2.48, 4.58, 4.68, 4.70, 4.74, 5.62, 5.134, 5.255, 5.258, 5.261, 5.264, 5.265, 5.267, 8.126, 8.127, 8.135, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.155, 8.158, 8.159, 8.160, 8.162 s 138(2) …. 8.127, 8.144, 8.155 s 138(3) …. 2.37 s 138(3)(f) …. 2.37 s 139 …. 5.134, 8.126, 8.149 s 139(2) …. 8.149 s 139(5) …. 8.149 s 140 …. 2.64 ss 140–141 …. 2.58 s 142 …. 2.12, 2.45, 2.91, 3.69, 5.31, 5.35, 7.8, 7.65 s 142(1) …. 8.160 s 143 …. 6.69 s 144 …. 6.60, 6.65, 6.71, 6.73, 6.77, 7.54, 7.59, 7.71 s 144(2) …. 6.66 s 144(4) …. 6.66 s 145 …. 6.60 s 146 …. 6.23, 7.13, 7.19, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 ss 146–147 …. 7.13, 7.26 s 147 …. 7.13, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 s 148 …. 7.11 s 149 …. 7.9 s 150 …. 7.11 s 151 …. 7.11 s 152 …. 7.11 s 153 …. 7.11

ss 153–159 …. 8.93 s 154 …. 7.11 s 155 …. 7.11 s 156 …. 7.11, 8.91 s 157 …. 7.11 s 158 …. 7.11 s 159 …. 7.11 s 161 …. 7.14, 8.200 s 162 …. 8.200 s 164 …. 4.9, 4.42, 4.45, 4.99, 4.102, 4.106 s 164(1) …. 4.4, 4.12 s 164(2) …. 4.4, 4.12, 4.14 s 164(3) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.12, 4.20, 4.22, 4.41 s 164(4) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.20, 4.41 s 164(5) …. 4.14 s 164(6) …. 4.7, 4.20 s 165 …. 4.10, 4.11, 4.23, 4.27, 4.28, 4.34, 4.36, 4.42, 4.45, 4.52, 4.75, 4.78, 4.79, 4.100, 4.102, 4.106, 7.93, 7.102, 7.112, 7.123, 8.193, 8.198 s 165(1) …. 4.24, 4.34, 4.36 s 165(1)–(4) …. 4.9 s 165(1)(a) …. 8.120 s 165(1)(b) …. 4.54, 4.56 s 165(1)(c) …. 4.39, 4.77 s 165(1)(d) …. 4.24, 4.27, 4.30, 4.52 s 165(1)(e) …. 4.76 s 165(1)(f) …. 4.22, 4.33, 4.34, 8.168 s 165(1)(g) …. 4.75 s 165(2) …. 4.5, 4.9, 4.10, 4.12, 4.33, 4.36, 4.52, 4.75, 4.100, 4.101, 4.105,

8.120 s 165(3) …. 4.9, 4.100, 7.123, 7.125 s 165(4) …. 4.9, 4.59 s 165(5) …. 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.22, 4.30, 4.34, 4.36, 4.39, 4.41, 4.54, 4.100 s 165A …. 4.36, 4.37, 4.39, 7.31 s 165A(1) …. 4.10, 4.39 s 165A(1)(a) …. 4.20 s 165A(2) …. 4.39 s 165B …. 4.36, 4.51 s 166 …. 7.8, 8.199 s 166(g) …. 5.194 s 167 …. 5.18, 5.194, 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 7.25, 7.64 ss 170–173 …. 7.26 s 171 …. 7.19 s 176 …. 7.61 s 177 …. 7.64 ss 178–179 …. 5.194 s 182 …. 7.14 s 183 …. 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 8.199, 8.200 s 184 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 187 …. 5.154 s 189 …. 2.12, 2.40, 7.120 s 189(1) …. 8.163 s 189(2) …. 2.42, 8.163 s 189(3) …. 8.129, 8.130, 8.163 s 189(4) …. 2.42, 5.168, 7.30 s 189(5) …. 2.42 s 189(6) …. 2.45, 3.83, 3.87, 8.164

s 189(7) …. 2.45, 8.162 s 189(8) …. 2.45, 8.163, 8.165 s 190 …. 2.46, 2.48, 5.26 s 190(1) …. 2.48 s 190(2) …. 2.48 s 190(3) …. 2.48, 6.68 s 191 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 192 …. 2.26, 2.40, 2.42, 3.104, 3.132, 7.23, 7.93, 7.112, 7.122 s 192(2) …. 3.109, 7.79 s 192A …. 2.40, 3.104, 3.132, 5.12 s 192A(c) …. 3.132 s 193 …. 7.14, 7.19, 7.26, 7.64 Sch …. 7.28 Dictionary …. 2.19, 4.54, 4.69, 5.19, 5.26, 7.5, 7.19, 7.73, 7.116, 7.140, 8.12, 8.21, 8.27, 8.100, 8.129, 8.192 Dictionary Pt 1 …. 8.94 Dictionary Pt 2 …. 7.19 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 1 …. 8.199 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 4 …. 8.66, 8.196 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 7 …. 7.122 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 8 …. 5.40 Dictionary cl 4(2) …. 8.196 Dictionary cl 6 …. 8.196 Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 Pt II Div 2A …. 5.207 Pt IIA …. 7.3 Pt IIA Div 3 …. 2.43 Pt IIAA …. 5.205

s 28 …. 5.207 s 32B …. 5.212 s 32C …. 5.212 Evidence Regulations 2009 cl 7 …. 3.68 Freedom of Information Act 1982 …. 5.232 s 31(1) …. 5.16 Independent Broad-based Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2011 s 144 …. 5.180 Juries Act 2000 s 46 …. 2.13 s 78 …. 5.185 Jury Directions Act 2013 s 15 …. 2.49 s 28(3) …. 4.88 Jury Directions Act 2015 …. 2.13, 3.66, 3.75, 3.136, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.34, 4.35, 4.36, 4.43, 4.52, 4.54, 4.56, 4.59, 4.61, 4.63, 4.78, 4.79, 4.99, 4.103, 4.105, 4.106 Pt 3 …. 2.13, 4.37 Pt 4 …. 2.13 Pt 4 Div 2 …. 3.75 Pt 4 Div 3 …. 4.8, 4.22, 4.30, 4.34, 4.36, 4.52 Pt 4 Div 4 …. 4.36 Pt 4 Div 5 …. 4.36, 4.51 Pt 4 Div 6 …. 5.115, 5.118 Pt 5 …. 2.13 Pt 6 …. 2.13

Pt 7 …. 2.13 Pt 8 …. 2.13 s 1 …. 2.13 s 4 …. 4.41 s 5 …. 2.13 s 10(2) …. 3.73 s 10(3) …. 3.73 s 11 …. 4.105 s 12 …. 4.34, 4.54, 4.105 ss 12–15 …. 3.136 s 14 …. 2.13, 4.5, 4.10, 4.105 s 15 …. 4.10 s 16 …. 2.13, 2.49, 3.75, 3.136, 4.10, 4.34, 4.105, 5.124 ss 18–24 …. 4.88 s 20 …. 4.88 s 21 …. 2.88 s 22 …. 4.88 s 21 …. 4.86, 4.88 s 24 …. 4.88 s 27 …. 3.75 s 28 …. 3.75 s 29 …. 3.75 s 31 …. 4.75 ss 31–34 …. 4.39 s 31(b) …. 4.77 s 31(c) …. 4.30, 4.52 s 31(d) …. 4.33, 4.76 s 31(e) …. 4.22, 4.30, 4.34

s 32 …. 4.5, 4.22, 4.34, 4.75 s 32(1) …. 4.34 s 32(2) …. 4.34 s 32(3) …. 4.34 s 33 …. 4.20, 4.37, 4.39 s 34 …. 4.36, 4.39, 4.52 s 35 …. 4.54, 4.56, 4.57 s 36 …. 4.54, 4.56, 4.61 s 36(1)(e) …. 4.62 s 36(3)(b) …. 4.59, s 36(3)(c) …. 4.62 s 36(3)(d) …. 4.73 s 37 …. 4.36, 4.54 s 40 …. 4.36 s 41 …. 5.120, 5.124, 5.132, 5.133 s 41(2) …. 5.124 s 41(2)(d) …. 5.120 s 42 …. 5.120, 5.124, 5.132, 5.133 s 44 …. 5.124, 5.133 ss 45–47 …. 6.9 s 51 …. 4.41, 7.107 ss 51–54 …. 4.45, 7.100 s 54 …. 4.41 s 62 …. 2.87, 4.88 s 63 …. 2.73 s 63(2) …. 2.73 s 64 …. 2.73 s 64(1)(d) …. 2.73

s 64(1)(e) …. 2.73 s 65(d) …. 2.12 s 67(2) …. 2.87 s 67(3) …. 2.87 Maintenance Act 1965 s 27 …. 4.14 Major Crime (Investigative Powers) Act 2004 …. 5.17 Partnership Act 1958 s 19 …. 8.110 s 67(1) …. 8.110 Police Regulation Act 1958 …. 5.162 Road Safety Act 1986 s 58(2) …. 7.25 s 58(4) …. 7.25 Supreme Court Act 1986 ss 18–19 …. 5.85 s 24A …. 1.3 s 25(1)(ea) …. 1.3 s 77 …. 7.64 Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 r 49.01 …. 2.11 Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 O 29–33 …. 5.6 O 33 …. 5.8 O 35 …. 8.95 O 42 …. 5.5 O 44 …. 5.8 O 50 …. 1.3

r 13.0 4 …. 6.3 r 23.01 …. 6.36 r 23.02 …. 6.36 r 25 …. 6.37 r 29.02 …. 5.7 r 29.13 …. 5.78 r 32.05 …. 5.10 r 32.07 …. 5.10 r 33.06 …. 5.76 r 37.01 …. 5.8 r 44.03 …. 5.76 r 49.01 …. 6.48 Form 44A …. 7.64 Wrongs Act 1958 s 58 …. 7.38 s 59 …. 7.38

WESTERN AUSTRALIA Aboriginal Affairs Planning Authority Act 1972 …. 8.133 Bail Act 1982 s 6 …. 8.147 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1998 s 57 …. 8.93 Civil Liability Act 2002 s 5PB …. 7.38 Corruption Crime and Misconduct Act 2003 ss 147, 223 …. 5.180 Criminal Appeals Act 2004

s 7 …. 2.14 s 24(2)(da) …. 2.14 s 4(2)(e) …. 2.14 s 30 …. 2.14 s 46 …. 2.15 s 47(7) …. 2.14 Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 …. 8.168 s 24 …. 3.142, 6.8, 6.9 s 29 …. 6.23 s 319(2) …. 3.142 s 321A …. 3.34 ss 325–326 …. 3.142 s 570D …. 4.33 Criminal Evidence Act 1898 s 1(e) …. 8.164 s 1(2) …. 8.164 Criminal Investigation Act 2006 …. 5.17, 8.156 Pt 12 Div 5 …. 8.148 s 118 …. 4.33, 8.97, 8.168 ss 127–128 …. 8.147 s 136 …. 8.150 s 137 …. 4.33 s 138 …. 4.33 s 138(2)(b) …. 8.149 s 138(3) …. 8.149 s 142 …. 8.147 s 154 …. 2.36 s 155 …. 2.36, 8.168

Criminal Investigation (Covert Powers) Act 2012 Pt 4 …. 5.205 Criminal Investigation (Identifying People) Act 2002 …. 5.17 Criminal Procedure Act 2004 …. 6.31 Pt 3 Div 4 …. 2.5, 5.12 Pt 3 Div 6 …. 5.14 s 35 …. 5.13 s 42 …. 5.12 ss 44–45 …. 5.13 s 44(1) …. 5.12 s 55 …. 2.43 s 56 …. 2.43 s 61 …. 5.13 s 62 …. 5.13, 5.14 ss 62–63 …. 2.8 s 63 …. 5.13, 5.14 s 75(3)(b) …. 7.35 s 78 …. 6.16, 6.21 s 82 …. 6.34 s 87(7) …. 6.31 s 88 …. 2.43 s 96 …. 5.14 ss 96–97 …. 2.8 s 98 …. 2.40 s 97 …. 5.13, 5.14 s 97(4) …. 5.13, 5.14 s 98 …. 5.12, 5.13 s 108 …. 6.30, 6.34

s 118 …. 2.7 ss 118–120 …. 6.35 s 133 …. 3.71, 3.78 s 133(5) …. 3.71 s 133(6) …. 3.71 s 137 …. 5.14 s 138 …. 5.14 s 140 …. 2.43 s 143 …. 2.7 s 145 …. 2.11 Sch 1 cl 7 …. 3.71 Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000 …. 5.180 District Court Rules 1996 r 5.2 …. 5.13 Evidence Act 1906 …. 8.180 s 7 …. 5.200 s 8 …. 3.83, 5.115 s 8(1)(a) …. 5.112 s 8(1)(c) …. 5.118 s 8(1)(d) …. 3.85, 5.180 s 8(1)(e) …. 3.91 s 8(1)(e)(i) …. 3.97 s 8(1)(e)(ii) …. 3.107, 3.110 s 8(1)(e)(iii) …. 3.117 s 9 …. 5.165, 5.201 s 11 …. 5.178 s 11A …. 5.178 s 12 …. 5.178

s 13 …. 5.178 s 15 …. 7.84 s 18 …. 5.204 ss 19A–19F …. 5.207 ss 19C–19F …. 5.212 s 19E …. 5.213 s 19F …. 5.213 s 19G …. 5.213 s 20 …. 7.118 ss 20–21 …. 7.118 ss 20A–20M …. 5.207, 5.214 s 20C …. 5.208 s 20I …. 5.208 s 20J …. 5.208 ss 20K–20M …. 5.207 s 21 …. 7.118, 7.148 s 22 …. 7.148 s 23(1) …. 7.138 s 24 …. 5.175 s 25 …. 3.145, 7.137 s 25A …. 7.33 s 26 …. 3.145, 7.33, 7.137 s 27 …. 5.85 s 30 …. 7.9 s 31 …. 7.10 s 31A …. 2.46, 2.87, 3.12, 3.63, 3.75 s 31A(1) …. 3.63 s 31A(1)(a) …. 3.63

s 31A(2) …. 3.63 s 31A(2)(a) …. 3.63s 31A(3) …. 3.49, 3.63, 3.70, 3.71 s 32 …. 3.66, 8.95 s 32A …. 5.76 s 35 …. 4.14 ss 36A–36BC …. 3.146 s 36BA …. 3.147 s 36BC …. 3.146, 3.147 s 36BD …. 4.45, 7.100, 7.107 s 36BE …. 7.108 s 50 …. 4.7, 4.12, 4.20, 4.41 s 50B …. 7.13, 7.26 s 53(1)(b) …. 6.69, 6.70 ss 54–56 …. 7.11 s 58 …. 6.69 ss 58–61 …. 6.69 s 65(1) …. 7.18, 8.91 s 69A …. 8.93 s 70 …. 6.70 s 71 …. 6.70 s 72 …. 6.60, 6.67 s 73A …. 7.18, 7.82, 7.86 s 73B …. 7.18 s 73BA …. 7.18 s 78 …. 6.69 s 79A …. 7.9 s 79B …. 8.178, 8.188 ss 79B–79F …. 7.13

s 79C …. 8.178 s 79C(1) …. 8.178 s 79C(2a) …. 8.179, 8.182 s 79C(2b) …. 8.179, 8.182 s 79C(4) …. 8.178 s 79C(6) …. 8.178, 8.179 s 79D …. 8.178, 8.179 s 79D(2) …. 8.178 s 79E …. 8.178, 8.179 ss 89–96 …. 7.18, 8.189 ss 97–106 …. 7.28 s 97(2) …. 5.115 s 97(3) …. 7.28 s 100A(1) …. 7.28 s 100A(1)(a) …. 7.29 s 100A(1)(b) …. 7.29 s 100A(2) …. 7.36 ss 106A–106T …. 7.33 s 106B …. 7.28, 7.31 s 106C …. 7.28, 7.31 s 106D …. 4.20, 4.37, 7.31 s 106G …. 7.33 ss 106HA–106HC …. 7.34 s 106HB(7) …. 7.33 ss 106I–106M …. 7.34 s 106P …. 7.33 s 106R …. 7.33 s 106R(7) …. 7.33

s 106RA …. 7.34 ss 120–132 …. 7.3 Freedom of Information Act 1992 …. 5.232 Sch 1 cl 5 …. 5.16 Juries Act 1957 Pt IXA …. 5.185 Limited Partnerships Act 1909 s 6(1) …. 8.110 Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 Pt 5 …. 1.3 s 23 …. 1.3 Oaths, Affidavits and Statutory Declarations Act 2005 s 4(2) …. 7.28 s 5 …. 7.28 Partnership Act 1895 s 22 …. 8.110 Road Traffic Act 1974 s 70(2) …. 7.25 Royal Commission (Police) Act 2002 Pt 7 …. 4.53 s 31(2) …. 4.53 s 32 …. 4.53 Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 O 20 r 8(3) …. 6.3 O 20 r 19 …. 6.36 O 23 …. 6.37 O 26 …. 5.6 O 26 r 1 …. 5.7

O 26 r 12 …. 5.77 O 26A …. 5.6 O 26A r 3 …. 5.10 O 26A r 4 …. 5.10 O 26A r 5 …. 5.10 O 27 …. 5.6 O 28 …. 5.8 O 29A …. 1.3 O 30 …. 8.95 O 31A.10 …. 1.3 O 34 r 5 …. 2.11 O 36A …. 5.8, 5.76 O 36B …. 5.5 O 40 …. 6.48 O 40 r 2 …. 7.64 O 52 r 2 …. 5.8 Sentencing Act 1995 s 140(1)(a) …. 2.14 Supreme Court Act 1935 Pt VI …. 1.3 s 60 …. 2.15 s 71 …. 5.105 s 72 …. 5.105 s 167(1)(q) …. 1.3 Young Offenders Act 1994 s 20 …. 8.150

EUROPE

European Court of Human Rights Art 6(2) …. 6.14

INTERNATIONAL European Convention on Human Rights …. 1.48 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Art 14 …. 5.13, 8.56

UNITED KINGDOM Civil Evidence Act 1938 …. 8.183, 8.188 Civil Evidence Act 1968 …. 8.172 Civil Evidence Act 1995 …. 8.4, 8.172 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 …. 2.6, 7.64 Contempt of Court Act 1981 s 10 …. 5.205 Criminal Appeals Act 1907 …. 2.14 Criminal Evidence Act 1898 …. 3.5, 3.83, 3.84, 3.87, 3.89, 3.90, 3.92, 3.100, 3.102, 3.107, 3.108, 3.109, 3.113, 3.118, 3.119, 3.121, 3.122, 3.124, 3.131 s 1(e) …. 3.83, 3.85, 3.86, 3.87, 3.124, 5.180 s 1(f) …. 3.85, 3.91, 3.92, 3.97, 3.103, 3.124 s 1(f)(i) …. 3.94, 3.95, 3.96, 3.97, 5.180 s 1(f)(ii) …. 3.110, 3.119, 3.129, 3.135 s 1(f)(iii) …. 3.117, 3.118, 3.119 Criminal Evidence Act 1965 …. 8.4, 8.172, 8.180 Criminal Justice Act 1967 s 8 …. 6.25 Criminal Justice Act 2003 …. 7.64 Ch 2 …. 8.4

Pt 11 Ch 1 …. 3.2, 3.20 s 1(2) …. 3.121 s 101 …. 3.53 s 101(1)(d) …. 3.20 s 101(3) …. 3.20 s 332 …. 3.121 Sch 37 Pt 5 …. 3.121 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 ss 32–33 …. 4.19 s 34 …. 5.144 s 35 …. 5.131 Criminal Procedure Act 1865 …. 7.118, 7.149, 7.152 s 3 …. 7.118 s 4 …. 7.148 s 5 …. 7.148 s 6 …. 7.138, 7.142 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 s 3 …. 7.64 s 4 …. 7.64 s 6D …. 7.64 s 7A …. 7.64 Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 …. 7.52 Pt 19 …. 7.64 Evidence Act 1843 …. 5.200 Evidence Act 1938 …. 7.119, 8.82, 8.172, 8.173, 8.177 Ch 28.1(1)(i) …. 8.173 Ch 28.1(5) …. 8.173 Human Rights Act 1998 …. 1.48, 6.14, 6.16, 6.19, 6.21

Interpretation Act 1889 s 9 …. 6.69 Lord Brougham’s Act 1853 …. 5.204 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 s 101 …. 6.16 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s 66 …. 4.65 s 74(1) …. 5.184 s 76 …. 8.131 s 78 …. 4.53 Prisoners Counsel Act 1836 …. 5.114 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 s 4 …. 7.142 s 7(1) …. 7.142

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Constitution 6th Amendment …. 7.64 Federal Evidence Rules …. 8.61 r 401 …. 2.22 r 402 …. 2.22 r 403 …. 2.22, 3.36 r 404 …. 3.36 rr 413–415 …. 3.36 r 803 …. 8.61 s 804 …. 8.61 r 807 …. 8.61

Contents Preface Acknowledgments Table of Cases Table of Statutes

Chapter One: The Fundamental Principles Chapter Two: The Trial Process Chapter Three: Character Chapter Four: Unreliable Evidence: Corroboration and Related Rules Chapter Five: The Adversary Context Chapter Six: Party Presentation and Prosecution Chapter Seven: The Testimonial Emphasis Chapter Eight: Hearsay Index

Detailed Contents Preface Acknowledgments Table of Cases Table of Statutes

Chapter One: The Fundamental Principles A Procedural Perspective The object of procedural rules The nature of material facts: past events Discovering Past Events The correspondence theory of knowledge The inferential process: Wigmorean analysis Probability theory Outline Mathematical probabilities Classical probabilities Frequency probabilities Subjective probabilities The equations of mathematical probability Problems with conceptualising probabilities mathematically Mathematical probabilities and the standard of proof

The non-mathematical approach: ‘inductive probabilities’ and ‘best explanations’ A correct probability approach? The Procedural Environment General considerations The common law adversary trial

Structuring the Rules of Evidence Synopsis

Chapter Two: The Trial Process The Process in Outline Sources of process The ambit of process Pre-trial process Trial process Appeal Following verdict Interlocutory appeals in criminal cases The Essential Tasks of the Trial Court The reception of evidence Two fundamental principles The nature of relevance Relevance and admissibility Discretion Nature and function at trial The residual exclusionary discretions Efficiency, time and cost Fairness Public policy

Determining the reception of tendered evidence Party waiver of rules of admissibility A ‘case to answer’ Proof Degrees of proof The civil standard: balance of probabilities

The criminal standard: beyond reasonable doubt Distinguishing the civil and criminal standards Directing the jury on the criminal standard To which facts does the criminal standard apply? Challenging unreasonable verdicts and applying the proviso

Proof on the voir dire Conclusion: the inductive approach The Ambit of Evidential Rules

Chapter Three: Character Introduction Common law approaches to unreliable evidence Character evidence: one exclusionary principle Character defined in terms of propensity/tendency Reasons for excluding evidence of propensity/tendency The multi-relevance of character evidence Prosecution Evidence Revealing the Accused’s Incriminating Propensity or Tendency The law in principle — an exclusionary presumption The evolution of the common law exclusionary rule The ambit of the common law exclusionary rule Discreditable conduct Discreditable conduct tendered as propensity Relationship evidence Other non-propensity uses

HML v R: the ambit unresolved Justifying exceptional admissibility Justification in principle Striking similarity Specifying a required probative value: the Pfennig test

Applying the Pfennig test Conclusion: the common law rule and the exclusionary principle Legislation affecting the exclusionary principle The uniform legislation Tendency reasoning Coincidence reasoning The nature of ‘probative value’ under ss 97, 98 and 101 ‘Significant probative value’ ‘Probative value substantially outweighing prejudicial effect’

Western Australia South Australia Queensland Determining probative strength: facts in issue Procedural matters Determining admissibility: notice Determining admissibility: onus Evidence upon which admissibility may be determined Multiple counts Inadvertent disclosure Directions to the jury Defence Evidence Revealing a Co-accused’s Incriminating Propensity Cross-examination of an Accused Disclosing Propensity The accused as a witness: two problems Modification of the privilege against self-incrimination Limiting cross-examination revealing the accused’s character The purpose of the legislative compromise The form of the compromise The extent of the prohibition under the Criminal Evidence Act The first exception: matters establishing facts in issue

The remaining exceptions: procedural issues The second exception: good character in issue The third exception: imputations against the character of the prosecutor or prosecution witnesses The fourth exception: evidence against a co-accused Evidence of Accused’s Propensity Tendered by the Defence Bad character of the accused Good character of the accused The nature and purpose of good character evidence Rebutting evidence of good character Directing the jury where good character raised Evidence Revealing the Propensity of a Third Party Defence evidence revealing the character of third parties The character of complainants in sexual assault cases Evidence Revealing Propensity in Civil Actions Where a party’s character is a material fact in issue Other evidence revealing the propensity of a party Evidence revealing the disposition of third parties Conclusion

Chapter Four: Unreliable Evidence: Corroboration and Related Rules Introduction Rules of ‘exclusion’ Rules requiring confirmation or warning Testimony Requiring Mandatory Corroboration Testimony Requiring a Mandatory Corroboration Warning The nature of the warning and the testimony embraced by it

Accomplices Police testimony of disputed confessions Testimony Requiring Warning Only as a Matter of Practice Children Sexual assault complainants Agents provocateurs (entrapment) Identification evidence The nature and risks of identification testimony The requirement to warn The warning: factors relevant to the reliability of identification evidence Discretionary exclusion of identification evidence The exclusionary rules in the Uniform Acts The effect of supporting evidence on the obligation to warn The cumulative effect of identification evidence The admissibility of out-of-court assertions of identity and pictures used for identification Other unreliable testimony The Nature of Corroborative Evidence Independence Implication in the crime charged Mutual corroboration Functions of Judge and Jury: Directing the Jury Where corroboration or a corroboration warning is mandatory Where a warning is required as a matter of practice to avoid a miscarriage of justice Conclusion

Chapter Five: The Adversary Context Access to Information

Introduction Rules giving access to information Civil cases Criminal cases The Nature of Rules Restricting Access to Information Adversary Restrictions Upon Access to Information Legal professional privilege (client legal privilege) Two privileges The communications (advice) privilege Lawyers and clients Legal professional advice Confidentiality Bona fides Communication made for the dominant purpose of legal advice

Material collected for litigation Limits to legal professional privilege Copies of documents Client’s privilege: waiver Only the communication or work-product is protected The privilege is a bar to access, not a rule of admissibility The public policy limit Statutory removal of the privilege

Claims to privilege: some procedural points Legal professional privilege and other rules and privileges preventing disclosure Conclusion The privilege in aid of settlement Justification Scope Costs Criminal cases Waiver: whose privilege?

Proceedings in which privilege may be claimed Secondary evidence of privileged admissions Public policy limits Negotiations between estranged spouses Alternative dispute resolution The privilege against self-incrimination Introduction: the adversary rationale Incompetence of accused and spouse as witnesses for the prosecution The accused The accused’s spouse

The accused’s right to silence The privilege of the accused not to testify on oath for the defence Comment and direction upon the accused’s failure to testify on oath The privilege of the accused to remain silent when questioned before trial

The privilege of citizens to refuse to provide answers or to produce documents that are self-incriminatory Scope Punishment, penalty, forfeiture and ecclesiastical censure Claiming the privilege Legislation affecting the privileges

The immunity of judges and jurors from testifying on the reasons for decisions Two adversary restrictions upon the tender of evidence The evidentiary rule flowing from the doctrine of res judicata The rule in Hollington v Hewthorn Public Policy Restrictions Upon Access to Information Introduction Parliamentary privilege Restrictions protecting marriage and family relationships Restrictions protecting other confidential relationships At common law

Under legislation Scope and nature Priest–penitent Doctor–patient Counsellors and complainants of sexual assault Professional confidential relationships and journalists’ sources

Public interest immunity General nature The public interests involved Nature of immunity Contents claims Class claims

Striking the balance: the procedural problems The rejection of otherwise admissible evidence on grounds of public interest

Chapter Six: Party Presentation and Prosecution Introduction Burden of Proof: Nature and Incidence Evidential and persuasive burdens The incidence of the burdens in criminal cases The incidence of the burdens in civil cases Legislative allocation of the burdens of proof Presumptions No Case to Answer Theory Criminal cases Civil cases The significance of the opponent’s failure to call evidence Material Facts Determined from Information Presented by the Parties Theory

The courts’ power to call witnesses Court intervention into the calling and questioning of witnesses Judicial notice

Chapter Seven: The Testimonial Emphasis Introduction Documentary Evidence Definition Authentication Tender of original Real Evidence Testimonial Evidence Outline Witnesses testify upon oath Testimonial formalities The testimony of children and other vulnerable witnesses Formalities and competency Formalities and credit Witnesses testify to facts, not opinions The rule and its rationale Observational inferences Example: sobriety and consequent capacity Expert assistance in drawing inferences: a functional approach Threshold tests at common law for expert knowledge Liberal relevancy Sufficient reliability determined by the court General acceptance within the relevant scientific community: Frye and Daubert

Current Australian position At common law

Under the uniform legislation

Ad hoc experts Two illusory tests of admissibility Common knowledge Ultimate issues and legal standards

Procedural aspects Adversarial presentation of expert testimony Establishing the admissibility of expert testimony: the voir dire Form of expert assistance Establishing primary facts through admissible evidence General expertise not subject to proof

The opinions of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander groups under the uniform legislation Facts and inferences are ultimately decided by the trier of fact Witnesses testify orally from memory Memory and its refreshment In-court refreshment of memory Out-of-court refreshment of memory Prior statements of witnesses General rule: prior consistent statements inadmissible Exception: prior statements rebutting alleged invention Exception: prior statements identifying accused Recent complaints in sexual assault cases Statements induced by hypnosis Questioning witnesses Examination-in-chief Scope and purpose: the bolster rule The prohibition against leading questions Hostile and unfavourable witnesses

Cross-examination The right to cross-examine

Issue cross-examination: introducing evidence Issue cross-examination: satisfying the rule in Browne v Dunn Credibility cross-examination Pursuing credit/credibility beyond cross-examination the general prohibition Exceptions to the general rule Cross-examination on documents

Re-examination

Chapter Eight: Hearsay Scope of the Hearsay Rule Rationale and definition Out-of-court ‘statements’ Statements tendered as assertions Narrative statements Assertions part of the res gestae Assertions of knowledge, belief and intention Assertions of physical sensation and health The availability of the maker of an out-of-court statement Machine-generated information Exceptions to the Hearsay Prohibition Common Law (and Related Statutory) Exceptions The so-called res gestae exceptions: spontaneous statements Out-of-court statements by persons since deceased (or otherwise unavailable) Statements against interest Statements in the course of duty Statements as to public or general rights Statements by relatives as to pedigree Dying declarations Post-testamentary statements by testators about the contents of their wills

Statements in public documents Admissions and confessions Terminology and the rationale for a hearsay exception Defining admissions and confessions Personal knowledge of admitted facts Self-serving statements Parties and their privies: vicarious admissions and confessions Vicarious admissions and confessions: the co-conspirator rule Confessions and admissions in criminal cases The rules and their rationale The voluntariness requirement The fairness discretion Unfairness as the unacceptable risk of wrongful conviction Unfairness as procedural impropriety

The public policy discretion Criminal investigations: standards of propriety Excluding for impropriety Appeals Determining the reception of confessions: the voir dire Statutory Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule Introduction The English approach and its variations Legislation based on the Evidence Act 1938 (UK) Legislation derived from the Criminal Evidence Act 1965 (UK) Other legislation admitting hearsay evidence in criminal cases Business records A more liberal approach to documents: South Australia Computer output

Bankers’ books and other books of account Transportation documents The Uniform Legislation The definition of hearsay Exceptions to the prohibition First-hand hearsay Business records Other exceptions Index

[page 1]

Chapter One

The Fundamental Principles A Procedural Perspective The object of procedural rules 1.1 The rules of evidence constitute part of the rules of procedure. In continental and other jurisdictions based upon civil law (for example, China) it is a part not dealt with separately, but in common law jurisdictions the rules of evidence have acquired a sophistication and complexity that has led to their separate treatment. As a consequence, there has been a tendency for these rules to lose their procedural perspective and be looked upon as a series of separate arbitrary and technical rules which apply seriatim during the course of trial. But, although the common law rules of evidence are capable of separate treatment, it is only by giving emphasis to their procedural context that their purpose can be seen and their primary justification understood. Consequently, this first chapter explains and classifies common law rules of evidence to give prominence to that procedural context. Procedural rules appear to have two overall purposes: to provide a framework within which citizens can settle disputes; and to provide machinery for the broader public function of law enforcement. In most cases, where a court is called upon to pronounce judgment, these two objectives coincide, as the court applies the appropriate rule in settlement of the dispute. But these bald assertions require some justification. Criminal cases most obviously illustrate the notion of dispute settlement

through law enforcement, with public prosecutors seeking to persuade courts that definitive rules apply to the facts alleged to produce conviction. Common law civil cases, on the other hand, appear at first sight to be exercises only in dispute settlement. Parties, not the court, decide whether proceedings will be taken, whether additional parties will be joined, the issues to be resolved, the evidence and arguments to be considered, and the extent to which witnesses will be examined and cross-examined. Parties may agree upon facts through admissions, and at any time before judgment may agree upon a settlement of their dispute. There is some authority for the proposition that the parties can stipulate the rule they wish the court to apply [page 2] in resolution of their differences.1 Parties can waive the strict application of procedural and evidential rules: see 2.46–2.49. Only when the parties transcend public policy or the bounds of criminal legality will courts intervene of their own motion.2 Otherwise, civil courts remain passive and reach their decisions, on the balance of probabilities, upon the basis only of the materials presented to them. This all appears as a procedure designed to determine disputes upon the relative merits of a discourse defined by the parties, not as a procedure designed to enforce society’s laws following an accurate determination of past events in the real world. But appearances may be deceptive, and it is argued that in both criminal and civil cases, when courts are called upon to settle disputes formally, they are called upon to settle them, at least so far as possible, through law enforcement. This requires some explanation. 1.2 Disputes can be settled in a variety of ways, from battle and ordeal to mediation, arbitration and judgment. The former methods, now rejected, called upon some external authority (deity or devil) or brute power to determine the appropriate outcome. The latter, now accepted, assume that humans are themselves capable of determining, in accordance with some rational logic belonging to their own world, the appropriate outcome of disputes. These latter methods are described by Twining3 as ‘the rationalist tradition’. Of these latter rational techniques a clear distinction can be drawn between

techniques seeking to persuade parties to settle their differences through agreement, and techniques that rather impose solutions upon parties. Eckhoff draws the distinction in discussing the relative roles of mediator and judge:4 The judge is distinguished from the mediator in that his activity is related to the level of norms rather than to the level of interests. His task is not to try to reconcile the parties but to reach a decision about which of them is right. This leads to several important differences between the two methods of conflict-resolution. The mediator should preferably look forward, toward the consequences which may follow from the various alternative solutions, and he must work on the parties to get them to accept a

[page 3] solution. The judge, on the other hand, looks back to the events which have taken place (eg agreements which the parties have entered into, violations which one has inflicted on the other, etc) and to the norms concerning acquisition of rights, responsibilities, etc which are connected with these events. When he has taken his standpoint on this basis, his task is finished.

What requires emphasis is that a mediator seeks a solution to a dispute through an agreement that makes no inherent claim to correctness or validity. It is enough that the parties agree. Future interests may in some cases be decisive, but there are no limits upon the matters that may be put by or to the parties in an attempt to reach agreement. Past events may assume importance (particularly where a prediction is made of the probable action of a judge should the dispute reach court), but not necessarily. 1.3 The principal techniques for settling disputes through agreement are negotiation, mediation and conciliation. Negotiation proceeds directly between parties, while mediation and conciliation are conducted by third parties who intervene to a greater or lesser degree in an attempt to encourage party agreement. These techniques have always played an important role in the settlement of disputes in Australia. Most civil claims are settled out of court through negotiation, and conciliation procedures have long existed in Australia to encourage the settlement by agreement of industrial and matrimonial disputes. In South Australia, judges have been empowered since 1929 to seek settlement before proceeding to formal trial and judgment.5 More recently, under the banner of ‘alternative dispute resolution’, these techniques have assumed a prominent place in all Australian jurisdictions as the most cost-effective and satisfactory methods of solving disputes.6 Not only do many disputants now

pursue settlement through mediation centres, but all courts have procedures for encouraging parties to agree before the matter goes to trial.7 But while agreement makes no claim to correctness or validity, judgment, it is submitted, does make that claim. It may be that many disputes are capable of settlement through agreement, and that this is the more appropriate mode of settlement. And it [page 4] can be strongly argued that the control given to parties during common law civil litigation is justified as a continuing encouragement for parties to settle. But where agreement cannot be achieved, and the matter goes to court (or indeed, so-called ‘arbitration’)8 for imposed settlement, in both the criminal and the civil sphere, courts are called upon to strive for that solution which is in some sense correct. 1.4 But in what sense correct? From what standpoint is a solution correct? By what form of reasoning can correct solutions be reached in this context? The only possible standpoint is that of someone within the world seeking a rational solution to a dispute, a solution that can apply either generally in lieu of agreement or at least apply where agreement breaks down. The form of reasoning is inherent in the very idea of judgment. The traditional description of judgment is that given by the positivist. Positivists assert that courts merely apply promulgated legal rules to the facts before them. The rules stipulate what must be done in a particular fact situation. Having isolated the relevant rule and the facts constituting the dispute, courts reach correct decisions by applying the relevant rule to the facts as found. Jerome Frank9 describes this process in symbolic form as R × F = D. It is in this positivist sense that it can be asserted that the object of procedural rules is to settle disputes correctly by means of law enforcement. This positivist approach dominates legal practice. Facts are asserted or pleaded with rules in mind. Clients come to lawyers asking what solution ‘the law’ provides to their problems. Law students sit in lectures expecting to learn ‘the law’ so that they can apply it in practice to their clients’ circumstances. As Brennan CJ said in Nicholas v R:10

As the rights prescribed by a court’s judgment … declare or are founded on the antecedent rights and liabilities of the parties … the court must find the facts and apply the law which, at the relevant time, prescribes those antecedent rights and liabilities.

It is assumed that a rule can provide an answer to every fact situation giving rise to dispute. Nevertheless, there are serious difficulties in using the positivist approach in every case to describe the way in which decisions are reached. Rules are often not clear in their application to particular situations, either because their formulation is ambiguous or because their application would produce a decision with which the judge cannot [page 5] agree. And eventually rules run out and do not cater for particular situations. Positivists can provide no logical answer to these difficult cases, leaving decision to the courts’ ‘discretion’. Dworkin11 attempts to avoid the conundrum by arguing that rules are not what they literally appear to be and must be refined, if necessary by a modern day Hercules, in light of the principles that can be discovered in the total history and tradition of the common law, to produce correct decisions in hard cases. Non-positivists, in particular natural lawyers, argue that rules promulgated by legislatures and courts are subject to the ultimate restraint of some further authority, to be found either in an external deity, or in the collective conscience of society, or in some notion of fundamental and inalienable human rights, or in the individual conscience of the judge. By this approach there are rules which ultimately produce correct solutions in hard cases — but they are promulgated from outside. Others argue that difficult cases cannot be decided by rules at all and must be determined on the uniqueness of their facts.12 But leaving these hard cases aside, the Frankian equation remains in most cases the conventional description of how courts reach solutions to the disputes brought before them. It is in this sense that it may be asserted that the general object of the procedural law is to settle disputes correctly through law enforcement. If this is so, then the procedural system exists to provide a suitable environment for the application of appropriate rules to the facts giving rise to a dispute. Even if one rejects this positivist stance and argues that correct decisions are reached in

some other way, it is likely that the facts of the dispute will remain decisive.13 Therefore, as a minimum, the procedural system exists to provide an environment suitable to the discovery of those facts giving rise to the dispute. For one way or another, facts are decisive.

The nature of material facts: past events 1.5 If one accepts the positivist description of judgment, then the common law procedural system is centrally concerned with the discovery of those facts that entitle a party to remedy under a particular legal rule. The applicable legal rule defines the facts to be established to entitle remedy under that rule. These facts may be referred [page 6] to as the material facts. If one rejects the positivist position, some other method must be devised for isolating those facts, or other criteria, that determine the settlement of a dispute. In Australia, as in all Western liberal democratic societies, it is left to the parties in both criminal and civil cases to seek formal remedy in settlement of disputes (this is the so-called ‘principle of free disposition’). The parties specify in their formal claim the material facts upon which they rely for their remedy. The procedural system then provides the parties with an environment in which those alleged material facts can, if disputed, be determined. It is this procedural environment that is the province of the rules of evidence. The rules of evidence are concerned with the discovery of those disputed material facts alleged by the parties and upon which their legal remedies depend. Material facts are in almost every case past events or states, or at least involve the discovery of past events or states.14 This might be simply illustrated by reference to a civil claim for personal injuries. If the plaintiff is claiming damages for injuries sustained in, say, a road accident, then to succeed he or she must establish the material facts demanded by the law of negligence. The law requires facts constituting a duty of care, breach of that duty and damage or loss resulting from that breach. These facts will comprise the circumstances at the time of the accident in question, the physical relationship of one party to another, the

conduct of the defendant, and the injuries thereby sustained (and perhaps still ensuing). The material facts are in this sense an historical event. A similar illustration might be given in a criminal case. Where murder is charged the prosecution will allege an event whereby the accused intentionally killed the victim without a lawful excuse. Again, a piece of history. The problem in discovering past events is that they cannot be exhumed and brought into court for the trier of fact to experience first-hand. They must be somehow reconstructed from their remnants in the current world. These remnants are primarily the memories of witnesses, but they might also be in the form of physical remnants such as documents, fingerprints and DNA samples found at the scene of the crime, continuing injuries and so on. From these remnants the trier of fact must somehow reconstruct the historical events constituting the material facts in issue.15 [page 7]

Discovering Past Events The correspondence theory of knowledge 1.6 The assumption in all this is that there is a physical world out there to be known; that we are capable of knowledge that corresponds to the physical world. The ‘correspondence’ theory lies at the very heart of the rationalist tradition that assumes disputes can be settled only following discovery of facts.16 Other theories of knowledge, which either deny that the world out there can be discovered, or deny that there is a world out there at all, argue that we are trapped by our subjective views and that courts can do no more than adjudge upon the discourse of the parties before them.17 However, these theories, while providing valuable critical perspectives, are not descriptive of the assumptions that underlie our existing evidentiary regime, and are generally eschewed by scholars and practitioners operating in the rationalist tradition. That tradition optimistically assumes that there is a world out there capable of discovery and which provides a sufficiently regular and common basis for us to carry on our lives. That world is revealed to us directly through perception. It is only in these senses that there is a kind of certainty about the world. But even in these experiences we may be mistaken. Our senses may deceive us. Our

perceptions are a product of the societies in which we live, our biology, our theories of knowledge, our beliefs and our individual psyches. We must take care when acting upon our perceptions of the world. Experience provides us with a direct knowledge of the world and its events. Where the world is not directly or fully experienced it can be constructed through a process of inference. From what the witness reports we infer what occurred (or is still occurring); from an examination of the scene of the accident, the tangled wreck and the testimony of witnesses to the event, we infer how the accident occurred. If we can be mistaken in our direct full experiences the risk of mistake may increase as we interpret the experiences of others, and draw inferences from the sensory reports of witnesses to events, from physical remnants we have directly experienced and from reports by experts about the appropriate inferences to be drawn from these remnants. As a consequence, definitive correspondence between knowledge and the physical world is an impossible ideal. Definitive knowledge of the world, including the past events most often alleged as material facts, is unattainable. An omniscient God may know the world and all that is and was in it, but we mere mortals, in our ignorance, can only strive for knowledge in a rational and orderly way. For legal practice the [page 8] important question then is: ‘What is that orderly way in which we do (and perhaps should) search for material facts?’18 1.7 Courts have not set out to create their own unique process of fact discovery. They seek to discover facts in exactly the same way as other members of society discover facts. The evolution of the jury system and its continued use in serious criminal cases reflects this. As Thayer emphasised in his Preliminary Treatise on the Law of Evidence at Common Law:19 Observe at this point one or two fundamental conceptions. There is a principle — not so much a rule of evidence as a presupposition involved in the very concept of a rational system of evidence as contrasted with the old formal and mechanical systems — which forbids receiving anything irrelevant, not logically probative. How are we to know what these forbidden things are? Not by any rule of law. The law furnishes no test of relevancy. For this, it tacitly refers to logic and general experience — assuming that the principles of reasoning are known to its judges and ministers, just as a vast multitude of other things are assumed as sufficiently known to them.

Thus, the reliance upon ordinary principles of reasoning becomes the very focus of a rational system of evidence.

The inferential process: Wigmorean analysis 1.8 As mentioned above, the process of reasoning is one of inference — given the direct experience of certain information or evidence, the existence or occurrence of the material facts can be inferred. Not with certainty, but to varying degrees of likelihood or probability. In most cases, the inferences used to reach particular conclusions of fact from stipulated information or evidence are detailed and sophisticated. Wigmore recognised this and in The Science of Judicial Proof, developed a notation whereby inferences drawn in any particular case can be diagrammatically represented.20 It is interesting to consider [page 9] this sort of analysis as descriptive of a rational approach to the discovery of facts. Whilst its normative justification remains problematic, it provides a precise analytical means for describing a fact-finding process. It also provides a common language in which evidential issues can be rigorously discussed. 1.9 The starting point of the analysis is the assumption that reaching conclusions of fact from particular evidence is a process that can be rationalised — that there is a logical relationship that can be articulated between evidence and conclusions of fact. Thus, the analysis begins with an isolation of, on the one hand, the evidence being relied upon and, on the other, the factual conclusions which the parties seek to justify. Assuming the standpoint of the fact-finder — the trier of fact — the evidence relied upon comprises that personally experienced, the testimony of witnesses and objects or documents produced. These can be symbolically represented by a square (brackets): [ ].21 These are the incontrovertible experiences of the trier of fact. Only triers can decide their experiences. Only a trier can determine what the witness said, what the witness looks like, how the witness behaves, and so on. Only the trier can determine the nature of an object produced in court or the signs on a paper

produced. These experiences thus become the very materials from which further conclusions are built. In many cases, there will be no debate between those present as to the nature of their direct experiences; the inferences and ultimate conclusions to be drawn are the matters most often controversial. The factual conclusions to be inferred from the matters experienced are, for the purposes of litigation, those material facts alleged and which will justify the granting of a particular remedy. In positivist terms, they are those facts upon which the operation of a legal rule is conditional. In practical terms, they are those facts alleged in the pleadings of a party in a civil case or in the opening of a party in a criminal case. They constitute that factual hypothesis for which a party is contending and which, if ultimately accepted by the trier of fact, will result in judgment being given in that party’s favour. They are represented by a circle (an ellipse): ( ). But judgment will normally be dependent, not upon the discovery of only one fact, but upon the discovery of a series of facts, some of which may be compounds of other [page 10] facts. To be rigorous we must be precise about which facts require ultimate discovery and which should therefore be represented by a separate circle.22 Having isolated precisely the information experienced and the facts ultimately to be established, the intermediary steps can be exposed by way of articulating each logical step to be taken if those facts are to follow from that evidence. Each logical step is a process of inference whereby an intermediary fact is inferred.23 From each intermediary fact further inferences are drawn until, by means of a whole series of inferences, the ultimate facts can be regarded as discovered. Symbolically, each inferred intermediary fact is also represented by a circle. To show the inferential relationship between evidence and facts an arrow is used to indicate the direction in which the inferences are proceeding. The intermediary steps are largely of two kinds. On the one hand, they consist of chains of inferences (what Wigmore calls catenate inferences).24 On the other hand, inferences are combined to infer the one fact by way of inference from a number of other separate facts (what Wigmore calls converging or corroborative

inferences).25 A common analogy in this case is to the rope or cable consisting of a number of separate strands, but Wigmore also draws analogy to a wheelchair being pushed towards a door by several pushes, each in the required direction.26 Each item of evidence and each inferred fact can be listed and numbered. The chart can then be constructed by giving each square or circle a reference number. Arrows indicate the drawing of inferences and their relationship one to another. 1.10 The process is best illustrated by means of example. This example has been simplified as far as possible. The detailed use of Wigmorean analysis in an actual case may be a sophisticated and complicated (and necessarily controvertible) process, and the simplified example is given only to illustrate how the analysis might apply to describe the process of fact-finding in a specific situation.27 [page 11] D is charged with having, on 12 September at Enfield, murdered V. The bare allegation is that D killed V by stabbing her with a knife. The prosecution’s opening story is that D and V were lovers, that they quarrelled because V went out with another man, that at 10 pm on the evening of 12 September, armed with a knife, D went from the Exeter Hotel, where he had been drinking alone, to V’s Enfield house, that D used a key given to him by V to enter the house, that he proceeded to V’s bedroom and there, drunk with jealousy and alcohol, he stabbed her to death. The material facts might compendiously be described as follows: (1) On 12 September at Enfield D, with malicious intent, stabbed and killed V. Breaking down this proposition, having regard to the constituents of the crime of murder, it might be analysed as comprising the following more specific material facts: (2) On 12 September at Enfield V was stabbed and killed. (3) It was D who stabbed and killed V. (4) At the time D stabbed V he did it intending to cause grievous bodily harm.

These material facts can be diagrammatically represented thus:

To simplify the example it is assumed that D is not disputing that V was killed at Enfield (2), but that he is denying that he was the person involved (3).28 This being the line of D’s testimony in defence, if it is found that D did kill V, despite his testimonial denial, then it will likely be inferred without argument that he killed her intentionally. This material fact (4) is thus also put aside for the purposes of this example. Nevertheless, this preliminary discussion illustrates the importance of isolating the material facts clearly and precisely, and shows that in practical terms which of these material facts will be in issue depends upon what line is taken by way of defence.29 [page 12] The issue in the case consequently is identity. The evidence in support of this issue might be: [5] The testimony of X that she saw D leave the relevant premises shortly after the alleged time of death. [6] The testimony of Y that D and V were lovers and that she heard D say: ‘I’m going to kill V because she has been sleeping with other men.’ [7] The testimony of Z that she found clutched in V’s hand a piece of cloth which appears to fit a tear in a coat owned by D. Taking each item separately one can create the following chain of inferences to reach the conclusion that it was D involved in (3): [5] X’s testimony that she saw D leave at the relevant time. ↓ (8) D did leave at the relevant time. ↓ (9) D had the opportunity to kill V.

↓ (3) D killed V. Putting the argument in this form raises immediate questions which themselves might give rise to further inferential analysis. In the first place, the inference from X’s testimony might be controversial. X’s identification might be doubtful.30 Other evidence about X’s eyesight or the light available might give rise to an alternative explanatory inferential chain. Next, the relevant time might be controversial. If the body was found the next day, medical evidence might be sought to establish the time of death.31 Determining that time will itself involve a chain of inferences starting with the testimony of the examining doctor and perhaps another forensic expert. Further, in articulating D’s opportunity to kill we raise the question of what other persons may have had that opportunity. Other persons may have had access to V’s house, and other inferential chains might be articulated to establish the opportunity that these other persons had. Any such chains need to be charted and their place in the initial analysis shown.32 Leaving aside these possibilities, we can construct another inferential chain from the testimony of Y: [page 13] [6] Y’s testimony that D and V are lovers and D threatened to kill V. ↓ (10) D and V are lovers and D threatened to kill V. ↓ (3) D killed V. This chain might raise questions about the veracity of Y, the circumstances in which D made the threat and whether D’s personality was consistent with him having carried out the threat. Other evidence, including perhaps testimony from a psychologist who has examined D, might give rise to rival or explanatory inferences which would again need to be articulated and positioned in the original chart. Again leaving aside these matters for the purposes of simplification, we can construct a final chain of inferences from Z’s testimony:

[7] Z’s testimony that the scrap of cloth in V’s hand fits D’s coat. ↓ (11) The scrap of cloth was in V’s hand and fits D’s coat. ↓ (12) The assailant wore D’s coat. ↓ (3) D killed V. This simple chain raises even more questions. Could the cloth have fitted other coats? Did V tear the scrap from the assailant at the time she was stabbed? Was D wearing the coat at the relevant time? Again the questions can be met by charting further inferences from any available information. The chains of inferences are complicated even in this apparently simple case. Completeness requires that all available information be charted, although this is not the place to do so. But assuming that these extended chains are available, we can appreciate that each separate chain ultimately leads to the same conclusion: D killed V (3). It is therefore necessary to chart the combination — the convergence — that is reached after considering each individual chain of inferences: (9) D had the opportunity to kill V. (10) D threatened to kill V.

(3) D killed V.

(12) Assailant was wearing D’S coat. The whole chart can then be put together to represent the relationship between the evidence experienced and the conclusions to be inferred: [page 14]

For each inferred fact for which there is an alternative explanation, that explanatory inferential chain may be inserted against and in contrast to the relevant inferred fact. For example, we could insert a contrasting chain against (9) that concludes that X’s identification was mistaken; or one against (10) that infers that the witness was lying; or one against (12) that infers that someone else was wearing D’s coat at the relevant time. Each explanatory inferential chain will be supported by its own evidence. Its insertion is represented by the symbol ‘>’. 1.11 This approach has a great deal of descriptive appeal. Counsel do focus upon those inferential chains that are open to debate, and do offer alternative explanatory chains to meet an opponent’s case. In cases involving so-called circumstantial evidence, judges will often have in mind this sort of inferential chart in deciding that the evidence supports the proponent’s case.33 Some judges have been known to chart expressly the inferences to be made so that in summing up to the jury the relationship between various arguments can be clearly explained without omitting a logical inferential step.34 The limits of the exercise lie in its failure, first, to attempt description of the very process of individual inference, and secondly, to describe how the various inferences combine to produce proof to the requisite standard. Without some further explanation there appears no reason for making one set of inferential divisions rather than another, so that the Wigmorean chart appears to be no more than the mere creation of its author. Yet the courts, when making use of this inferential process, appear to assume

[page 15] that it does constitute a rational description so that the decision-making process is not a mere accident of the mind of the individual. This is the very nub of the rationalist tradition. Appellate judges will interfere in cases where fact-finders in lower courts have gone ‘wrong’ in their combination of the tendered evidence to produce proof to the requisite degree, and trial judges will rule upon whether individual inferences can be drawn from tendered evidence at all.35 Ultimately, it is only through analysis of the very process of inference, individually and in combination, that any rational process can be isolated and described, and although courts have been willing to specify the chains of inferences to be drawn in reaching conclusions of fact, they have been less willing to analyse and describe the very process of inference and combination itself. What exactly do we mean when we say ‘if evidence E exists then conclusion C follows’? To what extent is this a definitive and scientific process? How do we combine individual inferences? These are the interesting and difficult questions that lead to an analysis of concepts of probability.

Probability theory Outline 1.12 While judges have been reluctant to analyse the very process of inference and proof, philosophers have long struggled with such analysis under the name of ‘probability theory’.36 Theories of interest in this context are those by which we within the world seek to explain why a particular piece of evidence can be said to ‘probabilify’ a particular conclusion. The terminology is that of probability because we live in a world of uncertainty, and must begin with the proposition that all we can do is adduce good reasons for reaching particular conclusions about the world out there. We can only infer that things probably exist and events probably occurred; we can never be certain. Only an omniscient God, able to look at the world from the outside, could be certain. The term ‘probability’ recognises that in all our knowledge, all our conclusions of fact, there is necessarily a degree of ignorance. The crucial questions are how do we reduce ignorance, and how do we then cope with any remaining uncertainty.

[page 16] The first question is what is meant when we say that particular evidence makes a particular conclusion more or less probable. (‘Probable’ here, as elsewhere in this chapter, does not mean likely, in the sense of more likely than not. Probability embraces the whole spectrum of likelihood, from the least likely to the most.) For example, if a witness testifies that she saw D leave particular premises at a particular time, the probability of D having done so can be said to be increased. Again, if a piece of fabric matching D’s jacket is found in the victim’s hand, and D’s jacket is damaged or is not able to be located, the probability of D having been in the vicinity can be said to be increased. But in what sense is the probability of the conclusion increased by the evidence? Philosophers isolate four different senses in which it might be said that evidence reflects upon the probability of a particular conclusion.37 We wish to know whether these approaches are descriptive of how courts find facts, and, furthermore, whether any of these approaches should be applied by courts normatively. The four approaches are: the subjective approach; the classical or a priori approach; the statistical or frequency approach; and the inductive approach. As the first three approaches can be conceptualised in mathematical terms and in that sense contrast to the inductive approach, they are first dealt with together.

Mathematical probabilities 1.13 A useful way of describing the nature of inference is to put the inference in deductive form. If the evidence is the testimony of X that she saw D at a relevant time, and the inference is that D was there at this time, the inference can be expressed in the following, deductive, form: 1.

When witnesses testify to events those events probably occurred.

2.

X testified to an event (that D was there).

3.

Therefore, the event probably occurred (D was there).

If from D’s presence it is to be further inferred that D killed V, then again the desired inference can be deductively expressed: 1.

Persons leaving victims’ houses shortly after victims have been killed are probably responsible for the killings.

2.

D left the victim’s house shortly after her death.

3.

Therefore, D is probably the killer.

By expressing the inference in this deductive form we articulate the generalisation of knowledge upon which the inference is based and are in a better position to determine the strength of the inference. This form recognises that inferences are only [page 17] drawn from evidence because a more general knowledge of the world compels a particular conclusion. An inference cannot be drawn in a vacuum. Commentators now agree that this kind of deductive analysis of the individual inference is a useful complement to Wigmore’s focus on the appropriate inferences to be drawn in a complex fact situation.38 Significantly, this use of the deductive syllogism immediately puts the inference in terms of probability, raising the whole question of probability and its meaning. And, furthermore, it is a short step to express the probability of the inference in numerical terms, as an expression of the generalisation of knowledge upon which it is based. But there is more than one way of giving mathematical expression to an inference, and each reflects a different notion of mathematical probability. Classical probabilities 1.14 In the classical approach, a generalisation delimits both the total number of possibilities and the proportion of those that will lead to the desired inference. So, inferring D’s involvement in a murder from evidence of D’s presence might lead to the following syllogism: 1.

Six people only were in the vicinity at the time of V’s killing.

2.

D was in the vicinity.

3.

Therefore there is a one in six chance that D killed V.

The probability of D having killed V can be expressed as 1/6 (0.166, or 16.6%). The odds are 5 to 1 against. The analogy is to the probability of a thrown six-sided dice showing a particular number.

Other examples illustrate the application of the classical approach. In each, a syllogism yields a mathematical probability measuring the number of favourable chances within a stipulated range. To infer that D did not pay on entering a rodeo, evidence is adduced that of the 1000 spectators only 499 paid and D was a spectator.39 The inference to be drawn might be expressed as follows: 1.

Of 1000 people at a rodeo, 499 paid.

2.

D attended the rodeo.

3.

Therefore, the chances of D having not paid are 501 in 1000.

The probability of D having not paid is 501/1000 (0.501, or 50.1%). The odds are 501 to 499 in favour (on). [page 18] In The Brimnes,40 it was shown that an acceptance telegram was transmitted between 9.45 am and 10.05 am in order to enable the inference that the telegram was transmitted before 10 am. So: 1.

A telegram was transmitted between 9.45 am and 10.05 am.

2.

This is the telegram that was transmitted.

3.

Therefore, the chances of this telegram having been transmitted before 10 am are 15 out of 20.

