Australian Evidence a Principled Approach to the Common Law and Uniform Acts [6 ed.] 9780409333671, 0409333670

Table of contents :
Full Title
Copyright
Preface
Acknowledgments
Table of Cases
Table of Statutes
Table of Contents
Chapter One: The Fundamental Principles
A Procedural Perspective
The object of procedural rules
The nature of material facts: past events
Discovering Past Events
The correspondence theory of knowledge
The inferential process: Wigmorean analysis
Probability theory
Outline
Mathematical probabilities
Classical probabilities
Frequency probabilities
Subjective probabilities
The equations of mathematical probability
Problems with conceptualising probabilities mathematically
Mathematical probabilities and the standard of proof
The non-mathematical approach: ‘inductive probabilities’ and ‘best explanations’
A correct probability approach?
The Procedural Environment
General considerations
The common law adversary trial
Structuring the Rules of Evidence
Synopsis
Chapter Two: The Trial Process
The Process in Outline
Sources of process
The ambit of process
Pre-trial process
Trial process
Appeal
Following verdict
Interlocutory appeals in criminal cases
The Essential Tasks of the Trial Court
The reception of evidence
Two fundamental principles
The nature of relevance
Relevance and admissibility
Discretion
Nature and function at trial
The residual exclusionary discretions
Efficiency, time and cost
Fairness
Public policy
Determining the reception of tendered evidence
Party waiver of rules of admissibility
A ‘case to answer’
Proof
Degrees of proof
The civil standard: balance of probabilities
The criminal standard: beyond reasonable doubt
Distinguishing the civil and criminal standards
Directing the jury on the criminal standard
To which facts does the criminal standard apply?
Challenging unreasonable verdicts and applying the proviso
Proof on the voir dire
Conclusion: the inductive approach
The Ambit of Evidential Rules
Chapter Three: Character
Introduction
Common law approaches to unreliable evidence
Character evidence: one exclusionary principle
Character defined in terms of propensity/tendency
Reasons for excluding evidence of propensity/tendency
The multi-relevance of character evidence
Prosecution Evidence Revealing the Accused’s Incriminating Propensity or Tendency
The law in principle — an exclusionary presumption
The evolution of the common law exclusionary rule
The ambit of the common law exclusionary rule
Discreditable conduct
Discreditable conduct tendered as propensity
Relationship evidence
Other non-propensity uses
HML v R: the ambit unresolved
Justifying exceptional admissibility
Justification in principle
Striking similarity
Specifying a required probative value: the Pfennig test
Applying the Pfennig test
Conclusion: the common law rule and the exclusionary principle
Legislation affecting the exclusionary principle
The uniform legislation
Tendency reasoning
Coincidence reasoning
The nature of ‘probative value’ under ss 97, 98 and 101
‘Significant probative value’
‘Probative value substantially outweighing prejudicial effect’
Western Australia
South Australia
Queensland
Determining probative strength: facts in issue
Procedural matters
Determining admissibility: notice
Determining admissibility: onus
Evidence upon which admissibility may be determined
Multiple counts
Inadvertent disclosure
Directions to the jury
Defence Evidence Revealing a Co-accused’s Incriminating Propensity
Cross-examination of an Accused Disclosing Propensity
The accused as a witness: two problems
Modification of the privilege against self-incrimination
Limiting cross-examination revealing the accused’s character
The purpose of the legislative compromise
The form of the compromise
The extent of the prohibition under the Criminal Evidence Act
The first exception: matters establishing facts in issue
The remaining exceptions: procedural issues
The second exception: good character in issue
The third exception: imputations against the character of the prosecutor or prosecution witnesses
The fourth exception: evidence against a co-accused
Evidence of Accused’s Propensity Tendered by the Defence
Bad character of the accused
Good character of the accused
The nature and purpose of good character evidence
Rebutting evidence of good character
Directing the jury where good character raised
Evidence Revealing the Propensity of a Third Party
Defence evidence revealing the character of third parties
The character of complainants in sexual assault cases
Evidence Revealing Propensity in Civil Actions
Where a party’s character is a material fact in issue
Other evidence revealing the propensity of a party
Evidence revealing the disposition of third parties
Conclusion
Chapter Four: Unreliable Evidence: Corroboration and Related Rules
Introduction
Rules of ‘exclusion’
Rules requiring confirmation or warning
Testimony Requiring Mandatory Corroboration
Testimony Requiring a Mandatory Corroboration Warning
The nature of the warning and the testimony embraced by it
Accomplices
Police testimony of disputed confessions
Testimony Requiring Warning Only as a Matter of Practice
Children
Sexual assault complainants
Agents provocateurs (entrapment)
Identification evidence
The nature and risks of identification testimony
The requirement to warn
The warning: factors relevant to the reliability of identification evidence
Discretionary exclusion of identification evidence
The exclusionary rules in the Uniform Acts
The effect of supporting evidence on the obligation to warn
The cumulative effect of identification evidence
The admissibility of out-of-court assertions of identity and pictures used for identification
Other unreliable testimony
The Nature of Corroborative Evidence
Independence
Implication in the crime charged
Mutual corroboration
Functions of Judge and Jury: Directing the Jury
Where corroboration or a corroboration warning is mandatory
Where a warning is required as a matter of practice to avoid a miscarriage of justice
Conclusion
Chapter Five: The Adversary Context
Access to Information
Introduction
Rules giving access to information
Civil cases
Criminal cases
The Nature of Rules Restricting Access to Information
Adversary Restrictions Upon Access to Information
Legal professional privilege (client legal privilege)
Two privileges
The communications (advice) privilege
Lawyers and clients
Legal professional advice
Confidentiality
Bona fides
Communication made for the dominant purpose of legal advice
Material collected for litigation
Limits to legal professional privilege
Copies of documents
Client’s privilege: waiver
Only the communication or work-product is protected
The privilege is a bar to access, not a rule of admissibility
The public policy limit
Statutory removal of the privilege
Claims to privilege: some procedural points
Legal professional privilege and other rules and privileges preventing disclosure
Conclusion
The privilege in aid of settlement
Justification
Scope
Costs
Criminal cases
Waiver: whose privilege?
Proceedings in which privilege may be claimed
Secondary evidence of privileged admissions
Public policy limits
Negotiations between estranged spouses
Alternative dispute resolution
The privilege against self-incrimination
Introduction: the adversary rationale
Incompetence of accused and spouse as witnesses for the prosecution
The accused
The accused’s spouse
The accused’s right to silence
The privilege of the accused not to testify on oath for the defence
Comment and direction upon the accused’s failure to testify on oath
The privilege of the accused to remain silent when questioned before trial
The privilege of citizens to refuse to provide answers or to produce documents that are self-incriminatory
Scope
Punishment, penalty, forfeiture and ecclesiastical censure
Claiming the privilege
Legislation affecting the privileges
The immunity of judges and jurors from testifying on the reasons for decisions
Two adversary restrictions upon the tender of evidence
The evidentiary rule flowing from the doctrine of res judicata
The rule in Hollington v Hewthorn
Public Policy Restrictions Upon Access to Information
Introduction
Parliamentary privilege
Restrictions protecting marriage and family relationships
Restrictions protecting other confidential relationships
At common law
Under legislation
Scope and nature
Priest–penitent
Doctor–patient
Counsellors and complainants of sexual assault
Professional confidential relationships and journalists’ sources
Public interest immunity
General nature
The public interests involved
Nature of immunity
Contents claims
Class claims
Striking the balance: the procedural problems
The rejection of otherwise admissible evidence on grounds of public interest
Chapter Six: Party Presentation and Prosecution
Introduction
Burden of Proof: Nature and Incidence
Evidential and persuasive burdens
The incidence of the burdens in criminal cases
The incidence of the burdens in civil cases
Legislative allocation of the burdens of proof
Presumptions
No Case to Answer
Theory
Criminal cases
Civil cases
The significance of the opponent’s failure to call evidence
Material Facts Determined from Information Presented by the Parties
Theory
The courts’ power to call witnesses
Court intervention into the calling and questioning of witnesses
Judicial notice
Chapter Seven: The Testimonial Emphasis
Introduction
Documentary Evidence
Definition
Authentication
Tender of original
Real Evidence
Testimonial Evidence
Outline
Witnesses testify upon oath
Testimonial formalities
The testimony of children and other vulnerable witnesses
Formalities and competency
Formalities and credit
Witnesses testify to facts, not opinions
The rule and its rationale
Observational inferences
Example: sobriety and consequent capacity
Expert assistance in drawing inferences: a functional approach
Threshold tests at common law for expert knowledge
Liberal relevancy
Sufficient reliability determined by the court
General acceptance within the relevant scientific community: Frye and Daubert
Current Australian position
At common law
Under the uniform legislation
Ad hoc experts
Two illusory tests of admissibility
Common knowledge
Ultimate issues and legal standards
Procedural aspects
Adversarial presentation of expert testimony
Establishing the admissibility of expert testimony: the voir dire
Form of expert assistance
Establishing primary facts through admissible evidence
General expertise not subject to proof
The opinions of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander groups under the uniform legislation
Facts and inferences are ultimately decided by the trier of fact
Witnesses testify orally from memory
Memory and its refreshment
In-court refreshment of memory
Out-of-court refreshment of memory
Prior statements of witnesses
General rule: prior consistent statements inadmissible
Exception: prior statements rebutting alleged invention
Exception: prior statements identifying accused
Recent complaints in sexual assault cases
Statements induced by hypnosis
Questioning witnesses
Examination-in-chief
Scope and purpose: the bolster rule
The prohibition against leading questions
Hostile and unfavourable witnesses
Cross-examination
The right to cross-examine
Issue cross-examination: introducing evidence
Issue cross-examination: satisfying the rule in Browne v Dunn
Credibility cross-examination
Pursuing credit/credibility beyond cross-examination the general prohibition
Exceptions to the general rule
Cross-examination on documents
Re-examination
Chapter Eight: Hearsay
Scope of the Hearsay Rule
Rationale and definition
Out-of-court ‘statements’
Statements tendered as assertions
Narrative statements
Assertions part of the res gestae
Assertions of knowledge, belief and intention
Assertions of physical sensation and health
The availability of the maker of an out-of-court statement
Machine-generated information
Exceptions to the Hearsay Prohibition
Common Law (and Related Statutory) Exceptions
The so-called res gestae exceptions: spontaneous statements
Out-of-court statements by persons since deceased (or otherwise unavailable)
Statements against interest
Statements in the course of duty
Statements as to public or general rights
Statements by relatives as to pedigree
Dying declarations
Post-testamentary statements by testators about the contents of their wills
Statements in public documents
Admissions and confessions
Terminology and the rationale for a hearsay exception
Defining admissions and confessions
Personal knowledge of admitted facts
Self-serving statements
Parties and their privies: vicarious admissions and confessions
Vicarious admissions and confessions: the co-conspirator rule
Confessions and admissions in criminal cases
The rules and their rationale
The voluntariness requirement
The fairness discretion
Unfairness as the unacceptable risk of wrongful conviction
Unfairness as procedural impropriety
The public policy discretion
Criminal investigations: standards of propriety
Excluding for impropriety
Appeals
Determining the reception of confessions: the voir dire
Statutory Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule
Introduction
The English approach and its variations
Legislation based on the Evidence Act 1938 (UK)
Legislation derived from the Criminal Evidence Act 1965 (UK)
Other legislation admitting hearsay evidence in criminal cases
Business records
A more liberal approach to documents: South Australia
Computer output
Bankers’ books and other books of account
Transportation documents
The Uniform Legislation
The definition of hearsay
Exceptions to the prohibition
First-hand hearsay
Business records
Other exceptions
Index

Citation preview

Australian Evidence A Principled Approach to the Common Law and Uniform Acts 6th edition

Australian Evidence A Principled Approach to the Common Law and Uniform Acts 6th edition Andrew Ligertwood LLB (Hons) (Adelaide), BCL (Oxford) Emeritus Fellow in Law, The University of Adelaide

Gary Edmond BA (Hons) (Medal) Wollongong, LLB (Hons) Sydney, PhD Cambridge Professor, School of Law, The University of NSW, Research Professor, Law School, Northumbria University, and Chair, Evidence-based Forensics Initiative

LexisNexis Butterworths Australia 2017

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Ligertwood, Andrew.

Title: Edition: ISBN: Notes: Subjects: Other Authors/Contributors:

Australian evidence : a principled approach to the common law and Uniform Acts. 6th edition. 9780409333664 (pbk). 9780409333671 (ebk). Includes index. Evidence (Law) — Australia — Cases. Edmond, Gary, author.

© 2017 Reed International Books Australia Pty Limited trading as LexisNexis. 1st edition, 1988; 2nd edition, 1993; 3rd edition, 1998; 4th edition 2004 (reprinted 2008); 5th edition 2010 (reprinted 2013 and 2014). This book is copyright. Except as permitted under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), no part of this publication may be reproduced by any process, electronic or otherwise, without the specific written permission of the copyright owner. Neither may information be stored electronically in any form whatsoever without such permission. Inquiries should be addressed to the publishers. Typeset in Helvetica Neue LT Std and Bembo Std. Printed in China. Visit LexisNexis Butterworths at www.lexisnexis.com.au

Preface As the aim of this work is to provide a principled exposition of evidence laws in Australia, the explanation in this Preface of the scope of the work has undergone little change since the first edition (1988). But, with five of the eight jurisdictions having now passed ‘uniform evidence legislation’ and legislatures in every Australian jurisdiction continuing to be active in the field of evidence reform, the temptation is now even greater to regard the subject as simply one of statutory interpretation, with all the technical arguments that such an approach entails. However, the High Court continues to emphasise that legislation requires interpretation in the context of fundamental common law principles, so-called principles of legality, assumed to be accepted by legislatures unless expressly modified. These principles are embodied in common law adversarial process whereby parties initiate and defend proceedings, and are most developed in the context of the accusatorial criminal trial. In turn the outcome of process necessarily depends (in the absence of agreement) upon the proof of facts, and the proof of facts is the concern of evidence laws. It is this context, proof of facts through adversarial trial, that explains not only common law rules of evidence but, it is argued, remains essential to the understanding and interpretation of statutory developments. The statutory framework remains far from uniform, even where so described. While the organisation and sequence of sections in the Uniform Acts are largely consistent, there remain many differences in content. Furthermore, these Acts do not purport to be a comprehensive evidential code, and disparate legislation exists in every jurisdiction seeking to reform other matters directly impacting upon the use of evidence (for example, legislation protecting complainants of sexual assault from excessive cross-examination, legislation modifying the procedures whereby children and vulnerable witnesses place their evidence before the court, and the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) seeking to ensure that directions about the use of evidence are communicated more simply to juries). In addition, in those jurisdictions not party to the uniform scheme there have been many important legislative reforms to the common law (for example, seeking to reform the common law’s approach to the admissibility of an accused’s other misconduct), with no attempt at uniform content or expression.

Yet despite this legislative complexity the fundamental purpose of evidence laws remains clear, the pursuit of factual rectitude in application of the rule of law. This quest necessarily underlies every trial. Evidence incapable of assisting with rectitude should not be considered (the basis of the discussion of forensic science evidence in Chapter 7), and the exclusion of evidence that is so capable demands justification (Chapter 5 discussing where policies extraneous to rectitude affect access to and tender of evidence). Legislation needs to be interpreted where possible to achieve these ends. This is not to assert the perfection of the process which currently underlies our common law evidential regimes in Australia (for example, its dependence upon party control, oral adversarial examination of witnesses and its current assumptions about the cognitive abilities of witnesses and jurors), only that this process remains the basis of those regimes and provides the appropriate principled perspective for their explanation. Indeed, recent revelations concerning the quality of much forensic science evidence and the way that evidence has been presented and understood in criminal proceedings raise difficult questions about the effectiveness of conventional rules and procedures as well as the way legal institutions engage with scientific and technical forms of knowledge and advice. Thus the principled structure of previous editions has not required change to accommodate cases decided and legislation passed since the last edition. The devil remains in the detail and ensuring that it does not distract from the fundamental object of the exercise. For the text presented we take joint responsibility, although for those familiar with the last edition the Edmond influence in widening references to academic discussion of fundamental assumptions, and providing critical comment upon forensic science evidence, will be apparent. In researching and preparing the current text we are indebted to Jarrad Napier, a final year student at The University of Adelaide, for his enthusiastic assistance in supplying us with (the many) evidence cases reported since the last edition and updating legislation as required. Many thanks also to our editor Annabel Adair for tidying our text so professionally, and to Jocelyn Holmes for her enthusiastic support for the project. Our publishing schedule required the manuscript to be submitted in January and it attempted to state the law as available on Australia Day 2017. However, in these days of instant publication we have been able to modify page proofs to

include references to selected later cases. The frustration of not being able to include decisions in cases raising important evidence points currently before the High Court remains. Andrew Ligertwood and Gary Edmond 12 April 2017

Acknowledgments The authors and publishers are grateful to the holders of copyright in material from which extracts appear in this work, particularly to the following: Little Brown & Co Penguin Books The Incorporated Council of Law Reporting for England and Wales While every care has been taken to establish and acknowledge copyright, the publishers tender their apologies for any accidental infringement. They would be pleased to come to a suitable arrangement with the rightful owners in each case.

Table of Cases References are to paragraph numbers 396 Bay Street Port Melbourne, Re [1969] VR 293 …. 5.191

A A (A child), Re (2000) 115 A Crim R 1 …. 8.100 A Child v Andrews (1994) 12 WAR 552 …. 2.49 A v Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532 …. 5.216, 5.223, 5.252 — v Maughan [2016] WASCA 128 …. 1.53, 2.29, 5.146, 5.183 — v Z (2007) 212 FLR 255; [2007] NSWSC 899 …. 5.5 Abdel-Hady (“SA”) v R [2011] NSWCCA 196 …. 2.12 Abdul-Kader v R [2007] NSWCCA 329 …. 7.158, 7.83, 7.123, 7.134 Abolos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167 …. 2.14 Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority v Maurice (1986) 10 FCR 104 …. 5.7, 5.83, 5.85, 5.221, 5.225, 5.226, 5.238, 5.242, 5.254 Abrahamson v R (1994) 63 SASR 139 …. 8.22, 8.33 Accident Insurance Mutual Holdings Ltd v McFadden (1993) 31 NSWLR 412 …. 5.166, 5.169, 5.172, 5.174, 8.174 Adam v R (2001) 207 CLR 96 …. 2.23, 3.90 Adami v R (1959) 108 CLR 605 …. 7.10 Adelaide Brighton Cement v South Australia (1999) 75 SASR 209 …. 5.234, 5.251, 5.252 Adelaide Chemical and Fertilizer Co Ltd v Carlyle (1940) 64 CLR 514 …. 8.37, 8.38 Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd v Spalvins (1998) 152 ALR 418 …. 5.19, 5.58 Adidas AG v Pacific Brands Footwear Pty Ltd (No 3) [2013] FCA 905 …. 7.56, 8.49

Adler v ASIC [2003] NSWCA 131 …. 7.66 Adsteam Building Industries Pty Ltd v Queensland Cement & Lime Co Ltd (No 4) [1985] 1 Qd R 127 …. 5.164 AE v R [2008] NSWCCA 52 …. 3.48, 3.58, 3.62 Agassiz v London Tramway Co (1872) 21 WR 199 …. 2.22 Age Co Ltd, The v Liu [2013] NSWCA 26 …. 8.112 Ahern v R (1988) 165 CLR 87 …. 8.101, 8.114, 8.116, 8.117, 8.118, 8.119, 8.120 Ainsworth v Burden [2005] NSWCA 174 …. 2.29 Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade [1983] 2 AC 394 …. 5.218, 5.229, 5.242, 5.247, 5.249 Aitken v Neville Jeffries Pidler Pty Ltd (1991) 33 FCR 418 …. 5.10 AJ v R (2011) 32 VR 614; [2011] VSCA 215 …. 5.15 — v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 228 …. 3.63, 3.71 AJE v Western Australia (2012) 225 A Crim R 242; [2012] WASCA 185 …. 2.87, 3.63, 3.75, 5.118 Ajodha v The State [1982] AC 204 …. 2.42, 8.101, 8.161, 8.166 AK v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438; [2008] HCA 8 …. 2.14, 4.57 Akins v Abigroup Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 539 …. 5.58 Al Fayed v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2002] EWCA 780 …. 5.65 Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542 …. 2.42, 8.170 Albu v R (1995) 65 SASR 439 …. 4.53, 5.258 Alchin v Commissioner for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 …. 7.81, 7.82, 7.93, 7.149, 7.151, 7.152, 7.153, 7.155 Alcoa Australia Ltd v McKenna (2003) 8 VR 45 …. 7.137 Alcoa of Australia Ltd v Apache Energy (No 6) [2014] WASC 287 …. 5.53 Aldersea v Public Transport Corp (2001) 3 VR 473 …. 7.40 Alderson v Booth [1969] 2 QB 216 …. 8.147 — v Clay (1816) 1 Stark 405; 171 ER 511 …. 7.18

Alexander v Manley (2004) 29 WAR 194 …. 7.82 — v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 …. 4.3, 4.59, 4.64, 4.65, 4.66, 4.67, 4.74, 7.94, 7.95, 7.96, 8.54, 8.55 Alexander, Re; Ex parte Ferguson (1944) 45 SR (NSW) 64 …. 6.18 Alexander (a pseudonym) v R [2016] VSCA 92 …. 3.58, 3.61 Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners (No 2) [1974] AC 405 …. 5.205, 5.231 Al-Hashimi v R (2004) 181 FLR 383; [2004] WASCA 61 …. 4.64 Ali v R (2005) 214 ALR 1; [2005] HCA 8 …. 2.49, 3.78 Alister v R (1983) 154 CLR 404 …. 5.216, 5.217, 5.218, 5.234, 5.242, 5.247, 5.248, 5.249, 5.251 — v — (1984) 154 CLR 404 …. 2.43, 5.5, 5.12, 7.153 Allen v R (2013) 39 VR 629; 235 A Crim R 40; [2013] VSCA 263 …. 4.10, 4.28, 4.104 Allianz Australia Ltd v Sim [2012] NSWCA 68 …. 7.62 Allied Interstate Qld Pty Ltd v Barnes (1968) 118 CLR 580 …. 8.107, 8.108 Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [1983] 1 NSWLR 1 …. 7.129, 7.130, 7.131 Allitt v Sullivan [1988] VR 621 …. 5.81 Allphones Retail Pty Ltd v ACCC (2009) 259 ALR 354; [2009] FCA 980 …. 5.10 Allstate Life Insurance Co v ANZ Banking Group (1995) 57 FCR 360 …. 5.85 — v — (No 6) (1996) 64 FCR 79; 137 ALR 138 …. 6.70, 7.61 — v — (No 32) (1996) 136 ALR 627 …. 7.38 Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S [2008] FCA 559 …. 2.31, 7.66, 7.69, 7.71 Alqudsi v R (2016) 90 ALJR 711; [2016] HCA 24 …. 2.7 AM v R (2006) 164 A Crim R 558; [2006] NTCCA 18 …. 3.151 — v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 196 …. 4.49 AM & S Europe Ltd v Commission of the European Communities [1983] QB

878 …. 5.22 158, 1.38, 1.42, 2.63, 2.67, 6.5 Amaca Pty Ltd v CSR Ltd [2015] VSC 582 …. 7.80, 7.81, 7.82, 8.196 — v King (2011) 35 VR 280; [2011] VSCA 447 …. 7.62 Amaca Pty Ltd (formerly James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd) v Hannell (2007) 34 WAR 109; [2007] WASCA Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden [2002] NSWCA 419 …. 7.19, 7.76 Amann Aviation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1988) 19 FCR 223 …. 5.199 Amcor Ltd v Barnes [2011] VSC 341 …. 5.31 Ames v Nicholson [1921] SASR 224 …. 7.86 AMEV Finance Ltd v Artes Studios Thoroughbreds Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 486 …. 5.103 Amoe v DPP (Nauru) (1991) 103 ALR 595 …. 3.108 Ampolex v Perpetual Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd (1995) 37 NSWLR 405 …. 5.57 — v — (1996) 40 NSWLR 12 …. 5.58 — v — (1996) 70 ALJR 603 …. 5.58 Ancher, Mortlock, Murray and Woolley Pty Ltd v Hooker Homes Pty Ltd [1971] 2 NSWLR 278 …. 7.60 Anchor Products Ltd v Hedges (1966) 115 CLR 493 …. 6.25 Andasteel Constructions Pty Ltd v Taylor [1964] VR 112 …. 5.211 Andelman v R (2013) 38 VR 659; 227 A Crim R 81; [2013] VSCA 25 …. 2.14, 3.54, 3.68, 4.9 Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1877) 2 Ch D 644 …. 5.23 — v Western Australia (2014) 46 WAR 363; [2014] WASCA 137 …. 4.47, 4.48 Andrews v R (1992) 60 A Crim R 137 …. 3.33, 4.85 Andrijich v D’Ascanio [1971] WAR 140 …. 2.64 Aneve Pty Ltd v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2005] NSWCCA 441 …. 7.20 Angel v Hawkesbury City Council [2008] NSWCA 130 …. 7.41 Anglim and Cooke v Thomas [1974] VR 363 …. 8.104

Angliss v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 162 …. 4.48, 4.49 Anglo Czechoslovak and Prague Credit Bank v Janssen [1943] VLR 185 …. 6.60 Ankin v London and NE Ry Co [1930] 1 KB 527 …. 5.229 Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes [1976] Ch 55 …. 5.9, 5.19, 5.146, 5.157, 5.176 AOTC Ltd v McAuslan (1993) 47 FCR 492 …. 6.47 Aouad v R (2011) 207 A Crim R 411; [2011] NSWCCA 61 …. 4.70 Apand Pty Ltd v Kettle Chip Co Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 474 …. 6.45 APC v Western Australia (2012) 224 A Crim R 59; [2012] WASCA 159 …. 3.63 Application of Cannar Re Eubanks [2003] NSWSC 802 …. 5.59 Application of the Attorney General for New South Wales dated 4 April 2014, The [2014] NSWCCA 251 …. 1.53, 5.209 Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim [1989] 1 WLR 565 …. 5.164 Ardrey v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 154 …. 2.38 Argyle Brewery Pty Ltd v Darling Harbourside (Sydney) Pty Ltd (1993) 48 FCR 1 …. 5.43 Aristocrat Technologies Aust Pty Ltd v Global Gaming Supplies Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 21 …. 3.159 Armstrong v Western Australia (2012) 220 A Crim R 274; [2012] WASCA 42 …. 2.49, 8.41 Arno v Forsyth (1986) 9 FCR 576 …. 5.80 Arno, Re; Ex parte Forsy (1985) 9 FCR 557 …. 5.80 Arnotts Ltd v TPC (1990) 24 FCR 313 …. 8.49 Aroutsidis v Illawarra Nominees Pty Ltd (1990) 21 FCR 500 …. 3.156 Arthurs v Attorney-General (Northern Ireland) (1971) 55 Cr App R 161 …. 4.63 Ashby v Commonwealth (No 2) (2012) 203 FCR 440; [2012] FCA 766 …. 5.214 Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] 4 All ER 193 …. 5.10 Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd v Anglo-Persian Oil Co Ltd [1916] 1 KB 822 ….

5.223 Aslett v R [2009] NSWCCA 188 …. 4.61 Assistant-Treasurer v Pacific Airways Ltd (2009) 259 ALR 203; [2009] FCAFC 105 …. 5.40, 5.51 Atholwood v R (2000) 110 A Crim R 417 …. 3.37 Atkins v R [2009] EWCA Crim 1876 …. 7.52 Atkinson, In the Marriage of (1997) 21 Fam LR 279 …. 5.168, 5.169, 5.177 Atkinson v T & P Fabrications Pty Ltd (2001) 10 Tas R 57 …. 5.52 Atra v Farmers and Graziers Co-op Co Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 281 …. 8.174 Attorney-General v Bowman (1791) 2 Bos & Pul 532; 126 ER 1423 …. 3.154 — v Clough [1963] 1 QB 773 …. 5.205 — v Good (1825) M’Cle & Yo 286; 148 ER 421 …. 8.26 — v Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch 91; 154 ER 38 …. 7.140, 7.143 — v Kaddour and Turkmani [2001] NSWCCA 456 …. 5.205 — v Mulholland [1963] 2 QB 477 …. 5.205, 5.206 — v Wheeler (1944) 45 SR (NSW) 321 …. 8.93 — (ACT); Ex rel Olaseat Pty Ltd v ACT Minister for Environment (1993) 115 ALR 161 …. 6.14, 6.18 — (Cth) v Tse Chu-Fai (1998) 193 CLR 128 …. 6.60 — (Hong Kong) v Wong Muk Ping [1987] AC 501 …. 4.100 — (NSW) v Chidgey (2008) 182 A Crim R 536; [2008] NSWCCA 65 …. 5.5, 5.12 — v Findlay (1976) 50 ALJR 637 …. 5.12 — v Smith (1996) 86 A Crim R 308 …. 5.205 — v Stuart (1994) 34 NSWLR 667 …. 5.216, 5.223, 5.242, 5.245 — (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500 …. 5.22, 5.26, 5.29, 5.33, 5.68, 5.82 — v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475 …. 5.33, 5.38, 5.47, 5.51 — (Tas) v Wright (2013) 22 Tas R 322; [2013] TASCCA 14 …. 2.37, 4.58 — (Vic) v Riach [1978] VR 301 …. 5.160, 5.171

Attorney-General’s Guidelines (1982) 74 Cr App R 302 …. 5.14 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1977), Re [1979] WAR 45 …. 8.109 — (No 1 of 1983) [1983] 2 VR 410 …. 2.50, 6.33 Attorney-General’s Reference No 1 of 1989; R v Brown [1990] Tas R 46 …. 6.9, 6.18 Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1979) (1979) 69 Cr App R 411 …. 7.82 Attwood v R (1960) 102 CLR 353 …. 2.20, 3.85, 3.91, 3.93, 3.95, 3.97, 3.108, 3.129, 3.130 Aubertin v Western Australia (2006) 33 WAR 87; [2006] WASCA 229 …. 4.83, 4.87 Audsley v R [2014] VSCA 321 …. 2.28 Austotel Management Pty Ltd v Jamieson (1995) 57 FCR 411 …. 5.92, 5.97, 5.103 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 …. 6.72, 6.73 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 1) [2012] FCA 1355 …. 7.8 — v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (2009) 259 ALR 541; [2009] FCA 1075 …. 5.90 — v Amcor Printing Papers Group Ltd (2000) 169 ALR 344 …. 6.39, 6.40 — v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (1998) 81 FCR 526 …. 5.28 — v Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd (2009) 174 FCR 547; [2009] FCAFC 32 …. 5.23, 5.28, 5.41, 5.49, 5.53, 5.55 — v Cathay Pacific Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1101 …. 5.54 — v CC (NSW) (1999) 52 FCR 375 …. 3.154 — v Chats House Investments Pty Ltd (1996) 142 ALR 177 …. 5.162 — v George Weston Foods Ltd (2003) 129 FCR 298 …. 5.58 — v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 794 …. 2.19, 8.117 — v Pratt (No 3) (2009) 175 FCR 558 …. 8.94, 8.95 — v Telstra (2000) 96 FCR 317 …. 5.55 — v World Netsafe (No 2) (2002) 119 FCR 307 …. 8.29, 8.112, 8.114

Australian Crime Commission v Stoddart (2011) 244 CLR 554; [2011] HCA 47 …. 5.165 Australian Federal Police v XYZ (2015) 123 SASR 274; [2015] SASC 113 …. 5.12 Australian Granites Ltd v Eisenwerk Hensel Bayreuth Dipl-Ing Burkhardt GmbH [2001] 1 Qd R 461 …. 6.60 Australian Hospital Care v Duggan (No 2) [1999] VSC 131 …. 5.26 Australian Medic-Care Company Ltd v Hamilton Pharmaceutical Pty Ltd (No 4) (2008) 170 FCR 9 …. 8.199 Australian Petroleum Pty Ltd v Parnell Transport Industries Pty Ltd (1998) 88 FCR 537 …. 8.199 Australian Postal Corporation v Digital Post Australia [2013] FCAFC 153 …. 7.56 Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Gorman [1973] VR 570 …. 8.114 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v 4WD Systems Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 850 …. 3.159 — v Active Super Pty Ltd (2015) 235 FCR 181; [2015] FCA 342 …. 7.8 — v Adler [2001] NSWSC 1168 …. 2.8, 2.9 — v Citigroup Global Markets Aust Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 157 FCR 310; [2007] FCA 121 …. 2.26, 2.42 — v Healey (2011) 196 FCR 291; [2011] FCA 717 …. 6.39 — v Hellicar (2012) 286 ALR 501; [2012] HCA 17 …. 2.62, 6.52 — v Lindberg (2009) 261 ALR 207; [2009] VSCA 234 …. 5.61, 5.81 — v Managed Investments Pty Ltd (No 7) [2015] 2 Qd R 32; [2014] QSC 72 …. 2.29, 3.158, 8.176 — v P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd (2008) 169 FCR 227; [2008] FCAFC 123 …. 2.215, 5.216 — v Plymin (2002) 4 VR 168 …. 5.162, 5.171 — v Rich (2004) 213 ALR 338; [2004] NSWSC 1062 …. 2.42 — v — [2005] NSWCA 152 …. 7.66

— v — (2005) 216 ALR 320; [2005] NSWSC 417 …. 2.32, 7.8, 7.19, 7.125 — v — [2006] NSWSC 643 …. 7.153 — v — (2006) 235 ALR 587; [2006] NSWSC 826 …. 2.9 Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominee Ltd (1995) 18 ACSR 459 …. 2.50 — v McLeod (2000) 22 WAR 255 …. 7.60 — v Zarro (No 2) (1992) 34 FCR 427 …. 5.205, 5.216, 5.224, 5.244 Australian Statistician, The v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (2008) 36 WAR 83; [2008] WASCA 34 …. 5.224, 5.238, 5.254 Avanes v Marshall (2007) 68 NSWLR 595 …. 5.58, 5.59 Avis v R [2002] WASCA 250 …. 2.12 AW v R [2009] NSWCCA 1 …. 4.49 AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382; [2006] FCA 571 …. 5.23, 5.27 — v — (No 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30; 234 ALR 651; [2006] FCA 1234 …. 5.30 Axon v Axon (1937) 59 CLR 395 …. 6.26 Aydin v R (2010) 28 VR 588; [2010] VSCA 190 …. 2.29 Aytugrul v R (2012) 247 CLR 170; [2012] HCA 15 …. 1.44, 2.31, 2.70, 6.65, 6.73, 7.67, 7.71 Azarian v Western Australia (2007) 178 A Crim R 19; [2007] WASCA 249 …. 2.49, 2.71, 4.84, 4.105 Azizi v R (2012) 224 A Crim R 325; [2012] VSCA 205 …. 8.197 Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50; 179 ALR 349 …. 2.12, 2.50, 5.106, 5.116, 5.118, 5.119, 5.120, 5.121, 5.122, 5.123, 5.124, 5.127, 5.130, 5.131, 5.132, 6.46

B B, In the Marriage of (1988) 91 FLR 105 …. 7.125 B v Dentists Disciplinary Tribunal [1994] 1 NZLR 95 …. 7.3 B v R (1992) 175 CLR 599 …. 2.49, 2.87, 3.35, 3.36, 3.73, 3.125, 4.102 B (child) v Potts (1992) 59 A Crim R 136 …. 8.133

Babcock v Canada (Attorney General) [2002] 3 SCR 3 …. 5.251 Babic v R (2010) 28 VR 297; [2010] VSCA 198 …. 6.8 Baddams v Thomas (1984) 34 SASR 420 …. 6.2 Bailey v ABC [1995] 1 Qd R 476 …. 5.85 Bain v R [2009] NZSC 16 …. 2.23, 7.48 Baini v R (2012) 246 CLR 469; [2012] HCA 59 …. 2.14 — v — (No 2) [2013] VSCA 157 …. 2.14 Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 …. 5.22, 5.23, 5.27, 5.34, 5.41, 5.49, 5.60, 5.72, 5.74, 5.79 — v Evans (1987) 77 ALR 565 …. 5.49 — v R (2012) 245 CLR 632 …. 8.6, 8.77, 8.78 Balabel v Air India [1988] Ch 317 …. 5.27 Bale v Mills (2011) 81 NSWLR 498; [2011] NSWCA 226 …. 7.131 Balnaves v Smith [2008] 2 Qd R 413; [2008] QSC 215 …. 5.51 Bank of NSW v Signorini [1966] Qd R 322 …. 6.38 Bank of Valetta PLC v NCA (1999) 165 ALR 60 …. 7.38 — v — [1999] FCA 109 …. 5.164 Bannister v Bowen (1985) 82 FLR 406 …. 6.18 — v R (1993) 10 WAR 484 …. 7.140 — v Walton (1993) 30 NSWLR 699 …. 2.69 Bannon v R (1995) 185 CLR 1 …. 8.6, 8.42, 8.56, 8.61, 8.68, 8.74, 8.77, 8.78, 8.170 Barbarian Motor Cycle Club v Koithan (1984) 35 SASR 481 …. 5.6 Barbaro v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 30 …. 8.108 Barbosa v Di Meglio [1999] NSWCA 307 …. 7.60 Barca v R (1975) 133 CLR 82 …. 5.138, 5.139 Barefoot v Estelle 463 US 880 (1983) …. 1.5 Barker v R (1994) 127 ALR 280 …. 5.266

Barkway v South Wales Transport Co Ltd [1949] 1 KB 54 …. 8.174, 8.176 Barrett v South Australia (1994) 63 SASR 208 …. 6.14 Barry v Police [2009] SASC 295 …. 6.56, 8.106 Barton v R (1980) 147 CLR 75 …. 5.13, 6.30 Basto v R (1954) 91 CLR 628 …. 8.166 Bataillard v R (1907) 4 CLR 1282 …. 5.118 Bater v Bater [1951] P 35 …. 2.60, 2.69 Batlow Packing House and Cool Stores Co-op v Commonwealth and Dominion Line (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 314 …. 8.93 Battistatos v RTA (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256 …. 2.29 Battle v Attorney-General [1949] P 358 …. 8.85 Baulch v Lyndoch Warnambool Inc (2010) 27 VR 1; [2010] VSCA 30 …. 2.49, 7.131 Bax Global (Australia) Pty Ltd v Evans (1999) 47 NSWLR 538; [1999] NSWSC 815 …. 5.146, 5.157 Bayeh v New South Wales (1999) 108 A Crim R 364 …. 5.166 Bayley v R [2016] VSCA 160 …. 2.31, 4.65 Bayliss v Cassidy (No 2) [2000] 1 Qd R 464 …. 5.51, 5.53 BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499; [2012] HCA 9 …. 2.18, 2.21, 3.12, 3.21, 3.34, 3.38, 3.40, 3.50 BC v R [2015] NSWCCA 327 …. 3.8, 3.12, 3.62, 3.40, 3.71 BC (by her litigation guardian BD) v Australian Red Cross Society (1991) …. 5.238 Beames v Police (2002) 135 A Crim R 447; [2002] SASC 405 …. 4.12, 4.49 — v R (1980) 1 A Crim R 239 …. 7.15 Beattie v Ball [1999] 3 VR 1 …. 7.131 Beatty, In the Estate of [1919] VLR 81 …. 8.93 Beck and Smith v R [1984] WAR 127 …. 3.147 Beckett v R [2014] NSWCCA 305 …. 2.37, 8.94

Bective Station Pty Ltd v AWB (Aust) Ltd [2006] FCA 1596 …. 3.159 Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac (1998) 86 FCR 215 …. 5.58 Bell v Bell [1970] SASR 310 …. 5.104 — v David Jones Ltd (1949) 49 SR (NSW) 223 …. 7.18 Bell, Re; Ex parte Lees (1980) 146 CLR 141 …. 5.31, 5.68, 5.69 Bellemore v Tasmania (2006) 16 Tas R 364; 170 A Crim R 1 …. 2.35, 3.35, 3.56, 3.136, 7.108 Bellevue Crescent Pty Ltd v Marland Holdings Pty Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 364 …. 7.65 Benbrika v R (2010) 29 VR 593; [2010] VSCA 281 …. 2.72 Bendix Autolite Corp v Midwesco Enterprises Inc 486 US 888 (1988) …. 3.41 Benecke v NAB (1993) 35 NSWLR 110 …. 5.57 Beneficial Finance Corp v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (1991) 31 FCR 523 …. 5.248 Bennett v Collett (1986) 40 SASR 426 …. 4.12 — v Police [2005] SASC 167 …. 7.43 — v — [2005] SASC 415 …. 7.43 — v Western Australia (2012) 223 A Crim R 419; [2012] WASCA 70 …. 3.63 Benney v Dowling [1959] VLR 237 …. 6.31 Bentley v Cooke (1784) 3 Dougl 422; 99 ER 729 …. 5.200 — v Nelson [1963] WAR 89 …. 5.97 Berger v Raymond Sun Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 625 …. 3.158 Berjak (Victoria) Pty Ltd v Peerless Processing Co Pty Ltd [1963] VR 515 …. 8.174 Bernes v Filz (1997) 6 Tas SR 450 …. 4.85 Bessela v Stern (1877) 2 CPD 265 …. 8.98 Betfair v Racing NSW (No 7) (2009) 260 ALR 538; [2009] FCA 1140 …. 5.89 Betts v Hardcastle (2000) 23 WAR 559 …. 4.12, 4.20 Bevan v Western Australia (2012) 43 WAR 233; [2012] WASCA 153 …. 7.25

Beverland v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 2 …. 3.37, 3.63, 3.75 BHP Olympic Dam Pty Ltd v Bluestone Apartments Pty Ltd (2013) 115 SASR 586; [2013] SASC 64 …. 5.27 Biala Pty Ltd v Mallina Holdings Ltd [1990] WAR 174 …. 5.97 Birks v Western Australia (2007) 33 WAR 291; [2007] WASCA 29 …. 4.33, 7.23 Bishop v R (2013) 39 VR 642; [2013] VSCA 273 …. 3.108, 3.130, 3.134, 3.136 Bissett v Deputy State Coroner (2011) 83 NSWLR 144; [2011] NSWSC 1182 …. 5.85 BJS v R (2013) 231 A Crim R 537; [2013] NSWCCA 123 …. 3.61, 3.62, 3.71, 7.110 Black v R (1993) 68 ALJR 91 …. 4.34 — v Walker [2000] NSWSC 983 …. 2.19 Black and Decker Inc v Flymo Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 753 …. 5.55 Blackie v Police [1966] NZLR 910 …. 7.42 Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 …. 5.187 Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63; 98 ER 969 …. 2.63, 2.67, 6.20, 6.52 Blatchford v Dempsey [1956] SASR 285 …. 6.60 Blewitt v R (1988) 62 ALJR 503 …. 7.115 Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd [1942] 2 KB 253 …. 5.159 Bohdal v R (1987) 24 A Crim R 318 …. 2.49 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 …. 7.52 Boles v Esandra Finance Corp Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 666 …. 5.187 Bolton v Western Australia (2007) 180 A Crim R 191; [2007] WASCA 277 …. 3.146, 3.147 Bond Media Ltd v John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd (1988) 16 NSWLR 82 …. 8.105 Bond v ABT (1988) 19 FCR 494 …. 6.54 — v Tuohy (1995) 56 FCR 92 …. 5.155, 5.172 Boonudnoon v R (2002) 172 FLR 111; [2002] WASCA 313 …. 2.72, 4.88

Booth v Bosworth (2001) 114 FCR 39 …. 2.50, 6.45 Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd v CFMEU (No 2) [2015] VSC 459 …. 8.46 Borowski v Quayle [1966] VR 382 …. 7.40, 7.71 Boston v Bagshaw and Sons [1966] 1 WLR 1134 …. 5.185 Bottomley, Ex parte [1909] 2KB 14 …. 7.117 Bowskill v Dawson [1954] 1 QB 288 …. 8.174 Boyer (a pseudonym) v R [2015] VSCA 242 …. 4.9, 4.10, 8.198 Boyes v Collins (2000) 23 WAR 123 …. 5.46 Boyre v Cafred Pty Ltd (1984) 4 FCR 367 …. 3.156 Bracegirdle v Bailey (1859) 1 F & F 536; 175 ER 842 …. 7.124 Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (unreported, 1951) …. 2.69 Brain v Preece (1843) 11 M & W 773; 152 ER 1016 …. 8.83 Brandi v Mingot (1976) 12 ALR 551 …. 6.45 Brannigan v Davison [1997] AC 238 …. 5.164 Braslin v Tasmania [2011] TASCCA 14 …. 4.54, 4.61 Brauer v O’Sullivan [1957] SASR 185 …. 6.35 Bray v R [2014] VSCA 276 …. 2.15, 2.26, 2.32, 3.12 Braysich v R (2011) 243 CLR 434; [2011] HCA 14 …. 3.128, 6.2, 6.8, 6.14 Brebner v Bruce (1950) 82 CLR 161 …. 6.69 — v Perry [1961] SASR 177 …. 5.172, 5.174 Breedon v Kongras (1996) 85 A Crim R 472 …. 6.23 Breen v R (1976) 50 ALJR 534 …. 7.99 — v Sneddon (1961) 106 CLR 406 …. 6.72 Brewer v Castles (No 3) (1984) 52 ALR 581 …. 5.81 Brewster v Sewell (1820) 106 ER 672 …. 7.18 Bridge v R (1964) 118 CLR 600 …. 5.118 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 …. 1.38, 2.64, 2.65, 2.66, 2.67, 2.69

— v — …. 7.131 Brimblecombe v Duncan; Ex parte Duncan [1958] Qd R 8 …. 6.8 Brimnes, The [1973] 1 All ER 769; [1973] QB 929 …. 1.14, 1.17, 2.60 Briscoe v Briscoe [1968] P 501 …. 6.54 British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Secretary, Department of Health and Aging (2011) 281 ALR 75; [2011] FCAFC 107 …. 5.199 British Coal Corp v Dennis Rye Ltd (No 2) [1988] 1 WLR 1113 …. 5.55, 5.65 British Steel Corp v Granada Television [1981] AC 1096 …. 5.10, 5.150, 5.205, 5.206 Brockway v Pando (2000) 22 WAR 405 …. 7.130 Bromley v R (1986) 161 CLR 315 …. 4.6, 4.12, 4.18, 4.19, 4.29, 4.36, 4.41, 4.59, 4.76, 4.77, 4.78, 4.104, 7.35 Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v International Litigation Funding Partners (Aust) Ltd (No 2) (2009) 256 ALR 416; [2009] FCA 449 …. 5.33 Brooks v Medical Defence Association of WA (1999) 94 FCR 164 …. 5.43 — v Police (2013) 116 SASR 234; [2013] SASC 81 …. 2.90, 5.130 — v R (2012) 36 VR 84; [2012] VSCA 197 …. 3.73, 4.83 Bropho v Western Australia (No 2) [2009] WASCA 94 …. 1.32, 2.87, 7.64 Brown v Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 187 ALR 714; [2001] FCA 596 …. 5.90 — v — (2001) 47 ATR 143 …. 7.137 — v — (2002) 119 FCR 269; [2002] FCA 318 …. 2.42, 5.90, 8.165 — v Foster (1857) 1 H & N 736; 156 ER 1397 …. 5.60 — v R (1913) 17 CLR 570 …. 2.72, 8.37, 8.38 — v — [1980] Tas SR 61 …. 7.130 — v — [2006] NSWCCA 69 …. 2.32, 4.10 — v Western Australia (2011) 207 A Crim R 533 …. 8.6 Browne v Dunn (1894) 6 R 67 …. 2.8, 6.68, 7.75, 7.95, 7.129, 7.130, 7.131, 7.132, 7.144, 7.145

BRS v R (1997) 191 CLR 275 …. 3.21, 3.34, 3.73, 3.106, 3.107, 3.135, 3.136, 3.137, 4.43, 4.93, 4.95 Brunskill v Sovereign Marine and General Insurance Co Ltd (1985) 62 ALR 53 …. 2.14 Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854 …. 2.12 Bryant v R (2011) 205 A Crim R 531; [2011] NSWCCA 26 …. 3.54, 3.68 BSJ v R (2012) 35 VR 475; [2012] VSCA 93 …. 3.60 BT Australasia Pty Ltd v New South Wales (1996) 140 ALR 268 …. 5.19, 5.83 — v NSW (No 7) (1998) 153 ALR 722 …. 5.59 BTR Engineering (Australia) Ltd (formerly Borg Warner Australia Ltd) v Patterson (1990) 20 NSWLR 724 …. 5.174 Buchanan, Re [1964–5] NSWR 1379 …. 5.205 Buchanan v Jennings (AG of New Zealand intervening) [2005] 1 AC 115; [2005] 2 All ER 273 …. 5.199 Buchwald v R (2011) 38 VR 199; [2011] VSCA 445 …. 7.131 Buck v R [1983] WAR 372; (1982) 8 A Crim R 208 …. 4.82 Bugg v Day (1949) 79 CLR 442 …. 7.49, 7.138 Buiks v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 194 …. 3.63 Bulejcik v R (1996) 70 ALJR 462; 185 CLR 375 …. 2.8, 4.56, 4.57, 5.156 Bulk Materials (Coal Handling) Services Pty Ltd v Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 689 …. 5.49, 5.56 Bull v R (2000) 201 CLR 443 …. 3.147, 8.9, 8.28, 8.46, 8.47 Bulstrode v Trimble [1970] VR 840 …. 7.130, 7.131 Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54 …. 2.27, 2.32, 2.33, 2.36, 2.37, 4.67, 5.62, 5.256, 5.265, 5.266, 8.123, 8.140, 8.141, 8.146, 8.156, 8.158 Burke (a pseudonym) v R (2013) 40 VR 161; [2013] VSCA 351 …. 5.124, 8.108 Burlinson v Police (1994) 75 A Crim R 258 …. 2.71 Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Bank of England [1980] AC 1090 …. 5.216, 5.220, 5.229, 5.249, 5.252 Burnell v British Transport Commission [1956] 1 QB 187 …. 5.51, 7.81, 7.119

Burns v Joseph [1969] Qd R 130 …. 6.53 — v Lipman (1974) 132 CLR 157 …. 6.75 — v R (1975) 132 CLR 258 …. 2.85, 8.163, 8.166 Burnside Sub-Branch RSSLA Inc v Burnside Memorial Bowling Club Inc (1990) 58 SASR 324 …. 8.186 Burrell v R [2007] NSWCCA 65 …. 2.28, 7.123 — v — [2009] NSWCCA 163 …. 2.85, 7.122, 7.123 Burrough v Martin (1809) 2 Camp 112; 170 ER 1098 …. 7.79 Bursill v Tanner (1885) 16 QBD 1 …. 5.60 Burton v Police (2004) 88 SASR 152 …. 2.32 BUSB v R (2011) 248 FLR 368; [2011] NSWCCA 39 …. 5.205 Busby v Thorn EMI Programmes Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 461 …. 5.145, 5.173 Bush v R (1993) 115 ALR 654 …. 2.8 Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 …. 7.15, 7.16, 7.17, 7.19, 7.24, 7.56 Butler v Board of Trade [1971] Ch 680 …. 5.64 — v R (2011) 34 VR 165; [2011] VSCA 417 …. 4.93, 5.131 Butterworth v Butterworth and Englefield [1920] P 126 …. 3.163 Buttes Gas and Oil Co v Hammer (No 3) [1980] 3 WLR 668 …. 5.43, 5.48, 5.51, 5.55 Button v R (2002) 25 WAR 382 …. 3.140, 8.6, 8.77 Buttsworth v R (2004) 29 WAR 1 …. 2.87

C C v Minister of Community Welfare (1989) 52 SASR 304 …. 7.35 — v N (2007) 215 FLR 131 …. 7.66 — v T (1995) 58 FCR 1 …. 5.168 C plc v P (Secretary of State for the Home Department Intervening) [2006] Ch 549 …. 5.146 Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd [2006] FCA

363 …. 7.59 — v — [2007] FCAFC 70 …. 7.59 — v — (No 2) [2006] FCA 364 …. 2.48 Cadwallader v Bajco Pty Ltd (2001) 189 ALR 370 …. 7.65 Cahill v CFMEU (No 2) (2008) 170 FCR 357; [2008] FCA 1292 …. 6.39, 6.40 Cain v Glass (1985) 3 NSWLR 39 …. 5.68 — v — (No 2) (1985) 3 NSWLR 230 …. 5.12, 5.15, 5.205 Calcraft v Guest [1898] 1 QB 759 …. 5.26, 5.49, 5.61, 5.63, 5.65 Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333 …. 5.98 Calderwood v SCI Operations Pty Ltd (1995) 130 ALR 456 …. 5.154 Callanan v B [2005] 1 Qd R 348 …. 5.165 Callander v R (2004) 144 NTR 1 …. 5.143, 5.144 Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd v State Pollution Control Commission (1991) 25 NSWLR 118 …. 5.150, 5.154, 5.155, 5.157 Camden v McKenzie [2008] 1 Qd R 39 …. 2.13 Camilleri v Wilkinson (1983) 35 SASR 270 …. 2.8 Campbell v R (2014) 312 ALR 129; [2014] NSWCCA 175 …. 2.87, 7.59 Candacal Pty Ltd v Industry Research & Development Board (2005) 223 ALR 284; [2005] FCA 649 …. 5.26 Cannon v Tahche (2002) 5 VR 317 …. 5.15 Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd v Andreason [2005] NSWSC 579 …. 3.159 Capar v Commissioner of Police (1994) 34 NSWLR 715; 74 A Crim R 428 …. 5.29, 5.30 Carbone v NCA (1994) 126 ALR 79 …. 5.46 Carbotech Australia Pty Ltd v Yates [2008] NSWSC 1151 …. 5.5, 5.19 Carew v Carbone (1991) 5 WAR 1 …. 5.15 Carey v Korda (2012) 45 WAR 181; [2012] WASCA 228 …. 5.71 — v R (1986) 30 CCC (3d) 498 …. 5.251 Carey and R, Re (1984) 7 CCC (3d) 193 …. 5.216

Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner and Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 …. 6.60 Carlton and United Breweries v Cassin [1956] VLR 186 …. 8.93 Carmody v Mackellar (1997) 76 FCR 115 …. 5.76, 5.81 Carnell v Mann (1998) 89 FCR 247 …. 5.28, 5.47, 5.58 Carr v R (1988) 165 CLR 314 …. 4.31, 4.41 — v — [2002] TASSC 60 …. 4.102, 4.103, 8.99 — v Western Australia (2007) 176 A Crim R 555; [2007] HCA 47 …. 4.33 Carroll v R (2002) 213 CLR 635 …. 5.188, 5.190 — v — [1964] Tas SR 76 …. 3.101 Carter v Hayes (1994) 61 SASR 451 …. 5.12 — v Managing Partner, Northmore Hale Davey and Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121 …. 5.22, 5.23, 5.27, 5.30, 5.31, 5.68, 5.70, 5.82, 7.150 Cartwright v W Richardson and Co Ltd [1955] 1 All ER 742; [1955] 1 WLR 340 …. 7.119, 8.173 Carusi v Housing Commission [1973] VR 215 …. 5.211, 8.173 Casey v R [2016] NSWCCA 77 …. 7.123 Casley-Smith v District Council of Stirling (1989) 51 SASR 447 …. 5.10, 5.252 — v FS Evans and Sons Pty Ltd (1988) 49 SASR 339 …. 6.67 — v — (No 2) (1988) 49 SASR 332 …. 2.42 — v FS Evans and Sons Pty Ltd and DC of Stirling (No 1) (1988) 49 SASR 314 …. 7.51, 7.66 Cassebohm v R (2011) 109 SASR 465; [2011] SASCFC 29 …. 4.51 Castle v R; Bucca v R (2016) 227 CLR 57; [2016] HCA 46 …. 2.14, 3.64 Cavanett v Chambers [1968] SASR 97 …. 6.47, 6.66, 6.67, 7.42, 7.60 CB v Western Australia (2006) 175 A Crim R 304; [2006] WASCA 227 …. 2.71 CDJ v VAJ (No 1) (1998) 197 CLR 172 …. 2.29 Cecez v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 344; [2007] WASCA 260 …. 4.6, 4.77, 4.78 Ceedive Pty Ltd v May [2004] NSWSC 33 …. 8.200

Century Yuasa Batteries Pty Ltd v Martin [2002] FCA 722 …. 3.159 Cesan v DPP (Cth) (2007) 174 A Crim R 385; [2007] NSWCCA 273 …. 4.88 Cesan v R; Mas Rivadavia v R (2008) 236 CLR 358; [2008] HCA 52 …. 2.14 Chadwick v Bowman (1886) 16 QBD 561 …. 5.43, 5.48 Chaina v Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust (No 9) [2013] NSWSC 212 …. 5.57 Challis v Western Australia (2014) 237 A Crim R 283; [2014] WASCA 8 …. 5.118 Chamber v Bernasconi (1843) 1 C, M & R 347; 149 ER 1114 …. 8.83 Chamberlain v Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 28 FCR 21 …. 5.187 — v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 164 CLR 502 …. 5.187 — v R (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521 …. 1.10, 1.11, 1.34, 2.14, 2.78, 2.79, 2.80, 2.81, 2.82, 2.83, 2.86, 2.90, 4.3, 7.75, 7.135 Chambers v Jobling (1986) 7 NSWLR 1 …. 2.14 Chandrasekera (alias Alisandiri) v R [1937] AC 220 …. 8.12 Chapman v Allan and Draper (1999) 74 SASR 274 …. 5.100 — v Luminis Pty Ltd (2000) 100 FCR 229 …. 5.222, 5.226, 5.254, 7.19 — v — (No 2) [2000] FCA 1010 …. 2.2 — v — (No 5) [2001] FCA 1106 …. 7.73 Chappell v Ross and Sons Pty Ltd [1969] VR 376 …. 8.114 Charara v Commissioner of Police (2008) 182 A Crim R 64; [2008] NSWCA 22 …. 5.156 Cheatley v R [1981] Tas R 123 …. 3.136 Cheddar Valley Engineering Ltd v Chaddlewood Homes Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 820 …. 5.94, 5.100 Chedzey v R (1987) 30 A Crim R 451 …. 2.70, 2.72, 4.56 Cheney v R (1991) 28 FCR 103 …. 3.140, 7.151 Cherry Lane Pty Ltd, Re (1988) 17 ALD 1 …. 2.69 Chidiac v R (1991) 171 CLR 432 …. 2.14, 4.3, 4.13, 4.102

Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police v McNally [2002] 2 Cr App R 37 …. 5.205 Chief Executive Officer of Customs v El Hajje (2005) 224 CLR 159 …. 6.22 — v Labrador Liquor Wholesale Pty Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 161; 201 ALR 1; [2003] HCA 49 …. 6.8 Chiou Yaou Fa v Morris (1987) 46 NTR 1 …. 7.24 Chisari v R (No 2) [2006] NSWCCA 325 …. 7.80 Chocalaterie Guylian NV v Registrar of Trade Marks [2009] FCA 891 …. 8.49 Choi v R [2007] NSWCCA 150 …. 4.20, 8.117 Choo v Quinn (1984) 11 FCR 217 …. 5.34 Chotiputhsilpa v Waterhouse [2005] NSWCA 295 …. 7.23 Christian v R (2012) 223 A Crim R 370; [2012] NSWCCA 34 …. 3.73, 5.49, 5.139 Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 …. 8.147 Christophers v R (2000) 23 WAR 106 …. 4.49, 7.112 — v — [2003] WASCA 214 …. 4.49 Christos v R [2013] VSCA 202 …. 7.16 Chugg v Pacific Dunlop Ltd (1990) 170 CLR 249 …. 6.14, 6.18 Church of Scientology of California v DHSS [1979] 1 WLR 723 …. 5.224, 5.254 Cicchino v R (1991) 54 A Crim R 358 …. 4.59 Citibank Ltd, Re [1989] 1 Qd R 516 …. 5.26 Clambake Pty Ltd v Tipperary Projects Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 35 WAR 394 …. 7.71 Clark Equipment Credit of Australia Ltd v Como Factors Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 552 …. 6.48, 6.68 Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 …. 7.44, 7.45, 7.55 Clarke v R (1993) 71 A Crim R 58 …. 4.65 — v — [2013] VSCA 206 …. 4.39

Clarkson v DPP [1990] VR 743 …. 5.15 Clay v R [2014] VSCA 269 …. 8.198 Clayton v Hardwick Colliery Co Ltd [1915] WN 395 …. 6.75 Cleland v R (1982) 151 CLR 1 …. 2.27, 2.29, 3.69, 5.256, 5.266, 8.121, 8.123, 8.124, 8.140, 8.143, 8.154, 8.160 Clements, Dunne & Bell Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (2001) 188 ALR 515; [2001] FCA 1858 …. 5.30 Clifford v Clifford [1961] 1 WLR 1274 …. 7.138 — v R (2004) 12 Tas R 415 …. 4.61 Coates v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 142 …. 2.88 Cockerill v Collins [1999] 2 Qd R 26 …. 5.71 Cojuangco v John Fairfax and Sons Ltd (No 2) [1991] Aust Torts Rep ¶81-068 …. 5.10 Col v R (2013) 237 A Crim R 67; [2013] NSWCCA 302 …. 7.123 Cole v Dyer (1999) 74 SASR 216 …. 5.53 — v Elders Finance Co [1993] 2 VR 356 …. 5.47 Coleman v Zanker (1992) 58 SASR 7 …. 5.266, 8.149 Collaroy Beach Club Ltd v Haywood [2007] NSWCA 21 …. 2.26 Collaton v Correl (1926) SASR 87 …. 7.84 Collie v Police (2013) 115 SASR 281; [2013] SASC 15 …. 2.90, 5.130 Collins v Northern Territory (2007) 161 FCR 549; 232 ALR 483; [2007] FCAFC 152 …. 6.60 — v R (1980) 31 ALR 257 …. 5.266, 8.128, 8.131, 8.133, 8.140, 8.143, 8.152, 8.156, 8.159, 8.162 — v — [2006] NSWCCA 162 …. 4.63 Colquhoun v R (No 1) [2013] NSWCCA 190 …. 3.56, 3.64 Commissioner for Government Transport v Adamcik (1961) 106 CLR 292 …. 6.76, 7.43, 7.47, 7.49, 7.51, 7.74 Commissioner for Metropolitan Police v Hills [1980] AC 26 …. 3.121

Commissioner for Motor Transport v Collier-Moat Ltd (1959) 60 SR (NSW) 238 …. 8.26 Commissioner for Railways v Murphy (1967) 41 ALJR 77 …. 7.22 — v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564 …. 5.5 Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Young (1962) 106 CLR 535 …. 7.15, 7.25 Commissioner for Taxation v Donoghue (2015) 237 FCR 316; [2015] FCAFC 183 …. 5.64 Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Cox (1989) 40 A Crim R 447 …. 5.164 — v McMillan (1987) 13 FCR 7 …. 5.181 — v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501; 141 ALR 545 …. 5.22, 5.23, 5.28, 5.30, 5.32, 5.34, 5.35, 5.43, 5.44, 5.45, 5.46, 5.48, 5.60, 5.61, 5.64, 5.81 Commissioner of Police v Justin (1991) 55 SASR 547 …. 5.181, 5.183 Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Guo (2016) 69 AAR 74; [2016] FCAFC 62 …. 2.2, 5.220 — v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2007) 70 NSWLR 643; [2007] NSWCCA 366 …. 5.254 Commissioner of Taxation v Coombes (1999) 92 FCR 240 …. 5.60 — v Rio Tinto Ltd (2006) 151 FCR 341; [2006] FCAFC 86 …. 5.57 Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Hatfield (1992) 34 FCR 190 …. 5.188 Commissioner of the Police Service v NIRTA [2002] 1 Qd R 364 …. 5.65 Commonwealth v CFMEU (2000) 98 FCR 31 …. 5.236, 5.239 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Cooke [2000] 1 Qd R 7 …. 5.46, 5.49 Commonwealth Freighters Pty Ltd v Sneddon (1959) 102 CLR 280 …. 6.72 — v Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46 …. 2.69 Commonwealth v Northern Land Council (1991) 30 FCR 1 …. 5.242, 5.247, 5.254 — v — (1993) 176 CLR 604 …. 5.220, 5.228, 5.235, 5.240, 5.247, 5.251, 5.254

— v Vance (2005) 158 ACTR 47; 224 FLR 243; [2005] ACTCA 35 …. 5.26, 5.199 — v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1 …. 7.64 Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing & Allied Services Union of Australia v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2007) 162 FCR 466 …. 2.64 Compagnie Financiere du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Co (1883) 11 QBD 55 …. 5.7, 5.242 Compaq Computer Australia Pty Ltd v Howard Merry (1998) 157 ALR 1 …. 6.39, 6.40 Compass Airlines Pty Ltd, Re (1992) 35 FCR 447 …. 5.71, 5.75 Complete Technology Pty Ltd v Toshiba (Australia) Pty Ltd (1994) 124 ALR 493 …. 5.53 Comptroller of Customs v Western Electric Co Ltd [1966] AC 367 …. 8.57, 8.103 Comptroller-General of Customs v Disciplinary Appeal Committee (1992) 35 FCR 466 …. 5.145, 5.183 Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd v Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees’ Union (No 2) (1987) 15 FCR 64 …. 8.43 Condo v R (1992) 62 A Crim R 11 …. 2.72 Connelly v DPP [1964] AC 1254 …. 2.47 Connor v Blacktown District Hospital [1971] 1 NSWLR 713 …. 3.161 Considine v Lemmer [1971] SASR 39 …. 6.3, 6.22 Constable v Constable [1964] SASR 68 …. 5.104 Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 25 …. 8.57 — v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 37; [2015] HCA 21 …. 5.154, 5.156 Controlled Consultants Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs [1984] VR 137 …. 5.150 — v — (1985) 156 CLR 385 …. 5.145, 5.146, 5.150, 5.152, 5.156, 5.180,

5.181, 5.183 Conway v R (2000) 98 FCR 204 …. 3.54, 3.56, 3.57, 3.62, 4.23, 8.66, 8.82, 8.197 — v — (2002) 209 CLR 203 …. 2.14, 4.20, 4.41, 4.42, 4.80, 4.102, 4.103, 4.104 — v Rimmer [1968] AC 910 …. 5.228, 5.229, 5.230, 5.252 Conwell v Tapfield [1981] 1 NSWLR 595 …. 7.7, 7.16, 7.24 Cook v Pasminco (No 2) (2000) 107 FCR 44 …. 5.60 — v R (1998) 126 NTR 17 …. 2.23 — v — (2000) 22 WAR 67 …. 2.42 Coonawarra Penola Wine Industry Association Inc and Geographical Indications Committee [2001] AATA 844 …. 7.64 Cooper, Re (1876) 2 VLR (I) 82 …. 7.11 Cooper v Bech (No 1) (1975) 12 SASR 147 …. 5.10 — v — (No 2) (1975) 12 SASR 151 …. 7.49 — v R (1961) 105 CLR 177 …. 3.67 — v Slade (1858) 6 HLC 746; 10 ER 1488 …. 2.58 — v van Heeren [2007] 3 NZLR 783 …. 5.89 Copland v Bourke [1963] P & NGLR 45 …. 5.75 Copper Industries Pty Ltd v Hill (1975) 12 SASR 292 …. 6.38, 6.39 Corbett v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 97 …. 4.83, 4.88 Corke v Corke and Cook [1958] P 93 …. 7.88 Cornelius v R (1936) 55 CLR 235 …. 8.126 Cornwall v Richardson (1825) Ry & Mood 305; 171 ER 1029 …. 3.154 Cornwell v R (2007) 231 CLR 260; [2007] HCA 12 …. 3.83, 3.87, 5.180 Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319 …. 5.22, 5.72, 5.73, 5.75 Cory v Bretton (1830) 4 Car & P 462; 172 ER 783 …. 5.94 Coshott v Burke [2013] FCA 513 …. 5.98

Costello v Random House Pty Ltd (1999) 137 ACTR 1 …. 7.65 Cotic v R [2000] WASCA 414 …. 2.85, 4.88 Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Archer (2008) 72 NSWLR 236; [2008] NSWCA 164 …. 5.57 — v Franklin [2014] NSWCA 329 …. 8.196 — v Power (2008) 71 NSWLR 451; [2008] NSWCA 135 …. 5.123 Cowan v Bunnings Group Ltd [2014] QSC 301 …. 1.38, 1.42, 2.63 Coward v Motor Insurer’s Bureau [1963] 1 QB 259 …. 8.76 Cox v New South Wales (2007) 71 NSWLR 225; [2007] NSWSC 471 …. 7.28, 8.66 — v R [2002] WASCA 358 …. 8.133, 8.153 — v — [2015] VSCA 28 …. 3.61 — v Salt (1994) 12 WAR 12 …. 6.32, 6.33 Crabbe v R (1984) 11 FCR 1 …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.136 Craig v R (1933) 49 CLR 429 …. 4.58 Crampton v R (2000) 206 CLR 161 …. 2.49, 4.41, 4.46, 4.47, 4.48 Crawford Earthmovers v Fitzsimmons (1972) 4 SASR 116 …. 6.22, 8.93 Crease v Barrett (1835) 1 Cr M & R 919; 149 ER 1353 …. 8.84 Credland v Knowler (1951) 35 Cr App R 48 …. 4.87 Cremer v SA Police (1994) 61 SASR 594 …. 4.33 Crescent Farm (Sidcup) Sports Ltd v Sterling Offices Ltd [1972] Ch 553 …. 5.26, 5.29, 5.49 Criminal Justice Commission v Connolly (1997) 91 A Crim R 323 …. 5.34 — v Parliamentary Civil Justice Commissioner (2001) 124 A Crim R 1 …. 5.198 Crisafio v R (2003) 27 WAR 169; [2003] WASCA 104 …. 4.48, 4.49 Crnisanin v Logan (1972) 4 SASR 340 …. 7.79 Crocker v R (2013) 39 VR 668; [2013] VSCA 318 …. 2.14 Crofts v R (1996) 186 CLR 427; 139 ALR 455 …. 3.72, 4.46, 7.107 Crosthwaite v City of Elizabeth (1989) 51 SASR 105 …. 7.130

— v Loader (1995) 77 A Crim R 348 …. 6.23 Crowley v Willis (1992) 110 FLR 194 …. 3.130 Crown Glass & Aluminium Pty Ltd v Ibrahim [2005] NSWCA 195 …. 6.66 CSR Ltd v Maddalena (2006) 224 ALR 1; [2006] HCA 1 …. 2.14 Cubillo v Commonwealth (2000) 174 ALR 97 …. 2.65, 6.45 Culley v Silhouette Health Studios Pty Ltd (1966) 2 NSWR 640 …. 3.161 Cullis v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd [1970] WAR 170 …. 8.174 Cumberland v R [2006] NSWCCA 377 …. 4.61 Curlex Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Carlingford Australia General Insurance Ltd [1987] 2 Qd R 335 …. 5.51 Currie v Dempsey [1967] 2 NSWR 532 …. 6.12 Curtis v R [1972] Tas SR 21 …. 7.9 Cutts v Head [1984] Ch 290 …. 5.89, 5.98 CV v DPP [2014] VSCA 58 …. 3.61, 3.70 Cvetkovic v R [2010] NSWCCA 329 …. 8.200 CW v R [2010] VSCA 288 …. 3.58, 3.61

D D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171 …. 5.66, 5.205, 5.221, 5.224, 5.238, 5.254 D (Infants), Re [1970] 1 WLR 599 …. 5.104 D (Minors), Re [1993] 2 WLR 721 …. 5.104 Daintry, Re; Ex parte Holt [1893] 2 QB 116 …. 5.89 Dair v Western Australia (2008) 36 WAR 413; [2008] WASCA 72 …. 3.25, 3.63 Dairy Farmers Co-operative Milk Co Ltd v Acquilina (1963) 109 CLR 458 …. 7.81 Dalleagles Pty Ltd v Australian Securities Commission (1991) 4 WAR 325 …. 5.22, 5.27, 5.33, 5.47 Dallison v Caffery [1965] 1 QB 348 …. 5.15 Daniel v Western Australia (1999) 94 FCR 537; [1999] FCA 1541 …. 5.225

— v — (2000) 173 ALR 51 …. 8.199 — v — (2000) 178 ALR 542 …. 7.73 — v — (2001) 186 ALR 369 …. 8.112 Daniels v Western Australia [2000] FCA 1334 …. 7.54 — v — (2012) 226 A Crim R 61; [2012] WASCA 213 …. 3.63 Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543 …. 5.22, 5.23, 5.30, 5.71, 5.73, 5.74, 5.154, 5.160, 5.183 DAO v R (2011) 81 NSWLR 568; [2011] NSWCCA 63 …. 2.15, 3.12, 3.59 Darby v Ousley (1856) 1 Hurl & Nor 1; 156 ER 1093 …. 7.153 Darkan v R (2006) 227 CLR 373 …. 2.72 Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; 85 ALJR 694; [2011] HCA 21 …. 7.54, 7.55, 7.66 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc 43 F 3d 1311 (1995) …. 7.52, 7.53, 7.54 — v — 509 US 579; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993) …. 7.46, 7.50, 7.52, 7.53, 7.54 David Symes & Co Ltd v Mather [1977] VR 516 …. 2.29, 3.158 Davidovic v R (1990) 51 A Crim R 197 …. 8.115, 8.117, 8.118, 8.120 Davidson v R [2009] NSWCCA 150 …. 2.85, 2.89 Davie v The Lord Provost, Magistrates and Councillors of the City of Edinburgh (1953) SC 34 …. 7.54, 7.66 Davies and Cody v R (1937) 57 CLR 170 …. 4.3, 4.54, 4.59, 4.64, 4.66, 7.94 Davies and Davies v Nyland and O’Neil (1974) 10 SASR 76 …. 5.89, 5.95, 5.99, 5.101, 8.98 Davies v DPP [1954] AC 378 …. 4.5, 4.17, 4.19, 4.24, 4.25, 4.26, 4.27, 4.28, 4.30, 4.100 — v Taylor [1974] AC 207 …. 2.60 Davy, Re [1935] P 1 …. 8.85 Daw v Toyworld (NSW) Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 25 …. 7.8, 7.69 Dawson v R (1961) 106 CLR 1 …. 2.72, 3.111

— v R (1990) 2 WAR 458 …. 4.64, 4.65, 4.74 Day v Dyson [1965] VR 165 …. 8.107 — v Perisher Blue Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 110 …. 3.49, 7.79 Dayman v Simpson [1935] SASR 320 …. 7.129, 7.131 De B v De B [1950] VLR 242 …. 7.103 De Gioia v Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd (1941) 42 SR (NSW) 1 …. 6.43 De Jesus v R (1986) 68 ALR 1 …. 3.71 De Rosa v Western Australia (2006) 32 WAR 136 …. 2.71 De Rose v South Australia [2002] FCA 1342 …. 8.84 De Silva v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 236 A Crim R 214; [2013] VSCA 339 …. 7.112 Dean v R (1995) 65 SASR 234 …. 2.73, 6.33 Decker v State Coroner (NSW) (1999) 46 NSWLR 415 …. 2.2 Demirok v R (1977) 137 CLR 20 …. 2.41, 2.42, 7.30 Dennis v AJ White & Co [1916] 2 KB 1 …. 6.75 Denovan’s Application, Re [1957] VR 333 …. 5.185 Denver v Cosgrove (1972) 3 SASR 130 …. 6.60 Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Law Institute of Victoria (2010) 27 VR 51; [2010] VSCA 73 …. 5.221 Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v McCauley (1996) 22 Fam LR 538 …. 2.2 — (Cth) v Robinswood Pty Ltd (2001) 24 WAR 284 …. 8.61 Derbas v R (2012) 221 A Crim R 13; [2012] NSWCCA 14 …. 5.205 — v — [2007] NSWCCA 118 …. 4.10 Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No 8) [1991] 1 WLR 73 …. 5.54 — v — (No 10) [1991] 1 WLR 660 …. 5.51 Derbyshire v Gilbert (2006) 31 WAR 558; [2006] WASCA 13 …. 5.5 Destanovic and Tangaloa v R [2015] VSCA 113 …. 3.78 Devala Provident Gold Mining Co, Re (1883) 22 Ch D 593 …. 8.113

DF Lyons Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1991) 100 ALR 468 …. 3.156 Dhanhoa v R (2003) 217 CLR 1; 199 ALR 547; [2003] HCA 40 …. 4.61, 4.88 Di Lena v Western Australia (2006) 165 A Crim R 482; [2006] WASCA 162 …. 3.63 Dibbs v R (2012) 225 A Crim R 195; [2012] VSCA 224 …. 3.12 Dickman v R [2015] VSCA 311 …. 2.37, 4.65, 4.67 Diehm v Director of Public Prosecutions (Nauru) (2013) 303 ALR 42; [2013] HCA 42 …. 6.52 Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292 …. 2.29, 7.35 Dillon v R [1982] AC 484 …. 6.28 Dimkovski v Ken’s Painting and Decorating Services Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 50 …. 5.28 Dingle v Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia (1989) 23 FCR 63 …. 5.23, 5.46 Director General Department of Community Services v D (2006) 66 NSWLR 582; [2006] NSWSC 827 …. 5.214 Director General, Department of Community Services; Sophie, Re [2008] NSWSC 1268 …. 5.69 Director of Public Prosecutions v A and BC Chewing Gum Ltd [1968] 1 QB 159 …. 7.58, 7.60 — v Bass [2016] VSCA 110 …. 4.57 — v Blake [1989] 1 WLR 432 …. 8.153 — v Boardman [1975] AC 421 …. 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 3.15, 3.18, 3.20, 3.21, 3.22, 3.24, 3.25, 3.26, 3.30, 3.39, 3.42, 3.44, 3.58, 3.64, 3.67, 3.70, 3.73, 4.97 — v Butay (2001) 124 A Crim R 41 …. 5.143 — v Carr [2002] NSWSC 194 …. 2.37, 5.261, 5.263 — v Ciantar [2006] VSCA 263 …. 2.88 — v Cole (1994) 100 NTR 1 …. 6.2, 6.16, 6.21, 6.22 — v Cook [2006] TASSC 75 …. 4.33

— v DJC (2012) 36 VR 33; [2012] VSCA 132 …. 2.15, 2.26, 4.67 — v Donnelly & Reed [2006] VSC 423 …. 8.168 — v Farr (2001) 118 A Crim R 399; [2001] NSWSC 3 …. 2.27, 2.36, 2.37 — v Faure [1993] 2 VR 497 …. 4.77 — v Finnegan [2011] TASCCA 3 …. 2.26 — v Galloway [2014] VSCA 272 …. 2.15, 5.19, 5.70 — v Garrett (a pseudonym) [2016] VSCA 31 …. 7.122, 7.123 — v Hester [1973] AC 296 …. 4.4, 4.16, 4.19, 4.38, 4.81, 4.97, 4.102, 4.103 — v JG (2010) 220 A Crim R 19; [2010] NSWCCA 222 …. 1.1, 7.110, 7.111, 7.112 — v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 …. 2.25, 3.9, 4.16, 4.19, 4.97, 4.100, 4.103 — v Lawson (2012) 226 A Crim R 138; [2012] VSC 526 …. 6.33 — v Leonard (2001) 53 NSWLR 227 …. 8.100 — v Lynch (2006) 16 Tas R 49; 166 A Crim R 327; [2006] TASSC 89 …. 2.14, 2.31, 4.69 — v Marijancevic (2011) 33 VR 440; [2011] VSCA 355 …. 2.26, 2.37 — v Martin (a Pseudonym) [2016] VSCA 219 …. 2.15, 3.56 — v MD (2010) 29 VR 434; [2010] VSCA 233 …. 2.37 — v Moore (2003) 6 VR 430 …. 2.37, 5.264 — v Morgan [1976] AC 182 …. 3.142, 3.143, 6.6, 6.9 — v Nicholls [2001] NSWSC 523 …. 7.98 — v P [1991] 2 AC 447 …. 3.20, 3.44 — v Ping Lin [1976] AC 574 …. 8.129 — v Riley (2007) 16 VR 519 …. 2.37, 5.264 — v Smiles (1993) 30 NSWLR 248 …. 5.200 — v Smith [1961] AC 290 …. 6.25 — v Stonehouse [1978] AC 55 …. 2.12 — v Tamcelik (2012) 224 A Crim R 350 …. 2.27

— v Toomalatai (2006) 13 VR 319 …. 8.131 — v United Telecasters of Sydney Ltd (1990) 168 CLR 594 …. 6.18 — v Walsh [1990] WAR 25 …. 5.97 — (NSW) v Alderman (1998) 45 NSWLR 526 …. 8.155 — v Gramelis [2010] NSWSC 787 …. 6.66 — v Wililo (2012) 222 A Crim R 106; [2012] NSWSC 713 …. 6.54 Director of Public Prosecutions Reference under s 693A of the Criminal Code: Y, Re (1998) 100 A Crim R 166 …. 2.11 Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas) v Cook (2006) 166 A Crim R 234 …. 8.100, 8.168 Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v BB; DPP v QN (2010) 29 VR 110; [2010] VSCA 211 …. 8.53, 8.197 — (Vic) v McEwan (No 2) (2012) 221 A Crim R 421; [2012] VSC 170 …. 7.149 — (Vic) v Debono (2012) 225 A Crim R 585; [2012] VSC 476 …. 5.242, 5.243 Director, Office of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2013] FCAFC 8 …. 7.144 Distillers Co v Times Newspapers [1975] QB 613 …. 5.53, 5.85 District Council of Mallala v Livestock Markets Ltd (2006) 94 SASR 258; [2006] SASC 80 …. 5.78, 5.105 District Council of Prospect, Re a by-law made by the; Ex parte Hill [1926] SASR 326 …. 6.75 Divall v Mifsud [2005] NSWCA 447 …. 5.54 Dixon v McCarthy [1975] 1 NSWLR 617 …. 2.45 Dixon’s Stores Group Ltd v Thames Television plc [1993] 1 All ER 349 …. 5.94 DJS v R [2014] NSWCCA 77 …. 3.71 DJV v R [2008] NSWCCA 272 …. 2.87 DKA v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 44 …. 3.12, 3.63 Dobler v Halverson [2007] NSWCA 335 …. 7.38 Dobson v Morris (1986) 4 NSWLR 681 …. 8.43, 8.47

Dodd v Western Australia (2014) 238 A Crim R 72; [2014] WASC 13 …. 4.87 Dodds v R [2009] NSWCCA 78 …. 7.54, 7.56, 7.79, 7.80 Doe v R [2008] NSWCCA 203 …. 2.71 Doe d Gilbert v Ross (1840) 7 M & W 102; 151 ER 696 …. 7.18 Doe d Mudd v Suckermore (1836) 5 Ad & E 703; 111 ER 1331 …. 7.10, 7.40 Doe d Thompson v Hodgson (1840) 113 ER 762 …. 7.18 Doggett v R (2001) 208 CLR 343 …. 4.5, 4.41, 4.47, 4.48, 4.49, 4.100 Dolan v Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corp (1993) 42 FCR 206 …. 5.168 Dolling-Baker v Merrett [1990] 1 WLR 1205 …. 5.7, 5.242 Domican v R (1992) 173 CLR 555 …. 4.54, 4.56, 4.57, 4.59, 4.60, 4.63, 4.71, 4.72, 4.73, 4.78, 4.79, 4.102, 4.103 Dominguez v R (1985) 63 ALR 181 …. 2.82 Donaldson v Harris and Hamood (1973) 4 SASR 299 …. 5.84 — v Western Australia (2005) 31 WAR 122; [2005] WASCA 196 …. 3.63, 3.70, 3.71 — v — (2007) 176 A Crim R 488; [2007] WASCA 216 …. 3.129, 3.136 Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207 …. 2.50, 2.55, 3.52, 4.19, 4.85, 4.86, 4.95, 6.31, 6.33 Donnini v R (1972) 128 CLR 114 …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.137 Donoghue v Terry [1939] VLR 165 …. 6.18, 6.20, 6.43 Doran Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq), Re (2002) 168 FLR 116; [2002] NSWSC 215 …. 2.2, 5.57 Douglass v R [2012] HCA 34 …. 2.71 Dover v Doyle (2012) 34 VR 295; [2012] VSC 117 …. 6.25 Dowe v R [2009] NSWCCA 23 …. 2.37, 4.53 Dowling v Bowie (1952) 86 CLR 136 …. 6.8, 6.14, 6.16, 6.18, 6.19 Downs Irrigation Co-op Association Ltd v National Bank of Australasia Ltd [1983] 1 Qd R 130 …. 2.8, 2.9

Doyle v R [2014] NSWCCA 4 …. 6.57, 7.83 DRE v R (2006) 164 A Crim R 400 …. 4.49 Driscoll v R (1977) 137 CLR 517 …. 2.29, 2.30, 2.32, 7.9, 7.119, 7.151, 8.167 DS v R (2012) 221 A Crim R 235; [2012] NSWCCA 159 …. 2.71 DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Intertan Inc (2003) 127 FCR 499 …. 5.50, 5.57 DSJ v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth); NS v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (2012) 215 A Crim R 349; [2012] NSWCCA 9 …. 3.60, 3.61, 3.70 DTS v R [2008] NSWCCA 329 …. 2.71, 2.87, 4.44 Dubai Bank Ltd v Galadari [1990] Ch 98 …. 5.43, 5.48 — v — (No 7) [1992] 1 WLR 106 …. 5.43, 5.48 Dublin, Wicklow and Wexford Railway Co v Slattery (1878) 3 App Cas 1155 …. 2.50 Duchess of Kingston’s Trial (1776) 20 How St Tr 355 …. 5.205 Duff v R (1979) 39 FLR 315 …. 3.140 Duff Development Co v Kelantan [1924] AC 797 …. 6.60 Duke v Duke (1975) 12 SASR 106 …. 7.10, 7.40 — v R (1989) 180 CLR 508; 83 ALR 650 …. 4.31, 8.140 Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Pilmer (1994) 63 SASR 364 …. 2.29, 2.36, 3.158, 8.92 — v Young (No 1) (1990) 54 SASR 498 …. 8.174, 8.185 — v — (No 3) (1990) 55 SASR 11 …. 8.184 Duke of Buccleugh v Metropolitan Board of Works (1872) LR 5 HL 418 …. 5.184 Duke of Wellington, Re [1947] Ch 506 …. 6.70 Dumoo v Garner (1997) 7 NTLR 129; (1998) 143 FLR 245 …. 8.133, 8.142, 8.152, 8.153 Duncan, dec’d, Re [1968] P 306 …. 5.22 Duncan v Cammell Laird & Co Ltd [1942] AC 624 …. 5.216, 5.218, 5.220, 5.223, 5.229, 5.247

Dunesky v Elder (1992) 35 FCR 429 …. 5.26 Dunks v R [2014] NSWCCA 134 …. 7.93 Dunsmore v Elliott (1981) 26 SASR 496 …. 7.24 Dunstall v R …. 5.264 Dunstan v Orr [2008] FCA 31 …. 5.69 Dupas v R (2012) 40 VR 182; 218 A Crim R 507; [2012] VSCA 328 …. 2.19, 2.28, 2.30, 2.31, 3.90, 4.3, 4.23, 4.65, 4.67, 7.43, 7.58, 7.112, 7.135, 7.136 Dupont v Chief Commissioner of Police (2015) 295 FLR 283; [2015] FamCAFC 64 …. 5.19 Dura (Australia) Constructions Pty Ltd v Hue Boutique Living Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 99 …. 7.54 Durani v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 172 …. 2.24 Durham v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 121 …. 5.139 Durston v Mercuri [1969] VR 507 …. 7.17 DW v R (2014) 239 A Crim R 192; [2014] NSWCCA 28 …. 8.155 Dwyer v Collins (1852) 155 ER 1104 …. 7.18 Dyer v Best (1866) LR 1 Exch 152; 4 H & C 189 …. 7.79 Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285; 192 ALR 181; [2002] HCA 45 …. 2.12, 2.50, 4.46, 4.47, 4.48, 5.15, 5.118, 5.120, 5.124, 5.132, 5.133, 6.43, 6.46, 6.56, 7.131 Dyett v Jorgensen [1995] 2 Qd R 1 …. 2.9 Dyson v Pharmacy Board of NSW (2000) 50 NSWLR 523 …. 7.65

E E, In the Marriage of (1978) 31 FLR 171 …. 7.103 E, Re (1976) 1 SASR 179 …. 2.69 E v Australian Red Cross (1991) 31 FCR 299 …. 7.58 Eade v R (1924) 34 CLR 154 …. 4.84, 4.87, 7.101 Eagles v Orth [1976] Qd R 313 …. 7.49, 7.71

Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 …. 2.43, 3.33, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109, 3.130, 3.132, 3.133, 3.137, 4.54, 4.56, 7.19, 7.56 — v R (2000) 203 CLR 1 …. 2.49 Ebber v Isager [1995] 1 Qd R 150 …. 5.187 Edmeades v Thames Board Mills [1969] 2 QB 67 …. 5.8 Edwards v Brookes (Milk) Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 795 …. 8.114 — v R (1993) 178 CLR 193 …. 2.85, 2.88, 4.12, 4.83, 4.85, 4.86, 4.87, 4.88, 4.93, 5.138 Edwards and Osakwe v DPP [1992] Crim LR 576 …. 8.69, 8.88 Egan v Bott [1985] VR 787 …. 2.44 — v Chadwick (1999) 46 NSWLR 563 …. 5.68, 5.218 Egart v Deal [1994] 2 Qd R 117 …. 4.12, 4.33 Eichsteadt v Lahrs [1961] Qd R 457 …. 3.161 El Bayeh v R (2011) 31 VR 305; [2011] VSCA 44 …. 2.29 Elbourne v Troon Pty Ltd [1978] VR 171 …. 5.211 Electricity Trust of SA v Mitsubishi (1991) 57 SASR 48 …. 5.34 El-Haddad v R (2015) 88 NSWLR 93; [2015] NSWCCA 10 …. 3.54, 3.61, 3.68 Elias v R [2006] NSWCCA 365 …. 3.141 Ella v R (1991) 103 FLR 8 …. 2.49 Elliott v Tippett (2008) 20 VR 195; [2008] VSC 175 …. 5.211 Ellis v Deheer [1922] 2 KB 113 …. 5.185 — v Home Office [1953] 2 QB 135 …. 5.229 — v R (2010) 30 VR 428; [2010] VSCA 302 …. 4.88, 5.138 Elomar v R (2014) 300 FLR 323; [2014] NSWCCA 303 …. 3.56, 3.75, 8.116, 8.118 El-Zayet v R (2014) 88 NSWLR 556; [2014] NSWCCA 298 …. 5.58 Em v R (2007) 232 CLR 67; [2007] HCA 46 …. 2.33, 2.34, 2.35, 2.36, 2.37, 4.33, 5.259, 8.127, 8.133, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.155

Employment Advocate v Williamson (2001) 111 FCR 20 …. 2.37, 2.64 Enoch and Zaretzky, Re; Bock and Co’s Arbitration [1910] 1 KB 327 …. 6.48, 6.50 Environmental Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477 …. 5.108, 5.150, 5.153, 5.154, 5.157, 5.160, 5.162 EPA v Unomedical Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWLEC 111 …. 7.23 Epiabaka v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 150 ALR 397 …. 2.2 ER v Khan [2015] NSWCCA 230 …. 5.212, 5.213 Eric Preston Pty Ltd v Euroz Securities Ltd (2009) 175 FCR 508; [2009] FCA 240 …. 5.52, 5.58 ES v R [2010] NSWCCA 197 …. 3.56 Eschenko v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2005] FCA 1772 …. 7.19 Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; 168 ALR 123; [1999] HCA 67 …. 5.19, 5.22, 5.23, 5.24, 5.33, 5.35, 5.36, 5.41, 5.47, 5.49, 5.83, 5.206, 5.208 — v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10 …. 5.85 Etherton v Western Australia (2005) 30 WAR 65; [2005] WASCA 83 …. 2.71 Evans v Chief Constable of Surrey [1988] QB 588 …. 5.231, 5.249 — v F [1964] SASR 130 …. 3.67 — v John Fairfax and Sons Ltd (1992) 110 FLR 411 …. 5.7 — v R (2007) 235 CLR 521; [2007] HCA 59 …. 2.14, 2.23, 4.9, 4.57, 4.69, 7.23, 7.41 Everard v Opperman [1958] VR 389 …. 6.16, 6.18, 6.19, 6.21 Evgeniou v R (1964) 37 ALJR 508 …. 6.34, 6.35 Ewart v Royds (1954) 72 WN (NSW) 58 …. 7.18 Ewin v Vergara (No 2) (2012) 209 FCR 288; [2012] FCA 1518 …. 5.177 Executive Director of Health v Lily Creek International Pty Ltd (2000) 22 WAR 510 …. 7.61

Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 303; [2013] HCA 46 …. 5.54, 5.58, 5.65

F Fagan, Re; Ex parte Hamilton [1966] 2 NSWR 732 …. 2.45 Fair Work Ombudsman v Valuair Ltd (2014) 314 ALR 499; [2014] FCA 404 …. 8.108 Fairmount Investments and Southwark London Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1976] 1 WLR 1255 …. 1.1 Fallon v Calvert [1960] 2 QB 201 …. 6.53 Familic v R (1994) 75 A Crim R 229 …. 2.85, 2.87, 2.89, 3.66, 4.32 Fang v R [2010] NSWCCA 254 …. 6.3 Farey v Burvett (1916) 21 CLR 433 …. 6.72 Farkas v R [2014] NSWCCA 141 …. 2.4 Farnaby and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission, Re [2007] AATA 1792 …. 5.23 Farquharson v R [2012] VSCA 296 …. 7.49 Farrell v R (1998) 194 CLR 286 …. 7.43, 7.44, 7.58, 7.112 Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Webb (1996) 39 NSWLR 601 …. 5.49 Fattal v R [2006] NSWCCA 359 …. 8.119 FB v R [2011] NSWCCA 217 …. 6.58, 7.124 FDP v R [2008] NSWCCA 317 …. 2.27, 2.46, 2.87, 3.33 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Citibank (1989) 20 FCR 403 …. 5.22, 5.49, 5.81 — v Pratt Holdings (2003) 195 ALR 717 …. 5.23, 5.37, 5.41, 5.52 Feiler v McIntyre [1974] 2 NSWLR 268 …. 8.96 Ferris v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 54 …. 3.63 Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593; [2001] HCA 72 …. 2.29, 3.25, 3.57, 4.56, 4.57,

4.58, 4.61, 4.62, 4.63, 4.67, 7.94 Feuerheerd v London General Omnibus Co Ltd [1918] 2 KB 565 …. 5.26 FGC v Western Australia (2008) 183 A Crim R 313; [2008] WASCA 47 …. 4.38, 4.43, 4.46, 4.49 FH v McDougall [2008] SCC 53 …. 2.65 Field v Commissioner for Railways for New South Wales (1957) 99 CLR 285 …. 5.89, 5.93, 5.95, 5.102 — v Gent (1996) 67 SASR 122 …. 4.14 Filipowski v Nikolaus (2004) 136 LGERA 157; [2004] NSWLEC 432 …. 5.68 Filippou v R (2015) 256 CLR 47; [2015] HCA 29 …. 2.4, 2.7, 4.12 Finance and Guarantee Co Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1970) 44 ALJR 368 …. 8.113 Fingleton v Lowen (1979) 20 SASR 312 …. 8.22 — v R (2005) 227 CLR 166; [2005] HCA 3 …. 2.49 Finn v Lemmer (1991) 55 SASR 455 …. 5.187 Fitzgerald v R (1992) 106 FLR 331 …. 2.49 — v — (2014) 88 ALJR 779; [2014] HCA 28 …. 1.44, 2.70, 2.90 Fitz-Gibbon v Wily [1998] FCA 1193 …. 8.192 FJL v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 8 …. 4.49 Flavel v South Australia (2008) 102 SASR 404 …. 7.66 Fleming v R [2009] NSWCCA 233 …. 4.48, 4.54 Fletcher Timber Ltd v Attorney-General [1984] 1 NZLR 290 …. 5.242, 5.244, 5.251 Flinders Medical Centre v Waller (2005) 91 SASR 378 …. 7.74 Flora v R (2013) 233 A Crim R 320; [2013] VSCA 192 …. 4.93 Flower and Hart v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1999) 163 ALR 744 …. 7.130 Flowers v R (2005) 189 FLR 423; [2005] NTCCA 5 …. 8.108 FMJ v R [2011] VSCA 308 …. 8.130

Folbigg v R [2007] NSWCCA 371 …. 5.185 Foletta v Merri Creek Quarry Pty Ltd [1951] VLR 149 …. 8.93 Folkes v Chadd (1782) 3 Dougl 157; 99 ER 589 …. 2.22, 7.43 Foo v R (2001) 161 FLR 279 …. 8.155 — v — (2001) 167 FLR 423 …. 4.20, 4.102 Forbes v Samuel [1913] 3 KB 706 …. 7.17 Foreign Media v Konstantinidis [2003] NSWCA 161 …. 7.19 Forrest v Normandale (1973) 5 SASR 524 …. 5.139 Fort Dodge Australia Pty Ltd v Nature Vet Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 501 …. 5.59 Fortson v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2008) 100 SASR 162 …. 7.64 Foster v R (1993) 113 ALR 1 …. 2.32, 8.138, 8.139, 8.140, 8.143, 8.156 Fox v General Medical Council [1960] 1 WLR 1017 …. 7.92 — v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 …. 2.14 — v Star Newspapers [1900] AC 19 …. 6.37 Framlingham Aboriginal Trust v McGuiness and Chatfield [2014] VSC 241 …. 8.200 Fraser Henleins Pty Ltd v Cody (1944) 70 CLR 100 …. 8.112 Freeman v Griffiths (1976) 13 SASR 494 …. 6.62, 6.69 French v Scarman (1979) 20 SASR 333 …. 5.264 Frijaf v R [1982] WAR 128 …. 8.163 Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir, 1923) …. 7.46, 7.50, 7.51, 7.52, 7.53, 7.136 Furnell v Betts (1978) 20 SASR 300 …. 6.3

G G v H (1994) 181 CLR 387; 68 ALJR 860 …. 2.58, 2.60 Gabriel v R (1997) 76 FCR 279 …. 3.72, 3.104, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132, 3.134, 3.135 Gaetani v Trustees of the Christian Bros (1988) Aust Torts Rep ¶80-156 …. 2.69

Gaggin v Moss [1984] 2 Qd R 513 …. 8.93 Gaio v R (1960) 104 CLR 419 …. 8.52, 8.53 Galafassi v Kelly (2014) 87 NSWLR 119; [2014] NSWCA 190 …. 5.90 Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSWLR 263 …. 6.58 Gallagher v Cendak [1988] VR 731 …. 6.22 Gallagher v R [2015] NSWCCA 228 …. 2.37 Gallant v R [2006] NSWCCA 339 …. 3.107, 3.134, 3.136, 3.138 Galler v Galler [1954] P 252 …. 4.75 Galvin v R [2006] NSWCCA 66 …. 4.20 Gambro Pty Ltd v Fresenius Medical Care Australia Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1828 …. 7.54 Ganin v NSW Crimes Commission (1993) 70 A Crim R 417 …. 5.182 Garcin v Amerindo Investment Advisers Ltd [1991] 4 All ER 655 …. 7.3 Gardiner v R (2006) 162 A Crim R 233; [2006] NSWCCA 190 …. 3.68, 4.61, 4.63 Gardner v Duve (1978) 19 ALR 695 …. 8.108 Gardner, Re (1967) 13 FLR 345 …. 8.30 Garratt’s Ltd v Thangathurai [2002] NSWSC 39 …. 5.59 Garrett v Nicholson (1999) 21 WAR 226 …. 2.84, 7.131 Garrett v R (1977) 139 CLR 437 …. 5.190 Garven v Quilty (1988) 148 FLR 273 …. 6.56 Gas Corporation v Phasetwo Nominees Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 773 …. 7.56, 8.49 Gately v R (2007) 232 CLR 208; [2007] HCA 55 …. 2.14, 7.21, 7.34 Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1982) 43 ALR 313 …. 3.156 Gatland v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1968] 2 QB 279 …. 6.16 Gattelaro v Westpac Banking Corp (2004) 204 ALR 258; [2004] HCA 6 …. 6.65 GBT v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 19 …. 4.46, 4.49 Gedeon v R (2013) 280 FLR 275; [2013] NSWCCA 257 …. 2.37

GEH v R (2012) 228 A Crim R 32; [2012] NSWCCA 150 …. 3.150 General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp Ltd v Tanter [1984] 1 WLR 100 …. 5.51 General Electric v Joiner 522 US 136 (1997) …. 7.52 George Doland Ltd v Blackburn Robson Coates & Co (a firm) [1972] 1 WLR 1338 …. 5.51 Gerard and Co Pty Ltd, Ex parte (1944) 44 SR NSW 370 …. 8.112 Ghebrat v R [2011] VSCA 299 …. 8.194 Giallombardo v R [2014] NSWCCA 25 …. 4.44 Gibson v R [2001] TASSC 59 …. 1.22, 2.87, 7.43 Gilbert v R (2000) 201 CLR 414; [2000] HCA 15 …. 2.13 Gilham v R (2007) 73 NSWLR 308; [2007] NSWCCA 323 …. 5.190 Gilham v R (2012) 224 A Crim R 22; [2012] NSWCCA 131 …. 5.190, 6.52, 6.55, 7.51, 7.65 Gill v R [1999] WASCA 68 …. 2.71 Gillespie v Steer (1973) 6 SASR 200 …. 7.82 Gillett v Murphy [2001] NSWCA 199 …. 7.23 Gillies v Downer EDI Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1323 …. 5.58, 5.59 Gilligan v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1990) 101 FLR 139 …. 5.216, 5.223, 5.244, 5.252 Gilmore v EPA; Tableland Topdressing v EPA [2002] NSWCCA 399 …. 2.27 Gilson v R (1991) 172 CLR 353 …. 2.58 Gipp …. 4.43 Gipp v R (1998) 194 CLR 104 …. 3.34, 3.36 Gipp v R (1998) 194 CLR 106 …. 2.87, 3.21, 3.66, 3.73 Gittany v R [2016] NSWCCA 182 …. 7.43, 7.58, 7.112, 7.136 Glass v Tasmania (2013) 22 Tas R 466 …. 3.73 Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd v Arthur Andersen [2002] 1 Qd R 233; [2001] QCA 115 …. 5.26

Glennon v R (1994) 179 CLR 1 …. 2.14, 2.29, 5.141 Global Funds Management (NSW) Ltd v Rooney (1994) 36 NSWLR 122 …. 5.26 GO v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 132 …. 7.31 Gobby v CWA (1991) 7 SR (WA) 203 …. 5.37 Goddard v Nationwide Building Society [1987] QB 670 …. 5.64, 5.65, 5.66, 5.85 Godfrey v Woolworths (WA) Ltd (1998) 103 A Crim R 336 …. 7.15, 7.18 Goldberg v Ng (1995) 185 CLR 83 …. 5.22, 5.52, 5.53 Goldman v The Ferry Kameruka [1971] 1 NSWLR 393 …. 8.93 Goldsmith v Newman (1992) 65 A Crim R 563 …. 5.13 Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 …. 7.140, 7.141 Golf Lynx v Golf Scene (1984) 59 ALR 343 …. 5.9, 5.10 Gonzales v R (2007) 178 A Crim R 232; [2007] NSWCCA 321 …. 2.46, 8.167 Goodrich Aerospace Pty Ltd v Arsic (2006) 66 NSWLR 186 …. 2.14 Goodwin v Nominal Defendant (1979) 54 ALJR 84 …. 2.58 Goody v Odham’s Press [1967] 1 QB 333 …. 3.153 Gordon v Carroll (1975) 27 FLR 129 …. 7.117 Gordon v Ross [2006] NSWCA 157 …. 8.112 Gordon-King v R [2008] NSWCCA 335 …. 7.93 Gough v Braden (1991) 55 A Crim R 92 …. 6.22 Government Insurance Office of NSW v Bailey (1992) 27 NSWLR 305 …. 6.47 GPI Leisure Corp Ltd (in liq) v Yuill (1997) 42 NSWLR 225 …. 5.90, 5.94 GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15 …. 7.117, 7.124 Graham v Police (2001) 122 A Crim R 152 …. 7.118 Graham v R (1998) 195 CLR 606 …. 5.143, 7.79, 7.83, 8.198 Granada Tavern v Smith [2008] FCA 646 …. 2.64 Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 …. 5.22, 5.33, 5.34, 5.36, 5.38, 5.48, 5.78,

5.169 Grant v R (1975) 11 ALR 503 …. 2.73 Grayden v R [1989] WAR 208 …. 7.10 Grbic v Pitkethly (1992) 38 FCR 95 …. 4.12, 4.64, 4.73 Great Atlantic Insurance Co v Home Insurance Co [1981] 1 WLR 529 …. 5.51 Great Southern Managers (in liq) v Clark (2012) 36 VR 308; [2012] VSCA 207 …. 5.57 Greaves v Aikman (1994) 74 A Crim R 370 …. 2.47, 4.57 Green (a Pseudonym) v R [2015] VSCA 279 …. 3.141 Green v R (1971) 126 CLR 28 …. 2.71, 2.72 Green v R (1999) 161 ALR 648; [1999] HCA 13 …. 4.20, 4.80, 4.83, 4.102, 4.103, 4.104 Green v Wilden Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 105 …. 6.39 Greenough v Eccles (1859) 5 CB (NS) 786; 144 ER 315 …. 7.118 Greenough v Gaskell (1833) 1 My & K 98; 39 ER 618 …. 5.27 Greensill v R (2012) 37 VR 257; [2012] VSCA 306 …. 4.51 Gregory and Sharwood v R (1983) 151 CLR 566 …. 3.142, 3.143, 3.144 Gregory v Philip Morris Ltd (1988) 80 ALR 455 …. 5.94 Grew v Cubitt [1951] 2 TLR 305 …. 8.52 Grey v R (2001) 184 ALR 593; 75 ALJR 1708; [2001] HCA 65 …. 5.15 Greyhound Australia Pty Ltd v Deluxe Coachlines Pty Ltd (1986) 11 FCR 592 …. 5.5, 5.239 Griffen, Re (1887) 8 LR (NSW) 132 …. 5.28 Griffin v Constantine (1954) 91 CLR 136 …. 6.72 Griffin v Pantzer (2004) 137 FCR 209 …. 2.2, 5.146, 5.156 Griffis v R (1996) 67 SASR 170 …. 6.48, 6.51, 7.33 Griffith v Australian Broadcasting Commission [2003] NSWSC 483 …. 7.19 Griffith v R (1937) 58 CLR 185 …. 3.29 Griffiths v ANZ (1990) 53 SASR 256 …. 8.189

Griffiths v R (1994) 125 ALR 545 …. 6.3 Griffiths v Wood (1994) 62 SASR 204 …. 6.47 Grills v R (1996) 70 ALJR 905 …. 3.150 Grimley v R (1995) 121 FLR 282 …. 4.33, 8.168 Grinham, Ex parte; Sneddon, Re (1961) 61 SR (NSW) 862 …. 5.183 Grofam Pty Ltd v ANZ (1993) 45 FCR 445 …. 5.26 Grofam Pty Ltd v MacAuley (1994) 121 ALR 22 …. 5.173 Grosser v SA Police (1994) 63 SASR 243 …. 2.8, 6.47, 7.22 Groundstroem v R [2013] NSWCCA 237 …. 4.49 Grubisic v Western Australia (2011) 41 WAR 524; [2011] WASCA 147 …. 4.85, 7.39 Grundy v Lewis [1998] FCA 1537 …. 7.76 GSA Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd v Constable [2002] 2 Qd R 146 …. 5.26, 5.34, 5.37, 5.43 Guardian Royal Exchange v Stuart [1985] 1 NZLR 596 …. 5.34 Guide Dog Owners’ & Friends’ Association Inc v Guide Dog Association of NSW & ACT (1998) 154 ALR 527 …. 7.38, 7.41, 7.61 Guinness Peat Properties Ltd v Fitzroy Robinson Partnership [1987] 1 WLR 1027 …. 5.54, 5.65 Gumana v Northern Territory [2005] FCA 50 …. 7.64, 8.84, 8.200 Gundersen v Miller [1936] SASR 206 …. 4.36 Guthrie v Spence [2009] NSWCA 369 …. 8.29 Gutierrez v R [1997] 1 NZLR 192 …. 7.130 Guy and Finger v R [1978] WAR 125 …. 8.52, 8.53 Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police (2008) 234 CLR 532 …. 5.217

H H, SA v Police (2013) 116 SASR 547; [2013] SASCFC 86 …. 7.34, 8.129

H Stanke & Sons Pty Ltd v Von Stanke (2006) 95 SASR 425; [2006] SASC 308 …. 5.61, 5.65 Ha v R [2014] VSCA 335 …. 7.23 Habib v Nationwide News Ltd (2010) 76 NSWLR 299; [2010] NSWCA 34 …. 8.131 Haddara v R (2014) 43 VR 53; [2014] VSCA 100 …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.29, 2.35, 2.37, 4.56, 8.100 Haidari v R [2015] NSWCCA 126 …. 2.46, 2.49, 7.38, 7.41 Haije v R [2006] NSWCCA 23 …. 4.57 Haines v Guthrie (1884) 13 QBD 818 …. 8.85 Hajar v R [2015] VSCA 233 …. 3.138 Haj-Ismail v Madigan (1982) 45 ALR 379 …. 5.224, 5.244 Hales v Kerr [1908] 2 KB 601 …. 3.155, 3.161 Hall v R [1971] 1 WLR 298 …. 5.134, 5.139 — v Western Australia (2013) 232 A Crim R 107; [2013] WASCA 165 …. 2.46, 3.63 Hally v Starkey [1962] Qd R 474 …. 7.137 Halverson v Dobler [2006] NSWSC 1307 …. 7.64 Hamilton v Ah Fayed [1999] 3 All ER 317 …. 5.198 — v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 486 …. 5.145, 5.171, 5.180, 5.181, 5.182 Hamod v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2006] NSWCA 243 …. 7.41 Handley v Baddock [1987] WAR 98 …. 5.41 Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 165 A Crim R 151; [2006] NSWCCA 373 …. 2.30, 2.31, 2.32, 2.83, 7.10, 7.43 Haque v Commissioner of Corrective Services (2008) 216 FLR 271 …. 8.199 HAR v Western Australia (No 2) [2015] WASCA 249 …. 3.146, 7.137 Harbours Corporation of Queensland v Vessey Chemicals Pty Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 60; 67 ALR 100 …. 5.85, 5.234, 5.251, 5.254 Hardie Finance Corp Pty Ltd v CCD Australia Pty Ltd (1995) 67 FCR 594 …. 5.42

Harding v Williams (1880) 14 Ch D 197 …. 8.189 Hare v Riley [1974] VR 638 …. 5.211 Hargan v R (1919) 27 CLR 13 …. 4.19 Hargraves v R (2011) 245 CLR 257; [2011] HCA 44 …. 2.12, 2.71, 4.76 Harman v Western Australia (2004) 29 WAR 380; [2004] WASCA 230 …. 2.71 Harmony Shipping Co SA v Saudi Europe Line Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 1384 …. 5.60 Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 …. 3.13, 3.14, 3.21, 3.26, 3.30, 3.31, 3.37, 3.42, 3.45, 3.46, 3.51, 3.52, 3.56, 3.57, 3.64, 3.66, 8.72 Harrington v Lowe (1996) 136 ALR 42 …. 5.94 — v North London Polytechnic [1984] 1 WLR 1293 …. 5.10 Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893 …. 7.56, 7.64, 7.66 Harris v AGC (1984) 38 SASR 303 …. 6.3 Harris v — [1952] AC 694 …. 3.14, 3.66, 3.69 — v R [1988] Tas R 31 …. 5.141 — v — (1990) 55 SASR 321 …. 4.87, 4.88 — v — (2005) 158 A Crim R 454 …. 8.197 — v Tippett (1811) 2 Camp 637; 170 ER 1277 …. 7.140 Harris (a Pseudonym) v R (2015) 44 VR 652; [2015] VSCA 112 …. 3.20, 3.58, 3.61 Harris Scarfe Ltd v Ernst & Young (No 4) [2005] SASC 443 …. 5.7 Harrison v Flaxmill Road Foodland Pty Ltd (1979) 22 SASR 385 …. 2.8, 6.62 Hart v Lancashire and Yorkshire Rail Co (1869) 21 LT 261 …. 2.21 Hartogen Energy Ltd v Australian Gas Light Co (1992) 109 ALR 177 …. 5.34, 5.36, 5.40, 5.78, 5.244 Harvey v Police (2006) 95 SASR 357; [2006] SASC 222 …. 4.53 — v Smith-Wood [1964] 2 QB 171 …. 7.119, 8.173 Hatziparadissis v GFC (Manufacturing) Pty Ltd [1978] VR 181 …. 7.82

Hawthorn Glen Pty Ltd v Aconex Pty Ltd (No 1) [2007] FCA 2010 …. 7.129 Hay v Mitchell [1973] 2 NSWLR 736 …. 7.17 Hayslep v Gymer (1834) 1 Ad & El 162; 110 ER 1169 …. 8.31 Hayward v Whitbread [1966] SASR 1 …. 6.18 He Kaw Teh v R (1985) 157 CLR 523 …. 6.8, 6.9 Health & Life Care Ltd v Price Waterhouse (1997) 69 SASR 362 …. 5.28 Health Insurance Commissioner v Freeman (1998) 88 FCR 544 …. 5.26 Heanes v Herangi (2007) 175 A Crim R 175; [2007] WASC 175 …. 3.49, 7.79 Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125; [2008] HCA 36 …. 5.53, 5.76, 5.85 Heatherington v R (1994) 179 CLR 370 …. 8.168 Hehir v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1982] 1 WLR 715 …. 5.216 Heid v Connell Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 629 …. 5.187 Helal v McConnell Dowell Constructors (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 3) (2011) 285 ALR 281; [2011] FCA 1344 …. 6.39 Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691 …. 2.64 Henderson v Queensland (2014) 89 ALJR 162; [2014] HCA 52 …. 2.65 — v Richardson (1996) 5 Tas R 375 …. 6.28 Henley v Henley [1955] P 202 …. 5.104 — v Tu [2009] ACTSC 37 …. 7.59 Henman v Lester (1862) 12 CB (NS) 776; 142 ER 1347 …. 7.153 Hennessy v BHP (1926) 38 CLR 342 …. 5.184 Henry Coxon, The (1878) 3 PD 156 …. 8.83 Henschke and Co v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1561 …. 7.65 Herbert v R (1982) 62 FLR 302 …. 8.108 Herijanto v Refugee Review Tribunal (2000) 170 ALR 379 …. 5.184 — v — (No 2) (2000) 170 ALR 575; 74 ALJR 703 …. 5.184 Hermanus v R [2015] VSCA 2 …. 4.46 Heron v R (2003) 197 ALR 81 …. 2.49

Herring v US 555 US (2009) …. 2.37 Hesse Blind Roller Co Pty Ltd v Hamitoski [2006] VSCA 121 …. 6.45 Hetherington v Brooks [1963] SASR 321 …. 7.79, 7.80, 7.82 Hevi Lift (PNG) Ltd v Etherington [2005] NSWCA 42 …. 7.66 Heyward v Bishop [2015] ACTCA 58 …. 2.37 HG v R (1999) 197 CLR 414; [1999] HCA 2 …. 3.146, 3.147, 3.150, 7.53, 7.54, 7.55, 7.65, 7.66 Hickey v R [2002] WASCA 321 …. 3.48 Hickman v Taylor 329 US 495 (1947) …. 5.23, 5.43 Hicks v R (1920) 28 CLR 36 …. 4.19, 4.38 Higgins v Parker (1984) 35 SASR 229 …. 2.8, 6.62 — v R [2007] NSWCCA 56 …. 8.142 Higham v Ridgway (1808) 10 East 109; 103 ER 717 …. 8.76, 8.80 Hill v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1990] 1 WLR 946 …. 5.193 — v R [2003] WASCA 177 …. 3.149 Hillier and Carney v Lucas (2000) 81 SASR 451 …. 7.66, 8.186 Hills, In the Estate of [2009] SASC 176 …. 6.23, 6.25 Hillstead v R [2005] WASCA 116 …. 7.66 Hilton v Lancashire Dynamo Nevelin Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 952 …. 8.173 Hindrum v Lane [2014] TASFC 5; (2014) 242 A Crim R 400 …. 6.8 Hinton v Mill (1991) 57 SASR 97 …. 2.49 Hirst v Police (2006) 95 SASR 260; [2006] SASC 244 …. 3.25, 4.73 HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 …. 2.12, 2.13, 2.85, 2.87, 3.7, 3.17, 3.21, 3.28, 3.29, 3.31, 3.35, 3.36, 3.38, 3.42, 3.45, 3.46, 3.50, 3.51, 3.53, 3.56, 3.58, 3.61, 3.64, 3.66, 3.69, 3.74, 7.89, 7.116, 7.140, 8.72 Ho v Powell (2001) 51 NSWLR 572 …. 2.63, 2.67, 6.20, 6.45, 8.194 Hoare v O’Neill (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 882 …. 5.103 Hobbs v Hobbs and Cousens [1960] P 112 …. 5.33 — v Tinling [1929] 2 KB 1 …. 3.153

Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292 …. 2.45, 3.21, 3.30, 3.39, 3.42, 3.44, 3.45, 3.46, 3.48, 3.49, 3.50, 3.52, 3.58, 3.60, 3.62, 3.63, 3.64, 3.65, 3.67, 3.70, 3.71, 4.98 Hocking v Bell (1945) 71 CLR 430 …. 2.50 Hodgson v Amcor Ltd (No 4) (2011) 32 VR 568; [2011] VSC 269 …. 5.58 Hodgson, Re; Beckett v Ramsdale (1885) 31 Ch D 177 …. 4.75 Hoefler v Tomlinson (1995) 60 FCR 452 …. 5.87, 5.96 Hogan v ACC (2010) 240 CLR 651; [2010] HCA 21 …. 5.85 Holcombe v Coulton (1988) 17 NSWLR 71 …. 2.49 Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149 …. 6.59, 6.64, 6.65, 6.75 — v Sammon (1972) 4 SASR 1 …. 5.5 Hollingham v Head (1858) 4 CB(NS) 388; 140 ER 1135 …. 2.21, 3.155, 3.158, 3.161 Hollington v Hewthorn [1943] KB 587 …. 5.186, 5.191, 5.192, 5.193, 5.194 Holloway v McFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470 …. 2.58, 2.64, 8.13, 8.96, 8.109 — v Victoria [2015] VSC 526 …. 5.12 Home Office v Harman [1983] 1 AC 280 …. 5.53, 5.85 Honeysett v R (2014) 253 CLR 122; [2014] HCA 29 …. 4.56, 7.24, 7.40, 7.43, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.65 Hong Kong Bank of Australia Ltd v Murphy (1992) 28 NSWLR 512 …. 5.92 — v Murphy [1993] 2 VR 419 …. 5.34, 5.54, 5.57 Hood Sweeney Technology Pty Ltd v Equant Aust Pty Ltd [2009] SASC 298 …. 5.10 Hooker Corp Ltd v Darling Harbour Authority (1987) 9 NSWLR 538 …. 5.54, 5.65 Hooper v Kirella Pty Ltd (1999) 96 FCR 1 …. 5.10 Horman v Bingham [1972] VR 29 …. 6.60 Horne v Comino [1966] Qd R 202 …. 8.103 — v Milne (1881) 7 VLR 296 …. 2.19

Horrell v R (1997) 6 NTR 125 …. 4.88 Horsman v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 190 …. 3.25, 3.63 Hoskyn v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] AC 474 …. 5.200 Hospitals Contribution Fund of Australia Ltd v Hunt (1983) 76 FLR 408 …. 5.234, 5.251 Hothnyang v R [2014] VSCA 64 …. 3.31 House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 …. 2.15, 2.26, 2.31, 3.12, 3.62, 3.105, 5.267, 8.159 Houston v Crannage [1990] WAR 11 …. 5.13 Howard, Estate of (1996) 39 NSWLR 409 …. 6.23 Howglen Ltd, Re [2001] 1 All ER 376 …. 5.10 Howson v R (2007) 170 A Crim R 401; [2007] WASC 83 …. 4.88 Hoy v R [2002] WASCA 275 …. 8.77 Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 314 …. 8.112 Hoyts Pty Ltd v Burns (2003) 77 ALJR 1943 …. 7.38 HP v R (2011) 32 VR 687; [2011] VSCA 251 …. 5.190 Hrysikos v Mansfield (2002) 5 VR 485 …. 7.152 Hua Wang Bank Berhad v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 7) [2013] FCA 1020 …. 5.223 Huges (a Pseudonym) v R (2013) 238 A Crim R 345; [2013] VSCA 338 …. 3.104, 3.108, 3.109 Hughes v Biddulph (1827) 4 Russ 190; 38 ER 777 …. 5.33 — v National Trustees Executors and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 134 …. 2.47, 8.45 — v R [2015] NSWCCA 330 …. 3.12, 3.60, 3.62 — v — [2016] HCATrans 201 …. 3.60 Hui Chi-ming v R [1992] 1 AC 34 …. 5.192 Hummerstone v Leary [1921] 2 KB 664 …. 6.40 Hunt v Russell and De Pinto (1995) 63 SASR 402 …. 5.5

— v Wark (1986) 40 SASR 489 …. 5.12, 8.155 — v Watkins (2000) 49 NSWLR 508 …. 6.37 — v Western Australia (2008) 189 A Crim R 248 …. 4.49 Hunter v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529 …. 5.187, 5.188, 5.192 — v Mann [1974] QB 767 …. 5.206 — v Police (2011) 111 SASR 411 …. 7.120 Hurd v Zomojo Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 148 …. 2.69 Hutt, Bell & Jeffrey v R (1988) 37 A Crim R 432 …. 3.67 HW Thompson Building Pty Ltd v Alien Property Services Pty Ltd (1983) 48 ALR 667 …. 3.156

I I Waxman and Sons Ltd v Texaco Canada Ltd (1968) 67 DLR(2d) 295 …. 5.88, 5.101 IBM Global Services Australia Ltd, Re [2005] FCAFC 66 …. 7.19, 7.20 IBM United Kingdom Ltd v Prima Data International [1994] 4 All ER 748 …. 5.157 Ibrahim v Pham [2007] NSWCA 215 …. 3.154 Idoport Pty Ltd v NAB (2000) 50 NSWLR 640 …. 2.3, 6.70, 7.60, 7.61 — v — [2001] NSWSC 123 …. 7.66 — v — [2001] NSWSC 222 …. 5.31 — v — [2001] NSWSC 529 …. 7.38, 7.41 Ilioski v R [2006] NSWCCA 164 …. 4.61, 4.69 IMM v R [2014] NTCCA 20 …. 2.31 — v — (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 …. 2.18, 2.19, 2.23, 2.31, 2.32, 2.52, 2.53, 3.58, 3.60, 3.61, 3.70, 4.58, 4.68, 4.98, 4.100, 7.54, 7.55, 7.135 Imnetu v R [2006] NSWCCA 203 …. 2.73 Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd v Caro [1961] 1 WLR 529 …. 1.1

Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cornwall (1993) 116 ALR 97 …. 5.205 Indigo Financial Money Pty Ltd v Bolivar Road Pty Ltd (2010) 108 SASR 120; [2010] SASCFC 29 …. 2.14 Ingot v Macquarie (No 4) [2005] NSWSC 90 …. 8.110 Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (2006) 67 NSWLR 91; [2006] NSWSC 530 …. 2.2, 5.23 Ingram v Ingram [1956] P 390 …. 5.191 Inspector Campbell v Hitchcock [2003] NSWIRComm 148 …. 7.8 Interchase Corp Ltd, Re (1996) 68 FCR 481; 21 ACSR 375 …. 2.2, 5.75 Interchase Corporation Ltd (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Queensland) Pty Ltd (No 1) [1999] 1 Qd R 141 …. 5.28 Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1991) 102 ALR 379 …. 8.49 — v — (1992) 111 ALR 577 …. 8.49 International Business Machines Corp v Phoenix International (Computers) Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 413 …. 5.54 Isherwood v Tasmania (2010) 20 Tas R 375; [2010] TASCCA 11 …. 7.27, 7.79 ISJ v R (2012) 38 VR 23; [2012] VSCA 321 …. 7.83, 7.102, 8.198 Istel (AT & T) Ltd v Tully [1993] AC 45 …. 5.157, 5.172 Italiano v Barbaro (1993) 114 ALR 21 …. 8.43, 8.115 ITC Ltd v Video Exchange Ltd [1982] Ch 431 …. 5.62

J J v L & A Services Pty Ltd [1995] 2 Qd R 10 …. 5.238, 5.254 — v R [1989] Tas R 116 …. 3.70, 4.98 J Boag and Son Brewing Ltd v Bridon Investments Pty Ltd (2001) 10 Tas R 26 …. 7.152, 7.153 JA McBeath Nominees Pty Ltd v Jenkins Development Corp Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 121 …. 5.103 Jacara Pty Ltd v Auto-Bake Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 417 …. 2.28, 3.159

— v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51; [2000] FCA 1886 …. 3.55, 3.60, 3.154, 3.156, 3.159, 3.161, 7.137 — v — (2000) 185 ALR 463 …. 7.137 Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446 …. 5.187 — v Lithgow City Council [2008] NSWCA 312 …. 2.60, 7.41 — v Wells (1985) 5 FCR 296 …. 5.246, 5.247 Jacobsen v Rogers (1995) 182 CLR 572 …. 5.205, 5.218, 5.238 Jacobson v Suncorp Insurance [1991] 2 Qd R 46 …. 7.118 — v United States 503 US 540 (1992) …. 4.53 Jadwan Pty Ltd v Porter (No 2) (2004) 13 Tas R 219; [2004] TASSC 126 …. 5.94 Jaffarie v Director General of Security [2014] FCAFC 102 …. 5.244 Jager v Lynch (2003) 12 Tas R 195 …. 8.149 Jago v District Court of NSW (1989) 168 CLR 23 …. 2.29, 4.46 Jamal v R (2012) 223 A Crim R 585; [2012] NSWCCA 198 …. 2.30, 2.43, 7.23, 8.96 James v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1985) 9 FCR 448 …. 6.37, 6.38, 6.40 — v — (1986) 64 ALR 347 …. 6.37, 6.38, 6.40 — v Keogh [2008] 101 SASR 42 …. 7.64 — v Launceston City Council (2004) 13 Tas R 89 …. 7.54 — v R [2013] VSCA 55 …. 2.49 Jango v Northern Territory (No 2) [2004] FCA 1004 …. 7.56, 7.73 — v — (No 4) (2004) 214 ALR 608; [2004] FCA 1539 …. 7.66, 8.29 Jarrett v R (2014) 86 NSWLR 623; [2014] NSWCCA 140 …. 4.45, 4.51, 7.21 Jarvie v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [1995] VR 84 …. 5.205 Jarvis (1756) 1 East 643n; 102 ER 249 …. 6.15, 6.16, 6.17, 6.18 Jayasena v R [1970] AC 618 …. 6.2, 6.8, 6.16, 6.22 JB v R [2012] NSWCCA 12 …. 8.153

J-Corp Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers (1992) 38 FCR 452 …. 5.23, 5.46 J-Corp Pty Ltd v ABLFU of WA (No 2) (1992) 38 FCR 458 …. 6.39, 6.40 JCS v Tasmania [2014] TASCCA 6 …. 4.20 JDK v R [2009] NSWCCA 76 …. 2.87, 7.116 Jenkins v R (2004) 211 ALR 116; [2004] HCA 57 …. 4.19, 4.23, 4.27, 4.29, 4.30 — v WMC Resources Ltd (1999) 21 WAR 393 …. 6.23 Jetopay Pty Ltd v Ocean Marine Mutual Insurance Association (Europe) OV (1999) 95 FCR 570 …. 7.66 Jetset Properties v Eurobadalla Shire Council [2007] NSWLEC 198 …. 7.64 JG v R [2014] NSWCCA 138 …. 3.61 Jingellic Minerals No Liability v Beach Petroleum (1991) 55 SASR 424 …. 2.8 JJB v R (2006) 161 A Crim R 187; [2006] NSWCCA 126 …. 4.46, 4.48, 4.49 JLS v R (2010) 28 VR 328; [2010] VSCA 209 …. 3.61 JMA Accounting Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 211 ALR 380 …. 5.81 John Fairfax and Sons Ltd v Cojuangco (1988) 165 CLR 346 …. 5.10 John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Abernathy [1999] NSWSC 826 …. 5.31 John v Humphreys [1955] 1 All ER 793 …. 6.19 Johnson v Poppeliers (2008) 20 VR 92; 190 A Crim R 23; [2008] VSC 461 …. 5.12 — v R (1976) 136 CLR 619 …. 6.8 Johnston v Jackson (1880) 6 VLR (L) 1 …. 5.100 — v Morien [2006] WADC 46 …. 5.89 Jokic v Hayes (1990) 53 SASR 530 …. 4.64 Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635 …. 3.85, 3.91, 3.92, 3.93, 3.94, 3.108, 3.125 — v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 …. 2.50, 2.56, 2.58, 2.63, 2.64, 5.121, 5.133, 6.20, 6.36, 6.37, 6.38, 6.43, 6.44, 6.45

— v Kaney [2011] UKSC 3 …. 7.64 — v Metcalfe [1967] 1 WLR 1286 …. 8.52 — v Multiple Sclerosis Society of Victoria [1996] 1 VR 499 …. 7.21 — v National Coal Board [1957] 2 QB 55 …. 6.58 — v R (1997) 191 CLR 439 …. 2.14, 4.13 — v — (1997) 71 ALJR 538 …. 7.100 — v — (2009) 254 ALR 626; [2009] HCA 17 …. 3.77 — v Sutherland Shire Council [1979] 2 NSWLR 206 …. 8.12, 8.13, 8.110 Jonkers v Police (1996) 67 SASR 401 …. 8.131 Jorgensen v News Media (Auckland) Ltd [1969] NZLR 961 …. 5.193 Joseph Constantine SS Line Ltd v Imperial Smelting Corp [1942] AC 154 …. 6.13 Joseph Hargreaves Ltd, Re [1900] 1 Ch 347 …. 5.229 Jovanovic v R (2007) 172 A Crim R 518; [2007] TASSC 56 …. 2.72, 4.88 JP v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2015] NSWSC 1669 …. 7.43, 7.64

K K v R (1992) 34 FCR 227 …. 2.87, 3.36, 4.19, 4.93 Ka Chung Fung v R [2007] NSWCCA 250 …. 3.136 Kailis v R (1999) 21 WAR 100 …. 3.32, 3.73, 3.74 Kalbasi v Western Australia (2013) 235 A Crim R 541; [2013] WASCA 241 …. 7.49, 7.53, 7.65, 7.66 Kamleh v R (2005) 213 ALR 97 …. 8.42, 8.47, 8.78 Kanaan v R [2006] NSWCCA 109 …. 4.9, 4.23, 4.24, 4.27, 4.45, 6.57 Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 698 …. 5.31, 5.49 Kanthal Australia Pty Ltd v Minister for Industry, Technology and Commerce (1987) 14 FCR 90 …. 5.85, 5.254 Karam v R [2015] VSCA 50 …. 8.27 Karina Fisheries Pty Ltd v Mitson (1990) 26 FCR 473 …. 5.81

Karmot Auto Spares Pty Ltd v Dominelli Ford (Hurstville) Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 560 …. 8.184 Katsilis v BHP (1976) 72 LSJS 338 …. 6.19 — v — (1978) 52 ALJR 189 …. 6.6, 6.20, 6.43 Kau Wong v R [1983] WAR 80 …. 4.84 Kaye v Hulthen [1981] Qd R 289 …. 5.48 KC v R (2011) 32 VR 61; [2011] VSCA 82 …. 7.131 Kelleher v R (1974) 131 CLR 534 …. 4.6, 4.12, 4.18, 4.19, 4.29, 4.38, 4.40, 4.59, 4.62, 7.101 Keller v R [2006] NSWCCA 204 …. 7.54 Kelly v R (1994) 12 WAR 405 …. 4.33, 8.149 — v — (2004) 218 CLR 216; [2004] HCA 12 …. 4.34, 8.99, 8.129, 8.168 Kennedy v Baker (2004) 135 FCR 520 …. 5.81 — v — (1883) 23 Ch D 387 …. 5.43, 5.48 — v — (2004) 142 FCR 185; 208 ALR 424; [2004] FCAFC 337 …. 5.22, 5.40, 5.81 Kennedy and Cahill, Re the Marriage of (1995) FLC ¶92-605 …. 2.49 Kent v Scattini [1961] WAR 74 …. 6.60 — v Wotton & Byrne Pty Ltd (2006) 15 Tas R 264; [2006] TASSC 8 …. 6.60, 6.65, 7.59 Kerr v R [1980] WAR 21 …. 2.41 Kerrisk v The North Queensland Newspaper Co Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 398 …. 5.10 Kerrison, Re; Ex parte Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1990) 101 ALR 525 …. 2.64 Kerrison, Re; Ex parte Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1991) 27 FCR 271 …. 2.64 Kessing v R [2008] NSWCCA 310 …. 8.57 Key International Drilling Company Ltd v TNT Bulkships Operations Pty Ltd [1989] WAR 280 …. 5.54

KH v R [2014] NSWCCA 294 …. 7.123 Khan v R [1971] WAR 44 …. 4.15, 4.25, 4.26 Kheir v R (2014) 43 VR 308; [2014] VSCA 200 …. 4.56, 4.57, 7.56 Kilby v R (1973) 129 CLR 460 …. 4.45, 7.99, 7.100, 7.107 Killick v R (1981) 147 CLR 565 …. 2.8 King v AG Australia (2002) 121 FCR 480 …. 5.51 — v R (1986) 15 FCR 427 …. 5.139, 5.140, 5.144 — v — (1996) 16 WAR 540 …. 5.264 — v — (2003) 215 CLR 150; [2003] HCA 42 …. 6.14 Kingston v State Fire Commission (1998) 8 Tas R 152 …. 5.54, 5.65 Kirch Communications Pty Ltd v Gene Engineering Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 485 …. 7.64 KJM v R (No 2) (2011) 33 VR 11; [2011] VSCA 268 …. 3.12 KJR v R (2007) 173 A Crim R 226; [2007] NSWCCA 165 …. 4.49 KJS v R [2014] NSWCCA 27 …. 2.13, 3.35, 3.56, 3.73 Klein v Bell [1955] 2 DLR 513 …. 5.150 — v Bryant [1998] ACTSC 89 …. 2.36 Klemenko v Huffa (1978) 17 SASR 549 …. 8.133 Klewer v Walton [2003] NSWCA 308 …. 2.31 KLM v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 73 …. 2.49 KMJ v Tasmania (2011) 20 Tas R 425; [2011] TASCCA 7 …. 2.31, 3.60 Knight v R (1992) 175 CLR 495 …. 2.73 Knight v Jones; Ex parte Jones [1981] Qd R 98 …. 3.140 Knowles, Re [1984] VR 751 …. 3.140 Knowles v R [2015] VSCA 141 …. 2.37, 2.49, 7.34 KNP v R [2006] NSWCCA 213 …. 4.54 Kolalich v DPP (1991) 173 CLR 222 …. 6.31 Kong v Kang [2014] VSC 28 …. 5.100

Konigsberg (a bankrupt), Re; Ex parte the Trustee v Konigsberg [1989] 3 All ER 289; [1989] 1 WLR 1257 …. 5.49, 5.57 Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Products Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 76 FCR 151; [2000] FCA 876 …. 2.28 Korean Air Lines v ACCC (No 3) (2008) 247 ALR 781; [2008] FCA 701 …. 5.90, 5.94 Korgbara v R (2007) 71 NSWLR 187; 170 A Crim R 568; [2007] NSWCCA 84 …. 4.3, 4.56, 4.63, 7.24 Kosian v R (2013) 237 A Crim R 156; [2013] VSCA 357 …. 7.58 Kossenberg v Kossenberg (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 358 …. 4.75 Kozul v R (1981) 147 CLR 221 …. 7.21, 7.23 Krasniqi v R (1993) 69 A Crim R 383 …. 2.72 Kriss v City of South Perth [1966] WAR 210 …. 3.161 KRM v R (2001) 206 CLR 221 …. 3.34, 3.56, 3.74, 3.137, 4.43 KS v Veitch (No 2) (2012) 84 NSWLR 172; [2012] NSWCCA 266 …. 5.207, 5.209, 5.213 Kuczborski v Queensland [2014] HCA 46 …. 6.14 Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael 526 US 137 (1999) …. 7.52, 7.54 Kurgeil and Kurgeil v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (1990) 54 SASR 125 …. 7.139, 7.140, 7.149 Kutschera v R [2010] NSWCCA 150 …. 4.24 Kyluk Pty Ltd v Chief Executive Office of Environment and Heritage [2013] NSWCCA 114 …. 7.66

L L v Lyons (2002) 56 NSWLR 600 …. 5.17 — v Tasmania (2006) 15 Tas SR 381; [2006] TASSC 59 …. 3.12, 3.62 La Fontaine v R (1976) 136 CLR 62 …. 2.72, 2.73 Lackovic v Insurance Commission (WA) (2006) 31 WAR 460 …. 2.14 Lafite v Samuels [1972] SASR 1 …. 2.38

Lafone v Griffin (1909) 25 TLR 308 …. 7.18 Lake Cumberline Pty Ltd v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (1994) 126 ALR 58 …. 5.51 Lalchan Nanan v The State [1986] AC 860 …. 5.185 Lam Chi-ming v R [1991] 2 AC 212 …. 8.131 Lamereaux & Noirot (2008) 216 FLR 432; [2008] FamCAFC 22 …. 6.47 Lancaster v R [1989] WAR 83 …. 3.71 Land Securities plc v Westminster City Council [1993] 4 All ER 124 …. 5.184 Lander v Mitson (1988) 83 ALR 466 …. 5.81 Landini v New South Wales [2007] NSWSC 259 …. 2.19, 8.119 Lane v Hales (2000) 155 FLR 102 …. 5.130 — v R (2013) 241 A Crim R 321; [2013] NSWCCA 317 …. 7.122 Lanford v General Medical Council [1990] 1 AC 13 …. 3.20 Langbein v R [2008] NSWCCA 38 …. 7.83, 8.198 Langford v Cleary (No 2) (1998) 8 Tas R 52 …. 5.97 Lapthorne v R [1989] WAR 207 …. 7.99 Latcha v R (1998) 127 NTR 1 …. 7.43 Latorre v R (2012) 226 A Crim R 319; [2012] VSCA 280 …. 2.8, 4.56 Lau v R (1991) 6 WAR 30 …. 2.42 Law v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 193 …. 2.65 Law Institute of Victoria v Irving [1990] VR 411 …. 5.238 Law Institute of Victoria Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 224 FLR 37; [2009] VSC 55 …. 5.218, 5.224, 5.238 Lawless v R (1979) 142 CLR 659 …. 5.15 Lawrence v R (1981) 38 ALR 1 …. 2.8 — v — [1933] AC 699 …. 2.43 Lawson v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 212 …. 8.77 Laxy v IBM Australia Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 79 …. 7.131 LBC v Western Australia [2011] WASCA 201 …. 2.49

Leary v FCT (1980) 32 ALR 221 …. 5.27 Lebon v Lake Placid Resort Pty Ltd [1995] 1 Qd R 24 …. 5.10 Lederberger v Mediterranean Olives Financial Pty Ltd (2012) 38 VR 509; [2012] VCA 262 …. 8.31 Lee, Application of (2009) 212 A Crim R 442; [2009] ACTSC 98 …. 2.37 Lee v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 305 …. 7.8 — v Napier (2013) 301 ALR 663; [2013] FCR 236 …. 6.6 — v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196; [2013] HCA 39 …. 1.53, 5.15, 5.145, 5.146, 5.183, 6.8, 8.148 — v R (1998) 195 CLR 594 …. 7.69, 8.194 — v — (2014) 253 CLR 455; [2014] HCA 20 …. 1.53, 2.14, 2.29, 2.35, 5.107, 5.108, 5.183, 6.8, 6.55, 8.148 Lee-Wright v Police (2010) 109 SASR 96; [2010] SASC 353 …. 8.149 Legal Services Commission v JHW (2012) 223 A Crim R 534; [2012] SASCFC 47 …. 5.50, 5.78 Legge v Edmonds (1855) 25 LJ Ch 125 …. 8.109 Lenehan v Queensland Trustees Ltd [1965] Qd R 559 …. 8.174, 8.176 Leonard v R (2006) 67 NSWLR 545; 164 A Crim R 374; [2006] NSWCCA 267 …. 2.87, 3.36, 3.56, 3.57, 3.75 Lewis v R (1987) 88 FLR 104; 29 A Crim R 267 …. 7.43, 7.49, 7.51 — v R (1998) 20 WAR 1 …. 6.52, 8.118 Lexcray v Northern Territory (2015) 292 FLR 447; [2015] NTSC 11 …. 5.96 Leydon v Tomlinson (1979) 22 SASR 302 …. 2.8, 6.62, 7.11, 7.130 LFG v Western Australia (2015) 48 WAR 178; [2015] WASCA 88 …. 2.7, 3.63 LGM v CAM [2011] FamCAFC 195 …. 5.166 Li v R (2003) 139 A Crim R 28; [2003] NSWCCA 290 …. 2.30, 4.56, 4.57, 7.48, 7.56 Liberato v R (1985) 159 CLR 507 …. 2.71 Libke v R (2007) 230 CLR 559; 235 ALR 517; [2007] HCA 30 …. 2.14, 6.55,

7.124 Lifeplan Australia Friendly Society Pty Ltd v Ancient Order of Foresters in Victoria Friendly Society Ltd (2013) 115 SASR 223; [2013] SASC 5 …. 5.10 Lilley (dec’d), Re [1953] VLR 98 …. 2.46 Lindsay v R (2015) 255 CLR 272; [2015] HCA 16 …. 2.14 Ling v The Police (1996) 90 A Crim R 376 …. 5.14 Lipohar v R (1999) 200 CLR 485; [1999] HCA 65 …. 2.43 Liquorland (Australia) Pty Ltd v Anghie [2003] 7 VR 27 …. 5.57 Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 85 ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36 …. 2.18, 7.41, 8.196, 8.199 Liu v Fairfax Newspapers Ltd (2012) 84 NSWLR 547; [2012] NSWSC 1352 …. 5.90, 5.92, 5.96, 5.99 Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206 …. 5.217 LK v Commissioner of Police (2011) 81 NSWLR 26; [2011] NSWSC 458 …. 5.17 Llewellyn v Finn and Collins (1994) 74 A Crim R 519 …. 5.12 — v Police (2005) 91 SASR 418 …. 8.39 Lloyd v Centurian Roller Shutters Pty Ltd (1994) 10 SR(WA) 202 …. 5.46 Lloyd v Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co Ltd [1914] AC 733 …. 8.14, 8.43 Lloyd-Groocock v Police (2008) 102 SASR 465; [2008] SASC 313 …. 6.16, 6.18 LMD v R [2012] VSCA 164 …. 8.198 Lo Presti v R (1994) 68 ALJR 477 …. 6.58 Lobban v R [1995] 2 Cr App R 573 …. 3.77, 3.79 — v — (2001) 80 SASR 550 …. 2.65 Lock v Lock [1966] SASR 245 …. 5.104 Lockwood v Police (2010) 107 SASR 237; [2010] SASC 120 …. 6.58 Lodhi v R (2007) 179 A Crim R 470; [2007] NSWCCA 360 …. 5.223 Lomman v R [2014] SASCFC 55 …. 4.21

Longman v R (1989) 168 CLR 79 …. 4.6, 4.21, 4.37, 4.41, 4.43, 4.44, 4.45, 4.46, 4.47, 4.48, 4.49, 4.50, 4.51, 4.76, 4.77, 4.79, 7.107, 7.112 Lopes v Taylor (1970) 44 ALJR 412 …. 2.58, 2.64, 6.75, 8.108 Lord Ashburton v Pape [1913] 2 Ch 469 …. 5.63 Lovegrove Turf Services Pty Ltd v Minister for Education [2003] WASC 213 …. 5.50, 5.53 Low v R (1978) 23 ALR 616 …. 6.35 Lowe v Lang [2000] NSWSC 309 …. 7.77 Lowery v R [1974] AC 85 …. 3.77, 3.80, 3.81, 3.82, 7.136 Lubrizol Corp v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 957 …. 5.43 Luckies v Ripley (No 2) (1994) 35 NSWLR 283 …. 5.87, 5.94 Lui Mei Lin v R [1989] AC 288 …. 3.120, 7.150, 8.78 Luna (a pseudonym) v R [2016] VSCA 10 …. 2.29, 8.197 Lustre Hosiery v York (1935) 54 CLR 134 …. 8.105 Luxton v Vines (1952) 85 CLR 352 …. 2.69 Lyell v Kennedy (1884) 27 Ch D 1 …. 5.43 Lym International Pty Ltd v Chen [2008] NSWSC 1110 …. 2.32

M M v R (1994) 117 FLR 200 …. 6.8, 6.9 — v — (1994) 181 CLR 487; 69 ALJR 83 …. 2.14, 4.13, 7.35, 7.105 MA v R (2011) 31 VR 203; [2011] VSCA 13 …. 2.15, 4.68 — v — (2013) 40 VR 564; [2013] VSCA 20 …. 7.112 Macdonnell v Evans (1852) 11 CB 930; 138 ER 742 …. 7.15 Macgillivray, In the Estate of [1946] 2 All ER 301 …. 8.90 Mackay Sugar Co-op Association Ltd v CSR Ltd (1996) 63 FCR 408; 137 ALR 183 …. 5.85, 5.254 Mackenzie, Re; Ex parte Whitelock [1971] 2 NSWLR 534 …. 2.42 Mackrell v Western Australia (2008) 190 A Crim R 43; [2008] WASCA 228 ….

5.144 MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 …. 2.27, 2.40, 2.42, 2.44, 2.45, 2.46, 2.47, 2.91, 7.7, 8.101, 8.160, 8.161, 8.162, 8.163, 8.165, 8.166 Madafferi v The Age Company Ltd [2015] VSC 687 …. 5.214 Maddison v Combe (1981) 26 SASR 523 …. 2.8 — v Goldrick [1976] 1 NSWLR 651 …. 5.12, 5.41, 7.18, 7.152 Magellan Petroleum Australia Ltd v Sagasco Amadeus Pty Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 37 …. 5.85, 5.254 Magill v R (2013) 42 VR 616; [2013] VSCA 259 …. 2.85, 8.166 MAH v R [2006] NSWCCA 226 …. 7.123 Maher-Smith v Gaw [1969] VR 371 …. 2.64 Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397; [2008] HCA 1 …. 2.9, 2.12, 5.116 Maiden Civil Pty Ltd, In the Matter of [2012] NSWSC 1618 …. 7.8 Maisel v Financial Times (1915) 84 LJKB 2145 …. 3.153 Majinski v Western Australia (2013) 226 A Crim R 552; [2013] WASCA 10 …. 7.117 Mak v Police [2008] SASR 324 …. 3.136 Makin v Attorney-General (NSW) [1894] AC 57 …. 3.13, 3.14, 3.15, 3.16, 3.17, 3.18, 3.22, 3.23, 3.28, 3.30, 3.31, 3.39, 3.42, 3.44, 3.47, 3.58, 3.64, 3.140, 8.72, 8.134 Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705 …. 7.54, 7.56, 7.64, 7.65, 7.66, 7.68 Mallard v R [2003] WASCA 296 …. 7.136, 7.146 — v — (2005) 224 CLR 125; 157 A Crim R 121 …. 5.15 Mallinson v Scottish Australian Investment Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 66 …. 7.18 Mallows, Re [1926] WALR 62 …. 4.75 Malone v Smith (1946) 63 WN (NSW) 54 …. 6.60 Maloney v R (2013) 252 CLR 168; [2013] HCA 28 …. 6.2, 6.72 Mamo v Surace (2014) 86 NSWLR 275; [2014] NSWCA 58 …. 2.49

Managers of the Metropolitan Asylum District v Hill (1882) 47 LT(NS) 29 …. 3.158, 3.161 Manchester Brewery Co Ltd v Coombs [1901] 2 Ch 608 …. 8.13 Mancorp Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Pty Ltd (1991) 57 SASR 87 …. 5.49, 7.81 Manenti v Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board [1954] VLR 115 …. 2.21, 2.29, 3.158, 3.161 Manly Council v Byrne [2004] NSWCA 123 …. 6.45 Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1 …. 5.22, 5.23, 5.24, 5.47, 5.50, 5.52, 5.56, 5.57, 5.58, 5.61 Mansell v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 140 …. 3.63 Mansour v Standard Telephone and Cables Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 205 …. 8.174 Manwell Pty Ltd v Dames and Moore Pty Ltd (2001) ATPR ¶41-845; [2001] QCA 436 …. 2.8 Mapp v Stephens [1965] NSWR 1661 …. 7.92 Marcel v Commissioner of Police [1992] Ch 225 …. 5.172 March v Stramare (1991) 171 CLR 506 …. 7.54 Marcus Clark and Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1952) 87 CLR 177 …. 6.72 Marelic v Comcare (1993) 121 ALR 114 …. 6.47, 7.131 Markby v R (1978) 140 CLR 108 …. 3.21, 3.22, 3.30, 3.66 Markovina v R (1996) 16 WAR 354 …. 3.26, 4.102, 7.17 — v — (No 2) (1997) 19 WAR 119 …. 4.20 Marks v Beyfus (1890) 25 QBD 494 …. 5.205, 5.224 Marks v National & General Insurance Co Ltd (1993) 114 FLR 416 …. 5.187 Marr (Contracting) Pty Ltd v White Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (1991) 32 FCR 425 …. 5.187 Marriott v Chamberlain (1886) 17 QBD 154 …. 5.6 Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1155 …. 7.76 — v — [1999] NSWSC 284 …. 5.253

Martin v New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 337 …. 3.154 — v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 …. 2.20 — v Police [2015] SASC 41 …. 5.133 — v R (2010) 28 VR 579; [2010] VSCA 153 …. 2.72 — v Tasmania (2008) 190 A Crim R 77; [2008] TASSC 66 …. 4.9 Martine v R [2015] ACTCA 38 …. 2.37 Martinez v Western Australia (2007) 172 A Crim R 389; [2007] WASCA 143 …. 2.71, 2.88, 4.86, 4.88, 4.93 Marwey v R (1977) 138 CLR 630 …. 6.8 Mason v R (1995) 15 WAR 165 …. 3.31 Master Builders Association v Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees Union of Australia (No 2) (1987) 14 FCR 479 …. 5.150 Masterman Homes Pty Ltd v Palm Assets Pty Ltd (2009) 261 ALR 382; [2009] NSWCA 234 …. 7.131 Mather v Morgan [1971] Tas SR 192 …. 7.84 Matta v R (1995) 119 FLR 414 …. 5.185 Matthews v Chicory Marketing Board (Vic) (1938) 60 CLR 263 …. 6.72 — v R [1973] WAR 110 …. 3.108 — v SA Police (1996) 65 SASR 516 …. 7.15 — v SPI Electricity (Ruling No 17) [2013] VSC 146 …. 7.152 — v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (Ruling No 32) [2013] VSC 630 …. 7.64 — v SPI Electrical Pty Ltd (Ruling No 35) [2014] VSC 59 …. 7.8 Matusevich v R (1977) 137 CLR 633 …. 3.100, 3.101, 3.103, 3.113, 3.119, 3.120, 3.123 Matuska v Ali (1987) 71 ACTR 23 …. 5.5, 5.10 Maugham v Hubbard (1828) 8 B & C 14; 108 ER 948 …. 7.81 Mawaz Khan v R [1967] 1 AC 454 …. 4.87, 8.26, 8.96, 8.99 Mawson v R [1967] VR 205 …. 6.58 Maxwell v DPP [1935] AC 309 …. 3.84, 3.92, 3.107

May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654 …. 2.50, 6.20, 6.30, 6.43 Mayor and Corporation of Bristol v Cox (1884) 26 Ch D 678 …. 5.41, 5.43 Mazinski v Bakka (1979) 20 SASR 350 …. 2.36, 5.255 MB v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 160 …. 4.49 McCartney v R (2012) 38 VR 1; 226 A Crim R 274; [2012] VSCA 268 …. 2.26, 3.12, 4.68 McCaskill v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 66 …. 5.48 McCool v McCool [2008] NSWSC 748 …. 2.20 McDermott v R (1948) 76 CLR 501 …. 2.29, 2.32, 5.136, 8.122, 8.126, 8.128, 8.129 McDonald v Camerotto (1984) 36 SASR 66 …. 2.8, 6.62 — v R (2014) 43 VR 152 …. 3.56 — v — [2013] VSCA 128 …. 8.96 McFadden v Snow (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 8 s …. 5.103 McGavin v R [2014] NSWCCA 171 …. 4.23 McGee v Gilchrist-Humphrey (2005) 92 SASR 100 …. 5.146, 5.182 McGreevy v DPP (1972) 57 Cr App R 424 …. 2.73 McGregor v McGregor [2012] FamCAFC 69 …. 6.65, 7.63 — v Stokes [1952] VLR 347 …. 8.22, 8.32, 8.34 McGuiness v Attorney-General (Vic) (1940) 63 CLR 73 …. 5.205 McIlwraith McEarcharn Operations Ltd v CE Heath Underwriting and Insurance (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) [1995] 1 Qd R 363 …. 5.34 McKay v Hutchins and Fire and All Risks Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 1 Qd R 533 …. 8.173 — v Page and Sobloski (1972) 2 SASR 117 …. 7.49 — v R (1936) 54 CLR 1 …. 8.105 McKeever v McGee; Ex parte McGee [1995] 1 Qd R 623 …. 6.22 McKellar v Smith [1982] 2 NSWLR 950 …. 8.146, 8.153, 8.156 McKey v R (2012) 219 A Crim R 227; [2012] NSWCCA 1 …. 4.88

McKinley v McKinley [1960] 1 WLR 120 …. 5.184 McKinney and Judge v R (1991) 171 CLR 468 …. 4.12, 4.22, 4.32, 4.33, 4.34, 8.105, 8.168 McLellan v Bowyer (1961) 106 CLR 95 …. 7.120 McLennan v Taylor (1966) 85 WN (Pt 1) NSW 525 …. 2.47 McMahon v Cooper [1989] 2 Qd R 8 …. 5.12, 5.34 McNee v Kay [1953] VLR 520 …. 4.23, 4.27, 4.29 McNeill v R (2008) 168 FCR 198 …. 8.154 McQuaker v Goddard [1940] 1 KB 687 …. 6.62, 6.66, 6.71 MDO (a child) v McKinlay (1984) 31 NTR 1 …. 8.152 Mead v Mead (2007) 235 ALR 197; [2007] HCA 25 …. 5.60 Meade v R [2015] VSCA 171 …. 4.56, 7.56 Meadon Pty Ltd v Nommack (No 247) Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 200 …. 5.56 Meadow v General Medical Council [2007] QB 462 …. 7.64 Medici v R (1995) 79 A Crim R 582 …. 5.185 Mees v Roads Corporation (2003) 128 FCR 418; [2003] FCA 306 …. 5.199 Mehesz v Redman (No 2) (1980) 26 SASR 244 …. 6.23, 6.28, 7.24 Meko v R (2004) 146 A Crim R 131 …. 4.93 Melbourne v R (1999) 198 CLR 1 …. 3.107, 3.130, 3.134, 3.136, 3.137 Melendez-Diaz v Massachusetts 129 S Ct 2527 (2009) …. 7.25, 7.64 Meltend Pty Ltd v Restoration Clinics of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 145 ALR 391 …. 5.19, 5.54, 5.58, 5.83 Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria [1998] FCA 1606 …. 7.56, 7.64 Menzies v Australian Iron and Steel Ltd and Hill (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 62 …. 6.40 Mercantile Mutual Insurance (NSW Workers Compensation) Ltd v Murray [2004] NSWCA 151 …. 5.49 Mercer v Denne [1905] 2 Ch 538 …. 8.84

Meredith v Innes (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 104 …. 7.152, 7.155 Merrall v Samuels (1971) 2 SASR 378 …. 5.138 Merritt & Roso v R (1985) 19 A Crim R 360 …. 5.139 Meteyard v Love (2005) 65 NSWLR 36; [2005] NSWCA 444 …. 2.3, 5.37, 5.39 Metricon Homes Pty Ltd v Barrett Property Group Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 46 …. 7.23 Metropolitan Railway Co v Jackson (1877) 3 App Cas 193 …. 6.38 Mexborough (Earl of) v Whitwood UDC [1897] 2 QB 111 …. 5.160, 5.161, 5.162 Meyer v Hall (1972) 26 DLR (3d) 309 …. 7.125 MFA v R (2002) 213 CLR 606 …. 2.14 MGICA (1992) Ltd v Kenny and Good Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 135 ALR 743 …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.81 Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls [2008] NSWSC 1230 …. 5.164 Michaels v R (1995) 184 CLR 117 …. 8.147 Mickelberg v R [1984] WAR 191 …. 8.101 Mickelberg and Mickelberg v Director of Perth Mint [1986] WAR 365 …. 5.187, 5.191, 5.192, 5.193 Mid-City Skin Cancer and Laser Centre Pty Ltd v Zahedi-Anarak [2006] NSWSC 615 …. 7.41 Middencorp v Electric Co Pty Ltd v Law Institute of Victoria (1993) 93 ATC 5041 …. 5.218 Middleton v R (1998) 19 WAR 179 …. 4.33, 8.47, 8.108 Mifsud v Campbell [1991] 2 NSWLR 725 …. 2.67 Miladinovic v R (1993) 47 FCR 190 …. 2.49, 4.57 Miles v R (2014) 240 A Crim R 524; [2014] NSWCCA 72 …. 2.71 Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd and Commonwealth (1971) 17 FLR 141 …. 7.40, 7.72, 7.73, 8.71, 8.84 Milisits v South Australia (2014) 119 SASR 538; [2014] SASCFC 67 …. 5.238

Miller v Minister of Pensions (1947) 63 TLR 474 …. 2.58 — v R (1995) 13 WAR 504 …. 7.105 — v — [2015] NSWCCA 206 …. 2.23, 4.57 — v — (2016) 334 ALR 1; [2016] HCA 30 …. 2.14 Mills v Western Australia (2008) 189 A Crim R 411; [2008] WASCA 219 …. 4.63 Milne v Pope and Belair Cellars Pty Ltd (1972) 4 SASR 45 …. 8.173 Milojevic v Roh Industries Pty Ltd (1991) 56 SASR 78 …. 5.187 Minassian v Minassian [2010] NSWSC 708 …. 7.19 Minet v Morgan (1873) LR 8 Ch App 361 …. 5.27 Minniti v R (2006) 159 A Crim R 394; [2006] NSWCCA 30 …. 2.85, 2.88, 2.89 Mister Figgins Pty Ltd v Centrepoint Freeholds Pty Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 23 …. 3.156, 3.158, 3.161 Mitchell v R [2008] NSWCCA 275 …. 4.63 Mitsubishi Electric Pty Ltd v VWA (2002) 4 VR 332 …. 5.23, 5.41, 5.43 MJH v Western Australia (2006) 33 WAR 9 …. 7.143, 7.149 MK v R [2014] NSWCCA 274 …. 7.30 — v Victorian Legal Aid (2013) 40 VR 378; [2013] VSC 49 …. 2.29 ML Ubase Holdings Co Ltd v Trigem Computer Inc (2007) 69 NSWLR 577; [2007] NSWSC 859 …. 5.59 MLB v R (2010) 203 A Crim R 575; [2010] NTCCA 11 …. 7.34, 7.99 MM v R (2012) 232 A Crim R 303; [2012] ACTCA 44 …. 3.33 MM Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Port Stephens Council (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 243 …. 2.42, 2.45 Moffa v R (1977) 138 CLR 601 …. 6.8 Mole v Mole [1951] P 21 …. 5.104 Moloney v Western Australia [2006] WASCA 193 …. 4.105 Momcilovic v R (2011) 245 CLR 1; [2011] HCA 34 …. 6.14

Monfries v MTT [1970] SASR 521 …. 8.174 Monroe v Twisleton (1802) Peake Add Cas 219; 170 ER 250 …. 5.200 Montecatini’s Patent, Re (1973) 47 ALJR 161 …. 8.170 Mood Music Publishing Co Ltd v De Wolfe Ltd [1976] Ch 119 …. 3.9, 3.158, 3.161 Mooney v James [1949] VLR 22 …. 7.117, 7.126, 7.137 Moor v Moor [1954] 2 All ER 458 …. 7.117 Moore v Giofrelle [1952] ALR 1049 …. 5.191 — v Skinner (1990) 101 FLR 152 …. 7.80 Moran v Amoret Installations Pty Ltd [2000] NSWCA 106 …. 7.69 — v Moran (No 9) [2000] NSWSC 219 …. 7.76 Moreay Nominees Pty Ltd v McCarthy (1993) 10 WAR 293 …. 5.57 Morgan v Babrock and Wilcox Ltd (1929) 43 CLR 163 …. 7.18 — v R [2011] NSWCCA 257 …. 6.58 — v — [2016] NSWCCA 25 …. 4.56, 7.56 Morley v National Insurance Co [1967] VR 566 …. 8.174 — v R (1999) 152 FLR 13 …. 2.71 Morris v R (1987) 163 CLR 454 …. 2.14, 4.3, 6.33, 7.35, 7.119, 7.151, 8.136, 8.166 Morrison v Kiwi Electrix Pty Ltd (1998) 19 WAR 482; 103 A Crim R 312 …. 2.50, 2.54, 6.32, 6.33 Mortimer v M’Callan (1840) 151 ER 320 …. 7.18 Mortimore v Brown (1970) 122 CLR 493 …. 5.181 Moti v R (2011) 245 CLR 456; [2011] HCA 50 …. 2.29, 2.36 Mouroufas v R [2007] NSWCCA 58 …. 3.134, 4.61 Mowday v Western Australia (2007) 176 A Crim R 85; [2007] WASCA 165 …. 6.25 Moyna v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2003] 4 All ER 162 …. 2.12 M’Queen v Great Western Railway Co (1875) LR 10 QB 569 …. 6.43

Mudway v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd [1988] 2 NZLR 283 …. 5.37 Muldoon v R [2008] NSWCCA 315 …. 4.57, 7.54, 8.57 Mule v R (2005) 221 ALR 85; 156 A Crim R 203; [2005] HCA 49 …. 8.108 Mullen v Hackney London Borough Council [1997] 1 WLR 1103 …. 6.60 — v R (1938) 59 CLR 124 …. 6.8 Muller v Linsley & Mortimer [1996] PNLR 74 …. 5.89 Mulley v Manifold (1959) 103 CLR 341 …. 5.7 Mulvihill v R [2016] NSWCCA 259 …. 4.86, 8.96 Munce v Vinidex Tubemakers Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 235 …. 6.2, 6.5, 6.6 Mundey v Askin [1982] 2 NSWLR 369 …. 5.199, 8.98 Mundine v Brown (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 515 …. 8.199 Mundraby v Commonwealth (2001) 184 ALR 737 …. 5.43 Munro v R [2014] ACTCA 11 …. 2.31, 2.83 Murdoch v R (2007) 167 A Crim R 329; [2007] NTCCA 1 …. 2.30, 4.56, 4.74, 7.40, 7.43 — v Taylor [1965] AC 574 …. 3.100, 3.119, 3.120, 3.122 Murdoch (a Pseudonym) v R (2013) 40 VR 451; [2013] VSCA 272 …. 2.31, 3.13, 3.20, 3.57, 3.60 Murphy v R (1989) 167 CLR 94 …. 7.29, 7.31, 7.43, 7.44, 7.53, 7.59, 7.60, 7.136, 7.146 — v R (1994) 62 SASR 121 …. 4.56, 4.88, 7.96 Murray v R (2002) 211 CLR 193; 189 ALR 40 …. 2.71 — v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 18 …. 4.56 Murray-Oates v Jjadd Pty Ltd (1999) 76 SASR 38 …. 8.174 Murrell v R [2014] VSCA 334 …. 2.84 Musarri v R (2006) 32 WAR 19 …. 3.26 Mutemeri v Cheesman [1998] 4 VR 484 …. 6.60 Mutual Life Insurance Co v Hillmon 145 US 285 (1892) …. 8.47 MWJ v R (2005) 222 ALR 436; 80 ALJR 329 …. 7.130, 7.131

Myers v DPP [1965] AC 1001 …. 7.3, 8.4, 8.6, 8.11, 8.30, 8.52, 8.61, 8.170, 8.172, 8.189

N Nagan v Holloway [1996] 1 Qd R 607 …. 5.23, 5.46 Nalberski v R (1989) 44 A Crim R 434 …. 7.125 NAR v PPC1 (2013) 224 A Crim R 535; [2013] NSWCCA 25 …. 5.213 Narkle v R (2001) 23 WAR 468 …. 7.140, 7.149 Narrier v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 191 …. 3.72 Nasrallah v R; R v Nasrallah [2015] NSWCCA 188 …. 7.56 Nast v Nast and Walker [1972] 2 WLR 901 …. 5.159 Nathan v MJF Constructions [1986] VR 75 …. 5.10 National Australia Bank Ltd v Rusu (1999) 47 NSWLR 309 …. 7.8, 7.19 National Crime Authority v Gould (1989) 23 FCR 191 …. 5.244 — v S (1991) 29 FCR 203 …. 5.49, 5.75, 5.77 National Employers’ Mutual General Insurance Association Ltd v Waind [1978] 1 NSWLR 372 …. 5.5, 7.18 — v — (1979) 141 CLR 648 …. 5.41, 5.84 National Justice Compania Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (The ‘Ikarian Reefer’) [1993] 2 Ll LR 68 …. 7.64 National Mutual Life v Godrich (1909) 10 CLR 1 …. 5.211 National Mutual Life Association v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) (2001) 183 ALR 700 …. 5.194 National Tertiary Education Industry Union v Commonwealth (2001) 111 FCR 583 …. 5.236 National Vegetation Management Solutions Pty Ltd v Shekar Plant Hire Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 3 …. 5.89 Natta v Canham (1991) 32 FCR 282 …. 7.140 Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 67 ALJR 170 …. 2.58, 2.64, 2.65, 2.66

Nederlandse Reassurantie Groep Holding NV v Bacon & Woodrow (a firm) [1995] 1 All ER 976 …. 5.27 Neill-Fraser v Tasmania [2012] TASCCA 2 …. 2.85, 2.87 Nembhard v R (1982) 74 Cr App R 144 …. 8.88 — v — [1982] 1 All ER 183 …. 7.125 Neowarra v Western Australia (2003) 205 ALR 145; [2003] FCA 1399 …. 7.54, 7.66, 7.73 Nesterczuk v Mortimore (1965) 115 CLR 140 …. 2.64, 6.3 Nestorov v R [2002] WASCA 356 …. 4.88 Network Ten Ltd v Capital Television Holdings Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 275 …. 5.52 Neubecker v R (2012) 34 VR 369; [2012] VSCA 58 …. 3.56 Neville v R (2004) 145 A Crim R 108; [2004] WASCA 62 …. 4.57 New Cap Reinsurance Corp Ltd (in liq) v Renaissance Reinsurance Ltd [2007] NSWSC 258 …. 5.42 New South Wales v Betfair Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 160 …. 5.26, 5.27 — v Hunt (2014) 86 NSWLR 226; [2014] NSWCA 47 …. 7.131 — v Jackson [2007] NSWCA 279 …. 5.28, 5.35, 5.43 — v Kuru [2007] NSWCA 141 …. 3.49, 7.79 — v Public Transport Ticketing Corp (No 3) (2011) 81 NSWLR 394; [2011] NSWCA 200 …. 2.254 New South Wales Crime Commission v Cassar (2012) 224 A Crim R 448; [2012] NSWSC 1170 …. 7.8 New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board v Master and Sons Pty Ltd [1986] 1 NZLR 191 …. 5.150 Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co v Court of Coal Mines Regulations (1997) 42 NSWLR 351 …. 5.39 Newis v Lark (1571) 2 Plowden 403; 75 ER 609 …. 2.58 Newton v Pieper [1968] 1 NSWR 42 …. 8.174 Nezovic v Minister for Immigration (2003) 203 ALR 33 …. 8.93

Nguyen v R (2002) 26 WAR 59; [2002] WASCA 181 …. 4.56 — v — (2007) 180 A Crim R 267; [2007] NSWCCA 363 …. 4.56, 7.41, 7.56 — v — (2012) 267 FLR 344; [2012] ACTCA 24 …. 2.13 — v — [2017] NSWCCA 4 …. 7.41, 7.56 NH v Director of Public Prosecutions (2016) 90 ALJR 978; [2016] HCA 33 …. 2.14, 5.185 Nichia Corporation v Arrow Electronics Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) (2016) 240 FCR 13; [2016] FCA 466 …. 8.196 Nicholas v Bantick (1993) 3 Tas R 47 …. 5.187, 5.188, 5.192 — v R (1998) 193 CLR 173 …. 1.4, 2.36, 4.53 Nicholl and Dowling; Ex parte Lehmann (1989) 40 A Crim R 185 …. 5.12 Nicholls v R; Coates v R (2005) 219 CLR 196; 213 ALR 1; [2005] HCA 1 …. 4.32, 4.33, 7.133, 7.139, 7.141, 7.143, 7.149, 8.97, 8.99, 8.168 Nichols v Police (2005) 91 SASR 232 …. 7.29 Nickmar Pty Ltd v Preservatrice Skandia Insurance Ltd (1985) 3 NSWLR 44 …. 5.23, 5.34, 5.37, 5.43, 5.48, 5.78 Nicola v Ideal Image Development Corp (2009) 261 ALR 1 …. 6.70 Nigro v Secretary to the Dept of Justice [2013] VSCA 213 …. 2.64 Nikolaidis v R [2008] NSWCCA 323 …. 7.102 Ninness v Walker (1998) 143 FLR 239 …. 6.55 NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank (1999) 161 ALR 576 …. 7.65 Nodnara Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 140 FLR 336 …. 2.19 Nokia Corporation v Cellular Line Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 726 …. 7.41 — v Truong [2005] FCA 1141 …. 7.41, 7.56 Nolan v Nolan (2003) 10 VR 626; [2003] VSC 121 …. 4.75 NOM v DPP [2012] VSCA 198 …. 2.62, 2.64 Nominal Defendant v Clements (1960) 104 CLR 476 …. 7.92, 7.93 — v Hook (1962) 113 CLR 641 …. 8.109

Noor Mohamed v R [1949] AC 182 …. 3.66, 3.69 Normandale v Rankine (1972) 4 SASR 205 …. 7.42 Normanshaw v Normanshaw and Measham (1893) 69 LT 468 …. 5.205 Norrie v NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] NSWCA 145 …. 6.65, 6.71, 6.73 North Sydney Leagues Club Ltd v Synergy Protection Agency Pty Ltd (2012) 83 NSWLR 710; [2012] NSWCA 168 …. 6.23, 7.19 North West Salt Co Ltd v Electrolytic Alkali Co Ltd [1914] AC 461 …. 1.1 Norton v R (2001) 24 WAR 488 …. 8.147, 8.149 Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133 …. 5.10, 5.230 Noto v Western Australia (2006) 168 A Crim R 457; [2006] WASCA 278 …. 3.37, 3.63, 3.75 Novacic v Cooper (1973) 1 ACTR 99 …. 7.17 Nowell v Palmer (1993) 32 NSWLR 574 …. 8.76, 8.110 NRMA Ltd v Morgan (No 2) [1999] NSWSC 694 …. 5.58 NSW Bar Association v Archer (No 7) [2005] NSWADT 223 …. 7.8 NSW Crime Commission v Z (2007) 231 CLR 75; [2007] HCA 7 …. 5.60 NSW Food Authority v Nutricia Australia Pty Ltd (2008) 72 NSWLR 456; [2008] NSWCCA 252 …. 5.71, 5.160 NT v R (2012) 225 A Crim R 102; [2012] VSCA 213 …. 8.53 Nudd v R (2006) 225 ALR 161; [2006] HCA 9 …. 2.49 Numoo v Garner (1998) 7 NTLR 129 …. 2.36 Nye v NSW (2002) 134 A Crim R 245 …. 8.199

O Obacelo Pty Ltd v Taveraft Pty Ltd (1986) 10 FCR 518 …. 6.48, 6.50 Ocean Marine Mutual Insurance Association (Europe) OV v Jetoplay Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1463 …. 7.14, 7.64 O’Chee v Rowley (1997) 150 ALR 199 …. 5.198

O’Connell v Adams [1973] Crim LR 113 …. 7.131 O’Connor v R [2007] NSWCCA 266 …. 7.76, 7.80 — v Stevenson (1988) 13 IPR 145 …. 3.156 Office of Fair Trading v IBA Healthcare Ltd [2004] 4 All ER 1103 …. 6.6 Ofulue v Bossert [2009] UKHL 16 …. 5.89, 5.94 Ogle v Comboyuro Investments Pty Ltd (1976) 136 CLR 444 …. 2.20 Oke v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (2007) 168 A Crim R 503 …. 5.81 O’Kelly v Dalrymple (1993) 45 FCR 145 …. 7.74 O’Leary v Lamb (1973) 7 SASR 159 …. 8.174, 8.186 — v R (1946) 73 CLR 566 …. 3.31, 8.35, 8.72 Ollerton v R (1989) 40 A Crim R 133 …. 8.104 Omar v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 198 …. 4.63 O’Meara v Dominican Fathers [2003] ACTCA 24 …. 7.19 — v R [2006] NSWCCA 131 …. 4.69 — v Western Australia (2013) 235 A Crim R 209; [2013] WASCA 228 …. 2.8 Omychund v Barker (1744) 1 Atk 21; 26 ER 15 …. 7.28 O’Neil, Re [1972] VR 327 …. 8.85 O’Neon v R (1991) 52 A Crim R 144 …. 4.59, 4.62, 4.71 Onerati v Phillips Constructions Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 750 …. 5.187 Orchard v Spooner (1992) 28 NSWLR 114 …. 7.80 Ordukaya v Hicks [2000] NSWCA 180 …. 2.32 Osland v R (1998) 197 CLR 316 …. 7.44, 7.51, 7.58 — v Secretary to the Department of Justice (2008) 234 CLR 275; [2008] HCA 37 …. 5.51, 5.58 O’Sullivan v R (2012) 233 A Crim R 449; [2012] NSWCCA 45 …. 3.147 — v Stubbs [1952] SASR 61 …. 6.20 — v Waterman [1965] SASR 150 …. 7.79

Ouwarkerk v Whalan (1986) 41 SASR 287 …. 5.134 Owen v Edwards (1983) 77 Cr App R 191 …. 7.84 Owner v Bee Hive Spinning Co Ltd [1914] 1 KB 105 …. 7.18

P P v R (1993) 61 SASR 75 …. 3.108, 3.112, 3.113 Pace v R [2014] VSCA 317 …. 4.70 Pacific Century Production Pty Ltd v Netafim Australia Pty Ltd [2004] 2 Qd R 422; [2004] QCA 63 …. 5.10 Packer v Cameron (1989) 54 SASR 246 …. 6.45 — v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1985] 1 Qd R 275 …. 5.33, 5.60 Paddock v Forrester (1842) 3 Man & G 903; 133 ER 1404 …. 5.94 Page v McKensey [2002] NSWSC 570 …. 5.187 — v R [2015] VSCA 537 …. 3.58, 3.61 Paine v R [1974] Tas SR (NC) 117 …. 4.19 Paino v Paino [2008] NSWCA 276 …. 7.66 Palermo, The (1883) 9 PD 6 …. 5.43 Palios Meegan & Nicholson Holdings Pty Ltd v Shore (2010) 108 SASR 31; [2010] SASCFC 21 …. 2.64, 3.161 Pallante v Stadiums Pty Ltd (No 2) [1976] VR 363 …. 8.61 Palmer v R (1998) 193 CLR 1 …. 2.49, 2.71, 7.124, 7.140 Palos Verdes Estates Pty Ltd v Carbon (1992) 6 WAR 223 …. 6.62 Pan Pharmaceuticals Ltd (in liq) v Selim [2008] FCA 416 …. 7.56 Panda v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 5 …. 3.75 Pantorno v R (1989) 166 CLR 466 …. 1.1, 6.69 Papakosmas v R (1999) 196 CLR 297 …. 2.23, 2.29, 2.30, 2.31, 2.32, 2.49, 7.93, 7.99, 7.102, 8.194 Papazoglou v R (2010) 28 VR 644; [2010] VSCA 201 …. 7.133 — v — (2014) 244 A Crim R 114; [2014] VSCA 194 …. 5.185

Pappas v New World Oil Developments (1993) 43 FCR 594 …. 5.168 Papson v Woolworths (Victoria) Pty Ltd (2000) 9 Tas R 261 …. 5.211 Paric v John Holland Constructions Pty Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 505 …. 7.131 — v — (1985) 62 ALR 85 …. 7.68 Park v Citibank Savings Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 219 …. 7.3 — v White (1995) 21 MVR 504 …. 5.266 Parker v Comptroller-General of Customs (2007) 243 ALR 574 …. 8.156 — v — (2009) 252 ALR 619; 83 ALJR 494; [2009] HCA 7 …. 2.27, 2.37, 5.258 — v — [2007] NSWCCA 348 …. 2.37 — v Espinoza (1996) 85 A Crim R 336 …. 4.12 — v Police (2002) 81 SASR 240; [2002] SASC 30 …. 2.32 — v R (1963) 111 CLR 610 …. 6.8, 6.25 Parkin v O’Sullivan (2009) 260 ALR 503; [2009] FCA 1096 …. 5.223, 5.232, 5.244 Parkview Qld Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2012] NSWSC 1599 …. 5.57 Parsons v R [2016] VSCA 17 …. 3.136 Pascoe v Divisional Security Group Pty Ltd (2007) 209 FLR 197; [2007] NSWSC 211 …. 5.154, 5.166 Pate (a pseudonym) v R [2015] VSCA 110 …. 8.198 Patel v Comptroller of Customs [1966] AC 356 …. 8.30, 8.57 Paul v DPP (1990) 90 Cr App R 173 …. 6.75 Pavey, In the Marriage of (1976) 10 ALR 259 …. 4.11, 4.75 Pavitt v R (2007) 169 A Crim R 452; [2007] NSWCCA 88 …. 7.92, 8.125, 8.155 Payless Superbarn (NSW) Ltd v O’Gara (1990) 19 NSWLR 551 …. 7.130 Payne v Crawford (1992) 3 Tas R 360 …. 1.38, 2.62, 2.67 — v Harrison [1961] 2 QB 403 …. 6.41 — v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191 …. 5.168

Peacock v R [2008] NSWCCA 264 …. 7.116 Pearce v Button (1985) 8 FCR 388 …. 2.36, 5.62, 5.255 Pearmine v R [1988] WAR 315 …. 7.131 Pearsall v R (1990) 49 A Crim R 439 …. 2.29, 4.66 Pearse v Sommers [1992] 28 NSWLR 492 …. 7.91 Pease v R [2009] NSWCCA 136 …. 4.30 Peatling, Re [1969] VR 214 …. 6.25, 6.26, 6.27 Peet & Co Ltd v Rocci [1985] WAR 164 …. 3.156 Pemble v R (1971) 124 CLR 107 …. 2.47 Penney v R (1998) 155 ALR 605 …. 2.87 Pennington v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 98 …. 4.88 Pennington (dec’d) (No 2), Re [1978] VR 617 …. 8.85 People v Carney [1955] IR 324 …. 4.101 — v Collins 438 P 2d 33 (1968) …. 1.21, 1.25 — v Donovan 279 NYS 2d 404 (1967) …. 4.53 People (Attorney-General), The v Casey (No 2) [1963] IR 33 …. 4.75 Perera v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 507 …. 8.53 Perez v R [2008] NSWCCA 46 …. 4.49 Perish v R [2016] NSWCCA 89 …. 2.27, 2.46 Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v Boulton (1994) 33 NSWLR 735 …. 7.60 Perry v New Hampshire 565 US 228 (2012) …. 4.65 — v R (1981) 28 SASR 417 …. 3.70 — v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 …. 3.14, 3.21, 3.22, 3.23, 3.24, 3.30, 3.39, 3.42, 3.44, 3.46, 3.52, 3.69 Pertl v Kahl (1976) 13 SASR 433 …. 6.28 Peters v R (1987) 23 A Crim R 451 …. 8.150, 8.159 Peterson (a Pseudonym) v R [2014] VSCA 111 …. 2.31, 4.69

Petty v R (1994) 13 WAR 372 …. 3.34, 4.49 Petty and Maiden v R (1991) 173 CLR 95 …. 5.121, 5.135, 5.137, 5.139, 5.141, 5.142, 5.143 Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461; [1995] HCA 7 …. 3.6, 3.12, 3.13, 3.17, 3.21, 3.22, 3.27, 3.28, 3.29, 3.30, 3.31, 3.32, 3.34, 3.37, 3.38, 3.41, 3.42, 3.44, 3.45, 3.46, 3.47, 3.51, 3.52, 3.53, 3.58, 3.62, 3.63, 3.64, 3.70, 3.97 PGM v R (2006) 164 A Crim R 426; [2006] NSWCCA 310 …. 3.108, 3.131, 3.134 Phelan v Black (1971) 56 Cr App R 257 …. 6.53 Phelps v Gothachalkenin [1996] Qd R 503 …. 4.64 Phillips v R (1985) 159 CLR 45 …. 2.30, 3.101, 3.103, 3.105, 3.111, 3.113, 3.114, 3.116, 7.138 — v — (2006) 225 CLR 303; [2006] HCA 4 …. 3.21, 3.39, 3.42, 3.44, 3.45, 3.47, 3.48, 3.50, 3.51, 3.66 — v — [2015] SASCFC 67 …. 2.71, 7.155 Phillon v R [1978] 1 SCR 18 …. 7.136 Physiotherapy Board of SA v Heywood-Smith (2008) 101 SASR 573 …. 7.44 Pickering v Edmunds (1994) 63 SASR 357 …. 5.57 Piddington v Bennett and Wood Pty Ltd (1940) 63 CLR 533 …. 7.140, 7.141 Pihiga Pty Ltd v Roche (2011) 278 ALR 209; [2011] FCA 240 …. 5.96, 5.97, 5.103 Pikos v Bezuidenhout (2004) 145 A Crim R 544; [2004] QCA 178 …. 6.60 PIM v Western Australia (2009) 40 WAR 489; [2009] WASCA 131 …. 2.87, 3.63, 3.75 Pinkstone v R [2003] WASCA 66 …. 7.131, 8.47 Pinta v R [1999] WASCA 125 …. 4.74 Pioneer Concrete (NSW) Pty Ltd v Webb (1995) 18 ACSR 418 …. 5.56 Piszczyk v Bolton (1984) 38 SASR 330 …. 2.8, 6.62 Pitkin v R (1995) 130 ALR 35 …. 4.13, 4.56, 4.65, 4.73 Pitman v Byrne [1926] SASR 207 …. 4.83

Pitts v Adney [1961] NSWR 535 …. 5.103 Plaintiff B 60 of 2012 v Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade (2013) 306 ALR 478; [2013] FCA 1303 …. 5.223 Plato Films Ltd v Speidel [1961] AC 1090 …. 3.129, 3.153 Players Pty Ltd (in liq) (receivers appointed) v Clone Pty Ltd (2013) 115 SASR 547; [2013] SASCFC 25 …. 5.30, 5.46, 5.55, 5.76, 5.85 Pledge v Roads & Traffic Authority (2004) 78 ALJR 572 …. 7.23 Plunkett v Bull (1915) 19 CLR 544 …. 4.11, 4.75 PNJ v DPP (2010) 27 VR 146; [2010] VSCA 88 …. 3.60, 3.61 Police v Barber (2010) 108 SASR 520; [2010] SASC 329 …. 7.66 — v Beck (2001) 79 SASR 98 …. 5.17 — v Butcher (2014) 119 SASR 509; [2014] SASC 85 …. 6.28 — v Dodd (2004) 88 SASR 130 …. 6.22 — v Dunstall (2015) 256 CLR 403; [2015] HCA 26 …. 2.27, 2.29, 2.32 — v Fountaine (1999) 74 SASR 26 …. 2.32 — v Hall (2006) 95 SASR 482; [2006] SASC 281 …. 2.29, 2.32, 2.36, 2.37, 5.264 — v Jervis (1998) 70 SASR 429 …. 2.29, 2.32, 2.36, 5.264 — v Jervis; Police v Holland (1998) SASR 1 …. 8.158 — v Kyriacou (2009) 103 SASR 243 …. 6.46 — v Leo (2006) 94 SASR 496; [2006] SASC 144 …. 6.33, 6.35 — v Sherlock (2009) 103 SASR 147; [2009] SASC 64 …. 2.29 — v Tupe [1999] SASC 314 …. 6.31 Police Service Board v Morris & Martin (1985) 156 CLR 397 …. 5.145, 5.146, 5.160, 5.162, 5.180, 5.181, 5.183 Pollard v R (1992) 176 CLR 177 …. 5.267, 8.140, 8.143, 8.156, 8.157, 8.168 — v — (2011) 31 VR 416; [2011] VSCA 95 …. 4.88, 4.93 Pollentine v Attorney-General (Qld) [2014] HCA 30 …. 1.5 Pollitt v R (1992) 174 CLR 558 …. 4.27, 4.32, 4.76, 4.77, 4.79, 4.97, 8.2, 8.5,

8.6, 8.9, 8.17, 8.28, 8.29, 8.61, 8.66, 8.68, 8.114 Pollock v Wellington (1996) 15 WAR 1 …. 7.68 Polycarpou v Australian Wire Industries Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 49 …. 2.29, 2.36, 3.158 Pomery v Rural Hotels Pty Ltd and Ellison (1973) 5 SASR 191 …. 8.111 Pooraka Holdings Pty Ltd v Participation Nominees Pty Ltd (1989) 52 SASR 148 …. 5.238 — v — (1991) 58 SASR 158 …. 8.92 Pope v Ewendt (1977) 17 SASR 45 …. 6.47, 6.60, 6.61, 6.63, 6.75, 7.22 Popovic v Derks [1961] VR 413 …. 4.87 Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589 …. 5.187 Porteous v Dorn (1974) 45 DLR (3d) 596 …. 8.85 Porter v Kolodzeij [1962] VR 75 …. 6.23, 6.28, 7.24, 7.25 Portland Manufacturers Ltd v Harte [1977] QB 306 …. 6.41 Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277 …. 5.71 — v R (2013) 39 VR 655; [2013] VSCA 291 …. 8.66 Potts v Miller (1940) 60 CLR 22 …. 8.170 Power v R (2014) 43 VR 261; A Crim R 553; [2014] VSCA 146 …. 7.123, 7.125, 8.78, 8.194 Powercor Australia Ltd v Perry (2011) 33 VR 548; [2011] VSCA 239 …. 5.27 Powers v R [2000] NTCCA 2 …. 4.64, 4.74 Pownall v Conlan Management Pty Ltd (1995) 12 WAR 370 …. 7.68, 7.71 PPC v Williams (2013) 238 A Crim R 25; [2013] NSWCCA 286 …. 5.213 PQ v Australian Red Cross Society [1992] 1 VR 19 …. 7.71 Practice Note (No 1 of 2004) (2004) 8 VR 475 …. 4.88 Practitioners of the Supreme Court, Re [1980] 26 SASR 275 …. 8.174 Prasad v Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1991) 101 ALR 109 …. 8.26 Prashar v R (1989) 1 WAR 190 …. 6.34, 6.35

Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357; 207 ALR 217 …. 5.19, 5.22, 5.23, 5.33, 5.36, 5.37, 5.38 Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd [1995] 1 AC 321 …. 5.199 Prentice v Collins (No 4) [2002] FCA 1215 …. 6.39, 6.40 — v Cummins (No 5) (2002) 124 FCR 67; [2002] FCA 1503 …. 6.39, 6.44, 6.66, 6.69 Prestage and Shearing v R [1976] Tas SR 16 …. 7.79 Preston v Western Australia (2012) 220 A Crim R 347; [2012] WASCA 64 …. 3.63 Prestwood v Shuttleworth (1985) 39 SASR 125 …. 5.201 Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81 …. 2.44, 2.45, 7.120, 7.151 — v Earl Torrington (1703) 1 Salk 285; 91 ER 252 …. 8.83 — v McCabe; Ex parte Price [1985] 2 Qd R 510 …. 5.149 Prince v Samo (1838) 7 Ad & El 627; 112 ER 606 …. 7.156 Protean (Holdings) Ltd v American Home Assurance Co [1985] VR 187 …. 6.38, 6.39, 6.40, 6.42, 6.44 Prus-Grzybowski v Everingham (1986) 44 NTR 7 …. 5.51 Public Transport Authority of WA v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (2007) 34 WAR 239; [2007] WASCA 151 …. 5.23, 5.28, 5.46, 5.49 Puchalski v R [2007] NSWCCA 220 …. 8.197 Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164 …. 6.2, 6.3, 6.5, 6.6, 6.11 Pye v Butterfield (1864) 5 B & S 829; 122 ER 1038 …. 5.160, 5.161 Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1983) 152 CLR 328 …. 5.74, 5.145, 5.146, 5.148, 5.149, 5.150, 5.152, 5.159, 5.160, 5.161, 5.162, 5.180, 5.181

Q Qantas v TWU (2011) 280 ALR 503; [2011] FCA 470 …. 8.112 Qantas Airways Ltd v Gama [2008] FCAFC 69 …. 2.64 Qing An v R [2007] NSWCCA 53 …. 7.21

Quad Consulting Pty Ltd v David R Bleakley & Associates Pty Ltd (1990) 27 FCR 86 …. 5.89, 5.100 Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Haynes [1959] AC 743 …. 2.20 Quality Publications Australia Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2009] FCA 1293 …. 5.36 Qualtieri v R (2006) 171 A Crim R 463; [2006] NSWCCA 95 …. 3.36, 3.54, 3.56, 3.73, 3.74, 3.75 Queanbeyan City Council v ACTEW Corporation Ltd (2008) 253 ALR 121; [2008] FCA 1983 …. 5.234 Queen Caroline, The Trial of (1820) 2 Brod & Bing 286; 129 ER 976 …. 7.15, 7.149, 7.153, 7.155 Queensland Independent Wholesalers Ltd, Re (1995) ATPR 41-438 …. 7.64 Queensland Law Society Inc v Albietz [2000] 1 Qd R 621 …. 5.51 Quenchy Crusta Sales Pty Ltd v Logi-Tech Pty Ltd [2002] SASC 374 …. 5.7 Question of Law Reserved (No 1 of 1998) (1998) 70 SASR 281 …. 2.37, 5.81, 5.261 Question of Law Reserved (No 1 of 2000) (2000) 113 A Crim R 272 …. 5.212, 5.213 Question of Law Reserved (No 2 of 1997) (1998) 98 A Crim R 544 …. 7.33 Question of Law Reserved (No 3 of 1997) (1998) 70 SASR 555 …. 8.77, 8.78 Question of Law Reserved (No 3 of 1998) (1998) 71 SASR 223 …. 8.57 Question of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 1 of 1993) (1993) 59 SASR 214 …. 4.21, 4.37, 4.41, 7.101 Questions of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 2 of 1993) (1993) 61 SASR 1 …. 2.50, 2.54, 6.32 Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371 …. 2.3, 2.31, 7.38, 7.54, 7.66, 7.69, 7.70

R R v AB [2001] NSWCCA 496 …. 3.36, 3.56, 3.62 — v Abadom [1983] 1 WLR 126 …. 7.43, 7.71

— v Abbey [2009] ONCA 624 …. 7.52 — v Abbott [1955] 2 QB 497 …. 6.34, 6.35 — v Abdallah [2001] NSWCCA 506 …. 4.88, 7.131 — v Abdullah [1999] NSWCCA 188 …. 5.205 — v Abraham (1998) 70 SASR 575 …. 2.71 — v Abusafiah (1991) 56 A Crim R 424 …. 2.49 — v Accused [1992] 1 NZLR 257 …. 7.3 — v Adam (1999) 47 NSWLR 267 …. 7.79, 7.83, 8.198 — v — (1999) 106 A Crim R 510; [1999] NSWCCA 189 …. 2.88 — v Adams (No 2) [1998] 1 Cr App R 377 …. 1.22, 1.26, 1.42 — v Adams [1996] 2 Cr App R 467 …. 1.22, 1.26, 1.33, 1.42, 2.66, 2.70 — v Adcock [2016] QCA 264 …. 8.181 — v Addison (1993) 70 A Crim R 213 …. 8.115 — v Adler (2000) 52 NSWLR 451; [2000] NSWCCA 357 …. 4.57 — v Agar (1990) 90 Cr App R 318 …. 5.205 — v Age (2011) 257 FLR 85; [2011] NTSC 104 …. 8.149, 8.152 — v AH (1997) 42 NSWLR 702 …. 3.56, 3.62, 3.75 — v Ainsworth (1991) 57 A Crim R 174 …. 8.133, 8.143, 8.147, 8.156 — v Aitchison (1996) 90 A Crim R 448 …. 4.45 — v Ajax (1977) 17 SASR 88 …. 8.146, 8.152, 8.153 — v AJS (2005) 12 VR 563 …. 2.12 — v Akbulat (1993) 69 A Crim R75 …. 4.85 — v Albu (1995) 64 SASR 319 …. 4.53, 5.258 — v Aldridge (1990) 20 NSWLR 737 …. 7.42, 7.138 — v Alexander [1975] VR 741 …. 2.46, 7.82, 7.84, 7.86 — v — [1994] 2 VR 239 …. 5.139 — v Alexandridis (1994) 76 A Crim R 391 …. 4.61 — v Alexandroaia (1995) 81 A Crim R 286 …. 2.26

— v Algar [1954] 1 QB 279 …. 5.200 — v Ali [1996] 2 VR 49 …. 2.65 — v — (2001) 122 A Crim R 498; [2001] NSWCCA 218 …. 4.73 — v — (No 2) (2005) 13 VR 257; [2005] VSCA 302 …. 4.86 — v ALJ (2000) 117 A Crim R 370 …. 2.71, 2.72 — v Allen [1988] VR 736 …. 7.130 — v — (2011) 109 SASR 396; [2011] SASCFC 40 …. 2.12, 8.108 — v Allen and Evans [1965] 2 QB 295 …. 4.102 — v Allingham [1991] 1 Qd R 429 …. 3.142 — v Ambrosoli (2002) 55 NSWLR 603; [2002] NSWCCA 386 …. 2.31, 8.66, 8.197 — v Ames [1964] NSWR 1489 …. 2.30, 7.24 — v AN (2000) 117 A Crim R 176 …. 3.57 — v Anders (2009) 20 VR 596; [2009] VSCA 7 …. 7.33 — v Anderson (1929) 21 Cr App R 178 …. 7.151, 7.152 — v — (1991) 57 A Crim R 143 …. 8.152, 8.154 — v — [2000] 1 VR 1 …. 3.33, 7.51, 7.54, 7.60 — v — (2001) 127 A Crim R 116 …. 2.72 — v Andrews (1982) 2 NSWLR 116 …. 3.136 — v — [1987] 1 Qd R 21 …. 3.33 — v — [1987] AC 281 …. 8.39, 8.41, 8.66, 8.67, 8.69, 8.88, 8.89 — v — [2003] NSWCCA 7 …. 3.56, 3.62 — v — (No 3) (2005) 92 SASR 442; [2005] SASC 298 …. 2.44, 5.170, 5.202 — v Anic, Stylianiou and Suleyman (1993) 68 A Crim R 313 …. 8.47 — v Anthony [1962] VR 440 …. 4.26, 6.34 — v Anunga (1976) 11 ALR 412 …. 8.152, 8.156 — v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563 …. 6.48, 6.51, 6.52, 6.53, 6.54, 6.55, 6.57 — v Appleby (1996) 88 A Crim R 456 …. 3.73

— v Armstrong (1990) 54 SASR 207 …. 3.42, 3.44 — v Armstrong; Ex parte King [1985] 2 Qd R 178 …. 2.50 — v Arnott (1995) 79 A Crim R 275 …. 8.86 — v — (2009) 26 VR 490; [2009] VSCA 299 …. 8.133, 8.136 — v Arundell [1999] 2 VR 228 …. 2.71, 4.49 — v Arvidson [2008] NSWCCA 135 …. 2.31 — v Asciak [1990] WAR 120 …. 4.30 — v Asfour (1991) 60 A Crim 409 …. 4.32 — v Ashton (1999) 108 A Crim R 200 …. 7.120 — v Asquith (1994) 72 A Crim R 250 …. 2.71 — v Associated Northern Collieries (1910) 11 CLR 738 …. 5.147, 5.162 — v Astill (1992) 63 A Crim R 148 …. 8.56, 8.69 — v Atef Fathakka Nouh Yussef El Zarw (1991) 58 A Crim R 310 …. 5.190 — v ATM [2000] NSWCCA 475 …. 3.75 — v Atroushi [2001] NSWCCA 406 …. 3.62 — v Austin (1979) 21 SASR 315 …. 8.159 — v Aylen (1987) 47 SASR 254 …. 8.189 — v Ayoub [2004] NSWCCA 209 …. 4.26 — v Azar (1991) 56 A Crim R 414 …. 8.128, 8.132, 8.133 — v Aziz [1982] 2 NSWLR 322 …. 4.59, 4.67, 4.74 — v — [1996] AC 41 …. 3.130, 3.136, 3.137, 3.138, 8.108 — v B, AM (2015) 124 SASR 176; [2015] SASCFC 174 …. 3.64, 7.34 — v B, FG (2013) 115 SASR 499; [2013] SASCFC 24 …. 4.88 — v B, J [2009] SASC 110 …. 4.49 — v Baden-Clay (2016) 334 ALR 234; [2016] HCA 35 …. 1.11, 2.14, 2.25, 2.90 — v Baffigo [1957] VR 303 …. 7.80 — v Bagshaw (1984) 78 Cr App R 163 …. 7.35

— v BAH (2002) 5 VR 517 …. 7.21 — v Baines [1909] 1 KB 258 …. 5.5 — v Bajic (2005) 12 VR 155; [2005] VSCA 158 …. 2.71 — v Baker (1912) 7 Cr App R 252 …. 3.108 — v — (2000) 78 SASR 103 …. 4.103 — v — [2001] NSWCCA 151 …. 4.26, 4.27 — v Ball [1911] AC 47 …. 3.17, 3.24, 3.25, 3.26, 3.29, 3.36, 3.40, 3.42 — v Baltensperger (2004) 90 SASR 129 …. 7.104 — v Bandiera and Licastro [1999] 3 VR 103 …. 4.88 — v Bank of Montreal (1962) 36 DLR (2d) 45 …. 5.150 — v Banks (1916) 12 Cr App R 74 …. 7.153 — v Banner [1970] VR 240 …. 8.131 — v Bara (1998) 106 A Crim R 1 …. 8.152 — v Barbaro (1993) 32 NSWLR 619 …. 7.96 — v Barbaro and Rovero (2000) 112 A Crim R 551 …. 7.98 — v Baring (2005) 155 A Crim R 326; [2005] SASC 262 …. 4.88 — v Barker (1975) 65 Cr App R 287 …. 2.55 — v Barnes (2008) 182 A Crim R 56; [2008] VSC 66 …. 6.33 — v Baron Von Russen (1995) 77 A Crim R 566 …. 8.28 — v Barrett (2007) 16 VR 240; [2007] VSCA 95 …. 4.88, 4.93, 5.138, 8.108 — v Barrington [1981] 1 WLR 419 …. 3.29 — v Barrow [2001] 2 Qd R 525 …. 4.89, 4.95 — v Barry [1984] 1 Qd R 74 …. 7.43 — v Bartels (1986) 44 SASR 260 …. 4.57, 4.59 — v Bartle (2003) 181 FLR 1 …. 3.108 — v Bartlett [1996] 2 VR 687 …. 7.47, 7.51, 7.58, 7.149, 8.159 — v Barton [1973] 1 WLR 115 …. 5.68, 5.70 — v — [2006] NSWSC 1494 …. 2.30

— v Basha (1989) 39 A Crim R 337 …. 5.13 — v Bashir [1969] 3 All ER 692 …. 3.142, 3.143 — v Baskerville [1916] 2 KB 658 …. 4.82, 4.85, 4.95, 4.97, 4.102 — v Bastan [2009] VSCA 157 …. 3.33 — v Bauer [2006] 1 Qd R 420; [2005] QCA 305 …. 3.146 — v BBR [2010] 1 Qd R 546; [2009] QCA 178 …. 7.30 — v BCQ (2013) 240 A Crim R 153; [2013] QCA 388 …. 2.87 — v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 …. 2.30, 7.92, 7.102, 8.194 — v BDX [2009] VSCA 28 …. 7.58, 7.112, 7.142 — v Beattie (1996) 40 NSWLR 155; 89 A Crim R 393 …. 2.28, 4.9, 4.22, 4.34, 7.137 — v — (2001) 127 A Crim R 250; [2001] NSWCCA 502 …. 2.23 — v Beck [1982] 1 All ER 807 …. 4.26, 4.28, 4.30, 4.76, 4.102 — v — [1990] 1 Qd R 30 …. 8.108 — v Beckett [2011] 1 Qd R 259; [2009] QCA 196 …. 3.77 — v Bedfordshire (Inhabitants) (1855) 4 E & B 335 …. 8.84 — v Bedingfield (1879) 14 Cox CC 341 …. 8.37 — v Bedington [1970] Qd R 353 …. 7.153 — v Beech (1978) 20 SASR 410 …. 3.107, 3.116, 3.140 — v Beggs [1989] Crim LR 898 …. 3.44 — v Begie [1992] Crim LR 301 …. 3.151 — v Béland [1987] 2 SCR 398 …. 7.136 — v Belford and Bound (2011) 208 A Crim R 256; [2011] QCA 43 …. 3.77 — v Beljajev [1984] VR 657 …. 5.138, 5.139, 5.140, 5.144 — v Bell (1994) 77 A Crim R 213 …. 4.33, 8.147 — v — [2002] NSWCCA 2 …. 3.134, 3.135 — v Bellino and Conte (1992) 59 A Crim R 322 …. 4.102 — v Benbrika (Ruling No 23) (2008) 221 FLR 122; [2008] VSC 137 …. 5.254

— v Benecke (1999) 106 A Crim R 282; [1999] NSWCCA 163 …. 4.57, 7.54, 8.57 — v Benfield [1997] 2 VR 491 …. 4.88 — v Bennett (2004) 88 SASR 6 …. 4.71 — v Bennett and Clark (1986) 44 SASR 164 …. 5.134, 5.267, 8.148, 8.154, 8.157 — v Bennett and Vaughan (1998) 100 A Crim R 228 …. 7.65 — v Benz (1989) 168 CLR 110 …. 4.57, 8.5, 8.6, 8.16, 8.40, 8.41, 8.68, 8.70, 8.85 — v Berry and Wenitong (2007) 17 VR 153; [2007] VSCA 202 …. 1.26, 2.87, 4.88 — v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 …. 2.87, 3.31, 3.34, 3.35, 3.36, 3.73, 3.74, 3.150, 6.46 — v BFB (2003) 87 SASR 278 …. 4.47, 4.49 — v Bigeni (1990) 47 A Crim R 363 …. 4.62 — v Bikic [2001] NSWCCA 537 …. 5.169, 5.172 — v Bilick and Starke (1984) 36 SASR 321 …. 6.32 — v Birch (1994) 74 A Crim R 585 …. 7.125 — v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677 …. 2.49, 7.131 — v Bishop [1975] QB 274 …. 3.140 — v Bisht (2013) 234 A Crim R 309; [2013] QCA 238 …. 7.33 — v BJC (2005) 13 VR 407; [2005] VSCA 154 …. 2.71, 3.36 — v Bjordal (2005) 93 SASR 237; [2005] SASC 422 …. 7.53, 7.66 — v Blake and Tye (1844) 6 QB 126; 115 ER 49 …. 8.115 — v Blastland [1986] AC 41 …. 8.2, 8.42, 8.43, 8.47, 8.77, 8.78 — v Blayney and Blayney [2002] SASC 192 …. 8.168 — v Blick [2000] NSWCCA 61 …. 2.31 — v Bliss (1837) Ad & El 550; 112 ER 577 …. 8.84 — v Blobel [2001] SASC 374 …. 2.9, 3.136

— v Board of Inland Revenue; Ex parte Goldberg [1989] QB 267 …. 5.43 — v Bodsworth [1968] 2 NSWR 132 …. 8.132 — v Bond [1906] 2 KB 389 …. 2.20, 3.66, 3.67 — v — (1996) 16 SR(WA) 207 …. 7.125 — v Bondareff, Usachov and McCabe (1999) 74 SASR 353 …. 8.142, 8.143, 8.156 — v Bonnick (1977) 66 Cr App R 266 …. 6.3 — v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45 …. 7.44, 7.53, 7.66 — v Bonython-Wright (2013) 117 SASR 410; [2013] SASCFC 87 …. 3.64 — v Boskovitz [1999] NSWCCA 437 …. 3.62 — v Bosman (1988) 50 SASR 365 …. 8.131, 8.160 — v Bouquet (1962) 62 SR (NSW) 563 …. 5.140 — v Bourchas (2002) 133 A Crim R 413 …. 2.4 — v Bowhay (No 3) [1998] NSWSC 660 …. 2.30 — v Boyes (1861) 1 B & S 311; 121 ER 730 …. 5.171 — v Boykovski and Atanasovski (1991) 58 A Crim R 436 …. 6.58 — v Boyle (2009) 26 VR 219; [2009] VSCA 289 …. 2.72 — v Bradshaw (1978) 18 SASR 83 …. 3.67, 6.3, 7.21, 7.82, 8.133 — v Brady (1980) 2 A Crim R 42 …. 8.104 — v — (2005) 92 SASR 135; [2005] SASC 277 …. 6.33 — v Bragg (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 436 …. 7.151 — v Braham and Mason [1976] VR 547 …. 5.28 — v Braum (1983) 21 NTR 6 …. 4.23 — v Brdarovski (2006) 166 A Crim R 366; [2006] VSCA 231 …. 4.84, 6.58 — v Brennan [1999] 2 Qd R 529 …. 4.88 — v Bridgman (1980) 24 SASR 278 …. 8.96 — v Briggs (1987) 24 A Crim R 98 …. 2.50, 2.54, 6.32, 6.33 — v Britten (1989) 51 SASR 567 …. 4.3, 4.67

— v Britton [1987] 1 WLR 539 …. 7.82 — v Brooks (1998) 44 NSWLR 121 …. 7.30 — v Brophy [1982] AC 476 …. 3.85, 8.165 — v Brotherton (1992) 29 NSWLR 95 …. 4.57 — v Brougham (2015) 122 SASR 546; [2015] SASCFC 75 …. 2.14 — v Brown (1975) 10 SASR 139 …. 6.9 — v — [1960] VR 382 …. 3.113 — v — [1977] Qd R 220 …. 7.28 — v — [1990] VR 820 …. 3.78 — v — [1995] 1 Qd R 287 …. 2.71 — v — [2004] VSCA 59 …. 7.79 — v Brown (Winston) [1998] AC 367 …. 5.15 — v Browne-Kerr [1990] VR 78 …. 2.91, 7.7, 7.10 — v Browning (1991) 103 FLR 425 …. 2.51, 2.55, 6.30 — v — (1992) 94 Cr App R 109 …. 4.56 — v Brownlee (1999) 105 A Crim R 214 …. 8.119 — v Brownlow [2003] SASC 262 …. 3.101, 3.105 — v Brownlowe (1987) 7 NSWLR 461 …. 4.56, 4.57 — v Bruce (1987) 61 ALJR 603 …. 5.121 — v — [1988] VR 579 …. 5.121, 5.140 — v — [1975] 1 WLR 1252 …. 3.122 — v Bryant (No 2) [1956] St R Qd 570 …. 7.81, 7.86 — v Bryce [1994] 1 Qd R 77 …. 4.93 — v Bryce (No 2) (2014) 240 A Crim R 471; [2014] NSWSC 498 …. 3.141 — v Buchanan [1966] VR 9 …. 8.136 — v Buckett (1995) 132 ALR 669 …. 2.49 — v Buckley (1873) 13 Cox CC 293 …. 8.47 — v — (2004) 10 VR 215; [2004] VSCA 185 …. 2.71, 8.166

— v Bueti and Morrissey (1997) 70 SASR 370 …. 4.57 — v Bunevski [2002] NSWCCA 19 …. 8.78 — v Bunting (2002) 84 SASR 378 …. 5.15, 5.26, 5.50, 5.68 — v — [2003] SASC 250 …. 5.13 — v — (2004) 92 SASR 146; [2004] SASC 235 …. 2.30 — v Bunting and Wagner (2005) 92 SASR 241 …. 2.13 — v Burchielli [1981] VR 611 …. 4.59, 4.62, 4.64, 4.67, 4.73 — v Burns (1883) 9 VLR 191 …. 2.19 — v Burns (1999) 107 A Crim R 330 …. 2.12, 3.33, 7.131 — v — [2003] NSWCCA 30 …. 7.137 — v Burns and Collins (2001) 123 A Crim R 226 …. 3.37 — v Burr (1988) 37 A Crim R 220 …. 4.87 — v Burt [2000] 1 Qd R 28 …. 8.131, 8.155 — v Burton (2013) 237 A Crim R 238; [2013] NSWCCA 335 …. 2.31, 3.60, 3.143, 8.155 — v Butler [2010] 1 Qd R 325; [2009] QCA 111 …. 7.43 — v — (No 2) (1991) 57 A Crim R 460 …. 4.33 — v Butterwasser [1948] 1 KB 4 …. 3.128 — v Buttery (1988) 145 LSJS 223 …. 2.69 — v Buzzacott (2010) 107 SASR 564; [2010] SASC 234 …. 8.86 — v BWT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241 …. 4.6, 4.43, 4.48 — v Byczko (No 1) (1977) 16 SASR 506 …. 3.142, 4.19, 4.28, 4.102, 7.101 — v — (No 2) (1977) 17 SASR 460 …. 4.84, 4.102 — v Byczko and McCloud (1982) 30 SASR 578 …. 8.159 — v Byrnes and Hopwood (1996) 20 ACSR 260 …. 8.72 — v Byster (2001) 80 SASR 373 …. 7.88, 8.106 — v C (1991) 59 A Crim R 46 …. 3.149 — v — (1993) 60 SASR 467 …. 5.202, 7.43, 7.51, 7.53, 7.58, 7.108, 7.136,

7.158 — v — (1993) 67 A Crim R 562 …. 5.254 — v — [2005] 3 NZLR 92 …. 5.185 — v C, CA [2013] SASCFC 137 …. 3.64, 3.75 — v — [2015] SASCFC 143 …. 2.12, 3.64, 3.70 — v C, CN (2013) 117 SASR 64; [2013] SASCFC 44 …. 3.64 — v C, G (2013) 117 SASR 162; [2013] SASCFC 83 …. 3.64 — v C, RE [2015] SASCFC 32 …. 5.213 — v Cahill (1985) 61 ACTR 7 …. 5.12 — v Cain (1994) 99 Cr App R 208 …. 3.138 — v Caine (1993) 68 A Crim R 233 …. 7.30 — v Cakovski (2002) 133 A Crim R 18 …. 7.122 — v — (2004) 149 A Crim R 21; [2004] NSWCCA 280 …. 2.28, 3.141 — v Calabria (1982) 31 SASR 423 …. 8.174, 8.185 — v Calides (1983) 34 SASR 355 …. 2.71 — v Callaghan [1994] 2 Qd R 300; [1993] QCA 419 …. 7.88, 8.106 — v — (2001) 4 VR 79; 124 A Crim R 126; [2001] VSCA 209 …. 2.40, 4.57, 4.67, 7.65 — v Calway (2005) 157 A Crim R 322; [2005] VSCA 266 …. 4.88 — v Camelleri [1922] 2 KB 122 …. 7.103 — v Cameron [1990] 2 WAR 1 …. 7.58 — v Camilleri (2001) 127 A Crim R 290; [2001] NSWCCA 527 …. 2.73, 4.57, 7.40, 7.131 — v — (2007) 169 A Crim R 197 …. 8.146, 8.156 — v — (2007) 68 NSWLR 720; [2007] NSWCCA 36 …. 5.266 — v Campbell [1956] 2 QB 432 …. 4.38 — v — (2007) 175 A Crim R 79; [2007] VSCA 189 …. 4.65, 4.66 — v Campbell and Greig (1999) 109 A Crim R 174 …. 2.25

— v Cannings [2004] EWCA Crim 1 …. 7.52 — v — [2004] 2 Cr App R 7 …. 3.58 — v Cao [2004] NSWCCA 61 …. 7.51 — v Carabott (2002) 132 A Crim R 355 …. 4.30, 4.77 — v Carbone (1989) 50 SASR 495 …. 2.49, 2.71, 2.72 — v Cardamone (2007) 171 A Crim R 207; [2007] VSCA 77 …. 4.88 — v Carney [2016] QCA 2 …. 4.93 — v Carpenter (2011) 249 FLR 432; [2011] ACTSC 71 …. 4.70 — v Carr (2000) 117 A Crim R 272 …. 4.46, 4.76 — v — [2005] NSWCCA 439 …. 4.58, 4.63 — v Carranceja and Asikin (1989) 42 A Crim R 402 …. 3.77, 3.79, 4.25 — v Carr-Briant [1943] KB 607 …. 2.58, 6.22 — v Carroll (1985) 19 A Crim R 410 …. 3.29, 7.43, 7.47, 7.51 — v — (2013) 234 A Crim R 233; [2013] NSWSC 1031 …. 4.65 — v Carter (1995) 86 A Crim R 17 …. 3.78 — v — (2001) 1 VR 175 …. 8.155 — v — [2003] 2 Qd R 402 …. 2.49 — v — (2014) 241 A Crim R 522; [2014] QCA 120 …. 7.33 — v Carusi (1997) 92 A Crim R 52 …. 4.67 — v Cashion (2013) 115 SASR 451; [2013] SASCFC 14 …. 3.64 — v Cassar and Sleiman [1999] NSWSC 436 …. 7.19, 7.56 — v — (No 28) [1999] NSWSC 651 …. 7.19, 7.79 — v Cavanagh (1972) 56 Cr App R 407 …. 6.54 — v Cavkic (2005) 12 VR 136 …. 2.70, 2.72 — v — (No 2) (2009) 28 VR 341; [2009] VSCA 43 …. 4.56, 4.57 — v CBL and BCT [2014] 2 Qd R 331; (2014) 240 A Crim R 492; [2014] QCA 93 …. 2.29, 5.139, 7.151 — v CBM [2015] 1 Qd R 165; [2014] QCA 212 …. 3.73

— v Cengiz [1998] 3 VR 720 …. 5.130 — v Central Criminal Court; Ex parte Francis & Francis [1989] AC 346 …. 5.30 — v Cervelli [1998] 3 VR 776 …. 5.130 — v Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153 …. 4.23, 5.110, 8.118, 8.119, 8.120 — v — [2002] NSWCCA 512 …. 2.31 — v Challinger [1989] 2 Qd R 352 …. 5.185 — v Chalmers [2013] 2 Qd R 175; [2011] QCA 134 …. 7.30 — v Chan (1992) 28 NSWLR 421 …. 6.22 — v — (2002) 131 A Crim R 66; [2002] NSWCCA 217 …. 3.62, 4.9 — v Chandler [1976] 1 WLR 585 …. 5.139 — v Chang (2003) 7 VR 236; 140 A Crim R 573; [2003] VSCA 149 …. 4.88 — v Chaouk; AG (Vic) (2013) 40 VR 356; [2013] VSCA 99 …. 2.29 — v — [1973] QB 774 …. 4.83 — v Chapman (2001) 79 SASR 342 …. 2.36 — v Charlie (1995) 121 FLR 306 …. 4.33, 8.168 — v Chatzidimitrious [2000] 1 VR 493 …. 2.72 — v Chee [1980] VR 303 …. 3.69 — v Cheema [1994] 1 WLR 147 …. 4.26 — v — (1993) 98 Cr App Rep 195 …. 4.97 — v Chekeri (2001) 122 A Crim R 422; [2001] NSWCCA 221 …. 5.190 — v Chen [1993] 2 VR 139 …. 4.85, 4.100, 7.7 — v Cheng (1977) 63 Cr App R 20 …. 7.82 — v — (1999) 48 NSWLR 616 …. 2.14, 6.30 — v — [2015] SASCFC 189 …. 4.37, 7.34 — v Chevathen and Dorrick (2001) 122 A Crim R 441 …. 3.33, 3.39 — v Chhay (1994) 72 A Crim R 1 …. 7.51 — v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [1995] AC 274 …. 5.230 — v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 …. 2.8, 2.9, 3.94, 7.82, 7.128, 7.153, 7.157

— v Chisnell [1992] Crim LR 507 …. 7.82 — v Chrimes (1959) 43 Cr App R 149 …. 4.101 — v Christie [1914] AC 545 …. 2.27, 2.29, 2.30, 2.31, 2.32, 2.35, 2.39, 3.12, 3.28, 3.38, 3.41, 3.53, 3.158, 3.159, 5.138, 5.188, 7.95, 7.99, 7.135, 8.101, 8.124 — v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26; 167 A Crim R 504; [2006] VSCA 263 …. 4.86, 4.88, 4.93, 6.23, 6.28 — v Ciesielski [1972] 1 NSWLR 504 …. 8.109 — v Cittadini [2008] NSWCCA 256 …. 3.75 — v Clark (1996) 91 A Crim R 46 …. 4.64, 4.67 — v — (2001) 123 A Crim R 506; [2001] NSWCCA 494 …. 2.23, 2.30, 2.31, 2.32, 3.33, 3.56, 3.57, 4.9, 4.10, 4.23, 4.24, 4.25, 4.100, 7.125, 8.29 — v — (2005) 13 VR 75; [2005] VSCA 294 …. 2.46 — v — [2006] EWCA Crim 231 …. 7.52 — v Clarke (1817) 2 Stark 241; 171 ER 633 …. 3.142, 3.143 — v — (1997) 97 A Crim R 414 …. 4.61, 5.139, 8.131, 8.149 — v — [2001] NSWCCA 223 …. 2.23 — v Clarke; Ex parte Attorney-General [1999] QCA 438 …. 8.99 — v Clay (1851) 5 Cox CC 14 …. 3.143 — v Cleal [1942] 1 All ER 203 …. 4.19 — v Climas (1999) 74 SASR 411 …. 7.28 — v Clough (1992) 28 NSWLR 396 …. 4.6, 4.76 — v Clout (1995) 41 NSWLR 312 …. 4.56 — v Clowes [1992] 3 All ER 440 …. 5.238 — v Clune (No 1) [1975] VR 723 …. 7.156 — v — (No 2) [1996] 1 VR 1 …. 4.56, 4.73 — v Clune [1982] VR 1 …. 4.59, 4.62, 4.64, 4.66, 4.67, 4.74 — v Clyne [1985] 2 NSWLR 740 …. 8.155 — v Clynes (1960) 44 Cr App R 158 …. 4.19, 4.102

— v Cockcroft (1870) 11 Cox CC 410 …. 3.142, 3.143 — v Cockley [1984] Crim LR 429 …. 6.35 — v Coe [2002] NSWCCA 385 …. 4.61, 7.97 — v Cokar [1960] 2 QB 207 …. 3.92, 3.97 — v Colby [1999] NSWCCA 261 …. 3.29, 3.48, 3.54, 3.55, 3.58, 3.62 — v Coll (1889) 25 LR Ir 522 …. 7.93 — v Collie [2005] SASC 148 …. 2.43 — v Collie, Kranz and Lovegrove (1991) 55 A Crim R 139 …. 4.30 — v Collins (1960) 44 Cr App R 170 …. 7.18 — v — (1976) 12 SASR 501 …. 7.58 — v — (1989) 43 A Crim R 170 …. 3.71 — v Colquhoun [2009] SASC 138 …. 7.118 — v Compton (2013) 237 A Crim R 177; [2013] SASCFC 134 …. 2.72 — v Congressi (1974) 9 SASR 257 …. 3.122 — v Connell, Lucas and Carter (No 1) (1992) 8 WAR 518 …. 3.78 — v Constantinou (1990) 91 Cr App R 74 …. 4.74, 7.95 — v Cook [1959] 2 QB 340 …. 3.101 — v — [1987] QB 417 …. 4.74, 7.95 — v — (2000) 110 A Crim R 117 …. 3.33, 3.71, 3.73 — v — [2004] NSWCCA 52 …. 2.30, 3.125, 8.96 — v — (2006) 95 SASR 201; [2006] SASC 231 …. 6.22 — v Cooney [2013] NSWCCA 312 …. 8.144 — v Cooper (2007) 175 A Crim R 94; [2007] ACTSC 74 …. 7.28, 7.30 — v Coote (1873) LR 4 PC 599 …. 5.167 — v Corak and Palmer (1982) 30 SASR 404 …. 3.85, 3.91, 3.97, 3.118 — v Corbett [2002] NSWCCA 402 …. 7.158 — v Corish (2006) 96 SASR 207; [2006] SASC 369 …. 5.133 — v Cornwell (2003) 57 NSWLR 82 …. 7.16, 7.19

— v Correia (1996) 15 WAR 95 …. 3.31, 3.71 — v Corrigan (1998) 74 SASR 454 …. 2.87, 3.36 — v Cosgrove and Hunter (1988) 34 A Crim R 299 …. 2.82 — v Coss [2016] QCA 44 …. 2.71 — v Costi (1988) 48 SASR 269 …. 2.72, 7.131 — v Costin [1998] 3 VR 659 …. 2.71, 4.49 — v Cotton (1990) 19 NSWLR 593 …. 8.150, 8.153 — v Coulman (1927) 20 Cr App R 106 …. 3.108 — v Courtney-Smith (No 2) (1990) 48 A Crim R 49 …. 2.12, 3.107, 3.130 — v Covill (2000) 114 A Crim R 111 …. 2.71 — v Cowan (2013) 237 A Crim R 388; [2013] QSC 337 …. 3.65, 8.131 — v Cowan; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2016] 1 Qd R 433; [2015] QCA 87 …. 2.37, 5.258, 8.129, 8.131, 8.135, 8.155 — v Cowie; Ex parte Attorney-General [1994] 1 Qd R 326 …. 7.34 — v Cox [1972] Qd R 366 …. 7.120 — v — [1986] 2 Qd R 55 …. 4.28, 8.108 — v Cox and Railton (1884) 14 QBD 153 …. 5.29 — v Coyne [1996] 1 Qd R 512 …. 5.143 — v Craig [1975] 1 NZLR 597 …. 5.49 — v Crawford [1965] VR 580 …. 3.108 — v — [1989] 2 Qd R 443 …. 3.78 — v — (2015) 123 SASR 353; [2015] SASCFC 112 …. 4.65 — v Crisologo (1998) 99 A Crim R 178 …. 2.28 — v Crooks [2001] 2 Qd R 541 …. 5.139, 8.149 — v Crossman [2011] 2 Qd R 435; [2011] QCA 126 …. 2.43, 7.22 — v Crouch (1850) 4 Cox CC 163 …. 7.56 — v Crowther-Wilkinson [2003] NSWSC 44 …. 8.99 — v Crupi (1995) 86 A Crim R 229 …. 4.56, 4.61, 5.267

— v Crupi (1996) 86 A Crim R 229 …. 8.157 — v Cuenco (2007) 16 VR 118; [2007] VSCA 41 …. 4.88 — v Cumes (1990) 102 FLR 113 …. 5.139, 8.131, 8.149, 8.156 — v Cumming (1995) 86 A Crim R 156 …. 4.88 — v Cummins (2004) 10 VR 15; [2004] VSCA 164 …. 2.87, 3.37 — v Cunningham (1992) 61 A Crim R 412 …. 6.58 — v Curran (2008) 100 SASR 71 …. 7.131 — v Curran and Torney [1983] 2 VR 133 …. 8.108 — v Curtis [2009] SASC 266 …. 4.64 — v Cvitko (2000) 159 FLR 403 …. 8.156 — v D (1996) 86 A Crim R 41 …. 3.138 — v — (1998) 71 SASR 99 …. 2.85, 4.85 — v — [2008] ACTSC 82 …. 4.65, 4.69 — v Da Silva [1990] 1 WLR 31 …. 7.79, 7.85, 7.121 — v Dalley (2002) 132 A Crim R 169; [2002] NSWCCA 284 …. 2.37 — v Dam (1986) 43 SASR 422 …. 2.55, 2.72 — v Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750 …. 6.50, 6.51, 6.53, 6.58 — v Dann [2000] NSWCCA 185 …. 3.146 — v Darby (1982) 148 CLR 668 …. 3.78 — v Daren and Tange [1971] 2 NSWLR 423 …. 7.9 — v Darmody (2010) 25 VR 209; [2010] VSCA 41 …. 8.66 — v Darrington and McGauley [1980] VR 353 …. 3.77, 3.79, 3.82 — v Darrington and McGauley [1980] VR 353 …. 7.58, 7.60 — v Darwiche (2006) 166 A Crim R 28; [2006] NSWSC 924 …. 4.65, 4.70, 7.98 — v Dastagir (2013) 118 SASR 83; [2013] SASCFC 109 …. 4.56, 7.40, 7.56 — v Dastagir (2013) 224 A Crim R 570; [2013] SASC 26 …. 4.56, 7.40, 7.56 — v Dat Quoc Ho (2002) 130 A Crim R 545 …. 4.86

— v Davidson (1991) 54 SASR 580 …. 5.266 — v Davidson and Moyle; Ex parte Attorney-General [1996] 2 Qd R 505 …. 8.155 — v Davies [1962] 3 All ER 97 …. 7.42, 7.60 — v — [1984] 3 NSWLR 572 …. 6.58 — v — [1985] 3 NSWLR 276 …. 7.107 — v — (2005) 11 VR 314; [2005] VSCA 90 …. 4.66 — v Davis (1975) 60 Cr App R 157 …. 3.122 — v — [1999] NSWCCA 15 …. 5.130 — v Dawes [1992] 2 Qd R 435 …. 2.8 — v Dawson-Ryan (2009) 104 SASR 571 …. 3.48 — v Day (2000) 115 A Crim R 80 …. 3.116 — v — (2002) 82 SASR 85 …. 8.168 — v Daylight (1989) 41 A Crim R 354 …. 8.89 — v DBA (2012) 219 A Crim R 408; [2012] QCA 49 …. 7.99 — v DBB [2013] 1 Qd R 188; [2012] QCA 96 …. 2.49 — v DBG (2002) 133 A Crim R 227 …. 4.48 — v DD [2000] 2 SCR 275 …. 7.52 — v — [2007] VSCA 317 …. 3.73 — v DDC (2004) 11 VR 129; [2004] VSCA 230 …. 3.73 — v DDR [1998] 3 VR 580 …. 2.87, 3.36 — v De Angelis (1979) 20 SASR 288 …. 3.143, 3.144, 3.146, 3.147 — v De Cressac (1985) 1 NSWLR 381 …. 4.74, 5.172 — v de Vere [1982] QB 75 …. 3.132 — v Deakin [1995] 1 Cr App R 471 …. 2.42, 7.30 — v Debs [2005] VSCA 66 …. 7.43 — v Debs and Roberts [2005] VSCA 66 …. 8.89 — v Deering (1986) 43 SASR 252 …. 4.64, 4.67, 4.74

— v Degnan [2001] 1 NZLR 280 …. 5.190 — v Delgado-Guerra [2002] 2 Qd R 384 …. 2.87, 3.42 — v Dellapatrona and Duffield (1993) 31 NSWLR 123 …. 2.88 — v Demeter [1995] 2 Qd R 626 …. 4.64, 5.131 — v Demir [1990] 2 Qd R 433 …. 5.205 — v Demirok [1976] VR 244 …. 3.78 — v Deng [2001] NSWCCA 153 …. 8.149 — v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation; Ex parte Briggs (1987) 13 FCR 389 …. 5.157, 5.166 — v Derbas (1993) 66 A Crim R 327 …. 4.6, 4.33 — v Derby Magistrate’s Court; Ex parte B [1996] 1 AC 487 …. 5.68 — v Deriz (1999) 109 A Crim R 329 …. 2.71 — v Devine (1985) 18 A Crim R 185 …. 8.167 — v Dewhirst (2001) 122 A Crim R 403 …. 8.155, 8.156 — v Dickinson [2007] VSCA 111 …. 2.88 — v Dickson [1983] 1 VR 227 …. 4.59, 8.96 — v Dimian (1995) 83 A Crim R 358 …. 3.150 — v Ditroia and Tucci [1981] VR 247 …. 3.122 — v Dixon (1992) 28 NSWLR 215 …. 8.131 — v DJT [1998] 4 VR 784 …. 2.71, 7.91 — v Do (1990) 54 SASR 543 …. 4.89 — v Dodd (2002) 135 A Crim R 32; [2002] NSWCCA 418 …. 4.54, 4.58, 4.63 — v Doe (1987) 31 CCC (3d) 353 …. 7.136, 7.146 — v Doheny and Adams [1997] 1 Cr App R 369 …. 1.22, 1.26, 1.42 — v Dolan (1992) 58 SASR 501 …. 3.73, 5.134, 8.149 — v Domican and Thurgar (1989) 43 A Crim R 24 …. 3.78 — v Domokos (2005) 92 SASR 258 …. 3.31 — v Donnelly (1997) 96 A Crim R 432 …. 8.129

— v Dookhea [2016] VSCA 67 …. 2.72 — v Doolan [1962] Qd R 449 …. 8.101 — v Doran (1972) 56 Cr App R 429 …. 2.8 — v Dossi (1918) 13 Cr App R 158 …. 4.19 — v Doyle [1967] VR 698 …. 4.65, 4.74 — v — [2014] NSWCA 4 …. 2.87 — v Drake (2013) 233 A Crim R 588; [2013] QCA 222 …. 7.33 — v Drollett [2005] NSWCCA 356 …. 2.23, 4.63 — v — [2005] NSWCCA 356 …. 7.41, 7.56 — v Drozd (1993) 67 A Crim R 112 …. 5.13 — v Drummond (No 2) [2015] SASCFC 82 …. 2.24 — v Dubois [1966] QWN 25 …. 7.105 — v Dudko [2002] NSWCCA 336 …. 7.19 — v Dudley [2004] EWCA Crim 3336 …. 7.23 — v Duke (1979) 22 SASR 46 …. 2.29, 4.19, 4.28, 4.102 — v Duncan (1981) 83 Cr App R 359 …. 8.108 — v — (2011) 109 SASR 479 …. 2.90 — v Duncan and Perre [2004] NSWCCA 431 …. 4.69, 8.153 — v Dungay [2001] NSWCCA 443 …. 2.37, 8.148 — v Dunn (2006) 94 SASR 177; [2006] SASC 58 …. 2.12 — v Dunphy (1994) 98 Cr App R 393 …. 7.35 — v Dunwoody (2004) 212 ALR 103; [2004] QCA 413 …. 2.9 — v Duong (2001) 110 SASR 291; [2011] SASC 121 …. 8.41 — v — [2002] 1 Qd R 502 …. 8.168 — v Duong, Sem and Huynh (2011) 110 SASR 291; [2011] SASC 121 …. 8.41 — v Dupas (No 2) (2005) 12 VR 601; [2005] VSCA 212 …. 3.44 — v — (No 3) (2009) 28 VR 380; [2009] VSCA 202 …. 2.29, 4.76 — v Durbin [1995] 2 Cr App R 84 …. 3.136

— v DWB (2008) 20 VR 112 …. 2.87 — v DWH [1999] NSWCCA 255 …. 7.92 — v E (1996) 39 NSWLR 450 …. 2.71, 4.84, 7.101 — v E J Smith [1984] 1 NSWLR 462 …. 4.57 — v — (1987) 7 NSWLR 444 …. 4.57 — v E, DJ (2012) 112 SASR 225; [2012] SASCFC 6 …. 4.21, 4.85 — v Eade [2000] NSWCCA 369 …. 2.27 — v Eades [1972] Crim LR 99 …. 7.145 — v Easom (1981) 28 SASR 134 …. 4.59, 4.63 — v Easton (1988) 144 LSJS 107 …. 8.147 — v Echo (1997) 6 NTLR 51 …. 8.152 — v Edelsten (1990) 21 NSWLR 542; 51 A Crim R 397 …. 2.26, 2.29, 5.266 — v Edwards (1997) 94 A Crim R 204 …. 5.188 — v — (2009) 255 ALR 399; [2009] HCA 20 …. 2.29 — v — [1975] 1 QB 27 …. 6.19 — v — [1991] 2 All ER 266 …. 3.140 — v Edwin (No 2) (2013) 277 FLR 14; [2013] ACTSC 84 …. 2.37 — v EF (2008) 189 A Crim R 463; [2008] VSCA 213 …. 2.87, 3.34 — v El Adl [1993] 2 Qd R 195 …. 4.77, 4.86 — v El-Azzi [2004] NSWCCA 455 …. 7.137 — v El-Hayek [2004] NSWCCA 25 …. 3.57 — v Elhusseini [1988] 2 Qd R 442 …. 3.78 — v El-Kheir [2004] NSWCCA 461 …. 2.26, 3.104, 3.106, 3.107, 3.108, 3.109, 3.130, 3.137, 4.57, 4.63, 7.40, 7.56 — v Ellem (1994) 75 A Crim R 370 …. 2.71 — v Elliott (1996) 128 FLR 172 …. 5.29, 5.30 — v — (1996) 185 CLR 250 …. 2.40 — v — (SC (Vic), Vincent J, 6 May 1996, unreported) …. 8.97, 8.99, 8.131,

8.154 — v Ellis [1910] 2 KB 746 …. 3.108 — v — (1992) 58 SASR 117 …. 8.149 — v — (1998) 100 A Crim R 49 …. 4.88, 5.130 — v — (2003) 58 NSWLR 700; [2003] NSWCCA 319 …. 3.58, 3.62 — v — (2010) 107 SASR 94; [2010] SASC 118 …. 3.44 — v Elms [2004] NSWCCA 467 …. 8.74, 8.197 — v Elsom (1975) 12 SASR 416 …. 3.67, 3.70 — v Elwarthy (1867) LR 1 CCR 103 …. 7.18 — v Ensor [1989] 2 All ER 586 …. 2.49 — v EO (2004) 8 VR 154 …. 4.49 — v Ernst [1984] VR 593 …. 8.117 — v Errigo (2005) 91 SASR 80 …. 8.77, 8.184 — v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442 …. 6.58, 7.123, 8.99, 8.129, 8.198 — v Etherington (1982) 32 SASR 230 …. 3.31 — v Evan (2006) 175 A Crim R 1; [2006] QCA 527 …. 4.64, 4.65, 4.71 — v Evans [1964] VR 717 …. 6.49 — v — (1985) 38 SASR 344 …. 4.87 — v Ewens [1967] 1 QB 322 …. 6.19 — v Ewing [1983] QB 1039 …. 2.91 — v Eyres (1977) 16 SASR 226 …. 8.146 — v F (1995) 83 A Crim R 502 …. 2.71, 7.51, 7.58, 7.108, 7.158 — v — (2002) 128 A Crim R 126; [2002] NSWCCA 125 …. 3.58, 3.62 — v F, AD [2015] SASCFC 130 …. 3.64 — v Fahad (2004) 146 A Crim R 169; [2004] VSCA 28 …. 4.56, 4.63 — v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30 …. 7.58 — v Falconer Atlee (1973) 58 Cr App R 348 …. 2.55 — v Falealili [1996] 3 NZLR 664 …. 3.136

— v Familic (1994) 75 A Crim R 229 …. 8.106 — v Fang (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 1784 …. 7.30 — v Fannon and Walsh (1922) 22 SR NSW 427 …. 4.74 — v FAR [1996] 2 Qd R 49 …. 7.34 — v Farquharson (2009) 26 VR 410; [2009] VSCA 307 …. 2.88, 7.49 — v Farr (2001) 118 A Crim R 399; [2001] NSWSC 3 …. 8.160, 8.168 — v Faure and Corrigan [1978] VR 246 …. 6.34 — v Fazio (1997) 69 SASR 54 …. 7.71 — v FD [2006] NSWCCA 31 …. 7.23 — v FE [2013] NSWSC 1692 …. 8.150, 8.156 — v Ferguson (1909) 2 Cr App R 250 …. 3.108 — v — (1994) 75 A Crim R 31 …. 7.34 — v — (2000) 117 A Crim R 44 …. 2.11 — v Fernandes (1996) 133 FLR 477 …. 3.29 — v Fernando [1999] NSWCCA 66 …. 3.117, 3.122, 7.41, 8.144 — v Field; Ex parte White (1895) 64 LJMC 158 …. 6.74 — v Fieldhouse (1977) 17 SASR 92 …. 8.146, 8.154 — v Finn (1988) 34 A Crim R 425 …. 4.59, 4.62 — v — (2014) 119 SASR 207; [2014] SASCFC 46 …. 4.51 — v Firman (1989) 52 SASR 391 …. 8.22, 8.33 — v Fisher [2009] VSCA 100 …. 6.47 — v Fitzgibbon (1885) 11 VLR 232 …. 3.143 — v FJB [1999] 2 VR 425 …. 2.87, 3.73 — v Flaherty (2002) 133 A Crim R 42 …. 8.168 — v Flannery [1969] VR 586 …. 4.84 — v Fleming; R v Maher [2017] SASC 16 …. 3.31, 3.64 — v Flesch (1987) 7 NSWLR 554 …. 2.70, 2.72 — v Fletcher [1998] 2 Qd R 437 …. 2.87

— v — (2005) 156 A Crim R 308; [2005] NSWCCA 338 …. 3.12, 3.59 — v Flood [1999] NSWCCA 198 …. 4.28 — v Flynn [2008] 2 Cr App R 266 …. 7.56 — v Foggo; Ex parte Attorney-General (1989) 2 Qd R 49 …. 7.82 — v Folbigg [2003] NSWCCA 17 …. 3.50, 3.58, 3.62, 8.21 — v Foley (1984) 13 A Crim R 29 …. 6.54 — v — [2000] 1 Qd R 290 …. 7.131 — v Fong [1981] Qd R 90 …. 7.58, 7.136 — v Ford (2009) 201 A Crim R 451; [2009] NSWCCA 306 …. 2.31 — v Forde (1986) 19 A Crim R 1 …. 3.80, 3.125, 7.136 — v Fordham (1997) 98 A Crim R 359 …. 3.56 — v Forgione [1969] SASR 248 …. 4.30, 4.52 — v Forster [2016] QCA 62 …. 1.44 — v Fortunato (2003) 137 A Crim R 453; [2003] SASC 4 …. 3.101 — v Fountain and Tootell (2001) 124 A Crim R 100 …. 4.100 — v Fouyaxis (2007) 99 SASR 233; [2007] SASR 335 …. 2.72, 4.88 — v Fowler (1985) 39 SASR 440 …. 7.58, 7.60, 7.67 — v — (SC (NSW), 15 May 1997, unreported) …. 7.138 — v — [2000] NSWCCA 142 …. 7.122, 7.123 — v — (2003) 151 A Crim R 166; [2003] NSWCCA 321 …. 2.87, 4.10, 4.27, 7.79 — v Fox [2000] Qd R 334 …. 3.97 — v — (No 2) [2000] 1 Qd R 640 …. 4.61 — v FP (2007) 169 A Crim R 318; [2007] QCA 97 …. 4.84 — v Fragomeli [2008] SASC 96 …. 8.35 — v Francis (1874) 12 Cox CC 612 …. 3.11 — v Franco [2006] VSCA 302 …. 2.71 — v — (2009) 105 SASR 446; [2009] SASC 370 …. 2.82, 3.37

— v Frangulis [2006] NSWCCA 363 …. 4.33, 8.94, 8.142 — v Franklin (2001) 119 A Crim R 223; [2001] VSCA 79 …. 2.37, 2.85, 2.88, 4.88, 8.155 — v Franks (1999) 105 A Crim R 377 …. 2.14 — v Fraser (1995) 65 SASR 260 …. 7.92 — v Fraser [2004] 2 Qd R 544; [2004] QCA 92 …. 5.259, 8.155 — v Frawley (1993) 69 A Crim R 208 …. 8.29 — v Frazer [2002] NSWCCA 59 …. 8.95 — v Freeman [1980] VR 1 …. 4.84 — v — [1980] VR 1 …. 7.105, 7.106 — v French (2012) 114 SASR 287; [2012] SASCFC 118 …. 7.30 — v Fricker (1986) 42 SASR 436; 23 A Crim R 147 …. 3.93, 3.125, 3.135 — v Frugtniet [1999] VCSA 58 …. 7.65 — v — [1999] VSCA 58 …. 2.40 — v Frugtniet and Frugtniet [1999] 2 VR 297 …. 8.156 — v FTG (2007) 15 VR 685; [2007] VSCA 109 …. 3.140, 7.133 — v Fuller (1994) 34 NSWLR 233 …. 3.108, 3.109, 3.134 — v Funderburk [1990] 1 WLR 587 …. 7.137, 7.140 — v Furney (1964) 20 ABC 166 …. 5.60 — v Fyffe [1991] 2 VR 72 …. 2.90 — v G [1994] 1 Qd R 540 …. 2.71 — v — (1996) 88 A Crim R 489 …. 3.34, 3.73 — v — [2005] NSWCCA 291 …. 8.100 — v G, AP (2014) 119 SASR 125; [2014] SASCFC 43 …. 5.201 — v G, F, S, and W [1974] 1 NSWLR 31 …. 8.96 — v G, GT (2007) 97 SASR 315; [2007] SASC 104 …. 3.6, 4.88 — v GAC (2007) 178 A Crim R 408; [2007] NSWCCA 315 …. 3.54, 3.59, 3.62

— v GAE [2000] 1 VR 198 …. 3.71 — v Galbraith (1981) 73 Cr App R 124 …. 6.33 — v — [1981] 1 WLR 1039 …. 2.55 — v Gale; R v Duckworth (2012) 217 A Crim R 487; [2012] NSWCCA 174 …. 2.15, 3.42, 3.58 — v Galea [2004] NSWCCA 227 …. 7.137 — v Gallagher [2001] NSWSC 462 …. 7.43 — v Galli [2001] NSWCCA 504 …. 1.22, 1.26, 2.67, 7.43 — v Galluzo (1986) 23 A Crim R 211 …. 4.89 — v Gangemi (1997) 17 SR (WA) 176 …. 4.33 — v Gao [2003] NSWCCA 390 …. 4.57, 8.100 — v GAR [2003] NSWCCA 224 …. 4.45 — v Garbett (1847) 1 Den 236; 169 ER 277 …. 5.167 — v Gardner (2001) 123 A Crim R 439; [2001] NSWCCA 381 …. 2.23, 7.40 — v Garofalo [1999] 2 VR 625 …. 5.15 — v Garrett (1988) 50 SASR 392 …. 3.33 — v Garth (1990) 49 A Crim R 298 …. 2.82 — v — (1994) 73 A Crim R 215 …. 8.133 — v GAS [1998] 3 VR 862 …. 3.26 — v Gassy (No 3) [2005] SASC 496 …. 2.87 — v Gathercole [2016] QCA 336 …. 6.55 — v Gaudion [1979] VR 57 …. 7.15 — v Gay [1976] VR 577 …. 2.46 — v Gazard (1838) 8 Car & P 595; 173 ER 633 …. 5.184 — v Gbojueh (2009) 103 SASR 545 …. 2.14 — v GEA (2002) 131 A Crim R 54 …. 4.48 — v Gee (2000) 113 A Crim R 376; [2000] NSWCCA 198 …. 3.54, 7.97 — v — [2012] SASCFC 86 …. 2.43

— v Geesing (1984) 39 SASR 111 …. 7.113, 7.136 — v — (1985) 38 SASR 226 …. 8.131, 8.137 — v Gemmill (2004) 8 VR 242 …. 7.47 — v George and Price (1981) 4 A Crim R 12 …. 5.118 — v Georgiev (2001) 119 A Crim R 363; [2001] VSCA 18 …. 2.12, 3.37, 3.73 — v GH (2000) 105 FCR 419 …. 8.96, 8.97, 8.100, 8.160, 8.162 — v Gibb and McKenzie [1983] 2 VR 155 …. 3.77, 3.79 — v Gibbons [1971] VR 79 …. 8.104 — v Gibson (1887) 18 QBD 537 …. 2.46 — v — (1989) 42 A Crim R 265 …. 3.71 — v — (1999) 110 A Crim R 180 …. 2.73 — v — [2002] NSWCCA 401 …. 2.30, 6.52, 6.57 — v Gilbert (1977) 66 Cr App R 237 …. 5.140 — v Gillard (No 3) (2000) 78 SASR 279 …. 3.116 — v Gillard and Preston (1999) 76 SASR 76 …. 5.12 — v Gillespie (1967) 51 Cr App R 172 …. 7.153 — v Gilmore [1977] 2 NSWLR 935 …. 4.56, 7.7, 7.43, 7.48, 7.49, 7.52 — v Giovannone [2002] NSWCCA 323 …. 7.19 — v — [2013] NSWSC 1503 …. 2.7 — v Gittany (No 3) (2013) 238 A Crim R 149; [2013] NSWSC 1670 …. 2.29, 5.15, 5.49 — v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317; [2001] NSWCCA 413 …. 1.22, 1.32, 2.30, 2.31, 7.43, 7.62 — v Glasby (2000) 115 A Crim R 465 …. 7.122 — v Glastonbury (2012) 115 SASR 37; [2012] SASCFC 141 …. 4.25, 4.28 — v Glencourse (1995) 78 A Crim R 256 …. 4.77 — v Glennon (No 3) (2005) 12 VR 421; [2005] VSCA 262 …. 3.73 — v Glossop [2001] NSWCCA 165 …. 7.110

— v Glover (1987) 46 SASR 310 …. 3.78 — v — [1991] Crim LR 48 …. 8.69, 8.88 — v Glusheski (1986) 33 A Crim R 193 …. 2.11 — v Godstone Rural District Council [1911] 2 KB 465 …. 5.33 — v Golder [1960] 1 WLR 1169 …. 7.119 — v Goodall [1982] VR 33 …. 4.56, 4.64, 4.67 — v Goode [1970] SASR 69 …. 4.59, 4.63, 4.71 — v Gordon (1999) 108 A Crim R 356 …. 3.42 — v Gordon and Gordon (1991) 57 A Crim R 413 …. 3.11, 7.24 — v Gould (2014) 243 A Crim R 205; [2014] QCA 164 …. 4.56 — v Gouldren [1993] 2 Qd R 534 …. 8.72 — v Gover (2000) 118 A Crim R 8 …. 8.61, 8.197 — v GPP (2001) 129 A Crim R 1 …. 4.49 — v Grant (2001) 127 A Crim R 124 …. 8.61 — v — [1996] 2 Crim App R 272 …. 3.25, 4.73 — v — [2009] SCC 32 …. 2.37 — v Gray [1965] Qd R 373 …. 5.167 — v Greatbanks [1959] Crim LR 450 …. 3.143 — v Grech [1997] 2 VR 609 …. 3.73 — v Greciun-King [1981] 2 NSWLR 469 …. 5.118, 5.119 — v Green (1939) 61 CLR 167 …. 2.30 — v — (2001) 78 SASR 463 …. 4.12, 4.49 — v — (2002) 4 VR 471 …. 8.166 — v Greenham [1999] NSWCCA 8 …. 3.56 — v Greenwood [1962] Tas SR 319 …. 7.103 — v Grey (1989) 88 Cr App R 375 …. 5.194 — v Griffin [1971] Qd R 12 …. 7.105 — v — [1998] 1 Qd R 659 …. 7.34

— v Griffith (1995) 79 A Crim R 125 …. 7.40 — v Griffiths [1930] VLR 204 …. 4.65 — v Grosser (1999) 73 SASR 584 …. 3.33, 4.88 — v GTN (2003) 6 VR 150 …. 4.48, 4.49 — v Gudabi (1984) 1 FCR 187 …. 8.152, 8.153, 8.159 — v Gudgeon (1995) 133 ALR 379 …. 4.53, 5.258 — v Guildhall Justices; Ex parte DPP (1983) 78 Cr App R 269 …. 5.205 — v Gujanovic (No 2) (2002) 130 A Crim R 179 …. 8.47 — v Gulder (1986) 8 NSWLR 12 …. 3.78 — v Gulliford (2004) 148 A Crim R 558; [2004] NSWCCA 338 …. 4.84, 4.85 — v Gum [2007] SASC 311 …. 8.184 — v Gun; Ex parte Stephenson (1977) 17 SASR 165 …. 3.144, 3.145, 7.137 — v GVV (2008) 20 VR 395; 194 A Crim R 242; [2008] VSCA 170 …. 3.73, 4.46, 4.49, 4.86 — v GW (2016) 90 ALJR 407; [2016] HCA 6 …. 4.13, 4.14, 4.39, 4.77, 7.30, 7.36 — v H [1995] 2 AC 597 …. 3.49, 3.70, 4.98 — v H, T (2010) 108 SASR 86; [2010] SASCFC 24 …. 7.99, 7.107 — v Haak (2012) 112 SASR 315; [2012] SASCFC 19 …. 4.37 — v Haas (1986) 22 A Crim R 299 …. 2.50, 6.33 — v Hackett [2006] VSCA 138 …. 4.63 — v Haddad (2000) 116 A Crim R 312; [2000] NSWCCA 351 …. 2.37, 5.261, 5.264 — v Hadlow [1992] 1 Qd R 440 …. 2.45, 7.120 — v Hagarty [2004] NSWCCA 89 …. 2.87 — v Haidley and Alford [1984] VR 229 …. 7.58, 7.60, 7.68, 4.59, 4.64, 4.67, 4.73 — v Hajistassi (2010) 107 SASR 67; [2010] SASC 111 …. 3.140 — v Hall (1988) 36 A Crim R 368 …. 4.13

— v — [1952] 1 KB 302 …. 3.66 — v — [2001] NSWSC 827 …. 7.7, 7.19, 7.40 — v Hallam and Karger (1985) 42 SASR 126 …. 8.146, 8.149, 8.156 — v Halliday [2009] VSCA 195 …. 2.87 — v Halpin [1975] QB 907 …. 8.91, 8.92 — v Halse (1980) 25 SASR 510 …. 8.156 — v Hamilton (1993) 68 A Crim R 298 …. 3.101, 3.109, 3.134, 3.138 — v Hammond (1941) 28 Cr App R 84 …. 8.163 — v Hamood (1987) 45 SASR 90 …. 4.67 — v Hamra [2016] SASCFC 130 …. 2.14, 2.38, 6.32 — v Handlen (2010) 247 FLR 261; [2010] QCA 371 …. 2.11 — v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359; [2000] NSWCCA 503 …. 2.12, 5.124, 5.127, 5.130, 5.131, 7.7, 7.10, 8.21, 8.27, 8.192, 8.193 — v Hanrahan [1967] 2 NSWR 717 …. 3.143, 7.142 — v Hansen (2002) 84 SASR 54; [2002] SASC 208 …. 2.7, 2.14, 4.46 — v Harbach (1973) 6 SASR 427 …. 3.78, 7.125 — v Harding [1989] 2 Qd R 373 …. 2.42, 7.30 — v Harker [2004] NSWCCA 427 …. 3.68 — v Harm (1975) 13 SASR 84 …. 4.59, 4.71, 6.69 — v Harmer (1987) 28 A Crim R 35 …. 3.140 — v Harrington [1998] 3 VR 531 …. 7.143 — v Harris (1971) 1 SASR 447 …. 4.59, 4.71 — v — (1979) 21 SASR 561 …. 3.67 — v Harris (1995) 64 SASR 85 …. 5.139, 8.149 — v — (No 3) [1990] VR 310 …. 4.57 — v — [2006] 1 Cr App R 5 …. 3.58 — v Harrison [1966] VR 72 …. 7.81, 7.82 — v Harry (1986) 86 Cr App R 105 …. 8.22, 8.33

— v Harry; Ex parte Eastway (1985) 39 SASR 203 …. 5.13 — v Hart (1932) 23 Cr App R 202 …. 7.131 — v — (1977) 17 SASR 100 …. 2.91, 8.154 — v — [1979] Qd R 8 …. 5.139, 8.146, 8.149, 8.156 — v Hartwick, Hartwick and Clayton (2005) 14 VR 125 …. 3.31 — v Harvey (1858) 8 Cox 99 …. 5.184 — v — (NSWCCA, 11 December 1996, unreported) …. 7.41 — v Hasler; Ex parte Attorney-General [1987] 1 Qd R 239 …. 8.134 — v Haslett (1987) 90 FLR 233 …. 5.13 — v Hastings (2003) 85 SASR 256 …. 8.168 — v Hatton (1977) 64 Cr App R 88 …. 3.122 — v Haughbro (1997) 142 FLR 415 …. 2.27, 2.36 — v Hawes (1994) 35 NSWLR 294 …. 7.140, 7.153 — v Hawi (No 2) (2011) 216 A Crim R 64; [2011] NSWSC 1648 …. 5.205 — v — (No 9) (2011) 216 A Crim R 90; [2011] NSWSC 1655 …. 5.205 — v Hayden and Slattery [1959] VR 102 …. 7.120 — v Haydon (No 5) [2005] SASC 19 …. 5.49 — v Hayes [1977] 2 All ER 288; (1976) 64 Cr App R 194 …. 7.28 — v Hayler and Henry (1988) 39 A Crim R 374 …. 4.19 — v Hayles (1990) 54 SASR 549 …. 4.59, 4.62, 4.64, 4.65 — v He and Bun (2001) 122 A Crim R 487 …. 4.5, 4.100 — v Heading (2011) 111 SASR 32; [2011] SASCFC 107 …. 3.72 — v Healy [2016] QCA 334 …. 2.37 — v Heaney (1998) 100 A Crim R 450 …. 5.260 — v Heaney [1992] 2 VR 531 …. 5.266, 5.267, 8.148, 8.157, 8.168 — v Heaney and Walsh [1998] 4 VR 636 …. 8.134, 8.155, 8.168 — v Heginbotham [2008] QCA 47 …. 4.27 — v Hein (2013) 117 SASR 444; [2013] SASCFC 97 …. 8.142, 8.154, 8.163

— v Hellwig [2007] 1 Qd R 17; [2006] QCA 179 …. 7.33 — v Helmhout [2000] NSWSC 185 …. 8.129 — v — [2001] NSWCCA 372 …. 2.35, 2.37, 8.129, 8.144 — v Helps [2016] SASCFC 154 …. 8.106 — v Hembury (1994) 73 A Crim R 1 …. 3.101 — v Hemmelstein [2001] NSWCCA 220 …. 3.51, 8.47 — v Henderson (1984) 37 SASR 82 …. 2.44, 7.120 — v Hendrie (1985) 37 SASR 581 …. 8.43, 8.44, 8.47 — v Heness [2009] SASC 243 …. 5.138, 5.141 — v Hennessey (1978) 68 Cr App R 419 …. 5.205 — v Hennig [2015] SASCFC 150 …. 3.64 — v Henry (1968) 53 Cr App R 150 …. 4.19, 4.103 — v Hentschel [1988] VR 362 …. 4.57, 4.74, 7.95, 7.96 — v Hepworth and Fearnley [1955] 2 QB 600 …. 2.69 — v Herring (1994) 74 A Crim R 72 …. 4.32, 4.76 — v Hewitt [1998] 4 VR 862 …. 2.71, 4.46, 7.107 — v Heyde (1990) 20 NSWLR 234 …. 4.85, 4.87 — v Heyes (2006) 12 VR 401 …. 4.86 — v Hickman (1993) 60 SASR 415 …. 7.158 — v Hill (1851) 2 Den 254; 169 ER 495 …. 7.35 — v Hill; Ex parte DPP (Cth) (2011) 212 A Crim R 359; [2011] QCA 306 …. 4.89 — v Hillier (2007) 228 CLR 618; [2007] HCA 13 …. 2.83 — v Hills (1988) 86 Cr App R 26 …. 4.89 — v Hilton [1972] 1 QB 421 …. 3.84, 3.123, 5.111, 7.124 — v Hines (1991) 24 NSWLR 737 …. 2.49 — v — (No 2) (2014) 242 A Crim R 316; [2014] NSWSC 990 …. 7.3 — v Hinschen [2008] QCA 145 …. 3.136

— v Hinton (1999) 150 FLR 20 …. 8.99 — v — (2000) 155 FLR 139 …. 3.62 — v Hinz [1972] Qd R 272 …. 6.8 — v Hirst (2013) 116 SASC 300; [2013] SASCFC 54 …. 4.88 — v Hissey (1973) 6 SASR 280 …. 3.33, 8.29 — v Hoare (1966) 50 Cr App R 166 …. 140 — v Hoch (1988) 32 A Crim R 443 …. 3.44 — v Hodge (1987) 48 SASR 91 …. 7.125 — v — [2002] NSWCCA 10 …. 5.144 — v Hodgkiss (1836) 7 Car & P 298; 173 ER 132 …. 3.132 — v Hogan [2001] NSWCCA 292 …. 7.122 — v Holden (1990) 52 A Crim R 32 …. 3.78 — v Holloway (2014) 239 A Crim R 108; [2014] ACTSC 54 …. 3.149 — v Holmes (1871) LR 1 CCR 334 …. 3.142, 3.143 — v — [1953] 2 All ER 324 …. 7.60 — v Holt and Merriman (1996) 87 A Crim R 82 …. 8.28 — v Holy Trinity, Kingston upon Hull (Inhabitants) (1827) 7 B & C 611; 108 ER 851 …. 7.18 — v Home Secretary; Ex parte Khawaja [1984] AC 74 …. 2.64, 2.69 — v Honner [1977] Tas SR 1 …. 7.58 — v Hood [1968] 1 WLR 773 …. 5.185 — v Hook (1858) Dears & B 606; 169 ER 1138 …. 4.4 — v Hopper [2005] VSCA 214 …. 4.48 — v Horry (1949) NZLR 791 …. 3.29, 3.67 — v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte Bennett (No 2) (1994) 99 Cr App R 123 …. 5.14 — v Horsfall (1989) 51 SASR 489 …. 2.30, 4.3, 7.29, 7.35, 7.110 — v Horton (1998) 45 NSWLR 426 …. 8.99

— v Horvath (1979) 93 DLR (3d) 1 …. 7.113 — v Houston (1982) 8 A Crim R 392 …. 7.121 — v Howard (2005) 156 A Crim R 343; [2005] VSCA 235 …. 4.88 — v — [2005] NSWCCA 25 …. 7.40, 7.41 — v Howe [1958] SASR 95 …. 3.140 — v Howes (2000) 2 VR 141 …. 7.131 — v Howick [1970] Crim LR 403 …. 4.64 — v HRA (2008) 183 A Crim R 91 …. 7.104, 7.106 — v Hsing (1991) 25 NSWLR 685 …. 4.53, 8.155 — v Hudson [2016] QCA 80 …. 8.61 — v Hughes (1989) 42 A Crim R 270 …. 2.12 — v Hugo and Nasko (2000) 113 A Crim R 484 …. 4.88 — v Huisman and Shiells [1999] VSCA 170 …. 2.84 — v Humble [2009] SASC 51 …. 4.49, 7.104 — v Humphrey (1999) 72 SASR 558 …. 2.30, 7.43 — v Humphries [1972] 2 NSWLR 783 …. 5.118 — v Hunt (1994) 76 A Crim R 363 …. 4.85 — v — [1987] AC 352 …. 6.2, 6.8, 6.14, 6.16, 6.19, 6.21 — v Hunter [1956] VLR 31 …. 7.118, 7.120 — v Hunter and Daebler (1989) 51 SASR 158 …. 5.144 — v Hush; Ex parte Devanny (1932) 48 CLR 487 …. 6.22 — v Hutchinson (1990) 53 SASR 587 …. 7.120 — v Hyatt [1998] 4 VR 182 …. 4.49 — v Hytch (2000) 114 A Crim R 573 …. 8.47 — v IA Shaw [1996] 1 Qd R 641 …. 7.117 — v IAS (2004) 89 SASR 159; [2004] SASC 240 …. 2.29 — v Ignjatic (1993) 68 A Crim R 333 …. 2.49 — v IK (2004) 89 SASR 406; [2004] SASC 280 …. 2.87, 3.35

— v Inamata (2003) 137 A Crim R 510; [2003] NSWCCA 19 …. 4.58, 4.63 — v Independent Broad-Based Anti-Corruption Commissioner (2016) 256 CLR 459; [2016] HCA 8 …. 1.53, 5.108, 5.146, 5.183, 6.8 — v Inhabitants of Worth (1843) 4 QB 132; 114 ER 847 …. 8.76 — v Inston (2009) 103 SASR 265; [2009] SASC 89 …. 3.48, 4.6, 4.49 — v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321 …. 5.138, 5.139, 5.256, 8.28, 8.140, 8.142, 8.149 — v Irlam; Ex parte Attorney-General [2002] QCA 235 …. 2.72 — v J (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 …. 7.47, 7.51, 7.58, 7.66, 7.108, 7.155, 7.158 — v — (No 2) (1994) 13 WAR 346 …. 7.111 — v — (No 2) [1998] 3 VR 602 …. 3.73 — v J, AP (2012) 113 SASR 529; [2012] SASCFC 95 …. 7.30 — v — (2013) 118 SASR 150; [2013] SASCFC 121 …. 4.37 — v J, JA (2009) 105 SASR 563; [2009] SASC 401 …. 7.21, 7.34, 7.99, 8.108 — v J, SM (2013) 117 SASR 535; [2013] SASCFC 96 …. 7.142 — v Jabarula (1984) 11 A Crim R 131 …. 8.152, 8.153 — v Jack (1894) 15 LR (NSW) 196 …. 7.152, 7.153 — v Jackson (1987) 8 NSWLR 116 …. 5.199 — v Jacobi (2012) 114 SASR 227; [2012] SASCFC 115 …. 2.29 — v Jacobs and Mehajer (2004) 151 A Crim R 452; [2004] NSWCCA 462 …. 4.23 — v Jacquier (1979) 20 SASR 543 …. 4.25, 7.118 — v Jafary [2016] NSWDC 41 …. 5.144 — v Jamal (2000) 116 A Crim R 45 …. 4.64 — v Jamison, Elliot and Blessington (1992) 60 A Crim R 68 …. 4.27 — v Jansen [1970] SASR 531 …. 4.102 — v — (2001) 80 SASR 590 …. 7.95 — v Jarrett (1994) 62 SASR 443; 73 A Crim R 160 …. 6.23, 6.28, 7.43, 7.51, 7.53

— v — [2012] NSWCCA 81 …. 8.136 — v Jarvis (1867) LR 1 CCR 96 …. 8.131 — v Jassar (2013) 233 A Crim R 510; [2013] QCA 115 …. 8.108 — v Jeffrey (1991) 60 A Crim R 384 …. 4.86 — v Jenkyns (1993) 32 NSWLR 712; 71 A Crim R 1 …. 7.53, 7.111 — v Jensen [2009] VSCA 266 …. 6.52 — v Jimmy Butler (No 1) (1991) 57 A Crim R 451 …. 8.152, 8.153 — v JJT (2006) 67 NSWLR 152; [2006] NSWCCA 283 …. 5.122 — v J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR 600 …. 7.52 — v Jobling [2012] 1 Qd R 573; [2011] QCA 31 …. 5.190 — v John [1973] Crim LR 113a …. 4.64 — v John Loe (No 1) [1969] PNGLR 12 …. 8.131 — v Johns (1992) SASC 12–13 (Bollen J, 26 August 1992, unreported) …. 3.144 — v — (1999) 110 A Crim R 149 …. 8.101, 8.161 — v Johnson (1979) 22 SASR 161 …. 6.34, 6.35 — v — (2004) 89 SASR 294; [2004] SASC 241 …. 4.56, 4.77 — v Johnson, Sonnet and Paisley (2001) 126 A Crim R 395 …. 5.119 — v Johnston (1986) 43 SASR 63 …. 4.18 — v — (1998) 45 NSWLR 362 …. 2.71, 4.6, 4.49 — v — [2004] NSWCCA 58 …. 3.104, 4.26 — v Joiner [2002] NSWCCA 354 …. 3.58 — v Jones [1970] 1 NSWR 190 …. 8.131 — v — (1998) 72 SASR 281 …. 2.43 — v — (2002) 2 Cr App R 128 …. 2.43 — v — (2006) 161 A Crim R 511; [2006] SASC 189 …. 4.77, 4.82 — v Jones and Waghorn (1991) 55 A Crim R 159 …. 3.78 — v Josifoski [1997] 2 VR 68 …. 3.31, 3.36, 4.49 — v Jovanovic (1997) 42 NSWLR 520 …. 2.71

— v JS [2007] NSWCCA 272 …. 2.14 — v JTB [2003] NSWCCA 295 …. 7.30 — v Judge (General Sessions of the Peace), County of York; Ex parte Corning Glass Works of Canada Ltd (1970) 16 DLR (3d) 609 …. 5.155 — v Jung [2006] NSWSC 658 …. 7.46, 7.54 — v Juric (2002) 4 VR 411 …. 8.155 — v — [2003] VSCA 382 …. 2.87 — v JX [2016] QCA 240 …. 5.185 — v K (1984) 14 A Crim R 226 …. 8.128 — v — (1991) 161 LSJS 135 …. 5.15 — v — (1992) 59 A Crim R 113 …. 4.97 — v — (2003) 59 NSWLR 431 …. 5.185 — v K, MC [2009] SASC 141 …. 3.35 — v Kai-Whitewind [2005] EWCA Crim 1092 …. 7.52 — v — [2005] 2 Cr App R 31 …. 3.58 — v Kalajzich and Orrock (1989) 39 A Crim R 415 …. 4.93 — v Kallis [1994] 2 Qd R 88 …. 2.30, 8.134, 8.168 — v KAN [2016] QCA 108 …. 2.87 — v Kanaan [2005] NSWCCA 385 …. 2.49 — v Kanaveilomani [1995] 2 Qd R 242 …. 5.131 — v Karam (1995) 83 A Crim R 416 …. 4.53, 5.258 — v Karapandzk (2008) 184 A Crim R 320; [2008] SASC 126 …. 2.7 — v Karger [2001] SASC 64 …. 7.43, 7.51, 7.53, 7.65 — v — (2002) 83 SASR 135 …. 1.20, 1.22, 1.26, 1.42, 2.67, 2.87, 7.43 — v Karounos (1995) 63 SASR 451 …. 2.11 — v Karunaratne (1989) 44 A Crim R 191 …. 4.89 — v Kaye [1983] 2 Qd R 202 …. 5.200 — v KDY [2008] VSCA 104 …. 2.71

— v Keane (1994) 99 Cr App R 1 …. 5.223 — v Kearley [1992] 2 AC 228 …. 8.4, 8.22, 8.33 — v — [1992] 2 AC 345 …. 8.33 — v Kearney (2013) 118 SASR 335; [2013] SASCFC 148 …. 4.65 — v Kehagias, Leone and Durkic [1985] VR 107 …. 4.98 — v Kelly [1958] VR 412 …. 7.42 — v — (1975) 12 SASR 389 …. 8.57 — v — (2002) 129 A Crim R 363; [2002] WASCA 134 …. 4.64 — v Kemble [1990] 1 WLR 1111 …. 7.28 — v Kempster (1989) 90 Cr App R 14 …. 5.194 — v Kennedy (1997) 94 A Crim R 341 …. 5.13 — v — (2000) 118 A Crim R 34 …. 7.118 — v Keogh (No 2) (2014) 121 SASR 307 …. 2.14 — v — (No 3) (2014) 121 SASR 410; [2014] SASCFC 137 …. 8.187 — v Kerim [1988] 1 Qd R 426 …. 4.93 — v Kesisyan [2003] NSWCCA 259 …. 4.48 — v KG (2001) 54 NSWLR 198 …. 7.112 — v Khalil (1987) 44 SASR 23 …. 8.149 — v Khazaal [2012] HCA 26 …. 6.2, 6.8 — v Kiah (2001) 120 A Crim R 365 …. 8.155 — v Killick (1979) 21 SASR 321 …. 8.146 — v — (1980) 24 SASR 137 …. 7.130 — v King [1965] 1 WLR 706 …. 5.135 — v — (1975) 12 SASR 404 …. 4.57 — v — [1983] 1 WLR 411 …. 5.60 — v — (1995) 78 A Crim R 53 …. 7.105 — v Kingston [1986] 2 Qd R 114 …. 5.12, 7.84, 7.154 — v — [2008] QCA 193 …. 8.168

— v Kirby [2000] NSWCCA 330 …. 4.69, 7.23 — v Kirkby [2000] 2 Qd R 57 …. 5.194 — v Kissier (2011) 212 A Crim R 121; [2011] QCA 223 …. 2.7 — v Kite (1992) 60 A Crim R 226 …. 5.188 — v Kneebone (1999) 47 NSWLR 450 …. 6.49, 6.52, 6.57, 7.123 — v Knigge (2003) 6 VR 150 …. 7.33, 7.34 — v Knight [1966] 1 WLR 230 …. 4.84 — v — (2001) 160 FLR 465; 120 A Crim R 381 …. 5.156, 8.100 — v — [2005] NSWCCA 241 …. 4.9 — v KNP (2006) 67 NSWLR 227 …. 7.158 — v Koelman [2000] 2 VR 20 …. 2.83, 2.85, 2.87, 8.155 — v Koenig (2013) 229 A Crim R 108; [2013] SASC 42 …. 8.181 — v Kola [2001] SASC 448 …. 2.40 — v Komornick [1986] VR 845 …. 6.55 — v Konstandopoulos [1998] 4 VR 381 …. 4.88 — v Kooyman and Brydson (1979) 22 SASR 376 …. 4.84 — v Koppen (1975) 11 SASR 182 …. 3.72 — v Kostaras [2002] SASC 326 …. 3.34 — v — (No 2) (2003) 143 A Crim R 254 …. 5.118 — v Kostic (2004) 151 A Crim R 10; [2004] SASC 406 …. 4.65 — v Kotzmann [1999] 2 VR 123 …. 2.84, 2.85, 2.86, 2.87, 4.56, 7.54 — v — (No 2) (2002) 128 A Crim R 479 …. 2.84 — v KRA [1999] 2 VR 708 …. 3.71 — v Krausz (1973) 57 Cr App R 466 …. 3.142, 3.143 — v Kuster (2008) 21 VR 407; [2008] VSCA 261 …. 4.85, 7.121 — v Kypri (2002) 5 VR 610 …. 4.33 — v Kyriacou [2000] SASC 312 …. 2.49 — v Kyu Hyuk Kim (1998) 104 A Crim R 233 …. 7.3

— v L, GA [2015] SASCFC 166 …. 6.58 — v LAH [2016] QCA 82 …. 4.7 — v Laing [2008] QCA 317 …. 4.63 — v Lal Khan (1981) 73 Cr App R 190 …. 2.42, 7.28 — v Lam (2001) 121 A Crim R 272 …. 4.64, 7.65, 7.95 — v — (Ruling No 6) [2005] VSC 280 …. 7.121 — v — (Ruling No 8) [2005] VSC 282 …. 7.121 — v — (Ruling No 9) [2005] VSC 283 …. 7.121 — v — (Ruling No 18) [2005] VSC 292 …. 2.88, 4.86 — v Lambert (2000) 111 A Crim R 564 …. 4.65 — v — [2001] UKHL 37; [2002] 2 AC 545; [2001] 2 Cr App R 511 …. 6.8, 6.14, 6.19, 6.21 — v Lancaster [1998] 4 VR 550 …. 8.156 — v Lancefield [1999] VSCA 176 …. 2.73 — v Landells [2000] VSCA 84 …. 2.87 — v Lander (1989) 52 SASR 424 …. 4.13, 4.89 — v Landmeter (2015) 121 SASR 522; [2015] SASCFC 3 …. 3.64, 7.99 — v Landon (2011) 109 SASR 216; [2011] SASCFC 12 …. 7.58, 7.59 — v Lane (1996) 66 FCR 144 …. 4.20 — v — (2011) 221 A Crim R 309; [2011] NSWCCA 157 …. 4.83 — v Langford [1990] Crim LR 653 …. 5.205 — v Lars (aka Larsson); Da Silva and Kalanderian (1994) 73 A Crim R 91 …. 2.40, 6.58 — v Larson and Lee [1984] VR 559 …. 8.146, 8.156 — v Latif and Shahzad [1996] 2 Cr App R 92 …. 4.53 — v Lau (1991) 6 WAR 30 …. 7.30, 7.35, 7.36 — v Laurie [1987] 2 Qd R 762 …. 7.58 — v Lavery (1978) 19 SASR 515 …. 8.147

— v — (2013) 116 SASR 242; [2013] SASCFC 46 …. 2.71 — v — (No 2) (1979) 20 SASR 430 …. 5.134, 7.155, 8.154 — v Law (2001) 122 A Crim R 542; [2001] NSWCCA 291 …. 5.123, 5.127 — v — (2008) 182 A Crim R 312; [2008] NTCCA 4 …. 5.12 — v Lawrence (1980) 32 ALR 72 …. 3.136 — v — [1980] 1 NSWLR 122 …. 6.8 — v — [2002] 2 Qd R 400; [2001] QCA 441 …. 3.140, 7.140 — v Lawson (1990) 90 Cr App R 107 …. 5.15 — v — [1996] 2 Qd R 587 …. 4.32 — v — [2000] NSWCCA 214 …. 7.69, 7.70 — v Laz [1998] 1 VR 453 …. 2.71 — v Le (2002) 54 NSWLR 474 …. 7.122, 7.123 — v — [2000] NSWCCA 49 …. 3.62, 7.79 — v — [2001] NSWSC 174 …. 2.26, 7.122 — v Le Blowitz [1998] 1 Qd R 303 …. 4.89 — v Le Broc (2000) 2 VR 43 …. 4.88 — v Leak [1969] SASR 172 …. 2.71 — v Lear [1998] 1 VR 285 …. 3.101 — v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133 …. 2.27, 2.29, 2.32, 2.34, 4.67, 8.126, 8.131, 8.134, 8.140 — v — (1989) 42 A Crim R 393 …. 7.68 — v — (2000) 50 NSWLR 289 …. 5.212 — v — [2005] VSC 167 …. 8.96 — v — (2007) 71 NSWLR 120; [2007] NSWCCA 71 …. 6.8 — v Leroy [1984] 2 NSWLR 441 …. 8.57 — v LeRoy and Graham [2000] NSWCCA 302 …. 4.69 — v Leslie [1989] 2 Qd R 378 …. 3.78 — v Lester (2008) 190 A Crim R 468; [2008] QCA 354 …. 8.29, 8.181

— v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; [1999] NSWCCA 287 …. 2.30, 4.57, 5.127 — v — [2012] NSWSC 1451 …. 8.147 — v Leung and Wong (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; [1999] NSWCCA 287 …. 7.40, 7.41, 7.56 — v Lewis (1998) 103 A Crim R 305 …. 3.115 — v — [2000] 1 VR 290 …. 8.155 — v Lewis-Hamilton [1998] 1 VR 630 …. 5.15 — v Leyland Justices; Ex parte Hawthorn [1979] QB 283 …. 5.15 — v LHH (2002) 132 A Crim R 498 …. 8.152 — v Li (2003) 140 A Crim R 288 …. 4.3, 4.42 — v — [1993] 2 VR 80 …. 8.133 — v — [2003] NSWCCA 407 …. 3.75 — v Liddy [2002] SASC 19 …. 3.44, 3.48 — v Lillyman [1896] 2 QB 167 …. 7.100, 7.104 — v Lindsay [1970] NZLR 1002 …. 8.57 — v — (1977) 18 SASR 103 …. 4.91, 4.92 — v — (2014) 119 SASR 320; [2014] SASCFC 56 …. 2.12 — v Linnane (1979) 32 SASR 72 …. 8.154 — v Liristis [2004] NSWCCA 287 …. 7.131 — v Lisoff [1999] NSWCCA 364 …. 2.26, 2.30, 2.31, 3.8 — v Lister [1981] 1 NSWLR 110 …. 6.54 — v Little (1976) 14 SASR 556 …. 2.40 — v Little (2013) 231 A Crim R 145; [2013] QCA 223 …. 7.33 — v — [2008] NSWDC 311 …. 2.29 — v Livingstone [1987] 1 Qd R 38 …. 3.140, 7.140 — v Lo Presti [1992] 1 VR 696 …. 6.58 — v Loader (2004) 89 SASR 204 …. 2.71, 4.86 — v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24; [2000] SASC 48 …. 2.29, 2.32, 2.36, 2.37,

5.262, 5.264 — v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 …. 2.27, 2.30, 3.31, 3.33, 3.34, 3.56, 3.57, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 8.66 — v Lockyer (1996) 89 A Crim R 457 …. 2.31, 3.61, 3.82 — v Lodhi (2006) 163 A Crim R 526 …. 8.101 — v Loguancio (2000) 1 VR 235 …. 2.85, 2.87, 3.74 — v Lomman (2014) 119 SASR 463; [2014] SASCFC 55 …. 7.30 — v Long and McDonnell (2002) 137 A Crim R 263; [2002] SASC 426 …. 3.11, 3.26, 3.33, 3.37, 3.42, 3.74, 4.27 — v Longford (1970) 17 FLR 37 …. 3.66 — v Lonie and Groom [1999] NSWCCA 319 …. 4.28, 4.30, 4.52 — v Loosely [2001] 4 All ER 897 …. 4.53 — v Lopatta (1983) 35 SASR 101 …. 3.136, 5.140 — v Louden (1995) 37 NSWLR 683 …. 8.118, 8.119 — v Lovett [1973] 1 All ER 744 …. 3.100, 3.109, 3.113, 3.119 — v Lowe (1997) 98 A Crim R 300 …. 4.34, 4.56 — v LRG [2006] VSCA 288 …. 2.83 — v LSS [2000] 1 Qd R 546 …. 3.34, 7.143 — v LTP [2004] NSWCCA 109 …. 7.107 — v Lucas [1973] VR 693 …. 6.49, 6.54 — v — [1981] 1 QB 720 …. 4.83, 4.87, 4.88 — v — [1992] 2 VR 109 …. 2.29, 7.43, 7.53 — v Luezkowski (1990) 54 SASR 169 …. 3.33 — v Luisi [1964] Crim LR 605 …. 4.84 — v Lumsden [2003] NSWCCA 83 …. 3.62, 7.137 — v Lunt (1987) 85 Cr App R 241 …. 3.44 — v Luttrell [2004] 2 Cr App R 31 …. 7.52 — v Lyndon (1987) 31 A Crim R 111 …. 7.35

— v Lyons (1889) 15 VLR 15 …. 2.44, 7.30 — v M (1993) 67 A Crim R 549 …. 3.147, 3.150 — v — (1994) 72 A Crim R 269 …. 3.136, 8.108 — v — (2002) 135 A Crim R 324 …. 8.155 — v M, RB [2007] SASC 207 …. 2.83, 2.87 — v Maarroui (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 757 …. 4.59 — v Mabbott [1990] WAR 323 …. 8.104 — v Macaskill (No 1) (2001) 81 SASR 152 …. 6.32 — v — (No 2) (2001) 81 SASR 155 …. 4.24, 4.77 — v Macecek [1960] Qd R 247 …. 3.132 — v MacFarlane [1993] 1 Qd R 202 …. 8.72 — v MacFie (No 2) (2004) 11 VR 215; [2004] VSCA 209 …. 4.27, 7.118 — v Madigan [2005] NSWCCA 170 …. 2.28, 2.30, 4.57, 7.40, 7.56 — v Madobi (1963) 6 FLR 1 …. 8.86 — v Maguire [1992] 2 WLR 767 …. 5.15 — v Mai (2000) 119 A Crim R 327; [2000] NSWCCA 517 …. 5.124, 5.127 — v Maiolo (No 2) (2013) 117 SASR 1; [2013] SASCFC 36 …. 3.64, 3.75, 4.51 — v Major and Lawrence [1998] 1 Qd R 317 …. 4.82, 4.84, 4.93 — v Makanjoula and E [1995] 2 Cr App R 469 …. 4.19 — v Maklouf [1999] NSWCCA 94 …. 4.70 — v Maladinovic (1992) 60 A Crim R 206 …. 7.16 — v Maleckas [1991] 1 VR 363 …. 2.82 — v Mandica (1980) 24 SASR 394 …. 3.136 — v Manh (1983) 33 SASR 563 …. 4.59, 4.63, 4.67 — v Mankotia [1998] NSWSC 295 …. 8.66, 8.197 — v Mann (1972) 56 Cr App R 750 …. 5.143 — v Manning (2014) 239 A Crim R 348; [2014] QCA 49 …. 3.65 — v Manser (1934) 25 Cr App R 18 …. 4.15

— v Mansfield [1977] 1 WLR 1102 …. 2.55 — v Manunta (1989) 54 SASR 17 …. 7.129, 7.131 — v Manwaring [1983] 2 NSWLR 82 …. 3.136, 7.104, 7.105 — v Maqsud Ali [1966] 1 QB 688 …. 8.59 — v Marijancevic (1993) 70 A Crim R 272 …. 4.57 — v Markovina (1996) 93 A Crim R 149 …. 8.170 — v — (1997) 19 WAR 119 …. 7.82 — v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82 …. 2.14 — v Marsh [2000] NSWCCA 370 …. 3.62, 3.74 — v — [2005] NSWCCA 331 …. 2.23, 7.40, 7.56 — v Marshall (2000) 113 A Crim R 190 …. 4.65 — v Martelli (1995) 83 A Crim R 550 …. 4.53, 5.258 — v Martin [1956] VLR 87 …. 4.65 — v — (1996) 65 SASR 590 …. 7.92 — v — [1992] 1 NZLR 313 …. 5.138 — v — (2002) 134 A Crim R 568 …. 8.78 — v — (2007) 99 SASR 213; [2007] SASC 336 …. 2.40, 6.8 — v — (No 2) (1997) 68 SASR 419 …. 7.88 — v — (No 4) (2000) 78 SASR 140 …. 6.47 — v MAS (2013) 118 SASR 160; [2013] SASCFC 122 …. 4.21 — v Maslen and Shaw (1995) 79 A Crim R 199 …. 7.137 — v Mason (1911) 7 Cr App R 67 …. 7.60, 7.67 — v — [1988] 1 WLR 139 …. 8.154 — v — (2000) 77 SASR 105 …. 5.205 — v Massey (1994) 62 SASR 481 …. 7.58 — v — [1997] 1 Qd R 404 …. 3.34, 4.85 — v — [2009] ACTCA 12 …. 4.70 — v — [2016] ACTSC 108 …. 5.205

— v Masters (1992) 26 NSWLR 450 …. 8.115, 8.118, 8.119 — v Mateiasevici [1999] 3 VR 185 …. 3.73 — v Mathers (1988) 38 A Crim R 423 …. 3.77 — v Matthews (1984) 36 SASR 503 …. 3.33 — v — (1990) 58 SASR 19 …. 8.29, 8.46 — v — [1999] 1 VR 534 …. 7.104 — v Matthews and Ford [1972] VR 3 …. 4.102, 7.15, 7.120 — v — [1973] VR 199 …. 5.185 — v Matthey (2007) 17 VR 222; [2007] VSC 398 …. 3.58 — v Maurangi (2001) 80 SASR 308 …. 3.78, 3.101 — v Mayfield (1995) 63 SASR 576 …. 3.71 — v Mazzolini [1999] 3 VR 113 …. 2.71, 4.49 — v Mazzone (1985) 43 SASR 330 …. 2.91, 7.7, 7.10 — v MBV (2013) 227 A Crim R 49; [2013] QCA 17 …. 4.86 — v MBX [2014] 1 Qd R 438; [2013] QCA 214 …. 4.46, 4.49, 4.78 — v MC [2009] VSCA 122 …. 4.88 — v McBride (1983) 34 SASR 433 …. 3.77 — v McCarthy (2015) 124 SASR 190 …. 2.38 — v McCarthy and Ryan (1993) 71 A Crim R 395 …. 4.66, 4.67 — v McClintock [2010] 1 Qd R 354; [2009] QCA 175 …. 2.13 — v McConnon [1951] SASR 22 …. 4.90 — v McCourt (1993) 69 A Crim R 151 …. 6.60 — v MCD [2014] QCA 326 …. 4.48 — v McDonald (1995) 84 A Crim R 508 …. 4.13, 4.21, 4.37, 4.41 — v — (2002) 128 A Crim R 228; [2002] ACTSC 39 …. 4.64, 4.69 — v — [2011] SASCFC 57 …. 2.73 — v McDonnell and Armstrong; Ex parte Attorney-General [1988] 2 Qd R 189 …. 5.164

— v McDowell [1997] 1 VR 473 …. 7.131 — v McFarlane [1992] 1 NZLR 495 …. 5.223 — v McFelin [1985] 2 NZLR 750 …. 7.112 — v McGillivray (1993) 97 Cr App R 232 …. 7.9 — v McGrane [2002] QCA 173 …. 8.181 — v McGregor [1984] 1 Qd R 256 …. 7.82 — v McHardie [1983] 2 NSWLR 733 …. 2.43, 4.56, 7.48 — v McInnes (1989) 90 Cr App R 99 …. 4.94, 4.95, 4.96 — v McIntyre (2000) 111 A Crim R 211 …. 2.49 — v — [2001] NSWSC 311 …. 7.43 — v McIvor (1883) 4 LR (NSW) 43 …. 7.11 — v McKellar [2000] NSWCCA 523 …. 4.70 — v McKenna (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 345 …. 8.96 — v McKenzie-McHarg (2008) 189 A Crim R 291; [2008] VSCA 206 …. 2.87, 3.74 — v McKeon (1986) 31 A Crim R 357 …. 4.86 — v McKnoulty (1995) 80 A Crim R 28 …. 3.31 — v McLachlan [1999] 2 VR 553 …. 4.25, 4.100, 7.120, 7.131 — v McLaughlan (2008) 218 FLR 158; [2008] ACTSC 49 …. 8.128, 8.129 — v McLean (1967) 52 Cr App R 80 …. 8.52 — v McLean and Funk; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 231 …. 4.3, 4.23, 5.110 — v McLellan [1974] VR 773 …. 5.156 — v Mcleod (1992) 61 A Crim R 465 …. 5.266 — v — [1995] 1 Cr App R 591 …. 3.109 — v McNamara [1987] VR 855 …. 5.138, 5.139, 5.140, 5.143 — v McNeil (No 1) (2007) 209 FLR 124 …. 8.129, 8.154 — v McNeill (2008) 184 A Crim R 467; [2008] FCAFC 80 …. 2.3

— v McNiven [2011] VSC 397 …. 8.129 — v McRae (1995) 80 A Crim R 380 …. 8.46 — v MDB [2005] NSWCCA 354 …. 7.93 — v MDR [2002] SASC 336 …. 8.168 — v Meade (2013) 233 A Crim R 40; [2013] VSC 250 …. 8.144, 8.147, 8.149, 8.168 — v Mearns [2005] NSWCCA 396 …. 3.36 — v Medina (1995) 84 A Crim R 316 …. 4.53, 5.258 — v Meier (1982) 30 SASR 126 …. 7.29 — v Meissner (1994) 76 A Crim R 81 …. 5.205 — v Melasecca (1994) 74 A Crim R 210 …. 5.223 — v Melrose [1989] 1 Qd R 572 …. 4.86 — v Mendoza [2007] VSCA 120 …. 4.65 — v Mercer (1993) 67 A Crim R 91 …. 4.83 — v Merlino [2004] NSWCCA 104 …. 2.85 — v Merrett, Piggott and Ferrari (2007) 14 VR 392 …. 6.8 — v Merritt [1999] NSWCCA 29 …. 2.85 — v Merritt and Roso (1985) 19 A Crim R 360 …. 8.149, 8.159 — v Middleton (2000) 114 A Crim R 141 …. 2.71 — v Midwinter (1971) 55 Cr App R 525 …. 4.19 — v Miladinovic (1992) 109 ACTR 11; 60 A Crim R 206 …. 4.57, 4.67, 8.61, 8.68 — v Milakovich [2004] NSWCCA 199 …. 7.123 — v Milat (1996) 87 A Crim R 446 …. 7.43 — v Miletic [1977] 1 VR 593 …. 7.107 — v — [1997] 1 VR 593 …. 4.46 — v Millar (1998) 103 A Crim R 526 …. 7.138, 7.142 — v Miller [1952] 2 All ER 667 …. 3.77, 3.78

— v — (1980) 25 SASR 170 …. 3.72 — v — (2008) 103 SASR 174; [2008] SASC 331 …. 6.8 — v Mills and Poole [1998] AC 382 …. 5.15 — v Minuzzo and Williams [1984] VR 417 …. 8.117, 8.118 — v Mirza [2004] 1 AC 1118; [2004] 1 All ER 925 …. 5.185 — v Mitchell (1892) 17 Cox CC 503 …. 7.125 — v — (2007) 174 A Crim R 52; [2007] QCA 267 …. 4.88, 4.93 — v MJJ; R v CJN (2013) 117 SASR 81 …. 2.87, 3.64 — v Mlaka [1971] VR 385 …. 4.15 — v MM (2000) 112 A Crim R 519 …. 2.71, 2.87, 3.57, 3.72, 3.74, 3.75 — v — [2014] NSWCCA 144 …. 3.54, 3.56, 3.75 — v MMJ (2006) 166 A Crim R 501; [2006] VSCA 226 …. 5.139 — v Moffat [2000] NSWCCA 174 …. 8.129 — v Mogg (2000) 112 A Crim R 417 …. 2.12, 3.140 — v Moghal (1977) 65 Cr App R 56 …. 8.47 — v Mohammadi (2011) 112 SASR 17; [2011] SASCFC 154 …. 6.58 — v Mokbel (2010) 249 FLR 169; [2010] VSCA 11 …. 2.43 — v — (2012) 222 A Crim R 377; [2012] VSC 86 …. 2.37 — v Molloy (2008) 102 SASR 452 …. 2.71 — v Moore (1972) 56 Cr App R 373 …. 8.131 — v — (1995) 77 A Crim R 577 …. 7.154 — v — [1999] 3 NZLR 385 …. 5.190 — v Moran and Mokbel [1999] 2 VR 87 …. 5.130 — v Morgan (1875) 14 Cox CC 337 …. 8.86 — v — [1978] 1 WLR 755 …. 4.38 — v — (1993) 30 NSWLR 543 …. 3.150 — v — [2009] VSCA 225 …. 7.16 — v Morris (1995) 78 A Crim R 465 …. 2.29

— v Morris; Ex parte AG [1996] 2 Qd R 68 …. 7.34 — v Morrisson [1999] 1 Qd R 397 …. 2.65 — v Morrow (2009) 26 VR 526; 213 A Crim R 530; [2009] VSCA 291 …. 2.13, 7.130, 7.131 — v Mostyn (2004) 145 A Crim R 304; [2004] NSWCCA 97 …. 3.31 — v Movis (1994) 75 A Crim R 416 …. 3.71 — v MRW (1999) 113 A Crim R 308 …. 7.102 — v Muller [1996] 1 Qd R 74 …. 4.38 — v — (2013) 273 FLR 215; [2013] ACTA 15 …. 7.30 — v Munce [2001] NSWSC 1072 …. 8.130, 8.134 — v Munday (No 1) [2016] VSC 26 …. 8.129 — v Mundine (2008) 182 A Crim R 302; [2008] NSWCCA 55 …. 4.68 — v Muniz [2016] QCA 210 …. 2.71 — v Murch and Logan (2014) 119 SASR 427; [2014] SASCFC 61 …. 2.28, 3.79 — v Murcott (2005) 31 WAR 198 …. 8.168 — v Murdoch (No 1) (2005) 195 FLR 362; [2005] NTSC 75 …. 4.65, 4.74 — v — (No 4) (2005) 195 FLR 421; [2005] NTSC 78 …. 4.56 — v Murphy (1985) 4 NSWLR 42 …. 3.107, 3.130, 3.136 — v — (1986) 5 NSWLR 18 …. 5.198 — v — (1995) 85 A Crim R 286 …. 4.66, 4.67 — v — (1996) 66 SASR 406 …. 5.134, 8.140, 8.149 — v — [2000] NSWCCA 297 …. 4.63 — v Murray (1982) 7 A Crim R 48 …. 7.146 — v — (1987) 11 NSWLR 12; 30 A Crim R 315 …. 2.71, 4.43, 4.44, 4.77 — v — (1999) 108 A Crim R 430 …. 2.71, 4.66 — v — [2016] QCA 342 …. 4.93 — v Mursic [1980] Qd R 482 …. 7.151 — v Murtagh and Kennedy (1955) 39 Cr App R 72 …. 2.69

— v Muscot (1713) 10 Mod Rep 192; 88 ER 689 …. 4.4 — v Musolino (2003) 86 SASR 37 …. 7.140, 7.149 — v Mustafa (1976) 65 Cr App R 26 …. 3.57 — v — (2005) 91 SASR 62 …. 7.104 — v Myers [1998] AC 124 …. 8.78 — v N Ltd [2009] 1 Cr App R 3 …. 2.51, 6.30 — v N, GF & N, SG [2010] SASC 7 …. 3.79 — v N, RC (2012) 112 SASR 399; [2012] SASCFC 37 …. 4.51 — v Nagawalli [2009] NTSC 25 …. 8.168 — v Naidinovici [1962] NZLR 334 …. 7.82 — v Namie [2011] QCA 304 …. 4.63 — v Narula (1985) 22 A Crim R 409 …. 8.159 — v Nassif [2004] NSWCCA 433 …. 3.59 — v Nation [1954] SASR 189 …. 4.52, 7.155 — v Naudi [1999] NSWCCA 259 …. 5.143, 5.144 — v Navorolli [2010] 1 Qd R 27; [2009] QCA 49 …. 4.83 — v Naylor [2013] 1 Qd R 368; [2012] QCA 116 …. 8.129 — v NE [2004] 2 Qd R 328; [2003] QCA 574 …. 2.49 — v Neal, Regos and Morgan [1947] ALR 616 …. 7.117, 7.121 — v Neilan [1992] 1 VR 57 …. 2.72 — v Nelson [2004] NSWCCA 231 …. 8.128 — v Ng (2002) 5 VR 257 …. 5.139, 8.149 — v Ngatikaura (2006) 161 A Crim R 329; [2006] NSWCCA 161 …. 3.26, 3.37, 3.56, 3.75 — v Ngo (2001) 122 A Crim R 467 …. 8.99 — v — (2003) 57 NSWLR 55; [2003] NSWCCA 82 …. 4.73, 7.3 — v Ngo and Le [2002] SASC 373 …. 3.37 — v Nguyen [1989] 2 Qd R 38 …. 7.119

— v — [1989] 2 Qd R 72 …. 7.125 — v — [1999] 1 VR 457 …. 8.47 — v — [2000] 1 Qd R 559 …. 2.45 — v — [2000] NSWCCA 285 …. 4.63 — v — [2002] NSWCCA 403 …. 2.25 — v — [2003] NSWSC 1068 …. 4.54 — v — [2008] ACTSC 40 …. 8.22, 8.33 — v — [2009] SASC 91 …. 8.187 — v — (2013) 117 SASR 432; [2013] SASCFC 91 …. 2.37 — v Nicholas [1988] Tas SR 155 …. 7.10 — v — [2000] 1 VR 356 …. 8.156 — v Nieterink (1999) 76 SASR 56; [1999] SASC 560 …. 2.87, 3.32, 3.34, 3.35, 3.38, 3.53, 3.64, 3.66, 3.73, 3.74 — v Ninnal (1992) 109 FLR 203 …. 8.152 — v NKS [2004] NSWCCA 144 …. 3.56 — v NM [2013] 1 Qd R 374; [2012] QCA 173 …. 7.99 — v Noakes (1986) 42 SASR 489 …. 8.154 — v Nobes (2001) 120 A Crim R 18 …. 6.56 — v Noll [1999] 3 VR 704 …. 7.43 — v Norfolk (2002) 129 A Crim R 288 …. 3.72, 3.109 — v Norton [1910] 2 KB 496 …. 5.138 — v Nottinghamshire Justices; Ex parte Bostock [1970] 1 WLR 1117 …. 5.104 — v Nowaz (1976) 63 Cr App R 178 …. 7.18 — v NRC (No 2) (2001) 124 A Crim R 580 …. 7.135 — v NZ (2005) 63 NSWLR 628; [2005] NSWCCA 278 …. 7.19, 7.21 — v O’Brien (1996) 66 SASR 396 …. 6.53, 6.54 — v OC [2015] NSWCCA 212 …. 1.53 — v O’Callaghan [1976] VR 676 …. 7.43, 7.47

— v O’Connor [2003] NSWCCA 335 …. 8.74 — v OGD (1997) 45 NSWLR 744 …. 5.127 — v — (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433; [2000] NSWCCA 404 …. 3.62, 3.73, 3.106, 3.127, 3.135 — v O’Keefe [2000] 1 Qd R 564 …. 2.87 — v Olasiuk (1973) 6 SASR 255 …. 6.58 — v Oliver [1944] KB 68 …. 6.19 — v Oliverio (1993) 61 SASR 354 …. 3.99 — v — (1994) 70 A Crim R 5 …. 2.49 — v Omar (1992) 58 A Crim R 139 …. 3.31, 4.57 — v Omarjee (1995) 79 A Crim R 355 …. 4.49 — v O’Meally [1952] VLR 499 …. 8.82, 8.83 — v — (No 2) [1964] Qd R 226 …. 3.57 — v O’Neill (1988) 48 SASR 51 …. 4.28, 4.30 — v — [1996] 2 Qd R 326 …. 4.33, 8.155 — v — [2001] VSCA 227 …. 7.16 — v Ong [2001] SASC 437 …. 2.71 — v — (2007) 176 A Crim R 366; [2007] VSCA 206 …. 4.57, 4.71 — v O’Reilly [1967] 2 QB 722 …. 4.19, 4.102 — v — (1975) 13 SASR 68 …. 3.66 — v Orgles [1993] 4 All ER 533 …. 5.185 — v Ortega-Farfan (2011) 215 A Crim R 251; [2011] QCA 364 …. 5.138 — v Orton [1922] VLR 496 …. 7.153 — v O’Sullivan and Mackie (1975) 13 SASR 68 …. 7.24, 3.136, 3.137 — v Osborne [1905] 1 KB 551 …. 7.100, 7.104 — v — [2009] VSCA 88 …. 2.87 — v Osbourne [1973] QB 678 …. 7.96 — v Ostojic (1978) 18 SASR 188 …. 8.133

— v Owen (1991) 56 SASR 397 …. 2.73 — v P (1991) 57 A Crim R 211 …. 2.40 — v — (2001) 53 NSWLR 664; [2001] NSWCA 473 …. 2.2, 5.69, 5.71 — v — [2008] 2 Cr App R 6 …. 6.33 — v PAB (2008) 1 Qd R 184 …. 3.34 — v Pachonick [1973] 2 NSWLR 86 …. 7.84, 7.85 — v Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191 …. 2.72, 4.19 — v Palaga (2001) 80 SASR 19 …. 3.37 — v Palazoff (1986) 43 SASR 99 …. 3.136 — v Palmer [1981] 1 NSWLR 209 …. 4.56, 4.63 — v Panagiotidis (1991) 55 SASR 172 …. 4.100 — v Pangallo (1989) 51 SASR 254 …. 8.50 — v Panozzo (2007) 178 A Crim R 323; [2007] VSCA 245 …. 4.93 — v Pantoja (1996) 88 A Crim R 554 …. 2.29, 2.87, 4.3, 7.43, 7.51, 7.53 — v Papamitrou (2004) 7 VR 375; [2004] VSCA 12 …. 3.71 — v Papoulias [1988] VR 858 …. 8.155 — v Paraskava (1983) 76 Cr App R 162 …. 5.15 — v Parenzee (2007) 101 SASR 456 …. 6.60, 7.51, 7.52 — v — [2007] SASC 143 …. 6.60, 7.51, 7.52 — v Parker (1990) 19 NSWLR 177 …. 8.133, 8.136 — v Parkes (1976) 64 Cr App R 25 …. 5.139 — v — (2003) 147 A Crim R 450; [2003] NSWCCA 12 …. 2.26, 7.122, 7.123 — v Parkinson [1990] 1 Qd R 382 …. 7.119 — v Parsons (2004) 145 A Crim R 519; [2004] VSCA 92 …. 4.25, 4.28 — v Parsons; R v Brady [2015] SASCFC 183 …. 2.71 — v Pascoe (2004) 90 SASR 505 …. 7.28 — v Patel (1981) 73 Cr App R 117 …. 8.26 — v Pateman [1984] 1 Qd R 312 …. 2.8

— v Pathare [1981] 1 NSWLR 124 …. 6.58 — v Patsalis and Spathis (No 4) [1999] NSWSC 715 …. 3.56, 3.57, 3.62 — v — (No 10) (1999) NSWSC 990 …. 7.122, 7.123 — v Patterson [1962] 2 QB 429 …. 6.22 — v Patton (1995) 80 A Crim R 595 …. 4.49 — v Paul [1920] 2 KB 183 …. 5.111 — v Payne [1950] 1 All ER 102 …. 4.23, 5.110 — v Peach [1990] 1 WLR 976 …. 4.4 — v Peake (1974) 9 SASR 458 …. 7.105 — v — (1996) 67 SASR 297 …. 2.87, 3.31, 3.33 — v Pearce [1999] 3 VR 287 …. 3.74 — v — [2001] NSWCCA 447 …. 8.149 — v Pektas [1989] VR 239 …. 8.120 — v Pelly (2015) 122 SASR 84; [2015] SASCFC 25 …. 6.55 — v Penny (1997) 91 A Crim R 288 …. 4.65, 4.67 — v Perara-Cathcart [2017] HCA 9 …. 2.12, 3.64 — v Percerep [1993] VR 109 …. 5.267, 8.157 — v Perrier (No 1) [1991] 1 VR 697 …. 3.109, 3.131, 3.132 — v Perry [1970] 2 NSWR 501 …. 4.25 — v — (No 2) (1981) 28 SASR 95 …. 8.11 — v — (No 3) (1981) 28 SASR 112 …. 8.184 — v — (No 4) (1981) 28 SASR 119 …. 8.184, 8.187 — v Peters and Heffernan (1996) 88 A Crim R 585 …. 4.53, 5.258 — v Petroulias (2006) 182 A Crim R 1; [2006] NSWSC 1422 …. 2.40, 2.45 — v Petroulias (No 22) (2007) 213 FLR 293; 176 A Crim R 309; [2007] NSWSC 692 …. 5.26, 5.68 — v Pettigrew (1980) 71 Cr App R 39 …. 7.12 — v PFD (2001) 124 A Crim R 418; [2001] VSCA 198 …. 2.12, 3.73

— v Pfennig (No 1) (1992) 57 SASR 507 …. 4.56, 5.139, 8.149 — v — (No 3) (1993) 60 SASR 271 …. 4.56 — v Pfitzner (1976) 15 SASR 170 …. 8.104 — v — (1996) 66 SASR 161 …. 8.128, 8.133, 8.136 — v Phair [1986] 1 Qd R 136 …. 7.155 — v Phan (1990) 54 SASR 561 …. 3.42 — v — (2001) 53 NSWLR 480; [2001] NSWCCA 29 …. 5.139, 8.131, 8.149 — v Phillips (1936) 26 Cr App R 17 …. 7.143 — v — [1997] 1 VR 558 …. 5.119 — v Phuong [2001] NSWSC 115 …. 2.37 — v Pidoto (2006) 14 VR 269; [2006] VSCA 185 …. 6.75 — v — [2009] VSCA 166 …. 2.87 — v Pieterson and Holloway [1995] 2 Cr App R 11 …. 8.57 — v Piller (1995) 86 A Crim R 249 …. 3.78 — v Pipe (1967) 51 Cr App R 17 …. 4.23, 5.110 — v Pisano [1997] 2 VR 342 …. 4.93 — v Pitman (1985) 38 SASR 566 …. 4.84, 4.85 — v Pitt (1967) 68 DLR (2d) 513 …. 7.76, 7.114 — v Pitts (No 1) [2012] NSWSC 1652 …. 8.126 — v PKS (NSWCCA, 1 October 1998, 9–10, unreported) …. 3.130 — v Place (2015) 124 SASR 467; [2015] SASCFC 163 …. 7.99 — v Playford [2013] 2 Qd R 567; [2013] QCA 109 …. 8.135 — v Plevac (1995) 84 A Crim R 570 …. 8.69 — v — [1999] NSWCCA 351 …. 2.87 — v PLK [1999] 3 VR 567 …. 2.71, 3.74 — v PLV (2001) 51 NSWLR 736 …. 7.112, 7.144 — v PMC (2004) 11 VR 175; [2004] VSCA 225 …. 5.190, 5.194, 7.143 — v Pohl (2014) 244 A Crim R 56; [2014] QSC 173 …. 2.37

— v Polkinghorne (1999) 108 A Crim R 189; [1999] NSWSC 704 …. 2.27, 8.197 — v Pollitt (1990) 51 A Crim R 227 …. 4.64 — v Portelli (2004) 10 VR 259 …. 3.140 — v Porter [2002] SASC 347 …. 8.154 — v — (2003) 85 SASR 581 …. 5.118, 5.123 — v Post and Georgee [1982] Qd R 495 …. 2.45, 3.84, 3.85, 8.164 — v Potts (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 340 …. 8.79, 8.197 — v — (No 4) [2016] ACTSC 370 …. 2.54 — v Power (1996) 87 A Crim R 407 …. 4.86, 4.93, 4.103 — v PP (2002) 135 A Crim R 575; [2002] VSC 523 …. 3.140 — v — [2002] VSC 530 …. 8.52 — v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161 …. 2.12, 2.51, 2.55, 6.31, 6.33, 6.35 — v — [2009] SASC 131 …. 7.131 — v Prater [1960] 2 QB 464 …. 4.26, 4.30, 4.76 — v Preston [1961] VR 761 …. 4.59 — v — (1997) NSWCCA (9 April 1997, unreported) …. 3.36 — v — (2013) 116 SASR 522; [2013] SASCFC 69 …. 4.57, 4.64 — v Pretorius [2010] 1 Qd R 67; [2009] QCA 58 …. 3.73 — v Preval [1984] 3 NSWLR 647 …. 4.87 — v Priest (2011) 246 FLR 341; [2011] ACTSC 18 …. 4.53 — v Priestley and Mason (1985) 19 A Crim R 388 …. 3.77 — v Pringle [2017] SASCFC 9 …. 3.64 — v Pritchard [1991] 1 VR 84 …. 8.168 — v Prosser (1993) 70 A Crim R 391 …. 2.50 — v PS [2004] QCA 347 …. 3.51 — v Punj (2002) 132 A Crim R 595; [2002] QCA 333 …. 2.71, 2.72 — v Quach (2002) 137 A Crim R 345; [2002] NSWCCA 519 …. 3.26, 3.56,

3.57, 3.62 — v Quesada (2001) 122 A Crim R 218 …. 7.58 — v Quinn and Bloom [1962] 2 QB 245 …. 7.23 — v R (1989) 18 NSWLR 74 …. 6.33 — v — (1991) 57 A Crim R 39 …. 6.33 — v R, GJ (2009) 105 SASR 506; [2009] SASC 371 …. 5.213 — v Radford (1993) 66 A Crim R 210 …. 2.46, 4.61, 8.56 — v Rae [2008] QCA 385 …. 3.38 — v RAG [2006] NSWCCA 343 …. 7.30 — v Rahme [2001] NSWCCA 414 …. 8.78, 8.131 — v Rajakaruna (No 2) (2006) 15 VR 592 …. 2.73 — v Randall [2004] 1 Cr App R 26 …. 3.77, 3.79 — v Randell [1999] TASSC 78 …. 3.32, 3.48 — v Ravindra [1997] 3 NZLR 242 …. 3.129 — v Rayner [1998] 4 VR 818 …. 4.88, 4.102 — v — [1998] VSC 263 …. 7.17 — v Reardon, Michaels and Taylor (2002) 186 FLR 1; [2002] NSWCCA 203 …. 4.27, 6.31, 7.122 — v Reci (1997) 70 SASR 78 …. 5.15, 5.52 — v Redd [1923] 1 KB 104 …. 3.108, 3.132 — v Redpath (1962) 46 Cr App R 319 …. 4.84 — v Reeves (1992) 29 NSWLR 109 …. 2.72, 5.143, 5.144 — v Reid [1989] Crim LR 719 …. 3.120 — v — (1999) NSWCCA 258 …. 8.167 — v Reiner (1974) 8 SASR 102 …. 7.68 — v Renzella [1997] 2 VR 88 …. 4.85, 4.88 — v Reynolds [1950] 1 KB 606 …. 2.42 — v Reynolds [2015] QCA 111 …. 4.37, 4.44, 8.106

— v RH [2005] 1 Qd R 180 …. 7.99 — v RHMcL [1999] 1 VR 746 …. 2.87, 3.34, 3.36 — v Rice [1963] 1 QB 857 …. 8.30 — v — [1996] 2 VR 406 …. 4.85, 4.88 — v Richards (2002) 128 A Crim R 204 …. 5.124 — v Richardson [1971] 2 QB 484 …. 7.84, 7.85 — v — [1989] 1 Qd R 583 …. 3.145, 3.147 — v Richardson and Longman [1969] 1 QB 299 …. 3.107, 3.137, 7.142, 8.84 — v Rickard (1918) 13 Cr App R 140 …. 7.56 — v Ridgeway [1983] 2 NSWLR 19 …. 4.19, 4.40, 7.101 — v — (1998) 71 SASR 73 …. 5.267 — v Rigney (1975) 12 SASR 30 …. 4.26, 4.29 — v — [2005] SASC 264 …. 3.31, 6.57 — v Riley (1887) 18 QBD 481 …. 3.142, 3.143 — v — (1979) 70 Cr App R 1 …. 4.102 — v Riscuta and Niga [2003] NSWCCA 6 …. 4.3, 4.57, 7.40, 7.56 — v Rivkin [2004] NSWCCA 7 …. 7.112 — v RJC (NSWCCA, 18 August 1998, unreported) …. 3.107, 3.136 — v Roads [1967] 2 QB 108 …. 5.185 — v Roba (2000) 110 A Crim R 245 …. 8.155, 8.156 — v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161 …. 7.52 — v Roberts [1936] 1 All ER 23 …. 3.121 — v — (2011) 111 SASR 100; [2011] SASCFC 117 …. 2.46 — v — (2004) 9 VR 295; [2004] VSCA 1 …. 5.166, 7.143 — v Robertson (1997) 91 A Crim R 388 …. 3.48, 3.49 — v — [1998] 4 VR 30 …. 4.49 — v — [2015] QCA 11 …. 8.66 — v Robertson; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 262 …. 7.99, 7.104,

7.106 — v Robinson [1994] 3 All ER 346; (1994) 98 Crim App R 370 …. 7.144, 7.158 — v — (1995) 80 A Crim R 358 …. 7.35 — v — (1996) 89 A Crim R 42 …. 8.156, 8.159 — v — [1999] NSWCCA 172 …. 3.136 — v Robson (1972) 56 Cr App R 450 …. 7.7 — v Rockford (2015) 122 SASR 391; [2015] SASCFC 51 …. 2.37 — v Rodley [1913] 3 KB 468 …. 3.29 — v Rodriguez (1997) 93 A Crim R 535 …. 2.71 — v Rogan (1916) 35 NZLR 265 …. 3.66 — v Rogers (1995) 1 Cr App R 374 …. 8.75, 8.76 — v — [1950] SASR 102 …. 8.86 — v Rogerson; R v McNamara (No 24) [2016] NSWSC 105 …. 7.79 — v Roissetter [1984] 1 Qd R 477 …. 2.46, 7.105 — v Rollason and Jenkins; Ex parte A-G [2008] 1 Qd R 85; [2007] QCA 65 …. 5.13 — v Romeo (1982) 30 SASR 243 …. 7.130, 8.30 — v Ronen (2004) 211 FLR 258; [2004] NSWSC 1283 …. 5.155 — v — (No 2) (2004) 211 FLR 268; [2004] NSWSC 1284 …. 5.177 — v — (No 4) (2004) 211 FLR 297; [2004] NSWSC 1290 …. 5.177 — v Rooke (CCA (NSW), 2 July 1997, unreported) …. 8.130 — v Rose (1993) 69 A Crim R 1 …. 7.9, 7.79 — v — (2002) 55 NSWLR 701; [2002] NSWCCA 455 …. 2.14, 3.75, 3.104, 3.108, 3.114, 3.115, 4.27, 7.56, 8.192 — v — (No 10) [2001] NSWSC 1060 …. 4.54 — v Rosemeyer [1985] VR 945 …. 4.98, 4.103 — v Roughan and Jones (2007) 179 A Crim R 389; [2007] QCA 443 …. 3.77, 3.78, 3.92

— v Roughley, Marshall and Heywood (1995) 78 A Crim R 160 …. 2.30, 7.53, 7.110 — v Router (1977) 14 ALR 365 …. 5.139 — v Rowe (1998) 71 SASR 389 …. 5.258 — v — (2001) 50 NSWLR 510 …. 8.168 — v Rowley (1986) 23 A Crim R 371 …. 2.40, 4.67, 4.73 — v Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520; 169 ER 1497 …. 3.106, 3.128, 3.129, 3.130, 3.132, 8.84 — v Royce-Bentley [1974] 1 WLR 535 …. 4.27 — v RR [2009] NTSC 44 …. 8.152 — v RTB [2002] NSWCCA 104 …. 2.24, 7.69 — v Rudd (1948) 32 Cr App R 138 …. 5.111 — v — (2009) 23 VR 444; [2009] VSCA 213 …. 8.106, 8.108 — v Runjanjic and Kontinnen (1991) 56 SASR 114 …. 7.43, 7.51, 7.53, 7.58, 7.136 — v Rusmanto (1997) 6 NTLR 68 …. 5.244 — v Russell (1968) 52 Cr App R 447 …. 4.26 — v — [1971] 1 QB 151 …. 3.121 — v — [1977] 2 NZLR 20 …. 4.74 — v Russo (2004) 11 VR 1 …. 2.71, 4.88 — v RW (2008) 18 VR 666; 184 A Crim R 388; [2008] VSCA 79 …. 4.46, 4.49 — v Ryan (1964) 50 Cr App R 144 …. 5.140 — v — (1984) 55 ALR 408 …. 8.114 — v — (2013) 33 NTLR 123; 234 A Crim R 299; [2013] NTSC 54 …. 8.69, 8.197 — v — (No 7) (2012) 218 A Crim R 384; [2012] NSWSC 1160 …. 7.21 — v S (1953) 53 SR(NSW) 460 …. 8.96 — v — [1995] 1 Qd R 558 …. 7.131

— v — (1991) 5 WAR 391 …. 2.87, 3.36 — v — (1998) 103 A Crim R 101 …. 3.73, 7.143 — v — (2000) 113 A Crim R 429 …. 2.30 — v — [2001] QCA 501 …. 3.44, 3.71 — v — (2002) 129 A Crim R 339 …. 7.105 — v — (2002) 132 A Crim R 326 …. 8.106 — v S and J (1983) 32 SASR 174 …. 8.152 — v S, G (2011) 109 SASR 491; [2011] SASCFC 48 …. 1.44, 2.90 — v S, PC (2008) 189 A Crim R 446; [2008] SASC 285 …. 3.28 — v SAB (2008) 20 VR 55; [2008] VSCA 150 …. 2.71 — v Sadaraka [1981] 2 NSWLR 459 …. 5.140, 5.144 — v Sadler (2008) 20 VR 69; [2008] VSCA 198 …. 2.87, 3.38, 3.73 — v Sahin (2000) 115 A Crim R 413 …. 2.37 — v Sailor [1994] 2 Qd R 342 …. 7.105 — v Salahattin [1983] 1 VR 521 …. 5.139 — v Salama [1999] NSWCCA 105 …. 4.27 — v Salameh (1985) 4 NSWLR 369 …. 7.9 — v Saleam (1989) 16 NSWLR 14; 41 A Crim R 108 …. 5.12, 7.155 — v Salerno [1973] VR 59 …. 2.87, 3.25, 4.73 — v Saloman [2006] QCA 244 …. 3.136 — v Saltan [2002] NSWCCA 423 …. 4.105 — v Sam (No 14) [2009] NSWSC 561 …. 7.19 — v Sandford (1994) 33 NSWLR 172 …. 5.13 — v Sang [1980] AC 402 …. 4.53 — v Saragozza [1984] VR 187 …. 7.105 — v Saraya (1994) 70 A Crim R 515 …. 7.35 — v Sargent (2001) 80 SASR 184 …. 5.130 — v Saric [1982] Qd R 360 …. 3.102

— v Sartori [1961] Crim LR 397 …. 2.91 — v Saunders [1965] Qd R 409 …. 7.103, 7.104, 7.105 — v Savage [1970] Tas SR 137 …. 8.86 — v Savory (1942) 29 Cr App R 1 …. 3.132 — v Savvas (1991) 55 A Crim R 241 …. 4.32 — v Savvas Stevens and Peisley (1989) 43 A Crim R 331 …. 5.254 — v Sawyer-Thompson (Ruling No 1) [2016] VSC 316 …. 5.42 — v SBB (2007) 175 A Crim R 449; [2007] QCA 173 …. 4.88 — v Scarrott [1978] QB 1016 …. 3.44 — v SCD [2013] QCA 352 …. 8.106 — v Schaeffer (2005) 13 VR 337; [2005] VSCA 306 …. 4.33, 8.142 — v Schafferius [1977] Qd R 213 …. 7.68 — v Schiavini (1999) 108 A Crim R 161 …. 8.168 — v Schlaefer (1984) 37 SASR 207 …. 4.19, 4.28, 4.38, 4.84, 4.85 — v — (1992) 57 SASR 423 …. 2.42, 2.44, 7.28, 7.30 — v Schneidas (No 2) (1981) 4 A Crim R 101 …. 7.130 — v Schuller [1972] QWN 94 …. 3.84, 3.123, 7.124 — v Schuurs [1999] QSC 176 …. 2.29 — v Schwarz [1923] SASR 347 …. 8.76 — v Sciberras [2003] SASC 104 …. 3.34, 3.73 — v SCO & SCP [2016] QCA 248 …. 2.87, 3.38 — v Scopelliti (1981) 34 OR (2d) 524 …. 3.140 — v Scott (1996) 137 ALR 347 …. 2.49 — v Sean Lydon (1987) 85 Cr App R 221 …. 8.30 — v Sehan (Yousry) (1914) 11 Cr App R 13 …. 7.153 — v Seidkofsky [1989] 1 Qd R 655 …. 7.119 — v Seigley (1911) 6 Cr App R 106 …. 6.53 — v Seivers [2004] NSWCCA 462 …. 2.25

— v Sekrst [2016] SASCFC 127 …. 4.88 — v Seller, R v McCarthy (No 3) [2014] NSWSC 1290 …. 2.29 — v Semyraha [2001] 2 Qd R 208; [2000] QCA 303 …. 3.84, 3.85 — v Semyraha [2001] 2 Qd R 208; [2000] QCA 303 …. 8.163, 8.164 — v Serrano (No 5) (2007) 16 VR 360 …. 2.43 — v Serratore (1999) 48 NSWLR 101; [1999] NSWCCA 377 …. 8.29, 8.66 — v — [2001] NSWCCA 123 …. 3.31, 3.62 — v SG (2011) 250 FLR 337; [2011] NTSC 44 …. 7.34 — v SH [2011] ACTSC 198 …. 7.122, 7.123 — v Shalala (2007) 17 VR 133 …. 2.46 — v Shamouil (2006) 66 NSWLR 228 …. 2.19, 2.31 — v Shannon (1987) 47 SASR 347 …. 4.64, 4.67 — v Sharp (1983) 33 SASR 366 …. 8.154, 8.162 — v — [1988] 1 WLR 7 …. 8.108 — v — (2003) 143 A Crim R 344; [2003] NSWSC 1117 …. 5.28 — v Shaw (1991) 57 A Crim R 425 …. 6.54 — v — (1995) 78 A Crim R 150 …. 7.117 — v Shea (1978) 18 SASR 591 …. 7.82 — v Sheehan (1999) 153 FLR 326 …. 6.22 — v Sheehy [2005] 1 Qd R 418 …. 2.40 — v Sherrin (No 2) (1979) 21 SASR 250 …. 4.28, 4.40, 4.87, 4.102, 4.103 — v Shone (1983) 76 Cr App R 76 …. 8.26 — v Sica (2012) 224 A Crim R 146; [2012] QSC 5 …. 8.133 — v — (2013) 232 A Crim R 572; [2013] QCA 247 …. 8.135, 7.51 — v — [2014] 2 Qd R 168; (2013) 232 A Crim R 572; [2013] QCA 247 …. 2.7, 4.56 — v Sievers (2004) 151 A Crim R 426 …. 4.93 — v Silverlock [1894] 2 QB 766 …. 7.43

— v Simmons (1997) 68 SASR 81; 93 A Crim R 32 …. 2.44, 7.28 — v — (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 189 …. 8.142, 8.154 — v Sims [1946] KB 531 …. 2.38, 3.66 — v Singh (1977) 15 SASR 591 …. 7.79 — v Singleton (1994) 72 A Crim R 117 …. 7.51 — v Sitek [1988] 2 Qd R 284 …. 7.16, 7.76 — v SJB (2002) 129 A Crim R 572 …. 4.48 — v SJC [2015] QCA 123 …. 8.66 — v SJRC [2007] NSWCCA 142 …. 2.26, 2.31 — v Skaf (2004) 60 NSWLR 86; [2004] NSWCCA 37 …. 5.185, 7.23 — v Skaf, Ghanem and Hajeid [2004] NSWCCA 74 …. 3.108, 4.67 — v Sleiman [2003] NSWCCA 231 …. 8.89 — v Small (1994) 33 NSWLR 575 …. 4.32, 4.34, 4.87, 4.102 — v Smart [1983] 1 VR 265 …. 8.189 — v Smith (1915) 11 Cr App R 229 …. 3.13 — v — [1964] NSWR 537 …. 8.109 — v — [1981] 1 NSWLR 193 …. 8.95 — v — (1983) 33 SASR 558 …. 4.56 — v — [1984] 1 NSWLR 462 …. 7.96 — v — [1987] VR 907 …. 2.28, 7.55, 7.58, 7.136, 7.146 — v — (1990) 51 A Crim R 434 …. 8.118 — v — (1992) 58 SASR 491 …. 8.128, 8.133 — v — (1996) 86 A Crim R 398 …. 5.267, 8.138, 8.157 — v — (1998) 71 SASR 543 …. 5.123 — v — (1999) 47 NSWLR 419; [1999] NSWCCA 317 …. 4.63, 7.38 — v — (2000) 116 A Crim R 1 …. 2.28 — v — [2005] 2 All ER 29; [2005] 1 WLR 704 …. 5.185 — v — [2015] 2 Qd R 452; [2014] QCA 277 …. 2.13

— v Smith and Turner (No 2) (1995) 64 SASR 1 …. 3.33, 3.73 — v SMS [1992] Crim LR 310 …. 3.151 — v Solomon (2005) 92 SASR 331; [2005] SASC 265 …. 4.56, 7.56 — v Solomon and Thumbler (1958) 25 WWR 307 …. 7.125 — v Soma (2001) 22 A Crim R 537 …. 7.151 — v — (2003) 212 CLR 299 …. 2.8, 2.9, 2.49, 7.128, 7.151 — v Sonnet (No 2) (2011) 220 A Crim R 199; [2011] VSC 551 …. 2.35 — v Sood [2007] NSWCCA 214 …. 2.31 — v — (Ruling No 3) [2006] NSWSC 762 …. 7.122 — v Sopher (1993) 74 A Crim R 21 …. 7.43, 7.51, 7.53 — v Sorby [1986] VR 753 …. 2.82, 4.100, 4.102 — v Soteriou (2013) 118 SASR 119; [2013] SASCFC 114 …. 3.37, 3.64 — v Sotheren [2001] NSWSC 204 …. 2.37 — v Souleyman (1996) 40 NSWLR 712 …. 7.122, 7.123 — v — (SC (NSW), 5 September 1996, unreported) …. 7.112 — v Southammavong; — v Sihavong [2003] NSWCCA 312 …. 2.72 — v Sparkes (1996) 88 A Crim R 194 …. 4.56, 4.74, 7.53, 7.95, 7.110 — v Sparks (2014) 121 SASR 132; [2014] SASCFC 122 …. 3.146 — v Sparrow (2009) 104 SASR 120 …. 4.65 — v Spencer (1985) 80 Cr App R 264 …. 7.35 — v — [1987] AC 128 …. 4.19, 4.46, 4.76 — v — (2000) 113 A Crim R 252 …. 8.142, 8.152 — v Spero (2006) 13 VR 225; 161 A Crim R 13; [2006] VSCA 58 …. 4.63, 4.71 — v Spinks (1981) 74 Cr App R 263 …. 8.109 — v Spiteri [2004] NSWCCA 321 …. 7.133 — v Spurge [1961] 2 QB 205 …. 6.19 — v ST (1997) 92 A Crim R 390 …. 4.87

— v Stackelroth (1996) 86 A Crim R 438 …. 7.125, 8.61 — v Stafford (1976) 12 SASR 501 …. 8.149, 8.156 — v — (1976) 13 SASR 392 …. 5.139, 8.146 — v — [2009] QCA 407 …. 8.104 — v Stalder [1981] 2 NSWLR 9 …. 3.106, 3.130, 3.131, 3.135 — v Stanbouli (2003) 141 A Crim R 531; [2003] NSWCCA 355 …. 6.75 — v Stanley [2004] NSWCCA 278 …. 4.64 — v — [2015] 1 Qd R 118; [2014] QCA 116 …. 2.14 — v Stannard (1962) 48 Cr App R 81 …. 4.76 — v Starecki [1960] VR 141 …. 8.133, 8.136 — v Starr [1969] QWN 23 …. 5.139, 7.103 — v Starrett (2002) 82 SASR 115 …. 4.12, 4.21, 7.30, 7.31 — v Stead (1992) 62 A Crim R 40 …. 4.53 — v Stephenson [1976] VR 376 …. 2.21, 2.28 — v — (1978) 18 SASR 381 …. 4.91, 4.92, 4.93 — v Stergiou (2004) 147 A Crim R 120; [2004] WASC 172 …. 3.146, 3.147, 3.149 — v Sterling; R v McCook [2014] NSWDC 199 …. 7.41, 7.56 — v Stevenson (2000) 23 WAR 92 …. 7.30, 7.31 — v Stewart [1993] 2 Qd R 322 …. 4.104 — v — (2001) 52 NSWLR 301 …. 4.9, 4.23, 4.105, 7.107 — v Stiles (1990) 50 A Crim R 13 …. 8.136 — v Stockwell (1993) 97 Cr App R 260 …. 4.56, 7.52 — v Storey (1978) 140 CLR 364 …. 3.92, 5.190 — v — [1998] 1 VR 359 …. 2.65 — v Story (2004) 144 A Crim R 370; [2004] SASC 32 …. 4.64 — v Stott (2000) 116 A Crim R 15 …. 4.56, 4.64 — v — (2011) 111 SASR 346; [2011] SASCFC 145 …. 6.32

— v Stoupas [1998] 3 VR 645 …. 7.100 — v Straffen [1952] 2 QB 911 …. 3.17, 3.24, 3.25, 3.26, 3.40, 3.42, 3.44, 3.58, 3.62 — v Strausz (1977) 17 SASR 197 …. 5.138, 8.101 — v Stronach [1988] Crim LR 48 …. 3.108 — v Strudwick and Merry (1994) 99 Cr App R 326 …. 7.59 — v Stuart [1959] SASR 144 …. 5.114 — v Su (1995) 129 FLR 120 …. 3.79, 5.118, 6.55, 8.99, 8.115 — v — [1997] 1 VR 1 …. 8.106 — v Suarwata [2008] ACTSC 140 …. 7.30 — v Suckling [1999] NSWCCA 36 …. 2.36, 8.144 — v Sukkar [2005] NSWCCA 54 …. 3.26, 8.119 — v Sullivan [1923] 1 KB 47 …. 6.53 — v — (1966) 51 Cr App R 102 …. 5.140 — v — [2003] NSWCCA 100 …. 4.23 — v Summers [1990] 1 Qd R 92 …. 2.72 — v Sumner; R v Fitzgerald (2013) 117 SASR 271; [2013] SASCFC 82 …. 8.41 — v Sumpton [2014] NSWSC 1432 …. 8.144, 8.154 — v Surrey [2005] 2 Qd R 81; [2005] QCA 4 …. 5.124 — v Surujpaul [1958] 1 WLR 1050 …. 8.103 — v Suteski (2002) 56 NSWLR 182; [2002] NSWCCA 509 …. 2.32, 8.75, 8.79, 8.82, 8.194 — v — (No 4) [2002] NSWSC 218 …. 2.31, 8.82 — v Sutton [1986] 2 Qd R 72 …. 2.55 — v — (1986) 5 NSWLR 697 …. 4.87 — v — (l990) 159 LSJS 96 …. 7.96 — v — (1992) 94 Cr App R 70 …. 7.79, 7.121 — v — (No 2) (1983) 32 SASR 553 …. 3.8

— v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159; 151 ALR 98 …. 2.26, 2.29, 2.31, 2.32, 2.33, 2.34, 2.36, 2.37, 4.33, 5.139, 5.259, 5.260, 5.267, 8.121, 8.123, 8.124, 8.125, 8.128, 8.134, 8.139, 8.142, 8.143, 8.144, 8.146, 8.149, 8.155, 8.156, 8.158 — v SWC (2007) 175 A Crim R 71; [2007] VSCA 201 …. 2.71 — v Swift (1999) 105 A Crim R 279 …. 4.53 — v Syed [2008] NSWCCA 37 …. 7.158 — v Symonds [2002] 2 Qd R 70 …. 3.115 — v Szabo [2000] NSWCCA 226 …. 3.136 — v Szach (1980) 23 SASR 504 …. 7.155, 8.42, 8.78, 8.154 — v T (1998) 71 SASR 265 …. 2.42, 7.28, 7.30 — v — (1999) 74 SASR 486 …. 4.49 — v — [2001] NSWCCA 210 …. 8.150 — v — [2010] EWCA Crim 2439 …. 7.71 — v T and M; Ex parte Attorney-General [1999] 2 Qd R 424 …. 8.150, 8.155 — v T, T (2004) 90 SASR 567 …. 5.202 — v T, WA (2013) 118 SASR 382; (2014) 238 A Crim R 205; [2014] SASCFC 3 …. 4.51, 6.58, 7.124 — v TA [2003] NSWCCA 191 …. 2.23 — v TAB [2002] NSWCCA 274 …. 2.87, 3.36, 3.54, 3.56, 3.74, 3.130 — v Tahere [1999] NSWCCA 170 …. 4.69 — v Taka [1992] 2 NZLR 129 …. 5.185 — v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; [2006] NSWCCA 167 …. 2.30, 4.3, 4.56, 6.58, 7.24, 7.40, 7.43, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56 — v Tang, Dang and Quach [1998] 3 VR 508 …. 8.156 — v Tanner (2006) 96 SASR 70; [2006] SASC 320 …. 2.8 — v Taouk [2005] NSWCCA 155 …. 4.33, 8.97, 8.99 — v Taousanis [2001] NSWSC 74 …. 4.67 — v Taranto; R v Freeman [1999] NSWCCA 396 …. 4.9

— v Tartaglia (2011) 110 SASR 378 …. 2.83 — v Tastan (1994) 75 A Crim R 498 …. 5.5 — v Taufahema (2007) 228 CLR 232; [2007] HCA 11 …. 2.49 — v Taylor [1999] ACTSC 47 …. 8.130, 8.149 — v — [2003] NSWCCA 194 …. 2.28 — v — (2004) 8 VR 213; [2004] VSCA 98 …. 3.74, 4.86, 4.93 — v — (No 2) (2008) 18 VR 613; 184 A Crim R 77 …. 4.49 — v — [2008] ACTSC 52 …. 4.65 — v Te [1998] 3 VR 566 …. 4.53 — v Tedesco [2003] SASC 79 …. 3.34, 3.73 — v Teitler [1959] VR 321 …. 4.17, 4.18, 4.26 — v Telfer [2004] NSWCCA 27 …. 3.134 — v Telford (1996) 86 A Crim R 427 …. 7.24 — v Templeton [2004] QCA 338 …. 7.43 — v The Stipendiary Magistrate at Southport; Ex parte Gibson [1993] 2 Qd R 687 …. 5.205 — v Theophanous (2003) 141 A Crim R 216; [2003] VSCA 78 …. 5.199 — v Theos (1996) 89 A Crim R 486 …. 4.56 — v Thomas (1959) 43 Cr App R 210 …. 4.28, 4.103 — v — (1989) 40 A Crim R 89 …. 4.24 — v Thomas [1970] VR 674 …. 5.139, 8.101 — v Thomason (1999) 139 ACTR 21 …. 4.64, 4.67, 4.69 — v Thompson [1951] SASR 135 …. 3.142 — v — [1962] 1 All ER 65 …. 5.185 — v — [1966] QWN 47 …. 3.136 — v — [1982] QB 647 …. 8.61 — v — (1992) 57 SASR 397 …. 3.73, 4.93, 4.97 — v — (2008) 21 VR 135; [2008] VSCA 144 …. 7.130, 7.131

— v Thomson [1912] 3 KB 19 …. 8.47 — v Thornley [1998] 3 VR 888 …. 3.73 — v Thornton (1980) 3 A Crim R 80 …. 5.118 — v Thynne [1977] VR 98 …. 7.81, 7.117, 7.119, 7.121, 7.151 — v Tichowitsch [2007] 2 Qd R 462 …. 4.45, 7.21 — v Tikos (No 2) [1963] VR 306 …. 2.12 — v Tilley [1985] VR 505 …. 7.43 — v Tillott (1995) 38 NSWLR 1 …. 7.53, 7.110, 7.111 — v Tissington (1843) 1 Cox CC 48 …. 3.143 — v TJB [1998] 4 VR 621 …. 3.71, 3.73 — v TJF (2001) 120 A Crim R 209 …. 7.102, 8.129, 8.130 — v To (2002) 131 A Crim R 264; [2002] NSWCCA 247 …. 4.65, 4.69, 7.43 — v To and Tran (2006) 96 SASR 1 …. 8.149 — v Tofilau (No 2) (2006) 13 VR 28; [2006] VSCA 40 …. 3.73 — v Toki (2000) 116 A Crim R 536 …. 8.66 — v — (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536; [2000] NSWSC 999 …. 2.31, 2.87, 3.57, 3.62 — v Tompkins (1977) 67 Cr App R 181 …. 5.61 — v Toumer (1991) 56 A Crim R 221 …. 8.166 — v TP; R v SBA [2007] QCA 169 …. 3.79 — v Tracey (2005) 93 SASR 101 …. 8.133 — v Tran (1990) 50 A Crim R 233 …. 2.29, 7.40, 7.43 — v — [2000] 2 Qd R 430 …. 4.63 — v — (2007) 214 FLR 21 …. 2.85 — v Tran & Tran [2009] SASC 327 …. 4.77, 4.100 — v Tran and To (2006) 96 SASR 8 …. 3.78, 5.120 — v Tran and Tran (2011) 109 SASR 595; [2011] SASCFC 51 …. 2.71 — v Trigg [1963] 1 WLR 305 …. 4.19

— v Trimboli (1979) 21 SASR 577 …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.136 — v Tripodi [1961] VR 186 …. 4.87 — v — (1961) 104 CLR 1 …. 4.98, 8.101, 8.114, 8.115, 8.116, 8.117 — v — [2002] SASC 420 …. 8.168 — v Tripodina & Morabito (1988) 35 A Crim R 183 …. 2.49 — v Trochym [2007] 1 SCR 239 …. 7.52, 7.113 — v Tropeano (2015) 122 SASR 298; [2015] SASCFC 29 …. 7.17, 7.24 — v Trotter [1977] Tas SR 133 …. 7.149 — v — (1992) 58 SASR 223; 60 A Crim R 1 …. 8.147, 8.149 — v Truong (1996) 86 A Crim R 188 …. 8.129, 8.131, 8.155, 8.158 — v TSR (2002) 5 VR 627; [2002] VSCA 87 …. 2.9, 5.15 — v Tugaga (1994) 74 A Crim R 190 …. 2.30, 4.3, 4.23, 4.64, 4.67 — v Turnbull [1977] QB 224 …. 4.62, 4.63, 4.73 — v Turnbull and Davidson (1985) 17 A Crim R 370 …. 4.28, 4.101 — v Turner (1816) 5 M & S 206; 105 ER 1026 …. 6.19 — v — (1944) KB 463 …. 3.111 — v — (1975) 61 Cr App R 67 …. 4.23 — v — [1975] QB 834; (1974) 60 Cr App R 80 …. 7.55, 7.58, 7.68, 7.136 — v — (2000) 76 SASR 163 …. 4.56, 4.71, 4.74, 7.96 — v — (No 13) [2001] TASSC 104 …. 8.96, 8.99 — v Turney (1990) 52 SASR 438 …. 3.28 — v Turnsek [1967] VR 610 …. 4.102 — v Tyler [1994] 1 Qd R 675 …. 4.30, 4.52 — v TZ (2011) 214 A Crim R 316; [2011] QCA 305 …. 3.107 — v UC [2008] QCA 194 …. 2.87, 3.38 — v Uittenbusch (2012) 219 A Crim R 562; [2012] QSC 89 …. 8.66, 8.197 — v Uljee [1982] 1 NZLR 561 …. 5.28, 5.61 — v Ulman-Naruniec [2001] SASC 317 …. 4.88

— v Umanski [1961] VR 242 …. 7.143, 7.149 — v Ung (2000) 173 ALR 287 …. 8.47 — v Upton (2007) 209 FLR 487 …. 4.53 — v Usher (2014) 119 SASR 22; [2014] SASCFC 32 …. 7.99 — v V (1998) 100 A Crim R 488 …. 2.9, 2.71, 7.140 — v Vale (2001) 120 A Crim R 322; [2001] WASCA 21 …. 2.37, 8.155 — v Van Beelen (1972) 6 SASR 534 …. 7.9, 7.79 — v — (1973) 4 SASR 353 …. 2.66, 2.75, 2.76, 2.77, 2.78, 2.79, 2.80, 2.81, 2.83, 7.43, 7.65, 7.135 — v — (1974) 9 SASR 163 …. 8.74, 8.77 — v — (2016) 125 SASR 253; [2016] SASCFC 71 …. 2.14, 2.75, 2.77, 2.78, 2.79, 2.80, 2.83, 5.192 — v Van Der Zyden [2012] 2 Qd R 568; [2012] QCA 89 …. 2.49, 2.71 — v Van Dyk [2000] NSWCCA 67 …. 3.134, 7.41 — v Varley (1982) 75 Cr App R 242 …. 3.122 — v Vaughan (1997) 98 A Crim R 239 …. 5.124 — v Velevski (No 2) (1997) 93 A Crim R 420 …. 7.122 — v Vella (2006) 14 VR 592 …. 7.82 — v Veneman [1970] SASR 506 …. 8.96 — v Venn-Brown [1991] 1 Qd R 458 …. 8.155 — v Verolla [1963] 1 KB 285 …. 5.200 — v Versac (2013) 227 A Crim R 569; [2013] QSC 46 …. 2.37 — v Vidic (1986) 43 SASR 176 …. 8.72 — v Villar; R v Zugecic [2004] NSWCCA 302 …. 5.120 — v Vincec (1990) 50 A Crim R 203 …. 4.62 — v Visser [1983] 3 NSWLR 240 …. 2.46 — v — (2000) 9 Tas R 285 …. 5.130, 5.131 — v Vlies [2016] QCA 276 …. 7.99

— v VN (2006) 15 VR 113; [2006] VSCA 111 …. 3.6, 3.36, 3.74, 4.88 — v Vollmer [1996] 1 VR 95 …. 3.33, 8.148, 8.154, 8.168 — v Von Einem (1985) 38 SASR 207 …. 3.28, 3.140, 8.43 — v Vonarx [1999] 3 VR 618 …. 2.87, 3.32, 3.34, 3.36, 3.73 — v Vu [2005] NSWCCA 266 …. 4.27 — v Vuckov (1986) 40 SASR 498 …. 2.45, 3.84, 3.85, 3.91, 3.98, 8.155, 8.162, 8.164 — v Vye (1993) 97 Cr App R 134 …. 3.136, 3.138 — v W [1996] Qd R 573 …. 7.105 — v W, GC (2006) 96 SASR 301; [2006] SASC 376 …. 5.213 — v W, PK [2016] SASCFC 5 …. 4.51 — v WAF and SBN [2010] 1 Qd R 370; [2009] QCA 144 …. 2.7 — v Wainwright (1875) 13 Cox CC 171 …. 8.47 — v — (1925) 19 Cr App R 52 …. 4.74 — v Walbank [1996] 1 Qd R 78 …. 8.161 — v Walden (1986) 41 SASR 421 …. 5.13 — v Waldman (1934) 24 Cr App R 204 …. 3.132, 3.132 — v Walker (1993) 61 SASR 260 …. 7.9, 7.149, 7.152 — v Wallace (2008) 100 SASR 119; [2008] SASC 47 …. 3.51 — v Wang [2007] VSCA 296 …. 7.107 — v Wanganeen (1988) 50 SASR 433 …. 5.121 — v — (2006) 95 SASR 226; [2006] SASC 254 …. 4.77 — v Wannan (2006) 94 SASR 521 …. 3.142, 3.147, 7.104 — v Warast (1991) 54 A Crim R 351 …. 3.136 — v Ward (1981) 3 A Crim R 171 …. 5.60, 7.68 — v — (1993) 96 Cr App R 1; [1993] 1 WLR 619 …. 5.15, 7.59 — v Ware (1994) 73 A Crim R 17 …. 4.24 — v Warner (1988) 49 SASR 125 …. 8.149

— v Warrell [1993] 1 VR 671 …. 8.133, 8.152, 8.153 — v Warren (1994) 72 A Crim R 74 …. 4.13, 7.35 — v Warsap (2010) 106 SASR 264 …. 4.37 — v Waters [2002] ACTSC 13 …. 8.130 — v Watkins (1989) 50 SASR 467 …. 8.148 — v — (2005) 153 A Crim R 434; [2005] NSWCCA 164 …. 3.54, 3.62 — v Watson (1817) 2 Stark 116; 171 ER 591 …. 7.17 — v — [1987] 1 Qd R 440 …. 7.58 — v Watts [1983] 3 All ER 101 …. 3.109 — v — [1992] 1 Qd R 214 …. 7.16 — v WB (2009) 23 VR 319 …. 7.111 — v Weatherstone (1968) 12 FLR 14 …. 7.82, 7.93, 7.152, 7.154 — v Webb (1974) Crim LR 159 …. 7.86 — v Wedd (2000) 115 A Crim R 205 …. 2.88, 3.130, 3.136 — v Weetra (1993) 93 NTR 8 …. 8.153 — v — (2010) 108 SASR 232; [2010] SASCFC 52 …. 8.108 — v Weiss (2004) 8 VR 388; [2004] VSCA 73 …. 4.25 — v Weisz (2008) 189 A Crim R 93; [2008] QCA 313 …. 4.41, 4.102 — v Welch [1992] Crim LR 368 …. 5.143 — v Welden (1977) 16 SASR 421 …. 7.118 — v Welsh (1996) 90 A Crim R 364 …. 7.69, 8.194 — v — [1999] 2 VR 62 …. 5.194, 7.125, 8.109 — v Wenitong [2007] VCSA 202 …. 7.65 — v West (1971) 18 FLR 333 …. 5.167 — v — [1992] 1 Qd R 227 …. 7.33 — v West London Youth Court; Ex parte N [2000] 1 All ER 823 …. 8.53 — v Western (2015) 124 SASR 38; [2015] SASCFC 148 …. 3.64 — v Weston-super-Mare Justices; Ex parte Townsend [1968] 3 All ER 225 ….