The probability of the telegram having been transmitted before 10 am is 15/20 (0.75, or 75%). The odds are 3 to 1 on. 1.15 In each of these cases there is evidence of the total number of possibilities and the number of those that comprise the inference to be drawn. By assuming that the event in question has an equal chance of being any one of the possible events — and on the information stipulated above there is no information to the contrary — then the probability of the inferred conclusion can be expressed in terms of ‘chances’ or classical probabilities. But the assumption of equi-possibility, the so-called ‘principle of indifference’, is crucial, and this assumption lies at the heart of all mathematical approaches to probability.41 In the development of the classical approach through its application

to stipulated games of chance (cards and dice, for example), the assumption has a definitional or empirical validity of its own. In extending the principle to real-life situations, the assumption finds its justification in the idea that, given a state of ignorance about the individual members of a class, any other distribution of possibility would be arbitrary. This justification relies upon the notion that, in practical decision-making, we are ultimately seeking good reasons for deciding one way or another. Although in reality the distribution may turn out to be different, we must, in the absence of any information, assume equi-possibility. To put it another way: in practical decision-making, probabilification is part of the effort to find good reasons for deciding one way or another and, ultimately, assuming all relevant information has been sought, the principle of indifference is a good reason. This being the case, the principle of indifference can only apply in the absence of information distinguishing between the chances of each member of the class. As soon as such information exists, any assessment of probability based upon the principle becomes meaningless. Thus, if there is evidence that, not only was D seen in the vicinity of V’s killing, but D also had a motive for killing V, then D no longer has an equal chance with others in the vicinity of having been the killer. Again, if there is evidence that D, who attended the rodeo, is of good character and asserts that payment [page 19] was made, then the assumption that all rodeo-attenders have an equal chance of being non-payers cannot stand. If this is so, then a search must be made for a sub-set of spectators to which the principle of indifference can apply. The search for, and justification of, classes thus assumes crucial importance in the application of the classical approach. But these points also apply to the frequency approach, to which we now turn. Frequency probabilities 1.16 A most common description of the probabilities found in the deductive syllogism, the form in which we have expressed inferences, is that offered by the frequency approach to probability.42

When we infer from X’s testimony that D was present at the scene of V’s killing, then, using the frequency approach, we might express the probability of D’s presence thus: 1.

In most cases (say 80%) where witnesses testify in these circumstances to the presence of an individual, that individual was present.

2.

X testifies, in these circumstances, that D was present.

3.

Therefore, D was present (to a probability of 8/10, 0.8 or 80%, at odds of 4 to 1 on).

Similarly, when we infer D’s involvement in V’s killing from D’s presence and D’s jealousy, the syllogism might be expressed: 1.

In most cases (say 60%) where jealous lovers are at the scene, they have killed their partners.

2.

D is a jealous lover so found.

3.

Therefore, D killed V (to a probability of 0.6 etc).43

Like the classical approach, the frequency approach sets up a general class as the basis for the inference, but while the classes of classical probabilities are definitive and include the inferred fact or event (all possible suspects; all possible nonpayers), the classes of frequency probabilities are based upon the measurement of past facts or events which do not include the fact or event to be inferred (such as a past class of testifying witnesses that does not include the witness in question, or a past class of jealous lovers found in the vicinity of the murder). Thus, the hypothesis is that [page 20] known frequencies will continue to occur in future instances, including that of the fact or event in question, so enabling the prediction of facts and events with similar characteristics.44 Known frequencies are projected into unknown frequencies, it being hypothesised that an indefinite sequence made up of past, present and future facts or events such as those in question would exhibit a limiting frequency approaching that evidenced by past experience. Once this hypothesis is stipulated then the conclusion is drawn using the principle of indifference in exactly the same way as in the classical approach.

1.17 The distinction between classical and frequency probabilities can be simply illustrated by reference to the tossing of a coin. In classical terms there are two possible outcomes, a head and a tail, so the probability that a throw has produced a head is 1 in 2 or 0.5 or 50% (the odds are even). Now consider the same example in frequency terms. Tests are conducted and over a long period heads comes up half of the time, so that the limiting frequency of 50% heads can be hypothesised to conclude that, on the basis of past experience, there is again a 1 in 2 probability that a particular throw has produced a head. If the coin had been biased and produced heads in 60% of past cases then the frequency probability would alter accordingly. Thus, while the frequency approach, like the classical approach, also purports to be an account of probabilities based upon measurement of stipulated ranges, it proves on analysis to involve an assumption additional to the principle of indifference. The presence of these assumptions means that neither approach will necessarily produce a correct result — a true correspondence — but each approach nevertheless provides an orderly way of approaching a situation of uncertainty. And in each case, as will be shown below, the probabilities generated obey mathematical laws. But the figures are in every case generated only in stipulated ranges. The final problem is the definition of the appropriate ranges. Probabilities can be generated in any stipulated range. The range can be defined simply or in a detailed and sophisticated way. How do fact-finders using these approaches generate appropriate ranges? The answer lies in the nature of the epistemological task: the task of providing the best reasons for inferring one way rather than another. As the above discussion has shown, mathematical probabilities are ultimately generated by the principle of indifference. Once further information is available to distinguish members of a class then the assumption of indifference goes, and another sub-class of events must be constructed. This process must continue until the principle of indifference can apply. So the ranges define themselves in this context. They are those ranges in which the assumption of indifference can be made because there are no reasons left for distinguishing between members of the class. [page 21]

The practical difficulty is the empirical measurement of the classes of events. In some cases, empirical evidence can be definitionally generated (as in The Brimnes, referred to above, at 1.14). Forensic and other empirical scientists and statisticians are able to provide evidence based upon empirical measurement (often of a representative sample, which measurement involves its own assumptions); for example, the distribution of DNA within populations. But even in these cases many assumptions must be made, so that a distinguished group of forensic scientists conclude in relation to frequencies of DNA:45 There appears to be a fairly widespread misconception that there is a real ‘statistical probability’ to be assigned to a profile but this is not the case. There is an infinite range of ways of carrying out the calculation that underlies the figures given. The method chosen in the individual case must be seen to be as much a matter of opinion as one given in other areas of forensic science. The match probability is ‘personal’. It is based on what the scientist considers to be the most appropriate calculation ‘given the circumstances of the case’.

Still we have no option but to seek empirical and statistical assistance if we are serious about refining our probability assessments as far as possible to reflect the world out there. But the assumptions and weaknesses of empirical and statistical evidence need, so far as possible, to be understood, and their combination with evidence not expressed mathematically needs to be articulated (see further below in the context of Bayesian analysis, particularly 1.28ff, and at 7.62 where the admissibility and use of expert evidence, often expressed in numerical terms, is discussed). But in the vast majority of cases where an inference is to be drawn from a generalisation there has been no attempt at empirical measurement and any generalisation is based only roughly upon past experience and knowledge. Thus, even if one accepts the logic of the classical and frequency approaches, the focus of the practical debate will be upon these rough generalisations in an attempt to fine-tune them, in a context that often makes fine-tuning a less than definitive exercise. One way around these problems is to leave the generation of mathematical probabilities to the individual by way of a more subjective approach to probability judgments. Subjective probabilities 1.18 If the subjective approach merely describes, leaving all inferences to the

personal decision of the fact-finder, it might be regarded as describing no consistent approach to probability at all. [page 22] But proponents of this approach as descriptive and/or appropriate in the trial context do not express it in this extreme form.46 Those who advocate subjective probabilities generally do so to enable the application of the mathematical calculus to proof, often to provide a logical way of computing in empirical probabilities. The mathematical equation most useful in this exercise is Bayes’ Theorem and hence the subjectivists are generally referred to as ‘Bayesians’. This term is somewhat misleading in that it suggests that Bayes’ Theorem is the only equation of the calculus that might apply to juridical proof, and Robertson and Vignaux47 emphasise that Bayesians advocate use of all the equations of the calculus. What the subjective proponents suggest is that, because in practice empirical measurement all too quickly runs out, most individual inferences of fact involve decisions that can best be described as subjective. Ultimately, decisions of fact are based upon these ‘beliefs’. In the absence of any or complete empirical measurement, the best we can do is to ensure that beliefs about facts are logically consistent. This can be done simply by giving numerical values to beliefs about particular inferences and then by using the equations of mathematical probability to compute their relationship.48 The subjectivist asks the trier to compute the strength of individual beliefs in numerical terms. Betting odds are a convenient way of explaining this. If they are fair bets, the equations of mathematical probabilities can be applied to them. If the belief is dependent upon the general proposition of an inferential syllogism then the subjective numerical probability might be based upon an hypothesised frequency assigned to that general proposition. Where the belief relates to a unique fact or event about which the trier is unable or unwilling to construct any general proposition, then a [page 23] numerical probability may be simply asserted in betting odds without any attempt

to conceptualise the probability in frequency terms at all.49 The equations of mathematical probability 1.19 These are provable from a number of simple assumptions and their internal logic is beyond debate.50 Whether their application to combine beliefs is either descriptive of curial fact-finding, or whether it necessarily leads to a closer correspondence between belief and reality, are fundamentally controversial questions. But these questions are put aside while the equations and their application are demonstrated. The application of these equations assumes the use of numbers to represent probabilities. The first equation is that of complementation. By this equation, if the probability P of an hypothesis [H] and its negation [–H] makes up the whole of the possible knowledge about a particular state of affairs, then by definition, P[H] + P[–H] = 1. And thus P[H] = 1–P[–H]. Therefore, if one is ignorant about H but has a belief about –H, the probability of H can be simply calculated. If, for example, the probability that a ship sank either because of poor repair or because it was hit by a submarine is extremely unlikely on the evidence (say 0.2), then, assuming these are the only possibilities constituting [–H], the probability that the ship sank for reasons associated with ‘perils of the sea’ [H] is complementarily likely (0.8).51 If, as in TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks,52 there are only three possible explanations for a head-on collision between two cars driven respectively by A and B (both killed [page 24] in the accident) — (1) A’s negligence alone; (2) B’s negligence alone; and (3) some admixture of their negligence — then, assuming (1) and (2) are equally possible, the probability of A being solely or partly negligent must be greater than 0.5. By this logic, Murphy J reasoned that the widow of A could recover damages against the insurer of B where the legislation permitted recovery so long as B’s negligence was a contributing factor to the accident. Of course, Murphy J’s creation of the range of explanations (which did not include the possibility that

neither driver was at fault) and his assumption that it was equally likely either driver was solely responsible, are entirely subjective (though presumably based upon Murphy J’s experience of head-on accidents and other evidence before him). But once the ranges had been subjectively hypothesised, Murphy J was able to use the complementational equation to calculate the mathematical probability that B’s negligence was solely or partly responsible for the accident. 1.20 The second equation is that which calculates the probability that two facts exist or have occurred from their individual probabilities — the multiplicational equation for conjunction. By this equation, the probability of the conjunction of two facts is the probability of the first fact multiplied by the probability of the second fact given that the first fact has occurred or exists; that is, P[F1 & F2] = P[F1] × P[F2/F1]. If the existence or occurrence of the facts are independent, so that the existence of the one has no relationship to the existence of the other, then the axiom reduces to P[F1 & F2] = P[F1] × P[F2]. It is this simplified version of the equation that is used to compute the statistical power of DNA evidence. DNA profiling compares separate samples of DNA in order to determine if they match. It involves comparing alleles found at a number of common points (loci) in the DNA chain. Where the alleles at the various loci match, the DNA samples are consistent with a common origin. But this simple multi-locus match cannot establish identity of origin, so population genetics are used to calculate the likely frequency of that multi-locus match within the population at large. By measuring the frequency within samples of the population of each locus match and by relying upon the equation of multiplication,53 experts can extrapolate the likely frequency of the multi-locus match in the population at large.54 The more loci analysed, the more multiplications to be made and the lower this relative frequency becomes. With technology now existing to compare alleles [page 25] at 10 or more loci, in R v Karger55 the relative frequency of the DNA analysed was put at one in 90 billion. 1.21 Many of the problems with this sort of analysis in identification cases are illustrated by the notorious Californian decision in People v Collins.56 Although Collins was a case involving identification through matching physical

characteristics, the same sorts of calculations are made where identification is sought through matching DNA loci.57 In Collins, the two accused were identified by eyewitnesses as having committed a robbery in Los Angeles. They denied involvement and argued the eyewitnesses were mistaken. To rebut this, the prosecution pointed to the undoubted characteristics of the two culprits described by the identifying witnesses and argued that, as the accused possessed those same characteristics, and as the mathematical chances were so slight (1 in 12 million) of randomly finding in Los Angeles another couple possessing the same characteristics, the accused must have been the suspects identified. The random probability was calculated by first assigning to each accepted characteristic a frequency in the Los Angeles population (supposedly erring on the conservative side), and then by simply multiplying these frequencies to determine the frequency of a couple possessing all of these characteristics. The characteristics and their frequencies were as follows: yellow car … 1 in 10 man with moustache … 1 in 4 black man with beard … 1 in 10 woman with blonde hair … 1 in 3 woman with pony-tail … 1 in 10 inter-racial couple … 1 in 1000 As an empirical application of the multiplication equation, two criticisms might be made of this approach. First, the frequencies were mere guesses and therefore neither [page 26] empirically justified frequencies nor necessarily the subjective probabilities the jury was prepared to accept for the purpose of applying the multiplication process. Why, for example, were the frequencies based upon the population of Los Angeles? Why not the population in the vicinity of the crime or of the whole of America? Secondly, the frequencies were multiplied without regard to their

possible non-independence. Black men with beards may have moustaches and be double-counted in the category of men with moustaches. Women with blonde hair may be more likely to wear pony-tails and so may be double-counted in this category. Also, women with blonde hair are likely to be white and so the interracial couple probability may not be independent of the probability for hair colour. Further, it may be that blondes do not date inter-racially at the same frequency as other women, and that the frequency of inter-racial couples, in particular populations, changes over time — so that the compilation of the statistics becomes significant. 1.22 But, more fundamentally, even if the frequencies and their multiplication accurately determine the chances of finding randomly a couple in the Los Angeles area possessing these characteristics, this was not the issue before the jury. The issue was the chances of this couple before the court being the perpetrators of this crime. If statistics could empirically show that not more than one couple with these characteristics could be found in a suspect population then conviction might be justified. But the frequency is not an empirical frequency within a finite class of all possible suspects. It is a hypothetical frequency dependent upon the assumptions of its creator.58 Nor does it hypothesise the regular occurrence of individuals within the class. It is more reasonable to assume that individuals in such classes do not occur regularly, but with a randomness of their own, so that one cannot exclude the possibility that within the hypothesised class of possible culprits there was more than one couple possessing the relevant characteristics. If two couples possessed these characteristics the chances of the accused having committed the crime were 1 in 2 or 0.5, if three, 1 in 3 or 0.33, and so on. To attempt to use the probability of a random match as the probability that the accused were the culprits commits what has come to be known as the prosecutor’s fallacy.59 Statistics in this situation can show the unlikelihood of finding the evidence, two persons with the described characteristics, but cannot establish the accused as those persons. Similarly, with DNA evidence, experts can use the multiplication rule to calculate the relative frequency of the DNA in question in a population but, no matter how rare this frequency, it remains the probability of finding this evidence, this particular DNA in that population, and is not the probability that the DNA in question was [page 27]

contributed by a particular person. Thus, even if one accepts the accuracy and reliability of the relative frequency calculated through the multiplication equation, further calculations are needed if this evidence is to be used to identify a particular person as having contributed that DNA. The equation most suited to this task is said to be60 Bayes’ Theorem. 1.23 This is an equation which determines the extent to which the probability of an hypothesis [H] is increased following consideration of further evidence [E]. The theorem can be derived from the previous equations explained above.61 It can be expressed as follows: Posterior odds = Prior odds × Likelihood ratio What this means is that the posterior odds of any hypothesis are a function of the prior odds of the hypothesis multiplied by the likelihood ratio of the evidence; that is, the ratio between the likelihood of the evidence being found if the hypothesis is true and the likelihood of it being found if the hypothesis is false. 1.24 In this form, Bayes’ Theorem can apply directly in a curial situation. It is particularly useful to the subjectivist who can use it to update beliefs as new evidence is received. Using the earlier example (at 1.10), the initial belief relates to whether it was D who killed V. The prior odds are assigned by attributing (fair) betting odds to the probability of this event having occurred. The evidence adduced (for example, the testimony of X that D was observed leaving V’s house around the relevant time) is then considered and probabilities assigned to the existence of that evidence if the facts as alleged did occur, and to the existence of that evidence if the facts as alleged did not occur. Bayes’ Theorem computes the logical effect of the tendered evidence upon the probability of the initial belief in the alleged event. If the prior odds are assumed as 1 to 20 on, the probability of the evidence existing if D did kill V 0.8, and the probability of the evidence existing if D did not kill V 0.2 (given that D frequents V’s residence), then the initial odds are increased by 8:2 (that is, four-fold) to 4 to 20 on. If the initial odds had been assumed at 1 to 1000 on, then the same evidence would increase the odds (again four-fold) to 4 to 1000 on. This demonstrates vividly that both the prior odds and the likelihood ratio are critical factors in the calculation of mathematical probability by this means. [page 28]

1.25 The theorem can also be applied in situations combining empirically based frequencies. Take, for example, the following scenario much discussed in the probability literature.62 A plaintiff pedestrian is negligently struck down at night by a vehicle identified by the plaintiff as a taxi-cab and described as green. There are no other witnesses. The defendant is a taxi-cab company in the town in question and all the company’s cabs are green. Of the 100 cabs that operate in the town, the defendant operates 20 and the remainder, coloured blue, are operated by another company. The plaintiff witness has been tested by a specialist who testifies that, in a long sequence of tests involving the identification of green/blue cabs under night-time conditions, in 80% of cases the witness’s colour identifications were correct and in 20% incorrect. How can a Bayesian analysis be employed to compute the probability that the cab involved belonged to the defendant? The Bayesian approach can be described in long-hand as follows. In the absence of any other evidence, each cab in town had an equal chance of being involved in the accident. Therefore, the witness had an equal chance of having observed any one of the 100 cabs, of which 80 are blue and 20 green. Accepting the expert evidence, in the long run, of the 80 blue cabs the witness might identify, 80% (64) would be correctly identified as blue and 20% (16) incorrectly as green. Of the 20 green cabs the witness might identify, 80% (16) would be correctly identified as green and 20% (4) incorrectly as blue. In the long run, of the 32 green identifications the witness will make, 16 will be correct and 16 will be incorrect. The probability of the green identification being correct is therefore 0.5. Using the odds version of Bayes’ Theorem the result is calculated as follows to produce the same result: O(H/E) = O(H) increased by ratio P(E/H)/ P(E/–H) = (1 to 4 on) increased by 0.8/ 0.2 (that is, 4) = (4 to 4 on), or 4 chances in 8, or a probability of 0.5 As an example of where Bayes’ Theorem might have clarified the situation, let us return to Collins. We left the case having computed the probability of finding at random [page 29]

a couple possessing the described characteristics of the culprits. But what we want to know is the probability of the particular accused being the persons so described. Bayes’ Theorem suggests that this probability is a function of the prior odds and the likelihood ratio produced by the generated frequencies. The problem in this case is assessing the prior likelihood. If there is no information suggesting any greater likelihood of each accused having committed the crime than any other member of the Los Angeles population, the prior odds for each might be hypothesised as one to the population of Los Angeles, say 1 to 12 million, and, using the multiplication equation, the prior odds for both being involved might be calculated at 1 to 144 trillion.63 If the accused are guilty then the probability of their having the characteristics described by the identifying witnesses is 1. If the accused are not guilty, the probability of their having those characteristics is the probability of finding those characteristics at random within the possible range of culprits; that is, on the Collins calculation, a population of 12 million. Applying the odds version of Bayes’ Theorem, the computation is as follows: O(H/E) = O(H) increased by ratio P(E/H)/ P(E/–H) = 1 to 144tr × 1/ 1/12 m = 1 to 12 m On the other hand, if the prior odds, based on evidence in the case linking the accused with the crime, including eyewitness identification, are subjectively assessed at, say generously, 1 to 1000, then the posterior odds dramatically increase to 12,000 to 1 on. Where the prior odds are set becomes the crucial part of the calculation. 1.26 Bayes’ Theorem can similarly be used to show the effect of DNA evidence on other evidence in a case. If so used then, if the prior odds against the accused’s involvement are sufficiently low, this may counteract even quite rare relative frequencies for the matching DNA. This is illustrated by defence counsel’s tactics in R v Dennis Adams.64 The accused was charged with rape and the prosecution relied principally upon evidence of a match between DNA taken from semen found on the victim with DNA taken from the accused. Expert testimony calculated the chances of a random match as 1 in 200 million. To meet this apparently strong evidence, the defence, with the agreement of the prosecution, sought to explain Bayes’ Theorem to the jury and then to establish prior odds that would effectively

counter the expert evidence. Although the accused had been isolated by the police as a result of the victim having described her attacker’s accent as that of a local man, the victim had failed to identify the accused [page 30] in a line-up, her description of her attacker did not match the accused, and the accused had called evidence of an alibi. The defence argued that there were 150,000 local men in the vicinity aged between 18 and 60, that if the victim could be interpreted as saying there was a 75% probability her attacker was a local man then (using the equation of complementation) the possible range of suspects could be taken to be, as a starting point, 200,000. To these prior odds of guilt (1 to 200,000), the defence first used Bayes’ Theorem to take account of the evidence that the accused did not match the victim’s description. If there is a 90% probability of such a discrepancy where the accused is innocent there remains, say, a 10% probability where he is guilty. Using Bayes’ Theorem, this likelihood ratio of 1 to 9 stretches the prior odds of guilt out to 1 to 1.8 million. If to this is added evidence of the accused’s alibi and the probability of an alibi if innocent is (say) twice as likely than if guilty, then the prior odds stretch further to 1 to 3.6 million. So hypothesised the defence. Then using this prior and computing in the likelihood ratio of the DNA match (200 million to 1), the resultant odds of guilt became 55 to 1 (or to put it in the accused’s favour, there was 1 chance in 56, an almost 2% chance, that he was innocent). Thus, the defence demonstrated how apparently compelling evidence might be explained away and argued that when the jury used their own likelihood ratios for the defence evidence they might not be convinced beyond reasonable doubt. The accused’s conviction was overturned on appeal.65 The jury had been misdirected about the Bayesian calculations and were no doubt bemused by the calculations required. But what most concerned the court was that the jury had not been clearly told that there was no obligation to apply a Bayesian approach, and that its task was simply to decide whether it was persuaded of the accused’s guilt having regard to all the evidence presented. In so concluding the court, without formally deciding the matter as it had not been argued, disapproved of

the Bayesian approach and was of the view that the trial judge should not, despite counsels’ agreement, have allowed it.66 1.27 There are other equations generated by the probability calculus that theoretically may be employed in curial situations. The disjunction equation determines the probability of either of two propositions (P[F1 or F2] = P[F1] + P[F2] – P[F1 & F2]); an equation that might be used where liability can be founded on the basis of [page 31] one or more hypotheses.67 The equation of total probabilities requires that where the probability of an hypothesis depends upon the probability of one or more evidentiary propositions, its probability may be calculated as the sum of all possible conditional probabilities. Thus, where the probability of an hypothesis depends on the probability of one evidential fact F1, the probability of the hypothesis may be calculated as follows: P[H] = P[H]/[F1] × P[F1] + P[H]/[–F1] × P[–F1] If the hypothesis depends upon the probability of two evidential facts one might calculate the probability thus:

P[H] = P[H]/[F1] & [F2] × P[F1] & [F2] + P[H]/[–F1] & [F2] × P[–F1] & [F2] + P[H]/[F1] & [–F2] × P[F1] & [–F2] + P[H]/[–F1] & [–F2] × P[–F1] & [–F2]

This equation can be used to calculate probabilities within a Wigmorean chart. If the hypothesis [H] is that it was the accused who killed the victim and this depends upon (say) two evidential facts — that the accused had the opportunity to kill V (F1) and that the accused had threatened to kill the victim (F2) — then the above equation can be used to determine the probability of H as the sum of the conditional probabilities of H given the possible permutations of F1 and F2. If F1 in turn depends on two other evidentiary facts — that D was in the vicinity (F3) and that D had a key to V’s apartment (F4) — then the equation can be applied to determine P[F1] as the sum of the conditional probabilities of F1 given the possible permutations of F3 and F4. And so on.68 Where the hypothesis is conditional on more than two evidentiary facts the equation is correspondingly more complicated but the sum can be made. Clearly, the application of the

equation of total probability will in real life very quickly push one’s computational capacities to their limit.69 Problems with conceptualising probabilities mathematically 1.28 So far the equations of mathematical probability and their possible application to curial fact-finding have been considered uncritically. But what scope is there to use, for example, Bayes’ Theorem to combine mathematically empirical and subjective probabilities to advance an hypothesis of guilt? Is this approach descriptive of how [page 32] triers of fact do reason and, if not, should it be put forward as a normative approach to fact-finding? Virtually all Bayesians admit that curial fact-finding does not generally employ the equations of mathematical probabilities, but there are situations where a mathematical approach does appear apposite, and the imperialist Bayesians would extrapolate from these situations to argue the normative use of mathematical probabilities.70 In that empirical frequencies are seldom available, the Bayesian argument is not that a mathematical approach will necessarily approximate discovery of the true facts, but that internal logical consistency demands that the equations of mathematical probability apply. 1.29 There are many problems with these normative arguments. A basic problem is that Bayesians can tell us nothing about how we construct the mathematical propositions to which the equations of the mathematical calculus apply. All they can tell us is that if we do hold certain propositions then the mathematical calculus can show us the relationship between them. Which propositions are most appropriate — which reference classes are used to generate mathematical probabilities (presumably those with a richness that applies the principle of indifference only when maximal information has been considered) — is not capable of stipulation by the Bayesians.71 Another way of explaining this criticism of mathematical probabilities is to say that Bayesians cannot discriminate between probabilities in terms of the weight of evidence.72 They cannot argue in favour of one mathematical probability rather than another. Thus, in the

blue/green taxi example discussed above, the base rate was the distribution of taxi-cabs in the town. But would not the accident rate of taxis in the town have provided a base rate more likely to lead to correspondence with the real world? Bayesians provide no reasons for discriminating between one class of mathematical probabilities and another in this way, and yet when it comes to making real-life decisions these distinctions seem important. 1.30 When one relies upon subjective probabilities, Bayesian analysis cannot inform us which betting odds to assign to facts and evidence. This may be justifiable in the realm of making consistent business decisions but may not be justified as a means of discovering the world out there, and particularly its past.73 A corollary is that if the trier [page 33] of fact after computation does not feel comfortable with the resulting probability the figures in the calculation can always be changed to achieve a more ‘intuitive’ result. Thus, in terms of discovering the world out there, Bayesian analysis appears inadequate. It works only by combining empirical and subjective probabilities. If all probabilities could be empirically determined one might argue that mathematical analysis apparently leads to discovering the world. But first, this empirical information is not available and, secondly, even where it is, it is often organised other than by reference to mathematical principles. In practice, we must rely upon subjective probabilities if a mathematical approach is to work. As an exercise seeking discovery of the world out there, the Bayesian approach is fatally flawed. As a system showing the relationship between various beliefs, as a system of logic, it remains more compelling. And where experts are permitted to present evidence in terms of likelihood ratios, to be consistent, logic appears to demand that the trier of fact understands what this means in Bayesian terms.74 Yet courts have so far been reluctant to accept this logic.75 1.31 There are other difficulties with a mathematical approach. One, adverted to above, is that its rigorous application is beyond the computational capacities of humans.76 We might use computers to make the calculations as we merely feed in subjective probabilities, but one suspects that, even if this situation can be created, triers will always check the results against their intuitions, and if unhappy

with the calculation will want to change the subjective probabilities until the answer accords with intuition. More fundamentally, some commentators argue that the mathematical approach necessarily leads to results that are at odds with our intuitions.77 For example, the equation of conjunction means that if a claim depends upon the proponent establishing a number of independent facts or events then each must be established to a very high degree if their multiplication is not to lead to their overall probability falling below any acceptable standard of mathematical proof. Thus, if a claim depends upon establishing identity, conduct and resulting harm, and these are regarded as three independent facts to be established, if each is established to a mathematical probability of 0.7 the probability of their conjunction is 0.343. This problem can be avoided either by arguing that the events are not independent, so that their conjunction is not simply a matter of multiplying together their individual probabilities, or by arguing that the proponent must establish a compendium story which is then used to determine whether the necessary legal requirements have been met. [page 34] The latter solution demonstrates that no mathematical theory can tell us how to conceptualise facts and evidence for the purpose of applying the equations of mathematical calculus to them.78 Suffice it to say that the problem of conjunction can be accommodated within mathematical notions by a redefinition of facts and evidence. 1.32 A more difficult problem is to accommodate the presumption of innocence within an application of Bayes’ Theorem. In State v Skipper,79 the principal evidence against an accused, charged with unlawful sexual assault on a child, was evidence, based upon DNA analysis, that the accused was the father of the victim’s aborted foetus. The evidence, a paternity index of 1 to 3497, was an odds ratio measuring the likelihood that the accused would produce a child with the same phenotypes as the foetus in question as compared to an unrelated random male. Using Bayes’ Theorem, this likelihood ratio was used to compute the probability that the accused was the father by assuming ‘neutral’ prior odds of paternity of 1 to 1 (that is, it was equally as likely that the accused was the father

as he was not the father). With this prior, a posterior probability of paternity of 99.97% could be calculated. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held this calculation should not have been put to the jury. First, the prior odds assumed to obtain this figure were not disclosed to the jury and it was a jury decision what prior odds should be used in any calculation. Secondly, and more decisively, use of any assumed prior odds of guilt directly contravenes the presumption of innocence. For an accused to be afforded the full protection of this presumption the prior odds must be set at zero. The difficulty with this, as the court recognised, is that whatever the likelihood ratio the resultant multiplication produces the same answer of zero. Therefore, concluded the court, Bayes’ Theorem had no application in a criminal case. The Bayesian answer to this case is that the presumption of innocence is no more than an embodiment of the rule that the prosecution carries the evidential and persuasive burdens of establishing the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The assessment of prior odds, made not at the commencement of the trial but as a calculation performed after all the evidence is in and made preliminary to adding in other evidence before the court (the trier of fact must be careful not to double-count evidence), is the only logical way of factoring in such expert evidence of paternity. To set the prior odds at zero is to prejudge the issue before the evidence is considered; zero represents not a probability of innocence but an unshakeable belief in innocence that cannot be affected by any subsequent evidence. [page 35] 1.33 Where initially the prior odds should be set is another matter. Ultimately, it must be for the jury to decide. Some Bayesians suggest that in cases of identity, more suitable prior odds than 50:50 are the odds of one (the accused’s involvement) to the entire population of possible culprits (as was calculated in the case of R v Dennis Adams, above).80 Where the issue is whether a crime occurred at all, finding prior odds is more problematical. Richard Friedman suggests the prior should be the odds that the defendant would implicitly use if the question had never been raised.81 But in these days of detailed crime statistics one might think that the prior odds of a crime having occurred within a particular district could be more empirically based. If the presumption does more than embody the

criminal burdens of proof and additionally requires innocent inferences of fact to be drawn in the accused’s favour in situations of ambiguity (for example, where the accused remains silent), then these can be factored into any Bayesian analysis. 1.34 A final problem with using Bayes’ Theorem to compute the odds favouring an hypothesis is that of making sure that the hypothesis is compared with all other possible explanatory hypotheses. If our search is for what has happened in the real world, then it is argued that we should consider individually all possible explanations.82 In the context of the adversary trial, the liability hypothesis put forward by the claimant is likely to be compared with other hypotheses put forward by the opponent, but this may lead to the trier ignoring other possibilities — as in Chamberlain v R (No 2),83 where the exculpatory hypothesis, focused upon to the apparent exclusion of others, was that the victim had been taken by a dingo. Unless all alternative hypotheses are taken into account, then the search for the real world is biased in favour of those explanations put forward by the parties in a case.84 Mathematical probabilities and the standard of proof 1.35 Recognising the limitations of a mathematical approach, there remains yet a final difficulty: the conversion of a mathematical probability into proof.85 [page 36] The principle of complementation means that if there is a 0.6 probability of an hypothesis H having occurred, there remains a 0.4 probability that it did not. Can a court ever be satisfied that a particular hypothesis did occur when confronted with the express probability that it did not? The problem arises because mathematical probabilities describe the nature of entire classes and say nothing about the individual members of that class. To say that an individual hypothesis is proved where its probability exceeds 0.5 is to say that, although there can be no certainty about the occurrence of this individual hypothesis, nevertheless, to act upon it as if it has occurred will in the long run produce more correct decisions than incorrect decisions. But incorrect decisions there will be. It may be that this is an acceptable approach to civil proof, but it gives rise to

especially serious questions in the case of criminal proof. Even if the mathematical standard is raised to reflect the seriousness of criminal cases, there will always remain an express proportion of cases that will have been wrongly decided. A standard of criminal guilt of 0.9 means that of every 100 persons convicted 10 will be wrongly convicted. If it is raised to 0.99 still 1 person in 100 convicted will be innocent. To this approach L Jonathan Cohen has objected that:86 The advancement of truth in the long run is not necessarily the same thing as the dispensation of justice in each individual case. It bears hard on the individual like the gatecrasher at the rodeo if he has to lose his own particular suit in order to maintain a stochastic probability of success for the system as a whole.

Business people and punters (and perhaps repeat litigants)87 can rely upon mathematical probabilities to ensure their overall success rate, but courts are concerned rather to be correct in each and every individual case. 1.36 It is difficult to dispute this conclusion as descriptive of the criminal trial. The imposition of criminal liability is a serious matter, often entailing serious punishment, and it is a matter for moral outrage when the innocent are punished. Courts in turn have a moral responsibility to pursue justice in the individual case.88 Although some commentators have been prepared to quantify the number of innocent capable of sacrifice,89 it is submitted that their talk is allegorical and that the concept of criminal [page 37] justice embodies a search for truth in the sense that there is an aspiration to convict only the guilty. It is preferable that the guilty go free rather than the innocent be punished. Thus, if the court has any (reasonable) doubt about whether the accused committed the acts in question, the quest for certainty must be regarded as having failed. It may be argued that a relatively high degree of statistical proof is appropriate in order to protect the community from crime by incarcerating probable criminals and deterring would-be criminals, but this is an argument that flies in the face of the ‘golden thread’ of the criminal law: the requirement of proof in each case beyond reasonable doubt.90 This requirement embodies an aspiration to certainty. 1.37 In civil cases the matter is not so clear. It is possible to imagine a civil system of dispute settlement based upon long-term probabilities. Not only can

this be justified in terms of resource distribution and cost/benefit analysis,91 but it arguably accords with reasonable party expectations. The search for truth, as illustrated in criminal trials, is a long and costly exercise that cannot be justified in civil disputes. As a consequence, it may be sufficient that parties be treated with procedural fairness in an even-handed way and that courts seek only to be more often right than wrong in the long run.92 But it is doubtful whether this is descriptive of how common law civil courts approach their task. Just as criminal laws only impose liability where a prosecutor can establish clearly facts giving rise to responsibility, so civil laws require one party to allege and prove the facts upon which responsibility depends. The whole system relies upon onus of proof, pleading and proof. Courts are not asked to produce a relative justice between parties; courts are asked to find those facts which give rise to liability according to law. As emphasised already, court disputes are settled by judgment; by the application of the appropriate rule to the facts discovered. Civil rules impose liability [page 38] in situations of moral responsibility akin to the moral responsibility required in criminal cases. Concepts of intention, negligence and fault dominate civil disputes in the same way as they dominate criminal cases. Parties as a result come to court seeking to vindicate particular claims, not seeking a mere procedural fairness, and courts in most cases respond to those claims by determining the defendant’s responsibility in an emphatic way.93 1.38 Even where courts stipulate proof in terms of a balance of probabilities, they embark upon a minute analysis of information in an effort to be as close to the truth about the individual case as they reasonably can. Mathematical probabilities are avoided even though they may produce decisions more often right than wrong in the long run. For example, in SGIC v Laube,94 the Supreme Court of South Australia refused to find on the balance of probabilities that a driver was so under the influence of alcohol as to be incapable of exercising effective control of a vehicle upon the basis of expert testimony that most (nearly all) people with a blood alcohol level equivalent to that of the driver at the relevant time would be so incapable. King CJ went so far as to say:95 … the statistical fact that a particular proposition is true of the majority of persons cannot of itself

amount to legal proof on the balance of probabilities that the proposition is true of any given individual.

Other courts have emphasised the search for individual truth by explaining the standard of proof in terms other than a mere balance of probabilities. The formulation of Dixon J in Briginshaw v Briginshaw96 is the seminal example of such an approach, requiring that fact-finders be reasonably satisfied that facts occurred, a formulation most important for its emphasis upon the need to take the establishment of individual events seriously.97 [page 39] It may be that in the long term notions of civil responsibility will be replaced by notions more appropriate to the economic allocation of loss and that courts will be so subjected to empirical evidence expressed statistically that the emphasis upon individual events will alter. But it can be strongly argued that historically, in both criminal and civil cases, the common law notion of justice encouraged the search for truth in the individual case. This may also be conceptualised in moral terms, whereby the court is asked to justify its belief in relation to the individual case.98 The focus then turns to look at how courts approach this task.

The non-mathematical approach: ‘inductive probabilities’ and ‘best explanations’ 1.39 This leads us to consider approaches to fact discovery that seek truth in the individual case. These approaches, rather than seeking to construct a normative explanation of fact-finding, as the mathematicists attempt, take as their starting point decision-making in the world and seek to describe its internal logic and justification. L Jonathan Cohen describes what he calls ‘Baconian’ or ‘inductive’ probabilities. He analyses directly the probability judgments reached in courts of law in order to demonstrate that these judgments have an internal rationality of their own, a rationality which does not always coincide with a mathematical approach. Cohen’s starting point is to explain that mathematical notions produce a number of problems when applied to traditional court approaches to the discovery of facts.99 Not only are there particular anomalies, such as the problem

of conjunction (considered above at 1.31), but the whole approach to proof at common law appears to eschew the logic of mathematical probabilities. Cohen argues that what is crucial is the failure of mathematical approaches to concentrate upon the individual event in issue. Courts, according to Cohen (and as argued above), are concerned to determine unique events. This concern sits uneasily with a mathematical notion that is always concerned with the nature of classes of events. Ultimately, the mathematicist must be content with a majority of cases in the long run. Yet courts reach their decisions as if they are declaratory of the finding of individual events. Cohen uses the rodeo example, referred to at 1.14, to conclude that courts are concerned with justice in the individual case, not a stochastic probability of success for the system as a whole.100 [page 40] 1.40 Cohen describes the judgments of probability reached by courts as akin to the optimistic (albeit tentative) conclusions reached by scientists about the nature of the world. Just as the scientist searches for hypotheses to explain the workings of the world, so the jurist approaches the discovery of facts as a search for that version which at a particular point in time best explains the existence of all available evidential traces. For Cohen the scientific search has two principal features. First, whenever an hypothesis is inconsistent with evidence, that hypothesis fails completely and is rejected in favour of a modified hypothesis which can explain the available evidence. Secondly, until so falsified, hypotheses co-exist, and must be ranked in the light of the totality of evidence.101 But the situation of the jurist differs from that of the scientist. The scientist can perform further experiments and collect further information until all possible evidential sources have been exhausted. In this way, competing hypotheses may be eliminated or narrowed. The jurist, on the other hand, is presented by the parties with a definitive quantity of evidence and is asked to act upon it, and, at least in civil cases, even where it remains consistent with more than one hypothesis. In this situation, while the scientist might resume the search for empirical support, the jurist can only weigh the evidence in the light of available knowledge about the world. Most importantly, this always includes the possibility of missing evidence that might support one hypothesis rather than another. Jurists

are thereby obliged to take into account all their experiences of the world in reaching optimistic, albeit tentative, conclusions about individual events. The totality of experience is crucial. Inductive probabilities are meaningless when based upon less. In this sense inductive probabilities may be contrasted with mathematical probabilities that can be generated by any amount of information. This is simply illustrated by the rodeo example. The mathematicist can ask whether liability follows the purely statistical evidence. The inductivist can only weigh this information in the light of knowledge about the possible availability of other information about the event in issue, such as testimony from those involved, and is not able, on statistical evidence alone, to take an optimistic position upon what actually occurred. 1.41 Cohen explains the inductive approach as a coherent system with its own rules for reaching decisions of fact.102 For example, it accepts that where a case comprises proof of a number of independent events then the evidential support for the case as a [page 41] whole is equivalent to the support for that event with the lowest inductive probability. This makes no sense to the mathematicist who, in this situation, must multiply individual independent probabilities to conclude a probability for the case as a whole. The contrast between the mathematical and inductive approaches might be illustrated by analysing inductively the taxi-cab example considered above: at 1.25. The hypothesis in issue is the colour of the taxi-cab involved. The evidence presented is apparently consistent with the cab being either blue or green, for some cabs in the town are of each colour and the witness, although having identified the cab as green, has been shown, experimentally, capable of error. To the inductivist, the issue is the ranking of the blue/green hypotheses. The township distribution is not decisive in the light of possible further evidence connecting a particular colour with the accident; for example, evidence relating to the number of cabs of each colour in the vicinity at the time of the accident. Even if this evidence is unavailable its possibility demonstrates to the inductivist

that it is unreasonable to rely blindly upon the township distribution. The statistical accuracy of the witness identification is apparently of more immediate effect, being based upon a generalisation applying to all blue/green identifications by the witness. But even here other factors will also have to be taken into account in determining the reliability of the witness’s testimony, including small things like demeanour. Every factor, or possible factor, must be taken into account. If the township distribution is equivocal, the degree of reliability of the visual identification may become decisive. 1.42 The inductive approach is descriptive of that used by common lawyers who operate within an adversarial environment designed to test the opposing factual hypotheses of the parties. Mathematical probabilities are eschewed by courts in favour of inductive analysis. This is nowhere better illustrated than in TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks,103 where the majority would have no part of Murphy J’s mathematical analysis (explained at 1.19) and sought to marshal the evidence that did survive an unwitnessed fatal accident in an effort to find an hypothesis which plausibly, having regard to each judge’s knowledge and experience of the world, explained its occurrence. Another example of the rejection of mathematical analysis can be seen in King CJ’s approach in SGIC v Laube,104 where the Chief Justice refused to act upon a statistical probability in the absence of (available) information about the individual event. Following the same approach, courts have refused to allow plaintiffs to establish causation of injuries by simply relying upon the statistical results of epidemiological [page 42] studies.105 More recently, courts, when presented in criminal cases with DNA evidence in a quite specific Bayesian form (a likelihood ratio), have disapproved of attempts to explain its significance mathematically and emphasised to juries that their task is to decide the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt having regard to all the evidence in the case.106 Cases on circumstantial evidence, analysed at 2.74ff, also illustrate an inductive rather than a mathematical approach, with the question being whether the prosecution hypothesis can explain the totality of the evidence (to the exclusion of all reasonably possible innocent hypotheses).

1.43 Cohen’s description of an inductive approach has caused considerable debate,107 for most commentators had, until he put forward his description, merely assumed that ultimately mathematical notions underlie all decisions of fact. This assumption provided commentators with an easy yardstick against which to measure probability judgments reached by courts.108 This was not to argue that in every case decisions should be expressed mathematically,109 but by exposing the mathematical assumptions commentators could criticise particular decisions. However, if it can be established that the reasoning of judges reflects a different but coherent and rational approach to determinations of probability, then the mathematicists lose their critical standpoint, and must accept that there are other ways of looking at the world. As a consequence of Cohen’s work, evidence scholars have refocused their efforts into seeking descriptive approaches to decisions of fact. Psychological research suggests that juries conceptualise decisions of fact in story form,110 and the relative plausibility of competing ‘stories’ can often be seen to lie at the heart of deciding [page 43] between competing hypotheses.111 In a more sophisticated form this approach draws upon philosophical work that analyses factual decisions in terms of ‘best explanation’ in relating available evidence to available hypotheses. Whilst available evidence may simply be explained mathematically it may also gather weight when put in terms of causality. Thus, in the blue/green taxi example, evidence of the crash records of blue and green taxis has more explanatory force than evidence of the frequency of coloured taxis in the vicinity of the accident. In this way the ‘best explanation’ approach overcomes the reference class problem that cannot be escaped by the mathematicist.112 It also recognises the cognitive dimensions of decisions of fact that the mathematicist can only ignore in the quest for normative perfection.113

A correct probability approach? 1.44 Our starting point in this discussion was to recognise that persons in the world cannot know the world with certainty. No theory of discovery can definitively determine whether a unique event in the world has occurred. Yet

persons live with decisions of fact made every day. Our reasoning processes achieve workable results. In this context the question is whether any one probability approach should prevail in courts of law.114 There are essentially two possible approaches. By the one, theorists attempt to devise a normative approach to overcoming uncertainty. This is the mathematical approach. By conceptualising uncertainty in terms of classes of events and relying upon the principle of indifference, their probability can be expressed mathematically. This is a tool of considerable explanatory force and appears capable of approximation to the world when linked to empirical evidence about those classes. By the other, theorists start with the world and how decisions are made by those within it, the assumption being that these decisions are able to produce workable results and that within their complexity coherent approaches to fact discovery evolve. Whilst the first approach has an aura of elegant simplicity (until the complexity of the calculations in an individual case are appreciated), the latter has an aura of uncertainty based as it is upon the complexities of human decision-making. As Pardo and Allen retort:115 [page 44] We suspect that those who favor the [mathematical] probability approaches will dislike the lack of formality and precision … but these features are part of the world, not defects in the explanationbased approach.

The reality is that both approaches are complementary in the construction of our knowledge about the world and the events in it. Mathematical probabilities based upon empirical studies have great explanatory force. Moreover, mathematical probabilities can express the logical relationship between mathematically expressed beliefs. But the calculation of mathematical probabilities is complex and cannot generate a definitive determination of an individual event. Yet the concept of justice sought by courts in both civil and criminal cases demands that courts justify their decisions through the proof of individual events. This being so, fact-finding must ultimately be justified by an inductive or ‘best explanation’ theory which focuses on individual events, where explanations are sought in causal theories and knowledge that fact-finders have about events the world. Most cases do not involve evidence presented in mathematical terms and

counsel present and argue about evidence in inductive terms. But courts, having rejected proof as a mathematical concept, are nevertheless more and more often being presented with evidence in a mathematical form. Evidence of DNA matching is the most significant example. While not yet definitive of identity, the statistics now being presented to courts are compelling and suggest an extremely low possibility of a random match, and yet, assuming the DNA match is decisive of the case,116 so long as that mathematical possibility remains it must be excluded if courts do not accept that proof is mathematical. This appears to be expressly demanded in criminal cases where the standard of proof requires all reasonable doubts of guilt to be excluded; so that even a small mathematical possibility of a random match leaves open the possibility of an innocent hypothesis and must be excluded as unreasonable having regard to all the evidence before the court. But courts are reluctant to engage in any deep analysis of the nature of proof. Thus statistical evidence is admitted, most often in terms of a likelihood ratio (in apparent anticipation of Bayesian reasoning), with courts then refusing to explain the significance of a likelihood ratio and how a Bayesian might consider this with other evidence, and simply directing juries to consider the statistical evidence together with other evidence before the court in deciding whether the criminal standard has been met. [page 45] The risk of this approach is that the jury will simply equate the likelihood that the sample came from the accused with the likelihood of guilt and fail to appreciate and carefully consider possibilities of innocence left open by this evidence.117 In the first place, the extent of the possibility that an accused is guilty cannot be simply assessed on the basis of this likelihood ratio of finding the evidence. The ratio can be used to upgrade a prior probability of guilt having regard to the evidence, but, as the discussion of Bayes’ Theorem above demonstrates, a prior probability there must be. This elucidation of the mathematical approach is not explained to the jury. But secondly, even if it is, and the Bayesian calculation is made, what needs to be further explained to the jury is that a mathematical probability cannot at common law be equated to guilt, and that the task of the jury is to consider the possibilities of innocence and decide whether they are reasonable or can be excluded in the light of all the

evidence before the court. To assist in this analysis, the statistical results need to be expressed not in terms of the likelihood of the guilty hypothesis but in terms which emphasise the statistical possibilities consistent with innocence that require exclusion before an accused can be convicted beyond reasonable doubt.118 With this analysis the mathematical and inductive (best explanation) approaches can operate together in reaching a decision on the satisfaction of the criminal standard of proof. Far from there being one approach to fact discovery there are two, and although courts are ultimately required to strive for proof of the individual case, to seek the best explanation of all the evidence, nevertheless evidence expressed in mathematical terms can still be used to emphasise that explanations consistent with innocence remain. 1.45 A further matter highlighted by the debate is that courts are obliged to reach decisions about the world in a real rather than an artificial environment. Not only must all available evidence be taken into account, but that evidence which appears to be unavailable also needs to be factored into any decision. If a mathematical approach is to be taken it at least must take into account this stock of both available and non-available information. In other words, the mathematicist must not be too quick to act upon the principle of indifference, but must search for that mathematical probability in that class defined by this totality of existing and possibly existing information. In this sense, mathematical conclusions in court must depend as much upon the weight of evidence as inductive conclusions. To rely upon a mathematical probability in a general class by ready (and unwarranted) reliance upon the principle of indifference may produce more right than wrong decisions in the long run, but to do so flies in [page 46] the face of a system of justice which seeks truth in individual cases. On the other hand, it is this very emphasis that is the strength of the inductive and ‘best explanation’ approaches, compelling consideration of all information and explanations before any conclusion about the hypothesis of an individual event can be reached.119 If the emphasis comes down to acting upon maximal information about the individual event it can be appreciated that, in practical terms, decisions of fact, no matter how much empirical evidence is formally adduced in court, will depend

upon the cognitive abilities and the background knowledge that each individual trier of fact brings to the court, using those abilities and knowledge to refine mathematical classes and to seek ‘best explanations’. As cognitive abilities and knowledge vary, so different triers may reach different conclusions about facts. For this reason, a jury system might be advocated to provide a wider range of abilities and knowledge. Of course at the opposite extreme a system might be advocated which employs triers with expert knowledge and experience about the factual matters in question.120 1.46 But experiences necessarily reflect a particular perspective of the world. Thus, women are frequently critical of decisions of fact reached by male judges, decisions dependent upon male perspectives of the world.121 The failure of a woman to resist an alleged rape, or to complain following an alleged rape, may be better understood by those who have been assaulted or have had close contact with victims.122 Each individual has insights into the world that are based upon different information and experiences than others, and somehow this must be recognised in seeking to know the world out there. [page 47] More radically, some argue that the world out there (if there is one) is not capable of discovery and that decisions are the product of psychological and sociological influences that are better directly faced than through the pretence that there is a discoverable world.123 Our legal system, however, pragmatically adopts the optimistic view that, although our quest for knowledge is imperfect, experience shows that it is capable of success, and, accepting that reality is undoubtedly influenced and constructed through psychological, social and political influences and processes, its task is to peel back or accommodate these influences in an effort to base its decisions upon what really happens in the world out there.

The Procedural Environment General considerations 1.47 Accepting this optimistic view of fact discovery, what conclusions can be

drawn about the nature of the procedural environment that courts must employ if they are to aspire to factual rectitude? In the first place, the factor common to the application of all approaches to fact discovery discussed above is the need to take into account a maximum amount of evidence in relation to the individual event sought to be proved. The uncovering of and emphasis upon maximal evidence relating to the particular event in issue is the very touchstone of an appropriate trial procedure. Secondly, the above discussion illustrates that evidence can only be assessed in the light of background knowledge and experience about the world. That knowledge and experience will be decisive in applying the principle of indifference or determining whether evidence is consistent with an advocated explanation. Ultimately, it is the designated fact-finder that must decide whether or not particular facts justifying a legal remedy have been discovered. These factfinders may need to be informed by the knowledge of others (‘experts’) but ultimately it is their knowledge and cognitive capacity that will be decisive of discovery. Any procedural environment must employ fact-finders of sufficient cognitive capacity to be informed by the knowledge and experience of others and to apply rationally their own knowledge and experience in considering available evidence to decide discovery of the material facts in issue. Thirdly, the above discussion emphasises the fragility of the orderly approach to the discovery of facts, so that any process must allow those affected by decisions to debate before the fact-finder how evidence and knowledge can rationally be used to determine the facts in issue. There must be a formal procedure for presenting evidence and debate, and evidence must be disclosed in circumstances that allow for effective debate. [page 48] Fourthly, fact-finders must act fairly and impartially in view of the delicacy of their task. This requires not only that they be free from overt influence, but that they be aware, or made aware, of the psychological, social and political influences upon their constructions of reality. Any trial procedure should cater for this. And in the same way, the trial must be able to reveal the (conscious and unconscious) cognitive biases of witnesses so that fact-finders can take these into account in deciding what weight to give to their testimony.124

But a central difficulty remains. If the law is unwilling to take a definitive approach to ‘rational’ fact discovery, and one can understand that unwillingness in the light of the above discussion, then ultimately the procedural system can do no more than leave it to fact-finders to reach decisions ‘rationally’ on the basis of available information, knowledge and experience. Appellate procedures may exist to ensure some uniformity in all this, allowing a smaller group of judges to determine once again what inferences they feel can rationally be drawn from available evidence, and decisions of lower courts may be reversed, but ultimately the approach of one or a number of individuals will be decisive.125 In this sense, some notion of free proof underlies any procedural system; in a deep sense, cognitive intuitions remain crucial.126 1.48 In all this we must accept that we mortals trapped in the world cannot achieve factual certainty. The risk of error remains in every decision of fact we make about the world and courts must necessarily take this risk into account in making their decisions. The risk of error remains no matter how thorough the quest. But the risk of error a legal system is prepared to tolerate also influences the very nature and thoroughness of the quest itself. How the risk of error is allocated is a normative decision, stemming from the uncertainty of fact discovery but based upon notions that go to the very nature of a legal system. This can be illustrated by the most basic technique used to allocate risk: burdens and standards of proof. In Australia and other common law jurisdictions, in criminal cases, where it is the state bringing an accusation of crime against the citizen, in order to ensure so far as possible that no innocent person is convicted, the state is required to [page 49] tender evidence sufficient to prove the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. There is no obligation on accused to give or call evidence in support of their innocence and no adverse inference may be drawn for failure to do so. The state must not interfere with the liberty of its citizens without bringing an accusation supported by lawfully obtained evidence that in itself is capable of eliminating all reasonably possible sources of error. The burdens of producing evidence and proving the accusation lie entirely on the state and the standard of proof demands the most serious quest for rectitude. By way of contrast, in civil cases, where the

primary object is to settle disputes between citizens, that dispute is regarded as appropriately settled by determining on the balance of probabilities whether the claim can be justified. While the burdens of adducing evidence lie upon the claimant, the quest for rectitude is modified by the need only to prove that the claim is better justified than its rejection (favouring the defendant). While the defendant is not obliged to call evidence, failure to do so may lead to adverse inference: see 6.45. Thus, the allocation of the risk of error demonstrates that deeper notions underlie any procedural system,127 notions that must be accepted by citizens to retain confidence in the administration of justice. Its decisions must be acceptable to society and accord with its fundamental values. In this sense the procedural process must retain its legitimacy.128 Critical to acceptance is the perceived rectitude of factual conclusions. However, because factual rectitude is not only impossible to attain but difficult to aspire to, in the sense that the collection and tender of and persuasion by evidence in proof of a case is a complicated and time-consuming process, the processes whereby this is done need to inspire confidence in citizens. For confidence to be inspired, most fundamentally the process needs to be public and transparent. Then the interests and dignity of citizens involved in the process, as both litigants and witnesses, need to be respected. Many of these interests coincide with the quest for rectitude; for example, processes demanding that parties have notice of claims, and a real opportunity, with the assistance of lawyers, to collect and present and comment upon evidence before the court; and processes ensuring that testimony is given free from threats or promises, and in circumstances that are conducive to testifying accurately. But protecting other interests may not be conducive to accuracy; for example, excluding evidence obtained illegally to ensure respect for the legal system, excluding evidence to protect privacy or family and other confidential relationships, and allowing governments to maintain secrecy over their [page 50] decisions. Some of these interests may be expressed as human rights.129 In criminal cases, rights to fair process are so expressed, but there is no expressed right to factual rectitude.130 Yet, perhaps ironically, every claim to a substantive

right is predicated upon factual assumptions.131 Whatever the rhetoric, the justifications and reasons for the evidential processes must necessarily be based upon theoretical reasons deeper than the rhetoric of rights. It is argued that a genuine and committed search for factual rectitude remains the fundamental instrumental end of the legal process,132 if always a search necessarily modified by other interests (and most mundanely in the allocation of always limited resources).

The common law adversary trial 1.49 Whether or not any of the above sorts of considerations were factors in its historical development,133 the common law adversarial trial as it now operates does appear in both civil and criminal cases to make factual rectitude its primary instrumental end. Maximisation of information is encouraged by not only allowing parties to initiate and define the ambit of proceedings (the principle of party prosecution, common to all democratic systems of procedure), but also by allowing the parties to call the evidence in support of their particular claims (the principle of party presentation), it being assumed that those prosecuting claims, and hence having the greatest interest in the outcome of the action, are most likely to uncover and present the maximum relevant evidence about the individual event in issue. The principle of party presentation also finds justification in ensuring that the trier of fact remains independent of the parties’ claims, for it does not merely allow [page 51] parties to present evidence but demands that the trier of fact acts only upon this evidence. The trier of fact is not entitled to pursue its own investigations into the claims nor otherwise act upon its own knowledge. Taken to its extreme, this latter demand would thwart effective trial altogether for, as emphasised above, relevance and evidential weight can only be gauged against the general knowledge and experience of the trier of fact. The line between the specific and the general might not in theory be capable of being drawn, but it is maintained in practice by the common law, which allows triers to act upon their background

knowledge unless the parties put that knowledge into dispute.134 By this technique, the common law maintains its emphasis upon party control of the presentation of evidence and the independence of the trier of fact. On the other hand, common law triers of fact are not chosen for their background knowledge and experience of particular events, and where the parties consider this inadequate for assessing the weight of evidence they may supplement it by calling experts with appropriate experience.135 In this way, the range of relevant information can be increased with the triers remaining aloof from the controversy, though ultimately responsible for any decision of fact. 1.50 There are other restraints upon the principle of party presentation designed to assist triers in determining most accurately the weight of tendered information (or to put it another way, the reliability of that information) and to ensure public confidence in the trial system. Although parties are permitted to control the relevant information to be presented and the order of its presentation, the common law insists that normally that information be presented directly to the court through witnesses who have experienced it first-hand. Thus, presented evidence is principally testimonial, consisting of the first-hand experiences of relevant events and mental states being spoken to the court, with the reliability and accuracy of the witness freely recalling their experiences being subject to the direct scrutiny of the trier of fact. To assist this scrutiny, the common law further insists that witnesses, having presented their oral testimony for the one party, be available for crossexamination by the other party to enable matters relevant to their testimony and credibility to be pursued. These restraints upon the principle of party presentation give rise to the most celebrated of the common law rules of evidence, the hearsay rule, but they also give rise to the detailed procedural rules that determine the precise way in which testimonial evidence is presented to the court. Moreover, parties are given confidence in a system that allows full and effective testing and comment upon tendered information. [page 52] While the common law never developed a sophisticated form of disclosure of evidence prior to trial to enable opponents to prepare for scrutiny at trial, processes have been developed through legislation and rules of court which now

demand such disclosure. To ensure that this occurs in criminal cases the state is obliged to disclose its case against the accused prior to trial, where serious crimes are alleged by way of a preliminary committal procedure, and in civil cases disclosure prior to trial of at least all documents and expert reports relating to the matters in issue is generally required: see further 5.4–5.18. At common law, there were few other restrictions upon tender to ensure the acceptability of verdicts. It was enough for acceptability that the trial itself was public and set up as a contest between adversaries (often far from equal in terms of resources and not always legally represented) before an independent court. However, as the discussion in this book will show, through the course of the twentieth century, and particularly the opening years of the twenty-first century, legislatures have done much to develop the sophistication of trial procedures and expand the interests beyond rectitude that may be taken into account in deciding whether to receive evidence. Yet the essential nature of the common law adversarial process underlies all these reforms. Parties control the tender of evidence and independent courts decide factual issues upon the basis of the evidence tendered to them. 1.51 The very assumption of the common law system is that triers of fact are intuitively equipped to determine the probative strength of evidence and the competing hypotheses generated by it. As mentioned above, triers are not chosen for their expertise and it is assumed that rational humans are capable of weighing evidence when presented with appropriate information, including background knowledge and experience, where necessary. The jury system is testimony to this assumption, although it also embodies other notions of liberty through the jury’s prerogative to refuse enforcement of unjust laws and thereby further strengthens confidence in the system.136 So the common law adversary system purports to maximise information in relation to the event under inquiry and the hypotheses in explanation of that evidence, to maintain the independence of the triers, to attract public confidence through the fair nature of its process and to avoid dogma by applying the principle of freedom of proof. But whether the first three advantages in practice flow from the adversary trial is another matter. The merits of the adversary trial are continually debated.137 It may be argued that parties, driven by self-interest, suppress hypotheses and evidence that

[page 53] promote neither party’s cause, thereby hindering the search for the true facts. It is contended that the advantages of the system depend upon parties having equal and sufficient access to evidence and to resources to investigate and prosecute claims, and this is rarely the case, particularly in criminal cases where the accused must face the investigatory resources of the state, or where an impecunious individual pursues action against a multi-national corporation in tort or product liability. It is argued that the system of examination and cross-examination of witnesses effectively distorts natural narrative and thereby assessment of the truth, as witnesses are called to support the claims of the party calling them, and may then be subjected to extremes of cross-examination in ways that encourage triers of fact to gauge credibility on trivial or even irrelevant grounds. It is argued that the system does not adequately reflect the experiences of many sections of society, particularly those of many women, indigenous Australians, gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered persons, and other minority cultural groups. Finally, it is said that the adversary system is inefficient and expensive — often encouraging strict proof of matters which are easily accepted, or which should never be in dispute at all.

Structuring the Rules of Evidence 1.52 This is not the context in which to pursue these criticisms, the present object being to elucidate those basic principles that have shaped the common law rules of evidence. The thesis of this book is that the driving principle behind the law of evidence is the effective employment of natural rules of fact discovery to determine the occurrence of those facts upon which claims depend. But in addition, the common law assumes that this effective employment is best, and most acceptably, achieved through the process of adversary trial as explained above. It is contended that in these natural rules of fact discovery and their application through adversary process the keys to understanding existing evidentiary rules can be found. This is not to deny the influence of other factors based upon wider notions of public policy, but by revealing the extent to which rectitude and adversarial process justify evidential rules a clearer perspective can be provided in determining whether other policies should be allowed to intervene. Indeed, public policies can intervene to drastically curtail evidential

rules and processes where effective government so demands — the government may refuse access to information where this runs the risk of undermining national security; journalists may refuse to disclose their sources to maximise the freedom of the press to criticise government; victims of sexual assault and children may be provided with special procedures to encourage their testimony against sexual predators (as well as seeking to ensure the greater accuracy of their testimony); and information disclosed during settlement negotiations may be privileged to encourage citizens to settle their differences through agreement rather than an expensive and emotional trial. In each case, extraneous interests must be seen against the perspective of risking accurate outcomes (the interests of justice). The judicial system is ultimately [page 54] one branch of government, and whilst the principle of independent judicial review must not be undermined, legislatures can not only modify court processes and the evidence available to courts but also, by altering substantive laws, alter standards of proof and the facts courts are able to consider in reaching their decisions.138 1.53 This work deals with evidential rules in both civil and criminal cases.139 However, it is recognised that, most significantly as a consequence of the accusatory nature of adversarial criminal proceedings — whereby the state makes an accusation against one of its citizens, and must bring to the court sufficient evidence to justify its claim without assistance from the accused to a standard of proof seeking to ensure no innocent accused is convicted — there are a number of evidential rules that apply only in criminal cases. At one level these rules protect an accused from conviction upon the basis of evidence that may be unreliable — for example, those applying to the revelation of the accused’s bad character, to the admissibility of confessional evidence, to the directions required to the jury where evidence may be unreliable — and give the judge a residual discretion to exclude incriminating evidence to which the fact-finder may give more probative weight than it deserves. At another level these rules reflect those principles fundamental to the common law accusatory criminal trial: demanding the state to specify and prove its accusation beyond reasonable doubt without assistance from the accused, giving the accused the protection of the privilege

against self-incrimination both before and during trial, requiring the state to disclose its case and giving the accused a full opportunity to examine and test that evidence for reliability at trial and produce evidence by way of rebuttal. These principles underlie the very fairness of the criminal trial and when not followed may be remedied through discretionary exclusion, or through a stay on grounds of abuse of process (a procedure expressly preserved by s 11(2) of the uniform legislation: see 2.29 n 138 for examples) or through a miscarriage of justice being determined on appeal.140 Courts remain protective of these principles, and although they receive no constitutional protection, legislation will be interpreted to reduce or abolish them only by express words or as a matter of necessary implication (the so-called ‘principle of legality’).141 [page 55] As a consequence, evidential rules are of most prominence in criminal cases, yet the common law has never sought to apply completely distinct evidential regimes to civil and criminal cases. To a large extent the evidential rules are common. And in Australia, the uniform legislation, whilst some provisions are confined to criminal cases, does not depart from this unified approach. Whilst the uniform legislation is not structured to reflect underlying principles of proof within the adversarial trial, it is contended that these principles remain a decisive background to its understanding. It will be seen (at 2.3) that the legislation codifies exclusionary rules of evidence, but it does not purport to be a complete evidential code, let alone to codify more fundamentally the procedural system within which the rules of evidence operate. The idea of proof within the process of the common law adversary trial generally and accusatory trial in particular thus lies behind the legislation and continues to exert explanatory force where the legislation or its application are unclear. Furthermore, the High Court has made clear that principles fundamental to the common law accusatorial trial are only modified by legislation, including the uniform legislation, to the extent that this is made clear expressly or by necessary implication.142 Thus the uniform legislation must be seen as part of the continuing evolution of the common law adversarial and accusatorial processes of proof.

Synopsis 1.54 This book is structured to reflect and emphasise these principles of proof by adversary trial. It is divided into two parts. The first analyses those evidential rules which are dependent upon natural principles of fact discovery, the second those evidential rules which maintain the adversarial process to the discovery of facts. Chapters 2–4 comprise the first part. Chapter 2 explains the trial process and the fundamental notions of relevance, admissibility, a case to answer and proof, in order to emphasise the place and overriding importance of the natural rules of fact discovery. The rules dealt with in Chapters 3 and 4 apply principally in criminal proceedings and seek to grapple with the problem of ensuring that the probative value of certain forms of unreliable evidence is not overvalued and the high standard of proof undermined. The underlying difficulty in achieving this is that probative value derives [page 56] from natural rules of fact discovery that mostly defy definitive empirical guidelines. Chapter 3 deals with the reception of character evidence, always regarded with suspicion by the common law (and now by the uniform and other state legislation) because of its dubious (controversial) probative value, a value determined only by natural rules. Chapter 4 deals with rules, including those requiring corroboration or warning or other directions, which have as their basis the law’s desire to prevent triers of fact from acting upon potentially unreliable testimony, that unreliability again being determined by natural rules. The openendedness of the law in this part is explained as an inescapable consequence of the open-endedness of these natural rules of fact discovery, coupled with the courts’ desire to ensure that no innocent accused is convicted. Chapters 5–8 comprise the second part. Chapter 5 deals with the important assumption of the adversarial trial that parties have access to relevant evidence before and during trial, and explains the circumstances in which that access may be restricted. Although the focus of the evidentiary regime is the proof at trial of the material facts in issue, without prior access parties are unable to plan and organise their

factual allegations at trial nor be prepared to contest effectively evidence presented at trial by their opponents. By the same token, what happens prior to trial in the collection and collation of evidence has a profound influence upon the evidence that will eventually be put before the court at trial.143 If the law is serious about rectitude it must not only ensure that parties have access to helpful evidence, but also ensure that some access is given to adverse evidence so that it may be properly tested at trial. However, in criminal cases these principles of access are compromised by the more fundamental demand that the state prove accusations of crime without assistance from the accused. But even here legislative inroads have been made requiring the accused to give notice of alibi and expert evidence to be tendered and to participate in the narrowing of issues for trial: see 5.14. However, there must also be some restrictions upon access to evidence more generally in the parties’ hands to preserve both the adversarial process generally and the accusatorial process in criminal cases. Legal professional privilege, the negotiations privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination may be seen as preserving these processes. Furthermore, there may need to be other restrictions to access based upon wider notions of public policy (for example, restrictions protecting marital and other confidential relationships, and public policy immunity). And to ensure that parties act lawfully in their collection and collation of evidence the law may restrict the tender of evidence that can be seen as consequent upon illegality and impropriety. [page 57] Chapter 6 deals with the evidentiary rules ensuring that parties remain primarily responsible for the course of the adversarial trial. Thus, evidence is presented by the parties to an independent trier of fact, the claimant or prosecutor must make out a case to answer, and the rules of burdens of proof and presumptions stipulate which parties must go forward in evidence and which must ultimately persuade the trier of the occurrence of the material facts. The chapter also considers in what circumstances triers are entitled to rely upon their own knowledge rather than evidence presented by the parties. It is interesting that whilst the uniform legislation has something to say about the last question it is otherwise silent about these important common law adversarial principles. Chapter 7 explains the common law’s emphasis upon the oral adversary

presentation of testimonial evidence, showing the relationship between testimonial evidence and other forms of evidence (documentary evidence and real evidence), and then elucidating those rules which circumscribe the giving of oral testimony (competence requirements, the forbidding of opinion evidence, the oral presentation of evidence from memory, rules of examination-in-chief and cross-examination). There are now many statutory modifications to this oral process, seeking to improve the accuracy of eyewitness testimony and to take the interests of witnesses into account. This chapter also importantly highlights the problems facing courts in maintaining the rule forbidding opinion evidence as a result of the increasing demand by parties to tender opinion testimony from experts. Chapter 8 concerns the hearsay rule which, it is argued, is based upon the requirements for the adversarial presentation of oral testimony elucidated in Chapter 7. The most radical changes implemented by the uniform legislation permit testimony to be put before the court other than through oral adversarial presentation. Not only can hearsay evidence be received by the court but recent amendments may be used to encourage witnesses to testify in terms of an uninterrupted narrative rather than in response to questions. While this structure makes no attempt to follow the more pragmatic structure of the uniform legislation, as will be seen the uniform legislation is easily accommodated within it. The intention is to articulate that legislation in the context of the process of proof by adversarial trial that underlies it, and by this approach provide a principled understanding of its effect. 1.55 The work makes no attempt to deal with two areas of law often covered in texts on evidence, namely rules relating to estoppel (and res judicata) and the parol evidence rule.144 These rules apply principally to delimit facts capable of dispute, and in this sense bear closer analogy to substantive rules of law. Indeed, the rules relating [page 58] to parol evidence are most often considered in the context of the substantive rules of contracts and wills. Although both rules clearly affect the tender of evidence, all substantive rules have this effect in their definition of material facts. It is neither appropriate nor possible for a book on evidence to cover all rules that

may affect the tender of information. The object of this book is to focus upon those rules concerning the proof of those facts that must be established for parties to succeed in their claims. ______________________________ 1.

ICI Ltd v Caro [1961] 1 WLR 529 at 539 (Lord Evershed MR), 542 (Upjohn LJ). Cf Fairmount Investments and Southwark London Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1976] 1 WLR 1255 at 1265–6 and the position in criminal cases such as Pantorno v R (1989) 166 CLR 466 at 473. See also the remarks of Basten JA in DPP v JG (2010) 220 A Crim R 19; [2010] NSWCCA 222 at [79], ‘a criminal trial is not to be run on the basis of some idiosyncratic view of the parties as to the applicable rules of evidence; it is to be run on the basis of the law prescribed by the Parliament …’.

2.

North West Salt Co Ltd v Electrolytic Alkali Co Ltd [1914] AC 461 at 475–7 (Lord Moulton); Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 44 (Gibbs ACJ), 58–9, 68 (Stephen J).

3.

Twining, ‘The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship’, first published in Campbell and Waller (eds), Well and Truly Tried, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1982, and republished, with some additions, in Twining, Rethinking Evidence, Blackwell, Oxford, 1990 (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006).

4.

Eckhoff, ‘The Mediator and the Judge’ in Aubert (ed), Sociology of Law, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1969, p 175.

5.

Conciliation Act 1929 (SA) s 3. Although repealed in 1996, judges are now granted wider powers to themselves mediate or to appoint mediators: District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 32; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 27; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 65.

6.

For an overview of alternative procedures in Australia, see Astor and Chinkin, Dispute Resolution in Australia, 2nd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2002; Boulle and Field, Australian Dispute Resolution Law and Practice, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2016; Legg (ed), The Future of Dispute Resolution, 2nd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2016.

7.

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 53A; FCR 2011 Pt 28 (O 72 discussed by Howard, ‘Federal Court of Australia: Assisted Court Resolution’ (1991) 2 Aust Dispute Res J 240); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) Pt 4; UCPR 1999 (Qld) Ch 9 Pt 4; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 65; SCCR 2006 (SA) Ch 10; District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 32; DCCR 2006 (SA) Ch 10; SCR 2000 (Tas) Pt 20; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) ss 24A, 25(1)(ea); SC(GCP)R 2015 (Vic) O 50; Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) Pt VI and s 167(1)(q); RSC 1971 (WA) OO 29A, 31A.10; Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA) s 23 and Pt 5; Supreme Court Act (NT) s 83A; SCR (NT) O 48.13; Local Court (Civil Procedure) Act (NT) s 16.

8.

Arbitration, in that it requires a third person to determine authoritatively a dispute (although involving a more economical procedure), entails the arbitrator reaching that decision which is correct in the circumstances. Therefore, it is a form of judgmental decision-making rather than a form for facilitating agreement. On the nature of arbitration, see Astor and Chinkin, n 6 above, pp 297–311.

9.

Frank, Courts on Trial, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1950, p 14. For wider perspectives on the pursuit of truth, see also Wootten, ‘Conflicting Imperatives: Pursuing Truth in the Court’ in McCalman and McGrath (eds), Proof & Truth: The Humanist as Expert, Australian Academy of the Humanities, Canberra, 2003, pp 15–50.

10. (1998) 193 CLR 173 at [19]. 11. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth, London, 1977, Ch 4. Cf Posner, How Judges Think,

Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2008. 12. See Detmold, The Unity of Law and Morality: A Refutation of Legal Positivism, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London and New York, 1984. 13. On the other hand, if one rejects altogether the idea that the object of the procedural system is to produce correct decisions and argues that it has other goals instead, then facts may be neither relevant nor decisive. At a conventional level, at 1.2 it was accepted that this may be the situation in the settlement of disputes through mediation. At a more radical level, it may be argued that facts are entirely elusive and that procedural rules merely provide a fair framework for a discourse ended by a court decision based upon the coherence of that discourse: see Jackson, Law, Fact and Narrative Coherence, Deborah Charles Publications, Liverpool, 1988. 14. There are exceptional cases where orders are made upon the basis of predicted behaviour; for example, control and prevention orders for potential terrorists and sex offenders. See Keyzer and McSherry, ‘The Preventive Detention of Sex Offenders: Law and Practice’ (2015) 38 UNSW LJ 792; Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 237 ALR 194 (Kirby J, in dissent); Pollentine v Attorney-General (Qld) [2014] HCA 30. Future dangerousness has exercised courts in the United States, most notoriously in Barefoot v Estelle 463 US 880 (1983). 15. It is recognised that ultimately a fact-finder can do no more than strive to rationally justify a belief about facts, and the importance of this moral commitment cannot be underestimated: cf Ho, A Philosophy of Evidence Law: Justice in the Search for Proof, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008. But the question posed here is the extent to which a belief about facts, if it is to be rationally justified, must rely upon a particular process or processes of reconstruction. 16. Twining, ‘The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship’ in Twining, n 3 above, pp 72–4 (2nd ed, n 3 above, pp 76–9). 17. See generally Dennis, The Law of Evidence, 5th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2013, [4.010]–[4.015]. A powerful explanation of the limits of the rationalist approach and the necessity for critical perspectives can be found in Nicholson, ‘Truth, Reason and Justice: Epistemology and Politics in Evidence Discourse’ (1994) 57 Mod L Rev 726. For the extreme version of the judicial discourse, see Jackson, n 13 above. 18. The approaches used by other groups, such as natural scientists, have diverged because of different objectives, resources, training, timeframes, constraints and methods. It is important to distinguish the endeavour to describe the rational process (the positive approach) from the endeavour to justify that process normatively (the normative approach). This distinction is stressed in the writings of Ronald J Allen: see, for example, Allen, ‘Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence’ (1994) 87 Northwestern ULR 604 at 630. 19. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on the Law of Evidence at Common Law, Little Brown and Co, Boston, 1898, pp 264–6. 20. Wigmore, The Science of Judicial Proof, 3rd ed, Little Brown and Co, Boston, 1937. It is not possible to give an account of Wigmore’s detailed system here. Instead a simplified version is provided that may, nevertheless, ultimately prove more useful than Wigmore’s own rather complicated schema. The discussion draws heavily upon the simplified schema advocated in Anderson and Twining, Analysis of Evidence, Little Brown and Co, Boston, 1991, pp 136–53 (now Anderson, Schum and Twining, Analysis of Evidence, 2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, Ch 5: ‘The Chart Method’). Though our schema is even more simplified. See also Roberts and Aitken, The Logic of Forensic Proof, RSS, London, 2013, pp 61–102; Palmer, Proof: How to Analyse Evidence in Preparation for Trial, 3rd ed, LawBook Co, Sydney, 2014, Part B; Palmer, ‘Why and How to Teach Proof’ (2011) 33 Syd LR 563. 21. In this work the standpoint from which we are considering this analysis is as counsel or trier of fact

seeking to justify a particular finding from a given amount of evidence. The same analysis can be employed from different standpoints, such as that of the investigator seeking to isolate additional evidential material which might be required if a particular factual conclusion is to be justified: see Anderson and Twining, n 20 above, pp 120–1 (Anderson, Schum and Twining, n 20 above, pp 124–5). Admissions and facts judicially noticed stand on the same basis as an incontrovertible experience of the fact-finder. 22. Anderson and Twining distinguish between ultimate and penultimate probanda as separate steps to be taken in constructing inferential charts: Anderson and Twining, n 20 above, pp 121–4 (Anderson, Schum and Twining, n 20 above, pp 125–6). This is a useful way of emphasising precision about which facts require discovery if an action is to succeed, but it also introduces terminology suggesting the existence of arbitrary categories. For this same reason no terminological distinction is drawn between direct testimonial evidence and circumstantial evidence, for it is the logical sequence of inferences that is always important, not the allocation of evidence into direct testimonial and circumstantial categories. 23. This term is used descriptively only. The High Court’s attempt to use the term ‘intermediate facts’ to single out a particular layer of facts in the inferential chain is difficult to justify. See the discussion of Shepherd v R (1990) 170 CLR 573 at 2.83. 24. Wigmore, n 20 above, [7]. 25. Ibid, [23]. 26. Ibid, [4]. 27. See Wigmore’s examples reproduced in Anderson and Twining, n 20 above, pp 131–5, and the example in Anderson, Schum and Twining, n 20 above, pp 136–9. For an antipodean example of Wigmorean analysis, see Robertson, ‘John Henry Wigmore and Arthur Allan Thomas: An Example of Wigmorean Analysis’ (1990) 20 Vic U of Wellington LR 181. 28. Note the adversarial assumption that fact-finding can be, formally or informally, a matter of party admission. In jurisdictions where the court remains responsible for investigating the case these admissions may not be accepted by the court. 29. A striking common law example is found in Chamberlain v R (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521, where the defence story — that a baby was taken by a dingo — dominated the facts with which the court concerned itself. 30. Limitations with eyewitness identification evidence are notorious: National Academy of Sciences, Identifying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification, National Academies Press, Washington, 2014. See further 4.54ff. 31. Estimating time of death can also be a complicated process and mistaken estimates have led to wrongful convictions: Re Truscott [2007] ONCA 575. 32. Wigmore, Anderson and Twining, and Anderson, Schum and Twining (see n 20 above), use an insertionary mark (‘>’) next to any controversial, inferred fact, to include a rival or explanatory chain. 33. Thus, in Shepherd v R (1990) 170 CLR 573, the High Court distinguishes between primary facts and intermediate facts. This distinction is discussed and explained in the light of Wigmorean analysis at 2.83. 34. Justice Wells, formerly of the Supreme Court of South Australia, advocated and used Wigmorean analysis in this way. 35. Although higher courts are sometimes reluctant to correct the inferences of a lower court: see, for example, Chamberlain v R (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521 (but cf R v Baden-Clay (2016) 334 ALR 234; [2016] HCA 35) and see, in civil appeals, Bell, ‘Appellate Review of the Facts’ (2014) 39 Aust Bar Rev 132. The impossibility of rational inference is also the basis of a submission of no case to answer: see

2.50–2.56. 36. An excellent discussion of these philosophical theories can be found in Mackie, Truth, Probability and Paradox, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1973, Ch 5. See also Twining, ‘Debating Probabilities’ [1980] Liverpool LR 51; Kaye, ‘What is Bayesianism? A Guide for the Perplexed’ (1988) 28 Jurimetrics 161; and Dawid’s summary in an Appendix to Anderson and Twining, and to Anderson, Schum and Twining, and Roberts and Aitken, n 20 above. 37. See Mackie, n 36 above, Ch 5. 38. James, ‘Relevance, Probability and the Law’ (1941) 29 Calif LR 689; Anderson and Twining, n 20 above, pp 63–9 (Anderson, Schum and Twining, n 20 above, pp 96–103). 39. This example is used by Cohen in The Probable and the Provable, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977, p 75, to criticise bare numerical probabilities. 40. [1973] QB 929. 41. This point is emphasised in Mackie, n 36 above, p 162. 42. See Mackie, n 36 above, pp 173–9. 43. The empirical generation of such probabilities is obviously problematic. While we have some evidence, based on numerous empirical studies, about the accuracy of eyewitness identification, the example of the jealous lover raises a range of more complicated issues and concepts (such as what constitutes ‘jealousy’, how jealous does a person need to be and how is that gauged, what does ‘presence’ mean and so on). 44. This is the problem of induction with which Hume grappled in his Treatise on Human Nature, Selby Bigge (ed), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1960, Book 1, Pt III, s vi, p 91. 45. Evett et al, ‘DNA Profiling: A Discussion of Issues Relating to the Reporting of Very Small Match Probabilities’ [2000] Crim LR 341 at 346. See also National Research Council, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence Committee on DNA Forensic Science: An Update, National Academy Press, Washington DC, 1996; Buckelton, Bright and Taylor, Forensic DNA Evidence Interpretation, 2nd ed, CRC Press, Boca Raton, 2016; Balding and Steele, Weight of Evidence for DNA Profiles, 2nd ed, Wiley, London, 2015. 46. For early explanations of the subjective theory, see Lempert, ‘Modelling Relevance’ (1977) 75 Mich LR 1021; Schum, ‘A Review of a Case Against Blaise Pascal and His Heirs’ (1979) 77 Mich LR 446; Ockleton, ‘How to be Convinced’ [1980] Liverpool LR 65. The justification and merit of a subjective theory is debated by Cohen, ‘Subjective Probability and the Paradox of the Gatecrasher’ [1981] Ariz St LJ 627; and Kaye, ‘Paradoxes, Gedanken Experiments and the Burden of Proof: A Response to Dr Cohen’s Reply’ [1981] Ariz St LJ 635. More recent, and strong advocates of the Bayesian School, include Kaye, n 36 above; Koehler and Shaviro, ‘Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods’ (1990) 75 Cornell LR 247; Edwards, ‘Influence Diagrams, Bayesian Imperialism, and the Collins Case: An Appeal to Reason’ (1991) 13 Cardozo LR 1025; Robertson and Vignaux, ‘Probability — The Logic of the Law’ (1993) 13 Ox J Legal Studies 457; Friedman, ‘Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge’ (1997) 1 E & P 276; Morrison, ‘The Likelihood-ratio Framework and Forensic Evidence in Court: A Response to R v T’ (2012) 16 Evid & Proof 1. 47. See n 46 above. 48. Robertson and Vignaux, n 46 above, emphasise that probability is not a property of facts and events in the real world (as might be suggested by always attempting to find empirical frequencies and which gives rise to what may be termed ‘The Mind Projection Fallacy’), but rather it is a measure of our (subjective) uncertainty about the world. Thus, probabilities are inherently subjective and the rules of

probability are simply dictates of reason and logic that determine the relationship between beliefs (and between mere beliefs and empirically based probabilities). 49. That subjective probabilities are not necessarily frequentist is emphasised by Robertson and Vignaux, n 46 above. 50. For simple introductions to the calculus, see Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability, 2nd ed, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1983, Chs 2, 12; Dawid in an Appendix to Anderson and Twining, n 20 above (2nd ed, Anderson, Schum and Twining, n 20 above, pp xx–xxi referring to the book’s website at ); Robertson and Vignaux, n 46 above; Robertson, Vignaux and Berger, Interpreting Evidence: Evaluating Forensic Science in the Courtroom, Wiley, London, 2016, pp 183–90. The use of mathematical techniques in court was strongly advocated by Finkelstein and Fairley, ‘A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence’ (1970) 83 Harv LR 489 and equally strongly criticised by Tribe, ‘Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process’ (1971) 84 Harv LR 1329. 51. This scenario confronted the House of Lords in The ‘Popi M’ [1983] 2 Lloyd’s LR 235, where the plaintiffs claimed under an insurance policy covering ‘perils of the sea’ (see the discussion by Robertson and Vignaux, n 46 above, at 465, 472), but their Lordships refused to apply the principle of complementation and held the claim could not be proved without a credible explanation. The decision is justified in principled terms by Stein, ‘An Essay on Uncertainty and Fact-Finding in Civil Litigation, with Special Reference to Contract Cases’ (1998) 48 U Toronto LJ 299 as treating contracting parties equally when distributing risk on grounds of party-expectations, party-encouragement to allocate risks in advance, and as minimising overall rates of fact-finding error. 52. (1979) 23 ALR 345. See comment by Simpson and Orlv, ‘An Application of Logic to the Law’ (1980) 3 UNSW LJ 415. 53. The simple use of this rule depends upon the existence of alleles at each loci being independent of each other. This assumption of independence has been subject to some experimental support and can also be allowed for statistically: see Evett et al, n 45 above, at 347. 54. As allele frequency varies within racial groups, where a suspect population is a smaller racial group then the relative frequency in the population at large will be inappropriate. Similarly, where relatives are included in the relevant suspect population this will affect the frequency and must be taken into account. See, for example, the discussion in Evett et al, n 45 above. 55. (2002) 83 SASR 135. In Tuite v R [2015] VSCA 148 at [19], the court refers to STRMix, a system designed to calculate the probabilities of mixed samples, generating numbers in the order of 10 to the power of 36 based on new profiling technologies. 56. 438 P 2d 33 (1968). Collins is discussed critically by Cullison, ‘Identification by Probabilities and Trial by Arithmetic (A Lesson for Beginners in How to be Wrong with Greater Precision)’ (1969) 6 Houston LR 471; Edwards, ‘Influence Diagrams, Bayesian Imperialism, and the Collins Case: An Appeal to Reason’ (1991) 13 Cardozo LR 1025; Huffman, ‘When the Blue Bus Crashes into the Gate: The Problem with People v Collins in the Probabilistic Evidence Debate’ (1992) 46 U of Miami LR 975. 57. For an Australian application of the multiplication and complementation probability equations, refer to Hodgson J’s judgment in In the Estate of RL Ralston (SC(NSW), No 109245/96, 12 September 1996, unreported). Compare with Hodgson J’s criticism of a mathematical conceptualisation of beliefs in ‘Probability: The Logic of the Law — a Response’ (1995) 15 Ox J Legal Studies 51. 58. Emphasised by Evett et al, n 45 above, at 346 (quoted at 1.17 above). 59. R v Doheny and Adams [1997] 1 Cr App R 369 at 372–3; Thompson and Schumann, ‘Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor’s Fallacy and the Defense Attorney’s Fallacy’ (1987) 11 Law & Hum Behav 167; Balding and Donnelly, ‘The Prosecutor’s Fallacy in DNA Evidence’

[1994] Crim LR 711 at 715–16. 60. See, for example, Evett et al, n 45 above, at 353; and Hodgson, ‘A Lawyer Looks at Bayes’ Theorem’ (2002) 76 Aust LJ 109. But compare this logical view with the refusal of courts to articulate Bayesian calculations: R v Dennis Adams [1996] 2 Cr App R 467; R v Doheny and Adams [1997] 1 Cr App R 369; R v Dennis Adams (No 2) [1998] 1 Cr App R 377 at 384; Gibson v R [2001] TASSC 59; R v Galli [2001] NSWCCA 504; R v GK [2001] NSWCCA 413; R v Karger (2002) 83 SASR 135; Riley v Western Australia (2005) 30 WAR 525 at [30] (Steytler P). See also the discussion in Lynch, Cole, Jordan and McNally, Truth Machine: The Contentious History of DNA Fingerprinting, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2008, pp 190–219. 61. For the formal proof of the odds version of Bayes’ Theorem, see Stein, ‘The Refoundation of Evidence Law’ (1996) 9 Can J Law & Jurisprudence 279 at 300–1. 62. This example has been subjected to psychological investigation in order to determine whether subjects intuitively apply the mathematical axioms in solution to it. See, for example, Kahneman and Tversky, ‘On the Psychology of Prediction’ (1972) 4 Oregon Research Institute Research Bulletin 12. The results of this research are critically examined by Cohen, ‘Can Human Irrationality be Experimentally Demonstrated?’ (1981) 4 The Behavioural and Brain Sciences 341 (and following commentaries). For further analysis of the problem, see Cohen, ‘Is There a Base-Rate Fallacy?’, unpublished paper, Oxford, 1984. The need to take into account the cognitive strategies of factfinders is emphasised by Callen, ‘Cognitive Strategies and Models of Fact-finding’ in Jackson, Langer and Tillers (eds), Crime, Procedure and Evidence in a Comparative and International Context: Essays in Honour of Professor Mirjan Damaska, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2008, Ch 9. 63. This calculation may not be strictly accurate as in principle, the probability that the two accused are the guilty parties cannot be found by simple multiplication of their individual anterior probabilities for a crime committed by only one person. 64. [1996] 2 Cr App R 467. 65. At a retrial Dennis Adams was convicted and his appeal against this conviction did not succeed: R v Dennis Adams (No 2) [1998] 1 Cr App R 377. 66. This disapproval of Bayesian analysis was endorsed by the Court of Appeal in R v Doheny and Adams [1997] 1 Cr App R 369 and in R v Dennis Adams (No 2) [1998] 1 Cr App R 377 at 384. Australian courts, although permitting DNA experts to testify in terms of a likelihood ratio, nevertheless discourage Bayesian analysis at trial and there is no obligation to direct the jury about how Bayesian analysis can be used to combine the likelihood ratio presented with the other evidence in the case: R v Galli [2001] NSWCCA 504; R v Karger (2002) 83 SASR 135; Ligertwood, ‘Avoiding Bayes in DNA Cases’ (2003) 77 Aust LJ 317; R v Berry Wenitong (2007) 17 VR 153; [2007] VSCA 202. 67. See the discussion of Thatcher v R (1987) 39 DLR (4th) 275 by Robertson and Vignaux, ‘Rethinking Verdicts: Chamberlain, Chignell, and Stratford’ [1993] NZ Recent LR 122. 68. Compare with Schum and Martin, ‘Formal and Empirical Research on Cascaded Inference in Jurisprudence’ (1982) 17 Law & Society Rev 105. 69. See Callen, ‘Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some Limits on the Use of a Bayesian Theory in Evidence Law’ (1982) 57 Ind LJ 1 at 10–15; Callen, ‘Second Order Considerations, Weight, Sufficiency and Schema Theory: A Comment on Professor Brilmayer’s Theory’ (1986) 66 Boston ULR 715 at 726, n 72: ‘[F]or the consistent use of Bayesian theory for the updating of probabilities by conditionalization, where thirty items of evidence are introduced relevant to an inference, one must record a billion probabilities’. 70. See n 46. 71. See Allen and Pardo, ‘The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models of Evidence’ (2007) 36 J Legal

Studies 107 and the symposium entitled ‘The Reference Class Problem’ in (2007) 11 E & P 243. See also Franklin, ‘The Objective Bayesian Conception of Proof and Reference Class Problems’ (2011) 33 Syd LR 545. 72. This point is made by Cohen, n 39 above, and is advocated strongly and persistently by Stein, n 61 above, Pt V: ‘On the Unbearable Lightness of Weight’; Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, pp 80–91. 73. The subjective approach was developed in the context of business decision-making rather than fact discovery: see Raiffa, Decision Analysis, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass, 1968. 74. Evett et al, n 45 above, at 353; Hodgson, n 60 above. And for a full development of the Bayesian approach in relation to scientific evidence, see Robertson, Vignaux and Berger, n 50 above. 75. See authorities at nn 60 and 66 above. 76. See n 69. 77. Cohen, n 39 above, Pt II. Arguments reconciling the problem of conjunction with a mathematical approach can be found in Friedman, n 46 above, at 279–84. 78. Lynch, Cole, McNally and Jordan prosecute this argument in Truth Machine: The Contentious History of DNA Fingerprinting, Ch 6, see n 60 above. 79. (1994) 637 A 2d 1101, discussed by various participants in ‘Probability and Proof in State v Skipper: An Internet Exchange’ (1995) 35 Jurimetrics 277. For Australian examples of paternity evidence in probabilistic terms, see R v GK [2001] NSWCCA 413; Bropho v Western Australia (No 2) [2009] WASCA 94. 80. Robertson and Vignaux, ‘Extending the Conversation About Bayes’ (1991) 13 Cardozo LR 629 at 638– 41. See generally Kaye, ‘The Probability of an Ultimate Issue: The Strange Case of Paternity Testing’ (1989) 75 Iowa LR 25; and in ‘Probability and Proof in State v Skipper: An Internet Exchange’, n 79 above, at 292–4. 81. Friedman, n 46 above, at 285–6. In ‘Probability and Proof in State v Skipper: An Internet Exchange’, n 79 above, at 296, Friedman advocates a very small probability based upon ‘no information apart from your general knowledge of the world’. 82. This point is stressed by Allen during the internet exchange reported as ‘Probability and Proof in State and Skipper: An Internet Exchange’, n 79 above, and debated at 293–8. See also Ligertwood and Edmond, ‘A Just Measure of Probability’ (2012) 11 Law, Prob & Risk 365. 83. (1984) 153 CLR 521. 84. This practical solution to the delimitation of hypotheses is the basis of the Bayesian analysis advocated by Robertson, Vignaux and Berger, n 50 above, particularly Ch 3. 85. Tribe, n 50 above, emphasises this problem. 86. Cohen, The Probable and the Provable, n 39 above, p 120. 87. Galanter, ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change’ (1974) 9 Law & Society Rev 95. 88. Ho, n 15 above, emphasises that proof must be approached from the internal viewpoint of the factfinder distributing justice, and that the fact-finder is a moral agent who must justify, on a moral and rational basis, beliefs in reaching a judgment or verdict in relation to another human being. While civil cases demand impartiality when distributing caution between parties, criminal cases require a protective attitude and the highest of standards of proof. 89. For example, Blackstone said ‘for the law holds, that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer’: 4 Blackstone Commentaries, 1st ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1765–9, Ch 27, p 352

(). The full range of suggested quantifications is canvassed by Volokh, ‘n Guilty Men’ (1997) 146 U Penn LR 173. 90. Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 at 481. And even this standard and conventional appellate processes may not avoid conviction of the innocent: see Hamer, ‘Wrongful Convictions, Appeals, and the Finality Principle: The Need for a Criminal Cases Review Commission’ (2014) 37 UNSW LJ 270. 91. See Kaye, ‘Naked Statistical Evidence’ (1980) 89 Yale LJ 601 at 605; ‘The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation’ [1982] Am Bar Found Res J 487; and ‘The Error of Equal Error Rates’ (2002) 1 Law, Prob & Risk 3–8 where the author applies decision theory techniques to justify in utility terms (in most cases) a standard of over 0.5. See also Redmayne, ‘Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation’ (1998) 62 Mod L Rev 167 at 167–74; Hamer, ‘Probabilistic Standards of Proof, Their Complements and the Errors that Are Expected to Flow from Them’ [2004] UNE LJ 3. 92. Dworkin, ‘Principle, Policy, Procedure’ in Tapper (ed), Crime, Proof and Punishment: Essays in Memory of Sir Rupert Cross, Butterworths, Sydney, 1981, argues that parties only have a right to procedural fairness, but is silent on the question of whether courts strive for individual proof or long-term accuracy. However, as Dworkin’s rights theory depends upon a determination of individual proof it is arguably implicit that what is required is this search for truth, which remains as the unobtainable ideal. The extreme fact sceptic may argue that truth plays no part in the trial process and that the trial is a fairly conducted dialectic adjudged according to principles of coherence rather than truth: see Jackson, n 13 above. 93. Though, consider Tyler and Huo, Trust in the Law, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 2002; Tyler (ed), Procedural Justice, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005. 94. (1984) 37 SASR 31; discussed by Eggleston, ‘Focusing on the Defendant’ (1987) 61 Aust LJ 58, and followed in Payne v Crawford (1992) 3 Tas R 360. Scepticism of statistical probabilities can also be found in those cases where plaintiffs have sought to establish causation by relying upon epidemiological evidence. In Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 at [122], [123], [130], Spigelman CJ emphasises that epidemiological evidence can only create a statistical possibility and that causation can only be established by considering it in relation to other relevant evidence relating to the cause of the particular plaintiff’s injury. See also Amaca Pty Ltd (formerly James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd) v Hannell [2007] WASCA 158; Cowan v Bunnings Group Ltd [2014] QSC 301 at [38] (Alan Wilson J). See Faigman, Monahan and Slobogin, ‘Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony’ (2014) 81 U Chicago LR 417. 95. SGIC v Laube (1984) 37 SASR 31 at 33. 96. (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361–2. 97. The subsequent emphasis upon Dixon J’s use of the terms ‘persuasion’ (see, for example, Spigelman CJ in Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 at [136]) and ‘belief’ (see, for example, Murphy J in TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks (1979) 23 ALR 345 at 352–3) distracts from this fundamental point. Proof is not a simple matter of belief and persuasion but of ‘reasonable satisfaction’ following a reasonable search for the truth about the individual event in question. For further discussion of the civil standard, see 2.59–2.67. 98. Ho, n 15 above. 99. Cohen, n 39 above, Pt II. 100. Although, (parts of) mass tort and class action litigation may more closely resemble probabilistic approaches. See Cranor, Toxic Torts, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006; Jasanoff, ‘Science and the Statistical Victim’ (2002) 32 Social Studies of Science 37; Edmond and Mercer, ‘Litigation Life’ (2000) 30 Social Studies of Science 265. For the less probabilistic approach taken by Australian courts to

similar claims taken by individuals, see the decisions referred to in n 105 below. 101. Some argue that such idealised (and philosophically oriented) models of science bear little resemblance to actual scientific practice: see, for example, Yearley, Making Sense of Science, Sage, London, 2005; Sismondo, An Introduction to Science and Technology Studies, Blackwell, Malden, MA, 2005; Collins, Gravity’s Shadow, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 2004; Jasanoff et al (eds), Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 1995; Latour, Science in Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987. 102. Cohen, n 39 above, Pt III. 103. (1979) 23 ALR 345. 104. (1984) 37 SASR 31, discussed at 1.38. 105. Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 at [122], [123], [130] (Spigelman CJ); Amaca Pty Ltd (formerly James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd) v Hannell [2007] WASCA 158; Cowan v Bunnings Group Ltd [2014] QSC 301. 106. See, for example, R v Dennis Adams [1996] 2 Cr App R 467; R v Doheny and Adams [1997] 1 Cr App R 369; R v Dennis Adams (No 2) [1998] 1 Cr App R 377; R v Karger (2002) 83 SASR 135; Riley v Western Australia (2005) 30 WAR 525 at [30] (Steytler P). And see Evett et al, n 45 above; Hodgson, n 60 above. 107. The debate was led by Cohen, n 39 above; and Eggleston, n 50 above, their views producing repercussion in both English and American journals: Williams, ‘The Mathematics of Proof’ [1979] Crim LR 279 at 340; Cohen, ‘The Logic of Proof’ [1980] Crim LR 91; Williams, ‘A Short Rejoinder’ [1980] Crim LR 103; Cohen, ‘Letter’ [1980] Crim LR 257; Eggleston, ‘The Probability Debate’ [1980] Crim LR 678; Schum, n 46 above; Kaye, ‘The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories’ [1979] Ariz State LJ 101; Cohen, n 46 above; ‘Paradoxes, Gadanken Experiments and the Burden of Proof: A Response to Dr Cohen’s Reply’ [1981] Ariz St LJ 635. Two symposia on the application of probabilistic analysis in courts are reported in (1986) 66 Boston ULR Pts 3 and 4; and (1991) 13 Cardozo LR Pts 2 and 3. Cohen’s views find support in Stein, n 61 above, Pt V: ‘On the Unbearable Lightness of Weight’; Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law, n 72 above, particularly Ch 5. 108. For example, Finkelstein and Fairley, n 50 above. 109. Tribe, n 50 above. 110. Pennington and Hastie, ‘Juror Decision-Making Models: The Generalisation Gap’ (1981) 89 Psych Bull 246, 251; ‘Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making’ (1986) 51 J Personality and Soc Psychology 242, 244; Bennett and Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ, 1984; Wagenaar, van Koppen and Crombag, Anchored Narratives: The Psychology of Criminal Evidence, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1993. 111. Allen, ‘The Nature of Juridical Proof’ (1991) 13 Cardozo LR 373; ‘Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence’ (1994) 88 Northwestern ULR 604. See also Hodgson, n 60 above. 112. Pardo and Allen, ‘Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation’ (2008) 27 Law & Philosophy 223. 113. Cognitive problems arise not only in triers being able to make the calculations required for a definitive mathematical analysis but in assessing the cognitive strength of testimony in mathematical terms at all. The importance of cognitive factors in assessing reliability is emphasised by Moore, ‘Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom’ (1989) 37 UCLA LR 273. 114. For an excellent analysis of what the ‘Bayesian v The Rest’ debate is all about, see Allen, ‘Rationality, Algorithms and Juridical Proof: A Preliminary Enquiry’ (1997) 1 E & P 254. 115. Pardo and Allen, n 112 above, at 261.

116. For example, in many cases it is the circumstances in which the DNA sample was found that raise doubts about the incriminating nature of the DNA match, rather than the statistical result itself. See, for example, Fitzgerald v R (2014) 88 ALJR 779; [2014] HCA 20 (reasonable hypothesis that matching DNA on didgeridoo deposited through direct or secondary transfer at a time other than the attack); R v S, G (2011) 109 SASR 491; [2011] SASCFC 48 (circumstances in which semen — the source of the DNA analysed — came to be on a sheet could not be established as incriminating beyond reasonable doubt); R v Forster [2016] QCA 62 (innocent hypothesis for blood could not be excluded). Fitzgerald distinguished in Sloan v R [2015] NSWCCA 279. 117. The argument that follows is developed in the following articles: Ligertwood, ‘Can DNA Alone Convict?’ (2011) 33 Syd LR 487; Ligertwood and Edmond, ‘Expressing Evaluative Forensic Science Opinions in a Court of Law’ (2012) 11 Law, Prob & Risk 289–302; Ligertwood, ‘Forensic Science Expressions and Legal Proof’ (2013) 45 Aust J Forensic Sci 263. 118. But cf the decision in Aytugrul v R (2012) 247 CLR 170; [2012] HCA 15, where the High Court refused to insist on a particular statistical expression compatible with the criminal standard. See further 2.70 and Ligertwood, ‘Forensic Science Expressions and Legal Proof’, n 117 above. 119. The importance of maximising information about the event in issue is advocated by Stein in formulation of a principle of ‘maximal individualized information’: Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law, n 72 above, pp 91–106. The exact nature of Stein’s principle is examined and criticised by Nance, ‘Allocating Risk of Error: Its Role in the Theory of Evidence Law’ (2007) 13 Legal Theory 129. 120. Proposals for expert adjudication have not proved particularly productive: see Kantrowitz, ‘Proposal for an Institution for Scientific Judgment’ (1967) 153 Science 763; Martin, ‘The Proposed Science Court’ (1977) 75 Mich LR 1058; Caspar and Wellstone, ‘Science Court on Trial in Minnesota’ in Barnes and Edge (eds), Science in Context, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1982, p 282. Nor are humans likely to entrust justice to processes governed by the artificial intelligence of a computer: Collins, Artificial Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990; Dreyfus, What Computers Can’t Do, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1972. 121. See generally Kinports, ‘Evidence Engendered’ [1991] U of Ill LR 423; Naffine and Owens (eds), Sexing the Subject of Law, Lawbook Co, Sydney, 1997; Childs and Ellison (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Evidence, Cavendish, London, 2000; Douglas et al (eds), Australian Feminist Judgments: Righting and Rewriting Law, Hart, Oxford, 2014. See further Park and Sacks, ‘Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered; Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn’ (2006) 47 Boston College LR 949 at 998–1008 and articles referred to therein. 122. See generally, for example, Henderson, ‘What Makes Rape a Crime?’ (1985) 3 Berkeley Women’s LJ 193; Conaghan and Russell, ‘Rape Myths, Law, and Feminist Research: “Myths About Myths”?’ (2014) 22 Fem Legal Stud 25; Cossins, ‘Expert Witness Evidence in Sexual Assault Trials: Questions, Answers and Law Reform in Australia and England’ (2013) 17 Evid & Proof 74. 123. Powerfully argued by Nicholson, n 17 above. For the extreme version of the judicial discourse, see Jackson, n 13 above. 124. See, for example, Chapter 7, n 343 referring to literature critical of the cognitive biases of forensic experts. 125. See, for example, the responses from trial and appellate judges in Scott v Harris 127 S Ct 1769 (2009), discussed in Feigenson and Spiesel, Law on Display: The Digital Transformation of Legal Persuasion and Judgment, New York University Press, New York, 2009, Ch 2. More generally, see Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995. 126. Cohen, ‘Freedom of Proof’ (1983) 16 Archiv für Rights und Socialphilosophie 1, paper delivered to the 9th Annual Conference (2–4 April 1982) of the Association for Legal and Social Philosophy (this freedom to evaluate evidence must be distinguished from the freedom to receive all relevant evidence). Some

experimental psychologists have claimed that intuitions cannot be relied upon as rational (but who are they to so conclude?): Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (eds), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge University Press, London, 1982; Cohen (and commentators), ‘Can Human Irrationality be Experimentally Demonstrated?’, n 62 above. 127. Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law, n 72 above, argues that all evidential rules can find their justification in seeking to allocate the risks of error. 128. Dennis, n 17 above, at [2.022]–[2.029] develops a wider theory of legitimacy, although always recognising the importance of the notion of factual rectitude. See also Tyler, Trust in the Law, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 2002. 129. See, for example, the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), which requires all legislation and legal decisions to accord with the European Convention on Human Rights. In Australia, human rights are embodied in legislation in Victoria (Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006) and the Australian Capital Territory (Human Rights Act 2004) permitting courts to declare, but not strike down, legislation incompatible with these rights. The provisions of most relevance to evidential decisions are those enacting the presumption of innocence (see 6.14) and an accused’s right to a fair trial, ensuring for example that an accused may challenge incriminatory evidence presented by the prosecution. See generally Gans, ‘Evidence Law Under Victoria’s Charter: Rights and Goals — Part 1’ (2008) 19 PLR 197 and Gans et al, Criminal Process and Human Rights, Federation Press, Sydney, 2011. 130. Cf comment of Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law, n 72 above, p 33, that if fact-finders were infallible, there would be no room for ‘evidential rights that are valuable intrinsically, rather than instrumentally’. 131. See Gans, ‘Evidence Law Under Victoria’s Charter: Rights and Goals — Part 1’ (2008) 19 PLR 197 at 198–203. 132. Compare with the conclusions reached by Park and Sacks, n 121 above. 133. See, for example, Cairns, Advocacy and the Making of the Adversarial Criminal Trial 1800–1865, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998; Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003; Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2008. 134. See 6.76–6.77. 135. See Chapter 7, ‘Opinion Evidence’, particularly at 7.43ff. 136. See generally Vidmar (ed), World Jury Systems, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000. 137. See, for example, Eggleston, ‘What is Wrong with the Adversary System?’ (1975) 49 Aust LJ 428; Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Trouble with the Adversary System’ (1996) 38 William & Mary LR 5; Davies, ‘Fairness in a Predominantly Adversarial System’ in Stacey and Lavarch (eds), Beyond the Adversarial System, Federation Press, Sydney, 1999, Ch 7; Managing Civil Justice, ALRC Report 89 (2002), at [1.111]–[1.134], [1.47]ff and [3.30]–[3.41]. 138. That the law of evidence can be regarded as an instrument of government is emphasised by Allen, ‘Reforming the Law of Evidence (Part Three): The Foundations of the Law of Evidence and Their Implications for Developing Countries’ (2015) 33 Boston U Int’l LJ 283 at 287–9. 139. Compare with the approach taken by Zuckerman, Principles of Criminal Evidence, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989. See also Dennis, n 17 above, at [2.022]–[2.029]. 140. Lee v R (2014) 253 CLR 455; [2014] HCA 20 (prosecution acquiring unauthorised access to accused’s evidence obtained through compulsion by the NSW Crimes Commission while a suspect undermined prosecution’s fundamental obligation to prove guilt without assistance from the accused). 141. X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92; [2013] HCA 29 (majority applied principle to read down legislation relied upon to permit examination of a person already charged); Lee v New South

Wales Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196; [2013] HCA 39 (principle applied to interpret legislation as permitting examination); R v OC [2015] NSWCCA 212; R v Independent Broad Based Corruption Commission (2016) 256 CLR 459; [2016] HCA 8 (principle applied to permit prosecution access to the compulsory examination of a suspect); Maughan v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 128 at [65] Martin CJ (legality principle did not affect provisions permitting examination of suspect nor provisions allowing access by prosecutor once suspect charged. Cf R v OC). See further at 5.183. In The Application of the Attorney General for New South Wales dated 4 April 2014 [2014] NSWSC 251, the ‘principle of legality’ was used to read down legislation protecting confidential child welfare reports to ensure accused had access to evidence assisting his defence. 142. X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92; [2013] HCA 29; Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196; [2013] HCA 39; R v Independent Broad Based Corruption Commission (2016) 256 CLR 459; [2016] HCA 8. 143. At its simplest level, the prosecution will focus upon investigating that evidence consistent with establishing the accused’s guilt, not that supporting a contrary hypothesis. This will be particularly pronounced during interrogation of a suspect: McConville, Sanders and Leng, The Case for the Prosecution, Routledge, London/New York, 1991, pp 12, 65ff. 144. For a detailed treatment of these topics, see LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, Ch 3 and Ch 20, s 3.

[page 59]

Chapter Two

The Trial Process The Process in Outline Sources of process 2.1 Given the procedural emphasis accorded the rules of evidence in this work, an appreciation of the overall trial process is a necessary background to an understanding of particular evidentiary rules. Process in all Australian courts is dominated by those common law adversary principles outlined in Chapter 1: the principles of free disposition, of party presentation, prosecution and comment, and of oral presentation of evidence. These principles are subject to modification by practical considerations of costefficiency. The precise procedural rules (including evidential rules) applicable in any particular Australian court are determined by an admixture of common law rules, legislation (there are Evidence Acts in every Australian jurisdiction) and rules of court (every court has its own rules). But in broad outline the procedures in the various Australian courts are based upon common law adversarial notions and are remarkably similar. 2.2 This conclusion remains true even where the uniform evidence legislation enacted by the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Tasmania, Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory applies.1 That legislation, based on the recommendations of the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) in its 38th

[page 60] Report,2 applies to ‘proceedings’3 in designated courts.4 The legislation follows the court rather than the jurisdiction being exercised.5 The courts designated by s 4 are, in the Commonwealth Act, a ‘federal court’6 (excluding the Supreme Court of a territory and not extending to a state court exercising federal jurisdiction) and, in the other Acts, respectively, a ‘NSW court’, a ‘Tasmanian court’, a ‘Victorian court’, an ‘ACT court’ and ‘a Territory Court’, defined restrictively to include either the High Court or a Supreme Court and ‘any other court created by Parliament’, but more broadly to include ‘any person or body (other than a court) that, in exercising a function under the law … is required to apply the laws of evidence’.7 Some of the provisions in the Commonwealth Act, provisions concerning evidence of federal-related matters, apply in all Australian courts.8 [page 61] 2.3 The uniform legislation is comprehensive in scope but, as Einstein J explains in Idoport Pty Ltd v NAB,9 it does not even purport to be a complete code. Section 8 expressly provides that ‘the Act does not affect the operation of the provisions of any other Act’ and as the discussion in this book will show, there are many Acts beside the uniform legislation which govern matters evidential (for example, protections given to vulnerable witnesses and restricting cross-examination of sexual assault victims) and many other topics commonly categorised as evidential are not dealt with at all (for example, burdens of proof and presumptions, the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel, submissions of no case to answer). The lack of comprehensiveness is further recognised in s 9 as enacted in all the Uniform Acts except the Commonwealth Act, which provides that the Act: … does not affect the operation of a principle or rule of common law or equity in relation to evidence in a proceeding to which the Act applies, except so far as this Act provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment.

The uniform legislation does apparently expressly provide otherwise in s 12 (‘except as otherwise provided by this Act every person is competent to give evidence’) and also in s 56(1) (‘except as otherwise provided by this Act, evidence that

is relevant in a proceeding is admissible in a proceeding’). These sections appear effectively to codify these two areas of the law of evidence.10 Section 56(1) is particularly far-reaching in that it apparently codifies all rules of admissibility. However, even in these instances, because courts remain reluctant to interpret any legislation to abolish common law rules based upon fundamental principles, in the absence of clear legislative expression it may be argued that some common law rules continue to apply.11 But leaving aside sections and issues such as these, the rules of evidence as a whole are not codified by the uniform legislation. And although the Commonwealth Act does not expressly preserve rules of common law and equity, where the legislation is ambiguous or less than comprehensive, given the extent to which the Act is based upon common law notions it would seem perverse not to have regard to previous common law authority.12 [page 62] Most significantly, the uniform legislation remains firmly based upon factfinding within a common law party-controlled accusatorial/adversarial process.13 It is only in the context of this process that the principles behind the legislation, and how the legislation seeks to address the evidential problems produced by this process, can be understood. Hence, this work seeks to explain the legislation not in isolation but in the context of those common law procedural principles upon which it is based.

The ambit of process 2.4 ‘Process’ in this context refers to the formal steps taken in a civil action or a criminal prosecution. That process comprises two stages: pre-trial proceedings followed by trial. As rules of evidence are concerned with the proof of disputed facts, and it is at the trial that disputes of fact are normally formally resolved, our principal concern is procedure at trial (although it might be emphasised that in reality trials resolve only a tiny fraction of proceedings formally commenced). But pre-trial process has a crucial effect upon the factual issues alleged and disputed at trial and upon the evidence available to a party at trial to prove those issues. Therefore, an appreciation of what is involved in pre-trial process is important to an understanding of the overall operation and effect of evidentiary rules during trial.14

Where actions are brought by private citizens there are few formal processes to assist in the investigation and collection of evidence. But where it is the state that takes action (criminal and civil) to enforce laws, its investigators are often granted special powers to collect evidence. These powers can be seen as an integral part of the process whereby justice is administered. Although this work will not analyse these powers in detail it will show how these powers are shaped by the principles of process developed through the adversarial trial. Thus, for example, the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence, principles which are argued in Chapter 5 to be intrinsic to the modern adversarial trial, must also be respected during investigation, and evidence obtained in breach of these principles will not be received at trial.15 Again, where [page 63] evidence is obtained unlawfully or improperly, judges may forbid its tender at trial where this would compromise the integrity of the court’s administration of justice. Thus, evidential rules have their own influence upon the collection of evidence and seek to ensure that those principles fundamental to formal process are not undermined by what occurs before.

Pre-trial process 2.5 Adversarial process is party-driven. Proceedings commence by a party laying a criminal charge or stating a civil claim. Less serious criminal charges (when disputed) go more or less directly to trial. Disputed serious criminal charges are screened through an administrative committal process (traditionally oral but now in many jurisdictions in writing), which is held principally to determine whether the prosecution has sufficient evidence to put an accused on trial. The process is defined by separate legislation in every Australian jurisdiction.16 This committal process requires the prosecutor to disclose the evidence against an accused, and it has evolved to emphasise the need for full pretrial disclosure to enable the accused fairly to meet the case alleged at trial.17 2.6 Civil claims are processed before trial in a rather more sophisticated manner. Parties exchange pleadings to isolate issues between them, and procedures exist for disclosure of documents and other information prior to trial and for the making of admissions so that parties clarify and have notice of issues to

be tried. More recently, courts have involved themselves in these pre-trial manoeuvres, endeavouring to ensure they are more efficiently carried out and that as many proceedings as possible are settled without resort to expensive trial.18 Sophisticated processes of mediation now exist in all Australian jurisdictions and parties, if not compelled to attempt mediation, will at least be strongly encouraged, especially through costs penalties, to do so. The adversary process, by leaving proceedings in the control of parties until verdict or judgment, is peculiarly suited to encouraging the settlement of disputes through agreement.