3.101 — v Westwell (1976) 62 Cr App R 251 …. 7.86 — v Whalen (2003) 56 NSWLR 454 …. 4.54 — v Whitaker (1976) 63 Cr App R 193 …. 4.76 — v Whitbread (1995) 78 A Crim R 452 …. 7.58 — v Whitby (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 441 …. 7.39, 7.42 — v White [1998] 2 Qd R 531 …. 3.34 — v — [2003] NSWCCA 64 …. 7.122 — v — (2007) 17 VR 308; [2007] VSC 471 …. 5.254 — v — (2008) 102 SASR 35; [2008] SASC 265 …. 4.71 — v Whitehead (1866) LR 1 CCR 33 …. 7.35 — v — [1929] 1 KB 99 …. 4.84 — v Whitmore [1999] NSWCCA 247 …. 7.92 — v Whyte [2006] NSWCCA 75 …. 7.41, 7.105 — v Wildy (2011) 111 SASR 189; [2011] SASCFC 131 …. 2.88, 4.86 — v Williams (1976) 14 SASR 1 …. 5.134, 6.3, 8.149 — v — (1978) 19 SASR 423 …. 4.30, 4.52 — v — (1981) 4 A Crim R 441 …. 3.136 — v — [1983] 2 VR 579 …. 4.59, 4.62, 4.64 — v — [1987] 2 Qd R 777 …. 4.87 — v — [1988] VR 261 …. 4.41 — v — [1989] 1 Qd R 601 …. 7.32 — v — (1999) 104 A Crim R 260; [1999] NSWCCA 9 …. 2.12 — v — [2010] 1 Qd R 276; [2008] QCA 411 …. 4.84, 5.89 — v — [2001] 2 Qd R 442 …. 7.115, 7.123 — v Williamson [1972] 2 NSWLR 281 …. 8.108 — v Willmot; Ex parte Attorney-General [1987] 1 Qd R 53 …. 4.14 — v Wills (1985) 39 SASR 35 …. 7.28, 7.36

— v Willshire (1881) 6 QBD 366 …. 6.28 — v Wilson (1973) 58 Cr App R 304 …. 4.84 — v — (1986) 42 SASR 203 …. 2.72 — v — (1988) 47 SASR 287 …. 4.26 — v — [1998] 2 Qd R 599 …. 6.51, 6.52, 6.54 — v — [1999] SASC 377 …. 4.74 — v — (2005) 62 NSWLR 346 …. 5.124 — v Wilton (2013) 116 SASR 392; [2013] SASCFC 60 …. 5.185 — v Winfield (1939) 27 Cr App R 139 …. 3.109, 3.134 — v Winner (1995) 79 A Crim R 528 …. 4.77 — v Winning [2002] WASCA 44 …. 3.79, 3.80 — v Witham [1962] Qd R 49 …. 2.87, 3.36 — v Wood (1982) 76 Cr App R 23; [1982] Crim LR 668–9 …. 7.12, 8.59 — v — [1974] VR 117 …. 6.35 — v Wood and Parker (1841) 5 Jur 225 …. 3.132 — v Woods (1991) 103 FLR 321 …. 8.168 — v — (2008) 102 SASR 422 …. 2.71 — v Woolley (1989) 42 A Crim R 418 …. 4.93 — v WRC [2002] NSWCCA 210 …. 3.50, 3.58 — v Wright [1969] SASR 256 …. 3.84, 8.163, 8.164 — v — [1980] VR 593 …. 7.39 — v — (1992) 60 A Crim R 215 …. 4.67 — v — (1999) 3 VR 355; [1999] VSCA 145 …. 2.49 — v WS (2000) 78 SASR 33 …. 7.33 — v WSP [2005] NSWCCA 427 …. 4.48, 4.49 — v Wurch (1932) 58 CCC 204 …. 4.83 — v Wurramara (2011) 213 A Crim R 440; [2011] NTSC 89 …. 7.35 — v XY (2010) 79 NSWLR 629; [2010] NSWCCA 181 …. 8.198

— v — (2013) 84 NSWLR 363; [2013] NSWCCA 121 …. 2.26, 2.31, 3.60 — v Y (1995) 81 A Crim R 446 …. 7.58 — v Y, DB (2006) 94 SASR 489; [2006] SASC 141 …. 4.88 — v — (2006) 96 SASR 180; [2006] SASC 289 …. 5.213 — v Yates [1970] SASR 302 …. 4.84, 7.101 — v Yates [2002] NSWCCA 520 …. 2.31 — v — [2002] NSWCCA 520 …. 7.43, 7.97 — v Ye (2000) 116 A Crim R 347; [2000] NSWCCA 401 …. 6.3 — v Ye Zhang [2000] NSWSC 1099 …. 8.126, 8.129, 8.130, 8.131, 8.163 — v Yeates [1992] 1 NZLR 421 …. 3.72 — v Yeo [1951] 1 All ER 864 …. 5.200 — v Yildiz (1983) 11 A Crim R 115 …. 7.58 — v YL [2004] ACTSC 115 …. 5.203 — v Young [1923] SASR 35 …. 4.89 — v — [1998] 1 VR 402 …. 7.105 — v — (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 …. 5.205, 5.206, 5.208, 5.213, 5.215, 5.221, 5.223, 5.224 — v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 …. 6.8 — v Yuill [1948] VR …. 3.67 — v Z [1990] 2 QB 355 …. 7.30 — v — [2000] 2 AC 483 …. 5.190 — v Zaidi (1991) 57 A Crim R 189 …. 3.71 — v Zammit (1999) 107 A Crim R 489; [1999] NSWCCA 65 …. 2.12, 2.30 — v Zampaglione (1981) 6 A Crim R 287 …. 5.185 — v Zappavigna [2015] SASCFC 8 …. 3.64 — v Zappia (2002) 84 SASR 206 …. 5.12 — v Zecevic [1986] VR 797 …. 3.107, 3.136, 6.8 — v Zhang (2005) 227 ALR 311; [2005] NSWCCA 437 …. 3.59, 3.68

— v Zheng (1995) 83 A Crim R 572 …. 4.83, 4.87 — v Zielinski [1950] 2 All ER 1114 …. 4.28 — v Zilm (2006) 14 VR 11 …. 4.88 — v Zion [1986] VR 609 …. 8.155 — v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91 …. 4.93, 7.130, 8.143 — v Zullo [1993] 2 Qd R 572 …. 4.57 — v Zurita [2002] NSWCCA 22 …. 3.130, 3.134, 3.135, 3.137 R (Kelly) v Warley Magistrates’ Court [2008] 1 WLR 2001 …. 5.41 RA v R [2007] NSWCCA 251 …. 7.30 Rabin v Mendoza and Co [1954] 1 WLR 271 …. 5.93, 5.94 Ragg v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria (2008) 18 VR 300; [2008] VSC 1 …. 5.13 Raimondi v R [2013] VSCA 194 …. 8.194 Ralph and George v R (1988) 37 A Crim R 202 …. 4.13 Ramsay, Re (1870) LR 3 PC 427 …. 5.99 Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642 …. 7.43, 7.68, 7.69, 8.50 Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited v AstraZeneca AB [2013] FCA 368 …. 7.64 Randell v Rockliff (1999) 9 Tas R 85 …. 5.51 Rank Film Distributors Ltd v ENT Ltd (1994) 4 Tas R 281 …. 5.56 — v Video Information Centre [1982] AC 380 …. 5.146, 5.156, 5.157, 5.163, 5.174 Rann v Olsen (2000) 76 SASR 450 …. 5.199 Ratten v R [1972] AC 378 …. 8.10, 8.15, 8.16, 8.23, 8.39, 8.40, 8.41, 8.66, 8.67, 8.69, 8.89 Raunio v Hills (2001) 116 FCR 518 …. 5.28 Rawcliffe v R (2000) 22 WAR 490 …. 6.56, 7.156 Razzak v R [2008] NSWCCA 204 …. 7.123 RBK v R [2004] WASCA 216 …. 4.48 Read v Bishop of Lincoln [1892] AC 644 …. 6.60

Redfern v Redfern [1891] P 139 …. 5.147 Redman v Klun (1979) 20 SASR 343 …. 6.23, 6.28, 7.24 Redpath v Hadid [2004] NSWCA 295 …. 3.75, 7.137 Reeves (a Pseudonym) v R (2013) 41 VR 275; [2013] VSCA 311 …. 2.71, 3.60, 3.61 Reference of a Question of Law (No 1 of 1999) (1999) 106 A Crim R 408 …. 4.20 Refrigerated Express Lines (Australasia) Pty Ltd v Australian Meat and Livestock Corp (1979) 42 FLR 204 …. 5.160, 5.166 Registrar, Court of Appeal v Craven (1994) 126 ALR 668 …. 5.166, 5.169, 5.172, 5.174 Registrar, Supreme Court of South Australia v Zappia (2003) 86 SASR 388; [2003] SASC 276 …. 5.166 Rehn v Australian Football League (2003) 225 LSJS 378 …. 5.7 Reichelt v Lewis (1986) 23 A Crim R 284 …. 5.63 Reid v Howard (1995) 184 CLR 1; 131 ALR 609 …. 5.145, 5.157, 5.171, 5.173, 5.206 — v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367 …. 7.75, 7.129, 7.130, 7.137 — v R [1990] 1 AC 363 …. 4.62 Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517 …. 2.64 Residues Treatment and Trading Co Ltd v Southern Resources Ltd (1989) 52 SASR 54 …. 2.51, 8.92 Revesz v Orchard [1969] SASR 336 …. 8.106, 8.108 Reynolds, Re; Ex parte Reynolds (1882) 20 Ch D 294 …. 5.169 Reynolds v Bogan Holdings (1984) 36 SASR 193 …. 2.8, 6.62, 6.69 Reza v Summerhill Orchards Ltd (2013) 37 VR 204; [2013] VSCA 17 …. 7.131 RGM v R [2012] NSWCCA 89 …. 7.116 RH v R (2014) 241 A Crim R 1; [2014] NSWCCA 71 …. 3.6, 3.60 Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds [1985] 2 All ER 712 …. 2.60 Rhoden v Wingate [2002] NSWCA 165 …. 2.19, 7.68

Rice v Chute (1995) 119 FLR 181 …. 5.12 — v Connolly [1966] 2 QB 414 …. 5.135, 8.147 — v Tricouris (2000) 110 A Crim R 86 …. 4.53 Rich v AG (NSW) [2013] NSWCA 419 …. 5.177 — v ASIC (2004) 220 CLR 129; [2004] HCA 42 …. 5.160, 5.162 — v Harrington (2007) 245 ALR 106; [2007] FCA 1987 …. 5.26 — v R (2014) 43 VR 558; [2014] VSCA 126 …. 6.52, 8.118 Richards v Macquarie Bank Ltd (No 2) (2012) 301 ALR 494; [2012] FCA 1403 …. 3.154, 3.159 Richardson v R (1974) 131 CLR 116 …. 6.55 — v Schultz (1980) 25 SASR 1 …. 7.49 Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 234 …. 5.42, 5.49 Riddick v Thames Board Mills [1977] QB 881 …. 5.85, 5.167, 5.169 Ridgeway v R (1995) 184 CLR 19 …. 2.29, 2.36, 2.37, 4.53, 5.257, 5.258, 5.263, 8.154, 8.155 Riley v R [2011] NSWCCA 238 …. 8.136 — v Western Australia (2005) 30 WAR 525 …. 1.22, 1.42 Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Ltd [2003] FCA 933 …. 8.199 Rio Tinto Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2006) 235 ALR 127 …. 5.49 Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electric Corp [1978] AC 547 …. 5.150, 5.169, 5.171 Riseley v R [1970] Tas SR 41 …. 6.35 Ritchie v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 134 …. 6.56, 8.106, 8.108 Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 158 …. 2.47, 8.49 — v — (No 4) (1987) 14 NSWLR 100 …. 5.22 — v — (Nos 15 & 16) (1987) 14 NSWLR 107 …. 6.60 — v — (No 21) (1988) 14 NSWLR 128 …. 7.15 — v — (No 22) (1988) 14 NSWLR 132 …. 5.28, 5.46, 5.49

Rivers v Fuller; Ex parte Rivers [1977] Qd R 97 …. 7.9, 7.17 RJP v R (2011) 215 A Crim R 315; [2011] VSCA 443 …. 3.75 RL Ralston, In the Estate of (SC(NSW), No 109245/96, 12 September 1996, unreported) …. 1.21 Roach v Page (No 11) [2003] NSWSC 907 …. 2.31, 2.32, 7.70 — v R (2011) 242 CLR 610; [2011] HCA 12 …. 3.17, 3.30, 3.31, 3.36, 3.38, 3.65, 3.75 Roads & Traffic Authority of NSW v Tetley [2004] NSWSC 925 …. 7.14 Roberts v Burns Philp Trustee Co Ltd (1985) 5 NSWLR 72 …. 8.75, 8.81, 8.174 — v Oppenheim (1884) 26 Ch D 724 …. 5.51 Robert Bax & Associates v Cavenham Pty Ltd [2013] 1 Qd R 476; [2012] QCA 177 …. 2.14, 2.47 Robin v Police (2002) 81 SASR 253; [2002] SASC 33 …. 2.32 Robinett v Police (2000) 78 SASR 85 …. 2.37, 5.263 Robinson v R (1995) 13 WAR 451 …. 4.49 — v — (1996) 15 WAR 191 …. 8.77 — v — (1999) 197 CLR 162; [1999] HCA 42 …. 4.7, 4.41, 4.44 — v — [2006] NSWCCA 192 …. 4.48, 4.76, 4.104, 4.105 — v — (No 2) (1991) 102 ALR 493 …. 2.71, 4.26, 4.76 — v South Australia (No 2) [1931] AC 704 …. 5.220, 5.237 — v Stern [1939] 2 KB 260 …. 8.174 — v Woolworths Ltd (2005) 64 NSWLR 612; [2005] NSWCCA 426 …. 2.37, 2.71 Robson v REB Engineering Pty Ltd [1997] 2 Qd R 102 …. 5.7 Rochfort v TPC (1982) 153 CLR 134 …. 5.7, 5.150, 5.155 Rodden v R [2008] NSWCCA 53 …. 3.36 Rodgers v Rodgers (1964) 114 CLR 608 …. 5.94, 5.104 Rodway v R (1990) 169 CLR 515 …. 4.41, 7.28

Rogers v Home Secretary [1973] AC 388 …. 5.216, 5.224, 5.227, 5.229, 5.231 — v — (1994) 181 CLR 251 …. 5.188 — v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 …. 7.52 Rogerson v R (1992) 65 A Crim R 530 …. 2.73 Rolfe v R [2007] NSWCCA 155 …. 4.39 Rook v Maynard (1993) 126 ALR 150 …. 8.59 Rose v Abbey Orchard Property Investments Pty Ltd [1987] Aust Torts Reports ¶80-121 …. 2.60 Rosebanner Pty Ltd v Energy Australia (2009) 223 FLR 460; [2009] NSWSC 43 …. 5.89 Roser v R (2001) 24 WAR 254 …. 4.65, 4.66, 4.67, 4.74 Rosomen Pty Ltd (t/as Shell Fairview Park) v Shell Co of Australia Ltd (1997) 144 ALR 497 …. 6.39, 6.42 Rossi Pty Ltd v Ballymore Tower Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 167 …. 5.10 Roux v ABC [1992] 2 VR 577 …. 5.7, 5.48, 5.78, 5.155 Rowen v Cornwall (No 5) (2002) 82 SASR 152 …. 5.199 Royal Women’s Hospital v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria (2006) 15 VR 22; [2006] VSCA 85 …. 5.205, 5.211, 5.221, 5.224 Royall v R (1991) 172 CLR 378 …. 8.96 Rozenes v Beljajev (1994) 126 ALR 481 …. 7.110 — v — [1995] 1 VR 533 …. 2.29, 2.30, 2.35, 4.3, 4.23, 5.110, 8.136 RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620 …. 2.12, 2.50, 5.116, 5.120, 5.127, 5.128, 5.130, 5.131, 6.46 RRS v R (2013) 231 A Crim R 168; [2013] NSWCCA 94 …. 4.75 RST v WA [2016] WASCA 59 …. 7.58 Rumping v DPP [1964] AC 814 …. 5.200, 5.204 Rural Export & Trading (WA) Pty Ltd v Hahnheuser [2007] FCA 1535 …. 8.115 Rush & Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council [1989] AC 1280 …. 5.89, 5.91, 5.92, 5.97, 5.101, 5.102

Russell v R [2016] VSCA 196 …. 2.15 — v Western Australia (2011) 214 A Crim R 326; [2011] WASCA 246 …. 3.77 Ryan v ETSA (No 2) (1987) 47 SASR 239 …. 8.184, 8.185, 8.186 — v R (1967) 121 CLR 205 …. 6.8 — v Victoria [2015] VSCA 353 …. 5.215, 5.223, 5.231 Rylands v R [2008] NSWCCA 106 …. 7.66 Rytir and Discrimination Commissioner, Re (1996) 44 ALD 427 …. 5.26

S S, Re [1948] VLR 11 …. 5.164 S v Boulton (2006) 151 FCR 364; [2006] FCAFC 99 …. 5.165, 5.221 — v McC [1972] AC 24 …. 5.8, 5.138 — v R (1989) 168 CLR 266 …. 2.38, 3.42 S and R, In Marriage of (1998) 149 FLR 149 …. 7.3 SAAB-Scania Australia Pty Ltd and Collector of Customs, Re (1990) 11 AAR 247 …. 2.69 Sabek v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 195 …. 3.139 Saffron v DPP (1989) 16 NSWLR 397 …. 6.31 — v FCT (1992) 109 ALR 695 …. 5.172 Sagar v O’Sullivan [2011] FCA 182 …. 5.232 Saint v Holmes (2008) 170 FCR 262; [2008] FCA 987 …. 5.184 Salsbury v Woodland [1970] 1 QB 324 …. 7.22 SAM v Western Australia (No 2) [2016] WASCA 64 …. 2.49, 7.131 Sampson, Ex parte (1966) 66 SR (NSW) 501 …. 7.39 Samuels v Flavel [1970] SASR 256 …. 7.60 Santo v R [2009] NSWCCA 269 …. 6.57 Sanchez-Sidiropoulos v Canavan [2015] NSWSC 1139 …. 7.64 Sandersan v Nicholson [1906] VLR 371 …. 7.18

Sanderson v Bank of Queensland [2016] QCA 137 …. 5.13 Sands v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd (2009) 104 SASR 452; [2009] SASC 215 …. 8.29, 8.184 Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 …. 1.1, 2.46, 5.66, 5.78, 5.169, 5.199, 5.205, 5.216, 5.217, 5.220, 5.228, 5.232, 5.233, 5.238, 5.239, 5.243, 5.244, 5.247, 5.252, 5.254 Santos v R (1987) 61 ALJR 668 …. 8.148, 8.149 Saoud v R (2014) 87 NSWLR 481; [2014] NSWCCA 136 …. 2.31, 3.12, 3.54, 3.61, 3.66 Sarah Getty Trust, Re [1985] QB 956 …. 5.60 Sargent v Massachusetts Accident Co 29 NE 2d 825 (1940) …. 2.67 Saunders v Australian Federal Police (1998) 160 ALR 469 …. 5.33 — v R (2004) 149 A Crim R 174 …. 8.198 Savanoff v Re-Car Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 219 …. 7.152, 7.155 Savage v Chief Constable of Hampshire [1997] 1 WLR 1061 …. 5.216, 5.223, 5.224 Sayer v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 132 …. 5.205 Sbec v Secretary, Department of Immigration (2012) 291 ALR 281; [2012] FCA 277 …. 5.232 Scalise v Bezzina [2003] NSWCA 362 …. 7.130 Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 121; 171 ALR 594 …. 6.25, 6.43 Schmerber v California 384 US 757 (1966) …. 5.156 Schneider v Leigh [1955] 2 QB 195 …. 5.49 Schreuder (as executor of the will of Murray) v Murray (no 2) (2009) 260 ALR 139; [2009] WASCA 145 …. 5.49 Schwark v Police (2011) 111 SASR 451; [2011] SASC 212 …. 7.44, 7.61 Science Research Council v Nasse [1980] AC 1028 …. 5.7, 5.78, 5.83, 5.242, 5.243, 5.249

Scott v Harris 127 S Ct 1769 (2009) …. 1.47 — v Killian (1985) 40 SASR 37 …. 4.12, 4.30, 4.52 — v Numurkah Corporation (1951) 91 CLR 300 …. 7.22, 7.23 — v Sampson (1882) 8 QBD 491 …. 3.153 — v R [1989] AC 1242 …. 7.125 — v Scott [1913] AC 417 …. 5.254 Scruby v R (1952) 55 WAR 1 …. 4.15 Seely Nominees Pty Ltd v ELAR Initiations UK Ltd (1990) 96 ALR 468 …. 5.164 Sell v R (1995) 15 WAR 240 …. 4.33, 4.49, 5.134, 8.149 Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262; [2000] NSWCA 29 …. 1.38, 1.42, 2.46, 2.63, 2.67, 7.43, 7.56 — v McNeil [2006] NSWCA 158 …. 7.38 Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 …. 3.108, 3.111 Semaan v R (2013) 39 VR 503; [2013] VSCA 134 …. 3.20, 3.61 Semple v Noble (1988) 49 SASR 356 …. 7.15 Senat v Senat [1965] P 172 …. 7.82, 7.154 Sepulveda v R [2006] NSWCCA 379 …. 4.48 Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2005] FCA 864 …. 5.56 — v — (2005) 225 ALR 672; [2005] FCA 1551 …. 5.26 — v — (No 8) [2005] FCA 1348 …. 2.31 — v — (No 10) (2005) 227 ALR 704; [2005] FCA 172 …. 5.58, 5.59 Sevic v Roarty (1998) 44 NSWLR 287 …. 5.58 Seyfang v GD Searle and Co [1973] 1 QB 148 …. 5.206 Seymour v ABC (1977) 19 NSWLR 219 …. 7.130 — v Attorney-General (Cth) (1984) 1 FCR 416 …. 8.128, 8.146, 8.155 — v R [2006] NSWCCA 206 …. 2.49, 3.134 SH v R (2012) 83 NSWLR 258; 222 A Crim R 43; [2012] NSWCCA 79 …. 7.30

Sharp v Rangott (2008) 167 FCR 225; [2008] FCAFC 45 …. 6.48, 6.49, 6.50 — v Rodwell [1947] VR 82 …. 5.200 Sharpe v ABLF (WA Branch) [1989] WAR 138 …. 2.43, 5.164 Sharrett v Gill (1993) 65 A Crim R 44 …. 4.12 Sharwood v R [2006] NSWCCA 157 …. 7.25, 7.64 Shaw v David Syme & Co [1912] VLR 336 …. 5.43, 5.48 — v R (1952) 85 CLR 365 …. 2.8 — v Wolf (1998) 163 ALR 205 …. 2.65 Shaw Savill and Albion Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1940) 66 CLR 344 …. 6.60 Shea v TruEnergy Services Pty Ltd (No 5) (2013) 303 ALR 230; [2013] FCA 937 …. 5.58, 5.59 Sheehan v R (2006) 163 A Crim R 397; [2006] NSWCCA 233 …. 4.48, 4.49 Sheen v R [2011] NSWCCA 259 …. 4.44 Sheldon v Sun Alliance Australia Ltd (1989) 53 SASR 97 …. 2.64, 3.156, 3.157, 3.161 — v Sun Alliance Ltd (1988) 50 SASR 236 …. 3.156, 3.158 Shenton v Tyler [1939] Ch 620 …. 5.204 Shepherd v R (1990) 170 CLR 573 …. 1.9, 1.11, 2.12, 2.73, 2.75, 2.78, 2.83, 2.87, 2.88, 2.89, 3.40, 3.63, 3.64, 3.75, 4.85, 4.88, 8.101 Sherman v US 356 US 369 (1958) …. 4.53 Sherrard v Jacob [1965] NI 151 …. 7.39 Short v Lee (1821) 2 Jac & W 464; 37 ER 705 …. 8.76 Shultz v R [1982] WAR 171 …. 7.43, 7.58 Sibanda v R (2011) 33 VR 67; [2011] VSCA 285 …. 5.139 Siebel v R (1992) 58 SASR 558 …. 5.118 Sills v Brown (1840) 9 Car & P 601; 173 ER 16 …. 7.60 Simic v R (1980) 144 CLR 319 …. 3.107, 3.136 Simon v R [2002] WASC 329 …. 8.133 Sinclair v R (1946) 73 CLR 316 …. 2.32, 2.40, 7.35, 8.131, 8.133, 8.136

Singh v DPP (NSW) (2006) 164 A Crim R 284; [2006] NSWCCA 333 …. 3.135, 4.10 — v R [2011] VSCA 263 …. 8.66 Sio v R [2016] HCA 32 …. 8.66, 8.79, 8.80, 8.83, 8.193, 8.197 SKA v R (2011) 243 CLR 400; [2011] HCA 13 …. 2.14 — v — [2012] NSWCCA 205 …. 2.87, 3.33, 4.44 Skipworth v R [2006] NSWCCA 37 …. 7.83, 8.198 Skone v Skone [1971] 1 WLR 812 …. 5.159 Skyways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1984) 57 ALR 657 …. 7.43 Slater v Western Australia [2009] WASC 144 …. 8.168 Slatterie & Pooley (1840) 151 ER 579 …. 7.18 Slipper v Magistrates Court of the ACT (2014) 179 ACTR 1; [2014] ACTSC 85 …. 5.199 Sloan v R [2015] NSWCCA 279 …. 1.44, 2.90 SLS v R [2014] VSCA 31 …. 3.60 Smallwood v Spurling (1983) 141 DLR (3d) 395 …. 5.218 Smart v Tasmania [2013] TASCCA 15 …. 2.72 Smith v Advanced Electrics Pty Ltd [2003] 1 Qd R 65 …. 7.131 — v Eurobodalla Shire Council [2004] NSWCA 479 …. 7.66 — v Joyce (1954) 89 CLR 529 …. 8.105 — v R (1990) 50 A Crim R 434 …. 8.119, 8.120 — v — (1990) 64 ALJR 588 …. 2.28, 7.112, 7.136 — v — (2001) 206 CLR 650; [2001] HCA 50 …. 2.19, 2.23, 2.25, 2.30, 2.32, 2.49, 4.56, 7.24, 7.38, 7.40, 7.41, 7.55, 7.56 — v — (2003) 138 A Crim R 403; [2003] WASCA 57 …. 3.31 — v — (2007) 35 WAR 201 …. 3.71 — v — R [2015] VSCA 256 …. 2.49, 3.138 — v Rapid Transit Inc 58 NE 2d (1945) …. 2.67 — v Western Australia (2000) 98 FCR 358 …. 5.225

— v — (2014) 250 CLR 473; [2014] HCA 3 …. 5.185 — v — (No 2) [2016] WASCA 136 …. 5.185 Sneddon v Stevenson [1967] 1 WLR 1051 …. 4.30, 4.52 Sobh v Police Force of Victoria [1994] 1 VR 41 …. 5.12, 5.16 Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola UEE v Lundquist [1991] 2 QB 310 …. 5.146, 5.164 Societe Francaise Hoechst v Allied Colloids Ltd [1992] FSR 66 …. 5.22 Sodeman v R (1936) 55 CLR 192 …. 6.8 Sokolowskyj v R (2014) 239 A Crim R 528; [2014] NSWCCA 55 …. 3.61 Solicitor, Re a [1992] 2 WLR 552 …. 5.192 Somerville v Australian Securities Commission (1995) 131 ALR 517; 13 ACLC 1527 …. 5.41 Song v Ying (2010) 79 NSWLR 442 …. 5.177 Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 …. 5.145, 5.146, 5.150, 5.156, 5.166, 5.171, 5.174, 5.180, 5.181, 5.182 Sorrells v US 287 US 435 (1932) …. 4.53 Soteriou v R [2013] VSCA 328 …. 8.129 South Australia v Peat Marwick Mitchell (1995) 65 SASR 72 …. 5.53, 5.56 South Australia Co v City of Port Adelaide [1914] SALR 16 …. 8.113 South Shropshire DC v Amos [1986] 1 WLR 1271 …. 5.94 Southern Cross Airline Holdings Ltd (in liq) v Arthur Anderson & Co (1998) 84 FCR 472 …. 5.49, 5.58 Southern Cross Commodities Pty Ltd v Crinis [1984] VR 697 …. 5.60 Southern Cross Mine Management Pty Ltd v Ensham Resources Pty Ltd [2006] 2 Qd R 145 …. 7.153 Southern Equities v Arthur Anderson (No 10) (2002) 82 SASR 53; [2002] SASC 128 …. 8.184 — v Bond (No 2) (2001) 78 SASR 554 …. 8.174 Southern Equities Pty Ltd v Arthur Anderson (No 11) (2002) 82 SASR 63; [2002] SASC 148 …. 8.185

Southern Equities Corp Ltd (in liq) v Arthur Anderson and Co (No 5) [2001] SASC 335 …. 5.7 Southern Equities Corporation Ltd v West Australian Government Holdings Ltd (1993) 10 WAR 1 …. 5.23, 5.28, 5.41, 5.46 Southland Coal Pty Ltd (rec & mgrs apptd) (in liq), Re (2006) 203 FLR 1; [2006] NSWSC 899 …. 5.27 Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co v Quick (1878) 3 QBD 315 …. 5.33 Sovereign v Bellavista [2000] NSWSC 521 …. 5.58, 5.59 Spalding v Radio Canberra Pty Ltd (2009) 224 FLR 440; [2009] ACTSC 26 …. 5.49, 7.76 SPAR Licensing Pty Ltd v MIS QLD Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 1116 …. 8.192 Sparnon v Arpand Pty Ltd (1996) 138 ALR 735 …. 5.35, 5.41 Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) v Bank of New Zealand (1991) 26 NSWLR 711 …. 5.49, 5.75 Spencer v Commonwealth (2012) 206 FCR 309; [2012] FCAFC 169 …. 5.236, 5.244 Sportsbet Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 3) [2009] FCA 1283 …. 5.89 Spotless Group Ltd v Premier Building and Consulting Group Pty Ltd (2006) 16 VR 1; [2006] VSCA 201 …. 5.52 Spruill v R [2008] NSWCCA 39 …. 3.141 Spence v Demasi (1988) 48 SASR 536 …. 6.45, 8.108 Spika Trading Pty Ltd v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd (SC (NSW), 3 October 1985, unreported) …. 7.64 Spurling v R [2006] NSWCCA 2 …. 8.150 SPW v Western Australia (2012) 220 A Crim R 301; [2012] WASCA 41 …. 7.106 Sreckovic v R [1973] WAR 85 …. 6.8 SS v Australian Crime Commission [2009] FCA 580 …. 7.14 Stack v WA (2004) 29 WAR 526 …. 7.137 Stafford v R (1993) 67 ALJR 510 …. 2.71

Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd v Antico (1993) 36 NSWLR 87 …. 5.33, 5.47 Stanhill Consolidated Ltd, Re [1967] VR 749 …. 5.55 Stanley v Service to Youth Council Inc (No 2) (2014) 317 ALR 141; [2014] FCA 644 …. 3.154 Stanoevski v R (2001) 202 CLR 115; [2001] HCA 4 …. 2.26, 3.104, 3.109, 3.132, 3.136, 7.23, 7.79, 7.122 Stapleton v Chief of Army [2009] ADFDAT 2 …. 4.12 Starkey v R [1988] 2 Qd R 294 …. 3.143, 3.144, 3.151 State v La Page (1876) 57 NH 245 …. 2.20 — v Skipper (1994) 637 A 2d 1101 …. 1.32 State Bank of New South Wales v Lawrence (Cohen J, 1987, unreported) …. 7.146 State Bank of South Australia v Barrett (1995) 64 SASR 73 …. 5.56 — v Ferguson (1995) 64 SASR 232 …. 5.76 — v Smoothdale No 2 (1995) 64 SASR 224 …. 5.53, 5.55 State Drug Crime Commission v Larsson (1991) 53 A Crim R 131 …. 5.75 — (NSW) v Chapman (1987) 12 NSWLR 447 …. 5.13 State Government Insurance Commission v Laube (1984) 37 SASR 31 …. 1.38, 1.42, 2.61, 2.62, 2.63, 2.67 State Rail Authority of NSW v Smith (1998) 45 NSWLR 382 …. 5.97 — v Brown (2006) 67 NSWLR 540; [2006] NSWCA 220 …. 7.130, 7.137 Statue of Liberty, The [1968] 2 All ER 195 …. 8.59 Steadman v R (No 1) [2013] NSWCCA 55 …. 3.56 Steele, Re; Ex parte Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Clayton Utz (1994) 119 ALR 716 …. 5.81 Steffen v Ruben [1966] 2 NSWR 622 …. 7.68 Steinhauser v Davies (1994) 3 Tas R 258 …. 2.46 Stenhouse v Coleman (1944) 69 CLR 457 …. 6.72

Stephanopoulos v Police (2001) 79 SASR 91 …. 5.17 Stephens v R (1985) 156 CLR 664 …. 7.9, 8.167 Steve v R (2008) 189 A Crim R 68; [2008] NSWCCA 231 …. 2.49, 3.90, 7.80 Stevens v McCallum [2006] ACTCA 13 …. 8.198 Stevenson v Yasso (2006) 163 A Crim R 1; [2006] QCA 40 …. 6.18, 6.21 Stirland v DPP [1944] AC 315 …. 2.46, 3.84, 3.92, 3.109, 3.134 Stockland Constructions Pty Ltd v Coombs [2004] NSWSC 333 …. 7.41 Stokes v R (1960) 105 CLR 279 …. 3.145 Straker v R (1977) 15 ALR 103 …. 5.138 Strauss v Police (2013) 115 SASR 90; [2013] SASC 3 …. 4.62, 4.65 Stretton v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) (2015) 231 FCR 36; [2015] FCA 559 …. 5.199 Strong v Woolworths Ltd [2012] HCA 5 …. 2.62, 2.64 Stubley v Western Australia (2011) 242 CLR 374; [2011] HCA 7 …. 3.42, 3.51, 3.66 Sturla v Freccia (1880) 5 App Cas 623 …. 8.91 Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 965 …. 7.6, 8.9, 8.28 Sugden v Sugden (2007) 70 NSWLR 301; [2007] NSWCA 312 …. 5.28, 5.59 — v St Leonards (Lord) [1876] 1 PD 154 …. 8.90 Sullivan v Gordon (1999) 47 NSWLR 319 …. 6.60 Sumitomo Corp v Credit Lyonnais Rouse Ltd [2002] 4 All ER 68 …. 5.45 Sumner v Booth [1974] 2 NSWLR 174 …. 7.10 — v R (2010) 29 VR 398; [2010] VSCA 221 …. 4.89 Summers v Moseley (1834) 2 Cr & M 477; 149 ER 849 …. 7.124 Suresh v R (1998) 102 A Crim R 18; [1998] HCA 23 …. 2.49 Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 …. 2.87, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 3.21, 3.22, 3.24, 3.25, 3.30, 3.42, 3.44, 3.46, 3.52, 3.58, 3.69, 3.71 — v — [1978] WAR 94 …. 4.59 Sussex Peerage case (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85; 8 ER 1034 …. 8.76

Sutcliffe, In the Marriage of (1988) 93 FLR 377 …. 6.6 Sutherland v Cooley (1898) 24 VLR 410 …. 7.11 SVI Systems Pty Ltd v Best and Less Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1507 …. 5.58 Swain v R [2015] NSWCCA 176 …. 2.14 — v Waverley Municipal Council (2005) 220 CLR 517 …. 2.14 SWV Pty Ltd v Spiroc Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 668 …. 5.97 Sydney Airports Corporation Ltd v Singapore Airlines Ltd [2005] NSWCA 47 …. 5.27, 5.35 Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd [2002] FCAFC 157 …. 2.19, 7.54, 7.64, 7.66, 7.68

T T (A Child) v R (1998) 20 WAR 130 …. 8.29, 8.47 T v Waye (1983) 35 SASR 247 …. 8.146, 8.153 Ta v R [2011] NSWCCA 32 …. 7.117 Tabe v R (2005) 225 CLR 418; [2005] HCA 59 …. 6.8 Taber v R [2007] NSWCCA 116 …. 8.197 Talbot v NRMA Ltd [2000] NSWSC 603 …. 5.69 — v The Police (2001) 80 SASR 279 …. 5.15 Taleb v R [2015] NSWCCA 105 …. 2.26, 4.68 Talukder v Dunbar [2009] ACTSC 42 …. 2.2, 2.4 Tambree v Travel Compensation Fund [2004] NSWCA 24 …. 3.159 Tann v Schild (1990) 54 SASR 523 …. 5.266 Tarong Energy Corporation Ltd v South Burnett Regional Council [2010] 1 Qd R 575; [2009] QCA 265 …. 5.52 Tasmania v B [2006] TASSC 110 …. 3.48 — v Bosworth (2005) 13 Tas SR 457 …. 2.43 — v Challender [2007] 16 Tas R 339 …. 8.144, 8.168 — v Crane [2004] TASSC 80 …. 2.37

— v Farmer (2004) 48 A Crim R 99; [2004] TASSC 104 …. 3.48, 3.58, 3.62 — v Finnigan (2011) 21 Tas R 116; [2011] TASSC 74 …. 5.190 — v Hall (2013) 238 A Crim R 42; [2013] TASSC 75 …. 2.37 — v L [2004] TASSC 86 …. 3.48 — v — (2013) 232 A Crim R 123; [2013] TASSC 47 …. 2.31, 3.60, 3.71 — v S [2004] TASSC 84 …. 3.48, 3.58, 3.62 — v Standage (2012) 238 A Crim R 294; [2012] TASSC 88 …. 3.61 — v Stebbings (2015) 248 A Crim R 128; [2015] TASSC 9 …. 8.154 — v Stojakovic [2008] TASSC 48 …. 8.128 — v W (No 2) (2012) 227 A Crim R 155; [2012] TASSC 48 …. 3.61 — v Woodberry (2012) 225 A Crim R 510; [2012] TASSC 89 …. 8.129 — v Y [2007] TASSC 112 …. 3.48, 3.58 Tasmanian Seafoods Pty Ltd v MacQueen (2004) 12 Tas R 436 …. 5.49 Tate v Johnson (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 492 …. 6.38 Tate Access Floors Inc v Boswell [1991] Ch 512 …. 5.164 Taylor v Chief Constable [1986] 1 WLR 1480 …. 7.16 — v Chief Constable of Cheshire [1986] 1 WLR 1479 …. 8.59 — v Harvey [1986] 2 Qd R 137 …. 2.29, 3.156 — v Hayes (1990) 53 SASR 282 …. 6.46 — v R (1978) 22 ALR 599 …. 7.74 — v Taylor [1967] P 25 …. 6.27 TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Anning (2002) 54 NSWLR 333 …. 7.68 Telstra Corp v Australis Media Holdings (1997) 41 NSWLR 147 …. 5.39 — v — (No 1) (1997) 41 NSWLR 277 …. 5.19 — v — (No 2) (1997) 41 NSWLR 346 …. 5.58 — v BT Australasia Pty Ltd (1998) 85 FCR 152 …. 5.59 — v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 568 …. 7.56 Tenstat v Permanent Trustee (Aust) Ltd (1992) 28 NSWLR 625 …. 5.89

Teper v R [1952] AC 480 …. 8.2, 8.21 Tepper v Di Francesco (1984) 38 SASR 256 …. 2.50, 6.35 — v Kelly (1987) 45 SASR 340 …. 6.22 Teubner v Humble (1963) 108 CLR 491 …. 2.20 Thannhauser v Westpac Banking Corp (1991) 31 FCR 572 …. 7.43, 7.60 Thatcher v Charles (1961) 104 CLR 57 …. 8.98 — v R (1987) 39 DLR (4th) 275 …. 1.27 Theodoropoulas v Theordoropoulas [1964] P 311 …. 5.102 — v R [2015] VSCA 364 …. 8.106 Theophilus v Police (2011) 110 SASR 420 …. 7.131 The Queen’s Case (1820) 2 Brod & Bin 284; 129 ER 976 …. 7.149, 7.153, 7.155 Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd v Terokell Pty Ltd [1993] 2 Qd R 341 …. 5.56 Thomas v Austen (1823) 1 LJ (OS) KB 99 …. 5.95 — v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 2 WLR 593 …. 7.142 — v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307 …. 6.60, 6.71, 6.73 — v Mowbray (2007) 237 ALR 194 …. 1.5 — v R (1960) 102 CLR 584 …. 2.58, 2.72 Thomas v Van Den Yssel (1976) 14 SASR 205 …. 7.130 Thomas, Re; Queensland Trustees Ltd v Thomas [1932] St R Qd 57 …. 8.93 Thomason v Council of the Municipality of Campbelltown (1939) 39 SR (NSW) 347 …. 5.55, 5.57 Thompson v Bella-Lewis [1997] 1 Qd R 429 …. 5.168 Thompson v Kovacs [1959] VR 229 …. 6.28 — v R (1986) 13 FCR 165 …. 7.23 — v R (1989) 169 CLR 1 …. 3.21, 3.24, 3.30, 3.42, 3.44, 3.46 — v — [1918] AC 221 …. 3.17, 3.66 Thompson and Wran v R (1968) 117 CLR 313 …. 3.57

Thorp v Abbotto (1992) 106 ALR 239 …. 6.31, 6.33 Thrasyvoulos Iounnou v Papa Christophoros Demetriou [1952] AC 84 …. 8.174 Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [2002] 4 All ER 881 …. 5.10 — v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6) [2005] 1 AC 610; [2005] 4 All ER 948 …. 5.22, 5.23, 5.27 Tickell v Trifleska (1990) 24 NSWLR 548 …. 5.34 Tieu v R [2016] NSWCCA 111 …. 3.104 Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 654 …. 2.31 — v — [2008] NSWSC 657 …. 8.112 Timbery v R (2007) 180 A Crim R 232; [2007] NSWCCA 355 …. 4.20, 4.42, 4.102 Timbury v Coffee (1941) 66 CLR 277 …. 6.60 Tims v Police [2008] SASC 141 …. 4.12 Tirango Nominees Pty Ltd v Dairy Vale Foods Ltd (1998) 83 FCR 397 …. 5.58 — v — [1998] FCA 724 …. 5.58 Tiver v Tiver [1969] SASR 40 …. 5.6 TKWJ v R (2002) 212 CLR 124; 193 ALR 7; [2002] HCA 46 …. 2.14, 2.40, 2.49, 3.101, 3.104, 3.127, 3.133 TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks (1979) 23 ALR 345; 53 ALJR 267 …. 1.19, 1.38, 1.42, 2.58, 2.60, 2.64, 2.67 Tofilau v R (2007) 231 CLR 396; [2007] HCA 39 …. 2.37, 4.53, 5.258, 8.101, 8.123, 8.124, 8.128, 8.131, 8.132, 8.133, 8.154, 8.155 Tomlin v Standard Telephones and Cables Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1378 …. 5.97 Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd (2015) 89 ALJR 750; [2015] HCA 28 …. 5.188 Tongahai v R (2014) 241 A Crim R 217; [2014] NSWCCA 81 …. 7.23 Tony Azzi (Automobiles) Pty Ltd v Volvo Car Australia Pty Ltd (2007) 71 NSWLR 140; [2007] NSWSC 375 …. 5.98 Toohey v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1965] AC 595 …. 7.43, 7.136, 7.145

Toussaint v AG of St Vincent and the Grenadines [2008] 1 All ER 1; [2008] 1 WLR 2825 …. 5.199 Townley v Minister, Land and Water Conservation (NSW) (1997) 76 FCR 401 …. 5.59 Trade Practices Commission v Abbco Iceworks Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 96 …. 5.154, 5.160, 5.162 — v Allied Mills Industries Pty Ltd (No 3) (1981) 55 FLR 174 …. 8.112 — v Ampol Petroleum (Victoria) Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 316 …. 5.34, 5.41, 5.46 — v Arnotts (1989) 88 ALR 69 …. 5.94 — v Arnotts Ltd (No 5) (1990) 21 FCR 324 …. 7.43, 7.67 — v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd (1995) 58 FCR 426 …. 5.7 — v George Weston Foods Ltd (No 2) (1980) 43 FLR 55 …. 6.39 — v Heating Centre (1984) 4 FCR 197 …. 8.114 — v International Technology Holdings Pty Ltd (1995) 31 IPR 466 …. 5.26 — v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (1979) 40 FLR 83 …. 8.108 — v Port Adelaide Wool Co Pty Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 645 …. 5.19, 5.83 — v Sterling (1979) 36 FLR 244 …. 5.23, 5.33 — v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 1 FCR 172 …. 5.150 — v — (1984) 56 ALR 647 …. 5.49, 7.81, 7.151, 8.92, 8.105, 8.112, 8.113, 8.173, 8.174 Traderight (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland [2013] NSWSC 211 …. 5.58 Tran and Chang v R [2016] VSCA 79 …. 4.56, 7.56 Tran v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [1998] 4 VR 294 …. 6.52 Transport and General Insurance v Edmondson (1961) 106 CLR 23 …. 7.91 Transport Industries Insurance Co Ltd v Longmuir [1997] 1 VR 125 …. 2.69 Transport Minister v Garry [1973] 1 NZLR 120 …. 7.131 Transport Publishing Co Pty Ltd v Literature Board of Review (1956) 99 CLR 111 …. 7.44, 7.58

Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (1992) 108 ALR 335 …. 5.187 Trevorrow v South Australia (No 4) (2006) 94 SASR 64; [2006] SASC 42 …. 5.54, 5.61, 5.65, 5.216 Trimcoll Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2007] NSWCA 307 …. 7.8, 7.14 Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd v Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 395 …. 5.150, 5.169, 5.171 Tru Floor Service Pty Ltd v Jenkins (No 2) (2006) 232 ALR 532; [2006] FCA 632 …. 6.38, 6.39, 6.40 Trudgett v R (2008) 182 A Crim R 253; [2008] NSWCCA 62 …. 4.54, 4.57, 4.63 Trudgian v Western Australia (2006) 33 WAR 163; [2006] WASCA 271 …. 5.178 Trueman v DPP (Cth) (2007) 99 SASR 431 …. 6.68 Truscott, Re [2007] ONCA 575 …. 1.10 Trustees of Christian Brothers v Cardone (1995) 130 ALR 345 …. 2.49 Trylow v Commissioner of Taxation [2004] FCA 446 …. 3.75, 3.159 Trzesinski v Daire (1986) 44 SASR 43 …. 2.44, 5.170, 5.202 Tsang Chi Ming v Uvanna Pty Ltd (1996) 140 ALR 273 …. 8.53 Tsang v DPP (Cth) (2011) 35 VR 240; [2011] VSCA 336 …. 7.35, 8.116, 8.117, 8.118, 8.120 Tucker v Oldbury UDC [1912] 2 KB 317 …. 8.76 Tuite v R [2015] VSCA 148 …. 1.20, 2.30, 2.31, 6.65, 7.40, 7.43, 7.50, 7.54, 7.55, 7.65, 7.71 Tulic v R (1999) 91 FCR 222 …. 2.71, 5.119, 5.124, 5.130 Tully v R (2006) 231 ALR 712; [2006] HCA 56 …. 2.12, 2.87, 3.66, 4.41, 4.43, 4.44, 4.50, 4.77 Tumahole Bereng v R [1949] AC 253 …. 5.120 Turf Enterprises Pty Ltd, Re [1975] Qd R 266 …. 5.100

Turnbull v Alm [2004] NSWCA 173 …. 7.23 Turner v Jenolan Investments Pty Ltd (1985) 7 ATPR ¶40,571 …. 3.156 TWL v R (2012) 222 A Crim R 445; [2012] NSWCCA 57 …. 3.31

U Ugle v R (1989) 167 CLR 647 …. 7.99 ULV Pty Ltd v Scott (1990) 19 NSWLR 190 …. 7.60 Unilever plc v Procter and Gamble Co [2001] 1 All ER 783; [2000] 1 WLR 2436 …. 5.89, 5.96, 5.103 Union Bank of Australia v Puddy [1949] VLR 242 …. 6.38, 6.39 United States v Llera Plaza II 188 F Supp 2d 549 (2002) …. 4.56 United States of America v Fabrizio 445 F Supp 2d 152 (2006) …. 7.12 —v — 463 F Supp 2d 111 (2006) …. 7.12 — v Scheffer 523 US 303 (1998) …. 7.136 Unsted v Unsted (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 495 …. 7.22 Unsworth v R [1986] Tas SR 173 …. 3.78 — v Tristar Steering and Suspension Australia Ltd [2007] FCA 1081 …. 5.54 Urban Transport Authority (NSW) v Nweiser (1991) 28 NSWLR 471 …. 2.8, 7.140 US v White 322 US 694 (1943) …. 5.150, 5.152 Uzan v R [2015] VSCA 292 …. 3.62

V Vairy v Wyong Shire Council [2002] NSWSC 881 …. 7.23 Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568 …. 2.49 Vallance v R (1961) 108 CLR 56 …. 6.25 Valoutin Pty Ltd v Furst (1998) 154 ALR 119 …. 8.199 Van Beelen, Re (1974) 9 SASR 163 …. 2.21, 2.78, 2.79, 2.80, 2.83, 5.13, 5.15 Van Den Hoek v R (1986) 161 CLR 158 …. 6.8

Van der Meer v R (1988) 35 A Crim 232 …. 5.134 — v — (1988) 82 ALR 10 …. 8.131, 8.147, 8.149, 8.154 Van Vliet v Griffiths (1978) 19 SASR 195 …. 7.76, 7.110, 7.114 Vance v McCormack (2004) 154 ACTR 12; [2004] ACTSC 78 …. 5.26 Vardas v South British Insurance Co Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 652 …. 5.33, 5.47, 5.48 Vasil v NAB Ltd (1999) 48 NSWLR 207 …. 5.146 Velevski v R (2002) 187 ALR 233; [2002] HCA 4 …. 2.83, 2.85, 2.88, 6.55, 7.51, 7.53, 7.54, 7.55, 7.59, 7.60, 7.75 Velkoskiv R (2014) 45 VR 680; [2014] VSCA 121 …. 2.31, 2.46, 2.49, 3.20, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.75 Ventouris v Mountain (No 2) [1992] 1 WLR 887 …. 8.173 Ventouris v Mountain [1991] 1 WLR 607; [1991] 1 Ll R 441 …. 5.43, 5.48 Verge v Devere Holdings Pty Ltd (2009) 258 ALR 464; [2009] FCA 832 …. 5.89 Verry v Watkins (1836) 7 Car & P 308; 173 ER 137 …. 3.163 Vetrovec v R (1982) 136 DLR (3d) 89 …. 4.18, 4.19, 4.26 Vic Hotel Pty Ltd v DC Payments Australasia Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 101 …. 5.57 Vickers v R (2006) 160 A Crim R 195; [2006] NSWCCA 60 …. 2.26, 2.31 Victoria v Brazel (2008) 181 A Crim R 562; [2008] VSCA 37 …. 5.232 — v Seal Rocks Victoria (Australia) Pty Ltd (2001) 3 VR 1 …. 5.216, 5.217 Vines v Djordjevitch (1955) 91 CLR 512 …. 6.14, 6.16, 6.18 Violi v Berrivale (2000) 173 ALR 518 …. 5.255 Viro v R (1978) 141 CLR 88 …. 6.8 Visy Industries Holdings Pty Ltd v ACCC (2007) ATPR 42-184; [2007] FCAFC 147 …. 6.55 Vo v R (2013) 39 VR 543; [2013] VSCA 225 …. 2.12 Vocisano v Vocisano (1974) 130 CLR 267 …. 7.118, 7.119, 7.122, 8.40, 8.69, 8.89

Vokalek v Commonwealth (2008) 101 SASR 588 …. 7.60 VOT v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 102 …. 3.147, 3.149

W W v Egdell [1990] Ch 359 …. 5.60 — v R (2001) 115 FCR 41; 189 ALR 633 …. 3.58, 3.62 — v R (2006) 16 Tas R 1 …. 2.72, 3.90 WA Newspapers Ltd v Bond [2009] WASCA 127 …. 5.10, 5.205, 5.206 Wade v R (2006) 164 A Crim R 583; [2006] NSWCCA 295 …. 4.49 Wade (a pseudonym) v R (2014) 239 A Crim R 29; [2014] VSCA 13 …. 7.16, 7.17, 7.19 Wah v R (2014) 239 A Crim R 42; [2014] VSCA 7 …. 3.106, 3.108, 3.130, 3.134 Wahi v R [2015] VSCA 132 …. 3.136 Wakeley v R (1990) 64 ALJR 321 …. 7.137 Waldie v Cook (1988) 91 FLR 413 …. 6.25 Waldridge v Kennison (1794) 1 Esp 143; 170 ER 306 …. 5.89 Walford v DPP (2012) 82 NSWLR 215; [2012] NSWCCA 290 …. 4.69 Walker v Marklew (1976) 14 SASR 463 …. 8.146, 8.153 — v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630 …. 2.47, 7.18, 7.83, 7.153, 7.154 — v Wisher (1889) 23 QBD 335 …. 5.89, 5.98, 5.100 Walsh v Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd (No 4) (1994) 14 ACSR 653 …. 5.76 — v Wilcox [1976] WAR 62 …. 7.15 Walt Disney Productions Ltd v H John Edwards Publishing Co Pty Ltd (1954) 55 SR (NSW) 162 …. 8.93 Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378; [1993] HCA 77 …. 2.29 Walton v R (1989) 166 CLR 283 …. 8.5, 8.6, 8.9, 8.14, 8.18, 8.20, 8.29, 8.40, 8.41, 8.46, 8.47, 8.48, 8.61, 8.66, 8.67, 8.68, 8.69, 8.193 Ward v HS Pitt & Co [1913] 2 KB 130 …. 8.76, 8.81

Wardrope v Dunn [1996] 1 Qd R 224 …. 5.57 Warman International Ltd v Envirotech Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 11 FCR 478 …. 5.157 Warming v O’Sullivan [1962] SASR 287 …. 7.42 Warnecke v Equitable Life Assurance Society of the US [1906] VLR 482 …. 5.211 Warneke v Pope [1950] SASR 113 …. 5.183 Warner v Women’s Hospital [1954] VLR 410 …. 5.55 Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531 …. 2.14 — v Warren [1997] QB 488 …. 5.184 Washer v R (2007) 234 CLR 492 …. 5.190 Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54; 71 ALR 673 …. 5.22, 5.23, 5.26, 5.27, 5.33, 5.34, 5.36, 5.40, 5.60, 5.77, 5.82 Waters Motors Pty Ltd v Cratchley [1964] NSWR 1085 …. 7.151 Waters v Sunday Pictorial Newspapers Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 967 …. 3.153 Watson v AWB Ltd (No 2) (2009) 259 ALR 524; [2009] FCA 1047 …. 5.216, 5.242, 5.244, 5.252, 5.254 — v Cammell Laird & Co Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 702 …. 5.43, 5.48 Watt v Miller [1950] 3 DLR 709 …. 8.76 Watts v Rake (1960) 108 CLR 158 …. 6.5 Waugh v British Railways Board [1980] AC 521 …. 5.23, 5.34, 5.43 Waugh v R [1950] AC 203 …. 5.124 Wayne Lawrence Pty Ltd v Hunt [1999] NSWSC 1044 …. 5.59 WBJ v Police (2001) 79 SASR 364 …. 5.205 WC v R [2015] NSWCCA 52 …. 2.46 WEA Records Ltd v Visions Channel 4 Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 721 …. 5.254 Weal v Bottom (1966) 40 ALJR 436 …. 7.43, 7.44, 7.47, 7.65 Weatherall v Whalan (1989) 50 SASR 319 …. 2.8 Webb and Hay v R (1994) 181 CLR 41 …. 2.71, 3.78, 4.18, 4.19, 4.26, 4.29,

4.30 Webbie v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1968) 12 FLR 271 …. 7.82, 7.93, 7.151, 7.152 Webster v James Chapman & Co [1989] 3 All ER 939 …. 5.54, 5.65 — v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598 …. 6.14 Weiss v R (2005) 224 CLR 300 …. 2.14, 2.70, 2.90, 4.3, 4.10, 4.17, 4.72, 6.35, 7.74 Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217 …. 2.50, 5.119, 5.120, 5.123, 5.124, 5.125, 5.127, 5.128, 5.129, 5.130, 5.131, 6.46, 8.162 Weller, Office of Fair Trading v El Homsi [2009] NSWSC 282 …. 6.16, 6.18 Wendo v R (1963) 109 CLR 559 …. 2.91 — v Rogers [1984] 2 NSWLR 422 …. 6.31 — v — [2002] NSWSC 921 …. 2.8 — v — (No 10) (1987) 8 NSWLR 398 …. 7.82, 7.155 West v Government Insurance Office of NSW (1981) 148 CLR 62 …. 2.60, 2.64 Western Australia v Atherton [2009] WASCA 148 …. 3.63, 3.75 — v Bowen (2006) 32 WAR 81 …. 3.71 — v Burke (2011) 42 WAR 124; [2011] WASCA 190 …. 2.53 — v Christie (2005) 30 WAR 514; [2005] WASC 214 …. 5.242, 5.254 — v Gibson (2014) 243 A Crim R 68; [2014] WASC 240 …. 8.132, 8.152, 8.153, 8.156 — v Lovett (2012) 225 A Crim R 363; [2012] WASC 177 …. 3.63 — v May (2011) 215 A Crim R 199; [2011] WASC 365 …. 8.149, 8.155 — v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (1994) 54 FCR 144 …. 5.221, 5.225 — v Montani (2007) 182 A Crim R 155; [2007] WASCA 259 …. 6.32, 6.33, 8.88 — v Osborne [2007] WASCA 183 …. 3.63 — v Pollock [2009] WASCA 96 …. 2.12

— v Rayney (2011) 42 WAR 383; [2011] WASC 326 …. 2.7 — v Rayney (No 3) [2012] WASC 404 …. 2.90 — v Silich (2011) 43 WAR 285; [2011] WASCA 135 …. 7.49, 8.133 — v Southern Equities Corp Ltd (1996) 142 ALR 597 …. 5.92, 5.100 Western Australian Museum v Information Commissioner (1994) 12 WAR 417 …. 5.218 Western Australian Trustee Executor and Agency Co v O’Connor (1955) 57 WALR 25 …. 8.83 Western v DPP [1997] 1 Cr App R 474 …. 8.108 Westpac Banking Corporation v 789TEN Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 321 …. 5.33 Wetherall v Harrison [1976] QB 773 …. 6.74 WFS v R (2011) 33 VR 406; [2011] VSCA 347 …. 3.33, 3.36, 3.56, 3.75 Wheeler v Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675 …. 5.37, 5.38, 5.43, 5.205 White v Venus [1968] SASR 83 …. 8.174 White Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (in liq) v White [2005] NSWCA 173 …. 2.31 White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower and Hart (1998) 156 ALR 169 …. 7.130 Whitehorn v R (1983) 152 CLR 657 …. 2.14, 6.31, 6.33, 6.52, 6.54, 6.55, 8.105 Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246 …. 7.64 Whitsed v R [2005] WASCA 208 …. 7.51 Wiedemann v Walpole [1891] 2 QB 534 …. 8.98 Wiest v DPP (1988) 86 ALR 464 …. 5.187 Wiki v Atlantis Relocations (NSW) Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 174 …. 7.74 Wilde v R (1988) 164 CLR 365 …. 2.14 Willett v Belconnen Soccer Club (2007) 212 FLR 203; [2007] ATCSC 41 …. 5.54 Williams v Nicoski [2003] WASC 131 …. 5.89

— v — (1986) 161 CLR 278 …. 5.266, 8.143, 8.147, 8.149 — v — (2000) 119 A Crim R 490 …. 8.66, 8.197 — v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509 …. 2.29 Willis v Magistrates Court (Vic) (1996) 89 A Crim R 273 …. 7.120 — v R (2001) 25 WAR 217 …. 8.6, 8.106, 8.108 — v — [2016] VSCA 176 …. 2.29 Wilson v Buttery [1926] SASR 150 …. 2.50 — v County Court of Victoria (2006) 14 VR 461; [2006] VSC 322 …. 5.141 — v Deputy State Coroner (1995) 124 FLR 388 …. 5.166 — v R (1970) 123 CLR 334 …. 2.20, 3.31, 3.33, 3.36, 3.56, 8.24, 8.29 — v R [2006] NSWCCA 217 …. 7.79, 7.92 Wimbridge v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 196 …. 4.65 Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244 …. 4.6, 4.35, 4.58, 4.62, 4.63, 4.64, 4.65, 4.66, 4.67, 4.70, 4.74, 6.67, 7.58, 7.95, 7.136 Witham v Holloway (1995) 69 ALJR 847 …. 2.69 WLC v R (2007) 210 FLR 378; [2007] NTCCA 6 …. 4.82, 4.97 — v — [2007] NTCCA 11 …. 3.36 Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1969] VR 323 …. 7.91, 7.155 Wolper v Poole (1972) 2 SASR 419 …. 7.67 Wong Kam-Ming v R [1980] AC 247 …. 3.84, 3.85, 8.163, 8.165 Wong v R (2001) 207 CLR 584; 185 ALR 233; [2001] HCA 64 …. 6.75 Wood v Desmond (1958) 78 WN (NSW) 65 …. 7.151 — v Mackinson (1840) 2 Mo & Rob 273; 174 ER 286 …. 7.124 — v R (2012) 84 NSWLR 581; [2012] NSWCCA 21 …. 4.64, 7.23, 7.64 — v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 179 …. 3.63, 3.71 Woodhouse v Hall (1980) 72 Cr App R 39 …. 8.25, 8.33, 8.34 Woodroffe v NCA (1999) 168 ALR 585 …. 5.242, 5.245

Woods v DPP (WA) (2008) 190 A Crim R 356 …. 7.68, 7.71, 8.50 — v Multi-Sport Holdings (2002) 208 CLR 460; 186 ALR 145 …. 6.59, 6.72, 6.73 Woollahra Municipal Council v Westpac (1994) 33 NSWLR 529 …. 5.53 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 162 …. 6.3, 6.8, 6.14, 6.15, 6.16, 6.19, 6.23 — v — [1935] AC 462 …. 1.36, 2.58 Woolway v Rowe (1834) 1 Ad & E 114; 110 ER 1151 …. 8.110 Woolworths Ltd v BP plc (No 2) [2006] FCAFC 132 …. 8.49 Woon v R (1964) 109 CLR 529 …. 4.88, 5.138, 5.139 Work Cover Authority (NSW), (General Manager) v Law Society of New South Wales (2006) 65 NSWLR 502; [2006] NSWCA 84 …. 5.27 Wright v Doe d Tatham (1837) 7 Ad & El 313; 112 ER 488 …. 8.11, 8.18 Wright v Wright (1948) 77 CLR 191 …. 2.64 Wright, Re; Hegan v Bloor [1920] 1 Ch 108 …. 8.31 WS v Gardin (2015) 48 WAR 494; [2015] WASC 97 …. 3.63 WSJ v R [2010] VSCA 339 …. 4.63 Wundowie Foundry Pty Ltd v Milson Foundry Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 474 …. 5.26 Wyatt v R (1992) 35 FCR 422 …. 5.117

X X v Australian Crime Commission (2004) 212 ALR 596; [2004] FCA 1475 …. 5.164 X v McDermott (1994) 123 ALR 226 …. 5.183 X v Y (No 1) [1954] VLR 708 …. 5.211 X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92; [2013] HCA 29 …. 1.53, 5.108, 5.122, 5.145, 5.146, 5.177, 5.183, 5.209, 6.8, 8.148 X Ltd v Morgan-Grampion (Publishers) Ltd [1991] 1 AC 1 …. 5.205 XY, Re; Ex parte Haes [1902] 1 KB 98 …. 5.162 Xypolitos v R [2014] VSCA 339 …. 2.49, 5.139, 8.108

Y Yamirr v Northern Territory (1998) 82 FCR 533 …. 8.84 Yates Property Corporation v Boland (1998) 85 FCR 84 …. 7.65 Yeldham v Rajski (1989) 18 NSWLR 48 …. 5.184 Yisrael v District Court of NSW (1996) 87 A Crim R 63 …. 5.138, 5.139 Yokogawa Aust Pty Ltd v Alstom Power Ltd [2009] SASC 377 …. 5.57, 5.89, 5.92, 5.100 Youkhana v R [2013] NSWCCA 85 …. 8.197 Young v Lusted (2011) 20 Tas R 98; [2011] TASSC 22 …. 4.64 — v Queensland Trustees Ltd (1956) 99 CLR 560 …. 6.13 — v Quin (1985) 4 FCR 483 …. 5.218, 5.223, 5.224, 5.241, 5.245 — v R [2016] VSCA 149 …. 2.84 Yuill v Yuill [1945] P 15 …. 6.58

Z Z, Re (1996) 134 FLR 40 …. 2.2 Zafiropoulos v Registrar-General (1980) 24 SASR 133 …. 5.9 Zaknic Pty Ltd v Svelte Corporation Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 171 …. 3.61, 3.155 Zammit v Western Australia (2007) 34 WAR 302 …. 3.71 Zanatta v McCleary [1976] 1 NSWLR 230 …. 5.184 Zanet v Hentchke (1988) 33 A Crim R 51 …. 5.266 Zanetti v Hill (1962) 108 CLR 433 …. 6.32 Zanon v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 91 …. 5.183 Zantiotis, In the Marriage of (1993) 113 ALR 441 …. 6.47 Zaphir v R [2009] NSWCCA 124 …. 3.134 Zappia v Registrar of the Supreme Court (2004) 90 SASR 193; [2004] SASC 375 …. 5.166, 5.169, 5.171, 5.174, 5.203 Zentai v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2010] FCA 252 …. 5.51 Zis v Bland [1962] WAR 137 …. 6.18

Zoneff v R (2000) 200 CLR 234; [2000] HCA 28 …. 2.13, 4.88

Table of Statutes References are to paragraphs

COMMONWEALTH Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 …. 2.2 s 33A …. 7.3 Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 s 21E …. 5.180 Australian Federal Police Act 1979 s 12F …. 8.155 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 s 68 …. 5.180 Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 Pt III Div 3 …. 8.148 Bankruptcy Act 1966 …. 2.2, 5.146 s 77 …. 5.81 s 77C …. 5.155 s 81(11AA) …. 5.180 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 s 49 …. 8.93 Civil Aviation Act 1988 s 27(2) …. 6.22 Commonwealth Constitution s 80 …. 2.7 s 118 …. 6.70 Competition and Consumer Act 2010

s 76 …. 5.162 s 77 …. 5.162 s 83 …. 5.194 s 155(7B) …. 5.74 s 159 …. 5.180 s 161 …. 5.180 Constitution s 16(3) …. 5.199 s 92 …. 8.107 s 109 …. 5.19 Corporations Act 2001 …. 5.33, 5.150 s 124 …. 5.150 s 597(12) …. 5.180 s 597(12A) …. 5.180 s 1316A …. 5.150 Crimes Act 1914 Pt 1AA …. 5.17 Pt 1AB …. 4.53, 5.17 Pt 1AC …. 5.17 Pt 1ACA Div 2 …. 5.205 Pt 1AD …. 7.33 Pt 1AD Div 5 …. 7.34 Pt 1AD Div 5A …. 7.34 Pt 1AE …. 7.3 Pt 1C …. 4.33, 5.17, 8.148, 8.149, 8.168 Pt 1D …. 5.17 s 3E …. 5.81 s 3W …. 8.147

ss 3ZM–3ZQ …. 4.58, 4.65, 4.68 s 3ZM(3) …. 4.69 s 3ZM(4) …. 4.69 s 3ZM(6)(l) …. 4.65 s 3ZO …. 4.70 s 3ZP …. 4.70 s 3ZQN …. 5.71 s 3ZQO …. 5.71 s 10 …. 5.80, 5.81 s 15D …. 6.22 s 15YE …. 7.33 ss 15YF-15YH …. 7.33 s 15YNE …. 7.33 s 15YQ …. 7.33 ss 23A–23V …. 8.148 s 23A(6) …. 4.33, 8.149, 8.168 s 23B(2) …. 8.147 s 23F …. 5.134, 8.149 s 23G …. 4.33 s 23H …. 8.151 s 23K …. 8.150 s 23U …. 8.97, 8.168 s 23V …. 4.33, 8.97, 8.168 Criminal Code Act 1995 …. 6.9 Pt 2.2 …. 6.9 Pt 2.3 …. 6.9 Pt 2.6 …. 6.2, 6.8, 6.21 Pt 5.3 …. 8.148

Div 9 s 13.3 …. 6.8 s 7.1 …. 6.23 s 7.2 …. 6.23 s 7.3(3) …. 6.8 s 9.1 …. 3.142 s 13.1(2) …. 6.8 s 13.2(2) …. 6.8 s 13.3 …. 3.142 s 13.3(2) …. 6.9 s 13.3(3) …. 6.16, 6.17 s 13.3(6) …. 6.8 s 13.3(4) …. 6.3 s 13.4 …. 6.8, 6.14, 6.16 s 13.5 …. 6.21 s 268.14 …. 3.142 s 268.102 …. 4.14 Evidence Act 1995 …. 2.2, 2.3, 2.25, 2.28, 2.50, 3.3, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.12, 3.17, 3.31, 3.33, 3.40, 3.43, 3.49, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.63, 3.64, 3.68, 3.69, 3.70, 3.82, 3.83, 3.85, 3.87, 3.88, 3.90, 3.91, 3.93, 3.96, 3.99, 3.101, 3.104, 3.106, 3.107, 3.108, 3.109, 3.112, 3.118, 3.119, 3.120, 3.122, 3.127, 3.129, 3.131, 3.133, 3.135, 3.136, 3.137, 3.139, 3.141, 3.145, 3.152, 3.153, 3.154, 3.156, 3.159, 3.160, 3.162, 3.165, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, 4.22, 4.27, 4.30, 4.35, 4.36, 4.39, 4.48, 4.54, 4.55, 4.56, 4.57, 4.59, 4.63, 4.64, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 4.78, 4.79, 4.98, 4.101, 4.102, 4.105, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, 5.24, 5.26, 5.27, 5.31, 5.35, 5.36, 5.39, 5.40, 5.43, 5.47, 5.49, 5.66, 5.67, 5.69, 5.77, 5.83, 5.84, 5.86, 5.92, 5.97, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102, 5.108, 5.118, 5.120, 5.134, 5.135, 5.139, 5.144, 5.154, 5.161, 5.169, 5.175, 5.176, 5.177, 5.184, 5.190, 5.194, 5.201, 5.202, 5.203, 5.204, 5.207, 5.208, 5.214, 5.218, 5.241, 5.247, 5.253, 5.254, 5.266, 6.1, 6.23, 6.57, 6.65, 6.66, 6.68, 6.77, 7.4, 7.8, 7.14, 7.20, 7.23, 7.26, 7.28, 7.30, 7.34, 7.35, 7.36, 7.54, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.66, 7.71, 7.73, 7.76, 7.78, 7.79, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.91, 7.93, 7.94, 7.95, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 7.113,

7.115, 7.116, 7.118, 7.124, 7.128, 7.134, 7.137, 7.141, 7.142, 7.143, 7.147, 7.148, 7.153, 7.158, 8.6, 8.8, 8.11, 8.12, 8.13, 8.22, 8.27, 8.28, 8.35, 8.48, 8.55, 8.57, 8.59, 8.62, 8.63, 8.65, 8.66, 8.69, 8.79, 8.81, 8.85, 8.87, 8.89, 8.90, 8.100, 8.106, 8.108, 8.112, 8.113, 8.114, 8.119, 8.125, 8.126, 8.127, 8.144, 8.146, 8.156, 8.161, 8.162, 8.163, 8.169, 8.171, 8.172, 8.173, 8.191, 8.196 Ch 3 …. 2.45 Ch 4 …. 2.48 Ch 5 …. 2.48 Pt 1.2 …. 2.2 Pt 2.1 Div 1 …. 2.48 Pt 2.1 Div 2 …. 2.48 Pt 3.1 …. 2.48 Pt 3.2 …. 8.93, 8.198 Pt 3.2 Div 2 …. 8.62, 8.195 Pt 3.2 Div 3 …. 8.199 Pt 3.4 …. 8.94, 8.100, 8.101, 8.198 Pt 3.6 …. 3.12, 3.106, 3.135, 3.153 Pt 3.7 …. 3.108, 7.122 Pt 3.8 …. 3.5, 3.90, 3.104, 3.108 Pt 3.9 …. 2.48, 4.2, 4.54, 4.55, 4.63 Pt 3.10 …. 2.48, 5.19 Pt 3.10 Div 1 …. 5.19 Pt 3.10 Div 1A …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.214 Pt 3.10 Div 1C …. 5.19, 5.207 Pt 3.10 Div 3 …. 5.19 Pt 3.11 …. 2.29, 2.31, 2.48, 8.196 Pt 4.6 Div 1 …. 7.14, 7.26 Pt 4.6 Div 2 …. 7.13

Pt 4.6 Div 3 …. 6.70 Div 2 …. 5.19, 8.198 Div 3 …. 8.195, 8.200 s 4 …. 2.2 s 4(1) …. 2.2, 5.24 s 4(1)(d) …. 2.4 s 4(2)–(4) …. 2.4 s 4(5)(a) …. 2.2 s 4(5)(b) …. 2.2 s 5 …. 2.2, 6.70, 7.14 s 8 …. 2.3 s 8(1) …. 2.2 s 9(3)(a) …. 6.23 s 10 …. 5.199 s 11 …. 7.124, 7.137 s 11(1) …. 6.48 s 11(2) …. 1.53, 2.29 s 12 …. 2.3, 3.83, 5.112, 5.115, 5.176, 5.200, 5.201 s 13 …. 4.14, 7.28, 7.30 s 13(1) …. 7.30 s 13(2) …. 7.30 s 13(3) …. 7.28, 7.30 s 13(5) …. 7.30 s 13(6) …. 7.30 s 13(8) …. 7.30, 7.31 s 14 …. 7.30 s 15(2) …. 5.199 s 16 …. 5.184

s 16(1) …. 5.185 s 17 …. 3.83, 8.126 s 17(2) …. 5.112 s 17(3) …. 5.112, 5.115 s 18 …. 2.26, 5.165, 5.201 s 19 …. 5.201 s 20 …. 2.12, 2.50, 5.115, 5.118, 5.120, 5.128, 5.129, 5.202, 8.126 s 20(2) …. 2.12, 5.120, 5.123 s 20(3) …. 5.132, 5.201 s 20(4) …. 2.12, 5.201 s 20(5) …. 5.120, 5.201 s 21 …. 5.115, 5.201, 5.202, 7.28 ss 21–24A …. 7.28 s 21(3a) …. 5.201 s 23 …. 7.28 s 24(2) …. 7.28 s 24A …. 7.28 s 26 …. 6.48, 7.115, 7.124, 7.137 ss 26–29 …. 7.115 s 26(a) …. 7.3 s 27 …. 3.84, 7.115, 7.124 s 28 …. 7.115 s 29 …. 6.58 s 29(2) …. 7.115 s 30 …. 7.30, 7.35 s 31 …. 7.30, 7.35, 8.12 s 31A(1)(b) …. 5.216 s 32 …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.79, 7.82, 7.83, 7.86

s 32(1) …. 7.79 s 32(2) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b)(i) …. 7.79 s 32(3) …. 7.80 s 32(4) …. 7.81 s 33 …. 5.26, 5.49, 7.76, 7.80 s 33(2)(a) …. 7.80 s 34 …. 7.76, 7.77, 7.84, 7.86, 7.112 s 35 …. 7.81, 7.82, 7.83, 7.154 s 37 …. 5.26, 7.115, 7.117, 7.126 s 37(1)(b) …. 7.117 s 38 …. 6.49, 6.57, 7.97, 7.118, 7.122, 7.123, 8.194 s 38(3) …. 7.122 s 38(4) …. 7.122 s 38(6) …. 7.122 s 38(7) …. 7.118, 7.122 s 39 …. 7.82, 7.156 s 40 …. 7.124 s 41 …. 2.46, 3.83, 3.145, 3.152, 7.33, 7.115, 7.137 s 42 …. 7.115, 7.126 s 43 …. 7.83, 7.97, 7.148, 7.149 s 44 …. 7.153 s 45 …. 7.82, 7.152 s 45(4) …. 7.82 s 46 …. 7.75, 7.129, 7.130 s 47(2) …. 7.19 s 48 …. 7.8, 7.56, 8.199

s 48(1) …. 7.19, 7.56 s 48(1)(c) …. 7.24, 7.56 s 48(1)(d) …. 7.19 s 48(2) …. 7.19 s 48(3) …. 7.19 s 48(4) …. 7.19 s 49 …. 7.19, 8.133 s 51 …. 7.19, 7.82 s 52 …. 7.20, 7.21 s 53 …. 7.23 s 53(1) …. 7.23 s 53(2) …. 7.23 s 53(2)(a) …. 2.43 s 53(3) …. 7.23 s 53(3)(d) …. 7.23 s 53(4) …. 7.23 s 53(5) …. 7.23 s 54 …. 7.23 s 55 …. 2.18, 2.19, 2.23, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.60, 3.141, 4.3, 4.100, 7.40, 7.41, 7.44, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.66, 7.116, 7.146, 8.95 s 55(1) …. 2.23, 2.24, 5.144, 7.54, 7.103 s 55(2) …. 2.19, 7.137 s 56 …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.28, 2.32, 7.44, 7.52, 7.66 s 56(1) …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.23, 2.27, 2.29, 2.46, 7.7, 7.8, 7.10, 8.27, 8.192 s 56(2) …. 7.54 s 57 …. 2.19, 7.8, 7.52, 8.194 s 57(1) …. 2.23, 7.8 s 57(1)(b) …. 2.19, 7.68

s 58 …. 7.8, 7.14, 8.199 s 58(1) …. 2.23 s 59 …. 2.46, 7.98, 8.8, 8.27, 8.57, 8.96, 8.99, 8.169, 8.192, 8.194, 8.199 s 59(1) …. 7.3, 8.8, 8.11, 8.19, 8.21, 8.22, 8.23, 8.24, 8.25, 8.26, 8.27, 8.28, 8.33, 8.44, 8.50, 8.53, 8.192, 8.193 s 59(2A) …. 8.27 s 60 …. 2.31, 2.39, 2.46, 4.1, 7.69, 7.70, 7.71, 7.72, 7.73, 7.81, 7.83, 7.91, 7.93, 7.97, 7.102, 7.123, 7.134, 7.151, 8.28, 8.29, 8.50, 8.71, 8.105, 8.194 s 60(1) …. 8.194 s 60(2) …. 7.69 s 60(3) …. 7.81, 8.105, 8.165 s 61 …. 8.195 s 62 …. 8.62, 8.66, 8.75, 8.79, 8.81, 8.83, 8.195, 8.196 s 62(1) …. 8.196 s 62(2) …. 8.196 s 63 …. 7.69, 7.98, 8.89, 8.196 s 63(2) …. 8.74, 8.85, 8.90 s 64 …. 7.69, 7.83, 7.93, 7.98, 8.169, 8.196 s 64(2) …. 7.76, 7.113, 8.85 s 64(4) …. 7.76, 8.196 s 65 …. 7.34, 8.66, 8.74, 8.83, 8.181, 8.193, 8.197 s 65(1)(b) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(c) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(d) …. 8.66 s 65(2) …. 8.82, 8.197 s 65(2)(a) …. 8.82, 8.83 s 65(2)(b) …. 8.29, 8.35, 8.39, 8.50, 8.66, 8.69, 8.75, 8.89, 8.197 s 65(2)(c) …. 7.98, 8.35, 8.50, 8.61, 8.89, 8.197

s 65(2)(d) …. 8.29, 8.75, 8.79, 8.80, 8.197 s 65(3) …. 8.53, 8.197 s 65(3)–(6) …. 8.197 s 65(7) …. 8.79 s 65(8) …. 8.63, 8.74, 8.197 s 65(9) …. 8.63, 8.197 s 66 …. 4.74, 7.34, 7.41, 7.79, 7.83, 7.93, 7.97, 7.98, 7.99, 7.102, 8.106, 8.169, 8.198 s 66(2) …. 7.76, 7.102, 7.113 s 66(2A) …. 7.79, 7.83, 8.198 s 66(3) …. 8.198 s 66(4) …. 7.76 s 66A …. 8.29, 8.31, 8.35, 8.42, 8.44, 8.46, 8.49, 8.50, 8.195, 8.198 s 67 …. 5.18, 8.74, 8.75, 8.82, 8.89, 8.90, 8.196, 8.197 s 68 …. 8.196 s 69 …. 7.13, 8.93, 8.182, 8.199 s 69(3) …. 8.199 s 69(4) …. 8.26, 8.199 s 70 …. 8.57, 8.190, 8.200 ss 70–75 …. 8.200 s 70(1) …. 8.30 s 71 …. 8.200 s 72 …. 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 73 …. 8.85, 8.200 s 74 …. 8.200 s 74(1) …. 8.84 s 74(2) …. 8.84 s 76 …. 2.23, 2.30, 7.38, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 8.49, 8.200

s 77 …. 2.31 ss 77–79 …. 7.38 s 78 …. 4.57, 7.41, 7.42, 7.56, 7.105 s 78(a) …. 7.41 s 78(b) …. 7.41 s 78A …. 7.73, 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 79 …. 2.23, 7.40, 7.41, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.58, 7.59, 7.64, 7.66, 8.71 s 79(1) …. 7.14, 7.41, 7.42, 7.44, 7.52, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.65, 7.66, 7.73, 7.108 s 79(2) …. 4.39, 7.45, 7.51, 7.54, 7.58, 7.62, 7.136 s 79(3) …. 7.136 s 80 …. 6.70, 7.44, 7.57, 7.59, 7.61 s 80(a) …. 7.62 s 80(b) …. 7.53, 7.55, 7.58, 7.65, 7.136 s 81 …. 5.144, 8.94, 8.108, 8.165, 8.194 s 81(2) …. 8.108 s 82 …. 8.99, 8.105 s 83 …. 8.78 s 83(1) …. 8.78 s 83(2) …. 8.78 s 83(3) …. 8.78 s 84 …. 5.135, 8.78, 8.96, 8.97, 8.99, 8.100, 8.126, 8.127, 8.131, 8.137, 8.160 s 84(1) …. 8.126 s 85 …. 5.135, 8.97, 8.99, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.130, 8.131, 8.134, 8.136, 8.137, 8.160, 8.162, 8.163 s 85(1) …. 8.126, 8.129 s 85(1)(b) …. 8.130 s 85(2) …. 8.126, 8.129, 8.130

s 85(3) …. 8.126, 8.128, 8.130 s 85(3)(a) …. 8.129 s 85(3)(b) …. 8.129, 8.130 s 86 …. 8.97, 8.167, 8.168 s 87(1) …. 8.112, 8.119 s 87(1)(a) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(b) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(c) …. 8.115, 8.117, 8.118 s 87(2) …. 8.114, 8.117 s 87(2)(c) …. 8.117 s 88 …. 7.7, 8.101 s 89 …. 5.139, 5.141, 5.142, 8.98, 8.126 s 89(1) …. 5.144 s 89(2) …. 5.144 s 89(4) …. 5.144 s 90 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.32, 2.33, 2.34, 2.35, 8.97, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.131, 8.134, 8.135, 8.136, 8.137, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.154, 8.160, 8.162 s 91 …. 5.194 s 92(2) …. 5.194 s 92(3) …. 5.194 s 93 …. 5.194 s 93(c) …. 5.190 s 94(1) …. 3.58, 3.152 s 94(3) …. 3.153 s 95 …. 3.11, 3.54, 3.75, 3.82, 3.106, 3.107, 3.135, 4.1 s 97 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 2.87, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.17, 3.26, 3.32, 3.36, 3.37, 3.40, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60,

3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 ss 97–98 …. 5.18 ss 97–100 …. 3.160 s 97(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 97(1)(b) …. 3.61 s 98 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.23, 3.25, 3.39, 3.40, 3.49, 3.54, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 s 98(1) …. 3.58 s 98(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 98(1)(b) …. 3.60 s 99 …. 3.9, 3.68 s 100 …. 3.9, 3.68, 3.125 s 101 …. 2.15, 2.31, 2.37, 2.87, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.36, 3.37, 3.39, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.127, 3.139, 3.156, 3.159 s 101(2) …. 3.59, 3.60, 3.62, 3.82, 3.127 s 101A …. 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 3.108, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112, 7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.139, 7.140 s 102 …. 2.46, 3.58, 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112, 7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.137, 7.139 s 103 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.135, 3.145, 3.152, 3.162, 7.97, 7.116, 7.133, 7.137, 7.139 s 103(1) …. 3.83, 3.84, 7.133, 7.137, 7.142 s 104 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.108, 5.115 s 104(2) …. 3.90, 3.114 s 104(3) …. 3.90, 3.104 s 104(3)(b) …. 7.112, 7.144

s 104(4) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.110, 3.112 s 104(5) …. 3.110, 3.112 s 104(6) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.113, 3.117, 3.120, 3.122, 3.123 s 106 …. 7.83, 7.116, 7.133, 7.142, 7.149 s 106(1) …. 7.141, 7.143 s 106(2) …. 7.141, 7.142, 7.143 s 106(2)(a) …. 7.143 s 106(2)(b) …. 7.138, 7.142 s 106(2)(c) …. 7.148 s 106(2)(d) …. 7.112, 7.144 s 106(2)(e) …. 7.142 s 107 …. 7.97, 7.98 s 108 …. 7.90, 7.93, 7.116, 7.133, 7.156 s 108(1) …. 7.97, 7.158 s 108(3) …. 4.74, 7.97, 7.102, 7.158 s 108(3)(a) …. 7.93, 7.152 s 108(3)(b) …. 7.91, 7.92, 7.106 s 108A …. 7.97, 7.98, 7.133, 8.196, 8.199 s 108B …. 7.133 s 108C …. 4.39, 7.51, 7.58, 7.108, 7.133, 7.136, 7.144, 7.146 s 108C(1) …. 7.110, 7.112 s 110 …. 3.82, 3.83, 3.90, 3.106, 3.108, 3.109, 3.127, 3.129, 3.130, 3.134, 3.135, 3.137 s 110(1) …. 3.107 s 110(2) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 110(3) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 111 …. 3.82, 3.108, 7.136 s 112 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.100, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109, 3.130, 3.132, 3.135

s 113 …. 4.69 s 114 …. 2.46, 2.48, 4.58, 4.64, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 5.26, 7.94 s 114(1) …. 4.69 s 114(2) …. 4.69 s 114(2)(c) …. 4.70 s 114(5) …. 4.70 s 115 …. 4.58, 4.64, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74 s 115(3) …. 4.70 s 115(4) …. 4.70 s 115(7) …. 4.70 s 115(8) …. 4.70 s 116 …. 4.10, 4.54, 4.59, 4.61, 4.63, 4.69 s 116(1) …. 4.61 s 116(2) …. 4.59 s 117 …. 5.22, 5.26, 5.28, 5.37, 5.49, 5.58 s 117(1) …. 5.26 s 118 …. 5.24, 5.25, 5.27, 5.28, 5.31, 5.39 ss 118–119 …. 2.46, 2.48 ss 118–120 …. 5.35, 5.47, 5.48, 5.49 s 118(a) …. 5.28, 5.39 s 118(b) …. 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 118(c) …. 5.19, 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 119 …. 5.24, 5.42, 5.43 ss 119–120 …. 5.46 s 120 …. 5.24, 5.42 s 121 …. 5.69 s 122 …. 5.19, 5.54, 5.56, 5.58, 5.59 s 122(1) …. 5.58, 5.59

s 122(2) …. 5.58, 5.59, 5.100 s 122(3) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(a) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(b) …. 5.58 s 122(4) …. 5.58, 5.59 s 122(5) …. 5.58 s 122(5)(a)(i) …. 5.52 s 122(5)(b) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(5)(c) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(6) …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.81 s 123 …. 5.19, 5.70, 5.216 s 124 …. 5.49, 5.57, 5.58 s 125 …. 5.31 s 125(1)(a) …. 5.31 s 125(1)(b) …. 5.31 s 125(2) …. 5.31 s 126 …. 5.59 s 126K …. 5.19 s 127 …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.210 s 127(1) …. 5.208 s 127(3) …. 5.208, 5.210 s 127A …. 5.19 s 127B …. 5.19 s 128 …. 3.87, 5.19, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177, 5.216, 8.164 s 128(1) …. 5.155, 5.176 s 128(1)(a) …. 5.164 s 128(2) …. 5.169 s 128(4)(a) …. 5.164

s 128(10) …. 3.83, 3.87, 5.180 s 128(12)–(14) …. 5.179 s 128A …. 5.19, 5.146, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177 s 129 …. 5.184, 5.185 s 129(4) …. 5.185 s 130 …. 5.205, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218, 5.222, 5.223, 5.226, 5.231, 8.79 s 130(1) …. 5.216, 5.222, 5.243 s 130(2) …. 5.216 s 130(3) …. 5.241 s 130(4) …. 5.222 s 130(4)(a) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(b) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(c)–(e) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(e) …. 5.205 s 130(5) …. 5.253 s 130(5)(d) …. 5.254 s 131 …. 5.87, 5.88, 5.90, 5.94, 5.95, 5.96, 5.98, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102, 5.105, 5.214 s 131(1) …. 5.88, 5.94, 5.95, 5.97 s 131(2) …. 5.88 s 131(2)(a)–(c) …. 5.100 s 131(2)(d) …. 5.90, 5.100 s 131(2)(f) …. 5.97 s 131(2)(g) …. 5.100, 5.103 s 131(2)(h) …. 5.98 s 131(2)(i) …. 5.92, 5.96 s 131(2)(j) …. 5.96 s 131(2)(k) …. 5.96

s 131(3) …. 5.96 s 131(4) …. 5.96 s 131(5) …. 5.88, 5.90 s 131(5)(b) …. 5.99 s 131A …. 5.19, 5.24, 5.67, 5.70, 5.90, 5.102, 5.176, 5.208, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218 s 131A(1) …. 5.49 s 132 …. 5.166, 5.167 s 133 …. 5.78, 5.169, 5.247 s 135 …. 2.27, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.127, 3.159, 7.41, 7.55, 7.59, 7.64, 7.73, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 8.144, 8.194 ss 135–137 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.32, 2.35, 3.11, 3.90, 3.133, 4.3, 7.124, 7.134, 8.29, 8.127, 8.193 ss 135–138 …. 2.27, 4.55 s 135(a) …. 7.55 s 136 …. 2.31, 2.39, 3.69, 3.79, 3.137, 7.41, 7.69, 7.73, 7.93, 7.102, 8.194 s 137 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.26, 2.27, 2.30, 2.31, 2.35, 2.46, 2.48, 2.70, 3.12, 3.54, 3.59, 3.60, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.104, 3.125, 3.127, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 7.41, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.67, 7.93, 7.102, 7.108, 7.110, 7.111, 7.112, 7.135, 8.96, 8.127, 8.134, 8.144, 8.159, 8.194 s 138 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.33, 2.35, 2.36, 2.37, 2.46, 2.48, 4.58, 4.68, 4.70, 4.74, 5.62, 5.134, 5.255, 5.258, 5.261, 5.264, 5.265, 5.267, 8.126, 8.127, 8.135, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.155, 8.158, 8.159, 8.160, 8.162 s 138(2) …. 8.127, 8.144, 8.155 s 138(3) …. 2.37 s 138(3)(f) …. 2.37 s 139 …. 5.134, 8.126, 8.149 s 139(2) …. 8.149 s 139(5) …. 8.149 s 140 …. 2.64

ss 140–141 …. 2.58 s 142 …. 2.12, 2.45, 2.91, 3.69, 5.31, 5.35, 7.8, 7.65 s 142(1) …. 8.160 s 143 …. 6.69, 6.70 s 144 …. 6.60, 6.65, 6.71, 6.73, 6.77, 7.54, 7.59, 7.71 s 144(2) …. 6.66 s 144(4) …. 6.66 s 145 …. 6.60 s 146 …. 6.23, 7.13, 7.19, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 ss 146–147 …. 7.13, 7.26 s 147 …. 7.13, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 s 148 …. 7.11 s 149 …. 7.9 s 150 …. 7.11 s 151 …. 7.11 s 152 …. 7.11 s 153 …. 7.11 ss 153–159 …. 8.93 s 154 …. 7.11 s 155 …. 7.11 s 156 …. 7.11, 8.91 s 157 …. 7.11 s 158 …. 7.11 s 159 …. 7.11 s 161 …. 7.14, 8.200 s 162 …. 8.200 s 164 …. 4.9, 4.42, 4.45, 4.99, 4.102, 4.106 s 164(1) …. 4.4, 4.12

s 164(2) …. 4.4, 4.12, 4.14 s 164(3) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.12, 4.20, 4.22, 4.41 s 164(4) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.20 s 164(6) …. 4.7, 4.20 s 165 …. 4.10, 4.11, 4.23, 4.27, 4.28, 4.34, 4.36, 4.42, 4.45, 4.52, 4.75, 4.78, 4.79, 4.100, 4.102, 4.106, 7.93, 7.102, 7.112, 7.123, 8.193, 8.198 s 165(1) …. 4.24, 4.34, 4.36 s 165(1)–(4) …. 4.9 s 165(1)(a) …. 8.120 s 165(1)(b) …. 4.54, 4.56 s 165(1)(c) …. 4.39, 4.77 s 165(1)(d) …. 4.24, 4.27, 4.30, 4.52 s 165(1)(e) …. 4.76 s 165(1)(f) …. 4.22, 4.33, 4.34, 8.168 s 165(1)(g) …. 4.75 s 165(2) …. 4.5, 4.9, 4.10, 4.12, 4.33, 4.36, 4.52, 4.75, 4.100, 4.101, 4.105, 8.120 s 165(3) …. 4.9, 4.100, 7.123, 7.125 s 165(4) …. 4.9, 4.59 s 165(5) …. 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.22, 4.30, 4.34, 4.36, 4.39, 4.41, 4.54, 4.100 s 165A …. 4.36, 4.37, 4.39, 7.31 s 165A(1) …. 4.10, 4.39 s 165A(1)(a) …. 4.20 s 165A(2) …. 4.39 s 165B …. 4.36, 4.51 s 166 …. 7.8, 8.199 s 166(g) …. 5.194 s 167 …. 5.18, 5.194, 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 7.25, 7.64

ss 170–173 …. 7.26 s 171 …. 7.19 s 176 …. 7.61 s 177 …. 7.64 ss 178–179 …. 5.194 s 182 …. 7.14 s 183 …. 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 8.199, 8.200 s 184 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 185 …. 2.2 s 186 …. 2.2 s 187 …. 2.2, 5.154 s 189 …. 2.12, 2.40, 7.120 s 189(1) …. 8.163 s 189(2) …. 2.42, 8.163 s 189(3) …. 8.129, 8.130, 8.163 s 189(4) …. 2.42, 5.168, 7.30 s 189(5) …. 2.42 s 189(6) …. 2.45, 3.83, 3.87, 8.164 s 189(7) …. 2.45, 8.162 s 189(8) …. 2.45, 8.163, 8.165 s 190 …. 2.46, 2.48, 5.26 s 190(1) …. 2.48 s 190(2) …. 2.48 s 190(3) …. 2.48, 6.68 s 191 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 192 …. 2.26, 2.40, 2.42, 3.104, 3.132, 7.23, 7.93, 7.112, 7.122 s 192(2) …. 3.109, 7.79 s 192A …. 2.40, 3.104, 3.132, 5.12

s 192A(c) …. 3.132, 5.19, 5.26 s 193 …. 7.14, 7.19, 7.26, 7.64 Sch …. 7.28 Dictionary …. 2.19, 4.54, 4.69, 7.5, 7.19, 7.73, 7.116, 7.140, 8.12, 8.21, 8.27, 8.100, 8.129, 8.192 Dictionary Pt 1 …. 8.94 Dictionary Pt 2 …. 7.19 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 1 …. 8.199 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 4 …. 8.66, 8.196 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 7 …. 7.122 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 8 …. 5.40 Dictionary cl 4(2) …. 8.196 Dictionary cl 6 …. 8.196 Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 Ch 3 …. 7.3 Evidence Regulations 1995 cl 6 …. 3.68 Excise Act 1901 s 144 …. 6.22 Family Court Rules O 30 r 2AAA …. 7.3 Family Law Act 1975 …. 2.2 Pt 2 Div 2 …. 5.104, 5.105 Pt 2 Div 3 …. 5.105 s 60CA …. 2.2 s 69ZT …. 2.2 s 69ZV …. 2.2 s 100(1) …. 5.200

s 102 …. 8.93 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 s 27 …. 7.3 s 30AA(1)(c) …. 2.14 s 30AA(1)(d) …. 2.14 s 30AJ …. 2.14 s 30CA …. 2.15 s 30CB …. 2.14 s 44 …. 7.28 ss 47–47C …. 7.3 s 50 …. 5.85 s 53A …. 1.3 s 53B …. 5.105 Federal Court Rules 1979 O 11 r 5 …. 6.3 O 11 r 16 …. 6.36 O 15 r 7 …. 5.84 O 15A r 3 …. 5.10 O 15A r 6 …. 5.10 O 18 …. 8.95 O 20 r 2 …. 6.36 O 22 …. 6.37 O 32 r 4(1) …. 6.48 O 34 …. 6.48 Federal Court Rules 2011 …. 1.54 Pt 7 …. 5.10 Pt 14 …. 5.8 Pt 20 …. 5.6

Pt 21 …. 5.6 Pt 23 …. 5.8 Pt 24 …. 5.5 Pt 28 …. 1.3 r 7.22 …. 5.10 r 14.01 …. 5.10 r 14.03 …. 5.78 r 20.12 …. 5.7 r 20.14 …. 5.7 r 23.01 …. 7.64 r 23.15(g) …. 7.64 Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 r 15.04 …. 6.48 Federal Rules of Evidence …. 7.52 r 401 …. 7.52 r 402 …. 7.52 r 702 …. 7.52, 7.54 Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 s 31(1) …. 6.8 Freedom of Information Act 1982 …. 5.27, 5.40, 5.218, 5.232 s 37(1)(a) …. 5.16 High Court Rules 2004 Pt 27 r 9 …. 6.36 Pt 27 r 10 …. 6.37 r 24.02 …. 5.5 Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 s 263 …. 5.81, 5.218 Inspector-General of Taxation Act 2003

s 16(1) …. 5.71 James Hardie (Investigations and Proceedings) Act 2004 …. 5.71 Judiciary Act 1903 s 68 …. 2.7 s 77F …. 7.28 s 79 …. 2.2, 5.19 Marriage Act 1961 s 94(7) …. 4.14 s 111A …. 4.14 National Crime Authority Act 1984 …. 5.75 National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 …. 2.43, 5.216, 5.217, 5.223, 5.247, 5.252, 5.254 Native Title Act 1993 …. 7.40, 7.73 s 82 …. 7.40, 7.73 s 82(1) …. 8.84 Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 s 16(3) …. 5.199 Patents Act 1990 s 200(2) …. 5.26 s 217 …. 7.64 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 s 202 …. 5.71 Royal Commissions Act 1902 s 6A(2) …. 5.180 s 6A(3) …. 5.180 Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 …. 8.155 s 45 …. 5.76 Trade Practices Act 1974 …. 5.148

s 76 …. 5.162 s 77 …. 5.162 s 155 …. 5.74 s 155(7B) …. 5.74

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY Bail Act 1992 s 13 …. 8.147 s 14 …. 8.147 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1997 s 65 …. 8.93 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 s 139M …. 5.194 Court Procedure Rules 2006 Pt 2.6 Div 9 …. 8.95 Pt 2.6 r 409 …. 6.3 Pt 2.8 …. 5.6 Pt 2.9 …. 5.8 Pt 2.11 Div 6 …. 6.37 Pt 2.12 …. 5.8 Pt 2.12 Div 3 …. 5.8 Pt 2.15 Div 4 …. 7.64 Pt 6.9 …. 5.5 r 425 …. 6.36 r 601 …. 5.19 rr 605–607 …. 5.7 r 650 …. 5.10 r 660 …. 5.10

r 1227 …. 5.76 r 1243 …. 5.76 Crimes Act 1900 Pt 10 …. 5.17 Subdiv 10.7.2 …. 8.150 s 54 …. 3.142 s 56 …. 3.34 s 186 …. 4.33, 8.149, 8.168 s 212 …. 8.147 ss 233–237 …. 4.58, 4.65, 4.68 s 233(4) …. 4.69 s 233(6)(l) …. 4.65 s 235 …. 4.70 s 264 …. 3.71, 3.78 s 264 …. 2.40 s 288 …. 2.8, 5.14 s 294 …. 2.11 ss 421–430 …. 2.14 s 434B …. 3.71 Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000 …. 5.17 Crimes (Protection of Witness Identity) Act 2011 Pt 2 …. 5.205 Criminal Code 2002 s 25 …. 6.23 s 26 …. 6.23 s 58 …. 6.17 ss 702–704 …. 4.14 Civil Procedure Rules 2006

r 1508 …. 2.11 Evidence Act 1971 s 28(2) …. 7.119 s 65 …. 8.170 s 72 …. 8.61 Evidence Act 2011 …. 2.2, 2.25, 2.28, 2.50, 3.3, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.12, 3.17, 3.31, 3.33, 3.40, 3.43, 3.49, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.63, 3.64, 3.68, 3.69, 3.70, 3.82, 3.83, 3.85, 3.87, 3.88, 3.90, 3.91, 3.93, 3.96, 3.99, 3.101, 3.104, 3.106, 3.107, 3.108, 3.109, 3.112, 3.118, 3.119, 3.120, 3.122, 3.127, 3.129, 3.131, 3.133, 3.135, 3.136, 3.137, 3.139, 3.141, 3.145, 3.152, 3.153, 3.154, 3.156, 3.159, 3.160, 3.162, 3.165, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, 4.22, 4.27, 4.30, 4.35, 4.36, 4.39, 4.48, 4.54, 4.55, 4.56, 4.57, 4.59, 4.63, 4.64, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 4.78, 4.79, 4.98, 4.101, 4.102, 4.105, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, 5.24, 5.26, 5.27, 5.31, 5.35, 5.36, 5.39, 5.40, 5.43, 5.47, 5.49, 5.66, 5.67, 5.69, 5.77, 5.83, 5.84, 5.86, 5.92, 5.97, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102, 5.108, 5.118, 5.120, 5.134, 5.135, 5.139, 5.144, 5.154, 5.161, 5.169, 5.175, 5.176, 5.177, 5.184, 5.190, 5.194, 5.201, 5.202, 5.203, 5.204, 5.207, 5.208, 5.214, 5.218, 5.241, 5.247, 5.253, 5.254, 5.266, 6.1, 6.23, 6.57, 6.66, 6.68, 6.77, 7.4, 7.8, 7.14, 7.20, 7.23, 7.26, 7.28, 7.30, 7.34, 7.35, 7.36, 7.54, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.66, 7.71, 7.73, 7.76, 7.78, 7.79, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.91, 7.93, 7.94, 7.95, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 7.113, 7.115, 7.116, 7.118, 7.124, 7.128, 7.134, 7.137, 7.141, 7.142, 7.143, 7.147, 7.148, 7.153, 7.158, 8.6, 8.8, 8.11, 8.12, 8.13, 8.22, 8.27, 8.28, 8.35, 8.48, 8.55, 8.57, 8.59, 8.62, 8.63, 8.65, 8.66, 8.69, 8.79, 8.81, 8.85, 8.87, 8.89, 8.90, 8.100, 8.106, 8.108, 8.112, 8.113, 8.114, 8.119, 8.125, 8.126, 8.127, 8.144, 8.146, 8.156, 8.161, 8.162, 8.163, 8.169, 8.171, 8.172, 8.173, 8.191, 8.196 Ch 3 …. 2.45 Ch 4 …. 2.48 Ch 5 …. 2.48 Pt 1.2 …. 2.2 Pt 2.1 Div 1 …. 2.48 Pt 2.1 Div 2 …. 2.48 Pt 3.1 …. 2.48

Pt 3.2 …. 8.93, 8.198 Pt 3.2 Div 2 …. 8.62, 8.195 Pt 3.2 Div 3 …. 8.199 Pt 3.4 …. 8.94, 8.100, 8.101, 8.198 Pt 3.6 …. 3.12, 3.106, 3.135, 3.153 Pt 3.7 …. 3.109, 7.122 Pt 3.8 …. 3.5, 3.90, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109 Pt 3.9 …. 2.4, 4.2, 4.54, 4.55, 4.63 Pt 3.10 …. 2.48, 5.19 Pt 3.10 Div 1 …. 5.19 Pt 3.10 Div 1A …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.214 Pt 3.10 Div 1C …. 5.19, 5.207 Pt 3.10 Div 3 …. 5.19 Pt 3.11 …. 2.29, 2.31, 2.48, 8.196 Pt 4.6 Div 1 …. 7.14, 7.26 Pt 4.6 Div 2 …. 7.13 Pt 4.6 Div 3 …. 6.70 Div 2 …. 5.19, 8.198 Div 3 …. 8.195, 8.200 s 4 …. 2.2 s 4(1) …. 2.2, 5.24 s 4(1)(d) …. 2.4 s 4(2)–(4) …. 2.4 s 8 …. 2.3 s 9 …. 2.3 s 9(2)(b) …. 6.23 s 10 …. 5.199 s 11 …. 7.124, 7.137

s 11(1) …. 6.48 s 11(2) …. 1.53, 2.29 s 12 …. 2.3, 3.83, 5.112, 5.115, 5.176, 5.200, 5.201 s 13 …. 4.14, 7.28, 7.30 s 13(1) …. 7.30 s 13(2) …. 7.30 s 13(3) …. 7.28, 7.30 s 13(5) …. 7.30 s 13(6) …. 7.30 s 13(8) …. 7.30, 7.31 s 14 …. 7.30 s 15(2) …. 5.199 s 16 …. 5.184 s 16(1) …. 5.185 s 17 …. 3.83, 8.126 s 17(2) …. 5.112 s 17(3) …. 5.112, 5.115 s 18 …. 2.26, 5.165, 5.201 s 19 …. 5.201 s 20 …. 2.12, 2.50, 5.115, 5.118, 5.120, 5.128, 5.129, 5.202, 8.126 s 20(2) …. 2.12, 5.120, 5.123 s 20(3) …. 5.132, 5.201 s 20(4) …. 2.12, 5.201 s 20(5) …. 5.120, 5.201 s 21 …. 5.115, 5.201, 5.202, 7.28 ss 21–24A …. 7.28 s 21(3a) …. 5.201 s 23 …. 7.28

s 24(2) …. 7.28 s 24A …. 7.28 s 26 …. 6.48, 7.115, 7.124, 7.137 ss 26–29 …. 7.115 s 26(a) …. 7.3 s 27 …. 3.84, 7.115, 7.124 s 28 …. 7.115 s 29 …. 6.58 s 29(2) …. 7.115 s 30 …. 7.30, 7.35 s 31 …. 7.30, 7.35, 8.12 s 31A(1)(b) …. 5.216 s 32 …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.79, 7.82, 7.83, 7.86 s 32(1) …. 7.79 s 32(2) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b)(i) …. 7.79 s 32(3) …. 7.80 s 32(4) …. 7.81 s 33 …. 5.26, 5.49, 7.76, 7.80 s 33(2)(a) …. 7.80 s 34 …. 7.76, 7.77, 7.84, 7.86, 7.112 s 35 …. 7.81, 7.82, 7.83, 7.154 s 37 …. 5.26, 7.115, 7.117, 7.126 s 37(1)(b) …. 7.117 s 38 …. 6.49, 6.57, 7.97, 7.118, 7.122, 7.123, 8.194 s 38(3) …. 7.122 s 38(4) …. 7.122

s 38(6) …. 7.122 s 38(7) …. 7.118, 7.122 s 39 …. 7.82, 7.156 s 40 …. 7.124 s 41 …. 2.46, 3.83, 3.145, 3.152, 7.33, 7.115, 7.137 s 42 …. 7.115, 7.126 s 43 …. 7.83, 7.97, 7.148, 7.149 s 44 …. 7.153 s 45 …. 7.82, 7.152 s 45(4) …. 7.82 s 46 …. 7.75, 7.129, 7.130 s 47(2) …. 7.19 s 48 …. 7.8, 7.56, 8.199 s 48(1) …. 7.19, 7.56 s 48(1)(c) …. 7.24, 7.56 s 48(1)(d) …. 7.19 s 48(2) …. 7.19 s 48(3) …. 7.19 s 48(4) …. 7.19 s 49 …. 7.19, 8.133 s 51 …. 7.19, 7.82 s 52 …. 7.20, 7.21 s 53 …. 7.23 s 53(1) …. 7.23 s 53(2) …. 7.23 s 53(2)(a) …. 2.43 s 53(3) …. 7.23 s 53(3)(d) …. 7.23

s 53(4) …. 7.23 s 53(5) …. 7.23 s 54 …. 7.23 s 55 …. 2.18, 2.19, 2.23, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.60, 3.141, 4.3, 4.100, 7.40, 7.41, 7.44, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.66, 7.116, 7.146, 8.95 s 55(1) …. 2.23, 2.24, 5.144, 7.54, 7.103 s 55(2) …. 2.19, 7.137 s 56 …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.28, 2.32, 7.44, 7.52, 7.66 s 56(1) …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.23, 2.27, 2.29, 2.46, 7.7, 7.8, 7.10, 8.27, 8.192 s 56(2) …. 7.54 s 57 …. 2.19, 7.8, 7.52, 8.194 s 57(1) …. 2.23, 7.8 s 57(1)(b) …. 2.19, 7.68 s 58 …. 7.8, 7.14, 8.199 s 58(1) …. 2.23 s 59 …. 2.46, 7.98, 8.8, 8.27, 8.57, 8.96, 8.99, 8.169, 8.192, 8.194, 8.199 s 59(1) …. 7.3, 8.8, 8.11, 8.19, 8.21, 8.22, 8.23, 8.24, 8.25, 8.26, 8.27, 8.28, 8.33, 8.44, 8.50, 8.53, 8.192, 8.193 s 59(2A) …. 8.27 s 60 …. 2.31, 2.39, 2.46, 4.1, 7.69, 7.70, 7.71, 7.72, 7.73, 7.81, 7.83, 7.91, 7.93, 7.97, 7.102, 7.123, 7.134, 7.151, 8.28, 8.29, 8.50, 8.71, 8.105, 8.194 s 60(1) …. 8.194 s 60(2) …. 7.69 s 60(3) …. 7.81, 8.105, 8.165 s 61 …. 8.195 s 62 …. 8.62, 8.66, 8.75, 8.79, 8.81, 8.83, 8.195, 8.196 s 62(1) …. 8.196 s 62(2) …. 8.196

s 63 …. 7.69, 7.98, 8.89, 8.196 s 63(2) …. 8.74, 8.85, 8.90 s 64 …. 7.69, 7.83, 7.93, 7.98, 8.169, 8.196 s 64(2) …. 7.76, 7.113, 8.85 s 64(4) …. 7.76, 8.196 s 65 …. 7.34, 8.66, 8.74, 8.83, 8.181, 8.193, 8.197 s 65(1)(b) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(c) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(d) …. 8.66 s 65(2) …. 8.82, 8.197 s 65(2)(a) …. 8.82, 8.83 s 65(2)(b) …. 8.29, 8.35, 8.39, 8.50, 8.66, 8.69, 8.75, 8.89, 8.197 s 65(2)(c) …. 7.98, 8.35, 8.50, 8.61, 8.89, 8.197 s 65(2)(d) …. 8.29, 8.75, 8.79, 8.80, 8.197 s 65(3) …. 8.53, 8.197 s 65(3)–(6) …. 8.197 s 65(7) …. 8.79 s 65(8) …. 8.63, 8.74, 8.197 s 65(9) …. 8.63, 8.197 s 66 …. 4.74, 7.34, 7.41, 7.79, 7.83, 7.93, 7.97, 7.98, 7.99, 7.102, 8.106, 8.169, 8.198 s 66(2) …. 7.76, 7.102, 7.113 s 66(2A) …. 7.79, 7.83, 8.198 s 66(3) …. 8.198 s 66(4) …. 7.76 s 66A …. 8.29, 8.31, 8.35, 8.42, 8.44, 8.46, 8.49, 8.50, 8.195, 8.198 s 67 …. 5.18, 8.74, 8.75, 8.82, 8.89, 8.90, 8.196, 8.197 s 68 …. 8.196

s 69 …. 7.13, 8.93, 8.182, 8.199 s 69(3) …. 8.199 s 69(4) …. 8.26, 8.199 s 70 …. 8.57, 8.190, 8.200 ss 70–75 …. 8.200 s 70(1) …. 8.30 s 71 …. 8.200 s 72 …. 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 73 …. 8.85, 8.200 s 74 …. 8.200 s 74(1) …. 8.84 s 74(2) …. 8.84 s 76 …. 2.23, 2.30, 7.38, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 8.49, 8.200 s 77 …. 2.31 ss 77–79 …. 7.38 s 78 …. 4.57, 7.41, 7.42, 7.56, 7.105 s 78(a) …. 7.41 s 78(b) …. 7.41 s 78A …. 7.73, 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 79 …. 2.23, 7.40, 7.41, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.58, 7.59, 7.64, 7.66, 8.71 s 79(1) …. 7.14, 7.41, 7.42, 7.44, 7.52, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.65, 7.66, 7.73, 7.108 s 79(2) …. 4.39, 7.45, 7.51, 7.54, 7.58, 7.62, 7.136 s 79(3) …. 7.136 s 80 …. 6.70, 7.44, 7.57, 7.59, 7.61 s 80(a) …. 7.62 s 80(b) …. 7.53, 7.55, 7.58, 7.65, 7.136 s 81 …. 5.144, 8.94, 8.108, 8.165, 8.194

s 81(2) …. 8.108 s 82 …. 8.99, 8.105 s 83 …. 8.78 s 83(1) …. 8.78 s 83(2) …. 8.78 s 83(3) …. 8.78 s 84 …. 5.135, 8.78, 8.96, 8.97, 8.99, 8.100, 8.126, 8.127, 8.131, 8.137, 8.160 s 84(1) …. 8.126 s 85 …. 5.135, 8.97, 8.99, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.130, 8.131, 8.134, 8.136, 8.137, 8.160, 8.162, 8.163 s 85(1) …. 8.126, 8.129 s 85(1)(b) …. 8.130 s 85(2) …. 8.126, 8.129, 8.130 s 85(3) …. 8.126, 8.128, 8.130 s 85(3)(a) …. 8.129 s 85(3)(b) …. 8.129, 8.130 s 86 …. 8.97, 8.167 s 87(1) …. 8.112, 8.119 s 87(1)(a) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(b) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(c) …. 8.115, 8.117, 8.118 s 87(2) …. 8.114, 8.117 s 87(2)(c) …. 8.117 s 88 …. 7.7, 8.101 s 89 …. 5.139, 5.141, 5.142, 8.98, 8.126 s 89(1) …. 5.144 s 89(2) …. 5.144

s 89(4) …. 5.144 s 90 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.32, 2.33, 2.34, 2.35, 8.97, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.131, 8.134, 8.135, 8.136, 8.137, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.154, 8.160, 8.162 s 91 …. 5.194 s 92(2) …. 5.194 s 92(3) …. 5.194 s 93 …. 5.194 s 93(c) …. 5.190 s 94(1) …. 3.58, 3.152 s 94(3) …. 3.153 s 95 …. 3.11, 3.54, 3.75, 3.82, 3.106, 3.107, 3.135, 4.1 s 97 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 2.87, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.17, 3.26, 3.32, 3.36, 3.37, 3.40, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 ss 97–98 …. 5.18 ss 97–100 …. 3.160 s 97(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 97(1)(b) …. 3.61 s 98 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.23, 3.25, 3.39, 3.40, 3.49, 3.54, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 s 98(1) …. 3.58 s 98(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 98(1)(b) …. 3.60 s 99 …. 3.9, 3.68 s 100 …. 3.9, 3.68, 3.125 s 101 …. 2.15, 2.31, 2.37, 2.87, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.36, 3.37, 3.39, 3.54, 3.55,

3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.127, 3.139, 3.156, 3.159 s 101(2) …. 3.59, 3.60, 3.62, 3.82, 3.127 s 101A …. 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 3.109, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112, 7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.139, 7.140 s 102 …. 2.46, 3.58, 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112, 7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.137, 7.139 s 102(2) …. 3.109 s 103 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.135, 3.145, 3.152, 3.162, 7.97, 7.116, 7.133, 7.137, 7.139 s 103(1) …. 3.83, 3.84, 7.133, 7.137, 7.142 s 104 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.109, 5.115 s 104(2) …. 3.90, 3.114 s 104(3) …. 3.90, 3.104 s 104(3)(b) …. 7.112, 7.144 s 104(4) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.110, 3.112 s 104(5) …. 3.110, 3.112 s 104(6) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.113, 3.117, 3.120, 3.122, 3.123 s 106 …. 7.83, 7.116, 7.133, 7.142, 7.149 s 106(1) …. 7.141, 7.143 s 106(2) …. 7.141, 7.142, 7.143 s 106(2)(a) …. 7.143 s 106(2)(b) …. 7.138, 7.142 s 106(2)(c) …. 7.148 s 106(2)(d) …. 7.112, 7.144 s 106(2)(e) …. 7.142 s 107 …. 7.97, 7.98 s 108 …. 7.90, 7.93, 7.116, 7.133, 7.156 s 108(1) …. 7.97, 7.158

s 108(3) …. 4.74, 7.97, 7.102, 7.158 s 108(3)(a) …. 7.93, 7.152 s 108(3)(b) …. 7.91, 7.92, 7.106 s 108A …. 7.97, 7.98, 7.133, 8.196, 8.199 s 108B …. 7.133 s 108C …. 4.39, 7.51, 7.58, 7.108, 7.133, 7.136, 7.144, 7.146 s 108C(1) …. 7.110, 7.112 s 110 …. 3.82, 3.83, 3.90, 3.106, 3.108, 3.109, 3.127, 3.129, 3.130, 3.134, 3.135, 3.137 s 110(1) …. 3.107 s 110(2) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 110(3) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 111 …. 3.82, 3.108, 7.136 s 112 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.100, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109, 3.130, 3.132, 3.135 s 113 …. 4.69 s 114 …. 2.46, 2.48, 4.58, 4.64, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 5.26, 7.94 s 114(1) …. 4.69 s 114(2) …. 4.69 s 114(2)(c) …. 4.70 s 114(5) …. 4.70 s 115 …. 4.58, 4.64, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74 s 115(3) …. 4.70 s 115(4) …. 4.70 s 115(7) …. 4.70 s 115(8) …. 4.70 s 116 …. 4.10, 4.54, 4.59, 4.61, 4.63, 4.69 s 116(1) …. 4.61 s 116(2) …. 4.59

s 117 …. 5.22, 5.26, 5.28, 5.37, 5.49, 5.58 s 117(1) …. 5.26 s 118 …. 5.24, 5.25, 5.27, 5.28, 5.31, 5.39 ss 118–119 …. 2.46, 2.48 ss 118–120 …. 5.35, 5.47, 5.48, 5.49 s 118(a) …. 5.28, 5.39 s 118(b) …. 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 118(c) …. 5.19, 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 119 …. 5.24, 5.42, 5.43 ss 119–120 …. 5.46 s 120 …. 5.24, 5.42 s 121 …. 5.69 s 122 …. 5.19, 5.54, 5.56, 5.58, 5.59 s 122(1) …. 5.58, 5.59 s 122(2) …. 5.58, 5.59, 5.100 s 122(3) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(a) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(b) …. 5.58 s 122(4) …. 5.58, 5.59 s 122(5) …. 5.58 s 122(5)(a)(i) …. 5.52 s 122(5)(b) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(5)(c) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(6) …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.81 s 123 …. 5.19, 5.70, 5.216 s 124 …. 5.49, 5.57, 5.58 s 125 …. 5.31 s 125(1)(a) …. 5.31

s 125(1)(b) …. 5.31 s 125(2) …. 5.31 s 126 …. 5.59 s 126K …. 5.19 s 127 …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.210 s 127(1) …. 5.208 s 127(3) …. 5.208, 5.210 s 127A …. 5.19 s 127B …. 5.19 s 128 …. 3.87, 5.19, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177, 5.216, 8.164 s 128(1) …. 5.155, 5.176 s 128(1)(a) …. 5.164 s 128(2) …. 5.169 s 128(4)(a) …. 5.164 s 128(10) …. 3.83, 3.87, 5.180 s 128(12)–(14) …. 5.179 s 128A …. 5.19, 5.146, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177 s 129 …. 5.184, 5.185 s 129(4) …. 5.185 s 130 …. 5.205, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218, 5.222, 5.223, 5.231, 8.79 s 130(1) …. 5.216, 5.222, 5.243 s 130(2) …. 5.216 s 130(3) …. 5.241 s 130(4) …. 5.222 s 130(4)(a) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(b) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(c)–(e) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(e) …. 5.205

s 130(5) …. 5.253 s 130(5)(d) …. 5.254 s 131 …. 5.87, 5.88, 5.90, 5.94, 5.95, 5.96, 5.98, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102, 5.105, 5.214 s 131(1) …. 5.88, 5.94, 5.95, 5.97 s 131(2) …. 5.88 s 131(2)(a)–(c) …. 5.100 s 131(2)(d) …. 5.90, 5.100 s 131(2)(f) …. 5.97 s 131(2)(g) …. 5.100, 5.103 s 131(2)(h) …. 5.98 s 131(2)(i) 5.92, 5.96 s 131(2)(j) …. 5.96 s 131(2)(k) …. 5.96 s 131(3) …. 5.96 s 131(4) …. 5.96 s 131(5) …. 5.88, 5.90 s 131(5)(b) …. 5.99 s 131A …. 5.19, 5.24, 5.67, 5.70, 5.90, 5.102, 5.176, 5.208, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218 s 131A(1) …. 5.49 s 132 …. 5.166, 5.167 s 133 …. 5.78, 5.169, 5.247 s 135 …. 2.27, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.127, 3.159, 7.41, 7.55, 7.59, 7.64, 7.73, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 8.144, 8.194 ss 135–137 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.32, 2.35, 3.11, 3.90, 3.133, 4.3, 7.124, 7.134, 8.29, 8.127, 8.193 ss 135–138 …. 2.27, 4.55 s 135(a) …. 7.55

s 136 …. 2.31, 2.39, 3.69, 3.79, 3.137, 7.41, 7.69, 7.73, 7.93, 7.102, 8.194 s 137 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.26, 2.27, 2.30, 2.31, 2.35, 2.46, 2.48, 2.70, 3.12, 3.54, 3.59, 3.60, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.104, 3.125, 3.127, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 7.41, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.67, 7.93, 7.102, 7.108, 7.110, 7.111, 7.112, 7.135, 8.96, 8.127, 8.134, 8.144, 8.159, 8.194 s 138 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.33, 2.35, 2.36, 2.37, 2.46, 2.48, 4.58, 4.68, 4.70, 4.74, 5.62, 5.134, 5.255, 5.258, 5.261, 5.264, 5.265, 5.267, 8.126, 8.127, 8.135, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.155, 8.158, 8.159, 8.160, 8.162 s 138(2) …. 8.127, 8.144, 8.155 s 138(3) …. 2.37 s 138(3)(f) …. 2.37 s 139 …. 5.134, 8.126, 8.149 s 139(2) …. 8.149 s 139(5) …. 8.149 s 140 …. 2.64 ss 140–141 …. 2.58 s 142 …. 2.12, 2.45, 2.91, 3.69, 5.31, 5.35, 7.8, 7.65 s 142(1) …. 8.160 s 143 …. 6.69 s 144 …. 6.60, 6.65, 6.71, 6.73, 6.77, 7.54, 7.59, 7.71 s 144(2) …. 6.66 s 144(4) …. 6.66 s 145 …. 6.60 s 146 …. 6.23, 7.13, 7.19, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 ss 146–147 …. 7.13, 7.26 s 147 …. 7.13, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 s 148 …. 7.11 s 149 …. 7.9 s 150 …. 7.11

s 151 …. 7.11 s 152 …. 7.11 s 153 …. 7.11 ss 153–159 …. 8.93 s 154 …. 7.11 s 155 …. 7.11 s 156 …. 7.11, 8.91 s 157 …. 7.11 s 158 …. 7.11 s 159 …. 7.11 s 161 …. 7.14, 8.200 s 162 …. 8.200 s 164 …. 4.9, 4.42, 4.45, 4.99, 4.102, 4.106 s 164(1) …. 4.4, 4.12 s 164(2) …. 4.4, 4.12, 4.14 s 164(3) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.12, 4.20, 4.22, 4.41 s 164(4) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.20 s 164(6) …. 4.7, 4.20 s 165 …. 4.10, 4.11, 4.23, 4.27, 4.28, 4.34, 4.36, 4.42, 4.45, 4.52, 4.75, 4.78, 4.79, 4.100, 4.102, 4.106, 7.93, 7.102, 7.112, 7.123, 8.193, 8.198 s 165(1) …. 4.24, 4.34, 4.36 s 165(1)–(4) …. 4.9 s 165(1)(a) …. 8.120 s 165(1)(b) …. 4.54, 4.56 s 165(1)(c) …. 4.39, 4.77 s 165(1)(d) …. 4.24, 4.27, 4.30, 4.52 s 165(1)(e) …. 4.76 s 165(1)(f) …. 4.22, 4.33, 4.34, 8.168

s 165(1)(g) …. 4.75 s 165(2) …. 4.5, 4.9, 4.10, 4.12, 4.33, 4.36, 4.52, 4.75, 4.100, 4.101, 4.105, 8.120 s 165(3) …. 4.9, 4.100, 7.123, 7.125 s 165(4) …. 4.9, 4.59 s 165(5) …. 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.22, 4.30, 4.34, 4.36, 4.39, 4.41, 4.54, 4.100 s 165A …. 4.36, 4.37, 4.39, 7.31 s 165A(1) …. 4.10, 4.39 s 165A(1)(a) …. 4.20 s 165A(2) …. 4.39 s 165B …. 4.36, 4.51 s 166 …. 7.8, 8.199 s 166(g) …. 5.194 s 167 …. 5.18, 5.194, 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 7.25, 7.64 ss 170–173 …. 7.26 s 171 …. 7.19 s 176 …. 7.61 s 177 …. 7.64 ss 178–179 …. 5.194 s 182 …. 7.14 s 183 …. 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 8.199, 8.200 s 184 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 187 …. 5.154 s 189 …. 2.12, 2.40, 7.120 s 189(1) …. 8.163 s 189(2) …. 2.42, 8.163 s 189(3) …. 8.129, 8.130, 8.163 s 189(4) …. 2.42, 5.168, 7.30

s 189(5) …. 2.42 s 189(6) …. 2.45, 3.83, 3.87, 8.164 s 189(7) …. 2.45, 8.162 s 189(8) …. 2.45, 8.163, 8.165 s 190 …. 2.46, 2.48, 5.26 s 190(1) …. 2.48 s 190(2) …. 2.48 s 190(3) …. 2.48, 6.68 s 191 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 192 …. 2.26, 2.40, 2.42, 3.104, 3.132, 7.23, 7.93, 7.112, 7.122 s 192(2) …. 3.109, 7.79 s 192A …. 2.40, 3.104, 3.132, 5.12 s 192A(c) …. 3.132 s 193 …. 7.14, 7.19, 7.26, 7.64 Sch …. 7.28 Dictionary …. 2.19, 4.54, 4.69, 5.19, 5.26, 7.5, 7.19, 7.73, 7.116, 7.140, 8.12, 8.21, 8.27, 8.100, 8.129, 8.192 Dictionary Pt 1 …. 8.94 Dictionary Pt 2 …. 7.19 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 1 …. 8.199 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 4 …. 8.66, 8.196 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 7 …. 7.122 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 8 …. 5.40 Dictionary cl 4(2) …. 8.196 Dictionary cl 6 …. 8.196 Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 …. 5.213 Ch 2 …. 7.33 Ch 4 …. 7.33

Pt 4.2.2A …. 7.34 Pt 7.2 …. 7.33 Div 4.2.5 …. 5.207 s 13 …. 7.33 s 38D …. 7.33 s 40K(3) …. 7.21 s 40V …. 8.61 ss 49–53 …. 3.146 ss 59–61 …. 5.212 s 60 …. 5.213 s 61 …. 5.213 s 62 …. 5.213 s 64 …. 5.213 s 69 …. 4.41 s 71 …. 4.45, 7.100, 7.107 ss 90–92 …. 5.85 Family Provision Act 1969 s 22 …. 8.45 Freedom of Information Act 1989 …. 5.232 s 37(1)(a) …. 5.16 Human Rights Act 2004 …. 1.48, 6.14, 8.124 s 22(2)(i) …. 5.145 s 28 …. 6.14 Juries Act 1967 s 42C …. 5.185 Legal Aid Act 1977 s 13(2) …. 5.26 Listening Devices Act 1992 …. 8.155

Magistrates Court Act 1930 …. 6.31 Pt 3.4 Div 3.4.4 …. 2.5 Div 3.10.2-2A …. 2.14 ss 89–96 …. 5.12 s 90 …. 5.13 s 90AA …. 5.13 ss 105A–108 …. 5.12 Oaths and Affirmations Act 1984 s 7 …. 7.28 s 14 …. 7.28 s 17 …. 7.28 Partnership Act 1963 s 19 …. 8.110 Road Transport (Alcohol and Drugs) Act 1977 s 41 …. 7.25 Supreme Court Act 1933 s 37E(4) …. 2.15 s 37O …. 2.14 s 37S …. 2.15 s 37S(6) …. 2.14 s 68B …. 2.7, 6.35 s 68C …. 6.35

NEW SOUTH WALES Bail Act 2013 s 43 …. 8.147 Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 s 29 …. 5.209

Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 s 5 …. 6.23 s 13 …. 8.150 Civil Liability Act 2002 Div 6 …. 7.52 s 50 …. 7.38 Civil Procedure Act 2005 …. 7.64 Pt 4 …. 1.3 s 56 …. 7.64 s 57(1) …. 2.49 s 71 …. 5.85 s 87 …. 5.19, 5.176 Community Justice Centres Act 1983 s 28(4) …. 5.105 s 28(5) …. 5.105 Companies (New South Wales) Code 1981 …. 5.72 Pt VII …. 5.72 Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 …. 5.85 Crimes Act 1900 s 23(4) …. 6.8 s 61HA …. 3.142 s 61I …. 3.142 s 61J …. 3.142 s 61JA …. 3.142 s 66EA …. 3.34 ss 327–339 …. 4.14 s 341 …. 5.135 s 407 …. 5.200

s 408(1) …. 8.170 s 413B …. 3.108 s 417 …. 6.16 s 417A …. 6.16 s 419 …. 6.8 Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 s 23 …. 2.14 s 56 …. 2.14 s 57 …. 2.14 s 77(1)(b) …. 2.14 s 78 …. 2.14 ss 99–106 …. 2.14, 5.190 s 107 …. 2.14 s 108 …. 2.14 Crime Commission Act 1985 ss 39, 39A …. 5.180 s 18B(4) …. 5.60 s 40 …. 5.207 Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000 …. 5.17 Criminal Appeal Act 1912 Pt 3 …. 2.14 s 5 …. 2.14 s 5A …. 2.15 s 5F …. 2.15 s 6 …. 2.14 Criminal Appeal Rules 1986 r 4 …. 2.49, 5.124 Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 …. 5.183

ss 13A, 31D(3) …. 5.180 Criminal Procedure Act 1986 …. 6.31 Ch 3 Pt 2 …. 2.5, 5.12, 6.31 Ch 3 Pt 3 Div 3 …. 5.13 Ch 4 Pt 2 Div 2 …. 5.14 Ch 6 Pt 5 Div 2 …. 5.207 Ch 6 Pt 5 Div 3 …. 7.34 Ch 6 Pt 5 Div 4 …. 7.34 Ch 6 Pt 6 Div 1 …. 7.33 Ch 6 Pt 6 Divs 1-3 …. 7.34 Ch 6 Pt 6 Div 4 …. 7.33 Ch 6 Pt 6 Div 5 …. 7.33 s 21(2) …. 3.71 s 29(1) …. 3.71 s 29(3) …. 3.71, 3.78 s 62 …. 6.31 s 66 …. 6.31 s 71 …. 2.43 ss 71–96 …. 5.13 s 72 …. 2.43 s 130 …. 2.40, 5.12 s 130A …. 2.40 ss 132–133 …. 2.7, 6.35 s 133 …. 2.7, 4.12 ss 134–142 …. 5.14 s 139 …. 5.13 s 140 …. 5.13 s 150 …. 2.8, 5.14

s 152 …. 5.14 s 159 …. 2.7 s 160 …. 2.11 s 164A …. 5.14 s 183 …. 5.14 s 196 …. 2.43 s 281 …. 4.33, 8.97, 8.168 s 284 …. 8.61 ss 284–289 …. 8.61 ss 291–291C …. 5.85 s 293 …. 3.146 s 293(4)(a) …. 3.147 s 293(4)(a)(i) …. 3.150 s 294(2) …. 4.45, 7.100, 7.107 s 294A …. 7.33 s 294AA …. 4.41 ss 294B–294D …. 7.33 s 294B(7) …. 7.33 s 296 …. 5.212 s 299A …. 5.212 s 299B …. 5.212 s 299D(1)(a) …. 5.213 s 299D(1)(b) …. 5.213 s 299D(1)(c) …. 5.213 s 299D(3) …. 5.212 s 299D(4) …. 5.212 s 306X …. 7.33 s 306Z …. 7.21

s 306ZI …. 7.33 s 306ZL …. 7.33 Sch 3 Pt 2 cl 3(2) …. 4.14 Criminal Records Act 1991 s 16 …. 7.142 Defamation Act 2005 s 42 …. 5.194 Evidence Act 1905 Pt IIIA …. 8.184 Evidence Act 1995 …. 2.2, 2.25, 2.28, 2.50, 3.3, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.12, 3.17, 3.31, 3.33, 3.40, 3.43, 3.49, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.63, 3.64, 3.68, 3.69, 3.70, 3.82, 3.83, 3.85, 3.87, 3.88, 3.90, 3.91, 3.93, 3.96, 3.99, 3.101, 3.104, 3.106, 3.107, 3.108, 3.109, 3.112, 3.118, 3.119, 3.120, 3.122, 3.127, 3.129, 3.131, 3.133, 3.135, 3.136, 3.137, 3.139, 3.141, 3.145, 3.152, 3.153, 3.154, 3.156, 3.159, 3.160, 3.162, 3.165, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, 4.22, 4.27, 4.30, 4.35, 4.36, 4.39, 4.48, 4.54, 4.55, 4.56, 4.57, 4.59, 4.63, 4.64, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 4.78, 4.79, 4.98, 4.101, 4.102, 4.105, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, 5.24, 5.26, 5.27, 5.31, 5.35, 5.36, 5.39, 5.40, 5.43, 5.47, 5.49, 5.66, 5.67, 5.69, 5.77, 5.83, 5.84, 5.86, 5.92, 5.97, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102, 5.108, 5.118, 5.120, 5.134, 5.135, 5.139, 5.144, 5.154, 5.161, 5.169, 5.175, 5.176, 5.177, 5.184, 5.190, 5.194, 5.201, 5.202, 5.203, 5.204, 5.207, 5.208, 5.214, 5.218, 5.241, 5.247, 5.253, 5.254, 5.266, 6.1, 6.23, 6.57, 6.66, 6.68, 6.77, 7.4, 7.8, 7.14, 7.20, 7.23, 7.26, 7.28, 7.30, 7.34, 7.35, 7.36, 7.54, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.66, 7.71, 7.73, 7.76, 7.78, 7.79, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.91, 7.93, 7.94, 7.95, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 7.113, 7.115, 7.116, 7.118, 7.124, 7.128, 7.134, 7.137, 7.141, 7.142, 7.143, 7.147, 7.148, 7.153, 7.158, 8.6, 8.8, 8.11, 8.12, 8.13, 8.22, 8.27, 8.28, 8.35, 8.48, 8.55, 8.57, 8.59, 8.62, 8.63, 8.65, 8.66, 8.69, 8.79, 8.81, 8.85, 8.87, 8.89, 8.90, 8.100, 8.106, 8.108, 8.112, 8.113, 8.114, 8.119, 8.125, 8.126, 8.127, 8.144, 8.146, 8.156, 8.161, 8.162, 8.163, 8.169, 8.171, 8.172, 8.173, 8.191, 8.196 Ch 3 …. 2.45 Ch 4 …. 2.48 Ch 5 …. 2.48

Pt 1.2 …. 2.2 Pt 2.1 Div 1 …. 2.48 Pt 2.1 Div 2 …. 2.48 Pt 3.1 …. 2.48 Pt 3.2 …. 8.93, 8.198 Pt 3.2 Div 2 …. 8.62, 8.195 Pt 3.2 Div 3 …. 8.199 Pt 3.4 …. 8.94, 8.100, 8.101, 8.198 Pt 3.6 …. 3.12, 3.106, 3.135, 3.153 Pt 3.7 …. 3.109, 7.122 Pt 3.8 …. 3.5, 3.90, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109 Pt 3.9 …. 2.48, 4.2, 4.54, 4.55, 4.63 Pt 3.10 …. 2.48, 5.19 Pt 3.10 Div 1 …. 5.19 Pt 3.10 Div 1A …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.214 Pt 3.10 Div 1B …. 5.207 Pt 3.10 Div 1C …. 5.19, 5.207 Pt 3.10 Div 3 …. 5.19 Pt 3.11 …. 2.29, 2.31, 2.48, 8.196 Pt 4.6 Div 1 …. 7.14, 7.26 Pt 4.6 Div 2 …. 7.13 Pt 4.6 Div 3 …. 6.70 Div 2 …. 5.19, 8.198 Div 3 …. 8.195, 8.200 s 4 …. 2.2 s 4(1) …. 2.2, 5.24 s 4(1)(d) …. 2.4 s 4(2)–(4) …. 2.4

s 8 …. 2.3 s 9 …. 2.3 s 9(2)(b) …. 6.23 s 10 …. 5.199 s 11 …. 7.124, 7.137 s 11(1) …. 6.48 s 11(2) …. 1.53, 2.29 s 12 …. 2.3, 3.83, 5.112, 5.115, 5.176, 5.200, 5.201 s 13 …. 4.14, 7.28, 7.30 s 13(1) …. 7.30 s 13(2) …. 7.30 s 13(3) …. 7.28, 7.30 s 13(5) …. 7.30 s 13(6) …. 7.30 s 13(8) …. 7.30, 7.31 s 14 …. 7.30 s 15(2) …. 5.199 s 16 …. 5.184 s 16(1) …. 5.185 s 17 …. 3.83, 8.126 s 17(2) …. 5.112 s 17(3) …. 5.112, 5.115 s 18 …. 2.26, 5.165, 5.201 s 19 …. 5.201 s 20 …. 2.12, 2.50, 5.115, 5.118, 5.120, 5.128, 5.129, 5.202, 8.126 s 20(2) …. 2.12, 5.120, 5.123 s 20(3) …. 5.132, 5.201 s 20(4) …. 2.12, 5.201

s 20(5) …. 5.120, 5.201 s 21 …. 5.115, 5.201, 5.202, 7.28 ss 21–24A …. 7.28 s 21(3a) …. 5.201 s 23 …. 7.28 s 24(2) …. 7.28 s 24A …. 7.28 s 26 …. 6.48, 7.115, 7.124, 7.137 ss 26–29 …. 7.115 s 26(a) …. 7.3 s 27 …. 3.84, 7.115, 7.124 s 28 …. 7.115 s 29 …. 6.58 s 29(2) …. 7.115 s 30 …. 7.30, 7.35 s 31 …. 7.30, 7.35, 8.12 s 31A(1)(b) …. 5.216 s 32 …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.79, 7.82, 7.83, 7.86 s 32(1) …. 7.79 s 32(2) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b)(i) …. 7.79 s 32(3) …. 7.80 s 32(4) …. 7.81 s 33 …. 5.26, 5.49, 7.76, 7.80 s 33(2)(a) …. 7.80 s 34 …. 7.76, 7.77, 7.84, 7.86, 7.112 s 35 …. 7.81, 7.82, 7.83, 7.154

s 37 …. 5.26, 7.115, 7.117, 7.126 s 37(1)(b) …. 7.117 s 38 …. 6.49, 6.57, 7.97, 7.118, 7.122, 7.123, 8.194 s 38(3) …. 7.122 s 38(4) …. 7.122 s 38(6) …. 7.122 s 38(7) …. 7.118, 7.122 s 39 …. 7.82, 7.156 s 40 …. 7.124 s 41 …. 2.46, 3.83, 3.145, 3.152, 7.33, 7.115, 7.137 s 42 …. 7.115, 7.126 s 43 …. 7.83, 7.97, 7.148, 7.149 s 44 …. 7.153 s 45 …. 7.82, 7.152 s 45(4) …. 7.82 s 46 …. 7.75, 7.129, 7.130 s 47(2) …. 7.19 s 48 …. 7.8, 7.56, 8.199 s 48(1) …. 7.19, 7.56 s 48(1)(c) …. 7.24, 7.56 s 48(1)(d) …. 7.19 s 48(2) …. 7.19 s 48(3) …. 7.19 s 48(4) …. 7.19 s 49 …. 7.19, 8.133 s 51 …. 7.19, 7.82 s 52 …. 7.20, 7.21 s 53 …. 7.23

s 53(1) …. 7.23 s 53(2) …. 7.23 s 53(2)(a) …. 2.43 s 53(3) …. 7.23 s 53(3)(d) …. 7.23 s 53(4) …. 7.23 s 53(5) …. 7.23 s 54 …. 7.23 s 55 …. 2.18, 2.19, 2.23, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.60, 3.141, 4.3, 4.100, 7.40, 7.41, 7.44, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.66, 7.116, 7.146, 8.95 s 55(1) …. 2.23, 2.24, 5.144, 7.54, 7.103 s 55(2) …. 2.19, 7.137 s 56 …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.28, 2.32, 7.44, 7.52, 7.66 s 56(1) …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.23, 2.27, 2.29, 2.46, 7.7, 7.8, 7.10, 8.27, 8.192 s 56(2) …. 7.54 s 57 …. 2.19, 7.8, 7.52, 8.194 s 57(1) …. 2.23, 7.8 s 57(1)(b) …. 2.19, 7.8 s 58 …. 7.8, 7.14, 8.199 s 58(1) …. 2.23 s 59 …. 2.46, 7.98, 8.8, 8.27, 8.57, 8.96, 8.99, 8.169, 8.192, 8.194, 8.199 s 59(1) …. 7.3, 8.8, 8.11, 8.19, 8.21, 8.22, 8.23, 8.24, 8.25, 8.26, 8.27, 8.28, 8.33, 8.44, 8.50, 8.53, 8.192, 8.193 s 59(2A) …. 8.27 s 60 …. 2.31, 2.39, 2.46, 4.1, 7.69, 7.70, 7.71, 7.72, 7.73, 7.81, 7.83, 7.91, 7.93, 7.97, 7.102, 7.123, 7.134, 7.151, 8.28, 8.29, 8.50, 8.71, 8.105, 8.194 s 60(1) …. 8.194 s 60(2) …. 7.69

s 60(3) …. 7.81, 8.105, 8.165 s 61 …. 8.195 s 62 …. 8.62, 8.66, 8.75, 8.79, 8.81, 8.83, 8.195, 8.196 s 62(1) …. 8.196 s 62(2) …. 8.196 s 63 …. 7.69, 7.98, 8.89, 8.196 s 63(2) …. 8.74, 8.85, 8.90 s 64 …. 7.69, 7.83, 7.93, 7.98, 8.169, 8.196 s 64(2) …. 7.76, 7.113, 8.85 s 64(4) …. 7.76, 8.196 s 65 …. 7.34, 8.66, 8.74, 8.83, 8.181, 8.193, 8.197 s 65(1)(b) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(c) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(d) …. 8.66 s 65(2) …. 8.82, 8.197 s 65(2)(a) …. 8.82, 8.83 s 65(2)(b) …. 8.29, 8.35, 8.39, 8.50, 8.66, 8.69, 8.75, 8.89, 8.197 s 65(2)(c) …. 7.98, 8.35, 8.50, 8.61, 8.89, 8.197 s 65(2)(d) …. 8.29, 8.75, 8.79, 8.80, 8.197 s 65(3) …. 8.53, 8.197 s 65(3)–(6) …. 8.197 s 65(7) …. 8.79 s 65(8) …. 8.63, 8.74, 8.197 s 65(9) …. 8.63, 8.197 s 66 …. 4.74, 7.34, 7.41, 7.79, 7.83, 7.93, 7.97, 7.98, 7.99, 7.102, 8.106, 8.169, 8.198 s 66(2) …. 7.76, 7.102, 7.113 s 66(2A) …. 7.79, 7.83, 8.198

s 66(3) …. 8.198 s 66(4) …. 7.76 s 66A …. 8.29, 8.31, 8.35, 8.42, 8.44, 8.46, 8.49, 8.50, 8.195, 8.198 s 67 …. 5.18, 8.74, 8.75, 8.82, 8.89, 8.90, 8.196, 8.197 s 68 …. 8.196 s 69 …. 7.13, 8.93, 8.182, 8.199 s 69(3) …. 8.199 s 69(4) …. 8.26, 8.199 s 70 …. 8.57, 8.190, 8.200 ss 70–75 …. 8.200 s 70(1) …. 8.30 s 71 …. 8.200 s 72 …. 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 73 …. 8.85, 8.200 s 74 …. 8.200 s 74(1) …. 8.84 s 74(2) …. 8.84 s 76 …. 2.23, 2.30, 7.38, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 8.49, 8.200 s 77 …. 2.31 ss 77–79 …. 7.38 s 78 …. 4.57, 7.41, 7.42, 7.56, 7.105 s 78(a) …. 7.41 s 78(b) …. 7.41 s 78A …. 7.73, 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 79 …. 2.23, 7.40, 7.41, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.58, 7.59, 7.64, 7.66, 8.71 s 79(1) …. 7.14, 7.41, 7.42, 7.44, 7.52, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.65, 7.66, 7.73, 7.108 s 79(2) …. 4.39, 7.45, 7.51, 7.54, 7.58, 7.62, 7.136

s 79(3) …. 7.136 s 80 …. 6.70, 7.44, 7.57, 7.59, 7.61 s 80(a) …. 7.62 s 80(b) …. 7.53, 7.55, 7.58, 7.65, 7.136 s 81 …. 5.144, 8.94, 8.108, 8.165, 8.194 s 81(2) …. 8.108 s 82 …. 8.99, 8.105 s 83 …. 8.78 s 83(1) …. 8.78 s 83(2) …. 8.78 s 83(3) …. 8.78 s 84 …. 5.135, 8.78, 8.96, 8.97, 8.99, 8.100, 8.126, 8.127, 8.131, 8.137, 8.160 s 84(1) …. 8.126 s 85 …. 5.135, 8.97, 8.99, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.130, 8.131, 8.134, 8.136, 8.137, 8.160, 8.162, 8.163 s 85(1) …. 8.126, 8.129 s 85(1)(b) …. 8.130 s 85(2) …. 8.126, 8.129, 8.130 s 85(3) …. 8.126, 8.128, 8.130 s 85(3)(a) …. 8.129 s 85(3)(b) …. 8.129, 8.130 s 86 …. 8.97, 8.167 s 88 …. 8.101 s 87(1) …. 8.112, 8.119 s 87(1)(a) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(b) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(c) …. 8.115, 8.117, 8.118

s 87(2) …. 8.114, 8.117 s 87(2)(c) …. 8.117 s 88 …. 7.7 s 89 …. 5.139, 5.141, 5.142, 8.98, 8.126 s 89(1) …. 5.144 s 89(2) …. 5.144 s 89(4) …. 5.144 s 89A …. 4.88, 5.14, 5.109, 5.134, 5.139, 5.140, 5.141, 5.142, 5.144, 5.167, 8.126, 8.154 s 90 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.32, 2.33, 2.34, 2.35, 8.97, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.131, 8.134, 8.135, 8.136, 8.137, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.154, 8.155, 8.160, 8.162 s 91 …. 5.194 s 92(2) …. 5.194 s 92(3) …. 5.194 s 93 …. 5.194 s 93(c) …. 5.190 s 94(1) …. 3.58, 3.152 s 94(3) …. 3.153 s 95 …. 3.11, 3.54, 3.75, 3.82, 3.106, 3.107, 3.135, 4.1 s 97 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 2.87, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.17, 3.26, 3.32, 3.36, 3.37, 3.40, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 ss 97–98 …. 5.18 ss 97–100 …. 3.160 s 97(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 97(1)(b) …. 3.61 s 98 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.23, 3.25, 3.39, 3.40, 3.49, 3.54, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82,

3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 s 98(1) …. 3.58 s 98(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 98(1)(b) …. 3.60 s 99 …. 3.9, 3.68 s 100 …. 3.9, 3.68, 3.125 s 101 …. 2.15, 2.31, 2.37, 2.87, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.36, 3.37, 3.39, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.127, 3.139, 3.156, 3.159 s 101(2) …. 3.59, 3.60, 3.62, 3.82, 3.127 s 101A …. 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 3.109, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112, 7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.139, 7.140 s 102 …. 2.46, 3.58, 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112, 7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.137, 7.139 s 102(2) …. 3.109 s 103 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.135, 3.145, 3.152, 3.162, 7.97, 7.116, 7.133, 7.137, 7.139 s 103(1) …. 3.83, 3.84, 7.133, 7.137, 7.142 s 104 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.109, 5.115 s 104(2) …. 3.90, 3.114 s 104(3) …. 3.90, 3.104 s 104(3)(b) …. 7.112, 7.144 s 104(4) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.110, 3.112 s 104(5) …. 3.110, 3.112 s 104(6) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.113, 3.117, 3.120, 3.122, 3.123 s 106 …. 7.83, 7.116, 7.133, 7.142, 7.149 s 106(1) …. 7.141, 7.143 s 106(2) …. 7.141, 7.142, 7.143

s 106(2)(a) …. 7.143 s 106(2)(b) …. 7.138, 7.142 s 106(2)(c) …. 7.148 s 106(2)(d) …. 7.112, 7.144 s 106(2)(e) …. 7.142 s 107 …. 7.97, 7.98 s 108 …. 7.90, 7.93, 7.116, 7.133, 7.156 s 108(1) …. 7.97, 7.158 s 108(3) …. 4.74, 7.97, 7.102, 7.158 s 108(3)(a) …. 7.93, 7.152 s 108(3)(b) …. 7.91, 7.92, 7.106 s 108A …. 7.97, 7.98, 7.133, 8.196, 8.199 s 108B …. 7.133 s 108C …. 4.39, 7.51, 7.58, 7.108, 7.133, 7.136, 7.144, 7.146 s 108C(1) …. 7.110, 7.112 s 110 …. 3.82, 3.83, 3.90, 3.106, 3.108, 3.109, 3.127, 3.129, 3.130, 3.134, 3.135, 3.137 s 110(1) …. 3.107 s 110(2) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 110(3) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 111 …. 3.82, 3.108, 7.136 s 112 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.100, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109, 3.130, 3.132, 3.135 s 113 …. 4.69 s 114 …. 2.46, 2.48, 4.58, 4.64, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 5.26, 7.94 s 114(1) …. 4.69 s 114(2) …. 4.69 s 114(2)(c) …. 4.70 s 114(5) …. 4.70

s 115 …. 4.58, 4.64, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74 s 115(3) …. 4.70 s 115(4) …. 4.70 s 115(7) …. 4.70 s 115(8) …. 4.70 s 116 …. 4.10, 4.54, 4.59, 4.61, 4.63, 4.69 s 116(1) …. 4.61 s 116(2) …. 4.59 s 117 …. 5.22, 5.26, 5.28, 5.37, 5.49, 5.58 s 117(1) …. 5.26 s 118 …. 5.24, 5.25, 5.27, 5.28, 5.31, 5.39 ss 118–119 …. 2.46, 2.48 ss 118–120 …. 5.35, 5.47, 5.48, 5.49 s 118(a) …. 5.28, 5.39 s 118(b) …. 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 118(c) …. 5.19, 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 119 …. 5.24, 5.42, 5.43 ss 119–120 …. 5.46 s 120 …. 5.24, 5.42 s 121 …. 5.69 s 122 …. 5.19, 5.54, 5.56, 5.58, 5.59 s 122(1) …. 5.58, 5.59 s 122(2) …. 5.58, 5.59, 5.100 s 122(3) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(a) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(b) …. 5.58 s 122(4) …. 5.58, 5.59 s 122(5) …. 5.58

s 122(5)(a)(i) …. 5.52 s 122(5)(b) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(5)(c) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(6) …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.81 s 123 …. 5.19, 5.70, 5.216 s 124 …. 5.49, 5.57, 5.58 s 125 …. 5.31 s 125(1)(a) …. 5.31 s 125(1)(b) …. 5.31 s 125(2) …. 5.31 s 126 …. 5.59 s 126A …. 8.147 s 126B …. 5.214 s 126B(4) …. 5.214 s 126E …. 5.85 s 126H …. 5.208 s 126K …. 5.19, 5.214 s 127 …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.210 s 127(1) …. 5.208 s 127(3) …. 5.208, 5.210 s 127A …. 5.19 s 127B …. 5.19 s 128 …. 3.87, 5.19, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177, 5.216, 8.164 s 128(1) …. 5.155, 5.176 s 128(1)(a) …. 5.164 s 128(2) …. 5.169 s 128(4)(a) …. 5.164 s 128(10) …. 3.83, 3.87, 5.180

s 128(12)–(14) …. 5.179 s 128A …. 5.19, 5.146, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177 s 129 …. 5.184, 5.185 s 129(4) …. 5.185 s 130 …. 5.205, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218, 5.222, 5.223, 5.231, 8.79 s 130(1) …. 5.216, 5.222, 5.243 s 130(2) …. 5.216 s 130(3) …. 5.241 s 130(4) …. 5.222 s 130(4)(a) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(b) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(c)–(e) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(e) …. 5.205 s 130(5) …. 5.253 s 130(5)(d) …. 5.254 s 131 …. 5.87, 5.88, 5.90, 5.94, 5.95, 5.96, 5.98, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102, 5.105, 5.214 s 131(1) …. 5.88, 5.94, 5.95, 5.97 s 131(2) …. 5.88 s 131(2)(a)–(c) …. 5.100 s 131(2)(d) …. 5.90, 5.100 s 131(2)(f) …. 5.97 s 131(2)(g) …. 5.100, 5.103 s 131(2)(h) …. 5.98 s 131(2)(i) …. 5.92, 5.96 s 131(2)(j) …. 5.96 s 131(2)(k) …. 5.96 s 131(3) …. 5.96

s 131(4) …. 5.96 s 131(5) …. 5.88, 5.90 s 131(5)(b) …. 5.99 s 131A …. 5.19, 5.24, 5.67, 5.70, 5.90, 5.102, 5.176, 5.208, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218 s 131A(1) …. 5.49 s 132 …. 5.166, 5.167 s 133 …. 5.78, 5.169, 5.247 s 135 …. 2.27, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.127, 3.159, 4.57, 7.41, 7.55, 7.59, 7.64, 7.73, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 8.144, 8.194 ss 135–137 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.32, 2.35, 3.11, 3.90, 3.133, 4.3, 7.124, 7.134, 8.29, 8.127, 8.193 ss 135–138 …. 2.27, 4.55 s 135(a) …. 7.55 s 136 …. 2.31, 2.39, 3.69, 3.79, 3.137, 7.41, 7.69, 7.73, 7.93, 7.102, 8.194 s 137 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.26, 2.27, 2.30, 2.31, 2.35, 2.46, 2.48, 2.70, 3.12, 3.54, 3.59, 3.60, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.104, 3.125, 3.127, 4.57, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 7.41, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.67, 7.93, 7.102, 7.108, 7.110, 7.111, 7.112, 7.135, 8.96, 8.127, 8.134, 8.144, 8.159, 8.194 s 138 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.33, 2.35, 2.36, 2.37, 2.46, 2.48, 4.57, 4.58, 4.68, 4.70, 4.74, 5.62, 5.134, 5.255, 5.258, 5.261, 5.264, 5.265, 5.267, 8.126, 8.127, 8.135, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.155, 8.158, 8.159, 8.160, 8.162 s 138(2) …. 8.127, 8.144, 8.155 s 138(3) …. 2.37 s 138(3)(f) …. 2.37 s 139 …. 5.134, 8.126, 8.149 s 139(2) …. 8.149 s 139(5) …. 8.149 s 140 …. 2.64 ss 140–141 …. 2.58

s 142 …. 2.12, 2.45, 2.91, 3.69, 5.31, 5.35, 7.8, 7.65 s 142(1) …. 8.160 s 143 …. 6.69 s 144 …. 6.60, 6.65, 6.71, 6.73, 6.77, 7.54, 7.59, 7.71 s 144(2) …. 6.66 s 144(4) …. 6.66 s 145 …. 6.60 s 146 …. 6.23, 7.13, 7.19, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 ss 146–147 …. 7.13, 7.26 s 147 …. 7.13, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 s 148 …. 7.11 s 149 …. 7.9 s 150 …. 7.11 s 151 …. 7.11 s 152 …. 7.11 s 153 …. 7.11 ss 153–159 …. 8.93 s 154 …. 7.11 s 155 …. 7.11 s 156 …. 7.11, 8.91 s 157 …. 7.11 s 158 …. 7.11 s 159 …. 7.11 s 161 …. 7.14, 8.200 s 162 …. 8.200 s 164 …. 4.9, 4.42, 4.45, 4.99, 4.102, 4.106 s 164(1) …. 4.4, 4.12 s 164(2) …. 4.4, 4.12, 4.14

s 164(3) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.12, 4.20, 4.22, 4.41 s 164(4) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.20 s 164(6) …. 4.7, 4.20 s 165 …. 4.10, 4.11, 4.23, 4.27, 4.28, 4.34, 4.36, 4.42, 4.45, 4.52, 4.75, 4.78, 4.79, 4.100, 4.102, 4.106, 7.93, 7.102, 7.112, 7.123, 8.193, 8.198 s 165(1) …. 4.24, 4.34, 4.36 s 165(1)–(4) …. 4.9 s 165(1)(a) …. 8.120 s 165(1)(b) …. 4.54, 4.56 s 165(1)(c) …. 4.39, 4.77 s 165(1)(d) …. 4.24, 4.27, 4.30, 4.52 s 165(1)(e) …. 4.76 s 165(1)(f) …. 4.22, 4.33, 4.34, 8.168 s 165(1)(g) …. 4.75 s 165(2) …. 4.5, 4.9, 4.10, 4.12, 4.33, 4.36, 4.52, 4.75, 4.100, 4.101, 4.105, 8.120 s 165(3) …. 4.9, 4.100, 7.123, 7.125 s 165(4) …. 4.9, 4.59 s 165(5) …. 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.22, 4.30, 4.34, 4.36, 4.39, 4.41, 4.54, 4.100 s 165A …. 4.36, 4.37, 4.39, 7.31 s 165A(1) …. 4.10, 4.39 s 165A(1)(a) …. 4.20 s 165A(2) …. 4.39 s 165B …. 4.36, 4.51 s 165B(2) …. 4.51 s 165B(7) …. 4.51 s 166 …. 7.8, 8.199 s 166(g) …. 5.194

s 167 …. 5.18, 5.194, 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 7.25, 7.64 ss 170–173 …. 7.26 s 171 …. 7.19 s 176 …. 7.61 s 177 …. 7.64 ss 178–179 …. 5.194 s 182 …. 7.14 s 183 …. 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 8.199, 8.200 s 184 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 187 …. 5.154 s 189 …. 2.12, 2.40, 7.120 s 189(1) …. 8.163 s 189(2) …. 2.42, 8.163 s 189(3) …. 8.129, 8.130, 8.163 s 189(4) …. 2.42, 5.168, 7.30 s 189(5) …. 2.42 s 189(6) …. 2.45, 3.83, 3.87, 8.164 s 189(7) …. 2.45, 8.162 s 189(8) …. 2.45, 8.163, 8.165 s 190 …. 2.46, 2.48, 5.26 s 190(1) …. 2.48 s 190(2) …. 2.48 s 190(3) …. 2.48, 6.68 s 191 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 192 …. 2.26, 2.40, 2.42, 3.104, 3.132, 7.23, 7.93, 7.112, 7.122 s 192(2) …. 3.109, 7.79 s 192A …. 2.40, 3.104, 3.132, 5.12 s 192A(c) …. 3.132

s 193 …. 7.14, 7.19, 7.26, 7.64 Sch …. 7.28 Dictionary …. 2.19, 4.54, 4.69, 5.19, 5.26, 7.5, 7.19, 7.73, 7.116, 7.140, 8.12, 8.21, 8.27, 8.100, 8.129, 8.192 Dictionary Pt 1 …. 8.94 Dictionary Pt 2 …. 7.19 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 1 …. 8.199 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 4 …. 8.66, 8.196 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 7 …. 7.122 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 8 …. 5.40 Dictionary cl 4(2) …. 8.196 Dictionary cl 6 …. 8.196 Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998 …. 7.3 Evidence Regulations 2005 cl 5 …. 3.68 cl 6 …. 3.68 Freedom of Information Act 1989 …. 5.232 Sch 1 cl 4(1)(a) …. 5.16 Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 ss 26, 37 …. 5.180 Jury Act 1977 s 55F …. 2.13 s 68B …. 5.185 Justices Act 1902 s 41(6) …. 6.31 Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act 1997 …. 2.37, 4.53 s 28 …. 5.205 Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 …. 5.17

Pt 9 …. 8.148 Pt 9 s 111 …. 8.147 s 99 …. 8.147 s 122(1) …. 8.149 s 123 …. 4.33 Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Regulations 2005 Pt 3 Div 3 …. 8.150, 8.152 reg 33 …. 8.151 Listening Devices Act 1984 …. 8.142 Oaths Act 1900 ss 11A–13 …. 7.28 Partnership Act 1892 s 15 …. 8.110 s 67(1) …. 8.110 Road Transport Act 2013 s 109 …. 7.25 Succession Act 2006 s 100 …. 8.45 Surveillance Devices Act 2007 …. 8.155 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 …. 5.19 Pt 5 …. 5.6 Pt 5 r 2 …. 5.10 Pt 5 r 3 …. 5.10 Pt 5 r 4 …. 5.10 Pt 12 Div 1 …. 6.37 Pt 13 r 1 …. 6.36 Pt 14 r 28 …. 6.36 Pt 17 …. 8.95

Pts 21–22 …. 5.6 Pt 21 r 2 …. 5.7 Pt 21 r 3 …. 5.7 Pt 23 …. 5.8 Pt 23 r 8 …. 5.8 Pt 29 r 6 …. 2.11 Pt 29 r 10 …. 6.39 Pt 29 r 29.8 …. 6.37 Pt 29 r 29.9 …. 6.37 Pt 31 Div 2 …. 5.8 Pt 31 Div 2 Subdiv 4 r 31.37 …. 7.64 Pt 31 Div 5 …. 7.64 Pt 31 rr 24–26 …. 7.64 Pt 31 r 28 …. 5.76 Pt 31 r 46 …. 6.48 Pt 31 Sch 7 …. 7.64 Pt 33 …. 5.5 r 1.8 …. 5.78 r 3 …. 5.6 r 14.10 …. 6.3 r 21.1(2) …. 5.7 r 21.2(3)(a) …. 5.7 r 29.10 …. 6.37 r 31.54 …. 7.64 Witness Protection Act 1995 s 26 …. 5.85

NORTHERN TERRITORY

Aboriginals Ordinance 1918–1947 …. 6.19 Bail Act 1982 s 16 …. 8.147 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 s 44 …. 8.93 Criminal Code Act 1983 s 32 …. 3.142, 6.8, 6.9 s 38 …. 6.23 s 43BU …. 6.17 s 43BV …. 6.17 s 47(2) …. 4.14 s 98 …. 4.14 s 120 …. 4.14 s 131A …. 3.34 s 192 …. 3.142 s 309 …. 3.71 s 331 …. 2.8, 5.14 s 331A …. 5.14 s 331B …. 5.14 s 341 …. 3.71 s 350 …. 3.71, 3.78 s 360(1) …. 5.115 s 361 …. 2.43 s 363 …. 2.7, 2.11 s 379 …. 3.66, 8.95 s 408 …. 2.15 s 410 …. 2.14 s 411 …. 2.14

s 414(2) …. 2.14 s 414(5) …. 2.14 s 440 …. 6.21 Sch 1 s 431(a) …. 2.14 Sch 4 …. 2.7 Defamation Act 2006 s 39 …. 5.194 Evidence Act 1939 Pt 5 …. 7.3 Pt IVA …. 5.217 s 12 …. 5.207 s 17 …. 5.85 s 21(3) …. 7.84 s 21A …. 7.33 ss 21A–21C …. 7.33 s 21A(1) …. 7.34 s 21A(3) …. 7.33 s 21B …. 7.34 s 21B(2)(a) …. 7.34 s 21B(2)(b) …. 7.34 s 21E …. 7.34 s 26E(1) …. 7.34, 7.99 s 26E(3) …. 7.34, 7.99 s 56 …. 5.212 ss 56–56G …. 5.207 s 56C …. 5.212 s 56D …. 5.212 s 57 …. 5.85

s 58 …. 5.85 Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 …. 2.2, 2.25, 2.28, 2.50, 3.3, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.12, 3.17, 3.31, 3.33, 3.40, 3.43, 3.49, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.63, 3.64, 3.68, 3.69, 3.70, 3.82, 3.83, 3.85, 3.87, 3.88, 3.90, 3.91, 3.93, 3.96, 3.99, 3.101, 3.104, 3.106, 3.107, 3.108, 3.109, 3.112, 3.118, 3.119, 3.120, 3.122, 3.127, 3.129, 3.131, 3.133, 3.135, 3.136, 3.137, 3.139, 3.141, 3.145, 3.152, 3.153, 3.154, 3.156, 3.159, 3.160, 3.162, 3.165, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, 4.22, 4.27, 4.30, 4.35, 4.36, 4.39, 4.48, 4.54, 4.55, 4.56, 4.57, 4.59, 4.63, 4.64, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 4.78, 4.79, 4.98, 4.101, 4.102, 4.105, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, 5.24, 5.26, 5.27, 5.31, 5.35, 5.36, 5.39, 5.40, 5.43, 5.47, 5.49, 5.66, 5.67, 5.69, 5.77, 5.83, 5.84, 5.86, 5.92, 5.97, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102, 5.108, 5.118, 5.120, 5.134, 5.135, 5.139, 5.144, 5.154, 5.161, 5.169, 5.175, 5.176, 5.177, 5.184, 5.190, 5.194, 5.201, 5.202, 5.203, 5.204, 5.207, 5.208, 5.214, 5.218, 5.241, 5.247, 5.253, 5.254, 5.266, 6.1, 6.23, 6.57, 6.66, 6.68, 6.77, 7.4, 7.8, 7.14, 7.20, 7.23, 7.26, 7.28, 7.30, 7.34, 7.35, 7.36, 7.54, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.66, 7.71, 7.73, 7.76, 7.78, 7.79, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.91, 7.93, 7.94, 7.95, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 7.113, 7.115, 7.116, 7.118, 7.124, 7.128, 7.134, 7.137, 7.141, 7.142, 7.143, 7.147, 7.148, 7.153, 7.158, 8.6, 8.8, 8.11, 8.12, 8.13, 8.22, 8.27, 8.28, 8.35, 8.48, 8.55, 8.57, 8.59, 8.62, 8.63, 8.65, 8.66, 8.69, 8.79, 8.81, 8.85, 8.87, 8.89, 8.90, 8.100, 8.106, 8.108, 8.112, 8.113, 8.114, 8.119, 8.125, 8.126, 8.127, 8.144, 8.146, 8.156, 8.161, 8.162, 8.163, 8.169, 8.171, 8.172, 8.173, 8.191, 8.196 Ch 3 …. 2.45 Ch 4 …. 2.48 Ch 5 …. 2.48 Pt 1.2 …. 2.2 Pt 2 Div 3 …. 8.199 Pt 2.1 Div 1 …. 2.48 Pt 2.1 Div 2 …. 2.48 Pt 3.1 …. 2.48 Pt 3.2 …. 8.93, 8.198 Pt 3.2 Div 2 …. 8.62, 8.195

Pt 3.4 …. 8.94, 8.100, 8.101, 8.198 Pt 3.6 …. 3.12, 3.106, 3.135, 3.153 Pt 3.7 …. 3.109, 7.122 Pt 3.8 …. 3.5, 3.90, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109 Pt 3.9 …. 2.48, 4.2, 4.54, 4.55, 4.63 Pt 3.10 …. 2.48, 5.19 Pt 3.10 Div 1 …. 5.19 Pt 3.10 Div 1A …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.214 Pt 3.10 Div 1C …. 5.19, 5.207 Pt 3.10 Div 3 …. 5.19 Pt 3.11 …. 2.29, 2.31, 2.48, 8.196 Pt 4.6 Div 1 …. 7.14, 7.26 Pt 4.6 Div 2 …. 7.13 Pt 4.6 Div 3 …. 6.70 Div 2 …. 5.19, 8.198 Div 3 …. 8.195, 8.200 s 4 …. 2.2 s 4(1) …. 2.2, 5.24 s 4(1)(d) …. 2.4 s 4(2)–(4) …. 2.4 s 8 …. 2.3 s 9 …. 2.3 s 9(2)(b) …. 6.23 s 10 …. 5.199, 5.199 s 11 …. 7.124, 7.137 s 11(1) …. 6.48 s 11(2) …. 1.53, 2.29 s 12 …. 2.3, 3.83, 5.112, 5.115, 5.176, 5.200, 5.201

s 13 …. 4.14, 7.28, 7.30 s 13(1) …. 7.30 s 13(2) …. 7.30 s 13(3) …. 7.28, 7.30 s 13(5) …. 7.30 s 13(6) …. 7.30 s 13(8) …. 7.30, 7.31 s 14 …. 7.30 s 15(2) …. 5.199 s 16 …. 5.184 s 16(1) …. 5.185 s 17 …. 3.83, 8.126 s 17(2) …. 5.112 s 17(3) …. 5.112, 5.115 s 18 …. 2.26, 5.165, 5.201 s 19 …. 5.201 s 20 …. 2.12, 2.50, 5.115, 5.118, 5.120, 5.128, 5.129, 5.202, 8.126 s 20(2) …. 2.12, 5.120, 5.123 s 20(3) …. 5.132, 5.201 s 20(4) …. 2.12, 5.201 s 20(5) …. 5.120, 5.201 s 21 …. 5.115, 5.201, 5.202, 7.28 ss 21–24A …. 7.28 s 21(3a) …. 5.201 s 23 …. 7.28 s 24(2) …. 7.28 s 24A …. 7.28 s 26 …. 6.48, 7.115, 7.124, 7.137

ss 26–29 …. 7.115 s 26(a) …. 7.3 s 27 …. 3.84, 7.115, 7.124 s 28 …. 7.115 s 29 …. 6.58 s 29(2) …. 7.115 s 30 …. 7.30, 7.35 s 31 …. 7.30, 7.35, 8.12 s 31A(1)(b) …. 5.216 s 32 …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.79, 7.82, 7.83, 7.86 s 32(1) …. 7.79 s 32(2) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b)(i) …. 7.79 s 32(3) …. 7.80 s 32(4) …. 7.81 s 33 …. 5.26, 5.49, 7.76, 7.80 s 33(2)(a) …. 7.80 s 34 …. 7.76, 7.77, 7.84, 7.86, 7.112 s 35 …. 7.81, 7.82, 7.83, 7.154 s 37 …. 5.26, 7.115, 7.117, 7.126 s 37(1)(b) …. 7.117 s 38 …. 6.49, 6.57, 7.97, 7.118, 7.122, 7.123, 8.194 s 38(3) …. 7.122 s 38(4) …. 7.122 s 38(6) …. 7.122 s 38(7) …. 7.118, 7.122 s 39 …. 7.82, 7.156

s 40 …. 7.124 s 41 …. 2.46, 3.83, 3.145, 3.152, 7.33, 7.115, 7.137 s 41(1) …. 7.138 s 41(2) …. 7.138 s 41(4) …. 7.138 s 41(6) …. 7.138 s 41(8) …. 7.138 s 42 …. 7.115, 7.126 s 43 …. 7.83, 7.97, 7.148, 7.149 s 44 …. 7.153 s 45 …. 7.82, 7.152 s 45(4) …. 7.82 s 46 …. 7.75, 7.129, 7.130 s 47(2) …. 7.19 s 48 …. 7.8, 7.56, 8.199 s 48(1) …. 7.19, 7.56 s 48(1)(c) …. 7.24, 7.56 s 48(1)(d) …. 7.19 s 48(2) …. 7.19 s 48(3) …. 7.19 s 48(4) …. 7.19 s 49 …. 7.19, 8.133 s 51 …. 7.19, 7.82 s 52 …. 7.20, 7.21 s 53 …. 7.23 s 53(1) …. 7.23 s 53(2) …. 7.23 s 53(2)(a) …. 2.43

s 53(3) …. 7.23 s 53(3)(d) …. 7.23 s 53(4) …. 7.23 s 53(5) …. 7.23 s 54 …. 7.23 s 55 …. 2.18, 2.19, 2.23, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.60, 3.141, 4.3, 4.100, 7.40, 7.41, 7.44, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.66, 7.116, 7.146, 8.95 s 55(1) …. 2.23, 2.24, 5.144, 7.54, 7.103 s 55(2) …. 2.19, 7.137 s 56 …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.28, 2.32, 7.44, 7.52, 7.66 s 56(1) …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.23, 2.27, 2.29, 2.46, 7.7, 7.8, 7.10, 8.27, 8.192 s 56(2) …. 7.54 s 57 …. 2.19, 7.8, 7.52, 8.194 s 57(1) …. 2.23, 7.8 s 57(1)(b) …. 2.19, 7.68 s 58 …. 7.8, 7.14, 8.199 s 58(1) …. 2.23 s 59 …. 2.46, 7.98, 8.8, 8.27, 8.57, 8.96, 8.99, 8.169, 8.192, 8.194, 8.199 s 59(1) …. 7.3, 8.8, 8.11, 8.19, 8.21, 8.22, 8.23, 8.24, 8.25, 8.26, 8.27, 8.28, 8.33, 8.44, 8.50, 8.53, 8.192, 8.193 s 59(2A) …. 8.27 s 60 …. 2.31, 2.39, 2.46, 4.1, 7.69, 7.70, 7.71, 7.72, 7.73, 7.81, 7.83, 7.91, 7.93, 7.97, 7.102, 7.123, 7.134, 7.151, 8.28, 8.29, 8.50, 8.71, 8.105, 8.194 s 60(1) …. 8.194 s 60(2) …. 7.69 s 60(3) …. 7.81, 8.105, 8.165 s 61 …. 8.195 s 62 …. 8.62, 8.66, 8.75, 8.79, 8.81, 8.83, 8.195, 8.196

s 62(1) …. 8.196 s 62(2) …. 8.196 s 63 …. 7.69, 7.98, 8.89, 8.196 s 63(2) …. 8.74, 8.85, 8.90 s 64 …. 7.69, 7.83, 7.93, 7.98, 8.169, 8.196 s 64(2) …. 7.76, 7.113, 8.85 s 64(4) …. 7.76, 8.196 s 65 …. 7.34, 8.66, 8.74, 8.83, 8.181, 8.193, 8.197 s 65(1)(b) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(c) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(d) …. 8.66 s 65(2) …. 8.82, 8.197 s 65(2)(a) …. 8.82, 8.83 s 65(2)(b) …. 8.29, 8.35, 8.39, 8.50, 8.66, 8.69, 8.75, 8.89, 8.197 s 65(2)(c) …. 7.98, 8.35, 8.50, 8.61, 8.89, 8.197 s 65(2)(d) …. 8.29, 8.75, 8.79, 8.80, 8.197 s 65(3) …. 8.53, 8.197 s 65(3)–(6) …. 8.197 s 65(7) …. 8.79 s 65(8) …. 8.63, 8.74, 8.197 s 65(9) …. 8.63, 8.197 s 66 …. 4.74, 7.34, 7.41, 7.79, 7.83, 7.93, 7.97, 7.98, 7.99, 7.102, 8.106, 8.169, 8.198 s 66(2) …. 7.76, 7.102, 7.113 s 66(2A) …. 7.79, 7.83, 8.198 s 66(3) …. 8.198 s 66(4) …. 7.76 s 66A …. 8.29, 8.31, 8.35, 8.42, 8.44, 8.46, 8.49, 8.50, 8.195, 8.198

s 67 …. 5.18, 8.74, 8.75, 8.82, 8.89, 8.90, 8.196, 8.197 s 68 …. 8.196 s 69 …. 7.13, 8.93, 8.182, 8.199 s 69(3) …. 8.199 s 69(4) …. 8.26, 8.199 s 70 …. 8.57, 8.190, 8.200 ss 70–75 …. 8.200 s 70(1) …. 8.30 s 71 …. 8.200 s 72 …. 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 73 …. 8.85, 8.200 s 74 …. 8.200 s 74(1) …. 8.84 s 74(2) …. 8.84 s 76 …. 2.23, 2.30, 7.38, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 8.49, 8.200 s 77 …. 2.31 ss 77–79 …. 7.38 s 78 …. 4.57, 7.41, 7.42, 7.56, 7.105 s 78(a) …. 7.41 s 78(b) …. 7.41 s 78A …. 7.73, 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 79 …. 2.23, 7.40, 7.41, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.58, 7.59, 7.64, 7.66, 8.71 s 79(1) …. 7.14, 7.41, 7.42, 7.44, 7.52, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.65, 7.66, 7.73, 7.108 s 79(2) …. 4.39, 7.45, 7.51, 7.54, 7.58, 7.62, 7.136 s 79(3) …. 7.136 s 80 …. 6.70, 7.44, 7.57, 7.59, 7.61 s 80(a) …. 7.62

s 80(b) …. 7.53, 7.55, 7.58, 7.65, 7.136 s 81 …. 5.144, 8.94, 8.108, 8.165, 8.194 s 81(2) …. 8.108 s 82 …. 8.99, 8.105 s 83 …. 8.78 s 83(1) …. 8.78 s 83(2) …. 8.78 s 83(3) …. 8.78 s 84 …. 5.135, 8.78, 8.96, 8.97, 8.99, 8.100, 8.126, 8.127, 8.131, 8.137, 8.160 s 84(1) …. 8.126 s 85 …. 5.135, 8.97, 8.99, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.130, 8.131, 8.134, 8.136, 8.137, 8.160, 8.162, 8.163 s 85(1) …. 8.126, 8.129 s 85(1)(b) …. 8.130 s 85(2) …. 8.126, 8.129, 8.130 s 85(3) …. 8.126, 8.128, 8.130 s 85(3)(a) …. 8.129 s 85(3)(b) …. 8.129, 8.130 s 86 …. 8.97, 8.167 s 87(1) …. 8.112, 8.119 s 87(1)(a) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(b) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(c) …. 8.115, 8.117, 8.118 s 87(2) …. 8.114, 8.117 s 87(2)(c) …. 8.117 s 88 …. 7.7, 8.101 s 89 …. 5.139, 5.141, 5.142, 8.98, 8.126

s 89(1) …. 5.144 s 89(2) …. 5.144 s 89(4) …. 5.144 s 90 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.32, 2.33, 2.34, 2.35, 8.97, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.131, 8.134, 8.135, 8.136, 8.137, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.154, 8.160, 8.162 s 91 …. 5.194 s 92(2) …. 5.194 s 92(3) …. 5.194 s 93 …. 5.194 s 93(c) …. 5.190 s 94(1) …. 3.58, 3.152 s 94(3) …. 3.153 s 95 …. 3.11, 3.54, 3.75, 3.82, 3.106, 3.107, 3.135, 4.1 s 97 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 2.87, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.17, 3.26, 3.32, 3.36, 3.37, 3.40, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 ss 97–98 …. 5.18 ss 97–100 …. 3.160 s 97(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 97(1)(b) …. 3.61 s 98 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.23, 3.25, 3.39, 3.40, 3.49, 3.54, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 s 98(1) …. 3.58 s 98(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 98(1)(b) …. 3.60 s 99 …. 3.9, 3.68

s 100 …. 3.9, 3.68, 3.125 s 101 …. 2.15, 2.31, 2.37, 2.87, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.36, 3.37, 3.39, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.127, 3.139, 3.156, 3.159 s 101(2) …. 3.59, 3.60, 3.62, 3.82, 3.127 s 101A …. 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 3.109, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112, 7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.139, 7.140 s 102 …. 2.46, 3.58, 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112, 7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.137, 7.139 s 102(2) …. 3.109 s 103 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.135, 3.145, 3.152, 3.162, 7.97, 7.116, 7.133, 7.137, 7.139 s 103(1) …. 3.83, 3.84, 7.133, 7.137, 7.142 s 104 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.109, 5.115 s 104(2) …. 3.90, 3.114 s 104(3) …. 3.90, 3.104 s 104(3)(b) …. 7.112, 7.144 s 104(4) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.110, 3.112 s 104(5) …. 3.110, 3.112 s 104(6) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.113, 3.117, 3.120, 3.122, 3.123 s 106 …. 7.83, 7.116, 7.133, 7.142, 7.149 s 106(1) …. 7.141, 7.143 s 106(2) …. 7.141, 7.142, 7.143 s 106(2)(a) …. 7.143 s 106(2)(b) 7.138, 7.142 s 106(2)(c) …. 7.148 s 106(2)(d) …. 7.112, 7.144 s 106(2)(e) …. 7.142 s 107 …. 7.97, 7.98

s 108 …. 7.90, 7.93, 7.116, 7.133, 7.156 s 108(1) …. 7.97, 7.158 s 108(3) …. 4.74, 7.97, 7.102, 7.158 s 108(3)(a) …. 7.93, 7.152 s 108(3)(b) 7.91, 7.92, 7.106 s 108A …. 7.97, 7.98, 7.133, 8.196, 8.199 s 108B …. 7.133 s 108C …. 4.39, 7.51, 7.58, 7.108, 7.133, 7.136, 7.144, 7.146 s 108C(1) …. 7.110, 7.112 s 110 …. 3.82, 3.83, 3.90, 3.106, 3.108, 3.109, 3.127, 3.129, 3.130, 3.134, 3.135, 3.137 s 110(1) …. 3.107 s 110(2) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 110(3) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 111 …. 3.82, 3.108, 7.136 s 112 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.100, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109, 3.130, 3.132, 3.135 s 113 …. 4.69 s 114 …. 2.46, 2.48, 4.58, 4.64, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 5.26, 7.94 s 114(1) …. 4.69 s 114(2) …. 4.69 s 114(2)(c) …. 4.70 s 114(5) …. 4.70 s 115 …. 4.58, 4.64, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74 s 115(3) …. 4.70 s 115(4) …. 4.70 s 115(7) …. 4.70 s 115(8) …. 4.70 s 116 …. 4.10, 4.54, 4.59, 4.61, 4.63, 4.69

s 116(1) …. 4.61 s 116(2) …. 4.59 s 117 …. 5.22, 5.26, 5.28, 5.37, 5.49, 5.58 s 117(1) …. 5.26 s 118 …. 5.24, 5.25, 5.27, 5.28, 5.31, 5.39 ss 118–119 …. 2.46, 2.48 ss 118–120 …. 5.35, 5.47, 5.48, 5.49 s 118(a) …. 5.28, 5.39 s 118(b) …. 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 118(c) …. 5.19, 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 119 …. 5.24, 5.42, 5.43 ss 119–120 …. 5.46 s 120 …. 5.24, 5.42 s 121 …. 5.69 s 122 …. 5.19, 5.54, 5.56, 5.58, 5.59 s 122(1) …. 5.58, 5.59 s 122(2) …. 5.58, 5.59, 5.100 s 122(3) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(a) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(b) …. 5.58 s 122(4) …. 5.58, 5.59 s 122(5) …. 5.58 s 122(5)(a)(i) …. 5.52 s 122(5)(b) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(5)(c) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(6) …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.81 s 123 …. 5.19, 5.70, 5.216 s 124 …. 5.49, 5.57, 5.58

s 125 …. 5.31 s 125(1)(a) …. 5.31 s 125(1)(b) …. 5.31 s 125(2) …. 5.31 s 126 …. 5.59 s 126K …. 5.19 s 127 …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.210 s 127(1) …. 5.208 s 127(3) …. 5.208, 5.210 s 127A …. 5.19 s 127B …. 5.19 s 128 …. 3.87, 5.19, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177, 5.216, 8.164 s 128(1) …. 5.155, 5.176 s 128(1)(a) …. 5.164 s 128(2) …. 5.169 s 128(4)(a) …. 5.164 s 128(10) …. 3.83, 3.87, 5.180 s 128(12)–(14) …. 5.179 s 128A …. 5.19, 5.146, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177 s 129 …. 5.184, 5.185 s 129(4) …. 5.185 s 130 …. 5.205, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218, 5.222, 5.223, 5.231, 8.79 s 130(1) …. 5.216, 5.222, 5.243 s 130(2) …. 5.216 s 130(3) …. 5.241 s 130(4) …. 5.222 s 130(4)(a) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(b) …. 5.223

s 130(4)(c)–(e) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(e) …. 5.205 s 130(5) …. 5.253 s 130(5)(d) …. 5.254 s 131 …. 5.87, 5.88, 5.90, 5.94, 5.95, 5.96, 5.98, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102, 5.105, 5.214 s 131(1) …. 5.88, 5.94, 5.95, 5.97 s 131(2) …. 5.88 s 131(2)(a)–(c) …. 5.100 s 131(2)(d) …. 5.90, 5.100 s 131(2)(f) …. 5.97 s 131(2)(g) …. 5.100, 5.103 s 131(2)(h) …. 5.98 s 131(2)(i) …. 5.92, 5.96 s 131(2)(j) …. 5.96 s 131(2)(k) …. 5.96 s 131(3) …. 5.96 s 131(4) …. 5.96 s 131(5) …. 5.88, 5.90 s 131(5)(b) …. 5.99 s 131A …. 5.19, 5.24, 5.67, 5.70, 5.90, 5.102, 5.176, 5.208, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218 s 131A(1) …. 5.49 s 132 …. 5.166, 5.167 s 133 …. 5.78, 5.169, 5.247 s 135 …. 2.27, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.127, 3.159, 7.41, 7.55, 7.59, 7.64, 7.73, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 8.144, 8.194 ss 135–137 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.32, 2.35, 3.11, 3.90, 3.133, 4.3, 7.124, 7.134, 8.29, 8.127, 8.193

ss 135–138 …. 2.27, 4.55 s 135(a) …. 7.55 s 136 …. 2.31, 2.39, 3.69, 3.79, 3.137, 7.41, 7.69, 7.73, 7.93, 7.102, 8.194 s 137 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.26, 2.27, 2.30, 2.31, 2.35, 2.46, 2.48, 2.70, 3.12, 3.54, 3.59, 3.60, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.104, 3.125, 3.127, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 7.41, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.67, 7.93, 7.102, 7.108, 7.110, 7.111, 7.112, 7.135, 8.96, 8.127, 8.134, 8.144, 8.159, 8.194 s 138 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.33, 2.35, 2.36, 2.37, 2.46, 2.48, 4.58, 4.68, 4.70, 4.74, 5.62, 5.134, 5.255, 5.258, 5.261, 5.264, 5.265, 5.267, 8.126, 8.127, 8.135, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.155, 8.158, 8.159, 8.160, 8.162 s 138(2) …. 8.127, 8.144, 8.155 s 138(3) …. 2.37 s 138(3)(f) …. 2.37 s 139 …. 5.134, 8.126, 8.149 s 139(2) …. 8.149 s 139(5) …. 8.149 s 140 …. 2.64 ss 140–141 …. 2.58 s 142 …. 2.12, 2.45, 2.91, 3.69, 5.31, 5.35, 7.8, 7.65 s 142(1) …. 8.160 s 143 …. 6.69 s 144 …. 6.60, 6.65, 6.71, 6.73, 6.77, 7.54, 7.59, 7.71 s 144(2) …. 6.66 s 144(4) …. 6.66 s 145 …. 6.60 s 146 …. 6.23, 7.13, 7.19, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 ss 146–147 …. 7.13, 7.26 s 147 …. 7.13, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 s 148 …. 7.11

s 149 …. 7.9 s 150 …. 7.11 s 151 …. 7.11 s 152 …. 7.11 s 153 …. 7.11 ss 153–159 …. 8.93 s 154 …. 7.11 s 155 …. 7.11 s 156 …. 7.11, 8.91 s 157 …. 7.11 s 158 …. 7.11 s 159 …. 7.11 s 161 …. 7.14, 8.200 s 162 …. 8.200 s 164 …. 4.9, 4.42, 4.45, 4.99, 4.102, 4.106 s 164(1) …. 4.4, 4.12 s 164(2) …. 4.4, 4.12, 4.14 s 164(3) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.12, 4.20, 4.22, 4.41 s 164(4) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.20 s 164(6) …. 4.7, 4.20 s 165 …. 4.10, 4.11, 4.23, 4.27, 4.28, 4.34, 4.36, 4.42, 4.45, 4.52, 4.75, 4.78, 4.79, 4.100, 4.102, 4.106, 7.93, 7.102, 7.112, 7.123, 8.193, 8.198 s 165(1) …. 4.24, 4.34, 4.36 s 165(1)–(4) …. 4.9 s 165(1)(a) …. 8.120 s 165(1)(b) 4.54, 4.56 s 165(1)(c) …. 4.39, 4.77 s 165(1)(d) …. 4.24, 4.27, 4.30, 4.52

s 165(1)(e) …. 4.76 s 165(1)(f) …. 4.22, 4.33, 4.34, 8.168 s 165(1)(g) …. 4.75 s 165(2) …. 4.5, 4.9, 4.10, 4.12, 4.33, 4.36, 4.52, 4.75, 4.100, 4.101, 4.105, 8.120 s 165(3) …. 4.9, 4.100, 7.123, 7.125 s 165(4) …. 4.9, 4.59 s 165(5) …. 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.22, 4.30, 4.34, 4.36, 4.39, 4.41, 4.54, 4.100 s 165A …. 4.36, 4.37, 4.39, 7.31 s 165A(1) …. 4.10, 4.39 s 165A(1)(a) …. 4.20 s 165A(2) …. 4.39 s 165B …. 4.36, 4.51 s 166 …. 7.8, 8.199 s 166(g) …. 5.194 s 167 …. 5.18, 5.194, 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 7.25, 7.64 ss 170–173 …. 7.26 s 171 …. 7.19 s 176 …. 7.61 s 177 …. 7.64 ss 178–179 …. 5.194 s 182 …. 7.14 s 183 …. 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 8.199, 8.200 s 184 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 187 …. 5.154 s 189 …. 2.12, 2.40, 7.120 s 189(1) …. 8.163 s 189(2) …. 2.42, 8.163

s 189(3) …. 8.129, 8.130, 8.163 s 189(4) …. 2.42, 5.168, 7.30 s 189(5) …. 2.42 s 189(6) …. 2.45, 3.83, 3.87, 8.164 s 189(7) …. 2.45, 8.162 s 189(8) …. 2.45, 8.163, 8.165 s 190 …. 2.46, 2.48, 5.26 s 190(1) …. 2.48 s 190(2) …. 2.48 s 190(3) …. 2.48, 6.68 s 191 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 192 …. 2.26, 2.40, 2.42, 3.104, 3.132, 7.23, 7.93, 7.112, 7.122 s 192(2) …. 3.109, 7.79 s 192A …. 2.40, 3.104, 3.132, 5.12 s 192A(c) …. 3.132 s 193 …. 7.14, 7.19, 7.26, 7.64 Sch …. 7.28 Dictionary …. 2.19, 4.54, 4.69, 5.19, 5.26, 7.5, 7.19, 7.73, 7.116, 7.140, 8.12, 8.21, 8.27, 8.100, 8.129, 8.192 Dictionary Pt 1 …. 8.94 Dictionary Pt 2 …. 7.19 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 1 …. 8.199 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 4 …. 8.66, 8.196 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 7 …. 7.122 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 8 …. 5.40 Dictionary cl 4(2) …. 8.196 Dictionary cl 6 …. 8.196 Family Provision Act 1970

s 22 …. 8.45 Information Act …. 5.232 Juries Act s 49A …. 5.185 Justices Act 1928 ss 153–155 …. 8.61 Local Court (Civil Procedure) Act s 16 …. 1.3 Local Court (Criminal Procedure) Act Pt V Div 1 …. 2.5, 5.12, 5.13, 6.31 s 60AG …. 2.8, 5.14 ss 60AM-60AO …. 5.14 s 152 …. 8.61 s 163 …. 2.14 Local Government Act 1993 s 200 …. 6.69 Misuse of Drugs Act s 31(3) …. 4.53 s 32 …. 4.53 Oaths, Affirmations and Declarations Act Pt 2 …. 7.28 s 5 …. 7.28 Partnership Act 1997 s 19 …. 8.110 Police Administration Act 1978 Pt VII …. 5.17 Pt VIII Div 6 …. 8.148 Pt VIII Div 6A …. 8.148

s 123(1) …. 8.147 ss 136–138 …. 8.148 s 138(h) …. 4.33 s 138(j) …. 4.33 ss 139–142 …. 8.97, 8.168 s 140 …. 4.33, 8.149 s 142 …. 4.33 Police (Special Investigative and Other Powers) Act Pt 4 …. 5.205 Rules of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory of Australia r 86.08 …. 2.49 Sexual Offences (Evidence and Procedure) Act s 4(5) …. 7.100, 7.107 s 4 …. 3.146 s 4(5)(a) …. 4.41 s 4(5)(b) …. 4.45 s 5 …. 7.33 Supreme Court Act s 26 …. 7.64 s 53 …. 2.15 s 83A …. 1.3 Supreme Court Rules O 23 rr 1–2 …. 6.36 O 25 …. 6.37 O 33 …. 5.76 O 35 …. 8.95 O 44 …. 5.76 O 48.13 …. 1.3

O 49.01 …. 6.48 r 13.04 …. 6.3 rr 29.01–33.13 …. 5.6 r 29.02 …. 5.7 r 32.03 …. 5.10 r 32.05 …. 5.10 r 32.07 …. 5.10 r 33.01 …. 5.8 r 37.01 …. 5.8 r 42.02 …. 5.5 r 44.01 …. 5.8 r 49.01 …. 2.11 r 81A.16 …. 5.13 Surveillance Devices Act 2007 …. 8.155 Traffic Act 1987 s 29AAU …. 7.25 Youth Justices Act 2005 s 15 …. 8.150 s 18 …. 8.150

QUEENSLAND Bail Act 1980 s 7 …. 8.147 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 2003 s 44 …. 8.93 Civil Liability Act 2003 s 22 …. 7.38 Crime and Corruption Act 2001

ss 190, 192, 194 (2), 197 …. 5.180 Criminal Code Act 1899 Ch 62 Div 3 …. 5.13 Ch 62 Div 4 …. 5.13 s 24 …. 3.142, 6.8, 6.9 s 29 …. 6.23 s 52 …. 4.14 s 125 …. 4.14 s 195 …. 4.14 s 229B …. 3.34 ss 348–349 …. 3.142 s 546 …. 8.147 s 567 …. 3.71 s 568 …. 3.71 s 590A …. 2.8, 5.14 ss 590A–590C …. 5.14 s 590AA …. 5.12 s 590AA(2)(e) …. 2.40 s 590AA(4) …. 2.15 s 590AB …. 5.13 s 590AB(1) …. 5.13 s 590AB(2) …. 5.13 s 597A …. 3.71 s 597A(1AA) …. 3.49, 3.65, 3.71 s 597B …. 3.71, 3.78 ss 614–615E …. 2.7, 6.35 s 615 …. 2.7 s 617 …. 2.43

s 619 …. 2.7, 2.11 s 632 …. 4.7, 4.12, 4.20, 4.37, 4.41 s 632(3) …. 4.7, 4.10, 4.20, 4.41, 7.31 s 644 …. 3.66, 8.95 s 668B …. 2.15 s 668D …. 2.14 s 668E …. 2.14 s 669A(2) …. 2.14 s 669A(5) …. 2.14 ss 678–678K …. 2.14, 5.190 s 695A …. 5.85 Sch 1 s 672A(a) …. 2.14 Criminal Law Amendment Act 1894 s 10 …. 8.99, 8.126, 8.129 Criminal Law (Rehabilitation of Offenders) Act 1986 …. 7.142 Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 s 4 …. 3.146, 7.99, 7.101 s 4A(4) …. 4.45, 7.100, 7.107 Defamation Act 2005 s 42 …. 5.194 Drug Misuse Act 1986 …. 4.33 s 46 …. 5.205 s 47 …. 5.205 s 57(d) …. 6.8 ss 119–120 …. 5.205 Evidence Act 1977 …. 3.85, 7.29, 7.34, 8.180 Pt 2 Div 4 …. 8.181 Pt 2 Div 4A …. 8.181

Pt 2 Div 4A Subdiv 1 …. 7.34 Pt 2 Div 4A Subdiv 3 …. 7.34 Pt 2 Div 5 …. 5.205 Pt 3A …. 7.3 Pt 5 Div 6 …. 7.18 Pt 7 …. 7.18 s 3 …. 8.175 s 5 …. 8.188 s 5(1) …. 8.176 s 7(2) …. 5.200 s 8 …. 3.83, 5.165, 5.201 s 8(1) …. 3.84, 3.85, 5.115 s 9 …. 7.28, 7.29 s 9A …. 7.29 s 9B …. 7.28, 7.29 s 9B(2) …. 7.28 s 9C …. 7.29, 7.31, 7.108 s 9D(2)(a) …. 7.36 s 9E …. 7.33 s 10 …. 5.175 s 14(1)(a) …. 5.161, 5.175 s 14(2) …. 5.84 s 15 …. 3.83, 5.115 s 15(1) …. 3.85, 5.180 s 15(2) …. 3.91, 3.102 s 15(2)(a) …. 3.97 s 15(2)(b) …. 3.97 s 15(2)(c) …. 3.107

s 15(2)(d) …. 3.110, 3.117 s 15A …. 7.142 s 16 …. 7.138 s 17 …. 7.118 s 17(1) …. 7.118 ss 18–19 …. 7.148 s 20 …. 7.137 ss 20–21 …. 3.145 s 21 …. 7.33, 7.137 s 21A …. 7.33 s 21A(2) …. 7.33 s 21A(2)(e) …. 7.34 s 21A(6)(b) …. 7.34 s 21A(8) …. 7.33 ss 21AA–21AX …. 7.33 s 21AV …. 5.85 s 21AW …. 7.33 s 21AW(2) …. 7.33 s 21E(2) …. 5.205 s 21M …. 7.33 s 21N …. 7.33 s 21O …. 7.33 s 23 …. 8.61 s 41 …. 7.11 s 42 …. 7.11 s 42A …. 7.11 s 43 …. 6.69 s 48 …. 6.69

s 51 …. 7.18, 8.91 s 59 …. 7.10 s 60 …. 7.9 s 61 …. 7.9 s 62 …. 7.11 s 67 …. 6.70 s 68 …. 6.70 s 74 …. 8.93 ss 78–82 …. 5.194 s 80 …. 5.194 s 81 …. 5.193 s 83 …. 8.189 ss 83–91 …. 8.189 s 85 …. 8.189 s 92 …. 8.175, 8.182 s 92(1) …. 8.176 s 92(4) …. 8.175 s 93 …. 8.180, 8.182 s 93A …. 7.33, 7.34, 8.181 s 93B …. 7.34, 8.74, 8.79, 8.81, 8.181 s 93B(1)(b) …. 8.66 s 93B(2)(a) …. 8.66 s 93B(2)(c) …. 8.75 s 93C …. 8.79, 8.181 s 94 …. 8.175, 8.176, 8.180 s 95 …. 7.13, 7.26, 8.176, 8.188 s 95(1) …. 8.188 s 95A …. 7.13, 7.26

ss 96–103 …. 8.175 s 97 …. 8.180 s 98 …. 8.176 s 101 …. 7.81, 7.151, 8.177, 8.181 s 101(1)(a) …. 7.119 s 101(1)(b) …. 7.91 s 103 …. 8.169 s 129A …. 6.68 s 130 …. 2.29, 3.38, 3.65, 8.181 s 131A …. 7.35 s 132 …. 4.14 s 132A …. 3.12, 3.49, 3.65, 3.70, 3.71 s 132B …. 3.12, 3.38, 3.65 s 132C …. 2.4 Sch 3 …. 8.175, 8.182 Freedom of Information Act 1992 …. 5.232 s 42(1) …. 5.16 s 42(2)(iv) …. 5.16 Jury Act 1995 s 52(2) …. 2.43 s 59A …. 2.13 s 70 …. 5.185 Justices Act 1886 …. 6.31 Pt 4 Div 12 …. 2.5 Pt 9 Div 1 s 222 …. 2.14 s 76 …. 6.16 s 83A …. 5.14 ss 104–134 …. 5.12

s 110A …. 5.13 s 111 …. 8.45 s 142 …. 2.43 Oaths Act 1867 s 17 …. 7.28 ss 17–19 …. 7.28 ss 18–19 …. 7.28 Partnership Act 1891 s 18 …. 8.110 Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 …. 5.17 Ch 11 …. 4.53 Ch 14 Pt 1 …. 8.147 Ch 15 …. 8.148 s 416 …. 8.126 s 418 …. 4.33 s 419 …. 4.33 s 420 …. 8.151 s 421 …. 8.150 s 422 …. 8.152 s 423 …. 8.152 s 424-426 …. 8.148 s 431 …. 5.134, 8.149 ss 436–439 …. 4.33, 8.97, 8.168 s 617 …. 4.58, 4.65, 4.68 Police Powers and Responsibilities Regulation 2012 cl 45(3) …. 4.65 reg 37 …. 8.149 Sch 10 …. 8.149

Sch 10 Pt 6 Div 1 …. 4.58, 4.68 Sch 10 Pt 6 Div 2 …. 4.58, 4.65, 4.68 Sch 10 Pt 6 Div 3 …. 4.58, 4.68 Police Service Administration Act 1990 s 4.9 …. 4.58 Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 s 80(15) …. 7.25 s 80(15A) …. 7.25 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 Ch 7 …. 5.6 Ch 9 Pt 3 …. 6.37 Ch 9 Pt 4 …. 1.3 Ch 11 Pt 5 …. 5.8 r 151 …. 6.3 r 171 …. 6.36 rr 186–190 …. 8.95 r 211 …. 5.7, 5.242 r 214 …. 5.7 r 229 …. 5.10 r 242 …. 5.10 r 250 …. 5.8 r 391 …. 6.48 r 392 …. 7.3 r 414 …. 5.5 r 423(d) …. 7.64 r 425 …. 6.48 r 429 …. 5.76 r 429J …. 7.64

r 501 …. 7.64 r 547 …. 5.8 Youth Justice Act 1992 s 29 …. 8.150

SOUTH AUSTRALIA Acts Interpretation Act 1915 s 10 …. 6.69 Bail Act 1985 s 5(1)(e) …. 8.147 s 6(3) …. 8.147 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 s 46 …. 8.93 Civil Liability Act 1936 s 40 …. 7.38 s 41 …. 7.38 Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1978 s 8(1)(b) …. 4.14 Criminal Investigation (Covert Operations) Act 2009 Pt 2 …. 4.53 Pt 4 …. 5.205 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 7 …. 4.14 s 10 …. 4.14 s 15(5) …. 6.8 s 15C …. 6.8 s 34L(5) …. 4.21 ss 46–48 …. 3.142

s 50 …. 3.34 s 76 …. 4.14 s 131(5) …. 6.8 s 242(4) …. 4.14 ss 271–273 …. 5.17 s 278(1) …. 3.71 s 278(2) …. 3.71, 3.78 s 278(2a) …. 3.71 s 285A …. 2.40, 5.12 ss 285BA–285BC …. 5.14 s 285BA(7) …. 5.14 ss 285BB–285C …. 5.14 s 285C …. 2.8, 5.14 s 288A …. 2.7 s 288B …. 2.11 ss 331–339 …. 2.14, 5.190 s 350 …. 2.15 s 351 …. 2.14 s 351A(2)(c) …. 2.14 s 352 …. 2.14 s 352(1)(ab) …. 2.14 s 352(1)(b) …. 2.15 s 352(1)(c) …. 2.15 s 353 …. 2.14 s 353A …. 2.14 s 354A …. 2.15 s 361 …. 2.43 s 369(1)(a) …. 2.14

Sch 11 …. 5.135 Conciliation Act 1929 s 3 …. 1.3 Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Act 2007 …. 5.17 District Court Act 1991 s 32 …. 1.3 s 32(3) …. 5.105 District Court Civil Rules 2006 Ch 10 …. 1.3 Evidence Act 1929 …. 4.37, 6.33, 7.29, 8.181 Pt 3 Div 3 …. 3.12 Pt 4 Div 4 …. 7.18 Pt 6C …. 7.3 Div 9 …. 5.213 s 4 …. 7.33 ss 6–12 …. 7.28 s 6(2) …. 7.28 s 6(3) …. 7.28 s 9(1) …. 7.28, 7.29 s 9(2)(b) …. 7.29 s 9(3) …. 7.30 s 9(4) …. 4.21, 7.31, 7.36 s 12A …. 4.37, 7.31 s 12A(2) …. 4.21, 4.37 s 12AB …. 7.34 ss 12AB–14A …. 7.33 s 13 …. 7.33 s 13(7) …. 7.33

s 13A …. 7.33 s 13A(12) …. 7.33 s 13B …. 7.33 s 13BA …. 7.34 s 13BA(6) …. 7.33 s 13C …. 7.34 s 13D …. 7.34 s 14 …. 7.35 s 14A …. 7.35 s 16 …. 5.200 s 18 …. 3.83, 5.115 s 18(1) …. 5.112 s 18(1)(b) …. 5.118 s 18(1)(c) …. 3.85, 5.180 s 18(1)(d) …. 3.91 s 18(1)(d)(i) …. 3.97, 3.98 s 18(1)(d)(ii) …. 3.107 s 18(1)(d)(iii) …. 3.110, 3.112 s 18(1)(d)(iv) …. 3.97, 3.117 s 18(1)(V) …. 3.85 s 18(1)(VI) …. 3.91 s 18(1)(VI)(a) …. 3.97, 3.98 s 18(1)(VI)(b) …. 3.107 s 18(1)(VI)(ba) …. 3.112 s 18(1)(VI)(c) …. 3.97, 3.117 s 18(2) …. 3.85, 3.110, 3.112 s 18(3) …. 3.110, 3.112 s 18A …. 5.115

s 21 …. 5.165, 5.201 s 22 …. 7.137 ss 22–25 …. 3.145 s 23 …. 7.137 s 24 …. 7.137 s 25 …. 7.33, 7.137, 7.138 s 25(5) …. 7.138 s 26 …. 7.138 s 27 …. 7.118 s 28 …. 7.148 s 29 …. 7.148 s 30 …. 7.10 s 31 …. 7.9 s 34 …. 3.66, 8.95 s 34A …. 5.194 s 34AB …. 4.54, 4.63, 4.65 s 34AB(1) …. 4.65 s 34AB(2) …. 4.65, 4.68 s 34AB(3) …. 4.54, 4.59, 4.61, 4.62 s 34AB(4) …. 4.54, 4.59 s 34AB(5) …. 4.65 s 34C …. 8.173, 8.188 s 34CA …. 4.57, 7.34 s 34CB …. 4.51 s 34D …. 4.37, 7.34, 8.173 s 34D(2) …. 4.84 s 34E …. 7.9 s 34F …. 7.11

s 34G …. 8.173 s 34G(2)(a) …. 8.169 s 34G(2)(b) …. 8.85 s 34K …. 8.61 s 34KA …. 8.66, 8.74, 8.181 ss 34KA–34KD …. 7.34 s 34KB …. 8.181 s 34KC …. 6.33, 8.181 s 34KD …. 2.28, 8.181 s 34J …. 8.61 s 34L …. 3.146 s 34L(2)(b) …. 3.146 s 34L(5) …. 4.21, 4.41 s 34E …. 7.9 s 34F …. 7.11 ss 34KA–34KD …. 7.34 s 34M(2) …. 4.45, 7.100, 7.107 s 34O …. 3.64 s 34P …. 2.87, 3.31, 3.64 s 34P(1) …. 3.64 s 34P(2) …. 3.64 s 34P(2)(a) …. 3.64, 3.69 s 34P(2)(b) …. 3.64 s 34P(3) …. 3.64 s 34P(4) …. 3.64, 3.68 s 34P(5) …. 3.64, 3.68 s 34Q …. 3.64 s 34R …. 2.87, 3.64

s 34R(1) …. 3.75 s 34S …. 3.49, 3.64, 3.70, 3.71 s 35 …. 6.69 ss 36–39 …. 7.11 s 37 …. 6.69 s 37A …. 6.69 s 37B …. 6.69 s 39 …. 7.18, 8.91 s 42 …. 8.184 s 45 …. 7.14, 8.30, 8.190 s 45A …. 8.183, 8.184, 8.187 s 45B …. 8.174, 8.183, 8.187 s 45C …. 8.187 ss 46–51 …. 8.189 s 52 …. 7.14, 8.174, 8.183, 8.185, 8.186, 8.187 s 52(3) …. 8.186 s 52(6) …. 8.185 s 53 …. 7.14, 8.182, 8.183, 8.184, 8.186, 8.187 s 53(2) …. 8.186 s 54 …. 7.14, 8.200 s 56 …. 7.13, 7.26, 8.188 s 57 …. 7.18, 7.82, 7.86, 8.187 s 59E(4) …. 7.3 s 59J …. 6.68 s 63 …. 6.70 s 64 …. 6.60, 6.67 s 67C …. 5.87, 5.99, 5.100, 5.105, 5.214 s 67C(1) …. 5.101

s 67C(2)(a)–(c) …. 5.100 s 67D …. 5.213 ss 67D–67F …. 5.207 s 67F(2) …. 5.213 s 67F(2)–(4) …. 5.212 s 67F(7) …. 5.213 s 69 …. 5.85 s 69A …. 5.85 Evidence Regulations 2007 reg 3AA …. 4.65 Family and Community Services Act 1972 s 140 …. 4.14 s 245 …. 5.201 s 246 …. 5.104 Freedom of Information Act 1991 …. 5.232 s 12 …. 5.16 Juries Act 1927 s 7 …. 2.7, 6.35 s 57 …. 2.13 Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 …. 8.155 Local Government Act 1999 Ch 14 Pt 3 …. 6.69 Magistrates Court Act 1991 s 27 …. 1.3 s 38(1) …. 6.48 s 42 …. 2.15 s 42(1)k …. 2.14 Magistrates Court Rules 1992 …. 5.14

r 8 …. 5.14 r 26 …. 5.14 Partnership Act 1891 s 15 …. 8.110 s 65 …. 8.110 Road Traffic Act 1961 s 47K …. 7.25 Royal Commission Act 1917 …. 5.146 Summary Offences Act 1953 s 5 …. 6.16 ss 67–82 …. 5.17 s 74C …. 8.168 ss 74C–74G …. 8.97, 8.168 s 75 …. 8.147 s 78 …. 8.148 s 79A …. 5.134, 8.148 s 79A(1)(b)(iii) …. 8.149 s 79A(1a) …. 8.150 s 79A(1b) …. 8.150 s 79A(3) …. 8.149 ss 74C–74G …. 4.33 s 79A …. 4.33 Summary Procedure Act 1921 …. 6.31 Pt 5 Div 2 …. 5.12 Pt 5 Div 4 …. 2.5 s 56 …. 6.16 ss 62–62C …. 2.43 s 104 …. 5.13

ss 104–107 …. 5.13 s 107(1) …. 6.31 Supreme Court Act 1935 s 65 …. 1.3 s 65(6) …. 5.105 s 67 …. 7.64 Supreme Court Rules 1987 r 38 …. 5.76 Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 Ch 7 Pt 8 …. 8.95 Ch 10 …. 1.3 r 10 …. 6.48 r 32 …. 5.10 r 104 …. 6.36 rr 107–108 …. 6.37 r 117 …. 6.48 r 118 …. 6.48 r 136 …. 5.7, 5.242 rr 136–152 …. 5.6 r 146 …. 5.10 r 149 …. 5.8 rr 153–155 …. 5.8 rr 159–161 …. 5.8 r 160 …. 5.76, 7.64 r 172 …. 5.5 r 208 …. 7.64 r 213 …. 7.64 r 271(3) …. 5.76

Supreme Court Rules (Criminal) 2014 rr 58–59 …. 5.13 Victims of Crime Act 2001 s 22(3) …. 4.14 Young Offenders Act 1993 …. 5.205 s 5 …. 6.23 s 14 …. 8.150

TASMANIA Acts Interpretation Act 1931 s 39 …. 6.69 s 39A …. 6.69 Civil Liability Act 2002 s 22 …. 7.38 Criminal Code Act 1924 s 2A …. 3.142 s 14 …. 3.142, 6.8, 6.9 s 18 …. 6.23 s 27 …. 5.17, 8.147 s 60(1) …. 4.14 s 67(3) …. 4.14 s 96 …. 4.14 s 125A …. 3.34 s 136 …. 4.41 s 185 …. 3.142 s 311(2) …. 3.71 s 326 …. 3.71 s 350(1)(a) …. 6.31

s 350(1)(ab) …. 6.31 s 361A …. 2.40, 5.12 s 363 …. 3.71, 3.78 s 368A …. 2.8, 5.14 s 369 …. 2.43 s 371 …. 2.7, 2.11 s 371A …. 7.100, 7.107 ss 387–388 …. 2.15 s 388AA(3) …. 2.14 ss 390–397AF …. 2.14, 5.190 s 401 …. 2.14 s 401(2)(b) …. 2.14 s 402 …. 2.14 s 402(2) …. 2.14 s 402(5) …. 2.14 s 402A …. 2.14 Sch 1 s 419(a) …. 2.14 Criminal Law (Detention and Interrogation) Act 1995 s 4 …. 8.148 s 4(3) …. 8.147 s 6 …. 4.33 Defamation Act 2005 s 42 …. 5.194 Evidence Act 1910 s 81F …. 8.170 s 81K …. 8.87, 8.170 Evidence Act 2001 …. 2.2, 2.25, 2.28, 2.50, 3.3, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.12, 3.17, 3.31, 3.33, 3.40, 3.43, 3.49, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.63, 3.64,

3.68, 3.69, 3.70, 3.82, 3.83, 3.85, 3.87, 3.88, 3.90, 3.91, 3.93, 3.96, 3.99, 3.101, 3.104, 3.106, 3.107, 3.108, 3.109, 3.112, 3.118, 3.119, 3.120, 3.122, 3.127, 3.129, 3.131, 3.133, 3.135, 3.136, 3.137, 3.139, 3.141, 3.145, 3.152, 3.153, 3.154, 3.156, 3.159, 3.160, 3.162, 3.165, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, 4.22, 4.27, 4.30, 4.35, 4.36, 4.39, 4.48, 4.54, 4.55, 4.56, 4.57, 4.59, 4.63, 4.64, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 4.78, 4.79, 4.98, 4.101, 4.102, 4.105, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, 5.24, 5.26, 5.27, 5.31, 5.35, 5.36, 5.39, 5.40, 5.43, 5.47, 5.49, 5.66, 5.67, 5.69, 5.77, 5.83, 5.84, 5.86, 5.92, 5.97, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102, 5.108, 5.118, 5.120, 5.134, 5.135, 5.139, 5.144, 5.154, 5.161, 5.169, 5.175, 5.176, 5.177, 5.184, 5.190, 5.194, 5.201, 5.202, 5.203, 5.204, 5.207, 5.208, 5.214, 5.218, 5.241, 5.247, 5.253, 5.254, 5.266, 6.1, 6.23, 6.57, 6.66, 6.68, 6.77, 7.4, 7.8, 7.14, 7.20, 7.23, 7.26, 7.28, 7.30, 7.34, 7.35, 7.36, 7.54, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.66, 7.71, 7.73, 7.76, 7.78, 7.79, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.91, 7.93, 7.94, 7.95, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 7.113, 7.115, 7.116, 7.118, 7.124, 7.128, 7.134, 7.137, 7.141, 7.142, 7.143, 7.147, 7.148, 7.153, 7.158, 8.6, 8.8, 8.11, 8.12, 8.13, 8.22, 8.27, 8.28, 8.35, 8.48, 8.55, 8.57, 8.59, 8.62, 8.63, 8.65, 8.66, 8.69, 8.79, 8.81, 8.85, 8.87, 8.89, 8.90, 8.100, 8.106, 8.108, 8.112, 8.113, 8.114, 8.119, 8.125, 8.126, 8.127, 8.144, 8.146, 8.149, 8.156, 8.161, 8.162, 8.163, 8.169, 8.171, 8.172, 8.173, 8.191, 8.196 Ch 3 …. 2.45 Ch 4 …. 2.48 Ch 5 …. 2.48 Pt 1.2 …. 2.2 Pt 2.1 Div 1 …. 2.48 Pt 2.1 Div 2 …. 2.48 Pt 3.1 …. 2.48 Pt 3.2 …. 8.93, 8.198 Pt 3.2 Div 2 …. 8.62, 8.195 Pt 3.2 Div 3 …. 8.199 Pt 3.4 …. 8.94, 8.100, 8.101, 8.198 Pt 3.6 …. 3.12, 3.106, 3.135, 3.153 Pt 3.7 …. 3.109, 7.122

Pt 3.8 …. 3.5, 3.90, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109 Pt 3.9 …. 2.48, 4.2, 4.54, 4.55, 4.63 Pt 3.10 …. 2.48, 5.19 Pt 3.10 Div 1 …. 5.19 Pt 3.10 Div 1A …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.214 Pt 3.10 Div 1C …. 5.19, 5.207 Pt 3.10 Div 3 …. 5.19 Pt 3.11 …. 2.29, 2.31, 2.48, 8.196 Pt 4.6 Div 1 …. 7.14, 7.26 Pt 4.6 Div 2 …. 7.13 Pt 4.6 Div 3 …. 6.70 Div 2 …. 5.19, 8.198 Div 3 …. 8.195, 8.200 s 4 …. 2.2 s 4(1) …. 2.2, 5.24 s 4(1)(d) …. 2.4 s 4(2)–(4) …. 2.4 s 8 …. 2.3 s 9 …. 2.3 s 9(2)(b) …. 6.23 s 10 …. 5.199 s 11 …. 7.124, 7.137 s 11(1) …. 6.48 s 11(2) …. 1.53, 2.29 s 12 …. 2.3, 3.83, 5.112, 5.115, 5.176, 5.200, 5.201 s 13 …. 4.14, 7.28, 7.30 s 13(1) …. 7.30 s 13(2) …. 7.30

s 13(3) …. 7.28, 7.30 s 13(5) …. 7.30 s 13(6) …. 7.30 s 13(8) …. 7.30, 7.31 s 14 …. 7.30 s 15(2) …. 5.199 s 16 …. 5.184 s 16(1) …. 5.185 s 17 …. 3.83, 8.126 s 17(2) …. 5.112 s 17(3) …. 5.112, 5.115 s 18 …. 2.26, 5.165, 5.201 s 19 …. 5.201 s 20 …. 2.12, 2.50, 5.115, 5.118, 5.120, 5.128, 5.129, 5.202, 8.126 s 20(2) …. 2.12, 5.120, 5.123 s 20(3) …. 5.132, 5.201 s 20(4) …. 2.12, 5.201 s 20(5) …. 5.120, 5.201 s 21 …. 5.115, 5.201, 5.202, 7.28 ss 21–24A …. 7.28 s 21(3a) …. 5.201 s 23 …. 7.28 s 24(2) …. 7.28 s 24A …. 7.28 s 26 …. 6.48, 7.115, 7.124, 7.137 ss 26–29 …. 7.115 s 26(a) …. 7.3 s 27 …. 3.84, 7.115, 7.124

s 28 …. 7.115 s 29 …. 6.58 s 29(2) …. 7.115 s 30 …. 7.30, 7.35 s 31 …. 7.30, 7.35, 8.12 s 31A(1)(b) …. 5.216 s 32 …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.79, 7.82, 7.83, 7.86 s 32(1) …. 7.79 s 32(2) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b)(i) …. 7.79 s 32(3) …. 7.80 s 32(4) …. 7.81 s 33 …. 5.26, 5.49, 7.76, 7.80 s 33(2)(a) …. 7.80 s 34 …. 7.76, 7.77, 7.84, 7.86, 7.112 s 35 …. 7.81, 7.82, 7.83, 7.154 s 37 …. 5.26, 7.115, 7.117, 7.126 s 37(1)(b) …. 7.117 s 38 …. 6.49, 6.57, 7.97, 7.118, 7.122, 7.123, 8.194 s 38(3) …. 7.122 s 38(4) …. 7.122 s 38(6) …. 7.122 s 38(7) …. 7.118, 7.122 s 39 …. 7.82, 7.156 s 40 …. 7.124 s 41 …. 2.46, 3.83, 3.145, 3.152, 7.33, 7.115, 7.137 s 42 …. 7.115, 7.126

s 43 …. 7.83, 7.97, 7.148, 7.149 s 44 …. 7.153 s 45 …. 7.82, 7.152 s 45(4) …. 7.82 s 46 …. 7.75, 7.129, 7.130 s 47(2) …. 7.19 s 48 …. 7.8, 7.56, 8.199 s 48(1) …. 7.19, 7.56 s 48(1)(c) …. 7.24, 7.56 s 48(1)(d) …. 7.19 s 48(2) …. 7.19 s 48(3) …. 7.19 s 48(4) …. 7.19 s 49 …. 7.19, 8.133 s 51 …. 7.19, 7.82 s 52 …. 7.20, 7.21 s 53 …. 7.23 s 53(1) …. 7.23 s 53(2) …. 7.23 s 53(2)(a) …. 2.43 s 53(3) …. 7.23 s 53(3)(d) …. 7.23 s 53(4) …. 7.23 s 53(5) …. 7.23 s 54 …. 7.23 s 55 …. 2.18, 2.19, 2.23, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.60, 3.141, 4.3, 4.100, 7.40, 7.41, 7.44, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.66, 7.116, 7.146, 8.95 s 55(1) …. 2.23, 2.24, 5.144, 7.54, 7.103

s 55(2) …. 2.19, 7.137 s 56 …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.28, 2.32, 7.44, 7.52, 7.66 s 56(1) …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.23, 2.27, 2.29, 2.46, 7.7, 7.8, 7.10, 8.27, 8.192 s 56(2) …. 7.54 s 57 …. 2.19, 7.8, 7.52, 8.194 s 57(1) …. 2.23, 7.8 s 57(1)(b) …. 2.19, 7.68 s 58 …. 7.8, 7.14, 8.199 s 58(1) …. 2.23 s 59 …. 2.46, 7.98, 8.8, 8.27, 8.57, 8.96, 8.99, 8.169, 8.192, 8.194, 8.199 s 59(1) …. 7.3, 8.8, 8.27, 8.57, 8.96, 8.99, 8.169, 8.192, 8.194, 8.199 s 59(2A) …. 8.27 s 60 …. 2.31, 2.39, 2.46, 4.1, 7.69, 7.70, 7.71, 7.72, 7.73, 7.81, 7.83, 7.91, 7.93, 7.97, 7.102, 7.123, 7.134, 7.151, 8.28, 8.29, 8.50, 8.71, 8.105, 8.194 s 60(1) …. 8.194 s 60(2) …. 7.69 s 60(3) …. 7.81, 8.105, 8.165 s 61 …. 8.195 s 62 …. 8.62, 8.66, 8.75, 8.79, 8.81, 8.83, 8.195, 8.196 s 62(1) …. 8.196 s 62(2) …. 8.196 s 63 …. 7.69, 7.98, 8.89, 8.196 s 63(2) …. 8.74, 8.85, 8.90 s 64 …. 7.69, 7.83, 7.93, 7.98, 8.169, 8.196 s 64(2) …. 7.76, 7.113, 8.85 s 64(4) …. 7.76, 8.85 s 65 …. 7.34, 8.66, 8.74, 8.83, 8.181, 8.193, 8.197

s 65(1)(b) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(c) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(d) …. 8.66 s 65(2) …. 8.82, 8.197 s 65(2)(a) …. 8.82, 8.83 s 65(2)(b) …. 8.29, 8.35, 8.39, 8.50, 8.66, 8.69, 8.75, 8.89, 8.197 s 65(2)(c) …. 7.98, 8.35, 8.50, 8.61, 8.89, 8.197 s 65(2)(d) …. 8.29, 8.75, 8.79, 8.80, 8.197 s 65(3) …. 8.53, 8.197 s 65(3)–(6) …. 8.197 s 65(7) …. 8.79 s 65(8) …. 8.63, 8.74, 8.197 s 65(9) …. 8.63, 8.197 s 66 …. 4.74, 7.34, 7.41, 7.79, 7.83, 7.93, 7.97, 7.98, 7.99, 7.102, 8.106, 8.169, 8.198 s 66(2) …. 7.76, 7.102, 7.113 s 66(2A) …. 7.79, 7.83, 8.198 s 66(3) …. 8.198 s 66(4) …. 7.76 s 66A …. 8.29, 8.31, 8.35, 8.42, 8.44, 8.46, 8.49, 8.50, 8.195, 8.198 s 67 …. 5.18, 8.74, 8.75, 8.82, 8.89, 8.90, 8.196, 8.197 s 68 …. 8.196 s 69 …. 7.13, 8.93, 8.182, 8.199 s 69(3) …. 8.199 s 69(4) …. 8.26, 8.199 s 70 …. 8.57, 8.190, 8.200 ss 70–75 …. 8.200 s 70(1) …. 8.30

s 71 …. 8.200 s 72 …. 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 73 …. 8.85, 8.200 s 74 …. 8.200 s 74(1) …. 8.84 s 74(2) …. 8.84 s 76 …. 2.23, 2.30, 7.38, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 8.49, 8.200 s 77 …. 2.31 ss 77–79 …. 7.38 s 78 …. 4.57, 7.41, 7.42, 7.56, 7.105 s 78(a) …. 7.41 s 78(b) …. 7.41 s 78A …. 7.73, 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 79 …. 2.23, 7.40, 7.41, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.58, 7.59, 7.64, 7.66, 8.71 s 79(1) …. 7.14, 7.41, 7.42, 7.44, 7.52, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.65, 7.66, 7.73, 7.108 s 79(2) …. 4.39, 7.45, 7.51, 7.54, 7.58, 7.62, 7.108, 7.136 s 79(3) …. 7.108, 7.136 s 79A …. 7.108 s 80 …. 6.70, 7.44, 7.57, 7.59, 7.61 s 80(a) …. 7.62 s 80(b) …. 7.53, 7.55, 7.58, 7.65, 7.136 s 81 …. 5.144, 8.94, 8.108, 8.165, 8.194 s 81(2) …. 8.108 s 82 …. 8.99, 8.105 s 83 …. 8.78 s 83(1) …. 8.78 s 83(2) …. 8.78

s 83(3) …. 8.78 s 84 …. 5.135, 8.78, 8.96, 8.97, 8.99, 8.100, 8.126, 8.127, 8.131, 8.137, 8.160 s 84(1) …. 8.126 s 85 …. 5.135, 8.97, 8.99, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.130, 8.131, 8.134, 8.136, 8.137, 8.160, 8.162, 8.163 s 85(1) …. 8.126, 8.129 s 85(1)(b) …. 8.130 s 85(2) …. 8.126, 8.129, 8.130 s 85(3) …. 8.126, 8.128, 8.130 s 85(3)(a) …. 8.129 s 85(3)(b) …. 8.129, 8.130 s 85A …. 4.33, 8.97, 8.168 s 86 …. 8.97, 8.167 s 87(1) …. 8.112, 8.119 s 87(1)(a) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(b) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(c) …. 8.115, 8.117, 8.118 s 87(2) …. 8.114, 8.117 s 87(2)(c) …. 8.117 s 88 …. 7.7, 8.101 s 89 …. 5.139, 5.141, 5.142, 8.98, 8.126 s 89(1) …. 5.144 s 89(2) …. 5.144 s 89(4) …. 5.144 s 90 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.32, 2.33, 2.34, 2.35, 8.97, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.131, 8.134, 8.135, 8.136, 8.137, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.154, 8.160, 8.162 s 91 …. 5.194

s 92(2) …. 5.194 s 92(3) …. 5.194 s 93 …. 5.194 s 93(c) …. 5.190 s 94(1) …. 3.58, 3.152 s 94(3) …. 3.153 s 95 …. 3.11, 3.54, 3.75, 3.82, 3.106, 3.107, 3.135, 4.1 s 97 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 2.87, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.17, 3.26, 3.32, 3.36, 3.37, 3.40, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 ss 97–98 …. 5.18 ss 97–100 …. 3.160 s 97(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 97(1)(b) …. 3.61 s 98 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.23, 3.25, 3.39, 3.40, 3.49, 3.54, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 s 98(1) …. 3.58 s 98(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 98(1)(b) …. 3.60 s 99 …. 3.9, 3.68 s 100 …. 3.9, 3.68, 3.125 s 101 …. 2.15, 2.31, 2.37, 2.87, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.36, 3.37, 3.39, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.127, 3.139, 3.156, 3.159 s 101(2) …. 3.59, 3.60, 3.62, 3.82, 3.127 s 101A …. 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 3.109, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112, 7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.139, 7.140

s 102 …. 2.46, 3.58, 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112, 7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.137, 7.139 s 102(2) …. 3.109 s 103 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.135, 3.145, 3.152, 3.162, 7.97, 7.116, 7.133, 7.137, 7.139 s 103(1) …. 3.83, 3.84, 7.133, 7.137, 7.142 s 104 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.109, 5.115 s 104(2) …. 3.90, 3.114 s 104(3) …. 3.90, 3.104 s 104(3)(b) …. 7.112, 7.144 s 104(4) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.110, 3.112 s 104(5) …. 3.110, 3.112 s 104(6) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.113, 3.117, 3.120, 3.122, 3.123 s 106 …. 7.83, 7.116, 7.133, 7.142, 7.149 s 106(1) …. 7.141, 7.143 s 106(2) …. 7.141, 7.142, 7.143 s 106(2)(a) …. 7.143 s 106(2)(b) …. 7.138, 7.142 s 106(2)(c) …. 7.148 s 106(2)(d) …. 7.112, 7.144 s 106(2)(e) …. 7.142 s 107 …. 7.97, 7.98 s 108 …. 7.90, 7.93, 7.116, 7.133, 7.156 s 108(1) …. 7.97, 7.158 s 108(3) …. 4.74, 7.97, 7.102, 7.158 s 108(3)(a) …. 7.93, 7.152 s 108(3)(b) …. 7.91, 7.92, 7.106 s 108A …. 7.97, 7.98, 7.133, 8.196, 8.199

s 108B …. 7.133 s 108C …. 4.39, 7.51, 7.58, 7.108, 7.133, 7.136, 7.144, 7.146 s 108C(1) …. 7.110, 7.112 s 110 …. 3.82, 3.83, 3.90, 3.106, 3.108, 3.109, 3.127, 3.129, 3.130, 3.134, 3.135, 3.137 s 110(1) …. 3.107 s 110(2) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 110(3) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 111 …. 3.82, 3.108, 7.136 s 112 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.100, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109, 3.130, 3.132, 3.135 s 113 …. 4.69 s 114 …. 2.46, 2.48, 4.58, 4.64, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 5.26, 7.94 s 114(1) …. 4.69 s 114(2) …. 4.69 s 114(2)(c) …. 4.70 s 114(5) …. 4.70 s 115 …. 4.58, 4.64, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74 s 115(3) …. 4.70 s 115(4) …. 4.70 s 115(7) …. 4.70 s 115(8) …. 4.70 s 116 …. 4.10, 4.54, 4.59, 4.61, 4.63, 4.69 s 116(1) …. 4.61 s 116(2) …. 4.59 s 117 …. 5.22, 5.26, 5.28, 5.37, 5.49, 5.58 s 117(1) …. 5.26 s 118 …. 5.24, 5.25, 5.27, 5.28, 5.31, 5.39 ss 118–119 …. 2.46, 2.48

ss 118–120 …. 5.35, 5.47, 5.48, 5.49 s 118(a) …. 5.28, 5.39 s 118(b) …. 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 118(c) …. 5.19, 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 119 …. 5.24, 5.42, 5.43 ss 119–120 …. 5.46 s 120 …. 5.24, 5.42 s 121 …. 5.69 s 122 …. 5.19, 5.54, 5.56, 5.58, 5.59 s 122(1) …. 5.58, 5.59 s 122(2) …. 5.58, 5.59, 5.100 s 122(3) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(a) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(b) …. 5.58 s 122(4) …. 5.58, 5.59 s 122(5) …. 5.58 s 122(5)(a)(i) …. 5.52 s 122(5)(b) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(5)(c) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(6) …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.81 s 123 …. 5.19, 5.70, 5.216 s 124 …. 5.49, 5.57, 5.58 s 125 …. 5.31 s 125(1)(a) …. 5.31 s 125(1)(b) …. 5.31 s 125(2) …. 5.31 s 126 …. 5.59 s 126K …. 5.19

s 127 …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.210 s 127(1) …. 5.208 s 127(3) …. 5.208, 5.210 s 127A …. 5.19, 5.207 s 127B …. 5.19, 5.207 s 127B(1) …. 5.212 s 128 …. 3.87, 5.19, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177, 5.216, 8.164 s 128(1) …. 5.155, 5.176 s 128(1)(a) …. 5.164 s 128(2) …. 5.169 s 128(4)(a) …. 5.164 s 128(10) …. 3.83, 3.87, 5.180 s 128(12)–(14) …. 5.179 s 128A …. 5.19, 5.146, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177 s 129 …. 5.184, 5.185 s 129(4) …. 5.185 s 130 …. 5.205, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218, 5.222, 5.223, 5.231, 8.79 s 130(1) …. 5.216, 5.222, 5.243 s 130(2) …. 5.216 s 130(3) …. 5.241 s 130(4) …. 5.222 s 130(4)(a) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(b) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(c)–(e) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(e) …. 5.205 s 130(5) …. 5.253 s 130(5)(d) …. 5.254 s 131 …. 5.87, 5.88, 5.90, 5.94, 5.95, 5.96, 5.98, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102,

5.105, 5.214 s 131(1) …. 5.88, 5.94, 5.95, 5.97 s 131(2) …. 5.88 s 131(2)(a)–(c) …. 5.100 s 131(2)(d) …. 5.90, 5.100 s 131(2)(f) …. 5.97 s 131(2)(g) …. 5.100, 5.103 s 131(2)(h) …. 5.98 s 131(2)(i) …. 5.92, 5.96 s 131(2)(j) …. 5.96 s 131(2)(k) …. 5.96 s 131(3) …. 5.96 s 131(4) …. 5.96 s 131(5) …. 5.88, 5.90 s 131(5)(b) …. 5.99 s 131A …. 5.19, 5.24, 5.67, 5.70, 5.90, 5.102, 5.176, 5.208, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218 s 131A(1) …. 5.49 s 132 …. 5.166, 5.167 s 133 …. 5.78, 5.169, 5.247 s 135 …. 2.27, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.127, 3.159, 7.41, 7.55, 7.59, 7.64, 7.73, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 8.144, 8.194 ss 135–137 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.32, 2.35, 3.11, 3.90, 3.133, 4.3, 7.124, 7.134, 8.29, 8.127, 8.193 ss 135–138 …. 2.27, 4.55 s 135(a) …. 7.55 s 136 …. 2.31, 2.39, 3.69, 3.79, 3.137, 7.41, 7.69, 7.73, 7.93, 7.102, 8.194 s 137 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.26, 2.27, 2.30, 2.31, 2.35, 2.46, 2.48, 2.70, 3.12, 3.54, 3.59, 3.60, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.104, 3.125, 3.127, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69,

4.70, 7.41, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.67, 7.93, 7.102, 7.108, 7.110, 7.111, 7.112, 7.135, 8.96, 8.127, 8.134, 8.144, 8.159, 8.194 s 138 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.33, 2.35, 2.36, 2.37, 2.46, 2.48, 4.58, 4.68, 4.70, 4.74, 5.62, 5.134, 5.255, 5.258, 5.261, 5.264, 5.265, 5.267, 8.126, 8.127, 8.135, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.155, 8.158, 8.159, 8.160, 8.162 s 138(2) …. 8.127, 8.144, 8.155 s 138(3) …. 2.37 s 138(3)(f) …. 2.37 s 139 …. 5.134, 8.126, 8.149 s 139(2) …. 8.149 s 139(5) …. 8.149 s 140 …. 2.64 ss 140–141 …. 2.58 s 142 …. 2.12, 2.45, 2.91, 3.69, 5.31, 5.35, 7.8, 7.65 s 142(1) …. 8.160 s 142A …. 6.16 s 143 …. 6.69 s 144 …. 6.60, 6.65, 6.71, 6.73, 6.77, 7.54, 7.59, 7.71 s 144(2) …. 6.66 s 144(4) …. 6.66 s 145 …. 6.60 s 146 …. 6.23, 7.13, 7.19, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 ss 146–147 …. 7.13, 7.26 s 147 …. 7.13, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 s 148 …. 7.11 s 149 …. 7.9 s 150 …. 7.11 s 151 …. 7.11 s 152 …. 7.11

s 153 …. 7.11 ss 153–159 …. 8.93 s 154 …. 7.11 s 155 …. 7.11 s 156 …. 7.11, 8.91 s 157 …. 7.11 s 158 …. 7.11 s 159 …. 7.11 s 161 …. 7.14, 8.200 s 162 …. 8.200 s 164 …. 4.9, 4.42, 4.45, 4.99, 4.102, 4.106 s 164(1) …. 4.4, 4.12 s 164(2) …. 4.4, 4.12, 4.14 s 164(3) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.12, 4.20, 4.22, 4.41 s 164(4) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.20 s 164(6) …. 4.7, 4.20 s 165 …. 4.10, 4.11, 4.23, 4.27, 4.28, 4.34, 4.36, 4.42, 4.45, 4.52, 4.75, 4.78, 4.79, 4.100, 4.102, 4.106, 7.93, 7.102, 7.112, 7.123, 8.193, 8.198 s 165(1) …. 4.24, 4.34, 4.36 s 165(1)–(4) …. 4.9 s 165(1)(a) …. 8.120 s 165(1)(b) …. 4.54, 4.56 s 165(1)(c) …. 4.39, 4.77 s 165(1)(d) …. 4.24, 4.27, 4.30, 4.52 s 165(1)(e) …. 4.76 s 165(1)(f) …. 4.22, 4.33, 4.34, 8.168 s 165(1)(g) …. 4.75 s 165(2) …. 4.5, 4.9, 4.10, 4.12, 4.33, 4.36, 4.52, 4.75, 4.100, 4.101, 4.105,

8.120 s 165(3) …. 4.9, 4.100, 7.123, 7.125 s 165(4) …. 4.9, 4.59 s 165(5) …. 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.22, 4.30, 4.34, 4.36, 4.39, 4.41, 4.54, 4.100 s 165A …. 4.36, 4.37, 4.39, 7.31 s 165A(1) …. 4.10, 4.39 s 165A(1)(a) …. 4.20 s 165A(2) …. 4.39 s 165B …. 4.36, 4.51 s 166 …. 7.8, 8.199 s 166(g) …. 5.194 s 167 …. 5.18, 5.194, 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 7.25, 7.64 ss 170–173 …. 7.26 s 171 …. 7.19 s 176 …. 7.61 s 177 …. 7.64 s 177B …. 7.11 s 177C …. 7.11 s 177D …. 7.11 s 177E …. 7.11 ss 178–179 …. 5.194 s 181A …. 8.61 s 182 …. 7.14 s 183 …. 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 8.199, 8.200 s 184 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 187 …. 5.154 s 189 …. 2.12, 2.40, 7.120 s 189(1) …. 8.163

s 189(2) …. 2.42, 8.163 s 189(3) …. 8.129, 8.130, 8.163 s 189(4) …. 2.42, 5.168, 7.30 s 189(5) …. 2.42 s 189(6) …. 2.45, 3.83, 3.87, 8.164 s 189(7) …. 2.45, 8.162 s 189(8) …. 2.45, 8.163, 8.165 s 190 …. 2.46, 2.48, 5.26 s 190(1) …. 2.48 s 190(2) …. 2.48 s 190(3) …. 2.48, 6.68 s 191 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 192 …. 2.26, 2.40, 2.42, 3.104, 3.132, 7.23, 7.93, 7.112, 7.122 s 192(2) …. 3.109, 7.79 s 192A …. 2.40, 3.104, 3.132, 5.12 s 192A(c) …. 3.132 s 193 …. 7.14, 7.19, 7.26, 7.64 s 194A …. 8.61 s 194J …. 5.85 s 194M …. 3.146 s 194M(6) …. 3.147 Sch …. 7.28 Dictionary …. 2.19, 4.54, 4.69, 5.19, 5.26, 7.5, 7.19, 7.73, 7.116, 7.140, 8.12, 8.21, 8.27, 8.100, 8.129, 8.192 Dictionary Pt 1 …. 8.94 Dictionary Pt 2 …. 7.19 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 1 …. 8.199 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 4 …. 8.66, 8.196

Dictionary Pt 2 cl 7 …. 7.122 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 8 …. 5.40 Dictionary cl 4(2) …. 8.196 Dictionary cl 6 …. 8.196 Evidence (Audio and Visual Links) Act 1999 …. 7.3 Evidence (Children and Special Witnesses) Act 2001 …. 7.33 s 5 …. 7.34 s 6 …. 7.34 s 6A …. 7.34 s 8 …. 7.33 s 8(2)(b)(iia) …. 7.34 s 8(2)(b)(iib) …. 7.34 Evidence Regulations 2002 cl 5 …. 3.68 Forensic Procedures Act 2000 …. 5.17 Freedom of Information Act 1991 …. 5.232 Pt XI Div 1 …. 2.14 s 28(1) …. 5.16 Juries Act 2003 s 43 …. 2.13 Justices Act 1959 …. 6.31 Pt VI …. 2.5 s 34 …. 8.147 Listening Devices Act 1991 …. 8.155 Partnership Act 1891 s 20 …. 8.110 s 79 …. 8.110 Road Safety (Alcohol and Drugs) Act 1970

s 25 …. 7.25 Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 s 37 …. 7.64 Supreme Court Rules 2000 Pt 12 …. 6.37 Pt 13 …. 5.6 Pt 13 Div 2 …. 8.95 Pt 20 …. 1.3 r 227(4) …. 6.3 r 259 …. 6.36 r 382 …. 5.7 r 403C …. 5.10 r 403E …. 5.10 r 403FA …. 5.10 rr 436–442 …. 5.8 rr 494–500F …. 5.5 rr 514–517 …. 5.8 r 516 …. 5.76 r 560 …. 7.64 r 569 …. 6.48 r 574 …. 7.64

VICTORIA Bail Act 1977 s 10 …. 8.147 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 s 46 …. 8.93 Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 …. 1.48, 6.14, 8.124

s 7 …. 6.14 s 25(k) …. 5.145 Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 s 344 …. 6.23 Civil Procedure Act 2010 s 65K …. 7.64 s 65M …. 7.64 s 65Q …. 7.64 Confiscation Act 1997 …. 8.95 Crimes Act 1958 Subdiv 30A …. 8.148 s 9AC …. 6.8 s 9AD …. 6.8 s 34C …. 3.142, 6.9 s 38 …. 3.142 s 47A …. 3.34 s 61(2) …. 4.41 s 61(3) …. 4.41 ss 314–315 …. 4.14 s 372 …. 3.71 s 398A …. 3.38 s 459 …. 5.17, 8.147 s 459A …. 5.17 s 464(1) …. 8.147 ss 464A–464B …. 8.148 s 464A(3) …. 8.149 s 464C …. 4.33 s 464E …. 8.150

s 464G …. 4.33, 8.97, 8.168 s 464H …. 4.33, 8.97, 8.168 ss 464–464ZL …. 5.17 s 465 …. 5.17 Criminal Procedure Act 2009 …. 5.13, 5.14 Ch 4 …. 2.5, 5.12, 5.13, 6.31 Ch 8 Div 4 …. 7.33 Pt 3.2 Div 2 …. 5.14 Pt 3.2 Div 3 …. 5.14 Pt 3.3 Div 10 …. 2.43 Pt 4.4 …. 5.13 Pt 4.11 …. 5.13 Pt 5.5 Div 2 …. 5.13 Pt 6.1 …. 2.14 Pt 8.2 Div 3 …. 7.33 Pt 8.2 Div 4 …. 7.33 Pt 8.2 Div 5 …. 7.33, 7.34 Pt 8.2 Div 6 …. 7.33, 7.34 Pt 8.2 Div 7 …. 7.34 s 51 …. 2.8, 5.14 s 54 …. 5.13 s 66 …. 6.30, 6.35 s 69 …. 6.34 s 72 …. 6.17 ss 73–75 …. 2.11 ss 80–87 …. 2.43 s 97(d) …. 5.13 s 110 …. 5.13

s 111 …. 5.13 s 141(4) …. 6.31 s 177(6) …. 6.31 s 179 …. 5.13 ss 179–181 …. 5.12 s 183 …. 5.14 s 185 …. 5.13 s 189 …. 5.14 s 190 …. 2.8, 5.14 s 193 …. 3.71, 3.78 s 194 …. 3.71 s 198 …. 8.61 s 199 …. 5.12 ss 199–205 …. 2.40 s 224 …. 2.7 s 225 …. 2.7 s 226 …. 6.30, 6.35 s 227 …. 2.14, 4.6 s 229 …. 6.34 s 231 …. 2.7 s 233(2) …. 2.8 s 233(3) …. 2.8 s 237 …. 5.14 s 276 …. 2.14, 4.10 ss 295–297 …. 2.15 s 297(1)(b) …. 2.15 s 302 …. 2.15 s 308 …. 2.14

s 327(1)(a) …. 2.14 ss 327A–327S …. 2.14, 5.190 ss 329–330 …. 2.43 ss 339–352 …. 3.146 s 343 …. 3.147 s 349 …. 3.146 ss 353–358 …. 7.33 s 358 …. 7.33 s 361 …. 7.33 s 375 …. 7.33 s 375A …. 7.33 s 382 …. 7.33 s 404 …. 5.14 s 416 …. 5.13 Sch 1 r 5 …. 3.71 Defamation Act 2005 s 42 …. 5.194 Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1986 s 50 …. 4.53 Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 s 21L …. 5.105 s 21M …. 5.105 s 149A …. 8.95 Evidence Act 2008 …. 2.2, 2.25, 2.28, 2.50, 3.3, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.12, 3.17, 3.31, 3.33, 3.40, 3.43, 3.49, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.63, 3.64, 3.68, 3.69, 3.70, 3.82, 3.83, 3.85, 3.87, 3.88, 3.90, 3.91, 3.93, 3.96, 3.99, 3.101, 3.104, 3.106, 3.107, 3.108, 3.109, 3.112, 3.118, 3.119, 3.120, 3.122, 3.127, 3.129, 3.131, 3.133, 3.135, 3.136, 3.137, 3.139, 3.141, 3.145, 3.152, 3.153, 3.154, 3.156, 3.159, 3.160, 3.162, 3.165, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.9,

4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, 4.22, 4.27, 4.30, 4.34, 4.35, 4.36, 4.39, 4.48, 4.54, 4.55, 4.56, 4.57, 4.59, 4.63, 4.64, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 4.78, 4.79, 4.98, 4.101, 4.102, 4.105, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, 5.24, 5.26, 5.27, 5.31, 5.35, 5.36, 5.39, 5.40, 5.43, 5.47, 5.49, 5.66, 5.67, 5.69, 5.77, 5.83, 5.84, 5.86, 5.92, 5.97, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102, 5.108, 5.118, 5.120, 5.134, 5.135, 5.139, 5.144, 5.154, 5.161, 5.169, 5.175, 5.176, 5.177, 5.184, 5.190, 5.194, 5.201, 5.202, 5.203, 5.204, 5.207, 5.208, 5.214, 5.218, 5.241, 5.247, 5.253, 5.254, 5.266, 6.1, 6.23, 6.57, 6.66, 6.68, 6.77, 7.4, 7.8, 7.14, 7.20, 7.23, 7.26, 7.28, 7.30, 7.34, 7.35, 7.36, 7.54, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.66, 7.71, 7.73, 7.76, 7.78, 7.79, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.91, 7.93, 7.94, 7.95, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 7.113, 7.115, 7.116, 7.118, 7.124, 7.128, 7.134, 7.137, 7.141, 7.142, 7.143, 7.147, 7.148, 7.153, 7.158, 8.6, 8.8, 8.11, 8.12, 8.13, 8.22, 8.27, 8.28, 8.35, 8.48, 8.55, 8.57, 8.59, 8.62, 8.63, 8.65, 8.66, 8.69, 8.79, 8.81, 8.85, 8.87, 8.89, 8.90, 8.100, 8.106, 8.108, 8.112, 8.113, 8.114, 8.119, 8.125, 8.126, 8.127, 8.144, 8.146, 8.156, 8.161, 8.162, 8.163, 8.169, 8.171, 8.172, 8.173, 8.191, 8.196 Ch 3 …. 2.45 Ch 4 …. 2.48 Ch 5 …. 2.48 Pt 1.2 …. 2.2 Pt 2 Div 3 …. 8.199 Pt 2.1 Div 1 …. 2.48 Pt 2.1 Div 2 …. 2.48 Pt 3.1 …. 2.48 Pt 3.2 …. 8.93, 8.198 Pt 3.2 Div 2 …. 8.62, 8.195 Pt 3.4 …. 8.94, 8.100, 8.101, 8.198 Pt 3.6 …. 3.12, 3.106, 3.135, 3.153 Pt 3.7 …. 3.109, 7.122 Pt 3.8 …. 3.5, 3.90, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109 Pt 3.9 …. 2.48, 4.2, 4.54, 4.55, 4.63 Pt 3.10 …. 2.48, 5.19

Pt 3.10 Div 1 …. 5.19 Pt 3.10 Div 1A …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.214 Pt 3.10 Div 1C …. 5.19, 5.207 Pt 3.10 Div 3 …. 5.19 Pt 3.11 …. 2.29, 2.31, 2.48, 8.196 Pt 4.6 Div 1 …. 7.14, 7.26 Pt 4.6 Div 2 …. 7.13 Pt 4.6 Div 3 …. 6.70 Div 2 …. 5.19, 8.198 Div 3 …. 8.195, 8.200 s 4 …. 2.2 s 4(1) …. 2.2, 5.24 s 4(1)(d) …. 2.4 s 4(2)–(4) …. 2.4 s 8 …. 2.3 s 9 …. 2.3 s 9(2)(b) …. 6.23 s 10 …. 5.199 s 11 …. 7.124, 7.137 s 11(1) …. 6.48 s 11(2) …. 1.53, 2.29 s 12 …. 2.3, 3.83, 5.112, 5.115, 5.176, 5.200, 5.201 s 13 …. 4.14, 7.28, 7.30 s 13(1) …. 7.30 s 13(2) …. 7.30 s 13(3) …. 7.28, 7.30 s 13(5) …. 7.30 s 13(6) …. 7.30

s 13(8) …. 7.30, 7.31 s 14 …. 7.30 s 15(2) …. 5.199 s 16 …. 5.184 s 16(1) …. 5.185 s 17 …. 3.83, 8.126 s 17(2) …. 5.112 s 17(3) …. 5.112, 5.115 s 18 …. 2.26, 5.165, 5.201 s 19 …. 5.201 s 20 …. 2.12, 2.50, 5.115, 5.118, 5.120, 5.128, 5.129, 5.202, 8.126 s 20(2) …. 2.12, 5.120, 5.123 s 20(3) …. 5.132, 5.201 s 20(4) …. 2.12, 5.201 s 20(5) …. 5.120, 5.201 s 21 …. 5.115, 5.201, 5.202, 7.28 ss 21–24A …. 7.28 s 21(3a) …. 5.201 s 23 …. 7.28 s 24(2) …. 7.28 s 24A …. 7.28 s 26 …. 6.48, 7.115, 7.124, 7.137 ss 26–29 …. 7.115 s 26(a) …. 7.3 s 27 …. 3.84, 7.115, 7.124 s 28 …. 7.115 s 29 …. 6.58 s 29(2) …. 7.115

s 30 …. 7.30, 7.35 s 31 …. 7.30, 7.35, 8.12 s 31A(1)(b) …. 5.216 s 32 …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.79, 7.82, 7.83, 7.86 s 32(1) …. 7.79 s 32(2) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b) …. 7.79 s 32(2)(b)(i) …. 7.79 s 32(3) …. 7.80 s 32(4) …. 7.81 s 33 …. 5.26, 5.49, 7.76, 7.80 s 33(2)(a) …. 7.80 s 34 …. 7.76, 7.77, 7.84, 7.86, 7.112 s 35 …. 7.81, 7.82, 7.83, 7.154 s 37 …. 5.26, 7.115, 7.117, 7.126 s 37(1)(b) …. 7.117 s 38 …. 6.49, 6.57, 7.97, 7.118, 7.122, 7.123, 8.194 s 38(3) …. 7.122 s 38(4) …. 7.122 s 38(6) …. 7.122 s 38(7) …. 7.118, 7.122 s 39 …. 7.82, 7.156 s 40 …. 7.124 s 41 …. 2.46, 3.83, 3.145, 3.152, 7.33, 7.115, 7.137 s 41(1) …. 7.138 s 41(2) …. 7.138 s 41(4) …. 7.138 s 41(6) …. 7.138

s 41(8) …. 7.138 s 48(1)(f) …. 7.19 s 42 …. 7.115, 7.126 s 43 …. 7.83, 7.97, 7.148, 7.149 s 44 …. 7.153 s 45 …. 7.82, 7.152 s 45(4) …. 7.82 s 46 …. 7.75, 7.129, 7.130 s 47(2) …. 7.19 s 48 …. 7.8, 7.56, 8.199 s 48(1) …. 7.19, 7.56 s 48(1)(c) …. 7.24, 7.56 s 48(1)(d) …. 7.19 s 48(2) …. 7.19 s 48(3) …. 7.19 s 48(4) …. 7.19 s 49 …. 7.19, 8.133 s 51 …. 7.19, 7.82 s 52 …. 7.20, 7.21 s 53 …. 7.23 s 53(1) …. 7.23 s 53(2) …. 7.23 s 53(2)(a) …. 2.43 s 53(3) …. 7.23 s 53(3)(d) …. 7.23 s 53(4) …. 7.23 s 53(5) …. 7.23 s 54 …. 7.23

s 55 …. 2.18, 2.19, 2.23, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.60, 3.141, 4.3, 4.100, 7.40, 7.41, 7.44, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.66, 7.116, 7.146, 8.95 s 55(1) …. 2.23, 2.24, 5.144, 7.54, 7.103 s 55(2) …. 2.19, 7.137 s 56 …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.28, 2.32, 7.44, 7.52, 7.66 s 56(1) …. 2.3, 2.17, 2.23, 2.27, 2.29, 2.46, 7.7, 7.8, 7.10, 8.27, 8.192 s 56(2) …. 7.54 s 57 …. 2.19, 7.8, 7.52, 8.194 s 57(1) …. 2.23, 7.8 s 57(1)(b) …. 2.19, 7.68 s 58 …. 7.8, 7.14, 8.199 s 58(1) …. 2.23 s 59 …. 2.46, 7.98, 8.8, 8.27, 8.57, 8.96, 8.99, 8.169, 8.192, 8.194, 8.199 s 59(1) …. 7.3, 8.8, 8.11, 8.19, 8.21, 8.22, 8.23, 8.24, 8.25, 8.26, 8.27, 8.28, 8.33, 8.44, 8.50, 8.53, 8.192, 8.193 s 59(2A) …. 8.27 s 60 …. 2.31, 2.39, 2.46, 4.1, 7.69, 7.70, 7.71, 7.72, 7.73, 7.81, 7.83, 7.91, 7.93, 7.97, 7.102, 7.123, 7.134, 7.151, 8.28, 8.29, 8.50, 8.71, 8.105, 8.194 s 60(1) …. 8.194 s 60(2) …. 7.69 s 60(3) …. 7.81, 8.105, 8.165 s 61 …. 8.195 s 62 …. 8.62, 8.66, 8.75, 8.79, 8.81, 8.83, 8.195, 8.196 s 62(1) …. 8.196 s 62(2) …. 8.196 s 63 …. 7.69, 7.98, 8.89, 8.196 s 63(2) …. 8.74, 8.85, 8.90 s 64 …. 7.69, 7.83, 7.93, 7.98, 8.169, 8.196

s 64(2) …. 7.76, 7.113, 8.85 s 64(4) …. 7.76, 8.196 s 65 …. 7.34, 8.66, 8.74, 8.83, 8.181, 8.193, 8.197 s 65(1)(b) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(c) …. 8.66 s 65(1)(d) …. 8.66 s 65(2) …. 8.82, 8.197 s 65(2)(a) …. 8.82, 8.83 s 65(2)(b) …. 8.29, 8.35, 8.39, 8.50, 8.66, 8.69, 8.75, 8.89, 8.197 s 65(2)(c) …. 7.98, 8.35, 8.50, 8.61, 8.89, 8.197 s 65(2)(d) …. 8.29, 8.75, 8.79, 8.80, 8.197 s 65(3) …. 8.53, 8.197 s 65(3)–(6) …. 8.197 s 65(7) …. 8.79 s 65(8) …. 8.63, 8.74, 8.197 s 65(9) …. 8.63, 8.197 s 66 …. 4.74, 7.34, 7.41, 7.79, 7.83, 7.93, 7.97, 7.98, 7.99, 7.102, 8.106, 8.169, 8.198 s 66(2) …. 7.76, 7.102, 7.113 s 66(2A) …. 7.79, 7.83, 8.198 s 66(3) …. 8.198 s 66(4) …. 7.76 s 66A …. 8.29, 8.31, 8.35, 8.42, 8.44, 8.46, 8.49, 8.50, 8.195, 8.198 s 67 …. 5.18, 8.74, 8.75, 8.82, 8.89, 8.90, 8.196, 8.197 s 68 …. 8.196 s 69 …. 7.13, 8.93, 8.182, 8.199 s 69(3) …. 8.199 s 69(4) …. 8.26, 8.199

s 70 …. 8.57, 8.190, 8.200 ss 70–75 …. 8.200 s 70(1) …. 8.30 s 71 …. 8.200 s 72 …. 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 73 …. 8.85, 8.200 s 74 …. 8.200 s 74(1) …. 8.84 s 74(2) …. 8.84 s 76 …. 2.23, 2.30, 7.38, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 8.49, 8.200 s 77 …. 2.31 ss 77–79 …. 7.38 s 78 …. 4.57, 7.41, 7.42, 7.56, 7.105 s 78(a) …. 7.41 s 78(b) …. 7.41 s 78A …. 7.73, 8.71, 8.84, 8.200 s 79 …. 2.23, 7.40, 7.41, 7.45, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.58, 7.59, 7.64, 7.66, 8.71 s 79(1) …. 7.14, 7.41, 7.42, 7.44, 7.52, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.65, 7.66, 7.73, 7.108 s 79(2) …. 4.39, 7.45, 7.51, 7.54, 7.58, 7.62, 7.136 s 79(3) …. 7.136 s 80 …. 6.70, 7.44, 7.57, 7.59, 7.61 s 80(a) …. 7.62 s 80(b) …. 7.53, 7.55, 7.58, 7.65, 7.136 s 81 …. 5.144, 8.94, 8.108, 8.165, 8.194 s 81(2) …. 8.108 s 82 …. 8.99, 8.105 s 83 …. 8.78

s 83(1) …. 8.78 s 83(2) …. 8.78 s 83(3) …. 8.78 s 84 …. 5.135, 8.78, 8.96, 8.97, 8.99, 8.100, 8.126, 8.127, 8.131, 8.137, 8.160 s 84(1) …. 8.126 s 85 …. 5.135, 8.97, 8.99, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.130, 8.131, 8.134, 8.136, 8.137, 8.160, 8.162, 8.163 s 85(1) …. 8.126, 8.129 s 85(1)(b) …. 8.130 s 85(2) …. 8.126, 8.129, 8.130 s 85(3) …. 8.126, 8.128, 8.130 s 85(3)(a) …. 8.129 s 85(3)(b) …. 8.129, 8.130 s 86 …. 8.97, 8.167 s 87(1) …. 8.112, 8.119 s 87(1)(a) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(b) …. 8.117 s 87(1)(c) …. 8.115, 8.117, 8.118 s 87(2) …. 8.114, 8.117 s 87(2)(c) …. 8.117 s 88 …. 7.7, 8.101 s 89 …. 5.139, 5.141, 5.142, 8.98, 8.126 s 89(1) …. 5.144 s 89(2) …. 5.144 s 89(4) …. 5.144 s 90 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.32, 2.33, 2.34, 2.35, 8.97, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.131, 8.134, 8.135, 8.136, 8.137, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.154, 8.160, 8.162

s 91 …. 5.194 s 92(2) …. 5.194 s 92(3) …. 5.194 s 93 …. 5.194 s 93(c) …. 5.190 s 94(1) …. 3.58, 3.152 s 94(3) …. 3.153 s 95 …. 3.11, 3.54, 3.75, 3.82, 3.106, 3.107, 3.135, 4.1 s 97 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 2.87, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.17, 3.26, 3.32, 3.36, 3.37, 3.40, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 ss 97–98 …. 5.18 ss 97–100 …. 3.160 s 97(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 97(1)(b) …. 3.61 s 98 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.46, 3.5, 3.6, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.23, 3.25, 3.39, 3.40, 3.49, 3.54, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.64, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.125, 3.127, 3.139, 3.141, 3.152, 3.154, 3.155, 3.156, 3.159, 3.162, 3.163, 4.1 s 98(1) …. 3.58 s 98(1)(a) …. 3.9, 3.68 s 98(1)(b) …. 3.60 s 99 …. 3.9, 3.68 s 100 …. 3.9, 3.68, 3.125 s 101 …. 2.15, 2.31, 2.37, 2.87, 3.10, 3.11, 3.12, 3.36, 3.37, 3.39, 3.54, 3.55, 3.56, 3.57, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.62, 3.69, 3.70, 3.75, 3.82, 3.127, 3.139, 3.156, 3.159 s 101(2) …. 3.59, 3.60, 3.62, 3.82, 3.127 s 101A …. 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 3.109, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112,

7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.139, 7.140 s 102 …. 2.46, 3.58, 3.83, 3.84, 3.90, 7.83, 7.88, 7.90, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.112, 7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.137, 7.139 s 102(2) …. 3.109 s 103 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.135, 3.145, 3.152, 3.162, 7.97, 7.116, 7.133, 7.137, 7.139 s 103(1) …. 3.83, 3.84, 7.133, 7.137, 7.142 s 104 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.109, 5.115 s 104(2) …. 3.90, 3.114 s 104(3) …. 3.90, 3.104 s 104(3)(b) …. 7.112, 7.144 s 104(4) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.110, 3.112 s 104(5) …. 3.110, 3.112 s 104(6) …. 3.90, 3.100, 3.113, 3.117, 3.120, 3.122, 3.123, 7.83, 7.116, 7.133, 7.142, 7.149 s 106(1) …. 7.141, 7.143 s 106(2) …. 7.141, 7.142, 7.143 s 106(2)(a) …. 7.143 s 106(2)(b) …. 7.138, 7.142 s 106(2)(c) …. 7.148 s 106(2)(d) …. 7.112, 7.144 s 106(2)(e) …. 7.142 s 107 …. 7.97, 7.98 s 108 …. 7.90, 7.93, 7.116, 7.133, 7.156 s 108(1) …. 7.97, 7.158 s 108(3) …. 4.74, 7.97, 7.102, 7.158 s 108(3)(a) …. 7.93, 7.152 s 108(3)(b) …. 7.91, 7.92, 7.106 s 108A …. 7.97, 7.98, 7.133, 8.196, 8.199

s 108B …. 7.133 s 108C …. 4.39, 7.51, 7.58, 7.108, 7.133, 7.136, 7.144, 7.146 s 108C(1) …. 7.110, 7.112 s 110 …. 3.82, 3.83, 3.90, 3.106, 3.108, 3.109, 3.127, 3.129, 3.130, 3.134, 3.135, 3.137 s 110(1) …. 3.107 s 110(2) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 110(3) …. 3.107, 3.108, 3.130, 3.131, 3.132 s 111 …. 3.82, 3.108, 7.136 s 112 …. 3.83, 3.90, 3.100, 3.104, 3.108, 3.109, 3.130, 3.132, 3.135 s 113 …. 4.69 s 114 …. 2.46, 2.48, 4.58, 4.64, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74, 5.26, 7.94 s 114(1) …. 4.69 s 114(2) …. 4.69 s 114(2)(c) …. 4.70 s 114(5) …. 4.70 s 115 …. 4.58, 4.64, 4.69, 4.70, 4.74 s 115(3) …. 4.70 s 115(4) …. 4.70 s 115(7) …. 4.70 s 115(8) …. 4.70 s 116 …. 4.10, 4.54, 4.59, 4.61, 4.63, 4.69 s 116(1) …. 4.61 s 116(2) …. 4.59 s 117 …. 5.22, 5.26, 5.28, 5.37, 5.49, 5.58 s 117(1) …. 5.26 s 118 …. 5.24, 5.25, 5.27, 5.28, 5.31, 5.39 ss 118–119 …. 2.46, 2.48

ss 118–120 …. 5.35, 5.47, 5.48, 5.49 s 118(a) …. 5.28, 5.39 s 118(b) …. 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 118(c) …. 5.19, 5.28, 5.33, 5.39 s 119 …. 5.24, 5.42, 5.43 ss 119–120 …. 5.46 s 120 …. 5.24, 5.42 s 121 …. 5.69 s 122 …. 5.19, 5.54, 5.56, 5.58, 5.59 s 122(1) …. 5.58, 5.59 s 122(2) …. 5.58, 5.59, 5.100 s 122(3) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(a) …. 5.58 s 122(3)(b) …. 5.58 s 122(4) …. 5.58, 5.59 s 122(5) …. 5.58 s 122(5)(a)(i) …. 5.52 s 122(5)(b) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(5)(c) …. 5.49, 5.56 s 122(6) …. 5.49, 7.76, 7.81 s 123 …. 5.19, 5.70, 5.216 s 124 …. 5.49, 5.57, 5.58 s 125 …. 5.31 s 125(1)(a) …. 5.31 s 125(1)(b) …. 5.31 s 125(2) …. 5.31 s 126 …. 5.59 s 126K …. 5.19

s 127 …. 5.19, 5.207, 5.210 s 127(1) …. 5.208 s 127(3) …. 5.208, 5.210 s 127A …. 5.19 s 127B …. 5.19 s 128 …. 3.87, 5.19, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177, 5.216, 8.164 s 128(1) …. 5.155, 5.176 s 128(1)(a) …. 5.164 s 128(2) …. 5.169 s 128(4)(a) …. 5.164 s 128(10) …. 3.83, 3.87, 5.180 s 128(12)–(14) …. 5.179 s 128A …. 5.19, 5.146, 5.157, 5.176, 5.177 s 129 …. 5.184, 5.185 s 129(4) …. 5.185 s 130 …. 5.205, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218, 5.222, 5.223, 5.231, 8.79 s 130(1) …. 5.216, 5.222, 5.243 s 130(2) …. 5.216 s 130(3) …. 5.241 s 130(4) …. 5.222 s 130(4)(a) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(b) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(c)–(e) …. 5.223 s 130(4)(e) …. 5.205 s 130(5) …. 5.253 s 130(5)(d) …. 5.254 s 131 …. 5.87, 5.88, 5.90, 5.94, 5.95, 5.96, 5.98, 5.99, 5.100, 5.101, 5.102, 5.105, 5.214

s 131(1) …. 5.88, 5.94, 5.95, 5.97 s 131(2) …. 5.88 s 131(2)(a)–(c) …. 5.100 s 131(2)(d) …. 5.90, 5.100 s 131(2)(f) …. 5.97 s 131(2)(g) …. 5.100, 5.103 s 131(2)(h) …. 5.98 s 131(2)(i) …. 5.92, 5.96 s 131(2)(j) …. 5.96 s 131(2)(k) …. 5.96 s 131(3) …. 5.96 s 131(4) …. 5.96 s 131(5) …. 5.88, 5.90 s 131(5)(b) …. 5.99 s 131A …. 5.19, 5.24, 5.67, 5.70, 5.90, 5.102, 5.176, 5.208, 5.215, 5.216, 5.218 s 131A(1) …. 5.49 s 132 …. 5.166, 5.167 s 133 …. 5.78, 5.169, 5.247 s 135 …. 2.27, 2.28, 2.31, 3.10, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.127, 3.159, 7.41, 7.55, 7.59, 7.64, 7.73, 7.102, 7.111, 7.112, 8.144, 8.194 ss 135–137 …. 2.23, 2.31, 2.32, 2.35, 3.11, 3.90, 3.133, 4.3, 7.124, 7.134, 8.29, 8.127, 8.193 ss 135–138 …. 2.27, 4.55 s 135(a) …. 7.55 s 136 …. 2.31, 2.39, 3.69, 3.79, 3.137, 7.41, 7.69, 7.73, 7.93, 7.102, 8.194 s 137 …. 2.15, 2.19, 2.23, 2.26, 2.27, 2.30, 2.31, 2.35, 2.46, 2.48, 2.70, 3.12, 3.54, 3.59, 3.60, 3.69, 3.79, 3.82, 3.104, 3.125, 3.127, 4.65, 4.68, 4.69,

4.70, 7.41, 7.54, 7.55, 7.56, 7.59, 7.64, 7.65, 7.67, 7.93, 7.102, 7.108, 7.110, 7.111, 7.112, 7.135, 8.96, 8.127, 8.134, 8.144, 8.159, 8.194 s 138 …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.33, 2.35, 2.36, 2.37, 2.46, 2.48, 4.58, 4.68, 4.70, 4.74, 5.62, 5.134, 5.255, 5.258, 5.261, 5.264, 5.265, 5.267, 8.126, 8.127, 8.135, 8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.150, 8.155, 8.158, 8.159, 8.160, 8.162 s 138(2) …. 8.127, 8.144, 8.155 s 138(3) …. 2.37 s 138(3)(f) …. 2.37 s 139 …. 5.134, 8.126, 8.149 s 139(2) …. 8.149 s 139(5) …. 8.149 s 140 …. 2.64 ss 140–141 …. 2.58 s 142 …. 2.12, 2.45, 2.91, 3.69, 5.31, 5.35, 7.8, 7.65 s 142(1) …. 8.160 s 143 …. 6.69 s 144 …. 6.60, 6.65, 6.71, 6.73, 6.77, 7.54, 7.59, 7.71 s 144(2) …. 6.66 s 144(4) …. 6.66 s 145 …. 6.60 s 146 …. 6.23, 7.13, 7.19, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 ss 146–147 …. 7.13, 7.26 s 147 …. 7.13, 7.26, 8.59, 8.188, 8.199 s 148 …. 7.11 s 149 …. 7.9 s 150 …. 7.11 s 151 …. 7.11 s 152 …. 7.11 s 153 …. 7.11

ss 153–159 …. 8.93 s 154 …. 7.11 s 155 …. 7.11 s 156 …. 7.11, 8.91 s 157 …. 7.11 s 158 …. 7.11 s 159 …. 7.11 s 161 …. 7.14, 8.200 s 162 …. 8.200 s 164 …. 4.9, 4.42, 4.45, 4.99, 4.102, 4.106 s 164(1) …. 4.4, 4.12 s 164(2) …. 4.4, 4.12, 4.14 s 164(3) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.12, 4.20, 4.22, 4.41 s 164(4) …. 4.5, 4.7, 4.20, 4.41 s 164(5) …. 4.14 s 164(6) …. 4.7, 4.20 s 165 …. 4.10, 4.11, 4.23, 4.27, 4.28, 4.34, 4.36, 4.42, 4.45, 4.52, 4.75, 4.78, 4.79, 4.100, 4.102, 4.106, 7.93, 7.102, 7.112, 7.123, 8.193, 8.198 s 165(1) …. 4.24, 4.34, 4.36 s 165(1)–(4) …. 4.9 s 165(1)(a) …. 8.120 s 165(1)(b) …. 4.54, 4.56 s 165(1)(c) …. 4.39, 4.77 s 165(1)(d) …. 4.24, 4.27, 4.30, 4.52 s 165(1)(e) …. 4.76 s 165(1)(f) …. 4.22, 4.33, 4.34, 8.168 s 165(1)(g) …. 4.75 s 165(2) …. 4.5, 4.9, 4.10, 4.12, 4.33, 4.36, 4.52, 4.75, 4.100, 4.101, 4.105,

8.120 s 165(3) …. 4.9, 4.100, 7.123, 7.125 s 165(4) …. 4.9, 4.59 s 165(5) …. 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.22, 4.30, 4.34, 4.36, 4.39, 4.41, 4.54, 4.100 s 165A …. 4.36, 4.37, 4.39, 7.31 s 165A(1) …. 4.10, 4.39 s 165A(1)(a) …. 4.20 s 165A(2) …. 4.39 s 165B …. 4.36, 4.51 s 166 …. 7.8, 8.199 s 166(g) …. 5.194 s 167 …. 5.18, 5.194, 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 7.25, 7.64 ss 170–173 …. 7.26 s 171 …. 7.19 s 176 …. 7.61 s 177 …. 7.64 ss 178–179 …. 5.194 s 182 …. 7.14 s 183 …. 7.8, 7.14, 7.19, 8.199, 8.200 s 184 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 187 …. 5.154 s 189 …. 2.12, 2.40, 7.120 s 189(1) …. 8.163 s 189(2) …. 2.42, 8.163 s 189(3) …. 8.129, 8.130, 8.163 s 189(4) …. 2.42, 5.168, 7.30 s 189(5) …. 2.42 s 189(6) …. 2.45, 3.83, 3.87, 8.164

s 189(7) …. 2.45, 8.162 s 189(8) …. 2.45, 8.163, 8.165 s 190 …. 2.46, 2.48, 5.26 s 190(1) …. 2.48 s 190(2) …. 2.48 s 190(3) …. 2.48, 6.68 s 191 …. 3.66, 5.26, 8.95 s 192 …. 2.26, 2.40, 2.42, 3.104, 3.132, 7.23, 7.93, 7.112, 7.122 s 192(2) …. 3.109, 7.79 s 192A …. 2.40, 3.104, 3.132, 5.12 s 192A(c) …. 3.132 s 193 …. 7.14, 7.19, 7.26, 7.64 Sch …. 7.28 Dictionary …. 2.19, 4.54, 4.69, 5.19, 5.26, 7.5, 7.19, 7.73, 7.116, 7.140, 8.12, 8.21, 8.27, 8.100, 8.129, 8.192 Dictionary Pt 1 …. 8.94 Dictionary Pt 2 …. 7.19 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 1 …. 8.199 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 4 …. 8.66, 8.196 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 7 …. 7.122 Dictionary Pt 2 cl 8 …. 5.40 Dictionary cl 4(2) …. 8.196 Dictionary cl 6 …. 8.196 Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 Pt II Div 2A …. 5.207 Pt IIA …. 7.3 Pt IIA Div 3 …. 2.43 Pt IIAA …. 5.205

s 28 …. 5.207 s 32B …. 5.212 s 32C …. 5.212 Evidence Regulations 2009 cl 7 …. 3.68 Freedom of Information Act 1982 …. 5.232 s 31(1) …. 5.16 Independent Broad-based Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2011 s 144 …. 5.180 Juries Act 2000 s 46 …. 2.13 s 78 …. 5.185 Jury Directions Act 2013 s 15 …. 2.49 s 28(3) …. 4.88 Jury Directions Act 2015 …. 2.13, 3.66, 3.75, 3.136, 4.10, 4.11, 4.12, 4.34, 4.35, 4.36, 4.43, 4.52, 4.54, 4.56, 4.59, 4.61, 4.63, 4.78, 4.79, 4.99, 4.103, 4.105, 4.106 Pt 3 …. 2.13, 4.37 Pt 4 …. 2.13 Pt 4 Div 2 …. 3.75 Pt 4 Div 3 …. 4.8, 4.22, 4.30, 4.34, 4.36, 4.52 Pt 4 Div 4 …. 4.36 Pt 4 Div 5 …. 4.36, 4.51 Pt 4 Div 6 …. 5.115, 5.118 Pt 5 …. 2.13 Pt 6 …. 2.13

Pt 7 …. 2.13 Pt 8 …. 2.13 s 1 …. 2.13 s 4 …. 4.41 s 5 …. 2.13 s 10(2) …. 3.73 s 10(3) …. 3.73 s 11 …. 4.105 s 12 …. 4.34, 4.54, 4.105 ss 12–15 …. 3.136 s 14 …. 2.13, 4.5, 4.10, 4.105 s 15 …. 4.10 s 16 …. 2.13, 2.49, 3.75, 3.136, 4.10, 4.34, 4.105, 5.124 ss 18–24 …. 4.88 s 20 …. 4.88 s 21 …. 2.88 s 22 …. 4.88 s 21 …. 4.86, 4.88 s 24 …. 4.88 s 27 …. 3.75 s 28 …. 3.75 s 29 …. 3.75 s 31 …. 4.75 ss 31–34 …. 4.39 s 31(b) …. 4.77 s 31(c) …. 4.30, 4.52 s 31(d) …. 4.33, 4.76 s 31(e) …. 4.22, 4.30, 4.34

s 32 …. 4.5, 4.22, 4.34, 4.75 s 32(1) …. 4.34 s 32(2) …. 4.34 s 32(3) …. 4.34 s 33 …. 4.20, 4.37, 4.39 s 34 …. 4.36, 4.39, 4.52 s 35 …. 4.54, 4.56, 4.57 s 36 …. 4.54, 4.56, 4.61 s 36(1)(e) …. 4.62 s 36(3)(b) …. 4.59, s 36(3)(c) …. 4.62 s 36(3)(d) …. 4.73 s 37 …. 4.36, 4.54 s 40 …. 4.36 s 41 …. 5.120, 5.124, 5.132, 5.133 s 41(2) …. 5.124 s 41(2)(d) …. 5.120 s 42 …. 5.120, 5.124, 5.132, 5.133 s 44 …. 5.124, 5.133 ss 45–47 …. 6.9 s 51 …. 4.41, 7.107 ss 51–54 …. 4.45, 7.100 s 54 …. 4.41 s 62 …. 2.87, 4.88 s 63 …. 2.73 s 63(2) …. 2.73 s 64 …. 2.73 s 64(1)(d) …. 2.73

s 64(1)(e) …. 2.73 s 65(d) …. 2.12 s 67(2) …. 2.87 s 67(3) …. 2.87 Maintenance Act 1965 s 27 …. 4.14 Major Crime (Investigative Powers) Act 2004 …. 5.17 Partnership Act 1958 s 19 …. 8.110 s 67(1) …. 8.110 Police Regulation Act 1958 …. 5.162 Road Safety Act 1986 s 58(2) …. 7.25 s 58(4) …. 7.25 Supreme Court Act 1986 ss 18–19 …. 5.85 s 24A …. 1.3 s 25(1)(ea) …. 1.3 s 77 …. 7.64 Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 r 49.01 …. 2.11 Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 O 29–33 …. 5.6 O 33 …. 5.8 O 35 …. 8.95 O 42 …. 5.5 O 44 …. 5.8 O 50 …. 1.3

r 13.0 4 …. 6.3 r 23.01 …. 6.36 r 23.02 …. 6.36 r 25 …. 6.37 r 29.02 …. 5.7 r 29.13 …. 5.78 r 32.05 …. 5.10 r 32.07 …. 5.10 r 33.06 …. 5.76 r 37.01 …. 5.8 r 44.03 …. 5.76 r 49.01 …. 6.48 Form 44A …. 7.64 Wrongs Act 1958 s 58 …. 7.38 s 59 …. 7.38

WESTERN AUSTRALIA Aboriginal Affairs Planning Authority Act 1972 …. 8.133 Bail Act 1982 s 6 …. 8.147 Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1998 s 57 …. 8.93 Civil Liability Act 2002 s 5PB …. 7.38 Corruption Crime and Misconduct Act 2003 ss 147, 223 …. 5.180 Criminal Appeals Act 2004

s 7 …. 2.14 s 24(2)(da) …. 2.14 s 4(2)(e) …. 2.14 s 30 …. 2.14 s 46 …. 2.15 s 47(7) …. 2.14 Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 …. 8.168 s 24 …. 3.142, 6.8, 6.9 s 29 …. 6.23 s 319(2) …. 3.142 s 321A …. 3.34 ss 325–326 …. 3.142 s 570D …. 4.33 Criminal Evidence Act 1898 s 1(e) …. 8.164 s 1(2) …. 8.164 Criminal Investigation Act 2006 …. 5.17, 8.156 Pt 12 Div 5 …. 8.148 s 118 …. 4.33, 8.97, 8.168 ss 127–128 …. 8.147 s 136 …. 8.150 s 137 …. 4.33 s 138 …. 4.33 s 138(2)(b) …. 8.149 s 138(3) …. 8.149 s 142 …. 8.147 s 154 …. 2.36 s 155 …. 2.36, 8.168

Criminal Investigation (Covert Powers) Act 2012 Pt 4 …. 5.205 Criminal Investigation (Identifying People) Act 2002 …. 5.17 Criminal Procedure Act 2004 …. 6.31 Pt 3 Div 4 …. 2.5, 5.12 Pt 3 Div 6 …. 5.14 s 35 …. 5.13 s 42 …. 5.12 ss 44–45 …. 5.13 s 44(1) …. 5.12 s 55 …. 2.43 s 56 …. 2.43 s 61 …. 5.13 s 62 …. 5.13, 5.14 ss 62–63 …. 2.8 s 63 …. 5.13, 5.14 s 75(3)(b) …. 7.35 s 78 …. 6.16, 6.21 s 82 …. 6.34 s 87(7) …. 6.31 s 88 …. 2.43 s 96 …. 5.14 ss 96–97 …. 2.8 s 98 …. 2.40 s 97 …. 5.13, 5.14 s 97(4) …. 5.13, 5.14 s 98 …. 5.12, 5.13 s 108 …. 6.30, 6.34

s 118 …. 2.7 ss 118–120 …. 6.35 s 133 …. 3.71, 3.78 s 133(5) …. 3.71 s 133(6) …. 3.71 s 137 …. 5.14 s 138 …. 5.14 s 140 …. 2.43 s 143 …. 2.7 s 145 …. 2.11 Sch 1 cl 7 …. 3.71 Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000 …. 5.180 District Court Rules 1996 r 5.2 …. 5.13 Evidence Act 1906 …. 8.180 s 7 …. 5.200 s 8 …. 3.83, 5.115 s 8(1)(a) …. 5.112 s 8(1)(c) …. 5.118 s 8(1)(d) …. 3.85, 5.180 s 8(1)(e) …. 3.91 s 8(1)(e)(i) …. 3.97 s 8(1)(e)(ii) …. 3.107, 3.110 s 8(1)(e)(iii) …. 3.117 s 9 …. 5.165, 5.201 s 11 …. 5.178 s 11A …. 5.178 s 12 …. 5.178

s 13 …. 5.178 s 15 …. 7.84 s 18 …. 5.204 ss 19A–19F …. 5.207 ss 19C–19F …. 5.212 s 19E …. 5.213 s 19F …. 5.213 s 19G …. 5.213 s 20 …. 7.118 ss 20–21 …. 7.118 ss 20A–20M …. 5.207, 5.214 s 20C …. 5.208 s 20I …. 5.208 s 20J …. 5.208 ss 20K–20M …. 5.207 s 21 …. 7.118, 7.148 s 22 …. 7.148 s 23(1) …. 7.138 s 24 …. 5.175 s 25 …. 3.145, 7.137 s 25A …. 7.33 s 26 …. 3.145, 7.33, 7.137 s 27 …. 5.85 s 30 …. 7.9 s 31 …. 7.10 s 31A …. 2.46, 2.87, 3.12, 3.63, 3.75 s 31A(1) …. 3.63 s 31A(1)(a) …. 3.63

s 31A(2) …. 3.63 s 31A(2)(a) …. 3.63s 31A(3) …. 3.49, 3.63, 3.70, 3.71 s 32 …. 3.66, 8.95 s 32A …. 5.76 s 35 …. 4.14 ss 36A–36BC …. 3.146 s 36BA …. 3.147 s 36BC …. 3.146, 3.147 s 36BD …. 4.45, 7.100, 7.107 s 36BE …. 7.108 s 50 …. 4.7, 4.12, 4.20, 4.41 s 50B …. 7.13, 7.26 s 53(1)(b) …. 6.69, 6.70 ss 54–56 …. 7.11 s 58 …. 6.69 ss 58–61 …. 6.69 s 65(1) …. 7.18, 8.91 s 69A …. 8.93 s 70 …. 6.70 s 71 …. 6.70 s 72 …. 6.60, 6.67 s 73A …. 7.18, 7.82, 7.86 s 73B …. 7.18 s 73BA …. 7.18 s 78 …. 6.69 s 79A …. 7.9 s 79B …. 8.178, 8.188 ss 79B–79F …. 7.13

s 79C …. 8.178 s 79C(1) …. 8.178 s 79C(2a) …. 8.179, 8.182 s 79C(2b) …. 8.179, 8.182 s 79C(4) …. 8.178 s 79C(6) …. 8.178, 8.179 s 79D …. 8.178, 8.179 s 79D(2) …. 8.178 s 79E …. 8.178, 8.179 ss 89–96 …. 7.18, 8.189 ss 97–106 …. 7.28 s 97(2) …. 5.115 s 97(3) …. 7.28 s 100A(1) …. 7.28 s 100A(1)(a) …. 7.29 s 100A(1)(b) …. 7.29 s 100A(2) …. 7.36 ss 106A–106T …. 7.33 s 106B …. 7.28, 7.31 s 106C …. 7.28, 7.31 s 106D …. 4.20, 4.37, 7.31 s 106G …. 7.33 ss 106HA–106HC …. 7.34 s 106HB(7) …. 7.33 ss 106I–106M …. 7.34 s 106P …. 7.33 s 106R …. 7.33 s 106R(7) …. 7.33

s 106RA …. 7.34 ss 120–132 …. 7.3 Freedom of Information Act 1992 …. 5.232 Sch 1 cl 5 …. 5.16 Juries Act 1957 Pt IXA …. 5.185 Limited Partnerships Act 1909 s 6(1) …. 8.110 Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 Pt 5 …. 1.3 s 23 …. 1.3 Oaths, Affidavits and Statutory Declarations Act 2005 s 4(2) …. 7.28 s 5 …. 7.28 Partnership Act 1895 s 22 …. 8.110 Road Traffic Act 1974 s 70(2) …. 7.25 Royal Commission (Police) Act 2002 Pt 7 …. 4.53 s 31(2) …. 4.53 s 32 …. 4.53 Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 O 20 r 8(3) …. 6.3 O 20 r 19 …. 6.36 O 23 …. 6.37 O 26 …. 5.6 O 26 r 1 …. 5.7

O 26 r 12 …. 5.77 O 26A …. 5.6 O 26A r 3 …. 5.10 O 26A r 4 …. 5.10 O 26A r 5 …. 5.10 O 27 …. 5.6 O 28 …. 5.8 O 29A …. 1.3 O 30 …. 8.95 O 31A.10 …. 1.3 O 34 r 5 …. 2.11 O 36A …. 5.8, 5.76 O 36B …. 5.5 O 40 …. 6.48 O 40 r 2 …. 7.64 O 52 r 2 …. 5.8 Sentencing Act 1995 s 140(1)(a) …. 2.14 Supreme Court Act 1935 Pt VI …. 1.3 s 60 …. 2.15 s 71 …. 5.105 s 72 …. 5.105 s 167(1)(q) …. 1.3 Young Offenders Act 1994 s 20 …. 8.150

EUROPE

European Court of Human Rights Art 6(2) …. 6.14

INTERNATIONAL European Convention on Human Rights …. 1.48 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Art 14 …. 5.13, 8.56

UNITED KINGDOM Civil Evidence Act 1938 …. 8.183, 8.188 Civil Evidence Act 1968 …. 8.172 Civil Evidence Act 1995 …. 8.4, 8.172 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 …. 2.6, 7.64 Contempt of Court Act 1981 s 10 …. 5.205 Criminal Appeals Act 1907 …. 2.14 Criminal Evidence Act 1898 …. 3.5, 3.83, 3.84, 3.87, 3.89, 3.90, 3.92, 3.100, 3.102, 3.107, 3.108, 3.109, 3.113, 3.118, 3.119, 3.121, 3.122, 3.124, 3.131 s 1(e) …. 3.83, 3.85, 3.86, 3.87, 3.124, 5.180 s 1(f) …. 3.85, 3.91, 3.92, 3.97, 3.103, 3.124 s 1(f)(i) …. 3.94, 3.95, 3.96, 3.97, 5.180 s 1(f)(ii) …. 3.110, 3.119, 3.129, 3.135 s 1(f)(iii) …. 3.117, 3.118, 3.119 Criminal Evidence Act 1965 …. 8.4, 8.172, 8.180 Criminal Justice Act 1967 s 8 …. 6.25 Criminal Justice Act 2003 …. 7.64 Ch 2 …. 8.4

Pt 11 Ch 1 …. 3.2, 3.20 s 1(2) …. 3.121 s 101 …. 3.53 s 101(1)(d) …. 3.20 s 101(3) …. 3.20 s 332 …. 3.121 Sch 37 Pt 5 …. 3.121 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 ss 32–33 …. 4.19 s 34 …. 5.144 s 35 …. 5.131 Criminal Procedure Act 1865 …. 7.118, 7.149, 7.152 s 3 …. 7.118 s 4 …. 7.148 s 5 …. 7.148 s 6 …. 7.138, 7.142 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 s 3 …. 7.64 s 4 …. 7.64 s 6D …. 7.64 s 7A …. 7.64 Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 …. 7.52 Pt 19 …. 7.64 Evidence Act 1843 …. 5.200 Evidence Act 1938 …. 7.119, 8.82, 8.172, 8.173, 8.177 Ch 28.1(1)(i) …. 8.173 Ch 28.1(5) …. 8.173 Human Rights Act 1998 …. 1.48, 6.14, 6.16, 6.19, 6.21

Interpretation Act 1889 s 9 …. 6.69 Lord Brougham’s Act 1853 …. 5.204 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 s 101 …. 6.16 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s 66 …. 4.65 s 74(1) …. 5.184 s 76 …. 8.131 s 78 …. 4.53 Prisoners Counsel Act 1836 …. 5.114 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 s 4 …. 7.142 s 7(1) …. 7.142

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Constitution 6th Amendment …. 7.64 Federal Evidence Rules …. 8.61 r 401 …. 2.22 r 402 …. 2.22 r 403 …. 2.22, 3.36 r 404 …. 3.36 rr 413–415 …. 3.36 r 803 …. 8.61 s 804 …. 8.61 r 807 …. 8.61

Contents Preface Acknowledgments Table of Cases Table of Statutes

Chapter One: The Fundamental Principles Chapter Two: The Trial Process Chapter Three: Character Chapter Four: Unreliable Evidence: Corroboration and Related Rules Chapter Five: The Adversary Context Chapter Six: Party Presentation and Prosecution Chapter Seven: The Testimonial Emphasis Chapter Eight: Hearsay Index

Detailed Contents Preface Acknowledgments Table of Cases Table of Statutes

Chapter One: The Fundamental Principles A Procedural Perspective The object of procedural rules The nature of material facts: past events Discovering Past Events The correspondence theory of knowledge The inferential process: Wigmorean analysis Probability theory Outline Mathematical probabilities Classical probabilities Frequency probabilities Subjective probabilities The equations of mathematical probability Problems with conceptualising probabilities mathematically Mathematical probabilities and the standard of proof

The non-mathematical approach: ‘inductive probabilities’ and ‘best explanations’ A correct probability approach? The Procedural Environment General considerations The common law adversary trial

Structuring the Rules of Evidence Synopsis

Chapter Two: The Trial Process The Process in Outline Sources of process The ambit of process Pre-trial process Trial process Appeal Following verdict Interlocutory appeals in criminal cases The Essential Tasks of the Trial Court The reception of evidence Two fundamental principles The nature of relevance Relevance and admissibility Discretion Nature and function at trial The residual exclusionary discretions Efficiency, time and cost Fairness Public policy

Determining the reception of tendered evidence Party waiver of rules of admissibility A ‘case to answer’ Proof Degrees of proof The civil standard: balance of probabilities

The criminal standard: beyond reasonable doubt Distinguishing the civil and criminal standards Directing the jury on the criminal standard To which facts does the criminal standard apply? Challenging unreasonable verdicts and applying the proviso

Proof on the voir dire Conclusion: the inductive approach The Ambit of Evidential Rules

Chapter Three: Character Introduction Common law approaches to unreliable evidence Character evidence: one exclusionary principle Character defined in terms of propensity/tendency Reasons for excluding evidence of propensity/tendency The multi-relevance of character evidence Prosecution Evidence Revealing the Accused’s Incriminating Propensity or Tendency The law in principle — an exclusionary presumption The evolution of the common law exclusionary rule The ambit of the common law exclusionary rule Discreditable conduct Discreditable conduct tendered as propensity Relationship evidence Other non-propensity uses

HML v R: the ambit unresolved Justifying exceptional admissibility Justification in principle Striking similarity Specifying a required probative value: the Pfennig test

Applying the Pfennig test Conclusion: the common law rule and the exclusionary principle Legislation affecting the exclusionary principle The uniform legislation Tendency reasoning Coincidence reasoning The nature of ‘probative value’ under ss 97, 98 and 101 ‘Significant probative value’ ‘Probative value substantially outweighing prejudicial effect’

Western Australia South Australia Queensland Determining probative strength: facts in issue Procedural matters Determining admissibility: notice Determining admissibility: onus Evidence upon which admissibility may be determined Multiple counts Inadvertent disclosure Directions to the jury Defence Evidence Revealing a Co-accused’s Incriminating Propensity Cross-examination of an Accused Disclosing Propensity The accused as a witness: two problems Modification of the privilege against self-incrimination Limiting cross-examination revealing the accused’s character The purpose of the legislative compromise The form of the compromise The extent of the prohibition under the Criminal Evidence Act The first exception: matters establishing facts in issue

The remaining exceptions: procedural issues The second exception: good character in issue The third exception: imputations against the character of the prosecutor or prosecution witnesses The fourth exception: evidence against a co-accused Evidence of Accused’s Propensity Tendered by the Defence Bad character of the accused Good character of the accused The nature and purpose of good character evidence Rebutting evidence of good character Directing the jury where good character raised Evidence Revealing the Propensity of a Third Party Defence evidence revealing the character of third parties The character of complainants in sexual assault cases Evidence Revealing Propensity in Civil Actions Where a party’s character is a material fact in issue Other evidence revealing the propensity of a party Evidence revealing the disposition of third parties Conclusion

Chapter Four: Unreliable Evidence: Corroboration and Related Rules Introduction Rules of ‘exclusion’ Rules requiring confirmation or warning Testimony Requiring Mandatory Corroboration Testimony Requiring a Mandatory Corroboration Warning The nature of the warning and the testimony embraced by it

Accomplices Police testimony of disputed confessions Testimony Requiring Warning Only as a Matter of Practice Children Sexual assault complainants Agents provocateurs (entrapment) Identification evidence The nature and risks of identification testimony The requirement to warn The warning: factors relevant to the reliability of identification evidence Discretionary exclusion of identification evidence The exclusionary rules in the Uniform Acts The effect of supporting evidence on the obligation to warn The cumulative effect of identification evidence The admissibility of out-of-court assertions of identity and pictures used for identification Other unreliable testimony The Nature of Corroborative Evidence Independence Implication in the crime charged Mutual corroboration Functions of Judge and Jury: Directing the Jury Where corroboration or a corroboration warning is mandatory Where a warning is required as a matter of practice to avoid a miscarriage of justice Conclusion

Chapter Five: The Adversary Context Access to Information

Introduction Rules giving access to information Civil cases Criminal cases The Nature of Rules Restricting Access to Information Adversary Restrictions Upon Access to Information Legal professional privilege (client legal privilege) Two privileges The communications (advice) privilege Lawyers and clients Legal professional advice Confidentiality Bona fides Communication made for the dominant purpose of legal advice

Material collected for litigation Limits to legal professional privilege Copies of documents Client’s privilege: waiver Only the communication or work-product is protected The privilege is a bar to access, not a rule of admissibility The public policy limit Statutory removal of the privilege

Claims to privilege: some procedural points Legal professional privilege and other rules and privileges preventing disclosure Conclusion The privilege in aid of settlement Justification Scope Costs Criminal cases Waiver: whose privilege?

Proceedings in which privilege may be claimed Secondary evidence of privileged admissions Public policy limits Negotiations between estranged spouses Alternative dispute resolution The privilege against self-incrimination Introduction: the adversary rationale Incompetence of accused and spouse as witnesses for the prosecution The accused The accused’s spouse

The accused’s right to silence The privilege of the accused not to testify on oath for the defence Comment and direction upon the accused’s failure to testify on oath The privilege of the accused to remain silent when questioned before trial

The privilege of citizens to refuse to provide answers or to produce documents that are self-incriminatory Scope Punishment, penalty, forfeiture and ecclesiastical censure Claiming the privilege Legislation affecting the privileges

The immunity of judges and jurors from testifying on the reasons for decisions Two adversary restrictions upon the tender of evidence The evidentiary rule flowing from the doctrine of res judicata The rule in Hollington v Hewthorn Public Policy Restrictions Upon Access to Information Introduction Parliamentary privilege Restrictions protecting marriage and family relationships Restrictions protecting other confidential relationships At common law

Under legislation Scope and nature Priest–penitent Doctor–patient Counsellors and complainants of sexual assault Professional confidential relationships and journalists’ sources

Public interest immunity General nature The public interests involved Nature of immunity Contents claims Class claims

Striking the balance: the procedural problems The rejection of otherwise admissible evidence on grounds of public interest

Chapter Six: Party Presentation and Prosecution Introduction Burden of Proof: Nature and Incidence Evidential and persuasive burdens The incidence of the burdens in criminal cases The incidence of the burdens in civil cases Legislative allocation of the burdens of proof Presumptions No Case to Answer Theory Criminal cases Civil cases The significance of the opponent’s failure to call evidence Material Facts Determined from Information Presented by the Parties Theory

The courts’ power to call witnesses Court intervention into the calling and questioning of witnesses Judicial notice

Chapter Seven: The Testimonial Emphasis Introduction Documentary Evidence Definition Authentication Tender of original Real Evidence Testimonial Evidence Outline Witnesses testify upon oath Testimonial formalities The testimony of children and other vulnerable witnesses Formalities and competency Formalities and credit Witnesses testify to facts, not opinions The rule and its rationale Observational inferences Example: sobriety and consequent capacity Expert assistance in drawing inferences: a functional approach Threshold tests at common law for expert knowledge Liberal relevancy Sufficient reliability determined by the court General acceptance within the relevant scientific community: Frye and Daubert

Current Australian position At common law

Under the uniform legislation

Ad hoc experts Two illusory tests of admissibility Common knowledge Ultimate issues and legal standards

Procedural aspects Adversarial presentation of expert testimony Establishing the admissibility of expert testimony: the voir dire Form of expert assistance Establishing primary facts through admissible evidence General expertise not subject to proof

The opinions of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander groups under the uniform legislation Facts and inferences are ultimately decided by the trier of fact Witnesses testify orally from memory Memory and its refreshment In-court refreshment of memory Out-of-court refreshment of memory Prior statements of witnesses General rule: prior consistent statements inadmissible Exception: prior statements rebutting alleged invention Exception: prior statements identifying accused Recent complaints in sexual assault cases Statements induced by hypnosis Questioning witnesses Examination-in-chief Scope and purpose: the bolster rule The prohibition against leading questions Hostile and unfavourable witnesses

Cross-examination The right to cross-examine

Issue cross-examination: introducing evidence Issue cross-examination: satisfying the rule in Browne v Dunn Credibility cross-examination Pursuing credit/credibility beyond cross-examination the general prohibition Exceptions to the general rule Cross-examination on documents

Re-examination

Chapter Eight: Hearsay Scope of the Hearsay Rule Rationale and definition Out-of-court ‘statements’ Statements tendered as assertions Narrative statements Assertions part of the res gestae Assertions of knowledge, belief and intention Assertions of physical sensation and health The availability of the maker of an out-of-court statement Machine-generated information Exceptions to the Hearsay Prohibition Common Law (and Related Statutory) Exceptions The so-called res gestae exceptions: spontaneous statements Out-of-court statements by persons since deceased (or otherwise unavailable) Statements against interest Statements in the course of duty Statements as to public or general rights Statements by relatives as to pedigree Dying declarations Post-testamentary statements by testators about the contents of their wills

Statements in public documents Admissions and confessions Terminology and the rationale for a hearsay exception Defining admissions and confessions Personal knowledge of admitted facts Self-serving statements Parties and their privies: vicarious admissions and confessions Vicarious admissions and confessions: the co-conspirator rule Confessions and admissions in criminal cases The rules and their rationale The voluntariness requirement The fairness discretion Unfairness as the unacceptable risk of wrongful conviction Unfairness as procedural impropriety

The public policy discretion Criminal investigations: standards of propriety Excluding for impropriety Appeals Determining the reception of confessions: the voir dire Statutory Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule Introduction The English approach and its variations Legislation based on the Evidence Act 1938 (UK) Legislation derived from the Criminal Evidence Act 1965 (UK) Other legislation admitting hearsay evidence in criminal cases Business records A more liberal approach to documents: South Australia Computer output

Bankers’ books and other books of account Transportation documents The Uniform Legislation The definition of hearsay Exceptions to the prohibition First-hand hearsay Business records Other exceptions Index

[page 1]

Chapter One

The Fundamental Principles A Procedural Perspective The object of procedural rules 1.1 The rules of evidence constitute part of the rules of procedure. In continental and other jurisdictions based upon civil law (for example, China) it is a part not dealt with separately, but in common law jurisdictions the rules of evidence have acquired a sophistication and complexity that has led to their separate treatment. As a consequence, there has been a tendency for these rules to lose their procedural perspective and be looked upon as a series of separate arbitrary and technical rules which apply seriatim during the course of trial. But, although the common law rules of evidence are capable of separate treatment, it is only by giving emphasis to their procedural context that their purpose can be seen and their primary justification understood. Consequently, this first chapter explains and classifies common law rules of evidence to give prominence to that procedural context. Procedural rules appear to have two overall purposes: to provide a framework within which citizens can settle disputes; and to provide machinery for the broader public function of law enforcement. In most cases, where a court is called upon to pronounce judgment, these two objectives coincide, as the court applies the appropriate rule in settlement of the dispute. But these bald assertions require some justification. Criminal cases most obviously illustrate the notion of dispute settlement

through law enforcement, with public prosecutors seeking to persuade courts that definitive rules apply to the facts alleged to produce conviction. Common law civil cases, on the other hand, appear at first sight to be exercises only in dispute settlement. Parties, not the court, decide whether proceedings will be taken, whether additional parties will be joined, the issues to be resolved, the evidence and arguments to be considered, and the extent to which witnesses will be examined and cross-examined. Parties may agree upon facts through admissions, and at any time before judgment may agree upon a settlement of their dispute. There is some authority for the proposition that the parties can stipulate the rule they wish the court to apply [page 2] in resolution of their differences.1 Parties can waive the strict application of procedural and evidential rules: see 2.46–2.49. Only when the parties transcend public policy or the bounds of criminal legality will courts intervene of their own motion.2 Otherwise, civil courts remain passive and reach their decisions, on the balance of probabilities, upon the basis only of the materials presented to them. This all appears as a procedure designed to determine disputes upon the relative merits of a discourse defined by the parties, not as a procedure designed to enforce society’s laws following an accurate determination of past events in the real world. But appearances may be deceptive, and it is argued that in both criminal and civil cases, when courts are called upon to settle disputes formally, they are called upon to settle them, at least so far as possible, through law enforcement. This requires some explanation. 1.2 Disputes can be settled in a variety of ways, from battle and ordeal to mediation, arbitration and judgment. The former methods, now rejected, called upon some external authority (deity or devil) or brute power to determine the appropriate outcome. The latter, now accepted, assume that humans are themselves capable of determining, in accordance with some rational logic belonging to their own world, the appropriate outcome of disputes. These latter methods are described by Twining3 as ‘the rationalist tradition’. Of these latter rational techniques a clear distinction can be drawn between

techniques seeking to persuade parties to settle their differences through agreement, and techniques that rather impose solutions upon parties. Eckhoff draws the distinction in discussing the relative roles of mediator and judge:4 The judge is distinguished from the mediator in that his activity is related to the level of norms rather than to the level of interests. His task is not to try to reconcile the parties but to reach a decision about which of them is right. This leads to several important differences between the two methods of conflict-resolution. The mediator should preferably look forward, toward the consequences which may follow from the various alternative solutions, and he must work on the parties to get them to accept a

[page 3] solution. The judge, on the other hand, looks back to the events which have taken place (eg agreements which the parties have entered into, violations which one has inflicted on the other, etc) and to the norms concerning acquisition of rights, responsibilities, etc which are connected with these events. When he has taken his standpoint on this basis, his task is finished.

What requires emphasis is that a mediator seeks a solution to a dispute through an agreement that makes no inherent claim to correctness or validity. It is enough that the parties agree. Future interests may in some cases be decisive, but there are no limits upon the matters that may be put by or to the parties in an attempt to reach agreement. Past events may assume importance (particularly where a prediction is made of the probable action of a judge should the dispute reach court), but not necessarily. 1.3 The principal techniques for settling disputes through agreement are negotiation, mediation and conciliation. Negotiation proceeds directly between parties, while mediation and conciliation are conducted by third parties who intervene to a greater or lesser degree in an attempt to encourage party agreement. These techniques have always played an important role in the settlement of disputes in Australia. Most civil claims are settled out of court through negotiation, and conciliation procedures have long existed in Australia to encourage the settlement by agreement of industrial and matrimonial disputes. In South Australia, judges have been empowered since 1929 to seek settlement before proceeding to formal trial and judgment.5 More recently, under the banner of ‘alternative dispute resolution’, these techniques have assumed a prominent place in all Australian jurisdictions as the most cost-effective and satisfactory methods of solving disputes.6 Not only do many disputants now

pursue settlement through mediation centres, but all courts have procedures for encouraging parties to agree before the matter goes to trial.7 But while agreement makes no claim to correctness or validity, judgment, it is submitted, does make that claim. It may be that many disputes are capable of settlement through agreement, and that this is the more appropriate mode of settlement. And it [page 4] can be strongly argued that the control given to parties during common law civil litigation is justified as a continuing encouragement for parties to settle. But where agreement cannot be achieved, and the matter goes to court (or indeed, so-called ‘arbitration’)8 for imposed settlement, in both the criminal and the civil sphere, courts are called upon to strive for that solution which is in some sense correct. 1.4 But in what sense correct? From what standpoint is a solution correct? By what form of reasoning can correct solutions be reached in this context? The only possible standpoint is that of someone within the world seeking a rational solution to a dispute, a solution that can apply either generally in lieu of agreement or at least apply where agreement breaks down. The form of reasoning is inherent in the very idea of judgment. The traditional description of judgment is that given by the positivist. Positivists assert that courts merely apply promulgated legal rules to the facts before them. The rules stipulate what must be done in a particular fact situation. Having isolated the relevant rule and the facts constituting the dispute, courts reach correct decisions by applying the relevant rule to the facts as found. Jerome Frank9 describes this process in symbolic form as R × F = D. It is in this positivist sense that it can be asserted that the object of procedural rules is to settle disputes correctly by means of law enforcement. This positivist approach dominates legal practice. Facts are asserted or pleaded with rules in mind. Clients come to lawyers asking what solution ‘the law’ provides to their problems. Law students sit in lectures expecting to learn ‘the law’ so that they can apply it in practice to their clients’ circumstances. As Brennan CJ said in Nicholas v R:10

As the rights prescribed by a court’s judgment … declare or are founded on the antecedent rights and liabilities of the parties … the court must find the facts and apply the law which, at the relevant time, prescribes those antecedent rights and liabilities.

It is assumed that a rule can provide an answer to every fact situation giving rise to dispute. Nevertheless, there are serious difficulties in using the positivist approach in every case to describe the way in which decisions are reached. Rules are often not clear in their application to particular situations, either because their formulation is ambiguous or because their application would produce a decision with which the judge cannot [page 5] agree. And eventually rules run out and do not cater for particular situations. Positivists can provide no logical answer to these difficult cases, leaving decision to the courts’ ‘discretion’. Dworkin11 attempts to avoid the conundrum by arguing that rules are not what they literally appear to be and must be refined, if necessary by a modern day Hercules, in light of the principles that can be discovered in the total history and tradition of the common law, to produce correct decisions in hard cases. Non-positivists, in particular natural lawyers, argue that rules promulgated by legislatures and courts are subject to the ultimate restraint of some further authority, to be found either in an external deity, or in the collective conscience of society, or in some notion of fundamental and inalienable human rights, or in the individual conscience of the judge. By this approach there are rules which ultimately produce correct solutions in hard cases — but they are promulgated from outside. Others argue that difficult cases cannot be decided by rules at all and must be determined on the uniqueness of their facts.12 But leaving these hard cases aside, the Frankian equation remains in most cases the conventional description of how courts reach solutions to the disputes brought before them. It is in this sense that it may be asserted that the general object of the procedural law is to settle disputes correctly through law enforcement. If this is so, then the procedural system exists to provide a suitable environment for the application of appropriate rules to the facts giving rise to a dispute. Even if one rejects this positivist stance and argues that correct decisions are reached in

some other way, it is likely that the facts of the dispute will remain decisive.13 Therefore, as a minimum, the procedural system exists to provide an environment suitable to the discovery of those facts giving rise to the dispute. For one way or another, facts are decisive.

The nature of material facts: past events 1.5 If one accepts the positivist description of judgment, then the common law procedural system is centrally concerned with the discovery of those facts that entitle a party to remedy under a particular legal rule. The applicable legal rule defines the facts to be established to entitle remedy under that rule. These facts may be referred [page 6] to as the material facts. If one rejects the positivist position, some other method must be devised for isolating those facts, or other criteria, that determine the settlement of a dispute. In Australia, as in all Western liberal democratic societies, it is left to the parties in both criminal and civil cases to seek formal remedy in settlement of disputes (this is the so-called ‘principle of free disposition’). The parties specify in their formal claim the material facts upon which they rely for their remedy. The procedural system then provides the parties with an environment in which those alleged material facts can, if disputed, be determined. It is this procedural environment that is the province of the rules of evidence. The rules of evidence are concerned with the discovery of those disputed material facts alleged by the parties and upon which their legal remedies depend. Material facts are in almost every case past events or states, or at least involve the discovery of past events or states.14 This might be simply illustrated by reference to a civil claim for personal injuries. If the plaintiff is claiming damages for injuries sustained in, say, a road accident, then to succeed he or she must establish the material facts demanded by the law of negligence. The law requires facts constituting a duty of care, breach of that duty and damage or loss resulting from that breach. These facts will comprise the circumstances at the time of the accident in question, the physical relationship of one party to another, the

conduct of the defendant, and the injuries thereby sustained (and perhaps still ensuing). The material facts are in this sense an historical event. A similar illustration might be given in a criminal case. Where murder is charged the prosecution will allege an event whereby the accused intentionally killed the victim without a lawful excuse. Again, a piece of history. The problem in discovering past events is that they cannot be exhumed and brought into court for the trier of fact to experience first-hand. They must be somehow reconstructed from their remnants in the current world. These remnants are primarily the memories of witnesses, but they might also be in the form of physical remnants such as documents, fingerprints and DNA samples found at the scene of the crime, continuing injuries and so on. From these remnants the trier of fact must somehow reconstruct the historical events constituting the material facts in issue.15 [page 7]

Discovering Past Events The correspondence theory of knowledge 1.6 The assumption in all this is that there is a physical world out there to be known; that we are capable of knowledge that corresponds to the physical world. The ‘correspondence’ theory lies at the very heart of the rationalist tradition that assumes disputes can be settled only following discovery of facts.16 Other theories of knowledge, which either deny that the world out there can be discovered, or deny that there is a world out there at all, argue that we are trapped by our subjective views and that courts can do no more than adjudge upon the discourse of the parties before them.17 However, these theories, while providing valuable critical perspectives, are not descriptive of the assumptions that underlie our existing evidentiary regime, and are generally eschewed by scholars and practitioners operating in the rationalist tradition. That tradition optimistically assumes that there is a world out there capable of discovery and which provides a sufficiently regular and common basis for us to carry on our lives. That world is revealed to us directly through perception. It is only in these senses that there is a kind of certainty about the world. But even in these experiences we may be mistaken. Our senses may deceive us. Our

perceptions are a product of the societies in which we live, our biology, our theories of knowledge, our beliefs and our individual psyches. We must take care when acting upon our perceptions of the world. Experience provides us with a direct knowledge of the world and its events. Where the world is not directly or fully experienced it can be constructed through a process of inference. From what the witness reports we infer what occurred (or is still occurring); from an examination of the scene of the accident, the tangled wreck and the testimony of witnesses to the event, we infer how the accident occurred. If we can be mistaken in our direct full experiences the risk of mistake may increase as we interpret the experiences of others, and draw inferences from the sensory reports of witnesses to events, from physical remnants we have directly experienced and from reports by experts about the appropriate inferences to be drawn from these remnants. As a consequence, definitive correspondence between knowledge and the physical world is an impossible ideal. Definitive knowledge of the world, including the past events most often alleged as material facts, is unattainable. An omniscient God may know the world and all that is and was in it, but we mere mortals, in our ignorance, can only strive for knowledge in a rational and orderly way. For legal practice the [page 8] important question then is: ‘What is that orderly way in which we do (and perhaps should) search for material facts?’18 1.7 Courts have not set out to create their own unique process of fact discovery. They seek to discover facts in exactly the same way as other members of society discover facts. The evolution of the jury system and its continued use in serious criminal cases reflects this. As Thayer emphasised in his Preliminary Treatise on the Law of Evidence at Common Law:19 Observe at this point one or two fundamental conceptions. There is a principle — not so much a rule of evidence as a presupposition involved in the very concept of a rational system of evidence as contrasted with the old formal and mechanical systems — which forbids receiving anything irrelevant, not logically probative. How are we to know what these forbidden things are? Not by any rule of law. The law furnishes no test of relevancy. For this, it tacitly refers to logic and general experience — assuming that the principles of reasoning are known to its judges and ministers, just as a vast multitude of other things are assumed as sufficiently known to them.

Thus, the reliance upon ordinary principles of reasoning becomes the very focus of a rational system of evidence.

The inferential process: Wigmorean analysis 1.8 As mentioned above, the process of reasoning is one of inference — given the direct experience of certain information or evidence, the existence or occurrence of the material facts can be inferred. Not with certainty, but to varying degrees of likelihood or probability. In most cases, the inferences used to reach particular conclusions of fact from stipulated information or evidence are detailed and sophisticated. Wigmore recognised this and in The Science of Judicial Proof, developed a notation whereby inferences drawn in any particular case can be diagrammatically represented.20 It is interesting to consider [page 9] this sort of analysis as descriptive of a rational approach to the discovery of facts. Whilst its normative justification remains problematic, it provides a precise analytical means for describing a fact-finding process. It also provides a common language in which evidential issues can be rigorously discussed. 1.9 The starting point of the analysis is the assumption that reaching conclusions of fact from particular evidence is a process that can be rationalised — that there is a logical relationship that can be articulated between evidence and conclusions of fact. Thus, the analysis begins with an isolation of, on the one hand, the evidence being relied upon and, on the other, the factual conclusions which the parties seek to justify. Assuming the standpoint of the fact-finder — the trier of fact — the evidence relied upon comprises that personally experienced, the testimony of witnesses and objects or documents produced. These can be symbolically represented by a square (brackets): [ ].21 These are the incontrovertible experiences of the trier of fact. Only triers can decide their experiences. Only a trier can determine what the witness said, what the witness looks like, how the witness behaves, and so on. Only the trier can determine the nature of an object produced in court or the signs on a paper

produced. These experiences thus become the very materials from which further conclusions are built. In many cases, there will be no debate between those present as to the nature of their direct experiences; the inferences and ultimate conclusions to be drawn are the matters most often controversial. The factual conclusions to be inferred from the matters experienced are, for the purposes of litigation, those material facts alleged and which will justify the granting of a particular remedy. In positivist terms, they are those facts upon which the operation of a legal rule is conditional. In practical terms, they are those facts alleged in the pleadings of a party in a civil case or in the opening of a party in a criminal case. They constitute that factual hypothesis for which a party is contending and which, if ultimately accepted by the trier of fact, will result in judgment being given in that party’s favour. They are represented by a circle (an ellipse): ( ). But judgment will normally be dependent, not upon the discovery of only one fact, but upon the discovery of a series of facts, some of which may be compounds of other [page 10] facts. To be rigorous we must be precise about which facts require ultimate discovery and which should therefore be represented by a separate circle.22 Having isolated precisely the information experienced and the facts ultimately to be established, the intermediary steps can be exposed by way of articulating each logical step to be taken if those facts are to follow from that evidence. Each logical step is a process of inference whereby an intermediary fact is inferred.23 From each intermediary fact further inferences are drawn until, by means of a whole series of inferences, the ultimate facts can be regarded as discovered. Symbolically, each inferred intermediary fact is also represented by a circle. To show the inferential relationship between evidence and facts an arrow is used to indicate the direction in which the inferences are proceeding. The intermediary steps are largely of two kinds. On the one hand, they consist of chains of inferences (what Wigmore calls catenate inferences).24 On the other hand, inferences are combined to infer the one fact by way of inference from a number of other separate facts (what Wigmore calls converging or corroborative

inferences).25 A common analogy in this case is to the rope or cable consisting of a number of separate strands, but Wigmore also draws analogy to a wheelchair being pushed towards a door by several pushes, each in the required direction.26 Each item of evidence and each inferred fact can be listed and numbered. The chart can then be constructed by giving each square or circle a reference number. Arrows indicate the drawing of inferences and their relationship one to another. 1.10 The process is best illustrated by means of example. This example has been simplified as far as possible. The detailed use of Wigmorean analysis in an actual case may be a sophisticated and complicated (and necessarily controvertible) process, and the simplified example is given only to illustrate how the analysis might apply to describe the process of fact-finding in a specific situation.27 [page 11] D is charged with having, on 12 September at Enfield, murdered V. The bare allegation is that D killed V by stabbing her with a knife. The prosecution’s opening story is that D and V were lovers, that they quarrelled because V went out with another man, that at 10 pm on the evening of 12 September, armed with a knife, D went from the Exeter Hotel, where he had been drinking alone, to V’s Enfield house, that D used a key given to him by V to enter the house, that he proceeded to V’s bedroom and there, drunk with jealousy and alcohol, he stabbed her to death. The material facts might compendiously be described as follows: (1) On 12 September at Enfield D, with malicious intent, stabbed and killed V. Breaking down this proposition, having regard to the constituents of the crime of murder, it might be analysed as comprising the following more specific material facts: (2) On 12 September at Enfield V was stabbed and killed. (3) It was D who stabbed and killed V. (4) At the time D stabbed V he did it intending to cause grievous bodily harm.

These material facts can be diagrammatically represented thus:

To simplify the example it is assumed that D is not disputing that V was killed at Enfield (2), but that he is denying that he was the person involved (3).28 This being the line of D’s testimony in defence, if it is found that D did kill V, despite his testimonial denial, then it will likely be inferred without argument that he killed her intentionally. This material fact (4) is thus also put aside for the purposes of this example. Nevertheless, this preliminary discussion illustrates the importance of isolating the material facts clearly and precisely, and shows that in practical terms which of these material facts will be in issue depends upon what line is taken by way of defence.29 [page 12] The issue in the case consequently is identity. The evidence in support of this issue might be: [5] The testimony of X that she saw D leave the relevant premises shortly after the alleged time of death. [6] The testimony of Y that D and V were lovers and that she heard D say: ‘I’m going to kill V because she has been sleeping with other men.’ [7] The testimony of Z that she found clutched in V’s hand a piece of cloth which appears to fit a tear in a coat owned by D. Taking each item separately one can create the following chain of inferences to reach the conclusion that it was D involved in (3): [5] X’s testimony that she saw D leave at the relevant time. ↓ (8) D did leave at the relevant time. ↓ (9) D had the opportunity to kill V.

↓ (3) D killed V. Putting the argument in this form raises immediate questions which themselves might give rise to further inferential analysis. In the first place, the inference from X’s testimony might be controversial. X’s identification might be doubtful.30 Other evidence about X’s eyesight or the light available might give rise to an alternative explanatory inferential chain. Next, the relevant time might be controversial. If the body was found the next day, medical evidence might be sought to establish the time of death.31 Determining that time will itself involve a chain of inferences starting with the testimony of the examining doctor and perhaps another forensic expert. Further, in articulating D’s opportunity to kill we raise the question of what other persons may have had that opportunity. Other persons may have had access to V’s house, and other inferential chains might be articulated to establish the opportunity that these other persons had. Any such chains need to be charted and their place in the initial analysis shown.32 Leaving aside these possibilities, we can construct another inferential chain from the testimony of Y: [page 13] [6] Y’s testimony that D and V are lovers and D threatened to kill V. ↓ (10) D and V are lovers and D threatened to kill V. ↓ (3) D killed V. This chain might raise questions about the veracity of Y, the circumstances in which D made the threat and whether D’s personality was consistent with him having carried out the threat. Other evidence, including perhaps testimony from a psychologist who has examined D, might give rise to rival or explanatory inferences which would again need to be articulated and positioned in the original chart. Again leaving aside these matters for the purposes of simplification, we can construct a final chain of inferences from Z’s testimony:

[7] Z’s testimony that the scrap of cloth in V’s hand fits D’s coat. ↓ (11) The scrap of cloth was in V’s hand and fits D’s coat. ↓ (12) The assailant wore D’s coat. ↓ (3) D killed V. This simple chain raises even more questions. Could the cloth have fitted other coats? Did V tear the scrap from the assailant at the time she was stabbed? Was D wearing the coat at the relevant time? Again the questions can be met by charting further inferences from any available information. The chains of inferences are complicated even in this apparently simple case. Completeness requires that all available information be charted, although this is not the place to do so. But assuming that these extended chains are available, we can appreciate that each separate chain ultimately leads to the same conclusion: D killed V (3). It is therefore necessary to chart the combination — the convergence — that is reached after considering each individual chain of inferences: (9) D had the opportunity to kill V. (10) D threatened to kill V.

(3) D killed V.

(12) Assailant was wearing D’S coat. The whole chart can then be put together to represent the relationship between the evidence experienced and the conclusions to be inferred: [page 14]

For each inferred fact for which there is an alternative explanation, that explanatory inferential chain may be inserted against and in contrast to the relevant inferred fact. For example, we could insert a contrasting chain against (9) that concludes that X’s identification was mistaken; or one against (10) that infers that the witness was lying; or one against (12) that infers that someone else was wearing D’s coat at the relevant time. Each explanatory inferential chain will be supported by its own evidence. Its insertion is represented by the symbol ‘>’. 1.11 This approach has a great deal of descriptive appeal. Counsel do focus upon those inferential chains that are open to debate, and do offer alternative explanatory chains to meet an opponent’s case. In cases involving so-called circumstantial evidence, judges will often have in mind this sort of inferential chart in deciding that the evidence supports the proponent’s case.33 Some judges have been known to chart expressly the inferences to be made so that in summing up to the jury the relationship between various arguments can be clearly explained without omitting a logical inferential step.34 The limits of the exercise lie in its failure, first, to attempt description of the very process of individual inference, and secondly, to describe how the various inferences combine to produce proof to the requisite standard. Without some further explanation there appears no reason for making one set of inferential divisions rather than another, so that the Wigmorean chart appears to be no more than the mere creation of its author. Yet the courts, when making use of this inferential process, appear to assume

[page 15] that it does constitute a rational description so that the decision-making process is not a mere accident of the mind of the individual. This is the very nub of the rationalist tradition. Appellate judges will interfere in cases where fact-finders in lower courts have gone ‘wrong’ in their combination of the tendered evidence to produce proof to the requisite degree, and trial judges will rule upon whether individual inferences can be drawn from tendered evidence at all.35 Ultimately, it is only through analysis of the very process of inference, individually and in combination, that any rational process can be isolated and described, and although courts have been willing to specify the chains of inferences to be drawn in reaching conclusions of fact, they have been less willing to analyse and describe the very process of inference and combination itself. What exactly do we mean when we say ‘if evidence E exists then conclusion C follows’? To what extent is this a definitive and scientific process? How do we combine individual inferences? These are the interesting and difficult questions that lead to an analysis of concepts of probability.

Probability theory Outline 1.12 While judges have been reluctant to analyse the very process of inference and proof, philosophers have long struggled with such analysis under the name of ‘probability theory’.36 Theories of interest in this context are those by which we within the world seek to explain why a particular piece of evidence can be said to ‘probabilify’ a particular conclusion. The terminology is that of probability because we live in a world of uncertainty, and must begin with the proposition that all we can do is adduce good reasons for reaching particular conclusions about the world out there. We can only infer that things probably exist and events probably occurred; we can never be certain. Only an omniscient God, able to look at the world from the outside, could be certain. The term ‘probability’ recognises that in all our knowledge, all our conclusions of fact, there is necessarily a degree of ignorance. The crucial questions are how do we reduce ignorance, and how do we then cope with any remaining uncertainty.

[page 16] The first question is what is meant when we say that particular evidence makes a particular conclusion more or less probable. (‘Probable’ here, as elsewhere in this chapter, does not mean likely, in the sense of more likely than not. Probability embraces the whole spectrum of likelihood, from the least likely to the most.) For example, if a witness testifies that she saw D leave particular premises at a particular time, the probability of D having done so can be said to be increased. Again, if a piece of fabric matching D’s jacket is found in the victim’s hand, and D’s jacket is damaged or is not able to be located, the probability of D having been in the vicinity can be said to be increased. But in what sense is the probability of the conclusion increased by the evidence? Philosophers isolate four different senses in which it might be said that evidence reflects upon the probability of a particular conclusion.37 We wish to know whether these approaches are descriptive of how courts find facts, and, furthermore, whether any of these approaches should be applied by courts normatively. The four approaches are: the subjective approach; the classical or a priori approach; the statistical or frequency approach; and the inductive approach. As the first three approaches can be conceptualised in mathematical terms and in that sense contrast to the inductive approach, they are first dealt with together.

Mathematical probabilities 1.13 A useful way of describing the nature of inference is to put the inference in deductive form. If the evidence is the testimony of X that she saw D at a relevant time, and the inference is that D was there at this time, the inference can be expressed in the following, deductive, form: 1.

When witnesses testify to events those events probably occurred.

2.

X testified to an event (that D was there).

3.

Therefore, the event probably occurred (D was there).

If from D’s presence it is to be further inferred that D killed V, then again the desired inference can be deductively expressed: 1.

Persons leaving victims’ houses shortly after victims have been killed are probably responsible for the killings.

2.

D left the victim’s house shortly after her death.

3.

Therefore, D is probably the killer.

By expressing the inference in this deductive form we articulate the generalisation of knowledge upon which the inference is based and are in a better position to determine the strength of the inference. This form recognises that inferences are only [page 17] drawn from evidence because a more general knowledge of the world compels a particular conclusion. An inference cannot be drawn in a vacuum. Commentators now agree that this kind of deductive analysis of the individual inference is a useful complement to Wigmore’s focus on the appropriate inferences to be drawn in a complex fact situation.38 Significantly, this use of the deductive syllogism immediately puts the inference in terms of probability, raising the whole question of probability and its meaning. And, furthermore, it is a short step to express the probability of the inference in numerical terms, as an expression of the generalisation of knowledge upon which it is based. But there is more than one way of giving mathematical expression to an inference, and each reflects a different notion of mathematical probability. Classical probabilities 1.14 In the classical approach, a generalisation delimits both the total number of possibilities and the proportion of those that will lead to the desired inference. So, inferring D’s involvement in a murder from evidence of D’s presence might lead to the following syllogism: 1.

Six people only were in the vicinity at the time of V’s killing.

2.

D was in the vicinity.

3.

Therefore there is a one in six chance that D killed V.

The probability of D having killed V can be expressed as 1/6 (0.166, or 16.6%). The odds are 5 to 1 against. The analogy is to the probability of a thrown six-sided dice showing a particular number.

Other examples illustrate the application of the classical approach. In each, a syllogism yields a mathematical probability measuring the number of favourable chances within a stipulated range. To infer that D did not pay on entering a rodeo, evidence is adduced that of the 1000 spectators only 499 paid and D was a spectator.39 The inference to be drawn might be expressed as follows: 1.

Of 1000 people at a rodeo, 499 paid.

2.

D attended the rodeo.

3.

Therefore, the chances of D having not paid are 501 in 1000.

The probability of D having not paid is 501/1000 (0.501, or 50.1%). The odds are 501 to 499 in favour (on). [page 18] In The Brimnes,40 it was shown that an acceptance telegram was transmitted between 9.45 am and 10.05 am in order to enable the inference that the telegram was transmitted before 10 am. So: 1.

A telegram was transmitted between 9.45 am and 10.05 am.

2.

This is the telegram that was transmitted.

3.

Therefore, the chances of this telegram having been transmitted before 10 am are 15 out of 20.

The probability of the telegram having been transmitted before 10 am is 15/20 (0.75, or 75%). The odds are 3 to 1 on. 1.15 In each of these cases there is evidence of the total number of possibilities and the number of those that comprise the inference to be drawn. By assuming that the event in question has an equal chance of being any one of the possible events — and on the information stipulated above there is no information to the contrary — then the probability of the inferred conclusion can be expressed in terms of ‘chances’ or classical probabilities. But the assumption of equi-possibility, the so-called ‘principle of indifference’, is crucial, and this assumption lies at the heart of all mathematical approaches to probability.41 In the development of the classical approach through its application

to stipulated games of chance (cards and dice, for example), the assumption has a definitional or empirical validity of its own. In extending the principle to real-life situations, the assumption finds its justification in the idea that, given a state of ignorance about the individual members of a class, any other distribution of possibility would be arbitrary. This justification relies upon the notion that, in practical decision-making, we are ultimately seeking good reasons for deciding one way or another. Although in reality the distribution may turn out to be different, we must, in the absence of any information, assume equi-possibility. To put it another way: in practical decision-making, probabilification is part of the effort to find good reasons for deciding one way or another and, ultimately, assuming all relevant information has been sought, the principle of indifference is a good reason. This being the case, the principle of indifference can only apply in the absence of information distinguishing between the chances of each member of the class. As soon as such information exists, any assessment of probability based upon the principle becomes meaningless. Thus, if there is evidence that, not only was D seen in the vicinity of V’s killing, but D also had a motive for killing V, then D no longer has an equal chance with others in the vicinity of having been the killer. Again, if there is evidence that D, who attended the rodeo, is of good character and asserts that payment [page 19] was made, then the assumption that all rodeo-attenders have an equal chance of being non-payers cannot stand. If this is so, then a search must be made for a sub-set of spectators to which the principle of indifference can apply. The search for, and justification of, classes thus assumes crucial importance in the application of the classical approach. But these points also apply to the frequency approach, to which we now turn. Frequency probabilities 1.16 A most common description of the probabilities found in the deductive syllogism, the form in which we have expressed inferences, is that offered by the frequency approach to probability.42

When we infer from X’s testimony that D was present at the scene of V’s killing, then, using the frequency approach, we might express the probability of D’s presence thus: 1.

In most cases (say 80%) where witnesses testify in these circumstances to the presence of an individual, that individual was present.

2.

X testifies, in these circumstances, that D was present.

3.

Therefore, D was present (to a probability of 8/10, 0.8 or 80%, at odds of 4 to 1 on).

Similarly, when we infer D’s involvement in V’s killing from D’s presence and D’s jealousy, the syllogism might be expressed: 1.

In most cases (say 60%) where jealous lovers are at the scene, they have killed their partners.

2.

D is a jealous lover so found.

3.

Therefore, D killed V (to a probability of 0.6 etc).43

Like the classical approach, the frequency approach sets up a general class as the basis for the inference, but while the classes of classical probabilities are definitive and include the inferred fact or event (all possible suspects; all possible nonpayers), the classes of frequency probabilities are based upon the measurement of past facts or events which do not include the fact or event to be inferred (such as a past class of testifying witnesses that does not include the witness in question, or a past class of jealous lovers found in the vicinity of the murder). Thus, the hypothesis is that [page 20] known frequencies will continue to occur in future instances, including that of the fact or event in question, so enabling the prediction of facts and events with similar characteristics.44 Known frequencies are projected into unknown frequencies, it being hypothesised that an indefinite sequence made up of past, present and future facts or events such as those in question would exhibit a limiting frequency approaching that evidenced by past experience. Once this hypothesis is stipulated then the conclusion is drawn using the principle of indifference in exactly the same way as in the classical approach.

1.17 The distinction between classical and frequency probabilities can be simply illustrated by reference to the tossing of a coin. In classical terms there are two possible outcomes, a head and a tail, so the probability that a throw has produced a head is 1 in 2 or 0.5 or 50% (the odds are even). Now consider the same example in frequency terms. Tests are conducted and over a long period heads comes up half of the time, so that the limiting frequency of 50% heads can be hypothesised to conclude that, on the basis of past experience, there is again a 1 in 2 probability that a particular throw has produced a head. If the coin had been biased and produced heads in 60% of past cases then the frequency probability would alter accordingly. Thus, while the frequency approach, like the classical approach, also purports to be an account of probabilities based upon measurement of stipulated ranges, it proves on analysis to involve an assumption additional to the principle of indifference. The presence of these assumptions means that neither approach will necessarily produce a correct result — a true correspondence — but each approach nevertheless provides an orderly way of approaching a situation of uncertainty. And in each case, as will be shown below, the probabilities generated obey mathematical laws. But the figures are in every case generated only in stipulated ranges. The final problem is the definition of the appropriate ranges. Probabilities can be generated in any stipulated range. The range can be defined simply or in a detailed and sophisticated way. How do fact-finders using these approaches generate appropriate ranges? The answer lies in the nature of the epistemological task: the task of providing the best reasons for inferring one way rather than another. As the above discussion has shown, mathematical probabilities are ultimately generated by the principle of indifference. Once further information is available to distinguish members of a class then the assumption of indifference goes, and another sub-class of events must be constructed. This process must continue until the principle of indifference can apply. So the ranges define themselves in this context. They are those ranges in which the assumption of indifference can be made because there are no reasons left for distinguishing between members of the class. [page 21]

The practical difficulty is the empirical measurement of the classes of events. In some cases, empirical evidence can be definitionally generated (as in The Brimnes, referred to above, at 1.14). Forensic and other empirical scientists and statisticians are able to provide evidence based upon empirical measurement (often of a representative sample, which measurement involves its own assumptions); for example, the distribution of DNA within populations. But even in these cases many assumptions must be made, so that a distinguished group of forensic scientists conclude in relation to frequencies of DNA:45 There appears to be a fairly widespread misconception that there is a real ‘statistical probability’ to be assigned to a profile but this is not the case. There is an infinite range of ways of carrying out the calculation that underlies the figures given. The method chosen in the individual case must be seen to be as much a matter of opinion as one given in other areas of forensic science. The match probability is ‘personal’. It is based on what the scientist considers to be the most appropriate calculation ‘given the circumstances of the case’.

Still we have no option but to seek empirical and statistical assistance if we are serious about refining our probability assessments as far as possible to reflect the world out there. But the assumptions and weaknesses of empirical and statistical evidence need, so far as possible, to be understood, and their combination with evidence not expressed mathematically needs to be articulated (see further below in the context of Bayesian analysis, particularly 1.28ff, and at 7.62 where the admissibility and use of expert evidence, often expressed in numerical terms, is discussed). But in the vast majority of cases where an inference is to be drawn from a generalisation there has been no attempt at empirical measurement and any generalisation is based only roughly upon past experience and knowledge. Thus, even if one accepts the logic of the classical and frequency approaches, the focus of the practical debate will be upon these rough generalisations in an attempt to fine-tune them, in a context that often makes fine-tuning a less than definitive exercise. One way around these problems is to leave the generation of mathematical probabilities to the individual by way of a more subjective approach to probability judgments. Subjective probabilities 1.18 If the subjective approach merely describes, leaving all inferences to the

personal decision of the fact-finder, it might be regarded as describing no consistent approach to probability at all. [page 22] But proponents of this approach as descriptive and/or appropriate in the trial context do not express it in this extreme form.46 Those who advocate subjective probabilities generally do so to enable the application of the mathematical calculus to proof, often to provide a logical way of computing in empirical probabilities. The mathematical equation most useful in this exercise is Bayes’ Theorem and hence the subjectivists are generally referred to as ‘Bayesians’. This term is somewhat misleading in that it suggests that Bayes’ Theorem is the only equation of the calculus that might apply to juridical proof, and Robertson and Vignaux47 emphasise that Bayesians advocate use of all the equations of the calculus. What the subjective proponents suggest is that, because in practice empirical measurement all too quickly runs out, most individual inferences of fact involve decisions that can best be described as subjective. Ultimately, decisions of fact are based upon these ‘beliefs’. In the absence of any or complete empirical measurement, the best we can do is to ensure that beliefs about facts are logically consistent. This can be done simply by giving numerical values to beliefs about particular inferences and then by using the equations of mathematical probability to compute their relationship.48 The subjectivist asks the trier to compute the strength of individual beliefs in numerical terms. Betting odds are a convenient way of explaining this. If they are fair bets, the equations of mathematical probabilities can be applied to them. If the belief is dependent upon the general proposition of an inferential syllogism then the subjective numerical probability might be based upon an hypothesised frequency assigned to that general proposition. Where the belief relates to a unique fact or event about which the trier is unable or unwilling to construct any general proposition, then a [page 23] numerical probability may be simply asserted in betting odds without any attempt

to conceptualise the probability in frequency terms at all.49 The equations of mathematical probability 1.19 These are provable from a number of simple assumptions and their internal logic is beyond debate.50 Whether their application to combine beliefs is either descriptive of curial fact-finding, or whether it necessarily leads to a closer correspondence between belief and reality, are fundamentally controversial questions. But these questions are put aside while the equations and their application are demonstrated. The application of these equations assumes the use of numbers to represent probabilities. The first equation is that of complementation. By this equation, if the probability P of an hypothesis [H] and its negation [–H] makes up the whole of the possible knowledge about a particular state of affairs, then by definition, P[H] + P[–H] = 1. And thus P[H] = 1–P[–H]. Therefore, if one is ignorant about H but has a belief about –H, the probability of H can be simply calculated. If, for example, the probability that a ship sank either because of poor repair or because it was hit by a submarine is extremely unlikely on the evidence (say 0.2), then, assuming these are the only possibilities constituting [–H], the probability that the ship sank for reasons associated with ‘perils of the sea’ [H] is complementarily likely (0.8).51 If, as in TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks,52 there are only three possible explanations for a head-on collision between two cars driven respectively by A and B (both killed [page 24] in the accident) — (1) A’s negligence alone; (2) B’s negligence alone; and (3) some admixture of their negligence — then, assuming (1) and (2) are equally possible, the probability of A being solely or partly negligent must be greater than 0.5. By this logic, Murphy J reasoned that the widow of A could recover damages against the insurer of B where the legislation permitted recovery so long as B’s negligence was a contributing factor to the accident. Of course, Murphy J’s creation of the range of explanations (which did not include the possibility that

neither driver was at fault) and his assumption that it was equally likely either driver was solely responsible, are entirely subjective (though presumably based upon Murphy J’s experience of head-on accidents and other evidence before him). But once the ranges had been subjectively hypothesised, Murphy J was able to use the complementational equation to calculate the mathematical probability that B’s negligence was solely or partly responsible for the accident. 1.20 The second equation is that which calculates the probability that two facts exist or have occurred from their individual probabilities — the multiplicational equation for conjunction. By this equation, the probability of the conjunction of two facts is the probability of the first fact multiplied by the probability of the second fact given that the first fact has occurred or exists; that is, P[F1 & F2] = P[F1] × P[F2/F1]. If the existence or occurrence of the facts are independent, so that the existence of the one has no relationship to the existence of the other, then the axiom reduces to P[F1 & F2] = P[F1] × P[F2]. It is this simplified version of the equation that is used to compute the statistical power of DNA evidence. DNA profiling compares separate samples of DNA in order to determine if they match. It involves comparing alleles found at a number of common points (loci) in the DNA chain. Where the alleles at the various loci match, the DNA samples are consistent with a common origin. But this simple multi-locus match cannot establish identity of origin, so population genetics are used to calculate the likely frequency of that multi-locus match within the population at large. By measuring the frequency within samples of the population of each locus match and by relying upon the equation of multiplication,53 experts can extrapolate the likely frequency of the multi-locus match in the population at large.54 The more loci analysed, the more multiplications to be made and the lower this relative frequency becomes. With technology now existing to compare alleles [page 25] at 10 or more loci, in R v Karger55 the relative frequency of the DNA analysed was put at one in 90 billion. 1.21 Many of the problems with this sort of analysis in identification cases are illustrated by the notorious Californian decision in People v Collins.56 Although Collins was a case involving identification through matching physical

characteristics, the same sorts of calculations are made where identification is sought through matching DNA loci.57 In Collins, the two accused were identified by eyewitnesses as having committed a robbery in Los Angeles. They denied involvement and argued the eyewitnesses were mistaken. To rebut this, the prosecution pointed to the undoubted characteristics of the two culprits described by the identifying witnesses and argued that, as the accused possessed those same characteristics, and as the mathematical chances were so slight (1 in 12 million) of randomly finding in Los Angeles another couple possessing the same characteristics, the accused must have been the suspects identified. The random probability was calculated by first assigning to each accepted characteristic a frequency in the Los Angeles population (supposedly erring on the conservative side), and then by simply multiplying these frequencies to determine the frequency of a couple possessing all of these characteristics. The characteristics and their frequencies were as follows: yellow car … 1 in 10 man with moustache … 1 in 4 black man with beard … 1 in 10 woman with blonde hair … 1 in 3 woman with pony-tail … 1 in 10 inter-racial couple … 1 in 1000 As an empirical application of the multiplication equation, two criticisms might be made of this approach. First, the frequencies were mere guesses and therefore neither [page 26] empirically justified frequencies nor necessarily the subjective probabilities the jury was prepared to accept for the purpose of applying the multiplication process. Why, for example, were the frequencies based upon the population of Los Angeles? Why not the population in the vicinity of the crime or of the whole of America? Secondly, the frequencies were multiplied without regard to their

possible non-independence. Black men with beards may have moustaches and be double-counted in the category of men with moustaches. Women with blonde hair may be more likely to wear pony-tails and so may be double-counted in this category. Also, women with blonde hair are likely to be white and so the interracial couple probability may not be independent of the probability for hair colour. Further, it may be that blondes do not date inter-racially at the same frequency as other women, and that the frequency of inter-racial couples, in particular populations, changes over time — so that the compilation of the statistics becomes significant. 1.22 But, more fundamentally, even if the frequencies and their multiplication accurately determine the chances of finding randomly a couple in the Los Angeles area possessing these characteristics, this was not the issue before the jury. The issue was the chances of this couple before the court being the perpetrators of this crime. If statistics could empirically show that not more than one couple with these characteristics could be found in a suspect population then conviction might be justified. But the frequency is not an empirical frequency within a finite class of all possible suspects. It is a hypothetical frequency dependent upon the assumptions of its creator.58 Nor does it hypothesise the regular occurrence of individuals within the class. It is more reasonable to assume that individuals in such classes do not occur regularly, but with a randomness of their own, so that one cannot exclude the possibility that within the hypothesised class of possible culprits there was more than one couple possessing the relevant characteristics. If two couples possessed these characteristics the chances of the accused having committed the crime were 1 in 2 or 0.5, if three, 1 in 3 or 0.33, and so on. To attempt to use the probability of a random match as the probability that the accused were the culprits commits what has come to be known as the prosecutor’s fallacy.59 Statistics in this situation can show the unlikelihood of finding the evidence, two persons with the described characteristics, but cannot establish the accused as those persons. Similarly, with DNA evidence, experts can use the multiplication rule to calculate the relative frequency of the DNA in question in a population but, no matter how rare this frequency, it remains the probability of finding this evidence, this particular DNA in that population, and is not the probability that the DNA in question was [page 27]

contributed by a particular person. Thus, even if one accepts the accuracy and reliability of the relative frequency calculated through the multiplication equation, further calculations are needed if this evidence is to be used to identify a particular person as having contributed that DNA. The equation most suited to this task is said to be60 Bayes’ Theorem. 1.23 This is an equation which determines the extent to which the probability of an hypothesis [H] is increased following consideration of further evidence [E]. The theorem can be derived from the previous equations explained above.61 It can be expressed as follows: Posterior odds = Prior odds × Likelihood ratio What this means is that the posterior odds of any hypothesis are a function of the prior odds of the hypothesis multiplied by the likelihood ratio of the evidence; that is, the ratio between the likelihood of the evidence being found if the hypothesis is true and the likelihood of it being found if the hypothesis is false. 1.24 In this form, Bayes’ Theorem can apply directly in a curial situation. It is particularly useful to the subjectivist who can use it to update beliefs as new evidence is received. Using the earlier example (at 1.10), the initial belief relates to whether it was D who killed V. The prior odds are assigned by attributing (fair) betting odds to the probability of this event having occurred. The evidence adduced (for example, the testimony of X that D was observed leaving V’s house around the relevant time) is then considered and probabilities assigned to the existence of that evidence if the facts as alleged did occur, and to the existence of that evidence if the facts as alleged did not occur. Bayes’ Theorem computes the logical effect of the tendered evidence upon the probability of the initial belief in the alleged event. If the prior odds are assumed as 1 to 20 on, the probability of the evidence existing if D did kill V 0.8, and the probability of the evidence existing if D did not kill V 0.2 (given that D frequents V’s residence), then the initial odds are increased by 8:2 (that is, four-fold) to 4 to 20 on. If the initial odds had been assumed at 1 to 1000 on, then the same evidence would increase the odds (again four-fold) to 4 to 1000 on. This demonstrates vividly that both the prior odds and the likelihood ratio are critical factors in the calculation of mathematical probability by this means. [page 28]

1.25 The theorem can also be applied in situations combining empirically based frequencies. Take, for example, the following scenario much discussed in the probability literature.62 A plaintiff pedestrian is negligently struck down at night by a vehicle identified by the plaintiff as a taxi-cab and described as green. There are no other witnesses. The defendant is a taxi-cab company in the town in question and all the company’s cabs are green. Of the 100 cabs that operate in the town, the defendant operates 20 and the remainder, coloured blue, are operated by another company. The plaintiff witness has been tested by a specialist who testifies that, in a long sequence of tests involving the identification of green/blue cabs under night-time conditions, in 80% of cases the witness’s colour identifications were correct and in 20% incorrect. How can a Bayesian analysis be employed to compute the probability that the cab involved belonged to the defendant? The Bayesian approach can be described in long-hand as follows. In the absence of any other evidence, each cab in town had an equal chance of being involved in the accident. Therefore, the witness had an equal chance of having observed any one of the 100 cabs, of which 80 are blue and 20 green. Accepting the expert evidence, in the long run, of the 80 blue cabs the witness might identify, 80% (64) would be correctly identified as blue and 20% (16) incorrectly as green. Of the 20 green cabs the witness might identify, 80% (16) would be correctly identified as green and 20% (4) incorrectly as blue. In the long run, of the 32 green identifications the witness will make, 16 will be correct and 16 will be incorrect. The probability of the green identification being correct is therefore 0.5. Using the odds version of Bayes’ Theorem the result is calculated as follows to produce the same result: O(H/E) = O(H) increased by ratio P(E/H)/ P(E/–H) = (1 to 4 on) increased by 0.8/ 0.2 (that is, 4) = (4 to 4 on), or 4 chances in 8, or a probability of 0.5 As an example of where Bayes’ Theorem might have clarified the situation, let us return to Collins. We left the case having computed the probability of finding at random [page 29]

a couple possessing the described characteristics of the culprits. But what we want to know is the probability of the particular accused being the persons so described. Bayes’ Theorem suggests that this probability is a function of the prior odds and the likelihood ratio produced by the generated frequencies. The problem in this case is assessing the prior likelihood. If there is no information suggesting any greater likelihood of each accused having committed the crime than any other member of the Los Angeles population, the prior odds for each might be hypothesised as one to the population of Los Angeles, say 1 to 12 million, and, using the multiplication equation, the prior odds for both being involved might be calculated at 1 to 144 trillion.63 If the accused are guilty then the probability of their having the characteristics described by the identifying witnesses is 1. If the accused are not guilty, the probability of their having those characteristics is the probability of finding those characteristics at random within the possible range of culprits; that is, on the Collins calculation, a population of 12 million. Applying the odds version of Bayes’ Theorem, the computation is as follows: O(H/E) = O(H) increased by ratio P(E/H)/ P(E/–H) = 1 to 144tr × 1/ 1/12 m = 1 to 12 m On the other hand, if the prior odds, based on evidence in the case linking the accused with the crime, including eyewitness identification, are subjectively assessed at, say generously, 1 to 1000, then the posterior odds dramatically increase to 12,000 to 1 on. Where the prior odds are set becomes the crucial part of the calculation. 1.26 Bayes’ Theorem can similarly be used to show the effect of DNA evidence on other evidence in a case. If so used then, if the prior odds against the accused’s involvement are sufficiently low, this may counteract even quite rare relative frequencies for the matching DNA. This is illustrated by defence counsel’s tactics in R v Dennis Adams.64 The accused was charged with rape and the prosecution relied principally upon evidence of a match between DNA taken from semen found on the victim with DNA taken from the accused. Expert testimony calculated the chances of a random match as 1 in 200 million. To meet this apparently strong evidence, the defence, with the agreement of the prosecution, sought to explain Bayes’ Theorem to the jury and then to establish prior odds that would effectively

counter the expert evidence. Although the accused had been isolated by the police as a result of the victim having described her attacker’s accent as that of a local man, the victim had failed to identify the accused [page 30] in a line-up, her description of her attacker did not match the accused, and the accused had called evidence of an alibi. The defence argued that there were 150,000 local men in the vicinity aged between 18 and 60, that if the victim could be interpreted as saying there was a 75% probability her attacker was a local man then (using the equation of complementation) the possible range of suspects could be taken to be, as a starting point, 200,000. To these prior odds of guilt (1 to 200,000), the defence first used Bayes’ Theorem to take account of the evidence that the accused did not match the victim’s description. If there is a 90% probability of such a discrepancy where the accused is innocent there remains, say, a 10% probability where he is guilty. Using Bayes’ Theorem, this likelihood ratio of 1 to 9 stretches the prior odds of guilt out to 1 to 1.8 million. If to this is added evidence of the accused’s alibi and the probability of an alibi if innocent is (say) twice as likely than if guilty, then the prior odds stretch further to 1 to 3.6 million. So hypothesised the defence. Then using this prior and computing in the likelihood ratio of the DNA match (200 million to 1), the resultant odds of guilt became 55 to 1 (or to put it in the accused’s favour, there was 1 chance in 56, an almost 2% chance, that he was innocent). Thus, the defence demonstrated how apparently compelling evidence might be explained away and argued that when the jury used their own likelihood ratios for the defence evidence they might not be convinced beyond reasonable doubt. The accused’s conviction was overturned on appeal.65 The jury had been misdirected about the Bayesian calculations and were no doubt bemused by the calculations required. But what most concerned the court was that the jury had not been clearly told that there was no obligation to apply a Bayesian approach, and that its task was simply to decide whether it was persuaded of the accused’s guilt having regard to all the evidence presented. In so concluding the court, without formally deciding the matter as it had not been argued, disapproved of

the Bayesian approach and was of the view that the trial judge should not, despite counsels’ agreement, have allowed it.66 1.27 There are other equations generated by the probability calculus that theoretically may be employed in curial situations. The disjunction equation determines the probability of either of two propositions (P[F1 or F2] = P[F1] + P[F2] – P[F1 & F2]); an equation that might be used where liability can be founded on the basis of [page 31] one or more hypotheses.67 The equation of total probabilities requires that where the probability of an hypothesis depends upon the probability of one or more evidentiary propositions, its probability may be calculated as the sum of all possible conditional probabilities. Thus, where the probability of an hypothesis depends on the probability of one evidential fact F1, the probability of the hypothesis may be calculated as follows: P[H] = P[H]/[F1] × P[F1] + P[H]/[–F1] × P[–F1] If the hypothesis depends upon the probability of two evidential facts one might calculate the probability thus:

P[H] = P[H]/[F1] & [F2] × P[F1] & [F2] + P[H]/[–F1] & [F2] × P[–F1] & [F2] + P[H]/[F1] & [–F2] × P[F1] & [–F2] + P[H]/[–F1] & [–F2] × P[–F1] & [–F2]

This equation can be used to calculate probabilities within a Wigmorean chart. If the hypothesis [H] is that it was the accused who killed the victim and this depends upon (say) two evidential facts — that the accused had the opportunity to kill V (F1) and that the accused had threatened to kill the victim (F2) — then the above equation can be used to determine the probability of H as the sum of the conditional probabilities of H given the possible permutations of F1 and F2. If F1 in turn depends on two other evidentiary facts — that D was in the vicinity (F3) and that D had a key to V’s apartment (F4) — then the equation can be applied to determine P[F1] as the sum of the conditional probabilities of F1 given the possible permutations of F3 and F4. And so on.68 Where the hypothesis is conditional on more than two evidentiary facts the equation is correspondingly more complicated but the sum can be made. Clearly, the application of the

equation of total probability will in real life very quickly push one’s computational capacities to their limit.69 Problems with conceptualising probabilities mathematically 1.28 So far the equations of mathematical probability and their possible application to curial fact-finding have been considered uncritically. But what scope is there to use, for example, Bayes’ Theorem to combine mathematically empirical and subjective probabilities to advance an hypothesis of guilt? Is this approach descriptive of how [page 32] triers of fact do reason and, if not, should it be put forward as a normative approach to fact-finding? Virtually all Bayesians admit that curial fact-finding does not generally employ the equations of mathematical probabilities, but there are situations where a mathematical approach does appear apposite, and the imperialist Bayesians would extrapolate from these situations to argue the normative use of mathematical probabilities.70 In that empirical frequencies are seldom available, the Bayesian argument is not that a mathematical approach will necessarily approximate discovery of the true facts, but that internal logical consistency demands that the equations of mathematical probability apply. 1.29 There are many problems with these normative arguments. A basic problem is that Bayesians can tell us nothing about how we construct the mathematical propositions to which the equations of the mathematical calculus apply. All they can tell us is that if we do hold certain propositions then the mathematical calculus can show us the relationship between them. Which propositions are most appropriate — which reference classes are used to generate mathematical probabilities (presumably those with a richness that applies the principle of indifference only when maximal information has been considered) — is not capable of stipulation by the Bayesians.71 Another way of explaining this criticism of mathematical probabilities is to say that Bayesians cannot discriminate between probabilities in terms of the weight of evidence.72 They cannot argue in favour of one mathematical probability rather than another. Thus, in the

blue/green taxi example discussed above, the base rate was the distribution of taxi-cabs in the town. But would not the accident rate of taxis in the town have provided a base rate more likely to lead to correspondence with the real world? Bayesians provide no reasons for discriminating between one class of mathematical probabilities and another in this way, and yet when it comes to making real-life decisions these distinctions seem important. 1.30 When one relies upon subjective probabilities, Bayesian analysis cannot inform us which betting odds to assign to facts and evidence. This may be justifiable in the realm of making consistent business decisions but may not be justified as a means of discovering the world out there, and particularly its past.73 A corollary is that if the trier [page 33] of fact after computation does not feel comfortable with the resulting probability the figures in the calculation can always be changed to achieve a more ‘intuitive’ result. Thus, in terms of discovering the world out there, Bayesian analysis appears inadequate. It works only by combining empirical and subjective probabilities. If all probabilities could be empirically determined one might argue that mathematical analysis apparently leads to discovering the world. But first, this empirical information is not available and, secondly, even where it is, it is often organised other than by reference to mathematical principles. In practice, we must rely upon subjective probabilities if a mathematical approach is to work. As an exercise seeking discovery of the world out there, the Bayesian approach is fatally flawed. As a system showing the relationship between various beliefs, as a system of logic, it remains more compelling. And where experts are permitted to present evidence in terms of likelihood ratios, to be consistent, logic appears to demand that the trier of fact understands what this means in Bayesian terms.74 Yet courts have so far been reluctant to accept this logic.75 1.31 There are other difficulties with a mathematical approach. One, adverted to above, is that its rigorous application is beyond the computational capacities of humans.76 We might use computers to make the calculations as we merely feed in subjective probabilities, but one suspects that, even if this situation can be created, triers will always check the results against their intuitions, and if unhappy

with the calculation will want to change the subjective probabilities until the answer accords with intuition. More fundamentally, some commentators argue that the mathematical approach necessarily leads to results that are at odds with our intuitions.77 For example, the equation of conjunction means that if a claim depends upon the proponent establishing a number of independent facts or events then each must be established to a very high degree if their multiplication is not to lead to their overall probability falling below any acceptable standard of mathematical proof. Thus, if a claim depends upon establishing identity, conduct and resulting harm, and these are regarded as three independent facts to be established, if each is established to a mathematical probability of 0.7 the probability of their conjunction is 0.343. This problem can be avoided either by arguing that the events are not independent, so that their conjunction is not simply a matter of multiplying together their individual probabilities, or by arguing that the proponent must establish a compendium story which is then used to determine whether the necessary legal requirements have been met. [page 34] The latter solution demonstrates that no mathematical theory can tell us how to conceptualise facts and evidence for the purpose of applying the equations of mathematical calculus to them.78 Suffice it to say that the problem of conjunction can be accommodated within mathematical notions by a redefinition of facts and evidence. 1.32 A more difficult problem is to accommodate the presumption of innocence within an application of Bayes’ Theorem. In State v Skipper,79 the principal evidence against an accused, charged with unlawful sexual assault on a child, was evidence, based upon DNA analysis, that the accused was the father of the victim’s aborted foetus. The evidence, a paternity index of 1 to 3497, was an odds ratio measuring the likelihood that the accused would produce a child with the same phenotypes as the foetus in question as compared to an unrelated random male. Using Bayes’ Theorem, this likelihood ratio was used to compute the probability that the accused was the father by assuming ‘neutral’ prior odds of paternity of 1 to 1 (that is, it was equally as likely that the accused was the father

as he was not the father). With this prior, a posterior probability of paternity of 99.97% could be calculated. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held this calculation should not have been put to the jury. First, the prior odds assumed to obtain this figure were not disclosed to the jury and it was a jury decision what prior odds should be used in any calculation. Secondly, and more decisively, use of any assumed prior odds of guilt directly contravenes the presumption of innocence. For an accused to be afforded the full protection of this presumption the prior odds must be set at zero. The difficulty with this, as the court recognised, is that whatever the likelihood ratio the resultant multiplication produces the same answer of zero. Therefore, concluded the court, Bayes’ Theorem had no application in a criminal case. The Bayesian answer to this case is that the presumption of innocence is no more than an embodiment of the rule that the prosecution carries the evidential and persuasive burdens of establishing the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The assessment of prior odds, made not at the commencement of the trial but as a calculation performed after all the evidence is in and made preliminary to adding in other evidence before the court (the trier of fact must be careful not to double-count evidence), is the only logical way of factoring in such expert evidence of paternity. To set the prior odds at zero is to prejudge the issue before the evidence is considered; zero represents not a probability of innocence but an unshakeable belief in innocence that cannot be affected by any subsequent evidence. [page 35] 1.33 Where initially the prior odds should be set is another matter. Ultimately, it must be for the jury to decide. Some Bayesians suggest that in cases of identity, more suitable prior odds than 50:50 are the odds of one (the accused’s involvement) to the entire population of possible culprits (as was calculated in the case of R v Dennis Adams, above).80 Where the issue is whether a crime occurred at all, finding prior odds is more problematical. Richard Friedman suggests the prior should be the odds that the defendant would implicitly use if the question had never been raised.81 But in these days of detailed crime statistics one might think that the prior odds of a crime having occurred within a particular district could be more empirically based. If the presumption does more than embody the

criminal burdens of proof and additionally requires innocent inferences of fact to be drawn in the accused’s favour in situations of ambiguity (for example, where the accused remains silent), then these can be factored into any Bayesian analysis. 1.34 A final problem with using Bayes’ Theorem to compute the odds favouring an hypothesis is that of making sure that the hypothesis is compared with all other possible explanatory hypotheses. If our search is for what has happened in the real world, then it is argued that we should consider individually all possible explanations.82 In the context of the adversary trial, the liability hypothesis put forward by the claimant is likely to be compared with other hypotheses put forward by the opponent, but this may lead to the trier ignoring other possibilities — as in Chamberlain v R (No 2),83 where the exculpatory hypothesis, focused upon to the apparent exclusion of others, was that the victim had been taken by a dingo. Unless all alternative hypotheses are taken into account, then the search for the real world is biased in favour of those explanations put forward by the parties in a case.84 Mathematical probabilities and the standard of proof 1.35 Recognising the limitations of a mathematical approach, there remains yet a final difficulty: the conversion of a mathematical probability into proof.85 [page 36] The principle of complementation means that if there is a 0.6 probability of an hypothesis H having occurred, there remains a 0.4 probability that it did not. Can a court ever be satisfied that a particular hypothesis did occur when confronted with the express probability that it did not? The problem arises because mathematical probabilities describe the nature of entire classes and say nothing about the individual members of that class. To say that an individual hypothesis is proved where its probability exceeds 0.5 is to say that, although there can be no certainty about the occurrence of this individual hypothesis, nevertheless, to act upon it as if it has occurred will in the long run produce more correct decisions than incorrect decisions. But incorrect decisions there will be. It may be that this is an acceptable approach to civil proof, but it gives rise to

especially serious questions in the case of criminal proof. Even if the mathematical standard is raised to reflect the seriousness of criminal cases, there will always remain an express proportion of cases that will have been wrongly decided. A standard of criminal guilt of 0.9 means that of every 100 persons convicted 10 will be wrongly convicted. If it is raised to 0.99 still 1 person in 100 convicted will be innocent. To this approach L Jonathan Cohen has objected that:86 The advancement of truth in the long run is not necessarily the same thing as the dispensation of justice in each individual case. It bears hard on the individual like the gatecrasher at the rodeo if he has to lose his own particular suit in order to maintain a stochastic probability of success for the system as a whole.

Business people and punters (and perhaps repeat litigants)87 can rely upon mathematical probabilities to ensure their overall success rate, but courts are concerned rather to be correct in each and every individual case. 1.36 It is difficult to dispute this conclusion as descriptive of the criminal trial. The imposition of criminal liability is a serious matter, often entailing serious punishment, and it is a matter for moral outrage when the innocent are punished. Courts in turn have a moral responsibility to pursue justice in the individual case.88 Although some commentators have been prepared to quantify the number of innocent capable of sacrifice,89 it is submitted that their talk is allegorical and that the concept of criminal [page 37] justice embodies a search for truth in the sense that there is an aspiration to convict only the guilty. It is preferable that the guilty go free rather than the innocent be punished. Thus, if the court has any (reasonable) doubt about whether the accused committed the acts in question, the quest for certainty must be regarded as having failed. It may be argued that a relatively high degree of statistical proof is appropriate in order to protect the community from crime by incarcerating probable criminals and deterring would-be criminals, but this is an argument that flies in the face of the ‘golden thread’ of the criminal law: the requirement of proof in each case beyond reasonable doubt.90 This requirement embodies an aspiration to certainty. 1.37 In civil cases the matter is not so clear. It is possible to imagine a civil system of dispute settlement based upon long-term probabilities. Not only can

this be justified in terms of resource distribution and cost/benefit analysis,91 but it arguably accords with reasonable party expectations. The search for truth, as illustrated in criminal trials, is a long and costly exercise that cannot be justified in civil disputes. As a consequence, it may be sufficient that parties be treated with procedural fairness in an even-handed way and that courts seek only to be more often right than wrong in the long run.92 But it is doubtful whether this is descriptive of how common law civil courts approach their task. Just as criminal laws only impose liability where a prosecutor can establish clearly facts giving rise to responsibility, so civil laws require one party to allege and prove the facts upon which responsibility depends. The whole system relies upon onus of proof, pleading and proof. Courts are not asked to produce a relative justice between parties; courts are asked to find those facts which give rise to liability according to law. As emphasised already, court disputes are settled by judgment; by the application of the appropriate rule to the facts discovered. Civil rules impose liability [page 38] in situations of moral responsibility akin to the moral responsibility required in criminal cases. Concepts of intention, negligence and fault dominate civil disputes in the same way as they dominate criminal cases. Parties as a result come to court seeking to vindicate particular claims, not seeking a mere procedural fairness, and courts in most cases respond to those claims by determining the defendant’s responsibility in an emphatic way.93 1.38 Even where courts stipulate proof in terms of a balance of probabilities, they embark upon a minute analysis of information in an effort to be as close to the truth about the individual case as they reasonably can. Mathematical probabilities are avoided even though they may produce decisions more often right than wrong in the long run. For example, in SGIC v Laube,94 the Supreme Court of South Australia refused to find on the balance of probabilities that a driver was so under the influence of alcohol as to be incapable of exercising effective control of a vehicle upon the basis of expert testimony that most (nearly all) people with a blood alcohol level equivalent to that of the driver at the relevant time would be so incapable. King CJ went so far as to say:95 … the statistical fact that a particular proposition is true of the majority of persons cannot of itself

amount to legal proof on the balance of probabilities that the proposition is true of any given individual.

Other courts have emphasised the search for individual truth by explaining the standard of proof in terms other than a mere balance of probabilities. The formulation of Dixon J in Briginshaw v Briginshaw96 is the seminal example of such an approach, requiring that fact-finders be reasonably satisfied that facts occurred, a formulation most important for its emphasis upon the need to take the establishment of individual events seriously.97 [page 39] It may be that in the long term notions of civil responsibility will be replaced by notions more appropriate to the economic allocation of loss and that courts will be so subjected to empirical evidence expressed statistically that the emphasis upon individual events will alter. But it can be strongly argued that historically, in both criminal and civil cases, the common law notion of justice encouraged the search for truth in the individual case. This may also be conceptualised in moral terms, whereby the court is asked to justify its belief in relation to the individual case.98 The focus then turns to look at how courts approach this task.

The non-mathematical approach: ‘inductive probabilities’ and ‘best explanations’ 1.39 This leads us to consider approaches to fact discovery that seek truth in the individual case. These approaches, rather than seeking to construct a normative explanation of fact-finding, as the mathematicists attempt, take as their starting point decision-making in the world and seek to describe its internal logic and justification. L Jonathan Cohen describes what he calls ‘Baconian’ or ‘inductive’ probabilities. He analyses directly the probability judgments reached in courts of law in order to demonstrate that these judgments have an internal rationality of their own, a rationality which does not always coincide with a mathematical approach. Cohen’s starting point is to explain that mathematical notions produce a number of problems when applied to traditional court approaches to the discovery of facts.99 Not only are there particular anomalies, such as the problem

of conjunction (considered above at 1.31), but the whole approach to proof at common law appears to eschew the logic of mathematical probabilities. Cohen argues that what is crucial is the failure of mathematical approaches to concentrate upon the individual event in issue. Courts, according to Cohen (and as argued above), are concerned to determine unique events. This concern sits uneasily with a mathematical notion that is always concerned with the nature of classes of events. Ultimately, the mathematicist must be content with a majority of cases in the long run. Yet courts reach their decisions as if they are declaratory of the finding of individual events. Cohen uses the rodeo example, referred to at 1.14, to conclude that courts are concerned with justice in the individual case, not a stochastic probability of success for the system as a whole.100 [page 40] 1.40 Cohen describes the judgments of probability reached by courts as akin to the optimistic (albeit tentative) conclusions reached by scientists about the nature of the world. Just as the scientist searches for hypotheses to explain the workings of the world, so the jurist approaches the discovery of facts as a search for that version which at a particular point in time best explains the existence of all available evidential traces. For Cohen the scientific search has two principal features. First, whenever an hypothesis is inconsistent with evidence, that hypothesis fails completely and is rejected in favour of a modified hypothesis which can explain the available evidence. Secondly, until so falsified, hypotheses co-exist, and must be ranked in the light of the totality of evidence.101 But the situation of the jurist differs from that of the scientist. The scientist can perform further experiments and collect further information until all possible evidential sources have been exhausted. In this way, competing hypotheses may be eliminated or narrowed. The jurist, on the other hand, is presented by the parties with a definitive quantity of evidence and is asked to act upon it, and, at least in civil cases, even where it remains consistent with more than one hypothesis. In this situation, while the scientist might resume the search for empirical support, the jurist can only weigh the evidence in the light of available knowledge about the world. Most importantly, this always includes the possibility of missing evidence that might support one hypothesis rather than another. Jurists

are thereby obliged to take into account all their experiences of the world in reaching optimistic, albeit tentative, conclusions about individual events. The totality of experience is crucial. Inductive probabilities are meaningless when based upon less. In this sense inductive probabilities may be contrasted with mathematical probabilities that can be generated by any amount of information. This is simply illustrated by the rodeo example. The mathematicist can ask whether liability follows the purely statistical evidence. The inductivist can only weigh this information in the light of knowledge about the possible availability of other information about the event in issue, such as testimony from those involved, and is not able, on statistical evidence alone, to take an optimistic position upon what actually occurred. 1.41 Cohen explains the inductive approach as a coherent system with its own rules for reaching decisions of fact.102 For example, it accepts that where a case comprises proof of a number of independent events then the evidential support for the case as a [page 41] whole is equivalent to the support for that event with the lowest inductive probability. This makes no sense to the mathematicist who, in this situation, must multiply individual independent probabilities to conclude a probability for the case as a whole. The contrast between the mathematical and inductive approaches might be illustrated by analysing inductively the taxi-cab example considered above: at 1.25. The hypothesis in issue is the colour of the taxi-cab involved. The evidence presented is apparently consistent with the cab being either blue or green, for some cabs in the town are of each colour and the witness, although having identified the cab as green, has been shown, experimentally, capable of error. To the inductivist, the issue is the ranking of the blue/green hypotheses. The township distribution is not decisive in the light of possible further evidence connecting a particular colour with the accident; for example, evidence relating to the number of cabs of each colour in the vicinity at the time of the accident. Even if this evidence is unavailable its possibility demonstrates to the inductivist

that it is unreasonable to rely blindly upon the township distribution. The statistical accuracy of the witness identification is apparently of more immediate effect, being based upon a generalisation applying to all blue/green identifications by the witness. But even here other factors will also have to be taken into account in determining the reliability of the witness’s testimony, including small things like demeanour. Every factor, or possible factor, must be taken into account. If the township distribution is equivocal, the degree of reliability of the visual identification may become decisive. 1.42 The inductive approach is descriptive of that used by common lawyers who operate within an adversarial environment designed to test the opposing factual hypotheses of the parties. Mathematical probabilities are eschewed by courts in favour of inductive analysis. This is nowhere better illustrated than in TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks,103 where the majority would have no part of Murphy J’s mathematical analysis (explained at 1.19) and sought to marshal the evidence that did survive an unwitnessed fatal accident in an effort to find an hypothesis which plausibly, having regard to each judge’s knowledge and experience of the world, explained its occurrence. Another example of the rejection of mathematical analysis can be seen in King CJ’s approach in SGIC v Laube,104 where the Chief Justice refused to act upon a statistical probability in the absence of (available) information about the individual event. Following the same approach, courts have refused to allow plaintiffs to establish causation of injuries by simply relying upon the statistical results of epidemiological [page 42] studies.105 More recently, courts, when presented in criminal cases with DNA evidence in a quite specific Bayesian form (a likelihood ratio), have disapproved of attempts to explain its significance mathematically and emphasised to juries that their task is to decide the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt having regard to all the evidence in the case.106 Cases on circumstantial evidence, analysed at 2.74ff, also illustrate an inductive rather than a mathematical approach, with the question being whether the prosecution hypothesis can explain the totality of the evidence (to the exclusion of all reasonably possible innocent hypotheses).

1.43 Cohen’s description of an inductive approach has caused considerable debate,107 for most commentators had, until he put forward his description, merely assumed that ultimately mathematical notions underlie all decisions of fact. This assumption provided commentators with an easy yardstick against which to measure probability judgments reached by courts.108 This was not to argue that in every case decisions should be expressed mathematically,109 but by exposing the mathematical assumptions commentators could criticise particular decisions. However, if it can be established that the reasoning of judges reflects a different but coherent and rational approach to determinations of probability, then the mathematicists lose their critical standpoint, and must accept that there are other ways of looking at the world. As a consequence of Cohen’s work, evidence scholars have refocused their efforts into seeking descriptive approaches to decisions of fact. Psychological research suggests that juries conceptualise decisions of fact in story form,110 and the relative plausibility of competing ‘stories’ can often be seen to lie at the heart of deciding [page 43] between competing hypotheses.111 In a more sophisticated form this approach draws upon philosophical work that analyses factual decisions in terms of ‘best explanation’ in relating available evidence to available hypotheses. Whilst available evidence may simply be explained mathematically it may also gather weight when put in terms of causality. Thus, in the blue/green taxi example, evidence of the crash records of blue and green taxis has more explanatory force than evidence of the frequency of coloured taxis in the vicinity of the accident. In this way the ‘best explanation’ approach overcomes the reference class problem that cannot be escaped by the mathematicist.112 It also recognises the cognitive dimensions of decisions of fact that the mathematicist can only ignore in the quest for normative perfection.113

A correct probability approach? 1.44 Our starting point in this discussion was to recognise that persons in the world cannot know the world with certainty. No theory of discovery can definitively determine whether a unique event in the world has occurred. Yet

persons live with decisions of fact made every day. Our reasoning processes achieve workable results. In this context the question is whether any one probability approach should prevail in courts of law.114 There are essentially two possible approaches. By the one, theorists attempt to devise a normative approach to overcoming uncertainty. This is the mathematical approach. By conceptualising uncertainty in terms of classes of events and relying upon the principle of indifference, their probability can be expressed mathematically. This is a tool of considerable explanatory force and appears capable of approximation to the world when linked to empirical evidence about those classes. By the other, theorists start with the world and how decisions are made by those within it, the assumption being that these decisions are able to produce workable results and that within their complexity coherent approaches to fact discovery evolve. Whilst the first approach has an aura of elegant simplicity (until the complexity of the calculations in an individual case are appreciated), the latter has an aura of uncertainty based as it is upon the complexities of human decision-making. As Pardo and Allen retort:115 [page 44] We suspect that those who favor the [mathematical] probability approaches will dislike the lack of formality and precision … but these features are part of the world, not defects in the explanationbased approach.

The reality is that both approaches are complementary in the construction of our knowledge about the world and the events in it. Mathematical probabilities based upon empirical studies have great explanatory force. Moreover, mathematical probabilities can express the logical relationship between mathematically expressed beliefs. But the calculation of mathematical probabilities is complex and cannot generate a definitive determination of an individual event. Yet the concept of justice sought by courts in both civil and criminal cases demands that courts justify their decisions through the proof of individual events. This being so, fact-finding must ultimately be justified by an inductive or ‘best explanation’ theory which focuses on individual events, where explanations are sought in causal theories and knowledge that fact-finders have about events the world. Most cases do not involve evidence presented in mathematical terms and

counsel present and argue about evidence in inductive terms. But courts, having rejected proof as a mathematical concept, are nevertheless more and more often being presented with evidence in a mathematical form. Evidence of DNA matching is the most significant example. While not yet definitive of identity, the statistics now being presented to courts are compelling and suggest an extremely low possibility of a random match, and yet, assuming the DNA match is decisive of the case,116 so long as that mathematical possibility remains it must be excluded if courts do not accept that proof is mathematical. This appears to be expressly demanded in criminal cases where the standard of proof requires all reasonable doubts of guilt to be excluded; so that even a small mathematical possibility of a random match leaves open the possibility of an innocent hypothesis and must be excluded as unreasonable having regard to all the evidence before the court. But courts are reluctant to engage in any deep analysis of the nature of proof. Thus statistical evidence is admitted, most often in terms of a likelihood ratio (in apparent anticipation of Bayesian reasoning), with courts then refusing to explain the significance of a likelihood ratio and how a Bayesian might consider this with other evidence, and simply directing juries to consider the statistical evidence together with other evidence before the court in deciding whether the criminal standard has been met. [page 45] The risk of this approach is that the jury will simply equate the likelihood that the sample came from the accused with the likelihood of guilt and fail to appreciate and carefully consider possibilities of innocence left open by this evidence.117 In the first place, the extent of the possibility that an accused is guilty cannot be simply assessed on the basis of this likelihood ratio of finding the evidence. The ratio can be used to upgrade a prior probability of guilt having regard to the evidence, but, as the discussion of Bayes’ Theorem above demonstrates, a prior probability there must be. This elucidation of the mathematical approach is not explained to the jury. But secondly, even if it is, and the Bayesian calculation is made, what needs to be further explained to the jury is that a mathematical probability cannot at common law be equated to guilt, and that the task of the jury is to consider the possibilities of innocence and decide whether they are reasonable or can be excluded in the light of all the

evidence before the court. To assist in this analysis, the statistical results need to be expressed not in terms of the likelihood of the guilty hypothesis but in terms which emphasise the statistical possibilities consistent with innocence that require exclusion before an accused can be convicted beyond reasonable doubt.118 With this analysis the mathematical and inductive (best explanation) approaches can operate together in reaching a decision on the satisfaction of the criminal standard of proof. Far from there being one approach to fact discovery there are two, and although courts are ultimately required to strive for proof of the individual case, to seek the best explanation of all the evidence, nevertheless evidence expressed in mathematical terms can still be used to emphasise that explanations consistent with innocence remain. 1.45 A further matter highlighted by the debate is that courts are obliged to reach decisions about the world in a real rather than an artificial environment. Not only must all available evidence be taken into account, but that evidence which appears to be unavailable also needs to be factored into any decision. If a mathematical approach is to be taken it at least must take into account this stock of both available and non-available information. In other words, the mathematicist must not be too quick to act upon the principle of indifference, but must search for that mathematical probability in that class defined by this totality of existing and possibly existing information. In this sense, mathematical conclusions in court must depend as much upon the weight of evidence as inductive conclusions. To rely upon a mathematical probability in a general class by ready (and unwarranted) reliance upon the principle of indifference may produce more right than wrong decisions in the long run, but to do so flies in [page 46] the face of a system of justice which seeks truth in individual cases. On the other hand, it is this very emphasis that is the strength of the inductive and ‘best explanation’ approaches, compelling consideration of all information and explanations before any conclusion about the hypothesis of an individual event can be reached.119 If the emphasis comes down to acting upon maximal information about the individual event it can be appreciated that, in practical terms, decisions of fact, no matter how much empirical evidence is formally adduced in court, will depend

upon the cognitive abilities and the background knowledge that each individual trier of fact brings to the court, using those abilities and knowledge to refine mathematical classes and to seek ‘best explanations’. As cognitive abilities and knowledge vary, so different triers may reach different conclusions about facts. For this reason, a jury system might be advocated to provide a wider range of abilities and knowledge. Of course at the opposite extreme a system might be advocated which employs triers with expert knowledge and experience about the factual matters in question.120 1.46 But experiences necessarily reflect a particular perspective of the world. Thus, women are frequently critical of decisions of fact reached by male judges, decisions dependent upon male perspectives of the world.121 The failure of a woman to resist an alleged rape, or to complain following an alleged rape, may be better understood by those who have been assaulted or have had close contact with victims.122 Each individual has insights into the world that are based upon different information and experiences than others, and somehow this must be recognised in seeking to know the world out there. [page 47] More radically, some argue that the world out there (if there is one) is not capable of discovery and that decisions are the product of psychological and sociological influences that are better directly faced than through the pretence that there is a discoverable world.123 Our legal system, however, pragmatically adopts the optimistic view that, although our quest for knowledge is imperfect, experience shows that it is capable of success, and, accepting that reality is undoubtedly influenced and constructed through psychological, social and political influences and processes, its task is to peel back or accommodate these influences in an effort to base its decisions upon what really happens in the world out there.

The Procedural Environment General considerations 1.47 Accepting this optimistic view of fact discovery, what conclusions can be

drawn about the nature of the procedural environment that courts must employ if they are to aspire to factual rectitude? In the first place, the factor common to the application of all approaches to fact discovery discussed above is the need to take into account a maximum amount of evidence in relation to the individual event sought to be proved. The uncovering of and emphasis upon maximal evidence relating to the particular event in issue is the very touchstone of an appropriate trial procedure. Secondly, the above discussion illustrates that evidence can only be assessed in the light of background knowledge and experience about the world. That knowledge and experience will be decisive in applying the principle of indifference or determining whether evidence is consistent with an advocated explanation. Ultimately, it is the designated fact-finder that must decide whether or not particular facts justifying a legal remedy have been discovered. These factfinders may need to be informed by the knowledge of others (‘experts’) but ultimately it is their knowledge and cognitive capacity that will be decisive of discovery. Any procedural environment must employ fact-finders of sufficient cognitive capacity to be informed by the knowledge and experience of others and to apply rationally their own knowledge and experience in considering available evidence to decide discovery of the material facts in issue. Thirdly, the above discussion emphasises the fragility of the orderly approach to the discovery of facts, so that any process must allow those affected by decisions to debate before the fact-finder how evidence and knowledge can rationally be used to determine the facts in issue. There must be a formal procedure for presenting evidence and debate, and evidence must be disclosed in circumstances that allow for effective debate. [page 48] Fourthly, fact-finders must act fairly and impartially in view of the delicacy of their task. This requires not only that they be free from overt influence, but that they be aware, or made aware, of the psychological, social and political influences upon their constructions of reality. Any trial procedure should cater for this. And in the same way, the trial must be able to reveal the (conscious and unconscious) cognitive biases of witnesses so that fact-finders can take these into account in deciding what weight to give to their testimony.124

But a central difficulty remains. If the law is unwilling to take a definitive approach to ‘rational’ fact discovery, and one can understand that unwillingness in the light of the above discussion, then ultimately the procedural system can do no more than leave it to fact-finders to reach decisions ‘rationally’ on the basis of available information, knowledge and experience. Appellate procedures may exist to ensure some uniformity in all this, allowing a smaller group of judges to determine once again what inferences they feel can rationally be drawn from available evidence, and decisions of lower courts may be reversed, but ultimately the approach of one or a number of individuals will be decisive.125 In this sense, some notion of free proof underlies any procedural system; in a deep sense, cognitive intuitions remain crucial.126 1.48 In all this we must accept that we mortals trapped in the world cannot achieve factual certainty. The risk of error remains in every decision of fact we make about the world and courts must necessarily take this risk into account in making their decisions. The risk of error remains no matter how thorough the quest. But the risk of error a legal system is prepared to tolerate also influences the very nature and thoroughness of the quest itself. How the risk of error is allocated is a normative decision, stemming from the uncertainty of fact discovery but based upon notions that go to the very nature of a legal system. This can be illustrated by the most basic technique used to allocate risk: burdens and standards of proof. In Australia and other common law jurisdictions, in criminal cases, where it is the state bringing an accusation of crime against the citizen, in order to ensure so far as possible that no innocent person is convicted, the state is required to [page 49] tender evidence sufficient to prove the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. There is no obligation on accused to give or call evidence in support of their innocence and no adverse inference may be drawn for failure to do so. The state must not interfere with the liberty of its citizens without bringing an accusation supported by lawfully obtained evidence that in itself is capable of eliminating all reasonably possible sources of error. The burdens of producing evidence and proving the accusation lie entirely on the state and the standard of proof demands the most serious quest for rectitude. By way of contrast, in civil cases, where the

primary object is to settle disputes between citizens, that dispute is regarded as appropriately settled by determining on the balance of probabilities whether the claim can be justified. While the burdens of adducing evidence lie upon the claimant, the quest for rectitude is modified by the need only to prove that the claim is better justified than its rejection (favouring the defendant). While the defendant is not obliged to call evidence, failure to do so may lead to adverse inference: see 6.45. Thus, the allocation of the risk of error demonstrates that deeper notions underlie any procedural system,127 notions that must be accepted by citizens to retain confidence in the administration of justice. Its decisions must be acceptable to society and accord with its fundamental values. In this sense the procedural process must retain its legitimacy.128 Critical to acceptance is the perceived rectitude of factual conclusions. However, because factual rectitude is not only impossible to attain but difficult to aspire to, in the sense that the collection and tender of and persuasion by evidence in proof of a case is a complicated and time-consuming process, the processes whereby this is done need to inspire confidence in citizens. For confidence to be inspired, most fundamentally the process needs to be public and transparent. Then the interests and dignity of citizens involved in the process, as both litigants and witnesses, need to be respected. Many of these interests coincide with the quest for rectitude; for example, processes demanding that parties have notice of claims, and a real opportunity, with the assistance of lawyers, to collect and present and comment upon evidence before the court; and processes ensuring that testimony is given free from threats or promises, and in circumstances that are conducive to testifying accurately. But protecting other interests may not be conducive to accuracy; for example, excluding evidence obtained illegally to ensure respect for the legal system, excluding evidence to protect privacy or family and other confidential relationships, and allowing governments to maintain secrecy over their [page 50] decisions. Some of these interests may be expressed as human rights.129 In criminal cases, rights to fair process are so expressed, but there is no expressed right to factual rectitude.130 Yet, perhaps ironically, every claim to a substantive

right is predicated upon factual assumptions.131 Whatever the rhetoric, the justifications and reasons for the evidential processes must necessarily be based upon theoretical reasons deeper than the rhetoric of rights. It is argued that a genuine and committed search for factual rectitude remains the fundamental instrumental end of the legal process,132 if always a search necessarily modified by other interests (and most mundanely in the allocation of always limited resources).

The common law adversary trial 1.49 Whether or not any of the above sorts of considerations were factors in its historical development,133 the common law adversarial trial as it now operates does appear in both civil and criminal cases to make factual rectitude its primary instrumental end. Maximisation of information is encouraged by not only allowing parties to initiate and define the ambit of proceedings (the principle of party prosecution, common to all democratic systems of procedure), but also by allowing the parties to call the evidence in support of their particular claims (the principle of party presentation), it being assumed that those prosecuting claims, and hence having the greatest interest in the outcome of the action, are most likely to uncover and present the maximum relevant evidence about the individual event in issue. The principle of party presentation also finds justification in ensuring that the trier of fact remains independent of the parties’ claims, for it does not merely allow [page 51] parties to present evidence but demands that the trier of fact acts only upon this evidence. The trier of fact is not entitled to pursue its own investigations into the claims nor otherwise act upon its own knowledge. Taken to its extreme, this latter demand would thwart effective trial altogether for, as emphasised above, relevance and evidential weight can only be gauged against the general knowledge and experience of the trier of fact. The line between the specific and the general might not in theory be capable of being drawn, but it is maintained in practice by the common law, which allows triers to act upon their background

knowledge unless the parties put that knowledge into dispute.134 By this technique, the common law maintains its emphasis upon party control of the presentation of evidence and the independence of the trier of fact. On the other hand, common law triers of fact are not chosen for their background knowledge and experience of particular events, and where the parties consider this inadequate for assessing the weight of evidence they may supplement it by calling experts with appropriate experience.135 In this way, the range of relevant information can be increased with the triers remaining aloof from the controversy, though ultimately responsible for any decision of fact. 1.50 There are other restraints upon the principle of party presentation designed to assist triers in determining most accurately the weight of tendered information (or to put it another way, the reliability of that information) and to ensure public confidence in the trial system. Although parties are permitted to control the relevant information to be presented and the order of its presentation, the common law insists that normally that information be presented directly to the court through witnesses who have experienced it first-hand. Thus, presented evidence is principally testimonial, consisting of the first-hand experiences of relevant events and mental states being spoken to the court, with the reliability and accuracy of the witness freely recalling their experiences being subject to the direct scrutiny of the trier of fact. To assist this scrutiny, the common law further insists that witnesses, having presented their oral testimony for the one party, be available for crossexamination by the other party to enable matters relevant to their testimony and credibility to be pursued. These restraints upon the principle of party presentation give rise to the most celebrated of the common law rules of evidence, the hearsay rule, but they also give rise to the detailed procedural rules that determine the precise way in which testimonial evidence is presented to the court. Moreover, parties are given confidence in a system that allows full and effective testing and comment upon tendered information. [page 52] While the common law never developed a sophisticated form of disclosure of evidence prior to trial to enable opponents to prepare for scrutiny at trial, processes have been developed through legislation and rules of court which now

demand such disclosure. To ensure that this occurs in criminal cases the state is obliged to disclose its case against the accused prior to trial, where serious crimes are alleged by way of a preliminary committal procedure, and in civil cases disclosure prior to trial of at least all documents and expert reports relating to the matters in issue is generally required: see further 5.4–5.18. At common law, there were few other restrictions upon tender to ensure the acceptability of verdicts. It was enough for acceptability that the trial itself was public and set up as a contest between adversaries (often far from equal in terms of resources and not always legally represented) before an independent court. However, as the discussion in this book will show, through the course of the twentieth century, and particularly the opening years of the twenty-first century, legislatures have done much to develop the sophistication of trial procedures and expand the interests beyond rectitude that may be taken into account in deciding whether to receive evidence. Yet the essential nature of the common law adversarial process underlies all these reforms. Parties control the tender of evidence and independent courts decide factual issues upon the basis of the evidence tendered to them. 1.51 The very assumption of the common law system is that triers of fact are intuitively equipped to determine the probative strength of evidence and the competing hypotheses generated by it. As mentioned above, triers are not chosen for their expertise and it is assumed that rational humans are capable of weighing evidence when presented with appropriate information, including background knowledge and experience, where necessary. The jury system is testimony to this assumption, although it also embodies other notions of liberty through the jury’s prerogative to refuse enforcement of unjust laws and thereby further strengthens confidence in the system.136 So the common law adversary system purports to maximise information in relation to the event under inquiry and the hypotheses in explanation of that evidence, to maintain the independence of the triers, to attract public confidence through the fair nature of its process and to avoid dogma by applying the principle of freedom of proof. But whether the first three advantages in practice flow from the adversary trial is another matter. The merits of the adversary trial are continually debated.137 It may be argued that parties, driven by self-interest, suppress hypotheses and evidence that

[page 53] promote neither party’s cause, thereby hindering the search for the true facts. It is contended that the advantages of the system depend upon parties having equal and sufficient access to evidence and to resources to investigate and prosecute claims, and this is rarely the case, particularly in criminal cases where the accused must face the investigatory resources of the state, or where an impecunious individual pursues action against a multi-national corporation in tort or product liability. It is argued that the system of examination and cross-examination of witnesses effectively distorts natural narrative and thereby assessment of the truth, as witnesses are called to support the claims of the party calling them, and may then be subjected to extremes of cross-examination in ways that encourage triers of fact to gauge credibility on trivial or even irrelevant grounds. It is argued that the system does not adequately reflect the experiences of many sections of society, particularly those of many women, indigenous Australians, gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered persons, and other minority cultural groups. Finally, it is said that the adversary system is inefficient and expensive — often encouraging strict proof of matters which are easily accepted, or which should never be in dispute at all.

Structuring the Rules of Evidence 1.52 This is not the context in which to pursue these criticisms, the present object being to elucidate those basic principles that have shaped the common law rules of evidence. The thesis of this book is that the driving principle behind the law of evidence is the effective employment of natural rules of fact discovery to determine the occurrence of those facts upon which claims depend. But in addition, the common law assumes that this effective employment is best, and most acceptably, achieved through the process of adversary trial as explained above. It is contended that in these natural rules of fact discovery and their application through adversary process the keys to understanding existing evidentiary rules can be found. This is not to deny the influence of other factors based upon wider notions of public policy, but by revealing the extent to which rectitude and adversarial process justify evidential rules a clearer perspective can be provided in determining whether other policies should be allowed to intervene. Indeed, public policies can intervene to drastically curtail evidential

rules and processes where effective government so demands — the government may refuse access to information where this runs the risk of undermining national security; journalists may refuse to disclose their sources to maximise the freedom of the press to criticise government; victims of sexual assault and children may be provided with special procedures to encourage their testimony against sexual predators (as well as seeking to ensure the greater accuracy of their testimony); and information disclosed during settlement negotiations may be privileged to encourage citizens to settle their differences through agreement rather than an expensive and emotional trial. In each case, extraneous interests must be seen against the perspective of risking accurate outcomes (the interests of justice). The judicial system is ultimately [page 54] one branch of government, and whilst the principle of independent judicial review must not be undermined, legislatures can not only modify court processes and the evidence available to courts but also, by altering substantive laws, alter standards of proof and the facts courts are able to consider in reaching their decisions.138 1.53 This work deals with evidential rules in both civil and criminal cases.139 However, it is recognised that, most significantly as a consequence of the accusatory nature of adversarial criminal proceedings — whereby the state makes an accusation against one of its citizens, and must bring to the court sufficient evidence to justify its claim without assistance from the accused to a standard of proof seeking to ensure no innocent accused is convicted — there are a number of evidential rules that apply only in criminal cases. At one level these rules protect an accused from conviction upon the basis of evidence that may be unreliable — for example, those applying to the revelation of the accused’s bad character, to the admissibility of confessional evidence, to the directions required to the jury where evidence may be unreliable — and give the judge a residual discretion to exclude incriminating evidence to which the fact-finder may give more probative weight than it deserves. At another level these rules reflect those principles fundamental to the common law accusatory criminal trial: demanding the state to specify and prove its accusation beyond reasonable doubt without assistance from the accused, giving the accused the protection of the privilege

against self-incrimination both before and during trial, requiring the state to disclose its case and giving the accused a full opportunity to examine and test that evidence for reliability at trial and produce evidence by way of rebuttal. These principles underlie the very fairness of the criminal trial and when not followed may be remedied through discretionary exclusion, or through a stay on grounds of abuse of process (a procedure expressly preserved by s 11(2) of the uniform legislation: see 2.29 n 138 for examples) or through a miscarriage of justice being determined on appeal.140 Courts remain protective of these principles, and although they receive no constitutional protection, legislation will be interpreted to reduce or abolish them only by express words or as a matter of necessary implication (the so-called ‘principle of legality’).141 [page 55] As a consequence, evidential rules are of most prominence in criminal cases, yet the common law has never sought to apply completely distinct evidential regimes to civil and criminal cases. To a large extent the evidential rules are common. And in Australia, the uniform legislation, whilst some provisions are confined to criminal cases, does not depart from this unified approach. Whilst the uniform legislation is not structured to reflect underlying principles of proof within the adversarial trial, it is contended that these principles remain a decisive background to its understanding. It will be seen (at 2.3) that the legislation codifies exclusionary rules of evidence, but it does not purport to be a complete evidential code, let alone to codify more fundamentally the procedural system within which the rules of evidence operate. The idea of proof within the process of the common law adversary trial generally and accusatory trial in particular thus lies behind the legislation and continues to exert explanatory force where the legislation or its application are unclear. Furthermore, the High Court has made clear that principles fundamental to the common law accusatorial trial are only modified by legislation, including the uniform legislation, to the extent that this is made clear expressly or by necessary implication.142 Thus the uniform legislation must be seen as part of the continuing evolution of the common law adversarial and accusatorial processes of proof.

Synopsis 1.54 This book is structured to reflect and emphasise these principles of proof by adversary trial. It is divided into two parts. The first analyses those evidential rules which are dependent upon natural principles of fact discovery, the second those evidential rules which maintain the adversarial process to the discovery of facts. Chapters 2–4 comprise the first part. Chapter 2 explains the trial process and the fundamental notions of relevance, admissibility, a case to answer and proof, in order to emphasise the place and overriding importance of the natural rules of fact discovery. The rules dealt with in Chapters 3 and 4 apply principally in criminal proceedings and seek to grapple with the problem of ensuring that the probative value of certain forms of unreliable evidence is not overvalued and the high standard of proof undermined. The underlying difficulty in achieving this is that probative value derives [page 56] from natural rules of fact discovery that mostly defy definitive empirical guidelines. Chapter 3 deals with the reception of character evidence, always regarded with suspicion by the common law (and now by the uniform and other state legislation) because of its dubious (controversial) probative value, a value determined only by natural rules. Chapter 4 deals with rules, including those requiring corroboration or warning or other directions, which have as their basis the law’s desire to prevent triers of fact from acting upon potentially unreliable testimony, that unreliability again being determined by natural rules. The openendedness of the law in this part is explained as an inescapable consequence of the open-endedness of these natural rules of fact discovery, coupled with the courts’ desire to ensure that no innocent accused is convicted. Chapters 5–8 comprise the second part. Chapter 5 deals with the important assumption of the adversarial trial that parties have access to relevant evidence before and during trial, and explains the circumstances in which that access may be restricted. Although the focus of the evidentiary regime is the proof at trial of the material facts in issue, without prior access parties are unable to plan and organise their

factual allegations at trial nor be prepared to contest effectively evidence presented at trial by their opponents. By the same token, what happens prior to trial in the collection and collation of evidence has a profound influence upon the evidence that will eventually be put before the court at trial.143 If the law is serious about rectitude it must not only ensure that parties have access to helpful evidence, but also ensure that some access is given to adverse evidence so that it may be properly tested at trial. However, in criminal cases these principles of access are compromised by the more fundamental demand that the state prove accusations of crime without assistance from the accused. But even here legislative inroads have been made requiring the accused to give notice of alibi and expert evidence to be tendered and to participate in the narrowing of issues for trial: see 5.14. However, there must also be some restrictions upon access to evidence more generally in the parties’ hands to preserve both the adversarial process generally and the accusatorial process in criminal cases. Legal professional privilege, the negotiations privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination may be seen as preserving these processes. Furthermore, there may need to be other restrictions to access based upon wider notions of public policy (for example, restrictions protecting marital and other confidential relationships, and public policy immunity). And to ensure that parties act lawfully in their collection and collation of evidence the law may restrict the tender of evidence that can be seen as consequent upon illegality and impropriety. [page 57] Chapter 6 deals with the evidentiary rules ensuring that parties remain primarily responsible for the course of the adversarial trial. Thus, evidence is presented by the parties to an independent trier of fact, the claimant or prosecutor must make out a case to answer, and the rules of burdens of proof and presumptions stipulate which parties must go forward in evidence and which must ultimately persuade the trier of the occurrence of the material facts. The chapter also considers in what circumstances triers are entitled to rely upon their own knowledge rather than evidence presented by the parties. It is interesting that whilst the uniform legislation has something to say about the last question it is otherwise silent about these important common law adversarial principles. Chapter 7 explains the common law’s emphasis upon the oral adversary

presentation of testimonial evidence, showing the relationship between testimonial evidence and other forms of evidence (documentary evidence and real evidence), and then elucidating those rules which circumscribe the giving of oral testimony (competence requirements, the forbidding of opinion evidence, the oral presentation of evidence from memory, rules of examination-in-chief and cross-examination). There are now many statutory modifications to this oral process, seeking to improve the accuracy of eyewitness testimony and to take the interests of witnesses into account. This chapter also importantly highlights the problems facing courts in maintaining the rule forbidding opinion evidence as a result of the increasing demand by parties to tender opinion testimony from experts. Chapter 8 concerns the hearsay rule which, it is argued, is based upon the requirements for the adversarial presentation of oral testimony elucidated in Chapter 7. The most radical changes implemented by the uniform legislation permit testimony to be put before the court other than through oral adversarial presentation. Not only can hearsay evidence be received by the court but recent amendments may be used to encourage witnesses to testify in terms of an uninterrupted narrative rather than in response to questions. While this structure makes no attempt to follow the more pragmatic structure of the uniform legislation, as will be seen the uniform legislation is easily accommodated within it. The intention is to articulate that legislation in the context of the process of proof by adversarial trial that underlies it, and by this approach provide a principled understanding of its effect. 1.55 The work makes no attempt to deal with two areas of law often covered in texts on evidence, namely rules relating to estoppel (and res judicata) and the parol evidence rule.144 These rules apply principally to delimit facts capable of dispute, and in this sense bear closer analogy to substantive rules of law. Indeed, the rules relating [page 58] to parol evidence are most often considered in the context of the substantive rules of contracts and wills. Although both rules clearly affect the tender of evidence, all substantive rules have this effect in their definition of material facts. It is neither appropriate nor possible for a book on evidence to cover all rules that

may affect the tender of information. The object of this book is to focus upon those rules concerning the proof of those facts that must be established for parties to succeed in their claims. ______________________________ 1.

ICI Ltd v Caro [1961] 1 WLR 529 at 539 (Lord Evershed MR), 542 (Upjohn LJ). Cf Fairmount Investments and Southwark London Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1976] 1 WLR 1255 at 1265–6 and the position in criminal cases such as Pantorno v R (1989) 166 CLR 466 at 473. See also the remarks of Basten JA in DPP v JG (2010) 220 A Crim R 19; [2010] NSWCCA 222 at [79], ‘a criminal trial is not to be run on the basis of some idiosyncratic view of the parties as to the applicable rules of evidence; it is to be run on the basis of the law prescribed by the Parliament …’.

2.

North West Salt Co Ltd v Electrolytic Alkali Co Ltd [1914] AC 461 at 475–7 (Lord Moulton); Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 44 (Gibbs ACJ), 58–9, 68 (Stephen J).

3.

Twining, ‘The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship’, first published in Campbell and Waller (eds), Well and Truly Tried, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1982, and republished, with some additions, in Twining, Rethinking Evidence, Blackwell, Oxford, 1990 (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006).

4.

Eckhoff, ‘The Mediator and the Judge’ in Aubert (ed), Sociology of Law, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1969, p 175.

5.

Conciliation Act 1929 (SA) s 3. Although repealed in 1996, judges are now granted wider powers to themselves mediate or to appoint mediators: District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 32; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 27; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 65.

6.

For an overview of alternative procedures in Australia, see Astor and Chinkin, Dispute Resolution in Australia, 2nd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2002; Boulle and Field, Australian Dispute Resolution Law and Practice, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2016; Legg (ed), The Future of Dispute Resolution, 2nd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2016.

7.

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 53A; FCR 2011 Pt 28 (O 72 discussed by Howard, ‘Federal Court of Australia: Assisted Court Resolution’ (1991) 2 Aust Dispute Res J 240); Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) Pt 4; UCPR 1999 (Qld) Ch 9 Pt 4; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 65; SCCR 2006 (SA) Ch 10; District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 32; DCCR 2006 (SA) Ch 10; SCR 2000 (Tas) Pt 20; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) ss 24A, 25(1)(ea); SC(GCP)R 2015 (Vic) O 50; Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) Pt VI and s 167(1)(q); RSC 1971 (WA) OO 29A, 31A.10; Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA) s 23 and Pt 5; Supreme Court Act (NT) s 83A; SCR (NT) O 48.13; Local Court (Civil Procedure) Act (NT) s 16.

8.

Arbitration, in that it requires a third person to determine authoritatively a dispute (although involving a more economical procedure), entails the arbitrator reaching that decision which is correct in the circumstances. Therefore, it is a form of judgmental decision-making rather than a form for facilitating agreement. On the nature of arbitration, see Astor and Chinkin, n 6 above, pp 297–311.

9.

Frank, Courts on Trial, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1950, p 14. For wider perspectives on the pursuit of truth, see also Wootten, ‘Conflicting Imperatives: Pursuing Truth in the Court’ in McCalman and McGrath (eds), Proof & Truth: The Humanist as Expert, Australian Academy of the Humanities, Canberra, 2003, pp 15–50.

10. (1998) 193 CLR 173 at [19]. 11. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth, London, 1977, Ch 4. Cf Posner, How Judges Think,

Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2008. 12. See Detmold, The Unity of Law and Morality: A Refutation of Legal Positivism, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London and New York, 1984. 13. On the other hand, if one rejects altogether the idea that the object of the procedural system is to produce correct decisions and argues that it has other goals instead, then facts may be neither relevant nor decisive. At a conventional level, at 1.2 it was accepted that this may be the situation in the settlement of disputes through mediation. At a more radical level, it may be argued that facts are entirely elusive and that procedural rules merely provide a fair framework for a discourse ended by a court decision based upon the coherence of that discourse: see Jackson, Law, Fact and Narrative Coherence, Deborah Charles Publications, Liverpool, 1988. 14. There are exceptional cases where orders are made upon the basis of predicted behaviour; for example, control and prevention orders for potential terrorists and sex offenders. See Keyzer and McSherry, ‘The Preventive Detention of Sex Offenders: Law and Practice’ (2015) 38 UNSW LJ 792; Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 237 ALR 194 (Kirby J, in dissent); Pollentine v Attorney-General (Qld) [2014] HCA 30. Future dangerousness has exercised courts in the United States, most notoriously in Barefoot v Estelle 463 US 880 (1983). 15. It is recognised that ultimately a fact-finder can do no more than strive to rationally justify a belief about facts, and the importance of this moral commitment cannot be underestimated: cf Ho, A Philosophy of Evidence Law: Justice in the Search for Proof, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008. But the question posed here is the extent to which a belief about facts, if it is to be rationally justified, must rely upon a particular process or processes of reconstruction. 16. Twining, ‘The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship’ in Twining, n 3 above, pp 72–4 (2nd ed, n 3 above, pp 76–9). 17. See generally Dennis, The Law of Evidence, 5th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2013, [4.010]–[4.015]. A powerful explanation of the limits of the rationalist approach and the necessity for critical perspectives can be found in Nicholson, ‘Truth, Reason and Justice: Epistemology and Politics in Evidence Discourse’ (1994) 57 Mod L Rev 726. For the extreme version of the judicial discourse, see Jackson, n 13 above. 18. The approaches used by other groups, such as natural scientists, have diverged because of different objectives, resources, training, timeframes, constraints and methods. It is important to distinguish the endeavour to describe the rational process (the positive approach) from the endeavour to justify that process normatively (the normative approach). This distinction is stressed in the writings of Ronald J Allen: see, for example, Allen, ‘Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence’ (1994) 87 Northwestern ULR 604 at 630. 19. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on the Law of Evidence at Common Law, Little Brown and Co, Boston, 1898, pp 264–6. 20. Wigmore, The Science of Judicial Proof, 3rd ed, Little Brown and Co, Boston, 1937. It is not possible to give an account of Wigmore’s detailed system here. Instead a simplified version is provided that may, nevertheless, ultimately prove more useful than Wigmore’s own rather complicated schema. The discussion draws heavily upon the simplified schema advocated in Anderson and Twining, Analysis of Evidence, Little Brown and Co, Boston, 1991, pp 136–53 (now Anderson, Schum and Twining, Analysis of Evidence, 2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, Ch 5: ‘The Chart Method’). Though our schema is even more simplified. See also Roberts and Aitken, The Logic of Forensic Proof, RSS, London, 2013, pp 61–102; Palmer, Proof: How to Analyse Evidence in Preparation for Trial, 3rd ed, LawBook Co, Sydney, 2014, Part B; Palmer, ‘Why and How to Teach Proof’ (2011) 33 Syd LR 563. 21. In this work the standpoint from which we are considering this analysis is as counsel or trier of fact

seeking to justify a particular finding from a given amount of evidence. The same analysis can be employed from different standpoints, such as that of the investigator seeking to isolate additional evidential material which might be required if a particular factual conclusion is to be justified: see Anderson and Twining, n 20 above, pp 120–1 (Anderson, Schum and Twining, n 20 above, pp 124–5). Admissions and facts judicially noticed stand on the same basis as an incontrovertible experience of the fact-finder. 22. Anderson and Twining distinguish between ultimate and penultimate probanda as separate steps to be taken in constructing inferential charts: Anderson and Twining, n 20 above, pp 121–4 (Anderson, Schum and Twining, n 20 above, pp 125–6). This is a useful way of emphasising precision about which facts require discovery if an action is to succeed, but it also introduces terminology suggesting the existence of arbitrary categories. For this same reason no terminological distinction is drawn between direct testimonial evidence and circumstantial evidence, for it is the logical sequence of inferences that is always important, not the allocation of evidence into direct testimonial and circumstantial categories. 23. This term is used descriptively only. The High Court’s attempt to use the term ‘intermediate facts’ to single out a particular layer of facts in the inferential chain is difficult to justify. See the discussion of Shepherd v R (1990) 170 CLR 573 at 2.83. 24. Wigmore, n 20 above, [7]. 25. Ibid, [23]. 26. Ibid, [4]. 27. See Wigmore’s examples reproduced in Anderson and Twining, n 20 above, pp 131–5, and the example in Anderson, Schum and Twining, n 20 above, pp 136–9. For an antipodean example of Wigmorean analysis, see Robertson, ‘John Henry Wigmore and Arthur Allan Thomas: An Example of Wigmorean Analysis’ (1990) 20 Vic U of Wellington LR 181. 28. Note the adversarial assumption that fact-finding can be, formally or informally, a matter of party admission. In jurisdictions where the court remains responsible for investigating the case these admissions may not be accepted by the court. 29. A striking common law example is found in Chamberlain v R (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521, where the defence story — that a baby was taken by a dingo — dominated the facts with which the court concerned itself. 30. Limitations with eyewitness identification evidence are notorious: National Academy of Sciences, Identifying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification, National Academies Press, Washington, 2014. See further 4.54ff. 31. Estimating time of death can also be a complicated process and mistaken estimates have led to wrongful convictions: Re Truscott [2007] ONCA 575. 32. Wigmore, Anderson and Twining, and Anderson, Schum and Twining (see n 20 above), use an insertionary mark (‘>’) next to any controversial, inferred fact, to include a rival or explanatory chain. 33. Thus, in Shepherd v R (1990) 170 CLR 573, the High Court distinguishes between primary facts and intermediate facts. This distinction is discussed and explained in the light of Wigmorean analysis at 2.83. 34. Justice Wells, formerly of the Supreme Court of South Australia, advocated and used Wigmorean analysis in this way. 35. Although higher courts are sometimes reluctant to correct the inferences of a lower court: see, for example, Chamberlain v R (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521 (but cf R v Baden-Clay (2016) 334 ALR 234; [2016] HCA 35) and see, in civil appeals, Bell, ‘Appellate Review of the Facts’ (2014) 39 Aust Bar Rev 132. The impossibility of rational inference is also the basis of a submission of no case to answer: see

2.50–2.56. 36. An excellent discussion of these philosophical theories can be found in Mackie, Truth, Probability and Paradox, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1973, Ch 5. See also Twining, ‘Debating Probabilities’ [1980] Liverpool LR 51; Kaye, ‘What is Bayesianism? A Guide for the Perplexed’ (1988) 28 Jurimetrics 161; and Dawid’s summary in an Appendix to Anderson and Twining, and to Anderson, Schum and Twining, and Roberts and Aitken, n 20 above. 37. See Mackie, n 36 above, Ch 5. 38. James, ‘Relevance, Probability and the Law’ (1941) 29 Calif LR 689; Anderson and Twining, n 20 above, pp 63–9 (Anderson, Schum and Twining, n 20 above, pp 96–103). 39. This example is used by Cohen in The Probable and the Provable, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977, p 75, to criticise bare numerical probabilities. 40. [1973] QB 929. 41. This point is emphasised in Mackie, n 36 above, p 162. 42. See Mackie, n 36 above, pp 173–9. 43. The empirical generation of such probabilities is obviously problematic. While we have some evidence, based on numerous empirical studies, about the accuracy of eyewitness identification, the example of the jealous lover raises a range of more complicated issues and concepts (such as what constitutes ‘jealousy’, how jealous does a person need to be and how is that gauged, what does ‘presence’ mean and so on). 44. This is the problem of induction with which Hume grappled in his Treatise on Human Nature, Selby Bigge (ed), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1960, Book 1, Pt III, s vi, p 91. 45. Evett et al, ‘DNA Profiling: A Discussion of Issues Relating to the Reporting of Very Small Match Probabilities’ [2000] Crim LR 341 at 346. See also National Research Council, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence Committee on DNA Forensic Science: An Update, National Academy Press, Washington DC, 1996; Buckelton, Bright and Taylor, Forensic DNA Evidence Interpretation, 2nd ed, CRC Press, Boca Raton, 2016; Balding and Steele, Weight of Evidence for DNA Profiles, 2nd ed, Wiley, London, 2015. 46. For early explanations of the subjective theory, see Lempert, ‘Modelling Relevance’ (1977) 75 Mich LR 1021; Schum, ‘A Review of a Case Against Blaise Pascal and His Heirs’ (1979) 77 Mich LR 446; Ockleton, ‘How to be Convinced’ [1980] Liverpool LR 65. The justification and merit of a subjective theory is debated by Cohen, ‘Subjective Probability and the Paradox of the Gatecrasher’ [1981] Ariz St LJ 627; and Kaye, ‘Paradoxes, Gedanken Experiments and the Burden of Proof: A Response to Dr Cohen’s Reply’ [1981] Ariz St LJ 635. More recent, and strong advocates of the Bayesian School, include Kaye, n 36 above; Koehler and Shaviro, ‘Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods’ (1990) 75 Cornell LR 247; Edwards, ‘Influence Diagrams, Bayesian Imperialism, and the Collins Case: An Appeal to Reason’ (1991) 13 Cardozo LR 1025; Robertson and Vignaux, ‘Probability — The Logic of the Law’ (1993) 13 Ox J Legal Studies 457; Friedman, ‘Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge’ (1997) 1 E & P 276; Morrison, ‘The Likelihood-ratio Framework and Forensic Evidence in Court: A Response to R v T’ (2012) 16 Evid & Proof 1. 47. See n 46 above. 48. Robertson and Vignaux, n 46 above, emphasise that probability is not a property of facts and events in the real world (as might be suggested by always attempting to find empirical frequencies and which gives rise to what may be termed ‘The Mind Projection Fallacy’), but rather it is a measure of our (subjective) uncertainty about the world. Thus, probabilities are inherently subjective and the rules of

probability are simply dictates of reason and logic that determine the relationship between beliefs (and between mere beliefs and empirically based probabilities). 49. That subjective probabilities are not necessarily frequentist is emphasised by Robertson and Vignaux, n 46 above. 50. For simple introductions to the calculus, see Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability, 2nd ed, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1983, Chs 2, 12; Dawid in an Appendix to Anderson and Twining, n 20 above (2nd ed, Anderson, Schum and Twining, n 20 above, pp xx–xxi referring to the book’s website at ); Robertson and Vignaux, n 46 above; Robertson, Vignaux and Berger, Interpreting Evidence: Evaluating Forensic Science in the Courtroom, Wiley, London, 2016, pp 183–90. The use of mathematical techniques in court was strongly advocated by Finkelstein and Fairley, ‘A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence’ (1970) 83 Harv LR 489 and equally strongly criticised by Tribe, ‘Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process’ (1971) 84 Harv LR 1329. 51. This scenario confronted the House of Lords in The ‘Popi M’ [1983] 2 Lloyd’s LR 235, where the plaintiffs claimed under an insurance policy covering ‘perils of the sea’ (see the discussion by Robertson and Vignaux, n 46 above, at 465, 472), but their Lordships refused to apply the principle of complementation and held the claim could not be proved without a credible explanation. The decision is justified in principled terms by Stein, ‘An Essay on Uncertainty and Fact-Finding in Civil Litigation, with Special Reference to Contract Cases’ (1998) 48 U Toronto LJ 299 as treating contracting parties equally when distributing risk on grounds of party-expectations, party-encouragement to allocate risks in advance, and as minimising overall rates of fact-finding error. 52. (1979) 23 ALR 345. See comment by Simpson and Orlv, ‘An Application of Logic to the Law’ (1980) 3 UNSW LJ 415. 53. The simple use of this rule depends upon the existence of alleles at each loci being independent of each other. This assumption of independence has been subject to some experimental support and can also be allowed for statistically: see Evett et al, n 45 above, at 347. 54. As allele frequency varies within racial groups, where a suspect population is a smaller racial group then the relative frequency in the population at large will be inappropriate. Similarly, where relatives are included in the relevant suspect population this will affect the frequency and must be taken into account. See, for example, the discussion in Evett et al, n 45 above. 55. (2002) 83 SASR 135. In Tuite v R [2015] VSCA 148 at [19], the court refers to STRMix, a system designed to calculate the probabilities of mixed samples, generating numbers in the order of 10 to the power of 36 based on new profiling technologies. 56. 438 P 2d 33 (1968). Collins is discussed critically by Cullison, ‘Identification by Probabilities and Trial by Arithmetic (A Lesson for Beginners in How to be Wrong with Greater Precision)’ (1969) 6 Houston LR 471; Edwards, ‘Influence Diagrams, Bayesian Imperialism, and the Collins Case: An Appeal to Reason’ (1991) 13 Cardozo LR 1025; Huffman, ‘When the Blue Bus Crashes into the Gate: The Problem with People v Collins in the Probabilistic Evidence Debate’ (1992) 46 U of Miami LR 975. 57. For an Australian application of the multiplication and complementation probability equations, refer to Hodgson J’s judgment in In the Estate of RL Ralston (SC(NSW), No 109245/96, 12 September 1996, unreported). Compare with Hodgson J’s criticism of a mathematical conceptualisation of beliefs in ‘Probability: The Logic of the Law — a Response’ (1995) 15 Ox J Legal Studies 51. 58. Emphasised by Evett et al, n 45 above, at 346 (quoted at 1.17 above). 59. R v Doheny and Adams [1997] 1 Cr App R 369 at 372–3; Thompson and Schumann, ‘Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor’s Fallacy and the Defense Attorney’s Fallacy’ (1987) 11 Law & Hum Behav 167; Balding and Donnelly, ‘The Prosecutor’s Fallacy in DNA Evidence’

[1994] Crim LR 711 at 715–16. 60. See, for example, Evett et al, n 45 above, at 353; and Hodgson, ‘A Lawyer Looks at Bayes’ Theorem’ (2002) 76 Aust LJ 109. But compare this logical view with the refusal of courts to articulate Bayesian calculations: R v Dennis Adams [1996] 2 Cr App R 467; R v Doheny and Adams [1997] 1 Cr App R 369; R v Dennis Adams (No 2) [1998] 1 Cr App R 377 at 384; Gibson v R [2001] TASSC 59; R v Galli [2001] NSWCCA 504; R v GK [2001] NSWCCA 413; R v Karger (2002) 83 SASR 135; Riley v Western Australia (2005) 30 WAR 525 at [30] (Steytler P). See also the discussion in Lynch, Cole, Jordan and McNally, Truth Machine: The Contentious History of DNA Fingerprinting, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2008, pp 190–219. 61. For the formal proof of the odds version of Bayes’ Theorem, see Stein, ‘The Refoundation of Evidence Law’ (1996) 9 Can J Law & Jurisprudence 279 at 300–1. 62. This example has been subjected to psychological investigation in order to determine whether subjects intuitively apply the mathematical axioms in solution to it. See, for example, Kahneman and Tversky, ‘On the Psychology of Prediction’ (1972) 4 Oregon Research Institute Research Bulletin 12. The results of this research are critically examined by Cohen, ‘Can Human Irrationality be Experimentally Demonstrated?’ (1981) 4 The Behavioural and Brain Sciences 341 (and following commentaries). For further analysis of the problem, see Cohen, ‘Is There a Base-Rate Fallacy?’, unpublished paper, Oxford, 1984. The need to take into account the cognitive strategies of factfinders is emphasised by Callen, ‘Cognitive Strategies and Models of Fact-finding’ in Jackson, Langer and Tillers (eds), Crime, Procedure and Evidence in a Comparative and International Context: Essays in Honour of Professor Mirjan Damaska, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2008, Ch 9. 63. This calculation may not be strictly accurate as in principle, the probability that the two accused are the guilty parties cannot be found by simple multiplication of their individual anterior probabilities for a crime committed by only one person. 64. [1996] 2 Cr App R 467. 65. At a retrial Dennis Adams was convicted and his appeal against this conviction did not succeed: R v Dennis Adams (No 2) [1998] 1 Cr App R 377. 66. This disapproval of Bayesian analysis was endorsed by the Court of Appeal in R v Doheny and Adams [1997] 1 Cr App R 369 and in R v Dennis Adams (No 2) [1998] 1 Cr App R 377 at 384. Australian courts, although permitting DNA experts to testify in terms of a likelihood ratio, nevertheless discourage Bayesian analysis at trial and there is no obligation to direct the jury about how Bayesian analysis can be used to combine the likelihood ratio presented with the other evidence in the case: R v Galli [2001] NSWCCA 504; R v Karger (2002) 83 SASR 135; Ligertwood, ‘Avoiding Bayes in DNA Cases’ (2003) 77 Aust LJ 317; R v Berry Wenitong (2007) 17 VR 153; [2007] VSCA 202. 67. See the discussion of Thatcher v R (1987) 39 DLR (4th) 275 by Robertson and Vignaux, ‘Rethinking Verdicts: Chamberlain, Chignell, and Stratford’ [1993] NZ Recent LR 122. 68. Compare with Schum and Martin, ‘Formal and Empirical Research on Cascaded Inference in Jurisprudence’ (1982) 17 Law & Society Rev 105. 69. See Callen, ‘Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some Limits on the Use of a Bayesian Theory in Evidence Law’ (1982) 57 Ind LJ 1 at 10–15; Callen, ‘Second Order Considerations, Weight, Sufficiency and Schema Theory: A Comment on Professor Brilmayer’s Theory’ (1986) 66 Boston ULR 715 at 726, n 72: ‘[F]or the consistent use of Bayesian theory for the updating of probabilities by conditionalization, where thirty items of evidence are introduced relevant to an inference, one must record a billion probabilities’. 70. See n 46. 71. See Allen and Pardo, ‘The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models of Evidence’ (2007) 36 J Legal

Studies 107 and the symposium entitled ‘The Reference Class Problem’ in (2007) 11 E & P 243. See also Franklin, ‘The Objective Bayesian Conception of Proof and Reference Class Problems’ (2011) 33 Syd LR 545. 72. This point is made by Cohen, n 39 above, and is advocated strongly and persistently by Stein, n 61 above, Pt V: ‘On the Unbearable Lightness of Weight’; Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, pp 80–91. 73. The subjective approach was developed in the context of business decision-making rather than fact discovery: see Raiffa, Decision Analysis, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass, 1968. 74. Evett et al, n 45 above, at 353; Hodgson, n 60 above. And for a full development of the Bayesian approach in relation to scientific evidence, see Robertson, Vignaux and Berger, n 50 above. 75. See authorities at nn 60 and 66 above. 76. See n 69. 77. Cohen, n 39 above, Pt II. Arguments reconciling the problem of conjunction with a mathematical approach can be found in Friedman, n 46 above, at 279–84. 78. Lynch, Cole, McNally and Jordan prosecute this argument in Truth Machine: The Contentious History of DNA Fingerprinting, Ch 6, see n 60 above. 79. (1994) 637 A 2d 1101, discussed by various participants in ‘Probability and Proof in State v Skipper: An Internet Exchange’ (1995) 35 Jurimetrics 277. For Australian examples of paternity evidence in probabilistic terms, see R v GK [2001] NSWCCA 413; Bropho v Western Australia (No 2) [2009] WASCA 94. 80. Robertson and Vignaux, ‘Extending the Conversation About Bayes’ (1991) 13 Cardozo LR 629 at 638– 41. See generally Kaye, ‘The Probability of an Ultimate Issue: The Strange Case of Paternity Testing’ (1989) 75 Iowa LR 25; and in ‘Probability and Proof in State v Skipper: An Internet Exchange’, n 79 above, at 292–4. 81. Friedman, n 46 above, at 285–6. In ‘Probability and Proof in State v Skipper: An Internet Exchange’, n 79 above, at 296, Friedman advocates a very small probability based upon ‘no information apart from your general knowledge of the world’. 82. This point is stressed by Allen during the internet exchange reported as ‘Probability and Proof in State and Skipper: An Internet Exchange’, n 79 above, and debated at 293–8. See also Ligertwood and Edmond, ‘A Just Measure of Probability’ (2012) 11 Law, Prob & Risk 365. 83. (1984) 153 CLR 521. 84. This practical solution to the delimitation of hypotheses is the basis of the Bayesian analysis advocated by Robertson, Vignaux and Berger, n 50 above, particularly Ch 3. 85. Tribe, n 50 above, emphasises this problem. 86. Cohen, The Probable and the Provable, n 39 above, p 120. 87. Galanter, ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change’ (1974) 9 Law & Society Rev 95. 88. Ho, n 15 above, emphasises that proof must be approached from the internal viewpoint of the factfinder distributing justice, and that the fact-finder is a moral agent who must justify, on a moral and rational basis, beliefs in reaching a judgment or verdict in relation to another human being. While civil cases demand impartiality when distributing caution between parties, criminal cases require a protective attitude and the highest of standards of proof. 89. For example, Blackstone said ‘for the law holds, that it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer’: 4 Blackstone Commentaries, 1st ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1765–9, Ch 27, p 352

(). The full range of suggested quantifications is canvassed by Volokh, ‘n Guilty Men’ (1997) 146 U Penn LR 173. 90. Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 at 481. And even this standard and conventional appellate processes may not avoid conviction of the innocent: see Hamer, ‘Wrongful Convictions, Appeals, and the Finality Principle: The Need for a Criminal Cases Review Commission’ (2014) 37 UNSW LJ 270. 91. See Kaye, ‘Naked Statistical Evidence’ (1980) 89 Yale LJ 601 at 605; ‘The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation’ [1982] Am Bar Found Res J 487; and ‘The Error of Equal Error Rates’ (2002) 1 Law, Prob & Risk 3–8 where the author applies decision theory techniques to justify in utility terms (in most cases) a standard of over 0.5. See also Redmayne, ‘Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation’ (1998) 62 Mod L Rev 167 at 167–74; Hamer, ‘Probabilistic Standards of Proof, Their Complements and the Errors that Are Expected to Flow from Them’ [2004] UNE LJ 3. 92. Dworkin, ‘Principle, Policy, Procedure’ in Tapper (ed), Crime, Proof and Punishment: Essays in Memory of Sir Rupert Cross, Butterworths, Sydney, 1981, argues that parties only have a right to procedural fairness, but is silent on the question of whether courts strive for individual proof or long-term accuracy. However, as Dworkin’s rights theory depends upon a determination of individual proof it is arguably implicit that what is required is this search for truth, which remains as the unobtainable ideal. The extreme fact sceptic may argue that truth plays no part in the trial process and that the trial is a fairly conducted dialectic adjudged according to principles of coherence rather than truth: see Jackson, n 13 above. 93. Though, consider Tyler and Huo, Trust in the Law, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 2002; Tyler (ed), Procedural Justice, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005. 94. (1984) 37 SASR 31; discussed by Eggleston, ‘Focusing on the Defendant’ (1987) 61 Aust LJ 58, and followed in Payne v Crawford (1992) 3 Tas R 360. Scepticism of statistical probabilities can also be found in those cases where plaintiffs have sought to establish causation by relying upon epidemiological evidence. In Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 at [122], [123], [130], Spigelman CJ emphasises that epidemiological evidence can only create a statistical possibility and that causation can only be established by considering it in relation to other relevant evidence relating to the cause of the particular plaintiff’s injury. See also Amaca Pty Ltd (formerly James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd) v Hannell [2007] WASCA 158; Cowan v Bunnings Group Ltd [2014] QSC 301 at [38] (Alan Wilson J). See Faigman, Monahan and Slobogin, ‘Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony’ (2014) 81 U Chicago LR 417. 95. SGIC v Laube (1984) 37 SASR 31 at 33. 96. (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361–2. 97. The subsequent emphasis upon Dixon J’s use of the terms ‘persuasion’ (see, for example, Spigelman CJ in Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 at [136]) and ‘belief’ (see, for example, Murphy J in TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks (1979) 23 ALR 345 at 352–3) distracts from this fundamental point. Proof is not a simple matter of belief and persuasion but of ‘reasonable satisfaction’ following a reasonable search for the truth about the individual event in question. For further discussion of the civil standard, see 2.59–2.67. 98. Ho, n 15 above. 99. Cohen, n 39 above, Pt II. 100. Although, (parts of) mass tort and class action litigation may more closely resemble probabilistic approaches. See Cranor, Toxic Torts, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006; Jasanoff, ‘Science and the Statistical Victim’ (2002) 32 Social Studies of Science 37; Edmond and Mercer, ‘Litigation Life’ (2000) 30 Social Studies of Science 265. For the less probabilistic approach taken by Australian courts to

similar claims taken by individuals, see the decisions referred to in n 105 below. 101. Some argue that such idealised (and philosophically oriented) models of science bear little resemblance to actual scientific practice: see, for example, Yearley, Making Sense of Science, Sage, London, 2005; Sismondo, An Introduction to Science and Technology Studies, Blackwell, Malden, MA, 2005; Collins, Gravity’s Shadow, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 2004; Jasanoff et al (eds), Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 1995; Latour, Science in Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987. 102. Cohen, n 39 above, Pt III. 103. (1979) 23 ALR 345. 104. (1984) 37 SASR 31, discussed at 1.38. 105. Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 at [122], [123], [130] (Spigelman CJ); Amaca Pty Ltd (formerly James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd) v Hannell [2007] WASCA 158; Cowan v Bunnings Group Ltd [2014] QSC 301. 106. See, for example, R v Dennis Adams [1996] 2 Cr App R 467; R v Doheny and Adams [1997] 1 Cr App R 369; R v Dennis Adams (No 2) [1998] 1 Cr App R 377; R v Karger (2002) 83 SASR 135; Riley v Western Australia (2005) 30 WAR 525 at [30] (Steytler P). And see Evett et al, n 45 above; Hodgson, n 60 above. 107. The debate was led by Cohen, n 39 above; and Eggleston, n 50 above, their views producing repercussion in both English and American journals: Williams, ‘The Mathematics of Proof’ [1979] Crim LR 279 at 340; Cohen, ‘The Logic of Proof’ [1980] Crim LR 91; Williams, ‘A Short Rejoinder’ [1980] Crim LR 103; Cohen, ‘Letter’ [1980] Crim LR 257; Eggleston, ‘The Probability Debate’ [1980] Crim LR 678; Schum, n 46 above; Kaye, ‘The Paradox of the Gatecrasher and Other Stories’ [1979] Ariz State LJ 101; Cohen, n 46 above; ‘Paradoxes, Gadanken Experiments and the Burden of Proof: A Response to Dr Cohen’s Reply’ [1981] Ariz St LJ 635. Two symposia on the application of probabilistic analysis in courts are reported in (1986) 66 Boston ULR Pts 3 and 4; and (1991) 13 Cardozo LR Pts 2 and 3. Cohen’s views find support in Stein, n 61 above, Pt V: ‘On the Unbearable Lightness of Weight’; Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law, n 72 above, particularly Ch 5. 108. For example, Finkelstein and Fairley, n 50 above. 109. Tribe, n 50 above. 110. Pennington and Hastie, ‘Juror Decision-Making Models: The Generalisation Gap’ (1981) 89 Psych Bull 246, 251; ‘Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making’ (1986) 51 J Personality and Soc Psychology 242, 244; Bennett and Feldman, Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ, 1984; Wagenaar, van Koppen and Crombag, Anchored Narratives: The Psychology of Criminal Evidence, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1993. 111. Allen, ‘The Nature of Juridical Proof’ (1991) 13 Cardozo LR 373; ‘Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence’ (1994) 88 Northwestern ULR 604. See also Hodgson, n 60 above. 112. Pardo and Allen, ‘Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation’ (2008) 27 Law & Philosophy 223. 113. Cognitive problems arise not only in triers being able to make the calculations required for a definitive mathematical analysis but in assessing the cognitive strength of testimony in mathematical terms at all. The importance of cognitive factors in assessing reliability is emphasised by Moore, ‘Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom’ (1989) 37 UCLA LR 273. 114. For an excellent analysis of what the ‘Bayesian v The Rest’ debate is all about, see Allen, ‘Rationality, Algorithms and Juridical Proof: A Preliminary Enquiry’ (1997) 1 E & P 254. 115. Pardo and Allen, n 112 above, at 261.

116. For example, in many cases it is the circumstances in which the DNA sample was found that raise doubts about the incriminating nature of the DNA match, rather than the statistical result itself. See, for example, Fitzgerald v R (2014) 88 ALJR 779; [2014] HCA 20 (reasonable hypothesis that matching DNA on didgeridoo deposited through direct or secondary transfer at a time other than the attack); R v S, G (2011) 109 SASR 491; [2011] SASCFC 48 (circumstances in which semen — the source of the DNA analysed — came to be on a sheet could not be established as incriminating beyond reasonable doubt); R v Forster [2016] QCA 62 (innocent hypothesis for blood could not be excluded). Fitzgerald distinguished in Sloan v R [2015] NSWCCA 279. 117. The argument that follows is developed in the following articles: Ligertwood, ‘Can DNA Alone Convict?’ (2011) 33 Syd LR 487; Ligertwood and Edmond, ‘Expressing Evaluative Forensic Science Opinions in a Court of Law’ (2012) 11 Law, Prob & Risk 289–302; Ligertwood, ‘Forensic Science Expressions and Legal Proof’ (2013) 45 Aust J Forensic Sci 263. 118. But cf the decision in Aytugrul v R (2012) 247 CLR 170; [2012] HCA 15, where the High Court refused to insist on a particular statistical expression compatible with the criminal standard. See further 2.70 and Ligertwood, ‘Forensic Science Expressions and Legal Proof’, n 117 above. 119. The importance of maximising information about the event in issue is advocated by Stein in formulation of a principle of ‘maximal individualized information’: Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law, n 72 above, pp 91–106. The exact nature of Stein’s principle is examined and criticised by Nance, ‘Allocating Risk of Error: Its Role in the Theory of Evidence Law’ (2007) 13 Legal Theory 129. 120. Proposals for expert adjudication have not proved particularly productive: see Kantrowitz, ‘Proposal for an Institution for Scientific Judgment’ (1967) 153 Science 763; Martin, ‘The Proposed Science Court’ (1977) 75 Mich LR 1058; Caspar and Wellstone, ‘Science Court on Trial in Minnesota’ in Barnes and Edge (eds), Science in Context, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1982, p 282. Nor are humans likely to entrust justice to processes governed by the artificial intelligence of a computer: Collins, Artificial Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990; Dreyfus, What Computers Can’t Do, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1972. 121. See generally Kinports, ‘Evidence Engendered’ [1991] U of Ill LR 423; Naffine and Owens (eds), Sexing the Subject of Law, Lawbook Co, Sydney, 1997; Childs and Ellison (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Evidence, Cavendish, London, 2000; Douglas et al (eds), Australian Feminist Judgments: Righting and Rewriting Law, Hart, Oxford, 2014. See further Park and Sacks, ‘Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered; Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn’ (2006) 47 Boston College LR 949 at 998–1008 and articles referred to therein. 122. See generally, for example, Henderson, ‘What Makes Rape a Crime?’ (1985) 3 Berkeley Women’s LJ 193; Conaghan and Russell, ‘Rape Myths, Law, and Feminist Research: “Myths About Myths”?’ (2014) 22 Fem Legal Stud 25; Cossins, ‘Expert Witness Evidence in Sexual Assault Trials: Questions, Answers and Law Reform in Australia and England’ (2013) 17 Evid & Proof 74. 123. Powerfully argued by Nicholson, n 17 above. For the extreme version of the judicial discourse, see Jackson, n 13 above. 124. See, for example, Chapter 7, n 343 referring to literature critical of the cognitive biases of forensic experts. 125. See, for example, the responses from trial and appellate judges in Scott v Harris 127 S Ct 1769 (2009), discussed in Feigenson and Spiesel, Law on Display: The Digital Transformation of Legal Persuasion and Judgment, New York University Press, New York, 2009, Ch 2. More generally, see Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995. 126. Cohen, ‘Freedom of Proof’ (1983) 16 Archiv für Rights und Socialphilosophie 1, paper delivered to the 9th Annual Conference (2–4 April 1982) of the Association for Legal and Social Philosophy (this freedom to evaluate evidence must be distinguished from the freedom to receive all relevant evidence). Some

experimental psychologists have claimed that intuitions cannot be relied upon as rational (but who are they to so conclude?): Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (eds), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge University Press, London, 1982; Cohen (and commentators), ‘Can Human Irrationality be Experimentally Demonstrated?’, n 62 above. 127. Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law, n 72 above, argues that all evidential rules can find their justification in seeking to allocate the risks of error. 128. Dennis, n 17 above, at [2.022]–[2.029] develops a wider theory of legitimacy, although always recognising the importance of the notion of factual rectitude. See also Tyler, Trust in the Law, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 2002. 129. See, for example, the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), which requires all legislation and legal decisions to accord with the European Convention on Human Rights. In Australia, human rights are embodied in legislation in Victoria (Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006) and the Australian Capital Territory (Human Rights Act 2004) permitting courts to declare, but not strike down, legislation incompatible with these rights. The provisions of most relevance to evidential decisions are those enacting the presumption of innocence (see 6.14) and an accused’s right to a fair trial, ensuring for example that an accused may challenge incriminatory evidence presented by the prosecution. See generally Gans, ‘Evidence Law Under Victoria’s Charter: Rights and Goals — Part 1’ (2008) 19 PLR 197 and Gans et al, Criminal Process and Human Rights, Federation Press, Sydney, 2011. 130. Cf comment of Stein, Foundations of Evidence Law, n 72 above, p 33, that if fact-finders were infallible, there would be no room for ‘evidential rights that are valuable intrinsically, rather than instrumentally’. 131. See Gans, ‘Evidence Law Under Victoria’s Charter: Rights and Goals — Part 1’ (2008) 19 PLR 197 at 198–203. 132. Compare with the conclusions reached by Park and Sacks, n 121 above. 133. See, for example, Cairns, Advocacy and the Making of the Adversarial Criminal Trial 1800–1865, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998; Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003; Whitman, The Origins of Reasonable Doubt, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2008. 134. See 6.76–6.77. 135. See Chapter 7, ‘Opinion Evidence’, particularly at 7.43ff. 136. See generally Vidmar (ed), World Jury Systems, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000. 137. See, for example, Eggleston, ‘What is Wrong with the Adversary System?’ (1975) 49 Aust LJ 428; Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Trouble with the Adversary System’ (1996) 38 William & Mary LR 5; Davies, ‘Fairness in a Predominantly Adversarial System’ in Stacey and Lavarch (eds), Beyond the Adversarial System, Federation Press, Sydney, 1999, Ch 7; Managing Civil Justice, ALRC Report 89 (2002), at [1.111]–[1.134], [1.47]ff and [3.30]–[3.41]. 138. That the law of evidence can be regarded as an instrument of government is emphasised by Allen, ‘Reforming the Law of Evidence (Part Three): The Foundations of the Law of Evidence and Their Implications for Developing Countries’ (2015) 33 Boston U Int’l LJ 283 at 287–9. 139. Compare with the approach taken by Zuckerman, Principles of Criminal Evidence, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989. See also Dennis, n 17 above, at [2.022]–[2.029]. 140. Lee v R (2014) 253 CLR 455; [2014] HCA 20 (prosecution acquiring unauthorised access to accused’s evidence obtained through compulsion by the NSW Crimes Commission while a suspect undermined prosecution’s fundamental obligation to prove guilt without assistance from the accused). 141. X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92; [2013] HCA 29 (majority applied principle to read down legislation relied upon to permit examination of a person already charged); Lee v New South

Wales Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196; [2013] HCA 39 (principle applied to interpret legislation as permitting examination); R v OC [2015] NSWCCA 212; R v Independent Broad Based Corruption Commission (2016) 256 CLR 459; [2016] HCA 8 (principle applied to permit prosecution access to the compulsory examination of a suspect); Maughan v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 128 at [65] Martin CJ (legality principle did not affect provisions permitting examination of suspect nor provisions allowing access by prosecutor once suspect charged. Cf R v OC). See further at 5.183. In The Application of the Attorney General for New South Wales dated 4 April 2014 [2014] NSWSC 251, the ‘principle of legality’ was used to read down legislation protecting confidential child welfare reports to ensure accused had access to evidence assisting his defence. 142. X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92; [2013] HCA 29; Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196; [2013] HCA 39; R v Independent Broad Based Corruption Commission (2016) 256 CLR 459; [2016] HCA 8. 143. At its simplest level, the prosecution will focus upon investigating that evidence consistent with establishing the accused’s guilt, not that supporting a contrary hypothesis. This will be particularly pronounced during interrogation of a suspect: McConville, Sanders and Leng, The Case for the Prosecution, Routledge, London/New York, 1991, pp 12, 65ff. 144. For a detailed treatment of these topics, see LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, Ch 3 and Ch 20, s 3.

[page 59]

Chapter Two

The Trial Process The Process in Outline Sources of process 2.1 Given the procedural emphasis accorded the rules of evidence in this work, an appreciation of the overall trial process is a necessary background to an understanding of particular evidentiary rules. Process in all Australian courts is dominated by those common law adversary principles outlined in Chapter 1: the principles of free disposition, of party presentation, prosecution and comment, and of oral presentation of evidence. These principles are subject to modification by practical considerations of costefficiency. The precise procedural rules (including evidential rules) applicable in any particular Australian court are determined by an admixture of common law rules, legislation (there are Evidence Acts in every Australian jurisdiction) and rules of court (every court has its own rules). But in broad outline the procedures in the various Australian courts are based upon common law adversarial notions and are remarkably similar. 2.2 This conclusion remains true even where the uniform evidence legislation enacted by the Commonwealth, New South Wales, Tasmania, Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory applies.1 That legislation, based on the recommendations of the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) in its 38th

[page 60] Report,2 applies to ‘proceedings’3 in designated courts.4 The legislation follows the court rather than the jurisdiction being exercised.5 The courts designated by s 4 are, in the Commonwealth Act, a ‘federal court’6 (excluding the Supreme Court of a territory and not extending to a state court exercising federal jurisdiction) and, in the other Acts, respectively, a ‘NSW court’, a ‘Tasmanian court’, a ‘Victorian court’, an ‘ACT court’ and ‘a Territory Court’, defined restrictively to include either the High Court or a Supreme Court and ‘any other court created by Parliament’, but more broadly to include ‘any person or body (other than a court) that, in exercising a function under the law … is required to apply the laws of evidence’.7 Some of the provisions in the Commonwealth Act, provisions concerning evidence of federal-related matters, apply in all Australian courts.8 [page 61] 2.3 The uniform legislation is comprehensive in scope but, as Einstein J explains in Idoport Pty Ltd v NAB,9 it does not even purport to be a complete code. Section 8 expressly provides that ‘the Act does not affect the operation of the provisions of any other Act’ and as the discussion in this book will show, there are many Acts beside the uniform legislation which govern matters evidential (for example, protections given to vulnerable witnesses and restricting cross-examination of sexual assault victims) and many other topics commonly categorised as evidential are not dealt with at all (for example, burdens of proof and presumptions, the doctrines of res judicata and issue estoppel, submissions of no case to answer). The lack of comprehensiveness is further recognised in s 9 as enacted in all the Uniform Acts except the Commonwealth Act, which provides that the Act: … does not affect the operation of a principle or rule of common law or equity in relation to evidence in a proceeding to which the Act applies, except so far as this Act provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment.

The uniform legislation does apparently expressly provide otherwise in s 12 (‘except as otherwise provided by this Act every person is competent to give evidence’) and also in s 56(1) (‘except as otherwise provided by this Act, evidence that

is relevant in a proceeding is admissible in a proceeding’). These sections appear effectively to codify these two areas of the law of evidence.10 Section 56(1) is particularly far-reaching in that it apparently codifies all rules of admissibility. However, even in these instances, because courts remain reluctant to interpret any legislation to abolish common law rules based upon fundamental principles, in the absence of clear legislative expression it may be argued that some common law rules continue to apply.11 But leaving aside sections and issues such as these, the rules of evidence as a whole are not codified by the uniform legislation. And although the Commonwealth Act does not expressly preserve rules of common law and equity, where the legislation is ambiguous or less than comprehensive, given the extent to which the Act is based upon common law notions it would seem perverse not to have regard to previous common law authority.12 [page 62] Most significantly, the uniform legislation remains firmly based upon factfinding within a common law party-controlled accusatorial/adversarial process.13 It is only in the context of this process that the principles behind the legislation, and how the legislation seeks to address the evidential problems produced by this process, can be understood. Hence, this work seeks to explain the legislation not in isolation but in the context of those common law procedural principles upon which it is based.

The ambit of process 2.4 ‘Process’ in this context refers to the formal steps taken in a civil action or a criminal prosecution. That process comprises two stages: pre-trial proceedings followed by trial. As rules of evidence are concerned with the proof of disputed facts, and it is at the trial that disputes of fact are normally formally resolved, our principal concern is procedure at trial (although it might be emphasised that in reality trials resolve only a tiny fraction of proceedings formally commenced). But pre-trial process has a crucial effect upon the factual issues alleged and disputed at trial and upon the evidence available to a party at trial to prove those issues. Therefore, an appreciation of what is involved in pre-trial process is important to an understanding of the overall operation and effect of evidentiary rules during trial.14

Where actions are brought by private citizens there are few formal processes to assist in the investigation and collection of evidence. But where it is the state that takes action (criminal and civil) to enforce laws, its investigators are often granted special powers to collect evidence. These powers can be seen as an integral part of the process whereby justice is administered. Although this work will not analyse these powers in detail it will show how these powers are shaped by the principles of process developed through the adversarial trial. Thus, for example, the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence, principles which are argued in Chapter 5 to be intrinsic to the modern adversarial trial, must also be respected during investigation, and evidence obtained in breach of these principles will not be received at trial.15 Again, where [page 63] evidence is obtained unlawfully or improperly, judges may forbid its tender at trial where this would compromise the integrity of the court’s administration of justice. Thus, evidential rules have their own influence upon the collection of evidence and seek to ensure that those principles fundamental to formal process are not undermined by what occurs before.

Pre-trial process 2.5 Adversarial process is party-driven. Proceedings commence by a party laying a criminal charge or stating a civil claim. Less serious criminal charges (when disputed) go more or less directly to trial. Disputed serious criminal charges are screened through an administrative committal process (traditionally oral but now in many jurisdictions in writing), which is held principally to determine whether the prosecution has sufficient evidence to put an accused on trial. The process is defined by separate legislation in every Australian jurisdiction.16 This committal process requires the prosecutor to disclose the evidence against an accused, and it has evolved to emphasise the need for full pretrial disclosure to enable the accused fairly to meet the case alleged at trial.17 2.6 Civil claims are processed before trial in a rather more sophisticated manner. Parties exchange pleadings to isolate issues between them, and procedures exist for disclosure of documents and other information prior to trial and for the making of admissions so that parties clarify and have notice of issues to

be tried. More recently, courts have involved themselves in these pre-trial manoeuvres, endeavouring to ensure they are more efficiently carried out and that as many proceedings as possible are settled without resort to expensive trial.18 Sophisticated processes of mediation now exist in all Australian jurisdictions and parties, if not compelled to attempt mediation, will at least be strongly encouraged, especially through costs penalties, to do so. The adversary process, by leaving proceedings in the control of parties until verdict or judgment, is peculiarly suited to encouraging the settlement of disputes through agreement.

Trial process 2.7 In other than serious criminal cases most trials are conducted by a judge sitting alone, without a jury. Furthermore, in many jurisdictions accused can now either choose or request that serious criminal cases be tried by judge alone rather than by [page 64] judge and jury.19 It is therefore somewhat ironic that so many of the rules of evidence (expressed to continue to apply in legislation permitting trial by judge alone) have their origins and justifications in the jury trial, and, as will be seen, to some extent explains why legislatures have modified the strictness of, and sometimes abolished altogether, common law evidential rules. Yet, as this book attempts to argue, the common law adversarial process of trial, which has also contributed to the evolution of evidential rules, remains influential, and is assumed by the drafters of the uniform evidence legislation. The criminal trial begins with the taking of a plea from the accused. In civil cases, the parties will have defined the ambit of their dispute before trial through their exchange of pleadings. The parties retain responsibility for adducing at trial evidence in proof of the material facts that remain in issue. The party bringing the charge or claim (the proponent) bears the burden of establishing, to the satisfaction of the court, the material facts in issue upon which that charge or claim depends. That party therefore ‘opens’, by outlining to the court the material facts in issue and the evidence to be adduced in proof of them:

The purpose of an opening is to bring to the attention of the trier of fact the matters which the party will prove, the evidence which will be led to prove these matters, the witnesses to be called, the issues in the trial and perhaps some matters of law. It is not appropriate for counsel to use the occasion to make what is in effect a closing address and an argument.20

[page 65] Having given this opening explanation the proponent adduces the supporting evidence, principally in the form of witnesses testifying to material or relevant facts experienced by them. These witnesses are questioned by the proponent (examination-in-chief), cross-examined by any other parties to the proceedings, and permission may be given to the proponent to remove any distortions or ambiguities consequential upon cross-examination through re-examination. Reference to relevant documents and other objects may be made through oral testimony and in appropriate cases these may be tendered to the court as evidence (they become exhibits). 2.8 At the close of the proponent’s case the opponent is called upon to answer. But the need to answer depends upon the proponent having produced sufficient allegations and evidence. The first trial option available to an opponent is to submit ‘no case to answer’. If this submission is successful the charge or claim will be brought to a premature and unsuccessful conclusion. This option of submitting ‘no case’ assumes that the proponent at the end of his or her case has completed calling all available evidence. It is an important aspect of the common law trial that a party, most significantly the proponent, calls all his or her evidence in one continuum and does not ‘split’ his or her case.21 Exceptional circumstances are required to justify a proponent ‘reopening’ a case after it is closed, more particularly, after other parties have gone into evidence22 or after reasons for judgment have been given.23 Such exceptional circumstances might arise [page 66] where the opponent has raised issues not reasonably foreseeable by the proponent,24 or which could not be fairly dealt with in advance of the

opponent’s case,25 or where fresh evidence has come to light following closure of the proponent’s case,26 or where formal, technical or non-contentious matters have been inadvertently overlooked.27 As exceptional circumstances depend upon detailed consideration of various factors relating to the case in hand the decision to reopen is said to lie within the discretion of the trial judge. The guiding principles are said to be ‘the interests of justice’.28 2.9 Considerations of practical efficiency are one reason for the rule against splitting, but in criminal cases there is the additional consideration of fairness that demands that an accused know in advance the evidence to be met.29 For this reason cross-examination of a defence witness may contravene the rule against splitting by the prosecution if it seeks to obtain evidence that should in fairness have been given [page 67] as part of the prosecution case-in-chief.30 In civil cases, where issues are clarified in advance through pleadings and much information is disclosed before trial, this consideration is of much less importance. But in civil cases, where cross-claims and specific defences are more common, there are many more situations where it will be unfair to ask proponents to anticipate issues, and it will be necessary to allow a proponent to split and call evidence by way of rebuttal.31 2.10 If the submission of no case to answer is not made or is rejected by the court, where the opponent wishes to call evidence by way of defence, the opponent may open and explain what answer will be made and evidence called,32 and then call all its relevant evidence. The defence evidence must also be called altogether, but this is much simpler because there will already be full knowledge of the issues and evidence of the proponent. Again, the defence evidence is principally testimonial, with the witnesses being examined in-chief by the defence, being available for cross-examination and, where appropriate, being reexamined. 2.11 The opponent having answered, the parties address the court and explain how their respective points of view can be maintained in the light of the evidence before the court. Particularly when the judge sits with a jury in a criminal case, there is thought to be some tactical advantage to the accused in addressing last on the evidence,33 but at common law, the prosecution addresses last whenever the

accused adduces evidence beyond his or her own testimony and the testimony of character witnesses.34 In addition, at common law, the practice is for the prosecution not to address at all where the accused is unrepresented. Legislation now governs the position in every jurisdiction with some legislation more or less preserving the common law but with most making it clear that the prosecution may address in every case but always granting the accused the tactical advantage of the final address, with the proviso in New South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory that the court [page 68] may give leave for the prosecution to reply to any facts asserted in the accused’s address that are not supported by evidence before the jury.35 In civil cases, the right of final address may be of less tactical import where the case is tried (as most often it is in Australian jurisdictions) before a judge alone, but the common law approach of only allowing the opponent who has adduced no evidence to address last is generally followed.36 2.12 When a jury sits, its role is to determine whether the material facts in issue have been proved to the requisite degree.37 The judge has the duty of orally38 directing the jury which material facts must be established to make out the proponent’s case and to what standard that case must be proved. This requires the judge to relate the law quite specifically to the evidence and arguments in the case in question.39 The judge [page 69] must sum up fairly on the evidence presented, put to the jury the respective cases of the parties, and ‘direct’ the jury about any legal limits on the use of tendered evidence.40 The judge may also ‘comment’41 in more detail upon the inferences sought and even express views about what conclusions appear appropriate, so long as the jury is directed that the final decisions of fact are for it alone and the overall summing-up is fair.42

The extent to which the judge should explain to the jury precisely how it should reason in a case is, given the uncertainty about the very nature of proof, controversial. The better view is that while a judge must direct the jury how it must not reason, it is preferable to leave the precise form of reasoning to the jury itself.43 But in some cases it may be necessary to isolate indispensable intermediate facts and direct that they be found beyond reasonable doubt.44 [page 70] Many other directions are required. For example, the judge must direct the jury to find the crime proved beyond reasonable doubt.45 And in certain situations where testimony may be unreliable judges may be obliged to warn the jury against acting on that testimony alone or at least warn of the possible unreliabilities: see further Chapter 4. But the propriety of jury instructions is in many cases less definitive and, for an accused to appeal successfully, it will have to be established that, having regard to the summing-up as a whole and the conduct of the case,46 a particular instruction or comment or failure to instruct or comment caused a miscarriage of justice.47 All jurisdictions have some form of formal or informal bench books to assist trial judges in properly instructing juries.48 2.13 Nevertheless, in many of these cases appeals are brought by convicted accused on the ground that the jury has been inadequately instructed about (or the judge sitting alone has inadequately taken into consideration) tendered evidence. Some items of evidence attract quite specific and almost formulaic direction, but the evidence as a whole and the course of the trial will in every case be different. There is always room for some argument. In Victoria, concerned about the confusing complexity and length of directions required at common law in criminal trials, and the consequent prolixity of appeals, the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) (replacing the previous 2013 Act) seeks to clarify and simplify the directions required. Sections 1 and 5 express the guiding purposes and principles underlying the legislation. Reform is made not only in relation to directions required generally but also for particular types of evidence (Pt 4),49 in trials for sexual offences and family violence (Pts 5 and 6), and in explanation of the criminal standard of proof (Pt 7). Part 8 seeks to ensure that the summing-up focuses on the decisive issues and evidence in the case. An

important thrust of these reforms is to transfer the primary obligation with respect to directions to counsel: see Pt 3. At the close of evidence and before the prosecutor’s closing address counsel must [page 71] identify the matters in issue and request any specific directions sought in respect of particular evidence. Other than directions required to be given under legislation, the directions requested must be given unless the judge considers there are good reasons not to or it is otherwise not in the interests of justice to so direct: s 14. No further directions may be given unless the judge is of the opinion that there are ‘substantial and compelling reasons’ for doing so: s 16. The overall effect of the reforms is intended to ensure that obligatory directions are reduced and simplified and that the summing-up canvasses the real issues of law and fact in the case, thereby not only reducing avenues for appeal but also increasing the understanding of the jury. Judicial instructions to a jury, and whether they can be classified as ‘directions’ or ‘comments’, are a crucially important practical part of evidence law. Indeed, it may be an error for a trial judge when summing up to the jury to refer to a ‘direction’ required by legislation as a mere ‘comment’, suggesting the jury may in its discretion disregard it.50 How effective these instructions are is another matter.51 Such psychological research as has been done suggests they are of limited effect.52 Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated throughout this book, their effectiveness is a crucial and basic assumption to the fairness of the common law accusatorial trial by jury.53 [page 72] Following addresses from the parties and any summing-up, judgment or verdict is given.54

Appeal Following verdict

2.14 From this judgment or verdict a party may appeal. At common law, the verdict of the jury was effectively inviolable and such rights of appeal that now exist are contained in legislation based on the Criminal Appeals Act 1907 (UK).55 In criminal trials for indictable offences tried by jury, a convicted accused may appeal on the grounds that there has been any wrong decision of any question of law (substantive or procedural), for example, the incorrect reception or ‘direction’ about the use of evidence; or that otherwise there was a miscarriage of justice,56 for example, resulting from a judge’s ‘comments’; or that the jury’s verdict is unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence.57 In both criminal and civil cases appellate courts are reluctant to interfere with decisions of fact reached by a trial court by determining a verdict unreasonable or against the weight of evidence.58 However, in civil cases where [page 73] appeals are generally by way of rehearing, appellate judges are required to conduct a thorough examination of the record, which may entail interfering with a trial judge’s decisions on credibility.59 In criminal trials for indictable offences tried by jury even where these grounds are made out by an accused, the legislation allows the appeal to be dismissed if the appellate court ‘considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred’ (generally referred to as ‘the proviso’). While past authority had suggested this requires the appellate court to determine whether in the absence of the irregularity the jury would inevitably have convicted, in Weiss v R60 it was held that the proviso requires [page 74] the court to determine whether ‘a substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred’, and that this requires the court to examine the record and determine for itself whether on the evidence properly before the court the case was nevertheless proved beyond reasonable doubt.61 However, where procedural error is fundamental it may itself constitute a substantial miscarriage of justice that negates application of the proviso.62

Where, following the above appellate processes, an accused maintains his or her innocence, clemency can still be sought from the government, and legislation in most jurisdictions permits the Attorney-General to initiate inquiry or further reference to the courts.63 More recently, legislation in New South Wales, South Australia and Tasmania permits application by the accused to the court seeking further remedy, including retrial and quashing of the conviction, where further evidence has come to light.64 [page 75] The inability of the Crown to appeal against an acquittal is a fundamental principle of the criminal law that can only be removed by clear legislative intent.65 Generally, legislation does not seek to interfere with this principle, although in some jurisdictions appeals are allowed where a jury has acquitted on the direction of the trial judge, and, with leave, where the acquittal was in a trial by judge alone.66 However, legislation in all jurisdictions permits the prosecution to refer a question of law to an appellate court without the jury’s acquittal being put at risk.67 By this process the accused is given protection against ‘double jeopardy’. More radically the principles of ‘double jeopardy’ have been modified by legislation in a number of jurisdictions permitting retrial where serious criminal accusations have resulted in acquittal and fresh and compelling incriminating evidence has come to light.68 Appeals against acquittal by courts of summary jurisdiction are allowed generally in some jurisdictions but not others.69 Where such appeals are permitted, double jeopardy principles may still influence appellate courts when deciding whether to give leave to appeal and whether to interfere with the verdict of acquittal.70 [page 76]

Interlocutory appeals in criminal cases 2.15 Appellate courts are reluctant to hear appeals against rulings made during a criminal trial unless they involve decisions of law decisive of the disposition of the case. One avenue for interim appeal is through the limited process of the trial judge stating a case on a point of law.71 In Queensland, interlocutory appeals

from pre-trial rulings (including rulings on admissibility of evidence) are not allowed but may be considered on appeal against conviction: Criminal Code s 590AA(4). In other jurisdictions interlocutory appeals are allowed only with leave.72 In these ways interlocutory appeals in other than exceptional cases are discouraged. Legislation in New South Wales73 and Victoria74 more specifically provides for interim appeal. In New South Wales, appeal is allowed by a party against an ‘interlocutory judgment or order’, but this has been held not to include rulings on the admissibility of evidence. A party, other than the prosecutor, must get leave or have the trial judge certify appeal is appropriate. In addition, the prosecution may appeal ‘against any decision or ruling on the admissibility of evidence’ which ‘eliminates or substantially weakens the prosecution case’.75 In Victoria, all parties can appeal against an ‘interlocutory decision’ but appeals against interlocutory decisions concerning the admissibility of evidence are more strictly controlled; a party may not appeal unless the trial judge has certified that ‘the evidence, if ruled inadmissible, would eliminate or substantially weaken the prosecution case’; and in the case of all appeals leave is required, having regard to ‘the interests of justice’.76 However, leave must not be given after the [page 77] trial has begun ‘unless the reasons for doing so clearly outweigh any disruption to the trial’. Once leave is given, the interlocutory decision can be reviewed but even then, if it is in the nature of an exercise of discretion by the trial judge (as is the case with many evidential decisions), appellate courts will not interfere unless it can be shown that the trial judge failed to take into account a relevant consideration or took into account an impermissible consideration.77 Thus even in these jurisdictions interim appeal is discouraged. Nevertheless, an interlocutory appeal provides an avenue for the prosecution to have an admissibility ruling overturned which otherwise may have led to an acquittal against which the prosecutor could not appeal.78

The Essential Tasks of the Trial Court 2.16 As the above outline shows, the essential tasks of the trial court are

threefold. First, it must determine which evidence presented by the parties it can properly consider; secondly, it must decide whether the proponent has adduced sufficient evidence to require the opponent to answer; and thirdly, it must determine whether the evidence received establishes or proves the material facts in issue. The first two tasks may be described as decisions of law, in that they are the exclusive province of the judge. The third is a decision of fact, in that the requisite standard of proof having been stipulated, it is the province of the jury, if there is one, to decide whether the material facts in issue are proved. But in essence each of these decisions is a decision of fact, in the sense that, as the following discussion will show, the natural rules of fact discovery ultimately determine for what purposes evidence may be received, whether a case to answer is made out, or whether material facts in issue are proved to the requisite degree. However, at various stages and for various reasons, the law intervenes to explain, modify or exclude these natural rules. These legal interventions are the province of the law of evidence and while some of these interventions are made to ensure that the natural rules are properly applied, others are made to ensure that the natural rules are applied through the process of the common law adversary trial. Exceptionally these natural rules are modified or put aside to promote policies extraneous to the procedural process. This chapter seeks to explain the relationship between the natural and legal rules during the trial. It will conclude that legal rules operate principally to restrict the reception and use of evidence and that the law provides little guidance upon the two other essential tasks of the trial court mentioned above. [page 78]

The reception of evidence Two fundamental principles 2.17 It was Thayer who insisted that the law of evidence is based upon two fundamental conceptions. The first forbids a court to consider evidence which is not, by virtue of the natural rules of fact discovery, probative of the material facts in issue; that is, it ‘forbids receiving anything irrelevant’. The second directs that

‘unless excluded by some rule or principle of law, all that is logically probative of the material facts in issue is admissible’.79 These conceptions are enacted (their order reversed) in s 56 of the uniform legislation: (1) Except as otherwise provided by this Act, evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is admissible in the proceeding. (2) Evidence that is not relevant in the proceeding is not admissible.

Thayer pointed out that the general receipt of what is logically probative is not, like his first principle of relevance, a necessary presupposition in a rational system of evidence, but he saw it as fundamental to the common law’s commitment to judgment based upon factual rectitude. For, as was argued in Chapter 1, factual rectitude is most likely to be achieved through maximising relevant information. Consequently, it can be argued that all relevant evidence should be received by a court.80 Thayer’s fundamental conceptions have never been seriously contested, and they produce the essential division between the application of natural and legal rules at the information-reception stage of the trial. The court must first apply natural rules to conclude the evidence relevant, and, secondly, apply any legal rules that make the evidence inadmissible (either generally or for a particular purpose). Only if relevant and admissible can evidence be received (the notions of admissibility and reception are not distinguished in the uniform legislation). By virtue of s 56(1) of the Uniform Acts, the only exceptions to the presumption that relevant evidence is admissible are arguably those which arise under the Act (not by common law). Thus, the exclusionary evidential rules appear to have been codified.81 [page 79]

The nature of relevance 2.18 Relevance describes the relationship between the evidence presented and the facts upon which the charge or claim depends (the material facts in issue). Evidence is relevant when it can be regarded as capable of affecting, directly or indirectly, the probability of the occurrence (or non-occurrence) or existence (or non-existence) of one or more of the material facts in issue. If that probability is

conceptualised mathematically on a scale of 0 to 1, information capable of affecting that probability, however marginally, may be described as relevant. It is this notion that appears to be enacted in the uniform legislation, s 55 providing: (1) The evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is evidence that, if it were accepted, could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding. (2) In particular, evidence is not taken to be irrelevant because it relates only to: (a)

the credibility of a witness; or

(b) the admissibility of other evidence; or (c) a failure to adduce evidence.

At this stage of the trial, where the relevance of tendered evidence is being determined, no question of proof arises, although it can be immediately appreciated that the concepts of relevance and proof are aspects of the same probability reasoning. But while proof requires the probability of the occurrence or existence of the material facts to be determined to a specified degree, relevance requires only that that probability be capable of being affected to any degree. Relevance is not concerned with the value or weight of evidence. Hence, under s 55, evidence is relevant where ‘if it were accepted’ it ‘could rationally’ be given more or less probative value or weight in assessing ‘the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding’. These words emphasise that what rational probative value or weight it is ultimately given is a matter for the trier of fact. The words ‘could rationally affect’ emphasise that evidence incapable of achieving any rational effect is necessarily irrelevant. If the evidence is irredeemably equivocal it may be regarded as irrelevant.82 Furthermore, the majority (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) in IMM v R,83 emphasise that although the words ‘if it were accepted’ mean that the judge in determining the relevance of testimony must generally assume its credibility and reliability, this is not the case where it is ‘so inherently incredible, fanciful or preposterous that it could not be accepted by [page 80] a rational jury. In such a case its effect on the probability of the existence of a fact in issue would be nil and it would not meet the criterion of relevance’. 2.19 As a relationship, relevance must be approached by first defining precisely

the subjects of that relationship: the evidence presented and the facts in issue upon which the claim depends. The former is generally the testimony of witnesses and perhaps it is for this reason that the words ‘if it were accepted’ are included in s 55, to emphasise the general common law principle that, in other than extreme cases where no rational person could accept the testimony, it is the trier of fact, not the judge in determining relevance, that must decide whether to accept the testimony and the reliability of assertions of observed fact in it.84 The latter, the material facts in issue, derive from the rule (or rules) of substantive law said to give rise to remedy in the matter before the court, and are particularised as the facts alleged to satisfy that rule.85 Once the material facts in issue have been defined, evidence can be tested against them for relevance. The evidence may be relevant for one or more reasons. It may be relevant directly or indirectly (for example, as recognised in s 55(2) quoted above, via the credibility of a witness), and may only be relevant in combination with other evidence to be put before the court.86 In all cases it is a relationship that is ultimately in question, a relationship that can only be determined by careful and precise analysis of natural rules of probability.

Relevance and admissibility 2.20 Some courts and commentators argue that relevance has or should have a legal meaning and cannot be left to the province of natural rules. This legal meaning has been asserted in a variety of ways. [page 81] First, some argue that the law should itself stipulate what it understands to be the natural rules of relevance, and thereby those rules become rules of law. Wills,87 for example, defined relevance not as a relationship but in terms of constituent facts of the transaction in issue, its subordinate incidents and such further facts as may be necessary to identify or explain them. But this definition raises a host of problems. By what yardstick is ‘the transaction’ defined? When does a ‘transaction’ begin and end? When is an incident ‘subordinate’ to a ‘transaction’? In one area of evidence law this approach has been accorded significance — in the development of the so-called inclusionary res gestae rule. It will be contended

that the phrase ‘res gestae’ has only produced confusion and should be used only to describe a limited common law exception to the hearsay rule rather than a ‘rule’ of relevance: see 8.72. Generally, courts have not attempted to interfere with the natural rules by stipulating a particular interpretation of them. However, some judges have sought to influence these natural rules through force of precedent, arguing with Cushing CJ in State v La Page that:88 … instances in which the evidence of particular facts as bearing on particular issues has been so often the subject of discussion in courts of law, and so often ruled upon, that the united logic of a great many judges and lawyers may be said to furnish evidence of the sense common to a great many individuals and therefore the best evidence of what one may call common sense, and then to acquire the authority of law.

This approach is fraught with danger. Only in precisely identical cases can such precedent be followed. The factual issue, the information presented, and the current state of knowledge about such issues must be exactly the same, and this identity of factors occurs so seldom in practice that to urge such a concept of legal relevance is to urge the risk that precedent will be slavishly followed in disregard of subtle, yet crucial, distinctions between fact situations. For these reasons courts generally expressly assume that they are not bound by decisions of fact.89 [page 82] 2.21 Secondly, it has been argued that courts are bound to interfere with the natural meaning of relevance, that of necessity they must stipulate the strength of the relationship required between evidence and material facts in issue before the evidence can be described as relevant. Natural rules require consideration of all evidence that may affect the probability of material facts in issue, however slightly, but practical demands for efficient judicial proceedings require courts to impose some threshold of sufficiency.90 Thus, some courts have insisted that evidence be capable of rendering material facts in issue ‘more probable than not’,91 others that it be ‘sufficiently relevant’92 or reach a significance that makes it ‘worth considering’93 or is ‘unequivocal’.94 The balance of probabilities test, as a standard of proof, clearly goes too far, but on the other hand, there can be little doubt that general considerations of efficiency, time and cost justify the imposition of a minimal standard of sufficiency.95

2.22 Whether these considerations should be embraced within the terminology of relevance is another matter. To do so gives relevance an additional legal content of sufficiency. Natural notions, while they may determine relevance, cannot of themselves determine sufficient relevance, for sufficiency will depend upon what significance the law gives to matters of efficiency, time and cost. To keep distinct these considerations, it is argued that they be embraced not within the notion of relevance but within the quite separate notion of admissibility. This matter has long been the subject of debate in America. Wigmore favoured a notion of relevance embodying a requirement of sufficiency to offset notions of efficiency, time, cost and prejudice.96 Other commentators favour a strictly natural notion of relevance together with a so-called discretion, embraced within the notion of admissibility, within which extraneous matters may be considered and balanced.97 The advantage of the latter view is that it seeks to distinguish as clearly as possible natural and legal notions, and for this reason it is preferred. [page 83] Some courts and commentators go further and expressly interpret the term ‘relevance’ to embrace sufficiency demanded by more specific reasons of policy.98 For example, in criminal cases evidence tending to reveal the accused’s previous disposition, being regarded as unduly prejudicial, cannot be considered unless so probative that any prejudicial effect is thereby offset, and Lord Hoffman has argued that this process is embraced within the very notion of relevance.99 Sir James Stephen went even further and argued that all policies modifying the natural canons of probability reasoning can be embraced within a legal concept of relevance.100 It is doubtful whether such views help us understand the notion of relevance with any clarity. It is contended that whether particular policy reasons demand a higher degree of sufficiency, forbid the use of a particular chain of reasoning, or exclude information ipso facto, their importance is best emphasised by employing the separate terminology of admissibility in cases where these reasons are decisive. This also ensures that the onus is on the party seeking to have relevant evidence excluded. 2.23 It is this approach that appears to be taken by s 55(1) of the Uniform

Acts. All evidence capable of rationally affecting the probability of a fact in issue to some degree is relevant. To what extent the evidence rationally affects the probability of the fact in issue is a matter for the trier of fact. In determining relevance, probative value or weight is cast aside. No policy issues intrude to demand any particular degree of probative weight. Relevance is a purely natural notion. All such relevant evidence is then admitted by s 56(1) ‘except as otherwise provided by this Act’.101 When the Act provides otherwise, it imposes limitations upon the admissibility of evidence for policy reasons. In addition to there being definitive rules of exclusion, less definitive discretionary and mandatory exclusions take account of demands for further sufficiency or weight on more general policy grounds: ss 135–137; and see 2.26–2.37. Thus, the Act clearly distinguishes between factual and policy questions. All relevant evidence is presumptively admissible. It is this interpretation of the legislation that is forcefully put by McHugh J in Papakosmas v R.102 [page 84] Yet in Smith v R,103 a majority of the High Court read down the concept of relevance contained in s 55. Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ were of the view that, in a case which turned upon the identification of the accused as the culprit caught on film by a security camera, testimony from two police officers, whose acquaintance with the accused was not much greater than that of the jury, that the accused was that culprit, was inadmissible because irrelevant.104 Given that the jury could make its own comparison, the majority held: Because the witness’s assertion of identity was founded on material no different from the material available to the jury from its own observation, the witness’s assertion that he recognised the appellant is not evidence that could rationally affect the assessment by the jury of the question we have identified.105

On a literal interpretation of s 55 this is doubtful. This was ‘evidence that, if it were accepted, could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding’. Even on the majority’s wider view of relevance their conclusion is doubtful. No matter how short the police officers’ acquaintance with the accused compared with that of the jury, the fact that they were also prepared to say that the accused was the person depicted in the photograph must, if accepted, rationally affect the jury’s assessment that this was so.

In contrast, Kirby J held the testimony relevant but inadmissible because it was in the form of an opinion excluded under s 76 and not exceptionally admissible under s 79 as not based upon ‘specialised knowledge’.106 What the majority in Smith seems to have done is to include a notion of sufficiency into s 55(1) by interpreting the words ‘could rationally affect’ to mean that the evidence be ‘reasonably capable’ of adding to a jury’s probability assessment.107 Gummow and [page 85] Hayne JJ in Evans v R108 take the same approach in holding that having the accused don balaclava, overalls and sunglasses to compare him with a security video of the culprit similarly dressed was irrelevant as it ‘revealed nothing about the wearer and nothing about the appellant that was not already apparent to the jury observing him in the dock’.109 The more extreme consequence of such an approach can be seen in the earlier case of Papakosmas v R,110 where it is suggested that there will be circumstances where a complaint of assault will be irrelevant hearsay evidence of that assault because it could not rationally affect the assessment of whether the complainant was assaulted. But as McHugh J says in the same case:111 Section 55 is itself a decisive answer … The words ‘if it were accepted’ … make it clear that a court assess ‘the probability of the existence of a fact in issue’ on the assumption that the evidence is reliable … The [Australian Law Reform] Commission thought that, as a threshold test, relevance should require only a logical connection between evidence and a fact in issue. To the extent that other policies … required the strict logic of the relevance rule to be modified, that could best be done by the exclusionary rules … and by conferring discretions upon the court … ‘By this approach relevant evidence is presumptively admitted with the onus then upon the party seeking exclusion’.

2.24 It may also be asserted that relevance has a legal meaning by virtue not of the relationship between the evidence produced and the fact sought to be proved, but by virtue of the nature of that latter fact itself. Only those facts constituting the basis for legal recovery (the material facts in issue) can be proved in a court of law, and where evidence is relevant to an alleged fact, but that fact is neither a material fact in issue nor itself relevant to a material fact in issue, sometimes that evidence is described as irrelevant. Where the term ‘relevance’ is employed in this way it can be argued that these legal reasons are better embraced within a concept

of materiality, evidence probative of an alleged fact that is itself neither a material fact in issue nor relevant to a material fact in issue, being described as immaterial. However, materiality is a notion more traditionally associated not with the nature of tendered evidence, but with the nature of the facts sought ultimately to be proved by that evidence. It is more conducive to clarity to maintain this use by describing evidence as [page 86] relevant whenever probative of facts sought to be proved by it, and where these facts do not comprise the material facts in issue nor are relevant to them, to describe those facts as immaterial. The legal considerations of materiality are thus clearly divorced from the notion of relevance while preserving their central importance in the process of proof. The uniform legislation simply demands in s 55(1) that evidence be relevant to ‘the existence of a fact in issue in the proceeding’.112 2.25 Montrose has shown that courts often use the terminology of relevance to embrace legal notions, thereby confusing natural and legal notions.113 His conclusion is that information should be ‘received’ only where ‘relevant’, ‘material’ and ‘admissible’; ‘relevance’ embracing purely natural notions and ‘materiality’ and ‘admissibility’ embracing legal notions. There is much to be said for this precise terminology. Although the Uniform Acts do not use the terminology of ‘materiality’ or ‘reception’, as discussed at 2.23 above, their use of ‘relevance’ is basically that advocated by Montrose.114 Even if relevance is regarded as an entirely natural notion, given the difficulty (discussed in Chapter 1) of explaining the natural concepts of relevance and proof, problems inevitably remain in determining whether evidence is relevant. Questions of relevance are specific to the precise facts and circumstances of any case.115 The precise facts in issue, the precise evidence presented and the background knowledge and experience of the judge will be crucial of the determination. And, even if regarded as relevant and not excluded by any specific rule of admissibility, problems will remain in determining whether that relevant evidence should nevertheless be excluded under the residuary discretions.116 Again, discretionary considerations are always specific to the circumstances and

dynamics of the individual case. It is these elusive considerations of relevance and discretion that are fundamental to the everyday decisions made by a trial judge in determining the reception of tendered evidence. [page 87]

Discretion Nature and function at trial 2.26 Discretion appears to play a large role in the administration of the rules of admissibility in both civil and criminal cases.117 But care must be taken in using the terminology of discretion. Discretion literally suggests that a choice might be exercised in any way; by tossing a coin or throwing a dice, for example.118 But only a strict positivist could suggest that judges in applying rules of admissibility have this sort of choice. Rather, the notion of discretion embodies the idea that many decisions of admissibility are difficult decisions dependent upon a myriad of factors, some better appreciated by trial judges on the spot than appellate judges removed from the fray, and that it is conducive to better decision-making to recognise these difficulties by the express isolation of such a notion. This is not to say that judges have a free choice. Every discretion must be exercised to ensure that decisions of fact are reached in accordance with those principles upon which our procedural system depends. But isolating the notion ensures that judges do not attempt to mechanically apply rules which of their very nature defy mechanical application. Because appellate courts will not interfere with a trial judge’s exercise of discretion unless it has ignored or given insufficient weight to a relevant fact or principle,119 trial judges are thereby encouraged to take responsibility for difficult decisions. Although ss 137 and 138 of the uniform legislation are no longer expressed in terms of a discretion, appellate judges continue to take this approach on interlocutory appeals,120 and in New South Wales121 (but not in Victoria)122 on appeals from conviction. [page 88] During trial, many apparently definitive rules of evidence require difficult

decisions that are often described as discretionary. Some of these have the effect of requiring leave from a judge before cross-examining a witness or adducing evidence. For example, a judge must determine whether a witness is hostile or his or her testimony is merely unfavourable before allowing counsel who called that witness to cross-examine; a judge must determine whether the good character of an accused has been raised before allowing prosecuting counsel to cross-examine the accused about bad character; and a judge must determine whether crossexamination suggests recent invention before giving leave to call evidence to rebut the suggestion. Whether leave is given depends upon a proper application of the evidential rules in question rather than discretion in any literal sense. However, the Uniform Acts may have the effect of expanding the matters to be considered. Section 192 provides that before a trial judge gives ‘any leave, permission or direction’123 because of the Act,124 a number of matters must be taken into consideration. The failure125 of a judge to have regard to these matters may provide grounds for appeal: Stanoevski v R.126 The matters include the effect of the decision on the length of the hearing; the extent to which the decision would be unfair to a party or to a witness; the importance of the evidence; the nature of the proceeding; and the power to make other orders or directions. Whilst these matters appear merely to embody considerations that also arise when considering the specific discretions discussed below, in one respect they are wider. The section refers to whether it would be ‘unfair to a party or witness’. This contrasts with the concept of whether it would be unfair to admit evidence against an accused, which is a basis of the common law discretion and of the specific fairness discretion embodied in s 90. As is argued below, this discretion generally requires that the trier be able rationally and effectively to determine the reliability of evidence tendered against an accused. But the unfairness to be considered under s 192 appears to be a much wider concept. It considers fairness in relation to all parties (including the Crown: see R v Le)127 and to witnesses (for example, in deciding whether to compel one spouse to testify against another under s 18). In so doing, the concept of fairness appears to be wider and more abstract than that which underlies any of the exclusionary discretions discussed at 2.27–2.37. [page 89]

Other rules of admissibility appear discretionary because of their very broad formulation; for example, that prohibiting the disclosure of an accused’s disposition unless sufficiently probative to outweigh possible prejudice. Rules requiring juries to be warned of the possible unreliabilities of evidence are similarly open-ended. These ‘discretions’, which arise in the context of more specific rules of evidence, will be referred to in the context of those rules in Chapters 3 and 4. The residual exclusionary discretions 2.27 But at common law, judges have evolved more specific residual exclusionary discretions. The first, applicable in both civil and criminal cases, seldom distinguished from the very notion of relevance, allows exclusion of evidence where its reception cannot on grounds of efficiency, time and cost be justified. Recent High Court authority128 is clear in expressing three further discretions: the discretion to exclude evidence where its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect (the Christie discretion); the discretion to exclude confessional evidence where it would be unfair to the accused to admit it (the Lee discretion); and the discretion to exclude improperly obtained evidence (the Bunning v Cross discretion). Whilst these discretions generally apply to exclude prosecution evidence in criminal cases, as will be seen, the Bunning v Cross discretion can also apply to exclude evidence in a civil case. Equivalent rules, some expressed in mandatory rather than discretionary terms, are enacted in the uniform legislation: ss 90, 135–138. Only s 137 is specific to criminal cases (obligating exclusion of prosecution evidence where probative value is outweighed by unfair prejudice to the accused; cf the common law Christie balance). At common law, the onus is upon the party seeking exercise of a discretion to justify its exercise,129 and while this is generally the approach under the uniform legislation,130 in the case of s 138 (discussed further at 2.36–2.37), once evidence is shown to have been unlawfully or improperly obtained, it must be excluded unless the court is persuaded to exercise its discretion to admit the evidence.131 [page 90] There is also in Australia strong authority that there is a more general discretion

at common law to exclude evidence to ensure the fairness of the trial. The High Court recently considered this matter in Police v Dunstall.132 In a case where none of the discretions specified above applied, it was argued exclusion was demanded by this more general fair trial discretion. The majority, in a joint judgment, held that even if there was such a general discretion, there were no grounds for its exercise in the case before them. It therefore expressly refused to decide whether this more general exclusionary discretion was part of the common law. However, it did suggest that if there was an unacceptable risk to the fairness of a trial the appropriate remedy was generally to stay proceedings, and it could not clearly see circumstances for exclusion beyond those covered by the more specific discretions available. Nettle J strongly supported the existence of the general exclusionary fair trial discretion, even if only to provide the court, in appropriate circumstances, with the option of excluding evidence rather than staying proceedings. Nettle J also considered whether the existing common law discretions could be regarded simply as examples of this wider discretion, but found it difficult to rationalise the Lee and Bunning v Cross discretions with such an approach. However, the judgments recognise that there are two policies at work when considering these exclusionary discretions. The first seeks to achieve a fair trial by excluding evidence that might result in an unacceptable risk of a wrongful conviction. The second seeks to maintain the integrity of the judicial system by excluding evidence that has been improperly obtained. It is this division that is here employed in categorising the discussion of the discretions that follows. After discussion of the less controversial discretion to exclude evidence on grounds of efficiency, time and cost, consideration is given to the ‘fairness discretion’, which it is argued embraces the Christie discretion (s 137), and the ‘public policy discretion’, which embraces the Bunning v Cross discretion (s 138). It is also argued that the Lee discretion (s 90), although expressed in terms of fairness, is generally exercised on public policy grounds. Efficiency, time and cost 2.28 As remarked above, at common law, this manifestation of discretion is seldom distinguished from the very notion of relevance. However, it was argued at 2.22 that matters of efficiency, time and cost are better considered under the heading of discretion to emphasise that the decision is one of legal sufficiency

rather than mere relevance. This ‘discretion’ applies in both civil and criminal cases. The Uniform Acts distinguish clearly between relevance and exclusion on grounds of efficiency, time and cost. Relevance is defined in s 55 in terms that embrace only [page 91] the potential probative value of the evidence. Section 135 is an exclusionary rule justifying (under s 56) the exclusion of relevant evidence, and it allows a court to ‘refuse to admit evidence if its probative value is substantially out-weighed by the danger that the evidence might … (c) cause or result in undue waste of time’. This places a heavy onus upon an opponent to justify the exclusion of relevant evidence altogether on these grounds. In contrast, at common law, a court might require a proponent to justify on similar grounds the reception of evidence as ‘sufficiently relevant’.133 This ‘discretion’ is most likely to be exercised in a civil dispute in order to limit inquiry into peripheral matters.134 A judge should seldom restrict the tender of relevant evidence from an accused in a criminal case on these grounds.135 There is authority suggesting that there is no discretion to prevent an accused from tendering directly or through cross-examination evidence otherwise relevant and admissible to establishing his or her innocence despite the prejudicial effect it may have upon a co-accused.136 Fairness 2.29 The second common law manifestation of an exclusionary discretion seeks to ensure an accused a fair trial.137 The fairness of the common law trial is encapsulated by [page 92] those fundamental common law procedural principles discussed in Chapter 1 which seek rectitude of decision through processes which accord respect to its

participants and otherwise maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. The High Court has shown its willingness to consider the fairness of a trial as a basis for staying proceedings (temporarily or permanently) as an abuse of process and s 11(2) of the uniform legislation expressly preserves this power with respect to abuse of process. Thus where a miscarriage of justice — the very rectitude of the decision — is threatened by matters such as the destruction or loss of evidence (through misconduct or delay), inadequate pre-trial disclosure, adverse publicity affecting the ability to empanel an unbiased jury, failure of the state to provide adequate legal representation or there has been disregard of the privilege against self-incrimination, courts may regard continuation of the trial so unfair that it would be an abuse of process to proceed.138 Courts are also prepared to find an abuse of process where the proceedings are brought for an improper purpose, or where an action is so affected by illegality or impropriety that to proceed would be an abuse of process.139 Nevertheless, not only is an abuse of process difficult to establish, but particularly in criminal cases, permanent stays are seldom granted because of the emphasis given by the High Court to the need [page 93] to consider ‘the substantial public interest of the community in having those who are charged with criminal offences brought to trial’: see Moti v R140 and Police v Dunstall.141 However, the High Court appears reluctant to have regard to an underlying concept of fairness in expansion of the existing categories of the exclusionary discretion: see Dunstall (at [34]). The majority referred to state authority supporting a fairness discretion, and was prepared to assume its existence for the purposes of argument, but then held that it could not apply to the facts before the court. On the other hand, Nettle J (at [49]) was quite forthright in recognising the discretion, but agreed with the majority that it was not enlivened in the instant case. While the Dunstall majority (at [48]) distinguishes the discretion to stay where to continue proceedings would be oppressive or unjust by reference to an overriding public interest in proceedings continuing, this is no reason to reject the application of a fairness discretion during trial. On the contrary, such a

discretion may allow a court to take account of unfairness without having to consider these larger issues, just as it is able to take account of illegality through exclusion or stay,142 or mitigate the effects of adverse publicity through direction. The High Court has emphasised, for example in Lee v R,143 that fundamental to the fairness of the accusatorial trial is the obligation of the prosecution to prove its case without assistance from the accused. In that case, the court allowed an appeal because the prosecution had unauthorised access to incriminating evidence of the accused that had been compelled in examination by the NSW Crime Commission. The court emphasised (at [53]) that the appeal was allowed not on the basis of public policy due to the unauthorised access, but because as a result of ‘the prosecution being armed with the [accused’s] evidence’ ‘the position of the prosecution vis a vis the accused was fundamentally altered’ and the trial was thereby ‘unfair’. One might question why, just as the public policy issue could have been dealt with at trial by discretion, the issue of fairness could not have been similarly dealt with. While references to a ‘fairness discretion’ at common law are first found in the context of controlling the admissibility of confessional evidence,144 lower court authority strongly supports the existence of a common law fairness discretion [page 94] applying to all evidence tendered in criminal cases.145 Whether that wider discretion has any place under the uniform legislation is controversial, being, on the one hand contrary to the apparent codification of the exclusionary rules of admissibility under s 56(1), but on the other hand consistent with the principle of legality that demands that legislation not be interpreted to remove fundamental common law principles of process. Nevertheless, the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal has not only refused to interpret Dunstall as authority against the existence of such a common law ‘discretion’ but has endorsed its existence alongside the rules of ‘admissibility’ enacted in the uniform legislation.146 The circumstances in which this wider discretion may apply remain elusive but are discussed below: at 2.32–2.35. The earliest manifestation of a discretion based on considerations of fairness is the discretion to exclude evidence where its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect upon an accused. The crystallisation of the discretion in these

terms is found in R v Christie.147 The prejudicial effect is the risk that the jury will give the evidence more probative weight than it deserves and thereby create an unacceptable risk of an innocent person being convicted. These risks may arise because the jury is not able to understand the evidence, misunderstands the evidence or, as a result of the prejudice it engenders, gives the evidence more probative weight than it deserves.148 Although [page 95] usually treated as a distinct discretion,149 it can be seen as a particular manifestation of a wider general discretion to exclude evidence to ensure a fair trial.150 But it is a manifestation that focuses upon protecting an accused against wrongful conviction. In this sense its focus is upon ensuring factual rectitude. The Christie discretion is of primary importance in the context of the tender of prosecution evidence in criminal cases. Whether at common law it is available in civil cases where judges sit alone is doubtful. It has been argued that there is little point in a civil judge declaring: ‘Having heard this evidence, I consider that I may lawfully consider it, but as judge of fact I will set it aside, lest I be prejudiced by it’.151 Rather, the Christie considerations can simply be considered by the trial judge when assessing the weight to be given to the evidence.152 While this same argument may be made in the case of criminal cases tried by judge alone it has never been questioned that the residual discretions apply and the uniform legislation in Pt 3.11 draws no distinction between trials before jury and judge alone when it comes to the exercise of the powers under these sections.153 2.30 The question posed for the judge under Christie is whether a properly directed jury will be capable of giving the evidence in question a rational probative weight, [page 96] despite aspects of it that might distract the jury from this task. Courts are adamant that where juries are required to decide the weight of admissible evidence judges should be reluctant to distrust the capacity of juries to perform this task.154 In this respect the common law draws no formal distinctions between the credibility or

reliability of the evidence or the inferences to be drawn from it. The discretion does not exist to enable judges to screen the jury from what judges regard as weak evidence where the jury itself is perfectly capable of assessing its probative value.155 Judges should only intervene where there is a real risk that a jury may give evidence more probative weight than it rationally deserves. In some cases that risk may be removed through editing the evidence,156 or in others sufficiently mitigated through direction to the jury.157 Where this is not possible the evidence should be excluded. Primary examples of exclusion under the Christie discretion are situations where evidence, whilst allowing appropriate probative inferences, also gives rise to inappropriate inferences or chains of reasoning, which, even with appropriate directions, may be used by the jury and create a risk of wrongful conviction. Thus, a trial judge might exclude a particularly gory photograph of a murder victim where, although it is appropriately probative to indicate the injuries inflicted, it shows an horrific injury for which a jury may instinctively and unreasonably seek to make the accused responsible, and thereby compromise the criminal standard of proof: R v Ames.158 Or a judge might [page 97] disallow relevant discrediting cross-examination of an accused revealing bad character because a jury is likely to infer, consciously or unconsciously, but with a strong risk of inaccuracy, the guilt of the accused from the criminal propensities revealed by that bad character: Phillips v R.159 For similar reasons a judge might limit the discrediting cross-examination of a witness that reveals the accused’s bad character (R v S),160 or exclude police mug-shots — revealing that the accused has a record — used to identify the accused as a suspect, or exclude equivocal evidence of flight.161 But evidence may also be described as more prejudicial than probative in situations where the jury is unlikely to appreciate its real probative value, either because it does not have the knowledge or experience to make a rational assessment or because the evidence is incapable of effective challenge or rebuttal. In these circumstances it is more prejudicial simply because of the risk that the jury will give it more probative weight than it deserves. Thus, lack of experience of the risks of inaccuracy gives rise to a discretion to exclude identification

evidence: see further 4.66. And the absence of evidence to challenge provides a strong reason for excluding police evidence alleging an unsigned confession where no independent person was present and no independent recording made: Driscoll v R.162 It also provides a reason to exclude prosecution evidence that an accused cannot rebut because this will necessarily reveal unrelated criminal activity or his or her bad character.163 Other examples might include prosecution evidence from persons in positions of authority or from ad hoc experts, which, although relevant, is of little weight or assumes a form (such as ipse dixit) that cannot realistically be rationally assessed by the jury and which may be given undue weight merely because of the witness’s apparent position of authority.164 In the case [page 98] of other expert evidence, opinions may simply be accepted because the evidence is presented in a manner that makes it impossible for a lay jury to rationally assess its probative value.165 2.31 The uniform legislation enacts the equivalent of the Christie discretion (in both criminal and civil cases and whether the trial is before a jury or by judge alone) by means of ss 135–137. Section 135 provides that the court may exclude evidence: … if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might: (a)

be unfairly prejudicial to a party; or

(b) be misleading or confusing; …

Section 136 (again applying to all trials) provides that the court, rather than excluding evidence altogether, may limit its use where either of these dangers may arise, but without the ‘substantial outweigh[ing]’ requirement. This discretion to limit use is of considerable importance under the uniform legislation, which provides (ss 60 and 77) that where evidence revealing hearsay or opinion (generally inadmissible) is nevertheless admissible for some other reason, then it may also be admitted for that hearsay or opinion purpose. Section 136 allows the court to restrict the use of the evidence where its probative value as hearsay or opinion is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice or because it is misleading or confusing. One would expect this restricting discretion to be most likely used in criminal cases before a jury.166 However, the mere use of the evidence as

hearsay or opinion, expressly permitted under ss 60 and 77, cannot be a legitimate basis for its exercise.167 Section 137 emphasises the greater importance of the Christie considerations in criminal cases by providing that in such cases (whether tried before a jury or by [page 99] judge alone): ‘… the court must refuse to admit evidence adduced by the prosecutor if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant’. Consequently, s 137 is not expressed as a discretion at all168 (although one might add that even at common law once evidence is determined to be more prejudicial than probative there is no choice but to exclude).169 The mandatory nature of s 137, together with the heavier onus under s 135, means that it is s 137 that will be invoked by an accused seeking exclusion on grounds of unfair prejudice. These sections were enacted to embody discretions based upon the same policy grounds as those at common law.170 In describing ‘unfair prejudice’, courts ask whether it would be unfair to receive the evidence because of the risk that the jury may give it more probative value than it deserves.171 But the discretion is described both at common law and under s 137 as requiring a ‘weighing’ of ‘probative value’ against ‘unfair prejudice’. A particular problem has arisen concerning the definition of ‘probative value’ and its relationship to s 55. As explained above (at 2.18), the role of s 55 is to determine whether evidence has any rational probative value, and in determining relevance the words ‘if it were accepted’ were interpreted by the majority in IMM v R172 as requiring the judge to assume the credibility and reliability of testimony for this purpose, these being matters for the trier of fact to determine. The definition of ‘probative value’ is reflective of s 55: ‘the extent to which the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue’. But whereas relevance requires a mere capability of probative effect, probative value is concerned with the rational ‘extent’ of that effect. Nor does the definition contain the words ‘if it were accepted’. [page 100]

All judges in IMM v R are clear that neither s 55 nor the definition of probative value require the judge to determine actual probative value.173 That remains always a matter for the trier of fact when considering its verdict. Rather, in determining probative value, the judge must determine the maximum weight that a rational person could assign to the evidence in question. It is this that is to be weighed against unfair prejudice under s 137. In this sense, and this sense alone, the evidence is to be considered at its highest. To the minority (Gageler, Gordon and Nettle JJ) that was the end of the matter. Without the words ‘if it were accepted’, the judge could simply consider all matters significant in determining the maximum rational probative value of which the evidence was capable, including matters going to both the credibility and reliability of any testimony. However, the majority (at [44]), following the approach taken by the Courts of Criminal Appeal in New South Wales,174 Tasmania175 and the Northern Territory,176 determined that the words ‘if it were accepted’ in s 55 were to be read into the definition of probative value, requiring the credibility and reliability of testimony to be assumed. The reason for reading these words into the definition appears to be based on the argument that the determination of relevance is a precondition to the consideration of probative value so that it would be illogical not to read the words into the definition (cf remarks at [49]). But one might argue, as did the minority, that whereas the concept of relevance requires only that evidence have some rational probative value, the admissibility rules which turn on considering the rational extent of the probative value of evidence seek, through a definition which does not contain the limiting words, to take into account all matters relevant to that inquiry.177 [page 101] But as the following example taken from their judgment (at [50]) shows, the majority view does not mean that matters of credibility and reliability can be ignored in determining the maximum probative weight of which testimony is capable: It must also be understood that the basis upon which a trial judge proceeds, that the jury will accept the evidence taken at its highest, does not distort a finding as to the real probative value of the evidence. The circumstances surrounding the evidence may indicate that its highest level is not very high at all. The example given by J D Heydon QC was of an identification made very briefly in foggy conditions and in bad light by a witness who did not know the person identified. As he points out, on one approach it is possible to say that taken at its highest it is as high as any other

identification, and then look for particular weaknesses in the evidence (which would include reliability). On another approach, it is an identification, but a weak one because it is simply unconvincing. The former is the approach undertaken by the Victorian Court of Appeal; the latter by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal. The point presently to be made is that it is the latter approach which the statute requires.

It seems then that the difference between the approaches in Victoria and New South Wales are simply a matter of semantics and under both the extent to which evidence is capable of being probative necessarily takes into account matters going to its potential reliability.178 In finding the testimony of the asserted identification unconvincing, factors going to its reliability can apparently be taken into account under either approach. A final perspective to this discussion is provided when we turn to what is required by the balancing exercise under s 137. Probative value must be weighed against unfair prejudice. If matters affecting probative weight cannot be considered under the heading of ‘probative value’ they may be taken into consideration as matters relevant to determining whether there is ‘unfair prejudice’, in considering whether there is an unacceptable risk that the jury will give more probative weight to the evidence than it deserves. A similar way out of the dilemma may be possible when applying ss 101, 135 and 136. Under ss 97 and 98, however, to be admissible, tendency and coincidence evidence must simply be of ‘significant probative value’ but, as did the majority in IMM v R, the notion of significance can be manipulated to take weight into account, so that if there is a problem reconciling s 55 and ‘probative value’, it can be overcome. [page 102] By failing to take the literal interpretation of the definition of ‘probative’ value, and endorsing the expression ‘if it were accepted’ as ‘taking the evidence at its highest’, there is an increased risk of trial judges admitting, without full consideration of the principles behind s 137, prosecution evidence to which the jury may give excessive weight. At common law, there has been no discussion of the precise nature of probative value for the purposes of exercising the Christie discretion. The distinction between actual probative value and potential probative value is at best a fine one. While there is a presumption at common law that juries are capable of assessing the credibility and reliability of testimony179 (indeed this is one of the

very reasons for jury trial), this is a matter considered in asking whether the jury will give evidence more weight than it deserves. This is the fundamental issue. The weighing of probative value and unfair prejudice is, as McHugh J points out in Papakosmas v R,180 a weighing of incommensurables. The expression cannot be taken literally. Rather, it seeks to embody an attempt to ensure that triers of fact do not give prosecution evidence probative value that it does not deserve and create an unacceptable risk of the conviction of an innocent person. The pity is that the focus on the words in the uniform legislation may divert courts from considering the essence of the exercise, factual rectitude, which goes to the very fairness of the trial. 2.32 The more general manifestation of this discretion to ensure an accused a fair trial is often simply described as the ‘fairness discretion’. Its exact scope is controversial. Two questions are considered in the following discussion. To what extent does its exercise turn, as the Christie discretion turns, on the search for factual rectitude? And to what extent does its exercise turn on policies beyond ensuring factual rectitude if a trial is to be regarded as fair? The search for factual rectitude is certainly an important consideration; for example, to the exercise of the fairness discretion, otherwise known as the Lee discretion, as it applies to confessional evidence: see R v Swaffield; Pavic v R.181 While mere unreliability might be rejected as a basis for exclusion under the Christie discretion, because of the influence confessional evidence has with the jury, there is arguably justification for taking considerations of reliability into account in exercising the Lee discretion. But, even in the confessional context, it is clear that if the jury can properly assess probative value there is generally no basis for exercise of the fairness discretion on grounds of unreliability alone. For example, in Sinclair v R,182 the High Court was reluctant to exclude as unfair the confession of a schizophrenic accused, holding that unless his incompetence as a witness was established, the jury could be left to determine what [page 103] weight to give his confession.183 But in Foster v R,184 the fairness discretion was invoked to exclude police evidence of an interview with an Aboriginal suspect where no solicitor was present and there was no other independent record of the interview.185 An indigenous accused and the absence of independent evidence

made it difficult to assess accurately the police evidence in that case and was at least one reason for successful exercise of the fairness discretion.186 Considerations of factual rectitude also arise in other contexts where the general fairness discretion is invoked. In Police v Hall,187 the accused was charged with driving with an excess of alcohol in his blood. The principal prosecution evidence was a breathalyser test taken by police. In accordance with legislation, at the time of the test the accused was given a blood-test kit to enable him to obtain an independent analysis of his blood alcohol level. But on attending a hospital to obtain the blood test there was such a delay that by the time his blood was taken his body had absorbed so much of the alcohol that the test was of no assistance in challenging the accuracy of the breathalyser analysis. Hall argued that in these circumstances it was unfair to admit the breathalyser analysis as he had been denied the opportunity to challenge it. A majority of the court interpreted the legislation as simply providing an opportunity to obtain an independent blood test and did not provide any guarantee that the test would be taken, nor that it would be effective.188 Furthermore, it could not be said that the mere loss of the opportunity created any unacceptable risk of acting upon unreliable evidence, as the legislation facilitates and assumes convictions upon the basis of evidence of breathalyser tests alone. As the accused could point to no evidence suggestive of unreliability, and in the absence of any impropriety causing loss of [page 104] the statutory opportunity, the majority held there was no basis for exclusion under either the unfairness discretion or the Bunning v Cross discretion.189 The decision and reasoning in Hall were endorsed in Dunstall v R,190 where the majority refused to decide whether there was a wider fairness discretion, holding that even if there was, in light of the statutory scheme the trial was in no way unfair. In the absence of impropriety, arguably it is the risk of error rather than the mere loss of any procedural right to challenge evidence that gives rise to exercise of the unfairness discretion in these circumstances. A simple example can be found in R v Lobban,191 where police, contrary to statute, destroyed plants and thereby denied the accused the opportunity to test whether they were cannabis as alleged in the charge. The accused sought exclusion of prosecution evidence

relating to the nature of the plants. The court refused to exercise the unfairness discretion as, although the accused had been denied the opportunity to challenge, the plants had been grown by him and the defence had conceded their nature. In these circumstances there was no risk of error in admitting the prosecution evidence.192 It is submitted that it is this rectitude manifestation of the Lee discretion that is given primary importance by Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ in R v Swaffield; Pavic v R193 when they say: Unreliability is an important part of the unfairness discretion but it is not exclusive. As mentioned earlier the purpose of that discretion is the protection of the rights and privileges of the accused. Those rights include procedural rights. There may be occasions when, because of some impropriety, a confessional statement is made, which if admitted would result in the accused being disadvantaged in the conduct of his defence.

Arguably it is where the procedural impropriety creates an unacceptable risk of error that an accused is most obviously ‘disadvantaged in the conduct of his defence’. [page 105] Clearly then at common law, considerations of rectitude are important not only to exercise of the Christie discretion, but also to the Lee discretion; and if these are part of a broader category, to exercise of the more general unfairness discretion. Under the uniform legislation, it perhaps remains doubtful whether s 56 leaves room for a more general fairness discretion, but in exercise of ss 90 and 135–137, considerations relevant to rectitude remain important, either directly to the s 90 fairness discretion or to determining the potential ‘probative value’ of evidence when unfair prejudice is argued under ss 135–137. A particular problem arises in relation to the scope of the discretion insofar as it might apply rectitude considerations to hearsay evidence admissible under the uniform legislation where rectitude may be affected by the inability to crossexamine the maker of the out-of-court representation. Courts are rightly reluctant to exclude such otherwise admissible hearsay for this reason alone, for this would undermine the policy of the legislation to admit that hearsay evidence in designated circumstances.194 Courts are also reluctant to regard the mere absence of cross-examination as a reason to regard any trial based on such evidence as unfair.195

But where the tendered evidence is not hearsay made admissible by the legislation, procedural disadvantages of significance to determining probative weight can be more freely considered in deciding whether there has been unfair prejudice.196 2.33 The more general discretion to ensure a fair trial has another possible manifestation. Where incriminating evidence has been obtained from an accused illegally, improperly or in circumstances that have denied the accused fundamental procedural rights, it may also be argued that it is unfair to admit the evidence where it would not have been obtained at all in the absence of such misconduct. Thus, if police obtain a confession from an accused without according the accused the right of access to a solicitor (which might be prescribed statutorily or be demanded by more fundamental procedural notions), it is not just unfair to admit the confession because the accused is limited in challenging the reliability of the police evidence; it is also unfair to admit the confession, because if the solicitor had been present and had properly advised the accused, no confession might have been made at all. Similarly, if [page 106] police, having failed to persuade a suspect to answer questions at a formal interview, then arrange for an undercover agent or friend to secretly record a conversation with the accused in order to obtain admissions, one might argue it is unfair to admit those admissions as they would not have been made at all if the conversation had been held subject to the procedural safeguards for police interviews, including the requirement to advise the suspect of his or her right to silence.197 This notion of unfairness beyond rectitude is recognised by the High Court in R v Swaffield; Pavic v R, but the majority suggests that it does not itself justify exclusion. Rather, it is one factor in an overall discretion (the Bunning v Cross discretion) which takes: … account of all the circumstances of the case to determine whether the admission of the evidence or the obtaining of a conviction on the basis of the evidence is bought at a price which is unacceptable having regard to contemporary community standards.198

In other words, this aspect of unfairness, the impact of procedural impropriety upon the accused, becomes just one aspect of the discretion to exclude illegally or

improperly obtained evidence on grounds of public policy.199 It is difficult to argue that procedural impropriety against the accused in itself constitutes unfairness justifying exclusion.200 2.34 Another aspect of unfairness is found in the reasons given by the ALRC for including in s 90 a fairness discretion to exclude admissional evidence. This section was said to enact the common law ‘Lee discretion’ in order to cover the situation where an accused fails to exercise procedural rights through ignorance or incapacity or self-induced misunderstanding rather than through any impropriety by law enforcement officers.201 But the High Court has been consistent in holding that at [page 107] common law mere ignorance of rights is not in itself a ground for discretionary exclusion. In R v Swaffield; Pavic v R,202 an admission made to an undercover agent secretly recording the conversation was held prima facie admissible despite the accused’s prior refusal to speak to police. More strongly, in Em v R,203 an admission made to police secretly recording a conversation was held by the majority not to be within the unfairness discretion despite police knowing that the accused was under a self-induced impression that evidence of an unrecorded conversation could not be tendered against him. By way of contrast, if police had induced or encouraged that impression this impropriety would have given rise to possible discretionary exclusion on grounds either of unfairness or public policy. But mere ignorance of rights in either a particular situation or more generally is no basis for exclusion.204 The issue is when are police obliged to inform suspects of their procedural rights and ensure that they are understood. Counsel may be better advised to seek exclusion on grounds of such impropriety rather than unfairness if seeking to enforce a suspect’s procedural rights. 2.35 The uniform legislation does not expressly enact a more general discretion to exclude evidence that might operate unfairly against an accused.205 As the above discussion suggests, it can be argued that no such general discretion is needed. As far as unfairness may affect the rectitude of decision, where evidence is more prejudicial than probative, unreliable or where it cannot be effectively challenged, ss 135–137 can accommodate these arguments. For any unfairness to the accused consequent upon illegality, impropriety or loss of

procedural rights, s 138 covers the arguments for exclusion. However, s 90 provides that prosecution evidence of an admission may be excluded if ‘having regard to the circumstances in which the admission was made it would be unfair to a defendant to use the evidence’. As argued in the previous paragraph, the content of this discretion beyond matters not already covered by ss 137 and 138 is problematic. One approach is simply to say there is an overlap between [page 108] these sections.206 Another, espoused by Gummow and Hayne JJ in Em v R,207 is to say that legislation should be interpreted as far as possible to avoid overlap and so, for example, once impropriety is established, exclusion must be via s 138, the impropriety discretion (discussed at 2.36–2.37), and not s 90, the unfairness discretion. To this extent the notion of unfairness under s 90 must be read down. However, neither Gleeson CJ and Heydon J in their joint judgment nor Kirby J (in dissent) were prepared to read down, or otherwise define, the notion of unfairness under s 90. If unfairness is so read down there remains the question of what is covered by it. Insofar as procedural impropriety affects rectitude it can be embraced within the Christie discretion and the notion of unfair prejudice. Insofar as procedural impropriety results in the obtaining of evidence prior to trial it is covered by the public policy discretion. Insofar as there is procedural impropriety affecting the trial, for example, where an accused is unrepresented, there has been undue prejudicial publicity, evidence has been lost so that it cannot be effectively challenged, the prosecution has failed to disclose evidence or call witnesses, or there is a long delay in a prosecution being brought affecting an accused’s ability to meet evidence, these are not matters that can generally be dealt with through simply excluding evidence208 but may be and are generally pursued more appropriately through the seeking of a stay of proceedings, as to continue would be an abuse of process.209 Furthermore, where a stay has been sought and a trial has been held resulting in conviction, on appeal, even if an appellate court accepts that there has been a procedural impropriety, so that the trial may be regarded as having been unfair, it may refuse the appeal if it considers there has been no substantial miscarriage of justice. Loss of procedural rights at trial in itself may produce a substantial miscarriage of justice but not necessarily and there are few

examples (although Lee v R, discussed at 2.29, is an exception). Again it seems that rectitude receives much more emphasis upon appeal than loss of procedural rights per se. It is rare that the High Court holds that loss of procedural rights at trial in itself, in the absence of an effect upon rectitude, constitutes unfairness justifying exclusionary discretion or a stay on grounds of abuse of process. [page 109] Public policy 2.36 The third and final discretion recognised at common law operates in both civil and criminal cases,210 and operates to exclude on grounds of public policy otherwise relevant and admissible evidence where it is obtained as a consequence of, or otherwise arises out of,211 illegality or impropriety. The basis of the discretion lies not simply in the notion that courts will punish law enforcement officers who do not themselves obey the law,212 but in the more fundamental idea that courts must maintain the integrity of their processes by not condoning illegality or impropriety through giving curial advantage to the prosecution by admitting evidence obtained as a consequence of it.213 Such condoning can only bring the system for the administration of justice into disrepute.214 In extreme cases, it may be an abuse of process to attempt to base a prosecution on evidence so obtained and justify the staying of proceedings altogether.215 Where evidence is obtained illegally or improperly one might argue either, that it is unfair to admit the evidence because it would not have been obtained without the illegality, or that it should be excluded on grounds of public policy so that the court [page 110] is not seen to condone the illegality. In R v Swaffield; Pavic v R, Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ suggest that ultimately it is the second consideration which is always determinative in deciding whether to exclude evidence affected by illegality or impropriety.216 The question is ultimately whether the admission of the evidence would be ‘bought at a price that is unacceptable having regard to contemporary community standards’: at [69]. The unfair impact (if any) of the

illegality upon the accused thus becomes one factor to be considered along with others in determining whether this public policy demands exclusion of the evidence, rather than being in itself decisive. This public policy discretion has been recognised by other courts,217 although the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Lobban218 held that this ‘combined discretion’ applied only to confessional evidence. It is submitted that whilst this might be technically correct in terms of authority, to impose such a limitation misunderstands the nature of what Martin J calls the ‘combined discretion’. Although it is true that the extended notion of fairness and the public policy discretion are brought together in Swaffield, it is submitted that the result is not a ‘combined discretion’ but a recognition that the extended notion of fairness is better embraced within the wider public policy discretion which always operates where evidence is illegally or improperly obtained. And it has never been doubted that the public policy discretion applies beyond confessional evidence. This discretion to exclude on grounds of illegality or impropriety (but with the onus on the party seeking admission once illegality or impropriety has been established)219 is enacted for both civil and criminal cases in s 138 of the uniform legislation: (1) Evidence that was obtained: (a)

improperly or in contravention of an Australian law; or

(b) in consequence of an impropriety or of a contravention of an Australian law; is not to be admitted unless the desirability of admitting the evidence outweighs the undesirability of admitting evidence that has been obtained in the way in which the evidence was obtained.

2.37 Both at common law and under s 138, there must be a causal relationship between the evidence and the illegality or impropriety.220 The notion of impropriety [page 111] is nowhere defined but, again, as at common law, might be widely interpreted.221 Impropriety is not limited to the conduct of law enforcement officers.222 Impropriety should include any situation where a person has been actively223 denied fundamental rights and privileges, the reference to a denial of rights granted by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in s 138(3)(f)

supporting this approach. The words ‘improperly’ and ‘in contravention of’ reflect the idea that the discretion extends beyond activities that are technically unlawful and applies to other activities that would bring courts into disrepute if they were simply condoned by the courts.224 The essence of this discretion is the weighing of the public interest in rectitude of decision against the public interest that citizens’ rights be maintained within the administration of [page 112] justice. It might be argued that as at common law the discretion exists to ensure that the administration of justice retains its legitimacy.225 Without purporting to be definitive, s 138(3) delineates matters to be taken into account when exercising this discretion, generally reflecting the matters emphasised in the leading common law decisions of Bunning v Cross and Ridgeway v R.226 These include the nature of the offence charged against the accused, the importance and probative value of the evidence in question, the gravity and intent of the illegality or impropriety (particularly whether it was deliberate or reckless),227 the nature of the impropriety (for example, whether it is a breach of an international covenant or legislation designed specifically to protect citizens),228 the ease with which the evidence could have been obtained without illegality or impropriety, and the likelihood of those committing the illegality or impropriety being otherwise dealt with. To these, following R v Swaffield; Pavic v R, one might add the effect (if any) of the impropriety upon the accused.229 According to the High Court in that case, the ultimate question to be asked is whether to admit the evidence would be to convict at a price unacceptable having regard to contemporary community standards. This public policy discretion is discussed in more detail at 5.255–5.267. [page 113]

Determining the reception of tendered evidence 2.38 Having considered the concepts of relevance and admissibility (including the role of discretion in determining admissibility), the approach taken to the

receipt of evidence by a trial court and the extent to which its decisions depend upon natural and legal rules can be clearly described. Tendered evidence must be relevant directly or indirectly to a material fact in issue. Adversary principles demand that the parties themselves state the material facts upon which they rely, and that the court determine as a matter of law whether those alleged material facts are sufficient to make out the legal remedy sought. In criminal cases, the complaint, information or indictment must give particulars of the incident alleged to constitute the crime and the prosecutor in opening will normally make clear the material facts to be established by the information to be tendered.230 The plea of not guilty puts all material facts in dispute.231 In civil cases, material facts must be precisely and accurately alleged in pleadings,232 but through the process of answer and counter-allegation and admission the parties will confine material facts to those in dispute (in issue), and at the trial only evidence relevant to those material facts in issue will be considered. 2.39 Having determined, by means of the natural rules of fact discovery, the relevance of adduced evidence to one or more material facts in issue, the evidence will be received in proof of those material facts unless declared by law inadmissible. When inadmissible, the evidence may be excluded, either absolutely (for example, where public policy demands that evidence be not divulged), or presumptively (for example, evidence revealing an accused’s previous disposition to wrongdoing is inadmissible unless its probative force can be shown to be greater than the risk of prejudice). Evidence may be inadmissible only for a particular purpose, in which case the evidence may be received, if relevant and admissible for some other purpose. For example, evidence containing hearsay is only inadmissible when tendered to establish [page 114] the truth of the facts asserted in the out-of-court statement, and if a statement asserting facts is otherwise relevant — to show, for example, simply that a person was capable of speaking — then the statement may be received for that purpose.233 While the uniform legislation recognises that evidence may have several and different uses, recognising the confusion this may cause it seeks to ensure that

once evidence has been admitted for one purpose it becomes admissible for any other relevant purpose. Thus, for example, under s 60 of the uniform legislation, if evidence has an admissible non-hearsay use it may then also be used as hearsay if it is so relevant. 2.40 Where a dispute arises over the reception of evidence that dispute must be decided by the court (as a matter of law) as a separate preliminary issue. The exact procedure for this determination depends upon whether the case is civil or criminal and upon the nature of the issue. A wide range of matters can arise as preliminary issues; for example, the relevance or sufficient relevance of evidence, whether relevant evidence should be excluded as unfairly prejudicial, the capacity of a witness to testify, the voluntariness of a confession, the expertise of a witness to give opinion evidence, the right of a witness to refuse to answer on grounds of privilege, the right of a co-accused to be separately tried, and so on. The range of issues is as wide as the law of evidence itself. Where disputed admissibility turns upon preliminary findings of fact, and where these facts are in dispute, the court may hold a preliminary trial within the main trial to hear evidence.234 Testimony at such preliminary hearings is said to be taken ‘on the voir dire’, the term deriving from the form of oath administered at common law in such proceedings (vrai dire), and consequently the preliminary trial is known as a ‘voir dire hearing’. Section 189 of the Uniform Acts recognises the voir dire and provides for the manner in which it should be held. Whether a voir dire is held is a matter of discretion.235 In criminal cases, judges are wary of extending trials through lengthy voir dire hearings.236 There is no right to such a hearing and the party bearing the onus must adduce sufficient reasons for holding it.237 The timing of a voir dire is within the [page 115] discretion of the court but legislation in most jurisdictions expressly permits it to be held before any jury is empanelled.238 2.41 Whether in a trial before a jury the voir dire should take place in open court depends upon whether the evidence and arguments are of any concern to the jury. Conditions for admissibility are separate preliminary questions, prima facie not of concern to the jury, and furthermore, questions that might involve the disclosure of evidence and argument that could prejudice any jury. Therefore,

as a general rule, the voir dire should be held as a separate proceeding in the jury’s absence. If evidence taken on the voir dire turns out to be of relevance to issues at the main trial, then that evidence may be separately and appropriately tendered at the trial. Gibbs J in Demirok v R239 appears to accept this view in holding that the competence of a wife to testify against her husband should have been determined in the jury’s absence. 2.42 Certainly the jury must be absent where prejudicial information may be disclosed during the voir dire and this is recognised in that legislation, referred to at n 238, allowing it to be held before any jury is empanelled. The jury will be absent where the admissibility of a confession is in issue.240 But in some cases, where evidence to be taken on the voir dire will certainly also be relevant to trial issues, and there is no risk of prejudice, there seems no reason why the voir dire should not be held before the jury. In Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital,241 Hutley JA distinguished Demirok on these grounds, holding in a civil case that it was proper to determine the reliability of a record-keeping system in the jury’s presence so that it could take the evidence into account in deciding what weight to give to the records if they were admitted. Similar considerations might apply in the case of a voir dire examination to determine the competency of a childwitness, but there appears to be some division of [page 116] opinion over whether this should be held in the jury’s presence.242 If the jury remains it should not be entitled to use at large evidence disclosed to it, but there is no reason why it may not use the evidence for admissible purposes provided it is appropriately directed.243 Similarly, a judge trying a case alone may use evidence taken on the voir dire if it be relevant and admissible to issues in the case.244 The uniform legislation provides in s 189(2) that where the voir dire is held to determine the admissibility of an admission or improperly obtained evidence then the jury must not be present. Where a member of the accused’s family objects to being called, s 189(5) provides that this issue should also be determined in the jury’s absence. In all other cases, s 189(4) provides that presumptively the jury should not be present unless the court so orders. In so deciding, but without limiting the court’s discretion, s 189(5) provides that the court take into account

the possible prejudice to the defendant that revelation of the evidence to the jury might cause and whether the evidence is likely anyway to be revealed to the jury at some stage.245 2.43 Although one might conclude that the jury’s presence depends upon the nature of the voir dire inquiry, on the other hand, there is clearly a presumption that parties, particularly the accused, should be present at each and every stage of proceedings, including the voir dire.246 But even here, there may be exceptional circumstances [page 117] where this presumption must give way. In cases of misbehaviour and absconding by an accused there may be no option to continue the trial in an accused’s absence,247 and the accused’s illness may justify some part of a trial to continue. But there are other genuine exceptions. For example, if the government objects to the disclosure of information upon grounds of national security, the most appropriate resolution of the controversy may be through the judge inspecting the relevant information in private (with or without the confidence of counsel).248 A similar approach may be appropriate where, for example, the privilege against self-incrimination is claimed.249 In the case of the testimony of children and vulnerable witnesses, where legislation permits screening or the taking of testimony by video-link or through the tender by video of testimony taken at a preliminary proceeding (see 7.33–7.34), provision is made for parties and counsel to participate in the process. But such cases are exceptional: generally, parties and their counsel should always be present. 2.44 The exact procedure to be followed in calling evidence at the voir dire remains in the discretion of the court and depends upon the nature of the issues in question and state of the evidence in the case. Where the issue is the competence of a witness or the claim of a witness to a privilege, the only evidence required is obtained upon questioning that witness, and generally this will be done at first instance by the judge.250 Whether the parties have a right to cross-examine in such circumstances is doubtful.251 Again, it is doubtful whether the witness is entitled to be legally represented (for

[page 118] example, in making a claim to privilege).252 Such issues are not strictly inter partes and courts are reluctant to prolong inquiry by permitting formal adversary investigation into them. But other issues do arise inter partes as preliminary issues, in which case adversary rules may apply.253 For example, the admissibility of a confession is decided with the prosecution bearing the onus of establishing voluntariness, and opening and proving that matter in the formal adversary way, with any witnesses called being available for cross-examination.254 2.45 Whether the rules of admissibility apply strictly at the voir dire is again a matter not capable of definitive answer. Where the preliminary issue arises inter partes in a criminal case, in most cases the rules are assumed to apply.255 But in determining the competence of a witness or the admissibility of expert evidence or a witness’s claim to privilege, it may be unrealistic to adhere strictly to the normal rules.256 In other cases practical efficiency may require preliminary issues to be determined upon depositions taken at committal hearings.257 While the assumption of s 189(7) of the uniform legislation is that the rules of admissibility in Ch 3 of the legislation apply at the voir dire, Johnson J in R v Petroulias258 held that the common law continues to apply in uniform evidence law jurisdictions in that there is no right to a voir dire and the precise procedure to be followed remains in the discretion of the court. As a result, transcripts from a voir dire in previous proceedings were used as the basis for the hearing with the accused being given the right to have prosecution witnesses [page 119] recalled for cross-examination. The legislation also provides in s 142 that the standard of proof on the voir dire in both civil and criminal cases is the balance of probabilities, whichever party bears the onus of proof. This latter provision reflects the common law position in Australia.259 The primary use of evidence taken at the voir dire is to decide the preliminary point, but if the jury remains it will use the evidence at large unless directed otherwise by the court. Where the jury has been excluded, evidence taken on the voir dire may, subject to the court’s residuary discretion, become admissible

against a witness as a prior inconsistent statement.260 This is expressly provided for by s 189(8) of the uniform legislation, which also permits tender of a witness’s evidence given at the voir dire where the witness has died (presumably before testifying at the main trial). Only where these preliminary matters are capable of giving rise to appealable points is authority available. In particular contexts (for example, the admissibility of evidence disclosing an accused’s propensity, the admissibility of confessions, claims to privilege, and determinations of expertise) some further reference will be made to the appropriate preliminary procedure. At this introductory stage, it is concluded that it would be wrong to assert the appropriateness of any one procedure on the voir dire, and although the ordinary trial procedures provide a presumptive model, the precise procedure depends very much on the nature of the issue, the extent to which it is inter partes, and the extent of inquiry required to fairly determine it.

Party waiver of rules of admissibility 2.46 As Thayer explained, the presumption of the common law is that all relevant evidence should be received by the court. The presumption is embodied in s 56(1) of the Uniform Acts. The presumption is reflected in the adversary idea that principally it is left to the parties to object to the admissibility of tendered evidence, so that in most cases the application of the rules of admissibility is left within the option of the opponent.261 This adversary idea has been held by judges to be embodied in the Uniform Acts, so that where sections provide that specified evidence ‘is not admissible’ (ss 59, 60, 97, 98, 102 and 114) or that a judge ‘must refuse to admit evidence’ [page 120] (s 137) these phrases have been interpreted by adding the words ‘following objection’.262 A similar interpretation has been made in respect of s 31A of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA).263 As a consequence, the trial judge’s failure to exclude in the absence of objection is not an error of law. But a number of observations and propositions need to be added to this general adversarial principle. In the first place, it applies only to allow waiver of rules of admissibility. If evidence is irrelevant — if, that is, it has no probative value at all

— it can in no circumstances be received, for there is nothing to receive. Nor can counsel waive the duty of the judge to give appropriate directions about the legal issues and the facts decisive of them.264 Secondly, there are some rules of admissibility that are based upon considerations of public policy extending beyond the interests of the parties, rules that cannot be waived and must be applied by judges in all cases whether or not parties object.265 Thirdly, where a party or counsel does not object to the reception of relevant information it must be clear that the party or counsel has fully understood the right to object and has chosen not to exercise that right free from [page 121] extraneous considerations. And a concession initially made may be withdrawn unless to do so would result in irreparable unfairness to the other side.266 2.47 Thus, it may be appropriate for a judge to intervene to assist an unrepresented party (particularly an accused) to ensure an understanding of the right to object, thereby guaranteeing a fair trial.267 Again, if an opponent has misled a party into not objecting to relevant but inadmissible information, it would be improper for the court to act upon it.268 Also, where a party fails to object and information is relevant on a number of grounds, one of which is excluded by a rule of admissibility, it is difficult to assume waiver of that rule, for failure to object may have been upon the understanding that the evidence would only be received for its admissible use.269 Consequently, whether failure to object is a binding waiver of a rule of admissibility at common law is not a question capable of an arbitrary answer. It is not possible to waive rules of admissibility based upon public policy, and whether there has been a waiver made with full knowledge of the consequences is a matter that depends upon the circumstances of the individual case. Past decisions should be so regarded. 2.48 Waiver is controlled by s 190 of the uniform legislation. Subsection (1) does not permit waiver of the rules relating to competence and compellability (Pt 2.1 Div 1); oaths and affirmations (Pt 2.1 Div 2); relevance (Pt 3.1); identification evidence (Pt 3.9); privileges (Pt 3.10); mandatory and discretionary exclusions (Pt 3.11); rules relating to proof (Ch 4); and the miscellaneous rules (Ch 5).270 Subsection (2) provides that in criminal cases consent by an accused is not

effective unless he or she has been advised to consent by his or her lawyer, or the court is satisfied that the defendant [page 122] understands the consequences of giving consent. Subsection (3) provides that in civil cases, a court may also refuse to apply rules capable of waiver where the matter to which the evidence relates is not seriously in dispute, or where application of the rules would cause unnecessary expense or delay.271 2.49 As a corollary to permitting waiver, courts are reluctant to allow appellants to argue points that were not taken at trial.272 The course a party takes during trial is a tactical matter and, where the parties have been represented, appellate courts assume that course was consciously taken and are reluctant to allow a change of tactic on appeal when the trial tactics have gone astray.273 Criminal appeal rules expressly provide that, unless leave is given, parties may not take points on appeal where no objection was made at the trial, and courts are otherwise reluctant to entertain such points unless a miscarriage of justice can be shown.274 Nor are appellate courts keen to question the competence of trial counsel275 and the conduct of counsel does not itself constitute a miscarriage of justice.276 Consequently, a failure to take a point of [page 123] law or object to evidence, a judge’s direction, or a trial procedure, makes it difficult in practice, and especially in civil cases,277 though never impossible, to take that point on appeal.278 The High Court in Crampton v R279 emphasised that there is no constitutional bar to an appellate court interfering where a point was not raised at trial although, for the above reasons, it should interfere only in exceptional circumstances. In contrast to the waiver rules, if a party tenders evidence for a particular purpose, that party cannot prevent the use of that evidence for other admissible purposes that may be contrary to his or her interests. In B v R,280 an accused charged with sexual assault of his daughter tendered evidence of his previous

misconduct towards his daughter to explain why she was now concocting allegations against him. The High Court held that this permitted the prosecution to argue before the jury that that previous misconduct could be interpreted also as corroborating the victim’s story.

A ‘case to answer’ 2.50 The second task of the common law court is to determine (where the opponent has made appropriate application) whether a case to answer has been made out.281 [page 124] The requirement constitutes an adversary hurdle the proponent must overcome to justify compelling the defendant to make answer to the claim. Because it constitutes an adversary hurdle its determination is a matter for the judge rather than the trier of fact. In this sense, the determination may be described as a matter of law. But it is a requirement dependent purely upon the application of the natural rules of fact-finding. In a criminal case, the stated requirement is that there be evidence before the court at the completion of the prosecution case from which a jury (or other trier of fact) could find the material facts proved to the criminal standard of proof (beyond reasonable doubt).282 In a civil case, the stated requirement is evidence from which the trier could find the material facts proved to the civil standard (the balance of probabilities).283 There is no need for any persuasion or proof at this preliminary stage, so that a judge sitting alone could decide that a case to answer was made out but then, even if no further evidence was called, refuse to find the case actually proved.284 2.51 But what exactly is required to make out a case to answer is not entirely clear from the cases.285 Three grounds suggest themselves as the basis for a submission:286 (1) that the claimant has not alleged sufficient material facts to justify the remedy sought;

[page 125] (2) that the claimant has not tendered any credible evidence in support of one or more of the material facts required to make out the claim; (3) that, although the claimant has tendered some credible evidence in relation to all the required material facts, that evidence is, in relation to one or more of those material facts, so unreliable or vague that no reasonable trier of fact could possibly be convinced by it to the requisite standard. A submission based on the first of these grounds is normally made before trial in a civil case by interlocutory proceeding in which the opponent seeks to have the claim struck out or applies for early judgment.287 In a criminal case, there is no formal allegation of material facts, the complaint, information or indictment serving a notice-giving function to prevent prejudice or embarrassment to the accused through surprise. At the completion of the prosecutor’s opening, the accused could possibly argue that the facts as alleged do not constitute the offence charged and the prosecutor should be invited not to call evidence.288 But counsel must wait until the completion of the prosecution case before making a ‘no case’ submission.289 Submissions on the other two grounds are made consequent to, and normally at the close of, the proponent’s case, for only at this stage will the opponent know what evidence has been adduced in support of the proponent’s claim. It is extremely difficult to distinguish in factual terms between submissions made on these two grounds. Nevertheless, a distinction must be drawn because the better view is that there is no right to make the submission on the third ground. 2.52 Judges should not become involved at a preliminary stage with the determination of the credibility and weight of tendered evidence. As long as there is some relevant evidence on each material fact in issue, judges should take that evidence at its (rational) highest, in deciding if it is capable of supporting the proponent’s hypothesis. This attitude derives from the view that the case to answer requirement is merely an adversary hurdle to justify calling upon the opponent to answer; it is at the completion of the trial that triers are asked to decide whether or not to accept relevant evidence and to determine what weight to give it. Expressed another way, the questions of credibility and weight are jury questions to be decided only at the completion of all the evidence.290 2.53 The nature of the standard required might be explained inductively.

Whether a case is actually proved depends upon the weighing of competing hypotheses. [page 126] Evidence adduced must in turn be assessed as reliable or not, and a determination must be made about whether the evidence overall supports one hypothesis or another. But the determination of a case to answer seeks to avoid this process. It asks only whether there are hypotheses and evidential support for them which are capable of consideration in the final weighing process. These will exist if there is before the court information which, if uncontradicted and accepted, rationally supports them. Where the evidence is the direct testimony of a witness to the event in issue, unless the testimony is entirely incredible,291 there must always be a case to answer irrespective of the judge’s opinion about the credibility of the witness. Where the case relies upon circumstantial evidence the judge’s only task is to ask whether, taking those items of evidence supporting the hypothesis in issue at their highest, they are capable of supporting it. Contradictory information and hypotheses are ignored, as is the credibility or reliability of the supporting evidence. Consideration of these matters necessarily involves a weighing process.292 If this approach is accepted, the standard for a case to answer is the same in civil and criminal cases, for the ultimate standard of proof does not arise for consideration. 2.54 But judges are not so clear in putting aside all questions of sufficiency in determining whether a case is made out. In Questions of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 2 of 1993),293 King CJ puts the standard in terms of ‘evidence capable of producing in a reasonable mind a conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt’. This appears to require the judge to make a preliminary weighing of all the evidence to determine whether it is so capable. In R v Briggs,294 Burt CJ doubts whether a ‘no case to answer submission should be formulated so as to embrace the criminal standard of persuasion. In my opinion, the question … is simply whether the evidence … is capable of sustaining a verdict of guilty …’. This ambiguous statement, intended to emphasise the need to put aside as far as possible questions of sufficiency, was disapproved by Malcolm CJ in Morrison v Kiwi Electrix Pty Ltd295 in favour of King CJ’s formulation. Whether in the end it

is cognitively possible to put aside questions of sufficiency is doubtful, but it is argued that judges should make their best attempts to do so at this preliminary stage of the trial. 2.55 In this respect, the submission must be distinguished from the closely related submission by which an opponent seeks to have a matter withdrawn from the trier of fact on the ground that it would be unsafe to find for the proponent upon the evidence [page 127] presented. This submission is made after a case to answer in the adversary sense has been established; it originates in the control exercised by judges over juries. The essence of this submission is a weighing of the evidential support for the proponent’s hypothesis. Thus, it is arguably most appropriately made at the conclusion of the presentation of evidence by all parties to the action, a stage at which the evidence can be properly weighed. Nevertheless, in practice it is often made at an earlier stage when it has become apparent that evidence crucial to the success of the proponent’s case is just too unreliable for the case to go on. The distinction between the two submissions is drawn clearly in R v Prasad.296 There the Supreme Court of South Australia held that in a criminal case tried before a jury, any submission seeking a weighing of evidence should be regarded merely as a request to a trial judge to remind the jury of its prerogative to acquit, at any stage of a trial, if convinced that the prosecution evidence is too unsafe to act upon. This explanation was made following English decisions which had confused the two submissions.297 While an accused has a right to have the trial judge consider a no case submission, the consideration of a sufficiency argument remains always within the discretion of the court and the failure of a trial judge to entertain it gives no ground for appeal. The ground of appeal must be the substantive point that the final verdict is unreasonable or against the weight of evidence.298 2.56 In civil cases at common law, the adversary submission of no case is embodied in the non-suit procedure, while the sufficiency submission is merely part of the courts’ armoury in controlling the jury by advising that it need not proceed.299 The abolishing of the non-suit procedure throws into doubt the existence of the adversary hurdle in most jurisdictions: see 6.37–6.38.

Proof Degrees of proof 2.57 With evidence relevant to material facts admissible, a case to answer having been made out, and the court having received all the evidence that the parties wish to adduce, the issue of proof arises. [page 128] Where the court comprises judge and jury, evaluation of evidence in proof of material facts is the exclusive province of the jury. The parties may address the jury upon how it should approach its task and the judge must sum up fairly on the evidence presented. But the judge is not encouraged to explain to the jury by exactly what reasoning process it should determine the material facts proved.300 The sufficiency of the cognitive abilities and reasoning processes of common law triers of fact are, it seems, assumed by the common law.301 It is assumed that all triers will approach their tasks ‘rationally’ and if they do not appellate courts can set them straight. 2.58 As shown in Chapter 1, what any analysis of a rationalist approach to proof concludes is that the world out there can never be certainly known. Even if a court has before it every item of relevant evidence from every conceivable source, certainty of knowledge is unattainable. The most the rationalist can do is approach this uncertainty according to consistent and coherent natural rules. Moreover, in practice the evidence available for proof is always limited. The common law adversary process leaves the presentation of evidence to the parties. Their resources and motivations to collect and produce information can never be sufficient to gather every piece of relevant evidence.302 Nor are they motivated to seek out or tender evidence that may be adverse to them. There are also rules of admissibility that may prevent the tender of relevant evidence. With certainty impossible to achieve, and available evidence limited for practical and policy reasons, the law is obliged to stipulate that degree of rational certainty, of probability, that it will accept as proof of the material facts. In civil cases, the standard of proof is traditionally and definitively stated as ‘the balance of probabilities’,303 and in

[page 129] criminal cases as ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.304 These standards are stipulated in respect of ‘the case’ of a party with little further elaboration in ss 140–141 of the uniform legislation. In that ‘the case’ of a party is necessarily based upon the material facts required to entitle legal remedy, it is the material facts that must be proved to these stipulated standards.

The civil standard: balance of probabilities 2.59 How one interprets the phrase ‘on the balance of probabilities’ depends upon which natural rules of probability, discussed in Chapter 1, one accepts as appropriate to the determination of proof of material facts in a civil case. The problem is that courts have never embarked upon any deep analysis of the appropriate natural rules. In these circumstances, one cannot expect to find a definitive legal interpretation of the phrase. But there are some things that can be said about it.305 First, there is the question whether the standard can be formulated in mathematical terms. As explained at 1.18, this question is not answered by saying that ‘empirical probabilities’ are capable of such measurement but ‘subjective probabilities’, being a matter of mere belief, are not. Probability as employed in courts of law is not an empirical measure of the relationship between things in the world; rather, it is a concept we use to cope with our uncertainty about the world.306 It is in essence a measure of our beliefs. This can be accepted by the mathematicist. The question then is whether these beliefs should be conceptualised in mathematical terms, as advocated by the Bayesians, and combined according to the equations of mathematical probability, or whether they should be otherwise conceptualised.307 It is this debate that forms the focus of Chapter 1: it was concluded that there are grave difficulties [page 130] in using mathematical conceptions to explain the concept of forensic proof in its entirety. But how do cases interpreting the standard of proof in civil cases approach the interpretation of the standard?

2.60 The phrase ‘balance of probabilities’ lends itself easily to a mathematical interpretation, one which places the standard of proof at a favourable probability of greater than 0.5. Thus, Lord Simon said in Davies v Taylor:308 Beneath the legal concept of probability lies the mathematical theory of probability. Only occasionally does this break the surface — apart from the concept of proof on a balance of probabilities, which can be restated as the burden of showing odds of at least 51 to 49 that such-andsuch has taken place or will do so.

And using this interpretation other judges have analysed the evidence before them according to mathematical notions in order to satisfy such a mathematical standard.309 If one has no preference on the allocation of errors between plaintiffs and defendants then a probability of greater than 0.5 will, assuming beliefs reflect reality, produce in the long run an appropriate distribution of correct results.310 This will not be the case if the standard is set at lower than 0.5, although some judges have suggested less than 0.5 suffices so long as the probability of the plaintiff’s case is greater than the probability of any other alternative explanation.311 2.61 The problems with conceptualising the standard in mathematical terms have been canvassed at 1.28–1.38. Of particular significance in this context is the problem that mathematical probabilities do not embody the notion of the weight of evidence. Thus, a degree of probability of greater than 0.5 can be generated on scanty information or upon complete information, and the mathematicist cannot say why the latter probability is more acceptable, or believable, than the former. If an accident involving a taxi-cab occurs and the defendant owns over 50% of the cabs in the town, [page 131] then it seems that on a mathematical balance of probabilities one of the defendant’s cabs was involved. But should a plaintiff be entitled to succeed on this evidence alone? If courts are to come as close to a true finding as is reasonable in the circumstances, should not the plaintiff be obliged to produce richer evidence relating to the accident in question before a finding is made? Note that this question does not raise any issue about where the mathematical standard should be set. We can accept the cost/benefit analysis in setting it as anything over 0.5. Rather, the question is what amount of evidence needs to be considered before it is acceptable to act upon satisfaction to this mathematical standard.312

2.62 It is beyond doubt that courts do have regard to this notion of the weight of evidence and will not make decisions in favour of a party unless satisfied that sufficient material has been put before it. For example, in SGIC v Laube,313 the Supreme Court of South Australia refused to make a finding that the defendant was incapable of exercising effective control of a motor car on the basis of evidence of a blood alcohol reading and testimony from an expert that statistically most people with such a reading would be so incapable. King CJ rejects the notion that a statistical probability can ever amount to proof, but the case might be better explained upon the basis that the court felt there should have been more evidence before it about the capacity of the driver in question. That is, the weight of evidence was insufficient even though the mathematical standard was formally satisfied. 2.63 There is another adversarial factor that might affect the weight required for proof. Where the plaintiff relies upon statistical evidence and chooses not to tender other available evidence, a court is likely to be reluctant to find the case proved. But if a plaintiff has no available evidence beyond the statistic and it is in the power of the defendant to tender further evidence, and he or she does not, then a court may be willing to find the case proved.314 Thus, the failure to tender evidence may weight [page 132] the scales in favour of a finding for the plaintiff. It is arguable that this was indeed the situation in SGIC v Laube, and that the court was correct in finding against the defendant.315 This adversarial idea, that the power of a party to produce evidence can be taken into account in determining whether a case is sufficiently proved, can be seen in the so-called rule in Blatch v Archer, where Lord Mansfield famously said:316 ‘All evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to have produced, and in the power of the other to have contradicted’. This allows adverse inference to be drawn against parties who fail to call evidence they would be expected to call.317 It effectively operates as an indicator of evidentiary weight. 2.64 The notion of the weight of evidence arises acutely in two general classes of case. First, in road accident cases where there are no eyewitnesses, courts are

reluctant to determine liability upon the basis of a bare assessment of the chances (as Murphy J was prepared to do in TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks),318 but will rather minutely analyse the evidence relating to the event to see whether there is sufficient evidence to justify a finding for the plaintiff.319 Secondly, in cases which involve serious allegations of crime or misconduct, courts will not decide in favour of the allegations unless the evidence is sufficiently complete.320 In Briginshaw v Briginshaw,321 a divorce case involving allegations of adultery, Dixon J formulated the standard of proof in the following terms: The truth is that, when the law requires the proof of any fact, the tribunal must feel an actual persuasion of its occurrence or existence before it can be found. It cannot be found as a result of a mere mechanical comparison of probabilities independently of any belief in its reality. No doubt an opinion that a state of facts exists may be held according to indefinite gradations of certainty … [A]t common law … it is enough that the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the

[page 133] tribunal. But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequences of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal.

It is this dictum which one finds most cited in explanation of the civil standard of proof in Australia,322 and which appears to be the genesis of the formulation of the standard in s 140 of the uniform legislation:323 (1) In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities. (2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account: (a)

the nature of the cause of action or defence; and

(b) the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding; and (c) the gravity of the matters alleged.

Whether one formulates the standard in terms of reasonable satisfaction, as Dixon J appears to prefer, or as on the balance of probabilities, which is that preferred by the High Court in Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd,324 or a combination of both, as in s 140 of the uniform legislation, arguably the idea of the weight of evidence lies at the heart of its application. The assumption is that courts must only decide cases following a reasonable search for

truth about the events in question. This is not to assert that truth about those events is certainly obtainable but that a court should make an optimistic attempt to come as close to truth as is reasonable in all the circumstances.325 [page 134] 2.65 If the weight of evidence is central to the notion of civil proof and that standard remains conceptualised in mathematical terms, it might be thought that what Dixon J argues is that the standard actually varies depending upon the seriousness of the case, so that in serious cases it will be considerably greater than 0.5. The very point in Briginshaw v Briginshaw was whether there were just two standards of proof, one civil, one criminal, or whether there was some intermediate standard for serious civil matters. The court rejected the idea of a third standard, but this does not answer the question of whether the civil standard is itself variable. Dixon J’s phrase, ‘[n]o doubt an opinion that a state of facts exists may be held according to indefinite gradations of certainty’, suggests the standard is mathematically variable. But more recently, the High Court has rejected a variable standard.326 In Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd,327 the court, in approving the Briginshaw formulation, said: The ordinary standard of proof required of a party who bears the onus in civil litigation in this country is proof on the balance of probabilities. That remains so even where the matter to be proved involves criminal conduct or fraud. On the other hand, the strength of the evidence necessary to establish a fact or facts on the balance of probabilities may vary according to the nature of what it is sought to prove. Thus, authoritative statements have been made to the effect that clear or cogent or strict proof is necessary ‘where so serious a matter as fraud is to be found’. Statements to that effect should not, however, be understood as directed to the standard of proof. Rather, they should be understood as merely reflecting a conventional perception that members of our society do not ordinarily engage in fraudulent or criminal conduct and a judicial approach that a court should not lightly make a finding that, on the balance of probabilities, a party to civil litigation has been guilty of such conduct. As Dixon J commented in Briginshaw v Briginshaw: The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved … There are, however, circumstances in which generalisations about the need for clear and cogent evidence to prove matters of the gravity of fraud or crime are, even when understood as not directed to the standard of proof, likely to be unhelpful and even misleading. In our view, it was so in the present case … When [as in this case concerned with alleged misrepresentations made on the sale of a business] an issue falls for determination on the balance of probabilities and the

[page 135] determination depends on a choice between competing and mutually inconsistent allegations of fraudulent conduct, generalisations about the need for clear and cogent proof are likely to be at best unhelpful and at worst misleading.

This dictum, while making it clear that there is but one civil standard, raises another question. It suggests seriousness is taken into account principally because the more serious an allegation the less likely it is to occur.328 This unlikelihood may or may not be so, but it is contended that seriousness should not simply be a matter going to inherent likelihood, but is a matter which determines what is the appropriate weight of evidence before a finding on the balance of probabilities — greater than 0.5 if conceptualised mathematically — can be acted upon as a reasonable search for truth in the circumstances. 2.66 But should we attempt to retain the mathematical analysis at all if the balance is dependent upon a weight of evidence? It is far from clear that the High Court in Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd in formulating the standard as a balance of probabilities has in mind a mathematical standard. And Dixon J in Briginshaw v Briginshaw, in advocating a standard formulated in terms of reasonable satisfaction, does not appear to be advocating a mathematical standard. Most judges, whether they formulate the standard in terms of a balance of probabilities or reasonable satisfaction, avoid the use of mathematical probabilities altogether.329 For one thing, it is unusual for empirical measurements to be put before courts. Cases turn on probabilities that have not been, or cannot easily be, empirically measured; for example, the probability that a witness is credible. And courts will normally only allow witnesses to testify in statistical terms where they possess appropriate expertise.330 Where courts are confronted with empirical probabilities which require combination with other evidence, judges have not encouraged triers to convert their beliefs to betting odds to enable use of Bayes’ Theorem to combine the evidence mathematically.331 Judges and jurors are not [page 136] accustomed to reaching decisions in this way, nor are the litigants who seek to settle their disputes through the courts. It is also argued that humans lack the

computational capacity to employ Bayesian analysis in even apparently simple cases.332 As a consequence, the approach to proof in civil cases, however it may be formulated, appears to be closer to that advocated by Cohen333 and Allen.334 The fact-finder is confronted with conflicting hypotheses and must, on the basis of experience of the ordinary course of events, determine with which hypothesis or hypotheses all the evidence is consistent. If, on this basis, there is compelling evidence inconsistent with a particular hypothesis, that hypothesis will be rejected altogether. If the evidence is more consistent with one hypothesis rather than another, that former hypothesis will be favoured. The more information consistent with a particular hypothesis, the more probable that hypothesis becomes until it reaches, by weight of evidence, a stage of acceptance by the factfinder as the likely explanation of all the available evidence. At this stage, the hypothesis is described as proved on the balance of probabilities. One might say that the fact-finder is persuaded or believes that hypothesis probably occurred. 2.67 The emphasis thereby shifts from the standard of proof to the weight of evidence required to constitute a reasonable search for truth. To those who object that this leaves too much ‘discretion’ to the trier of fact in applying the standard it must be pointed out that triers must act reasonably (having regard to the search for truth) in the circumstances of each case. Where triers act unreasonably, appellate courts may set matters straight. The problem is to find judicial guidance upon what is an appropriate weight of evidence in the circumstances of particular cases. But this sort of problem has not bothered courts in other contexts, such as the law of negligence, and particular cases must be correct within the normative guidelines to be gleaned from decided cases. Examples of the weight required can be found. For instance, in running down cases requiring proof of negligence, in the absence of eyewitnesses it [page 137] appears that there must at least be information relating to the environment and state of the vehicles following the accident.335 Again, it is doubtful whether a court in a running down case would allow a motor vehicle to be identified as belonging to a defendant where it could only be shown that the defendant owned a majority of vehicles of that type, particularly if

other information was reasonably available.336 In cases of personal injury, it is doubtful whether statistical epidemiological evidence alone is sufficient to establish causation.337 A reasonable search requires that available evidence relating to the circumstances of the particular injury be called. As Hodgson J explains in Ho v Powell,338 the adversarial manifestation of the requirement of a reasonable search is the rule in Blatch v Archer,339 which allows adverse inferences to be drawn against parties who fail to call evidence they would be expected to call. Thus, evidence that is not available can be taken into account in determining the reasonableness of acting upon that evidence which is available. This approach does not rule out acting upon empirical statistical evidence where no other evidence is reasonably available.340 Such evidence would satisfy both a mathematical standard (taking into account the weight (availability) of the evidence) as well as a ‘reasonable satisfaction’ standard (put in terms of a reasonable search for truth). It would maintain one’s best estimate of correctness in the long run. Whether one can achieve the psychological state of belief or persuasion on such evidence is arguably not to the point. The standard as explained by Dixon J in Briginshaw v Briginshaw is rational belief or persuasion,341 and, if there was no evidence after a reasonable [page 138] search except a statistic, that would arguably be enough.342 Of course it is virtually impossible to conceive of such a case arising in practice and hence, as Samuels JA said in Mifsud v Campbell:343 ‘[I]t is an incident of judicial duty for the judge [when fact-finder in a civil case] to consider all the evidence in the case’.

The criminal standard: beyond reasonable doubt 2.68 Elucidation of the standard of proof in criminal cases is complementary of this analysis. Criminal cases are regarded as the most serious of cases, and no one may be found guilty of a crime until a stage as close to certainty as is reasonably practicable has been reached. The search for truth must extend as far as is reasonably practicable. It is a guiding common law principle that it is better that the guilty go free than the innocent be punished and this has led to the formulation of criminal proof in the strictest terms of proof beyond reasonable doubt. This asymmetrical approach to proof embodies the premium placed on

innocence and liberty and, in theory, protects the accused, who has no obligation to marshal evidence or contest the accusations. Distinguishing the civil and criminal standards 2.69 In a sense, this criminal standard may be regarded as the point of reasonable satisfaction in a criminal case, so that there is no conceptual difference between the civil and criminal standards. But it would be wrong not to clearly distinguish the criminal standard from the standard in civil cases. The degree of proof in a criminal case is fixed at as high a level as can be practicably contemplated. Triers are not asked to vary the standard according to the nature and consequences of the criminal acts alleged, but are asked not to convict until, having considered all evidence that can practicably be produced, all reasonable doubts concerning such a finding have been eliminated.344 [page 139] In civil cases, even those civil cases involving criminal allegations, no court has attempted to state the standard of proof in this eliminative form. It appears that one may have reasonable doubts in a civil case yet be satisfied on the balance of probabilities by the available evidence that one hypothesis is the likely explanation345 — although Lord Scarman had some difficulty accepting this proposition.346 If a court is prepared to hold that an allegation in a civil case is so serious that the search for evidence must be pursued until all reasonable doubts have been eliminated, in order to preserve the high standard demanded by the criminal law, the court should recognise that in such circumstances the criminal standard of proof is appropriate.347 Confusion between the standards of civil and criminal proof can only lead to a weakening of the latter, and unless courts are prepared to undermine expressly the fundamental common law principle of optimum proof in criminal cases, it is better to avoid such confusion. The history of the formulation of the criminal standard of proof indicates that courts are not prepared to challenge that principle.348 2.70 Although it may be possible to approach the civil standard mathematically and specify proof at beyond 0.5, it is doubtful whether it is even possible to conceptualise the criminal standard in mathematical terms.349 Conviction can only follow the elimination of all reasonable doubts. To all intents and purposes,

certainty of guilt must be achieved. The standard does not contemplate there being any other [page 140] reasonable explanation of the evidence. Although we know that certainty cannot in fact be achieved, on the other hand we are not prepared to express the mathematical probability of criminal verdicts being incorrect.350 No court has ever attempted to state the criminal standard in mathematical terms and courts often disapprove of trial judges explaining criminal proof in such terms.351 Some researchers352 have asked laypersons out of the court context where, mathematically, they think the standard lies, but their variable answers at best illustrate differing interpretations of numbers and at worst the ignorance of both researchers and subjects of the object of a criminal trial. Faced with difficulties such as this, it is no wonder that even most proponents of mathematical theory advocate their theory merely as a model against which decisions and rules can be criticised rather than as an appropriate tool for utilisation by courts in making daily judgments.353 But the non-mathematical conceptualisation of the standard of proof has not led courts to prohibit the tender of evidence in statistical terms. This raises the question of how this evidence is to be accommodated with other evidence and embodied within the courts’ approach to criminal proof.354 If the statistical evidence is expressed in terms that show the extent to which that evidence might be found if the accused is innocent then it may be possible to combine the statistical expression with the non-mathematical standard. What the statistic can show is that there are explanations of the evidence consistent with innocence and the jury can be directed that these must be eliminated as reasonable doubts, having regard to other evidence before the court, before the accused can be found guilty. Where the possibility of innocent explanation is extremely low (as with DNA evidence in some circumstances) little may be required for the jury to be convinced. The failure of the accused to provide an innocent explanation may itself be enough to eliminate there being any reasonable doubt. But in most cases there will be other evidence that needs to be taken into account, including nonstatistical evidence relating to the accuracy and relevance of the statistical

evidence (DNA evidence may have been contaminated, transferred or not found where it could incriminate the accused: Fitzgerald v R).355 [page 141] While likelihood ratios appear to point to Bayesian calculations rather than the sort of analysis suggested in the previous paragraph, DNA continues to be so expressed, and the High Court in Aytugrul v R356 failed to take an opportunity to comment upon an appropriate statistical expression for DNA evidence and provide an explanation of how it might be accommodated by the jury in determining proof beyond reasonable doubt. The court refused to exercise s 137 of the uniform legislation to exclude DNA evidence presented in terms of an exclusion percentage rather than as a frequency, on the basis that the expression was accurate, and with appropriate direction (given in the case before them) there was no risk that the jury would give the evidence more weight than it deserved. As the discussion that follows shows, common law judges are reluctant to intrude upon the jury’s reasoning process by giving any explanations at all of the criminal standard. The formulation and content of this criminal standard arises in practice in two particular contexts: first, when the judge is called upon to direct the jury (and such direction may be called into question on appeal); and, secondly, when the trier of fact determines the verdict (and such determination may be challenged on appeal as being unreasonable or against the weight of evidence).357 Directing the jury on the criminal standard 2.71 First, judges must direct juries in terms of the traditional standard — beyond reasonable doubt — and not suggest that some different standard may apply. Thus, it is a misdirection to suggest that the degree of certainty required is no different from that required in making other serious decisions in one’s life and it is enough to feel comfortable with the decision.358 Nor should a jury be directed merely to consider which witnesses it thinks are ‘telling the truth’, for none of the witnesses may be telling the truth,359 or otherwise suggest the standard requires simply choosing

[page 142] between the prosecution and defence case.360 On the other hand, where a case turns upon the credibility of one uncorroborated witness it may not only be appropriate but necessary to tell the jury that it cannot convict beyond reasonable doubt unless convinced of the truth of that testimony.361 Explaining the standard in other than traditional terms may not only dilute the strictness of the criminal standard; it may also have the effect of transferring the burden of explanation to the accused, thereby shifting the burden of proof and undermining the presumption of innocence. Thus, for a judge to focus the issue of proof by asking the jury why a prosecution witness should lie, is generally a misdirection, as it suggests a burden on the accused to provide such an explanation.362 In Palmer v R,363 the High Court also held it generally impermissible for a prosecutor to ask the accused in cross-examination what motive a complainant might have for lying, as (a) this is a matter generally outside the knowledge of the accused and therefore irrelevant speculation; (b) such a question places an illegitimate onus upon the accused to explain; and (c) failure to provide a motive may lead to the jury unfairly jumping to the conclusion that the complainant is necessarily telling the truth. A direction to the jury might meet the last objection but not the other two.

[page 143] The motives of a witness to lie are a legitimate matter for inquiry and comment, but care must always be taken to ensure, by careful direction if necessary, that the jury does not infer, from the mere discrediting of a particular motive, that a key witness is thereby necessarily made more credible or is necessarily telling the truth and therefore the matter is proved beyond reasonable doubt.364 It may also undermine the presumption of innocence to suggest to the jury that the testimony of the accused is to be the subject of close scrutiny because of his or her interest in the outcome of the case.365 But the joint judgment of the majority (French CJ, Gumow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) in Hargraves v R366 regarded formulations of ‘rules’ against particular directions derived from cases such as Palmer and Robinson as simply reflecting the wider principles of the common law accusatorial trial which place the onus on the prosecution to establish the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.367 The majority, holding that these principles were not undermined by the general credibility directions before them, emphasised (at [42]) that ‘the judge’s instruction to the jury, whether by way of legal direction or judicial commentary on the facts, must not deflect the jury’s attention from the need to be persuaded beyond reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt before returning a verdict of guilty’, and (at [45]) that: ‘In every case, the ultimate question must be whether, taken as a whole, the judge’s instruction to the jury deflected the jury from its proper task’. But there is no ‘rule’, for example, to direct the jury in terms of the presumption of innocence.368 [page 144] 2.72 Secondly, apart from emphasising the eliminative nature of the standard, appellate courts warn against any elaboration of the phrase ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.369 One fear is that judicial elaboration will water down the very strictness of the standard. But more fundamentally, as Phillips JA emphasises in R v Chatzidimitrious,370 it is not the function of the judge to tell the jury which of its doubts are reasonable and which are not. That is their exclusive province.

To emphasise to the jury that their function is to determine whether there is a reasonable doubt, it may be no misdirection to explain in general terms that the standard requires the jury to entertain ‘reasonable doubts’ rather than entertain ‘fanciful possibilities’ (possible innocent explanations of the evidence before the court)371 or ‘groundless speculations’.372 But even here a judge must be careful, and in a case in which a very high figure of statistical probability was presented to the court it was held a misdirection to explain that the standard was not proof beyond a ‘skerrick of doubt’.373 In the circumstances, the direction might have caused the jury to accept the very high statistical probability rather than applying the traditional, non-mathematical standard to the case as a whole.374 [page 145] How much further a judge may go is problematical. The standard requires a jury to eliminate ‘reasonable’ doubts rather than ‘any’ doubts whatsoever. It is suggested by Phillips JA in R v Chatzidimitrious375 that an explanation in these general terms may also be permissible, it then being left to the jury to determine whether its doubts are reasonable. But it is not clear how this view sits with other authority which rejects instruction to the jury to analyse remaining doubts in order to decide which are reasonable.376 These cases proceed upon the assumption that a reasonable doubt is by definition that which remains in the mind of a (reasonable) jury after carefully considering all the evidence in the case. In R v Chatzidimitrious, the majority held that it was not improper for the trial judge, having refused to define ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, to have acceded to the jury’s request for a dictionary so they could make up their own minds about the application of that phrase in the case before them.377 Callaway JA dissented on the basis that acceding to their request was tantamount to encouraging the jury to dissect the traditional formulation by examining its doubts, and that this undermined the practical consequence of that formulation, which is that a reasonable doubt is that which still remains after a reasonable jury has carefully examined all the evidence. There is no further definition or test to apply. 2.73 Only in one case is elaboration encouraged at common law. Where proof depends entirely upon circumstantial evidence so that the jury must expressly decide between conflicting hypotheses, it is permissible, and generally desirable, to emphasise the eliminative nature of the standard and direct the jury to find the

evidence consistent with the Crown’s hypothesis and inconsistent with any other reasonable explanatory innocent hypothesis.378 In some circumstances, it may be necessary to direct in these terms, and failure to do so might constitute a miscarriage of justice resulting in successful [page 146] appeal.379 It might be argued that a direction in these eliminative terms should be required in every case to effectively explain the essence of the criminal standard. In Victoria, directions about the criminal standard are now governed by ss 63 and 64 of the Jury Directions Act 2015. Section 63 provides: (1) The trial judge may give the jury an explanation of the phrase ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ if the jury asks the trial judge (a) a direct question about the meaning of the phrase; or (b) asks a question that indirectly raises the meaning of the phrase. (2) Subsection (1) does not limit any other power of a trial judge to give an explanation of the phrase ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.

Subsection (2) would appear to allow the judge to explain the phrase in accordance with the common law and to preserve the direction in relation to cases reliant upon circumstantial evidence that reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence must be eliminated. But s 64 then provides: (1) If the jury has asked a direct question about the meaning of the phrase, or a question that indirectly raises the meaning of the phrase, ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’, the trial judge may — (a)

refer to— (i)

the presumption of innocence; and

(ii) the prosecution’s obligation to prove that the accused is guilty; or (b) indicate that it is not enough for the prosecution to persuade the jury that the accused is probably guilty or very likely to be guilty; or (c) indicate that— (i)

it is almost impossible to prove anything with absolute certainty when reconstructing past events; and

(ii) the prosecution does not have to do so; or (d) indicate that the jury cannot be satisfied that the accused is guilty if the jury has a reasonable doubt about whether the accused is guilty; or (e) indicate that a reasonable doubt is not an imaginary or fanciful doubt or an unrealistic possibility.

(2) The trial judge may adapt his or her explanation of the phrase ‘proof beyond reasonable doubt’ in order to respond to the particular question asked by the jury.

While subs (1)(d) and (e) appear to endorse the common law limits of explanation, this section does not appear expressly to endorse explanation emphasising the eliminative nature of the standard. [page 147] To which facts does the criminal standard apply? 2.74 A vital question concerning the application of the criminal standard of proof is whether the standard applies only to the case as a whole or whether it applies to each material fact and, in turn, to each fact the existence of which is essential to prove each material fact. This question is of considerable importance in cases turning upon circumstantial evidence, that is, where there are no eyewitnesses to the crime alleged to have been committed by the accused and it can only be inferred from surrounding circumstances. An associated question is the extent to which the trial judge is obliged to isolate material and essential facts and expressly direct the jury to apply the criminal standard to each and every one of them. This is a slightly different problem. On appeal, the first question arises where the court is asked to find that the jury’s verdict cannot be sustained upon the tendered evidence; the second arises when the convicted accused complains that the summing-up contains a misdirection (an error of law). Mathematicians must argue that the standard applies to the case as a whole, and that, upon breaking down a fact situation into its essential facts and inferences, the equations of the probability calculus can be applied to determine the mathematical probability of the accused’s (overall) guilt. The application of the criminal standard involves asking whether this (overall) guilt has reached the required mathematical standard (whatever that might be).380 On the other hand, inductivists argue that, as fact-finding depends upon the finding of explanations for evidence, logically evidence must first be isolated and then inferences drawn, sequentially or in combination, in seeking explanation of it; in a criminal prosecution, one explanation to the exclusion of all other reasonable explanations. Within this logic, the overall probability of guilt may be no higher than the probability of the evidence and inferences upon which explanation depends. 2.75 This inductive approach is illustrated by R v Van Beelen,381 a case reliant

upon circumstantial evidence. To identify the accused as a murderer, the prosecution tendered evidence of trace materials originating from the victim and which were found on or near the accused, and trace materials originating from the accused which were found on or near the victim. The material consisted of hairs, fibres (from clothing), specks of paint allegedly from the accused’s car, and so on. There was evidence that each set of materials had similar characteristics, such that it could be inferred each set came from a common source. It was argued that the only explanation for the finding of the totality of these matching materials was that the accused and the victim had come into contact (a fact denied by the accused). [page 148] To reach this conclusion, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, in a classic, albeit implicit, reference to Wigmorean analysis, said that four mental steps (inferences) were necessary:382 First, it would be necessary to accept the evidence of the police that they found the various trace materials where they said they found them, ie some on or about the deceased or her environment and others on or about the appellant or his environment. The next step would be to find that certain similarities existed between the trace materials associated with the deceased or her environment and those associated with the appellant or his environment and the absence of any relevant dissimilarities, so that the various sets of trace materials could have originated from the same source. The third step would be to find that they did originate from the same source, and the fourth that the appellant would then have been so closely in contact with the girl that he must have been her assailant and, indeed, her slayer.

The first two steps were subject to direct evidence from the police as to the finding of the materials, and from various experts who had examined the minute particles of material and testified to their similarities.383 The other steps were a matter of inference from this evidence. With ‘D’ representing the appellant, ‘V’ the victim, and ‘W’ the relevant witnesses, a Wigmorean chart might look something like this:

[page 149] Seeking explanation of the tendered evidence, the Full Court sought first to isolate the evidence and secondly to consider the possible inferences and their sequence from that evidence. Within this analysis the court was of the view that unless from the evidence tendered the jury could infer beyond reasonable doubt that the materials were found by the police where alleged and possessed the matching similarities as alleged by the analysts, they could not support circumstantial proof of the case as a whole. 2.76 However, in summing up to the jury the trial judge had said, inter alia:384 I direct you as a matter of law — and I remind you that you must accept my directions on the law — that you do not have to find every single fact in the prosecution case proved beyond reasonable doubt … You are to consider the whole of the evidence, not only such evidence as may satisfy you beyond reasonable doubt that a particular fact was established, but also evidence about which you can only conclude that some fact was probably so, or even only might have been so.

In relation to the four mental steps elucidated by the Full Court, this was held to constitute a misdirection, for if the jury was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the police had found the trace materials where alleged, and that the matching similarities testified to were established, the case as a whole had to fail and the direction did not make this clear.

2.77 But this is not to say that every individual inference must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, because doubtful inferences, based upon particular facts, may be combined in appropriate circumstances where they all lead to the one conclusion. For example, in R v Van Beelen, the Full Court described the permissible approach to the matching similarities thus:385 Obviously, if there had been only one pair of specimens, one associated with the deceased and the other with the appellant, which could have come from the same source, it would be quite unsafe to infer that they did so come. But if there were a sufficient number of such pairs or sets of specimens, the jury, in our view, would be entitled to come to the conclusion that the number was too great to be attributed to coincidence and to pass from a finding of consistency of origin to a finding of identity of origin when the scientific evidence was taken in conjunction with the admitted evidence of opportunity and the absence of any evidence of opportunity on the part of any other specific person. Of course, on this point the jury would have to consider the probabilities or otherwise of the specimens matching by chance and the comparative abundance or scarcity of such objects in the community. On that they could take into account both the expert evidence and their own knowledge of life.

This combination of a number of doubtful or weak inferences (comprising strands in a cable stretching towards the one conclusion of fact) is the very process of proof by circumstantial evidence, and nothing said by the court in R v Van Beelen was intended to detract from this process of circumstantial proof where appropriate. [page 150] 2.78 The approach of the Full Court was endorsed by the High Court in Chamberlain v R (No 2).386 Unfortunately, the explanation given by the High Court has led to some confusion, which has not been entirely dispelled by the later case of Shepherd v R.387 Chamberlain is probably the most publicised Australian criminal case of modern times. The issue was whether it could be established circumstantially that Lindy Chamberlain had murdered her baby Azaria while camping near Uluru (then referred to as Ayers Rock). Her defence was that she had seen a dingo making off with the child and much of the case was concerned with the credibility of that account, including whether the evidence was consistent with such an hypothesis.388 There was some additional, more positive evidence against the accused: evidence of opportunity; lack of apparent distress at the loss of her baby; evidence

that clothes from the child had been interfered with by human contact; evidence that the blood on the clothes was most consistent with the child having had her throat cut; and, crucially, evidence of various blood stains found on the accused’s clothes and joggers, on a camera bag kept in the accused’s car, and on the car itself, particularly on the front passenger side of the car where the prosecution alleged the accused had cut the baby’s throat.389 The prosecution had led expert evidence that tests carried out on the latter blood stains showed that the foetal haemoglobin content was such that the blood must have come from a baby about the age of the deceased Azaria. The High Court appeal concentrated upon this expert evidence. It was established to the satisfaction of the court that no jury could safely have concluded that the blood contained the foetal haemoglobin alleged. It was in this context the High Court endorsed Van Beelen and said that, if the verdict in the case before it was to be justified, it had to be upon the basis that the evidence could only show at its highest that human blood was found on the relevant objects. Having so decided, the majority was prepared to say that even if only human blood could be shown to have been found, it could not be said that the jury’s verdict was unsafe, in the sense that on the remaining evidence adduced a reasonable jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt. In the course of reaching this decision Gibbs CJ and Mason J said:390 … the jury cannot view a fact as a basis for an inference of guilt unless at the end of the day they are satisfied of the existence of that fact beyond reasonable doubt.

[page 151] This statement, perfectly understandable in the context of Chamberlain — that is, foetal blood could not be used as the basis for an inference of guilt because the existence of foetal haemoglobin could not be established — was then interpreted as not permitting facts to be used unless there is no ambiguity about the individual inference to be drawn from them. Yet this was the very situation in both Van Beelen and Chamberlain. In the former, it could not be inferred beyond reasonable doubt from each set of matching trace materials that each had a common source, only that they were consistent with such a view. It was the combination of individually doubtful inferences that led to proof. In the latter, it could not be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the blood was foetal, but it was

apparently blood and therefore not inconsistent with being foetal blood.391 Such evidence of consistency is clearly not as strong as evidence which beyond doubt establishes a common source or beyond doubt establishes foetal blood, but in combination with other inferences (strands in the cable) it may nevertheless support the hypothesis sought beyond reasonable doubt. 2.79 Doubtful inferences may therefore combine to produce proof. They may be inferential strands in a cable of proof. But which facts can be used as a basis for drawing those inferences is another matter. It is here that Van Beelen and Chamberlain make it clear that, if inferences are to be drawn towards proof beyond reasonable doubt, then logically the facts from which they are to be drawn must first be established to the same standard. As it could not be shown beyond reasonable doubt that the blood found in Chamberlain was foetal, no inference was permitted from that fact. However, as the court found that the jury was entitled to find beyond any reasonable doubt that the blood was of human origin, and therefore not inconsistent with being foetal blood, an inference was permitted from this fact. 2.80 The terminology in this area is one source of confusion. Gibbs CJ and Mason J distinguish ‘primary facts’ and ‘inferences’: see Chamberlain.392 But the distinctions can be drawn only in the context of that inferential Wigmorean chart that the judge (or jury) happens to have implicitly in mind. The crucial distinction is between ‘facts’ and ‘inferences’. But what is a fact at one stage may be a matter for inference at a preceding stage. For example, if the accused’s involvement is to be inferred from the finding of foetal blood in the accused’s car, the finding of that foetal blood is a fact from which involvement will be inferred (in combination with inferences to be drawn from other facts). But whether the blood is foetal, a matter considered at a preceding stage in the inferential map, will be inferred from other facts (tests, experiments etc). In turn these facts will have been established by inference. And so on back along the inferential chain to the testimony of the witnesses and other evidence directly perceived by the trier of fact. It is in this context that facts are described as ‘basic’, ‘primary’ or ‘intermediate’. [page 152] Nevertheless, it can been seen from the approaches taken in both the Supreme

Court of South Australia in Van Beelen and the High Court in Chamberlain that proof is to be approached inductively, not mathematically, and that logically each stage of the inferential process, if isolated by application of the Wigmorean process described at 1.8–1.11 above, defines the level of acceptance required before the trier of fact moves to the next. 2.81 However, whether the jury should be encouraged to use Wigmorean analysis and directed in respect of any particular inferences is another matter. In R v Van Beelen,393 the Full Court recognised the confusion that would be produced if in every case the trial judge was required to dissect the reasoning process and instruct the level of proof required at each stage. It is one thing to say that logic dictates that some inferences cannot be concluded beyond reasonable doubt from doubtful facts; but another to say that a judge is obliged to isolate every stage of the inferential process and direct such definitive proof. Nevertheless, on the basis of past authority the Full Court said that in appropriate cases the jury might have to be told to find a fact at an essential stage ‘clearly proved’ if it is to convict. In Chamberlain v R (No 2),394 the High Court recognised the artificiality of these different terms and, not being bound by the same authority, held that in appropriate cases a trial judge might be obliged to direct the jury that facts at an essential stage be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 2.82 These dicta have been applied by subsequent courts, for example, the Full Court of the Federal Court in Dominguez v R395 and the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria in R v Sorby,396 where it is made clear that the question of whether failure to direct that a fact at an essential stage be proved beyond reasonable doubt constitutes a misdirection depends upon the circumstances of the case and the summing-up as a whole. In each of these cases, it was held that the jury could have been under no misapprehension in their application of the criminal standard. Generally, in the absence of any suggestion that less than beyond reasonable doubt is sufficient proof of a fact at an essential stage, the overall direction to find the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt will suffice.397 If the facts essential to this process have been clearly articulated in the summing-up, no further direction is necessary. On the other hand, it will be no misdirection for a trial judge to bring the standard to the jury’s attention at this stage and it may in some circumstances be necessary for him or her to do so.398 [page 153]

2.83 But some courts took a more literal view of the remarks of Gibbs CJ and Mason J. They interpreted these judges as requiring in cases turning on circumstantial evidence, that the jury be directed to find each ‘primary fact’ they rely upon proved beyond reasonable doubt. This became known as a ‘Chamberlain direction’, and some judges in the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal were prepared to hold that failure to give a Chamberlain direction was ipso facto grounds for appeal. The matter arose for decision in the High Court in Shepherd v R.399 It was argued that the Chamberlain direction confused the process of proof insofar as it suggested that evidence and facts could not be viewed cumulatively to produce proof beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court recognised this, holding that the Chamberlain direction is not always an appropriate direction. But in so holding, the High Court sowed seeds for further confusion. Mason CJ, wanting to accommodate the process of circumstantial inference, explained his and Gibbs CJ’s dictum in Chamberlain by altering it to read:400 … the jury cannot view an intermediate fact as an indispensable basis for an inference of guilt unless at the end of the day they are satisfied of the existence of that fact beyond reasonable doubt.

Only in relation to these indispensable ‘intermediate facts’ might there be an obligation to direct. Dawson J, with whom Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ agreed, also employs the terminology of intermediate facts. However, it is not entirely clear which facts are intermediate facts. If the term refers to all stages in the Wigmorean inferential chain as illustrated above, then it accords with the above analysis. And this interpretation appears implicit in the explanation by Dawson J. To accommodate the cumulative force of a mass of evidence he rejects the notion that every fact, every item of evidence taken into account, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, saying it would be ‘pointless to consider the degree of probability of each item of evidence separately’. But he does recognise that the material facts and some other essential facts might require separate consideration and proof. Thus, he says:401 … it may sometimes be necessary or desirable to identify those intermediate facts which constitute indispensable links in a chain of reasoning towards an inference of guilt. Not every possible intermediate conclusion of fact will be of that character. If it is appropriate to identify an intermediate fact as indispensable it may well be appropriate to tell the jury that that fact must be found beyond reasonable doubt before the ultimate inference can be drawn. But where — to use the metaphor referred to by Wigmore on Evidence, vol 9 (Chadbourn revision 1981), para 2497, pp 412– 14, the evidence consists of strands in a cable rather than links in a chain, it will not be appropriate to give such a warning.

[page 154] This dictum raises two difficulties. First, it suggests that the intermediate facts are only the penultimate facts from which the ultimate inference of guilt is drawn (see also Dawson J in Shepherd:402 ‘… in most, if not all, cases that ultimate inference [of guilt] must be drawn from some intermediate factual conclusion’). But in terms of inductive logic this is too narrow a view of the inferential process. As the above analysis of Van Beelen shows, intermediate facts at every stage of the inferential chain may, in terms of inductive logic, demand proof beyond reasonable doubt before the ultimate inference of guilt can be drawn to the same standard.403 But secondly, this dictum suggests that where evidence supports strands in a cable of proof rather than links in a chain of proof there is never need for the jury to be directed that they require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The terminology used here is confusing. Neither ‘evidence’ nor ‘facts’ are strands of the cable. The inferences drawn from them constitute the strands. One can accept that individual inferences need not be capable of supporting the factual conclusion desired beyond reasonable doubt, but in logic one must remain clear about the evidence and facts from which those inferences are being drawn. Thus, in Chamberlain (which is neither overruled nor disapproved of in Shepherd), the court held that no inference could be drawn from the foetal nature of the blood. In this sense, if the foetal blood was to be used as a basis for inference, its foetal nature required proof as an indispensable intermediate fact. Thus, in terms of inductive logic, even where inferences operate as strands in a cable, there remains room for regarding any facts relied upon as giving rise to those inferential strands as ‘indispensable’ to drawing them. If this is so, where that inferential strand is important (a ‘thick strand’), the jury should be directed about which facts it must find beyond reasonable doubt before that inferential strand can be drawn.404 Furthermore, if, despite there being a number of inferential strands, the jury might isolate one of these strands and regard it as a link in a chain of proof, and base conviction upon that strand alone, there is again a strong argument that the jury should be directed to find that inference (now a ‘link’ rather than a ‘strand’) beyond reasonable doubt before acting upon it. [page 155]

2.84 However, subsequent cases appear to take a stricter approach to the notion of ‘indispensable’ intermediate facts in rejecting any requirement for jury direction. In R v Kotzmann,405 the prosecution sought to identify the accused by identifying the gun used in the robbery as a gun that was in the accused’s possession at the relevant time. If this had been the only evidence against the accused, the court accepted that proof of the identity of the gun would have been an indispensable intermediate fact, being an indispensable link in a chain of proof. And it would then have been appropriate for the jury to be directed that it could only convict the accused if satisfied of that identity beyond reasonable doubt. But there was also other circumstantial evidence linking the accused to the crime: evidence of his movements before and after the crime and of his possession of the proceeds of the robbery. This could be used in combination with the evidence relating to the identity of the gun to create inferential strands in a cable of circumstantial proof. In this context, the similarity of the guns rather than their proved identity might be sufficient in combination with the other evidence to find the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. This being so, the Court of Criminal Appeal held that the identity of the gun was not an indispensable intermediate fact requiring direction of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Where a fact (the similarity of the guns) can also be used to support an inference in a cable of proof it is not logically indispensable. 2.85 Although, in the light of the complexity of the above discussion, one can understand the courts’ reluctance to direct juries about how to dissect and combine the evidence before them, particularly in cases turning on extensive circumstantial evidence, this explanation of an indispensable intermediate fact creates two problems. First, it simply ignores how the jury might reason about the evidence before them. It might reason sequentially. The jury in Kotzmann might have convicted the accused because it was satisfied (and not necessarily beyond reasonable doubt) of the identity of the gun. It is probably implicit in Kotzmann that the court rejected this possibility. But if this sort of sequential reasoning is a distinct possibility (and this will depend upon how the case has been presented), it may be appropriate to direct the jury not to so reason unless it finds that indispensable intermediate fact proved beyond reasonable doubt.406 The logic of this is supported by that authority (including Kotzmann at [21]) [page 156]

demanding that where evidence of a full confession (including a confession inferred from lies) is relied upon by the prosecution, even where other evidence against the accused exists, generally the jury should be directed not to find the accused guilty unless it finds the fact of the confession and its truthfulness and accuracy established beyond reasonable doubt.407 2.86 The second problem with the Kotzmann analysis is that it fails to clarify the process of inductive proof and what facts must be found to justify the drawing of inferential strands in a cable of proof. The jury should not be encouraged to draw inferential strands from facts that cannot be found beyond reasonable doubt. This was the problem in Chamberlain, where the jury was left to draw an inferential strand from the foetal nature of the blood when this could not be established. In Kotzmann, the jury may similarly have been influenced by evidence of the identity of the gun even though not satisfied of this identity beyond reasonable doubt. But either the evidence in Kotzmann was able to prove to the jury’s satisfaction ‘the identity’ of the gun beyond reasonable doubt, in which case the accused was proven guilty, or it only established to the jury’s satisfaction similarities (of a greater or lesser degree) between the gun used and that in the accused’s possession, in which case an inference from the similarity could only convict the accused if combined with inferences from other circumstantial evidence of involvement. There was no inferential strand in a cable of proof — no converging inference — to be drawn from ‘the identity’ of the gun, only from its ‘similarity’. If there had been any risk of the jury drawing an inference from ‘identity’, it should have been so instructed. What Chamberlain emphasises is that when considering inferential strands in a cable of proof one must be clear about the facts from which the inferences are being drawn. 2.87 In a number of particular contexts courts have considered whether facts attract direction of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Earlier common law authorities suggest that whenever evidence of other misconduct is admissible to establish a propensity capable of founding an inference towards guilt, then the jury should be directed that it [page 157] accept the misconduct beyond reasonable doubt before acting upon it.408 But later state decisions suggest, following the Kotzmann analysis of Shepherd, that this

requirement should be confined to where that admissible propensity is in logic an indispensable link in a sequential chain of proof.409 Central to the position at common law is HML v R,410 a case concerning the admissibility of uncharged acts of sexual conduct testified to by the complainant in alleging charged acts of sexual assault. Hayne, Kirby and Gummow JJ appear to give support to the view that whenever uncharged acts are admissible they require proof beyond reasonable doubt.411 Later state authority has taken this view.412 But insofar as this approach depends upon such evidence only being admissible if its tendency use has no rational explanation consistent with the accused’s innocence (the Pfennig test), it is distinguishable in jurisdictions that do not, as a result of legislation, take this approach to the admissibility of uncharged acts.413 While Heydon J offered no concluded opinion on the subject, the three remaining members of the court (Gleeson CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ) took the view that the Pfennig test applies only where evidence of misconduct is tendered specifically for a propensity use, and as the [page 158] evidence before them had not been so tendered, the question of a direction on proof of an admissible propensity never arose. They regarded the evidence of the uncharged acts as relevant for two non-propensity uses: first, to provide context (to enable a full understanding of the complainant’s testimony) and, secondly, to show the accused’s sexual interest in the complainant — the latter being commonly admitted in trials for sexual assault414 to provide evidence of motive.415 To these uses Crennan J applied Shepherd to conclude no criminal direction was required. But while agreeing that neither use was an indispensable link in a chain of proof, both Gleeson CJ (at [32]) and Kiefel J (at [506]) favoured the view that, because of the significance of evidence of sexual interest, the jury should be directed to act upon it only if satisfied of its proof beyond reasonable doubt.416 Gleeson CJ further explained that where (as in the case before him) it is the complainant who gives evidence of uncharged acts ‘it may be unrealistic … to contemplate that any reasonable jury would differentiate between the reliability of the complainant’s evidence as to the uncharged acts and the complainant’s evidence as to the charged acts’, and so it is preferable that the jury be directed to the same standard of proof.417

As a consequence, Hayne J declared in HML (at [247]) that ‘a majority of the Court is of the opinion that [i]n the ordinary course a jury would be instructed by the trial judge that they must only find that the accused has a sexual interest in the complainant if it is proved beyond reasonable doubt’. This dictum has been applied in a number of state decisions,418 although others have sought to emphasise that the direction is not obligatory and it must be shown that its absence has caused a miscarriage of [page 159] justice.419 But if sexual interest requires such a direction it can be strongly argued that at common law, whenever evidence of other misconduct is tendered to establish a relevant and admissible propensity the jury should be similarly directed in terms of the criminal standard. In all jurisdictions, the common law concerning the admissibility of other misconduct has been replaced (or in the case of Queensland substantially modified) by legislation.420 In making admissibility rules dependent upon the purpose of tender (s 97) and not enacting the Pfennig test of admissibility (s 101), the uniform legislation allows the approach of Hayne, Kirby and Gummow JJ in HML to be distinguished421 and provides support for that of Gleeson CJ and Kiefel and Crennan JJ. This legislation does not, however, affect the authority of Shepherd. Nevertheless, the practice under the uniform legislation, because of the influence such evidence can have, is to direct juries to find both evidence admitted as tendency422 and evidence admitted as of sexual interest423 established beyond reasonable doubt whether or not it constitutes an indispensable step in a chain of proof. Where misconduct is tendered simply to provide a relevant context for the complainant’s testimony, no direction about the criminal standard is required although the strictly limited purposes for which the evidence may be used must be emphasised.424 In Western Australia, where s 31A of [page 160] the Evidence Act 1906 governs the admissibility of propensity evidence, authority supports a similar approach.425

In South Australia, s 34R of the Evidence Act 1929 specifically provides that where evidence of discreditable conduct is admitted under s 34P then if ‘that evidence is essential to the process of reasoning leading to a finding of guilt, the evidence cannot be used unless on the whole of the evidence, the facts in proof of which the evidence was admitted are established beyond reasonable doubt, and the judge must (whether or not sitting with a jury) give a direction accordingly’. In R v MJJ; R v CJN,426 Vanstone J said that s 34R ‘embodies the rule in Shepherd’ but it may be that such evidence remains ‘essential to the process of reasoning’, as a crucial circumstantial intermediate fact, even where it is not a logically indispensable link in a chain of proof. And one might argue that the criminal standard should be demanded whenever there is a risk that a jury will regard it as essential even where as a matter of strict logic it might not be indispensable to a chain of reasoning. In Victoria, s 62 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 abolishes any common law rule demanding directions in terms of the criminal standard beyond the elements of the offence or the absence of a relevant defence. The notes to s 62 specifically refer to ‘the rule attributed to Shepherd v R’ and ‘the rule attributed to R v Sadler [2008] VSCA 198’). However, as the judge is permitted to direct about elements in terms of factual questions decisive of the case (s 67(2) and (3)), this may require the judge to isolate facts to which the criminal standard must be applied by the jury. In Penney v R,427 it is suggested that at common law, wherever a motive is relied upon it should be established beyond reasonable doubt, but again state cases428 have read these dicta down in the light of Kotzmann. Where the motive is established through sexual interest, as noted above, a direction to find the interest established beyond reasonable doubt is generally required in all jurisdictions other than Victoria. [page 161] In the case of DNA evidence, some courts are more forthright in requiring the jury to be directed to accept the reliability of that evidence beyond reasonable doubt before acting on it,429 even when presented with other circumstantial evidence, perhaps because it is always a ‘thick strand’430 in the cable of proof. But again, more recently courts have said that strictly the jury need only to be

generally so directed where the DNA evidence is ‘indispensable’ in the Kotzmann sense.431 2.88 Whether the accused’s lies are indispensable intermediate facts involving proof beyond reasonable doubt was considered by the High Court in Edwards v R.432 There the majority held, following Shepherd, that where a lie by the accused is relied upon to support an inference of guilt, it is not necessary that the jury find beyond reasonable doubt that the lie was motivated by a consciousness of guilt of the crime charged if there is, besides the lie, other evidence from which that same inference of guilt may be drawn (other inferential strands in the cable). Thus, if a lie by the accused is put forward to corroborate other evidence it is enough that ‘consciousness of guilt’ inference is capable of being drawn.433 On the other hand, if the accused’s lie is the only evidence of guilt — is the logically indispensable intermediate fact in a chain of proof — then clearly the jury will have to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that it was motivated by a consciousness of guilt of the crime charged if the accused is to be convicted.434 There may be other cases where a lie is of such significance that as a [page 162] matter of prudence the jury should be warned to find it proved beyond reasonable doubt before acting upon it.435 2.89 Even if a court accepts a fact to be an indispensable intermediate fact logically requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, the question whether the jury must be so directed if a miscarriage of justice is to be avoided remains a separate question. Courts are reluctant to direct juries how to reason as opposed to how not to reason and are conscious that too much dissection and analysis of facts may confuse the jury. As Dawson J concludes in Shepherd:436 [Such direction] should not be given … where it would be unnecessary or confusing to do so.437 It will generally be sufficient to tell the jury that the guilt of the accused must be established beyond reasonable doubt and, where it is helpful to do so, to tell them that they must entertain such a doubt where any other inference consistent with innocence is reasonably open on the evidence.

Where there are ‘indispensable intermediate facts’, the trial judge should not attempt to explain that notion to the jury but, if appropriate in the circumstances, merely point out which facts require proof beyond reasonable doubt if the accused is to be found guilty.438

Challenging unreasonable verdicts and applying the proviso 2.90 The process of proof through application of the criminal standard is not the sole province of juries and trial courts. Appellate courts are also required to determine the sufficiency of evidence in asking whether the verdict of the jury is unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence. Although appellate courts are reluctant to interfere with jury verdicts, the High Court has made it clear that appellate courts have a responsibility to overrule verdicts where, having examined the evidence on the record for themselves, they consider that a reasonable doubt necessarily remains (rather than artificially attempt to ask whether a rational jury could have convicted on the evidence). This is an issue of sufficiency distinct from the question of whether there is a case to answer made out. In determining sufficiency on appeal, the eliminative nature of the criminal standard is of fundamental significance — whether on the evidence a reasonable doubt necessarily remains.439 This eliminative nature is most clearly exposed in cases turning on circumstantial evidence where appellate courts [page 163] (and judges sitting alone) focus on the question of whether all reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence can be eliminated.440 By the same token, where there are prima facie grounds for upholding an appeal due to an error of law or some other miscarriage of justice, the High Court has made it clear that in applying the proviso, again it is the responsibility of the appellate court to examine the record and dismiss the appeal where it believes that, on the evidence properly before the court, the accused’s guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.441 When asked to interfere, appellate courts may be faced with the question of whether an intermediate fact can be proved beyond reasonable doubt and relied upon as a circumstantial intermediate fact. This was the situation in Chamberlain v R (No 2),442 with the High Court deciding that it could not be proved that the blood in question was foetal in character. However, the court went on to hold that even without evidence of that foetal character the totality of evidence in that case supported conviction to the requisite standard.443 Matters of sufficiency were again decisive.444 In other cases, the inability to prove an indispensable intermediate fact has been the very basis of successful appeal. For example, with

DNA evidence being increasingly decisive, cases have arisen where, despite there being a DNA match, evidence has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the DNA was deposited during the crime rather than on another occasion.445

Proof on the voir dire 2.91 For the sake of completeness, one other context in which decisions of fact are made by judges is mentioned; that is, where they determine on the voir dire the facts upon which a rule of admissibility depends. Although these determinations arise at the evidence collecting stage of the trial they, nonetheless, involve decisions of fact, and must be decided by reference to the natural rules of fact discovery and the appropriate legal standards of proof. These preliminary issues of fact are matters for the judge even when a jury is sitting. [page 164] There are differences in opinion over the standard of proof appropriate at the voir dire in criminal cases where the prosecution seeks to establish admissibility. Some English authorities favour the criminal standard, whereas in Australia it has been generally held that the civil standard is appropriate.446 If the civil standard is understood in the sense of the reasonable search for truth as explained at 2.59–2.67, it is arguable that, even in the case of confessions, the criminal standard goes too far, the fundamental protection of this standard being only appropriate at the trial. Where the accused seeks to establish admissibility there seems no doubt the civil standard applies, and in civil cases no other standard is appropriate. The uniform legislation makes it clear in s 142 that the civil standard applies.

Conclusion: the inductive approach 2.92 It is concluded that although the notion of proof lies at the very heart of the law of evidence an understanding of its nature remains beset with philosophical and practical difficulties. How the standards of proof are formulated depends upon which philosophical analysis is accepted as describing the process of proof in courts of law. It is contended that mathematical approaches are an inappropriate description of how courts approach the standards of proof. These standards do not embody mathematical notions but embody two forms of

hypothesis testing to be made having regard to all available evidence following a reasonable search for truth. The criminal form requires elimination of those hypotheses consistent with innocence upon consideration of the evidence available, so that absence of specific evidence makes it more difficult to conclude the guilty hypothesis. The civil form does not insist upon this sort of elimination and allows hypotheses to be weighed according to the available evidence, but with the proviso that this evidence constitute what can be regarded as, in the circumstances of the case, a reasonable search for truth. Each concentrates upon the discovery of individual events and ostensibly eschews the proportional generalisations implicit in mathematical theory. These standards may lack the apparent precision of mathematical expression, but they nevertheless constitute an orderly approach to decisions in the face of uncertainty.

The Ambit of Evidential Rules 2.93 Although the standards of proof have been legally formulated, their application relies essentially upon natural notions. It is left to triers of fact to do their best in applying these notions, free from legal constraints, in the search for factual rectitude. The evidence they consider in this search is not, however, free from constraint and, [page 165] through the concept of admissibility, the common law imposes restraints upon the consideration of evidence which, on natural notions of relevance, may appear to be otherwise available. The law of evidence is mainly concerned with these constraints, principally imposed, as has been argued in Chapter 1, to reflect the difficulties in applying natural notions of relevance and proof, and to ensure that evidence is maximised through its adversarial presentation and consideration (although policies extraneous to these notions do from time to time give rise to evidential constraints which may compromise the search for rectitude). It is with these evidential constraints, the rules of admissibility, that the remainder of this book is concerned. ______________________________ 1.

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth); Evidence Act 1995 (NSW); Evidence Act 2001 (Tas); Evidence Act 2008

(Vic); Evidence Act 2011 (ACT); Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT). The divisions and section sequences in this ‘mirroring’ legislation are common although the content is not always identical. 2.

Evidence, ALRC Report 38 (1987).

3.

This term is not defined but s 4(1) provides it includes ‘proceedings that — (a) relate to bail; or (b) are interlocutory proceedings or proceedings of a similar kind; or (c) are heard in chambers; or (d) subject to subs (2) [‘if the court so directs], relate to sentencing’ (absent direction the common law may apply: see Talukder v Dunbar [2009] ACTSC 42 at [17]–[19]). Proceedings have been held to include a step in an action: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v McCauley (1996) 22 Fam LR 538 at [34]–[37]; and protective proceedings: R v P [2001] NSWCA 473 at [38]. But examinations under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) or the Corporations Law, not being inter party nor ones where evidence may be adduced from witnesses, are arguably not ‘proceedings’ for the purposes of s 4: Griffin v Pantzer (2004) 137 FCR 209 at [198]–[206] (FC FCt); cf Re Interchase Corp Ltd (1996) 68 FCR 481; Doran Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) [2002] NSWSC 215 at [87]–[112]. The rules of evidence do not apply to proceedings by virtue of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act but as a doctrine of substantive law the common law principles of public interest immunity continue to apply unless expressly abrogated pursuant to the ‘principle of legality’ (see further at 5.183): Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Guo (2016) 69 AAR 74; [2016] FCAFC 62.

4.

Uniform legislation Pt 1.2, particularly s 4. For more detailed discussion of this Part, see Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law, 12th ed, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2016, pp 47–75; Williams, Anderson, Marychurch and Roy, Uniform Evidence in Australia, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2015, pp 12–43; LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, particularly at [1685]–[1700]. See also Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] FCA 1010 at [70]ff.

5.

Except where a federal court is hearing an appeal from a state or Northern Territory court: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 4(5)(a), (b). Where a state court exercises federal jurisdiction, that state’s evidential rules apply by virtue of s 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth): preserved by the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 8(1). For arguments favouring the application of the uniform legislation to follow the court rather than the jurisdiction, see Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [2.93]–[2.102].

6.

Whilst this includes the Family Court, the application of the Evidence Act is expressly modified by the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) in child-related proceedings: ss 69ZT, 69ZV. It is arguable that the Evidence Act cannot apply (pursuant to s 8(1)) if this is incompatible with the welfare of the child, which is paramount under s 60CA of the Family Law Act: Re Z (1996) 134 FLR 40.

7.

The New South Wales Coroners Court was held not created by parliament and, not being required to apply the laws of evidence, was held not subject to the New South Wales Act: Decker v State Coroner (NSW) (1999) 46 NSWLR 415 at [16]–[17]. Neither the Refugee Review Tribunal nor the Administrative Appeals Tribunal are bodies required to apply the laws of evidence and, not otherwise being courts, are not subject to the uniform legislation: Epiabaka v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 150 ALR 397; Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (2006) 67 NSWLR 91 at [16].

8.

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 5, 185, 186 and 187.

9.

(2000) 50 NSWLR 640 at [25]–[30]. See also Haddara v R (2014) 43 VR 53; [2013] VSCA 100 at [54]– [56], [69] (Redlich and Weinberg JJA) and more generally Heydon, ‘The Non-Uniformity of the “Uniform” Evidence Acts and Their Effect on the General Law’ (2013) 2 J Civil Litigation & Practice 169.

10. See Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371 at 373 (Branson J); R v McNeill (2008) 184 A Crim R 467; [2008] FCAFC 80 at [58]–[61] (referring to the uniform legislation in its application in Norfolk Island courts).

11. See cases cited in Meteyard v Love (2005) 65 NSWLR 36; [2005] NSWCA 444 at [114] by Basten JA. In Haddara v R (2014) 43 VR 53; [2013] VSCA 100 at [14]ff, particularly at [56]–[72], Redlich and Weinberg JJA argue that the common law principle to ensure the fairness of a criminal trial is not expressly excluded by s 56, and may operate as a residual power to exclude as a matter of ‘discretion’ evidence otherwise ‘admissible’ pursuant to s 56. Even if their argument is not accepted, the fair trial principle remains available to justify a stay of proceedings: see authorities at 2.29 nn 138–139. 12. LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, at [1765] adverts to there being no universal answer to the question of how far previous case law is relevant in interpreting the uniform evidence legislation. 13. See Evidence, ALRC Interim Report 26 (1985), vol 1, [64]; Evidence, ALRC Report 38 (1987), [28]; Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005). Rules about waiver and case to answer are examples of manifestations of this process: see 2.46–2.56 below. 14. This work makes no attempt to deal with the tender of evidence at sentencing. Where the prosecution seeks to rely upon facts as a basis for increasing the severity of the sentence, authority suggests these must be established beyond reasonable doubt (if so, arguably the rules of evidence should apply to establishing this standard); whilst it is enough that facts in mitigation be established by the accused at most on the balance of probabilities: Filippou v R (2015) 256 CLR 47; [2015] HCA 29 at [64]; see further LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [9070]; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 132C. In a proceeding governed by the uniform legislation, the uniform rules of evidence apply at sentencing facts only on direction (s 4(1)(d), (2)–(4)), and if no direction the common law applies: R v Bourchas (2002) 133 A Crim R 413 at 428 (Giles JA); Taluker v Dunbar [2009] ACTSC 42 at [17]–[18]; Farkas v R [2014] NSWCCA 141 at [14] (Basten JA). 15. Historical work explains the emergence of rules and practices, often implied by modern practitioners to be timeless: see Langbein, The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Trial, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003; Cairns, Advocacy and the Making of the Adversarial Criminal Trial 1800–1865, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998. 16. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) Ch 3 Pt 2; Justices Act 1886 (Qld) Pt 4 Div 12; Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) Pt 5 Div 4; Justices Act 1959 (Tas) Pt VI; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) Ch 4; Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) Pt 3 Div 4; Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) Pt 3.4 Div 3.4.4; Local Court (Criminal Procedure) Act (NT) Pt V Div 1. 17. Disclosure before trial in criminal cases is discussed further at 5.12ff. 18. Lord Woolf’s inquiry into civil justice in England and Wales has been influential in Australia. Many of the proposals and refinements to the English Civil Procedure Rules 1998 have been adopted in Australian jurisdictions: see Woolf, Access to Justice, HMSO, London, 1996. 19. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ss 132–133 (by order following mutual agreement or agreement of accused: ss 132–133, discussed in R v Gittany [2013] NSWSC 1503; s 133 requires judges to demonstrate in their reasons that they have taken account of the same warnings and directions that would be given if the trial had been by jury: Filippou v R (2015) 256 CLR 47; [2015] HCA 29 at [52]); Criminal Code (Qld) ss 614–615E (by application of either party in interests of justice but accused must consent; s 615 discussed in R v Kissier (2012) 212 A Crim R 121; [2011] QCA 223; R v Sica (2013) 232 A Crim R 572; [2013] QCA 247); Juries Act 1927 (SA) s 7 (generally by election of accused if judge satisfied accused sought legal advice for the trial to proceed without a jury, but subject to certain exceptions by application); Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) s 118 (by application of either party ‘in the interests of justice’ but accused must consent: discussed in Western Australia v Rayney (2011) 42 WAR 383; [2011] WASC 326, where ordered due to pre-trial publicity; and LFG v Western Australia (2015) 48 WAR 178; [2015] WASCA 88 at [83]–[150] (Martin CJ extensively considering principles and authorities; not ordered as jury directions sufficient protection from prejudice)); Supreme Court Act (ACT) s 68B (by election of the accused after legal advice). Section 80 of the Australian Constitution

provides that ‘The trial on indictment of any offence against any law of the Commonwealth shall be by jury’ and this provision applies to state courts trying federal offences by virtue of s 68 of the Judiciary Act: Alqudsi v R (2016) 90 ALJR 711; [2016] HCA 24 (accused charged on indictment for federal offence unable to seek trial by judge alone under New South Wales legislation; s 80 strictly construed). 20. R v Hansen [2002] SASC 208 at [89]–[90] (Lander J). In R v WAF and SBN [2010] 1 Qd R 370; [2009] QCA 144, the prosecutor’s calling of evidence not referred to in opening was held to have caused a miscarriage of justice. In trials on indictment, legislation in some jurisdictions permits or invites (and in Victoria demands where the accused is represented) an accused, as well as later opening after the prosecution case, to make a statement immediately following the prosecutor’s opening to explain the matters disputed and to be raised by way of defence (and in Victoria is required to respond to the written prosecution opening that must be served prior to trial): Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 159; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 288A (R v Karapandzk (2008) 184 A Crim R 320; [2008] SASC 126 (must identify issues, not lead evidence); Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) s 371; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 224, 225, 231. Legislation in other jurisdictions only expressly permits the defence to open after the prosecution case on the evidence (if any) the defence proposes to call: Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 619; Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) s 143 (an accused who is calling no evidence may open ‘immediately after the prosecutor has given or declined to give an opening address’); Criminal Code (NT) s 363, Sch 4. But as a matter of practice an earlier opening may be permitted: cf R v Hansen [2002] SASC 208 at [7]–[10] (Perry J), [99] (Lander J). 21. R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671; R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299; Downs Irrigation Co-op Association Ltd v National Bank of Australasia Ltd [1983] 1 Qd R 130; O’Meara v Western Australia (2012) 235 A Crim R 209; [2013] WASCA 228 (proof of a defendant witness’s prior inconsistent statement to discredit following cross-examination does not constitute splitting). A judge or magistrate has no general authority to order reopening: Weatherall v Whalan (1989) 50 SASR 319; Grosser v SA Police (1994) 63 SASR 243. For a principled discussion of the English common law situation in criminal cases, see Andrews, ‘Re-opening the Case for the Prosecution’ (1991) 107 LQR 577. 22. Urban Transport Authority (NSW) v Nweiser (1991) 28 NSWLR 471 at 478. 23. A judge may permit reopening any time before judgment is formally entered (Jingellic Minerals No Liability v Beach Petroleum (1991) 55 SASR 424) but courts are extremely reluctant to reopen after reasons for judgment have been given: see, for example, Manwell Pty Ltd v Dames and Moore Pty Ltd (2001) ATPR ¶41-845; [2001] QCA 436; Wentworth v Rogers [2002] NSWSC 921 (Barrett J). In Bulejcik v R (1996) 185 CLR 375; [1996] HCA 50 at [23]–[28], McHugh and Gummow JJ suggest it would be rare to permit reopening after a jury had retired. 24. Shaw v R (1952) 85 CLR 365 at 379–80 (Dixon, McTiernan, Webb and Kitto JJ), 383–4 (Fullagar J); Lawrence v R (1981) 38 ALR 1 (HC); R v Dawes [1992] 2 Qd R 435 at 437–8; Bush v R (1993) 115 ALR 654 at 667 (FC FCt); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Adler [2001] NSWSC 1168 (Santow J); Latorre v R (2012) 226 A Crim R 319; [2012] VSCA 280 at [99]–[109] (defence testimony of phone intercept beyond prosecution case could be contradicted). Cf Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 233(2), (3). It may be necessary to cross-examine defence witnesses on unforeseen issues within their knowledge (satisfying the rule in Browne v Dunn) before seeking leave to reopen: see, for example, R v Tanner (2006) 96 SASR 70; [2006] SASC 320. 25. For example, where the onus of proving a defence lies upon the opponent (R v Pateman [1984] 1 Qd R 312); although if the defence has been anticipated, the prohibition against splitting takes over: R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 at 677 (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J). Note that alibis do not fall into this category and ought to be disproved by the Crown unless they could not reasonably be foreseen: Killick v R (1981) 147 CLR 565. The following legislation requires notice of alibi to be given: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 150; Criminal Code (Qld) s 590A; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 285C; Criminal Code (Tas) s 368A; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 51, 190; Criminal Procedure Act

2004 (WA) ss 62–63, 96–97; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 288; Criminal Code (NT) s 331; Local Court (Criminal Procedure) Act (NT) s 60AG. 26. R v Doran (1972) 56 Cr App R 429. 27. R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 at 677 (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J). Reopening permitted on this basis in Maddison v Combe (1981) 26 SASR 523 and Camilleri v Wilkinson (1983) 35 SASR 270. Other judges have taken a stricter line when formal omissions are the result of incompetence: for example, Leydon v Tomlinson (1979) 22 SASR 302; Harrison v Flaxmill Road Foodland Pty Ltd (1979) 22 SASR 385 at 388– 91; Higgins v Parker (1984) 35 SASR 229; McDonald v Camerotto (1984) 36 SASR 66; Reynolds v Bogan Holdings (1984) 36 SASR 193; Piszczyk v Bolton (1984) 38 SASR 330. 28. R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671; Urban Transport Authority (NSW) v Nweiser (1991) 28 NSWLR 471 at 478. 29. R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 at 685–6 (Dawson J); R v V (1998) 100 A Crim R 488 at 495–6 (CCA (NSW)); R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299 at [27]–[31] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). Similar considerations may apply to civil actions for penalty: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Adler [2001] NSWSC 1168; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2006) 235 ALR 587; [2006] NSWSC 826 at [15]–[17]. By the same token notions of fairness may demand a more lenient view to reopening where it is the accused’s application: Dyett v Jorgensen [1995] 2 Qd R 1 at 5, quoted with approval by Debelle J in R v Blobel [2001] SASC 374 at [99]; Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397; [2008] HCA 1 at [15]. 30. But the rule is not contravened simply by cross-examining a defence witness on a matter about which the prosecution has tendered no evidence-in-chief in order to discredit the witness, or to obtain damaging admissions from an accused to support the prosecution’s case-in-chief: R v TSR (2002) 5 VR 627; [2002] VSCA 87; R v Dunwoody (2004) 212 ALR 103; [2004] QCA 413 at [96]–[99] (MacPherson JA). 31. Downs Irrigation Co-op Association Ltd v National Bank of Australasia Ltd [1983] 1 Qd R 130 at 138 (Connolly J). 32. See legislation referred to in n 20 above. 33. Though consider Walker, Thibaut and Andreoli, ‘Order of Presentation at Trial’ (1972) 82 Yale LJ 216; Kassin and Wrightsman, ‘On the Requirements of Proof: The Timing of Judicial Instruction and Mock Juror Verdicts’ (1979) 37 J Personality and Soc Psychology 1877; Englich, Mussweiler and Strack, ‘Last Word in Court — A Hidden Disadvantage for the Defence’ (2005) 29 Law & Hum Behav 705. 34. Tendering an exhibit in cross-examination of a Crown witness constitutes additional evidence: R v Ferguson (2000) 117 A Crim R 44 (Blow J, SC (Tas)). See also DPP Reference under s 693A of the Criminal Code: Re Y (1998) 100 A Crim R 166 (CCA (WA)). 35. The legislation largely preserving the common law practice comprises Criminal Code (Qld) s 619 (R v Handlen (2010) 247 FLR 261; [2010] QCA 371 at [121] (Holmes JA, Fraser and White JJA agreeing)); Criminal Code (Tas) s 371. Legislation varying the common law practice comprises Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 160; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 288B (R v Karounos (1995) 63 SASR 451 (prosecution entitled to address where accused unrepresented)); Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 73–75 (summary hearings), 234–236 (trials on indictment); Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) s 145; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 294; Criminal Code (NT) s 363. Where the accused addresses last this may allow the trial judge greater scope to comment adversely upon the defence submissions: R v Glusheski (1986) 33 A Crim R 193 at 195–6 (CCA (NSW)). 36. UCPR 2005 (NSW) Pt 29 r 6; SC(GCP)R 2015 (Vic) r 49.01; RSC 1971 (WA) O 34 r 5; CPR 2006 (ACT) r 1508; SCR (NT) r 49.01. 37. In this sense of the Frankian equation (R x F = D), and in this sense alone, questions of fact (F) are for

the jury and questions of law (R) for the judge. Whether there is a distinction beyond functional pragmatism between Rs and Fs is doubted by Allen and Pardo, ‘Facts in Law and Facts of Law’ (2003) 7 E & P 153, but cf Endicott, ‘Questions of Law’ (1998) 114 LQR 292. In Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854 at 861, Lord Reid said: ‘The meaning of an ordinary word of the English language is not a question of law. The proper construction of a statute is a question of law.’ For a critique of the universality of this distinction, see LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [11.010]; and Lord Hoffman in Moyna v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2003] 4 All ER 162 at [21]–[28]. Note that a judge may have to decide facts in determining preliminary questions of admissibility; cf ss 142, 189 of the uniform legislation. 38. A supplementary written memorandum may be given to the jury as an aide memoire in supplement to the oral direction but the discretion to do so should be exercised sparingly: R v Dunn (2006) 94 SASR 177; [2006] SASC 58; R v Lindsay (2014) 119 SASR 320; [2014] SASCFC 56 (appeals upheld for failure to give key directions orally). In Hargraves v R (2011) 245 CLR 257; [2011] HCA 44 at [22], the jury was assisted with powerpoint slides which the jury was allowed to take into the jury room when considering its verdict. See also s 65(d) of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) that permits a judge in summing up to ‘use a combination of oral and written components’. 39. See, for example, R v Williams (1999) 104 A Crim R 260; [1999] NSWCCA 9 at [37]–[45] (Wood J); RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620 at 637 (Gaudron ACJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); R v Mogg (2000) 112 A Crim R 417 at 425–7 (CA (Qld)) (and cases there referred to); Avis v R [2002] WASCA 250 at [33] (Murray J); R v AJS (2005) 12 VR 563 at [54]–[60] (CA (Vic)); Western Australia v Pollock [2009] WASCA 96 at [2]–[6] (Martin CJ), [135]–[138], [146]–[151] (Miller JA). But the judge is not obliged to canvass mechanically every argument put by counsel: R v Burns (1999) 107 A Crim R 330 at [62]–[64] (Pincus JA); R v Allen (2011) 109 SASR 396 at [1]–[5] (Doyle CJ). On the responsibility of the trial judge to identify the real issues in a case and instruct the jury accordingly, see generally Hayne J in Tully v R (2006) 231 ALR 712; [2006] HCA 56 at [73]–[94]; HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 at [121]; Hargraves v R (2011) 245 CLR 257; [2011] HCA 44 at [42] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) citing many High Court authorities to conclude ‘the judge in a criminal trial must accept the responsibility of deciding what are the real issues in the case, must tell the jury what those issues are, and must instruct the jury on so much of the law as the jury need to know to decide those issues’; R v Perara-Cathcart [2017] HCA 9 at [53], [56], [62] (Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Keane JJ). 40. For example, the very limited inferences which may be drawn from the accused’s failure to testify or call evidence: Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50; Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285; Uniform Evidence Acts s 20(2), (4). And see the discussion in R v Georgiev [2001] VSCA 18 at [52]–[58] (Ormiston JA). 41. It is suggested in those High Court cases concerning inferences from an accused’s failure to testify or call evidence that there is a distinction between a ‘direction’ or ‘instruction’ (which is required by law), and a ‘comment’ (which may be made by a judge to assist the jury about how it may reason in the case before it): for example, RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620 at 637 (Gaudron ACJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285 at [15] (Gaudron and Hayne JJ). See also Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397; [2008] HCA 1 at [15]–[18] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Kiefel JJ) (‘direction’ to draw no incriminating inference from accused’s demeanour at police interview required, not a mere ‘comment’ to take care in determining what inference, if any, to draw). Compare with the terminology in s 20 of the Uniform Acts. 42. R v Tikos (No 2) [1963] VR 306 at 308–9; R v Hughes (1989) 42 A Crim R 270 (CCA (Vic)); R v Courtney-Smith (No 2) (1990) 48 A Crim R 49 at 55–8 (CCA (NSW)); Abdel-Hady (“SA”) v R [2011] NSWCCA 196 at [134]–[141] (Adams and Fullerton JJ); R v C, CA [2015] SASCFC 143 at [57]–[58] (Kelly J). The judge is not obliged to summarise the defence case: R v Allen (2011) 109 SASR 396; [2011] SASCFC 40 at [3]–[5] (Doyle CJ). A judge may direct a jury to acquit where the evidence is too unreliable to be acted upon: DPP v Stonehouse [1978] AC 55 (Lords Diplock and Dillhorne dissenting);

and cf R v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161. The jury is never obliged to accept such direction but any conviction would most likely be set aside on appeal as unreasonable or against the weight of evidence. 43. RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620 at [41]–[43] (Gaudron ACJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285 at [15] (Gaudron and Hayne JJ); Vo v R (2013) 39 VR 543; [2013] VSCA 225. This is the approach taken by courts even where DNA evidence is expressed in Bayesian terms: see Chapter 1, nn 60, 66. 44. Shepherd v R (1990) 170 CLR 573. See further 2.83–2.89. 45. See discussion below at 2.71ff. 46. R v Zammit (1999) 107 A Crim R 489; [1999] NSWCCA 65 at [71], [130]–[132] (Wood CJ at CL); R v Hannes [2000] NSWCCA 503 at [106]ff (Spigelman CJ); R v PFD (2001) 124 A Crim R 418 (CCA (Vic)); [2001] VSCA 198 at [23] (Winneke P). Failure of counsel to object to the summing-up is an important, although not necessarily determinative, factor in deciding whether there has been a miscarriage of justice. See further 2.49. 47. See further Chapter 4 where directions required of testimony to avoid a miscarriage of justice where evidence may be unreliable are discussed: in particular at 4.6–4.8, 4.35–4.36, 4.76–4.79. 48. See, for example, the books prepared by the Judicial Commission of New South Wales at ; Queensland at ; Western Australia at . 49. Post-offence conduct, other misconduct evidence, unreliable evidence, identification evidence, delay and forensic disadvantage, failure to give evidence or call a witness. The provisions will be discussed when we consider these various categories of evidence — which all raise problems in accurately assessing probative value — principally in Chapters 3 and 4. 50. R v Morrow (2009) 213 A Crim R 530; [2009] VSCA 29 at [24]–[26] (Redlich JA, Nettle JA and Lasry AJA agreeing). 51. Cf New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper No 4: Jury Directions (2008) at [2.50]–[2.52], remarking that current research on jury simulation research ‘does seem to point to the need to make jury directions more comprehensible …’. 52. Wissler and Saks, ‘On the Inefficiency of Jury Instructions’ (1985) 9 Law & Hum Behav 37; Eichorn, ‘Social Science Findings and the Jury’s Ability to Disregard Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence’ (1989) 52 Law & Contemporary Problems 341; Schaefer and Hansen, ‘Similar Fact Evidence and Limited Use Instructions: An Empirical Investigation’ (1990) 14 Crim LJ 157; Cush and GoodmanDelahunty, ‘The Influence of Limiting Instructions on Processing and Judgments of Emotionally Evocative Evidence’ (2006) 13 Psychiatry, Psychology & Law 110; Lieberman and Sales, ‘The Effectiveness of Jury Instructions’ in Abbott and Batt (eds), A Handbook of Jury Research, American Law Institute, Philadelphia, 1999, [18.1]; Ogloff and Rose, ‘The Comprehension of Judicial Instructions’ in Brewer and Williams (eds), Psychology and Law: An Empirical Perspective, Guilford Press, New York, 2005, p 407; Charrow and Charrow, ‘Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions’ (1979) 79 Columbia LR 1306; Paglia and Schuller, ‘Jurors’ Use of Hearsay Evidence: The Effects of Type and Timing of Instructions’ (1998) 22 Law & Hum Behav 501; Kerr, Boster, Callen, Braz, O’Brien and Horowitz, ‘Jury Nullification Instructions as Amplifiers of Bias’ (2008) 6 ICE Art 2. And see discussion of and references to psychological literature in ‘Simplification of Jury Directions Report’ (‘The Weinberg Report’) 2012, [1.28]–[1.47]. 53. See the comments of Kirby J in Zoneff v R (2000) 200 CLR 234; [2000] HCA 28 at [65]–[67] nn 63–7; and HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 at [52]. See also McHugh J in Gilbert v R (2000) 201 CLR 414; [2000] HCA 15 at [31]. In R v Bunting and Wagner (2005) 92 SASR 241, the CCA gave

short shrift to the argument that, following a long trial, the summing-up was so complex that the jury would not have understood the directions given. Confidence in the effectiveness of instructions is regularly endorsed by appellate judges: see, for example, KJS v R [2014] NSWCCA 27 at [41] (Hoeben CJ at CL, Adams and RA Hulme JJ) referring to High Court authority. 54. Historically, jury unanimity was required, but legislation now permits majority verdicts (most often 10 of 12 jurors) where after a stipulated time unanimity has not been reached: Jury Act 1977 (NSW) s 55F; Jury Act 1995 (Qld) s 59A (see, for example, R v McClintock [2010] 1 Qd R 354; [2009] QCA 175; R v Smith [2015] 2 Qd R 452; [2014] QCA 277); Juries Act 1927 (SA) s 57; Juries Act 2003 (Tas) s 43; Juries Act 2000 (Vic) s 46. Where trial is by judge alone the judge must provide adequate reasons for his or her decision: see, for example, Camden v McKenzie [2008] 1 Qd R 39; Nguyen v R (2012) 267 FLR 344; [2012] ACTCA 24. 55. The court has no inherent jurisdiction to grant appeals on other grounds: NH v DPP (2016) 90 ALJR 978; [2016] HCA 33 at [67]ff (French CJ, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 56. Some judges have suggested that a miscarriage of justice occurs in a criminal case where the court determines that the accused has been deprived of a real chance of acquittal: see McHugh J in TKWJ v R (2002) 212 CLR 124 at [61]–[73]. The High Court in Weiss v R (2005) 224 CLR 300 at [33], in discussing the proviso, warns that such ‘expressions attempt to describe the operation of the statutory language in other words. They must not be taken as substitutes for that language’. See also Cesan v R; Mas Rivadavia v R [2008] HCA 52 at [123] (Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ). 57. The grounds for appeal against conviction in serious criminal cases are expressed more or less in these terms in the following legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 30AJ (discussed in Conway v R (2002) 209 CLR 203); Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) ss 5, 6; Criminal Code (Qld) ss 668D, 668E (no further equitable power to hear appeal: R v Stanley [2015] 1 Qd R 118; [2014] QCA 116); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 352, 353, 353A; Criminal Code (Tas) ss 401, 402; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 276 (appellant to establish verdict cannot be supported having regard to the evidence or due to irregularity or for some other reason there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice, and not enacting as such the proviso); Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) s 30; Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 37O; Criminal Code (NT) ss 410, 411. Whilst not expressed in statute, the grounds of appeal in civil cases are comparable (see generally LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [11.145]–[11.150], although appellate courts may be more reluctant to interfere with decisions of fact: see, for example, Swain v Waverley Municipal Council (2005) 220 CLR 517. 58. In deciding in criminal cases whether a jury’s verdict is unreasonable or against the weight of evidence, the appellate court is obliged to examine whether the record supports the verdict. Some courts put the question in terms of whether a reasonable jury must have held a reasonable doubt upon all the evidence: Whitehorn v R (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 686–8; Chamberlain v R (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 534, 606–8. However, in M v R (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 493, the majority judgment explained that the appellate court, rather than putting itself in the shoes of a hypothetical jury, ‘must ask itself … whether it thinks that upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty … In most cases a doubt experienced by an appellate court will be a doubt which a jury ought also to have experienced. It is only where a jury’s advantage in seeing and hearing the evidence is capable of resolving a doubt experienced by a court of criminal appeal that the court may conclude that no miscarriage of justice occurred’. This approach is followed in, for example, Jones v R (1997) 191 CLR 439; MFA v R (2002) 213 CLR 606; SKA v R (2011) 243 CLR 400; [2011] HCA 13 at [21]–[22]; Swain v R [2015] NSWCCA 176 at [87]–[90] (Hoeben CJ, RA Hulme and Fagan JJ agreeing); Miller v R (2016) 334 ALR 1; [2016] HCA 30 at [51], [78]–[82] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ); R v Baden-Clay (2016) 334 ALR 234; [2016] HCA 35 at [64]–[66] (principles), [67]–[79] (application) (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ). Courts are more likely to interfere where the Crown case is circumstantial: see, for example, R v Franks (1999) 105 A

Crim R 377 (CCA (Vic)); R v Rose [2002] NSWCCA 455; R v Baden-Clay (2016) 334 ALR 234; [2016] HCA 35; or dependent upon unreliable evidence: see, for example, Morris v R (1987) 163 CLR 454; but cf Chidiac v R (1991) 171 CLR 432; or where verdicts appear inconsistent: see, for example, R v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82; R v Hansen (2002) 84 SASR 54; R v Gbojueh (2009) 103 SASR 545. 59. Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531; Brunskill v Sovereign Marine and General Insurance Co Ltd (1985) 62 ALR 53; Chambers v Jobling (1986) 7 NSWLR 1; Abolos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167; Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at [25]–[31] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ), [65]ff (McHugh J); CSR Ltd v Della Maddalena (2006) 224 ALR 1; [2006] HCA 1 at [16]–[24] (Kirby J, with whom Gleeson CJ agreed), [180] (Heydon and Callinan JJ); Goodrich Aerospace Pty Ltd v Arsic (2006) 66 NSWLR 186; Lackovic v Insurance Commission (WA) (2006) 31 WAR 460; Indigo Financial Money Pty Ltd v Bolivar Road Pty Ltd (2010) 108 SASR 120; [2010] SASCFC 29; Robert Bax & Associates v Cavenham Pty Ltd [2013] 1 Qd R 476; [2012] QCA 177 at [83]–[88] (‘finding not glaringly improbable’). See generally Bell, ‘Appellate Review of the Facts’ (2014) 39 Aust Bar Rev 132. 60. (2005) 224 CLR 300 at [35] (see also at 2.90). Applied in Libke v R (2007) 235 ALR 517; [2007] HCA 30 at [46]–[53] (Kirby and Callinan JJ), [115] (Hayne J, Gleeson CJ and Heydon J concurring); Gately v R (2007) 232 CLR 208; [2007] HCA 55 at [109] (Heydon J); Cesan v R; Mas Rivadavia v R (2008) 236 CLR 358; [2008] HCA 52 at [127]–[130] (Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ) (proviso not applied when judge fell asleep); Lindsay v R (2015) 255 CLR 272; [2015] HCA 16 at [48] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ holding court can apply proviso even if not invoked by prosecution on appeal). The proviso is not enacted in s 227 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) and in every case the appellant must establish a ‘substantial miscarriage of justice’ for an appeal to succeed: where an error or irregularity is established on appeal this will not have caused a substantial miscarriage of justice if the court finds on the record that, even if there had been no error or irregularity, conviction was inevitable (no jury could have entertained a reasonable doubt): Baini v R (2012) 246 CLR 469; [2012] HCA 59 at [40] (appeal upheld as appellate court failed to consider whether the convictions were inevitable). See explanations of High Court decision in Baini v R (No 2) [2013] VSCA 157; Andleman v R (2013) 38 VR 659; [2013] VSCA 25 at [85]–[86]; and Crocker v R (2013) 39 VR 668; [2013] VSCA 318 at [21]–[22] (Redlich JA, Priest JA and Robson AJA agreeing). 61. As Gageler J explains in Baini v R (see n 60 above) at 56, even where the accused can establish that an error or irregularity may have impacted upon the trial, Weiss v R requires the court to dismiss the appeal if satisfied that the record of evidence properly before the court supports conviction beyond reasonable doubt. This may require consideration of the possible impact of the error on the decision open to the jury: Castle v R; Bucca v R (2016) 227 CLR 57; [2016] HCA 46 at [68] (and see Gageler J’s comments about reconciling this plurality approach with the principles in Weiss at [80]). Examination of the record does not require the appeal court to view for itself an audio video record of an interview with a witness tendered at trial in the absence of some forensic purpose for doing so. The account given and the language used by witnesses, available from the transcript, are usually sufficient for a review of evidence: SKA v R (2011) 243 CLR 400; [2011] HCA 13 at [27]–[35] (French CJ, Gummow and Kiefel JJ), [116]–[117] (Crennan J). 62. Whether a procedural error is so fundamental as to constitute a substantial miscarriage of justice is considered in Wilde v R (1988) 164 CLR 365; Glennon v R (1994) 179 CLR 1; Conway v R (2002) 209 CLR 203; AK v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438 (failure of judge in trial by judge alone to give reasons for the verdict). Cf Evans v R (2007) 235 CLR 521 at [41]–[51] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), [122], [126] (Kirby J): error considered simply as preventing court from being satisfied of accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In Cesan v R; Mas Rivadavia v R (2008) 236 CLR 358; [2008] HCA 52 at [125]–[126] (Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ), it is emphasised that ‘it is necessary to have regard to the miscarriage of justice that has been identified’ and not to apparently apt descriptions in the cases

describing the operation of the statutory language. In Lee v R (2014) 253 CLR 455; [2014] HCA 20 at [48]–[53], the court held that the prosecution’s unauthorised access to accused’s evidence obtained through compulsion by the NSW Crimes Commission so undermined the prosecution’s fundamental obligation to prove guilt without assistance from the accused that there was no question of the proviso applying. 63. Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) s 77(1)(b); Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) Sch 1 s 672A(a); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 369(1)(a) (‘CLCA’); Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) Sch 1 s 419(a); Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 327(1)(a); Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 140(1)(a); Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) ss 421–430 (Inquiries into Convictions); Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) Sch 1 s 431(a). See generally Caruso and Crawford, ‘The Executive Institution of Mercy in Australia: The Case and Model for Reform’ (2014) 37 UNSW LJ 312. 64. Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) s 78; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 353A (appeal succeeded: R v Keogh (No 2) (2014) 121 SASR 307; appeal denied: R v Van Beelen (2016) 125 SASR 253 but leave to appeal granted [2017] HCA Trans 19); Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 402A. These and the provisions in the previous footnote are discussed by Hamer, ‘Wrongful Convictions, Appeals, and the Finality Principle: The Need for a Criminal Cases Review Commission’ (2014) 37 UNSW LJ 270 at 286–98. 65. R v Cheng (1999) 48 NSWLR 616; R v JS [2007] NSWCCA 272 at [26]–[32] (Spigelman CJ, other judges agreeing). There is no inherent jurisdiction in the court to interfere on appeal with a judgment made on the basis of a mistaken verdict of acquittal communicated in open court by the foreman without dissent or correction from other members of the jury: NH v Director of Public Prosecutions [2016] HCA 33. 66. See, for example, Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 30AA(1)(c) and (d); Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act (NSW) s 107; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 352(1)(ab) (applied in R v Hamra [2016] SASCFC 130); Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) s 24(2)(da), (e). In Tasmania, appeals may be allowed against acquittal by leave on a point of law: Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) ss 401(2)(b), 402(5) (see, for example, DPP v Lynch (2006) 166 A Crim R 327; [2006] TASSC 89 at [44]–[46], proviso in s 402(2) not applied). For provisions allowing trial by judge alone, see n 19 above. 67. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 30CB; Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) s 108; Criminal Code (Qld) s 669A(2), (5); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 351, 351A(2) (c); Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 388AA(3); Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 308; Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) s 47(7) (but cf s 24(2)(da)); Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 37S(6); Criminal Code Act (NT) s 414(2), (5). 68. NSW: Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 ss 99–106; Qld: Criminal Code ss 678–678K; SA: Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 ss 331–339; Tas: Criminal Code Act 1924 ss 390–397AF; Vic: Criminal Procedure Act 2009 ss 327A–327S. And see further at 5.190. 69. Generally allowed: Justices Act 1886 (Qld) Pt 9 Div 1 s 222; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 42(1); Justices Act (Tas) Pt XI Div 1; Criminal Appeals Act (WA) s 7. Generally not allowed: Criminal Appeal Act (NSW) Pt 3 (in summary matter appeal on point of law may result in quashing of acquittal); Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 (NSW) ss 23, 56, 57; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) Pt 6.1 (no provision for prosecution appeal against acquittal); Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) Div 3.10.2–2A; Local Court (Criminal Procedure) Act (NT) s 163. 70. See discussion of authorities by Peek J in R v Brougham (2015) 122 SASR 546; [2015] SASCFC 75. 71. Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 30CA; Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) s 5A; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 668B; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 350 (expressly includes reserving a relevant question on an issue antecedent to trial); Criminal Code (Tas) ss 387–388; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 302 (question of law before or during trial); Criminal Appeals Act 2004

(WA) s 46; Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 37S; Criminal Code (NT) s 408. 72. See, for example, Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 42 (no appeal unless special reasons in interests of justice); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 352(1)(b) and (c) (appeals permitted from ‘a decision on an issue antecedent to trial’ with leave but by DPP as a matter of right ‘on any ground that involves a question of law alone’, cf s 354A permitting appeals against ‘ancillary orders’); Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 60 (no appeal without leave except in stipulated cases); Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) s 37E(4) (appeals permitted from interlocutory ‘orders’ ‘with leave of the Court of Appeal’); Supreme Court Act (NT) s 53 (appeals permitted from interlocutory judgments with leave of the Court of Appeal). 73. Criminal Appeals Act 1913 (NSW) s 5F. 74. Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 295–297. 75. See, for example, R v Gale and Duckworth [2012] NSWCCA 174 at [2] (Simpson J). In DPP v Galloway [2014] VSCA 272 at [18]–[19], the court resorted to applying the case stated procedure under s 302 of the Criminal Procedure Act to permit an appeal against an admissibility ruling where the conditions for an interlocutory appeal ran out. 76. And in so determining the court must take into account the disruption or delay to the trial and whether the appeal will resolve an issue decisive of the conduct of the trial or its outcome: see s 297(1)(b). Procedure discussed in MA v R (2011) 31 VR 203; [2011] VSCA 13 in rejecting appeal against exercise of discretion refusing to exclude identification evidence. See also Russell v R [2016] VSCA 196 at [4]– [8], where statutory conditions for interlocutory appeal held not to be satisfied. 77. House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 principles. Applied to interlocutory appeals in DAO v R (2011) 81 NSWLR 568; [2011] NSWCCA 63 concerning ss 97 and 101 of the uniform legislation, and Bray v R [2014] VSCA 276 at [61]ff (Santamaria JA, Maxwell CJ and Weinberg JA agreeing) concerning the application of s 137 of the uniform legislation. 78. See, for example, DPP v DJC [2012] VSCA 132; DPP v Martin (a Pseudonym) [2016] VSCA 219. 79. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on the Law of Evidence at Common Law, Little Brown and Co, Boston, 1898, pp 264–6. This approach is in what can be characterised as ‘the rationalist tradition’: Twining, ‘The Rationalist Tradition of Evidence Scholarship’, first published in Campbell and Waller (eds), Well and Truly Tried, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1982, and republished, with some additions, in Twining, Rethinking Evidence, Blackwell, Oxford, 1990 (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006). 80. Cf Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham (ed, J Bowring), Edinburgh, 1843, vol vii, p 24: ‘Evidence is the basis of justice: to exclude evidence is to exclude justice’. 81. But see Haddara v R (2014) 43 VR 53; [2013] VSCA 100 at [14]ff, particularly at [60]–[72], where Redlich and Weinberg JJA argue that the common law principle to ensure the fairness of a criminal trial is not excluded by the uniform legislation and may, as a residual ‘discretion’ operate, consequent upon the rules of ‘admissibility’ referred to in s 56 having run out, to justify the exclusion of relevant evidence. 82. Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36 at [25]–[26] (French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ), ‘The appellant’s submission as to relevance should be accepted on the basis that the impugned representation was so ambiguous that it could not rationally affect the assessment of the probability of a fall from the vertical head wall’; BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499; [2012] HCA 9 at [56] (French CJ), ‘The evidence was irrelevant because it was equivocal’ and at [57] ‘The equivocal character of the evidence marked this as a case of logical irrelevancy’. The irredeemably equivocal nature of the evidence was disputed by Heydon J in his discussion of relevance at [85]ff. 83. (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 at [39].