Trial process 2.7 In other than serious criminal cases most trials are conducted by a judge sitting alone, without a jury. Furthermore, in many jurisdictions accused can now either choose or request that serious criminal cases be tried by judge alone rather than by [page 64] judge and jury.19 It is therefore somewhat ironic that so many of the rules of evidence (expressed to continue to apply in legislation permitting trial by judge alone) have their origins and justifications in the jury trial, and, as will be seen, to some extent explains why legislatures have modified the strictness of, and sometimes abolished altogether, common law evidential rules. Yet, as this book attempts to argue, the common law adversarial process of trial, which has also contributed to the evolution of evidential rules, remains influential, and is assumed by the drafters of the uniform evidence legislation. The criminal trial begins with the taking of a plea from the accused. In civil cases, the parties will have defined the ambit of their dispute before trial through their exchange of pleadings. The parties retain responsibility for adducing at trial evidence in proof of the material facts that remain in issue. The party bringing the charge or claim (the proponent) bears the burden of establishing, to the satisfaction of the court, the material facts in issue upon which that charge or claim depends. That party therefore ‘opens’, by outlining to the court the material facts in issue and the evidence to be adduced in proof of them:

The purpose of an opening is to bring to the attention of the trier of fact the matters which the party will prove, the evidence which will be led to prove these matters, the witnesses to be called, the issues in the trial and perhaps some matters of law. It is not appropriate for counsel to use the occasion to make what is in effect a closing address and an argument.20

[page 65] Having given this opening explanation the proponent adduces the supporting evidence, principally in the form of witnesses testifying to material or relevant facts experienced by them. These witnesses are questioned by the proponent (examination-in-chief), cross-examined by any other parties to the proceedings, and permission may be given to the proponent to remove any distortions or ambiguities consequential upon cross-examination through re-examination. Reference to relevant documents and other objects may be made through oral testimony and in appropriate cases these may be tendered to the court as evidence (they become exhibits). 2.8 At the close of the proponent’s case the opponent is called upon to answer. But the need to answer depends upon the proponent having produced sufficient allegations and evidence. The first trial option available to an opponent is to submit ‘no case to answer’. If this submission is successful the charge or claim will be brought to a premature and unsuccessful conclusion. This option of submitting ‘no case’ assumes that the proponent at the end of his or her case has completed calling all available evidence. It is an important aspect of the common law trial that a party, most significantly the proponent, calls all his or her evidence in one continuum and does not ‘split’ his or her case.21 Exceptional circumstances are required to justify a proponent ‘reopening’ a case after it is closed, more particularly, after other parties have gone into evidence22 or after reasons for judgment have been given.23 Such exceptional circumstances might arise [page 66] where the opponent has raised issues not reasonably foreseeable by the proponent,24 or which could not be fairly dealt with in advance of the

opponent’s case,25 or where fresh evidence has come to light following closure of the proponent’s case,26 or where formal, technical or non-contentious matters have been inadvertently overlooked.27 As exceptional circumstances depend upon detailed consideration of various factors relating to the case in hand the decision to reopen is said to lie within the discretion of the trial judge. The guiding principles are said to be ‘the interests of justice’.28 2.9 Considerations of practical efficiency are one reason for the rule against splitting, but in criminal cases there is the additional consideration of fairness that demands that an accused know in advance the evidence to be met.29 For this reason cross-examination of a defence witness may contravene the rule against splitting by the prosecution if it seeks to obtain evidence that should in fairness have been given [page 67] as part of the prosecution case-in-chief.30 In civil cases, where issues are clarified in advance through pleadings and much information is disclosed before trial, this consideration is of much less importance. But in civil cases, where cross-claims and specific defences are more common, there are many more situations where it will be unfair to ask proponents to anticipate issues, and it will be necessary to allow a proponent to split and call evidence by way of rebuttal.31 2.10 If the submission of no case to answer is not made or is rejected by the court, where the opponent wishes to call evidence by way of defence, the opponent may open and explain what answer will be made and evidence called,32 and then call all its relevant evidence. The defence evidence must also be called altogether, but this is much simpler because there will already be full knowledge of the issues and evidence of the proponent. Again, the defence evidence is principally testimonial, with the witnesses being examined in-chief by the defence, being available for cross-examination and, where appropriate, being reexamined. 2.11 The opponent having answered, the parties address the court and explain how their respective points of view can be maintained in the light of the evidence before the court. Particularly when the judge sits with a jury in a criminal case, there is thought to be some tactical advantage to the accused in addressing last on the evidence,33 but at common law, the prosecution addresses last whenever the

accused adduces evidence beyond his or her own testimony and the testimony of character witnesses.34 In addition, at common law, the practice is for the prosecution not to address at all where the accused is unrepresented. Legislation now governs the position in every jurisdiction with some legislation more or less preserving the common law but with most making it clear that the prosecution may address in every case but always granting the accused the tactical advantage of the final address, with the proviso in New South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory that the court [page 68] may give leave for the prosecution to reply to any facts asserted in the accused’s address that are not supported by evidence before the jury.35 In civil cases, the right of final address may be of less tactical import where the case is tried (as most often it is in Australian jurisdictions) before a judge alone, but the common law approach of only allowing the opponent who has adduced no evidence to address last is generally followed.36 2.12 When a jury sits, its role is to determine whether the material facts in issue have been proved to the requisite degree.37 The judge has the duty of orally38 directing the jury which material facts must be established to make out the proponent’s case and to what standard that case must be proved. This requires the judge to relate the law quite specifically to the evidence and arguments in the case in question.39 The judge [page 69] must sum up fairly on the evidence presented, put to the jury the respective cases of the parties, and ‘direct’ the jury about any legal limits on the use of tendered evidence.40 The judge may also ‘comment’41 in more detail upon the inferences sought and even express views about what conclusions appear appropriate, so long as the jury is directed that the final decisions of fact are for it alone and the overall summing-up is fair.42

The extent to which the judge should explain to the jury precisely how it should reason in a case is, given the uncertainty about the very nature of proof, controversial. The better view is that while a judge must direct the jury how it must not reason, it is preferable to leave the precise form of reasoning to the jury itself.43 But in some cases it may be necessary to isolate indispensable intermediate facts and direct that they be found beyond reasonable doubt.44 [page 70] Many other directions are required. For example, the judge must direct the jury to find the crime proved beyond reasonable doubt.45 And in certain situations where testimony may be unreliable judges may be obliged to warn the jury against acting on that testimony alone or at least warn of the possible unreliabilities: see further Chapter 4. But the propriety of jury instructions is in many cases less definitive and, for an accused to appeal successfully, it will have to be established that, having regard to the summing-up as a whole and the conduct of the case,46 a particular instruction or comment or failure to instruct or comment caused a miscarriage of justice.47 All jurisdictions have some form of formal or informal bench books to assist trial judges in properly instructing juries.48 2.13 Nevertheless, in many of these cases appeals are brought by convicted accused on the ground that the jury has been inadequately instructed about (or the judge sitting alone has inadequately taken into consideration) tendered evidence. Some items of evidence attract quite specific and almost formulaic direction, but the evidence as a whole and the course of the trial will in every case be different. There is always room for some argument. In Victoria, concerned about the confusing complexity and length of directions required at common law in criminal trials, and the consequent prolixity of appeals, the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) (replacing the previous 2013 Act) seeks to clarify and simplify the directions required. Sections 1 and 5 express the guiding purposes and principles underlying the legislation. Reform is made not only in relation to directions required generally but also for particular types of evidence (Pt 4),49 in trials for sexual offences and family violence (Pts 5 and 6), and in explanation of the criminal standard of proof (Pt 7). Part 8 seeks to ensure that the summing-up focuses on the decisive issues and evidence in the case. An

important thrust of these reforms is to transfer the primary obligation with respect to directions to counsel: see Pt 3. At the close of evidence and before the prosecutor’s closing address counsel must [page 71] identify the matters in issue and request any specific directions sought in respect of particular evidence. Other than directions required to be given under legislation, the directions requested must be given unless the judge considers there are good reasons not to or it is otherwise not in the interests of justice to so direct: s 14. No further directions may be given unless the judge is of the opinion that there are ‘substantial and compelling reasons’ for doing so: s 16. The overall effect of the reforms is intended to ensure that obligatory directions are reduced and simplified and that the summing-up canvasses the real issues of law and fact in the case, thereby not only reducing avenues for appeal but also increasing the understanding of the jury. Judicial instructions to a jury, and whether they can be classified as ‘directions’ or ‘comments’, are a crucially important practical part of evidence law. Indeed, it may be an error for a trial judge when summing up to the jury to refer to a ‘direction’ required by legislation as a mere ‘comment’, suggesting the jury may in its discretion disregard it.50 How effective these instructions are is another matter.51 Such psychological research as has been done suggests they are of limited effect.52 Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated throughout this book, their effectiveness is a crucial and basic assumption to the fairness of the common law accusatorial trial by jury.53 [page 72] Following addresses from the parties and any summing-up, judgment or verdict is given.54

Appeal Following verdict

2.14 From this judgment or verdict a party may appeal. At common law, the verdict of the jury was effectively inviolable and such rights of appeal that now exist are contained in legislation based on the Criminal Appeals Act 1907 (UK).55 In criminal trials for indictable offences tried by jury, a convicted accused may appeal on the grounds that there has been any wrong decision of any question of law (substantive or procedural), for example, the incorrect reception or ‘direction’ about the use of evidence; or that otherwise there was a miscarriage of justice,56 for example, resulting from a judge’s ‘comments’; or that the jury’s verdict is unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence.57 In both criminal and civil cases appellate courts are reluctant to interfere with decisions of fact reached by a trial court by determining a verdict unreasonable or against the weight of evidence.58 However, in civil cases where [page 73] appeals are generally by way of rehearing, appellate judges are required to conduct a thorough examination of the record, which may entail interfering with a trial judge’s decisions on credibility.59 In criminal trials for indictable offences tried by jury even where these grounds are made out by an accused, the legislation allows the appeal to be dismissed if the appellate court ‘considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred’ (generally referred to as ‘the proviso’). While past authority had suggested this requires the appellate court to determine whether in the absence of the irregularity the jury would inevitably have convicted, in Weiss v R60 it was held that the proviso requires [page 74] the court to determine whether ‘a substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred’, and that this requires the court to examine the record and determine for itself whether on the evidence properly before the court the case was nevertheless proved beyond reasonable doubt.61 However, where procedural error is fundamental it may itself constitute a substantial miscarriage of justice that negates application of the proviso.62

Where, following the above appellate processes, an accused maintains his or her innocence, clemency can still be sought from the government, and legislation in most jurisdictions permits the Attorney-General to initiate inquiry or further reference to the courts.63 More recently, legislation in New South Wales, South Australia and Tasmania permits application by the accused to the court seeking further remedy, including retrial and quashing of the conviction, where further evidence has come to light.64 [page 75] The inability of the Crown to appeal against an acquittal is a fundamental principle of the criminal law that can only be removed by clear legislative intent.65 Generally, legislation does not seek to interfere with this principle, although in some jurisdictions appeals are allowed where a jury has acquitted on the direction of the trial judge, and, with leave, where the acquittal was in a trial by judge alone.66 However, legislation in all jurisdictions permits the prosecution to refer a question of law to an appellate court without the jury’s acquittal being put at risk.67 By this process the accused is given protection against ‘double jeopardy’. More radically the principles of ‘double jeopardy’ have been modified by legislation in a number of jurisdictions permitting retrial where serious criminal accusations have resulted in acquittal and fresh and compelling incriminating evidence has come to light.68 Appeals against acquittal by courts of summary jurisdiction are allowed generally in some jurisdictions but not others.69 Where such appeals are permitted, double jeopardy principles may still influence appellate courts when deciding whether to give leave to appeal and whether to interfere with the verdict of acquittal.70 [page 76]

Interlocutory appeals in criminal cases 2.15 Appellate courts are reluctant to hear appeals against rulings made during a criminal trial unless they involve decisions of law decisive of the disposition of the case. One avenue for interim appeal is through the limited process of the trial judge stating a case on a point of law.71 In Queensland, interlocutory appeals

from pre-trial rulings (including rulings on admissibility of evidence) are not allowed but may be considered on appeal against conviction: Criminal Code s 590AA(4). In other jurisdictions interlocutory appeals are allowed only with leave.72 In these ways interlocutory appeals in other than exceptional cases are discouraged. Legislation in New South Wales73 and Victoria74 more specifically provides for interim appeal. In New South Wales, appeal is allowed by a party against an ‘interlocutory judgment or order’, but this has been held not to include rulings on the admissibility of evidence. A party, other than the prosecutor, must get leave or have the trial judge certify appeal is appropriate. In addition, the prosecution may appeal ‘against any decision or ruling on the admissibility of evidence’ which ‘eliminates or substantially weakens the prosecution case’.75 In Victoria, all parties can appeal against an ‘interlocutory decision’ but appeals against interlocutory decisions concerning the admissibility of evidence are more strictly controlled; a party may not appeal unless the trial judge has certified that ‘the evidence, if ruled inadmissible, would eliminate or substantially weaken the prosecution case’; and in the case of all appeals leave is required, having regard to ‘the interests of justice’.76 However, leave must not be given after the [page 77] trial has begun ‘unless the reasons for doing so clearly outweigh any disruption to the trial’. Once leave is given, the interlocutory decision can be reviewed but even then, if it is in the nature of an exercise of discretion by the trial judge (as is the case with many evidential decisions), appellate courts will not interfere unless it can be shown that the trial judge failed to take into account a relevant consideration or took into account an impermissible consideration.77 Thus even in these jurisdictions interim appeal is discouraged. Nevertheless, an interlocutory appeal provides an avenue for the prosecution to have an admissibility ruling overturned which otherwise may have led to an acquittal against which the prosecutor could not appeal.78

The Essential Tasks of the Trial Court 2.16 As the above outline shows, the essential tasks of the trial court are

threefold. First, it must determine which evidence presented by the parties it can properly consider; secondly, it must decide whether the proponent has adduced sufficient evidence to require the opponent to answer; and thirdly, it must determine whether the evidence received establishes or proves the material facts in issue. The first two tasks may be described as decisions of law, in that they are the exclusive province of the judge. The third is a decision of fact, in that the requisite standard of proof having been stipulated, it is the province of the jury, if there is one, to decide whether the material facts in issue are proved. But in essence each of these decisions is a decision of fact, in the sense that, as the following discussion will show, the natural rules of fact discovery ultimately determine for what purposes evidence may be received, whether a case to answer is made out, or whether material facts in issue are proved to the requisite degree. However, at various stages and for various reasons, the law intervenes to explain, modify or exclude these natural rules. These legal interventions are the province of the law of evidence and while some of these interventions are made to ensure that the natural rules are properly applied, others are made to ensure that the natural rules are applied through the process of the common law adversary trial. Exceptionally these natural rules are modified or put aside to promote policies extraneous to the procedural process. This chapter seeks to explain the relationship between the natural and legal rules during the trial. It will conclude that legal rules operate principally to restrict the reception and use of evidence and that the law provides little guidance upon the two other essential tasks of the trial court mentioned above. [page 78]

The reception of evidence Two fundamental principles 2.17 It was Thayer who insisted that the law of evidence is based upon two fundamental conceptions. The first forbids a court to consider evidence which is not, by virtue of the natural rules of fact discovery, probative of the material facts in issue; that is, it ‘forbids receiving anything irrelevant’. The second directs that

‘unless excluded by some rule or principle of law, all that is logically probative of the material facts in issue is admissible’.79 These conceptions are enacted (their order reversed) in s 56 of the uniform legislation: (1) Except as otherwise provided by this Act, evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is admissible in the proceeding. (2) Evidence that is not relevant in the proceeding is not admissible.

Thayer pointed out that the general receipt of what is logically probative is not, like his first principle of relevance, a necessary presupposition in a rational system of evidence, but he saw it as fundamental to the common law’s commitment to judgment based upon factual rectitude. For, as was argued in Chapter 1, factual rectitude is most likely to be achieved through maximising relevant information. Consequently, it can be argued that all relevant evidence should be received by a court.80 Thayer’s fundamental conceptions have never been seriously contested, and they produce the essential division between the application of natural and legal rules at the information-reception stage of the trial. The court must first apply natural rules to conclude the evidence relevant, and, secondly, apply any legal rules that make the evidence inadmissible (either generally or for a particular purpose). Only if relevant and admissible can evidence be received (the notions of admissibility and reception are not distinguished in the uniform legislation). By virtue of s 56(1) of the Uniform Acts, the only exceptions to the presumption that relevant evidence is admissible are arguably those which arise under the Act (not by common law). Thus, the exclusionary evidential rules appear to have been codified.81 [page 79]

The nature of relevance 2.18 Relevance describes the relationship between the evidence presented and the facts upon which the charge or claim depends (the material facts in issue). Evidence is relevant when it can be regarded as capable of affecting, directly or indirectly, the probability of the occurrence (or non-occurrence) or existence (or non-existence) of one or more of the material facts in issue. If that probability is

conceptualised mathematically on a scale of 0 to 1, information capable of affecting that probability, however marginally, may be described as relevant. It is this notion that appears to be enacted in the uniform legislation, s 55 providing: (1) The evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is evidence that, if it were accepted, could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding. (2) In particular, evidence is not taken to be irrelevant because it relates only to: (a)

the credibility of a witness; or

(b) the admissibility of other evidence; or (c) a failure to adduce evidence.

At this stage of the trial, where the relevance of tendered evidence is being determined, no question of proof arises, although it can be immediately appreciated that the concepts of relevance and proof are aspects of the same probability reasoning. But while proof requires the probability of the occurrence or existence of the material facts to be determined to a specified degree, relevance requires only that that probability be capable of being affected to any degree. Relevance is not concerned with the value or weight of evidence. Hence, under s 55, evidence is relevant where ‘if it were accepted’ it ‘could rationally’ be given more or less probative value or weight in assessing ‘the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding’. These words emphasise that what rational probative value or weight it is ultimately given is a matter for the trier of fact. The words ‘could rationally affect’ emphasise that evidence incapable of achieving any rational effect is necessarily irrelevant. If the evidence is irredeemably equivocal it may be regarded as irrelevant.82 Furthermore, the majority (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) in IMM v R,83 emphasise that although the words ‘if it were accepted’ mean that the judge in determining the relevance of testimony must generally assume its credibility and reliability, this is not the case where it is ‘so inherently incredible, fanciful or preposterous that it could not be accepted by [page 80] a rational jury. In such a case its effect on the probability of the existence of a fact in issue would be nil and it would not meet the criterion of relevance’. 2.19 As a relationship, relevance must be approached by first defining precisely

the subjects of that relationship: the evidence presented and the facts in issue upon which the claim depends. The former is generally the testimony of witnesses and perhaps it is for this reason that the words ‘if it were accepted’ are included in s 55, to emphasise the general common law principle that, in other than extreme cases where no rational person could accept the testimony, it is the trier of fact, not the judge in determining relevance, that must decide whether to accept the testimony and the reliability of assertions of observed fact in it.84 The latter, the material facts in issue, derive from the rule (or rules) of substantive law said to give rise to remedy in the matter before the court, and are particularised as the facts alleged to satisfy that rule.85 Once the material facts in issue have been defined, evidence can be tested against them for relevance. The evidence may be relevant for one or more reasons. It may be relevant directly or indirectly (for example, as recognised in s 55(2) quoted above, via the credibility of a witness), and may only be relevant in combination with other evidence to be put before the court.86 In all cases it is a relationship that is ultimately in question, a relationship that can only be determined by careful and precise analysis of natural rules of probability.

Relevance and admissibility 2.20 Some courts and commentators argue that relevance has or should have a legal meaning and cannot be left to the province of natural rules. This legal meaning has been asserted in a variety of ways. [page 81] First, some argue that the law should itself stipulate what it understands to be the natural rules of relevance, and thereby those rules become rules of law. Wills,87 for example, defined relevance not as a relationship but in terms of constituent facts of the transaction in issue, its subordinate incidents and such further facts as may be necessary to identify or explain them. But this definition raises a host of problems. By what yardstick is ‘the transaction’ defined? When does a ‘transaction’ begin and end? When is an incident ‘subordinate’ to a ‘transaction’? In one area of evidence law this approach has been accorded significance — in the development of the so-called inclusionary res gestae rule. It will be contended

that the phrase ‘res gestae’ has only produced confusion and should be used only to describe a limited common law exception to the hearsay rule rather than a ‘rule’ of relevance: see 8.72. Generally, courts have not attempted to interfere with the natural rules by stipulating a particular interpretation of them. However, some judges have sought to influence these natural rules through force of precedent, arguing with Cushing CJ in State v La Page that:88 … instances in which the evidence of particular facts as bearing on particular issues has been so often the subject of discussion in courts of law, and so often ruled upon, that the united logic of a great many judges and lawyers may be said to furnish evidence of the sense common to a great many individuals and therefore the best evidence of what one may call common sense, and then to acquire the authority of law.

This approach is fraught with danger. Only in precisely identical cases can such precedent be followed. The factual issue, the information presented, and the current state of knowledge about such issues must be exactly the same, and this identity of factors occurs so seldom in practice that to urge such a concept of legal relevance is to urge the risk that precedent will be slavishly followed in disregard of subtle, yet crucial, distinctions between fact situations. For these reasons courts generally expressly assume that they are not bound by decisions of fact.89 [page 82] 2.21 Secondly, it has been argued that courts are bound to interfere with the natural meaning of relevance, that of necessity they must stipulate the strength of the relationship required between evidence and material facts in issue before the evidence can be described as relevant. Natural rules require consideration of all evidence that may affect the probability of material facts in issue, however slightly, but practical demands for efficient judicial proceedings require courts to impose some threshold of sufficiency.90 Thus, some courts have insisted that evidence be capable of rendering material facts in issue ‘more probable than not’,91 others that it be ‘sufficiently relevant’92 or reach a significance that makes it ‘worth considering’93 or is ‘unequivocal’.94 The balance of probabilities test, as a standard of proof, clearly goes too far, but on the other hand, there can be little doubt that general considerations of efficiency, time and cost justify the imposition of a minimal standard of sufficiency.95

2.22 Whether these considerations should be embraced within the terminology of relevance is another matter. To do so gives relevance an additional legal content of sufficiency. Natural notions, while they may determine relevance, cannot of themselves determine sufficient relevance, for sufficiency will depend upon what significance the law gives to matters of efficiency, time and cost. To keep distinct these considerations, it is argued that they be embraced not within the notion of relevance but within the quite separate notion of admissibility. This matter has long been the subject of debate in America. Wigmore favoured a notion of relevance embodying a requirement of sufficiency to offset notions of efficiency, time, cost and prejudice.96 Other commentators favour a strictly natural notion of relevance together with a so-called discretion, embraced within the notion of admissibility, within which extraneous matters may be considered and balanced.97 The advantage of the latter view is that it seeks to distinguish as clearly as possible natural and legal notions, and for this reason it is preferred. [page 83] Some courts and commentators go further and expressly interpret the term ‘relevance’ to embrace sufficiency demanded by more specific reasons of policy.98 For example, in criminal cases evidence tending to reveal the accused’s previous disposition, being regarded as unduly prejudicial, cannot be considered unless so probative that any prejudicial effect is thereby offset, and Lord Hoffman has argued that this process is embraced within the very notion of relevance.99 Sir James Stephen went even further and argued that all policies modifying the natural canons of probability reasoning can be embraced within a legal concept of relevance.100 It is doubtful whether such views help us understand the notion of relevance with any clarity. It is contended that whether particular policy reasons demand a higher degree of sufficiency, forbid the use of a particular chain of reasoning, or exclude information ipso facto, their importance is best emphasised by employing the separate terminology of admissibility in cases where these reasons are decisive. This also ensures that the onus is on the party seeking to have relevant evidence excluded. 2.23 It is this approach that appears to be taken by s 55(1) of the Uniform

Acts. All evidence capable of rationally affecting the probability of a fact in issue to some degree is relevant. To what extent the evidence rationally affects the probability of the fact in issue is a matter for the trier of fact. In determining relevance, probative value or weight is cast aside. No policy issues intrude to demand any particular degree of probative weight. Relevance is a purely natural notion. All such relevant evidence is then admitted by s 56(1) ‘except as otherwise provided by this Act’.101 When the Act provides otherwise, it imposes limitations upon the admissibility of evidence for policy reasons. In addition to there being definitive rules of exclusion, less definitive discretionary and mandatory exclusions take account of demands for further sufficiency or weight on more general policy grounds: ss 135–137; and see 2.26–2.37. Thus, the Act clearly distinguishes between factual and policy questions. All relevant evidence is presumptively admissible. It is this interpretation of the legislation that is forcefully put by McHugh J in Papakosmas v R.102 [page 84] Yet in Smith v R,103 a majority of the High Court read down the concept of relevance contained in s 55. Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ were of the view that, in a case which turned upon the identification of the accused as the culprit caught on film by a security camera, testimony from two police officers, whose acquaintance with the accused was not much greater than that of the jury, that the accused was that culprit, was inadmissible because irrelevant.104 Given that the jury could make its own comparison, the majority held: Because the witness’s assertion of identity was founded on material no different from the material available to the jury from its own observation, the witness’s assertion that he recognised the appellant is not evidence that could rationally affect the assessment by the jury of the question we have identified.105

On a literal interpretation of s 55 this is doubtful. This was ‘evidence that, if it were accepted, could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding’. Even on the majority’s wider view of relevance their conclusion is doubtful. No matter how short the police officers’ acquaintance with the accused compared with that of the jury, the fact that they were also prepared to say that the accused was the person depicted in the photograph must, if accepted, rationally affect the jury’s assessment that this was so.

In contrast, Kirby J held the testimony relevant but inadmissible because it was in the form of an opinion excluded under s 76 and not exceptionally admissible under s 79 as not based upon ‘specialised knowledge’.106 What the majority in Smith seems to have done is to include a notion of sufficiency into s 55(1) by interpreting the words ‘could rationally affect’ to mean that the evidence be ‘reasonably capable’ of adding to a jury’s probability assessment.107 Gummow and [page 85] Hayne JJ in Evans v R108 take the same approach in holding that having the accused don balaclava, overalls and sunglasses to compare him with a security video of the culprit similarly dressed was irrelevant as it ‘revealed nothing about the wearer and nothing about the appellant that was not already apparent to the jury observing him in the dock’.109 The more extreme consequence of such an approach can be seen in the earlier case of Papakosmas v R,110 where it is suggested that there will be circumstances where a complaint of assault will be irrelevant hearsay evidence of that assault because it could not rationally affect the assessment of whether the complainant was assaulted. But as McHugh J says in the same case:111 Section 55 is itself a decisive answer … The words ‘if it were accepted’ … make it clear that a court assess ‘the probability of the existence of a fact in issue’ on the assumption that the evidence is reliable … The [Australian Law Reform] Commission thought that, as a threshold test, relevance should require only a logical connection between evidence and a fact in issue. To the extent that other policies … required the strict logic of the relevance rule to be modified, that could best be done by the exclusionary rules … and by conferring discretions upon the court … ‘By this approach relevant evidence is presumptively admitted with the onus then upon the party seeking exclusion’.

2.24 It may also be asserted that relevance has a legal meaning by virtue not of the relationship between the evidence produced and the fact sought to be proved, but by virtue of the nature of that latter fact itself. Only those facts constituting the basis for legal recovery (the material facts in issue) can be proved in a court of law, and where evidence is relevant to an alleged fact, but that fact is neither a material fact in issue nor itself relevant to a material fact in issue, sometimes that evidence is described as irrelevant. Where the term ‘relevance’ is employed in this way it can be argued that these legal reasons are better embraced within a concept

of materiality, evidence probative of an alleged fact that is itself neither a material fact in issue nor relevant to a material fact in issue, being described as immaterial. However, materiality is a notion more traditionally associated not with the nature of tendered evidence, but with the nature of the facts sought ultimately to be proved by that evidence. It is more conducive to clarity to maintain this use by describing evidence as [page 86] relevant whenever probative of facts sought to be proved by it, and where these facts do not comprise the material facts in issue nor are relevant to them, to describe those facts as immaterial. The legal considerations of materiality are thus clearly divorced from the notion of relevance while preserving their central importance in the process of proof. The uniform legislation simply demands in s 55(1) that evidence be relevant to ‘the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding’.112 2.25 Montrose has shown that courts often use the terminology of relevance to embrace legal notions, thereby confusing natural and legal notions.113 His conclusion is that information should be ‘received’ only where ‘relevant’, ‘material’ and ‘admissible’; ‘relevance’ embracing purely natural notions and ‘materiality’ and ‘admissibility’ embracing legal notions. There is much to be said for this precise terminology. Although the Uniform Acts do not use the terminology of ‘materiality’ or ‘reception’, as discussed at 2.23 above, their use of ‘relevance’ is basically that advocated by Montrose.114 Even if relevance is regarded as an entirely natural notion, given the difficulty (discussed in Chapter 1) of explaining the natural concepts of relevance and proof, problems inevitably remain in determining whether evidence is relevant. Questions of relevance are specific to the precise facts and circumstances of any case.115 The precise facts in issue, the precise evidence presented and the background knowledge and experience of the judge will be crucial of the determination. And, even if regarded as relevant and not excluded by any specific rule of admissibility, problems will remain in determining whether that relevant evidence should nevertheless be excluded under the residuary discretions.116 Again, discretionary considerations are always specific to the circumstances and

dynamics of the individual case. It is these elusive considerations of relevance and discretion that are fundamental to the everyday decisions made by a trial judge in determining the reception of tendered evidence. [page 87]

Discretion Nature and function at trial 2.26 Discretion appears to play a large role in the administration of the rules of admissibility in both civil and criminal cases.117 But care must be taken in using the terminology of discretion. Discretion literally suggests that a choice might be exercised in any way; by tossing a coin or throwing a dice, for example.118 But only a strict positivist could suggest that judges in applying rules of admissibility have this sort of choice. Rather, the notion of discretion embodies the idea that many decisions of admissibility are difficult decisions dependent upon a myriad of factors, some better appreciated by trial judges on the spot than appellate judges removed from the fray, and that it is conducive to better decision-making to recognise these difficulties by the express isolation of such a notion. This is not to say that judges have a free choice. Every discretion must be exercised to ensure that decisions of fact are reached in accordance with those principles upon which our procedural system depends. But isolating the notion ensures that judges do not attempt to mechanically apply rules which of their very nature defy mechanical application. Because appellate courts will not interfere with a trial judge’s exercise of discretion unless it has ignored or given insufficient weight to a relevant fact or principle,119 trial judges are thereby encouraged to take responsibility for difficult decisions. Although ss 137 and 138 of the uniform legislation are no longer expressed in terms of a discretion, appellate judges continue to take this approach on interlocutory appeals,120 and in New South Wales121 (but not in Victoria)122 on appeals from conviction. [page 88] During trial, many apparently definitive rules of evidence require difficult

decisions that are often described as discretionary. Some of these have the effect of requiring leave from a judge before cross-examining a witness or adducing evidence. For example, a judge must determine whether a witness is hostile or his or her testimony is merely unfavourable before allowing counsel who called that witness to cross-examine; a judge must determine whether the good character of an accused has been raised before allowing prosecuting counsel to cross-examine the accused about bad character; and a judge must determine whether crossexamination suggests recent invention before giving leave to call evidence to rebut the suggestion. Whether leave is given depends upon a proper application of the evidential rules in question rather than discretion in any literal sense. However, the Uniform Acts may have the effect of expanding the matters to be considered. Section 192 provides that before a trial judge gives ‘any leave, permission or direction’123 because of the Act,124 a number of matters must be taken into consideration. The failure125 of a judge to have regard to these matters may provide grounds for appeal: Stanoevski v R.126 The matters include the effect of the decision on the length of the hearing; the extent to which the decision would be unfair to a party or to a witness; the importance of the evidence; the nature of the proceeding; and the power to make other orders or directions. Whilst these matters appear merely to embody considerations that also arise when considering the specific discretions discussed below, in one respect they are wider. The section refers to whether it would be ‘unfair to a party or witness’. This contrasts with the concept of whether it would be unfair to admit evidence against an accused, which is a basis of the common law discretion and of the specific fairness discretion embodied in s 90. As is argued below, this discretion generally requires that the trier be able rationally and effectively to determine the reliability of evidence tendered against an accused. But the unfairness to be considered under s 192 appears to be a much wider concept. It considers fairness in relation to all parties (including the Crown: see R v Le)127 and to witnesses (for example, in deciding whether to compel one spouse to testify against another under s 18). In so doing, the concept of fairness appears to be wider and more abstract than that which underlies any of the exclusionary discretions discussed at 2.27–2.37. [page 89]

Other rules of admissibility appear discretionary because of their very broad formulation; for example, that prohibiting the disclosure of an accused’s disposition unless sufficiently probative to outweigh possible prejudice. Rules requiring juries to be warned of the possible unreliabilities of evidence are similarly open-ended. These ‘discretions’, which arise in the context of more specific rules of evidence, will be referred to in the context of those rules in Chapters 3 and 4. The residual exclusionary discretions 2.27 But at common law, judges have evolved more specific residual exclusionary discretions. The first, applicable in both civil and criminal cases, seldom distinguished from the very notion of relevance, allows exclusion of evidence where its reception cannot on grounds of efficiency, time and cost be justified. Recent High Court authority128 is clear in expressing three further discretions: the discretion to exclude evidence where its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect (the Christie discretion); the discretion to exclude confessional evidence where it would be unfair to the accused to admit it (the Lee discretion); and the discretion to exclude improperly obtained evidence (the Bunning v Cross discretion). Whilst these discretions generally apply to exclude prosecution evidence in criminal cases, as will be seen, the Bunning v Cross discretion can also apply to exclude evidence in a civil case. Equivalent rules, some expressed in mandatory rather than discretionary terms, are enacted in the uniform legislation: ss 90, 135–138. Only s 137 is specific to criminal cases (obligating exclusion of prosecution evidence where probative value is outweighed by unfair prejudice to the accused; cf the common law Christie balance). At common law, the onus is upon the party seeking exercise of a discretion to justify its exercise,129 and while this is generally the approach under the uniform legislation,130 in the case of s 138 (discussed further at 2.36–2.37), once evidence is shown to have been unlawfully or improperly obtained, it must be excluded unless the court is persuaded to exercise its discretion to admit the evidence.131 [page 90] There is also in Australia strong authority that there is a more general discretion

at common law to exclude evidence to ensure the fairness of the trial. The High Court recently considered this matter in Police v Dunstall.132 In a case where none of the discretions specified above applied, it was argued exclusion was demanded by this more general fair trial discretion. The majority, in a joint judgment, held that even if there was such a general discretion, there were no grounds for its exercise in the case before them. It therefore expressly refused to decide whether this more general exclusionary discretion was part of the common law. However, it did suggest that if there was an unacceptable risk to the fairness of a trial the appropriate remedy was generally to stay proceedings, and it could not clearly see circumstances for exclusion beyond those covered by the more specific discretions available. Nettle J strongly supported the existence of the general exclusionary fair trial discretion, even if only to provide the court, in appropriate circumstances, with the option of excluding evidence rather than staying proceedings. Nettle J also considered whether the existing common law discretions could be regarded simply as examples of this wider discretion, but found it difficult to rationalise the Lee and Bunning v Cross discretions with such an approach. However, the judgments recognise that there are two policies at work when considering these exclusionary discretions. The first seeks to achieve a fair trial by excluding evidence that might result in an unacceptable risk of a wrongful conviction. The second seeks to maintain the integrity of the judicial system by excluding evidence that has been improperly obtained. It is this division that is here employed in categorising the discussion of the discretions that follows. After discussion of the less controversial discretion to exclude evidence on grounds of efficiency, time and cost, consideration is given to the ‘fairness discretion’, which it is argued embraces the Christie discretion (s 137), and the ‘public policy discretion’, which embraces the Bunning v Cross discretion (s 138). It is also argued that the Lee discretion (s 90), although expressed in terms of fairness, is generally exercised on public policy grounds. Efficiency, time and cost 2.28 As remarked above, at common law, this manifestation of discretion is seldom distinguished from the very notion of relevance. However, it was argued at 2.22 that matters of efficiency, time and cost are better considered under the heading of discretion to emphasise that the decision is one of legal sufficiency

rather than mere relevance. This ‘discretion’ applies in both civil and criminal cases. The Uniform Acts distinguish clearly between relevance and exclusion on grounds of efficiency, time and cost. Relevance is defined in s 55 in terms that embrace only [page 91] the potential probative value of the evidence. Section 135 is an exclusionary rule justifying (under s 56) the exclusion of relevant evidence, and it allows a court to ‘refuse to admit evidence if its probative value is substantially out-weighed by the danger that the evidence might … (c) cause or result in undue waste of time’. This places a heavy onus upon an opponent to justify the exclusion of relevant evidence altogether on these grounds. In contrast, at common law, a court might require a proponent to justify on similar grounds the reception of evidence as ‘sufficiently relevant’.133 This ‘discretion’ is most likely to be exercised in a civil dispute in order to limit inquiry into peripheral matters.134 A judge should seldom restrict the tender of relevant evidence from an accused in a criminal case on these grounds.135 There is authority suggesting that there is no discretion to prevent an accused from tendering directly or through cross-examination evidence otherwise relevant and admissible to establishing his or her innocence despite the prejudicial effect it may have upon a co-accused.136 Fairness 2.29 The second common law manifestation of an exclusionary discretion seeks to ensure an accused a fair trial.137 The fairness of the common law trial is encapsulated by [page 92] those fundamental common law procedural principles discussed in Chapter 1 which seek rectitude of decision through processes which accord respect to its

participants and otherwise maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. The High Court has shown its willingness to consider the fairness of a trial as a basis for staying proceedings (temporarily or permanently) as an abuse of process and s 11(2) of the uniform legislation expressly preserves this power with respect to abuse of process. Thus where a miscarriage of justice — the very rectitude of the decision — is threatened by matters such as the destruction or loss of evidence (through misconduct or delay), inadequate pre-trial disclosure, adverse publicity affecting the ability to empanel an unbiased jury, failure of the state to provide adequate legal representation or there has been disregard of the privilege against self-incrimination, courts may regard continuation of the trial so unfair that it would be an abuse of process to proceed.138 Courts are also prepared to find an abuse of process where the proceedings are brought for an improper purpose, or where an action is so affected by illegality or impropriety that to proceed would be an abuse of process.139 Nevertheless, not only is an abuse of process difficult to establish, but particularly in criminal cases, permanent stays are seldom granted because of the emphasis given by the High Court to the need [page 93] to consider ‘the substantial public interest of the community in having those who are charged with criminal offences brought to trial’: see Moti v R140 and Police v Dunstall.141 However, the High Court appears reluctant to have regard to an underlying concept of fairness in expansion of the existing categories of the exclusionary discretion: see Dunstall (at [34]). The majority referred to state authority supporting a fairness discretion, and was prepared to assume its existence for the purposes of argument, but then held that it could not apply to the facts before the court. On the other hand, Nettle J (at [49]) was quite forthright in recognising the discretion, but agreed with the majority that it was not enlivened in the instant case. While the Dunstall majority (at [48]) distinguishes the discretion to stay where to continue proceedings would be oppressive or unjust by reference to an overriding public interest in proceedings continuing, this is no reason to reject the application of a fairness discretion during trial. On the contrary, such a

discretion may allow a court to take account of unfairness without having to consider these larger issues, just as it is able to take account of illegality through exclusion or stay,142 or mitigate the effects of adverse publicity through direction. The High Court has emphasised, for example in Lee v R,143 that fundamental to the fairness of the accusatorial trial is the obligation of the prosecution to prove its case without assistance from the accused. In that case, the court allowed an appeal because the prosecution had unauthorised access to incriminating evidence of the accused that had been compelled in examination by the NSW Crime Commission. The court emphasised (at [53]) that the appeal was allowed not on the basis of public policy due to the unauthorised access, but because as a result of ‘the prosecution being armed with the [accused’s] evidence’ ‘the position of the prosecution vis a vis the accused was fundamentally altered’ and the trial was thereby ‘unfair’. One might question why, just as the public policy issue could have been dealt with at trial by discretion, the issue of fairness could not have been similarly dealt with. While references to a ‘fairness discretion’ at common law are first found in the context of controlling the admissibility of confessional evidence,144 lower court authority strongly supports the existence of a common law fairness discretion [page 94] applying to all evidence tendered in criminal cases.145 Whether that wider discretion has any place under the uniform legislation is controversial, being, on the one hand contrary to the apparent codification of the exclusionary rules of admissibility under s 56(1), but on the other hand consistent with the principle of legality that demands that legislation not be interpreted to remove fundamental common law principles of process. Nevertheless, the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal has not only refused to interpret Dunstall as authority against the existence of such a common law ‘discretion’ but has endorsed its existence alongside the rules of ‘admissibility’ enacted in the uniform legislation.146 The circumstances in which this wider discretion may apply remain elusive but are discussed below: at 2.32–2.35. The earliest manifestation of a discretion based on considerations of fairness is the discretion to exclude evidence where its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect upon an accused. The crystallisation of the discretion in these

terms is found in R v Christie.147 The prejudicial effect is the risk that the jury will give the evidence more probative weight than it deserves and thereby create an unacceptable risk of an innocent person being convicted. These risks may arise because the jury is not able to understand the evidence, misunderstands the evidence or, as a result of the prejudice it engenders, gives the evidence more probative weight than it deserves.148 Although [page 95] usually treated as a distinct discretion,149 it can be seen as a particular manifestation of a wider general discretion to exclude evidence to ensure a fair trial.150 But it is a manifestation that focuses upon protecting an accused against wrongful conviction. In this sense its focus is upon ensuring factual rectitude. The Christie discretion is of primary importance in the context of the tender of prosecution evidence in criminal cases. Whether at common law it is available in civil cases where judges sit alone is doubtful. It has been argued that there is little point in a civil judge declaring: ‘Having heard this evidence, I consider that I may lawfully consider it, but as judge of fact I will set it aside, lest I be prejudiced by it’.151 Rather, the Christie considerations can simply be considered by the trial judge when assessing the weight to be given to the evidence.152 While this same argument may be made in the case of criminal cases tried by judge alone it has never been questioned that the residual discretions apply and the uniform legislation in Pt 3.11 draws no distinction between trials before jury and judge alone when it comes to the exercise of the powers under these sections.153 2.30 The question posed for the judge under Christie is whether a properly directed jury will be capable of giving the evidence in question a rational probative weight, [page 96] despite aspects of it that might distract the jury from this task. Courts are adamant that where juries are required to decide the weight of admissible evidence judges should be reluctant to distrust the capacity of juries to perform this task.154 In this respect the common law draws no formal distinctions between the credibility or

reliability of the evidence or the inferences to be drawn from it. The discretion does not exist to enable judges to screen the jury from what judges regard as weak evidence where the jury itself is perfectly capable of assessing its probative value.155 Judges should only intervene where there is a real risk that a jury may give evidence more probative weight than it rationally deserves. In some cases that risk may be removed through editing the evidence,156 or in others sufficiently mitigated through direction to the jury.157 Where this is not possible the evidence should be excluded. Primary examples of exclusion under the Christie discretion are situations where evidence, whilst allowing appropriate probative inferences, also gives rise to inappropriate inferences or chains of reasoning, which, even with appropriate directions, may be used by the jury and create a risk of wrongful conviction. Thus, a trial judge might exclude a particularly gory photograph of a murder victim where, although it is appropriately probative to indicate the injuries inflicted, it shows an horrific injury for which a jury may instinctively and unreasonably seek to make the accused responsible, and thereby compromise the criminal standard of proof: R v Ames.158 Or a judge might [page 97] disallow relevant discrediting cross-examination of an accused revealing bad character because a jury is likely to infer, consciously or unconsciously, but with a strong risk of inaccuracy, the guilt of the accused from the criminal propensities revealed by that bad character: Phillips v R.159 For similar reasons a judge might limit the discrediting cross-examination of a witness that reveals the accused’s bad character (R v S),160 or exclude police mug-shots — revealing that the accused has a record — used to identify the accused as a suspect, or exclude equivocal evidence of flight.161 But evidence may also be described as more prejudicial than probative in situations where the jury is unlikely to appreciate its real probative value, either because it does not have the knowledge or experience to make a rational assessment or because the evidence is incapable of effective challenge or rebuttal. In these circumstances it is more prejudicial simply because of the risk that the jury will give it more probative weight than it deserves. Thus, lack of experience of the risks of inaccuracy gives rise to a discretion to exclude identification

evidence: see further 4.66. And the absence of evidence to challenge provides a strong reason for excluding police evidence alleging an unsigned confession where no independent person was present and no independent recording made: Driscoll v R.162 It also provides a reason to exclude prosecution evidence that an accused cannot rebut because this will necessarily reveal unrelated criminal activity or his or her bad character.163 Other examples might include prosecution evidence from persons in positions of authority or from ad hoc experts, which, although relevant, is of little weight or assumes a form (such as ipse dixit) that cannot realistically be rationally assessed by the jury and which may be given undue weight merely because of the witness’s apparent position of authority.164 In the case [page 98] of other expert evidence, opinions may simply be accepted because the evidence is presented in a manner that makes it impossible for a lay jury to rationally assess its probative value.165 2.31 The uniform legislation enacts the equivalent of the Christie discretion (in both criminal and civil cases and whether the trial is before a jury or by judge alone) by means of ss 135–137. Section 135 provides that the court may exclude evidence: … if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might: (a)

be unfairly prejudicial to a party; or

(b) be misleading or confusing; …

Section 136 (again applying to all trials) provides that the court, rather than excluding evidence altogether, may limit its use where either of these dangers may arise, but without the ‘substantial outweigh[ing]’ requirement. This discretion to limit use is of considerable importance under the uniform legislation, which provides (ss 60 and 77) that where evidence revealing hearsay or opinion (generally inadmissible) is nevertheless admissible for some other reason, then it may also be admitted for that hearsay or opinion purpose. Section 136 allows the court to restrict the use of the evidence where its probative value as hearsay or opinion is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice or because it is misleading or confusing. One would expect this restricting discretion to be most likely used in criminal cases before a jury.166 However, the mere use of the evidence as

hearsay or opinion, expressly permitted under ss 60 and 77, cannot be a legitimate basis for its exercise.167 Section 137 emphasises the greater importance of the Christie considerations in criminal cases by providing that in such cases (whether tried before a jury or by [page 99] judge alone): ‘… the court must refuse to admit evidence adduced by the prosecutor if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant’. Consequently, s 137 is not expressed as a discretion at all168 (although one might add that even at common law once evidence is determined to be more prejudicial than probative there is no choice but to exclude).169 The mandatory nature of s 137, together with the heavier onus under s 135, means that it is s 137 that will be invoked by an accused seeking exclusion on grounds of unfair prejudice. These sections were enacted to embody discretions based upon the same policy grounds as those at common law.170 In describing ‘unfair prejudice’, courts ask whether it would be unfair to receive the evidence because of the risk that the jury may give it more probative value than it deserves.171 But the discretion is described both at common law and under s 137 as requiring a ‘weighing’ of ‘probative value’ against ‘unfair prejudice’. A particular problem has arisen concerning the definition of ‘probative value’ and its relationship to s 55. As explained above (at 2.18), the role of s 55 is to determine whether evidence has any rational probative value, and in determining relevance the words ‘if it were accepted’ were interpreted by the majority in IMM v R172 as requiring the judge to assume the credibility and reliability of testimony for this purpose, these being matters for the trier of fact to determine. The definition of ‘probative value’ is reflective of s 55: ‘the extent to which the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue’. But whereas relevance requires a mere capability of probative effect, probative value is concerned with the rational ‘extent’ of that effect. Nor does the definition contain the words ‘if it were accepted’. [page 100]

All judges in IMM v R are clear that neither s 55 nor the definition of probative value require the judge to determine actual probative value.173 That remains always a matter for the trier of fact when considering its verdict. Rather, in determining probative value, the judge must determine the maximum weight that a rational person could assign to the evidence in question. It is this that is to be weighed against unfair prejudice under s 137. In this sense, and this sense alone, the evidence is to be considered at its highest. To the minority (Gageler, Gordon and Nettle JJ) that was the end of the matter. Without the words ‘if it were accepted’, the judge could simply consider all matters significant in determining the maximum rational probative value of which the evidence was capable, including matters going to both the credibility and reliability of any testimony. However, the majority (at [44]), following the approach taken by the Courts of Criminal Appeal in New South Wales,174 Tasmania175 and the Northern Territory,176 determined that the words ‘if it were accepted’ in s 55 were to be read into the definition of probative value, requiring the credibility and reliability of testimony to be assumed. The reason for reading these words into the definition appears to be based on the argument that the determination of relevance is a precondition to the consideration of probative value so that it would be illogical not to read the words into the definition (cf remarks at [49]). But one might argue, as did the minority, that whereas the concept of relevance requires only that evidence have some rational probative value, the admissibility rules which turn on considering the rational extent of the probative value of evidence seek, through a definition which does not contain the limiting words, to take into account all matters relevant to that inquiry.177 [page 101] But as the following example taken from their judgment (at [50]) shows, the majority view does not mean that matters of credibility and reliability can be ignored in determining the maximum probative weight of which testimony is capable: It must also be understood that the basis upon which a trial judge proceeds, that the jury will accept the evidence taken at its highest, does not distort a finding as to the real probative value of the evidence. The circumstances surrounding the evidence may indicate that its highest level is not very high at all. The example given by J D Heydon QC was of an identification made very briefly in foggy conditions and in bad light by a witness who did not know the person identified. As he points out, on one approach it is possible to say that taken at its highest it is as high as any other

identification, and then look for particular weaknesses in the evidence (which would include reliability). On another approach, it is an identification, but a weak one because it is simply unconvincing. The former is the approach undertaken by the Victorian Court of Appeal; the latter by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal. The point presently to be made is that it is the latter approach which the statute requires.

It seems then that the difference between the approaches in Victoria and New South Wales are simply a matter of semantics and under both the extent to which evidence is capable of being probative necessarily takes into account matters going to its potential reliability.178 In finding the testimony of the asserted identification unconvincing, factors going to its reliability can apparently be taken into account under either approach. A final perspective to this discussion is provided when we turn to what is required by the balancing exercise under s 137. Probative value must be weighed against unfair prejudice. If matters affecting probative weight cannot be considered under the heading of ‘probative value’ they may be taken into consideration as matters relevant to determining whether there is ‘unfair prejudice’, in considering whether there is an unacceptable risk that the jury will give more probative weight to the evidence than it deserves. A similar way out of the dilemma may be possible when applying ss 101, 135 and 136. Under ss 97 and 98, however, to be admissible, tendency and coincidence evidence must simply be of ‘significant probative value’ but, as did the majority in IMM v R, the notion of significance can be manipulated to take weight into account, so that if there is a problem reconciling s 55 and ‘probative value’, it can be overcome. [page 102] By failing to take the literal interpretation of the definition of ‘probative’ value, and endorsing the expression ‘if it were accepted’ as ‘taking the evidence at its highest’, there is an increased risk of trial judges admitting, without full consideration of the principles behind s 137, prosecution evidence to which the jury may give excessive weight. At common law, there has been no discussion of the precise nature of probative value for the purposes of exercising the Christie discretion. The distinction between actual probative value and potential probative value is at best a fine one. While there is a presumption at common law that juries are capable of assessing the credibility and reliability of testimony179 (indeed this is one of the

very reasons for jury trial), this is a matter considered in asking whether the jury will give evidence more weight than it deserves. This is the fundamental issue. The weighing of probative value and unfair prejudice is, as McHugh J points out in Papakosmas v R,180 a weighing of incommensurables. The expression cannot be taken literally. Rather, it seeks to embody an attempt to ensure that triers of fact do not give prosecution evidence probative value that it does not deserve and create an unacceptable risk of the conviction of an innocent person. The pity is that the focus on the words in the uniform legislation may divert courts from considering the essence of the exercise, factual rectitude, which goes to the very fairness of the trial. 2.32 The more general manifestation of this discretion to ensure an accused a fair trial is often simply described as the ‘fairness discretion’. Its exact scope is controversial. Two questions are considered in the following discussion. To what extent does its exercise turn, as the Christie discretion turns, on the search for factual rectitude? And to what extent does its exercise turn on policies beyond ensuring factual rectitude if a trial is to be regarded as fair? The search for factual rectitude is certainly an important consideration; for example, to the exercise of the fairness discretion, otherwise known as the Lee discretion, as it applies to confessional evidence: see R v Swaffield; Pavic v R.181 While mere unreliability might be rejected as a basis for exclusion under the Christie discretion, because of the influence confessional evidence has with the jury, there is arguably justification for taking considerations of reliability into account in exercising the Lee discretion. But, even in the confessional context, it is clear that if the jury can properly assess probative value there is generally no basis for exercise of the fairness discretion on grounds of unreliability alone. For example, in Sinclair v R,182 the High Court was reluctant to exclude as unfair the confession of a schizophrenic accused, holding that unless his incompetence as a witness was established, the jury could be left to determine what [page 103] weight to give his confession.183 But in Foster v R,184 the fairness discretion was invoked to exclude police evidence of an interview with an Aboriginal suspect where no solicitor was present and there was no other independent record of the interview.185 An indigenous accused and the absence of independent evidence

made it difficult to assess accurately the police evidence in that case and was at least one reason for successful exercise of the fairness discretion.186 Considerations of factual rectitude also arise in other contexts where the general fairness discretion is invoked. In Police v Hall,187 the accused was charged with driving with an excess of alcohol in his blood. The principal prosecution evidence was a breathalyser test taken by police. In accordance with legislation, at the time of the test the accused was given a blood-test kit to enable him to obtain an independent analysis of his blood alcohol level. But on attending a hospital to obtain the blood test there was such a delay that by the time his blood was taken his body had absorbed so much of the alcohol that the test was of no assistance in challenging the accuracy of the breathalyser analysis. Hall argued that in these circumstances it was unfair to admit the breathalyser analysis as he had been denied the opportunity to challenge it. A majority of the court interpreted the legislation as simply providing an opportunity to obtain an independent blood test and did not provide any guarantee that the test would be taken, nor that it would be effective.188 Furthermore, it could not be said that the mere loss of the opportunity created any unacceptable risk of acting upon unreliable evidence, as the legislation facilitates and assumes convictions upon the basis of evidence of breathalyser tests alone. As the accused could point to no evidence suggestive of unreliability, and in the absence of any impropriety causing loss of [page 104] the statutory opportunity, the majority held there was no basis for exclusion under either the unfairness discretion or the Bunning v Cross discretion.189 The decision and reasoning in Hall were endorsed in Dunstall v R,190 where the majority refused to decide whether there was a wider fairness discretion, holding that even if there was, in light of the statutory scheme the trial was in no way unfair. In the absence of impropriety, arguably it is the risk of error rather than the mere loss of any procedural right to challenge evidence that gives rise to exercise of the unfairness discretion in these circumstances. A simple example can be found in R v Lobban,191 where police, contrary to statute, destroyed plants and thereby denied the accused the opportunity to test whether they were cannabis as alleged in the charge. The accused sought exclusion of prosecution evidence

relating to the nature of the plants. The court refused to exercise the unfairness discretion as, although the accused had been denied the opportunity to challenge, the plants had been grown by him and the defence had conceded their nature. In these circumstances there was no risk of error in admitting the prosecution evidence.192 It is submitted that it is this rectitude manifestation of the Lee discretion that is given primary importance by Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ in R v Swaffield; Pavic v R193 when they say: Unreliability is an important part of the unfairness discretion but it is not exclusive. As mentioned earlier the purpose of that discretion is the protection of the rights and privileges of the accused. Those rights include procedural rights. There may be occasions when, because of some impropriety, a confessional statement is made, which if admitted would result in the accused being disadvantaged in the conduct of his defence.

Arguably it is where the procedural impropriety creates an unacceptable risk of error that an accused is most obviously ‘disadvantaged in the conduct of his defence’. [page 105] Clearly then at common law, considerations of rectitude are important not only to exercise of the Christie discretion, but also to the Lee discretion; and if these are part of a broader category, to exercise of the more general unfairness discretion. Under the uniform legislation, it perhaps remains doubtful whether s 56 leaves room for a more general fairness discretion, but in exercise of ss 90 and 135–137, considerations relevant to rectitude remain important, either directly to the s 90 fairness discretion or to determining the potential ‘probative value’ of evidence when unfair prejudice is argued under ss 135–137. A particular problem arises in relation to the scope of the discretion insofar as it might apply rectitude considerations to hearsay evidence admissible under the uniform legislation where rectitude may be affected by the inability to crossexamine the maker of the out-of-court representation. Courts are rightly reluctant to exclude such otherwise admissible hearsay for this reason alone, for this would undermine the policy of the legislation to admit that hearsay evidence in designated circumstances.194 Courts are also reluctant to regard the mere absence of cross-examination as a reason to regard any trial based on such evidence as unfair.195

But where the tendered evidence is not hearsay made admissible by the legislation, procedural disadvantages of significance to determining probative weight can be more freely considered in deciding whether there has been unfair prejudice.196 2.33 The more general discretion to ensure a fair trial has another possible manifestation. Where incriminating evidence has been obtained from an accused illegally, improperly or in circumstances that have denied the accused fundamental procedural rights, it may also be argued that it is unfair to admit the evidence where it would not have been obtained at all in the absence of such misconduct. Thus, if police obtain a confession from an accused without according the accused the right of access to a solicitor (which might be prescribed statutorily or be demanded by more fundamental procedural notions), it is not just unfair to admit the confession because the accused is limited in challenging the reliability of the police evidence; it is also unfair to admit the confession, because if the solicitor had been present and had properly advised the accused, no confession might have been made at all. Similarly, if [page 106] police, having failed to persuade a suspect to answer questions at a formal interview, then arrange for an undercover agent or friend to secretly record a conversation with the accused in order to obtain admissions, one might argue it is unfair to admit those admissions as they would not have been made at all if the conversation had been held subject to the procedural safeguards for police interviews, including the requirement to advise the suspect of his or her right to silence.197 This notion of unfairness beyond rectitude is recognised by the High Court in R v Swaffield; Pavic v R, but the majority suggests that it does not itself justify exclusion. Rather, it is one factor in an overall discretion (the Bunning v Cross discretion) which takes: … account of all the circumstances of the case to determine whether the admission of the evidence or the obtaining of a conviction on the basis of the evidence is bought at a price which is unacceptable having regard to contemporary community standards.198

In other words, this aspect of unfairness, the impact of procedural impropriety upon the accused, becomes just one aspect of the discretion to exclude illegally or

improperly obtained evidence on grounds of public policy.199 It is difficult to argue that procedural impropriety against the accused in itself constitutes unfairness justifying exclusion.200 2.34 Another aspect of unfairness is found in the reasons given by the ALRC for including in s 90 a fairness discretion to exclude admissional evidence. This section was said to enact the common law ‘Lee discretion’ in order to cover the situation where an accused fails to exercise procedural rights through ignorance or incapacity or self-induced misunderstanding rather than through any impropriety by law enforcement officers.201 But the High Court has been consistent in holding that at [page 107] common law mere ignorance of rights is not in itself a ground for discretionary exclusion. In R v Swaffield; Pavic v R,202 an admission made to an undercover agent secretly recording the conversation was held prima facie admissible despite the accused’s prior refusal to speak to police. More strongly, in Em v R,203 an admission made to police secretly recording a conversation was held by the majority not to be within the unfairness discretion despite police knowing that the accused was under a self-induced impression that evidence of an unrecorded conversation could not be tendered against him. By way of contrast, if police had induced or encouraged that impression this impropriety would have given rise to possible discretionary exclusion on grounds either of unfairness or public policy. But mere ignorance of rights in either a particular situation or more generally is no basis for exclusion.204 The issue is when are police obliged to inform suspects of their procedural rights and ensure that they are understood. Counsel may be better advised to seek exclusion on grounds of such impropriety rather than unfairness if seeking to enforce a suspect’s procedural rights. 2.35 The uniform legislation does not expressly enact a more general discretion to exclude evidence that might operate unfairly against an accused.205 As the above discussion suggests, it can be argued that no such general discretion is needed. As far as unfairness may affect the rectitude of decision, where evidence is more prejudicial than probative, unreliable or where it cannot be effectively challenged, ss 135–137 can accommodate these arguments. For any unfairness to the accused consequent upon illegality, impropriety or loss of

procedural rights, s 138 covers the arguments for exclusion. However, s 90 provides that prosecution evidence of an admission may be excluded if ‘having regard to the circumstances in which the admission was made it would be unfair to a defendant to use the evidence’. As argued in the previous paragraph, the content of this discretion beyond matters not already covered by ss 137 and 138 is problematic. One approach is simply to say there is an overlap between [page 108] these sections.206 Another, espoused by Gummow and Hayne JJ in Em v R,207 is to say that legislation should be interpreted as far as possible to avoid overlap and so, for example, once impropriety is established, exclusion must be via s 138, the impropriety discretion (discussed at 2.36–2.37), and not s 90, the unfairness discretion. To this extent the notion of unfairness under s 90 must be read down. However, neither Gleeson CJ and Heydon J in their joint judgment nor Kirby J (in dissent) were prepared to read down, or otherwise define, the notion of unfairness under s 90. If unfairness is so read down there remains the question of what is covered by it. Insofar as procedural impropriety affects rectitude it can be embraced within the Christie discretion and the notion of unfair prejudice. Insofar as procedural impropriety results in the obtaining of evidence prior to trial it is covered by the public policy discretion. Insofar as there is procedural impropriety affecting the trial, for example, where an accused is unrepresented, there has been undue prejudicial publicity, evidence has been lost so that it cannot be effectively challenged, the prosecution has failed to disclose evidence or call witnesses, or there is a long delay in a prosecution being brought affecting an accused’s ability to meet evidence, these are not matters that can generally be dealt with through simply excluding evidence208 but may be and are generally pursued more appropriately through the seeking of a stay of proceedings, as to continue would be an abuse of process.209 Furthermore, where a stay has been sought and a trial has been held resulting in conviction, on appeal, even if an appellate court accepts that there has been a procedural impropriety, so that the trial may be regarded as having been unfair, it may refuse the appeal if it considers there has been no substantial miscarriage of justice. Loss of procedural rights at trial in itself may produce a substantial miscarriage of justice but not necessarily and there are few

examples (although Lee v R, discussed at 2.29, is an exception). Again it seems that rectitude receives much more emphasis upon appeal than loss of procedural rights per se. It is rare that the High Court holds that loss of procedural rights at trial in itself, in the absence of an effect upon rectitude, constitutes unfairness justifying exclusionary discretion or a stay on grounds of abuse of process. [page 109] Public policy 2.36 The third and final discretion recognised at common law operates in both civil and criminal cases,210 and operates to exclude on grounds of public policy otherwise relevant and admissible evidence where it is obtained as a consequence of, or otherwise arises out of,211 illegality or impropriety. The basis of the discretion lies not simply in the notion that courts will punish law enforcement officers who do not themselves obey the law,212 but in the more fundamental idea that courts must maintain the integrity of their processes by not condoning illegality or impropriety through giving curial advantage to the prosecution by admitting evidence obtained as a consequence of it.213 Such condoning can only bring the system for the administration of justice into disrepute.214 In extreme cases, it may be an abuse of process to attempt to base a prosecution on evidence so obtained and justify the staying of proceedings altogether.215 Where evidence is obtained illegally or improperly one might argue either, that it is unfair to admit the evidence because it would not have been obtained without the illegality, or that it should be excluded on grounds of public policy so that the court [page 110] is not seen to condone the illegality. In R v Swaffield; Pavic v R, Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ suggest that ultimately it is the second consideration which is always determinative in deciding whether to exclude evidence affected by illegality or impropriety.216 The question is ultimately whether the admission of the evidence would be ‘bought at a price that is unacceptable having regard to contemporary community standards’: at [69]. The unfair impact (if any) of the

illegality upon the accused thus becomes one factor to be considered along with others in determining whether this public policy demands exclusion of the evidence, rather than being in itself decisive. This public policy discretion has been recognised by other courts,217 although the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Lobban218 held that this ‘combined discretion’ applied only to confessional evidence. It is submitted that whilst this might be technically correct in terms of authority, to impose such a limitation misunderstands the nature of what Martin J calls the ‘combined discretion’. Although it is true that the extended notion of fairness and the public policy discretion are brought together in Swaffield, it is submitted that the result is not a ‘combined discretion’ but a recognition that the extended notion of fairness is better embraced within the wider public policy discretion which always operates where evidence is illegally or improperly obtained. And it has never been doubted that the public policy discretion applies beyond confessional evidence. This discretion to exclude on grounds of illegality or impropriety (but with the onus on the party seeking admission once illegality or impropriety has been established)219 is enacted for both civil and criminal cases in s 138 of the uniform legislation: (1) Evidence that was obtained: (a)

improperly or in contravention of an Australian law; or

(b) in consequence of an impropriety or of a contravention of an Australian law; is not to be admitted unless the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighs the undesirability of admitting evidence that has been obtained in the way in which the evidence was obtained.