84. This interpretation of the assumption in s 55, including the exception, appears to be accepted without demur in R v Shamouil (2006) 66 NSWLR 228, and IMM v R (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14, where the majority (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ, Gageler, Gordon and Nettle JJ disagreeing) held that this notion of acceptance had to be read into the definition of ‘probative value’ contained in the Dictionary and referred to in ss 97 and 137. In Dupas v R (2012) 40 VR 182 at 196 [63(c)], the court attempts to distinguish between ‘credibility’ and ‘reliability’ for the purposes of applying the assumption to the interpretation of ‘probative value’ in s 137, but this distinction is rejected by all judges in IMM. 85. Smith v R (2001) 206 CLR 650; [2001] HCA 50 at [7] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 86. Where evidence appears to be relevant (pace Young J in Nodnara Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1997) 140 FLR 336 at 339–40) but only in combination with other evidence a court may be obliged to admit it conditionally upon assurance from counsel that its relevance will be substantiated by later evidence (Horne v Milne (1881) 7 VLR 296; uniform legislation s 57(1)(b): see Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd [2002] FCAFC 157 at [15]–[16] (Branson J); Rhoden v Wingate [2002] NSWCA 165 at [138]; Black v Walker [2000] NSWSC 983). If not substantiated in a criminal trial before a jury, the jury should be discharged if this creates a risk of unfair prejudice that cannot be eliminated by direction, and otherwise may lead to a successful appeal: R v Burns (1883) 9 VLR 191; and cf 3.72. Section 57 is sometimes used in relation to alleged admissions: Landini v New South Wales [2007] NSWSC 259; ACCC v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 794. 87. Finlaison (ed), Wills on Evidence, 3rd ed, Stevens & Sons Ltd, London, 1938, p 305. Similar terminology has been employed by courts in appropriate cases: for example, R v Bond [1906] 2 KB 389 at 400; Martin v Osborne (1936) 55 CLR 367 at 375; Attwood v R (1960) 102 CLR 353 at 360; Wilson v R (1970) 123 CLR 334 at 338. 88. (1876) 57 NH 245 at 288. 89. See, for example, Qualcast (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Haynes [1959] AC 743 at 757 (Lord Somerville), 759 (Lord Denning); Teubner v Humble (1963) 108 CLR 491 at 503–4; Ogle v Comboyuro Investments Pty Ltd (1976) 136 CLR 444 at 463–4 (Murphy J); McCool v McCool [2008] NSWSC 748 (Gzell J). Distinguishing conceptually rather than functionally between decisions of fact and of law is another matter. See further n 37 above. Scholars in the United States have proposed granting factual findings the status of legal precedent in order to prevent similar cases resulting in mass tort litigation: Walker and Monahan, ‘Scientific Authority: The Breast Implant Litigation and Beyond’ (2000) 86 Virginia LR 801. Cf attempts to define ‘significant probative value’ under ss 97 and 98 of the uniform legislation: see further at 3.61. 90. Described in Wigmore, The Science of Judicial Proof, 3rd ed, Little Brown and Co, Boston, 1937, App I. 91. Manenti v Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board [1954] VLR 115 at 117–18. 92. R v Stephenson [1976] VR 376 at 380–1. 93. Re Van Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 192–7 follows Wigmore’s analysis. 94. BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499; [2012] HCA 9 at [56] (French CJ), ‘The evidence was irrelevant because it was equivocal’ and at [57], ‘The equivocal character of the evidence marked this as a case of logical irrelevancy’. 95. Hollingham v Head (1858) 4 CB(NS) 388; 140 ER 1135 and Hart v Lancashire and Yorkshire Rail Co (1869) 21 LT 261 are examples of such decisions. Of these decisions it has been said: ‘… it is as idle to enquire as it is impossible to say whether the evidence was rejected in the above two cases because it was altogether irrelevant, or merely because it was too remotely relevant’: LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [1530]. This sort of cost/benefit analysis can be formalised: see Posner, ‘An Economic

Approach to the Law of Evidence’ (1999) 51 Stanford LR 1477. 96. Wigmore, Evidence (rev by Tillers), Little Brown and Co, Boston, 1983, vol 1A, [28]. 97. For example, Lempert and Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence, 2nd ed, West Publishing Co, St Paul, Minnesota, 1983. This view is now embodied in the United States Federal Evidence Rules, rr 401, 402, 403. 98. See, for example, Folkes v Chadd (1782) 3 Dougl 157; 99 ER 589; Agassiz v London Tramway Co (1872) 21 WR 199, discussed in LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [1535]. The same sorts of policy reasons provide the justification for specific rules of evidence; for example, the rule that a witness’s answer to a collateral question is final is justified on pragmatic grounds of time, cost and the risk of confusing diversion. 99. Hoffman, ‘Similar Facts After Boardman’ (1975) 91 LQR 193. 100. Stephen, A Digest of the Law of Evidence, 12th ed, MacMillan and Co, London, 1948. 101. If the relevance depends upon another finding being made or other evidence being tendered then it may be admitted if that finding is reasonably open or provisionally pending the tender of evidence from which such a finding is reasonably open: s 57(1). Furthermore, inferences that a document or thing is relevant may be drawn from that evidence itself: s 58(1). These sections appear to allow inferences of authenticity to be drawn from the document tendered itself: see discussion at 7.8. 102. (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [80]–[81]. Alluded to also in Adam v R (2001) 207 CLR 96 at [22] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Kirby and Hayne JJ). 103. (2001) 206 CLR 650; [2001] HCA 50. And see Biber, Captive Images: Race, Crime, Photography, Routledge-Cavendish, London, 2007. 104. Majority view applied in R v Gardner (2001) 123 A Crim R 439; [2001] NSWCCA 381 at [15]; R v Beattie (2001) 127 A Crim R 250; [2001] NSWCCA 502; R v TA [2003] NSWCCA 191. Additional knowledge found in Cook v R (1998) 126 NTR 17; R v Marsh [2005] NSWCCA 331 at [18], [31]; R v Drollett [2005] NSWCCA 356 at [51]. 105. (2001) 206 CLR 650 at [11]. See also Bain v R [2009] NZSC 16 at [54]–[59], where the New Zealand Court of Appeal held irrelevant and inadmissible the interpretation of a voice recording by a police officer following repeated listenings, some involving technical enhancement. Where the witness has an advantage over the jury, the evidence will not be irrelevant: Miller v R [2015] NSWCCA 206 at [109]– [113]. 106. Kirby J’s approach applied by Simpson J in R v Drollett [2005] NSWCCA 356 in holding testimony of identification from a video record relevant but inadmissible opinion evidence. See generally Edmond, Biber, Kemp and Porter, ‘Law’s Looking Glass: Expert Identification Evidence Derived from Photographic and Video Images’ (2009) 20 Current Issues Crim Just 337 and further at 7.41 and 7.56. 107. Heydon JA in R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506; [2001] NSWCCA 223 at [111]–[112] uses this same terminology. Compare with the notion of ‘significant probative value’ demanded in ss 97 and 98 of the uniform legislation and which the majority in IMM v R (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 held was not present when the relevant tendency evidence came from the complainant and could not add anything to the determination of whether her testimony, upon which the crimes alleged turned, should be accepted. 108. (2007) 235 CLR 521. 109. However, they were prepared to hold evidence relevant and admissible when the accused was asked to walk and speak certain phrases allegedly spoken during the robbery. Kirby J (particularly at [101]–[103]) regarded all the evidence relevant, as it was open to the jury to draw similarities between the accused and the offender, but held it inadmissible under s 137 as unfairly prejudicial, it being likely the jury

would give the evidence more weight than it deserved. Heydon J (Crennan J agreeing), particularly at [177], [181], [184], regarded all the evidence relevant as items of circumstantial evidence capable of demonstrating the accused’s similarity (or dissimilarity) with the culprit, but, with one minor exception, found no ‘prejudice over and above the damage to his position caused by the probative value of the evidence’: at [185]. See also Lindsay, Wallbridge and Drennan, ‘Do the Clothes Make the Man? An Exploration of the Effect of Lineup Attire on Eyewitness Identification Accuracy’ (1987) 19 Can J Behav Sci 463; Loftus, ‘Planting Misinformation in the Human Mind: A 30-year Investigation of the Malleability of Memory’ (2005) 12 Learning & Memory 361. 110. (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [31] (Gleeson CJ and Hayne J), [52]–[59] (Gaudron and Kirby JJ). 111. At [81]. 112. Query whether evidence is relevant to the existence of a fact in issue where tendered simply to prevent jury speculation about its existence: see Odgers, n 4 above, at [EA.55.570], referring to R v RTB [2002] NSWCCA 104 at [24]. It is not uncommon for a prosecutor to call expert evidence to explain the lack of DNA evidence: Durani v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 172 at [162]; R v Drummond (No 2) [2015] SASCFC 82 at [21]. 113. Montrose, ‘Basic Concepts of the Law of Evidence’ (1954) 70 LQR 527. Some older judicial recognition of the need to distinguish ‘relevance’ and ‘admissibility’ is found in the judgment of Lord Simon in DPP v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 at 756. 114. Although in Smith v R a majority of the High Court took a somewhat restricted approach to the notion of ‘relevance’. 115. This issue is explored in detail in relation to DNA evidence in Lynch et al, Truth Machine: The Contentious History of DNA Fingerprinting, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2008, Ch 4. 116. A commonly recurring example illustrating these difficulties arises in prosecutions for supplying drugs, where questions arise over the relevance and admissibility of ‘large’ sums of cash found on or near the accused: R v Campbell and Greig (1999) 109 A Crim R 174 (CCA (Vic)); R v Nguyen [2002] NSWCCA 403. See also Dennis, The Law of Evidence, 5th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2013, [3.018]–[3.020]. Another example is the use of post-offence conduct; consider: R v Seivers [2004] NSWCCA 462 and R v Baden-Clay (2016) 334 ALR 234; [2016] HCA 35. 117. For criminal cases, see generally Pattenden, Judicial Discretion and Criminal Litigation, 2nd ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990; Edmond, ‘Specialised Knowledge, the Exclusionary Discretions and Reliability: Reassessing Incriminating Expert Opinion Evidence’ (2008) 31 UNSW LJ 1 at 7–23. 118. Consider Judges Bridoye and Bridlegoose in Rabelais’s sixteenth century satire, Gargantua and Pantagruel. 119. House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504–5. Applied in, for example, R v Edelsten (1990) 21 NSWLR 542 at 552; R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159 at 185 (Brennan CJ). See also at 8.159 n 540. On appeal there is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of an exercise of discretion: see R v Lisoff [1999] NSWCCA 364 at [48], referring to R v Alexandroaia (1995) 81 A Crim R 286 at 290; and Collaroy Beach Club Ltd v Haywood [2007] NSWCA 21 at [48]–[49]. 120. DPP v Marijancevic (2011) 33 VR 440; [2011] VSCA 355 at [13]–[14] (Warren CJ, Buchanan and Redlich JJA) (interlocutory appeal from s 138 ruling); R v XY (2013) 84 NSWLR 363; [2013] NSWCCA 121 at [140] (Simpson J) (interlocutory appeal from rulings under ss 90 and 137); Bray v R [2014] VSCA 276 at [61]ff (Santamaria JA, Maxwell CJ and Weinberg JA agreeing) (interlocutory appeal from s 137 ruling). 121. Vickers v R (2006) 160 A Crim R 195; [2006] NSWCCA 60 at [76] (Simpson J); R v SJRC [2007] NSWCCA 142 at [34]; Taleb v R [2015] NSWCCA 105 at [84] (quoting Simpson J in Vickers with approval).

122. DPP v DJC (2012) 36 VR 33; [2012] VSCA 132; McCartney v R (2012) 38 VR 1; [2012] VSCA 268 at [31]–[51] (Maxwell CJ, Neave and Coghlan JJA) (following extensive considerations of authorities held that on appeal from conviction where facts are not in dispute House did not apply and the court must determine whether s 137 should be applied). 123. Sections giving power to ‘order’ have also been held to be governed by s 192: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Aust Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 157 FCR 310; [2007] FCA 121 at [7]–[8] (Jacobsen J). 124. For a full list of the many sections which so provide, see Williams, Anderson, Marychurch and Roy, n 4 above, [192.8]–[192.9]. 125. In substance, rather than in form, R v Parkes [2003] NSWCCA 12 at 87 (Ipp JA). 126. (2001) 202 CLR 115 at [41], [47]. 127. [2001] NSWSC 174 at [21]–[23] (McClellan J); R v El-Kheir [2004] NSWCCA 461 at [63] (Tobias JA); DPP v Finnegan [2011] TASCCA 3 at [49]–[50]. 128. Police v Dunstall (2015) 256 CLR 403; [2015] HCA 26. The discretions are based, respectively, on the decisions in R v Christie [1914] AC 545; R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133; Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54. 129. See, for example, MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 519–20 (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J), 532 (Mason J); Cleland v R (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 19 (Deane J) and the authorities there cited. 130. For s 56(1) presumes the admissibility of relevant evidence unless an exception (under the legislation) can be invoked. For express authority on onus under s 137, see Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 at 364 (Hunt CJ at CL); R v Polkinghorne [1999] NSWSC 704 at [51] (Levine J); Gilmore v EPA; Tableland Topdressing v EPA [2002] NSWCCA 399 at [46] (Santow JA). Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), at [16.9] suggests the words of ss 135 and 137 are literally wide enough to require the judge to exclude on his or her own motion. In FDP v R [2008] NSWCCA 317, the court rejected the argument that, in the absence of objection, the failure of the judge to consider exclusion under s 137 was a ground for appeal. See also Perish v R [2016] NSWCCA 89 at [261]–[273] (Bathurst CJ, Hoeben CJ at CL and Bellew J). 131. R v Haughbro (1997) 142 FLR 415 at 428 (Miles CJ); R v Eade [2000] NSWCCA 369 at [60] (Priestley JA); DPP v Farr (2001) 118 A Crim R 299; [2001] NSWSC 3 at [75] (Smart AJ); Parker v ComptrollerGeneral of Customs (2009) 83 ALJR 494 at [28] (French CJ); DPP v Tamcelik (2012) 224 A Crim R 350 at [107]–[118] (Garling J) emphasising that once illegality established prosecutor must actively seek exclusion under s 138. 132. (2015) 256 CLR 403; [2015] HCA 26. 133. Cf R v Stephenson [1976] VR 376 at 380–1. But enacted as a discretion in s 34KD of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) where a witness’s prior statement made admissible under the Act would cause ‘an undue waste of time’. 134. See, for example, Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Products Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 76 FCR 151; [2000] FCA 876 at [21] (Burchett J). Another example is where a party wishes to refer to ‘similar facts’ in civil cases. These may be relevant, but marginally so, and thus to inquire into them would be wasteful and distracting: for example, Jacara Pty Ltd v Auto-Bake Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 417 at [19] (Sundberg J); and see 3.158. Another example, normally regarded as illustrative of a definitive rule but which arguably is better regarded as a matter of this discretion, is where a party seeks to contradict the answer given by a witness in cross-examination to a question which goes only to the witness’s credit and is otherwise collateral to the matters in issue. To pursue such matters is costly and ultimately a distraction from the principal issues to be decided: see 7.139–7.141.

135. Because the disutility of convicting an innocent accused is so weighty that the reception of all relevant evidence is demanded. See, for example, R v Beattie (1996) 40 NSWLR 155 at 162–3 (CCA); R v Crisologo (1998) 99 A Crim R 178 at 190; R v Taylor [2003] NSWCCA 194 at [127]–[130] (Bell J); R v Cakovski (2004) 149 A Crim R 1; [2004] NSWCCA 280 at [72] (Hidden J); Dupas v R (2012) 218 A Crim R 507; [2012] VSCA 328; Audsley v R [2014] VSCA 321 at [46] (Maxwell P, Weinberg and Priest JJA). In contrast, English courts have, on this ground, excluded defence evidence that police witnesses have previously fabricated evidence: see Pattenden, ‘Evidence of Previous Malpractice by Police Witnesses and R v Edwards’ [1992] Crim LR 549; and 3.140. See also Choo, ‘The Notion of Relevance and Defence Evidence’ [1993] Crim LR 114. Other examples of apparently relevant defence evidence being excluded include R v Smith [1987] VR 907 (appeal unsuccessful: Smith v R (1990) 64 ALJR 588); and R v Smith (2000) 116 A Crim R 1 at [69]–[70] (defence expert evidence on the dangers of identification evidence); R v Madigan [2005] NSWCCA 170 (defence expert evidence on appropriate methodology for voice identification evidence; cf discussion at 7.56); Burrell v R [2007] NSWCCA 65 at [186]–[191] (McClellan CJ at CL). 136. See R v Murch and Logan (2014) 119 SASR 427; [2014] SASCFC 61 at [33]–[39], where the authorities are discussed. And see further the discussion at 3.79. 137. See Selway, ‘Principle, Public Policy and Fairness: Exclusion of Evidence on Discretionary Grounds’ (2002) 23 Adel LR 1. On the influence of the notion of fair trial more generally, see Spigelman, ‘The Truth Can Cost Too Much: The Principle of a Fair Trial’ (2004) 78 Aust LJ 29. Notions of fair trial may also receive emphasis on appeal in determining whether there has been a miscarriage of justice: see, for example, R v IAS (2004) 89 SASR 159; [2004] SASC 240. 138. Delay: Jago v District Court of NSW (1989) 168 CLR 23 (no right to speedy criminal trial but delay may produce unfairness); Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378; [1993] HCA 77 (stay upheld where delay in bringing misconduct proceedings against a medical practitioner); Battistatos v RTA (NSW) (2006) 226 CLR 256 (stay granted where delay in bringing civil proceeding); Loss/Destruction of evidence: R v Edwards (2009) 255 ALR 399; [2009] HCA 20; Police v Sherlock (2009) 103 SASR 147; [2009] SASC 64; Aydin v R (2010) 28 VR 588; [2010] VSCA 190; El Bayeh v R (2011) 31 VR 305; [2011] VSCA 44 (stays refused); Disclosure: R v Gittany (No 3) (2013) 238 A Crim R 149; [2013] NSWSC 1670 at [20] (McCallum J, ‘The Crown’s duty of disclosure probably takes its place among the fundamental elements of the accusatorial system of criminal justice …’); Adverse publicity: R v Glennon (1994) 179 CLR 1; R v Dupas (No 3) (2009) 28 VR 380; [2009] VSCA 202 (stays refused); Legal representation: Dietrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292 (stay granted to ensure legal representation of indigent accused); R v Chaouk; AG (Vic) (2013) 40 VR 356; [2013] VSCA 99 (common law stay to ensure further legal representation refused); MK v Victorian Legal Aid (2013) 40 VR 378; [2013] VSC 49 (common law stay to ensure more effective legal representation granted); Prosecution use of incriminating evidence of accused obtained during compulsory examination: Lee v R (2014) 253 CLR 455; [2014] HCA 20 at [46] (circumstances justified a stay); R v Seller; R v McCarthy (No 3) [2014] NSWSC 1290 at [50]–[63] (stay justified where prosecution sought to tender expert evidence based on incriminating testimony of accused compelled for purpose of ACC inquiry); A v Maughan [2016] WASCA 128 (no abuse of process as legislation permitted prosecution access to compulsory examination); Poor health of accused: R v Jacobi (2012) 114 SASR 227; [2012] SASCFC 115 (stay refused). 139. Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509 (purpose of civil action to secure reinstatement or favourable settlement an abuse of process); Moti v R (2011) 245 CLR 456; [2011] HCA 50 (stay granted where Australian government involved in illegal deportation of accused from the Solomon Islands). 140. (2011) 245 CLR 456; [2011] HCA 50 at [11]. 141. (2015) 256 CLR 403; [2015] HCA 26 at [48]. 142. Cf Ridgeway v R (1995) 184 CLR 19 (not an abuse of process to proceed where element of crime

constituted by police illegality, but discretion to exclude evidence relating to that element applied to demand stay). 143. (2014) 253 CLR 455; [2014] HCA 20. 144. See McDermott v R (1948) 76 CLR 501 at 512; R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133 at 150–1; Driscoll v R (1977) 137 CLR 517 at 541 (Gibbs J); Cleland v R (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 18 (Deane J), 30 (Dawson J); R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159. The application of the fairness discretion as it specifically applies to confessional evidence is also discussed at 8.134–8.142. 145. See, for example, R v Edelsten (1990) 21 NSWLR 542 at 554; (1990) 51 A Crim R 397 at 408; Pearsall v R (1990) 49 A Crim R 439 at 442–3 (NSWCCA); Rozenes v Beljajev [1995] 1 VR 533 at 549; Police (SA) v Jervis (1998) 70 SASR 429 at 441–3 (Doyle CJ); 101 A Crim R 1 at 14; R v Schuurs [1999] QSC 176 at [27] (Fryberg J); R v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24 at [77], [89] (Martin J for CCA as part of a comprehensive discussion of the authorities at [59]–[86]); Police v Hall (2006) 95 SASR 482; [2006] SASC 281; Haddara v R (2014) 43 VR 53; [2013] VSCA 100 (Redlich and Weinberg JJ again following a comprehensive consideration of the authorities). A general power to exclude evidence where it would be unfair to admit it against an accused is enacted in s 130 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld). Discussed but not applied in R v CBL and BCT [2014] 2 Qd R 331; [2014] QCA 93 at [52]–[54], distinguishing from public policy discretion and emphasising reliability. Mulligan J suggests there may also be a common law discretion to exclude on grounds of ‘procedural unfairness’ in a civil case but says it is enlivened by ‘the extent to which admitting the evidence will complicate and prolong the trial’: The Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Pilmer (1994) 63 SASR 364 at 378. 146. See text at nn 11, 81 above and Haddara v R (2014) 43 VR 53; [2013] VSCA 100 at [14]ff, particularly at [56]–[72] (Redlich and Weinberg JJA). ‘Haddara principles’ approved but not applied in Jonny Luna (a Pseudonym) v R [2016] VSCA 10 at [43] (Redlich, Priest and Beach JJA) and referred to with apparent approval in Jesse Willis v R [2016] VSCA 176 at [44] n 1 (Weinberg and Beach JJA). 147. [1914] AC 545 at 599. At 599 Moulton LJ expressly explains that the discretion ‘is based on an anxiety to secure for every one a fair trial’. See also Driscoll v R (1977) 137 CLR 517 at 541, where Gibbs J describes the Christie discretion as ‘a discretion to exclude evidence if the strict rules of admissibility would operate unfairly against the accused’. 148. Evidence, ALRC Interim Report 26 (1985), vol 1, at [644]. See R v Duke (1979) 22 SASR 46 at 47–8 (King CJ); R v Morris (1995) 78 A Crim R 465 at 469 (CA (Qld)); Papakosmas v R (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [91]–[92] (McHugh J); Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593 at [22] (Gleeson CJ), [51] (McHugh J); Ainsworth v Burden [2005] NSWCA 174 at [99] (Hunt AJA). Consider some of the concerns about DNA evidence in R v Tran (1990) 50 A Crim R 233 at 242 (McInerney J); R v Lucas [1992] 2 VR 109 (Hampel J); R v Pantoja (1996) 88 A Crim R 554 (Hunt CJ at CL). Interestingly, not extended to forensic science and medicine evidence with inferior scientific provenance. 149. For example, by the majority in Police v Dunstall (2015) 322 ALR 440; [2015] HCA 26. 150. In R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159, while Brennan CJ merely treats it as a separate discretion at [29]–[30], the majority (Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ) at [54], [64] recognise the overlap between the ‘fairness’ of confessions and ‘more prejudicial than probative’ discretions so far as each is concerned with rectitude. In R v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24 at [86], [89], Martin J regards Christie as an example of the application of the general unfairness discretion. 151. Forbes, ‘Extent of the Judicial Discretion to Reject Prejudicial Evidence in Civil Cases’ (1988) 62 Aust LJ 211 at 215. Although applied in a civil case by Carter J in Taylor v Harvey [1986] 2 Qd R 137, this use of the discretion at common law was rejected by Sholl J in Manenti v Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board [1954] VLR 115, followed by the Full Court in David Symes & Co Ltd v Mather [1977] VR 516, and by Mulligan J in The Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Pilmer (1994) 63 SASR 364 at 378–9 (although he thought there may be a discretion to prevent procedural unfairness), and, after an extensive

review of authority, by Kirby P in Polycarpou v Australian Wire Industries Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 49 at 60–7. Its existence was regarded as ‘highly doubtful’ by McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ in CDJ v VAJ (No 1) (1998) 197 CLR 172 at [142] n 106, a dictum quoted authoritatively by Douglas J in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Managed Investments Pty Ltd (No 7) [2015] 2 Qd R 32 at [21]–[25]. For further discussion of this question, see 3.158. 152. While the same argument might be applied to doubt the applicability of the Christie discretion to judges sitting alone in criminal cases, the high standard of proof in a criminal case provides a strong reason for judges sitting alone to consider separately whether to exclude evidence which has the potential to undermine this standard. 153. See, for example, R v Little [2008] NSWDC 311. Empirical American research suggests that judges sitting alone are vulnerable to influence from inadmissible evidence: Wistrich, Guthrie and Rachlinski, ‘Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding’ (2004–5) 153 U Penn LR 1251. For arguments in favour of a uniform evidentiary regime for jury and jury-less trials, see Schauer, ‘On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law’ (2006) 155 U Penn LR 165; Damaska, ‘The Jury and the Law of Evidence: Real and Imagined Interconnections’ (2006) 5 Law, Prob & Risk 255. 154. R v Tugaga (1994) 74 A Crim R 190 (CCA (NSW)); Rozenes v Beljajev [1995] 1 VR 533; R v Lisoff [1999] NSWCCA 364 at [49], [60] (mere complexity of DNA evidence insufficient reason for exercise of the discretion under s 137 of the uniform legislation); R v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317 at [39] (highly probative DNA evidence permitted in terms of odds despite some ‘prejudicial overlay’): cf R v Humphrey (1999) 72 SASR 558 (DNA evidence excluded as insufficient evidential basis laid). 155. Although often judges come close to excluding evidence on grounds of unreliability where witnesses testify following hypnosis; for example, R v Horsfall (1989) 51 SASR 489 (cf refusal to exercise discretion in R v Roughley, Marshall and Heywood (1995) 78 A Crim R 160). See further 7.110ff. Identification evidence may sometimes be excluded on grounds of unreliability, for example dock identifications, but generally directions are regarded as sufficient to ensure that juries assess accurately the probative value of identification evidence: see, for example, Dupas v R (2012) 40 VR 182; [2012] VSCA 328 at [229]ff. Identification evidence is discussed at 4.54ff. 156. See, for example, R v Kallis [1994] 2 Qd R 88; R v Madigan [2005] NSWCCA 170 at [73], [83]; R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; [2006] NSWCCA 167 at [157]. 157. Courts recognise that in considering exercise of the discretion the mitigating effects of a direction to the jury should be taken into account: R v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 at 365 (Hunt CJ at CL); R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 at 139–40 (Hunt CJ at CL); Papakosmas v R (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [94] (McHugh J); R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 at [167]; Dupas v R (2012) 40 VR 182; [2012] VSCA 328 at [141]–[142]. The empirical validity of this mitigating effect may be questioned but the whole efficacy of the common law jury trial depends upon assuming the effectiveness of jury directions: see 2.12–2.13 particularly at nn 51–53 above. 158. [1964] NSWR 1489; R v Barton [2006] NSWSC 1494 (Buddin J); but cf R v Green (1939) 61 CLR 167; R v Bowhay (No 3) [1998] NSWSC 660 (Dunford J); and R v Zammit (1999) 107 A Crim R 489; [1999] NSWCCA 65 at [153]–[158] (Wood CJ at CL: judge’s direction sufficient to maintain proper balance); see also R v Gibson [2002] NSWCCA 401 at [69]–[74] (Sully J); R v Bunting (2004) 92 SASR 146; [2004] SASC 235 at [665]. Empirical studies suggest that mock jurors are more likely to ‘convict’ when shown gruesome images of crimes: Bright and Goodman-Delahunty, ‘Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger, Blame, and Jury Decision-Making’ (2006) Law & Hum Behav 283; Douglas, Lyon and Ogloff, ‘The Impact of Graphic Photographic Evidence on Mock Juror Decisions in a Murder Trial: Probative or Prejudicial’ (1997) 21 Law & Hum Behav 485; Whalen and Blanchard, ‘Effects of Photographic Evidence on Mock Juror Judgment (1982) 12 J App Soc Psych 30; Bandes and Blumenthal,

‘Emotion and the Law’ (2012) 8 Annual Rev Law & Soc Sci 161. 159. (1985) 159 CLR 45; and see 3.114. 160. (2000) 113 A Crim R 429 (CCA (Qld)). 161. Jamal v R (2012) 223 A Crim R 585; [2012] NSWCCA 198. 162. (1977) 137 CLR 517. 163. R v Cook [2004] NSWCCA 52 at [20]–[49] (Simpson J); Hannes v DPP (Cth) (No 2) [2006] NSWCCA 373 at [309]–[320]. 164. This is one reason for excluding police testimony of unsigned confessions: Driscoll v R (1977) 137 CLR 517. Arguably the identification testimony in Smith v R (2001) 206 CLR 650; [2001] HCA 50 (discussed at 2.23) would have been most appropriately excluded upon this basis if not excluded as inadmissible opinion evidence under s 76. Courts have been less willing latterly to exclude testimony of identification or similarity from other ad hoc prosecution experts: see, for example, R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; Li v R (2003) 139 A Crim R 281; R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; [2006] NSWCCA 167; Murdoch v R (2007) 167 A Crim R 329; [2007] NTCCA 1. See generally Edmond and San Roque, ‘Quasi Justice: Ad Hoc Expertise and Identification Evidence’ (2009) 33 Crim LJ 8 and at 7.56. 165. In Tuite v R [2015] VSCA 148 at 11, the court (Maxwell CJ, Redlich and Weinberg JJA) held that before forensic evidence can be led ‘its reliability must be established to the court’s satisfaction (under s 137) …’. See Edmond, ‘Forensic Science Evidence and the Conditions for Rational (Jury) Evaluation’ (2015) 39 Melb ULR 77. 166. Klewer v Walton [2003] NSWCA 308 at [27] (Hodgson JA); Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 8) [2005] FCA 1348 at [21] (Sackville J in the course of exercising discretion in a case tried before judge alone). 167. Papakosmas v R (1999) 196 CLR 297 at 308 (Gleeson CJ and Hayne J), 311 (Gaudron and Kirby JJ), 325–8 (McHugh J). This discretion is most likely to be exercised if there is a particular difficulty in accurately assessing probative value due to the lack of opportunity to cross-examine the maker of an out-of-court assertion: Munro v R [2014] ACTCA 11 at [26] (Refshauge ACJ and Penfold J). See, for example, Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371 at 377–8 (Branson J), 382 (Finkelstein J); Roach v Page (No 11) [2003] NSWSC 907 at [35]–[39], [74](h) (Sperling J after extensive analysis); White Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (in liq) v White [2005] NSWCA 173 at [237]–[240] (Ipp JA); Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 654 (Barrett J); or because the basis for an opinion has not been laid and cannot be accurately assessed through cross-examination: Roach v Page (No 11) [2003] NSWSC 907 at [35]–[37], [74](h) (Sperling J); Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 8) [2005] FCA 1348 at [24] (Sackville J); Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S [2008] FCA 559 at [716]–[783] (Lindgren J). See generally Odgers, n 4 above, at [EA.136.60]. 168. The mandatory nature of s 137 is emphasised in R v Blick [2000] NSWCCA 61 at [19]–[20] (Sheller JA); R v GK [2001] NSWCCA 413 at [74] (Sully J); DPP v Lynch (2006) 16 Tas R 49; [2006] TASSC 89 at [18]–[19]; R v Sood [2007] NSWCCA 214 at [23]; and now in the amended heading to Pt 3.11. The mandatory expression may be of little consequence as for the purposes of appeal the application of s 137 is regarded as analogous to the exercise of a discretion and must be reviewed in accordance with the principles in House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504–5: see Vickers v R (2006) 160 A Crim R 195; [2006] NSWCCA 60 at [76] (Simpson J); R v SJRC [2007] NSWCCA 142 at [34]–[37] (James J); R v Arvidson [2008] NSWCCA 135 at [41]–[43] (Beazley JA) and cases at nn 120–122 above. 169. Cf R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159 at [64] (Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ). 170. See Evidence, ALRC Interim Report 26 (1985), vol 1, [643]–[644], [957]. Cf discussion in Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [16.1]–[16.5]. 171. R v Lockyer (1996) 89 A Crim R 457 at 460 (Hunt CJ at CL); R v Lisoff [1999] NSWCCA 364 at [52]

(Spigelman CJ, Newman and Sully JJ); R v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536 at 548 (Howie J); R v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317 at [30] (Mason P); R v Clark [2001] NSWCCA 494 at [164] (Heydon JA); R v Ambrosoli (2002) 55 NSWLR 603 at [12], [70] (Mason P); R v Chai [2002] NSWCCA 512 at [43] (Mason P, Sperling and Bergin JJ); R v Yates [2002] NSWCCA 520 at [252] (Wood CJ at CL, Hulme and Budden JJ); R v Suteski (No 4) [2002] NSWSC 218 at [42]–[44] (Kirby J); Hannes v DPP (Cth) (No 2) [2006] NSWCCA 373 at [315] (Barr and Hall JJ); Aytugrul v R (2012) 247 CLR 170; [2012] HCA 15 at [26]–[30] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ). 172. (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 at [39]. 173. Cf remarks in Tuite v R [2015] VSCA 148 at 11, demanding the establishment of the reliability of forensic techniques before they are admissible under s 137. 174. R v Shamouil (2006) 66 NSWLR 228; R v XY (2013) 84 NSWLR 363. See also R v Burton (2013) 237 A Crim R 238; [2013] NSWCCA 335 at [157]ff (Simpson J); Saoud v R (2014) 87 NSWLR 481; [2014] NSWCCA 136 (Basten JA, Fullerton and RA Hume JJ agreeing) at [33], ‘as explained by Campbell JA (Howie and Rothman JJ agreeing) in R v Ford (2009) 201 A Crim R 451; [2009] NSWCCA 306 at [52], a decision that evidence has “significant probative value” is, like the decision about whether the evidence has “probative value” at all, a decision about the reasoning processes that are open to a jury’. 175. KMJ v Tasmania (2011) 20 Tas R 425; [2011] TASCCA 7 at [30] (Evans J), but cf reservation at [34], [42] (Blow J). See also Tasmania v L (2013) 232 A Crim R 123; [2013] TASSC 47 at [42]–[43] (Pearce J). 176. IMM v R [2014] NTCCA 20 at [48]. 177. Victorian courts, having regard to the policy of rectitude inherent in ss 97, 98, 101 and 137, have held that while the words ‘if accepted’ require an assumption of witness credibility, courts can consider matters going to the reliability of their testimony in assessing the rational potential of probative value: Murdoch v R (2013) 40 VR 436; [2013] VSCA 272 at [84] (Priest J) and Velkoski v R (2014) 45 VR 680; [2014] VSCA 121 at [179] (Redlich, Weinberg and Coghlan JJA) extend Dupas v R (2012) 40 VR 182; [2012] VSCA 328 (decided under s 137) to interpreting ss 97 and 98. Whether the Victorian approach to s 137 significantly differs in practice to that taken in New South Wales is questioned by Basten JA in R v XY (2013) 84 NSWLR 363; [2013] NSWCCA 121 at [23]–[26], [41]–[73], particularly his conclusion at [64]. 178. That each approach appears to be substantively the same can be seen when the quote from IMM is compared with the Victorian approach as summarised by Priest and Beech JJ in Peterson (a Pseudonym) v R [2014] VSCA 111 at [51]. See also Bayley v R [2016] VSCA 160 at [53]–[55] (Warren CJ, Weinberg and Priest JJA), where this quote from IMM was applied to exclude under s 137 weak and unconvincing identification evidence based upon a Facebook entry. For commentary, see Odgers, ‘The Probative Value of Evidence after IMM v The Queen’ (2016, Winter) Bar News 38; Lancaster, ‘IMM v The Queen: A Response’ (2016, Winter) Bar News 40; Hamer, ‘The Province of Jury Factfinding and Principles of Judicial Restraint after IMM v The Queen [2016] HCA 14’ (in draft). The identification example is adapted from Heydon, ‘Is the Weight of Evidence Material to its Admissibility?’ (2014) 26 Current Issues Crim Just 219 at 234. 179. Cf judicial confidence in jury understanding directions: see n 53 above. 180. (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [91]–[93]. 181. (1998) 192 CLR 159 at [18] (Brennan CJ), [54], [78] (Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ), [126] (Kirby J). 182. (1946) 73 CLR 316. 183. In passing it might be noted that this case suggests that there are situations where a court may say that

evidence has no capacity for probative weight at all. In this sense it might be described as irrelevant, both at common law and also under the uniform legislation (if the notion of relevance is that explained in Smith): see 2.23 and French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ in IMM v R (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 at [39] ‘[evidence] so inherently incredible, fanciful or preposterous that it could not be accepted by a rational jury … would not meet the criterion of relevance’. See also at 2.18 above. 184. (1993) 113 ALR 1. 185. Cf Driscoll v R (1977) 137 CLR 517 at 541–2, where Gibbs J considered that generally unsigned records of interview should be excluded in exercise of a discretion to ensure that a strict application of the rules of admissibility did not operate unfairly against the accused. 186. Exercise was also influenced by the fact that the police had acted improperly in conducting an interview with an Aborigine without him being given the opportunity to obtain legal assistance. In McDermott v R (1948) 76 CLR 501 at 517–18, Williams J emphasised that it would have been unfair if police had tendered evidence of an interview without calling witnesses to it who testified that the accused appeared to be answering in a sarcastic tone. Here the duties of prosecutors interact with considerations of unreliability in enlivening the fairness discretion. See discussion of Palmer, ‘Police Deception: The Right to Silence and the Discretionary Exclusion of Confessions’ (1988) 22 Crim LJ 325 at 332–3. 187. (2006) 95 SASR 482; [2006] SASC 281. 188. Doyle CJ explained in Hall that unless the blood test was carried out immediately, in other than extreme cases its effectiveness in challenging the breathalyser test was very limited. 189. Evidence of blood alcohol levels has been excluded where there has been police impropriety: Parker v Police (2002) 81 SASR 240; [2002] SASC 30 (Mulligan J); Robin v Police (2002) 81 SASR 253; [2002] SASC 33; Burton v Police (2004) 88 SASR 152. Doyle CJ in Police v Jervis (1998) 70 SASR 429 suggests that the impropriety must be that of law enforcement officers, but in R v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24 at [2] he admitted to having expressed himself ‘more narrowly than I should’ in Jervis. But in Dunstall v R (2015) 322 ALR 440; [2015] HCA 14 at [42], the majority emphasised that any impropriety by a medical practitioner not acting as an agent for ‘the law enforcement authorities responsible for the prosecution’ could not give rise to the Bunning v Cross discretion. In Police v Fountaine (1999) 74 SASR 26 at [41] (Doyle CJ), [154]–[155] (Lander J), it was held that although a notice to the defendant about a blood sample taken had been incorrectly served it resulted in no loss of opportunity to challenge the prosecution’s blood analysis, so there was no basis for discretionary exclusion. Arguably, where there has been impropriety, exclusion should be justified in exercise of the public policy discretion rather than the unfairness discretion: see 2.36. 190. (2015) 322 ALR 440; [2015] HCA 14. 191. (2000) 77 SASR 24. 192. Nor was the court willing to exercise the public policy discretion as the evidence of the plants’ nature had not been unlawfully or improperly obtained. The unlawfulness was the subsequent destruction of the plants. 193. (1998) 192 CLR 159 at [78]. 194. See McHugh J in Papakosmas v R (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [91]–[93], [97]; Ordukaya v Hicks [2000] NSWCA 180 at [38]–[41]; R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506; [2001] NSWCCA 494 at [164]; R v Suteski (2002) 56 NSWLR 182; [2002] NSWCCA 509 at [101], [126]–[127]; Roach v Page (No 11) [2003] NSWSC 907 at [74]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 216 ALR 320; [2005] NSWSC 417 at [325]–[343]; Brown v R [2006] NSWCCA 69 at [33]–[36]; Lym International Pty Ltd v Chen [2008] NSWSC 1110 at [13]–[16] (Hamilton J); Bray v R [2014] VSCA 276 (Santamaria J); IMM v R (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 at [71] (applying Papakosmas); and Odgers, n 4 above, at [EA.135.150].

195. Bray v R [2014] VSCA 276 at [71]–[102] (Santamaria JA, Maxwell CJ and Weinberg JA agreeing in a learned judgment canvassing authorities, including those in other common law jurisdictions). 196. Hannes v DPP (No 2) [2006] NSWCCA 373 at [313]. 197. Cf R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159 (secret recording of conversation with accused does not in itself invoke discretionary exclusion on any ground); Em v R (2007) 232 CLR 67; [2007] HCA 46 (secret recording where an accused is under a self-induced impression that evidence of an unrecorded conversation cannot be tendered against him does not invoke discretionary exclusion on grounds of unfairness (under s 90), but if police have induced or encouraged that impression this impropriety gives rise to possible discretionary exclusion on grounds either of unfairness or public policy). These cases are discussed further at 5.259 and 8.142. 198. R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159 at [69] (Toohey, Gummow and Gaudron JJ). 199. Brennan CJ recognises this in R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159 at [27], [28]. See further Palmer, n 186 above. This extended idea of unfairness was developed in relation to confessional evidence at a time before courts recognised a general discretion to exclude illegally and improperly obtained evidence. With the advent of this general discretion this extended notion is arguably no longer required: see 8.134–8.146. 200. In Em v R (2007) 232 CLR 67; [2007] HCA 46, Gummow and Hayne JJ take the view that once there is impropriety the appropriate approach under the uniform legislation is to apply s 138, the public policy discretion, and not s 90, the unfairness discretion. But neither Gleeson CJ and Heydon J nor Kirby J (in dissent) take this ‘categorical’ approach to the legislation. Whether these views translate to the common law is another matter. 201. Evidence, ALRC Report 38 (1987), at 90, [160]: ‘… where the confession was obtained because the accused proceeded on a false assumption’, and the examples therein at n 18. See also the discussion of Kirby J in Em v R (2007) 232 CLR 67; [2007] HCA 46 at [183]–[188]. 202. (1998) 192 CLR 159. 203. (2007) 232 CLR 67; [2007] HCA 46. 204. To this Kirby J, dissenting in Em v R (2007) 232 CLR 67; [2007] HCA 46 at [228], passionately declared: ‘Gleeson CJ and Heydon J state that “every day police officers take advantage of the ignorance or stupidity of persons whom they eventually prosecute”. Their Honours suggest that the appellant’s incorrect belief about the availability of any admissions in the May conversation at a trial was simply a species of such “ignorance or stupidity”. This approach implies that the educated and the clever enjoy a special position under the law which the ignorant and stupid do not. I could never agree with such a view’. 205. In Bellemore v Tasmania (2006) 16 Tas R 364 at [194] (Blow J), [48] (Crawford J concurring), their Honours doubted that a residual unfairness discretion continued under the uniform legislation. Slicer J (at [126]) disagreed insofar as this might suggest that the principles in Rozenes v Beljajev did not continue under the uniform legislation. Compare with views of Redlich and Weinberg JJA in Haddara v R (2014) 43 VR 53; [2014] VSCA 100 at [14]ff, particularly at [60]–[72] that the common law principle to ensure the fairness of a criminal trial is not excluded by the uniform legislation and may justify the exclusion of evidence as well as a stay of proceedings. See also 2.3 n 11 above. 206. In R v Helmhout [2001] NSWCCA 372, the trial judge did not regard it as automatically unfair to admit admissions consequent upon illegality and considered exclusion principally under s 138 so that all the surrounding circumstances could be considered. The CCA appeared to agree with this approach. 207. (2007) 232 CLR 67; [2007] HCA 46. 208. But compare with R v Sonnet (No 2) (2011) 220 A Crim R 199; [2011] VSC 551 at [38], where Lasry J

excluded the accused’s admissional testimony in a previous trial, which testimony had been held on appeal to have been productive of a miscarriage of justice as the accused had felt obliged to testify at that trial as a result of a procedural error, and it would be at odds with the Court of Appeal’s decision and ‘unfair to the accused … for the Crown to gain forensic advantage’ from the situation. 209. See cases cited in nn 138–139 above. 210. On criminal cases, see Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54; Ridgeway v R (1995) 184 CLR 19. This public policy discretion is discussed in more detail at 8.143–8.146. On civil cases, see Mazinski v Bakka (1979) 20 SASR 350 at 361, 381; Pearce v Button (1985) 8 FCR 388; The Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Pilmer (1994) 63 SASR 364 at 377–8; Polycarpou v Australian Wire Industries Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 49 at 67; Klein v Bryant [1998] ACTSC 89 (Master Connolly: applying uniform legislation to exclude a tortious video surveillance). 211. Thus, in Ridgeway v R (1995) 184 CLR 19, the court excluded evidence relating to a charge of possessing illegally imported drugs because the police had themselves instigated the illegal importation upon which the possession was based. 212. Empirical studies in the United States suggest that legal decisions tend to have limited and indirect effects on the behaviour of police and other investigators: see Spiotto, ‘Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives’ (1973) 2 J Legal Studies 243; Orfield, ‘The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers’ (1987) 54 U Chicago LR 1016; Cassell, ‘Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment’ (1996) 90 Northwestern ULR 387; Leo, ‘Miranda’s Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game’ (1996) 30 Law & Society Rev 259; Thomas, ‘Plain Talk About the Miranda Empirical Debate: A “Steady-state” Theory of Confessions’ (1996) 43 UCLA LR 933; Thomas, ‘Is Miranda a Real-world Failure?’ (1996) 43 UCLA LR 821. 213. Ridgeway v R (1995) 184 CLR 19 at 31 (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ); Nicholas v R (1998) 193 CLR 173 at [35]–[36] (Brennan CJ), [101] (McHugh J), [211]–[214] (Kirby J). This is not to say that judges never have regard to the discouragement of police malpractices in exercising their discretion: see, for example, R v Chapman (2001) 79 SASR 342; Em v R (2007) 232 CLR 67; [2007] HCA 46 at [238] (Kirby J). 214. Dennis, n 116 above, at [2.022]–[2.029], [3.042]–[3.046], sees this discretion as illustrating a concept of ‘legitimacy’ which underlies the public acceptance of verdicts. At the other extreme, Davies, ‘Exclusion of Evidence Illegally or Unlawfully Obtained’ (2002) 76 Aust LJ 170, argues that the discretion has little effect in either discouraging police illegality or in ensuring respect for the administration of justice and should be replaced by an effective process for punishing police impropriety. See also n 212 above. 215. Moti v R (2011) 245 CLR 456; [2011] HCA 50 (stay granted where Australian government involved in illegal deportation of accused from the Solomon Islands). 216. (1998) 192 CLR 159 at [69]–[70]. 217. For example, Numoo v Garner (1998) 7 NTLR 129; Police v Jervis (1998) 70 SASR 429; R v Suckling [1999] NSWCCA 36 at [40] (contrasting ‘community standards’ with ‘populist public opinion’). See also Martinez, ‘Confessions and Admissions to Undercover Agents’ (2000) 74 Aust LJ 391. 218. (2000) 77 SASR 24 (Martin J, with Doyle CJ and Bleby J agreeing). Lobban was endorsed in Police v Hall (2006) 95 SASR 482; [2006] SASC 281. 219. R v Haughbro (1997) 142 FLR 415 at 428 (Miles CJ); DPP v Farr (2001) 118 A Crim R 299; [2001] NSWSC 3 at [75] (Smart JA). The same approach is enacted in ss 154, 155 of the Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA). 220. Question of Law Reserved (No 1 of 1998) (1998) 70 SASR 281 at 287–8 (Doyle CJ); R v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24; [2000] SASC at [39]–[41] (Martin J); R v Healy [2016] QCA 334 at [38]–[39] (Gotterson JA).

A more liberal approach to causation is suggested in Robinett v Police (2000) 78 SASR 85 at 101 (Bleby J) (criticised by Grant (2001) 25 Crim LJ 97, but followed by Smart AJ in DPP v Carr [2002] NSWSC 194 at [50]–[72]). In R v Haddad (2000) 116 A Crim R 312; [2000] NSWCCA 351 at [69]–[76], Spigelman CJ, disapproving of Martin J’s comments in Lobban at [39], suggests the words ‘obtained in contravention’ in s 138 may ‘encompass the entirety of an integrated scheme … designed to protect fundamental freedoms’ and thus encompass impropriety following the obtaining of evidence; but cf narrower approach in R v Dalley (2002) 132 A Crim R 169; [2002] NSWCCA 284 at [86]; Tasmania v Crane [2004] TASSC 80 at [21] (Blow J). Doyle CJ in Police v Hall (2006) 95 SASR 482; [2006] SASC 281 at [39]–[45], expressly modified his narrow position in Lobban and followed Chernov JA in DPP v Moore (2003) 6 VR 430 at [55] in agreeing that impropriety after the obtaining of evidence may be so closely related as to give rise to this discretion (for example, improper failure to provide defendant with blood-test kit following taking of breathalyser test). See also DPP v Riley (2007) 16 VR 519; Martine v R [2015] ACTCA 38 at [63]–[68]; Heyward v Bishop [2015] ACTCA 58 at [75]–[76], though contrast Application of Lee (2009) 212 A Crim R 442; [2009] ACTSC 98 at [26]–[31]. 221. Ridgeway v R (1995) 184 CLR 19 at 36–7 (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ); DPP v Carr [2002] NSWSC 194 at [19]–[38] (Smart AJ); Robinson v Woolworths Ltd (2005) 64 NSWLR 612; [2005] NSWCCA 426 at [22]–[23] (Basten JA). Mere lies have been held not to constitute impropriety: Beckett v R [2014] NSWCCA 305 at [66]–[70]. It seems that secret photographing or tape recording is not in itself improper: see, for example, R v Sahin (2000) 115 A Crim R 413 (CCA (Vic)); R v Franklin (2001) 119 A Crim R 223 (CCA (Vic)); R v Sotheren [2001] NSWSC 204 at [36] (Dowd J); R v Vale (2001) 120 A Crim R 322 (CCA (WA)). Nor is secretly recording a suspect knowing he or she is under a selfinduced misapprehension that an unrecorded conversation cannot be admitted against him or her: Em v R (2007) 232 CLR 67; [2007] HCA 46; or the creation of ‘criminal’ gangs and false scenarios to encourage prospective members to admit their previous crimes: Tofilau v R (2007) 231 CLR 396; [2007] HCA 39; R v Cowan [2016] 1 Qd R 433; [2015] QCA 87. 222. Employment Advocate v Williamson (2001) 111 FCR 20 at [81] (Branson J); R v Edwin (No 2) (2013) 227 FLR 14; [2013] ACTSC 84 at [23]–[24] (Burns J). 223. Em v R (2007) 232 CLR 67; [2007] HCA 46, where the court held that a suspect’s belief that an unrecorded conversation with police was inadmissible was entirely self-induced and not actively reinforced by police until after relevant admissions had been made. 224. The breadth of ‘impropriety’ as opposed to ‘contravention’ is adverted to by French CJ in Parker v Comptroller-General of Customs (2009) 252 ALR 619; [2009] HCA 7 at [29]–[30]. Compare with AG (Tas) v Wright (2013) 22 Tas R 322; [2013] TASCCA 14, where in answer to a specific question it was held that failure to comply with recommended identification procedures in a police manual was not ‘a breach of Australian law’ for the purposes of s 138 as the text specified with particularity (by enclosed boxes) what were orders obliging obeyance. See also Gans et al, Criminal Process and Human Rights, Federation Press, Sydney, 2011. 225. But as with other provisions in the uniform legislation enacting common law rules (for example, s 101) the legislation makes no reference to underlying policy and courts may give the words a more ‘literal’ interpretation. 226. (1978) 141 CLR 54; (1995) 184 CLR 19 respectively: discussed at 5.256–5.260. As a consequence, judges commonly use common law authorities as a guide to determining whether to admit unlawfully obtained evidence under s 138: see, for example, R v Mokbel (2012) 222 A Crim R 377; [2012] VSC 86 at [313]ff (Whelan J). 227. Whether there has been deliberate disregard for the law is a primary consideration: Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54 at 77–8 (Stephen and Aickin JJ); Parker v Comptroller-General of Customs [2007] NSWCCA 348 at [59]; DPP v Marijancevic (2011) 33 VR 440; [2011] VSCA 355 at [91] (Warren CJ,

Buchanan and Redlich JJA); Gallagher v R [2015] NSWCCA 228 at [50]–[52]. But not necessarily determinative: Evidence, ALRC Interim Report 26 (1985), vol 1, [964]. Where the activity of police officers is unlawful but they are unaware of the unlawfulness, because they falsely believe their authority is valid under the appropriate legislation — such as the Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act 1997 (NSW) — courts tend to take a sympathetic approach: Dowe v R [2009] NSWCCA 23; Gedeon v R (2013) 280 FLR 275; [2013] NSWCCA 257. See also Herring v US 555 US (2009); R v Grant [2009] SCC 32. 228. For example, to protect against unlawful questioning and unauthorised search by police: see, for example, Tasmania v Hall (2013) 238 A Crim R 42; [2013] TASSC 75; R v Versac (2013) 227 A Crim R 569; [2013] QSC 46; R v Nguyen (2013) 117 SASR 432; [2013] SASCFC 91 at [41]; R v Pohl (2014) 244 A Crim R 56; [2014] QSC 173; R v Rockford (2015) 122 SASR 391; [2015] SASCFC 51 at [41] (Stanley J); Knowles v R [2015] VSCA 141 at [71]–[76] (Ashley, Redlich and Priest JJA, unlawful VARE interview). 229. Although the Act does not mention fairness (in this sense) as a separate consideration under s 138(3), the following cases suggest its strong relevance: DPP v Farr (2001) 118 A Crim R 299; [2001] NSWSC 3 at [86] (Smart AJ); R v Dungay [2001] NSWCCA 443 at [31]–[51] (Ipp AJA); R v Helmhout [2001] NSWCCA 372 at [11], [12] (Ipp AJA); R v Phuong [2001] NSWSC 115 at [48]–[50], [59] (Wood CJ at CL); DPP v MD (2010) 29 VR 434; [2010] VSCA 233 at [33]–[44] (Maxwell P, Nettle and Harper JJA); Haddara v R (2014) 43 VR 53; [2013] VSCA 100 at [165]–[170] (Priest JA); Dickman v R [2015] VSCA 311 at [124]–[128] (Priest JA and Croucher JJA). 230. The document commencing proceedings need not formally allege all material facts but it must give sufficient particulars so that the accused can identify the incident alleged to constitute the crime and thereby adequately prepare a defence: Lafite v Samuels [1972] SASR 1. (This sometimes creates problems in the case of sexual crimes committed against (particularly) children over a long period: see, for example, S v R (1989) 168 CLR 226. Legislation making it an offence to maintain a sexual relationship seeks to overcome this problem: referred to in Chapter 3, n 93.) If in opening counsel fails to indicate how all necessary material facts are to be proved, the defence might informally object on grounds of sufficiency at that point but, if the prosecution insists on proceeding, a formal objection of no case to answer cannot be made until after the prosecution has presented its case: see further 6.30. It may be necessary to direct the jury to be agreed beyond reasonable doubt of particular material facts alleged: see, for example, Ardrey v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 154; discussed as the ‘unanimity rule’ in R v McCarthy (2015) 124 SASR 190 and R v Hamra [2016] SASCFC 130 at [32]–[50] (Kourakis CJ), [100]– [105] (Peek J). 231. R v Sims [1946] KB 531 at 539 (Lord Goddard CJ). 232. Court rules in each jurisdiction embody these requirements. See generally Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure, 10th ed, Law Book Co, Sydney, 2014, Chs 6–7. 233. Where evidence has two uses, one admissible and the other not, this must at least be subject to direction to any jury and may lead to exclusion of the evidence if its inadmissible purpose is more prejudicial (‘unfairly prejudicial’) than the probative value of the admissible purpose (the Christie discretion: cf Uniform Acts s 136). 234. See, for example, Sinclair v R (1946) 73 CLR 316; R v Little (1976) 14 SASR 556; MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512; Uniform Acts s 189. 235. Under the uniform legislation, the matters listed in s 192 must be taken into account: see further 2.26. 236. R v Frugtniet [1999] VSCA 58 at [2]–[10]; or during trial to allow evidential points to be reserved or appealed to a higher court: R v Elliott (1996) 185 CLR 250; R v Kola [2001] SASC 448. 237. MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 523 (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J), 533–4 (Mason J) (in case of

confessional evidence voir dire should be held when a real question of admissibility arises: see further at 8.161); R v Rowley (1986) 23 A Crim R 371 (CCA (Vic)) (may be wider discretion to refuse voir dire in relation to identification evidence than confessional evidence); R v Lars (1994) 73 A Crim R 91 at 115–25; R v Callaghan (2001) 124 A Crim R 126 (CCA (Vic)) (court should be reluctant to call witnesses on a voir dire where they have already been cross-examined at the committal); R v Petroulias (2006) 182 A Crim R 1; [2006] NSWSC 1422 (the common law continues to apply in uniform evidence law jurisdictions in that there is no right to a voir dire and the precise procedure to be followed remains in the discretion of the court); R v Martin (2007) 99 SASR 213; [2007] SASC 336 at [17]–[22] (Gray J: no material to justify holding a voir dire). 238. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ss 130, 130A; Criminal Code (Qld) s 590AA(2)(e) (ruling binding at retrial: R v Sheehy [2005] 1 Qd R 418); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 285A; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 361A; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 199–205; Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) s 98; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 264 (objections to indictment or joint trial). This legislation does not permit the voir dire before arraignment and plea: R v P (1991) 57 A Crim R 211. The power to order advance rulings in any proceedings now given by s 192A of the uniform legislation (overruling the decision in TKWJ v R (2002) 212 CLR 124) would also appear to permit applications prior to any jury being empanelled: see further Odgers, n 4 above, at [EA.192A.60]. 239. (1977) 137 CLR 20 at 31 (followed in Kerr v R [1980] WAR 21). 240. MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 (cf Ajodha v The State [1982] AC 204 at 223). The defence may consent to or request such a course. The procedure for determining the admissibility of confessions is discussed further at 8.160ff. 241. [1980] 2 NSWLR 542 at 566–7. 242. The weight of Australian authority favours the jury’s absence: R v Harding [1989] 2 Qd R 373; R v Schlaefer (1992) 57 SASR 423; R v T (1998) 71 SASR 265 at 272; but this view is criticised in Lau v R (1991) 6 WAR 30 at 39–45 (Murray J), 57–60 (Owen J); and it is the English practice for the jury to remain: see R v Reynolds [1950] 1 KB 606 at 610–11; R v Lal Khan (1981) 73 Cr App R 190; R v Deakin [1995] 1 Cr App R 471 (voir dire examination of the witness whose competency is in question should be in the presence of the jury, but any additional expert evidence on competency should be heard in the jury’s absence). In Cook v R (2000) 22 WAR 67 at 98–9, the giving of the judge’s reasons for holding a child-witness competent in the presence of the jury where the reasons did not convey any approbation of the child’s credibility was held no basis for appeal. 243. Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542 at 566–7. 244. Re Mackenzie; Ex parte Whitelock [1971] 2 NSWLR 534 (Meares J); Casley-Smith v FS Evans and Sons Pty Ltd (No 2) (1988) 49 SASR 332; Brown v Commissioner of Taxation (2002) 119 FCR 269; [2002] FCA 318 at [90]–[95]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2004) 213 ALR 338; [2004] NSWSC 1062 at [23]–[49]; MM Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Port Stephens Council (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 243 at [49]. As the uniform legislation is silent on this issue, the last three cases accept that the common law position applies. 245. Section 192 also applies to this exercise of discretion to so ‘order’; cf Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Aust Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 157 FCR 310; [2007] FCA 121 at [7]– [8] (Jacobsen J). 246. Lawrence v R [1933] AC 699 at 708; Lipohar v R (1999) 200 CLR 485; [1999] HCA 65 at [69] (and cases court refers to in fn 134); R v Gee [2012] SASCFC 86. Legislation relating to presence includes: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ss 71, 72; Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 617 (as affected by Jury Act 1995 s 52(2): R v Crossman [2011] 2 Qd R 435; [2011] QCA 126); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 361 (presence at appeal); Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 369 (discretion to dispense with presence exercised in Tasmania v Bosworth (2005) 13 Tas SR 457); Criminal Procedure

Act 2009 (Vic) ss 329–330 (see also ss 80–87: non-appearance when charged with summary offence); (Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 (Vic) Div 3 of Pt IIA permits the appearance of an accused before the court by audio visual link in certain circumstances); Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) ss 88, 140; Criminal Code Act (NT) s 361. Under s 53(2)(a) of the uniform legislation, parties, including accused, must be given ‘a reasonable opportunity’ of attending a view; see Jamal v R (2012) 223 A Crim R 585; [2012] NSWCCA 198. 247. R v McHardie [1983] 2 NSWLR 733 at 739; Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 43–4; R v Jones (1998) 72 SASR 281 (discretion to continue without accused when absconded after arraignment properly exercised; no miscarriage of justice); R v Jones (2002) 2 Cr App R 128 at [6]; R v Collie [2005] SASC 148 at [24]–[47] (Duggan J for CCA); R v Serrano (No 5) (2007) 16 VR 360; R v Mokbel (2010) 249 FLR 169; [2010] VSCA 11 at [40]–[42] (the court); R v Gee [2012] SASCFC 86. Statutory procedures exist to deal with summary offences in the accused’s absence; for example: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 196; Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 142; Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) ss 62–62C; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) Pt 3.3 Div 10 (ss 80–87); Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) ss 55, 56. 248. Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 404. In cases of national security the procedure under the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) may have to be invoked. See further at 5.247ff. For an overview of national security law, see Williams, ‘A Decade of Australian Anti-Terror Laws’ (2011) 35 Melb ULR 1136. 249. Sharpe v ABLF (WA Branch) [1989] WAR 138 at 151 (Seaman J). 250. Trzesinski v Daire (1986) 44 SASR 43; R v Schlaefer (1992) 57 SASR 423. But cf R v Simmons (1997) 93 A Crim R 32 at 37–8 (Perry J: ‘I do not accept the proposition that in discharging his or her role the judge is confined to simply questioning the child … ordinarily [cross-examination by the accused] would not be permitted as it would be apt to put undue stress on the child’). See also R v Andrews (No 3) (2005) 92 SASR 442; [2005] SASC 298 at [11] (Debelle J). 251. R v Lyons (1889) 15 VLR 15; R v Simmons (1997) 93 A Crim R 32 at 37–8 (Perry J). 252. Trzesinski v Daire (1986) 44 SASR 43 (Prior J). Cf R v Andrews (No 3) (2005) 92 SASR 442; [2005] SASC 298 at [7]–[10], where Debelle J suggests circumstances should determine whether representation is appropriate. 253. In Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81, it was held an opponent should have the opportunity to crossexamine a witness examined on the voir dire to determine hostility. Distinguished in R v Henderson (1984) 37 SASR 82, where a witness was examined on the voir dire merely to determine the relevance of his testimony. 254. MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512. This same procedure applies to a hearing before a magistrate: Egan v Bott [1985] VR 787. See further 8.161–8.162. 255. See Re Fagan; Ex parte Hamilton [1966] 2 NSWR 732; applied in Dixon v McCarthy [1975] 1 NSWLR 617. The privilege against self-incrimination was held to apply in R v Post and Georgee [1982] Qd R 495 (and is fully preserved by s 189(6) of the uniform legislation). In R v Vuckov (1986) 40 SASR 498, the statutory protection of the accused against cross-examination on previous convictions was held to apply on the voir dire. But cf R v Nguyen [2000] 1 Qd R 559. Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81 affirms that the statutory rules concerning proof of inconsistent statements apply strictly on the voir dire. See also R v Hadlow [1992] 2 Qd R 440 (CCA (Qld)). 256. In New South Wales, it has become increasingly common in criminal proceedings to use concurrent evidence (so-called ‘hot-tubs’) in determining the admissibility of opinions based on ‘specialised knowledge’ during the voir dire. The concurrent evidence procedure is not, however, used for the presentation of expert evidence before a jury. See Edmond, ‘Merton and the Hot-tub’ (2009) 72 Law &

Contemporary Problems 159. See further 7.64. 257. For example, Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 303–4 (followed in J v R [1989] Tas R 116). See further 3.70. 258. (2006) 182 A Crim R 1; [2006] NSWSC 1422; MM Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Port Stephens Council (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 243 at [36]. See Odgers, n 4 above, at [EA.189.40]. 259. MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 519–20 (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J), 532 (Mason J). 260. In the case of an accused testifying on the voir dire there are special problems: see 8.163–8.165. 261. The consequences of failure to object are dealt with in articles by Weinberg, ‘The Consequences of Failure to Object to Inadmissible Evidence in Criminal Cases’ (1978) 11 Melb ULR 408; and Samuels, ‘Failure to Object to an Irregularity’ [1968] Crim LR 310 at 312–14. See also Harrison, ‘Hearsay Admitted Without Objection’ (1955) 7 Res Judicatae 58; Emery, ‘The Consequences of Failure to Object to Inadmissible Evidence’, unpublished thesis, University of Adelaide, 1986; Lawrence, ‘Failure to Object: The Death of Evidential Rules’ (1996–97) 15 Aust Bar Rev 137 (where the author argues that waiver, the optional enforcement of evidential rules, undermines there being any ‘rules’ of evidence at all, that waivable rules are more akin to ‘privileges’ and that only those rules incapable of waiver are truly evidential ‘rules’).

262. ‘Is not admissible’ means ‘is not admissible following objection’: Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262; [2000] NSWCA 29 at [149]; Gonzales v R (2007) 178 A Crim R 232; [2007] NSWCCA 303 at [24]–[26]. ‘Must refuse to admit evidence’ means ‘must refuse to admit evidence following objection’: FDP v R [2008] NSWCCA 317; WC v R [2015] NSWCCA 52 at [19]–[25] (Meagher JA, Simpson and Wilson JJ agreeing); Haidari v R [2015] NSWCCA 126 at [42] (Johnson J, Gleeson JA and Hall J agreeing). These words might arguably be contrasted with the stronger phrases, ‘is not to be adduced’ (ss 118–119) and ‘is not to be admitted’ in s 138. The more recently enacted s 41 in all the Uniform Acts expressly imposes a duty upon the court to refuse improper questions to a witness whether or not an objection is made, but the answer to an improper question remains admissible. Odgers, n 4 above, at [EA.Intro.350], argues that requiring objection is inconsistent with s 190. The CCA in Velkoski v R (2014) 45 VR 680; [2014] VSCA 121 at [196]–[200] was attracted to this view, though not the CCA in Perish v R (2014) 45 VR 680; [2016] NSWCCA 89 at [268]–[272]. 263. Hall v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 165 at [100]–[103] (Mazza JA, Martin CJ agreeing). 264. R v Roberts (2011) 111 SASR 100; [2011] SASCFC 117 at [39]–[44] (Sulan J). 265. Re Lilley, dec’d [1953] VLR 98 at 101 (Smith J); Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 44 (Gibbs ACJ), 58–9, 68 (Stephen J). There is some debate over whether rules of admissibility can be waived at all in criminal cases. A number of cases assert the duty of the judge to ensure adherence to the rules of admissibility in criminal cases: R v Gibson (1887) 18 QBD 537 at 542 (Lord Coleridge CJ); Stirland v DPP [1944] AC 315 at 328 (Viscount Simon LC); MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 543 (Brennan J) (the latter case may be explained on the ground that the accused in that case was unrepresented). A limited duty is asserted in Velkoski v R (2014) 45 VR 680; [2014] VSCA 121 at [218]–[221]. Later decisions in state courts suggest the rules can be waived in criminal cases where the accused is represented and where waiver is clear and consciously made with full knowledge of the consequences: R v Alexander [1975] VR 741 at 752; R v Gay [1976] VR 577 at 584–5; R v Visser [1983] 3 NSWLR 240 at 242 (Hunt J); R v Roissetter [1984] 1 Qd R 477 at 479; R v Radford (1993) 66 A Crim R 210; Steinhauser v Davies (1994) 3 Tas R 258; Velkoski v R (2014) 45 VR 680; [2014] VSCA 121 at [208]–[217]. Failure to object in a criminal case may constitute a waiver particularly where legislation requires the defence to consider and identify admissibility issues in advance of trial: R v Clark (2005) 13 VR 75; [2005] VSCA 294 at [27] (Maxwell P). Failure to object may prima facie estop taking that ground on appeal: see 2.49. 266. R v Shalala (2007) 17 VR 133 at [24]–[25]. 267. MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 543–4 (followed by Cox J in Greaves v Aikman (1994) 74 A Crim R 370). The duty of the trial judge to ensure a fair trial is emphasised in Pemble v R (1971) 124 CLR 107 at 117–18 (Barwick CJ); and Connelly v DPP [1964] AC 1254 at 1347ff (Lord Devlin). 268. Hughes v National Trustees Executors and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd (1979) 143 CLR 134 at 153 (Gibbs J). 269. Hughes, applied in Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 158. By the same token, if evidence is only relevant upon (one or more) inadmissible grounds then, if waiver is consciously and freely made, the evidence may be used at large for any relevant purpose: McLennan v Taylor (1966) 85 WN (Pt 1) NSW 525 at 528–9 (Walsh JA), 540 (Asprey JA). Cf the rule in Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630, whereby a party calling for an inadmissible document may be compelled to tender it and it is thereby received for all relevant purposes, relied upon in Robert Baxt and Associates v Cavenham Pty Ltd [2013] 1 Qd R 476 at [46] (Muir JA, Holmes JA and Martin J agreeing) to conclude that in Queensland ‘generally speaking at least, a party who fails to object to inadmissible hearsay evidence contained in a document which is admissible as original evidence will have waived its right to limit the use to which the evidence may be put’. 270. Although these rules cannot be waived, sections in this list which provide that a judge ‘must refuse to

admit evidence’ (s 137), that evidence ‘is not admissible’ (s 114), that evidence ‘is not to be adduced’ (ss 118–119) and evidence ‘is not to be admitted’ (s 138) may be read down to operate only following objection so that on appeal the judge’s failure to exclude inadmissible evidence will not in itself constitute an error leading to successful appeal unless the proviso applies. See further at 2.46. 271. Applied in Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] FCA 364. See further 6.68. 272. See, for example, Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568 (new allegation of bias could not be raised on appeal — cf Re the Marriage of Kennedy and Cahill (1995) FLC ¶92-605); Hinton v Mill (1991) 57 SASR 97 (King CJ); Trustees of Christian Brothers v Cardone (1995) 130 ALR 345; Holcombe v Coulton (1988) 17 NSWLR 71 (point, if taken at trial, could have been met). 273. See Suresh v R (1998) 102 A Crim R 18; [1998] HCA 23 at [22]–[23] (McHugh J), [54]–[58] (Kirby J), [64]–[65] (Hayne J); TKWJ v R (2002) 212 CLR 124 at [8], [16]–[17] (Gleeson CJ); Velkoski v R (2014) 45 VR 680; [2014] VSCA 121 at [201]–[207]. 274. For example, Criminal Appeal Rules 1986 (NSW) r 4 (the importance of which is emphasised in R v Tripodina & Morabito (1988) 35 A Crim R 183 at 191–5; R v Abusafiah (1991) 56 A Crim R 424 at 429– 30; R v Hines (1991) 24 NSWLR 737 at 742–4; R v Buckett (1995) 132 ALR 669 at 689–91; Papakosmos v R (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [70]–[73] (McHugh J)); R v Kanaan [2005] NSWCCA 385 at [99]–[102]; Haidari v R [2015] NSWCCA 126 at [46]–[47] (Johnson J, Gleeson JA and Hall J agreeing); RSC (NT) r 86.08. See also R v Carbone (1989) 50 SASR 495 at 497; R v Wright (1999) 3 VR 355; [1999] VSCA 145 at [2] (Phillips CJ and Charles JA) (failure to object a ‘serious obstacle’ to appeal); LBC v Western Australia [2011] WASC 201 at [10] (Martin CJ); R v Van Der Zyden [2012] 2 Qd R 568; [2012] QCA 89 at [34]–[41] (failure by counsel to seek Palmer direction a rational forensic decision and no miscarriage shown); James v R [2013] VSCA 55 at [13] (Maxwell P: ‘rational forensic judgments made by defence counsel constitute an exercise, rather than an infringement, of the accused’s right to a fair trial’); Xypolitos v R [2014] VSCA 339 at [41]–[45] (under Jury Directions Act 2013 s 15 and now 2015 s 16), failure of counsel to request direction does not require trial judge to direct unless necessary, and absence of direction not in itself ground for appeal). 275. R v Ensor [1989] 2 All ER 586; R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677; Ella v R (1991) 103 FLR 8; Fitzgerald v R (1992) 106 FLR 331; R v Oliverio (1994) 70 A Crim R 5; R v Scott (1996) 137 ALR 347 at 361–6; R v NE [2004] 2 Qd R 328; [2003] QCA 574. See also cases referred to in n 273. But the argument succeeded in: Seymour v R [2006] NSWCCA 206 at [53] (Hunt AJA); Steve v R (2008) 189 A Crim R 68; [2008] NSWCCA 231 at [81] (Beazley JA); KLM v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 73 (Martin CJ and Le Meire AJA, Pullin JA dissenting); Baulch v Lyndoch Warnambool Inc (2010) 27 VR 1; [2010] VSCA 30; R v DBB [2013] Qd R 188; [2012] QCA 96 at [55]–[58] (Muir JA, White JA and Mullins J agreeing). 276. R v Ignjatic (1993) 68 A Crim R 333; Miladinovic v R (1993) 47 FCR 190; TKWJ v R (2002) 212 CLR 124 at [23]–[34], [45] (Gaudron J), [79], [97] (McHugh J) (‘must show that there is a significant possibility that it affected the outcome of the trial’); Ali v R (2005) 214 ALR 1; [2005] HCA 8 at [18] (Hayne J), [98]–[100] (Callinan and Heydon JJ); Nudd v R (2006) 225 ALR 161; [2006] HCA 9; SAM v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 64 at [35]–[36] (Corboy J). See, for example, R v McIntyre (2000) 111 A Crim R 211 (CCA (NSW)); R v Kyriacou [2000] SASC 312; R v Carter [2003] 2 Qd R 402; Armstrong v Western Australia (2012) 220 A Crim R 274 at [57]–[62] (Buss JA, Newnes and Mazza JA agreeing); Knowles v R [2015] VSCA 141 at [127]–[161] (Ashley, Redlich and Priest JJA); Smith v R [2015] VSCA 256. 277. Mamo v Surace (2014) 86 NSWLR 275; [2014] NSWCA 58 at [75]–[82] (McColl JA referring to the importance of efficiency, cost and timely disposal emphasised in s 57(1) of the Civil Procedure Act). 278. For example, Bohdal v R (1987) 24 A Crim R 318 (the possibility that jurors heard the accused’s

previous convictions should have led to a discharge of the jury despite counsel’s refusal to insist); A Child v Andrews (1994) 12 WAR 552 (the failure to object to inadmissible hearsay evidence was no bar to the appeal court taking the erroneous admission of that evidence into account in determining that there was insufficient evidence to convict); Azarian v Western Australia (2007) 178 A Crim R 19; [2007] WASCA 249 at [20], [117] (failure to object does not bar court considering whether there has been a miscarriage of justice). In recent decades the High Court has been increasingly prepared to consider appeals concerning points not taken at trial, including Suresh v R (1998) 102 A Crim R 18; [1998] HCA 23; Crampton v R (2000) 206 CLR 161; Eastman v R (2000) 203 CLR 1; Smith v R (2001) 206 CLR 650; [2001] HCA 50; Soma v R (2003) 212 CLR 299; Fingleton v R (2005) 227 CLR 166; [2005] HCA 3. And see R v Taufahema (2007) 228 CLR 232; [2007] HCA 11, where the prosecution was permitted to advance arguments in the High Court not raised in the appellate court below. 279. (2000) 206 CLR 161, particularly at [14]–[20] (Gleeson CJ), [52], [57] (Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ), [105]–[123] (Kirby J). See also Eastman v R (2000) 203 CLR 1; Heron v R (2003) 197 ALR 81 (leave to appeal refused). 280. (1992) 175 CLR 599. 281. This discussion focuses on the nature of the submission to explain its relationship to natural rules of proof. For a full discussion of the submission, see 6.29–6.46. Insofar as the Uniform Evidence Acts contain no provisions relating to no case submissions the common law continues to apply. 282. May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654 at 658; Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1983] 2 VR 410; Tepper v Di Francesco (1984) 38 SASR 256; R v Armstrong; Ex parte King [1985] 2 Qd R 178; R v Haas (1986) 22 A Crim R 299; R v Briggs (1987) 24 A Crim R 98; Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207; R v Prosser (1993) 70 A Crim R 391; Questions of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 2 of 1993) (1993) 61 SASR 1; Morrison v Kiwi Electrix Pty Ltd (1998) 19 WAR 482. See also the discussion in Glass, ‘The Insufficiency of Evidence to Raise a Case to Answer’ (1981) 55 Aust LJ 842 at 848–50; Glass, ‘Acquittals by Direction’ (1986) 2 Aust Bar Rev 11; Thomson, ‘No Case Submissions’ (1997) 71 Aust LJ 207. See further 6.32. Note that in Wilson v Buttery [1926] SASR 150 at 154, the case to answer requirement is wrongly put in terms of ‘a substantial balance of probability’. 283. Dublin, Wicklow and Wexford Railway Co v Slattery (1878) 3 App Cas 1155; Hocking v Bell (1945) 71 CLR 430 at 443. 284. By the same token a judge may in a civil case determine the case proved, both at common law and under the Uniform Acts (ASC v AS Nominee Ltd (1995) 18 ACSR 459; Booth v Bosworth (2001) 114 FCR 39) by inferring from the opponent’s failure to call available evidence that the evidence would not have supported the opponent’s case (not the stronger inference that it would have contradicted the opponent’s case): see Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 and further at 6.43–6.45. In criminal cases, the High Court is increasingly reluctant, on account of an accused’s right to silence, embodied in s 20 of the Uniform Acts, to allow inferences to be drawn against an accused for failure to testify or otherwise tender evidence by way of defence: see Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217; RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620; Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50; 179 ALR 349; Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285; [2002] HCA 45; and see further at 5.117ff and 6.46. 285. See the perceptive discussion of Thomson, n 282 above. 286. Compare with the four grounds suggested by Perry J in Residues Treatment and Trading Co Ltd v Southern Resources Ltd (1989) 52 SASR 54 at 68. He suggests there is a stage between our grounds (2) and (3) where it is contended that the evidence, even taken at its highest, is incapable of supporting the claimant’s case. Arguably this is simply the equivalent of a ‘no evidence’ situation. 287. See Cairns, n 232 above, pp 495–506. 288. In R v Browning (1991) 103 FLR 425, a submission that the prosecutor be invited to call no evidence

was made following the prosecutor’s opening and, that being rejected, at the completion of the prosecution case a Prasad submission (see 2.55) was made. 289. R v N Ltd [2009] 1 Cr App R 3. See further 6.30. 290. Cf definition of ‘probative value’ as defined in the uniform legislation and discussed in IMM v R (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14. See further at 2.31. 291. In IMM v R (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 at [39], French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ regard such evidence as irrelevant: see further at 2.18 above. 292. Western Australia v Burke (2011) 42 WAR 125; [2011] WASCA 190 at [12]–[20] (Buss JA, Martin CJ and Mazza J agreeing). See further at 6.32, 6.33. 293. (1993) 61 SASR 1 at 5. 294. (1987) 24 A Crim R 98 at 104. 295. (1998) 103 A Crim R 312 at 319–21. King CJ’s formulation cited with approval by Penfold J in R v Potts (No 4) [2016] ACTSC 370 at [16]. 296. (1979) 23 SASR 161. See also R v Sutton [1986] 2 Qd R 72; R v Browning (1991) 103 FLR 425. The nature and existence of the ‘Prasad submission’ is endorsed by the High Court in Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207 at 214–15. 297. R v Falconer Atlee (1973) 58 Cr App R 348; R v Barker (1975) 65 Cr App R 287; R v Mansfield [1977] 1 WLR 1102. These decisions were rejected in R v Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039. 298. See, for example, R v Dam (1986) 43 SASR 422. For the argument seeking to collapse the two submissions, see Glissan, ‘Unsafe and Unsatisfactory Verdicts: The Law as to Directed Verdicts’ (1989) 63 Aust LJ 283. 299. Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 322–32 (Windeyer J). 300. See 2.12. 301. If not by experimental psychologists: Wells, ‘Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability’ (1992) 62 J Personality and Soc Psychology 739; Niedermeier, Kerr and Messé, ‘Jurors’ Use of Naked Statistical Evidence: Exploring Bases and Implications of the Wells Effect’ (1999) 76 J Personality and Soc Psychology 533. More generally, see Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2011. 302. Nor are their resources and the abilities of the lawyers representing them always equal so the evidentiary materials may be biased towards one party rather than the other; as in criminal cases, where the resources of the state are pitted against those of the individual. But also other individuals, corporations and institutions routinely involved in proceedings, or able to anticipate them (for example, pharmaceutical manufacturers), tend to have evidentiary as well as experiential and resource advantages: Galanter, ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change’ (1974) 9 Law & Society Rev 95; Kritzer and Silbey (eds), In Litigation Do the ‘Haves’ Still Come Out Ahead?, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 2003. 303. Miller v Minister of Pensions (1947) 63 TLR 474; Holloway v McFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470 at 476, 480–1; Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 304–5, 309–10, 319; Lopes v Taylor (1970) 44 ALJR 412 at 415, 418, 420; TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks (1979) 53 ALJR 267 at 269; Goodwin v Nominal Defendant (1979) 54 ALJR 84; Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 67 ALJR 170 at 170–1; G v H (1994) 181 CLR 387. The origin of the phrase is obscure, the traditional authority being a dictum of Willes J in tendering advice to the House of Lords in Cooper v Slade (1858) 6 HLC 746 at 772; 10 ER 1488 at 1499, which refers to Newis v Lark (1571) 2 Plowden 403 at 412; 75 ER 609 at 621. 304. Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 at 481–2; Thomas v R (1960) 102 CLR 584; Gilson v R (1991) 172

CLR 353. When a persuasive onus is borne by the accused it carries with it the lower civil standard: Thomas, at 602; R v Carr-Briant [1943] KB 607; see also 6.22. 305. For critical Australian discussion of the civil standard, see Hamer, ‘The Civil Standard of Proof: Uncertainty, Probability, Belief and Justice’ (1994) 16 Syd LR 506; and Hodgson, ‘The Scales of Justice: Probability and Proof in Legal Fact-Finding’ (1995) 69 Aust LJ 731. 306. Robertson and Vignaux, ‘Probability — The Logic of the Law’ (1993) 13 Ox J Legal Studies 457, emphasise that probability is not a property of facts and events in the real world (as might be suggested by always attempting to find empirical frequencies and which gives rise to what may be termed ‘The Mind Projection Fallacy’), but rather it is a measure of our (subjective) uncertainty about the world. Thus, probabilities are inherently subjective and the rules of probability are simply dictates of reason and logic which determine the relationship between beliefs. 307. It is not entirely clear what answer would be given to this question by Hodgson (see n 305 above), who argues that as a minimum, a belief supporting proof in a civil case must be greater than the belief in a coin coming up heads, but that this belief must be based on adequate evidence and not be unreasonable. This seems to argue for a mathematical conception of belief, but a mathematical conception that also takes into account the weight of evidence in a non-mathematical way. Subsequently, Hodgson in ‘A Lawyer Looks at Bayes’ Theorem’ (2002) 76 Aust LJ 109 is equally ambivalent, suggesting that Bayes should be explained to juries where DNA evidence is presented as a likelihood ratio but admitting that ultimately the question is always whether the jury is persuaded on the whole evidence. 308. [1974] AC 207 at 219. See also Denning LJ in Bater v Bater [1951] P 35 at 37–8. 309. Murphy J in TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks (1979) 53 ALJR 267; and West v Government Insurance Office of NSW (1981) 148 CLR 62; The Brimnes [1973] 1 All ER 769; [1975] QB 929; Rose v Abbey Orchard Property Investments Pty Ltd [1987] Aust Torts Reports ¶80-121. 310. See Kaye, ‘Naked Statistical Evidence’ (1980) 89 Yale LJ 601 at 605; ‘The Limits of the Preponderance of the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation’ [1982] Am Bar Found Res J 487; and ‘The Error of Equal Error Rates’ (2002) 1 Law, Prob & Risk 3, where the author applies decision theory techniques to justify in utility terms (in most cases) a standard of greater than 0.5. See also Redmayne, ‘Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation’ (1998) 62 Mod L Rev 167 at 167–74; Hamer, ‘Probabilistic Standards of Proof, Their Complements and the Errors that are Expected to Flow from Them’ [2004] UNE LJ 3. 311. Brennan and McHugh JJ appear to suggest this in G v H (1994) 68 ALJR 860 at 862; and see the comments by Hodgson, n 305 above, at 745–6. It is not accepted by the court in Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds [1985] 2 All ER 712, where the House of Lords said the civil standard was not satisfied by acceptance of the more probable of two unlikely possibilities, a position endorsed in Jackson v Lithgow City Council [2008] NSWCCA 132 at [11]–[13]. 312. Hodgson, n 305 above, at 741, suggests that if the defendant owned 90% of the cabs in the town that would increase the evidential weight sufficiently, but it seems unlikely that the statistical probability overcomes the lack of the other evidence that can be expected in such a case. Cf SGIC v Laube (1984) 37 SASR 31, where a high statistical probability was not accepted as proof. And see cases at nn 314 and 337 below. Another way of conceptualising this problem is to ask what is the appropriate reference class within which to generate probability assessments. See further symposium on ‘The Reference Class Problem’ (2007) 11 E & P 243ff, with contributions from Paul Roberts, Michael Pardo, Ron Allen, Dale Nance, Mark Colvyan, Helen Regan, Robert Rhee and Larry Laudan. 313. (1984) 37 SASR 31 (discussed by Eggleston, ‘Focusing on the Defendant’ (1987) 61 Aust LJ 58 and followed in Payne v Crawford (1992) 3 Tas R 360). See also NOM v DPP [2012] VSCA 198 at [99]– [124]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar [2012] HCA 17 at [255] (Heydon J); Strong v Woolworths [2012] HCA 5 at [75]–[77] (Heydon J), though cf French CJ, Gummow, Crennan

and Bell JJ at [30]–[34]. 314. But cf cases holding that epidemiological evidence presented in statistical terms cannot itself establish the causation of an individual illness: Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 at [122], [123], [130] (Spigelman CJ); Amaca Pty Ltd (formerly James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd) v Hannell (2007) 34 WAR 109; [2007] WASCA 158; Cowan v Bunnings Group Ltd [2014] QSC 301 at [38] (Alan Wilson J). 315. Hodgson, n 305 above, at 743. Limited inferences may be drawn against a party who fails to call available evidence in civil cases: Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; and see further at 6.43–6.46. 316. (1774) 1 Cowp 63 at 65; 98 ER 969 at 970. 317. Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; Ho v Powell (2001) 51 NSWLR 572. 318. (1979) 53 ALJR 267. 319. See also Holloway v McFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470 at 477 (Dixon J); Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 304–5; Nesterczuk v Mortimore (1965) 115 CLR 140 at 149 (Kitto J); Lopes v Taylor (1970) 44 ALJR 412 at 421–2; West v Government Insurance Office of NSW (1981) 148 CLR 62 at 65–6. This is an example of the best explanation approach advocated by Pardo and Allen as descriptive of common law proof: see further 1.43. 320. See, for example, Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691; Reifek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517; R v Home Secretary; Ex parte Khawaja [1984] AC 74; Sheldon v Sun Alliance Australia Ltd (1989) 53 SASR 97; Re Kerrison; Ex parte Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1990) 101 ALR 525, affirmed at (1991) 27 FCR 271 (Federal Court contempt proceedings); Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 67 ALJR 170; Palios Meegan & Nicholson Holdings Pty Ltd v Shore (2010) 108 SASR 31; [2010] SASCFC 21 (allegations of misconduct by lawyer in advising client). 321. (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361–2. 322. Helton v Allen (1940) 63 CLR 691 at 712; Wright v Wright (1948) 77 CLR 191 at 210; Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517 at 521; Nesterczuk v Mortimore (1965) 115 CLR 140 at 149; Maher-Smith v Gaw [1969] VR 371 at 374; Andrijich v D’Ascanio [1971] WAR 140 at 142; Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 67 ALJR 170 at 170–1. In Granada Tavern v Smith [2008] FCA 646 at [96], Heerey J described the fact that Briginshaw continues to be cited rather than s 140 of the uniform legislation as an ‘intriguing phenomenon in Australian professional legal culture’. In Strong v Woolworths Ltd [2012] HCA 5 at [32]–[39], the majority referred to neither s 140 nor Briginshaw. And, in NOM v DPP [2012] VSCA 198 at [112]–[124] and Nigro v Secretary to the Dept of justice [2013] VSCA 213 at [159]–[160], the Court of Appeal explains that s 140 ‘reflects the principles in Briginshaw and is to be so understood’. 323. See Employment Advocate v Williamson (2001) 111 FCR 20 at [65]; Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing & Allied Services Union of Australia v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2007) 162 FCR 466 at [29]–[38]. See generally De Plevtiz, ‘Briginshaw “Standard of Proof” in Anti-discrimination Law: “Pointing with a Wavering Finger”’ (2003) 27 Melb ULR 308. Comments in Qantas Airways Ltd v Gama [2008] FCAFC 69 at [139] (Branson J), [110] (French and Jacobson JJ), discussed by Heerey J in Granada Tavern v Smith [2008] FCA 646 at [85]–[96], disapprove of courts continuing to use the Briginshaw formulation in preference to that found in s 140. As the analysis in the text seeks to show, it is doubtful whether there is any distinction in substance. 324. (1992) 67 ALJR 170 at 170. 325. Many of the cases involving scanty information emphasise this point: Holloway v McFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470 at 477 (Dixon J); Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 304–5; Nesterczuk v Mortimore (1965) 115 CLR 140 at 149 (Kitto J); Lopes v Taylor (1970) 44 ALJR 412 at 421–2; TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks (1979) 53 ALJR 267 at 270; West v Government Insurance Office of NSW (1981) 148 CLR 62 at 65–6.

326. An interesting rejection of a variable civil standard is found in R v Ali [1996] 2 VR 49, where the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal rejected previous authority applying a ‘higher’ civil standard to sentencing facts relied upon by the Crown. The court held the criminal standard applicable to such facts. This is confirmed in, for example, R v Storey [1998] 1 VR 359; R v Morrisson [1999] 1 Qd R 397; Lobban v R (2001) 80 SASR 550; Law v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 193 at [33] (Buss JA). That there is just one standard at common law has been confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada in FH v McDougall [2008] SCC 53 at [26]–[49]. 327. (1992) 67 ALJR 170 at 170–2 (footnotes omitted). 328. So interpreted, Neat Holdings was applied by O’Loughlin J in Cubillo v Commonwealth (2000) 174 ALR 97 at 215–17 to allegations of misconduct by missionaries (for whose conduct it was alleged the Commonwealth was responsible) against Aboriginal children, and by Merkel J in Shaw v Wolf (1998) 163 ALR 205 at 215, to allegations that ATSIC candidates were ineligible because non-Aboriginal. Though in Henderson v Queensland (2014) 89 ALJR 162; [2014] HCA 52 at [15] (French CJ), [31] (Bell J, Kiefel J agreeing) and [170]–[172] (Keane J), an appeal from proceedings where the appellant bore the burden of proving that specific assets were not the benefits of serious criminal activities, the majority concluded that any presumption about the unlikelihood of non-criminality was ‘inconsistent with the allocation of the burden of proof’. 329. Hamer, n 305 above, at n 17, points out that judges who advocate a standard in terms of ‘reasonable satisfaction’, ‘persuasion’ and ‘belief’ on other occasions express the standard merely in terms of ‘a balance of probabilities’. Terminology is clearly not decisive of a mathematical approach. On the contrary, it suggests the terminology leaves open the question of the conceptualisation of the standard. It is interesting to note that the formulation in the uniform legislation, satisfaction on the balance of probabilities, takes words from both judicial formulations. 330. R v Van Beelen (1973) 4 SASR 353 at 384. 331. See the discussion of R v Dennis Adams [1996] 2 Cr App R 467 at 1.26 and the cases in Chapter 1, n 66. 332. See Callen, ‘Notes on a Grand Illusion: Some Limits on the Use of a Bayesian Theory in Evidence Law’ (1982) 57 Ind LJ 1 at 10–15; ‘Second Order Considerations, Weight, Sufficiency and Schema Theory: A Comment on Professor Brilmayer’s Theory’ (1986) 66 Boston ULR 715 at 726, n 72: ‘… for the consistent use of Bayesian theory for the updating of probabilities by conditionalization, where thirty items of evidence are introduced relevant to an inference, one must record a billion probabilities’. For a recent plea to employ cognitive strategies that human fact-finders can accommodate, see Callen, ‘Cognitive Strategies and Models of Fact Finding’ in Crime Procedure and Evidence in a Comparative and International Context: Essays in Honour of Professor Mirjan Damaska, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 2008. For an excellent general critique of the use of mathematical probabilities in civil cases, see Dant, ‘Gambling on the Truth: The Use of Purely Statistical Evidence as a Basis for Civil Liability’ (1988) 22 Columbia J Law & Soc Prob 31. 333. Cohen, The Probable and the Provable, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977, pp 252–4. 334. Allen, ‘The Nature of Juridical Proof’ (1991) 13 Cardozo LR 373; ‘Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence’ (1994) 88 Northwestern ULR 604; Allen and Pardo, ‘The Problematic Value of Mathematical Models of Evidence’ (2007) 36 J Legal Studies 107; ‘Judicial Proof and the Best Explanation’ (2008) 27 Law & Phil 223. 335. For example, TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks (1979) 53 ALJR 267. 336. Sargent v Massachusetts Accident Co 29 NE 2d 825 (1940) at 827; Smith v Rapid Transit Inc 58 NE 2d (1945) 754. Cf SGIC v Laube (1984) 37 SASR 31 (followed by Zeeman J in Payne v Crawford (1992) 3 Tas R 360).

337. In Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 at [122], [123], [130], Spigelman CJ emphasises that epidemiological evidence can only create a statistical possibility and that causation can only be established by considering it in relation to other relevant evidence relating to the cause of the particular plaintiff’s injury. See also Amaca Pty Ltd (formerly James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd) v Hannell (2007) 34 WAR 109; [2007] WASCA 158. Reluctance to rely upon individual epidemiological studies or meta-analysis, along with indicative forms of evidence — such as in vitro and in vivo studies, for example — makes it difficult for some types of plaintiffs to establish causation. Consider Wagner, ‘Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products’ (1997) Cornell LR 773; Cranor, Toxic Torts: Science, Law and the Possibility of Justice, 2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2016. 338. (2001) 51 NSWLR 572 at [14]–[16]. 339. (1774) 1 Cowp 63; 98 ER 969. 340. For example, the scenario suggested by Hodgson, ‘Probability: The Logic of the Law — A Response’ (1995) 15 Ox J Legal Studies 51 at 60. 341. It is submitted that recent cases adopting Dixon J’s statement should be similarly interpreted: see, for example, Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 at [136] (Spigelman CJ). And in criminal cases, references to persuasion in the dicta of Doyle CJ in R v Karger (2002) 83 SASR 135 at [20]–[21], and Spigelman CJ in R v Galli [2001] NSWCCA 504 at [55], should also be similarly interpreted. 342. Another way of achieving this result is to place an evidential or persuasive burden on a defendant once a plaintiff has reasonably exhausted his or her search for available evidence: cf Amaca Pty Ltd (formerly James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd) v Hannell [2007] WASCA 158 at [395] (Steytler P and McLure JA). Some argue more extremely that the practical difficulties and policy values should place the burden of proof on defendants where, as with proceedings over pharmaceuticals, therapeutic products, pollution and work environments, they are in the best position, and may even be required, under regulation, to conduct research into the risks of their activities: Berger, ‘Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation’ (2001) 64 Law & Contemporary Problems 289; ‘Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts’ (1997) 97 Columbia LR 2117; Wagner, ‘Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products’ (1997) 82 Cornell LR 773. 343. [1991] 2 NSWLR 725 at 728. And see Spigelman CJ in Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 at [122], [123], [130]. 344. The word ‘reasonable’ does suggest a chink in this assertion (see Denning LJ in Bater v Bater [1951] P 35 at 37) and there is research evidence that jurors regard the standard as higher in more serious cases (Simon and Mahon, ‘Quantifying Burdens of Proof’ (1971) 5 Law & Society Rev 319). In R v Buttery (1988) 145 LSJS 223 at 232–5, Cox J rejects the idea that the criminal standard can vary. Another perspective is to regard proof from the internal view of the fact-finder who is a moral agent who must justify, on a moral and rational basis, beliefs in reaching a judgment or verdict in relation to another human being. While civil cases demand impartiality when distributing caution between parties, criminal cases require a protective attitude and the highest of standards of proof. But seriousness of consequences may then justify different attitudes towards the caution required before conviction in a criminal case. See Ho, A Philosophy of Evidence Law: Justice in the Search for Truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, particularly Chs 2 and 4. 345. See the High Court’s statement in Bradshaw v McEwans Pty Ltd (unreported, 1951) quoted in Luxton v Vines (1952) 85 CLR 352 at 358 and Transport Industries Insurance Co Ltd v Longmuir [1997] 1 VR 125 at 141: ‘The difference between the criminal standard of proof … and the civil is that in the former the facts must be such as to exclude reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence, while in the latter you need only circumstances raising a more probable inference in favour of what is alleged’. See also Gaetani v Trustees of the Christian Bros (1988) Aust Torts Rep ¶80-156.

346. R v Home Secretary; Ex parte Khawaja [1984] AC 74 at 113; see also Lord Goddard CJ in R v Hepworth and Fearnley [1955] 2 QB 600 at 603; and Hilbery J in R v Murtagh and Kennedy (1955) 39 Cr App R 72 (in argument). 347. Thus, the standard of proving a civil contempt has been held by the High Court to be the criminal standard: Witham v Holloway (1995) 69 ALJR 847; Hurd v Zomojo Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 148 at [28], [92]. Cf this clear demarcation with Bannister v Walton (1993) 30 NSWLR 699 at 711–12, where in disciplinary proceedings against a medical practitioner the standard applied was a civil standard of ‘comfortable satisfaction on the balance of probabilities’. See also Commonwealth v Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate [2015] HCA 46 at [89]–[90]. 348. Where legislation uses the word ‘satisfied’ the court must as a matter of statutory construction determine whether this imports either the civil or criminal standard: Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; Re E (1976) 1 SASR 179; Re Cherry Lane Pty Ltd (1988) 17 ALD 1; Re SAAB-Scania Australia Pty Ltd and Collector of Customs (1990) 11 AAR 247. 349. For a critical discussion of the number of guilty who should be set free to secure the liberty of the innocent, by Hale, Blackstone, Fortescue and others, see Volokh, ‘n Guilty Men’ (1997) 146 U Penn LR 173. 350. Tribe, ‘Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process’ (1971) 84 Harv LR 1329 at 1810. 351. R v Flesch (1987) 7 NSWLR 554; Chedzey v R (1987) 30 A Crim R 451; R v Adams [1996] 2 Cr App R 467; R v Cavic (2005) 12 VR 136 (jury asked what percentage constituted guilt and judge failed to direct jury not to consider standard in terms of percentages). 352. Simon and Mahan, ‘Quantifying Burdens of Proof’ (1971) 5 Law & Society Rev 319. 353. Eggleston, Evidence Proof and Probability, 2nd ed, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1983, p xiii; Kaye, ‘Paradoxes, Gedanken Experiments and the Burden of Proof: A Response to Dr Cohen’s Reply’ [1981] Ariz St LJ 635; Friedman, ‘Answering the Bayesioskeptical Challenge’ (1997) 1 E & P 276. See also Redmayne et al, ‘Forensic Science Evidence in Question’ [2011] Crim LR 347. 354. The argument that follows is more fully developed in the following articles: Ligertwood, ‘Can DNA Alone Convict?’ (2011) 33 Syd LR 487; Ligertwood and Edmond, ‘Expressing Evaluative Forensic Science Opinions in a Court of Law’ (2012) 11 Law, Prob & Risk 289–302; Ligertwood, ‘Forensic Science Expressions and Legal Proof’ (2013) 45 Aust J Forensic Sci 263. 355. (2014) 88 ALJR 779; [2014] HCA 20. 356. (2012) 247 CLR 170; [2012] HCA 15. Discussed further in Hamer, ‘Expected Frequencies, Exclusion Percentages and “Mathematical Equivalence”: The Probative Value of DNA Evidence in Aytugrul v The Queen’ (2013) 45 Aust J Forensic Sci 271. 357. Note that it must also be applied by appellate judges when applying the ‘no substantial miscarriage of justice’ proviso: Weiss v R (2005) 224 CLR 300; and see 2.14. 358. Green v R (1972) 126 CLR 28; R v Punj (2002) 132 A Crim R 595 (‘feeling sure’ a misdirection). 359. See R v Calides (1983) 34 SASR 355; Liberato v R (1985) 159 CLR 507 at 515 (Brennan J); Burlinson v Police (1994) 75 A Crim R 258; R v E (1996) 39 NSWLR 450; Murray v R (2002) 189 ALR 40 at [57] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); R v KDY [2008] VSCA 104 at [26]–[27]; R v Tran and Tran (2011) 109 SASR 595; [2011] SASCFC 51. Cf R v Carbone (1989) 50 SASR 495 at 500 and R v Lavery (2013) 116 SASR 242; [2013] SASCFC 46 at [51]–[53] (Nicholson J), where references by the trial judge to determining who was telling the truth/whom to believe did not constitute a misdirection. See also R v Laz [1998] 1 VR 453 at 465 (CCA); R v V (1998) 100 A Crim R 488 at 498–500 (CCA (NSW)); Morley v R (1999) 152 FLR 13 (CCA (WA)); R v Middleton (2000) 114 A Crim R 141 (CCA (WA)); R

v Loader (2004) 89 SASR 204 at [58]–[60]; Azarian v Western Australia (2007) 178 A Crim R 19 at [9]– [16]; R v Woods (2008) 102 SASR 422; R v Molloy (2008) 102 SASR 452; Phillips v R [2015] SASCFC 67 at [31]–[37] (Sulan, Nicholson and Lovell JJ: reference to counsel’s address and general directions insufficient direction where oath against oath). 360. Murray v R (2002) 211 CLR 193 at [23] (Gaudron J), [57] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). Cf Douglass v R [2012] HCA 34 (conviction quashed in trial by judge alone where credibility contest as judge failed to focus on whether the criminal standard of proof had been satisfied). 361. R v Murray (1987) 11 NSWLR 12; 30 A Crim R 315; this so-called Murray direction is discussed in R v DTS [2008] NSWCCA 329; and see further at 4.44. 362. R v G [1994] 1 Qd R 540; R v F (1995) 83 A Crim R 502; R v E (1996) 39 NSWLR 450; R v Rodriguez (1997) 93 A Crim R 535; R v Jovanovic (1997) 42 NSWLR 520; R v Abraham (1998) 70 SASR 575; R v ALJ (2000) 117 A Crim R 370 at [82]–[93] (CCA (SA)) (judge’s firm response to jury question so speculating held appropriate); R v Russo (2004) 11 VR 1 (prosecutor’s constant rhetorical question, ‘Who else but the accused would have committed these murders?’ unfairly reversed burden of proof); Harman v Western Australia (2004) 29 WAR 380; [2004] WASCA 230 at [20]–[22] (Murray J), [126]–[138] (Pullin J), [97]–[105] (Steytler J dissenting); CB v Western Australia (2006) 175 A Crim R 304; [2006] WASCA 227 at [125]–[136] (Roberts-Smith J for CCA) (directions in relation to specific motive raised by the defence did not suggest any onus on accused); Doe v R [2008] NSWCCA 203, particularly at [58]–[60], [69]–[72] (remark in prosecutor’s address that accused made no suggestion that witness had ‘an axe to grind’ did not suggest onus on accused); DS v R (2012) 221 A Crim R 235; [2012] NSWCCA 159 (reference to specific motive significant in deciding onus not reversed). 363. (1998) 193 CLR 1. Such cross-examination of the accused in a police interview may require exclusion of the interview, or at least strong directions: R v Arundell [1999] 2 VR 228; Gill v R [1999] WASCA 68; R v Deriz (1999) 109 A Crim R 329 (CCA (WA)). Palmer was discussed (or distinguished) in R v Johnston (1998) 45 NSWLR 362; R v DJT [1998] 4 VR 784; R v Mazzolini [1999] 3 VR 113; and applied in R v Costin [1998] 3 VR 659; R v Murray (1999) 108 A Crim R 430 (CCA (NSW)); R v Buckley (2004) 10 VR 215; [2004] VSCA 185; R v Bajic (2005) 12 VR 155; [2005] VSCA 168; R v SWC (2007) 175 A Crim R 71; [2007] VSCA 201; R v SAB (2008) 20 VR 55; [2008] VSCA 150; Reeves (a Pseudonym) v R (2013) 41 VR 275; [2013] VSCA 311 (counsel apology to brief questioning of accused about complainant and mother’s motive to lie followed by jury direction sufficient to offset Palmer dangers); Miles v R (2014) 240 A Crim R 524; [2014] NSWCCA 72 at [3]–[21] (Simpson J holding judge’s unwise question did not reverse onus in context of decisive issue). 364. See the draft directions of Sperling J in R v Jovanovic (1997) 42 NSWLR 520 at 542. See also R v Hewitt [1998] 4 VR 862; R v PLK [1999] 3 VR 567; R v MM (2000) 112 A Crim R 519 (CCA (NSW)); R v Covill (2000) 114 A Crim R 111 (CCA (NSW)); R v Van Der Zyden [2012] 2 Qd R 568; [2012] QCA 89 (motive of complainant to lie central to defence and required direction that non-acceptance of alleged motive did not mean complainant necessarily truthful); R v Coss [2016] QCA 44 (Van Der Zyden applied); R v Muniz [2016] QCA 210 (Van Der Zyden not applied). Nor should a witness (including the accused) be asked whether another witness is lying (as opposed to whether what the other witness said is true): R v Leak [1969] SASR 172; R v Middleton (2000) 114 A Crim R 141 (CCA (WA)). 365. Robinson v R (No 2) (1991) 102 ALR 493 at 495; Stafford v R (1993) 67 ALJR 510 at 510–11 (Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ); Webb v R (1994) 181 CLR 41 at 63 (Brennan J); R v Asquith (1994) 72 A Crim R 250 at 255–60 (Hunt CJ at CL); R v Ellem (1994) 75 A Crim R 370 (remarks by prosecutor not endorsed by the trial judge did not give rise to any miscarriage of justice); R v Brown [1995] 1 Qd R 287; R v Ong [2001] SASC 437 (failure of judge to comment on accused’s testimony may give rise to suggestion that it is not to be given the same weight as other testimony); Etherton v Western Australia (2005) 30 WAR 65; [2005] WASCA 83 at [36]; R v BJC (2005) 13 VR 407; [2005] VSCA 154 at [90];

De Rosa v Western Australia (2006) 32 WAR 136 at [42]–[44] (Roberts-Smith JA, McLure and Buss JJA agreeing); R v Franco [2006] VSCA 302 at [80]–[88] (no blanket prohibition against directing the jury to scrutinise an accused person’s evidence closely); Martinez v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 143 at [239]–[246]. 366. (2011) 245 CLR 257; [2011] HCA 44. 367. In R v Parsons; R v Brady [2015] SASCFC 183 at [73], Peek J, Kelly and Nicholson JJ agreeing, in disapproving of the directions before him emphasised that Hargraves does not overrule previous decisions but rather places them in a wider context. 368. Tulic v R (1999) 91 FCR 222. 369. Brown v R (1913) 17 CLR 570; Thomas v R (1960) 102 CLR 584; Dawson v R (1961) 106 CLR 1 at 18; Green v R (1971) 126 CLR 28; La Fontaine v R (1976) 136 CLR 62 at 71, 80–1; R v Flesch (1987) 7 NSWLR 554; R v Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191; R v Reeves (1992) 29 NSWLR 109; Condo v R (1992) 62 A Crim R 11; Krasniqi v R (1993) 69 A Crim R 383 (CCA (SA)); R v Chatzidimitrious [2000] 1 VR 493; R v Anderson (2001) 127 A Crim R 116 at [18]–[19]; R v Punj (2002) 132 A Crim R 595; [2002] QCA 333 at [23]–[24] (Williams JA), [30] (Jerrard JA and Atkinson J); R v Southammavong; R v Sihavong [2003] NSWCCA 312; Darkan v R (2006) 227 CLR 373 at [69] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Heydon and Crennan JJ); R v Fouyaxis (2007) 99 SASR 233 at [47]–[48] (Gray J), [59]–[70] (White J); Jovanovic v R (2007) 172 A Crim R 518; [2007] TASSCA 56 at [66]–[79] (Crawford J), [91]–[103] (Evans J); R v Compton (2013) 237 A Crim R 177; [2013] SASCFC 134 (‘Absolute certainty of guilt is not required. The prosecution does not have to prove guilt beyond all doubt’ a misdirection); R v Dookhea [2016] VSCA 67 at [90] (Maxwell P, Redlich JA and Croucher AJA). 370. [2000] 1 VR 493; see also Green v R (1971) 126 CLR 28 at 33. 371. R v Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191, where King CJ concedes that this might be permissible (and see King CJ in R v Carbone (1989) 50 SASR 495 at 501). Cox J is willing to accept other general explanations of what constitutes a reasonable doubt — ‘real’ doubts as opposed to ‘fanciful’ doubts for example — but he (reluctantly) agrees that it is generally a misdirection to ask juries expressly to examine their doubts and then classify them. See also Krasniqi v R (1993) 69 A Crim R 383 (CCA (SA)) (explanation in terms of ‘fanciful possibilities’ not a misdirection); R v ALJ (2000) 117 A Crim R 370 (CCA (SA)) (to decide in ‘a reasonable sensible way’ in ‘a practical court of law’ not a misdirection); Boonudnoon v R [2002] WASCA 313 (‘You are all adults and you know if you have a reasonable doubt, not a fanciful doubt, not a stupid doubt, a reasonable doubt’ held not in error); R v Irlam; Ex parte Attorney-General [2002] QCA 235 at [53]–[58] (elaboration unnecessary but not basis for successful appeal). 372. R v Boyle (2009) 26 VR 219; [2009] VSCA 289 at [57]–[59] (Weinberg JA, Williams and Coghlan AJJA): these ‘groundless speculations’ having been raised by counsel it was appropriate for the trial judge to refer to them in summing up to the jury. 373. Chedzey v R (1987) 30 A Crim R 451 (CCA (WA)). 374. See also R v Flesch (1987) 7 NSWLR 554; R v Cavkic (2005) 12 VR 136; and W v R (2006) 16 Tas SR 1 at 11–19, for disapproval of jury being left to consider the traditional standard in mathematical terms. But by the same token, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not require the elimination of all scientific possibilities: R v Summers [1990] 1 Qd R 92. 375. [2000] 1 VR 493 at [11]. 376. R v Wilson (1986) 42 SASR 203; R v Dam (1986) 43 SASR 422; R v Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191; R v Costi (1988) 48 SASR 269; R v Neilan [1992] 1 VR 57 at 67–72. In Krasniqi v R (1993) 69 A Crim R 383 (CCA (SA)) and W v R (2006) 16 Tas SR 1 at 6–10, the trial judge was held not to have asked the jury to examine their doubts. But cf Smart v Tasmania [2013] TASCCA 15 (Blow CJ, Wood and Pearce JJ) at [66]–[78], where appeal upheld where jury asked to examine doubts.

377. In Martin v R (2010) 28 VR 579; [2010] VSCA 153, discovery of resort to internet by jury to responses to question ‘what is meant by beyond reasonable doubt’ did not result in the trial miscarrying. See also Benbrika v R (2010) 29 VR 593; [2010] VSCA 281 at [212]–[216], [275]–[228]. Where a jury otherwise requests clarification of a particular matter this may call for a particular explanation: see R v Cavic (2005) 12 VR 136 (judge required to explain to jury that the law did not conceptualise the criminal standard in terms of percentages). 378. Shepherd v R (1990) 170 CLR 573 at 579–80, 586 (Dawson J); Knight v R (1992) 175 CLR 495 at 502 (Mason CJ, Dawson and Toohey JJ); R v Lancefield [1999] VSCA 176 (direction must not suggest any onus on the accused to establish innocent hypotheses); R v Camilleri [2001] NSWCCA 527 at [39] (exclusion of other ‘reasonable or sensible’ explanations not a misdirection). 379. Grant v R (1975) 11 ALR 503; La Fontaine v R (1976) 136 CLR 62 at 71 (Barwick CJ), 80–1 (Gibbs J); followed in R v Owen (1991) 56 SASR 397 at 412. Compare with McGreevy v DPP (1972) 57 Cr App R 424; Rogerson v R (1992) 65 A Crim R 530 at 545; Dean v R (1995) 65 SASR 234 at 240; R v Gibson (1999) 110 A Crim R 180 at [29] (CCA (NSW)) (no invariable rule of practice that direction required in every circumstantial evidence case); Imnetu v R [2006] NSWCCA 203 at [18]–[36] (McClellan CJ at CL); R v Rajakaruna (No 2) (2006) 15 VR 592 at [12]–[20] (Redlich JA); R v McDonald [2011] SASCFC 57 at [47]–[49] (Duggan J) (may not be required where circumstantial and direct evidence). 380. For example, Eggleston, n 353 above, p 122; Hamer, ‘The Continuing Saga of the Chamberlain Direction: Untangling the Cables and Chains of Criminal Proof’ (1997) 23 Monash ULR 43 (where it is argued that the High Court in Shepherd implicitly accepts the mathematical approach, rather than the inductive approach here argued). For working illustrations of the mathematical approach, see Ligertwood, ‘The Uncertainty of Proof’ (1976) 10 Melb ULR 367; and Odgers, ‘Proof and Probability’ (1989) 5 Aust Bar Rev 137. 381. (1973) 4 SASR 353. Leave to reopen case on basis of incorrect forensic analysis refused in R v Van Beelen (2016) 125 SASR 253; [2016] SASCFC 71; appeal from refusal granted [2017] HCA Trans 19. 382. At 372. 383. The National Research Council (NRC) of the United States National Academy of Science questioned the reliability of this kind, and many other kinds, of forensic science evidence. See discussion at 7.46. For similarity claims to be probative generally requires background information about the frequency (or occurrence and independence) of the relevant similarities. See generally Edmond, ‘What Lawyers Should Know about the Forensic “Sciences”’ (2015) 36 Adel LR 33. 384. Transcript, p 3774, referred to in R v Van Beelen (1973) 4 SASR 353 at 376. 385. At 373. 386. (1984) 153 CLR 521. 387. (1990) 170 CLR 573. 388. See generally Staines, Biber and Arrow (eds), The Chamberlain Case Reader, Australian Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne, 2009. 389. For a critical account of the consideration of the evidence in this case, see Edmond, ‘Science, Law and Narrative: Helping the “Facts” to Speak for Themselves’ (1999) 23 Sthn Ill LR 555; ‘Azaria’s Accessories: The Social (Legal-Scientific) Construction of Guilt and Innocence’ (1998) 22 Melb ULR 396. 390. At 536. 391. For a more detailed discussion of the blood evidence, see Morling, Royal Commission of Inquiry into Chamberlain Convictions, Government Printer, Canberra, 1987. 392. (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 534–9; cf Deane J’s use of the term ‘intermediate facts’ at 626–7.

393. (1973) 4 SASR 353 at 374–5. 394. (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 534–9 (Gibbs CJ and Mason J) and 570 (Murphy J). 395. (1985) 63 ALR 181 at 191–3. 396. [1986] VR 753 at 786–91 (followed by McGarvie J in R v Maleckas [1991] 1 VR 363 at 379–80). 397. In R v Maleckas [1991] 1 VR 363, the trial judge directed the jury that it was sufficient that particular circumstantial facts be proved only on the balance of probabilities and, in the light of Chamberlain, this was held to be a misdirection. 398. R v Cosgrove and Hunter (1988) 34 A Crim R 299; R v Garth (1990) 49 A Crim R 298. But it may also cause confusion: see, for example, R v Franco (2009) 105 SASR 446; [2009] SASC 370 at [15] (Vanstone J). 399. (1990) 170 CLR 573. See comments on terminology used in Shepherd by Callinan J in R v Hillier (2007) 228 CLR 618; [2007] HCA 13 at [64]. 400. At 576. 401. At 579. 402. Ibid. 403. This is recognised by Burns J in by Munro v R [2014] ACTCA 11 at [102]. 404. Support for this Chamberlain approach, also in the context of disputed scientific evidence of circumstantial facts, can be found in Velevski v R (2002) 187 ALR 233 at [37] (Gleeson CJ and Hayne J), [84]–[89] (Gaudron J), but compare with Gummow and Callinan JJ at [177]–[182]. See also Hannes v DPP (2006) 165 A Crim R 151; [2006] NSWCCA 373 at [667]: ‘If one cord provides the bulk of the load-carrying capacity, the rope may begin to look more like the chain’. In R v M, RB [2007] SASC 207, Debelle J concludes at [73] that evidence revealing prior uncharged acts may provide ‘a number of very large strands for the cable’. In R v Koelman [2000] 2 VR 20 at [28] (Tadgell JA), DNA evidence was regarded as a ‘thick strand’. See also R v LRG [2006] VSCA 288 at [40] (Callaway JA: a strand ‘of such practical importance that it is prudent to direct the jury that they must be satisfied about it beyond reasonable doubt’); R v Tartaglia (2011) 110 SASR 378 at [22]–[25] (Sulan J: ‘without that evidence the accused could not have been convicted’). 405. [1999] 2 VR 123. Explained and followed in R v Huisman and Shiells [1999] VSCA 170 at [14]; applied in R v Kotzmann (No 2) (2002) 128 A Crim R 479; discussed in Young v R [2016] VSCA 149 at [73]– [101]. For an example and similar analysis of an indispensable intermediate fact, see Garrett v Nicholson (1999) 21 WAR 226. For an example of where there was disagreement over whether the evidence of similarity of weapons was sufficient to leave to the jury at all, see Murrell v R [2014] VSCA 334 at [57]– [86] (Redlich JA, Maxwell P agreeing). 406. R v Familic (1994) 75 A Crim R 229 at 238–42; R v Merritt [1999] NSWCCA 29 at [70]; R v Merlino [2004] NSWCCA 104 at [42], [46]. Cf Minniti v R [2006] NSWCCA 30 at [38]–[45]; R v Tran (2007) 214 FLR 21 at [30]–[35]; Davidson v R [2009] NSWCCA 150; Burrell v R [2009] NSWCCA 163 at [131]–[136], where held sequential reasoning not relied upon. Support for direction where a jury may use evidence (sequentially) to infer guilt is found in HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 at [196] (Hayne J); Neill-Fraser v Tasmania [2012] TASCCA 2 at [231]–[240], Porter J referring to the need for a ‘prudential direction’; cf stricter approach taken at [156]–[161] by Crawford J, Tennant J agreeing at [223]. 407. Burns v R (1975) 132 CLR 258; R v D (1998) 71 SASR 99 at 100–1 (Doyle J: confession standing alone sufficient to support a verdict of guilty); Kotzmann v R [1999] 2 VR 123 at [21] (customary to direct but confession may just be the straw that breaks the camel’s back); R v Koelman [2000] 2 VR 20 at [28]; R v Loguancio (2000) 1 VR 235 at [9]; Cotic v R [2000] WASCA 414; Magill v R (2013) 42 VR 616 (Priest

JA, Buchanan AP agreeing the ‘Burns direction’ required), at [44]–[52] (Neave JA in dissent holding absence of ‘Burns direction’ where no full confession not fatal). In R v Franklin [2001] VSCA 79 at [115]–[117], [126]–[130], the court emphasises that lies described as capable of indicating a ‘consciousness of guilt’ are particularly vulnerable to being regarded as full admissions of guilt and acted upon alone to infer guilt even though presented as part of a circumstantial case. See also Edwards v R (1993) 178 CLR 193, discussed below at 2.88. But within the dynamics of a particular case the possibility of a lie being regarded as a full confession may not arise: Velevski v R (2002) 187 ALR 233; [2002] HCA 4 at [43]–[44], [126]. 408. Earlier authorities include R v Salerno [1973] VR 59; Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528; B v R (1992) 175 CLR 599 at 602–3 (Mason CJ); R v Peake (1996) 67 SASR 297 at 300–2 (Millhouse J), 309–10 (Olsson J in dissent). 409. R v Loguancio (2000) 1 VR 235; R v O’Keefe [2000] 1 Qd R 564 at 571; R v MM (2000) 112 A Crim R 519 at [56] (Hulme J), [57] (Dowd J); R v Delgado-Guerra [2002] 2 Qd R 384 at [23]–[32]; Buttsworth v R (2004) 29 WAR 1 at [44]; Neill-Fraser v Tasmania [2012] TASCCA 2 at [226]–[240]. See also Familic v R (1994) 75 A Crim R 229 (Kotzman approach applied in holding that in determining the admissibility of propensity evidence a high standard of probative value should only apply where that propensity is to be relied on as an indispensable intermediate fact); R v FJB [1999] 2 VR 425 (uncharged acts stood or fell with charged acts and required proof to same standard). 410. (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16. Only Crennan J (at [477]) clearly endorsed the Shepherd requirement of indispensability. Heydon J found it unnecessary to consider this issue, as directions to the criminal standard were given (at [339], [376], [395]). For a critical discussion of this aspect of HML, see Hamer, ‘Admissibility and Use of Relationship Evidence in HML v The Queen: One Step Forward Two Steps Back’ (2008) 32 Crim LJ 351 at 365–7. Dicta in Gipp v R (1998) 194 CLR 106 at [21] (Gaudron J), [142] (Kirby J) suggest the criminal standard without mentioning Shepherd whereas McHugh and Hayne JJ endorse Shepherd at [79] whilst suggesting (at [76]) that guilty passion requires proof to the criminal standard. 411. Hayne J (Kirby and Gummow JJ agreeing) at [132], [196], [200], [244]. 412. See, for example, R v UC [2008] QCA 194 at [44] (Muir JA, Cullinane J agreeing); while the dictum extends to all admissible uncharged acts the case concerned uncharged acts proving sexual interest. See also R v Kan [2016] QCA 108 at [39]–[40], [46] (Margaret McMurdo P, Philippides JA and Burns J agreeing). Cf R v SCO & SCP [2016] QCA 248 [137]–[143] (Margaret McMurdo P) where, on the authority of Gleeson CJ’s approach in HML, uncharged acts were held admissible to provide context and did not require the criminal direction. 413. R v Sadler (2008) 20 VR 69; [2008] VSCA 198 at [59]; PIM v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 131 at [21]–[24] (Wheeler JA distinguished HML as applying the stricter Pfennig test of admissibility and favouring Shepherd applying under s 31A of the Evidence Act 1906), [149]–[158] (Pullin JA stating that Shepherd applied in Western Australia), [313]–[318] (Buss JA favouring beyond reasonable doubt direction whenever evidence of sexual interest admitted). 414. See, for example, R v Witham [1962] Qd R 49; R v S (1991) 5 WAR 391 (subsequent sexual relationship admissible); B v R (1992) 175 CLR 599 at 610 (Deane J); K v R (1992) 34 FCR 227; R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 at 515; R v DDR [1998] 3 VR 580; R v Corrigan (1998) 74 SASR 454 at 459–60; R v Vonarx [1999] 3 VR 618; R v RHMcL [1999] 1 VR 746 at [68]; Tully v R (2006) 231 ALR 712 (Callinan J). See also the discussion and cases referred to by Heydon J in HML at [271]–[272]. 415. Distinguished from propensity evidence by Hodgson JA in R v Leonard (2006) 67 NSWLR 545 at [49]– [53]. Note that Kirby, Gummow, Hayne JJ in HML would not admit evidence of other misconduct to prove motive, or any other non-propensity purposes, until its admissibility as propensity evidence was first established under the Pfennig test, requiring direction in terms of the criminal standard to establish

this propensity, whether an indispensable intermediate fact or not. 416. Gleeson CJ says (at [33]) that his approach is consistent with Doyle CJ’s approach in Nieterink v R (1999) 76 SASR 56 at [83] (see also R v IK (2004) 89 SASR 406; [2004] SASC 280 at [86]). 417. In R v FJB [1999] 2 VR 425 at [41], Charles JA required a direction that uncharged acts be proved to the criminal standard where the evidence was admitted only to support the credibility of the victim. The pragmatic argument in favour of a criminal direction wherever uncharged acts are admitted is developed more fully and endorsed by Debelle J in R v M, RB [2007] SASC 207 at [72]–[73]. 418. See, for example, R v EF (2008) 189 A Crim R 463; [2008] VSCA 213 at [2] (Nettle JA); R v Halliday [2009] VSCA 195 at [88], [92] (Weinberg JA); AJE v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 185 (Mazza JA and Beech J, Pullin JA disagreeing); R v BCQ (2013) 240 A Crim R 153; [2013] QCA 388 at [36]ff (McMeekin J) (extended to sexual interest asserted in an admission rather than implicit in previous misconduct). 419. In R v Sadler (2008) 20 VR 69; [2008] VSCA 198 at [65], the court held that in the case of uncharged acts admitted for non-propensity purposes but where there was a strong risk the jury might use it as propensity evidence, in the light of HML it was advisable but not strictly obligatory to direct that sexual interest must be proved beyond reasonable doubt before acting upon it. Sadler was applied in R v DWB (2008) 20 VR 112 at [67]–[74]; R v Pidoto [2009] VSCA 166 at [41]–[46]; AJE v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 185 at [61]–[66] (Mazza JA and Beech J, Pullin JA disagreeing). See also Martin CJ in Bropho v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 94 at [88]. Cf R v Osborne [2009] VSCA 88 at [22] (Weinberg J suggesting jury cannot have recourse to any uncharged acts unless directed to first find them proved beyond reasonable doubt). See also R v McKenzie-McHarg (2008) 189 A Crim R 291; [2008] VSCA 206 at [12] (Pagone AJA). 420. See Chapter 3 for a full discussion of the admissibility of evidence of the accused’s other misconduct both at common law and under the uniform and other state evidence legislation. 421. See cases at n 413 above. 422. Authority for this approach can be found in R v Toki (2000) 116 A Crim R 536 at [33] (Howie J); R v Tab [2002] NSWCCA 274 at [44]; R v Hagarty [2004] NSWCCA 89 at [24]–[25] (Sperling J), [30]– [34]; DJV v R [2008] NSWCCA 272 at [30] (McClellan CJ at CL); FDP v R [2008] NSWCCA 317 at [38] (‘… it appears now to be the law that, if … evidence is to be used by the jury for tendency reasoning, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt’); R v Doyle [2014] NSWCA 4 at [129]. Cf R v MM (2000) 112 A Crim R 519 at [56] (Hulme J), [57] (Dowd J). In Campbell v R (2014) 312 ALR 129; [2014] NSWCCA 175 at [322]–[334], Simpson J expressed doubts about the legitimacy of this approach, seeing no reason to create an exception to Shepherd. 423. Authorities appear divided upon whether evidence tendered to establish sexual interest as motive is tendency evidence within s 97: see discussion and authorities referred to at 3.56 (particularly at n 176). 424. Authority for this approach can be found in R v Tab [2002] NSWCCA 274 at [28], [37], [44] (relationship evidence not tendered as tendency evidence outside s 97). See now DJV v R [2008] NSWCCA 272 at [31] (McClellan CJ at CL: ‘Context evidence does not require a direction that it be proved beyond reasonable doubt’); FDP v R [2008] NSWCCA 317 at [38]–[39] (the court); DTS v R [2008] NSWCCA 329 at [55] (Beazley JA); JDK v R [2009] NSWCCA 76 (McClellan CJ at CL); SKA v R [2012] NSWCCA 205 (Adams J, Hislop J agreeing). 425. See AJE v Western Australia (2012) 225 A Crim R 242; [2012] WASCA 185 at [53]–[67] (Mazza JA and Beech J demanding that the jury always be directed to find sexual interest proved by the misconduct evidence beyond reasonable doubt); [5]–[8] (Pullin JA applying Shepherd). Not following the Shepherd approach of the majority in PIM v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 131 at [21]–[24] (Wheeler JA), [149]–[158] (Pullin JA) but agreeing with Buss JA at [313]–[318]. While strictly these authorities relate

to evidence of sexual interest, the same arguments, the strong influence of sexual interest, apply to propensities more generally. 426. (2013) 117 SASR 81 at [246]. 427. (1998) 155 ALR 605 at [26] (Callinan J). 428. Kotzmann v R [1999] 2 VR 123; R v Plevac [1999] NSWCCA 351 at [26]–[28]; R v Landells [2000] VSCA 84 at [24]; R v Fowler [2003] NSWCCA 321 at [73]–[77]; R v Cummins (2004) 10 VR 15; [2004] VSCA 164 at [31]; R v Gassy (No 3) [2005] SASC 496 at [345]–[364] (Bleby and White JJ). Tadgell JA in R v Koelman [2000] 2 VR 20 at [28] hints that there may be ‘practical considerations’ demanding direction beyond reasonable doubt where motive is not logically indispensable. 429. R v Pantoja (1996) 88 A Crim R 554 at 559 (Hunt CJ at CL), 583–4 (Abadee J); R v Fletcher [1998] 2 Qd R 437 (Crown conceded that the Crown case would fail without the DNA evidence but judge directed the jury that the DNA evidence alone could not be the basis for conviction); Gibson v R [2001] TASSC 59 at [15]; R v Karger (2002) 83 SASR 135. 430. R v Koelman [2000] 2 VR 20 at [28] (Tadgell JA). See also cases at n 404 above. 431. R v Juric [2003] VSCA 382 at [62]–[66] (ruling of Nettle J); R v Berry and Wenitong (2007) 17 VR 153; [2007] VSCA 202 at [57]; Neill-Fraser v Tasmania [2012] TASCCA 2 at [236]–[237]. 432. (1993) 178 CLR 193. See further 4.87–4.88. 433. Where the lie is intractably neutral as to its motivation it is not so capable (see further Chapter 4, in particular at 4.93). Flight may also be left to the jury if capable of giving rise to a consciousness of guilt along with other evidence without the jury being directed to draw that inference to any particular standard: see DPP v Ciantar [2006] VSCA 263 at [45]–[47], [52]–[54] (Warren CJ and Chernov, Nettle, Neave and Redlich JJA); Minniti v R (2006) 159 A Crim R 394 at [44]–[45] (Sully J); R v Dickinson [2007] VSCA 111 at [17], [25] (Chernov JA), [61] (Eames JA). Other post-offence conduct capable of giving rise to a consciousness of guilt can be similarly relied upon: R v Wildy (2011) 111 SASR 189; [2011] SASCFC 131. Section 21 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) requires consciousness of guilt to be the only inference: see further 4.88. 434. See also R v Dellapatrona and Duffield (1993) 31 NSWLR 123; R v Adam (1999) 106 A Crim R 510; [1999] NSWCCA 189 at [54]–[61]; R v Wedd (2000) 115 A Crim R 205 (CCA (WA)); R v Franklin [2001] VSCA 79 at [115]–[131]; Velevski v R (2002) 187 ALR 233 at [43]–[44], [126]; R v Lam [2005] VSC 292 (ruling of Redlich J approving the general rule but emphasising that circumstances may demand that jury be directed in terms of beyond reasonable doubt even where a lie is not strictly relied upon as an indispensable intermediate fact); Martinez v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 143 at [288]– [295] (Edwards principles confirmed after lengthy analysis of state authorities); Coates v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 142. 435. R v Farquarson (2009) 26 VR 410; [2009] VSCA 307 at [200]–[204] (Warren CJ, Nettle and Redlich JJA). Section 21 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) so provides generally in the case of admissional inferences sought from post-offence conduct. 436. At 579. 437. See, for example, Minniti v R (2006) 159 A Crim R 394 at [45] (Sully J); Davidson v R [2009] NSWCCA 150 at [8] (Spigelman CJ). 438. Familic v R (1994) 75 A Crim R 229 at 231. 439. For clear recent examples of such analysis in cases dependent upon circumstantial evidence, see Collie v Police (2013) 115 SASR 281; [2013] SASC 15 (Nicholson J) and Brooks v Police (2013) 116 SASR 234; [2013] SASC 81 (White J). 440. See, for example, R v Baden-Clay (2016) 334 ALR 234; [2016] HCA 35 at [46]–[64] (French CJ,

Kiefel, Bell, Nettle and Gordon JJ determining the Court of Appeal’s hypothesis of manslaughter rather than murder not open on the evidence); R v Duncan (2011) 109 SASR 479; [2011] SASCFC 46; Western Australia v Rayney (No 3) [2012] WASC 404 at [6] (Martin J refusing to convict in trial by judge alone). 441. Weiss v R (2005) 224 CLR 300. 442. (1984) 153 CLR 521. 443. Cf R v Fyffe [1991] 2 VR 72. 444. Although subsequently reversed after the Morling Royal Commission determined that some of the forensic science evidence was mistaken: Morling, n 391 above. 445. Fitzgerald v R (2014) 88 ALJR 779; [2014] HCA 20 (reasonable hypothesis that matching DNA on didgeridoo deposited through direct or secondary transfer at a time other than the attack). Cf R v S, G (2011) 109 SASR 491; [2011] SASCFC 48 (circumstances in which semen on sheet could not be established beyond reasonable doubt). Fitzgerald distinguished in Sloan v R [2015] NSWCCA 279. 446. See the English cases R v Sartori [1961] Crim LR 397; R v Ewing [1983] QB 1039; and the Australian cases Wendo v R (1963) 109 CLR 559; R v Hart (1977) 17 SASR 100 at 103; MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 519; R v Browne-Kerr [1990] VR 78 (not following R v Mazzone (1985) 43 SASR 330, where the court applied the criminal standard to establish that comparative handwriting was that of accused).

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Chapter Three

Character Introduction Common law approaches to unreliable evidence 3.1 Most of the common law rules of evidence exist to ensure that the trier of fact is in a position to assess accurately the probative value of evidence put before it. Some of these rules are concerned with the way evidence is relayed to the court, ensuring that evidence is presented directly to the court through eyewitnesses subject fully to testing through cross-examination. These rules form the subject of the later chapters of this book. Other rules exist to protect the trier from acting upon evidence that, even if presented in proper adversary form, remains in the law’s experience so generally unreliable that if received, or received without appropriate instruction, runs the risk of being given inappropriate (irrational) probative value by the trier of fact resulting in inaccurate decision-making. These rules form the subject of this chapter and Chapter 4. In that evidence legislation in Australia, including the uniform evidence legislation, builds upon common law principles, their more definitive rules can be categorised and discussed in the same way. 3.2 Notions of sufficient relevance and the residual discretions provide some filter against the receipt of evidence that, in the sense described above, can be described as unreliable. But these are flexible notions within which it is difficult for appellate courts to offer definitive guidance. In civil cases, the common law has left the control of the receipt of unreliable evidence to the application of these flexible notions. But in criminal cases, where proof of guilt is so strict that triers

of fact are directed to strive for proof beyond reasonable doubt, these notions provide scant protection against the risk that triers of fact will give inappropriate probative weight to unreliable evidence and convict an innocent accused. As a result, the more definitive rules to be considered in this chapter and the next have evolved at common law and can be found, if sometimes in a modified form, in the uniform and other legislation. Although originating in concerns about unreliability, these rules may also be conceptualised as ensuring that the accused is given the full protection of the [page 168] presumption of innocence, a presumption embodied in the common law principle (which may in turn be conceptualised as a fundamental constitutional principle or human right)1 that an accused be proved guilty beyond all reasonable doubt. This principle seeks to ensure that no innocent person is convicted. Those who criticise the strictness of these rules seeking accuracy bear the burden of demonstrating that their relaxation will not undermine this principle, or that the principle can be otherwise guaranteed, or that the principle is misguided altogether.2 The common law, the uniform evidence legislation and other state evidence legislation modifying the common law take two approaches to generally unreliable evidence tendered against an accused. On the first, the evidence is excluded from the trier of fact’s consideration altogether unless, exceptionally, it is capable in the circumstances of being probative and that probative value can be accurately assessed by the trier of fact. On the second, the evidence, although it may be put before the trier of fact, cannot be acted upon unless corroborated by other evidence, or at least unless the trier of fact has been warned against the dangers of acting upon it alone or otherwise directed about possible unreliabilities. The first approach is illustrated by the rules concerning character discussed in this chapter; the second forms the subject of Chapter 4.

Character evidence: one exclusionary principle 3.3 The common law’s attitude to information that can be broadly described as character evidence is at first sight ambivalent. On the one hand, the disclosure of

character lies at the very heart of the adversary trial, since the emphasis upon cross-examination in testing the credit of witnesses inexorably leads to them being asked questions about their character. Many aspects of character are assumed relevant to the determination of credit, and triers of fact are encouraged to consider character evidence for this purpose. Cross-examination, much of which is directed to revealing character regarded as relevant to a determination of the witness’s credit, has been described as the greatest legal engine for the discovery of truth.3 [page 169] But while recognising and encouraging the use of character evidence for this purpose the common law is, on the other hand, highly suspicious of the use of evidence revealing the accused’s character for the purposes of inferring a propensity4 towards the particular criminal conduct in issue. Consequently, the common law seeks to ensure that generally triers of fact are shielded from such propensity reasoning. It is this exclusionary principle, and this exclusionary principle alone, that has led the common law to evolving special rules applying to the receipt of evidence of the accused’s character in criminal cases. 3.4 The object of this chapter is to explain the scope of this exclusionary principle. Evidence that reveals an accused’s propensity towards crime and is tendered by the prosecution or by a co-accused as relevant to the material facts in issue is first dealt with. Both situations clearly enliven the exclusionary principle. The extent to which an accused who testifies may be cross-examined to reveal bad character is next considered. Character is generally relevant to determining the creditworthiness of a witness, but where that witness is the accused, the contradictory attitudes of the common law clash and must be reconciled. The extent to which accused can adduce evidence of good character to cast reasonable doubt upon their guilt of the crime charged is then considered; for, while at first sight this does not appear to enliven the exclusionary principle, that principle becomes important as soon as the prosecution seeks to challenge the evidence with information revealing bad character. Finally, situations where evidence of the character of persons other than an accused is tendered to establish material facts in issue are dealt with. In these last situations the exclusionary principle has no application, so that the receipt of evidence that may be described as character

evidence is arguably subject to no special common law rules and remains to be determined by the general rule of sufficient relevance.5 The cross-examination of witnesses other than the accused about character relevant to their credit, because it does not involve the exclusionary principle, is regarded as a separate topic and dealt with in Chapter 7.

Character defined in terms of propensity/tendency 3.5 The precise nature of character evidence is elusive and an abstract analysis is of doubtful practical assistance in this context. Only in one situation has the common law sought to define character; limiting the good character evidence an accused [page 170] can call to raise a reasonable doubt to evidence of the accused’s general reputation.6 In the case of legislation permitting cross-examination of the accused, courts have been obliged to interpret the word ‘character’.7 But even there, courts have avoided definition, concentrating instead upon the probative value of particular information tendered on issues before the court. The uniform legislation only uses the term in Pt 3.8, which regulates the tender and rebuttal of good character evidence, but no definition is provided and the meaning must be generated from the context. In this way, rules of admissibility concerning the accused’s character set their focus, not upon the nature of the tendered evidence, but upon the way in which it is argued that that evidence is relevant to facts in issue or to the accused’s credibility. 3.6 The exclusionary principle which lies at the heart of our consideration of character evidence centrally applies where evidence suggests, or makes it possible to infer, that because of a propensity or tendency to act or think in a particular way on other occasions, the accused acted or thought in the same way on the occasion in question.8 It is this sequential chain of reasoning that causes courts to view evidence with suspicion, not particular categorisations of evidence. This questionable chain of reasoning may be set up through evidence of an accused’s convictions or other misconduct, the opinions of acquaintances, or the reputation

that the accused holds in a community, but, for the purposes of the exclusionary principle, these categories of ‘character evidence’ cannot be regarded as closed. Any evidence disclosing an incriminating propensity/tendency in the accused to act or think in a particular way, and which may form the basis of the suspect chain of reasoning, can be regarded as character evidence for present purposes.9 The uniform legislation recognises the crucial role played by this sequential chain of reasoning in s 97: Evidence of the character, reputation or conduct of a person, or a tendency that a person has or had, is not admissible to prove that a person has or had a tendency (whether because of the person’s character or otherwise) to act in a particular way, or to have a particular state of mind …

It is this section that expressly picks up the common law’s fundamental reason for excluding character evidence: the suspect nature of what might be called sequential tendency/propensity reasoning. But suspicion of such reasoning also arguably lies at [page 171] the heart of s 98, which excludes evidence of ‘2 or more events’ to prove a person’s conduct or state of mind through the improbability of the similarity of the events and/or their circumstances occurring coincidentally (often referred to as ‘similar fact’ evidence). The prototypical case of improbability of coincidence is where similar events inclusive of the crime(s) charged are tendered to infer a course of conduct (a tendency or propensity) explicable only as criminal.10 In this sense, propensity/tendency is not used sequentially; rather, it is a conclusion based upon a series of events which compels the inference that all were criminal. As will be seen, the common law is also suspicious of such reasoning.11

Reasons for excluding evidence of propensity/tendency 3.7 The root of all reasons given for excluding evidence revealing propensity/tendency is the perceived difficulty in assessing the probative weight of the incriminating propensity reasoning arising from it. If this reasoning were a clear and reliable guide to particular conduct there would be no need for any special rules. The problem is that human beings are complex creatures. We lack

precise knowledge about what motivates people to act in certain ways upon particular occasions. Psychologists in the past have argued inconclusively about the predictive nature of a person’s propensity (‘trait theory’) in comparison with the environmental factors to which that person is subject (‘situationism’).12 More recent theory and research suggests not just that prediction of behaviour is a combination of both (‘interactionism’) but also that predictive character traits are better defined in relation to situational factors.13 Research on rates of recidivism also suggests that criminal propensity has substantial predictive value (confirming what criminal investigators would say they have always known) and therefore is of relevance at trial. Redmayne argues that recidividism rates are most probative when seen in comparative terms, demonstrating how much more [page 172] likely an accused with prior convictions is to have committed the crime charged than a member of the community without such a criminal record. But the problem remains in determining how much probative value to attribute. It is one thing to use criminal propensity as a predictive or investigative tool.14 It is much more problematic to determine the probative weight to assign that propensity in proof of specific conduct alleged against an accused.15 When this difficulty is coupled with the fundamental principle that an accused can be convicted only where the particular crime charged is established beyond all reasonable doubt,16 the law is compelled to be wary of evidence revealing the propensity of an accused, for even the most bona fide and ostensibly objective triers of fact may be misled into ascribing undeserved probative weight to such evidence.17 3.8 The justification becomes stronger where there is a risk that the trier of fact, consciously or subconsciously, may not approach its task in an objective fashion.18 While the frailties of jurors are often emphasised,19 all human triers are subject to unconscious prejudice — moral prejudice — against accused of particular propensities [page 173]

and backgrounds.20 The possibility of prejudice exists in all of us.21 The danger of acting on prejudice is compounded where there is uncertainty in ascribing probative value to propensity reasoning. The need to avoid this possibility where the freedom of the individual is at stake, where proof ought to be as certain as humanly possible, provides justification for the common law’s exclusionary principle. 3.9 Other arguments for exclusion cannot escape dependence upon the uncertain probative value of propensity reasoning. First, it is said that responsibility attaches to particular conduct, not propensity, and to allow inquiry into the latter merely diverts courts from their task. In other words, accused are not punished for their general propensity, and their propensities are of uncertain probative value to proving the particular crime in issue. Secondly, because courts sit to adjudge particular conduct, parties do not come to court prepared to defend their general propensities, and to allow tender of such evidence would take them by surprise.22 But one might say they are not prepared to meet such evidence because generally it is recognised as insufficiently probative of particular acts. If it were, they would come prepared.23 Thirdly, psychologists argue that evidence of propensity has other diverting effects upon triers of fact, who attempt to associate such character traits and thereby seek in an unreliable way to construct and judge the entire character of a party to an incident, particularly an accused.24 Also, psychologists and criminologists suggest that environmental factors are as important as character traits in determining behaviour in particular situations, and that an undue emphasis upon character traits may be misleading.25 These perspectives merely serve to emphasise that propensity reasoning is uncertain evidence of material facts in issue. [page 174] In the final analysis, it is the uncertainty of the probative value of propensity reasoning, coupled with the need to prove criminals guilty beyond reasonable doubt of particular crimes, that leads to the common law’s suspicion of the disclosure of an accused’s incriminating propensity.26 3.10 While the uniform legislation contains a demanding standard for the admissibility of tendency and coincidence reasoning in criminal cases (s 101), its suspicion of such reasoning extends beyond criminal cases. Sections 97 and 98

exclude such reasoning in all cases, criminal and civil, and to whomsoever such reasoning relates, unless of ‘significant probative value’. One might argue that although there are good reasons for special rules to protect an accused from reasoning arising from propensity, in other cases there is no need for rules beyond relevance (s 55) and the residual discretions (s 135).

The multi-relevance of character evidence 3.11 The rules in this area are complicated by a factor beyond the difficulty of assessing the probative value of reasoning arising from propensity. Tendered character evidence is very often relevant for a number of reasons, only one of which may involve propensity reasoning. Even where the evidence is relied upon for reasons independent of propensity, that propensity reasoning will still be revealed to the trier of fact and the law must decide how to deal with these competing inferences (be it through exclusionary rule, exclusionary discretion or mere direction to any jury). The suspect propensity inference may be almost overwhelming, yet the evidence may remain otherwise significantly relevant to an important fact in issue. For example, the prosecution in a case involving obtaining money by falsely pretending a brass ring to be gold, faced with a defence that the accused believed the ring to be gold, may seek to adduce evidence that the accused had previously been charged in similar circumstances in respect of the same ring, not for the purpose of establishing the accused’s propensity to commit such a crime, but to rebut the accused’s defence of ignorance about the quality of the ring in question.27 [page 175] The resolution of the dilemma produced by the presence of two inferences, one apparently extremely probative and the other suspect and potentially prejudicial, is fundamental to the development of the common law’s reception of evidence revealing the accused’s character. This multi-relevance demands that the law deals both with evidence tendered specifically in order to rely upon propensity or tendency reasoning, and also with evidence, tendered for another purpose, which nevertheless is capable of evoking that propensity or tendency reasoning. The multi-relevance is expressly recognised in ss 95, 97 and 98 of the

uniform legislation, which exclude only evidence tendered as tendency or coincidence reasoning. Consequently, evidence led for another purpose but revealing inadmissible tendency or coincidence reasoning must be dealt with through the accused invoking the ‘discretionary and mandatory exclusions’ (ss 135–137) or through direction.28 Whether the common law more generally excludes all prosecution evidence capable of giving rise to incriminating propensity reasoning, whatever the intended purpose of its tender, long remains at common law in Australia, as will be seen below, a moot point.

Prosecution Evidence Revealing the Accused’s Incriminating Propensity or Tendency The law in principle — an exclusionary presumption 3.12 This particular area of the law of evidence is traditionally regarded as one of the most difficult to understand and explain. One reason for this is that it is concerned with ensuring that evidence is given appropriate probative value and, as Chapter 1 shows, probative value can be (is always?) an elusive concept. Another is the difficulty of conceptualising rules of admissibility as regulating modes of reasoning rather than categories of information.29 Yet judges and legislators continue to attempt to define with some particularity the circumstances where evidence revealing an accused’s propensity or tendency may be admissible. The law would be much simplified if it just presumptively excluded all evidence revealing the accused’s propensity towards crime, but then permitted the tender of such evidence where the court determined that its probative value outweighed its possible prejudicial effect. This will be achieved where the trier of fact is likely, with appropriate directions, to assess rationally the proper probative value of the evidence (that is, is unlikely to give the evidence more probative value than it deserves). And this will be the case where either any relevant reasoning based on propensity is sufficiently clear and probative, or where the non-propensity relevance of the evidence is clear and any improper propensity reasoning arising can be guarded against through appropriate [page 176]

direction. This approach is essentially that taken when exercising the exclusionary Christie discretion (or where exclusion is demanded by s 137 of the uniform legislation), but there are two important differences. First, whereas the onus is on the accused to justify exercise of the exclusionary discretion (and the exercise of s 137),30 because of the ever-present danger of propensity reasoning arguably the onus should be placed upon the prosecution to justify the reception of the evidence. Secondly, by embodying this weighing process within a rule rather than a discretion, the likelihood of successful appeal against conviction sought on the basis of an improper ruling is in theory increased. The appeal could simply be decided on the merits, whereas an appeal against conviction on the basis of a wrongful exercise of discretion can only succeed by showing that the trial judge failed to take into account a relevant consideration or took into account an improper consideration.31 Such an approach, by avoiding more definitive legal guidelines, giving weight to the exclusionary principle, and recognising the difficulty of deciding where potentially prejudicial propensity reasoning arises, would focus courts upon the probative value of the particular evidence to the issues in the case and the ability of the trier of fact to accurately assess that value. Cases can then be read as decisions on their facts rather than as statements of a more definitive legal rule. That is not to say that this approach makes deciding any easier, but it focuses on underlying principles and issues, not technical legal distinctions which, as the discussion that follows shows, tends to divert courts from the reasons for the rules in the first place. [page 177] This principled approach was explained and powerfully advocated by McHugh J in Pfennig v R.32 Yet the majority was worried about leaving the application of exception to the exclusionary principle to what it termed ‘discretion’ rather than ‘rule’, and therefore demanded that evidence disclosing propensity in the case before them ‘ought not to be admitted if the trial judge concludes that, viewed in the context of the prosecution case, there is a reasonable view of it which is consistent with innocence’. This high standard may have been an appropriate standard for admissibility in that particular case, as the evidence was relevant through propensity reasoning and of a kind that any jury would likely act upon

once admitted. The case could in theory be simply regarded as a particular application of the principled approach explained above. But the court’s apparent demand for a definitive standard required that the circumstances where this standard applied also be defined. This threw open the whole question of the scope of the exclusionary rule at common law in Australia. For most jurisdictions in Australia, the question of the scope of the common law rule might be thought to be academic as the common law has been replaced by legislation in every jurisdiction other than Queensland. The uniform legislation replaces it with Pt 3.6, which controls the admissibility of ‘tendency and coincidence evidence’; in South Australia, Pt 3 Div 3 of the Evidence Act 1939 governs the admissibility of evidence of ‘discreditable conduct’; and in Western Australia, ‘propensity and relationship evidence’ must satisfy s 31A of the Evidence Act 1906 to be admissible. Only in Queensland does the common law provide the basic rules for admissibility, although modified by ss 132A and 132B of the Evidence Act. Yet while there are now various formulations of the exclusionary rules controlling the tender by the prosecution of evidence disclosing propensity the principle underlying the rules remains that developed at common law. Essentially, the legislation seeks to simplify and resolve problems continuing at common law. Thus fundamental distinctions drawn at common law remain (as has already been alluded to in the introductory discussion above) and the day-to-day control of the use of propensity evidence in courts remains extremely similar. It is just the legal framework that has changed. Therefore, to understand the new framework and to avoid statutory interpretations that might create difficulties, the common law is considered before moving to a consideration of the various statutory formulations.

The evolution of the common law exclusionary rule 3.13 The evolution of the common law exclusionary rule can be traced back to an oft-quoted dictum of Lord Herschell in Makin v Attorney-General (NSW):33 It is undoubtedly not competent for the prosecution to adduce evidence tending to shew that the accused has been guilty of criminal acts other than those covered by the

[page 178]

indictment for the purpose of leading to the conclusion that the accused is a person likely from his criminal conduct or character to have committed the offence for which he is being tried. On the other hand, the mere fact that the evidence adduced tends to shew the commission of other crimes does not render it inadmissible if it be relevant to an issue before the jury, and it may be so relevant if it bears upon the question whether the acts alleged to constitute the crime charged in the indictment were designed or accidental, or to rebut a defence which would otherwise be open to the accused.

In the case before him, the husband and wife accused had been charged with murdering a baby boy.34 The victim’s mother testified that, for a small and inadequate fee, the accused agreed to adopt and care for the child. Other testimony established that the child’s body had been found buried in premises occupied by the accused. The accused denied all knowledge of the victim and his mother, admitting only that they once agreed to look after a child for a short period for an adequate fee and later returned that child to its mother. To establish the crime (that the accused killed the child in question with the requisite intention), the prosecution tendered evidence that the (decomposed and unrecognisable) bodies of 12 other children were found buried in premises occupied at various times by the accused. In addition, the mothers of five infants testified that they too had entrusted their children to the accused for adoption for an inadequate fee, and had never again seen their children. There was also evidence that one of the accused had admitted to a fellow prisoner on remand that he was being held for ‘baby-farming’ and ‘that is what a man gets for obliging people’. In applying the above dictum, Lord Herschell concluded, shortly and unhelpfully, that the evidence tending to show other criminal misconduct was not ‘irrelevant to the issue to be tried by the jury’. To explain his brief conclusion one might point out that the evidence of the other deaths was not tendered to raise a sequential propensity chain of reasoning (that is, to argue that the accused murdered the other children therefore they murdered the victim of the crime charged). Rather, it was tendered to establish a probative coincidence, the argument being that the evidence relating to each child was not sufficient to prove how he or she died, but when one looked at all the evidence relating to the deaths of all the children, as a body of circumstantial evidence, it led to the irresistible conclusion that the accused were taking in and then killing children for profit (‘baby-farming’), the victim of the crime covered by the indictment being part of this overall scheme (or propensity).35

[page 179] The implicit premise in Lord Herschell’s conclusion was that no prejudice (risk of incorrect or irrational reasoning) arose through the revelation of the criminal acts other than that charged. The jury was not asked to rely upon a sequential chain of propensity reasoning. The jury was asked to decide whether all the circumstances were explicable by the improbable coincidence of accidental deaths resulting in profit to the accused or by the accused’s carrying on of a babyfarming business for profit, the particular victim being part of that business. The jury was in this sense asked to decide whether a generalisation of propensity embracing the accused’s guilt of the crime charged explained all the circumstances.36 There was no reason to think it was incapable of reasoning accurately towards that conclusion. For these reasons the evidence of other incidents was held admissible under the second limb of Lord Herschell’s dictum. On its facts the decision appears to be beyond criticism.37 3.14 The problem is that subsequent generations of lawyers sought to raise the statement of Lord Herschell to the status of a definitive (legislative) formulation of law. As commentators have shown, it just cannot stand up to rigorous analysis.38 In particular, if interpreted literally, the second sentence renders the first of no effect. Taken literally, the second sentence admits all relevant evidence, notwithstanding that it may be relevant only in showing the accused as the sort of person likely to commit crime. The point is that evidence revealing other misconduct is not excluded because it is irrelevant.39 Considerable reinterpretation is required to avoid the literal contradiction of the Herschell formulation and to explain when evidence disclosing other misconduct is admissible in exception to the rule. Ever since Makin, common law courts have struggled to state clearly the ambit of the exclusionary rule and when evidence is permitted in exception to it. On the one hand, it was argued the common law made inadmissible only evidence of other misconduct tendered for its propensity or coincidence reasoning, so that evidence otherwise relevant remained admissible subject to discretionary exclusion. On the other, it was argued that because of the risks to rectitude inherent in the revelation of an accused’s propensity towards crime, the common law made all evidence revealing

[page 180] other misconduct inadmissible unless the prosecution could establish that it had such probative weight that the risk of the fact-finder giving it excessive probative value could, with appropriate direction, be eliminated. However, for over 80 years English courts displayed a reluctance to apply principle, interpreting the first sentence as a rule of exclusion subject to the exception of evidence technically relevant to a particular defence raised by the accused. Courts thus set about defining the defences that could justify the exceptional admission of evidence disclosing other misconduct. Gradually courts increased the number of defences, with the House of Lords encouraging this technical process by declaring in 1952 in Harris v DPP40 that the categories of exception were not closed. Thus, courts were compelled to categorise cases allowing the exception to apply under the defences of identity, knowledge, mistake, involuntary conduct, accident, innocent association, and so on. Amid a morass of technical decisions, to the accompaniment of bewildered criticism from commentators, the reason for the exclusionary rule became all but lost.41 3.15 However, in DPP v Boardman,42 a majority of the House of Lords opted for an approach that excluded evidence of other misconduct whatever the purpose of tender unless of sufficient probative value to outweigh any improper (prejudicial) use that might arise. This was another case involving coincidence reasoning rather than sequential propensity reasoning. The accused, the headmaster at a male boarding school, was charged with three counts involving buggery with three pupils at his school. On appeal, only two of those counts remained in issue, it being alleged in one that the accused committed buggery with a 16-year-old pupil, and in the other, that the accused incited a 17-year-old pupil to commit buggery with him. The principal evidence in each count was the testimony of the complainant concerned, relating various incidents43 leading up to the offences charged. [page 181] The accused answered that some incidents never occurred at all, and that others, although involving some association with the complainants, were entirely

innocent. The credibility of the testimony of the complainants thereby became the principal issue in the case. With the law at that time being wary of juries acting upon the uncorroborated testimony of sexual assault complainants (see 4.40), there was little chance of conviction if the counts were considered separately, each supported only by the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant. Although the counts were in fact heard together (the accused had not applied for separate trials), the exclusionary limb of the rule in Makin required their separate treatment, supported by their separate evidence, unless it could be shown that the evidence on the one count was relevant and admissible to the other, pursuant to the second limb of that rule. It was argued that this was the case. The stories of the complainants bore striking similarity (nocturnal dormitory visits and, in each case, the suggestion by the accused that he be the passive party in the buggery) and, in the absence of evidence of collaboration or other common suggestion, it was unlikely that the complainants had invented such similar accounts. Therefore, while individually doubts about their credibility might exist, together there was the strong inference that the similarities were not simply explicable through a coincidence of lies but through the accused having committed the crimes as alleged (that is, through the accused having a particular propensity). In other words, coincidence reasoning rather than sequential propensity reasoning. 3.16 A minority (Lords Hailsham and Salmon) explained Makin as prohibiting only sequential propensity reasoning and as this was not the purpose of the tender in the case before them allowed the evidence to be admitted on each count. Given the strong probative weight they were prepared to give to the evidence, discretionary exclusion was rejected. But a serious difficulty with this interpretation was that previous decisions had admitted evidence of other misconduct relevant only through sequential propensity reasoning. In two particular situations this had been done: to establish the identity of a culprit; and to prove a relevant relationship between the accused and the victim or another party involved in the offence. 3.17 The first situation is illustrated by R v Straffen,44 where, to identify Straffen as the killer of a young girl, murdered in a most peculiar and brutal way, the prosecution was allowed to adduce evidence that Straffen was in the vicinity at the time, that he had escaped for two hours from nearby Broadmoor Prison where he was being detained, and that his detention was for the killing of two

young girls in precisely the same circumstances as the victim in question. This last piece of information, disclosing previous misconduct, was received under the Makin rule despite it acquiring its [page 182] probative force directly through the sequential propensity chain. It was the possession by Straffen of the peculiar propensity employed in the crime in question that identified him as the killer, the information being given crucial probative force by the coincidental evidence that Straffen was in the vicinity at the time in question. Similarly, in Thompson v R,45 the identifying testimony of a boy propositioned by the accused to commit crimes of indecency could be corroborated by information (the possession of powder puffs and indecent photographs) establishing the accused’s propensity towards crimes of that sort.46 The second situation, propensity admitted to prove a relevant relationship, is illustrated by R v Ball,47 where, to establish an act of incest, it was shown that the accused brother and sister were sleeping in the same house which contained only one bedroom furnished with a double bed, and that they had previously lived together as husband and wife during which time the sister had given birth to a child. The latter information was of significance only to establish a propensity on the part of the accused to act intimately towards each other and the propensity again assumed crucial significance when considered with the other evidence in the case. 3.18 On the other hand, the majority of their Lordships in Boardman, Lords Wilberforce, Morris and Cross, interpreted the first limb in Makin as excluding presumptively all evidence of other misconduct because it is always capable of giving rise to suspect propensity reasoning. For the evidence to be exceptionally admissible it must have a probative value beyond mere relevance to offset this suspect (prejudicial) reasoning. Lord Wilberforce required ‘a strong degree of probative force’,48 Lord Morris (at 439) evidence with ‘a really material bearing on the issues to be decided’, and Lord Cross (at 457), evidence which does more than raise suspicion but points so strongly to guilt ‘that only an ultra-cautious jury, if they accepted it as true, would acquit in face of it’. But their Lordships left it open for this probative value to be achieved either through the suspect chain of reasoning or in some other way.

This approach has two advantages over the minority approach: first, it leaves room for those cases that have admitted information probative only on grounds of propensity; secondly, it does not place any onus upon the accused. Although the majority appear not to have denied the existence of the residual discretion, the application of the principles in this area was not made dependent upon it.49 [page 183] 3.19 By this decision, the majority of the House of Lords paved the way to deciding the admissibility of evidence disclosing other misconduct by reference to the substantial question of the overall probative value of the evidence, keeping in mind that in other than the exceptional case propensity reasoning is likely to prejudice the trier of fact, be in some way given excessive probative value, and thereby run the risk of leading to the conviction of an innocent accused. Their Lordships made it quite clear that in dealing with evidence disclosing other misconduct it is counter-productive to attempt to formulate in any definitive way the situations in which evidence revealing misconduct can be regarded as sufficiently clearly probative to admit. Rather, this involves a careful analysis of the particular facts before the court, using natural rules to determine whether the trier of fact can gain assistance from the tendered evidence without there being a significant risk of it ascribing undue probative value to the evidence. 3.20 Yet still subsequent courts attempted to be more definitive of the law in this area. In England, for example, courts focused upon references in Boardman to the ‘striking similarities’ of the misconduct alleged on each occasion, and raised this to a test of admissibility.50 It took another House of Lords decision, DPP v P,51 to make it clear that although ‘striking similarities’ are often an indicator of probative value, this is not always or necessarily so. It is one thing to use previous decisions as analogies for present decisions; it is another to use previous decisions to provide definitive answers where ultimately the facts of the individual case must be decisive. In the result, the English common law approach was made clear: evidence revealing the accused’s propensity towards crime was inadmissible unless the prosecution could establish that in the circumstances the evidence could be given appropriate probative weight by the trier of fact. This was expressed as requiring the probative value of the evidence to outweigh its prejudicial effect.52 This

determination could only be made after a rigorous analysis of the evidence and its relationship to the facts in issue and [page 184] other available evidence. This approach recognised the inherent difficulties, adverted to in Chapters 1 and 2, of determining accurately the probative value of evidence. 3.21 The simplicity of the English common law approach contrasts starkly with that which, consequent to Boardman, developed in Australia. While the admissibility of evidence revealing other misconduct has been considered in a number of cases before the High Court,53 and while as judgments applying exclusionary principles to particular facts the decisions appear justified, the court has failed to give a simple, clear and coherent account of the scope of the exclusionary rule and the circumstances in which evidence can be admitted in exception to it. In particular, the court in Pfennig v R54 created confusion by attempting to define, in terms of the criminal standard of proof, the degree of probative value required to admit evidence in exception to the rule. Subsequent judgments, for example Phillips v R,55 HML v R56 and BBH v R,57 have failed to dispel the confusion. 3.22 The general principles, deriving directly from Makin, are expounded in the judgment of Gibbs ACJ in Markby v R,58 in a dictum applied in the later cases of Perry v R,59 Sutton v R60 and Pfennig v R.61 Gibbs CJ in Perry restated the principles as follows (at 585): The prosecution cannot adduce evidence tending to show that the accused has been guilty of criminal acts other than those with which he is charged if the evidence shows only that he had a propensity to commit crime, or crime of a particular kind, or that he was the sort of person likely to have committed the crime charged. On the other hand, if the evidence is relevant in some other way, it is admissible even though it reveals that the accused was disposed or likely to commit the sort of crime with which he is charged.

He went on to explain that these principles give rise to an exclusionary rule, not merely an exercise of discretion, and in terms derived from Boardman, emphasised (at 586) that to be admissible it is: … not enough that the evidence [falling within the exclusionary principle] should be only technically relevant (otherwise than as showing a propensity); it must be really material; it must have strong probative force.

[page 185] 3.23 In Perry, the accused, Mrs Perry, was charged with attempting to murder her husband by poisoning him with arsenic. She had an obvious opportunity to do so, and her alleged motive was the insurance policies on her husband’s life in her favour. In her defence, she explained that her husband must have ingested the poison while using an arsenic-based substance to restore an old musical instrument. To rebut this defence of accidental poisoning, the prosecution sought to prove that the accused had been similarly associated with the deaths of two previous husbands and of her brother. The High Court accepted that these previous deaths would be probative and admissible to meet the defence of accidental poisoning if in each case the evidence could show a previous husband who was heavily insured and poisoned by arsenic (that is, if the similarities were only explicable by reference to a specific propensity on the part of the accused). But the circumstances of the previous deaths were too dissimilar to be probative in this way; the brother’s life was not insured in the accused’s favour and a previous husband, who was insured, had died from an overdose of barbiturates, not arsenic poisoning. Only evidence of the other husband’s death was held sufficiently similar to be probative and therefore admissible in the event of a subsequent retrial. Again the admissibility of the evidence turned on arguments of probative value not dependent upon a sequential propensity chain of reasoning but on coincidence reasoning. As in Makin, none of the previous incidents showing a tendency or disposition to murder could be individually established. The argument was that the circumstances were not simply coincidental but capable of explanation upon the basis of the accused’s system (propensity) to poison her husbands for profit.62 3.24 Gibbs CJ’s approach appears to build on the approach of the minority in Boardman, distinguishing evidence relevant through sequential propensity reasoning from evidence otherwise relevant. However, it avoids placing any onus on the accused to persuade the court to exercise its residuary discretion and instead requires the prosecution to establish not just that the evidence disclosing other misconduct is relevant other than via sequential propensity reasoning but also that it has a sufficiently high probative value to justify reception. The

exclusionary discretion remains but, as the Chief Justice pointed out, will seldom be used where the rules of admissibility have been correctly applied.63 However, the difficulty of accommodating cases such as Straffen, Thompson and Ball, where evidence was admitted on the basis of sequential propensity reasoning, remained. It appeared, then, that Gibbs CJ had a different view of what constituted relevance on grounds that show other than propensity. [page 186] 3.25 The next case to come before the High Court, Sutton v R,64 did not resolve this issue. The accused was charged with various counts involving the rape and assault of three different women on three separate occasions. The issue was identity. One complainant was confident in her ability to identify the accused but the others were so uncertain that a finding of identity beyond reasonable doubt in their cases was unlikely or impossible. Prima facie, the incidents were unrelated, and should therefore have been separately tried, with evidence of the other incidents being inadmissible evidence disclosing propensity. But the prosecution argued that the three incidents could rightly be tried together because the similarities between the assaults indicated that the same offender must have been involved and, if the jury was prepared to find beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had committed one assault, then it could use this to connect him beyond reasonable doubt to the others. In these circumstances, it was argued that the evidence was admissible as an exception to the prohibition against revelation of other misconduct — as coincidence rather than sequential propensity. Both the trial judge and the High Court accepted the argument.65 The court held that, in the terms of Gibbs CJ’s statement of the principles, the evidence of the other assaults was not tendered to show the accused’s propensity but to infer that, having regard to the similarities, the crimes were committed by the same man.66 Once so inferred then acceptance of any one of the identifications was sufficient to convict him of all the crimes.67 The controversial question was whether the similarities were such that this conclusion could be drawn with sufficient probative force to admit the evidence revealing other crimes in exception to the general rule. While a somewhat borderline case, the court agreed the similarities could support this conclusion;68 that the jury could rationally so decide.

[page 187] In a more general discussion of the exclusionary rule, Deane J (at 557) sought to distinguish between evidence of ‘mere propensity’ and ‘evidence (of propensity) that is relevant for the reason that it is probative of a fact which is in issue’. His preference was to regard evidence going beyond mere propensity as admissible so long as it could be shown to be more probative than prejudicial: at 560. This approach maintains respect for the exclusionary principle while accommodating cases such as Straffen and Ball. It moves closer to the approach of the majority in Boardman. But it requires drawing a formal distinction in terms of ‘mere propensity’ and does not seek to specify in advance the required probative force of evidence beyond ‘mere propensity’. A simpler approach is to recognise that evidence of other misconduct, however relevant, should be presumptively excluded but to permit exception if it is more probative than prejudicial, whether that strength comes from sequential propensity reasoning or from some other form of reasoning. 3.26 It is this approach that was expressly accepted by Dawson J in Harriman v R.69 The accused was charged with the illegal importation of heroin into Australia. His associate had turned Queen’s evidence and testified to arranging the importation with the accused, meeting him in Bangkok, travelling to Chiang Mai where heroin was collected, and then, while the accused returned to Australia, flying to Britain and there posting the heroin to prearranged addresses in Western Australia. The defence admitted the trip to Thailand but claimed the accused had been innocently accompanying the associate on holiday. The associate was crossexamined to establish his previous involvement in the heroin trade, making the defence that the associate alone was guilty more credible. With the defence case looking promising, the prosecution successfully sought permission to adduce evidence that the accused and the associate had previously been involved together in the sale of heroin in Western Australia and that the accused had previously used heroin. The High Court accepted that the evidence of the previous association in the sale of heroin was admissible. This evidence strongly suggested (could rationally be used by the jury to conclude) that the accused did not accompany his associate on the trip to Chiang Mai, a known source of heroin, for the mere purpose of a holiday. On

[page 188] the other hand, the evidence of previous drug use was held not sufficiently probative to be admitted, but in the circumstances the court held that its wrongful admission produced no substantial miscarriage of justice. Dawson J simply explained that the general rule prohibits evidence of other behaviour indicating criminal propensity until it can be shown to be so probative that its admission is justified notwithstanding its apparently prejudicial effect. He emphasised the approach of the majority in Boardman. He cited Straffen and Ball as examples where evidence of previous misconduct was admissible, as an exception, through the sequential propensity chain of reasoning. In the case before him, by analogy to Ball, the evidence of the previous association to sell heroin was admissible to establish a relationship and a propensity to act in accordance with it. Toohey and Gaudron JJ took a similar approach. 3.27 That sequential propensity reasoning is exceptionally permissible was endorsed by all members of the High Court in Pfennig v R.70 The accused was charged with murder. The victim, a young boy, had disappeared from a river reserve in suspicious circumstances, his bicycle and clothes left as if he had gone swimming. No body could be found in the river. It was accepted that the only possible explanation for the disappearance was abduction and murder. The question was the identity of the abductor. Witnesses testified to when the victim was last seen, and one to hearing a disturbance and a vehicle driving off at speed. The accused admitted he had been in the vicinity at the time of the boy’s disappearance, camping in the area in his white campervan. He also admitted having spoken to the victim. A witness identified the sound of the exhaust at the time of the disturbance with that of the exhaust of the accused’s van. To identify the accused, the prosecution sought to tender evidence that a year later the accused had abducted another boy in the same van and had sexually assaulted him. The accused had placed the boy’s bicycle at the top of a cliff to lay a false trail. The boy had escaped. When apprehended for this later crime the accused said he had been thinking of ‘it’ for 12 months. The defence argued that the evidence of the other criminal conduct was presumptively inadmissible and that, as it could only identify the accused through a sequential propensity chain of reasoning, it could not be exceptionally admitted.

The argument was rejected. All members of the High Court accepted that evidence relevant only via the sequential propensity chain of reasoning can be exceptionally admitted if sufficiently clearly probative of the crime in issue. In the circumstances, they required the evidence to bear, having regard to the prosecution evidence, no reasonable explanation other than that it had been the accused who had abducted the [page 189] boy in question. On the evidence before them they agreed that this was the case and that the evidence had been correctly admitted to identify the accused. But, by suggesting that sequential propensity reasoning is presumptively inadmissible unless it bears no reasonable explanation other than the accused’s guilt, as will be seen, the High Court has focused attention upon exactly what is the scope of the exclusionary presumption in the first place. This appears to be a difficult exception to invoke and the presumption appears to extend to evidence (for example, of a relevant relationship) that has long been admitted. Thus Pfennig squarely raises the ambit of the common law exclusionary presumption.

The ambit of the common law exclusionary rule Discreditable conduct 3.28 Lord Herschell’s dictum in Makin v Attorney-General (NSW)71 is expressed simply to apply to ‘criminal acts other than those covered in the indictment’. It is revelation of these that most obviously creates the opportunity for prejudicial propensity reasoning and invokes the exclusionary principle. But taken literally this extends the exclusionary presumption only to evidence of conduct capable of constituting a criminal offence. Conduct that may be regarded as discreditable and capable of giving rise to propensity reasoning is not presumptively excluded (although an accused still may persuade the court to exclude it in exercise of the Christie discretion). This literal interpretation has been applied in the Supreme Court of South Australia. In R v Von Einem,72 evidence that the accused was homosexual in order to explain the motive for an abduction was not regarded as within any exclusionary rule. In R v Turney,73 evidence of an accused’s (lawful but extreme) sexual practices with his wife was held outside the exclusionary

rule.74 In Pfennig, although the application of the exclusionary rule was simply assumed, the majority (at 464) echo the Makin ambit in discussing ‘evidence which is received notwithstanding that it discloses the commission of offences other than those with which the accused is charged’. 3.29 There exists, however, quite a strong body of authority that in the main simply assumes the application of the exclusionary rule to evidence of noncriminal [page 190] discreditable conduct revealing a potentially prejudicial propensity,75 and a majority of the High Court appears to support such a view in the following case. In HML v R,76 the court was asked to determine whether a complainant to a charged sexual assault could also testify to alleged but uncharged criminal acts and other non-criminal sexual misconduct towards her by the accused (her father) in order to support her direct testimony of the charged assaults.77 One act of ‘noncriminal sexual misconduct’ concerned the purchase by the accused of a G-string (underwear) for the 10-year-old complainant. Others concerned the accused’s tendency to walk around naked when the complainant was nearby and an incident involving his filming of her naked. Hayne J, with whom Kirby and Gummow JJ agreed, expressly extends the exclusionary rule beyond disclosure of other criminal misconduct to all discreditable acts,78 and, applying the Pfennig test, held that filming the naked complainant showed a sexual interest inconsistent with innocence (at [173]), whereas the purchase of the G-string was more ambiguous and strictly inadmissible (at [174]–[176]). Heydon J is less clear about the scope of the exclusionary presumption, considering the non-criminal acts and the uncharged criminal acts together in discussing their relevance and admissibility: at [279]. While the remaining members of the court refused to apply the rigorous Pfennig test to the evidence in question, regarding it as relevant otherwise than through propensity, nevertheless Gleeson CJ and Crennan J suggest that the exclusionary principle applies whenever evidence reveals propensity through criminal or otherwise discreditable conduct, and that such evidence should not be admitted unless shown to be more probative than prejudicial.79

[page 191] Therefore, although there remains disagreement in the High Court over whether the Pfennig test applies where non-propensity uses are being relied upon (see 3.38 below), there is a clear majority in favour of extending the exclusionary rule beyond criminal conduct to include other discreditable conduct. This is consistent with the exclusionary principle that seeks to protect an accused from prejudicial propensity reasoning. It is of no mere coincidence that this terminology forms the basis of statutory reform in South Australia: discussed below at 3.64. 3.30 A more limited ambit for the exclusionary rule is suggested in the judgment of Brennan J in Harriman v R.80 It applies the rule to exclude ‘[e]vidence that an accused has committed other offences of the same or similar character’, justifying this limit in the following dictum: Where the evidence tendered to prove the commission of another offence does not reveal an offence of the same general kind or character as the offence charged, usually there is no occasion to consider the principles relating to the admission of similar fact evidence for, prima facie, the evidence will not reveal an offence the commission of which might tend to show the commission of the offence charged.

Using this logic in the case before him, Brennan J was prepared, not only to admit evidence relating to the previous criminal association between the accused and the chief prosecution witness (heroin selling), but also evidence of the accused’s previous heroin use; neither previous misconduct was similar to the importing offences alleged, persons involved with heroin are likely to have incentives to trade, and Brennan J was not persuaded that the exclusionary discretion should be exercised. This approach takes as its starting point the assumption that the exclusionary rule is directed to the prohibition of ‘similar facts’. The term ‘similar facts’ is often resorted to by judges and commentators but is a source of confusion.81 The principle behind the exclusionary rule — that of avoiding prejudice to an accused through unreliable propensity reasoning — applies whether the revealed misconduct is similar to the crime charged or not.82 It may generally be more prejudicial where it is similar (or sometimes very probative either via sequential propensity reasoning or as coincidence

[page 192] evidence explicable by propensity)83 but the exclusionary principle requires that an accused should be more generally protected against the revelation of potentially prejudicial propensity. The danger of watering down the protection to an accused is well illustrated by Brennan J’s decision to admit all of Harriman’s heroin-related crimes, not merely those proving his association with the chief prosecution witness. 3.31 Another limit to the ambit of the exclusionary rule is suggested by McHugh J in Harriman v R.84 He points out that the Makin rule extends to prohibit evidence revealing other misconduct. Therefore, if the conduct can be regarded as part of the transaction in issue, as part of the res gestae, the exclusionary rule has no apparent application. He concludes that courts must, therefore, ask as a preliminary question, whether evidence is tendered as part of the res gestae, or whether it can be categorised as only circumstantial evidence of the crime charged.85 But this categorisation is potentially misleading. The conduct subject to the charge is formally alleged. Evidence of conduct outside this is tendered in proof of the conduct charged. If it is relevant it is prima facie admissible, but if it reveals potentially prejudicial propensity reasoning its admissibility should be justified. While one can appreciate McHugh J’s point that evidence which is part of a transaction will generally be admitted as sufficiently probative of the acts charged, the formal categorisation of evidence as res gestae or circumstantial evidence is of little or no assistance in proving the facts charged. Brennan J, while seeing the substance of McHugh J’s point, was doubtful that the categorisation was useful: Harriman (at 594). Certainly, in the hearsay context, the notion of res gestae has produced much confusion: see 8.66–8.72. Yet references to res gestae continue. Gleeson CJ (at [24]) and Kiefel J (at [495]) in HML v R86 suggest the idea of res gestae may explain the admissibility of allegations by the victim of a sexual assault of uncharged acts. But such allegations are better regarded as examples of relevant evidence sufficiently probative to admit in exception to the exclusionary rule rather than as illustrative of any separate legal doctrine.87 [page 193]

Discreditable conduct tendered as propensity 3.32 This discussion so far of the ambit of the exclusionary presumption takes as its starting point the presumption that the exclusionary rule applies to all evidence capable of giving rise to propensity reasoning, whether or not the evidence is tendered for that purpose. The justification for this in principle, already expressed above, is that, whatever the reason for its tender, such evidence is potentially prejudicial and should be carefully scrutinised by courts before it is admitted. But the appropriateness of this approach is thrown into doubt by the decision in Pfennig v R,88 requiring the highest degree of probative value before evidence is admitted in exception to the exclusionary rule. The problem is that if this is the test of exceptional admissibility, and if the exclusionary presumption extends to all discreditable conduct, there will be conduct which courts regard as more probative than prejudicial, which in the past has been admitted and which in principle should be admitted, that runs the risk of being excluded. The problem then is to refine the situations to which the Pfennig test appropriately applies. Although it may be appropriate in situations such as Pfennig, where the evidence is tendered for the very purpose of propensity reasoning and is decisive of conviction, it is less appropriate where evidence is tendered for other purposes and only incidentally reveals a prejudicial propensity (for example, evidence of escape from nearby prison to prove the accused in the vicinity of the crime). State courts have therefore distinguished Pfennig as applying only where evidence is tendered for its propensity reasoning. But instead of then saying that evidence of other misconduct not tendered for its propensity reasoning remains presumptively excluded unless shown by the prosecution to be more probative than prejudicial, some state courts, [page 194] without discussion, assumed such evidence outside the exclusionary presumption altogether.89 As a consequence, where evidence of other misconduct is tendered for a non-propensity purpose it can only be excluded if the accused can persuade the court to exercise its exclusionary discretion.90

Relationship evidence 3.33 This more limited exclusionary rule has been applied by state courts to explain the admissibility of evidence loosely described as ‘evidence of relationship’.91 The relationship between an accused and victim can be relevant in various ways, depending upon the precise issues in the case and the exact evidence adduced. In many previous cases, relevant evidence of relationship has been admitted without mention of any exclusionary rule. Most notoriously in Wilson v R, where the High Court endorsed the trial judge’s decision to permit witnesses to be called to testify to a violent relationship between the accused and his wife in order to rebut his defence to a charge of murder, that a gun he admitted holding discharged accidentally, killing his wife.92 The problem is that the probative value of such evidence does depend upon the acceptance of the propensity/tendency of people to act in a certain way towards each other. But the incriminating inference sought can be conceptualised as not being [page 195] drawn directly from that tendency. Rather, in a case such as Wilson, the inference is that the accused’s innocent explanation that the gun discharged accidentally is made less credible in the light of the antagonistic relationship established. The distinction may be subtle and one of degree but it can ensure that the jury remains instructed in terms of the exclusionary principle. 3.34 In sexual assault cases, evidence revealing the relationship of the accused and the complainant is commonly received.93 Where this evidence discloses no criminal offence by the accused it may be regarded as outside the exclusionary rule altogether. But even where it does reveal criminal misconduct, often uncharged acts of assault by the accused on the complainant,94 courts still generally admit this evidence subject to appropriate direction. With the relevance sought being incapable of satisfying the strict Pfennig test, Doyle CJ in R v Nieterink,95 citing BRS v R and Gipp v R,96 explains that such evidence is admissible outside the exclusionary principle where it is not tendered for a purpose dependent upon acceptance of the accused’s propensity.97 In the case

[page 196] before him Doyle CJ concluded (at [76]) that evidence given by the complainant of a continuing sexual relationship, including uncharged acts, was admissible to explain the ‘lead up to the first charged incident’; ‘the lack of surprise on the part of [the complainant]’; ‘the confidence that the [accused] might have in repeating his conduct’; ‘the failure of [the complainant] to complain to her mother’; and to ‘establish a sexual attraction by the [accused] towards [the complainant]’. None of these he regarded as propensity purposes. 3.35 This is problematic and depends upon exactly what inferences are being sought. In Nieterink, the central issue for the jury was the credibility of the complainant’s direct testimony about the charged acts. There was no independent corroboration. If the complainant had simply testified to the charged acts the jury would have been left wondering what had led up to these crimes. The question was whether in assessing her credibility it was appropriate for the jury to take into account her entire story about her relationship with the accused. The prosecution was not asking the jury to infer directly the accused’s guilt of the incidents charged from the propensity of the accused to act in a particular way towards the complainant, for this would have undermined the exclusionary principle. Rather, it was seeking to infer the credibility of the complainant from the coherence of the entire story she had to tell.98 No part of that story was corroborated to make it capable of independent prior proof. Her story stood or fell on the basis of its internal consistency, and the disclosure of the entire relationship was an important part in establishing that internal consistency.99 Explained in this way the inferences do not appear to rely upon a sequential propensity chain of reasoning.100 3.36 On the other hand, the relationship can also be relied upon to infer the accused’s sexual interest in the complainant (‘guilty passion’), which, by providing a motive for the crimes alleged, confirms the credibility of the remainder of the complainant’s story. This does appear to be a use dependent upon acceptance of propensity. Where the only evidence of sexual interest comes from the complainant herself, to direct the [page 197]

jury to use the evidence in this way would seem only to risk propensity reasoning, when the jury could simply be directed to consider the complainant’s story as a whole in deciding whether to accept it as proving the crimes charged.101 But where there is independent evidence confirming the accused’s sexual interest in the complainant, it would seem more appropriate to direct the jury that it may use this evidence of sexual interest to confirm the complainant’s account. However, this use of evidence of sexual interest, whether it comes from complainant or independent witness, clearly involves a sequential propensity use.102 Nevertheless, again it may be argued, as in Wilson v R,103 that so long as the prosecution is not seeking to infer directly the accused’s guilt from this motive, it does not run up against the exclusionary principle and can be admitted.104 Where evidence of past violence is tendered to explain why a complainant did not complain it may be argued that the issue being the state of mind of the complainant it is not tendered as evidence of propensity.105 If there is a propensity link it is again indirect so that the evidence may be admissible without unduly undermining the exclusionary principle.106 [page 198] Where possible the jury should be entitled to consider all relevant evidence. By the same token it should only be discouraged from using propensity reasoning where there is an unacceptable risk that it will be misused. The above approach compromises these objectives. What remains important, as Doyle CJ emphasises, is that each case be analysed on its own facts and that the jury be directed accordingly and precisely upon the permissible and impermissible uses of the evidence.107 Directions thus assume vital importance: see below at 3.73ff. With the admissibility of other misconduct depending on fine distinctions such as these, in the face of growing allegations of sexual assault and difficulty with their proof, and in the light of research suggesting at least the strong probative value of comparative recidivism rates, it is interesting to observe that rr 413–415 of the United States Federal Rules of Evidence make evidence of the commission of another offence for sexual assault or child molestation respectively ‘admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant’. The intention is to admit ‘relevant’ propensity reasoning in these defined situations in

exception to the general prohibition: r 404. The accused may still seek exclusion under the residual discretion: r 403.108 Other non-propensity uses 3.37 A similar approach to the admissibility of evidence capable of giving rise to a propensity use (evidence of discreditable conduct) can be found in prosecutions relating to the possession, importing, growing or manufacture of drugs.109 In R v Long and [page 199] McDonnell,110 the accused were charged with being involved in the manufacture of amphetamines. An accomplice admitted manufacture with McDonnell in Long’s house and agreed to testify against both. When police raided the premises the accomplice and McDonnell were in the process of dismantling the amphetamines laboratory. Long and McDonnell claimed ignorance of the accomplice’s project and the prosecution sought to rebut this ignorance by establishing their prior amphetamine use, and by proving, through the accomplice, previous amphetamine manufacture by McDonnell and the accomplice in Long’s house with her consent. Doyle CJ held the evidence admissible for the non-propensity uses of showing that the accused had a motive for the manufacture, that Long had no objection to manufacture on her premises, and to show that McDonnell had knowledge of the process of amphetamine manufacture. So far as the evidence showed a propensity in the accomplice and McDonnell to manufacture together in similar circumstances (one might call this an ‘amphetamine manufacturing relationship’), which directly negatived McDonnell’s story that he was an innocent participant in the dissembling of the laboratory, Doyle CJ held that this evidence did fall within the exclusionary rule as evidence of propensity. However, it was exceptionally admissible because, given the circumstances in which the accomplice and McDonnell were caught red-handed, there was no reasonable possibility that they were not indulging their previous propensity to manufacture amphetamines in Long’s house. The analogy with the facts in Harriman v R (discussed at 3.26) is extremely strong. As far as the non-propensity uses mentioned by Doyle CJ are concerned, they all appear to depend upon acceptance of prior misconduct and hence propensity;

but again, no direct inference of guilt was sought from the propensity — rather, inferences of motive, state of mind and knowledge from which guilt could in turn be inferred in combination with other relevant inferences.111

HML v R: the ambit unresolved 3.38 Thus, the requirement of strict probative value laid down by the High Court in Pfennig has forced state courts to rethink the scope of the exclusionary rule in order to ensure the admissibility of evidence revealing other criminal misconduct from [page 200] which they believe a jury can, with appropriate instruction, draw accurate factual conclusions. The propriety of this approach was considered by the High Court in HML v R112 (also discussed at 3.29 above). The case concerned appeals from verdicts in three separate South Australian cases where the approach of Doyle CJ in Nieterink had been followed by both prosecuting counsel and trial judge in admitting and directing upon evidence of uncharged acts and other misconduct — evidence revealed by the complainant of a sexual assault in explaining the background relationship and lead-up to sexual assaults charged. Unfortunately, although all judges agreed that the appeals should be dismissed, they divided upon the appropriateness of the ‘non-propensity approach’ to such cases. Three judges, Gleeson CJ (at [22]–[25]), Crennan J (at [454]–[455]) and Kiefel J (at [505]), endorsed the approach. Heydon J did not find it necessary to decide as he was of the opinion that even if the exclusionary rule did apply, the Pfennig test was satisfied: at [335].113 In a forceful judgment, endorsed by Kirby and Gummow JJ, Hayne J emphasised that, despite there being other non-propensity uses for the evidence of uncharged acts and discreditable conduct in question, it was extremely unlikely a jury in such a case would be able to put aside the prejudicial propensity reasoning inherent in their disclosure, and therefore, unless the Pfennig test was satisfied the evidence could not be admitted. Once satisfied, the evidence became admissible for all relevant purposes, including through propensity reasoning. He also considered that generally the Pfennig test would be satisfied where uncharged crimes against the complainant were tendered (at [171]), and

was so satisfied in the cases before him. However, he held that it might often be more difficult to satisfy the test where merely discreditable conduct is revealed (at [172]), and whilst filming the naked complainant showed a sexual interest inconsistent with innocence (at [173]) the purchase of the G-string was more ambiguous and strictly inadmissible (at [174]–[176]). While Gleeson CJ and Crennan and Kiefel JJ were of the view that the Pfennig test for exceptional admissibility only applied to evidence of discreditable conduct relied upon for its propensity reasoning, where other uses were invoked Gleeson CJ (at [24]) and Crennan J (at [466]–[467]) were of the view that the prosecution was also required to convince the court that, if the inadmissible (and prejudicial) propensity use could not be prevented through direction, then the judge was required to determine the evidence more probative than prejudicial before admitting it. Kiefel J is less clear and may be interpreted as obliging the defence to turn to the Christie discretion in these circumstances: at [504]–[505]. The approach of all three judges requires the Pfennig test to be applied where evidence is tendered for propensity purposes so that the distinction between propensity and non-propensity uses remains crucial. [page 201] Subsequent High Court decisions contain ambiguous dicta on the scope of the common law rule,114 although in BBH v R, whilst Hayne J (at [68], [78]) endorses his approach in HML, Crennan and Keiffel JJ (at [147]–[149]) appear to be joined by Bell J (at [172]) in regarding Pfennig as applying only to evidence tendered to prove a relevant propensity. In lower courts judges have continued similarly to restrict the scope of Pfennig.115 As mentioned above, the common law now only applies in Queensland but subject to an important modification. Section 132B of the Evidence Act 1977 permits, in specified charges, evidence of the history of a domestic relationship where simply relevant (whether through propensity or otherwise) and s 130 permits the accused to argue that this evidence be excluded if unfairly prejudicial. The High Court in Roach v R116 has interpreted these sections to abolish the application of the Pfennig test where they apply. Where this legislation runs out, Queensland courts must continue to apply the common law as interpreted by the High Court.

Whether the Pfennig test for an exceptional probative value of propensity use is as strict as first appears is another matter, discussed below: at 3.45ff. 3.39 Another question is where this leaves the common law in respect of socalled similar fact or coincidence cases (Makin, Boardman, Perry, Hoch and Phillips). As argued above, while these decisions do not depend upon sequential propensity reasoning they do rely upon coincidence to establish a propensity inclusive of the crimes charged and for this reason fall within the exclusionary principle. Thus many of the leading authorities on the admissibility of other misconduct already discussed (most notably [page 202] Makin and Boardman) have involved such reasoning and Phillips v R117 confirms that the Pfennig test must be satisfied to make such reasoning admissible. The distinctive nature of this coincidence reasoning from similar facts and the need for it to have clear probative value is expressly recognised by ss 98 and 101 of the uniform legislation: discussed below at 3.58ff. 3.40 Evidence disclosing other misconduct may be exceptionally admissible via either sequential propensity reasoning or coincidence (similar fact) reasoning or even via a mixture of the two. Indeed, it is important that the probative strength of propensity evidence be considered in the light of other evidence and often arguments of coincidence then become crucial. Thus, in Straffen, the propensity of the accused gained strength from evidence that the accused was in the vicinity of the crime when it occurred; in Ball, the evidence of a sexual relationship between the accused brother and sister only assumed force as propensity because of other evidence that they were living together in a one-bedroom house. In BBH v R,118 Crennan and Kieffel JJ (at [159]), with Bell J agreeing (at [199]), more controversially held the jury could use the coincidences between the testimony of the victim (V), alleging sexual assaults by the accused, and the testimony of W, a witness to a more equivocal event between the accused and V (but not remembered by her), to infer that the equivocal event could only also have been a sexual assault and then use the guilty passion (propensity) established as consistent only with the occurrence of the assaults testified to by the victim. French CJ rejected the argument as circular (at [58]) and declared that ‘[t]he

equivocal nature of the evidence marked this as a case of logical irrelevancy’ (at [57]). As will be seen below (at 3.54ff) the use of a combination of coincidence and propensity reasoning may create problems under the uniform legislation, which has different requirements for the admissibility of such evidence under ss 97 and 98 respectively and requires separate notices of proposed tender.119 Finally it should be noted that where evidence is tendered for its propensity/tendency reasoning, certainly if the propensity is an indispensable intermediate fact, applying Shepherd v R, the jury must be directed to find that propensity proved beyond reasonable doubt before acting upon it to convict the accused: see at 2.87 for a detailed discussion of this issue. [page 203]

Justifying exceptional admissibility Justification in principle 3.41 The justification for the reception of evidence caught by the exclusionary rule (whatever its precise ambit might be) should be that the evidence is relevant and its probative value is capable of rational and accurate assessment by the jury. Thus, for evidence to be admissible as propensity the trier must be in a position to assess the probative value of that propensity and not be misled by false reasoning or improper moral prejudice that it may provoke. Where the evidence remains inadmissible as propensity but is relevant for another reason outside the exclusionary principle, then for it to be so admissible the trier must be in a position to distinguish between the admissible and inadmissible uses, and to put aside any influence the inadmissible use may have. Although these tests are traditionally formulated in terms of whether the probative value ‘outweighs’ any prejudicial effect, as McHugh J in Pfennig v R explained, this is not strictly a weighing process, as probative value and prejudice are really incommensurables.120 Rather, the question is whether the jury, with appropriate direction, is capable of using the evidence in a rational and balanced way to determine accurately the material facts in issue. As McHugh J concluded, this determination requires ‘a value judgment, not a mathematical calculation’.121

This being the justification for exceptional admissibility, one might argue that as this value judgment turns so closely upon the particular facts and circumstances of the case, the law should not seek to define further the test for exceptional admissibility.122 Past decisions can then be read as decisions on their facts from which factual analogies might be drawn rather than being read as formulating rules to apply in specific situations. 3.42 It might, however, be possible to draw some generalisations. For example, past cases suggest that a sequential propensity chain of reasoning is most likely exceptionally admissible first, to link (identify) a culprit to a proved crime via a distinctive propensity, and secondly, to establish the commission of a crime by reference to a relationship between victim and accused within which such a crime was likely to occur. Central examples of sequential propensity reasoning being used to identify an accused include R v Straffen and Pfennig v R (discussed above respectively at 3.17 and 3.27). In each of these cases, the prosecution sought to show that the crime in question had been committed in a distinctive way and then to connect the accused with the crime by showing, first, that the accused was in the vicinity at the time, and secondly, that the accused had previously committed a similarly distinctive crime. It can be readily [page 204] appreciated that the probative strength of the propensity established cannot be assessed without considering all other evidence connecting the accused to the crime. Central examples of establishing the commission of a crime by reference to a relationship within which such a crime was likely to occur, include R v Ball and Harriman v R123 (discussed above respectively at 3.16 and 3.26). In each of these cases, the accused are proved to be found in circumstances which a prior relationship directly suggests involved criminal misconduct. More recently, in HML v R124 (discussed at 3.38), Hayne J suggests that on a charge of sexual assault evidence of other uncharged sexual assaults between the accused and complainant will generally be admissible. Again, the strength of this suggestion will depend upon all the evidence in the case (for example, in Ball it was

significant that the accused were living together in a house with one double bed recently used). It is less easy to generalise in those cases that do not depend upon sequential propensity reasoning but seek to establish the accused’s involvement in a series of crimes through circumstances explicable not by improbable coincidence but by a generalisation based upon the accused’s propensity towards those particular crimes — cases such as Makin v Attorney-General (NSW); Perry v R; Sutton v R; DPP v Boardman; Hoch v R; Thompson v R; and Phillips v R.125 More recently, the High Court rejected the use of coincidence reasoning in Stubley v Western Australia.126 These are circumstantial evidence cases that turn very much upon their particular facts. Similarities may often, [page 205] but not necessarily as Phillips and Stubley illustrate, be used in assessing probative strength in relation to the particular facts in issue. 3.43 Another approach is to ask whether the law can be more definitive in prescribing the required probative strength for exceptional admissibility. General principles need to be kept in mind. In the first place, juries should be left to make decisions of fact where possible. In particular, it should be left to the jury to decide the credibility of witnesses upon which the acceptance of evidence depends. It needs to be kept in mind that the object of the exercise is to protect the accused from irrational or morally prejudiced reasoning by the jury. One way in which courts can provide protection is to ensure that the evidence is capable of such probative value that the jury will, with appropriate direction, be protected from such reasoning altogether, or at least be unlikely to use it.127 But what probative value is sufficient?128

Striking similarity 3.44 In cases involving the tender of similar facts, either tendered as propensity evidence (as in Straffen and Pfennig) or as coincidence evidence (as in Makin, Perry, Sutton, Boardman, Hoch and Phillips), one test of probative strength, found in DPP v Boardman,129 is that of ‘striking similarity’. It is clear from all the cases just mentioned that striking similarities are often a strong indicator of probative force, as the majority in Hoch expressly recognises.130 In a number of English cases131

this test of probative strength was raised to a test of admissibility, until the House of Lords in DPP v P132 pointed out its limits. Striking similarities may be explicable in probative terms but not always (for example, Hoch illustrates that similarities may be explained by collusion or concoction). They cannot in themselves constitute a test of probative strength133 and a mechanical search for similarities may distract the court from a rigorous quest for probative value.134 And evidence may be sufficiently probative without the need [page 206] for ‘striking’ similarities.135 Thus, in Thompson v R,136 Gaudron and Deane JJ preferred to look for an ‘underlying unity’ to explain a series of related incidents rather than striking similarities: see Deane J (at 32) and Gaudron J at (39–41).137 In cases where a culprit is identified by inferring that a series of crimes was committed by the same person (as in Sutton), or where an accused is directly identified through a proved propensity (as in Straffen and Pfennig), striking similarities are often relied upon, but an accused may be identified through one outstanding feature of his or her other conduct (leaving his or her mark).138 Striking similarities are merely an indicator, albeit a common and often strong indicator, of probative strength either through propensity or coincidence reasoning.

Specifying a required probative value: the Pfennig test 3.45 The more recent focus of the High Court has been an attempt to specify the degree of probative strength required to outweigh the possible prejudice of evidence otherwise within the general prohibition. This approach has crystallised through the cases of Hoch v R, Harriman v R, Pfennig v R, Phillips v R and HML v R.139 The court has made it clear that, at least in some contexts, it does wish to specify the degree of probative strength required for admissibility. In exactly which contexts, as the previous discussion of the scope of the exclusionary rule above demonstrates, remains a moot point. Nevertheless, the majority in Pfennig (at 483; [60]) was of the opinion that this approach is necessary as otherwise ‘striking the balance will continue to resemble the exercise of a discretion rather than the exercise of a principle’. What principle exactly the majority had in mind is not clear. Certainly, juries should not convict unless satisfied beyond reasonable

doubt, but generally it is their role to decide the probative value of evidence. Only where there is a risk that juries are incapable of a rational and accurate determination should the judge interfere. If this is the overriding principle then the court should clarify in precisely which circumstances the risk requires imposing a particular standard of probative value before leaving evidence to a jury. 3.46 Putting this problem aside, the degree of probative strength required is explained by the majority in Pfennig thus:140 [page 207] Because propensity evidence is a special class of circumstantial evidence, its probative force is to be gauged in the light of its character as such. But because it has a prejudicial capacity of a high order, the trial judge must apply the same test as a jury must apply in dealing with circumstantial evidence and ask whether there is a rational view of the evidence that is consistent with the innocence of the accused … Here ‘rational’ must be taken to mean ‘reasonable’ … and the trial judge must ask himself or herself the question in the context of the prosecution case; that is to say, he or she must regard the evidence as a step in the proof of that case. Only if there is no such view can one safely conclude that the probative force of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. And, unless the tension between probative force and prejudicial effect is governed by such a principle, striking the balance will continue to resemble the exercise of a discretion rather than the application of a principle.

The court thus assumes that because there is such a high risk of inaccurate reasoning or moral prejudice the evidence must be withdrawn unless, in the context of the prosecution case, there is no rational view of it consistent with the innocence of the accused.141 The judge is not asked to look at all the evidence presented by the prosecution and ask whether the charges are proved beyond reasonable doubt. This would usurp the role of the jury.142 The judge’s task has a different focus. It is to look at the evidence revealing propensity in the context of the other prosecution evidence and ask whether, on the assumption the jury accept that evidence, there would be any explanation of it consistent with the innocence of the accused. 3.47 The need for these assumptions is emphasised in Phillips v R:143 What is said in Pfennig v The Queen about the task of a judge deciding the admissibility of similar fact evidence, and for that purpose comparing the probative effect of the evidence with its prejudicial effect, must be understood in the light of two further considerations. First, due weight must be given to the necessity to view the similar fact evidence in the context of the prosecution case. Secondly, it must be recognised that, as a test of admissibility of evidence, the test is to be applied by the judge on certain assumptions. Thus it must be assumed that the similar fact evidence would be accepted as true and that the prosecution case (as revealed in evidence already given at trial or in the depositions of

witnesses later to be called) may be accepted by the jury. Pfennig v The Queen does not require the judge to conclude that the similar fact evidence, standing alone, would demonstrate the guilt of the accused of the offence or offences with which he or she is charged. But it does require the judge to exclude the evidence if, viewed in the context and way just described, there is a reasonable view of the similar fact evidence which is consistent with innocence.

[page 208] The intent of this dictum is to ensure that the jury is left to determine the credibility of both the propensity evidence and the remainder of the prosecution evidence. The role of the court in determining admissibility is to ask only whether, assuming the credibility of the propensity evidence and acceptance of the remainder of the prosecution evidence, an inference of guilt alone can be drawn from the propensity evidence. Once the jury has decided to accept the prosecution evidence there is no risk of it overestimating the probative value of the propensity evidence if that evidence can be explained only by the guilt of the accused. This approach can be illustrated by the facts in Pfennig. The prosecution case was that the victim was abducted by a person in a vehicle after the victim’s bicycle and clothes had been left to suggest the victim had gone swimming. There was also evidence that the accused was in the vicinity that day driving around in his white van and that he had spoken to the victim. The propensity evidence was of a later abduction of a young boy by the accused in similar circumstances in a white van. Once the jury accepted the boy was abducted and did not drown, and accepted evidence that the accused was in the vicinity driving around in his white van, the court held there could be no reasonable explanation of the propensity evidence other than that it had been the accused who had abducted the boy in question. To use the propensity evidence to identify the accused as the culprit would not be to overestimate its probative strength and therefore it could be left to the jury. Makin can also be explained by such an approach. Assuming the jury accepted the evidence of all the mothers in question and the police evidence of the finding of buried remains, was there any inference to be drawn from the totality of this evidence other than that the accused had murdered each child? The court having concluded there was no other possible inference there was no risk in leaving the totality of the evidence to the jury.

While the focus is on the inference to be drawn from the evidence within the exclusionary presumption, the judge must do this on the assumption that the prosecution evidence is accepted by the jury. In the above illustrations there is a clear distinction between issues of the credibility of evidence and the inferences to be then drawn from the disputed evidence. But in some cases the decisive inference is the very credibility of the propensity evidence in question, and to assume its reliability would defeat the very object of the exercise; namely, to ensure the jury does not overestimate the probative value of that propensity evidence. 3.48 The earlier case of Hoch v R144 illustrates this problem and the approach there taken is not easy to reconcile with that literally advocated in Phillips. In Hoch, [page 209] the accused, a recreation officer at a boys’ home, was jointly charged with separate counts of sexual offences against three of the residents, two of whom were brothers. In response to an application to try the charges separately, the prosecution argued that in light of the striking similarities between the complainants’ accounts their testimony was cross-admissible, the coincidence between their separate strikingly similar accounts making it likely each was accurate and truthful. The problem with the prosecution argument was that there was another explanation for this coincidence — that there had been contact between the complainants resulting in concoction of their testimony against the accused. The majority held that so long as the evidence remained ‘reasonably explicable’ upon the basis of concoction it could not be cross-admissible, the assumption being that there would remain too great a risk that the jury would give the evidence more weight than it deserved. This approach effectively required the trial judge to apply the criminal standard to determine the credibility of the similar accounts before permitting them to be cross-admissible.145 The minority thought the evidence could be left to the jury so long as there was no ‘real chance’ of concoction. If the assumptions in Phillips were to apply literally to the evidence in Hoch, the probative strength appears to require assessment on the assumption that the truth of the boys’ testimonies will be accepted by the jury — the very matter in issue.

Only by saying it is the fact of testifying that must be accepted, not the content of that testimony, can the Phillips assumption sensibly apply. To assume the content assumes the truth of the very issue — the creditworthiness of the eyewitnesses — the cross-admissibility is intended to establish. It was only on the assumption that the witnesses would testify in accordance with their depositions that the majority in Hoch proceeded to ask whether the coincidence between their testimonies was explicable only upon the basis that the accused was guilty as the boys alleged. 3.49 This case raises further difficulties in the light of the reasons for excluding similar fact evidence. The concern is that the jury might give evidence more probative value than it deserves. But in a case such as Hoch where the striking similarities are sufficient to convict the accused in the absence of concoction it is not altogether clear why the issue of concoction cannot be left to the jury. The evidence on this will be clear. The jury is not being asked to reason sequentially from propensity. The jury is being asked to reason by coincidence, and in the absence of concoction the inference of credibility is presumably conclusive. Why should the jury be regarded as incapable of determining the issue of concoction in cases such as these? The only possible response is that in such circumstances it is extremely difficult for a trier of fact [page 210] to put from his or her mind that the accused is implicated not just in one crime but in a series and this will somehow improperly influence his or her judgment. To eliminate this risk it is appropriate for judge rather than jury to make this decision. The House of Lords in R v H146 refused to follow Hoch.147 In its view, strongly probative ‘strikingly similar’ accounts can generally be put before a jury without the accused being subject to an unfair risk of prejudice, and a properly directed jury can fairly determine whether to accept the evidence of similarity and whether a risk of deliberate concoction or innocent infection remains (just as a jury must determine the issue of concoction where two or more witnesses testify to the one event).148 There is no need to remove these issues of credibility from the jury, although it might be directed not to rely on the evidence if at the end of the trial the evidence is such that no reasonable jury would accept as

credible the testimony of similarity or be able to eliminate a reasonable risk of deliberate concoction or innocent infection. Section 132A of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) (see also Criminal Code (Qld) s 597A(1AA)), modifies Hoch, providing that: In a criminal proceeding similar fact evidence, the probative value of which outweighs its potentially prejudicial effect, must not be ruled inadmissible on the ground that it may be the result of collusion or suggestion, and the weight of that evidence is a question for the jury, if any.

A similar provision is also found in s 31A(3) of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA) and s 34S of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) as part of more extensive amendments to the common law: discussed at 3.63, 3.64. It is interesting to note that under the uniform legislation, courts have continued to employ the Hoch test requiring the elimination of the possibility of concoction to determine whether coincidence evidence can be admitted under s 98 as of ‘significant probative value’: see the discussion at 3.60 below. 3.50 But while the situation in Hoch might be reconciled with the Phillips assumptions, reconciliation is more difficult in cases such as were before the court in HML. In each of three cases, the issue was whether the complainant in relation to charged sexual assaults could testify to uncharged acts and discreditable conduct towards her by the accused. In this situation it is impossible to apply the Pfennig test on the Phillips assumption that the remaining prosecution case is accepted by the jury. This would be to assume the acceptance of the complainant’s testimony about the acts charged. But as this would then prove the acts charged beyond reasonable doubt, the propensity evidence would be superfluous. An approach to overcome this problem is suggested by Hodgson JA in R v WRC:149 [page 211] In my opinion, what [the approach in Pfennig] must mean is that, if it first be assumed that all the other evidence in the case left the jury with a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused, the propensity evidence must be such that, when it is considered along with the other evidence, there will then be no reasonable view that is consistent with the innocence of the accused. That is, the propensity evidence must be such that, when it is added to the other evidence, it would eliminate any reasonable doubt which might be left by the other evidence.

Gleeson CJ (at [27]), Heydon J (at [284]–[287]) and Kiefel J (at [510]) in HML endorse this approach, Heydon J concluding (at [287]) that ‘[t]he uncharged acts evidence is sufficient to remove the reasonable doubt which must be assumed to

exist in relation to the evidence of charged acts by itself’.150 However, Hayne J (with whom Kirby and Gummow JJ agreed) is critical of this approach, concluding (at [116]): … as thus appears from what was said in Phillips, the trial judge is not called upon to make some separate or sequential assessment of evidence to be led at the trial in which it is necessary or relevant to ask whether the evidence, with or without the material whose admissibility is being considered, would support a verdict of guilt. Rather, the determinative question is whether there is a reasonable view of the similar fact evidence which is consistent with innocence. And as explained earlier, in cases of the kind now under consideration (in which absence of consent is not an issue) there usually will be no reasonable view of other sexual conduct which would constitute an offence by the accused against the complainant which would do other than support an inference that the accused is guilty of the offence being tried.

It is interesting that this conclusion ignores references to ‘the context of the prosecution case’ contained in Phillips; and in other passages Hayne J simply concludes that evidence of both uncharged acts ([107], [171]) and discreditable conduct ([111], [172]–[175]) cannot reasonably be viewed as consistent with the accused’s innocence.151 Unless the Hodgson JA assumption is made, the probative value of the disputed evidence must be considered in a vacuum and certainly no other High Court decision has made this suggestion. The probative value of evidence towards the disputed issues in a case can only be fairly assessed in the context of the other prosecution evidence in a case. If the prosecution case is not taken into account the issue becomes whether the disputed evidence standing alone can support only an inference of guilt of the crime charged, and nothing else. This is an artificial question that misconstrues the Pfennig test for exceptional admissibility: Heydon J at [286]. Nevertheless, under both reasoning processes all judges in HML suggested (Gleeson CJ at [27], Hayne J at [171]–[176] (Gummow and Kirby JJ agreeing), Heydon CJ at [287], [364], [387], Crennan J at [457], and Kiefel J at [511]) that the evidence of the uncharged acts and most152 of the discreditable conduct in the cases before them was capable of satisfying the Pfennig test. [page 212] More recently, in BBH v R,153 the need to make decisions about relevance and probative value in the context of other evidence was emphasised: discussed above at 3.40.

Applying the Pfennig test 3.51 As the division of opinion in HML demonstrates (see 3.38), the situations where the Pfennig test for exceptional admissibility applies remain controversial. And even where it is agreed that the test applies and upon what assumptions, there remains much room for disagreement over whether the test is satisfied on the facts of a particular case. Phillips v R154 provides an example. The court was unanimous in refusing to permit a series of alleged rapes by the accused on six separate complainants to be tried together because it was of the view that the testimony of each complainant was not cross-admissible on the issue of consent. The court held that the fact that one complainant had not consented was irrelevant to the issue of whether another had not consented. This issue, it said, had nothing to do with the accused’s propensity. But the question of consent can be influenced by the persuasive or forceful propensities of rapists and a consistently strikingly similar modus operandi might be of great relevance in determining whether such influence had been used. Such propensities may be relevant sequentially or through arguments based upon coincidence, as was the argument in Phillips. The trial judge had admitted the evidence, on the basis that whilst one might not believe one complainant who alleges she did not consent to sexual relations with the accused, where six different and unassociated victims all make the same allegation and to each the accused says there was consent, the totality of the evidence — the coincidence between each complainant’s testimony that there was no consent — suggests each witness was truthful about her lack of consent.155 There can be no controversy that the evidence of other incidents was so relevant. But the relevance was purely statistical. The chances were that some of the witnesses were telling the truth but not necessarily all.156 What would have supported the inference that all were telling the truth would have been a generalisation based upon [page 213] the propensity of the accused. This would have been provided by evidence from each complainant of similarities which demonstrated a consistent modus operandi.157 In the absence of such evidence the High Court held the evidence could not satisfy the high standard of probative value required for crossadmissibility.

Some applications of the Pfennig test are less controversial. In Harriman v R,158 given the prosecution evidence linking the accused to the illegal heroin importation and his explanation that he and his associate had simply gone to Chang Mai for a holiday, the revelation that he and his associate had previously been involved in illegal heroin importation excluded any reasonable doubts about the reason for the accused’s trip.159 And in Pfennig even McHugh J, who advocated a varying standard of probative strength for exceptional admissibility, agreed that in the light of the prosecution evidence of the circumstances of the abduction and Pfennig’s admission that he was in the vicinity at the time, undisputed evidence that he had subsequently abducted a boy in similar circumstances eliminated any reasonable doubt about his involvement in the abduction and murder charged. 3.52 In many cases the revelation of other misconduct is likely, in practical terms, to be determinative of the accused’s guilt. In these circumstances, the imposition of the highest standard of probative value may be justified to ensure inaccurate and prejudicial reasoning does not arise. But in many other cases, where the evidence is not so conclusive but part of the often circumstantial case against the accused, such an approach seems unnecessary. One might also note that the precedent for the high standard is itself extremely doubtful. The precedent is the suggestion that in every circumstantial evidence case the circumstances cannot go to the jury unless consistent only with the accused’s guilt.160 But while a jury cannot convict unless so satisfied, a circumstantial case can go to the jury (a case to answer is made out) as long as the hypothesis of guilt is reasonably open. The fact that there are other reasonable hypotheses is not a reason [page 214] for withdrawing the case from the jury (although it may be a reason for holding the subsequent verdict of the jury unsafe: Doney v R).161

Conclusion: the common law rule and the exclusionary principle 3.53 By setting a standard for exceptional admissibility in terms of a standard of

probative value the High Court has diverted trial courts from the substantive issue, emphasised by McHugh J in Pfennig, of whether, if the evidence disclosing criminal propensity is tendered, a risk of prejudice remains that might undermine the fairness of the trial, the prejudice lying in the incapacity of the jury to assess accurately and objectively the probative value of the evidence in question. Pfennig has, on the one hand, caused courts to question the ambit of the exclusionary rule and, on the other, focused questions of exceptional admissibility away from the issue of whether the jury would itself be able to fairly decide the probative value of evidence revealing propensity. HML has made it impossible to state definitively the common law rules regulating evidence disclosing propensity in criminal cases. On one view, all evidence revealing the accused’s discreditable conduct is excluded unless, in the context of the issues in the case and the prosecution evidence, it bears no reasonable explanation consistent with the accused’s innocence. On another, whilst evidence revealing discreditable conduct is prima facie excluded it is only where it is tendered to establish propensity, either sequentially or through coincidence reasoning, that this high standard for exceptional admissibility applies. In other cases the evidence may be admitted if it is more probative than prejudicial. There is possibly also a third view, to be found in cases such as Nieterink and in Crennan J’s judgment in HML, that in other cases it is for the accused to persuade the court to exclude the evidence under the Christie discretion. The application of all these approaches requires difficult decisions about probative value and requires courts to isolate sequential and coincidence propensity reasoning. But these decisions are made at common law to ensure that where the accused’s other criminal and discreditable conduct is disclosed the accused receives the benefit of the exclusionary principle. As will be seen in the discussion of legislation seeking to control the admission of prosecution evidence revealing the accused’s other criminal and discreditable conduct, formalising the required probative value and the distinction between propensity and coincidence and other reasoning runs the risk of distracting courts from this enterprise. Only by taking McHugh J’s approach to the exclusionary rule and its exceptional admissibility does focus remain upon the exclusionary principle.162 While this might give the impression that courts are exercising discretion [page 215]

rather than applying a rule, the reality is, as shown in the discussion in Chapter 1, that decisions of fact are inherently difficult and can only be left to the rigorous analysis of the facts and circumstances of the individual case.

Legislation affecting the exclusionary principle The uniform legislation 3.54 Under the uniform legislation, whenever the relevance of evidence relies upon ‘tendency’ or ‘coincidence’ reasoning it is inadmissible by virtue of ss 97 and 98 unless of ‘significant probative value’ (and reasonable notice has been given of the proposed tender).163 These sections apply in all cases, civil and criminal, and are not confined to where the reasoning relates to an accused. Consequently, they do not appear to invoke the exclusionary principle. But where the prosecution wishes to tender such evidence against an accused it must also satisfy s 101, which provides that prosecution evidence about a defendant that satisfies s 97 or s 98 cannot be used unless the probative value of that evidence ‘substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have on the defendant’. It is this section that clearly (if not expressly) embraces the common law exclusionary principle. But it may also be invoked where, pursuant to s 137, a defendant seeks to exclude evidence, tendered for an admissible non-tendency purpose but revealing inadmissible tendency reasoning, on the ground that its admissible probative value is outweighed by the unfair prejudice the risk of inadmissible tendency reasoning would cause to the defendant.164 It is further recognised in the courts’ insistence, in conformance with s 95, that where evidence admissible for a non-tendency or coincidence purpose also gives rise to an inadmissible tendency or coincidence use, the jury must be carefully directed to avoid that inadmissible use.165 In these ways, under the uniform legislation, courts continue to maintain respect for the common law principle that an accused should not be convicted upon a mere tendency towards crime. Furthermore, it is [page 216] suggested that this respect must inevitably influence the way the courts approach the interpretation of ss 97, 98 and 101.166

Tendency reasoning 3.55 ‘Tendency evidence’ is defined in s 97 as: Evidence of the character, reputation or conduct of a person, or a tendency that a person has or had is not admissible to prove that a person has or had a tendency (whether because of the person’s character or otherwise) to act in a particular way, or to have a particular state of mind …

Although the section extends to prohibit the tendency of any person, in the present context that person is the accused. The prohibition is wider than the common law in extending to all tendencies, not just tendencies towards criminal misconduct.167 But it is narrower than the broad exclusionary rule advocated by McHugh J and more consistent with state decisions seeking to evade the strictness of the Pfennig test, in that the section applies only where the evidence is adduced for the very purpose of establishing a relevant tendency in the accused. In other words, the evidence must be tendered for its relevant tendency reasoning to fall within s 97 and in turn trigger s 101.168 The distinction between propensity (tendency) and non-propensity (nontendency) uses of evidence is discussed above (at 3.32–3.39) in the context of an attempt by state courts to circumvent the strictness of the Pfennig test. This analysis concludes that the majority of the ‘non-propensity uses’ isolated do in strict logic require an acceptance of propensity before the evidence has any probative weight. However, it was argued that at common law this logical reliance could be ignored as producing an acceptable compromise where the jury was not being asked to infer the accused’s guilt directly from propensity. In this way the exclusionary principle is given sufficient respect. Whether this compromise is possible under the uniform legislation is more doubtful. 3.56 Yet courts in jurisdictions governed by the uniform legislation, to avoid the stricter test of exceptional admissibility found in s 101, at times continue to describe evidence which in logic relies upon a relevant inference from an accused’s tendency as non-tendency evidence. To give a simple example of this, in R v Quach,169 a case [page 217] with circumstances analogous to Harriman v R (discussed at 3.26), Spigelman CJ

and James J were of the view that the Harriman reasoning did not fall foul of s 97 because the evidence was not tendered to prove the tendency of Harriman and his associate to be involved in drug dealing but to prove the nature of their trip to Thailand. This may be so, but the nature of their trip is inferred from their tendency to associate as drug importers. Section 97 must be invoked.170 But by the same token s 101 may very well be satisfied to permit exceptional admissibility. Whether s 97 applies depends upon a rigorous analysis of the purpose for which evidence is tendered. The fine distinctions capable of being drawn are illustrated by cases concerned with so-called ‘relationship evidence’. Often discussed as a separate category of generally admissible evidence, both at common law171 and under the uniform legislation,172 courts now recognise that such evidence may be caught by s 97 depending upon exactly why it is being tendered.173 Thus, as was explained at 3.33–3.36, the disclosure of relationship evidence by a complainant to a sexual assault may escape tendency reasoning where it is tendered to demonstrate the coherence of the complainant’s testimony and thereby assist in determining his or her credibility. Reference to this overall context may explain that the charged incidents did not simply occur ‘out of the blue’ and explain, through a story of dependence, intimidation or violence, why the complainant apparently acquiesced to a course of sexual misconduct and the accused’s brazen approach to it. Without the whole story a jury may have difficulty in deciding whether to believe the complainant. Courts are clear that when relationship evidence is used in this way s 97 is not invoked.174 But the same evidence (from either complainant or another witness) may also lead to an independent inference of guilt; for example, by demonstrating the accused’s sexual interest or guilty passion towards [page 218] the complainant. Such evidence, providing motive for the crimes alleged, is generally regarded as a prohibited tendency use.175 However, in Leonard v R, Hodgson JA176 sought to distinguish between evidence tendered to establish ordinary human motives, such as greed or jealousy or sexual interest, not regarded by him as tendency evidence, and evidence tendered to establish not merely an ordinary human motive but that the accused is prepared or likely to act

improperly upon that motive, which he did regard as tendency evidence. He regarded evidence of a sexual interest in young children as falling within the latter category: at [68]. A similar distinction is drawn in Elomar v R,177 where (at [358]– [360]) the court distinguished between evidence tendered to establish a tendency to have a state of mind and evidence tendered to establish the fact of a state of mind, concluding (at [369]) that: ‘If it could reasonably be inferred from the evidence of his attendance at the camp, and the nature of the camp, that [the accused] had a state of mind that favoured militant Islamic Jihad, it may equally be reasonably inferred that he continued to have that state of mind up to and beyond 2004. That is not tendency evidence and does not give rise to tendency reasoning.’ While one can understand the reluctance to find evidence of ordinary human motives and states of mind within the exclusionary rule and subject to s 101, the distinction in terms of tendency appears only to be one of degree. Because s 97 expressly refers to evidence of tendency to have a particular state of mind, one might argue all such motivations should be categorised as tendency reasoning. This is not to say that such evidence would not generally satisfy the admissibility conditions of s 101 (as the court held that it did in Elomar at [373]– [378]). It should be noted that the logic of the non-tendency contextual use generally depends upon the evidence coming from the complainant (whose credibility is often [page 219] the determining issue in the case).178 But at common law, the tender of relationship evidence has been justified on grounds of ‘context’ in circumstances where the evidence is arguably only relevant as tendency evidence. In Wilson v R,179 evidence of the strained relationship between the accused and his wife whom he was accused of murdering was admitted to put into context his defence that the gun with which she was shot discharged accidentally. While clearly such evidence was properly admitted in that case, in logic the use is a tendency use that should now be caught by s 97. Nevertheless, in Qualtieri v R, Howie J180 appears to accept that contextual evidence such as that in Wilson v R is not tendency evidence within s 97 despite him recognising (at [117], [119]) the

narrower (correct) non-tendency use where a witness is permitted to provide context in order to assess the coherence (credibility) of that witness’s testimony. 3.57 There are obviously many situations where evidence disclosing an accused’s previous criminal or discreditable conduct will not be tendered for a tendency purpose. To prove a complainant was in fear of an accused, and therefore unlikely to have acted consensually, previous threats to the complainant by the accused are not so tendered, the issue not being the accused’s tendency but the complainant’s state of mind in reaction to previous misconduct.181 Disclosing that an accused had committed a different crime to prove he or she was in the vicinity of the crime alleged would not be to disclose the accused’s other criminal conduct for a tendency purpose. Disclosing an accused’s illegal possession of the proceeds of the robbery charged in order to identify him or her as involved would not be to disclose other criminal conduct for a tendency purpose.182 For a comprehensive and critical catalogue of examples from cases decided under the uniform legislation, see Odgers.183 There are fine inferential distinctions to be drawn in considering whether in logic evidence is relevant on account of an inference from tendency. The distinctions require clear articulation, first of the issue to be established, and secondly of the evidence to be tendered. Then the various ways in which that evidence might be relevant to that [page 220] issue must be specified and distinguished. What looks like non-tendency reasoning where only the complainant testifies to a relationship may in logic involve tendency reasoning where that evidence comes from another witness. While common law judges are not bound by the strict logic of the tendency/non-tendency distinction, so that one can seek other explanations for their decisions (see discussion at 3.32–3.37), only by redefining tendency (as Hodgson JA suggests in Leonard) or otherwise reading words into the section can the strict logic of the distinction be avoided in applying s 97. Yet judges remain reluctant to apply the strict logic of s 97, particularly where they feel the evidence should be admissible but might not satisfy either the test of ‘significant probative value’ under s 97 or the even stricter test of s 101.184

Coincidence reasoning 3.58 ‘Coincidence evidence’ is presumptively excluded by s 98. Its origins lie in the version of what lawyers colloquially refer to as ‘similar fact evidence’ that does not rely upon sequential tendency reasoning but upon explaining the coincidences between similar events by the perpetrator’s tendency. The original version of s 98 made only coincidences between what it defined as ‘related events’ (the similar facts) inadmissible.185 The section has now been redrafted to make clear that what is prohibited is coincidence reasoning through similarities between events generally, not just coincidence reasoning as it applies to ‘related events’. Section 98(1) now provides: Evidence that 2 or more events occurred is not admissible to prove that a person did a particular act or had a particular state of mind on the basis that, having regard to any similarities in the events or the circumstances in which they occurred, or any similarities in both the events and the circumstances in which they occurred, it is improbable that the events occurred coincidentally.

Such evidence is generally excluded unless of ‘significant probative value’ and notice is given. Where the person to be implicated by such reasoning is an accused, s 101 must also be satisfied.186 Makin (discussed at 3.13) provides the classic example of coincidence reasoning between events and their circumstances. While it was difficult to associate the accused [page 221] with the killing of a particular child under their care, looking at the similarities between the circumstances of the deaths of all of the children under their care made it improbable the events occurred simply through coincidence. Rather, the explanation lay in the inference that the accused had killed each of the children, including the child who was the subject of the crime charged. This reasoning was used to apply s 98 in R v Folbigg,187 where evidence relating to the deaths of four of the accused’s infant children was admitted to infer that all had been suffocated by the accused and it was improbable that the deaths occurred coincidentally.188 Another example of coincidence reasoning is provided by Sutton v R189 (discussed at 3.25), where the accused was tried for raping several women on separate occasions but only one complainant was prepared to identify him. The prosecution successfully argued that the rapes in relation to each complainant

could be heard together because the similarities between their circumstances were such that the jury could find that the only inference was that all had been committed by the same person (rather than coincidentally in the same circumstances by different persons); so that if the jury found the accused identified as having raped one complainant it could find him guilty of all. The other classic common law example of coincidence reasoning is where unrelated witnesses testify to a series of crimes involving the accused in such strikingly similar terms that, while the testimony of any one witness standing alone might be explicable through mistake or insincerity, when the similarities between the testimonies of all witnesses are looked at the only inference is that each witness is testifying accurately and truthfully. Boardman (discussed at 3.15) and Hoch (discussed at 3.48) involved attempts to reason in this way. In Hoch, the argument did not succeed because it could not be shown that the similarities were not explicable as a result of concoction. It is somewhat difficult to explain these cases in exactly the terms of s 98, because it is the improbability that the testimonies occurred coincidentally that leads to the implicating [page 222] inference. But it has generally been assumed that these situations are caught by s 98.190 While this approach has been applied in Tasmania,191 in Tasmania v Y, Crawford J192 was of the view that to accommodate these situations within s 98(1) ‘is to strain the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used’. He also suggested that ‘if the evidence is relevant only to credibility, it is not admissible at all’, infringing s 94(1) and the bolster rule implicit in s 102.193 In some cases, testimony of similarities may give rise to both coincidence and tendency reasoning, but where only coincidence reasoning is open, although this sort of coincidence evidence does achieve its probative force through enhancing credibility, its direct purpose is to establish the events alleged against the accused through supporting the only direct evidence available and it is generally regarded as falling within s 98.194 It is important to reiterate that the same evidence may give rise to tendency or coincidence reasoning or even involve a combination of both. How the evidence may be used may depend upon exactly what is in issue in a case. In both Boardman and Hoch, the accused had admitted his association with each

complainant but claimed each association was innocent. In this situation the credibility of all witnesses was in issue and the jury might have reasoned that although it could not accept beyond reasonable doubt that any one witness was truthful, the coincidence between their similar accounts compelled that conclusion. On the other hand, it might have been prepared to accept the testimony of one witness beyond reasonable doubt and then used this to infer that the other witnesses were also testifying truthfully as their accounts in similar terms could not simply be explained through coincidence.195 It could also be argued that if the jury was prepared to accept the testimony of one witness it might use that tendency to infer directly that the accused’s association on the other occasions was not innocent.196 If the accused in Boardman or Hoch had denied any association at all with the complainants, so that identity was also in issue, while the similarities [page 223] in testimonies might have demanded that the witnesses were testifying truthfully to the events, the problem of mistaken identification remained. But the inference that the witnesses were testifying truthfully on account of the similarities may lead to the further inference that it was the same person who assaulted each complainant. This being so, the jury may either consider the doubtful identifications of the one person together to infer it beyond coincidence that every complainant would have identified the same person, or it could accept one of the identifications beyond reasonable doubt and then deduce that the accused was responsible for all the crimes.197 In Straffen (discussed at 3.17) and Pfennig (discussed at 3.27), proof relied upon tendency reasoning (within s 97) to associate the accused with the crime alleged, but coincidence reasoning (outside s 98) to conclude that, given each accused was in the vicinity of the crime at the relevant time, it was unlikely there was another person there with that propensity who committed the crime. Because of this overlap between tendency and coincidence reasoning, to ensure that the statutory requirements are met, commonly the prosecution will give notice that it is seeking admissibility under both ss 97 and 98. Thus, in R v Ellis,198 the court was able simply to refer to both ss 97 and 98 before admitting under s 101 evidence of a series of idiosyncratic break-ins to permit the jury to

infer by coincidence reasoning that they had been committed by the same person (or persons) and to use circumstantial evidence to connect the accused to one or more crimes in the series to establish (via tendency?) his involvement in them all. The nature of ‘probative value’ under ss 97, 98 and 101 3.59 As a result, under the uniform legislation, relevant evidence revealing other criminal or discreditable conduct by an accused is only presumptively inadmissible if tendered to support tendency or coincidence reasoning. Once so relevant, the evidence will remain inadmissible unless the prosecution can, first, establish that the evidence has ‘significant probative value’ to satisfy ss 97 and 98, and then, on the evidence being ‘adduced’199 under s 101, persuade the court that the ‘probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect that it may have upon the defendant’. If the use of evidence revealing other criminal or discreditable conduct is not presumptively inadmissible under s 97 or s 98 then it must still be excluded [page 224] if the accused can persuade the court that the ‘probative value’ of the evidence is outweighed by ‘the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant’: s 137. 3.60 The meaning of ‘probative value’ and its relationship to s 55 is discussed in Chapter 2 in the context of discussing the nature of relevance (at 2.18) and the application of s 137 (at 2.31). As a consequence of the majority judgment in IMM v R,200 when considering ‘probative value’ in determining the application of admissibility rules under the uniform legislation, the court must, assuming that the evidence is accepted, have regard to that maximal probative value of which the evidence is rationally capable. In this sense the probative value must be taken at its highest. But the nature of the evidence may be such that it is not rationally capable of supporting a very high probative value. What is important is that the judge leaves to the jury the assessment of the actual probative value. A similar hands-off approach was taken by the common law in emphasising that the Pfennig test for admissibility was to be applied upon the assumption that the jury would accept the prosecution case. But in Hoch the High Court refused to let testimony go to the jury as coincidence evidence until the possibility of

collusion was eliminated, and a similar approach has infiltrated into the uniform legislation.201 Confronted by this apparent intrusion of the judge into the determination of probative value, the majority in IMM (at [59]) said: The premise for the appellant’s submission — that it is ‘well-established’ that under the identical test in s 98(1)(b) the possibility of joint concoction may deprive evidence of probative value consistently with the approach to similar fact evidence stated in Hoch v The Queen — should not be accepted. Section 101(2) places a further restriction on the admission of tendency and coincidence evidence. That restriction does not import the ‘rational view inconsistent with the guilt of the accused’ test found in Hoch v The Queen. The significance of the risk of joint concoction to the application of the s 101(2) test should be left to an occasion when it is raised in a concrete factual setting.

[page 225] If coincidence is capable of rationally supporting an incriminating inference it may be of significant probative value, the risk of collusion being a separate issue capable of determination by the jury. If there is any risk of the jury misunderstanding the evidence or being incapable of rationally assessing its probative value this can be taken into account under s 101 as a prejudicial effect. By the same token, once rational incriminating inferences from tendency and coincidence evidence are open, the effect of competing inferences can be left to the jury to determine, unless they produce prejudicial effect leading to exclusion under s 101. But to say that inferences from evidence are simply to be taken at their highest arguably obscures the limitation of rationality, suggesting that the mere possibility of an inference is sufficient to create probative value. What the words ‘highest’ might legitimately emphasise, at least when applying ss 97 and 98, is that for the purposes of admissibility the judge is concerned only with those inferences favouring the prosecution case that could rationally be accepted by a jury.202 The legislation gives no express guidance on the distinction between mere ‘probative value’, ‘significant probative value’, and the degree of ‘probative value’ required before prejudicial effect is substantially outweighed. Given the slippery nature of proof, this may come as no surprise. Hunt CJ at CL suggests in R v Lock203 that there at least appears to be a legislative continuum from ‘probative value’ to ‘significant probative value’ to the probative value required to ‘substantially outweigh’ prejudice.

‘Significant probative value’ 3.61 Under ss 97 and 98, evidence of tendency and coincidence is not admissible unless ‘the court thinks that the evidence will, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced by the party seeking to adduce the evidence, have significant probative value’. The decision is required without regard to evidence that may be tendered by any opponent.204 The question is whether having regard to this evidence from the tendering party it ‘could [if accepted] rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue’. The decision does not involve a prediction of what weight might be given to the evidence once all the evidence in the case has been received. [page 226] The question then is what is required for evidence to be of ‘significant probative value’. Does this require enhanced value beyond mere relevance or does ‘significant’ simply describe the ‘importance’ of the evidence to the issues before the court? In R v Lock, Hunt CJ at CL suggests the latter, following R v Lockyer.205 The majority in IMM (at [46]) say: The significance of the probative value of the tendency evidence under s 97(1)(b) must depend on the nature of the facts in issue to which the evidence is relevant and the significance or importance which that evidence may have in establishing those facts. So understood, the evidence must be influential in the context of fact-finding.

It can only be influential if the fact it proves is of importance and the evidence is of importance to establishing that fact. This does not demand stipulating to what degree the evidence must be capable of being probative. In IMM, the evidence was of little or no significance in assessing the complainant’s credibility and therefore the majority held it not to be of significant probative value. But in other contexts the potential of the probative value has been held to require enhancement before it can be described as ‘significant’.206 Commonly this enhancement is found in similarities between other misconduct and the crimes charged. Tendencies may be probative by reason of their similarity to the conduct in question,207 but a tendency may be established by reference to

[page 227] one other unique event208 or the presence of one overwhelming manifestation of that tendency.209 Similarities are also demanded by s 98 for coincidence reasoning but again this does not require events to be similar in every respect.210 While there are dicta suggesting that in making decisions under these sections Victorian courts place more emphasis upon similarities than their New South Wales counterparts, it may be that, because the remarks are always made in the context of particular factual circumstances, the differences are more apparent than real.211 It should be emphasised that in criminal cases the prejudicial nature of tendency and coincidence evidence is expressly considered under s 101 so that courts must be careful not to apply a test of significance that pre-judges this issue. It must be remembered that ss 97 and 98 apply not only where it is the behaviour of an accused that is in issue, but also to the relevant behaviour of witnesses and parties in civil cases. The issue of significance has been allowed to loom too large in criminal cases to exclude tendency and coincidence evidence without the need to turn to s 101. It is s 101 that embodies the exclusionary principle. It is s 101 that seeks to ensure that the jury will not give the evidence more probative value than it deserves. ‘Probative value substantially outweighing prejudicial effect’ 3.62 Given that ss 97 and 98 exclude evidence tendered only as tendency or coincidence evidence, the way was open for courts to follow Hoch and Pfennig in applying s 101 and requiring the very highest capability of probative value before it could be said to substantially outweigh any prejudicial effect. [page 228] Despite dissenting voices,212 there was originally clear authority in New South Wales for this approach.213 But judges of the Federal Court in W v R,214 while recognising the persuasive analogies to be drawn from common law cases,215 refused to interpret s 101 as requiring the highest degree of probative value in every criminal case where ss 97 and 98 apply. This more flexible approach, reminiscent of that of McHugh J in Pfennig v R (see 3.12), enables a wider

interpretation to be taken of the notion of tendency and coincidence evidence in the knowledge that satisfaction of the criminal standard is not necessarily required for it to be concuded that the probative value substantially outweighs the prejudicial effect the evidence may have on the defendant.216 Without such a flexible approach, judges must ensure that important evidence of, for example, relationship217 or use or possession of drugs,218 or prior suspect business dealings,219 is not regarded as ‘tendency evidence’ but as evidence providing context, or evidence of knowledge or of motive and outside the ambit of the exclusionary rule altogether, if the evidence is to be admitted. In 2003, a five-member bench of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Ellis220 overruled previous authority and followed the approach of the Federal Court. The court held that a trial judge was correct in simply ruling, using the terminology of s 101(2) and without reference to the Pfennig test, that ‘the probative [page 229] value of the evidence substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect it may have upon the defendant’. In giving the majority judgment of the court, Spigelman CJ emphasises that the section requires the judge in every case to determine this balance, a change to the common law which determines admissibility in every case upon application of the one Pfennig standard. This definitive approach to probative value is not taken by the legislation, although Spigelman CJ recognised that in some cases (but certainly not in all cases) the balance might only be achieved where the Hoch or Pfennig test is satisfied.221 He disagreed with Hidden and Buddin JJ who were of the view that it could always be assumed that evidence falling within ss 97 and 98 was ‘likely to be highly prejudicial’ — so the test for admissibility was always ‘one of very considerable stringency’. Thus, in New South Wales as well, trial judges are now obliged to adhere to the terms of s 101(2). The same approach is taken in other jurisdictions.222 On the face of it, this requires the court to apply a weighing process impossible of precise analysis. The potential probative value has already been determined ‘significant’ but s 101 presumes that prejudice may still arise and demands that the prosecution convince the court that the prejudice that does arise in the particular circumstances is substantially outweighed by the potentially significant probative

value of the evidence. The phrase ‘prejudicial effect’ effectively embodies all the reasons that lie behind the common law exclusionary principle. Ultimately the concern is one of rectitude. Is there an unacceptable risk that the reception of the evidence will result in an inaccurate verdict through diverting the fact-finder from its task or creating bias or otherwise resulting in the evidence being given more weight than it deserves?223 That risk must be ‘substantially outweighed’ by the probative value that the jury could rationally give to the evidence. ‘Substantial’ is a vague word but suggests the court should be very clear before holding the probative weight sufficient to obviate an unacceptable risk that the evidence might result in an inaccurate verdict.224 This approach emphasises that it is not the task of the judge to assess the reliability of the evidence but to assess [page 230] whether the trier of fact is in a position to objectively determine its probative value in the context of the case at hand. Inevitably judges continue to disagree on the application of s 101 to particular cases. Those with faith in juries and the effectiveness of directions to ensure their objectivity are more likely to admit evidence of other misconduct. Those who regard the risks of the revelation of other misconduct, particularly when serious and of the same nature as the facts in issue, as inevitably influential and impervious to direction will be more likely to exclude.225 Victorian courts may have sought to be more definitive of when probative value substantially outweighs prejudicial effect, demanding similarities that clearly connect the other crimes to the crimes charged. But as common law experience shows, similarities are not always determinative. The reality is that decisions cannot be based on further interpretation of the words of the legislation nor upon what has been said by judges in reaching decisions in past cases. The sophistry of such analysis merely distracts from the reasons for requiring the exclusion of tendency and coincidence in the first place. To give effect to these reasons, for a judge to find that probative value substantially outweighs possible prejudice he or she must decide, following rigorous analysis of the particular evidence and issues, that the jury, with appropriate directions, will not give probative weight to the evidence in question beyond that of which it is rationally capable. This is the approach advocated by

McHugh J in his dissent in Pfennig. Previous cases can provide factual analogies but not binding rules about the circumstances in which s 101 is satisfied. This approach seeks to give full effect to the exclusionary principle that necessarily lies behind the words of s 101. As the discussion of the nature of proof in Chapter 1 demonstrates, in seeking rectitude of decision, we can do no more than rigorously and rationally analyse the probative value of the particular evidence under consideration.

Western Australia 3.63 In this regard it is interesting to consider s 31A of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA), which provides: (1) In this section ‘propensity evidence’ means — (a)

similar fact evidence or other evidence of the conduct of the accused person; or

(b) evidence of the character or reputation of the accused person or of a tendency that the accused person has or had; ‘relationship evidence’ means evidence of the attitude or conduct of the accused person towards another person, or a class of persons, over a period of time.

[page 231] (2) Propensity evidence or relationship evidence is admissible in proceedings for an offence if the court considers — (a)

that the evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, have significant probative value; and

(b) that the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial, is such that fair-minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial. (3) In considering the probative value of evidence for the purposes of subsection (2) it is not open to the court to have regard to the possibility that the evidence may be the result of collusion, concoction or suggestion.

This section does not itself impose an exclusionary rule. It assumes propensity or relationship evidence may be inadmissible at common law, and where it is so inadmissible, it designates circumstances where it may be admitted. If evidence is already admissible at common law there is no need to rely upon the section.226 Where no objection is made to evidence falling within s 31A, no error is made in

the admission of the evidence, nor can the failure by the prosecution to seek leave to tender such evidence constitute a miscarriage of justice.227 To ensure the more liberal admissibility of ‘propensity evidence’ and ‘relationship evidence’, these terms are widely defined to embrace any evidence that might possibly fall within the common law exclusionary rule.228 The first limb of this test for admissibility imposes a test of minimal probative value in terms that follow the uniform legislation. Western Australian courts have used cases decided under the uniform legislation to explain the notion of ‘significant’ probative value in terms of ‘important’ or ‘of consequence’.229 ‘Probative value’ has also [page 232] been interpreted in line with the definition under the uniform legislation to be that value that could rationally be given to the evidence, but more recent Court of Appeal decisions emphasise that s 31A(2)(a), in contrast, requires the court to determine whether the evidence would have significant probative value.230 The second limb takes its text directly from McHugh J in Pfennig v R.231 Its interpretation was considered in Dair v Western Australia,232 where the accused was charged with stabbing a police officer attempting to apprehend him in relation to a theft. The prosecution sought to confirm doubtful identification evidence by adducing evidence of other incidents where the accused had behaved violently towards police. Steytler J focused upon how a fair-minded person would regard the magnitude of the risks of a jury overestimating the probative value of behaviour with no distinctive characteristics rather than on assessing the probative value of the identification evidence available, concluding the risk of inaccurate verdict too high to admit the evidence: at [73]–[79].233 Miller JA, on the other hand, accepted these risks of inaccurate verdict but held that — one can only assume because of the seriousness of the crime involved and the degree of suspicion created by witnesses having identified a person who had previously been violent towards the police — a fair-minded member of the public would be prepared to give priority to adducing the evidence: at [183]–[185].234 [page 233]

EM Heenan AJA was prepared to take a similar approach to the interpretation of the second limb to s 31A(2) (at [276]) but refused to admit the evidence in the case before him as not having ‘significant probative value’. If this majority interpretation of the second limb is accepted, it seems that the legislature, in replacing the Pfennig test with a more flexible test for admissibility to enable courts to take a more realistic approach to the risk of inaccurate verdict, has created a test which enables the risk of inaccurate verdict to be displaced by the priority of the public interest in controlling crime. It is doubtful that McHugh J had this in mind in seeking to explain the judgment involved in balancing probative value against the risk of prejudice. Nor is it a rhetoric that has been used by judges in other contexts where this balance is required. No court should admit evidence where it creates a likelihood that a verdict may be inaccurate. That is the very basis of a fair trial. No fair-minded member of the public can accept less than this.235 Priority in this context must be interpreted to mean that in the light of the potential probative value of the evidence and the directions that can be given, there is no significant risk that the jury will give undue probative weight to the evidence in question.236 Subsection (3) makes it also clear that where probative value depends upon the absence of collusion that issue must be left to the jury and not taken into account in assessing the probative value under subs (2). The intention of the subsection is to overrule the decision in Hoch: Donaldson v Western Australia.237 The section thus takes the common law as its starting point. The suspicion of propensity reasoning remains and generally care must be taken against admitting [page 234] evidence giving rise to such reasoning. But once propensity reasoning is admitted under the section, the need to give the usual warning against propensity reasoning is modified accordingly,238 and while Shepherd suggests there is no need for a direction that it be proved beyond reasonable doubt unless it is an indispensable link in proof of the crime charged, the important significance of sexual interest has been held to attract a similar direction.239 Once evidence is admitted under the section there will be little or no room for exercise of the residual discretion.

South Australia

3.64 Legislation in South Australia,240 triggered by the diverging approaches of the judges to the common law in HML v R, seeks to clarify the admissibility of evidence of an accused’s other ‘discreditable conduct’. Section 34O of the Evidence Act 1929 provides that the provisions prevail over the common law to the extent of any inconsistency, and judges emphasise that common law authorities continue to inform the application of the provisions.241 Section 34P(1) declares, in terms reminiscent of Lord Herschell in Makin, that the use of evidence of other ‘discreditable conduct’242 is ‘impermissible’ to suggest that the accused is ‘more likely to have committed the offence charged because he or [page 235] she has engaged in discreditable conduct’.243 But, seeking then to follow the logic of Doyle CJ in Neiterink v R,244 s 34P(2) permits uses other than the ‘impermissible use’ if (a) this other use ‘substantially outweighs’ any prejudicial effect the evidence may have on the defendant and (b) where the other use sought is of a particular propensity relied upon as circumstantial evidence that use has ‘strong probative value’ having regard to a particular issue(s) arising at trial. Notice requirements apply where tender of a particular propensity is sought (s 34P(4) and (5)), and in determining admissibility under s 34P(2), the judge must consider whether permissible and impermissible uses are sufficiently distinguishable to ensure that the evidence will not be used for an impermissible use (s 34P(3)). Evidence not admissible245 under s 34P remains inadmissible for that use notwithstanding it may be admissible for other uses: s 34Q. Just as the Makin formulation has caused confusion amongst common law judges so the ambit of s 34P(1), which appears to be based upon it, is less than clear. Taken literally, the ‘impermissible use’ extends to all propensity reasoning based upon evidence of other discreditable conduct. But the intention appears to be to exclude only what might be called ‘bare’ or ‘mere’ or ‘general’ propensity reasoning.246 This being so, s 34P(2) has been interpreted in (a) to permit evidence of discreditable conduct relied upon for a purpose that is independent of propensity reasoning altogether where its probative value as such outweighs any prejudicial effect (an effect most likely to arise from impermissible propensity reasoning); and in (b) to permit evidence of discreditable conduct not relied upon

for its ‘bare’ propensity reasoning but for propensity reasoning arising from a particular propensity which as circumstantial evidence has ‘strong probative value’247 that substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect that may arise.248 [page 236] This alters the previous common law as applied in Neiterink in that to achieve admissibility the prosecution must show that any non-propensity use substantially outweighs forbidden propensity uses also arising,249 whereas at common law a non-propensity use was admissible until the defence could establish grounds for exercise of the exclusionary discretion.250 Furthermore, it alters the common law by permitting reasoning from a particular propensity when of a ‘strong probative value’ that substantially outweighs any prejudice; in contrast to admitting such evidence only where it has no explanation consistent with innocence (the Pfennig and Hoch tests, which are expressly abolished by s 34S). While the residual discretion has not been abolished, it is difficult to see that s 34P(2)(a) leaves any scope for its exercise.251 It is not entirely clear where coincidence evidence such as arose in Makin, Boardman and Pfennig now stands. Did these cases involve evidence that a defendant engaged in other discreditable conduct ‘to suggest that the defendant is more likely to have committed the offence because he or she has engaged in discreditable conduct’? The reasoning process in these cases can be analysed sequentially — by accepting one or more act of other discreditable conduct to infer the crime charged — or analysed as involving no prior judgment about any one act of other discreditable conduct but inferring a criminal propensity, inclusive of the crime charged, from a series of similar events with which the accused is allegedly associated. The uniform legislation expressly draws the distinction between these two modes of reasoning in ss 97 and 98, but s 34P does not make the distinction clear. If such reasoning is not regarded as giving rise to propensity reasoning,252 the probative value of the discreditable conduct evidence must still be shown to substantially outweigh any prejudicial effect it may have before it can be admitted. If such reasoning is regarded as giving rise to reasoning beyond a ‘general’ or ‘mere’ propensity, then the evidence may still be admitted if the propensity can be regarded as sufficiently particular and is of strong probative value that substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect. When both forms of

reasoning (coincidence and propensity) may arise, both avenues for admission may be considered.253 While s 34S [page 237] removes the risk of collusion as a bar to admissibility, collusion may remain a crucial issue for the jury and the judge must direct the jury accordingly.254 Section 34R makes clear that where evidence is admitted under s 34P, the permissible and impermissible uses must be explained to the jury255 and that where evidence admitted under s 34P is essential to a process of reasoning leading to a conclusion of guilt it requires proof beyond reasonable doubt before it can be acted upon. This probably follows current practice, although arguably modifying Shepherd v R, which requires such proof only where such evidence is an indispensable step in such a chain of reasoning.256 While the statutory language causes some difficulties, the effect of the legislation has been to clarify the law following HML and to consolidate the Neiterink distinction between propensity and non-propensity uses. The general approach to be taken by the trial judge in determining the admissibility of discreditable conduct has been said to be essentially unchanged. Evidence and issues must be isolated and the uses of the evidence rigorously distinguished in arguing that the evidence is exceptionally admissible under s 34P(2). Furthermore, common law decisions can still provide relevant analogies in determining whether non-propensity and propensity uses should be allowed257 and if so what directions are required.258

Queensland 3.65 As mentioned above (at 3.38), the common law continues to apply in Queensland but subject to two important modifications. First, s 132B of the Evidence Act permits, in specified charges, evidence of the history of a domestic relationship where simply relevant (whether through propensity or otherwise), with s 130 permitting the accused to argue that the evidence should [page 238]

be excluded as unfairly prejudicial. The High Court in Roach v R259 has interpreted these sections to abolish the application of the Pfennig test where they apply. Where this legislation runs out, Queensland courts must continue to apply the common law as interpreted by the High Court.260 Secondly, s 132A of the Evidence Act 1977 and s 597A(1AA) of the Criminal Code abolish Hoch to ensure that when the admissibility of ‘similar fact evidence’ is being considered, the risk of collusion or suggestion is not a matter to be taken into account but is an issue to be decided, with appropriate directions, by the jury.

Determining probative strength: facts in issue 3.66 Whenever evidence revealing an accused’s prejudicial propensity is tendered, the crucial question for its admissibility, whether under common law or statutory exclusionary rule or by way of discretion, is its precise relevance and probative value with regard to the material facts in issue.261 The starting point for this determination is the clear articulation of the particular material fact to which the evidence is claimed to be either directly or indirectly relevant. Although technically a plea of not guilty puts all material facts in issue,262 in practical terms this is not the case, and it would be wrong to admit potentially prejudicial evidence as relevant to an issue not being seriously contested. An accused can narrow issues by making formal admissions.263 Furthermore, in the interests of trial efficiency, legislation in most jurisdictions demands that an accused give the prosecution notice in advance of the evidence and issues in dispute and the defences to be relied upon, and in all jurisdictions courts seek to achieve consensus on these matters through pre-trial hearings.264 Nevertheless, an accused who pleads not guilty will usually put the prosecution to proof as far as possible. It will be the evidence available that will determine which prosecution evidence can be disputed and which lines of defence can be reasonably pursued by an accused at trial. The accused may [page 239] choose to pursue one line of defence rather than another for tactical reasons. Failure to dispute evidence or pursue a particular line of defence may amount to a

de facto acceptance of prosecution evidence or concession that a line of defence is not open (although the onus always remains on the prosecution to establish all the material facts beyond reasonable doubt).265 For example, where an accused is well known to the complainant it is unlikely a defence of mistaken identity can be realistically pursued and the nature of the association is more likely to be the determinative issue.266 In Stubley v Western Australia,267 where a psychiatrist was charged with sexual assaults on two of his patients in his consulting rooms, the prosecution sought to tender evidence from three further patients to sexual advances that had been made to them on other occasions in similar circumstances. None alleged that threats or intimidation influenced their participation. The accused admitted all the sexual encounters but argued they were consensual. As, in the light of Phillips, the testimonies of the other patients were regarded as not of significant probative value to the issue of consent, the prosecution argued they were of significant value in establishing a propensity of the accused to exploit his position of power over his patients to engage in sex. The court held that if the issue in the case had been whether the accused had had sexual relationships at all with his patients then the evidence may have established a propensity of significant probative value, but as the sexual encounters were all admitted and none of the witnesses testified to threatening or intimidating conduct, the evidence established no more than the accused’s unprofessional psychological dominance and did not rationally affect the likelihood that the victims in question consented: at [74]. Nor on the facts was it relevant to any other issue before the court.268 Thus, to some degree, the material facts in issue, and the way in which they are in issue, are at the option of the accused. It is these disputed issues that will be decisive before the jury.269 Given the potentially prejudicial nature of evidence disclosing propensity, courts should only permit it to be relied upon when required. If in practical terms a material fact (upon which there must, of course, be other prosecution evidence) is not seriously in issue, or only in issue in a way to which the evidence revealing the accused’s disposition is not relevant, or the material fact can be simply proved by other [page 240] available evidence, then it is unlikely a court will allow that evidence to be

tendered.270 As Lord Sumner so eloquently summed up the situation in Thompson v R:271 The prosecution cannot credit the accused with fancy defences in order to rebut them at the outset with some damning piece of prejudice.

The effect of this is that, despite remarks to the contrary by Lord Goddard in R v Sims,272 the nature of the defence may, in practice, be considered in determining whether and in what way a material fact is substantially in issue.273 This is not to say that in every case the line of defence will necessarily be decisive in determining what the jury will regard as really in issue.274 Nor will the availability of other prosecution evidence necessarily be decisive against the admissibility of evidence of other misconduct, as the jury may not accept that other evidence.275 Once the material fact to which the evidence is arguably relevant has been determined, the process of reasoning making the evidence revealing propensity relevant and probative of that fact must be isolated. As already explained, at both common law and under the uniform and other legislation, this process of reasoning will, one way or another, be decisive of admissibility. Only by rigorous analysis of the precise issues and particular evidence can the accused be afforded the protection of the exclusionary principle that, it is argued, presumptively excludes evidence that may give rise to reasoning based on propensity.

Procedural matters Determining admissibility: notice 3.67 The practical problem arising from all this is that of devising an appropriate procedure for determining which material facts are in issue and how the evidence will be relevant and probative of those issues. While one can wait and only allow the disputed information to be tendered after the trial has proceeded sufficiently to clarify the issues and the evidence being relied upon to prove them,276 the problem is that [page 241] this may not just disrupt the trial because admissibility arguments will have to take place in the jury’s absence, but may also result in inadmissible evidence being

revealed to a jury where even clear and forceful directions may be incapable of preventing a mistrial. Although an appropriate procedure where the trial is by judge alone (it being assumed a judge is not influenced by prejudicial evidence),277 where the trial is by jury it is preferable to deal with matters of admissibility before the jury is empanelled. While at common law this could be done through seeking an indication from counsel at the outset of the case,278 now legislation permits questions of admissibility to be determined before the jury is empanelled.279

3.68 However, if an accused is to object to the admissibility of evidence prior to trial, he or she must have advance notice of the evidence to be tendered. In the case of indictable offences this will be provided through the process of committal, but the courtesy of the prosecution, in pursuance of its duty to ensure a fair trial, may have to be relied upon to ensure advance notice in summary cases. However, legislation now exists in a number of jurisdictions requiring not only that the prosecution disclose its case in advance but also that the defence indicate which evidence will be contested.280 The uniform legislation goes further in requiring quite specific notice of a party’s intention to tender tendency and coincidence evidence.281 The notice should specify the tendency and/or coincidence relied upon and identify the facts that it is contended will be consequently established.282 These provisions seek to ensure that the accused is in a position to object to evidence before the trial begins (and to obtain evidence in [page 242] response if it is admitted).283 In South Australia, notice is required where a party seeks to rely on other discreditable conduct as evidence of a particular propensity of strong probative value: s 34P(4) and (5).

Determining admissibility: onus 3.69 At common law, where the exclusionary rule applies to evidence the prosecution must establish grounds for its admissibility.284 Where the defence alleges that, although technically admissible, the residual exclusionary discretion should be exercised, the onus will lie upon the defence so to persuade the judge.285 Insofar as these decisions depend upon preliminary findings of fact, the standard of proof is the civil standard.286 The position is the same under the uniform legislation. Tendency and coincidence reasoning is not admissible unless the party tendering the evidence can establish it is of significant probative value (ss 97, 98) and the prosecution may not tender such evidence against an accused unless, in addition, it can persuade the court that its probative value substantially outweighs the prejudicial effect it may have upon the accused (s 101). When s 137 is invoked, the accused must establish that the probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused. The party relying upon exercise of discretion under s

135 or s 136 bears the onus of persuading the court that the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger it might be unfairly prejudicial. The standard of persuasion in determining admissibility is the civil standard: s 142. In South Australia, whilst the common law residual discretion can still theoretically apply, s 34P(2)(a) of the Evidence Act 1929 essentially embodies the balance of probative value and prejudice within the admissibility rule itself, leaving little or no room for discretionary exclusion. The position is similar under the Western Australian legislation: see 3.63. [page 243]

Evidence upon which admissibility may be determined 3.70 The problem in determining admissibility before any evidence has been formally tendered is that the precise nature of that evidence is not known. Even where evidence has been disclosed in advance, the issues and evidence may turn out differently at the trial. And even where the presumptively inadmissible evidence is not in dispute, so the only question is the strength of the inference to be drawn from it, it may not be possible to determine this without access to much of the evidence to be adduced in the principal case (see, for example, Pfennig, where the strength of the inference of identity depended upon the other circumstantial evidence). Evidence can always be taken on the voir dire but this is a time-consuming process and in practice, given the depositions and other material available, predictions can often be made and assurances given by counsel so that it may not become necessary to take evidence at this preliminary stage. And, if during trial the evidence changes, then any preliminary decision about admissibility may have to be revisited.287 In Perry v R,288 the trial judge made the preliminary ruling upon the basis of argument of counsel and the depositions taken at the committal. Those statutory provisions demanding further disclosure by both the prosecution and the defence also facilitate this process. In other situations, evidence may have to be taken or the decision upon admissibility deferred until other evidence in the case has been given.289 In Hoch v R,290 the majority’s approach of requiring only a reasonable possibility of collusion to exclude similar testimonies allowed a decision on the depositions; whereas the minority approach of Brennan and Dawson JJ, requiring

a ‘real chance’ of collusion, demanded a decision be made only after a voir dire inquiry. As mentioned above (at n 221), while courts applying the uniform legislation have continued to follow the majority approach in determining admissibility under s 101, the High Court in IMM v R291 (quoted at 3.60) suggests this may not be appropriate. Legislation in the remaining state jurisdictions provides that collusion, as a matter going to credibility, must, with appropriate directions, be left to the jury. 292 Under ss 97 and 98 of the uniform legislation, the decision that tendency and coincidence is admissible because of significant probative value must be made only upon the basis of evidence tendered or to be tendered by the prosecution.293 But when [page 244] in a criminal case this evidence is ‘adduced’, s 101 provides that it cannot be used against a defendant unless its probative value substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect. This formulation does not appear necessarily to restrict the evidence that can be taken into account in making this decision to evidence tendered or to be tendered by the prosecution.

Multiple counts 3.71 Counts can be joined where they arise out of the same circumstances or are a part of a series of offences that are of the same or similar character.294 Once joined, counts will be concurrently tried. But the evidence relevant and admissible to each count must still be separately considered, and evidence in relation to one count is presumptively inadmissible in relation to another by virtue of the propensity/tendency and coincidence rules being here considered. If an application for separate trials295 has not been made or has failed, the decision whether the evidence is cross-admissible can theoretically be deferred until all the evidence is in, the issue not being whether the information is properly before the jury but what use the jury is entitled to make of it. However, as the application for separate trials itself will generally turn upon cross-admissibility, even if there is no formal application by the defence to have cross-admissibility determined, at least a provisional view will have to be made about this where an application for separate trials is made.296

Trials can be separated where the interests of justice so demand — where a fair trial cannot proceed if the charges are tried together. There is a strong line of High Court authority to the effect that, where an accused is charged with multiple offences and the evidence relating to each is not ‘cross-admissible’, then, unless a jury direction can clearly protect the accused from the impermissible and prejudicial use of evidence relating to other counts, the offences should be separately tried.297 In particular in [page 245] the case of a series of sexual assaults, failure to sever counts where the evidence is not cross-admissible will generally lead to a successful appeal.298 This approach to severance has resulted in legislative intervention. Section 133(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) provides that a court may refuse to separate trials notwithstanding that evidence is not cross-admissible. Other legislation focuses on changing the practice only in relation to joined charges of sexual assault. In South Australia, where sexual offences are jointly charged separate trials may only be ordered where evidence is not crossadmissible.299 In Queensland and Western Australia, the Hoch test — the possibility of collusion — must be put aside in considering whether to sever.300 In Victoria, s 194 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (replacing s 372 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic)) creates a presumption that joined counts in sexual cases are triable together and the mere absence of cross-admissibility does not rebut that presumption, so that the onus is placed upon the accused to establish that, even with appropriate directions, the joinder would produce an unacceptable risk of prejudice.301 All these amendments encourage courts to permit joinder of counts whenever possible and only sever where a fair trial cannot be held. For the situation where separation is sought by accused who are jointly charged, see 3.78 below. [page 246]

Inadvertent disclosure

3.72 Propensity evidence should not normally be conditionally admitted in the hope that its sufficiency will become obvious as the case proceeds. Evidence disclosing propensity is normally too prejudicial for this course of action, and a subsequent direction to the jury to disregard it is insufficient mitigation of the risk of prejudice. Only in trials of multiple counts where separate trials are refused must such a warning be relied upon. In other cases, the inadmissible evidence should not be revealed.302 If it is revealed inadvertently, the trial judge has a discretion to discharge the jury.303 If the trial judge permits it to be revealed, any resulting conviction should be quashed, unless the appellate court is satisfied that, having regard to any directions given, there has been no substantial miscarriage of justice.304

Directions to the jury 3.73 With evidence revealing propensity being commonly admitted outside or in exception to the general rule, courts still seek to give the accused the protection of the exclusionary principle through jury direction.305 Although courts are wary of laying down definitive directions to be given in every case so that failure to give them constitutes an error of law,306 there will generally be a miscarriage of justice if directions [page 247] do not make it clear to the jury that it is not to use inadmissible propensity reasoning in considering whether an accused is guilty. Thus, unless evidence has been admitted exceptionally for a propensity purpose,307 the jury must normally be expressly told to eschew propensity reasoning,308 or at least the direction, in making clear the purposes for which the evidence may be used, must make it clear in the context of the case that propensity reasoning is not one of those purposes.309 Some judges suggest it is desirable that the jury receive some direction when the evidence is actually led.310 And [page 248] this is expressly permitted in Victoria by s 10(2) and (3) of the Jury Directions Act

2015, following and having regard to submissions from counsel. Ultimately, however, in every case the question is whether, in all the circumstances, the direction has given rise to the risk of a (substantial in Victoria) miscarriage of justice.311 3.74 The strictness of the directions required can be seen in the so-called ‘relationship’ cases where evidence of uncharged acts is admitted.312 Judges are wary of this evidence being left to the jury in vague terms of relationship or background evidence or as providing context, and generally demand that juries be quite specifically told how the evidence may be used. This in turn depends upon the rule of admissibility that applies. At common law, the High Court divided in HML v R313 upon the issue of whether evidence disclosing other crimes or discreditable conduct required any propensity reasoning arising to be justified under the Pfennig test before the evidence was admissible for any purpose at all. On the Hayne, Kirby and Gummow JJ approach, requiring that justification, the evidence once admitted can be used for that propensity purpose as well as for any other relevant purpose. On the approach of Gleeson CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ, the evidence need not be admissible for the propensity purpose before it becomes admissible for other purposes, in which case the jury must be directed to eschew any inadmissible propensity reasoning and be told as carefully and precisely as possible for what other purposes the evidence may be used; for example, as evidence of a relevant attraction or to explain why the complainant did not complain of the crimes charged, or to allow the complainant to tell the whole story so that his or her credibility can be determined in a true and realistic context, thereby explaining that the matters charged were not isolated acts but part of a wider account. This may also provide reasons why the complainant did not complain or felt compelled to submit to continuous degradation.314 Where the evidence is admissible for a propensity purpose, as well as telling the jury this reasoning is open, if that reasoning becomes an indispensable step towards guilt the jury should be directed to find that propensity proved beyond reasonable doubt [page 249] before acting upon it. Whether indispensability is required is thrown into some doubt by HML v R, where Hayne J concludes that a majority of the court

requires the jury always to be directed to find sexual interest proved beyond reasonable doubt before acting upon it: see discussion at 2.87. While sexual interest appears to be relevant via propensity reasoning, Gleeson CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ seem prepared to admit evidence of it outside the common law exclusionary rule, whether it comes from the complainant or another witness.315 But in all cases where evidence discloses criminal misconduct, judges should give clear directions about how the evidence can and cannot be used.316 3.75 Sections 97 and 98 of the uniform legislation define when tendency and coincidence reasoning processes are admissible. Where the evidence is admitted for another purpose in a criminal case, the jury must be instructed what these purposes are and directed to eschew inadmissible tendency and coincidence reasoning (expressed to remain inadmissible under s 95).317 Where the evidence is admissible for a tendency or coincidence purpose and the evidence has been tendered by the prosecution, the next hurdle is s 101. If this hurdle is negotiated the jury should be directed specifically as to the tendency and/or coincidence uses as well as any other admissible and inadmissible uses.318 As at common law, authority suggests the jury should be directed to find an admissible tendency or sexual interest proved beyond reasonable doubt before acting upon it (even where technically it is not an indispensable intermediate fact within Shepherd v R).319 In Queensland, where evidence of the history of a domestic relationship is more liberally admitted, directions as to its precise use, whether as propensity or otherwise, must still be given,320 and in South Australia, the legislation demands detailed directions [page 250] about the permissible and impermissible uses of any evidence of discreditable conduct that is admitted.321 In Western Australia, no direction against propensity reasoning is required where evidence is admitted under s 31A of the Evidence Act (1906) as propensity evidence, but otherwise, as at common law, specific directions about use may be required to avoid a miscarriage of justice.322 Ultimately, the precise instructions to be given to the jury depend upon the issues, evidence and argument in the individual case. The purpose of instructing the jury is to warn against inadmissible and prejudicial inferences where evidence

is before the court for other admissible purposes, and to instruct the jury about the uses to which the evidence can be admissibly put in the final equation of proof. To succeed on appeal, unless directions contain a clear error of law, an accused will have to persuade the court that the directions given have in the circumstances of the particular case created an unacceptable risk of a miscarriage of justice. The problems in directing that have arisen are a consequence of judges seeking, in past decisions and judges’ bench books, formulas for direction, rather than focusing on what is required in particular circumstances to ensure that evidence is used for admissible purposes and that the exclusionary principle remains respected. In Victoria, the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) (see generally 2.13) contains particular provisions (Pt 4 Div 2) dealing with cases where evidence of other misconduct is admissible (as tendency evidence, coincidence evidence or as evidence relevant for purposes outside ss 97 and 98 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic)). These provide (s 27) that where the prosecution tenders admissible evidence of other misconduct the defence may request that directions be given to the jury by the trial judge, but that, when given, these directions need only identify how the evidence is relevant to a fact in issue, direct that the evidence may not be used for any other purpose, explain if the evidence is only part of the prosecution case, and direct the jury that it must not decide the case based upon any prejudice arising from what it has heard about the accused. The judge is not required to explain further how the jury should approach the evidence nor explain inadmissible purposes, nor indeed any other matter when giving these directions (unless there are compelling reasons for doing so: s 16). A similar provision (s 28) applies where one co-accused tenders evidence of other misconduct admissible against another co-accused. Section 29 provides that where evidence of other misconduct is admissible other than as tendency evidence, [page 251] prosecution or defence counsel may request that the jury be warned not to use the evidence as tendency evidence, a request that may be refused if there is no substantial risk of the jury so using the evidence. These provisions seek to simplify directions where evidence of other

misconduct is admissible and avoid complex distinctions between permissible and impermissible uses of such evidence ‘that have troubled judges and evidence scholars across the common law world for over 100 years’.323 Whether this can be achieved given the subtle distinctions demanded by ss 97 and 98 of the uniform legislation remains to be seen.

Defence Evidence Revealing a Co-accused’s Incriminating Propensity 3.76 An accused may wish to refer to evidence disclosing the incriminating propensity of a co-accused in order to implicate that co-accused as solely responsible for the crime charged. This situation may give rise to a clash of principles, between that supporting one accused’s right to adduce all evidence relevant to establishing his or her innocence, and that supporting the other accused’s right not to have his or her incriminating propensity admitted in support of the prosecution case unless its probative value is clear. While the accused adducing evidence to establish innocence needs only to satisfy ordinary principles of relevance, for that same evidence to be relied upon by the prosecution it will have to be sufficiently probative to eliminate the possibility that it might be given more weight than it deserves. Only when that additional probative weight is satisfied can conflict between the principles be avoided. This will not always be the case. 3.77 The problem is illustrated by R v Darrington and McGauley.324 The two accused were jointly tried for murder. McGauley sought to tender evidence that Darrington had previously killed the victim’s brother and had asserted that she would do the same to the victim, seeking to make more credible McGauley’s defence that Darrington alone was responsible for the murder charged. The evidence revealing Darrington’s previous crime was not sufficiently probative to justify admitting it on behalf of the Crown, but on grounds of mere relevance it was prima facie admissible to McGauley’s defence. The court was thus confronted with a clash of principles. It might be argued that in this situation the right of an accused to adduce evidence relevant to establishing his or her innocence should be given precedence. Certainly there are dicta supporting this approach. In Lowery v R,325 the Privy Council approved a

[page 252] dictum of the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal to the effect that there is ‘no reason of policy or fairness which justifies or requires the exclusion of evidence relevant to prove the innocence of an accused person’. And in R v Randall,326 although the House of Lords only positively answered the question, ‘Where two accused are jointly charged with a crime, and each blames the other for its commission, may one accused rely on the criminal propensity of the other?’327 applying a test of mere relevance to determine its admissibility, Lord Steyn, with whose judgment the remaining judges agreed, remarked (at [29]) that ‘there must be cases in which the propensity of one accused may be relied on by the other, irrespective of whether he has put his character in issue’.328 If the policy arguments for excluding evidence revealing propensity only apply to evidence relied upon by the Crown, at common law the test for admissibility at the behest of an accused must simply be one of sufficient relevance. But there must be sufficient relevance to facts in issue.329 The evidence is not akin to evidence of good character tendered in an abstract way to raise the possibility of a reasonable doubt. Some judges have suggested that where the evidence is tendered as relevant to a fact in issue as ‘similar fact evidence’ then it will only be admitted if it satisfies a test of striking similarity,330 but this sets too high a standard.331 [page 253] It may be that at common law, ultimately the right to adduce evidence relevant to establishing innocence does prevail, but this does not relieve a trial judge from ensuring that the revelation of evidence prejudicial to an accused is a last resort. And, to facilitate this, Devlin J in R v Miller332 suggests that counsel for that accused who might be prejudiced should be notified in advance of the intended tender. In this way, options available to avoid prejudice may be carefully considered. The options are, in practical terms, various. Counsel may be willing not to press for tender where the information is of little significance. Counsel may be able to adduce the substance of the evidence without revealing the prejudicial material or at least by disclosing any past misbehaviour in its mildest and least prejudicial form. If prejudicial material must be revealed, its impact may

be mitigated by direction (although a direction that evidence may be used to meet the prosecution case against one accused but not be used in support of the prosecution case against another accused may, at least in some circumstances, involve distinctions so fine as to be impossible to apply).333 3.78 Most importantly, counsel should consider whether justice would best be achieved by separating trials.334 If the accused are tried separately then evidence can be admitted as relevant to establishing innocence in the one case and excluded as prejudicial in the other. Separate trials may be ordered where this is ‘in the interests of justice’. As this open-ended phrase suggests, separation is not automatic. Courts are concerned with efficiently discovering the truth, and where several accused are charged with the one crime there is a presumption that that truth is more likely to reveal itself if the accused are tried together. And prima facie a joint trial is the more costeffective. Consequently, in cases where accused are alleged to have committed crimes together, the onus of establishing that justice would be better served by separation lies upon the applicant.335 [page 254] Although the interests of justice are not necessarily the same as the interests of the accused, courts are increasingly aware that it is of paramount importance that each accused receive a fair trial. And an accused does not ostensibly receive a fair trial where evidence, admissible against one co-accused, might wrongfully and therefore prejudicially be also used by the jury against the other. Consequently, the fact that information is admissible against one accused but not the other, and may be prejudicially used against that other accused, is important in deciding whether to stage separate trials.336 But it is not decisive. Courts must still consider other factors. Time and cost remain important337 and may be decisive where the risk of prejudice is slight or can be sufficiently mitigated by direction.338 Most importantly, separation should not be allowed to obscure the truth, and this risk must be somehow weighed against the possibility of prejudice.339 The decision to separate is therefore a multi-faceted one. On balance, it may be more appropriate to continue the joint trial despite the risk of prejudice, with appropriate direction to mitigate this risk.

[page 255] 3.79 The majority in Darrington and McGauley340 suggest a final, somewhat controversial option: in exercise of the trial judge’s residuary discretion to ensure a fair trial, the tendered information may be excluded where the implicated accused can establish that this is appropriate. Thus, where the information is prejudicial to the co-accused but not absolutely vital to the defence — as the majority in that case concluded was the situation before them — then the information might be excluded. The difficulty with this is that it seeks to limit the accused’s right to tender evidence relevant to establishing innocence. If it is an option, it can only be applied in the rare circumstances where exclusion can have no practical effect upon the accused’s case. This was probably the situation in Darrington and McGauley, where there was already other evidence of Darrington’s hatred for the accused. The later decisions of the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Carranceja and Asikin341 and R v Su342 emphasise the limited circumstances in which exclusion might be an appropriate option, although in the latter case the trial judge’s discretionary exclusion was allowed to stand. The Privy Council in Lobban v R343 was more emphatic in stating that the discretion to exclude on grounds of prejudice applies only to evidence relied upon by the prosecution and not by a co-accused seeking relevant evidence to raise a reasonable doubt. Section 137 of the uniform legislation similarly demands the exclusion of evidence where its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to a defendant but only where the evidence is ‘adduced’ by the prosecutor. However, ss 135 and 136 do not contain this limitation. 3.80 Where an accused brings about a situation where the co-accused is obliged to reveal that other’s past, then that revelation will normally have to proceed. This situation is well illustrated by Lowery v R.344 Lowery and King were jointly tried for murdering a girl in extremely cruel circumstances. Lowery, who put his defence first, claimed [page 256] that King had committed the murder. To support his innocence he tendered evidence of his own good character and prospects. When it came to presenting his defence, King blamed Lowery, and supported his defence with evidence from

a professor of psychology that Lowery was the stronger personality, aggressive, callous and with signs of sadistic tendencies. As relevant to establishing King’s innocence, the Privy Council regarded the evidence as prima facie admissible and, when confronted with the prejudice the evidence might cause Lowery, answered that, although this was so, Lowery had already put his character in issue and therefore could not complain when King led evidence to rebut it. The decision does not strictly support the proposition that evidence relevant to an accused’s defence is always admissible in a joint trial despite its disclosure of a coaccused’s adverse propensity. In the circumstances, by putting character in issue, the ‘prejudiced’ accused had brought about the situation for the tender of the controversial evidence. 3.81 Another way of looking at the decision in Lowery is to consider what the situation would have been if Lowery had been separately tried. The prosecution evidence clearly established that either or both men had murdered the girl and the only line of defence was for Lowery to blame the other man. In these circumstances, arguably the personalities of both men assumed such crucial importance that the accused could not be denied the relevance of the other man’s personality. It can be strongly argued that, once this had been made an issue by the accused, even if the two men were separately tried, the prosecution could adduce evidence suggesting that the accused did possess an appropriate personality and that in the circumstances this information could be regarded as sufficiently probative to be admissible as propensity/tendency evidence. Interpreted in this way, Lowery is not a case where the principles under consideration came into conflict at all. Joint trials therefore raise their own particular problems. Although an accused should ultimately be entitled to adduce evidence relevant to establishing his or her innocence, there are various techniques that a court can utilise to ensure that a co-accused is not unduly prejudiced by the revelation of bad character. 3.82 The provisions in the uniform legislation controlling the tender of evidence revealing tendency (s 97) or coincidence (s 98) reasoning may apply to the tender of evidence by a co-accused. But to be within these sections the evidence must be so tendered (doubtfully the case in Darrington and McGauley) and have ‘significant probative value’ (only where such evidence is tendered by the prosecution does s 101 require that its probative value substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect). When these sections can be satisfied they take away an accused’s right to tender tendency and coincidence evidence on grounds of mere

relevance (although it might be opined that trial judges will find probative value ‘significant’ where evidence is tendered by an accused to establish innocence through raising a reasonable doubt).345 But by the [page 257] same token, even if the evidence is tendered to establish innocence by implicating the co-accused in the crime charged, there is no requirement that the evidence be of any further substantial weight. However, the evidence could not be so relied upon by the prosecution unless s 101(2) was also satisfied: s 95. When caught by the presumptive exclusion of ss 97 and 98, the accused wishing to tender exceptionally must give reasonable notice so that the court will be in a position to consider how to approach the evidence if it might prejudice a co-accused. The separation of trials remains an option, and the discretion under s 135. As mentioned above, there is no power under s 137 to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice to an accused where the evidence has not been adduced by the prosecution. It might also be noted that the situation in Lowery is provided for by the uniform legislation in two ways. First, s 110 provides that the tendency, hearsay, opinion and credibility rules do not apply where a defendant gives evidence of good character nor to evidence adduced by prosecution or a co-defendant to contradict such evidence;346 and secondly, s 111 provides that the tendency and hearsay rules do not apply to evidence of a defendant’s character which takes the form of an opinion based on specialised knowledge adduced by a co-defendant. Section 111 appears to be a direct response to the particular circumstances in Lowery.

Cross-examination of an Accused Disclosing Propensity The accused as a witness: two problems 3.83 On the face of it, the protection given the accused against the disclosure of adverse evidence of propensity applies to all forms of disclosure. It would be incongruous if, for example, the prosecution — forbidden from introducing such

evidence as part of its case — could circumvent the prohibition by eliciting the same information in cross-examination of the accused. But, as demonstrated at 3.76–3.82, principles often clash and more particularly so when the accused takes the stand. On the one hand, the accused’s opponents are entitled to cross-examine the accused as an ordinary witness in order to discredit the testimony given. And a common guide to a witness’s credibility is character including the witness’s propensity towards unlawful activities. The justification and extent of this crossexamination to determine credibility will be dealt with in Chapter 7. It is enough to assert at this point that the entitlement to credibility cross-examination was taken seriously by the common law (though subject to inadequate control).347 But, on the other hand, as an accused the witness is entitled to be protected from having a propensity or disposition revealed [page 258] which may be given more weight than it deserves in the final determination of proof. The law in this area is concerned to reconcile these competing principles. The common law avoided this need for reconciliation by not allowing an accused to testify at all. Parties were originally considered too self-interested to take the oath.348 The incongruous result was that the person with most intimate knowledge of the events under investigation was not able to give an account of them. This could be particularly harsh on innocent accused and, spurred by the opinions of the nineteenth century reformers, parliaments intervened to remedy the incongruity.349 The most important and influential Act was the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (UK) (‘the Criminal Evidence Act’), the principles of which remain, subject to some modifications, the basis of legislation in all Australian jurisdictions, although the uniform legislation takes a significantly different form.350 3.84 Once the accused was made competent to testify on oath for the defence at every stage of the trial,351 he or she became subject to the rules of crossexamination applicable to witnesses generally. All parties to the case may crossexamine352 and, provided the question seeks information which is otherwise admissible and relevant either to proving the material facts in issue or to determining the witness’s creditworthiness,353 the witness is obliged to answer,354

unless the witness is able to claim some exemption, such as, for example, the privilege against self-incrimination. But two problems arise in applying these general rules to the accused-witness. First, an accused might refuse to answer any questions relating to the offence charged by claiming the privilege against self-incrimination. Secondly, if the accused is allowed [page 259] to be cross-examined about character relevant to credit in the same way as any other witness, there is the risk that the character so revealed will be used by the trier of fact to set up a propensity chain of reasoning implicating the accused directly in the crime charged. The legislation seeks to overcome these two problems.

Modification of the privilege against selfincrimination 3.85 With the exception of the Uniform Evidence Acts, the Australian legislation remains based upon s 1(e) of the Criminal Evidence Act: s 1: Every person charged with an offence shall be a competent witness for the defence at every stage of the proceedings … Provided — (e) A person charged and being a witness in pursuance of this Act may be asked any question in cross-examination notwithstanding that it would tend to criminate him as to the offence charged.

While the South Australian and Western Australian legislation355 take exactly the same form, the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) is drafted differently but to the same effect, s 8(1) making the accused a competent witness and s 15(1) providing that an accused who testifies ‘shall not be entitled to refuse to answer a question or produce a document or thing on the ground that to do so would tend to prove the commission by the person of the offence with which the person is there charged’. These provisions certainly remove the privilege against self-incrimination in respect of the crime charged against the accused-witness. But in contrast to the form of the Queensland legislation, on a literal interpretation the South Australian

and Western Australian legislation also empowers the cross-examiner to ask an accused about any relevant matter tending to so incriminate him or her in the offence charged. This would empower cross-examination of the accused about commissions, convictions, charges and bad character so relevant and otherwise admissible. The problem with this interpretation is that it makes at least the first proviso in s 1(f) (discussed at 3.97) unnecessary. As a result, authority is against giving s 1(e) this literal interpretation. It is s 1(f) that codifies the circumstances in which the accused-witness may be cross-examined about these matters. Once a matter is so characterised s 1(f) must be satisfied to permit the cross-examination. Section 1(e) simply abolishes the accused-witness’s right to claim the privilege against self-incrimination in respect to the crime charged.356 It assumes the right of all parties to cross-examine, that cross-examination must seek information otherwise relevant and admissible (whether to issue or credit), and recognises the obligation of the accused to answer permissible questions: see 3.84. With the s 1(e) form of the legislation applying ‘at every stage of the proceedings’, and the Queensland legislation applying ‘[w]here in a proceeding a person charged [page 260] gives evidence’, it has been held that the privilege in respect to the crime charged is abolished at trial and on any voir dire examination.357 However, it does not follow that a question seeking to implicate the accused in the crime charged is necessarily relevant to the issues on the voir dire, nor, if relevant, that it is necessarily admissible before the jury: see Wong Kam-Ming v R358 and R v Brophy,359 discussed at 8.163–8.165. But in both formulations the privilege is only abolished insofar as it relates to implication in the crime charged. Therefore, the accused-witness might still claim the privilege insofar as it relates to other crimes, at least so far as they do not so implicate the accused. This possibility is illustrated by the facts in R v Corak and Palmer.360 Four accused were charged with drug offences and one, attempting to show she had acted under duress and was therefore not guilty, cross-examined the accused-witness to show that he had previously threatened her with a gun when she sought to disobey his instructions relating to the delivery of marijuana (not the subject of the crimes charged). The cross-examination was undoubtedly

relevant to establishing the defence of duress and was allowed (despite an objection based upon the limits to cross-examination imposed by the equivalent to s 1(f)). The privilege against self-incrimination was not claimed by the accusedwitness, but on a literal interpretation of s 1(e) it appears a claim could have been made, for the answer incriminated the accused-witness, not in the crime charged, but only in another crime. The general privilege of a witness to refuse to answer could apply in these circumstances. 3.86 The problem is, however, more complicated where the other crime for which the claim of privilege is made is also admissible to establish the crime charged. For example, if the accused is charged with obtaining money by falsely pretending a brass ring to be gold, and alleges a belief that the ring was gold, could the prosecution compel the accused to reveal in cross-examination a previous criminal incident in which the accused had been told of the inferior quality of the ring? The situation is unlikely to arise because the prosecution will normally have other information relating to the incident that must be introduced as part of its case through other witnesses, in which case the accused could not claim that answers would be further incriminating. But assuming no other available informants to the previous incident, would it be possible for the prosecution to pursue the matter in cross-examination, or may the accused claim the privilege, not on the ground that the answer will ‘criminate him as to the offence charged’ but upon the basis that it will ‘criminate him’ as to another offence? Unless one is prepared to argue that s 1(e) and its equivalents are intended to [page 261] oblige all answers revealing information relevant to proving the crime charged, a literal interpretation appears to allow the claim to privilege. 3.87 The uniform legislation provides in s 128(10) that the privilege against self-incrimination: … does not apply in relation to the giving of evidence by a defendant, being evidence that the defendant: (a) did an act the doing of which is a fact in issue; or (b) had a state of mind the existence of which is a fact in issue.

This provision does not apply on the voir dire: s 189(6). The provision is clearly directed towards abolishing the accused’s privilege against self-

incrimination in relation to testimony relevant and admissible to prove the crime charged. It contains, however, two possible interpretations. On one interpretation, the privilege applies only to evidence that constitutes a material fact in issue — ‘evidence that the defendant did an act the doing of which is a fact in issue’ or ‘evidence that the defendant had a state of mind the existence of which is a fact in issue’. On this interpretation, if the evidence is not itself a material fact in issue but only relevant to a material fact in issue then the privilege can be claimed. But on the other interpretation, the privilege applies ‘in relation to’ the accused giving evidence about a fact in issue, meaning that as long as the evidence is relevant, whether directly or indirectly, to a material fact in issue no privilege can be claimed in relation to it. The question of which interpretation to take was raised by the facts in Cornwell v R.361 The accused, charged with importing drugs, sought to claim the privilege in relation to telephone conversations which revealed he was part of a wider business syndicate involved in the importation and distribution of drugs. Although the conversations were clearly indirectly relevant to establishing the crimes charged, the accused did not wish to implicate himself in further crimes and so claimed the privilege. Accepting the second interpretation, the majority rejected his claim. It regarded the first interpretation ‘extremely unlikely’ in view of the history of the Criminal Evidence Act, the arbitrariness of abolishing the privilege in relation to only some evidence relevant to the material facts in issue, and the failure of the ALRC to explain that it was proposing such a limited change to existing law: see particularly at [58], [72], [79]–[83]. While these are strong arguments it should be noted that a decision between the interpretations was not crucial to the outcome of the accused’s claim. Even if the claim was beyond s 128(10), other provisions within s 128 enabled the trial judge to compel the accused to testify as required on giving him a certificate granting immunity against the use of the evidence in later criminal proceedings. And such a certificate had been given. It was in the light of this procedure that Kirby J dissented, arguing that the text of the legislation should be given its natural meaning as in terms of policy the section as a whole dealt sensibly with the problem of an accused-witness claiming the privilege in relation to evidence relevant only indirectly to the crime charged.362 [page 262]

In the result, s 128(10) can be used to refuse a claim of privilege in relation to other crimes which implicate the accused in the crime charged. The use of the history of the Criminal Evidence Act to justify this conclusion is somewhat ironic in that under that legislation, as argued in the paragraph above, there remains doubt whether a claim to privilege in a crime other than the crime charged is abrogated by s 1(e).

Limiting cross-examination revealing the accused’s character The purpose of the legislative compromise 3.88 To allow the accused-witness to be cross-examined generally as to credit would result in his or her bad character being revealed, which would lead to the risk of the prejudicial propensity chain of reasoning influencing the trier’s decision of fact. The solution to this problem, a solution that underlies all relevant Australian legislation, although it takes a significantly different form under the uniform legislation, is to prohibit altogether, in the first instance, crossexamination that would reveal the accused’s character (which would be relevant and admissible to credit alone in the case of an ordinary witness). This prohibition is then lifted in three exceptional situations: where the accused has put his or her character in issue by giving evidence of good character; where the accused has attacked the character of a witness for the prosecution; and where the accusedwitness has given evidence against a co-accused. In these three cases there is a justification for treating the accused as an ordinary witness so far as credit cross-examination is concerned: in the first because the accused has already raised the matter and cannot be allowed to claim a character to which he or she is not entitled; in the second because the trier is entitled to know the character of an accused who attacks the character of accusers; and in the third because an accused should retain the right to discredit all accusers, including those who happen to be concurrently on trial. The legislation is not intended to limit cross-examination required to obtain evidence otherwise relevant and admissible to the material facts of the charged offences or the defences to them. It is intended to limit cross-examination relevant to credit only and which may reveal a prejudicial propensity. And where, as an exception, cross-examination is permitted, the trier should be warned against the use of prejudicial propensity reasoning and directed to use the cross-

examination only to determine the accused’s credibility as a witness or to rebut any evidence of good character that may have been given.

The form of the compromise 3.89 The approach of the legislation based upon the Criminal Evidence Act is to codify the circumstances in which an accused can be cross-examined upon matters revealing character (described as comprising commissions, convictions, charges and bad character). It prohibits cross-examination about character and creates four [page 263] exceptions. The first is intended to lift the prohibition where the crossexamination seeks evidence relevant and admissible to the material facts in issue. The other three are intended to specify the situations where the accused can be treated as an ordinary witness so far as cross-examination about character is concerned — where the accused has given evidence of good character, has attacked a prosecution witness or has given evidence against a co-accused. A major problem with this legislation is to interpret it to permit cross-examination on all character evidence relevant and admissible to the issues in the case: see 3.92–3.98. 3.90 The uniform legislation eliminates this last problem by controlling crossexamination of the accused about credibility evidence only, rather than about character evidence more generally, but in practical terms it permits crossexamination of an accused to reveal character in much the same situations as the legislation based on the Criminal Evidence Act. The uniform legislation makes inadmissible ‘credibility evidence’363 about any witness: s 102. Credibility evidence is essentially evidence that is relevant only because it affects the credibility of a witness (or person) (or where relevant to credibility and ‘for some other purpose for which it is not admissible’: s 101A).364 But it permits such evidence in cross-examination when it can substantially affect the assessment of a witness’s credibility: s 103. However, where the witness is an accused, there are further provisions designed to protect the accused from the revelation of credibility evidence that might prejudice his or her fair trial: s 104.

Cross-examination about evidence relevant and admissible to the material facts in issue remains untouched365 and, as mentioned above, no privilege against selfincrimination can be claimed in respect of such evidence. But credibility crossexamination of an accused-witness is prohibited altogether unless the court gives leave: s 104(2). Section 104(3) of the uniform legislation creates three exceptions to the prohibition against credibility cross-examination without leave: … leave is not required for cross-examination by the prosecutor366 about whether the defendant: (a) is biased or has a motive to be untruthful; or (b) is, or was, unable to be aware of or to recall matters to which his or her evidence relates; or (c) has made a prior inconsistent statement.

These exceptions are not specifically dealt with by legislation based on the Criminal Evidence Act as such cross-examination does not necessarily reveal prohibited [page 264] character. Where it does, an exception to the prohibition will need to be invoked. One might argue that in each of these situations, even if an accused’s propensity may be revealed, cross-examination is generally so important to assessing credibility that it should proceed as for any other witness. An accused can still seek to invoke the mandatory and discretionary exclusions (ss 135–137) should it be claimed the cross-examination will prevent a fair trial. In all other cases leave is required to cross-examine a testifying accused about credibility. However, s 104(4) provides that leave must not be given to the prosecutor unless the defendant has adduced admissible evidence tending to prove a prosecution witness untruthful and it is relevant solely or mainly to discredit that witness, and s 104(6) provides that leave may not be given to a co-defendant unless the defendant has given evidence adverse to the co-defendant seeking to crossexamine. Cross-examination of an accused consequential upon evidence of good character is governed by separate provisions contained in Pt 3.8 ‘Character’ (discussed in more detail at 3.108). This Part represents a departure from common law practice, if perhaps not the underlying principle.367 It is concerned to control the adducing by the accused of good character evidence whether relevant to issue or credibility, and to the adducing of evidence in response. The

evidence permitted by s 110 is not subject to the credibility, hearsay, opinion and tendency rules. The accused may tender good character evidence ‘generally’ or ‘in a particular respect’. Once good character evidence is adduced, the evidence in response is then limited to rebutting the claim to good character in kind. That the accused can also be cross-examined as part of that response is implicit in s 112, which provides: ‘A defendant must not be cross-examined about matters arising out of evidence of a kind referred to in this Part unless the court gives leave’. Leave will be given so long as the cross-examination is not unfairly prejudicial to the accused. 3.91 The legislative compromise in s 1(f) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (UK) is as follows: A person charged and called as a witness in pursuance of this Act shall not be asked, and if asked shall not be required to answer, any question tending to show that he has committed or been convicted of or been charged with any offence other than that wherewith he is then charged, or is of bad character, unless — (i)

the proof that he has committed or been convicted of such other offence is admissible evidence to show that he is guilty of the offence wherewith he is then charged; or

(ii) he has personally or by his advocate asked questions of the witnesses for the prosecution with a view to establish his own good character, or has given evidence of his good character, or the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations on the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution; or (iii) he has given evidence against any other person charged with the same offence.

[page 265] The legislation in Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia,368 while based on s 1(f), makes amendments to meet some of the problems that have arisen from it and which are the subject of the discussion that follows. As mentioned above, this basic form of the legislation has been interpreted by both the House of Lords in Jones v DPP369 and the High Court in Attwood v R370 as a code dealing with the circumstances in which cross-examination is permitted upon those matters specified — commissions, convictions, charges and bad character — subject to the general prohibition. Once the prohibition operates, any cross-examination on these matters must be justified under an exception which follows. By the same token, if the prohibition does not operate, the accused may be treated as an ordinary witness and, except to the extent that the privilege against self-incrimination may still apply, is obliged to answer all

questions seeking relevant and admissible information, whether that information is relevant to the material facts or only to the testifying accused’s credit. But there remain some situations where the prohibition appears to prevent the revelation of evidence that would be otherwise relevant and admissible to prove material facts in issue. Some judges argue that the prohibition must not be allowed to prevent such evidence being revealed (see, for example, Mitchell J in R v Corak and Palmer371 and Cox J in R v Vuckov),372 but this view is difficult to justify upon the basis of the legislation as it is drafted. These situations will be explained more fully at 3.97–3.98 in the context of the first exception to the prohibition. The problem will be seen to have been avoided to some extent by the more careful drafting of the Queensland legislation and, as explained above, does not arise under the uniform legislation.

The extent of the prohibition under the Criminal Evidence Act 3.92 The prohibition in s 1(f) and embodied in the legislation in Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia, extends to ‘questions tending to show that [the accused] has committed or been convicted of or been charged with any offence other than that wherewith he is then charged, or is of bad character’. In the case of the first three categories specified, there is little ambiguity, each ensuring that questions revealing previous offences by the accused are not pursued. The word ‘charged’ means charged in court,373 and is included to prevent the prohibition against the disclosure of convictions being technically avoided by directing questions to reveal only the charges laid. A charge followed by acquittal will often not be of sufficient relevance to be [page 266] received,374 but in some circumstances it may be,375 so long as it is not revealed in such a way as to question the verdict of acquittal.376 ‘Bad character’ is a more ambiguous phrase. The initial bills leading to the Criminal Evidence Act dealt only with previous offences, with ‘bad character’ being added to the list of prohibited instances at a later stage of the debate.377 Bad character is nowhere defined. In Jones v DPP,378 Lord Devlin argued that, at common law, ‘character’ had but one meaning — general reputation — and that the prohibition should be read accordingly. But the majority in that case rejected

this interpretation emphatically and took a broad view of character, one embracing particular conduct that might prejudice an accused if revealed to the trier. The intention of the prohibition is to protect the accused against disclosure of character that might give rise to the prejudicial dispositional chain of reasoning, so that this broad approach to character is appropriate. 3.93 The real problems in defining the extent of the prohibition arise where an accused is cross-examined in order to obtain information relevant to material facts in issue, but where the cross-examination is prima facie caught by the prohibition and the first exception, intended to permit issue cross-examination, does not literally apply. Wanting to allow cross-examination in these circumstances, the courts, unable to extend the exceptions through interpretation, have been prepared to read down the prohibition. In some jurisdictions, the exceptions allowing revelation of information relevant to facts in issue have been legislatively extended so that the reading down of the prohibition is generally unnecessary. But there are still some gaps even in these jurisdictions, as will be explained at 3.97–3.98. The problem does not arise under the uniform legislation as it only regulates cross-examination concerning credibility evidence. The problem is illustrated by the cases of Jones v DPP379 and Attwood v R,380 and both use a different technique to read down the prohibition to permit crossexamination relevant to the issue. [page 267] 3.94 In Jones v DPP, the prosecution carefully cross-examined an accused charged with raping a Girl Guide to show that, in relation to a previous incident, revealed in general terms so as to imply only bad character but not to reveal the precise nature of that incident (for it was a previous allegation of rape), the accused gave an identical alibi to that put forward at his current trial. Such crossexamination, although relevant to the issue of the alibi, could not be justified under s 1(f)(i) of the Criminal Evidence Act, which did not allow crossexamination revealing bad character to establish guilt of the crime charged. But in his evidence-in-chief, the accused had already explained that he changed his alibi because he had been ‘in trouble’ before. The majority emphasised this fact and decided that the words ‘tending to show’ in the prohibition meant ‘tending to

show for the first time’ and, as the bad character had already been revealed, the cross-examination could proceed. This interpretation makes some sense because generally the prosecution should lay a proper foundation through evidence-in-chief of the matters it wishes to pursue in cross-examination.381 But Jones leaves open the amount of information that must be disclosed to justify a full cross-examination about the prohibited matter. This difficulty must, however, be seen in the light of the problem of statutory interpretation their Lordships were seeking to solve. 3.95 In Attwood v R, the prosecution again sought to cross-examine the accused about his bad character, in this case his previous relationship with the victim, in order to rebut his defence of accident. Again, the exception in the provision equivalent to s 1(f)(i) was of no assistance. But the High Court wanted to allow this line of cross-examination that would adduce evidence relevant to an important issue in the case. It therefore seized upon the ambiguity in the phrase ‘bad character’ in the prohibition and, deciding that the intention of the legislation was only to prevent the accused being cross-examined about bad character solely relevant to credit, interpreted the words ‘bad character’ in the prohibition accordingly, holding that the cross-examination was not prohibited. Again, the decision must be seen in the light of the poor drafting of the s 1(f)(i) equivalent. 3.96 Nevertheless, these decisions support the propositions that the words ‘tend to reveal’ or ‘tend to show’ mean ‘tend to reveal (or show) for the first time’, and the phrase ‘bad character’ refers only to character as it is relevant to the accused’s credibility as a witness, not character otherwise relevant and admissible to material facts in issue. As there is no ambiguity about the words ‘commissions’, ‘convictions’ and ‘charges’, they cannot be read down in the same way. In Queensland and South Australia, as is discussed below, these problems have been removed by amendment to their equivalents of the s (1)(f)(i) exception. Under the [page 268] uniform legislation, these problems are avoided by the prohibition applying only

to cross-examination seeking credibility evidence from the defendant. This obviates altogether the need for the exception next discussed.

The first exception: matters establishing facts in issue 3.97 The intention of the first exception to s 1(f) of the Criminal Evidence Act is to allow cross-examination upon prohibited matters where that information is relevant and admissible to establishing material facts in issue.382 But as originally drafted, s 1(f)(i) provides an inadequate catalogue of matters that might be relevant to material facts in issue. In the first place, it refers only to ‘commissions and convictions’ that might be relevant, providing no exception for cross-examination as to ‘previous charges or bad character’. Thus, crossexamination upon these latter matters can only be allowed where the prohibition does not apply in the first place, although perhaps there is a hint in Attwood v R383 that the omission of the word ‘charge’ from s 1(f)(i) might be an oversight that courts could overcome by employing that technique of statutory interpretation known as casus omissus. There is authority permitting cross-examination relevant to an issue that nevertheless revealed a previous charge: see R v Cokar.384 The wording of s 1(f)(i), omitting charges and bad character from the exception, is now found only in the legislation in Western Australia.385 In Queensland and South Australia, cross-examination is permitted upon any matter where the information is admissible to prove the accused guilty of the offence charged.386 In South Australia, the cross-examination is also permitted to show that the cross-examined accused is not guilty of the offence charged, although it is difficult to envisage the circumstances in which another party might want to establish this. More likely, a co-accused might wish to cross-examine the accused-witness to establish the co-accused’s innocence. Only the Queensland legislation provides for this situation.387 In other jurisdictions it remains a significant gap. In R v Corak and Palmer, Mitchell J ignored this gap to hold that such a crossexamination was permissible just because it sought information relevant to material facts in issue, in this case a defence of duress (King CJ justified the crossexamination under s 18(1)VI(c) (now s 18(1)(d)(iv)) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA)).388 [page 269]

3.98 One other gap in this first exception that may remain despite the Australian amendments was brought to light by the facts in R v Vuckov.389 The accused sought to have a confession excluded and gave evidence on the voir dire. Cox J held that the prohibition applied to the accused’s voir dire examination and therefore the accused could not be cross-examined about his past brushes with the police (which were relevant to determining whether the trial judge should exclude the confession in exercise of his discretion) unless an exception applied (s 18(1)VI(a) (now s 18(1)(d)(i)) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) being the only possible exception). Cox J queried whether the cross-examination sought information to show the accused ‘guilty or not guilty of the offence charged’. His tentative view was that, although the information was not directly relevant to the issue of guilt, it nevertheless would have an effect upon such a finding sufficient to justify the cross-examination under this exception. This problem also arises under the legislation in Queensland.

The remaining exceptions: procedural issues 3.99 The remaining exceptions refer to situations where it is considered appropriate to treat the accused as an ordinary witness so far as cross-examination as to credit is concerned, even though this might result in the revelation of potentially prejudicial propensity evidence. In that the cross-examination is primarily directed to credibility, these exceptions apply equally under the uniform legislation. Whether the exceptions apply depends upon the way the accused conducts his or her defence.390 If good character is put in issue, prosecution witnesses are attacked, or evidence is given against a co-accused, the accused-witness loses the protection of the prohibition — loses the shield — and can be treated as any ordinary witness for the purposes of credit cross-examination. 3.100 The legislation based on the Criminal Evidence Act is silent as to which parties are entitled to cross-examine once the shield is lost. Where prosecution witnesses are attacked, then it will be the prosecution that is primarily interested in cross-examination. Where evidence is given against a co-accused, then that coaccused will primarily be the interested party. However, arguably the better view is that, once the exceptions apply, the general rule that all parties to the case are allowed to cross-examine takes over and any party may seek to cross-examine about prohibited matters.391

[page 270] Under the uniform legislation, only a prosecutor can be given leave to crossexamine where an accused has adduced evidence tending to prove that a prosecution witness has a tendency to be untruthful that is relevant solely or mainly to that witness’s credibility (s 104(4)), and only a co-defendant where adverse evidence has been given against that co-defendant by the other accused (s 104(6)). Where the accused gives good character evidence, any party can crossexamine with leave: s 112. 3.101 While in Queensland (see 3.102) and under the uniform legislation (see 3.104), leave to cross-examine an accused is stipulated when required, in the absence of such provisions, cross-examination still remains always subject to the control of the court. Parties must have a legitimate interest in pursuing a particular line of cross-examination, and can only seek evidence of relevance that is admissible and not unduly prejudicial to the fair trial of the accused. In all cases, there is a residual discretion to control the receipt of information in this way. In the context of the revelation of prohibited matters, this discretion assumes crucial importance, for the evidence to be revealed in cross-examination will generally be very prejudicial to the accused. Consequently, even at common law, there is High Court authority for the view that the permission of the court should be sought before a party embarks upon cross-examination under any of these exceptions.392 This will necessarily require the prosecutor to explain the nature and extent of the cross-examination sought. In anticipation of a request to cross-examine, in some jurisdictions it is suggested that Crown counsel in a case involving an accused with previous convictions should inform the defence counsel which convictions will be alleged if the shield is thrown away, and warn where a line of defence is likely to lead to an application to cross-examine upon prohibited matters.393 In other jurisdictions, courts emphasise that it is the duty of defence counsel to ask the Crown prosecutor what matters will be alleged in cross-examination should the shield be thrown away.394 It is suggested in R v Cook that a trial judge has a duty to warn the accused where a line of defence may result [page 271]

in loss of the shield.395 Where there is a failure to follow any of these procedures, the authorities cited suggest that the accused must still persuade the court that the failure has resulted in a miscarriage of justice sufficient to justify a successful appeal. 3.102 The Queensland legislation396 based on the Criminal Evidence Act expressly requires the court to grant leave before cross-examination upon prohibited matters can proceed for all exceptions other than the last (where the accused-witness gives evidence against a co-accused). 3.103 A problem created by the Queensland provision is whether it is intended to take away the supervisory discretion where leave to cross-examine is not expressly required. This may have further repercussions. In Matusevich v R,397 a case from Victoria decided upon (now repealed) legislation based on s 1(f) but in the same terms as the Queensland provision, the question arose whether the prosecution could cross-examine upon prohibited matters after the testifying accused had given evidence against a co-accused charged with the same offence. Pointing to the fact that permission to cross-examine was not expressly required upon this exception being invoked, and being reluctant to give the prosecution an absolute right to cross-examine upon prohibited matters in these circumstances, Stephen J (at 639) and Murphy J (at 647) inclined to the view that the prosecution could never cross-examine under this exception. However, in the later case of Phillips v R,398 the High Court stresses the importance of the discretion whenever cross-examination is sought upon prohibited matters, whether the discretion is embodied in legislation through the requirement of permission or not. It is suggested this is the better view. Certainly, in practice, this is the accepted position. 3.104 Under the uniform legislation, leave is required for all crossexamination of the accused about credibility except in the situations specified in s 104(3),399 where the prosecutor is entitled to cross-examine without permission.400 In addition, s 112 provides that leave is required before a defendant can be cross-examined ‘about matters arising out of evidence of a kind referred to in this Part [3.8]’ — that is, where the accused has given evidence of good character generally or in a particular respect and the prosecution is seeking to elicit from the defendant evidence that he or she is not a person of such good character.401 The criteria for leave, which are specified in s 192 to

[page 272] include broad considerations of fairness to all parties and any witness,402 nevertheless appear to be comparable to those which would be applied at common law.403 Section 192A overrules TKWJ v R,404 and expressly permits advance rulings to be made where leave is sought under s 192 (and on other questions of admissibility). The onus is clearly upon the party seeking leave to justify it being granted. Basten JA in Lieu v R405 doubts whether s 137 requires consideration in this context as it is concerned only with evidence probative of ‘facts in issue’ not ‘credibility evidence’. 3.105 One matter that has not been made entirely clear by the High Court is the incidence of the onus where the common law discretion is invoked. The courts’ discretion is usually described as a residual one, so that the party seeking to exclude otherwise admissible evidence normally bears the burden of proving those factors that give rise to its exercise. Where the discretionary exclusion of a confession is sought it is clear that, at common law, the accused bears the burden of establishing the grounds for its exercise: see 8.160. But in the present context, where the courts emphasise the need for the party seeking to cross-examine to seek permission, it would seem that it is up to that party to show grounds for cross-examination and to demonstrate that the cross-examination will in all the circumstances be fair to the accused. Certainly this must be the situation where leave is required pursuant to statute. Although the High Court in Phillips v R406 has held that where good character is put in issue or a prosecution witness attacked it is not necessary to show ‘exceptional circumstances’ to justify crossexamination, the majority emphasises (at 57) the care a trial judge should take before allowing cross-examination (‘… it is undoubtedly right that the discretion of a trial judge to permit such an attack be sparingly and cautiously exercised’), and Deane J makes it clear (at 62) that ‘[o]nce the discretion has arisen it will be for the prosecution to persuade the trial judge that he should permit crossexamination’. The precise way in which the discretion operates is dealt with below in the context of discussion of each exception. On appeal, where leave to cross-examine has been sought and the trial judge has considered the discretion carefully, it will not be easy for an accused to succeed upon the basis that the discretion was wrongly exercised.407

[page 273] Appeals are most likely to succeed where no exception can be properly invoked to permit cross-examination or the discretion was not considered at all and as a result prejudicial information was unjustifiably put before the trier of fact.408

The second exception: good character in issue 3.106 Any discussion of this exception is complicated by the fact that, at common law, an accused is entitled to adduce evidence of good character in the form of evidence of general reputation to persuade the trier that, on grounds of disposition, it is unlikely that he or she committed the crime charged.409 This right is expanded by s 110 of the uniform legislation to allow an accused to adduce evidence not only of good character generally but of good character in a particular respect. The right exists independently of whether the accused gives evidence upon oath (in fact, it arose at a time when the accused was not entitled to testify). Evidence of good character can be met through cross-examining to discredit the character witness and through tendering evidence of bad character in rebuttal (although, in other than jurisdictions covered by the uniform legislation, if the accused does not testify and so cannot be cross-examined, this is technically restricted to proving previous convictions and tendering evidence of general bad reputation): see 3.131–3.135. Where the accused does not testify, the only purpose of this evidence of good character is to persuade the trier that the accused is not the sort of person who would have committed the crime in question. It is relevant in this sense to proof of the material facts in issue. But any bad character adduced by way of rebuttal can be used only for this purpose, to rebut, and cannot be used positively to establish a propensity probative of the accused’s guilt.410 To allow this would be to allow the prohibited propensity chain of reasoning. These rules concerning the adducing of evidence of good character to persuade the trier that the accused is not guilty are dealt with more fully at 3.126–3.138, but this exception to the prohibition against character cross-examination cannot be fully understood without this perspective. 3.107 The exception is invoked under legislation equivalent to the Criminal Evidence Act where the accused has ‘asked questions of the witness for the

prosecution with a view to establishing his own good character, or has given evidence of his good [page 274] character’.411 Under the uniform legislation, it is invoked where, pursuant to s 110(1), evidence has been ‘adduced by the defendant that tends to prove that the defendant is, either generally or in a particular respect, a person of good character’ and, consistently with s 110(2) and (3), where that adduced evidence has been ‘admitted’ in favour of the accused. The exception based on the Criminal Evidence Act recognises that, once an accused becomes a witness, evidence of good character is not only directly relevant to determining whether the accused committed the crime but is also relevant to determining whether the accused is a credible witness. Once the accused has put character in issue in this way, it is only fair that, to prevent advantage to the accused, he or she should be treated as an ordinary witness so far as cross-examination as to credibility is concerned. The justification for any shield is lost. Cross-examination is therefore permitted, not merely to enable the prosecution to reveal information which rebuts the evidence of good character, that is, for the purpose of determining whether there is any good character left to leave to the trier in determining whether to convict (the original common law position), but also to elicit information relevant more generally to the accused’s credibility as a witness. Cross-examination is allowed for both these purposes.412 In allowing the first, the legislation implicitly extends the availability of information to rebut any evidence of good character put forward to encourage the trier not to convict. The purpose for which cross-examination is not allowed is to reveal an inadmissible propensity from which to infer the accused guilty of the crime.413 This prejudicial propensity reasoning remains prohibited, although the evidence capable of giving rise to it may, for other reasons, have already been disclosed. What this means in practice is that the jury must be directed, whenever there is a risk that it may rely upon prohibited propensity reasoning, that it must eschew that reasoning altogether. Those cases that emphasise that juries should be clearly directed about how

they can use evidence of bad character disclosed in cross-examination make it clear that the need for the direction is the risk that the jury might act upon forbidden propensity [page 275] reasoning.414 Where this risk is not a real one, a failure to so direct is unlikely to lead to a successful appeal. But the trial judge must also generally put fairly to the jury how it may use the evidence of good character of which it may remain satisfied, and cases make it clear that good character may go to both credit and issue.415 3.108 An initial difficulty with the exception created by legislation based on the Criminal Evidence Act was the meaning of the words ‘good character’. In Jones v DPP,416 Lord Devlin argued persuasively, but unsuccessfully, that these words should be given their common law meaning of general reputation. After all, at common law this was, strictly speaking, the only evidence of good character that an accused was entitled to adduce (although in practice the limit has probably never been strictly observed). The majority rejected this argument and it has never been seriously entertained by the courts again. Consequently, in this context ‘character’ is given its broadest meaning to include evidence of particular conduct and evidence of general disposition or reputation.417 An unintended effect of the legislation is to extend the permissible evidence of good character that can be adduced by the accused beyond the common law notion of general reputation, sanctioning the concessions made in practice to an accused. Under the uniform legislation, s 110 makes it clear that the accused can adduce evidence of good character ‘generally or in a particular respect’.418 [page 276] Under the legislation based on the Criminal Evidence Act, before the exception can be invoked the court must be satisfied that the question asked419 or the evidence of good character tendered was given ‘with a view to’ establishing good character.420 This phrase governs the operation of the whole exception, so that good character disclosed gratuitously by a witness421 or adduced for the

legitimate purpose of establishing facts relevant to the accused’s defence422 will not bring the exception into play. This is an important limit to the exception and makes it unnecessary to define ‘good character’ in a technical and arbitrary fashion. The question is whether the defence intended to put character in issue by referring to conduct, disposition or reputation, either to suggest it is unlikely that the accused committed the crime, or to suggest the accused is a credible witness, or (most likely) both.423 The uniform legislation can be interpreted to impose a similar requirement of intention.424 Section 112 provides that no cross-examination of a defendant ‘in respect to the matters arising out of evidence of a kind referred to in this Part’ can proceed without leave. The ‘evidence of a kind referred to in’ Pt 3.8 is, under ss 110 and 111, ‘evidence adduced by the defendant to prove … good character’ and, once that evidence has been admitted, evidence adduced by the prosecution to meet it. When either the first or both these situations have arisen then crossexamination in respect to matters arising can proceed with leave.425 The phrase ‘adduced by the defendant to prove’ has been interpreted to require an intention to raise the issue of good character. Without this requisite intention the evidence adduced will not enliven the possibility of leave.426 As well as calling or crossexamining of other witnesses, evidence [page 277] of character may be adduced through testimony from the defendant in-chief or in cross-examination.427 It may be more difficult to infer the intention to raise good character where the defendant asserts good character in responding emphatically to a line of persistent questions in cross-examination by the prosecution.428 As at common law, it does not matter whether the evidence is adduced to suggest it unlikely that the accused committed the crime, or to suggest the accused is a credible witness, or both.429 Once the intention to adduce evidence of good character is manifested and the evidence adduced (the mere asking of a question is not enough) then leave is possible.430 Consistently with s 110(2) and (3), one might argue that nor should the possibility of leave be enlivened unless the good character evidence ‘has been admitted’, but otherwise this can be taken into account in deciding whether to grant leave. 3.109 The court’s supervisory discretion determines leave to cross-examine

consequential upon evidence of good character under both legislation equivalent to the Criminal Evidence Act and the uniform legislation.431 In terms of principle, the discretion must be employed to ensure that matters revealed in cross-examination are relevant to rebutting good character or discrediting the accused as a witness and do not create an unacceptable risk of unfair trial through prohibited propensity reasoning. Where character has been intentionally raised there are few circumstances where cross-examination is likely to be forbidden altogether, for otherwise an accused might be left with a false claim to good character.432 But, given that under the [page 278] Criminal Evidence Act (but not under the uniform legislation), the mere asking of a question to a (prosecution) witness technically invokes the exception, it may be that cross-examination would not be allowed where the question does not succeed. Where no issue exists between co-accused, it might be inappropriate to permit a co-accused to cross-examine.433 The discretion is most likely to be exercised to restrict cross-examination to prevent the revelation of misconduct that will seriously prejudice the accused through inadmissible propensity reasoning upon the issue of guilt.434 But even here the court may be obliged to permit the cross-examination to prevent the accused from unfairly claiming a character to which he or she is not entitled.435 A balance must be struck between ‘the advantage gained by the accused by the steps which have been taken by him or on his behalf in an endeavour to show his good character, and on the other hand the degree of prejudice which may result to the accused from proof of prior convictions’.436 Whether cross-examination should be restricted to the character trait raised by the evidence of good character is something of a moot point.437 Where the purpose of the cross-examination is to discredit the accused (and it is hard to imagine that this cannot be at least one purpose for cross-examining in every case) arguably, the courts must take a wide view of what character traits are relevant for this purpose. The cross-examination should be at least as wide as that permitted of an ordinary witness as to discrediting character. The accused should be treated differently only if the cross-examination would be unfairly prejudicial

on the issue of guilt. Thus, it is arguable that in this context, as Viscount Simond said in Stirland v DPP,438 ‘[a]n accused who “puts his character in issue” must be regarded as putting the whole of his past record in issue’, and that therefore it would not be appropriate to exercise the discretion to limit cross-examination to any more specific character trait that may have been adduced and is relevant to credit.439 Under the uniform legislation, one might similarly argue [page 279] that if a more specific character trait has relevance to both issue and credibility then leave to cross-examine under s 112 may extend to any other character traits relevant to the accused’s credibility: see further 3.135.

The third exception: imputations against the character of the prosecutor or prosecution witnesses 3.110 Much of the litigation in this area has been concerned with the interpretation of s 1(f)(ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act and its Australian equivalents (Queensland and Western Australia).440 The South Australian (s 18(1) (d)(iii), 18(2), 18(3)) and uniform legislation (s 104(4) and (5)) has been drafted to avoid the difficulty. The problem is that, while loss of the shield is justified in principle where an accused attacks the character of the prosecutor or witnesses for the prosecution, with the ensuing cross-examination enabling the trier accurately to assess the credibility of an accused prepared to make such an attack, s 1(f)(ii) is so worded that any contradiction of the prosecution case by the accused appears literally to constitute such an ‘imputation’. Consequently, an accused with a bad character, notably an accused with a criminal record, is discouraged from giving evidence on oath contradicting the prosecution case, even where this is necessary in establishing a defence. The revelation of the previous convictions in cross-examination may weigh more heavily with the trier than the accused’s (honest) testimony in defence. The only solution is for the accused to make out such a defence without giving testimony on oath, thereby avoiding revelation of a prejudicial past. 3.111 Some courts attempted to avoid this unfortunate conclusion by reading limitations into the exception, holding that evidence necessary to the

development of a legitimate line of defence does not invoke it.441 This approach has been rejected by both the House of Lords and the High Court, but perhaps more firmly by the former than the latter. In Selvey v DPP,442 the House of Lords required the words of the statute to be given their ordinary meaning, except where an accused charged with rape alleges consent or where the accused merely denies (however emphatically) the [page 280] prosecution case. In Phillips v R,443 the majority, while accepting Selvey, endorsed the view of Dixon CJ in Dawson v R that:444 … the word ‘involves’ refers to what is a part of the defence or, at all events, an element or ingredient in the defence or what arises from the manner in which the defence is conducted. It is not meant to cover inferences, logical implications or consequential deductions which may spell imputations against the character of witnesses.

This interpretation gives some scope for reading down the exception, but, in the absence of clearer words, the High Court has emphasised that the main control over cross-examination lies in the exercise of the supervisory discretion. 3.112 In South Australia, the exception has been clarified so that only gratuitous attacks upon the credibility of the prosecutor or witnesses for the prosecution are grounds for loss of the shield.445 The same clarification exists under the uniform legislation. In South Australia, s 18(1)(d)(iii) (formerly s 18(1)VI(ba)), 18(2) and 18(3) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) state that the imputation must not be ‘such as would necessarily arise from a proper presentation of the defence’ and, notwithstanding this limitation, that the shield is not lost if the imputations arise ‘from evidence of the conduct of the prosecutor or witness’ for the prosecution: (a)

in the events or circumstances upon which the charge is based;

(b) in the investigation of those events or circumstances, or in assembling evidence in support of the charge; or (c) in the course of the trial, or proceedings preliminary to the trial.

The uniform legislation provides in s 104(4) that the prosecutor cannot obtain leave to cross-examine on credibility unless: … evidence adduced by the defendant has been admitted that: (a)

tends to prove that a witness called by the prosecution has a tendency to be untruthful;

(b) and (b) is relevant solely or mainly to the witness’s credibility.

And s 104(5) provides: A reference in paragraph (4) to evidence does not include reference to evidence of conduct in relation to: (a)

the events in relation to which the defendant is being prosecuted: or

(b) the investigation of the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted.

[page 281] Again, it is important to note that under the uniform legislation it is not enough merely to allege that a prosecution witness lacks credibility. Evidence to this effect must have been adduced and admitted. 3.113 The trial judge’s discretion remains of overriding importance, most especially where the original formulation of the exception is retained. Although on appeal it is difficult to succeed where that discretion has been considered by the judge,446 appellate courts have made clear the factors to be taken into account when the discretion is considered.447 In the first place, the credibility of the accused must be in issue, for any cross-examination must be directed to determining that credibility. This is the very justification for the exception and provides the basis for its exercise. Thus, the party wishing to cross-examine must show that it is important to his or her case to determine the accused’s credibility. Where the accused has attacked a prosecution witness this may not justify crossexamination by a co-accused under the Criminal Evidence Act (only the prosecutor can cross-examine under the uniform legislation) unless that attack somehow affects the co-accused’s case.448 Further, even if the accused’s credit is an issue of importance to the party seeking to cross-examine, the character to be disclosed must be relevant to that credit and not be outweighed by the prejudice it might cause to the accused through revelation of an adverse propensity.449 In addition, the trial judge should consider, before allowing cross-examination, whether the imputation is sufficiently serious to justify cross-examination at all and secondly, whether it would be unfair to allow cross-examination because of the importance of the imputation to the accused’s development of a legitimate line of defence. 3.114 In Phillips v R,450 it was argued that the supervisory discretion was to be exercised to permit cross-examination in exceptional circumstances only, but the

whole court (including Deane J who dissented on the facts) rejected this notion. The exceptional circumstances are the words of the exception and once it applies the discretion must be exercised — taking into account the considerations discussed above — so that the interests of justice in the particular case are served. Yet the majority [page 282] said (at 57) that ‘it is undoubtedly right that the discretion of a trial judge to permit such an attack be sparingly and cautiously exercised’. 3.115 In R v Symonds,451 the court applied this approach in a case where an accused was charged with sexual assaults alleged to have occurred some 14 to 22 years before the trial. Given that the accused was already at a disadvantage in denying the assaults,452 and that the accused was obliged to put the complainant’s truthfulness in issue if the charge was to be defended at all, and that although defending vigorously, the defence had made no gratuitous attacks on the complainant’s character,453 the court found it would unfairly tip the scales against the accused to permit cross-examination on his previous crimes of dishonesty. To permit cross-examination created the risk that the jury was deflected from what was centrally required in the case: a very careful assessment of the complainant’s testimony. By contrast, in R v Lewis, Teague J permitted an accused to be cross-examined on prior convictions following gratuitous imputations against a number of prosecution witnesses.454 3.116 The difficulty in producing a fair balance through the exercise of the discretion is the general reluctance of appellate courts to interfere with the exercise of a trial judge’s discretion, so that differences exist between trial judges as to what sort of attack justifies cross-examination. As a consequence there is a need for legislation to make this clear, as it seeks to do in South Australia and under the uniform legislation. Where cross-examination is allowed, the trial judge must carefully direct the jury that the revealed information, particularly information regarding previous convictions, can be used only to determine the accused’s credit as a witness, and must not be used in support of the forbidden propensity chain of reasoning.455

[page 283]

The fourth exception: evidence against a co-accused 3.117 The object of the exception set out in s 1(f)(iii) of the Criminal Evidence Act and its Australian equivalents is to maintain the right of an accused to discredit an accusing witness even where that witness happens to be a coaccused concurrently standing trial.456 The differently drafted s 104(6) of the uniform legislation is of similar intent.457 Although exposure of prohibited matters might prejudice that accusing witness as a co-accused, the right to discredit an accusing witness is too fundamental to be affected by such a consideration. Any prejudice to the accusing witness as a co-accused can be mitigated only by appropriate direction from the trial judge to the jury, if there is one. This rationale leads to a number of conclusions. 3.118 First, as the purpose of cross-examination is to discredit, crossexamination should not be directed to eliciting information relevant to facts in issue (even though they implicate the accused being cross-examined or explain the position of the accused conducting the cross-examination). Information relevant to material facts should either be outside the prohibition (as it is under the uniform legislation) or admissible under the first exception. There are as we have seen, however, under the Criminal Evidence Act, omissions from the first exception, and in R v Corak and Palmer, King CJ was prepared to allow crossexamination under the South Australian equivalent of s 1(f)(iii) to reveal previous offences relevant to establishing that the accused conducting the crossexamination had acted under duress.458 3.119 Secondly, the rationale provides only an implicated co-accused with a right to cross-examination, not other parties to the case, including the prosecution. This is made clear in the uniform legislation. But courts are divided on whether such a conclusion is justified by the words of the exception in the Criminal Evidence Act, with a majority considering that it is not and that the literal interpretation allows other parties to cross-examine, but subject always to the court’s residual discretion.459 Only where the implicating evidence given is also of significance to the case of another [page 284]

party is there any justification for allowing such a cross-examination and, as Aickin J emphasises in Matusevich v R,460 such cases are likely to be extremely rare. 3.120 Thirdly, the rationale gives the implicated accused an absolute right to discredit the co-accused witness, a right which should not be limited by exercise of the trial judge’s residual discretion (although the information sought must be otherwise relevant and admissible to the question of credit). English and Australian courts agree upon this absolute right.461 Interestingly, the uniform legislation still requires the court to grant leave to cross-examine even after one defendant has given evidence adverse to another (s 104(6)), but presumably it would be rare for leave not to be granted to permit this adverse evidence to be discredited: compare with the discussion at 3.80. 3.121 Fourthly, the rationale applies whenever two accused are jointly tried, whatever the offences with which they are charged. Unfortunately, this logic runs counter to the express words of the exception in the Criminal Evidence Act, which stipulate that the accused must be charged with ‘the same offence’. Despite initial judicial approval of a wide approach to this phrase,462 the House of Lords took a restricted approach, demanding that both accused stand charged with the one crime (so that they may be charged in the same count without that count being bad on grounds of duplicity).463 Their Lordships recognised the illogicality of the restriction, feeling perhaps that a restricted interpretation would encourage parliament to remove it.464 In Queensland and South Australia, this restriction has been removed so that any accused being jointly tried can cross-examine a coaccused who has given evidence against him or her. The restriction is not enacted in the uniform legislation. 3.122 Finally, the exception under the Criminal Evidence Act applies only where one accused has given ‘evidence against’ another, and this has been interpreted, in accordance with the rationale of the exception, to cover all information (beyond mere denial), whether given in evidence-in-chief or crossexamination and whether intended to be implicating or not, which may rationally be considered by the trier of fact in determining the other accused’s guilt of the crime charged.465 The uniform [page 285]

legislation achieves this same position by requiring in s 104(6) that the one defendant has given ‘evidence adverse’ to the other and such evidence has been admitted.466 3.123 As argued at 3.100, the better view is that once any of the exceptions to the general prohibition apply any party may cross-examine, although permission must first be sought from the trial judge. In Matusevich v R, Aickin J expressly emphasises that, if the Crown is able to cross-examine under this final exception, then such permission is necessary.467 However, in Queensland while under the other exceptions permission to cross-examine is expressly required, this express requirement does not extend to the fourth exception. In these circumstances it might be opined that the legislation assumed that only the accused against whom evidence has been given is entitled to cross-examine under this exception. Only the defendant against whom adverse evidence has been given can cross-examine under s 104(6) of the uniform legislation, but leave remains required. It should be noted that this exception is only required where legislation prohibits cross-examination of an accused about certain matters; all parties remain entitled to cross-examine about non-prohibited matters, generally evidence relevant to proof of the material facts in issue, irrespective of the testimony given by an accused during examination-in-chief.468 3.124 Despite the technical difficulties in the interpretation and application of s 1(e) and (f) and its Australian equivalents, there can be little doubt that a degree of compromise is required where the accused is called as a witness to avoid the unnecessary revelation of disposition or propensity which may be given undue weight in finding the material facts proved. Whether or not the compromise is embodied in legislation, the duty of the trial judge to ensure a fair trial gives rise to principles of compromise which judges are not slow to exercise where legislation is ambiguous or silent. Even under the uniform legislation, which is drafted to avoid many of the interpretational difficulties of the Criminal Evidence Act and the legislation based on it, the supervisory discretion remains of primary importance. Although a discretion, this does not imply that its exercise may be arbitrary; rather, it recognises that the principles of compromise require a weighing of factors from case to case. Given the uncertainty of the natural rules of fact discovery, this delicate weighing must be expected, not merely tolerated, and always firmly based upon principle. Insofar as the legislation prevents the

application of principle it can be criticised. What all the legislation emphasises is that the propensity of an accused towards crime should not be revealed at all unless justified in principle. A mere direction given to the trier of [page 286] fact is scant protection against the risk of wrongful conviction where an incriminating propensity is wrongly revealed.469

Evidence of Accused’s Propensity Tendered by the Defence Bad character of the accused 3.125 An accused may sometimes wish to reveal a criminal propensity in order to explain prosecution evidence that at first sight is incriminating. For example, in Jones v DPP,470 the accused explained the giving of a false alibi on the basis that he had been in trouble before and that he therefore refrained from telling the truth. In R v Fricker,471 to explain flight, the accused testified that he had a previous criminal record and thought the police were wrongfully pursuing him.472 In R v Forde,473 in order to suggest the absence of responsibility on his part, the accused called a forensic psychologist to testify to his neurotic and submissive nature. In each of these cases, the evidence was admissible on grounds of sufficient relevance but was subject to an appropriate warning to the jury not to draw any inference of guilt from the revealed propensity. If the accused chooses to reveal a criminal propensity for other relevant purposes, that revelation cannot be prevented by the court at common law. Only a warning can be given. But accused should take care. In B v R,474 the High Court held that an accused could not limit the admissible purposes for which misconduct revealed could be used. As a result the misconduct revealed by the accused could be used by the jury to support the prosecution case. The uniform legislation (ss 97 and 98) imposes a further hurdle to the tender of tendency and coincidence evidence by the accused, these sections applying by whomsoever it is tendered. These sections require reasonable notice to be given

(unless dispensed with under s 100) and the evidence must be of ‘significant probative value’. These provisions should not be interpreted to restrict an accused from tendering evidence relevant to his or her innocence (although this may require ignoring the [page 287] courts’ interpretation of ‘significance’ when the prosecution tender evidence under these sections: see 3.61 above).

Good character of the accused The nature and purpose of good character evidence 3.126 If the difficulty of assessing probative value was the only reason for excluding evidence of propensity there would be no ground for distinguishing between evidence revealing good or bad propensity, and there would be a presumption against the accused being entitled to establish good propensity to cast doubt upon the prosecution case. But, as has already been emphasised in this chapter, the exclusionary presumption governing prosecution evidence revealing criminal propensity is based upon the need for strict proof of guilt in criminal cases. It is the fundamental importance of this requirement, as a guarantee against wrongful conviction of the innocent, which gives rise to the exclusionary presumption at common law. Rather than arguing against the admission of evidence of good propensity tendered by the accused, this principle positively demands its admission, for it might give rise to a reasonable doubt, however tentatively. If this makes the search for truth in criminal cases appear lop-sided, then so be it, for, as was argued in Chapters 1 and 2, this is the very nature of the truth sought in the common law courts. The common law requires the prosecution to establish the facts giving rise to the alleged crime beyond reasonable doubt. There is, therefore, no lack of logic in a conclusion that allows the accused to reveal good character to cast doubt upon the prosecution case, no matter how tentatively. Whether it was this logic that gave rise to the rules in this area is another matter, for it must be remembered that the concession to the accused to call evidence revealing good character arose at a time when the accused was not

entitled to testify on oath at all, and rather it helped mitigate the harshness of this prohibition. 3.127 The uniform legislation is not expressly based upon these principles. It takes the position in ss 97 and 98 that tendency and coincidence evidence should be viewed with suspicion in every case, whatever the nature of the tendency revealed, whether good or bad, and by whomsoever the tendency or coincidence evidence is tendered. But there is an additional hurdle in s 101 that must be negotiated where such evidence is ‘adduced’ (meaning ‘tendered’: see n 199 above) by the prosecution and this may be assumed as based upon the exclusionary principle. Furthermore, s 110 creates an exception to the suspicion of tendency evidence in that an accused is entitled to tender evidence of good character in every case in order to cast doubt upon the prosecution case. That section provides, as we will see more generously than the common law, that: The hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule do not apply to evidence adduced by a defendant to prove (directly or by implication) that the defendant is, either generally or in a particular respect, a person of good character.

[page 288] By removing these restrictions the right to cast doubt upon the prosecution case by calling evidence of good character is also given primary importance under the uniform legislation.475 3.128 To allow an accused to refer to an unblemished record or reputation within a community is one thing; to allow an accused to refer to the details which make up such a record or reputation, or to refer to specific acts which suggest he or she is of good character, is another, for it may very well divert the court from its main task of finding the facts in issue. Where the detail is of significant relevance in casting doubt upon a particular material fact in issue, then ordinary principles of sufficient relevance demand its admission,476 but with the common law trial not being directed towards determinations about the accused’s character, care must be taken not to allow the accused’s evidence of good character to go too far. Consequently, at common law, an accused is entitled only to give evidence of reputation, and traditionally general reputation at that. At common law, an accused may attempt to raise a reasonable doubt by giving evidence of good

reputation within the community, but the witnesses called to so testify cannot give evidence of either their personal opinions about the accused’s character or the incidents which go to make up that reputation.477 By this rule, a balance is maintained between the accused being able to throw doubt upon prosecution evidence by giving evidence of good character and the need to ensure that the criminal trial remains focused upon the material facts to be proved by the prosecution. Time and expense are sufficient justification for this balance without having to consider arguments based upon the need for lay juries to be protected from their personality biases. The rule applies as much to a judge sitting alone as it does to a case where a jury also sits. 3.129 However, it has proved difficult at common law to maintain this limit upon the tendering of character evidence, and in practice trial judges do allow references to be made to specific instances either to establish reputation or to establish good [page 289] disposition directly.478 We saw at 3.108, in the context of s 1(f)(ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act and its Australian equivalents, that such evidence is often adverted to and appears to have been sanctioned implicitly by legislation. Furthermore, it can be argued that general reputations, based upon rumour and suspicion (the very hearsay reports frowned upon by the common law), are a less reliable guide than the opinions of people who have had direct experience of the accused and evidence of specific acts from which it can be directly inferred that a person is of good character. Although arguments of time and cost appear to favour limiting such evidence to general reputation, in practice it is only an accused with an unblemished character who will put it forward to establish innocence (and should be entitled to strenuously assert it), so that it is unlikely that courts will be involved in extensive inquiry to ascertain whether on the whole the accused’s character is good. In R v Ravindra,479 Gendall J was of the view that the Rowton limitation of general reputation is outdated in an age where reputations are often falsified by the media, and that at least witnesses should be entitled to speak directly of the experiences upon which they adjudge a person to be of good character. But he distinguished ‘between a witness giving evidence of character from their own

knowledge of the accused … and the giving of evidence of a particular specific act, which may be very different to evidence of a pattern of behaviour towards the witness’. In the words of Lord Denning in Plato Films Ltd v Speidel,480 Gendall J limited character evidence to ‘what other people think [the accused] is’ rather than extending it to ‘what [the accused] in fact is’. The uniform legislation may be interpreted to take this further step as it simply embraces in s 110: … evidence adduced by a defendant to prove (directly or by implication) that the defendant is, either generally or in a particular respect, a person of good character.

3.130 The purpose of the tender of evidence of good character at common law is to cast doubt directly upon the material facts alleged against the accused by means of propensity reasoning — the accused, having a good character, is not the sort of person likely to have committed the acts alleged by the prosecution.481 The tender of evidence of good character is not dependent upon the accused being called to testify as a witness. Indeed, the leading case on the common law rule, R v Rowton,482 was decided before the accused was competent to testify at all. But, where the accused does testify, evidence of good character also becomes relevant to an assessment of the accused’s [page 290] creditworthiness as a witness, and the jury is then entitled to use the good character evidence for both purposes.483 Strictly speaking, it may be that, at common law, the only way in which the accused could give evidence of good character was by calling a witness to testify to the accused’s general reputation in a relevant community, but there seems no reason why good character cannot be adverted to in cross-examination of a prosecution or other witness. Now that the accused can testify, it is common for the accused to raise good character, although in the form of a specific or general disposition rather than through evidence of reputation.484 Section 110 of the uniform legislation permits evidence of good character generally or in a particular respect. There are no apparent restrictions upon the way in which evidence of good character can be adduced, nor on the nature of good character evidence that may be adduced.485 And it may be relevant either to

the issues in the case or, because the credibility rule does not apply to it, to the mere credibility of the accused, or to both.486 However, as discussed at 3.108, before an opponent will be able to adduce evidence (s 110(2) and (3)) or be given leave to cross-examine an accused (s 112) in order to meet the evidence of good character, the accused must have intended to put his or her character in issue.

Rebutting evidence of good character 3.131 Once evidence of good character has been given, the prosecution must be given the opportunity to rebut it. In R v Perrier (No 1),487 the Victorian Court of [page 291] Criminal Appeal suggests that, at common law, the right of rebuttal arises as soon as the defence puts character in issue, which might be done through putting suggestions of good character to a witness in cross-examination or otherwise revealing information to the court although technically no admissible evidence might be before it. If a right of rebuttal exists in these circumstances, the common law rule is even further blended with the statutory right to cross-examination, for, under the Criminal Evidence Act, good character is put in issue by the mere asking of questions rather than the tender of admissible evidence. The uniform legislation does not accept this approach, providing in s 110(2) and (3) that evidence in rebuttal cannot be given until evidence of good character has been adduced and admitted. It is not enough to make mere references in argument or to ask questions about the accused’s good character.488 The major difficulty arising from the concession that permits an accused to advert to his or her good character is the extent to which this can be rebutted by evidence of bad character. Although the law remains always committed to preventing the prosecution from relying upon the prohibited propensity chain of reasoning,489 it cannot permit the accused to claim a good character to which he or she is not entitled. Thus, whether the accused testifies or not, the prosecution is entitled to disclose evidence of bad character in order to negate evidence of good character, but not to set up the prohibited propensity chain of reasoning. 3.132 Because of the difficulty in balancing claims of good character against

the prejudice which might be caused by the revelation of bad character in rebuttal, it is suggested in R v Perrier (No 1)490 that the court may ultimately limit the revelation of bad character in exercise of its residuary discretion to ensure a fair trial, and that, in view of this discretion and as a matter of courtesy, the prosecution should seek the court’s permission before revealing evidence of bad character. The uniform legislation does not expressly require leave before another party adduces evidence of bad character in rebuttal (s 110(2) and (3)) — except where that is to be done through cross-examination of the accused (s 112)491 — but the requirements of s 110(2) and (3), the existence of residual discretions and the prosecution’s duty of fairness in practice require the common law precautionary practice to be followed. Furthermore, under s 192A, an accused may seek, but not necessarily be granted, an advance ruling upon what adverse evidence can be tendered and admitted in rebuttal should certain evidence of good character be given. [page 292] At common law, the prosecution can reveal evidence of bad character to meet evidence of good character in three ways. First, it can call a witness to give evidence of general bad reputation, but the testimony should be limited to that.492 Secondly, it can cross-examine any witness called to establish good character in order to discredit that witness. This cross-examination may take the form of putting to the witness evidence of specific misconduct on the part of the accused (including previous offences)493 to undermine the witness’s evidence that the accused has a good reputation. There is also authority that rumours of the accused’s misconduct may be put to the witness to question the testimony of a good reputation494 (although this may not be permitted where the rumours have no basis).495 Thirdly, it seems that in every case the prosecution may tender evidence of previous convictions which are relevant to negating the good character claimed.496 Although all this evidence of bad character is potentially prejudicial, its tender is triggered by the accused’s evidence of good character and its justification is to prevent the accused claiming a good character to which he or she is not entitled. 3.133 The uniform legislation permits rebuttal evidence where a defendant has adduced evidence to prove that the defendant is a person of good character either

generally or in a particular respect. This requires the good character evidence to have been adduced with the purpose of contending that the accused is not the sort of person to have committed the crime charged.497 Once so adduced, evidence may be adduced in rebuttal to show the defendant is not a person of the good character claimed. As long as the rebutting evidence meets the general criterion of relevance — that is, as long as it counters the good character set up by the defendant, be it generally or in a particular respect — it is admissible, neither the hearsay, opinion, tendency and credibility rules applying to it.498 But the court might exercise its discretionary or mandatory exclusions to exclude or limit its tender, particularly to avoid a prejudicial propensity chain of reasoning: ss 135–137.499 3.134 A problem at common law with the tender of evidence to rebut good character is whether it should be limited to the character trait which the accused has put in issue. Although there is authority for the view that the accused cannot put part of a [page 293] character in issue, it comes from remarks made in the context of the crossexamination of an accused to determine credit, not in the context of the prosecution rebutting evidence of good character tendered to establish the accused’s innocence.500 So, if an accused is charged with a sexual crime and puts forward evidence of an outstanding reputation for propriety in such matters, it is difficult to see how a previous conviction for housebreaking rebuts this evidence, although it may be relevant to determining the accused’s credibility as a witness: cf discussion at 3.109. It must be remembered that good character can be put forward whether or not the accused testifies as a witness, and is generally relevant to the issue alone where the accused does not testify.501 It is suggested that, where good character is relevant only to the issue, then any rebutting bad character should, on grounds of sufficient relevance, be limited to the trait put forward by the accused.502 Other evidence of bad character might be excluded as either irrelevant or in exercise of the exclusionary discretion. Under s 110 of the uniform legislation, evidence of good character may be given in a particular respect and where this occurs then evidence of bad character tendered in rebuttal must be limited to that same particular respect.503 This

might, in theory at least, be of particular value to the defence in characterising the accused.504 3.135 The above discussion and its conclusions are made independently of whether the accused testifies. But where the accused does testify, the situation is complicated by the fact that the accused’s credibility as a witness must also be decided upon. Under s 1(f of the Criminal Evidence Act and its Australian equivalents, where the accused gives evidence of good character and also testifies, he or she can be cross-examined generally (as an ordinary witness) upon bad character relevant to the determination of credit. Thus, cross-examination is permitted, not only to obtain evidence of bad character in order to negate an adduced good character, but also positively to establish bad character relevant to discrediting the accused: see [page 294] 3.106–3.109. This will go beyond any character trait put in issue to all those aspects of character relevant to credit. As to the uniform legislation, it is not clear whether the limitation in s 110, that rebutting evidence be limited to character in the particular respect adduced and admitted, applies where the accused is being cross-examined under s 112, but it may be argued that an accused who adduces evidence of good character in a particular respect to establish credibility should be open to cross-examination on all aspects of character that may substantially affect the assessment of the accused’s credibility (cf s 103) — subject always to the mandatory and discretionary exclusions.505 In Gabriel v R,506 Higgins J felt that the cross-examination should have been limited to the accused’s propensity to stab and not extend to his convictions generally, but this case may be explicable on the basis that there were doubts about whether the accused was intentionally raising good character and the general convictions were extensive and prejudicial. In R v Zurita, rebutting evidence was limited but it appears that the accused did not testify.507 Notwithstanding the above, every case in which the accused’s bad character is revealed is subject to the general prohibition that forms the focus of this chapter. The trier of fact must not infer guilt from any adverse propensity or tendency

revealed to rebut good character or to discredit the accused.508 While this is certainly the position at common law, as s 110 provides that the tendency rule does not apply to any evidence adduced under the section it may be argued that rebutting tendency evidence, if relevant to the issue, is technically admissible. However, s 95 requires the jury not to use such evidence for tendency purposes unless it is admissible via Pt 3.6.509

Directing the jury where good character raised 3.136 Once credible evidence of an accused’s good character is before the court,510 the jury must receive sufficient direction about how to use that evidence, and any [page 295] contradictory evidence, as ensures that there is no risk of a miscarriage of justice. The majority in Melbourne v R511 makes it clear that there is no obligation to give particular directions other than those directions required to avoid the risk of a miscarriage of justice.512 Nevertheless, the direction to the jury must often be careful and complete if a miscarriage is to be avoided.513 The same approach is taken where evidence of good character is adduced under the uniform legislation: Gallant v R.514 Under the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), only the directions requested by counsel are required (ss 12–15) although the trial judge, following consultation with the parties, retains the obligation to give additional directions where he or she ‘considers that there are substantial and compelling reasons for doing so’ (s 16). On the one hand, the jury must generally have explained to it the uses to which it may put any good character it finds the accused to possess (it is for the jury to decide whether, after contradictory evidence, the accused is left with a good character to be taken into account).515 Where the accused does not testify (and no self-serving out-of-court statement of the accused is before the court), good character is relevant only to the issue of whether the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime charged. The trial judge must give such a ‘propensity direction’ and not denigrate evidence of good character by emphasising unduly that ‘there is always a

[page 296] first time’ without explaining the reasonable doubts to which an unblemished record may give rise.516 Where the good character is countered by evidence of bad character, this must be confined to negating the good character put forward, and the jury must be directed to draw no inference of guilt from any bad disposition that may be disclosed.517 3.137 In addition to these directions, where the accused does testify on oath (and exceptionally, where without testifying, he or she relies on admitted selfserving statements)518 the jury should generally be directed to consider good character on the question of the accused’s credit (give a ‘credibility direction’).519 But it can also be told that any bad character elicited in cross-examination of the accused may also be considered positively for the purpose of discrediting the accused.520 Again, the jury must never be left with the impression that it is entitled to employ the prohibited chain of propensity reasoning to infer guilt. Although BRS v R521 suggests that in other than exceptional circumstances the failure of the trial judge expressly to direct the jury to eschew the prohibited chain will constitute a miscarriage of justice, later cases, while emphasising that juries not be left under the impression that they can use that chain of reasoning, show a greater willingness to have regard to all the circumstances in determining whether the failure to give an express propensity direction has produced a miscarriage of justice.522 [page 297] While under s 110 of the uniform legislation the tendency rule does not apply to evidence adduced to establish good character and evidence adduced and admitted in reply,523 judges continue to respect the exclusionary principle by exercising their discretion under s 136 to limit the use of adverse tendency evidence to the rebuttal of the evidence of good character, and by directing the jury that the adverse tendency evidence cannot be used to implicate the accused in the crime charged.524

3.138 Where more than one accused is on trial separate directions for each are required. Where one only is of good character English courts have held that this must be put favourably before the jury, even where the effect is that another accused who cannot put forward a good character (or about whom there is bad character evidence) necessarily suffers through comparison.525 While the direction may display an apparently unjustified degree of sophistry, it is difficult to see how such sophistry can be avoided if the general prohibition is to be maintained and the accused is to be given every benefit of remaining good character. In practice, the sophistry will arise in few cases, for only an accused with an unblemished record will be advised to raise it.526

Evidence Revealing the Propensity of a Third Party 3.139 It is argued that the common law position is as follows: as the reasons for an exceptional degree of probative force only arise where information revealing an adverse propensity is tendered against an accused, where information tendered to prove a material fact in issue reveals the propensity of a person who is not an accused, ordinary principles of sufficient relevance apply. This is not to say that courts should not be wary about the way in which evidence revealing propensity may or may not be relevant — they may, indeed, be more wary of relevance on account of propensity than otherwise — but there is no prejudicial [page 298] presumption to displace. The decision is one unfettered by rule; sufficient relevance is decisive.527 The uniform legislation takes a different approach, ss 97 and 98 providing generally that evidence of tendency and coincidence evidence is inadmissible unless reasonable notice has been given and it is of ‘significant probative value’. These sections apply to evidence of the tendency of any person, whatever their status, whether party, witness or third party. As the discussion at 3.54–3.60 shows, the application of these provisions raises difficult issues. In particular, one might question whether the hurdle of ‘significant probative value’ (discussed at

3.60) applies as rigorously in this context as where the prosecution is seeking to introduce evidence of tendency and coincidence that concerns the accused. Section 101 expressly has no application in these circumstances.

Defence evidence revealing the character of third parties 3.140 It is quite common for an accused to refer to the character of a third person to develop a particular defence or to raise a possibility of innocence, often via the disposition of that person. In R v Howe,528 the violent disposition of the victim to an alleged murder was revealed by the accused in order to render more probable the accused’s assertion that the victim had acted violently and that the accused’s actions were taken by way of self-defence.529 In cases where it is alleged that an assault has been provoked by homosexual advances, the complainant’s homosexual disposition may be similarly relevant.530 More imaginatively, but unsuccessfully, in Cheney v R531 the accused sought to tender as fresh evidence details of similar crimes committed by an unknown third party, to suggest [page 299] that the third person had committed the crimes charged against the accused. The court held the similarities insufficient to raise a ‘real possibility’ of the involvement by that third person in the crimes. In Button v R, a similar fact argument in relation to a known third party was successfully tendered as fresh evidence, as being of sufficient relevance ‘to raise a reasonable doubt’.532 Arguably, at common law, these cases contain no principle of law beyond sufficient relevance and are, therefore, just random examples of that concept. In each, character was relevant as propensity. But, with the exclusionary principle justifying special rules in the case of the accused having no application, courts should be wary about constructing ‘similar fact rules’ to govern the admissibility of evidence disclosing the propensity of a third party.533

Thus, if an accused wishes to establish that a confession given to a police officer was fabricated or induced by violence, the tender of information showing the officer’s previous fabrications or violence towards others should turn upon ordinary rules of relevance.534 There is at common law no requirement of exceptional probative force to justify admission in these circumstances. That is not to say that courts may not remain suspicious of the relevance of mere propensities and might require more than a mere similarity to implicate a third person on propensity grounds.535 But this is no legal requirement and each case can only be decided on its facts. Analogies to past decisions may be drawn but ultimately the facts of the particular case must determine sufficient relevance. 3.141 But where the uniform legislation applies, assuming the evidence passes the test of relevance,536 ss 97 and 98 compel courts to isolate evidence revealing prohibited ‘tendency’ or ‘coincidence’ reasoning, even where it relates to the conduct of a third [page 300] party, and then to determine whether the evidence is of ‘significant probative value’ before admitting it. The distraction of requiring negotiation of this additional hurdle is illustrated by the following decision. In R v Cakovski,537 both the trial judge (holding the evidence was of ‘tendency’ but not of ‘significant probative value’) and the Court of Criminal Appeal (the majority holding the evidence was of ‘significant probative value’ but not ‘tendency evidence’) disagreed on this negotiation before the latter decided (unanimously), that the accused was entitled to adduce in support of his testimony that he had been violently threatened by the victim and acted in self-defence, evidence that the victim had 23 years previously murdered three men (and killed a dog).538 But Hidden J on appeal held the evidence was relevant as ‘tendency evidence’ and of ‘significant probative value’. If the accused had testified differently, that he had acted under what appeared to be slight provocation because he knew the victim had committed violence in the past, the evidence, as relevant to his state of mind rather than the conduct of the victim, may not have been ‘tendency evidence’,539 in which case there would have been no need to determine whether the probative weight was ‘significant’. But these questions of statutory construction might be regarded as an unnecessary distraction from the decisive question of

whether the evidence was capable, on grounds of relevance and probative value, of being left to the jury as raising a reasonable doubt: cf Hodgson JA in Cakovski (at [36]).540

The character of complainants in sexual assault cases 3.142 The character of the complainant assumes importance, most often as part of the defence case, in prosecutions for rape.541 At common law, the prosecution must establish that the accused had intercourse with the complainant without his or her consent and believing that the complainant was not consenting.542 Whilst legislation in some [page 301] Australian jurisdictions now defines consent in more objective terms543 and/or requires the accused to adduce evidence of honest and reasonable mistaken belief in consent,544 proof of consent remains central to rape (and other sexual assault) prosecutions. In many cases the issue of consent will turn on a contest between the credibility of the complainant’s testimony on the one hand and the accused’s testimony on the other. To raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the complainant consented, or at least as to whether the accused believed the complainant was consenting, an accused may seek to refer to the complainant’s sexual history — past sexual reputation, experiences and disposition.545 With the prosecution calling its witnesses first, the accused may initially seek to raise this evidence in cross-examination of the complainant. Cross-examination is normally permitted on grounds of relevance, either to the issues in the case, or to determining the witness’s general creditworthiness.546 Courts bound only by the common law have allowed cross-examination of a complainant on his or her past sexual history on both grounds. It is worth noting at the outset that, where the cross-examination is of relevance to the issues in the case, matters raised in cross-examination may be taken further by the defence and made the subject of separate and perhaps contradictory evidence called as part of the accused’s case.547 On the other hand, matters of general creditworthiness are

regarded as collateral matters that cannot be pursued beyond cross-examination — the witness’s answer is final.548 [page 302] The difficulty is in determining when sexual experiences are relevant, either to the issues or to the general creditworthiness of the complainant. Controversy has arisen because (predominantly male) common law judges have allegedly been all too willing to allow the (often female) complainant’s previous sexual character to be revealed through her cross-examination. In consequence, complainants wanting to prosecute their assailants have had to be prepared to subject themselves to the ordeal, at both committal and trial, of a long and searching cross-examination on their sexual experiences and attitudes. Needless to say, the potential humiliation and embarrassment of this ordeal, whereby the complainant is effectively also put on trial to defend his or her moral character, has discouraged complainants from prosecuting their assailants. An important consequence of this controversy has been the enactment of legislation protecting the complainant from gratuitous revelation of character. But the effect of this so-called ‘rapeshield’ legislation is best understood against a clear outline of the common law position. 3.143 The material fact in issue to which a complainant’s sexual experiences are most often argued to be relevant and admissible in a rape case is consent. Nineteenth century English judges were prepared to accept that a complainant’s general propensity to engage in consensual sex was relevant to the issue of consent, but instead of leaving it to the trial judge to determine on the facts of the particular case whether any particular propensity was sufficiently relevant to this precise issue, a series of decisions purported to lay down definitive rules which determined when evidence of a sexual propensity was admissible in a rape trial. Thus, it came to be accepted that the following matters were always admissible as relevant to the issue of consent: the sexual relationship between the complainant and accused;549 the complainant’s reputation for chastity;550 and whether the complainant was a common prostitute or otherwise indiscriminately promiscuous.551 On the other hand, isolated acts of consensual intercourse with others were not admissible, not being regarded as sufficient to establish a propensity to engage in sexual intercourse generally.552

As general principles of relevance, these propositions are not only highly dubious, but it is quite wrong to assert that they apply in every case. Previous consent to intercourse with a particular person does not give a general licence. On the other hand, if the complainant denies a relationship, it may be appropriate for the accused to seek to prove it in order to give proper perspective to the alleged rape. A reputation [page 303] for freely having consensual sex again would not appear to be in itself relevant in a particular case as inferring a general licence to the accused, but, where the accused alleges belief in consent based upon the circumstances of the alleged rape and the accused’s knowledge of the complainant’s reputation, it may become of sufficient relevance.553 And acts of intercourse with others, although again generally irrelevant, may become relevant if more directly associated with the incident in question.554 3.144 It is not at all clear that modern Australian courts were prepared to follow these inflexible and dubious common law rules. Certainly modern judgments tend to display more enlightened attitudes towards complainants,555 and several judges have expressly not followed the technical distinctions of the common law to determine the reception of evidence on grounds of sufficient relevance. For example, in Gregory and Sharwood v R, the High Court admitted acts of consensual intercourse with other men that occurred in between the rapes alleged.556 Therefore, left to their own devices Australian judges may have been prepared rigorously to adjudge on a case-by-case basis the reception of evidence of the complainant’s previous sexual experience as sufficiently relevant to the material facts in issue. But, as the analysis of relevance and proof contained in previous chapters shows, relevance is a decision dependent entirely upon the knowledge and experience of the fact-finder, and with most judges being male, and most victims female, there are grave doubts as to whether their knowledge of sexual experiences provides a sound epistemological basis for these decisions of ‘sufficient relevance’ in cases of rape and sexual assault.557 One important object of the rape-shield legislation is to mitigate this problem. 3.145 When one turns to the circumstances in which the complainant may be

cross-examined at common law on his or her sexual experiences to determine general creditworthiness, it is not clear that even modern courts are prepared or able to control that examination. Judges appear to take the position that a witness’s sexual standards and morality are always relevant to whether the witness is telling the truth. Thus, the High Court said in Stokes v R: [page 304] Prima facie questions are admissible in cross-examination of a prosecutrix … if they tend to the disclosure of her own moral character or prior knowledge and her experience of the character of such acts and if the question is whether her evidence is to be accepted …558

Other judges have rejected outright the connection between sexual morality and credibility and suggest that judges can use their common law and statutory powers to limit this sort of gratuitous cross-examination.559 The uniform legislation further encourages this by providing in s 103 that credibility crossexamination is only permitted if the evidence sought ‘could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness’. But in practice it is difficult to stop counsel embarking upon a course of cross-examination which is intended to suggest that the complainant encouraged or provoked the sexual assault in question, that the complainant is a person of loose sexual morals and practices, and that he or she is not to be believed in his or her testimony against the accused. It is difficult, in short, to stop counsel suggesting to jurors that the complainant has received no more than he or she has asked for.560 The other important aim of the rape-shield legislation is to prevent cross-examination about sexual reputation and experience under the pretence that it is of relevance to a complainant’s credit. 3.146 It was against this background that the so-called ‘rape-shield’ statutes were passed.561 So-called because the statutes apply to offences of a sexual nature beyond [page 305] rape and where consent may not be either an element of the offence or in issue.562 Although sadly the Australian legislation is not uniform, its effect is to

prohibit altogether tender of evidence563 of a complainant’s sexual reputation and general sexual disposition, and to permit tender of evidence revealing the complainant’s specific sexual experiences and activities564 only by leave of the court. In New South Wales, the legislation specifies the situations where leave may be granted. In all other jurisdictions, leave may be granted where the evidence is of direct or substantial relevance to a fact in issue. In Tasmania, it is specifically provided that leave may not be given on the ground the evidence is relevant only to the complainant’s credibility, but in the remaining jurisdictions leave may be given if the evidence is capable of substantially undermining the complainant’s credibility as a witness (in Queensland, Victoria and the Northern Territory because of ‘special circumstances’). In all jurisdictions other than Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory, leave must be refused where the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the distress, humiliation or embarrassment to a complainant its revelation would cause.565 This is an example of the growing recognition of interests beyond those of the parties in determining the reception of evidence, but it is doubtful whether a court will be able to give much or any weight to this interest where the evidence is of such probative value to the defence that to deny its admission might deprive the accused of a real chance of acquittal.566 But where evidence is of less probative value this interest may be invoked to deny leave for its tender.567 [page 306] 3.147 In all jurisdictions except New South Wales and the Northern Territory, evidence of a victim’s ‘sexual reputation’ or ‘general reputation with respect to chastity’ is prohibited altogether.568 In Western Australia, this prohibition extends to ‘evidence relating to the disposition of the complainant in sexual matters’.569 In Queensland, South Australia, Victoria, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory, whilst the absolute prohibition does not extend to disposition, other sections provide that leave cannot be given where the prohibited evidence does no more than disclose a general sexual disposition.570 The basis for an absolute prohibition is not entirely clear. Granted that a reputation may be a doubtful matter and that a mere disposition is generally of no probative value, either to issue or credit, one might yet envisage rare circumstances where a reputation or general disposition might be relevant to

whether an accused believed the complainant was consenting, and therefore should be admitted in exception to a general prohibition.571 [page 307] The general prohibition from which a court can give exemption is phrased or defined in terms of the complainant’s ‘sexual experience’ (New South Wales and Tasmania), ‘sexual experiences’572 (Western Australia), and ‘sexual activity(ies)’573 (New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania,574 the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory). The absence of such experience or activity is expressly included in New South Wales,575 South Australia and Tasmania. But all legislation makes it clear that the general prohibition does not extend to such matters that are the subject of the charge nor part of the events leading to the acts charged (the Western Australian legislation expresses this in common law terms of res gestae). In South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory, the general prohibition does not extend to sexual activities between the complainant and the accused. This may suggest that previous acts of consensual intercourse with the accused are always of sufficient relevance to the issues in a sexual assault case. This is far from self-evident and there is no reason why the accused should not, as in the other jurisdictions, at least have to justify disclosure of a previous relationship with the complainant. 3.148 Where leave to tender evidence or cross-examine is required it must be sought through voir dire proceedings in the absence of the jury. In the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria, permission to tender evidence or cross-examine must be sought in writing and in these jurisdictions and New South Wales where permission to tender evidence or cross-examine is granted, it must be justified by written reasons (in Tasmania, reasons are required but there is no demand for them to be in writing). The principal advantage of a more formal procedure is that it prevents defence counsel from embarking at all on cross-examination about prohibited matters until they have persuaded the court to give the all-clear. The seriousness of the matter is emphasised where written notice and reasons are required. This can be contrasted with the general situation where a court cannot really intervene until after the offensive question has been asked, and where, until recently, the opponent might have borne the onus of explaining why the questioning should not proceed.576

[page 308] 3.149 Except in New South Wales, where the grounds for leave are specified, for a court to give leave a distinction is drawn by the legislation between the relevance of the evidence to facts in issue and its relevance only to the credit of the complainant. As is argued at 7.139–7.141, this is a difficult distinction to draw when it is the credibility of a witness that may be decisive of the issues in a case — as is often the situation where consent is in issue. In jurisdictions where both issue and credit relevance can justify exception to the prohibition, the distinction may not be crucial,577 but in Western Australia and Tasmania, where evidence relevant only to the credit of the complainant is excluded altogether, the distinction may be decisive.578 3.150 In New South Wales, the legislature recognises that decisions about substantial and direct relevance to facts in issue or to credit remain controversial and dependent upon a court’s knowledge and experience of the world, and therefore seeks to list definitively the circumstances in which evidence of the sexual history of the complainant can be revealed, subject to the further requirement that the probative value of the evidence outweighs any distress, humiliation or embarrassment that the complainant might suffer as a result of its admission. While the legislation covers most situations where evidence of sexual history is required to ensure an accused can reveal evidence of importance to his or her defence,579 the list is nevertheless closed and the court has no discretion to admit evidence it believes required to ensure a fair trial.580 [page 309] Furthermore, by defining relevance in specific terms, courts must tend to concentrate upon whether evidence comes within a definition rather than upon the fundamental probative relationship in the case before them. While the legislation in other jurisdictions still depends upon decisions based upon the knowledge and experience of judges, there is little risk of a return to nineteenth century male notions because the very existence of the legislation emphasises to judges that the issue of consent or belief in consent should normally be determined upon what the complainant says and does at the time of the alleged rape.

3.151 The difficulty in determining sufficient relevance, and its dependence upon the precise facts and circumstances of the individual case, might be (randomly) illustrated by reference to R v Starkey.581 The accused was charged with having raped the 16-year-old complainant after she had been tied, naked, to a bed. By her testimony she was grabbed by the accused and another and forcibly tied and gagged despite her protests and screams. By his testimony she agreed, albeit somewhat reluctantly at first, to engage in sexual intercourse with him and another in this way. The prosecution agreed that it had suggested that a 16-yearold would never consent to intercourse while tied up. To rebut this suggestion the defence was held entitled to cross-examine the complainant to establish that she had previously engaged in consensual sex with her boyfriend in such circumstances. But, as Williams J pointed out (at 305): The jury would have to be told that a woman’s consent to intercourse in circumstances of bondage in the privacy of her home with her live-in boyfriend does not establish a general disposition to have intercourse in similar circumstances with a group of men some of whom were not well-known to her.

If the accused had not testified that the complainant had expressly consented, and had argued that he presumed consent from a knowledge of her previous disposition, the evidence would not have been admitted. Nor would the disposition have been admitted if the circumstances of the rape had not given rise to the general inference of non-consent. But it might be argued that even in this case the previous acts of consensual intercourse were insufficiently relevant to determining a conflict in testimony between the accused and the complainant, and that, rather than allowing a jury to place undue emphasis upon previous actions, its attention would have been better focused upon a close examination of the stories relating to the incident in question in determining the witnesses’ credibility. The court recognised this but felt that the relative importance of the items of evidence was a matter for the jury to determine. [page 310] 3.152 The uniform legislation contains no ‘rape-shield’ provisions. It does, as mentioned above, only permit cross-examination in exception to the credibility rule where the evidence to be adduced will substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness (s 103); improper questions are prohibited by s 41

(other than in Victoria where only improper questions to ‘vulnerable witnesses’ are prohibited);582 and furthermore ss 97 and 98 generally apply to exclude evidence of tendency and coincidence tendered as relevant to material facts in issue (rather than as relevant only to the credibility of a witness: s 94(1)). The state ‘rape-shield’ legislation applies in addition to these provisions.

Evidence Revealing Propensity in Civil Actions Where a party’s character is a material fact in issue 3.153 As a preliminary point it should be noted that, in civil cases, the character of a party may itself be a material fact in issue. If, for example, an alleged libel consists of the publication of specific acts, rumours or reputation of the plaintiff, then the defendant, assuming that the matter has been properly raised in the pleadings, may prove the acts, rumours or reputation to be true, thereby successfully establishing the defence of justification.583 Again, in defamation cases it is possible for a defendant to plead that the plaintiff possessed a bad reputation before the defamatory publication in mitigation of damages. In this context, the courts have emphasised that only public reputation is in issue and have discouraged the proof of specific acts of misconduct584 unless constituting the basis for that public reputation.585 But where a witness testifies to public reputation, cross-examination may raise specific acts of misconduct to question the witness’s credibility.586 To preserve this situation, the uniform legislation provides in s 94(3) that Pt 3.6 ‘Tendency and Coincidence’: … does not apply to evidence of: (a) the character, reputation or conduct of a person; or (b) a tendency that a person has or had; if that character, reputation, conduct or tendency is a fact in issue.

Other evidence revealing the propensity of a party 3.154 As concluded at 3.9, the special rules which in criminal cases control the admissibility of character evidence exist not only because the probative value of evidence disclosing disposition is extremely difficult to assess, but also because, given the strict standard of proof in criminal cases, the accused should be protected against

[page 311] the risk that the trier will give propensity evidence more weight than it deserves. Although the first of these reasons applies in civil proceedings, the second does not, and the better view is that at common law no special rules exist in civil cases for the admission of evidence disclosing a party’s propensity tendered to prove a fact in issue in a case.587 By virtue of the same reasoning, permission to call doubtfully relevant evidence of general good reputation in proof of a fact in issue has not been accorded parties in civil cases.588 Reception of evidence that reveals propensity to prove facts in issue in civil cases depends at common law merely upon the notion of sufficient relevance. The position is changed by the uniform legislation. It recognises that tendency and coincidence reasoning, as defined in ss 97 and 98, is prima facie unreliable and should not be admitted in any case in proof of a fact in issue unless reasonable notice is given and the evidence is shown to be of ‘significant probative value’. This being something beyond mere relevance, courts are given another tool by which to exclude evidence they think is insufficiently probative to admit.589 3.155 Generally, evidence of what a party does on other occasions will not be sufficiently relevant to admit in proof of the occasion giving rise to civil action. It is evidence of what happened on the occasion in question that courts seek in determining claims. Courts are not interested in pursuing the mere propensities of people towards certain conduct. Such inquiry is time-consuming and likely to produce evidence of uncertain probative value in most cases. It is much better to focus on seeking evidence relating more directly to the occasion in question. Civil courts are most often asked to admit evidence which might disclose the propensity of a party where that party’s other conduct is said to be sufficiently relevant because of ‘similar facts’. If the exclusionary principle based upon protecting an innocent accused does not arise, the only question is whether the ‘similar facts’ adduced are worth considering in proving a material fact in issue. The description ‘similar facts’ is not at common law a term of art (although is raised to that status by s 98 of the uniform legislation) but merely a shorthand way of saying that their sufficient relevance is to be found in similarity to the facts in issue. It has already been argued at 2.20ff that it is counter-productive to attempt to formulate definitive rules

[page 312] about sufficient relevance. Similarly, it is arguably counter-productive to attempt to formulate definitive rules that determine the admissibility of similar facts in civil cases. This is not to say that analogous cases cannot be referred to by way of argument, but past decisions should not be regarded as having definitive precedential value. There is a plethora of decisions in civil cases where evidence of similar facts revealing a party’s propensity has been admitted or rejected simply upon grounds of sufficient relevance.590 Many of these cases have been decided without mention of any special rules. The two most quoted are Hollingham v Head,591 where evidence of terms in previous contracts for the supply of artificial manure was held insufficiently relevant to establishing a similar term in the contract in issue, and Hales v Kerr,592 where evidence that previous customers of the defendant barber contracted skin disorders after haircuts was held sufficiently relevant to proving that the plaintiff’s skin disorder, similarly contracted after a haircut by the defendant, had been the result of the defendant’s use of unclean instruments. These cases would undoubtedly be caught by ss 97 and/or 98 but it is doubtful that these sections would lead to different decisions on the facts.593 3.156 But in more recent cases, some judges, faced with difficult decisions about the reception of evidence of ‘similar facts’ disclosing propensity, and understandably reluctant to inquire into the conduct of a party on a different occasion, have turned to criminal cases for assistance and have even suggested that the criminal rules apply directly or in a modified form to determine the admissibility of such evidence in civil cases.594 This approach is illustrated in the Australian context by a series of decisions by Federal Court judges concerning the admissibility of previous representations in actions for misrepresentation. Some judges, seeking support for the exclusion of previous representations, expressly assert that the principles to be applied in civil cases are the same as those in criminal cases.595 Other judges, normally prepared to admit the evidence in question, decide on grounds of sufficient relevance, some simply, others

[page 313] after reference to criminal rules.596 It might be said that one thing that the uniform legislation does at least make clear is that the standard of probative value required for admissibility differs between civil and criminal cases in that in the latter s 101 demands that the probative value must substantially outweigh any unfair prejudice.597 Presumably, also the notion of ‘significant probative value’ required by ss 97 and 98 varies as it applies in criminal and civil cases (for discussion of ‘significant probative value’ in criminal cases, see 3.60 above). 3.157 The question of the admissibility of ‘similar facts’ disclosing propensity at common law arose directly before the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia in Sheldon v Sun Alliance Ltd.598 The plaintiff claimed under an insurance policy following the loss of her house through fire. The defendant insurance company claimed that the fire had been deliberately lit. It sought to tender evidence that other insured houses in which the plaintiff had lived had been similarly lost through fire, seeking to draw the inference that in each case the fire had been deliberate. Bollen J, with whom Prior J agreed, decided (at 148) that the reception of the evidence was to be decided upon grounds of sufficient relevance alone. White J referred to the criminal rules and felt they were applicable with the modification that the standard of sufficiency for admissibility was the civil, rather than the criminal, standard. 3.158 Other judges, while not attempting to apply the criminal rules to civil cases, suggest that there remains a residual discretion to exclude evidence revealing propensity in civil cases. Lord Denning MR in Mood Music Publishing Co Ltd v De Wolfe Ltd599 suggested that the test of relevance was subject to the proviso that the admission of the information ‘is not oppressive or unfair to the other side and also that the other side has fair notice of it and is able to deal with it’. This proviso would appear to embody two notions: the evidence must be more probative than prejudicial (the Christie discretion); and the defendant must have fair notice of any evidence of other occasions. Although some Australian authority favours the continuation of the Christie discretion in civil ‘similar fact’ cases,600 authority rejects the application of the Christie discretion generally in civil cases.601 Given both the absence of the strict standard of

[page 314] proof and the fact that civil cases are tried by judge alone, there seems little point in attempting to encourage counsel to seek exclusion of evidence under such a discretion. It is better that the courts focus their attention upon the probative weight to be given to relevant evidence, having regard to the possibility of doubtful inferences from propensity being drawn. There must remain a discretion in civil courts to draw a line on practical grounds where the slight value of evidence does not make inquiry worth it in terms of time and cost,602 but these practical considerations do not support a wider discretion to exclude evidence on the ground of potential prejudice.

3.159 The uniform legislation enacts a version of the Christie discretion in civil cases through s 135, allowing exclusion of evidence where ‘probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might: (a) be unfairly prejudicial to a party; or (b) be misleading or confusing; or (c) cause or result in undue waste of time’. But the tender of evidence of conduct on other occasions is not controlled principally through this discretion, through what might roughly be referred to as the common law idea of sufficient relevance. Rather, it is controlled through ss 97 and 98. These sections take the position that the suspicious reasoning processes from other conduct are tendency and coincidence reasoning, and these processes of reasoning are prohibited unless shown to be of significant probative value. Consequently, only where these reasoning processes do not arise is it likely that the exclusionary discretion will assume decisive significance in controlling the reception of evidence of other conduct. But it does provide a further justification for excluding tendency or coincidence evidence of doubtful probative value which might raise issues expensive to pursue.603 The nature of tendency and coincidence reasoning and what is meant by ‘significant probative value’ have already been considered in detail in the criminal context. Suffice it to say that a similar approach must be taken to whether evidence gives rise to such reasoning in civil cases.604 But in civil cases, ‘significant probative value’ may not be [page 315] as high a hurdle as it has been suggested in some criminal cases (see 3.60), and the additional hurdle of s 101 does not require negotiation. 3.160 Fair notice is a distinct problem. Once issues are raised in pleadings, the basic test of receipt is relevance, and a party is entitled to adduce relevant evidence whether or not it takes the opponent by surprise. There is no insistence on the pretrial disclosure of evidence at common law, although rules of discovery and inspection and pre-trial conferences (see further 5.5–5.11) now result in the pre-trial disclosure of much evidence in civil cases. And, if notice is regarded as vital, an adjournment may effect it. Failure to give notice is not in itself a basis for discretionary exclusion, although one might argue for exclusion where prejudice has resulted from it.

Under the uniform legislation, reasonable notice becomes an essential prerequisite to the admission of tendency and coincidence evidence in all proceedings: ss 97–100. 3.161 The better and most supported view is that at common law the reception of information of ‘similar facts’ disclosing the propensity or disposition of a party in a civil case turns simply upon its relevance to the precise facts in issue.605 This is a difficult question, dependent upon the particular facts and circumstances of the case at hand. Previous decisions must be carefully used, for seldom, if ever, are the issues and tendered evidence exactly the same. Sufficient relevance may be advocated via a propensity chain of reasoning606 or in some other way.607 If information disclosing propensity is relevant to an issue in a way not dependent upon that propensity, then the judge must sort out the permissible and impermissible inferences. If it is relevant via propensity the judge must take care in using a chain of reasoning which experience [page 316] shows may be an unreliable guide to a person’s conduct. But the common law imposes no special test of admissibility. 3.162 In cross-examination of a party who testifies in a civil case, there are again no special rules at common law, although, as in the case of any other witness, the questions must seek information which is relevant to the issue (in which situation ss 97 and 98 must be satisfied where the uniform legislation applies) or to the witness’s credibility (and be capable of substantially affecting the assessment of that credibility under s 103), and not be improper, unfair, vexatious or insulting. Thus, general principles are left to determine whether information revealing the propensity of a party can be elicited in cross-examination.

Evidence revealing the disposition of third parties 3.163 Whether in a civil case the character (bad or good) of a non-party can be revealed to prove a fact in issue is something which is also left to be decided at common law on the grounds of relevance,608 but is governed by ss 97 and 98 where the uniform legislation applies.

Conclusion 3.164 In the context of proving material facts in issue the concept of character is wide, including both reputation and propensity, and has, as a general rule, not been the subject of definition at common law. Tendered information is treated upon its merits and, if relevant to a material fact in issue, will usually be received in evidence. What is subject to suspicion by the common law is reasoning which is dependent upon inferences from or about propensity. In criminal cases, to protect the innocent, evidence capable of giving rise to reasoning based upon propensity is excluded unless its probative value is clear or there are other grounds of relevance that compel its consideration. The existence of this principle creates difficulties where the accused is called as a witness; the legislative compromise between this principle and the principle that witnesses may be cross-examined about character relevant to credit is of considerable subtlety. Yet, again, the principles behind this compromise are clear, despite some lack of clarity and completeness in the legislation. The concession made by the common law to permit an accused to refer to good character to cast reasonable doubt creates an unavoidable complexity, especially where the accused also testifies on oath. But the guiding principle remains the prohibition against the prosecution using any revealed bad character to infer the accused guilty of the offence charged. [page 317] 3.165 Beyond this principle applying to protect the accused, other than in respect of complainants to sexual assault, there were, until the enactment of the uniform legislation, no special rules with respect to character evidence of other persons tendered as relevant to proving the material facts in issue. The character of third parties and parties in civil cases may be revealed where the general tests of relevance and admissibility are satisfied. While judges remain vigilant to the infirmities of propensity reasoning and the need to analyse precisely why evidence revealing propensity has been tendered, if evidence is shown to be sufficiently relevant, it must be admitted. There is, at common law, no further exclusionary presumption. The uniform legislation adds an important dimension: suspicion of evidence of

tendency and coincidence reasoning in every case and to whomsoever the evidence relates. This compels judges to consider in exactly what situations the legislation singles out such evidence and to consider what probative weight is demanded to make such evidence of ‘significant probative value’. The practical effect of these provisions, given the inherent difficulties in determining probative value emphasised in the first chapters of this book, is doubtful (beyond the beneficial requirement of notice), with courts obliged to be distracted by tackling the interpretation of provisions rather than focusing on the fundamental principles at play in this area of law. The attitude of the law towards the disclosure of character evidence for the purpose of determining the creditworthiness of a witness is a separate topic and, although touched upon in the preceding discussion, is dealt with in more detail in the adversarial context of Chapter 7. ______________________________ 1.

Although the common law has not traditionally articulated a human rights approach, constitutions and legislation in many common law jurisdictions, including the United Kingdom, Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory, now take this approach: see Chapter 1, n 129. It might be noted that even common law countries with human rights regimes may be more permissive than the common law in the kinds of character and propensity evidence they admit against an accused: see, for example, Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK) Pt 11 Ch 1.

2.

Roach, ‘Unreliable Evidence and Wrongful Convictions’ (2007) 52 CLQ 210 argues that, in order to avoid miscarriages of justice, courts should take an even more pro-active approach to the exclusion of unreliable evidence through exercise of the exclusionary discretion. Cf Larry Laudan, Truth, Error and the Criminal Law: An Essay on Legal Epistemology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, who argues that the criminal standard should be the principal protection against wrongful conviction.

3.

Wigmore, Evidence, (rev’d Chadbourn), Little Brown and Co, Boston, 1974, vol 5, [1367].

4.

While common law judges have tended to use the terminology of ‘propensity’ or ‘disposition’, the uniform legislation uses the term ‘tendency’. It is assumed that each of these terms essentially mean the same thing, but the term propensity will be used when discussing common law authorities and tendency when discussing the legislation.

5.

Nevertheless, ss 97 and 98 of the uniform legislation extend the suspicion of tendency reasoning to whenever it is used in both criminal and civil proceedings: see 3.10 below.

6.

The notion of good character has now been pushed beyond that of general reputation both at common law and under the uniform legislation: see discussion at 3.128–3.129.

7.

For example, in interpreting the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (UK) and its Australian equivalents: see 3.92.

8.

Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 illustrates that propensity reasoning may also be generated by evidence of conduct subsequent to the crime charged. See also, for example, R v VN (2006) 15 VR 113; [2006] VSCA 111 at [35]–[41] (Redlich JA); R v G, GT (2007) 97 SASR 315; [2007] SASC 104 at [35]; RH v R (2014) 241 A Crim R 1; [2014] NSWCCA 71.

9.

LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [21030].

10. And not presented simply as a mathematical statistic as suggested by Hoffman: see LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [21060]. 11. Contrast Damaska, ‘Propensity Evidence in Continental Legal Systems’ (1994) 70 Chicago-Kent LR 55. 12. See Character and Conduct, ALRC Evidence Reference Research Paper 11 (1983), pp 2–16 for a collection of influential references. See Saks and Spellman, The Psychological Foundations of Evidence Law, New York University Press, New York, 2016, Ch 5. 13. For a summary of psychological research (favouring ‘interactionism’), see Imwinkelried, ‘Reshaping the “Grotesque” Doctrine of Character Evidence: The Reform Implications of the Most Recent Psychological Research’ (2008) 36 Southwestern ULR 741; Kurland, ‘Character as a Process in Judgment and Decision-making and its Implications for the Character Prohibition in Anglo-American Law’ (2014) 38 Law & Psychology Rev 135; Redmayne, Character in the Criminal Trial, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, pp 10–16. For other summaries and introductions to more recent literature, see Park, ‘Character at the Cross-Roads’ (1997–8) 49 Hastings LJ 717, particularly at 728–38; Redmayne, ‘The Relevance of Bad Character’ (2002) 61 Camb LJ 684 at 687–90; Ruschena, ‘Determining Dangerousness: Whatever Happened to the Rules of Evidence’ (2003) 10 Psychiatry, Psychology & Law 122; Park and Saks, ‘Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn’ (2006) 47 Boston College LR 949 at 964–73; and more generally Sanchirico, ‘Character Evidence and the Object of Trial’ (2001) Columbia LR 1228. 14. Differences between evidence in investigative and trial contexts has assumed greater significance in the context of decisions about going to war and combating terrorism. See, for example, Walker, ‘The United Kingdom’s Anti-Terrorism Laws: Lessons for Australia’ in Lynch, MacDonald and Williams (eds), Law and Liberty in the War on Terror, Federation Press, Sydney, 2007, p 181, and more generally Phillips, ‘Predicting the Risk of Future Dangerousness’ (2012) 14 Virtual Mentor 472. 15. For a rigorous, but ultimately inconclusive, discussion of the relevance (based on recidivist rates) of prior convictions, see Redmayne, ‘The Relevance of Bad Character Evidence’, n 13 above and Character in the Criminal Trial, n 13 above, at 16–25. See also Hamer, The Admissibility and Use of Tendency, Coincidence and Relationship Evidence in Child Sexual Assault Prosecutions in a Selection of Foreign Jurisdictions, Commonwealth of Australia, Sydney, 2016; Mercado and Ogloff, ‘Risk and the Preventive Detention of Sex Offenders in Australia and the United States’ (2007) Int’l J L & Psychiatry 49; and more generally O’Malley, ‘The Uncertain Promise of Risk’ (2004) 37 ANZ J Crim 32. 16. See, for example, Lord Hailsham in DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421 at 451, 454; and Brennan J in Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 548. 17. ‘It is the risk that evidence of propensity will be taken by a jury to prove too much that the law seeks to guard against’: Gleeson CJ in HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 at [12]. 18. See the historical analysis of ‘objectivity’ in Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1995; and Daston and Gallison, Objectivity, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1999. 19. Jury frailty is referred to as a justification in DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421 at 456 (Lord Cross); and in Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 548 (Brennan J). Wells J in R v Sutton (No 2) (1983) 32 SASR 553 argues that jury frailties can no longer justify an exclusionary rule (gaining local academic support from McNamara, ‘Dissimilar Judgments on Similar Facts’ (1984) 58 Aust LJ 74 at 143). Later decisions give greater respect to the capabilities of juries: for example, R v Lisoff [1999] NSWCCA 364 at [49], [60]; BC v R [2015] NSWCCA 327 at [81] (Beech-Jones J, Simpson JA agreeing), [28]–[30] (cf more sceptical views of Adam J). The assumption is fundamental to the reliance of the law on jury directions to ensure accuracy: see further Chapter 4. Some argue that the revelation of prior crimes may not be

particularly influential on jurors: Laudan and Allen, ‘The Devastating Impact of Prior Crimes Evidence and Other Myths of the Criminal Justice Process’ (2011) 101 J Crim L & Crim 493. 20. That the exclusionary rule exists to eliminate this ‘moral prejudice’ as well as any ‘reasoning prejudice’ is emphasised in Zuckerman, ‘Similar Fact Evidence — The Unobservable Rule’ (1987) 103 LQR 187. See also Dennis, The Law of Evidence, 5th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2013, [18.007]–[18.008]. 21. As modern sociologists, philosophers and psychologists point out, precommitments, assumptions and theories are inescapable when approaching the world, and in that sense we are all unavoidably prejudiced. On the one hand, the law seeks to leave fact-finding to the life experiences of juries whilst at the same time it asks them to discount a range of undesirable assumptions deemed inconsistent with objectivity. See, for example, the discussion of ‘historically effected consciousness’ in Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Weinsheimer and Marshall, Crossroad, New York, 1989. 22. See Lord Denning MR in Mood Music Publishing Co Ltd v De Wolfe Ltd [1976] Ch 119 at 127. 23. As notice provisions ensure where tendency and coincidence evidence is tendered under the uniform legislation: ss 97(1)(a), 98(1)(a), 99, 100. 24. Asch, ‘Forming Impressions of Personality’ (1946) J Abnorm and Soc Psychol 258; Kelley, ‘The WarmCold Variable in First Impressions of Persons’ (1950) 18 Personality 431, quoted in Character and Conduct, ALRC Evidence Reference Research Paper 11 (1983), pp 12–13. More recent research supports the conclusion that laypersons are subject to ‘dispositional bias’: see Ross and Shestowsky, ‘Contemporary Psychology’s Challenges to Legal Theory and Practice’ (2003) 97 Northwestern ULR 1081 at 1093. 25. Ichheiser, ‘Misunderstandings in Human Relations’ (1949) 55 Am J Sociol 27, quoted in Character and Conduct, ALRC Evidence Reference Research Paper 11 (1983), pp 14–15. See further literature referred to in n 13 above emphasising such ‘interactionism’. For criminological perspectives, see Andresen, Brantingham and Kinney (eds), Classics in Environmental Criminology, CRC Press, New York, 2010. 26. See, for example, Lord Simon of Glaisdale in DPP v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 at 756–7; Lord Hailsham in DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421 at 451; Brennan J in Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 548. 27. Contrast with R v Francis (1874) 12 Cox CC 612. Knowledge may be established in other contexts through the tender of evidence also disclosing an accused’s disposition: see R v Gordon and Gordon (1991) 57 A Crim R 413, where photographs of the accused performing sexual acts explained the complainant’s knowledge of those sorts of acts and rebutted a suggestion that the complainant had been coached; R v Long and McDonnell (2002) 137 A Crim R 263; [2002] SASC 426, where prior manufacture of drugs was admitted to show an accused’s knowledge of the process. 28. Note that s 95 expressly prohibits the use of tendency and coincidence reasoning where evidence is admissible for some other purpose but does not satisfy the admissibility requirements for tendency and coincidence evidence in ss 97, 98 and (in criminal cases) 101. 29. See the remarks of Hayne J in BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499; [2012] HCA 9 at [62]–[63]. 30. See authorities at 2.27 nn 129–130. 31. House v R (1936) 55 CLR 99 is authority for this approach to appeals against exercise of discretion. Authority for the proposition that House principles do not apply to appeals against conviction on the ground of admissibility under the exclusionary rule in common law jurisdictions is found in, for example, Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 515 (McHugh J) and DKA v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 44 at [33]–[34] (Buss P, Mazza JA and Beech J). In Tasmania and Victoria, a similar approach is taken to appeals against conviction involving ss 97, 98, 101 and 137 of the uniform legislation; see L v Tasmania (2006) 15 Tas SR 381; [2006] TASSC 59 at [55] (Underwood CJ), [86] (Tennent J agreeing), [79]–[85] (Crawford J not deciding); Dibbs v R (2012) 225 A Crim R 195; [2012] VSCA 224 at [78]– [80] (and authorities cited therein); McCartney v R (2012) 226 A Crim R 274; [2012] VSCA 268 at

[31]–[45] (Maxwell CJ, Neave and Coghlan JJA) (not applying House to a conviction appeal concerning s 137; extensive considerations of authorities). But in Victoria, to discourage appeals against interlocutory evidential rulings House principles do apply to such appeals: KJM v R (No 2) (2011) 33 VR 11; [2011] VSCA 268 at [9]–[14]; McCartney v R (2012) 226 A Crim R 274; [2012] VSCA 268 at [46]–[51]; Bray v R [2014] VSCA 276 at [61]–[63] (Santamaria JA, Maxwell CJ and Weinberg JA agreeing). In New South Wales, authority appears to favour House principles applying generally to both appeals against conviction and interlocutory appeals: R v Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308; [2005] NSWCCA 338 at [36], [48] (Simpson J, McClellan CJ at CL agreeing); DAO v R [2011] NSWCCA 63 at [81]–[88], [99]–[102], [99]–[104] (Allsop P); Saoud v R (2014) 87 NSWLR 481; [2014] NSWCCA 136 at [5]–[6] (Basten JA, Fullerton and RA Hume JJ agreeing); Hughes v R [2015] NSWCCA 330 at [189] (Beazley P, Schmidt and Button JJ); BC v R [2015] NSWCCA 327 at [98] (Beech-Jones J, Simpson JA agreeing). See further Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law, 12th ed, Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2016, [EA.97.480], [EA.98.450], [EA.101.450]. 32. (1995) 182 CLR 461. 33. [1894] AC 57 at 65. 34. For accounts of the case, see Woods, A History of the Criminal Law in NSW: The Colonial Period, 1788– 1900, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp 387–407; Herben, From Burren Street to the Gallows: The John and Sarah Makin Story, C & J Herben, Wollongong, NSW, 1997; Cossins, The Baby Farmers, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2013; and Cossins, ‘The Legacy of the Makin Case 120 Years on: Legal Fictions, Circular Reasoning and Some Solutions’ (2013) 35 Syd LR 731. 35. In this sense one might say that the case turned on proof of a ‘baby-farming’ propensity and therefore involved propensity reasoning: cf Dawson J in Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 600; and LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [21060] (rejecting Hoffman’s argument that the coincidence argument was simply statistical). See also Murdoch v R (2013) 40 VR 436; [2013] VSCA 272 at 81 (Priest JA, explaining the rationale of s 97 of the uniform legislation). 36. McHugh J in Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 530–1 emphasised that Makin involved ‘objective improbability reasoning’ (that is, ‘coincidence’ reasoning within s 98 of the uniform legislation) rather than sequential propensity reasoning (that is, ‘tendency’ reasoning within s 97) and was of the view that the risk of prejudice is much less in the former case. 37. Though, consider Cossins’ revisionist interpretation at n 34 above. For another historically important case pursuing the same line of ‘objective improbability’ or ‘coincidence’ reasoning, see R v Smith (1915) 11 Cr App R 229 (the ‘brides in the bath’ case). See also Redmayne, ‘A Likely Story’ (1999) 19 Ox J Legal Studies 660. 38. Hoffman, ‘Similar Facts After Boardman’ (1975) 91 LQR 193 at 197. 39. As emphasised by Gibbs CJ in Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 585; and Dawson J in Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 597. 40. [1952] AC 694 at 715. 41. For references to the decisions concerned, see older editions of Cross on Evidence. Commentary on this area of law is extensive. Leading writings include Cowan and Carter, Essays on the Law of Evidence, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1956, essay No 4; Stone, ‘The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence (England)’ (1933) 46 Harv LR 954; Hoffman, n 38 above; Williams, ‘The Problem of Similar Fact Evidence’ (1979) 5 Dal LJ 281; Cross, ‘Fourth Time Lucky — Similar Fact Evidence in the House of Lords’ [1975] Crim LR 62; Piragoff, Similar Fact Evidence, Carswell, Toronto, 1981; Allan, ‘Similar Fact Evidence and Disposition: Law, Discretion and Admissibility’ (1985) 48 Mod L Rev 253; Neasey, ‘Similar Fact Evidence and Propensity Reasoning’ (1985) 9 Crim LJ 232; Carter, ‘Forbidden Reasoning Permissible: Similar Fact Evidence a Decade after Boardman’ (1985) 48 Mod L Rev 29; Mirfield, ‘Similar

Facts — Makin Out?’ (1987) 46 Camb LJ 83; Zuckerman, n 20 above; Palmer, ‘The Scope of the Similar Fact Rule’ (1994) 16 Adel LR 161; Nair, ‘Weighing Similar Facts and Avoiding Prejudice’ (1996) 112 LQR 262; Gans, ‘Similar Facts After Phillips’ (2006) 30 Crim LJ 224; Hamer, ‘Similar Fact Reasoning in Phillips: Artificial, Disjointed and Pernicious’ (2007) 30 UNSW LJ 609; ‘Admissibility and Use of Relationship Evidence in HML v The Queen’ (2008) 32 Crim LJ 351; Cossins, n 34 above. 42. [1975] AC 421. 43. Uncharged acts or relationship evidence to which no objection was taken. 44. [1952] 2 QB 911. 45. [1918] AC 221. 46. More recent High Court cases applying the common law and employing sequential propensity reasoning include: Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461; HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16; and Roach v R (2011) 242 CLR 610; [2011] HCA 12. These cases would fall within s 97 if the uniform legislation had applied. 47. [1911] AC 47. 48. DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421 at 444. 49. Ibid at 439 (Lord Morris) and 457 (Lord Cross). 50. See, for example, Lanford v General Medical Council [1990] 1 AC 13. While ‘striking similarities’ receive emphasis in decisions of the Victorian CCA — see, for example, Murdoch (a Pseudonym) v R [2013] VSCA 272; Semaan v R [2013] VSCA 134 at [36]–[38]; and Velkoski v R (2014) 45 VR 680; [2014] VSCA 121 at [171] — later authority has been careful to emphasise that these are merely indicators of probative weight (of ‘underlying unity’ investing the testimony of different complainants with probative value) and neither definitive nor decisive of admissibility: see, for example, Ramon Harris (a Pseudonym) v R [2015] VSCA 112 at [18]–[25] (Priest and Kaye JJA and Croucher AJA) (but refusing crossadmissibility as underlying unity established but not of ‘significant probative value’). 51. [1991] 2 AC 447 (discussed by Tapper (1992) 108 LQR 26). 52. The past tense is used as the common law in England has been replaced by Pt 11 Ch 1 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK). This legislation effectively abolishes the common law presumption against the admissibility of evidence of bad character. Section 101(1)(d) admits evidence of bad character ‘relevant to an important matter in issue between the defendant and the prosecution’ but subject (s 101(3)) to the accused convincing the court that its ‘reception would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it’: see Dennis, n 20 above, Ch 19. 53. Markby v R (1978) 140 CLR 108; Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580; Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528; Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292; Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590; Thompson v R (1989) 169 CLR 1; Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461; BRS v R (1997) 191 CLR 275; Gipp v R (1998) 194 CLR 106; Phillips v R (2006) 225 CLR 303; [2006] HCA 4; HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16; BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499; [2012] HCA 9. 54. (1995) 182 CLR 461. 55. (2006) 225 CLR 303. 56. (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16. 57. (2012) 245 CLR 499; [2012] HCA 9. 58. (1978) 140 CLR 108 at 116. 59. (1982) 150 CLR 580. 60. (1984) 152 CLR 528.

61. (1995) 182 CLR 461. 62. This sort of coincidence reasoning (targeted by s 98 of the uniform legislation) was not regarded by Gibbs CJ as excluded by the first limb of his rule. 63. Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 604 (Wilson J); Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 534 (Gibbs CJ), 564–5 (Dawson J). 64. (1984) 152 CLR 528. 65. See ibid at 552–3, where Brennan J states: ‘If these facts support the inference that one offender committed the three sets of offences, it would be right for the jury to infer that the applicant, if guilty of one set of offences, was guilty of all’. See also Deane J at 561 and Dawson J at 566. The reasoning in Sutton is applied in Horsman v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 190. 66. This is again coincidence reasoning within s 98 of the uniform legislation. 67. In R v Salerno [1973] VR 59, it was held that, even where a jury was prepared to find a series of crimes committed by the same person, less than positive identifications of the accused by every individual witness to each crime could not be considered together as coincidence evidence to infer beyond reasonable doubt that the culprit was the accused. Cf situation where doubtful identifications of the culprit who committed only one crime: Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593; [2001] HCA 72; Dair v Western Australia (2008) 36 WAR 413; [2008] WASCA 72. Salerno was not followed in R v Grant [1996] 2 Crim App R 272; Hirst v Police (2006) 95 SASR 260; [2006] SASC 244 at [65]–[79] and cases referred to therein. 68. In Hirst v Police (2006) 95 SASR 260; [2006] SASC 244 at [59]–[63], Duggan J was of the view that the fact that a number of testifying witnesses to separate crimes opined to identify, to varying degrees of doubt, the same accused, could not be used to infer that the separate crimes were committed by the same man — whereas testimony of similar identifying features could be so used. 69. (1989) 167 CLR 590. The reasoning in Harriman was applied in, for example, Markovina v R (1996) 16 WAR 354 at 363 (later drug association could be used to infer an earlier involvement with different drugs); R v GAS [1998] 3 VR 862 at 884–5 (prior taxi robbery association of S and F admissible to infer nature of later taxi incident in which both involved); R v Long and McDonnell (2002) 137 A Crim R 263; [2002] SASC 426 (prior association in manufacturing drugs suggested both involved in later manufacture); Musarri v R (2006) 32 WAR 19 (conversations about previous drug transactions admissible to show nature of parties’ association and reason for conspiracy to sell drugs alleged). In R v Quach (2002) 137 A Crim R 345; [2002] NSWCCA 519 at [24], Spigelman CJ argues that Harriman did not involve tendency reasoning within s 97 of the uniform legislation. See also R v Sukkar [2005] NSWCCA 54 at [58]–[66] (Wood CJ at CL); R v Ngatikaura [2006] NSWCCA 161 at [24]–[25] (Beazely JA) (but cf at [68] Simpson J (Rothman J agreeing) finding evidence of prior drug offences used as tendency evidence). 70. (1995) 182 CLR 461 (discussed by Odgers (1995) 19 Crim LJ 229). 71. [1894] AC 57 at 65. 72. (1985) 38 SASR 207. 73. (1990) 52 SASR 438. In R v S, PC (2008) 189 A Crim R 446; [2008] SASC 285 at [17] n 3, Duggan J says: ‘The doubt expressed in R v Turney (1990) 52 SASR 438 as to whether discreditable conduct as opposed to illegal conduct attracts the rule in Makin’s case must now be read in the light of the judgments in HML v The Queen …’ in holding that the trial judge erred in allowing evidence that the accused had taken photographs of nude boys to be left to the jury as evidence that the accused had a general sexual propensity for young boys (as opposed to establishing the accused’s interest in or relationship with the victim of the crimes charged).

74. But nevertheless excluded in exercise of the Christie discretion as insufficiently relevant and prejudicial at his trial for unlawfully interfering sexually with his stepdaughter in an allegedly similar manner. 75. R v Ball [1911] AC 47; R v Rodley [1913] 3 KB 468; Griffith v R (1937) 58 CLR 185; R v Horry (1949) NZLR 791; R v Barrington [1981] 1 WLR 419; R v Carroll (1985) 19 A Crim R 410 at 413 (Kneipp J, CCA (Qld)); McHugh J in Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 512 (‘evidence that reveals that the accused is a person of bad character is not admissible’); R v Colby [1999] NSWCCA 261 at [106]. See the discussion by Palmer, n 41 above, at 181–7. Where the propensity does not amount to prejudicial misconduct no exclusionary rule need apply; in R v Fernandes (1996) 133 FLR 477, the CCA (SA) admitted evidence showing a gambling habit as providing a motive for the misappropriation of funds. 76. (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16. 77. See more generally Reed, ‘Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offender Cases’ (1993) 21 Am J Crim L 127; Imwinkelried, ‘“Where There’s Smoke, There’s Fire”: Should the Judge or the Jury Decide the Question of Whether the Accused Committed an Alleged Uncharged Crime Proffered Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404?’ (1998) 42 St Louis ULJ 813. 78. At [105]. ‘[Because evidence] shows other discreditable conduct, or in many cases the commission of other offences, it is generally inadmissible’: at [111]; ‘evidence of other conduct which did not constitute any offence … may present more difficult issues’ in applying the Pfennig test: at [113]; ‘[The Pfennig] rule takes as its premise that evidence of other discreditable acts of the accused is ordinarily inadmissible’: at [162]; ‘Because the evidence showed the commission of offences by the appellant or other discreditable acts on his part, its admissibility was to be determined by applying the test in Pfennig’: at [169]. 79. Gleeson CJ at [12], [23] (but cf [24] where he confines the exclusionary principle to ‘evidence revealing the commission of other offences’). Crennan J at [466] confines her remarks about ensuring evidence more probative than prejudicial to evidence of ‘uncharged acts [having] a relevance beyond merely demonstrating propensity’. 80. (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 593–4. 81. See Markby v R (1978) 140 CLR 108 at 116–17 (Gibbs ACJ); Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 586, 589 (Gibbs CJ), 608–9 (Brennan J); Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 532 (Gibbs CJ), 559 (Deane J), 563 (Dawson J); Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 294 (Mason CJ, Wilson and Gaudron JJ), 299 (Brennan and Dawson JJ); Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 593–4 (Brennan J), 607, 609 (Toohey J), 627 (McHugh J); Thompson v R (1989) 169 CLR 1 at 15–16 (Mason CJ and Dawson J); Roach v R (2011) 242 CLR 610; [2011] HCA 12 (all judges use this terminology). See also LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [21001], which says this nomenclature, though inaccurate, is too ‘deeply engrained’ to be abandoned. 82. ‘[T]he exclusionary rules concerning evidence of criminal propensity are not confined to similar fact evidence’: McHugh J in Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 516. 83. Examples of similarities explicable by propensity rather than sheer coincidence include Makin, Boardman and Perry (all above). 84. (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 627–34. 85. This res gestae approach was applied by Miles CJ in R v Omar (1992) 58 A Crim R 139 (SC (ACT)); Smith v R (2003) 138 A Crim R 403; [2003] WASCA 57 at [30]–[31]; R v Hartwick, Hartwick and Clayton (2005) 14 VR 125 at [67]. It is recognised in High Court dicta in HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 at [24] (Glesson CJ), [495] (Kiefel J); Roach v R (2011) 242 CLR 610; [2011] HCA 12 at [30] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ). It has also been used to avoid the application of s 97 of the Uniform Acts: R v Serratore [2001] NSWCCA 123; R v Mostyn (2004) 145 A Crim R 304; [2004] NSWCCA 97 at [116]–[135]; TWL v R (2012) 222 A Crim R 445; [2012]

NSWCCA 57 at [41]–[45]. 86. (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16. 87. For further examples of how courts have dealt with what might be described as ‘res gestae situations’, see, for example, O’Leary v R (1946) 73 CLR 566 at 577 (Dixon J); R v Etherington (1982) 32 SASR 230 at 235 (Walters J saw prior sexual acts as part of a continuum including the crimes charged); R v McKnoulty (1995) 80 A Crim R 28 (Abadee J admits acts of violence four hours before crime charged); Mason v R (1995) 15 WAR 165 (prior assaults against other persons on day of crime charged admitted); R v Correia (1996) 15 WAR 95 (a separate rape alleged on the same night not part of the res leading to the rape charged); R v Josifoski [1997] 2 VR 68 at 74–6 (argument that isolated previous sexual acts showed a ‘connected series of events’ or a ‘pattern of behaviour’ rejected); R v Rigney [2005] SASC 264 at [40]–[41] (violent use of wooden pole earlier in the day of the crime relevant to prove identity); R v Domokos (2005) 92 SASR 258 at [43]–[47] (admissibility of circumstantial evidence of drug importation over period of time not caught by Pfennig); Hothnyang v R [2014] VSCA 64 at [15]–[21] (O’Leary applied in decision under the uniform legislation); R v Fleming; R v Maher [2017] SASC 16 at [55] (Doyle J excluding evidence of prior robbery under s 34P of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA)). But where does the res end? By the same reasoning, where the charged acts are the culmination of a longer course of conduct or relationship it may be relevant and sufficiently probative to reveal the whole course of conduct or relationship: Wilson v R (1970) 123 CLR 334 at 344 (defence of accidental shooting had to be considered in light of poor relationship between husband and wife); R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 at 515 (testimony of extreme sexual misconduct unbelievable without context of sexual relationship); R v Peake (1996) 67 SASR 297 at 300 (jury would have had an artificial picture if the parties’ violent relationship not revealed); R v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 at 364 (defence of accidental stabbing had to be seen in light of the violent relationship between the parties). On the admissibility of such ‘relationship evidence’, see below at 3.33. 88. (1995) 182 CLR 461. 89. For example, Kailis v R (1999) 21 WAR 100 at [188] (Ipp J); R v Nieterink (1999) 76 SASR 56. But compare with R v Randell [1999] TASSC 78 at [17] (Underwood J: ‘… as [relationship evidence] is also evidence of a general propensity it will be excluded when sought to be lead by the prosecution unless its probative value is so high that it outweighs its prejudicial effect’); R v Vonarx [1999] 3 VR 618 at 622: ‘If the evidence is tendered by the prosecution to prove the existence of a relevant “relationship” between the accused and the victim, the onus rests on the prosecution to establish that the evidence goes further than mere propensity and has additional probative value which justifies its admission despite its prejudicial effect’. 90. This is now the situation with evidence falling outside s 97 of the uniform legislation. 91. In addition to the cases referred to in n 89, see also, for example, R v Cook (2000) 110 A Crim R 117 at [64]–[66] (Anderson J, CCA (WA)); R v Anderson [2000] 1 VR 1 at [34]–[35], [38]; R v Chevathen and Dorrick (2001) 122 A Crim R 441 at [36] (CCA (Qld)); R v Long and McDonnell (2002) 137 A Crim R 263; [2002] SASC 426; R v Bastan [2009] VSCA 157; WFS v R (2011) 33 VR 406; [2011] VSCA 347 (Robson AJA, Buchanan JA and Whelan AJA agreeing); MM v R (2012) 232 A Crim R 303; [2012] ACTCA 44; SKA v R [2012] NSWCCA 205. 92. (1970) 123 CLR 334 at 344. Interestingly, evidence that a previous wife also died from an accidental gunshot was deemed inadmissible, but was inadvertently disclosed at trial. Other examples of a similar use of a violent or hostile relationship include R v Hissey (1973) 6 SASR 280; R v Matthews (1984) 36 SASR 503; R v Andrews [1987] 1 Qd R 21; R v Garrett (1988) 50 SASR 392; R v Luezkowski (1990) 54 SASR 169; R v Andrews (1992) 60 A Crim R 137 (CCA (SA)); R v Smith and Turner (No 2) (1995) 64 SASR 1 at 15–16; R v Vollmer [1996] 1 VR 95 at 130–3; R v Peake (1996) 67 SASR 297 (in refusing leave to appeal (4 September 1997), Brennan CJ suggested the Pfennig test does not apply to propensity

evidence tendered to establish mens rea); R v Grosser (1999) 73 SASR 584; R v Burns (1999) 107 A Crim R 330 at 341 (Pincus JA), 345–6 (McMurdo P); R v Anderson [2000] 1 VR 1; R v Chevathen and Dorrick (2001) 122 A Crim R 441 (CCA (Qld)); R v Bastan [2009] VSCA 157. Cases under the uniform legislation similarly assume a relevant violent relationship is not tendency evidence: Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 25–6; R v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 at 364; R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 at [134]–[148] (Heydon JA); FDP v R [2008] NSWCCA 317 at [36]–[37]. 93. As well as the cases discussed in the text, further common law examples include: R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510; Petty v R (1994) 13 WAR 372 (relationship evidence only falls within the exclusionary rule when tendered as propensity evidence); R v G (1996) 88 A Crim R 489 at 493; R v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 at n 4 (Hunt CJ at CL: ‘relationship’ and ‘tendency’ evidence are distinguishable); R v Massey [1997] 1 Qd R 404; R v White [1998] 2 Qd R 531 (evidence of sexual relationship admissible outside the Pfennig test); R v Vonarx [1999] 3 VR 618 (relationship evidence admissible if shown more probative than prejudicial); R v RHMcL [1999] 1 VR 746 at [66]ff; R v LSS [2000] 1 Qd R 546 (evidence of uncharged acts admitted as non-propensity evidence of sexual relationship or passion); KRM v R (2001) 206 CLR 221 at [25]–[31] (McHugh J); R v Kostaras [2002] SASC 326 (evidence of attraction and uncharged acts admissible as non-propensity evidence to establish ‘attraction’ and as propensity evidence to establish a ‘practice of engaging in particular sexual acts at particular locations when they were alone’: at [49]); R v Tedesco [2003] SASC 79; R v Sciberras [2003] SASC 104 (admissibility not challenged by accused); R v PAB (2008) 1 Qd R 184 (relationship admissible to explain allegations of conduct which would otherwise not be believable). Note that where legislation makes criminal a ‘sexual relationship’, evidence of uncharged acts may also be admitted as constituting that relationship: see NSW: Crimes Act 1900 s 66EA; Qld: Criminal Code (Qld) s 229B (as explained in BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499; [2012] HCA 9 at [14]–[16], [36] (French CJ)); SA: Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 50; Tas: Criminal Code s 125A; Vic: Crimes Act 1958 s 47A (discussed in KRM v R (2001) 206 CLR 221); WA: Criminal Code s 321A; ACT: Crimes Act 1900 s 56; NT: Criminal Code s 131A. 94. On the general dangers of admitting uncharged acts, see the discussion of Imwinkelried, n 77 above. 95. (1999) 76 SASR 56. See also Weinberg JA in R v EF (2008) 189 A Crim R 463; [2008] VSCA 213 at [26]. 96. (1997) 191 CLR 275 and (1998) 194 CLR 104 respectively. Both cases are concerned only with the appropriate directions about non-propensity evidence. On the question of admissibility McHugh J in KRM v R (2001) 206 CLR at [24]–[31] regarded BRS and Gipp as unclear, and concluded that ‘[u]ntil this Court decides to the contrary, courts in this country should treat evidence of uncharged sexual conduct as admissible to explain the nature of the relationship between the complainant and the accused, just as they have done for the best part of a century’. Doyle CJ cites this dictum in R v Kostaras [2002] SASC 326 in reiterating his explanation of the scope of the exclusionary rule in Pfennig. 97. A similar explanation is found in other cases referred to at n 93 above. 98. Heydon J in HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 at [292]ff and conclusions at [313], [314], [315], [322] (but cf Gleeson CJ at [25], Kiefel J at [500]) argues that this approach breaches the prohibition against tendering evidence in support of your witness’s credibility (the ‘bolster rule’). To so interpret the bolster rule ignores that it is the direct testimony of the complainant that is the decisive issue in the case (cf Heydon J’s exhortation at [334] that juries have a ‘duty to concentrate upon the issues presented’). See also Bellemore v Tasmania (2006) 170 A Crim R 1 at [45] (Crawford J). The bolster rule is discussed in detail at 7.116. 99. What Deane J in B v R (1992) 175 CLR 599 at 610 described as ‘background evidence’, and Hunt CJ at CL in R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 at 515 as evidence placing the crime in ‘context’, ‘rather than as an isolated act occurring without any apparent reason’. For a more recent example, see KJS v R

[2014] NSWCCA 27. This credibility explanation is emphasised by Vanstone J in R v IK (2004) 89 SASR 406 at [143], and R v K, MC [2009] SASC 141 at [23], [33]. 100. Although it might be argued that the notion of propensity is relied upon in constructing the consistency of the complainant’s account. 101. But compare with HML where Hayne (at [183]) and Heydon JJ (at [280]) are of the view that sexual interest may be established by the complainant’s testimony alone, that a jury may quite reasonably accept part of a complainant’s story to establish motive, and then use that motive in deciding to accept the direct testimony of the charged acts. 102. Cf R v VN (2006) 15 VR 113; [2006] VSCA 111 at [29], [30] (Redlich JA). In WFS v R (2011) 33 VR 406; [2011] VSCA 347 at [38], [74], the court (Robson AJA, Buchanan JA and Whelan AJA agreeing) distinguishes relationship evidence (1) when relevant as non-propensity evidence to provide context against which to assess the complainant’s credibility and (2) when relevant as propensity evidence of a guilty passion to infer the crime charged. The latter use being caught by ss 97 and 101 (at [80]); when used for the former use only, the jury must be directed about permissible and impermissible uses: at [75]–[76]. 103. (1970) 123 CLR 334. 104. Evidence of so-called guilty passion is commonly admitted (although that terminology should not generally be used before a jury: R v TAB [2002] NSWCCA 274 at [36] (Levine J); R v Mearns [2005] NSWCCA 396 at [52]–[72] (Latham J); R v BJC (2005) 13 VR 407; [2005] VSCA 154 at [28] (Byrne AJA), [69] (Osborn AJA)). For examples of admission at common law, see R v Witham [1962] Qd R 49; R v S (1991) 5 WAR 391 (subsequent sexual relationship admissible); B v R (1992) 175 CLR 599 at 610 (Deane J); K v R (1992) 34 FCR 227; R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 at 515; R v DDR [1998] 3 VR 580; R v Corrigan (1998) 74 SASR 454 at 459–60; R v Vonarx [1999] 3 VR 618; R v RHMcL [1999] 1 VR 746 at [68]; WLC v R [2007] NTCCA 11 at [24] (admissible to corroborate). In Leonard v R (2006) 67 NSWLR 545 at [49], Hodgson J distinguished the use of prior sexual assaults to support the consistency of the complainant’s testimony, to provide motive, and to infer the accused acted upon a tendency to assault, holding that only the last use is prohibited tendency evidence under s 97 of the uniform legislation. Other cases suggest evidence of unlawful sexual interest is tendency evidence: R v AB [2001] NSWCCA 496 at [10]; Qualtieri v R (2006) 171 A Crim R 463; [2006] NSWCCA 95 at [122] (Howie J); Rodden v R [2008] NSWCCA 53 at [39]–[44], [125] (Hall J). In R v Ball [1911] AC 47, the evidence of guilty passion was the basis of a direct inference to the accused’s guilt and for that reason the exclusionary rule had to be satisfied. 105. For example, R v Preston (1997) (NSWCCA, 9 April 1997, unreported). 106. See also R v Josifoski [1997] 2 VR 68 at 77; R v RHMcL [1999] 1 VR 746 at [71]. 107. See also the comments of Callinan J in Gipp v R (1998) 194 CLR 104 at [181]–[182]. More recently, the importance of directions on use where propensity is disclosed is emphasised in WFS v R (2011) 33 VR 406; [2011] VSCA 347 at [75]–[76]; Roach v R (2011) 242 CLR 610; [2011] HCA 12 at [47]. 108. Though see the criticism by Imwinkelried, ‘Reshaping the “Grotesque” Doctrine of Character Evidence: The Reform Implications of the Most Recent Psychological Research’ (2008) 36 Southwestern ULR 741; Imwinkelried, n 13 above, at 759–61; and Cavallaro, ‘Federal Rules of Evidence 413–415 and the Struggle for Rulemaking Pre-eminence’ (2007) 98 J Crim L & Crim 31. Commentators have questioned the special admissibility provisions for sexual assault offences on the grounds that the recidivism rates for sexual assault are lower than the average recidivism rate: Imwinkelreid, ‘A Small Contribution to the Debate over the Proposed Legislation Abolishing the Character Evidence Prohibition in Sex Offense Prosecutions’ (1993) 44 Syracuse LR 1125 at 1150; Ellis, ‘The Politics Behind Federal Rules of Evidence 413, 414 and 415’ (1998) 38 Santa Clara LR 961 at 982; Orenstein and Lave, ‘Empirical Fallacies of Evidence Law: A Critical Look at the Admission of

Prior Sex Crimes’ (2013) U Cincinatti LR 795. 109. See, for example, Atholwood v R (2000) 110 A Crim R 417 (possession of drugs not subject to charge and other drug-using paraphernalia relevant to intention to supply specified drugs and admissible as non-propensity evidence); R v Palaga (2001) 80 SASR 19 (non-propensity uses); R v Burns and Collins (2001) 123 A Crim R 226 (evidence revealing extended plans between accused to import cannabis admissible within Pfennig to show importing relationship); R v Georgiev (2001) 119 A Crim R 363 at 365 (evidence of drug dealing relevant to motive); R v Ngo and Le [2002] SASC 373 (involvement in obtaining and selling heroin admissible to infer who in the house was in possession of the heroin found in the house); R v Cummins (2004) 10 VR 15 (heroin addiction only remotely relevant to provide motive for armed robbery and too prejudicial to admit); R v Ngatikaura [2006] NSWCCA 161 (drug dealing to prove possession tendency evidence requiring admission under ss 97, 101, cf Beasley JA dissenting); Noto v Western Australia (2006) 168 A Crim R 457; [2006] WASCA 278 at [42] (evidence of drug dealings admissible to establish drug business which included offences charged); Beverland v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 2 (prior dealing admissible circumstantial evidence); R v Franco (2009) 105 SASR 446; [2009] SASC 370 (on charge of illegal manufacture of methylamphetamine possession of a quantity of that drug admissible to show interest in that drug irrespective of whether the drug possessed came from a batch manufactured); R v Soteriou (2013) 118 SASR 119; [2013] SASCFC 114 at [30]–[33]. 110. (2002) 137 A Crim R 263; [2002] SASC 426. 111. In R v Ngo and Le [2002] SASC 373, Ngo’s prior crimes of selling heroin were admissible to infer her possession of the heroin found in the house. This seems a direct inference of guilt from propensity. 112. (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16. 113. Gleeson CJ at [27] and Kiefel J at [511] agreed that this was so but nevertheless discussed the appropriate scope of the Pfennig test. 114. Cf the remarks of French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ in Roach v R (2011) 242 CLR 610; [2011] HCA 12 at [11] (Pfennig applies only to tender for a particular purpose) and at [14] (‘By that [common law] rule the prosecution may not adduce evidence of other misconduct on the part of the accused, if that evidence shows that an accused had a propensity to commit crime or the offence in question, unless the evidence is sufficiently highly probative of a fact in issue to outweigh the prejudice it may cause’). As Bell J points out in BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499; [2012] HCA 9 at [148], the court in Roach did regard the evidence of domestic relationship relevant for non-propensity purposes but the decision in Roach did not turn upon this. 115. Hayne J’s approach was distinguished in R v Sadler (2008) 20 VR 69; [2008] VSCA 198 at [61] (case decided under s 398A of the Crimes Act abolishing the Pfennig test; Victoria is now governed by a ‘Uniform Evidence Act’). In R v Rae [2008] QCA 385 at [76], Daubney JA, with whom the other members of the court agreed, in a case where misconduct was admitted as ‘relationship evidence’ and to provide ‘context’ outside any exclusionary rule, said of HML that ‘there is no ratio of a majority in HML which prohibits the approach taken by the trial judge in respect of the relationship evidence in this case’. In R v UC [2008] QCA 194, Hayne J’s approach was applied without analysis in dismissing an appeal against a trial judge’s directions on the standard of proof of the uncharged acts. Cf R v SCO & SCP [2016] QCA 248 at [137]–[143] (Margaret McMurdo P) where, on the authority of Gleeson CJ’s approach in HML, uncharged acts were held admissible to provide context. 116. (2011) 242 CLR 610; [2011] HCA 12. 117. (2006) 225 CLR 303; [2006] HCA 4. Earlier cases have also seen these as a category to which the Pfennig test centrally applies: for example, R v Chevathen and Dorrick (2001) 122 A Crim R 441 at [36] (CCA (Qld)).

118. (2012) 245 CLR 499; [2012] HCA 9. 119. If notice is only given in respect to tendency arguments under s 97, strictly coincidence arguments under s 98 cannot be made: but cf BC v R [2015] NSWCCA 327, where coincidence arguments (rebutting concoction) appeared to be permitted to establish a tendency admissible under s 97. 120. (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 528–9. See also Bendix Autolite Corp v Midwesco Enterprises Inc 486 US 888 (1988) at 897 (Scalia J). 121. Cf the ‘weighing’ process undertaken in applying the Christie discretion: see 2.29–2.31. 122. As McHugh J argues in Pfennig v R (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 529–30. 123. [1911] AC 47; (1989) 167 CLR 590 respectively. Harriman is mentioned with approval in S v R (1989) 168 CLR 266 at 275 (Dawson J), 279 (Toohey J), and effectively applied by Doyle CJ in R v Long and McDonnell (2002) 137 A Crim R 263; [2002] SASC 426, discussed at 3.37. These cases, where the relationship is shown to have involved misconduct of the very type alleged, and which is relied upon to directly infer that the propensity towards that misconduct was acted upon on the occasion charged, must be distinguished from those ‘relationship cases’ discussed above (at 3.33ff) where the relationship evidence is adduced as indirectly relevant to show the context of a witness’s account, or to establish relevant knowledge or feelings of one person towards another. The authorities there discussed suggest that there should be more leeway in admitting such evidence, if necessary by regarding it as outside the exclusionary rule altogether. 124. (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 at [171]. 125. [1894] AC 57; (1982) 150 CLR 580; (1984) 152 CLR 528; [1975] AC 421; (1988) 165 CLR 292; (1989) 169 CLR 1; (2006) 225 CLR 303 respectively. Other examples of circumstantial cases asserting similar facts include R v Armstrong (1990) 54 SASR 207 (accused’s involvement inferred circumstantially from the accused’s car being in the vicinity of a number of similar housebreakings); R v Phan (1990) 54 SASR 561 (accused pawnbroker’s knowledge that goods stolen inferred circumstantially from large number of dealings with stolen goods); R v Gordon (1999) 108 A Crim R 356 (SC (WA)) (prior killing of wife in similar but not distinctive circumstances inadmissible circumstantially and inadmissible as propensity); R v Delgado-Guerra [2002] 2 Qd R 384 (no possibly innocent explanation of presence of accused’s fingerprints at scene of a number of voyeuristic breakings); and R v Gale; R v Duckworth (2012) 217 A Crim R 487; [2012] NSWCCA 174 at [37]–[38] (asserted similarities assumed and ‘a classic example of “begging the question”’). 126. (2011) 242 CLR 374. 127. Although empirical research suggests we should be sceptical as to the effectiveness of jury instructions: see further discussion and references at 2.13 nn 51–52. 128. Cf the approach under the uniform legislation to the requirements of ‘significant probative value’ and that the probative value of evidence ‘substantially outweigh’ any prejudicial effect it may have. See further 3.60 below. 129. [1975] AC 421 at 439, 444. 130. (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 295. 131. R v Scarrott [1978] QB 1016; R v Lunt (1987) 85 Cr App R 241; R v Beggs [1989] Crim LR 898. 132. [1991] 2 AC 447. 133. Similarities and differences, and the probative value of evidence, can be controvertible. Consider the discussion of ‘family resemblances’ in Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, London, 2001 (1953). See also Bowker and Starr, Sorting Things Out: Classification and its Consequences, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000.

134. As the CCA (Qld) was distracted in R v Hoch (1988) 32 A Crim R 443, ignoring the risk of collaboration while finding ‘striking similarities’. In Thompson v R (1989) 169 CLR 1, the trial judge, in his eagerness to list ‘striking similarities’, included the conclusion that each victim had been shot through the head (rather than dying through incineration following a car accident), when this cause of death was the very fact in issue that the series of deaths was intended to establish. Similarly, in Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580, the Crown sought to interpret symptoms of death consistent with arsenic poisoning as proved arsenic poisoning for the purpose of establishing ‘striking similarities’. Cf Cossins’ cautionary discussion of coincidences in works referred to at n 34 above. 135. See, for example, R v Ellis (2010) 107 SASR 94; [2010] SASC 118 at [53] (Sulan J), [116] (Kourakis J). 136. (1989) 169 CLR 1. 137. See also, for example, R v Armstrong (1990) 54 SASR 207 at 216–17 (Cox J); R v S [2001] QCA 501 at [36]–[37] (Thomas JA); R v Liddy [2002] SASC 19 at [70]–[80] (Mulligan J); R v Ellis (2010) 107 SASR 94; [2010] SASC 118 at [49] (Sulan J). And see VCA cases referred to in n 50 above. 138. See, for example, R v Dupas (No 2) (2005) 12 VR 601; [2005] VSCA 212, where an accused was identified through severance of his murdered victims’ breasts. 139. (1988) 165 CLR 292; (1989) 167 CLR 590; (1995) 182 CLR 461; (2006) 225 CLR 303; (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 respectively. 140. (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 482–3 (references omitted). 141. The origins of this circumstantial evidence approach in the High Court can be traced back to Murphy J in Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 596; it is developed by Dawson J in Sutton (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 564; accepted by the majority in Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 296; and applied by a majority in Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 602 (Dawson J), 615 (Gaudron J), and 635 (McHugh J); and by Mason CJ and Dawson J in Thompson v R (1989) 169 CLR 1 at 18. 142. As Gleeson CJ remarks in HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 at [27]: ‘It is a test of admissibility of evidence, not a test of the reasonableness of a jury verdict’. 143. (2006) 225 CLR 303 at [63]. 144. (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 302. The majority approach in Hoch is discussed and applied in R v Robertson (1997) 91 A Crim R 388; R v Colby [1999] NSWCCA 261; R v Randell [1999] TASSC 78; R v Liddy [2002] SASC 19 at [50]–[60]; Hickey v R [2002] WASCA 321 (there was factual foundation for a reasonable possibility of concoction); Tasmania v S [2004] TASSC 84; Tasmania v Farmer (2004) 48 A Crim R 99; Tasmania v L [2004] TASSC 86; Tasmania v B [2006] TASSC 110; Tasmania v Y [2007] TASSC 112; AE v R [2008] NSWCCA 52 at [44]. 145. That this requires the trial judge to make a decision on credibility normally reserved for the jury is expressly recognised by Brennan and Dawson JJ in Hoch at 303. The mere possibility of concoction is not sufficient to give rise to reasonable doubt: R v Colby [1999] NSWCCA 261 at [111]; R v DawsonRyan (2009) 104 SASR 571 at [25], [31]; R v Inston (2009) 103 SASR 265 at [95] (Vanstone J: trial judge entitled to find concoction was no more than a theoretical possibility). 146. [1995] 2 AC 597 (and see the discussion by Nair, n 41 above, particularly at 265–71). 147. R v H is discussed approvingly by Ambrose J in R v Robertson (1997) 91 A Crim R 388 at 402–11. 148. Lord Mustill in R v H at 617–18. In Heanes v Herangi (2007) 175 A Crim R 175; [2007] WASC 175, Johnson J held that witness collaboration was a matter going to weight, not admissibility, refusing to exercise his exclusionary discretion. See also New South Wales v Kuru [2007] NSWCA 141 at [71]–[77] (Santow JA) and comments by Sheller JA in Day v Perisher Blue Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 110 at [30]. 149. [2002] NSWCCA 210 at [27]–[29]. See also R v Folbigg [2003] NSWCCA 17 at [24]–[28].

150. Hodgson JA’s approach was expressly endorsed in BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499 at [157] by Crennan and Kiefel JJ and implicitly by Bell J at [203]. 151. Hayne J takes the same approach in BBH v R (2012) 245 CLR 499 at [68], [77]–[81]. 152. With the possible exception of the evidence relating to HML’s purchase of a G-string for the victim: Hayne J at [172]–[176], Crennan J at [457]. 153. (2012) 245 CLR 499. 154. (2006) 225 CLR 303. For a more detailed analysis of this case, see Gans, n 41 above; and Hamer, n 41 above. Reasoning consistent with Phillips was applied in deciding Stubley v R (2011) 242 CLR 374; [2011] HCA 7. 155. ‘So you ask yourselves this, what are the probabilities that all six girls have lied when they say they did not consent to [Phillips] dealing with them sexually. If you think it could possibly be just an unlucky coincidence then you consider each incident and the evidence of each girl completely separately and you reach your verdicts in light of your view of the evidence relating to each incident completely separately. But if you are satisfied that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn is that they are all telling the truth when they say they did not consent to [Phillips] dealing with them sexually then you may use that conclusion in your thinking along the path to deciding whether [Phillips] is guilty or not guilty of each of the offences’: quoted by the Queensland Court of Appeal in dismissing Phillips’ appeal: R v PS [2004] QCA 347 at [67]. 156. Cf Odgers, n 31 above, at [EA.98.120]. 157. Cf R v Wallace (2008) 100 SASR 119; [2008] SASC 47, where Phillips was distinguished by Vanstone J (at [98]) on the basis that the issue before her went beyond a mere matter of the victim’s mental state (consent) to whether the striking similarities between victims’ testimonies made it objectively improbable the events were other than alleged by them. 158. (1989) 167 CLR 590. 159. Although compare with the comment on Harriman in Odgers (1990) 14 Crim LJ 127 at 130: ‘Even drug dealers can on occasion be tourists’; and Meagher JA’s comment in R v Hemmelstein [2001] NSWCCA 220 at [7]: ‘One can knowingly import cocaine and still find time to slot in a little golf’. 160. This idea appears to have been first put forward by Murphy J in Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580 at 596; it is developed by Dawson J in Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 564; accepted by the majority in Hoch (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 296; and applied by a majority in Harriman (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 602 (Dawson J), 615 (Gaudron J) and 635 (McHugh J); and Pfennig (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 485 (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ). 161. (1990) 171 CLR 207. 162. Another approach would be to abolish any specific exclusionary rule and simply to leave application of the exclusionary principle to directions and exercise of the exclusionary discretion. This would place the onus on the accused to persuade the court of an unacceptable risk that the jury would give the evidence in question inappropriate probative value: cf approach in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK) s 101. 163. The practical importance of specific notice in order to assess fairly admissibility under ss 97 and 98 should not be underestimated: Bryant v R (2011) 205 A Crim R 531; [2011] NSWCCA 26 at [50]–[51] (Howie AJ, McClellan CJ at CL and Simpson J agreeing); Andelman v R (2013) 38 VR 659; [2013] VSCA 25 at [73]–[76] (Maxwell P, Weinberg and Priest JJ); El-Haddad v R (2015) 88 NSWLR 93; [2015] NSWCCA 10 at [56] (Leeming JA, McCallum and RA Hulme JJ agreeing). And see further at 3.67. 164. Although s 101 adopts the phrase ‘any prejudicial effect’, it must have the same meaning as ‘unfair prejudice’ in s 137: R v Watkins (2005) 153 A Crim R 434 at [45]–[51] (Barr J); R v GAC (2007) 178 A

Crim R 408 at [79]–[89] (Giles JA); R v MM [2014] NSWCCA 144 at [43]–[53] (and may be ameliorated with directions). 165. See, for example, R v Colby [1999] NSWCCA 261 at [132]; Conway v R (2000) 98 FCR 204 at [159]– [170]; R v Gee (2000) 113 A Crim R 376 at [21] (Hidden J); R v TAB [2002] NSWCCA 274; Qualtieri v R (2006) 171 A Crim R 463; [2006] NSWCCA 95 at [81]–[92] (McClellan CJ at CL). See further 3.73. 166. El-Haddad v R (2015) 88 NSWLR 93; [2015] NSWCCA 10 (Leeming JA, McCallum and Hulme JJ agreeing) at [66], ‘Where as here the legislative text is patently open-textured, the immediate context — namely, its replacement of common law rules restricting the use of a particular type of evidence — is especially apt to illuminate its legal meaning’. But see Saoud v R (2014) 87 NSWLR 481; [2014] NSWCCA 136 (Basten JA, Fullerton and RA Hume JJ agreeing) at [38], ‘whilst there may be assistance to be derived from the common law cases with respect to the underlying principles which inform the exclusion of tendency and coincidence evidence, those cases provide limited guidance as to the circumstances in which such evidence may now be admitted’. 167. R v Colby [1999] NSWCCA 261 at [106]. 168. Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51 at [61] (Sackville J: ‘[T]he question is whether the evidence of conduct is relevant to a fact in issue via propensity’). 169. (2002) 137 A Crim R 345; [2002] NSWCCA 519. 170. Quach reasoning applied by Beazley JA in dissent in R v Ngatikaura [2006] NSWCCA 161 at [24]–[25], but rejected by Simpson J at [68], Rothman J at [87]. For other cases of reasoning described wrongly as non-propensity reasoning, see, for example, Qualtieri v R (2006) 171 A Crim R 463; [2006] NSWCCA 95 at [114]–[116] (Howie J); and R v NKS [2004] NSWCCA 144 at [21]. 171. McHugh J in KRM v R (2001) 206 CLR 221 at [31]. 172. R v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 (Hunt CJ at CL at n 4: there is a clear distinction between ‘tendency’ evidence and ‘relationship’ evidence); Conway v R (2000) 98 FCR 204 at [95]–[102]; R v Quach [2002] NSWCCA 519 at [68], [72] (James J). 173. See, for example, Qualtieri v R (2006) 171 A Crim R 463; [2006] NSWCCA 95 at [72] (McClellan CJ at CL); WFS v R (2011) 33 VR 406; [2011] VSCA 347 at [38] (Robson AJA, Buchanan JA and Whelan AJA agreeing). 174. See the use made of the evidence in R v TAB [2002] NSWCCA 274; Leonard v R (2006) 67 NSWLR 545; 164 A Crim R 374; [2006] NSWCCA 267 at [49](1). Howie J in R v Fordham (1997) 98 A Crim R 359 at 369–70, inclined to the view that evidence of violence during a sexual relationship could be admitted outside s 97 on this contextual basis. For other cases emphasising ‘contextual’ uses outside s 97, see WFS v R (2011) 33 VR 406; [2011] VSCA 347 at [38], [84]–[90] (Robson AJA); Neubecker v R (2012) 34 VR 369; [2012] VSCA 58 at [31]; KJS v R [2014] NSWCCA 27 at [32]ff; R v MM [2014] NSWCCA 144 at [26]–[33] (Emmett JA, Price and Fullerton JJ); DPP v Martin [2016] VSCA 219 (where accused’s uncharged behaviour while under 14 and doli incapax held capable of providing a relevant context to determining the credibility of the victim’s account). 175. R v AH (1997) 42 NSWLR 702 at 708–9 (Ireland J); R v Greenham [1999] NSWCCA 8 at [23] (Hidden J); R v AB [2001] NSWCCA 496; R v TAB [2002] NSWCCA 274 (evidence not tendered to prove ‘guilty passion’); R v Andrews [2003] NSWCCA 7 at [13] (Hulme J: jealousy as motive based on tendency reasoning); R v Ngatikaura (2006) 161 A Crim R 329; [2006] NSWCCA 161 at [68] (Simpson J), [68] (Rothman J) (establishing drug knowledge relied upon tendency reasoning); Qualtieri v R (2006) 171 A Crim R 463; [2006] NSWCCA 95 at [80]–[87] (McClellan CJ at CL); WFS v R (2011) 33 VR 406; [2011] VSCA 347 at [38] (distinguishing context and guilty passion evidence). But cf R v Patsalis and Spathis (No 4) [1999] NSWSC 715 at [14], [23]–[25] (Kirby J); R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R

506; [2001] NSWCCA 494 at [138] (relationship providing motive not considered to invoke s 97). 176. (2006) 67 NSWLR 545; 164 A Crim R 374; [2006] NSWCCA 267 at [49]–[52]. See also ES v R [2010] NSWCCA 197 at [37]–[43] (Hodgson JA, Whealy and Buddin JJ agreeing) (sexual interest of adult in a child not mere motive); Colquhoun v R (No 1) [2013] NSWCCA 190 at [22] (Macfarlan JA doubting that general sexual interest in a child not previously acted upon should be more than mere motive). In Victoria, the accused’s interest in viewing pornographic photos of children does not mean that the accused has acted upon that interest to abuse a particular child and is generally excluded under s 101. But to falsely deny that interest may allow evidence of it to be admitted to discredit the accused (with an appropriate direction against using tendency reasoning): see McDonald v R (2014) 43 VR 152. 177. (2014) 300 FLR 323; [2014] NSWCCA 303. 178. Query whether evidence of context to support the credibility of one’s own witness contravenes the ‘bolster rule’: see Bellemore v Tasmania (2006) 170 A Crim R 1 at [45] (Crawford J); HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 at [292]ff (Heydon J) and n 98 above. The bolster rule is discussed further at 7.116. 179. (1970) 123 CLR 334. 180. (2006) 171 A Crim R 463; [2006] NSWCCA 95 at [114]–[116]. See also Steadman v R (No 1) [2013] NSWCCA 55 at [7]–[11]. 181. Cf R v El-Hayek [2004] NSWCCA 25 at [32]–[34]. 182. R v O’Meally [No 2] [1964] Qd R 226; Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 631–2 (McHugh J). Although to disclose prior possession of arms and disguises for carrying out a robbery would be tendency evidence in the absence of evidence that those things were used in the robbery in question: see Thompson and Wran v R (1968) 117 CLR 313; R v Mustafa (1976) 65 Cr App R 26; Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593 at [86]–[99] (McHugh J), [181]–[189] (Kirby J), [220] (Hayne J), [262]–[266] (Callinan J). 183. See Odgers, n 31 above, at [EA.97. 240], [EA.101.150]. 184. R v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 (hostile relationship established through tendency to provide ‘context’); R v Patsalis and Spathis (No 4) [1999] NSWSC 715 at [14]–[25] (Kirby J: relevant motive and relationship established through tendency); R v MM (2000) 112 A Crim R 519; R v AN (2000) 117 A Crim R 176; R v Toki (No 3) [2000] NSWSC 999; Conway v R (2000) 98 FCR 204 (hostile relationship established through tendency); R v Clark [2001] NSWCCA 494 at [134]–[148] (Heydon JA finding admissible evidence of a violent relationship without regard to s 97); R v Quach [2002] NSWCCA 519 (relevant relationship established through tendency). Contrast Murdoch v R [2013] VSCA 272 at [93] (Priest JA). 185. The requirement that the acts be related was emphasised by Miles J in W v R (2001) 189 ALR 633 at [60]. 186. For the six steps to be taken before coincidence evidence is admissible, see Simpson J (McClellan CJ at CL and Fullerton J agreeing) in R v Gale and Duckworth (2012) 217 A Crim R 487; [2012] NSWCCA 174 at [31]. On ‘significant probative value’, see 3.61. 187. [2003] NSWCCA 17. 188. Distinguished by Coldrey J in R v Matthey (2007) 17 VR 222; [2007] VSC 398 at [166] and holding at [191] that ‘[t]he rarity of the phenomenon of four unexpected and seemingly unexplained deaths in one family cannot, of itself, provide a cause of death’. See Cunliffe, Murder, Medicine and Motherhood, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011. Similar issues have created serious difficulties for courts in other jurisdictions, noticeably England and Canada: R v Cannings [2004] 2 Cr App R 7; R v Kai-Whitewind [2005] 2 Cr App R 31; R v Harris [2006] 1 Cr App R 5; Goudge, Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology in Ontario,

Government Printer, Ontario, Toronto, 2008; Ward, ‘Experts, Juries and Witch-hunts: From Fitzjames Stephen to Angela Cannings’ (2004) 31 J Law & Society 369. Tasmania v Farmer (2004) 48 A Crim R 99; [2004] TASSC 104 provides another good example of coincidence reasoning to prove a criminal scheme by the accused to commit sexual assaults upon girls associated with nightclubs of which he was part-owner or licensee. Examples of use of such reasoning under the uniform legislation include CW v R [2010] VSCA 288 at [22]–[24]; Page v R [2015] VSCA 537 at [59]–[61]; Alexander (a Pseudonym) v R [2016] VSCA 92 at [29]–[44]; and of reticence Harris (a Pseudonym) v R (2015) 44 VR 652; [2015] VSCA 112 at [21]–[25]. 189. (1984) 152 CLR 528. 190. Examples of this reasoning being so regarded include R v Colby [1999] NSWCCA 261 at [105], [107] (Mason P); W v R (2001) 115 FCR 41; 189 ALR 633 at [46], [52] (Miles J), [98] (Madgwick J); R v F [2002] NSWCCA 125 at [26]–[28]; R v WRC [2002] NSWCCA 210 at [30]–[34] (Hodgson JA); R v Joiner [2002] NSWCCA 354 (Hodgson JA). 191. See, for example, Tasmania v S [2004] TASSC 84 at [4], [5]. 192. [2007] TASCC 112 at [37]. 193. Cf Heydon J’s similar analysis of the common law position in HML: see n 98. The bolster rule is further discussed at 7.116. 194. The majority in IMM v R (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 at [59] proceeded on this assumption in leaving aside the implication of concoction under s 101. See further Odgers, n 31 above, at [EA.101.120]. The significance of concoction is referred to in 3.60 (and cases at n 201) and 3.62 n 221. 195. This possibility of both tendency and coincidence reasoning is recognised in, for example, R v F [2002] NSWCCA 125 at [26]–[28]. Note that the possibility of concoction might require consideration under both lines of reasoning: see Odgers, n 31 above, at [EA.101.240]. 196. Cf W v R (2001) 115 FCR 41; 189 ALR 633 at [98] (Madgwick J); and AE v R [2008] NSWCCA 52 at [38], where these various lines of reasoning were regarded as open but insufficiently probative to justify admitting the evidence under s 101. 197. Such cases are discussed in the context of DNA exonerations by Garrett and Neufeld, ‘Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions’ (2009) 95 Virginia LR 1. 198. (2003) 58 NSWLR 700; [2003] NSWCCA 319. 199. Use of ‘adduced’ in s 101(2) seems to have generated some confusion. Odgers, n 31 above, at [EA.101.60] argues persuasively, that ‘there is no doubt it means the same as tendered, by a party, which is a step prior to the determination of admissibility, not one which follows such a ruling’. Cf R v Nassif [2004] NSWCCA 433 at [46]–[47]; R v Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308 at [45]–[48]; R v Zhang [2005] NSWCCA 437; R v GAC [2007] NSWCCA 315 at [18] (Giles JA); Dao v R (2011) 81 NSWLR 568; [2011] NSWCCA 63 at [11] (Spigelman CJ), [103] (Allsop P), [171] (Simpson J). 200. (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14. 201. NSW: R v Burton (2013) 237 A Crim R 238; [2013] NSWCCA 335 at [177]–[180] (Simpson J) relying upon DSJ v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth); NS v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (2012) 215 A Crim R 349; [2012] NSWCCA 9, and, at [185]ff, criticising Hoeben CJ at CL and Blanch J for suggesting in R v XY [2012] NSWCCA 121 that this same approach was appropriate for s 137; RH v R [2014] NSWCCA 71 at [77]–[80], [144]–[159] (Ward JA); Hughes v R [2015] NSWCCA 330 at [94] (appeal heard [2017] HCA Trans 16); Tas: KMJ v Tasmania (2011) 20 Tas R 425; [2011] TASCCA 7 at [34] (Evans J), [42] (Blow J); Tasmania v L (2013) 232 A Crim R 123 at [54]–[61] (Pearce J, considering concoction under s 101); Vic: PNJ v DPP (2010) 27 VR 146; [2010] VSCA 88 at [24]–[28]; BSJ v R (2012) 35 VR 475; [2012] VSCA 93 at [17]–[22]; Murdoch v R (2013) 40 VR 436; [2013] VSCA 272 at

[4], [72], [95]–[99]; Reeves v DPP (2013) 41 VR 275; [2013] VSCA 311 at [61]–[63]; Velkoski v R (2014) 45 VR 680; [2014] VSCA 121 at [173](c) and (d); SLS v R [2014] VSCA 31 at [170]–[181] (this was consistent with their view that matters of reliability could be considered in determining ‘probative value’). 202. R v Burton (2013) 237 A Crim R 238; [2013] NSWCCA 335 at [158], [161]–[162] (Simpson J). 203. (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 at 360–4. See also Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51; [2000] FCA 1886 at [72]–[82] (Sackville J). 204. JG v R [2014] NSWCCA 138 at [111] (Simpson J). If the tendering party must immediately satisfy s 101 if the evidence is to be admissible, probative value appears also to be based only upon evidence adduced or to be adduced by the tendering party. On the other hand, s 101 provides that evidence adduced under ss 97 and 98 ‘cannot be used’ against a defendant unless the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect, a decision not expressly restricted by the evidence to be taken into account. 205. (1996) 89 A Crim R 457. See also DSJ v DPP (2012) 215 A Crim 349; [2012] NSWCCA 9 at [71]– [72] (Whealy JA). Cf Semaan v R (2013) 39 VR 503; [2013] VSCA 134 at [38] (Priest JA, Buchanan and Ashley JJA agreeing) ‘“significant” must bear a meaning closer to “substantial” than to “important” or “of consequence” …’ 206. Zaknic Pty Ltd v Svelte Corporation Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 171 at 175–6: ‘Before evidence can have significant probative value … more is required than mere … relevance’; Semaan v R (2013) 39 VR 503 (Priest JA, Buchanan and Ashley JJA agreeing) at [38] ‘… s 97 is designed to impose a high (or, at least, higher) threshold of admissibility than for evidence which has “mere” probative value’, at [40] ‘a nonexhaustive list of [connecting] factors … might include … the number of occasions that the conduct displaying the alleged tendency have occurred; the temporal (and, perhaps, geographical) connection of such conduct with the charged conduct; the degree of similarity between the evidence of tendency and the charged conduct on the various occasions alleged (for example, its distinctiveness, such as showing a particular pattern or modus operandi); and whether the circumstances of occurrence of the conduct and charged conduct are similar’. In, for example, Sokolowskyj v R (2014) 239 A Crim R 528; [2014] NSWCCA 55, similarities were held insufficient to conclude ‘significant probative value.’ See also CW v R [2010] VSCA 288 at [22]–[24]; Page v R [2015] VSCA 537 at [59]–[61]; Ramon Harris (a Pseudonym) v R [2015] VSCA 112 at [25] (Priest and Kaye JJA and Croucher AJA) (refusing cross-admissibility as underlying unity established but not of ‘significant probative value’); Alexander (a Pseudonym) v R [2016] VSCA 92 at [29]–[44]. 207. But what one judge thinks is conduct of sufficient similarity to create an incriminating tendency another might regard the conduct as having no similarities beyond the ordinary in offences of the kind under consideration: see, for example, Reeves (a Pseudonym) v R (2013) 41 VR 275; [2013] VSCA 311 (cf conclusions of Maxwell P and Coghlan JA about similarities between sexual assaults with those of Priest JA in dissent). 208. And may be established by the testimony of the complainant to the crime charged: as occurs often in the cases of sexual assaults: see, for example, HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334 and other common law authority); JLS v R (2010) 28 VR 328; [2010] VSCA 209 (applying HML). 209. And generally similarities establishing tendency must emanate from the control of the accused to be relevant: PNJ v DPP (2010) 27 VR 146; [2010] VSCA 88 at [19]–[23] (Maxwell P, Buchanan and Bongiorno JJA). 210. Cf El-Haddad v R (2015) 88 NSWLR 93; [2015] NSWCCA 10 at [72], emphasising that ‘the specificity of the tendency directly informs the strength of the inferential mode of reasoning’ and at [74] ‘I do not accept the appellant’s submission based on dissimilarities per se. Evidence which supports tendency or coincidence reasoning turns on whether there are relevant similarities or dissimilarities’. See also BJS v R

(2013) 231 A Crim R 537; [2013] NSWCCA 123 at [63]–[64] (Hoeben CJ at CL); CV v R [2014] VSCA 58 at [9]–[11] (Redlich, Osborne JJA and Sifris AJA); Cox v R [2015] VSCA 28 at [25]. For examples of the need for similarities to create probative value in particular cases, see Tasmania v W (No 2) (2012) 227 A Crim R 155; [2012] TASSC 48 (Blow J); Tasmania v Standage (2012) 238 A Crim R 294; [2012] TASSC 88 (Evans J). 211. See dicta in Velkoski v R (2014) 45 VR 680; [2014] VSCA 121 at [34], [82], [163] (Redlich, Weinberg and Coghlan JJA) and the response in Saoud v R (2014) 87 NSWLR 481; [2014] NSWCCA 136 at [34]–[37], [44]–[48] (Basten JA, Fullerton and RA Hume JJ agreeing). See also Victorian cases at n 50 above explaining the significance of similarities. These differences and what constitutes ‘significant probative value’ await decision following argument in Hughes v R [2017] HCA Trans 16. 212. Most notably Hulme J in, for example, R v Le [2000] NSWCCA 49 at [112]–[116] (Sully J at [18] agreeing the matter needs to be reconsidered); and R v Andrews [2003] NSWCCA 7 at [16]. In R v AB [2001] NSWCCA 496 at [18]–[19], the CCA appeared to admit evidence of ‘guilty passion’ as propensity evidence without even attempting to apply the Pfennig standard to it. 213. R v Lock (1997) 91 A Crim R 356 at 363 (Hunt CJ at CL); R v AH (1997) 42 NSWLR 702 at 709; R v Colby [1999] NSWCCA 261 (no reasonable possibility of concoction); R v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433 at [77] (Simpson J applying Hoch); R v Le [2000] NSWCCA 49; R v F (2002) 128 A Crim R 126 (CCA (NSW)); R v Folbigg [2003] NSWCCA 17 at [24]–[28] (Hodgson JA) (Folbigg discussed at 3.58 n 188). 214. (2001) 189 ALR 633 at [53]–[60] (Miles J), [101]–[103] (Madgwick J). 215. Madgwick J at [99] considered it appropriate to apply the Hoch approach to the case before him. 216. The Full Court of the Federal Court did not advert to this issue in Conway v R (2000) 98 FCR 204, but asserted (wrongly, it is argued) that evidence tendered to establish a relevant relationship was not tendency evidence. Compare with the (arguably correct) approach of Spender J of the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory in R v Hinton (2000) 155 FLR 139 at [31] in holding relationship evidence tendency evidence but admitting it under a flexible approach to s 101. 217. R v Patsalis and Spathis (No 4) [1999] NSWSC 715 at [22], [27], [38] (Kirby J); R v Toki (No 3) (2000) 116 A Crim R 536 at [69]–[72] (Howie J); R v Marsh [2000] NSWCCA 370 (but the admissibility of relationship evidence to provide context cannot be abused to permit either prejudicial general allegations (at [18]), nor previous prejudicial crimes (at [20], [25]) to be put before the jury); R v Serratore [2001] NSWCCA 123 (evidence of an interconnected series of events is not tendency evidence: at [42]); R v Atroushi [2001] NSWCCA 406 (prior relationship relevant to intent of accused in stalking victim); R v Chan [2002] NSWCCA 217 at [47]; R v Quach [2002] NSWCCA 519. 218. R v Lumsden [2003] NSWCCA 83. 219. R v Boskovitz [1999] NSWCCA 437 at [70]–[75]. 220. (2003) 58 NSWLR 700; [2003] NSWCCA 319; approach endorsed in, for example, BJS v R (2013) 231 A Crim R 537; [2013] NSWCCA 123 at [45] (Hoeben CJ at CL). 221. Cases decided after Ellis continue to take the Hoch approach to the exclusion of the possibility of concoction where probative value relies upon witnesses independently telling strikingly similar stories: Tasmania v S [2004] TASSC 84 at [11]; Tasmania v Farmer (2004) 48 A Crim R 99; [2004] TASSC 104 at [13]; AE v R [2008] NSWCCA 52 at [44]; Velkoski v R (2014) 45 VR 680; [2014] VSCA 121 at [173](c) and (d). It may also be that where evidence is relevant as disclosing a criminal tendency identifying the accused as the perpetrator, as in Straffen and Pfennig the highest probative value remains appropriate. See further discussion in Odgers, n 31 above, at [EA.101.180]. 222. Tasmania: for example, L v Tasmania (2006) 15 Tas R 381; [2006] TASSC 59; Victoria: for example, Velkoski v R (2014) 45 VR 680; [2014] VSCA 121 at [173](a); Uzan v R [2015] VSCA 292 at [26]–[27].

223. See, for example, R v Watkins (2005) 153 A Crim R 434; [2005] NSWCCA 315 at [49] (Barr J); R v GAC (2007) A Crim R 408; [2007] NSWCCA 315 at [83]–[84] (Giles JA). 224. This, inevitably open-ended, textual analysis is rigorously pursued by Odgers, n 31 above, at [EA.101.180]. The evaluative nature of this task is recognised by New South Wales courts applying the principles in House on appeal: Hughes v R [2015] NSWCCA 330 at [189] (Beazley P, Schmidt and Button JJ) and authorities at n 31 above. 225. Cf, for example, the differing approaches of the majority (Simpson JA and Beech-Jones J) and Adams J in BC v R [2015] NSWCCA 327. 226. Ferris v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 54 at [63] (Martin CJ: allowing evidence to establish motive). 227. Hall v Western Australia (2013) 232 A Crim R 107; [2013] WASCA 165 at [90]–[103] (Mazza JA, Martin CJ agreeing). 228. In Buiks v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 194 at [115], Murray AJA offhandedly says of evidence of prior drug offences: ‘This was undoubtedly propensity evidence as defined by s 31A(1)(a) in that it was, to some degree, similar fact evidence, or was otherwise evidence of the conduct of the appellant’; and at [122] referring to Di Lena v Western Australia (2006) 165 A Crim R 482; [2006] WASCA 162, says: ‘Roberts-Smith JA described the definition of “propensity evidence” in s 31A(1) as being “remarkably wide” which, with respect, is undoubtedly correct’. See also Preston v Western Australia (2012) 220 A Crim R 347; [2012] WASCA 64 at [36] ‘extraordinarily wide’ (Martin CJ, Buss and Mazza JJ). 229. See, for example, Western Australia v Osborne [2007] WASCA 183 at [12]–[13] (Wheeler JA); Dair v Western Australia (2008) 36 WAR 413; [2008] WASCA 72 at [61] (Steytler P), [267] (EM Heenan AJA: the phrase ‘significant probative value’ emphasises ‘that a merely tenuous, oblique or remote probative potential of the evidence would be insufficient to justify admission’); Western Australia v Atherton [2009] WASCA 148 at [70] (Pullin JA), [313] (Miller JA); APC v Western Australia (2012) 224 A Crim R 59; [2012] WASCA 159 at [88] (Mazza JA); Daniels v Western Australia (2012) 226 A Crim R 61; [2012] WASCA 213 (prior assaults of victim — but not of others — of significant probative value). In Buiks v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 194 at [56], Buss JA (Miller JA agreeing) held a prior conviction for passive involvement in cultivating cannabis inadmissible to later active cultivating and possessing for sale charges as it ‘did not rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of the facts in issue … to a significant extent, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced’. See also Murray AJA at [138](5) and [149]. Cf other cases concerning possession of drugs where prior offences admitted as of significant probative value: Mansell v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 140 at [41]–[43] (Miller JA); Preston v Western Australia (2012) 220 A Crim R 347; [2012] WASCA 64; Bennett v Western Australia (2012) 223 A Crim R 419; [2012] WASCA 70. See also DKA v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 44 at [30], [69] (Buss P, Mazza JA and Beech J), where in upholding an appeal, the court concluded that given the innate ‘open texture’ of the minimal requirement of ‘significant probative value’, prosecutors should take into account the risk of an adverse view on appeal before tendering propensity evidence. 230. Donaldson v Western Australia (2005) 31 WAR 122; [2005] WASC 196 at 153 (Roberts-Smith JA); AJE v Western Australia (2012) 225 A Crim R 242; [2012] WASCA 185 at [73] (Mazza JA and Beech J); Daniels v Western Australia (2012) 226 A Crim R 61; [2012] WASCA 213 at [49] (Buss JA); WS v Gardin (2015) 48 WAR 494; [2015] WASC 97 at [94]–[104] (Mitchell J); LFG v Western Australia (2015) 48 WAR 178; [2015] WASCA 88 at [209]–[292] (Buss JA); DKA v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 44 at [30](b) (Buss P, Mazza JA and Beech J). 231. (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 529; [1995] HCA 7. Emphasised by Murray AJA in Buiks v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 194 at [119]. 232. (2008) 36 WAR 413; [2008] WASCA 72. Distinguished in Western Australia v Lovett (2012) 225 A

Crim R 363; [2012] WASC 177 (prior arson admitted to support CCTV identification). 233. See also Donaldson v Western Australia (2005) 31 WAR 122; [2005] WASCA 196 at [127]–[130] (Roberts-Smith JA, with whom Wheeler and Miller JJA agreed on this point). In Western Australia v Atherton [2009] WASCA 148 at [315], Miller JA cites Steytler P in Dair with approval, as does Buss JA in PIM v Western Australia (2009) 40 WAR 489; [2009] WASCA 131 at [293] and the court in Daniels v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 213 at [50], [85]–[89]. 234. See Miller JA’s comment at [188]: ‘The fair-minded person would, in some cases, see that it would be contrary to common sense and the interests of justice to exclude that evidence’. And EM Heenan AJA at [277]: ‘It is in the public interest that evidence which may make the difference between an offender escaping conviction because of weaknesses in other evidence in the case should be received and considered by the jury’. 235. Cf the emotive argument of counsel in Buiks v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 194 at [28]. 236. This is the approach of Murray AJA in Buiks v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 194 at [119], [138] (points 7–9 of his summary) in rejecting evidence of prior cannabis conviction to establish cultivation and possession of cannabis for sale. For other decisions admitting evidence under s 31A(2), see Wood v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 179 (charges of sexual assault against masseur who defended that association innocent jointly tried as similar testimony of patient-complainants cross-admissible); Donaldson v Western Australia (2005) 31 WAR 122; [2005] WASCA 196 (charges of sexual assault denied by swimming coach jointly tried as testimony of swimming-student-complainants crossadmissible); Di Lena v Western Australia (2006) 165 A Crim R 482; [2006] WASCA 162 (evidence establishing ongoing drug business admissible in drug conspiracy case); AJ v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 228 (evidence of a series of charged sexual offences cross-admissible to establish sexual interest and provide context); Horsman v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 190 (evidence of a series of indecent exposures admissible to infer one person responsible and to identify the accused either through acceptance of one identification or by the coincidence between witnesses separately identifying the accused as the culprit); Preston v Western Australia (2012) 220 A Crim R 347; [2012] WASCA 64 (prior drug possession conviction admissible); Bennett v Western Australia (2012) 223 A Crim R 419; [2012] WASCA 70 (prior drug convictions admissible); APC v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 159 (Mazza JA, Martin CJ agreeing: sexual assaults on siblings when all children inadmissible to support later assaults by accused on his own children. Pullin JA dissenting). For perceptive factual analyses explaining in probative terms the Western Australian decisions since the passing of s 31A, see Yoo, ‘Re-Thinking Evidence Act 1906 (WA), Section 31A: Evolution, Experience and Back to Basics’ (2015) 40 UWA LR 481. 237. (2005) 31 WAR 122; [2005] WASCA 196 at [108]–[112]. 238. Noto v Western Australia (2006) 168 A Crim R 457; [2006] WASCA 278; Beverland v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 2; Western Australia v Atherton [2009] WASCA 148 at [80]–[83] (Pullin JA); PIM v Western Australia (2009) 40 WAR 489; [2009] WASCA 131 at [127]–[148], [160] (Pullin JA), [302]– [304], [340] (Buss JA) (no general need for a propensity direction when uncharged acts admissible evidence under s 31A but directions may be required to prevent a risk of a miscarriage of justice). 239. AJE v Western Australia (2012) 225 A Crim R 242; [2012] WASCA 185 at [59]–[67] (Mazza JA and Beech J), [5]–[8] (Pullin JA applying Shepherd). See further at 2.87 n 413. 240. The history of this legislation, some of its basic assumptions and its likely effectiveness are discussed in Plater, Line and Davies, ‘The Schleswig-Holstein Question of the Criminal Law Finally Resolved? An Examination of South Australia’s New Approach to the Use of Bad Character Evidence in Criminal Proceedings’ (2013) 15 Flinders LJ 55. 241. R v MJJ; R v CJN (2013) 117 SASR 81 at [13] (Kourakis CJ), [238] (Vanstone J); R v Fleming; R v Maher [2017] SASC 16 at [63] (Doyle J).

242. In R v B, AM [2015] SASCFC 174 at [67], Sulan and Peek JJ express the view that conduct in the context of s 34P means behaviour, which in turn requires a physical act; concluding that an accused’s mere expressions of thoughts or concerns are not within s 34P although they may be admissible statements against interest providing evidence of future intentions which in turn may lead to the inference that those intentions were carried out. Cf s 97 of the uniform legislation: ‘evidence of … a tendency … to have a particular state of mind …’. See also Colquhoun v R (No 1) [2013] NSWCCA 190 at [22] (Macfarlan JA critical of clear authority that mere expression of sexual interest within s 97) and R v Landmeter (2015) 121 SASR 522; [2015] SASCFC 3 (acts of hugging without kissing not discreditable conduct for purposes of s 34P). In Castle v R; Bucca v R (2016) 227 CLR 57; [2016] HCA 46 at [77]–[78], the court held that the unlawful possession of firearms was in itself prejudicial evidence of ‘discreditable conduct’ although it gave rise to no inference of unlawful use; however, as evidence also established that one of the weapons ‘might’ have been the murder weapon, the evidence was thus relevant and this use ‘substantially outweighed’ its more general prejudicial effect. 243. This formulation appears to ‘bear some resemblance to the well-known statement of principle by Lord Herschell in Makin …’; per Vanstone J in R v MJJ; R v CJN (2013) 117 SASR 81 at [241]. It has been held that in the absence of objection a trial judge is not obliged to consider whether evidence satisfies the admissibility conditions of s 34P: R v C, G (2013) 117 SASR 162; [2013] SASCFC 83 at [50]–[53] (Gray, Sulan and Blue JJ) although their Honours add that ‘[i]ssues may, however, arise as to the proper use of evidence’. 244. (1999) 76 SASR 56; [1999] SASC 560. The relationship between Doye CJ’s approach to nonpropensity uses and that taken in the legislation is discussed in R v Maiolo (No 2) (2013) 117 SASR 1; [2013] SASCFC 36, particularly at [50]–[57] (Peek J). 245. R v Cashion (2013) 115 SASR 451; [2013] SASCFC 14 at [28] (Kourakis CJ, Sulan and David JJ agreeing) pointing out that ‘not admissible’ wider than ‘not admitted’. 246. While Kourakis CJ describes the legislation as intended to restrict only ‘bare’/‘mere’/general propensity uses in R v C, CA [2013] SASCFC 137 at [76] and R v MJJ; R v CJN (2013) 117 SASR 81 at [18], Vanstone J in the latter case at [242]–[243] emphasises that the intention of s 34P(2)(a) is to deal with non-propensity uses (rather than other than bare propensity uses) and s 34P(2)(b) with exceptionally permissible propensity uses. 247. R v MJJ; R v CJN (2013) 117 SASR 81 at [243] (Vanstone J: ‘I would assess the qualitative reqirement there provided as being comparable to the common law as it stood prior to Hoch v The Queen …’). 248. That the requirements of s 34P(2)(a) and (b) are cumulative in the case of other discreditable conduct evidence tendered as beyond ‘general’ propensity is emphasised in R v C, CN (2013) 117 SASR 64; [2013] SASCFC 44 at [16] (White J). 249. This is not an exercise of discretion but application of a strict condition of admissibility: R v Maiolo (No 2) (2013) 117 SASR 1; [2013] SASCFC 36 at [51]; R v MJJ; R v CJN (2013) 117 SASR 81 at [233] (Vanstone J). This approach applied by the High Court in Castle v R; Bucca v R [2016] HCA 46 at [77]– [78]: see n 242 above. 250. Nieterink v R (1999) 76 SASR 56; [1999] SASC 560 at [79]. The change is emphasised by Peek J in R v Maiolo (No 2) (2013) 117 SASR 1; [2013] SASCFC 36 at [51]. 251. R v MJJ; R v CJN (2013) 117 SASR 81 at [237], [247], [250] (Vanstone J); R v C, CN (2013) 117 SASR 64; [2013] SASCFC 44 at [42]–[45] (White J). 252. This view is expressed — ‘speaking broadly’ — by Kourakis CJ in R v C, CA [2013] SASCFC 137 at [77], [83]. 253. R v C, CA [2013] SASCFC 137 at [83]–[84], [89] (Kourakis CJ), [130]–[140] (Nicholson J); see also remarks of Kourakis CJ in R v MJJ; R v CJN (2013) 117 SASR 81 at [16].

254. See, for example, R v Bonython-Wright (2013) 117 SASR 410; [2013] SASCFC 87 at [49]–[51] (Kourakis CJ); R v C, CA [2013] SASCFC 137 at [97]–[103] (Kourakis CJ); R v C, CA [2015] SASCFC 143 at [20]–[32] (Kelly J). 255. This does not require the judge to specify relevant dissimilarities: see R v C, CA [2015] SASCFC 143 at [33]–[37] (Kelly J). But the permissible and impermissible uses must be clearly explained: see, for example, R v Pringle [2017] SASCFC 9. 256. Compare with Vanstone J’s comment in R v MJJ; R v CJN (2013) 117 SASR 81 at [246] that s 34R ‘embodies the rule in Shepherd …’. 257. See, for example, Soteriou v R (2013) 118 SASR 119, where Harriman was relied upon to admit evidence of the accused’s involvement in the drug trade, and remarks in R v MJJ; R v CJN (2013) 117 SASR 81 at [13] (Kourakis CJ), [242]–[243] (Vanstone J). 258. For recent examples of applications of s 34P, see R v Zappavigna [2015] SASCFC 8 (breach of bail condition admissible to show strong sexual interest in complainant); R v Perara-Cathcart [2017] HCA 9 (accused’s prior drug possession admissible to rebut defence denying drug involvement and directions sufficient: Nettle J dissenting on adequacy of directions); R v F, AD [2015] SASCFC 130 (testimony cross-admissible to corroborate as coincidence evidence); R v Western (2015) 124 SASR 38; [2015] SASCFC 148 (testimony of step-sister admissible to establish embedded behavioural proclivity); R v Hennig [2015] SASCFC 150 (evidence of violent conduct towards complainants admissible). 259. (2011) 242 CLR 610; [2011] HCA 12. 260. See, for example, R v Cowan (2013) 237 A Crim R 388; [2013] QSC 337 (Atkinson J: Pfennig test not satisfied); R v Manning (2014) 239 A Crim R 348; [2014] QCA 49 (evidence of sexual interest did not satisfy the Pfennig test). 261. Emphasised in, for example, R v Familic (1994) 75 A Crim R 229 at 231 (Smart J), 238–9 (BadgeryParker J). 262. R v Sims [1946] KB 531 at 539. 263. Legislation permits formal admissions to be made in criminal cases: Uniform Evidence Acts ss 184, 191 (agreed facts); Criminal Code (Qld) s 644; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 32 (discussed in Stubley v R (2011) 242 CLR 374; [2011] HCA 7, by the majority at [63] holding that while there is no formality prescribed ‘counsel’s statement … in … opening … not an admission for the purposes of the section’ and more authoritatively and rigorously by Heydon J at [88]ff in concluding that there was no formal admission and that, given the conduct of the trial, the occurrence of the sexual encounters remained a live issue); Criminal Code (NT) s 379. 264. Procedural rules in all jurisdictions now to some degree demand or encourage accused to specify in advance issues and facts being contested: see further at 5.14. 265. Where an accused has failed to object to evidence at trial a court will generally only permit the matter to be disputed on appeal if this is necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice: see 2.49. 266. See further examples in LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [21115]. 267. (2011) 242 CLR 374; [2011] HCA 11. 268. Heydon J dissented on the basis that in the absence of a formal admission all material facts were in issue and the disputed evidence supported the victim’s testimony that the sexual assaults alleged took place. Stubley was distinguished in Saoud v R (2014) 87 NSWLR 481; [2014] NSWCCA 136 at [21]–[26] (Basten JA, Fullerton and RA Hume JJ agreeing). 269. This is recognised in the context of the directions required of a jury, which as far as possible should focus on the ‘real issues’: see, for example, Tully v R [2006] HCA 56 at [44]–[45] (Kirby J), [75]–[78]

(Hayne J); HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16 at [121]ff (Hayne J). And cf Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), generally described at 2.13. 270. R v Bond [1906] 2 KB 389 at 417; R v Rogan (1916) 35 NZLR 265 at 304; Noor Mohamed v R [1949] AC 182 at 191–2; Harris v DPP [1952] AC 694 at 706–7 (Viscount Simon); R v Longford (1970) 17 FLR 37 at 38 (Gibbs J); R v O’Sullivan (1975) 13 SASR 68 at 74 (Bray CJ). 271. [1918] AC 221 at 232. 272. [1946] KB 531 at 539. 273. Although it will not always be necessary to wait until the issue is expressly raised: see Noor Mohamed v R [1949] AC 182 at 191–2 (Lord Du Parcq); Harris v DPP [1952] AC 694 at 706–7 (Viscount Simon); R v Hall [1952] 1 KB 302 at 307 (Lord Goddard CJ, amending his extreme view in Sims); Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 601–2 (Dawson J), 608 (Toohey J); R v Nieterink (1999) 76 SASR 56 at [68] (Doyle CJ). Compare with Gaudron J in Gipp v R (1998) 194 CLR 106 at 112–13, with whom Gleeson CJ and Kiefel J disagreed in HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334 at [9], [501], but with whom Hayne J ostensibly agreed at [177]–[179]. 274. Markby v R (1978) 140 CLR 108 at 116–17 (Gibbs ACJ). 275. See discussion in LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [21130]. 276. R v Elsom (1975) 12 SASR 416; Hutt, Bell & Jeffrey v R (1988) 37 A Crim R 432 (SC (Tas)). 277. See Evans v F [1964] SASR 130 at 147; and Cooper v R (1961) 105 CLR 177 at 184–5, where the High Court emphasises that this does not sanction unnecessary disclosure of such information to the trial judge. Both cases nevertheless imply that the procedure for determining admissibility is the same before a single judge as the procedure where a jury also sits. On the vulnerability of judges, see Landsman and Rakos, ‘A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation’ (1994) 12 Behav Sci & Law 113 and Wistrich, Guthrie and Rachlinski, ‘Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding’ (2005) 153 U Penn LR 1251. 278. See DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421 at 442 (Lord Wilberforce), 459 (Lord Cross); Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 303 (Brennan and Dawson JJ). See also R v Bond [1906] 2 KB 389 at 417; R v Yuill [1948] VR at 46; R v Horry [1949] NZLR 791 at 798–9. Similar procedures were permitted in the case of confessional evidence (see, for example, R v Bradshaw (1978) 18 SASR 83 at 101), although, to discourage time-wasting preliminary objections, some judges preferred to wait until that point in the case where the evidence assumes importance before determining admissibility: see, for example, Sangster J in R v Harris (1979) 21 SASR 561. 279. See 2.40 n 238. 280. See further at 5.12–5.16. 281. Sections 97(1)(a), 98(1)(a), 99, 100, and Evidence Regulations 1995 (Cth) cl 6; 2005 (NSW) cll 5, 6; 2002 (Tas) cl 5; 2009 (Vic) cl 7. 282. R v Zhang (2005) 227 ALR 311; [2005] NSWCCA 437 at [131]; Gardiner v R (2006) 162 A Crim R 233; [2006] NSWCCA 190 at [128]; Andelman v R (2013) 38 VR 659; [2013] VSCA 25 at [73]–[76] (Maxwell P, Weinberg and Priest JJ); El-Haddad v R (2015) 88 NSWLR 93; [2015] NSWCCA 10 at [53]–[56] (Leeming JA). See further Odgers, n 31 above, at [EA.97.180], [EA.98.150]. 283. R v Harker [2004] NSWCCA 427 (Howie J). The failure to give notice, even in the absence of objection, was criticised in Bryant v R [2011] NSWCCA 26 at [50]–[51]; approved in Andelman v R (2013) 227 A Crim R 81; [2013] VSCA at [73]–[77]. 284. In Perry v R (1982) 150 CLR 580, the High Court emphatically rejected R v Chee [1980] VR 303 which had suggested that exclusion of information disclosing disposition or propensity was in every case

discretionary only. Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 endorses this approach, disagreeing with Wells J, in the court below, who had tried to resurrect the Chee approach. 285. There is little express discussion of these propositions in the leading propensity authorities but general principles support them. And see further the discussion of HML v R at 3.38. Some authority suggests that the trial judge should always consider exercising the exclusionary discretion in relation to evidence prima facie admissible (cf Lord Du Parcq in Noor Mohamed v R [1949] AC 182 at 192 and Viscount Simon in Harris v DPP [1952] AC 694 at 707), but generally in relation to the exercise of exclusionary discretions, the evidential and persuasive burdens lie upon the accused: see 2.27 nn 129–130. 286. Cleland v R (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 19 (Deane J) and the authorities there cited. See also 2.91. 287. Donaldson v Western Australia (2005) 31 WAR 122; [2005] WASCA 196 at [17] (Roberts-Smith JA). 288. (1981) 28 SASR 417 at 434. 289. See DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421 at 438 (Lord Morris); R v Elsom (1975) 12 SASR 416. 290. (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 303–4 (followed in J v R [1989] Tas R 116). 291. (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 at [59]. 292. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 132A (applying to ‘similar fact evidence’); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34S (applying to evidence of discreditable conduct otherwise admissible); Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 31A(3). This approach was taken at common law by the House of Lords in R v H [1995] 2 AC 597 at 612 (Lord Mackay), 622 (Lord Mustill). See, for example R v C, CA [2015] SASCFC 143. 293. DSJ v DPP (Cth) (2012) 215 A Crim R 349; [2012] NSWCCA 9 at [9] (Bathurst CJ); CV v DPP [2014] VSCA 58 at [22]. 294. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 29(1); Criminal Code (Qld) ss 567, 568; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 278(1); Criminal Code (Tas) s 311(2); Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) Sch 1, r 5; Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) Sch 1, cl 7; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 264; Criminal Code (NT) s 309. 295. The power to order separate trials on separate counts is provided for in the following legislation: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ss 21(2), 29(3); Criminal Code (Qld) ss 597A, 597B; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 278(2); Criminal Code (Tas) ss 326, 363; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 193; Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) s 133 (for summary of relevant legislation and the appropriate procedure, see Donaldson v Western Australia (2005) 31 WAR 122; [2005] WASCA 196 at [91]–[99] (Roberts-Smith JA); AJ v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 228 at [3] (Pullin JA), [27]ff (Buss JA); Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 434B; Criminal Code (NT) ss 341, 350. 296. Wood v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 179 at [12]–[13] (Steytler P), [42] (Pullin JA); AJ v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 228 at [3](e) (Pullin JA), [24] (Buss JA). 297. Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528; De Jesus v R (1986) 68 ALR 1. In R v Gibson (1989) 42 A Crim R 265, the CCA (NSW) declined to interfere where separation had been refused in a drug case, emphasising that appropriate direction could overcome the risk of prejudice. See also Lancaster v R [1989] WAR 83; R v Mayfield (1995) 63 SASR 576; R v Correia (1996) 15 WAR 95 at 99; Western Australia v Bowen (2006) 32 WAR 81; Zammit v Western Australia (2007) 34 WAR 302; Smith v R (2007) 35 WAR 201. 298. Sutton v R (1984) 152 CLR 528 at 531 (Gibbs CJ), 541–2 (Brennan J); De Jesus v R (1987) 68 ALR 1 at 4–5 (Gibbs CJ), 9 (Mason and Deane JJ), 12 (Brennan J), 16 (Dawson J); Hoch v R (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 294 (Mason CJ, Wilson and Gaudron JJ), 298 (Brennan and Dawson JJ). Gibbs CJ maintained that in cases where sexual offences are joined this rule is automatic and separation is obligatory. Brennan J explains that generally in such cases a warning to the jury is insufficient protection against the risk of prejudice and separation should be granted in all but exceptional circumstances. Dawson J agrees with

Brennan J. As examples of successful appeals on failure to separate in sexual assault cases, see R v Collins (1989) 43 A Crim R 170 (CCA (SA)); R v Zaidi (1991) 57 A Crim R 189 (CCA (NSW)); R v Movis (1994) 75 A Crim R 416 (CCA (Vic)); R v S [2001] QCA 50; cf R v Cook (2000) 110 A Crim R 117 (CCA (WA)). Recent examples of unsuccessful attempts to sever or appeal where severance has been refused include BJS v R (2013) 231 A Crim R 537; [2013] NSWCCA 123 at [38]–[39] (Hoeben CJ at CL); Tasmania v L (2013) 232 A Crim R 123; [2013] TASSC 47; DJS v R [2014] NSWCCA 77; BC v R [2015] NSWCCA 327. 299. Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 278(2a). 300. Criminal Code (Qld) s 597A(1AA); Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) s 133(6). The possibility of collusion is ignored for the purposes of determining admissibility of evidence of other misconduct in Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 132A, Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34S and Evidence Act 1908 (WA) s 31A(3). 301. R v TJB [1998] 4 VR 621; R v KRA [1999] 2 VR 708; R v GAE [2000] 1 VR 198; R v Papamitrou (2004) 7 VR 375; [2004] VSCA 12 at [26], [27] (Winneke P: cross-admissibility still ‘a powerful factor influencing the discretion’). 302. On wrongful revelation of character evidence generally, see Munday, ‘Irregular Disclosure of Evidence of Bad Character’ [1990] Crim LR 92. 303. R v Koppen (1975) 11 SASR 182; R v Miller (1980) 25 SASR 170; R v Yeates [1992] 1 NZLR 421; R v MM (2000) 112 A Crim R 519 at [53]. In R v Norfolk (2002) 129 A Crim R 288 (CCA (WA)), the court held the prosecutor should not have been permitted to ask the accused whether he ‘still did drugs’, that counsel should have sought discharge of the jury, and that the judge should not have regarded the accused’s denial as evidence of good character that permitted cross-examination of the accused on his drug convictions. 304. Crofts v R (1996) 139 ALR 455 at 464 (revelation of inadmissible evidence of accused’s previous sexual misconduct in re-examination of the complainant gave rise to a successful appeal unless proviso could apply); Gabriel v R (1997) 76 FCR 279 at 281, 284–7; Narrier v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 191 (accused in rape case appealed successfully where his sister testified (at [17]): ‘I don’t want my brother to go down for something he didn’t did (sic). My brother done 10 years. He done it like a man. He don’t need a girl like her to put him behind bars again’); R v Heading (2011) 111 SASR 32; [2011] SASCFC 107 (revelation that accused a person of interest in Royal Commission inquiry into institutional sexual assault inadmissible and if revealed required strong direction to avoid miscarriage of justice). 305. The importance of this direction is suggested by Nair, n 41 above, particularly at 284–5. The effectiveness of directions is assumed by trial judges: see, for example, Brooks v R (2012) 36 VR 84 at [45]–[46]; KJS v R [2014] NSWCCA 27 at [41]; cf empirical scepticism of their effectiveness at 2.13 nn 51–52. 306. See, for example, R v Grech [1997] 2 VR 609 at 613 (Callaway JA); R v J (No 2) [1998] 3 VR 602 at 642 (‘[a] price has to be paid every time it is held that yet another direction is mandatory’: Callaway JA distinguishing between a required ‘direction’ and a desirable ‘warning’); R v S (1998) 103 A Crim R 101 at 111 (‘I am reluctant to interpret BRS and Gipp as requiring warnings by rote …’: Thomas JA). That the ground is a miscarriage of justice rather than an error of law is made clear by the High Court in BRS v R (1997) 191 CLR 275. But a failure to direct the jury to eschew inadmissible propensity reasoning may be a serious omission (see McHugh J). 307. In which case, where that propensity is an indispensable link in a chain of proof, it may also be necessary to direct the jury to be satisfied of it beyond reasonable doubt before acting upon it: see 2.87. It will also generally be necessary to direct the jury precisely how it may use that propensity to infer the guilt of the accused: see, for example, R v Thompson (1992) 57 SASR 397 at 411 (Olsson J), 416–17 (Debelle J); B v R (1992) 175 CLR 599 at 620 (Dawson and Gaudron JJ).

308. DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421 at 453 (Lord Hailsham); BRS v R (1997) 191 CLR 275 (failure to direct jury to eschew propensity reasoning fatal even though on the whole the trial judge’s direction appeared the most favourable to the accused), particularly at 304 (McHugh J). See also, for example, R v Dolan (1992) 58 SASR 501 at 503; R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 at 516 (Hunt CJ at CL: must neither substitute evidence of other acts for specific acts charged nor reason via propensity); R v Vonarx (1995), reported in [1999] 3 VR 618; R v Smith and Turner (No 2) (1995) 64 SASR 1 at 16; R v Appleby (1996) 88 A Crim R 456 at 480 (Smith AJA); R v G (1996) 88 A Crim R 489 at 492–4 (Callaway JA); R v Grech [1997] 2 VR 609 at 614 (following Beserick); R v Thornley [1998] 3 VR 888; R v TJB [1998] 4 VR 621 at 633; R v FJB [1999] 2 VR 425; Kailis v R (1999) 21 WAR 100 at [212] (Ipp J); R v Nieterink (1999) 76 SASR 56 at [86]; R v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433; R v DCC (2004) 11 VR 129; [2004] VSCA 230 at [14] (Callaway JA), [60] (Eames JA) (preferable to direct jury not to reason that the accused is ‘the kind of person likely to have committed offences charged’); R v Glennon (No 3) (2005) 12 VR 421; [2005] VSCA 262; R v Tofilau (No 2) (2006) 13 VR 28; [2006] VSCA 40 at [2]–[8], [190] (scenario evidence used to obtain confession required propensity direction); R v DD [2007] VSCA 317 at [75]–[87] (Neave JA); R v Sadler (2008) 20 VR 69; [2008] VSCA 198 at [64](4), [66]; R v GVV (2008) 20 VR 395 at [22]–[38]; Christian v R (2012) 223 A Crim R 370; [2012] NSWCCA 34 at [84]– [85] (McClellan CJ at CL) (clear directions on precise use of pretext conversations required to avoid possible tendency reasoning); Glass v Tasmania (2013) 22 Tas R 466 at [41]–[44] (Escourt J, Tennent J agreeing) (direction required not to use discreditable conduct as evidence of guilt); R v CBM [2015] 1 Qd R 165; [2014] QCA 212 at [50]–[52] (direction required where evidence not cross-admissible in joint sexual assault trial). Compare with comment of Thomas JA in R v S (1998) 103 A Crim R 101 at 111 that ‘there will be many cases where the suggested warning against the evils of propensity evidence would be at best confusing, and at worst counterproductive’; R v Pretorius [2010] 1 Qd R 67; [2009] QCA 58 at [63] (propensity direction ‘inappropriate’ and ‘may have served to convert a common place exercise … into something more abstract’). 309. See, for example, R v J (No 2) [1998] 3 VR 602 at 642–3 (victim’s allegations of series of crimes stood or fell together and propensity reasoning not invoked or likely); R v Mateiasevici [1999] 3 VR 185 at [29]–[36]; Kailis v R (1999) 21 WAR 100 at [102] (Malcolm CJ: direction sufficient without express propensity warning); R v Cook (2000) 110 A Crim R 117 at [90]–[93] (express propensity warning not required in every case); R v PFD (2001) 124 A Crim R 418 at [24] (propensity reasoning unlikely to be invoked); R v Georgiev (2001) 119 A Crim R 363 at [18]–[21] (no risk of propensity reasoning); R v Sciberras [2003] SASC 104 at [18] (Bleby J: ‘propensity warning … cannot be taken to be a universal rule’). 310. R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510; R v Cook (2000) 110 A Crim R 117 at [70] (Anderson J); Qualtieri v R (2006) 171 A Crim R 463; [2006] NSWCCA 95 at [80] (McClellan CJ at CL). The effectiveness of these directions is of course another matter: see 2.13 nn 51–52. 311. R v Tedesco [2003] SASC 79 at [29] (Doyle CJ). 312. But where the evidence of relationship does not reveal uncharged acts or other discreditable conduct then no propensity warning will be required: see R v Taylor (2004) 8 VR 213; [2004] VSCA 98 at [22] (Winneke P); R v VN (2006) 15 VR 113; [2006] VSCA 111 at [26] (Redlich JA). 313. (2008) 235 CLR 334; [2008] HCA 16. 314. R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 at 516–17; R v Pearce [1999] 3 VR 287 at [26]–[27]; R v PLK [1999] 3 VR 567; Kailis v R (1999) 21 WAR 100 at [212] (Ipp J); R v Nieterink (1999) 76 SASR 56 at [83]–[88]; R v Loguancio [2000] 1 VR 235; R v MM (2000) 112 A Crim R 519 at [42]ff; R v Marsh [2000] NSWCCA 370 at [22]; R v TAB [2002] NSWCCA 274 at [25] (phrase ‘guilty passion’ improperly used in directing jury); R v McKenzie-McHarg (2008) 189 A Crim R 291; [2008] VSCA 206 at [10]–[11] (Pagone AJA: preferable not to use term ‘uncharged acts’ in directing jury). The need for

specific directions where ‘relationship evidence’ is admitted is recognised in KRM v R (2001) 206 CLR 221 at [31] (McHugh J), [134] (Hayne J). See also Qualtieri v R (2006) 171 A Crim R 463; [2006] NSWCCA 95 at [81], where McClellan CJ at CL endorsed the model relationship directions in the NSW Supreme Court Bench Book. 315. For a fuller discussion of the possible relevant and admissible purposes in such cases (and hence the directions required) at common law, see the discussion at 3.36. 316. See, for example, R v Long and McDonnell (2002) 137 A Crim R 263; [2002] SASC 426 at [57] (Doyle CJ). 317. See, for example, R v AH (1997) 42 NSWLR 702 at 708–9; R v ATM [2000] NSWCCA 475 at [75]– [77] (Howie J); R v El-Azzi [2004] NSWCCA 455 at [110]; Trylow v Commissioner of Taxation [2004] FCA 446 at [113]–[124]; Qualtieri v R (2006) 171 A Crim R 463; [2006] NSWCCA 95; R v Ngatikaura [2006] NSWCCA 161 at [66] (Simpson J); Leonard v R (2006) 67 NSWLR 545; 164 A Crim R 374; [2006] NSWCCA 267; R v Cittadini [2008] NSWCCA 256 at [38] (McCallum J); R v MM [2014] NSWCCA 144; Elomar v R [2014] NSWCCA 303. In practice, concerns may be relaxed somewhat where there is no jury and other persuasive evidence: Redpath v Hadid [2004] NSWCA 295. The common law authorities on directions referred to in nn 308–309 remain essentially applicable to cases decided under the uniform legislation. 318. R v MM (2000) 112 A Crim R 519 at [48]–[50]; R v Li [2003] NSWCCA 407 at [14], [60]; WFS v R (2011) 33 VR 406; [2011] VSCA 347 at [93]–[106], [107]–[155]; RJP v R (2011) 215 A Crim R 315; [2011] VSCA 443 (requiring clear directions about coincidence reasoning); Velkoski v R (2014) 45 VR 680; [2014] VSCA 214 at [222]–[237]. 319. (1990) 170 CLR 573. See discussion at 2.87 and particularly authorities referred to therein at nn 418–419. 320. Roach v R (2011) 242 CLR 610; [2011] HCA 12 at [47] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ). 321. Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34R(1). See lengthy discussion in R v Maiolo (No 2) (2013) 117 SASR 1; [2013] SASCFC 36 at [68]–[123] (Peek J); R v C, CA [2013] SASCFC 137 at [91]ff (Kourakis CJ). 322. Noto v Western Australia (2006) 168 A Crim R 457; [2006] WASCA 278; Beverland v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 2; Western Australia v Atherton [2009] WASCA 148 at [80]–[83] (Pullin JA); PIM v Western Australia (2009) 40 WAR 489; [2009] WASCA 131 at [127]–[148], [160] (Pullin JA), [302]– [304], [340] (Buss JA); AJE v Western Australia [2012] WASCA 185 at [54] (Mazza JA and Beech J); Panda v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 5 (no ‘balancing direction’ required if propensity not found). 323. Weinberg, ‘Simplification of Jury Directions, A Report to the Jury Directions Advisory Group’, August 2012, at [4.4]. 324. [1980] VR 353. See also R v Gibb and McKenzie [1983] 2 VR 155; R v McBride (1983) 34 SASR 433; R v Priestley and Mason (1985) 19 A Crim R 388 (CCA (Qld)). 325. [1974] AC 85 at 102. 326. [2004] 1 Cr App R 26. 327. Cf entitlement of an accused implicated by the testimony of a co-accused to cross-examine and discredit that co-accused by revealing previous bad character and convictions, notwithstanding the possible prejudice: see 3.117–3.124. 328. Authority in addition to the cases cited at nn 325 and 326 includes R v Mathers (1988) 38 A Crim R 423 (CCA (Vic)); R v Carranceja and Asikin (1989) 42 A Crim R 402 at 407–8 (CCA (Vic)); Lobban v R [1995] 2 Cr App R 573 at 584–5 (Lord Steyn); R v Roughan and Jones (2007) 179 A Crim R 389; [2007] QCA 443. Also see generally Elliott, ‘Cut Throat Tactics: The Freedom of an Accused to Prejudice a Co-Accused’ [1991] Crim LR 5 and the English cases referred to in that article. There is no

definitive High Court authority. In Jones v R (2009) 254 ALR 626; [2009] HCA 17 at [22], the majority said that, ‘[a]s the admissible evidence of Roughan’s propensity which the appellant claims to have been prevented from adducing is unknown, this appeal does not provide the occasion to consider the principles discussed in Randall’. See also Hayne J at [34]–[36]. 329. Cf R v Priestley and Mason (1985) 19 A Crim R 388 at 399 (Williams J for QCA distinguishing Lowery: ‘There is in my view no reasonable link between the statements attributed to Priestley and the killing of Jackson which would give that evidence some probative effect’). In Jones v R (2009) 254 ALR 626; [2009] HCA 17 at 22, the majority explains the nature of the relevance required: ‘It is trite to observe that all evidence, including that adduced by an accused in order to raise a doubt as to guilt, must be relevant in the sense that it could rationally affect, directly or indirectly, the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the proceedings’. 330. R v Roughan and Jones (2007) 179 A Crim R 389; [2007] QCA 443 at [71]–[73] (Keane JA). 331. Ibid at [88] (Muir JA), [102] (McMurdo JA). The majority judgment in Jones v R (2009) 254 ALR 626; [2009] HCA 17 at [21] explains Keane JA’s remarks above in terms of relevance, as simply seeking to determine whether the ‘general propensity in Roughan to behave violently had a capacity rationally to bear on the determination of the likelihood that it was he who carried out this murderous assault’. And see discussion in R v Beckett [2011] 1 Qd R 259; [2009] QCA 196 at [25]–[34] (Fraser JA). 332. [1952] 2 All ER 667 at 669. 333. In R v Randall [2004] 1 Cr App R 26 at [35], Lord Steyn thought that justice did not require such a direction and that it ‘would needlessly perplex juries’. For an example of the difficulty (or impossibility) of distinguishing the different uses of evidence where there is a cut-throat defence, see R v Roughan and Jones (2007) 179 A Crim R 389; [2007] QCA 443 at [59] (Keane JA). Although McMurdo J disagreed that the direction in that case could not be understood the High Court abstained from resolving this difference of opinion: see Jones v R (2009) 254 ALR 626; [2009] HCA 17 at [26]. See also Russell v Western Australia (2011) 214 A Crim R 326; [2011] WASCA 112 at [80]–[86] (McLure P). Faith in jury directions is endorsed in R v Belford and Bound (2011) 208 A Crim R 256; [2011] QCA 43 at [107]– [109] (Fraser JA) and Russell v Western Australia (2011) 214 A Crim R 326; [2011] WASCA 112 at [129]–[134] (McLure P). 334. The power to order that jointly-charged accused be separately tried is provided for in legislation in all jurisdictions: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 29(3); Criminal Code (Qld) s 597B; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 278(2); Criminal Code (Tas) s 363; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 193; Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) s 133; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 264; Criminal Code (NT) s 350. 335. Appellate courts are often reluctant to interfere with trial judges’ decisions not to separate: see, for example, R v Harbach (1973) 6 SASR 427; R v Demirok [1976] VR 244; R v Glover (1987) 46 SASR 310; R v Elhusseini [1988] 2 Qd R 442; R v Holden (1990) 52 A Crim R 32 (CCA (SA)); R v Tran and To (2006) 96 SASR 8. For examples of situations where failure to separate did lead to successful appeal, see R v Crawford [1989] 2 Qd R 443; R v Leslie [1989] 2 Qd R 378; R v Jones and Waghorn (1991) 55 A Crim R 159 (CCA (Vic)); R v Roughan and Jones (2007) 179 A Crim R 389; [2007] QCA 443; and the cases listed in n 336. Where co-accused are alleged to have jointly committed a crime the prima facie rule is that there should be a joint trial: Webb and Hay v R (1994) 181 CLR 41 at 89 (Toohey J); R v Maurangi (2001) 80 SASR 308 at [16]–[21]; Ali v R (2005) 214 ALR 1 at [58] (Callinan and Heydon JJ); R v Roughan and Jones (2007) 179 A Crim R 389; [2007] QCA 443 at [49]–[50]. 336. See, for example, R v Darby (1982) 148 CLR 668 at 677–8; R v Domican and Thurgar (1989) 43 A Crim R 24 (SC (NSW), Hunt J); R v Brown [1990] VR 820, which considers the separation of conspiracy trials; R v Gulder (1986) 8 NSWLR 12; R v Piller (1995) 86 A Crim R 249 at 255–8 (Dowd J ordering separate trials). In R v Connell, Lucas and Carter (No 1) (1992) 8 WAR 518 at 529, Seaman J said: ‘I do

not regard Darby as an encouragement to order a separate trial in conspiracy trials involving more than two people merely because the evidence of one of the accused is significantly different from the evidence of others’. (See also R v Carter (1995) 86 A Crim R 17, where in the same proceedings another application to separate was rejected.) In the case of the separation of counts charged against the one accused, any presumption in favour of separation where evidence is not cross-admissible has been rejected by legislation, mainly applicable where sexual assaults are charged: see discussion at 3.71. 337. Compare with the remark in R v Domican and Thurgar (1989) 43 A Crim R 24 at 27 (SC (NSW), Hunt J) that, where evidence against each accused is different, one joint trial often takes longer. 338. Unsworth v R [1986] Tas SR 173. 339. For example, each accused may more credibly blame the other in a separate trial: R v Miller [1952] 2 All ER 667 at 670 (Devlin J). Thus, where accused employ the ‘cut-throat’ defence the reasons for a joint trial may be strengthened: Webb v R (1994) 181 CLR 41 at 88–9 (Toohey J); Ali v R (2005) 214 ALR 1 at [58] (Callinan and Heydon JJ). In a conspiracy or joint enterprise trial, separation may produce the incongruous result of one party to the conspiracy being found guilty, but not the other; and on this basis, despite juries being directed to consider charges against each accused separately, courts permit the credibility of a witness to be enhanced by evidence admissible only against another accused: see the learned discussion by Maxwell P in Destanovic and Tangaloa v R [2015] VSCA 113. 340. [1980] VR 353 at 385. Existence of discretion approved in R v Gibb and McKenzie [1983] 2 VR 155 at 163; (1983) 7 A Crim R 385 at 394 (admitting evidence of violent propensity relevant to defence of duress: ‘But such an exercise of discretion will necessarily be rare. It is not to be exercised simply because one accused wishes to elicit evidence of the bad character of another accused’). 341. (1989) 42 A Crim R 402. 342. (1995) 129 FLR 120 at 186–7. See also R v N, GF & N, SG [2010] SASC 7, where Kelly J refused tender from a co-accused, but she emphasised that her decision was based upon the insufficient relevance of the evidence, and was not the result of any exercise of exclusionary discretion (the existence of which she regarded as controversial). 343. [1995] 2 Cr App R 573 at 584–5 (Lord Steyn); applied by Lord Steyn in the HL in R v Randall [2004] 1 Cr App R 26 at [18]; Randall quoted with apparent approval by McMurdo JA in R v TP; R v SBA [2007] QCA 169 at [10]. See also R v Winning [2002] WASCA 44 at [41] (Olsson AUJ: no discretion to exclude evidence relevant to a co-accused’s defence: only option to separate trials); R v Murch and Logan (2014) 119 SASR 427; [2014] SASCFC 61 at [33]–[39] (authorities suggest no discretion to refuse cross-examination by an accused of a co-accused on matters prejudicial to the co-accused but probative of the accused’s innocence. If directions insufficient the only option is to separate trials). 344. [1974] AC 85. Applied in R v Forde (1986) 19 A Crim R 1 at 14–15 (Kaye J: ‘[I]t is now accepted by authority that evidence of an accused person’s personality may be admitted in his defence’; R v Winning [2002] WASCA 44 at [34]–[43] (Olsson AUJ). 345. As Hunt CJ at CL was prepared to find in R v Lockyer (1996) 89 A Crim R 457 at 460. 346. Tender of good character including the scope of s 110 is discussed below at 3.126–3.138. 347. Legislation now seeks to control the excesses of credit cross-examination; for example, the uniform legislation requires that the evidence sought ‘substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness’ (s 103(1)), and excludes ‘improper questions’ (s 41). See further 7.138. 348. The accused’s incompetence pre-dated the development of the privilege against self-incrimination: Langbein, The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Trial, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp 277ff. 349. The history and arguments behind the passing of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (UK), in particular in relation to the modification of the privilege against self-incrimination (s 1(e)), are comprehensively set

out in the judgment of the majority in Cornwell v R (2007) 231 CLR 260; [2007] HCA 12 at [32]–[57]. 350. Uniform Evidence Acts: ss 12, 17, 101A, 102, 103, 104, 110, 112, 128(10), 189(6); Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) ss 8, 15; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 18; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 8. 351. The words of the legislation are wide enough to include the voir dire and in R v Vuckov (1986) 40 SASR 498 at 527, Cox J said the words in the South Australian and English Acts, ‘at every stage of the proceedings’, were open to no other interpretation. Despite the absence of this phrase in s 8(1) of the Evidence Act 1906 (Qld) it has been held that the position is the same: R v Semyraha [2001] 2 Qd R 208; [2000] QCA 303 at [13] (overruling R v Post and Georgee [1982] Qd R 495 at 496). 352. R v Hilton [1972] 1 QB 421; R v Schuller [1972] QWN 41; uniform legislation s 27. 353. Cases concerned with the cross-examination of the accused under the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (UK) emphasise that fulfilment of these basic requirements of relevance and admissibility remain necessary: Maxwell v DPP [1935] AC 309; Stirland v DPP [1944] AC 315 at 323; Wong Kam-Ming v R [1980] AC 247 (in which the commission of a crime was held not to be relevant to issues on the voir dire). Under the uniform legislation, credibility evidence can only be sought in cross-examination where it ‘could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness’: ss 101A, 102, 103(1). 354. This requirement is not affected by the relevant legislation (see R v Wright [1969] SASR 256 at 259, 269), even where the obligation to answer is not expressly enacted in the legislation. 355. Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 18(1)(c) (formerly s 18(1)(V)), 18(2); Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 8(1)(d). 356. This interpretation of s 1(e) was endorsed by the House of Lords in Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635 (despite vigorous dissent from Lord Denning, who sought to interpret s 1(e) as allowing only and all crossexamination as to the issue) and the High Court in Attwood v R (1960) 102 CLR 353. 357. R v Vuckov (1986) 40 SASR 498 at 527. The same interpretation has been given to the Queensland legislation: R v Semyraha [2001] 2 Qd R 208; [2000] QCA 303 at [13] (overruling R v Post and Georgee [1982] Qd R 495 at 496). 358. [1980] AC 247. 359. [1982] AC 476. 360. (1982) 30 SASR 444. 361. (2007) 231 CLR 260; [2007] HCA 12. 362. Kirby J’s dissent in Cornwell emphasised the need to give the text of the legislation primacy: at [136]– [137], and the policy behind the immunity procedure under s 128: at [162]–[163], [171], [185]. 363. Dupas v R (2012) 40 VR 182; [2012] VSCA 328 at [265], per curiam, ‘[i]n short “credibility” imports notions of both truthfulness and reliability’. 364. This definition avoids the High Court’s interpretation in Adam v R (2001) 207 CLR 96 at [31]–[38]: see 7.134 n 726. 365. For an example of cross-examination of an accused not caught by s 104(2), see W v R (2006) 16 Tas R 1 (cross-examination on interest in anal sex relevant to a fact in issue). 366. A co-accused will always be able to justify such cross-examination under s 104(6) where it is required. 367. On the relationship, see Steve v R [2008] NSWCCA 231 at [66]–[69] (Beazley JA). 368. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 15(2); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 18(1)(d) (formerly s 18(1)VI); Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 8(1)(e). 369. [1962] AC 635. 370. (1960) 102 CLR 353.

371. (1982) 30 SASR 404 at 424. 372. (1986) 40 SASR 498 at 525–7. 373. Stirland v DPP [1944] AC 315. 374. Maxwell v DPP [1935] AC 309. 375. Relevant to issue: R v Cokar [1960] 2 QB 207, where a previous charge for housebreaking with intent rebutted the defence that the accused, who was faced again with the same charge, had merely been looking for shelter. Relevant to credit: Stirland v DPP [1944] AC 315 at 323, 327 (Viscount Simon). But a charge is irrelevant to establishing any propensity: R v Roughan and Jones (2007) 179 A Crim R 389; [2007] QCA 443 at [96] (McMurdo JA). 376. An issue estoppel arises on a verdict of not guilty and evidence cannot be led in later proceedings that is inconsistent with that verdict: Storey v R (1978) 140 CLR 364. For further discussion of evidentiary rules consequent upon principles of res judicata, see 5.189–5.190. 377. For the history of the provisions, see Tapper, ‘The Meaning of Section 1(f)(i) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898’ in Tapper (ed), Crime, Proof and Punishment: Essays in Memory of Sir Rupert Cross, Butterworths, Sydney, 1981. 378. [1962] AC 635. 379. [1962] AC 635 (followed in R v Fricker (1986) 42 SASR 436). 380. (1960) 102 CLR 353. 381. Requiring the Crown to reveal its whole case before the accused is called upon to reply: Jones v DPP [1962] AC 635 at 685; R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671. See further 2.7–2.8. 382. Where the cross-examination seeks to reveal evidence of propensity or similar facts it must satisfy any relevant admissibility rules (for example, Pfennig) before it can be admitted: R v Fox [2000] Qd R 334. 383. (1960) 102 CLR 353 at 361–2. 384. [1960] 2 QB 207. 385. Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 8(1)(e)(i). 386. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 15(2)(a); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 18(1)(d)(i) (formerly s 18(1)VI(a)). 387. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 15(2)(b). 388. (1982) 30 SASR 404 at 424. 389. (1986) 40 SASR 498. 390. In practice it is counsel who conducts the case and if counsel acts incompetently to lose the shield of the legislation an accused may successfully appeal: see, for example, R v Oliverio (1993) 61 SASR 354. But cf cases at 2.49 nn 275, 276. 391. Murdoch v Taylor [1965] AC 574 at 593; R v Lovett [1973] 1 All ER 744; Matusevich v R (1977) 137 CLR 633 at 653–5 (Aickin J). Cf the remarks of Stephen J in Matusevich at 639 and those of Murphy J at 647; their view is explained at 3.103. 392. Phillips v R (1985) 159 CLR 45 at 51 (Mason, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ). See also Aickin J in Matusevich v R (1977) 137 CLR 633 at 653–5; R v Fortunato (2003) 137 A Crim R 453; [2003] SASC 4 at [10] (CCA); R v Brownlow [2003] SASC 262 at [37]–[44] (Sulan J: there is a discretion whether to permit cross-examination and to limit cross-examination to particular matters). A court should not gratuitously declare its intention to permit cross-examination on prohibited matters before permission to cross-examine on those matters is sought, and permission should not be sought in advance of the witness being called and examined: R v Hembury (1994) 73 A Crim R 1 at 13; R v Lear [1998] 1 VR 285 at 294 (Phillips CJ); R v Maurangi (2001) 80 SASR 308 at [23]–[32]; R v Fortunato (2003) 137 A

Crim R 453; [2003] SASC 4 at [18] (no obligation on court to give advance ruling); but cf remarks of Sulan J in R v Brownlow [2003] SASC 262 at [56]. Although the power to give advance rulings was not available under the original uniform legislation (see TKWJ v R (2002) 193 ALR 7) the power is now expressly given by s 192A. 393. R v Cook [1959] 2 QB 340 at 349 (Devlin J); Carroll v R [1964] Tas SR 76; R v Weston-super-Mare Justices; Ex parte Townsend [1968] 3 All ER 225. 394. R v Hamilton (1993) 68 A Crim R 298; R v Brownlow [2003] SASC 262 at [45]–[55] (Sulan J). 395. [1959] 2 QB 340 at 349 (Devlin J). 396. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 15(2) as interpreted in R v Saric [1982] Qd R 360. 397. (1977) 137 CLR 633. 398. (1985) 159 CLR 45 at 51 (Mason, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ). 399. Failure to seek leave may produce a miscarriage of justice: see, for example, Tieu v R [2016] NSWCCA 111 (McCallum and Davies JJ, Basten JA dissenting). 400. R v Johnston [2004] NSWCCA 58 at [33]–[34] (James J). 401. R v El-Kheir [2004] NSWCCA 461 at [41]–[56] (Tobias JA); R v El-Azzi [2004] NSWCCA 455 at [199] (Simpson J). 402. In granting leave, the matters listed in s 192 must be taken into consideration: Stanoevski v R (2001) 202 CLR 115 at [38]. See further at 2.26. 403. See, for example, Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 55 (‘reflect the existing law’); Gabriel v R (1997) 76 FCR 279 at 298 (Higgins J refers to the common law before cataloguing factors indicating that crossexamination was unduly prejudicial to an accused); Hughes v DPP (2013) 238 A Crim R 345; [2013] VSCA 338 at [30]–[37], [49]–[55] (the Court of Appeal considered that leave should not have been granted). 404. (2002) 212 CLR 124; 193 ALR 7. 405. [2016] NSWCCA 111 at [44]–[47]. 406. (1985) 159 CLR 45. 407. See, for example, Phillips v R (1985) 159 CLR 45, where the majority refused to interfere despite strong arguments that the cross-examination was prejudicial (see Deane J’s dissenting view). Any appeal will be decided according to House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499 principles. 408. As occurred in R v Brownlow [2003] SASC 262 at [57] (Sulan J). 409. R v Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520; 169 ER 1497. 410. R v Stalder [1981] 2 NSWLR 9; BRS v R (1997) 191 CLR 275. Whether this is technically the position under the uniform legislation appears controversial (Odgers, n 31 above, at [EA.110.90]), but authority supports preservation of the common law position: R v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433; [2000] NSWCCA 404 at [24]–[38], [63], [87]–[88], [107]–[108] (Simpson J); R v El-Kheir [2004] NSWCCA 461 at [70]–[93] (Tobias JA); Wah v R (2014) A Crim R 41; [2014] VSCA 7 (Weinberg JA). Section 95 prohibits using otherwise admissible evidence for tendency and coincidence purposes unless it satisfies the requirements set out in Pt 3.6. 411. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 15(2)(c) (‘asked questions of any witness’); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 18(1) (d)(ii) (formerly s 18(1)VI(b)); Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 8(1)(e)(ii). 412. That it can be used to rebut evidence of good character is emphasised by Lord Sankey LC in Maxwell v DPP [1935] AC 309 at 319. That it can also go beyond this and be used to discredit the accused generally is emphasised in R v Richardson and Longman [1969] 1 QB 299 at 309–10, and by Barwick CJ

in R v Donnini (1972) 128 CLR 114 at 121. In Crabbe v R (1984) 11 FCR 1 at 18–19, Muirhead J wrongly interprets the remarks of Barwick CJ as limiting the effect of disclosed bad character to creditworthiness, but he may have used this terminology widely to include the ‘creditworthiness’ of the good character asserted by the accused in that case. 413. This point is emphasised in the judgments of Barwick CJ in Donnini v R (1972) 128 CLR 114 and Muirhead J in Crabbe v R (1984) 11 FCR 1. It is also ensured by s 95 of the uniform legislation. 414. For example, Donnini ibid, Crabbe ibid, R v Beech (1978) 30 SASR 410 at 420–2; BRS v R (1997) 191 CLR 275 (where the High Court held that the failure to direct the jury to eschew the propensity chain of reasoning, from evidence of bad character admitted to counter evidence of good character, produced a miscarriage of justice notwithstanding that the failure of the trial judge to mention the bad character evidence at all appeared tactically to be to the accused’s advantage). For authority under the uniform legislation, see R v El-Kheir [2004] NSWCCA 461 at [70]–[93] (Tobias JA). 415. The general need for directions is illustrated by R v Trimboli (1979) 21 SASR 577 at 578 (King CJ); Simic v R (1980) 144 CLR 319; R v Murphy (1985) 4 NSWLR 42; R v Zecevic [1986] VR 797 at 819– 23 (Tadgell J); R v Courtney-Smith (No 2) (1990) 48 A Crim R 49 at 68–70 (CCA (NSW)). While failure to direct on the use that can be made of good character is not an error of law (see Melbourne v R (1999) 198 CLR 1 at [30]–[32] (McHugh J), [77]–[80] (Gummow J), [155]–[157] (Hayne J)) it may lead to a miscarriage of justice in the particular circumstances. Or may not: see, for example, R v TZ (2011) 214 A Crim R 316; [2011] QCA 305 at [36]. The position is the same under the uniform legislation: Gallant v R [2006] NSWCCA 339 at [39] (no mandatory requirements); R v RJC (NSWCCA, 18 August 1998, unreported) (citing Trimboli and stating directions desirable: as quoted in Odgers, n 31 above, at [EA.110.60]). 416. [1962] AC 635. 417. Examples of good character sufficient to invoke the exception include assertions concerning regular attendance at Mass (R v Ferguson (1909) 2 Cr App R 250); honest earning of a living (R v Baker (1912) 7 Cr App R 252); and marriage, a family and regular work (R v Coulman (1927) 20 Cr App R 106). Selvey v DPP [1970] AC 304 endorses a wide approach to the meaning of character within the section as does the High Court in Attwood v R (1960) 102 CLR 353 at 359. See also R v Trimboli (1979) 21 SASR 577 at 586 and Crabbe v R (1984) 11 FCR l, which demonstrate that it is necessary to look to the whole of the evidence and how it is given to determine whether it constitutes evidence of good character. 418. Bishop v R [2013] VSCA 273 at [8] (Redlich JA); Saw Wah v R (2014) 239 A Crim R 41; [2014] VSCA 7 at [54]–[63] (Weinberg JA). 419. It need not be successful in achieving the desired evidence: Donnini v R (1972) 128 CLR 114. 420. This purposive phrase is included in all the relevant legislation referred to in n 368. Its importance was emphasised by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Fuller (1994) 34 NSWLR 233 in reading it into s 413B of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (now replaced by the uniform legislation). 421. R v Redd [1923] 1 KB 104; P v R (1993) 61 SASR 75 (discussed by Waye (1993) 18 Crim LJ 290, particularly at 292). 422. R v Ellis [1910] 2 KB 746; R v Crawford [1965] VR 580; Matthews v R [1973] WAR 110. 423. Once a question is asked of a (prosecution) witness with the intention of putting character in issue then the exception operates: Donnini v R (1973) 128 CLR 114. Where the accused gives evidence, the whole of that evidence should be examined to see if the issue of good character was intentionally raised. For a good analysis of such a case, see Muirhead J in Crabbe v R (1984) 11 FCR 1 at 16–17 (in particular). See also R v Stronach [1988] Crim LR 48; Amoe v DPP (Nauru) (1991) 103 ALR 595 (High Court).

424. Such an interpretation is consistent with what Hunt CJ at CL in R v Fuller (1994) 34 NSWLR 233 at 237–8 described, before the passing of the uniform legislation, as a ‘fundamental rule of the common law that, unless otherwise relevant to an issue in the case, bad character may be established by the Crown only in rebuttal of a case of good character intentionally raised by an accused’, adding that clear statutory words were required to take away such a right. 425. Compare with the possible (but unlikely) wider interpretation identified in R v El-Azzi [2004] NSWCCA 455 at [199] (Simpson J), [12] (Santow J agreeing) that s 112 simply applies to the topic of good character whether or not any evidence in relation to it has been adduced. The repercussions of the two approaches are considered by Odgers, n 31 above, at [EA.112.60]. 426. See, for example, PGM v R (2006) 164 A Crim R 426; [2006] NSWCCA 310. 427. See, for example, Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 54–5; Gabriel v R (1997) 76 FCR 279 at 297; R v Bartle (2003) 181 FLR 1 at [140]–[146] (Mason P and Barr J). 428. See, for example, Gabriel v R (1997) 76 FCR 279 at 297 (Higgins J) (‘I don’t go round attacking people’); R v Bartle (2003) 181 FLR 1 at [136] (Mason P and Barr J) (‘Because I never been involved in any importation, been selling any drugs’); PGM v R (2006) 164 A Crim R 426; [2006] NSWCCA 310 at [35], [38]–[40] (‘I’ve never seen that sort of image’); Huges (a Pseudonym) v R (2013) 238 A Crim R 345; [2013] VSCA 338 at [23] (Priest JA), [49] (Lasry AJA) (‘I’ve never hit my daughter.’ ‘I’m just not into pornographic movies’); cf R v Skaf, Ghanem and Hajeid [2004] NSWCCA 74 at [203], [221]–[226] (‘I’ve never been charged with anything. They’re the first charges I’ve ever had. Other than a driving offence’). But, as these cases recognise, the issue of intention is ultimately one of fact to be decided in the circumstances and dynamics of the case. 429. Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 54F (if character raised went to both credibility and issue); Gabriel v R (1997) 76 FCR 279 at 297–8 (Higgins J) (if character raised only to issue); R v El-Kheir [2004] NSWCCA 461 at [54]–[55] (character raised went to credibility). 430. It should also be noted that because the evidence of character adduced under Pt 3.8 is not subject to the tendency rule, and so is admissible as tendency evidence, it is unlikely that the evidence will be relevant and admissible only to credibility under s 101A. As a result, Pt 3.7 is not invoked and leave to crossexamine is governed by s 112 not s 104: see Odgers, n 31 above, at [EA.112.60]. 431. Note that leave under s 112 of the uniform legislation should be expressed in the terms of s 192(2): Stanoevski v R (2001) 202 CLR 115; [2001] HCA 4. See, for example, R v El-Kheir [2004] NSWCCA at [57]–[64] (emphasising that the interests of the Crown also need to be taken into account). 432. For this reason cross-examination was rightly permitted in Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 57E. By contrast, in R v Norfolk (2002) 129 A Crim R 288 (CCA (WA)) the court held that the accused’s denial to the improper question of the prosecutor, ‘Do you still do drugs?’, although evidence given with a view to establishing good character, could not justify giving leave to cross-examine the accused on his prior drug convictions. 433. It is assumed that under the Criminal Evidence Act a co-accused may cross-examine once the good character exception is invoked: see the cases cited in n 391, especially R v Lovett [1973] 1 All ER 744. Under s 112 of the uniform legislation, leave is not confined to any particular party in the case. 434. For example, R v Watts [1983] 3 All ER 101; R v McLeod [1995] 1 Cr App R 591; Huges (a Pseudonym) v R (2013) 238 A Crim R 345; [2013] VSCA 338 at [31]–[37] (Priest JA), [42] (Coghlan JA), [50]–[55] (Lasry AJA). 435. R v Hamilton (1993) 68 A Crim R 298 at 299 (Hunt CJ at CL); R v Fuller (1994) 34 NSWLR 233 at 240 (Hunt CJ at CL). 436. R v Perrier (No 1) [1991] 1 VR 697 at 705 (Brooking J).

437. See LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [23285]. 438. [1944] AC 315 at 326–7. 439. See also R v Fuller (1994) 34 NSWLR 233 at 240 (Hunt CJ at CL). The position is probably otherwise where the accused does not testify. In this case, the evidence of good character is relevant only to the question of guilt or innocence of the crime charged, and arguably it is only the particular character trait that is so relevant, not unrelated character traits. Therefore, the prosecution cannot rebut evidence of good character about one trait by adducing evidence in relation to other traits. R v Winfield (1939) 27 Cr App R 139 at 141 is better regarded as a case concerned with the cross-examination of the accused (rather than the accused’s character witness). But cf Hunt CJ at CL’s remarks in R v Hamilton (1993) 68 A Crim R 298 at 299. The approach here advocated is consistent with s 110 of the uniform legislation which, if the defendant adduces evidence of good character in a particular respect, is confined to permitting the calling of evidence in this particular respect in rebuttal. 440. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 15(2)(d); Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 8(1)(e)(ii) (extends to imputations against a deceased victim of the offence charged). 441. For example, R v Turner (1944) KB 463. 442. [1970] AC 304. 443. (1985) 159 CLR 45 at 50–1 (Mason, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ). 444. (1961) 106 CLR 1 at 9–10. The High Court in Dawson accepted that the exception should be interpreted literally and that words of limitation cannot otherwise be read into it. 445. Applied in P v R [1993] 61 SASR 75 (discussed by Waye (1993) 18 Crim LJ 290, particularly at 292 where it is pointed out that whether a smear upon credibility is a necessary part of a defence may be a matter only of degree). 446. For it will have to be shown that the discretion was exercised upon wrong grounds and that this produced a miscarriage of justice: Phillips v R (1985) 159 CLR 45 at 59. 447. Phillips v R (1985) 159 CLR 45 at 54, interpreting R v Brown [1960] VR 382 at 398 (Smith J). 448. Where credibility is an issue between the testifying accused and co-accused, cross-examination may be permitted under this exception: R v Lovett [1973] 1 All ER 744; cf the contrary view of Stephen J in Matusevich v R (1977) 137 CLR 633 at 644. See uniform legislation s 104(6). 449. In P v R (1993) 61 SASR 75 (discussed by Waye (1993) 18 Crim LJ 290), the court exercised its discretion to prevent revelation of conviction for a similar crime upon the complainant’s sister, a conviction subject to appeal at the time of the proceedings. 450. (1985) 159 CLR 45; R v El-Azzi [2004] NSWCCA 445 at [199] (Simpson J: common law principles apply to s 104(2) discretion). 451. [2002] 2 Qd R 70. 452. Thomas JA at [7]–[8] is somewhat forthright in discussing ‘some contemporary features of trials … where there is a stale sexual complaint’, regarding ‘the use of the term [‘victims’] in most instances a barbarism in a criminal trial’, pointing out that ‘[w]hen the truth of the complainant’s version is in issue the term is a direct negation of the presumption of innocence’. He says: ‘When a complaint of [sexual predation within families] is now made there is a not inconsiderable risk that a jury or some of its members may start with the premise that it is probably true’. 453. Thomas JA at [14]: ‘Courts should not be too precious in condemning counsel’s perceived errors of taste or choice of words in putting their client’s position to the witness. I do not regard “lie” as a taboo word which counsel may not use; or that counsel’s use of it should subject the client either to exposure of his criminal record or abandonment of his right to go into the witness box. On the contrary it may

be an accurate formulation of the only real defence’. 454. (1998) 103 A Crim R 305. See also R v El-Azzi [2004] NSWCCA 445, where cross-examination allowed. 455. Phillips, at 57, endorsing R v Beech (1978) 20 SASR 410 at 420–3; R v Day (2000) 115 A Crim R 80 at [34]–[37] (Thomas JA). In R v Gillard (No 3) (2000) 78 SASR 279 at [161], Duggan and Bleby JJ held that this did not prevent the judge directing the jury that, the shield having been lost through an imputation, although the jury could not use any propensity chain of reasoning, it could nevertheless use crimes revealed in cross-examination committed in company with a co-accused, not just as relevant to the cross-examined accused’s credit, but also to demonstrate a relevant and implicating trust between him and his co-accused. 456. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 15(2)(d); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 18(1)(d)(iv) (formerly s 18(1)VI(c)); Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 8(1)(e)(iii). 457. Section 104(6): ‘Leave is not to be given for cross-examination by another defendant unless: (a) the evidence that the defendant to be cross-examined has given includes evidence adverse to the defendant seeking leave to cross-examine and (b) that evidence has been admitted’. ‘Adverse’ has been defined very broadly and includes an account of events ‘inconsistent with the version’ provided by a co-accused: R v Fernando [1999] NSWCCA 66 at [286]. 458. (1982) 30 SASR 404 at 413. 459. Murdoch v Taylor [1965] AC 574 at 593; R v Lovett [1973] 1 All ER 744; Matusevich v R (1977) 137 CLR 633 at 653–5 (Aickin J); cf Stephen and Murphy JJ in Matusevich v R at 639, 647. This contrary opinion can be explained on the basis of the then applicable legislation which, while giving an express discretion to prevent cross-examination under the provision equivalent to s 1(f)(ii), was silent as to the existence of a discretion under the equivalent to s 1(f)(iii). The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterus thus made doubtful the existence of any discretion at all under the s 1(f)(iii) equivalent, so that the prosecutor would have been given the (unreasonable) right to cross-examine if it had been allowed to cross-examine.

460. (1977) 137 CLR 633 at 655. 461. See Murdoch v Taylor [1965] AC 574; Matusevich v R (1977) 137 CLR 633; Lui Mei Lin v R [1989] AC 288; R v Reid [1989] Crim LR 719. Note, however, that if the prosecution can cross-examine under this exception then the discretion remains. 462. R v Roberts [1936] 1 All ER 23; R v Russell [1971] 1 QB 151. 463. Commissioner for Metropolitan Police v Hills [1980] AC 26. 464. Which succeeded in the United Kingdom where the restriction was removed (prior to repeal of the whole of s 1(2) by s 332, Sch 37 Pt 5 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK)). 465. See Murdoch v Taylor [1965] AC 574; R v Congressi (1974) 9 SASR 257, which states that a mere denial is not usually ‘evidence against’; R v Bruce [1975] 1 WLR 1252; R v Davis (1975) 60 Cr App R 157; R v Hatton (1977) 64 Cr App R 88; R v Ditroia and Tucci [1981] VR 247 at 256; R v Varley (1982) 75 Cr App R 242. 466. R v Fernando [1999] NSWCCA 66. 467. (1977) 137 CLR 633 at 654. 468. R v Hilton [1972] 1 QB 421; R v Schuller [1972] QWN 94. 469. Kerr, Boster, Callen, Braz, O’Brien and Horowitz, ‘Jury Nullification Instructions as Amplifiers of Bias’ (2008) 6 International Commentary on Evidence Art 2; NSW Law Reform Commission, Jury Directions — Consultation Paper 4 (December 2008), at [2.50]–[2.51]. For further references on the effectiveness of jury directions, see 2.13 nn 51–52. 470. [1962] AC 635. 471. (1986) 42 SASR 436. 472. In R v Cook [2004] NSWCCA 52 at [20]–[49], Simpson J explained that evidence of the accused’s flight might be excluded altogether by virtue of s 137 where there was a credible explanation for the flight requiring revelation of offences similar to the crime charged. 473. (1986) 19 A Crim R 1 (CCA (Vic)). 474. (1992) 175 CLR 599. In B v R, the accused invoked an earlier confession in relation to a prior sexual assault charge regarding his daughter to support a subsequent denial when similar allegations were prosecuted by her. 475. Note that s 110 does not exempt evidence of good character from the s 98 coincidence rule, so that if coincidence evidence is called to establish good character it must comply with s 98. While coincidence evidence in response must also comply with s 98, arguably the prosecution need not additionally comply with s 101(2) as the evidence is not adduced as evidence ‘against the defendant’ but as evidence to negate the evidence of good character. Nevertheless, the residual discretion (ss 135, 137) may operate to maintain the high probative value generally required of coincidence evidence tendered by the prosecution: see, for example, R v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433; [2000] NSWCCA 404 (similar testimonies tendered to rebut good character excluded unless no reasonable possibility of concoction); but cf TKWJ v R (2002) 212 CLR 124; [2002] HCA 46 at [88] (McHugh J), and see discussion in Odgers, n 31 above, at [EA.110.90]. 476. See, for example, Braysich v R (2011) 243 CLR 434 at [39]–[44] (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ) where, charged with offences of false trading on the stock market, evidence of the accused’s honest trading activities was held relevant to establishing that the trading in question was also conducted honestly. 477. R v Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520; 169 ER 1497; R v Butterwasser [1948] 1 KB 4.

478. Attwood v R (1960) 102 CLR 353 at 359. In Donaldson v Western Australia (2007) 176 A Crim R 488; [2007] WASCA 216 at [73], the CCA concluded after a detailed review of authority that ‘in practice [Rowton] is often not observed’, as appeared to be the situation in the case before the court where no objection was made to evidence that extended beyond general reputation (at [83]). 479. [1997] 3 NZLR 242. 480. [1961] AC 1090. 481. R v Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520; 169 ER 1497; Attwood v R (1960) 102 CLR 353 at 359. 482. (1865) Le & Ca 520; 169 ER 1497. 483. R v Trimboli (1979) 21 SASR 577; R v Murphy (1985) 4 NSWLR 42; R v Courtney-Smith (No 2) (1990) 48 A Crim R 49 at 68–70 (CCA (NSW)); Crowley v Willis (1992) 110 FLR 194 at 200 (Gallop J); R v Aziz [1996] AC 41; Melbourne v R (1999) 198 CLR 1; R v Wedd (2000) 115 A Crim R 205 (CCA (WA)). And the jury should usually be so directed: see 3.136–3.138. 484. Crabbe v R (1984) 11 FCR 1. It had also been held that the issue of good character could be raised through matters alleged in an unsworn statement: R v Stalder [1981] 2 NSWLR 9. 485. Bishop v R (2013) 39 VR 642; [2013] VSCA 273 at [8] (Redlich JA), ‘The phrase “in a particular respect” in s 110 is described by Gans and Palmer as meaning “pertaining to a particular characteristic” such as for example, gentleness, generosity or good citizenship. But it may also relate to a particular context in which relevant conduct has taken place’. See, for example, R v PKS (NSWCCA, 1 October 1998, 9–10, unreported); R v Zurita [2002] NSWCCA 22. In R v TAB [2002] NSWCCA 274, Levine J said that this did not permit counsel to seek to limit the good character evidence to the specific question of whether, prior to the offence charged, the accused had not come to the attention of the police (so that the prosecution would be unable to rebut it with evidence of previous crimes which had not at that stage come to the attention of the police). He said at [94] that s 110 ‘makes no reference to “limited” evidence of good character’. Cf Saw Wah v R [2014] VSCA 7 at [78] ‘[Counsel for the accused] was even more clearly entitled to ask whether, putting traffic offences to one side, the applicant had ever been convicted of anything’), [88]–[93] (Weinberg JA). 486. Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 54F (if character raised went to both credibility and issue); Gabriel v R (1997) 76 FCR 279 at 297–8 (Higgins J) (if character raised only to issue); R v El-Kheir [2004] NSWCCA 461 at [54]–[55] (character raised went to credibility). 487. [1991] 1 VR 697 at 702–3. 488. Gabriel v R (1997) 76 FCR 279; PGM v R [2006] NSWCCA 310 at [35] (Barr J). 489. R v Stalder [1981] 2 NSWLR 9 at 15–18 (Street CJ). 490. [1991] 1 VR 697 at 703. 491. In granting this leave the matters listed in s 192 must be taken into consideration: Stanoevski v R (2001) 202 CR 115 at [38]. Leave was upheld in Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 55–7 but overruled in Gabriel v R (1997) 76 FCR 279 at 298 (Higgins J). An advance ruling may now be sought under s 192A(c). 492. R v Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520; 169 ER 1497: this limit being based on the premise that good character witnesses could also only testify to general reputation. 493. R v Hodgkiss (1836) 7 Car & P 298; 173 ER 132; R v Waldman (1934) 24 Cr App R 204. 494. R v Wood and Parker (1841) 5 Jur 225. 495. R v Savory (1942) 29 Cr App R 1. 496. R v Redd [1923] 1 KB 104; R v Waldman (1934) 24 Cr App R 204, where the accused was recalled to prove previous convictions; R v Macecek [1960] Qd R 247; R v de Vere [1982] QB 75, where

convictions were proved to rebut a claim to good character made in an unsworn statement. 497. Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 52–5 (the fact that the evidence may also rebut the prosecution evidence does not prevent the court from finding the requisite intention). For other authorities discussing intention, see 3.108. 498. But the coincidence rule apparently still applies. See discussion in n 475. 499. See TKWJ v R (2002) 212 CLR 124; [2002] HCA 46 at [89]–[90] (McHugh J). 500. R v Winfield (1939) 27 Cr App R 13; Stirland v DPP [1944] AC 315 at 326–7 (Viscount Simond); R v Fuller (1994) 34 NSWLR 233 at 240 (Hunt CJ at CL). But the remarks of Hunt CJ at CL in R v Hamilton (1993) 68 A Crim R 298 at 299 were not made in that context. 501. Unless out-of-court assertions of the accused are before the court as admissible hearsay and in contention: as in Melbourne v R (1999) 198 CLR 1. 502. See generally Gooderson, ‘Is a Prisoner’s Character Divisible?’ (1953) 11 Camb LJ 377. 503. Thus, in Gabriel v R (1997) 76 FCR 279 at 298, Higgins J held that after an accused had said he was not the sort of person to stab, assuming it had been said to raise good character, it was raised only in that respect so that any rebutting evidence should have been so limited. In R v Zurita [2002] NSWCCA 2 at [19], the trial judge was held in error in ruling that if the accused raised his good character in respect of sexual conduct this would put his whole character in issue. In Bishop v R (2013) 39 VR 642; [2013] VSCA 273 at [7]–[9], good character was raised specifically and generally. 504. Examples of such attempts, and failures to attempt, to characterise, include R v Van Dyk [2000] NSWCCA 67 at [124]–[125]; R v Zurita [2002] NSWCCA 22; R v Telfer [2004] NSWCCA 27; Seymour v R [2006] NSWCCA 206; Gallant v R [2006] NSWCCA 339; PGM v R [2006] NSWCCA 310; Mouroufas v R [2007] NSWCCA 58 at [38]–[49]; Zaphir v R [2009] NSWCCA 124 at [62]; Saw Wah v R (2014) 239 A Crim R 41; [2014] VSCA 7 at [89]–[92]. 505. Cf Singh v DPP (NSW) [2006] NSWCCA 333 at [27]–[33] (Basten JA). 506. (1997) 76 FCR 279 at 298. 507. [2002] NSWCCA 2. 508. R v Stalder [1981] 2 NSWLR 9 at 15–18 (Street CJ); BRS v R (1997) 191 CLR 275; compare with R v Fricker (1986) 23 A Crim R 147 at 149–50 (King CJ). 509. Cf R v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433; [2000] NSWCCA 404 and references and discussion at nn 410, 475, 524. 510. In R v Aziz [1996] AC 41, the House of Lords held that appropriate good character directions should be given whenever an accused comes before the court without (‘relevant’) previous convictions. One might argue that in Australia directions need only be considered where the accused specifically raises good character and gives credible evidence of it (cf R v Falealili [1996] 3 NZLR 664; and see Munday, ‘What Constitutes a Good Character?’ (1997) Crim LR 247). In R v Saloman [2006] QCA 244 at [24]– [27], the court considered absence of prior convictions irrelevant. See also comments of Kourakis J in Mak v Police [2008] SASR 324 at [28] and Parsons v R [2016] VSCA 17 at [60]–[67]. In any case, while the House of Lords in Aziz held that an accused with good character is entitled to receive good character directions as to both propensity and credibility (where relevant) unless ‘it would be an insult to common sense’ (at 53), in Australia there are no such definitive obligations and the direction required is that necessary in the circumstances to avoid the risk of a miscarriage of justice: Melbourne v R (1999) 198 CLR 1. 511. (1999) 198 CLR 1. Applied in, for example, Bishop v R (2013) 39 VR 642; [2013] VSCA 273 at [30] (Priest JA).

512. See also Stanoevski v R (2001) 202 CLR 115 at [21]. Examples of circumstances where no direction was required include R v Szabo [2000] NSWCCA 226 at [63]–[65]; Bellemore v Tasmania (2006) 170 A Crim R 1 at [62]–[71]; Donaldson v Western Australia (2007) 176 A Crim R 488; [2007] WASCA 216 at [84]. In R v Hinschen [2008] QCA 145, whilst the court held that the jury would not have misunderstood the significance of the good character evidence, Fraser JA at [66] remarked that a direction would be required if a prosecutor wrongly asserted in addressing the jury that good character could not be used in deciding whether the accused committed the crime charged. 513. R v Trimboli (1979) 21 SASR 577; Simic v R (1980) 144 CLR 319 at 333; R v Mandica (1980) 24 SASR 394; R v Lawrence (1980) 32 ALR 72 at 80, 122; R v Williams (1981) 4 A Crim R 441 (CCA (Qld)); Cheatley v R [1981] Tas R 123; R v Andrews (1982) 2 NSWLR 116; R v Lopatta (1983) 35 SASR 101; Crabbe v R (1984) 11 FCR 1; R v Murphy (1985) 4 NSWLR 42; R v Zecevic [1986] VR 797; R v Palazoff (1986) 43 SASR 99 at 101–4 (Zelling ACJ), 110–11 (O’Loughlin J); R v Warast (1991) 54 A Crim R 351 (CCA (Vic)); R v Vye (1993) 97 Cr App R 134; R v Durbin [1995] 2 Cr App R 84; R v RJC (CCA (NSW), 18 August 1998, unreported) (citing Trimboli and stating directions desirable: quoted in Odgers, n 31 above, at [EA.60.150]); R v Robinson [1999] NSWCCA 172 at [24]; Melbourne v R (1999) 198 CLR 1; R v Wedd (2000) 115 A Crim R 205 (CCA (WA)); R v Blobel [2001] SASC 374 at [36]–[40] (Doyle CJ), [77]–[79] (Mulligan J). There is no fixed form of words: Ka Chung Fung v R [2007] NSWCCA 250 at [59]. 514. [2006] NSWCCA 339 at [39]. 515. R v Manwaring [1983] 2 NSWLR 82; and see direction given in R v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433 at [107]–[108]. 516. Compare with the directions in R v Trimboli (1979) 21 SASR 577 and R v Thompson [1966] QWN 47. In R v M (1994) 72 A Crim R 269 at 276–7, the CCA (SA) disapproved of the trial judge’s denigrating suggestion to the jury that it ‘might make some use of [the good character evidence] if you are teetering on the edge of whether to convict or not to convict’. See also R v Wedd (2000) 115 A Crim R 205 at [24] (CCA (WA): the direction ‘evidence of good character may be of limited assistance’, ‘seriously disturbed the balance of the direction’); R v Blobel [2001] SASC 374 at [36]–[40] (Doyle CJ), [77]–[79] (Mulligan J) (the remark ‘every criminal commits his first crime’ did not give rise to a miscarriage of justice in the circumstances); Bishop v R (2013) 39 VR 642; [2013] VSCA 273 (to direct gratuitously that testimony of good character with children related to conduct in public rather than in private gave rise to a miscarriage of justice); Wahi v R [2015] VSCA 132 (the comment ‘even Jack the Ripper at some stage had no previous convictions’ did not give rise to a successful appeal). 517. BRS v R (1997) 191 CLR 275 (the High Court held the failure to direct the jury to eschew the propensity chain of reasoning, from evidence of bad character admitted to counter evidence of good character, produced a miscarriage of justice notwithstanding that the failure of the trial judge to mention the bad character evidence at all appeared tactically to be to the accused’s advantage). 518. R v Aziz [1996] AC 41; Melbourne v R (1999) 198 CLR 1. 519. Such a direction may be unnecessary if the good character evidence is not relevant to credibility: R v Zurita [2002] NSWCCA 22 at [23] (good character alleged, no antecedents for sexual offences, would have required a direction only to propensity, not credibility). 520. R v Richardson and Longman (1969) 1 QB 299 at 310–11; R v Donnini (1972) 128 CLR 114. 521. (1997) 191 CLR 275. 522. See, for example, KRM v R (2001) 206 CLR 221 (a clear direction to consider separately evidence in relation to a number of separately charged sexual incidents was sufficient to avoid a miscarriage of justice even where joined with a general charge of ‘maintaining a sexual relationship’). 523. Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 57–8. See possible contrary argument in Odgers, n 31 above, at

[EA.110.90]. 524. See, for example, directions of trial judge approved by CCA in R v OGD (No 2) (2000) 50 NSWLR 433 at [113]–[116]; R v El-Kheir [2004] NSWCCA 461 at [68]–[93] (Tobias JA followed common law authority in holding that the trial judge had not sufficiently directed the jury to eschew tendency reasoning arising from evidence of bad character adduced by the prosecution in rebuttal of good character evidence adduced by the defendant). 525. R v Vye (1993) 97 Cr App R 134; R v Cain (1994) 99 Cr App R 208; R v Aziz [1996] AC 41. 526. Because of the serious consequences which ensue when good character is raised, failure by counsel to inquire whether that good character evidence may be met by damning evidence of bad character may give grounds for successful appeal: R v Hamilton (1993) 68 A Crim R 298 at 299–303 (Hunt CJ at CL). In R v D (1996) 86 A Crim R 41, Hunt CJ at CL held the failure to call evidence of good character after counsel indicated he so intended resulted in a miscarriage of justice. In, for example, Gallant v R [2006] NSWCCA 339; Hajar v R [2015] VSCA 233; Smith v R [2015] VSCA 256, the failure of counsel to call good character evidence did not lead to successful appeal. 527. On the subject of evidence revealing third party disposition generally, see Pattenden, ‘Character of Victims and Third Parties in Criminal Proceedings Other than Rape Trials’ [1986] Crim LR 367. Where the prosecution tenders evidence of the propensity of a person with whom the accused is closely involved care must be taken that the propensity is not, through association, used against the accused: cf Sabek v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 195 (fact that person to whom the accused handed packages was a drug dealer held relevant and admissible to infer their illegal contents). 528. [1958] SASR 95. 529. Followed in R v Beech (1978) 20 SASR 410. See also Re Knowles [1984] VR 751; R v PP (2002) 135 A Crim R 575; [2002] VSC 523; R v Portelli (2004) 10 VR 259 at [33]; R v Hajistassi (2010) 107 SASR 67; [2010] SASC 111 at [14]–[16] (White and David JJ). Cf R v Mogg (2000) 112 A Crim R 417 (prior drug convictions of deceased victim irrelevant to accused’s defence). 530. See R v Bishop [1975] QB 274: the revelation of these proclivities constituted an imputation enabling cross-examination of the accused about past crimes and bad character. See also R v Von Einem (1985) 38 SASR 207: the deceased’s attitude to homosexuality became relevant. 531. (1991) 28 FCR 103. See also R v FTG (2007) 15 VR 685; [2007] VCA 109 at [75]–[76] (accused permitted to call the accused’s son to testify to complainant’s false allegations against him of similar sexual assaults to establish the complainant’s animosity towards accused and his family). 532. [2002] 25 WAR 382 (particularly at [243]–[244], [261], [285]). 533. As the courts appear to do in R v Scopelliti (1981) 34 OR (2d) 524 (CA (Ontario)); Knight v Jones; Ex parte Jones [1981] Qd R 98 at 101; R v Livingstone [1987] 1 Qd R 38 at 43–4. Although in Cheney v R the judges toy with the Makin rule before asserting that no exclusionary rule operates and the issue is merely one of sufficient relevance, the court in Button v R (2002) 25 WAR 382 at [243]–[244], [261] is more forthright in rejecting any exclusionary rule. 534. See, for example, R v Harmer (1987) 28 A Crim R 35 (CCA (Vic)); R v Edwards [1991] 2 All ER 266. Courts should be ever wary of police corruption and take a liberal view of sufficient relevance in permitting counsel to cross-examine and to tender evidence of possible corruption: see Pattenden, ‘Evidence of Previous Malpractice by Police Witnesses and R v Edwards’ [1992] Crim LR 549. Where it is alleged a witness has fabricated evidence, as a matter of credibility the collateral evidence rule (see further 7.139ff) may be invoked to prevent evidence beyond the witness’s cross-examination; but cf the liberal approach to that rule in R v Lawrence [2002] 2 Qd R 400; [2001] QCA 441 at [5]–[20] (McPherson JA), [24]–[38] (Thomas JA), [41]–[54] (White J). 535. Duff v R (1979) 39 FLR 315; Cheney v R (1991) 28 FCR 103 at 111–12.

536. In Green (a Pseudonym) v R [2015] VSCA 279 at [34]–[38], the court suggested s 55 applied more liberally to tender by an accused — while still excluding letters of the complainant as irrelevant. 537. (2004) 149 A Crim R 21; [2004] NSWCCA 280. 538. Distinguished in Spruill v R [2008] NSWCCA 39 at [40]–[43] (Hodgson JA). In Elias v R [2006] NSWCCA 365 at [30]–[31], Simpson J agreed with Hidden J in Cakovski that the evidence in that case could not be other than ‘tendency evidence’. 539. Cf Elias v R [2006] NSWCCA 365 at [24]–[26] (Simpson J). 540. See also R v Bryce (No 2) (2014) 240 A Crim R 471; [2014] NSWSC 498, where Beech-Jones J ruled that evidence of complainant’s tendency to violence and self-harm satisfied s 97 as having the capacity to be important in raising reasonable possibilities inconsistent with aspects of the Crown case. 541. See generally Scutt, ‘Admissibility of Sexual History Evidence and Allegations in Rape Cases’ (1979) 53 Aust LJ 817; McNamara, ‘Cross-Examination of the Complainant in a Trial for Rape’ (1981) 5 Crim LJ 25; Odgers, ‘Evidence of Sexual History in Sexual Offence Trials’ (1986) 11 Syd LR 73; Naffine, ‘Windows on the Legal Mind: The Evocation of Rape in Legal Writing’ (1992) 18 Melb ULR 741; McDonald, ‘Her Sexuality as Indicative of His Innocence: The Operation of New Zealand’s “Rape Shield” Provision’ (1994) 18 Crim LJ 321; Conaghan and Russell, ‘Rape Myths, Law, and Feminist Research: “Myths About Myths”?’ (2014) 22 Fem Legal Stud 25; Hunter, ‘Rape Law, Past Wrongs and Legal Fiction’ in Hunter et al, The Integrity of the Criminal Process, Hart, Oxford, 2016. See also articles referred to in n 561 below. 542. R v Morgan [1976] AC 182. For a critique of the narrowness of the common law notion of consent, see Waye, ‘Rape and the Unconscionable Bargain’ (1992) 16 Crim LJ 94. 543. The statutory provisions relating to consent and rape in Australia are: Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 268.14; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 61HA, 61I, 61J, 61JA; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) ss 348–349; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 46–48; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) ss 2A, 185; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 34C, 38; Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) ss 319(2), 325–326; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 54; Criminal Code (NT) s 192. 544. In the code jurisdictions an (honest and reasonable) mistaken belief in consent is a defence, with the evidential burden upon the accused: Criminal Code (Cth) ss 9.1, 13.3; Criminal Code (Qld) s 24; Criminal Code (Tas) s 14; Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 24; Criminal Code (NT) s 32. 545. By the same token the prosecution might seek to disclose the complainant’s lack of sexual experience to make allegations of consent to more extreme assaults less credible: see, for example, R v Byczko (1977) 16 SASR 506 at 520. In R v Allingham [1991] 1 Qd R 429, a majority (with McPherson J strongly dissenting) considered chastity (virginity) relevant beyond credit to the issue of consent itself, allowing it to be revealed in the complainant’s evidence-in-chief. In R v Wannan (2006) 94 SASR 521, the complainant was permitted to testify in-chief to her reluctance to have sex whilst menstruating as relevant to the issue of consent. 546. The distinction between relevance to the issue and relevance to credit is not an easy or clear one, and credit can assume such significance in a case that the very issues will turn upon its assessment. For further discussion, see 7.116, 7.139–7.141. 547. Thereby contradicting, where appropriate, answers given by the complainant in cross-examination: R v Clarke (1817) 2 Stark 241; 171 ER 633; R v Riley (1887) 18 QBD 481; R v Bashir [1969] 3 All ER 692; R v Krausz (1973) 57 Cr App R 466; Gregory v R (1983) 151 CLR 566. By the same token where cross-examination raises an issue that could not have been foreseen by the prosecution it may be permitted to call evidence by way of rebuttal: cf R v Wannan (2006) 94 SASR 521 at [33]–[39] (Doyle CJ).

548. See, for example, R v Cockcroft (1870) 11 Cox CC 410; R v Holmes (1871) LR 1 CCR 334; R v Thompson [1951] SASR 135. See further 7.139–7.141. 549. R v Fitzgibbon (1885) 11 VLR 232; R v Riley (1887) 18 QBD 481. 550. R v Clarke (1817) 2 Stark 241; 171 ER 633; R v Tissington (1843) 1 Cox CC 48; R v Hanrahan [1967] 2 NSWR 717. 551. R v Clay (1851) 5 Cox CC 14; R v Holmes (1871) LR 1 CCR 334; R v Riley (1887) 18 QBD 481; R v Greatbanks [1959] Crim LR 450; R v Bashir [1969] 3 All ER 692; R v Krausz (1973) 57 Cr App R 466. 552. R v Cockcroft (1870) 11 Cox CC 410; R v Holmes (1871) LR 1 CCR 334; R v Bashir [1969] 3 All ER 692. 553. Compare with R v Morgan [1976] AC 182. 554. General irrelevance is asserted by Simpson J in R v Burton [2013] NSWCCA 335 at [68]. But see R v De Angelis (1979) 20 SASR 288; Gregory v R (1983) 151 CLR 566; Starkey v R [1988] 2 Qd R 294. 555. See in particular R v Gun; Ex parte Stephenson (1977) 17 SASR 165 at 168 (Bray CJ), 173–4 (Zelling J), 170 (Wells J). Though cf R v Johns (1992) SASC 12–13 (Bollen J, 26 August 1992, unreported). 556. (1983) 151 CLR 566. See also R v De Angelis (1979) 20 SASR 288; Starkey v R [1988] 2 Qd R 294. 557. Generally, see, for example, Conaghan, Law and Gender, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013; McGlynn and Munro (eds), Rethinking Rape Law: International and Comparative Perspectives, Routledge, London, 2010; Bourke, Rape: A History from 1860 to the Present, Virago, London, 2007; Daly and Maher, Criminology at the Crossroads: Feminist Readings in Crime and Justice, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998. 558. (1960) 105 CLR 279 at 283. In fairness it should be noted that the matters that the accused sought to elicit in this case were of genuine relevance to the complainant’s credit, it being claimed that she had previously falsely accused another. In R v Richardson [1989] Qd R 583 (Vasta J dissenting), previous acts of consensual intercourse were regarded as admissible as relevant to the complainant’s credit. 559. See the strong remarks in R v Gun; Ex parte Stephenson (1977) 17 SASR 165 at 168 (Bray CJ), 174 (Zelling J), 185 (Wells J). The general statutory powers now available are even more extensive: see uniform legislation ss 103 (cross-examination must ‘substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness’) and 41 (in other than Victoria prohibiting improper questions to witnesses generally, and in Victoria such questions to vulnerable witnesses unless necessary); Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) ss 20– 21; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 22–25; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 25, 26. See further 7.137–7.138. 560. See, for example, the cross-examination quoted in the Victorian Law Reform Commission report, ‘Rape: Reform of Law and Procedure’, Interim Report No 42 (1991), Appendices, pp 167–8. 561. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 293; Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 (Qld) s 4; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34L; Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 194M; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 339–352; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 36A–36BC; Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (ACT) ss 49–53; Sexual Offences (Evidence and Procedure) Act (NT) s 4. Discussed by McNamara, n 541 above. See generally Flowe, Ebbesen and Puycha-Bhagavatula, ‘Rape Shield Laws and Sexual Behavior Evidence: Effects of Consent Level and Women’s Sexual History on Rape Allegations’ (2007) 31 Law & Hum Behav 159. For a comprehensive summary of debate and early reform in this area, see Character and Conduct, ALRC Evidence Reference Research Paper No 11 (1983), pp 168–202, and on potential effects of particular formulations, see Spohn and Horney, ‘“The Law’s the Law, but Fair is Fair”: Rape Shield Laws and Officials’ Assessments of Sexual History Evidence’ (2006) 29 Criminology 137. 562. See, for example, HG v R (1999) 197 CLR 414 at 425, 456 (New South Wales legislation not confined to sexual offences where consent is in issue). Applied to Queensland legislation in R v Bauer [2006] 1

Qd R 420; [2005] QCA 305 at [1]–[3] (McPherson JA), [22] (Williams JA), [43]–[45] (Wilson J). 563. In Western Australia, these provisions only apply to evidence adduced by or on behalf of the accused. 564. In HAR v Western Australia (No 2) [2015] WASCA 249 at [150], the court confirmed, referring to Bolton v Western Australia (2007) 180 A Crim R 191; [2007] WASCA 277 at [36] (Steytler P, Buss and Miller JJA agreeing) that the absence of sexual experience or of a particular sexual experience did not fall within s 36BC of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA). In New South Wales, South Australia and Tasmania, the legislation expressly extends to evidence revealing the lack of sexual experience or activity. 565. The Victorian legislation also requires consideration of the need to avoid jury bias, to respect the complainant’s personal dignity and privacy, and to ensure the accused’s right to defend the charge: Criminal Procedure Act 2009 s 349. The South Australian legislation requires the admission also to be in ‘the interests of justice’; Evidence Act 1929 s 34L(2)(b): R v Sparks (2014) 121 SASR 132; [2014] SASCFC 122 at [57] (Vanstone J emphasising the requirements to be satisfied before cross-examination is permitted). 566. R v De Angelis (1979) 20 SASR 288 at 289. In New South Wales, where exceptional circumstances for admitting evidence of sexual experience are specified without reference to probative value there may be more scope for exercise of the balancing process: cf R v Dann [2000] NSWCCA 185 at [34]–[36]. 567. See, for example, R v Stergiou (2004) 147 A Crim R 120; [2004] WASC 172 at [28], [35] (Le Miere J). In Bolton v Western Australia (2007) 180 A Crim R 191; [2007] WASCA at [20], the trial judge edited down conversations revealing sexual disposition by reference to this interest. 568. A reputation is what others think are a person’s propensities or tendencies, whether or not it has any empirical justification, whereas a disposition seeks to embody what those propensities or tendencies actually are: see O’Sullivan v R (2012) 233 A Crim R 449; [2012] NSWCCA 45 at [99]–[101] (Davies and Garling JJ) (holding evidence was of disposition rather than reputation and should have been exceptionally permitted under s 293(4)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act). 569. The apparent broadness of this prohibition (Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 36BA) and its relationship to the provision (s 36BC) permitting revelation of ‘sexual experiences’, not being part of the res gestae, in exceptional circumstances, was considered by the High Court in Bull v R (2000) 201 CLR 443. The court held admissible a prior conversation between the complainant and one of the accused that tended to prove that she visited the accused for the purpose of having group sex. Gleeson CJ (at [22]) and Kirby J (at [150]) limited s 36BA to evidence tendered as dispositional evidence and, insofar as the evidence was not so tendered and was probative beyond disposition s 36BC applied. The majority (at [102]ff) refused so to read down s 36BA. It held (at [115]) that evidence of disposition absolutely prohibited by s 36BA was evidence tending to prove the complainant was the ‘kind of person’ to participate in the conduct alleged, that insofar as such evidence also revealed otherwise admissible sexual experiences these were subject to s 36BC and could be admitted as res gestae or otherwise by leave of the court; but that insofar as the conversation in question was only admissible to prove the reason why the complainant visited the accused (the assertions in the statement being hearsay) it was not evidence of sexual reputation, disposition or experiences of the complainant and therefore not caught by either section. The hearsay aspects of Bull are discussed at 8.46. Bull was discussed and applied in Bolton v Western Australia (2007) 180 A Crim R 191; [2007] WASCA 277 to admit prior conversations in an internet chat-room between the accused and complainant in which the complainant appeared to agree to meet for a sexual relationship; insofar as the conversation itself could be regarded as evidence of sexual experience the court held that it was substantially relevant to the facts in issue (at [65]–[66]). Bull applied in VOT v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 102 at [12]–[14] (Steytler P), [31]–[34] (Miller JA), [62]–[64] (EM Heenan AJA). 570. In R v Wannan (2006) 94 SASR 521 at [54]–[59], Doyle CJ held that examination to establish

complainant’s reluctance to have sex when menstruating was not prohibited as evidence of general disposition because it did not raise ‘kind of person reasoning’. The Victorian legislation expressly provides that sexual history evidence is not admissible to support the inference that a complainant is the type of person more likely to consent to the sexual activity alleged: Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 343. 571. Rare because, generally, belief must be based upon what the complainant does and says at the time: R v De Angelis (1979) 20 SASR 288 at 293; Beck and Smith v R [1984] WAR 127 at 131–2; R v Richardson [1989] 1 Qd R 583. 572. The majority in Bull v R (2000) 201 CLR 443 at [62] suggest that ‘sexual experiences’ cover sexual activity rather than the complainant’s knowledge of sexual matters, or evidence of her physical state. Sexual activity is capable of a broad interpretation to include all activities, including conversation, with sexual overtones the disclosure of which may distress a complainant: see Bolton v Western Australia (2007) 180 A Crim R 191; [2007] WASCA 277 at [37]–[42], [65]–[66]. Cross-examination to establish a false complaint or failure to complain is not about prohibited sexual experiences: R v Stergiou (2004) 147 A Crim R 120; [2004] WASC 172 at [19] (Le Miere J); Bolton v Western Australia (2007) 180 A Crim R 191 at [36]; VOT v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 102 at [12]–[14] (Steytler P), [31]–[34] (Miller JA), [62]–[64] (EM Heenan AJA). 573. ‘Sexual activities’ are not confined to consensual activities: HG v R (1999) 197 CLR 414 at [28]–[31] (Gleeson CJ), [70] (Gaudron J), [92] (McHugh J), [124] (Gummow J), [147] (Hayne J); R v Wannan (2006) 94 SASR 521 at [44] (Doyle CJ) (see n 545 above). 574. By virtue of the wide definition of ‘sexual experience’ in s 194M(6) of the Evidence Act 2001. 575. Discussed in R v M (1993) 67 A Crim R 549 at 554–5. 576. Legislation now requires the judge to disallow ‘improper questions’. See n 559 above. 577. See, for example, R v C (1991) 59 A Crim R 46 (CCA (Vic)); R v Holloway (2014) 239 A Crim R 108; [2014] ACTSC 54. 578. See, for example, Le Miere J in R v Stergiou (2004) 147 A Crim R 120; [2004] WASC 172 at [24]–[28], referring to Hill v R [2003] WASCA 177 and preferring the view that cross-examination of the complainant about her previous complaints of sexual assault to suggest prior opportunities to implicate the accused was relevant only to her credibility. A similar inconclusive preference is expressed in VOT v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 102 at [15]–[17] (Steytler P), [38]–[41] (Miller JA), [68], [70]–[72] (EM Heenan AJA). 579. The catalogue includes evidence of the complainant’s experiences in relation to the sexual activity alleged; evidence of events which are part of the circumstances of the alleged crime; evidence of the relationship between complainant and accused (‘relationship’ interpreted to embrace the guilty passion of the accused in circumstances in which it would be otherwise admissible at common law against the accused: R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510, particularly Hunt CJ at CL at 515–21); evidence relevant to explaining whether the presence of semen, pregnancy, disease or injury is attributable to the sexual intercourse alleged (‘injury’ interpreted to include psychological injury in R v Dimian (1995) 83 A Crim R 358); and evidence relevant to rebutting prosecution evidence relating to the complainant’s sexual (in)experience. Once evidence is within a defined exception the court must consider whether its probative value outweighs possible distress to complainant (and possible prejudice to accused): R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 at 521 (Hunt CJ at CL). 580. R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 at 516 (Hunt CJ at CL); R v M (1993) 67 A Crim R 549 at 555–8 (Allen J speaking for CCA (NSW)). This does not prevent courts taking, where possible, a liberal view in interpreting the exceptions to ensure an accused has access to relevant information: R v Morgan (1993) 30 NSWLR 543 at 551 (Mahoney JA); R v Dimian (1995) 83 A Crim R 358. In Grills v R

(1996) 70 ALJR 905, the High Court remarked that it could not grant leave to appeal merely because it thought ‘a law enacted by the Parliament is unfair’, and see dicta in HG v R (1999) 197 CLR 414 at [46]–[47] (Gleeson CJ), [150]–[151] (Hayne J). For an example of a textual approach in upholding the refusal to allow cross-examination under s 293(4)(a)(i), see GEH v R (2012) 228 A Crim R 32; [2012] NSWCCA 150. 581. (1988) 2 Qd R 294. For a similar scenario, see AM v R (2006) 164 A Crim R 558; [2006] NTCCA 18. The difficulties faced by trial judges in restricting cross-examination are illustrated by English cases where the Court of Appeal has intervened: see R v Begie [1992] Crim LR 301; R v SMS [1992] Crim LR 310. 582. On special procedures protecting vulnerable witnesses more generally, see 7.33–7.34. 583. Maisel v Financial Times (1915) 84 LJKB 2145. 584. Scott v Sampson (1882) 8 QBD 491; Plato Films v Speidel [1961] AC 1090. 585. Waters v Sunday Pictorial Newspapers Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 967; Goody v Odham’s Press [1967] 1 QB 333. 586. Hobbs v Tinling [1929] 2 KB 1. 587. For a strong and well researched argument to this conclusion, see Cox, ‘Similar Fact Evidence — With Particular Attention to Civil Trials’, a paper presented to the SA Law Society CLE program, 26 June 1991. 588. Attorney-General v Bowman (1791) 2 Bos & Pul 532; 126 ER 1423; Cornwall v Richardson (1825) Ry & Mood 305; 171 ER 1029. 589. This conclusion would appear to be borne out in cases such as ACCC v CC (NSW) (1999) 92 FCR 375; Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51; Martin v New South Wales [2002] NSWCA 337; Ibrahim v Pham [2007] NSWCA 215 at [229]–[267] (Campbell JA); Richards v Macquarie Bank Ltd (No 2) (2012) 301 ALR 494; [2012] FCA 1403; Stanley v Service to Youth Council Inc (No 2) (2014) 317 ALR 141; [2014] FCA 644. 590. Many of these cases are conveniently collected in Forbes, Similar Facts, LawBook Co, Sydney, 1987, Ch 8. See also Cox, n 587 above. 591. (1858) 4 CB(NS) 388; 140 ER 1135. 592. [1908] 2 KB 601. 593. In Zanic Pty Ltd v Svelte Corp Pty Ltd (1995) 61 FCR 171, decided under s 97, Lehane J at 176 relied upon common law cases for guidance upon ‘significant probative value’. 594. See, for example, Taylor v Harvey [1986] 2 Qd R 137 at 140–1 (Carter J); and Sheldon v Sun Alliance Ltd (1988) 50 SASR 236 at 247 (Von Doussa J), which was, however, reversed on appeal on this point: Sheldon v Sun Alliance Ltd (1989) 53 SASR 97 at 148 (Bollen J with Prior J agreeing). 595. See, for example, HW Thompson Building Pty Ltd v Alien Property Services Pty Ltd (1983) 48 ALR 667 at 675 (St John J); Boyre v Cafred Pty Ltd (1984) 4 FCR 367 at 370–1 (Spender J); Peet & Co Ltd v Rocci [1985] WAR 164 at 172–4 (Rowland J); Aroutsidis v Illawarra Nominees Pty Ltd (1990) 21 FCR 500 at 508–9 (Hill J). 596. Mister Figgins Pty Ltd v Centrepoint Freeholds Pty Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 23 (Northrop J); Gates v City Mutual Life Assurance Society Ltd (1982) 43 ALR 313 at 327–8 (Ellicott J); Turner v Jenolan Investments Pty Ltd (1985) 7 ATPR ¶40,571 at ¶46,635 (Beaumont J); O’Connor v Stevenson (1988) 13 IPR 145 (Einfeld J); DF Lyons Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1991) 100 ALR 468 at 478 (Gummow J). 597. Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51 at [73], [82]. 598. (1989) 53 SASR 97 (discussed by McCausland (1991) 13 Syd LR 620).

599. [1976] Ch 119 at 127 (applied by Warner J in Berger v Raymond Sun Ltd [1984] 1 WLR 625). 600. See discussion of authorities by Douglas J in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Managed Investments Pty Ltd (No 7) [2014] QSC 72; [2015] 2 Qd R 32 at [21]–[25]. 601. Manenti v Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board [1954] VLR 115; David Symes and Co Ltd v Mather [1977] VR 516 at 531; Mister Figgins Pty Ltd v Centrepoint Freeholds Pty Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 23 at 31 (Northrop J); Sheldon v Sun Alliance Ltd (1988) 50 SASR 236 at 247 (Von Doussa J); The Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Pilmer (1994) 63 SASR 364 at 378–9 (Mulligan J); Polycarpou v Australian Wire Industries Pty Ltd (1995) 36 NSWLR 49 at 60–7 (Kirby P). 602. Hollingham v Head (1858) 4 CB(NS) 388; 140 ER 1135; Managers of the Metropolitan Asylum District v Hill (1882) 47 LT(NS) 29. 603. See, for example, Jacara Pty Ltd v Auto-Bake Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 417 at [19] (Sundberg J). 604. Cases discussing the application of s 97 include Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51 (representations to a number of other tenants tendency evidence but differences prevented significant probative value); cf Century Yuasa Batteries Pty Ltd v Martin [2002] FCA 722 at [32] (marketing of batteries to unidentified customers admissible tendency evidence of contempt of court constituted by marketing of batteries to named persons); ACCC v 4WD Systems Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 850 at [49]–[52] (Selway J) (non-tendency evidence established business system involving franchises); Trylow v Commissioner of Tax [2004] FCA 446 at [109], [117]–[118] (evidence showing that company employed other persons non-tendency evidence to establish nature of company’s business); Tambree v Travel Compensation Fund [2004] NSWCA 24 at [98]–[100] (improbability that a business practice departed from not coincidence evidence within s 98); Cantarella Bros Pty Ltd v Andreason [2005] NSWSC 579 at [12]–[13] (statements in prior failed negotiation insisting that umbrellas be provided not regarded as tendency evidence to support contractor’s testimony that later successful agreement contained such a term; anyway of significant probative value); Bective Station Pty Ltd v AWB (Aust) Ltd [2006] FCA 1596 (tendency evidence — representations to other purchasers of wheat — was of significant probative value; but evidence of absence of representations to other purchasers, while tendency evidence, was not of significant probative value); Richards v Macquarie Bank Ltd (No 2) (2012) 301 ALR 494; [2012] FCA 1403 (previous statements not of significant probative value to establish misleading representations in issue); Aristocrat Technologies Aust Pty Ltd v Global Gaming Supplies Pty Ltd [2013] HCA 21 at [35]–[36] (open to Court of Appeal to find trial judge relied on tendency reasoning without considering s 97). 605. This same conclusion is reached by Sackville J in Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 106 FCR 51 at [70]–[71]. 606. Hollingham v Head (1858) 4 CB(NS) 388; 140 ER 1135; Managers of the Metropolitan Asylum District v Hill (1882) 47 LT(NS) 29; Hales v Kerr [1908] 2 KB 601; Manenti v Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board [1954] VLR 115 at 117; Kriss v City of South Perth [1966] WAR 210; Mister Figgins Pty Ltd v Centrepoint Freeholds Pty Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 23 at 30. Some cases admit propensity evidence as relevant when it can be described as reaching a form of habit or practice: see Eichsteadt v Lahrs [1961] Qd R 457 (High Court); Connor v Blacktown District Hospital [1971] 1 NSWLR 713. On the relevance of a habit or practice to credit of a lawyer as witness, see Palios Meegan v Shore (2010) 108 SASR 31; [2010] SASCFC 21 at [80]–[86] (Gray J). 607. Culley v Silhouette Health Studios Pty Ltd (1966) 2 NSWR 640; Mood Music Publishing Co Ltd v De Wolfe Ltd [1976] Ch 119 at 127; Sheldon v Sun Alliance Ltd (1989) 53 SASR 97. 608. Verry v Watkins (1836) 7 Car & P 308; 173 ER 137; Butterworth v Butterworth and Englefield [1920] P 126 at 145.

[page 319]

Chapter Four

Unreliable Evidence: Corroboration and Related Rules Introduction Rules of ‘exclusion’ 4.1 The complete exclusion of an accused’s discreditable or criminal conduct on occasions other than that charged illustrates the most extreme stance that the law may take in the face of the revelation of possibly unreliable evidence. As we will see in Chapter 5, this exclusionary approach is taken where public policy demands that evidence, however it may be relevant, be not revealed. Other so-called exclusionary rules merely forbid the tender of evidence for a particular purpose (use), so that if it is otherwise relevant it may be received for that other purpose (use). For example, under the uniform legislation, ss 97 and 98 exclude evidence tendered as tendency or coincidence evidence, so that where that same evidence has a relevant purpose independent of tendency or coincidence reasoning it may be tendered for that purpose.1 And, as we will see in Chapter 8, at common law and under the uniform legislation, evidence of an out-of-court statement is excluded as hearsay if it is relevant to a material fact only in reliance upon the truth of an assertion of fact in that statement. If the statement is relevant independently of the truth of any assertion of fact in it — for example, to identify a characteristic speech pattern — it is outside the common law hearsay rule and may be received for that purpose.2 Both at common law and

under the uniform legislation, there is an important distinction between these two ‘exclusionary’ techniques.3 [page 320] 4.2 In this context of rules of evidence based upon possible unreliability, at common law only evidence of an accused’s other misconduct remains subject to an exclusionary technique. The now abolished common law disqualification of witnesses on grounds of interest is a past example. The restrictions upon the physical and psychological competence of witnesses, imposed through the requirement of an oath or other testimonial formality, are another means for ensuring reliability; they are, however, so closely related to the nature of the adversary trial that they are dealt with in that adversarial context: see 7.28ff. The uniform legislation takes similar approaches; although the exclusionary technique applied to evidence of an accused’s other misconduct is purposive, other provisions exclude unreliable evidence without any express consideration of the purpose of the tender, for example identification evidence: Pt 3.9. 4.3 The common law test of ‘sufficient relevance’ may also lead to the exclusion of possibly unreliable evidence, but it is not capable of analysis as a definitive rule of admissibility and it is better left either in the realm of natural rules of fact discovery, or regarded as an aspect of the residual discretion. Nor can the residual discretion, particularly that aspect which applies in a criminal case to exclude information which is more prejudicial than probative, be analysed usefully as a definitive rule based upon notions of unreliability: see 2.26–2.37. Yet, in everyday practical terms, notions of sufficient relevance and the residuary discretion remain available as extremely important vehicles for the exclusion of possibly unreliable evidence. Many trials turn upon decisions made upon these less than definitive notions,4 although it is difficult for a convicted accused to succeed on appeal by arguing that the reception of possibly unreliable evidence has produced a miscarriage of justice.5 These residuary [page 321] exclusionary vehicles are commonly argued at trial by counsel where the more

definitive exclusionary rules run out.

Rules requiring confirmation or warning 4.4 But at common law there are other than exclusionary techniques that can be used to control the tender and reception of possibly unreliable evidence.6 These are essentially employed in criminal cases to ensure that the high standard of proof is not undermined by juries giving excessive probative value to prosecution testimony that is possibly unreliable. First, and most drastically, the law may insist that, although admissible, potentially unreliable testimony must be supported by other relevant evidence before it is acted upon. This approach, requiring corroboration, was avoided by the common law. This is in interesting contrast to the more formal systems of civil and canon law (deriving from the Roman law) where the number of witnesses for proof was often specified.7 With the common law jury originally a body of witnesses, such a formal approach was inappropriate, and as the adversary trial developed together with the age of reason in the eighteenth century, new rationalist theories argued against more formalistic approaches to proof.8 Only in one situation, prosecutions for perjury, did the common law insist that proof go beyond the oath of one witness against another, thus ensuring some independent proof of falsity.9 All other examples of mandatory corroboration are derived from statute, where legislators have employed the technique to protect defendants from possibly unreliable accusers. Distraught complainants and the young have historically been singled out as potentially unreliable, as well as defendants in affiliation proceedings. However, as is discussed below, most Australian legislatures have now come to realise that to require corroboration in most cases is to go too far. And the uniform legislation [page 322] endorses this position by providing generally in s 164(1) that ‘[i]t is not necessary that evidence upon which a party relies be corroborated’.10 4.5 There are other non-exclusionary techniques that fall short of requiring corroboration. For example, courts can insist instead that triers, particularly juries, are strongly warned against acting on possibly unreliable testimony alone,

although ultimately leaving them to decide whether, in the particular circumstances, it is appropriate to so act. This is the common law approach to the testimony of accomplices. By this technique, the corroboration warning becomes the requirement rather than the actual corroborative evidence. Failure to give the warning is an error of law leading to successful appeal unless the proviso applies.11 Although no magic formula has evolved, the mandatory corroboration warning is sophisticated. It requires a trial judge to draw the risks of unreliability to the jury’s attention and to direct that it is the court’s experience that it is normally dangerous or unsafe to act upon the testimony in question alone. Furthermore, the judge must define generally corroborative evidence and draw the jury’s attention to the evidence available which is and is not capable of satisfying this definition; the judge must also instruct that, having considered the risks of unreliability, the jury may, even if it decides no corroborative evidence exists, act upon the possibly suspect testimony alone if convinced by it beyond reasonable doubt. This might be called a ‘full corroboration warning’. Its requirements are technical and a trial judge must direct carefully to avoid appealable error. The perils of this technicality have led, as will be seen below, to its gradual reduction by common law judges and legislatures. Section 164(3) of the uniform legislation provides that ‘[d]espite any rule, whether of law or practice’ corroboration warnings are no longer ‘necessary’.12 As is discussed below, this has, unfortunately, not prevented judges from giving warnings in corroboration terms. Consequently, in Victoria, s 164(4) of its ‘uniform’ Evidence Act 2005 prohibits judges from giving warnings in corroboration terms. But a third technique remains to deal with evidence that may be reliable. 4.6 This third technique seeks to avoid the creation of arbitrary and technical ‘rules’ by imposing no mandatory requirement for corroboration or corroboration warning [page 323] at all. Rather, it accepts that, if the risk of convicting the innocent is to be avoided, triers should in every case be aware of the potential unreliabilities of testimony and, if there is any chance that a jury might overlook a potential risk, and give the evidence excessive weight, then it should be appropriately directed. The technique recognises that it is the duty of the trial judge in every case to

draw the jury’s attention to potential unreliabilities that it might overlook. But, as one cannot define exhaustively the circumstances in which these risks arise, nor define exactly what might be an appropriate direction and warning, the onus is cast upon the convicted accused to show that, in all the circumstances, an inadequate direction was given. A direction is inadequate if it gives rise to an unacceptable risk that an innocent accused might have been convicted. Only the circumstances of the individual case, analysed with reference to natural rules of probability and to jury knowledge and awareness, can determine what instruction is appropriate to avoid that risk.13 An appeal will only succeed if the defendant can show that, in all the circumstances, the failure to adequately direct — the failure to warn — has produced a ‘miscarriage of justice’.14 In theory, this technique goes no further than a judge’s general duty to instruct the jury adequately so that there is no risk of a miscarriage of justice. But the precedential nature of the common law creates judicial categorisations such that, when certain fact situations arise, a prudent trial judge will always carefully consider the need for warning, and appellate judges will readily infer an unacceptable risk of injustice where no, or what is regarded as an inadequate, warning has been given. And again the force of precedent inexorably drives trial judges in deciding what is an adequate warning in the circumstances. It seems to be difficult (perhaps impossible) for lawyers to accept that these decisions must ultimately remain decisions on the particular facts and [page 324] circumstances of the individual case and should not be regarded as decisions creating precedential rules.15 4.7 Two broad approaches have been taken at common law to possibly suspect testimony in terms of the warning prudently required under this third technique. The first demands that a full corroboration warning should as a matter of practice be given by the trial judge. Its absence will not necessarily be fatal, but in most cases failure to give the full warning will enable the accused to establish an appealable miscarriage of justice. At common law, the testimony of children and of persons complaining of sexual assault fell into this category although, as is seen below, legislation has now abolished any requirements to warn about such testimony. The uniform legislation (s 164(3)) goes further and provides that such

corroboration warnings as a matter of practice are no longer necessary.16 But in Victoria, s 164(3) now applies only to civil jury trial, s 164(4) has been added prohibiting corroboration warnings altogether in criminal proceedings before a jury, and s 164(6) expressly abolishes the common law principles and rules requiring corroboration warnings. 4.8 The second category of suspect testimony requires at common law a much less defined direction. There is no set warning. There is no need to warn in terms of the presence or absence of corroboration. But it remains important that the jury have drawn to its attention what are in the courts’ experience possible unreliabilities if a miscarriage of justice is to be avoided. The question on appeal is whether the jury may have overlooked some possible unreliability in reaching its decision that has created an unacceptable risk that an innocent accused was convicted. This will depend upon all the facts and circumstances and the nature of the direction given by the trial judge. Nevertheless, there are various categories of testimony that generally require some direction if the jury is to decide in a properly informed manner. For example, identification testimony generally requires some instruction. Yet, despite precedential guidance from appellate courts, the precise scope of that instruction remains dependent upon the particular circumstances of the individual case. [page 325] As already emphasised, at common law this third technique strictly involves no further obligation than the trial judge’s general duty to appropriately direct the jury so that the risk of a miscarriage of justice is avoided. The continuation of the judge’s general duty to so direct is expressly recognised in s 165(5) of the uniform legislation; but in Victoria this subsection applies only in civil proceedings before a jury and Pt 4 Div 3 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 seeks to codify the directions permitted in criminal trials before a jury where ‘evidence of a kind that may be unreliable’ is admitted. 4.9 The approach to possibly unreliable evidence taken by the uniform legislation in jurisdictions other than Victoria does not fit entirely neatly within these common law techniques. It rejects in s 164 the need for corroboration or corroboration warnings, whether demanded as a matter of law or as a matter of practice, and recognises in s 165(5) the continuation of the trial judge’s general

common law duty to direct the jury. But in addition, s 165(1)–(4) provides that where evidence is ‘of a kind that may be unreliable’17 (specifying a nonexhaustive list of seven such types of evidence) then: (2) If there is a jury and a party so requests, the judge is to: (a)

warn the jury that the evidence may be unreliable; and

(b) inform the jury of matters that may cause it to be unreliable; and (c) warn the jury of the need for caution in determining whether to accept the evidence and the weight to be given to it.

It might be noted that whilst these provisions generally apply irrespective of whether the proceedings are civil or criminal and which party tenders the evidence in question, many of the specified categories of unreliable information apply only in criminal proceedings and their principal application is where the unreliable evidence implicates an accused. The accused must therefore request the warning.18 The judge [page 326] may only refuse to grant this under s 165(3) ‘if there are good reasons for not doing so’ (and the trial judge should generally give reasons: R v Beattie).19 There is no obligation to use any particular form of words in giving the warning: s 165(4). 4.10 Thus, under s 165, a ‘warning’ becomes obligatory on request. In the absence of ‘good reasons’, failure to comply with the request and adequately warn appears to be an error of law demanding successful appeal unless the proviso applies. But neither are the circumstances in which the warning must be given clear,20 nor are the terms of the warnings required specified.21 So that in the absence of a quite specific request an accused will bear the onus of establishing these matters if the appellate court is to find a prima facie error. The Crown may meet the accused’s argument by showing either that there were good reasons for not warning, or that the warnings given were adequate. Even if there is error the Crown can still seek to convince the court to apply the proviso.22 In practical terms, in the absence of a quite specific request, the onus upon the accused to establish the inadequacy of the warning appears to be only marginally less than, and barely indistinguishable from, that required to establish generally that the judge’s direction has produced a miscarriage of justice. The approach of

the uniform legislation is therefore close to the common law technique reliant upon the trial judge’s general duty to direct. Moreover, if an accused cannot establish the conditions for a requested warning under s 165(2), or if no request has been made for a warning under s 165(2), he or she may still, pursuant to s 165(5), rely upon breach of the judge’s general duty to direct in seeking to establish a miscarriage of justice.23 To this extent, [page 327] the third technique of the common law is expressly preserved under the uniform legislation. As will be discussed below, in one case it goes further. In the case of evidence from children (s 165A(1)), the judge is prohibited from giving corroboration warnings or otherwise suggesting children as a class are unreliable witnesses or less reliable than other witnesses. Breach of these prohibitions will ipso facto constitute an error of law prima facie justifying appeal. The situation is similar under s 632(3) of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), which provides that ‘the judge must not warn or suggest in any way to the jury that the law regards any class of persons as unreliable witnesses’. Under s 276 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2005 (Vic), unless the appellant is seeking to show that the verdict is unreasonable or against the weight of evidence, to successfully appeal an appellant must satisfy the court that ‘as the result of an error or an irregularity’ or otherwise ‘there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice’. As a consequence, whatever complaints appellants are making of directions they must establish that these have produced a substantial miscarriage of justice. This effectively enlivens the third technique distinguished here in every case, but even more rigorously than in other jurisdictions because the appellant must also satisfy what in other jurisdictions constitutes the proviso. The Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) governs the requirements and options for directions, but the main thrust of the legislation is to encourage directions that are fact specific and expressed without technicality. The process whereby the judge determines the directions to give is initiated through the request of the parties, and the directions requested must be given unless there are good reasons to the contrary: s 14. Furthermore, these directions alone must be given (s 15) in the

absence of compelling reasons for additional directions (s 16). The object is to simplify directions and reduce appeals. 4.11 It should be emphasised that these non-exclusionary techniques apply principally in criminal cases, where unreliability assumes such crucial importance within the strict standard of proof.24 Furthermore, these techniques generally apply to protect an accused from the risk of a wrongful conviction based upon human [page 328] testimony. Which technique offers appropriate protection ultimately depends upon general principles of proof, the vital question being whether the generalisations produced by the mandatory requirements for either corroboration or a corroboration or other warning (with the resulting difficulties and intricacies of definition) help in the application of these general principles. As the analysis that follows shows, it is doubtful whether this is so. Certainly, parliaments have indicated their distrust of mandatory requirements, as the uniform legislation and now the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) even more clearly illustrate. But appellate courts left to their own devices and under pressure from counsel are, and have long been, reluctant to leave the appropriate directions to the facts and circumstances of the individual case, conscious of their obligation to provide guidance to trial judges and counsel about when some direction may be required if a miscarriage of justice is to be avoided. 4.12 One final preliminary question is whether the common law rules also apply in trials held before a judge or magistrate sitting alone. Certainly where corroboration is mandatory, the rule applies in all trials. But, where only the warning is mandatory, it seems unduly technical for an appellate court to insist pedantically that the judge or magistrate expressly warn himself or herself of the usual need for corroboration. Judges and magistrates should be assumed to be aware of the law, so that the onus is upon the accused either to establish an error of law or a miscarriage of justice from the reasons given for the decision, or to persuade the appellate court that the verdict is unsafe. Nevertheless, remarks by King CJ in Scott v Killian suggest magistrates should indicate in their reasons that they have given themselves appropriate warnings.25 But except where a warning is mandatory,26 the accused already bears the onus of establishing a miscarriage of

justice through the failure of the judge to appreciate the possible unreliabilities of the evidence. [page 329] The uniform legislation abolishes corroboration requirements in all cases (s 164(1)), but corroboration warning requirements are abolished only in trials before juries (s 164(3)),27 and the entitlement to request a warning similarly extends only to jury trials (s 165(2)). The reforms of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) apply only to criminal trials before a jury. The position in trials before judge alone in respect of warnings is thus still governed by the common law.28 4.13 A final perspective to these corroborative techniques is that, even where there has been no error in the application of a mandatory technique and no risk of injustice has been produced through an inadequate direction to the jury, a convicted accused may still appeal upon the basis that the resulting verdict is unsafe or against the weight of the evidence.29 Where an appeal is based on this ground, the appellate court must analyse the evidence in the case to determine whether it entertains a reasonable doubt.30 Whilst appellate courts are reluctant to interfere with a jury’s decisions about the credibility of witnesses, even here the court is bound to interfere if it has a reasonable doubt unless the ‘jury’s advantage in seeing and hearing the evidence is capable of resolving [that] doubt’.31 Having analysed the various non-exclusionary techniques used to protect against possible misuse of unreliable testimony it remains to explain first, to which witnesses each technique applies;32 secondly, the nature of corroborative evidence; and finally, the relationship between judge and jury where each technique is employed and the consequences that follow inadequate direction to the jury. [page 330]

Testimony Requiring Mandatory Corroboration 4.14 As mentioned at 4.4, there is a corroboration requirement at common law only in perjury cases. Otherwise, it has been left to legislators to utilise this

technique. Nowadays, while the common law rule requiring more than the uncorroborated testimony of one witness to establish the falsity of a statement relied upon as perjury is preserved or enacted in some jurisdictions, in others it has been abolished.33 No legislative corroboration requirements remain in the case of the unsworn testimony of children, but some remain for the testimony of persons procured for sexual offences and analogous offences,34 the testimony of complainants in affiliation proceedings,35 and in a variety of other less common situations.36 In most cases, the words of the statute are clear and there are few doubts about the circumstances in which corroboration is required. The courts are therefore unable to go behind the legislation to question the original reasons for the corroboration requirement. At first glance, the reasons why these particular kinds of testimony may be suspect appear obvious — those procured to commit sexual crimes may bear malice towards their accused procurators; complainants in affiliation cases are emotionally involved and have much to gain from the proceedings. But one can only question the propriety of a legal technique that forbids putting aside the generality in a specific case. In the case of children, the technique has been put aside however the child testifies. If any witness is unable to understand the nature of an oath or solemn promise to tell the truth but is otherwise able to give an intelligible account of the events, legislation [page 331] in all jurisdictions permits the witness to testify without formality: see 7.28–7.31. In so permitting unsworn testimony, s 13 of the uniform legislation does not by way of comparison give primacy to sworn testimony, nor treat either sworn or unsworn evidence from any witness as unreliable testimony requiring corroboration or warning: R v GW.37 While the judge must still ensure the jury appreciates the possible risks of a particular child’s evidence being unreliable, the judge must not suggest that children’s evidence as a class is presumptively unreliable: see 4.20–4.21, 4.37–4.39. 4.15 An illustration of the kind of misunderstanding that can result from

arbitrary corroboration rules was the fruitless debate that occurred over whether testimony itself subject to a corroboration requirement could be legally capable of constituting corroboration. Could the testimony of an unsworn child (assuming it is subject to a corroboration requirement) corroborate the testimony of another unsworn child? Initially, courts thought it circular to argue that, in these circumstances, each child could corroborate the other.38 Thus, courts refused to convict upon unsworn children’s testimony alone, no matter how many independent unsworn children testified to the events in question. This approach cannot be justified by natural rules. Proof is not circular but cumulative. Items of evidence, individually of low probative value, may together dramatically increase the probability of the facts in dispute. This is the very reasoning justifying proof based upon circumstantial evidence (strands in a cable of proof). However, it was not until 1973 that the House of Lords finally resolved the issue in favour of the natural rules of proof. 4.16 In DPP v Hester,39 it was held that an unsworn child-witness (by legislation requiring mandatory corroboration) is capable of corroborating the testimony of a sworn witness (requiring a mandatory warning), on the basis that mutual corroboration is permissible. By allowing such mutuality, the House of Lords ruled out any question of acting upon evidence requiring corroboration or warning in isolation. But, having discarded this arbitrary limit, the House of Lords in Hester imposed another, by interpreting the legislative requirement for corroboration of unsworn children’s testimony ‘by some other material evidence in support thereof implicating [the accused]’ as a requirement that the corroborative evidence be other than unsworn testimony admitted pursuant to the section. This problem has now disappeared with the repeal of that legislation demanding mandatory corroboration for the unsworn testimony of children. These technicalities have no rational foundation in natural rules of proof and only help criminals avoid conviction. This has now been appreciated by legislators. [page 332]

Testimony Requiring a Mandatory Corroboration Warning The nature of the warning and the testimony embraced by it 4.17 As explained at 2.14, under appellate legislation in all criminal jurisdictions other than Victoria (where a substantial miscarriage of justice must be established in all cases by an appellant), an error of law during trial constitutes grounds for a successful appeal unless the prosecution can invoke the proviso. Just as it is an error of law to permit the trier to act upon testimony requiring corroboration without corroborative evidence, it is also an error of law for a judge to fail to give a mandatory corroboration warning. Where accomplice testimony is concerned, this proposition is made clear by the House of Lords in Davies v DPP.40 But later courts sometimes had difficulty with this approach and were reluctant to apply the strict proviso where there had been a failure to give the mandatory corroboration warning. For example, in the Victorian case of R v Teitler,41 the majority declared that a failure to warn of the dangers inherent in accomplice testimony would lead to a successful appeal: … unless there was apart from the evidence of the accomplice substantial evidence implicating the applicant and upon which the jury could properly have convicted the applicant even if they had disregarded the evidence of the accomplice.

This appeared to fall short of the requirement in the proviso as then interpreted by the courts that the jury would inevitably have convicted the accused on such evidence.42 4.18 In recent decades some courts have doubted the need to impose mandatory warnings,43 but others44 fudge the issue by refusing to clearly distinguish between cases where a failure to warn itself constitutes error or irregularity (mandatory warning) and cases where the accused must establish that in the circumstances the failure to warn produced a miscarriage of justice (warning as a matter of practice). Unless this distinction is clearly drawn it is impossible to determine the precise legal effect of a failure to warn. Appellate courts may wish to leave their options open where difficult decisions of fact are concerned, but at the very least they should explain what issues a convicted accused must sustain on appeal.

[page 333] 4.19 This lack of clarity makes it difficult to say in which situations at common law a corroboration warning is mandatory. Traditionally, text writers consider that three categories of testimony required such warning: accomplices; children; and complainants of sexual assault. While in England this was clear,45 in Australia there have always been doubts about whether at common law there are any mandatory corroboration warnings. In the case of accomplices, Davies v DPP46 remains the leading authority of persuasion, and while the authority of this case was not overruled by the High Court in Jenkins v R,47 the court makes it clear that the warning is designed for the protection of the accused in a particular trial contested on particular issues, and the obligation for a full corroboration warning arises only where it is required to give this protection. If an accomplice’s testimony is not in dispute or cannot be regarded as implicating the accused or if an accused may be disadvantaged by the full warning (for example, because he or she is seeking to rely upon the testimony) then it appears that it need not be given.48 In the case of sexual assault complainants49 and young children,50 Australian authorities more clearly suggest that at common law a corroboration warning is not mandatory. [page 334] 4.20 However, the common law position in regard to mandatory corroboration warnings has been substantially changed by legislation in every Australian jurisdiction. In jurisdictions other than Victoria, the Uniform Acts provide (s 164(3)) that in all trials before a jury, mandatory corroboration warnings are ‘not necessary’. This provision does not forbid a corroboration or such other warning as may be justified by the particular circumstances of the case,51 and a judge remains always bound to direct the jury in terms which avoid the unacceptable risk of a miscarriage of justice. Similarly, in criminal trials in Queensland (Criminal Code s 632) and Western Australia (Evidence Act 1906 s 50 (which applies to all trials for indictable offences)),52 no mandatory corroboration warnings in respect of witnesses are ‘required’. But in Victoria, s 164(3) of their Uniform Act is restricted to civil jury trials and subs (4) and (6) have been added to prohibit

mandatory warnings altogether in criminal trials and to abolish expressly any common law rules that suggest otherwise. However, in addition, legislation also exists prohibiting the giving of a corroboration or other warning simply upon the basis that a witness belongs to a particular class.53 In Queensland, s 632(3) of the Criminal Code expressly generally so provides. But under the uniform legislation (s 165A(1)(a) and in Victoria also s 33 of the Jury Directions Act 2015) and in Western Australia (Evidence Act 1906 s 106D),54 the legislation expressly so provides only in the case of children. The presence of these express provisions makes it more difficult for courts to imply a more general prohibition against warnings on the basis of membership of other classes. As a consequence — for example, in the case of accomplices — courts may, where they think it appropriate, continue to give corroboration warnings based upon the witness’s membership of that class. And where such a corroboration warning is given, courts have insisted that it fulfil common law requirements in specifying which evidence is capable of providing corroboration of the witness’s testimony.55 4.21 In South Australia, legislation abolishes mandatory corroboration warnings for witnesses who are sexual assault complainants56 and, except where their evidence is uncorroborated, a party requests and there are cogent reasons to so warn, for witnesses who are children.57 The intention of this legislation is to put more clearly the testimony [page 335] of these witnesses upon the same basis as any other testimony. This is expressly provided in the case of children (Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 12A(2)) and has been implied in respect of victims of sexual assault.58 In the case of sexual assault complainants, by stipulating that no corroboration warning is required the legislation does not prohibit corroboration or other warnings justified by the particular circumstances of the case so long as no suggestion is made that mere membership of their respective classes makes their evidence unreliable.59 In the case of children, a corroboration warning is prohibited except in the circumstances designated, but warnings not in corroboration terms may still be given and may be required to avoid a miscarriage of justice. 4.22 The High Court has isolated another situation where a common law

corroboration warning appears to be mandatory: where police witnesses testify that a suspect has while in custody confessed to a crime.60 The requirement has been imposed not because such testimony is necessarily unreliable but because, as police are in control of this situation and have available to them facilities for confirming what suspects have said at interview, notably facilities for electronic recording, fairness to the accused demands that they use these facilities and not put the accused in a position where he or she is effectively unable to dispute police testimony that a confession was made. In most jurisdictions, legislation now requires that a confession be electronically recorded before it is admissible.61 However, before this legislation was passed and now where this legislation runs out the High Court seeks to encourage recording by insisting that juries have pointed out to them the absence of any independent confirmation of a confession and the consequent inability of the accused effectively to dispute it. This is an interesting example of the imposition of a corroboration warning requirement upon grounds of fairness and public policy, rather than principally upon grounds of possible unreliability: see below at 4.32. Under the uniform legislation, whilst such a warning if required as a matter of law or practice has been abolished by s 164(3) in respect of trials by jury, a party may request a warning under s 165(1)(f) in the case of ‘oral evidence of official questioning of a defendant that is questioning recorded in writing that has not been signed or otherwise acknowledged in writing, by the defendant’.62 This is a specific category of [page 336] ‘evidence of a kind that may be unreliable’, and where the specific category runs out the generality takes over. In addition, a warning might be required, whether or not requested, pursuant to a trial judge’s general duty to direct under s 165(5). Under Pt 4 Div 3 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), which applies to ‘unreliable evidence’ and specifically includes oral evidence of official questioning (s 31(e)), counsel may similarly request a direction (s 32). As a result of the above legislation, mandatory corroboration warnings in jury trials have been abolished altogether in all jurisdictions except in South Australia. In that jurisdiction, mandatory warnings remain required for prosecution testimony from accomplices and from police giving uncorroborated evidence of

confessions. In other jurisdictions, the need for direction is focused rather upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case in determining what direction is required to ensure that no risk remains of an innocent accused being convicted. However, as will be seen, appellate courts continue to lay down guidelines that hark back to the more technical approach taken by the common law in demanding mandatory warnings. There is a salutary lesson to be learned from analysing the common law mandatory corroboration warnings that still apply in South Australia. This analysis shows that the mandatory approach raises many technical legal issues, arguably distracting courts from focusing upon the reliability of testimony in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case at hand. Whether the abolition of mandatory corroboration warnings avoids these technicalities is a question to consider when we look later at those situations where warnings are required only to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

Accomplices 4.23 The unreliability of the testimony of accomplices is said to stem from the fact that, being involved in the very criminal transaction giving rise to charges against those accused, it is in their interest to play down their own participation in the transaction at the expense of others alleged to be involved.63 But this rationale needs to be put in the context of two other related rules of practice. In the first place, where the risks of unreliability are extremely high, as in the case of accomplices who have turned Queen’s evidence, the courts have a discretion to exclude their testimony altogether.64 Secondly, the prosecutor should ensure that, [page 337] before calling accomplices as witnesses, any outstanding charges against them have been dealt with one way or another — through conviction and sentence or the withdrawal of all charges.65 This being so, the interpretation of the rationale given by Sholl J in McNee v Kay is too narrow, requiring that the accomplice be: … charged in relation to the same events as those founding the charge against the accused, with an offence (whether the same offence or not) of such a character that he would be, if convicted thereof, liable to such punishment as might possibly tempt that person to exaggerate or fabricate evidence as to the guilt of the accused.66

Even after charges have been dealt with, and because they have been dealt with, the temptation for the accomplice to be unreliable remains, whether to keep faith with an indemnity given in return for favourable testimony,67 to avoid the possibility of losing the benefit of a discounted sentence,68 or simply to ensure that the accused does not escape with a lighter punishment than the accomplice. Similarly, even before charges have been laid, accomplices may fabricate evidence against an accused in order to cover up their part in the crime or to encourage prosecutors to ‘reward’ them through offer of an indemnity. 4.24 But, while recognising these wider arguments and insisting upon the warning whether or not the witness has been formally charged, authorities suggest a narrow approach to the degree of participation required to attract the mandatory warning.69 [page 338] There must be evidence before the court from which it can be inferred that the witness was involved in the same offence as that charged against the accused. The seminal decision is that of the House of Lords in Davies v DPP.70 The prosecution witness had participated in a gang assault upon a person. Unknown to him, another participant, the accused, was carrying a knife, with which he stabbed and killed the victim. At the accused’s trial the witness was held not to be an accomplice as there was insufficient evidence to implicate him in murder, the offence charged against the accused. This technical approach to participation may very well be based upon a wish to circumscribe the mandatory rule, but it has produced a technicality which has no justification in the rationale outlined above. This is recognised in s 165(1)(d) of the uniform legislation, which specifies as ‘evidence of a kind that may be unreliable’ evidence from a witness who ‘might reasonably be supposed to have been criminally concerned in the events giving rise to the proceedings’.71 4.25 On an analysis of previous authority the House of Lords in Davies v DPP concluded the following as falling within the category of accomplices if called as witnesses for the prosecution: 1

On any view, persons who are participes criminis in respect of the actual crime charged, whether as principals or accessories before or after the fact (in felonies) or persons committing, procuring, or aiding and abetting (in the case of misdemeanors). This is surely the natural and

primary meaning of the term ‘accomplice’ … 2

Receivers have been held to be accomplices of the thieves from whom they receive goods on a trial of the latter for larceny …

3

When X has been charged with a specific offence on a particular occasion, and evidence is admissible, and has been admitted, of his having committed crimes of this identical type on other occasions, as proving system or intent and negativing accident; in such cases the court has held that in relation to such other similar offences, if evidence of them were given by parties to them, the evidence of such other parties should not be left to the jury without a warning that it is dangerous to accept it without corroboration …72

The House of Lords regarded these extensions of the term ‘accomplice’ as anomalous, but so embedded in the case law that ‘it would be inconvenient for any authority other than the legislature to disturb them’: at 401. [page 339] On the whole, as a result of this attitude, subsequent courts have tended to interpret the above definitions as if they were legislative. Some courts have expressed doubts over whether accessories after the fact, whose interest appears to be the acquittal rather than the conviction of the accused principal, are sufficiently involved to be regarded as unreliable accomplices,73 and the Supreme Court of Western Australia has held that a witness involved, not in the crime charged against the accused, but in a crime of which the accused may nevertheless be convicted on that indictment, is to be regarded as an accomplice in extension of the first rule in Davies. Thus, the court in Khan v R74 held that evidence of participation in a manslaughter made a witness an accomplice when the jury could find manslaughter as an alternative verdict to the murder specifically charged against the accused. In R v Jacquier,75 Walters and Wells JJ suggest ‘a witness may fall within the category of an accomplice, if by actions and gestures intended to signify approval, he has given assistance and active encouragement to the principal offender though he has taken no positive or active step in the commission of the offence’.76 4.26 Courts have also expressed doubts about the limitation expressed in Davies whereby a witness must be called by the prosecution to be an accomplice. Although there is Australian authority for the view that when one co-accused gives evidence against another a mandatory warning will normally be required,77 Toohey J (with whom Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ agreed) in Webb and Hay v R,78 decided that at least flexibility should be retained. Consequently, where an

accomplice warning was given where an accused in testifying for the defence implicated his co-accused, the trial judge ‘was not obliged to give the accomplice corroboration warning but was not in error in doing so’, and the only question was whether the accused-witness had been disadvantaged as a result. On the facts he was not prepared to so find. [page 340] Brennan J analysed the situation of the accused-witness in more depth. He said (at 66–7): … when an accused being in peril of conviction, gives self-exculpatory evidence which inculpates a co-accused, two factors will frequently militate against the giving of an accomplice warning. First, as the warning is to be acted upon only if the accused witness is an accomplice, the jury must address that question before proceeding to consider the case against the co-accused. That course may be prejudicial to the accused witness. Secondly, as the jury must not be directed to treat the evidence of the accused witness differently from the evidence of other witnesses [Robinson v R (No 2) (1991) 102 ALR 493 at 495] in considering the case against the accused witness, an accomplice warning to scrutinise the evidence of the accused witness carefully must [apply only to testimony implicating the other accused and not to testimony exculpating the accused witness] if it is not to carry an implication that runs counter to [that] principle … Without attempting to prescribe a universal rule where an accused witness gives evidence exculpating himself but implicating a co-accused, it is generally preferable not to give an accomplice warning in respect of that evidence unless, in the particular circumstances, the trial judge is of the opinion that the jury might fail to appreciate the risk of acting on that evidence against a co-accused.

In such a case, Brennan J emphasises that the judge must explain to the jury that the warning applies only to the testimony inculpating the co-accused and must be ignored when considering the testimony exculpating the accused-witness.79 Brennan J was of the view that no warning should have been given in the case before him. Another problem arising from the removal of the prosecution limitation is illustrated in R v Anthony,80 where, although there was clear evidence of an accused-witness’s status as an accomplice, the testimony given was intended to exculpate the convicted co-accused. Only by disbelieving the accused-witness’s account was the testimony inculpatory, and the resulting conviction suggested such a rejection. In these circumstances, the court held the convicted accused could not complain of the failure to warn. Indeed, to give a warning in these circumstances may itself produce a miscarriage of justice.81 Any warning would only have

further encouraged the jury to interpret the ex facie exculpatory testimony in an inculpatory way. 4.27 But there is also authority for taking a similar principled approach to accomplices testifying for the prosecution;82 that is, demanding a corroboration warning only where testimony is reasonably capable of being interpreted by the jury as intended to implicate the accused.83 Similarly, although s 165 generally applies irrespective of [page 341] which party tenders the evidence and whether it implicates or exculpates the accused,84 the rationale for a warning under s 165(1)(d), to protect the accused from potentially unreliable evidence, applies only where the evidence implicates the accused.85 As a result, in the case of witnesses for the defence, including co-accused, the position in Australia is clear that the accomplice corroboration warning is not obligatory and the judge’s general duty to direct will determine whether a failure to warn (or any warning given) has caused a miscarriage of justice. Furthermore, this principled approach is consistent with later High Court dicta. In Pollitt v R,86 Dawson and Gaudron JJ (Mason CJ and Brennan J agreeing) suggest that it was proper to have held a witness who had conspired to have a particular person killed an accomplice, although the agreed killer had shot the wrong person and the witness was testifying in a prosecution relating to that murder. Although technically the witness was not participes criminis in respect of the crime charged, the court quoted McNee v Kay as authority for taking a more flexible approach to the notion of an accomplice. More strongly, in Jenkins v R,87 the unanimous joint judgment of the court remarks, after quoting the definition of accomplice in Davies: ‘These propositions have generally been understood as an accurate summary of the common law in Australia. But they do not exhaust the subject, and they are not to be treated as if they did’, and ‘the rule is not so mechanical as to call for a warning in any case in which an accomplice gives any evidence which may be relied upon to establish the prosecution case. The application of the rule must be related to its purpose’. Without further comment upon the technical definition of accomplice the court goes on to hold that the

warning seeks to protect the accused within a particular forensic contest so that if an accomplice’s testimony is not in dispute there is no need for any warning. 4.28 The complexity of the technical approach is compounded by the further holding in Davies that it is for the jury to decide whether or not a particular witness [page 342] is an accomplice. It would appear that technically the onus is ultimately upon the accused to establish this on the balance of probabilities.88 But if there is evidence from which the jury is able to draw such a conclusion, the trial judge must give the full corroboration warning.89 The trial judge must therefore explain what makes a witness an accomplice in law, canvass the evidence which may support such a categorisation, and explain that, if the jury decides on the balance of probabilities that the witness is an accomplice, it would be dangerous to convict upon that testimony alone, although it may do so if satisfied of its reliability beyond reasonable doubt.90 The probability of error in explaining these matters to the jury is high, especially as it has been held that judges should normally point out to juries which evidence may or may not constitute corroboration of the doubtful testimony.91 An error in the course of these explanations is an error of law, justifying successful appeal unless the proviso is applicable.92 The task of the trial judge thus becomes complex, with concentration focused, not only upon the substantive issue of the reliability of the testimony presented, but also upon the now technical rules of corroboration which must not be breached if a successful appeal is to be avoided. 4.29 There is much to be said for mitigating these problems by requiring at least that any corroboration warning be required at most as a matter of practice, thereby casting the onus upon the accused to establish before any appellate court a miscarriage of justice on the facts. In these circumstances, no trial judge can be diverted from the approach to proof directed by fundamental principles. As discussed at 4.27, there [page 343]

are dicta in the High Court suggesting a return to this more principled approach,93 and judges often air their criticism of the current common law accomplice warning rules.94 But they have yet to be expressly overturned judicially in South Australia. 4.30 Finally, it must be emphasised that the accomplice rules do not cover the field where witnesses may be involved in events giving rise to the charges against an accused. Where they run out, a failure to warn may still produce a miscarriage of justice.95 The need for some warning where witnesses have outstanding charges hanging over them or have been granted indemnities against further prosecution has already been noted at 4.23. As another example, it has been held (under the Davies tests) that agents provocateurs (crime-detection agents who encourage or provoke crimes to obtain convictions) cannot be regarded as accomplices,96 but this does not avoid some warning in an appropriate case.97 Similarly, although co-accused and witnesses for the defence may not technically be regarded as accomplices, some warning may yet be necessary if a miscarriage of justice is to be avoided.98 In R v Collie, Kranz and Lovegrove, the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal held that, although a witness was not an accomplice, the fact that he might have been guilty of misprision of felony gave a motive to lie and a cautionary direction was thus necessary.99 But [page 344] each case depends upon its own facts. The warning is merely discretionary and a full corroboration warning is unlikely to be demanded. Similarly, under the uniform legislation (and the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) Pt 4 Div 3), if a warning cannot be requested under s 165(1)(d) (or s 31(e) of the Victorian Act) it may be requested on the ground that there is ‘evidence of a kind that may be unreliable’ and where the uniform legislation applies the general duty to direct (s 165(5)) may require a warning if a miscarriage of justice is to be avoided.

Police testimony of disputed confessions 4.31 In Carr v R and Duke v R,100 the High Court considered the appropriate direction to avoid a miscarriage of justice in the case of disputed police testimony

of an unsigned confession allegedly given while the suspect was in police custody. In the first case, the court split 3:2 in deciding that the direction given was inadequate; in the second, it split 3:2 in holding that the direction was adequate. These cases provide a dramatic illustration of how difficult factual decisions are and how much the direction required turns upon particular circumstances. In each case, Deane J argued that a corroboration warning should be mandatory where police allege confessions made while the suspect is compulsorily detained, not because police are generally liars, but because fairness to a person in police custody demands that generally there be an independent record kept of any police questioning so that the content of any questioning can be even-handedly disputed. 4.32 In McKinney and Judge v R,101 the High Court, upset by the apparent disparities between their decisions in the previous cases, and swayed by considerations of fairness to the vulnerable suspect questioned in custody, agreed to accept Deane J’s approach by a majority of four to three.102 The majority stated that (at 475): … what is appropriate is a rule of practice of general application [to warn the jury] whenever police evidence of a confessional statement allegedly made by an accused while in police custody is disputed and its making is not reliably corroborated.

The signing of a record of interview is not necessarily reliable corroboration; rather, the presence of an independent third person or the electronic recording of the interview will generally be required. What must be corroborated is not the truth of the confession but the fact that it was made.103 However, it has been held that [page 345] the McKinney warning is required only where the confessional evidence is the only (or substantially the only) evidence against the accused.104 The dissentients forcefully argued that, given that there is no rule of admissibility based on notions of fairness or public policy excluding confessions obtained without independent confirmation, once a confession is admitted an appellate court can intervene only on the ground that the accused may have been wrongly convicted — on the ground that there may have been a miscarriage of justice. This would only occur if the jury may have acted upon unreliable

evidence without appreciating the nature or extent of the reasons for that unreliability. Wider notions of fairness to suspects arise in considering whether to admit evidence, not in deciding whether to warn. The purpose of the warning is to ensure that the jury is fully aware of possible unreliabilities, so that unless police are as a class unreliable witnesses (and even the majority did not suggest they are) the only warning required is that ensuring the jury is aware of the risks of unreliability that arise in the particular circumstances of the case.105 4.33 As the discussion of accomplice testimony at 4.23–4.30 has demonstrated, mandatory warnings give rise to technicalities, for the courts must define exactly when a warning is mandatory and exactly what warning must be given. Most precisely, the majority demands a warning (where the confession is disputed)106 in ‘cases involving an uncorroborated confessional statement allegedly made by an accused while involuntarily held in police custody without access to a lawyer or even an independent third person who might confirm his account’: McKinney (at 478). As in the case of accomplices, it is up to the judge to determine what constitutes these conditions and up to the jury to decide whether the conditions have been met. The jury will have to decide, following appropriate instruction, whether the confession is ‘uncorroborated’, whether the suspect was ‘involuntarily detained in police custody’,107 and whether the suspect had ‘access to a lawyer or some other third person’. [page 346] The precise content of the warning is outlined in the majority judgment in McKinney (at 476) as follows: … the jury should be informed that it is comparatively more difficult for an accused person held in police custody without access to legal advice or other means of corroboration to have evidence available to support a challenge to police evidence of confessional statements than it is for such police evidence to be fabricated, and, accordingly, it is necessary that they be instructed … that they should give careful consideration as to the dangers involved in convicting an accused person in circumstances where the only (or substantially the only) basis for finding that guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt is a confessional statement allegedly made while in police custody, the making of which is not reliably corroborated. Within the context of this warning it will ordinarily be necessary to emphasise the need for careful scrutiny of the evidence and to direct attention to the fact that police witnesses are often practised witnesses and it is not an easy matter to determine whether a practised witness is telling the truth. And, of course, the trial judge’s duty to ensure that the defence case is fairly and accurately put will require that, within the same context, attention be drawn to those matters which bring the reliability of the confessional evidence into

question. Equally, in the context of and as part of the warning, it will be proper for the trial judge to remind the jury, with appropriate comment, that persons who make confessions sometimes repudiate them.

The trial judge must ‘add the weight of his own authority to the warnings’ and ‘it is not sufficient for a trial judge merely to mention those warnings in the context of repeating the arguments of counsel’: R v Bell.108 But, as Hunt CJ at CL points out in R v Derbas, the direction does not ‘suggest that police evidence is inherently unreliable or that police officers should, as such, be placed in a special category of suspect or unreliable witnesses’ so that these matters need not be canvassed by a trial judge.109 The breadth of this warning creates a veritable minefield for the trial judge and many opportunities for accused to claim appealable error. The experience with accomplice testimony is the obvious precedent. The purpose of the High Court’s approach is to encourage police to obtain independent corroboration of the making of confessions. In all Australian jurisdictions, confessional statements made in custody are now not admissible unless electronically recorded110 and suspects in custody are given statutory access to a lawyer or some [page 347] other independent third person.111 The result is that, in most cases, there will be independent confirmation of confessions allegedly made while in police custody, so that the practical difficulties arising from the mandatory warning will be avoided.112 4.34 Even where the conditions for a McKinney direction are not strictly satisfied, the circumstances may demand a direction in relation to particular matters if a miscarriage of justice is to be avoided.113 As mentioned, under s 165 of the uniform legislation, a party (and under the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) ss 31(e) and 32, counsel) may request a warning in the case of ‘oral evidence of questioning by an investigating official of a defendant that is questioning recorded in writing that has not been signed or otherwise acknowledged in writing, by the defendant’ (acknowledgment ‘in writing’ not required under the Victorian Act). This warning, in that it only arises because such evidence is a particular

[page 348] example of ‘evidence of a kind that may be unreliable’, has its focus on the possibility of unreliability rather than the matters of policy underlying McKinney.114 It applies without regard to whether the accused was in custody or to whether the confessional evidence is substantially the only evidence against the accused, but it does require that the questioning be recorded in writing and be not signed by the accused. Where ss 165(1)(f) and 31(e) run out,115 a warning might still be requested under s 165(1) on the ground there is ‘evidence of a kind that may be unreliable’ and a McKinney direction sought pursuant to a trial judge’s general duty to direct under s 165(5). In Victoria, s 165(1)(f) of the uniform legislation has been deleted and Pt 4 Div 3 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 stipulates the only directions ‘required’ in the case of ‘evidence of a kind that may be unreliable’, defined to include (s 31(e)) ‘oral evidence of questioning by an investigating official (within the meaning of the Evidence Act 2008) of an accused where the questioning has not been acknowledged by the accused’. As with all directions under this Act, they must be sought by the request of counsel (s 32(1) and (2)) which request must be granted unless there are good reasons to the contrary (s 12). The request must clearly stipulate the significant matters that may make the evidence unreliable, and the direction to be given, and in the absence of substantial and compelling reasons to the contrary (s 16), the trial judge must (s 32(3)) warn the jury that the evidence may be unreliable, inform the jury of the reasons why and warn the jury of the need for caution in acting on the evidence. As is argued above (at 4.10), these statutory provisions effectively require the accused to establish that failure to give an appropriate warning produced, on the facts and circumstances of the case before the court, a (substantial) miscarriage of justice, effectively requiring warning which at common law would be regarded required as a matter of practice.

Testimony Requiring Warning Only as a Matter of Practice 4.35 In cases involving testimonies in this category the failure to warn

adequately is not ipso facto an error of law, and in each case the accused must convince the appellate court that the failure has produced a (in Victoria, ‘substantial’) miscarriage of justice; that is, an unacceptable risk that an innocent person has been convicted. Once this is achieved (in jurisdictions other than Victoria), the appeal will succeed unless the prosecution can successfully invoke the proviso. In fact, as has already been pointed out, at common law most potentially unreliable testimony is considered by Australian courts under this heading and it has been argued above at 4.10 that, although the [page 349] uniform legislation and the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) provide for the directions required on request in the case of ‘evidence of a kind that may be unreliable’, the onus will remain upon the accused to establish not just that a warning in the specific terms sought was required but that its absence caused a (substantial) miscarriage of justice. It is the role of the jury to determine the reliability of relevant and admissible evidence implicating an accused. What the judge must ensure is that in making that determination and finding the accused’s guilt proved beyond reasonable doubt, the jury takes fully into account all factors that courts, as a result of their experience, regard as important in determining that reliability.116 Where there is a risk that the jury may not appreciate a factor or its full significance then the judge must direct (warn) the jury to take it fully into account. Failure to so direct (warn) leaves the risk that the jury has not adequately (rationally) assessed the reliability of evidence implicating an accused, leaving an unacceptable risk that an innocent person may have been convicted. The common law consequently isolated various categories of testimony that as a matter of practice generally require some sort of direction if a miscarriage of justice is to be avoided. The direction required may extend from a full corroboration warning (as was required at common law in the case of children and sexual assault complainants) to a direction that simply brings home to the jury factors that it might not fully appreciate as significant in determining reliability (as is required in the case of identification testimony). The common feature in all of these cases is that there are no definitive rules; whether a miscarriage of justice results ultimately depends upon all the circumstances of the individual case. In

this way, judges are encouraged, in deciding what is an appropriate direction, to pursue that detail required by the natural rules of proof by concentrating on the facts and circumstances and forensic issues of the particular case. 4.36 It could simply be said that all possibly unreliable testimony is testimony requiring a warning as a matter of practice,117 but some categories of testimony are so often held to require warning or direction as a matter of practice that it is possible to state in some detail the guidelines that determine appropriate warning or direction in these cases. In the next section these guidelines are discussed as they apply to the testimony of children, sexual assault complainants, agents provocateurs, and identifying witnesses. Other possibly unreliable witnesses, including prison informers, [page 350] are canvassed as a final general category. As can be appreciated, by definition the list at common law is not closed.118 The uniform legislation contains a general provision dealing with unreliable evidence (s 165) whilst specific provisions, ss 165A and 165B, deal respectively with warnings in relation to children’s evidence and delay in prosecution being brought. Section 165(1) specifies categories of evidence where a warning may be requested but applies more generally to any ‘evidence of a kind that may be unreliable’ (as at common law the list of unreliable evidence is not closed).119 But in addition, as s 165(5) expressly leaves unaffected the general duty of the trial judge to direct where there is ‘evidence of a kind that may be unreliable’, and as the common law requirements are merely part of that general duty, even if no request has been made under s 165(2) a convicted accused may turn to common law decisions to argue that a failure to warn or direct has in the circumstances produced a miscarriage of justice. Section 165B also expressly preserves this general duty. In Victoria, s 165 has been amended to apply only in civil jury trials and the Jury Directions Act 2015 determines the directions to be given in criminal jury trials in respect of ‘evidence of a kind that may be unreliable’: Pt 4 Div 3 (the operation of this Division is explained at 4.34). The definition includes those categories found in s 165 (but not including identification evidence, dealt with separately in Pt 4 Div 4). The Act also replaces s 165B as found in the other

Uniform Acts (relating to directions demanded in relation to forensic disadvantage to an accused caused by delay) with provisions contained in Pt 4 Div 5. In contrast to ss 165 and 165B as contained in the other Uniform Acts, the Jury Directions Act expressly abolishes any common law requirements for directions beyond those required by Divs 3, 4 and 5 respectively: ss 34, 37, 40.

Children 4.37 As mentioned at 4.14, statutory provisions requiring the mandatory corroboration of children’s testimony have been repealed in all Australian jurisdictions. By the same token, following psychological research suggesting that under appropriate conditions even very young children can be accurate witnesses,120 any common law [page 351] requirement that a full corroboration warning be given as a matter of practice if a miscarriage of justice is to be avoided has suffered a similar fate. The legislation expressly provides that the judge must not ‘warn the jury, or suggest to the jury, that children as a class are unreliable witnesses’.121 However, the prohibition does not forbid a warning based upon the particular circumstances or characteristics of the witness, and this may be required to avoid a miscarriage of justice.122 Section 12A(2) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) provides that a corroboration warning must still be given if the child’s evidence is uncorroborated, a request for a warning is made,123 and in the particular circumstances, apart from the age of the child, there are cogent reasons to doubt the reliability of the child’s evidence.124 But absent these circumstances the judge still remains required to direct the jury about matters of which it may not be sufficiently aware to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not result. Similar detailed directions may be demanded by courts where legislation permits the tender in exception to the hearsay rule of recorded interviews and other out-of-court statements made by children125 and other vulnerable witnesses: see further at 7.34ff. [page 352]

4.38 As at common law, a direction might be considered in relation to testimony however given,126 there is no arbitrary age limit, and on appeal the opinion of the trial judge, having seen the witness, not to warn may be given weight by the appellate court.127 A judge may also direct a jury that testimony that may be individually unreliable may be mutually corroborative.128 Factors relevant both to the need to give a warning and the nature of the warning to be given include the witness’s cognitive development, intelligence and emotional maturity; the degree to which the witness has been formally educated; the witness’s susceptibility to outside influence and suggestion; the possibility of outside influence or suggestion (for example, during interview in investigation of the crime); the nature and detail of the evidence given; the issues in dispute at the trial; the nature of the offence charged against the accused; the involvement of the witness in that charge; and the presence of other evidence corroborating the child’s testimony.129 While the trial judge may not suggest that children’s evidence as a class is unreliable, nor give a corroboration warning, the above factors remain relevant in determining whether in the particular circumstances of a case a direction is required to avoid a miscarriage of justice. In most cases this will require some direction beyond the endorsement of stereotypical assumptions about the inability of children generally to testify accurately.130 4.39 Under s 165(1)(c) of the uniform legislation, a party can request an obligatory warning where the reliability of testimony may be affected by age (young or old) or may request a warning if otherwise the evidence ‘is of a kind that may be unreliable’, and, in the absence of request, the general duty of the judge to direct (s 165(5)) may require some warning to avoid a miscarriage of justice. While these provisions on their face extend to children, for all practical purposes (in other than Victoria) the testimony of children is now governed by s 165A and the Acts draw no distinction between the reliability of sworn or unsworn testimony: [page 353] R v GW131 (see further 7.36). Section 165A(1) prohibits a judge from warning or

suggesting that children’s testimony as a class is unreliable, or less reliable than that of adults, or warn or suggest unreliability solely on account of the age of a child, and the judge must not in criminal proceedings give a general warning of the danger of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of a witness who is a child.132 Section 165A(2) then provides that this ‘does not prevent the judge, at the request of a party’, informing a ‘jury that the evidence of the particular child may be unreliable and the reasons why’ and ‘warning or informing the jury of the need for caution in determining’ the weight to be given to the child’s evidence, but only ‘if the party has satisfied the court that there are circumstances (other than solely the age of the child) particular to the child that affect the reliability of the child’s evidence and that warrant the giving of a warning or the information’. Section 165(5) provides that the ‘section does not affect any other power of the judge to give a warning to, or to inform, the jury’. However, the fact that a child gives unsworn testimony is not, on the authority of R v GW, by itself a reason for warning either under the uniform legislation or at common law. In Victoria, similar provisions are embodied in ss 31–34 of the Jury Directions Act 2015, but the prohibited comments in s 33 extend to counsel, and s 34 provides that no further directions beyond those permitted by these sections are required and that any common law rules to the contrary are abolished. The admissibility of expert evidence pertaining to the credibility of a childwitness may be facilitated by ss 108C and 79(2) of the Uniform Evidence Acts: see 7.108.

Sexual assault complainants 4.40 (Male) common lawyers have traditionally been apprehensive about the testimony of those alleging sexual crimes, a fear based on purported experience that such complainants, influenced by a variety of motives — from guilt to jealousy and spite — may tell entirely false stories in an emotional situation where false allegations are easy to make but more difficult for the accused to rebut.133 [page 354] With more recent concern over the difficulty of convicting those who commit sexual assaults, the justification for regarding the complainant’s testimony as prima

facie suspect has been discredited.134 Prosecuting a person for sexual assault is a most unpleasant experience for the complainant. This in itself counts against the risk that the allegation will be false. To require a warning about the complainant’s testimony severely handicaps his or her credibility from the start, a credibility no more suspect than that of complainants to non-sexual assaults. It is more conducive to rectitude to base the assessment of credibility upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case, rather than upon the witness’s status as the complainant to a sexual assault. 4.41 As a consequence of such criticisms, legislation has been passed in all Australian jurisdictions placing the testimony of sexual assault complainants upon the same basis as the testimony of witnesses generally. The form of the legislation varies. In some jurisdictions any requirement to give a corroboration warning is abolished, either specifically in relation to those alleging sexual assault135 or more generally in relation to all witnesses.136 It might be argued that in relation to sexual assault complainants these provisions were strictly unnecessary as there never was, in Australia at least, any requirement to warn. Appellate judges nevertheless displayed a considerable willingness to interfere where full corroboration warnings were not given when sexual assault complainants testified, and the legislation was necessary to curb this practice.137 In other jurisdictions, all warnings, including corroboration warnings where still available, on the basis that sexual assault complainants are a class of unreliable witness, are simply prohibited.138 But even where expressed in terms only of abolishing any requirement to warn, the intention of the legislation in South Australia and Tasmania is to place the testimony of complainants, and in Queensland the testimony of any other class of witness, upon the same footing as the testimony of witnesses generally.139 As a consequence, its effect is not only that an accused cannot claim a miscarriage of justice upon the ground that a particular warning or direction should have been given simply because the witness [page 355] is a sexual assault complainant (or some other class of witness), but furthermore the trial judge is implicitly forbidden from giving any corroboration warning or other direction on this basis.140 It should be noted that a similar prohibition is not

implicit in s 164(3) of the uniform legislation nor s 50 of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA), which merely make corroboration warnings ‘not necessary’ or ‘not required’.141 Rather, the specific legislation in these jurisdictions forbidding discrimination against the testimony of sexual assault complainants as a class achieves this end. But none of this legislation intends that the testimony of complainants (or any other category of witness) should be treated as especially reliable, and the effect of this is that a direction or warning, in theory even a full corroboration warning in jurisdictions other than Victoria (which abolishes corroboration warnings altogether in s 164(4) of the Evidence Act 2008), may be demanded by circumstances other than class relating to the reliability of the particular witness, and where failure so to warn might give rise to an unacceptable risk of convicting an innocent accused. In other words, the trial judge’s general duty to direct in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice remains.142 Although in Victoria, the Jury Directions Act 2015 generally replaces in s 4, and in this context in s 54 abolishes rules of common law inconsistent with its provisions, those directions which it does require seek to ensure that judges focus on the particular facts and circumstances that may affect reliability; essentially also endorsing the importance of the trial judge’s general duty to direct where required to avoid a substantial miscarriage of justice. 4.42 With the abolition of corroboration warning requirements one might have thought that judges would simply avoid the technical language of corroboration altogether, and focus instead upon analysing the particular issues and evidence in the case to ensure the jury receives a direction that avoids the risk of a miscarriage of justice. While appellate courts often recommend that corroboration terminology be where possible avoided,143 trial judges continue to direct in these terms where they believe an emphatic warning is required. The problem is that where they do, appellate [page 356] courts then insist that corroboration be used in accordance with its common law meaning, so there is an error of law if a judge wrongly defines the nature of common law corroboration or refers to evidence as capable of providing ‘corroboration’ when it cannot satisfy the common law requirements.144

4.43 In sexual assault cases, there are often circumstances beyond the complainant’s membership of a class that contrive to make a direction or warning necessary if a miscarriage of justice is to be avoided. In many cases the complainant is the only witness and his or her testimony requires careful scrutiny upon that basis. Furthermore, in many cases the complaint comes long after the event, when memories have faded or may be contaminated and effective means for testing those memories may have been lost. In other cases the alleged assault may have occurred within a family situation at a time when the complainant was a child and was woken from sleep or was affected by family loyalties or disputes. The duty of the trial judge is, through direction, to ensure that all these relevant circumstances are taken carefully into account by the jury. The duty of the appellate court is to ensure that, having regard to the course of the trial and the directions given, no miscarriage of justice may have arisen through failure of the jury to consider a relevant circumstance. In particular, where there are circumstances that in the appellate court’s experience give rise to possible unreliability and which may not have been fully appreciated by the jury, a risk of a miscarriage of justice will arise. The jury must therefore be directed accordingly.145 Ultimately, whether there remains a risk of a miscarriage of justice depends upon first, the precise issues in the case and, secondly, upon whether all evidence and circumstances relevant to their resolution have been taken into account by the jury.146 But appellate courts, through bench books147 and authoritatively in judgments, lay [page 357] down guidelines about the sort of circumstances that trial judges should through direction ensure have been taken into account, and over time these guidelines have a tendency to be (wrongly) regarded as mandatory rules.148 It is this situation which the Jury Directions Act 2015 in Victoria has sought to remedy. 4.44 Two directions that are often regarded as having mandatory status are the ‘Murray direction’ and the ‘Longman warning’. The former requires the trial judge, in a case where the jury must determine guilt upon the uncorroborated testimony of one witness, to warn the jury that it should scrutinise that testimony with great care before finding the crime proved beyond reasonable doubt. While

often the situation where sexual assaults are alleged, the direction applies in cases beyond sexual assault. Whilst one might think that the situation and its inherent risks would have become patently obvious to a jury by the completion of the parties’ addresses, nevertheless the failure of a trial judge to give a Murray direction, although not strictly an error of law, will be taken seriously by any appellate court.149 4.45 The other direction that almost acquired mandatory status is the Longman warning. This is concerned to ensure that in a case where the complainant has delayed in reporting the assault the jury takes into account any forensic disadvantages resulting to the accused from that delay.150 As an introductory perspective it should be noted that common law judges were prepared to admit a complaint made soon after an alleged assault (a recent complaint) [page 358] in exception to the general rule prohibiting reception of a witness’s prior consistent statements: see 7.99–7.108. The assumption in this was that delay in complaining is always of significance in assessing a complainant’s credibility, and in the absence of ‘recent complaint’ the jury was directed accordingly.151 This assumption has been discredited, with experience and research providing many good reasons why complainants might not immediately report assault. As a result, legislation now exists in every Australian jurisdiction which to varying degrees governs the requirements to direct where evidence of absence or delay in complaint is revealed. At one end of the spectrum, the judge is required only to direct that absence or delay does not necessarily mean the complaint is false and that there may be good reasons for delay.152 At the other, the judge is simply prohibited from suggesting that delay in itself is of any probative value to the complainant’s credibility.153 In between, in New South Wales,154 as well as requiring, where failure or delay in complaint is revealed, that the judge warn the jury that such failure or delay is not necessarily of consequence and that there may be good reasons for it, no further warning can be given that the delay is relevant to assessing the victim’s credibility unless there is sufficient evidence to justify such a warning;155 and in Victoria,156 following prohibition of any mention that complainants who fail or delay to complain are as a class unreliable

witnesses, or any suggestion from the judge that their testimony would be unsafe to rely upon or requires careful scrutiny, where delay or failure to complain is disclosed the judge must inform the jury that people react in different ways following sexual assault and that delay is a common occurrence. None of this legislation prevents the prosecution revealing evidence to explain why the complainant in question delayed or failed to complain, and, although the New South Wales legislation forbids the judge to give further warning unless there is sufficient evidence to justify it, the Victorian legislation simply empowers the prosecution to request appropriate directions in this situation. The above discussion concerns directions required to ensure that a victim’s failure or delay in complaining is not used by the jury to reflect inappropriately upon the credit [page 359] of the complainant. But the case of Longman v R suggests that in some circumstances, where proceedings have been delayed, whether through a victim’s failure or delay in complaining or for any other reason, directions are required to ensure the jury is aware of the difficulties faced in defending the allegations as a consequence of the delay. Furthermore, it suggests that a warning in corroboration terms may be required to avoid a miscarriage of justice.157 4.46 In Longman v R,158 the accused was convicted of two counts of sexual assault upon his stepdaughter alleged to have occurred over 20 years before the trial, when she was aged 6 and 10 years. There was no evidence to corroborate the stepdaughter’s testimony. With legislation recently passed abolishing any requirements to give a full corroboration warning in cases involving the testimony of sexual assault complainants, and forbidding such a warning unless justified by the circumstances, the judge was reluctant to give a full corroboration warning, although prepared to comment upon the circumstances and their possible effect. On appeal, it was argued that the legislation did not affect the judge’s general duty to give directions and that the length of the delay demanded that a full corroboration warning be given. A majority of the High Court (Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ) agreed, holding that in the circumstances it was not enough for the judge simply ‘to comment’ upon the risks consequent

upon the long delay, but the judge was obliged ‘to warn’ the jury that it would be unsafe to act upon the complainant’s uncorroborated testimony. While no attack had been made upon the witness’s honesty and sincerity, the majority justified their view (at 91) as follows: There is one factor which may not have been apparent to the jury and which therefore required not merely a comment but a warning be given to them: see Reg v Spencer … That factor was the applicant’s loss of those means of testing the complainant’s allegations which would have been open to him had there been no delay in prosecution. Had the allegations been made soon after the alleged event, it would have been possible to explore in detail the alleged circumstances attendant upon its occurrence and perhaps to adduce evidence throwing doubt upon the complainant’s story or confirming the applicant’s denial. After more than twenty years that opportunity was gone and the applicant’s recollection of them could not be adequately tested. The fairness of the trial had necessarily been impaired by the long delay (see Jago v District Court (NSW)) and it was imperative that a warning be given to the jury. The jury should have been told that, as the evidence of the complainant could not be adequately tested after the passage of more than twenty years, it would be

[page 360] dangerous to convict on that evidence alone unless the jury, scrutinizing the evidence with great care, considering the circumstances relevant to its evaluation and paying heed to the warning, were satisfied of its truth and accuracy. To leave a jury without such a full appreciation of the danger was to risk a miscarriage of justice. The jury were told simply to consider the relative credibility of the complainant and the appellant without either a warning or a mention of the factors relevant to the evaluation of the evidence. That was not sufficient.

Deane J, on the other hand, thought these matters could be appropriately brought to the attention of the jury with a mere comment or, if it was alleged delay had caused particular difficulties for the defence, through direction. But no particular difficulties had been raised nor a direction sought at the trial. However, Deane J (at 100–1) thought another matter required a strong warning in this case: The possibility of child fantasy about sexual matters, particularly in relation to occurrences when the child is half-asleep or between periods of sleep, cannot be ignored. The borderline between fantasy and reality can be an uncertain one. Contemporaneous questioning of the child may distinguish fantasy from reality. The long passage of time can harden fantasy or semi-fantasy into the absolute conviction of reality. [This required] a warning to the jury of the need, in the particular circumstances of the case, to scrutinize the evidence of the complainant with great care and to exercise considerable caution before convicting the applicant upon the basis of it alone …159

McHugh J (at 107–8) emphasised both matters in holding that a corroboration warning should have been given.160 In Crofts v R,161 the court held that any direction demanded by Longman is in addition to, and is not inconsistent with, and may be required to complement,

that direction required by legislation, discussed in the previous paragraph, to the effect that the jury should not or not necessarily draw inferences adverse to the complainant on account of delay in complaining.162 [page 361] 4.47 The better interpretation of Longman is simply as an example of where circumstances contrived to demand a warning in corroboration terms to avoid the risk of a miscarriage of justice. To interpret Longman to demand presumptively a corroboration warning in all cases of delay not only creates problems in defining exactly when and what warning must be given (How much delay is required? What risks attract the warning? And so on.), but also, because of the many cases where there is delay in complaint, significantly erodes that legislation attempting to facilitate the proof of sexual assaults through abolition of corroboration warnings.163 The mandatory nature of the warning received High Court endorsement in Doggett v R.164 The accused was charged with various sexual offences against a child that occurred while he was living with her mother. The offences were alleged to have occurred from 1980 to 1986 when the child was aged between 8 and 15 years, but she did not formally complain of the offences until 1998, 18 years after the first alleged offences. At the trial, no ‘Longman warning’ was requested as experienced counsel feared this would be put in corroboration terms and, as there was strong corroborative evidence, such a warning would have done no more than draw this evidence to the jury’s attention. Nevertheless, a majority of the court (Gaudron, Callinan and Kirby JJ) held that the judge’s directions were inadequate because they did not canvass the risks consequent upon such a long delay, suggesting it is imperative that the jury be clearly warned of these risks in every case of delay. The presence of corroborative evidence made no difference as it may not have been accepted by the jury and the jury may have acted upon the suspect evidence alone. There are strong dissents by Gleeson CJ and McHugh J analysing the issues and evidence in the case to see what sort of warning, if any, was demanded. They regarded the case as not having been contested on the issue of delay and considered that the judge had directed the jury appropriately in relation to the

issues and evidence before the court. Neither was prepared to give the problems arising from delay a more prominent focus on appeal. On its face, the majority decision suggests that in every case of delay a Longman warning must presumptively be given. It is the forensic disadvantage to the accused [page 362] in testing the reliability of the complainant’s evidence that is emphasised as the basis for the warning and, furthermore, where delay is substantial, as it was in Doggett, significant disadvantage can be assumed.165 4.48 In R v BWT, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, albeit reluctantly, interpreted the High Court judgments in Longman, Crampton166 and Doggett as demanding a full corroboration warning in every case of delay to avoid a miscarriage of justice because of the risk of forensic disadvantage to the accused resulting from the delay.167 But again it was a case of long delay in complaining. The trial judge had commented that the delay ‘may have resulted in some difficulties for the accused’, that the accused ‘may have been deprived of the opportunity of finding witnesses’, that ‘[r]eally I am only emphasising matters of common sense and which you would understand anyway’, and ‘I make it perfectly clear that you are entitled to convict the accused on the evidence of the complainant alone but only once you have considered it carefully and only if you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that she is honest and accurate’. This was held to be a misdirection as the judge was obliged to warn (rather than merely comment) that the delay did mean that the complainant’s testimony could not be adequately tested, and furthermore was obliged to give the authority of the judicial office to a warning that, because of the possibility of forensic difficulties arising from long delay, it would be dangerous to convict168 the accused upon the testimony of the complainant alone. This formalisation comes close to a mandatory full corroboration warning. It must be given whether or not there is evidence capable of amounting to corroboration of the complainant’s testimony. Where there is evidence capable of corroborating that testimony the legal nature of corroborative evidence must be explained to the jury

[page 363] and the evidence canvassed to explain which might, and which might not, constitute corroboration.169 The only flexibility lies in the length of delay that triggers the warning. Sully J suggests that the full corroboration warning should be given by trial judges in all cases of delay, however short, unless a reasonable mind would regard the possibility of forensic disadvantage to the accused as far-fetched.170 If so, it is the mere possibility of disadvantage that triggers the warning. It seems that once this possibility exists the fairness of the trial can only be redeemed by a full corroboration warning. The focus is not upon the forensic disadvantages caused by the delay in the instant case but upon the mere possibility of disadvantage caused by delay. Thus, a full corroboration warning is resurrected in cases of sexual assault where complaint is delayed. This constitutes an unwelcome return to the technicalities of corroboration warnings that the uniform legislation and other state legislation intended to abolish. As the judges in R v BWT171 recognise, the effect of requiring this warning, together with other warnings that must be given in the case of sexual assaults, is to make it very difficult to convict persons accused of sexual assault. 4.49 But not all judges accepted Longman as endorsing a return to a mandatory corroboration warning. For example, in R v Johnston,172 Spigelman CJ thought there were no prescriptions but upheld an appeal because the judge had not drawn the jury’s attention to the specific forensic difficulties to the defence case that had been caused by delay,173 nor told the jury in sufficiently emphatic terms of the special care required in assessing the complainant’s testimony in the circumstances. Since then Spigelman CJ’s approach appears to have been influential,174 if never accepted by the entire New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal.175 Other state courts take a similar approach. [page 364] For example, in Christophers v R,176 Owen J describes the Longman warning as a rule of practice which is not a conventional corroboration warning but, arising from the judge’s general duty to direct, requires it to be brought home to the jury

that, having regard to the particular risks of unreliability and any particular forensic difficulties caused to the defence by the delay, the jury must take great care before acting on the testimony. Particular words are not insisted upon. No mention need be made of corroboration. The word ‘dangerous’ is not a magic incantation. The Western Australian Court of Criminal Appeal in Christophers v R endorsed this approach of Owen J177 and subsequent Western Australian authority has taken the same principled approach.178 The Queensland,179 South Australian180 and Victorian181 Courts of Criminal Appeal [page 365] appear to take a similar, more flexible approach to ensuring that in a particular case the Longman risks are met by direction if and when they arise so as to avoid a miscarriage of justice. These approaches appear more in keeping with the spirit of Longman, that the required direction is merely part of the judge’s duty to direct fairly, taking account of all relevant considerations, on the evidence before the court. 4.50 In Tully v R,182 the High Court also emphasises that whether a Longman warning must be given is part of a wider question of whether its absence has caused a miscarriage of justice. The complaints of assault, occurring when the victim was aged between 9 and 10, were made within three years of the first assault and two years of the last, when her mother separated from the accused. The defence sought to discredit the complainant through concentrating upon the extravagance and inconsistencies of her claims and medical evidence that contradicted her allegation of rape, and the trial judge directed the jury in these terms. It was claimed upon appeal that a ‘Longman direction’ should have been given but the whole court agreed that in the circumstances, where the defence had alleged no prejudice through delay or that the complainant’s testimony was mistaken as a result of childhood fantasy consequent upon delay, nor had sought a direction in relation to it or complained of the directions given, the absence of a Longman direction could not be said to have caused a miscarriage of justice. Indeed, to have given a Longman warning would, in the circumstances, have been misleading. Kirby and Hayne JJ dissented, being of the view that a stronger warning should have been given about finding the accused guilty upon the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant (a ‘Murray direction’).