2.37 Both at common law and under s 138, there must be a causal relationship between the evidence and the illegality or impropriety.220 The notion of impropriety [page 111] is nowhere defined but, again, as at common law, might be widely interpreted.221 Impropriety is not limited to the conduct of law enforcement officers.222 Impropriety should include any situation where a person has been actively223 denied fundamental rights and privileges, the reference to a denial of rights granted by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in s 138(3)(f)

supporting this approach. The words ‘improperly’ and ‘in contravention of’ reflect the idea that the discretion extends beyond activities that are technically unlawful and applies to other activities that would bring courts into disrepute if they were simply condoned by the courts.224 The essence of this discretion is the weighing of the public interest in rectitude of decision against the public interest that citizens’ rights be maintained within the administration of [page 112] justice. It might be argued that as at common law the discretion exists to ensure that the administration of justice retains its legitimacy.225 Without purporting to be definitive, s 138(3) delineates matters to be taken into account when exercising this discretion, generally reflecting the matters emphasised in the leading common law decisions of Bunning v Cross and Ridgeway v R.226 These include the nature of the offence charged against the accused, the importance and probative value of the evidence in question, the gravity and intent of the illegality or impropriety (particularly whether it was deliberate or reckless),227 the nature of the impropriety (for example, whether it is a breach of an international covenant or legislation designed specifically to protect citizens),228 the ease with which the evidence could have been obtained without illegality or impropriety, and the likelihood of those committing the illegality or impropriety being otherwise dealt with. To these, following R v Swaffield; Pavic v R, one might add the effect (if any) of the impropriety upon the accused.229 According to the High Court in that case, the ultimate question to be asked is whether to admit the evidence would be to convict at a price unacceptable having regard to contemporary community standards. This public policy discretion is discussed in more detail at 5.255–5.267. [page 113]

Determining the reception of tendered evidence 2.38 Having considered the concepts of relevance and admissibility (including the role of discretion in determining admissibility), the approach taken to the

receipt of evidence by a trial court and the extent to which its decisions depend upon natural and legal rules can be clearly described. Tendered evidence must be relevant directly or indirectly to a material fact in issue. Adversary principles demand that the parties themselves state the material facts upon which they rely, and that the court determine as a matter of law whether those alleged material facts are sufficient to make out the legal remedy sought. In criminal cases, the complaint, information or indictment must give particulars of the incident alleged to constitute the crime and the prosecutor in opening will normally make clear the material facts to be established by the information to be tendered.230 The plea of not guilty puts all material facts in dispute.231 In civil cases, material facts must be precisely and accurately alleged in pleadings,232 but through the process of answer and counter-allegation and admission the parties will confine material facts to those in dispute (in issue), and at the trial only evidence relevant to those material facts in issue will be considered. 2.39 Having determined, by means of the natural rules of fact discovery, the relevance of adduced evidence to one or more material facts in issue, the evidence will be received in proof of those material facts unless declared by law inadmissible. When inadmissible, the evidence may be excluded, either absolutely (for example, where public policy demands that evidence be not divulged), or presumptively (for example, evidence revealing an accused’s previous disposition to wrongdoing is inadmissible unless its probative force can be shown to be greater than the risk of prejudice). Evidence may be inadmissible only for a particular purpose, in which case the evidence may be received, if relevant and admissible for some other purpose. For example, evidence containing hearsay is only inadmissible when tendered to establish [page 114] the truth of the facts asserted in the out-of-court statement, and if a statement asserting facts is otherwise relevant — to show, for example, simply that a person was capable of speaking — then the statement may be received for that purpose.233 While the uniform legislation recognises that evidence may have several and different uses, recognising the confusion this may cause it seeks to ensure that

once evidence has been admitted for one purpose it becomes admissible for any other relevant purpose. Thus, for example, under s 60 of the uniform legislation, if evidence has an admissible non-hearsay use it may then also be used as hearsay if it is so relevant. 2.40 Where a dispute arises over the reception of evidence that dispute must be decided by the court (as a matter of law) as a separate preliminary issue. The exact procedure for this determination depends upon whether the case is civil or criminal and upon the nature of the issue. A wide range of matters can arise as preliminary issues; for example, the relevance or sufficient relevance of evidence, whether relevant evidence should be excluded as unfairly prejudicial, the capacity of a witness to testify, the voluntariness of a confession, the expertise of a witness to give opinion evidence, the right of a witness to refuse to answer on grounds of privilege, the right of a co-accused to be separately tried, and so on. The range of issues is as wide as the law of evidence itself. Where disputed admissibility turns upon preliminary findings of fact, and where these facts are in dispute, the court may hold a preliminary trial within the main trial to hear evidence.234 Testimony at such preliminary hearings is said to be taken ‘on the voir dire’, the term deriving from the form of oath administered at common law in such proceedings (vrai dire), and consequently the preliminary trial is known as a ‘voir dire hearing’. Section 189 of the Uniform Acts recognises the voir dire and provides for the manner in which it should be held. Whether a voir dire is held is a matter of discretion.235 In criminal cases, judges are wary of extending trials through lengthy voir dire hearings.236 There is no right to such a hearing and the party bearing the onus must adduce sufficient reasons for holding it.237 The timing of a voir dire is within the [page 115] discretion of the court but legislation in most jurisdictions expressly permits it to be held before any jury is empanelled.238 2.41 Whether in a trial before a jury the voir dire should take place in open court depends upon whether the evidence and arguments are of any concern to the jury. Conditions for admissibility are separate preliminary questions, prima facie not of concern to the jury, and furthermore, questions that might involve the disclosure of evidence and argument that could prejudice any jury. Therefore,

as a general rule, the voir dire should be held as a separate proceeding in the jury’s absence. If evidence taken on the voir dire turns out to be of relevance to issues at the main trial, then that evidence may be separately and appropriately tendered at the trial. Gibbs J in Demirok v R239 appears to accept this view in holding that the competence of a wife to testify against her husband should have been determined in the jury’s absence. 2.42 Certainly the jury must be absent where prejudicial information may be disclosed during the voir dire and this is recognised in that legislation, referred to at n 238, allowing it to be held before any jury is empanelled. The jury will be absent where the admissibility of a confession is in issue.240 But in some cases, where evidence to be taken on the voir dire will certainly also be relevant to trial issues, and there is no risk of prejudice, there seems no reason why the voir dire should not be held before the jury. In Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital,241 Hutley JA distinguished Demirok on these grounds, holding in a civil case that it was proper to determine the reliability of a record-keeping system in the jury’s presence so that it could take the evidence into account in deciding what weight to give to the records if they were admitted. Similar considerations might apply in the case of a voir dire examination to determine the competency of a childwitness, but there appears to be some division of [page 116] opinion over whether this should be held in the jury’s presence.242 If the jury remains it should not be entitled to use at large evidence disclosed to it, but there is no reason why it may not use the evidence for admissible purposes provided it is appropriately directed.243 Similarly, a judge trying a case alone may use evidence taken on the voir dire if it be relevant and admissible to issues in the case.244 The uniform legislation provides in s 189(2) that where the voir dire is held to determine the admissibility of an admission or improperly obtained evidence then the jury must not be present. Where a member of the accused’s family objects to being called, s 189(5) provides that this issue should also be determined in the jury’s absence. In all other cases, s 189(4) provides that presumptively the jury should not be present unless the court so orders. In so deciding, but without limiting the court’s discretion, s 189(5) provides that the court take into account

the possible prejudice to the defendant that revelation of the evidence to the jury might cause and whether the evidence is likely anyway to be revealed to the jury at some stage.245 2.43 Although one might conclude that the jury’s presence depends upon the nature of the voir dire inquiry, on the other hand, there is clearly a presumption that parties, particularly the accused, should be present at each and every stage of proceedings, including the voir dire.246 But even here, there may be exceptional circumstances [page 117] where this presumption must give way. In cases of misbehaviour and absconding by an accused there may be no option to continue the trial in an accused’s absence,247 and the accused’s illness may justify some part of a trial to continue. But there are other genuine exceptions. For example, if the government objects to the disclosure of information upon grounds of national security, the most appropriate resolution of the controversy may be through the judge inspecting the relevant information in private (with or without the confidence of counsel).248 A similar approach may be appropriate where, for example, the privilege against self-incrimination is claimed.249 In the case of the testimony of children and vulnerable witnesses, where legislation permits screening or the taking of testimony by video-link or through the tender by video of testimony taken at a preliminary proceeding (see 7.33–7.34), provision is made for parties and counsel to participate in the process. But such cases are exceptional: generally, parties and their counsel should always be present. 2.44 The exact procedure to be followed in calling evidence at the voir dire remains in the discretion of the court and depends upon the nature of the issues in question and state of the evidence in the case. Where the issue is the competence of a witness or the claim of a witness to a privilege, the only evidence required is obtained upon questioning that witness, and generally this will be done at first instance by the judge.250 Whether the parties have a right to cross-examine in such circumstances is doubtful.251 Again, it is doubtful whether the witness is entitled to be legally represented (for

[page 118] example, in making a claim to privilege).252 Such issues are not strictly inter partes and courts are reluctant to prolong inquiry by permitting formal adversary investigation into them. But other issues do arise inter partes as preliminary issues, in which case adversary rules may apply.253 For example, the admissibility of a confession is decided with the prosecution bearing the onus of establishing voluntariness, and opening and proving that matter in the formal adversary way, with any witnesses called being available for cross-examination.254 2.45 Whether the rules of admissibility apply strictly at the voir dire is again a matter not capable of definitive answer. Where the preliminary issue arises inter partes in a criminal case, in most cases the rules are assumed to apply.255 But in determining the competence of a witness or the admissibility of expert evidence or a witness’s claim to privilege, it may be unrealistic to adhere strictly to the normal rules.256 In other cases practical efficiency may require preliminary issues to be determined upon depositions taken at committal hearings.257 While the assumption of s 189(7) of the uniform legislation is that the rules of admissibility in Ch 3 of the legislation apply at the voir dire, Johnson J in R v Petroulias258 held that the common law continues to apply in uniform evidence law jurisdictions in that there is no right to a voir dire and the precise procedure to be followed remains in the discretion of the court. As a result, transcripts from a voir dire in previous proceedings were used as the basis for the hearing with the accused being given the right to have prosecution witnesses [page 119] recalled for cross-examination. The legislation also provides in s 142 that the standard of proof on the voir dire in both civil and criminal cases is the balance of probabilities, whichever party bears the onus of proof. This latter provision reflects the common law position in Australia.259 The primary use of evidence taken at the voir dire is to decide the preliminary point, but if the jury remains it will use the evidence at large unless directed otherwise by the court. Where the jury has been excluded, evidence taken on the voir dire may, subject to the court’s residuary discretion, become admissible

against a witness as a prior inconsistent statement.260 This is expressly provided for by s 189(8) of the uniform legislation, which also permits tender of a witness’s evidence given at the voir dire where the witness has died (presumably before testifying at the main trial). Only where these preliminary matters are capable of giving rise to appealable points is authority available. In particular contexts (for example, the admissibility of evidence disclosing an accused’s propensity, the admissibility of confessions, claims to privilege, and determinations of expertise) some further reference will be made to the appropriate preliminary procedure. At this introductory stage, it is concluded that it would be wrong to assert the appropriateness of any one procedure on the voir dire, and although the ordinary trial procedures provide a presumptive model, the precise procedure depends very much on the nature of the issue, the extent to which it is inter partes, and the extent of inquiry required to fairly determine it.

Party waiver of rules of admissibility 2.46 As Thayer explained, the presumption of the common law is that all relevant evidence should be received by the court. The presumption is embodied in s 56(1) of the Uniform Acts. The presumption is reflected in the adversary idea that principally it is left to the parties to object to the admissibility of tendered evidence, so that in most cases the application of the rules of admissibility is left within the option of the opponent.261 This adversary idea has been held by judges to be embodied in the Uniform Acts, so that where sections provide that specified evidence ‘is not admissible’ (ss 59, 60, 97, 98, 102 and 114) or that a judge ‘must refuse to admit evidence’ [page 120] (s 137) these phrases have been interpreted by adding the words ‘following objection’.262 A similar interpretation has been made in respect of s 31A of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA).263 As a consequence, the trial judge’s failure to exclude in the absence of objection is not an error of law. But a number of observations and propositions need to be added to this general adversarial principle. In the first place, it applies only to allow waiver of rules of admissibility. If evidence is irrelevant — if, that is, it has no probative value at all

— it can in no circumstances be received, for there is nothing to receive. Nor can counsel waive the duty of the judge to give appropriate directions about the legal issues and the facts decisive of them.264 Secondly, there are some rules of admissibility that are based upon considerations of public policy extending beyond the interests of the parties, rules that cannot be waived and must be applied by judges in all cases whether or not parties object.265 Thirdly, where a party or counsel does not object to the reception of relevant information it must be clear that the party or counsel has fully understood the right to object and has chosen not to exercise that right free from [page 121] extraneous considerations. And a concession initially made may be withdrawn unless to do so would result in irreparable unfairness to the other side.266 2.47 Thus, it may be appropriate for a judge to intervene to assist an unrepresented party (particularly an accused) to ensure an understanding of the right to object, thereby guaranteeing a fair trial.267 Again, if an opponent has misled a party into not objecting to relevant but inadmissible information, it would be improper for the court to act upon it.268 Also, where a party fails to object and information is relevant on a number of grounds, one of which is excluded by a rule of admissibility, it is difficult to assume waiver of that rule, for failure to object may have been upon the understanding that the evidence would only be received for its admissible use.269 Consequently, whether failure to object is a binding waiver of a rule of admissibility at common law is not a question capable of an arbitrary answer. It is not possible to waive rules of admissibility based upon public policy, and whether there has been a waiver made with full knowledge of the consequences is a matter that depends upon the circumstances of the individual case. Past decisions should be so regarded. 2.48 Waiver is controlled by s 190 of the uniform legislation. Subsection (1) does not permit waiver of the rules relating to competence and compellability (Pt 2.1 Div 1); oaths and affirmations (Pt 2.1 Div 2); relevance (Pt 3.1); identification evidence (Pt 3.9); privileges (Pt 3.10); mandatory and discretionary exclusions (Pt 3.11); rules relating to proof (Ch 4); and the miscellaneous rules (Ch 5).270 Subsection (2) provides that in criminal cases consent by an accused is not

effective unless he or she has been advised to consent by his or her lawyer, or the court is satisfied that the defendant [page 122] understands the consequences of giving consent. Subsection (3) provides that in civil cases, a court may also refuse to apply rules capable of waiver where the matter to which the evidence relates is not seriously in dispute, or where application of the rules would cause unnecessary expense or delay.271 2.49 As a corollary to permitting waiver, courts are reluctant to allow appellants to argue points that were not taken at trial.272 The course a party takes during trial is a tactical matter and, where the parties have been represented, appellate courts assume that course was consciously taken and are reluctant to allow a change of tactic on appeal when the trial tactics have gone astray.273 Criminal appeal rules expressly provide that, unless leave is given, parties may not take points on appeal where no objection was made at the trial, and courts are otherwise reluctant to entertain such points unless a miscarriage of justice can be shown.274 Nor are appellate courts keen to question the competence of trial counsel275 and the conduct of counsel does not itself constitute a miscarriage of justice.276 Consequently, a failure to take a point of [page 123] law or object to evidence, a judge’s direction, or a trial procedure, makes it difficult in practice, and especially in civil cases,277 though never impossible, to take that point on appeal.278 The High Court in Crampton v R279 emphasised that there is no constitutional bar to an appellate court interfering where a point was not raised at trial although, for the above reasons, it should interfere only in exceptional circumstances. In contrast to the waiver rules, if a party tenders evidence for a particular purpose, that party cannot prevent the use of that evidence for other admissible purposes that may be contrary to his or her interests. In B v R,280 an accused charged with sexual assault of his daughter tendered evidence of his previous

misconduct towards his daughter to explain why she was now concocting allegations against him. The High Court held that this permitted the prosecution to argue before the jury that that previous misconduct could be interpreted also as corroborating the victim’s story.

A ‘case to answer’ 2.50 The second task of the common law court is to determine (where the opponent has made appropriate application) whether a case to answer has been made out.281 [page 124] The requirement constitutes an adversary hurdle the proponent must overcome to justify compelling the defendant to make answer to the claim. Because it constitutes an adversary hurdle its determination is a matter for the judge rather than the trier of fact. In this sense, the determination may be described as a matter of law. But it is a requirement dependent purely upon the application of the natural rules of fact-finding. In a criminal case, the stated requirement is that there be evidence before the court at the completion of the prosecution case from which a jury (or other trier of fact) could find the material facts proved to the criminal standard of proof (beyond reasonable doubt).282 In a civil case, the stated requirement is evidence from which the trier could find the material facts proved to the civil standard (the balance of probabilities).283 There is no need for any persuasion or proof at this preliminary stage, so that a judge sitting alone could decide that a case to answer was made out but then, even if no further evidence was called, refuse to find the case actually proved.284 2.51 But what exactly is required to make out a case to answer is not entirely clear from the cases.285 Three grounds suggest themselves as the basis for a submission:286 (1) that the claimant has not alleged sufficient material facts to justify the remedy sought;

[page 125] (2) that the claimant has not tendered any credible evidence in support of one or more of the material facts required to make out the claim; (3) that, although the claimant has tendered some credible evidence in relation to all the required material facts, that evidence is, in relation to one or more of those material facts, so unreliable or vague that no reasonable trier of fact could possibly be convinced by it to the requisite standard. A submission based on the first of these grounds is normally made before trial in a civil case by interlocutory proceeding in which the opponent seeks to have the claim struck out or applies for early judgment.287 In a criminal case, there is no formal allegation of material facts, the complaint, information or indictment serving a notice-giving function to prevent prejudice or embarrassment to the accused through surprise. At the completion of the prosecutor’s opening, the accused could possibly argue that the facts as alleged do not constitute the offence charged and the prosecutor should be invited not to call evidence.288 But counsel must wait until the completion of the prosecution case before making a ‘no case’ submission.289 Submissions on the other two grounds are made consequent to, and normally at the close of, the proponent’s case, for only at this stage will the opponent know what evidence has been adduced in support of the proponent’s claim. It is extremely difficult to distinguish in factual terms between submissions made on these two grounds. Nevertheless, a distinction must be drawn because the better view is that there is no right to make the submission on the third ground. 2.52 Judges should not become involved at a preliminary stage with the determination of the credibility and weight of tendered evidence. As long as there is some relevant evidence on each material fact in issue, judges should take that evidence at its (rational) highest, in deciding if it is capable of supporting the proponent’s hypothesis. This attitude derives from the view that the case to answer requirement is merely an adversary hurdle to justify calling upon the opponent to answer; it is at the completion of the trial that triers are asked to decide whether or not to accept relevant evidence and to determine what weight to give it. Expressed another way, the questions of credibility and weight are jury questions to be decided only at the completion of all the evidence.290 2.53 The nature of the standard required might be explained inductively.

Whether a case is actually proved depends upon the weighing of competing hypotheses. [page 126] Evidence adduced must in turn be assessed as reliable or not, and a determination must be made about whether the evidence overall supports one hypothesis or another. But the determination of a case to answer seeks to avoid this process. It asks only whether there are hypotheses and evidential support for them which are capable of consideration in the final weighing process. These will exist if there is before the court information which, if uncontradicted and accepted, rationally supports them. Where the evidence is the direct testimony of a witness to the event in issue, unless the testimony is entirely incredible,291 there must always be a case to answer irrespective of the judge’s opinion about the credibility of the witness. Where the case relies upon circumstantial evidence the judge’s only task is to ask whether, taking those items of evidence supporting the hypothesis in issue at their highest, they are capable of supporting it. Contradictory information and hypotheses are ignored, as is the credibility or reliability of the supporting evidence. Consideration of these matters necessarily involves a weighing process.292 If this approach is accepted, the standard for a case to answer is the same in civil and criminal cases, for the ultimate standard of proof does not arise for consideration. 2.54 But judges are not so clear in putting aside all questions of sufficiency in determining whether a case is made out. In Questions of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 2 of 1993),293 King CJ puts the standard in terms of ‘evidence capable of producing in a reasonable mind a conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt’. This appears to require the judge to make a preliminary weighing of all the evidence to determine whether it is so capable. In R v Briggs,294 Burt CJ doubts whether a ‘no case to answer submission should be formulated so as to embrace the criminal standard of persuasion. In my opinion, the question … is simply whether the evidence … is capable of sustaining a verdict of guilty …’. This ambiguous statement, intended to emphasise the need to put aside as far as possible questions of sufficiency, was disapproved by Malcolm CJ in Morrison v Kiwi Electrix Pty Ltd295 in favour of King CJ’s formulation. Whether in the end it

is cognitively possible to put aside questions of sufficiency is doubtful, but it is argued that judges should make their best attempts to do so at this preliminary stage of the trial. 2.55 In this respect, the submission must be distinguished from the closely related submission by which an opponent seeks to have a matter withdrawn from the trier of fact on the ground that it would be unsafe to find for the proponent upon the evidence [page 127] presented. This submission is made after a case to answer in the adversary sense has been established; it originates in the control exercised by judges over juries. The essence of this submission is a weighing of the evidential support for the proponent’s hypothesis. Thus, it is arguably most appropriately made at the conclusion of the presentation of evidence by all parties to the action, a stage at which the evidence can be properly weighed. Nevertheless, in practice it is often made at an earlier stage when it has become apparent that evidence crucial to the success of the proponent’s case is just too unreliable for the case to go on. The distinction between the two submissions is drawn clearly in R v Prasad.296 There the Supreme Court of South Australia held that in a criminal case tried before a jury, any submission seeking a weighing of evidence should be regarded merely as a request to a trial judge to remind the jury of its prerogative to acquit, at any stage of a trial, if convinced that the prosecution evidence is too unsafe to act upon. This explanation was made following English decisions which had confused the two submissions.297 While an accused has a right to have the trial judge consider a no case submission, the consideration of a sufficiency argument remains always within the discretion of the court and the failure of a trial judge to entertain it gives no ground for appeal. The ground of appeal must be the substantive point that the final verdict is unreasonable or against the weight of evidence.298 2.56 In civil cases at common law, the adversary submission of no case is embodied in the non-suit procedure, while the sufficiency submission is merely part of the courts’ armoury in controlling the jury by advising that it need not proceed.299 The abolishing of the non-suit procedure throws into doubt the existence of the adversary hurdle in most jurisdictions: see 6.37–6.38.

Proof Degrees of proof 2.57 With evidence relevant to material facts admissible, a case to answer having been made out, and the court having received all the evidence that the parties wish to adduce, the issue of proof arises. [page 128] Where the court comprises judge and jury, evaluation of evidence in proof of material facts is the exclusive province of the jury. The parties may address the jury upon how it should approach its task and the judge must sum up fairly on the evidence presented. But the judge is not encouraged to explain to the jury by exactly what reasoning process it should determine the material facts proved.300 The sufficiency of the cognitive abilities and reasoning processes of common law triers of fact are, it seems, assumed by the common law.301 It is assumed that all triers will approach their tasks ‘rationally’ and if they do not appellate courts can set them straight. 2.58 As shown in Chapter 1, what any analysis of a rationalist approach to proof concludes is that the world out there can never be certainly known. Even if a court has before it every item of relevant evidence from every conceivable source, certainty of knowledge is unattainable. The most the rationalist can do is approach this uncertainty according to consistent and coherent natural rules. Moreover, in practice the evidence available for proof is always limited. The common law adversary process leaves the presentation of evidence to the parties. Their resources and motivations to collect and produce information can never be sufficient to gather every piece of relevant evidence.302 Nor are they motivated to seek out or tender evidence that may be adverse to them. There are also rules of admissibility that may prevent the tender of relevant evidence. With certainty impossible to achieve, and available evidence limited for practical and policy reasons, the law is obliged to stipulate that degree of rational certainty, of probability, that it will accept as proof of the material facts. In civil cases, the standard of proof is traditionally and definitively stated as ‘the balance of probabilities’,303 and in

[page 129] criminal cases as ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.304 These standards are stipulated in respect of ‘the case’ of a party with little further elaboration in ss 140–141 of the uniform legislation. In that ‘the case’ of a party is necessarily based upon the material facts required to entitle legal remedy, it is the material facts that must be proved to these stipulated standards.

The civil standard: balance of probabilities 2.59 How one interprets the phrase ‘on the balance of probabilities’ depends upon which natural rules of probability, discussed in Chapter 1, one accepts as appropriate to the determination of proof of material facts in a civil case. The problem is that courts have never embarked upon any deep analysis of the appropriate natural rules. In these circumstances, one cannot expect to find a definitive legal interpretation of the phrase. But there are some things that can be said about it.305 First, there is the question whether the standard can be formulated in mathematical terms. As explained at 1.18, this question is not answered by saying that ‘empirical probabilities’ are capable of such measurement but ‘subjective probabilities’, being a matter of mere belief, are not. Probability as employed in courts of law is not an empirical measure of the relationship between things in the world; rather, it is a concept we use to cope with our uncertainty about the world.306 It is in essence a measure of our beliefs. This can be accepted by the mathematicist. The question then is whether these beliefs should be conceptualised in mathematical terms, as advocated by the Bayesians, and combined according to the equations of mathematical probability, or whether they should be otherwise conceptualised.307 It is this debate that forms the focus of Chapter 1: it was concluded that there are grave difficulties [page 130] in using mathematical conceptions to explain the concept of forensic proof in its entirety. But how do cases interpreting the standard of proof in civil cases approach the interpretation of the standard?

2.60 The phrase ‘balance of probabilities’ lends itself easily to a mathematical interpretation, one which places the standard of proof at a favourable probability of greater than 0.5. Thus, Lord Simon said in Davies v Taylor:308 Beneath the legal concept of probability lies the mathematical theory of probability. Only occasionally does this break the surface — apart from the concept of proof on a balance of probabilities, which can be restated as the burden of showing odds of at least 51 to 49 that such-andsuch has taken place or will do so.

And using this interpretation other judges have analysed the evidence before them according to mathematical notions in order to satisfy such a mathematical standard.309 If one has no preference on the allocation of errors between plaintiffs and defendants then a probability of greater than 0.5 will, assuming beliefs reflect reality, produce in the long run an appropriate distribution of correct results.310 This will not be the case if the standard is set at lower than 0.5, although some judges have suggested less than 0.5 suffices so long as the probability of the plaintiff’s case is greater than the probability of any other alternative explanation.311 2.61 The problems with conceptualising the standard in mathematical terms have been canvassed at 1.28–1.38. Of particular significance in this context is the problem that mathematical probabilities do not embody the notion of the weight of evidence. Thus, a degree of probability of greater than 0.5 can be generated on scanty information or upon complete information, and the mathematicist cannot say why the latter probability is more acceptable, or believable, than the former. If an accident involving a taxi-cab occurs and the defendant owns over 50% of the cabs in the town, [page 131] then it seems that on a mathematical balance of probabilities one of the defendant’s cabs was involved. But should a plaintiff be entitled to succeed on this evidence alone? If courts are to come as close to a true finding as is reasonable in the circumstances, should not the plaintiff be obliged to produce richer evidence relating to the accident in question before a finding is made? Note that this question does not raise any issue about where the mathematical standard should be set. We can accept the cost/benefit analysis in setting it as anything over 0.5. Rather, the question is what amount of evidence needs to be considered before it is acceptable to act upon satisfaction to this mathematical standard.312

2.62 It is beyond doubt that courts do have regard to this notion of the weight of evidence and will not make decisions in favour of a party unless satisfied that sufficient material has been put before it. For example, in SGIC v Laube,313 the Supreme Court of South Australia refused to make a finding that the defendant was incapable of exercising effective control of a motor car on the basis of evidence of a blood alcohol reading and testimony from an expert that statistically most people with such a reading would be so incapable. King CJ rejects the notion that a statistical probability can ever amount to proof, but the case might be better explained upon the basis that the court felt there should have been more evidence before it about the capacity of the driver in question. That is, the weight of evidence was insufficient even though the mathematical standard was formally satisfied. 2.63 There is another adversarial factor that might affect the weight required for proof. Where the plaintiff relies upon statistical evidence and chooses not to tender other available evidence, a court is likely to be reluctant to find the case proved. But if a plaintiff has no available evidence beyond the statistic and it is in the power of the defendant to tender further evidence, and he or she does not, then a court may be willing to find the case proved.314 Thus, the failure to tender evidence may weight [page 132] the scales in favour of a finding for the plaintiff. It is arguable that this was indeed the situation in SGIC v Laube, and that the court was correct in finding against the defendant.315 This adversarial idea, that the power of a party to produce evidence can be taken into account in determining whether a case is sufficiently proved, can be seen in the so-called rule in Blatch v Archer, where Lord Mansfield famously said:316 ‘All evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to have produced, and in the power of the other to have contradicted’. This allows adverse inference to be drawn against parties who fail to call evidence they would be expected to call.317 It effectively operates as an indicator of evidentiary weight. 2.64 The notion of the weight of evidence arises acutely in two general classes of case. First, in road accident cases where there are no eyewitnesses, courts are

reluctant to determine liability upon the basis of a bare assessment of the chances (as Murphy J was prepared to do in TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks),318 but will rather minutely analyse the evidence relating to the event to see whether there is sufficient evidence to justify a finding for the plaintiff.319 Secondly, in cases which involve serious allegations of crime or misconduct, courts will not decide in favour of the allegations unless the evidence is sufficiently complete.320 In Briginshaw v Briginshaw,321 a divorce case involving allegations of adultery, Dixon J formulated the standard of proof in the following terms: The truth is that, when the law requires the proof of any fact, the tribunal must feel an actual persuasion of its occurrence or existence before it can be found. It cannot be found as a result of a mere mechanical comparison of probabilities independently of any belief in its reality. No doubt an opinion that a state of facts exists may be held according to indefinite gradations of certainty … [A]t common law … it is enough that the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the

[page 133] tribunal. But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequences of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal.

It is this dictum which one finds most cited in explanation of the civil standard of proof in Australia,322 and which appears to be the genesis of the formulation of the standard in s 140 of the uniform legislation:323 (1) In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities. (2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account: (a)

the nature of the cause of action or defence; and

(b) the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding; and (c) the gravity of the matters alleged.

Whether one formulates the standard in terms of reasonable satisfaction, as Dixon J appears to prefer, or as on the balance of probabilities, which is that preferred by the High Court in Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd,324 or a combination of both, as in s 140 of the uniform legislation, arguably the idea of the weight of evidence lies at the heart of its application. The assumption is that courts must only decide cases following a reasonable search for

truth about the events in question. This is not to assert that truth about those events is certainly obtainable but that a court should make an optimistic attempt to come as close to truth as is reasonable in all the circumstances.325 [page 134] 2.65 If the weight of evidence is central to the notion of civil proof and that standard remains conceptualised in mathematical terms, it might be thought that what Dixon J argues is that the standard actually varies depending upon the seriousness of the case, so that in serious cases it will be considerably greater than 0.5. The very point in Briginshaw v Briginshaw was whether there were just two standards of proof, one civil, one criminal, or whether there was some intermediate standard for serious civil matters. The court rejected the idea of a third standard, but this does not answer the question of whether the civil standard is itself variable. Dixon J’s phrase, ‘[n]o doubt an opinion that a state of facts exists may be held according to indefinite gradations of certainty’, suggests the standard is mathematically variable. But more recently, the High Court has rejected a variable standard.326 In Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd,327 the court, in approving the Briginshaw formulation, said: The ordinary standard of proof required of a party who bears the onus in civil litigation in this country is proof on the balance of probabilities. That remains so even where the matter to be proved involves criminal conduct or fraud. On the other hand, the strength of the evidence necessary to establish a fact or facts on the balance of probabilities may vary according to the nature of what it is sought to prove. Thus, authoritative statements have been made to the effect that clear or cogent or strict proof is necessary ‘where so serious a matter as fraud is to be found’. Statements to that effect should not, however, be understood as directed to the standard of proof. Rather, they should be understood as merely reflecting a conventional perception that members of our society do not ordinarily engage in fraudulent or criminal conduct and a judicial approach that a court should not lightly make a finding that, on the balance of probabilities, a party to civil litigation has been guilty of such conduct. As Dixon J commented in Briginshaw v Briginshaw: The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved … There are, however, circumstances in which generalisations about the need for clear and cogent evidence to prove matters of the gravity of fraud or crime are, even when understood as not directed to the standard of proof, likely to be unhelpful and even misleading. In our view, it was so in the present case … When [as in this case concerned with alleged misrepresentations made on the sale of a business] an issue falls for determination on the balance of probabilities and the

[page 135] determination depends on a choice between competing and mutually inconsistent allegations of fraudulent conduct, generalisations about the need for clear and cogent proof are likely to be at best unhelpful and at worst misleading.

This dictum, while making it clear that there is but one civil standard, raises another question. It suggests seriousness is taken into account principally because the more serious an allegation the less likely it is to occur.328 This unlikelihood may or may not be so, but it is contended that seriousness should not simply be a matter going to inherent likelihood, but is a matter which determines what is the appropriate weight of evidence before a finding on the balance of probabilities — greater than 0.5 if conceptualised mathematically — can be acted upon as a reasonable search for truth in the circumstances. 2.66 But should we attempt to retain the mathematical analysis at all if the balance is dependent upon a weight of evidence? It is far from clear that the High Court in Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd in formulating the standard as a balance of probabilities has in mind a mathematical standard. And Dixon J in Briginshaw v Briginshaw, in advocating a standard formulated in terms of reasonable satisfaction, does not appear to be advocating a mathematical standard. Most judges, whether they formulate the standard in terms of a balance of probabilities or reasonable satisfaction, avoid the use of mathematical probabilities altogether.329 For one thing, it is unusual for empirical measurements to be put before courts. Cases turn on probabilities that have not been, or cannot easily be, empirically measured; for example, the probability that a witness is credible. And courts will normally only allow witnesses to testify in statistical terms where they possess appropriate expertise.330 Where courts are confronted with empirical probabilities which require combination with other evidence, judges have not encouraged triers to convert their beliefs to betting odds to enable use of Bayes’ Theorem to combine the evidence mathematically.331 Judges and jurors are not [page 136] accustomed to reaching decisions in this way, nor are the litigants who seek to settle their disputes through the courts. It is also argued that humans lack the

computational capacity to employ Bayesian analysis in even apparently simple cases.332 As a consequence, the approach to proof in civil cases, however it may be formulated, appears to be closer to that advocated by Cohen333 and Allen.334 The fact-finder is confronted with conflicting hypotheses and must, on the basis of experience of the ordinary course of events, determine with which hypothesis or hypotheses all the evidence is consistent. If, on this basis, there is compelling evidence inconsistent with a particular hypothesis, that hypothesis will be rejected altogether. If the evidence is more consistent with one hypothesis rather than another, that former hypothesis will be favoured. The more information consistent with a particular hypothesis, the more probable that hypothesis becomes until it reaches, by weight of evidence, a stage of acceptance by the factfinder as the likely explanation of all the available evidence. At this stage, the hypothesis is described as proved on the balance of probabilities. One might say that the fact-finder is persuaded or believes that hypothesis probably occurred. 2.67 The emphasis thereby shifts from the standard of proof to the weight of evidence required to constitute a reasonable search for truth. To those who object that this leaves too much ‘discretion’ to the trier of fact in applying the standard it must be pointed out that triers must act reasonably (having regard to the search for truth) in the circumstances of each case. Where triers act unreasonably, appellate courts may set matters straight. The problem is to find judicial guidance upon what is an appropriate weight of evidence in the circumstances of particular cases. But this sort of problem has not bothered courts in other contexts, such as the law of negligence, and particular cases must be correct within the normative guidelines to be gleaned from decided cases. Examples of the weight required can be found. For instance, in running down cases requiring proof of negligence, in the absence of eyewitnesses it [page 137] appears that there must at least be information relating to the environment and state of the vehicles following the accident.335 Again, it is doubtful whether a court in a running down case would allow a motor vehicle to be identified as belonging to a defendant where it could only be shown that the defendant owned a majority of vehicles of that type, particularly if

other information was reasonably available.336 In cases of personal injury, it is doubtful whether statistical epidemiological evidence alone is sufficient to establish causation.337 A reasonable search requires that available evidence relating to the circumstances of the particular injury be called. As Hodgson J explains in Ho v Powell,338 the adversarial manifestation of the requirement of a reasonable search is the rule in Blatch v Archer,339 which allows adverse inferences to be drawn against parties who fail to call evidence they would be expected to call. Thus, evidence that is not available can be taken into account in determining the reasonableness of acting upon that evidence which is available. This approach does not rule out acting upon empirical statistical evidence where no other evidence is reasonably available.340 Such evidence would satisfy both a mathematical standard (taking into account the weight (availability) of the evidence) as well as a ‘reasonable satisfaction’ standard (put in terms of a reasonable search for truth). It would maintain one’s best estimate of correctness in the long run. Whether one can achieve the psychological state of belief or persuasion on such evidence is arguably not to the point. The standard as explained by Dixon J in Briginshaw v Briginshaw is rational belief or persuasion,341 and, if there was no evidence after a reasonable [page 138] search except a statistic, that would arguably be enough.342 Of course it is virtually impossible to conceive of such a case arising in practice and hence, as Samuels JA said in Mifsud v Campbell:343 ‘[I]t is an incident of judicial duty for the judge [when fact-finder in a civil case] to consider all the evidence in the case’.

The criminal standard: beyond reasonable doubt 2.68 Elucidation of the standard of proof in criminal cases is complementary of this analysis. Criminal cases are regarded as the most serious of cases, and no one may be found guilty of a crime until a stage as close to certainty as is reasonably practicable has been reached. The search for truth must extend as far as is reasonably practicable. It is a guiding common law principle that it is better that the guilty go free than the innocent be punished and this has led to the formulation of criminal proof in the strictest terms of proof beyond reasonable doubt. This asymmetrical approach to proof embodies the premium placed on

innocence and liberty and, in theory, protects the accused, who has no obligation to marshal evidence or contest the accusations. Distinguishing the civil and criminal standards 2.69 In a sense, this criminal standard may be regarded as the point of reasonable satisfaction in a criminal case, so that there is no conceptual difference between the civil and criminal standards. But it would be wrong not to clearly distinguish the criminal standard from the standard in civil cases. The degree of proof in a criminal case is fixed at as high a level as can be practicably contemplated. Triers are not asked to vary the standard according to the nature and consequences of the criminal acts alleged, but are asked not to convict until, having considered all evidence that can practicably be produced, all reasonable doubts concerning such a finding have been eliminated.344 [page 139] In civil cases, even those civil cases involving criminal allegations, no court has attempted to state the standard of proof in this eliminative form. It appears that one may have reasonable doubts in a civil case yet be satisfied on the balance of probabilities by the available evidence that one hypothesis is the likely explanation345 — although Lord Scarman had some difficulty accepting this proposition.346 If a court is prepared to hold that an allegation in a civil case is so serious that the search for evidence must be pursued until all reasonable doubts have been eliminated, in order to preserve the high standard demanded by the criminal law, the court should recognise that in such circumstances the criminal standard of proof is appropriate.347 Confusion between the standards of civil and criminal proof can only lead to a weakening of the latter, and unless courts are prepared to undermine expressly the fundamental common law principle of optimum proof in criminal cases, it is better to avoid such confusion. The history of the formulation of the criminal standard of proof indicates that courts are not prepared to challenge that principle.348 2.70 Although it may be possible to approach the civil standard mathematically and specify proof at beyond 0.5, it is doubtful whether it is even possible to conceptualise the criminal standard in mathematical terms.349 Conviction can only follow the elimination of all reasonable doubts. To all intents and purposes,

certainty of guilt must be achieved. The standard does not contemplate there being any other [page 140] reasonable explanation of the evidence. Although we know that certainty cannot in fact be achieved, on the other hand we are not prepared to express the mathematical probability of criminal verdicts being incorrect.350 No court has ever attempted to state the criminal standard in mathematical terms and courts often disapprove of trial judges explaining criminal proof in such terms.351 Some researchers352 have asked laypersons out of the court context where, mathematically, they think the standard lies, but their variable answers at best illustrate differing interpretations of numbers and at worst the ignorance of both researchers and subjects of the object of a criminal trial. Faced with difficulties such as this, it is no wonder that even most proponents of mathematical theory advocate their theory merely as a model against which decisions and rules can be criticised rather than as an appropriate tool for utilisation by courts in making daily judgments.353 But the non-mathematical conceptualisation of the standard of proof has not led courts to prohibit the tender of evidence in statistical terms. This raises the question of how this evidence is to be accommodated with other evidence and embodied within the courts’ approach to criminal proof.354 If the statistical evidence is expressed in terms that show the extent to which that evidence might be found if the accused is innocent then it may be possible to combine the statistical expression with the non-mathematical standard. What the statistic can show is that there are explanations of the evidence consistent with innocence and the jury can be directed that these must be eliminated as reasonable doubts, having regard to other evidence before the court, before the accused can be found guilty. Where the possibility of innocent explanation is extremely low (as with DNA evidence in some circumstances) little may be required for the jury to be convinced. The failure of the accused to provide an innocent explanation may itself be enough to eliminate there being any reasonable doubt. But in most cases there will be other evidence that needs to be taken into account, including nonstatistical evidence relating to the accuracy and relevance of the statistical

evidence (DNA evidence may have been contaminated, transferred or not found where it could incriminate the accused: Fitzgerald v R).355 [page 141] While likelihood ratios appear to point to Bayesian calculations rather than the sort of analysis suggested in the previous paragraph, DNA continues to be so expressed, and the High Court in Aytugrul v R356 failed to take an opportunity to comment upon an appropriate statistical expression for DNA evidence and provide an explanation of how it might be accommodated by the jury in determining proof beyond reasonable doubt. The court refused to exercise s 137 of the uniform legislation to exclude DNA evidence presented in terms of an exclusion percentage rather than as a frequency, on the basis that the expression was accurate, and with appropriate direction (given in the case before them) there was no risk that the jury would give the evidence more weight than it deserved. As the discussion that follows shows, common law judges are reluctant to intrude upon the jury’s reasoning process by giving any explanations at all of the criminal standard. The formulation and content of this criminal standard arises in practice in two particular contexts: first, when the judge is called upon to direct the jury (and such direction may be called into question on appeal); and, secondly, when the trier of fact determines the verdict (and such determination may be challenged on appeal as being unreasonable or against the weight of evidence).357 Directing the jury on the criminal standard 2.71 First, judges must direct juries in terms of the traditional standard — beyond reasonable doubt — and not suggest that some different standard may apply. Thus, it is a misdirection to suggest that the degree of certainty required is no different from that required in making other serious decisions in one’s life and it is enough to feel comfortable with the decision.358 Nor should a jury be directed merely to consider which witnesses it thinks are ‘telling the truth’, for none of the witnesses may be telling the truth,359 or otherwise suggest the standard requires simply choosing

[page 142] between the prosecution and defence case.360 On the other hand, where a case turns upon the credibility of one uncorroborated witness it may not only be appropriate but necessary to tell the jury that it cannot convict beyond reasonable doubt unless convinced of the truth of that testimony.361 Explaining the standard in other than traditional terms may not only dilute the strictness of the criminal standard; it may also have the effect of transferring the burden of explanation to the accused, thereby shifting the burden of proof and undermining the presumption of innocence. Thus, for a judge to focus the issue of proof by asking the jury why a prosecution witness should lie, is generally a misdirection, as it suggests a burden on the accused to provide such an explanation.362 In Palmer v R,363 the High Court also held it generally impermissible for a prosecutor to ask the accused in cross-examination what motive a complainant might have for lying, as (a) this is a matter generally outside the knowledge of the accused and therefore irrelevant speculation; (b) such a question places an illegitimate onus upon the accused to explain; and (c) failure to provide a motive may lead to the jury unfairly jumping to the conclusion that the complainant is necessarily telling the truth. A direction to the jury might meet the last objection but not the other two.

[page 143] The motives of a witness to lie are a legitimate matter for inquiry and comment, but care must always be taken to ensure, by careful direction if necessary, that the jury does not infer, from the mere discrediting of a particular motive, that a key witness is thereby necessarily made more credible or is necessarily telling the truth and therefore the matter is proved beyond reasonable doubt.364 It may also undermine the presumption of innocence to suggest to the jury that the testimony of the accused is to be the subject of close scrutiny because of his or her interest in the outcome of the case.365 But the joint judgment of the majority (French CJ, Gumow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) in Hargraves v R366 regarded formulations of ‘rules’ against particular directions derived from cases such as Palmer and Robinson as simply reflecting the wider principles of the common law accusatorial trial which place the onus on the prosecution to establish the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.367 The majority, holding that these principles were not undermined by the general credibility directions before them, emphasised (at [42]) that ‘the judge’s instruction to the jury, whether by way of legal direction or judicial commentary on the facts, must not deflect the jury’s attention from the need to be persuaded beyond reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt before returning a verdict of guilty’, and (at [45]) that: ‘In every case, the ultimate question must be whether, taken as a whole, the judge’s instruction to the jury deflected the jury from its proper task’. But there is no ‘rule’, for example, to direct the jury in terms of the presumption of innocence.368 [page 144] 2.72 Secondly, apart from emphasising the eliminative nature of the standard, appellate courts warn against any elaboration of the phrase ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.369 One fear is that judicial elaboration will water down the very strictness of the standard. But more fundamentally, as Phillips JA emphasises in R v Chatzidimitrious,370 it is not the function of the judge to tell the jury which of its doubts are reasonable and which are not. That is their exclusive province.

To emphasise to the jury that their function is to determine whether there is a reasonable doubt, it may be no misdirection to explain in general terms that the standard requires the jury to entertain ‘reasonable doubts’ rather than entertain ‘fanciful possibilities’ (possible innocent explanations of the evidence before the court)371 or ‘groundless speculations’.372 But even here a judge must be careful, and in a case in which a very high figure of statistical probability was presented to the court it was held a misdirection to explain that the standard was not proof beyond a ‘skerrick of doubt’.373 In the circumstances, the direction might have caused the jury to accept the very high statistical probability rather than applying the traditional, non-mathematical standard to the case as a whole.374 [page 145] How much further a judge may go is problematical. The standard requires a jury to eliminate ‘reasonable’ doubts rather than ‘any’ doubts whatsoever. It is suggested by Phillips JA in R v Chatzidimitrious375 that an explanation in these general terms may also be permissible, it then being left to the jury to determine whether its doubts are reasonable. But it is not clear how this view sits with other authority which rejects instruction to the jury to analyse remaining doubts in order to decide which are reasonable.376 These cases proceed upon the assumption that a reasonable doubt is by definition that which remains in the mind of a (reasonable) jury after carefully considering all the evidence in the case. In R v Chatzidimitrious, the majority held that it was not improper for the trial judge, having refused to define ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, to have acceded to the jury’s request for a dictionary so they could make up their own minds about the application of that phrase in the case before them.377 Callaway JA dissented on the basis that acceding to their request was tantamount to encouraging the jury to dissect the traditional formulation by examining its doubts, and that this undermined the practical consequence of that formulation, which is that a reasonable doubt is that which still remains after a reasonable jury has carefully examined all the evidence. There is no further definition or test to apply. 2.73 Only in one case is elaboration encouraged at common law. Where proof depends entirely upon circumstantial evidence so that the jury must expressly decide between conflicting hypotheses, it is permissible, and generally desirable, to emphasise the eliminative nature of the standard and direct the jury to find the

evidence consistent with the Crown’s hypothesis and inconsistent with any other reasonable explanatory innocent hypothesis.378 In some circumstances, it may be necessary to direct in these terms, and failure to do so might constitute a miscarriage of justice resulting in successful [page 146] appeal.379 It might be argued that a direction in these eliminative terms should be required in every case to effectively explain the essence of the criminal standard. In Victoria, directions about the criminal standard are now governed by ss 63 and 64 of the Jury Directions Act 2015. Section 63 provides: (1) The trial judge may give the jury an explanation of the phrase ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ if the jury asks the trial judge (a) a direct question about the meaning of the phrase; or (b) asks a question that indirectly raises the meaning of the phrase. (2) Subsection (1) does not limit any other power of a trial judge to give an explanation of the phrase ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.

Subsection (2) would appear to allow the judge to explain the phrase in accordance with the common law and to preserve the direction in relation to cases reliant upon circumstantial evidence that reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence must be eliminated. But s 64 then provides: (1) If the jury has asked a direct question about the meaning of the phrase, or a question that indirectly raises the meaning of the phrase, ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’, the trial judge may — (a)

refer to— (i)

the presumption of innocence; and

(ii) the prosecution’s obligation to prove that the accused is guilty; or (b) indicate that it is not enough for the prosecution to persuade the jury that the accused is probably guilty or very likely to be guilty; or (c) indicate that— (i)

it is almost impossible to prove anything with absolute certainty when reconstructing past events; and

(ii) the prosecution does not have to do so; or (d) indicate that the jury cannot be satisfied that the accused is guilty if the jury has a reasonable doubt about whether the accused is guilty; or (e) indicate that a reasonable doubt is not an imaginary or fanciful doubt or an unrealistic possibility.

(2) The trial judge may adapt his or her explanation of the phrase ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ in order to respond to the particular question asked by the jury.

While subs (1)(d) and (e) appear to endorse the common law limits of explanation, this section does not appear expressly to endorse explanation emphasising the eliminative nature of the standard. [page 147] To which facts does the criminal standard apply? 2.74 A vital question concerning the application of the criminal standard of proof is whether the standard applies only to the case as a whole or whether it applies to each material fact and, in turn, to each fact the existence of which is essential to prove each material fact. This question is of considerable importance in cases turning upon circumstantial evidence, that is, where there are no eyewitnesses to the crime alleged to have been committed by the accused and it can only be inferred from surrounding circumstances. An associated question is the extent to which the trial judge is obliged to isolate material and essential facts and expressly direct the jury to apply the criminal standard to each and every one of them. This is a slightly different problem. On appeal, the first question arises where the court is asked to find that the jury’s verdict cannot be sustained upon the tendered evidence; the second arises when the convicted accused complains that the summing-up contains a misdirection (an error of law). Mathematicians must argue that the standard applies to the case as a whole, and that, upon breaking down a fact situation into its essential facts and inferences, the equations of the probability calculus can be applied to determine the mathematical probability of the accused’s (overall) guilt. The application of the criminal standard involves asking whether this (overall) guilt has reached the required mathematical standard (whatever that might be).380 On the other hand, inductivists argue that, as fact-finding depends upon the finding of explanations for evidence, logically evidence must first be isolated and then inferences drawn, sequentially or in combination, in seeking explanation of it; in a criminal prosecution, one explanation to the exclusion of all other reasonable explanations. Within this logic, the overall probability of guilt may be no higher than the probability of the evidence and inferences upon which explanation depends. 2.75 This inductive approach is illustrated by R v Van Beelen,381 a case reliant

upon circumstantial evidence. To identify the accused as a murderer, the prosecution tendered evidence of trace materials originating from the victim and which were found on or near the accused, and trace materials originating from the accused which were found on or near the victim. The material consisted of hairs, fibres (from clothing), specks of paint allegedly from the accused’s car, and so on. There was evidence that each set of materials had similar characteristics, such that it could be inferred each set came from a common source. It was argued that the only explanation for the finding of the totality of these matching materials was that the accused and the victim had come into contact (a fact denied by the accused). [page 148] To reach this conclusion, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, in a classic, albeit implicit, reference to Wigmorean analysis, said that four mental steps (inferences) were necessary:382 First, it would be necessary to accept the evidence of the police that they found the various trace materials where they said they found them, ie some on or about the deceased or her environment and others on or about the appellant or his environment. The next step would be to find that certain similarities existed between the trace materials associated with the deceased or her environment and those associated with the appellant or his environment and the absence of any relevant dissimilarities, so that the various sets of trace materials could have originated from the same source. The third step would be to find that they did originate from the same source, and the fourth that the appellant would then have been so closely in contact with the girl that he must have been her assailant and, indeed, her slayer.

The first two steps were subject to direct evidence from the police as to the finding of the materials, and from various experts who had examined the minute particles of material and testified to their similarities.383 The other steps were a matter of inference from this evidence. With ‘D’ representing the appellant, ‘V’ the victim, and ‘W’ the relevant witnesses, a Wigmorean chart might look something like this:

[page 149] Seeking explanation of the tendered evidence, the Full Court sought first to isolate the evidence and secondly to consider the possible inferences and their sequence from that evidence. Within this analysis the court was of the view that unless from the evidence tendered the jury could infer beyond reasonable doubt that the materials were found by the police where alleged and possessed the matching similarities as alleged by the analysts, they could not support circumstantial proof of the case as a whole. 2.76 However, in summing up to the jury the trial judge had said, inter alia:384 I direct you as a matter of law — and I remind you that you must accept my directions on the law — that you do not have to find every single fact in the prosecution case proved beyond reasonable doubt … You are to consider the whole of the evidence, not only such evidence as may satisfy you beyond reasonable doubt that a particular fact was established, but also evidence about which you can only conclude that some fact was probably so, or even only might have been so.

In relation to the four mental steps elucidated by the Full Court, this was held to constitute a misdirection, for if the jury was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the police had found the trace materials where alleged, and that the matching similarities testified to were established, the case as a whole had to fail and the direction did not make this clear.

2.77 But this is not to say that every individual inference must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, because doubtful inferences, based upon particular facts, may be combined in appropriate circumstances where they all lead to the one conclusion. For example, in R v Van Beelen, the Full Court described the permissible approach to the matching similarities thus:385 Obviously, if there had been only one pair of specimens, one associated with the deceased and the other with the appellant, which could have come from the same source, it would be quite unsafe to infer that they did so come. But if there were a sufficient number of such pairs or sets of specimens, the jury, in our view, would be entitled to come to the conclusion that the number was too great to be attributed to coincidence and to pass from a finding of consistency of origin to a finding of identity of origin when the scientific evidence was taken in conjunction with the admitted evidence of opportunity and the absence of any evidence of opportunity on the part of any other specific person. Of course, on this point the jury would have to consider the probabilities or otherwise of the specimens matching by chance and the comparative abundance or scarcity of such objects in the community. On that they could take into account both the expert evidence and their own knowledge of life.

This combination of a number of doubtful or weak inferences (comprising strands in a cable stretching towards the one conclusion of fact) is the very process of proof by circumstantial evidence, and nothing said by the court in R v Van Beelen was intended to detract from this process of circumstantial proof where appropriate. [page 150] 2.78 The approach of the Full Court was endorsed by the High Court in Chamberlain v R (No 2).386 Unfortunately, the explanation given by the High Court has led to some confusion, which has not been entirely dispelled by the later case of Shepherd v R.387 Chamberlain is probably the most publicised Australian criminal case of modern times. The issue was whether it could be established circumstantially that Lindy Chamberlain had murdered her baby Azaria while camping near Uluru (then referred to as Ayers Rock). Her defence was that she had seen a dingo making off with the child and much of the case was concerned with the credibility of that account, including whether the evidence was consistent with such an hypothesis.388 There was some additional, more positive evidence against the accused: evidence of opportunity; lack of apparent distress at the loss of her baby; evidence

that clothes from the child had been interfered with by human contact; evidence that the blood on the clothes was most consistent with the child having had her throat cut; and, crucially, evidence of various blood stains found on the accused’s clothes and joggers, on a camera bag kept in the accused’s car, and on the car itself, particularly on the front passenger side of the car where the prosecution alleged the accused had cut the baby’s throat.389 The prosecution had led expert evidence that tests carried out on the latter blood stains showed that the foetal haemoglobin content was such that the blood must have come from a baby about the age of the deceased Azaria. The High Court appeal concentrated upon this expert evidence. It was established to the satisfaction of the court that no jury could safely have concluded that the blood contained the foetal haemoglobin alleged. It was in this context the High Court endorsed Van Beelen and said that, if the verdict in the case before it was to be justified, it had to be upon the basis that the evidence could only show at its highest that human blood was found on the relevant objects. Having so decided, the majority was prepared to say that even if only human blood could be shown to have been found, it could not be said that the jury’s verdict was unsafe, in the sense that on the remaining evidence adduced a reasonable jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt. In the course of reaching this decision Gibbs CJ and Mason J said:390 … the jury cannot view a fact as a basis for an inference of guilt unless at the end of the day they are satisfied of the existence of that fact beyond reasonable doubt.

[page 151] This statement, perfectly understandable in the context of Chamberlain — that is, foetal blood could not be used as the basis for an inference of guilt because the existence of foetal haemoglobin could not be established — was then interpreted as not permitting facts to be used unless there is no ambiguity about the individual inference to be drawn from them. Yet this was the very situation in both Van Beelen and Chamberlain. In the former, it could not be inferred beyond reasonable doubt from each set of matching trace materials that each had a common source, only that they were consistent with such a view. It was the combination of individually doubtful inferences that led to proof. In the latter, it could not be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the blood was foetal, but it was

apparently blood and therefore not inconsistent with being foetal blood.391 Such evidence of consistency is clearly not as strong as evidence which beyond doubt establishes a common source or beyond doubt establishes foetal blood, but in combination with other inferences (strands in the cable) it may nevertheless support the hypothesis sought beyond reasonable doubt. 2.79 Doubtful inferences may therefore combine to produce proof. They may be inferential strands in a cable of proof. But which facts can be used as a basis for drawing those inferences is another matter. It is here that Van Beelen and Chamberlain make it clear that, if inferences are to be drawn towards proof beyond reasonable doubt, then logically the facts from which they are to be drawn must first be established to the same standard. As it could not be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the blood found in Chamberlain was foetal, no inference was permitted from that fact. However, as the court found that the jury was entitled to find beyond any reasonable doubt that the blood was of human origin, and therefore not inconsistent with being foetal blood, an inference was permitted from this fact. 2.80 The terminology in this area is one source of confusion. Gibbs CJ and Mason J distinguish ‘primary facts’ and ‘inferences’: see Chamberlain.392 But the distinctions can be drawn only in the context of that inferential Wigmorean chart that the judge (or jury) happens to have implicitly in mind. The crucial distinction is between ‘facts’ and ‘inferences’. But what is a fact at one stage may be a matter for inference at a preceding stage. For example, if the accused’s involvement is to be inferred from the finding of foetal blood in the accused’s car, the finding of that foetal blood is a fact from which involvement will be inferred (in combination with inferences to be drawn from other facts). But whether the blood is foetal, a matter considered at a preceding stage in the inferential map, will be inferred from other facts (tests, experiments etc). In turn these facts will have been established by inference. And so on back along the inferential chain to the testimony of the witnesses and other evidence directly perceived by the trier of fact. It is in this context that facts are described as ‘basic’, ‘primary’ or ‘intermediate’. [page 152] Nevertheless, it can been seen from the approaches taken in both the Supreme

Court of South Australia in Van Beelen and the High Court in Chamberlain that proof is to be approached inductively, not mathematically, and that logically each stage of the inferential process, if isolated by application of the Wigmorean process described at 1.8–1.11 above, defines the level of acceptance required before the trier of fact moves to the next. 2.81 However, whether the jury should be encouraged to use Wigmorean analysis and directed in respect of any particular inferences is another matter. In R v Van Beelen,393 the Full Court recognised the confusion that would be produced if in every case the trial judge was required to dissect the reasoning process and instruct the level of proof required at each stage. It is one thing to say that logic dictates that some inferences cannot be concluded beyond reasonable doubt from doubtful facts; but another to say that a judge is obliged to isolate every stage of the inferential process and direct such definitive proof. Nevertheless, on the basis of past authority the Full Court said that in appropriate cases the jury might have to be told to find a fact at an essential stage ‘clearly proved’ if it is to convict. In Chamberlain v R (No 2),394 the High Court recognised the artificiality of these different terms and, not being bound by the same authority, held that in appropriate cases a trial judge might be obliged to direct the jury that facts at an essential stage be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 2.82 These dicta have been applied by subsequent courts, for example, the Full Court of the Federal Court in Dominguez v R395 and the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria in R v Sorby,396 where it is made clear that the question of whether failure to direct that a fact at an essential stage be proved beyond reasonable doubt constitutes a misdirection depends upon the circumstances of the case and the summing-up as a whole. In each of these cases, it was held that the jury could have been under no misapprehension in their application of the criminal standard. Generally, in the absence of any suggestion that less than beyond reasonable doubt is sufficient proof of a fact at an essential stage, the overall direction to find the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt will suffice.397 If the facts essential to this process have been clearly articulated in the summing-up, no further direction is necessary. On the other hand, it will be no misdirection for a trial judge to bring the standard to the jury’s attention at this stage and it may in some circumstances be necessary for him or her to do so.398 [page 153]

2.83 But some courts took a more literal view of the remarks of Gibbs CJ and Mason J. They interpreted these judges as requiring in cases turning on circumstantial evidence, that the jury be directed to find each ‘primary fact’ they rely upon proved beyond reasonable doubt. This became known as a ‘Chamberlain direction’, and some judges in the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal were prepared to hold that failure to give a Chamberlain direction was ipso facto grounds for appeal. The matter arose for decision in the High Court in Shepherd v R.399 It was argued that the Chamberlain direction confused the process of proof insofar as it suggested that evidence and facts could not be viewed cumulatively to produce proof beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court recognised this, holding that the Chamberlain direction is not always an appropriate direction. But in so holding, the High Court sowed seeds for further confusion. Mason CJ, wanting to accommodate the process of circumstantial inference, explained his and Gibbs CJ’s dictum in Chamberlain by altering it to read:400 … the jury cannot view an intermediate fact as an indispensable basis for an inference of guilt unless at the end of the day they are satisfied of the existence of that fact beyond reasonable doubt.