Crennan J (with whom Heydon J agreed) emphasised that the question on appeal is whether there is a risk of a miscarriage of justice; that the verdict may have been unsafe. She conceptualised the question in the case before her as (at [178]) ‘whether all of the circumstances gave rise to some forensic disadvantage to the appellant, palpable or obvious to a judge, which may not have been apparent to the jury, thus necessitating a warning so as to avoid a miscarriage of justice. There is a clear distinction between such a case and a case where all the circumstances can be evaluated by a jury in the light of their own experiences’. She explained (at [181]–[182]) that while there may be some presumption of disadvantage in cases of longer delay, in cases of shorter delay the accused must be able to identify ‘some forensic disadvantage which is palpable and obvious to an experienced judge, but which a jury may fail to appreciate’, and that ‘[w]ithout that circumstance, a warning in accordance with Longman is not imperative because a trial judge is in no position to explain why it would be dangerous to convict on the complainant’s uncorroborated evidence’. While the last remark might be taken to suggest that ‘a warning in accordance with Longman’ is imperative where some forensic disadvantage can be shown, it is made in the wider context of the trial judge’s duty to direct the jury so as to avoid a [page 366] miscarriage of justice and should not be taken to demand any particular incantation from the trial judge where such disadvantage arises. 4.51 Directions concerning forensic disadvantage consequent upon delay in all cases are now now the subject of legislation in every jurisdiction other than Queensland and Western Australia. Section 165B of the uniform legislation (replaced in Victoria by the Jury Directions Act 2015 Pt 4 Div 5) provides that, in criminal proceedings before a jury, where the judge is satisfied that delay has caused a ‘significant forensic disadvantage’ (not defined but not constituted simply by delay),183 on application of the defendant184 the judge must, absent good reasons, inform the jury of that disadvantage and the need to take it into account. No particular form of words is required but the legislation goes further than the common law in providing that the judge must not suggest that it would be dangerous or unsafe to convict the defendant solely because of the delay or the

forensic disadvantage suffered (although this is unlikely to be the situation in many cases). It is also provided that a jury cannot be warned or informed about forensic disadvantage consequent on delay other than in accordance with the section, ‘but this section does not affect any other power of the judge to give any warning to, or to inform, the jury’.185 Similar legislation in South Australia (Evidence Act 1929 s 34CB) abolishes ‘a warning of a kind known as a Longman warning’ but provides that if delay ‘between the alleged offending and the trial has resulted in a significant forensic disadvantage to the defendant’ the judge must explain the disadvantage and direct the jury to take it into account (no application by a party is required). But the direction must be specific to the circumstances of the case and not take the form of a warning or ‘include the phrase “dangerous or unsafe to convict” or similar words or phrases’. In Victoria, s 165B of the Uniform Evidence Act has been repealed but replaced by Pt 4 Div 5 of the Jury Directions Act 2015, which permit defence counsel to request directions on the basis of ‘forensic disadvantage’ resulting from delay. If satisfied of such disadvantage the judge must direct the jury accordingly but must not suggest it would be dangerous to convict or suggest that a complainant’s testimony must be scrutinised with great care. Any common law rules requiring direction (for example, Longman) are expressly abolished. The thrust of all this legislation is to prohibit warnings as a matter of course in cases of delay, but to permit jury warnings tailored to the particular circumstances of [page 367] the case where that delay gives rise to some significant disadvantage to the accused.186 Generally, the disadvantage will be consequent upon the loss or destruction of evidence and/or the opportunity to assemble and/or test it caused by the passage of time, but its significance will usually be speculative. In Cassebohm v R,187 Doyle CJ commented that ‘it is sufficient for a trial judge to conclude that the lost or unavailable material is likely to have assisted in the defence of a charge, even though one cannot say just how, and even though one cannot be certain that that is so’.188 The object of the direction is to explain to the jury, where it would be otherwise unaware, of the need to take that particular

disadvantage into account and explain how it might affect their consideration of the evidence.189 This may in principle be no more than what should also have been required at common law to avoid a miscarriage of justice in cases of delay. As at common law, the difficult speculative nature of the exercise suggests a prudent trial judge will give some warning in cases of delay out of abundant caution. But a warning in general terms will be insufficient to satisfy the legislation which, as Doyle CJ emphasised at [32] and [34] in upholding the appeal, requires a warning tied carefully to the particular circumstances of the case.

Agents provocateurs (entrapment) 4.52 One controversial method of obtaining evidence against the accused is through the medium of agents provocateurs who encourage others to commit offences, either by instigating offences which would otherwise not have been committed or by participating in offences, thereby obtaining first-hand evidence of the crimes. Given the purpose of agents provocateurs, their later testimony in court should at least be carefully scrutinised and the jury appropriately directed. It has been argued that agents provocateurs are accomplices and thus subject to mandatory warning, but courts have consistently refused to accept this argument, whatever the degree to which the crime has been encouraged by the agent provocateur.190 Courts may, however, be willing to consider on a case-by-case basis whether, in the circumstances, a warning, not necessarily in corroboration terms, is so [page 368] warranted that failure to give it amounts to a miscarriage of justice. In R v Nation,191 the court carefully considered the argument but held that, in the case before them, sufficient warning had been given. The onus remains upon the accused to show that the failure to warn has produced a miscarriage of justice, and the warning required will undoubtedly turn upon the extent of the witness’s participation in the criminal activities alleged against the accused. Under s 165(1)(d) and (2) of the uniform legislation, which allows a party to request a direction where there is evidence ‘of a kind that may be unreliable’, such evidence includes evidence from a witness who might reasonably be

supposed to have been criminally concerned in the events giving rise to the proceedings. This provision reflects the common law’s definition of accomplice and although wider in ambit it might be doubted whether an agent provocateur falls within this definition. But if there are particular reasons to suspect his or her evidence it may be argued that the evidence falls within the general category and a direction requested, or a direction might be sought under the judge’s general power to direct as required to avoid a miscarriage of justice. 192 While the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) limits s 165 to civil proceedings it enacts a similar process to seek directions with respect to unreliable evidence (Pt 4 Div 3), and s 31(c) includes the category expressed in s 165(1)(d). But except as provided the judge is not required to direct and any common law rules to the contrary are abolished: s 34. Defence counsel have consistently argued that a mere warning is an inappropriate way of dealing with a case turning upon the testimony of an agent provocateur, particularly where that person has instigated or encouraged the crime in question. The objection to the testimony is not just that it is possibly unreliable but that it is inappropriate for law enforcement agencies to encourage crime in order to detect offenders. It is argued that such encouragement should either provide an accused with a substantive defence of entrapment, or the court should refuse abuse of its process through the prosecution of offences so procured and stay such proceedings, or at least the court should exclude, in exercise of its residual public policy discretion, any evidence so obtained. 4.53 These arguments were considered by the High Court in Ridgeway v R.193 The accused was charged with possession of an illegally imported substance. The illegal importation, sanctioned at ministerial level between the governments of Australia and Malaysia, had been carried out by undercover agents employed by the Malaysian and Australian police with the cooperation of customs officials. [page 369] The court agreed that, in contrast to the situation in America,194 the defence of entrapment is unjustifiable in principle and has never been accepted in Australia; that it is no abuse of the court’s process to ask it to determine the criminality of acts even though encouraged or induced by law enforcement officers; but that evidence might be excluded on grounds of public policy where police have acted

illegally or have gone beyond the limits of acceptable methods of investigation. In the case before them, where an illegal importation, essential to conviction of the accused, had been blatantly committed by police and condoned at the very highest levels of government, it was appropriate that all evidence relating to the illegal importation be excluded and the conviction be quashed and any further proceedings for the same offence permanently stayed. Subsequent courts, following a dictum in Ridgeway (at 39), will generally not consider discretionary exclusion unless the police illegality either forms an essential element of the crime charged or is exceptionally serious and calculated. As a consequence, entrapment evidence is generally admitted.195 [page 370] Legislation now permits the approval of operations and directs that such controlled operations neither give rise to the criminal liability of participants nor to illegality for the purpose of determining the admissibility of evidence obtained as a consequence of the operation.196

Identification evidence 4.54 The unreliabilities inherent in identification testimony have been the focus of considerable public attention, with resulting public inquiries making important recommendations for reform of the way in which courts receive and act upon such testimony.197 The uniform legislation enacts important reforms, applicable only to criminal proceedings, in Pt 3.9. In Victoria, the Jury Directions Act 2015 abolishes the common law and enacts more detailed warning requirements where identification evidence is admitted. Section 34AB of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA), in providing that identification evidence is admissible despite the absence of an identification parade, also appears to impact more generally on this area of law. Judges have for long been aware of the potential unreliability of identification evidence,198 although their thinking on the subject has been sharpened by public debate, empirical research,199 and the consequent spate of cases (many of which are referred to in the following discussion) in which counsel for accused have taken points

[page 371] in objection to such testimony. Yet the main technique applied by the common law to such testimony is to insist that the trial judge adequately direct any jury about the possible unreliabilities of the evidence in question to ensure they are taken into account by the jury when applying the criminal standard of proof. It remains with the accused to establish a miscarriage of justice on the ground that failure to direct has left the jury with insufficient ‘knowledge and understanding of the evidence to discharge their duty to determine the case according to the evidence’.200 In this sense, the required direction remains part of the trial judge’s general duty to adequately instruct the jury. But, just as the common law created presumptive corroboration warning requirements in the cases of testimony from children and sexual assault complainants, so in cases which turn upon disputed identification testimony there is a presumptive duty to warn in every case. Some warning must be given if a miscarriage of justice is to be avoided: Domican v R.201 But it need not be a corroboration warning and its precise content depends ultimately upon the disputed facts and circumstances of the particular case. No court has been prepared, or is indeed able, to hold the warning mandatory in the sense that the failure to give a particular warning, let alone a corroboration warning, is ipso facto an error of law entitling successful appeal unless the proviso applies. The uniform legislation retains the warning as an important safeguard against the unreliability of identification evidence. Under s 165(1)(b) (repealed in Victoria), ‘evidence of a kind that may be unreliable’ includes ‘identification evidence’ (defined in the Dictionary as an assertion that ‘a defendant was or resembles (visually, aurally202 or otherwise)’ the suspect on the basis of what the witness perceived at the relevant time),203 so a party may request an appropriate warning in respect of it. Where identification evidence falls outside this definition204 a warning may still be requested if it is otherwise evidence ‘of a kind that may be unreliable’. Furthermore, the common [page 372]

law general duty to direct is retained by s 165(5). But more significantly, s 116 (also repealed in Victoria) specifically requires, where ‘identification evidence’ (as defined above) ‘has been admitted, that the judge inform the jury (a) that there is a special need for caution before accepting identification evidence; and (b) of the reasons for the need for caution, both generally and in the circumstances of the case’.205 No particular form of words is demanded. As a consequence of these provisions, the content of any warning required under the uniform legislation is unlikely to differ from that required at common law. Section 34AB(3) and (4) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) enact provisions similar to s 116, but the section provides no definition of ‘identification evidence’ (although ‘identity parade’ is defined in terms of a contemporaneous visual presentation of persons or images for the purpose of identifying the accused). The court ‘must’ give an adequate warning in every case where identification evidence has been admitted and identification is in issue, so that failure to warn adequately is an error of law. But given that in most cases the precise warning and its expression will be fact specific, it is hard to see how adequacy can be determined other than by considering the risk of a miscarriage of justice. Thus this section is unlikely to alter the common law approach. In Victoria, directions about ‘identification evidence’, extending to the identification of both persons and objects and defined in terms of evidence of recognition or of similar general appearance or characteristics (s 35), can be requested under s 12 (on specific grounds) and the requirements of any direction are stipulated in s 36. The judge must not simply warn the jury of the need for caution and the grounds for that need but in addition: (c) inform the jury that— (i)

a witness may honestly believe that his or her evidence is accurate when the witness is, in fact, mistaken; and

(ii) the mistaken evidence of a witness may be convincing; and (d) if relevant, inform the jury that a number of witnesses may all be mistaken; (e) if relevant, inform the jury that mistaken identification evidence has resulted in innocent people being convicted.

Any further common law requirements are abolished: s 37. 4.55 Beyond warning, however, at common law, courts should seriously consider using their residuary discretion to exclude identification evidence of particularly doubtful reliability which may be overvalued by the jury, or where it would otherwise be unfair to admit such evidence against an accused, or where

the evidence has been obtained illegally or improperly. Parallel discretions exist under the uniform [page 373] legislation: ss 135–138. But the uniform legislation takes an important further step and in Pt 3.9 strictly controls the very admissibility of ‘visual identification evidence’ and ‘picture identification evidence’ of the accused. These additional controls, beyond mere warning, are also considered in this discussion of identification evidence.

The nature and risks of identification testimony 4.56 The central notion of identification testimony both at common law and under the uniform legislation is testimony whereby the witness identifies the accused206 as the person207 who was witnessed committing the crime charged or at least was witnessed in circumstances from which involvement in the crime can be inferred.208 McHugh J [page 374] in Festa v R refers to this as ‘positive-identification evidence’,209 which he describes (at [54]) as ‘direct proof’ of the charge where the accused was witnessed committing the crime charged, and ‘circumstantial proof’ where the accused is only witnessed in circumstances from which involvement can, usually in combination with other evidence, be inferred. Where a witness identifies the accused, he or she is testifying not merely that the accused is of the same description, or has similar characteristics as the perpetrator of the crime, but is additionally testifying to his or her inferential act of identification, that the accused and the person witnessed are one and the same. This might be referred to as evidence of ‘recognition’. Testimony that involves this leap of inferential faith can be distinguished from testimony that merely describes similarities between a person previously witnessed and the accused,210 and where the witness is unable or refuses to take the further inferential step.211

[page 375] 4.57 In the case of testimony of identification of the accused, at common law the jury must be warned against the risks of relying upon the witness’s assertion of ‘recognition’.212 Where the testimony is merely of similarity, generally it may be said that there is no requirement to warn in these terms,213 although McHugh J in Festa (at [57]) asserts that where a witness claims a similarity in facial features it would usually be appropriate to give the standard warning. The definition of ‘identification evidence’ in the uniform legislation extends to evidence the accused ‘was or resembles’ the offender, which would appear to extend to evidence of similarity falling short of recognition. Section 35 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) expressly defines ‘identification’ to apply both to evidence of recognition and of similarity. Section 34CA of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) contains no definition of ‘identification evidence’. The discretions to exclude apply to both similarity and recognition evidence, although a court may be more likely to consider excluding recognition testimony on the ground that the jury may give undue weight to it.214 Although normally an accused will be identified visually through facial features, it is quite common for a witness to testify to identification of an accused’s voice.215 New South Wales common law decisions suggested that voice identification is only admissible where either the witness is familiar with the voice or the voice recognised has distinctive features (so that in their absence the evidence could be treated only as [page 376] evidence of similarity).216 Courts in other jurisdictions have refused to demand any such formal threshold requirements,217 regarding matters of familiarity and distinctiveness as going to weight, or appropriate warning or discretionary exclusion rather than admissibility. The better view, expressed by Ormiston J in R v Harris (No 3),218 is that the courts’ approach to testimony of voice identification should follow as far as possible the approach to testimony of visual identification. Toohey and Gaudron JJ in Bulejcik v R demand a warning, comparable to that required for visual identification,219 and as visual identification is the strongest form of identification testimony, the courts’ views about the risks

of such evidence should apply a fortiori to voice identification or resemblance. But whether in every case a witness should be asked to identify a voice for the first time at a ‘voice line-up’ is extremely doubtful.220 [page 377] An accused could theoretically be identified through other personal characteristics; for example, smell,221 touch,222 and even a distinctive propensity.223 But to be admissible the witness must identify the suspect from some direct sense impression supporting the inference of identity: AK v Western Australia.224 Despite amendments it makes to the hearsay rule, the definition of ‘identification evidence’ under the uniform legislation demands that testimony of identification be based upon the witness’s own perceptions, so that testimony that a person was introduced to a witness as, for example, ‘Adam’, if relevant, was not identification evidence within that legislation: Trudgett v R.225 4.58 The risks of unreliability inherent in identification testimony — particularly of strangers and cross-racial identification226 — are well documented.227 They stem, first, from the difficulty that witnesses have in forming reliable impressions of persons observed by them and, secondly, from the difficulty in subsequently matching recollections with the suspects put before them.228 Most significantly, courts have [page 378] emphasised that, even where the witness is honest and the circumstances of observation and subsequent identification are ideal, there can be no certainty about identification testimony, particularly where the person observed was at that time unknown to the witness. The persistence of subtle but influential cues along with the vulnerability of witnesses to suggestibility and reinforcement only compound the dangers.229 Honest mistakes are easily and commonly made. Where the circumstances of observation and subsequent identification are less than ideal, the risks of honest mistake, again particularly with strangers, increase dramatically. Fleeting observation at night at a distance, coupled with the police confronting the witness with only one person who matches only some of the

characteristics observed, must lead to identification evidence of dubious reliability.230 Courts have been conscious that juries should be made fully aware, by clear and careful warning, of the risks inherent in both observation and subsequent identification, and that police should employ identification procedures that eliminate the most obvious risks. But, at common law, this consciousness has so far fallen short of the imposition of either mandatory guidelines for adequate warning or mandatory identification procedures to be followed by police, despite appellate courts being given opportunities to tighten up their approach. It is this failure that has led to the enactment of ss 114 and 115 of the uniform legislation, sections ensuring the inadmissibility of identification evidence obtained in breach of appropriate identification procedures.231 [page 379]

The requirement to warn 4.59 As pointed out at 4.6, the common law warning requirement has evolved from, and is part of, the judge’s general duty to sum up fairly to the jury, with appellate courts ruling a miscarriage of justice where, upon the facts before them, they consider that a failure to warn has resulted in an unreasonable risk of wrongful conviction. That this general duty remains the basis of any requirement to warn in identification cases is clearly spelled out by the High Court in Domican v R,232 although, in practice, a warning must be given in every case of disputed identification. The appropriate warning is ultimately dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. There is no formula that can be simply followed by trial judges in every case to avoid the possibility of a miscarriage of justice. Some courts have tried to definitively catalogue the matters to be canvassed in every case.233 But state court decisions show the variety of circumstances that may become decisive in particular cases.234 Where the uniform legislation requires an identification warning it also rejects the idea of attempting to impose any formula for the direction: ss 116(2), 165(4). While the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) adds to the general directions required in the case of identification evidence it leaves the final direction very much dependent upon the specific circumstances — ‘the significant matters that the trial judge considers may make the evidence unreliable’: s 36(3)(b). Section 34AB(3) and (4) of the

Evidence Act 1929 (SA) mirror s 116 of the uniform legislation in providing that, where identification is in issue and identification evidence has been admitted, the jury be informed of the need and reasons for caution generally and in the circumstances before accepting identification evidence and ‘[i]n giving any such information, the judge is not required to use any particular form of words …’. 4.60 The High Court in Domican v R provides guidance on the approach to be taken by trial judges in giving a warning in respect to identification evidence. In that case, a witness claimed to recognise, some nine months after the crime alleged, a person who [page 380] wore a false wig and moustache at the time of the crime and who had unexpectedly started shooting at the witness’s husband while he was walking in the street with the witness. The two had taken cover and the husband was shot in the hand. The trial judge emphasised that these stressful circumstances might affect different people in different ways, and told the jury to be careful in assessing the reliability of the witness’s testimony and to take account of the risk of honest mistake. In assessing this risk, he instructed the jury carefully to consider four matters (at 560): … whether the witness had previously known the person identified; how good an opportunity the witness had to get a clear picture of the person identified; how long had elapsed between the event and the first identification; and what were the circumstances and nature of that first identification.

What the judge had failed to direct the jury upon were a number of specific inconsistencies and doubts in the witness’s testimony — inconsistencies and doubts that had been canvassed by counsel during the case. No attempt had been made by the trial judge to highlight these particular alleged unreliabilities. In these circumstances, the High Court held that there was a misdirection. Although the general risks of unreliability had been adequately canvassed, the judge had failed to relate these to the particular circumstances of the case, and it is this particularisation that the High Court saw as the essence of the warning if the jury was to properly appreciate the risks in the case before it. The approach to be taken by a trial judge to disputed evidence of identification is summarised by the majority (at 561–2): Whatever the defence and however the case is conducted, where evidence as to identification represents any significant part of the proof of guilt of an offence, the judge must warn the jury as to

the dangers of convicting on such evidence where its reliability is disputed. The terms of the warning need not follow any particular formula. But it must be cogent and effective. It must be appropriate to the circumstances of the case. Consequently, the jury must be instructed ‘as to the factors which may affect the consideration of [the identification] evidence in the circumstances of the particular case’. A warning in general terms is insufficient. The attention of the jury ‘should be drawn to any weaknesses in the identification evidence’. Reference to counsel’s arguments is insufficient. The jury must have the benefit of a direction which has the authority of the judge’s office behind it. It follows that the trial judge should isolate and identify for the benefit of the jury any matter of significance which may reasonably be regarded as undermining the reliability of the identification evidence.

4.61 It is not enough for the judge merely to refer the jury to what may have been said by counsel for the accused,235 for the judge’s authority must clearly be given to the direction (Festa v R);236 nor is it enough to refer to possible weaknesses without stressing the real need to take these into account on the particular facts of the case: [page 381] R v Radford.237 However, in canvassing the particular facts a judge is not in error in also referring to perceived strengths in the evidence: R v Fox (No 2).238 This common law need for the judge to highlight not just the general but also the particular risks is expressly enacted in s 116(1) of the uniform legislation,239 s 36 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) and s 34AB(3) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA). Although s 116(1) requires such warning in the case of all identification evidence, the majority in Dhanhoa v R240 holds that the section has no application where the identification evidence is not in dispute. McHugh and Gummow JJ, rather than reading down s 116, preferred to emphasise that because the trial judge was not expressly requested by counsel to give any direction there was no ‘wrong decision of any question of law’ and as there was not otherwise a miscarriage of justice there was no ground for appeal. Under the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), directions are only required on the request of one of the parties (s 36) and anyway an appellant must establish a substantial miscarriage of justice even where there has been a wrong decision of law. In South Australia, under s 34AB(3) of the Evidence Act 1929, adequate warnings are required whenever identification is in issue.

The warning: factors relevant to the reliability of identification evidence

4.62 This need for particularity had been emphasised in a number of earlier state court decisions.241 But the question remains: what are these matters of significance that may reasonably be regarded as undermining the reliability of identification evidence? The factors governing the need to give a warning in identification cases and the nature of that warning are numerous and do not apply in every case.242 These factors [page 382] are a catalogue of the possible weaknesses of identification evidence at the stages of observation and initial identification. What is particularly stressed by the courts243 (and by the psychologists)244 is that, when giving evidence of identification, even the most honest and positive witnesses may be mistaken, and that jurors tend to be easily convinced when faced with a confident witness. The weight of such testimony is therefore always difficult to assess.245 It is because of this that courts must carefully consider the need to warn in every identification case — and juries should, at the least, be informed of this. Under s 36(3)(c) of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), such a direction is a required element of any identification direction; and s 36(1)(e) furthermore demands that, ‘if relevant, [the judge must] inform the jury that mistaken identification evidence has resulted in innocent people being convicted’. Section 34AB(3) of the Evidence Act 1929 provides that the jury ‘must’ be informed of the need and reasons for caution generally and in the particular circumstances whenever identification evidence is admitted and identity is in issue. [page 383] 4.63 The factor most likely to mitigate the need for, or nature of, the warning is the witness’s acquaintance with the accused before observation; that is, the nature and quality of familiarity. Where a witness identifies a suspect upon the basis of a previous acquaintance, the evidence is often described as evidence of recognition (fact) rather than identification (opinion).246 Some judges imply that where the witness is well acquainted with the accused the warning need only be

cursory,247 but others seek to play down the significance of previous acquaintance,248 the court in R v Turnbull249 declaring that ‘even when the witness is purporting to recognise someone whom he knows, the jury should be reminded that mistakes in recognition of close relatives and friends are sometimes made’.250 But the significance of this factor will generally be assessed on the facts having regard to the length and nature of the acquaintance, any special features possessed by the person identified, and the circumstances under which the suspected criminal was observed.251 In R v Spero,252 Redlich AJA held that where the complainant had known the applicant for 25 years no Domican warning was required. Under the uniform legislation, testimony of recognition (based upon a past acquaintance) of the accused in implicating circumstances at or about the time the crime was committed, as an assertion of identity based partly upon what the witness then perceived, is ‘identification evidence’ requiring a warning under s 116: Trudgett v R.253 The Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) expressly (but broadly) refers to ‘recognition’ in defining identification evidence, although in the context of distinguishing between recognition and resemblance based on similar characteristics. Identification evidence is not defined by s 34AB of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA), although ‘identity parade’ is defined as a contemporaneous presentation (whether by a physical line-up or by [page 384] means of images) of a number of persons to a witness for the purpose of identifying a person. The circumstances in which the witness observes the suspect involved in the relevant events are of potential significance in every case.254 They comprise not only the external physical circumstances, such as the conditions of visibility (light, weather, distance, length of observation, and so on), but also the witness’s capacity to observe (eyesight, concentration, state of mind, sobriety, and so on).255 4.64 The circumstances in which the witness, having initially observed the suspect, subsequently identifies the accused are crucial, not only to the need to give a warning and the extent of that warning, but also to the issue of whether that subsequent identification should be excluded altogether, in exercise of the trial judge’s discretion,256 or, under the uniform legislation, as a matter of

admissibility under ss 114 and 115. Sometimes identification is unprovoked, spontaneous and immediate and accorded considerable weight as a result.257 But usually it is made following request by the police. ‘Where there is … delay between observation and identification, a trial judge should direct a jury that delay is a factor to be considered in assessing the accuracy of identification.’258 But perhaps the matter of most crucial importance to both warning and deciding whether to admit the identification is the procedure followed in obtaining that evidence. The courts emphasise that the greatest risk of unreliability occurs (through [page 385] suggestion)259 when the witness is asked to identify a single suspect only.260 This can occur in various ways. Most unreliable is the dock identification, where the accused is identified for the first time in the dock, and such identification calls not only for careful warning but also for serious consideration of the exclusionary discretion.261 Again, the police may themselves be confronted by the suspect or confront the witness with the suspect alone before trial262 or, alternatively, show the witness a single photograph of the accused.263 These procedures may be appropriate where the suspect is already well known to the witness and the procedure is being used only to confirm a prior identification.264 [page 386] 4.65 It is generally accepted by courts that the most reliable method of identification is at an identification parade (preferably organised by someone who is not actively investigating the offence)265 of persons among whom the accused does not stand out in any way (through appearance or dress).266 But more recently, following empirical research, debate has arisen over whether this procedure should proceed sequentially, through each person in the ‘line-up’ being shown individually in turn to the witness until an identification is made, rather than simultaneously, as is the current practice.267 Research indicates that the sequential approach reduces the rate of false positives; that is, incorrect positive identifications, but it does not establish that the sequential approach

increases the overall rate of correct positive identifications. Therefore, although one may argue that the sequential procedure results in a more appropriate allocation of the risk of error between suspect and state, it may not produce a net gain in the rate of factual accuracy. The procedure is endorsed in some United States jurisdictions but whilst recognised as appropriate by the National Institute of Justice, it is put forward simply as an option to the current simultaneous practice. In England and Wales, the principal mode of identification is now through a sequential video presentation, but the witness must not make an identification until all the images have been at least twice viewed.268 In Australia, where legislation lays down identification procedures, an ‘identification parade’ is specified.269 The term is not defined but does not appear to assume a sequential procedure. In South Australia, s 34AB of the Evidence Act 1929 defines an identity parade in terms of ‘contemporary’ presentations, thereby apparently not affecting sequential procedures. But the common law legitimacy of a sequential procedure was not only endorsed by the Court of Criminal Appeal in [page 387] Winmar v Western Australia270 but it concluded, referring to the scientific literature, that ‘the question of whether an identification is performed by showing images or persons sequentially, or all at once, is not of such critical importance as to require a warning, as a rule’ and that, rather, courts should be vigilant to warning where there may be a risk ‘the witness has performed a relative identification, rather than actually identifying the offender’. But it is agreed that the reliability of an identification parade is seriously undermined if the witness has previously purported to recognise the accused (the so-called ‘displacement effect’).271 If this previous recognition has been by way of single presentation, either in person or (most commonly) by photograph, all the risks of the initial identification remain, for psychologists have shown, and courts agree, that there is a high risk that witnesses subconsciously transfer previous recognition to any later recognition.272 It is therefore unlikely that the risks of a single presentation will be erased by later recognition at a parade.273 But the practical reality is that, unless the accused is previously known to the witness, in many cases police must seek recognition of an identifiable suspect before anyone can be asked to participate in an identification parade. Verbal

descriptions, identikit constructions, computer constructions274 and photographs must be used to isolate an identifiable suspect. Practical necessity demands identification of a suspect before an identification parade can be held. That parade is consequently of limited use [page 388] because of the risk of displacement.275 It is, therefore, crucial that the first identification is made as far as possible without suggestion or prompting (or reinforcement).276 Where photographic identification is used, the witness should identify from a series of similar photographs.277 But risks are inherent even in such a photographic array;278 there is no safeguard against police suggestion (at least the accused and, often, a lawyer or other independent person is present at a full identification parade),279 and [page 389] when photographic identification is disclosed to the jury it may assume, from police possession of photographs, that the accused has a criminal record (the ‘rogues’ gallery effect’).280 These are all matters about which the jury should be made aware in the judge’s warning.281 If, even with a strong warning, an unacceptable risk of prejudice or unreliability remains, then the evidence might warrant exclusion under the residuary discretion.282 Section 34AB(1) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) expressly preserves the admissibility of identification made by means other than an identity parade (defined in terms of visual identification following contemporaneous presentation of persons or images), and further providing that where such other means are used it must not be suggested to the jury that such other means are inherently or intrinsically less reliable than an identity parade. But subs (5) then expressly provides that s 34AB does not make evidence admissible that would otherwise be inadmissible and preserves the court’s discretion to exclude. It is not clear how these provisions affect the admissibility of identifications made in the absence of a parade, if at all. However, s 34AB(2) provides that where evidence of identity is obtained by means of an ‘identity parade’ it is to be excluded unless an audio

video record is made and kept in accordance with the regulations, and any other procedures prescribed by regulations are followed (see Evidence Regulations 2007 reg 3AA); unless the judge is satisfied that despite noncompliance, admission is required in the interests of justice. Significantly, the burden is upon the prosecution to establish these matters.

Discretionary exclusion of identification evidence 4.66 At common law, all the above considerations are relevant not just to the extent and nature of the warning required, but also to the question whether the evidence should, as a matter of discretion, be excluded. Some counsel have sought to go further and have courts not merely exclude identification evidence in exercise of the residuary discretion, but also to lay down identification procedures to be followed by the police in every case, with a penalty of mandatory exclusion for not adhering to them. [page 390] In Alexander v R,283 the accused was identified from a series of police photographs at a stage where an identification parade could have been attempted, and it was argued that the identification evidence, which included tender of the photographs in question, should have been excluded. Stephen and Murphy JJ accepted the argument, the former clearly favouring an exclusionary rule in circumstances where an identification parade, generally considered by courts to be more reliable, could have been held. Although Stephen J was prepared to accept that, in initially investigating a crime and finding a suspect, photographs must necessarily be used, he was of the view that, once the suspect has been singled out and can be placed in an identification parade, the police should be obliged to attempt to use that procedure284 (the suspect may, of course, always decline to participate).285 The majority refused to approach the case in this way, asking, not what were the most appropriate identification procedures in the abstract, but whether in the circumstances of the case before them there was any risk that a miscarriage of justice had occurred.286 Mason and Aickin JJ (at 430–2) appear to rule out the possible application of the public policy discretion altogether, although Gibbs J (at 402–3) leaves open this possibility in cases of illegality.

4.67 Subsequent cases consider the nature of the exclusionary discretion applicable to identification testimony. There is no dispute over its exercise on grounds of unfairness in the sense that the probative value is insufficient and may be given undue weight or may be misleading (the evidence may be more prejudicial than probative).287 [page 391] But cases also favour the possibility of its exercise on public policy grounds,288 at least where the identification has been conducted illegally.289 Alexander v R is best explained on its facts, as deciding that absence of an identification parade is not ipso facto an impropriety to be considered under public policy principles, so that, on its facts, the case called for no exercise of those principles. Certainly, other courts have stressed that an identification parade is not always necessary where, for example, the accused is well known to the witness;290 or where positive identification has been made from photographs;291 or where the police and all parties are present at the scene of the crime;292 or where the accused has refused to participate in an identification parade.293 Nor are the courts prepared to tie themselves to any particular procedures in holding such parades.294 Nevertheless, in R v Deering, King CJ suggested that, where [page 392] the police have a definite suspect and are able to organise an identification parade, they should do so and will run the risk of discretionary exclusion if they do not;295 and in R v Penny, Wallwark J, in a strongly worded judgment, cited this case in excluding identification evidence on grounds of unfairness and prejudice to the accused where the police had made no attempt either to arrange a formal identification parade, or to record the more informal procedure they had used so that its reliability could be fairly determined by the court.296 However, following a consideration of the psychological literature the court in Winmar v Western Australia297 refused to conclude that photographic identification through the use of ‘digi-boards’, whereby a series of photographs, some of which may be digitally

enhanced to reproduce a description given by the witness, was inferior to identification by live parade. 4.68 Discretionary exclusion is also available under the uniform legislation, in particular ss 137298 and 138, with the latter reversing the onus so that where evidence [page 393] has been obtained illegally or improperly the Crown must justify admission. The failure to hold an identification parade may also lead to exclusion under s 114: discussed at 4.69. In relation to the investigation of Commonwealth and Australian Capital Territory offences, ss 3ZM–3ZQ of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and ss 233–237 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) require visual identification parades on the request of the suspect and otherwise prescribe procedures for such parades where they are held and for the use of photographs for identification. Breach of these provisions will constitute an illegality invoking the exclusionary discretion, both at common law and under s 138 of the Uniform Acts. Section 617 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) permits various forms of identification which must be taken in accordance with procedures in the ‘responsibilities code’: Sch 10 Pt 6 Divs 1, 2 and 3. As mentioned above (at 4.65), s 34AB(2) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) goes further and excludes evidence obtained by means of an ‘identity parade’ unless the prosecution establishes that an audio video record was made and kept in accordance with the regulations, and any other procedures prescribed in the regulations were followed; unless the judge can be persuaded that despite non-compliance admission is required in the interests of justice. It is expressly provided that the section does not affect the court’s discretion to exclude evidence. In all jurisdictions, police orders specify identification procedures.

The exclusionary rules in the Uniform Acts299 4.69 More relevantly and comprehensively, s 114 of the Uniform Acts by way of a rule of admissibility requires an identification parade to be held in the case of ‘visual identification evidence’ adduced by a prosecutor. The Dictionary defines

‘identification evidence’ in terms that makes it clear that such evidence must relate to identification of the defendant. ‘Visual identification evidence’ is defined in s 114(1) as ‘identification evidence’ based wholly or partly on what a person saw at the scene of the offence, but not including ‘picture identification evidence’, which is separately provided for in s 115: discussed at 4.70. ‘Visual identification evidence’, which includes (and must be specified as) an identification asserted out of300 or in court,301 is inadmissible under s 114(2): [page 394] … unless (a)

an identification parade that included the defendant was held before the identification was made;302 or

(b) it would not have been reasonable to have held such a parade;303 or (c) the defendant refused to take part in such a parade;304 and the identification was made without the person who made it having been intentionally influenced to identify the defendant.305

The remaining subsections specify the matters that may and may not be considered in determining whether it would not have been reasonable to hold a parade. A number of matters referred to in common law cases above are stressed: the nature of the offence and the importance of the evidence; the cooperation of the defendant; whether identification was made at or about the same time as the offence; the relationship between the identifier and the suspect; reasonable grounds for believing that, where a lawyer or other person is requested to be present, it would be reasonably impractical for such person to attend; and the fairness of an identification parade to the defendant. It is expressly provided that the availability of pictures or photographs that could be used in making the identification is not to be taken into account. 4.70 Picture identification evidence is strictly controlled by s 115 of the Uniform Acts. As mentioned at 4.65, identification through the use of photographs and other [page 395]

pictures (for example, photofit and identikit pictures) may be a practical necessity where police are attempting to isolate a particular suspect. But the policy of the uniform legislation is that this procedure should only be used when an identification parade is impossible or impracticable and, furthermore, steps should be taken to eliminate as far as possible the ‘rogues’ gallery’ effect of such evidence when it is admitted.306 This is the purpose of s 115, which applies to ‘picture identification evidence’ (defined as identification of the defendant through the examination of ‘pictures [including photographs] kept for the use of police officers’). Prosecution evidence of picture identification evidence is inadmissible where the defendant was in ‘the custody of a police officer of the police force investigating the offence’ when the pictures were examined,307 unless either the defendant had refused to take part in an identification parade,308 or his or her appearance had changed significantly since the time of the offence, or it was not reasonably practicable to hold such a parade, or the evidence is adduced to meet defence picture identification evidence: s 115(3), (4). Where the defendant was in such custody and one of the exceptions permits picture identification, the picture must nevertheless (to eliminate any risk of a rogues’ gallery effect) have been made after the defendant had been taken into that custody, unless either the defendant’s appearance had significantly changed since the alleged offence, or it was not reasonably practicable to make a picture, or the evidence is adduced to meet defence picture identification evidence. Furthermore, picture identification evidence remains inadmissible as long as ‘the pictures examined suggest that they are pictures of persons in police custody’, again unless adduced to meet picture identification evidence adduced by the defence: s 115(8). And where picture identification evidence is admissible the judge must on request inform the jury that the picture was made after the defendant had been taken [page 396] into custody, and warn the jury that they must not assume the defendant has a previous record or has been previously charged with an offence: s 115(7). The section lays down no set procedure for making a picture identification, but

ss 3ZO and 3ZP of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and s 235 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) specify the procedure which is to apply to the investigation of federal and territory offences, breach of which may lead to discretionary exclusion. Where possible, witnesses should identify from a series of similar pictures, and always without any form of suggestion. In other jurisdictions, police orders may specify procedures to be followed. Whether the assumptions underlying these sections — that a (simultaneous) live identification parade is preferable to ‘picture identification’— are valid seems questionable in the light of the psychological literature discussed in Winmar v Western Australia to conclude the effectiveness and advantages of ‘digi-board identification’. ALRC Report 102309 contains no critical discussion of the new technology and no recommendations to amend these sections of the uniform legislation. But where the accused is not in police custody the new technology may lawfully be employed.

The effect of supporting evidence on the obligation to warn 4.71 Even when a consideration of the above factors leads to the conclusion that an inadequate direction has been given to the jury, an appellate court may refuse to interfere with a conviction where the identification testimony is clearly supported by other evidence. The mere presence of such evidence is not enough to obviate the need for a warning.310 As the High Court point out in Domican v R:311 The adequacy of the warning has to be evaluated by reference to the nature of the relationship between the witness and the person identified, the opportunity to observe the person subsequently identified, the length of time between the incident and the identification, and the nature and circumstances of the first identification — not by reference to other evidence which implicates the accused. A trial judge is not absolved from his or her duty to give general and specific warnings concerning the danger of convicting on identification evidence because there is other evidence, which, if accepted, is sufficient to convict the accused.

The point being that the trial judge cannot know whether the jury will accept the other evidence.312 [page 397] But on appeal the presence of other evidence may be decisive where it is strong and clear.313 The effect of such evidence on appeal was considered by the

High Court in Domican v R. In appellate jurisdictions other than Victoria (see 4.72 below) an appellate court, having decided a warning inadequate, must uphold the appeal unless the prosecution can convince the court that even with a correct warning the jury would inevitably have convicted. Where it is argued that the presence of other evidence cures the failure to warn, the prosecution is effectively arguing that this evidence is sufficient to support the conviction independently of the disputed identification testimony, and that the jury must have accepted it. Only in these circumstances can the appellate court say that the jury would inevitably have convicted even if warned against acting on the identification testimony. 4.72 However, as Brennan J points out in Domican, one can never know upon what basis a jury has acted. Even if there is independent evidence capable of supporting a conviction, the jury may not have acted, nor been willing to act, solely upon that evidence. The possibility cannot be eliminated that the jury did act upon the disputed identification testimony, partly or wholly, in reaching its decision, and that it might have rejected the independent line of evidence. Thus, Brennan J concluded that, even where there is other evidence, it can seldom if ever be concluded that ‘by reason of the misdirection or inadequate direction, the accused did not lose a chance of acquittal’: at 571. Although, as the majority point out, the question on the application of the proviso is not strictly whether the accused has lost a chance of acquittal but whether the jury would inevitably have convicted with a correct direction, the same reasoning is applicable to this latter test. This reasoning is affected by the interpretation of the proviso now demanded by the High Court in Weiss v R.314 This obliges the appellate court to determine from the record whether it believes the conviction must be upheld as on the evidence properly before the court the accused’s guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. Where the evidence on the record is in dispute and the appellate court has not heard [page 398] the witnesses testify it is unlikely that this change in interpretation to the proviso will make it easier for an appellate court to apply. In Victoria, there is no proviso and the question on appeal is whether the appellant can establish a substantial

miscarriage of justice. Unless the accused’s guilt on the evidence properly admitted is inevitably established beyond reasonable doubt, the appeal is likely to succeed: see 2.14 nn 60–61.

The cumulative effect of identification evidence 4.73 One issue that has perplexed courts is whether the doubtful identification testimony315 of a series of identification witnesses can be added together circumstantially to create a strong identification.316 In R v Turnbull,317 Lord Widgery CJ declares that juries should be warned that, just as one witness may be mistaken, so may a number. In R v Burchielli,318 the court said the jury should be directed that ‘two defective identifications do not necessarily support one another’. But these remarks are not to be interpreted as asserting that identifying witnesses are unable to confirm each other. In R v Haidley and Alford, the Supreme Court of Victoria made this clear.319 All evidence should be looked at together and may in the circumstances of a particular case draw strength from the combination. Identification evidence is no exception, [page 399] although the strength of combined identification testimony must be carefully assessed in the light of the real possibility of individual mistake and group contamination, and the jury should normally be so directed. Where identification testimony is individually very poor, combining it may not take the matter any further. On the other hand, ‘[t]wo or three far from perfect identifications may in the minds of a reasonable jury produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt where one would not’. In view of this, Brooking J concluded that, ‘[t]o tell a jury, without explanation, that two defective identifications do not necessarily support one another may mislead them’: at 252.320 On the other hand, it may be appropriate to warn the jury that several witnesses may be equally mistaken.321 What is important to stress is that, to conclude that doubtful identification testimony may be combined in no way affects the warning that the trial judge must give in respect of each individual identification. As Domican v R322 emphasises, the presence of other evidence, which a jury may or may not

accept, does not absolve a trial judge from canvassing the possible dangers of acting on the identification testimony of the individual witness.323 Section 36(3) (d) of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) provides that the judge must ‘if relevant, inform the jury that a number of witnesses may all be mistaken’.

The admissibility of out-of-court assertions of identity and pictures used for identification 4.74 The above discussion of the factors relevant to the reliability of identification evidence makes a number of assumptions about the admissibility of such evidence at the trial. As Chapters 7 and 8 explain, the general rule is that witnesses must testify in court to the events and circumstances experienced by them. Out-of-court assertions are inadmissible as prior consistent statements or hearsay. If this principle is slavishly followed, then only in-court identification evidence is admissible.324 Yet, for reasons which are discussed at 7.94–7.98, courts are generally prepared to admit in [page 400] addition evidence of the witness’s out-of-court identification,325 from a photograph or in the course of an identification parade, or by means of identikit reconstruction,326 notwithstanding that this evidence is at least relevant as a witness’s prior consistent statement and sometimes is accepted as hearsay. Clearly, this previous information is of vital importance in assessing the weight of the witness’s in-court testimony, generally an in-court identification, and any warning will have to canvass its full significance.327 Where the identification witness is not called or, when called is unable to testify at all to a prior act of identification, it may be arguable that the evidence of the prior act of identification should be excluded at common law as hearsay. If it is admitted, again an appropriate warning will be required. However, aspects of the out-of-court identification may be prejudicial to an accused, particularly where photographic identification gives rise to the rogues’ gallery effect, and courts will consider preventing the tender of the actual photographs where they are likely to be prejudicial to the accused and where a warning is insufficient safeguard.328 Although some courts consider there is a presumption of exclusion in these circumstances and that tender should be left

within the option of the defence,329 the High Court in Alexander v R was more prepared to admit photographs (with appropriate warning) tendered by the prosecution as a matter of course unless clear prejudice can be established. This approach has been followed by later courts.330

[page 401] Under s 114 of the uniform legislation, identification evidence, including an in-court identification, cannot be received unless an identification parade has been held or is excused under that section. Nor is there any problem in admitting evidence of a witness’s out-of-court identification as a prior consistent statement and as first-hand hearsay under the uniform legislation.331 Under s 115, photographs are also inadmissible unless the picture identification evidence satisfies that section. Where other statutory procedures for picture identification have not been followed all evidence relating to that identification may fall for exclusion under the common law discretion or s 138 of the Uniform Acts.

Other unreliable testimony 4.75 So far in this chapter, four categories of testimony have been singled out as requiring some warning as a matter of practice. Others, perhaps not of such everyday importance, can be singled out, and are mentioned here for the sake of completeness. When divorce depended upon the establishment of matrimonial offences, such as adultery, judges often declared that they would not generally act upon the uncorroborated testimony of one of the adulterers,332 and judges in divorce and related proceedings still take care in acting upon the testimony of the parties and others intimately involved in delicate family disputes.333 Again, courts take care in acting upon the testimony alone of a claimant to the estate of a deceased person.334 But there are no fixed rules in these civil cases and rarely would an appellate court interfere unless it could be clearly shown that the trial judge had given a decision which was unsupported by, or against the weight of, the evidence, or had failed to advert to a significant matter in assessing the weight of the evidence. These civil cases are best not singled out for special treatment. In criminal cases at common law: The category of circumstances and special types of case which call for special directions and warnings from the trial judge cannot be considered as closed. Increased judicial experience, and, indeed, further psychological research, may extend it.335

[page 402]

And under s 165(2) of the uniform legislation and ss 31 and 32 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), on request a warning is required, unless there are good reasons to the contrary,336 in respect of all ‘evidence of a kind that may be unreliable’.337 4.76 Examples can be found of appellate courts considering some warning desirable where a prosecution witness may have a purpose to serve in giving false testimony,338 or other matters creating risks of unreliability may arise.339 In Pollitt v R, the High Court agreed that, where a prison informer testifies to a confession made by a fellow prisoner on remand for that crime, the jury should have explained to it why such testimony carries a high risk of unreliability and be warned about acting on the confession without some confirmation of its making.340 The uniform legislation in s 165(1)(e) and s 31(d) of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) expressly recognise such testimony as ‘evidence of a kind that may be unreliable’. 4.77 This residual category of circumstances that may make a witness’s testimony unreliable and demand a warning to avoid a miscarriage of justice is recognised by the [page 403] High Court in a series of decisions.341 In R v Bromley,342 where the chief prosecution witness was of a schizophrenic personality (and would therefore have fallen within s 165(1)(c) of the uniform legislation), Gibbs CJ (with whom Mason and Wilson JJ agreed) remarked (at 319): If it appears that a witness whose evidence is important has some mental disability which may affect his or her capacity to give reliable evidence, common sense clearly dictates that the jury should be given a warning, appropriate to the circumstances of the case, of the possible danger of basing a conviction on the testimony of that witness unless it is confirmed by other evidence. The warning should be clear and in a case in which a lay juror might not understand why the evidence of the witness was potentially unreliable, it should be explained to the jury why that is so. There is no particular formula that must be used; the words used must depend on the circumstances of the case …

In the case before him the jury was aware of the witness’s mental condition and had been warned to scrutinise the testimony ‘with special care’ and the court refused to interfere with the verdict. Brennan J, who agreed with the majority,

emphasised that warning is primarily necessary where the danger of unreliability is not obvious to the lay mind. He concluded (at 325): Perhaps no more can be said than this: when the danger in acting upon the evidence is real and substantial and when the conduct of the trial and evidence as to the witness’s mental disorder are such that the jury may not have fully perceived or the jury’s attention may have been diverted from the danger, a warning should be given. This was such a case.

[page 404] Section 165(1)(c) of the uniform legislation and s 31(b) of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) expressly nominate ‘evidence the reliability of which may be affected by age, ill health (whether physical or mental), injury or the like’ as evidence of a kind that may be unreliable justifying a request for direction. In R v GW,343 the court noted that the section makes no mention of whether testimony is sworn or unsworn, and whilst holding that the fact that a six-year-old child gave unsworn testimony required no direction from the judge as in the circumstances the jury would have been under no misapprehension of the risks of acting on the child’s testimony, at [57] it left open whether where an adult gives unsworn testimony some mention of why that was necessary might require direction to avoid a miscarriage of justice. 4.78 Bromley serves to emphasise that, as the court also pointed out in Domican v R,344 at common law the duty to warn in all of the cases considered under this heading is ultimately an aspect of the trial judge’s general duty to sum up fairly to the jury to ensure that it considers factors relevant to its decision that it may not fully appreciate.345 There is a duty to warn where the circumstances so demand if a miscarriage of justice is to be avoided. Such a ‘warning’, which will effectively be imposed by an appellate court, may be distinguished from those ‘comments’ that a trial judge may make about the evidence but where failure to comment will produce no miscarriage of justice. The terminology simply follows the likely consequences of the failure to direct and carries no significance in itself. Even though the uniform legislation provides for warning on request, as already emphasised, that legislation expressly provides that the general ‘power of the judge to give a warning to, or to inform, the jury’ remains unaffected. And whatever may be the technical interpretations of s 165 or the requirements of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) canvassed by the courts, the ultimate question in every case must always be whether on the facts the failure to direct about a

specific matter has produced an unacceptable risk of a (‘substantial’ in Victoria) ‘miscarriage of justice’. 4.79 The difficulty is to determine what constitutes an appropriate warning in the circumstances of a case. In particular, it must be decided, first, to what extent the trial judge must canvass the specific risks of unreliability of the testimony in question and, secondly, in what circumstances the judge should go further and direct the jury in terms of the danger of acting upon the evidence in the absence of confirming evidence. Where no corroboration warning is required as a matter of law or practice it must be [page 405] preferable for the trial judge, where possible, to avoid use of the word ‘corroboration’ altogether, for fear of failing to explain that term in a way that conforms with its common law meaning: discussed at 4.80ff. Given that the appropriate direction will depend upon the particular circumstances in each case, one cannot expect definitive answers to these questions. But the close analysis given to both of these aspects of the direction by the High Court in Longman, Pollitt and Domican suggest that a trial judge is well advised, if there is any doubt about the matter, to cover both aspects. The uniform legislation, where a warning is requested under s 165, and the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), require some warning in the absence of ‘good reasons’, but these provisions impose no particular form of words, rather demanding that the warning clearly explain that the evidence may be unreliable, the reasons for this, and the need for caution before acting upon it. The wording of the legislation is sufficiently open so that on appeal the substantive question will always be whether the particular directions and warnings given have left open on the particular facts of the case an unacceptable risk of a (‘substantial’ in Victoria) ‘miscarriage of justice’.

The Nature of Corroborative Evidence 4.80 The above discussion shows that the number of situations in which corroboration or corroboration warning is demanded has diminished sharply in recent years, and one might argue that there is now less need to define in any

technical way the nature of that evidence the common law will allow to be put to the jury as corroboration. But not only does the need still exist where corroboration or corroboration warning is still required for the testimony of a witness (as in South Australia for an accomplice), but furthermore where judges are not prohibited from warning in corroboration terms, the rigors of a common law corroboration warning may be considered appropriate. And where warnings are given in corroboration terms the High Court appears to insist that any evidence left to the jury as capable of constituting corroboration must satisfy the common law definition.346 But furthermore, even if a judge is able to avoid using the word ‘corroboration’ altogether ‘in an attempt to avoid any technical interpretation an appellate court may give to that common law term’, arguably, a clear knowledge of the common law term can only assist a trial judge in explaining lucidly to the jury the appropriate uses and strengths of evidence apparently confirming testimony of doubtful reliability.347 [page 406] Although the respective functions of judge and jury will be more fully canvassed at 4.99–4.105, it is well to emphasise from the outset that, ultimately, it is the jury that decides whether to accept evidence as corroborative. The judge’s duty is to determine which evidence is capable of being found by the jury as satisfying the common law definition of corroboration. 4.81 In each situation considered above, it is the testimony of a witness that requires corroboration; that is, confirmation.348 Moreover, it requires confirmation because of doubts that arise for a particular reason or reasons. With accomplices, the doubts arise from concerns about the witness’s honesty. With a child’s testimony about events, the doubts might arise from misgivings about the witness’s cognitive capacity. With identification testimony, the doubts arise usually from the risk of honest mistake, and the circumstances will reveal the potential sources of mistake. Testimony that is suspect in these various ways can be confirmed in many ways and to varying degrees. The doubts about the accomplice’s testimony might be mitigated by evidence that the particular witness had no purpose to serve by implicating the accused, together with evidence of the accomplice’s general honesty. The doubts about the child’s evidence might be mitigated by psychological evidence of the child’s cognitive abilities or by the

consistent and coherent accounts given by the child. The possibility of mistake inherent in identification testimony might be mitigated by the subsequent confirmation that the suspect possesses the very characteristics described by the witness or by other evidence linking the accused with the crime. 4.82 Aware of the varying ways in which testimony can be confirmed and the varying degrees of that confirmation, and aware that it is in criminal cases that corroboration requirements are most needed, the common law has developed its own strong definition of corroborative evidence.349 It is expressed in R v Baskerville: We hold that evidence in corroboration must be independent testimony which affects the accused by connecting or tending to connect him with the crime. In other words, it must be evidence which implicates him, that is, which confirms in some material particular not only the evidence that the crime has been committed, but also that the prisoner committed it … The corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused committed the crime; it is sufficient if it is merely circumstantial evidence of his connection with the crime.350

What the common law demands is no mere confirmation of the witness’s credibility, but confirmation through independent evidence of the very occurrence of the crime [page 407] alleged. There must be admissible evidence351 that, independently of the doubtful witness, is able to implicate the accused in the crime charged. This admissible evidence may be the direct testimony of another eyewitness or be circumstantial evidence from which it can be inferred that the accused committed the crime alleged. But it must be independent evidence of that crime. Diagrammatically, the position can be represented thus, with D representing the accused, W the testimony to be corroborated, and C the corroborative evidence:

In the absence of this sort of confirmation, and no matter how persuasively the credibility of the witness’s testimony may be otherwise confirmed, there can be no corroboration at common law. Where corroboration or a corroboration

warning is mandatory, this limit has decisive consequences. Even where it is not mandatory, the distinctions inherent in this definition need to be kept in mind when any apparently confirmatory evidence is canvassed.

Independence 4.83 Independence requires the corroborative evidence to have probative force that arises independently of the credit of the witness to be corroborated. One illustration of this requirement is in the use of the accused’s lies as corroboration of the testimony of a prosecution witness. Where the inference from the accused’s lie is a consciousness of guilt of the crime charged, that may constitute a convergent inference leading to the conclusion that he or she is guilty.352 [page 408] But the inference will not arise independently if it is based upon the acceptance of the testimony requiring corroboration.353 As the judge in an affiliation case once remarked,354 the court cannot ‘prefer the evidence of the mother to that of the defendant, and then use its disbelief of his evidence as the basis for an inference to be used in corroboration of the mother’s testimony’. This danger was translated by one court into the rule that the in-court lie of an accused, which always runs the risk of being inferred from the in-court testimony of the doubtful witness, can never be corroborative.355 That decision has since been overruled, and any lie may be corroborative if it implicates the accused in the crime and can be independently established.356 This requirement of independence is confirmed in Edwards v R:357 If the telling of a lie by an accused is relied upon, not merely to strengthen the prosecution case, but as corroboration of some other evidence, the untruthfulness of the relevant statement must be established otherwise than through the evidence of the witness whose evidence is to be corroborated. If a witness required to be corroborated is believed in preference to the accused and this alone establishes the lie on the part of the accused, reliance upon the lie for corroboration would amount to the witness corroborating himself. That is a contradiction in terms.

The requirement of independence might exceptionally be satisfied where falsity can be inferred from the very improbability of the accused’s account in the light of the remaining evidence.358

4.84 But the notion of independence has a wider aspect. It is not merely enough that a Wigmorean convergent inference can be constructed independently of the witness’s in-court testimony; that inference must be constructed independently of the credit of the witness altogether. Thus, a convergent inference that might arise from a separate, out-of-court statement made by the doubtful witness cannot be corroborative. [page 409] Prior consistent statements of witnesses exceptionally admitted — complaints following sexual assault, for example — cannot be corroborative:359 A girl cannot corroborate herself, otherwise it is only necessary for her to repeat her story some twenty-five times in order to get twenty-five corroborations of it.360

However, the common law distinguishes between an implicative inference drawn from a witness’s prior statement and an implicative inference drawn from a witness’s prior conduct. The latter can, in exceptional circumstances, be regarded as arising independently of the witness’s credit, so that it may be corroborative. Thus, it has been held that, in a rape case, evidence of the complainant’s distress at the time of, or immediately following, the alleged assault may be corroborative of the complainant’s testimony that intercourse took place without consent.361 The condition of independence is regarded as satisfied if an inference can be drawn that the distress was directly produced by the accused’s crime, thereby eliminating the risk of concoction. But there is a fine line to be drawn in this context. Just as consistent statements can be concocted, so can consistent conduct. Only where the distress is capable of being regarded as having been directly caused by the alleged assault will its probative force be regarded as deriving independently of the complainant’s credit. If this inference is fairly open, the distress may be left to the jury as potentially corroborative, but strictly upon this basis.362 Even so, juries should be warned about placing too much reliance upon that distress.363 [page 410]

Implication in the crime charged 4.85 R v Baskerville364 requires that the corroborative evidence confirm the unreliable witness’s testimony by implicating the accused in the crime charged. Only if this requirement is satisfied can it be said that the witness’s testimony is corroborated in a material particular. In Wigmorean terms, an inference must be capable of being drawn from the corroborative evidence to the accused’s involvement in the crime alleged. The problem lies in determining when such an implicative inference can arise and just how probative it must be before it can be regarded as legally corroborative. In Doney v R, the High Court held that there is no requirement that the convergent inference be capable of itself proving the accused’s crime beyond reasonable doubt:365 It is not necessary that corroborative evidence, standing alone, should establish any proposition beyond reasonable doubt. In the case of an accomplice’s evidence, it is sufficient if it strengthens that evidence by confirming or tending to confirm the accused’s involvement in the events as related by the accomplice.

It is enough that the convergent inference is open. It can then, assuming the inference can be drawn independently of the testimony to be corroborated, be considered by the jury together with inferences drawn from other evidence (including the testimony of the doubtful witness) in deciding whether the accused’s crime has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. In Doney, an accomplice’s testimony implicating the accused in the importation of drugs was capable of corroboration by a note in the accused’s handwriting giving delivery instructions to a Sydney taxi driver in whose possession the imported drugs were also found. Although the inference that the accused was involved in the importation of those drugs did not necessarily arise from the taxi driver’s possession of the note, it was nevertheless a circumstantial inference that could be drawn by the jury, and the presence of such an inference was sufficient to leave the evidence to the jury as independently confirming the accomplice’s testimony in a material particular.366 [page 411] This analysis suggests that it is enough that an implicative inference arises for evidence to be corroborative. But some courts have demanded a higher standard

of sufficiency. In R v Schlaefer,367 it was held that the distress of a sexual assault complainant could be left to the jury as corroborative if it was capable of explanation only upon the basis that the assault occurred as alleged, the jury being directed that it must make such a finding before using the evidence as corroborative.368 A similar standard was suggested by R v Evans in the case of lies, it being held that a lie may only be left to the jury if capable of explanation only upon the basis of a consciousness of guilt of the crime alleged.369 In each of these cases, the court was concerned with notoriously equivocal evidence that requires great care in assessing its probative force independently of the doubtful witness. The high standard of sufficiency demanded reflects these concerns. The problem with insisting upon such a high standard is that it appears to result in the demand for independent proof of the crime alleged. And if the corroborating evidence can independently prove the crime, there is no need to rely upon the doubtful witness’s testimony at all. It is one thing to demand only the inference of guilt where the lie is relied upon as an indispensable link in the chain of proof,370 but such clear proof is inappropriate where the lie is relied upon as confirmation of the crime along with other evidence — a strand in the cable of proof. 4.86 For these reasons, other courts have rejected such a high standard of sufficiency,371 allowing evidence from which convergent inferences might reasonably be drawn to go to the jury with appropriate directions to act cautiously and to take into account all other possible explanations. In R v Melrose,372 Connolly J held in a rape prosecution [page 412] that evidence of the accused’s flight (admitted by the defence) could be left to the jury as corroborative without the need to direct the jury that it should first find, beyond reasonable doubt, that the flight gave rise to an inference of guilt of the crime alleged. Instead, the flight could be left to the jury as capable of confirming the complainant’s testimony, and the jury could then be directed to consider other explanations for the flight in the context of the evidence as a whole in determining whether the accused’s guilt had been proved beyond reasonable doubt.373 This same approach is taken in R v Taylor374 in leaving to the jury

evidence of persistent telephone calls by the 48-year-old accused to the 13-yearold complainant and visits to her when alone at home as capable of corroborating her allegation of sexual assault. In R v McKeon,375 Thomas J rejected any special rule requiring a high standard of sufficiency before distress could be left to the jury as capable of corroboration. In R v Jeffrey,376 the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal held that there was no need to direct a jury to find beyond reasonable doubt that the reason for an accused’s lie was a consciousness of guilt of the crime charged before it could consider this lie as part of the circumstantial case. This approach is consistent with that of the High Court in Doney and is endorsed in Edwards v R.377 4.87 In Edwards v R, the High Court discussed generally the use of an accused’s lies as demonstrating a consciousness of guilt of the crime charged.378 It confirmed [page 413] that, except where that consciousness of guilt can be regarded as an indispensable link in the chain of proof (which is not the situation where it is relied upon only as corroboration), there is no requirement that this inference be established beyond reasonable doubt before it can be acted upon. Without specifying any particular standard to which the inference must be accepted, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ conclude (at 210) that the jury ‘may accept that evidence [sic inference] without applying any particular standard of proof and conclude that, when they consider it together with the other evidence, the accused is or is not guilty beyond reasonable doubt’.379 4.88 Edwards also discusses the directions that should be given to a jury where lies of the accused are revealed to the jury.380 The accused’s lies can generally be used to discredit the accused’s testimony but not to infer guilt.381 They can only be used directly to infer the accused’s guilt where capable of being regarded as admissions of guilt (or, as it is otherwise expressed, as indicating a ‘consciousness of guilt’ of the crime charged).382 [page 414]

Where no such admissional inference can be drawn383 there are no special directions that must be given to the jury,384 but any direction that is given must not suggest that an admissional inference is open where it is not, and, furthermore, it is advisable to warn the jury not to ‘follow a process of reasoning to the effect that just because a person has told a lie about something, that is evidence of guilt’.385 [page 415] Where an admissional inference from a lie386 is possible the jury requires careful direction if a miscarriage of justice is to be avoided.387 The circumstances in which a lie can found an admissional inference, and the trial judge’s obligations to direct the jury accordingly, are explained as follows by Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ: A lie can constitute an admission against interest only if it is concerned with some circumstance or event connected with the offence (ie it relates to a material issue) and if it was told by the accused in circumstances in which the explanation for the lie is that he knew that the truth would implicate him in the offence. Thus, in any case where a lie is relied upon to prove guilt, the lie should be precisely identified, as should the circumstances and events that are said to indicate that it constitutes an admission against interest … And the jury should be instructed that they may take the lie into account only if they are satisfied, having regard to those circumstances and events, that it reveals a knowledge of the offence or some aspect of it … and that it was told because the accused knew that the truth of the matter about which he lied would implicate him in the offence, or, as was said in Reg v Lucas (Ruth), because of a ‘realisation of guilt and a fear of the truth’. Moreover, the jury should be instructed that there may be reasons for telling a lie apart from a realization of guilt388 … And in many cases where there appears to be a departure

[page 416] from the truth it may not be possible to say that a deliberate lie has been told. The accused may be confused. He may not recollect something which, upon his memory being jolted in crossexamination, he subsequently does recollect.389

In the case before them, the accused was charged with procuring a fellow prisoner to commit an act of gross indecency upon him. The accused and the complainant were at the time being transferred in a bus with other prisoners. Only the complainant and the accused testified. The accused testified that he had seen nothing of the incident involving the complainant, but in cross-examination

he admitted he heard thumps and someone say: ‘Whoever wants a headjob come down here’, then quickly turned around a couple of times and had seen another prisoner next to the complainant. The trial judge had instructed the jury that it would be dangerous to convict on the testimony of the complainant alone, but that they could regard the lies told by the accused in the witness box as corroborating that testimony, as long as satisfied, in accordance with R v Lucas,390 that the lies (1) were deliberate; (2) related to a material issue; (3) sprang from a realisation of guilt and a fear of the truth; and (4) could be shown to be lies by evidence independent of the testimony of the complainant. Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ quashed the conviction on the basis that there was no evidence from which the jury could be satisfied either that the lies were deliberate (rather than merely evasive) or that the accused was lying in fear of implicating himself rather than a fellow prisoner (it being a serious thing to ‘dog’ on a fellow prisoner). They concluded that ‘the innocent explanation for the lie was so plausible that the lie could not have been probative of guilt’.391 Brennan and McHugh JJ disagreed that the lie was incapable of supporting an inference of guilt and, as the jury had been adequately instructed, were not prepared to disturb the verdict. In this context it is noted that the directions required where lies and other post-offence conduct are relied upon for their admissional inferences (‘incriminating conduct’) are the subject of reform under ss 18–24 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic). These sections abolish the so-called Edwards and Zoneff directions: s 24 (and s 28(3) of the repealed Jury Directions Act 2013). In replacement, s 20 provides that the prosecution must not rely upon ‘incriminating conduct’ unless notice has been given and, reflecting Edwards, unless the judge determines on all the evidence that the evidence is ‘reasonably capable of being viewed by the jury as evidence of incriminating conduct’. But once the judge has so determined, s 21 stipulates that the jury must be directed that: [page 417] (a)

the jury may treat the evidence as evidence that the accused believed that he or she had committed the offence charged or an element of the offence charged, or that he or she had negated a defence to the offence charged, only if it concludes that—

(i)

the conduct occurred; and

(ii) the only reasonable explanation of the conduct is that the accused held that belief; and (b) even if the jury concludes that the accused believed that he or she had committed the offence charged, it must still decide, on the basis of the evidence as a whole, whether the prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

While this direction does eliminate much of the detail apparently required by Edwards, it appears to go beyond the common law in two respects. First, in requiring in every case an express direction that an admission is only ever evidence of the accused’s belief in commission of a crime and as such does not necessarily establish that crime beyond reasonable doubt. And secondly, in requiring a direction that the jury must conclude that the belief (the basis of the admissional inference) is the only explanation of the accused’s incriminating conduct; this direction appears to go beyond the abolition of Shepherd in s 62 and beyond the common law where the admissional inference from the incriminating conduct is not relied upon as an indispensable intermediate fact but merely as a relevant fact in a circumstantial case (although at common law if there is a risk that a jury might nevertheless convict on the basis of a fact which is not logically indispensable the required direction may be appropriate). Section 22 provides that defence counsel may require as additional directions that: (a)

there are all sorts of reasons why a person might behave in a way that makes the person look guilty; and

(b) the accused may have engaged in the conduct even though the accused is not guilty of the offence charged; and (c) even if the jury thinks that the conduct makes the accused look guilty, that does not necessarily mean that the accused is guilty.

4.89 Whether for the purposes of providing corroboration at common law an independent inference arises implicating the accused in the crime may ultimately depend upon the totality of the other evidence in the case. The implication need not arise from each item of evidence considered separately. This would be quite contrary to the very notion of inference itself. It is enough that the inference arises from the totality of the other evidence.392 And this will include admissions that may have been made by the accused at trial.393 [page 418]

This point is simply illustrated by the example of a prosecution for nonconsensual sexual assault. If the accused denies any involvement at all, thereby putting identity in issue, then medical evidence of forcible intercourse, although confirming absence of consent, does not implicate the accused in the crime alleged. It is not by itself capable of corroborating the complainant’s testimony in a material particular. On the other hand, if the accused admits the association and offers the defence that the intercourse was consensual, then medical evidence of force together with the accused’s admission of association will implicate the accused in the crime charged.394 It is the totality of the independent evidence that must implicate the accused in the crime. This point is also illustrated by those cases where the corroborative inference is to be drawn from a number of items of circumstantial evidence.395 This sexual assault example shows that, by making admissions, the accused can produce corroboration where otherwise there would be none. Where the accused narrows the ambit of dispute through admission, confirmation of the disputed material facts will be sufficient to implicate the accused in the crime charged. The nature and conduct of the defence is therefore always vital to a determination on whether the confirming evidence implicates the accused in the crime charged and thereby confirms the disputed testimony in a material particular. 4.90 This raises the interesting question of whether the accused can, by way of admission, deprive evidence of its prima facie corroborative effect by putting forward an innocent explanation. In R v McConnon,396 an accused schoolteacher charged with indecently assaulting one of his pupils in class was faced with the testimony of the complainant together with independent evidence of having sat next to the boy and having touched him on the leg. He admitted the touching, explaining that he often sat next to his pupils to assist them with their work and often gave them a ‘cow-bite’ on the knee to make them move over to make room for him to sit next to them. The court held that the evidence of touching was in the circumstances incapable of constituting corroboration of the complainant’s story, since it was equally consistent with innocence and guilt (that is, as consistent with the defence

case as the prosecution case). Thus, by putting before the court an innocent explanation, the accused may [page 419] persuade the court that no jury could reasonably interpret the evidence as supporting the witness’s testimony by implicating the accused in the crime charged. 4.91 But how far can an accused take this tactic? In R v Stephenson,397 a woman alleged she had been forcibly held down while the accused raped her. There was independent evidence that she had been held down and appeared to protest. The accused’s defence was consent. He admitted both that he had held the woman down and that she had protested, but argued that he had been engaged in an (admittedly uncommon) sexual practice in which the complainant also willingly participated. The question was whether the evidence of holding down could be left to the jury as corroborative of the complainant’s story, as evidence which implicated the accused in the crime charged. The majority held that it could, applying (Walters J at 393 and King J at 398– 9) the following dictum of Zelling and Wells JJ in R v Lindsay:398 We think the true test is that no evidence which is common to the case of the Crown and the case of the accused can amount to corroboration unless either the evidence itself bears a different character when viewed in relation to the Crown case from what it bears in relation to the case of the accused or unless the inferences which can be drawn from such evidence, if the jury are constrained to draw them, support the evidence of the prosecutrix in a material particular. Certainly an accused person cannot, by a timely admission of facts which could otherwise amount to corroboration, deprive them of that quality by making an admission.

4.92 The court appears to be saying, in the first place, that one must look at the evidence in the context of the other prosecution evidence. This may provide an entirely different perspective to the accused’s innocent explanation and enable the jury to conclude the evidence only consistent with the witness’s account. If a reasonable jury might reach this conclusion then the evidence can be left to it as capable of providing corroboration of the witness’s account.399 Thus, in Stephenson, because a reasonable jury could interpret the independent testimony of the victim being held down and protesting as quite inconsistent with even

bizarre consent (because of the evidence of the force used and the protests made), the court held that this evidence could be left to the jury as capable of implicating the accused in the crime charged.400 On the other hand, even if this interpretation had not been open, the court appears to be saying that a convergent inference of guilt might still be open to a jury simply [page 420] because it might reasonably reject the explanations of the evidence of the holding down as being equally likely. The evidence could be regarded quite reasonably by the jury as more consistent with the complainant’s account than that given by the accused. Taking this second perspective, Bray CJ remained wary of ever leaving common ground capable of innocent explanation to the jury as corroboration, declaring in Stephenson (at 385–6): If that happens there is a danger that bizarre or unconventional behaviour or circumstances, which are nevertheless, on the accused’s story at least, entirely innocent, may be thrown into the scales against him with disproportionate emphasis by being categorized as potentially corroborative. On this reasoning it would in the last century have been regarded as potentially corroborative if the accused admitted a secret assignation with the girl in a secluded area, even though for a non-amorous purpose.

But one might argue that, whilst juries should be warned against the bizarre and unconventional, nevertheless where evidence is, having regard to the court’s experience, capable of being interpreted as giving rise to an implicating inference, it is the province of the jury to decide whether so to regard it in deciding whether the entirety of the evidence, including the testimony to be corroborated, proves the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 4.93 Other courts explain that evidence consistent with both prosecution and defence cases can go to the jury as supporting an inference of guilt (and where appropriate provide corroboration) as long as the evidence is not ‘intractably neutral’.401 While perhaps a less than definitive term,402 when used in the corroboration context it [page 421]

emphasises that what is being sought is some independent evidence that can be looked to as providing support for a witness’s account in the context of the case at hand. Evidence that no reasonable jury can interpret as supporting one side of the case rather than another is, from this point of view, intractably neutral.403 However, as Stephenson emphasises, the evidence is not to be looked at in isolation but in the context of all the evidence supporting the prosecution case, excluding, however, to ensure independent confirmation, the testimony to be corroborated.404 In that context, if the jury is able to regard the evidence as supporting the prosecution case it can be left to consider the evidence as providing independent corroboration. The same approach applies where the question is not whether evidence may constitute corroboration but simply whether evidence is admissible as capable of giving rise to a relevant inference by implicating the accused in the crime charged. Only where a reasonable (rational) jury might draw the implicating inference sought is evidence sufficiently relevant to be admissible. Thus, in Edwards v R, the majority held that the innocent explanations for the accused’s lie were so compelling that the lie could not be left to the jury as capable of supporting an implicating admissional inference.405 Where an accused is charged with a number of crimes (or conviction for a lesser crime is possible as an alternative verdict; for example, manslaughter rather than murder) the relevance and admissibility and corroborative effect of evidence must ultimately be determined in relation to each crime. The crucial question is ultimately whether the evidence implicates the accused in the particular crime under consideration. Where a lie or other post-offence conduct is put forward as capable of supporting a relevant implicating inference — a consciousness of guilt — judges must be careful to ensure that the implicating inference can reasonably be drawn in relation to every crime charged. In some cases, the prosecution may seek to rely upon the consciousness of guilt to infer facts common to all crimes under consideration (for example, where it is alleged a lie demonstrates a consciousness that the accused caused a victim’s death). But in other cases the prosecution may seek to rely upon the consciousness to infer facts referable to only one crime rather than another (for example, where it [page 422]

is alleged that a lie demonstrates a consciousness that the accused intentionally killed the victim). In the latter situation the lie might be explicable upon the basis that the accused was conscious of having unlawfully, albeit unintentionally, killed the victim. Where this is so, the jury will have to be directed to consider carefully whether the lie indicated a consciousness that implicates the accused in one crime rather than another before drawing any inferences from it.406 It is submitted that the accused can, through admission and argument, seek to persuade the court that evidence does not implicate him or her in the crime charged. If the court is persuaded that having regard to the prosecution evidence, no reasonable jury could draw an independent convergent inference of guilt from the evidence in question — if, in this sense, the evidence is ‘intractably neutral’ — then it cannot go forward as capable of providing corroboration. It is not then capable of providing independent support for the testimony to be corroborated. But if a reasonable (rational) jury might draw the supportive inference of guilt, then the evidence must, with appropriate warnings including reference to all possibly innocent explanations, go forward as a potential source of corroboration. Whether the evidence is regarded as a corroborative inference is for the jury to decide. 4.94 The above analysis seeks to emphasise that whether evidence is corroborative of a prosecution witness in a material particular depends upon it being capable of independently supporting an inference of the accused’s involvement in the alleged crime. It is not sufficient that the evidence confirms the witness’s testimony in a more peripheral way. But whether courts are so insistent in every case is another matter. The point can be illustrated by an analysis of R v McInnes.407 The seven-yearold victim of a kidnapping and rape gave a detailed description to the police of the clothes worn by the culprit and of the inside of the culprit’s car. Without reference to these matters the complainant picked the accused at an identification parade. On searching the accused’s home, the police then found clothes matching the description given by the child. The outside of the accused’s car was recognised by the child and its interior matched the previous description given by the child. This evidence confirming the victim’s visual identification of the accused was admitted as corroboration. Its existence tended to rule out the risk that the child may have been mistaken in her identification, for she had effectively made three quite separate identifications of the accused and his environs. The fact that the child identified someone who was then shown to

possess the other identifying characteristics she had described tended to mitigate the risk of her being mistaken in identifying the accused. [page 423] 4.95 In BRS v R,408 the court used similar reasoning to hold that the complainant’s account of sexual assault by his boarding master in which KY jelly was used and a yellow towel produced from under the accused’s bed, could be corroborated by the testimony of another boy that the accused had offered him the use of these same items for the purposes of masturbation. There is no doubt that the evidence did mitigate the risk of these witnesses being mistaken or lying. But R v Baskerville409 requires that corroborative evidence do this through its independent implication of the accused in the crime. The difficulty is that the evidence relating to the finding of the clothes and the car had no implicative effect independently of the complainant’s assertion that these things were in the possession of her attacker.410 What McInnes and BRS might stand for, given that the evidence was regarded as corroborative, is that the principal question in a corroboration case is whether there is independent evidence capable of confirming possibly unreliable testimony in a material way. If the risks can be clearly mitigated other than through independent implication in the crime charged, then the courts may be willing to forgo strictly following the Baskerville requirements.411 Thus, Brennan CJ in BRS v R says (at 285): ‘[I]t is sufficient to constitute corroboration that the evidence should strengthen the evidence to be corroborated as to a fact on which proof depends’.412 4.96 Where corroboration is not mandatory, it is not crucial that there be strict corroboration of the suspect testimony. Other evidence confirming the testimony can go to the jury, and it may act upon the strictly legally uncorroborated testimony if satisfied of the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt on all the admissible evidence. Other confirming evidence can be considered at this point. It is only where corroboration is mandatory, as it was in McInnes, that failure to satisfy the strict legal requirements will necessarily be fatal to the prosecution. But what this analysis shows is the precise extent to which evidence does independently confirm the accused’s involvement in the crime charged. In every case where the notion of confirmation is

[page 424] discussed by a trial judge the jury should be clear about the extent to which particular evidence is capable of confirming doubtful testimony.

Mutual corroboration 4.97 An issue that once perplexed courts was whether evidence itself requiring corroboration was capable of constituting corroborative evidence. This issue has been touched upon at 4.15–4.16 in the context of the evidence of young children, where the House of Lords emphatically declared in DPP v Hester413 that ‘corroboration’ must be given its ordinary meaning within the bounds set by Baskerville and not be subject to any arbitrary or technical limits. Their Lordships thereupon accepted that natural rules of proof determine that information can be mutually corroborative and that evidence requiring corroboration can therefore itself be corroborative. Later that year this reasoning was taken a step further in DPP v Kilbourne,414 where it was held that ‘similar fact’ evidence could be corroborative and that, in circumstances which precluded concoction, one accomplice could corroborate another.415 At common law, fellow accomplices to the same crime cannot corroborate each other due to the high risk of them conspiring to blame the accused, but Kilbourne decided that, where the witnesses are accomplices to separate transactions charged as a series of transactions, accomplices to the one transaction can corroborate the testimony of accomplices to another, with any residual risk of concoction sufficiently guarded against by appropriate warning.416 4.98 Similarly, spouses of accomplices have been held capable of providing corroboration.417 In Victoria, it had been held that at common law where two persons complain of sexual assaults arising out of the same incident their testimonies cannot, as a matter of law, corroborate each other because of the risk of concoction.418 This stricter approach is achieved in practice at common law if not as a matter of technical law by the High Court decision of Hoch v R, where, while accepting the theory of mutual corroboration, the court said that the strikingly similar testimony of a complainant [page 425]

to a separate assault was not admissible at all, let alone as corroboration, unless the risk of concoction was first eliminated as a reasonable possibility altogether.419 This narrow approach is unfortunate. Whether complainants, or even accomplices to the same crime, are able to corroborate each other mutually in such circumstances should depend upon the degree of risk of concoction. If concoction is an open question the jury should determine whether it has robbed the evidence of its potential mutually corroborative force. It is this latter approach that has been accepted by the House of Lords in R v H,420 by legislation in Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia (see further at 3.49), and now appears to have been endorsed, under the uniform legislation, by the majority of the High Court in IMM v R:421 see discussion at 3.60.

Functions of Judge and Jury: Directing the Jury 4.99 The decided cases in this area all concern appeals from jury verdicts. With the grounds of appeal limited, the technicalities of the law described above and the uncertainties of the requirements of a warning to avoid a miscarriage of justice have proved fruitful for defendants. Although the same considerations apply before magistrates sitting alone,422 appeals tend to focus on whether the verdict can be supported by the evidence. But in the case of jury trials the direction given by the trial judge to the jury is always less than definitive and consequently a fertile ground for appeal. In Victoria, the Jury Directions Act 2015, referred to throughout this chapter, provides the most sophisticated legislative response to this situation: see generally at 2.13, 4.10, 4.34 and 4.105.

Where corroboration or a corroboration warning is mandatory 4.100 In those situations where corroboration or a corroboration warning remains mandatory, in keeping with the general rule that questions of law are for the judge and questions of fact for the jury, assuming that the witness in question is at least credible,423 the judge’s first function is to determine whether there is evidence from which a jury can conclude that a particular witness falls within a category requiring corroboration [page 426]

or warning.424 If such evidence exists, a corroboration or corroboration warning direction will be required whether or not it has been requested by a party.425 The court is under no duty to investigate whether the reasons for requiring corroboration or a corroboration warning have been satisfied in the case of the particular witness before the court.426 In some cases, the categorisation will be obvious (as in the case of perjury or forensic disadvantage resulting from complaint after a long delay) but in others the categorisation may be more controversial. For example, in cases where the question is whether a witness is an accomplice, the direction required may be quite complex. If there is evidence that a witness may be an accomplice then, in order to leave the final decision (as the law strictly requires) to the jury, the judge must explain to it the circumstances in which the law deems a witness an accomplice. 4.101 In practice, trial judges err on the side of caution and seek to prevent appeals by giving directions unduly favourable to accused (although there are no doubt exceptions to this practice).427 Technically, the jury should apply a standard of proof in determining whether a witness is within a category requiring corroboration, but the issue is unlikely to arise on appeal as, first, a direction in terms of mere satisfaction is usually given and acts in favour of the accused and, secondly, in most cases it is the nature of the warning consequently given by the trial judge which assumes importance on appeal. There is authority for the view that the jury should be directed to find a witness an accomplice if satisfied of this on the balance of probabilities.428 [page 427] 4.102 Once the trial judge has directed the jury on the issue of whether a witness falls within a category requiring corroboration or a corroboration warning, if there is no evidence capable in law of amounting to corroboration, then this should be pointed out to the jury.429 In addition, where corroboration is mandatory, the trial judge must direct the jury to acquit if it finds that the witness falls in the appropriate category (seldom, if ever, in issue). Where a corroboration warning is mandatory or required as a matter of practice, the judge should warn of the danger of acting upon the testimony alone while leaving the jury to so act if satisfied of the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.430 Where, in such situations, there is no evidence capable of amounting to corroboration, there is

not only no need for the judge to explain the legal requirements of corroboration (the Baskerville definition) but it will also often be much clearer and plainer to direct the jury without mentioning the word ‘corroboration’ at all.431 If there is evidence capable in law of amounting to corroboration, and corroboration or a corroboration warning is required, the trial judge should explain to the jury what is meant by ‘corroboration’ in general terms (that is, independent evidence implicating the accused),432 and should normally analyse the evidence to point out which items of evidence are capable of constituting legal corroboration and which are not.433 Failure to so analyse will not ipso facto give grounds for successful appeal434 but may, in the [page 428] particular circumstances, give rise to a miscarriage of justice if there is any risk that the jury might have regarded evidence as legally corroborative when it was not so capable. Whether evidence is finally regarded as corroborative is a matter for the jury, and the trial judge must not usurp the jury’s fact-finding function by directing that evidence is corroborative and a warning therefore unnecessary.435 As it is always the prerogative of the jury to find that there is no corroboration, where corroboration is mandatory it must be directed to acquit if it so finds; where warning is mandatory it must be told of the danger of acting upon the testimony alone if it rejects the evidence in corroboration, and a similar direction should normally be given where the corroboration warning is required only as a matter of practice. 4.103 Even where a corroboration warning is mandatory, courts have refused to lay down a precise formula for the direction of the jury. Courts have emphasised that such rigidity is to be studiously avoided, and that it is advisable to warn the jury in terms tailored to the circumstances and which avoid legal jargon and technicalities.436 There is ‘no magic formula or mumbo jumbo’ nor need to mention the word ‘corroboration’ if it can sensibly be avoided.437 But these remarks must not be interpreted as permitting a watering down of any mandatory requirements. Where a witness who may be held to be an accomplice testifies, the jury must

be told that judicial experience indicates that accomplice testimony is often unreliable because accomplices have their own purposes to serve, and that judges are required by law to warn juries of the danger of acting upon such testimony alone. The jury should then be directed that it is not prohibited from acting on accomplice testimony alone, but that it should take exceptional care before finding facts proved beyond reasonable doubt upon that basis. The mere presence of evidence capable of being corroborative does not obviate the need for the warning because it is the sole province of the jury to decide whether to accept that evidence as corroborative.438 Nor should the trial judge direct the jury that, if they find corroboration exists, they can then treat the testimony in the same way as other testimony.439 [page 429] If the judge misdirects the jury by erroneously defining the circumstances in which corroboration or a corroboration warning is required, or wrongly describing evidence as capable of constituting corroboration, that in itself constitutes an error of law justifying successful appeal unless the proviso can apply.440

Where a warning is required as a matter of practice to avoid a miscarriage of justice 4.104 Where the jury has been already made clearly aware of the risks of unreliability it may be that the absence of a direction from the trial judge cannot be said to have caused a miscarriage of justice.441 Where a warning is not mandatory, but given as a matter of practice to avoid a miscarriage of justice, there may be no need to warn the jury in terms of corroboration at all. For example, in the case of identification evidence it may be sufficient to point out the possible risks with the evidence and warn the jury that it is the law’s experience that even honest and positive witnesses can be mistaken. In other cases, it may be more appropriate to warn in terms of corroboration. Although in the case of children and sexual assault complainants legislation no longer requires any corroboration warnings, this may not prevent a judge from warning in corroboration terms where the particular circumstances suggest that

the witness’s testimony should be approached with such caution, and judges often continue to warn in corroboration terms. In these circumstances, the trial judge should emphasise both the risks inherent in the testimony and the desirability for confirmation.442 In addition, if the judge uses the concept of corroboration then its common law requirements should be explained to the jury and only evidence satisfying these requirements should be described as capable of amounting to ‘corroboration’.443 While in these cases Bromley v R suggests it is appropriate to direct the jury to the ‘dangers of convicting on such evidence’,444 judges should avoid stating that it is ‘dangerous to convict’ in case it is misunderstood as a direction to acquit.445 [page 430] 4.105 Where corroboration or a corroboration warning is no longer mandatory it seems preferable for trial judges to avoid the terminology of corroboration wherever possible.446 The warning, always given with the authority of the judge’s office and experience, can then focus on explaining in clear terms the possible risks in the testimony before canvassing other evidence in the case which either supports the witness’s credit or independently implicates the accused in the crime charged. The emphasis thus shifts from a general warning to look for corroboration to a warning to take into account particular risks having regard to the totality of evidence in the case. This is the approach adopted in s 165(2) of the uniform legislation447 which, in the case of ‘evidence of a kind that may be unreliable’, on request requires the judge to: (a)

warn the jury that the evidence may be unreliable; and

(b) inform the jury of the matters that may cause it to be unreliable; and (c) warn the jury of the need for caution in determining whether to accept the evidence and the weight to be given to it.448

While this approach will not avoid appeals by accused against the warnings given by trial judges, at least the appellate court will be focused upon the facts of the case and the warning given rather than the technicalities of corroboration warnings and the technical requirements of corroborative evidence. In Victoria, the Jury Directions Act 2015, whilst following the approach of the uniform legislation in respect of ‘evidence of a kind that may be unreliable’, goes radically further. Generally, it places the initiation of directions in the hands of the parties,

requiring them to isolate the particular issues and evidence in dispute (s 11) and to request appropriate directions in relation to these (s 12). These must be given by the trial judge in the absence of good reasons to the contrary (s 14) and absent request no further directions may be given unless the judge, having obtained the views of the parties, decides that there are substantial and compellings reasons for doing so (s 16). More particularly, as has been discussed, the legislation stipulates, to the exclusion of common law authorities to the contrary, the directions required in the case of the particular categories of evidence dealt with in this chapter and which at common law attracted often technical directions, confusing juries and providing opportunities for appeal. [page 431]

Conclusion 4.106 Any rules of evidence seeking to control definitively the tender of relevant but possibly unreliable evidence are arbitrary — imposing generalisations in every case — and complicated — seeking to define fact situations to which they apply. Such definitive rules fly in the face of natural principles demanding maximisation of relevant information. Although past experiences cannot be ignored in reaching decisions of fact, for they are the very basis of these decisions, the rules discussed in this chapter suggest that it is ultimately better to leave the tribunal of fact to decide on the basis of the particular evidence and its own experiences, guided by the additional experiences of counsel and judges, but not bound by them. In essence this is the common law approach. Difficulty arises where judges seek to impose mandatory directions, where failure to leave experiences to a trier is regarded as ipso facto an error of law (as is the case, for example, with accomplice testimony). To require the accused in every case to show on appeal that there has been a miscarriage of justice takes nothing from the sensible solution and avoids much technicality (even if it does not make individual decisions any easier). The High Court generally appears to prefer this more flexible approach, as do parliaments in the many jurisdictions that have now abolished mandatory warnings. The practical effect of ss 164 and 165 of the uniform legislation is that the accused will have to establish that the circumstances required a warning and the appropriate terms of the warning, in other words a miscarriage of justice, for the appeal to succeed. In Victoria, any

breach of the party initiated and open-textured requirements of the Jury Directions Act 2015 must produce a substantial miscarriage of justice on the facts if an appeal is to succeed. But difficulty remains. This more flexible approach assumes confidence in the experiences that counsel, judges and jurors bring to the judicial process. In the prosecution of sexual crimes the experiences of male judges have been questioned to the extent that they are prohibited legislatively from suggesting complainants as a class are unreliable witnesses. Similarly, children can no longer be regarded as generally unreliable, although this does not prevent taking into account specific circumstances that create that risk. Whether the experiences of counsel, judges and jurors can be so simply controlled in every case is doubtful. To require more by way of definitive rule runs the risk of returning to the technical and arbitrary approach so at odds with natural principles. But some guidance is required to ensure at least that like cases are approached alike, and common lawyers are acutely aware that past decisions need to be taken into account. However, in the case of fact-finding, experience suggests that this must be achieved through subtle means. Thus the bench books that are developed by judges, based as they are upon decisions in appellate courts, provide guidance, but particular decisions are left to be made upon the particular evidence before the court. Given this situation it might be [page 432] argued that the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) seeks an appropriate compromise that abolishes confusing and prejudiced directions and lays down minimal requirements in the case of particular kinds of evidence that may be unreliable. It also makes counsel fundamentally responsible for the directions that are given, providing another subtle influence to ensure commonality of approach. While appellate courts remain ultimately responsible for ensuring uniformity, it is important that appellate courts do not seek to impose upon this subtle regime the pedantic technicality that the legislation seeks to avoid. They must make clear that the miscarriage of justice upon which successful appeal depends will turn on the facts and circumstances of the individual case rather than apparent errors or mistakes in directions given to juries.

But what remains important is that the decisions of counsel, judges and juries are informed by experiences and research that help to provide an accurate view of the world. There is growing empirical evidence that needs to be taken into account if counsel, judges and juries are to encourage or draw inferences based upon generalisations of knowledge capable of accurately interpreting tendered evidence. How this empirical evidence should be taken into account is a difficult issue. If left to the parties the rules relating to the tender of ‘expert evidence’ become of crucial import: see further at 7.43ff. On some matters, including those perceived as matters within common knowledge, it may be appropriate for judges, and perhaps even juries, to undertake education programs before hearing cases. Or it may be better simply to constitute courts led by judges (and perhaps also juries) who already have appropriate specialised knowledge. A final perspective upon an approach that leaves the treatment of possibly unreliable evidence not to definitive rules but to the particular facts and circumstances of the case, is that it requires counsel, judges and juries to take full responsibility for their decisions of fact. Triers, and counsel and judges who seek to guide them, are obliged to approach their task with the utmost moral integrity.449 ______________________________ 1.

But such evidence remains always inadmissible for the tendency or coincidence purposes: s 95.

2.

Under the uniform legislation, once evidence has an admissible non-hearsay purpose it may then also be used as hearsay: s 60.

3.

See McNamara, ‘The Canons of Evidence — Rules of Exclusion or Rules of Use?’ (1985) 10 Adel LR 341.

4.

For some random examples, see R v McLean and Funk; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 231, where the trial judge excluded as unreliable the evidence of an accomplice who had turned Queen’s evidence; and R v Horsfall (1989) 51 SASR 489, where the evidence of a young child who had undergone hypnotherapy was regarded by the trial judge as too unreliable to admit. However, the recent tendency of appellate courts is to emphasise that this discretion should not be exercised on grounds of possible unreliability unless a properly directed jury would be incapable of fairly assessing the probative significance of the evidence: R v Tugaga (1994) 74 A Crim R 190 (CCA (NSW)); Rozenes v Beljajev [1995] 1 VR 533; R v Pantoja (1996) 88 A Crim R 554 (Hunt CJ at CL); Dupas v R (2012) 40 VR 182; [2012] VSCA 328. The uniform legislation, in that s 55 defines relevance in terms of evidence capable of possessing probative value ‘if accepted’, embodies a similar approach (see discussion at 2.18), as does the courts’ interpretation of the notion of ‘probative value’ when asked to exclude evidence or its use under ss 135–137 (see discussion at 2.31).

5.

Chamberlain v R (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521; Morris v R (1987) 163 CLR 454. Also see the following cases where allegedly unreliable identification evidence has been admitted but convictions upheld: Davies v R (1937) 57 CLR 170; Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395; R v Britten (1989) 51 SASR 567. In Chidiac v R (1991) 171 CLR 432, a conviction based on admittedly unreliable witnesses was upheld.

Questions about the reliability of opinions concerning identity (and similarity) derived from surveillance images (for example, poor quality CCTV) or covert sound recordings, by those with expertise or ‘specialised knowledge’, have not exerted much influence on appeal: R v Riscuta [2003] NSWCCA 6; R v Li (2003) 140 A Crim R 288; R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; Korgbara v R (2007) 170 A Crim R 568. Weiss v R (2005) 224 CLR 300 (see further 2.14) has now decided that, even where unreliable evidence has been admitted the proviso must be applied where the appellate court is convinced from the record that the crime has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. 6.

See Ligertwood, ‘Failure to Warn in Criminal Cases Where Corroboration May be Required’ (1976) 50 Aust LJ 158. The various common law techniques for controlling the reception of unreliable evidence are canvassed by Lord Diplock in DPP v Hester [1973] AC 296 at 324–5.

7.

A dramatic example can be found in the formal rules associated with evidence obtained through torture and its use in proof in early modern Europe. See Langbein, Torture and the Law of Proof: Europe and England in the Ancient Regime, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1977; and the discussion in von Langenfeld, Cautio Criminalis, or a Book on Witch Trials, Marcus Hellyer (trans), University of Virginia Press, Charlottesville, 2005 (originally published in 1631).

8.

For the history of the common law’s rejection of oath counting, see Wigmore, Evidence, (rev’d Chadbourn), Little Brown and Co, Boston, 1978, vol 7, [2032].

9.

R v Muscot (1713) 10 Mod Rep 192; 88 ER 689; R v Hook (1858) Dears & B 606; 169 ER 1138; R v Peach [1990] 1 WLR 976. See also Wigmore, n 8 above, vol 7, [2040]–[2041].

10. With s 164(2) preserving ‘the operation of a rule of law that requires corroboration with respect to the offence of perjury or a similar or related offence’. 11. Davies v DPP [1954] AC 378 illustrates this approach. Where the warning is mandatory it must be given whether or not requested: R v He and Bun (2001) 122 A Crim R 487 (CCA (Vic)); Doggett v R (2001) 208 CLR 343 (discussed at 4.47). Under the uniform legislation, warnings required for ‘evidence of a kind that may be unreliable’ are mandatory only upon request: s 165(2). See also Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) ss 14, 32. 12. It reads: ‘Despite any rule, whether of law or practice, to the contrary, but subject to the other provisions of this Act, if there is a jury, it is not necessary that the Judge; (a) warn the jury that it is dangerous to act on uncorroborated evidence or give a warning to the same or similar effect; or (b) give a direction relating to the absence of corroboration’. 13. In reality, empirical study — of types of evidence, fact-finder reasoning and the effects of instructions — affords the best opportunity to identify substantial risks of unfairness (created by the evidence or the trial processes, including instructions themselves). Judges, however, tend to proceed in terms of what appears to be formally fair based on personal experience and institutional traditions. There is a literature suggesting that some corrective or preventative instructions may actually be iatrogenic — drawing attention to or reinforcing the very problems they are intended to address: see, for example, Lieberman and Sales, ‘The Effectiveness of Jury Instructions’ in Abbott and Batt (eds), A Handbook of Jury Research, American Law Institute, Philadelphia, 1999, pp 18–73; Lieberman and Arndt, ‘Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pre-Trial Publicity and Other Inadmissible Evidence’ (2000) 6 Psych, Pub Policy & Law 677. And see further references at 2.13 nn 51–52. 14. Kelleher v R (1974) 131 CLR 534; Bromley v R (1986) 161 CLR 315; and Longman v R (1989) 168 CLR 79 illustrate this approach. See also Cecez v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 344; [2007] WASCA 260 at [100]–[109] (Buss JA), [220]–[221] (Murray AJA). The appellate consequences of this approach are analysed and explained by Vanstone J in R v Inston (2009) 103 SASR 265; [2009] SASC 89 at [125]– [130]. In Victoria, a ‘substantial miscarriage of justice’ must now be established; s 227 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) effectively making the proviso part of the ground of appeal: see further 2.14

n 60. 15. Some appellate courts have sought to lay to lay down definitive guidelines for trial judges. See, for example, Hunt CJ at CL in R v Clough (1992) 28 NSWLR 396 (prison informers); R v Derbas (1993) 66 A Crim R 327 (uncorroborated police testimony of admissions); Spigelman CJ in R v Johnston (1998) 45 NSWLR 362 at 375; and Sully J in R v BWT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241 at [95] (delays in complaint of sexual assault). Compare with Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244 at [120], where the CCA summarises various propositions expressed as more general guidelines in respect of warnings in identification cases. 16. Other general abolitions of all corroboration warning ‘requirements’ can be found in s 632 of the Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) (jury trials) and s 50 of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA) (trials on indictment before a jury). The Queensland provision (subs (3)) also prohibits any warning suggesting ‘the law regards any class of persons as unreliable witnesses’. These provisions do not abrogate the need to warn when required to avoid a miscarriage of justice: Robinson v R (1999) 197 CLR 162; [1999] HCA 42; unsuccessfully argued in R v LAH [2016] QCA 82 at [42]–[47]. 17. Authority suggests this phrase implies a generality rather than simply the idiosyncrasies and particular potential deficiencies of a given witness: R v Stewart (2001) 52 NSWLR 301 at [16] (Spigelman CJ, although pointing out that any particular deficiency can be expressed in terms of a generality), [98]– [101] (Howie J, Hulme J agreeing, said the question is ‘whether the evidence is such as could not be expected to fall within the general experience and understanding of a jury and in respect of which the courts have special knowledge’). The court agreed that the testimony of a witness who although sentenced could possibly have lost the benefit of a reduction in sentence if he failed to testify as agreed, was evidence ‘of a kind that may be unreliable’. See also R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 at [71]– [73] (Heydon JA); R v Chan (2002) 131 A Crim R 66 at [34]–[39] (Hodgson JA: registered NCA informant’s evidence not ‘“of a kind” which the experience of the courts has shown may be more unreliable than the general run of evidence’); Kanaan v R [2006] NSWCCA 109 at [123] (applying Howie J’s approach in Stewart to find negative identification evidence ‘of a kind that may be unreliable’); Boyer v R [2015] VSCA 242 at [39] (Priest JA accepting that there was no need ‘to make any assessment of the account of the particular witness’). 18. Evans v R (2007) 235 CLR 521; [2007] HCA 59 at [232] (Heydon J): ‘The conditions necessary to satisfy the word “requests” in s 165(2) in relation to a warning about “evidence of a kind that may be unreliable” would involve counsel making the request identifying what the “kind” of evidence was, why it was unreliable, and what the terms of the warning requested were’. The need for a particularised request is emphasised in Martin v Tasmania (2008) 190 A Crim R 77; [2008] TASSC 66 at [23]–[36] (Crawford CJ). In the absence of a request, the trial judge may be obliged to bring the application of s 165(2) to the unrepresented defendant’s attention: Andelman v R (2013) 227 A Crim R 81; [2013] VSCA 25 at [55]–[66]. 19. (1996) 40 NSWLR 115 at 160; R v Taranto; R v Freeman [1999] NSWCCA 396 at [8]–[17] (Spigelman CJ); R v Knight [2005] NSWCCA 241 at [58]–[62] (Howie J); and see s 165(3). 20. New South Wales authority suggests the particular evidence must be ‘of a kind that may be unreliable’ even if encompassed within one of the seven specified types: R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 at [70] (Heydon JA); R v Fowler (2003) 151 A Crim R 166; [2003] NSWCCA 321 at [182]–[190]; Derbas v R [2007] NSWCCA 118 at [28] (McClellan CJ at CL). Cf discussion in Allen v R (2013) 39 VR 629; [2013] VSCA 263 at [27]–[37], the conclusion of Priest JA in Boyer v R [2015] VSCA 242 at [39] that there was no need ‘to make any assessment of the account of the particular witness’) and comment by Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law, 12th ed, Thompson Reuters, Sydney, 2016, [EA.165.90]. See also cases at n 17 above. 21. Though see s 165(2). Brown v R [2006] NSWCCA 69 at [37]–[45] is authority for the proposition that

there must be an actual ‘warning’. Section 116, applying to ‘identification evidence’, provides that the jury must be advised that there is a special need for caution and the reasons for caution, without requiring any particular form of words. See further generally at 4.59ff. 22. That is, convince the appellate court on the record that the crime remains proved beyond reasonable doubt: Weiss v R (2005) 224 CLR 300. See further at 2.14. 23. In R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 (CCA (NSW)), no request for a warning had been made and the argument on appeal was that a warning was required at common law as part of the general duty to direct because a crucial witness had been granted immunity. It was held that the general duty did not require in that situation any particular warning be given with the authority of the judge, and that the jury was made sufficiently aware of the potential risks so as to avoid any miscarriage of justice. See also Singh v DPP (NSW) (2006) 164 A Crim R 284; [2006] NSWCCA 333 at [38]–[46], where the circumstances did not call for any further direction. 24. At common law, claims against the estate of a deceased person will not generally be allowed on the uncorroborated evidence of the claimant (Plunkett v Bull (1915) 19 CLR 544) and, in matrimonial cases, circumstances may require the court to look for corroboration (In the Marriage of Pavey (1976) 10 ALR 259), but, other than in the case of paternity allegations in affiliation proceedings, no definitive rules have ever been laid down in civil cases. Section 165 of the uniform legislation, applying ‘to evidence of a kind that may be unreliable’, insofar as it enables requests for warnings and allows for the continuation of the trial judge’s general duty to direct, applies only to trials by jury (which will generally be criminal proceedings). 25. (1985) 40 SASR 37 at 39–41. See also Bennett v Collett (1986) 40 SASR 426 at 440 (Zelling J); Grbic v Pitkethly (1992) 38 FCR 95 at 107–8 (Sheppard J); Sharrett v Gill (1993) 65 A Crim R 44 at 49–50, 53– 4 (Miles CJ); Egart v Deal [1994] 2 Qd R 117 at 123–4 (Ambrose J, Cooper J agreeing) (McKinney warning applies to magistrate sitting alone); Parker v Espinoza (1996) 85 A Crim R 336 (SC (WA)) (identification warning applies to magistrate or judge sitting alone); Betts v Hardcastle (2000) 23 WAR 559 (magistrate obliged to give himself the accomplice and Edwards warnings); R v Green (2001) 78 SASR 463 at 474; R v Starrett (2002) 82 SASR 115 at [44] (assumed common law warnings applied in absence of definitive authority); Beames v Police [2002] SASC 405 at [21] (Bleby J: ‘Thus, while a judge or magistrate may not need the type of warning that must be given to a jury, there must be some evidence, usually only to be gleaned from the reasons, that the judge or magistrate has in fact addressed the evidence in the manner that a jury would be required to’); Tims v Police [2008] SASC 141 at [46]– [50] (Gray J) (no error where magistrate did not warn herself in the same terms as she would have warned a jury); Filippou v R (2015) 256 CLR 47; [2015] HCA 29 at [52] (reasons should indicate all legally required matters are taken into account in trial by judge alone pursuant to Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW): s 133). 26. The reluctant attitude of the High Court towards mandatory requirements is illustrated in cases such as Kelleher v R (1974) 131 CLR 534; and Bromley v R (1986) 161 CLR 315 at 324–5 (Brennan J). 27. With the exception that s 164(2) ‘does not affect the operation of a rule of law that requires corroboration with respect to the offence of perjury or a similar or related offence’. See also Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 632; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 50. 28. Stapleton v Chief of Army [2009] ADFDAT 2 at [67]–[68]. 29. See further 2.14. 30. Although strictly the question is whether a reasonable jury must have entertained a reasonable doubt as the High Court in M v R (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 151 explains: ‘In most cases a doubt experienced by an appellate court will be a doubt which a jury ought also to have experienced’. 31. M v R (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 151. In Chidiac v R (1991) 171 CLR 432, the High Court was not

prepared to interfere, stressing the presence of corroborative evidence. But verdicts were found unsafe in M v R (1994) 181 CLR 487; Pitkin v R (1995) 130 ALR 35; and Jones v R (1997) 191 CLR 439. For other examples of appellate interference, see R v Hall (1988) 36 A Crim R 368 (CCA (NSW)); Ralph and George v R (1988) 37 A Crim R 202 (CCA (NSW)); R v Lander (1989) 52 SASR 424 (unreliable and uncorroborated accomplice testimony); R v Warren (1994) 72 A Crim R 74 (CCA (NSW)) (contaminated evidence of a five-year-old child); R v McDonald (1995) 84 A Crim R 509 at 518 (CCA (SA)) (uncorroborated testimony of child-complainant of sexual assault). But cf approach of the High Court upholding conviction on the basis of a child’s unsworn evidence in R v GW (2016) 90 ALJR 407; [2016] HCA 6: see further at 4.77. 32. Although each category of witness is discussed in the context of the common law technique applied to them, their position under legislation, including the uniform legislation, is at the same time explained. 33. Insofar as a rule of law, common law or statutory, requires corroboration with respect to perjury or a similar or related offence, the requirement is preserved by s 164(2) of the uniform legislation and appropriate direction is expressly preserved in Victoria by s 164(5) of the Evidence Act 2008. While the common law corroboration requirement appears to continue unaffected by legislation enacting the offence of perjury in Commonwealth (Criminal Code s 268.102), New South Wales (Crimes Act 1900 ss 327–339), Victorian (Crimes Act 1958 ss 314–315) and Australian Capital Territory (Criminal Code 2002 ss 702–704) jurisdictions, in Tasmania a corroboration requirement similar to that at common law is enacted by s 96 of the Criminal Code. A similar corroboration requirement is enacted in Queensland (Criminal Code ss 125, 195 (but see R v Willmot; Ex parte Attorney-General [1987] 1 Qd R 53)) and the Northern Territory (Criminal Code ss 98, 120). All corroboration requirements for perjury are abolished in South Australia (Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s 242(4)) and Western Australia (Evidence Act 1906 s 35). The common law requirements are discussed in LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [15020]. 34. Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 76. 35. Family and Community Services Act 1972 (SA) s 140; Maintenance Act 1965 (Vic) s 27. 36. Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 94(7) (bigamy); Criminal Procedure Act 1996 (NSW) Sch 3 Pt 2 cl 3(2) (treason); Criminal Code (Qld) s 52 (sedition); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 7, 10 (treason); Victims of Crime Act 2001 (SA) s 22(3) (formerly Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1978 (SA) s 8(1)(b) (applied Field v Gent (1996) 67 SASR 122)); Criminal Code (Tas) ss 60(1) (treason), 67(3) (sedition); Criminal Code (NT) ss 47(2) (sedition), 120 (false statements). In actions for breach of promise to marry, corroboration is required in Queensland: Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 132. That action is restricted by s 111A of the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth). 37. [2016] 90 ALJR 407; [2016] HCA 6. 38. R v Manser (1934) 25 Cr App R 18; Scruby v R (1952) 55 WAR 1; R v Mlaka [1971] VR 385 at 393; Khan v R [1971] WAR 44. 39. [1973] AC 296 (applied to accomplice testimony in DPP v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729). 40. [1954] AC 378. 41. [1959] VR 321 at 330. 42. In fact the statement quoted from Teitler is ambiguous, either applying a less stringent proviso in the case of a particular error of law, or declaring the warning not mandatory at all (and attempting to define the circumstances where failure to warn constitutes a miscarriage of justice). The proviso now applies if the appellate court regards the record as establishing the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt: Weiss v R (2005) 224 CLR 300: see further 2.14. 43. Kelleher v R (1974) 131 CLR 534; Vetrovec v R (1982) 136 DLR (3d) 89; Bromley v R (1986) 161 CLR 315; Webb and Hay v R (1994) 181 CLR 41.

44. R v Teitler [1959] VR 321; R v Johnston (1986) 43 SASR 63 at 65 (Jacobs J). 45. R v Dossi (1918) 13 Cr App R 158; and R v Cleal [1942] 1 All ER 203 (children); Davies v DPP [1954] AC 378 (accomplice testimony); R v Clynes (1960) 44 Cr App R 158; R v Trigg [1963] 1 WLR 305; R v O’Reilly [1967] 2 QB 722; R v Henry (1968) 53 Cr App R 150; and R v Midwinter (1971) 55 Cr App R 525 (sexual assault complainants); DPP v Hester [1973] AC 296 at 309 (Lord Morris), 325 (Lord Diplock, treating accomplices, children and sexual assault complainants in the same way); DPP v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 at 740 (Lord Hailsham, treating the three categories alike and stipulating the drastic consequence of the failure to warn), 750, 751 (Lord Reid, stipulating that it is a rule of law to warn in the case of young children); and R v Spencer (1987) AC 128 at 133 (Lord Hailsham), 141 (Lord Ackner). Legislation now abolishes all common law corroboration warning requirements: Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (UK) ss 32–33 (applied R v Makanjoula and E [1995] 2 Cr App R 469). 46. [1954] AC 378. 47. (2004) 211 ALR 116; [2004] HCA 57. 48. This continues the move away from an inflexible mandatory approach hinted at by the High Court (particularly Brennan J) in Bromley v R (1986) 161 CLR 315, and by Toohey J (with whom Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ agreed) in Webb and Hay v R (1994) 181 CLR 41 at 94–5. Toohey J refers to the move away from mandatory accomplice warning in Canada in Vetrovec v R (1982) 136 DLR (3d) 89 in refusing to extend the mandatory warning to a co-accused who may also have been an accomplice. In Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207, no doubts are expressed about the mandatory warning in the case of accomplice testimony, but the only issue was whether corroborative evidence existed. In R v Hayler and Henry (1988) 39 A Crim R 374 at 379, Roden J refused to consider whether the accomplice warning was merely discretionary. 49. Kelleher v R (1974) 131 CLR 534, discussed in Ligertwood, n 6 above. Later decisions confirm this approach, while hastening to emphasise that a miscarriage of justice would very often be found where there was a failure to warn of the risk inherent in acting on the uncorroborated testimony of such a witness: R v Byczko (No 1) (1977) 16 SASR 506 at 510, 525, 536; R v Duke (1979) 22 SASR 46; R v Ridgeway [1983] 2 NSWLR 19. 50. Hargan v R (1919) 27 CLR 13; Hicks v R (1920) 28 CLR 36; Paine v R [1974] Tas SR (NC) 117; R v Schlaefer (1984) 37 SASR 207 at 212 (King J); R v Pahuja (No 1) (1987) 49 SASR 191 at 200 (King CJ), 215–17 (Cox J), 222–4 (Johnston J); K v R (1992) 34 FCR 227. See also Ligertwood, n 6 above; and cf LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [15140] n 3. 51. Galvin v R [2006] NSWCCA 66; Choi v R [2007] NSWCCA 150 at [53]–[61]. 52. It remains necessary in trials for non-indictable offences for a magistrate to warn himself or herself where the common law so requires: Betts v Hardcastle (2000) 23 WAR 559. 53. R v Lane (1996) 66 FCR 144 at 147. 54. The express prohibition was enforced in, for example, Reference of a Question of Law (No 1 of 1999) (1999) 106 A Crim R 408 (WA (CCA)). See also JCS v Tasmania [2014] TASCCA 6 at [6]–[20]. 55. See, for example, Markovina v R (No 2) (1997) 19 WAR 119 at 135–9; Green v R (1999) 161 ALR 648; [1999] HCA 13; Foo v R (2001) 167 FLR 423; Conway v R (2002) 209 CLR 203 at [55], [62]; Timbery v R (2007) 180 A Crim R 232; [2007] NSWCCA 355. 56. Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34L(5). 57. Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 12A(2); where no request may still ask on appeal whether judge’s approach produced a miscarriage of justice: R v E, DJ (2012) 112 SASR 225; [2012] SASCFC 6 at [81] (Kourakis CJ). Section 9(4) abolishes any general warning that might apply to a child’s unsworn testimony (R v

Starrett (2002) 82 SASR 115 at [40] per Doyle CJ), but strictly requires explanation of the reasons the evidence is unsworn and, if requested, a warning as to the need for caution before acting on the unsworn testimony (Lomman v R [2014] SASCFC 55 at [31]–[43] (Sulan J)). 58. Section 34L(5) does not expressly so provide but has been so interpreted: Question of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 1 of 1993) (1993) 59 SASR 214; R v McDonald (1995) 84 A Crim R 508 at 517 (CCA (SA)). 59. Longman v R (1989) 168 CLR 79 at 86 and cases referred to in n 122. And see, for example, R v MAS (2013) 118 SASR 160; [2013] SASCFC 122 at [33]ff. 60. McKinney and Judge v R (1991) 171 CLR 468. 61. See legislation at n 110. 62. Applied in R v Beattie (1996) 89 A Crim R 393. 63. Glanville Williams, Proof of Guilt, Stevens & Sons, London, 1955, p 112; Heydon, ‘The Corroboration of Accomplices’ [1973] Crim LR 264 at 265–7. For a justification based upon the moral revulsion of convicting on accomplice testimony, see Jackson, ‘Credibility, Morality and the Corroboration Warning’ [1988] Camb LJ 428. For High Court endorsement of this rationale, see Jenkins v R (2004) 211 ALR 116; [2004] HCA 57 at [30]. See also Kanaan v R [2006] NSWCCA 109 at [165]. 64. R v Turner (1975) 61 Cr App R 67 at 77–9; R v Braum (1983) 21 NTR 6; R v McLean and Funk; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 231. However, the CCA (Vic) appeal in Rozenes v Beljajev [1995] 1 VR 533 considered that this discretion should only be exercised in the rare situation where a properly directed jury would be incapable of fairly assessing the probative value of the evidence. Hunt CJ at CL takes the same approach to allegedly unreliable identification evidence in R v Tugaga (1994) 74 A Crim R 190. See also Dupas v R (2012) 40 VR 182; [2012] VSCA 328. 65. R v Payne [1950] 1 All ER 102 (co-accused pleading guilty should be sentenced before being called by prosecution); R v Pipe (1967) 51 Cr App R 17 (proceedings against an accomplice should be dropped if the prosecution wishes to call that accomplice). These are rules of practice dependent upon the discretion of a judge to ensure a fair trial, and a trial judge may permit a witness to testify although proceedings are still outstanding: see R v McLean and Funk; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 231; R v Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153; cf R v Stewart (2001) 52 NSWLR 301. In other than exceptional circumstances an adequate warning will be considered generally sufficient to avoid a miscarriage of justice: Rozenes v Beljajev [1995] 1 VR 533. 66. [1953] VLR 520 at 530 (emphasis added). 67. R v Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153; R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506; Kanaan v R [2006] NSWCCA 109 at [166]. 68. This possibility and the details of any discount might have to be specifically explained to a jury if a miscarriage of justice is to be avoided: Conway v R (2000) 98 FCR 204 at [207]; R v Stewart (2001) 52 NSWLR 301 at [141]–[151]; R v Sullivan [2003] NSWCCA 100 at [96]–[97] (Buddin J, Smart JA agreeing; magnitude of discount should have been led by Crown and s 165 warning appropriately tailored); R v Jacobs and Mehajer (2004) 151 A Crim R 452; [2004] NSWCCA 462 at [293] (failure to mention that Crown could have appealed against discounted sentence if undertaking to testify not honoured did not result in insufficient s 165 direction). Though the need for any explanation will depend on the circumstances of the case: McGavin v R [2014] NSWCCA 171 (Basten JA, Price and Fullerton JJ agreeing). 69. See R v Thomas (1989) 40 A Crim R 89 (CCA (Vic)) at 92–3; R v Macaskill (No 2) (2001) 81 SASR 155. Compare with R v Ware (1994) 73 A Crim R 17 at 27–33, where Coldrey J uses wider arguments to conclude that complainants of incest should not be regarded as accomplices. The High Court now takes a more flexible approach.

70. [1954] AC 378. 71. See, for example, Kutschera v R [2010] NSWCCA 150 at [95]–[103] (judge’s ruling that witness could not ‘reasonably be supposed to be involved’ upheld). Query whether an accessory after the fact is so ‘concerned’ that his or her evidence meets the additional requirement in the opening words of s 165(1) that it be ‘of a kind that may be unreliable’: R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 at [70]–[73] (Heydon JA); Kanaan v R [2006] NSWCCA 109 at [202]–[203]. 72. [1954] AC 378 at 400. 73. Khan v R [1971] WAR 44 at 55 (Burt J), quoting other earlier Australian authorities of a similar view. See also R v Carranceja and Asikin (1989) 42 A Crim R 402 (CCA (Vic)); R v Weiss (2004) 8 VR 388; [2004] VSCA 33 at [54]; R v Parsons (2004) 145 A Crim R 519; [2004] VSCA 92 at [25]–[27] (Buchanan JA); but cf dicta in R v Perry [1970] 2 NSWR 501 and R v McLachlan [1999] 2 VR 553 at [26] which followed Davies on this point. For an unresolved discussion of whether accessories after the fact are accomplices at common law, and who is at law an accessory after the fact, see R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506 at [50]–[53] (Heydon JA). 74. [1971] WAR 44. 75. (1979) 20 SASR 543 at 551. 76. Approved and applied in R v Glastonbury (2012) 115 SASR 37; [2012] SASCFC 141 at [78]. 77. R v Tietler [1959] VR 321; Khan v R [1971] WAR 44 at 51 (Neville J); R v Rigney (1975) 12 SASR 30 at 38 (Bray CJ). White J in R v Wilson (1988) 47 SASR 287 regards the warning as discretionary where the witness testifies for the defence. See also the refusal of English courts to extend the mandatory warning to this situation: R v Prater [1960] 2 QB 464; R v Russell (1968) 52 Cr App R 447; R v Beck [1982] 1 All ER 807; R v Cheema [1994] 1 WLR 147. 78. (1994) 181 CLR 41 at 94, quoting Vetrovec v R (1982) 136 DLR (3d) 89 as authority against mandatory corroboration warnings for accomplices. 79. Applied in R v Johnston [2004] NSWCCA 58 at [145]–[147]. 80. [1962] VR 440. 81. R v Baker [2001] NSWCCA 151 at [22]–[34] (Ipp JA); R v Ayoub [2004] NSWCCA 209 at [16] (Howie J). 82. Often in pursuance of its duty of fairness to call all material witnesses: see 6.55. 83. R v Royce-Bentley [1974] 1 WLR 535; R v Long and McDonnell (2002) 137 A Crim R 263; [2002] SASC 426 at [83]–[85] (Doyle CJ). Where the testimony is both adverse and favourable to an accused the trial judge should confine the accomplice warning to the adverse testimony: R v Jamison, Elliot and Blessington (1992) 60 A Crim R 68 at 76 (Gleeson CJ); R v MacFie (No 2) (2004) 11 VR 215; [2004] VSCA 209 at [66]–[73] (referring to Jenkins v R (2004) 211 ALR 116; [2004] HCA 57). 84. R v Salama [1999] NSWCCA 105 at [74]–[94] (self-serving statement of accused); R v Rose (2002) 55 NSWLR 701; [2002] NSWCCA 455 at [283]–[297] (identification evidence favouring the defence); Kanaan v R [2006] NSWCCA 109 at [126]–[128] (identification evidence favouring the defence). There may be ‘good reasons’ for not warning: see, for example, R v Salama [1999] NSWCCA 105 at [87]. 85. So that no warning should be given with respect to evidence not capable of implicating the accused. See R v Baker [2001] NSWCCA 151 at [27]–[28], following Jamieson, Elliott and Blessington (1992) 60 A Crim R 68. See also R v Vu [2005] NSWCCA 266 at [34]–[36]. Similarly, there will be no need to warn under the uniform legislation where the evidence is not in dispute or is incapable of being regarded as unreliable: R v Reardon, Michaels and Taylor [2002] NSWCCA 203 at [136] (Simpson J); R v

Fowler (2003) A Crim R 166 at [181]–[182]. See also R v Heginbotham [2008] QCA 47 at [30] (Fraser JA). 86. (1992) 174 CLR 558 at 599. 87. (2004) 211 ALR 116; [2004] HCA 57 at [27], [32]. 88. R v Turnbull and Davidson (1985) 17 A Crim R 370 (CCA (Qld)); R v Cox [1986] 2 Qd R 55; R v Parsons (2004) 145 A Crim R 519; [2004] VSCA 92 at [18]–[24]; R v Glastonbury (2012) 115 SASR 37; [2012] SASCFC 141 at [70], [74]. It makes little sense, however, to talk in terms of proof in this context, for in most cases the jury will be unable to find the witness an accomplice without at the same time finding the accused guilty of the offence charged. But the purpose of the rule will be fulfilled once the jury has been appropriately directed and warned. 89. In R v O’Neill (1988) 48 SASR 51, the warning was held not to be mandatory because the jury could only find the witness an accomplice by taking an absurd view of the evidence. 90. This approach contrasts to that under s 165 of the uniform legislation, which leaves it to the trial judge to determine (on the balance of probabilities) whether ‘evidence is of a kind that may be unreliable’, and if it is, a request mandates (in the absence of ‘good reasons’) a warning about the possible unreliability of that evidence, the reasons for that unreliability and the need for caution. The jury need merely take these matters into account in determining whether to accept the testimony in question. There is no need for the jury to determine formally whether the witness falls into a particular category of unreliable witness. See R v Flood [1999] NSWCCA 198 at [3]–[4] (Spigelman CJ); R v Lonie and Groom [1999] NSWCCA 319 at [64] (Smart JA). Nor is the judge to determine actual reliability, only its reasonable possibility: Allen v R (2013) 235 A Crim R 40; [2013] VSCA 263 at [37] (Redlich and Coghlan JJA, T Forrest AJA). 91. R v Duke (1979) 22 SASR 46; R v Sherrin (No 2) (1979) 21 SASR 250; R v Beck (1982) 1 All ER 807. However, the final decision of whether to accept evidence as corroboration remains with the jury: see, for example, R v Byczko (No 1) (1977) 16 SASR 506. 92. R v Zielinski [1950] 2 All ER 1114; R v Thomas (1959) 43 Cr App R 210; R v Sherrin (No 2) (1979) 21 SASR 250 at 256 (King CJ); R v Schlaefer (1984) 37 SASR 207. 93. See also Kelleher v R (1974) 131 CLR 534; Bromley v R (1986) 161 CLR 315 (particularly Brennan J); Webb and Hay v R (1994) 181 CLR 41 at 94 (Toohey J); Jenkins v R (2004) 211 ALR 116; [2004] HCA 57 at [27], [32]. 94. For example, Hogarth J in R v Rigney (1975) 12 SASR 30 at 54, where he concludes: ‘I think it much better that the law should require a judge to give a warning when the facts of the case require it in fairness, rather than to lay down any hard and fast rule of thumb which makes it obligatory to give the warning in some cases where it is unnecessary, and to say nothing of other cases where in fairness it should be given’. Earlier criticism is found in the judgment of Sholl J in McNee v Kay [1953] VLR 520 at 550. 95. This is emphasised in Jenkins v R (2004) 211 ALR 116; [2004] HCA 57 at [27]. Residual circumstances that may give rise to a duty to warn so that any risk of a miscarriage is avoided are discussed more generally at 4.75ff. 96. Sneddon v Stevenson [1967] 1 WLR 1051; R v Forgione [1969] SASR 248 at 252; R v Williams (1978) 19 SASR 423; Scott v Killian (1985) 40 SASR 37; R v Tyler [1994] 1 Qd R 675. Section 165(1)(d) of the uniform legislation (and Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) s 31(c)) applies only where a person is ‘criminally concerned’ in the events giving rise to the proceedings. In R v Lonie and Groom [1999] NSWCCA 319 at [63], Smart JA remarked: ‘I doubt whether it applies to police investigating a crime or conducting an operation as to a crime and who engage in collateral crime’. He went on to hold that evidence from corrupt police officers was nevertheless ‘evidence of a kind that may be unreliable’

requiring warning. Query whether the evidence of agents provocateurs may be similarly categorised. 97. See R v Forgione [1969] SASR 248 at 252 and R v O’Neill (1988) 48 SASR 51 at 61–2, where the witness was not an accomplice and the jury was adequately directed about possible dangers in acting on that testimony. 98. Webb and Hay v R (1994) 181 CLR 41. See also R v Prater [1960] 2 QB 464; R v Beck [1982] 1 All ER 807; cf R v Asciak [1990] WAR 120, which held that the jury was not required to be told that the witness might have their own purpose to serve. 99. (1991) 55 A Crim R 139. Applied in R v Carabott (2002) 132 A Crim R 355 at [20] (Gray J for CCA (SA)) (witness with own interest to serve: ‘In the circumstances of this matter the jury should also have been warned about the dangers of acting on his evidence in the absence of independent support’). 100. (1988) 165 CLR 314; (1989) 180 CLR 508. 101. (1991) 171 CLR 468 (discussed by Rosen (1994) 68 Aust LJ 27). See also Nicholls v R; Coates v R (2005) 219 CLR 196; [2005] HCA 1 at [165] (Gummow and Callinan JJ), [367]–[374] (Hayne and Heydon JJ) (McKinney endorsed but warning not required as evidence did not stand alone). 102. The court refused to apply their mandatory approach retrospectively: see R v Savvas (1991) 55 A Crim R 241 (CCA (NSW)); cf the High Court’s decision in Pollitt which has been held merely declaratory of the common law position: R v Herring (1994) 74 A Crim R 72 (CCA (NSW)). 103. R v Asfour (1991) 60 A Crim 409 (CCA (NSW)). 104. R v Small (1994) 33 NSWLR 575 at 599–604 (Hunt CJ at CL); R v Familic (1994) 75 A Crim R 229 at 242–5 (Hunt CJ at CL also holds that the rationale of McKinney, the special position of vulnerability of the accused, does not extend to police testimony of a search conducted in the absence of the accused); R v Lawson [1996] 2 Qd R 587. The circumstances may still demand that the trial judge emphasise some of the McKinney matters but no reference need be made to the danger of convicting on uncorroborated police evidence. 105. See Brabazon and Flood, ‘If Walls Could Talk: The McKinney Direction on Disputed Confessions’ (1992) 8 Aust Bar Rev 146. On the subject of police testimony of disputed confessions more generally, see Wood, Royal Commission into the NSW Police Service, Government of New South Wales, Sydney, 1997; Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions: A Handbook, Wiley, New York, 2002; Leo and Thomas, Confessions of Guilt: From Torture to Miranda and Beyond, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012; Kassin et al, ‘Police-induced Confessions, Risk Factors, and Recommendations: Looking Ahead’ (2010) 34 Law & Hum Behav 49. 106. R v Butler (No 2) (1991) 57 A Crim R 460 (SC (NT)). 107. Detention, not at a police station, but under provisions of the Drug Misuse Act 1986 (Qld) is sufficient to attract warning: Egart v Deal [1994] 2 Qd R 117 at 124–6 (Ambrose J, Cooper J agreeing); but secret recording by an acquaintance does not invoke a McKinney warning: R v O’Neill [1996] 2 Qd R 326 at 433–4 (Dowsett J, with Pincus JA agreeing). Clandestine recording may in some cases give rise to discretionary exclusion: R v Swaffield; R v Pavic (1998) 192 CLR 159, and see further 8.155 n 523. Note that s 165(1)(f) of the uniform legislation and s 31(d) of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) apply whether or not the accused is in custody: see 4.34 below. 108. (1994) 77 A Crim R 213 at 220 (Gleeson CJ). 109. (1993) 66 A Crim R 327 at 335. It is wrong for a fact-finder, for example a magistrate, to so speculate: Cremer v SA Police (1994) 61 SASR 594. Although reliability is the focus of any warning, under s 165(2) of the uniform legislation there is nothing in s 165(1)(f) to suggest that police testimony as such is ‘evidence of a kind that may be unreliable’. 110. Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 23V (applies in ACT by virtue of s 23A(6) to the investigation of ACT

offences punishable by imprisonment for a period exceeding 12 months); Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 281 (applied in R v Taouk [2005] NSWCCA 155; R v Frangulis [2006] NSWCCA 363; Em v R (2007) 232 CLR 67; [2007] HCA 46); Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) ss 436– 439; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) ss 74C–74G; Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 85A (DPP v Cook [2006] TASSC 75); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 464G, 464H (applied R v Schaeffer [2005] VSCA 306); Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA) s 118 (formerly Criminal Code (WA) s 570D) (applied R v Gangemi (1997) 17 SR (WA) 176; Middleton v R (1998) 19 WAR 179; Nicholls v R; Coates v R (2005) 219 CLR 196; 213 ALR 1; Carr v Western Australia (2007) 176 A Crim R 555; [2007] HCA 47); Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 23A(6) (applying investigative provisions to the investigation of ACT offences punishable by imprisonment for a period exceeding 12 months); Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 186 (applying Pt 1C of the Crimes Act (Cth) to the investigation of summary ACT offences); Police Administration Act 1978 (NT) s 142 (discussed in Grimley v R (1995) 121 FLR 282; R v Charlie (1995) 121 FLR 306). 111. Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 23G (applies in ACT by virtue of s 23A(6) to the investigation of ACT offences punishable by imprisonment for a period exceeding 12 months); Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) s 123; Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) ss 418, 419; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 79A; Criminal Law (Detention and Interrogation) Act 1995 (Tas) s 6; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 464C; Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA) ss 137, 138; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 186 (applying Pt 1C of the Crimes Act (Cth) to the investigation of summary ACT offences on arrest); Police Administration Act 1978 (NT) ss 138(h), (j), 140. 112. Cf remarks of Hayne and Heydon JJ in Nicholls v R; Coates v R (2005) 219 CLR 196; [2005] HCA 1 at [373]. Where recording is not mandated by legislation the selective use of recording facilities will not avoid the need for a McKinney direction: Kelly v R (1994) 12 WAR 405 (accused alleging uncorroborated admissions not made and that later video-taped admissions only made following assaults by police); Sell v R (1995) 15 WAR 240 (McKinney warning adequate and failure to record initial interview not a basis for discretionary exclusion); R v Kypri (2002) 5 VR 610 (independent evidence of alleged off-camera threats obviated need for McKinney warning); Birks v Western Australia (2007) 33 WAR 291; [2007] WASCA 29 (no McKinney warning required as not alleged recorded voluntary confession fabricated). And on the effectiveness of video-taping, see Dixon, ‘Videotaping Police Interrogation’ [2008] UNSWLRS 28. 113. Black v R (1993) 68 ALJR 91 at 96–7 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, McHugh JJ); R v Small (1994) 33 NSWLR 575 at 602. 114. R v Beattie (1996) 40 NSWLR 155 at 158–62 (CCA (NSW)); R v Lowe (1997) 98 A Crim R 300 at 310–12 (Hunt CJ at CL). 115. The limit of the provision to ‘questioning’ is criticised by Odgers, n 20 above, at [EA.165.420], in the light of the High Court’s narrow approach to the notion of ‘official questioning’ in Kelly v R (2004) 218 CLR 216; [2004] HCA 12. 116. Cf Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244 at [22]–[23]: ‘[I]t follows that where a judge, or the courts, has or have no special expertise or knowledge, a warning is not only unnecessary, but is an unwarranted intrusion into the province of the jury’. But where there are other fields of knowledge and inquiry engaged in research and experimentation, legal ignorance (or indifference) may provide a questionable rationale for inaction. 117. For example, in Gundersen v Miller [1936] SASR 206 at 207, the court declared that ‘it is certainly the law that a jury should be warned of the danger of acting on the uncorroborated testimony of disreputable witnesses’, and this view finds expression in Bromley v R (1986) 161 CLR 315. 118. Some commentators suggest that exclusion might sometimes be preferable to admitting unreliable evidence subject to directions and/or warnings. See, for example, Roach, ‘Unreliable Evidence and

Wrongful Convictions: The Case for Excluding Tainted Identification Evidence and Jailhouse and Coerced Confessions’ (2007) 52 CLQ 210; Neuschatz et al, ‘The Effects of Accomplice Witnesses and Jailhouse Informants on Jury Decision Making’ (2008) 32 Law & Hum Behav 137; Natapoff, ‘Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful Convictions’ (2006) 37 Golden Gate ULR 107; Greer, Supergrasses, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995. 119. For a list of particular types of evidence that may, in the circumstances of particular cases, be considered ‘of a kind that may be unreliable’, see Odgers, n 20 above, at [EA.165.450]. 120. A stunning example is described in Jones, ‘The Evidence of a Three-Year-Old Child’ [1987] Crim LR 677. The reliability of children’s evidence is considered in more detail at 7.31, where the competence of child-witnesses to testify is discussed. A voluminous literature exists on the psychology and evidence of children; see, for example, Seen and Heard: Priority for Children in the Legal Process, ALRC Report 84 (1997), [14.15]–[14.24] (and references therein); McGough, Child Witnesses: Fragile Voices in the American Legal System, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1994; Spencer and Flin, The Evidence of Children: The Law and the Psychology, Wiley, London, 1993; Spencer and Lamb (eds), Children and CrossExamination: Time to Change the Rules?, Hart, Oxford, 2012. See also research by Goodman et al, ‘Hearsay Versus Children’s Testimony: Effects of Truthful and Deceptive Statements on Jurors’ Decisions’ (2006) 30 Law & Hum Behav 363; and Brainerd and Reyna, ‘Reliability of Children’s Testimony in the Era of Developmental Reversals’ (2012) 32 Development Rev 224. 121. Uniform legislation s 165A; Criminal Code (Qld) s 632 (banning all corroboration requirements and ‘class’ warnings: applied in R v Reynolds [2015] QCA 111 at [36]–[37] (the Chief Justice); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 12A (applies only in jury trials: R v Haak (2012) 112 SASR 315; [2012] SASCFC 19 at [38]); Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) s 33; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 106D (in any proceedings on indictment). 122. Longman v R (1989) 168 CLR 79; Question of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 1 of 1993) (1993) 59 SASR 214; R v McDonald (1995) 84 A Crim R 508 at 517 (CCA (SA)). These cases are discussed at 4.43ff. Where a direction more favourable to the accused than permitted leads to an accused being acquitted, even where legislation allows the Crown to state a question of law for an appellate court, generally it is upon the basis that the jury’s acquittal must stand: see further 2.14 nn 66 and 67. These provisions make it more difficult to ensure directions that do not disparage children or indeed any other categories of witnesses. For this reason, s 165A of the uniform legislation seeks to ensure that any direction is given only on request of a party (cf Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) Pt 3) and is confined to ‘circumstances particular to that child’ witness before the court. 123. R v Warsap (2010) 106 SASR 264 at [64]–[65] (in absence of request judge precluded from giving corroboration warning under s 12A). 124. Mere delay and inconsistencies in the child’s evidence do not constitute cogent reasons: R v J, AP (2013) 118 SASR 150; [2013] SASCFC 121 at [41]–[46] (Kelly J). 125. See, for example, R v Cheng [2015] SASCFC 189, which relied upon s 34D of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) to demand detailed directions in respect of a video-recorded interview admitted under the Act; cf R v J, AP (2013) 118 SASR 150; [2013] SASCFC 121. 126. Testimony sworn, unsworn, or upon affirmation. The rules regulating testimonial formalities are discussed at 7.28–7.31. 127. See, for example, R v Muller [1996] 1 Qd R 74 at 76–7: ‘[I]f the witness is a child, as conventionally understood, a direction to approach the evidence with special care may well be required. Whether it is, and if so its content, must then depend on the particular circumstances of the case, in which the judgment of the trial judge, with the assistance of counsel, should assume prime significance’. 128. R v Campbell [1956] 2 QB 432 at 436, 438; DPP v Hester [1973] AC 296; R v Morgan [1978] 1 WLR

755; R v Schlaefer (1984) 37 SASR 207. 129. This last factor has often been emphasised by the High Court: see Hicks v R (1920) 28 CLR 36; Kelleher v R (1974) 131 CLR 534. It is, however, up to the jury to decide whether to accept corroborative evidence or not, so that such evidence should obviate the need for warning only where it is not controversial: see Kelleher at 541 (Barwick CJ), 555 (Gibbs J). 130. R v Muller [1996] 1 Qd R 74 at 76–7 (quoted at n 127 above). Judges must themselves be careful to avoid endorsing such assumptions: see FGC v Western Australia (2008) 183 A Crim R 313; [2008] WASCA 47 at [68] (Wheeler JA). 131. [2016] 90 ALJR 407; [2016] HCA 6. 132. Rolfe v R [2007] NSWCCA 155 at [26]–[27] (Giles JA); Clarke v R [2013] VSCA 206 at [20]–[25] (Maxwell ACJ). 133. Glanville Williams, The Proof of Guilt, Stevens & Sons, London, 1955, pp 117–23, makes great play of the fantasies of the emotionally disturbed female. See also Barwick CJ in Kelleher v R (1974) 131 CLR 534 at 543. Although the fears are based upon the female complainant, the common law was unable to resist the extension of the corroboration requirements to male complainants as well: see R v Sherrin (No 2) (1979) 21 SASR 250; R v Ridgeway [1983] 2 NSWLR 19. Cf, for example, ‘Rape and Sexual Assault’ at . Rape myths and misperceptions seem to be widespread and reinforced through a range of popular sources; for example, Franiuk et al, ‘Prevalence and Effects of Rape Myths in Print Journalism’ (2008) 14 Violence Against Women 287. 134. See the persuasive discussion in Naffine, ‘Windows on the Legal Mind: The Evocation of Rape in Legal Writings’ (1992) Melb ULR 741. See also Mack, ‘Continuing Barriers to Women’s Credibility: A Feminist Perspective on the Proof Process’ (1993) 4 Crim Law Forum 327; and historical work by Lacey, Women, Crime, and Character: From Moll Flanders to Tess of the D’Urbervilles, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008. 135. Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34L(5); Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) s 136. 136. Uniform legislation s 164(3); Criminal Code (Qld) s 632; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 50. 137. See Longman v R (1989) 168 CLR 79 at 84–6 (Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ). 138. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 294AA; Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) s 51 (counsel are also prohibited from making such suggestions); Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (ACT) s 69; Sexual Offences (Evidence and Procedure) Act (NT) s 4(5)(a). Being procedural in nature, all legislation mentioned in this paragraph is effectively retrospective: Rodway v R (1990) 169 CLR 515. 139. See R v Williams [1988] VR 261; Longman v R (1989) 168 CLR 79; Question of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 1 of 1993) (1993) 59 SASR 214 at 217–18; R v McDonald (1995) 84 A Crim R 508 at 517 (CCA (SA)). 140. Question of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 1 of 1993) (1993) 59 SASR 214. There are difficulties in enforcing such a prohibition where the result of the warning has been the acquittal of an accused. That legislation (see above), which permits the Crown to state a question of law on appeal, also provides that any verdict of acquittal must stand: see further n 122 above. 141. Conway v R (2002) 209 CLR 203 at [55] is authority for the proposition that s 164(3) simply abolishes the requirement to warn: see further at n 144. 142. Expressly preserved by the uniform legislation s 165(5); Criminal Code (Qld) s 632(3) (applied R v Weisz (2008) 189 A Crim R 93; [2008] QCA at [88]–[90] (McMurdo P); Robinson v R (1999) 197 CLR 162; [1999] HCA 42); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 61(2), (3). That the judge’s general duty to direct is expressly or impliedly preserved is emphasised by the High Court in Longman v R (1989) 168 CLR

79 at 86 (Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ, citing Bromley v R (1986) 161 CLR 315 at 319, 323–5 and Carr v R (1988) 165 CLR 314 at 330); Robinson v R (1999) 197 CLR 162 at [20]; Crampton v R (2000) 206 CLR 161; Doggett v R (2001) 208 CLR 343; Tully v R (2006) 231 ALR 712; [2006] HCA 56 at [43] (Kirby J), [89] (Hayne J), [158] (Crennan J). 143. See, for example, R v Li (2003) 140 A Crim R 288 at [65] (Dunford J). 144. In Conway v R (2002) 209 CLR 203, the court held that ss 164 and 165 of the uniform legislation did not prohibit a judge from giving a full common law accomplice warning, but once given the judge was in error in referring to evidence as capable of providing corroboration when it could not fulfil the common law requirements (the proviso was applied to dismiss the appeal). Conway followed in R v Li (2003) 140 A Crim R 288 at [65]; Timbery v R (2007) 180 A Crim R 232; [2007] NSWCCA 355 at [95]–[96]. 145. FGC v Western Australia (2008) 183 A Crim R 313; [2008] WASCA 47 at [3] (Wheeler JA), [121] (Buss JA), [143], [145]–[147] (Murray AJA, also emphasising that classifying what a judge must say as a ‘direction’, ‘warning’ or ‘comment’ is not of crucial significance in this context). This case is an excellent example of counsel attempting (unsuccessfully) to make every possible unreliability factor a ground of appeal on the basis of inadequate direction. See the critical comments of Wheeler JA at [5]– [7]. 146. Hayne J in Tully v R (2006) 231 ALR 712; [2006] HCA 56 at [88] required the ‘deep issues’ — the issues defined by reference to relevant circumstances — be put to the jury by the trial judge: ‘[D]o you accept the evidence of a young person about particular events of sexual misconduct, occurring in the family setting described, and said to have occurred, unwitnessed, some years ago, when she was aged between eight and 10 and which medical examination can now neither verify nor falsify?’ 147. The utility and dangers of model directions are adverted to by Hayne J in Tully v R (2006) 231 ALR 712; [2006] HCA 56 at [93]: ‘The bare recitation to a jury of the relevant sections of a bench book of standard instructions, unrelated to the real issues in the case, does not fulfil the trial judge’s task’. 148. A fuller list of directions that may apply in sexual assault cases is compiled in R v BRT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241 at [32], where Wood CJ at CL refers to (1) the warning to scrutinise the testimony of a sole witness (the Murray direction); (2) the Longman direction; (3) the direction that there may be good reasons for delay but that delay is relevant to assessing credit (the Crofts direction); (4) the direction to consider concurrent charges separately (the KRM direction); (5) warnings about the admissible use of evidence of complaint; (6) warnings as to the admissible use of relationship evidence (the Gipp warning); (7) warnings in respect of coincidence evidence; (8) warnings against impermissible propensity reasoning (a BRS direction). 149. R v Murray (1987) 11 NSWLR 12 at 19 (Lee J); Tully v R (2006) 231 ALR 712; [2006] HCA 56 at [54]–[58] (Kirby J suggests direction obligatory), [89], [93] (Hayne J: the interests of justice determine whether there must be and the extent of any warning), [184], [186] (Crennan J: no forensic disadvantage that would not have been appreciated by jury demanded warning); DTS v R [2008] NSWCCA 329 (Murray direction not required as corroboration available; query whether judge should say warning ‘required by law’); Sheen v R [2011] NSWCCA 259 at [38]–[44]; SKA v R [2012] NSWCCA 205 at [249]–[260] (Beazley JA), [306]–[307] (Adams J), 323 (Hislop J) (permissible to say direction required by law); Giallombardo v R [2014] NSWCCA 25 at [70]–[73]. See also R v Reynolds [2015] QCA 111 at [36]–[52] (the Chief Justice, concluding at [52] that a ‘Robinson direction’ (to take care in convicting on the evidence of a lone child-complainant) was not required as ‘the circumstances display no exceptional or peculiar features placing the appellant at a forensic disadvantage which would have been clear to the trial judge, but unobvious to the jury’), [53]–[65] (the Chief Justice concluding that the warning given drew adequate attention to inconsistencies in the child’s evidence), [90] (Fraser JA agreeing), [96]–[97] (Gotterson JA agreeing).

150. See generally Lewis, ‘A Comparative Examination of Forensic Disadvantage Directions in Delayed Prosecutions of Childhood Sexual Abuse’ (2005) 29 Crim LJ 281. 151. Kilby v R (1973) 129 CLR 460. 152. Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 36BD; Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (ACT) s 71; Sexual Offences (Evidence and Procedure) Act (NT) s 4(5)(b). 153. Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 (Qld) s 4A(4) (referred to in R v Tichowitsch [2007] 2 Qd R 462 in holding that the uncorroborated testimony of a child complaining three years after the events did not demand a warning that it would be dangerous to act upon that testimony alone); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34M(2). 154. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 294(2). 155. See Jarrett v R (2014) 86 NSWLR 623; [2014] NSWCCA 140 at [33]–[50], particularly at [43] (Basten JA), ‘Without being prescriptive, there must be something in the evidence sufficient to raise in the judge’s mind the possibility that the jury may legitimately consider that the delay could cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant’; and [49] ‘What might have cast doubt on the complainant’s credibility was not the delay in complaining but the inconsistencies between her complaints and her evidence’. 156. Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) ss 51–54. 157. To ‘require’ a corroboration warning is inconsistent with s 164 of the uniform legislation (cf Miles AJ in R v GAR [2003] NSWCCA 224 at [57]; cf Kanaan v R [2006] NSWCCA 109 at [217]) but the testimony of adults who complain of sexual assaults during childhood may be regarded as ‘evidence of a kind that may be unreliable’ within s 165, attracting a Longman warning on request (R v Aitchison (1996) 90 A Crim R 448 at 452 (Higgins J); cf Kanaan v R [2006] NSWCCA 109 at [217]). 158. (1989) 168 CLR 79. See Cossins, ‘Time Out for Longman: Myths, Science and the Common Law’ (2010) 34 Melb ULR 69; and Hermanus v R [2015] VSCA 2. Delay in reporting other crimes may also attract a warning: R v Carr (2000) 117 A Crim R 272. 159. Subsequent courts have, in the light of empirical evidence, criticised the application of this dictum as a general proposition requiring what is referred to as ‘the extended Longman warning’: JJB v R (2006) 161 A Crim R 187 at [2]–[8] (Spigelman CJ); FGC v Western Australia (2008) 183 A Crim R 313; [2008] WASCA 47 at [68]–[69] (Wheeler JA); R v MBX [2014] 1 Qd R 438; [2013] QCA 214 at [99] (Applegarth J). 160. Crampton v R (2000) 206 CLR 161 involved similarly uncorroborated evidence which made a ‘corroboration warning’ appropriate, although the majority make clear that it is the delay which gives rise to the reasons for a warning: at [45]. The situation was the same in Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285 at [54]–[59] (Kirby J), [127]–[130] (Callinan J). The warning is only required where there has been such a delay as to give rise to these reasons: R v Hansen (2002) 84 SASR 54 at [126]–[133]. Also note that it is the disadvantage to the accused caused by delay that demands the warning. To warn that the prosecution is also disadvantaged by delay may produce a miscarriage of justice by suggesting that the prosecution case would have been stronger if there had been no delay: GBT v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 19 at [30] (Pullin JA). See also R v RW (2008) 18 VR 666; [2008] VSCA 79 (warning diluted by reference to police difficulties in investigating); R v GVV (2008) 194 A Crim R 242; [2008] VSCA 170 at [65] (Lasry AJA) (warning must be ‘unequivocally favourable to the accused’). 161. (1996) 186 CLR 79. 162. See also R v Miletic [1997] 1 VR 593; R v Hewitt [1998] 4 VR 862 at 865–6; and further at 7.107. 163. Particularly when one has regard to the many other warnings that a trial judge may have to give in a sexual assault case: see R v BRT (2002) 54 NSWLR 241 at [32] (Wood CJ at CL), referred to at n 148

above. See also Doyle CJ in R v BFB (2003) 87 SASR 278 at [38]: ‘The giving of excessive and inappropriate warnings … runs the risk of returning this aspect of the law to an approach from which Parliament endeavoured to extract it …’; and Anderson v Western Australia (2014) 46 WAR 363; [2014] WASCA 137 at [41] (McLure P) critical of Longman warnings being ‘routinely given’. The incantation of warnings in sexual assault cases is lamented by Boniface, ‘The Common Sense of Jurors vs the Wisdom of the Law: Judicial Directions and Warnings in Sexual Assault Trials’ (2005) 28 UNSW LJ 261. 164. (2001) 208 CLR 343. 165. The forensic disadvantage justification receives emphasis in Crampton v R (2001) 206 CLR 161 at [45] (Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ) and in Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285 at [54]–[59] (Kirby J), [127]–[130] (Callinan J). 166. Crampton v R (2000) 206 CLR 161. 167. (2002) 54 NSWLR 241. Kirby J in Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285 at [55] regards Sully J’s analysis as ‘a correct statement of the present law … It is, and it is expressed to be, strict’. R v BWT is applied in R v GEA (2002) 131 A Crim R 54 (CCA (NSW)); R v DBG (2002) 133 A Crim R 227 at [36]; and R v WSP [2005] NSWCCA 427 at [92]–[93]. Though other cases suggested greater flexibility: R v Kesisyan [2003] NSWCCA 259 at [8]; Crisafio v R (2003) 27 WAR 169; [2003] WASCA 104; RBK v R [2004] WASCA 216; Angliss v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 162; R v Hopper [2005] VSCA 214; JJB v R [2006] NSWCCA 126 at [43]. 168. Though the need for this exact phrase, derived from R v SJB (2002) 129 A Crim R 572 (CCA (NSW)), is tempered in Sepulveda v R [2006] NSWCCA 379 at [180] (Johnson J); Sheehan v R [2006] NSWCCA 233 (Kirby J); JJB v R [2006] NSWCCA 126 (Kirby J). Indeed, in Robinson v R [2006] NSWCCA 192 at [19], Spigelman CJ suggests that it is ‘a formulation best avoided, save in exceptional circumstances’. See also Fleming v R [2009] NSWCCA 233 at [57] (McClellan CJ at CL); R v MCD [2014] QCA 326 at [20]–[30] (Gotterson JA). 169. R v BWT (2002) 84 NSWLR 241 at [95] (point [3](e)) (Sully J). 170. Compare with the more realistic approach in R v GTN (2003) 6 VR 150. 171. (2002) 54 NSWLR 241 at [32]–[38] (Wood CJ at CL), [114]–[118] (Sully J). See also Anderson v Western Australia (2014) 46 WAR 363; [2014] WASCA 137 at [41] (McLure P, Buss and Mazza JJA agreeing) critical of Longman warnings being ‘routinely given’ and remarking that ‘given the now proven magnitude of past sexual offending against children and the skepticism which allowed it to flourish, the time may have arrived to reassess the rationale for or terms of the warnings given in child sexual abuse trials’. 172. (1998) 45 NSWLR 362. 173. The appeal succeeded on a similar basis in R v GPP (2001) 129 A Crim R 1. 174. For example, JJB v R (2006) 161 A Crim R 187 at [43]–[44], [97]–[102] (Kirby J); Sheehan v R (2006) 163 A Crim R 397 at [69]–[70], [107], [117] (Kirby J); DRE v R (2006) 164 A Crim R 400 at [29]– [31] (Spigelman CJ), [59]–[60] (Simpson J); DPW v R (2006) 164 A Crim R 583; [2006] NSWCCA 295 at [2] (Hunt AJA), [20]–[25] (Barr J); KJR v R (2007) 173 A Crim R 226; [2007] NSWCCA 165 at [8] (Simpson J), [58]–[68] (Rothman J); Perez v R [2008] NSWCCA 46 at [75]–[76] (Kirby J); AW v R [2009] NSWCCA 1 at [38]–[40] (Latham J). 175. See the detailed response to Spigelman CJ’s approach by Sully J in R v WSP [2005] NSWCCA 427 at [74]ff and his conclusions at [92] (‘… one man’s ritualism is another man’s consistency’) and [185]. See also Groundstroem v R [2013] NSWCCA at [59]–[62] (Adams J, Mcfarlan JA and Button J agreeing). 176. (2000) 23 WAR 106 at 117.

177. [2003] WASCA 214 at [26]–[27]. For earlier examples of the approach of the CCA (WA), see Petty v R (1994) 13 WAR 372; Sell v R (1995) 15 WAR 240 at 255–6; Robinson v R (1995) 13 WAR 451. 178. Crisafio v R (2003) 27 WAR 169; [2003] WASCA 104 at [1] (Malcolm CJ), [27] (Murray J); Angliss v Western Australia [2005] WASCA 162 at [14]–[23] (Wheeler JA); FGC v Western Australia (2008) 183 A Crim R 313; [2008] WASCA 47; AM v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 196 at [128] (Miller JA) (direction required to ensure the jury considered actual prejudice consequent upon delay); GBT v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 19 at [27] (Pullen JA). In Hunt v Western Australia (2008) 189 A Crim R 248 at [16], Wheeler JA nevertheless suggests that in cases of ‘long delay’ some warning will be required. And if delay results in loss of a chance to test evidence attention must be drawn to this: FJL v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 8 at [2] (McLure P), [27] (Wheeler JA). And see also MB v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 160 at [49]–[53] (Martin CJ), [60] (Mazza JA), [69] (Mitchell J) upholding appeal because judge’s directions amounted to a ‘comment’ rather than a clear ‘warning’ of the risks of acting upon the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant. 179. R v MBX [2014] 1 Qd R 438; [2013] QCA 214 at [105], Applegarth J (holding adequate the direction of the trial judge emphasising matters caused by that delay of which the jury may have been unaware, and which needed to be taken into account if a miscarriage of justice was to be avoided. 180. R v T (1999) 74 SASR 486; R v Green (2001) 78 SASR 463 at [36]; Beames v Police (2002) 135 A Crim R 447 (SC (SA)); R v BFB (2003) 87 SASR 278 at [32]–[50] (Doyle CJ, Perry and Mulligan JJ agreeing); R v Humble [2009] SASC 51 at [92] (Kelly and Kourakis JJ); R v Inston (2009) 103 SASR 265; [2009] SASC 89 at [55]–[56] (Gray J), [109]–[114], [125]–[130] (Vanstone J); R v B, J [2009] SASC 110 at [3]–[10] (Doyle CJ), [31]–[32] (Vanstone J). 181. While generally requiring a Longman warning in cases of delay (for example, R v Hyatt [1998] 4 VR 182) flexibility is apparent in, for example, R v Arundell [1999] 2 VR 228 (in a tactical situation similar to Doggett a majority held no miscarriage of justice); R v Mazzolini [1999] 3 VR 103 (direction in terms of a ‘comment’, in the light of experienced counsel’s failure to object, was held by a majority to produce no miscarriage of justice); R v Costin [1998] 3 VR 659 (no warning justified where no evidence to show whether there had been any delay in complaining); R v GTN (2003) 6 VR 150 (New South Wales approach not endorsed); R v EO (2004) 8 VR 154 at [7] (Winneke P), [46], [54] (Coldrey AJA); R v Taylor (No 2) (2008) 18 VR 613; 184 A Crim R 77 at [77]–[78], [91] (Kellam JA: while no set formula jury must be directed about specific disadvantage to accused with authority of judge’s office); R v RW (2008) 184 A Crim R 389; [2008] VSCA 79 (warning diluted by reference to police difficulties in investigating); R v GVT (2008) 184 A Crim R 242; [2008] VSCA 170 at [65] (Lasry AJA: warning must be ‘unequivocally favourable to the accused’). For earlier ‘Longman direction’ cases, see R v Omarjee (1995) 79 A Crim R 355 at 370–1 (CCA (Vic)); R v Patton (1995) 80 A Crim R 595 (CCA (Vic)); R v Josifoski [1997] 2 VR 68 at 77–80 (Southwell AJA); R v Robertson [1998] 4 VR 30. 182. (2006) 231 ALR 712; [2006] HCA 56. 183. Section 165B(7) of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) gives as examples of forensic disadvantage the death of a witness or loss of evidence. 184. Any party in New South Wales: Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 165B(2). In the absence of application query whether the trial judge may be obliged by the common law obligation to give the direction as necessary to avoid a perceptible risk of a miscarriage of justice: so held in Greensill v R (2012) 37 VR 257; [2012] VSCA 306 at [45]–[54] (Redlich, Osborn and Priest JJA). 185. Cf decision in Greensill v R referred to in previous footnote. 186. While the legislation does not apply where a trial is before a judge alone, appellate courts will examine reasons given for decisions to determine whether the judge has sufficiently taken into account any disadvantages consequent upon delay to ensure that no miscarriage of justice has occurred: R v T, WA (2014) 118 SASR 382; [2014] SASCFC 3 at [22].

187. (2011) 109 SASR 465; [2011] SASCFC 29 at [30]. 188. Applied in R v N, RC (2012) 112 SASR 399; [2012] SASCFC 37 (Gray and Sulan JJ holding warning sufficient, Peek J disagreeing); R v Maiolo (No 2) (2013) 117 SASR 1; [2013] SASCFC 36 at [176]ff; R v Finn (2014) 119 SASR 207; [2014] SASCFC 46; R v W, PK [2016] SASCFC 5 at [47] (Kourakis CJ drafting suggested direction to cover particular disadvantages in case before him). 189. Jarrett v R (2014) 86 NSWLR 623; [2014] NSWCCA 140 at [54] (Basten JA). 190. Sneddon v Stevenson [1967] 1 WLR 1051; R v Forgione [1969] SASR 248 at 253; R v Williams (1978) 19 SASR 423; Scott v Killian (1985) 40 SASR 37 (customer testifying against accused prostitute); R v Tyler [1994] 1 Qd R 675 (police undercover agent’s intention was to detect crime, not commit it). 191. [1954] SASR 189. 192. Cf R v Lonie and Green [1999] NSWCCA 319 at [62]–[63] (Smart AJ). 193. (1995) 184 CLR 19. 194. In the United States, the defence of entrapment may apply to exclude testimony where an offence has been instigated by police: Sorrells v US 287 US 435 (1932); Sherman v US 356 US 369 (1958); People v Donovan 279 NYS 2d 404 (1967). See also Jacobson v United States 503 US 540 (1992). English courts have refused to develop such a defence, or to exercise a common law discretion to exclude such evidence on grounds of public policy (R v Sang [1980] AC 402), although now the discretion to ensure a fair trial under s 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (UK) may be invoked: R v Loosely [2001] 4 All ER 897 at [12] (Lord Nicholls), [42]–[44] (Lord Hoffman); and see Choo, ‘Entrapment and s 78 of PACE’ [1992] Camb LJ 236; Sharp, ‘Covert Police Operations and the Discretionary Exclusion of Evidence’ [1994] Crim LR 793; Robertson, ‘Entrapment Evidence: Manna from Heaven, or Fruit of the Poisoned Tree?’ [1994] Crim LR 805. English courts regard a stay for abuse of process as the primary remedy for entrapment, but it will only succeed where there is a misuse of state authority such that to condone a prosecution based upon it would constitute an ‘affront to the public conscience’: see R v Latif and Shahzad [1996] 2 Cr App R 92 at 100–1 (PC, Lord Steyn); R v Loosely [2001] 4 All ER 897 at [19], [25] (Lord Nicholls), [36], [41]–[44] (Lord Hoffman), [103]–[104] (Lord Hutton) (discussed in Ashworth, ‘Redrawing the Boundaries of Entrapment’ [2002] Crim LR 161); and see generally Dennis, Law of Evidence, 5th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2013, [8.026]–[8.031]; Bronitt, ‘The Law in Undercover Policing: A Comparative Study of Entrapment and Covert Interviewing in Australia, Canada and Europe’ (2004) 33 Common Law World Rev 35; Redmayne, ‘Exploring Entrapment’ in Zedner and Roberts, Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012. 195. See, for example, R v Martelli (1995) 83 A Crim R 550 (CCA (SA)); R v Albu (1995) 64 SASR 319 (Matheson J); (1996) 65 SASR 439 at 445 (CCA, Cox J); R v Gudgeon (1995) 133 ALR 379 (CCA (Qld)); R v Medina (1995) 84 A Crim R 316 (CCA (WA)); R v Karam (1995) 83 A Crim R 416 (CCA (NSW)); R v Peters and Heffernan (1996) 88 A Crim R 585 (CCA (NSW)); R v Swift (1999) 105 A Crim R 279 (CCA (Qld)); Rice v Tricouris (2000) 110 A Crim R 86 (SC (Vic), Beach J); Harvey v Police (2006) 95 SASR 357; [2006] SASC 222; Tofilau v R (2007) 231 CLR 396; [2007] HCA 39; R v Upton (2007) 209 FLR 487; Dowe v R (2009) NSWCCA 23; R v Priest (2011) 246 FLR 341; [2011] ACTSC 18. See also Bronnitt and Roach, ‘Between Rhetoric and Reality: Socio-legal and Republican Perspectives on Entrapment’ (2000) 4 E & P 77 at 88–9. Cases prior to Ridgeway staying proceedings where offences instigated by police, for example, R v Hsing (1991) 25 NSWLR 685; R v Stead (1992) 62 A Crim R 40 (CCA (Qld)), remain relevant to exercise of the exclusionary discretion. 196. Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) Pt 1AB (inserted following Ridgeway and applying to controlled narcotics importations; this legislation has been held within the courts’ judicial power: Nicholas v R (1998) 193 CLR 173); Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act 1997 (NSW); Police Powers and

Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) Ch 11; Controlled Operations; Criminal Investigation (Covert Operations) Act 2009 (SA) Pt 2 (1995 Act applied in R v Albu (1995) 64 SASR 319; (1996) 65 SASR 439 at 450 (Cox J)); Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1986 (Vic) s 50 (discussed in R v Te [1998] 3 VR 566); Royal Commission (Police) Act 2002 (WA) Pt 7 ss 31(2), 32; Misuse of Drugs Act (NT) ss 31(3), 32. Even without such legislation undercover police may lack the requisite intention to be criminally responsible (see cases at n 190). 197. See English Criminal Law Revision Committee, 11th Report, Evidence (1967), United Kingdom, [198]–[203]; Home Office, Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department of the Departmental Committee on Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases, HMSO, London, 1976; Law Reform Commission of Victoria, Report on cl 12 Crimes (Powers of Arrest) Bill 1972 (Police Powers) (1972–73); South Australian Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee, 2nd Report, Criminal Investigation (1972); Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department of the Departmental Committee on Evidence of Identification of Criminal Cases (1976), United Kingdom (The ‘Devlin Report’); Glanville Williams, ‘Evidence of Identification: The Devlin Report’ [1976] Crim LR 407; Criminal Investigation, ALRC Report 2 (1975); Evidence, ALRC Interim Report 26 (1985), vol 1, Ch 18; Evidence, ALRC Report 38 (1987), Ch 15; Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), Ch 13. 198. See, for example, Davies v R (1937) 57 CLR 170; and the discussion in R v Nguyen [2003] NSWSC 1068. 199. National Research Council, Identifying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification, National Academies Press, Washington DC, 2014. And see references in n 227. 200. Domican v R (1992) 173 CLR 555 at 561. See also KNP v R [2006] NSWCCA 213 at [76]. 201. (1992) 173 CLR 555 at 561–2. 202. See, for example, Braslin v Tasmania [2011] TASCCA 14 at [26]–[36]. 203. Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 104–5 assumes this definition requires testimony beyond description of similar features; see also R v Dodd (2002) 135 A Crim R 32; (2002) NSWCCA 418 at [16]ff. But cf R v Whalen (2003) 56 NSWLR 454 at [17] (Hodgson JA suggesting similar features forming a ‘significant part’ of testimony may be ‘identification evidence) and the comments of Odgers, n 20 above, at [EA.165.300] emphasising that the definition of ‘identification evidence’ applies to assertions of resemblance not recognition. In Trudgett v R (2008) 182 A Crim R 253; [2008] NSWCCA 62, the court held that the definition requires testimony of recognition based upon what the witness perceived; testimony that the accused was introduced to the witness as ‘Adam’ did not constitute identification evidence attracting automatic warning under s 116. Identification of an accused not based on the perception of a witness but on scientific analysis of bodily samples (for example, DNA analysis) or characteristics (for example, voice analysis), or inferred from circumstantial evidence, does not fall within this definition. 204. For example, where it does not relate to the identification of the accused: R v Rose (No 10) [2001] NSWSC 1060; R v Whalen (2003) 56 NSWLR 454 at [45]–[48]; or where the identification is based on a technology such as DNA profiling: Fleming v R [2009] NSWCCA 233; or where the identification is of an object: cf cases at n 207 below. 205. See further at 4.62–4.65 for discussion of factors relevant to the warning required. 206. The uniform legislation definition of ‘identification evidence’ as limited to identification of the accused. Under the Jury Directions Act 2015, ‘identification evidence’ and the directions required expressly extend to any person and to objects (s 35) and may be requested by prosecution or defence (s 36). It has been held that the common law warning extends to where the identification of other persons is crucial to the prosecution case: R v Stott (2000) 116 A Crim R 15 (SC (Qld)) (prosecution evidence of identification of deceased through a single photograph admitted subject to cross-examination and

appropriate warning). It has also been held at common law that where an accused calls identification evidence by way of defence a warning may be given provided appropriate instructions are also given about the burden of proof: R v Johnson (2004) 89 SASR 294; [2004] SASC 241 at [90]. Note that under the uniform legislation, warnings may be requested under s 165(1)(b) where the evidence is not specified but can be nevertheless regarded as ‘of a kind that may be unreliable’: see 4.54. 207. At common law, where it is not a person being identified, but a relevant object, it has been held that no special guidelines exist for directions: see R v Browning (1992) 94 Cr App R 109; R v Pfennig (No 1) (1992) 57 SASR 507 at 511–12 (Cox J) (approved by the CCA at (1993) 60 SASR 271 at 299 (Duggan J) (no special warning in respect of sound of accused’s car)). But in R v Clout (1995) 41 NSWLR 312 at 320–1, Kirby J suggests the same approach should be taken to the identification of objects where that identification is a major issue; see also R v Crupi (1995) 86 A Crim R 229 at 241 (CCA (Vic)); R v Theos (1996) 89 A Crim R 486 at 494–5 (Tadgell JA) (distinguished in Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 105 where object not ‘identified’); R v Lowe (1997) 98 A Crim R 300 at 314–18 (Hunt CJ at CL); R v Kotzmann [1999] 2 VR 123 at [68]–[69] (opinion of witness as to identity of an object in a photograph not identification evidence, cf handwriting evidence); R v Cavkic (No 2) (2009) 28 VR 341; [2009] VSCA 43 (Domican warning not required in respect of evidence of similarities without positive identification between weapon seen before killing and weapon found in accused’s possession after the killing). The required directions under the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) extend to the identification of objects; and the uniform legislation provides that a warning may be requested under s 165(1)(b) if the evidence is regarded as ‘of a kind that may be unreliable’: see 4.54. 208. It is now common for accused to be identified from photographs or videos taken by security cameras installed at the scene of the crime: see, for example, R v Palmer (1981) 1 NSWLR 209; R v Goodall [1982] VR 33; R v Smith (1983) 33 SASR 558; R v Theos (1996) 89 A Crim R 486; Smith v R (2001) 206 CLR 650. Sound recordings of telephone calls can similarly be used to identify the caller: see, for example, Chedzey v R (1987) 30 A Crim R 451 (CCA (WA)). In such cases the jury may, in appropriate circumstances and with appropriate expert assistance and appropriate directions, make a direct comparison of photographs/CCTV images or voices for itself: see generally Bulejcik v R (1996) 185 CLR 375 (recording used for comparison should generally be tendered); Smith v R (2001) 206 CLR 650 at [10]–[16]; Nguyen v R (2002) 26 WAR 59; [2002] WASCA 181; R v Solomon (2005) 92 SASR 331; [2005] SASC 265; Nguyen v R (2007) 180 A Crim R 267; [2007] NSWCCA 363; Latorre v R (2012) 226 A Crim R 319; [2012] VSCA 280 (voice); R v Dastagir (2013) 118 SASR 83; [2013] SASCFC 109 (CCTV images); Haddara v R [2014] VSCA 100 (voices). In Korgbara v R (2007) 71 NSWLR 187; [2007] NSWCCA 84, a majority affirmed the trial judge permitting a jury to undertake its own cross-lingual comparison without expert assistance of two recorded voices, one speaking in English and the other in the Nigerian dialect of Igbo. Forms of expert assistance include facial mapping: R v Stockwell (1993) 97 Cr App R 260; R v Murdoch (No 4) (2005) 195 FLR 421; [2005] NTSC 78; affirmed Murdoch v R (2007) 167 A Crim R 329; [2007] NTCCA 1 at [290]; R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; [2006] NSWCCA 167 at [146]; R v Dastagir (2013) 224 A Crim R 570; [2013] SASC 26; ruling upheld (2013) 118 SASR 83; [2013] SASCFC 109; Honeysett v R (2014) 253 CLR 122; [2014] HCA 29; voice comparison: R v Gilmore [1977] 2 NSWLR 935; R v McHardie [1983] 2 NSWLR 733; Li v R (2003) 139 A Crim R 281; [2003] NSWCCA 290 at [106]; Kheir v R [2014] VSCA 200; Tran and Chang v R [2016] VSCA 79; Morgan v R [2016] NSWCCA 25 (ad hoc police expert); footprint comparison: R v Sica [2014] 2 Qd R 168; [2013] QCA 247 (admitted only to establish that evidence did not exclude the possibility that the footprint was that of the accused); Meade v R [2015] VSCA 171 at [208]–[219] (expert opinion regarding identification of brand of boot worn by accused seen on CCTV footage). On the admissibility and reliability of these often ad hoc expert opinions, see further 7.56. 209. (2001) 208 CLR 593 at [53]. Note that in the same case Kirby J (at [167]) and Hayne J (at [217]–[219]) express a wariness of these terms but as long as they are regarded as only descriptive and not as formal

legal categories their use is convenient. 210. That evidence of similarity is admissible circumstantial evidence is uncontroversial: Murphy v R (1994) 62 SASR 121; R v Sparkes (1996) 88 A Crim R 194 at 207–8; R v Clune (No 2) [1996] 1 VR 1 (may support conviction when combined with other circumstantial evidence); R v Brownlowe (1987) 7 NSWLR 461 (evidence of similarity of voice admissible circumstantial evidence). But alone it cannot support conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In Pitkin v R (1995) 130 ALR 35, testimony that a photograph ‘looks like the person’ was not unambiguous evidence of recognition that could itself support a verdict of guilt beyond reasonable doubt (applied in Murray v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 18; R v Gould (2014) 243 A Crim R 205; [2014] QCA 164); nor is the matter taken further if a number of witnesses merely so testify: R v Clune (No 2) [1996] 1 VR 1 at 4. 211. Ultimately the jury must decide whether it accepts the testimony of an eyewitness as positive evidence of identity (recognition) or as evidence of mere similarity, and its attention may have to be drawn to this: R v Turner (2000) 76 SASR 163 at [17]–[20] (Doyle CJ); R v Fahad (2004) 146 A Crim R 169; [2004] VSCA 28 at [21]. In the case of ‘identification evidence’ presented by forensic experts a recent preference to limit such evidence to ‘similarity’ rather than positive identification in R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681 seems to have been influenced by United States v Llera Plaza II 188 F Supp 2d 549 (2002). For analysis of the curious Llera Plaza reversal, see Cole, ‘Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Ruling from Jennings to Llera Plaza and Back Again’ (2004) 41 Am Crim LR 1189; and on the limits of individualisation, see Cole, ‘Forensics Without Uniqueness, Conclusions Without Individualization: The New Epistemology of Forensic Identification’ (2009) 8 Law, Prob & Risk 233. 212. McHugh J in Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 563 at [55], referring to Domican v R (1992) 173 CLR 555 at 561–2. 213. McHugh J in Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 563 at [57]–[62], referring to R v King (1975) 12 SASR 404; R v Bartels (1986) 44 SASR 260 at 272–4 (Johnston J); R v Marijancevic (1993) 70 A Crim R 272 at 278 (Brooking J) (circumstantial evidence of identity); R v Benz (1989) 168 CLR 110 (discussed by Wells, ‘Principles of Evidence and the Benz Case’ (1992) 8 Aust Bar Rev 255 at 259–60); R v Cavkic (No 2) (2009) 28 VR 341; [2009] VSCA 43 (Domican warning not required in respect of evidence of similarities between weapon seen before killing and weapon found in accused’s possession after the killing). But cf R v Preston (2013) 116 SASR 522; [2013] SASCFC 69 at [38]–[39] (Crown conceding — ‘properly’ — that Domican warning required where a circumstantial identification). In R v Zullo [1993] 2 Qd R 572 at 578, the CCA (Qld) refused to follow King, requiring a warning where the witness said he saw ‘a man in a red shirt’ stab the victim, but McHugh J in Festa at [61] declares this decision wrong. 214. Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 563 at [65]. 215. See generally Carracher, ‘Voice Identification Evidence’ (1993) 10 Aust Bar Rev 75; Ormerod, ‘Sounds Familiar? — Voice Identification Evidence’ [2001] Crim LR 595; ‘Sounding Out Expert Voice Identification’ [2002] Crim LR 771; Rose, Forensic Speaker Identification, CRC, London, 2002; Edmond, Martire and San Roque, ‘Unsound Law: Issues with (“Expert”) Voice Comparison Evidence’ (2011) 35 Melb ULR 52; Singh, ‘Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodies? Should Justice Beware? A Review of Voice Identification Evidence in Light of Advances in Biometric Voice Identification Technology’ (2015) 11 ICE 1. 216. R v E J Smith [1984] 1 NSWLR 462; R v E J Smith (1987) 7 NSWLR 444; R v Brownlowe (1987) 7 NSWLR 461; R v Brotherton (1992) 29 NSWLR 95. In R v Adler (2000) 52 NSWLR 451, the CCA held that the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) had implicitly abolished any threshhold tests there may have been for the admissibility of voice identification evidence so that, once relevant, exclusion is only possible under ss 135, 137, 138: R v Riscuta and Niga [2003] NSWCCA 6 at [34] (Heydon JA); Li v R (2003) 139 A Crim R 281; [2003] NSWCCA 290 at [61]–[62]; R v Madigan [2005] NSWCCA 170 at

[92]–[94]; Miller v R [2015] NSWCCA 206 at [56]. Voice similarity evidence is treated in the same way: for example, in R v Evans (2007) 235 CLR 521; [2007] HCA 59, some members of the High Court thought it appropriate to enable a jury to use witnesses’ fairly vague recollections of an armed robber’s voice (for example, ‘slow’, ‘slurred’ and ‘dull’) to evaluate the accused’s voice during his testimony as part of the process of identification. 217. South Australia: R v Bueti and Morrissey (1997) 70 SASR 370 at 380 (Doyle CJ); Tasmania: Greaves v Aikman (1994) 74 A Crim R 370 at 378–9 (Cox J); High Court: Bulejcik v R (1996) 185 CLR 375 at 382–3 (Brennan CJ), 405–7 (McHugh and Gummow JJ), cf Toohey and Gaudron JJ who at 394–5 demand familiarity or ‘something about the voice at the crime scene to sufficiently embed it in the witness’s memory’; Victoria: R v Hentschel [1988] VR 362; R v Harris (No 3) [1990] VR 310; R v Callaghan (2001) 4 VR 79; R v Ong (2007) 176 A Crim R 366; [2007] VSCA 206 at [19]–[20]; Western Australia: Neville v R (2004) 145 A Crim R 108; [2004] WASCA 62 at [42]–[43] (Miller J), [89]–[90] (EM Heenan J); ACT: R v Omar (1992) 58 A Crim R 139 at 146–7 (Miles CJ); R v Miladinovic (1992) 60 A Crim R 206 at 210–11 (Miles CJ), but cf Full Court, Miladinovic v R (1993) 47 FCR 190 at 195–6. 218. [1990] VR 310. See also R v Miladinovic (1992) 60 A Crim R 206 at 210–11 (Miles CJ). And a witness, familiar with a suspect’s voice through constant hearing of it, does not have to be formally classified as an expert to be able to testify: Kheir v R (2014) 43 VR 308; [2014] VSCA 200 (informer who had intercepted many calls able to identify caller under s 78 of the uniform legislation). 219. (1996) 185 CLR 375. See also, for example, R v Bueti and Morrissey (1999) 70 SASR 370 at 380–3. 220. R v Miladinovic (1992) 60 A Crim R 206 at 210–11 (Miles CJ in admitting testimony identifying the voice on a tape although the witness had listened to no other tapes); Li v R (2003) 139 A Crim R 281; [2003] NSWCCA 290 at [58]–[60] (Ipp JA). See also LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [1445]; and voice identification cases in n 294 below. Voice ‘parades’ have, however, been used: R v Callaghan [2001] VSCA 209 at [9]; Nolan, ‘A Recent Voice Parade’ (2003) 10 Int’l J Speech, Lang & Law 277. See also R v Leung and Wong [1999] NSWCCA 287; R v Camilleri (2001) 127 A Crim R 290; R v Gao [2003] NSWCCA 390; R v Riscuta and Niga [2003] NSWCCA 6; R v El-Kheir [2004] NSWCCA 461. 221. It is unlikely that human beings could identify through smell in other than exceptional circumstances. But sniffer dogs are trained to so identify: see generally Taslitz, ‘A Practitioner’s Guide to Dog Scent Line-ups’ [1992] Crim Law Bull 218. In R v Benecke (1999) 106 A Crim R 282, an appeal succeeded as although a handler’s ‘expert’ evidence of the dog’s ‘testimony’ was potentially admissible in the case at hand, it should have been excluded as irrelevant or prejudicial or at least strong cautionary directions given about it. See also Muldoon v R [2008] NSWCCA 315. 222. R v Adler [2000] NSWCCA 357 at [35]–[36] (Heydon J); AK v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 438; 243 ALR 409; [2008] HCA 8 at [66]–[68] (Heydon J). 223. See McHugh J in Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 563 at [56]. 224. (2008) 232 CLR 438; 243 ALR 409; [2008] HCA 8 at [66]–[75] (Heydon J). 225. (2008) 182 A Crim R 253; [2008] NSWCCA 62. See also Haije v R [2006] NSWCCA 23 at [86]–[88] (Simpson J); DPP v Bass [2016] VSCA 110 at [38]–[50] (the court). 226. See, for example, the special issue on cross-racial identification, (2001) 7 Psych, Pub Policy & Law; and Wells, Memon and Penrod, ‘Eyewitness Evidence: Improving its Probative Value’ (2006) 7 Psych Sci in the Public Interest 45. Cf R v Dodd [2002] NSWCCA 418 at [31]; R v Inamata (2003) 137 A Crim R 510; R v Carr [2005] NSWCCA 439 at [30] (Hodgson JA). 227. See the reports referred to at n 197. Considerable psychological research has been undertaken into evidence of identification. On the reliability of testimony generally, see Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony, Harvard University Press, New York, 1979 (now Loftus and Doyle, Eyewitness Testimony: Civil and

Criminal, 4th ed, LexisNexis, Newark NJ, 2007); Wells and Loftus (eds), Eyewitness Testimony, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984; Lloyd-Bostock and Clifford (eds), Evaluating Witness Evidence, John Wiley & Sons, London, 1983; Brewer, Weber and Semmler, ‘Eyewitness Identification’ in Brewer and Williams (eds), Psychology and the Law, Guildford Press, New York, 2005 Ch 6; Lindsay, Ross, Read and Toglia (eds), The Handbook of Eyewitness Psychology (Vol 1, Memory for Events; Vol 2, Memory for People), Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah NJ, 2007. And see references to psychological research on identification testimony in Coyle, Field and Miller, ‘The Blindness of the Eye-Witness’ (2008) 82 Aust LJ 471; Roberts, ‘Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Procedural Developments and the Ends of Adjudicative Accuracy’ (2009) 6 ICE, Iss 2, Art 3, nn 23–8 (at ); Cutler (ed), Expert Testimony on the Psychology of Eyewitness Identification, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009; and in Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244. For a somewhat sceptical view of psychological research, see Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, Ch 15. 228. Compare with the remarks of Evatt and McTiernan JJ in Craig v R (1933) 49 CLR 429 at 446. See Burton and Jenkins, ‘Unfamiliar Face Perception’ in Calder et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Face Perception, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011; White et al, ‘Passport Officers’ Errors in Face Matching’ (2014) 9(8) PLoS ONE e103510; Burton, ‘Why Has Research in Face Recognition Progressed So Slowly? The Importance of Variability’ (2013) 66 Qtly J Experimental Psych 1467; Kemp, Towell and Pike, ‘When Seeing Should Not Be Believing: Photographs, Credit Cards and Fraud’ (1997) 11 Applied Cognitive Psych 211; Davis and Valentine (eds), Forensic Facial Identification: Theory and Practice of Identification from Eyewitnesses, Composites and CCTV, Wiley, Chichester, 2015. 229. See Wells and Quinlivan, ‘Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later’ (2009) 33 Law & Hum Behav 1. 230. For example, Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593. This resembles an example used by the majority in IMM v R [2016] HCA 14 at [50]. 231. Other legislation enacting recognition regimes for police include Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 3ZM–3ZQ; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) ss 233–237; Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) s 617; and Police Powers and Responsibilities Regulations 2000 (Qld) Sch 10 Pt 6 Divs 1, 2, 3. Police standing orders may also regulate the procedures for recognition: see Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 563 at [156], [247], where Kirby J and Callinan J refer to the procedures of the Queensland Police Operational Procedures Manual which are given the force of law by virtue of s 4.9 of the Police Service Administration Act 1990 (Qld). Compare with AG (Tas) v Wright (2013) 22 Tas R 322; [2013] TASCCA 14, where in answer to a specific question it was held that failure to comply with recommended identification procedures in a police manual was not ‘a breach of Australian law’ for the purposes of s 138 as the text specified with particularity (by enclosed boxes) what were orders obliging obeyance. 232. (1992) 173 CLR 555. See also Davies v R (1937) 57 CLR 170; Kelleher v R (1974) 131 CLR 534; Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 (Gibbs CJ, Mason and Aickin JJ, with only Stephen and Murphy JJ dissenting being prepared to lay down mandatory guidelines for trial judges); Bromley v R (1986) 161 CLR 315. 233. For example, R v Burchielli [1981] VR 611. R v Williams [1983] 2 VR 579 at 585–6 disapproved of this case insofar as it suggested a definitive list of matters to be canvassed, as did R v Haidley and Alford [1984] VR 229, where it is emphasised that, ultimately, individual circumstances are decisive. Things are compounded where ‘identification’ evidence is based on expert or ad hoc expert opinion: see 7.56. 234. R v Preston [1961] VR 761; R v Goode [1970] SASR 69; R v Maarroui (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 757; R v Harris (1971) 1 SASR 447; R v Harm (1975) 13 SASR 84; Sutton v R [1978] WAR 94; R v Easom (1981) 28 SASR 134; R v Burchielli [1981] VR 611; R v Aziz [1982] 2 NSWLR 322; R v Clune [1982]

VR 1; R v Manh (1983) 33 SASR 563; R v Dickson [1983] 1 VR 227; R v Williams [1983] 2 VR 579; R v Haidley and Alford [1984] VR 229; R v Bartels (1986) 44 SASR 260; R v Finn (1988) 34 A Crim R 425 (CCA (NSW)); R v Hayles (1990) 54 SASR 549; O’Neon v R (1991) 52 A Crim R 144 (CCA (WA)); Cicchino v R (1991) 54 A Crim R 358 (CCA (WA)). 235. R v Coe [2002] NSWCCA 385 at [73]–[87] (Dunford J); Cumberland v R [2006] NSWCCA 377 at [34]–[37] (McClellan CJ at CL). 236. (2001) 208 CLR 593 at [26] (Gleeson CJ). 237. (1993) 66 A Crim R 210 at 217–19 (CCA (Vic)). See also the same court’s decisions in R v Alexandridis (1994) 76 A Crim R 391 (direction undermined by comments favourable to the prosecution); R v Crupi (1996) 86 A Crim R 229 at 243 (warning adequate). 238. [2000] 1 Qd R 640 at [23], [58]. 239. See further R v Clarke (1997) 97 A Crim R 414 at 422–8 (Hunt CJ at CL), 431–2 (Smart J), 433 (Howie AJ); Ilioski v R [2006] NSWCCA 164 at [62]–[63] (Hunt AJA); Gardiner v R (2006) 162 A Crim R 233; [2006] NSWCCA 190 at [75]–[79]; Aslett v R [2009] NSWCCA 188 at [69]–[76]; Braslin v Tasmania [2011] TASCCA 14 at [34]–[35] (voice identification). Clarke (Hunt CJ at CL at 427–8, Smart J at 432) also emphasises that there is no requirement for a judge to direct in terms of the ‘danger’ of convicting on identification evidence.

240. (2003) 217 CLR 1 at [22] (Gleeson CJ and Hayne J), [92]–[94] (Callinan J). Applied in Clifford v R (2004) 12 Tas R 415 (only issue was whether the accused, who admitted his presence, had struck the victim); and Mouroufas v R [2007] NSWCCA 58 at [31]–[34] (only the honesty of the witnesses was challenged, not whether their identification of the accused might have been mistaken). Section 116 is not concerned with honesty: Ilioski v R [2006] NSWCCA 164 at [98]–[99] (Hunt AJA). 241. R v Finn (1988) 34 A Crim R 425 (CCA (NSW)); R v Hayles (1990) 54 SASR 549; R v Vincec (1990) 50 A Crim R 203 (CCA (Vic)); R v Bigeni (1990) 47 A Crim R 363 (CCA (NSW)); O’Neon v R (1991) 52 A Crim R 144 (CCA (WA)). 242. The cases of R v Turnbull [1977] QB 224 (followed by the Privy Council in Junior Reid v R [1990] 1 AC 363) and R v Burchielli [1981] VR 611 contain useful catalogues of these factors, although they are in no way definitive. See more generally the learned discussion of Peek J in Strauss v Police (2013) 115 SASR 90; [2013] SASC 3 at [17]–[30], canvassing psychological literature and variety of factors canvassed in authorities at n 234. R v Williams [1983] 2 VR 579 at 585–6 asserts that the previous decision in Burchielli referred to over 50 relevant factors and that it would be absurd to require mandatory warning on each of these factors in every case. 243. Kelleher v R (1974) 131 CLR 534 at 551 (Gibbs J); R v Turnbull [1977] QB 224 at 228; R v Burchielli [1981] VR 611 at 620–1; R v Clune [1982] VR 1; Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593 at [218] (Hayne J); Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244 at [12]. 244. Wells and Loftus, n 227 above, p 101; National Research Council, n 199 above; Wells, Lindsay and Ferguson, ‘Accuracy, Confidence and Juror Perceptions in Eye-Witness Identification’ (1979) 64 J App Psych 440; Scogin, Calhoon and D’Errico, ‘Eyewitness Confidence and Accuracy Among Three Age Cohorts’ (1994) 13 J Applied Gerontology 172; Brewer and Wells, ‘The Confidence-Accuracy Relationship in Eyewitness Identification: Effects of Lineup Instructions, Foil Similarity, and TargetAbsent Base Rates’ (2006) 12 J Experimental Psych: Applied 11. Interestingly, the confidence of witnesses frequently increases over time, particularly after they have made an initial identification during a parade or photo array. This phenomenon, which may be substantially influenced by post-identification reinforcement (or suggestion) from investigators, the decision to prosecute the particular accused, and through discussion with other witnesses or other psychological processes, is undesirable and could be reduced by allowing only a recording of the original identification to be played in court rather than have a witness re-cast their opinion months or years after the event. 245. Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department of the Departmental Committee on Evidence of Identification of Criminal Cases (1976), United Kingdom (The ‘Devlin Report’), p 81. One method advocated (in, for example, the South Australian Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee’s Second Report, Criminal Investigation (1972), pp 76–82) is to require comparison between the formal identification and a prior description of the suspect: see R v Finn (1988) 34 A Crim R 425 (CCA (NSW)), where a previous description proved important. The reform proposed is to compel the taking of such description and the disclosure of it to the defence. However, in Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244 at [68], [70], [120], following analysis of psychological research the CCA concluded that the processes of description and identification are not co-extensive, that a description is more likely to be inaccurate than an identification, and that therefore (at [120]): ‘A trial judge is not, as a general rule, required to direct a jury that discrepancies between a description given by a witness and the appearance of the person identified by the witness may suggest that the identification is unreliable’. Compare with discussion of Peek J in Strauss v Police (2013) 115 SASR 90; [2013] SASC 3 at [46]–[55]. 246. Mills v Western Australia (2008) 189 A Crim R 411; [2008] WASCA 219 at [5] (McLure JA), [73] (Buss JA); Omar v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 198 at [42] (Buss JA). Although the use of ‘recognition’ as evidence of fact and eyewitness identification evidence as opinion is not used consistently by courts. Cf

R v Palmer [1981] 1 NSWLR 209, 210–13; R v Smith (1999) 47 NSWLR 419; [1999] NSWCCA 317; R v Drollett [2005] NSWCCA 356. 247. R v Goode [1970] SASR 69; R v Easom (1981) 28 SASR 134 at 144 (Wells J); Gardiner v R (2006) 162 A Crim R 233; [2006] NSWCCA 190 at [75] (McClellan CJ at CL). See also R v Laing [2008] QCA 317 at [37]–[40]; WSJ v R [2010] VSCA 339 at [15]. 248. Use of ‘recognition’ (or ‘description’) rather than ‘identification’ should not be used to circumvent the application of Pt 3.9 of the uniform legislation: Trudgett v R [2008] NSWCCA 62. See also Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593 at [54]–[56]; R v Dodd (2002) 135 A Crim R 32 at [16]–[31]; R v Fahad [2004] VSCA 28 at [21]; R v Hackett [2006] VSCA 138 at [36]. Cf Collins v R [2006] NSWCCA 162 at [60]– [61] (Simpson J). 249. [1977] QB 224 at 228. 250. See also Arthurs v Attorney-General (Northern Ireland) (1971) 55 Cr App R 161; R v Tran [2000] 2 Qd R 430 at [5]–[6]. 251. Mills v Western Australia [2008] WASC 219 at [7], [25] (McLure JA in dissent), [73]–[91] (Buss JA), [123]–[129] (Murray JA). 252. (2006) 13 VR 225; 161 A Crim R 13 at [25]–[30]. 253. (2008) 182 A Crim R 253; [2008] NSWCCA 62 at [19]–[33] (Spigelman CJ). 254. Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244 at [14]. 255. For example, in R v Manh (1983) 33 SASR 563 at 573, Mitchell ACJ stated that the trial judge should have emphasised the drunkenness of all concerned, including the identification witness. See also R v Goode [1970] SASR 69 at 81; R v Murphy [2000] NSWCCA 297 (Kirby J). Cf Mitchell v R [2008] NSWCCA 275 at [20]–[31] (Hodgson JA). In Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244 at [87], [120], the CCA held, following discussion of psychological literature, that the effects of stress are so uncertain that ‘[a] trial judge is not required as a general rule to direct a jury that “stress” is a factor that may make a witness identification suspect’. In R v Nguyen [2000] NSWCCA 285 at [25], Kirby J refers to the dangers of a person of one race identifying someone from a different race and the need to bring this to the jury’s attention; see also Carr v R [2005] NSWCCA 439 at [30]; R v Namie [2011] QCA 304 at [38], but cf R v Inamata (2003) 137 A Crim R 510; [2003] NSWCCA 19 at [35]. Similar issues arise in relation to audibility and aural identification: see, for example, R v El-Kheir [2004] NSWCCA 461; Korgbara v R (2007) 170 A Crim R 568. 256. Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395; R v Burchielli [1981] VR 61l; R v Clune [1982] VR 1; R v Goodall [1982] VR 33; R v Williams [1983] 2 VR 579; R v Haidley and Alford [1984] VR 229; R v Deering (1986) 43 SASR 252; R v Shannon (1987) 47 SASR 347; R v Hayles (1990) 54 SASR 549; R v Tugaga (1994) 74 A Crim R 190 (CCA (NSW)). 257. R v Williams [1983] 2 VR 579; R v Thomason (1999) 139 ACTR 21; R v Story (2004) 144 A Crim R 370; [2004] SASC 32 (warning in respect of on-the-spot identification sufficient). But cf Powers v R [2000] NTCCA 2, where the circumstances of an allegedly spontaneous recognition in the vicinity of the court two-and-a-half years after the offence raised serious doubts about the reliability of the identification. 258. Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244 at [120]. 259. It might be pointed out that suggestion can be made in other ways. A witness might be influenced to identify a particular suspect by community gossip, or by pressure from victims or their families, or by the police. That the risk of suggestion requires canvassing in any warning is emphasised in Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244 at [13]. 260. Davies v R (1937) 57 CLR 170 at 181; R v Burchielli [1981] VR 611.

261. R v Howick [1970] Crim LR 403 describes an identification for the first time in the dock as usually unfair; see also R v Pollitt (1990) 51 A Crim R 227 (CCA (Vic)); Dawson v R (1990) 2 WAR 458; Jokic v Hayes (1990) 53 SASR 530. Other courts approach such evidence only on the basis of potential unreliability: see R v John [1973] Crim LR 113; Grbic v Pitkethly (1992) 38 FCR 95; R v Demeter [1995] 2 Qd R 626 (dock identifications acceptable where there was other evidence of identification); R v Clark (1996) 91 A Crim R 46 at 52 (Cox J approving of a dock identification in addition to a previous identification by the witness); R v Jamal (2000) 116 A Crim R 45 (FCA) (dock identification following photographic identification admissible); R v Stanley [2004] NSWCCA 278 at [21]–[27]; Al-Hashimi v R (2004) 181 FLR 383; [2004] WASCA 61 (dock identification admitted, with appropriate warnings, where clear observation of accused); R v Evan (2006) 175 A Crim R 1; [2006] QCA 527 (insufficient warning about dangers of dock identification); R v Curtis [2009] SASC 266 (dock identification of person previously known to the accused admitted); R v Preston (2013) 116 SASR 522; [2013] SASCFC 69 (dock identification following failure to positively identify from photo-board of no value and should have been excluded). There is no rule that a verdict will inevitably be set aside where the only identification of a person previously unknown to the witness is through a single confrontation, for example, in the dock: R v Williams [1983] 2 VR 579 at 583–4. 262. R v Burchielli [1981] VR 611; Phelps v Gothachalkenin [1996] Qd R 503 (identification admitted where suspect brought to complainant by security officer soon after assault); R v Kelly (2002) 129 A Crim R 363; [2002] WASCA 134 (aggravated theft and assault alleged against driver of stolen car; soon after crime police officer witness confronted by and identified one of two occupants as the driver and also testified, as photographs confirmed, that driver wearing clothing distinctive from other occupant; conviction upheld); R v McDonald (2002) 128 A Crim R 228; [2002] ACTSC 39 (on-the-spot identification excluded); R v Story (2004) 144 A Crim R 370; [2004] SASC 32 (warning in respect of on-the-spot identification sufficient); Young v Lusted (2011) 20 Tas R 98; [2011] TASSC 22 (identification by police officer confronted with accused shortly after offence observed by him admitted). 263. Davies and Cody v R (1937) 57 CLR 170; Wood v R (2012) 84 NSWLR 581; [2012] NSWCCA 21 at [409]–[434] (McClellan CJ at CL holding warnings essentially sufficient where identification following showing of single photo admitted without objection). In R v Stott (2000) 116 A Crim R 15, Byrne J admitted evidence of the identification of the deceased from a single photograph. 264. R v Lam (2001) 121 A Crim R 272 at [57]–[63] (CCA (Qld)). 265. R v Hayles (1990) 54 SASR 549. 266. But this does not necessarily require all participants in the parade to have the same racial origins as the suspected accused: R v To (2002) 131 A Crim R 264 (CCA (NSW)) (majority of Koreans in parade in which Vietnamese accused recognised did not affect the integrity of the parade where the subtleties in racial origin did not apparently influence the identifying witnesses). On the other hand, to conduct a (successful) identification parade of men only after the witness has described the offender as a woman may lead to exclusion on grounds of suggestion and undue police influence: R v Kostic (2004) 151 A Crim R 10; [2004] SASC 406 at [33]–[35] (Bleby J). Line-up participants should be selected using the description of the perpetrator (rather than the suspect). See Wells et al, ‘The Selection of Distractors of Eyewitness Lineups’ (1993) 78 J App Psych 835. 267. See Roberts, n 227 above, at 10–13 (at ) and the literature referred to therein; Wells et al, A Test of the Simultaneous vs. Sequential Line-up Methods, American Judicature Society, Des Moines, 2011. 268. Code D of the Codes of Practice issued under s 66 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (UK). The use, and advantages, of a digi-board to identify accused is discussed and endorsed as a procedure no less reliable than an identification parade in Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR

159; [2007] WASCA 244 at [47]–[56], [120]. Cf Perry v New Hampshire 565 US 228 (2012). 269. Uniform legislation s 114; Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 3ZM–3ZQ; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) ss 233–237; Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) s 617; and Police Powers and Responsibilities Regulations 2000 (Qld) Sch 10 Pt 6 Div 2. It may be arguable that an ‘identification parade’, although it requires a live viewing, may include a sequential viewing. 270. (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244 at [57]–[62]. 271. Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395; R v Mendoza [2007] VSCA 120; Dupas v R (2012) 40 VR 182; [2012] VSCA 328; R v Crawford (2015) 123 SASR 353; [2015] SASCFC 112; Dickman v R [2015] VSCA 311; Bayley v R [2016] VSCA 160. The risks, as Penfold J explained in R v D [2008] ACTSC 82 at [53]–[56], may be particularly high where the witness is known to the person identified. Cf R v Taylor [2008] ACTSC 52 at [28]–[30] (Rares J). 272. See Wells and Loftus, n 227 above, pp 142–4; Clarke v R (1993) 71 A Crim R 58 at 66 (CCA (NSW), Badgery-Parker J) (evidence of subsequent identification parade should not have been admitted); R v Marshall (2000) 113 A Crim R 190 (CCA (NSW)) (subsequent identification parade did not cure dangers resulting from witness being shown single photographs of accused and all identification evidence excluded under s 137 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)). Significantly, influential work by Loftus and colleagues explores the creation and resilience of false memories stimulated by investigator cues: Loftus and Pickrell, ‘The Formation of False Memories’ (1995) 25 Psychiatric Annals 720; Loftus, ‘Memory Distortion and False Memory Creation’ (1996) 24 Bull Am Acad of Psychiatry & Law 281; Laney et al, ‘The Persistence of False Beliefs’ (2008) 129 Acta Psychologica 190; Morris, Laney, Bernstein and Loftus, ‘Susceptibility to Memory Distortion: How Do We Decide it Has Occurred?’ (2006) Am J Psych 119; Bernstein and Loftus, ‘How to Tell if a Particular Memory is True or False’ (2009) 4 Perspectives on Psych Science 370. 273. Similarly, a later line-up can do little to ameliorate the risks inherent in an identification from a series of photographs: Roser v R (2001) 24 WAR 254 at [79]–[84]. A fortiori a dock identification cannot overcome the deficiencies of a previous photo-board identification and the jury must be so directed: R v Evan (2006) 175 A Crim R 1; [2006] QCA 527 at [63]–[64]. 274. In R v Sparrow (2009) 104 SASR 120, the CCA refused, in the particular circumstances, to interfere with the trial judge’s exercise of discretion not to exclude identification following a photographic parade where a computer program was used to impose the accused’s moustache on each photograph. 275. The risk is less where a parade occurs following the witness’s preparation of an identikit or computergenerated image of the offender: R v Darwiche (2006) 166 A Crim R 28; [2006] NSWSC 924 at [36]– [38] (Bell J in refusing to exclude under s 137 of the uniform legislation evidence of a photographic parade following creation of a computer-generated image — a ‘com-fit image’). In Wimbridge v Western Australia [2009] WASCA 196, the court held there was no requirement to warn the jury of a possible displacement effect where a digi-board identification had followed shortly after the compilation of a computer image. 276. Sometimes the circumstances of the first identification are beyond police control, as in R v Murdoch (No 1) (2005) 195 FLR 362; [2005] NTSC 75, where the witness identified the accused after accessing an article about the crime on the internet, not knowing there would be an image of the suspect on it. This evidence and its confirmation through a photo-board identification (the accused appearing bearded rather than clean-shaven as in the internet image) and a (formal) dock identification was held admissible. See also rulings in R v Carroll (2013) 234 A Crim R 233; [2013] NSWSC 1031; R v Kearney (2013) 118 SASR 335; [2013] SASCFC 148 (witnesses identified accused when shown Facebook photos at a party; confirmed by identification at photo line-up; evidence admissible); R v Crawford (2015) 123 SASR 353; [2015] SASCFC 112 (witness identified accused on Facebook after being told name of suspect by police; later confirmed at photo line-up; initial identification went to weight, no ground for

exclusionary discretion, directions extensive and appropriate); cf Strauss v Police (2013) 115 SASR 90; [2013] SASC 3 (Facebook identifications not confirmed by line-up or previous description and magistrate’s reasons for decision expressed no warning about the dangers of misidentification; problems arising from Facebook contamination discussed by Peek J at [31]–[37]). 277. In R v Lambert (2000) 111 A Crim R 564 at [10] (CCA (Qld)), the court said although the series of photographs should generally meet the verbal description given by the witness this is not a dogmatic requirement and any discrepancies may be dealt with through appropriate direction. Cf R v Kostic (2004) 151 A Crim R 10; [2004] SASC 406 at [33]–[35] (Bleby J) (identification of accused from identification parade of men excluded after the witness had described the offender as a woman). Procedures for identifying a suspect from photographs are often strictly controlled by police to ensure that the risks in such processes here discussed are so far as possible eliminated. See, for example, the strict procedure for using digi-boards as described in Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244 at [31]–[37]. 278. Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244 at [38]–[46]; see also at [48]: ‘Where a digiboard is used, it would therefore be desirable, in our view, that the judge generally warn the jury that they should take into account the fact that the digiboard is a static and two-dimensional image’. However, the court, after referring to the scientific literature and advantages of the digi-board procedure refused (at [55]–[56]) to regard that particular procedure as less reliable than an identification parade and requiring a warning to that effect. 279. These risks may be mitigated where police make a video record of the photographic identification: R v Penny (1997) 91 A Crim R 288 (CCA (WA)); Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244 at [37]. Such a record is required of identification parades under, for example, the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 3ZM(6)(l); Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 233(6)(l); if reasonably practicable, for all identification procedures under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Regulation 2000 (Qld) cl 45(3); and under the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34AB(2). 280. Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 400–1 (Gibbs CJ), 409 (Stephen J). Although recognising the need for photographic identification, the need to scrutinise such identifications carefully is emphasised by the High Court in Pitkin v R (1995) 130 ALR 35 at 38–9. 281. Dawson v R (1990) 2 WAR 458 (judge adequately directed the jury to ignore rogues’ gallery effect); R v Campbell (2007) 175 A Crim R 79; [2007] VSCA 189 (directions in respect of photo-board identification adequate). 282. R v Griffiths [1930] VLR 204 and R v Martin [1956] VLR 87 both held a warning sufficient. In R v Doyle [1967] VR 698, the showing to the jury of a photograph of the accused in prison garb caused the conviction to be quashed. In R v Hayles (1990) 54 SASR 549, a photographic identification parade organised by an investigating police officer who was himself a witness was regarded as raising such a conflict of interest as to require discretionary exclusion. 283. (1981) 145 CLR 395. 284. This assumes the identification parade produces more reliable results. In Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244 at [55]–[56], the court, after referring to the scientific literature and advantages of the digi-board procedure, refused to regard the procedure as less reliable than an identification parade and requiring a warning to that effect. 285. See, for example, R v Clune [1982] VR 81. Where an accused so declines this may be established by the prosecution to explain why an identification parade was not held even where the fairness of the identification process is not challenged: R v Davies (2005) 11 VR 314; [2005] VSCA 90 at [8]–[12] (cf criticism of Odgers, n 20 above, at [EA.114.150]). As the accused has a right not to participate in an identification process the jury must also be directed to draw no adverse inference against an accused on account of such refusal: R v McCarthy and Ryan (1993) 71 A Crim R 395 at 404 (Hunt CJ at CL).

286. Following Davies v R (1937) 57 CLR 170. For examples of this same approach, see R v Pearsall (1990) 49 A Crim R 439 (CCA (NSW)); R v Murphy (1995) 85 A Crim R 286 (CCA (Qld)) (reluctant to lay down mandatory procedures for identification the court held a photo-board identification admissible and not productive of an unsafe verdict); R v Murray (1999) 108 A Crim R 430 (CCA (NSW)) (photographic identification created no risk that jury mistaken or misled); Roser v R (2001) 24 WAR 254 (no miscarriage of justice where photo-board identification and appropriate directions); R v Campbell (2007) 175 A Crim R 79; [2007] VSCA 189 (directions where photo-board identification discussed). See also dictum in Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244, quoted at n 278 above. 287. Applying this approach the majority (Kirby J disagreeing) in Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593 refused to exclude ‘court-house identifications’. Counsel did not invoke the public policy discretion. Judges are reluctant to remove issues of fact from a jury where, with appropriate direction, the jury is assumed capable itself of taking into account all relevant considerations in deciding whether to accept possibly unreliable evidence: R v Tugaga (1994) 74 A Crim R 190 at 193–6 (Hunt CJ at CL). See also Dupas v R (2012) 40 VR 182; [2012] VSCA 328, where identification evidence confirmed by seeing a newspaper photograph was held properly left to the jury. But cf Dickman v R [2015] VSCA 311 (Priest JA and Croucher JJA), Whelan JA dissenting arguing on totality of evidence there was no substantial miscarriage of justice. 288. See R v Burchielli [1981] VR 611, where McInerney and McGarvie JJ apply the wider discretion to an identification in the back of a car after the police had brought the suspect to the witness. McInerney J expressly mentions Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54, but refuses to find it necessary to consider the exercise of the discretion as he can decide the case on other grounds. McGarvie J explains the discretion only in terms of ‘fairness to the accused’ (R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133) and is prepared to exercise it to exclude the above identification: see also R v Deering (1986) 43 SASR 252. The nature of the fairness and public policy discretions is analysed at 2.26–2.37. Note that the discretion to hold a voir dire to determine the exclusion of identification testimony may be wider than where admissibility of a confession is in issue: R v Rowley (1986) 23 A Crim R 371 (CCA (Vic)). 289. R v Clune [1982] VR 1 (attempted identification parade after accused’s refusal to participate an unlawful use of detention following arrest and the trial judge should have given due weight to this in exercising the exclusionary discretion); R v Haidley and Alford [1984] VR 229 (not an unlawful use of detention to have the witness secretly pick out the accused while, with others on remand, he carried out his daily yard exercise; if it had been unlawful the identification would have had to be considered under Bunning v Cross principles); R v Shannon (1987) 47 SASR 347 (police acted illegally in moving the accused so that he could be identified and identification was excluded under Bunning v Cross), followed by Slicer J in R v Wright (1992) 60 A Crim R 215 (SC (Tas)). 290. R v Goodall [1982] VR 33. 291. R v Aziz [1982] 2 NSWLR 322. 292. R v Manh (1983) 33 SASR 563; R v Thomason [1999] 139 ACTR 21 at [17]. 293. In R v Haidley and Alford [1984] VR 229, the court followed R v Clune [1982] VR 1 in holding that, whereas an accused cannot be forced to participate in an identification parade, this does not give him or her a right not to be identified, and it is appropriate where an accused refuses to participate for a witness to secretly observe and identify the accused while otherwise lawfully in the remand yard with other prisoners awaiting trial. Where it is disclosed to the jury that the accused refused to participate in an identification parade the jury should be directed to draw no adverse inference from that refusal: R v McCarthy and Ryan (1993) 71 A Crim R 395 at 404 (Hunt CJ at CL). 294. Compare with the critical comments of Brooking J in R v Haidley and Alford [1984] VR 229 at 255. In R v Hamood (1987) 45 SASR 90, followed but distinguished by Slicer J in R v Wright (1992) 60 A Crim

R 215 (SC (Tas)), a parade held in the front bar of a local hotel was held to have resulted in no risk of injustice. Standing orders generally lay down procedures to be followed by police in conducting identification parades, but as Hamood shows, a failure to adhere to these precise procedures will not necessarily lead to the exclusion of the identification. In the case of identification by voice where voice parades are impractical if not impossible (the accused could easily disguise his or her voice), courts have sanctioned taking the witness to a place where a group of people including the accused will be speaking in a manner appropriate for impartial recognition. In each of the live (as opposed to taped) voice identification cases referred to in nn 216, 217, and in Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593 at [44], the accused’s voice was recognised when the witness was taken to other court proceedings in which the suspect was participating, and this was held an appropriate method of voice recognition notwithstanding its suggestive nature. See also R v Callaghan [2001] VSCA 209 at [9]. In R v Miladinovic (1992) 60 A Crim R 206 at 211, Miles CJ thought the equivalent of a parade unnecessary to identify fairly the voice on a tape. 295. (1986) 43 SASR 252. But King CJ refused to exclude the identification from a series of photographs as the suspicion against the accused at the time the witness was asked to identify was based more on hunch than evidence. See also R v Britten (1989) 51 SASR 567 and R v Clark (1996) 91 A Crim R 46 at 51 (Cox J), both of which involved photographic identification at an investigatory stage. Compare with the approach of the CCA (Qld) in R v Murphy (1995) 85 A Crim R 286 where, although recognising the desirability of parades, the court was reluctant to lay down mandatory guidelines. In DPP v DJC [2012] VSCA 132 (Neave and Bongiorno JJA), a prosecution interlocutory appeal against exclusion of a photoboard identification succeeded. 296. (1997) 91 A Crim R 288. Dicta supporting this approach can be found in Roser v R (2001) 24 WAR 254 at [11] (Malcolm CJ), [87] (Anderson J). See also R v Carusi (1997) 92 A Crim R 52 at 646 (Hunt CJ at CL). In R v Taousanis [2001] NSWSC 74 at [8] (Hidden J), failure to retain all the images from the photo array made it extremely difficult to assess the reliability of the process. Other courts have commented on the degree of similarity required between the witness’s description and the images: R v Skaf, Ghanem and Hajeid [2004] NSWCCA 74 at [117]–[127]. 297. (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244 at [55], [120]. 298. Exclusion under s 137 on the basis that probative value is outweighed by unfair prejudice may be handicapped by the definition of probative value as a rational potential and by IMM v R [2016] HCA 14, where the majority holds that probative value must be assessed upon the assumption that the evidence will be accepted by the jury: see, for example, R v Mundine (2008) 182 A Crim R 302; [2008] NSWCCA 55; MA v R [2011] VSCA 13; and discussion at 2.31. Where facts are not disputed House principles do not apply in Victoria and on appeal from conviction court may determine exercise of s 137 for itself: McCartney v R (2012) 226 A Crim R 274; [2012] VSCA 268; cf position in New South Wales: Taleb v R [2015] NSWCCA 105 at [84]; and see further at 2.26 nn 120–122. 299. Note that ss 113, 114 and 115 are not enacted in the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas). Exclusion may be granted under s 137, but only where unfair prejudice remains after the s 116 warning: see, for example, DPP v Lynch (2006) 16 Tas R 49; [2006] TASSC 89. 300. Walford v DPP (2012) 82 NSWLR 215; [2012] NSWCCA 290 (evidence of assertion of recognition made out of court at time of offending admissible without parade). Basten JA emphasising the need to be clear about the precise evidence and its identifying relevance in determining whether s 114 is satisfied. 301. See discussion in Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102, (2005), [13.93]–[13.109]. A jury making its own comparison between the accused and a photograph does not constitute ‘identification evidence’: cf R v Kirby [2000] NSWCCA 330 at [46]–[47] (Wood CJ at CL). See also Evans v R (2007) 235 CLR 521; [2007] HCA 59 at [231] (Heydon J: a ‘demonstration’ by the accused wearing apparel, walking

and speaking particular words, ultimately to infer identity with the offender not ‘identification evidence’ within the uniform legislation. The evidence was excluded as irrelevant (Gummow and Hayne JJ) and prejudicial (Kirby J) with Heydon and Crennan JJ dissenting: see further 2.23 and 7.23. 302. Cf observation of Basten JA in Walford v DPP (2012) 82 NSWLR 215; [2012] NSWCCA 290 at [13] that ‘a purposive construction required that the condition should be understood as having been satisfied where the identification occurred in the course of the identification parade’. 303. See, for example, R v Thomason (1999) 139 ACTR 21; R v Tahere [1999] NSWCCA 170 (change of circumstances made later parade reasonable); R v LeRoy and Graham [2000] NSWCCA 302 at [19] (logistical difficulties); R v McDonald (2002) 128 A Crim R 228 at [25] (on-the-spot identification); Ilioski v R [2006] NSWCCA 164 at [123] (suspect with facial injury incurred at time of crime); O’Meara v R [2006] NSWCCA 131 at [114]–[118] (Simpson J); R v D [2008] ACTSC [53]–[56] (suspect known to the witness and recognised offending); Walford v DPP (2012) 82 NSWLR 215; [2012] NSWCCA 290 (suspect known to witness observed committing crime); Peterson v R [2014] VSCA 111 at [46]–[49] (not reasonable to hold a parade after the victim had viewed images of the suspect on Facebook so s 114 not engaged). 304. See, for example, R v Duncan and Perre [2004] NSWCCA 431 at [176]–[196] (Wood CJ at CL). Section 3ZM(3), (4) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and s 233(4) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) require the refusal to be video-recorded or audio-recorded. 305. R v To (2002) 131 A Crim R 264; [2002] NSWCCA 247 at [29]–[32] (simply telling witness a suspect is in the parade not such influence). Some of the effects on memory through cues, forms of suggestion and reinforcement seem to be incredibly subtle and inadvertent. Consequently, the use of ‘intentionally’ to prevent investigators from deliberately contaminating the process tends to overlook the power and effect of informal and even unintended cues and clues. See further cases and literature at n 272 above. 306. Cf R v Maklouf [1999] NSWCCA 94. See Pace v R [2014] VSCA 317 at [21]–[29]. 307. This custody is a crucial limitation to the scope of s 115. Where a suspect is voluntarily assisting police with their inquiries, or has been released on bail or is in the custody of a correctional institution, the only limits to the use of picture identification are those which may be imposed by the court under ss 137 and 138: R v McKellar [2000] NSWCCA 523 (photo identification after accused released on bail did not have to comply with s 115 and no grounds for discretionary exclusion); R v Darwiche (2006) 166 A Crim R 28; [2006] NSWSC 924 at [27]–[33] (Bell J: correctional institution custody did not invoke s 115). Cf Odgers, n 20 above, at [EA.115.150]. 308. In R v Darwiche (2006) 166 A Crim R 28; [2006] NSWSC 924 at [34], Bell J holds that declining to participate in a parade unless a lawyer is present constitutes a refusal. On appeal, Aouad v R (2011) 207 A Crim R 411; [2011] NSWCCA 61 at [264], the court held there was no error in Bell J so holding. But see Odgers, n 20 above, at [EA.115.180], who suggests such an interpretation rejecting such a conditional agreement is inconsistent with s 114(2)(c), (5). See also R v Massey [2009] ACTCA 12. In R v Carpenter (2011) 249 FLR 432; [2011] ACTSC 71, Penfold J held that refusal plus comment that might change mind after seeking legal advice not a conditional agreement and constituted a refusal under s 114, rejecting argument that refusal can only be effectively made after legal advice has been sought. 309. Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005). 310. R v Goode [1970] SASR 69 at 81 (Bray CJ); R v Harris (1971) 1 SASR 447. Of course, on the other hand, where ‘other evidence’ contaminates the identification this may provide grounds for exclusion. 311. (1992) 173 CLR 555 at 565. 312. Cf the suggestion in some courts that the effect of this dictum is that unless identification evidence is itself accepted beyond reasonable doubt it cannot be considered with other supporting evidence to find

the criminal standard satisfied: R v Turner (2000) 76 SASR 163 at 183 (Mulligan J); R v Bennett (2004) 88 SASR 6 at [77]–[82] (Doyle CJ), [102] (Perry J); R v Evan (2006) 175 A Crim R 1; (2006) QCA 527 at [57]–[58]. This view is rejected in R v Spero (2006) 161 A Crim R 13; [2006] VCA 58 at [35]– [40] (Redlich AJA: ‘… having received a full Domican warning the jury were entitled to have regard to circumstantial evidence which might give support to the identification evidence’); R v Ong (2007) 176 A Crim R 366; [2007] VSCA 206 at [21] (‘The relevance of the existence of the other evidence was that the jury was not required to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that [the evidence attracting an identification warning] was correct’); R v White (2008) 102 SASR 35; [2008] SASC 265 at [20] (Vanstone J: ‘… it is one thing to warn a jury about aspects of a body of evidence presented to it … It would be quite another thing to instruct a jury to evaluate the identification evidence in isolation and then to, in effect, assign it some sort of weighting, before introducing it to the remainder of the evidence in the case. Not only would a jury find it difficult to reach a corporate view about its evidentiary value, but to ask it to do so would be invading its territory. Moreover, the artificiality of such a process is obvious’), [46]–[47] (David J). 313. R v Harm (1975) 13 SASR 84 (handwritten confession and failure to deny accuracy of identification); O’Neon v R (1991) 52 A Crim R 144 (CCA (WA)). 314. (2005) 224 CLR 300. 315. If the testimony does not rise above describing similarities rather than asserting recognition then no matter how many witnesses testify to similarities the evidence cannot amount to recognitional identification evidence: Pitkin v R (1995) 130 ALR 35; R v Clune (No 2) [1996] 1 VR 1 at 4. However, even similarity evidence might lead to positive identification (beyond reasonable doubt) where the features described are accepted and, in combination, sufficiently discriminating. 316. In the United States, there have been several cases, brought to light by DNA evidence and the efforts of Innocence Projects, where multiple witnesses have been mistaken in their identification evidence implicating an innocent person. Indeed, mistakes by eyewitnesses are a common feature in wrongful conviction cases. See Findley, ‘Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the Search for the Truth’ (2008) 38 Seton Hall LR 893; Garrett and Neufeld, ‘Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions’ (2009) 95 Virginia LR 1; Garrett, Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2011; Sangha and Moles, Miscarriages of Justice: Criminal Appeals and the Rule of Law in Australia, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2015. 317. [1977] QB 224 at 228. 318. [1981] VR 611 at 621. 319. [1984] VR 229. Followed in R v Rowley (1986) 23 A Crim R 371 at 377–8 (Young CJ). This view appears to be inconsistent with the view taken in R v Salerno [1973] VR 59, where it being clear one man had committed a series of crimes, the doubtful identification evidence in each instance was not allowed to be considered in combination; cf R v Grant [1996] 2 Crim App R 272, where the fragile identifications of a number of witnesses to a series of crimes committed by the one person were allowed to support each other and eliminate the possibility of honest mistake (and render conviction safe even though the jury had not been specifically directed, as they should have been, that a number of honest witnesses can be mistaken). In R v Hirst (2006) 95 SASR 260; [2006] SASC 244 at [70]–[79], Duggan J disagrees with the view in Salerno and follows English authority. 320. Quoted with approval in R v Hirst (2006) 95 SASR 260; [2006] SASC 244 at [82] (Duggan J). 321. Grbic v Pitkethly (1992) 38 FCR 95 at 112 (Von Doussa J, dissenting on the facts); R v Ali (2001) 122 A Crim R 498; [2001] NSWCCA 218 at [10] (Badgery-Parker AJ); R v Ngo (2003) 57 NSWLR 55; [2003] NSWCCA 82 at [156]–[162]. Research confirms that feedback, and even discussion between observers, have the potential to contaminate both individual and group memories: Steblay, Wells and

Douglas, ‘The Eyewitness Post Identification Feedback Effect 15 years Later: Theoretical and Policy Implications’ (2014) 20 Psych, Pub Policy & Law 1. 322. (1992) 173 CLR 555 at 565. 323. See also cases cited at n 310 above. 324. That generally an in-court identification should formally be made is discussed and endorsed in R v Murdoch (No 1) (2005) 195 FLR 362; [2005] NTSC 75 at [64]–[90] (Martin (BR) CJ) sub nom Murdoch v R (2007) 167 A Crim R 329; [2007] NTCCA 1 at [110]. 325. The leading Australian case is Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395, where evidence of photographic recognition was admitted (together with the photographs used for that purpose). See also R v Hentschel [1988] VR 362; R v Turner (2000) 76 SASR 163. 326. R v Clune [1982] VR 1; R v Deering (1986) 43 SASR 252; R v Cook [1987] QB 417; R v Hentschel [1988] VR 362; R v Constantinou (1990) 91 Cr App R 74; R v Sparkes (1996) 88 A Crim R 194 at 205– 6 (Underwood J, who also admitted photographs of the accused taken at the time of the offence (which had occurred some 12 years before trial) to enable the jury to make direct comparison); Roser v R (2001) 24 WAR 254 at [52]. 327. In R v Turner (2000) 76 SASR 163 at [17]–[20] (Doyle CJ), [86]–[95] (Mulligan J), the court required specific direction to the jury by the trial judge about the purposes and significance of evidence which sought to clarify whether the witness was actually testifying to having identified the accused at a prior identification parade at all. The importance of the prosecutor tendering evidence of the circumstances of a first (and contentious) recognition is emphasised in Powers v R [2000] NTCCA 2 at [56]–[58]. 328. R v Doyle [1967] VR 698. 329. R v Fannon and Walsh (1922) 22 SR NSW 427 at 430–1; R v Wainwright (1925) 19 Cr App R 52; R v Russell [1977] 2 NZLR 20. 330. (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 430. See R v Aziz [1982] 2 NSWLR 322 and Dawson v R (1990) 2 WAR 458 at 461–2, where photographs were held to be prima facie admissible. Examples of appropriate warnings in photographic identification cases can be found in R v De-Cressac (1985) 1 NSWLR 381, particularly at 395–6; Dawson v R (1990) 2 WAR 458; Pinta v R [1999] WASCA 125; R v Wilson [1999] SASC 377; Roser v R (2001) 24 WAR 254 (no need to compare and contrast with identification by parade); Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244 at [55] (digi-board identification not less reliable than identification parade). 331. Pursuant to s 66 — or even s 108(3). 332. Fairman v Fairman [1949] P 341; Galler v Galler [1954] P 252; cf Kossenberg v Kossenberg (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 358. 333. In the Marriage of Pavey (1976) 10 ALR 259 at 265. 334. Re Hodgson; Beckett v Ramsdale (1885) 31 Ch D 177; Plunkett v Bull (1915) 19 CLR 544; Re Mallows [1926] WALR 62; Copland v Bourke [1963] P & NGLR 45; Nolan v Nolan (2003) 10 VR 626; [2003] VSC 121 at [146]–[156]. Recognised in s 165(1)(g) of the Uniform Acts. 335. The People (Attorney-General) v Casey (No 2) [1963] IR 33 at 38 (Kingsmill Moore J). 336. In RRS v R (2013) A Crim R 168; [2013] NSWCCA 94 at [91], ‘The matters raised in submissions for the appellant, do not constitute grounds for a warning to be given expressed as based on the accumulated experience of the courts in dealing with certain types of evidence’. The way the case had been conducted made it perfectly clear to the jury what matters to take into account. These were ‘good reasons’ for the judge to refuse a request for a specific direction under s 165. 337. See generally at 4.9–4.10. For a comprehensive list of evidence found by courts to fall within this

general category, see Odgers, n 20 above, at [EA.165.450]. 338. R v Prater [1960] 2 QB 464; cf R v Stannard (1962) 48 Cr App R 81; R v Whitaker (1976) 63 Cr App R 193; R v Beck [1982] 1 All ER 807. But it is a misdirection, undermining the presumption of innocence, for a trial judge to suggest that the testimony of an accused is unreliable on account of his or her interest in the outcome of the proceedings: Robinson v R (No 2) (1991) 102 ALR 493 at 495 (HC); Hargraves v R (2011) 245 CLR 257; [2011] HCA 44 at [45]–[46]; and see further 2.71 n 365. 339. Bromley v R (1986) 161 CLR 315. See also R v Spencer [1987] AC 128 and Longman v R (1989) 168 CLR 79, discussed at 4.46. 340. (1992) 174 CLR 558 (but police informers are not prison informers: R v Carr (2000) 117 A Crim R 272 at [65]–[67]). As there will generally be independent evidence of the crime — for that will presumably be generally why the accused is on remand — that evidence scarcely takes further the question of whether the prison informer has fabricated the confession: see Deane, Toohey and McHugh JJ in Pollitt. The direction required by Pollitt is explained by Hunt CJ in R v Clough (1992) 28 NSWLR 396 at 405–6. Failure to so warn will not necessarily produce a miscarriage of justice if trial has otherwise made jury aware of possible unreliabilities: R v Dupas (No 3) (2009) 28 VR 380; [2009] VSCA 202 at [52] (Nettle JA, Ashley and Weinberg JJA agreeing). In Robinson v R [2006] NSWCCA 192 at [19], Spigelman CJ, with whom Simpson J agreed, suggests the words ‘dangerous to convict’ should be avoided as suggesting the jury should acquit. The direction applies retrospectively as Pollitt merely declares the existing common law position: R v Herring (1994) 74 A Crim R 72 (CCA (NSW)). 341. (1989) 168 CLR 79; Pollitt v R (1992) 174 CLR 558; Tully v R (2006) 231 ALR 712; [2006] HCA 56. For examples from lower courts, see DPP v Faure [1993] 2 VR 497 (testimony of wife with purpose to serve); R v El Adl [1993] 2 Qd R 195 (schizophrenic witness); R v Winner (1995) 79 A Crim R 528 at 538–41 (Kirby ACJ) (confession to a friend of dubious honesty); R v Macaskill (No 2) (2001) 81 SASR 155 (husband of wife accused of manslaughter of infant child, although not strictly an accomplice, had purpose to serve in testifying against wife and judge required to use weight of office to emphasise this); R v Carabott (2002) 132 A Crim R 355 (prosecution witness with own interest to serve); R v Johnson (2004) 89 SASR 294 (previous cases distinguished as witness did not have own purpose to serve); R v Jones (2006) 161 A Crim R 511; [2006] SASC 189 at [57], [65] (Duggan J) (no requirement to warn where witness a ‘barracker’ and jury well aware of ‘these matters’ and sufficiently directed); R v Wanganeen (2006) 95 SASR 226; [2006] SASC 254 (Anderson J dissenting); Cecez v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 344; [2007] WASCA 260 at [109] (Buss JA) (no automatic warning where witness has own purpose to serve, but question is whether without it jury may overlook or not appreciate the deficiency or danger in the testimony); R v Tran & Tran [2009] SASC 327 (an accomplice warning having been given it was not necessary also to warn that it would be dangerous to convict on account of the witness’s mental illness). Although R v Murray (1987) 11 NSWLR 12 suggests a jury should be directed to scrutinise carefully the testimony of a sole prosecution witness, in R v Glencourse ((1995) 78 A Crim R 256 at 257) Hunt CJ at CL emphasises that this direction is not by law required in every case and in the circumstances the usual direction to convict beyond reasonable doubt was sufficient (see also cases at n 149 above). 342. (1986) 161 CLR 315. 343. (2016) 90 ALJR 407; [2016] HCA 6. 344. (1992) 173 CLR 555 at 561. 345. Recognised in Cecez v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 344; [2007] WASCA 260 at [100]–[109] (Buss JA), [220]–[221] (Murray AJA); R v MBX [2014] 1 Qd R 438; [2013] QCA 214 at [105] (points 8–10) and [116] (Applegarth J, in holding there was not necessarily a need expressly to warn a jury that after time memories may be falsely reconstructed, ‘The test in determining whether these matters [put by counsel], individually or together, necessitated a warning is whether they created a risk of a miscarriage

of justice perceptible to the judge, but not the jury’). On the trial judge’s general duty to sum up fairly, see 2.12 and the discussion at 4.6 and 4.35. 346. Green v R (1999) 161 ALR 648; Conway v R (2002) 209 CLR 203 at [55], [62]. 347. While research may support the liberalising of corroboration warning requirements — as in the case of the competence of children and sexual assault complainants — directions continue to play an important part in the consideration of potentially unreliable testimony. Yet legislators and judges appear curiously indifferent to the considerable empirical literature questioning the value and practical efficacy (for example, substantial fairness) of many judicial directions, instructions and warnings. See literature referred to in n 13 above and 2.13 n 52. 348. DPP v Hester [1973] AC 296 at 325 (Lord Diplock). 349. For an excellent discussion of this notion, see Mirfield, ‘An Alternative Future for Corroboration Warnings’ (1991) 107 LQR 450. For a concise summary of when evidence is corroborative, see Fitzgerald P in R v Major and Lawrence [1998] 1 Qd R 317 at 318–20. 350. [1916] 2 KB 658 at 667. The general applicability of this definition was emphasised in WLC v R (2007) 210 FLR 378; [2007] NTCCA 6 at [27]–[28] (the court). 351. Buck v R [1982] WAR 372 at 376; (1982) 8 A Crim R 208 at 213 (evidence of telephone calls admissible to support witness’s testimony that calls made, supporting credit, but evidence of the contents of call implicating the accused in crime charged was inadmissible hearsay and therefore unable to provide corroboration of the witness’s other testimony against the accused); R v Jones (2006) 161 A Crim R 511; [2006] SASC 189 at [340] (in a joint trial admissions of other co-accused are inadmissible against an accused and therefore cannot be used to corroborate the testimony of a witness as against that accused. But Bleby and Anderson JJ (Duggan J dissenting at [122]) held (ignoring the inadmissible hearsay use on grounds of practicality: at [362]) that the admissions could nevertheless be used by the jury to support the credibility of the witness generally as against all accused). 352. On lies as corroboration generally, see Heydon, ‘Can Lies Corroborate?’ (1973) 89 LQR 552. The circumstances in which a lie will implicate an accused and the directions required are discussed at 4.87–4.88. 353. By the same token if any lie sought to be relied upon to infer guilt cannot be established other than by first accepting the remainder of the Crown case it has no further value in proving that case. It must be established by evidence independent of that relied upon by the Crown to prove guilt for it to have any evidential value: see, for example, R v Lane (2011) 221 A Crim R 309; [2011] NSWCCA 157 (court holding there was circumstantial evidence from which falsity could be established independent of Crown case); Brooks v R (2012) 36 VR 84; [2012] VSCA 197 (jury acceptance that accused stabbed victim would establish his story of suicide as a lie from which jury properly directed intent could be inferred). 354. Pitman v Byrne [1926] SASR 207 at 211 (Napier CJ). 355. R v Chapman [1973] QB 774. 356. R v Lucas [1981] 1 QB 720. 357. (1993) 178 CLR 193 at 210–11 (Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ). And endorsed in Green v R (1999) 161 ALR 648. See also R v Mercer (1993) 67 A Crim R 91 at 98 (Hunt CJ at CL); R v Zheng (1995) 83 A Crim R 572; Aubertin v Western Australia (2006) 33 WAR 87; [2006] WASCA 229 at [68]–[70] (McLure JA); Corbett v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 97 at [52]–[60] (Mitchell J). 358. R v Wurch (1932) 58 CCC 204. Quoted with approval in R v Navorolli [2010] 1 Qd R 27; [2009] QCA 49 at [115]–[116]. 359. Eade v R (1924) 34 CLR 154 at 157; and the jury should be so directed: R v E (1996) 39 NSWLR 450

at 457–61 (Sperling J). Generally prior consistent statements of witnesses are inadmissible at common law but there are a number of exceptions: see 7.87ff. Where a witness’s prior out-of-court statement is admissible as hearsay it is similarly incapable of providing independent evidence corroborating the witness’s in-court testimony: R v FP (2007) 169 A Crim R 318; [2007] QCA 97 at [14]. And see s 34D(2) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) (previous statement of witness admitted under the Act cannot corroborate that witness’s in-court testimony). 360. R v Whitehead [1929] 1 KB 99 at 102 (Lord Hewart CJ). One might also argue that, as the complaint is only admitted as a prior consistent statement and not as hearsay to prove the assertions in it, that it does not admissibly implicate the accused in the crime charged and therefore cannot constitute corroboration: cf Kau Wong v R [1983] WAR 80. 361. R v Redpath (1962) 46 Cr App R 319; R v Flannery [1969] VR 586; R v Yates [1970] SASR 302; R v Byczko (No 2) (1977) 17 SASR 460; R v Kooyman and Brydson (1979) 22 SASR 376 (a shout for help); R v Freeman [1980] VR 1; R v Major and Lawrence [1998] 1 Qd R 317. 362. See, for example, R v Williams [2010] 1 Qd R 276; [2008] QCA 411, where no causal inference was capable. In R v Schlaefer (1984) 37 SASR 207 and R v Pitman (1985) 38 SASR 566, the Full Court held that distress is allowed to go to the jury as corroboration if it is capable of being explained only as a consequence of the assault alleged, and it gives rise to no other reasonable explanation. See also R v Gulliford (2004) 148 A Crim R 558; [2004] NSWCCA 338 at [151] (Wood CJ at CL). This extremely narrow view is not stressed in earlier cases and may set a standard of sufficiency of independent implication in the crime at too high a level: see 4.86–4.87. 363. See R v Luisi [1964] Crim LR 605; R v Knight [1966] 1 WLR 230; R v Flannery [1969] VR 586 at 591; R v Wilson (1973) 58 Cr App R 304; R v Byczko (No 2) (1977) 17 SASR 460 at 463; R v Brdarovski (2006) 166 A Crim R 366; [2006] VSCA 231 at [42] (Nettle JA); Azarian v Western Australia (2007) 178 A Crim R 19; [2007] WASCA 249 at [49]–[50] (Pullin JA), [157]–[158] (Miller JA). 364. [1916] 2 KB 658. 365. (1990) 171 CLR 207 at 211. Applied in Andrews v R (1992) 60 A Crim R 137 at 151–3 (Matheson J), 166–7 (Olsson J) (CCA (SA)). See also, for example, R v Chen [1993] 2 VR 139 at 154–6; R v Hunt (1994) 76 A Crim R 363 at 364–6 (Fitzgerald J); R v Kuster (2008) 21 VR 407 at [14]–[18]; R v E, DJ (2012) 112 SASR 225; [2012] SASCFC 6 at [82]ff (Kourakis CJ). Where the jury may act upon (the ‘corroborative’) evidence alone to convict the accused, for example, where it may amount to a full admission of guilt, it may be necessary to direct the jury to find the evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt before so acting upon it (as an indispensable intermediate fact): R v D (1998) 71 SASR 99 at 100–1 (Doyle CJ), 104 (Matheson J); and see further at 2.88. 366. Similarly, in a rape case where the accused denies any relationship, an admission that the complainant’s child is his can corroborate the complainant’s testimony even though the admission does not conclusively prove that the intercourse was without consent: R v Massey [1997] 1 Qd R 404 at 406–7. 367. (1984) 37 SASR 207. 368. See also R v Pitman (1985) 38 SASR 566; R v Gulliford (2004) 148 A Crim R 558; [2004] NSWCCA 338 at [151] (Wood CJ at CL). In Grubisic v Western Australia (2011) WAR 524; [2011] WASCA 147 at [136]–[138] (Hall J, Pullin and Buss JJA agreeing), direction not required as only issue was the genuineness of the distress not its cause if determined genuine. 369. (1985) 38 SASR 566. Followed by Clarke JA in R v Heyde (1990) 20 NSWLR 234 at 244. 370. Where a lie is relied upon not as corroboration but as an indispensable link in the chain of proof then the standard of criminal proof must, on the authority of Shepherd v R (1990) 170 CLR 573, be appropriate: R v Akbulat (1993) 69 A Crim R 75 at 79 (Coldrey J); Edwards v R (1993) 178 CLR 193 at 210; R v Rice [1996] 2 VR 406 at 422–3 (Brooking JA); R v Renzella [1997] 2 VR 88 at 92; Bernes v

Filz (1997) 6 Tas SR 450. And see further at 2.88. 371. While Victorian courts rejected the requirement for this high standard, for ‘prudential reasons’ it remained often customary to direct the jury that it should not act upon a consciousness of guilt unless satisfied of it beyond reasonable doubt: R v Lam (Ruling No 18) [2005] VSC 292 at [33]–[36] (Redlich J) (lies); R v Ciantar (2006) 167 A Crim R 504; [2006] VSCA 263 at [52], [87] (flight). See, for example, R v Ali (No 2) (2005) 13 VR 257; [2005] VSCA 302 at [33]–[35]. Section 21 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) now demands the jury apply this standard in all cases. See also R v MBV (2013) 227 A Crim R 49; [2013] QCA 17 at [21] (McMurdo P, Muir and Gotterson JJA) where evidence admitted as capable of supporting consciousness of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 372. [1989] 1 Qd R 572 at 576. 373. Applied in R v El Adl [1993] 2 Qd R 195; R v Power (1996) 87 A Crim R 407 (CCA (SA)); R v Dat Quoc Ho (2002) 130 A Crim R 545 at [42]–[65] (CCA (NSW)) (flight can be left to jury as long as not intractably neutral); R v Ciantar (2006) 167 A Crim R 504; [2006] VSCA 263 at [44]–[45], [52], [72], [73] (not following R v Heyes (2006) 12 VR 401, where the majority limited the use of lies and other post-offence conduct); R v GVV (2008) 20 VR 395 at [47]–[50]; Mulvihill v R [2016] NSWCCA 259 at [219]–[222] (Ward JA, Beech-Jones and Fagan JJ). 374. (2004) 8 VR 213; [2004] VSCA 98 at [13] (Winneke P), [28]–[32] (Vincent JA). The same approach is taken in R v Loader (2004) 89 SASR 204 in leaving lies to the jury as capable of supporting a circumstantial case. 375. (1986) 31 A Crim R 357 at 362 (CCA (Qld)). 376. (1991) 60 A Crim R 384. 377. (1993) 178 CLR 193. See also Martinez v Western Australia (2007) 172 A Crim R 389; [2007] WASCA 1 43 at [288]–[295] (authorities applying Edwards discussed); R v Wildy (2011) 111 SASR 189; [2011] SASCFC 131 at [24]–[26] (Vanstone J). 378. (1993) 178 CLR 193. Cases prior to Edwards illustrating the circumstances in which lies may or may not be corroborative include: R v Lucas [1981] 1 QB 720; R v Evans (1985) 38 SASR 344; R v Sutton (1986) 5 NSWLR 697; R v Williams [1987] 2 Qd R 777; R v Burr (1988) 37 A Crim R 220 (CCA (Vic)); Harris v R (1990) 55 SASR 321; R v Heyde (1990) 20 NSWLR 234. That the jury must be directed to be wary of possible reasons for a lie other than consciousness of guilt is emphasised in R v Preval [1984] 3 NSWLR 647; R v Heyde (1990) 20 NSWLR 234; R v Small (1994) 33 NSWLR 575 at 595–7. Lies about presence at the scene have led to corroborative inferences: see Eade v R (1924) 34 CLR 154; Credland v Knowler (1951) 35 Cr App R 48; R v Tripodi [1961] VR 186; Popovic v Derks [1961] VR 413. So have demonstrably false alibis: see Mawaz Khan v R [1967] 1 AC 454; R v Sherrin (No 2) (1979) 21 SASR 250. It may be that an inference of guilt can be more readily inferred from a false account, particularly when it is elaborate, but this is not to forbid such inferences in the case of a mere false denial: see Eade v R (1924) 34 CLR 154; R v Tripodi [1961] VR 186 (as long as the falsity can be independently proved: R v Zheng (1995) 83 A Crim R 572); and a mere disbelief of an accused’s denial does not give rise to a consciousness of guilt: Aubertin v Western Australia (2006) 33 WAR 87 at [68]. 379. In R v ST (1997) 92 A Crim R 390 at 393, Hunt CJ at CL suggests that ‘[f]or a lie to amount to an admission of guilt the only reasonable inference from the circumstances in which it was told must be that the accused lied because he knew that, if he told the truth he would be found guilty’. This seems to impose a higher standard than the majority suggests in Edwards is appropriate when combining inferences in a cable of proof. Cf Dodd v Western Australia (2014) 238 A Crim R 72; [2014] WASC 13 at [103] (Buss and Newnes JJA) where criminal standard not demanded. See further 4.85–4.86. 380. See generally Mathias, ‘Lies Directions’ [1995] NZ LJ 307; Palmer, ‘Guilt and the Consciousness of

Guilt: The Use of Lies, Flight and Other “Guilty Behaviour” in the Investigation and Prosecution of Crime’ (1997) 21 Melb ULR 95. 381. This cautionary attitude is reflected in Harris v R (1990) 55 SASR 321 at 323 (King CJ says of persons under suspicion that the ‘endeavour to improve their position by falsehood is far too common to enable an inference to be drawn with confidence, in any but the rarest of cases, that lies proceed from a consciousness of guilt’); R v G, GT (2007) 97 SASR 315; [2007] SASC 104 at [12] (Doyle CJ: ‘[I]f a prosecutor proposes to submit to the jury that there is evidence of lies told by the accused which manifest a consciousness of guilt, the prosecutor should raise that matter with the judge before the submission is put to the jury’). See also R v Russo (2004) 11 VR 1 at [6] (Winneke P: ‘Most lies told by an accused person will merely affect the credit of the accused, or the credibility of the case which the accused is advancing’). For a prosecutor to suggest use of lies to infer guilt for the first time in the closing address may result in an unfair trial: R v Howard (2005) 156 A Crim R 343; [2005] VSCA 235; see also Practice Note (No 1 of 2004) (2004) 8 VR 475. 382. See, for example, Woon v R (1964) 109 CLR 529. The use of this terminology in directing juries has been criticised: Zoneff v R (2000) 200 CLR 234 at [63] (Kirby J); R v Franklin [2001] VSCA 79 at [121]–[122]; Martinez v Western Australia (2007) 172 A Crim R 389; [2007] WASCA 143 at [283]. As Zoneff shows, the phrase ‘consciousness of guilt’ should be avoided where a lie is incapable of founding an admissional inference, for fear of the phrase suggesting that it is so capable. 383. As a general rule unless the prosecution relies upon an admissional inference the judge should direct on the assumption that no such inference is open: Zoneff v R (2000) 200 CLR 235 at [16]–[20]; Dhanhoa v R (2003) 217 CLR 1; 199 ALR 547; [2003] HCA 40 at [34] (Gleeson CJ and Hayne J: ‘Where the prosecution does not contend that a lie is evidence of guilt, then, unless the judge apprehends that there is a real danger that the jury may apply such a process of reasoning, as a general rule it is unnecessary and inappropriate to give an Edwards direction’), [60] (McHugh and Gummow JJ: ‘… it is not enough to establish … that it would have been better if the trial judge had given an appropriate direction concerning the effect of lies. To succeed in the appeal, Dhanhoa must establish that it is a reasonable possibility that the failure to direct the jury “may have affected the verdict”’); Nestorov v R [2002] WASCA 356 at [69] (even where prosecution relies on an admissional inference there should be no Edwards direction if that inference is not open); Boonudnoon v R (2002) 172 FLR 111; R v Zilm (2006) 14 VR 11 (judge should have directed that no admissional inference open); Jovanovic v R (2007) 172 A Crim R 518; [2007] TASSC 56; R v Cardamone (2007) 171 A Crim R 207; [2007] VSCA 7; McKey v R (2012) 219 A Crim R 227; [2012] NSWCCA 1 (closing address suggested admission from lie relied upon and Edwards direction should have been given); R v Hirst (2013) 116 SASC 300; [2013] SASCFC 54 (consciousness of guilt inference open from cover-up and Edwards direction should have been given). To give a direction suggesting such an inference where it is not sought by the prosecution may give ‘undeserved prominence’ to an issue upon which the parties were not joined: Zoneff at [20]. While Winneke P in R v Bandiera and Licastro [1999] 3 VR 103 at [8] suggests that, for the prosecution to disavow reliance upon an admissional inference to avoid the need for an Edwards direction may disadvantage an accused, McPherson JA in R v Brennan [1999] 2 Qd R 529 at 530 discourages prosecutors from relying on such inferences to shield juries from the confusing complexities of an Edwards direction. 384. This is emphasised not only in Edwards itself (at 211), but by R v Renzella [1997] 2 VR 88 at 91–2 and R v Benfield [1997] 2 VR 491 at 501. It would, of course, be a misdirection to instruct the jury that the lie could be used to infer guilt: R v Russo (2004) 11 VR 1 at [3] (Winneke P). 385. Zoneff v R (2000) 200 CLR 235 at [23]; R v Abdallah [2001] NSWCCA 506 at [34]; R v Baring (2005) 155 A Crim R 326; [2005] SASC 262; Pennington v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 98 at [122]–[125] (Martin CJ, Buss and Mazza JJA agreeing); R v Sekrst [2016] SASCFC 127 at [49]–[52] (Kourakis CJ), [115] (Vanstone J). Examples of where Edwards and Zoneff directions held not required: R v VN (2006)

15 VR 113; [2006] VSCA 111 at [50]–[56]; Howson v R (2007) 170 A Crim R 401; [2007] WASC 83 at [94] (Roberts-Smith JA); R v Berry (2007) 17 VR 153; [2007] VSCA 202 at [94]–[104]; Cesan v DPP (Cth) (2007) 174 A Crim R 385; [2007] NSWCCA 273 at [133]–[136]. To give an ‘Edwards direction’ where no admissional inference is open or relied upon will generally be a misdirection: see, for example, R v Grosser (1999) 73 SASR 584 at [83] (Duggan J); Cotic v R [2000] WASCA 414; R v Ulman-Naruniec [2001] SASC 317; R v G, GT (2007) 97 SASR 315; [2007] SASC 104; Martinez v Western Australia (2007) 172 A Crim R 389; [2007] WASCA 143; R v Mitchell (2007) 174 A Crim R 52; [2007] QCA 267. 386. In R v Calway (2005) 157 A Crim R 322; [2005] VSCA 266 at [11] (Eames JA), an accused’s claim in the police interview to not being able to remember was held capable of being interpreted as a lie and could be left to the jury with appropriate directions (discussed by Eames JA at [28]–[33]). See also R v Barrett (2007) 16 VR 240; [2007] VSCA 95 (evasive answers to questions could demonstrate a consciousness of guilt); R v Y, DB (2006) 94 SASR 489; [2006] SASC 141 (accused’s reactions when confronted by complainant’s father capable of providing corroboration). Denial by the accused when questioned by the police may be construed as an exercise of the accused’s right to silence giving rise to no implicating inference: see generally 5.134–5.144 and particularly at 5.139 (but cf Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 89A). 387. The requirements to warn where a jury may rely upon a lie admissionally are colloquially referred to now as an ‘Edwards direction’. Cases endorsing the need for such a direction where an admissional inference is open, based upon the passage quoted below, include Murphy v R (1994) 62 SASR 121; R v Cumming (1995) 86 A Crim R 156 (CCA (WA)); R v Rice [1996] 2 VR 406; R v Renzella [1997] 2 VR 88; R v Benfield [1997] 2 VR 491; Horrell v R (1997) 6 NTR 125; R v Konstandopoulos [1998] 4 VR 381; R v Rayner [1998] 4 VR 818 at 835–8, 854–9; R v Ellis (1998) 100 A Crim R 49 at 56–9 (Ollson J); R v Brennan [1999] 2 Qd R 529; R v Hugo and Nasko (2000) 113 A Crim R 484 at [52]–[61] (CCA (WA)); R v Chang (2003) 7 VR 236; 140 A Crim R 573; [2003] VSCA 149; R v Fouyaxis (2007) 99 SASR 233; [2007] SASR 335 at [40] (Gray J); R v Cuenco (2007) 16 VR 118; [2007] VSCA 41 at [14]– [18], [31]–[35] (Nettle JA); R v MC [2009] VSCA 122 at [61]–[66] (Coghlan AJA); Pollard v R [2011] VSCA 95 at [83] (Neave JA); Corbett v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 97 at [34]–[36] (Mitchell J). A separate Edwards direction may not be required where the lie concerns the decisive facts in issue: R v B, FG (2013) 115 SASR 499; [2013] SASCFC 24 at [111]–[114] (Anderson J), [169]–[171] (David J). In R v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26, to ensure the judge is in a position to identify the precise lies relied upon for the purposes of giving an Edwards direction at least prior to addresses, the prosecution should precisely delineate each lie relied upon; cf Ellis v R (2010) 30 VR 428; [2010] VSCA 302, where parties agreed judge should direct in terms of an ‘overall lie’ rather than giving an Edwards direction in relation to each particular lie constituting it. 388. The failure so to direct may not give rise to a miscarriage of justice where those reasons have been prominent in the accused’s defence: R v Le Broc (2000) 2 VR 43 at [35]–[38]. In other cases failure to advert to reasons consistent with innocence may produce a miscarriage of justice: see, for example, R v SBB (2007) 175 A Crim R 449; [2007] QCA 173. 389. Edwards v R (1993) 178 CLR 193 at 210–11. 390. [1981] 1 QB 720. 391. The reluctance to draw admissional inferences from lies is simply expressed by King CJ in Harris v R (1990) 55 SASR 321 at 323: ‘Unjust results can easily flow from a readiness to treat lies of an accused person as positive evidence of guilt’. 392. R v Le Blowitz [1998] 1 Qd R 303. 393. Strictly speaking, these should either be formal admissions made by counsel or admissions made by the accused when testifying at trial or admissible in consequence of being questioned by the police. In R v

Lander (1989) 52 SASR 424, it was held that no corroborating evidential inference could be drawn from a line of cross-examination pursued by counsel (presumably upon the accused’s instructions). 394. R v Young [1923] SASR 35; R v Karunaratne (1989) 44 A Crim R 191 (CCA (Qld)); R v Do (1990) 54 SASR 543 at 546. 395. R v Galluzo (1986) 23 A Crim R 211 (CCA (NSW)); R v Hills (1988) 86 Cr App R 26; R v Barrow [2001] 2 Qd R 525 at [28]; Sumner v R (2010) 29 VR 398; [2010] VSCA 221 at [23]–[32]; R v Hill; Ex parte DPP (Cth) (2011) 212 A Crim R 359; [2011] QCA 306 at [227]–[231] (Atkinson J). 396. [1951] SASR 22. 397. (1978) 18 SASR 381. 398. (1977) 18 SASR 103 at 122. 399. Zelling and Wells JJ preferred to decide R v Lindsay (1977) 18 SASR 103 at 122 upon this basis. 400. This appears to have been the interpretation put on the evidence before him by King J, because he added that ‘in most cases independent evidence confirming a fact that is common ground could not be regarded as corroborative’: R v Stephenson (1978) 18 SASR 381 at 399. 401. Gaudron J uses this terminology in BRS v R (1998) 191 CLR 275 at 297. See also R v Kerim [1988] 1 Qd R 426; R v Kalajzich and Orrock (1989) 39 A Crim R 415 (CCA (NSW)); R v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91; K v R (1992) 34 FCR 227; R v Thompson (1992) 57 SASR 397; R v Bryce [1994] 1 Qd R 77 at 81 (Davies J: ‘[Evidence that the accused and three other persons could have committed forgeries raising] the probability of his guilt to a level of one in four, remained nevertheless more consistent with his innocence than his guilt … such evidence … [must] be capable of increasing the probability of the accused’s guilt without equally increasing the probability of the guilt of another suspect’: Davies J at 81); R v Power (1996) 87 A Crim R 407 at 409 (CCA (SA)) (evidence of flight not ‘intractably neutral’); R v Pisano [1997] 2 VR 342 at 351 (Phillips CJ); R v Major and Lawrence [1998] 1 Qd R 317 (distress following admitted acts of intercourse with two accused during a single episode could be left to the jury as capable of corroborating the complainant’s testimony that both acts were non-consensual although theoretically distress explicable on basis that only one unidentified act was non-consensual); Butler v R (2011) 34 VR 165; [2011] VSCA 417 (on all the evidence lies not equally consistent in inferring murder or manslaughter); Pollard v R (2011) 31 VR 416; [2011] VSCA 9 (hiding immediately after alleged offence phone on which pornographic photos shown and transmitted to victim not intractably neutral following R v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26); Flora v R (2013) 233 A Crim R 320; [2013] VSCA 192 (distress not intractably neutral to establish rape in context of other evidence). Once admissible whether directions are required about non-implicating explanations depends upon whether failure may cause a miscarriage of justice: see, for example, R v Carney [2016] QCA 2 at [31]–[32]. 402. R v Taylor (2004) 8 VR 213; [2004] VSCA 98 at [13] (Winneke P): ‘For my own part, I do not regard the evidence to be “intractably neutral”, whatever that may mean’. 403. As Winneke P in R v Taylor (2004) 8 VR 213; [2004] VSCA 98 at [16] explains, evidence is ‘intractably neutral’ only where ‘of such an equivocal character that it lacks the capacity to enable a reasonable jury to conclude that it connects or tends to connect the accused to the crime charged’. He held evidence of persistent telephone calls by 48-year-old accused to a 13-year-old complainant and visits to her when alone in her home not intractably neutral despite his defence that he was simply a family friend and her confidante. 404. ‘[T]he evidence to be corroborated cannot form part of the accumulation of evidence … to determine whether an inference may be drawn’: R v Ciantar (2006) 167 A Crim R 504; [2006] VSCA 263 at [73]. 405. See also, for example, Martinez v Western Australia (2007) 172 A Crim R 389; [2007] WASCA 143, where some lies were held incapable of supporting admissional inferences because of other explanations.

406. R v Woolley (1989) 42 A Crim R 418 at 423–4; Meko v R (2004) 146 A Crim R 131 at [43]–[52] (Heenan J); R v Sievers (2004) 151 A Crim R 426; R v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26; [2006] VSCA 263 at [69]–[87]; R v Barrett (2007) 16 VR 240; [2007] VSCA 95 at [41]–[46]; R v Panozzo (2007) 178 A Crim R 323; [2007] VSCA 245 at [20]–[27]; R v Mitchell (2007) 174 A Crim R 52; [2007] QCA 267; R v Murray [2016] QCA 342 at [27]–[36] (P McMurdo JA). 407. (1989) 90 Cr App R 99. 408. (1997) 191 CLR 275 at 291–2 (Toohey J), 297–8 (Gaudron J), 303–4 (McHugh J). 409. [1916] 2 KB 658. 410. See further Mirfield, n 349 above. 411. Compare with Mirfield, n 349 above. See also R v Barrow [2001] 2 Qd R 525 at [30]. 412. Although earlier Brennan CJ says that ‘when corroboration of an accomplice’s evidence is sought, it can be found only in evidence that confirms or tends to confirm the accused’s involvement in the events as related by the accomplice (Doney v R)’: at 284. Toohey J similarly requires only confirmation of ‘the accused’s involvement in the events described by the complainant’: at 291. On the other hand, Gaudron J seems to regard the evidence of the KY jelly and yellow towel for sexual purposes as corroborative as it was ‘not intractibly neutral’ and did implicate the accused in the offence charged. McHugh J regarded the evidence as confirming ‘the complainant’s account of the sexual activity of the appellant which led up to the oral and anal intercourse which were the subject of the charges against the appellant’: at 304. 413. [1973] AC 296. 414. [1973] AC 729 (applied R v Cheema (1993) 98 Cr App Rep 195). 415. Approved by the High Court in Pollitt v R (1992) 174 CLR 558 at 600 (Dawson and Gaudron JJ, Mason CJ and Brennan J agreeing), and applied by the Federal Court in R v K (1992) 59 A Crim R 113 at 119–20. See also R v Thompson (1992) 57 SASR 397, where independent testimony of uncharged acts revealing the accused’s ‘guilty passion’ towards his stepdaughter was held corroborative as long as the jury was instructed about the proper use to which the evidence revealing propensity could be put. In WLC v R (2007) 210 FLR 378; [2007] NTCCA 6, it was held that the testimony of an accomplice to a sexual assault — to which the complainant had not testified — could be corroborated by the complainant’s evidence of uncharged acts establishing the accused’s ‘guilty passion’ towards the complainant. If the complainant had simply testified to the same assault the testimonies would have been more directly mutually corroborative: at [34]. 416. Compare with DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421. 417. R v Tripodi (1961) 104 CLR 1. 418. R v Kehagias, Leone and Durkic [1985] VR 107; R v Rosemeyer [1985] VR 945. 419. (1988) 165 CLR 292. This reasoning is followed in J v R [1989] Tas R 116 at 140 (Underwood J), 148 (Wright J), in rejecting the technical Victorian approach. 420. [1995] 2 AC 597. 421. [2016] HCA 14 at [59]. 422. See n 25 above. Note that corroboration warnings are not abolished by s 164 of the uniform legislation where a judge sits alone. 423. DPP v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 at 746 (Lord Hailsham). See also IMM v R [2016] HCA 14 at [39], where the majority suggests that testimony does not satisfy s 55 where it is ‘so inherently incredible, fanciful or preposterous that it could not be accepted by a rational jury’. Where testimony of doubtful credibility has been admitted and is incapable of resurrection by corroborative evidence the judge may be obliged to point this out to the jury, but this situation will rarely arise, and generally a witness’s

credibility will be so obviously in issue that no special attention will have to be drawn to it by the trial judge: R v Sorby [1986] VR 753; Attorney-General (Hong Kong) v Wong Muk Ping [1987] AC 501 (PC); R v Panagiotidis (1991) 55 SASR 172; R v Chen [1993] 2 VR 139 at 153–4. 424. That the jury must ultimately decide this issue is clearly laid down in Davies v DPP [1954] AC 378, despite the complexity of the decision in the case of accomplices. Note that the testimony of a witness may fall within more than one category that attracts a corroboration or other warning as a matter of law or practice, in which case the judge must give all appropriate warnings: see, for example, R v Tran & Tran [2009] SASC 327, where it was argued (albeit unsuccessfully) that, an accomplice warning having been given, it was also necessary to warn that it would be dangerous to convict on account of the witness’s mental illness. 425. R v He and Bun (2001) 122 A Crim R 487 at [27] (CCA (Vic)); R v Fountain and Tootell (2001) 124 A Crim R 100 (CCA (Vic)). Indeed, a warning may be required even where defence counsel has made it clear that he or she would prefer, in the interests of the accused, that it be not given: Doggett v R (2001) 208 CLR 343, discussed above at 4.47. Although warnings under s 165(2) of the uniform legislation are only obligatory upon request, the general duty to warn preserved in s 165(5) may make a warning obligatory in the absence of request: R v Clark (2001) 123 A Crim R 506. 426. R v McLachlan [1999] 2 VR 553 at [32]–[34] (Callaway JA). Cf the situation under s 165 of the uniform legislation where courts have held that even in the categories of evidence specified as unreliable it must still be ‘evidence of a kind that may be unreliable’ (see n 20 above); further, no warning is required where good reasons for this course of action exist: s 165(3). 427. For example, the judge may merely direct that a particular witness is an accomplice: People v Carney [1955] IR 324; R v Chrimes (1959) 43 Cr App R 149 at 152–3. The uniform legislation may encourage this approach by requiring warning once a request has been made: s 165(2). The practice of giving directions unduly favourable to the accused has caused much controversy in the context of the prosecution of sexual assaults: see 4.40ff above. 428. R v Turnbull and Davidson (1985) 17 A Crim R 370 (CCA (Qld)); and cases at n 88 above. 429. R v Byrczko (No 2) (1977) 17 SASR 460 at 463; R v Sherrin (No 2) (1979) 21 SASR 250 at 255–6 (King CJ); R v Duke (1979) 22 SASR 46; compare with R v Allen and Evans [1965] 2 QB 295 at 302. 430. R v Turnsek [1967] VR 610 at 615–16. 431. R v Jansen [1970] SASR 531; Foo v R (2001) 167 FLR 423 at [35] (CCA (WA)). See also the remarks by Lord Diplock in DPP v Hester [1973] AC 296 at 328, and Salmon LJ in R v O’Reilly [1967] 2 QB 722 at 727. It is this situation that is achieved by the uniform legislation in that s 164 abolishes corroboration warnings and s 165 substitutes warnings that need not be given in terms of corroboration at all. Thus, any technical common law requirements for evidence to be corroborative can be avoided altogether. However, in practice, trial judges continue to give warnings in corroboration terms and where they do they must define corroboration accordingly, even in jurisdictions covered by the uniform legislation: see, for example, Green v R (1999) 161 ALR 648; Conway v R (2002) 209 CLR 203; Timbery v R (2007) 180 A Crim R 232; [2007] NSWCCA 355; and cases at n 55 above. 432. R v Clynes (1960) 44 Cr App R 158. 433. R v Sherrin (No 2) (1979) 21 SASR 250; R v Duke (1979) 22 SASR 46 (cf R v Matthews and Ford [1972] VR 3; R v Byczko (No 2) (1977) 17 SASR 460 at 463); R v Beck [1982] 1 All ER 807 at 814; Chidiac v R (1991) 171 CLR 432 at 440–1 (Mason CJ); R v Bellino and Conte (1992) 59 A Crim R 322 at 355 (Pincus JA, CCA (Qld)); R v Small (1994) 33 NSWLR 575 at 593 (Hunt CJ at CL); Markovina v R (1996) 16 WAR 354 at 364–9 (Malcolm CJ); Carr v R [2002] TASSC 60 at [51]–[61]. See generally Munday, ‘Juries and Corroboration’ (1980) 130 New LJ 352. Where evidence is relied upon circumstantially the jury should be directed ‘that they may consider all of those matters, taken together,

provided that they were satisfied that such matters would usually exist in combination only because of the existence also of some particular fact which tended to show that the appellant was involved in the crimes charged’: R v Small (1994) 33 NSWLR 575 at 594 (Hunt CJ at CL). 434. R v Sorby [1986] VR 753; R v Rayner [1998] 4 VR 818 at 839–41 (Winneke P), 859 (Callaway JA); R v Weisz (2008) 189 A Crim R 93; [2008] QCA 313 at [89] (McMurdo P), [174] (Mackenzie AJA), holding that where evidence was complex it was sufficient to direct generally that the accused’s lies during interviews could be corroborative without each and every lie being identified. 435. R v Byczko (No 1) (1977) 16 SASR 506; R v Riley (1979) 70 Cr App R 1; B v R (1992) 175 CLR 599 at 603 (Mason CJ), 604–7 (Brennan J), 617 (Dawson and Gaudron JJ); Domican v R (1992) 173 CLR 555 (discussed at 4.60 above). 436. DPP v Hester [1973] AC 296 at 328 (Lord Diplock); DPP v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 at 740–1 (Lord Hailsham). 437. R v Henry (1968) 53 Cr App R 150 at 153; cf R v Rosemeyer [1985] VR 945 at 950 (Young CJ). In Carr v R [2002] TASSC 60 at [32]–[34], the court said it was not necessary specifically to tell the jury ‘that convicting on the evidence of the impugned witness alone carries the danger of a serious risk that an innocent man will be convicted’. 438. See the discussion of Domican v R (1992) 173 CLR 555 at 4.60. 439. R v Power (1996) 87 A Crim R 407 at 411 (CCA (SA)); R v Baker (2000) 78 SASR 103 (CCA). 440. R v Thomas (1959) 43 Cr App R 210; R v Sherrin (No 2) (1979) 21 SASR 250 at 256; Green v R (1999) 161 ALR 648; Conway v R (2002) 209 CLR 203. In Victoria, on appeal the question is more simply whether there has been a substantial miscarriage of justice but corroboration and corroboration warnings may have have been effectively eliminated by the Jury Directions Act 2015. 441. Allen v R (2013) 235 A Crim R 40; [2013] VSCA 263 at [38] (Redlich and Coghlan JJA, T Forrest AJA) ‘the issue of the complainant’s mental ill-health and its potential impact on her reliability was completely exposed in evidence … there were no dangers lurking in the evidence of which the jury would not have been aware’. 442. Failure to explain the reasons why testimony is unreliable will not necessarily produce a miscarriage of justice: R v Stewart [1993] 2 Qd R 322 (CCA). 443. Green v R (1999) 161 ALR 648; Conway v R (2002) 209 CLR 203. 444. (1986) 161 CLR 315 at 319. 445. See Spigelman CJ, with whose remarks Simpson J agreed, in Robinson v R [2006] NSWCCA 192 at [19]: ‘The formulation “dangerous to convict” is a powerful direction, capable of being understood, and in my opinion, is frequently understood, by a jury as, in effect, a direction by the judge to acquit the accused. It is a formulation that is best avoided, save in exceptional circumstances’. 446. See, for example, Moloney v Western Australia [2006] WASCA 193 at [15]–[19] (Wheeler JA), [33] (Roberts-Smith JA); Azarian v Western Australia (2007) 178 A Crim R 19; [2007] WASCA 249 at [160] (Miller JA). 447. See Spigelman CJ in Robinson v R [2006] NSWCCA 192 at [13]. 448. In R v Stewart (2001) 52 NSWLR 301 at [125]–[126], Howie J suggests that even use of the word ‘accomplice’ should be avoided to prevent any prejudice to the accused through suggestion of involvement in the crime charged. Followed in R v Saltan [2002] NSWCCA 423 at [15] (Spigelman CJ). 449. The emphasis focuses upon the internal view of fact-finding expressed eloquently in Ho, A Philosophy of Evidence Law: Justice in the Search for Truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008. See also at 1.36.

[page 433]

Chapter Five

The Adversary Context Access to Information Introduction 5.1 With the reception of every piece of information dependent upon the concept of relevance, and the outcome of every claim ultimately dependent upon the concept of proof, natural rules of fact discovery lie at the very heart of the common law procedural system, the adversary trial. The immediate justification for the adversary trial is that it leads to accurate proof through the maximisation of information. But it also has deeper political justification, reflecting the liberal philosophy of Western democracies that accords rights to individuals enforceable at their option. Thus, it is left to the individual to formulate claims and to produce evidence in substantiation of them. For this political reason, even in civil law jurisdictions procedural systems are in this respect adversarial in nature. What distinguishes the common law procedural system is that it carries the initial notion of adversarialness into every aspect of the trial, leaving it to the parties to present all relevant information, and allowing the court to act only upon that information in reaching a decision upon the facts. This the common law does partly upon the assumption that such a procedure is most likely to lead to accurate proof. Civil law jurisdictions do not share this assumption, and allow courts to intervene in the collection and presentation of information relevant to parties’ claims. 5.2 But the present purpose is not to debate the justification for or the relative merits and demerits of common law and civil law procedural systems; rather, it is

to explain what is meant by the adversary context, and to show that many rules affecting the collection and presentation of evidence find their origin in that context. For this purpose the adversary context is given its widest meaning, embracing not only the immediate common law justification of accurate proof, but also the wider political justification giving protection to individual rights. As will be seen, the consequence of giving the adversary context this wide meaning is that some of the resultant rules are found in both common law and civil law procedural systems. [page 434] Furthermore, some of the resultant rules have consequences that transcend evidentiary bounds. Legal professional privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination are prime examples of these consequences. As these privileges impose important evidentiary limitations they clearly require discussion in any work on the law of evidence. But they have a much wider procedural effect. If this shows the arbitrariness of an evidentiary or procedural classification of rules, then so be it. Nothing turns upon the classification. There may be, in the end, no real distinction between procedural rules and substantive rules. What is important is to show that many rules affecting the collection and presentation of evidence have their origin in the procedural system. For it is the thesis of this book that while some evidentiary rules find their justification in the notion of proof, others find their justification in the notion of the common law procedural system. 5.3 The emphasis of the common law adversary procedure is to leave to the parties the tasks not only of initiating and formulating claims but also of collecting and adducing evidence in support of them. It assumes, first, party access to courts and, secondly, party access to evidence. The first assumption is circumscribed predominantly by economic considerations (which provisions for legal aid have sought to mitigate), but questions of access to courts lie outside the task of this work, which seeks to analyse how claims can be substantiated once proceedings have been initiated. The second assumption, however, is crucial to this analysis. It is an assumption

circumscribed not only by economic limitations but by legal limitations as well. This chapter focuses upon those legal limitations which restrict party access to information1 both before and during trial, seeking to show to what extent these limitations find their origin in the notion of the common law adversary procedural system and to what extent they are based upon other policy considerations. It will be seen that there are a number of limitations upon access that are inherent in the common law adversarial system of administering justice. But before discussing these limitations upon party access to information, a summary is given of the general powers of parties to obtain information both during and before trial.

Rules giving access to information 5.4 Even assuming appropriate economic resourcing, parties need legal assistance to collect effectively information that may be presented as evidence. Without such assistance, although at liberty to interview witnesses and request them to testify, parties can compel neither. Documents and other items of information or relevant objects [page 435] may be known or suspected to be in the legal possession of others but, if cooperation is not forthcoming, parties cannot compel divulgence either before or during trial. In the absence of legal intervention courts would be denied relevant evidence. Therefore, if relevant evidence is to be maximised, rules must exist to assist parties in its collection and its production in court. This also has the effect of creating greater equality of information (consistent with equality of arms) between the parties and is thus conducive to a fairer adversarial trial.2

Civil cases3 5.5 The inherent power to ensure the effective administration of justice provides the basis for common law courts to intervene. Initially they intervened at the trial stage to compel the attendance of witnesses (subpoena ad testificandum) and the production of relevant and admissible documents (subpoena duces tecum). These rules, still sanctioned by the inherent powers of superior courts, are

nowadays embodied in court rules and legislation.4 Attendance or production, ultimately within the discretion of the court, is compelled by the court initially to the court.5 The court then determines the extent to which information produced should be disclosed to other parties and whether it may be tendered as evidence at trial.6 Although fundamentally each subpoena exists to ensure that relevant and admissible information is available for tender at trial, in practice the power to subpoena has other purposes. The power to subpoena documents extends to documents required ‘for the purpose of evidence’. This notion extends to documents, not strictly admissible, but which may be required for a legitimate forensic purpose; for example, to allow effective cross-examination to take place.7 Furthermore, by making a subpoena returnable to a preliminary hearing, the power to subpoena can be effectively used to give discovery [page 436] of information before trial.8 Although strictly the subpoena is an order to produce the document to the court, generally the court will make the document available to the parties to the case. The main limit to the power of subpoena is that its exercise must be sought for a bona fide forensic purpose,9 and it must not be used for the purpose of fishing for information a party hopes, but does not reasonably expect, is in existence.10 5.6 Common law judges were reluctant to give parties access to information before trial and it was left to the courts of Chancery to develop those practices of discovery, inspection and interrogation which are today embodied in rules of court and accepted as integral to the adversary trial in civil cases.11 Once proceedings have commenced, then, in accordance with these techniques, courts insist upon an exchange of information and documents between parties, thereby eliminating surprise, narrowing issues and allowing the evidence of opponents to be effectively tested. Nevertheless, it is not at all apparent that these techniques were originally designed to assist parties in the collection and maximisation of information. Rather, they were designed to ensure that any trial focused upon the real issues between the parties and that, in relation to these issues, the parties were made aware of surrounding facts that would be alluded to by opponents. The object

was certainly not to exchange the names of potential witnesses and the evidence that they would give. Thus, interrogatories cannot be used to fish for further information or to seek evidence, but must be used instead to obtain admissions concerning disputed issues of fact.12 The difficulty in this context of distinguishing between an improper inquiry as to evidence and a proper inquiry as to a disputed issue of fact will always puzzle the theorist, but the thrust of the distinction is clear, prohibiting a frank exchange of the evidence to be led at the trial for fear of perjury by the parties or tampering with witnesses. 5.7 Since these fears are less compelling in the case of documents, the rules of discovery and inspection go much further towards assisting parties in the collection and maximisation of relevant information in this form. Discovery and inspection extends, by virtue of rules of court, to all documents in a party’s ‘possession, custody [page 437] and power’ ‘relating to matters in question in the action’ irrespective of the subsequent admissibility of those documents.13 Assisted by a liberal judicial interpretation of this phrase,14 parties have become reliant upon information obtained through this process (automatic or activated by notice at the close of pleadings in most Australian jurisdictions).15 However, with large volumes of documents discovered for inspection producing long delays, discovery in some jurisdictions16 is now subject to court order, and in some17 discovery is limited to documents ‘relevant’ or ‘directly relevant’18 to allegations in issue. This is intended to restrict the courts’ liberal interpretation of the phrase ‘relating to matters in question in the action’ and thereby reduce the number of documents to be inspected. 5.8 But other techniques for the exchange of information between parties have been developed by the courts, enabling party inspection and court preservation of objects or things which may form the subject matter of the action or be relevant to its proof. Individual superior courts at first relied upon their inherent powers to order medical examinations and blood tests,19 but now most rules of court contain express powers to order the inspection and preservation of property.20 Nevertheless, as a general rule these powers are exercised, not to enable parties to

fossick for new material, but to enable them to have access to property known to exist but under the control of the opponent. [page 438] In one specialised case — personal injury claims — rules of court did evolve to encourage a frank exchange of medical evidence before trial,21 and in all jurisdictions similar rules now importantly compel the exchange of all expert reports, and the information upon which they are based, before trial.22 5.9 Courts have extended access between parties in emergency situations, enabling preliminary discovery of documents and other property where another party is likely to dispose of them pending trial.23 The scope of such emergency access is co-extensive with ordinary access by way of discovery and inspection, although the need to search for and seize may sometimes result in access being more extensive than it ought to be. The courts have not been insistent that the matters to be seized be precisely defined in advance and have allowed general seizure of documents ‘relating to matters in question in the action’.24 Another development of the inherent powers in this context has been to allow seizure to take place before formal proceedings have been served, to ensure that the opponent with notice of action does not dispose of relevant information.25 But this development does not herald the way for access generally before proceedings are begun, and an order for seizure before proceedings are issued will only be made upon an undertaking that proceedings will be commenced immediately.26 5.10 The two important limitations upon these techniques for ensuring access to information are, first, they only apply after proceedings have been commenced (or an undertaking to that effect has been given), and, secondly, they only apply between parties. But even these limitations have been eroded by rules of court which, on the one hand, extend these techniques to operate between intending parties27 and, on the other, allow parties to obtain information from third persons not party to [page 439] the proceeding.28 These rules are more obviously access-giving in nature. But

there are difficulties in intruding upon intending parties and third persons pending action or trial and, on the whole, courts have applied these provisions only to allow access to known documents and property, giving no rights of access and seizure and not obliging third persons to disclose oral evidence likely to be given by them at any trial.29 One situation where intending parties have been allowed access to suspected information is in seeking disclosure to identify an appropriate defendant.30 5.11 More recently, these techniques have been supplemented in all jurisdictions through discovery made in the course of the pre-trial court management of proceedings.31 These procedures require parties to file information and give wide powers to courts to order disclosure of information, including evidence from experts and other witnesses, before trial, and to order pre-trial conferences between the parties. The object of the conference is to narrow issues and induce settlement. If disclosure of information is required for these purposes courts have wide powers to make orders to that effect. The modern tendency in civil jurisdictions is to increase the management of litigation by judges and to ensure that disclosure necessary to encourage settlement and to prepare parties for trial. It recognises that pre-trial disclosure can produce a fairer trial through eliminating surprise and being more conducive to accurate fact-finding. But it remains acutely aware of the possibilities for abuse if pre-trial proceedings are [page 440] left entirely in the hands of the parties and recognises the need for court management if trials are to proceed quickly and efficiently.

Criminal cases 5.12 In criminal cases, as in civil cases, testimonial and documentary evidence can be liberally compelled at trial through subpoena. With criminal courts conscious of the need to give the accused access to information, provided the subpoena is specific and not merely ‘dragging the lake in the hope of turning up some fish’,32 courts take a wide view of their power to subpoena the production of documents for a ‘legitimate forensic purpose’ or ‘for the purposes of evidence’

and will generally make documents so produced available to the parties to the case.33 Although no formal pre-trial discovery process between parties developed at common law, pre-trial discovery can be achieved through a variety of methods.34 In all criminal cases, pre-trial disclosure can be achieved through a court ordering that a subpoena be returned to a hearing prior to trial.35 If there is no pre-trial hearing to which the subpoena may be returned, the trial itself may be adjourned after documents have been produced to the court. [page 441] In serious criminal cases, pre-trial discovery is an important consequence of the committal procedure.36 Although initially only a process to ensure sufficient evidence against an accused to justify bringing the charge to trial, the procedure also has the consequence of disclosing the prosecution’s hand (although it will seldom disclose the defence’s, as an accused will rarely present evidence at committal proceedings). With legislation now authorising ‘paper’ or ‘hand-up’ committals whereby written witness statements alone may be the basis of committal, the procedure very much takes on the character of a pre-trial discovery process. In Western Australia, where the justices are required to commit the accused for trial following disclosure and a plea of not guilty,37 the process appears designed only to achieve pre-trial discovery. 5.13 The importance and fairness of disclosure to the accused through the committal process is recognised in a number of decisions.38 For example, although the calling of prosecution witnesses is said to remain at the discretion of the Crown, and failure to call a relevant witness at the committal is not a ground for invalidating the committal proceeding itself, nevertheless that failure may result in the staying of a subsequent trial to permit the accused to cross-examine a prosecution witness before trial.39 This discretion would appear to survive that legislation which provides for the presumptive hand-up paper committal.40 By this legislation,41 the prosecution evidence at committal may by consent, or presumptively must, consist of written witness statements. Where presumptive, witnesses may only be called by leave of the court (in some jurisdictions only where there are ‘substantial reasons in the interests of

[page 442] justice’ or ‘special circumstances’); that is, where a fair trial demands that the witness be called and cross-examined prior to trial. The legislation may impose further obligations of disclosure at committal. For example, by s 104 of the Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA), the prosecution is obliged also to disclose at the committal any documentary evidence upon which the prosecutor seeks to rely together with disclosure of ‘any other material relevant [and admissible] to the charge that is available to the prosecution’.42 In Victoria, the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 enacts a sophisticated process which through the delivery of a hand-up brief ensures full disclosure to the accused not just of material upon which the prosecution is relying at the committal, but also of ‘any other information, document or thing that is in the possession of the prosecution that is relevant to the offence’: s 110. The obligation of disclosure on the prosecution continues to trial: ss 111, 185, 416. In Ragg v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria,43 Bell J held that the right to a fair trial embodied in Art 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights imposed obligations upon prosecutors to disclose material documents to the accused. In most jurisdictions, pre-trial conferences or directions hearings are required or permitted at which the definition of issues for trial can be encouraged and preliminary objections dealt with.44 This can only be effectively achieved by the Crown making full disclosure of its case and the evidence it proposes to adduce in support of it, and the accused at least being asked which matters will be seriously disputed and evidence objected to. But in Victoria,45 New South Wales,46 Queensland47 and Western Australia,48 extensive pre-trial disclosure procedures are now enacted. There are, to varying degrees, specific obligations of disclosure upon the prosecution and the defence, and/or judges are given wide powers to seek clarification of issues and to determine preliminary legal points. This legislation is fast increasing in sophistication as it has become accepted that full disclosure by the prosecution is integral to a fair trial. Thus, for example, s 590AB(1) of the Criminal Code (Qld) ‘acknowledges that it is a fundamental obligation of the

[page 443] prosecution to ensure criminal proceedings are conducted fairly with the single aim of determining and establishing truth’, and enacts (s 590AB(2)) that ‘the obligation includes an ongoing obligation for the prosecution to give an accused person full and early disclosure’ of all evidence it proposes to rely upon and anything in its possession that would tend to help the accused’s case (except where disclosure of the latter would be unlawful or contrary to public policy). Following sections then elaborate the detail of these obligations.49 The disclosure obligations of the prosecution under the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) are similarly expressed in terms of ensuring a fair trial: see, for example, s 97(d). 5.14 Although by legislation in all Australian jurisdictions an accused has long been obliged to disclose an alibi,50 more recently most jurisdictions have imposed more extensive disclosure obligations upon accused.51 The accused must disclose any expert reports to be relied upon, state which evidence will be disputed and upon what basis, and make reasonable admissions where matters are not in dispute. But, as is discussed below at 5.134ff, except in limited circumstances in New South Wales, there remains no general obligation upon an accused to reveal his or her defence prior to trial. 52 In this sense the privilege against selfincrimination is preserved. Various techniques are employed to enforce these obligations. Failure to disclose an alibi may permit the trier to draw an inference where the prosecution has been denied the opportunity to investigate the alleged alibi, although, to preserve the privilege against self-incrimination, no more direct inference of guilt is permitted: see further at 5.142. The Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) provides that the failure of the accused to cooperate may result in costs against the accused and his or her lawyer (s 404),53 and permits ‘any comment that the judge thinks appropriate’ (query whether this [page 444] includes an inference of guilt) (s 237). Section 164A of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) permits the court in cases of non-compliance ‘to make such comments at the trial as appears proper’ and ‘the court or jury may then draw

such unfavourable inferences that may appear proper’. In South Australia, by virtue of ss 285BA–285BC of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935, the consequences for failure to comply are more extensively specified — unreasonable failure54 to make admissions following a prosecution notice to admit does not give rise to adverse comment but may be taken into account at sentencing; failure to disclose that evidence will be introduced on specified defences permits both prosecutor and judge to comment on non-compliance; failure to comply with a notice seeking consent to dispense with the authentication of certain evidence results in consent being presumed; failure to disclose an expert report may prevent tender of that expert evidence; and, where a defendant proposes to introduce expert evidence in relation to his or her physical or mental condition, failure of the accused to submit to medical examination by the prosecution estops the accused from tendering evidence from his or her experts. By ss 63 and 97 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), disclosure requirements may be enforced through adjournment, recalling witnesses and through ‘adverse comment to the jury by the court, counsel for the accused person, or the prosecution’: s 97(4). Again, in preservation of the privilege against self-incrimination,55 it is unlikely a court would permit a comment suggesting that an inference of guilt may be drawn. In summary cases, where traditionally pre-trial procedures have not been formalised, in some jurisdictions such procedures, including provisions for pretrial disclosure by both prosecution and defence, have been enacted,56 while in others, court rules provide for principles of case-flow management and encourage parties to cooperate before trial, and empower pre-trial conferences for these purposes.57 In addition, prosecutorial guidelines generally provide for disclosure prior to trial.58 [page 445] 5.15 This consciousness of the need for prosecutorial pre-trial disclosure may be explained by the common law obligation of the prosecution in every criminal case, indictable or summary, to provide that disclosure which allows an accused to prepare and conduct his or her case so that a miscarriage of justice may be avoided.59 The prosecution’s duty to call all material witnesses may be seen as part of this obligation.60 This obligation imposes duties of disclosure beyond

committal which apply in all criminal cases, and were summarised thus by the Supreme Court of South Australia in Re Van Beelen:61 1

Where the Crown calls a witness who did not give evidence at the committal proceedings, the accused should be given reasonable notice of the Crown’s intention to call that witness and should be furnished with a proof of the witness’s proposed evidence.

2

Where the Crown does not propose to call a witness who gave evidence at the committal proceedings, it should, unless there are strong and satisfactory reasons to the contrary, have the witness available in court so that the counsel (for the defence) may have the opportunity of calling him or her, as his or her own witness, if so wished.

3

Where the Crown has in its possession the statement of a person who can give material evidence, but decides not to call him or her, it must make him or her available as a witness for the defence, but need not supply the defence with a copy of the statement taken.62

4

When the Crown has in its possession a statement of a credible witness who can speak of material facts ‘which tend to show the prisoner to be innocent’ it must either call that witness or make his or her statement available to the defence.63

In R v Ward, the English Court of Appeal stated more generally that the interests of a fair trial demand that the prosecution ensure that all relevant evidence that may assist [page 446] an accused be either tendered at the trial or otherwise made available to the defence.64 This at least requires the availability of all statements taken from the accused and the disclosure of any tests, experiments or other evidence that might cast doubt on the prosecution case. The obligation has also been held to extend to prior convictions and other evidence that may materially affect the credibility of a prosecution witness.65 The question on appeal is whether the failure to disclose has produced a miscarriage of justice.66 5.16 A final avenue for enforcing pre-trial discovery exists in those jurisdictions which have freedom of information legislation.67 In Sobh v Police Force of Victoria, the Full Court held that the police file relating to the charge against the accused had to be disclosed under the legislation and that the statutory exemption, ‘prejudice [to] the … proper administration of the law in a particular instance’, could not be invoked on the ground that no general entitlement to discovery exists in criminal cases.68 Disclosure of particular documents may be refused if particular prejudice can be established, and there are other statutory grounds for refusing disclosure, such as legal professional privilege and public

interest immunity, similar to those grounds which exist at common law for refusing access to documents. 5.17 As a final perspective to this discussion of access to information it should be noted that to support effective law enforcement, where necessary through prosecution, police have wide powers of criminal investigation at common law and now generally by legislation, allowing them to arrest suspects, to search and seize premises and persons, to compel blood tests and fingerprints, and to question suspects before (and after) detention.69 [page 447] Nor should it be forgotten that many other investigatory bodies created by legislation have wide powers to collect evidence that may later be used in criminal prosecutions and other proceedings to impose penalties.70 It is not possible to give a full analysis of these powers here, but they, together with the resources that police and other investigative agencies have at their disposal (including, for police, most importantly, forensic resources), ensure wide access to information by prosecutors before trial. There are strong arguments that, to ensure the effectiveness of the adversarial trial through an equality of arms, not only should prosecutors be obliged to disclose the evidence upon which they intend to rely at trial, but also defendants should have greater access to facilities for the collection of information in preparation for trial. For example, the decisive effect of much DNA evidence makes it crucial that in every case defence counsel have access to the processes used to collect bodily samples and to isolate and analyse their DNA content, so that the reliability of any DNA identification can be effectively explored at trial. 5.18 The Uniform Evidence Acts are primarily directed to rules which govern the admissibility of evidence at trial, and do not purport to enact rules which give access to evidence prior to trial: see further 5.19. However, some provisions do have an incidental effect upon the pre-trial disclosure of evidence between parties; for example, in the case of hearsay evidence (s 67) and tendency and coincidence evidence (ss 97–98), notice of tender must be given and this will act as a disclosure device. Also, under s 167, where a party may make requests to determine a question relating to (a) a previous representation, or (b) evidence of a conviction, or (c) the

[page 448] authenticity, identity or admissibility of a document or thing, that request may be for the production and inspection of a document before trial.

The Nature of Rules Restricting Access to Information 5.19 Having examined the circumstances in which parties are given access to information, we are now in a position to consider those rules that apply to restrict that access. These are the truly exclusionary rules of evidence, for their effect may be to prevent altogether the disclosure of evidence to the trial court.71 At common law, they prevent party access to information before trial through the powers of search, seizure and investigation and through the procedures of discovery and inspection, and prevent the compulsory disclosure, inspection and tender of information at trial through the process of subpoena (of documents and witnesses); they also entitle witnesses subpoenaed to testify to refuse the tender of information or documents during their examination by the parties. The common law restrictions upon access are effectively enacted in the uniform legislation in Pt 3.10 headed ‘Privileges’, and while the principles behind these restrictions in many instances reflect the common law, inevitably in their enactment technical modifications to the common law position are made. As originally enacted, the most significant difference from the common law was that many of the privileges were enacted as rules of admissibility, determining the admissibility of evidence ‘adduced’ at trial,72 so that the privileges enacted apply only to restrict the tender of evidence.73 Where this is the case, other processes whereby information is produced or inspected prior to or during trial remain governed by rules of court, which generally [page 449] preserve common law restrictions. Where this is so, access to (the same) information may depend upon the stage of the trial at which access is sought. A document might be discoverable because at common law it is not within legal

professional privilege yet its tender at trial might be prevented by the statutory client legal privilege. Judges sought to mitigate these anomalies by simply evolving the common law in Australia to accord with the uniform legislation,74 or more modestly explained the existing common law as conforming with the legislation,75 or through exercising their pre-trial discretions to produce uniformity.76 In some jurisdictions the anomalies were removed by rules of court simply applying the uniform legislation to all pre-trial access in civil proceedings.77 Legislatures party to the Uniform Evidence Acts also acted to mitigate the anomalies. At one level reforms were made to equate the scope of the statutory privilege with common law developments.78 But more sensibly, s 131A has now been included to extend (to varying degrees in each jurisdiction) the application of the privileges to ‘preliminary proceedings of courts’. 79 These are defined as processes for ‘preliminary disclosure which means a court process or court order that requires the disclosure of information or a document and includes’ a subpoena to testify or produce a document, pre-trial discovery, non-party discovery, interrogatories, a notice to produce, a request to produce, and (in Victoria only) a search warrant.80 In all uniform legislation jurisdictions, other than the Commonwealth, this section applies to all [page 450] privileges enacted in Pt 3.10 Divs 1 (Client legal privilege), 1C (Journalist privilege) and 3 (Evidence excluded in the public interest — judicial etc decisions, matters of state and settlement negotiations).81 In New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory, a Div 1A (Professional confidential relationship privilege) is also enacted and s 131A extends to this privilege; in Tasmania, it extends to the privileges enacted in ss 127A (Medical communications) and 127B (Communications to counsellors); but in the Commonwealth Act, s 131A is restricted to the journalists’ privilege (enacted in Pt 3.10 Div 1C).82 Section 131A is enlivened on objection by the person from whom discovery or production of the information or document is sought, so that the common law continues to apply to a claim by a privilege holder who is not the subject of this process.83 While the Victorian Act extends to search warrants ordered by courts

by way of preliminary proceeding, none of the Uniform Acts extend the privileges more generally to access by statutory investigative bodies. Consequently, where these bodies have power themselves to compel the production of information and documents the common law restrictions upon access also continue unless removed by the legislative grant of power.84 5.20 Many of the common law restrictions upon access to information are inherent in the common law procedural system. To recommend their abolition would be to recommend a fundamental change to the way justice is administered by common law courts. In particular, as is argued below, legal professional privilege, the negotiations privilege and the privilege against self-incrimination, are all necessary components of the common law adversarial process. Other restrictions upon access to information are based upon policy factors that exist quite independently of the administration of justice which culminates in the adversary trial. For example, protection given to marital and other confidential relationships (through a witness’s immunity to testify or to answer particular questions) is justified by social attitudes that exist independently of the system of justice. Similarly, the [page 451] protection given to matters of state exists in its own right, trumping the right of access for effective adversarial trial. These restrictions may be extended, as they increasingly are under the uniform legislation, without changing common law adversarial process in any fundamental way, although it must always be recognised that further restrictions can only result in less accurate decision-making by the courts. 5.21 By way of introduction, it might finally be noted that the restrictions upon access to information manifest themselves in different ways. Most operate to give an individual the option of refusing to disclose information. There is a right in the nature of a ‘privilege’ to refuse disclosure. As a result an individual may refuse to produce documents, or to testify at all (is not a ‘compellable’ witness), or to answer particular questions (has a ‘privilege’ not to answer). In this chapter, the word ‘privilege’ will generally be used to embrace all these consequences, although in a narrow sense, the word has often been used by common lawyers only to describe the right of a testifying witness to refuse to answer a particular

question or produce a particular document. Other restrictions upon access to information give no option to an individual and forbid party access to particular information altogether. Public interest immunity is the best example of this, and courts are charged with the duty of ensuring that particular information is not leaked into the public domain. Whether a restriction operates by way of ‘privilege’ or ‘compellability’ or ‘immunity’, its effect is the same — to restrict access to information by adversaries, and hence courts, to relevant evidence.

Adversary Restrictions Upon Access to Information Legal professional privilege (client legal privilege)85 Two privileges 5.22 In a series of modern High Court decisions the rationale behind legal professional privilege is put forward in the following terms:86 citizens (natural and artificial)87 are accorded rights and obligations by the law which it is their prerogative to understand fully and, ultimately, to enforce and protect through the courts. In many cases these rights and obligations are capable of being effectively understood and enforced only through expert legal advice and assistance; and to encourage citizens to seek that advice and assistance through frank and open discussion, communications [page 452] made with lawyers seeking their professional advice and assistance are protected from disclosure.88 This rationale protects communications whether or not they seek advice related to litigation.89 Upon this justification, legal professional privilege should apply in all Western democracies, for it seeks no rationale in litigation and the more extreme details of the common law adversary trial,90 but in the right of citizens to obtain legal advice on matters that may affect them. In this sense it should not be seen as jurisdictionally specific.91 The High Court has put the justification in the strongest terms. The ‘basic

justification for allowing the privilege is the public interest in facilitating the application of the rule of law’,92 the privilege is a ‘practical guarantee of fundamental, constitutional or human rights’,93 and as such it is especially important as ‘a bulwark against tyranny and oppression’.94 [page 453] Put in these terms the privilege applies not merely as a rule of evidence to prevent compulsory disclosure in the course of court proceedings but takes on the character of a substantive right that applies to prevent all compulsory access to privileged material.95 Thus, for example, a police search warrant may be resisted by claim of the privilege,96 or a search by taxation authorities,97 or an inquiry by a statutory body such as the Australian Securities and Investments Commission.98 5.23 The justification emphasised by the High Court ostensibly proceeds upon the assumption that there is but one privilege: a privilege protecting client–lawyer communications. And it may be that, in the long run, the High Court will make this assumption overt. However, it is generally accepted that there is another narrower aspect of legal professional privilege at common law, one that protects materials collected by lawyers (personally or through their clients) for the purposes of pursuing adversary litigation. This privilege finds its justification in the adversary notion that the lawyer’s brief is sacrosanct.99 In America, it is known as the lawyers’ ‘work product privilege’.100 Its most powerful justification is that it provides an incentive to lawyers and parties to collect information and argument for presentation at trial.101 Although [page 454] some references to this privilege can be found in High Court judgments,102 the court is yet to make clear whether this litigation privilege has an existence and rationale distinct from the communications privilege.103 If this narrower litigation privilege finds its justification in the notion of the common law adversary trial we would expect to find it only in common law

adversarial jurisdictions.104 And upon this narrow adversary justification, it might also be argued that the privilege applies only to entitle one adversary litigant to refuse access to an opponent in the litigation, and cannot be relied upon in other situations where access is compulsory.105 It appears then, that at common law the notion of legal professional privilege embraces two privileges: a communications privilege and a litigation privilege. These are separate privileges that can be justified by separate rationales,106 although they overlap where clients and lawyers communicate about litigation. The major difference in their scope is that whereas the communications privilege extends only to privilege communications made between client and lawyer, the litigation privilege extends to privilege communications made with and materials collected by lawyer and client [page 455] from third parties when made for the purposes of litigation. However, as is discussed below (at 5.37–5.38), there is evolving authority in Australia supporting the view that if clients are to be fully encouraged simply to seek effective legal advice then, not only must the actual communication between client and lawyer be privileged, but also any communications made with and materials collected from third parties when required to obtain that advice. If this evolution continues, the distinction between the two privileges is significantly eroded. 5.24 The uniform legislation distinguishes and enacts both privileges, the communications (advice) privilege in s 118 and the litigation privilege in ss 119 and 120. Section 120 extends the litigation privilege to protect not only material created for the lawyer’s brief but also similar material created by a litigant acting in person and without legal representation. These sections only operate in ‘proceedings’ to which the Uniform Acts apply,107 and are expressed to operate as rules of admissibility (‘evidence is not to be adduced’).108 However, in all Uniform Acts, other than the Commonwealth Act, this ambit is extended by s 131A to pre-trial access during litigation. Beyond litigation access must be resisted by invoking the common law: see further the discussion at 5.19. Therefore, whereas the privileges under the uniform legislation operate as rules of admissibility and access during trial, the common

law privileges operate more generally simply as rules of access, giving rise to an argument that once access has been obtained the privilege has no further operation: see further 5.61ff. The legislative privileges are therefore arguably different not only in scope but also in nature to those at common law.

The communications (advice) privilege 5.25 This privilege protects from disclosure confidential communications between client and lawyer made bona fide for the purpose of seeking and giving legal professional advice. Its apparent enactment is found in s 118 of the uniform legislation. Various aspects require elaboration. Lawyers and clients 5.26 The privilege exists to encourage clients to seek confidential professional advice from lawyers sufficiently competent and independent to give it. In each Australian jurisdiction these qualities are ensured through the strict control (ultimately by the courts) of the right to practise law, and Waterford v Commonwealth makes clear that only [page 456] advice sought from admitted legal practitioners gives rise to the privilege.109 Section 117 of the uniform legislation similarly defines ‘lawyer’ to mean (amongst other things) an Australian lawyer, in turn defined in the Dictionary as a person admitted to practice. At both common law and under s 117, the holding of a practising certificate is not essential so long as legal advice is genuinely sought from or given by a person qualified to practise.110 At common law, it may even be enough to justify a claim to privilege that a client reasonably believes another to be acting as lawyer on his or her behalf.111 It matters not either at common law nor under the uniform legislation whether lawyers practise upon their own account or for others (including the Crown) upon a salary or retainer.112 In the latter cases, however, courts will be careful to ensure that the lawyer acts independently113 and that only legal advice is protected by the privilege: [page 457]

see 5.27. At common law, the privilege is not jurisdictionally specific so advice by foreign lawyers is within the ambit of the privilege,114 and s 117 of all Uniform Evidence Acts extends their client–lawyer privileges to overseasregistered foreign lawyers or natural persons who under the law of a foreign country are permitted to engage in legal practice in that country.115 All the Uniform Acts include employees or agents of lawyers within the definition of lawyer in s 117. By s 200(2) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth), communications between patent attorneys and their clients are privileged to the same extent as if they were communications between solicitor and client.116 Clients comprise any entity entitled to legal rights and obligations and able to enforce them. Companies and other legal entities including the government and its various administrative entities may be clients for these purposes.117 The uniform legislation recognises this by defining client in s 117(1) as including any person or body (including governmental and statutory bodies and including employees or agents) who employs a lawyer. At common law, the privilege survives the death of the client,118 and s 117(1) of the uniform legislation achieves this position by defining client to include personal representatives and successors. Legal professional advice 5.27 The advice sought may relate to pending litigation or rights and obligations not in prospect of dispute.119 But it must be legal professional advice that is sought. In Waterford v Commonwealth,120 advice from the Attorney-General to the Treasury upon the government’s policy in enforcing the Freedom of Information Act 1982 [page 458] (Cth) was held not to constitute legal advice, whereas advice concerning the extent of the government’s rights and obligations in providing information under that Act was so regarded. Dawson J refused to draw this distinction on the ground that where a government seeks and is given advice upon legal rights and

obligations in the course of making administrative decisions, any protection ought to be justified upon wider grounds of public interest rather than on grounds of legal professional privilege. The majority, reluctant to consider public interests beyond those reflected in the privilege, held that the rationale of the communications privilege applies as strongly to governments as to individual citizens, and determined the case simply upon the basis of the privilege. The correctness of this approach is implicitly confirmed by the High Court in Carter v Managing Partner, Northmore Hale Davey and Leake:121 discussed below at 5.68. Waterford illustrates that, where lawyers are consulted upon other than professional matters, there is no privilege.122 Where lawyers practise privately there is a factual presumption that they are consulted upon professional matters.123 Where lawyers practise as the employees of, for example, companies, and are employed to perform various duties, such a presumption cannot be made.124 But ‘legal advice is not confined to telling the client the law; it must include advice as to what should prudently and sensibly be done in the relevant legal context’.125 Thus, wherever lawyers are asked to put on their legal spectacles to consider a matter as lawyer it is likely they are asked to provide legal professional advice.126 [page 459] The uniform legislation provides simply in s 118 that the communication should be made for the dominant purpose of ‘providing legal advice’, a phrase that will presumably be interpreted in the light of the common law position.127 Confidentiality 5.28 Communications must be made confidentially between lawyer and client to attract the communications privilege. As long as the communication is made confidentially the privilege applies to it, even though the communication may concern information that is not otherwise confidential, for it is the communication that attracts the privilege at common law.128 All communications made privately between clients and lawyers will be presumed confidential, so that the lawyer is under an obligation not to disclose the communications. But the presence of third parties might displace this

presumption. In R v Braham and Mason, an admission made by a suspected criminal over the telephone to his solicitor in the presence of police officers was not protected by the privilege. On its facts, where the same admissions had already been made to the police, the case may not have justified the inference of confidentiality underlying the privilege, but it should not be taken to stand for the arbitrary conclusion that the presence of third parties always undermines the confidentiality of a communication.129 R v Braham and Mason was distinguished by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v Uljee,130 where it was held that a police officer outside a room in which the client was conversing with his solicitor did not destroy the confidentiality of the conversation even though the police officer was able to overhear what was said. Essentially the question must be whether the client is communicating on the understanding that neither the lawyer nor any third party known by the client to be present will disclose the communication. Where third parties are known by the client to be present it may be difficult to infer that the client was communicating confidentially to the lawyer [page 460] unless the third parties already owe a duty of confidence to the client, or the client has (reasonably) insisted beforehand that the third parties retain confidentiality. If the communications privilege extends to communications by a client (or lawyer) with third parties for the purpose of obtaining or giving confidential advice, it is suggested (drawing on cases considering the application of the litigation privilege to third party communications) that such communications are privileged when sought from the lawyer or client (as a duty of confidence arises by virtue of the lawyer–client relationship) whether or not the third party is under any obligation of confidence.131 However, if evidence of the communication is sought from the third party, privilege cannot be asserted by the client unless the third party made the communication at least understanding it was sought in confidence.132 And it may be possible to infer this ‘from the nature of the activities being undertaken’.133 There is of course a distinction to be drawn here between an obligation not to disclose the fact and contents of the privileged communication and an obligation not to disclose otherwise unprivileged

information that happens also to be contained in that privileged communication. The client cannot prevent a third party (for example, a witness) disclosing otherwise unprivileged information (events observed by the witness) where to do so does not involve disclosure of what is contained in a privileged communication (for example, the confidential statement made by the witness to a party’s lawyer for the purposes of litigation).134 The notion of confidentiality remains central to s 118 of the uniform legislation, s 117 defining separately ‘confidential communications’ and ‘confidential documents’, and providing that such confidence exists wherever the maker or receiver of the communication or document was ‘under an express or implied obligation not to [page 461] disclose its contents, whether or not the obligation arises under law’.135 Despite the breadth of this definition, in the case of the advice privilege enacted in s 118, it is submitted that an obligation of confidentiality between lawyer and client must exist for s 118(a) and (b) to apply, but that insofar as s 118(c) includes third party documents, when sought from the lawyer it is enough that the lawyer be under the obligation of confidence (to the client), but where sought from the third party it is the third party who must be under that obligation (‘whether or not the obligation arises under law’). Bona fides 5.29 The communications privilege does not arise unless the client is genuinely seeking advice about his or her legal rights and/or responsibilities. Thus, for example, communications made in furtherance of a crime or fraud do not fall within the privilege.136 This in no way limits the right of a client to obtain advice about past misdeeds, but excludes from protection communications made in furtherance of a misdeed. And a distinction must be drawn between the seeking of genuine advice about the legal limits of a future course of conduct and abusing the relationship to further a fraudulent or criminal purpose.137 The privilege exists to encourage the seeking of genuine advice about one’s legal position, not to encourage advice that will enable one to manipulate or otherwise abuse one’s legal position. In Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney, the Northern

Territory government sought advice from its Crown Law Department upon whether it could legally frustrate an Aboriginal land claim under Commonwealth legislation by rezoning the land in question. The High Court refused to uphold a claim of privilege over documents embodying the advice as the government’s objective was an abuse of the government’s zoning powers.138 5.30 Although bona fides has traditionally been discussed in terms of there being a ‘crime and fraud exception’ to legal professional privilege, in Carter v Managing Partner, Northmore Hale Davey and Leake, Deane and McHugh JJ emphasise that where advice is sought in furtherance of a crime or fraud, rather than these being exceptional circumstances which defeat the privilege they are circumstances which prevent the [page 462] privilege arising in the first place.139 However, it does appear that, in accordance with a presumption of innocence, there is an evidential presumption of bona fides, so that a party objecting to the privilege must be able to point to some prima facie admissible evidence of bad faith before that issue will be considered.140 Once the issue is properly raised the persuasive onus is upon the party claiming privilege to establish that the communication was made in good faith. In R v Central Criminal Court; Ex parte Francis & Francis, Lords Bridge and Goff suggest in dicta that the fraud of a third party manipulating an innocent client might invoke the crime and fraud exception as ‘the disclosure of the third party’s iniquity must, in the interests of justice, prevail over the privilege of the client’.141 This must be regarded as highly doubtful in view of the majority decision in Carter v Managing Partner, Northmore Hale Davey and Leake that once the privilege applies it cannot be outweighed by further public interests.142 5.31 Under the uniform legislation, there is no flexible requirement of bona fides expressed in s 118. Rather, under the heading ‘Loss of client legal privilege: misconduct’, s 125 provides two formal exceptions: s 125(1)(a) excepts communications or documents made by client, lawyer or party in furtherance of a crime or fraud143 or act attracting civil penalty;144 and s 125(1)(b) excepts communications or documents made knowingly or negligently by client, lawyer

or party in furtherance of a deliberate abuse of power.145 It is not enough that a third party is acting fraudulently if the parties [page 463] to the privileged communication or document are acting innocently. The persuasive onus of establishing these exceptions lies on the party seeking to avoid the privilege to the civil standard: s 142. However, under s 125(2), if the crime or fraud or misconduct is a fact in issue in the principal proceedings the standard is ‘reasonable grounds for finding’.146 Just as a lack of bona fides in making the communication prevents the privilege from arising it may be argued that a lack of bona fides in claiming should prevent it arising. This is a possible explanation of Re Bell; Ex parte Lees, where the High Court held that a wife illegally avoiding a custody order over her child could not prevent her solicitor, employed by her to claim the matrimonial home, from disclosing her whereabouts to enable enforcement of the custody order.147 Insofar as Re Bell; Ex parte Lees suggests that the privilege can be outweighed by countervailing public policies it is inconsistent with Carter v Managing Partner, Northmore Hale Davey and Leake,148 but it was expressly not overruled by that case. Communication made for the dominant purpose of legal advice 5.32 The rationale for the privilege extends to protecting communications (oral or written) from client to lawyer (including their agents) for the purpose of obtaining professional legal advice. This rationale does not protect information as such; rather, it protects from disclosure only communications.149 But this raises a number of questions about what is a communication for these purposes. Does the rationale extend the privilege to communications the lawyer makes in response to a client’s advice-seeking communication? Does the rationale protect material, notes, memoranda and records prepared by lawyer and/or client to facilitate the making of communications, disclosure of which would reveal the contents of a confidential communication? Does the rationale extend to protect a communication made for mixed purposes, only one of which is the seeking or giving of legal advice? Can a communication made to a lawyer or client by a

third person be regarded in any circumstances as a lawyer–client communication, or at least so integral to the communication process that it is protected by the privilege? 5.33 It would give the client little incentive to disclose confidential matters to a lawyer if the communications they received in response were not also privileged, and the authorities are clear in granting the privilege to communications passing both [page 464] ways.150 But the advice must be given in response to an express or implied confidential request by the client for advice. There is no need for any formal retainer before the privilege applies but unsolicited communications by lawyers to persons they hope to encourage to be their clients are not privileged.151 Counsel’s opinion to a solicitor152 and communications between legal advisers and subordinates are also privileged.153 Again, there would be little incentive to disclose confidential matters to a lawyer if, in addition to the actual communication, material brought into existence in confidence for the facilitation of that communication (disclosure of which would lead to revelation of the privileged communication) was not also privileged. Thus, confidential notes, memoranda, minutes, copies and other documents made by client and lawyer relating to the communication process, disclosure of which would reveal privileged communications, are also privileged.154 The protection of this material may be justified conceptually as the existence of such confidential material is directly attributable to the making of the privileged communication, and in this sense may be regarded as an integral part of that communication. Nor can this material be regarded as comprising new communications to which the application of the privilege should be independently determined.155 A further conceptualisation for protecting such material can be found in Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd v Antico,156 where Hodgson J held that the privilege also allows a client to refuse disclosure of confidential [page 465]

knowledge, information or belief based upon a privileged communication where disclosure of that knowledge, information or belief would reveal the contents of the privileged communication upon which it is based. Another extension of the privilege beyond the actual communication can be found in Southwark and Vauxhall Water Co v Quick,157 where a confidential document prepared by the client for the purpose of seeking advice but never actually communicated was held to be privileged: see also s 118(c) of the uniform legislation. 5.34 For a communication between client and lawyer to be privileged it must have been made for the purposes of seeking or giving legal advice. Similarly, where the litigation privilege is invoked it must be shown the material was created at the instigation of lawyer or client for the purposes of pending or anticipated litigation. But problems arise where communications are made or materials created for a variety of purposes. These problems were canvassed by the High Court in Grant v Downs.158 As it happened, the facts of this case gave rise simultaneously to both communications and litigation limbs of the common law privilege but in determining the degree of purpose required the court drew no distinction between these limbs. The defendant (in substance the New South Wales Department of Health) refused discovery of reports prepared for senior officers following an accidental death in a psychiatric centre run by the department. The routine reports, prepared by medical superintendents employed by the department at the centre, were made for three departmental purposes: to determine whether breaches of discipline by staff had occurred; to determine whether there were any faults in the security and general running of the centre; and to provide material for legal advisers in view of possible legal proceedings. The reports in question had been forwarded by the senior officers to the department’s legal advisers. With English authority suggesting privilege could be invoked as long as one of the purposes was the seeking of legal advice or use in litigation, the question considered by the High Court was the degree to which the creation of these documents had to be referable to either purpose before they could be regarded as privileged. The majority (Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ) began with the proposition that party access to information should only be restricted on clear and justifiable grounds, and reasoned that legal professional privilege should apply only insofar as is strictly necessary to encourage frank consultation between client and lawyer. Worried about abuse of the privilege, particularly through the routine

channelling of existing documents through legal advisers, and particularly by corporations, the majority held that for legal professional privilege to apply, a document must have been created for [page 466] the sole purpose of advice or use in litigation. On the other hand, Barwick CJ thought the sole purpose test too strict and considered that a dominant purpose test struck a more appropriate balance in terms of the interests concerned.159 Jacobs J formulated the test in terms of legal advice accounting for the creation of the document. All agreed that the reports in question satisfied none of these tests. On a literal interpretation of the ‘sole purpose’ test any subsidiary purpose served by the communication or document is sufficient to defeat a claim of privilege. Subsequent courts were reluctant to take this approach and interpreted the majority approach more in line with that expounded by Jacobs J.160 This interpretation emphasises that it is always the reasons for the creation of the communication or document which will determine whether it is privileged.161 The majority had explained that (at 688) ‘[i]t is not right that the privilege can attach to documents which, quite apart from the purpose of submission to a solicitor, would have been brought into existence for other purposes in any event’, and Deane J in Waterford v Commonwealth refers to this passage in concluding that the majority test ‘has conveniently, if somewhat loosely, been referred to as the sole purpose test’.162 Deane J goes on to explain the sole purpose test in words similar to those used by Jacobs J in Grant v Downs: ‘For the document to be protected, the cause of its existence, in the sense of both causans and sine qua non, must be the seeking or provision of professional legal advice’. Although Mason and Wilson JJ in Waterford (at 67) are less explicit, their emphasis upon the reason why the document was brought into existence, an issue to which the presence of contents extraneous to legal advice is relevant but not decisive, suggests they were applying the sole purpose test in a similar manner. As a consequence it became necessary to interpret express judicial adoptions of the ‘sole purpose’ test in this light.163 [page 467]

5.35 The uniform legislation enacts in ss 118–120 a ‘dominant purpose’ test. By this approach, even where a communication or document would have had an existence independent of the seeking of legal advice or use in anticipated litigation, the particular communication or document in question will still be protected if the seeking of advice or use in litigation can be regarded as the dominant reason for its existence.164 This decision is much more difficult than that of sole purpose, as somehow weight must be accorded to the various reasons which give rise to the making or preparing of the particular communication or document in question,165 the onus of satisfying the court to the civil standard always being on the person claiming the privilege: s 142. 5.36 As explained at 5.19, the differences in approach to purpose at common law and under the uniform legislation led to the anomalous situation whereby in the same litigation a document might not be privileged on discovery (applying the sole purpose test of the common law) and yet privileged at trial (applying the dominant purpose test of the uniform legislation). Some courts sought to avoid this situation by altering the common law in light of the statutory test; others sought to use the discretion on discovery to ensure the same result was achieved on discovery and at trial. When the matter came before the High Court in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation166 all judges agreed that the techniques used by the lower courts to remove the differences were inappropriate. A majority was, however, prepared to take the opportunity to overrule the dicta of the majority in Grant v Downs endorsing a ‘sole purpose’ test. Dicta because, on the facts of that case, upon the application of either sole purpose or dominant purpose there was no privilege, and dicta because in that case it was in the interests of neither party to pursue the differences between the tests. [page 468] The determinative issue in Grant v Downs was simply whether the privilege could arise where a report was created to serve a number of purposes, only one of which was the seeking of legal advice. The majority in Esso was persuaded that the ‘sole purpose’ test, if literally applied, operated too strictly against corporations, and, although there is a clear sympathy in the majority judgments for the application of a modified test along

the lines suggested by Jacobs J in Grant v Downs,167 it felt that it was too late to impose what it regarded as a new test, that the acceptance of the dominant purpose test throughout the common law world was a precedent the court should follow, and that in practical terms it is unlikely the dominant purpose test will produce results which would not be achieved by the Jacobs J approach. McHugh and Kirby JJ, in strong dissents, lamented the extension of the privilege and the consequent diminution in discovery against companies, and lamented the increased difficulties that appear to arise in determining when a purpose is dominant. In the result, the dominant purpose test now applies both at common law and under the uniform legislation, mitigating the differences between the common law and statutory privileges that might otherwise apply at different stages of the litigation process. But the result has not been to abandon entirely the approach of the sole purpose test, for if a judge can decide that the seeking of legal advice or use in litigation alone accounts for the existence of the communication or document then the dominant purpose test is satisfied. Only where two purposes would individually or in combination account for its existence must the court determine which was dominant. For the claim to privilege to succeed it is the purpose of the client or lawyer in making the communication to obtain advice or in creating the material for use in pending or anticipated litigation that must be dominant to its creation.168 This is a question of fact.169 5.37 On its face, the communications privilege protects only communications between clients and lawyers. These communications may be made directly or through agents with authority to make communications on behalf of a client or lawyer. This is recognised by s 117 of the uniform legislation, which defines clients and lawyers to include their employees and agents. [page 469] The result of this logic is that communications made by clients and lawyers to third parties do not fall within the privilege protecting communications between client and lawyer. This may be contrasted to the litigation privilege which exists to encourage lawyers to create materials for litigation so that communications from persons outside the client–lawyer relationship made for the purposes of the

lawyer obtaining information for anticipated or pending litigation are centrally within this litigation limb of the privilege. But the same latitude does not extend to the communications privilege, so that unless a third person communicates with a lawyer as agent for the client no privilege can arise. The crucial consequence of this is illustrated by Wheeler v Le Marchant,170 where, for the purposes of giving non-litigious advice, a lawyer had commissioned a report from a surveyor and the court held that this report could not be privileged — it was not a communication between client and lawyer and no litigation was pending or anticipated to invoke the litigation privilege. However, had the client instructed the surveyor to communicate with the lawyer on his behalf in relation to the matter upon which the client was seeking advice then the communications privilege could have applied. This was held to be the situation in Nickmar Pty Ltd v Preservatrice Skandia Insurance Ltd.171 An insurer, having contacted loss assessors following a fire on the insured’s premises, on the advice of the loss assessors formally requested its lawyers to obtain a report from the loss assessor. The main issue was whether the channelling of the report through the insurer’s lawyers was simply a sham. This argument Wood J rejected. But he also was prepared to find that when the assessor duly reported to the insurer’s lawyers it had acted as the insurer’s agent in making a client–lawyer communication, so that the communications privilege could be invoked. One might question whether the loss assessors were truly the insurer’s agents for the purposes of communicating with their lawyers. Rather, one might argue that the assessor was only an agent for the purpose of providing a report on loss to the lawyers and that there was insufficient agency to invoke the communications privilege.172 But as Wood J was also prepared to invoke the litigation privilege this was not a crucial point. However, in Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation,173 Finn J was more explicit in holding that the employment by a client of a firm of accountants to provide [page 470] information relevant to a proposal to restructure did not make the accountants agents for the purpose of making communications with the client’s lawyers. The

firm simply did work for the client but in no further sense could be regarded as an agent for the purposes of seeking legal advice. As can be appreciated, this need to find agency, while ensuring that the privilege protects only client–lawyer communications, produces results that are at least technical and at most appear inconsistent with the reasons for having a communications privilege in the first place. The self-sufficient (and often wellresourced) client can simply communicate in confidence all information in relation to a matter upon which legal advice is sought, and the self-sufficient lawyer can simply communicate in confidence the necessary advice in return, knowing those communications are privileged. But as soon as the client or lawyer needs to turn to third parties for the purposes of obtaining any further information necessary to obtain or give effective advice, the communications with those third parties fall outside the privilege. Only if the client has formally instructed the third party to communicate directly with the lawyer as its agent can the communications privilege be invoked. If this has not been done the anomalous situation arises whereby if the client includes the report from the third party with its communication to its lawyer, the privilege applies when access is sought from the client (the report becoming part of a client–lawyer communication), but if access to the report is sought from the third party no privilege can be claimed.174 Yet if the privilege exists to encourage clients to obtain and lawyers to give effective legal advice it is strongly arguable that such communications should be protected without the client having to formally appoint a third party as its agent. 5.38 In Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation, the Full Court of the Federal Court accepted these arguments in holding that a report prepared by accountants for a client for the predominant purpose of it being communicated to lawyers for advice was privileged in the hands of the accountants. As Finn J concluded (at [41]): The important consideration in my view is not the nature of the third party’s legal relationship with the party that engaged it but, rather, the nature of the function it performed for that party. If that function was to enable the principal to make the communication necessary to obtain legal advice it required, I can see no reason for withholding the privilege from the documentary communication authored by the third party. That party has been so implicated in the communication made by the client to its legal adviser as to bring its work product within the rationale of legal advice privilege.

But the court emphasises that whether a third party communication can be protected by the communications privilege then depends entirely upon the purpose of the client in instigating the communication. Where the documentary

communication from the third party is obtained for the dominant purpose of it being transmitted by the client to the lawyer to obtain legal advice, Finn J is clear in privileging the document in the [page 471] third party’s hands. But if the documentary communication is obtained in order for the client to consider it in deciding what information to put to the lawyer in seeking advice then it may be argued that the dominant purpose for the creation of the third party’s report is not to obtain legal advice based upon it but to decide what use to make of it in seeking advice. In these circumstances it will not be privileged in the third party’s hands (or one might argue at all). As Finn J comments (at [47]): … notwithstanding the principal’s stated purpose in having a documentary communication brought into existence, the principal may have so conducted himself or herself in the matter as to indicate that the intended use of the document authored by the third party was not its communication to the legal adviser as the principal’s communication, but rather it was to advise and inform the principal concerning its subject matter, with the principal then determining (a) in what manner, if at all, the whole or part of the document would be used by the principal in making its own communication or (b) the purpose(s) for which the document could or should be used. The less the principal performs the function of a conduit of the documentary information to the legal adviser, the more he or she filters, adapts or exercises independent judgment in relation to what of the third party’s document is to be communicated to the legal adviser, the less likely it is that that document will be found to be privileged in the third party’s hands. This will be because the intended use of the document is more likely to be found to be to advise and inform the principal in making the principal’s communication to the lawyer (whether or not that communication embodied wholly or substantially the content of the document) and not to record the communication to be made.

How far this expansion of the communications privilege will evolve at common law remains to be seen. Although the decision in Wheeler v Le Marchant was not disapproved of by Finn J, one might argue that the following dictum of Barwick CJ in Grant v Downs175 contains an appropriate objective for the common law: … a document which was produced or brought into existence either with the dominant purpose of its author, or of the person or authority under whose direction, whether particular or general, it was produced or brought into existence, of using it or its contents in order to obtain legal advice or to conduct or aid in the conduct of litigation, at the time of its production in reasonable prospect, should be privileged and excluded from inspection.

5.39 The privilege enacted in s 118 of the uniform legislation is based upon the common law communications privilege. Thus, s 118(a) and 118(b) protect

confidential communications passing between client and lawyer, as well as confidential communications between lawyers, provided they are made for the dominant purpose of the lawyer providing legal advice to the client. [page 472] And just as the common law extends the privilege beyond the communications as such, so s 118(c) extends the privilege to the contents of confidential documents (whether delivered or not) prepared by client or lawyer for the dominant purpose of the lawyer providing legal advice to the client. But whereas at common law the disclosure of such documents is privileged insofar as they are integral to the process of communication between client and lawyer, and to ensure that confidential communications are not revealed, s 118(c) applies the privilege to such documents prepared by client or lawyer in their own right, whether or not they are communications between client and lawyer. The privilege in s 118 extends beyond the protection of lawyer–client communications to embrace any confidential document brought into existence by client or lawyer for the dominant purpose of a lawyer providing legal advice.176 Furthermore, with s 118(c) now amended to include a document prepared not just by a client or lawyer but by ‘another person’, documents created by persons outside the client–lawyer relationship fall within the privilege created by s 118. Only communications not contained in documents remain outside s 118(c) and can only be privileged if within s 118(a) or (b).177 Oral communications from third parties made for the purposes of a lawyer giving advice are outside s 118(c). Thus, both at common law and under the uniform legislation, the first limb of privilege has shifted from being regarded as a communications privilege to being more accurately described as an advice privilege, closely paralleling the litigation privilege: discussed further at 5.41ff. The limit to the privilege is the purpose of the client or lawyer who has instigated the creation of the particular communication or document. 5.40 Communications made for mixed purposes remain privileged so long as their dominant purpose is the seeking or giving of legal advice. But a separate question is whether, where extraneous matters are referred to, might these still be disclosed by way of severance.