Only in relation to these indispensable ‘intermediate facts’ might there be an obligation to direct. Dawson J, with whom Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ agreed, also employs the terminology of intermediate facts. However, it is not entirely clear which facts are intermediate facts. If the term refers to all stages in the Wigmorean inferential chain as illustrated above, then it accords with the above analysis. And this interpretation appears implicit in the explanation by Dawson J. To accommodate the cumulative force of a mass of evidence he rejects the notion that every fact, every item of evidence taken into account, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, saying it would be ‘pointless to consider the degree of probability of each item of evidence separately’. But he does recognise that the material facts and some other essential facts might require separate consideration and proof. Thus, he says:401 … it may sometimes be necessary or desirable to identify those intermediate facts which constitute indispensable links in a chain of reasoning towards an inference of guilt. Not every possible intermediate conclusion of fact will be of that character. If it is appropriate to identify an intermediate fact as indispensable it may well be appropriate to tell the jury that that fact must be found beyond reasonable doubt before the ultimate inference can be drawn. But where — to use the metaphor referred to by Wigmore on Evidence, vol 9 (Chadbourn revision 1981), para 2497, pp 412– 14, the evidence consists of strands in a cable rather than links in a chain, it will not be appropriate to give such a warning.

[page 154] This dictum raises two difficulties. First, it suggests that the intermediate facts are only the penultimate facts from which the ultimate inference of guilt is drawn (see also Dawson J in Shepherd:402 ‘… in most, if not all, cases that ultimate inference [of guilt] must be drawn from some intermediate factual conclusion’). But in terms of inductive logic this is too narrow a view of the inferential process. As the above analysis of Van Beelen shows, intermediate facts at every stage of the inferential chain may, in terms of inductive logic, demand proof beyond reasonable doubt before the ultimate inference of guilt can be drawn to the same standard.403 But secondly, this dictum suggests that where evidence supports strands in a cable of proof rather than links in a chain of proof there is never need for the jury to be directed that they require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The terminology used here is confusing. Neither ‘evidence’ nor ‘facts’ are strands of the cable. The inferences drawn from them constitute the strands. One can accept that individual inferences need not be capable of supporting the factual conclusion desired beyond reasonable doubt, but in logic one must remain clear about the evidence and facts from which those inferences are being drawn. Thus, in Chamberlain (which is neither overruled nor disapproved of in Shepherd), the court held that no inference could be drawn from the foetal nature of the blood. In this sense, if the foetal blood was to be used as a basis for inference, its foetal nature required proof as an indispensable intermediate fact. Thus, in terms of inductive logic, even where inferences operate as strands in a cable, there remains room for regarding any facts relied upon as giving rise to those inferential strands as ‘indispensable’ to drawing them. If this is so, where that inferential strand is important (a ‘thick strand’), the jury should be directed about which facts it must find beyond reasonable doubt before that inferential strand can be drawn.404 Furthermore, if, despite there being a number of inferential strands, the jury might isolate one of these strands and regard it as a link in a chain of proof, and base conviction upon that strand alone, there is again a strong argument that the jury should be directed to find that inference (now a ‘link’ rather than a ‘strand’) beyond reasonable doubt before acting upon it. [page 155]

2.84 However, subsequent cases appear to take a stricter approach to the notion of ‘indispensable’ intermediate facts in rejecting any requirement for jury direction. In R v Kotzmann,405 the prosecution sought to identify the accused by identifying the gun used in the robbery as a gun that was in the accused’s possession at the relevant time. If this had been the only evidence against the accused, the court accepted that proof of the identity of the gun would have been an indispensable intermediate fact, being an indispensable link in a chain of proof. And it would then have been appropriate for the jury to be directed that it could only convict the accused if satisfied of that identity beyond reasonable doubt. But there was also other circumstantial evidence linking the accused to the crime: evidence of his movements before and after the crime and of his possession of the proceeds of the robbery. This could be used in combination with the evidence relating to the identity of the gun to create inferential strands in a cable of circumstantial proof. In this context, the similarity of the guns rather than their proved identity might be sufficient in combination with the other evidence to find the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. This being so, the Court of Criminal Appeal held that the identity of the gun was not an indispensable intermediate fact requiring direction of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Where a fact (the similarity of the guns) can also be used to support an inference in a cable of proof it is not logically indispensable. 2.85 Although, in the light of the complexity of the above discussion, one can understand the courts’ reluctance to direct juries about how to dissect and combine the evidence before them, particularly in cases turning on extensive circumstantial evidence, this explanation of an indispensable intermediate fact creates two problems. First, it simply ignores how the jury might reason about the evidence before them. It might reason sequentially. The jury in Kotzmann might have convicted the accused because it was satisfied (and not necessarily beyond reasonable doubt) of the identity of the gun. It is probably implicit in Kotzmann that the court rejected this possibility. But if this sort of sequential reasoning is a distinct possibility (and this will depend upon how the case has been presented), it may be appropriate to direct the jury not to so reason unless it finds that indispensable intermediate fact proved beyond reasonable doubt.406 The logic of this is supported by that authority (including Kotzmann at [21]) [page 156]

demanding that where evidence of a full confession (including a confession inferred from lies) is relied upon by the prosecution, even where other evidence against the accused exists, generally the jury should be directed not to find the accused guilty unless it finds the fact of the confession and its truthfulness and accuracy established beyond reasonable doubt.407 2.86 The second problem with the Kotzmann analysis is that it fails to clarify the process of inductive proof and what facts must be found to justify the drawing of inferential strands in a cable of proof. The jury should not be encouraged to draw inferential strands from facts that cannot be found beyond reasonable doubt. This was the problem in Chamberlain, where the jury was left to draw an inferential strand from the foetal nature of the blood when this could not be established. In Kotzmann, the jury may similarly have been influenced by evidence of the identity of the gun even though not satisfied of this identity beyond reasonable doubt. But either the evidence in Kotzmann was able to prove to the jury’s satisfaction ‘the identity’ of the gun beyond reasonable doubt, in which case the accused was proven guilty, or it only established to the jury’s satisfaction similarities (of a greater or lesser degree) between the gun used and that in the accused’s possession, in which case an inference from the similarity could only convict the accused if combined with inferences from other circumstantial evidence of involvement. There was no inferential strand in a cable of proof — no converging inference — to be drawn from ‘the identity’ of the gun, only from its ‘similarity’. If there had been any risk of the jury drawing an inference from ‘identity’, it should have been so instructed. What Chamberlain emphasises is that when considering inferential strands in a cable of proof one must be clear about the facts from which the inferences are being drawn. 2.87 In a number of particular contexts courts have considered whether facts attract direction of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Earlier common law authorities suggest that whenever evidence of other misconduct is admissible to establish a propensity capable of founding an inference towards guilt, then the jury should be directed that it [page 157] accept the misconduct beyond reasonable doubt before acting upon it.408 But later state decisions suggest, following the Kotzmann analysis of Shepherd, that this

requirement should be confined to where that admissible propensity is in logic an indispensable link in a sequential chain of proof.409 Central to the position at common law is HML v R,410 a case concerning the admissibility of uncharged acts of sexual conduct testified to by the complainant in alleging charged acts of sexual assault. Hayne, Kirby and Gummow JJ appear to give support to the view that whenever uncharged acts are admissible they require proof beyond reasonable doubt.411 Later state authority has taken this view.412 But insofar as this approach depends upon such evidence only being admissible if its tendency use has no rational explanation consistent with the accused’s innocence (the Pfennig test), it is distinguishable in jurisdictions that do not, as a result of legislation, take this approach to the admissibility of uncharged acts.413 While Heydon J offered no concluded opinion on the subject, the three remaining members of the court (Gleeson CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ) took the view that the Pfennig test applies only where evidence of misconduct is tendered specifically for a propensity use, and as the [page 158] evidence before them had not been so tendered, the question of a direction on proof of an admissible propensity never arose. They regarded the evidence of the uncharged acts as relevant for two non-propensity uses: first, to provide context (to enable a full understanding of the complainant’s testimony) and, secondly, to show the accused’s sexual interest in the complainant — the latter being commonly admitted in trials for sexual assault414 to provide evidence of motive.415 To these uses Crennan J applied Shepherd to conclude no criminal direction was required. But while agreeing that neither use was an indispensable link in a chain of proof, both Gleeson CJ (at [32]) and Kiefel J (at [506]) favoured the view that, because of the significance of evidence of sexual interest, the jury should be directed to act upon it only if satisfied of its proof beyond reasonable doubt.416 Gleeson CJ further explained that where (as in the case before him) it is the complainant who gives evidence of uncharged acts ‘it may be unrealistic … to contemplate that any reasonable jury would differentiate between the reliability of the complainant’s evidence as to the uncharged acts and the complainant’s evidence as to the charged acts’, and so it is preferable that the jury be directed to the same standard of proof.417

As a consequence, Hayne J declared in HML (at [247]) that ‘a majority of the Court is of the opinion that [i]n the ordinary course a jury would be instructed by the trial judge that they must only find that the accused has a sexual interest in the complainant if it is proved beyond reasonable doubt’. This dictum has been applied in a number of state decisions,418 although others have sought to emphasise that the direction is not obligatory and it must be shown that its absence has caused a miscarriage of [page 159] justice.419 But if sexual interest requires such a direction it can be strongly argued that at common law, whenever evidence of other misconduct is tendered to establish a relevant and admissible propensity the jury should be similarly directed in terms of the criminal standard. In all jurisdictions, the common law concerning the admissibility of other misconduct has been replaced (or in the case of Queensland substantially modified) by legislation.420 In making admissibility rules dependent upon the purpose of tender (s 97) and not enacting the Pfennig test of admissibility (s 101), the uniform legislation allows the approach of Hayne, Kirby and Gummow JJ in HML to be distinguished421 and provides support for that of Gleeson CJ and Kiefel and Crennan JJ. This legislation does not, however, affect the authority of Shepherd. Nevertheless, the practice under the uniform legislation, because of the influence such evidence can have, is to direct juries to find both evidence admitted as tendency422 and evidence admitted as of sexual interest423 established beyond reasonable doubt whether or not it constitutes an indispensable step in a chain of proof. Where misconduct is tendered simply to provide a relevant context for the complainant’s testimony, no direction about the criminal standard is required although the strictly limited purposes for which the evidence may be used must be emphasised.424 In Western Australia, where s 31A of [page 160] the Evidence Act 1906 governs the admissibility of propensity evidence, authority supports a similar approach.425

In South Australia, s 34R of the Evidence Act 1929 specifically provides that where evidence of discreditable conduct is admitted under s 34P then if ‘that evidence is essential to the process of reasoning leading to a finding of guilt, the evidence cannot be used unless on the whole of the evidence, the facts in proof of which the evidence was admitted are established beyond reasonable doubt, and the judge must (whether or not sitting with a jury) give a direction accordingly’. In R v MJJ; R v CJN,426 Vanstone J said that s 34R ‘embodies the rule in Shepherd’ but it may be that such evidence remains ‘essential to the process of reasoning’, as a crucial circumstantial intermediate fact, even where it is not a logically indispensable link in a chain of proof. And one might argue that the criminal standard should be demanded whenever there is a risk that a jury will regard it as essential even where as a matter of strict logic it might not be indispensable to a chain of reasoning. In Victoria, s 62 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 abolishes any common law rule demanding directions in terms of the criminal standard beyond the elements of the offence or the absence of a relevant defence. The notes to s 62 specifically refer to ‘the rule attributed to Shepherd v R’ and ‘the rule attributed to R v Sadler [2008] VSCA 198’). However, as the judge is permitted to direct about elements in terms of factual questions decisive of the case (s 67(2) and (3)), this may require the judge to isolate facts to which the criminal standard must be applied by the jury. In Penney v R,427 it is suggested that at common law, wherever a motive is relied upon it should be established beyond reasonable doubt, but again state cases428 have read these dicta down in the light of Kotzmann. Where the motive is established through sexual interest, as noted above, a direction to find the interest established beyond reasonable doubt is generally required in all jurisdictions other than Victoria. [page 161] In the case of DNA evidence, some courts are more forthright in requiring the jury to be directed to accept the reliability of that evidence beyond reasonable doubt before acting on it,429 even when presented with other circumstantial evidence, perhaps because it is always a ‘thick strand’430 in the cable of proof. But again, more recently courts have said that strictly the jury need only to be

generally so directed where the DNA evidence is ‘indispensable’ in the Kotzmann sense.431 2.88 Whether the accused’s lies are indispensable intermediate facts involving proof beyond reasonable doubt was considered by the High Court in Edwards v R.432 There the majority held, following Shepherd, that where a lie by the accused is relied upon to support an inference of guilt, it is not necessary that the jury find beyond reasonable doubt that the lie was motivated by a consciousness of guilt of the crime charged if there is, besides the lie, other evidence from which that same inference of guilt may be drawn (other inferential strands in the cable). Thus, if a lie by the accused is put forward to corroborate other evidence it is enough that ‘consciousness of guilt’ inference is capable of being drawn.433 On the other hand, if the accused’s lie is the only evidence of guilt — is the logically indispensable intermediate fact in a chain of proof — then clearly the jury will have to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that it was motivated by a consciousness of guilt of the crime charged if the accused is to be convicted.434 There may be other cases where a lie is of such significance that as a [page 162] matter of prudence the jury should be warned to find it proved beyond reasonable doubt before acting upon it.435 2.89 Even if a court accepts a fact to be an indispensable intermediate fact logically requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, the question whether the jury must be so directed if a miscarriage of justice is to be avoided remains a separate question. Courts are reluctant to direct juries how to reason as opposed to how not to reason and are conscious that too much dissection and analysis of facts may confuse the jury. As Dawson J concludes in Shepherd:436 [Such direction] should not be given … where it would be unnecessary or confusing to do so.437 It will generally be sufficient to tell the jury that the guilt of the accused must be established beyond reasonable doubt and, where it is helpful to do so, to tell them that they must entertain such a doubt where any other inference consistent with innocence is reasonably open on the evidence.

Where there are ‘indispensable intermediate facts’, the trial judge should not attempt to explain that notion to the jury but, if appropriate in the circumstances, merely point out which facts require proof beyond reasonable doubt if the accused is to be found guilty.438

Challenging unreasonable verdicts and applying the proviso 2.90 The process of proof through application of the criminal standard is not the sole province of juries and trial courts. Appellate courts are also required to determine the sufficiency of evidence in asking whether the verdict of the jury is unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence. Although appellate courts are reluctant to interfere with jury verdicts, the High Court has made it clear that appellate courts have a responsibility to overrule verdicts where, having examined the evidence on the record for themselves, they consider that a reasonable doubt necessarily remains (rather than artificially attempt to ask whether a rational jury could have convicted on the evidence). This is an issue of sufficiency distinct from the question of whether there is a case to answer made out. In determining sufficiency on appeal, the eliminative nature of the criminal standard is of fundamental significance — whether on the evidence a reasonable doubt necessarily remains.439 This eliminative nature is most clearly exposed in cases turning on circumstantial evidence where appellate courts [page 163] (and judges sitting alone) focus on the question of whether all reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence can be eliminated.440 By the same token, where there are prima facie grounds for upholding an appeal due to an error of law or some other miscarriage of justice, the High Court has made it clear that in applying the proviso, again it is the responsibility of the appellate court to examine the record and dismiss the appeal where it believes that, on the evidence properly before the court, the accused’s guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.441 When asked to interfere, appellate courts may be faced with the question of whether an intermediate fact can be proved beyond reasonable doubt and relied upon as a circumstantial intermediate fact. This was the situation in Chamberlain v R (No 2),442 with the High Court deciding that it could not be proved that the blood in question was foetal in character. However, the court went on to hold that even without evidence of that foetal character the totality of evidence in that case supported conviction to the requisite standard.443 Matters of sufficiency were again decisive.444 In other cases, the inability to prove an indispensable intermediate fact has been the very basis of successful appeal. For example, with

DNA evidence being increasingly decisive, cases have arisen where, despite there being a DNA match, evidence has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the DNA was deposited during the crime rather than on another occasion.445

Proof on the voir dire 2.91 For the sake of completeness, one other context in which decisions of fact are made by judges is mentioned; that is, where they determine on the voir dire the facts upon which a rule of admissibility depends. Although these determinations arise at the evidence collecting stage of the trial they, nonetheless, involve decisions of fact, and must be decided by reference to the natural rules of fact discovery and the appropriate legal standards of proof. These preliminary issues of fact are matters for the judge even when a jury is sitting. [page 164] There are differences in opinion over the standard of proof appropriate at the voir dire in criminal cases where the prosecution seeks to establish admissibility. Some English authorities favour the criminal standard, whereas in Australia it has been generally held that the civil standard is appropriate.446 If the civil standard is understood in the sense of the reasonable search for truth as explained at 2.59–2.67, it is arguable that, even in the case of confessions, the criminal standard goes too far, the fundamental protection of this standard being only appropriate at the trial. Where the accused seeks to establish admissibility there seems no doubt the civil standard applies, and in civil cases no other standard is appropriate. The uniform legislation makes it clear in s 142 that the civil standard applies.

Conclusion: the inductive approach 2.92 It is concluded that although the notion of proof lies at the very heart of the law of evidence an understanding of its nature remains beset with philosophical and practical difficulties. How the standards of proof are formulated depends upon which philosophical analysis is accepted as describing the process of proof in courts of law. It is contended that mathematical approaches are an inappropriate description of how courts approach the standards of proof. These standards do not embody mathematical notions but embody two forms of

hypothesis testing to be made having regard to all available evidence following a reasonable search for truth. The criminal form requires elimination of those hypotheses consistent with innocence upon consideration of the evidence available, so that absence of specific evidence makes it more difficult to conclude the guilty hypothesis. The civil form does not insist upon this sort of elimination and allows hypotheses to be weighed according to the available evidence, but with the proviso that this evidence constitute what can be regarded as, in the circumstances of the case, a reasonable search for truth. Each concentrates upon the discovery of individual events and ostensibly eschews the proportional generalisations implicit in mathematical theory. These standards may lack the apparent precision of mathematical expression, but they nevertheless constitute an orderly approach to decisions in the face of uncertainty.

The Ambit of Evidential Rules 2.93 Although the standards of proof have been legally formulated, their application relies essentially upon natural notions. It is left to triers of fact to do their best in applying these notions, free from legal constraints, in the search for factual rectitude. The evidence they consider in this search is not, however, free from constraint and, [page 165] through the concept of admissibility, the common law imposes restraints upon the consideration of evidence which, on natural notions of relevance, may appear to be otherwise available. The law of evidence is mainly concerned with these constraints, principally imposed, as has been argued in Chapter 1, to reflect the difficulties in applying natural notions of relevance and proof, and to ensure that evidence is maximised through its adversarial presentation and consideration (although policies extraneous to these notions do from time to time give rise to evidential constraints which may compromise the search for rectitude). It is with these evidential constraints, the rules of admissibility, that the remainder of this book is concerned. ______________________________ 1.

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth); Evidence Act 1995 (NSW); Evidence Act 2001 (Tas); Evidence Act 2008

(Vic); Evidence Act 2011 (ACT); Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT). The divisions and section sequences in this ‘mirroring’ legislation are common although the content is not always identical. 2.

Evidence, ALRC Report 38 (1987).

3.

This term is not defined but s 4(1) provides it includes ‘proceedings that — (a) relate to bail; or (b) are interlocutory proceedings or proceedings of a similar kind; or (c) are heard in chambers; or (d) subject to subs (2) [‘if the court so directs], relate to sentencing’ (absent direction the common law may apply: see Talukder v Dunbar [2009] ACTSC 42 at [17]–[19]). Proceedings have been held to include a step in an action: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v McCauley (1996) 22 Fam LR 538 at [34]–[37]; and protective proceedings: R v P [2001] NSWCA 473 at [38]. But examinations under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) or the Corporations Law, not being inter party nor ones where evidence may be adduced from witnesses, are arguably not ‘proceedings’ for the purposes of s 4: Griffin v Pantzer (2004) 137 FCR 209 at [198]–[206] (FC FCt); cf Re Interchase Corp Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 481; Doran Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 215 at [87]–[112]. The rules of evidence do not apply to proceedings by virtue of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act but as a doctrine of substantive law the common law principles of public interest immunity continue to apply unless expressly abrogated pursuant to the ‘principle of legality’ (see further at 5.183): Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Guo (2016) 69 AAR 74; [2016] FCAFC 62.

4.

Uniform legislation Pt 1.2, particularly s 4. For more detailed discussion of this Part, see Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law, 12th ed, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2016, pp 47–75; Williams, Anderson, Marychurch and Roy, Uniform Evidence in Australia, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2015, pp 12–43; LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, particularly at [1685]–[1700]. See also Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] FCA 1010 at [70]ff.

5.

Except where a federal court is hearing an appeal from a state or Northern Territory court: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 4(5)(a), (b). Where a state court exercises federal jurisdiction, that state’s evidential rules apply by virtue of s 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth): preserved by the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 8(1). For arguments favouring the application of the uniform legislation to follow the court rather than the jurisdiction, see Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [2.93]–[2.102].

6.

Whilst this includes the Family Court, the application of the Evidence Act is expressly modified by the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) in child-related proceedings: ss 69ZT, 69ZV. It is arguable that the Evidence Act cannot apply (pursuant to s 8(1)) if this is incompatible with the welfare of the child, which is paramount under s 60CA of the Family Law Act: Re Z (1996) 134 FLR 40.

7.

The New South Wales Coroners Court was held not created by parliament and, not being required to apply the laws of evidence, was held not subject to the New South Wales Act: Decker v State Coroner (NSW) (1999) 46 NSWLR 415 at [16]–[17]. Neither the Refugee Review Tribunal nor the Administrative Appeals Tribunal are bodies required to apply the laws of evidence and, not otherwise being courts, are not subject to the uniform legislation: Epiabaka v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 150 ALR 397; Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (2006) 67 NSWLR 91 at [16].

8.

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 5, 185, 186 and 187.

9.

(2000) 50 NSWLR 640 at [25]–[30]. See also Haddara v R (2014) 43 VR 53; [2013] VSCA 100 at [54]– [56], [69] (Redlich and Weinberg JJA) and more generally Heydon, ‘The Non-Uniformity of the “Uniform” Evidence Acts and Their Effect on the General Law’ (2013) 2 J Civil Litigation & Practice 169.

10. See Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371 at 373 (Branson J); R v McNeill (2008) 184 A Crim R 467; [2008] FCAFC 80 at [58]–[61] (referring to the uniform legislation in its application in Norfolk Island courts).

11. See cases cited in Meteyard v Love (2005) 65 NSWLR 36; [2005] NSWCA 444 at [114] by Basten JA. In Haddara v R (2014) 43 VR 53; [2013] VSCA 100 at [14]ff, particularly at [56]–[72], Redlich and Weinberg JJA argue that the common law principle to ensure the fairness of a criminal trial is not expressly excluded by s 56, and may operate as a residual power to exclude as a matter of ‘discretion’ evidence otherwise ‘admissible’ pursuant to s 56. Even if their argument is not accepted, the fair trial principle remains available to justify a stay of proceedings: see authorities at 2.29 nn 138–139. 12. LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, at [1765] adverts to there being no universal answer to the question of how far previous case law is relevant in interpreting the uniform evidence legislation. 13. See Evidence, ALRC Interim Report 26 (1985), vol 1, [64]; Evidence, ALRC Report 38 (1987), [28]; Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005). Rules about waiver and case to answer are examples of manifestations of this process: see 2.46–2.56 below. 14. This work makes no attempt to deal with the tender of evidence at sentencing. Where the prosecution seeks to rely upon facts as a basis for increasing the severity of the sentence, authority suggests these must be established beyond reasonable doubt (if so, arguably the rules of evidence should apply to establishing this standard); whilst it is enough that facts in mitigation be established by the accused at most on the balance of probabilities: Filippou v R (2015) 256 CLR 47; [2015] HCA 29 at [64]; see further LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [9070]; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 132C. In a proceeding governed by the uniform legislation, the uniform rules of evidence apply at sentencing facts only on direction (s 4(1)(d), (2)–(4)), and if no direction the common law applies: R v Bourchas (2002) 133 A Crim R 413 at 428 (Giles JA); Taluker v Dunbar [2009] ACTSC 42 at [17]–[18]; Farkas v R [2014] NSWCCA 141 at [14] (Basten JA). 15. Historical work explains the emergence of rules and practices, often implied by modern practitioners to be timeless: see Langbein, The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Trial, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003; Cairns, Advocacy and the Making of the Adversarial Criminal Trial 1800–1865, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998. 16. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) Ch 3 Pt 2; Justices Act 1886 (Qld) Pt 4 Div 12; Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) Pt 5 Div 4; Justices Act 1959 (Tas) Pt VI; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) Ch 4; Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) Pt 3 Div 4; Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) Pt 3.4 Div 3.4.4; Local Court (Criminal Procedure) Act (NT) Pt V Div 1. 17. Disclosure before trial in criminal cases is discussed further at 5.12ff. 18. Lord Woolf’s inquiry into civil justice in England and Wales has been influential in Australia. Many of the proposals and refinements to the English Civil Procedure Rules 1998 have been adopted in Australian jurisdictions: see Woolf, Access to Justice, HMSO, London, 1996. 19. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ss 132–133 (by order following mutual agreement or agreement of accused: ss 132–133, discussed in R v Gittany [2013] NSWSC 1503; s 133 requires judges to demonstrate in their reasons that they have taken account of the same warnings and directions that would be given if the trial had been by jury: Filippou v R (2015) 256 CLR 47; [2015] HCA 29 at [52]); Criminal Code (Qld) ss 614–615E (by application of either party in interests of justice but accused must consent; s 615 discussed in R v Kissier (2012) 212 A Crim R 121; [2011] QCA 223; R v Sica (2013) 232 A Crim R 572; [2013] QCA 247); Juries Act 1927 (SA) s 7 (generally by election of accused if judge satisfied accused sought legal advice for the trial to proceed without a jury, but subject to certain exceptions by application); Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) s 118 (by application of either party ‘in the interests of justice’ but accused must consent: discussed in Western Australia v Rayney (2011) 42 WAR 383; [2011] WASC 326, where ordered due to pre-trial publicity; and LFG v Western Australia (2015) 48 WAR 178; [2015] WASCA 88 at [83]–[150] (Martin CJ extensively considering principles and authorities; not ordered as jury directions sufficient protection from prejudice)); Supreme Court Act (ACT) s 68B (by election of the accused after legal advice). Section 80 of the Australian Constitution

provides that ‘The trial on indictment of any offence against any law of the Commonwealth shall be by jury’ and this provision applies to state courts trying federal offences by virtue of s 68 of the Judiciary Act: Alqudsi v R (2016) 90 ALJR 711; [2016] HCA 24 (accused charged on indictment for federal offence unable to seek trial by judge alone under New South Wales legislation; s 80 strictly construed). 20. R v Hansen [2002] SASC 208 at [89]–[90] (Lander J). In R v WAF and SBN [2010] 1 Qd R 370; [2009] QCA 144, the prosecutor’s calling of evidence not referred to in opening was held to have caused a miscarriage of justice. In trials on indictment, legislation in some jurisdictions permits or invites (and in Victoria demands where the accused is represented) an accused, as well as later opening after the prosecution case, to make a statement immediately following the prosecutor’s opening to explain the matters disputed and to be raised by way of defence (and in Victoria is required to respond to the written prosecution opening that must be served prior to trial): Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 159; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 288A (R v Karapandzk (2008) 184 A Crim R 320; [2008] SASC 126 (must identify issues, not lead evidence); Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) s 371; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 224, 225, 231. Legislation in other jurisdictions only expressly permits the defence to open after the prosecution case on the evidence (if any) the defence proposes to call: Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 619; Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) s 143 (an accused who is calling no evidence may open ‘immediately after the prosecutor has given or declined to give an opening address’); Criminal Code (NT) s 363, Sch 4. But as a matter of practice an earlier opening may be permitted: cf R v Hansen [2002] SASC 208 at [7]–[10] (Perry J), [99] (Lander J). 21. R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671; R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299; Downs Irrigation Co-op Association Ltd v National Bank of Australasia Ltd [1983] 1 Qd R 130; O’Meara v Western Australia (2012) 235 A Crim R 209; [2013] WASCA 228 (proof of a defendant witness’s prior inconsistent statement to discredit following cross-examination does not constitute splitting). A judge or magistrate has no general authority to order reopening: Weatherall v Whalan (1989) 50 SASR 319; Grosser v SA Police (1994) 63 SASR 243. For a principled discussion of the English common law situation in criminal cases, see Andrews, ‘Re-opening the Case for the Prosecution’ (1991) 107 LQR 577. 22. Urban Transport Authority (NSW) v Nweiser (1991) 28 NSWLR 471 at 478. 23. A judge may permit reopening any time before judgment is formally entered (Jingellic Minerals No Liability v Beach Petroleum (1991) 55 SASR 424) but courts are extremely reluctant to reopen after reasons for judgment have been given: see, for example, Manwell Pty Ltd v Dames and Moore Pty Ltd (2001) ATPR ¶41-845; [2001] QCA 436; Wentworth v Rogers [2002] NSWSC 921 (Barrett J). In Bulejcik v R (1996) 185 CLR 375; [1996] HCA 50 at [23]–[28], McHugh and Gummow JJ suggest it would be rare to permit reopening after a jury had retired. 24. Shaw v R (1952) 85 CLR 365 at 379–80 (Dixon, McTiernan, Webb and Kitto JJ), 383–4 (Fullagar J); Lawrence v R (1981) 38 ALR 1 (HC); R v Dawes [1992] 2 Qd R 435 at 437–8; Bush v R (1993) 115 ALR 654 at 667 (FC FCt); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Adler [2001] NSWSC 1168 (Santow J); Latorre v R (2012) 226 A Crim R 319; [2012] VSCA 280 at [99]–[109] (defence testimony of phone intercept beyond prosecution case could be contradicted). Cf Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 233(2), (3). It may be necessary to cross-examine defence witnesses on unforeseen issues within their knowledge (satisfying the rule in Browne v Dunn) before seeking leave to reopen: see, for example, R v Tanner (2006) 96 SASR 70; [2006] SASC 320. 25. For example, where the onus of proving a defence lies upon the opponent (R v Pateman [1984] 1 Qd R 312); although if the defence has been anticipated, the prohibition against splitting takes over: R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 at 677 (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J). Note that alibis do not fall into this category and ought to be disproved by the Crown unless they could not reasonably be foreseen: Killick v R (1981) 147 CLR 565. The following legislation requires notice of alibi to be given: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 150; Criminal Code (Qld) s 590A; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 285C; Criminal Code (Tas) s 368A; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 51, 190; Criminal Procedure Act

2004 (WA) ss 62–63, 96–97; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 288; Criminal Code (NT) s 331; Local Court (Criminal Procedure) Act (NT) s 60AG. 26. R v Doran (1972) 56 Cr App R 429. 27. R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 at 677 (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J). Reopening permitted on this basis in Maddison v Combe (1981) 26 SASR 523 and Camilleri v Wilkinson (1983) 35 SASR 270. Other judges have taken a stricter line when formal omissions are the result of incompetence: for example, Leydon v Tomlinson (1979) 22 SASR 302; Harrison v Flaxmill Road Foodland Pty Ltd (1979) 22 SASR 385 at 388– 91; Higgins v Parker (1984) 35 SASR 229; McDonald v Camerotto (1984) 36 SASR 66; Reynolds v Bogan Holdings (1984) 36 SASR 193; Piszczyk v Bolton (1984) 38 SASR 330. 28. R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671; Urban Transport Authority (NSW) v Nweiser (1991) 28 NSWLR 471 at 478. 29. R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 at 685–6 (Dawson J); R v V (1998) 100 A Crim R 488 at 495–6 (CCA (NSW)); R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299 at [27]–[31] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). Similar considerations may apply to civil actions for penalty: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Adler [2001] NSWSC 1168; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2006) 235 ALR 587; [2006] NSWSC 826 at [15]–[17]. By the same token notions of fairness may demand a more lenient view to reopening where it is the accused’s application: Dyett v Jorgensen [1995] 2 Qd R 1 at 5, quoted with approval by Debelle J in R v Blobel [2001] SASC 374 at [99]; Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397; [2008] HCA 1 at [15]. 30. But the rule is not contravened simply by cross-examining a defence witness on a matter about which the prosecution has tendered no evidence-in-chief in order to discredit the witness, or to obtain damaging admissions from an accused to support the prosecution’s case-in-chief: R v TSR (2002) 5 VR 627; [2002] VSCA 87; R v Dunwoody (2004) 212 ALR 103; [2004] QCA 413 at [96]–[99] (MacPherson JA). 31. Downs Irrigation Co-op Association Ltd v National Bank of Australasia Ltd [1983] 1 Qd R 130 at 138 (Connolly J). 32. See legislation referred to in n 20 above. 33. Though consider Walker, Thibaut and Andreoli, ‘Order of Presentation at Trial’ (1972) 82 Yale LJ 216; Kassin and Wrightsman, ‘On the Requirements of Proof: The Timing of Judicial Instruction and Mock Juror Verdicts’ (1979) 37 J Personality and Soc Psychology 1877; Englich, Mussweiler and Strack, ‘Last Word in Court — A Hidden Disadvantage for the Defence’ (2005) 29 Law & Hum Behav 705. 34. Tendering an exhibit in cross-examination of a Crown witness constitutes additional evidence: R v Ferguson (2000) 117 A Crim R 44 (Blow J, SC (Tas)). See also DPP Reference under s 693A of the Criminal Code: Re Y (1998) 100 A Crim R 166 (CCA (WA)). 35. The legislation largely preserving the common law practice comprises Criminal Code (Qld) s 619 (R v Handlen (2010) 247 FLR 261; [2010] QCA 371 at [121] (Holmes JA, Fraser and White JJA agreeing)); Criminal Code (Tas) s 371. Legislation varying the common law practice comprises Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 160; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 288B (R v Karounos (1995) 63 SASR 451 (prosecution entitled to address where accused unrepresented)); Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 73–75 (summary hearings), 234–236 (trials on indictment); Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) s 145; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 294; Criminal Code (NT) s 363. Where the accused addresses last this may allow the trial judge greater scope to comment adversely upon the defence submissions: R v Glusheski (1986) 33 A Crim R 193 at 195–6 (CCA (NSW)). 36. UCPR 2005 (NSW) Pt 29 r 6; SC(GCP)R 2015 (Vic) r 49.01; RSC 1971 (WA) O 34 r 5; CPR 2006 (ACT) r 1508; SCR (NT) r 49.01. 37. In this sense of the Frankian equation (R x F = D), and in this sense alone, questions of fact (F) are for

the jury and questions of law (R) for the judge. Whether there is a distinction beyond functional pragmatism between Rs and Fs is doubted by Allen and Pardo, ‘Facts in Law and Facts of Law’ (2003) 7 E & P 153, but cf Endicott, ‘Questions of Law’ (1998) 114 LQR 292. In Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854 at 861, Lord Reid said: ‘The meaning of an ordinary word of the English language is not a question of law. The proper construction of a statute is a question of law.’ For a critique of the universality of this distinction, see LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [11.010]; and Lord Hoffman in Moyna v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2003] 4 All ER 162 at [21]–[28]. Note that a judge may have to decide facts in determining preliminary questions of admissibility; cf ss 142, 189 of the uniform legislation. 38. A supplementary written memorandum may be given to the jury as an aide memoire in supplement to the oral direction but the discretion to do so should be exercised sparingly: R v Dunn (2006) 94 SASR 177; [2006] SASC 58; R v Lindsay (2014) 119 SASR 320; [2014] SASCFC 56 (appeals upheld for failure to give key directions orally). In Hargraves v R (2011) 245 CLR 257; [2011] HCA 44 at [22], the jury was assisted with powerpoint slides which the jury was allowed to take into the jury room when considering its verdict. See also s 65(d) of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) that permits a judge in summing up to ‘use a combination of oral and written components’. 39. See, for example, R v Williams (1999) 104 A Crim R 260; [1999] NSWCCA 9 at [37]–[45] (Wood J); RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620 at 637 (Gaudron ACJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); R v Mogg (2000) 112 A Crim R 417 at 425–7 (CA (Qld)) (and cases there referred to); Avis v R [2002] WASCA 250 at [33] (Murray J); R v AJS (2005) 12 VR 563 at [54]–[60] (CA (Vic)); Western Australia v Pollock [2009] WASCA 96 at [2]–[6] (Martin CJ), [135]–[138], [146]–[151] (Miller JA). But the judge is not obliged to canvass mechanically every argument put by counsel: R v Burns (1999) 107 A Crim R 330 at [62]–[64] (Pincus JA); R v Allen (2011) 109 SASR 396 at [1]–[5] (Doyle CJ). On the responsibility of the trial judge to identify the real issues in a case and instruct the jury accordingly, see generally Hayne J in Tully v R (2006) 231 ALR 712; [2006] HCA 56 at [73]–[94]; HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 at [121]; Hargraves v R (2011) 245 CLR 257; [2011] HCA 44 at [42] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) citing many High Court authorities to conclude ‘the judge in a criminal trial must accept the responsibility of deciding what are the real issues in the case, must tell the jury what those issues are, and must instruct the jury on so much of the law as the jury need to know to decide those issues’; R v Perara-Cathcart [2017] HCA 9 at [53], [56], [62] (Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Keane JJ). 40. For example, the very limited inferences which may be drawn from the accused’s failure to testify or call evidence: Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50; Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285; Uniform Evidence Acts s 20(2), (4). And see the discussion in R v Georgiev [2001] VSCA 18 at [52]–[58] (Ormiston JA). 41. It is suggested in those High Court cases concerning inferences from an accused’s failure to testify or call evidence that there is a distinction between a ‘direction’ or ‘instruction’ (which is required by law), and a ‘comment’ (which may be made by a judge to assist the jury about how it may reason in the case before it): for example, RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620 at 637 (Gaudron ACJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285 at [15] (Gaudron and Hayne JJ). See also Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397; [2008] HCA 1 at [15]–[18] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Kiefel JJ) (‘direction’ to draw no incriminating inference from accused’s demeanour at police interview required, not a mere ‘comment’ to take care in determining what inference, if any, to draw). Compare with the terminology in s 20 of the Uniform Acts. 42. R v Tikos (No 2) [1963] VR 306 at 308–9; R v Hughes (1989) 42 A Crim R 270 (CCA (Vic)); R v Courtney-Smith (No 2) (1990) 48 A Crim R 49 at 55–8 (CCA (NSW)); Abdel-Hady (“SA”) v R [2011] NSWCCA 196 at [134]–[141] (Adams and Fullerton JJ); R v C, CA [2015] SASCFC 143 at [57]–[58] (Kelly J). The judge is not obliged to summarise the defence case: R v Allen (2011) 109 SASR 396; [2011] SASCFC 40 at [3]–[5] (Doyle CJ). A judge may direct a jury to acquit where the evidence is too unreliable to be acted upon: DPP v Stonehouse [1978] AC 55 (Lords Diplock and Dillhorne dissenting);

and cf R v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161. The jury is never obliged to accept such direction but any conviction would most likely be set aside on appeal as unreasonable or against the weight of evidence. 43. RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620 at [41]–[43] (Gaudron ACJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285 at [15] (Gaudron and Hayne JJ); Vo v R (2013) 39 VR 543; [2013] VSCA 225. This is the approach taken by courts even where DNA evidence is expressed in Bayesian terms: see Chapter 1, nn 60, 66. 44. Shepherd v R (1990) 170 CLR 573. See further 2.83–2.89. 45. See discussion below at 2.71ff. 46. R v Zammit (1999) 107 A Crim R 489; [1999] NSWCCA 65 at [71], [130]–[132] (Wood CJ at CL); R v Hannes [2000] NSWCCA 503 at [106]ff (Spigelman CJ); R v PFD (2001) 124 A Crim R 418 (CCA (Vic)); [2001] VSCA 198 at [23] (Winneke P). Failure of counsel to object to the summing-up is an important, although not necessarily determinative, factor in deciding whether there has been a miscarriage of justice. See further 2.49. 47. See further Chapter 4 where directions required of testimony to avoid a miscarriage of justice where evidence may be unreliable are discussed: in particular at 4.6–4.8, 4.35–4.36, 4.76–4.79. 48. See, for example, the books prepared by the Judicial Commission of New South Wales at ; Queensland at ; Western Australia at . 49. Post-offence conduct, other misconduct evidence, unreliable evidence, identification evidence, delay and forensic disadvantage, failure to give evidence or call a witness. The provisions will be discussed when we consider these various categories of evidence — which all raise problems in accurately assessing probative value — principally in Chapters 3 and 4. 50. R v Morrow (2009) 213 A Crim R 530; [2009] VSCA 29 at [24]–[26] (Redlich JA, Nettle JA and Lasry AJA agreeing). 51. Cf New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper No 4: Jury Directions (2008) at [2.50]–[2.52], remarking that current research on jury simulation research ‘does seem to point to the need to make jury directions more comprehensible …’. 52. Wissler and Saks, ‘On the Inefficiency of Jury Instructions’ (1985) 9 Law & Hum Behav 37; Eichorn, ‘Social Science Findings and the Jury’s Ability to Disregard Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence’ (1989) 52 Law & Contemporary Problems 341; Schaefer and Hansen, ‘Similar Fact Evidence and Limited Use Instructions: An Empirical Investigation’ (1990) 14 Crim LJ 157; Cush and GoodmanDelahunty, ‘The Influence of Limiting Instructions on Processing and Judgments of Emotionally Evocative Evidence’ (2006) 13 Psychiatry, Psychology & Law 110; Lieberman and Sales, ‘The Effectiveness of Jury Instructions’ in Abbott and Batt (eds), A Handbook of Jury Research, American Law Institute, Philadelphia, 1999, [18.1]; Ogloff and Rose, ‘The Comprehension of Judicial Instructions’ in Brewer and Williams (eds), Psychology and Law: An Empirical Perspective, Guilford Press, New York, 2005, p 407; Charrow and Charrow, ‘Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions’ (1979) 79 Columbia LR 1306; Paglia and Schuller, ‘Jurors’ Use of Hearsay Evidence: The Effects of Type and Timing of Instructions’ (1998) 22 Law & Hum Behav 501; Kerr, Boster, Callen, Braz, O’Brien and Horowitz, ‘Jury Nullification Instructions as Amplifiers of Bias’ (2008) 6 ICE Art 2. And see discussion of and references to psychological literature in ‘Simplification of Jury Directions Report’ (‘The Weinberg Report’) 2012, [1.28]–[1.47]. 53. See the comments of Kirby J in Zoneff v R (2000) 200 CLR 234; [2000] HCA 28 at [65]–[67] nn 63–7; and HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 at [52]. See also McHugh J in Gilbert v R (2000) 201 CLR 414; [2000] HCA 15 at [31]. In R v Bunting and Wagner (2005) 92 SASR 241, the CCA gave

short shrift to the argument that, following a long trial, the summing-up was so complex that the jury would not have understood the directions given. Confidence in the effectiveness of instructions is regularly endorsed by appellate judges: see, for example, KJS v R [2014] NSWCCA 27 at [41] (Hoeben CJ at CL, Adams and RA Hulme JJ) referring to High Court authority. 54. Historically, jury unanimity was required, but legislation now permits majority verdicts (most often 10 of 12 jurors) where after a stipulated time unanimity has not been reached: Jury Act 1977 (NSW) s 55F; Jury Act 1995 (Qld) s 59A (see, for example, R v McClintock [2010] 1 Qd R 354; [2009] QCA 175; R v Smith [2015] 2 Qd R 452; [2014] QCA 277); Juries Act 1927 (SA) s 57; Juries Act 2003 (Tas) s 43; Juries Act 2000 (Vic) s 46. Where trial is by judge alone the judge must provide adequate reasons for his or her decision: see, for example, Camden v McKenzie [2008] 1 Qd R 39; Nguyen v R (2012) 267 FLR 344; [2012] ACTCA 24. 55. The court has no inherent jurisdiction to grant appeals on other grounds: NH v DPP (2016) 90 ALJR 978; [2016] HCA 33 at [67]ff (French CJ, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 56. Some judges have suggested that a miscarriage of justice occurs in a criminal case where the court determines that the accused has been deprived of a real chance of acquittal: see McHugh J in TKWJ v R (2002) 212 CLR 124 at [61]–[73]. The High Court in Weiss v R (2005) 224 CLR 300 at [33], in discussing the proviso, warns that such ‘expressions attempt to describe the operation of the statutory language in other words. They must not be taken as substitutes for that language’. See also Cesan v R; Mas Rivadavia v R [2008] HCA 52 at [123] (Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ). 57. The grounds for appeal against conviction in serious criminal cases are expressed more or less in these terms in the following legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 30AJ (discussed in Conway v R (2002) 209 CLR 203); Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) ss 5, 6; Criminal Code (Qld) ss 668D, 668E (no further equitable power to hear appeal: R v Stanley [2015] 1 Qd R 118; [2014] QCA 116); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 352, 353, 353A; Criminal Code (Tas) ss 401, 402; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 276 (appellant to establish verdict cannot be supported having regard to the evidence or due to irregularity or for some other reason there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice, and not enacting as such the proviso); Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) s 30; Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 37O; Criminal Code (NT) ss 410, 411. Whilst not expressed in statute, the grounds of appeal in civil cases are comparable (see generally LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [11.145]–[11.150], although appellate courts may be more reluctant to interfere with decisions of fact: see, for example, Swain v Waverley Municipal Council (2005) 220 CLR 517. 58. In deciding in criminal cases whether a jury’s verdict is unreasonable or against the weight of evidence, the appellate court is obliged to examine whether the record supports the verdict. Some courts put the question in terms of whether a reasonable jury must have held a reasonable doubt upon all the evidence: Whitehorn v R (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 686–8; Chamberlain v R (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 534, 606–8. However, in M v R (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 493, the majority judgment explained that the appellate court, rather than putting itself in the shoes of a hypothetical jury, ‘must ask itself … whether it thinks that upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty … In most cases a doubt experienced by an appellate court will be a doubt which a jury ought also to have experienced. It is only where a jury’s advantage in seeing and hearing the evidence is capable of resolving a doubt experienced by a court of criminal appeal that the court may conclude that no miscarriage of justice occurred’. This approach is followed in, for example, Jones v R (1997) 191 CLR 439; MFA v R (2002) 213 CLR 606; SKA v R (2011) 243 CLR 400; [2011] HCA 13 at [21]–[22]; Swain v R [2015] NSWCCA 176 at [87]–[90] (Hoeben CJ, RA Hulme and Fagan JJ agreeing); Miller v R (2016) 334 ALR 1; [2016] HCA 30 at [51], [78]–[82] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ); R v Baden-Clay (2016) 334 ALR 234; [2016] HCA 35 at [64]–[66] (principles), [67]–[79] (application) (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ). Courts are more likely to interfere where the Crown case is circumstantial: see, for example, R v Franks (1999) 105 A

Crim R 377 (CCA (Vic)); R v Rose [2002] NSWCCA 455; R v Baden-Clay (2016) 334 ALR 234; [2016] HCA 35; or dependent upon unreliable evidence: see, for example, Morris v R (1987) 163 CLR 454; but cf Chidiac v R (1991) 171 CLR 432; or where verdicts appear inconsistent: see, for example, R v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82; R v Hansen (2002) 84 SASR 54; R v Gbojueh (2009) 103 SASR 545. 59. Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531; Brunskill v Sovereign Marine and General Insurance Co Ltd (1985) 62 ALR 53; Chambers v Jobling (1986) 7 NSWLR 1; Abolos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167; Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at [25]–[31] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ), [65]ff (McHugh J); CSR Ltd v Della Maddalena (2006) 224 ALR 1; [2006] HCA 1 at [16]–[24] (Kirby J, with whom Gleeson CJ agreed), [180] (Heydon and Callinan JJ); Goodrich Aerospace Pty Ltd v Arsic (2006) 66 NSWLR 186; Lackovic v Insurance Commission (WA) (2006) 31 WAR 460; Indigo Financial Money Pty Ltd v Bolivar Road Pty Ltd (2010) 108 SASR 120; [2010] SASCFC 29; Robert Bax & Associates v Cavenham Pty Ltd [2013] 1 Qd R 476; [2012] QCA 177 at [83]–[88] (‘finding not glaringly improbable’). See generally Bell, ‘Appellate Review of the Facts’ (2014) 39 Aust Bar Rev 132. 60. (2005) 224 CLR 300 at [35] (see also at 2.90). Applied in Libke v R (2007) 235 ALR 517; [2007] HCA 30 at [46]–[53] (Kirby and Callinan JJ), [115] (Hayne J, Gleeson CJ and Heydon J concurring); Gately v R (2007) 232 CLR 208; [2007] HCA 55 at [109] (Heydon J); Cesan v R; Mas Rivadavia v R (2008) 236 CLR 358; [2008] HCA 52 at [127]–[130] (Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ) (proviso not applied when judge fell asleep); Lindsay v R (2015) 255 CLR 272; [2015] HCA 16 at [48] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ holding court can apply proviso even if not invoked by prosecution on appeal). The proviso is not enacted in s 227 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) and in every case the appellant must establish a ‘substantial miscarriage of justice’ for an appeal to succeed: where an error or irregularity is established on appeal this will not have caused a substantial miscarriage of justice if the court finds on the record that, even if there had been no error or irregularity, conviction was inevitable (no jury could have entertained a reasonable doubt): Baini v R (2012) 246 CLR 469; [2012] HCA 59 at [40] (appeal upheld as appellate court failed to consider whether the convictions were inevitable). See explanations of High Court decision in Baini v R (No 2) [2013] VSCA 157; Andleman v R (2013) 38 VR 659; [2013] VSCA 25 at [85]–[86]; and Crocker v R (2013) 39 VR 668; [2013] VSCA 318 at [21]–[22] (Redlich JA, Priest JA and Robson AJA agreeing). 61. As Gageler J explains in Baini v R (see n 60 above) at 56, even where the accused can establish that an error or irregularity may have impacted upon the trial, Weiss v R requires the court to dismiss the appeal if satisfied that the record of evidence properly before the court supports conviction beyond reasonable doubt. This may require consideration of the possible impact of the error on the decision open to the jury: Castle v R; Bucca v R (2016) 227 CLR 57; [2016] HCA 46 at [68] (and see Gageler J’s comments about reconciling this plurality approach with the principles in Weiss at [80]). Examination of the record does not require the appeal court to view for itself an audio video record of an interview with a witness tendered at trial in the absence of some forensic purpose for doing so. The account given and the language used by witnesses, available from the transcript, are usually sufficient for a review of evidence: SKA v R (2011) 243 CLR 400; [2011] HCA 13 at [27]–[35] (French CJ, Gummow and Kiefel JJ), [116]–[117] (Crennan J). 62. Whether a procedural error is so fundamental as to constitute a substantial miscarriage of justice is considered in Wilde v R (1988) 164 CLR 365; Glennon v R (1994) 179 CLR 1; Conway v R (2002) 209 CLR 203; AK v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438 (failure of judge in trial by judge alone to give reasons for the verdict). Cf Evans v R (2007) 235 CLR 521 at [41]–[51] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), [122], [126] (Kirby J): error considered simply as preventing court from being satisfied of accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In Cesan v R; Mas Rivadavia v R (2008) 236 CLR 358; [2008] HCA 52 at [125]–[126] (Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ), it is emphasised that ‘it is necessary to have regard to the miscarriage of justice that has been identified’ and not to apparently apt descriptions in the cases

describing the operation of the statutory language. In Lee v R (2014) 253 CLR 455; [2014] HCA 20 at [48]–[53], the court held that the prosecution’s unauthorised access to accused’s evidence obtained through compulsion by the NSW Crimes Commission so undermined the prosecution’s fundamental obligation to prove guilt without assistance from the accused that there was no question of the proviso applying. 63. Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) s 77(1)(b); Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) Sch 1 s 672A(a); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 369(1)(a) (‘CLCA’); Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) Sch 1 s 419(a); Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 327(1)(a); Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 140(1)(a); Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) ss 421–430 (Inquiries into Convictions); Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) Sch 1 s 431(a). See generally Caruso and Crawford, ‘The Executive Institution of Mercy in Australia: The Case and Model for Reform’ (2014) 37 UNSW LJ 312. 64. Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) s 78; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 353A (appeal succeeded: R v Keogh (No 2) (2014) 121 SASR 307; appeal denied: R v Van Beelen (2016) 125 SASR 253 but leave to appeal granted [2017] HCA Trans 19); Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 402A. These and the provisions in the previous footnote are discussed by Hamer, ‘Wrongful Convictions, Appeals, and the Finality Principle: The Need for a Criminal Cases Review Commission’ (2014) 37 UNSW LJ 270 at 286–98. 65. R v Cheng (1999) 48 NSWLR 616; R v JS [2007] NSWCCA 272 at [26]–[32] (Spigelman CJ, other judges agreeing). There is no inherent jurisdiction in the court to interfere on appeal with a judgment made on the basis of a mistaken verdict of acquittal communicated in open court by the foreman without dissent or correction from other members of the jury: NH v Director of Public Prosecutions [2016] HCA 33. 66. See, for example, Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 30AA(1)(c) and (d); Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act (NSW) s 107; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 352(1)(ab) (applied in R v Hamra [2016] SASCFC 130); Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) s 24(2)(da), (e). In Tasmania, appeals may be allowed against acquittal by leave on a point of law: Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) ss 401(2)(b), 402(5) (see, for example, DPP v Lynch (2006) 166 A Crim R 327; [2006] TASSC 89 at [44]–[46], proviso in s 402(2) not applied). For provisions allowing trial by judge alone, see n 19 above. 67. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 30CB; Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) s 108; Criminal Code (Qld) s 669A(2), (5); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 351, 351A(2) (c); Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 388AA(3); Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 308; Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) s 47(7) (but cf s 24(2)(da)); Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 37S(6); Criminal Code Act (NT) s 414(2), (5). 68. NSW: Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 ss 99–106; Qld: Criminal Code ss 678–678K; SA: Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 ss 331–339; Tas: Criminal Code Act 1924 ss 390–397AF; Vic: Criminal Procedure Act 2009 ss 327A–327S. And see further at 5.190. 69. Generally allowed: Justices Act 1886 (Qld) Pt 9 Div 1 s 222; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 42(1); Justices Act (Tas) Pt XI Div 1; Criminal Appeals Act (WA) s 7. Generally not allowed: Criminal Appeal Act (NSW) Pt 3 (in summary matter appeal on point of law may result in quashing of acquittal); Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) ss 23, 56, 57; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) Pt 6.1 (no provision for prosecution appeal against acquittal); Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) Div 3.10.2–2A; Local Court (Criminal Procedure) Act (NT) s 163. 70. See discussion of authorities by Peek J in R v Brougham (2015) 122 SASR 546; [2015] SASCFC 75. 71. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 30CA; Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) s 5A; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 668B; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 350 (expressly includes reserving a relevant question on an issue antecedent to trial); Criminal Code (Tas) ss 387–388; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 302 (question of law before or during trial); Criminal Appeals Act 2004

(WA) s 46; Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 37S; Criminal Code (NT) s 408. 72. See, for example, Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 42 (no appeal unless special reasons in interests of justice); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 352(1)(b) and (c) (appeals permitted from ‘a decision on an issue antecedent to trial’ with leave but by DPP as a matter of right ‘on any ground that involves a question of law alone’, cf s 354A permitting appeals against ‘ancillary orders’); Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 60 (no appeal without leave except in stipulated cases); Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 37E(4) (appeals permitted from interlocutory ‘orders’ ‘with leave of the Court of Appeal’); Supreme Court Act (NT) s 53 (appeals permitted from interlocutory judgments with leave of the Court of Appeal). 73. Criminal Appeals Act 1913 (NSW) s 5F. 74. Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 295–297. 75. See, for example, R v Gale and Duckworth [2012] NSWCCA 174 at [2] (Simpson J). In DPP v Galloway [2014] VSCA 272 at [18]–[19], the court resorted to applying the case stated procedure under s 302 of the Criminal Procedure Act to permit an appeal against an admissibility ruling where the conditions for an interlocutory appeal ran out. 76. And in so determining the court must take into account the disruption or delay to the trial and whether the appeal will resolve an issue decisive of the conduct of the trial or its outcome: see s 297(1)(b). Procedure discussed in MA v R (2011) 31 VR 203; [2011] VSCA 13 in rejecting appeal against exercise of discretion refusing to exclude identification evidence. See also Russell v R [2016] VSCA 196 at [4]– [8], where statutory conditions for interlocutory appeal held not to be satisfied. 77. House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 principles. Applied to interlocutory appeals in DAO v R (2011) 81 NSWLR 568; [2011] NSWCCA 63 concerning ss 97 and 101 of the uniform legislation, and Bray v R [2014] VSCA 276 at [61]ff (Santamaria JA, Maxwell CJ and Weinberg JA agreeing) concerning the application of s 137 of the uniform legislation. 78. See, for example, DPP v DJC [2012] VSCA 132; DPP v Martin (a Pseudonym) [2016] VSCA 219. 79. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on the Law of Evidence at Common Law, Little Brown and Co, Boston, 1898, pp 264–6. This approach is in what can be characterised as ‘the rationalist tradition’: Twining, ‘The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship’, first published in Campbell and Waller (eds), Well and Truly Tried, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1982, and republished, with some additions, in Twining, Rethinking Evidence, Blackwell, Oxford, 1990 (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006). 80. Cf Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham (ed, J Bowring), Edinburgh, 1843, vol vii, p 24: ‘Evidence is the basis of justice: to exclude evidence is to exclude justice’. 81. But see Haddara v R (2014) 43 VR 53; [2013] VSCA 100 at [14]ff, particularly at [60]–[72], where Redlich and Weinberg JJA argue that the common law principle to ensure the fairness of a criminal trial is not excluded by the uniform legislation and may, as a residual ‘discretion’ operate, consequent upon the rules of ‘admissibility’ referred to in s 56 having run out, to justify the exclusion of relevant evidence. 82. Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36 at [25]–[26] (French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ), ‘The appellant’s submission as to relevance should be accepted on the basis that the impugned representation was so ambiguous that it could not rationally affect the assessment of the probability of a fall from the vertical head wall’; BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499; [2012] HCA 9 at [56] (French CJ), ‘The evidence was irrelevant because it was equivocal’ and at [57] ‘The equivocal character of the evidence marked this as a case of logical irrelevancy’. The irredeemably equivocal nature of the evidence was disputed by Heydon J in his discussion of relevance at [85]ff. 83. (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 at [39].

84. This interpretation of the assumption in s 55, including the exception, appears to be accepted without demur in R v Shamouil (2006) 66 NSWLR 228, and IMM v R (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14, where the majority (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ, Gageler, Gordon and Nettle JJ disagreeing) held that this notion of acceptance had to be read into the definition of ‘probative value’ contained in the Dictionary and referred to in ss 97 and 137. In Dupas v R (2012) 40 VR 182 at 196 [63(c)], the court attempts to distinguish between ‘credibility’ and ‘reliability’ for the purposes of applying the assumption to the interpretation of ‘probative value’ in s 137, but this distinction is rejected by all judges in IMM. 85. Smith v R (2001) 206 CLR 650; [2001] HCA 50 at [7] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 86. Where evidence appears to be relevant (pace Young J in Nodnara Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 140 FLR 336 at 339–40) but only in combination with other evidence a court may be obliged to admit it conditionally upon assurance from counsel that its relevance will be substantiated by later evidence (Horne v Milne (1881) 7 VLR 296; uniform legislation s 57(1)(b): see Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd [2002] FCAFC 157 at [15]–[16] (Branson J); Rhoden v Wingate [2002] NSWCA 165 at [138]; Black v Walker [2000] NSWSC 983). If not substantiated in a criminal trial before a jury, the jury should be discharged if this creates a risk of unfair prejudice that cannot be eliminated by direction, and otherwise may lead to a successful appeal: R v Burns (1883) 9 VLR 191; and cf 3.72. Section 57 is sometimes used in relation to alleged admissions: Landini v New South Wales [2007] NSWSC 259; ACCC v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 794. 87. Finlaison (ed), Wills on Evidence, 3rd ed, Stevens & Sons Ltd, London, 1938, p 305. Similar terminology has been employed by courts in appropriate cases: for example, R v Bond [1906] 2 KB 389 at 400; Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 at 375; Attwood v R (1960) 102 CLR 353 at 360; Wilson v R (1970) 123 CLR 334 at 338. 88. (1876) 57 NH 245 at 288. 89. See, for example, Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Haynes [1959] AC 743 at 757 (Lord Somerville), 759 (Lord Denning); Teubner v Humble (1963) 108 CLR 491 at 503–4; Ogle v Comboyuro Investments Pty Ltd (1976) 136 CLR 444 at 463–4 (Murphy J); McCool v McCool [2008] NSWSC 748 (Gzell J). Distinguishing conceptually rather than functionally between decisions of fact and of law is another matter. See further n 37 above. Scholars in the United States have proposed granting factual findings the status of legal precedent in order to prevent similar cases resulting in mass tort litigation: Walker and Monahan, ‘Scientific Authority: The Breast Implant Litigation and Beyond’ (2000) 86 Virginia LR 801. Cf attempts to define ‘significant probative value’ under ss 97 and 98 of the uniform legislation: see further at 3.61. 90. Described in Wigmore, The Science of Judicial Proof, 3rd ed, Little Brown and Co, Boston, 1937, App I. 91. Manenti v Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board [1954] VLR 115 at 117–18. 92. R v Stephenson [1976] VR 376 at 380–1. 93. Re Van Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 192–7 follows Wigmore’s analysis. 94. BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499; [2012] HCA 9 at [56] (French CJ), ‘The evidence was irrelevant because it was equivocal’ and at [57], ‘The equivocal character of the evidence marked this as a case of logical irrelevancy’. 95. Hollingham v Head (1858) 4 CB(NS) 388; 140 ER 1135 and Hart v Lancashire and Yorkshire Rail Co (1869) 21 LT 261 are examples of such decisions. Of these decisions it has been said: ‘… it is as idle to enquire as it is impossible to say whether the evidence was rejected in the above two cases because it was altogether irrelevant, or merely because it was too remotely relevant’: LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [1530]. This sort of cost/benefit analysis can be formalised: see Posner, ‘An Economic

Approach to the Law of Evidence’ (1999) 51 Stanford LR 1477. 96. Wigmore, Evidence (rev by Tillers), Little Brown and Co, Boston, 1983, vol 1A, [28]. 97. For example, Lempert and Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence, 2nd ed, West Publishing Co, St Paul, Minnesota, 1983. This view is now embodied in the United States Federal Evidence Rules, rr 401, 402, 403. 98. See, for example, Folkes v Chadd (1782) 3 Dougl 157; 99 ER 589; Agassiz v London Tramway Co (1872) 21 WR 199, discussed in LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [1535]. The same sorts of policy reasons provide the justification for specific rules of evidence; for example, the rule that a witness’s answer to a collateral question is final is justified on pragmatic grounds of time, cost and the risk of confusing diversion. 99. Hoffman, ‘Similar Facts After Boardman’ (1975) 91 LQR 193. 100. Stephen, A Digest of the Law of Evidence, 12th ed, MacMillan and Co, London, 1948. 101. If the relevance depends upon another finding being made or other evidence being tendered then it may be admitted if that finding is reasonably open or provisionally pending the tender of evidence from which such a finding is reasonably open: s 57(1). Furthermore, inferences that a document or thing is relevant may be drawn from that evidence itself: s 58(1). These sections appear to allow inferences of authenticity to be drawn from the document tendered itself: see discussion at 7.8. 102. (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [80]–[81]. Alluded to also in Adam v R (2001) 207 CLR 96 at [22] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 103. (2001) 206 CLR 650; [2001] HCA 50. And see Biber, Captive Images: Race, Crime, Photography, Routledge-Cavendish, London, 2007. 104. Majority view applied in R v Gardner (2001) 123 A Crim R 439; [2001] NSWCCA 381 at [15]; R v Beattie (2001) 127 A Crim R 250; [2001] NSWCCA 502; R v TA [2003] NSWCCA 191. Additional knowledge found in Cook v R (1998) 126 NTR 17; R v Marsh [2005] NSWCCA 331 at [18], [31]; R v Drollett [2005] NSWCCA 356 at [51]. 105. (2001) 206 CLR 650 at [11]. See also Bain v R [2009] NZSC 16 at [54]–[59], where the New Zealand Court of Appeal held irrelevant and inadmissible the interpretation of a voice recording by a police officer following repeated listenings, some involving technical enhancement. Where the witness has an advantage over the jury, the evidence will not be irrelevant: Miller v R [2015] NSWCCA 206 at [109]– [113]. 106. Kirby J’s approach applied by Simpson J in R v Drollett [2005] NSWCCA 356 in holding testimony of identification from a video record relevant but inadmissible opinion evidence. See generally Edmond, Biber, Kemp and Porter, ‘Law’s Looking Glass: Expert Identification Evidence Derived from Photographic and Video Images’ (2009) 20 Current Issues Crim Just 337 and further at 7.41 and 7.56. 107. Heydon JA in R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506; [2001] NSWCCA 223 at [111]–[112] uses this same terminology. Compare with the notion of ‘significant probative value’ demanded in ss 97 and 98 of the uniform legislation and which the majority in IMM v R (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 held was not present when the relevant tendency evidence came from the complainant and could not add anything to the determination of whether her testimony, upon which the crimes alleged turned, should be accepted. 108. (2007) 235 CLR 521. 109. However, they were prepared to hold evidence relevant and admissible when the accused was asked to walk and speak certain phrases allegedly spoken during the robbery. Kirby J (particularly at [101]–[103]) regarded all the evidence relevant, as it was open to the jury to draw similarities between the accused and the offender, but held it inadmissible under s 137 as unfairly prejudicial, it being likely the jury

would give the evidence more weight than it deserved. Heydon J (Crennan J agreeing), particularly at [177], [181], [184], regarded all the evidence relevant as items of circumstantial evidence capable of demonstrating the accused’s similarity (or dissimilarity) with the culprit, but, with one minor exception, found no ‘prejudice over and above the damage to his position caused by the probative value of the evidence’: at [185]. See also Lindsay, Wallbridge and Drennan, ‘Do the Clothes Make the Man? An Exploration of the Effect of Lineup Attire on Eyewitness Identification Accuracy’ (1987) 19 Can J Behav Sci 463; Loftus, ‘Planting Misinformation in the Human Mind: A 30-year Investigation of the Malleability of Memory’ (2005) 12 Learning & Memory 361. 110. (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [31] (Gleeson CJ and Hayne J), [52]–[59] (Gaudron and Kirby JJ). 111. At [81]. 112. Query whether evidence is relevant to the existence of a fact in issue where tendered simply to prevent jury speculation about its existence: see Odgers, n 4 above, at [EA.55.570], referring to R v RTB [2002] NSWCCA 104 at [24]. It is not uncommon for a prosecutor to call expert evidence to explain the lack of DNA evidence: Durani v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 172 at [162]; R v Drummond (No 2) [2015] SASCFC 82 at [21]. 113. Montrose, ‘Basic Concepts of the Law of Evidence’ (1954) 70 LQR 527. Some older judicial recognition of the need to distinguish ‘relevance’ and ‘admissibility’ is found in the judgment of Lord Simon in DPP v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 at 756. 114. Although in Smith v R a majority of the High Court took a somewhat restricted approach to the notion of ‘relevance’. 115. This issue is explored in detail in relation to DNA evidence in Lynch et al, Truth Machine: The Contentious History of DNA Fingerprinting, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2008, Ch 4. 116. A commonly recurring example illustrating these difficulties arises in prosecutions for supplying drugs, where questions arise over the relevance and admissibility of ‘large’ sums of cash found on or near the accused: R v Campbell and Greig (1999) 109 A Crim R 174 (CCA (Vic)); R v Nguyen [2002] NSWCCA 403. See also Dennis, The Law of Evidence, 5th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2013, [3.018]–[3.020]. Another example is the use of post-offence conduct; consider: R v Seivers [2004] NSWCCA 462 and R v Baden-Clay (2016) 334 ALR 234; [2016] HCA 35. 117. For criminal cases, see generally Pattenden, Judicial Discretion and Criminal Litigation, 2nd ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990; Edmond, ‘Specialised Knowledge, the Exclusionary Discretions and Reliability: Reassessing Incriminating Expert Opinion Evidence’ (2008) 31 UNSW LJ 1 at 7–23. 118. Consider Judges Bridoye and Bridlegoose in Rabelais’s sixteenth century satire, Gargantua and Pantagruel. 119. House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504–5. Applied in, for example, R v Edelsten (1990) 21 NSWLR 542 at 552; R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159 at 185 (Brennan CJ). See also at 8.159 n 540. On appeal there is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of an exercise of discretion: see R v Lisoff [1999] NSWCCA 364 at [48], referring to R v Alexandroaia (1995) 81 A Crim R 286 at 290; and Collaroy Beach Club Ltd v Haywood [2007] NSWCA 21 at [48]–[49]. 120. DPP v Marijancevic (2011) 33 VR 440; [2011] VSCA 355 at [13]–[14] (Warren CJ, Buchanan and Redlich JJA) (interlocutory appeal from s 138 ruling); R v XY (2013) 84 NSWLR 363; [2013] NSWCCA 121 at [140] (Simpson J) (interlocutory appeal from rulings under ss 90 and 137); Bray v R [2014] VSCA 276 at [61]ff (Santamaria JA, Maxwell CJ and Weinberg JA agreeing) (interlocutory appeal from s 137 ruling). 121. Vickers v R (2006) 160 A Crim R 195; [2006] NSWCCA 60 at [76] (Simpson J); R v SJRC [2007] NSWCCA 142 at [34]; Taleb v R [2015] NSWCCA 105 at [84] (quoting Simpson J in Vickers with approval).

122. DPP v DJC (2012) 36 VR 33; [2012] VSCA 132; McCartney v R (2012) 38 VR 1; [2012] VSCA 268 at [31]–[51] (Maxwell CJ, Neave and Coghlan JJA) (following extensive considerations of authorities held that on appeal from conviction where facts are not in dispute House did not apply and the court must determine whether s 137 should be applied). 123. Sections giving power to ‘order’ have also been held to be governed by s 192: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Aust Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 157 FCR 310; [2007] FCA 121 at [7]–[8] (Jacobsen J). 124. For a full list of the many sections which so provide, see Williams, Anderson, Marychurch and Roy, n 4 above, [192.8]–[192.9]. 125. In substance, rather than in form, R v Parkes [2003] NSWCCA 12 at 87 (Ipp JA). 126. (2001) 202 CLR 115 at [41], [47]. 127. [2001] NSWSC 174 at [21]–[23] (McClellan J); R v El-Kheir [2004] NSWCCA 461 at [63] (Tobias JA); DPP v Finnegan [2011] TASCCA 3 at [49]–[50]. 128. Police v Dunstall (2015) 256 CLR 403; [2015] HCA 26. The discretions are based, respectively, on the decisions in R v Christie [1914] AC 545; R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133; Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54. 129. See, for example, MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 519–20 (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J), 532 (Mason J); Cleland v R (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 19 (Deane J) and the authorities there cited. 130. For s 56(1) presumes the admissibility of relevant evidence unless an exception (under the legislation) can be invoked. For express authority on onus under s 137, see Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 at 364 (Hunt CJ at CL); R v Polkinghorne [1999] NSWSC 704 at [51] (Levine J); Gilmore v EPA; Tableland Topdressing v EPA [2002] NSWCCA 399 at [46] (Santow JA). Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), at [16.9] suggests the words of ss 135 and 137 are literally wide enough to require the judge to exclude on his or her own motion. In FDP v R [2008] NSWCCA 317, the court rejected the argument that, in the absence of objection, the failure of the judge to consider exclusion under s 137 was a ground for appeal. See also Perish v R [2016] NSWCCA 89 at [261]–[273] (Bathurst CJ, Hoeben CJ at CL and Bellew J). 131. R v Haughbro (1997) 142 FLR 415 at 428 (Miles CJ); R v Eade [2000] NSWCCA 369 at [60] (Priestley JA); DPP v Farr (2001) 118 A Crim R 299; [2001] NSWSC 3 at [75] (Smart AJ); Parker v ComptrollerGeneral of Customs (2009) 83 ALJR 494 at [28] (French CJ); DPP v Tamcelik (2012) 224 A Crim R 350 at [107]–[118] (Garling J) emphasising that once illegality established prosecutor must actively seek exclusion under s 138. 132. (2015) 256 CLR 403; [2015] HCA 26. 133. Cf R v Stephenson [1976] VR 376 at 380–1. But enacted as a discretion in s 34KD of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) where a witness’s prior statement made admissible under the Act would cause ‘an undue waste of time’. 134. See, for example, Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Products Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 76 FCR 151; [2000] FCA 876 at [21] (Burchett J). Another example is where a party wishes to refer to ‘similar facts’ in civil cases. These may be relevant, but marginally so, and thus to inquire into them would be wasteful and distracting: for example, Jacara Pty Ltd v Auto-Bake Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 417 at [19] (Sundberg J); and see 3.158. Another example, normally regarded as illustrative of a definitive rule but which arguably is better regarded as a matter of this discretion, is where a party seeks to contradict the answer given by a witness in cross-examination to a question which goes only to the witness’s credit and is otherwise collateral to the matters in issue. To pursue such matters is costly and ultimately a distraction from the principal issues to be decided: see 7.139–7.141.

135. Because the disutility of convicting an innocent accused is so weighty that the reception of all relevant evidence is demanded. See, for example, R v Beattie (1996) 40 NSWLR 155 at 162–3 (CCA); R v Crisologo (1998) 99 A Crim R 178 at 190; R v Taylor [2003] NSWCCA 194 at [127]–[130] (Bell J); R v Cakovski (2004) 149 A Crim R 1; [2004] NSWCCA 280 at [72] (Hidden J); Dupas v R (2012) 218 A Crim R 507; [2012] VSCA 328; Audsley v R [2014] VSCA 321 at [46] (Maxwell P, Weinberg and Priest JJA). In contrast, English courts have, on this ground, excluded defence evidence that police witnesses have previously fabricated evidence: see Pattenden, ‘Evidence of Previous Malpractice by Police Witnesses and R v Edwards’ [1992] Crim LR 549; and 3.140. See also Choo, ‘The Notion of Relevance and Defence Evidence’ [1993] Crim LR 114. Other examples of apparently relevant defence evidence being excluded include R v Smith [1987] VR 907 (appeal unsuccessful: Smith v R (1990) 64 ALJR 588); and R v Smith (2000) 116 A Crim R 1 at [69]–[70] (defence expert evidence on the dangers of identification evidence); R v Madigan [2005] NSWCCA 170 (defence expert evidence on appropriate methodology for voice identification evidence; cf discussion at 7.56); Burrell v R [2007] NSWCCA 65 at [186]–[191] (McClellan CJ at CL). 136. See R v Murch and Logan (2014) 119 SASR 427; [2014] SASCFC 61 at [33]–[39], where the authorities are discussed. And see further the discussion at 3.79. 137. See Selway, ‘Principle, Public Policy and Fairness: Exclusion of Evidence on Discretionary Grounds’ (2002) 23 Adel LR 1. On the influence of the notion of fair trial more generally, see Spigelman, ‘The Truth Can Cost Too Much: The Principle of a Fair Trial’ (2004) 78 Aust LJ 29. Notions of fair trial may also receive emphasis on appeal in determining whether there has been a miscarriage of justice: see, for example, R v IAS (2004) 89 SASR 159; [2004] SASC 240. 138. Delay: Jago v District Court of NSW (1989) 168 CLR 23 (no right to speedy criminal trial but delay may produce unfairness); Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378; [1993] HCA 77 (stay upheld where delay in bringing misconduct proceedings against a medical practitioner); Battistatos v RTA (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256 (stay granted where delay in bringing civil proceeding); Loss/Destruction of evidence: R v Edwards (2009) 255 ALR 399; [2009] HCA 20; Police v Sherlock (2009) 103 SASR 147; [2009] SASC 64; Aydin v R (2010) 28 VR 588; [2010] VSCA 190; El Bayeh v R (2011) 31 VR 305; [2011] VSCA 44 (stays refused); Disclosure: R v Gittany (No 3) (2013) 238 A Crim R 149; [2013] NSWSC 1670 at [20] (McCallum J, ‘The Crown’s duty of disclosure probably takes its place among the fundamental elements of the accusatorial system of criminal justice …’); Adverse publicity: R v Glennon (1994) 179 CLR 1; R v Dupas (No 3) (2009) 28 VR 380; [2009] VSCA 202 (stays refused); Legal representation: Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292 (stay granted to ensure legal representation of indigent accused); R v Chaouk; AG (Vic) (2013) 40 VR 356; [2013] VSCA 99 (common law stay to ensure further legal representation refused); MK v Victorian Legal Aid (2013) 40 VR 378; [2013] VSC 49 (common law stay to ensure more effective legal representation granted); Prosecution use of incriminating evidence of accused obtained during compulsory examination: Lee v R (2014) 253 CLR 455; [2014] HCA 20 at [46] (circumstances justified a stay); R v Seller; R v McCarthy (No 3) [2014] NSWSC 1290 at [50]–[63] (stay justified where prosecution sought to tender expert evidence based on incriminating testimony of accused compelled for purpose of ACC inquiry); A v Maughan [2016] WASCA 128 (no abuse of process as legislation permitted prosecution access to compulsory examination); Poor health of accused: R v Jacobi (2012) 114 SASR 227; [2012] SASCFC 115 (stay refused). 139. Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509 (purpose of civil action to secure reinstatement or favourable settlement an abuse of process); Moti v R (2011) 245 CLR 456; [2011] HCA 50 (stay granted where Australian government involved in illegal deportation of accused from the Solomon Islands). 140. (2011) 245 CLR 456; [2011] HCA 50 at [11]. 141. (2015) 256 CLR 403; [2015] HCA 26 at [48]. 142. Cf Ridgeway v R (1995) 184 CLR 19 (not an abuse of process to proceed where element of crime

constituted by police illegality, but discretion to exclude evidence relating to that element applied to demand stay). 143. (2014) 253 CLR 455; [2014] HCA 20. 144. See McDermott v R (1948) 76 CLR 501 at 512; R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133 at 150–1; Driscoll v R (1977) 137 CLR 517 at 541 (Gibbs J); Cleland v R (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 18 (Deane J), 30 (Dawson J); R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159. The application of the fairness discretion as it specifically applies to confessional evidence is also discussed at 8.134–8.142. 145. See, for example, R v Edelsten (1990) 21 NSWLR 542 at 554; (1990) 51 A Crim R 397 at 408; Pearsall v R (1990) 49 A Crim R 439 at 442–3 (NSWCCA); Rozenes v Beljajev [1995] 1 VR 533 at 549; Police (SA) v Jervis (1998) 70 SASR 429 at 441–3 (Doyle CJ); 101 A Crim R 1 at 14; R v Schuurs [1999] QSC 176 at [27] (Fryberg J); R v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24 at [77], [89] (Martin J for CCA as part of a comprehensive discussion of the authorities at [59]–[86]); Police v Hall (2006) 95 SASR 482; [2006] SASC 281; Haddara v R (2014) 43 VR 53; [2013] VSCA 100 (Redlich and Weinberg JJ again following a comprehensive consideration of the authorities). A general power to exclude evidence where it would be unfair to admit it against an accused is enacted in s 130 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld). Discussed but not applied in R v CBL and BCT [2014] 2 Qd R 331; [2014] QCA 93 at [52]–[54], distinguishing from public policy discretion and emphasising reliability. Mulligan J suggests there may also be a common law discretion to exclude on grounds of ‘procedural unfairness’ in a civil case but says it is enlivened by ‘the extent to which admitting the evidence will complicate and prolong the trial’: The Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Pilmer (1994) 63 SASR 364 at 378. 146. See text at nn 11, 81 above and Haddara v R (2014) 43 VR 53; [2013] VSCA 100 at [14]ff, particularly at [56]–[72] (Redlich and Weinberg JJA). ‘Haddara principles’ approved but not applied in Jonny Luna (a Pseudonym) v R [2016] VSCA 10 at [43] (Redlich, Priest and Beach JJA) and referred to with apparent approval in Jesse Willis v R [2016] VSCA 176 at [44] n 1 (Weinberg and Beach JJA). 147. [1914] AC 545 at 599. At 599 Moulton LJ expressly explains that the discretion ‘is based on an anxiety to secure for every one a fair trial’. See also Driscoll v R (1977) 137 CLR 517 at 541, where Gibbs J describes the Christie discretion as ‘a discretion to exclude evidence if the strict rules of admissibility would operate unfairly against the accused’. 148. Evidence, ALRC Interim Report 26 (1985), vol 1, at [644]. See R v Duke (1979) 22 SASR 46 at 47–8 (King CJ); R v Morris (1995) 78 A Crim R 465 at 469 (CA (Qld)); Papakosmas v R (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [91]–[92] (McHugh J); Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593 at [22] (Gleeson CJ), [51] (McHugh J); Ainsworth v Burden [2005] NSWCA 174 at [99] (Hunt AJA). Consider some of the concerns about DNA evidence in R v Tran (1990) 50 A Crim R 233 at 242 (McInerney J); R v Lucas [1992] 2 VR 109 (Hampel J); R v Pantoja (1996) 88 A Crim R 554 (Hunt CJ at CL). Interestingly, not extended to forensic science and medicine evidence with inferior scientific provenance. 149. For example, by the majority in Police v Dunstall (2015) 322 ALR 440; [2015] HCA 26. 150. In R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159, while Brennan CJ merely treats it as a separate discretion at [29]–[30], the majority (Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ) at [54], [64] recognise the overlap between the ‘fairness’ of confessions and ‘more prejudicial than probative’ discretions so far as each is concerned with rectitude. In R v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24 at [86], [89], Martin J regards Christie as an example of the application of the general unfairness discretion. 151. Forbes, ‘Extent of the Judicial Discretion to Reject Prejudicial Evidence in Civil Cases’ (1988) 62 Aust LJ 211 at 215. Although applied in a civil case by Carter J in Taylor v Harvey [1986] 2 Qd R 137, this use of the discretion at common law was rejected by Sholl J in Manenti v Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board [1954] VLR 115, followed by the Full Court in David Symes & Co Ltd v Mather [1977] VR 516, and by Mulligan J in The Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Pilmer (1994) 63 SASR 364 at 378–9 (although he thought there may be a discretion to prevent procedural unfairness), and, after an extensive

review of authority, by Kirby P in Polycarpou v Australian Wire Industries Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 49 at 60–7. Its existence was regarded as ‘highly doubtful’ by McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ in CDJ v VAJ (No 1) (1998) 197 CLR 172 at [142] n 106, a dictum quoted authoritatively by Douglas J in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Managed Investments Pty Ltd (No 7) [2015] 2 Qd R 32 at [21]–[25]. For further discussion of this question, see 3.158. 152. While the same argument might be applied to doubt the applicability of the Christie discretion to judges sitting alone in criminal cases, the high standard of proof in a criminal case provides a strong reason for judges sitting alone to consider separately whether to exclude evidence which has the potential to undermine this standard. 153. See, for example, R v Little [2008] NSWDC 311. Empirical American research suggests that judges sitting alone are vulnerable to influence from inadmissible evidence: Wistrich, Guthrie and Rachlinski, ‘Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding’ (2004–5) 153 U Penn LR 1251. For arguments in favour of a uniform evidentiary regime for jury and jury-less trials, see Schauer, ‘On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law’ (2006) 155 U Penn LR 165; Damaska, ‘The Jury and the Law of Evidence: Real and Imagined Interconnections’ (2006) 5 Law, Prob & Risk 255. 154. R v Tugaga (1994) 74 A Crim R 190 (CCA (NSW)); Rozenes v Beljajev [1995] 1 VR 533; R v Lisoff [1999] NSWCCA 364 at [49], [60] (mere complexity of DNA evidence insufficient reason for exercise of the discretion under s 137 of the uniform legislation); R v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317 at [39] (highly probative DNA evidence permitted in terms of odds despite some ‘prejudicial overlay’): cf R v Humphrey (1999) 72 SASR 558 (DNA evidence excluded as insufficient evidential basis laid). 155. Although often judges come close to excluding evidence on grounds of unreliability where witnesses testify following hypnosis; for example, R v Horsfall (1989) 51 SASR 489 (cf refusal to exercise discretion in R v Roughley, Marshall and Heywood (1995) 78 A Crim R 160). See further 7.110ff. Identification evidence may sometimes be excluded on grounds of unreliability, for example dock identifications, but generally directions are regarded as sufficient to ensure that juries assess accurately the probative value of identification evidence: see, for example, Dupas v R (2012) 40 VR 182; [2012] VSCA 328 at [229]ff. Identification evidence is discussed at 4.54ff. 156. See, for example, R v Kallis [1994] 2 Qd R 88; R v Madigan [2005] NSWCCA 170 at [73], [83]; R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; [2006] NSWCCA 167 at [157]. 157. Courts recognise that in considering exercise of the discretion the mitigating effects of a direction to the jury should be taken into account: R v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 at 365 (Hunt CJ at CL); R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 at 139–40 (Hunt CJ at CL); Papakosmas v R (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [94] (McHugh J); R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 at [167]; Dupas v R (2012) 40 VR 182; [2012] VSCA 328 at [141]–[142]. The empirical validity of this mitigating effect may be questioned but the whole efficacy of the common law jury trial depends upon assuming the effectiveness of jury directions: see 2.12–2.13 particularly at nn 51–53 above. 158. [1964] NSWR 1489; R v Barton [2006] NSWSC 1494 (Buddin J); but cf R v Green (1939) 61 CLR 167; R v Bowhay (No 3) [1998] NSWSC 660 (Dunford J); and R v Zammit (1999) 107 A Crim R 489; [1999] NSWCCA 65 at [153]–[158] (Wood CJ at CL: judge’s direction sufficient to maintain proper balance); see also R v Gibson [2002] NSWCCA 401 at [69]–[74] (Sully J); R v Bunting (2004) 92 SASR 146; [2004] SASC 235 at [665]. Empirical studies suggest that mock jurors are more likely to ‘convict’ when shown gruesome images of crimes: Bright and Goodman-Delahunty, ‘Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger, Blame, and Jury Decision-Making’ (2006) Law & Hum Behav 283; Douglas, Lyon and Ogloff, ‘The Impact of Graphic Photographic Evidence on Mock Juror Decisions in a Murder Trial: Probative or Prejudicial’ (1997) 21 Law & Hum Behav 485; Whalen and Blanchard, ‘Effects of Photographic Evidence on Mock Juror Judgment (1982) 12 J App Soc Psych 30; Bandes and Blumenthal,

‘Emotion and the Law’ (2012) 8 Annual Rev Law & Soc Sci 161. 159. (1985) 159 CLR 45; and see 3.114. 160. (2000) 113 A Crim R 429 (CCA (Qld)). 161. Jamal v R (2012) 223 A Crim R 585; [2012] NSWCCA 198. 162. (1977) 137 CLR 517. 163. R v Cook [2004] NSWCCA 52 at [20]–[49] (Simpson J); Hannes v DPP (Cth) (No 2) [2006] NSWCCA 373 at [309]–[320]. 164. This is one reason for excluding police testimony of unsigned confessions: Driscoll v R (1977) 137 CLR 517. Arguably the identification testimony in Smith v R (2001) 206 CLR 650; [2001] HCA 50 (discussed at 2.23) would have been most appropriately excluded upon this basis if not excluded as inadmissible opinion evidence under s 76. Courts have been less willing latterly to exclude testimony of identification or similarity from other ad hoc prosecution experts: see, for example, R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; Li v R (2003) 139 A Crim R 281; R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; [2006] NSWCCA 167; Murdoch v R (2007) 167 A Crim R 329; [2007] NTCCA 1. See generally Edmond and San Roque, ‘Quasi Justice: Ad Hoc Expertise and Identification Evidence’ (2009) 33 Crim LJ 8 and at 7.56. 165. In Tuite v R [2015] VSCA 148 at 11, the court (Maxwell CJ, Redlich and Weinberg JJA) held that before forensic evidence can be led ‘its reliability must be established to the court’s satisfaction (under s 137) …’. See Edmond, ‘Forensic Science Evidence and the Conditions for Rational (Jury) Evaluation’ (2015) 39 Melb ULR 77. 166. Klewer v Walton [2003] NSWCA 308 at [27] (Hodgson JA); Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 8) [2005] FCA 1348 at [21] (Sackville J in the course of exercising discretion in a case tried before judge alone). 167. Papakosmas v R (1999) 196 CLR 297 at 308 (Gleeson CJ and Hayne J), 311 (Gaudron and Kirby JJ), 325–8 (McHugh J). This discretion is most likely to be exercised if there is a particular difficulty in accurately assessing probative value due to the lack of opportunity to cross-examine the maker of an out-of-court assertion: Munro v R [2014] ACTCA 11 at [26] (Refshauge ACJ and Penfold J). See, for example, Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371 at 377–8 (Branson J), 382 (Finkelstein J); Roach v Page (No 11) [2003] NSWSC 907 at [35]–[39], [74](h) (Sperling J after extensive analysis); White Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (in liq) v White [2005] NSWCA 173 at [237]–[240] (Ipp JA); Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 654 (Barrett J); or because the basis for an opinion has not been laid and cannot be accurately assessed through cross-examination: Roach v Page (No 11) [2003] NSWSC 907 at [35]–[37], [74](h) (Sperling J); Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 8) [2005] FCA 1348 at [24] (Sackville J); Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S [2008] FCA 559 at [716]–[783] (Lindgren J). See generally Odgers, n 4 above, at [EA.136.60]. 168. The mandatory nature of s 137 is emphasised in R v Blick [2000] NSWCCA 61 at [19]–[20] (Sheller JA); R v GK [2001] NSWCCA 413 at [74] (Sully J); DPP v Lynch (2006) 16 Tas R 49; [2006] TASSC 89 at [18]–[19]; R v Sood [2007] NSWCCA 214 at [23]; and now in the amended heading to Pt 3.11. The mandatory expression may be of little consequence as for the purposes of appeal the application of s 137 is regarded as analogous to the exercise of a discretion and must be reviewed in accordance with the principles in House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504–5: see Vickers v R (2006) 160 A Crim R 195; [2006] NSWCCA 60 at [76] (Simpson J); R v SJRC [2007] NSWCCA 142 at [34]–[37] (James J); R v Arvidson [2008] NSWCCA 135 at [41]–[43] (Beazley JA) and cases at nn 120–122 above. 169. Cf R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159 at [64] (Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ). 170. See Evidence, ALRC Interim Report 26 (1985), vol 1, [643]–[644], [957]. Cf discussion in Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [16.1]–[16.5]. 171. R v Lockyer (1996) 89 A Crim R 457 at 460 (Hunt CJ at CL); R v Lisoff [1999] NSWCCA 364 at [52]

(Spigelman CJ, Newman and Sully JJ); R v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536 at 548 (Howie J); R v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317 at [30] (Mason P); R v Clark [2001] NSWCCA 494 at [164] (Heydon JA); R v Ambrosoli (2002) 55 NSWLR 603 at [12], [70] (Mason P); R v Chai [2002] NSWCCA 512 at [43] (Mason P, Sperling and Bergin JJ); R v Yates [2002] NSWCCA 520 at [252] (Wood CJ at CL, Hulme and Budden JJ); R v Suteski (No 4) [2002] NSWSC 218 at [42]–[44] (Kirby J); Hannes v DPP (Cth) (No 2) [2006] NSWCCA 373 at [315] (Barr and Hall JJ); Aytugrul v R (2012) 247 CLR 170; [2012] HCA 15 at [26]–[30] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ). 172. (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 at [39]. 173. Cf remarks in Tuite v R [2015] VSCA 148 at 11, demanding the establishment of the reliability of forensic techniques before they are admissible under s 137. 174. R v Shamouil (2006) 66 NSWLR 228; R v XY (2013) 84 NSWLR 363. See also R v Burton (2013) 237 A Crim R 238; [2013] NSWCCA 335 at [157]ff (Simpson J); Saoud v R (2014) 87 NSWLR 481; [2014] NSWCCA 136 (Basten JA, Fullerton and RA Hume JJ agreeing) at [33], ‘as explained by Campbell JA (Howie and Rothman JJ agreeing) in R v Ford (2009) 201 A Crim R 451; [2009] NSWCCA 306 at [52], a decision that evidence has “significant probative value” is, like the decision about whether the evidence has “probative value” at all, a decision about the reasoning processes that are open to a jury’. 175. KMJ v Tasmania (2011) 20 Tas R 425; [2011] TASCCA 7 at [30] (Evans J), but cf reservation at [34], [42] (Blow J). See also Tasmania v L (2013) 232 A Crim R 123; [2013] TASSC 47 at [42]–[43] (Pearce J). 176. IMM v R [2014] NTCCA 20 at [48]. 177. Victorian courts, having regard to the policy of rectitude inherent in ss 97, 98, 101 and 137, have held that while the words ‘if accepted’ require an assumption of witness credibility, courts can consider matters going to the reliability of their testimony in assessing the rational potential of probative value: Murdoch v R (2013) 40 VR 436; [2013] VSCA 272 at [84] (Priest J) and Velkoski v R (2014) 45 VR 680; [2014] VSCA 121 at [179] (Redlich, Weinberg and Coghlan JJA) extend Dupas v R (2012) 40 VR 182; [2012] VSCA 328 (decided under s 137) to interpreting ss 97 and 98. Whether the Victorian approach to s 137 significantly differs in practice to that taken in New South Wales is questioned by Basten JA in R v XY (2013) 84 NSWLR 363; [2013] NSWCCA 121 at [23]–[26], [41]–[73], particularly his conclusion at [64]. 178. That each approach appears to be substantively the same can be seen when the quote from IMM is compared with the Victorian approach as summarised by Priest and Beech JJ in Peterson (a Pseudonym) v R [2014] VSCA 111 at [51]. See also Bayley v R [2016] VSCA 160 at [53]–[55] (Warren CJ, Weinberg and Priest JJA), where this quote from IMM was applied to exclude under s 137 weak and unconvincing identification evidence based upon a Facebook entry. For commentary, see Odgers, ‘The Probative Value of Evidence after IMM v The Queen’ (2016, Winter) Bar News 38; Lancaster, ‘IMM v The Queen: A Response’ (2016, Winter) Bar News 40; Hamer, ‘The Province of Jury Factfinding and Principles of Judicial Restraint after IMM v The Queen [2016] HCA 14’ (in draft). The identification example is adapted from Heydon, ‘Is the Weight of Evidence Material to its Admissibility?’ (2014) 26 Current Issues Crim Just 219 at 234. 179. Cf judicial confidence in jury understanding directions: see n 53 above. 180. (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [91]–[93]. 181. (1998) 192 CLR 159 at [18] (Brennan CJ), [54], [78] (Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ), [126] (Kirby J). 182. (1946) 73 CLR 316. 183. In passing it might be noted that this case suggests that there are situations where a court may say that

evidence has no capacity for probative weight at all. In this sense it might be described as irrelevant, both at common law and also under the uniform legislation (if the notion of relevance is that explained in Smith): see 2.23 and French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ in IMM v R (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 at [39] ‘[evidence] so inherently incredible, fanciful or preposterous that it could not be accepted by a rational jury … would not meet the criterion of relevance’. See also at 2.18 above. 184. (1993) 113 ALR 1. 185. Cf Driscoll v R (1977) 137 CLR 517 at 541–2, where Gibbs J considered that generally unsigned records of interview should be excluded in exercise of a discretion to ensure that a strict application of the rules of admissibility did not operate unfairly against the accused. 186. Exercise was also influenced by the fact that the police had acted improperly in conducting an interview with an Aborigine without him being given the opportunity to obtain legal assistance. In McDermott v R (1948) 76 CLR 501 at 517–18, Williams J emphasised that it would have been unfair if police had tendered evidence of an interview without calling witnesses to it who testified that the accused appeared to be answering in a sarcastic tone. Here the duties of prosecutors interact with considerations of unreliability in enlivening the fairness discretion. See discussion of Palmer, ‘Police Deception: The Right to Silence and the Discretionary Exclusion of Confessions’ (1988) 22 Crim LJ 325 at 332–3. 187. (2006) 95 SASR 482; [2006] SASC 281. 188. Doyle CJ explained in Hall that unless the blood test was carried out immediately, in other than extreme cases its effectiveness in challenging the breathalyser test was very limited. 189. Evidence of blood alcohol levels has been excluded where there has been police impropriety: Parker v Police (2002) 81 SASR 240; [2002] SASC 30 (Mulligan J); Robin v Police (2002) 81 SASR 253; [2002] SASC 33; Burton v Police (2004) 88 SASR 152. Doyle CJ in Police v Jervis (1998) 70 SASR 429 suggests that the impropriety must be that of law enforcement officers, but in R v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24 at [2] he admitted to having expressed himself ‘more narrowly than I should’ in Jervis. But in Dunstall v R (2015) 322 ALR 440; [2015] HCA 14 at [42], the majority emphasised that any impropriety by a medical practitioner not acting as an agent for ‘the law enforcement authorities responsible for the prosecution’ could not give rise to the Bunning v Cross discretion. In Police v Fountaine (1999) 74 SASR 26 at [41] (Doyle CJ), [154]–[155] (Lander J), it was held that although a notice to the defendant about a blood sample taken had been incorrectly served it resulted in no loss of opportunity to challenge the prosecution’s blood analysis, so there was no basis for discretionary exclusion. Arguably, where there has been impropriety, exclusion should be justified in exercise of the public policy discretion rather than the unfairness discretion: see 2.36. 190. (2015) 322 ALR 440; [2015] HCA 14. 191. (2000) 77 SASR 24. 192. Nor was the court willing to exercise the public policy discretion as the evidence of the plants’ nature had not been unlawfully or improperly obtained. The unlawfulness was the subsequent destruction of the plants. 193. (1998) 192 CLR 159 at [78]. 194. See McHugh J in Papakosmas v R (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [91]–[93], [97]; Ordukaya v Hicks [2000] NSWCA 180 at [38]–[41]; R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506; [2001] NSWCCA 494 at [164]; R v Suteski (2002) 56 NSWLR 182; [2002] NSWCCA 509 at [101], [126]–[127]; Roach v Page (No 11) [2003] NSWSC 907 at [74]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 216 ALR 320; [2005] NSWSC 417 at [325]–[343]; Brown v R [2006] NSWCCA 69 at [33]–[36]; Lym International Pty Ltd v Chen [2008] NSWSC 1110 at [13]–[16] (Hamilton J); Bray v R [2014] VSCA 276 (Santamaria J); IMM v R (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 at [71] (applying Papakosmas); and Odgers, n 4 above, at [EA.135.150].

195. Bray v R [2014] VSCA 276 at [71]–[102] (Santamaria JA, Maxwell CJ and Weinberg JA agreeing in a learned judgment canvassing authorities, including those in other common law jurisdictions). 196. Hannes v DPP (No 2) [2006] NSWCCA 373 at [313]. 197. Cf R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159 (secret recording of conversation with accused does not in itself invoke discretionary exclusion on any ground); Em v R (2007) 232 CLR 67; [2007] HCA 46 (secret recording where an accused is under a self-induced impression that evidence of an unrecorded conversation cannot be tendered against him does not invoke discretionary exclusion on grounds of unfairness (under s 90), but if police have induced or encouraged that impression this impropriety gives rise to possible discretionary exclusion on grounds either of unfairness or public policy). These cases are discussed further at 5.259 and 8.142. 198. R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159 at [69] (Toohey, Gummow and Gaudron JJ). 199. Brennan CJ recognises this in R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159 at [27], [28]. See further Palmer, n 186 above. This extended idea of unfairness was developed in relation to confessional evidence at a time before courts recognised a general discretion to exclude illegally and improperly obtained evidence. With the advent of this general discretion this extended notion is arguably no longer required: see 8.134–8.146. 200. In Em v R (2007) 232 CLR 67; [2007] HCA 46, Gummow and Hayne JJ take the view that once there is impropriety the appropriate approach under the uniform legislation is to apply s 138, the public policy discretion, and not s 90, the unfairness discretion. But neither Gleeson CJ and Heydon J nor Kirby J (in dissent) take this ‘categorical’ approach to the legislation. Whether these views translate to the common law is another matter. 201. Evidence, ALRC Report 38 (1987), at 90, [160]: ‘… where the confession was obtained because the accused proceeded on a false assumption’, and the examples therein at n 18. See also the discussion of Kirby J in Em v R (2007) 232 CLR 67; [2007] HCA 46 at [183]–[188]. 202. (1998) 192 CLR 159. 203. (2007) 232 CLR 67; [2007] HCA 46. 204. To this Kirby J, dissenting in Em v R (2007) 232 CLR 67; [2007] HCA 46 at [228], passionately declared: ‘Gleeson CJ and Heydon J state that “every day police officers take advantage of the ignorance or stupidity of persons whom they eventually prosecute”. Their Honours suggest that the appellant’s incorrect belief about the availability of any admissions in the May conversation at a trial was simply a species of such “ignorance or stupidity”. This approach implies that the educated and the clever enjoy a special position under the law which the ignorant and stupid do not. I could never agree with such a view’. 205. In Bellemore v Tasmania (2006) 16 Tas R 364 at [194] (Blow J), [48] (Crawford J concurring), their Honours doubted that a residual unfairness discretion continued under the uniform legislation. Slicer J (at [126]) disagreed insofar as this might suggest that the principles in Rozenes v Beljajev did not continue under the uniform legislation. Compare with views of Redlich and Weinberg JJA in Haddara v R (2014) 43 VR 53; [2014] VSCA 100 at [14]ff, particularly at [60]–[72] that the common law principle to ensure the fairness of a criminal trial is not excluded by the uniform legislation and may justify the exclusion of evidence as well as a stay of proceedings. See also 2.3 n 11 above. 206. In R v Helmhout [2001] NSWCCA 372, the trial judge did not regard it as automatically unfair to admit admissions consequent upon illegality and considered exclusion principally under s 138 so that all the surrounding circumstances could be considered. The CCA appeared to agree with this approach. 207. (2007) 232 CLR 67; [2007] HCA 46. 208. But compare with R v Sonnet (No 2) (2011) 220 A Crim R 199; [2011] VSC 551 at [38], where Lasry J

excluded the accused’s admissional testimony in a previous trial, which testimony had been held on appeal to have been productive of a miscarriage of justice as the accused had felt obliged to testify at that trial as a result of a procedural error, and it would be at odds with the Court of Appeal’s decision and ‘unfair to the accused … for the Crown to gain forensic advantage’ from the situation. 209. See cases cited in nn 138–139 above. 210. On criminal cases, see Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54; Ridgeway v R (1995) 184 CLR 19. This public policy discretion is discussed in more detail at 8.143–8.146. On civil cases, see Mazinski v Bakka (1979) 20 SASR 350 at 361, 381; Pearce v Button (1985) 8 FCR 388; The Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Pilmer (1994) 63 SASR 364 at 377–8; Polycarpou v Australian Wire Industries Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 49 at 67; Klein v Bryant [1998] ACTSC 89 (Master Connolly: applying uniform legislation to exclude a tortious video surveillance). 211. Thus, in Ridgeway v R (1995) 184 CLR 19, the court excluded evidence relating to a charge of possessing illegally imported drugs because the police had themselves instigated the illegal importation upon which the possession was based. 212. Empirical studies in the United States suggest that legal decisions tend to have limited and indirect effects on the behaviour of police and other investigators: see Spiotto, ‘Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives’ (1973) 2 J Legal Studies 243; Orfield, ‘The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers’ (1987) 54 U Chicago LR 1016; Cassell, ‘Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment’ (1996) 90 Northwestern ULR 387; Leo, ‘Miranda’s Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game’ (1996) 30 Law & Society Rev 259; Thomas, ‘Plain Talk About the Miranda Empirical Debate: A “Steady-state” Theory of Confessions’ (1996) 43 UCLA LR 933; Thomas, ‘Is Miranda a Real-world Failure?’ (1996) 43 UCLA LR 821. 213. Ridgeway v R (1995) 184 CLR 19 at 31 (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ); Nicholas v R (1998) 193 CLR 173 at [35]–[36] (Brennan CJ), [101] (McHugh J), [211]–[214] (Kirby J). This is not to say that judges never have regard to the discouragement of police malpractices in exercising their discretion: see, for example, R v Chapman (2001) 79 SASR 342; Em v R (2007) 232 CLR 67; [2007] HCA 46 at [238] (Kirby J). 214. Dennis, n 116 above, at [2.022]–[2.029], [3.042]–[3.046], sees this discretion as illustrating a concept of ‘legitimacy’ which underlies the public acceptance of verdicts. At the other extreme, Davies, ‘Exclusion of Evidence Illegally or Unlawfully Obtained’ (2002) 76 Aust LJ 170, argues that the discretion has little effect in either discouraging police illegality or in ensuring respect for the administration of justice and should be replaced by an effective process for punishing police impropriety. See also n 212 above. 215. Moti v R (2011) 245 CLR 456; [2011] HCA 50 (stay granted where Australian government involved in illegal deportation of accused from the Solomon Islands). 216. (1998) 192 CLR 159 at [69]–[70]. 217. For example, Numoo v Garner (1998) 7 NTLR 129; Police v Jervis (1998) 70 SASR 429; R v Suckling [1999] NSWCCA 36 at [40] (contrasting ‘community standards’ with ‘populist public opinion’). See also Martinez, ‘Confessions and Admissions to Undercover Agents’ (2000) 74 Aust LJ 391. 218. (2000) 77 SASR 24 (Martin J, with Doyle CJ and Bleby J agreeing). Lobban was endorsed in Police v Hall (2006) 95 SASR 482; [2006] SASC 281. 219. R v Haughbro (1997) 142 FLR 415 at 428 (Miles CJ); DPP v Farr (2001) 118 A Crim R 299; [2001] NSWSC 3 at [75] (Smart JA). The same approach is enacted in ss 154, 155 of the Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA). 220. Question of Law Reserved (No 1 of 1998) (1998) 70 SASR 281 at 287–8 (Doyle CJ); R v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24; [2000] SASC at [39]–[41] (Martin J); R v Healy [2016] QCA 334 at [38]–[39] (Gotterson JA).

A more liberal approach to causation is suggested in Robinett v Police (2000) 78 SASR 85 at 101 (Bleby J) (criticised by Grant (2001) 25 Crim LJ 97, but followed by Smart AJ in DPP v Carr [2002] NSWSC 194 at [50]–[72]). In R v Haddad (2000) 116 A Crim R 312; [2000] NSWCCA 351 at [69]–[76], Spigelman CJ, disapproving of Martin J’s comments in Lobban at [39], suggests the words ‘obtained in contravention’ in s 138 may ‘encompass the entirety of an integrated scheme … designed to protect fundamental freedoms’ and thus encompass impropriety following the obtaining of evidence; but cf narrower approach in R v Dalley (2002) 132 A Crim R 169; [2002] NSWCCA 284 at [86]; Tasmania v Crane [2004] TASSC 80 at [21] (Blow J). Doyle CJ in Police v Hall (2006) 95 SASR 482; [2006] SASC 281 at [39]–[45], expressly modified his narrow position in Lobban and followed Chernov JA in DPP v Moore (2003) 6 VR 430 at [55] in agreeing that impropriety after the obtaining of evidence may be so closely related as to give rise to this discretion (for example, improper failure to provide defendant with blood-test kit following taking of breathalyser test). See also DPP v Riley (2007) 16 VR 519; Martine v R [2015] ACTCA 38 at [63]–[68]; Heyward v Bishop [2015] ACTCA 58 at [75]–[76], though contrast Application of Lee (2009) 212 A Crim R 442; [2009] ACTSC 98 at [26]–[31]. 221. Ridgeway v R (1995) 184 CLR 19 at 36–7 (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ); DPP v Carr [2002] NSWSC 194 at [19]–[38] (Smart AJ); Robinson v Woolworths Ltd (2005) 64 NSWLR 612; [2005] NSWCCA 426 at [22]–[23] (Basten JA). Mere lies have been held not to constitute impropriety: Beckett v R [2014] NSWCCA 305 at [66]–[70]. It seems that secret photographing or tape recording is not in itself improper: see, for example, R v Sahin (2000) 115 A Crim R 413 (CCA (Vic)); R v Franklin (2001) 119 A Crim R 223 (CCA (Vic)); R v Sotheren [2001] NSWSC 204 at [36] (Dowd J); R v Vale (2001) 120 A Crim R 322 (CCA (WA)). Nor is secretly recording a suspect knowing he or she is under a selfinduced misapprehension that an unrecorded conversation cannot be admitted against him or her: Em v R (2007) 232 CLR 67; [2007] HCA 46; or the creation of ‘criminal’ gangs and false scenarios to encourage prospective members to admit their previous crimes: Tofilau v R (2007) 231 CLR 396; [2007] HCA 39; R v Cowan [2016] 1 Qd R 433; [2015] QCA 87. 222. Employment Advocate v Williamson (2001) 111 FCR 20 at [81] (Branson J); R v Edwin (No 2) (2013) 227 FLR 14; [2013] ACTSC 84 at [23]–[24] (Burns J). 223. Em v R (2007) 232 CLR 67; [2007] HCA 46, where the court held that a suspect’s belief that an unrecorded conversation with police was inadmissible was entirely self-induced and not actively reinforced by police until after relevant admissions had been made. 224. The breadth of ‘impropriety’ as opposed to ‘contravention’ is adverted to by French CJ in Parker v Comptroller-General of Customs (2009) 252 ALR 619; [2009] HCA 7 at [29]–[30]. Compare with AG (Tas) v Wright (2013) 22 Tas R 322; [2013] TASCCA 14, where in answer to a specific question it was held that failure to comply with recommended identification procedures in a police manual was not ‘a breach of Australian law’ for the purposes of s 138 as the text specified with particularity (by enclosed boxes) what were orders obliging obeyance. See also Gans et al, Criminal Process and Human Rights, Federation Press, Sydney, 2011. 225. But as with other provisions in the uniform legislation enacting common law rules (for example, s 101) the legislation makes no reference to underlying policy and courts may give the words a more ‘literal’ interpretation. 226. (1978) 141 CLR 54; (1995) 184 CLR 19 respectively: discussed at 5.256–5.260. As a consequence, judges commonly use common law authorities as a guide to determining whether to admit unlawfully obtained evidence under s 138: see, for example, R v Mokbel (2012) 222 A Crim R 377; [2012] VSC 86 at [313]ff (Whelan J). 227. Whether there has been deliberate disregard for the law is a primary consideration: Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54 at 77–8 (Stephen and Aickin JJ); Parker v Comptroller-General of Customs [2007] NSWCCA 348 at [59]; DPP v Marijancevic (2011) 33 VR 440; [2011] VSCA 355 at [91] (Warren CJ,

Buchanan and Redlich JJA); Gallagher v R [2015] NSWCCA 228 at [50]–[52]. But not necessarily determinative: Evidence, ALRC Interim Report 26 (1985), vol 1, [964]. Where the activity of police officers is unlawful but they are unaware of the unlawfulness, because they falsely believe their authority is valid under the appropriate legislation — such as the Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act 1997 (NSW) — courts tend to take a sympathetic approach: Dowe v R [2009] NSWCCA 23; Gedeon v R (2013) 280 FLR 275; [2013] NSWCCA 257. See also Herring v US 555 US (2009); R v Grant [2009] SCC 32. 228. For example, to protect against unlawful questioning and unauthorised search by police: see, for example, Tasmania v Hall (2013) 238 A Crim R 42; [2013] TASSC 75; R v Versac (2013) 227 A Crim R 569; [2013] QSC 46; R v Nguyen (2013) 117 SASR 432; [2013] SASCFC 91 at [41]; R v Pohl (2014) 244 A Crim R 56; [2014] QSC 173; R v Rockford (2015) 122 SASR 391; [2015] SASCFC 51 at [41] (Stanley J); Knowles v R [2015] VSCA 141 at [71]–[76] (Ashley, Redlich and Priest JJA, unlawful VARE interview). 229. Although the Act does not mention fairness (in this sense) as a separate consideration under s 138(3), the following cases suggest its strong relevance: DPP v Farr (2001) 118 A Crim R 299; [2001] NSWSC 3 at [86] (Smart AJ); R v Dungay [2001] NSWCCA 443 at [31]–[51] (Ipp AJA); R v Helmhout [2001] NSWCCA 372 at [11], [12] (Ipp AJA); R v Phuong [2001] NSWSC 115 at [48]–[50], [59] (Wood CJ at CL); DPP v MD (2010) 29 VR 434; [2010] VSCA 233 at [33]–[44] (Maxwell P, Nettle and Harper JJA); Haddara v R (2014) 43 VR 53; [2013] VSCA 100 at [165]–[170] (Priest JA); Dickman v R [2015] VSCA 311 at [124]–[128] (Priest JA and Croucher JJA). 230. The document commencing proceedings need not formally allege all material facts but it must give sufficient particulars so that the accused can identify the incident alleged to constitute the crime and thereby adequately prepare a defence: Lafite v Samuels [1972] SASR 1. (This sometimes creates problems in the case of sexual crimes committed against (particularly) children over a long period: see, for example, S v R (1989) 168 CLR 226. Legislation making it an offence to maintain a sexual relationship seeks to overcome this problem: referred to in Chapter 3, n 93.) If in opening counsel fails to indicate how all necessary material facts are to be proved, the defence might informally object on grounds of sufficiency at that point but, if the prosecution insists on proceeding, a formal objection of no case to answer cannot be made until after the prosecution has presented its case: see further 6.30. It may be necessary to direct the jury to be agreed beyond reasonable doubt of particular material facts alleged: see, for example, Ardrey v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 154; discussed as the ‘unanimity rule’ in R v McCarthy (2015) 124 SASR 190 and R v Hamra [2016] SASCFC 130 at [32]–[50] (Kourakis CJ), [100]– [105] (Peek J). 231. R v Sims [1946] KB 531 at 539 (Lord Goddard CJ). 232. Court rules in each jurisdiction embody these requirements. See generally Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure, 10th ed, Law Book Co, Sydney, 2014, Chs 6–7. 233. Where evidence has two uses, one admissible and the other not, this must at least be subject to direction to any jury and may lead to exclusion of the evidence if its inadmissible purpose is more prejudicial (‘unfairly prejudicial’) than the probative value of the admissible purpose (the Christie discretion: cf Uniform Acts s 136). 234. See, for example, Sinclair v R (1946) 73 CLR 316; R v Little (1976) 14 SASR 556; MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512; Uniform Acts s 189. 235. Under the uniform legislation, the matters listed in s 192 must be taken into account: see further 2.26. 236. R v Frugtniet [1999] VSCA 58 at [2]–[10]; or during trial to allow evidential points to be reserved or appealed to a higher court: R v Elliott (1996) 185 CLR 250; R v Kola [2001] SASC 448. 237. MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 523 (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J), 533–4 (Mason J) (in case of

confessional evidence voir dire should be held when a real question of admissibility arises: see further at 8.161); R v Rowley (1986) 23 A Crim R 371 (CCA (Vic)) (may be wider discretion to refuse voir dire in relation to identification evidence than confessional evidence); R v Lars (1994) 73 A Crim R 91 at 115–25; R v Callaghan (2001) 124 A Crim R 126 (CCA (Vic)) (court should be reluctant to call witnesses on a voir dire where they have already been cross-examined at the committal); R v Petroulias (2006) 182 A Crim R 1; [2006] NSWSC 1422 (the common law continues to apply in uniform evidence law jurisdictions in that there is no right to a voir dire and the precise procedure to be followed remains in the discretion of the court); R v Martin (2007) 99 SASR 213; [2007] SASC 336 at [17]–[22] (Gray J: no material to justify holding a voir dire). 238. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ss 130, 130A; Criminal Code (Qld) s 590AA(2)(e) (ruling binding at retrial: R v Sheehy [2005] 1 Qd R 418); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 285A; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 361A; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 199–205; Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) s 98; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 264 (objections to indictment or joint trial). This legislation does not permit the voir dire before arraignment and plea: R v P (1991) 57 A Crim R 211. The power to order advance rulings in any proceedings now given by s 192A of the uniform legislation (overruling the decision in TKWJ v R (2002) 212 CLR 124) would also appear to permit applications prior to any jury being empanelled: see further Odgers, n 4 above, at [EA.192A.60]. 239. (1977) 137 CLR 20 at 31 (followed in Kerr v R [1980] WAR 21). 240. MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 (cf Ajodha v The State [1982] AC 204 at 223). The defence may consent to or request such a course. The procedure for determining the admissibility of confessions is discussed further at 8.160ff. 241. [1980] 2 NSWLR 542 at 566–7. 242. The weight of Australian authority favours the jury’s absence: R v Harding [1989] 2 Qd R 373; R v Schlaefer (1992) 57 SASR 423; R v T (1998) 71 SASR 265 at 272; but this view is criticised in Lau v R (1991) 6 WAR 30 at 39–45 (Murray J), 57–60 (Owen J); and it is the English practice for the jury to remain: see R v Reynolds [1950] 1 KB 606 at 610–11; R v Lal Khan (1981) 73 Cr App R 190; R v Deakin [1995] 1 Cr App R 471 (voir dire examination of the witness whose competency is in question should be in the presence of the jury, but any additional expert evidence on competency should be heard in the jury’s absence). In Cook v R (2000) 22 WAR 67 at 98–9, the giving of the judge’s reasons for holding a child-witness competent in the presence of the jury where the reasons did not convey any approbation of the child’s credibility was held no basis for appeal. 243. Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542 at 566–7. 244. Re Mackenzie; Ex parte Whitelock [1971] 2 NSWLR 534 (Meares J); Casley-Smith v FS Evans and Sons Pty Ltd (No 2) (1988) 49 SASR 332; Brown v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 119 FCR 269; [2002] FCA 318 at [90]–[95]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2004) 213 ALR 338; [2004] NSWSC 1062 at [23]–[49]; MM Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Port Stephens Council (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 243 at [49]. As the uniform legislation is silent on this issue, the last three cases accept that the common law position applies. 245. Section 192 also applies to this exercise of discretion to so ‘order’; cf Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Aust Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 157 FCR 310; [2007] FCA 121 at [7]– [8] (Jacobsen J). 246. Lawrence v R [1933] AC 699 at 708; Lipohar v R (1999) 200 CLR 485; [1999] HCA 65 at [69] (and cases court refers to in fn 134); R v Gee [2012] SASCFC 86. Legislation relating to presence includes: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ss 71, 72; Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 617 (as affected by Jury Act 1995 s 52(2): R v Crossman [2011] 2 Qd R 435; [2011] QCA 126); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 361 (presence at appeal); Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 369 (discretion to dispense with presence exercised in Tasmania v Bosworth (2005) 13 Tas SR 457); Criminal Procedure

Act 2009 (Vic) ss 329–330 (see also ss 80–87: non-appearance when charged with summary offence); (Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 (Vic) Div 3 of Pt IIA permits the appearance of an accused before the court by audio visual link in certain circumstances); Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) ss 88, 140; Criminal Code Act (NT) s 361. Under s 53(2)(a) of the uniform legislation, parties, including accused, must be given ‘a reasonable opportunity’ of attending a view; see Jamal v R (2012) 223 A Crim R 585; [2012] NSWCCA 198. 247. R v McHardie [1983] 2 NSWLR 733 at 739; Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 43–4; R v Jones (1998) 72 SASR 281 (discretion to continue without accused when absconded after arraignment properly exercised; no miscarriage of justice); R v Jones (2002) 2 Cr App R 128 at [6]; R v Collie [2005] SASC 148 at [24]–[47] (Duggan J for CCA); R v Serrano (No 5) (2007) 16 VR 360; R v Mokbel (2010) 249 FLR 169; [2010] VSCA 11 at [40]–[42] (the court); R v Gee [2012] SASCFC 86. Statutory procedures exist to deal with summary offences in the accused’s absence; for example: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 196; Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 142; Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) ss 62–62C; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) Pt 3.3 Div 10 (ss 80–87); Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) ss 55, 56. 248. Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 404. In cases of national security the procedure under the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) may have to be invoked. See further at 5.247ff. For an overview of national security law, see Williams, ‘A Decade of Australian Anti-Terror Laws’ (2011) 35 Melb ULR 1136. 249. Sharpe v ABLF (WA Branch) [1989] WAR 138 at 151 (Seaman J). 250. Trzesinski v Daire (1986) 44 SASR 43; R v Schlaefer (1992) 57 SASR 423. But cf R v Simmons (1997) 93 A Crim R 32 at 37–8 (Perry J: ‘I do not accept the proposition that in discharging his or her role the judge is confined to simply questioning the child … ordinarily [cross-examination by the accused] would not be permitted as it would be apt to put undue stress on the child’). See also R v Andrews (No 3) (2005) 92 SASR 442; [2005] SASC 298 at [11] (Debelle J). 251. R v Lyons (1889) 15 VLR 15; R v Simmons (1997) 93 A Crim R 32 at 37–8 (Perry J). 252. Trzesinski v Daire (1986) 44 SASR 43 (Prior J). Cf R v Andrews (No 3) (2005) 92 SASR 442; [2005] SASC 298 at [7]–[10], where Debelle J suggests circumstances should determine whether representation is appropriate. 253. In Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81, it was held an opponent should have the opportunity to crossexamine a witness examined on the voir dire to determine hostility. Distinguished in R v Henderson (1984) 37 SASR 82, where a witness was examined on the voir dire merely to determine the relevance of his testimony. 254. MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512. This same procedure applies to a hearing before a magistrate: Egan v Bott [1985] VR 787. See further 8.161–8.162. 255. See Re Fagan; Ex parte Hamilton [1966] 2 NSWR 732; applied in Dixon v McCarthy [1975] 1 NSWLR 617. The privilege against self-incrimination was held to apply in R v Post and Georgee [1982] Qd R 495 (and is fully preserved by s 189(6) of the uniform legislation). In R v Vuckov (1986) 40 SASR 498, the statutory protection of the accused against cross-examination on previous convictions was held to apply on the voir dire. But cf R v Nguyen [2000] 1 Qd R 559. Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81 affirms that the statutory rules concerning proof of inconsistent statements apply strictly on the voir dire. See also R v Hadlow [1992] 2 Qd R 440 (CCA (Qld)). 256. In New South Wales, it has become increasingly common in criminal proceedings to use concurrent evidence (so-called ‘hot-tubs’) in determining the admissibility of opinions based on ‘specialised knowledge’ during the voir dire. The concurrent evidence procedure is not, however, used for the presentation of expert evidence before a jury. See Edmond, ‘Merton and the Hot-tub’ (2009) 72 Law &

Contemporary Problems 159. See further 7.64. 257. For example, Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 303–4 (followed in J v R [1989] Tas R 116). See further 3.70. 258. (2006) 182 A Crim R 1; [2006] NSWSC 1422; MM Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Port Stephens Council (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 243 at [36]. See Odgers, n 4 above, at [EA.189.40]. 259. MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 519–20 (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J), 532 (Mason J). 260. In the case of an accused testifying on the voir dire there are special problems: see 8.163–8.165. 261. The consequences of failure to object are dealt with in articles by Weinberg, ‘The Consequences of Failure to Object to Inadmissible Evidence in Criminal Cases’ (1978) 11 Melb ULR 408; and Samuels, ‘Failure to Object to an Irregularity’ [1968] Crim LR 310 at 312–14. See also Harrison, ‘Hearsay Admitted Without Objection’ (1955) 7 Res Judicatae 58; Emery, ‘The Consequences of Failure to Object to Inadmissible Evidence’, unpublished thesis, University of Adelaide, 1986; Lawrence, ‘Failure to Object: The Death of Evidential Rules’ (1996–97) 15 Aust Bar Rev 137 (where the author argues that waiver, the optional enforcement of evidential rules, undermines there being any ‘rules’ of evidence at all, that waivable rules are more akin to ‘privileges’ and that only those rules incapable of waiver are truly evidential ‘rules’).