It was this situation that arose in Waterford v Commonwealth, with the majority refusing to interfere with the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to uphold the privilege claim despite the fact that the communications in question gave not only legal advice but also advice upon the government’s policy in enforcing the Freedom [page 473] of Information Act 1982 (Cth).178 But both Mason and Wilson JJ (at 66) in majority, and Deane (at 87–8) and Dawson JJ (at 102–3) in dissent, recognise the possibility of severance where a privileged communication deals also with extraneous matters and it is possible to disclose these without disclosing the privileged matters. Although this case was decided by reference to a sole purpose test, that test was not applied in its pure form so that privilege remained although the communication also dealt with non-privileged matters. This is the situation that will necessarily arise where the dominant purpose test applies and there seems no reason why the severance reasoning in Waterford should not apply. The uniform legislation makes no express provision for severance. But insofar as the privilege applies to documents, because Pt 2 cl 8 of the Dictionary provides that a reference to a document in the Act includes a part of a document, one is able to consider parts of a document separately for the purposes of determining whether privilege applies. This enables the privilege to be confined to those parts of a document falling within the privilege. And where the one conversation can be regarded as comprising a series of separate communications, a decision as to privilege can be taken in relation to each separate communication so there is also scope for severance under the legislation.179

Material collected for litigation 5.41 This separate common law privilege is recognised in a series of Australian decisions.180 It protects from access material created at the instigation of party or lawyer for the dominant purpose of conducting anticipated or pending litigation.181 The privilege exists only to encourage the pursuit of adversary litigation through lawyers, so a litigant in person has no common law privilege.182 The privilege cannot

[page 474] be claimed unless the material has been created at the instance of a party (or intended party, or its lawyers) to litigation. In Somerville v Australian Securities Commission, evidence collected by the Australian Securities Commission preliminary to taking proceedings in the names of particular litigants was held not within the litigation privilege as it had not been collected by the Commission as party or intended party to litigation.183 5.42 The uniform legislation in s 119 enacts a litigation privilege based upon that at common law. It excludes evidence that would result in the disclosure of communications between client or lawyer and another person made ‘for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal services relating to’ a ‘proceeding’ or ‘an anticipated or pending proceeding’ ‘in which the client is or may be, or was or might have been, a party’.184 It also extends to exclude evidence that would result in the disclosure of any other confidential document made for a similar purpose, but places no limits upon who may be the author and consequentially no limits upon whose dominant purpose is decisive. Nicholson J in Hardie Finance Corp Pty Ltd v CCD Australia Pty Ltd recognises that literally this is a much wider privilege than the litigation privilege at common law.185 But the purpose must be for ‘the client being provided with professional legal services’ in relation to an actual, anticipated or pending proceeding. Section 120 of the uniform legislation grants a similarly wide privilege to a litigant acting in person, although the proceedings must have commenced (it is not enough that they be pending or anticipated) and the privilege only applies in the proceedings in question. Neither limitation applies at common law nor under s 119. [page 475] 5.43 Both at common law and under the uniform legislation, these privileges apply not only following the formal commencement of litigation but where litigation is pending or in reasonable prospect.186 At common law, it is the purpose of the party or lawyer who instigated the bringing of the material into

existence which is decisive of privilege, so it is submitted that the prospect of litigation should be determined from that person’s perspective. If there is, from that person’s perspective, a real prospect of litigation and the material is instigated in pursuance of that prospect then privilege should prevail notwithstanding that objectively the prospects of litigation may have been slight. Of course, as an evidentiary matter it will be harder to persuade a court that the reason for creating material was litigation where the prospects were objectively slight. But there must be litigation, and communications and documents collected by a lawyer for the purpose of giving non-litigious advice will not fall within this privilege,187 and must seek protection from disclosure under the communications (advice) privilege previously discussed: see particularly at 5.37–5.39. The privilege extends to protect any products of the lawyer’s work in pursuing the litigation, such as counsel’s memoranda, briefs, communications and other writings prepared for the use by counsel in bringing or defending the client’s case, statements taken from witnesses and writings which reflect the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of counsel.188 It also extends to material created by the client for the purpose of it being provided to the lawyer for the purposes of litigation. But the privilege cannot be used to abuse the discovery process. Thus, communications and documents that have an existence independent of the litigation process cannot be made the subject of privilege merely by placing them in the lawyer’s adversary brief.189 Just as the communications privilege does not extend to pre-existing unprivileged material, by analogy neither does the litigation privilege. In both cases, the question is whether the seeking of advice or the pursuit of litigation is the dominant purpose for the creation of the communication or other material. Only where previously unprivileged materials collected for litigation have been annotated or collated in such [page 476] a way that their disclosure would reveal the lawyer’s work expended for the purpose of advice or trial, may they be protected in their annotated or collated state.190 5.44 Whether the mere copying of unprivileged material for the purpose of seeking or giving advice or in preparation for litigation creates a privilege in the

copy has been a vexed question. As the original remains discoverable, there seems little point in privileging the copy. Indeed, to privilege the copy may give an incentive to destroy the original to which access is permitted. However, a majority of the High Court in Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd, concerned that to refuse privilege to copies of unprivileged material would allow a party considerable access to an opponent’s brief, and worried about the effect this might have on the responsibilities and incentives of parties and their lawyers to prepare their own cases, decided that copies of unprivileged documents taken for the purposes of seeking legal advice or for use in pending litigation are privileged.191 Brennan CJ said that no privilege could be claimed if there was no original to which a party could responsibly gain access. To the argument that a privilege in a copy might provide incentive for the original to be destroyed, McHugh (at 555), Gummow (at 570–1) and Kirby JJ (at 588) said that to copy for this purpose would constitute an abuse which would prevent any privilege arising in the copy. 5.45 The practical effect of Propend is to protect copies of unprivileged documents that find their way into a lawyer’s brief for litigation. It should, however, be emphasised that the majority (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Kirby JJ) bases its decision not on a separate litigation privilege but rather on the ground that the copying of [page 477] unprivileged material and sending it to a lawyer (or sending unprivileged material to the lawyer for him or her to copy) itself constitutes a privileged communication between client and lawyer and therefore falls within the communications privilege.192 McHugh J also emphasises that other copies of unprivileged material in the hands of lawyers will be privileged if their disclosure would reveal the confidential advice given by the lawyer to the client.193 Either way the privilege in copies is not justified in Propend on any narrow litigation basis, although the practical effect will be to strengthen the secrecy of counsel’s brief. 5.46 The ambit of the litigation privilege is contentious. A statement taken from a witness for the purposes of litigation may be privileged in the hands of lawyer or client.194 But it is arguable that a copy of that statement in the hands of

the witness is only privileged if the witness owes a duty of confidentiality to the party taking the statement,195 or at least knows that the lawyer or party who took the statement intended that its contents remain private.196 A confidential tape recording of an interview with a witness would presumably be similarly privileged. But what of the situation where client or lawyer collects other information in preparation for litigation, as in J-Corp Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers,197 where the client filmed a picket line in order to give a recording to the lawyers for the purposes of pending industrial proceedings? Is the recording privileged as created for the dominant purpose of pursuing litigation? [page 478] French J, sceptical of there being any justification for a litigation privilege, denied privilege in these circumstances on the ground that the videotape was real evidence of a public event which ought to be discovered.198 In Nagan v Holloway, a client pursuing defamation proceedings arranged to secretly tape-record private conversations with the defendant to obtain further defamatory material to pass on to her lawyer.199 That tape was held privileged as created for the sole purpose of litigation and J-Corp was distinguished on the ground that in that case the recording had been of a public event and thus lacked the requisite confidentiality to give rise to the privilege. But it is not the confidentiality of the event observed that is crucial; it is the confidentiality and purpose of the record that justifies the privilege.200 If this is so, J-Corp and Nagan v Holloway are indistinguishable and inconsistent. Logically in each situation the recording, if taken confidentially for the dominant purpose of advice or litigation, should be privileged. The J-Corp approach is also taken in Players Pty Ltd (in liq) (receivers appointed) v Clone Pty Ltd,201 where it is asserted that as the privilege only protects ‘confidential communications’, that ‘a communication is not privileged if it is conducted in public’, tentatively concluding (at [128]), that as a consequence, records of public events taken for the purposes of seeking legal advice or use in litigation cannot be privileged. In Boyes v Collins, Ipp J refused to follow J-Corp in holding privileged a video confidentially taken for litigation.202 This would seem to be the position under ss 119–120 of the uniform legislation (as a confidential communication or

document — ‘any record of information’ — prepared for the dominant purpose of advice or use in a proceeding). Nevertheless, it might be debated whether the litigation privilege is necessary at all, for professional incentives exist to ensure that lawyers maximise their workproduct pending trial, and the communications privilege provides the incentive to clients to obtain professional assistance in the enforcement of their legal rights.203 [page 479]

Limits to legal professional privilege Copies of documents 5.47 Whether copies of documents are privileged is a vexing question. But the question cannot be answered in its generality. Rather, the answer depends upon which privilege is being invoked and upon whether the original document is itself privileged or not. In the case of confidential record-keeping copies of documents that are protected communications between client and solicitor made for the purposes of advice, it is clear that such copies are privileged.204 They are not in themselves communications to which a purposive test can be applied. Rather, they are simply confidential records of the privileged communications, and their disclosure would in a fundamental way undermine the privilege in the original. If the confidential copy is made to serve other purposes this may throw doubt upon whether the original communication was made for the dominant purpose of advice. If the copy is communicated to another it will become a separate communication to which the dominant purpose test of the privilege must then be applied.205 And if that communication is not made confidentially for the dominant purpose of advice it may also operate as a waiver of the privilege in the original document.206 In the case of confidential record-keeping copies of documents which are protected as material created for the dominant purpose of litigation, similar conclusions would appear to apply. Under the uniform legislation, ss 118–120 similarly extend to all confidential

documents made with the requisite dominant purpose, and prohibit the tender of evidence that would reveal the contents of such documents.207 5.48 Where the original is not privileged and a confidential copy is taken for the purposes of obtaining legal advice or for use in litigation, common sense would appear to lead to the conclusion that the mere copy should not be privileged (unless disclosure would reveal a privileged communication or advice).208 [page 480] A majority of decisions before Grant v Downs favours this conclusion,209 and those to the contrary are discovery cases explicable on the ground that in each case the party did not hold the original (so that original was not discoverable) and to order inspection of a copy collected by the party was merely to disclose evidence of that party’s case.210 But with discovery rules now extending to documents in the hands of third parties, and a trend towards greater pre-trial discovery, even of evidence, the reason emphasised in these contrary decisions may be doubted. Post-Grant v Downs, Australian cases were also divided on the matter,211 but the High Court in Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (see 5.44 n 191 above) decided by a majority of 5:2 that copies taken with the requisite purpose of obtaining or giving advice are distinct privileged communications. Dawson J, drawing analogy to the situation where the unprivileged original is handed to solicitors for advice, argued that a copy is no more than a translation of that original and in this sense can have no separate existence from the original. But the majority, drawing analogy to the situation where a client orally communicates the contents of a document, argued that the communication of those contents did have a separate existence capable of attracting privilege, and better to encourage clients to provide their lawyers with accurate copies than encourage them to make inaccurate oral reports. Although copies taken for the purpose of a lawyer’s brief and not constituting communications (which may rarely be the case) do not appear to fall within this logic or rationale, another rationale given for protecting copies — to encourage adversaries to collect their own information rather than rifling through the brief

of an opponent’s lawyer — suggests that these copies may also be privileged if taken for the dominant purpose of use in lawyer-conducted litigation. Again, these conclusions would appear to have direct application under ss 118– 120 of the uniform legislation, which protect all documents made with the requisite dominant purpose and (in the absence of waiver) prohibit the tender of evidence that would reveal the contents of such documents. [page 481] Client’s privilege: waiver 5.49 Although in origin the privilege was granted to lawyers, the rationales we have been examining assign the privilege to clients212 (and their successors).213 Waiver must be effected through the privilege holder. Where clients jointly consult a common solicitor the privilege rightly belongs to both. Where a third person shares a common legal interest with the client (for example, insurer and insured, tenants of the same landlord, a company and its directors) a joint privilege may in the circumstances be held to arise.214 Where it does arise, privileged communication may be disclosed to each without breach of privilege, joint clients may not maintain privilege against each other,215 and as against the rest of the world waiver by one does not affect the other’s privilege.216 The uniform legislation recognises the possibility of joint privilege in s 122(5)(b) in providing that disclosure to a joint client does not constitute waiver (and further providing that disclosure to a person with a common interest in litigation does not constitute waiver: s 122(5)(c)).217 And s 124, applying only in civil proceedings, allows parties who have jointly retained a lawyer in relation to the same matter to adduce evidence of otherwise privileged material in proceedings in connection with that matter. Where privileged documents or other communications are sought from the person entitled to the privilege, the privilege must be expressly claimed or it will be assumed to have been waived.218 On the other hand, where privileged documents or communications are sought from lawyers or third parties in confidential possession then the privilege will generally be assumed to exist unless it is, or has been, waived by the client.219 In this sense

[page 482] it might be said that a privilege claim can be made by a person who is not the privilege holder.220 Sections 118–120 of the uniform legislation each provide that evidence must not be adduced if, on objection of a client, the conditions for privilege are satisfied. Where s 131A(1) extends the application of client legal privilege to pretrial processes it expressly provides that the determination of an objection is to be made ‘as if the objection to giving information or producing the document were an objection to the giving or adducing of evidence’. Thus the onus continues to be on the client to claim the privilege. Waiver may be effected personally or through a representative (most often the client’s lawyer). Waiver may be intentional. To be intentional a client must, with knowledge of the privilege and the right to waive it, intend to forgo it. This knowledge and intention may be expressed but more often it will be implicit in the act of voluntarily disclosing the privileged communication. There is no doubt that voluntary and non-confidential disclosure to a party outside the relationship of client and lawyer will amount to a waiver of the privilege. Similarly, voluntary disclosure to an opponent during proceedings will generally be regarded as an intentional waiver; for example, by serving under court rules a witness’s proof of evidence prior to calling the witness to testify in accordance with that proof,221 or calling a witness to testify with his or her memory refreshed by reference to a privileged proof waives any privilege in the proof,222 as does a failure to object to the use of a privileged document in proceedings.223 [page 483] 5.50 But even these are ambiguous examples of circumstances where an intention to abandon the privilege may be implied. There may have been no intention to waive the privilege. Disclosure may have been made to a third party on the understanding that the disclosure was strictly confidential. Or disclosure may have been made in ignorance of the privilege. However, this may not matter, because, even where there is no intention to abandon the privilege, the actions of the client may create a situation where a court will impute a waiver. If the client’s knowledge and intention alone governed waiver not only could a

client abuse the privilege (for example, by only releasing advantageous portions of privileged communications and thereby distorting the nature of the communication or the information contained in it, or by disclosing information ‘in confidence’ beyond the client–lawyer relationship to his or her advantage) but also a client may have so acted that it becomes unfair for him or her to say that the privilege has not been waived (for example, where there has been disclosure of all or part of the privileged communication and this has been acted upon by an opponent or where the plaintiff’s very suit involves the legal advice given to him or her). To prevent abuse and unfairness consequent upon the client’s actions, waiver can be imputed. Or, as these situations were conceptualised by the majority in Mann v Carnell:224 It is the inconsistency between the conduct of the client and maintenance of confidentiality which effects a waiver of the privilege … What brings about the waiver is the inconsistency, which the courts, where necessary informed by considerations of fairness, perceive, between the conduct of the client and maintenance of the confidentiality; not some overriding principle of fairness operating at large.

5.51 Principles of imputed waiver were first expounded by the High Court in Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice.225 There it was argued that a claim book, prepared and released to opponents in connection with an Aboriginal land claim, operated to waive any privilege in respect of communications (from Aboriginal persons and anthropologists) made to the solicitors preparing the claim and which provided the information upon which the [page 484] detailed claim book was prepared. There was no intention (expressed or implicit) to waive the privilege, the confidential communications were not specifically referred to or otherwise disclosed in the claim book, and the whole court agreed that no principle of fairness demanded that the privilege be regarded as waived. The claim book was not evidence in the case but was in the nature of a pleading. Reference was made to previous authorities holding that mere reference to documents or other material in a pleading does not constitute waiver (although quotation from a privileged communication probably does).226

The majority felt that if the claim book had been relied upon as evidence it might have been arguable that there be a waiver to allow effective crossexamination and testing of it, although Dawson J felt that, even in this situation, no waiver was required because the claim book made no reference to the contents of any particular document of which the claimant was taking unfair advantage. Maurice therefore recognises that the partial disclosure of privileged material during proceedings may lead to an imputed waiver for related material227 where to hold otherwise would permit the party making partial disclosure to obtain an unfair advantage in the proceedings. In other circumstances partial disclosure may not amount to waiver as there is no unfairness in the sense that the conduct is not inconsistent with maintenance of the privilege. In Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice,228 disclosure by the government, in order to justify its decision, that independent legal advice had been received favouring its decision not to accede to a petition of mercy, was held not to [page 485] constitute waiver of its privilege in that advice, the disclosure of the fact of advice to show due process in reaching its decision not being regarded in the circumstances as inconsistent with maintaining privilege over the details of the advice received. The majority emphasised (at [45]–[46], [48]–[49]) that questions of waiver were ultimately questions of fact and degree dependent upon ‘the nature of the matter in respect of which the advice was received, the evident purpose … in making the disclosure that was made, and the legal and practical consequences of limited rather than complete disclosure’. 5.52 The principles of waiver were discussed earlier by the High Court in Goldberg v Ng.229 A solicitor, Goldberg, was sued by a client, Ng, for failure to account for monies paid to him by Ng. Ng had complained to the Law Society about Goldberg’s failure to account and Goldberg had been investigated for (and cleared of) misconduct. But in the course of that investigation Goldberg had voluntarily disclosed privileged material to the Law Society but on the express condition that

the disclosure was confidential to the Law Society alone and that the material would not be shown to Ng. In the court action Ng subpoenaed the Law Society to produce these documents and Goldberg sought a declaration that the subpoena could not compel production of privileged documents. Ng claimed that any privilege had been waived by the disclosure to the Law Society, a party beyond the lawyer–client relationship. There was clearly no intentional waiver. But it was argued that waiver should be imputed as it was unfair that Goldberg be able to use these communications to his advantage in the Law Society’s investigation of Ng’s complaint and then be able to prevent their disclosure to his disadvantage in the court proceedings taken by Ng in relation to the same matter. The majority accepted that waiver should be imputed on the basis that the court proceedings concerned the same dispute as that which caused the complaint to be made to the Law Society, that Goldberg had voluntarily disclosed the communications to the Law Society, and for Goldberg to then refuse access to Ng was conduct inconsistent with maintenance of the privilege. Fairness demanded that Goldberg not be able to manipulate the material available in essentially the same action. In that the court in Goldberg v Ng sought to find some unfairness in Goldberg claiming privilege, it is implicit that the court was not prepared to say that the mere voluntary, albeit confidential, disclosure of the privileged material beyond the client–lawyer relationship was in itself inconsistent conduct constituting waiver of the privilege.230 [page 486] McHugh J in Mann v Carnell criticises this implicit assumption and argues that there are strong reasons for regarding the privilege as lost in these circumstances.231 The privilege exists only to encourage confidentiality between client and solicitor, not confidentiality with parties beyond that relationship. In these circumstances it may be said that generally the conduct of the client in voluntarily disclosing the privileged material beyond the client–lawyer relationship is inconsistent with the notion of confidentiality (between lawyer and client) that underlies the privilege.

5.53 Goldberg v Ng emphasises that it was the deliberate and voluntary conduct of Goldberg which gave rise to the imputation of waiver. If the Law Society had exercised its power to compel production it is unlikely the court would have imputed a waiver, as Goldberg could not then have been regarded as manipulating the available material to his advantage. In Woollahra Municipal Council v Westpac,232 Giles J held that disclosure of privileged material to a local government inspector under threat of compulsion did not constitute waiver, express or imputed. Whether compulsory disclosure by court rules gives rise to questions of waiver may depend upon whether the documents are privileged in the first place. In the case of finalised witness statements and expert reports prepared for the very purpose of disclosure to the opponent during litigation arguably no privilege arises; and if there is a privilege as the party has by disclosure to the opponent indicated that the evidence is to be used in the litigation it would be inconsistent to continue to claim it.233 But in any case, the statement or report [page 487] can be used only for the purposes of the proceedings in question unless a party has been released by a subsequent court from that undertaking.234 However, materials and communications created for the purpose of advice in preparation of such statements or expert reports are privileged unless principles of waiver otherwise apply.235 5.54 Where disclosure made under court rules is voluntary but mistaken, for example, where during the discovery process inspection has been mistakenly permitted of privileged documents, the question of waiver is more problematic. Whilst some cases suggest that mere disclosure is enough to demand that the case be decided upon all available evidence,236 judges remain reluctant to find the privilege lost by mere inadvertence not yet acted upon.237 Reconciling this with principle is difficult. One might argue that fairness demands waiver where disclosed material has been innocently acted upon by an opponent, but it may be more difficult to regard the disclosure as [page 488]

involuntary,238 or the conduct in asserting privilege consistent with maintenance of the privilege.239 The better way to solve this problem may not be by reference to any principles of waiver but by reference to those equitable rules which will entitle a party to obtain return of confidential material in the hands of another: see 5.63ff. This recognises that rules of privilege run out once access has been obtained by an opponent: see 5.61ff. 5.55 Where the privilege has been waived through disclosure to an opponent through discovery or at trial, one resulting problem is whether the waiver operates only in the proceedings in question (and any other proceedings where an issue estoppel may arise), or whether such waiver constitutes loss of the privilege altogether. If the privilege is a principle of access then once access to the privileged material has been gained it may be argued that the privilege should no longer apply. But, on the other hand, where disclosure is only to an opponent it may be argued that any waiver should apply only to the proceedings in question.240 After all, documents disclosed through the discovery process can only be used by an opponent for the purposes of the action in which discovery has been made.241 Certainly where revelation is compulsory some courts have been reluctant to remove the privilege in subsequent proceedings.242 In British Coal Corp v Dennis Rye Ltd (No 2),243 confidential disclosure to the police of privileged material was held to constitute no general waiver, so that, when attempts at criminal prosecution failed, the use of the material (which had been disclosed to the defendants during those proceedings) in subsequent civil proceedings arising out of the same dispute could be restrained. Authority therefore [page 489] favours the notion of a limited waiver in the case of privileged material disclosed to an opponent during criminal proceedings. 5.56 Finally, it should be emphasised that where waiver turns upon disclosure it must be disclosure beyond the relationship of lawyer and client. Thus, confidential disclosure by a client or lawyer to his or her agent will be no waiver. By parity of reasoning, in State Bank SA v Barrett, confidential disclosure by the bank (of legal advice to it from its lawyers) to its directors during the currency of their directorships did not permit them to obtain access to that privileged material

after they had ceased to be directors and were being sued by the bank for their negligent performance as directors.244 (Their entitlement may have been otherwise if they could have been regarded as joint clients.) In Mann v Carnell, confidential disclosure by the Chief Minister of the Australian Capital Territory of privileged legal advice to the government in respect of a pending action to a member of the Legislative Assembly was held not to constitute disclosure beyond the body politic of the client. But the majority, in deference to a learned judgment from McHugh J, added:245 Although ‘disclosure to a third party’ may be a convenient rubric under which to discuss many problems of this nature, it represents, at the least, an over-simplification of the circumstances of the present case.

It preferred simply to conclude that in this case the disclosure was not conduct inconsistent with the maintenance of the confidentiality of the privilege: at [35]. Similarly, confidential disclosure to a person whose legal interests are common with those of the client is not conduct inconsistent with the maintenance of the confidentiality of the privilege and constitutes no waiver; for example, disclosure by an insured to his or her insurer, or one partner to another, or one co-tenant to another.246 5.57 By the same token, where a lawyer is jointly consulted on a matter and the clients later become opponents in litigation arising out of that matter, it would be unfair to allow one to seek an advantage by claiming privilege, and so no privilege [page 490] arises between them.247 And, more generally, if a client raises an issue concerning the advice given by his or her lawyer, for example, a state of mind or knowledge dependent upon the advice given, or by disputing the advice given or its competence, to permit the client to limit the information available through a claim to privilege would be clearly to allow the client to take unfair advantage of his or her position.248 Now that the Mann v Carnell conceptualisation is used to determine waiver, the question must be whether the court is of the opinion that it would be inconsistent to put in issue the contents of that advice whilst at the same time attempting to claim privilege over it. To create such inconsistency it is not enough that the privileged material is simply relevant to a state of mind put in

issue. The inconsistent conduct is claiming privilege having effectively asserted that it is the content of the advice that has produced that state of mind.249 5.58 Waiver is provided for in s 122 of the uniform legislation. In its original form the basal concept for waiver was put only in terms of the consent of or disclosure by the client or party holding the privilege. Recent amendment now puts waiver in terms of the client or party’s consent (s 122(1)) and in terms of action by the client or party that is inconsistent with the claim of privilege (s 122(2)) (the onus being on the party seeking waiver: Hodgson v Amcor Ltd (No 4)250). Section 122(3) further [page 491] provides that ‘[w]ithout limiting subsection (2) a client or party is taken to have so acted if (a) the client or party knowingly and voluntarily disclosed the substance of the evidence to another person; or (b) the substance of the evidence has been disclosed with the express or implied consent of the client or party’ (any agent requiring authority to disclose: s 122(4)).251 The disclosure now becomes an example of inconsistent conduct rather than being a separate and definitive ground of waiver, thus avoiding previous problems in statutory interpretation. The effect of the legislation is to incorporate the common law test of waiver found in Mann v Carnell and endorsed in Osland.252 In Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd,253 French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ clearly assert that the principles in Mann v Carnell ‘articulated in relation to waiver at common law apply with equal force to the statutory question posed by s 122(2)’. Courts must thus decide, as at common law, on a case-by-case basis, whether the conduct of the client is inconsistent with the making of a claim of privilege. Common law decisions remain persuasive in determining what amounts to inconsistent conduct in a particular case. Insofar as under s 122(3) disclosure can still found a waiver of the privileges, the question is whether ‘the substance of the evidence’ has been disclosed beyond the privileged relationship, either ‘knowingly and voluntarily’ (s 122(3)(a)) or with the ‘express or implied consent’ (s 122(3)(b)) of the client or party. Prior to amendment, when each disclosure provision was in a separate subsection, to preserve the separate ambits of the subsections, authority had suggested the latter

applied only to disclosure by another with the client’s consent,254 but now any literal limits to the scope of each subsection can be extended by the notion of inconsistency in s 122(2). Similarly, whether ‘the substance of the evidence’ has been disclosed can be interpreted in the context of such disclosure constituting conduct inconsistent with claiming the privilege.255 Thus, [page 492] in circumstances similar to those in Osland v Secretary to the Department of Justice,256 ‘the substance of the evidence’ would not appear to have been disclosed. Under s 122(3), ‘knowing and voluntarily’ means more than other than by compulsion, duress or deception as these situations are expressly dealt with in subs (5). Where the substance of the evidence is intentionally disclosed but in ignorance of its nature or of the consequences of disclosure, it has been held that the disclosure may yet be made knowingly and voluntarily and may, in the absence of obvious mistake or fraud, constitute waiver of the privilege.257 In determining whether there has been conduct inconsistent with maintaining privilege, s 122(5) is of primary importance, listing various situations where, by analogy to common law situations already discussed, a client or party’s conduct cannot be regarded as so inconsistent (the onus being upon the party asserting that subs (5) is satisfied: Hodgson v Amcor Ltd (No 4)).258 There is no inconsistent conduct ‘merely because’: (a)

the substance of the evidence has been disclosed: (i)

in the course of making a confidential communication or preparing a confidential document; or

(ii) as a result of duress or deception; or (iii) under compulsion of law;259 or (iv) if the client or party is a body established by, or a person holding an office under, an Australian law — to the Minister, or the Minister of the Commonwealth, the State or Territory, administering the law, or part of the law, under which the body is established or the office is held; or

[page 493] (b) of a disclosure by a client to another person if the disclosure concerns a matter in relation to

which the same lawyer is providing, or is to provide, professional legal services to both the client and the other person;260 or (c) of a disclosure to a person with whom the client or party had, at the time of the disclosure, a common interest relating to the proceeding or an anticipated or pending proceeding in an Australian court or a foreign court.261

The first exception, while apparently extremely wide because of the liberal definition of ‘confidential communication’ and ‘confidential document’ in s 117, does not provide that confidential disclosure beyond the lawyer–client relationship can never amount to waiver. What it says is that there is no inconsistent conduct merely as a result of confidential disclosure and additional circumstances must be shown before waiver will be imputed. This is consistent with common law authorities.262 But, along with McHugh J, one might lament that disclosure beyond the lawyer–client relationship does not presumptively undermine a claim to privilege. 5.59 Waiver can also be achieved under s 122(1) of the uniform legislation where the basal concept is not disclosure but the ‘consent’ of the client or party to the adducing of the evidence. It has been held that under this subsection, consent may not only be express or implied but may also be imputed.263 Thus, for example, where the basis of a party’s claim is a state of mind formed on the basis of legal advice, a consent to the tender of that advice may, on grounds of inconsistency or unfairness, be imputed.264 In this way, even before the inclusion of s 122(2) common law notions had found their way into the legislation.265 This approach now has express legislative endorsement. [page 494] It should also be noted that under s 126 any waiver extends to permit the tender of ‘another communication or document’ where this is ‘reasonably necessary to enable a proper understanding of the communication or document’ in which the privilege has been waived.266 Only the communication or work-product is protected 5.60 The rationale protects communications267 given in confidence and the work-product of lawyers. Two aspects of this require emphasis. In the first place, a lawyer is only forbidden from disclosing communications seeking and giving

professional advice, the contents of those communications, and work-product created for litigation. Other matters observed during the relationship of solicitor and client must be given in evidence if the lawyer is called to testify. The identity of the client, of his or her handwriting, the payment of money by the client, and so on, must all be disclosed if relevant to material issues in the case.268 In NSW Crime Commission v Z,269 Hayne and Crennan JJ were of the view that requiring the solicitor to provide the client’s name and address would not generally be privileged, but not because it was a fact observed [page 495] by the lawyer but because it was not disclosed in a communication made for the purpose of seeking legal advice. Arguably, all facts observed, not being confidential communications or material created for litigation, fall outside the privilege, including the fruits of the crime or other evidence disclosed by the client. However, where the disclosure of such matters would reveal the content of confidential advice-seeking communications between client and lawyer, disclosure might be resisted.270 In the second place, if the information contained in a privileged communication or material created for litigation can be proved through other sources, then so be it. It is not the information contained within the communication or work-product that is privileged; it is the communication and work-product itself (and hence its contents) that cannot be disclosed. Therefore, a party’s proof of a witness may be privileged,271 but if an opponent calls that witness to testify the witness cannot refuse to divulge his or her observations of the events because they are also recorded in the privileged proof.272 This simple distinction between the communication or work-product and the information to which it may refer can be easily misunderstood. By the same token, the fact that information can be acquired from other sources does not detract from the privilege that may apply to a communication made in the course of giving professional advice that contains that same information.273 The Uniform Acts are similarly drafted to protect only specified confidential communications and documents and not the information that might be contained in them.

Nor does the privilege stand in the way of drawing an inference from the fact that a person has had confidential communications with a lawyer. In Mead v Mead,274 in contempt proceedings the High Court held that an inference of a client’s knowledge of the contents of a court order might be drawn from her confidential communication [page 496] with her lawyer as this involves no disclosure of the actual communications between client and lawyer. Whether that inference is sufficient proof of knowledge is of course another matter. The privilege is a bar to access, not a rule of admissibility 5.61 The privilege exists to assure the client that confidential professional discussions with legal advisers and their work-product for litigation will not be disclosed by those advisers and need not be disclosed by the client. Once the privileged matters have been leaked beyond the relationship of lawyer and client it may be argued that there is nothing inherent in the privilege, or the reasons behind it, to prevent those outside sources from disclosing the privileged matters. Certainly, more encouragement will be given to a client who is assured that privileged matters will never be disclosed, whoever obtains wind of them. But if, as a general rule, access to information should not be restricted and legal professional privilege should, therefore, apply only where necessary, there is an argument that once privileged matters have been divulged the privilege is lost. The privilege then operates only as a bar to compulsory access, not as a rule of admissibility.275 If confidential matters have been wrongfully disclosed or improperly obtained by outside parties that may be a reason for not allowing tender. But that is a separate issue having nothing to do with the notion of privilege as a bar to access. That the privilege acts primarily as a bar to access is the conceptualisation underlying Calcraft v Guest.276 A client’s successor was held not entitled to object to the tender of secondary evidence (a handwritten copy) of privileged communication (the advice of the predecessor’s solicitor). And in R v Tompkins the logic of this case was applied to hold that a privileged written communication

accidentally dropped by counsel and found by the opponent thereby became admissible evidence.277 But the New Zealand Court of Appeal disapproved of this approach in R v Uljee, the court conceptualising privilege as a rule of admissibility to hold that an innocently eavesdropping policeman could not testify to a conversation between a criminally suspected client and his solicitor.278 [page 497] 5.62 The circumstances in which a party will be able to tender disclosed privileged material or secondary evidence of it will, however, be uncommon, for that evidence must be otherwise admissible, and in many cases it will be either inadmissible hearsay (particularly where the evidence is documentary) or inadmissible as wrongfully obtained evidence. An example of the latter can be found in ITC Ltd v Video Exchange Ltd,279 in which Warner J excluded copies obtained during court proceedings by a trick; in Australia, the discretion in Bunning v Cross (which operates also in civil cases)280 may be exercised on wide grounds of public policy to prevent tender of evidence improperly acquired (this discretion is enacted in s 138 of the uniform legislation): see 2.36–2.37 and 5.255ff for a more detailed discussion. 5.63 But there is another legal technique which may be employed to prevent tender of privileged material to which access has been obtained, and which throws into doubt the very approach in Calcraft v Guest.281 Equity will restrain the use and dissemination of confidential material in the hands of another. Consequently, where privileged material has been divulged to legal advisers in confidence and passed on to third parties (innocently or fraudulently), equitable proceedings may be taken against those third parties to protect the client’s interest in that material. In Lord Ashburton v Pape, such proceedings were successful, the injunction ordering return of privileged documents and copies and forbidding absolutely use of the information contained in the privileged documents.282 At first instance, to accommodate the decision in Calcraft v Guest, Neville J qualified the injunction with respect to pending bankruptcy proceedings. But the Court of Appeal in Chancery struck out the qualification. It distinguished Calcraft v Guest as applying only where evidence is tendered directly to a court, in which case that court will not concern itself with questions about the privileged nature of that material nor

(at that time) with how the material was obtained. On the other hand, it held that, where confidentiality is directly in issue, it is no answer to the granting of an injunction that the material may be of relevance in later proceedings. A court will grant an injunction in absolute terms once material is confidential. 5.64 In Butler v Board of Trade, Goff J refused to apply this decision to restrain the Board of Trade from tendering secondary evidence in a later criminal prosecution.283 But in Goddard v Nationwide Building Society, the English Court of Appeal held that [page 498] it was no answer to an injunction that the material might be relevant and admissible in civil proceedings.284 That the privilege at common law acts simply as an immunity against access is emphasised by the decision in Commissioner for Taxation v Donoghue.285 The applicant was seeking to have tax assessments set aside on the ground that they were based upon confidential communications with legal advisers that had been leaked by a disgruntled associate to the Commissioner. The applicant sought to base the action upon common law principles of legal professional privilege, arguing that the use of the privileged material was unlawful by virtue of that privilege. Any action based on equitable principles of breach of confidence was abandoned by counsel. The Federal Court held that legal professional privilege at common law provided only an immunity against compulsory production and conferred no individual rights breach of which might be actionable.286 In the absence of any other basis for the remedy sought the action was dismissed. 5.65 In Goddard, the court permitted informal application for an injunction in the course of the very civil proceedings in which tender was being resisted. This has now become an accepted practice in both England and Australia, and focus has shifted from the application of a rule of admissibility to prevent tender, to the circumstances in which an injunction will be granted on equitable principles to protect legal professional confidences.287 The conduct of the parties will be decisive.288 For example, where privileged matters have been inadvertently disclosed to an opponent, return of the material will be ordered and use of the material in court prohibited so long as the opponent is not unfairly prejudiced by such an order.289 If the opponent has

[page 499] innocently acted upon the inadvertent disclosure, fairness might require that no injunction be granted. On the other hand, if the opponent has realised the mistake and taken advantage of it by copying or deliberately acting upon the material, an injunction may be appropriate. Where innocent disclosure has been made to a third party there may be more reason for an injunction. In British Coal Corp v Dennis Rye Ltd (No 2), an injunction succeeded in resistance of civil discovery where confidential disclosure had been made to police to pursue criminal proceedings (which had been unsuccessful).290 As a consequence, at least in civil proceedings, the rule in Calcraft v Guest, although not overruled, can be frustrated by the taking of separate equitable proceedings, informally if necessary, during the civil proceedings where tender is threatened.291 Query whether this might lead to inconsistent decisions under common law and equitable rules, in which case presumably the equitable decision would prevail. 5.66 One logical side effect of the equitable power is that it is available to restrain the use of any sort of confidential material, material which is not exempt from compulsory discovery; for example, communications between doctor and patient. It has, however, been held that any such injunction must be limited to allow tender of such material in subsequent proceedings.292 After all, a subpoena may be issued for its production. This is not so in the case of material subject to legal professional privilege. It might be noted in passing that the provision of information in confidence is not regarded by the courts as a reason to grant, on grounds of public interest, any immunity against access or tender of the information.293 However, the position is different in those uniform legislation jurisdictions where information communicated confidentially within professional relationships may be protected: see discussion at 5.214. 5.67 Where privileged matters have been revealed beyond the lawyer–client relationship and equitable proceedings are taken for their return, one crucial issue will be whether the revelation occurred in circumstances constituting waiver of the privilege. Where waiver is imputed the criterion is fairness or conduct inconsistent with the confidentiality of the privilege. Where there has been no imputed waiver, in exercising the equitable discretion to order the return of the

material, the court is technically obliged to apply the criterion of fairness once again. Thus, while one court may determine fairness in the context of waiver another might determine it in [page 500] exercise of the equitable discretion. But conceptually fairness applies in two distinct contexts and in theory may require different answers in each. The uniform legislation as originally drafted raised none of these problems. It enacted only rules of admissibility, not access, simply preventing the tender of evidence disclosing certain confidential communications and documents. As rules of admissibility, unless one accepts the unlikely argument that where an opponent has gained access to privileged matter, tender cannot constitute ‘disclosure’ within the meaning of the legislation, mere access by an opponent will not in itself prevent the rules of admissibility applying. Whether the privilege has been waived is, of course, a separate question. It is doubtful that s 131A of the uniform legislation, extending legal client privileges in all jurisdictions other than the Commonwealth to apply to pretrial access in proceedings (and to search warrants), changes this focus on admissibility, providing as it does that the privileges apply, with only any necessary modifications, as if the objection had been to the giving or adducing of evidence. The public policy limit 5.68 The roots of legal professional privilege lie in the fundamental public policy giving and encouraging access to professional advice concerning individual rights and obligations. But in some situations this policy may conflict with other public policies and some judges have been prepared to resolve the conflict by weighing the policies concerned, sometimes permitting the privilege to be denied on account of wider interests. For example, in R v Barton, despite a dearth of authority, Caufield J held the privilege inapplicable where the innocence of an accused could only be demonstrated by revealing privileged communications between client and solicitor.294 And in R v Bell; Ex parte Lees, Gibbs CJ and Murphy J refused a claim of privilege over a communication disclosing the whereabouts of the client and her child where disclosure was required in the interests of the child to enable enforcement of a court order in respect of her.295

It is also possible to explain Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney in these terms, the government’s claim to privilege being outweighed by the public interest in ensuring that governments do not abuse their legislative position.296 However, the High Court in Carter v Managing Partner, Northmore Hale Davey and Leake has rejected any public policy limit to the privilege.297 In refusing disclosure, the very strong public interests in having the privilege were stressed. That case sought disclosure of a privileged communication of apparent relevance to establishing the [page 501] innocence of an accused, but the court refused to create an exception to the privilege on this basis, the majority deciding that the privilege itself embodies the appropriate balance of the public interests concerned. Barton was not followed. Kearney was explained as a case where no privilege could arise at all due to the client’s lack of bona fides in seeking the advice. R v Bell was justified as an anomalous exception to ensure enforcement of a court order. One situation that concerned the court if an exception were allowed was where there are coaccused who might seek disclosure of statements made by other co-accused to their lawyers. It would break open the sanctity of the professional relationship to permit exception to the privilege in these circumstances. The House of Lords in R v Derby Magistrate’s Court; Ex parte B has similarly upheld the sanctity of the privilege.298 In R v Bunting,299 Martin J applied the reasoning in Carter to hold that the DPP’s privilege over communications was not subject to any exception even where the prosecutor’s duty of disclosure appeared to demand disclosure to an accused. But he held that if the DPP can be regarded as the client, a waiver of the privilege could be imputed as the continuation of the prosecution was conduct inconsistent with the maintenance of the privilege.300 There is one limit to the privilege that may be seen as broadly based in public policy. In Egan v Chadwick, it was held that the special relationship between the executive and the legislature meant that the Legislative Council could demand that the government reveal otherwise privileged legal advice where this revelation was ‘reasonably necessary’ for the performance of the Council’s functions.301 And

while a court cannot otherwise break the sanctity of the privilege on grounds of public policy, the legislature can always override it through an Act of Parliament. 5.69 The uniform legislation is not so dogmatic in its recognition of the privilege. Section 121 enacts three exceptions: (1) where ‘the evidence is relevant to a question concerning the intentions, or competence in law, of a client or party who has died’; (2) where failure to adduce the evidence would frustrate the enforcement of an order of an Australian court (enacting R v Bell);302 and (3) in the case of ‘the adducing of evidence of a communication or document that affects a right of a person’. This third exception is of uncertain and potentially wide import. Not only does it exempt confidential documents themselves creating legal rights, for example, those [page 502] creating trusts or constituting contracts or constituting acts of bankruptcy (which would seldom be protected ‘communications’ at common law), but also communications that might be actionable as defamatory or deceptive. But it has been held that the exception does not extend to communications merely relevant to proving the right of a person.303 5.70 Section 123 enacts Barton rather than Carter, providing simply that the Division enacting the privileges does not prevent an accused in a criminal proceeding from adducing evidence.304 DPP v Galloway305 explains that s 123 goes no further than to permit an accused in possession of such evidence to adduce it (as in Barton). It does not interfere with the right of a witness from whom the evidence is sought from refusing to answer by claiming the privilege. To overcome the problem of co-accused adverted to by the court in Carter, the section provides that the Division continues to apply to a confidential communication between or documents made by an associated defendant and his or her lawyer acting in connection with the prosecution of that defendant. Statutory removal of the privilege 5.71 The recognition that legal professional privilege is a fundamental common law right or immunity and not merely a rule of evidence, and that it

applies to inquiry before trial as forcefully as to inquiry at trial, has serious repercussions on the inquiry powers of law enforcement agencies, particularly in their investigation of corporate and organised crime. Although communications in furtherance of crime are not privileged, claims to privilege can seriously delay the investigative process. As a consequence, legislation giving investigative powers may seek to restrict such claims.306 There is a strong presumption that common law rights and immunities cannot be removed by legislation except by clear words or by necessary implication.307 A majority of the High Court in Daniels Corp International Pty Ltd v ACCC trace this presumption [page 503] to Potter v Minahan.308 But so long as the courts do not require express words to abolish the privilege, problems in statutory interpretation remain. 5.72 The difficulty of interpreting legislation giving powers of inquiry is illustrated by the High Court judgments in Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Yuill.309 An inspector appointed to investigate the suspected illegal activities of a group of companies under Pt VII of the Companies Code (NSW) was met with a claim to privilege on seeking the production of various documents from the officer of a company. The Code required that documents be produced and questions answered in the absence of a ‘reasonable excuse’, and it was argued that privilege constituted such an excuse. On the other hand, the Code was enacted before Baker v Campbell made it clear that the privilege applies outside legal proceedings, and the Code expressly permitted legal practitioners to refuse the production of information on grounds of legal professional privilege (requiring them only to furnish the name of the client). The Code also protected information subject to legal professional privilege but compulsorily divulged during inquiry from use in subsequent court proceedings. In the face of these ambiguities, the court divided 3:2 in holding that the Code had removed the client’s privilege. Although the judgments contain much technical analysis of various provisions of the Code, the majority appears to have proceeded on the assumption that investigations into the illegal activities of companies could not proceed effectively if privilege could be claimed, and therefore it resolved the

doubts in parliamentary language against the client, finding, as a ‘necessary implication’, that the privilege had been removed.310 5.73 This approach to resolving the ambiguities in legislation was seriously questioned by a majority of the court in Daniels Corp International Pty Ltd v ACCC in concluding that ‘it may be that Yuill would now be decided differently’.311 With the privilege not extending to communications between client and lawyer for the purposes of engaging in unlawful conduct in contravention of applicable legislation, the majority seriously doubted whether the retention of the privilege in that case would have ‘significantly impair[ed]’ the investigations of unlawful conduct under the Act. The implication is that it is not enough for repeal by ‘necessary implication’ that legislation might work more effectively and efficiently without the privilege. Legislative ambiguities cannot be resolved by considering matters relating to the mere efficiency of the legislative scheme. In the absence of clear words, the privilege [page 504] will continue unless the legislation would be seriously impaired. McHugh J (at [43]) put it more directly. What must be shown is that the legislation would be ‘rendered inoperative or its object largely frustrated in its practical application’ if the legislation is interpreted to allow the privilege to remain. And as powers in general terms can almost always be given some practical scope they will seldom abolish the privilege by ‘necessary implication’. Therefore, in the absence of clear words abolishing the privilege, the presumption against repeal will not be rebutted. 5.74 This approach is reflected in the decision in Daniels Corp, where the court held that s 155 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), permitting notices to produce documents and entry to inspect documents, remained subject to legal professional privilege, despite it providing that persons were to comply with notices ‘to the extent that the person is capable of complying’ — and despite the decision in Pyneboard Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission312 implying into the same section the privilege against exposure to penalties. Capability was construed as referring only to physical considerations (at [33]), and Pyneboard was explicable, either on the basis that the section expressly preserved the privilege against self-incrimination and it would have been

incongruous not to extend this to the privilege against exposure to penalties, or (preferably) on the basis that the exposure to penalty privilege has no application beyond judicial proceedings and, anyway, like the privilege against selfincrimination, is not available to corporations: at [29]–[31]. Furthermore, the power to enter and seize documents was equivalent to that of the search warrants held in Baker v Campbell313 to be subject to the privilege. With there being no clear words abolishing the privilege and with there being no evidence that the retention of the privilege would substantially impair investigations under the Act, the privilege was held not to be repealed by either clear words or necessary implication.314 5.75 The reluctance to resolve legislative ambiguities in favour of abolition by necessary implication on grounds of practical efficacy can be found in other decisions. The Federal Court in Re Compass Airlines Pty Ltd315 distinguished Yuill and held that investigations by liquidators into the financial position of companies could effectively proceed even if legal professional privilege remained, consequently interpreting ambiguities in favour of the party claiming privilege.316 The court emphasised that [page 505] liquidators were not inquiring into necessarily unlawful activities, and that if such activities were unearthed incidentally, the privilege would not generally extend to communications in respect of them. The National Crime Authority Act 1984 (Cth) gave powers of inquiry in terms similar to the provisions considered in Yuill, and Lockhart J in National Crime Authority v S held that legal professional privilege was not removed for the client despite it being preserved expressly in the Act for lawyers. He commented that it would be: … a nonsense … that a legal practitioner would be entitled to refuse to divulge material protected by the doctrine of legal professional privilege, a doctrine that exists for the benefit of the client not the lawyer; yet if the client is being examined or is required to produce documents he could not himself invoke the rule.317

5.76 In the result, at common law there necessarily remains flexibility in interpreting legislation as removing legal professional privilege by necessary

implication318 despite the High Court having indicated its reluctance to construe ambiguous legislation as abolishing the privilege. The uncertainty inherent in this led the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) to recommend general legislation providing that the privilege continues in the absence of a clear, express statutory statement to the contrary in relation to each coercive informationgathering power granted.319 Although it appears that courts, including the High Court, do take this approach to legislation interfering with those principles it regards fundamental to the fairness of the common law trial — so-called principles of legality — of which legal professional privilege is one; another being the requirement (and its counterpart, the privilege against self-incrimination) that the prosecution prove its accusations without assistance from the accused: see discussion at 5.183. It might finally be noted that most rules of court necessarily modify the privilege in demanding the exchange of witness statements or expert reports during the discovery process.320 [page 506]

Claims to privilege: some procedural points 5.77 At common law, legal professional privilege may be claimed in three situations: 1.

in objection to a search warrant or other compulsory inquiry;

2.

in refusing to allow inspection of documents revealed through discovery; and

3.

in refusing to produce documents at the trial or otherwise testifying about privileged communications.

On the other hand, as explained at 5.19, the uniform legislation applies principally only as a rule of admissibility to the adducing of evidence at trial and of access to that evidence preliminary to trial. Once proceedings have begun, the procedure for claiming privilege is determined by the stage at which the claim is made. On discovery, pursuant to rules of court, a party will claim privilege from production for inspection when disclosing the existence of the particular documents in question. If the opponent

wishes to dispute the claim of privilege, appropriate steps must be taken to have an interlocutory hearing, at which the party claiming privilege will be obliged to justify the claim.321 5.78 Normally, the nature of the document in question will determine the issue and the court may inspect the document if in any doubt.322 The High Court gives active encouragement to courts to inspect documents subject to claims of privilege, particularly where the deciding officer is not the trial judge.323 Deponents to affidavits filed in support of any claim of privilege may be crossexamined if necessary.324 [page 507] Objection to a subpoena325 or questioning at the trial will be dealt with in the same way, as a preliminary point, with evidence being taken on the voir dire if necessary and the court being entitled to inspect if it considers this necessary to determine the claim. Usually the privilege is claimed inter partes. Where a third person claims this privilege, then determining whether that person may be legally represented and call evidence, and to what extent the parties may participate in the claim, would appear to be within the discretion of the court: see further at 2.44 n 252. 5.79 Claims to privilege in objection to search warrants or other statutory authority to search present greater difficulties. Indeed, the very absence of an obviously appropriate procedure by which to resolve disputes over privilege claims led a minority in Baker v Campbell to conclude that, in enabling search warrants, parliament never intended them to be subject to claims of legal professional privilege.326 On the other hand, the majority was not prepared to let procedural difficulties undermine such an important privilege, recognising that ultimately a resisting party can always seek an injunction to restrain the execution of a warrant. 5.80 Where privilege is claimed in objection to a search warrant, proceedings can be brought to have the warrant declared invalid or to restrain execution that might extend to privileged material.327 Ideally, there should be an obligation upon a judicial officer granting a search warrant to consider whether documents subject to legal professional privilege might be included within the documents

sought and, if so, to specify a procedure appropriate for the determination of any dispute about the privilege. Sweeney J in Re Arno; Ex parte Forsy328 was prepared to strike down a warrant issued under s 10 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) to search the premises of a solicitor, where the warrant did not, on its face, show that the issuing magistrate had turned his mind to how questions of privilege might be dealt with. Lockhart J on appeal (Arno v Forsyth)329 inclined to the same view, while Fox J regarded questions of privilege as relevant to the question of the validity of execution rather than to the validity of the warrant itself. 5.81 Following this last approach, courts have generally been reluctant to invalidate warrants for their failure to show on their face that the question of privilege has been considered by the issuing magistrate, or for failure to specify any procedure for claiming privilege. To invalidate the warrant would invalidate the seizure of all material seized [page 508] in pursuance of it. Rather, courts have given remedy either by allowing proceedings to restrain execution or through remedying wrongful execution by ordering the return of privileged material, or by upholding objection at tender on the basis the evidence was unlawfully obtained.330 In this way other material remains validly seized under the warrant. Whatever the strict legal position, the Australian Federal Police and the Law Council of Australia have reached agreement upon the procedure to be followed where warrants are issued for the search of material on lawyers’ premises, a procedure which allows disputed material to be placed in court custody pending resolution of the privilege claim.331 Also warrants to search persons obtained by ASIC pursuant to s 3E of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) have a document attached to them entitled ‘Claims for Legal Professional Privilege: Searches of the Person’ setting out the procedure to be followed.332 In Commissioner of Taxation v Citibank,333 the Full Federal Court unanimously held that legal professional privilege applies to searches conducted under s 263 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth), and that the Commissioner is obliged to employ procedures that give a realistic opportunity to claim the privilege. The South Australian Full Court in Question of Law Reserved (No 1) refused to follow Citibank insofar as it held that the failure to provide such an

opportunity resulted in the invalidity of the entire search.334 Rather, it held, by analogy to the situation in the case of search warrants, that the failure is relevant to the lawfulness of the execution of the search power given by s 263, an approach endorsed by the Federal Court in [page 509] JMA Accounting Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation.335 The question is whether the power of search has been reasonably executed. In relation to possibly privileged documents the court held in JMA that, in the circumstances, it was reasonable for officers to read material insofar as necessary to determine a reasonable belief as to its relevance and as to whether privilege might possibly be claimed, and to take copies prior to giving JMA the opportunity to claim privilege.336 The Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has guidelines seeking to ensure that a reasonable opportunity to claim privilege is always provided where a search is conducted under s 263.337 Whilst investigators complain of the delays appropriate procedures may cause, sometimes in frustration of the entire investigation, if the privilege is to be maintained procedures are required that permit disputed claims of privilege to be fairly and yet, from the point of view of investigators, efficiently determined. At the moment, procedures are ad hoc and their validity subject only to the less than definitive supervision of the common law. The ALRC has investigated these problems at the federal level and has recommended that legislation provide comprehensive procedures applying to all federal bodies with coercive information-gathering powers to ensure the opportunity to claim privilege and to ensure that disputed claims are fairly and efficiently dealt with (through independent review in addition to courts).338

Legal professional privilege and other rules and privileges preventing disclosure 5.82 In Waterford v Commonwealth, it was argued (while discussing Dawson J’s contrary view in Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney)339 that, even if legal professional privilege ostensibly applied to professional legal advice given to a government in the exercise of its administrative and executive functions, that advice must also (and ultimately) be considered according to the rules of public

interest immunity. In other words, disclosure can only be avoided if the balance of public interests so demands. In reaching this balance the reasons for ostensibly granting legal professional privilege might be taken into consideration but are not decisive. The whole court rejected this argument, and the scope for considering other public interests once the conditions for [page 510] granting privilege have been satisfied was emphatically rejected by the High Court in Carter v Managing Partner, Northmore Hale Davey and Leake.340 Legal professional privilege exhausts the consideration of the public interest. Where legal professional privilege is not available, disclosure may be resisted on other grounds, whether public interest immunity or another of the privileges, such as that against self-incrimination. 5.83 Very often, legal professional privilege is invoked in the context of discovery and inspection before trial. In this context, where no specific immunity or privilege applies, a court may still refuse disclosure where it is unable to conclude that disclosure is necessary for the fair disposal of the matters in issue between the parties. If the opponent is able to fairly pursue his or her case without access to the information then disclosure need not be ordered. Thus, in Science Research Council v Nasse, where the plaintiffs alleged that they had been discriminated against because they had not been promoted by the defendant, the Privy Council refused to allow automatic inspection of unprivileged confidential reports concerning the suitability of the other applicants for promotion.341 It held that, before disclosure could be ordered, the tribunal concerned had to consider whether, in all the circumstances, disclosure of the reports was necessary for fairly disposing of the action. This involved inspecting the documents in question, determining their relevance to the issues in the case, considering the detriment (particularly and generally) which might flow from the disclosure of confidential documents of this sort in industrial matters, considering whether the information relevant to the issues could be obtained from other sources, and considering the terms upon which any necessary discovery should be made.342 It was this discretion that was invoked by judges343 seeking to resolve the

difference in scope of the privileges at common law applicable pre-trial and those applying at tender under the uniform legislation. Although many of these differences have now been removed, where they might remain Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation344 disapproves of the use of the discretion on discovery to equate access rules with those that determine the admissibility of evidence. The discretion at discovery exists to promote principled and efficient trial management, not to implement rules of admissibility.345 [page 511] 5.84 One other privilege that may apply in the discovery process to documents over which legal professional privilege is claimed, is the privilege to refuse disclosure of documents relating solely to a party’s own case and of no assistance to the opponent — as either undermining a party’s own case or assisting the opponent’s case. This discovery privilege, developed by the courts of Chancery to discourage adversaries from manufacturing contrary evidence, may still apply in some Australian jurisdictions.346 It is not enacted in the uniform legislation. It is a clear example of a rule restricting access to information upon the basis of narrow adversary trial considerations. As the elements of secrecy are removed from that trial the reasons for this privilege become increasingly doubtful.

Conclusion 5.85 The communications or advice limb of legal professional privilege finds its justification in the need to ensure that individuals can seek professional advice about their legal rights and obligations in confidence and, where necessary, pursue those rights with professional help in the courts. It is not the mere need for confidentiality which gives rise to the privilege. If clients ran the risk of having confidential communications disclosed by their lawyers, they could not afford to make frank disclosure and the effective enforcement of their rights and obligations might be frustrated. The litigation limb seeks to encourage the pursuit of adversary litigation through lawyers. The privilege thus lies at the heart of the common law legal system, encouraging professional advice and the use of lawyers in adversary litigation. These reasons do not apply to other confidential relationships, such as doctor

and patient, priest and penitent, journalist and informant, police and informant, husband and wife, and so on. There are reasons of public policy why such relationships are confidential, and equitable rules exist to protect confidences exchanged within them.347 But where a court of law requires the disclosure of information imparted during such relationships in order to determine the legal rights and obligations of litigants, at common law the need for correct legal decisions prevails over the confidence of the relationship. This does not mean disclosure at large is ordered. Disclosure is ordered only for the purposes of particular litigation;348 discovered documents cannot be used [page 512] outside that litigation; and courts possess extensive powers to limit disclosure to the parties (or even just their lawyers) by taking evidence in camera or by otherwise restricting the publication of evidence.349 Legal professional confidences cannot be protected by these means, for the very information disclosed to the lawyer may be crucial to the litigation itself and may never be disclosed if the privilege does not exist. The only privilege against court disclosure which is necessary to ensure correct legal decisions is legal professional privilege. 5.86 The common law recognises these arguments by not extending any privilege to other confidential relationships (although privileges are being increasingly recommended by law reform bodies and granted by statute: see 5.205ff).

At the same time, the common law recognises the need to keep the legal professional privileges within strict bounds if the overall object of rectitude of decision-making is to be maintained. They extend only to communications and materials created for the purposes of advice or use in litigation and not to the information contained in them; they extend only to communications and materials created for the dominant and bona fide purpose of such uses, and once a party has access to a privileged communication or material, admissible evidence of it may be given. But more recent decisions in Australia have not taken opportunities to confine the privileges. Copies of unprivileged documents may be privileged communications. Extraneous public interests favouring disclosure are ignored once the conditions for privilege have been satisfied. Documents and materials in the hands of persons outside the confidential relationship of client and lawyer are increasingly protected by courts. Courts are reluctant to impute waiver where clients reveal privileged materials to persons outside the confidential client–lawyer relationship. The scope of the client legal privileges under the uniform legislation is similarly broad. While one must not downplay the fundamental importance of the privileges to the administration of justice, one must not forget that justice most fundamentally [page 513] depends upon the quest for rectitude. Privilege should only interfere with this quest so far as is necessary to ensure the policies that justify it.

The privilege in aid of settlement Justification 5.87 A second privilege finding justification in the procedural context of the adversary trial is that which protects disclosures made by parties during settlement negotiations.350 The privilege derives from the adversary freedom of parties to determine whether to commence or continue formal enforcement of their rights and obligations. This principle of free disposition, which finds its most forceful expression in civil actions, entitles parties to settle their differences out of court upon whatever terms they agree are appropriate. But furthermore, it is in the

interests of both parties and the public that disputes are settled as quickly and efficiently and as inexpensively as possible. To encourage settlement through negotiation, the common law privileges disclosures made between parties with a view to reaching settlement of their disputes.351 If the privilege derives from the principle of free disposition, and if that principle is basic to all democratic procedural systems, then the privilege may apply in common law and civil law systems. The privilege is enacted in s 131 of the uniform legislation and s 67C of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) insofar as it concerns the settlement of civil disputes. Other statutory provisions encouraging parties to pursue alternative dispute resolution contain protections with respect to confidential negotiations conducted in pursuance of these procedures: see 5.105.

Scope 5.88 The precise scope of the privilege at common law remains unclear. On the one hand, the greatest encouragement to settle is achieved by regarding the privilege as a general bar to access anything disclosed during a negotiation. On the other hand, the minimal scope required to recognise the policy behind the privilege, [page 514] and to thereby at the same time recognise the predominant interest of adversarial access to information and material, is to regard the privilege as embodying only a rule of evidence that makes inadmissible in subsequent proceedings admissions made by parties during negotiations to settle the dispute that has led to those proceedings.352 But whilst, in the absence of clear High Court authority to the contrary, it still remains possible to argue that the common law takes a minimal view of the privilege, applying it only to admissions made in settlement of disputes and to prevent access to those admissions in proceedings related to the original dispute subject to settlement negotiations, more recent authority, influenced by the widespread acceptance of the view that citizens be encouraged to employ methods of dispute settlement alternative to the combatant and expensive judicial

system, suggests that the privilege is wider. Most significantly it protects not just admissions but all communications and materials made for the purposes of settlement negotiations, and increasingly it extends the privilege to prevent third parties obtaining access to these communications and materials. In this way the common law has evolved towards the statutory expression of the privilege found in s 131 of the uniform legislation. This legislation casts the net of privilege widely to cover all communications and documents made in connection with negotiations attempting settlement of a civil dispute (s 131(1), (5)), and then provides for those situations where, for some reason, the privilege cannot be invoked (s 131(2)). 5.89 The common law privilege has never purported to extend to everything disclosed during settlement negotiations. Just as legal professional privilege extends only to communications made and materials created for the purposes of advice or litigation and not to information as such, it has never been suggested that the negotiations privilege is of greater ambit. Therefore, so-called ‘objective facts’ discovered during the course of negotiations independently of communications made and materials created are not privileged at common law. Thus, in Field v Commissioner for Railways for New South Wales,353 where a doctor was asked to examine the plaintiff for the purpose of negotiating an outof-court settlement of a personal injuries claim, the court was clear that the doctor remained entitled to testify to his observations concerning the plaintiff’s condition, explaining that the privilege ‘is not concerned with objective facts which may be ascertained during the course of negotiations’. [page 515] But this decision can be interpreted as part of a more fundamental conceptualisation of the privilege, extending it only to admissions made in the course of settlement negotiations. In the case before them not only was the doctor called to testify to his observations about the plaintiff’s condition, but more significantly to testify to an admission of negligence the plaintiff had made to him during the examination. In considering this evidence the majority said that the privilege ‘is concerned with the use of the negotiations or what is said in the course of them as evidence by way of admission’ and that it protects admissions made by words or conduct by a party during negotiations. While there was an

admission in the case before them, it had not been made during any negotiations,354 and so the claim for privilege had to be rejected. What is not entirely clear is whether the majority was confining the privilege to admissions, or whether this terminology was used because of the nature of the evidence before it, or because it is where there are admissions that the privilege is most likely to be invoked. Nevertheless, on its face the judgment supports this more limited conceptualisation of the privilege. Other authorities also emphasise this admissional scope.355 On the basis that the evidence was not a concessional admission, the privilege has been held not to apply to a declaration of inability to pay debts made during settlement negotiations (as establishing an act of bankruptcy);356 to the exercise of an option during negotiations;357 to an actionable misrepresentation during negotiations;358 to the observation during negotiations that a letter had been written and its date;359 to evidence of negotiations to prove the objective reasonableness of the resulting settlement;360 and to evidence of the fact of negotiations to prove a relevant commercial relationship.361 [page 516] However, more recent cases have refused to limit the privilege to concessional admissions.362 English authority is most clear, with the privilege being held in Unilever plc v The Procter & Gamble Co363 to cover a threat to take proceedings to prevent breach of a patent made during settlement negotiations, and in Ofulue v Bosser364 to cover the implicit acknowledgment of a fact (the ownership of property) underlying a settlement negotiation. In each case it was argued that the evidence could be conceptualised as other than a concessional admission, but in each the privilege was held to apply whether or not it could be so conceptualised. In Unilever, Robert Walker LJ (at 2448–9) concluded that the cases: … show that the protection of admissions against interest is the most important practical effect of the rule. But to dissect out identifiable admissions and withhold protection from the rest of without prejudice communications (except for a special reason) would not only create huge practical difficulties but would be contrary to the underlying objective of giving protection to the parties, in the words of Lord Griffiths in the Rush & Tompkins case [1989] AC 1280, 1300: ‘to speak freely about all issues in the litigation both factual and legal when seeking compromise and, for the purpose of establishing a basis of compromise, admitting certain facts.’ Parties cannot speak freely at a without prejudice meeting if they must constantly monitor every sentence, with lawyers or patent agents sitting at their shoulders as minders.

Having rejected the more limited privilege Robert Walker LJ added (at 2449) that the privilege could only be set aside ‘where the protection afforded by the rule has been unequivocally abused’. In Yokogawa Australia Pty Ltd v Alstom Power Ltd,365 the South Australian Full Court accepted that these English authorities now represent the scope of the common law privilege in Australia, holding that settlement negotiations could not be relied upon to establish the reasonableness of a settlement, even where only the objective reasonableness of that settlement was in issue and the negotiations were not put forward as admissions or otherwise to prove the truth of any facts asserted. Of further significance, the court held that the privilege extended to ‘post-settlement’ communications and internal communications made between officers of the company conducting the negotiation, on the ground that these communications could be regarded as ‘reasonably incidental’ to the negotiations.366 [page 517] 5.90 The effect of these decisions is that the scope of the common law privilege is now close to that enacted in s 131 of the uniform legislation: (1) Evidence is not to be adduced of: (a)

a communication that is made between persons in dispute, or between one or more persons in dispute and a third party, in connection with an attempt to negotiate a settlement of the dispute; or

(b) a document (whether delivered or not) that has been prepared in connection with an attempt to negotiate a settlement of a dispute.

Section 131(5) extends this provision to a dispute in which relief may be given in an Australian or overseas proceeding, but it does not extend to an attempt to negotiate the settlement of a criminal dispute.367 This is a wide privilege, extending to all communications and documents, whether made by the persons in dispute or third parties, provided they are made ‘in connection with an attempt to negotiate a settlement of a dispute’. Given that the purpose of the privilege is to encourage negotiated settlements, these are the crucial limiting words.368 It may be possible to escape the statutory privilege where evidence is relevant independently of evidence of a communication or document. But the statutory privilege applies even where the communication or

document may have been made also for other purposes — there is no test of dominant purpose as for client legal privilege. And confidentiality is assumed unless expressly rejected in the communication or document: s 131(2)(d). In other than the Commonwealth, s 131A of the uniform legislation expressly extends the application of the privilege beyond acting as a rule of admissibility at trial to permit objection to disclosure requirements that apply preliminary to trial. 5.91 But at common law also, the privilege operates not simply as a rule of admissibility but may be invoked more generally to resist access sought by third parties to the negotiations (the parties to negotiation will already have access). In Rush & [page 518] Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council, contractors sued the council claiming indemnity in respect of their liability to subcontractors as a result of delays in completing a building contract.369 The council and the contractors reached a monetary settlement on the understanding that the contractors would then remain responsible for any liability to the subcontractors. An estimate of this liability had formed the basis of their agreement with the council. Their action against the council was discontinued. The subcontractors counter-claimed seeking to make the contractors liable for their losses and in that action sought discovery of documents created during the negotiations with the council which showed the amount the contractors had conceded as representing their liability to the subcontractors. Discovery was refused by the House of Lords on the basis that the privilege could be invoked by the contractors. Three doctrinal propositions formed the basis of this conclusion: first, the privilege is not just a rule of admissibility but may apply on discovery; secondly, the privilege can be invoked to resist access by a person who was not a party to the settlement negotiations; and thirdly, the privilege may be invoked even after an agreement has been negotiated: see 5.97. 5.92 How far the common law privilege extends to prevent discovery to, or admissibility sought by, third parties is not, however, clear from Rush & Tompkins. On its facts, there would have been no encouragement to the contractors to settle if concessions made to the council could have been used against them by a subcontractor party to the same dispute. Although subsequent

Australian cases permitting the privilege on discovery against third parties in separate proceedings have not made it a requirement that the proceedings arise out of the same dispute, this is the situation where the evidence is most likely to be relevant and therefore where disclosure by a third party will most often be sought.370 In Yokogawa Australia Pty Ltd v Alstom Power Ltd,371 Duggan J, after examining the authorities, concluded that the question is not whether all concerned are joined in the same action, and that the privilege may apply ‘where the negotiations and the litigation arise out of the same subject matter and the negotiations and settlement (if achieved) are of potential relevance to subsequent litigation between one of the parties to the negotiation and a party involved in the litigation’. The uniform legislation creates a rule that simply applies to all proceedings and between any parties: Liu v Fairfax Newspapers Ltd.372 That the privilege may extend to prevent tender or access by third parties is recognised in s 131(2)(i), which creates [page 519] an exception to the privilege where ‘making the communication, or preparing the document affects a right of a person’. 5.93 Another question relating to the scope of the privilege at common law is how it is affected by the parties agreeing that their negotiations are to be ‘without prejudice’. It is common for letters written during negotiations to be headed with these words, and one issue is whether they have the effect of extending the scope of the privilege, either on the basis that the parties have agreed that nothing revealed during negotiations should be subsequently disclosed, or on the ground that it would be unfair for one party to tender against another information obtained in such circumstances. The majority in Field v Commissioners for Railways for New South Wales comment that ‘to some extent the area of protection may be enlarged by the tacit acceptance of one side of the use by the other side of these words’.373 In Rabin v Mendoza and Co, the plaintiff sought discovery of a surveyor’s report commissioned during negotiations expressed to be ‘without prejudice’. In refusing discovery, Romer LJ commented that:374 It seems to me that it would be monstrous to allow the plaintiff to make use — as he certainly would

— for his own purposes as against the defendants of a document which is entitled to the protection of ‘without prejudice’ status.

The entitlement appeared based simply upon the words ‘without prejudice’. However, it is one thing to refuse discovery (ultimately, as Romer LJ emphasises, a matter of discretion);375 it is another to hold such a report privileged. To permit the agreement of the parties to restrict access to information during formal proceedings is a more serious step. It is up to the courts to decide, upon public policy grounds, in what circumstances access can be restricted during proceedings. If the public policy basis of the privilege is the encouragement of settlements and not the express or implied agreement of the parties to maintain confidentiality, then the mere agreement of the parties should not be permitted to extend the scope of the privilege. 5.94 If the privilege is to encourage consensual dispute resolution outside the courts it must arise although settlement negotiations occur before any formal court proceedings are taken.376 The policy requires only that negotiations have begun for the purpose of inducing settlement of an existing dispute. The use of the words ‘without prejudice’ when communications are made is strong evidence that such negotiations have begun,377 but only evidence. The phrase is not [page 520] a precondition for the application of the privilege,378 and a court can also look to surrounding circumstances in determining whether bona fide negotiations have begun.379 But where the phrase is used generally ‘the protection that these words claim will be given to it unless the other party can show that there is a good reason for not doing so’.380 Negotiations begin with the first bona fide overture, whether or not this is accepted as a commencement of negotiation by the opponent.381 Once negotiations have proceeded on a ‘without prejudice’ basis there is an onus upon any party seeking to establish that the basis of the negotiations has changed.382 Section 131(1) of the uniform legislation in the same way demands an attempt to negotiate the settlement of a dispute and the above common law authorities appear to have direct application.383

5.95 Once settlement negotiations have begun, the common law privilege extends only to communications and documents made during those negotiations with a view to inducing settlement. Section 131 similarly provides that the communication or document be made ‘in connection with an attempt to negotiate a settlement’.384 Thus, in Davies and Davies v Nyland and O’Neil, Wells J held that a statement containing an admission made during ‘without prejudice’ negotiations as an ultimatum, and not with a view to seeking peace, was not privileged at common law.385 Nor, given the purpose of the privilege, should it be regarded as a communication ‘made in connection with an attempt to negotiate’. Similarly, in Field v Commissioner for Railways for New South Wales, the admission by the plaintiff during examination by a doctor was held not to have been made during negotiations and therefore not privileged. Again, s 131(1) is only invoked in the most general of terms. [page 521] 5.96 But as the primary scope of the privilege is expanded, so it becomes important to ensure that claims to privilege are genuine and that the policy behind the privilege is not abused. As Robert Walker LJ in Unilever plc v The Procter & Gamble Co explained, the privilege will be set aside ‘where the protection afforded by the rule has been unequivocally abused’.386 This principle gives common law courts a wide scope to limit the privilege where it is felt it would be inappropriate to claim it. Section 131(2)(j) and (k) is more specific and more limited in providing that the privilege does not apply to communications and documents made in pursuance of a fraud, offence or act attracting a civil penalty, or made or reasonably known to have been made in pursuance of an abuse of power (reasonable grounds for so finding being sufficient to invoke these exceptions: s 131(3) and (4)). An important limit to the privilege contained in s 131(2)(i) provides that no privilege can be claimed where ‘making the communication or preparing the document affects the right of a person’. This would appear to cover the situation in those common law cases where acts of bankruptcy, exercise of options or actionable misrepresentations etc were held outside the privilege on the basis that these matters could not be regarded as concessional admissions within the privilege.387 If the common law now extends beyond concessional admissions

some other rationalisation will have to be found for these cases. They may be explained on the basis that it would have been an abuse of the privilege to allow it to be invoked.388 Other common law cases excluding evidence from the privilege where relevant other than as a concessional admission389 are more difficult to explain if the privilege is more extensive. It is interesting in this context to note the decision in Hoefler v Tomlinson where, despite s 131, the Full Federal Court was prepared to admit evidence of the date and nature of a letter in order to show that the defendant was aware of an application to strike out his proceedings.390 5.97 On settlement of a dispute, the resulting agreement may be proved, if necessary, through some disclosure of the negotiations that have occurred,391 and despite the [page 522] placing of the words ‘without prejudice’ upon the resulting agreement itself.392 Section 131(1) of the Uniform Acts similarly extends only to protect the negotiations393 and s 131(2)(f) allows these to be tendered if necessary in proceedings in which any resulting agreement is in issue.394 But the House of Lords held in Rush & Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council that reaching an agreement does not generally make the concessional negotiations leading up to that agreement admissible.395 The privilege survives the agreement. This may be necessary if a party is to be encouraged to settle despite the continuing of the dispute with other more recalcitrant persons. In Rush, the settlement of the dispute between the council and a contractor in respect of losses incurred from delays in completing a building did not allow a subcontractor to obtain access to the negotiations to determine what losses the contractor considered could be reasonably claimed from it by that subcontractor. If such access is allowed, contractors will be less willing to concede such claims in settlement negotiations. On this authority, negotiations remain privileged even after agreement where this is necessary to encouragement settlements. This is only likely to be an issue where third parties are interested in the parties’ settlement. The position is the same under the uniform legislation that only admits negotiations insofar as they are necessary to prove the settlement agreement.

Costs396 5.98 In Walker v Wisher, the Court of Appeal held the privilege extended to prevent reference to offers of compromise in determining costs in an action pursued following failure of settlement negotiations.397 This manifestation of the privilege may be seen as based simply upon the implied agreement of the parties rather than any wider public policy seeking the encouragement of the settlement of disputes, as the consciousness of the risk of costs can only act as an incentive to settle.398 To avoid this, a party may express an offer to be without prejudice ‘save as to costs’, in which case it may be so taken into account. The proviso was accepted in Calderbank v Calderbank, and the offer is known as a Calderbank offer.399 Court rules provide procedures for payments into court and for the more formal filing of offers and these rules stipulate the consequences for costs. Because the Calderbank offer creates no costs entitlements and merely allows [page 523] the offer to be considered when the discretion to award costs arises, where formal procedures exist it is usually more appropriate for these to be used.400 Under s 131(2)(h) of the uniform legislation, the privilege does not apply to communications relevant to liability for costs, whether or not there is a Calderbank offer.401

Criminal cases 5.99 There is no justification for extending the negotiations privilege as such to criminal cases.402 Public policy arguments do not favour the encouragement of private settlements in criminal cases and any plea bargaining that does take place should be open to scrutiny.403 Insofar as any bargaining takes place before trial, the law must ensure that the accused is not unfairly deprived of the privilege against self-incrimination.404 But this is a quite separate issue and should not be confused with the idea of a negotiation privilege in criminal cases. And there is authority for the proposition that the privilege cannot be invoked by an accused to prevent the disclosure of admissions made during negotiations to settle a civil claim.405 But, again, the criminal court might be asked to intervene if the accused has been unfairly deprived of the privilege against self-incrimination.406

The uniform legislation does not apply to attempts to settle criminal proceedings or anticipated criminal proceedings (s 131(5)(b)) but, according to Beech-Jones J in Liu v Fairfax Newspapers Ltd,407 the fact that a dispute has both civil and criminal consequences does not prevent the privilege applying (at least in civil proceedings), and s 67C of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) is limited to negotiations to settle civil disputes.

Waiver: whose privilege? 5.100 If the privilege operates only to protect a particular party from disclosure of an admission, logic and policy demand that the privilege belongs to that party, not both parties to the litigation, and therefore can be waived by that party. Even before the scope of the privilege had been extended beyond admissions, some authorities favoured the view that both parties must waive. In Walker v Wisher, this was asserted [page 524] to be so, but in the context of the admissibility of the fact of a ‘without prejudice’ offer in determining costs, where different considerations may require both parties to consent.408 Similarly, Re Turf Enterprises Pty Ltd,409 which followed Walker v Wisher, can be distinguished. There, a scheme of arrangement suggested by a creditor during ‘without prejudice’ negotiations with a company was sought to be admitted against the company (which had never accepted the scheme) in winding-up proceedings. The evidence was hearsay, and no admission against the company arose.410 In Johnston v Jackson,411 a defendant was estopped from claiming privilege after using a ‘without prejudice’ letter to set aside a default judgment, and in State of Western Australia v Southern Equities Corp Ltd,412 French J held that a party to a negotiation could unilaterally plead the negotiation into relevance in proceedings against a defendant who was not party to those negotiations. These cases suggest that the conduct of one party may result in loss of the privilege. In Yokogawa Australia Pty Ltd v Alstom Power Ltd,413 Duggan J (Sulan J agreeing, Kourakis J not deciding) reconciles these decisions on the ground that whereas in proceedings between the parties to the settlement negotiations both parties must consent to disclosure, ‘the unilateral actions of one of the negotiating

parties can impliedly waive privilege in litigation involving a third party’. Duggan J held that the principles of implied waiver were similar to those applying to legal professional privilege. In the case before him there was no implied waiver in the mere allegation that a settlement was (objectively) reasonable, because this did not put in issue the course of negotiations that had led to that settlement. There was therefore no inconsistency in alleging the reasonableness of the settlement and seeking to maintain the confidentiality of the settlement negotiations: see further discussion and cases at n 249. But Duggan J was quick to add that if the party to the negotiation itself puts in issue settlement negotiations in an action by or against a third party then the privilege would be regarded as (unilaterally) waived. It seems that in this situation the interests of justice trump the privilege, particularly as often there remains no strong reason for the continuation of the privilege in these circumstances. The uniform legislation specifies a number of situations where the privilege is lost through the consent of or disclosure by both parties: s 131(2)(a)–(c); see also Evidence [page 525] Act 1929 (SA) s 67C(2)(a)–(c).414 In addition, under s 131(2)(g), the privilege goes, by analogy to imputed waiver, ‘if evidence has been adduced that is likely to mislead the court unless evidence of the communication or document is adduced to contradict or to qualify that evidence’.415 And by s 131(2)(d), a communication or document containing a statement to the effect that it is not to be treated as confidential is not privileged. These last two provisions result in the conduct of one party either waiving the privilege or preventing it from arising in the first place.

Proceedings in which privilege may be claimed 5.101 As mentioned above, in its narrowest form, the privilege operates only to prevent admissions being tendered in those proceedings between the parties that follow the settlement negotiations. But authority supports admissions also being privileged from disclosure or tender in proceedings involving a third party.416 Except where the third party has been somehow involved in the principal dispute, it is unlikely that such admissions will be relevant to the issues

vis-a-vis the third party, and where relevant to those issues, may be of little probative value, having been conceded only for the sake of peace.417 But if these problems are surmounted then, to give realistic encouragement to parties to make admissions for the purposes of settlement, it is appropriate that the privilege extend to proceedings involving third parties. The privilege enacted in s 131 of the uniform legislation applies irrespective of the proceedings in which it is claimed and of the parties to those proceedings. Section 67C(1) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) makes privileged communications and documents inadmissible ‘in any civil and criminal proceedings’. There is Australian common law authority denying the privilege in subsequent criminal proceedings against an admitting party,418 but both at common law and under the uniform legislation, a judge might still exclude an admission in exercise of the exclusionary discretion. But, on the basis of the above authority, the mere fact the admission is made during civil negotiations does not ipso facto constitute grounds for exclusion. [page 526]

Secondary evidence of privileged admissions 5.102 If the privilege is regarded simply as one against access then once evidence of the privileged admission has been obtained by a party it may be tendered without abuse of the privilege. On the other hand, if the privilege is also one of admissibility then tender may fall foul of the privilege even after access to the privileged admission has been obtained. Although it is doubtful that the negotiating privilege rests on grounds of public policy stronger than those that support legal professional privilege, there are many dicta which define the privilege in the stronger terms of admissibility.419 The only direct authority concerns the scope of the negotiating privilege in a matrimonial dispute, where secondary evidence (eavesdropping) of a privileged concession was excluded.420 That case might once have been distinguished on the ground that the public policy basis of the privilege is stronger in the case of matrimonial matters,421 but it is doubtful whether this distinction would now be recognised. The uniform legislation in jurisdictions other than the Commonwealth extends the application in s 131A to pre-trial access during proceedings, but as a rule of

admissibility, once s 131 is satisfied no evidence of a privileged communication or document may be adduced at trial.

Public policy limits 5.103 Although the High Court appears reluctant to constrain legal professional privilege by public policy considerations (see 5.68), there is authority refusing to apply the settlement privilege when its application would result in the court being misled.422 This limit is enacted in s 131(2)(g) of the uniform legislation and effectively requires the privilege to be waived where one party has been permitted to tender evidence relating to a privileged negotiation and the court was likely to be misled without further evidence of the negotiation.

Negotiations between estranged spouses 5.104 A specific application of the privilege in aid of settlement can be found in cases dealing with the admissibility of negotiations between estranged spouses.423 [page 527] These are of interest on a number of counts. They show that the privilege applies to protect concessions made in negotiations entered into before formal proceedings are commenced,424 and to protect concessions made to a third party who has successfully or unsuccessfully attempted to induce the parties to enter into settlement negotiations.425 But the third party must be acting as a negotiator for this privilege to apply, and a number of decisions refuse to privilege concessions made to welfare officers who have not been concerned to negotiate settlement of their client’s matrimonial affairs.426 However, reports made by welfare officers to their superiors may themselves be privileged either under legislation427 or by virtue of the wider public policy immunity.428 Under Pt 2 Div 2 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), non-court based conferences with family counsellors and family dispute resolution practitioners are confidential and evidence of anything said during the conference is inadmissible (subject to some exceptions; for example, to disclose the abuse of a child).

Alternative dispute resolution

5.105 The above analysis of the privilege suggests that the common law privilege has shifted from one kept within the limited bounds of concessional admissions to one that seeks to provide the maximum incentive to parties to settle by privileging all communications made and documents prepared during settlement negotiations. Certainly, s 131 of the uniform legislation (and s 67C of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA)) provides this maximal incentive and may be seen as part of other legislation that exists in Australian jurisdictions encouraging alternative dispute resolution by generally protecting matters disclosed in alternative processes encouraging parties to settle through agreement.429 Some of this legislation encourages the use of negotiation or mediation after formal proceedings have been commenced, and the privilege applies only in those or related proceedings.430 Specific duties are also imposed on [page 528] mediators not to disclose matters communicated to them by the disputing parties during attempts to mediate.

The privilege against self-incrimination Introduction: the adversary rationale 5.106 The third privilege that can find justification in the procedural context of the adversary trial, and more particularly the accusatorial trial, is the privilege against self-incrimination. This privilege arguably has many manifestations and it would be naive to assert that the procedural context is its sole justification.431 Nevertheless, it sits easily within this context. And although scholars had tied the development of the accused’s right not to testify to disapproval by the common law of the excesses of the examinations by the Star Chamber and the ecclesiastical courts,432 later research explains this important manifestation of the privilege as evolving with the development of the criminal accusatorial trial, in particular, as a consequence of the growing use of lawyers in the trial.433 The principle that no person should be compelled to incriminate oneself (nemo tenetur prodere seipsum) was long recognised in ecclesiastic courts.434 However, although aware of this principle, common law courts never applied it. In the early eighteenth century, the accused was tried before judge and jury without assistance

of counsel. The accused was not able to testify on oath but was expected to make an answer to the allegations against him or her. But, as the prosecution in an effort to control crime became more reliant upon professional informers, solicitors and counsel, to restore the balance judges began to permit, probably as a matter of discretion, lawyers to represent the accused. At first these were permitted only to cross-examine often dubious professionally collected prosecution testimony,435 with the accused remaining expected to give an unsworn explanation of the charge.436 As lawyers pressed their involvement and control, the accused became allowed to answer entirely through counsel and thereby to seek refuge in the privilege. Thus, although in prosecutions for felony counsel were not strictly permitted until 1836, it appears that counsel gradually infiltrated the criminal process and changed the trial from one controlled [page 529] by the judge to one controlled by counsel for the parties; in other words, to what we recognise today as the adversarial accusatorial trial. The prosecutor became obliged to make out a case on his or her evidence alone, defence counsel were able to examine and cross-examine witnesses and eventually to address the jury, and the standard of proof became set at beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the conditions became ripe for the accused to claim that there had evolved a right not to testify and this became regarded, rightly or wrongly, as an offshoot of the privilege against self-incrimination. So, although the notion of the privilege had earlier origins, its manifestation in the right of the accused not to testify only became possible with the development of the common law adversarial trial. 5.107 A further link with this evolution is that, during the formative period of the common law adversary trial — until, indeed, the evidence reforms of the nineteenth century — parties (and their spouses) were also not competent to testify in civil cases, and were not obliged to disclose information to their opponents before trial, consequences also consistent with an adversarially based privilege. Thus, the privilege against self-incrimination has at least strong procedural overtones, and the protections accorded an accused by the adversary trial and by the privilege are closely related. As explained in Lee v R,437 the fundamental principle of the accusatory trial is that the prosecution proves its case without

assistance from the accused, and as a corollary, a ‘companion rule’, the accused cannot be required to testify. As such, the fundamental principle at least partly justifies, but can be regarded as distinct from, the privilege against selfincrimination. As the court also said (at [34]), ‘The privilege against selfincrimination may be lost, but the principle remains’. Arguably, the justification for the privilege against self-incrimination goes beyond these procedural associations and reflects more fundamentally the importance of the sanctity of the individual in society. Not only does the privilege seek to protect individuals from being inhumanely forced to confess their guilt (for this protection can be achieved by means other than giving the privilege), but the privilege also embodies an abhorrence at the state having to rely upon individuals being humiliated into confessing their guilt. At this level it is a notion regarded as fundamental to the relationship between the individual and the state in a democratic society. Whether this notion of abhorrence can be justified and whether the removal of the privilege would undermine espoused social values is a matter of constant debate.438 And a debate that [page 530] has resulted in statutory modification in New South Wales of the right of an accused to silence when questioned by police: see further at 5.144 below. 5.108 The question of the rationale of the privilege came squarely before the High Court in Environmental Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd,439 where it was asked to decide whether a company could claim the privilege in objection to orders to produce certain documents. In rejecting a company’s right to claim the privilege, the majority, although emphasising the human rights aspects of the privilege, recognise and accept its adversarial justifications but regarded this justification, which applies of course to companies, as outweighed by the need for the state to obtain documentary evidence from its statutorily created entities: see further at 5.150ff. The privilege against self-incrimination, if regarded as inclusive of the companion principle upon which it is partly based, finds expression in various contexts in the common law of evidence. Generally, it can be regarded as underlying the accusatory notion whereby the prosecution make out a prima facie case against an accused and prove that case beyond reasonable doubt without

the assistance of the accused. More specifically, it produces the following evidentiary rules. First, the accused (and originally the accused’s spouse) is an incompetent witness for the prosecution (and originally also for the defence). Secondly, the accused has a right (privilege or immunity) to remain silent, both at trial and when examined by law enforcement authorities before trial. Thirdly, witnesses, and citizens generally, have the right (privilege or immunity) to remain silent and to refuse to answer questions or produce documents which risk being self-incriminatory unless that right has been expressly modified by statute. As will be seen, the uniform legislation, except for the modification in New South Wales to the right to silence during official questioning (explained at 5.144), endorses these various particular manifestations of the common law accusatory principle. More recently, the High Court has shown that there are further manifestations of the general accusatorial principle. In X7 v Australian Crime Commission,440 as interpreted in R v Independent Broad Based Corruption Commission,441 the general principle was applied to interpret legislation not to extend to the compulsory examination of persons after they had been formally charged. In Lee v R,442 the unauthorised access by the prosecutor to the compulsory examination of the accused whilst still a suspect was held to produce a substantial miscarriage of justice in contravention of the general accusatorial principle. But the discussion that follows will focus on the particular manifestations of the privilege against selfincrimination described above. [page 531] 5.109 The relationship between the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to remain silent is often ignored but also requires some preliminary explanation. The privilege exists to protect those who may be suspected of guilt from being under any obligation to make incriminatory admissions. It manifests itself in the right to remain silent. Nevertheless, the privilege is not the only ground upon which citizens can claim silence. Reasons of privacy justify silence even where there is no suggestion of a citizen’s criminal involvement. It is not obstruction of the police to refuse to answer police questions (although, rarely, it might still constitute misprision of felony). The right of silence is thus the manifestation of other more basic entitlements and is not in itself a justifying

principle. The following discussion of the right to silence is confined to its manifestation as an aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination. The right to silence is, perhaps, the most important manifestation of that privilege and provides one of the strongest practical reasons for maintaining it. Given that people cannot be forced to speak, for only cruel torture can achieve this, where silence is maintained the courts must ultimately, if the privilege is removed, draw an appropriate inference from that silence. But what is the appropriate inference to draw from silence? Is it guilt? Are we equipped to handle the myriad of possible reasons why an accused person may not speak? Should we, given that only the guilty should be convicted and very few risks should be taken in this, speculate upon the reasons for silence? Just as we are wary about disclosing an accused’s disposition to the jury for fear of the inaccurate inferences which might be drawn from it, so we might be wary about the inferences to be drawn from silence.443

Incompetence of accused and spouse as witnesses for the prosecution The accused 5.110 At common law, this rule is absolute. In practical terms there would be little point in the prosecution calling the accused to testify unless he or she could be forced to speak, and this is not now tolerated. The practical application of the rule is in the case of accused jointly standing trial, and its effect is to forbid the prosecution from calling one accused to testify against another.444 Leaving aside questions of reliability, to allow a co-accused to testify in these circumstances would give the prosecution the opportunity to inveigle that accused into giving self-incriminatory testimony about the offences charged. [page 532] Additionally, such testimony against a co-accused would be suspect, although this provides reason for a corroboration or warning requirement rather than the exclusion of the testimony altogether. That this real possibility of the abuse of the privilege against self-incrimination in respect to the offences charged is the basis of the rule in the case of co-accused is seen in its arbitrary limit: it applies only

while the accused remain jointly charged and tried. An accused therefore becomes a competent and compellable prosecution witness, although able to refuse to answer questions on the ground of self-incrimination and remaining liable to a corroboration or some other warning (see 4.23–4.25), in the following situations; where (a)

the Crown enters a nolle prosequi against that accused;

(b) that accused is acquitted following the calling of no evidence by the Crown; (c) that accused pleads guilty (in which case sentence should be passed before that accused is called as a prosecution witness);445 (d) the joint trial is separated446 (in which case that accused should not, if possible, be called until the charges against that accused have been fully dealt with);447 or (e) where the Crown charges and tries each accused separately. 5.111 It should also be emphasised that the privilege only applies to forbid the prosecution from calling a co-accused as a Crown witness. If, during a joint trial, one accused chooses to give testimony by way of defence, and in the course of that testimony implicates the other co-accused, that testimony can be relied upon by the prosecution,448 although again a corroboration or other warning may be required and the co-accused against whom the testimony is given will have the right to cross-examine on the past character of the accused-witness: see 3.117–3.124. Furthermore, once an accused chooses to testify, the prosecution is entitled to seek information about the co-accused’s part in the crime through cross-examination, and the prosecution may use leading questions for this purpose.449 This illustrates that it is the particular risk of self-incrimination in the offence charged which is the basis of the rule, and no policy exists to prevent co-accused from [page 533] testifying against each other or implicating themselves when the privilege against self-incrimination in relation to the offences charged has been renounced by an accused choosing or agreeing to testify for the defence.

5.112 Although some state legislation makes an accused generally competent (rather than competent to give evidence for the defence only), it provides that an accused, whether tried jointly or alone, is an incompetent witness for the prosecution or provides that the accused can be called only on his or her own application, so that the position of the accused as a prosecution witness is the same as that at common law.450 By s 12 of the uniform legislation, all persons are competent and compellable except as otherwise provided by the legislation, and by s 17(2), a defendant is generally not competent and so cannot testify for the prosecution. But s 17(3) provides that an associated defendant is not compellable to give evidence for or against a defendant unless being tried separately. And the judge must be satisfied that an associated defendant being tried jointly is aware of the effect of subs (3). Although s 17(3) suggests that a jointly tried associated defendant is competent to give evidence for the prosecution against a defendant, the associated defendant remains incompetent by virtue of s 17(2). Consequently, so far as competency for the prosecution is concerned, the accused’s position is the same as that at common law. The accused’s spouse 5.113 At common law, spouses were regarded as one, and therefore incompetent to testify against each other. In this sense, the privilege against selfincrimination lay behind the rule, although these days, policies concerned with maintaining marriage and its confidentiality are adduced in support of any special rules that may exist. These are matters of policy outside the procedural context; consequently, the ability of the accused’s spouse to testify is dealt with at 5.200–5.204 in the context of restrictions upon access to information based upon extraneous policy factors.

The accused’s right to silence The privilege of the accused not to testify on oath for the defence 5.114 As explained at 5.106, although at common law an accused charged with felony was not entitled to counsel, nor to testify on oath by way of defence, whilst counsel were not involved the accused was expected to make an unsworn statement by way of defence. As counsel became involved and the nature of the criminal trial changed, and the accused became a less active participant, it seems

that, with the permission of the court, the accused could still make an unsworn statement by way [page 534] of defence.451 When felons became formally entitled to counsel by statute the practice continued. Thus, the accused’s unsworn statement continued to serve an evidentiary function, although the compulsion to make it was much less than when no defence counsel was permitted and an accused was expected to make an unsworn answer by way of defence. 5.115 It was not until the end of the nineteenth century that legislation was passed to allow an accused to testify on oath by way of defence like any other witness.452 But the unsworn statement was not initially abolished, nor was there any move to compel the accused to testify. As a consequence, this legislation allowed an accused one of three courses. First, the accused could testify on oath, subject to the obligation of answering questions concerning the offence charged and subject to cross-examination as to credit in the same way as any ordinary witness (except so far as previous convictions and bad character are concerned): see 3.83ff. Secondly, the accused could choose not to testify on oath and remain silent at trial. Thirdly, the accused could choose to make an unsworn statement, in which case the accused could not be cross-examined. 5.116 The first course obliges the accused to renounce the privilege against self-incrimination insofar as the offence charged is concerned. It may still be claimed in respect of other offences: see 3.85–3.87. The other courses preserve that privilege in respect of the crime charged — more or less completely where the accused remains silent, and to the extent that the accused is afforded the opportunity of giving a version of the facts without being subject to crossexamination where the accused makes an unsworn statement. The retention of the unsworn statement was justified as appropriate for accused likely to be unreasonably harassed by cross-examination. But, with judges having discretions to protect witnesses against harassment, the retention of the unsworn statement became regarded as an unnecessary anachronism and it has now been abolished in all jurisdictions.

The provisions governing the accused’s testifying on oath were analysed in the context of character evidence at 3.83ff. But where an accused fails to testify, the crucial question is what inferences, if any, may properly be drawn from this choice. The answer to this question will be decisive in determining what comments counsel [page 535] and judge may make about this choice, and what directions a judge is obliged to give about it.453 Comment and direction upon the accused’s failure to testify on oath 5.117 A principled approach to the question of what inferences may be drawn from an accused’s failure to testify might say that the accused’s right to silence is an aspect of the privilege against self-incrimination and this privilege entitles an accused to make a choice free from outside pressure. It is not enough to guarantee that an accused will be free from punishment in making the choice if the consequences of making the choice may otherwise be adverse to the accused’s interests. What right to remain silent can there be if the fact-finder is able to draw adverse inferences against an accused who remains silent? Such an approach leads to the conclusion that if an accused is to have the right to remain silent then, first, the accused must be under no legal obligation to testify on oath; secondly, no adverse comment may be made by judge or counsel upon the choice not to testify; and thirdly, the jury must draw no adverse inference from the choice and be directed accordingly.454 5.118 In every Australian jurisdiction there is no legal obligation on an accused to testify. In every jurisdiction, except Queensland, the right to comment is regulated455 although, except in Victoria where the permissible and prohibited directions are stipulated, the exact purpose for this regulation is not clearly expressed. In jurisdictions other than those governed by the uniform legislation, the provisions simply prohibit altogether comment by stipulated participants upon the accused’s failure ‘to give evidence’. In South Australia and Western Australia, comment by the prosecutor alone is prohibited.456 It has been held that there is no comment

on an accused’s failure ‘to give evidence’ where the comment is confined simply to saying that the prosecution [page 536] case is unanswered, and does not suggest, directly or indirectly, that the accused could have provided that answer by testifying on oath.457 5.119 The problem with prohibiting comment by both prosecutor and judge is that the judge cannot explain simply the choices open to the accused and tell the jury what adverse inferences (if any) it may draw from the accused’s failure to testify on oath.458 As a consequence, an accused may feel there is no real choice but to testify on oath if the jury is not to be left to speculate about the significance of his or her silence.459 Indeed, it might even be argued that legislation which makes no provision at all for comment intends to leave the jury free so to speculate and to draw whatever inferences it regards as appropriate from the accused’s silence.460 5.120 But in interpreting the legislation in those jurisdictions which do permit judicial comment the High Court in a series of important decisions461 has made it clear that the right to silence remains fundamental at common law and there are strict limits upon the inferences which may be drawn from an accused’s failure to testify, and consequently upon the comments that a judge may make about that failure to testify. Most notably ‘the fact that an accused does not give evidence at trial is not itself evidence against the accused. It is not an admission of guilt; it cannot fill any gaps in the prosecution case; it cannot be used as a makeweight in considering whether the [page 537] prosecution has proved the accusation beyond reasonable doubt’.462 This notion finds expression in s 20(2) of the Uniform Acts, which provides: The judge or any party (other than the prosecutor) may comment on a failure of a defendant to give evidence. However, unless the comment is made by another defendant in the proceeding, the comment must not suggest that the defendant failed to give evidence because the defendant was, or believed that he or she was, guilty of the offence concerned. 463

And the dictum is transposed virtually word for word into s 41(2)(d) of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic). There is authority in South Australia, where the uniform legislation does not apply, against permitting a co-defendant to comment other than in terms that a judge is permitted to use and requiring the judge to correct any inappropriate comment a co-defendant may make.464 While on its face s 20(2) expressly (and perhaps realistically)465 does not prevent a co-defendant from suggesting that the defendant failed to give evidence because the defendant believed he or she was guilty, under s 20(5) the judge may comment upon any comment made by another defendant and it would seem inappropriate for a judge to do other than to comment that no inference may be drawn from the defendant’s failure to testify. But, other than in Victoria where ss 41 and 42 of the Jury Directions Act make it clear that it must not be suggested to the jury that any adverse inference can be drawn against accused from their failure to give evidence or call a witnesses, s 20 fails to deal with two further questions about the comment that is permitted. First, are there any legitimate adverse inferences which may be drawn from an accused’s failure to testify or call witnesses and about which comment may be made? And secondly, are there any directions that a judge should otherwise give where an accused fails to give evidence? 5.121 There is a considerable body of authority that suggests that, in determining the weight to be given to a proponent’s evidence, a fact-finder is entitled to take into account the extent to which that evidence might have been contradicted by evidence available to an opponent. This is the situation in civil cases (see 6.45), and although civil courts refuse to permit the positive admissional inference that any evidence would have been adverse to the opponent’s case, in appropriate circumstances it may be inferred that the evidence would not have assisted the opponent and the proponent’s evidence can then be weighed accordingly (the so-called Jones v Dunkel inference). At first sight, this common sense reasoning appears just as applicable in criminal cases to permit a jury to take into account, in appropriate cases, the failure of the accused to [page 538] give evidence of matters within his or her own knowledge in deciding what

weight to give to the prosecution evidence.466 In particular, it would permit a jury to take into account in every case the failure of the accused to contradict prosecution evidence within his or her knowledge. 5.122 The difficulty with this reasoning is that it fails to appreciate the difference between civil and criminal proceedings. Whereas in civil cases the parties are expected to tender any and all favourable evidence, in criminal cases an accused is entitled to demand that the prosecution produce the evidence to prove the accusation made. There is no obligation upon an accused to explain. To permit any use of the accused’s failure to give evidence, to expect in any circumstances an explanation from the accused, appears contrary to an accused’s right within the accusatorial trial to remain silent. The obligation is upon the prosecution to prove its case without assistance from the accused.467 To permit even a limited inference must influence an accused’s decision whether to testify. It is for these reasons that the majority of the High Court in Azzopardi v R468 refused to permit generally any inference against an accused for failure to explain adverse prosecution evidence within his or her own knowledge. And no comment must suggest such an inference.469 5.123 But the majority in Azzopardi recognises that in ‘rare and exceptional’ cases inference and corresponding comment may be permissible.470 In determining whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt, the jury is entitled to take into account the failure of the accused to give an innocent explanation which, if it exists, is peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused. Where the facts of the innocent explanation are additional facts known only to the accused (‘What is important is that the accused, and only the accused, can shed light upon [page 539] what happened’: at [62]) then the failure of the accused to provide any explanation may be taken into account in determining whether the prosecution evidence has proved its accusation beyond reasonable doubt.471 Nor will a corresponding comment be in breach of s 20(2) of the Uniform Acts if couched simply in terms of the accused’s failure to explain (rather than give evidence about) matters peculiarly within his or her knowledge: at [66]. As McHugh J emphasises, even this limited inference permitted in exceptional

circumstances undermines the right to silence. But whereas Gleeson CJ and McHugh J argue that the common sense inferences permitted in civil cases should also apply in criminal cases,472 the majority felt that to permit inferences in every case where an accused fails to contradict prosecution evidence within his or her knowledge would place pressure on accused to testify in too many cases, and undermine to too great an extent the right of an accused not to testify: at [61]. Its compromise between the right to silence and the common sense inferences from silence thus gives greater weight to the right to silence than does McHugh J, who argues powerfully that the common law right to silence has never been interpreted to prevent appropriate common sense inferences being drawn from an accused’s failure to testify.473 5.124 Where the exceptional inference is open and the judge decides to comment, the majority in Azzopardi (at [67]) suggests: … it should be made plain that it is a comment that the jury are free to disregard. If made, it should be placed in its proper context. This requires identifying the facts which are said to call for an explanation474 and giving adequate directions to the jury about the onus of proof, the absence of any obligation upon the accused to give evidence, and the fact that the accused does not give evidence is not an admission, does not fill in the prosecution proof, and is not to be used as a make-weight.

It may also be appropriate to comment that the jury should consider other quite legitimate reasons the accused might have for failing to testify and which give rise [page 540] to no adverse inference.475 But there is no formulaic comment to be given and an accused to successfully appeal will have to demonstrate either that any comment was erroneous or that its absence created a risk of a miscarriage of justice. However, the majority in Azzopardi recognises that as well as permissible comment on an adverse inference in exceptional circumstances, there are directions that ‘it will almost always be desirable’476 for a judge to give where an accused fails to testify, to protect the accused from impermissible reasoning (at [51]): … if an accused does not give evidence at trial it will almost always be desirable for the judge to warn the jury that the accused’s silence in court is not evidence against an accused, does not constitute an admission by the accused, may not be used to fill gaps in the evidence tendered by the prosecution and may not be used as a make-weight in determining whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.

Where no adverse inference is open, some judges suggest that the jury should also generally be directed not to speculate about why the accused has chosen not to give evidence477 and that the onus of proof remains on the prosecution.478 If defence counsel so requests, these directions become expressly required by s 41(2) of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic). In addition, s 42 specifies statements that cannot be made by prosecutor, defence counsel or judge suggesting that any adverse inference can be drawn against the silent accused, which, in conjunction with s 44 abolishing [page 541] the common law, prohibits the limited direction permitted, as explained above, by Azzopardi. 5.125 The permissible inferences from silence and the appropriate comments that a trial judge may make in jurisdictions other than Victoria are illustrated and discussed in the series of High Court decisions abovementioned. In Weissensteiner v R,479 the accused was charged with murder and tried before a jury in the Supreme Court of Queensland. Evidence established that the two victims had used their savings to purchase and fit out a yacht to cruise the Pacific and, following advertisement, agreed to take the accused on their journey in return for his labours in preparation for the voyage. The yacht was meticulously equipped to the victim Bayerl’s specifications. The victims last communicated with their families and banks in late November 1989. The victim Zack, then four months pregnant, had seen her doctor and explained she would probably return to Cairns for the birth. The boat was seen with the three adventurers aboard near Cairns in early December 1989. When next seen, later that month, only the accused was aboard, but he explained that he was to meet the others in New Guinea. The yacht then sailed from Australia and cruised the Pacific. It was seen at various times and places with only the accused aboard. Each time he gave differing explanations as to the whereabouts of the owners. Some of these were established by police to be false. Interpol investigations continued until eventually the accused was arrested in the Marshall Islands in August 1990, in possession of the yacht, containing all the very personal possessions of the victims, including nappies and other things purchased by Zack for the expected baby. In the face of this circumstantial evidence the accused chose not to testify.

There being no statutory prohibition in Queensland upon the right to comment upon the accused’s failure to give evidence, the trial judge directed the jury that, although an accused is under no obligation to testify and guilt cannot be inferred from failure to testify, the result in this case was that there was no evidence to explain or contradict the circumstantial case established by the prosecution and ‘an inference may be more safely drawn from the proven facts when the accused elects not to give evidence of relevant facts which can be easily be perceived to be in his knowledge’. 5.126 The majority held this comment permissible. While the failure to testify cannot itself amount to evidence capable of adding in any way to the prosecution case, the evidence adduced by the prosecution may be weighed in the light of the failure of the accused to offer an explanation of facts within his or her own knowledge in circumstances where an explanation can otherwise be expected. In dissent, Gaudron and McHugh JJ emphasised that it is the failure to explain rather than the failure to testify on oath that is of real significance, and that the judge should have drawn attention to the particular facts which demanded explanation [page 542] from the accused, notably the accused’s possession of the boat containing all the victims’ worldly goods, and the conflicting explanations given by the accused about the victims’ whereabouts. They criticised the willingness of the majority to permit the jury to draw an inference simply from the totality of the unexplained circumstances. 5.127 Following Weissensteiner, ambiguity remained. At its widest, the decision suggested that the prosecution case must always be weighed in the light of the failure of the accused to contradict matters within his or her knowledge.480 But on its facts it permitted comment because the accused had failed to provide an explanation of a strong circumstantial case where only he was in a position to provide an explanation. In particular, doubts remained whether an adverse comment could be made on the failure of the accused simply to contradict prosecution evidence within his knowledge. 5.128 In RPS v R, a case involving multiple charges of sexual assault by the

accused against his daughter, where the complainant and her mother were the principal witnesses481 and the accused failed to contradict their testimony, the trial judge had directed the jury that they could use this failure: (1) for the purpose of discounting their doubts about the prosecution evidence (as opposed to filling gaps in that evidence) so they might ‘more readily’ accept it; and also (2) if they were of the view that it was reasonable to expect some denial or contradiction by the accused of the prosecution evidence, for the purpose of inferring that any denial or explanation ‘would not have assisted’ the accused. The latter remark was held to constitute a prohibited comment under s 20 of the uniform legislation. In refusing to give s 20 any narrow construction the majority held the comment prohibited because (at [19]): Any belief which the appellant held that his evidence would not have assisted him could proceed only from a belief that he was guilty; … No other construction of what was said by the trial judge in that part of his charge was reasonably open to the jury.

In so concluding, the majority regarded s 20 as being co-extensive with the common law’s prohibition against any direct or indirect comment or any subtle allusion suggesting the accused failed to give evidence because he or she believed he or she was guilty.482 [page 543] 5.129 Although this was sufficient to dispose of the appeal, the majority went on to consider the propriety of the judge’s comments that the prosecution evidence could be assessed in the light of the fact that the accused had failed to contradict it by explaining matters obviously within his knowledge. This was held a misdirection. Weissensteiner was interpreted narrowly. In a criminal case there is no general expectation that an accused will testify or otherwise call evidence. Only in exceptional circumstances might some inference be drawn against the accused who fails to testify or otherwise call evidence. In a case where the prosecution leads direct testimony of the accused’s guilt, as is generally the situation in sexual assault cases, it is not reasonable to expect an accused to answer or contradict the prosecution evidence and this failure can be given no evidential weight. The accused is entitled to ask the prosecution to establish its case on the basis of its eyewitnesses to the events. The accused’s failure to contradict that evidence cannot reasonably be said to spring from any

belief that any evidence he or she might call would be of no assistance, let alone any belief that it would demonstrate guilt. Consequently, the failure to contradict cannot lead to a more ready acceptance of the testimony of the prosecution eyewitnesses. Insofar as the inferences suggested by the trial judge, even though indirect, were dependent upon the reasonable expectation that an innocent accused would contradict direct eyewitness testimony, the judge’s direction was in error and therefore the appeal succeeded. Although McHugh J agreed with the majority that there had been a contravention of s 20 in the judge’s comment that the jury might infer a belief that the accused’s evidence would not have assisted his case, he disagreed fundamentally with their conclusion that the credibility of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses could not be assessed in light of the accused’s failure to contradict them in respect of matters within his knowledge (at [60]–[62]): As long as the jury is instructed that the accused is under no obligation to give evidence, that the Crown must prove his or her guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the evidence adduced and that the accused bears no onus of proof, I find it difficult to see how the so-called ‘right to silence’ is infringed if the jury takes into account the silence of the accused in respect of any facts ‘easily perceived to be within his knowledge’ and which call for an answer … the jury can consider the failure of the accused ‘to contradict on oath evidence that to his knowledge must be true or untrue’ because it ‘can logically be regarded as increasing the probability that it is true’.

McHugh J explains Weissensteiner as involving an application of this wide approach. 5.130 With the debate in RPS strictly dicta, the matter came again before the High Court in Azzopardi where, despite vigorous dissents by Gleeson CJ and McHugh J, the majority was clear in taking the narrow view of Weissensteiner. This leaves the question of exactly when, in jurisdictions other than Victoria, on the facts an adverse inference and comment is permissible. [page 544] The requirement that any explanation be peculiarly within the accused’s knowledge is clear.483 And then it must be possible for the jury to infer that the accused has chosen not to testify because the explanation would be of no assistance to his or her case. There may be other legitimate reasons for an accused choosing not to testify: the prosecution case may be obviously deficient;484 or the accused’s explanation may already be before the court in the form of his or her

responses in a police interview;485 or the accused may be unable to speak; or not want to give testimony that may implicate a loved one; or be culturally afraid to speak or so inarticulate or uneducated or of such an age or of limited intelligence that it is unreasonable to expect an explanation on oath subject to its inevitable cross-examination.486 And where an accused is charged with a number of counts it may be difficult to attribute an adverse inference to any one particular count.487 These matters may prevent an adverse inference arising at all and demand that the judge so direct.488 And if an adverse inference remains open the jury should be directed to consider such matters before drawing it.489 5.131 Whether an adverse inference can only be drawn in a situation analogous to Weissensteiner, where the prosecution case is circumstantial and the issue is whether the accused committed the criminal acts alleged, remains a moot point. In R v Visser, the accused was charged with arson.490 The only evidence was a videotape of his interview with police in which he admitted lighting a piece of paper held by a friend who had then dropped the lighted paper into a post box, setting fire to the adjacent post office. The crucial issue was whether the accused lit the paper intending to assist his friend in setting fire to the post box. The accused did not testify. The magistrate relied upon Weissensteiner in finding the accused guilty. On appeal Blow J held (at [8]): … the Weissensteiner principle has no application in relation to the drawing of inferences as to an accused person’s state of mind, as distinct from inferences of guilt drawn from circumstantial evidence.

[page 545] There is other authority for such a limit.491 Whether or not this represents a strict limit, only a brave judge could draw an adverse inference in a case not analogous to Weissensteiner. Gleeson CJ forcefully argues in Azzopardi (at [18]) that the restriction of an adverse inference to a circumstantial case where the matter is peculiarly within the accused’s knowledge cannot be justified in purely probative terms, but the pragmatic limit finds its justification rather in the acceptance of the need to preserve the accused’s right to silence within the accusatorial trial. Although McHugh J, in a learned judgment, provides a forceful argument for rejecting the

fundamental importance of the right at common law, the majority clearly takes a different view and this is the position in Australia until altered by legislation.492 5.132 The last case in this line of authority is Dyers v R, where the court considered the propriety of comments, not about the accused’s failure to testify, but about the accused’s failure to call other evidence in contradiction of the prosecution case.493 (It should be noted that ss 41 and 42 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) apply to both the failure of the accused to testify and/or to call a particular witness.) The court was loath to draw any inference, justifying its conclusion not only in the accusatorial right to silence but also in the prosecution’s related accusatorial obligation to call all material witnesses, whether favourable or unfavourable to the prosecution case. The majority held that no inference could be drawn against an accused who had failed to call as witnesses persons referred to in his appointment’s diary as having appointments at times when the complainant alleged she was with and assaulted by the accused. And while Gaudron and Hayne JJ (at [15]) thought the jury should be directed not to speculate about what those witnesses might have said if they had been called, Callinan J (at [123]) thought it better that the trial judge generally say nothing, and if some comment was appropriate that it be confined to telling the jury to decide the case on the basis of the evidence led. Although courts recognise that the failure of an accused to cross-examine a prosecution witness may give rise to adverse inference, in the spirit of Azzopardi and Dyers this may also now be the exception rather than the rule: see discussion and references at 7.131. [page 546] McHugh J in a strong dissent thought that at least where the accused sets up an affirmative defence that failure to call evidence about it could give rise to adverse comment, and relied upon s 20(3) of the Uniform Acts, permitting comment on an accused’s failure to call a spouse, parent or child so long as it does not suggest the failure related to any belief in the accused’s guilt, as a clear legislative indication that some adverse comment was contemplated. 5.133 As a consequence of this line of High Court authority, in criminal cases there is little scope for inferences being drawn against an accused, not merely for failure to testify, but equally for failure to call evidence or to cross-examine

witnesses. This conclusion is endorsed in ss 41, 42 and 44 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic), sections that cover the field with respect to permissible and prohibited directions or comments. This situation contrasts with that in civil cases where such inferences as appear reasonable may be drawn, unaffected by the right to silence and any obligations on claimants to call all available evidence. However, it might be emphasised that the assumption of the above discussion is that the prosecution carries the persuasive burden of proving the crime alleged against the accused. The accused’s silence or failure to call evidence cannot be used directly or indirectly to assist the prosecution to prove its case against the accused. But where the onus is upon an accused to prove a defence, as it sometimes is under legislation, the position may be different. In R v Corish,494 the accused was charged with separate counts of manufacturing and possessing for sale an amphetamine. Furthermore, under the relevant legislation, once possession of a certain quantity was proved by the prosecution the accused bore the burden of proving that the possession was not for the purposes of sale. The trial judge had directed the jury that it could take into account the failure of the accused to call his stepbrother in determining the charges. In relation to the material facts the prosecution had to prove, manufacturing and possession of a certain quantity of the drug, on the authority of Dyers this was clearly a misdirection and the appeal had to succeed. But in relation to the fact the accused had to prove by way of defence, that the drugs were not for sale, as the accused had sought to contend that he held the drugs for his stepbrother, arguably his failure to call his stepbrother could, with appropriate and careful directions, have been properly taken into account, at least to the extent permitted by Jones v Dunkel, without offending Dyers. Bleby J (at [10]) left the point open, but Gray J (at [38]) thought ‘very exceptional circumstances’ would be required to justify a Jones v Dunkel inference, a sentiment endorsed by Sulan J in Martin v Police.495 The privilege of the accused to remain silent when questioned before trial 5.134 Courts have long recognised the right to silence at this stage of the criminal process. ‘It is a clear and widely known principle of the common law … that a [page 547]

person is entitled to refrain from answering a question put to him for the purpose of discovering whether he has committed a criminal offence’.496 This right to silence remains sacrosanct in all jurisdictions except New South Wales: see 5.144 below. In support of this right, at first Judges’ Rules and now legislation require police to caution a suspect of the right to remain silent. The Judges’ Rules require police to caution on deciding to charge (generally on arrest) and on questioning in custody,497 and Mason CJ suggests in Van der Meer v R that the caution be administered as soon as police begin questioning a person as suspect.498 Legislation in most jurisdictions also requires a caution, either on apprehension or before questioning after apprehension.499 Although failure to caution does not lead to the automatic exclusion of the questioning, the embodiment of the obligation in statute makes it more difficult for courts to ignore the breach when exercising their discretion to exclude improperly obtained evidence.500 Under the uniform legislation, failure to caution under s 139 requires exclusion of the questioning under s 138 unless its admissibility can be justified. 5.135 In addition, common law courts have insisted that no outside pressure be placed upon a suspect to confess in derogation of the right to choose to remain silent. Specifically, confessions obtained following threats or promises held out by persons in authority are excluded. Courts have been strict in their application of this particular rule. But, more generally, wherever there is a serious question of outside pressure the prosecution must prove its absence and in this sense establish the confession as voluntary. It is interesting to note that although the uniform legislation recognises the right to remain silent in enacting the requirement to caution, it does not recognise it by an enactment of the requirement of voluntariness. More specifically, it excludes admissions obtained by violence and other inhuman and degrading conduct (s 84), and admissions made to, or in the presence of, an investigating official engaged in the investigation of an offence, or as a result of an act by a person who was, and could [page 548] reasonably be believed to be, capable of influencing the decision to prosecute, that are likely to be unreliable (s 85).501 The privilege to remain silent is also endorsed in courts holding that a suspect

cannot be charged with obstruction502 or misprision of felony503 on account of a mere refusal to answer questions. 5.136 It is, however, arguable that if the privilege is to be taken seriously the courts should go further, and no confession should be admitted unless it can be shown, first, that the accused understood the right to remain silent; secondly, that the accused had the capacity to exercise that right; and thirdly, that the accused then exercised the right freely. In the High Court the voluntariness rule is expressed in terms wide enough to embrace these requirements, and in McDermott v R,504 Dixon J declares that a confession cannot be admitted unless shown to have been made in exercise of a ‘free choice’. But free choice is an elusive concept, raising difficult psychological issues. Consequently, courts attempt in practice to avoid questions about the accused’s knowledge and mental capacity and concentrate upon outside pressure in determining the suspect’s free choice.505 If there is no such pressure, the internal psychological factors are left to be considered only in the exercise of the residuary discretion. The practical significance of this is that, whereas the prosecution must establish voluntariness, the onus is upon the accused to persuade the court to exercise its residual discretion. Thus, the privilege as applied at common law ensures that accused are freed from outside pressure, but does not ensure that they fully understand, and are psychologically able to exercise, their right to silence. 5.137 When the accused does choose to remain silent before trial, one might expect that the prosecution is prohibited from tendering evidence revealing that silence, and if that silence is for some reason otherwise revealed during trial, the jury must be clearly directed to draw no adverse inference at all from it. Courts in the past have been reluctant to state the law as clearly as this, but the High Court in Petty and Maiden v R is more forthright.506 5.138 Difficulties were initially created by courts holding that it was the province of the jury to decide what inference, if any, to draw from the accused’s reaction to [page 549] an out-of-court allegation. Consequently, allegations made in the presence of the

accused became generally admissible, whatever the accused’s reaction and even where it comprised only silence. The technical admissibility of this evidence was recognised by the House of Lords in R v Christie, where it was held admissible to reveal to the jury that, on being confronted and identified by the young complainant of an indecent assault, the accused replied: ‘I am innocent’, a denial which in these circumstances appeared to carry no inference of guilt.507 Although dismissing the appeal in the case before them, their Lordships did recognise that this situation could be ameliorated by the residuary discretion to exclude — on the grounds of ensuring that the accused received a fair trial — evidence more prejudicial than probative.508 This amelioration has, in Australia, now evolved to the point where the High Court will normally exclude statements made in the presence of the accused unless the reaction of the accused is capable of giving rise to an inference of guilt.509 No inference of guilt can normally be drawn from mere silence or denial.510 There must be something more — lies, prevarication, changes in story — from which either assent to allegations, or at least a consciousness of guilt of the crime charged, can be inferred.511 The better view is that such a consciousness should not be inferred from the mere selective answering of questions,512 although some courts have taken a contrary view.513 As a preliminary issue (not normally involving the taking of testimony on the [page 550] voir dire) the judge should decide whether the evidence is capable of supporting an inference of guilt.514 5.139 If the question is one of fact, of relevance, one might argue that in some circumstances assent can be inferred from mere silence, and can, where this is so, be acted on. Where police question the accused, at common law no inference can arise after he or she has been cautioned,515 and certainly not after he or she refuses to answer,516 but some courts have been prepared to allow an inference of guilt to be drawn from the accused’s silence before he or she is cautioned.517 However, these decisions have been doubted in other courts and appear inconsistent with the importance placed upon the right to silence in Petty and Maiden v R.518 The position under the uniform legislation is made clear by s 89, which prohibits any implicating inference from the suspect’s silence in the face of

questioning by an investigating official and provides that evidence of such silence is inadmissible: cf Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 89A, discussed at 5.144. But that right, both at common law and under the uniform legislation, receives emphasis only in the context of official questioning, and it appears that silence in the face of allegations made not by police but by third parties, such as victims or their relatives or mere acquaintances, and not in the presence of the police, may be permitted to give rise to any sufficient common sense inference [page 551] of guilt.519 This suggests that the right to silence, deriving from the privilege against self-incrimination, seeks ultimately to strike a fair balance between the interests of individual and state, not between the interests of mere individuals. 5.140 Further difficulties have arisen through common law courts distinguishing between the use of silence to directly infer guilt, a use prohibited by the right to remain silent, and its use to discredit a defence raised at the trial, a use not prohibited by that right. Not only have courts sanctioned this latter use of silence520 but some have suggested that it provides justification for the admissibility of a police interview, indicating the extent of the opportunity given the suspect to offer an explanation.521 This distinction between using silence as the basis of an inference of guilt and using it to discredit a later defence is applied in legislation demanding notice of alibi and making a failure to give notice the subject of comment to the jury.522 The distinction also appears to underlie the inferences permissible under s 89A of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW): discussed at 5.144. The difficulty with this distinction is that the basis for rejecting the defence put forward at trial can only be the drawing of some inference of guilt from the accused’s pre-trial silence. It assumes that the innocent provide their explanations before trial, at the first reasonable opportunity. To apply the distinction therefore significantly [page 552] undermines the right to remain silent before trial. Indeed, if it is applied, the

police caution will constitute a misleading entrapment for the innocent accused who takes it on face value and does not provide an early explanation. (For this reason, s 89A of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) demands an appropriate caution before inferences may be drawn: see 5.144.) 5.141 Accepting this critique, the High Court in Petty and Maiden v R has emphatically disapproved of any distinction between these two uses of pre-trial silence523 (as does s 89 of the uniform legislation but not s 89A in New South Wales: see 5.144). Both are encompassed and prohibited by the right to silence. The accused in that case, rather than remaining silent, had offered an immediate explanation to the police but gave a completely different account at the trial. The issue was whether the prosecution could discredit the accused’s defence by revealing that, neither while in custody, nor at the committal proceeding, did the accused seek to alter his original account. It was argued that the prosecution could not refer to these occasions because the accused was under no obligation to put forward his trial defence at an earlier stage and could be regarded as merely exercising his right to remain silent. While upholding the right to silence and the right of the accused not to disclose a defence until trial, the court held that, once the accused had broken silence and given an explanation, it was relevant and admissible to show that that explanation had not been withdrawn before trial despite opportunities to do so. On the other hand, if no explanation had been given, and the right to silence had been asserted, no reference could have been made to that failure, neither for the purpose of drawing a direct inference of guilt, nor for the purpose of seeking to discredit any later defence. Only Dawson J was prepared to hold silence admissible for the latter purpose. 5.142 It is also held in Petty and Maiden that, in addition to there being a right to remain silent, at common law an accused is under no adversary obligation at common law to disclose a defence prior to trial, and the trial judge must not suggest that there is any such obligation. The majority was not convinced that the trial judge’s reference to the prosecution’s lack of opportunity to investigate the accused’s defence carried with it the innuendo that the accused was under such an obligation. But Brennan J dissented on this, and it is clear that trial judges must take care that any reference to the prosecution’s opportunity to investigate does not carry with it the suggestion that the accused is under an obligation to give the prosecution advance notice of any defence. Legislation provides otherwise in the case of alibis and, now in some

jurisdictions, in the case of other defences and contested issues (for a summary of the details of [page 553] this legislation, see 5.14). In some cases this legislation permits an adverse inference to be drawn where there has been a failure to comply with these requirements, but it is submitted, in the absence of any express legislative words to the contrary, that any inference cannot be one of guilt but must relate to any opportunity to investigate or respond that the prosecution has lost as a consequence of not having notice in advance of trial. More radical change to the common law position (embodied in s 89 of the uniform legislation) has now been enacted in s 89A of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) (discussed below at 5.144), which permits adverse inference where during official questioning about a serious offence the accused fails to refer to a fact later relied upon by way of defence where revelation could reasonably have been expected. What Petty and Maiden illustrates is the drastic distinction at common law between an accused remaining silent and an accused choosing to talk to the police. Once that choice is made, inferences become permissible. The crucial question of fact upon which the application of this area of law depends is whether or not an accused has remained silent. What constitutes silence and what constitutes a response, keeping in mind that a response can be by words or conduct and need indicate only a consciousness of guilt of the crime charged, is a crucial and often difficult question. 5.143 Notwithstanding the above, in many cases out-of-court questioning and the accused’s silence to it are revealed to the jury. The accused may not object. In other cases, where the accused has answered some questions but not others, it may distort the interview merely to edit out those questions that the accused failed to answer.524 In R v Reeves, Hunt CJ at CL was of the view that the prosecution could reveal the accused’s silence to anticipate any later objection by the accused that the police had acted unfairly or improperly in not giving an opportunity to explain.525 In R v Coyne,526 the court rejected the argument that Maiden and Petty made revelation of the accused’s failure to talk to the police ipso facto an error of law. On the contrary, that case recognised that there would be situations where it would be legitimate to reveal that failure, if only to make the

narrative complete, and as long as the trial judge gives a clear direction that no adverse inference can be drawn against an accused for remaining silent, the trial will not miscarry. But it is submitted that trial judges should nevertheless not allow prosecutors to gratuitously refer to an accused’s silence and Victorian courts have taken a stricter approach.527 [page 554] 5.144 Where the accused’s silence is revealed to the jury it should be expressly directed to draw no inference adverse to the accused.528 So to direct is an error of law justifying successful appeal unless the Crown can show that there has been no substantial miscarriage of justice. In this respect, the Federal Court in King v R preferred the stricter view of the Victorian court.529 In New South Wales, at least prior to the enactment of s 89A, the Court of Criminal Appeal has asked rather whether the failure to direct has caused a miscarriage of justice, but Hunt CJ at CL in R v Reeves (above) suggests that this will generally be so.530 The admissibility and use of silence in all jurisdictions party to the uniform legislation except New South Wales is essentially equivalent to that at common law. Under s 89(1), no ‘inference unfavourable to a party’ may be drawn from failure ‘(a) to answer one or more question531 or (b) to respond to a representation’ put or made ‘by an investigating official who at the time was performing functions in connection with the investigation of the commission, or possible commission, of an offence’,532 with s 89(4) defining ‘inference’ to include inferences of consciousness of guilt and inferences relevant to a party’s credibility. It is necessary for a trial judge to direct any jury accordingly. Furthermore, under s 89(2), failure to answer is inadmissible ‘if it can only be used to draw such an inference’.533 In the case of silence in other circumstances, as at common law, it may constitute an admission (under s 81). But in New South Wales, the ‘uniform’ Evidence Act has been amended to include s 89A.534 This section provides that (emphasis added): (1) In a criminal proceeding for a serious indictable offence such unfavourable inferences may be drawn as appear proper from evidence that during official questioning in relation to the offence, the defendant failed or refused to mention a fact:

[page 555]

(a)

that the defendant could reasonably have been expected to mention in the circumstances existing at the time, and

(b) that is relied on in his or her defence in that proceeding.

There are further strict limits. The accused must have not only received a ‘special caution’ about the possibility of inference in the circumstances but also have received legal advice about this. And the section does not apply if at the time of questioning the accused was under 18, nor if the inference is the only evidence against the accused. But what inferences are proper continues to haunt changes such as these to the common law.

The privilege of citizens to refuse to provide answers or to produce documents that are self-incriminatory Scope 5.145 We now turn to consider the privilege against self-incrimination as it applies to parties, witnesses and citizens generally, rather than its particular application to the accused in a criminal case. In this residuary context the High Court has emphasised the fundamental importance of the privilege in Australian society. Whatever its precise policy basis, whatever its historical justification, the High Court will enforce this privilege, unless clearly directed otherwise by parliament.535 It will not allow courts to use their inherent powers to undermine the privilege.536 Some have argued that the privilege is of such constitutional importance that the federal government at least, cannot modify or abrogate it, but the High Court has rejected this rights-oriented approach.537 But this fundamental common law privilege remains the basis of the law in every Australian jurisdiction.538 Consequently, although modifying legislation exists to a greater or lesser degree in every Australian jurisdiction, an examination of the scope of the privilege must begin with the common law. We can then consider its statutory modifications and how they are approached by the courts. [page 556] 5.146 Until recently the privilege was regarded as a rule of evidence (or procedure) applying only to judicial proceedings and allowing witnesses or parties

to refuse to answer questions or disclose documents either at trial or in pre-trial proceedings of an interlocutory nature.539 The High Court in Pyneboard Pty Ltd v TP540 and subsequent cases has now emphatically rejected this limitation. The privilege applies beyond judicial proceedings to every situation where information is compulsorily sought. Although at common law there is no obligation upon citizens to provide information outside judicial proceedings, where this obligation is legislatively imposed (increasingly the case as statutory commissions are set up to investigate and prosecute crime and corruption) the High Court will interpret the legislation to preserve the common law privilege to the extent that this is not expressly or by necessary implication removed or modified (the ‘principle of legality’). Statutory investigation through the Australian and NSW and other Crime Commissions,541 Trade Practices Commission,542 the Commissioner for Corporate Affairs,543 the Police Board,544 and a Royal Commission,545 have been held by the High Court to require the preservation of the privilege except insofar as it has been necessarily altered by the enabling legislation. The approach to determining whether the privilege has been modified by legislation is considered below at 5.180–5.183. 5.147 This extension of the privilege beyond judicial proceedings, and the High Court’s emphasis of its public policy basis, highlights the issue of the precise scope of the privilege. In the context of judicial proceedings the privilege has been held to extend to every disclosure that might tend towards exposure ‘to any punishment, [page 557] penalty, forfeiture or ecclesiastical censure’.546 In applying the privilege beyond judicial proceedings, the High Court directly raised the question of whether the privilege so extended embraces these four aspects, or whether it should be read down to give only a privilege against self-incrimination strictu sensu. And if this is appropriate beyond judicial proceedings, can it be argued that the privilege within judicial proceedings ought to be similarly limited? 5.148 These issues presented themselves to the High Court in Pyneboard Pty Ltd v TPC, where legislation giving investigatory powers in trade practices matters abrogated the privilege against self-incrimination, but declared

information obtained as a result to be admissible only in certain criminal proceedings under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).547 The company under investigation argued that this express abrogation did not extend to the privilege against exposure to civil penalty and that, as such penalties were provided for under the same Act, and as disclosure of the information sought might subject the company to such action, disclosure could be refused on this ground. The High Court could have distinguished between the various aspects of the privilege and only applied the privilege against self-incrimination strictu sensu beyond judicial proceedings. But, having emphasised that the various aspects could be regarded as quite separate privileges, the majority (Mason ACJ and Wilson and Dawson JJ) appears to have held that all these privileges (certainly the penalty privilege) apply beyond judicial proceedings. It then held that, insofar as the penalty privilege applies beyond judicial proceedings, it had been abrogated by necessary implication by the Trade Practices Act, for the very purpose of that Act was to obtain information to be used in criminal and penalty proceedings under it. The express provision relating to self-incrimination was explained as necessary to make it clear that the information could not be used in criminal proceedings outside the Act. As the only relevant penalties were under the Act, there was no need for a similar provision with respect to penalty disclosures. Brennan J dissented, holding that the privileges were only applicable in judicial proceedings. Murphy J agreed with the decision of the majority but on the ground that only the privilege against self-incrimination strictu sensu could be claimed outside judicial proceedings. He also had serious doubts about whether the privilege should be any wider in judicial proceedings: Pyneboard (at 347). 5.149 The logic of the High Court majority approach means that, both within and beyond judicial proceedings, information may be withheld on the ground that [page 558] its disclosure might tend towards exposure ‘to any punishment, penalty, forfeiture or ecclesiastical censure’. Although separate privileges, each applies beyond

judicial proceedings. Strictly, the High Court made no decision with respect to the two last privileges, and it may be that their continuation will be seen as anachronistic (compare the comments of Murphy J in Pyneboard at 347). But that is another issue, dealt with below. As each privilege is separate, its abrogation by legislation can also be considered separately, and courts may be more willing to infer an intention to oust one rather than another,548 but that, again, is another issue. 5.150 A further important issue in relation to the scope of the privilege is its application beyond individuals to corporations (as corporations cannot testify, this privilege will be invoked only at the investigatory and discovery stages in objection to the production of documents). Before the decision in Environmental Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd the issue had been considered and put aside by the High Court on at least four occasions.549 Only Murphy J had been prepared to express a firm view on each occasion: that the privilege against self-incrimination (which he was only prepared to accept in its strictest sense) is a human right that may be claimed only by individuals, following American decisions on this point.550 In terms of authority, however, the stronger view was that, at common law, a corporation was entitled to claim the privilege, this having been decided in England,551 Canada,552 New Zealand,553 the Federal Court,554 the Supreme Court of New South Wales555 and the Supreme Court of Victoria.556 And the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) significantly gives to a company ‘the legal capacity and powers of an individual’.557 5.151 In terms of principle, the issue should strictly be considered in relation to each of the four privileges embraced by this discussion. Ecclesiastical censure seems peculiarly inappropriate to a corporation, whereas forfeiture of property, if justified [page 559] by reference to the sanctity of realty in English law, would appear to be of as much importance to a corporation as an individual. Penalties and punishment are similarly of concern to corporations and, if these privileges merely have their justification in the adversary idea that claimants should seek independent evidence, there is no reason to exclude corporations from their ambit.

5.152 But it is the human rights approach that distinguishes corporations.558 This approach has two limbs. First, it argues that the privilege only arose to protect people from inhuman punishment (although it might be argued that such protection is now given by other laws and provides no modern justification for a privilege). It at least now protects them from the ‘cruel trilemma’ of selfincrimination, perjury or contempt. Secondly, it argues that the privilege is a fundamental part of the relationship between individual and state. And it might be said in answer to this that corporations similarly have need of protection in such a relationship. But this misses the point. Existing autonomous human beings must be protected from intrusion by the state if their very individuality is to be preserved and respected. This argument does not apply to corporations. They are mere creatures of the state, of legislation, and have no pre-existing autonomy to protect. On the contrary, as mere creations of the law, it is necessary that they be fully subject to inquiry to ensure that their legal limits are maintained. This human rights aspect finds expression in the privilege’s very nature. It is a testimonial privilege. It permits refusal to testify on grounds of self-incrimination. It does not allow individuals to refuse, for example, a compulsory fingerprint test that may result in incrimination. It assumes the testimony of a human being, not mere revelation by a creature of statute. Insofar as the humans who conduct that statutory creature may be incriminated by the questions they are asked, the privilege may be claimed by them. But the company itself has no inherent claim against the revelation of incriminating material. 5.153 In Environmental Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd, Caltex was prosecuted for oil spills and, charges having been laid under the relevant legislation, production of relevant documents was sought from Caltex both under that legislation and pursuant to the rules of the Land and Environment Court in which the prosecution was brought.559 By a majority of 4:3 the High Court held that a corporation cannot refuse to produce relevant documents on the ground that their production will be incriminatory. The majority accepted the centrality of the human rights approach to the privilege. However, it was strenuously argued that the privilege could be independently justified [page 560]

on the accusatorial (adversarial) ground that the system of justice demands that the prosecution establish its case without relying upon the defendant to produce evidence against itself. This argument was decisive of the minority decision, but the majority, whilst recognising its force in principle, rejected on pragmatic grounds its application to the disclosure of documents by corporations. It argued that, first, to demand production of documents made little inroad into the privilege, particularly as the privilege can be (and has been) simply avoided by legislation empowering direct seizure of documentary material; and that, secondly, abuses by powerful corporations demand that they not be entitled to the privilege, even if this results in some modification of accusatory principles in their case. 5.154 Brennan J suggested that, at least in proceedings brought to enforce a penalty, corporations might, like other parties, be entitled to refuse orders for production of documents, but a specially constituted Full Federal Court in TPC v Abbco Iceworks Pty Ltd rejected this possibility.560 The entitlement referred to by Brennan J was seen by Burchett J not as based upon a separate discovery privilege but as just one aspect of the more general privilege against self-exposure to penalty,561 and all other judges in Caltex were clear that no distinction should be drawn in the (non) application of the self-exposure to penalty and selfincrimination privileges to corporations. Gummow J in a learned separate judgment agreed, carefully tracing history to argue that neither privilege ever clearly applied, at common law or equity, to corporations. Dicta of the majority in Daniels Corp International Pty Ltd v ACCC562 support this approach. The uniform legislation enacts in s 187 that a corporation cannot refuse to answer questions or give information, or to produce document563 or to do any other act whatever on the ground that the action would incriminate the company or make it liable to a penalty. In that the legislation makes it clear that the privilege is unavailable not merely where production of documents is sought, it goes further than the actual decision in Caltex. Moreover, as well as applying to the above demands in ‘proceedings’ [page 561] covered by each of the Uniform Acts, s 187 applies to such demands ‘made under a law’ in each of the uniform legislation jurisdictions.

5.155 In terms of scope, it must be emphasised that the common law privilege is against self-incrimination (s 128(1) of the uniform legislation is expressed in equivalent terms). The privilege cannot be claimed where the disclosure has a tendency to expose another to punishment, penalty, forfeiture or ecclesiastical censure.564 Thus, even before the decision in Caltex, where documents were sought personally from an officer of a company, disclosure could not be refused on the ground of its effect on the company565 (it was otherwise where the documents were sought from the company and the officer was merely answering on its behalf).566 Where an officer is personally required to produce documents which are held only in his or her capacity as an officer of the company, although the officer cannot invoke any privilege on behalf of the company, the officer may be able to resist discovery or subpoena on the ground that the documents are not in his or her possession, custody or control, but in the custody of the corporation. As a general rule, it seems that an employee may object to the production of a document held for an employer where its disclosure would be inconsistent with the conditions of employment.567 Where an officer of a corporation is called as a witness, no privilege can be claimed on the basis that the company will be incriminated, but if the witness will be incriminated personally the privilege may be claimed. However, where a subpoena is upon a corporation to be answered by the proper officer of that corporation, it cannot, where other officers are available, seek to avoid the subpoena by having it answered by an officer who has a personal claim to privilege.568 5.156 Another aspect of the requirement of self-incrimination is problematic. The privilege protects the individual from testimonial disclosure of information. As pointed out above, it is in origin, and is still in principle, a testimonial privilege.569 It has been held not to justify an individual refusing to supply, where supply can be demanded by legislation, blood tests, fingerprints, breath-tests, voice samples or other objects or real evidence which exist and can be found independently of any testimony [page 562] of the individual.570 There must be some testimonial link in the act of production if the privilege is to apply. By the same reasoning, if incriminating documents can be legally seized

without any testimonial assistance from the person incriminated, the privilege has no application. If later asked to authenticate an incriminating document the privilege could be claimed to resist the testimonial authentication, but if the document can be independently proved then the application of the privilege against self-incrimination can be avoided altogether. As Gibbs CJ, Mason and Dawson JJ explain in Controlled Consultants Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs: … while the privilege, apart from any statutory exclusion, would protect a person against a requirement that he produce or identify incriminating documents or reveal their whereabouts or explain their contents in an incriminating fashion, it has no application to the seizure of documents or their use for the purpose of incrimination provided they can be proved by some independent means. The privilege is not a privilege against incrimination; it is a privilege against selfincrimination.571

5.157 In the case of discovery, or other court orders for production, a person is asked to identify, locate and produce relevant documents. This action provides a testimonial link that can be met by the privilege against self-incrimination.572 But even where discovery appears to be a de facto seizure of documents — for example, in the case of the Anton Piller order, where to prevent a party abusing process by disposing of or destroying property and documents, a party may be authorised to search an opponent’s premises and seize documents and property — the privilege against self-incrimination [page 563] has been held to apply,573 although the only testimonial link appears to be that the search and seizure can be resisted by choosing to be in contempt of the court order. Mason and Toohey JJ in Environmental Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd574 reluctantly accept that the privilege applies to production of documents by compulsion of law, although they find it difficult to see in every case the testimonial aspects, and conclude (at 503): Plainly enough the case for protecting a person from compulsion to make an admission of guilt is much stronger than the case for protecting a person from compulsion to produce books or documents which are in the nature of real evidence of guilt and are not testimonial in character.

McHugh J in the same case (at 555–6) refers to existing powers to obtain

documents by search warrant as a reason for not allowing a company to resist production of documents on grounds of self-incrimination. The argument extends by analogy to individuals. Cracks in the sanctity of the privilege insofar as it applies to the production of documents are showing.575 Section 128A of the uniform legislation expressly enacts a procedure for claims to the privilege where documents are seized under an Anton Piller order or an order in execution of a Mareva injunction (but not orders under proceeds of crime legislation), giving immunity where required and the claim to privilege can be justified. Punishment, penalty, forfeiture and ecclesiastical censure 5.158 It has so far been asserted that the privilege can be claimed upon these four different grounds, and that each in reality constitutes a separate but related head of privilege. But do all these grounds still justify a refusal to disclose information and, if so, what are the limits of each ground? 5.159 In the first place, it must be seriously doubted whether the ecclesiastical censure privilege exists in Australia. There is no Australian authority upholding the privilege. Murphy J in Pyneboard doubted its application in a secular society such as Australia and, insofar as adultery attracted ecclesiastical censure, authority denies a [page 564] claim for privilege upon this ground.576 The practical problems of applying such a privilege in a country where there is no established church are insuperable. 5.160 But the existence of the other heads of privilege is beyond doubt. It has been argued that the privileges against penalty and forfeiture originated in the courts of Chancery and are only rules of discovery allowing a defendant to refuse discovery or interrogation in proceedings for penalty or forfeiture.577 There is no doubt that such discovery rules do still exist (and that in such actions, therefore, no discovery at all will be allowed)578 but the better view is that in fact the courts of Chancery imported the rule from the common law and at common law these privileges were of general application.579 In Pyneboard, the majority expressly accept this view and, insofar as they do

exist, the penalty and forfeiture privileges apply generally and not merely as rules of discovery.580 The existence of the penalty privilege was affirmed in Pyneboard and applied in Police Service Board v Martin,581 where the majority held the privilege was capable of applying to a statutory provision which required members of the police force to answer questions at a hearing of the Police Disciplinary Board tending to show the commission by them of disciplinary offences.582 5.161 Although the forfeiture privilege has not been an issue in the High Court cases, its rationale may be seen as an anachronistic over-protection of interests in land, and Murphy J has suggested that it ought not to be applied in Australia.583 However, its existence at common law is as clear as the penalty privilege (the two privileges [page 565] normally being discussed together)584 and it is doubtful that the High Court will excise it from the law judicially. But the limited scope of the forfeiture privilege deserves emphasis. It is concerned only with forfeiture of interests in land,585 and liability to forfeiture rather than loss of title on account of the failure of a condition precedent or subsequent must be shown.586 With legislation affording relief against forfeiture, in many situations it is a privilege of little practical application. It has been abolished in Queensland (by s 14(1)(a) of the Evidence Act 1977) and is not enacted in the uniform legislation: see 5.176. 5.162 The penalty privilege is potentially of much wider application, its breadth hinging upon the definition of a penalty for this purpose. ‘Penalty’ is distinguished from ‘punishment’. Punishment is imposed in criminal proceedings, penalty in civil proceedings.587 Civil proceedings for penalty must be distinguished from other civil proceedings seeking enforcement of agreements to pay money or compensation in redress of civil injury.588 Actions for debt (including bankruptcy proceedings)589 or damages (including punitive damages) are not actions for penalty.590 Civil actions for penalty bear a close resemblance to (although they remain distinct from) criminal proceedings to punish offenders. The existence of the penalty privilege allows

courts to uphold a claim for privilege where the legislature has seen fit to impose a punishment through the civil courts rather than the criminal courts. Civil proceedings for penalty under ss 76 and 77 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) were held to attract the privilege,591 as were disciplinary proceedings under the Police Regulation Act 1958 (Vic),592 and proceedings to disqualify a person from acting as a company director.593 It is suggested that — although the High Court has held the penalty privilege distinct from that against self-incrimination, that historically this appears so, and the distinction may be relevant in interpreting legislation seeking to abrogate privileges — nevertheless, in terms of its justification, the penalty privilege stands together with the privilege against selfincrimination594 and the concept of a penalty should be interpreted accordingly. [page 566] 5.163 The privilege against self-incrimination extends to the disclosure of all crime, summary and indictable, although it has been suggested that the disclosure of a summary offence may not in some circumstances be grounds for a bona fide claim to the privilege. In Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information Centre,595 doubts were expressed as to whether disclosure could be refused where information would only disclose summary offences under copyright legislation (the principal claim seeking substantial civil damages for the same breach of copyright), apparently on the ground that a claim upon the basis of disclosure of such petty offences could not be regarded as having been genuinely made: see further at 5.174. 5.164 Whether incrimination under foreign law can provide a basis for the common law privilege has never been authoritatively decided.596 Modern English decisions suggest it cannot597 but there is contrary Australian authority.598 Within Australia, full faith and credit must be given to interstate laws and there must be little doubt that an interstate crime can found the privilege. The practical problem in claiming privilege on grounds of incrimination under a foreign law will be establishing the risk of prosecution in the event of revelation, but in principle, if the privilege is regarded as a fundamental human right, then the place of prosecution is of no importance, and if a real risk of prosecution under foreign law can be established, then the privilege ought to be granted.599 This is made clear in s 128(1)(a) and 128(4)(a)

[page 567] of the uniform legislation, which apply to incrimination under a law of a foreign country and to exposure to penalty in a foreign jurisdiction. 5.165 Incrimination of a spouse should not give rise to the privilege, for it is a privilege against self-incrimination but, given that the common law has always held that one spouse cannot be compelled to testify against the other, it may be argued that the same policy favours there being a privilege to allow one spouse to refuse disclosure of the other’s crimes in other situations where evidence can be compulsorily sought.600 There is old authority for such a privilege,601 which is endorsed in recent Australian decisions, although not extending to de facto spouses.602 With modern legislation having eroded the principle in the case of the compellability of spouses,603 the High Court has now rejected that authority suggesting by analogy that the privilege against self-incrimination extends to incrimination of a spouse.604 Claiming the privilege 5.166 The privilege must be claimed.605 In judicial proceedings the judge must decide whether a person can refuse to answer a question or produce a document on [page 568] the ground that disclosure would have a tendency to expose that person to a criminal charge, penalty or forfeiture. Objection should generally be made to each question or document sought,606 except that in actions to enforce a penalty or forfeiture a defendant may refuse generally to produce documents on discovery or answer interrogatories.607 Outside judicial proceedings the existence of privilege creates a practical problem where a person subject to investigation refuses to answer. Where the investigation is through a Royal Commission or other quasi-judicial tribunal, a claim can be made to that body and prerogative remedies sought in cases of dispute. Where the investigation is by officials with no particular qualifications, the person investigated must either refuse disclosure and await prosecution or seek to have the investigation set aside. The existence of

these practical difficulties was emphasised by Brennan J in refusing to extend privilege beyond judicial proceedings.608 Although the majority of the High Court have decided otherwise, these practical difficulties remain.609 They may provide a reason for inferring that parliament did not intend that the privilege remain available to a person subject to investigation. 5.167 It is doubtful whether at common law, strictly speaking, any advice need be given to a person, within or without judicial proceedings, on the availability of the privilege. Only police must advise a suspect of the availability of the privilege before questioning with failure to do so a ground for discretionary exclusion.610 During trial, judges may, and generally do, warn as a matter of courtesy and discretion. An accused testifying on the voir dire is often warned where the answers might incriminate him [page 569] or her in the crime charged;611 although arguably such a warning is given on the grounds of relevance, rather than privilege, for, as a general rule, the accused’s guilt of the offence charged is not relevant to issues on the voir dire. However, s 132 of the uniform legislation does require the judge, in the absence of the jury if there is one, to advise a witness of a privilege where there appear to be grounds for claiming it. Incriminating testimony given in ignorance of the privilege has been admitted against a witness in subsequent criminal proceedings.612 Ignorance does not make a statement involuntary. On the other hand, a statement is involuntary and inadmissible where a judge incorrectly rejects a claim to privilege and compels the witness to testify.613 5.168 But a witness is entitled to claim the privilege in the knowledge that, in later criminal proceedings, no direct or indirect admissional inference can be drawn from that claim. Just as no admissional inference can be drawn from the silence of the accused in the face of official questioning, so no adverse inference should be drawn from the assertion of the privilege. But it does not necessarily follow from this that reasonable inferences should not be drawn for the purposes of the court proceedings in which the privilege is successfully claimed. Although most authority favours the view that a successful claim to privilege leaves the court in the same situation as if no evidence is tendered and no inference beyond

this can be drawn,614 in Thompson v Bella-Lewis, where the validity of a will was in dispute, the majority of the Full Court was inclined in the particular circumstances to draw further inference from an attesting witness’s refusal to testify.615 The witness had sworn inconsistent affidavits that had been admitted into evidence and the witness’s claim to privilege was on the ground that answer might disclose that she had sworn false affidavit. In these circumstances Davies JA (at 436–8) (and Fitzgerald P in passing at 432) thought inferences were reasonably open in respect to the affidavit evidence before the court and the jury should have been so instructed. To prevent an unacceptable adverse inference, where the trial is before a jury, the claim may be determined in the absence of the jury (this is presumptive under s 189(4) of the uniform legislation). Once the jury is aware of a valid claim to privilege, as [page 570] Thompson v Bella-Lewis illustrates, it will generally be necessary for the judge to give an appropriate direction in respect of it. 5.169 The onus is upon the person claiming the privilege to convince the court deciding the claim,616 that first, disclosure will result in a real additional risk of subsequent prosecution or of proceedings (for penalty or forfeiture); and secondly, that the refusal to disclose is made genuinely upon that ground.617 Insofar as s 128(2) of the uniform legislation provides that there be ‘reasonable grounds for the objection’ the same onus exists and the same matters will be considered.618 These matters may be decided upon evidence from the person refusing disclosure and from the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the information to be disclosed.619 Although some judges express a reluctance to compel a witness to disclose fully the details of incriminating matters for the purpose of deciding the claim,620 it is suggested that, in view of the High Court’s willingness to examine material claimed to be privileged,621 if a judge is in doubt and only full disclosure can eliminate that doubt then disclosure should be compelled for this purpose, in camera. If the claim for privilege is upheld, then the information disclosed in camera can never be available for use in subsequent proceedings.622 No other procedure is appropriate if the court is to remain the final arbiter of the interests in issue (cf procedure, discussed at 5.241ff, where

public interest immunity is claimed). The uniform legislation provides only in s 133 that a court may inspect documents for the purposes of determining questions in relation to them. 5.170 When the privilege is claimed by a person who is not a party to the proceedings further procedural difficulties arise. Is that person entitled to legal representation? Are the parties entitled to participate, by argument and evidence, in the claim? Decisions appear to assume that it is for the judge to determine the claim, and initially this may be achieved through appropriate questioning by the judge, but as the decision will affect the evidence put before the court, the parties must be entitled to cross-examine. Often separate representation may be neither necessary nor requested. Counsel calling the witness may be able to represent the witness where there is no conflict with the [page 571] party’s interest. But, arguably, separate representation should be within the discretion of the court and allowed where required.623 5.171 The principal question for the court deciding the claim is whether there is a real additional risk of prosecution or other proceedings if disclosure is compelled. As a preliminary point it should be noted that this risk need not arise directly from the disclosure. It is not necessary that the information disclosed would be capable of forming the basis of subsequent proceedings or would be admissible in those proceedings. It is enough that disclosure may give rise to a chain of inquiries which may result in proceedings being taken (derivative use).624 The most quoted expression of the degree of risk required to give a foundation for the claim of privilege is found in R v Boyes:625 … the danger to be apprehended must be real and appreciable … not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character … so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct.

In that case, the witness, having been handed a pardon under the Great Seal in relation to alleged parliamentary bribes, was held unable to claim privilege on the basis of the risk of parliamentary impeachment for the offence, the court holding that ‘no one seriously supposes that the witness runs the slightest risk of an impeachment by the House of Commons’. But, once the risk is regarded as a real

and appreciable risk even though prosecution may be rare, then, in the absence of male fides, the person claiming privilege is entitled to the courts’ protection,626 and even if there may be other reasons for the witness being reluctant to testify.627 Viscount Dilhorne in Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electric Corp explained that: … once it appears that the risk is not fanciful, then it follows that it is real. If it is real, then there must be a reasonable ground to apprehend danger, and, if there is, great latitude is to be allowed to the witness and to a person required to produce documents.628

[page 572] 5.172 The risk will not be real where the information the witness is seeking to protect is already available to prosecuting authorities (as in Brebner v Perry, where the witness had already openly confessed to the police),629 nor where the prosecution authorities have made it clear that they will not prosecute for the offences disclosed,630 nor where the witness has already been convicted of the offence despite the continuing possibility of appeal.631 This enables the prosecution to defeat a claim of privilege, although, as the derivative use of disclosed information may create a risk of prosecution for other offences, any immunity offered will have to be clear before it will defeat the claim. 5.173 Another way in which the risk of prosecution may be avoided is for the court itself to use its inherent powers to restrict publication of the disclosed information so that there is no possibility of it being used for the purposes of subsequent prosecution. This technique has been applied in New Zealand632 as a pragmatic way of making information available in civil proceedings (although it leads to the anomaly that information is available to determine a private dispute but cannot be used in the public interest to prosecute a crime). However, the High Court in Reid v Howard disapproved in the strongest of terms of courts using their inherent powers to undermine the privilege against incrimination in this way.633 It must be left to the legislature to determine whether to remove such a fundamental privilege. The court also doubted the effectiveness of such orders to prevent, in particular, the derivative use of disclosed information. Although the case does not prevent prosecuting authorities giving immunities, it may discourage courts from enforcing them and it advises that any immunity given be carefully scrutinised to ensure that it is completely effective.

5.174 Once an increased risk of prosecution or action for penalty or forfeiture is shown, bona fides in claiming the privilege will generally be assumed. That bona fides in claiming the privilege is a requirement to a successful claim is mentioned in many cases. In Brebner v Perry, Mayo J did not regard as genuine a claim to privilege upon the basis of a crime to which the witness had already confessed.634 In Rank Film Distributors [page 573] Pty Ltd v Video Information Centre, the House of Lords referred to the concept of bona fides in doubting whether it would have allowed a claim of privilege upon the basis of a minor copyright offence of no real concern to the defendant seeking to resist disclosure.635 However, Kirby P in Accident Insurance Mutual Holdings Ltd v McFadden has doubted the need for any subjective test to be satisfied before a claim to privilege can be successful: ‘What is in issue, ultimately, is not the subjective fears of the witness claiming the privilege but the objective tendency of the question to expose that witness to the risk of criminal prosecution’.636 Thus, Kirby P allowed a claim to privilege although its motivation was to obtain an immunity from prosecution in return for testimony which would convict another. But this motivation in turn did depend upon a genuine fear of increased risk of prosecution. If the objection had stemmed from other reasons and the privilege had been used as a mere excuse, there would have been no reason to grant the privilege.637 Just as in the case of legal professional privilege, courts should not tolerate its abuse. But in practice, abuse will be difficult to establish once a real increased risk of prosecution has been shown. Legislation affecting the privileges 5.175 As this discussion has emphasised, in the absence of legislative abrogation or modification the common law privileges apply, and in no jurisdiction in Australia have they been completely replaced by legislation. But considerable legislation exists, either applying generally to endorse or modify the privileges, or seeking to modify them in particular situations. Only that legislation of general application is dealt with in any detail here, although some reference is made to legislation modifying the privilege in specific cases, and to factors relevant to implying legislative modification.

Only South Australia has no legislation generally endorsing or modifying the common law privileges. In jurisdictions not covered by the uniform legislation, Evidence Acts at least declare that ‘nothing in this Act shall render any person compellable to answer any question tending to criminate himself’.638 This declaration does not affect the other privileges, although in Queensland the forfeiture privilege is abolished insofar as it applies in civil proceedings.639 [page 574] 5.176 Section 128 of the uniform legislation allows a witness to object to giving evidence on the ground that the evidence may tend to prove that the witness has committed an offence (under Australian or foreign law) or is liable to a civil penalty (under Australian or foreign law: s 128(1)). The privileges in respect to forfeiture and ecclesiastical censure are not enacted, so that by s 12 ‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this Act’ all witnesses are competent and all competent witnesses are compellable ‘to give evidence about a fact’. This would appear to abolish the application of these privileges where witnesses testify under the uniform legislation. While s 131A does not extend s 128 to disclosure requirements in other preliminary proceedings, by s 128A a procedure is enacted to enable a similar privilege to be claimed where disclosure orders equivalent to Mareva injunctions and Anton Piller orders are sought. A similar procedure also applies more generally in interlocutory proceedings in New South Wales.640 By the procedure in the uniform legislation an answer may be compelled despite a claim to privilege under Australian law, but the witness is protected against use of that answer in subsequent proceedings. A similar procedure is enacted in Western Australia: see 5.178. 5.177 The uniform legislation modifies the privilege in the following way. First, the self-incrimination and penalty privileges are enacted to apply only where a witness objects641 to giving evidence (or a disclosure order covered by s 128A) on these grounds;642 secondly, the objection may be in respect of particular evidence (perhaps in answer to a particular question) or to evidence more generally relating to a particular matter; thirdly, where a witness refuses to testify invoking, on reasonable grounds, either privilege, the witness is given the option of testifying having received a certificate declaring that neither particular evidence (or evidence relating to that particular matter) nor other information

obtained as a direct or indirect consequence of it may be used against the person in an Australian court (except in proceedings in respect to the falsity of the evidence); and fourthly, if the witness still refuses to testify, and the exposure is to incrimination or penalty under Australian law, the court can compel an answer, subject to similar certification, where ‘the interests of justice require that the witness give the evidence’. In the case of an objection on the ground of incrimination or penalty under foreign law, an answer can be compelled, again subject to certification, if the court is satisfied that the evidence to be revealed does not tend to prove that crime or liability to penalty, and again where ‘the interests of justice require that the witness give the evidence’. Given the liberal indemnity against even derivative use, it is likely that in the case of incrimination or penalty under Australian law, the [page 575] interests of justice will so require whenever the evidence is significantly relevant to the case at hand and the witness is likely to cooperate. 643 5.178 In Western Australia, a similar certification procedure exists to compel answers that will incriminate or tend to incriminate.644 In certain revenue cases, the certificate is declared by s 13 to free the person compelled to answer from: … all criminal prosecutions and penal actions, and from all penalties, forfeitures, and punishments to which he was liable … in respect of the matters touching which he is so examined.

That legislative declaration extends to the penalty and forfeiture privileges, and by providing a bar to proceedings, it ensures that disclosures cannot be used directly or indirectly in subsequent proceedings. In other than revenue cases, incriminatory answers can be compelled on the giving of a certificate, but it then takes the form of only making the answer inadmissible in subsequent proceedings. 5.179 Doubts have been expressed over the extra-territorial effect of these certification procedures within Australia,645 and while it is hard to imagine that a court, sitting in a jurisdiction where the privilege continues or where there is a similar certification process, would hold an answer admissible that was compelled under an interstate certification procedure, the matter is dealt with expressly by s 128(12)–(14). 5.180 This is not the place to catalogue the legislation which affects the

privilege in specific cases, but it includes the Australian provisions equivalent to s 1(e) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (UK), which compel an accused choosing to testify upon oath to answer questions notwithstanding that the answer might criminate him or her as to the crime charged.646 If the answer might incriminate the accused in other crimes not charged, the privilege continues. It is not entirely clear whether the privilege is removed in respect of other crimes relevant and admissible to prove the crime [page 576] charged.647 A court could hold the accused obliged to answer where the equivalent of s 1(f)(i) applies to admit these other crimes, the privilege being implicitly removed by this exception. Section 128(10) of the uniform legislation has been interpreted to remove the privilege in these circumstances.648 Other legislation modifies the privileges where a bankrupt is being examined,649 where witnesses are called before Royal Commissions650 or Crime Commissions,651 and where trade practice652 and company and security investigations are being held.653 But, as the number of High Court decisions show, the extent to which legislation modifies the privileges is often a delicate matter, for parliaments do not always express their intentions unambiguously.654 This lack of uniformity in abolishing privileges has been much criticised and, in respect of client legal privilege, the ALRC655 has made recommendations seeking to ensure that clear and express words are required to abrogate the common law privilege, that so far as possible uniform approaches are taken to any abrogation and that, where privileges continue to be available in objection to otherwise compulsory requests for information, there are effective procedures in place for claiming privilege.656 5.181 The High Court approaches these questions of statutory interpretation on the assumption that the privileges exist unless modified expressly or by ‘necessary implication’. But ‘necessary implication’ is a phrase open to various interpretations. Murphy J held that the privilege against self-incrimination is so important that he would not infer necessary implication unless the legislation could not operate without the modification of the privilege.657 He accepted that parliaments may modify the privilege, but demanded they do

so in unmistakable language, being prepared to presume the privilege despite the obvious [page 577] problems that such preservation would cause in the operation of legislation. In many cases the majority of the court has taken a more ‘realistic’ view and will consider the broad purpose and intent of legislation to decide whether preservation of the privilege is consistent with this purpose and intent. Thus, in Police Service Board v Martin,658 where legislation permitted the board to require police to answer all questions in the course of inquiry into their misconduct, Murphy J refused to find the privilege abrogated (the legislation could still operate, albeit not so effectively, with the privilege preserved), while the majority held that the intent of the legislation was to ensure effective discipline in the force and that this could not be efficiently effected if the privilege was retained.659 Thus, the phrase ‘necessary implication’ was allowed a wider interpretation to embrace a consideration of an efficient implementation of all policies inherent in the legislation.660 There is much to be said in favour of Murphy J’s view as an interpretation that forces parliaments to draft legislation clearly where fundamental human rights are to be abrogated. 5.182 The majority in these earlier cases isolate various factors to be considered in determining whether the necessary implication of the legislation is to abrogate the privilege. Where information is sought on oath in the course of proceedings presided over by a qualified judicial officer who is able to efficiently and competently determine any claim to privilege, very clear words are required to abrogate the privilege. In Sorby v Commonwealth,661 the court refused to find the privilege abrogated in proceedings before a Royal Commission, rather pedantically holding that a provision making directly incriminating answers inadmissible in subsequent proceedings could not be construed to abolish a privilege which extended to allow a witness to refuse to disclose information which only indirectly might lead to the discovery of a crime.662 5.183 On the other hand, where the authorised inquiry is administrative and not carried out by a judicial officer able to decide a privilege claim on the spot,

and where parliament has expressly given the officer wide powers for specific investigatory purposes that would be frustrated by retaining the privilege, then the court will be more ready to abrogate the privilege by necessary implication, as it did in Controlled Consultants Pty Ltd v Commissioners for Corporate Affairs and Police Service [page 578] Board v Martin.663 This reasoning allows the High Court to construe much legislation giving general investigatory power to authorised officers as excluding the privilege as long as the information sought is relevant to the authorised investigation.664 To allow parliaments to so easily abrogate the privilege against self-incrimination only goes to emphasise the point made by Murphy J and the ALRC. In Daniels Corp International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission,665 the majority of the court takes a stricter line to abrogation of common law privilege, more in line with that advocated by Murphy J: see discussion at 5.71–5.76. In X7 v Australian Crime Commission,666 the attitude of the majority (Hayne, Bell and Kiefel JJ) might be seen as even stricter. It refused to interpret legislation — removing the privilege, empowering compulsory examination and demanding the secrecy of answers given in examination if publishing might prejudice a person’s fair trial — as permitting the examination of a person charged with but not yet tried for a criminal offence. The majority held that such an interpretation was contrary to the fundamental principle of accusatorial trial and its companion principle that once charged an accused cannot be compelled to assist the prosecution in proving its accusation.667 The majority held that interference with these principles, by virtue of what is known as the ‘principle of legality’, required clear words, not words that applied equally to interrogated suspects whether or not they had been charged. The minority (French CJ and Crennan J) took a more pragmatic approach to the question of whether the ‘companion principle’ was preserved, regarding the statutory secrecy safeguard, subject as it is to judicial review, as sufficient to preserve the companion principle, preventing the prosecution from gaining access to answers that might prejudice the fair trial of the accused. In the later case of Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission,668 the majority of

the court distinguished X7 in holding that, despite the absence of express words, the limited purpose and provisions of the Criminal Assets Recovery Act (NSW) made it [page 579] unambiguously clear as a matter of necessary implication that parliament intended that a person charged could be judicially examined compulsorily in abolition of the privilege. What these cases demonstrate is that in considering the ‘principle of legality’ in determining the scope of legislation allowing compulsory examination, courts require clear words not just to restrict the privilege against self-incrimination, but also to interfere with the principle, companion to the accusatorial trial, that a person charged with an offence cannot be compelled to assist the accused with its accusation. This companion principle requires consideration not only when determining the scope of legislation permitting compulsory examination in deciding whether examination should be permitted at all, but also when questions arise about the revelation to and use by the prosecution of evidence obtained during the accused’s compulsory examination. If the relevant legislation restricts revelation and in breach the evidence is passed to a prosecutor, Lee v R669 suggests that mere access is sufficient to cause a miscarriage of justice. On the other hand, if the legislation expressly mandates that revelation and use then the accusatorial principles are modified accordingly.670

The immunity of judges and jurors from testifying on the reasons for decisions 5.184 A formal immunity inherent in the procedural system is that attaching to judges671 and arbitrators672 protecting them from having to testify or otherwise provide evidence in later proceedings about the reasons for their decisions. It is enacted in s 129 of the uniform legislation.673 To maintain the apparent integrity of those judicially involved in the adversary trial it is important that they not be dragged into controversies concerning matters decided by them. Appellate procedures exist to correct their errors; otherwise, in the exercise of their judicial

duties, they are protected from testifying in other proceedings. To ensure this protection it has been held that: [page 580] [E]vidence which exposes or purports to expose the means whereby [a court] came to its decision, is inadmissible for the purpose of impugning the decision … because if evidence was admitted for that purpose the absolute immunity of the [court] from having to answer as to how [it] came to [its] decision, would be lost.674

This immunity should be distinguished from the privilege that superior court judges may have against testifying as to other matters that have come to their attention during proceedings. There is authority that superior court judges cannot be compelled to testify to matters such as the content of a witness’s testimony relevant in perjury proceedings.675 However, although generally it may be inappropriate to prove facts through the presiding judge rather than through other officials present in court, there does not seem to be a reason for excusing judges where their testimony is necessary. Authority is against inferior judges having such a privilege, although there seems little reason to distinguish between judges in such matters.676 The uniform legislation provides in s 16 that a judge over a proceeding is not competent to give evidence in that proceeding and is not compellable to give evidence about that proceeding in other proceedings without the leave of the judge in those other proceedings. 5.185 A similar immunity forbids jurors from giving evidence in later proceedings of what occurred during a jury’s deliberations or of the reasons for a jury’s decision.677 This immunity is enacted in s 129(4) of the uniform legislation.678 What goes on in the jury room is secret.679 The jury’s verdict, given without dissent in open court, cannot be questioned by bringing evidence that a juror did not agree or was under some misapprehension in agreeing with the verdict.680 A juror wishing to dissent must [page 581] do so in open court and evidence of that dissent may be later given to show that

the jury’s verdict was no verdict at all; similarly, a verdict given by a foreman in the absence of dissentient jurors may be later proved to be no verdict at all.681 It has been suggested that it may (should) be possible to go behind a jury’s verdict where the evidence is to the effect that the jury did not deliberate at all but determined the case by drawing lots, tossing a coin or consulting a ouija board.682 Where the question is whether, before verdict has been given, an irregularity has occurred that may require the jury to be discharged (for example, where a juror has ‘inside’ knowledge from an informal view or internet search, or is related to an accused), as well as being able to call extrinsic evidence of the irregularity a juror may be called to give evidence of it.683 Section 16(1) of the uniform legislation provides that a juror in a proceeding is not competent to give evidence in that proceeding except about matters affecting the conduct of the proceeding. After verdict has been given and judgment entered, the only recourse by a party is by way of appeal. In the case of an acquittal the prosecution cannot appeal in order to have the verdict quashed, although a question of law can be put before the appellate court without affecting the acquittal.684 In the case of conviction the accused can appeal on the grounds that the verdict cannot be supported by the evidence, that there has been an error of law or otherwise there has been a miscarriage of justice. If some impropriety can be established in the way the jury has reached its decision then it may be argued that there has been a miscarriage of justice.685 Section 129 of the uniform [page 582] legislation expressly does not apply on appeal so that a member of the jury could be called on appeal to establish that impropriety. The position is the same at common law. Legislation in most Australian jurisdictions prohibits jurors from discussing their deliberations publicly but does not affect the common law immunity described above.686

Two adversary restrictions upon the tender of evidence

5.186 The principal focus of the discussion so far has been those procedural restrictions that prevent parties and courts from gaining access to relevant information at all. Procedural principles can, however, also operate to restrict parties in their tender to the court of evidence that is available to them. Two common law rules have this effect: the evidentiary rule flowing from the doctrine of res judicata; and the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn.687

The evidentiary rule flowing from the doctrine of res judicata 5.187 By the doctrine of res judicata, once a cause of action between parties has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,688 that action689 cannot be the subject again of litigation between those same parties (or their privies).690 The cause of action is said to merge into the final judgment691 and in the interests of finality of judgment the matter is formally at an end. By extension of this doctrine the parties are also estopped, in later judicial proceedings to which they are again party, from disputing any of those facts that [page 583] have been determined as material facts in previous proceedings between them (issue estoppel).692 5.188 In criminal cases, the doctrine of res judicata finds expression in the pleas of autrefois convict and autrefois acquit. There is some debate over whether issue estoppels can arise in a criminal proceeding due to the difficulty in defining those issues upon which a jury makes its decision. A majority of the High Court in Rogers v R decided that there is no need for a formal extension of the civil rule to criminal cases.693 The principal reason is that any limits to formal rules relating to res judicata may be extended where the court is of the opinion that it would be an abuse of process for parties to call into question the findings of previous proceedings.694 Thus, in Rogers, the court held it would be an abuse of process for the prosecution to tender in later proceedings the confession of the accused that had been excluded as involuntary in earlier proceedings. The doctrine of res judicata, and its extension through the notions of issue estoppel and abuse of process, have the effect of taking causes of action and facts outside the arena of dispute altogether. The doctrine is pleaded by way of

defence. As this book concentrates upon the proof of facts capable of dispute, the doctrine is not dealt with in any detail here.695 5.189 In criminal cases, however, it has been said that there is an evidentiary rule arising out of the doctrine of res judicata and deserving of mention in this context. An accused is entitled to the full benefit of any acquittal and the Crown is not entitled to call into question that acquittal in later proceedings against the accused. If in later proceedings the Crown wishes to tender evidence relating to an earlier incident (giving rise to the charge of which the accused has been acquitted) that evidence must be relevant on the assumption that the accused was innocent of the previous charge. It is doubtful whether this evidentiary rule has any application in civil proceedings [page 584] following earlier unsuccessful civil action (unless it gives rise to an abuse of process argument). 5.190 The rule is illustrated by the High Court decision in R v Storey.696 The accused had been acquitted of a charge of forcibly abducting the prosecutrix with intent to know her carnally. In a later trial for rape arising out of the same incident, the Crown wished to tender evidence relating to the abduction, to show that the prosecutrix had been taken from a railway station against her will. The majority held the evidence admissible as it could achieve its relevance without assuming the accused guilty of the earlier charge and, moreover, it was impossible to edit the evidence relating to the abduction without inviting dangerous speculation from the jury. However, the appeal was allowed because the trial judge had failed to give a sufficiently clear warning that the previous acquittal was not to be questioned.

Although this evidentiary rule springs from the doctrine of res judicata, its ultimate justification appears rooted in the criminal principle against double jeopardy. The House of Lords has held in R v Z697 that this principle demands no more than that an accused remains immune from being prosecuted again for the crime of which he or she has been acquitted. It held admissible evidence of a prior similar crime for which the accused had been prosecuted but acquitted in order to establish the crime charged. In Carroll v R, the High Court appears to take a slightly wider approach in considering how the doctrine of res judicata applied to an accused prosecuted for having perjured himself in previous proceedings, at which he had denied on oath that he had killed a young girl and had been acquitted of her murder. It held that the doctrine demanded that verdicts be incontrovertible, and that this required that no later conviction be inconsistent with the acquittal. On this basis the perjury prosecution could not proceed as it was premised on the fact that the accused had killed the young girl of whose killing he had been acquitted. It is not clear, however, how far this notion of incontrovertibility extends. Gleeson CJ and Hayne J (at [50]) are clear in denying the [page 585] doctrine any evidentiary significance and endorse the approach of the House of Lords in Z. Gaudron and Gummow JJ (at [93]–[94]) leave the matter open, while McHugh J at ([137]–[138]) does not dissent from Storey.698 While the uniform legislation does not affect the doctrines of res judicata, issue estoppel and double jeopardy, nor pre-trial proceedings to strike out or stay proceedings as an abuse of process (see s 93(c) and Gilham v R699) legislation has now been passed in a number of jurisdictions enabling acquitted accused to be prosecuted again where further evidence has come to light since that acquittal.700

The rule in Hollington v Hewthorn 5.191 While the principle of res judicata recognises the finality of proceedings between the same parties, the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn701 recognises that adversary proceedings bind only the parties to them and that, in later proceedings between different parties, previous factual findings by a court are not to the point.

That case decides that, in civil proceedings, a criminal conviction702 following trial703 cannot be tendered as evidence of the material facts upon which that conviction is based.704 Thus, a conviction for careless driving could not be tendered against a defendant in civil proceedings for negligence arising out of the same incident. The problem is that Hollington v Hewthorn takes the adversary principle too far. It is one thing to say that proceedings between different parties must proceed unfettered by findings in previous cases, and another to say that those previous findings are entirely excluded in the later proceedings. Where the previous findings are reached in accordance with the criminal standard of proof and the party against whom the finding is tendered was present at the previous proceeding and had full opportunity to contest the charge, it can be strongly argued on grounds of probative sufficiency and [page 586] procedural fairness that the previous conviction should be at least admissible where it is relevant to subsequent issues. 5.192 These reasons, together with the absence of binding Australian authority, have led the Supreme Court of Western Australia to reject the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn.705 In Mickelberg and Mickelberg v Director of Perth Mint,706 the director took civil proceedings (conversion) against the defendants, alleging that they had defrauded him of a quantity of gold bullion. The defendants had been previously convicted of the fraud. Upon the defendants filing a defence to the civil claim, the director sought to have that defence struck out as an abuse of process of the court. Although no res judicata could apply to give rise to an estoppel in these circumstances (since the two cases involved different parties), it was argued that it was an abuse of process to seek to reopen the identical issue decided in the criminal proceedings. This argument could not proceed if convictions were inadmissible in subsequent civil proceedings, and so the authority of Hollington v Hewthorn fell under consideration. The whole court rejected the rule, with Burt CJ holding not only that convictions are admissible as evidence of the facts upon which they are based, but also that proof of the conviction throws a burden upon the accused to adduce evidence (fresh evidence) showing why those facts should not be accepted.

Having rejected Hollington v Hewthorn, only Smith J accepted that there was an abuse of process raised by the pleadings. The majority did not consider it appropriate that the previous conviction should inevitably lead to an abuse of process and left the director to amend the statement of claim to allege the conviction and the defendants to accordingly amend their defence. Burt CJ felt that, following that amendment, it might be open to the director to renew the abuse of process application if the defendants had pleaded no facts (fresh evidence) calling the correctness of the conviction into question. 5.193 Mickelberg illustrates the major issue that arises (assuming the conviction is relevant to the subsequent issues)707 if Hollington v Hewthorn is overruled; namely, the evidentiary weight to be accorded to the conviction. One might argue that, as with other evidence, this is a matter of sufficient relevance that should be left to the circumstances of a particular case. If the charge, including particulars together with [page 587] the conviction, is the only evidence tendered, it must be shown how the findings of these particulars are relevant to the issues in the civil proceedings.708 In Mickelberg, this relevance was obvious. In Hollington v Hewthorn, a finding of ‘careless driving’ could do little to advance the precise allegations of fact put forward in the civil action. It is suggested that the better view is that the tender of a conviction should shift no burden of proof and in each case ordinary principles of fact evaluation should determine the weight to be given to the findings upon which that conviction is based.709 5.194 In a number of Australian jurisdictions, including courts bound by the uniform legislation, parliaments have overruled the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn insofar as it affects civil proceedings.710 In South Australia, the legislation711 provides that in civil proceedings where ‘the commission of an offence is in issue or relevant to any issue’ then ‘the conviction or finding is evidence of the commission of the offence and admissible in the proceeding against the person or a party claiming through or under the person’. In Queensland, the legislation is drafted more specifically to make convictions

evidence of the acts and state of mind which constitute the offence in all civil proceedings (whether or not the accused is a party).712 This evidence must be accepted ‘unless the contrary is proved’. It matters not that the conviction follows a plea of guilty. The uniform legislation, although providing in s 91 that ‘[e]vidence of the decision or of a finding of fact, in an Australian or overseas proceeding is not admissible to [page 588] prove the existence of a fact that was in issue in that proceeding’,713 then provides in s 92(2) by way of exception that this does not, in civil proceedings, ‘prevent the admission or use of evidence that a party, or a person through or under whom a party claims, has been convicted of an offence’ and (s 92(3)) neither the opinion nor the hearsay rules apply to that evidence. Section 93 preserves the rules of res judicata and issue estoppel. Evidence of previous convictions may be given by certificate under ss 178–179. Where a question arises in relation to evidence of a conviction a party may request, under ss 166(g) and 167, that witnesses who gave evidence in the earlier proceedings be called. Other specific provisions in legislation may modify the rule.714

Public Policy Restrictions Upon Access to Information Introduction 5.195 The restrictions so far discussed are inherent in the system of justice as it is administered through the adversary trial. In determining the extent of these restrictions the primary question is whether the existence of the restriction is necessary to ensure the overall fairness and effectiveness of the adversary process. To alter or remove any of these restrictions would be to alter fundamentally the nature of the common law procedural system itself. 5.196 We now turn to consider restrictions that are based upon public policies that have nothing to do with the common law procedural system; with, that is,

the administration of justice. The extent to which these restrictions apply involves balancing the need for the fair and effective administration of justice against the need to recognise public policies concerned with other matters. The result is a compromise that may shift as the courts’ and legislatures’ attitudes towards these other matters of public policy shift. But a change in attitude towards these other policies, although it may result in a change to the information available to a court, will have no effect upon the fundamental nature of the common law adversary process.715 5.197 The common law has always been loath to allow extraneous policies to interfere with the administration of justice, which it regards as fundamental to a peaceful society. One definitive restriction that could be cited, but a restriction which is not often [page 589] relevant in trials of fact, is parliamentary privilege. Another is the restriction upon the competence and compellability of spouses. Otherwise few definitive restrictions exist at common law, with the common law preferring to strike the appropriate balance from case to case, in the context of what has come to be known as public interest immunity or in exercise of the residuary discretion. On the other hand, legislators have been more willing to impose definitive restrictions upon access to information based upon extraneous policy factors. For example, legislation gives doctors and priests the privilege to withhold information concerning their patients and flock respectively. In other contexts, legislators have favoured the balancing approach of the common law. We have already encountered one such example: the accused charged with a sexual crime may be prevented from eliciting the sexual experience of the complainant, even though it is of substantial relevance to the issues, where this would cause undue embarrassment to the complainant: see 3.142ff. This same technique is now employed, as we shall see below, to protect family and other personal and confidential relationships. We will first look at those public policy restrictions (common law and legislative) that have produced (sometimes definitive) restrictions upon access to information in particular situations, and then consider the residual categories of

public interest immunity and the residuary discretion, which strike an appropriate balance on the facts of the individual case.

Parliamentary privilege 5.198 The Bill of Rights 1688 declares ‘the freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings in parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of parliament’. The effect of this declaration upon the tender in court of parliamentary statements716 has been debated in Australia. The view in favour of narrowly construing the privilege is convincingly expounded by Hunt J in R v Murphy: Freedom of speech in Parliament is not now, nor was it in 1901 or even in 1688, so sensitive a flower that, although the accuracy and honesty of what is said by members of parliament (or witnesses before parliamentary committees) can be severely challenged in the media or in public, it cannot be challenged in the same way in the courts of law. It is only where legal consequences are to be visited upon such members or witnesses for what was said or done by them in parliament that they can be prevented by challenges in courts of law from exercising their freedom of speech in parliament. It is only when that is the consequence of the challenge that freedom of speech in

[page 590] parliament needs any greater protection from what is said or done in the courts of law than it does from what is said or done in the media or in public.717

By this approach Hunt J held not only that the fact of a previous inconsistent parliamentary statement can be put to a witness in order to ask the court to disbelieve the witness’s testimony, but also that the cross-examiner may seek to show the falsity of parliamentary statements in an attempt to discredit the witness. In these situations no legal consequences are visited on account of the parliamentary statements. By the same reasoning, Hunt J expressed the view that voluntary confessional statements made in parliament might be tendered against an accused, because any legal consequences result from the misconduct confessed to rather than from the making of the parliamentary statement. 5.199 This narrow interpretation was summarily rejected by Carruthers J in R v Jackson in holding Hansard reports of statements made by the accused to be inadmissible for the purpose of establishing corroborating lies by him.718 Although the fact of parliamentary statements might be proved if relevant as such (for example, to establish a fair report of parliamentary proceedings),719 statements

cannot be tendered where their relevance calls into question the conduct or motives of the maker (inside or outside of parliament). Carruthers J took the view that this wide protection is necessary to guarantee freedom of speech in parliament. The effect of this interpretation is that assertions in statements made in parliament cannot be relied upon to establish a contentious fact. This wider view is endorsed by the Privy Council in Prebble v Television New Zealand Ltd720 and receives statutory expression in s 16(3) of the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 (Cth).721 [page 591] The privilege cannot be waived by a member or a party to litigation.722 Section 10 of the uniform legislation preserves parliamentary privileges. A member of parliament is not compellable without the permission of the House,723 nor can tabled documents be subpoenaed without its permission. Furthermore, an Australian member of parliament is not compellable where s 15(2) of that legislation applies.

Restrictions protecting marriage and family relationships 5.200 The common law sought to protect the institution of marriage by forbidding spouses from testifying for or against each other in civil and criminal cases.724 The prohibition extended to divorced spouses testifying to matters occurring during marriage.725 The rule in civil cases appears to have been also, and perhaps principally, based upon the idea that, where one spouse is a party, the other is an interested and therefore biased witness whose testimony cannot be relied upon. This disqualification was removed by the Evidence Act 1843 (UK), and legislation exists in all Australian jurisdictions making spouses competent and compellable witnesses in civil proceedings (although only with difficulty can the Queensland and South Australian legislation be interpreted to abolish the rule with respect to former spouses).726 The common law rule in criminal cases was subject to the exception that, where one spouse was charged with a crime involving personal violence or loss of liberty against the other, that other was a competent witness for the prosecution,

although, as was ultimately decided, not a compellable one.727 Without such an exception the common law would have been seen to condone violence and imprisonment within the institution of marriage. The extent of this exception was never authoritatively settled,728 but principle suggests it should have been broadly interpreted to give a spouse protection against another wherever injury to the person or loss of liberty to [page 592] the spouse occurred or was threatened. Pedantic questions such as whether a threat as such constitutes violence729 or whether murder by poisoning involves violence730 merely bring the law into disrespect. Courts should also be entitled to go beyond the nature of the charge alleged and consider the evidence to be tendered in determining whether a spouse needs protection.731 5.201 Legislation exists in all Australian jurisdictions overruling the common law and making a spouse in criminal proceedings a generally competent witness for both prosecution and defence.732 But different approaches are taken to the compellability of such witnesses. In Queensland and Western Australia, spouses are compellable for the prosecution only in relation to specified offences (of a serious nature or giving protection to spouse and family) and compellable for the defence in all cases (except that in Queensland one co-accused may only compel the spouse of another co-accused where the prosecution could compel the spouse to testify). In jurisdictions covered by the Uniform Acts, and in South Australia, the balance between protecting marriage and calling all available testimony to disclose offences is further tipped towards disclosure. Spouses are compellable for the defence in all cases and there is a presumption in favour of compellability for the prosecution. But in the latter situation, generally on application (cf s 21(3a)), the judge has a discretion to exempt a spouse from testifying where the interest to justice in obtaining the evidence is outweighed by the risk of serious harm or damage to the witness or the relationship between the witness and the accused.733 This balance can now be struck having regard to the seriousness of the offence charged and the importance of the testimony in establishing that offence. Serious

harm or damage includes social, emotional or psychological, and economic or material harm or damage. The uniform legislation applies to the spouse, de facto spouse, parent or child of a defendant; in South Australia, (full or partial) exemptions can be given to spouse, putative spouse, parents and children. [page 593] 5.202 The procedures for granting exemption are important. The legislation generally requires that spouses be informed of their right to obtain exemption734 and that any such application is heard in the absence of any jury. The South Australian legislation forbids any comment by counsel or judge on the fact that a witness has obtained an exemption. The uniform legislation forbids the prosecution from commenting upon any objection to testify and on any subsequent order and failure to testify, and any comment by the judge must not suggest the failure is because the accused is guilty or believed to be guilty by the exempted witness. But a judge may comment upon any comment made by a co-accused and the legislation places no restriction on the comment of a co-accused: s 20. Prior J in Trzesinski v Dair735 considered whether a witness seeking exemption is entitled to independent legal representation on the application, and whether the parties are entitled to participate in any voir dire examination and argument. He held there was no entitlement to either. However, Debelle J in R v Andrews (No 3)736 made it clear that, while as a general rule an application under s 21 should be dealt with by the judge alone without the assistance of independent representation of the witness or examination of the witness by the parties, in an appropriate case a judge may seek such assistance. Neither matter is specifically provided for in any legislation. 5.203 In criminal cases, there is much to be said in favour of at least a presumption of compellability in all cases. It is possible for publication of testimony to be restricted, and for testimony to be taken in camera if there is a serious risk of harm being caused by compulsion. But marriage is a special case, which may justify the exemption of a recalcitrant spouse from being compelled to testify at all.

The uniform legislation and that in South Australia recognises this on a caseby-case basis rather than the arbitrary offence-by-offence basis applied in remaining jurisdictions. The decision to compel involves a weighing of the interests of justice (correct decisions) against a wider public policy protecting marriage. Only a court is in a position to weigh these interests in a particular case. Whether the risk of harm to other familial relationships should be considered so important that information may be withheld from a court is another matter.737 But the power to compel must always be kept within the perspective of the difficulty a prosecutor will have in obtaining [page 594] testimony from an unwilling witness without the assistance of leading questions, and the harshness of convicting a spouse reluctant to testify of contempt.738 5.204 Although the common law recognised the institution of marriage in the context of the competence and compellability of spouses, it did not recognise any privilege attaching to marital communications as such.739 A spouse agreeing to testify could be compelled to disclose such communications. Lord Brougham’s Act of 1853 (UK) enacted that a spouse740 should not be compelled to disclose a communication made to them by the other spouse, and, while this provision was originally enacted in most Australian jurisdictions, the current position is that the privilege remains enacted only in Western Australia, applying in all proceedings except certain domestic matters.741 But, whereas Lord Brougham’s Act applied to communications to the testifying spouse, in Western Australia it applies to communications to and from the spouse-witness. The privilege is not enacted in the uniform legislation.

Restrictions protecting other confidential relationships At common law 5.205 The common law gave no protection to other confidential relationships, either by privileging information obtained or disclosed in the course of that relationship or by restricting the compellability of parties to that relationship. Thus, communications between, for example, doctor and patient,742 sexual

assault complainant and counsellor,743 priest and penitent,744 and journalist and informant,745 are given no special protection [page 595] at common law, and the House of Lords,746 and the High Court,747 have recognised that confidentiality does not by itself give rise to any protection.748 There is authority for the proposition that the identity of an informant who gives information to law enforcement authorities is subject to a privilege against disclosure,749 but there is some doubt about whether this is a definite rule or whether it is embraced within the residual category of public interest immunity.750 Certainly it can be outweighed where the identity is necessary to establish innocence in a criminal case,751 and, once an informer testifies, natural justice may demand that the witness’s true identity be [page 596] disclosed to the defence.752 Informers appear covered by s 130(4)(e) of the Uniform Acts so that a balance of public interests will be required.753 5.206 There is some authority for the view that, where compulsion of evidence would involve a breach of confidentiality, then the court should exercise its discretion to ensure that revelation is only compelled insofar as this is necessary for the effective and fair disposal of the case in hand.754 But discretions should not be used as a back door for a wholesale changing of clear common law principles,755 and courts are loath to introduce new privileges when legislatures are much better equipped to consider the wide range of evidence and opinion that must provide the basis for change and to formulate clearly the ambit of any new privilege.756 [page 597]

Under legislation

Scope and nature 5.207 The admissibility of communications and other information disclosed in the course of confidential relationships has been much altered by legislation in Australia. In Tasmania (Evidence Act 2001 s 127A), Victoria (Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 s 28) and the Northern Territory (Evidence Act 1939 s 12) there are distinct provisions protecting information necessary for treatment disclosed to a doctor by a patient. In all the uniform legislation jurisdictions, s 127 protects religious confessions from disclosure.757 In all jurisdictions other than Queensland, legislation (which is by no means uniform) protects confidential communications between sexual assault complainants and their professional counsellors.758 In all uniform legislation jurisdictions except Tasmania and the Northern Territory, under Pt 10 Div IC, journalists are presumptively privileged from divulging their confidential sources; and similar provisions exist in Western Australia under ss 20K–20M of the Evidence Act 1906. More generally, under Pt 3.10 Div 1A of the uniform legislation enacted in New South Wales, Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory, all confidential professional communications are presumptively privileged. A similar privilege is enacted in Western Australia.759 5.208 The specific medical communications privilege in Tasmania, Victoria and the Northern Territory applies in civil proceedings, but regulates both the tender of evidence at trial as well as the production and disclosure of documents prior to trial. The religious confessions privilege under the Uniform Acts simply entitles a member of the clergy to refuse to divulge a religious confession, thus applying in every situation where information may be compulsorily acquired: s 127(1) and (3). The privilege for communications between sexual assault complainants and their counsellors in New South Wales, Tasmania, Western Australia and the Northern Territory applies to criminal proceedings at all stages (committal, pretrial access, tender at trial and sentencing), and in New South Wales once evidence is privileged in a criminal proceeding it cannot be adduced in later civil proceedings arising out of the same acts.760 The similar privilege in Victoria, South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory applies in all legal proceedings and at all stages of those proceedings.

[page 598] Under the uniform legislation (where enacted), the journalists’ informant identity privilege and the more general confidential professional communications privilege apply in both criminal and civil proceedings; expressed as rules relating to adducing evidence at trial, their application is extended to a ‘preliminary proceeding’ by virtue of s 131A: see 5.19 and comments relating to journalists privilege in n 73. The journalists’ informant identity privilege as enacted in Western Australia is expressed as prohibiting compellability to give evidence (Evidence Act 1906 s 20I), but subject to a person acting judicially ordering disclosure on grounds of public interest (s 20J). The more general confidential professional communications privilege as enacted in Western Australia, whilst applying in civil and criminal proceedings, is a rule of admissibility whereby a court may direct that evidence may not be adduced where the harm of disclosure would outweigh the desirability of the evidence being given: Evidence Act 1906 s 20C. Where the application of any of this legislation runs out, the common law continues to apply.761 5.209 The legislation takes one of two forms. It either protects altogether specified communications (generally subject to waiver by the person protected by the privilege) or in the case of certain communications (again generally subject to waiver) it gives the court power to determine disclosure after having regard to, on the one hand, the confidential relationship concerned, and, on the other, the interests of justice in the particular case. This second technique is comparable to (but certainly not co-extensive with) that developed by the common law to determine whether evidence should be immune from production and tender on grounds of public interest. One advantage of the legislation is that it has provided more definitive procedures to be followed in considering claims to privilege. Another is that it has clarified the matters to be taken into account where a balance must be struck — although the difficult decision of the appropriate balance in the individual case remains. That legislation protecting religious confessions and doctor–patient communications takes the first form, as does the Tasmanian legislation protecting communications to sexual assault counsellors. Communications to sexual assault counsellors in New South Wales, South Australia and the Northern Territory are also absolutely privileged at committal proceedings and absolutely privileged from

pre-trial disclosure in South Australia and the Northern Territory. Otherwise the legislation takes the second approach. In The Application of the Attorney General for New South Wales dated 4 April 2014,762 referring (at [15]–[19]) to authorities763 supporting the ‘principle of legality’ demanding courts to interpret legislation so far as possible to preserve fundamental common law procedural and other safeguards of individual rights and freedoms, the court read down [page 599] s 29 of Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) to permit a subpoena ordering the production of the substance (but not the authorship) of a protected report, as this was required to ensure the fair trial of an accused (at [20]–[23]). Once so read down it was held that the section did not interfere with judicial power. It might be argued that ‘the principle of legality’ could lead to the reading down of other legislation protecting confidential relationships. Or alternatively it might be argued that legislation prohibiting disclosure involves an invalid interference with the court’s judicial power (argument rejected in KS v Veitch (No 2)764). Priest–penitent 5.210 The general intention of s 127 of the uniform legislation covering religious communications entitles a member of the clergy from divulging, in civil or criminal proceedings and in any situation of otherwise compulsory disclosure (s 127(3)), the fact and contents of a religious confession made to him or her in a professional capacity, so long as the communication was not made for a criminal purpose. The confession must be made according to the ritual or usage of the church. The privilege appears to belong to the member of the clergy and there is no provision for its loss through waiver by the penitent or through other disclosure. Whether s 127, particularly as it applies to admissions made by offenders, survives in its current form may depend upon the recommendations made by the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse.

Doctor–patient 5.211 The form of the legislation in respect of doctors and their patients is to forbid a doctor, without the consent of the patient,765 from divulging in any civil proceedings, communications made to the doctor in a professional capacity by the patient.766 In the circumstances in which the legislation applies, disclosure is prohibited altogether unless an exception applies; there is no weighing of interests from case to case. The legislation applies both to tender at trial and production of documents prior to trial. There is no privilege where the sanity of the patient is in issue and in some compensation and insurance matters where information about the patient’s health is crucial. The doctor–patient prohibition in Victoria extends to ‘any information acquired … in attending the [page 600] patient767 and which was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient,’768 whereas in Tasmania and the Northern Territory it extends only to communications by the patient that were necessary to prescribe or act for the patient.769 In Tasmania, any person in possession of a patient’s protected communications is not permitted to disclose them without the patient’s consent. Counsellors and complainants of sexual assault 5.212 As mentioned above, the Tasmanian legislation protecting a confidential ‘counselling communication’770 between sexual assault complainants and a ‘counsellor’771 is subject to no general exception in the interests of justice. But it applies only in relation to criminal proceedings (to tender of evidence at trial and to disclosure of documents before trial) and the complainant may consent to disclosure. Confidentiality includes circumstances where there is a reasonable expectation of confidentiality, and the presence of a third party necessary to facilitate the communication or further the counselling process does not destroy the confidentiality. The remaining state legislation protecting confidential communications772 between sexual assault complainants and their professional counsellors is more elaborate. In New South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia and the Northern Territory, the protection is

[page 601] by way of privilege, that is, the protection can be waived by disclosure or consent. In the Australian Capital Territory and South Australia, by contrast, the protection is by way of an immunity that cannot be waived by the complainant. In every jurisdiction,773 as well as defining the circumstances where the privilege prima facie arises (and communications made in furtherance of a fraud or offence, including civil penalty, are not privileged), it also provides for a detailed procedure to follow when it is argued either that disclosure can be refused or that disclosure may be justified in the interests of justice (the matters relevant to this determination being also specified). Generally, the procedures ensure that notice of the application is given, that any application at trial is made in the absence of any jury and not in public, that the court alone may have access to the confidential communication for the purpose of making its determination,774 and that all interested parties have an opportunity to provide evidence and make submissions, in writing if this is necessary to preserve confidentiality. 5.213 Once it is established that the document is privileged or immune from production, in all jurisdictions the onus is upon the party seeking leave to admit or gain access to the protected evidence but the criteria for leave are approached differently and differently expressed. In New South Wales, Victoria and the Northern Territory, if the court is satisfied that the document or evidence is of ‘substantial probative value’775 and other evidence is not available,776 the evidence may be admitted or access given prior to trial but only if the public interest in preserving the confidentiality of protected confidence777 and in protecting the complainant from harm (widely defined to include physical, [page 602] financial, emotional, psychological or psychiatric harm) is ‘substantially outweighed’ by the public interest in admitting the evidence. In Western Australia, prior to considering an application for disclosure the judge must be satisfied that there is a ‘legitimate forensic purpose’ for it and that other evidence to the same effect is not available: Evidence Act (1906) ss 19E,

19F.778 Once this hurdle is overcome, the judge can determine whether it is in ‘the public interest’ to admit the protected communication; having regard to (including) whether disclosure is required to enable the applicant ‘to make a full defence’, whether the communication ‘will have substantial probative value’, the likelihood disclosure will affect the outcome of the case, the public interest in ensuring that victims seek and receive effective counselling, the likelihood disclosure may cause harm to the complainant, and any other matter the court thinks relevant: s 19G. The Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (ACT), although enacting an immunity rather than a privilege (s 64), takes a similar approach, first requiring the applicant to satisfy the court there is a legitimate forensic purpose to the application (s 60), and then, if this threshold is passed, specifying the process for the application (s 61) and the criteria for giving leave (s 62). The court can only order disclosure if satisfied that the public interest in ensuring a civil proceeding is conducted fairly, or in ensuring that an accused is given a fair trial, outweighs the public interest in preserving confidentiality. Specified matters to be considered are similar to those in Western Australia and the court may have regard to any other matters it considers relevant. The South Australian legislation also enacts an immunity rather than a privilege capable of waiver. It provides that communications ‘relating to a victim or alleged victim of a sexual offence’ made in a ‘therapeutic context’ to a ‘counsellor or therapist’779 are subject to public interest immunity (thereby becoming ‘protected communications’). Such communications are inadmissible at committal and are not liable to ‘pre-trial disclosure’ whether to parties or a judge.780 However, permission to adduce evidence of a protected communication can be given at trial if the judge decides ‘that the public [page 603] interest in preserving the confidentiality of protected communications is outweighed, in the circumstances of the case, by the public interest in preventing a miscarriage of justice that might arise from suppression of relevant evidence’: s 67F(7). However, no preliminary examination of a ‘protected communication’ for the purpose of determining whether to give that permission may be made unless the judge is satisfied that there is a legitimate forensic purpose for seeking that permission and an arguable case that the evidence would materially assist the

applicant’s case: s 67F(2).781 In deciding whether to give permission, the court is to have regard to the need to encourage ‘victims of sexual assault’ to seek counselling; the probative value of the evidence; the attitude of ‘the victim or alleged victim to whom the communication relates’ to disclosure of the evidence; ‘whether admission of the evidence is being sought on the basis of a discriminatory belief or bias’; and ‘the extent to which the admission of the evidence would infringe a reasonable expectation of privacy and the potential prejudice to any person who would otherwise be protected by public interest immunity’: see, for example, the analysis of Parker J in determining disclosure in R v C, RE.782 Professional confidential relationships and journalists’ sources 5.214 The ‘professional confidential relationship privilege’,783 once unique to New South Wales but now also applying under the uniform legislation (Pt 3.10 Div 1A) in Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory, and in Western Australia by virtue of ss 20A–20M of the Evidence Act 1906, permits the exclusion of evidence at trial in both civil and criminal proceedings, and protects not only communications made to professional confidants but also the identity of the communicator. It can be invoked on application or by the court acting on its own motion. It can be waived with the consent of the confider and does not apply where communications are made in furtherance of fraud or an offence (including an act giving rise to liability to a civil penalty). The privilege is widely drawn and appears to apply to relationships including doctor and patient, nurse and patient, psychologist and client, counsellor and client, social worker and client, accountant and client, private investigator and client and journalist and client etc, so long as the confidant is acting in a professional capacity: cf s 126B(4). Section 126B appears first to give the court a simple discretion to direct that evidence of a communication or identity not be given; and secondly, to demand that no evidence [page 604] be given where harm (widely defined) to the confider is likely from disclosure and this harm outweighs the desirability of the evidence being given. It specifies a

number of matters that may be taken into account by a court in determining exclusion: the probative value and importance of the evidence; the nature of the cause of action (and whether it is an accused seeking tender); the availability of other evidence; the effect of disclosure and the likelihood and nature of any likely harm to the confider (taking into account ancillary orders that may be made to limit such harm); and previous disclosure of the communication or identity. The implicit onus under s 126B can be contrasted with that under s 126K which protects disclosure of the identity of a journalist’s source. This section requires the claimant (journalist or employer) to prove that a promise that the identity of the informant would remain confidential was given in respect of the information provided. Once this is established identity is privileged unless the party seeking disclosure can persuade the court that, having regard to the issues in the case, the public interest in disclosure outweighs ‘(a) any likely adverse effect of disclosure on the informant or any other person and (b) the public interest in the communication of facts and opinion to the public by the news media and, accordingly also, in the ability of the news media to access sources of facts’.784 Confidential settlement negotiations are also accorded statutory protection in most jurisdictions but the settlement agreed is not immune from disclosure and tender.785

Public interest immunity General nature 5.215 We come to the residual category, where courts will consider limiting access to information upon the ground that extraneous public interests against disclosure outweigh the need for disclosure to ensure justice in the individual case. This residual category is enacted in s 130 of the uniform legislation and although expressed as a rule of admissibility at trial its application is extended by s 131A in all uniform legislation jurisdictions, except the Commonwealth, to other proceedings for access preliminary to trial: see further 5.19. While it might be argued that at common law public interests are unlimited, Australian authority suggests that they are confined to what can be broadly described as governmental interests and that in this respect the common law and s 130 remain coextensive.786 [page 605]

As a residual exclusionary category requiring a balance of interests, it is counterproductive to seek definitive guidelines in this area. The courts remain free to act in that way most conducive to the enforcement of public policy in the circumstances of the particular case. Hence the difficulty with this topic. Nevertheless, the question of immunity is a matter of substantive law, so that appeal is available on the merits not simply against an exercise of discretion.787 5.216 The residual category does not create a ‘privilege’.788 For one thing, courts are obliged to take public policy points of their own motion.789 For another, no option is formally given to individuals or parties to waive restrictions upon disclosure, as is the case where ‘privileges’ apply.790 This is not to deny altogether the relevance of the wishes or attitudes of individuals or parties. In most cases, public policy points will be formally raised by individuals or parties seeking to avoid disclosure of information (most often it is the government making such an objection). And the wishes of individuals may be significant in determining where the balance of interests lies in a particular case. For example, if the public interest exists to protect the anonymity of informers and those informers publicly declare themselves, the reasons for restricting access may disappear.791 Again, if the public interest exists to enable classes of government communications to remain confidential, the failure of the government to object to their disclosure will be of great (although not necessarily decisive) importance in determining whether access should be restricted.792 [page 606] In the case of information relating to matters of national security, the government is best placed to determine the repercussions of releasing that information. Where no objection is made to its release (after formal consideration of the matter) courts are unlikely to allow private individuals to assert that its release may damage the public interest in national security.793 On the other hand, where the government objects to access on grounds of national security, although great weight will be given to the government view, ultimately courts retain the prerogative to determine whether access to information will be granted.794 In avoiding the term ‘privilege’, the courts most often use the phrase ‘public interest immunity’.795 But even this terminology is misleading.796 No immunity is granted at the behest of governments and, even where public interests need to

be taken into account, the consequent order is not necessarily one granting immunity against access. Public interests may be satisfied by giving individuals the option to disclose, or by ordering disclosure for a limited purpose to a limited class, or by allowing disclosure from one source rather than another. There is no general rule requiring immunity, and public interests may be weighed from case to case in deciding what restriction upon access is necessary for their preservation. The uniform legislation in s 130(1) provides that where matters of state so dictate, the court ‘may direct that the information or document not be adduced as evidence’ and where s 131A extends s 130 to pre-trial disclosure, the court is directed (s 31A(1)(b)) to ‘apply the provisions of this Part (other than sections 123 and 128) with any necessary modifications as if the objection to giving information or producing the document were an objection to the giving or adducing of evidence’. 5.217 Common law courts regard themselves as the ultimate guardians of public policy.797 Overall public policy requires consideration not only of extraneous public interests, but also of the public interest in ensuring justice in the individual case. Courts take the view that only they are in a position to properly take all these interests into account. Great weight will be given to the views of elected governments, but they are not in a position to take into account the interests of justice in the particular [page 607] case, and hence courts take the position that they are the appropriate institution to make the final decision upon access.798 Of course, parliament may remove the issue of disclosure from the domain of the court altogether, either by making particular issues non-justiciable,799 or by taking the responsibility of deciding where the public interests lie from the court in a particular case.800 In the discussion that follows it is assumed that the court is dealing with a justiciable issue. But in the absence of such intervention the courts regard themselves as the guardians of public interest where disclosure of sensitive information is in issue. 5.218 It goes without saying that at common law (and now, by virtue of s 131A, under s 130 of the uniform legislation) the courts’ guardianship applies at all stages of the litigation process. Whether deciding to issue a subpoena duces tecum801 to order inspection following discovery,802 or to insist that a witness

answer a particular question,803 the same balancing process must be applied. At each stage, similar considerations will affect the balancing process, although the existence of different procedural rules for disclosure at different stages of the judicial process has caused some courts to be distracted from this essential point.804 The High Court has also held, consistently with its approach to legal professional privilege, that at common law immunity may be sought to avoid any compulsory disclosure: cf uniform legislation discussed at 5.19. In Jacobsen v Roger,805 immunity was held available to resist seizure of documents under a search warrant although, as McHugh J pointed out in his dissent, seized material remains strictly confidential and [page 608] any countervailing interests of justice may be nebulous at this stage.806 Although the legislature is not bound by public interest immunity in seeking from the government information ‘reasonably necessary’ for the legislature to fulfil its functions (no court is in a position to weigh the relevant interests in such a case for it is the interests of the legislature rather than the interests of justice that must be weighed against the other public interests concerned), it does remain bound by the doctrine of cabinet responsibility and cannot gain access to documents which might reveal ‘the internal deliberations of the cabinet’ for this would undermine the doctrine of responsible government.807 5.219 When public policy arguments against disclosure are considered by a court, two kinds of problems arise. First, there are the substantive problems of what sorts of public interests can be taken into account and what importance should be attached to them. Secondly, there are the procedural problems involved in striking a balance in the particular case: who bears the onus in that process, how public interests are established, when the court can inspect information and documents, and what rights interested parties have to argument and tender of evidence. It is not always easy to keep separate these substantive and procedural issues, but an attempt to do so is made for the purpose of the following discussion. In practice, the procedural issues are of primary importance. The balance itself cannot ex hypothesi be definitive as policies shift from case to case and age to age.

The public interests involved Nature of immunity 5.220 The origins of public interest immunity lie in claims by the Crown on behalf of its government that disclosure of information sought from the government would be contrary to the public interest. Such claims came to be referred to as claims to Crown privilege.808 Sometimes the Crown argued that disclosure of particular information would be contrary to the public interest (a contents claim), but most often it argued that disclosure of confidential government communications would be contrary to the public interest in that a government cannot operate effectively if its communications are liable to disclosure in a public forum (a class claim).809 The latter argument is [page 609] made irrespective of the particular information contained in the communication. The common law immunity is a fundamental doctrine of substantive law, not simply a rule of evidence, and consequently, as with legal professional privilege (see 5.22 above), can be invoked whenever compulsory access is sought and is subject to ‘the principle of legality’ when statutory abolition is in issue: Commissioner of Police (NSW) v Guo810 (where the common law doctrine remained available to resist answering questions during proceedings before the Australian Administrative Tribunal). The courts now accept that claims to public interest immunity are not a prerogative of the Crown. Thus, if the Crown is willing to divulge government information, a litigant may still object to disclosure,811 and in every case, irrespective of a claim by the Crown or an individual, the court should decide where the public interests lie.812 5.221 Although there is authority suggesting that at common law the public interest is not to be equated with government interest, and non-government bodies have been restrained from disclosing information on grounds of public interest not directly related to government,813 nevertheless in R v Young,814 Spigelman CJ (at [54]), with whose judgment Abadee and Barr JJ (at [217]) and James J (at [349]) ‘generally agreed’, was strongly of the view that the doctrine went no further than protecting ‘government functions’ (at [55]–[56]):

The ‘public interest’ to which this immunity refers requires a dimension that is governmental in character.

He disagreed815 with treating public interest immunity: … as if it were a residual category of circumstances in which courts limit access to information on the basis of weighing the public interest in disclosure against any factor that can be described as a ‘public interest’. …

[page 610] The references in the case law to the proposition that the categories of public interest are not closed need to be similarly confined.

Spigelman CJ used this conclusion to refuse to consider that there was any proved government interest in protecting from disclosure communications made by sexual assault complainants to their counsellors. Nevertheless, Spigelman CJ was prepared to consider as a governmental interest the reporting and conviction of sexual offenders but not prepared to find, on the evidence before the court, that the granting of an immunity would do anything to further this interest. As Spigelman CJ recognises (at [58]), ‘[t]he dividing line between private and public interests is not always easy to draw’. Furthermore, as Maxwell P emphasises in Royal Women’s Hospital v Medical Practitioners Board,816 it is ‘the character of the information for which protection is sought, not the nature of the agency which holds the information’ that determines immunity. 5.222 Claims to immunity from disclosure are certainly most commonly made by government bodies or agencies. Perhaps in recognition of this, s 130 of the uniform legislation embraces only public interests relating to ‘matters of state’. Although this term is not defined and may be interpreted to embrace all public interests, s 130(4) lists, without limiting the circumstances in which material may be taken to relate to a matter of state, a number of matters that relate directly to government interests (including law enforcement). While it is doubtful that Aboriginal concerns in maintaining confidentiality in their lore can be regarded as matters of state, it may be argued that such concerns are a public interest supporting common law immunity. But the government’s interest in preserving Aboriginal heritage through encouraging confidential disclosure of that heritage does appear to be a matter of state under s 130(1).817

Contents claims 5.223 Although it may be argued that there should be no stipulated limit to the sorts of interests that might be invoked under the heading of a contents claim, at common law new interests can be invoked only by analogy,818 and generally interests past recognised can be categorised as governmental in character. The most obvious example is national defence and security where disclosure of information might help the enemy, especially in time of war. Section 130(4)(a) of the uniform legislation is cast even wider, including information relating to matters of state which if adduced ‘would prejudice the security, defence or international relations of Australia’.819 [page 611] The readiness to recognise defence interests (and to secure their protection) is illustrated by Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd v Anglo-Persian Oil Co Ltd,820 decided during WWI, where the court refused disclosure of a letter containing information about the Middle East campaign; and by Duncan v Cammell Laird & Co Ltd,821 decided during WWII, where the court refused disclosure of plans of a submarine relevant to a dispute over its construction. Information held by the security organisation of a state might provide another example of information that would prejudice national security if disclosed.822 Internal security, embracing investigations by the police and other law enforcement agencies (s 130(4)(c)–(e)), is another governmental interest that may be invoked when making a contents claim.823 In this context, in addition to the ordinary public interest immunity processes, legislation (National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth)) exists enacting special procedures to ensure that parties notify the Attorney-General of the expected disclosure of national security sensitive information during proceedings, and that, should the Attorney-General object, before a judge determines whether to permit disclosure (and under what conditions), the judge must accord the ‘greatest weight’ to any certificate received from the Attorney-General stating that disclosure of the information would create a risk of prejudice to national security. The judge’s decision must be made at a closed hearing and the Attorney-General may intervene to explain the nature and degree of the risk and argue against disclosure. Thus, the court retains the prerogative to make the final determination of whether to permit disclosure in

the public interest, but only after giving the highest priority to any risks to national security.824 5.224 It should be noted that often there is a very close relationship between a contents claim and a class claim, but whereas the former depends upon the [page 612] releasing of particular information as being contrary to the public interest, the latter argues that vital organisations cannot operate if certain classes of communication are divulged, irrespective of the information contained in those communications. The closeness of the relationship is illustrated by those cases giving the police and other analogous organisations immunity against disclosure of the identity of informers.825 In D v NSPCC, the House of Lords recognised the interest of the NSPCC in protecting the identity of persons reporting incidents of cruelty towards children.826 This can be justified upon both a class and a contents basis. If such disclosure was granted as a matter of course, informers would be discouraged from coming forward. On the other hand, disclosure of the identity of a particular informer might lead to social disruption and in that sense be contrary to the public interest. Thus, on the same facts both class and contents arguments may be open. What D v NSPCC also shows is that the categories of public interest at common law are not closed, and that a contents claim may be made upon the basis of public interests that do not involve the actual running of a government. However, such contents arguments not involving the more general interests of the state are likely to be only rarely successful. There is a heavy burden placed upon a private litigant seeking the suppression of information, and, if no direct analogy can be drawn to an existing category of public interest, there will have to be clear evidence before the court that disclosure would produce the public repercussions alleged.827 Furthermore, a court may be able to otherwise accommodate any public interest arguments by imposing strict limitations upon the disclosure of the information.828 [page 613]

5.225 Recognition of a possible new head of public interest capable of supporting a contents claim is found in Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority v Maurice.829 In the course of an Aboriginal land claim, the Commissioner sought, from the authority, reports of anthropologists and others made to the authority in connection with its obligation to protect sacred Aboriginal sites. The authority resisted disclosure on two grounds: the class ground, because the communications were made confidentially to it and its sources of information would be lost if that confidentiality was not maintained; and secondly, the contents ground, because the reports contained information relating to secret and sacred matters of Aboriginal lore and legend, disclosure of which would undermine the very basis of Aboriginal society. Emphasising that the list of material public interests is not closed by past decisions, Woodward J in particular emphasised the public interest urged in support of the contents claim, explaining (at 114) that the information would warrant protection not only in the hands of a government authority but in the hands of others, Aboriginal elders or a private foundation, entrusted confidentially with that information. Having recognised the new head of public interest, Woodward J nevertheless decided the Commissioner had properly weighed it in the balance in deciding to order production. One crucial factor in the court’s refusal to interfere was that the commissioner had proposed to restrict access to himself, his associate, counsel, and (possibly) to a consultant anthropologist and the researchers responsible for gathering the material: at 107. Furthermore, he had emphasised that no one was permitted to use any of the information so learned for any purpose other than the land claim, and had invited counsel to agree upon appropriate protective measures and arrangements for inspection. 5.226 In Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd,830 Von Doussa J considered whether the contents of a confidential letter to the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs containing details from Aboriginal women of their association with an area of land subject to dispute was protected from disclosure under s 130 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). Holding (at [54]) that s 130 ‘closely reflects the common law position’, Von Doussa J followed Maurice in finding that there were both class public interests (retaining confidentiality to encourage disclosure of information required for the government to fulfil its obligation to protect Aboriginal heritage) and contents public interests (the offence that would be caused to Aborigines through disclosure of secret lore) to be protected, but he doubted whether disclosure in

collateral proceedings would discourage the otherwise confidential supply of heritage information, and he felt that any direct hurt to Aboriginal people could be effectively dealt with by strictly [page 614] limiting access of the information, in the first instance to female lawyers and the judge. Insofar as Von Doussa J recognises the public interest of Aborigines to have their secret lore respected, he appears to accept that public interests extend beyond ‘governmental interests’. 5.227 As a claim to immunity upon the ground of contents seeks to suppress the release of information into the public domain, the argument is entirely undermined once the information in question has been made public. But there may be argument about whether information has been publicly released. The mere possession of the information by an opponent or some other unauthorised person may not defeat a claim to immunity. Furthermore, in a situation where the information has not been effectively disclosed to the public, it is not possible for a litigant to tender secondary evidence of the information subject to immunity.831 The object of contents immunity is to prevent disclosure through the court of particular information, however it is to be proved. The notion of secondary evidence that operates in the case of some privileges has no part to play as such in the context of public interest immunity claimed upon the basis of contents. Class claims 5.228 Many reported claims to public interest immunity are made upon grounds of class, not contents. Class claims are made upon the basis that important decisions cannot be made in the running of state and other public affairs unless that decision-making process is kept secret. To disclose this process would not only deter the frank exchange of information between public officials and between members of the public and public officials, but it would also leave public decisions open to attack in such a way that effective and firm decisionmaking could very well be frustrated altogether.832 In an age where the press is free and powerful, these are very real dangers, but the question is whether they can ever, in themselves, justify a complete immunity to classes of communications

irrespective of their contents. And, if not, what then is the relationship between a class claim and a contents claim? 5.229 Until 1968, the year Conway v Rimmer was decided, English courts gave very great weight to class grounds. Many internal government communications and reports, at the certification of the responsible minister, were accorded immunity upon a class basis.833 These decisions are probably best understood in the context of a war-torn [page 615] society that accepted, and to some extent needed, a government free from harassment through close public scrutiny of its decision-making processes. The strict Official Secret Acts and their heavy penalties reflect this ready acceptance of government secrecy. More recently — at least in the relative peace prior to the attack on the World Trade Center — the wheel has turned and the House of Lords decision in Conway v Rimmer signalled that the courts would be more ready to scrutinise government claims to immunity made upon a class basis. Not only did their Lordships declare it the duty of the court to go behind any ministerial certificate and decide for itself where the public interests lay, but it also decided that only documents relating to decision-making at the very highest levels could lay claim to automatic class immunity: ‘Cabinet minutes, minutes of discussion between heads of government departments and dispatches from ambassadors abroad’.834 The later decisions of Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Bank of England and Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade835 decided that even documents in these rarefied echelons are not free from court scrutiny and disclosure in appropriate cases, although great weight will still be given to a class claim made by the government in respect of such documents. Nevertheless, in neither case was the House of Lords prepared to order disclosure to the opponent of documents relating to the formulation of government policy; although in Burmah Oil the majority did deign to inspect documents to determine whether the class claim should be denied. Both cases display a reluctance by the House of Lords to disclose documents dealing with matters of high government policy. 5.230 On the other hand, within the lower echelons of government, class claims are more difficult to justify to their Lordships, so for most practical

purposes it is now impossible for governments to routinely refuse disclosure of communications and reports. For example, in Conway v Rimmer (above), where a probationary constable brought proceedings for malicious prosecution against a superintendent who had prosecuted him for theft, the House of Lords refused to give automatic immunity to probation reports, a report from a police training centre, or a report from the superintendent to the Chief Constable recommending prosecution. The House required the reports to be inspected in order to determine where the balance of public interests lay. In Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners,836 the House refused to grant immunity to documents confidentially prepared by importers to provide information to the Commissioners, and in R v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police, refused immunity, on mere grounds of class, of documents generated as a result of police complaints procedures.837 [page 616] 5.231 However, although class claims are more difficult to justify, in most cases the House of Lords continued to recognise the validity of arguments in favour of class claims. Its position being that with documents in the lower echelons of government such arguments are seldom decisive and must be balanced against other public interests before immunity can be granted. Thus, in Rogers v Home Secretary, the House granted immunity to a letter sent by the Chief Constable of Sussex following a request by the Gaming Board seeking information relevant to Rogers’ application for a gaming licence.838 To have held otherwise would have frustrated the board’s capacity to obtain confidential information about applicants seeking licences. A similar result was reached in Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners (No 2) in relation to information provided to the commissioners concerning the value of imported goods.839 In Evans v Chief Constable of Surrey, Wood J held that police reports to the DPP were privileged in proceedings for damages on the basis of wrongful arrest.840 Class claim arguments are thus recognised and only likely to be decisive when concerned with the formulation of government policy at the highest levels.841 5.232 In Australia, the attitude of the High Court is similar but arguably more liberal, the court sitting in a society that demands open government, and where

parliaments have passed legislation giving citizens access to government information previously inaccessible.842 In this climate, the High Court has indicated its reluctance to restrict access to relevant information and has, for example, ordered production of cabinet documents and inspected documents prepared by Australia’s security organisation, ASIO (but cf acceptance of class immunity for documents relating to adverse security assessments by ASIO in Parkin v O’Sullivan).843 In Sankey v Whitlam, Gibbs ACJ recognised the strong interest in favour of immunity for ‘any documents which relate to the framing of government policy at a high level’ (‘cabinet minutes and minutes of discussion between heads of departments … [page 617] papers brought into existence for the purpose of preparing a submission to cabinet’) but emphasised (at 39) that: ‘It does not follow that all such documents should be absolutely protected from disclosure irrespective of the subject matter with which they deal’. Stephen J was of the view (at 62) that: ‘Those who urge Crown privilege for classes of documents regardless of particular contents carry a heavy burden’.844 5.233 In Sankey v Whitlam, immunity was claimed for an explanatory memorandum and schedule relating to a meeting of the Executive Council, memoranda between senior officials of different federal government departments, a note on a Treasury file relating to a meeting with the Prime Minister, a minute from a senior public servant to the Treasurer, and documents submitted to the Loan Council (a body comprised of state and federal treasurers). Sankey sought the documents by subpoena in support of his prosecution against the then Prime Minister and other senior ministers alleging they had illegally conspired to borrow money overseas without appropriate approval from the Loan Council. At the time of the prosecution that government was no longer in office. The High Court recognised the public interest in such documents being free from public scrutiny. But on considering their subject matter (a past attempt to borrow money overseas by a government which had since lost office, a matter at

the time of the prosecution only of historical interest) and taking into account the need for disclosure of these documents if Sankey’s allegations of impropriety were to be effectively investigated by the court, the High Court was in no doubt that immunity could not be justified upon a class basis (the only immunity actually granted related to Loan Council documents, sought only to disclose the amount of any authorised loan, and which the court left to be examined to see whether this amount could be secured and disclosed without disclosure of the documents themselves). 5.234 In Alister v R,845 the accused, charged with murder, suspected that the chief prosecution witness had been employed by ASIO to investigate the activities of the Ananda Marga sect, it being alleged that the sect had planned the bombing giving rise to the charges. The accused therefore sought to subpoena the witness’s reports to ASIO, considering they might well conflict with the testimony the witness had given at the committal. The Crown claimed the reports, if they existed, belonged to a class of documents immune from production. The High Court, while recognising the interest in maintaining the secrecy of such security organisation reports, nevertheless insisted upon inspecting any reports, to ensure that they did not contain information which could establish the innocence of [page 618] the accused without undermining the security of the country in a serious way. Thus, the High Court ensured it was in a position to balance all relevant interests, including class membership, before acceding to a claim of immunity. And lower courts have followed this approach in ordering the disclosure of cabinet documents, comprising not just documents put before cabinet but documents summarising its deliberations, where it could not be shown that disclosure of the particular information in them would have any deleterious public effect.846 5.235 However, in Commonwealth v Northern Land Council, a majority of the High Court were reluctant to consider the disclosure of documents summarising the very deliberations of cabinet on matters remaining current or controversial.847

The Northern Land Council sued the Commonwealth in relation to an agreement between them which permitted uranium mining on Aboriginal land. It claimed that the Commonwealth had made misrepresentations and had acted unconscionably and abused its fiduciary position in the concluding of the agreement. The agreement had been considered at the very highest levels of government, including the cabinet, and the council sought discovery of notebooks which summarised cabinet discussions. The Commonwealth claimed immunity. At first instance, Jenkinson J pragmatically ordered that the notebooks be confidentially disclosed to the legal advisers in the case so that appropriate arguments could be put to the court in relation to the immunity claim. The Commonwealth refused even this limited production and appealed. In a joint majority judgment, six justices of the High Court decided that the claim to immunity could stand without even inspection of the notebooks by the court. Although recognising the principle that disclosure is in every case a matter of weighing public interests against the particular interests of justice, the majority held that these documents belonged to a class of documents that was presumptively immune from production. Immunity is not absolute, but our system of collectively responsible cabinet government demands that records of cabinet discussions be immune from disclosure in other than exceptional circumstances. The majority went on to say (at 618): Indeed for our part we doubt whether the disclosure of the records of Cabinet deliberations upon matters which remain current or controversial would ever be warranted in civil proceedings. The public interest in avoiding serious damage to the proper working of government at the highest level must prevail over the interests of a

[page 619] litigant seeking to vindicate private rights. In criminal proceedings the position may be different … [as in] cases involving allegations of serious misconduct on the part of a Cabinet minister … [or where] denial of access to the documents had impeded the defendants in the conduct of their defence.

5.236 It is unclear whether this decision marks a retreat from the readiness of the court to determine through inspection and argument every class claim to immunity, even for documents at the highest echelons of government. The facts

were strong. The disclosure sought was of the very deliberations of cabinet; but the agreement in dispute had not been negotiated through cabinet, and the majority saw the allegations of unconscionability as relating to misrepresentations made and other conduct during the negotiations; the cabinet discussions were not seen by the majority as being directly relevant to these issues. But it may be no coincidence that later decisions show that judges are reluctant to disclose even documents which, although not a summary of cabinet discussions, would have had the effect of revealing their nature or content.848 5.237 Where the class claim relates to documents in the lower levels of government or government agencies, although the claim will be recognised as based upon a legitimate public interest, even less weight will be given to it, and contents and relevance are likely to be decisive in rejecting the immunity claim. In Robinson v South Australia (No 2), a class claim relating to decisions by a statutory wheat marketing body was considered by the Privy Council unlikely to succeed but it nevertheless ordered inspection to the court to ensure a balance could be struck with full knowledge of all the interests concerned.849 5.238 Immunity on grounds of class may be sought by non-government public bodies. For example, in D v NSPCC, the defendant refused to disclose the identity of an informant upon the ground that disclosure would discourage the reporting of incidents involving cruelty to children.850 The House of Lords upheld the claim to immunity but was quick to emphasise that it was not the mere confidentiality of the communication that gave rise to an interest capable of protection, but rather the public interest in ensuring that that particular [page 620] confidentiality was retained. The High Court has also declared that confidentiality as such is not a ground for claiming public interest immunity851 and that mere confidentiality must take second place to the need to administer justice effectively. Thus, confidential income tax returns852 and other confidential inquiries853 are normally only privileged to the extent that they are given statutory protection.

Nor, in AIDS litigation, can blood donors resist discovery of their confidentially disclosed identities to health authorities.854 But compare with remarks of the majority in Jacobsen v Rogers,855 which suggest that where information is compulsorily acquired on a confidential basis there is a strong case for immunity. 5.239 Public disclosure of documents or communications over which a class claim has been made has the same effect as in the case of a contents claim; because further disclosure to the court can produce no further detriment the claim must fail. Consequently, in Sankey v Whitlam, the High Court held that the tabling of documents in parliament undermined a class claim to immunity.856 But, in contrast to the situation where a contents claim is made, the information contained in a protected class of documents may arguably be established by secondary evidence. It is disclosure of a class of documents, not its contents, which gives rise to a class claim. If the information is not protected per se, its proof by secondary evidence will avoid all arguments of public interest immunity. However, if claims are only likely to succeed on grounds of class alone exceptionally, so that, where immunity is granted, matters of content will generally have been taken into consideration, then secondary evidence must generally be prohibited. [page 621] 5.240 Although the above discussion assumes that there is a clear distinction between a contents claim and a class claim, and in practice immunity is sought upon one or other of these grounds, the analysis of the High Court decisions suggests that, in granting immunity, both class and content arguments will normally be considered and balanced against the relevance and importance of the information sought to the issues before the court. Furthermore, in deciding immunity, in other than exceptional circumstances, as in the Northern Land Council decision, decisive weight will be drawn from contents, not class. This does not mean that class arguments are ignored; they must be taken into account in the final balance. But a final balance there must be, and to decide immunity only upon grounds of class membership would be to avoid that balance in other than exceptional circumstances.

Striking the balance: the procedural problems 5.241 Most commonly, claims to public interest immunity are made in protest to a warrant to seize or subpoena to produce documents, or to a general obligation to allow an opponent to inspect discovered documents. But such claims may also be made in protest to a witness testifying orally.857 In each situation the procedure for striking the balance should be substantially the same. The uniform legislation allows a court to inform itself as it thinks fit where a ‘matter of state’ arises: s 130(3). A claim to immunity only arises where a person is already under an obligation to give access. These obligations arise by virtue of the principles and rules relating to search warrants, subpoenas, discovery and inspection, and oral examination. In each case the fundamental principle is that access should always be given where the information is that specified or it is relevant to a matter properly in issue in the proceedings. Once specified or so relevant there is a presumption that access should be granted, and good reasons are required to resist it. 5.242 Fundamentally, all evidence relevant to material facts in issue is admissible. Similarly, all documents which it is reasonable to suppose contain information which may be relevant, directly or indirectly, to material facts in issue are prima facie discoverable,858 although provisos in rules of court requiring discovery to be necessary for the purpose of disposing fairly of the issues in the action give courts a limited discretion to refuse discovery of documents technically relevant but not required [page 622] by a party to establish the material facts alleged.859 The principal limits upon the obligation to produce documents are that they must be relevant to matters properly in issue,860 and the party seeking subpoena or discovery and inspection should not use the court’s powers to fish for relevant information and must be able to identify sufficiently the forensic purpose of those documents sought under court order.861 But, once sufficiently identified and established as relevant to a matter properly in issue, there is a presumption that access to a document will be given. In practice, persons claiming public interest immunity do so on the assumption

that otherwise there is an obligation to produce, and in many cases are prepared to admit the relevance of the information or documents to matters properly in issue.862 5.243 As a result of this fundamental principle — that parties should have access to all relevant information — the onus is upon the party resisting access to adduce [page 623] credible reasons and persuade the court that access should not be given.863 This onus arises whether that party seeks to argue that disclosure is not necessary for the fair disposal of the matters in issue, or whether the party seeks to argue that disclosure would be contrary to the public interest. A court will require reasons for not giving access to relevant information. Where the court is directed by rules of court to grant access only where necessary for the fair disposal of the issues in the action, it may be that the party seeking such access must ultimately persuade the court that such access is necessary.864 But whether or not there are such conditions, a party objecting to access on public policy grounds must persuade the court, as Gibbs ACJ emphasises in Sankey v Whitlam,865 that the public interest favouring non-production outweighs the public interest that a court not be denied otherwise accessible information. A similar onus is implicit in s 130(1) of the uniform legislation. 5.244 The claim to immunity is generally and desirably made through the detailed affidavit866 of a responsible minister, departmental head or other responsible public servant where immunity is sought by the government, and of an interested person where immunity is sought by a private individual. The person swearing the affidavit should have full knowledge of the information or communication in question and should have read any documents to which immunity is claimed. The affidavit should explain precisely upon what grounds of public interest immunity is sought.867 The courts seek sufficient information in the affidavit to be able to determine at least whether there are public interests to be seriously considered before access is given. Failure to persuade the court that there are any such interests will mean that the court will not embark upon the weighing process at all. Where the affidavit is deficient in form, a court may give an opportunity for a further

affidavit to be filed868 and if necessary the deponent may be called for crossexamination.869 Although normally [page 624] affidavits will be available to all parties in the case, there is authority for the view that, exceptionally, where the affidavit itself refers to the information in dispute, it may in the first instance be disclosed confidentially to the court, and the court in turn may refuse disclosure to the parties.870 5.245 Once convinced that there are public interests to be taken into account, the court will embark upon the weighing process, hearing the arguments of interested parties, allowing further affidavits to be filed, but only exceptionally allowing deponents to be called for cross-examination.871 Against the public interests advanced, the court must weigh the interests of justice — most obviously the need for disclosure if rectitude is to be fairly achieved in the case at hand. The vital question is the significance of the information to the issues in the case. If the information is peripherally relevant or merely duplicates existing evidence, then immunity can be granted without harm to the interests of justice. But where the information is of significance to the issues in the case a real weighing must take place, with one interest ultimately prevailing over another. 5.246 Whether the significance of the information to the issues in a case can be accurately determined will often depend upon how far the case has progressed and the issues have crystallised. If prima facie grounds of immunity are made out, a court may defer a decision on disclosure until the issues in the case have become clearer. Thus, where objection is made to production before trial, a court may provisionally deny access until pleadings are completed or the trial has begun.872 A line of cross-examination at the trial may alter the significance of information. Courts are aware of the possibly changing significance of information and are prepared to reconsider a preliminary ruling in favour of immunity. 5.247 The above discussion assumes that the court and those seeking access have sufficient knowledge of the information in question to fully appreciate the public interests involved and the significance of the information to the issues in

the case. In some cases, a knowledge of the general nature of the information is sufficient.873 In others, a precise knowledge is required to embark meaningfully upon the balancing process. But ex hypothesi disclosure of that information may be contrary to the public interest, with access being resisted on that ground. It would be difficult to justify [page 625] provisional disclosure to the parties for the purpose of arguing the weighing process. Confidential disclosure to counsel would in this situation appear to be the appropriate course, although it might place counsel in a difficult position with respect to the parties they represent,874 and the High Court in Commonwealth v Northern Land Council disapproved of the employment of this process in the case before it.875 Nevertheless, it is this procedure that is endorsed under the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth). By that Act, following the Attorney-General’s filing of a certificate declaring that the disclosure of information creates a national security risk, the court must consider whether this certificate must be accepted at a ‘closed hearing’ at which counsel may be present (so long as they have any appropriate security clearance). A strong case can be made for at least allowing the court access to the information in those cases where a balance cannot be accurately struck without such access. The uniform legislation gives a general power to inspect in s 133 (see also n 322 above). To the criticism that this may allow judges and magistrates in lower courts access to sensitive information it must be pointed out that, if the government strongly objects to such inspection, it is entitled to a stay of proceedings to enable the issue of immunity to be decided by the highest court in the land.876 This is sufficient protection where the information may be particularly sensitive. 5.248 The willingness of the High Court to inspect is illustrated by Alister v R.877 The accused sought to subpoena reports made by the principal prosecution witness to ASIO — reports belonging to a class of documents normally immune from disclosure. The problem was that the accused only suspected that the witness had been an ASIO agent and had made reports containing information relevant to the issues in the case at hand. The majority decided that the suspicion was sufficiently well founded to

prevent the subpoena being described as merely ‘fishing’ for relevant information, and that it was ‘on the cards’ that there were reports that would be of significance one way or another in determining the credibility of that witness. Given these suspicions, and given the seriousness of the charges of murder against the accused, the majority had [page 626] no doubt that a court inspection was appropriate to enable an informed decision to be made about whether the reports were subject to public interest immunity. Although aware that the result of such a course of action was a decision made without the assistance of counsel, the High Court could see no other appropriate way of cutting the Gordian knot. 5.249 But Alister v R was a criminal case where the information sought might have established the innocence of an accused, and the case may be distinguishable upon this ground.878 Indeed, the House of Lords in two civil cases879 applied by the minority (Wilson and Dawson JJ) in Alister v R, has taken a quite different approach to the question of court inspection. It has decided that inspection by the court should not be ordered where a party is seeking discovery and inspection of documents until the court has been persuaded that the documents contain information that is likely to materially assist the case of the party seeking inspection. And this onus must of course be satisfied without that party having access to the documents. It is not clear whether this onus flowed from the general rules of discovery and inspection (requiring access only where documents are necessary for the purpose of disposing fairly of the issues) or whether it arose because the documents in question were prima facie subject to immunity, being ‘cabinet communications’. If the former, it is submitted that such a decision is contrary to the earlier decision in Science Research Council v Nasse,880 where, in a case not involving any public interest which could justify immunity, but where inspection was resisted upon the ground that the disclosure of confidential reports was not necessary for disposing fairly of the action, the House of Lords directed the relevant industrial court to inspect the documents in question in order to decide whether to give access. This right of the court to inspect was not doubted, and no onus was cast upon the party seeking access to persuade the court to inspect.

As Lord Edmund-Davies remarked (at 1078): Whether a tribunal or court should decide that they themselves should inspect must always depend on the particular facts and issues, though it is difficult to see how they can ever properly conclude that discovery is necessary without such inspection.

5.250 Therefore, the onus to establish that information is likely to assist a party’s case appears to arise by virtue of the fact that the documents in question are prima facie subject to immunity. The House of Lords decided that the onus to be satisfied if the court is to inspect in such circumstances is equivalent to the onus to be satisfied where a party seeks an inspection in a case not involving public interest arguments. But inspection by the court and inspection by parties are quite distinct matters. [page 627] To place an onus on a party before access is given is one thing. It may be appropriate that a party demonstrates that access is necessary for disposing fairly of the action. But it is not appropriate to require that same demonstration before the court will inspect documents to fulfil its responsibility to decide whether party access to relevant information can be resisted because of extraneous public interests, particularly where court inspection is the only way in which a responsible decision about party access can be made.881 As emphasised earlier, if the information is particularly sensitive, a government may seek the court decision at the very highest level. 5.251 Although the High Court demonstrates a ready willingness to inspect in Alister, in Commonwealth v Northern Land Council882 the High Court refused to inspect records of cabinet discussions as the plaintiff could not establish ‘exceptional circumstances’. A heavy onus was placed on the plaintiff. But the facts were special. What were sought were records of the very discussions of cabinet and the court was of the view that this was a virtually sacrosanct class of documents. It would therefore be unwise to extrapolate from this case a reluctance in the High Court to inspect in any other situations. In, for example, HCF v Hunt, Harbours Corp of Queensland v Vessey Chemicals Pty Ltd, and Adelaide Brighton Cement v South Australia (all cases where access was eventually ordered),883 judges were prepared to inspect documents put before cabinet, including in Vessey, minutes of cabinet discussions.884 This course has

been followed in New Zealand885 and Canada.886 The Northern Land Council decision should be confined to its special facts. 5.252 As a result, where there is an objection to giving access to information and an appropriate affidavit is filed, if the court is unable to decide the issue without access to the information in question, it may inspect and decide the resultant balance without help from the parties.887 This power of inspection is no different where access is objected to only upon the grounds that disclosure is not necessary for disposing of the issues in the action. [page 628] With affidavits, knowledge of the information and its relevance to the issues in the case, and appropriate argument from counsel, the court is in a position to decide where the balance of interests lies. Where it is the government objecting to access, courts will give careful weight to the objection, conscious that the government may be in a better position to fully appreciate the repercussions of making particular information public.888 By the same token, where the government consciously refrains from objecting to access being given, as in Sankey v Whitlam, this will be given due weight by the court.889 But the ultimate responsibility for determining where the balance of public interest lies belongs to the courts and will not be abrogated. 5.253 The uniform legislation lists some of the matters to be taken into account in determining the balance in s 130(5). This is not intended to be a definitive list but includes matters such as the importance of the material in the proceedings, the nature of the proceedings, the consequences of disclosure, other means available to limit disclosure, other publication of the material,890 and provides finally, and quite specifically, that in a criminal case a court should consider whether an order of immunity preventing an accused adducing evidence should be subject to an order that the prosecution be stayed. 5.254 As mentioned at the outset, it is counter-productive to attempt to define in the abstract where the balance of public interests lies in any case. The importance of information in a particular case is unique and extraneous public interests are of their nature shifting.891 This category of public interest immunity is a residual category. As Stephen J concluded in Sankey v Whitlam (at 63–4):

The judge-made law relating to Crown privilege is no code, it erects no immutable classes of documents to which a so-called absolute privilege is to be accorded. On the contrary its essence is a recognition of the existence of the competing aspects of the public interest, their respective weights and hence the resulting balance varying from case to case.892

[page 629] But there remains both at common law and under the uniform legislation a presumption in favour of access to relevant information unless countervailing interests can be clearly established. Despite the Northern Land Council case, the High Court has shown itself reluctant to grant immunity in other than clear situations.893 And, as s 130(5)(d) of the uniform legislation stresses, courts have available to them powers short of granting immunity which can be used to protect public interests. Evidence may be taken in camera,894 the publication of evidence may be restricted,895 the names of parties and witnesses may be suppressed,896 documents may be edited or redacted,897 and access to evidence may ultimately be limited to a party’s legal advisers.898 These are important powers which receive full consideration by courts before taking the more drastic step of declaring information immune altogether from production or tender.

The rejection of otherwise admissible evidence on grounds of public interest 5.255 The rules and discretions discussed at 5.215–5.254 in the context of public interest immunity deal principally with restriction upon access to information by the parties — restrictions which operate at all stages of the administration of justice. [page 630] A related public interest rule concerns the admissibility of relevant information to which parties do have access. The courts have a residual discretion to reject evidence tendered by a party at trial where it would be contrary to the public

interest for the court to receive and act upon that information: see also at 2.36–2.37. The principal use of this discretion is to empower a court to exclude (in criminal and civil proceedings)899 evidence illegally or improperly obtained. 5.256 The leading common law case is Bunning v Cross.900 The accused was charged with driving while his blood alcohol content exceeded the statutory limit. The content had been measured by a breathalyser machine situated at a police station. Having stopped the accused whilst driving, the police had taken him into custody for the purpose of him undergoing the breathalyser test. Legislation permitted this, but only if, either an alcotest had first been administered and showed an excessive blood alcohol limit, or, a person had refused to take that test, or the police had reasonable grounds to believe that a person had been driving while under the influence of alcohol to an extent rendering him or her incapable of having proper control of the vehicle. The police had neither requested an alcotest nor were there reasonable grounds for believing alcohol had rendered the accused so incapable, although at the time the police had assumed the accused so incapable because of the effect a chronic knee condition had upon the gait of the accused. The police were at the time unaware of this condition. The magistrate refused to reject the evidence. He approached discretionary exclusion by asking only whether it would be unfair to the accused to admit the evidence. Stephen and Aiken JJ, who gave the leading judgment, agreed it would not be unfair to admit the evidence, equating unfairness with reliability in concluding (at 77): If a breathalyzer test, properly performed and with all attendant safeguards observed, discloses an excessive level of alcohol in a motorist’s blood, it is in no sense unfair to use it in conviction of the motorist …

But they accepted that discretionary exclusion might also be ordered where evidence has been unlawfully procured, as society has a right (at 74–5): … to insist that those who enforce the law themselves respect it, so that a citizen’s precious right to immunity from arbitrary and unlawful intrusion into the daily affairs of private life remain unimpaired.

Where there has been such impropriety the court does not automatically exclude the evidence but must weigh against each other competing requirements of public policy, the desirable goal of bringing to conviction the wrongdoer and the demeaning

[page 631] effect of curial approval, or even encouragement, to the unlawful conduct of those whose task it is to enforce the law. This weighing of interests does not take fairness to the accused as its focus (at 74–5): It is, on the contrary, concerned with broader questions of high public policy, unfairness to the accused being only one factor which, if present, will play its part in the whole process of consideration.

The court outlined the matters it thought relevant to the exercise of the discretion in the case before it. First, the impropriety was the result of a mistaken belief on the part of the police that the accused’s gait was attributable to alcohol. The police were therefore not aware that they were acting unlawfully. Secondly, the unlawfulness did not affect the cogency of the evidence (although Mason and Aikin JJ were quick to point out that if the unlawfulness had been deliberate or reckless this would generally be irrelevant). Thirdly, although the ease with which police could have acted lawfully is relevant, so that a deliberate cutting of corners would be viewed seriously, this was not here the case. Fourthly, the nature of the offence charged is a significant factor, and driving under the influence of alcohol was not regarded as a trivial crime. And finally, the intention of the legislature to ensure that police do not unnecessarily take citizens into custody was considered as a factor, although this was contrasted with the legislature’s liberal attitude towards subjecting citizens to breath tests. Having considered these matters, the evidence was admitted by the High Court. Very little further guidance was given upon exactly how the weighing process was undertaken. In Cleland v R, the court made it clear that the public policy discretion could apply to exclude not just ‘real evidence’ but also confessional evidence.901 5.257 In Ridgeway v R,902 the court extended the discretion beyond evidence unlawfully obtained to evidence of a crime the commission of which has been unlawfully procured by police for the purposes of obtaining a conviction. The accused was charged with the possession of illegally imported drugs, but the illegal importation had been carried out by undercover police acting on the instructions of their superiors. The accused argued first, that the defence of

entrapment applied; secondly, that if that defence was unavailable in Australia then the prosecution should be stayed as an abuse of the court’s process; and thirdly, if a stay was also unavailable then tender of the evidence of the importation should not be permitted as the illegal importation upon which the crime depended had been performed by police. [page 632] The court held that neither was the defence of entrapment available in Australia nor was it an abuse of process to ask a court to decide a case where police had acted unlawfully. But the court would distance itself from the unlawful conduct of police by excluding evidence of an offence procured by such conduct. By ‘procured’ the majority explained (at 39) that it had in mind two possibly overlapping situations: The first category consists of cases in which the police conduct has induced the accused to commit the offence which he or she has committed. In this category of case the public interest in the conviction and punishment of those guilty of crime is likely to prevail over other considerations except in what we would hope to be the rare and exceptional case where the illegality or impropriety of the police conduct is grave and either so calculated or so entrenched that it is clear that considerations of public policy relating to the administration of criminal justice require exclusion of the evidence. The other category is where the police conduct is itself the principal offence to which the charged offence is ancillary or creates or itself constitutes an essential ingredient of the charged offence … In that category of case, the police illegality and the threat to the rule of law which it involves assume a particularly malignant aspect. Even in such a case, if the police conduct is disowned by those in higher authority and criminal proceedings have been instituted against the police as well as the accused, it is unlikely that considerations of public policy relating to the integrity of the administration of criminal justice would require exclusion of evidence either of the accused’s offence or of the particular element of it created by the police illegality. If, however, the illegal police conduct would appear to be condoned by those in higher authority and it does not appear that criminal proceedings have been brought against the police, those considerations of public policy will be so strong that an extremely formidable case for exclusion will be raised.

As the illegality in the case before the court fell into the second category and had been planned and performed not just with the connivance of senior officers in the Australian and Malaysian police, but with general approval at ministerial level, evidence relating to the offence so procured was excluded. There being insufficient evidence to proceed, the court indefinitely stayed the proceedings. It is interesting to note that in this case the prosecution was estopped from claiming the importation performed by police was not in the circumstances illegal, as if it had not been illegal the offence charged could not have been established.

5.258 Although reluctant to exclude evidence procured by police undercover operations, the court in Ridgeway did emphasise that the public policy discretion applies not only where police have acted illegally but also where they have acted improperly. While illegality connotes the idea of a clear contravention of a legal rule, impropriety also extends further to activities which, while not strictly prohibited by law, are nevertheless activities that courts should not be seen to be condoning.903 But, in the context of police undercover operations, it added (at 53): [page 633] … mere subterfuge, deceit and the creation of opportunities to commit crime will not normally constitute an impropriety for this purpose. There must be a degree of harassment or manipulation which is clearly inconsistent with acceptable standards of police conduct in the circumstances, including, amongst other things, the nature and extent of any known or suspected existing or threatened criminal activity, the basis and justification of any suspicion, the difficulty of effective investigation or prevention and any imminent danger to the community.

As a consequence of Ridgeway it has become extremely difficult to argue for exclusion of evidence in the case of undercover police operations in other than the exceptional case.904 This is vividly illustrated by Tofilau v R,905 where the High Court refused to exclude confessional evidence obtained following an elaborate undercover ruse: discussed at 8.133. 5.259 That impropriety does not require illegality is also endorsed by the High Court in R v Swaffield; Pavic v R,906 and in another context the court shows it is more willing to find impropriety and exclude evidence consequently obtained. Police had secretly recorded conversations with suspects after each had refused to formally answer police questions. In the one case, the recording was made by an undercover police officer, in the other by a friend of the suspect acting at the instigation of police. In neither case did the suspect realise either that the police were involved in the conversation or that the conversation was being recorded. In each case the covert recording was strictly legal, and the court accepted that the mere recording of the conversations involved no impropriety. But the court asked whether police had transgressed the bounds of propriety in either holding the conversation at all, or in conducting it as it had been conducted. Again, the mere

[page 634] holding of the conversation was not regarded as improper, despite the suspect not realising that he was speaking to undercover police or a police informer. But to use the occasion in an attempt to actively elicit information from a suspect, particularly where that suspect had previously refused to give that information during formal interrogation, was regarded as an improper intrusion upon a suspect’s rights. An interrogation of a suspect should take place subject to statutory protections and these should not be undermined by clandestine interrogation.907 On the other hand, in R v Em,908 the High Court refused to exclude confessional evidence where the police had secretly recorded a conversation with a suspect knowing he was under the self-induced misapprehension that an unrecorded conversation could not be admitted in evidence against him. The secret recording was not itself improper and what motivated the suspect to talk was not regarded as relevant to whether the police had acted improperly. 5.260 The focus of the judgments in R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (above) was upon the question of whether the discretionary exclusion in that case should be explained on the basis of the fairness discretion or the public policy discretion. As explained at 2.33, 2.36 and 8.140–8.142, R v Swaffield; Pavic v R appears to take the view that the notion of fairness focuses on rectitude so that, in the case of illegally or improperly obtained evidence, if there is no threat to rectitude in the case at hand then exclusion remains to be determined by the public policy discretion.909 The practical effect of R v Swaffield; Pavic v R is to emphasise that, assuming rectitude is unaffected, the mere fact that impropriety has caused an accused to provide evidence against himself or herself does not lead to automatic exclusion on grounds of unfairness, and the court must take this consequence of the impropriety into account in determining the overall public policy balance. It may be that this approach will result in even fewer exclusions of improperly obtained evidence. 5.261 However, as current authority stands, there are limits to the circumstances in which the public policy discretion may be exercised. It is a discretion to exclude evidence obtained as a consequence of impropriety (s 138 of the Uniform Acts, although no longer expressed as a ‘discretion’, remains

expressed in these same causative terms).910 The discretion exists to ensure that courts distance themselves from acting [page 635] upon the evidential fruits of impropriety. It does not exist as a means for ensuring more generally that law enforcers act with propriety. If the impropriety has not led to the obtaining of the evidence tendered then there is no room for the discretion. In Question of Law Reserved (No 1 of 1998), Doyle CJ refused to exercise the discretion to exclude evidence lawfully obtained under a search warrant where police had later given deliberately false evidence in court about how they had executed the warrant.911 There was no room for excluding the evidence as a means of punishing the police for their misconduct at trial. The discretion does not exist to be applied at large to discourage police misconduct. The control of police conduct generally is not the responsibility of the court. On the other hand, it will ensure that it is not brought into disrepute by acting upon evidence that is obtained as a consequence of misconduct. This was not, however, the situation before the Chief Justice. Indeed, the exposure of and rejection of the false evidence during trial ensured the integrity of the process. 5.262 The requirement that the evidence be a consequence of the impropriety is well illustrated by R v Lobban,912 where, having lawfully seized and analysed the marijuana of which the accused was charged with having unlawfully possessed, the police later destroyed it in breach of the legislation. The Court of Appeal held that these circumstances could not give rise to the public policy discretion. The only discretion that might possibly operate was the unfairness discretion, but as the rectitude of the police evidence was not seriously in issue and could be adequately ensured through cross-examination of the police analysts, there were no grounds for its exercise. 5.263 Ridgeway also operates only to exclude evidence of an offence which itself has been procured by unlawful or improper police conduct. A more controversial application of this requirement is found in Robinett v Police.913 The Aboriginal accused was arrested when drunk for minor public disorder offences. The arresting woman police officer, the only police officer in a small country town, had used a capsicum spray to effect the arrest and this clearly hurt the

accused’s eyes. When they arrived at the closest police cells some 28 kms away, the accused demanded immediate medical attention. He was given only water to wash off the spray. He was locked in the cells. He continued to demand treatment. When no treatment was forthcoming the accused made hysterical threats to harm the arresting officer. These threats were audio-recorded by the police. At his trial for making unlawful threats to harm, the accused argued that exclusion of evidence of the threats could be considered under the public policy discretion because the police had effectively procured the offence through improperly failing to provide adequate medical treatment. Bleby J agreed: [page 636] In my opinion this was an omission which was not only inappropriate, but which fell within that category of impropriety or unfairness that gives rise to the public policy discretion. It was a neglect which, if allowed to persist, was almost certain, in the circumstances, to give rise to the type of offending which in fact occurred on this occasion. I repeat: I do not consider that the police officers in this case allowed the situation to develop merely for the purposes of encouraging the commission of another offence. However their inaction almost inevitably had that effect.914

Bleby J went on to exclude the evidence. To regard the police behaviour as having sufficiently procured the offence charged, where the police behaviour has unwittingly led to an offence, is certainly an extension of Ridgeway, where the police misconduct was designed to and did procure the offence in question.915 But there was strict causation. If the police had acted more sympathetically to the accused and had provided medical treatment where the accused was in apparent distress it is very unlikely any threats would have been made. And it might be argued that courts should take a broad view of causation for the purposes of invoking this public policy discretion.916 5.264 But the question arises whether in some circumstances courts might also be seen to be condoning police misconduct by acting upon evidence closely related to, but not strictly the result of, that misconduct. Authority favours the view that even where the evidence is not strictly a consequence of misconduct it may be so closely associated with misconduct that the discretion should apply.917 Furthermore, where the misconduct is not related to the obtaining of the evidence but has prevented the accused from properly testing or disputing the

evidence at trial it may be argued that the public policy discretion can be invoked.918 [page 637] While some courts have recognised that impropriety, whether by law enforcement officers or otherwise, is not a basis for exercise of a residual fairness discretion,919 and the High Court remains reluctant to even recognise the existence of a residual fairness discretion (see discussion of Dunstall v R at 2.27), judges remain hesitant in extending the public policy discretion to improprieties by persons not in authority.920 This seems wrong in principle. The discretion exists to ensure the courts do not appear to condone impropriety, not to punish police for their impropriety. There may be stronger arguments for exercising the discretion to exclude where the impropriety is institutional, but the discretion should extend to all situations where evidence has been produced against an accused as a consequence of illegal or improper conduct. In all such situations it might be argued that condoning reception of the evidence would be too high a price to pay for a conviction. Section 138 of the Uniform Acts applies to all illegalities and improprieties no matter who has committed them. 5.265 The problematic aspect of the public policy discretion is the weighing process and the emphasis to be given to the various matters elucidated in Bunning v Cross as affecting the public policy decision. The Uniform Acts appear to accept that courts are reluctant to exercise the discretion and consequently s 138 places the burden of persuasion on the party seeking admission once it is established that evidence was obtained unlawfully or improperly. Without limiting the matters that may be taken into account, the section then refers to matters which must be considered: (a)

the probative value of the evidence; and

(b) the importance of the evidence in the proceedings; and (c) the nature of the relevant offence, cause of action or defence and the nature of the subjectmatter of the proceeding; and (d) the gravity of the impropriety or contravention; and (e) whether the impropriety or contravention was deliberate or reckless; and (f)

whether the impropriety or contravention was contrary to or inconsistent with a right of a person recognised by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and

(g) whether any other proceedings (whether or not in a court) has been or is likely to be taken in

relation to the impropriety or contravention; and (h) the difficulty (if any) of obtaining the evidence without impropriety or contravention of an Australian law.

The catalogue reflects the matters referred to by the High Court in Bunning v Cross. There are no guidelines as to how the weighing process is to be carried out. [page 638] 5.266 On the whole, in the absence of a serious and intentional impropriety, even under the uniform legislation courts are reluctant to exercise the public policy discretion to exclude evidence on grounds of impropriety. In the case of confessional evidence the exclusionary discretion is more often exercised, but generally only where the impropriety has affected the accused’s right to remain silent, and courts have consequently regarded it as unfair to use the confession against the accused (for a detailed discussion of discretionary exclusion of confessional evidence, see 8.134–8.158). There are remarks in earlier cases suggesting that in confessional cases where the impropriety has had no effect upon the particular accused, so that in this sense it is not unfair to admit the evidence against the accused, and the evidence is otherwise reliable, it is only exceptionally that the public policy discretion would be exercised to exclude evidence so as not to be seen to approve of police irregularities.921 In the case of ‘real evidence’ one can find examples of exclusion by reference to the Bunning v Cross discretion,922 but where the crime is serious, courts generally require a deliberate and serious impropriety which has affected the accused.923 The approach is similar under the uniform legislation924 despite the onus being upon the prosecution to justify reception once the defence has shown it to have been improperly obtained. 5.267 Some judges have emphasised the importance that police respect statutory protections to accused in arguing for exclusion,925 but others have refused to suggest there is any presumptive exclusion in the case of breach of those protections.926 In Pollard v R, admissions were obtained following failure of police to advise the accused of both his statutory right to silence and his statutory right to have a lawyer present, but the court not only did not articulate any exclusionary presumption in the case of breach of statutory protections but was

divided on which aspect of the exclusionary discretion was decisive (Mason CJ and Deane J appeared to rely on the public policy discretion; McHugh J suggested breach of the statutory provisions made it ipso facto unfair to admit the confessional evidence).927 [page 639] In that Swaffield v R; Pavic v R (see 5.260) suggests that the effect of improprieties upon the accused be considered as part of the wider public policy balance, and not as a separate ground for exclusion on grounds of fairness, there is even greater need for the High Court to provide more guidance upon the relative values to be given to those matters that are considered in exercising the public policy discretion. The reverse onus provisions of s 138 of the Uniform Acts, that make it more attractive for accused to rely upon the public policy discretion in cases of impropriety, may also encourage judges to consider more rigorously exactly how the exclusionary factors should be weighed. But this whole discussion needs always to be put in the perspective of the difficulty in appealing against the exercise of discretion by a trial judge. Appellate courts will not interfere with a trial judge’s exercise of discretion unless it can be shown to be wrong.928 It remains the responsibility of the trial judge to determine, in all the facts and circumstances of the case, when respect for the administration of justice demands that evidence obtained or affected by impropriety be excluded. But whereas s 138 of the uniform legislation is no longer couched as a discretion, an opportunity exists to shift responsibility to appellate judges.929 ______________________________ 1.

The word ‘information’ is used to emphasise that much information used in preparation for trial is never formally tendered (and indeed may be strictly inadmissible at trial).

2.

See Zuckerman, Zuckerman on Civil Procedure, 3rd ed, Thomson Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2013, [3.152]–[3.155].

3.

For more detailed treatment of the procedures for disclosure in civil cases, see Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure, 10th ed, Thompson Reuters, Sydney, 2014, particularly Ch 10; and Kumar, Legg and Vickovich, Civil Procedure in New South Wales, 3d ed, Thompson Reuters, Sydney, 2015, Ch 12. For the current English position, see Zuckerman, n 2 above, Chs 15 (Disclosure), 21 (Witness Statements) and 20 (Experts and Assessors).

4.

For example, the following court rules give power to subpoena: HCR 2004 r 24.02; FCR 2011 Pt 24;

UCPR 2005 (NSW) Pt 33; UCPR 1999 (Qld) r 414; SCCR 2006 (SA) r 172; SCR 2000 (Tas) rr 494– 500F; SC(GCP)R 2015 (Vic) O 42; RSC 1971 (WA) O 36B; CPR 2006 (ACT) Pt 6.9; SCR (NT) r 42.02. The inherent power to issue subpoenas is discussed by Brennan J in Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 404 at 450ff. See further Cairns, n 3 above, pp 525ff. 5.

Commissioner for Railways v Small (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 564 at 573–5 (Jordan CJ); NEMGA v Waind [1978] 1 NSWLR 372.

6.

Cf Carbotech Australia Pty Ltd v Yates [2008] NSWSC 1151 at [10].

7.

NEMGIA v Waind [1978] 1 NSWLR 372 at 385; A v Z (2007) 212 FLR 255; [2007] NSWSC 899. See n 33 below for cases interpreting similar provisions in criminal cases.

8.

Greyhound Australia Pty Ltd v Deluxe Coachlines Pty Ltd (1986) 11 FCR 592 at 594–6 (Pincus J); Matuska v Ali (1987) 71 ACTR 23 at 30 (Miles CJ); Derbyshire v Gilbert (2006) 31 WAR 558; [2006] WASCA 13.

9.

R v Baines [1909] 1 KB 258; Holland v Sammon (1972) 4 SASR 1.

10. See, for example, R v Tastan (1994) 75 A Crim R 498; Hunt v Russell and De Pinto (1995) 63 SASR 402; AG (NSW) v Chidgey (2008) 182 A Crim R 536; [2008] NSWCCA 65, applying the cases at n 5 above. 11. FCR 2011 Pts 20, 21; UCPR 2005 (NSW) Pts 5, 21–22, r 3; UCPR 1999 (Qld) Ch 7; SCCR 2006 (SA) rr 136–152; SCR 2000 (Tas) Pt 13; SC(GCP)R 2015 (Vic) OO 29–33; RSC 1971 (WA) OO 26, 26A, 27; CPR 2006 (ACT) Pt 2.8; SCR (NT) rr 29.01–33.13. 12. Marriott v Chamberlain (1886) 17 QBD 154; Tiver v Tiver [1969] SASR 40; Barbarian Motor Cycle Club v Koithan (1984) 35 SASR 481. 13. Rochfort v TPC (1982) 153 CLR 134; Roux v ABC [1992] 2 VR 577 at 589–91. In most jurisdictions, the obligation is now continuing so a party must disclose relevant documents which subsequently come into a party’s possession. 14. See, for example, Compagnie Financiere du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Co (1883) 11 QBD 55 at 63; Mulley v Manifold (1959) 103 CLR 341 at 345; Trade Practices Commission v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd (1995) 58 FCR 426 at 436–9 (Lindgren J). Note that, ultimately, courts have a discretion whether to order inspection of technically relevant documents: see the court rules referred to in n 11 above, and Science Research Council v Nasse [1980] AC 1028 (discussed at 5.83 and n 859 below); Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority v Maurice (1986) 10 FCR 104; Dolling-Baker v Merrett [1990] 1 WLR 1205; Evans v John Fairfax and Sons Ltd (1992) 110 FLR 411. 15. FCR 2011 rr 20.12, 20.14; UCPR 2005 (NSW) Pt 21 rr 2, 3; UCPR 1999 (Qld) rr 211, 214; SCCR 2006 (SA) r 136; SCR 2000 (Tas) r 382; SC(GCP)R 2015 (Vic) r 29.02; RSC 1971 (WA) O 26 r 1; CPR 2006 (ACT) rr 605–607; SCR (NT) r 29.02. 16. For example, in the Federal Court and the Supreme Court of New South Wales: see rules in previous footnote. 17. See, for example, FCR 2011 r 20.14 (‘directly relevant’); UCPR 2005 (NSW) rr 21.1(2), 21.2(3)(a) (‘relevant’); UCPR (Qld) r 211 (‘directly relevant’); SCCR 2006 (SA) r 136 (‘directly relevant’). And see Cairns, ‘New Discovery Regime for Queensland’ (1994) 18 U of Qd LJ 93. 18. Explained in Robson v REB Engineering Pty Ltd [1997] 2 Qd R 102; Southern Equities Corp Ltd (in liq) v Arthur Anderson and Co (No 5) [2001] SASC 335; Quenchy Crusta Sales Pty Ltd v Logi-Tech Pty Ltd [2002] SASC 374; Rehn v Australian Football League (2003) 225 LSJS 378; Harris Scarfe Ltd v Ernst & Young (No 4) [2005] SASC 443. 19. Edmeades v Thames Board Mills [1969] 2 QB 67; S v S [1972] AC 24 at 46–7.

20. FCR 2011 Pt 14; UCPR 2005 (NSW) Pt 23 r 8; UCPR 2000 (Qld) r 250; SCCR 2006 (SA) r 149; SCR 2000 (Tas) rr 436–442; SC(UCP)R 2015 (Vic) r 37.01; RSC 1971 (WA) O 52 r 2; CPR 2006 (ACT) Pt 2.9; SCR (NT) r 37.01. See further Cairns, n 3 above, pp 533ff. 21. UCPR 2005 (NSW) Pt 23; UCPR (Qld) 1999 r 547ff; SCCR 2006 (SA) rr 153–155; SC(GCP) R 2015 (Vic) O 33; RSC 1971 (WA) O 28, 36A; CPR 2006 (ACT) Pt 2.12 Div 3; SCR (NT) rr 33.01ff. See further Cairns, n 3 above, pp 555–6. 22. FCR 2011 Pt 23: UCPR 2005 (NSW) Pt 31 Div 2; UCPR 1999 (Qld) Ch 11 Pt 5; SCCR 2006 (SA) rr 159–161; SCR 2000 (Tas) rr 514–517; SC(GCP)R 2015 (Vic) O 44; RSC 1971 (WA) O 36A; CPR 2006 (ACT) Pt 2.12; SCR (NT) rr 44.01ff. See further 7.64 and Cairns, n 3 above, pp 599–607. 23. Anton Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes [1976] Ch 55; applied Golf Lynx v Golf Scene (1984) 59 ALR 343. For early discussion of the application of the Anton Piller case in Australia, see Egert, ‘The Anton Piller Order’ (1983) 13 QLSJ 117. See also Federal Court Practice Note 10, discussed by McCausland and Gilchrist in (1995) 33 Law Soc J 45–8. See further Cairns, n 3 above, pp 535–42 also referring (at nn 11 and 12) to relevant court rules and practice directions. 24. Egert, n 23 above, at 124 (draft order). 25. Ibid at 117. 26. Zafiropoulos v Registrar-General (1980) 24 SASR 133. 27. FCR 2011 Pt 7 (FCR 1979 O 15A r 6 upheld and applied in Hooper v Kirella Pty Ltd (1999) 96 FCR 1); UCPR 2005 (NSW) Pt 5 r 3; SCCR 2006 (SA) r 32; SCR 2000 (Tas) rr 403C, 403E; SC(GCP)R 2015 (Vic) r 32.05; RSC 1971 (WA) O 26A rr 3, 4; SCR (NT) r 32.05. 28. FCR 2011 r 14.01; UCPR 2005 (NSW) Pt 5 r 4; UCPR 1999 (Qld) r 242ff; SCCR 2006 (SA) r 146; SCR 2000 (Tas) r 403FA; SC(GCP)R 2015 (Vic) r 32.07; RSC 1971 (WA) O 26A r 5; CPR (ACT) 2006 r 660ff; SCR (NT) r 32.07ff. 29. Cooper v Bech (No 1) (1975) 12 SASR 147; Rossi Pty Ltd v Ballymore Tower Pty Ltd [1984] 2 Qd R 167; Nathan v MJF Constructions [1986] VR 75; Mutaska v Ali (1987) 71 ACTR 23; Casley-Smith v District Council of Stirling (1989) 51 SASR 447; Aitken v Neville Jeffries Pidler Pty Ltd (1991) 33 FCR 418; Lebon v Lake Placid Resort Pty Ltd [1995] 1 Qd R 24; Re Howglen Ltd [2001] 1 All ER 376; Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [2002] 4 All ER 881 (‘likely’ means ‘may well’ rather than more likely than not); Lifeplan Australia Friendly Society Pty Ltd v Ancient Order of Foresters in Victoria Friendly Society Ltd (2013) 115 SASR 223; [2013] SASC 5. 30. Norwich Pharmacal v Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133; British Steel Corp v Granada TV [1981] AC 1096; Harrington v North London Polytechnic [1984] 1 WLR 1293; Golf Lynx v Golf Scene (1984) 59 ALR 343; Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Ltd [2002] 4 All ER 193. See also FCR 2011 r 7.22 (validity of FCR 1979 O 15A r 3 upheld and applied in Hooper v Kirella Pty Ltd (1999) 96 FCR 1; see also Allphones Retail Pty Ltd v ACCC (2009) 259 ALR 354; [2009] FCA 980); UCPR 2005 (NSW) Pt 5 r 2; UCPR 1999 (Qld) r 229 (Pacific Century Production Pty Ltd v Netafim Australia Pty Ltd [2004] 2 Qd R 422; [2004] QCA 63); SCCR 2006 (SA) r 32 (applied Hood Sweeney Technology Pty Ltd v Equant Aust Pty Ltd [2009] SASC 298); SCR 2000 (Tas) r 403E; SC(GCP)R 2015 (Vic) r 32.03; RSC 1971(WA) O 26A r 3; CPR 2006 (ACT) r 650; SCR (NT) r 32.03. To provide a remedy for defamation, despite the ‘newspaper rule’ on discovery (see further n 745 below), a newspaper may be obliged to name the source of its published information: John Fairfax and Sons Ltd v Cojuangco (1988) 165 CLR 346; Cojuangco v John Fairfax and Sons Ltd (No 2) [1991] Aust Torts Rep ¶81-068; Kerrisk v The North Queensland Newspaper Co Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 398; WA Newspapers Ltd v Bond [2009] WASCA 127 at [94] (Buss JA). 31. See generally Cairns, n 3 above, Ch 2. 32. Llewellyn v Finn and Collins (1994) 74 A Crim R 519 at 525 (Martin CJ). See, for example, R v Zappia

(2002) 84 SASR 206 at [29]–[48]; Attorney-General (NSW) v Chidgey (2008) 182 A Crim R 536; [2008] NSWCCA 65; Australian Federal Police v XYZ (2015) 123 SASR 274; [2015] SASC 113. 33. Maddison v Goldrick [1976] 1 NSWLR 651; Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 404; R v Cahill (1985) 61 ACTR 7; Hunt v Wark (1986) 40 SASR 489; R v Kingston [1986] 2 Qd R 114; McMahon v Cooper [1989] 2 Qd R 8; R v Saleam (1989) 16 NSWLR 14; Nicholl and Dowling; Ex parte Lehmann (1989) 40 A Crim R 185 (Gallop J, SC (ACT)); Carter v Hayes (1994) 61 SASR 451; Rice v Chute (1995) 119 FLR 181; R v Gillard and Preston (1999) 76 SASR 76; R v Law (2008) 182 A Crim R 312; [2008] NTCCA 4; Johnson v Poppeliers (2008) 20 VR 92; 190 A Crim R 23; [2008] VSC 461 (reasonable possibility test applied flexibly); Holloway v Victoria [2015] VSC 526 (principles discussed and applied). One might query whether a document containing only the name of a relevant witness can be subject to subpoena: Cain v Glass (No 2) (1985) 3 NSWLR 230. Note that, ultimately, the court has a discretion whether to exercise any of these powers and whether to grant inspection to a party (Maddison v Goldrick, affirmed in the High Court in Attorney-General (NSW) v Findlay (1976) 50 ALJR 637 at 638) and can demand inspection of the documents before exercising that discretion: Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 404. See the discussion by King CJ in Carter v Hayes (1994) 61 SASR 451. 34. See generally Sobh v Police Force of Victoria [1994] 1 VR 41; Corns, Anatomy of Long Criminal Trials, AIJA, Melbourne, 1997, Ch 4; O’Connor, ‘Prosecution Disclosure: Principle, Practice and Justice’ [1992] Crim LR 464; Hinton, ‘Unused Material and the Prosecutor’s Duty of Disclosure’ (2001) 25 Crim LJ 121. 35. The following legislation expressly permits pre-trial applications in serious criminal cases: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 130; Criminal Code Act (Qld) s 590AA; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 285A; Criminal Code (Tas) s 361A; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 179–181, 199; Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) s 98. Section 192A of the uniform legislation also permits ‘advance rulings’. 36. Committal hearings in Australia are governed by the following legislation: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) Ch 3 Pt 2; Justices Act 1886 (Qld) ss 104–134; Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) Pt 5 Div 2; Justices Act 1959 (Tas) Pt VII; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) Ch 4; Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) Pt 3 Div 4; Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) ss 89–96, 105A–108; Local Court (Criminal Procedure) Act (NT) Pt V Div 1. 37. Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) ss 42, 44(1). 38. Re Van Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163; Barton v R (1980) 147 CLR 75 at 98–101, 105–6, 109; R v Harry; Ex parte Eastway (1985) 39 SASR 203; R v Walden (1986) 41 SASR 421; R v Haslett (1987) 90 FLR 233, in which an ex officio indictment was quashed because the absence of a committal produced unfairness to the accused; and State Drug Crime Commission (NSW) v Chapman (1987) 12 NSWLR 447, in which legislation privileging information collected by the commission was read down to retain the accused’s right to discovery on committal; cf R v Drozd (1993) 67 A Crim R 112 (CCA (Qld)) (fairness did not require that committal be stayed). 39. R v Harry; Ex parte Eastway (1985) 39 SASR 203 at 211–12 (King CJ); see also R v Walden (1986) 41 SASR 421; R v Basha (1989) 39 A Crim R 337 (such pre-trial examination is now referred to in New South Wales as a Basha inquiry); Houston v Crannage [1990] WAR 11; R v Sandford (1994) 33 NSWLR 172; R v Kennedy (1997) 94 A Crim R 341 (CCA (NSW)); R v Bunting [2003] SASC 250. This process is embodied in Pt 4.11 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic). 40. Cf R v Kennedy (1997) 94 A Crim R 341 at 351–3 (CCA (NSW)). 41. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ss 71–96; Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 110A (defendant may consent to written statement); Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) ss 104–107; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) Ch 4; Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) ss 35, 44–45; Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT) ss 90, 90AA; Local Court (Criminal Procedure) Act (NT) Pt V Div 1.

42. Goldsmith v Newman (1992) 65 A Crim R 563. 43. (2008) 18 VR 300; [2008] VSC 1. In Sanderson v Bank of Queensland [2016] QCA 137, the court held that the lack of legal representation in a civil case was not in itself a breach of the right to a fair trial. 44. See, for example, Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ss 139, 140; Supreme Court Rules (Criminal) 2014 (SA) rr 58–59; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 54 (summary), 179 (indictable); Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) s 98; District Court Rules 1996 (WA) r 5.2; Supreme Court Rules (NT) r 81A.16. 45. Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) Pts 4.4, 5.5 Div 2. 46. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) Ch 3 Pt 3 Div 3. 47. Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) Ch 62 Divs 3, 4. 48. Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) ss 61, 62 (summary proceedings), 95, 96 (prosecutions in superior courts). Sections 63 and 97 permit enforcement of disclosure requirements through adjournment and recalling witnesses and, in s 97(4), permits ‘adverse comment to the jury by the court, counsel for the accused person, or the prosecution’. 49. The importance of s 590AB in interpreting these specific disclosure obligations was emphasised in R v Rollason and Jenkins; Ex parte A-G [2008] 1 Qd R 85; [2007] QCA 65. 50. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 150; Criminal Code (Qld) s 590A; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 285C; Criminal Code (Tas) s 368A; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 51, 190; Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) s 96 (see also s 62 in relation to charges tried summarily); Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 288; Criminal Code (NT) s 331; Local Court (Criminal Procedure) Act (NT) s 60AG. 51. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ss 134–142 (in complex criminal trials), 150 (alibi), 152 (mental impairment); Criminal Code (Qld) ss 590A–590C; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 285BB–285C; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) Pt 3.2 Div 3 (summary trials), ss 183, 189 (trials on indictment); Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) ss 62, 63, 96, 97, 138 (disclosure by accused), 137 (case management powers); Criminal Code (NT) ss 331A (expert reports), 331B (psychiatric examination); Local Court (Criminal Procedure) Act (NT) ss 60AM–60AO. 52. Under s 89A of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), under strict conditions, an adverse inference may be drawn against an accused for failure to mention at official interview facts relied upon later by way of defence. See 5.144 below. 53. Cf Ling v The Police (1996) 90 A Crim R 376, where it was held that a provision in the Magistrates Court Rules (SA) permitting costs against an accused who did not cooperate in seeking to expedite proceedings was not inconsistent with the common law right to silence. 54. And a claim to the privilege against self-incrimination does not prevent the failure from being unreasonable where it puts the prosecution to proof of facts that are not seriously contested: s 285BA(7). 55. This can be modified only by clear words: see further 5.180–5.183. 56. Comprehensive provision is made for disclosure in Ch 4 Pt 2 Div 2 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) (in particular s 183 which requires the prosecution to serve a brief of evidence, including witness statements and copies of exhibits on the accused 14 days before the hearing); Pt 3.2 Divs 2, 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic); and Pt 3 Div 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA). In Queensland, the legislation referred to in n 47 above applies to prescribed summary trials and disclosure may be ordered in summary trials: Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 83A (at a directions hearing). 57. See, for example, Magistrates Courts Rules (SA) rr 8, 26. In Ling v The Police (1996) 90 A Crim R 376, the Full Court held that the power to award costs against an accused who has failed to expedite

procedures under these rules was not invalid by virtue of the right to silence. 58. See, for example, Attorney-General’s Guidelines (1982) 74 Cr App R 302, discussed in O’Connor, n 34 above; R v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court; Ex parte Bennett (No 2) (1994) 99 Cr App R 123. For the current English rules, see Rules and Practice Directions 2015, Pt 15. Equivalent guidelines are issued by Directors of Public Prosecutions in each Australian jurisdiction. 59. Cannon v Tahche (2002) 5 VR 317 at [56]–[59] (duty an ethical duty owed to the court to ensure fair trial by the court and its breach gives no rise to civil action by an accused alleging consequential loss); R v Gittany (No 3) (2013) 238 A Crim R 149; [2013] NSWSC 1670 at [20]: ‘It has been recognised that the Crown has a duty at common to disclose all relevant evidence to an accused and that a failure to do so may, in some circumstances, require the quashing of a verdict of guilty: Grey v The Queen (2001) 75 ALJR 1708; cited in Mallard v The Queen (2005) 224 CLR 125; 157 A Crim R 121 at [17]. The Crown’s duty of disclosure probably takes its place among the fundamental elements of the accusatorial system of criminal justice, the nature of which was considered recently by the High Court in Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission [2013] HCA 39; (2013) 251 CLR 196’. 60. Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285; and see 6.55–6.57. 61. (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 248–9; see also Lawless v R (1979) 142 CLR 659 at 673, 678. 62. R v Leyland Justices; Ex parte Hawthorn [1979] QB 283; Cain v Glass (No 2) (1985) 3 NSWLR 230 at 233 (Kirby P); R v Lawson (1990) 90 Cr App R 107; Clarkson v DPP [1990] VR 743; R v Reci (1997) 70 SASR 78 at 102 (Doyle CJ refusing, without full argument, to extend this rule by demanding disclosure of statement). 63. Dallison v Caffery [1965] 1 QB 348 at 369 (Lord Denning MR). In R v Mills and Poole [1998] AC 382, it was held disclosure should extend to statements of witness not regarded by the prosecution as credible. 64. [1993] 1 WLR 619. See also R v Maguire [1992] 2 WLR 767; R v Mills and Poole [1998] AC 382 (disclosure required of statements of witness not regarded by prosecution as credible); R v Brown (Winston) [1998] AC 367 (duty does not extend to disclosure of information relating solely to credibility of defence witnesses). The fundamental importance of the prosecution’s duty of disclosure is emphasised by Martin J in R v Bunting (2002) 84 SASR 378 at [80]. 65. R v Paraskava (1983) 76 Cr App R 162; R v K (1991) 161 LSJS 135; R v Lewis-Hamilton [1998] 1 VR 630 at 634–5; R v Garofalo [1999] 2 VR 625 at [55]–[70]; Grey v R (2001) 184 ALR 593; [2001] HCA 65; Talbot v The Police (2001) 80 SASR 279; Mallard v R (2005) 224 CLR 125; AJ v R (2011) 32 VR 614; [2011] VSCA 215. 66. In Carew v Carbone (1991) 5 WAR 1, Murray J emphasises that mere failure to disclose does not ipso facto constitute a miscarriage of justice. The need to show a miscarriage of justice is emphasised by Chernov JA in R v TSR (2002) 5 VR 627 at [74], [86]–[89]. 67. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) s 37(1)(a); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW) Sch 1 cl 4(1)(a); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (Qld) s 42(1), (2)(iv); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA) s 12; Freedom of Information Act 1991 (Tas) s 28(1); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) s 31(1); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA) Sch 1 cl 5; Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT) s 37(1) (a). 68. [1994] 1 VR 41. 69. See generally LexisNexis, Halsbury’s Laws of Australia, looseleaf, vol 20, [320]ff, ‘Police and Emergency Services’. The principal statutory powers are found in Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) Pts 1AA, 1AB, 1AC, 1C, 1D; Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW); Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000 (NSW) (discussed in L v Lyons (2002) 56 NSWLR 600; LK v Commissioner of Police (2011) 81 NSWLR 26; [2011] NSWSC 458); Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld); Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) ss 67–82; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 271–273; Criminal

Law (Forensic Procedures) Act 2007 (SA) (earlier version of the Act discussed in Stephanopoulos v Police (2001) 79 SASR 91; Police v Beck (2001) 79 SASR 98); Criminal Code (Tas) s 27; Forensic Procedures Act 2000 (Tas); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 459, 459A, 464–464ZL, 465; Major Crime (Investigative Powers) Act 2004 (Vic); Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA); Criminal Investigation (Identifying People) Act 2002 (WA); Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) Pt 10; Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000 (ACT); Police Administration Act 1978 (NT) Pt VII. In addition to these general powers, specific powers to question and search are given in many Acts of Parliament. 70. See Privilege in Perspective: Client Legal Privilege in Federal Investigations, ALRC Report 107 (2007), Ch 4, where the role and coercive information-gathering powers of many of the 41 identified federal bodies are summarised, including the Australian Crime Commission (ACC), the Australian Federal Police (AFP), the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), the Commonwealth Ombudsman, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC), Australian Customs Service, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Department of the Environment and Water Resources, Civil Aviation Safety Authority, Australian Maritime Safety Authority, and Royal Commissions of Inquiry set up to undertake specific investigations. Other coercive information-gathering bodies exist at the state level. 71. See McNamara, ‘The Canons of Evidence: Rules of Exclusion or Rules of Use?’ (1986) 10 Adel LR 341. 72. In DPP v Galloway [2014] VSCA 272 at [33]–[38], the court, following close analysis of the uniform legislation, concluded that the phrase ‘adducing evidence’ was an umbrella phrase that could cover every way in which evidence can be put legitimately before the court at trial, its precise meaning dependent upon context. 73. The privileges in Div 2 apply differently: the privilege against self-incrimination (s 128) applies to where a witness objects to giving evidence and extends (s 128A) to orders for disclosure of information in connection with freezing (Mareva injunctions) and search (Anton Piller) orders. The privilege in s 127 (religious confessions) applies generally to prohibit any divulging of the confession. Two privileges enacted in Div 2 only in the Tasmanian [Uniform] Evidence Act 2001, ‘medical communications’ (s 127A applying only in civil proceedings) and ‘communication to counsellor’ (s 127B applying only in criminal proceedings), also prohibit disclosure more generally during the trial process. The journalist privilege as enacted in Div 1C (s 126K) of the Commonwealth and ACT Evidence Acts, applies to prevent journalists and their emplyees from being ‘compellable to answer any question or produce any document that would disclose the identity of the informant’. Literally this provision extends beyond the courtroom situation, although it is doubtful that it would ever be so interpreted. If it was s 131A would not be required to extend the application of Div 1C. Cf expression under s 126K of New South Wales and Victorian Uniform Acts that journalist not ‘compellable to give evidence’. See discussion of Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law, 12th ed, Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2016, at [EA.126K.20]. 74. Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd v Spalvins (1998) 152 ALR 418 (following McLelland CJ in Eq in Telstra Corp v Australis Media Holdings (No 1) (1997) 41 NSWLR 277). This approach was stopped by the High Court in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; 168 ALR 123; [1999] HCA 67 on the basis that there was no uniform legislation in Australia upon which an Australian common law could be based. 75. In Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; 168 ALR 123; [1999] HCA 67, the court distinguished common law cases suggesting a ‘sole purpose’ test for determining a claim of legal professional privilege and held the common law test to be the ‘dominant purpose’ test, which happened to be the test enacted in the uniform legislation. 76. For example, TPC v Port Adelaide Wool Co Pty Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 645 (Branson J); BT Australasia Pty

Ltd v New South Wales (1996) 140 ALR 268 (Sackville J). In Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; 168 ALR 123; [1999] HCA 67, the court regarded the discretion as existing to ensure procedural expediency and disapproved of it being used to alter the very ambit of discovery. See also Meltend Pty Ltd v Restoration Clinics of Australia Ltd (1997) 145 ALR 191 (Goldberg J); and 5.83 below. 77. For example, UCPR 2005 (NSW), defines ‘privileged material’ in the Dictionary to the Rules in terms of the Uniform Act provisions, and see CPR 2006 (ACT) r 601. 78. For example, s 118(c) has been amended to embrace documents prepared by third parties to reflect the common law development in Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357; 207 ALR 217 (see further at 5.37–5.38) and s 122 to reflect the common law idea that conduct inconsistent with privilege constitutes waiver: see further at 5.49ff. 79. As a consequence of the discussion in Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [14.43]–[14.69] and Recommendation 14.1 (in relation to client legal privilege). 80. Which must presumably be interpreted to mean a search warrant ordered as a preliminary proceeding. In DPP v Galloway [2014] VSCA 272 at [21]–[24], an application prior to trial for a stay of proceedings was held not to be a ‘preliminary proceeding’ (consequentially s 131A did not apply to preserve the application of s 123 to cross-examination of a witness at that proceeding). 81. A procedure similar to s 128 is enacted in s 87 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) for interlocutory matters. 82. As a consequence, federal courts, despite s 79 of the Judiciary Act, even when sitting within a state remain bound by the Commonwealth Evidence Act on application of s 109 of the Constitution: Dupont v Chief Commissioner of Police (2015) 295 FLR 283; [2015] FamCAFC 64. 83. Cf Carbotech Australia Pty Ltd v Yates [2008] NSWSC 1151 at [8]–[13]. 84. The legal and logistical problems in creating a uniform law of privilege that applies whenever compulsory access is sought are discussed in Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [14.7]– [14.42]. Furthermore, the ALRC has recommended reform of client legal privilege to apply uniformly to investigatory agencies. To gain some idea of the large number of such agencies with power to compulsorily seek information at the federal level, see Privilege in Perspective, ALRC Report 107 (2007), Ch 4, ‘Overview of Federal Bodies with Coercive Information-Gathering Powers’. 85. While common lawyers have always used the former terminology, the Uniform Acts use the latter terminology, seeking to emphasise that the privilege belongs to the client, not to the lawyer. 86. For a more complete analysis of possible rationales, see Privilege in Perspective, ALRC Report 107 (2007), Ch 2. 87. It has never been doubted at common law that legal professional privilege applies to corporations (confirmed in Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543); and see the discussion in Privilege in Perspective, ALRC Report 107 (2007), [3.92]–[3.106]. Only if the privilege is itself a human right might there be some argument that the privilege should not extend to corporations, but as the discussion following shows, the justification is found more broadly in the proper administration of justice. 88. Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674; Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52; Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500; Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54; Carter v Managing Partner, Northmore Hale Davey and Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121; Goldberg v Ng (1995) 185 CLR 83; Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501; Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1; Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543.

89. Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 688 (Stephen, Mason and Murphy JJ); Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 at 86 (Murphy J), 95 (Wilson J), 112, 115–16 (Deane J), 122 (Dawson J). See also the authoritative analysis of the justification and scope of the communications privilege by Lord Carswell in Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6) [2005] 1 AC 610; [2005] 4 All ER 948. 90. AM & S Europe Ltd v Commission of the European Communities [1983] QB 878. And see the comparative law discussion in Privilege in Perspective, ALRC Report 107 (2007), [3.135]–[3.154]. 91. So that communications with foreign lawyers must be accorded privilege (Re Duncan, dec’d [1968] P 306; Societe Francaise Hoechst v Allied Colloids Ltd [1992] FSR 66; Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 142 FCR 185 at [198]–[215] (Allsop J with whom Black CJ and Emmett J agreed)) as well as advice concerning foreign law: Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (No 4) (1987) 14 NSWLR 100. All Uniform Evidence Acts now define ‘lawyer’ in s 117 to include ‘an overseas-registered foreign lawyer or a natural person who, under the law of a foreign country, is permitted to engage in legal practice in that country’, and advice is nowhere confined to Australian law. 92. Carter v Managing Partner, Northmore Hale Davey and Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121 at 127 (Brennan J), 161 (McHugh J); Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1 at [111]–[113] (McHugh J); Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 at [35] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ). 93. Carter v Managing Partner, Northmore Hale Davey and Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121 at 161 (McHugh J); Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 at 552 (McHugh J); Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 at [111] (Kirby J). 94. Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 at 583 (Kirby J). See also Gummow J at 564–5. And see Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54 at 82 (Deane J). 95. Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1 at [19] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ); Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 at [4] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ); Daniels Corp International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2002) 213 CLR 543 at [9] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ), [44] (McHugh J), [85] (Kirby J). 96. Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52; Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501. 97. Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Citibank (1989) 20 FCR 403; Pratt Holdings v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357; 207 ALR 217. 98. Dalleagles Pty Ltd v ASC (1991) 4 WAR 325; Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319. 99. Anderson v Bank of British Columbia (1877) 2 Ch D 644 at 656; Waugh v British Railways Board [1980] AC 521 at 537 (Lord Simon). Australian authorities recognising the litigation privilege include Trade Practices Commission v Sterling (1979) 36 FLR 244 (Lockhart J); Nickmar Pty Ltd v Preservatrice Skandia Insurance Ltd (1985) 3 NSWLR 44 (Wood J); Dingle v Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia (1989) 23 FCR 63; J-Corp Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers (1992) 38 FCR 452; Southern Equities Corp Ltd v West Australian Government Holdings Ltd (1993) 10 WAR 1; Nagan v Holloway [1996] 1 Qd R 607; Mitsubishi Electric Pty Ltd v VWA (2002) 4 VR 332 at [8] (Batt JA); Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Pratt Holdings (2003) 195 ALR 717 at [39]–[40] (Kenny J); Pratt Holdings v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357; 207 ALR 217; Public Transport Authority (WA) v Leighton Holdings Pty Ltd (2007) 34 WAR 279 at [13] (McLure JA); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd (2009) 174 FCR 547 at [38] (holding that a document prepared for the purpose of being disclosed to an opponent could not fall within the rationale of the litigation privilege. Case discussed by Podjoy, ‘The Service of Witness Statements and Litigation Privilege: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cadbury’ (2009) 13 Int J E and P 336).

100. Hickman v Taylor (1947) 329 US 495. 101. Allen, Grady, Polsby and Yashko, ‘A Positive Theory of the Attorney–Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine’ (1990) 19 J Legal Studies 359. 102. See, for example, Australian Federal Police v Propend (1997) 188 CLR 501 at 508 (Brennan CJ: ‘… privilege is accorded to a document produced for use in litigation or for the obtaining or giving of legal advice …’); Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1 at [114] (McHugh J); Daniels Corp International Pty Ltd v ACCC (2002) 213 CLR 543 at [44] (McHugh J). 103. The justifications for the privilege given in the more recent decisions of Carter v Northmore Hale Davey and Leake (1995) 183 CLR 121; Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501; and Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 at [35] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ) are firmly rooted in the idea that the privilege exists to encourage citizens to obtain legal advice, whether or not this is in relation to litigation. Moreover, the majority in both Propend, and in Esso (and see McHugh J at [79]) emphasise that the privilege applies to protect not particular information or documents but to protect client–lawyer communications. In Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1 at [114], McHugh J specifically refers to the justifications for the litigation privilege. 104. But cf remarks of Lord Rodger in Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6) [2005] 1 AC 610 at [53], suggesting a fair trial may always demand an adversarial process supporting a litigation privilege. Brief dicta in Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54 at 101; 71 ALR 673 at 707 extending the litigation privilege to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal were not followed by Bergin J in Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (2006) 67 NSWLR 91; [2006] NSWSC 530 at [50]–[55], which in turn was not followed in Re Farnaby and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Commission [2007] AATA 1792. See criticisms of Ingot by Privilege in Perspective, ALRC Report 107 (2007), [3.53]–[3.66]; and Mantziaris, ‘Client Legal Privilege in Administrative “Proceedings”: Killing off the Adversarial/Inquisitorial Distinction’ (2008) 82 Aust LJ 397. The privilege does not apply to an inquiry by a Royal Commission (AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382; [2006] FCA 571 at [160]–[164] (Young J)). 105. Compare with the remarks of Mason J in Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 at 75. 106. Their distinction is developed in a most forceful and scholarly manner in two articles by Williams, ‘Discovery of Civil Litigation Trial Preparation in Canada’ (1980) 58 Can Bar Rev 1; and ‘Four Questions of Privilege: The Litigation Aspect of Legal Professional Privilege’ (1990) Civil Just Qtly 139. 107. Section 4(1): including proceedings that relate to bail, interlocutory and like proceedings, proceedings heard in chambers and proceedings relating to sentencing. 108. This limited ambit of the legislation underlies the decisions of the High Court in Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1 at [17]–[27] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ), [41] (McHugh J), [143]– [144] (Kirby J); and Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 at [16]– [17] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ), [64] (McHugh J), [144], [150] (Callinan J). 109. (1987) 163 CLR 54. See also Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd v Arthur Andersen [2002] 1 Qd R 233 at [8]– [21]; GSA Industries (Aust) Ltd v Constable [2002] 2 Qd R 146 at [17]. The privileges that arise between client and lawyer may apply between applicants for legal aid and officers of legal aid commissions: for example, s 13(2) of the Legal Aid Act 1977 (ACT) as applied in Re Rytir and Discrimination Commissioner (1996) 44 ALD 427. 110. See Australian Hospital Care v Duggan (No 2) [1999] VSC 131; Candacal Pty Ltd v Industry Research & Development Board (2005) 223 ALR 284; [2005] FCA 649 at [96]–[108] (Lee J); Commonwealth v Vance (2005) 158 ACTR 47; [2005] ACTCA 35. By way of contrast, under some sections of the uniform legislation (ss 33, 37, 114, 184, 190, 191), a person’s rights can only be waived on the advice of an ‘Australian legal practitioner’ or ‘legal counsel’ and the former is required to hold a practising certificate

(see Dictionary). 111. Feuerheerd v London General Omnibus Co Ltd [1918] 2 KB 565; Grofam Pty Ltd v ANZ (1993) 45 FCR 445; Global Funds Management (NSW) Ltd v Rooney (1994) 36 NSWLR 122 (Young J); Health Insurance Commissioner v Freeman (1998) 88 FCR 544 at 566. Cf Glengallan Investments Pty Ltd v Arthur Andersen [2002] 1 Qd R 233; [2001] QCA 115 at [18] (belief that provision of legal advice by non-practitioner gives rise to privilege insufficient).

112. Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500 at 510 (Gibbs CJ), 521 (Wilson J), 531 (Dawson J) (Northern Territory government seeking advice from Crown law officers); Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54 (Treasury advice from Attorney-General and Crown Solicitor’s office); Re Citibank Ltd [1989] 1 Qd R 516 (advice to company from salaried lawyer); R v Bunting (2002) 84 SASR 378 at [8]–[11] (‘Unless a basis exists for distinguishing in a relevant way the Director and DPP practitioners from other practitioners in Government employment the decision in Waterford appears to dictate that communications in appropriate circumstances with the Director and DPP practitioners are not outside the ambit of legal professional privilege’); R v Petroulias (No 22) (2007) 213 FLR 293; [2007] NSWSC 692 at [62] (Johnson J) (communications between prosecution lawyers and Crown witnesses privileged); New South Wales v Betfair Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 160 (advice to state by parliamentary counsel in form of draft legislation privileged). 113. Vance v McCormack (2004) 154 ACTR 12; [2004] ACTSC 78 (full-time military officer not providing independent advice); Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (2005) 225 ALR 672; [2005] FCA 1551 at [15] (Graham J); Rich v Harrington (2007) 245 ALR 106; [2007] FCA 1987 at [56]–[60] (Branson J) (in-house counsel insufficiently independent to advise on claim of sexual harassment against accounting firm). See further Tamberlin and Bastin, ‘In-house Counsel and Privilege: “The Client’s Man of Business”’ (2008) 31 Aust Bar Rev 188; Westgarth, ‘In-house Counsel and Client Legal Privilege: The Issue of Independence’ (2008) 82 Aust LJ 333; Tamberlin and Bastin, ‘In-house Counsel, Legal Professional Privilege and “Independence”’ (2009) 83 Aust LJ 193. 114. See cases referred to at n 91 above. 115. These definitions were modified as a consequence of Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [14.82]–[14.100]. 116. Wundowie Foundry Pty Ltd v Milson Foundry Ltd (1993) 44 FCR 474 (applied in TPC v International Technology Holdings Pty Ltd (1995) 31 IPR 466). 117. See cases cited at n 112 above. In exercising prosecutorial powers either the DPP is the client for the purposes of communicating confidentially with its salaried DPP practitioners, or the Crown or some other third party can be regarded as the client of the DPP; if the DPP is the client at the point when the prosecutor’s duty of disclosure requires disclosure of a privileged communication, the conduct of the DPP in continuing the prosecution is inconsistent with maintenance of any privilege, and the privilege will be regarded as waived: R v Bunting (2002) 84 SASR 378 at [44]–[45], [74] (Martin J). 118. Dunesky v Elder (1992) 35 FCR 429. See also Calcraft v Guest [1898] 1 QB 759; Crescent Farm (Sidcup) Sports Ltd v Sterling Offices Ltd [1972] Ch 553. 119. Greenough v Gaskell (1833) 1 My & K 98 at 103; 39 ER 618 at 620–1; Minet v Morgan (1873) LR 8 Ch App 361 at 366–9; Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52. 120. (1987) 163 CLR 54. 121. (1995) 183 CLR 121. 122. Other examples of lawyers giving non-professional advice include Leary v FCT (1980) 32 ALR 221 at 240 (Brennan J) (entrepreneurial advice); Work Cover Authority (NSW), (General Manager) v Law Society of New South Wales (2006) 65 NSWLR 502; [2006] NSWCA 84 at [88], [91] (advice on policy or administrative matters); AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382; [2006] FCA 571 (advice on draft statement of contrition not legal advice). 123. Dalleagles Pty Ltd v ASC (1991) 4 WAR 325. Applied in BHP Olympic Dam Pty Ltd v Bluestone Apartments Pty Ltd (2013) 115 SASR 586; [2013] SASC 64. But care must be taken where lawyers provide other than professional services: Balabel v Air India [1988] Ch 317; Nederlandse Reassurantie Groep Holding NV v Bacon & Woodrow (a firm) [1995] 1 All ER 976.

124. And the dominant purpose test may not be satisfied: Sydney Airports v Singapore Airline [2005] NSWCA 47 at [24] (Spigelman CJ). 125. Balabel v Air India [1988] Ch 317 at 330 (Taylor LJ). Dictum cited with approval in, for example, AWB Ltd v Cole (2006) 152 FCR 382; [2006] FCA 571 at [86], [100] (Young J). Privilege refused in Powercor Australia Ltd v Perry (2011) 33 VR 538; [2011] VSCA 239. 126. Compare with the remarks of Lord Rodger in Three Rivers District Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6) [2005] 1 AC 610; 4 All ER 948 at [60], approving Lord Taylor’s dictum in Balabel and privileging advice about evidence and submissions to be put to a government inquiry. See also Work Cover Authority (NSW), (General Manager) v Law Society of New South Wales (2006) 65 NSWLR 502; [2006] NSWCA 84 at [74], [94] (advice on preparation and drafting of bills); New South Wales v Betfair Pty Ltd [2009] FCAFC 160 (provision of draft legislation by parliamentary counsel privileged). 127. Cf Re Southland Coal Pty Ltd (rec & mgrs apptd) (in liq) (2006) 203 FLR 1; [2006] NSWSC 899 at [14](d) (Austin J) and cases referred to therein. 128. That it is the communication which attracts the privilege, rather than information or documents per se, is central to the decision in Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501, where the High Court held that the making of a copy of an unprivileged document for the purposes of seeking or giving legal advice could itself constitute a privileged communication. See also Sugden v Sugden (2007) 70 NSWLR 301; [2007] NSWCA 312 at [64]–[67], [69], [74]. 129. [1976] VR 547. See also R v Sharp (2003) 143 A Crim R 344; [2003] NSWSC 111 at [35]–[37]. Although compare with the remarks of Innes J in Re Griffen (1887) 8 LR (NSW) 132. In Raunio v Hills (2001) 116 FCR 518 (Fed Ct Full Ct), notes taken by the plaintiff’s solicitor of an interview with the defendant were held not confidential for the purpose of any privilege; but cf Sugden v Sugden (2007) 70 NSWLR 301; [2007] NSWCA 312 at [64]–[69], which emphasises that a confidential record of a nonconfidential conversation may attract privilege: see further discussion at 5.46 and 5.48. 130. [1982] NZLR 561. 131. Southern Equities Corporation Ltd v West Australian Government Holdings Ltd (1993) 10 WAR 1 at 22 (Seaman J); Health & Life Care Ltd v Price Waterhouse (1997) 69 SASR 362; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (1998) 81 FCR 526. 132. Public Transport Authority of WA v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (2007) 34 WAR 239; [2007] WASCA 15 at [33]–[35] (McLure JA, having considered the authorities equivocal but reluctant to abandon confidentiality altogether concluded: ‘It is sufficient in my view if the lawyer, to the knowledge of the witness, intended the communications to be and remain private’). A stronger requirement of confidentiality appears demanded by McLelland J in Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (No 22) (1988) 14 NSWLR 132. But cf Interchase Corporation Ltd (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Queensland) Pty Ltd (No 1) [1999] 1 Qd R 141, where Pincus J emphasised that the parties’ right to prevent production of documents is founded on the doctrine of legal professional privilege, not on any contractual relationship or equitable right. That the requirements of confidentiality for the advice privilege and litigation privileges must necessarily differ is recognised in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd (2009) 174 FCR 547; [2009] FCAFC 32 at [35]. In that case, the court held (at [54]) that the requirement of confidentiality necessary for the litigation privilege could not be satisfied in the case of a witness proof prepared for and in the hands of the opposing litigant. 133. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (1998) 81 FCR 526 at 563 (Goldberg J). 134. See, for example, Public Transport Authority of WA v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (2007) 34 WAR 239; [2007] WASCA 15 at [32] (McLure JA). See further 5.60.

135. This definition of confidentiality extends beyond any relationship that might exist between the maker and receiver and nor is the nature of the obligation to be narrowly interpreted: Carnell v Mann (1998) 89 FCR 247 at 259; New South Wales v Jackson [2007] NSWCA 279 at [41], [55]. But there was no confidentiality on the facts in Dimkovski v Ken’s Painting and Decorating Services Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 50 at [6]–[8] (Dunford J). 136. See generally O’Connor, ‘Legal Professional Privilege: An Engine for Fraud’ (1990) 64 Aust LJ 174; Newbold, ‘The Crime/Fraud Exception to Legal Professional Privilege’ (1990) 53 Mod L Rev 472. 137. See generally R v Cox and Railton (1884) 14 QBD 153; Crescent Farm (Sidcup) Sports Ltd v Sterling Offices Ltd [1972] Ch 553; Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500 at 511–13 (Gibbs CJ); Capar v Commissioner of Police (1994) 34 NSWLR 715; 74 A Crim R 428; R v Elliott (1996) 128 FLR 172 (Vincent J). 138. (1985) 158 CLR 500. 139. (1995) 183 CLR 121 at 134 (Deane J), 163 (McHugh J). This approach is endorsed by Gaudron J in Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 at 546. It is arguably also implicit in Daniels Corp International Pty Ltd v ACCC (2002) 213 CLR 543 at [24], [36] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 140. Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 at 514 (Brennan CJ), 521–2 (Dawson J), 532 (Toohey J), 546 (Gaudron J), 556 (McHugh J) (Gummow J at 573–6 is less clear on the incidence and nature of the onus, and Kirby J at 591–2 suggests there is a persuasive onus on the party claiming fraud); R v Elliott (1996) 128 FLR 172 at 177 (Vincent J: a ‘good arguable case’); AWB Ltd v Cole (No 5) (2006) 155 FCR 30; 234 ALR 651; [2006] FCA 1234 at [217]–[219] (Young J: no need to establish fraud on the balance of probabilities but must refer to admissible evidence); Players Pty Ltd (in liq) (receivers appointed) v Clone Pty Ltd (2013) 115 SASR 547; [2013] SASCFC 25 at [129] (‘colourable case of abuse’ of process defeated privilege). 141. [1989] AC 346. 142. (1995) 183 CLR 121; see 5.68, although cf Capar v Commissioner of Police (1994) 34 NSWLR 715 at 722 (Donovan AJ); and Clements, Dunne & Bell Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (2001) 188 ALR 515; [2001] FCA 1858 at [213]–[220] (North J). 143. This may be a concept narrower than conduct required to prevent a communication being ‘bona fide’ at common law: Idoport Pty Ltd v NAB [2001] NSWSC 222 at [63] (Einstein J); Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 698 at [37](9) (Santow J). In Amcor Ltd v Barnes [2011] VSC 341 at [47], Kyrou J suggests that in this context ‘fraud’ refers to ‘all categories of fraud known to the law irrespective of whether dishonesty is a necessary element’ but (at [49]–[50]) does seem to require the client being knowingly involved. 144. The nature of a civil penalty is discussed at 5.162. 145. That there must be a deliberate abuse of power is emphasised in John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Abernathy [1999] NSWSC 826 at [10]; Idoport Pty Ltd v NAB [2001] NSWSC 222 at [64] (Einstein J); Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 698 at [37](10) (Santow J). 146. These burdens and standards are discussed by Santow J in Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 698 at [37](3)– (7). 147. (1980) 146 CLR 141. 148. (1995) 183 CLR 121, discussed at 5.68. 149. That it is the communication which attracts the privilege, rather than information or documents per se, is central to the decision in Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501, where the High Court held that the making of a copy of an unprivileged document for the purposes of

seeking or giving legal advice could itself constitute a privileged communication. 150. In Attorney-General (NT) v Kearney (1985) 158 CLR 500 and Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54, it was never doubted that advice from lawyers fell within the privilege: see also Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 686. See s 118, which applies to ‘a confidential communication made between’. In Westpac Banking Corporation v 789TEN Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 321 (discussed in Privilege in Perspective, ALRC Report 107 (2007), [3.41]–[3.48]), the court held that a communication between the bank’s lawyers to auditors stating their opinion on the assessment by bank directors of contingent liabilities — as required by the Corporations Act — was not privileged as it was made not for the purpose of providing advice to the client but made for the purpose of providing information to the auditors so they could complete their statutory audit. 151. Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v International Litigation Funding Partners (Aust) Ltd (No 2) (2009) 256 ALR 416; [2009] FCA 449 at [21] (Finkelstein J). 152. This proposition is generally accepted without debate. Authority on the point is not easily to be found, but see R v Godstone Rural District Council [1911] 2 KB 465; and Hobbs v Hobbs and Cousens [1960] P 112. 153. Hughes v Biddulph (1827) 4 Russ 190; 38 ER 777. And see Uniform Acts s 118(b), (c). 154. See Trade Practices Commission v Sterling (1979) 36 FLR 244 at 246 (proposition (d)); Vardas v South British Insurance Co Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 652 (record-keeping copies); Packer v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1985] 1 Qd R 275; Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475 at 496; Dalleagles Pty Ltd v Australian Securities Commission (1991) 4 WAR 325; Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd v Antico (1993) 36 NSWLR 87 (a minute of a board meeting summarising legal advice given orally to the board by a lawyer-director would be privileged); Saunders v Australian Federal Police (1998) 160 ALR 469 at 471–2 (French J); Pratt Holdings v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357; 207 ALR 217 at [20] (Finn J). 155. This point is emphasised by McHugh J in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 at [81]. 156. (1993) 36 NSWLR 87. 157. (1878) 3 QBD 315. See also Pratt Holdings v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357; 207 ALR 217 at [19] (Finn J emphasising that to this extent the privilege might be said to protect documents rather than communications as such). 158. (1976) 135 CLR 674. 159. This approach has found favour in England (Waugh v British Railways Board [1980] AC 521) and New Zealand (Guardian Royal Exchange v Stuart [1985] 1 NZLR 596). 160. Brennan CJ in Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 141 ALR 545 at 548 quotes Jacobs J as authority for the sole purpose test. See also Dawson J at 555. In Hong Kong Bank of Australia Ltd v Murphy [1993] 2 VR 419 at 431, Smith J concluded that ‘there has been a shift in emphasis in the formulation of the sole purpose test to a position more akin to that adopted by Jacobs J in Grant v Downs’. 161. It is the reasons which lead to the creation that are decisive: Electricity Trust of SA v Mitsubishi (1991) 57 SASR 48; GSA Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd v Constable [2002] 2 Qd R 146 at [32]–[35]. The time for determining purpose is when the communication or document is made. 162. (1987) 163 CLR 54 at 85. 163. Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 at 60 (Gibbs CJ), 86 (Murphy J), 108 (Brennan J), 112 (Deane J), 122 (Dawson J). Later examples of the application of the sole purpose test include Choo v Quinn (1984) 11 FCR 217; Nickmar Pty Ltd v Preservatrice Skandia Insurance Ltd (1985) 3 NSWLR 44 (Wood J);

McMahon v Cooper [1989] 2 Qd R 8; Tickell v Trifleska (1990) 24 NSWLR 548 (Rogers CJ: instructions for a will had the purpose of creating a testamentary disposition as well as seeking advice about the form of the will and therefore the sole purpose test was not satisfied); Hartogen Energy Ltd v Australian Gas Light Co (1992) 109 ALR 177; Trade Practices Commission v Ampol Petroleum (Victoria) Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 316 (statutory examination of witnesses by TPC taken for purposes beyond seeking legal advice); McIlwraith McEarcharn Operations Ltd v CE Heath Underwriting and Insurance (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 2) [1995] 1 Qd R 363 (loss assessor reports produced at request of solicitors but used also by client for business purposes not privileged); Criminal Justice Commission v Connolly (1997) 91 A Crim R 323 (documents created for purpose of public inquiry by the CJC not created for the sole purpose of submission to the commission’s legal advisers). 164. Dawson J in Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 at 516–17 criticises this as a test satisfying the rationale for privilege. In Sparnon v Arpand Pty Ltd (1996) 138 ALR 735 at 740, Branson J said: ‘It will be a question of objective fact whether in any case any one purpose “dominated” the decision to bring the document into existence. Such objective fact is not necessarily to be ascertained by reference solely to the intention of the author of the document, or solely to the intention of the individual upon whose instructions the document was brought into existence …’. But in having regard to intentions of persons outside the lawyer–client relationship one must be careful not to lose sight of the rationale for the privilege, which is to encourage clients to seek legal advice and lawyers to provide it. 165. Some of the difficulties and anomalies of applying a ‘dominant purpose’ as opposed to a ‘sole purpose’ test are discussed in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 at [73]– [78] (McHugh J), [93]–[94], [108] (Kirby J). In Sydney Airports Corporation Ltd v Singapore Airlines Ltd [2005] NSWCA 47 at [7], Spigelman CJ referred to authorities describing dominance in terms of a ‘clear paramountcy’ and as ‘the ruling, prevailing, or most influential purpose’. As Giles JA said in New South Wales v Jackson [2007] NSWCA 279 at [75]: ‘Determining dominance calls for appreciation of competing purposes’. 166. (1999) 201 CLR 49. 167. Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 at [54] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Gaudron JJ). 168. That it is always the purpose of client or lawyer and not the purpose of the author of material that is determinative is emphasised in Hartogen Energy Ltd v Australian Gas Light Co (1992) 109 ALR 177 at 187 (Gummow J (Fed Ct)). 169. Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54 at 66 (Mason and Wilson JJ), at 78 (Brennan J); Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357; 207 ALR 217 at [35] (Finn J); Quality Publications Australia Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2009] FCA 1293 at [7]–[10] (Edmonds J). 170. (1881) 17 Ch D 675. 171. (1985) 3 NSWLR 44. Followed in Mudway v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd [1988] 2 NZLR 283; Gobby v CWA (1991) 7 SR (WA) 203; GSA Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd v Constable [2002] 2 Qd R 146 at [19]– [21]; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Pratt Holdings (2003) 195 ALR 717 at [41]–[54] (Kenny J). On claims by insurers to privilege generally, see Borrowdale, ‘Insurers and Legal Professional Privilege in New Zealand’ (1989) 8 Civil Just Qtly 249. 172. This distinction is emphasised by Cotton LJ in Wheeler v LeMarchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675 at 684. Quoted without disapproval by Basten JA in Meteyard v Love (2005) 65 NSWLR 36 at [109], and with approval by Finn J in Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357; 207 ALR 217 at [40]. 173. (2004) 136 FCR 357; 207 ALR 217.

174. Pratt Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 136 FCR 357; 207 ALR 217 at [38] (Finn J). 175. (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 677. See also Deane J in Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475 at 490: ‘It is a substantive general principle of the common law and not a mere rule of evidence that, subject to defined qualifications and exceptions, a person is entitled to preserve the confidentiality of confidential statements and other materials which have been made or brought into existence for the sole purpose of his or her seeking or being furnished with legal advice by a practising lawyer or for the sole purpose of preparing for existing or contemplated judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings’. 176. In Telstra Corp v Australis Media Holdings (1997) 41 NSWLR 147 at 149F, McLelland CJ in Eq was of the view that a document that was a communication had to seek privilege as a communication under s 118(a) or (b), not as a document under s 118(c). This approach was endorsed in Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co v Court of Coal Mines Regulations (1997) 42 NSWLR 351 at 388–9 (Powell JA) and Meteyard v Love (2005) 65 NSWLR 36 at [110] (Basten JA), principally with the object of excluding third party communications from the advice privilege. This approach is endorsed in Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [14.122], where the ALRC asserts that its amendment to s 118(c) was not intended to result in all third party communications being embraced within the privilege. 177. Without discussion, Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [14.122] expressly refused to extend the s 118(c) privilege to communications not contained in documents. 178. (1987) 163 CLR 54. Applied by Gummow J in Hartogen Energy Ltd v Australian Gas Light Co (1992) 109 ALR 177 at 187–8 (Fed Ct). That privilege can apply to part of a document only may avoid waiver where the unprivileged part is disclosed: see Assistant-Treasurer v Pacific Airways Ltd (2009) 259 ALR 203; [2009] FCAFC 105 at [74]–[81]. 179. See Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 142 FCR 185; [2004] FCAFC 337 at [157]–[159] (Allsop J). 180. See authorities at n 99 above. 181. That the same ‘purpose test’ applies to determine whether material falls within this privilege is recognised in Southern Equities Corp Ltd v West Australian Government Holdings Ltd (1993) 10 WAR 1 (Full Ct); Trade Practices Commission v Ampol Petroleum (Victoria) Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 316 at 322–3 (Davies J), 326 (Burchett J); Somerville v ASC (1995) 13 ACLC 1527 (particularly Lindgren J); Sparnon v Arpand Pty Ltd (1996) 138 ALR 735 at 738 (Branson J). The change to the common law test made by Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 has been applied to the litigation privilege: Mitsubishi Electric Pty Ltd v VWA (2002) 4 VR 332 at [8] (Batt JA); Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Pratt Holdings (2003) 195 ALR 717 at [39] (Kenny J). The same tests apply to both privileges under the Uniform Acts. 182. NEMGIA v Waind (1979) 141 CLR 648 at 654; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd (2009) 174 FCR 547; [2009] FCAFC 32 at [39]. See also Maddison v Goldrick [1976] 1 NSWLR 651, where a prosecutor’s brief was held not to be privileged; and Mayor and Corporation of Bristol v Cox (1884) 26 Ch D 678. The common law view that a litigant in person has no privilege is criticised by Murphy J in Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 at 90; Master Seaman QC in Handley v Baddock [1987] WAR 98; Williams, ‘Four Questions of Privilege: the Litigation Aspect of Legal Professional Privilege’ (1990) 9 Civil Just Qtly 139 at 152–4. In dicta in R (Kelly) v Warley Magistrates’ Court [2008] 1 WLR 2001 at [17]–[21], Lawes LJ asserts that a litigant in person can claim litigation privilege. 183. (1995) 131 ALR 517. It was also held there was insufficient common interest in the particular litigation between the ASC and the litigants to claim privilege upon this basis. 184. In Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 234 at [59], Bergin J held communications with third parties in relation to the funding of anticipated litigation privileged within s 119 as being for the purposes of the party ‘being provided with’ professional legal services.