262. ‘Is not admissible’ means ‘is not admissible following objection’: Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262; [2000] NSWCA 29 at [149]; Gonzales v R (2007) 178 A Crim R 232; [2007] NSWCCA 303 at [24]–[26]. ‘Must refuse to admit evidence’ means ‘must refuse to admit evidence following objection’: FDP v R [2008] NSWCCA 317; WC v R [2015] NSWCCA 52 at [19]–[25] (Meagher JA, Simpson and Wilson JJ agreeing); Haidari v R [2015] NSWCCA 126 at [42] (Johnson J, Gleeson JA and Hall J agreeing). These words might arguably be contrasted with the stronger phrases, ‘is not to be adduced’ (ss 118–119) and ‘is not to be admitted’ in s 138. The more recently enacted s 41 in all the Uniform Acts expressly imposes a duty upon the court to refuse improper questions to a witness whether or not an objection is made, but the answer to an improper question remains admissible. Odgers, n 4 above, at [EA.Intro.350], argues that requiring objection is inconsistent with s 190. The CCA in Velkoski v R (2014) 45 VR 680; [2014] VSCA 121 at [196]–[200] was attracted to this view, though not the CCA in Perish v R (2014) 45 VR 680; [2016] NSWCCA 89 at [268]–[272]. 263. Hall v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 165 at [100]–[103] (Mazza JA, Martin CJ agreeing). 264. R v Roberts (2011) 111 SASR 100; [2011] SASCFC 117 at [39]–[44] (Sulan J). 265. Re Lilley, dec’d [1953] VLR 98 at 101 (Smith J); Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 44 (Gibbs ACJ), 58–9, 68 (Stephen J). There is some debate over whether rules of admissibility can be waived at all in criminal cases. A number of cases assert the duty of the judge to ensure adherence to the rules of admissibility in criminal cases: R v Gibson (1887) 18 QBD 537 at 542 (Lord Coleridge CJ); Stirland v DPP [1944] AC 315 at 328 (Viscount Simon LC); MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 543 (Brennan J) (the latter case may be explained on the ground that the accused in that case was unrepresented). A limited duty is asserted in Velkoski v R (2014) 45 VR 680; [2014] VSCA 121 at [218]–[221]. Later decisions in state courts suggest the rules can be waived in criminal cases where the accused is represented and where waiver is clear and consciously made with full knowledge of the consequences: R v Alexander [1975] VR 741 at 752; R v Gay [1976] VR 577 at 584–5; R v Visser [1983] 3 NSWLR 240 at 242 (Hunt J); R v Roissetter [1984] 1 Qd R 477 at 479; R v Radford (1993) 66 A Crim R 210; Steinhauser v Davies (1994) 3 Tas R 258; Velkoski v R (2014) 45 VR 680; [2014] VSCA 121 at [208]–[217]. Failure to object in a criminal case may constitute a waiver particularly where legislation requires the defence to consider and identify admissibility issues in advance of trial: R v Clark (2005) 13 VR 75; [2005] VSCA 294 at [27] (Maxwell P). Failure to object may prima facie estop taking that ground on appeal: see 2.49. 266. R v Shalala (2007) 17 VR 133 at [24]–[25]. 267. MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 543–4 (followed by Cox J in Greaves v Aikman (1994) 74 A Crim R 370). The duty of the trial judge to ensure a fair trial is emphasised in Pemble v R (1971) 124 CLR 107 at 117–18 (Barwick CJ); and Connelly v DPP [1964] AC 1254 at 1347ff (Lord Devlin). 268. Hughes v National Trustees Executors and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 134 at 153 (Gibbs J). 269. Hughes, applied in Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 158. By the same token, if evidence is only relevant upon (one or more) inadmissible grounds then, if waiver is consciously and freely made, the evidence may be used at large for any relevant purpose: McLennan v Taylor (1966) 85 WN (Pt 1) NSW 525 at 528–9 (Walsh JA), 540 (Asprey JA). Cf the rule in Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630, whereby a party calling for an inadmissible document may be compelled to tender it and it is thereby received for all relevant purposes, relied upon in Robert Baxt and Associates v Cavenham Pty Ltd [2013] 1 Qd R 476 at [46] (Muir JA, Holmes JA and Martin J agreeing) to conclude that in Queensland ‘generally speaking at least, a party who fails to object to inadmissible hearsay evidence contained in a document which is admissible as original evidence will have waived its right to limit the use to which the evidence may be put’. 270. Although these rules cannot be waived, sections in this list which provide that a judge ‘must refuse to

admit evidence’ (s 137), that evidence ‘is not admissible’ (s 114), that evidence ‘is not to be adduced’ (ss 118–119) and evidence ‘is not to be admitted’ (s 138) may be read down to operate only following objection so that on appeal the judge’s failure to exclude inadmissible evidence will not in itself constitute an error leading to successful appeal unless the proviso applies. See further at 2.46. 271. Applied in Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] FCA 364. See further 6.68. 272. See, for example, Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568 (new allegation of bias could not be raised on appeal — cf Re the Marriage of Kennedy and Cahill (1995) FLC ¶92-605); Hinton v Mill (1991) 57 SASR 97 (King CJ); Trustees of Christian Brothers v Cardone (1995) 130 ALR 345; Holcombe v Coulton (1988) 17 NSWLR 71 (point, if taken at trial, could have been met). 273. See Suresh v R (1998) 102 A Crim R 18; [1998] HCA 23 at [22]–[23] (McHugh J), [54]–[58] (Kirby J), [64]–[65] (Hayne J); TKWJ v R (2002) 212 CLR 124 at [8], [16]–[17] (Gleeson CJ); Velkoski v R (2014) 45 VR 680; [2014] VSCA 121 at [201]–[207]. 274. For example, Criminal Appeal Rules 1986 (NSW) r 4 (the importance of which is emphasised in R v Tripodina & Morabito (1988) 35 A Crim R 183 at 191–5; R v Abusafiah (1991) 56 A Crim R 424 at 429– 30; R v Hines (1991) 24 NSWLR 737 at 742–4; R v Buckett (1995) 132 ALR 669 at 689–91; Papakosmos v R (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [70]–[73] (McHugh J)); R v Kanaan [2005] NSWCCA 385 at [99]–[102]; Haidari v R [2015] NSWCCA 126 at [46]–[47] (Johnson J, Gleeson JA and Hall J agreeing); RSC (NT) r 86.08. See also R v Carbone (1989) 50 SASR 495 at 497; R v Wright (1999) 3 VR 355; [1999] VSCA 145 at [2] (Phillips CJ and Charles JA) (failure to object a ‘serious obstacle’ to appeal); LBC v Western Australia [2011] WASC 201 at [10] (Martin CJ); R v Van Der Zyden [2012] 2 Qd R 568; [2012] QCA 89 at [34]–[41] (failure by counsel to seek Palmer direction a rational forensic decision and no miscarriage shown); James v R [2013] VSCA 55 at [13] (Maxwell P: ‘rational forensic judgments made by defence counsel constitute an exercise, rather than an infringement, of the accused’s right to a fair trial’); Xypolitos v R [2014] VSCA 339 at [41]–[45] (under Jury Directions Act 2013 s 15 and now 2015 s 16), failure of counsel to request direction does not require trial judge to direct unless necessary, and absence of direction not in itself ground for appeal). 275. R v Ensor [1989] 2 All ER 586; R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677; Ella v R (1991) 103 FLR 8; Fitzgerald v R (1992) 106 FLR 331; R v Oliverio (1994) 70 A Crim R 5; R v Scott (1996) 137 ALR 347 at 361–6; R v NE [2004] 2 Qd R 328; [2003] QCA 574. See also cases referred to in n 273. But the argument succeeded in: Seymour v R [2006] NSWCCA 206 at [53] (Hunt AJA); Steve v R (2008) 189 A Crim R 68; [2008] NSWCCA 231 at [81] (Beazley JA); KLM v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 73 (Martin CJ and Le Meire AJA, Pullin JA dissenting); Baulch v Lyndoch Warnambool Inc (2010) 27 VR 1; [2010] VSCA 30; R v DBB [2013] Qd R 188; [2012] QCA 96 at [55]–[58] (Muir JA, White JA and Mullins J agreeing). 276. R v Ignjatic (1993) 68 A Crim R 333; Miladinovic v R (1993) 47 FCR 190; TKWJ v R (2002) 212 CLR 124 at [23]–[34], [45] (Gaudron J), [79], [97] (McHugh J) (‘must show that there is a significant possibility that it affected the outcome of the trial’); Ali v R (2005) 214 ALR 1; [2005] HCA 8 at [18] (Hayne J), [98]–[100] (Callinan and Heydon JJ); Nudd v R (2006) 225 ALR 161; [2006] HCA 9; SAM v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 64 at [35]–[36] (Corboy J). See, for example, R v McIntyre (2000) 111 A Crim R 211 (CCA (NSW)); R v Kyriacou [2000] SASC 312; R v Carter [2003] 2 Qd R 402; Armstrong v Western Australia (2012) 220 A Crim R 274 at [57]–[62] (Buss JA, Newnes and Mazza JA agreeing); Knowles v R [2015] VSCA 141 at [127]–[161] (Ashley, Redlich and Priest JJA); Smith v R [2015] VSCA 256. 277. Mamo v Surace (2014) 86 NSWLR 275; [2014] NSWCA 58 at [75]–[82] (McColl JA referring to the importance of efficiency, cost and timely disposal emphasised in s 57(1) of the Civil Procedure Act). 278. For example, Bohdal v R (1987) 24 A Crim R 318 (the possibility that jurors heard the accused’s

previous convictions should have led to a discharge of the jury despite counsel’s refusal to insist); A Child v Andrews (1994) 12 WAR 552 (the failure to object to inadmissible hearsay evidence was no bar to the appeal court taking the erroneous admission of that evidence into account in determining that there was insufficient evidence to convict); Azarian v Western Australia (2007) 178 A Crim R 19; [2007] WASCA 249 at [20], [117] (failure to object does not bar court considering whether there has been a miscarriage of justice). In recent decades the High Court has been increasingly prepared to consider appeals concerning points not taken at trial, including Suresh v R (1998) 102 A Crim R 18; [1998] HCA 23; Crampton v R (2000) 206 CLR 161; Eastman v R (2000) 203 CLR 1; Smith v R (2001) 206 CLR 650; [2001] HCA 50; Soma v R (2003) 212 CLR 299; Fingleton v R (2005) 227 CLR 166; [2005] HCA 3. And see R v Taufahema (2007) 228 CLR 232; [2007] HCA 11, where the prosecution was permitted to advance arguments in the High Court not raised in the appellate court below. 279. (2000) 206 CLR 161, particularly at [14]–[20] (Gleeson CJ), [52], [57] (Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ), [105]–[123] (Kirby J). See also Eastman v R (2000) 203 CLR 1; Heron v R (2003) 197 ALR 81 (leave to appeal refused). 280. (1992) 175 CLR 599. 281. This discussion focuses on the nature of the submission to explain its relationship to natural rules of proof. For a full discussion of the submission, see 6.29–6.46. Insofar as the Uniform Evidence Acts contain no provisions relating to no case submissions the common law continues to apply. 282. May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654 at 658; Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1983] 2 VR 410; Tepper v Di Francesco (1984) 38 SASR 256; R v Armstrong; Ex parte King [1985] 2 Qd R 178; R v Haas (1986) 22 A Crim R 299; R v Briggs (1987) 24 A Crim R 98; Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207; R v Prosser (1993) 70 A Crim R 391; Questions of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 2 of 1993) (1993) 61 SASR 1; Morrison v Kiwi Electrix Pty Ltd (1998) 19 WAR 482. See also the discussion in Glass, ‘The Insufficiency of Evidence to Raise a Case to Answer’ (1981) 55 Aust LJ 842 at 848–50; Glass, ‘Acquittals by Direction’ (1986) 2 Aust Bar Rev 11; Thomson, ‘No Case Submissions’ (1997) 71 Aust LJ 207. See further 6.32. Note that in Wilson v Buttery [1926] SASR 150 at 154, the case to answer requirement is wrongly put in terms of ‘a substantial balance of probability’. 283. Dublin, Wicklow and Wexford Railway Co v Slattery (1878) 3 App Cas 1155; Hocking v Bell (1945) 71 CLR 430 at 443. 284. By the same token a judge may in a civil case determine the case proved, both at common law and under the Uniform Acts (ASC v AS Nominee Ltd (1995) 18 ACSR 459; Booth v Bosworth (2001) 114 FCR 39) by inferring from the opponent’s failure to call available evidence that the evidence would not have supported the opponent’s case (not the stronger inference that it would have contradicted the opponent’s case): see Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 and further at 6.43–6.45. In criminal cases, the High Court is increasingly reluctant, on account of an accused’s right to silence, embodied in s 20 of the Uniform Acts, to allow inferences to be drawn against an accused for failure to testify or otherwise tender evidence by way of defence: see Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217; RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620; Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50; 179 ALR 349; Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285; [2002] HCA 45; and see further at 5.117ff and 6.46. 285. See the perceptive discussion of Thomson, n 282 above. 286. Compare with the four grounds suggested by Perry J in Residues Treatment and Trading Co Ltd v Southern Resources Ltd (1989) 52 SASR 54 at 68. He suggests there is a stage between our grounds (2) and (3) where it is contended that the evidence, even taken at its highest, is incapable of supporting the claimant’s case. Arguably this is simply the equivalent of a ‘no evidence’ situation. 287. See Cairns, n 232 above, pp 495–506. 288. In R v Browning (1991) 103 FLR 425, a submission that the prosecutor be invited to call no evidence

was made following the prosecutor’s opening and, that being rejected, at the completion of the prosecution case a Prasad submission (see 2.55) was made. 289. R v N Ltd [2009] 1 Cr App R 3. See further 6.30. 290. Cf definition of ‘probative value’ as defined in the uniform legislation and discussed in IMM v R (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14. See further at 2.31. 291. In IMM v R (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 at [39], French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ regard such evidence as irrelevant: see further at 2.18 above. 292. Western Australia v Burke (2011) 42 WAR 125; [2011] WASCA 190 at [12]–[20] (Buss JA, Martin CJ and Mazza J agreeing). See further at 6.32, 6.33. 293. (1993) 61 SASR 1 at 5. 294. (1987) 24 A Crim R 98 at 104. 295. (1998) 103 A Crim R 312 at 319–21. King CJ’s formulation cited with approval by Penfold J in R v Potts (No 4) [2016] ACTSC 370 at [16]. 296. (1979) 23 SASR 161. See also R v Sutton [1986] 2 Qd R 72; R v Browning (1991) 103 FLR 425. The nature and existence of the ‘Prasad submission’ is endorsed by the High Court in Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207 at 214–15. 297. R v Falconer Atlee (1973) 58 Cr App R 348; R v Barker (1975) 65 Cr App R 287; R v Mansfield [1977] 1 WLR 1102. These decisions were rejected in R v Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039. 298. See, for example, R v Dam (1986) 43 SASR 422. For the argument seeking to collapse the two submissions, see Glissan, ‘Unsafe and Unsatisfactory Verdicts: The Law as to Directed Verdicts’ (1989) 63 Aust LJ 283. 299. Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 322–32 (Windeyer J). 300. See 2.12. 301. If not by experimental psychologists: Wells, ‘Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability’ (1992) 62 J Personality and Soc Psychology 739; Niedermeier, Kerr and Messé, ‘Jurors’ Use of Naked Statistical Evidence: Exploring Bases and Implications of the Wells Effect’ (1999) 76 J Personality and Soc Psychology 533. More generally, see Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2011. 302. Nor are their resources and the abilities of the lawyers representing them always equal so the evidentiary materials may be biased towards one party rather than the other; as in criminal cases, where the resources of the state are pitted against those of the individual. But also other individuals, corporations and institutions routinely involved in proceedings, or able to anticipate them (for example, pharmaceutical manufacturers), tend to have evidentiary as well as experiential and resource advantages: Galanter, ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change’ (1974) 9 Law & Society Rev 95; Kritzer and Silbey (eds), In Litigation Do the ‘Haves’ Still Come Out Ahead?, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2003. 303. Miller v Minister of Pensions (1947) 63 TLR 474; Holloway v McFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470 at 476, 480–1; Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 304–5, 309–10, 319; Lopes v Taylor (1970) 44 ALJR 412 at 415, 418, 420; TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks (1979) 53 ALJR 267 at 269; Goodwin v Nominal Defendant (1979) 54 ALJR 84; Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 67 ALJR 170 at 170–1; G v H (1994) 181 CLR 387. The origin of the phrase is obscure, the traditional authority being a dictum of Willes J in tendering advice to the House of Lords in Cooper v Slade (1858) 6 HLC 746 at 772; 10 ER 1488 at 1499, which refers to Newis v Lark (1571) 2 Plowden 403 at 412; 75 ER 609 at 621. 304. Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 at 481–2; Thomas v R (1960) 102 CLR 584; Gilson v R (1991) 172

CLR 353. When a persuasive onus is borne by the accused it carries with it the lower civil standard: Thomas, at 602; R v Carr-Briant [1943] KB 607; see also 6.22. 305. For critical Australian discussion of the civil standard, see Hamer, ‘The Civil Standard of Proof: Uncertainty, Probability, Belief and Justice’ (1994) 16 Syd LR 506; and Hodgson, ‘The Scales of Justice: Probability and Proof in Legal Fact-Finding’ (1995) 69 Aust LJ 731. 306. Robertson and Vignaux, ‘Probability — The Logic of the Law’ (1993) 13 Ox J Legal Studies 457, emphasise that probability is not a property of facts and events in the real world (as might be suggested by always attempting to find empirical frequencies and which gives rise to what may be termed ‘The Mind Projection Fallacy’), but rather it is a measure of our (subjective) uncertainty about the world. Thus, probabilities are inherently subjective and the rules of probability are simply dictates of reason and logic which determine the relationship between beliefs. 307. It is not entirely clear what answer would be given to this question by Hodgson (see n 305 above), who argues that as a minimum, a belief supporting proof in a civil case must be greater than the belief in a coin coming up heads, but that this belief must be based on adequate evidence and not be unreasonable. This seems to argue for a mathematical conception of belief, but a mathematical conception that also takes into account the weight of evidence in a non-mathematical way. Subsequently, Hodgson in ‘A Lawyer Looks at Bayes’ Theorem’ (2002) 76 Aust LJ 109 is equally ambivalent, suggesting that Bayes should be explained to juries where DNA evidence is presented as a likelihood ratio but admitting that ultimately the question is always whether the jury is persuaded on the whole evidence. 308. [1974] AC 207 at 219. See also Denning LJ in Bater v Bater [1951] P 35 at 37–8. 309. Murphy J in TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks (1979) 53 ALJR 267; and West v Government Insurance Office of NSW (1981) 148 CLR 62; The Brimnes [1973] 1 All ER 769; [1975] QB 929; Rose v Abbey Orchard Property Investments Pty Ltd [1987] Aust Torts Reports ¶80-121. 310. See Kaye, ‘Naked Statistical Evidence’ (1980) 89 Yale LJ 601 at 605; ‘The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation’ [1982] Am Bar Found Res J 487; and ‘The Error of Equal Error Rates’ (2002) 1 Law, Prob & Risk 3, where the author applies decision theory techniques to justify in utility terms (in most cases) a standard of greater than 0.5. See also Redmayne, ‘Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation’ (1998) 62 Mod L Rev 167 at 167–74; Hamer, ‘Probabilistic Standards of Proof, Their Complements and the Errors that are Expected to Flow from Them’ [2004] UNE LJ 3. 311. Brennan and McHugh JJ appear to suggest this in G v H (1994) 68 ALJR 860 at 862; and see the comments by Hodgson, n 305 above, at 745–6. It is not accepted by the court in Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds [1985] 2 All ER 712, where the House of Lords said the civil standard was not satisfied by acceptance of the more probable of two unlikely possibilities, a position endorsed in Jackson v Lithgow City Council [2008] NSWCCA 132 at [11]–[13]. 312. Hodgson, n 305 above, at 741, suggests that if the defendant owned 90% of the cabs in the town that would increase the evidential weight sufficiently, but it seems unlikely that the statistical probability overcomes the lack of the other evidence that can be expected in such a case. Cf SGIC v Laube (1984) 37 SASR 31, where a high statistical probability was not accepted as proof. And see cases at nn 314 and 337 below. Another way of conceptualising this problem is to ask what is the appropriate reference class within which to generate probability assessments. See further symposium on ‘The Reference Class Problem’ (2007) 11 E & P 243ff, with contributions from Paul Roberts, Michael Pardo, Ron Allen, Dale Nance, Mark Colvyan, Helen Regan, Robert Rhee and Larry Laudan. 313. (1984) 37 SASR 31 (discussed by Eggleston, ‘Focusing on the Defendant’ (1987) 61 Aust LJ 58 and followed in Payne v Crawford (1992) 3 Tas R 360). See also NOM v DPP [2012] VSCA 198 at [99]– [124]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar [2012] HCA 17 at [255] (Heydon J); Strong v Woolworths [2012] HCA 5 at [75]–[77] (Heydon J), though cf French CJ, Gummow, Crennan

and Bell JJ at [30]–[34]. 314. But cf cases holding that epidemiological evidence presented in statistical terms cannot itself establish the causation of an individual illness: Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 at [122], [123], [130] (Spigelman CJ); Amaca Pty Ltd (formerly James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd) v Hannell (2007) 34 WAR 109; [2007] WASCA 158; Cowan v Bunnings Group Ltd [2014] QSC 301 at [38] (Alan Wilson J). 315. Hodgson, n 305 above, at 743. Limited inferences may be drawn against a party who fails to call available evidence in civil cases: Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; and see further at 6.43–6.46. 316. (1774) 1 Cowp 63 at 65; 98 ER 969 at 970. 317. Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; Ho v Powell (2001) 51 NSWLR 572. 318. (1979) 53 ALJR 267. 319. See also Holloway v McFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470 at 477 (Dixon J); Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 304–5; Nesterczuk v Mortimore (1965) 115 CLR 140 at 149 (Kitto J); Lopes v Taylor (1970) 44 ALJR 412 at 421–2; West v Government Insurance Office of NSW (1981) 148 CLR 62 at 65–6. This is an example of the best explanation approach advocated by Pardo and Allen as descriptive of common law proof: see further 1.43. 320. See, for example, Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691; Reifek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517; R v Home Secretary; Ex parte Khawaja [1984] AC 74; Sheldon v Sun Alliance Australia Ltd (1989) 53 SASR 97; Re Kerrison; Ex parte Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1990) 101 ALR 525, affirmed at (1991) 27 FCR 271 (Federal Court contempt proceedings); Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 67 ALJR 170; Palios Meegan & Nicholson Holdings Pty Ltd v Shore (2010) 108 SASR 31; [2010] SASCFC 21 (allegations of misconduct by lawyer in advising client). 321. (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361–2. 322. Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691 at 712; Wright v Wright (1948) 77 CLR 191 at 210; Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517 at 521; Nesterczuk v Mortimore (1965) 115 CLR 140 at 149; Maher-Smith v Gaw [1969] VR 371 at 374; Andrijich v D’Ascanio [1971] WAR 140 at 142; Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 67 ALJR 170 at 170–1. In Granada Tavern v Smith [2008] FCA 646 at [96], Heerey J described the fact that Briginshaw continues to be cited rather than s 140 of the uniform legislation as an ‘intriguing phenomenon in Australian professional legal culture’. In Strong v Woolworths Ltd [2012] HCA 5 at [32]–[39], the majority referred to neither s 140 nor Briginshaw. And, in NOM v DPP [2012] VSCA 198 at [112]–[124] and Nigro v Secretary to the Dept of justice [2013] VSCA 213 at [159]–[160], the Court of Appeal explains that s 140 ‘reflects the principles in Briginshaw and is to be so understood’. 323. See Employment Advocate v Williamson (2001) 111 FCR 20 at [65]; Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing & Allied Services Union of Australia v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2007) 162 FCR 466 at [29]–[38]. See generally De Plevtiz, ‘Briginshaw “Standard of Proof” in Anti-discrimination Law: “Pointing with a Wavering Finger”’ (2003) 27 Melb ULR 308. Comments in Qantas Airways Ltd v Gama [2008] FCAFC 69 at [139] (Branson J), [110] (French and Jacobson JJ), discussed by Heerey J in Granada Tavern v Smith [2008] FCA 646 at [85]–[96], disapprove of courts continuing to use the Briginshaw formulation in preference to that found in s 140. As the analysis in the text seeks to show, it is doubtful whether there is any distinction in substance. 324. (1992) 67 ALJR 170 at 170. 325. Many of the cases involving scanty information emphasise this point: Holloway v McFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470 at 477 (Dixon J); Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 304–5; Nesterczuk v Mortimore (1965) 115 CLR 140 at 149 (Kitto J); Lopes v Taylor (1970) 44 ALJR 412 at 421–2; TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks (1979) 53 ALJR 267 at 270; West v Government Insurance Office of NSW (1981) 148 CLR 62 at 65–6.

326. An interesting rejection of a variable civil standard is found in R v Ali [1996] 2 VR 49, where the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal rejected previous authority applying a ‘higher’ civil standard to sentencing facts relied upon by the Crown. The court held the criminal standard applicable to such facts. This is confirmed in, for example, R v Storey [1998] 1 VR 359; R v Morrisson [1999] 1 Qd R 397; Lobban v R (2001) 80 SASR 550; Law v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 193 at [33] (Buss JA). That there is just one standard at common law has been confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in FH v McDougall [2008] SCC 53 at [26]–[49]. 327. (1992) 67 ALJR 170 at 170–2 (footnotes omitted). 328. So interpreted, Neat Holdings was applied by O’Loughlin J in Cubillo v Commonwealth (2000) 174 ALR 97 at 215–17 to allegations of misconduct by missionaries (for whose conduct it was alleged the Commonwealth was responsible) against Aboriginal children, and by Merkel J in Shaw v Wolf (1998) 163 ALR 205 at 215, to allegations that ATSIC candidates were ineligible because non-Aboriginal. Though in Henderson v Queensland (2014) 89 ALJR 162; [2014] HCA 52 at [15] (French CJ), [31] (Bell J, Kiefel J agreeing) and [170]–[172] (Keane J), an appeal from proceedings where the appellant bore the burden of proving that specific assets were not the benefits of serious criminal activities, the majority concluded that any presumption about the unlikelihood of non-criminality was ‘inconsistent with the allocation of the burden of proof’. 329. Hamer, n 305 above, at n 17, points out that judges who advocate a standard in terms of ‘reasonable satisfaction’, ‘persuasion’ and ‘belief’ on other occasions express the standard merely in terms of ‘a balance of probabilities’. Terminology is clearly not decisive of a mathematical approach. On the contrary, it suggests the terminology leaves open the question of the conceptualisation of the standard. It is interesting to note that the formulation in the uniform legislation, satisfaction on the balance of probabilities, takes words from both judicial formulations. 330. R v Van Beelen (1973) 4 SASR 353 at 384. 331. See the discussion of R v Dennis Adams [1996] 2 Cr App R 467 at 1.26 and the cases in Chapter 1, n 66. 332. See Callen, ‘Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some Limits on the Use of a Bayesian Theory in Evidence Law’ (1982) 57 Ind LJ 1 at 10–15; ‘Second Order Considerations, Weight, Sufficiency and Schema Theory: A Comment on Professor Brilmayer’s Theory’ (1986) 66 Boston ULR 715 at 726, n 72: ‘… for the consistent use of Bayesian theory for the updating of probabilities by conditionalization, where thirty items of evidence are introduced relevant to an inference, one must record a billion probabilities’. For a recent plea to employ cognitive strategies that human fact-finders can accommodate, see Callen, ‘Cognitive Strategies and Models of Fact Finding’ in Crime Procedure and Evidence in a Comparative and International Context: Essays in Honour of Professor Mirjan Damaska, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 2008. For an excellent general critique of the use of mathematical probabilities in civil cases, see Dant, ‘Gambling on the Truth: The Use of Purely Statistical Evidence as a Basis for Civil Liability’ (1988) 22 Columbia J Law & Soc Prob 31. 333. Cohen, The Probable and the Provable, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977, pp 252–4. 334. Allen, ‘The Nature of Juridical Proof’ (1991) 13 Cardozo LR 373; ‘Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence’ (1994) 88 Northwestern ULR 604; Allen and Pardo, ‘The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models of Evidence’ (2007) 36 J Legal Studies 107; ‘Judicial Proof and the Best Explanation’ (2008) 27 Law & Phil 223. 335. For example, TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks (1979) 53 ALJR 267. 336. Sargent v Massachusetts Accident Co 29 NE 2d 825 (1940) at 827; Smith v Rapid Transit Inc 58 NE 2d (1945) 754. Cf SGIC v Laube (1984) 37 SASR 31 (followed by Zeeman J in Payne v Crawford (1992) 3 Tas R 360).

337. In Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 at [122], [123], [130], Spigelman CJ emphasises that epidemiological evidence can only create a statistical possibility and that causation can only be established by considering it in relation to other relevant evidence relating to the cause of the particular plaintiff’s injury. See also Amaca Pty Ltd (formerly James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd) v Hannell (2007) 34 WAR 109; [2007] WASCA 158. Reluctance to rely upon individual epidemiological studies or meta-analysis, along with indicative forms of evidence — such as in vitro and in vivo studies, for example — makes it difficult for some types of plaintiffs to establish causation. Consider Wagner, ‘Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products’ (1997) Cornell LR 773; Cranor, Toxic Torts: Science, Law and the Possibility of Justice, 2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2016. 338. (2001) 51 NSWLR 572 at [14]–[16]. 339. (1774) 1 Cowp 63; 98 ER 969. 340. For example, the scenario suggested by Hodgson, ‘Probability: The Logic of the Law — A Response’ (1995) 15 Ox J Legal Studies 51 at 60. 341. It is submitted that recent cases adopting Dixon J’s statement should be similarly interpreted: see, for example, Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 at [136] (Spigelman CJ). And in criminal cases, references to persuasion in the dicta of Doyle CJ in R v Karger (2002) 83 SASR 135 at [20]–[21], and Spigelman CJ in R v Galli [2001] NSWCCA 504 at [55], should also be similarly interpreted. 342. Another way of achieving this result is to place an evidential or persuasive burden on a defendant once a plaintiff has reasonably exhausted his or her search for available evidence: cf Amaca Pty Ltd (formerly James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd) v Hannell [2007] WASCA 158 at [395] (Steytler P and McLure JA). Some argue more extremely that the practical difficulties and policy values should place the burden of proof on defendants where, as with proceedings over pharmaceuticals, therapeutic products, pollution and work environments, they are in the best position, and may even be required, under regulation, to conduct research into the risks of their activities: Berger, ‘Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation’ (2001) 64 Law & Contemporary Problems 289; ‘Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts’ (1997) 97 Columbia LR 2117; Wagner, ‘Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products’ (1997) 82 Cornell LR 773. 343. [1991] 2 NSWLR 725 at 728. And see Spigelman CJ in Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 at [122], [123], [130]. 344. The word ‘reasonable’ does suggest a chink in this assertion (see Denning LJ in Bater v Bater [1951] P 35 at 37) and there is research evidence that jurors regard the standard as higher in more serious cases (Simon and Mahon, ‘Quantifying Burdens of Proof’ (1971) 5 Law & Society Rev 319). In R v Buttery (1988) 145 LSJS 223 at 232–5, Cox J rejects the idea that the criminal standard can vary. Another perspective is to regard proof from the internal view of the fact-finder who is a moral agent who must justify, on a moral and rational basis, beliefs in reaching a judgment or verdict in relation to another human being. While civil cases demand impartiality when distributing caution between parties, criminal cases require a protective attitude and the highest of standards of proof. But seriousness of consequences may then justify different attitudes towards the caution required before conviction in a criminal case. See Ho, A Philosophy of Evidence Law: Justice in the Search for Truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, particularly Chs 2 and 4. 345. See the High Court’s statement in Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (unreported, 1951) quoted in Luxton v Vines (1952) 85 CLR 352 at 358 and Transport Industries Insurance Co Ltd v Longmuir [1997] 1 VR 125 at 141: ‘The difference between the criminal standard of proof … and the civil is that in the former the facts must be such as to exclude reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence, while in the latter you need only circumstances raising a more probable inference in favour of what is alleged’. See also Gaetani v Trustees of the Christian Bros (1988) Aust Torts Rep ¶80-156.

346. R v Home Secretary; Ex parte Khawaja [1984] AC 74 at 113; see also Lord Goddard CJ in R v Hepworth and Fearnley [1955] 2 QB 600 at 603; and Hilbery J in R v Murtagh and Kennedy (1955) 39 Cr App R 72 (in argument). 347. Thus, the standard of proving a civil contempt has been held by the High Court to be the criminal standard: Witham v Holloway (1995) 69 ALJR 847; Hurd v Zomojo Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 148 at [28], [92]. Cf this clear demarcation with Bannister v Walton (1993) 30 NSWLR 699 at 711–12, where in disciplinary proceedings against a medical practitioner the standard applied was a civil standard of ‘comfortable satisfaction on the balance of probabilities’. See also Commonwealth v Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46 at [89]–[90]. 348. Where legislation uses the word ‘satisfied’ the court must as a matter of statutory construction determine whether this imports either the civil or criminal standard: Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; Re E (1976) 1 SASR 179; Re Cherry Lane Pty Ltd (1988) 17 ALD 1; Re SAAB-Scania Australia Pty Ltd and Collector of Customs (1990) 11 AAR 247. 349. For a critical discussion of the number of guilty who should be set free to secure the liberty of the innocent, by Hale, Blackstone, Fortescue and others, see Volokh, ‘n Guilty Men’ (1997) 146 U Penn LR 173. 350. Tribe, ‘Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process’ (1971) 84 Harv LR 1329 at 1810. 351. R v Flesch (1987) 7 NSWLR 554; Chedzey v R (1987) 30 A Crim R 451; R v Adams [1996] 2 Cr App R 467; R v Cavic (2005) 12 VR 136 (jury asked what percentage constituted guilt and judge failed to direct jury not to consider standard in terms of percentages). 352. Simon and Mahan, ‘Quantifying Burdens of Proof’ (1971) 5 Law & Society Rev 319. 353. Eggleston, Evidence Proof and Probability, 2nd ed, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1983, p xiii; Kaye, ‘Paradoxes, Gedanken Experiments and the Burden of Proof: A Response to Dr Cohen’s Reply’ [1981] Ariz St LJ 635; Friedman, ‘Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge’ (1997) 1 E & P 276. See also Redmayne et al, ‘Forensic Science Evidence in Question’ [2011] Crim LR 347. 354. The argument that follows is more fully developed in the following articles: Ligertwood, ‘Can DNA Alone Convict?’ (2011) 33 Syd LR 487; Ligertwood and Edmond, ‘Expressing Evaluative Forensic Science Opinions in a Court of Law’ (2012) 11 Law, Prob & Risk 289–302; Ligertwood, ‘Forensic Science Expressions and Legal Proof’ (2013) 45 Aust J Forensic Sci 263. 355. (2014) 88 ALJR 779; [2014] HCA 20. 356. (2012) 247 CLR 170; [2012] HCA 15. Discussed further in Hamer, ‘Expected Frequencies, Exclusion Percentages and “Mathematical Equivalence”: The Probative Value of DNA Evidence in Aytugrul v The Queen’ (2013) 45 Aust J Forensic Sci 271. 357. Note that it must also be applied by appellate judges when applying the ‘no substantial miscarriage of justice’ proviso: Weiss v R (2005) 224 CLR 300; and see 2.14. 358. Green v R (1972) 126 CLR 28; R v Punj (2002) 132 A Crim R 595 (‘feeling sure’ a misdirection). 359. See R v Calides (1983) 34 SASR 355; Liberato v R (1985) 159 CLR 507 at 515 (Brennan J); Burlinson v Police (1994) 75 A Crim R 258; R v E (1996) 39 NSWLR 450; Murray v R (2002) 189 ALR 40 at [57] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); R v KDY [2008] VSCA 104 at [26]–[27]; R v Tran and Tran (2011) 109 SASR 595; [2011] SASCFC 51. Cf R v Carbone (1989) 50 SASR 495 at 500 and R v Lavery (2013) 116 SASR 242; [2013] SASCFC 46 at [51]–[53] (Nicholson J), where references by the trial judge to determining who was telling the truth/whom to believe did not constitute a misdirection. See also R v Laz [1998] 1 VR 453 at 465 (CCA); R v V (1998) 100 A Crim R 488 at 498–500 (CCA (NSW)); Morley v R (1999) 152 FLR 13 (CCA (WA)); R v Middleton (2000) 114 A Crim R 141 (CCA (WA)); R

v Loader (2004) 89 SASR 204 at [58]–[60]; Azarian v Western Australia (2007) 178 A Crim R 19 at [9]– [16]; R v Woods (2008) 102 SASR 422; R v Molloy (2008) 102 SASR 452; Phillips v R [2015] SASCFC 67 at [31]–[37] (Sulan, Nicholson and Lovell JJ: reference to counsel’s address and general directions insufficient direction where oath against oath). 360. Murray v R (2002) 211 CLR 193 at [23] (Gaudron J), [57] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). Cf Douglass v R [2012] HCA 34 (conviction quashed in trial by judge alone where credibility contest as judge failed to focus on whether the criminal standard of proof had been satisfied). 361. R v Murray (1987) 11 NSWLR 12; 30 A Crim R 315; this so-called Murray direction is discussed in R v DTS [2008] NSWCCA 329; and see further at 4.44. 362. R v G [1994] 1 Qd R 540; R v F (1995) 83 A Crim R 502; R v E (1996) 39 NSWLR 450; R v Rodriguez (1997) 93 A Crim R 535; R v Jovanovic (1997) 42 NSWLR 520; R v Abraham (1998) 70 SASR 575; R v ALJ (2000) 117 A Crim R 370 at [82]–[93] (CCA (SA)) (judge’s firm response to jury question so speculating held appropriate); R v Russo (2004) 11 VR 1 (prosecutor’s constant rhetorical question, ‘Who else but the accused would have committed these murders?’ unfairly reversed burden of proof); Harman v Western Australia (2004) 29 WAR 380; [2004] WASCA 230 at [20]–[22] (Murray J), [126]–[138] (Pullin J), [97]–[105] (Steytler J dissenting); CB v Western Australia (2006) 175 A Crim R 304; [2006] WASCA 227 at [125]–[136] (Roberts-Smith J for CCA) (directions in relation to specific motive raised by the defence did not suggest any onus on accused); Doe v R [2008] NSWCCA 203, particularly at [58]–[60], [69]–[72] (remark in prosecutor’s address that accused made no suggestion that witness had ‘an axe to grind’ did not suggest onus on accused); DS v R (2012) 221 A Crim R 235; [2012] NSWCCA 159 (reference to specific motive significant in deciding onus not reversed). 363. (1998) 193 CLR 1. Such cross-examination of the accused in a police interview may require exclusion of the interview, or at least strong directions: R v Arundell [1999] 2 VR 228; Gill v R [1999] WASCA 68; R v Deriz (1999) 109 A Crim R 329 (CCA (WA)). Palmer was discussed (or distinguished) in R v Johnston (1998) 45 NSWLR 362; R v DJT [1998] 4 VR 784; R v Mazzolini [1999] 3 VR 113; and applied in R v Costin [1998] 3 VR 659; R v Murray (1999) 108 A Crim R 430 (CCA (NSW)); R v Buckley (2004) 10 VR 215; [2004] VSCA 185; R v Bajic (2005) 12 VR 155; [2005] VSCA 168; R v SWC (2007) 175 A Crim R 71; [2007] VSCA 201; R v SAB (2008) 20 VR 55; [2008] VSCA 150; Reeves (a Pseudonym) v R (2013) 41 VR 275; [2013] VSCA 311 (counsel apology to brief questioning of accused about complainant and mother’s motive to lie followed by jury direction sufficient to offset Palmer dangers); Miles v R (2014) 240 A Crim R 524; [2014] NSWCCA 72 at [3]–[21] (Simpson J holding judge’s unwise question did not reverse onus in context of decisive issue). 364. See the draft directions of Sperling J in R v Jovanovic (1997) 42 NSWLR 520 at 542. See also R v Hewitt [1998] 4 VR 862; R v PLK [1999] 3 VR 567; R v MM (2000) 112 A Crim R 519 (CCA (NSW)); R v Covill (2000) 114 A Crim R 111 (CCA (NSW)); R v Van Der Zyden [2012] 2 Qd R 568; [2012] QCA 89 (motive of complainant to lie central to defence and required direction that non-acceptance of alleged motive did not mean complainant necessarily truthful); R v Coss [2016] QCA 44 (Van Der Zyden applied); R v Muniz [2016] QCA 210 (Van Der Zyden not applied). Nor should a witness (including the accused) be asked whether another witness is lying (as opposed to whether what the other witness said is true): R v Leak [1969] SASR 172; R v Middleton (2000) 114 A Crim R 141 (CCA (WA)). 365. Robinson v R (No 2) (1991) 102 ALR 493 at 495; Stafford v R (1993) 67 ALJR 510 at 510–11 (Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ); Webb v R (1994) 181 CLR 41 at 63 (Brennan J); R v Asquith (1994) 72 A Crim R 250 at 255–60 (Hunt CJ at CL); R v Ellem (1994) 75 A Crim R 370 (remarks by prosecutor not endorsed by the trial judge did not give rise to any miscarriage of justice); R v Brown [1995] 1 Qd R 287; R v Ong [2001] SASC 437 (failure of judge to comment on accused’s testimony may give rise to suggestion that it is not to be given the same weight as other testimony); Etherton v Western Australia (2005) 30 WAR 65; [2005] WASCA 83 at [36]; R v BJC (2005) 13 VR 407; [2005] VSCA 154 at [90];

De Rosa v Western Australia (2006) 32 WAR 136 at [42]–[44] (Roberts-Smith JA, McLure and Buss JJA agreeing); R v Franco [2006] VSCA 302 at [80]–[88] (no blanket prohibition against directing the jury to scrutinise an accused person’s evidence closely); Martinez v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 143 at [239]–[246]. 366. (2011) 245 CLR 257; [2011] HCA 44. 367. In R v Parsons; R v Brady [2015] SASCFC 183 at [73], Peek J, Kelly and Nicholson JJ agreeing, in disapproving of the directions before him emphasised that Hargraves does not overrule previous decisions but rather places them in a wider context. 368. Tulic v R (1999) 91 FCR 222. 369. Brown v R (1913) 17 CLR 570; Thomas v R (1960) 102 CLR 584; Dawson v R (1961) 106 CLR 1 at 18; Green v R (1971) 126 CLR 28; La Fontaine v R (1976) 136 CLR 62 at 71, 80–1; R v Flesch (1987) 7 NSWLR 554; R v Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191; R v Reeves (1992) 29 NSWLR 109; Condo v R (1992) 62 A Crim R 11; Krasniqi v R (1993) 69 A Crim R 383 (CCA (SA)); R v Chatzidimitrious [2000] 1 VR 493; R v Anderson (2001) 127 A Crim R 116 at [18]–[19]; R v Punj (2002) 132 A Crim R 595; [2002] QCA 333 at [23]–[24] (Williams JA), [30] (Jerrard JA and Atkinson J); R v Southammavong; R v Sihavong [2003] NSWCCA 312; Darkan v R (2006) 227 CLR 373 at [69] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Heydon and Crennan JJ); R v Fouyaxis (2007) 99 SASR 233 at [47]–[48] (Gray J), [59]–[70] (White J); Jovanovic v R (2007) 172 A Crim R 518; [2007] TASSCA 56 at [66]–[79] (Crawford J), [91]–[103] (Evans J); R v Compton (2013) 237 A Crim R 177; [2013] SASCFC 134 (‘Absolute certainty of guilt is not required. The prosecution does not have to prove guilt beyond all doubt’ a misdirection); R v Dookhea [2016] VSCA 67 at [90] (Maxwell P, Redlich JA and Croucher AJA). 370. [2000] 1 VR 493; see also Green v R (1971) 126 CLR 28 at 33. 371. R v Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191, where King CJ concedes that this might be permissible (and see King CJ in R v Carbone (1989) 50 SASR 495 at 501). Cox J is willing to accept other general explanations of what constitutes a reasonable doubt — ‘real’ doubts as opposed to ‘fanciful’ doubts for example — but he (reluctantly) agrees that it is generally a misdirection to ask juries expressly to examine their doubts and then classify them. See also Krasniqi v R (1993) 69 A Crim R 383 (CCA (SA)) (explanation in terms of ‘fanciful possibilities’ not a misdirection); R v ALJ (2000) 117 A Crim R 370 (CCA (SA)) (to decide in ‘a reasonable sensible way’ in ‘a practical court of law’ not a misdirection); Boonudnoon v R [2002] WASCA 313 (‘You are all adults and you know if you have a reasonable doubt, not a fanciful doubt, not a stupid doubt, a reasonable doubt’ held not in error); R v Irlam; Ex parte Attorney-General [2002] QCA 235 at [53]–[58] (elaboration unnecessary but not basis for successful appeal). 372. R v Boyle (2009) 26 VR 219; [2009] VSCA 289 at [57]–[59] (Weinberg JA, Williams and Coghlan AJJA): these ‘groundless speculations’ having been raised by counsel it was appropriate for the trial judge to refer to them in summing up to the jury. 373. Chedzey v R (1987) 30 A Crim R 451 (CCA (WA)). 374. See also R v Flesch (1987) 7 NSWLR 554; R v Cavkic (2005) 12 VR 136; and W v R (2006) 16 Tas SR 1 at 11–19, for disapproval of jury being left to consider the traditional standard in mathematical terms. But by the same token, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not require the elimination of all scientific possibilities: R v Summers [1990] 1 Qd R 92. 375. [2000] 1 VR 493 at [11]. 376. R v Wilson (1986) 42 SASR 203; R v Dam (1986) 43 SASR 422; R v Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191; R v Costi (1988) 48 SASR 269; R v Neilan [1992] 1 VR 57 at 67–72. In Krasniqi v R (1993) 69 A Crim R 383 (CCA (SA)) and W v R (2006) 16 Tas SR 1 at 6–10, the trial judge was held not to have asked the jury to examine their doubts. But cf Smart v Tasmania [2013] TASCCA 15 (Blow CJ, Wood and Pearce JJ) at [66]–[78], where appeal upheld where jury asked to examine doubts.

377. In Martin v R (2010) 28 VR 579; [2010] VSCA 153, discovery of resort to internet by jury to responses to question ‘what is meant by beyond reasonable doubt’ did not result in the trial miscarrying. See also Benbrika v R (2010) 29 VR 593; [2010] VSCA 281 at [212]–[216], [275]–[228]. Where a jury otherwise requests clarification of a particular matter this may call for a particular explanation: see R v Cavic (2005) 12 VR 136 (judge required to explain to jury that the law did not conceptualise the criminal standard in terms of percentages). 378. Shepherd v R (1990) 170 CLR 573 at 579–80, 586 (Dawson J); Knight v R (1992) 175 CLR 495 at 502 (Mason CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ); R v Lancefield [1999] VSCA 176 (direction must not suggest any onus on the accused to establish innocent hypotheses); R v Camilleri [2001] NSWCCA 527 at [39] (exclusion of other ‘reasonable or sensible’ explanations not a misdirection). 379. Grant v R (1975) 11 ALR 503; La Fontaine v R (1976) 136 CLR 62 at 71 (Barwick CJ), 80–1 (Gibbs J); followed in R v Owen (1991) 56 SASR 397 at 412. Compare with McGreevy v DPP (1972) 57 Cr App R 424; Rogerson v R (1992) 65 A Crim R 530 at 545; Dean v R (1995) 65 SASR 234 at 240; R v Gibson (1999) 110 A Crim R 180 at [29] (CCA (NSW)) (no invariable rule of practice that direction required in every circumstantial evidence case); Imnetu v R [2006] NSWCCA 203 at [18]–[36] (McClellan CJ at CL); R v Rajakaruna (No 2) (2006) 15 VR 592 at [12]–[20] (Redlich JA); R v McDonald [2011] SASCFC 57 at [47]–[49] (Duggan J) (may not be required where circumstantial and direct evidence). 380. For example, Eggleston, n 353 above, p 122; Hamer, ‘The Continuing Saga of the Chamberlain Direction: Untangling the Cables and Chains of Criminal Proof’ (1997) 23 Monash ULR 43 (where it is argued that the High Court in Shepherd implicitly accepts the mathematical approach, rather than the inductive approach here argued). For working illustrations of the mathematical approach, see Ligertwood, ‘The Uncertainty of Proof’ (1976) 10 Melb ULR 367; and Odgers, ‘Proof and Probability’ (1989) 5 Aust Bar Rev 137. 381. (1973) 4 SASR 353. Leave to reopen case on basis of incorrect forensic analysis refused in R v Van Beelen (2016) 125 SASR 253; [2016] SASCFC 71; appeal from refusal granted [2017] HCA Trans 19. 382. At 372. 383. The National Research Council (NRC) of the United States National Academy of Science questioned the reliability of this kind, and many other kinds, of forensic science evidence. See discussion at 7.46. For similarity claims to be probative generally requires background information about the frequency (or occurrence and independence) of the relevant similarities. See generally Edmond, ‘What Lawyers Should Know about the Forensic “Sciences”’ (2015) 36 Adel LR 33. 384. Transcript, p 3774, referred to in R v Van Beelen (1973) 4 SASR 353 at 376. 385. At 373. 386. (1984) 153 CLR 521. 387. (1990) 170 CLR 573. 388. See generally Staines, Biber and Arrow (eds), The Chamberlain Case Reader, Australian Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne, 2009. 389. For a critical account of the consideration of the evidence in this case, see Edmond, ‘Science, Law and Narrative: Helping the “Facts” to Speak for Themselves’ (1999) 23 Sthn Ill LR 555; ‘Azaria’s Accessories: The Social (Legal-Scientific) Construction of Guilt and Innocence’ (1998) 22 Melb ULR 396. 390. At 536. 391. For a more detailed discussion of the blood evidence, see Morling, Royal Commission of Inquiry into Chamberlain Convictions, Government Printer, Canberra, 1987. 392. (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 534–9; cf Deane J’s use of the term ‘intermediate facts’ at 626–7.

393. (1973) 4 SASR 353 at 374–5. 394. (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 534–9 (Gibbs CJ and Mason J) and 570 (Murphy J). 395. (1985) 63 ALR 181 at 191–3. 396. [1986] VR 753 at 786–91 (followed by McGarvie J in R v Maleckas [1991] 1 VR 363 at 379–80). 397. In R v Maleckas [1991] 1 VR 363, the trial judge directed the jury that it was sufficient that particular circumstantial facts be proved only on the balance of probabilities and, in the light of Chamberlain, this was held to be a misdirection. 398. R v Cosgrove and Hunter (1988) 34 A Crim R 299; R v Garth (1990) 49 A Crim R 298. But it may also cause confusion: see, for example, R v Franco (2009) 105 SASR 446; [2009] SASC 370 at [15] (Vanstone J). 399. (1990) 170 CLR 573. See comments on terminology used in Shepherd by Callinan J in R v Hillier (2007) 228 CLR 618; [2007] HCA 13 at [64]. 400. At 576. 401. At 579. 402. Ibid. 403. This is recognised by Burns J in by Munro v R [2014] ACTCA 11 at [102]. 404. Support for this Chamberlain approach, also in the context of disputed scientific evidence of circumstantial facts, can be found in Velevski v R (2002) 187 ALR 233 at [37] (Gleeson CJ and Hayne J), [84]–[89] (Gaudron J), but compare with Gummow and Callinan JJ at [177]–[182]. See also Hannes v DPP (2006) 165 A Crim R 151; [2006] NSWCCA 373 at [667]: ‘If one cord provides the bulk of the load-carrying capacity, the rope may begin to look more like the chain’. In R v M, RB [2007] SASC 207, Debelle J concludes at [73] that evidence revealing prior uncharged acts may provide ‘a number of very large strands for the cable’. In R v Koelman [2000] 2 VR 20 at [28] (Tadgell JA), DNA evidence was regarded as a ‘thick strand’. See also R v LRG [2006] VSCA 288 at [40] (Callaway JA: a strand ‘of such practical importance that it is prudent to direct the jury that they must be satisfied about it beyond reasonable doubt’); R v Tartaglia (2011) 110 SASR 378 at [22]–[25] (Sulan J: ‘without that evidence the accused could not have been convicted’). 405. [1999] 2 VR 123. Explained and followed in R v Huisman and Shiells [1999] VSCA 170 at [14]; applied in R v Kotzmann (No 2) (2002) 128 A Crim R 479; discussed in Young v R [2016] VSCA 149 at [73]– [101]. For an example and similar analysis of an indispensable intermediate fact, see Garrett v Nicholson (1999) 21 WAR 226. For an example of where there was disagreement over whether the evidence of similarity of weapons was sufficient to leave to the jury at all, see Murrell v R [2014] VSCA 334 at [57]– [86] (Redlich JA, Maxwell P agreeing). 406. R v Familic (1994) 75 A Crim R 229 at 238–42; R v Merritt [1999] NSWCCA 29 at [70]; R v Merlino [2004] NSWCCA 104 at [42], [46]. Cf Minniti v R [2006] NSWCCA 30 at [38]–[45]; R v Tran (2007) 214 FLR 21 at [30]–[35]; Davidson v R [2009] NSWCCA 150; Burrell v R [2009] NSWCCA 163 at [131]–[136], where held sequential reasoning not relied upon. Support for direction where a jury may use evidence (sequentially) to infer guilt is found in HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 at [196] (Hayne J); Neill-Fraser v Tasmania [2012] TASCCA 2 at [231]–[240], Porter J referring to the need for a ‘prudential direction’; cf stricter approach taken at [156]–[161] by Crawford J, Tennant J agreeing at [223]. 407. Burns v R (1975) 132 CLR 258; R v D (1998) 71 SASR 99 at 100–1 (Doyle J: confession standing alone sufficient to support a verdict of guilty); Kotzmann v R [1999] 2 VR 123 at [21] (customary to direct but confession may just be the straw that breaks the camel’s back); R v Koelman [2000] 2 VR 20 at [28]; R v Loguancio (2000) 1 VR 235 at [9]; Cotic v R [2000] WASCA 414; Magill v R (2013) 42 VR 616 (Priest

JA, Buchanan AP agreeing the ‘Burns direction’ required), at [44]–[52] (Neave JA in dissent holding absence of ‘Burns direction’ where no full confession not fatal). In R v Franklin [2001] VSCA 79 at [115]–[117], [126]–[130], the court emphasises that lies described as capable of indicating a ‘consciousness of guilt’ are particularly vulnerable to being regarded as full admissions of guilt and acted upon alone to infer guilt even though presented as part of a circumstantial case. See also Edwards v R (1993) 178 CLR 193, discussed below at 2.88. But within the dynamics of a particular case the possibility of a lie being regarded as a full confession may not arise: Velevski v R (2002) 187 ALR 233; [2002] HCA 4 at [43]–[44], [126]. 408. Earlier authorities include R v Salerno [1973] VR 59; Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528; B v R (1992) 175 CLR 599 at 602–3 (Mason CJ); R v Peake (1996) 67 SASR 297 at 300–2 (Millhouse J), 309–10 (Olsson J in dissent). 409. R v Loguancio (2000) 1 VR 235; R v O’Keefe [2000] 1 Qd R 564 at 571; R v MM (2000) 112 A Crim R 519 at [56] (Hulme J), [57] (Dowd J); R v Delgado-Guerra [2002] 2 Qd R 384 at [23]–[32]; Buttsworth v R (2004) 29 WAR 1 at [44]; Neill-Fraser v Tasmania [2012] TASCCA 2 at [226]–[240]. See also Familic v R (1994) 75 A Crim R 229 (Kotzman approach applied in holding that in determining the admissibility of propensity evidence a high standard of probative value should only apply where that propensity is to be relied on as an indispensable intermediate fact); R v FJB [1999] 2 VR 425 (uncharged acts stood or fell with charged acts and required proof to same standard). 410. (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 1