185. (1995) 67 FCR 594. See also New Cap Reinsurance Corp Ltd (in liq) v Renaissance Reinsurance Ltd [2007] NSWSC 258 at [18], [30], [34] (expert’s own documents, prepared by him for the purpose of expressing an expert opinion in litigation but which were not communicated to the client or the lawyer of the client, and do not reveal communications between the expert and the client, or between the expert and the lawyer for the client could be privileged under s 119 provided the expert had the requisite dominant purpose in their creation) and R v Sawyer-Thompson (Ruling No 1) [2016] VSC 316 at [22]–[35]. 186. Waugh v British Railways Board [1980] AC 521; Nickmar Pty Ltd v Preservatrice Skandia Insurance Ltd (1985) 3 NSWLR 44; GSA Industries (Aust) Pty Ltd v Constable [2002] 2 Qd R 146 at [36]–[43]; Mitsubishi Electric Pty Ltd v VWA (2002) 4 VR 332 at [16]–[19] (Batt JA: ‘[T]here must be a real prospect of litigation, as distinct from a mere possibility, but it does not have to be more likely than not’); New South Wales v Jackson [2007] NSWCA 279 at [67] (applying the same common law test to s 119). 187. Wheeler v Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675, where a surveyor’s report called for by a lawyer to give advice in relation to a conveyancing transaction was held not to be privileged. 188. Hickman v Taylor (1947) 329 US 495 at 510–11. Confidential draft pleadings are privileged but not the pleading itself: Argyle Brewery Pty Ltd v Darling Harbourside (Sydney) Pty Ltd (1993) 48 FCR 1. 189. Brooks v Medical Defence Association of WA (1999) 94 FCR 164. Similarly, the mere attachment of preexisting documents to a privileged statement does not make those documents privileged unless their disclosure would reveal privileged communications or material: Mundraby v Commonwealth (2001) 184 ALR 737 at [7]–[11] (Tamberlin J). 190. Lyell v Kennedy (1884) 27 Ch D 1; Chadwick v Bowman (1886) 16 QBD 561; Shaw v David Syme and Co [1912] VLR 336; Buttes Gas and Oil Co v Hammer (No 3) [1980] 3 WLR 668; Nickmar Pty Ltd v Preservatrice Skandia Insurance Ltd [1985] 3 NSWLR 44 at 58–62 (Wood J); Dubai Bank Ltd v Galadari [1990] Ch 98; Ventouris v Mountain [1991] 1 Ll R 441 (discussed by Tapper (1991) 107 LQR 370); Dubai Bank Ltd v Galadari (No 7) [1992] 1 WLR 106; Lubrizol Corp v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 957. Compare these cases with the greater willingness to privilege materials collected for a lawyer’s brief in The Palermo (1883) 9 PD 6; Kennedy v Lyell (1883) 23 Ch D 387; Mayor and Corporation of Bristol v Cox (1884) 26 Ch D 678; Watson v Cammell Laird & Co Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 702; R v Board of Inland Revenue; Ex parte Goldberg [1989] QB 267. And see the discussion in Williams, ‘Four Questions of Privilege: the Litigation Aspect of Legal Professional Privilege’ (1990) 9 Civil Just Qtly 154–60; and Zuckerman, ‘Legal Professional Privilege and the Ascertainment of Truth’ (1990) 53 Mod L Rev 381. McHugh J in Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 at 553–4 suggests that the originals of unprivileged documents in the hands of a lawyer may be privileged if disclosure would reveal confidential advice either sought or given. 191. (1997) 188 CLR 501. See in particular Brennan CJ at 509 where he says: ‘If privilege were denied to a copy of an unprivileged document when the copy is produced solely for the purpose of seeking advice from a solicitor or counsel or for the purpose of use in pending, intended or reasonably apprehended litigation there would be a risk that the confidentiality of solicitor–client communications would be breached. The way would be open for the execution of search warrants by the emptying out of, and sifting through, solicitors’ files and counsels’ briefs. That would undermine the adversary system under which most litigation is conducted’. See also Gaudron J at 544, Gummow J at 571 and Kirby J at 589. 192. Compare with Sumitomo Corp v Credit Lyonnais Rouse Ltd [2002] 4 All ER 68 at [32]–[47] (Jonathan Parker LJ), where translations made by lawyers of unprivileged documents were held not to be privileged. 193. Compare with Sumitomo Corp v Credit Lyonnais Rouse Ltd [2002] 4 All ER 68 at [48]ff (Jonathan Parker LJ), where copying of client’s own unprivileged documents by lawyers for litigation, as opposed to

copying of third party documents, was held not to give rise to any claim for privilege. 194. Dingle v Commonwealth Development Bank Australia (1989) 23 FCR 63; J-Corp Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers (1992) 38 FCR 452; Southern Equities Corp Ltd v WA Government Holdings Ltd (1993) 10 WAR 1; Carbone v NCA (1994) 126 ALR 79 at 91–2. 195. Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (No 22) [1988] 14 NSWLR 132 (McLelland J); Trade Practices Commission v Ampol Petroleum (Victoria) Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 316 at 320–2 (Davies J in the Full Court); CBA v Cooke [2000] 1 Qd R 7. The statement in the hands of the witness must be protected to give practical protection to the statement in the hands of lawyer or client. If the absence of any obligation of confidence by the client undermines the privilege of the statement in the witness’s hands, is the statement in the lawyer’s or client’s hands then discoverable? In Southern Equities Corp Ltd v West Australian Government Holdings Ltd (1993) 10 WAR 1, it was held that the copy in the hands of the lawyers or clients was privileged ‘whatever might be the capacity or potentiality of the witness to disclose his statement to others’ (Malcolm CJ at 5), and that the litigation privilege does not require the same quality of confidentiality as the communications privilege (Seaman J at 21). 196. In Public Transport Authority of WA v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (2007) 34 WAR 239; [2007] WASCA 15 at [33]–[35], McLure JA, having considered the authorities equivocal, was reluctant to abandon some notion of confidentiality altogether. See further at 5.28. 197. (1992) 38 FCR 452. 198. Distinguished by Barlow J in Lloyd v Centurian Roller Shutters Pty Ltd (1994) 10 SR(WA) 202. 199. [1996] 1 Qd R 607. 200. That a record of an unprivileged occasion may give rise to a privilege seems consistent with the reasoning in Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 141 ALR 545. There seems no reason in principle why a confidential record of a conversation between the parties should stand on any special footing: but compare with the discussion in LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [25255]. 201. (2013) 115 SASR 547; [2013] SASCFC 25 at [123]. 202. (2000) 23 WAR 123. 203. Pincus J referred to the litigation privilege as ‘this rather unattractive body of doctrine’ in Dingle v Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia (1989) 23 FCR 63 at 67, and French J in J-Corp Ltd v Australian Builders Labourers Federated Union of Workers (1992) 38 FCR 452 at 457 is critical of the doctrine. 204. Vardas v South British Insurance Co Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 652 (Clarke J); Cole v Elders Finance Co [1993] 2 VR 356 (Ashley J); Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 at [80]– [81] (McHugh J). This is consistent with decisions which protect from disclosure other confidential memoranda in the hands of lawyer or client which exist to enable advice to be sought or given; see, for example, Dalleagles Pty Ltd v ASC (1991) 4 WAR 325; Standard Chartered Bank of Australia Ltd v Antico (1993) 36 NSWLR 87. 205. Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1 at [96] (McHugh J); Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 at [82] (McHugh J). 206. Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475 at 480 (Gibbs CJ); Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1 at [99] (McHugh J). 207. For example, assuming no waiver, copies: Carnell v Mann (1998) 89 FCR 247 at 254. 208. This was the considered view of Wood J in Nickmar Pty Ltd v Preservatrice Skandia Insurance Ltd (1985) 3 NSWLR 44 at 58–62, and of Byrne J in Roux v ABC [1992] 2 VR 577 at 591, 597–600. It is now the prevalent English position: see Dubai Bank Ltd v Galadari [1990] Ch 98; Ventouris v Mountain (1991) 1 WLR 607 (discussed in Tapper (1991) 107 LQR 370); Dubai Bank Ltd v Galadari (No 7) [1992] 1 WLR

106. 209. (1976) 135 CLR 674; Chadwick v Bowman (1886) 16 QBD 561; Shaw v David Syme & Co [1912] VLR 336; Buttes Gas and Oil Co v Hammer (No 3) [1980] 3 WLR 668 at 680–1. 210. Kennedy v Lyell (1883) 23 Ch D 387; Watson v Cammell Laird & Co Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 702; Kaye v Hulthen [1981] Qd R 289. 211. For example, Hunt J in McCaskill v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1984] 1 NSWLR 66 upholding a privilege while Clarke J in Vardas v South British Insurance Co Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 652 was of a contrary view. Clarke J’s view appeared to be the most favoured. 212. Schneider v Leigh [1955] 2 QB 195; Baker v Evans (1987) 77 ALR 565 (Pincus J, Fed Ct). 213. Calcraft v Guest [1898] 1 QB 759; Crescent Farm (Sidcup) Sports Ltd v Sterling Offices Ltd [1972] Ch 553. Client is defined in s 117 to include successors. 214. See, for example, Bulk Materials (Coal Handling) Services Pty Ltd v Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 689 (a copy of a privileged report commissioned by an insurer was privileged in the hands of, and at the claim of, the insured); Mercantile Mutual Insurance (NSW Workers Compensation) Ltd v Murray [2004] NSWCA 151 at [54] (Mason P: ‘[S]olicitors retained by the insurer may have both insured and insurer as client’). 215. Re Konigsberg (a bankrupt); Ex parte the Trustee v Konigsberg [1989] 3 All ER 289 at 297; Mercantile Mutual Insurance (NSW Workers Compensation) Ltd v Murray [2004] NSWCA 151 at [41] (Mason P); Schreuder (as executor of the will of Murray) v Murray (No 2) (2009) 260 ALR 139; [2009] WASCA 145. 216. Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Webb (1996) 39 NSWLR 601 at 608A–D; Mercantile Mutual Insurance (NSW Workers Compensation) Ltd v Murray [2004] NSWCA 151 at [41] (Mason P). 217. See, for example, Southern Cross Airline Holdings Ltd (in liq) v Arthur Anderson & Co (1998) 84 FCR 472 at 480–1 (creditors and liquidator shared a common interest in litigation); Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 234 at [49]–[57] (litigation funder and litigant shared common interest in litigation). 218. And where successfully claimed the reasons for adhering to the claim cannot be pursued in crossexamination nor can any adverse inference be drawn from the claim: see, for example, Christian v R (2012) 223 A Crim R 370; [2012] NSWCCA 34 at [26]–[31] (McClellan CJ at CL, Latham and Harrison JJ agreeing). 219. This is the underlying assumption in Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52. See also R v Craig [1975] 1 NZLR 597 at 598; Commissioner of Taxation v Citibank (1989) 20 FCR 403 (Full Fed Ct); Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 at [79] (McHugh J); Kang v Kwan [2001] NSWSC 698 at [29]–[30] (Santow J). But grounds for the privilege must first be established: National Crime Authority v S (1991) 29 FCR 203. And if the corporate client has been dissolved third parties holding the material will not be able to claim privilege: Pincus J in Baker v Evans (1987) 77 ALR 565. In Schneider v Leigh [1955] 2 QB 195, it was held that a doctor holding a report commissioned for litigation could not claim privilege, but the privilege had been already waived. A third party who has authored a document privileged in the hands of the client cannot be compelled to disclose a copy in his hands if he owes a duty of confidentiality to the client and the privilege has not otherwise been waived: Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (No 22) [1988] 14 NSWLR 132; CBA v Cooke [2000] 1 Qd R 7; Public Transport Authority of WA v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (2007) 34 WAR 239; [2007] WASCA 15 at [33]–[35] (McLure JA). And see further at 5.28 n 132, 5.46 n 195. 220. Cf comments of Sundberg J in Rio Tinto Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2006) 235 ALR 127 at [26]– [27]. 221. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd (2009) 174 FCR 547;

[2009] FCAFC 32 at [102]. See further 5.53 n 233 below. 222. TPC v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647 at 687–9; Mancorp Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Pty Ltd (1991) 57 SASR 87 (Debelle J); Spalding v Radio Canberra Pty Ltd (2009) 224 FLR 440; [2009] ACTSC 26 (Refshauge J: providing full analysis of cases and not following Tasmanian Seafoods Pty Ltd v MacQueen (2004) 12 Tas R 436). Where the uniform legislation applies, s 122(6) provides that privilege does not prevent evidence of a proof being adduced where it has been used to try to revive a witness’s memory out of court or in court pursuant to ss 32, 33; see, for example, MGICA (1992) Ltd v Kenny and Good Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 135 ALR 743. But the disclosure of a witness’s testimony, for example at committal, is not in itself inconsistent with the maintenance of the privilege attaching to the witness’s communications with the lawyer: R v Gittany (No 3) (2013) 238 A Crim R 149; [2013] NSWSC 1670 (R v Haydon (No 5) [2005] SASC 19 not followed). 223. Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) v Bank of New Zealand (1991) 26 NSWLR 711 at 729–31. 224. Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1 at [28]–[29] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ). Followed in R v Bunting (2002) 84 SASR 378 (Martin J: any privilege in communications in hands of prosecutor and subject to the prosecutor’s duty of disclosure waived by continuing prosecution, this being conduct inconsistent with maintenance of the prosecutor’s privilege); DSE (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Intertan Inc (2003) 127 FCR 499 (Allsop J emphasising that test of imputed waiver is this inconsistency rather than any test of unfairness at large); Lovegrove Turf Services Pty Ltd v Minister for Education [2003] WASC 213 at [15] (Johnson J); Legal Services Commission v JHW (2012) 223 A Crim R 534; [2012] SASCFC 47 (no inconsistency in disclosure to the DPP for purpose of concluding a plea bargain and seeking to maintain privilege over communications with solicitor as against a co-accused in relation to the same events who had pleaded not guilty; notional ‘unfairness to co-accused in not being able to obtain access irrelevant to the question of waiver). 225. (1986) 161 CLR 475. 226. Roberts v Oppenheim (1884) 26 Ch D 724; Buttes Gas and Oil Co v Hammer (No 3) [1980] 3 WLR 668 at 687–8. There is some support for the view that disclosure of documents upon discovery can never give rise to waiver in related documents: General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp Ltd v Tanter [1984] 1 WLR 100; Prus-Grzybowski v Everingham (1986) 44 NTR 7; Curlex Manufacturing Pty Ltd v Carlingford Australia General Insurance Ltd [1987] 2 Qd R 335. But the better view is that there is no such arbitrary limit and the general principles are determinative: Maurice at 483 (Gibbs CJ), 498 (Dawson J); Randell v Rockliff (1999) 9 Tas R 85; King v AG Australia (2002) 121 FCR 480 at [61]–[68] (Moore J). 227. See, for example, Burnell v British Transport Commission (1956) 1 QB 187; George Doland Ltd v Blackburn Robson Coates & Co (a firm) [1972] 1 WLR 1338 (the waiver of the communications privilege by disclosure may not waive the litigation privilege); Great Atlantic Insurance Co v Home Insurance Co [1981] 1 WLR 529 (discussed in the practice note at (1987) 61 ALJ 95); General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp Ltd v Tanter [1984] 1 WLR 100; Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No 10) [1991] 1 WLR 660; Lake Cumberline Pty Ltd v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (1994) 126 ALR 58 (disclosure of memoranda of fees in action to recover legal fees no waiver of privilege in underlying documents); Queensland Law Society Inc v Albietz [2000] 1 Qd R 621 (disclosure of advice waived privilege in reasons leading to that advice); Bayliss v Cassidy (No 2) [2000] 1 Qd R 464 (disclosure in interrogatories of reliance on legal advice as basis of reasonable cause for a relevant belief gave rise to imputed waiver). 228. (2008) 234 CLR 275; [2008] HCA 37. Similar considerations applied in deciding Balnaves v Smith [2008] 2 Qd R 413; [2008] QSC 215 at [17]; and Assistant-Treasurer v Pacific Airways Ltd (2009) 259 ALR 203; [2009] FCAFC 105 at [33]–[36]. Distinguished in Zentai v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2010] FCA 252 at [137]–[140] (McKerracher J). 229. (1995) 185 CLR 83. 230. This is recognised in other cases. See, for example, Network Ten Ltd v Capital Television Holdings Ltd

(1995) 36 NSWLR 275 (confidential disclosure to a possible purchaser of client’s business did not constitute waiver); R v Reci (1997) 70 SASR 78 at 103–4 (confidential disclosure by lawyer to DPP of client’s privileged communication in order to negotiate plea did not constitute a general waiver of privilege); Atkinson v T & P Fabrications Pty Ltd (2001) 10 Tas R 57 (disclosure by a defendant of a privileged statement to a psychiatrist appointed to examine the plaintiff held not inconsistent with maintenance of privilege); Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Pratt Holdings (2003) 195 ALR 717 at [78] (confidential disclosure to the client’s accountants for purposes of obtaining further analysis for legal advice was held not to constitute any waiver); Spotless Group Ltd v Premier Building and Consulting Group Pty Ltd (2006) 16 VR 1; [2006] VSCA 201 (disclosure of legal advice to bank financing a property development and to a firm employed to explain to the public the nature of the development no waiver); Tarong Energy Corporation Ltd v South Burnett Regional Council [2010] 1 Qd R 575; [2009] QCA 265 at [31] (confidential disclosure of legal advice to consultant did not amount to waiver despite difficulties created in understanding consultant’s report with advice that had been disclosed masked). The same result is achieved by s 122(5)(a)(i) of the uniform legislation: see, for example, Eric Preston Pty Ltd v Euroz Securities Ltd (2009) 175 FCR 508; [2009] FCA 240 at [20]ff (Gilmour J). 231. (1999) 201 CLR 1 at [100]–[134], where McHugh J forcefully argues that principles of disclosure beyond the confidential relationship of client and lawyer should be determinative of waiver at common law. See also Neave JA in Spotless Group Ltd v Premier Building and Consulting Group Pty Ltd (2006) 16 VR 1; [2006] VSCA 201 at [68]. 232. (1994) 33 NSWLR 529; South Australia v Peat Marwick Mitchell (1995) 65 SASR 72 (compulsory disclosure to a Royal Commission not waiver). 233. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd (2009) 174 FCR 547; [2009] FCAFC 32 at [65]–[77], [97], [102]–[103] in dicta disapproving of the decision in State Bank SA v Smoothdale No 2 (1995) 64 SASR 224, where the court held that the privilege continued until the witness testified in accordance with the statement or it was otherwise tendered in evidence. 234. Distillers Co v Times Newspapers [1975] QB 613; Home Office v Harman [1983] 1 AC 280; Complete Technology Pty Ltd v Toshiba (Australia) Pty Ltd (1994) 124 ALR 493; Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125; [2008] HCA 36 at [96] (Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ); Alcoa of Australia Ltd v Apache Energy (No 6) [2014] WASC 287. 235. See, for example, Cole v Dyer (1999) 74 SASR 216 (no unfairness in withholding materials collected in preparation of expert report which had been disclosed); Bayliss v Cassidy (No 2) [2000] 1 Qd R 464 at 469 (Davies J); cf Lovegrove Turf Services Pty Ltd v Minister for Education [2003] WASC 213 at [17]–[21] (Johnson J held that the privilege over legal advice upon which an administrative decision was conceded to be based was waived by analogy to materials relied upon as the basis of opinions expressed in compulsorily exchanged expert reports). 236. Guinness Peat Properties Ltd v Fitzroy Robinson Partnership [1987] 1 WLR 1027 at 1044 (Slade LJ); Webster v James Chapman & Co [1989] 3 All ER 939; Meltend Pty Ltd v Restoration Clinics of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 145 ALR 391. 237. Hooker Corp Ltd v Darling Harbour Authority (1987) 9 NSWLR 538; Key International Drilling Company Ltd v TNT Bulkships Operations Pty Ltd [1989] WAR 280; Derby & Co Ltd v Weldon (No 8) [1991] 1 WLR 73; Hong Kong Bank of Australia Ltd v Murphy [1993] 2 VR 419 at 439–41 (Smith J); International Business Machines Corp v Phoenix International (Computers) Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 413 (privilege not lost where a reasonable solicitor would have realised documents disclosed unintentionally by mistake); Kingston v State Fire Commission (1998) 8 Tas R 152 at 162 (Slicer J); Willett v Belconnen Soccer Club (2007) 212 FLR 203; [2007] ATCSC 41 (applying s 122 of the uniform legislation, privilege lost after mistaken discovery only after inspection unless inspection has been procured by fraud, or the inspecting solicitor realises on inspection that the document has been produced only by reason of an obvious

mistake); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cathay Pacific Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1101 (disclosure not by deliberate conduct and questioned by opponent on inspection did not constitute waiver); Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 303; [2013] HCA 46 at [49] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ denying waiver on mistaken disclosure, commenting that ‘courts will normally only permit an error to be corrected if a party acts promptly. If the party to whom the documents have been disclosed has been placed in a position, as a result of the disclosure, where it would be unfair to order the return of the privileged documents, relief may be refused. However, in taking such considerations (analogous to equitable considerations) into account, no narrow view is likely to be taken of the ability of a party, or the party’s lawyers, to put any knowledge gained to one side. That must be so in the conduct of complex litigation unless the documents assume particular importance’). And concluding at [63] that ‘in reality, there was no question of waiver sufficient to be agitated before the Court’. 238. Which courts are reluctant to find on discovery until inspection and then not if the mistake is obvious: Willett v Belconnen Soccer Club (2007) 212 FLR 203; [2007] ATCSC 41; Unsworth v Tristar Steering and Suspension Australia Ltd [2007] FCA 1081 at [9] (Gyles J), but less reluctant to find on failure to object to the tender of evidence at trial: Divall v Mifsud [2005] NSWCA 447 at [10] (Ipp JA). 239. Although compare with Trevorrow v South Australia (No 4) (2006) 94 SASR 64; [2006] SASC 42 at [66] (Doyle CJ), [175] (White J), where the action of a government department giving access to allegedly privileged archival documents to a party’s solicitor was held to be conduct inconsistent with the government (much) later claiming privilege over the documents. 240. Thomason v Council of the Municipality of Campbelltown (1939) 39 SR (NSW) 347 at 357–8; Re Stanhill Consolidated Ltd [1967] VR 749 at 750; cf Warner v Women’s Hospital [1954] VLR 410 at 421; Buttes Gas and Oil Co v Hammer (No 3) [1980] 3 WLR 668 at 687–8; Players Pty Ltd (in liq) (receivers appointed) v Clone Pty Ltd (2013) 115 SASR 547; [2013] SASCFC 25 at [81]–[88] (disclosure made at taxation of costs waived privilege in application to have the principal action stayed). 241. See cases at n 234 above. 242. State Bank of SA v Smoothdale No 2 (1995) 64 SASR 224; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Telstra (2000) 96 FCR 317 at [28]–[31]. But compare with the attitude of Hoffman J in Black and Decker Inc v Flymo Ltd [1991] 1 WLR 753 and decision in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd (2009) 174 FCR 547; [2009] FCAFC 32 at [97], [102]–[103]. 243. [1988] 1 WLR 1113. 244. (1995) 64 SASR 73. See also Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd [2005] FCA 864 at [56] (Graham J) (disclosure from one officer to another within the same corporation not waiver under s 122). 245. (1999) 201 CLR 1 at [33]. 246. Bulk Materials (Coal Handling) Services Pty Ltd v Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 689 (disclosure by insurer to insured); Thiess Contractors Pty Ltd v Terokell Pty Ltd [1993] 2 Qd R 341 (disclosure by insurer to insured); Meadon Pty Ltd v Nommack (No 247) Pty Ltd (1994) 54 FCR 200 (disclosure to a land agent involved in a property development subject to legal advice); Rank Film Distributors Ltd v ENT Ltd (1994) 4 Tas R 281 (disclosure to associated company); Pioneer Concrete (NSW) Pty Ltd v Webb (1995) 18 ACSR 418 (disclosure by former director to the liquidator of his company which had a common interest in the litigation); South Australia v Peat Marwick Mitchell (1995) 65 SASR 72 (disclosure by subsidiary finance company to its parent bank, Olsson J making it clear that common interest did not have to relate to litigation). That disclosure to joint privilege holders and persons with a common interest in litigation does not constitute waiver is provided for by s 122(5)(b) and (c) of the uniform legislation. Note that persons with a common interest may be regarded as joint privilege holders entitled to claim the privilege: see, for example, cases at n 214 above.

247. Re Konigsberg (a bankrupt) [1989] 1 WLR 1257. This situation is expressly provided for by in s 124 of the uniform legislation: applied Re Doran Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) (2002) 168 FLR 116 at [81]. In Great Southern Managers (in liq) v Clark (2012) 36 VR 308; [2012] VSCA 207, s 124 was interpreted to permit tender where lawyers had been consulted by a defendant investor scheme on behalf of their investors bringing the litigation; and to result in disclosure to other parties to the litigation not party to that advice. 248. Thomason v Council of the Municipality of Campbelltown (1939) 39 SR (NSW) 347; Hongkong Bank v Murphy [1993] 2 VR 419 at 434–9; Benecke v NAB (1993) 35 NSWLR 110; Moreay Nominees Pty Ltd v McCarthy (1993) 10 WAR 293; Pickering v Edmunds (1994) 63 SASR 357; Ampolex v Perpetual Trustee Co (Canberra) Ltd (1995) 37 NSWLR 405; Wardrope v Dunn [1996] 1 Qd R 224; Liquorland (Australia) Pty Ltd v Anghie [2003] 7 VR 27. Unfairness does not arise simply because legal advice may be relevant to the state of mind put in issue: see Auburn, ‘Generalised Rules of Fairness in Evidence Law’ (2000) 63 Mod L Rev 104; Mathieson and Page, ‘Implied Waiver of Privilege’ [2000] NZLR 355; and the discussion of relevant authorities by Byrne J in Liquorland (Australia) Pty Ltd v Anghie [2003] 7 VR 27. 249. DSE Holdings Pty Ltd v Intertan Inc (2003) 127 FCR 499 (Allsop J); Commissioner of Taxation v Rio Tinto Ltd (2006) 151 FCR 341; [2006] FCAFC 86 at [68]; Council of the NSW Bar Association v Archer (2008) 72 NSWLR 236; [2008] NSWCA 164 at [45]–[49] (Hodgson JA); Yokogawa Aust Pty Ltd v Alstom Power Ltd [2009] SASC 377 (CA) at [57]–[59], [66] (Duggan J: neither the putting in issue of the objective reasonableness of a negotiated settlement nor a mere denial of its unconscionability puts in issue legal advice given during its negotiation); Parkview Qld Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2012] NSWSC 1599 at [11]–[21] (Black J); Chaina v Presbyterian Church (NSW) Property Trust (No 9) [2013] NSWSC 212; Vic Hotel Pty Ltd v DC Payments Australasia Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 101 at [34]–[35] (Dixon AJA). Generally see Corkhill and Selwyn, ‘Evolution of the Common Law Principle of “Issue Waiver”’ (2008) 82 Aust LJ 338 and Odgers, n 73 above, at [EA.122.150]. 250. (2011) 32 VR 568; [2011] VSC 269 at [13]–[15] (Vickery J). 251. Adelaide Steamship Co v Spalvins (1998) 152 ALR 418 at 426. See, for example, El-Zayet v R (2014) 88 NSWLR 556; [2014] NSWCCA 298 at [116]–[120] (Beazley P and Emmett JA) (Deputy-DPP had no apparent or implied authority to waive). See also Traderight (NSW) Pty Ltd v Bank of Queensland [2013] NSWSC 211 at [17]–[24] and Shea v TruEnergy Services Pty Ltd (No 5) (2013) ALR 230; [2013] FCA 937 at [56]–[69] (an expert’s report is not ‘based’ on privileged materials where those documents or communications did not influence the content, as opposed to form). 252. Although even prior to the amendment courts had been prepared to incorporate the Mann v Carnell test into s 122: see, for example, Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 10) (2005) 227 ALR 704 at [44]; [2005] FCA 172 (Sackville J); Avanes v Marshall (2007) 68 NSWLR 595 at [30]–[34] (Gzell J discussing the relevant authorities). 253. (2013) 250 CLR 303; [2013] HCA 46 at [32]. 254. Telstra Corp v Australis Media Holdings (No 2) (1997) 41 NSWLR 346 at 350–1 (McLelland J); Tirango Nominees v Dairy Vale Foods Ltd [1998] FCA 724 (Mansfield J); Carnell v Mann (1998) 89 FCR 247 at 260–1; but cf Sovereign v Bellavista [2000] NSWSC 521 at [16]–[17] and comments of Odgers, n 73 above, at [EA.122.240]. 255. Cases prior to amendment discussing whether ‘the substance of the evidence’ had been disclosed include Ampolex v Perpetual Trustee (Canberra) Ltd (1996) 70 ALJR 603 (reference in Pt B of a takeover document that ‘Ampolex maintains that the correct [conversion ratio for convertible notes] ratio is 1:1 and has legal advice supporting this position’ regarded by Kirby J as a disclosure of the substance of the legal advice). This was also the view of the judge at first instance, Rolfe J: (1996) 40 NSWLR 12 at 18– 19. Distinguished by Drummond J in Southern Cross v Arthur Anderson (1998) 84 FCR 472 at 479. See also Adelaide Steamship Co v Spalvins (1998) 152 ALR 418 at 430–1; Tirango Nominees Pty Ltd v Dairy

Vale Foods Ltd (1998) 83 FCR 397 at 401–2 (Mansfield J); NRMA Ltd v Morgan (No 2) [1999] NSWSC 694 at [9]–[16] (Giles J); SVI Systems Pty Ltd v Best and Less Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1507 at [5]–[7] (Einfeld J). 256. (2008) 234 CLR 275; [2008] HCA 37. 257. Ampolex v Perpetual Trustee (Canberra) Ltd (1996) 40 NSWLR 12 at 22 (Rolfe J) as applied in Meltend Pty Ltd v Restoration Clinics of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 145 ALR 391 at 405–6 (Goldberg J); cf Sovereign v Bellavista [2000] NSWSC 521 at [21]–[23] (no waiver where ‘everything indicates [to opponent] an intention to claim privilege … and what has gone wrong is attributable to sheer inadvertence’). See further cases on mistaken disclosure at 5.54. 258. (2011) 32 VR 568; [2011] VSC 269 at [16]–[22] (Vickery J). 259. Disclosure is by compulsion when made pursuant to a practice direction or court order: Akins v Abigroup Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 539 at 550–1; Sevic v Roarty (1998) 44 NSWLR 287 at 291 (Sheller JA); Bell Group Ltd (in liq) v Westpac (1998) 86 FCR 215 (cf critical remarks of Garling J in Gillies v Downer EDI Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1323 at [46]). Or when made under legislation: see, for example, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v George Weston Foods Ltd (2003) 129 FCR 298 (Conti J). 260. See discussion at 5.49. Note that where a lawyer is jointly consulted on a matter and the clients later become opponents in litigation arising out of that matter no privilege arises between them: s 124; and see 5.57, particularly at n 247. 261. See discussion and cases cited at 5.49 and cases referred to at n 246 above. 262. See cases at n 230 above. In Tirango Nominees Pty Ltd v Dairy Vale Foods Ltd [1998] FCA 724, disclosure of legal advice in confidence to the client’s accountant did not waive the privilege. See also Eric Preston Pty Ltd v Euroz Securities Ltd (2009) 175 FCR 508; [2009] FCA 240 at [20]ff (Gilmour J); Hodgson v Amcor Ltd (No 4) (2011) 32 VR 568; [2011] VSC 269 at [32]–[36] (Vickery J). 263. Telstra Corp Ltd v BT Australasia Pty Ltd (1998) 85 FCR 152 at 168 (Branson and Lehane JJ); Wayne Lawrence Pty Ltd v Hunt [1999] NSWSC 1044 at [11]–[13] (Hodgson CJ in Eq); Garratt’s Ltd v Thangathurai [2002] NSWSC 39 at [51]; Fort Dodge Australia Pty Ltd v Nature Vet Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 501 at [10]–[15] (Hely J). 264. Telstra Corp Ltd v BT Australasia Pty Ltd (1998) 85 FCR 152 (Branson and Lehane JJ, Beaumont J dissenting, applying those common law cases mentioned at n 248 above); followed in Application of Cannar Re Eubanks [2003] NSWSC 802 at [84]–[86] (Bell J). 265. See comments of Odgers, n 73 above, at [EA.122.90]. Contrast the cautious views of Sackville J in BT Australasia Pty Ltd v NSW (No 7) (1998) 153 ALR 722 (reluctant to import common law notions of issue waiver into s 122); and Austin J in Sovereign v Bellavista [2000] NSWSC 521 at [28] (refusing to import the common law into s 122(4)) with Sackville J’s later conclusions in Seven Network Ltd v News Ltd (No 10) (2005) 227 ALR 704; [2005] FCA 172 at [44], and those of Gzell J in Avanes v Marshall (2007) 68 NSWLR 595 at [30]–[34]. 266. Townley v Minister, Land and Water Conservation (NSW) (1997) 76 FCR 401 at 412–14 (Sackville J): ‘[T]he expression “proper understanding” is by no means narrow … if a privileged document is voluntarily disclosed for forensic purposes, and a thorough apprehension or appreciation of the character, significance and implications of that document requires disclosure of source documents, otherwise protected by client legal privilege, ordinarily the test laid down by s 126 … will be satisfied’. A stricter approach appears to be applied by McDougall JA in Sugden v Sugden (2007) 70 NSWLR 301; [2007] NSWCA 312 at [91]–[113]; and by Bell J in ML Ubase Holdings Co Ltd v Trigem Computer Inc (2007) 69 NSWLR 577; [2007] NSWSC 859 at [45] (no waiver of working documents relating to a disclosed expert report as not required to understand the report). See also Gillies v Downer EDI Ltd

[2010] NSWSC 1323 at [64] (use of privileged document in expert’s report demanded its disclosure); Shea v TruEnergy Services Pty Ltd (No 5) (2013) 303 ALR 230; [2013] FCA 937 at [60], [71] (DoddsStreeton J) (disclosure not ordered). 267. In Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501, the majority emphasise the importance of conceptualising the privilege as applying to communications in holding that the copying of unprivileged documents may constitute privileged communications. See the discussion at 5.44, 5.48. 268. Brown v Foster (1857) 1 H & N 736; 156 ER 1397; Bursill v Tanner (1885) 16 QBD 1; R v Furney (1964) 20 ABC 166; Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 at 123 (Dawson J); Southern Cross Commodities Pty Ltd v Crinis [1984] VR 697; Packer v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1985] 1 Qd R 275; Commissioner of Taxation v Coombes (1999) 92 FCR 240 (names and addresses of clients generally not privileged communications); Cook v Pasminco (No 2) (2000) 107 FCR 44 at [47] (costs agreement not privileged communications). By the same token, Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54 stands for the proposition that communications containing non-professional advice must be disclosed if they can be fairly severed from professional matters. 269. (2007) 231 CLR 75; [2007] HCA 7 at [36], [42]. Gleeson CJ, Kirby and Callinan JJ held that any privilege was abolished by s 18B(4) of the Crimes Commission Act 1985 (NSW). Gleeson CJ (at [4]) said normally the name and address would not be privileged unless there is such a connection between a confidential communication and a retainer that disclosure by a lawyer of the identity of a client will disclose that confidential communication. Kirby and Callinan JJ (at [12]) inclined to the view that the particular circumstances did give rise to privilege. 270. Commissioner of Taxation v Coombes (1999) 92 FCR 240 at [27]–[31]. McHugh J in Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 at 553–4; (1997) 141 ALR 545 at 584–5 suggests that even the originals of unprivileged documents in the hands of a lawyer might be privileged upon this basis. See further the cases referred to at n 189 above; and Saltzburg, ‘Communications Falling Within the Attorney–Client Privilege’ (1981) 66 Iowa LR 811. 271. Certainly in the hands of the party and arguably also in the hands of the witness where the proof has been given to the witness on the understanding that it is to remain confidential: see 5.28 and cases at nn 132, 195–196 and 219 above. 272. See Harmony Shipping Co SA v Saudi Europe Line Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 1384, in which Lord Denning notes the far-reaching consequences this might have in the case of experts who have conducted experiments prior to trial: R v Ward (1980) 3 A Crim R 171 (CCA (NSW)); R v King [1983] 1 WLR 411; W v Egdell [1990] Ch 359. 273. Re Sarah Getty Trust [1985] QB 956. 274. (2007) 235 ALR 197; [2007] HCA 25. 275. This conceptualisation of the privilege is recognised in Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 141 ALR 545 at 562 (Toohey J), 595 (Gummow J); Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1 at [122] (McHugh J); Trevorrow v South Australia (No 4) (2006) 94 SASR 64; [2006] SASC 42 at [11] (Doyle CJ), [78] (Debelle J); H Stanke & Sons Pty Ltd v Von Stanke (2006) 95 SASR 425; [2006] SASC 308 at [37] (White J); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Lindberg (2009) 261 ALR 207; [2009] VSCA 234. See also Zuckerman, n 2 above, at 16.38ff and Zuckerman, n 190 above, at 383. 276. [1898] 1 QB 759. 277. (1977) 67 Cr App R 181. 278. [1982] 1 NZLR 561. 279. [1982] Ch 431. 280. (1978) 141 CLR 54; Pearce v Button (1985) 8 FCR 388.

281. [1898] 1 QB 759. 282. [1913] 2 Ch 469: this case and its effect upon Calcraft v Guest is discussed in Heydon, ‘Legal Professional Privilege and Third Parties’ (1974) 37 Mod L Rev 601; and Tapper (1972) 35 Mod L Rev 83. In Reichelt v Lewis (1986) 23 A Crim R 284 (SC (Qld)), equitable proceedings were successfully taken by a solicitor to regain information obtained illegally by police intercepting telephone conversations with a client. 283. [1971] Ch 680. 284. [1987] QB 670. 285. (2015) 237 FCR 316; [2015] FCAFC 183. 286. (2015) 237 FCR 316; [2015] FCAFC 183 at [52]–[60] (Kennan and Perram JJ, Davies J agreeing), quoting dicta of Gummow J in Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 at 565–6. 287. Andrews, ‘The Influence of Equity Upon the Doctrine of Legal Professional Privilege’ (1989) 105 LQR 608. 288. Kingston v State Fire Commission (1998) 8 Tas R 152 at 161 (Slicer J). The decision in Commissioner of the Police Service v NIRTA [2002] 1 Qd R 364 may be explained on the basis that police deceived the client into permitting seizure of privileged documents under a warrant by suggesting that the client’s lawyer was unable to advise him due to an alleged conflict of interest. In these circumstances there was no waiver, express, implied or imputed, and return of the privileged documents was ordered. See also Trevorrow v South Australia (No 4) (2006) 94 SASR 64; [2006] SASC 42, where the court refused to exercise the equitable jurisdiction to return all but one archived governmental record relating to the taking of an Aboriginal child from his parents, as they were not disclosed in confidence (Doyle CJ at [55], White J at [147]) and anyway the invocation of the equitable jurisdiction was tardy (Debelle J at [88]); and H Stanke & Sons Pty Ltd v Von Stanke (2006) 95 SASR 425; [2006] SASC 308 at [37] (White J following Trevorrow). 289. Guinness Peat Properties Ltd v Fitzroy Robinson Partnership [1987] 1 WLR 1027; Hooker Corp Ltd v Darling Harbour Authority (1987) 9 NSWLR 538; Webster v James Chapman & Co [1989] 3 All ER 939; Kingston v State Fire Commission (1998) 8 Tas R 152; Al Fayed v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2002] EWCA 780 at [16]. 290. [1988] 1 WLR 1257. 291. While the court in Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd (2013) 250 CLR 303; [2013] HCA 46 recognise the parallel existence of both common law and equitable resolutions in terms of the decision in that case each approach produced the same result. 292. Goddard v Nationwide Building Society [1987] QB 670 at 685 (Nourse LJ). 293. D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171; Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 42–3 (Gibbs ACJ). 294. [1973] 1 WLR 115. This case does not stand for the proposition that the Crown in a criminal case can never resist a subpoena from the accused for relevant documents which are subject to legal professional privilege. The privilege normally applies and an accused would have to justify exceptional circumstances to overrule it: Cain v Glass (1985) 3 NSWLR 39. 295. (1980) 146 CLR 141. 296. (1985) 158 CLR 500. 297. (1995) 183 CLR 121. 298. [1996] 1 AC 487.

299. (2002) 84 SASR 378. 300. In R v Petroulias (No 22) (2007) 176 A Crim R 309; [2007] NSWSC 692 at [63], [70]–[73], Johnson J accepts Martin J’s reasoning that the prosecution’s duty of disclosure is irrelevant to its claim for privilege, but refused to find that the prosecution itself or the calling of witnesses at committal proceedings or at earlier trials of the accused in itself gave rise to waiver. See also Filipowski v Nikolaus (2004) 136 LGERA 157; [2004] NSWLEC 432 at [15]–[21] (Pain J). 301. (1999) 46 NSWLR 563. 302. And applied in Director General, Department of Community Services; Re Sophie [2008] NSWSC 1268 at [2] (Brereton J). 303. Talbot v NRMA Ltd [2000] NSWSC 603 at [3] (Hodgson CJ in Eq); R v P (2001) 53 NSWLR 664 at [41]–[42] (Hodgson JA); Dunstan v Orr [2008] FCA 31 at [141] (Besanko J). 304. Section 131A does not extend s 123 to apply beyond the adducing of evidence at trial. 305. [2014] VSCA 272. 306. Privilege in Perspective, ALRC Report 107 (2007), [5.3], [5.5] found that most federal investigative legislation is silent about client legal privilege and that very few Acts expressly abolish the privilege (citing James Hardie (Investigations and Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth); Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 3ZQN, 3ZQO; Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) s 202; and Inspector-General of Taxation Act 2003 (Cth) s 16(1), as the exceptions). 307. See, for example, Re Compass Airlines Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 447 at 451–2 (Lockhart J), 459 (Beaumont and Gummow JJ); Cockerill v Collins [1999] 2 Qd R 26; R v P (2001) 53 NSWLR 664 at [43] (Hodgson JA); NSW Food Authority v Nutricia Australia Pty Ltd (2008) 72 NSWLR 456; [2008] NSWCCA 252 at [103]–[105], [136], [161] (Spigelman CJ); Carey v Korda (2012) 45 WAR 181; [2012] WASCA 228 at [107]–[111] (Murphy JA). 308. (2002) 213 CLR 543 at [11], referring to Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277 at 304 (O’Connor J). 309. (1991) 172 CLR 319: discussed in McNicol, ‘Evidence’ in Baxt and Moore (eds), An Annual Survey of Australian Law 1991, Adelaide Law Review Association, Adelaide, 1992, pp 350–67; and by Privilege in Perspective, ALRC Report 107 (2007), [5.29]–[5.35]. 310. This emphasis upon legislative policy at the expense of the policies underlying legal professional privilege is criticised in Boniface, ‘Legal Professional Privilege and Disclosure Powers of Investigative Agencies’ (1992) 16 Crim LJ 320. 311. (2002) 213 CLR 543 at [35] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). Daniels is analysed in Privilege in Perspective, ALRC Report 107 (2007), [5.36]–[5.43] and its implications at [5.44]ff. 312. (1983) 152 CLR 328. Discussed at 5.148. 313. (1983) 153 CLR 52. 314. As a consequence of this decision, s 155(7B) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) was added to preserve expressly legal professional privilege. See now s 155(7B) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. 315. (1992) 35 FCR 447. 316. Overruling the contrary decision in Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) v Bank of New Zealand (1991) 26 NSWLR 711. Compass was approved in Re Interchase Corp (in liq) (1996) 21 ACSR 375 at 380 (Kiefel J). 317. (1991) 29 FCR 203 at 209, see also Heerey J at 213; and cf Newman J’s remarks in State Drug Crime Commission v Larsson (1991) 53 A Crim R 131 at 134–5 (SC (NSW)). 318. Other cases upholding statutory removal of the privilege by necessary implication include Walsh v

Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd (No 4) (1994) 14 ACSR 653; Carmody v Mackellar (1997) 76 FCR 115 (s 45 of the then Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979 (Cth) overrode client legal privilege). 319. Privilege in Perspective, ALRC Report 107 (2007), Recommendations 5.1–5.3. 320. UCPR 2005 (NSW) Pt 31 r 28; UCPR 1999 (Qld) r 429; SCCR 2006 (SA) r 160 (formerly r 38 of the SCR 1987; not applied in State Bank of South Australia v Ferguson (1995) 64 SASR 232 to a report obtained for the purpose of a pre-trial conference); SCR 2000 (Tas) r 516; SC(GCP)R 2015 (Vic) rr 33.06, 44.03; RSC 1971 (WA) O 36A (and see also Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 32A); CPR 2006 (ACT) rr 1227, 1243; SCR (NT) OO 33 and 44. Where these rules can be interpreted to remove the privilege it is modified only to the extent that the discovered material is required for the proceeding in question, no further waiver of privilege can be imputed, and the material may not be disclosed or used by the recipient for other purposes: see Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125 at [96] (Hayne, Heydon and Crennan JJ); Players Pty Ltd (in liq) (receivers appointed) v Clone Pty Ltd (2013) 115 SASR 547; [2013] SASCFC 25 at [81]–[88] (holding at [94], [96], [100] that r 271(3) of the SCCR (SA) 2006 did not remove legal professional privilege but that voluntary disclosure during the taxation of costs constituted express waiver in that proceeding and imputed waiver in related proceedings to set aside judgment in the original action). 321. That the onus is upon the party claiming privilege is emphasised by the High Court in Waterford v Commonwealth (1987) 163 CLR 54; see also National Crime Authority v S (1991) 29 FCR 203. But cf O 26 r 12 of the SCR (WA), which states that, once privilege is claimed, the party seeking to deny the privilege bears the onus of ‘adducing evidence that the claim … is unfounded or mistaken’. For comment on this process, see Privilege in Perspective, ALRC Report 107 (2007), [8.60]–[8.66]. 322. See Science Research Council v Nasse [1980] AC 1028 and Nickmar Pty Ltd v Preservatrice Skandia Insurance Ltd (1985) 3 NSWLR 44, where only a detailed inspection of the documents allowed the judge to decide the purpose of their creation. The uniform legislation s 133 expressly gives the court power to inspect as do rules of court: see, for example, FCR 2011 r 14.03; UCPR 2005 (NSW) r 1.8; SC(GCP)R 2015 (Vic) r 29.13. But, in taking a more cautionary approach to inspection, White J in District Council of Mallala v Livestock Markets Ltd (2006) 94 SASR 258; [2006] SASC 80 at [30] emphasises that a party has no right to demand court inspection. 323. Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 at 677 (Barwick CJ), 689 (Stephen, Mason, Murphy JJ); Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 45–6 (Gibbs ACJ). In Legal Services Commission v JHW (2012) 223 A Crim R 534; [2012] SASCFC 47 at [20], [59]–[60], [81]–[82], the court held that inspection by the judge was not appropriate where the issue was whether the privilege had been waived. Where public interest immunity is sought, courts will only inspect sensitive material if this is necessary: see 5.247–5.252. 324. Hartogen Energy Ltd v Australian Gas Light Co (1992) 109 ALR 177 at 179 (Fed Ct, Gummow J). 325. Objection on grounds of privilege may be made on issue, on application to set aside, on answer to subpoena, or on an application by a party to inspect a produced document: Roux v ABC [1992] 2 VR 577. 326. (1983) 153 CLR 52 at 70 (Gibbs CJ), 83 (Mason J). 327. For a discussion of the practical difficulties in applying the privilege to search warrants, see Sing, ‘Search Warrants and Legal Professional Privilege’ (1986) 10 Crim LJ 32. 328. (1985) 9 FCR 557. 329. (1986) 9 FCR 576. 330. Allitt v Sullivan [1988] VR 621; Lander v Mitson (1988) 83 ALR 466 (Forster J, Fed Ct); Carmody v Mackellar (1997) 76 FCR 115 (warrants under telecommunications and listening legislation could validly extend to privileged material); Question of Law Reserved (No 1 of 1998) (1998) 70 SASR 281; Oke v

Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (2007) 168 A Crim R 503 at [105]–[118] (seizure of material subject to possible privilege claim prima facie lawful but subject to resolution of the privilege claim). In Brewer v Castles (No 3) (1984) 52 ALR 581 (Fed Ct, Beaumont J), a warrant was held invalid to the extent that it authorised seizure of ‘opinions of counsel’. In Karina Fisheries Pty Ltd v Mitson (1990) 26 FCR 473, the issuing magistrate specified a procedure for objection on the face of a s 10 warrant authorising search of lawyer’s premises. 331. Australian Federal Police and Law Council of Australia, General Guidelines Between the Australian Federal Police and the Law Council of Australia as to the Execution of Search Warrants on Lawyers’ Premises, Law Societies and Like Institutions Where a Claim of Legal Professional Privilege is Made (1997). Discussed in Privilege in Perspective, ALRC Report 107 (2007), [8.378]–[8.380]. The use of these guidelines was endorsed by the High Court in Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501 and are referred to in Kennedy v Baker (2004) 135 FCR 520 at [19]–[20]; Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 208 ALR 424 at [72]; Oke v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (2007) 168 A Crim R 503 at [104], [118]–[122]. 332. See Privilege in Perspective, ALRC Report 107 (2007), [8.381]–[8.382] and Recommendations 8.19– 8.21. 333. (1989) 20 FCR 403. Note this decision does not apply to require giving a privilege holder the opportunity to object to material that has come into the authority’s possession through the medium of a third party: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Lindberg (2009) 261 ALR 207; [2009] VSCA 234 at [50]–[51]. 334. (1998) 70 SASR 281. 335. (2004) 211 ALR 380 at [10]–[12]. 336. Ibid at [18]: ‘It was proposed that all material be scanned or copied on to disks which would be duplicated. One copy was to be given to JMA Accounting. The other was to be retained by the Australian Government Solicitor. An undertaking was to be offered that the Australian Government Solicitor would not take access to such information for a period of 14 days in order to allow any claim of legal professional privilege to be made’. 337. Australian Taxation Office, Our Approach to Information Gathering, Ch 7; available at . See discussion in Privilege in Perspective, ALRC Report 107 (2007), [8.56]–[8.58], [8.236]–[8.240]. Citibank applied to s 77 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) by Ryan J in Re Steele; Ex parte Official Trustee in Bankruptcy v Clayton Utz (1994) 119 ALR 716. 338. Privilege in Perspective, ALRC Report 107 (2007), particularly Recommendations 8.1–8.15. 339. (1987) 163 CLR 54; (1985) 158 CLR 500, respectively. 340. (1995) 183 CLR 121. 341. [1980] AC 1028. 342. Followed by the Federal Court in Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority v Maurice (1986) 10 FCR 104. 343. For example, TPC v Port Adelaide Wool Co Pty Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 645 (Branson J); BT Australasia Pty Ltd v New South Wales (1996) 140 ALR 268 (Sackville J). See further discussion at 5.19. 344. (1999) 201 CLR 49. 345. See also the discussion of Goldberg J in Meltend Pty Ltd v Restoration Clinics of Australia Pty Ltd (1997) 145 ALR 391. 346. Donaldson v Harris and Hamood (1973) 4 SASR 299; NEMGIA v Waind (1979) 141 CLR 648 at 654 (NSW). Own-case privilege is severely restricted in the Federal Court (FCR 1979 O 15 r 7), is

abolished in Queensland (Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 14(2)) and is not available where the Uniform Acts apply. 347. But not to prevent tender at a subsequent trial: Goddard v Nationwide Building Society [1987] QB 670 at 685 (Nourse LJ). 348. Distillers Co v Times Newspapers [1975] QB 613; Riddick v Thames Board Mills [1977] 1 QB 881 at 895–6; Home Office v Harman (1983) 1 AC 280; Bailey v ABC [1995] 1 Qd R 476; Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Plowman (1995) 183 CLR 10; Allstate Life Insurance Co v ANZ Banking Group (1995) 57 FCR 360; Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125; [2008] HCA 36; Players Pty Ltd (in liq) (receivers appointed) v Clone Pty Ltd (2013) 115 SASR 547; [2013] SASCFC 25 at [108]–[109] (the court). 349. See, for example, Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 50, discussed in Hogan v ACC (2010) 240 CLR 641; [2010] HCA 21; Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 71; Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ss 291–291C; Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 126E (and various other specific Acts; for example, Witness Protection Act 1995 (NSW) s 26; Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW): applied Bissett v Deputy State Coroner (2011) 83 NSWLR 144; [2011] NSWSC 1182); Criminal Code (Qld) s 695A; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 21AV; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 69, 69A; Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 194J; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) ss 18–19; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 27; Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (ACT) ss 90–92; Evidence Act 1939 (NT) ss 17, 57, 58. See also Nettheim, ‘Open Justice versus Justice’ (1985) 9 Adel LR 987; ‘Open Justice and State Secrets’ (1986) 10 Adel LR 282 at 294–8. Examples of restricting disclosure can be found in Harbours Corp of Queensland v Vessey Chemicals Pty Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 60; Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority v Maurice (1986) 10 FCR 104; Kanthal Australia Pty Ltd v Minister for Industry, Technology and Commerce (1987) 14 FCR 90; Magellan Petroleum Australia Ltd v Sagasco Amadeus Pty Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 37; Mackay Sugar Co-op Association Ltd v CSR Ltd (1996) 63 FCR 408 (access to specified officers upon undertaking of confidentiality). 350. A most useful and comprehensive discussion of the authorities in this area is found in Vaver, ‘Without Prejudice Communications — Their Admissibility and Effect’ (1974) 9 UBC LR 85. See also Perell, ‘The Problems of Without Prejudice’ (1992) 71 Can Bar Rev 223; McNichol, The Law of Privilege, Lawbook Co, Sydney, 1992, Ch 8. This common law privilege is now complemented by a number of statutory provisions, including s 131 of the uniform legislation, protecting the confidentiality of settlement negotiations: see 5.105. 351. For arguments in favour of a wider justification ‘promoting the individual’s right to enter into such negotiations openly and without interference’ (Hoefler v Tomlinson (1995) 60 FCR 452 at 453), see McNichol, n 350 above, p 438. A contractual justification of the privilege is difficult to justify upon public policy grounds and does not sit easily with the extension of the privilege to disclosure to third parties: see McNichol, p 439, but compare with Young J’s view in Luckies v Ripley (No 2) (1994) 35 NSWLR 283 at 287. 352. In practice the privilege is most likely to be claimed in this situation. It may be argued that there is no need for a privilege even here as an admission made only for the sake of settlement would have little probative value. Wigmore used this argument to explain why admissions during negotiations are generally inadmissible by way of the privilege: Wigmore (rev Chadbourn), Evidence, Little Brown and Co, Boston, 1972, vol 4, [1061], fully discussed by Vaver, n 350 above, at 101–4; Fraser J in I Waxman and Sons Ltd v Texaco Canada Ltd (1968) 67 DLR (2d) 295 at 305–6; and McNichol, n 350 above, p 440. 353. (1957) 99 CLR 285 at 291–2. 354. See also Waldridge v Kennison (1794) 1 Esp 143; 170 ER 306 (an admission of handwriting not made as part of the negotiation). 355. For example, Davies and Davies v Nyland and O’Neil (1974) 10 SASR 76 at 89–90 (Wells J) (but see

wider view of Zelling J at 105). The House of Lords in Rush & Tompkins Ltd v Greater London Council [1989] AC 1280 at 1301 was careful to limit the privilege to ‘admissions made in a genuine attempt to reach a settlement’, referring to Cutts v Head [1984] Ch 290 at 306 (Oliver LJ). See also Quad Consulting Pty Ltd v David R Bleakley & Associates Pty Ltd (1990) 27 FCR 86 (Hill J: misrepresentations during negotiations, not being admissions, not privileged); Rosebanner Pty Ltd v Energy Australia (2009) 223 FLR 460; [2009] NSWSC 43 at [390] (Ward J); Verge v Devere Holdings Pty Ltd (2009) 258 ALR 464; [2009] FCA 832 at [5], [35], [39], [50] (McKerracher J); Betfair v Racing NSW (No 7) (2009) 260 ALR 538; [2009] FCA 1140 at [66], [70]–[74] (Jagot J: document not tendered to establish the truth of an admission); and equivocal remarks of Wilson J in National Vegetation Management Solutions Pty Ltd v Shekar Plant Hire Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 3 at [18]. 356. Re Daintry; Ex parte Holt [1893] 2 QB 116. 357. Tenstat v Permanent Trustee (Aust) Ltd (1992) 28 NSWLR 625 at 633 (McLelland J). 358. Quad Consulting Pty Ltd v David R Bleakley & Associates Pty Ltd (1990) 27 FCR 86. 359. Walker v Wisher (1889) 23 QBD 335 at 338 (Lindley LJ: to establish laches). 360. Muller v Linsley & Mortimer [1996] PNLR 74. 361. Sportsbet Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 3) [2009] FCA 1283 at [75]–[80] (Jagot J); Betfair v Racing NSW (No 7) (2009) 260 ALR 538; [2009] FCA 1140 at [66], [70]–[74] (Jagot J). 362. Williams v Nicoski [2003] WASC 131 at [306]–[318] (Barker J); Johnston v Morien [2006] WADC 46 at [48] (Sleight DCJ). See also Village/Nine Network Restaurants & Bars Pty Ltd v Mercantile Mutual Custodians Pty Ltd [2001] 1 Qd R 276; [1999] QCA 276 at [14]–[15] (Pincus J), [36]–[40]; Cooper v van Heeren [2007] 3 NZLR 783 at [31]–[41] (Hamond and France JJ). For the arguments in favour of giving the privilege a wider scope, see McNichol, n 350 above, pp 435–6; and Zuckerman, n 2 above, at [17.7]–[17.9]. 363. [2000] 1 WLR 2436. 364. [2009] UKHL 16 (Lord Scott dissenting). 365. [2009] SASC 377 (CA) at [100] (Duggan J, Sulan and Kourakis JJ agreeing). 366. Ibid at [104]: ‘The determination as to whether a particular communication is privileged: “… depends upon what formed part of the negotiations for the settlement of the action and what was reasonably incidental thereto”’. 367. A civil dispute with criminal aspects remains covered by the privilege: Liu v Fairfax Newspapers Ltd (2012) 84 NSWLR 547; [2012] NSWSC 1352 at [106]–[117] (Beech-Jones J). 368. This broad ambit is recognised in Brown v Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 187 ALR 714; [2001] FCA 596 at [157]–[185] (Emmett J) and, on appeal, (2002) 119 FCR 269 at [103] (Sackville and Finn JJ); and by Beech-Jones J after an extensive review of authority in Liu v Fairfax Newspapers Ltd (2012) 84 NSWLR 547; [2012] NSWSC 1352 at [42]–[80] (s 131 not limited to admissions), [81]–[87] (and can be claimed against persons not party to the dispute). But in GPI Leisure Corp Ltd (in liq) v Yuill (1997) 42 NSWLR 225 at 226, Young J suggests there are limits and that communications should be ‘directly connected’ rather than ‘in any way connected’. Followed in Galafassi v Kelly (2014) 87 NSWLR 119; [2014] NSWCA 190 at [115]–[122], [126]–[133] (Gleeson JA, Ward JA agreeing) in rejecting claim to privilege. However, opening shots in negotiations are covered and negotiations do not need to be at the stage where any formal offer to compromise has been made: Korean Air Lines v ACCC (No 3) (2008) 247 ALR 781; [2008] FCA 701 at [72]–[75] (Jacobson J); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (2009) 259 ALR 541; [2009] FCA 1075 at [61]–[65] (Foster J). 369. [1989] AC 1280. 370. Austotel Management Pty Ltd v Jamieson (1995) 57 FCR 411 (Burchett J); Western Australia v Southern

Equities Corp Ltd (1996) 142 ALR 597 (Fed Ct, French J). See also Hong Kong Bank of Australia Ltd v Murphy (1992) 28 NSWLR 512 at 522. 371. [2009] SASC 377 (CA) at [84]. 372. (2012) 84 NSWLR 547; [2012] NSWSC 1352 at [81]–[87] (Beech-Jones J). 373. (1955) 99 CLR 285 at 292. 374. [1954] 1 WLR 271 at 274. 375. A court may always refuse discovery on the basis that it is not necessary for disposing of the issues in the case: see 5.83. 376. For example, Rabin v Mendoza and Co [1954] 1 WLR 271; South Shropshire DC v Amos [1986] 1 WLR 1271. 377. The use of the disclaimer on the first of a series of letters may privilege the whole correspondence, certainly the answer: see Paddock v Forrester (1842) 3 Man & G 903; 133 ER 1404. 378. Rodgers v Rodgers (1964) 114 CLR 608 at 614; Luckies v Ripley (No 2) (1994) 35 NSWLR 283 (where Young J applied the privilege to pre-trial negotiations held in the presence of solicitors where the object was not to achieve a full settlement but to agree upon valuations of the property in dispute so that litigation might be shortened); Harrington v Lowe (1996) 136 ALR 42 at 48–9 (Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ). 379. Gregory v Philip Morris Ltd (1988) 80 ALR 455 at 475 (Full Ct Fed Ct); Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts (1989) 88 ALR 69 at 73 (Beaumont J). 380. Ofulue v Bossert [2009] UKHL 16 at [2] (Lord Hope). But cf Jadwan Pty Ltd v Porter (No 2) (2004) 13 Tas R 219; [2004] TASSC 126, where counsel’s disclosures during a hearing, and not during settlement negotiations, preceded by the words ‘off the record’ and ‘without prejudice’ were held not to give rise to any legal obligation of confidentiality. 381. Cory v Bretton (1830) 4 Car & P 462; 172 ER 783; South Shropshire DC v Amos [1986] 1 WLR 1271. 382. Cheddar Valley Engineering Ltd v Chaddlewood Homes Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 820; cf Dixon’s Stores Group Ltd v Thames Television plc [1993] 1 All ER 349 at 351. 383. See, for example, GPI Leisure Corp Ltd (in liq) v Yuill (1997) 42 NSWLR 225 at 226 (Young J: words ‘without prejudice’ are simply evidence of an attempt to negotiate a settlement); Korean Air Lines v ACCC (No 3) (2008) 247 ALR 781; [2008] FCA 701 at [72]–[75] (Jacobson J: opening shots prior to any formal offers are within s 131). And see further Odgers, n 73 above, at [EA.131.270(1)]. 384. See further cases at n 368 above. 385. (1974) 10 SASR 76 at 89–90; see also Thomas v Austen (1823) 1 LJ (OS) KB 99, where an admission was held to be unqualified and not for the sake of peaceful negotiations. 386. [2000] 1 WLR 2436 at 2449. 387. See cases at nn 356–358 above. In Liu v Fairfax Newspapers Ltd (2012) 84 NSWLR 547; [2012] NSWSC 1352 at [118]–[128], Beech-Jones J held that s 131(2)(i) was limited to communications that themselves have substantive legal consequences and are not merely relevant as evidence of rights. See also Pihiga Pty Ltd v Roche (2011) 278 ALR 209; [2011] FCA 240 at [126]–[127] (Lander J); Lexcray v Northern Territory (2015) 292 FLR 447; [2015] NTSC 11 at [25] (Kelly J) and Odgers, n 73 above, at [EA.131.540]. 388. In Pihiga Pty Ltd v Roche [2011] FCA 240, Lander J, after extensive discussion of the common law authorities, and recognising that the privilege extends beyond mere admissions, emphasised the public policy basis of the privilege in refusing to let it act as a cloak to prevent disclosure of negotiations to prove that the resulting agreement was a consequence of a party being misled.

389. See cases at nn 359–361 above. 390. (1995) 60 FCR 452. 391. Tomlin v Standard Telephones and Cables Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1378; Biala Pty Ltd v Mallina Holdings Ltd [1990] WAR 174; Austotel Management Pty Ltd v Jamieson (1995) 57 FCR 411 at 418–19 (Burchett J); Langford v Cleary (No 2) (1998) 8 Tas R 52 at 62 (Slicer J). 392. Bentley v Nelson [1963] WAR 89. 393. State Rail Authority of NSW v Smith (1998) 45 NSWLR 382 at 385. 394. SWV Pty Ltd v Spiroc Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 668 at [41]–[45] (Barrett J: the privilege goes in respect of all separate attempts to settle the dispute); Piliga Pty Ltd v Roche (2011) 278 ALR 209; [2011] FCA 240. 395. [1989] AC 1280; followed in DPP v Walsh [1990] WAR 25. 396. See generally McNichol, n 350 above, pp 448–55. 397. (1889) 23 QBD 335. 398. Cutts v Head [1984] Ch 290 at 306 (Oliver LJ: ‘As a practical matter, a consciousness of a risk as to costs if reasonable offers are refused can only encourage settlement …’). 399. [1975] 3 All ER 333. 400. Cutts v Head [1984] Ch 290. 401. See, for example, Coshott v Burke [2013] FCA 513. This section only removes the bar to admissibility under s 131 and does not effect a bar to admissibility demanded by other legislation: Tony Azzi (Automobiles) Pty Ltd v Volvo Car Australia Pty Ltd (2007) 71 NSWLR 140; [2007] NSWSC 375. 402. See the discussion in Vaver, n 350 above, at 139–41. 403. Sentencing of Federal Offenders, ALRC Interim Report 15 (1980); Mack, Pleading Guilty: Issues and Practices, AIJA, Melbourne, 1996. 404. Cf Re Ramsay (1870) LR 3 PC 427. 405. Davies and Davies v Nyland and O’Neil (1974) 10 SASR 76 at 90. 406. The principles upon which confessions are excluded are discussed at 8.121ff. 407. (2012) 84 NSWLR 547; [2012] NSWSC 1352 at [106]–[117]. 408. (1889) 23 QBD 335 at 337, 338: Cheddar Valley Engineering Ltd v Chaddlewood Homes Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 820 may, for the same reason, have implicitly accepted that both parties must waive. 409. [1975] Qd R 266 at 267. 410. Followed by Hill J in Quad Consulting Pty Ltd v David Bleakley & Associates Pty Ltd (1990) 27 FCR 86 at 93. 411. (1880) 6 VLR (L) 1. 412. (1996) 142 ALR 597 (Fed Ct). 413. [2009] SASC 377 (CA) at [96]. 414. Kong v Kang [2014] VSC 28 at [66] (s 122(2) — party acting in a way that is inconsistent ‘with objecting to the adducing of the evidence’ — does not apply to s 131). Chapman v Allan and Draper (1999) 74 SASR 274 at [83]–[92] (mutual consent to tender required under s 67C). 415. This provision does not permit implied waiver through mere allegation in pleadings. 416. I Waxman and Sons Ltd v Texaco Canada Ltd (1968) 67 DLR(2d) 295; Rush & Tompkins Pty Ltd v Greater London Council [1989] AC 1280. See Vaver, n 350 above, at 141–2 for previous English authorities.

417. Cf Wigmore’s justification of the privilege in Wigmore, n 352 above, vol 4, [1061] fully discussed by Vaver, n 350 above, at 101–4; and by Fraser J in I Waxman and Sons Ltd v Texaco Canada Ltd (1968) 67 DLR(2d) 295 at 305–6. 418. See Davies and Davies v Nyland and O’Neil (1974) 10 SASR 76 at 90. 419. For example, Field v Commissioner for Railways for New South Wales (1955) 99 CLR 285 at 291–2; Rush & Tompkins Pty Ltd v Greater London Council [1989] AC 1280. 420. Theodoropoulas v Theordoropoulas [1964] P 311. 421. Ibid; Vaver, n 350 above, at 107. 422. McFadden v Snow (1952) 69 WN (NSW) 8 at 10; Pitts v Adney [1961] NSWR 535; Hoare v O’Neill (1961) 78 WN (NSW) 882; AMEV Finance Ltd v Artes Studios Thoroughbreds Pty Ltd (1988) 13 NSWLR 486; JA McBeath Nominees Pty Ltd v Jenkins Development Corp Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 121 at 134 (Ryan J); Austotel Management Pty Ltd v Jamieson (1995) 57 FCR 411 at 418 (Burchett J). See also Unilever plc v Procter and Gamble Co [2001] 1 All ER 783, followed in Pihiga Pty Ltd v Roche [2011] FCA 240 (Lander J) emphasising that the public interest in the privilege cannot be abused. 423. Rodgers v Rodgers (1964) 114 CLR 608. In Re D (Minors) [1993] 2 WLR 721, the Court of Appeal suggests that the privilege applying to matrimonial conciliation, based on the public interest in stability of marriage, is separate from and may be wider than what it calls the ‘without prejudice’ privilege. 424. Mole v Mole [1951] P 21. 425. Ibid; Henley v Henley [1955] P 202. 426. Constable v Constable [1964] SASR 68; R v Nottinghamshire Justices; Ex parte Bostock [1970] 1 WLR 1117. 427. For example, Family and Community Services Act 1972 (SA) s 246; Bell v Bell [1970] SASR 310. Legislation also now exists to protect confidential communications with professional advisers more generally: see 5.214 below. 428. Lock v Lock [1966] SASR 245; Re D (Infants) [1970] 1 WLR 599. 429. For example: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pt 2 Divs 2, 3; Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 s 53B; Community Justice Centres Act 1983 (NSW) s 28(4), (5); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 67C (applied in District Council of Mallala v Livestock Markets Ltd (2006) 94 SASR 258; [2006] SASC 80); Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 (Vic) ss 21L, 21M; Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) ss 71, 72. See generally Astor and Chinkin, Dispute Resolution in Australia, 2nd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2002, pp 181–3; Boulle and Field, Australian Dispute Resolution Law and Practice, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2016; Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 5th ed, Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2016, pp 517–19. 430. See, for example, Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 65(6); District Court Act 1991 (SA) s 32(3). For further examples of legislation and rules, see Chapter 1, n 7. 431. For a comprehensive treatment of the possible rationales, see Dolinko, ‘Is There a Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?’ (1986) 33 UCLA LR 1019. 432. Wigmore (rev McNaughton), Evidence, Little Brown and Co, Boston, 1961, vol 8, [2250]; Levy, Origins of the Fifth Amendment, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1968. 433. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary Criminal Trial, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003. Other parallel scholarship is summarised in Hempholz et al, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Its Origins and Development, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1997. See also McHugh J in Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50 at [118]ff. 434. Although it sat uneasily beside examination of suspects on oath — the ex officio oath. 435. Dubious as it was either collected by professional informers or given by other accused who had turned

Queen’s evidence in return for leniency. 436. Failure to answer was equivalent to confessing the prosecution case. 437. (2014) 253 CLR 455; [2014] HCA 20 at [34]–[35]. 438. For removal, see Dolinko, n 431 above; Zuckerman, ‘The Right Against Self-Incrimination: An Obstacle to the Supervision of Interrogation’ (1986) 102 LQR 42; ‘Trial by Unfair Means — The Report of the Working Group on the Right of Silence’ [1989] Crim LR 855; Thomas, ‘The So-called Right to Silence’ (1991) 14 NZULR 299; Robertson, ‘The Right to Silence Ill-Considered’ (1991) 21 VUWLR 139. For retention, see Galligan, ‘The Right to Silence Reconsidered’ (1988) 14 CLP 69. For more recent contributions to these and subsequent debates, spanning England, the US and Australia, see Weisselberg and Bibas, ‘The Right to Remain Silent’ (2010) 159 U Penn LR PEN Numbra 69; Daly, ‘The Right to Silence: Inferences and Interference’ (2014) 47 ANZ J Crim 59; Griffin, ‘Silence, Confessions and the New Accuracy Imperative’ (2016) 65 Duke LJ 697. 439. (1993) 178 CLR 477. 440. (2013) 248 CLR 92; [2013] HCA 29. 441. (2016) 256 CLR 459; [2016] HCA 8. 442. (2014) 253 CLR 455; [2014] HCA 20. 443. Magarey, ‘The Right to Silence’, unpublished honours dissertation, Law School, Adelaide University, Adelaide, 1990. This problem of inference is emphasised in critiques of s 89A of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW); see Dixon and Daly, ‘The Right to Silence: Inferences and Interference’ (2014) 47 ANZ J Crim 59; ‘Silence Rights’ [2014] UNSWLRS 9; Hamer, ‘NSW Right to Silence Reforms’, paper presented to Seminar organised by Sydney Institute of Criminology and NSW Bar Association, 11 February 2013. For a probabilistic analysis of the inferences from silence, see Hamer, ‘The Privilege of Silence and the Persistent Risk of Self-Incrimination’ (2004) 28 Crim LJ 160 (Pt I), 200 (Pt II). 444. See generally Gooderson, ‘The Evidence of Co-Prisoners’ (1953) 11 Camb LJ 209; and Heydon, ‘Obtaining Evidence versus Protecting the Accused’ [1971] Crim LR 13. 445. R v Payne [1950] 1 All ER 102. This is, however, only a rule of practice (a matter of residual discretion) and as long as the jury is fully aware of the circumstances and properly directed it is unlikely that an appellate court will find a miscarriage of justice: R v Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153; Rozenes v Beljajev (1995) 1 VR 533. 446. An accused may apply to have trials separated ‘in the interests of justice’: see further at 3.78. 447. R v Pipe (1967) 51 Cr App R 17. Again, this is only a rule of practice, a matter of residual discretion, and in R v McLean and Funk; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 231, the CCA refused to interfere with the trial judge’s decision to allow an indemnified accomplice to testify notwithstanding the possibility of other charges against the accomplice and notwithstanding the incentive to please the authorities. The jury had been appropriately directed. See also Rozenes v Beljajev (1995) 1 VR 533. 448. R v Rudd (1948) 32 Cr App R 138. 449. R v Paul [1920] 2 KB 183. Once a witness testifies, all parties may cross-examine the witness to elicit relevant information: R v Hilton [1972] 1 QB 421. 450. Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 8(1)(a). In South Australia, a defendant is only a competent witness for the defence: Evidence Act 1929 s 18(1). 451. The history of the unsworn statement is traced in R v Stuart [1959] SASR 144 at 148ff. It is there suggested that, until the Prisoners Counsel Act 1836 (UK), defence counsel were permitted only on charges for misdemeanour, but Langbein’s research (see n 433 above) suggests the indulgence was extended to charges for felony well before this legislation was passed.

452. The current legislation, which does differ in detail from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, is as follows: Uniform Evidence Acts ss 12, 17(3), 20, 21, 104; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) ss 8(1), 15; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 18, 18A; Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) Pt 4 Div 6 (which replaces s 20 of the uniform legislation); Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 8, 97(2); Criminal Code (NT) s 360(1). 453. The distinction between a permissible comment on factual inferences a jury may draw and a required direction against impermissible inferences and reasoning is drawn by the majority in RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620 at [41]–[43]; Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50 at [49]–[50]; and Mahmood v Western Australia (2008) 232 CLR 397; [2008] HCA 1 at [15]–[18] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Kiefel JJ). See also 2.12 n 41. 454. There is no obligation upon the judge to commend the accused to the jury for testifying on oath: Wyatt v R (1992) 35 FCR 422. 455. The specific provisions relating to comment are Uniform Evidence Acts s 20; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 18(1)(b); Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) Pt 4 Div 6 (which replaces s 20 of the uniform legislation); Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 8(1)(c). There are no statutory prohibitions upon comment in Queensland. 456. The extent of this prohibition being equivalent to the prohibition in other legislation on judicial comment: Siebel v R (1992) 58 SASR 558. The strictness of the prohibition is emphasised in AJE v Western Australia (2012) 225 A Crim R 242; [2012] WASCA 185 at [25]–[35] (Mazza JA and Beech J); cf decision in Challis v Western Australia (2014) 237 A Crim R 283; [2014] WASCA 8 not to allow appeal. 457. R v Thornton (1980) 3 A Crim R 80 (CCA (Vic)); R v George and Price (1981) 4 A Crim R 12 (CCA (NSW)); Siebel v R (1992) 58 SASR 558 (CCA); R v Su (1995) 129 FLR 120 at 139–43 (CCA (Vic)); Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50 at [153] (McHugh J); R v Porter (2003) 85 SASR 581 at [54] (Sulan J). Where an accused made an unsworn statement the prohibition did not prevent an explanation of the evidentiary weight to be given to that statement, so long as no reference was made to the fact that the accused might have made that explanation on oath: Bataillard v R (1907) 4 CLR 1282 at 1291; Bridge v R (1964) 118 CLR 600; R v Humphries [1972] 2 NSWLR 783; R v Greciun-King [1981] 2 NSWLR 469. Cf R v Kostaras (No 2) (2003) 143 A Crim R 254 at [96]–[108] (no prohibited comment where accused’s testimony from previous trial read to the jury and prosecutor and judge commented that the jury was at a disadvantage in assessing its credibility as the evidence was not given in person subject to cross-examination). Whether the implicit inferences permitted in all the above cases can be reconciled with the inferences now permitted by Azzopardi and Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285 is another matter. Cf discussion at 5.120ff. 458. See the critical comments of Street CJ in R v Greciun-King [1981] 2 NSWLR 469 at 471–2; and Charles and Chernov JJ in R v Johnson, Sonnet and Paisley (2001) 126 A Crim R 395 at [107]. It creates particular problems in directing the jury where one co-accused testifies but the other does not: see, for example, R v Phillips [1997] 1 VR 558 at 560–1 (Callaway JA) (even where comment is permitted the court must walk a tightrope: Tulic v R (1999) 91 FCR 222 at 225–6). In R v Anastosiou (aka Peters) (1991) 21 NSWLR 394, it was suggested that a general comment on the accused’s right not to testify made in a prosecutor’s opening statement was not a prohibited comment. 459. See Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217 at 224–5 (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ), 234 (Brennan and Toohey JJ); Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50 at [43]–[44] (Gaudron, Kirby, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 460. Although it is clear from the cases referred to in the next footnote that the High Court would never accept such an argument. 461. Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217; RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620; Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50; Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285.

462. Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50 at [34] (Gaudron, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ); Tumahole Bereng v R [1949] AC 253 (no corroborating inference from accused’s silence). 463. In R v Villar; R v Zugecic [2004] NSWCCA 302 at [119], cases decided under state legislation (see, for example, cases at n 457) were referred to in determining what is prohibited comment. 464. R v Tran and To (2006) 96 SASR 8 at [42]–[44] (Duggan J). 465. Cf comments in Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50 at [54]. 466. See in particular the (dissenting) arguments of Gleeson CJ and McHugh J in Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50. Thus, authorities suggest that failure to explain makes stronger the inference of theft from recent possession: R v Bruce [1988] VR 579; (1987) 61 ALJR 603; R v Wanganeen (1988) 50 SASR 433; Petty and Maiden v R (1991) 173 CLR 95 at 125–6 (Gaudron J). The status of these authorities may be affected by the majority view in Azzopardi. 467. This might be explained as a ‘companion principle’ if it is assumed to be a principle separate from the privilege against self-incrimination: see 5.107 above. Both define the common law accusorial trial and are protected by the ‘principle of legality’ demanding that a legislative intention to modify them be expressed with irresistible clarity: see X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92 at [87] (Hayne and Bell JJ) discussed further at 5.183. 468. (2001) 205 CLR 50. 469. Thus, in R v JJT (2006) 67 NSWLR 152; [2006] NSWCCA 283 at [77], the comment, ‘it is usually easier to accept uncontradicted evidence than evidence that is actively disputed’ was held erroneous, although not of significance in the circumstances of the appeal. 470. (2001) 205 CLR 50 at [68]. What ‘comments’ (as opposed to ‘directions’) are made by a judge remain within his or her discretion and ‘as with all judicial comments on the facts in a jury trial it will often be better (and safer) for the judge to leave the assessment of the facts to the determination of the jury in the light of the submissions by the parties’: Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50 at [52]. A judge who ‘directs’ rather than ‘comments’ in respect of the appropriate inference is in error: R v Law (2001) 122 A Crim R 542; [2001] NSWCCA 291 at [21] (Newman AJ). 471. Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217, as explained by the majority in Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50. For examples of permissible comment, see R v Smith (1998) 71 SASR 543 at 561–2 (Perry J); R v Porter (2003) 85 SASR 581 at [42]–[59]. In Council of the NSW Bar Association v Power (2008) 71 NSWLR 451; [2008] NSWCCA 135 at [22], it was held that a fortiori this inference could be drawn in civil proceedings even if for a civil penalty. 472. McHugh J emphasises the inconsistency between the majority’s conclusion and their apparent support for the proposition that the right to silence permits no inference from an accused’s failure to testify. McHugh J argues that acceptance of the inroad recognises that the right to silence should not be, and has never been, interpreted to prevent appropriate common sense inferences being drawn from an accused’s failure to testify. 473. See also Davies, ‘The Prohibition Against Adverse Inferences from Silence: A Rule Without Reason’ (2000) 74 Aust LJ 26 at 99; and ‘Application of Weissensteiner to Direct Evidence’ (2000) 74 Aust LJ 371. 474. R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359; [2000] NSWCCA 503 at [162]–[165] (Spigelman CJ); R v Mai (2000) 119 A Crim R 327; [2000] NSWCCA 517 at [14] (Hidden J). 475. Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217 at 228 (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ); Tulic v R (1999) 91 FCR 222 at 236–7; R v Wilson (2005) 62 NSWLR 346 at [14] (Hunt AJA explaining that this comment is only necessary where the accused’s failure to testify may legitimately be taken into account in deciding whether to accept the prosecution case and is not required where the jury is directed to

draw no inference from that failure). 476. It has been held that the question on appeal remains whether the failure to direct in these terms has resulted in a miscarriage of justice: R v Wilson (2005) 62 NSWLR 346 at [15], [25], [35] (Hunt AJA: ‘It has never been suggested that, where it becomes “desirable” in the particular case to give only the first two ingredients of the Azzopardi direction, the failure to give a ritual incantation of the whole direction is an error giving rise to a miscarriage of justice’: at [25]). In Wilson, as in R v Richards (2002) 128 A Crim R 204 (CCA (NSW)) at [24]–[34], counsel had sought no direction at trial and its absence was held not such a fundamental flaw that leave to appeal should be given under s 4 of the Criminal Appeal Rules. See also R v Surrey [2005] 2 Qd R 81; [2005] QCA 4. But cf stricter approach taken in Victoria: Burke (a pseudonym) v R (2013) 40 VR 161; [2013] VSCA 351 at [69]–[75], [101] (Redlich, Weinberg and Priest JJA), now modified by Jury Directions Act 2015 s 16, and s 41 requiring counsel to request direction. 477. R v Vaughan (1997) 98 A Crim R 239 at 243 (Dunford J); but cf R v Wilson (2005) 62 NSWLR 346 at [14] (Hunt AJA), discussed at n 476 above. In Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285, which dealt with the related situation where the accused fails to call a witness, Gaudron and Hayne JJ at [15] were clear about the need for such a direction, whereas Callinan J at [123] thought that ‘in almost all cases a trial judge should say nothing about an absent material witness whom an accused might supposedly have called. At most, a trial judge might in some [rare] circumstances have occasion to say that the jury should act upon the evidence, and only the evidence that has been called’. Kirby J does not appear to have said anything about the need for a further direction. 478. Waugh v R [1950] AC 203 at 211–12. 479. (1993) 178 CLR 217. 480. The NSW CCA endorsed this wide approach: R v OGD (1997) 45 NSWLR 744; R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405. It was retracted following RPS and Azzopardi: see R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359; R v Mai (2000) 119 A Crim R 327; R v Law (2001) 122 A Crim R 542. 481. (2000) 199 CLR 620: the mother testified that the accused had denied to her that he had ever had intercourse with the victim but had admitted that everything else the victim alleged was true. 482. Callinan J (at [108]) was of the opinion that a Weissensteiner direction is a prohibited comment under s 20. The majority judgment does not expressly consider this question but does say (at [20]) that the permitted comment under s 20 is co-extensive with that at common law. 483. For further examples, see R v Cengiz [1998] 3 VR 720 at 729–30 (Charles JA); R v Cervelli [1998] 3 VR 776 at 784 (Charles JA); R v Sargent (2001) 80 SASR 184 at [47]. 484. R v Moran and Mokbel [1999] 2 VR 87; Brooks v The Police (2013) 116 SASR 234; [2013] SASC 81 at [33] (White J). 485. R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359 at [139] (Spigelman CJ). But compare with remarks by Doyle CJ and Ollson J in R v Ellis (1998) 100 A Crim R 49; and R v Davis [1999] NSWCCA 15 at [49]–[51] (Wood CJ at CL) suggesting presence of explanation in police interview does not prevent an adverse inference arising. 486. R v Visser (2000) 9 Tas R 285 at [7] (Blow J); Lane v Hales (2000) 155 FLR 102 at [19] (Mildren J). 487. RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620 at [34], [39]. 488. Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217 at 228: ‘[A] jury should not be invited to take into account the failure of the accused to give evidence unless that failure is clearly capable of assisting them in the evaluation of the evidence before them’. In Collie v The Police (2013) 115 SASR 281; [2013] SASC 15, Nicholson J refused to draw an adverse inference as it could only be drawn by first assuming the accused’s guilt.

489. Weissensteiner ibid at 228 (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ); Tulic v R (1999) 91 FCR 222 at 236–7. 490. (2000) 9 Tas R 285. 491. R v Kanaveilomani [1995] 2 Qd R 242 (cf R v Demeter [1995] 2 Qd R 626 decided before Azzopardi and Maxwell P in Butler v R (2011) 34 VR 165; [2011] VSCA 417 at [33]–[37]) and see comment of Spigelman CJ in R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359; [2000] NSWCCA 503 at [169], referring to dicta in RPS. See also Davies (2000) 74 Aust LJ 371, n 473 above. The matter receives no emphasis in Azzopardi, although at [81] the majority recognise that whether comment is permitted may depend upon how the prosecution case is presented. 492. In the United Kingdom, such inferences ‘as appear proper’ may be drawn against an accused who fails to testify: Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (UK) s 35; and see Dennis, The Law of Evidence, 5th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2013, [13.010]–[13.014]. 493. (2002) 210 CLR 285. 494. (2006) 96 SASR 207; [2006] SASC 369. 495. [2015] SASC 41 at [23]. 496. Lord Diplock in Hall v R [1971] 1 WLR 298 at 301 (although he does go on to say that such silence may be relied upon in ‘exceptional circumstances’). 497. On the adoption of the Judges’ Rules in Australia, see Teh, ‘An Examination of the Judges’ Rules in Australia’ (1972) 46 Aust LJ 489. The appropriate time for the caution is discussed by Wells J in R v Williams (1976) 14 SASR 1. The text of the Judges’ Rules is annexed to Wells J’s judgment in R v Lavery (No 2) (1979) 20 SASR 430. 498. (1988) 35 A Crim 232 at 239–40: see also R v Dolan (1992) 58 SASR 501 at 505; Sell v R (1995) 15 WAR 240; R v Murphy (1996) 66 SASR 406 at 414; and further at 8.149. 499. The relevant legislation is: Uniform Acts s 139; Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 23F; Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) s 431; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 79A. In New South Wales, s 89A of the Evidence Act 1995 also demands a caution, but explaining the possibility of adverse inference where the accused fails to mention facts later relied upon at trial: see further at 5.144. 500. This discretion is discussed in the confessional context in detail at 8.143ff. For examples of a willingness to exclude in cases of statutory breach, see the South Australian cases of R v Clark and Bennett (1986) 44 SASR 164 at 193 (Johnston J); Ouwarkerk v Whalan (1986) 41 SASR 287 (Matheson J). And see further at 8.157. 501. The common law requirement of voluntariness and its relationship to these provisions in the uniform legislation is discussed at 8.128–8.133. The admissibility of confessions generally is discussed at 8.121ff. 502. Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 QB 414. 503. R v King [1965] 1 WLR 706; Petty and Maiden v R (1991) 173 CLR 95 at 99, 106. Common law offence abolished by Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 341; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) Sch 11. 504. (1948) 76 CLR 501 at 511. 505. See the discussion at 8.133. 506. (1991) 173 CLR 95. 507. [1914] AC 545 (particularly Lord Atkinson at 554–5). 508. The possibility was expressly adverted to by Lord Reading in R v Christie [1914] AC 545 at 564–5, where R v Norton [1910] 2 KB 496 is explained as only an example of the exercise of this discretion.

509. See R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321 at 333, where Barwick CJ recognises that, in rare cases, the statement may be relevant as disclosing information to the accused; Barca v R (1975) 133 CLR 82 at 106–8 (although the judge went on to emphasise how the jury should be directed if such evidence is admitted); Straker v R (1977) 15 ALR 103 at 109, 114–15; R v Strausz (1977) 17 SASR 197 at 204 (Bray CJ). Where interrogation continues following an accused’s refusal to answer, the answers may be excluded as a matter of public policy: R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321 at 333 and the cases cited at n 516 below and in Chapter 8, nn 403, 531. 510. By the same token, a refusal to provide a non-compulsory bodily sample gives rise to no adverse inference: S v McC [1972] AC 24; R v Martin [1992] 1 NZLR 313. 511. Woon v R (1964) 109 CLR 529; Edwards v R (1993) 178 CLR 193; Ellis v R (2010) 30 VR 428; [2010] VSCA 302 at [34]–[47] (Nettle, Neave and Harper JJA, emphasising that appropriate directions may be required to ensure that the jury takes care before drawing any admissional inference from a police interview if a miscarriage of justice is to be avoided). On the reluctance of courts to infer consciousness of guilt from the accused’s lies and the directions required, see the discussion at 4.87–4.88. 512. R v Beljajev [1984] VR 657; R v McNamara [1987] VR 855; Yisrael v District Court of NSW (1996) 87 A Crim R 63; R v Heness [2009] SASC 243 (Doyle CJ: no inference where accused participated in police interview but failed to mention allegations of complainant’s blackmail). 513. Merrall v Samuels (1971) 2 SASR 378 at 391–2; R v Heness [2009] SASC 243 at [124]–[127] (Bleby J); R v Barrett (2007) 16 VR 240; [2007] VSCA 95 (but if inference permitted it must be accompanied by a strong direction to the jury to be cautious when inferring a consciousness of guilt of the specific crime charged: see further 4.88). 514. R v Strausz (1977) 17 SASR 197 at 200–4; R v Ortega-Farfan (2011) 215 A Crim R 251; [2011] QCA 364 (allowing appeal as preliminary editing of transcript denied jury context to meaningfully assess whether conversation gave rise to a consciousness of guilt; and even with context conversation ‘at best equivocal evidence that accused guilty’). 515. Woon v R (1964) 109 CLR 529 at 541; R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321 at 331–3; Forrest v Normandale (1973) 5 SASR 524 at 541; R v Router (1977) 14 ALR 365 at 375 (CCA (NSW)); R v Salahattin [1983] 1 VR 521 at 528; R v Beljajev [1984] VR 657 at 662; King v R (1986) 15 FCR 427; R v McNamara [1987] VR 855; Yisrael v District Court of NSW (1996) 87 A Crim R 63. 516. Once an accused refuses to answer, any subsequent conversation should generally be excluded: R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321 at 333; R v Stafford (1976) 13 SASR 392 at 398–9; R v Hart [1979] Qd R 8 at 13; R v Cumes (1990) 102 FLR 113 (SC (NT), Nader J); R v Pfennig (No 1) (1992) 57 SASR 507 (confession to a fellow prisoner on remand acting as a police informer was excluded where the accused had previously refused to answer questions); R v Harris (1995) 64 SASR 85; Swaffield v R; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159. But questioning after refusal will not necessarily lead to exclusion either on grounds of involuntariness nor as a matter of discretion: Merritt & Roso v R (1985) 19 A Crim R 360 at 375; R v Clarke (1997) 97 A Crim R 414 at 419 (Hunt CJ at CL); R v Phan [2001] NSWCCA 29; (2001) 53 NSWLR 480 at [54]–[56]; R v Crooks [2001] 2 Qd R 541; R v Ng (2002) 5 VR 257 at [119]; Durham v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 121 (point at which ‘no comment’ asserted indicated consciousness of guilt). 517. R v Thomas [1970] VR 674 at 679; Barca v R (1975) 133 CLR 82 at 107; R v Chandler [1976] 1 WLR 585; R v Salahattin [1983] 1 VR 521; R v CBL and BCT [2014] 2 Qd R 331; [2014] QCA 93 at [126]– [127] (admissional matters must be within personal knowledge of silent accused). 518. (1991) 173 CLR 95. See R v Starr [1969] QWN 23, which holds that, as a suspect may appreciate the right to silence before it is explained by the caution, no inference may be drawn from any silence; and Hall v R [1971] 1 WLR 298, where silence before caution was held to give rise to no inference other than in ‘exceptional circumstances’. Brennan J in Petty and Maiden at 105 specifically disapproves of

those cases in which guilt was inferred from the accused’s silence before caution. 519. R v Parkes (1976) 64 Cr App R 25, expressly approved by Brennan J in Petty and Maiden at 107. But rarely in such a case will the accused’s reaction be one of mere silence, as it was not in Parkes. In R v Alexander [1994] 2 VR 239 at 258–63, conversations with acquaintances by the accused after he had been charged with his wife’s murder in which he had asserted the police had no evidence and had left the forensic evidence too late, and in which he had failed to assert his innocence, were held by the Full Court capable of being regarded by the jury as admissional. Alexander applied in Sibanda v R (2011) 53 VR 67; [2011] VSCA 285 at [68]–[77] (Sifris AJA, Nettle and Neave JJA agreeing). In R v MMJ (2006) 166 A Crim R 501; [2006] VSCA 226, it was accepted by Warren CJ (at [18]) that the accused’s silence in the face of allegations by his wife that he had committed sexual misconduct with their daughter was admissible, but (at [30]), that just as in the case of lies relied upon as demonstrating a consciousness of guilt, the jury should have been directed only to draw such an inference if satisfied that the accused remained silent because he knew he could otherwise be implicated (see also Ashley JA, Buchanan JA agreeing, at [86]–[92] for the precise directions they considered required in the circumstances). MJJ applied in Christian v R (2012) 223 A Crim R 370; [2012] NSWCCA 34 at [81]–[83] (McClellan CJ at CL, Latham and Harrison JJ agreeing) to demand further directions about ‘admissions’ to be inferred from the accused’s confrontation by the complainant. In R v CBL; R v BCT (2014) 240 A Crim R 492; [2014] QCA 93, accused’s failure to disassociate herself from co-accused’s implicating lies could give rise to admissional inference. See also Xypolitis v R [2014] VSCA 339 at [80], permitting admissional inference from, inter alia, the failure to inform anyone of the death and disposal of the deceased. 520. R v Bouquet (1962) 62 SR (NSW) 563; R v Ryan (1964) 50 Cr App R 144; R v Hoare (1966) 50 Cr App R 166; R v Sullivan (1966) 51 Cr App R 102; R v Sadaraka [1981] 2 NSWLR 459 at 462; R v McNamara [1987] VR 855; R v Bruce [1988] VR 579. 521. R v McNamara [1987] VR 855. Other courts hold that it may be permissible to reveal the mere fact that the accused has not disclosed a defence beforehand: R v Gilbert (1977) 66 Cr App R 237; R v Lopatta (1983) 35 SASR 101 at 113–15; R v Beljajev [1984] VR 657; King v R (1986) 15 FCR 427. 522. See the legislation listed at n 50 above. 523. (1991) 173 CLR 95: followed in Glennon v R (1994) 179 CLR 1. Applied in, for example, Wilson v County Court of Victoria (2006) 14 VR 461; [2006] VSC 322 (judge’s use of accused’s no comment answer to impugn his credibility an error of law); R v Heness [2009] SASC 243 (judge required to direct jury to draw no infererence from accused’s failure to disclose allegations of blackmail at police interview). Other judges previously expressed similar views: see, for example, Cosgrove J in Harris v R [1988] Tas R 31. 524. R v Mann (1972) 56 Cr App R 750; R v McNamara [1987] VR 855 at 865; R v Welch [1992] Crim LR 368. 525. (1992) 29 NSWLR 109; see also R v Naudi [1999] NSWCCA 259 at [16] (Windeyer J); cf Callinan J’s stricter approach in Graham v R (1998) 195 CLR 606 at [38]–[45]. 526. [1996] 1 Qd R 512. See also Callander v R (2004) 144 NTR 1 at [22]–[23] (where revelation of accused’s silence at the third interview at which he refused to answer questions so favoured the accused that the court held the absence of a direction to the jury to draw no adverse inference could provide no basis for a successful appeal). 527. DPP v Butay (2001) 124 A Crim R 41 (revelation of silence in prosecutor’s opening led to discharge of jury). See also argument of White, ‘Silence is Golden?’ (1998) 72 Aust LJ 539. 528. R v Naudi [1999] NSWCCA 259 at [16]; R v Hodge [2002] NSWCCA 10 at [29]–[32]. 529. (1986) 15 FCR 427 at 436: referring to R v Sadaraka [1981] 2 NSWLR 459; and R v Beljajev [1984]

VR 657. This approach was also taken in R v Hunter and Daebler (1989) 51 SASR 158 at 164–5. In Mackrell v Western Australia (2008) 190 A Crim R 43; [2008] WASCA 228, the failure of the trial judge to correct improper comments by the prosecutor on the inference from the accused’s silence was held an error of law, but the proviso was applied to dismiss the appeal. 530. The Reeves approach appears to have been followed in Callander v R (2004) 144 NTR 1 at [23]. 531. So that under s 89(1), selective answering may not give rise to an unfavourable inference: King v R (1986) 15 FCR 427 at 436. At common law, selective answering may give rise to such an inference: see nn 512–513 above. 532. The section was amended following Recommendation 10.1 of Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005) to extend to silence beyond ‘official questioning’. 533. Unless the silence is a material fact in issue, although it is often disclosed to show that police gave the accused an opportunity to respond (see 5.143), it may be difficult to conclude it is otherwise strictly relevant under s 55(1): see further Odgers, n 73 above, at [EA.89.150], [1.3.9550]. 534. The legislation is based upon s 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (UK), discussed in Dennis, n 492 above, [5.025]–[5.036]. It is critiqued by Dixon and Cowdery, ‘Silence Rights’ [2014] UNSWLRS 9. See also Odgers, n 73 above, at [EA.89A.30]. Not applied in R v Jafary [2016] NSWDC 41, as accused had refused to participate in official questioning and no adverse inferences could be drawn. 535. Pyneboard Pty Ltd v TPC (1983) 152 CLR 328; Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281; Controlled Consultants Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (1985) 156 CLR 385; Police Service Board v Morris (1985) 156 CLR 397; Hamilton v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 486; Reid v Howard (1995) 184 CLR 1; X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92; [2013] HCA 29; Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196; [2013] HCA 39. 536. Reid v Howard (1995) 184 CLR 1; cf the Court of Appeal’s approach in Busby v Thorn EMI Programmes Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 461; and see the discussion by Harvey, ‘Speak and not be Silent: Recent Developments of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination’ (1996) 4 Waikato LR 60. See further at 5.173. 537. Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281. Section 25(k) of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) and s 22(2)(i) of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) provide that a person charged with a criminal offence has the right ‘not to be compelled to testify against himself or herself or to confess guilt’ but there is no more extensive enactment of the privilege against selfincrimination. For a critique of the absence of the privilege and the right to silence from the Victorian Charter, see Gans, ‘Evidence Law Under Victoria’s Charter: Rights and Goals — Part I’ (2008) 19 PLR 197 at 206–9. 538. Including the Commonwealth: Comptroller-General of Customs v Disciplinary Appeal Committee (1992) 35 FCR 466 at 474–5 (Gummow J). 539. It has also been held to apply to disclosure orders in the course of seeking Anton Piller orders (Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information Centre [1982] AC 380) and Mareva injunctions (Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola UEE v Lundquist [1991] 2 QB 310; Vasil v NAB Ltd (1999) 48 NSWLR 207; Bax Global (Australia) Pty Ltd v Evans (1999) 47 NSWLR 538). Handing documents to the solicitor executing the order in compliance with the order does not itself amount to a waiver of the privilege: C plc v P (Secretary of State for the Home Department Intervening) [2006] Ch 549 at [18]. The uniform legislation provides a procedure for claiming the privilege in respect of ‘freezing or search orders’: s 128A. The common law privilege is not affected by rules of court endorsing these orders: see, for example, Cairns, n 3 above, p 542. 540. (1983) 152 CLR 328. Privilege extended to disclosure of documents and examination under the

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) except where excluded expressly or by necessary implication: Griffin v Pantzer (2004) 137 FCR 209. 541. See, for example, X7 v Australian Crimes Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92; [2013] HCA 29; Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196; [2013] HCA 39; R v Independent Broad Based Corruption Commission (2016) 256 CLR 459; [2016] HCA 8; Maughan v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 128. 542. Pyneboard Pty Ltd v TPC (1983) 152 CLR 328. 543. Controlled Consultants Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (1985) 156 CLR 385. 544. Police Service Board v Morris (1985) 156 CLR 397. 545. Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281. Followed in interpreting the Royal Commission Act 1917 (SA) not to exclude the privilege: McGee v Gilchrist-Humphrey (2005) 92 SASR 100. 546. Redfern v Redfern [1891] P 139 at 147 is often quoted for this formulation. See also nineteenth century texts on discovery such as Hare on Discovery, 1836, p 131, quoted by Isaacs J in R v Associated Northern Collieries (1910) 11 CLR 738 at 744. 547. (1983) 152 CLR 328. 548. Price v McCabe; Ex parte Price [1985] 2 Qd R 510. 549. (1993) 178 CLR 477; Rochfort v TPC (1982) 153 CLR 134; Pyneboard Pty Ltd v TPC (1983) 152 CLR 328; Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281; Controlled Consultants Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (1985) 156 CLR 385. 550. For example, US v White 322 US 694 (1943). See generally Wigmore, n 432 above, [2259a]. 551. Triplex Safety Glass Co v Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 395; Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electric Corp [1978] AC 547; British Steel Corp v Granada Television [1981] AC 1096 at 1178. 552. Klein v Bell [1955] 2 DLR 513; R v Bank of Montreal (1962) 36 DLR (2d) 45. The common law has, however, been altered by legislation: see R v Amway Corp (1989) 56 DLR (4d) 309. 553. New Zealand Apple and Pear Marketing Board v Master and Sons Pty Ltd [1986] 1 NZLR 191. 554. TPC v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 1 FCR 172; Master Builders Association v Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees Union of Australia (No 2) (1987) 14 FCR 479. 555. Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd v State Pollution Control Commission (1991) 25 NSWLR 118, noted in Magner (1992) 16 Crim LJ 117. 556. Controlled Consultants Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs [1984] VR 137. 557. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 124. But any privilege in criminal proceedings for offences under the Act is removed expressly by s 1316A. 558. Murphy J states the human rights approach in, for example, Pyneboard Pty Ltd v TPC (1983) 152 CLR 328 at 346 and Controlled Consultants Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (1985) 156 CLR 385 at 395. The justification is discussed in US v White 322 US 694 (1943) at 698–701. 559. (1993) 178 CLR 477. 560. (1994) 52 FCR 96. Followed in, for example, Pascoe v Divisional Security Group Pty Ltd (2007) 209 FLR 197; [2007] NSWSC 211 at [41] (White J). 561. Followed by Gray J in Calderwood v SCI Operations Pty Ltd (1995) 130 ALR 456. 562. (2002) 213 CLR 543 at [13]. 563. It was argued in Calderwood v SCI Operations Pty Ltd (1995) 130 ALR 456 that there remained a general principle that a defendant to a criminal proceeding cannot be required to produce evidence against

itself, but following Burchett J in TPC v Abbco Iceworks Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 96, Gray J held there was no such separate principle, neither in proceedings to enforce a penalty, nor in criminal proceedings generally. In CFMEU v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 37; [2015] HCA 21, this ‘companion principle’ is recognised but was held not capable of justifying the refusal by a corporation to produce documents on the ground of exposure to penalty in non-criminal contempt proceedings. Whether the principle might be invoked to resist compulsory interrogation of a corporation as to an offence with which it is charged was expressly left open by Nettle J (at [80]). While s 187 is expressed to abolish the privilege against self-incrimination for bodies corporate it makes no reference to a more general principle whereby an accused is not required to assist the prosecution during criminal proceedings. The extent of the general principle is discussed at 5.107 above. 564. Rochfort v TPC (1982) 153 CLR 134. In Bond v Tuohy (1995) 56 FCR 92, Ryan J held that the Official Receiver could, under s 77C of the Bankruptcy Act, order the Australian Federal Police to produce documents they had seized from a bankrupt’s estate and the AFP could not object on the ground that the production would incriminate the bankrupt. 565. R v Judge (General Sessions of the Peace), County of York; Ex parte Corning Glass Works of Canada Ltd (1970) 16 DLR (3d) 609. See also Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ in Caltex at 535. 566. The distinction is emphasised in Ex parte Corning Glass. However, in this situation the officer may also be able to claim the privilege on his or her own behalf. 567. Resisting subpoena on grounds of possession, custody and control was discussed by the High Court in Rochfort v TPC (1982) 153 CLR 134. See also Byrne J in Roux v ABC [1992] 2 VR 577 at 590. 568. R v Ronen (2004) 211 FLR 258; [2004] NSWSC 1283. 569. Wigmore, n 432 above, [2263]. 570. Schmerber v California 384 US 757 (1966); R v McLellan [1974] VR 773; Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information Centre [1982] AC 380; Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 292; Bulejcik v R (1996) 70 ALJR 462 at 463 (Brennan CJ), 474 (Toohey and Gaudron JJ); R v Knight (2001) 160 FLR 465 at [78]–[81] (Greg James J); Charara v Commissioner of Police (2008) 182 A Crim R 64; [2008] NSWCA 22 at [73]–[74] (legislation authorising taking of samples for forensic procedures not affected by the privilege). The mind/body distinction implicit in this limit is discussed by Easton, ‘Bodily Samples and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination’ [1991] Crim LR 18. 571. (1985) 156 CLR 385 at 393. Applied in Griffin v Pantzer (2004) 137 FCR 209 at [183]. Cf CFMEU v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 37; [2015] HCA 21 at [38]. 572. R v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation; Ex parte Briggs (1987) 13 FCR 389 at 392 (Beaumont J); Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd v State Pollution Control Commission (1991) 25 NSWLR 118 at 124 (Gleeson CJ quoting Wigmore). In the case of documents sought by subpoena or notice to produce the documents are returned to the court to be used as the court directs, so that the claim to privilege is not a ground for setting aside the subpoena or notice, although it may be a ground for refusing to identify, locate and produce particular documents: Warman International Ltd v Envirotech Australia Pty Ltd (1986) 11 FCR 478 at 490. A notice to produce can still be used as a foundation for the admissibility of secondary evidence of the documents: Caltex at 535. To use inherent powers to restrict disclosure in order to prevent a claim of privilege arising is an unlawful exercise of those powers and ground for striking down orders under them: Reid v Howard (1995) 184 CLR 1. 573. Rank Film Distributors Ltd v Video Information Centre [1982] AC 380; IBM United Kingdom Ltd v Prima Data International [1994] 4 All ER 748. Similarly, the privilege may be claimed where discovery is sought in the course of a Mareva injunction: Istel (AT & T) Ltd v Tully [1993] AC 45; Bax Global v Evans [1999] NSWSC 815 (discussing the procedural problems arising out of applying s 128 of the Uniform Acts). A procedure for claiming privilege in the case of Mareva injunctions and Anton Piller

orders is now enacted in s 128A of the uniform legislation. 574. (1993) 178 CLR 477. 575. Similar criticisms are found in Istel Ltd v Tully [1993] AC 45 at 53 (Lord Templeman), 57–8 (Lord Griffith). 576. (1983) 152 CLR 328 at 346; Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd [1942] 2 KB 253; Skone v Skone [1971] 1 WLR 812; Nast v Nast and Walker [1972] 2 WLR 901. 577. Attorney-General (Vic) v Riach [1978] VR 301. See also Brennan J in Environmental Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477 at 519–20; Daniels Corp International Pty Ltd v ACCC (2002) 213 CLR 543 at [13], n 26. 578. Refrigerated Express Lines (Australasia) Pty Ltd v Australian Meat and Livestock Corp (1979) 42 FLR 204. But a company cannot now claim the privilege: TPC v Abbco Iceworks Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 96. 579. Mexborough (Earl of) v Whitwood UDC [1897] 2 QB 111, following Pye v Butterfield (1864) 5 B & S 829; 122 ER 1038. See also TPC v Abbco Iceworks Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 96 at 121ff (Burchett J), 140–4 (Gummow J); Daniels Corp International Pty Ltd v ACCC (2002) 213 CLR 543 at [13] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ, but cf their dictum at [31]: ‘[T]here seems little, if any, reason why that privilege should be recognised outside judicial proceedings. Certainly, no decision of this Court says it should be so recognised, much less that it is a substantive rule of law’). 580. (1983) 152 CLR 328 at 337. 581. (1985) 156 CLR 397 at 403–4 (Gibbs CJ, Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ). 582. Despite this decision doubts continue to be expressed about whether the privilege applies beyond judicial proceedings: Rich v ASIC (2004) 220 CLR 129; [2004] HCA 42 at [24]: ‘[T]he privilege against exposure to penalty now serves the purpose of ensuring that those who allege criminality or other illegal conduct should prove it. That is not to say that the privileges against exposure to penalties or exposure to forfeitures are substantive rules of law, like legal professional privilege, having application beyond judicial proceedings’. See also NSW Food Authority v Nutricia Australia Pty Ltd (2008) 72 NSWLR 456; [2008] NSWCCA 252 at [168]–[169] (Spigelman CJ). 583. Pyneboard Pty Ltd v TPC (1983) 152 CLR 328 at 346. 584. See, for example, Mexborough (Earl of) v Whitwood UDC [1897] 2 QB 111. 585. See Mexborough (Earl of) v Whitwood UDC [1897] 2 QB 111 at 117. 586. Pye v Butterfield (1864) 5 B & S 829; 122 ER 1038. 587. Mexborough (Earl of) v Whitwood UDC [1897] 2 QB 111 at 115 (Esher MR). 588. R v Associated Northern Collieries (1910) 11 CLR 738 at 742 (Isaacs J). 589. Re XY; Ex parte Haes [1902] 1 KB 98. 590. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Chats House Investments Pty Ltd (1996) 142 ALR 177 (Fed Ct, Branson J). 591. Pyneboard Pty Ltd v TPC (1983) 152 CLR 328. These penalty provisions are retained in ss 76 and 77 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. 592. Police Service Board v Martin (1985) 156 CLR 397. 593. Rich v ASIC (2004) 220 CLR 129; [2004] HCA 42. 594. Environmental Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477; TPC v Abbco Iceworks Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 96; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Plymin (2002) 4 VR 168 at [4]–[5] (in actions for penalties directors could refuse disclosure of expert reports before close of commission’s case despite the proceedings being regarded as civil rather than criminal).

595. [1982] AC 380 at 441, 445. 596. See generally LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [25155]; McNichol, n 350 above, pp 215–23; Theophilopoulos, ‘The Anglo-American Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Fear of Foreign Prosecution’ (2003) 25 Syd LR 305. 597. Arab Monetary Fund v Hashim [1989] 1 WLR 565. But such incrimination is a factor to be considered in exercising the court’s discretion to order discovery and production for inspection: Sociedade Nacional de Combustiveis de Angola UEE v Lundquist [1991] 2 QB 310; Tate Access Floors Inc v Boswell [1991] Ch 512; Brannigan v Davison [1997] AC 238 (PC). 598. Re S [1948] VLR 11, in which the examination was, however, for the purpose of the foreign proceedings; Adsteam Building Industries Pty Ltd v Queensland Cement & Lime Co Ltd (No 4) [1985] 1 Qd R 127; R v McDonnell and Armstrong; Ex parte Attorney-General [1988] 2 Qd R 189 at 191 (Macrossan J), 195–6 (McPherson J); Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Cox (1989) 40 A Crim R 447 (Morling J). For contrary Australian authority on application of the privilege, see Sharpe v ABLF [1989] WAR 138; Seely Nominees Pty Ltd v ELAR Initiations UK Ltd (1990) 96 ALR 468 at 471–3 (Zelling J); Bank of Valetta plc v NCA [1999] FCA 109; X v Australian Crime Commission (2004) 212 ALR 596; [2004] FCA 1475 at [41]–[44] (Finn J). In Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd v Nicholls [2008] NSWSC 1230 at [11], Brereton J was of the view that the fact that the very disclosure of documents would infringe foreign law was merely a factor in exercising his discretion to order inspection in Australian proceedings. 599. There may be contrary public interest considerations. In Brannigan v Davison [1997] AC 238, a grant of privilege would have frustrated a commission of inquiry’s attempt to discover the details of a tax scheme involving the laundering of monies through the Cook Islands and the Privy Council was reluctant, on grounds of the interests of the New Zealand public, to accept such a limitation upon an important inquiry. It might be argued that it should be left to the legislature to impose these limits on the privilege rather than the courts, and it is likely the High Court, as it emphasises the fundamental human rights basis of the privilege, would take this approach. 600. In s v Boulton (2006) 151 FCR 364; [2006] FCAFC 99 at [53]–[59], Black CJ, for the purpose of determining whether the privilege had been abolished, regarded this as a separate privilege rather than as part of the privilege against self-incrimination. Jacobson J at [144]–[149] appears to agree with this proposition (although noting that, because similar policies underlie each, the same approach must be taken to their statutory abrogation by ‘necessary implication’). 601. R v All Saints, Worcester (1817) 6 M & S 194 at 201; 105 ER 1215 at 1218. 602. Callanan v B [2005] 1 Qd R 348. In S v Boulton (2006) 151 FCR 364; [2006] FCAFC 99, the court followed Callanan v B on the basis that there was a unified common law in Australia and decisions of intermediate appellate courts should be followed unless shown in terms of existing authority to be wrong. This could not be shown (reference being made to Lusty, ‘Is there a Common Law Privilege Against Spouse Incrimination?’ (2004) 27 UNSW LJ 1). However, the court rejected the extension of the privilege to the incrimination of de facto spouses. 603. Uniform legislation s 18; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 8; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 21; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 9. See further at 5.201–5.204. 604. Australian Crime Commission v Stoddart (2011) 244 CLR 554; [2011] HCA 47 (Heydon J dissenting). 605. Failure to claim the privilege can in principle be conceptualised as a waiver of privilege. (Note that s 132 of the uniform legislation obliges the judge to inform a witness or party where it appears they may have a claim for privilege: LGM v CAM [2011] FamCAFC 195 at [147]–[158].) And the privilege might be regarded as impliedly waived through previous disclosure of the information in question: Accident Insurance Mutual Holdings Ltd v McFadden (1993) 31 NSWLR 412 at 423–4 (Kirby P), 430–2 (Clarke JA); Registrar, Court of Appeal v Craven (1994) 126 ALR 668 at 698–9 (Powell JA); Registrar,

Supreme Court v Zappia (2003) 86 SASR 388 at [43]–[51]. However, in such cases it is suggested that generally in practice it is the fact that later disclosure will not increase the risk of prosecution, rather than conscious waiver, that will be the fundamental reason for denying the privilege claim: cf Spender AJ’s remarks in Wilson v Deputy State Coroner (1995) 124 FLR 388 at 407–8: ‘[T]he waiver relates to past events, rather than the future right to waive the privilege’. Where self-incriminating information is compulsorily disclosed subject to it not later being used against the witness in proceedings there may be a genuine waiver through the witness attempting to use this privileged information to his or her advantage, for example, in a later Parole Board hearing: Bayeh v New South Wales (1999) 108 A Crim R 364 (Ireland J). Another example of genuine imputed waiver may arise where a witness claims privilege on the basis of possible prosecution for perjury for statements made earlier in his or her testimony; but the waiver does not extend to later proceedings: Registrar, Supreme Court v Zappia (2003) 86 SASR 388 at [72], [76] (Bleby J). On appeal Duggan J (Doyle CJ and Anderson J agreeing) was reluctant to regard perjury as an exception to the privilege but left open whether a waiver might arise: Zappia v Registrar of the Supreme Court (2004) 90 SASR 193; [2004] SASC 375 at [59]–[60]. 606. Accident Insurance Mutual Holdings Ltd v McFadden (1993) 31 NSWLR 412 at 423 (CA); Registrar, Supreme Court of South Australia v Zappia (2003) 86 SASR 388; [2003] SASC 276 at [12]. As with other evidential points, it may be appropriate to take the objection prior to jury empanelment: R v Roberts (2004) 9 VR 295; [2004] VSCA 1 at [81]–[84] (Batt JA). For legislation now empowering this course, see 2.40 n 238. 607. Refrigerated Express Lines (Australasia) Pty Ltd v Australian Meat and Livestock Corp (1979) 42 FLR 204; R v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation; Ex parte Briggs (1987) 13 FCR 389; Pascoe v Divisional Security Group Pty Ltd (2007) 209 FLR 197; [2007] NSWSC 211 at [31]–[33] (White J). For the procedure in penalty proceedings, see further LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [25125]. 608. Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 317. 609. Similar problems arise in claiming legal professional privilege where information is compulsorily sought outside judicial proceedings: see discussion at 5.79–5.81. 610. On the requirement to caution a suspect, see further at 5.134. Under s 89A of the Evidence Act (NSW), no adverse inference can be drawn unless the appropriate caution has been given: see 5.144. 611. R v Gray [1965] Qd R 373. 612. R v Coote (1873) LR 4 PC 599. Compare with the situation in civil cases where documents discovered cannot form the basis of subsequent civil action: Riddick v Thames Board Mills [1977] QB 881. 613. R v Garbett (1847) 1 Den 236; 169 ER 277; R v West (1971) 18 FLR 333. 614. Dolan v Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corp (1993) 42 FCR 206 at 215–16 (Spender J); Pappas v New World Oil Developments (1993) 43 FCR 594 at 595 (Lee J); C v T (1995) 58 FCR 1 at 16– 17 (Burchett J); In the Marriage of Atkinson (1997) 21 Fam LR 279 at 290–1 (Baker J), 324 (Lindenmayer J); cf the inference from a party’s failure to call a witness: Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191 at 200–2 (Glass JA). 615. [1997] 1 Qd R 429. 616. By adducing evidence of the basis for the claim: see, for example, Zappia v Registrar of the Supreme Court (2004) 90 SASR 193; [2004] SASC 375 at [35]–[39] (Duggan J). 617. Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd v Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 395 at 403–4 (du Parcq LJ), quoted with approval by Lord Fraser in Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electric Corp [1978] AC 547 at 647. For doubts about the second condition, see discussion at 5.174. 618. In the Marriage of Atkinson (1997) 21 Fam LR 279 at 285 (Baker J), 308–9 (Lindenmayer J); R v Bikic [2001] NSWCCA 537 at [14]–[15].

619. Re Reynolds; Ex parte Reynolds (1882) 20 Ch D 294; Accident Insurance Mutual Holdings Ltd v McFadden (1993) 31 NSWLR 412; Registrar, Court of Appeal v Craven (1994) 126 ALR 668. 620. Lord Denning MR in Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electric Corp [1978] AC 547 at 574. 621. Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674; Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1. 622. Such use would be an abuse of process of the court: Riddick v Thames Board Mills [1977] QB 881. 623. R v Andrews (No 3) (2005) 92 SASR 442; [2005] SASC 298 at [7]–[10] (Debelle J discussing the comparable procedure where one spouse seeks exemption from testifying for the prosecution against another). Debelle J disagreed with the apparently inflexible inquisitorial procedure suggested by Prior J in Trzesinski v Daire (1986) 44 SASR 43. See further 2.44. 624. Hamilton v Oades (1969) 166 CLR 486 at 495 (Mason CJ), 508 (Dawson J); Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 293–5, 310 (cf Kaye J in Attorney-General (Vic) v Riach [1978] VR 301); Reid v Howard (1995) 131 ALR 609 at 611–12 (Deane J), 619 (Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Plymin (2002) 4 VR 168 at [6]–[12] (Mandie J). 625. (1861) 1 B & S 311 at 330; 121 ER 730 at 738. 626. See Triplex Safety Glass Co Ltd v Lancegaye Safety Glass (1934) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 395, although the actual decision in that case was criticised by Lord Denning MR and Viscount Dilhorne in Rio Tinto Zinc Corp v Westinghouse Electric Corp [1978] AC 547 at 573, 627. 627. Zappia v Registrar of the Supreme Court (2004) 90 SASR 193; [2004] SASC 375 at [37] (Duggan J). 628. [1978] AC 547 at 628. 629. [1961] SASR 177. But the mere availability of some information does not mean that disclosure of additional information may not increase the risk of prosecution: see, for example, Accident Insurance Mutual Holdings Ltd v McFadden (1993) 31 NSWLR 412; Registrar, Court of Appeal v Craven (1994) 126 ALR 668; Bond v Tuohy (1995) 56 FCR 92 at 100, quoting from Dillon LJ in Marcel v Commissioner of Police [1992] Ch 225 at 257. 630. AT & T Istel Ltd v Tully [1993] AC 45. In Saffron v FCT (1992) 109 ALR 695, the undertaking of the Attorney-General not to prosecute was sufficient to remove the risk of prosecution and defeat the claim to privilege. 631. Confessions subsequent to conviction will not be taken into account on appeal: R v De Cressac (1985) 1 NSWLR 381; R v Bikic [2001] NSWCCA 537. 632. Busby v Thorn EMI Programmes Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 461. And see the discussion by Harvey, n 536 above, at 79. 633. (1995) 184 CLR 1. See also Grofam Pty Ltd v MacAuley (1994) 121 ALR 22. 634. [1961] SASR 177. For a comment on this decision and further examples of claims for privilege that would not be upheld as genuine, see Gibbs CJ in Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281 at 290. See also BTR Engineering (Australia) Ltd (formerly Borg Warner Australia Ltd) v Patterson (1990) 20 NSWLR 724. 635. [1982] AC 380 at 441, 445. 636. (1993) 31 NSWLR 412 at 422. See also Registrar, Court of Appeal v Craven (1994) 126 ALR 668 at 685. 637. In Zappia v Registrar of the Supreme Court (2004) 90 SASR 193; [2004] SASC 375 at [37], one reason given by Duggan J for rejecting the claim of privilege was that the witness had made it clear at a voir dire examination that he had no intention of testifying for the prosecution at the trial of a person with whom the witness had originally been jointly charged with murder. 638. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 10; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 24.

639. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 14(1)(a). 640. Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) s 87. 641. See Song v Ying (2010) 79 NSWLR 442 at [26]–[28] (Hodgson J, an element to compulsion in the giving of the evidence); Ewin v Vergara (No 2) (2012) 209 FCR 288; [2012] FCA 1518 at [15] (Bromberg J). But see comment of Odgers, n 73 above, at [EA.128.120]. 642. See further 5.19 particularly at n 73.

643. For a catalogue of factors that might be considered in determining if the interests of justice require that the witness gives the evidence, see Odgers, n 73 above, at [EA.128.540]. Also see In the Marriage of Atkinson (1997) 21 Fam LR 279 at 289–90 (Baker J). The fact that proceedings are pending against the witness was held not to prevent the certification procedure under s 128 being considered in R v Ronen (No 4) (2004) 211 FLR 297; [2004] NSWSC 1290, but this authority is doubtful given the decision of the High Court in X7 v Australian Crimes Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92; [2013] HCA 29 discussed at 5.183. The fact that a witness would suffer adverse consequences other than the risk of criminal conviction whilst relevant was not sufficient to negative the interests of justice in R v Ronen (No 2) (2004) 211 FLR 268; [2004] NSWSC 1284; cf Rich v AG (NSW) [2013] NSWCA 419 at [38]–[42] (Leeming JA, Bathurst CJ and Beazley P agreeing). 644. Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 11, 11A, 12, 13. This normally is done in the presence of the jury and requires appropriate directions: see Trudgian v Western Australia (2006) 23 WAR 163; [2006] WASCA 271. 645. Evidence, ALRC Interim Report 26 (1985), vol 2, pp 260–2. 646. Uniform legislation s 128(10); Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 15(1); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 18(1)(c); Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 8(1)(d). For a discussion of these provisions, see 3.85–3.87. 647. See discussion at 3.86. 648. Cornwell v R (2007) 231 CLR 260; [2007] HCA 12, discussed at 3.87. 649. Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 81(11AA). 650. For example, Royal Commissions Act 1902 (Cth) s 6A(2), (3). 651. For example, Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) s 21E; Crime Commission Act 1985 (NSW) ss 39, 39A; Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 (NSW) ss 26, 37; Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld) ss 190, 192, 194(2), 197; Independent Broad-based Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2011 (Vic) s 144; Corruption Crime and Misconduct Act 2003 (WA) ss 147, 223. Other compulsory examinations for specific purposes may modify the privilege: for example, Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW) ss 13A, 31D(3). 652. Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) ss 159, 161. 653. Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 68; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 597(12), (12A). 654. Pyneboard Pty Ltd v TPC (1983) 152 CLR 328; Sorby v Commonwealth (1983) 152 CLR 281; Controlled Consultants Pty Ltd v Commissioner for Corporate Affairs (1985) 156 CLR 385; Police Service Board v Martin (1985) 156 CLR 397; Hamilton v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 486. 655. Privilege in Perspective, ALRC Report 107 (2007), Recommendations 5.1–5.3. 656. Privilege in Perspective, ALRC Report 107 (2007), Recommendations 8.1–8.15. 657. Pyneboard at 347; Sorby at 312; Controlled Consultants at 395; Police Service Board at 406. 658. (1985) 156 CLR 397. 659. The importance of the legislation and the need for full inquiry to make it effective are emphasised by Burchett J in Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v McMillan (1987) 13 FCR 7. See also Commissioner of Police v Justin (1991) 55 SASR 547. 660. See also Mason CJ’s comments in Hamilton v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 486 at 494–6, referring to Mortimore v Brown (1970) 122 CLR 493. 661. (1983) 152 CLR 281. See also McGee v Gilchrist-Humphrey (2005) 92 SASR 100. 662. Compare with the (virtually conceded) decision in Hamilton v Oades (1989) 166 CLR 486. See also

Ganin v NSW Crimes Commission (1993) 70 A Crim R 417. 663. Controlled Consultants (1985) 156 CLR 385; Police Service Board (1985) 156 CLR 397. See also Commissioner of Police v Justin (1991) 55 SASR 547. These cases were distinguished by Gummow J in Comptroller-General of Customs v Disciplinary Appeal Committee (1992) 35 FCR 466 (privilege not excluded by necessary implication in the case of an inquiry made for the purpose of public service disciplinary proceedings); and by Sheppard J in X v McDermott (1994) 123 ALR 226 (privilege could be relied upon in course of defence force inquiry). 664. Where prosecutions are brought for failure to provide information, this condition will have to be established in most cases: see Warneke v Pope [1950] SASR 113; Ex parte Grinham; Re Sneddon (1961) 61 SR (NSW) 862. 665. (2002) 213 CLR 543. 666. (2013) 248 CLR 92; [2013] HCA 29. 667. But this ‘companion principle’ has no application before a charge has been laid: R v Independent BroadBased Anti-Corruption Commissioner (2016) 256 CLR 459; [2016] HCA 8 at [41]–[48] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ requiring police not subject to charge to answer investigatory questions as the privilege against self-incrimination had been expressly abrogated by the legislation in question). 668. (2013) 251 CLR 196; [2013] HCA 39. 669. (2014) 253 CLR 455; [2014] HCA 20. 670. See, for example, Zanon v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 91; A v Maugan [2016] WASCA 128. 671. Zanatta v McCleary [1976] 1 NSWLR 230 at 234 (Street CJ, cf comments of Samuels JA at 237–9 that judges cannot be compelled to testify to such matters); Herijanto v Refugee Review Tribunal (2000) 170 ALR 379 (Gaudron J setting aside interrogatories to members of the tribunal); Saint v Holmes (2008) 170 FCR 262; [2008] FCA 987 at [57] (Siopis J). Judges are also immune from suit in respect of their acts or statements made in the course of the exercise of their judicial functions: Yeldham v Rajski (1989) 18 NSWLR 48. 672. Duke of Buccleugh v Metropolitan Board of Works (1872) LR 5 HL 418; Hennessy v BHP (1926) 38 CLR 342 at 349 (Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ). In Land Securities plc v Westminster City Council [1993] 4 All ER 124, Hoffman J rejected evidence of an arbitrator’s valuation made as part of an award as mere opinion. 673. The exclusion applies to the reasons and deliberations of a person acting as a judge, and there are exceptions in subs (5); it does not prevent admission or use of the published reasons for decision and does not apply to various prosecutions relating to the improper administration of justice, contempt proceedings, appeals and civil proceedings relating to knowingly acting in excess of jurisdiction. 674. Saint v Holmes (2008) 170 FCR 262; [2008] FCA 987 at [58] (Siopis J relying upon Gaudron J’s view in Herijanto v Refugee Review Tribunal (No 2) (2000) 74 ALJR 703; 170 ALR 575 at [13]–[16] in refusing discovery against the tribunal that ‘the preclusion extended to “any aspect” of the decisionmaking process’). 675. R v Gazard (1838) 8 Car & P 595; 173 ER 633; R v Harvey (1858) 8 Cox 99; McKinley v McKinley [1960] 1 WLR 120; Warren v Warren [1997] QB 488 at 497 (Lord Woolf MR). 676. Zanatta v McCleary [1976] 1 NSWLR 230 at 237 (Samuels JA). In Warren v Warren [1997] QB 488 at 497, Lord Woolf MR applied the privilege to English District Court judges but not magistrates. 677. Ellis v Deheer [1922] 2 KB 113; Re Denovan’s Application [1957] VR 333; R v Thompson [1962] 1 All ER 65; Boston v Bagshaw and Sons [1966] 1 WLR 1134; R v Roads [1967] 2 QB 108; R v Taka [1992] 2 NZLR 129; R v Mirza [2004] 1 AC 1118 at [123]; [2004] 1 All ER 925; R v Smith [2005] 2 All ER 29

at [16]; [2005] 1 WLR 704 (HL); R v C [2005] 3 NZLR 92 at [39] (CA); Smith v Western Australia (2014) 250 CLR 473; [2014] HCA 3 (where the rationale of the rule and justification for the exception discussed below are fully discussed). 678. Subject to similar exceptions as the judges’ immunity: see n 673 above. 679. The justifications for this are canvassed by Jaconelli, ‘Some Thoughts on Jury Secrecy’ (1990) 10 Legal Studies 91. See also McHugh in Findlay and Duff (eds), The Jury Under Attack, Butterworths, Sydney, 1988, Ch 4; Audy and Toussaint (eds), A Jury of Whose Peers? The Cultural Politics of Juries in Australia, UWA Press, Crawley, 2004, Ch 1; cf Knox, Secrets of the Juryroom, Random House, Sydney, 2005; Hunter, ‘Jury Deliberations and the Secrecy Rule: The Tail that Wags the Dog’ (2013) Syd LR 35. 680. R v Roads [1967] 2 QB 108; Lalchan Nanan v The State [1986] AC 860; R v Challinger [1989] 2 Qd R 352; Matta v R (1995) 119 FLR 414; NH v DPP (SA) [2016] HCA 33. 681. Ellis v Deheer [1922] 2 KB 113. 682. R v Mirza [2004] 1 AC 1118; [2004] 1 All ER 925 at [123] (Lord Hope). 683. R v Hood [1968] 1 WLR 773; R v Matthews and Ford [1973] VR 199 at 209–11; R v Zampaglione (1981) 6 A Crim R 287; Medici v R (1995) 79 A Crim R 582 (CCA (Vic)); R v K (2003) 59 NSWLR 431; R v Skaf (2004) 60 NSWLR 86; cf Folbigg v R [2007] NSWCCA 371. In R v Orgles [1993] 4 All ER 533, it was held that a judge suspecting a jury unable to work together should question the foreman in front of the jury in open court rather than jurors individually. Where it is brought to the judge’s attention before verdict that the jury is misconducting itself the judge must decide whether to discharge the jury or deal with the problem through direction: R v Smith [2005] 2 All ER 29 at [16]; [2005] 1 WLR 704 (HL) (direction inadequate); R v JX [2016] QCA 240 (following jury note direction required to avoid risk of miscarriage of justice). 684. NH v DPP (SA) [2016] HCA 33 (a verdict of acquittal delivered in open court without dissent incapable of challenge under appellate legislation and no inherent jurisdiction upon which to base a challenge). 685. In Papazoglou v R (2014) 244 A Crim R 119; [2014] VSCA 194, revelation after guilty verdicts of juror’s non-participation did not lead to successful appeal against majority verdicts. In Smith v Western Australia (2014) 250 CLR 473; [2014] HCA 3, an anonymous note found in the jury room alleging a juror was physically coerced to agree in a verdict of guilty was held admissible and (at [55]), ‘as capable of giving rise to a reasonable apprehension or suspicion on the part of a fair-minded and informed member of the public that a juror has not discharged his task because of unlawful coercion’ thus constituting a miscarriage of justice requiring a retrial unless the Court of Appeal can be satisfied through inquiry by the sheriff that no coercion took place (inquiry so showed: see Smith v Western Australia (No 2) [2016] WASCA 136). See also R v Wilton (2013) SASR 392; [2013] SASCFC 60, where communication between jurors during deliberations revealing accused’s previous convictions admitted on appeal to quash conviction. 686. Jury Act 1977 (NSW) s 68B; Jury Act 1995 (Qld) s 70; Juries Act 2000 (Vic) s 78 (Medici v R (1995) 79 A Crim R 582); Juries Act 1957 (WA) Pt IXA; Juries Act 1967 (ACT) s 42C; Juries Act (NT) s 49A. 687. [1943] KB 587. 688. Compare with the situation where a magistrate acts in an administrative capacity in deciding extradition: Wiest v DPP (1988) 86 ALR 464 (Full Fed Ct). 689. And other actions which should have been raised in the same proceedings: Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd (1981) 147 CLR 589; Chamberlain v DCT (1988) 164 CLR 502; Boles v Esandra Finance Corp Ltd (1989) 18 NSWLR 666; Chamberlain v Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 28 FCR 21. 690. This requirement may be relaxed in circumstances where it is an abuse of process for different parties to

call into question previous proceedings: see Hunter v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529; Mickelberg and Mickelberg v Director of Perth Mint [1986] WAR 365; Nicholas v Bantick (1993) 3 Tas R 47; Page v McKensey [2002] NSWSC 570 at [52]–[55]. 691. Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 532 (Dixon J); Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 164 CLR 502. Applied in, for example, Onerati v Phillips Constructions Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 750; Trawl Industries of Australia Pty Ltd v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (1992) 108 ALR 335 (Fed Ct, Gummow J); Marks v National & General Insurance Co Ltd (1993) 114 FLR 416 (Miles CJ); Ebber v Isager [1995] 1 Qd R 150. 692. Jackson v Goldsmith (1950) 81 CLR 446; Heid v Connell Investments Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 629; Marr (Contracting) Pty Ltd v White Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (1991) 32 FCR 425; Finn v Lemmer (1991) 55 SASR 455; Milojevic v Roh Industries Pty Ltd (1991) 56 SASR 78. 693. (1994) 181 CLR 251. 694. Hunter v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529; Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police v Hatfield (1992) 34 FCR 190; R v Kite (1992) 60 A Crim R 226 (SC(SA)); Nicholas v Bantick (1993) 3 Tas R 47. In R v Edwards (1997) 94 A Crim R 204 (CCA (Vic)), Rogers was distinguished in holding that an evidentiary ruling excluding evidence in exercise of the Christie discretion was not binding at a retrial for the same crime. Rogers was applied in Carroll v R (2002) 213 CLR 635 (discussed at 5.190). See also Tomlinson v Ramsey Food Processing Pty Ltd (2015) 89 ALJR 750; [2015] HCA 28 at [24]–[26] (French CJ, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ), where the relationship between the overlapping doctrines of estoppel and abuse of process are explained (and see LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [5175]). 695. See LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, Ch 3, S1, for a more detailed discussion of the doctrine and its nature. 696. (1978) 140 CLR 364: see also Garrett v R (1977) 139 CLR 437. Storey applied in R v Atef Fathakka Nouh Yussef El Zarw (1991) 58 A Crim R 310 (CCA (Qld)); R v Chekeri (2001) 122 A Crim R 422; [2001] NSWCCA 221 at [53]; HP v R (2011) 32 VR 687; [2011] VSCA 251 at [1]–[7] (Bongiorno JA), [32]–[69] (Harper JA deciding on principle after discussing and distinguishing the authorities); Tasmania v Finnigan (2011) 21 Tas R 116; [2011] TASSC 74. Doctrine discussed in Pedler, ‘Protecting an Accused from Successive Prosecutions — Issue Estoppel in Australia’, unpublished honours thesis, Law School, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, 1979. Distinguished in R v Moore [1999] 3 NZLR 385, where earlier acquittal obtained or affected by perjury and not followed in R v Degnan [2001] 1 NZLR 280. 697. [2000] 2 AC 483; discussed in Roberts, ‘Acquitted Misconduct Evidence and Double Jeopardy Principles from Sambasivam to Z’ [2000] Crim LR 952. In R v Chekeri (2001) 122 A Crim R 422; [2001] NSWCCA 221 at [53], it was held that Z was inconsistent with the fundamental assumptions in Storey. See also HP v R (2011) 32 VR 687; [2011] VSCA 251 at [45]–[69] (Harper JA distinguishing the application of R v Z to the case before him and concluding it would be an abuse of process to admit the contested evidence). 698. (2002) 213 CLR 635. Applied in R v Jobling [2012] 1 Qd R 573; [2011] QCA 31. In Washer v R (2007) 234 CLR 492 at [37], Gleeson CJ, Heydon and Crennan JJ left open the effect of R v Z on the previous High Court cases. Cf R v PMC (2004) 11 VR 175; [2004] VSCA 225 (the doctrine gives no rights to an accused to refer to previous acquittals or to tender an acquittal as evidence of false accusation: prior acquittal an irrelevant opinion). See also Gilham v R [2012] NSWCCA 131; (2012) 224 A Crim R 22. 699. (2007) 73 NSWLR 308; [2007] NSWCCA 323. 700. NSW: Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001 ss 99–106; Qld: Criminal Code ss 678–678K; SA: Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 ss 331–339; Tas: Criminal Code Act 1924 ss 390–397AF; Vic:

Criminal Procedure Act 2009 ss 327A–327S. See also at 2.14. 701. [1943] KB 587. 702. An acquittal will generally be of no relevance in subsequent civil proceedings. See the remarks by Kennedy J in Mickelberg and Mickelberg v Director of Perth Mint (1986) WAR 365. 703. A plea of guilty will, however, be admissible against an accused in subsequent civil proceedings as an admission: Moore v Giofrelle [1952] ALR 1049 (non-appearance held to constitute an admission where the evidence showed the proceedings had come to the accused’s attention). 704. Note that the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn has no application where the fact of the conviction is itself relevant: Ingram v Ingram [1956] P 390; Re 396 Bay Street Port Melbourne [1969] VR 293. 705. See also the scepticism about the rule expressed in Re a Solicitor [1992] 2 WLR at 560, referring to Hunter v Chief Constable of the Midlands Police [1982] AC 529 at 543 (Lord Diplock). But in Hui Chiming v R [1992] 1 AC 34, the rule was referred to with apparent approval by the Privy Council in rejecting an appeal and agreeing with the trial judge that the acquittal of an alleged co-offender was of insufficient relevance to be admitted in favour of an accused. In Nicholas v Bantick (1993) 3 Tas R 47 at 72, Cox J was of the view that the rule did not apply in Tasmania. In R v Van Beelen (2016) 125 SASR 253; [2016] SASCFC 71 at [108]–[111], Vanstone and Kelly JJ referred to the rule by analogy in rejecting the opinions of a coroner about the incompetence of a pathologist who testified in later criminal proceedings. 706. [1986] WAR 365. 707. Compare with Hill v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1990] 1 WLR 946, where the conviction was irrelevant to the question of the lawfulness of arrest. 708. There is no authority upon what evidentiary material can be tendered to a court where a previous conviction is alleged. Cf, for example, Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 81. 709. Supported by Smith and Kennedy JJ in Mickelberg and Mickelberg v Director of Perth Mint [1986] WAR 365; and the CA (NZ) in Jorgensen v News Media (Auckland) Ltd [1969] NZLR 961. 710. The rule continues to apply insofar as it affects criminal proceedings: R v Kirkby [2000] 2 Qd R 57 and cases discussed therein. McMurdo P concludes at [40]: ‘The long-established general rule is that the conviction for an offence is not admissible against an accused person at trial. One exception to that rule seems to be that on a trial of an accessory after the fact, proof of the conviction of the actual offender is admissible to prove an element of the offence’. The strict limits of this exception are stressed in R v Welsh [1999] 2 VR 62 (CCA (Vic)). Note that by the same token the accused cannot tender evidence of the fact of acquittal of an offence to establish the bias of a witness: R v PMC (2004) 11 VR 175; [2004] VSCA 225 at [21] (defence counsel forbidden from cross-examining the brother of a complainant to establish the fact that the accused had been acquitted of sexual assaults upon him). Compare with s 74(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (UK), which abolishes the rule in criminal cases, so that the conviction of a co-accused is admissible. Applied in R v Grey (1989) 88 Cr App R 375; R v Kempster (1989) 90 Cr App R 14 (noted at [1990] Crim LJ 228 and discussed in R v Kirkby [2000] 2 Qd R 57 at [34] (McMurdo P)). For a discussion of the problems created by this section, see Munday, ‘Proof of Guilt by Association under Section 74 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984’ [1990] Crim LR 236; and Dennis, n 492 above, at [20.027]–[20.032]. 711. Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34A. 712. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) ss 78–82. 713. Applied in National Mutual Life Association v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) (2001) 183 ALR 700 at [46]–[51] (Full Ct Fed Ct). 714. For example, if in defamation proceedings a question arises whether a person committed an offence,

proof of conviction in an Australian court is conclusive evidence that the person committed that offence: Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 42; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 80; Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) s 42; Defamation Act 2005 (Tas) s 42; Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) s 42; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 139M; Defamation Act 2006 (NT) s 39. See also Competition and Consumer Act 2010 s 83 (previous findings prima facie evidence in later proceedings). 715. This distinction is drawn in Zuckerman, ‘Privilege and Public Interest’ in Tapper (ed), Crime Proof and Punishment: Essays in Memory of Sir Rupert Cross, Butterworths, Sydney, 1981, p 263. 716. The privilege extends to parliamentary commissions (Hamilton v Ah Fayed [1999] 3 All ER 317; Criminal Justice Commission v Parliamentary Civil Justice Commissioner (2001) 124 A Crim R 1 (QCA)) and to papers in the possession of members for the purposes of debate (O’Chee v Rowley (1997) 150 ALR 199). 717. (1986) 5 NSWLR 18 at 34. 718. (1987) 8 NSWLR 116. 719. Cf Mundey v Askin [1982] 2 NSWLR 369. See also Buchanan v Jennings (AG of New Zealand intervening) [2005] 1 AC 115; [2005] 2 All ER 273 (where defamatory statement out of court refers to parliamentary statement the fact of the latter could be established without breaching parliamentary privilege); Toussaint v AG of St Vincent and the Grenadines [2007] 1 All ER 1; 1 WLR 2825 (fact of statement in the House admitted to explain executive action outside the House and enable its judicial review). 720. [1995] 1 AC 321: followed by Debelle J in Rowen v Cornwall (No 5) (2002) 82 SASR 152 at [98]–[115], despite expressing doubts on the absoluteness of the rule at [113]. See also Mees v Roads Corporation (2003) 128 FCR 418; [2003] FCA 306 at [85]–[86] (statements to parliament could only be tendered to establish the fact they were made not to establish their truth). 721. See generally LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [27095] and Amann Aviation Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1988) 19 FCR 223 (cases prior to enactment of s 16(3) surveyed by Beaumont J); Rann v Olsen (2000) 76 SASR 450; R v Theophanous (2003) 141 A Crim R 216; [2003] VSCA 78 at [62]– [70]; Commonwealth v Vance (2005) 158 ACTR 47; 224 FLR 243; [2005] ACTCA 35 at [39]–[43]; British American Tobacco Australia Ltd v Secretary, Department of Health and Aging (2011) 281 ALR 75; [2011] FCAFC 107 at [48]–[55] (Keane CJ, Downes and Besanko JJ); Slipper v Magistrates Court of the ACT (2014) 179 ACTR 1; [2014] ACTSC 85 at [37]–[53] (Burns J); Stretton v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (No 2) (2015) 231 FCR 36; [2015] FCA 559 at [46]–[47] (Logan J). The constitutional validity of s 16(3) has been questioned: see R v Theophanous (2003) 141 A Crim R 216; [2003] VSCA 78 at [67]. And see generally Campbell, ‘Parliamentary Privilege and Admissibility of Evidence’ (1999) 27 Fed L Rev 367. 722. Rann v Olsen (2000) 76 SASR 450 at [226] (Prior J); Rowen v Cornwall (No 5) (2002) 82 SASR 152 at [101] (Debelle J); Commonwealth v Vance (2005) 158 ACTR 47; 224 FLR 243; [2005] ACTCA 35 at [41]. 723. Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 36–7; 21 ALR 505 at 524. 724. Bentley v Cooke (1784) 3 Dougl 422; 99 ER 729; Rumping v DPP [1964] AC 814. 725. Monroe v Twisleton (1802) Peake Add Cas 219; 170 ER 250; R v Algar [1954] 1 QB 279. 726. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 100(1); Uniform Evidence Acts s 12; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 7(2); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 16; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 7 (expressly covers former spouses). The now repealed s 407 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) in terms similar to the Queensland and South Australian legislation was interpreted in DDP (Cth) v Smiles (1993) 30 NSWLR 248 to abolish the rule with respect to a former spouse.

727. Hoskyn v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] AC 474; R v Kaye [1983] 2 Qd R 202. 728. The leading authorities are discussed in the Victorian decision of Sharp v Rodwell [1947] VR 82, where it was held that the nature of the charge, not the evidence to be adduced, determined whether the exception applied. 729. R v Yeo [1951] 1 All ER 864. 730. R v Verolla [1963] 1 KB 285. 731. But cf the remarks in Sharp v Rodwell [1947] VR 82. 732. Uniform legislation ss 12, 18, 19, 20(3), (4), (5); Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 8; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 21; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 9. The Western Australian legislation expressly provides that former spouses are competent and compellable. The uniform legislation simply provides that all witnesses are generally competent and compellable. The South Australian provision modifies by implication s 245 of the Family and Community Services Act 1972 (SA) which makes spouses generally compellable in proceedings under that Act: Prestwood v Shuttleworth (1985) 39 SASR 125. 733. Procedural requirements under s 21 discussed in R v G, AP (2014) 119 SASR 125; [2014] SASCFC 43. Section 19 of the Uniform Acts provides that in the case of (separately specified in each Act) serious crimes against the person the discretion to exempt under s 18 does not apply. 734. Failure to comply with this aspect of s 21 of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA), for example a judge’s failure to inform a witness of her rights to apply for exemption, is an irregularity of which an accused can take advantage on appeal subject to application of the proviso: R v C (1993) 60 SASR 467 at 476 (King CJ, Mohr and Duggan JJ); R v T, T (2004) 90 SASR 567 at [54] (Gray J), [94] (Vanstone J). 735. (1986) 44 SASR 43. See the commentary by Mack (1987) 11 Crim LJ 107. 736. (2005) 92 SASR 442; [2005] SASC 298 at [7]–[10]. See also at 2.44 n 252. 737. But cf comments of Crispin J in R v YL [2004] ACTSC 115 at [15]. 738. See the comments in Brownlee, ‘Compellability and Contempt in Domestic Violence Cases’ [1990] J Soc Welfare L 107. For a vivid example of the problems for the prosecution in dealing with an incalcitrant witness, see Zappia v Registrar of the Supreme Court (2004) 90 SASR 193; [2004] SASC 375. 739. Rumping v DPP [1964] AC 814. 740. Interpreted not to include former spouses: Shenton v Tyler [1939] Ch 620. 741. Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 18. 742. Duchess of Kingston’s Trial (1776) 20 How St Tr 355 at 572–3. Further authorities are gathered in Evidence, ALRC Interim Report 26 (1985), vol 2, p 247, n 30. By the same token confidential records of a hospital were held not to be protected in Royal Women’s Hospital v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria (2006) 15 VR 22; [2006] VSCA 85. 743. R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 at [72]–[122] (Spigelman CJ refusing as an intermediate court to create a new privilege). 744. Wheeler v Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675 at 681; Normanshaw v Normanshaw and Measham (1893) 69 LT 468. 745. McGuiness v Attorney-General (Vic) (1940) 63 CLR 73; Attorney-General v Clough [1963] 1 QB 773; Attorney-General v Mulholland [1963] 2 QB 477; Re Joseph Buchanan [1964–5] NSWR 1379; British Steel Corp v Granada Television [1981] AC 1096; Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cornwall (1993) 116 ALR 97 at 123–4 (Abadee J). The position is altered by s 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 (UK), discussed in X Ltd v Morgan-Grampion (Publishers) Ltd [1991] 1 AC 1; and Allan, ‘Disclosure of Journalists’ Sources, Civil Disobedience and the Rule of Law’ [1991] Camb LJ 131. However, as a matter of discretion, by ‘the newspaper rule’, discovery will not generally be ordered to disclose the

source of a newspaper’s information: for an excellent summary of the ambit of that common law ‘rule’, see WA Newspapers Ltd v Bond [2009] WASCA 127, particularly at [60]–[68] (Buss JA). A journalist can now more generally seek privilege from disclosure of the identity of a confidential source under statute: see 5.207–5.209. 746. Alfred Crompton Amusement Machines Ltd v Commissioner of Customs and Excise (No 2) [1974] AC 405 at 433; D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171 at 238. 747. Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 42–3 (Gibbs ACJ). See also Sayer v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd (1994) 34 NSWLR 132 at 144–5. Compare with remarks of the majority in Jacobsen v Rogers (1995) 182 CLR 572 at 589–90 that where information is compulsorily acquired on a confidential basis there is a strong case for immunity. 748. Compulsory confidential conferences under legislation will not give rise to any privilege unless the legislation can be interpreted to so provide: WBJ v Police (2001) 79 SASR 364 (family conference in Youth Court pursuant to Young Offenders Act 1993 (SA) not privileged). 749. Marks v Beyfus (1890) 25 QB 494; Jarvie v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [1995] VR 84 at 90–1 (same principles apply to undercover police operatives). See further the discussion in LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [27105]. Legislation protects operatives in controlled operations: see, for example, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) Pt IACA Div 2; Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act 1997 (NSW) s 28; Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld) ss 119–120 (formerly ss 46 and 47, discussed in R v Demir [1990] 2 Qd R 433; R v The Stipendiary Magistrate at Southport; Ex parte Gibson [1993] 2 Qd R 687); Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) Pt 2 Div 5; Criminal Investigation (Covert Operations) Act 2009 (SA) Pt 4; Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 (Vic) Pt IIAA; Criminal Investigation (Covert Powers) Act 2012 (WA) Pt 4; Crimes (Protection of Witness Identity) Act 2011 (ACT) Pt 2; Police (Special Investigative and Other Powers) Act (NT) Pt 4. 750. See Cain v Glass (No 2) (1985) 3 NSWLR 230, in which Priestly JA was willing to weigh appropriate interests while Kirby P and McHugh JA favoured the existence of a more definitive rule. A balancing approach appears to have been taken in R v Meissner v R (1994) 76 A Crim R 81, but in AttorneyGeneral (NSW) v Smith (1996) 86 A Crim R 308 at 311–12, the CCA (NSW) regarded the common law rule as definitive, contrasting it with the position under s 130 of the uniform legislation. The definitive rule approach is taken in, for example, R v Abdullah [1999] NSWCCA 188; and R v Mason (2000) 77 SASR 105 at [23]–[35] (CCA) (immunity established by proving on balance of probabilities that information given by informer on the condition that identity remains confidential). In Jarvie v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [1995] VR 84, the court regarded the protection of undercover agents as determined by general principles of public interest immunity. This appears to be the English approach: Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police v McNally [2002] 2 Cr App R 37. But see Derbas v R (2012) 221 A Crim R 13; [2012] NSWCCA 14 at [25]–[27] (Meagher JA, Hoeben and Rothman JJ agreeing), where different approaches recognised but not resolved in upholding immunity. The need to protect informers is often advanced in cases granting immunity to documents in the possession of law enforcement agencies: see, for example, Australian Securities Commission v Zarro (No 2) (1992) 34 FCR 427. 751. Marks v Beyfus (1890) 25 QB 494 at 498; R v Hennessey (1978) 68 Cr App R 419 at 426; R v Guildhall Justices; Ex parte DPP (1983) 78 Cr App R 269; R v Agar (1990) 90 Cr App R 318; R v Langford [1990] Crim LR 653. In R v Meissner v R (1994) 76 A Crim R 81 at 88; Jarvie v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [1995] VR 84 at 90; and R v Mason (2000) 77 SASR 105 at [36]–[50] (CCA), the test was put in terms of whether non-disclosure would be of ‘substantial prejudice’ to the defence. 752. The question remains whether failure to disclose a witness’s true identity will result in ‘substantial prejudice’ to the defence: Jarvie v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [1995] VR 84 at 90; BUSB v R (2011) 248 FLR 368; [2011] NSWCCA 39 (approving order screening ASIO officers during testimony). Compare

with R v The Stipendiary Magistrate at Southport; Ex parte Gibson [1993] 2 Qd R 687, where the court felt natural justice always demanded disclosure once a witness testifies. See now Pt II Div 5 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), which allows law enforcement agencies to issue anonymity certificates in relation to covert operatives (the provisions are in addition to any common law protections: s 21E(2)). 753. See, for example, Attorney-General v Kaddour and Turkmani [2001] NSWCCA 456; R v Massey [2016] ACTSC 108. But other witnesses are not; see R v Hawi (No 2) (2011) 216 A Crim R 64; [2011] NSWSC 1648, where determination of pseudonym orders sought for ‘innocent bystander’ witnesses on grounds of public interest held to be determined by the common law. Orders for five witnesses granted in R v Hawi (No 9) (2011) 216 A Crim R 90; [2011] NSWSC 1655. In R v Andrews (2010) 107 SASR 471 at [46]–[47] (Gray J), [111]–[113] (White J), a judge’s ruling to suppress the identity of an informer was upheld on appeal as the identity was not critical to the defence case at trial. 754. Seyfang v GD Searle and Co [1973] 1 QB 148; and Hunter v Mann [1974] QB 767 at 775, which dealt with doctors being compelled to testify; and Attorney-General v Mulholland [1963] 2 QB 477; and British Steel Corp v Granada Television [1981] AC 1096, which dealt with the compelled disclosure of a journalist’s informant. These cases are discussed in Walker, ‘Compelling Journalists to Identify their Sources: “The Newspaper Rule” and “Necessity”’ (1991) 14 UNSW LJ 302. The scope of the newspaper rule is explained by Buss JA in WA Newspapers Ltd v Bond [2009] WASCA 127, particulary at [60]–[68]. The limited nature of the discretion on discovery is emphasised at 5.83 and 5.242 n 859. 755. See, for example, Reid v Howard (1995) 184 CLR 1 (the common law privilege against selfincrimination should not be undermined through court exercising its discretionary powers to maintain the confidentiality of evidence); Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 (disapproving of the derivative application of the Uniform Evidence Act admissibility rules to change the common law applicable at pre-trial disclosure); and see discussion at 5.19. 756. R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 at [105], [106], [122] (Spigelman CJ), [220]–[230] (Abadee and Barr JJ emphasising that the common law proceeds incrementally by analogy). 757. See also New South Wales Crime Commission Act 1985 s 40. For a more detailed discussion of such provisions, see Evidence, ALRC Interim Report 26 (1985), vol 2, pp 247–54. 758. Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) Pt 10 Div 1B (civil cases; scope and nature of privilege discussed generally by Basten JA in KS v Veitch (No 2) (2012) 84 NSWLR 172; [2012] NSWCCA 266 at [14]–[38]); Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) Ch 6 Pt 5 Div 2 (criminal cases); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 67D–67F; Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 127B; Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 (Vic) Pt II Div 2A; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 19A–19F; Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (ACT) Div 4.2.5; Evidence Act 1939 (NT) ss 56–56G. 759. Uniform Acts Pt 3.10 Div 1A — ‘Professional confidential relationship privilege’; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 20A–20M. 760. Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 126H. 761. R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681; Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49; and see discussion at 5.19. 762. [2014] NSWCCA 251. 763. For example, X7 v Australian Crimes Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92; [2013] HCA 29, discussed at 5.183 above. 764. (2012) 84 NSWLR 172; [2012] NSWCCA 266. 765. Consent to divulging the communication in the proceedings in question. A general consent (waiver) is insufficient: Carusi v Housing Commission [1973] VR 215. Consent must be given personally by the patient and not by his or her personal representatives following death: Andasteel Constructions Pty Ltd v

Taylor [1964] VR 112; Elbourne v Troon Pty Ltd [1978] VR 171 at 175. The taking of litigation against a doctor and other disclosures during proceedings may constitute consent (waiver): see, for example, Elliott v Tippett (2008) 20 VR 195; [2008] VSC 175 (Judd J). 766. The relationship between doctor and patient must exist; compulsory medical examination does not give rise to the privilege; for example, X v Y (No 1) [1954] VLR 708 at 712. 767. This includes all information observed or communicated for the purposes of professional treatment (Warnecke v Equitable Life Assurance Society of the US [1906] VLR 482) but not matters which could be observed by a layperson. Arguably, the information may be acquired indirectly through a paramedic. It gives no general protection to confidential hospital records as such: Royal Women’s Hospital v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria (2006) 15 VR 22; [2006] VSCA 85. 768. The prohibition does not extend to the treatment prescribed: National Mutual Life v Godrich (1909) 10 CLR 1; Hare v Riley [1974] VR 638. 769. Papson v Woolworths (Victoria) Pty Ltd (2000) 9 Tas R 261. 770. Defined (Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 127B(1)) to include all confidential communications made in the course of counselling or treatment for any emotional or psychological harm suffered in connection with the offence. Given the absolute nature of the privilege this should probably be interpreted narrowly: cf narrow approach taken by the CCA in R v Lee (2000) 50 NSWLR 289 at [23] (statement to referring social worker not privileged). 771. Defined (Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 127B(1)) as professionals who provide psychiatric or psychological therapy to victims of sexual assault and voluntary workers for organisations who provide such services. 772. Section 296 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) applies to a ‘counselling communication’, definition of which was amended following R v Lee (see n 770 above) to ensure a broader interpretation to include counselling by experienced persons, whether for reward or not, that includes listening to and giving verbal and other support to a victim: see further Odgers, n 73 above, at [NSW.CP.260] and ER v Khan [2015] NSWCCA 230 (remitted to District Court as some documents may contain counselling communications). By way of contrast, s 32B of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 (Vic) and s 56 of the Evidence Act 1939 (NT) apply to a ‘confidential communication’, widely defined to include all communications in the course of the relationship of counsellor and client, but a ‘counsellor’ is more narrowly defined as ‘a person who is treating a victim for an emotional, psychological or psychiatric condition’ or, in addition under the Victorian Act, a registered medical practitioner. 773. NSW: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 ss 299A, 299B, 299D(3),(4) and Odgers, n 73 above, at [NSW CP.600]; SA: Evidence Act 1929 s 67F(2)–(4); Vic: Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 s 32C; WA: Evidence Act 1906 ss 19C–19F; ACT: Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 ss 59– 61; NT: Evidence Act 1939 ss 56C, 56D. 774. Parties and their counsel have no right to see confidential documents prior to a court’s decision either to make a preliminary examination of the document or in determining whether to give access to it or permit its tender: see, for example, R v Lee (2000) 50 NSWLR 289 (inspection by court of documents themselves may establish preconditions for access in an appropriate case); Question of Law Reserved (No 1 of 2000) (2000) 113 A Crim R 272 (CCA (SA)) at [73] (Lander J: counsel have no right to examine evidence before rulings made); ER v Khan [2015] NSWCCA 230 at [102]–[110] (Hall J, Hoeben CJ and Button J agreeing emphasising difficulty for trial judge in deciding documents privilege through inspection without assistance from counsel). 775. See, for example, Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 299D(1)(a). The problems of determining this requirement in relation to the production of documents prior to trial are referred to by James J in R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 at [316]–[317] and Beech-Jones J in KS v Veitch (No 2) (2012) 84 NSWLR 172; [2012] NSWCCA 266 at [84]–[86] (followed in NAR v PPC1 (2013) 224 A Crim R

535; [2013] NSWCCA 25; PPC v Williams (2013) 238 A Crim R 25; [2013] NSWCCA 286); ER v Khan [2015] NSWCCA 230; and see discussion of Odgers, n 73 above, at [NSW.CP.440]. 776. See, for example, Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 299D(1)(b). This requirement is criticised as ambiguous and unnecessary by Odgers, n 73 above, at [NSW.CP.460]. 777. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 299D(1)(c). Odgers, n 73 above, at [NSW.CP.480]– [NSW.CP.520] queries the need for confidentiality to encourage such communications; see also R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 at [12] (Spigelman CJ); KS v Veitch (No 2) (2012) 84 NSWLR 172; [2012] NSWCCA 266 at [77] (Basten JA). 778. Section 19E makes clear that mere relevance to credibility or simply to prove the existence of the communication is generally not such a purpose and s 19F permits the judge to examine available material and question the victim in the absence of the parties in determining whether there is such a purpose. 779. These terms are defined by s 67D of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) so that all communications in the course of professional ‘psychiatric or psychological therapy’ to victims of trauma are covered: see R v R, GJ (2009) 105 SASR 506; [2009] SASC 301 at [20]–[23] (Kourakis J, Duggan and Bleby JJ agreeing). Therapists who work voluntarily are included as are communications made to enable the nature and severity of the trauma to be assessed as well as communications for the very purposes of therapy. 780. R v R, GJ (2009) 105 SASR 506; [2009] SASC 301 at [17], [18] (Kourakis J, Duggan and Bleby JJ agreeing) ‘having regard to the statutory purpose of Div 9 of the Evidence Act, there is no sensible reason why the prohibition against disclosure should operate differently depending on whether a subpoena is made returnable on a day before the trial commences or on a day during the course of the trial’; R v C, RE [2015] SASCFC 32 at [57] (‘the prohibition on discovery and disclosure should be read as extending to applications for permission to appeal and to appeals’). 781. Question of Law Reserved (No 1 of 2000) (2000) 113 A Crim R 272 (CCA (SA)) at [73] (Lander J). For cases considering whether these conditions were satisfied, see R v Y, DB (2006) 96 SASR 180; [2006] SASC 289 (‘on the cards’ material relevant to the credibility of the alleged victim was in the counsellor’s file satisfying the conditions of s 67F(2)); R v W, GC (2006) 96 SASR 301; [2006] SASC 376 (no legitimate forensic purpose to justify inspection). 782. [2015] SASCFC 32 at [36]–[48]. 783. Cf comment of Brereton J in Director General Department of Community Services v D (2006) 66 NSWLR 582; [2006] NSWSC 827 at [23] that s 126B does not create a privilege properly so-called but a discretion to exclude (or not give access to) confidential communications. There is no entitlement to protection as in the case of a privilege strictu sensu. 784 Privilege considered in Ashby v Commonwealth (No 2) (2012) 203 FCR 440; [2012] FCA 766 (privilege not established) and Madafferi v The Age Company Ltd [2015] VSC 687 (privilege not rebutted). Professional confidence and journalists’ source privileges discussed further in Odgers, n 73 above, [EA.Ch 3.10.Div.1A and 1C]. 785. Uniform Evidence Acts s 131; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 67C. For other examples, see the legislation and references at nn 429–430 above. 786. See Spigelman CJ in R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 at [53]–[54], followed in Ryan v Victoria [2015] VSCA 353 at [32], [52], [58]–[67], [100]–[105] Tate JA (Santamaria and Ferguson JJA agreeing) explaining that, while s 130 is derivative of the common law, it does not codify the common law, but its interpretation remains informed by the common law and it is for all practical purposes co-extensive. 787. Australian Securities and Investments Commission v P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd (2008) 169 FCR 227; [2008] FCAFC 123 at [19]–[21].

788. Criticism of the use of the term ‘privilege’ is found in Duncan v Cammell Laird and Co Ltd [1942] AC 624 at 641; and Rogers v Home Secretary [1973] AC 388 at 400, 406–7. 789. Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 44 (Gibbs ACJ), 58, 68 (Stephen J); uniform legislation s 130(2). 790. Duncan v Cammell Laird Co Ltd [1942] AC 624 at 641 (Lord Simon); Victoria v Seal Rocks Victoria (Australia) Pty Ltd [2001] 3 VR 1 at [16]–[18]. 791. Hehir v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1982] 1 WLR 715 at 722–3; Savage v Chief Constable of Hampshire [1997] 1 WLR 1061. Compare with Attorney-General (NSW) v Stuart (1994) 34 NSWLR 667 at 679–80, where the defendant’s knowledge of the informer’s identity did not destroy the immunity; and Australian Securities and Investments Commission v P Dawson Nominees Pty Ltd (2008) 169 FCR 227; [2008] FCAFC 123 at [37] (partial disclosure did not prevent claim of immunity succeeding). 792. Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 44. In this case the government did not object to the production of documents which had already been tabled in parliament, but the defendants were still able to contend public interest immunity — although their arguments failed. Applied by Drummond J in Australian Securities Commission v Zarro (No 2) (1992) 34 FCR 427 at 432–3. In Trevorrow v South Australia (No 4) (2006) 94 SASR 64; [2006] SASC 42 at [63] (Doyle CJ), [168] (White J), the South Australian government failed in its claim to immunity over documents that had been released into the State Archive pursuant to a policy of disclosure and accessed from the Archive by the plaintiff’s solicitor. 793. A v Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532 at 549 (Gibbs CJ), 564 (Murphy J). 794. Gilligan v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1990) 101 FLR 139 (SC (ACT), Gallop J); Watson v AWB Ltd (No 2) (2009) 259 ALR 524; [2009] FCA 1047 at [46], [51] (Foster J: great weight to be given to views of responsible minister but immunity to be determined following inspection by the court). Note that disclosure of matters of national security is now additionally regulated by the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth): see 5.223 below. 795. Acceptance of the ‘public interest immunity’ terminology is found in Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Bank of England [1980] AC 1090 at 1111 (Lord Wilberforce); and Alister v R (1983) 154 CLR 404 at 412 (Gibbs CJ), 432 (Wilson and Dawson JJ). 796. It is criticised in Re Carey and The Queen (1984) 7 CCC (3d) 193 at 226–7 (CA (Ontario)). 797. In Victoria v Seal Rocks Victoria (Australia) Pty Ltd (2001) 3 VR 1, the Victorian Court of Appeal held that, even in the absence of statutory authority, the Supreme Court had an inherent jurisdiction itself to determine a claim of public interest immunity that had been refused by an arbitrator. 798. Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 38–9 (Gibbs ACJ); Alister v R (1983) 154 CLR 404 at 436 (Wilson and Dawson JJ). Courts should not too readily bow to governmental claims to immunity if an appropriate balance is to be maintained: Zuckerman, ‘Public Interest Immunity — A Matter of Prime Judicial Responsibility’ (1994) 57 Mod L Rev 703. 799. Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206, discussed in Nettheim (1986), n 349 above, at 282–9. 800. Part IVA of the Evidence Act 1939 (NT) (1982 Amendment) and equivalent legislation in New South Wales has now been repealed. Care must be taken to ensure that provisions such as this do not interfere with the court’s judicial power: cf Gypsy Jokers Motorcycle Club Inc v Commissioner of Police (2008) 234 CLR 532. This is sought to be achieved in the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) where, in federal criminal proceedings and civil cases generally, while the Attorney-General’s Certificate is conclusive evidence that information is security sensitive, the court must, at a closed hearing in which the Attorney-General may intervene and appear, and giving the risk to national security expressed in the certificate ‘the greatest weight’, determine whether and upon what conditions the security sensitive information may be used in the proceeding. See further 5.223 n 824 below.

801. For example, Alister v R (1983) 154 CLR 404. 802. For example, Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade [1983] 2 AC 394. 803. For example, Duncan v Cammell Laird and Co Ltd [1942] AC 624 at 643; Smallwood v Spurling (1983) 141 DLR (3d) 395 at 408–10; Young v Quin (1985) 4 FCR 483 at 485 (Bowen CJ), 488 (Sheppard J). 804. Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade [1983] 2 AC 394. Point discussed at 5.249. 805. (1995) 182 CLR 572. For a recent example of a claim for immunity beyond judicial proceedings, see Law Institute of Victoria Ltd v DCT (2009) 224 FLR 37; [2009] VSC 55 (notice to produce under the Income Tax Assessment Act). 806. See also Middencorp v Electric Co Pty Ltd v Law Institute of Victoria (1993) 93 ATC 5041 (public interest immunity used to resist access to documents under s 263 of the Income Tax Assessment Act); Western Australian Museum v Information Commissioner (1994) 12 WAR 417 at 426 (immunity applied to resist disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act). 807. Egan v Chadwick (1999) 46 NSWLR 563 at [52]–[55], [70]–[71] (Spigelman CJ), [154] (Meagher JA). 808. Robinson v South Australia (No 2) [1931] AC 704. For criticism of this terminology, see Lord Simon’s comments in Duncan v Cammell Laird and Co Ltd [1942] AC 624 at 641. 809. The distinction between class and contents claims is drawn in many leading cases. See, for example, Lord Wilberforce in Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Bank of England [1980] AC 1090 at 1111; Gibbs ACJ in Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 37; the majority judgment in Commonwealth v Northern Land Council (1993) 176 CLR 604 at 616. 810. (2016) 69 AAR 74; [2016] FCAFC 62. 811. For example, Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1, where the defendants could continue their objection although the Crown had withdrawn its objection in respect of some of the documents in question. 812. Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 43 (Gibbs ACJ), 56 (Stephen J). 813. In D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171, the defendant society was entitled on grounds of public interest to refuse to disclose the identity of persons reporting acts of cruelty towards children. In Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority v Maurice (1986) 10 FCR 104, the need to retain the secrecy of information relating to Aboriginal sacred sites was regarded as a relevant public interest. Aboriginal interests are recognised in Western Australia v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (1994) 54 FCR 144, although complete immunity was not granted. 814. (1999) 46 NSWLR 681. Followed in Royal Women’s Hospital v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria (2006) 15 VR 22; [2006] VSCA 85 at [34] (Warren CJ), [55] (Maxwell P); and in S v Boulton (2006) 151 FCR 364; [2006] FCAFC 99 at [62] (Black CJ), [159]–[161] (Jacobson J), [174] (Greenwood J) (court refusing to consider public interest immunity as applying to incrimination of a de facto spouse). 815. Referring in particular to Ligertwood, Australian Evidence, 3rd ed, Butterworths, Sydney, 1998, [5.96], [5.104]. 816. (2006) 15 VR 22; [2006] VSCA 85 at [54]. This approach is reflected in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Law Institute of Victoria (2010) 27 VR 51; [2010] VSCA 73 (material held by Law Institute not subject to immunity). 817. Chapman v Luminis (2000) 100 FCR 229 at [32], [57]. 818. As Beazley JA emphasised in her dissenting judgment in R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 at [214]. 819. That relations with the Cayman Islands ‘might’ rather than ‘would’ be affected insufficient to invoke s 130: Hua Wang Bank Berhad v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (No 7) [2013] FCA 1020. Section 130(4) (b) refers information which if disclosed would damage relations between state and Commonwealth

governments. 820. [1916] 1 KB 822. 821. [1942] AC 624. 822. A v Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532; Gilligan v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1990) 101 FLR 139 (SC (ACT), Gallop J); Parkin v O’Sullivan (2009) 260 ALR 503; [2009] FCA 1096 at [31]–[39] (Sundberg J); Plaintiff B 60 of 2012 v Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade (2013) 306 ALR 478; [2013] FCA 1303 (Dowsett J). 823. Young v Quin (1985) 4 FCR 483 at 495 (Beaumont J); R v McFarlane [1992] 1 NZLR 495; AttorneyGeneral (NSW) v Stuart (1994) 34 NSWLR 667; R v Melasecca (1994) 74 A Crim R 210 at 224–7 (FCA, Ryan J); R v Keane (1994) 99 Cr App R 1; Savage v Chief Constable of Hampshire [1997] 1 WLR 1061; Ryan v Victoria [2015] VSCA 353, particularly at [122] (Tate JA, Santamaria and Ferguson JJA agreeing). 824. Lodhi v R (2007) 179 A Crim R 470; [2007] NSWCCA 360 at [41] (Spigelman CJ: having decided that the legislation simply specifies the comparative weight to be given to one factor in relation to others he concluded that ‘tilting the balance by some form of guidance is perfectly consistent with the traditional judicial decision making process’). The High Court refused leave to appeal. 825. Marks v Beyfus (1890) 25 QBD 494; Rogers v Home Secretary [1973] AC 388 (reasoning extended by analogy to information provided to the Gaming Board); Haj-Ismail v Madigan (1982) 45 ALR 379 (Fed Ct, Lockhart J); Young v Quin (1985) 4 FCR 483; Australian Securities Commission v Zarro (No 2) (1992) 34 FCR 427; Savage v Chief Constable of Hampshire [1997] 1 WLR 1061. 826. [1978] AC 171. 827. Emphasised by Spigelman CJ in R v Young (1999) 46 NSWLR 681 at [67]ff (compare with Beazley JA’s greater readiness to find analogy to an existing category — informers — and to find sufficient evidence that granting immunity would further the public interest); and Maxwell P in Royal Women’s Hospital v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria (2006) 15 VR 22; [2006] VSCA 85 at [42]. Cf The Australian Statistician v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (2008) 36 WAR 83; [2008] WASCA 34 (Australian Bureau of Statistics granted immunity against disclosure of documents which would reveal the identity of survey respondents and threaten the confidential collection of reliable raw data); Law Institute of Victoria v DCT (2009) 224 FLR 37 (Pagone J was prepared to consider arguments in relation to documents held by the Law Institute, but was overruled on appeal: see n 816 above). 828. As in Church of Scientology of California v DHSS [1979] 1 WLR 723 where, because of fears of recrimination by the church, information was disclosed only to legal advisers. 829. (1986) 10 FCR 104: applied in Western Australia v Minister for Aboriginal Affairs (1994) 54 FCR 144. See also Daniel v Western Australia (1999) 94 FCR 537; [1999] FCA 1541 at [60]–[64] (Nicholson J); Smith v Western Australia (2000) 98 FCR 358 at [15]–[17] (Madgwick J). 830. (2000) 100 FCR 229. 831. Cf Rogers v Home Secretary [1973] AC 388, where the plaintiff was unable to tender his copy of the original. 832. Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910 at 952 (Lord Reid); Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 40 (Gibbs ACJ); the majority in Commonwealth v Northern Land Council (1993) 176 CLR 604 at 615–16. 833. [1968] AC 910; Duncan v Cammell Laird and Co Ltd [1942] AC 624 endorses the courts’ reluctance to go behind a ministerial certificate in an appropriate form. Cases where government documents in the lower echelons were protected include Re Joseph Hargreaves Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 347; Ankin v London and NE Ry Co [1930] 1 KB 527; Ellis v Home Office [1953] 2 QB 135. 834. Lord Salmon in Rogers v Home Secretary [1973] AC 388 at 412. 835. [1980] AC 1090; [1983] AC 394, respectively.

836. [1974] AC 133. 837. [1995] AC 274. 838. [1973] AC 388. 839. [1974] AC 405. 840. [1988] QB 588. See also Ryan v Victoria [2015] VSCA 353 at [68]–[89] where, following extensive discussion of authority, governmental interests under s 130 interpreted in line with common law authorities to embrace confidential procedures contained in police manuals. 841. Furthermore, the policy of the central government may not be to claim immunity simply upon the basis of class: see Dennis, n 492 above, [9.027]–[9.028]. 842. Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (NSW); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (Qld); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA); Freedom of Information Act 1991 (Tas); Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic); Freedom of Information Act 1992 (WA); Freedom of Information Act 1989 (ACT); Information Act (NT). 843. (2009) 260 ALR 503; [2009] FCA 1096. See also Sbec v Secretary, Department of Immigration (2012) 291 ALR 281; [2012] FCA 277 at [15]–[16] (Besanko J). Once immunity granted no inference as to the contents of the report can be drawn in proceedings challenging the minister’s decision: Sagar v O’Sullivan [2011] FCA 182 at [64] (Tracey J). 844. (1978) 142 CLR 1. As it seems do persons who do rely upon contents: Victoria v Brazel (2008) 181 A Crim R 562; [2008] VSCA 37 (no public interest demonstrated for protecting prison documents relating to prisoner security). 845. (1983) 154 CLR 404. 846. HCF v Hunt (1983) 76 FLR 408 (SC (NSW), Master Allen); Harbours Corporation of Queensland v Vessey Chemicals Pty Ltd (1986) 67 ALR 100, in which restricted disclosure was ordered; Adelaide Brighton Cement v South Australia (1999) 75 SASR 209 (Debelle J). Cf Queanbeyan City Council v ACTEW Corporation Ltd (2008) 253 ALR 121; [2008] FCA 1983 (principles affirmed but deliberations of cabinet could not assist in the interpretation of a statute of parliament). 847. (1993) 176 CLR 604. 848. For example, Commonwealth v CFMEU (2000) 98 FCR 31 (disclosure of letter from minister which, with agreement of Prime Minister, was put before cabinet for its deliberation, would be contrary to the convention of collective cabinet responsibility in that it would reveal the minister’s views and what was discussed in cabinet); NTEU v Commonwealth (2001) 111 FCR 583 (submission from minister for consideration by cabinet immune from production); Spencer v Commonwealth (2012) 206 FCR 309; [2012] FCAFC 169 (documents created to make submission, and submission considered by cabinet gave rise to class immunity requiring no judicial inspection). 849. [1931] AC 704. 850. [1978] AC 171. See also The Australian Statistician v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (2008) 36 WAR 83; [2008] WASCA 34, where the Australian Bureau of Statistics successfully claimed immunity against disclosure of documents which would reveal the identity of survey respondents and threaten the confidential collection of reliable raw data. 851. Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 42–3 (Gibbs ACJ). See also Aboriginal Sacred Sites Authority v Maurice (1986) 10 FCR 104. 852. Pooraka Holdings Pty Ltd v Participation Nominees Pty Ltd (1989) 52 SASR 148. 853. Law Institute of Victoria v Irving [1990] VR 411 (a Law Institute inquiry into the affairs of a solicitor discoverable); but cf Law Institute of Victoria v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2009) 224 FLR 37

(where Pagone J was prepared to consider claims for immunity but was overruled on appeal: see n 816 above); R v Clowes [1992] 3 All ER 440 (a liquidator’s investigation not immune); Milisits v South Australia (2014) 119 SASR 538; [2014] SASCFC 67 (results of confidential surveys administered by a state agency relating to a salmonella outbreak not subject to immunity). 854. BC (by her litigation guardian BD) v Australian Red Cross Society (1991) (SC (Vic)), quoted in Magnusson, ‘Public Interest Immunity and the Confidentiality of Blood Donor Identity in AIDS Litigation’ (1992) 8 Aust Bar Rev 226. Compare with J v J & A Services Pty Ltd [1995] 2 Qd R 10, where the Queensland Full Court refused to suppress the identities of litigants seeking compensation for contraction of the AIDS virus. 855. (1995) 182 CLR 572 at 589–90. 856. Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 46 (Gibbs ACJ), 64–5 (Stephen J). The mere fact that the information contained in documents subject to a class claim is available from other sources does not undermine the justification for class confidentiality: see Pincus J in Greyhound Australia Pty Ltd v Deluxe Coachlines Pty Ltd (1986) 11 FCR 592 at 594. Nor will immunity be necessarily lost through limited confidential disclosure: Commonwealth v CFMEU (2000) 98 FCR 31 at [46]. 857. Young v Quin (1985) 4 FCR 483. 858. Compagnie Financiere du Pacifique v Peruvian Guano Co (1883) 11 QBD 55 (see also the comments of Lords Fraser and Scarman in Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade [1983] 2 AC 394 at 433 and 444 respectively); and Commonwealth v Northern Land Council (1991) 30 FCR 1 at 23–4 (Full Fed Ct). Rules of court in some jurisdictions require documents to be directly relevant to matters in issue before they are discoverable: for example, UCPR 1999 (Qld) r 211; SCCR 2006 (SA) r 136. 859. Science Research Council v Nasse [1980] AC 1028; Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority v Maurice (1986) 10 FCR 104; Dolling-Baker v Merrett [1990] 1 WLR 1205. This discretion must be sharply distinguished from the public interest immunity balance. The discretion cannot operate to exclude information which is required by a party to establish material facts alleged. Once the information is required, only privilege or public interest immunity can justify its non-disclosure. Technically, any public interest balance should only take place upon the court deciding that the information is required by a party. Normally, it will be presumed by a court that all relevant information is required by a party and some reason will have to be adduced to rebut this presumption. In Nasse, the reason was that the information consisted of confidential reports relating to the job performance of employees. Although this confidentiality could not justify granting immunity, it could be put forward as a reason for denying access to prima facie discoverable information not required by the opponent to establish its case. In Nasse, the Privy Council sent the matter back to the trial court to determine whether the reports were required by the opponent. Thus, the grounds for exercise of this discretion are not limited to matters capable of justifying a claim of public interest immunity. 860. For example, in Attorney-General (NSW) v Stuart (1994) 34 NSWLR 667, a subpoena seeking production of documents to a committal to show entrapment was successfully resisted on the basis that neither was entrapment a defence, nor did the magistrate have jurisdiction to order a stay of proceedings on this basis. There was therefore ‘no legitimate forensic purpose’ in seeking production. 861. For example, Alister v R (1983) 154 CLR 404 at 414 (Gibbs CJ). In Western Australia v Christie (2005) 30 WAR 514; [2005] WASC 214, while the accused was unable to establish a legitimate forensic purpose for obtaining access to a profiling report and a crime stoppers report (so that there was no need to consider public interest immunity arguments) such a purpose was established in respect of material relating to police surveillance of the accused, but the judge ruled, having regard to the interest of the police in maintaining the secrecy of their surveillance methods, that access was to be restricted at first instance to the accused’s lawyers. For judicial treatment of a similar scenario, see DPP (Vic) v Debono (2012) 225 A Crim R 585; [2012] VSC 476.

862. For example, Fletcher Timber Ltd v Attorney-General [1984] 1 NZLR 290 at 293, where Woodhouse P states that ‘… it has been freely conceded … that all documents relate to matters in issue between the parties’. In other cases, discovery may have been made, conceding relevance, but production for inspection is being resisted: see, for example, Woodroffe v NCA (1999) 168 ALR 585. Where documents are sought by subpoena, arguments about failure to establish relevance may avoid the need to consider issues of immunity: see, for example, Watson v AWB Ltd (No 2) (2009) 259 ALR 524; [2009] FCA 1047 at [60] (Foster J). 863. The position is arguably the same under s 130(1) of the Uniform Acts: see Odgers, n 73 above, at [EA.130.360], citing R v DeBono (2012) 225 A Crim R 585; [2012] VSC 476 at [28] (Kyrou J). 864. Science Research Council v Nasse [1980] AC 1028. 865. (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 39. 866. Sankey at 43 (Gibbs ACJ), 96 (Mason J), 108 (Aickin J). An excellent example of such an affidavit is found in Gilligan v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1990) 101 FLR 139 (SC (ACT), Gallop J). The affidavit need not be by the most senior officer, although this is preferable: Australian Securities Commission v Zarro (No 2) (1992) 34 FCR 427 at 436–7. 867. Fletcher Timber Ltd v Attorney-General [1984] 1 NZLR 290 at 296–7, with Woodhouse P approving the comments of Mason J in Sankey v Whitlam; Watson v AWB Ltd (No 2) (2009) 259 ALR 524; [2009] FCA 1047 at [51]–[53] (Foster J). In Jaffarie v Director General of Security [2014] FCAFC 102 at [24]–[31], Flick and Perram JJ placed a premium on ‘the need to explain the basis upon which the claim is made’ though in a manner that is ‘conscious of the need to not disclose the very information for which the privilege is claimed’. In Spencer v Commonwaelth [2012] FCAFC 169 at [16]ff, the court indicated that in some cases, such as where the basis for gaining access to cabinet deliberations is not compelling, a judge might decline to examine the relevant documents. 868. Haj-Ismail v Madigan (1982) 45 ALR 379 (Fed Ct, Lockhart J). 869. Hartogen Energy Ltd v Australian Gas Light Co (1992) 109 ALR 177 at 179 (Fed Ct, Gummow J). 870. NCA v Gould (1989) 23 FCR 191; R v Rusmanto (1997) 6 NTLR 68; Parkin v O’Sullivan (2009) 260 ALR 503; [2009] FCA 1096 at [23]–[30] (immunity granted by court following consideration, of affidavits not provided to applicant’s legal advisers and inspection of the documents). 871. Young v Quin (1985) 4 FCR 483; Attorney-General (NSW) v Stuart (1994) 34 NSWLR 667 at 681 (Hunt CJ at CL); Woodroffe v NCA (1999) 168 ALR 585 (Full Ct Fed Ct). 872. Jackson v Wells (1985) 5 FCR 296 at 303–4 (Wilcox J). On determining the significance to issues, see the discussion in Zuckerman, ‘Privilege and Public Interest’ in Tapper, n 715 above, pp 252–6. Deferral of the decision to order disclosure may be an appropriate course of action where documents are seized under a search warrant. 873. For example, Duncan v Cammell Laird and Co Ltd [1942] AC 624; Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1. 874. See the remarks of Wilcox J in Jackson v Wells (1985) 5 FCR 296 at 307–8. 875. It was this procedure that was followed by the trial judge and endorsed by the Full Federal Court in Commonwealth v Northern Land Council (1991) 30 FCR 1, but it was disapproved of by the majority of the High Court who felt that if disclosure was required to determine a claim it should be to the judge alone (see (1993) 176 CLR 604 at 619). These remarks were made in the context of the court believing there was a strong prima facie case for immunity attaching to records of cabinet deliberations. 876. Sankey v Whitlam (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 43 (Gibbs ACJ); Alister v R (1983) 154 CLR 404 at 415 (Gibbs CJ); Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade [1983] 2 AC 394 at 432 (Lord Fraser). 877. (1983) 154 CLR 404: followed in Beneficial Finance Corp v Commissioner of Australian Federal Police (1991) 31 FCR 523 (Full Fed Ct) where, in proceedings to strike down a search warrant, access was sought to

the police information upon which the issue of the search warrant was based. 878. In Alister at 415, Gibbs CJ emphasises the special factors in a criminal case. 879. Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Bank of England [1980] AC 1090; Air Canada v Secretary of State for Trade [1983] 2 AC 394. Followed in Evans v Chief Constable of Surrey [1988] QB 588. 880. [1980] AC 1028. 881. See Zuckerman, n 798 above, at 717–20. 882. (1993) 176 CLR 104. 883. Hunt (1983) 76 FLR 408 (SC (NSW), Master Allen); Vessey (1986) 12 FCR 60 (Pincus J); Adelaide Brighton Cement (1999) 75 SASR 209 (Debelle J). 884. See also the commentary in Walton (1987) 61 Aust LJ 144. 885. Fletcher Timber Ltd v Attorney-General [1984] 1 NZLR 290. 886. Carey v R (1986) 30 CCC (3d) 498 (SC (Canada)); Babcock v Canada (Attorney General) [2002] 3 SCR 3. 887. See, for example, Casley-Smith v District Council of Stirling (1989) 51 SASR 447 at 470–2 (Matheson J); Adelaide Brighton Cement v South Australia (1999) 75 SASR 209 (Debelle J); Watson v AWB Ltd (No 2) (2009) 259 ALR 524; [2009] FCA 1047 at [46] (Foster J); R v Andrews (2010) 107 SASR 471; [2010] SASCFC 5 at [39], (Gray J), [79] (Vanstone J), [128]–[131] (White J). Arguably, despite the Northern Land Council decision exceptionally a court might still invoke the confidential assistance of counsel. 888. The courts appear to accept that this is more likely to be so in the case of a contents claim than a class claim: see Conway v Rimmer [1968] AC 910 at 943–4 (Lord Reid), 993 (Lord Upjohn); Burmah Oil Co Ltd v Bank of England [1980] AC 1090 at 1131–2 (Lord Keith), 1145–6 (Lord Scarman). This is particularly so where national security is concerned: A v Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532; Gilligan v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1990) 101 FLR 139 (SC (ACT), Gallop J). And the court must give ‘the greatest weight’ to this under the procedure enacted in the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth), discussed at 5.223. 889. (1978) 142 CLR 1 at 44; see also A v Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532, particularly the remarks of Gibbs CJ and Murphy J. 890. Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 284 at [28] (‘publication’ in the sense of loss of confidentiality: Levine J). 891. ‘The categories of public interest are not closed’: Lord Hailsham in D v NSPCC [1978] AC 171 at 230. 892. The same point is emphasised by Toohey J in Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority v Maurice (1986) 10 FCR 104 at 132. 893. The situation may be otherwise under the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) where a national security risk must be given ‘the greatest weight’ in deciding whether to give access: see 5.223. 894. Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417, discussed in Nettheim (1986), n 349 above, at 294–8. 895. Nettheim (1986), n 349 above, at 298–312. Some of the relevant statutory powers are listed at n 349 above. The nature and limits of the court’s inherent powers to restrict publication are discussed in R v Savvas Stevens and Peisley (1989) 43 A Crim R 331 (SC (NSW)); Commissioner of Police NSW v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2007) 70 NSWLR 643; [2007] NSWCCA 366. 896. R v Mr ‘C’ (1993) 67 A Crim R 562; J v L & A Services Pty Ltd [1995] 2 Qd R 10 (identity of a party suffering from HIV virus not suppressed); R v White (2007) 17 VR 308; [2007] VSC 471; R v Benbrika (Ruling No 23) (2008) 221 FLR 122; [2008] VSC 137. 897. Cf Watson v AWB Ltd (No 2) (2009) 259 ALR 524; [2009] FCA 1047 (disclosure of redacted

documents resisted). 898. See, for example, Church of Scientology of California v DHSS [1979] 1 WLR 723; WEA Records Ltd v Visions Channel 4 Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 721; Harbours Corp of Queensland v Vessey Chemicals Pty Ltd (1986) 12 FCR 60; Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority v Maurice (1986) 10 FCR 104; Kanthal Australia Pty Ltd v Minister for Industry, Technology and Commerce (1987) 14 FCR 90; Magellan Petroleum Australia Ltd v SAGASCO Amadeus Pty Ltd [1994] 2 Qd R 37; Mackay Sugar Co-op Association Ltd v CSR Ltd (1996) 137 ALR 183; Chapman v Luminis (2000) 100 FCR 229; Western Australia v Christie (2005) 30 WAR 514; [2005] WASC 214 at [50] (McKechnie J). Cf The Australian Statistician v Leighton Contractors (2008) 36 WAR 83; [2008] WASCA 34, where the court held that even disclosure to lawyers might threaten the reliability of the work of the ABS and that this risk outweighed the importance of the evidence to the resolution of the case. In such a case the court might consider appointing special counsel to assist the judge in determining immunity: New South Wales v Public Transport Ticketing Corp (No 3) (2011) 81 NSWLR 394; [2011] NSWCA 200. 899. Mazinski v Bakka (1979) 20 SASR 350 at 361 (King J), 381 (Wells J); Pearce v Button (1985) 8 FCR 388; and cases at 2.36 n 210. Section 138 of the Uniform Acts has similar scope: Violi v Berrivale (2000) 173 ALR 518. 900. (1978) 141 CLR 54: following R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321 (failure to follow procedures for the medical examination and photographing of the accused led to exclusion). 901. (1982) 151 CLR 1. 902. (1995) 184 CLR 19. 903. Cf Parker v Comptroller-General of Customs (2009) 252 ALR 619; [2009] HCA 7 at [29]–[30], where French CJ, in discussing s 138 of the uniform legislation which distinguishes evidence obtained ‘improperly’ from evidence obtained ‘in contravention of’ law says: ‘The relevant ordinary meanings of “improper” include “not in accordance with truth, fact, reason or rule; abnormal, irregular; incorrect, inaccurate, erroneous, wrong”. “Contravention” refers to “[t]he action of contravening or going counter to; violation, infringement, transgression”. Without essaying an exhaustive definition, the core meaning of “contravention” involves disobedience of a command expressed in a rule of law which may be statutory or non-statutory. It involves doing that which is forbidden by law or failing to do that which is required by law to be done. Mere failure to satisfy a condition necessary for the exercise of a statutory power is not a contravention. Nor would such a failure readily be characterised as “impropriety” although that word does cover a wider range of conduct than the word “contravention”’. 904. Cases in which unsuccessful applications to exclude have been made include R v Martelli (1995) 83 A Crim R 550 (CCA (SA)); R v Albu (1995) 64 SASR 319 (Matheson J); R v Gudgeon (1995) 133 ALR 379 (CCA (Qld)); R v Karam (1995) 83 A Crim R 416 (CCA (NSW)); R v Medina (1995) 84 A Crim R 316 (CCA (WA)); R v Albu (1996) 65 SASR 439 at 445 (Cox J); R v Peters and Heffernan (1996) 88 A Crim R 585 (CCA (NSW)); R v Rowe (1998) 71 SASR 389. 905. (2007) 231 CLR 396; [2007] HCA 39. See also R v Cowan; Ex parte Attorney-General (Qld) [2015] QCA 87 at [29]–[91]. 906. (1998) 151 ALR 89. Considered in R v Fraser [2004] 2 Qd R 544; [2004] QCA 92 (deception by fellow prisoner and police informant did not lead to exclusion on grounds of unfairness or public policy). 907. For further examples, see 8.155 and cases in n 501 above. 908. (2007) 232 CLR 67; [2007] HCA 46. Discussed further at 8.142. 909. For a clear application of this approach, see R v Heaney (1998) 100 A Crim R 450 (Coldrey J) (taped confession reliable but improperly induced and too high a price to admit).

910. R v Haddad [2000] NSWCCA 351 at [69]–[76] (Spigelman CJ); DPP v Carr [2002] NSWSC 194 at [50]–[72] (Smart AJ in the course of an equivocal discussion of the required causation not accepting ‘that on the point in question there is a significant difference between the position under s 138 … and that at common law’: at [62]). For further discussion of the causation required, see 2.37 and particularly authorities at n 220. 911. (1998) 70 SASR 281. 912. (2000) 77 SASR 24. 913. (2000) 78 SASR 85. 914. Ibid at [69]–[70]. 915. See the critical comments of Grant (2001) 25 Crim LJ 97. The decision in Robinett was approved by Smart AJ in DPP v Carr [2002] NSWSC 194 at [50]–[72]. 916. Although Smart AJ in DPP v Carr [2002] NSWSC 194 at [67]–[70] (decided under s 138) appears to have applied a wide ‘but for’ test on the facts before him (an unnecessary and improper arrest provoking minor public order offences) he suggests there is some requirement of proportionality before it can be said that an offence is the consequence of police impropriety. 917. This is the approach of King CJ in French v Scarman (1979) 20 SASR 333 as explained in R v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24 at [37], [39] (Martin J). Spigelman CJ in R v Haddad (2000) 116 A Crim R 312 at [69]–[76] appears also prepared to take this wider approach under the Uniform Acts. Doyle CJ in Police v Hall (2006) 95 SASR 482; [2006] SASC 281 at [39]–[45] expressly modified the strict causative position he had taken in Lobban and followed Chernov JA in DPP v Moore (2003) 6 VR 430 at [55] to agree that impropriety after the obtaining of evidence may be so closely related to obtaining it as to give rise to the public policy discretion (for example, improper failure to provide defendant with blood-test kit following taking of breathalyser test). See also DPP v Riley (2007) 16 VR 519. 918. R v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24 at [39]. The fairness discretion, insofar as it exists to ensure rectitude, might also be invoked in this situation. In King v R (1996) 16 WAR 540, blood samples lawfully taken on a drink-driving charge could be lawfully tendered in unrelated sexual assault proceedings to identify accused; if that later tender had been unlawful the court said it would not, however, have excluded the evidence. (Is unlawful subsequent use less serious than the unlawful obtaining of evidence?) 919. See, for example, Martin J in R v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24 at [52], [58], [89](vii); and Doyle CJ at [2] agreeing that in saying in R v Jervis (1998) 70 SASR 429 that the unfairness discretion required police impropriety, ‘I expressed myself more narrowly than I should’. 920. R v Jervis (1998) 70 SASR 429; R v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24 at [89](v). 921. Collins v R (1980) 31 ALR 257 at 317 (Brennan J); Cleland v R (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 9 (Gibbs CJ), 34– 5 (Dawson J); Williams v R (1986) 161 CLR 278 at 286 (Gibbs CJ). 922. For example, Tann v Schild (1990) 54 SASR 523; R v Davidson (1991) 54 SASR 580; Coleman v Zanker (1992) 58 SASR 7; R v Mcleod (1992) 61 A Crim R 465 (Slicer J, SC (Tas)); Park v White (1995) 21 MVR 504. 923. Zanet v Hentchke (1988) 33 A Crim R 51 (O’Loughlin J, SC (SA)); R v Edelsten (1990) 21 NSWLR 542 at 551–9; R v Heaney [1992] 2 VR 531 at 552–5; Barker v R (1994) 127 ALR 280. 924. See, for example, R v Camilleri (2007) 68 NSWLR 720; [2007] NSWCCA 36. 925. R v Bennett and Clark (1986) 44 SASR 164 (Johnston J); R v Smith (1996) 86 A Crim R 398 at 404 (Franklyn J), 409–10 (Wallwark J). 926. Victorian courts have consistently refused to interpret Pollard v R (1992) 176 CLR 177 as laying down any exclusionary presumption where there have been breaches of statutory rights in the case of

confessional evidence, and regard the ‘seriousness of the breach’ as decisive: R v Heaney [1992] 2 VR 531 at 554–5; R v Percerep [1993] VR 109; R v Crupi (1996) 86 A Crim R 229. 927. (1992) 176 CLR 177. 928. That is, House principles apply: see further 2.26 nn 119–122, 8.159. See, for example, R v Ridgeway (1998) 71 SASR 73 at 85, where Doyle CJ, after considering how difficult the balance was in the case before him, declared that he was not in a position ‘to say that the trial judge’s decision was wrong’ and therefore refused to interfere. 929. An opportunity taken by Victorian judges on appeal from conviction, whilst in New South Wales judges continue to apply House principles: see cases at 2.26 nn 120–122.

[page 641]

Chapter Six

Party Presentation and Prosecution Introduction 6.1 Two features distinguish the common law adversary trial (features upon which the uniform legislation is based). First, not only is it left to parties to formulate claims; they must also substantiate the facts upon which their claims depend by tendering information, primarily collected by them, to the court. The court undertakes no independent investigation itself and relies, more or less entirely, upon the information tendered in determining the material facts. Secondly, information is primarily — or should one say presumptively — tendered to the court in the form of the spontaneous oral testimony of witnesses to the material or relevant facts and events. These witnesses are examined by the party calling them and then become available for cross-examination by the opponent. This procedure is regarded by the common law as the most appropriate way of discovering those material facts upon which claims depend. The subject of this chapter is those evidentiary rules which illustrate, or comprise, the first distinguishing feature, described here as the principle of party presentation and prosecution. Chapter 7 discusses the second distinguishing feature, the principle of oral presentation of evidence. The process by which claims are formulated is not considered in any detail in this book. Space does not permit it. But to separate this process is arbitrary, because the formulation of a claim has a decisive influence over the course of evidence. It sets the factual parameters of the claim. Furthermore, the very system of making claims carries with it the strong presumption that the party alleging a particular claim should substantiate it. The formulation of claims therefore has a

decisive influence upon the first requirement of any system dependent upon a principle of party presentation and prosecution; namely, the allocation of the burden of substantiating those factual issues inherent in the claim. This burden of substantiating facts is commonly referred to as the ‘burden of proof’, and its nature and incidence is the first matter considered here. [page 642] What becomes immediately apparent is that the burden involves two distinct stages: that of adducing evidence in support of the claim, and that of persuading the court of the material facts in issue. Before a court will consider the question of persuasion it demands sufficient evidence to raise seriously that issue. This is reflected in the procedure allowing opponents to submit that the evidence adduced does not give rise to a case to answer. This submission is next considered, as reflecting an important aspect of the principle of party presentation and prosecution. Finally, and perhaps most centrally, the principle ostensibly assumes that the court may act only upon the information presented to it by the parties; that the court can carry out no investigation itself nor act upon its own knowledge of material facts in issue. But, as will be seen, a strict adherence to this position is impossible and impractical. Some knowledge must be assumed if information is to be processed. And in other cases it would be impractical for courts to require facts to be proved in the ordinary way. Exceptionally, ‘judicial notice’ may be taken of facts. Exceptionally, a judge is entitled to question and even call witnesses. These matters are considered at 6.47ff.

Burden of Proof: Nature and Incidence Evidential and persuasive burdens 6.2 The practical consequence of applying the Frankian equation R × F = D (see 1.4) is that a legal decision depends upon the court discovering the material facts which satisfy the granting of a remedy under a particular legal rule. The common law requires one or other of the parties, normally the claimant initiating proceedings, to substantiate those facts, first by adducing evidence of them, and

secondly, by persuading the court that they exist or occurred. The burden of proof therefore involves these two aspects: the burden of adducing evidence, here called the evidential burden; and the burden of convincing the court of the material facts, here called the persuasive burden.1 It is important to be clear about this terminology in the discussion that follows. The phrase ‘burden of proof’ is used here to describe the general process of substantiation of issues. In other contexts, the phrase may be used to refer only to the persuasive burden. For example, where legislation casts a burden of proof upon a defendant, most courts have interpreted this as casting a persuasive burden, using the argument [page 643] that satisfaction of the evidential burden is no proof at all.2 The evidential burden was described in Purkess v Crittenden3 as ‘the burden of proof in the sense of introducing evidence’; it is also sometimes described as ‘the burden of passing the judge’. But the term ‘evidential burden’ is now commonly used.4 Many descriptions have also been used for the persuasive burden: the risk of nonpersuasion, the fixed burden, the probative burden and the legal burden. The latter phrase is perhaps now most common,5 but is not used here because both burdens are legal, in the sense of entailing legal consequences. 6.3 If a party bearing the evidential burden adduces no evidence of a material fact and this lacuna has not been otherwise filled, then the court will not consider the question of the existence or occurrence of that fact.6 On the other hand, the mere satisfying of the evidential burden in relation to a material fact does not oblige the court to find that fact proved, and it must then be persuaded, beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal case and on the balance of probabilities in a civil case, of the existence or occurrence of that fact.7 Both burdens are of legal significance at various stages of the trial. Most obviously the evidential burden is crucial in determining whether a claimant has made out a case to answer (see 6.29–6.46), while the persuasive burden is crucial in determining which party loses in cases of doubt.8 But the burdens are also decisive at other stages. The evidential burden will determine which party must allege material facts in pleadings9 and begin calling evidence of those facts at the trial.

[page 644] If the claimant plaintiff bears the evidential burden on no issues of fact (a result which may be reached through admissions on the pleadings), then the defendant should begin and call evidence.10 Such a situation could theoretically arise in criminal proceedings, but in practice the prosecution always bears evidential burdens, cannot split its case, and must begin calling evidence. The situation may be otherwise on the voir dire; for example, where an accused seeks exercise of an exclusionary discretion and carries both burdens. In South Australia, even in this situation, the Crown will normally begin calling evidence if the accused has justified the holding of a voir dire inquiry.11 The persuasive burden and its incidence and standard for persuasion are crucial when the judge is instructing a jury.12 And on appeal the incidence of the burdens at these various stages may have to be recanvassed. 6.4 In many cases, the claimant or prosecutor bears both evidential and persuasive burdens in relation to all the material facts in the case. Given the principle of free disposition, which states that parties may choose to enforce their legal rights, the general rule is that, when they do choose to do so, they bear the burdens of substantiating with evidence the material facts upon which those rights are based. But it may be unfair to invoke this principle to argue that the claimant must in advance negative every possible factual explanation that would prevent proof of those material facts. For example, in a personal injuries claim, it might be considered unfair to oblige the plaintiff to show in every case that there was no pre-existing injury capable of defeating the claim that the injury was caused by the incident in issue. Again, in circumstances where the law stipulates separate facts that operate by way of defence to claims (contributory negligence by the claimant, for example), it may be more in accordance with adversarial notions of fairness to place burdens upon the opponent in respect of these facts. Consequently, the incidence of the burdens of proof cannot be considered globally in relation to the case as a whole. Rather, the law determines in advance the incidence of the burden in relation to particular issues. Strictly, burdens of proof must be considered issue by issue. [page 645]

6.5 This approach is well illustrated by the High Court decision in Purkess v Crittenden.13 There it was held that, where a defendant wished to defeat a plaintiff’s claim for damages for personal injury upon the ground of pre-existing injury, the defendant was obliged to adduce credible evidence of that injury before the court was obliged to consider it.14 On the issue of pre-existing injury, the evidential burden lay upon the defendant. But the court was quick to point out that this did not mean that the defendant had to prove the existence of this injury. Once the issue was properly raised by evidence, the plaintiff bore the persuasive burden of satisfying the court that no pre-existing injury existed. Thus, the incidence of the burdens must be considered issue by issue; there are two distinct burdens, and on a particular issue although one party may bear the evidential burden the other may bear the persuasive burden. 6.6 A final point may also be illustrated by reference to this case. Burdens are allocated by the law in relation to particular issues once and for all. Parties must know which of them is obliged to make out a case to answer, or finally to convince the court of particular issues, for it is in this way that the law ultimately allocates evidential risks.15 Therefore, the burdens here described (and these are the only burdens of legal consequence) do not shift. There are two loose senses in which one may talk of burdens shifting. First, one may say, in a case such as Purkess v Crittenden, that once the defendant satisfied the evidential burden on the issue of pre-existing injury, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to persuade the court that there was no such injury. But, as this discussion above has made clear, there is no shift of burden. Rather, there are two burdens, the one not arising until the other is satisfied.16 But, secondly, one might say (again by reference to Purkess v Crittenden) that tactically a burden does shift to the plaintiff on the defendant producing evidence of pre-existing injury, and that, if the plaintiff calls no further evidence, it is likely that the burden of persuasion will not be satisfied. The tactical burden of calling evidence may be described as having shifted to the plaintiff.17 But such tactical burden has no formal [page 646] legal consequence. The incidence of the evidential and persuasive burdens formally determines the outcome of this case. The tactical burden merely

describes the current state of play with respect to these burdens. During the course of a trial this tactical burden will shift from one party to another on a particular issue until ultimately, in a tactical sense, the obligation will be upon one party to call evidence or risk losing the issue. This has been described as the ultimate burden.18 These tactical burdens are of practical importance to the parties during the course of a case but are of no concern to the court in making its legal decisions. 6.7 The distinguishing of issues and the allocating of burdens is a matter of substantive law. As can be appreciated, the incidence of the burdens of proof is of crucial consequence in distributing the evidential risks between the parties.19 For example, to place the persuasive burden upon one party rather than another may be the difference between obliging the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and obliging the accused to prove innocence to the same standard. Why the burden should be placed upon one party rather than another is a matter of policy, which can only be fully explained by those policy factors that underlie a particular area of law. These policy factors determine which outcomes should apply in given circumstances of uncertainty; where the risks arising from that uncertainty should be allocated. Therefore, the following sections seek to emphasise the more general guidelines rather than elucidate the incidence of the burdens on every issue in every case. That, as a separate subject, perhaps more so in civil cases, is an impossible and fruitless task. Much better that the incidence of the burden is considered in the context of the particular specialised areas of law where all relevant policy factors can be articulated in distinguishing issues and allotting risks.20 All that can be emphasised here is that, in dealing with particular matters, courts must clearly isolate issues and distinguish between the evidential and persuasive burdens when determining the incidence of the burdens. Failure to do this can only create confusion. And yet courts have not even agreed upon a common terminology to distinguish between the burdens. [page 647]

The incidence of the burdens in criminal cases21 6.8 The incidence of the burdens of proof in criminal cases is dominated by the policies implicit in the presumption of innocence.22 This presumption is also

the basis of the common law ‘accusatory principle’, recently emphasised by the High Court,23 requiring the prosecution to prove its case without assistance from the accused. As a result of the presumption of innocence as a general rule at common law, the prosecution bears both evidential and persuasive burdens in relation to all material facts, positive or negative, which bear upon the guilt of the accused. This general rule was endorsed by the House of Lords in Woolmington v DPP. Their Lordships held that no persuasive burden was cast upon an accused charged with murder to establish the defences of accident, mistake, self-defence, and so on, and that once properly raised, the prosecution was required to rebut these issues to the ordinary criminal standard, beyond reasonable doubt.24 The only issues upon which the accused bears a persuasive [page 648] burden in a criminal case is where the accused raises the defence of insanity (which the accused must establish on the balance of probabilities),25 or where statute so directs (expressly or by implication).26 No distinction was drawn by their Lordships in Woolmington between the evidential and persuasive burdens, but it is quite clear that, in dealing with a direction by the trial judge to the jury, they were concerned only with the latter.27 The trial judge had directed that, once the prosecution satisfied the jury that the killing was unlawful, it was up to the accused, who had given evidence that the killing was accidental, to convince the jury that the accident had in fact occurred. Therefore, the decision leaves open the question of who bears the burden of adducing evidence on issues such as accident and the more specific defences of self-defence, provocation, duress, and so on, before they can be left by the judge to the trier of fact. Is the prosecution in every case obliged to adduce evidence and prove that none of these defences occurred? Or is the evidential burden cast upon the accused to raise such issues by putting credible information before the court, then leaving it to the prosecution to show beyond reasonable doubt that these matters did not occur? This latter compromise gives effect to the presumption of innocence in the sense that the prosecution remains obliged to remove all reasonable doubts of an accused’s guilt,28 whilst at the same time it avoids

obliging the prosecution to negative in advance every possible defence open to the accused. Accepting this compromise, the common law generally imposes an evidential burden upon the accused in respect of defences, with the prosecution then being required to negative the defence once it has been properly raised by the accused. The problem is to determine what at common law comes by way of defence rather than being a matter essential to the crime upon which the prosecution must call evidence in every case. On some issues the authorities are clear in placing an evidential burden [page 649] upon the accused; for example, self-defence,29 provocation,30 duress,31 automatism,32 alibi33 and honest and reasonable mistake.34 Once these issues are properly raised the prosecution must prove their absence beyond reasonable doubt. The evidential burden is satisfied by the accused being able to point to credible evidence capable of raising a reasonable doubt; that is, a reasonable possibility of the events argued by the defence having occurred.35 6.9 Where other issues are concerned, authorities are not so clear in determining whether an issue is a separate issue to be raised by way of defence, or merely one aspect of a more general issue to be raised and proved by the prosecution. For example, accident or necessity or honest and reasonable belief might be regarded as such an integral aspect of moral culpability that in every case the prosecution should bear [page 650] the evidential and persuasive burden of negating its possibility.36 Thus, for example, at common law in a rape case, the issue of whether the accused could reasonably have believed the victim to have been consenting to the intercourse is regarded as so integral to establishing the requisite mens rea by the prosecution that no evidential burden is placed upon the accused in respect to this as a separate issue, and in every case the prosecution must adduce evidence that proves that there was no reasonable possibility that the accused could have held

this belief. Of course, unless there is some evidence suggesting such a mistaken belief, the inference from the evidence tendered will usually be that no such belief was held, so that in reality there may be a tactical burden upon an accused to either personally give evidence or point to evidence from which the possibility of a mistaken belief might be inferred. But at common law there is no formal obligation to pass the judge before arguing this issue before the jury.37 The practical consequence is that a trial judge should be always ready to direct the jury upon this issue. The position appears to be similar in the state code jurisdictions.38 The Criminal Code (Cth) has extensive and sophisticated provisions making clear what matters are generally essential to the establishing of criminal responsibility (Pt 2.2) and what matters must be raised by way of defence (Pt 2.3). Where a matter is to be raised by way of defence, s 13.3(2) places an evidential burden only upon the accused, except in the case of mental impairment, where the burden on the accused is both evidential and persuasive.

The incidence of the burdens in civil cases 6.10 The principle of free disposition produces the general rule that the party seeking to enforce legal rights bears the burden of substantiating the material facts upon which those rights depend.39 Be those material facts expressed positively or [page 651] negatively, the plaintiff bears, as a general rule, both evidential and persuasive burdens in relation to each and every material fact essential to establishing the cause of action. Exceptionally, on some issues relevant to the establishing of the material facts, an evidential burden is placed upon an opponent to avoid the situation whereby the claimant is obliged to negative circumstances that rarely arise. It is left to the opponent to raise these issues in evidence, although, once raised, because these issues are important to establishing the material facts, the claimant bears the burden of persuading the court that they do not prevent the court from finding the material facts as alleged. 6.11 Purkess v Crittenden (see 6.5) illustrates this technique. Once the plaintiff had established apparent fitness before the accident and injury afterwards, the

court would not consider the question of whether there was a latent pre-existing injury until it was properly raised by evidence from the defendant. The inherent improbability of such injury threw the evidential burden upon the defendant to raise it. It would be inappropriate to oblige a plaintiff to negative such unlikely circumstances in advance in every case. It can be appreciated that there is a fine line between the casting of an evidential burden upon the defendant in such circumstances, and casting a tactical burden, and in most cases the distinction is of no significance. The two situations in which the distinction may be important are in determining which party should plead an issue of fact, and in determining whether an issue should have been left to a jury. In Purkess v Crittenden, which was not a jury trial, the only question was whether the trial judge reached the correct decision of fact, not whether the burden on the defendant was evidential or tactical. The High Court decided that on the balance of probabilities and in the absence of other evidence, the injuries all resulted from the accident and were not pre-existing. It is therefore not entirely clear that Purkess v Crittenden cast an evidential burden in the strict sense. 6.12 There are no exceptions to the rule that the claimant bears the persuasive burden of establishing those material facts upon which the legal rights claimed depend. Rather, the question is what are the material facts for this purpose. It is said that the persuasive burden ‘lies on the plaintiff if the fact alleged (whether affirmative or negative in form) is an essential element in his cause of action, for example, if its existence is a condition precedent to his right to maintain the action’, while ‘[t]he onus is on the defendant, if the allegation … is one which, if established, will constitute a good defence, that is, an “avoidance” of the claim which, prima facie, the plaintiff has’.40 This dictum does no more than say that the plaintiff must prove the facts material to the claim and the defendant the facts material to a defence. It provides no test for determining which facts are material to the claim and which are material to the defence. This is a matter of substantive law. [page 652] Nor will previous formulations of the substantive law necessarily determine which facts are material to claim or defence. What are the material facts is a question of substance, not form. The common law is never definitively expressed

in a way that can give guidance as to the material facts. Legislation, on the other hand, is promulgated in a particular form and this may give some indication of what the legislature intended the material facts to be. But, as we will see, the courts are loath to determine materiality as a formal matter even in the case of legislation. Materiality can only be determined as a question of substance on the basis of policies underlying the area of law in question. 6.13 One can only attempt to illustrate the process in this context. For example, in Young v Queensland Trustees Ltd,41 the question was whether a plaintiff suing for repayment of a loan had to persuade the court, not only that money had been given to the defendant and given by way of loan, but also that repayment had not already been made. The High Court referred to precedent in deciding that repayment had to be alleged and persuasively proved by the defendant. The reasons for allocating the burdens of proof in this way lie in an analysis of the policies underlying the law of loans. Again, in Joseph Constantine SS Line Ltd v Imperial Smelting Corp,42 the House of Lords determined that, when a plaintiff sues in contract, the onus is upon the defendant to establish events producing frustration of that contract, for frustration is alleged by way of defence. But it went on to decide that where it is alleged that these frustrating events were caused through the defendant’s own default, that is a separate issue — a defence to the defence of frustration, the onus of proving which lies upon the plaintiff. In his analysis of this case, Professor Stone pointed out that the reasons for placing the burden upon the plaintiff to establish this negligence were the difficulty of a party proving the absence of fault, the undesirability of making a party establish exculpation in this way, and the inherent improbability of there having been fault where a frustrating event is established.43 But the reasons may lie even deeper, in an analysis of the allocation of contractual risks, a difficult issue that cannot be pursued in this context. This case can merely illustrate the sorts of arguments that may be taken into account in determining what is a material fact for the purposes of allocating the persuasive burden of proof in civil cases.44

Legislative allocation of the burdens of proof 6.14 The allocation of the burdens of proof in criminal charges and civil claims brought under statute is ultimately a matter for the legislature. As long as a legislature has the constitutional authority to deal with a particular subject matter, it may allocate

[page 653] burdens in whatever way it wishes, and courts must determine that allocation by using the ordinary rules of statutory interpretation. The allocation can be achieved either through express words or by implication. Until recently there has been in Australia45 and the United Kingdom no restriction, legislative or constitutional, upon this allocation, in either civil or criminal cases. Thus, many examples can be found of legislation quite expressly imposing persuasive burdens upon accused that must be satisfied if the accused is to be found innocent.46 The allocation of burdens in criminal cases is somewhat restricted in jurisdictions that have enacted human rights legislation recognising the right to be presumed innocent. Such legislation currently exists in the United Kingdom (the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK)) and in two Australian jurisdictions: Victoria (Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006) and the Australian Capital Territory (Human Rights Act 2004). The legislation directs courts, when confronted in a criminal case with a statutory offence that appears to place a burden upon an accused to establish his or her innocence, first, wherever possible, to interpret that legislation to conform with the presumption (which can be most easily achieved by interpreting any burden placed upon an accused as an evidential burden only);47 and secondly, where this is not possible, to declare legislation placing a burden upon an accused as inconsistent with the right to be presumed innocent (leaving it to parliament to take appropriate steps to amend the offending legislation).48 [page 654] In the remaining Australian jurisdictions the only questions that arise in respect of legislation allocating burdens of proof are questions of ordinary statutory interpretation. Questions arise because, first, where actions or offences are created often legislation makes no express reference to the allocation of the burdens of proof, in which case courts must determine whether an allocation should be implied from the legislation (having reference to the policies embodied in it and the form in which it is drafted); and secondly, often where there is some reference to the allocation of burdens this reference is ambiguous or incomplete, leaving it to courts to determine the precise allocation.

These questions remain in criminal cases as a consequence of the Woolmington rule, which requires that the prosecution bear the persuasive burden (to a standard of beyond reasonable doubt) upon every issue except insanity, except where parliament has indicated otherwise. Many questions could have been avoided if courts had interpreted Woolmington as demanding that legislation use express words to alter the persuasive burden of proof, and that, in the absence of such words, only an evidential burden could be impliedly cast upon an accused (by analogy to the common law defences; it is this approach that is now enacted in s 13.4 of the Criminal Code (Cth) and effectively achieved by the human rights legislation considered above). Such an interpretation gives due weight to the presumption of innocence when interpreting legislation. The possibility of this interpretation has never been discussed by the High Court (although the House of Lords in R v Hunt49 expressly decided that to place the persuasive burden upon an accused by implication was consistent with the Woolmington rule.) In Dowling v Bowie,50 the court simply assumes that the persuasive burden can be impliedly placed upon an accused. But in Braysich v R, French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ assert, without discussion, that ‘[i]t is an “elementary principle of the criminal law that unless express statutory provision to the contrary be made, the onus lies upon the Crown throughout to negative defences sufficiently raised”’.51 It is therefore not entirely clear whether at common law in Australia the presumption of innocence as embodied in the Woolmington principle permits both evidential and persuasive burdens to be placed upon the accused by legislative implication. If it does so permit, which burden is placed upon an accused by implication becomes simply a matter of ordinary [page 655] statutory interpretation. Both the House of Lords52 and the High Court53 have in the past determined that whether any persuasive burden is placed upon the accused depends simply upon the intention of the legislature, to be gleaned from the words and policies of the legislation under consideration. The presumption of innocence has received little or no express attention while other guidelines are given prominence. But as it is usually in criminal cases that these other guidelines are given prominence, one might argue that the presumption of innocence has exerted unexpressed influence.54 Furthermore, later High Court decisions

emphasising the accusatorial principle and its companion rules have not hesitated in expressing fundamental common law principles and rules which require clear and unambiguous words before legislation will be interpreted as interfering with them.55 The question is whether the rule that the accused bears the persuasive burden on all issues, derived from Woolmington, is a fundamental companion to the common law accusatorial trial. 6.15 By far the most important guideline in interpreting legislation to allocate burdens is the rule in Jarvis.56 The rule is expressed in that case by Lord Mansfield in the following terms: … it is a known distinction that what comes by way of proviso in a statute must be insisted upon by way of defence by the party accused; but, where exceptions are in the enacting part of the law, it must appear in the charge that the defendant does not fall within any of them.

Originally only a rule of averment in criminal cases, its application was extended from burdens of pleading to burdens of proof — inevitably, given the close adversary relationship between the two.57 Its basis depends upon whether it is a guide to determining the incidence of the evidential or persuasive burden of proof. If the former, it is based simply upon the convenience (assumed to be acceptable to parliament) of avoiding the prosecutor being obliged to aver and prove every proviso in every case, thereby allowing a case to answer to be readily established and throwing a burden upon the accused to produce evidence of facts making the proviso applicable. The prosecution must then persuade the court that the proviso does not arise. This approach is comparable to that taken by the common law to defences such as self-defence and provocation. [page 656] If, on the other hand, the rule is based upon the assumption (notwithstanding deeper policies concerned with the presumption of innocence which arguably underlie Woolmington)58 that parliaments simply accept the general adversary rule that even in criminal cases claimants carry the persuasive burden only in respect of those facts essential to the claim, then it can be presumptively assumed that parliament intended that facts expressed by way of proviso must be established persuasively by the accused. This assumed parliamentary intention then brings the situation within one of the exceptional cases where Woolmington permits a persuasive burden to lie upon the accused.

6.16 Prior to the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), English courts expressly decided that the Jarvis rule was a guide to determining the allocation of the persuasive burden.59 One reason was that, given that in summary offences parliament itself had expressly enacted the Jarvis rule in a form courts decided showed that the persuasive burden is concerned,60 it would have been anomalous to have different approaches to indictable and summary cases.61 In Australia, the statutory enactment of the Jarvis rule exists in some form in a number of jurisdictions62 and has similarly been interpreted to cast a persuasive burden upon the accused.63 Those High Court cases that have discussed the Jarvis rule generally have been concerned only with the question of what is a proviso, rather than the effect of so finding.64 But the serious way in which the High Court in these cases went [page 657] about determining whether there was a proviso (discussed at 6.18) suggests that it was concerned with the question of whether parliament had intended to place a persuasive burden on the accused so as to invoke the exceptional situation within the Woolmington rule. If Jarvis can be interpreted to provide an appropriate guide, in order to maintain parity between summary and indictable offences, it may be more consistent to interpret it as also concerned with placing the persuasive burden.65 6.17 This argument depends to some extent upon reference in the statutory enactments of the Jarvis rule to no ‘proof’ being required from the informant in the case of an exception or proviso. In the Commonwealth, Victoria, and in the Australian Capital and Northern Territories, legislation now makes it clear that only an evidential burden is cast upon the defendant in enacting the Jarvis rule, and that, once this burden is satisfied, the informant bears the persuasive burden of proof on the issue.66 The existence of this legislation means that the argument for consistency in those jurisdictions now favours the Jarvis rule being interpreted as casting only an evidentiary burden. This approach would permit a common law rule to receive differing interpretations depending upon the form its statutory enactment happens to take. 6.18 The problematical issues for rules such as that in Jarvis are what exactly is an exception or proviso, and does the finding that a matter comes by way of

exception or proviso provide a formal guide for determining parliament’s intention in respect of the allocation of the burden of proof? It seems now clear that in both summary and indictable cases courts do not limit themselves to formal parliamentary expression in determining what is an exception or proviso. Rather, matters of policy are decisive in determining whether parliament intended an issue to be essential to the prosecution case or whether, rather, it expresses: … an exculpation, justification, excuse, ground of defeasance or exclusion which assumes the existence of the general or primary grounds from which the liability or right arises but denies the right or liability in a particular case by reason of additional special facts.

If the legislation is interpreted to create such an exception or proviso, then ‘such an enactment supplies considerations of substance for placing the burden of proof on [page 658] the party seeking to rely upon the additional or special matter’.67 Courts have found formal parliamentary expression too accidental as a decisive guide to determining whether an issue is intended to be raised by way of exception or proviso. For example, the issue of a licence may be regarded formally as a material fact of the offence where the legislature provides that ‘no unlicensed person shall drive an articulated truck’, and formally as an exception or proviso where the legislature provides that ‘no person shall drive an articulated truck except the holder of the appropriate licence’. However, courts are not prepared to regard such formal expression as decisive in determining an exception or proviso for the purpose of allocating the persuasive burden. The form of expression will always be taken into account,68 but courts will go behind the express words and determine as a matter of policy and substance whether an issue is a distinct issue, by way of exception or proviso, upon which parliament may be presumed to have intended the accused to bear the burden. But the policies behind the presumption of innocence receive little express influence in determining this intention. 6.19 Another guideline to interpreting legislative allocation of the burden of proof is found in the following dictum of Bayley J in R v Turner:69 … if a negative averment be made by one party, which is peculiarly within the knowledge of the

other, the party within whose knowledge it lies, and who asserts the affirmative is to prove it and not he who asserts the negative.

The status of this as a definitive rule is extremely doubtful. Scholl J in Everard v Opperman rejected it as such, and it receives no emphasis in High Court decisions.70 It is better regarded as merely illustrating two vital factors: the negative nature of an issue and the respective knowledge of the parties, which require serious consideration [page 659] in deciding as a matter of substance upon which party the legislature intended to place the burden of proof.71 Certainly, the respective knowledge of the parties looms large as a factor in determining whether an issue should be regarded as a proviso for the purpose of presuming parliament intended the accused to bear a persuasive burden. The House of Lords in R v Hunt72 refused to throw the burden of proof on an accused to prove the nature of a substance alleged to be a prohibited drug, because of the difficulty an accused might have in explaining something of a technical nature not necessarily within that accused’s knowledge. It was thus much fairer that the prosecution seize and analyse the substance and prove its nature. Similarly, in Dowling v Bowie,73 the High Court thought it easier and fairer for the prosecution to establish that a ‘half-caste’ within the Aboriginals Ordinance 1918–1947 (NT) had not been declared exempt for the purposes of a charge against a publican for selling liquor to a ‘half-caste’. Both cases provide quite pragmatic reasons for regarding parliament as intending to retain ‘the golden thread’ of Woolmington. 6.20 It should also be noted that the accused’s knowledge, even if not relied upon for the purpose of placing a burden of proof upon that accused, has been held influential in deciding whether there is a case to answer and whether the prosecution has established its case.74 For example, in Donoghue v Terry,75 the accused was charged with driving a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent. Lowe J refused to place any burden upon the accused with respect to the issue of consent, which he regarded as

clearly an essential element of the offence. The prosecution adduced evidence from a car repairer that the car in question had been entrusted to him by the owner for repairs, and evidence that the accused, an employee of the repairer, had been caught driving the car after hours. The accused argued that the case had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt as there was no evidence that the owner of the car had not given him permission to drive the car. Lowe J held that, as consent was a matter peculiarly within the accused’s knowledge, little evidence was required from the prosecution to establish a case to answer. He then went on to find absence of consent proved because the accused had failed to testify or otherwise call any evidence of consent. Although there was no evidential or persuasive burden on the accused, failure to offer any evidence of an explanation peculiarly within his knowledge meant there was no reason for [page 660] doubting the prosecution evidence.76 Whether this case is consistent with more recent High Court authority recognising the accused’s ‘right to silence’ and limiting the circumstances in which inferences may be drawn against an accused from failure to testify or otherwise call evidence (see 5.117ff, 6.43–6.46) may be doubtful, particularly if the owner of the car could have been called by the prosecution to testify. It is more likely that in a civil case a court will have regard to a party’s knowledge and power to produce evidence in determining whether a case has been made out and proved.77 6.21 We can conclude that, while in most Australian jurisdictions there are no restraints upon legislatures placing burdens upon the accused, where legislation is unclear or silent about the allocation of the burden: courts will consider placing burdens upon the accused by implication; the principal criterion is whether an issue is part of the offence or comes by way of proviso; matters of substance and policy determine how this criterion applies but little express emphasis has been given to the policies inherent in the presumption of innocence; and once an issue is regarded as one by way of proviso, in jurisdictions other than

the Commonwealth, Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory, the accused carries a persuasive burden (all courts agreeing that wherever an accused carries a persuasive burden it is to the civil standard).78 The failure to emphasise the policies inherent in the presumption of innocence and to place only an evidential burden upon an accused have been strongly criticised by commentators.79 Yet the House of Lords held the common law so clear in placing a persuasive burden on the accused that only legislative intervention could alter the situation.80 In Australia as well, courts appear loath to consider the incidence of other than the persuasive burden, although the High Court has not ruled out expressly the possibility [page 661] of placing evidential burdens only upon those accused unless the statutory words are clear. There is much to be said for the view that the legislature should be presumed only to have, on practical grounds, placed an evidential burden on the accused. This enables a case to answer to be easily established and throws the burden upon the accused of adducing evidence of matters peculiarly within his or her knowledge. But at the same time it recognises and gives due weight to the presumption of innocence. It is also an approach now enacted in Pt 2.6 of the Criminal Code (Cth) and effectively demanded in jurisdictions that have enacted ‘the right to be presumed innocent’. 6.22 Other difficulties are caused where the legislature does expressly refer to the incidence of the burden of proof, but does so in ambiguous or incomplete terms. The courts have, however, sorted out these difficulties by distinguishing between the evidential and persuasive burdens in a way apparently not contemplated in discussing exceptions and provisos. When legislation requires a party to ‘prove’ an issue, this is interpreted to involve the persuasive burden (and where it is the accused who must prove an issue the standard is the civil standard).81 Another popular legislative technique is to make allegations or averments ‘prima facie evidence’ of the facts alleged or averred, and the courts have decided, after some deliberation, that the effect of such a provision is that the facts are

regarded as proved unless the accused tenders credible evidence raising the possibility of a reasonable doubt (compare this to common law defences). Once the accused has satisfied this evidential burden, the prosecution carries the persuasive burden of proving the facts in the ordinary way, beyond reasonable doubt. The benefit of the statutory presumption is not lost merely because the prosecution also adduces evidence on the issue, although the accused may use this information in seeking to satisfy the evidential burden that is upon the defence.82 Where it is an offence to be found in possession of things ‘reasonably suspected’ to have been used or acquired unlawfully, the courts have consistently held that once the prosecution has established the reasonable suspicion, the accused bears the persuasive onus (to the civil standard) of showing that the possession was an innocent one.83 [page 662]

Presumptions 6.23 Presumed facts must be accepted by courts either absolutely84 (irrebuttable or conclusive presumptions), or until the court is persuaded otherwise (persuasive presumptions), or until credible evidence to the contrary is adduced (evidential presumptions).85 Presumptions are therefore a technique for allocating burdens of proof on particular issues of fact.86 As long as the operation of a presumption is not inconsistent with the uniform legislation, it is expressly preserved.87 Facts may be presumed either as a general rule or only upon the establishing of other (basic) facts. The presumptions of innocence and sanity, which apply in criminal cases, are examples of the former. Insofar as these are put forward as having specific legal consequences (rather than as embodying more general policy arguments for imposing legal consequences, or embodying generalisations of knowledge from which inferences of fact might be drawn) they simply express the general rules allocating burdens of proof found in Woolmington’s case. Those presumptions that arise on proof of basic facts are presumptions in the strong sense, the presumptions embodying rules of law that allocate burdens of proof on particular issues in particular circumstances. For example, the presumption of legitimacy embodies the rule that, on proof

of birth during lawful marriage, the opponent must convince the court of the child’s illegitimacy (a persuasive presumption).88 The presumption of death embodies the rule that, on proof that at the time of the trial a person has been absent for seven years and not heard of by those who could be expected to have heard, the opponent must [page 663] convince the court that that person is still alive (another persuasive presumption).89 The presumptions of formal and essential validity of marriage embody the rule that, on proof of a marriage ceremony, the opponent must persuade the court that there is a formal or essential defect that causes the marriage’s invalidity (persuasive presumptions).90 The presumption of accuracy of scientific instruments embodies the rule that, on proof that an instrument belongs to a class of notoriously accurate scientific instruments, the opponent must adduce evidence suggesting the inaccuracy of a particular reading (an evidential presumption).91 Compare with the persuasive presumption enacted in s 146 of the uniform legislation, which presumes the nature of a document or thing produced by a device or process if ‘it is reasonably open to find that the device or process is one that, or is of a kind that, if properly used, ordinarily produces that outcome’.92 6.24 It may be said that presumptions in this strong sense initially arise because they express the inherent likelihood of the existence or occurrence of the presumed fact — legitimacy where birth is during lawful marriage, death after long absence, and so on — but formal strength, through the incidence of a persuasive or evidential burden, is given to this inherent likelihood by additional extraneous policy considerations. For example, illegitimacy is (or has been) cause for legal and social stigma and therefore should be clearly established by the party asserting it. Again, marriage is of such legal and social importance that, on proof of ceremony, it is only appropriate that good reasons should be established for striking it down. In the case of alleged death following absence, it would be impossible to establish death (for example, for testamentary purposes) unless the law laid down an arbitrary limit. 6.25 This reliance upon extraneous policies to determine the incidence of the burdens of proof distinguishes presumptions from mere inferences of fact.

Whether an inference of fact arises is a matter of general probability only, and all the circumstances [page 664] must be looked to in determining whether or not to draw a particular inference. Where the circumstances are strong, so that the drawing of the inference by the trier of fact is likely, there may arise a tactical burden to adduce contrary evidence, but the law does not formally place upon the opponent an evidential or persuasive burden. With the line between a tactical and an evidential burden difficult to draw, it is often unclear whether courts are discussing evidential presumptions or mere inferences of fact. It has now been made clear by the High Court, for example, that the oft-called presumption of res ipsa loquitur is no more than a shorthand way of referring to situations where an inference of negligence may be drawn, placing at highest a tactical burden upon the opponent.93 If a plaintiff can prove a situation where accidents do not normally occur without the person in control having been negligent, an inference of negligence may be drawn, but as a matter of general probability, not as a rule of law.94 There are many other situations where the word ‘presumption’ is used to describe the process of inference. For example, the ‘presumption’ that a person intends the natural consequences of actions was wrongly raised to the status of a rule of law in England before this was remedied by statute.95 And query whether there is a formal presumption that a person’s acts are conscious and voluntary.96 Judges still refer to the ‘presumption’ of life continuing, which is merely an inference of fact,97 and ‘presumptions’ of regularity.98 Similarly, the ‘presumption’ of innocence applied in civil cases to conclude that participants did not act criminally is merely an inference of fact that may or may not be drawn.99 6.26 Difficulties are created in this area by courts failing to distinguish between presumptions and inferences, failing to be clear about which burden of proof is involved where a presumption does arise, and failing to use presumptions only as a guide to the incidence of the burdens of proof. [page 665]

To illustrate these difficulties, consider the following fact situation: The plaintiff’s claim depends upon proof of the validity of a marriage between A and B. The plaintiff adduces evidence of that ceremony. The defendant adduces evidence that A had previously married C, although at the time of A’s marriage to B, C had not been heard of for many years. In this situation, McInerney J in Re Peatling100 declared the following ‘presumptions’ relevant: the presumption of essential validity of a marriage, the presumption of death, the presumption of continuance, and the presumption of innocence. He concluded (at 227): It seems to me, therefore, that I ought to give effect to the social policy expressed in the presumption of the validity of a marriage ceremony proved to have been performed, followed by cohabitation, and to the general presumption against misconduct as well as to the presumption of [C]’s death prior to the date of [A]’s marriage to [B], and that I should treat those presumptions as outweighing any inference that [C]’s life continued to [A’s marriage to B], and that I should presume [C] to have died prior to that date.

This admixture of presumptions and inferences may have produced the correct result, but the logic of the approach is difficult to follow and appears to confuse the use of presumptions to determine the incidence of a burden of proof and as mere inferences of fact. The correct approach to this situation was clearly explained by Dixon J in Axon v Axon,101 and can be summarised as follows: 1.

The plaintiff as claimant bears the persuasive burden of proving the validity of A’s marriage to B.

2.

On proof of the ceremony between A and B the presumption of essential validity requires the defendant to carry the evidential and persuasive burdens102 of proving that the marriage is invalid.

3.

The defendant can establish this invalidity by showing that: (a)

A was previously validly married to C; and

(b) C was still alive when A married B. 4.

Evidence of the ceremony between A and C establishes the first issue (casting evidential and persuasive burdens upon the plaintiff to show invalidity) so that the major issue upon which the defendant bears the evidential and persuasive burdens is that C was alive when A married B.

[page 666] 5.

If C had not been heard of for seven years prior to A’s marriage to B it is arguable that C is persuasively presumed dead at this time,103 but this is of no assistance to the defendant who already carries the persuasive burden of showing C alive at this time. As a means for determining the incidence of the persuasive burden on the issue of the life of C, the presumption of death takes the matter no further. Whether there is possibly an inference of death in these circumstances is a separate issue.

6.

The question is thus whether on the facts the defendant can establish (on the balance of probabilities) by inference that C was still alive at the relevant time. The trier of fact must decide whether to draw an inference that C’s life continued to this time, based upon factors such as the health and age of C and the circumstances of C’s disappearance, or instead to infer death from the nature of the absence. These are questions of fact. The inference that A acted innocently in marrying B on the assumption that C was dead does not as a matter of evidence appear to take the matter much further. No presumption of innocence in the sense of determining the incidence of the burden of proof applies in a civil case such as this.

6.27 Analysed in this way presumptions assist in determining the incidence of the burden of proof upon the vital issue in the case, but once they have been isolated and the burden determined, the decision becomes one of fact, not presumption. The only possible conflict of ‘presumptions’ in this example is between the inferences of continuance of C’s life and the inference of C’s death, and this is a conflict that can only be resolved as a question of fact upon the evidence. It is not easy to envisage situations where true presumptions conflict.104 Where they do, it is said that the presumption embodying the stronger public policy must prevail.105 Although one may agree with this conclusion in theory, in the absence of practical examples there is little point in taking the matter further. If the analysis of presumptions and inferences pursued here is followed, conflict will seldom, if ever, arise. 6.28 Presumptions only arise where there are good reasons for placing the burden of proof on one party rather than another. They embody reasons for allocating the burden of proof. As our general discussion of the incidence of the

burdens of proof clearly shows, the reasons for placing burdens, particularly persuasive burdens, upon an [page 667] accused in a criminal case must be very convincing. It does not, therefore, necessarily follow that, because a presumption has been applied in a civil case to allocate a burden of proof, this will necessarily be followed in a criminal case. Thus, in R v Willshire,106 the court in a bigamy prosecution refused to place any persuasive burden upon an accused by virtue of the presumption of essential validity of the first marriage relied upon by the prosecution, and evidence creating a reasonable possibility that this first marriage was not valid was sufficient to cast upon the prosecution the persuasive burden of its strict proof. Similarly, in Dillon v R,107 the Privy Council refused to allow the prosecution to rely upon a presumption that officials acted lawfully, an issue central to the charge of escape from lawful custody. However, courts in criminal cases are in other circumstances willing to allow presumptions to cast evidential burdens upon an accused. Thus, in Pertl v Kahl,108 the presumption omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta was invoked to prove that the Commissioner of Taxation had validly delegated his authority to a Deputy Commissioner for the purposes of a tax prosecution in the absence of credible evidence to the contrary from the accused. And the evidential presumption that commonly used scientific instruments are accurate has been applied in criminal proceedings through courts taking judicial notice of an instrument’s accuracy, in the case of speedometers109 and microspectrophotometers110 (but not breathalysers111 or laser speed guns).112 Gathering together all rules laying down presumptions in civil and criminal cases is an exercise of substantive law beyond the scope of this book. In this context it is only possible to explain and distinguish the various presumptive techniques.

No Case to Answer Theory 6.29 The theory of the adversary trial embodies the notion that a proponent

must allege and provide sufficient evidence of material facts before the opponent is called upon to answer. Following that answer, the court considers whether it is persuaded as to the existence or occurrence of the material facts. This theory is consistent with the [page 668] notion of the evidential burden of proof and appears to be confirmed by an opponent being able to submit, at the close of the proponent’s case, that no case to answer has been made out and that the matter should be thereupon summarily determined. But, while in criminal cases the submission appears to support the accusatory adversarial theory, in civil cases the submission may be grounded more in notions of practical convenience.

Criminal cases 6.30 Criminal cases proceed by way of formal charge (generally described as a complaint, information or indictment) and consequent plea by the accused. Prior to plea, an accused may allege the court has no jurisdiction to hear the case or contest the formal validity of the charge113 or allege the charge constitutes an abuse of process or, by plea in bar, allege autrefois acquit or convict. To be formally valid the charge must provide sufficient particulars of the offence charged so that it may be fairly defended by an accused. But there is no other formal statement of the material facts alleged by the prosecution to constitute the offence charged. These allegations of fact will be made in the prosecution’s opening statement at trial when an accused contests the charges. In the absence of formal allegations of fact by the prosecution, the accused has no right to submit there is no case to answer until the completion of the prosecution case, when the prosecution case has been definitively alleged through the evidence called.114 At that stage the submission will be made on the basis that the prosecution has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the material facts of the offence charged. Whether a case to answer is made out is a question of law for the judge115 and, if the judge accepts the submission, a verdict must be entered for the accused (any jury being directed to acquit).116 The matter then becomes res judicata. A submission of no case to answer is a request for a final verdict. 6.31 It is important to distinguish this procedure from other related

procedures. In the first place, the submission is distinct from any application or argument that may be made at committal proceedings. Committal proceedings are separate proceedings, [page 669] created by statute,117 and held in order to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to put on trial a person charged with a serious offence. Although the standard of sufficiency may be equivalent to that required for a case to answer,118 this is not necessarily so,119 and, furthermore, the prosecution’s failure to produce sufficient evidence results in no verdict and does not prevent fresh charges for the same offence being brought against the accused. Secondly, the submission must be distinguished from the prosecutor’s right to abandon proceedings prior by entering a nolle prosequi. Again, no res judicata applies in such a case.120 Thirdly, the submission must be distinguished from a request by the accused to the judge to remind the jury of its prerogative to acquit at an early stage on the ground that, in any event, it considers it would be unsafe to convict.121 Although the effect of a successful request is a verdict of acquittal and the principles of res judicata thereupon apply, the accused has no right to the consideration or exercise of this prerogative and failure of the trial judge to respond to a request gives no right of appeal. 6.32 The standard of sufficiency for a case to answer concentrates upon the adversarial sufficiency of the evidence to oblige the accused to make answer to the adduced evidence. It seeks to put aside all issues of credibility and the strength of [page 670] hypotheses and inferences and concentrates upon the capacity of the evidence, taken at its highest, to support a conviction. It is for the jury, not the judge, to determine whether the prosecution evidence is persuasive beyond reasonable doubt.

But whether the standard of sufficiency for a case to answer is such that the judge is obliged to disregard altogether questions of credibility and sufficiency appears to be, on the authorities, still a matter of some doubt.122 Indeed, whether as a matter of cognitive capacity a judge is able to do this might be regarded as doubtful. In an oft-quoted dictum, Kitto J in Zanetti v Hill123 described the standard as requiring ‘some evidence which, if accepted, would either prove the element directly or enable its existence to be inferred’. Some judges have interpreted this as requiring them to put aside altogether questions of sufficiency to satisfy the applicable standard of proof.124 On this approach, the only question is whether the prosecution has adduced some evidence upon all the material facts. King CJ, on the other hand, formulates the standard as follows:125 … on the assumption that all the evidence of primary fact considered at its strongest from the point of view of the case for the prosecution is accurate, and on the further assumption that all inferences most favourable to the prosecution which are reasonably open are drawn, is the evidence capable of producing in the mind of a reasonable person satisfaction, beyond reasonable doubt, of the guilt of the accused?

This formulation, in its reference to the capacity of the evidence to persuade a reasonable person beyond reasonable doubt, suggests that it is not enough that there is just some evidence supporting each material fact, but that this evidence, assuming it is believed, must have the capacity to persuade a reasonable person to the criminal standard. The degree of sufficiency required to achieve this capacity remains elusive. 6.33 But some further points might be made. As well as matters of witness credibility being put aside, where a case depends upon circumstantial evidence the fact that, in addition to an inference of guilt being open, there remain hypotheses that a jury might [page 671] regard as consistent with innocence does not necessarily prevent a case to answer being made out.126 Furthermore, authorities are clear in holding that the judge should not consider on a no case submission whether it would be safe to convict upon the evidence presented.127 The jury retains a prerogative to acquit on this basis at any stage, and the trial judge has a discretion to remind the jury of this right (which should not be lightly exercised),128 but the question of whether it

would be reasonable or safe to convict raises matters of sufficiency which are not relevant to a no case submission. If it is alleged that the jury should not have convicted, an appeal may succeed on the ground that the verdict was unsafe;129 but on the no case submission questions of the safety of any resulting conviction are said to be irrelevant. This being so, the clearest way of distinguishing the Prasad submission from the submission of no case to answer would be to say that whereas the former requires decisions of persuasive sufficiency the latter does not, and the only question where a submission of no case is made is whether the prosecution has adduced some credible evidence relating to all the material facts of the charge.130 6.34 The fundamental issue is what amount of evidence should be required to make it fair to call upon the accused to answer the prosecution case. Is some evidence enough, or should it be screened for its sufficiency, and if it should, to what extent? Stated as purely factual questions it is doubtful whether we will find clear general answers to them. Chapters 1 and 2 have illustrated the difficulty in pinning down factual issues. It might be better to ask what sort of evidence, in normative terms, should the prosecution be expected to adduce in a particular case before it can be said [page 672] that it is fair for the accused to be called upon to answer. But the courts have never put the test in these terms. If one accepts that the standard of sufficiency is based upon adversarial grounds, then it can be understood that the submission of no case is made after the prosecution case as a matter of right.131 Thus, if more than one accused is standing trial, each co-accused is entitled to make the submission at the close of the prosecution case before the other co-accused go into evidence. The English,132 South Australian133 and Western Australian134 courts are clear on this. The Supreme Court of Victoria consistently took a different view.135 It reasoned that the submission of no case is linked to the privilege against self-incrimination, and that the accused cannot submit the absence of need to answer until all the other evidence is in, for only then does the privilege against self-incrimination take over. But not only does it seem somewhat unfair to allow the Crown to obtain evidence in this way when it could not call co-accused as prosecution

witnesses, but there are also grave objections on grounds of unreliability. In principle it is the state that should itself tender sufficient evidence to oblige an accused to answer. This predominant view has now been enacted in ss 69 and 229 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic). 6.35 Whether the case is tried before a jury or alone by a judge or magistrate, the accused has the adversarial right to submit no case at the close of the prosecution case.136 Where, on the other hand, the accused seeks an exercise of the prerogative to acquit, it is left to the discretion of the judge or magistrate whether that matter is considered. It has been held in South Australia that a magistrate sitting alone does possess the prerogative to acquit on the ground that the evidence is unsafe or unsatisfactory but that, as a general rule, this prerogative should not be considered by the magistrate until all the evidence in the case is in.137 The magistrate should thus insist that the accused [page 673] elect to call no evidence if the accused persists in a request for an early verdict and the magistrate decides to hear and determine that request. If the adversarial right is accepted, where a convicted accused appeals on the ground that the submission of no case was improperly rejected, the court of appeal is entitled to consider only the evidence up until the close of the prosecution case in ruling whether that case to answer had been made out. If it decides it had not been made out then there has been an error of law that will presumptively lead to a successful appeal. English138 and South Australian139 cases support this view, but Victorian cases140 (followed in Tasmania141 and Western Australia)142 have held that it would be unrealistic to disregard evidence given following the unsuccessful submission and that, if all the evidence supports a conviction, it cannot be argued that any substantial miscarriage of justice occurred.143 This pragmatic view does much to undermine the adversarial right. It also appears to be inconsistent with ss 66 and 226 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic), which entitle a defendant to a submission of no case at the completion of the prosecution case. On the other hand, failure of a court to consider its prerogative to acquit at an early stage gives no ground for appeal.

Civil cases 6.36 Failure to allege material facts would normally be taken as a preliminary point before trial by way of interlocutory proceedings, the defendant seeking to have a statement of claim struck out as disclosing no cause of action.144 Arguments at the trial about the insufficiency of evidence are taken upon a submission of no case to answer, but in civil cases it appears that this terminology may [page 674] be used to embrace two distinct common law procedures: verdict by direction, and non-suit. It is therefore essential from the outset to distinguish these.145 6.37 At common law, to ensure that juries did not act against the evidence, the procedure developed whereby the defendant, at the completion of all the evidence, could ask the judge to direct the jury to find against the plaintiff on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to support the plaintiff’s claim. If the submission succeeded and the verdict directed was given, the plaintiff thus lost the claim and the matter became res judicata. The procedure was not based upon the idea of adversarial sufficiency, that a plaintiff should adduce sufficient evidence to warrant the defendant giving an answer; rather, it existed to give judges control, as a matter of law, over jury decisions, thereby ensuring those decisions were soundly based upon sufficient evidence. The common law procedure embodying the idea of adversarial sufficiency was the non-suit. This procedure originated as one enabling a plaintiff, who realised the claim was defective in some way, to withdraw the claim before verdict (thereby avoiding losing the claim and being prevented, by the doctrine of res judicata, from suing again). But this procedure evolved to permit the defendant, at the close of the plaintiff’s case, to seek to have the plaintiff enter a non-suit upon the ground that there was insufficient allegation or evidence to warrant the defendant being called upon to answer. If the defendant succeeded, the plaintiff’s claim was withdrawn, unresolved, and the doctrine of res judicata did not apply to prevent the plaintiff later bringing the same claim. It has been held that the non-suit procedure was implicitly abolished by the Judicature Acts, which replaced the non-suit procedure with that of

discontinuance (a procedure which makes no allowance for being invoked at the option of the opponent and which provides that the court may direct discontinuance to have the same effect as judgment).146 The discontinuance procedure is adopted in all Australian Supreme Courts147 and therefore the nonsuit procedure is implicitly abolished. As a result, except where a non-suit procedure has been expressly preserved,148 the submission [page 675] of no case to answer is now only equivalent to the common law submission seeking a verdict by direction. This is of crucial significance in determining the standard of sufficiency and the stage at which this submission is made. 6.38 The standard of sufficiency where a verdict by direction is sought is satisfied by that evidence from which a properly directed jury would be entitled to find the material facts of the claim proved on the balance of probabilities.149 Put in this perspective the standard is higher than that required on the non-suit. The non-suit standard is the adversarial notion that appropriate allegations have been made and some evidence (taken at its highest) has been adduced in support of those allegations. However, the verdict by direction standard additionally asks whether the evidence in support reaches that degree of sufficiency that would entitle a jury to act upon it. These different standards are emphasised in those cases distinguishing between a submission of no case ‘on the law’ (equivalent to the non-suit and invoking the first standard) and such a submission ‘on the facts’ (equivalent to a verdict by direction and invoking the second standard).150 It is appropriate, therefore, on a submission of no case to answer which seeks a verdict by direction, to argue that the ‘evidence is so weak or so unsatisfactory that it should not be accepted’.151 This would be inappropriate where only a non-suit is sought. 6.39 The nature of the submission is also important in determining at what stage of the trial the submission can be made. In those jurisdictions (most jurisdictions) where the no case submission is strictly equivalent to a verdict by direction, it should as a general rule be made only after all the evidence is in.152 The defendant wishing to

[page 676] make the submission can create this situation by electing to call no further evidence. Thus, the general rule, where the submission of no case is equivalent to seeking a verdict by direction, is that a defendant cannot make such a submission at the close of the plaintiff’s case unless that defendant elects to call no further evidence. It has, however, been held, on grounds of practical convenience, that the court does have a discretion to hear such a submission at the close of the plaintiff’s case without obliging the defendant to make the election.153 It has been held that, even in those jurisdictions where the submission of no case essentially seeks only a directed verdict, wherever the submission involves an argument that there is no allegation or no evidence (a submission ‘on the law’ effectively equivalent to a non-suit), then it ought to be heard at the close of the plaintiff’s case. If, on the other hand, it involves an argument concerning the credibility of the evidence (a submission ‘on the facts’ and properly seeking a directed verdict), it ought not be considered until all the evidence is in.154 But the timing is ultimately always within the discretion of the court. No adversarial right exists to have such a submission ‘on the law’ considered at the close of the plaintiff’s case except in those jurisdictions that preserve the procedure for dismissal by non-suit. In those jurisdictions preserving the procedure for dismissal by non-suit upon the defendant’s application, the situation is different. That procedure is justified by adversarial notions, the non-suit can be sought at the close of the plaintiff’s case, and the standard of sufficiency is analogous to the no case standard in criminal cases. 6.40 In those jurisdictions where the submission of no case strictly seeks a directed verdict, various other factors have been referred to by courts as influencing their discretion to permit the submission to be heard at the close of the plaintiff’s case (that is, without requiring election).155 Time and cost, including principles of case-flow management, justify such a procedure where there is no allegation or no evidence and the submission is equivalent to a nonsuit. But if there is doubt about sufficiency it is preferable to defer a no case submission until all the evidence is in. Then, if the submission is upheld and the matter goes on appeal, there will be no need for another trial should the appeal court consider there was a case to answer.156 Adversarial

[page 677] principles seem to lie behind references to the nature of the case, with election not being insisted upon where the case is quasi-criminal in character — for example, cases involving fraud and other serious misconduct.157 Where there are co-defendants the discretion remains exercisable upon similar grounds of proper case-management.158 If only one wishes to submit no case to answer, a judge should be careful of ruling on the submission before the close of all the evidence because this might result in judgment for a defendant shown liable by subsequent evidence (from a co-defendant); and where the plaintiff’s evidence shows one or other of the defendants must be liable, it is generally appropriate for the judge to defer ruling upon the submission until all the evidence is in (by hearing the co-defendant and calling upon the defendant making the submission to elect).159 6.41 Where the submission of no case in a civil proceeding is in the nature of a directed verdict, the only question on appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence as a whole. Where a defendant on appeal complains that the trial judge should have upheld the submission and the defendant was allowed to give evidence following the unsuccessful submission (which will rarely occur as the defendant will normally be required to elect to call no evidence before the submission is heard), then the appellate court may look to all of the evidence in deciding sufficiency. Directed verdict decisions are quite clear upon this.160 The exercise of the discretion to insist upon election will only give rise to a question on appeal if the defendant can show that the election was not knowingly and freely made and consequently the defendant was deprived improperly of the right to give evidence in defence.161 6.42 It can be appreciated that this whole discussion of the submission of no case to answer, so far as it is seeking a directed verdict, has an air of unreality about it because as a general rule no juries sit and judges decide cases sitting alone. The rationale for the directed verdict makes little sense in this context. Naturally, judges will not want to consider the evidence twice and will not want to canvass the evidence until all the evidence is in. At this point, the question is not whether there is enough evidence to [page 678]

justify a finding, but whether the trial judge is persuaded one way or another.162 The submission thus only has practical content where it is based upon adversarial (nonsuit) grounds and is permitted at the close of the plaintiff’s case. Whether a court will allow a submission strictly only seeking a directed verdict without election remains in the discretion of the court. However, in practice, where the absence of allegation or supporting evidence is clear, no election will be required and the submission will be decided upon adversarial notions equivalent to the situation where a non-suit is sought.163 But in those jurisdictions where the non-suit has been abolished, there is no right to such a course of action, and it is doubtful whether judges would ever hold otherwise.

The significance of the opponent’s failure to call evidence 6.43 Where a submission of no case is permitted, upon adversarial notions, at the close of the proponent’s case (in criminal cases and in civil cases where it is, or is equivalent to, an application for a non-suit), the formal failure of that party to call evidence should be irrelevant because he or she will not have yet been called upon to go into evidence. If the claimant has been permitted to call evidence of the opponent’s failure to explain before trial, that may be taken into account.164 The fact that matters are within an opponent’s personal knowledge may be taken into account by the judge in determining how much evidence against the opponent is required to make out a case to answer.165 On the other hand, if the court determines that a case to answer has been made out on these adversarial grounds, calls upon the opponent to go into evidence, and no evidence is forthcoming, there is authority in both civil and criminal cases suggesting that failure may be taken into account in deciding whether the case has been proved.166 [page 679] But in criminal cases the use of this failure by an accused is extremely doubtful following Dyers v R167 and can probably only be used to discount an alleged

doubt as reasonable where the accused has failed to testify to a matter that is exclusively within his or her knowledge: see further at 5.117–5.133. 6.44 Where a submission of no case is not made upon adversarial grounds, but upon the ground that it would be unsafe to find for the claimant on the evidence presented, and the judge has insisted the opponent elect to call no evidence before considering the submission, in deciding the strength of the evidence the judge may to a similar extent take into account the failure to call evidence.168 The opponent has no right that the judge consider the sufficiency of the evidence before all evidence in the case is completed and the submission is only considered after the opponent has freely chosen to call no evidence. Where a court exercises its discretion to hear a submission for a directed verdict at the end of the proponent’s case without insisting on any election,169 the court agrees to determine that submission on the evidence tendered to that point, before the opponent goes into evidence. There has been no choice by the opponent not to call evidence. There is thus no failure to call evidence to be taken into account. The position is equivalent to where a submission has been made on strictly adversarial grounds. 6.45 However, it should be noted that in civil cases, courts are wary about permitting inferences from a party’s mere failure to call apparently available evidence. If there are good reasons why a party faced with a case to answer has not called the evidence (for example, a witness may be reasonably expected to be hostile), then it may be inappropriate to give the failure any significance at all.170 But even where it is appropriate to have expected a party to call available evidence courts will not permit an inference that the evidence would, if tendered, have necessarily been unfavourable to the party. In this sense the failure to call available evidence cannot provide positive evidence against a party to add to, and perhaps fill gaps in, an opponent’s case. But an inference may be drawn that the absent evidence would not have assisted the party’s [page 680] case, and to this extent the opponent’s case can be considered unanswered and thereby strengthened.171 6.46 In criminal cases no inference can be drawn against an accused except

where he or she fails to testify to a possible innocent explanation that is exclusively within his or her knowledge. It is the prosecution’s duty to tender all material evidence. The accused is entitled to sit back and have the prosecution prove its case without recourse to any explanations or evidence from the accused. Only where the prosecution has adduced a strong case and the sole source of a possible innocent explanation is the accused, and the accused has failed to testify, may it be permissible to discount that explanation as giving rise to a reasonable doubt.172 On the other hand, from the failure of the prosecution to call available evidence in breach of its duty to call all material witnesses, it may sometimes be possible to draw an inference that the evidence would not have assisted the Crown case.173

Material Facts Determined from Information Presented by the Parties Theory 6.47 Although the traditional fact-finding arm of the common law court, the jury, was in origin a jury of the neighbourhood, charged to act upon its own intimate knowledge of local affairs and informing itself accordingly,174 common law factfinding has evolved full-circle. Perhaps the most sacred principle of the modern trial is that the court is forbidden from acting upon its own knowledge of material facts in issue and forbidden from carrying out its own investigation of those facts or otherwise relying upon extra-evidentiary curial observations.175 [page 681] This principle acts in four different ways to ensure that justice is done, and seen to be done. First, it ensures the impartiality of the court. By refraining from actively forming hypotheses and seeking information, and thereby remaining beyond the conflict, the court is in the best position to draw appropriate inferences and gives the appearance of even-handedness. Secondly, the presentation of all relevant information in open court is ensured,

thereby allowing opponents to comment upon and test by cross-examination all information to be acted upon by the court. Thirdly, upon the assumption that interested parties are most motivated to collect relevant information, the information from which material facts are inferred is maximised. Fourthly, by giving parties full control over the presentation of information and full opportunity to comment, parties are discouraged from criticising the evidentiary basis of a court’s decision. How effective this principle is in terms of reaching correct decisions, ensuring public confidence and yielding cost/benefit efficiency, is another matter, beyond the scope of this book.176 Here the principle is emphasised to explain the existence of various evidentiary rules. But an analysis of these rules will also show the degree to which courts accept the principle. It will be seen that there are a number of limits, all of which must be taken into account when the effectiveness of the common law trial is being evaluated.

The courts’ power to call witnesses 6.48 The clearest illustration of the principle of party presentation is the common law rule generally prohibiting the court (the judge acting alone or at the request of the jury) from calling witnesses. Even though it may be clear that it is against the interest of both parties to call a particular witness, and clear that the witness has significant information to contribute concerning material facts in issue, in neither civil nor criminal cases is the court entitled as a general rule to call the witness.177 [page 682] There are some statutory inroads to the rule.178 The extent to which the Uniform Evidence Acts permit courts to call and examine witnesses is unclear. The Acts are silent about whether witnesses are called by parties or the court as the adversarial presentation of evidence is assumed. Nor is there any express power granted to the court to call or question witnesses (s 26 gives the court control over the process for questioning, but not for the calling, of witnesses),179 and s 11(1) provides that:

The power of the court to control the conduct of a proceeding is not affected by this Act, except so far as this Act provides otherwise expressly or by necessary intendment.

There seems no reason why this provision does not just leave unaffected the common law position.180 6.49 To the common law rule there are two exceptions. In a civil case, the court may call a witness with the consent of both parties. In a criminal case, there is power to call a witness where this is necessary in the interests of justice, a necessity that, it seems, will seldom arise. The scope of the rule and its exceptions are best considered in the context of the situations where the rule is most likely to be invoked. There are principally two. First, where the court of its own motion calls and examines a witness, gives the parties the opportunity to cross-examine, and decides the case upon the basis of that witness’s testimony. This might occur, for example, where an unrepresented party in a criminal case omits or refuses to call a critical defence witness, and the court, in the interests of the accused, calls the witness. The other situation is where a party has failed to call a witness it is expected to call, and the opponent, reluctant to call the witness in the light of adverse testimony [page 683] anticipated, requests the court to do so. This situation might arise in a criminal case where the prosecution fails or refuses to call a witness and the defence does not want to because, first, if the testimony is adverse there will be no opportunity to test it by cross-examination,181 and secondly, the prosecution, able to put leading questions in cross-examination, will have complete control over the testimony it then elicits from the witness. Furthermore, at common law, by calling the witness the accused lost the right to make the last address to the jury (now generally the accused has the final address: see 2.11). Judges have been prepared to avoid these unfair consequences to an accused by acceding to the request to call the witness and permitting both parties to cross-examine.182 In the absence of a request from a party for the court to call a witness it has seldom been argued that an appeal should succeed simply upon the basis that the court has a duty to call a witness on its own motion.183 Any possible miscarriage

of justice is more likely to be argued on the basis of counsel’s incompetence184 or simply on the basis that having regard to the evidence presented the case was not capable of proof to the requisite standard. 6.50 Considering the above two situations in civil cases, the first arose in Re Enoch and Zaretzky, Bock and Co’s Arbitration,185 where an arbitrator called a witness but did not give the parties an opportunity to cross-examine. The court quashed the arbitration on the ground that without the parties’ consent the arbitrator had no right to call a witness.186 But it is doubtful that a court of appeal would interfere where the parties had been afforded full opportunity to crossexamine and the decision was supported by all the evidence. However, the emphasis upon consent in this case suggests that a court’s failure to accede to a party’s request to call a witness is not an appealable error. On the contrary, to accede without obtaining the consent of all parties would be in error. But, if in the case of a judge calling a witness an appellate court is unlikely to interfere if all parties had a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine, then one might say that in this sense a judge in a civil case does have a discretion to call a witness; and that judges might be more active in taking this course where it appears necessary to [page 684] seek out the truth, as North and Grey JJ in Sharp v Rangott envisage.187 But Besanko J in that case argues that this approach cuts across the fundamental adversarial approach of the common law. The pure adversarial position would have been simply to say that parties must consent to the judge calling a witness, but Besanko J accepts that in ‘exceptional circumstances’ a judge at common law might call a witness, even in a civil case. Whether the failure of a court to call a witness might be a basis for appeal in a civil case is doubtful. It would be difficult to argue that the discretion miscarried where a judge refuses the request of a party to call a witness, and even more difficult to argue that a judge should have exercised the discretion on his or her own motion. Therefore, while a trial judge might get away with calling a witness where the parties have been afforded full opportunity to cross-examine, it is extremely difficult to envisage circumstances where the failure of a judge to exercise the discretion to call a witness would itself provide a ground for appeal in a civil case. 6.51 In criminal cases, both situations are more likely to arise, although not

often given the Crown’s duty to call all material witnesses: see 6.55. The first occurred in R v Damic,188 where a schizophrenic charged with murder insisted upon conducting his own defence and in a rather eccentric manner. Having suffered the performance, the trial judge called a doctor, who had been treating the accused, to determine whether the accused should be found not guilty (to be detained at the Governor’s pleasure) on the ground of mental illness. The judge first asked the accused, who made no objection; the prosecutor examined as amicus curiae; the accused was given the opportunity to cross-examine; and the accused was found not guilty on grounds of mental illness. The accused’s appeal failed on the basis that, although as a general rule a trial judge should not interfere and call a witness, the exceptional circumstances justified the course of action taken and there was no procedural unfairness. This decision was reached before the High Court’s pronouncement in R v Apostilides189 that even in criminal cases ‘most exceptional circumstances’ must exist for a court to call a witness. However, Apostilides was concerned with the second situation (discussed next), and includes (at 577) only one very passing reference to Damic. Although the effect of the interference in Damic was to raise a completely new issue, it is suggested that the circumstances in Damic were sufficiently exceptional to justify the trial judge’s action.190 [page 685] 6.52 The second situation has arisen in a number of criminal cases. It arose in Apostilides, where the accused was convicted following the court’s failure either to insist upon the prosecution calling two crucial witnesses or to call the witnesses itself, upon which the accused was obliged to call those witnesses to devastating effect. The Court of Criminal Appeal determined the conviction unsafe and unsatisfactory and the High Court refused to grant the Crown special leave to appeal. But in refusing leave, the High Court commented upon the propriety of the trial court’s action. First, the court made it clear that, although the prosecution has an obligation to prosecute fairly and this entails an obligation to call all material witnesses, ultimately which witnesses are called is within its discretion and a trial judge has no right to insist that it call a particular witness. Secondly, it made it clear that where the prosecutor refuses to call a witness the court should not interfere in the adversarial system and itself call a witness in

other than the most exceptional circumstances. The adversarial system should be maintained and the remedy of a convicted accused complaining that the prosecution should have called a witness is on appeal.191 Apostilides (at 577–8) makes it clear that, on appeal, the issue is not the conduct of the prosecutor, but whether the absence of the witness has produced a miscarriage of justice in the sense that ‘in all the circumstances the verdict is unsafe or unsatisfactory’. This requires the appeal court ‘to focus directly on the consequences, objectively perceived, that the failure to call the witness has had on the course of the trial and its outcome’. Where the testimony of the witness is critical to the true determination of the facts then an appeal will likely succeed. This was the situation in Apostilides and also in R v Whitehorn, where the absent witness was the complainant to a sexual [page 686] assault.192 Where the testimony is not critical or patently unreliable there will be no miscarriage of justice.193 6.53 It is difficult to envisage the ‘most exceptional circumstances’ which would justify a court itself calling a witness. ‘[M]ore would be required to establish “most exceptional circumstances” than the refusal of the prosecutor, for reasons which the judge thinks insufficient, to call a witness’: Apostilides (at 576). Where the reasons given by the prosecutor are sufficient it is less likely a judge will interfere.194 In practical terms, as a result of Apostilides, judges will refrain from calling witnesses. Where no witness is called the issue on appeal is whether this has resulted in an unsafe or unsatisfactory verdict. If a judge did call a witness and the accused was then convicted the issue would be the same. Where the court does call a witness, the view has been expressed in Damic (at 762) that this may take place even after the jury has retired, that the judge may examine the witness or invite one or other of the parties to conduct the examination-in-chief, and that it is crucial that both parties be given the full opportunity to cross-examine. Where parties have already called and examined witnesses, there is authority for the view that those witnesses may be recalled by the court, on its own motion

or upon the request of a party, to clear up issues which have subsequently arisen and are within that witness’s knowledge.195

Court intervention into the calling and questioning of witnesses 6.54 While the court may exceptionally have power to call a witness it has no power to forbid a party from calling a witness.196 Nor does it have power to insist that a party calls a witness or calls witnesses in a particular order. This is so in both [page 687] civil197 and criminal198 cases. The failure to call an available witness, or the stage at which a witness is called, may lead to adverse inferences being drawn against a party and appropriate directions being given to a jury (if there is one),199 and on appeal the absence of a crucial witness may lead an appellate court to conclude that the verdict is unsafe or unsatisfactory,200 but the court may not intervene to compel a party to call a witness, let alone at a particular stage of the trial. A court might request a party or a prosecutor to call a witness, and usually prosecutors should accede to such a request201 even without threat of an inference or direction being drawn or made if the request is not fulfilled. There is some authority suggesting that a trial judge may discharge a jury and remand an accused for retrial if a prosecutor refuses to accede to the request to call a witness,202 although this seems inconsistent with the view of the role of the court expressed in Apostilides. 6.55 The discretion of the prosecution to call witnesses is canvassed by the High Court in the three leading decisions of Richardson v R,203 Whitehorn v R,204 and R v Apostilides (above). These cases emphasise that, although cast in an adversarial role, the fundamental duty of the prosecutor, as an instrument of the state, is to act fairly in the interests of justice and to seek out the truth of the matters alleged. As discussed at 5.12, the prosecutor is obliged prior to trial to disclose to the defence the evidence available to it in relation to its accusation, even where it is of assistance only to the accused;205 and at trial it must act fairly in addressing the jury and in cross-examining witnesses,206 and otherwise assist the court to achieve justice in the case at hand. In the

[page 688] present context, as Dawson J explains in Whitehorn,207 this requires the prosecution to call all witnesses: … necessary to unfold the narrative and give a complete account of the events upon which the prosecution is based … notwithstanding that they give accounts inconsistent with the Crown’s case. However, a prosecutor is not bound to call a witness … whose evidence he judges to be unreliable, untrustworthy or otherwise incapable of belief. And if … it would be unnecessarily repetitious to call them all then a selection may be made.

And the court in Apostilides explains (at 575–6) that: … the prosecutor’s role in this regard is a lonely one, the nature of which is such that it cannot be shared with the trial judge without placing in jeopardy the essential independence of that office in the adversary system. It is not only a lonely responsibility but also a heavy one. A decision whether or not to call a person whose name appears on the indictment and from whom the defence wish to lead evidence must be made with due sensitivity to the dictates of fairness towards an accused person. A refusal to call the witness will be justified only by reference to the overriding interests of justice. Such occasions are likely to be rare. The unreliability of the evidence will only suffice where there are identifiable circumstances which clearly establish it; it will not be enough that the prosecutor merely has a suspicion about the unreliability of the evidence. In most cases where a prosecutor does not wish to lead evidence from a person named on the indictment but the defence wishes that person to be called, it will be sufficient for the prosecutor simply to call the person so that he may be cross-examined by the defence and then, if necessary, be re-examined.

6.56 Thus, despite this duty, ultimately it is in the discretion of the prosecution whether a particular witness is called.208 A court may ask why a witness is not being called and encourage the prosecution to do so, but it should itself call a witness only in exceptional circumstances. Where a prosecutor cannot give satisfactory reasons for [page 689] not calling a witness an adverse inference may be possible,209 but no inference may be drawn against an accused for not calling a material witness whom the prosecution should have called.210 A convicted accused may successfully appeal by showing that the failure to call the witness has caused a miscarriage of justice in the sense that it has caused the verdict to be unsafe or unsatisfactory.211 And this may be more likely where the prosecution has failed to disclose the existence of a witness or has failed to notify the accused that a named witness will not be called and that witness is not

available in court at the trial (these obligations of disclosure are discussed at 5.12ff).212 But there is no more direct way in which the prosecutor’s duty to call all material witnesses can be enforced. 6.57 An attempt to give more weight to the obligation of the prosecution to call all material witnesses in deciding whether there has been a miscarriage of justice can be found in R v Kneebone.213 A critical witness had not been called as the prosecutor assumed she would be unreliable, but the prosecutor had made no meaningful inquiry of the witness herself and Greg James J (at [49]–[51]) suggests that this lack of proper inquiry itself constituted a miscarriage of justice. But the witness was the only witness other than the accused and the complainant, and her testimony so vital to a determination of where the truth lay that, even ignoring the conduct of the prosecutor, there was a strong case for finding the verdict unsafe or unsatisfactory. The court in R v Gibson214 did not regard Kneebone as extending the principles in Apostilides. 6.58 The only court intervention sanctioned by the common law is the power of the judge, on his or her own motion or at the request of the jury (if any),215 to put [page 690] questions to witnesses called by the parties.216 But intervention should be restrained, should not interfere with the strategy of the party examining or crossexamining the witness, and should not seek to raise issues which have not been raised by the parties. Principally intervention should seek to clear up ambiguities, uncertainties and obvious lacunae.217 Where it is alleged on appeal that intervention has been undue, the aggrieved party will have to establish that the intervention caused such unfairness or confusion that it produced a miscarriage of justice. This will be difficult to establish in all but the most extreme cases of intervention.218

Judicial notice 6.59 The rules we have been examining make it clear that it is not the task of the court to conduct an investigation into the dispute before it, and insofar as information is presented in open court it is presented by the parties. In this sense,

the common law affirms the principle of party presentation and prosecution. But the corollary is not that the court is prohibited altogether from using its own knowledge in deciding the existence or occurrence of the material facts in issue (what might be termed the adjudicative facts). Such a prohibition would render the discovery of facts impossible. In the first place, the court must utilise its knowledge of language in understanding the nature and extent of the information presented. In the second place, as the discussion in Chapter 1 shows, factfinding involves the drawing of inferences from evidence and such inferences are drawn upon the basis of the previous knowledge and experience of the factfinder. [page 691] Strictly, these are the limits to courts using their own knowledge in determining material facts in issue. All other information must be tendered as evidence by the parties through witnesses tested by cross-examination. But exceptionally, information need not be so tendered and may be acted upon either simpliciter, because it is well known to the court and those before it, or following other means of appropriate verification.219 In these exceptional circumstances courts are said to take ‘judicial notice’ of facts.220 6.60 Judicial notice of adjudicative facts is taken in the following circumstances and for the following reasons. First, where the court and all before it are perfectly aware of the information, which is therefore notorious and indisputable, it would be a waste of time and money to insist upon the normal mode of proof being followed; for example, that 25 December is Christmas Day, or that Sydney is in New South Wales. But the exception extends to include local knowledge which, to those in court, is notorious and indisputable; for example, that Eastwood is a suburb of Adelaide within a 100 mile radius of the Adelaide GPO,221 that Sydney is more than five miles from Boorowa,222 that there is only one bend in the Gatacre Road.223 And general features may be more likely to be well known and indisputable than particular features.224 The normal yields of cannabis crops and their street value are not notorious and indisputable225 — but the fact that the HIV virus is a terminal disease,226 that international terrorism poses threats to Australia and that Al Qa’ida claims responsibility for some of them,227 that

asbestos is dangerous and can be deadly,228 the ages at which children start and finish [page 692] school229 and that unmilled timber is a staple commercial product230 are all susceptible to notice.231 Secondly, where a fact can only be proved conventionally with inconvenience and expense, but can be quickly verified by the court consulting an authoritative text or expert, and once verified that fact is beyond the possibility of dispute by the parties, the court, on grounds of convenience and efficiency, may consult that source either directly or through the parties. Uncontroversial historical and scientific facts may be verified by consulting standard texts — the date of the fall of the Whitlam government, the number of bones in the wrist, and so on.232 Thirdly, where a fact is within the domain of the executive, reasons of public policy may dictate that the court verify the fact by consulting the executive and that the parties be bound by that verification; for example, whether a country should be regarded as an independent sovereign state,233 whether a state of war exists,234 or whether ships were engaged in an official naval exercise against the enemy.235 Public policy dictates that such matters not be proved and disputed before the court in the ordinary way.236 This aspect of judicial notice is recognised in s 145 of the Uniform Acts. 6.61 The common thread flowing through these situations is that, either in reality or for reasons of public policy, the fact in question is indisputable, and, therefore, for [page 693] the court to act upon the information, either simpliciter or after inquiry, can in no way prejudice the parties. There is no point in the facts being expensively proved in the ordinary way subject to party debate. The limit of judicial notice is where there is need for party debate about the existence of the fact or the inferences to be drawn from it. For this reason, it is wrong for justices to view the scene of an

accident in the absence of the parties and to use the information so acquired to interpret other presented evidence. It may be that the physical features are obvious and indisputable, but the parties must be given the opportunity of debating the inferences to be drawn from them, and this cannot be done unless those features have been put in evidence in the ordinary way or have otherwise been agreed upon by the parties.237 It is this need for party comment and debate that is the crucial factor in an appellate court deciding whether judicial notice can properly be taken of a fact that has not been proved in evidence. And such debate is required when either the fact in question or the inferences to be drawn from it are controversial. 6.62 Given that pragmatic reasons dominate in deciding whether the normal mode of proof should be departed from and judicial notice taken of facts, it is important to view decisions about the application of the exception in the light of the practical situations that gave rise to them. There are four main situations where the issue of judicial notice arises. In the first place, a party may, during trial, ask the judge to dispense with formal proof and direct that judicial notice be taken of a fact, on the ground that one of the three circumstances (detailed at 6.60) applies.238 Where the judge hears the parties on the question of taking notice and ensures party debate upon any controversial inferences that may arise from the noticed facts, appellate courts will be reluctant to interfere. On the other hand, if debate has been stifled and decisions taken upon the basis of information (or inferences drawn from it) that remains controversial, there is a much greater likelihood of appellate intervention. Secondly, after a party’s case has closed, that party may seek to rely upon a fact not formally proved by urging the court to take judicial notice of it, perhaps urging the court to inform itself of the fact as it thinks appropriate. Where, with the foresight of reasonable competency, the party could and should have established the fact during the presentation of its case, judges are reluctant to use the doctrine of judicial notice to salvage the situation. Additionally, they are reluctant to search out sources of information which could more efficiently have been produced by the party during its case. In Leydon v Tomlinson,239 Zelling J refused to judicially notice that a particular signatory was the relevant minister required to authorise the prosecution, holding that

[page 694] it was not a notorious fact that that person held that post at that time.240 The emphasis upon a requirement of notoriety was merely a vehicle for Zelling J to express his disapproval at the way the prosecution had been handled. Nor was he willing to sanction reopening the case in an instance where the omission was important and foreseeable.241 6.63 Thirdly, in reaching its decision the trier of fact may have relied upon facts not formally proved in evidence but acquired by the trier of fact at an unauthorised view, or by consulting sources not referred to by the parties, or acquired on some earlier occasion in the trier’s experience, and on appeal it may be argued that the doctrine of judicial notice authorises the use of such information.242 Where the information (or the inferences to be drawn from it) remains controversial, and the parties have been denied the opportunity of appropriate comment and debate, it is unlikely that an appellate court will sanction the use of the knowledge, and in borderline cases disapproval of trial courts so informing themselves or otherwise acting on their own knowledge is likely to act against the application of the doctrine. The final situation is where an appellate court is asked on appeal to make up a formal defect in the evidence by relying upon the doctrine of judicial notice. Again, an appellate court being asked to cure an incompetently handled case may be reluctant to employ the doctrine except in the clearest situations. 6.64 Seen in this perspective, the doctrine of judicial notice allows adjudicative facts to be relied upon where the reasons for adversary proof have run out, on grounds of practicality and expense or public policy. Notoriety may be an indication that adversary proof is unnecessary, but it is not the only indication,243 and other non-notorious facts that may be easily and indisputably verified may be outside the adversary reasons for party proof. To say that such latter facts are notorious amongst those who know them seems an unnecessary and distracting rationalisation of the doctrine. 6.65 This common law doctrine of judicial notice of adjudicative facts at first sight appears to be embodied in s 144 of the uniform evidence legislation, a section headed ‘Matters of common knowledge’ and which provides:

[page 695] Proof is not required about knowledge that is not reasonably open to question and is: (a) common knowledge in the locality in which the proceeding being held or generally; or (b) capable of verification by reference to a document the authority of which cannot be reasonably questioned.

This follows Isaacs J’s formulation in Holland v Jones of the common law doctrine of judicial notice.244 But whereas the common law doctrine appeared to focus on the taking of judicial notice of facts constituting or relevant to proving adjudicative facts, s 144 has no limits upon the use of knowledge to which the section applies. As long as it is ‘not reasonably open to question’245 and one or other of the conditions in s 144 are satisfied that knowledge may be used. And, as has been adverted to above and is explained more fully below, there is other knowledge that courts must use to adjudicate the matters before them, knowledge required to determine the validity and extent of legal rules (legislative facts), as well as general knowledge that must be used in drawing inferences about adjudicative facts. Whether the common law doctrine of judicial notice extends to these other sorts of knowledge is, as discussed below, not entirely clear: see 6.71ff. Rather, courts appear to have a free hand in determining legislative facts, and fact-finders are generally left to their own devices in relying upon their general knowledge in drawing inferences. Literally the requirements of s 144 apply also to this knowledge. And a majority of the High Court has suggested that ‘there would appear to be no room for the operation of the common law doctrine of judicial notice, strictly so called, since the enactment [of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)]’.246 [page 696] 6.66 Where judicial notice is taken on inquiry the mode of inquiry is left to the courts and the ordinary rules of evidence (for example, the hearsay rule) do not apply.247 Nevertheless, the court should give the parties the opportunity to comment upon the propriety of taking judicial notice and the appropriate method of inquiry, before it embarks upon an inquiry of its own.248 And where that inquiry consists of consulting authoritative works or experts, there is authority for the view that this should take place in the presence of the parties, allowing opportunity for comment.249 These principles appear to lie behind the uniform

legislation. It allows the court to acquire knowledge subject to notice ‘in any way the judge thinks fit’ (s 144(2)), but provides in s 144(4) that: The judge is to give a party such opportunity to make submissions, and to refer to relevant information, relating to the acquiring or taking into account of knowledge of that kind as is necessary to ensure that the party is not unfairly prejudiced.

Only if the court decides that the fact is indisputable (‘knowledge that is not reasonably open to question’) and not practicably susceptible to adversary proof in the ordinary way, and that acting on that knowledge will not result in unfair prejudice to a party,250 can judicial notice be taken. It would be a short step to argue that indisputability is not a necessary precondition and that convenience alone is the touchstone of the doctrine, but it is submitted that not only is there no authority for this proposition, but that in principle it is the indisputability of the information which makes the adversary search for truth unnecessary. 6.67 It is possible to interpret statutory provisions equivalent to s 64 of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) as based simply upon convenience and practicality.251 That section provides that in matters of ‘public history, literature, science or art’ the court is entitled to consider ‘published books, calendars, maps or charts’.252 Indisputability is not expressed as a precondition. The section appears to allow the court to inform itself by considering the published material whenever it feels appropriate. However, there are two arguments against giving s 64 such a wide scope. [page 697] First, the section should be read in light of the common law and not be interpreted by mere implication to sweep away a fundamental requirement of the common law, that parties tender evidence in proof of facts except in indisputable situations. Certainly, Bray CJ in Cavanett v Chambers253 did not consider the provision as extending the common law, holding that where the matter is disputable, unless both parties consent, it ought to be proved at the trial in the ordinary way through parties tendering admissible evidence. This leads to the second argument against s 64 being used effectively to extend the doctrine of judicial notice. The section allows the court to consider published books and so on ‘when tendered’. This may be the key to interpreting the section, as providing for the reception of evidence in proof of facts in the ordinary way

where otherwise that evidence would be inadmissible by virtue of (in particular) the hearsay or opinion rules.254 Either way, it is submitted that the section should not be interpreted to allow the court, under the guise of judicial notice, to inform itself, without party comment, about facts that are controversial. 6.68 The power to dispense with the application of evidential rules in situations beyond where matters are indisputable is given in civil cases by the uniform legislation,255 which allows a court to order that stipulated provisions do not apply ‘in relation to evidence if: (a) the matter to which the evidence relates is not genuinely in dispute; or (b) the application of those provisions would cause or involve unnecessary expense or delay’. A similar power, applying in both civil and criminal proceedings, is given by s 59J of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA). This section is headed ‘Court’s power to dispense with formal proof’ and provides: (1) A court may at any stage of civil or criminal proceedings — (a)

dispense with compliance with the rules of evidence for proving any matter that is not genuinely in dispute; or

(b) dispense with compliance with the rules of evidence where compliance might involve unreasonable expense or delay. (2) In exercising its power under subsection (1) the court may, for example, dispense with proof of — (a)

a document or the execution of a document;

(b) handwriting; (c) the identity of a party; (d) the conferral of an authority to do a particular act.

[page 698] (3) A court is not bound by the rules of evidence in informing itself on any matter relevant to the exercise of its discretion under this section.

These provisions offer little guidance for courts. They notionally extend the idea of judicial notice beyond indisputability to situations of unreasonable delay and cost. They say nothing about how a court should go about informing itself. Furthermore, sections such as these can only be interpreted against the adversary process that underlies proof both under the uniform legislation and at common law. In this context, the sections do little more than recognise the notion of judicial notice insofar as it does away with the need for proof where facts are not reasonably (genuinely) in dispute. Adversarial principles continue to apply to

ensure that parties control the proof of facts genuinely in dispute and have a full opportunity to comment upon evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it.256 It is that facts and knowledge are beyond genuine (reasonable) dispute that takes the idea of practicability as far as possible within the confines of the adversary trial, and it is unrealistic to ask trial judges to set about fundamentally changing that system of trial.257 6.69 One final aspect of judicial notice requires emphasis. If one accepts that decisions can be analysed in terms of the Frankian equation R × F = D, then the doctrine’s concern is only with the F aspect of this formula: the facts.258 The R aspect, the applicable legal rules, is a matter for the judge, and judges may ascertain the applicable rules as they consider fit (as long as parties have the opportunity to comment upon their applicability).259 A party who thinks that the judge has got the rules wrong is entitled to appeal. On this theory it should not be necessary for parties to tender statutory rules, Acts, regulations, rules, proclamations, etc, and the court should act on what it considers to be the correct rules in force. This theory is now embodied in s 143 of the uniform legislation, which effectively does away with formal proof of all matters of law. [page 699] At common law, practical considerations intruded upon theory, judges being aware of their ignorance of a great mass of subordinate legislation and wishing the parties to bear the burden of ‘reminding’ them of it. Judges have always been willing to act upon public Acts without proof, and in England doubts concerning private Acts were removed by s 9 of the Interpretation Act 1889 (UK), which directs courts to take ‘judicial notice’ of such legislation. In Australia, legislation exists to ensure that courts act upon applicable legislation without proof260 but it is submitted that this is the common law situation in any case.261 As far as subordinate legislation is concerned, unless the empowering Act declares it to take effect ‘as if enacted’ in the principal empowering Act262 then, at common law, such legislation must be formally proved by the parties.263 Australian legislation deals with this situation, either by providing that judicial notice should be taken of subordinate legislation, or by providing a method of proving such legislation.264 Where subordinate legislation must still be proved, some cases distinguish between minor legislation of a general effect and that applying only to

a limited class of individuals, and suggest the former need not be proved (drawing analogy to the notoriety of general facts).265 This merely confuses the situation, and the better view is that in these jurisdictions, in the absence of an ‘as if enacted’ clause, all subordinate legislation, on grounds of convenience, should be formally proved. 6.70 Where conflicts rules determine that foreign law should apply, the presumption that the common law judge knows the law has no operation and the general rule is that foreign law must be proved by calling appropriate experts.266 Some Australian [page 700] legislation provides for judicial notice to be taken of legislation in former colonies,267 and other provisions exist to simplify the proof of foreign laws.268 By virtue of s 118 of the Constitution, neither Commonwealth nor state laws are, in Australian courts, foreign laws. They are noticed or proved by virtue of s 143 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (applying, by virtue of s 5, to proceedings in all Australian courts), or by virtue of the appropriate provisions in other Evidence Acts.269 6.71 A fundamental difficulty arising from this Frankian description of conventional legal decisions is that facts may also have to be considered in determining the content and validity of the applicable legal rule. Such facts have been distinguished and described by Davis as ‘legislative facts’, and are to be contrasted with the ‘adjudicative facts’ which arise for decision under the F aspect of the equation.270 The relevance of facts to both aspects of the equation may be seen to throw the whole positivist edifice into doubt; but, assuming that it can be maintained, there is authority for the view that, where the content or validity of a legal rule depends upon accepting a fact, the court may inform itself of that legislative fact as it thinks fit, and is not bound by the ordinary rules of evidence in its inquiry. McQuaker v Goddard271 is an illustration of the courts’ approach to the finding of legislative facts. For the purpose of determining the legal standard of care, the court was obliged to decide whether a camel, which had bitten the plaintiff, was in the eyes of the law fera natura or mansueta natura. The court held that it was not bound by the ordinary rules of evidence and proceeded to inform itself by

consulting, in the presence of the parties, various books and experts to discover the current habits of camels. This inquiry was referred to by the court as an exercise in judicial notice, but strictly this was not the case. Judicial notice operates as a means of verifying indisputable adjudicative facts. The classification of camels was neither indisputable nor adjudicative. What is of interest is that, although the court did not purport to apply the strict rules of evidence, it did give the parties the opportunity to tender and comment upon all information considered by the court. [page 701] 6.72 In many disparate contexts Australian courts have been willing to act on their own knowledge or after consulting appropriate books or statistics on social, economic, psychological, political and historical matters which may have a bearing on legislative facts.272 Cases concerning the constitutional validity of legislation provide further illustration of the courts’ approach to the finding of legislative facts.273 The High Court’s approach to the finding of such facts has always shown considerable flexibility, judges being willing to consult normally inadmissible encyclopedias and other texts274 and to act upon their own knowledge of political, historical and economic facts.275 For example, in Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth,276 the judges used their own knowledge in deciding whether the Communist Party constituted such a threat to security that its banning could be justified under the defence power. Some judges have sought to justify such inquiry and use of information under the guise of judicial notice, and have suggested that the courts must always act within the limitations of that doctrine.277 Dixon J recognised the distinction between the finding of legislative facts and adjudicative facts,278 emphasising that, whereas the latter are of concern only to the parties to the dispute and therefore the proper subject of strict adversary inquiry, the former, in determining the content or validity of general legal rules, are the concern of the whole community and it is the court’s responsibility to inform itself of such facts ‘as best it can’.279 6.73 But, even if one accepts a greater community interest in the finding of legislative facts (and hence in the content or validity of rules), it is not clear why this makes the general common law approach to the discovery of facts

inappropriate. It may suggest that other parties representing the public be given standing to tender and comment [page 702] upon information relevant to proving legislative facts, but it does not explain why the customary rules of evidence should not apply, at least presumptively. The difficulty is that legislative facts are often complex and slippery, as in the Communist Party case and, having regard to time and cost, courts (particularly the High Court) want to retain a flexible approach to their discovery. Nevertheless, as far as possible, the common law approach to fact-finding should be followed. Most importantly, parties should have the opportunity to tender and comment upon information considered by the court. This cautious approach to legislative facts is advocated by Callinan J in Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings280 and reiterated by him in Thomas v Mowbray.281 In the latter case, he says (at [526]): [Constitutional facts] must be proved in the same way as other facts are proved, or be sufficiently notorious to be within judicial notice, or ascertainable by reference to indisputably reputable and broadly accepted historical writings, or within a special category which I would describe as ‘official facts’, being, for example, official published statistics, scrupulously collected and compiled, information contained in parliamentary reports, explanatory memoranda, Second Reading Speeches, reports and findings of Commissions of Inquiry, and, in exceptional circumstances, materials generated by organs of the Executive.

The latter categories arguably fall within the categories of judicial notice explained at 6.60 above. However, later in his judgment Callinan J appears to go beyond these notions of judicial notice; for example, in justifying findings of fact about terrorist activities by reference to an interview in Time Magazine. Of this he says (at [548]): Although this is hearsay material, it is uncontradicted and consistent with other statements attributed to this person, is also consistent with events that have happened, and therefore admissible for the purposes of, and to support the jurisdiction for the making of an ICO.

Heydon J in Thomas v Mowbray avoids these incongruities by regarding only adjudicative facts, as of concern only to the parties of the case, as requiring proof through admissible evidence and the strict doctrine of judicial notice: at [619]. He argues that legislative facts, most notably where they involve the constitutional validity of a statute (at [627]), are not of mere concern to the parties, and it is inappropriate that the evidential rules developed to decide adjudicative facts apply. He explains (at [629]) that because legislative facts are often controversial

rather than beyond dispute and are therefore ‘incapable of being judicially noticed by recourse either to common law principles or to statutory principles applying to’ adjudicative facts, ultimately a court must, if it is to fulfil its obligations in upholding the law, particularly the Constitution [page 703] (at [625]–[627]), be able to refer to ‘all relevant material’ in determining whether to act upon a legislative fact — so long as parties retain the opportunity to comment upon any such material and may tender evidence and suggest other material that may be of relevance (at [636]–[638]). This open-ended approach does not sit easily with s 144 of the Uniform Evidence Acts which draws no distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts in permitting ‘knowledge not reasonably open to question’ to be acted upon without formal proof.282 However, although the Australian Law Reform Commission appeared to intend legislative facts to be covered by this section,283 on Heydon J’s argument legislative facts should be regarded as outside the statutory evidential regime altogether. 6.74 A major difficulty remains in determining the scope of judicial notice. At the beginning of this discussion it was asserted that the prohibition upon court inquiry did not prevent the trier of fact from relying upon its own general knowledge and experience in drawing appropriate inferences. The difficulty is the distinction between general knowledge that can be relied upon without proof, and information that must be established by the parties in the normal way. Cases illustrate the distinction without defining it clearly. In Wetherall v Harrison,284 an accused charged with failing to submit to a blood test alleged that the sight of the needle to be used caused him to have a fit. The court held that a justice trying the case was entitled to use his knowledge gained as a general medical practitioner in deciding to accept the accused’s explanation.285 6.75 But this sort of generalised knowledge used to draw inferences must somehow be distinguished from general knowledge more directly relevant to adjudicative facts [page 704]

where the doctrine of judicial notice has been expressly relied upon. For example, in Pope v Ewendt,286 the court held that justices could not use information about the precise length of a stretch of road obtained during their private viewing of the road, but they could use their general knowledge of the locality of the offence for the purpose of interpreting tendered evidence. This general knowledge could be used because it could be regarded as notorious and indisputable to those sitting in the court, and was therefore the proper subject of judicial notice.287 Similarly, cases allowing other items of relevant indisputable general knowledge to be used — that the streets of London are full of traffic,288 that young boys have playful habits,289 that buses stop to collect passengers at regular intervals,290 that an area is residential and frequented by prostitutes,291 and (at sentencing) that great social consequences follow from the importation of heroin292 — may be explained on the grounds of judicial notice. The generalised knowledge forming the general propositions of probability from which inferences are drawn from particular proved facts or events is in a different category.293 It does not have to attain the status of notorious indisputability before it can be acted upon. To insist upon this would make factfinding impossible. Reasonable triers would in many situations disagree as to the appropriate generalised information to be employed. Those running down cases where inferences are drawn from circumstantial evidence illustrate how reasonable judges, by employing different generalised background knowledge, reach different decisions as to the appropriate inferences to be drawn.294 It is submitted that the use of generalised background knowledge should not be considered as an exercise in judicial notice, and that that doctrine should be limited to those certain situations where as a matter of law the judge may rule that particular indisputable information, be it general or specific, can and must be acted upon. 6.76 In practical terms, opponents will not in most cases put formally in issue the generalised knowledge to be employed in drawing inferences, but will explicitly or implicitly refer to the appropriate generalisations when addressing the court on the facts. Where generalisations are put in issue, a party may seek to call expert evidence to explain, on the basis of theoretical research or empirical investigation, the appropriate generalisation to be used, but the courts will only allow such evidence where the area [page 705]

of knowledge is sufficiently organised and researched to give weight to that expertise.295 And even where expert testimony is allowed, the trier still has the task of drawing the appropriate inferences from what it regards as the appropriate generalisations, and a party disagreeing with the conclusion will have to persuade an appellate tribunal that the trier’s findings cannot be rationally justified.296 6.77 The point is that, while particular facts (or events) can be said either to exist (or to have occurred) or not, and are thus susceptible to adversary proof, generalisations of knowledge have no such independent existence. They are the product of human organisation and are employed to predict and discover actual facts and events. Which generalisations are the most useful for such prediction and discovery is a matter for debate, with some people (notably experts who have carried out or analysed empirical research) having more to contribute to that debate than others. But in the end the trier of fact (subject to the supervision of the appellate courts) sits in judgment upon the appropriate generalisations to employ. It is concluded that the doctrine of judicial notice should be confined to establishing indisputable adjudicative facts or events, but that the court remains entitled to draw inferences upon the basis of its general knowledge. Where parties wish to dispute knowledge they must call upon expert assistance to establish their position, and this assistance will be governed by those evidential rules that govern the admissibility of expert evidence: see further 7.43ff. The uniform legislation does not refer expressly to the problem of generalisations of knowledge but it may be argued that insofar as s 144 simply applies to ‘knowledge’, it is wide enough to cover these generalisations. This would require their formal proof whenever contested, unless the court can be satisfied that the generalisation is not reasonably open to question. This might lead to some interesting, although ultimately diverting, arguments. As with legislative facts, the ordinary principles of judicial notice appear to have no application. ______________________________ 1.

For more detailed discussion of the nature of the burden of proof generally, see LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, Ch 4; Williams, ‘Placing the Burdens of Proof’ in Waller and Campbell (eds), Well and Truly Tried, Lawbook Co, Sydney, 1982; Williams, ‘Burdens and Standards in Civil Litigation’ (2003) 25 Syd LR 165; Redmayne, ‘Exploring the Proof Paradoxes’ (2008) 14 Legal Theory 281; and the report of the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, The Burden of Proof in Criminal Proceedings, AGPS, Canberra, 1982.

2.

For example, Jayasena v R [1970] AC 618; Baddams v Thomas (1984) 34 SASR 420; R v Hunt [1987] AC 352 at 385 (Lord Ackner); DPP v Cole (1994) 100 NTR 1.

3.

(1965) 114 CLR 164 at 168.

4.

For example, by the House of Lords in R v Hunt [1987] AC 352; the High Court in Braysich v R (2011) 243 CLR 434; [2011] HCA 14 at [31]ff (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ) and in Pt 2.6 of the Criminal Code (Cth) created by the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth); and see R v Khazaal [2012] HCA 26.

5.

See, for example, Cross JA in Munce v Vinidex Tubemakers Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 235 at 238. Part 2.6 of the Criminal Code (Cth) also uses the term ‘legal burden’. Cf Maloney v R (2013) 252 CLR 168; [2013] HCA 28 at [355] (Gageler J).

6.

A court will look to the whole of the evidence properly before it in deciding whether there is sufficient evidence to raise an issue: for example, Considine v Lemmer [1971] SASR 39; R v Bonnick (1977) 66 Cr App R 266. And this is demanded by s 13.3(4) of the Criminal Code (Cth).

7.

See, as a random example, R v Ye (2000) 116 A Crim R 347; [2000] NSWCCA 401 (case to answer made out but evidence insufficient to satisfy the persuasive burden). Cf Fang v R [2010] NSWCCA 254 at [58]–[59], where Ye principle applied but evidence sufficient to prove case beyond reasonable doubt.

8.

An often used example is Nesterczuk v Mortimore (1965) 115 CLR 140. The standard of persuasion in criminal and civil cases is analysed at 2.57ff.

9.

This is implicit in the requirement in rules of court that parties plead those material facts upon which the party relies. Some rules of court expressly provide for the burden of pleading to follow the burden of proof: for example, FCR 1979 O 11 r 5; UCPR 2005 (NSW) r 14.10; UCPR 1999 (Qld) r 151; SCR 2000 (Tas) r 227(4); SC(GCP)R 2005 (Vic) r 13.04; RSC 1971 (WA) O 20 r 8(3); CPR 2006 (ACT) Pt 2.6 r 409; SCR (NT) r 13.04. Where the respective burdens lie on different parties in relation to an issue of fact (as in, for example, Purkess v Crittenden (1965) 114 CLR 164), it is suggested that the burden of pleading must follow the evidential burden, and the phrase ‘burden of proof’ and its equivalents in the above rules must be interpreted accordingly. On rules of pleading generally, see Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure, 10th ed, Law Book Co, Sydney, 2014, Chs 6, 7.

10. For example, Harris v AGC (1984) 38 SASR 303. 11. R v Williams (1976) 14 SASR 1 at 3; R v Bradshaw (1978) 18 SASR 83 at 85–8; Furnell v Betts (1978) 20 SASR 300 at 302. 12. Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 162. Applied by the High Court in Griffiths v R (1994) 125 ALR 545. How far a judge may go in explaining the standard of proof under the prosecution’s persuasive burden in a criminal case is discussed at 2.71–2.73, 2.89. 13. (1965) 114 CLR 164. 14. Explaining Watts v Rake (1960) 108 CLR 158. Cf the situation where the issue is whether the plaintiff could mitigate damages by undertaking a particular operation, where both evidential and persuasive burdens lie upon the defendant: Munce v Vinidex Tubemakers Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 235. For another example of where a defendant carries an evidential burden, see Amaca Pty Ltd (formerly James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd) v Hannell [2007] WASCA 158 at [395] (Steytler P and McLure JA): ‘[O]nce a plaintiff demonstrates that a breach of duty has occurred followed by injury within the area of foreseeable risk, a prima facie causal connection will be established and the defendant has an evidential burden to adduce evidence that the breach had no effect’. 15. On the use of evidentiary rules to allocate risk, see Stein, ‘The Refoundation of Evidence Law’ (1996) 9 Can J Law & Jurisprudence 279 at 322ff. 16. Cf Glass JA in Munce v Vinidex Tubemakers Pty Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 235 at 238.

17. See Lee v Napier (2013) 301 ALR 663; [2013] FCR 236 at [74] (Katzman J quoting Cross on Evidence). Cf Williams, n 1 above, 1982, p 274. The distinction between a tactical and an evidential burden is highlighted by Lord Cross’s summary of counsel’s argument in DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182 at 200. See also Barwick CJ in Katsilis v BHP (1978) 52 ALJR 189 at 196–7; Office of Fair Trading v IBA Healthcare Ltd [2004] 4 All ER 1103 at [57]. In In the Marriage of Sutcliffe (1988) 93 FLR 377 at 381, the Family Court appears to confuse the evidential and tactical burdens in holding that ‘once it is established that the children were not delivered to the applicant in accordance with the order and no excuse or explanation was offered by the respondent, the prosecution does not carry any further tactical burden of establishing facts from which the absence of just cause or excuse or reasonable cause could be inferred. The tactical burden of adducing evidence of the existence of such exculpatory circumstances rests upon the respondent’. 18. Denning, ‘Presumptions and Burdens’ (1945) 61 LQR 379 at 380. 19. See further Stein, n 15 above. 20. The subtlety of this task might be illustrated by those cases dealing with the incidence of the burdens in tort cases involving mitigation of damages: see Williams, n 1 above, 1982, pp 278–80. 21. The distinction between criminal and civil cases developed in the following discussion is drawn for descriptive and expositional purposes only. It is neither suggested that the distinction is normatively definitive nor that once the distinction is drawn that particular consequences in terms of the incidence of burdens and the standard of the persuasive burden necessarily follow: see, for example, Chief Executive Officer of Customs v Labrador Liquor Wholesale Pty Ltd (2003) 216 CLR 161; 201 ALR 1; [2003] HCA 49 at [114] (Hayne J, Gleeson CJ and McHugh J agreeing). For a more conceptual discussion of the relevance of the distinction in devising process, see Rosen-Zvi and Fisher, ‘Overcoming Procedural Boundaries’ (2008) 94 Va L Rev 80. 22. These are canvassed by Ashworth, ‘Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence’ (2006) 10 E & P 241 at 246–51. The report of the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, The Burden of Proof in Criminal Proceedings, n 1 above, contains an impassioned plea for the persuasive burden always to remain with the Crown in criminal cases. References to the presumption of innocence abound. Heydon suggests (and cf the Lord Chancellor’s seminal dictum in Woolmington) that the presumption does no more than express the burdens of proof in a criminal case and that care should be taken in using it in other circumstances; for example, as a presumption of fact: see LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [7085]. See also Laudan, ‘The Presumption of Innocence’ (2005) 11 Legal Theory 333. But as Ashworth (above) argues, the moral and political values underlying the rhetoric of the presumption are powerful and influential in developing norms at both trial and pre-trial stages in criminal cases. This argument is strongly put by Kitai, ‘Presuming Innocence’ (2002) 55 Okla L Rev 257; by Dennis, The Law of Evidence, 5th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2013, [11.008]–[11.010]; and addressed by Lippke, Taming the Presumption of Innocence, Oxford University Press, New York, 2016. 23. X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92; [2013] HCA 29; Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196; [2013] HCA 39; Lee v R (2014) 253 CLR 455; [2014] HCA 20; R v Independent Broad Based Corruption Commission (2016) 256 CLR 459; [2016] HCA 8. See further at 5.106–5.109, 5.183. 24. [1935] AC 162. Accepted by the High Court in many decisions: for example, Moffa v R (1977) 138 CLR 601 at 607–8 (Barwick CJ). Also held by the High Court to apply in those Australian jurisdictions where the criminal law has been codified: Mullen v R (1938) 59 CLR 124 at 128. This same principle underlies Pt 2.6 of the Criminal Code (Cth). Under the Code, the prosecution’s standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt can only be altered by legislation specifying a different standard: s 13.2(2): see, for example, R v Lee (2007) 71 NSWLR 120; [2007] NSWCCA 71 at [18]–[26] (Spigelman CJ deciding the words ‘it would be reasonable to conclude’ specified a different standard in respect of the

fault element of intention under s 31(1) of the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cth)). 25. Sodeman v R (1936) 55 CLR 192. Sections 7.3(3) and 13.1(2) of the Criminal Code (Cth) take the same approach. 26. R v Hunt [1987] AC 352 rejected the argument that Woolmington was authority only for express legislative reversal of the persuasive burden of proof. Dowling v Bowie (1952) 86 CLR 136 implicitly takes the same approach. Section 13.4 of the Criminal Code (Cth) demands express words to cast a legal (persuasive) burden on an accused. 27. In contrast to the persuasive burden, the evidential burden is never a matter for the jury. The judge must explain to the jury which issues have been properly raised by the evidence. See Braysich v R (2011) 243 CLR 434; [2011] HCA at [32]–[36] (French CJ, Crennan and Kiefel JJ), [101] (Bell J). 28. Courts in jurisdictions that recognise the right to be presumed innocent have consistently held that imposition of an evidential burden upon an accused is compatible with this right because the state remains obliged to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt: see the discussion of Lord Steyn in R v Lambert [2002] 2 AC 545; [2001] UKHL 37 at [40]–[42]. 29. Viro v R (1978) 141 CLR 88 at 95 (Barwick CJ), 117 (Gibbs J); Marwey v R (1977) 138 CLR 630 at 640–1 (Stephen J) in relation to state code jurisdictions. See also s 419 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) (no persuasive burden on accused); s 15(5) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (but contrast with s 15C where, if disproportionate force is used, self-defence may still be established if the accused can prove on the balance of probabilities a genuine belief of home invasion: considered in R v Martin (2007) 99 SASR 213; [2007] SASC 336); and ss 9AC, 9AD of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) (interpreted to place only evidential burden on accused: Babic v R (2010) 28 VR 297; [2010] VSCA 198 at [19]–[22] (Ashley JA), [85]–[86] (Neave and Harper JJA)). 30. Parker v R (1963) 111 CLR 610 (High Court), 665 (Privy Council); Moffa v R (1977) 138 CLR 601 at 607–8 (Barwick CJ), 612 (Gibbs J), 628 (Murphy J). Section 23(4) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) expressly so provides (reversing Johnson v R (1976) 136 CLR 619) and this has been held to be the position in other state code jurisdictions: Sreckovic v R [1973] WAR 85; Van Den Hoek v R (1986) 161 CLR 158. 31. R v Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122 at 131. 32. Ryan v R (1967) 121 CLR 205 at 213–16 (Barwick CJ); R v Hinz [1972] Qd R 272; R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 (CCA (NSW)). 33. R v Merrett, Piggott and Ferrari (2007) 14 VR 392 at [16] (Maxwell P). 34. He Kaw Teh v R (1985) 157 CLR 523; Hindrum v Lane (2014) 242 A Crim R 400; [2014] TASFC 5 at [10]–[23] (Tennent J, Pearce and Porter JJ agreeing on the applicable legal principles); Criminal Code (Cth) Div 9 s 13.3. It appears that there is an evidential burden on the accused to raise the issue of honest and reasonable mistake of fact in the state code jurisdictions: Criminal Code (Qld) s 24; Criminal Code (Tas) s 14; Criminal Code (WA) s 24; Criminal Code (NT) s 32; but while some cases suggest these sections impose an evidential burden on the accused, for example, Brimblecombe v Duncan; Ex parte Duncan [1958] Qd R 8 at 12 (Philp J), 23 (Stanley J), others simply emphasise that the prosecution must persuasively negate mistake whenever evidence raises it as an issue; for example, M v R (1994) 117 FLR 200. In the case of the defence of honest and reasonable belief to a claim of right, an evidential burden is imposed by s 131(5) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA): discussed in R v Miller (2008) 103 SASR 174; [2008] SASC 331. Legislation may expressly place a persuasive burden upon the defence in relation to honest mistake; for example, where unlawful possession of drugs is charged: Tabe v R (2005) 225 CLR 418; [2005] HCA 59, interpreting s 57(d) of the Drugs Misuse Act 1986 (Qld). 35. Jayasena v R [1970] AC 618 at 623 (Lord Devlin); R v Zecevic [1986] VR 797; R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 at 3 (Hunt J, CCA (NSW)). This evidential standard is enacted in s 13.3(6) of the Criminal

Code (Cth). See discussion of French CJ in R v Khazaal [2012] HCA 26 at [10]–[12] and Heydon J at [100]–[102]; evidential burden not satisfied: see French CJ at [20], Gummow, Crennan, Bell JJ at [74]– [78], Heydon J at [114]. 36. The rhetoric of ‘justification’ and ‘excuse’ may be used to distinguish between on the one hand situations where there is a complete absence of moral culpability, where a person’s conduct is justified, and on the other where there is moral culpability but it is in the circumstances excused. One might argue there are stronger reasons for placing an evidential burden on the accused in the latter case. 37. R v Brown (1975) 10 SASR 139; DPP v Morgan [1976] AC 182 at 200 (Lord Cross). See the discussion in Williams, n 1 above, 1982, pp 289–90. Statutory offences must be interpreted to determine whether mens rea is integral to the offence in this way: He Kaw Teh v R (1985) 157 CLR 523. 38. In the code jurisdictions a person who acts under an honest and reasonable mistaken belief in consent is not criminally responsible: Criminal Code (Qld) s 24; Criminal Code (Tas) s 14; Criminal Code (WA) s 24; Criminal Code (NT) s 32. It has been held that once the issue of mistake is ‘raised by the evidence’ the jury must be directed to find this possibility negated beyond reasonable doubt before the accused can be convicted: Attorney-General’s Reference No 1 of 1989; R v Brown [1990] Tas R 46; M v R (1994) 117 FLR 200. In Victoria, consent is defined by s 34C of the Crimes Act 1958, and ss 45–47 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 stipulate the directions to be given where ‘consent’ and ‘reasonable belief in consent’ are in issue. 39. To allow otherwise would encourage vexatious litigation, although other measures could be taken to prevent this. Economic justifications are discussed by Hay, ‘Allocating the Burden of Proof’ (1996) 72 Indiana LJ 651. 40. Currie v Dempsey [1967] 2 NSWR 532 at 539 (Walsh JA). 41. (1956) 99 CLR 560. 42. [1942] AC 154. 43. ‘Burden of Proof and the Judicial Process’ (1944) 60 LQR 260. 44. As another random example, see Blay, ‘Onus of Proof of Consent in an Action for Trespass to the Person’ (1987) 61 ALJ 25. 45. It was argued unsuccessfully in Kuczborski v Queensland [2014] HCA 46 at [239]–[248] (Crennan, Kiefel, Gageler and Keane JJ) that the heavy burden placed upon the accused was an unconstitutional interference with the judicial power. 46. In England, a survey in the 1990s found that over 40% of offences tried in the Crown Court imposed persuasive burdens upon accused to some extent: Ashworth and Blake, ‘The Presumption of Innocence in English Criminal Law’ [1996] Crim LR 306. 47. Courts accept that this is consistent with the right to be presumed innocent as the state remains obliged to negate any reasonable possibility that an accused may be innocent: see n 28 above. In R v Lambert [2002] 2 AC 545 (discussed by Dingwall (2002) 65 Mod L Rev 450; Roberts (2002) 6 E & P 17), the court was prepared to interpret the words ‘to prove’ as meaning ‘to adduce sufficient evidence’ to ensure compatibility with the presumption of innocence. This liberal approach might avoid incompatibility in most cases where legislatures place burdens upon the accused: see Dennis, n 22 above, at [11.041]. The validity of these legislative human rights approaches in Australia was critically analysed by the High Court in Momcilovic v R (2011) 245 CLR 1; [2011] HCA 34 in upholding legislation expressly placing a persuasive burden upon the accused. 48. The validity of the determination of incompatibility is unclear following the decision in Momcilovic v R (2011) 245 CLR 1; [2011] HCA 34. Even if valid, the process is far from clear-cut. United Kingdom courts, following the approach of the European Court of Human Rights, will only declare legislation

incompatible with Art 6(2) if the imposition of a reverse persuasive burden is not in the particular circumstances a reasonable and proportional response to a legitimate legislative policy: see further, Dennis, n 22 above, at [11.018]–[11.040]; Hamer, ‘The Presumption of Innocence and Reverse Burdens: A Balancing Act’ (2007) 66 Camb LJ 142. A similar compromising approach is imposed by s 7 of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) and s 28 of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT). In Momcilovic, the High Court held that the declaration made by the VCA should not have been made. 49. [1987] AC 352. This aspect of Hunt is discussed by Stein, ‘After Hunt: The Burden of Proof, Risk of Non-Persuasion and Judicial Pragmatism’ (1991) 54 Mod L Rev 570. 50. (1952) 86 CLR 136. 51. (2011) 243 CLR 434; [2011] HCA 14 at [32], quoting Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ in King v R (2003) 215 CLR 150; [2003] HCA 42 at [52]. In Braysich, there was no dispute that the relevant legislation in relation to a particular issue placed both evidential and persuasive burdens upon the accused and the only question was whether the evidential burden had been satisfied so that the trial judge was in error in not leaving that particular issue to the jury to be persuasively determined. In King, the issue was whether as a matter of statutory construction a defence from another Act was implicit in the legislation under which the accused was charged, and the lack of express incorporation was an important reason for refusing the implication. 52. R v Hunt [1987] AC 352. 53. Dowling v Bowie (1952) 86 CLR 136; Chugg v Pacific Dunlop Ltd (1990) 170 CLR 249. 54. Thus, while similar guidelines apply in civil cases (see, for example, Vines v Djordjevitch (1955) 91 CLR 512; Webster v Lampard (1993) 177 CLR 598; Attorney-General (ACT); Ex rel Olaseat Pty Ltd v ACT Minister for Environment (1993) 115 ALR 161; Barrett v South Australia (1994) 63 SASR 208 at 219–22), it is easier to infer an intention to place a persuasive burden upon a defendant in a civil case because the Woolmington principles do not arise. 55. See cases referred to in n 23 above. 56. (1756) 1 East 643n; 102 ER 249. 57. See the discussion by Zuckerman, ‘The Third Exception to the Woolmington Rule’ (1976) 92 LQR 402. 58. Ashworth, n 22 above, at 246–51. 59. R v Hunt [1987] AC 352. 60. Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 (Eng) s 101, as interpreted in Gatland v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1968] 2 QB 279. 61. This argument is not entirely convincing, as the Woolmington policies appear stronger in more serious offences where liberty is at stake. 62. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 417A (this provision applies also to trials on indictment); Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 76; Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) s 56; Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 142A (applies also to trials on indictment); Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) s 78 (applying only to simple offences and expressly casting a persuasive burden on the defendant). Differences in the legislation are historically explained by Hemming, Kumar and Peden, Evidence Commentary and Materials, 8th ed, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2013, [3.340]–[3.360]. Compare with that legislation which specifically provides that the accused bears the ‘burden of proving’ authority, lawful excuse or permission: for example, Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 417; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 5. 63. Everard v Opperman [1958] VR 389. The use of the words ‘proved’ and ‘proof’ in the legislation are probably decisive, courts generally interpreting these words to invoke the persuasive burden: see Jayasena v R [1970] AC 618. Further authority for the statutory versions casting a persuasive burden can

be found in R v Hunt [1987] AC 352; DPP v Cole (1994) 100 NTR 1; Lloyd-Groocock v Police (2008) 102 SASR 465; [2008] SASC 313 at [53] (Doyle CJ); Weller, Office of Fair Trading v El Homsi [2009] NSWSC 282 at [38] (Kirby J). It is possible the High Court could yet decide that only an evidential burden is concerned, but the better view of the High Court decisions is that the judges are prepared to throw persuasive burdens upon accused when the Jarvis rule applies, and the statutory provisions simply enact these guidelines. 64. Dowling v Bowie (1952) 86 CLR 136; Vines v Djordjevitch (1955) 91 CLR 512. 65. It is suggested, having regard to the policies underlying the burdens in criminal cases, that courts should be more reluctant to place a persuasive burden on the accused, that the statutory form of Jarvis should be interpreted as placing only an evidential burden on the accused, and that the Jarvis approach at common law should be the same. Only where there is no ambiguity should parliament be taken as placing a persuasive onus on the accused. It is this approach that is taken in the Senate Standing Committee 1982 report (see n 1 above), by most commentators, and which is enacted in ss 13.3(3) and 13.4 of the Criminal Code (Cth). One might argue that Jarvis is a more appropriate guide to the allocation of the persuasive burden in a civil case. 66. Criminal Code (Cth) s 13.3(3); Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 72; Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) s 58; Criminal Code Act (NT) ss 43BU and 43BV. 67. Vines v Djordjevitch (1955) 91 CLR 512 at 519–20. The High Court emphasises substance rather than mere form in Dowling v Bowie (1952) 86 CLR 136; DPP v United Telecasters of Sydney Ltd (1990) 168 CLR 594 at 601; and Chugg v Pacific Dunlop Ltd (1990) 170 CLR 249 at 257. For lower court examples of the same approach, see Donoghue v Terry [1939] VR 165; Everard v Opperman [1958] VR 389; Hayward v Whitbread [1966] SASR 1; Bannister v Bowen (1985) 82 FLR 406; Attorney-General (ACT) v Minister for Environment (ACT) (1993) 115 ALR 161; Stevenson v Yasso (2006) 163 A Crim R 1; [2006] QCA 40 at [95]–[97]; Lloyd-Groocock v Police (2008) 102 SASR 465; [2008] SASC 313; Weller, Office of Fair Trading v El Homsi [2009] NSWSC 282. Cf the more formal approach taken in Zis v Bland [1962] WAR 137; and Attorney-General’s Reference No 1 of 1989; R v Brown [1990] Tas R 46 at 62–3. 68. Re Alexander; Ex parte Ferguson (1944) 45 SR (NSW) 64 at 66–7 (Jordon CJ). 69. (1816) 5 M & S 206 at 211; 105 ER 1026 at 1028. 70. [1958] VR 389 at 394; cf a number of English cases which have been all too ready to place a persuasive burden on the accused where licences are required: R v Oliver [1944] KB 68; John v Humphreys [1955] 1 All ER 793; R v Ewens [1967] 1 QB 322. These cases are now better regarded as examples of provisos where courts were prepared to regard the persuasive onus as upon the accused: R v Edwards [1975] 1 QB 27; R v Hunt [1987] AC 352. Their status is doubtful following adoption of the ‘right to be presumed innocent’ by the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) and its interpretation in R v Lambert [2002] 2 AC 545, requiring legislation to be read down to impose no more than an evidential burden upon an accused. 71. But not necessarily decisive factors: R v Spurge [1961] 2 QB 205; Katsilis v BHP (1976) 72 LSJS 338 at 382–3 (Sangster J). 72. [1987] AC 352. 73. (1952) 86 CLR 136. 74. This may be regarded as an aspect of the rule in Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63 at 65: ‘It is certainly a maxim that all evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to have produced, and in the power of the other to have contradicted’. 75. [1939] VLR 165. 76. See also O’Sullivan v Stubbs [1952] SASR 61; and May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654, where the

effect of offering no explanation is adverted to. 77. Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; Katsilis v BHP (1978) 52 ALJR 189 at 197 (Barwick CJ); Ho v Powell (2001) 51 NSWLR 572. And see further at 6.45. 78. Everard v Opperman [1958] VR 389 at 391; R v Hunt [1987] AC 352 at 374 (Lord Griffiths), 385 (Lord Ackner); DPP v Cole (1994) 100 NTR 1; Stevenson v Yasso (2006) 163 A Crim R 1; [2006] QCA 40 at [97]; and cases referred to at n 63 above. Enacted in, for example, Criminal Code (Cth) s 13.5; Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) s 78; Criminal Code (NT) s 440. 79. See commentaries listed at n 1 above. See also the Criminal Law Revision Committee’s 11th Report, Evidence, UK Cmnd 4991, [137]–[142]; and cl 8 of that Committee’s recommended bill. 80. R v Hunt [1987] AC 352 at 376 (Lord Griffiths referring to the recommendation of the Criminal Law Revision Committee). This intervention has now come by way of adoption of the ‘presumption of innocence’ in the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK): see R v Lambert [2001] 2 Cr App R 511. The legislature has intervened in the Commonwealth, Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory: see n 66 above. 81. For example, R v Carr-Briant [1943] KB 607; R v Patterson [1962] 2 QB 429; Jayasena v R [1970] AC 618; Crawford Earthmovers v Fitzsimmons (1972) 4 SASR 116; DPP v Cole (1994) 100 NTR 1; R v Sheehan (1999) 153 FLR 326 (applying Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 15D to Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth) s 27(2)). 82. The effects of statutory provisions utilising the technique of the prima facie averment are discussed in R v Hush; Ex parte Devanny (1932) 48 CLR 487 at 507–8 (Dixon J); Considine v Lemmer [1971] SASR 39; Gallagher v Cendak [1988] VR 731; Police v Dodd (2004) 88 SASR 130; Chief Executive Officer of Customs v El Hajje (2005) 224 CLR 159 (discussing s 144 of the Excise Act 1901 (Cth)). 83. Tepper v Kelly (1987) 45 SASR 340; Gough v Braden (1991) 55 A Crim R 92 (CCA (Qld)). On proof of ‘reasonable suspicion’, see R v Chan (1992) 28 NSWLR 421; McKeever v McGee; Ex parte McGee [1995] 1 Qd R 623. In Tepper v Kelly (1987) 45 SASR 340 at 276, it was held that reasonable suspicion is a matter of opinion or judgment as to the quality of the suspicion and that it is inappropriate to speak of this requirement being proved beyond reasonable doubt: see also R v Cook (2006) 95 SASR 201; [2006] SASC 231 at [13] (Duggan J). 84. For example, that no child under a stipulated age (generally, under 10 years) can commit an offence: Criminal Code (Cth) s 7.1 (the presumption is rebuttable by the prosecution where the child is aged between 10 and 14 years: s 7.2); Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW) s 5; Criminal Code (Qld) s 29 (rebuttable where child between 10 and 14 years); Young Offenders Act 1993 (SA) s 5; Criminal Code (Tas) s 18 (rebuttable where child between 10 and 14 years); Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic) s 344; Criminal Code (WA) s 29; Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) ss 25, 26 (rebuttable where child between 10 and 14 years); Criminal Code (NT) s 38 (rebuttable where child between 10 and 14 years). 85. The terminology used in this section is self-explanatory although by no means commonly accepted among judges and commentators. For a discussion of other classifications, see LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, Ch 4 s 4B. 86. This instrumental use of presumptions by the law is emphasised by Allen, ‘How Burdens of Proof Should be Allocated: Burdens of Proof, Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Modern Legal Discourse’ (1994) 17 Harv J L & PP 627. The benefit of the presumption as a distinct concept for allocating burdens is questioned by Allen and Callen, ‘The Juridical Management of Factual Uncertainty’ (2003) 7 E & P 1. 87. Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 9(3)(a); Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 9(2)(b); Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 9(2) (b); Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) s 9(2)(b); Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) s 9(2)(b); Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2013 (NT) s 9(2)(b).

88. For the law relating to this presumption, see Byrne and Heydon, Cross on Evidence, 4th ed, Butterworths, Sydney, 1991, pp 234–40. 89. Ibid, pp 246–55. Presumption applied in Estate of Howard (1996) 39 NSWLR 409; and In the Estate of Hills [2009] SASC 176. 90. Byrne and Heydon, note 88 above, pp 240–6. 91. Porter v Kolodzeij [1962] VR 75; Redman v Klun (1979) 20 SASR 343; Mehesz v Redman (No 2) (1980) 26 SASR 244, particularly 251–2 (White J); R v Jarrett (1994) 73 A Crim R 160 at 188 (where Mulligan J said: ‘I do not think any of the instruments fall within the category of notorious scientific instruments of which the courts will take judicial notice of the capacity for accuracy but they are within the class of instruments which are generally accepted by experts as accurate for their particular purpose’); Crosthwaite v Loader (1995) 77 A Crim R 348; Breedon v Kongras (1996) 85 A Crim R 472 (presumption not applied to a ‘sheridan gauge’); Jenkins v WMC Resources Ltd (1999) 21 WAR 393. The presumption may be excluded by statute; see, for example, Breedon v Kongras (1996) 85 A Crim R 472 at 478–80 (this aspect of Breedon disapproved of by Pidgeon J in Jenkins v WMC Resources Ltd (1999) 21 WAR 393 at [9]). Where instruments are not of sufficient notoriety to enliven the presumption expert evidence may be tendered to establish their general accuracy: R v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26 at [8]–[9]. 92. The nature and extent of this presumption is discussed in North Sydney Leagues Club Ltd v Synergy Protection Agency Pty Ltd (2012) 83 NSWLR 710; [2012] NSWCA 168. 93. Anchor Products Ltd v Hedges (1966) 115 CLR 493; Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 121 at [22]–[25] (Gleeson CJ and McHugh J), at [72]–[74] (Gaudron J) although it is suggested that her reference to an ‘evidential burden’ at [73] should be taken as a reference to a ‘tactical burden’ only, [106]–[112] (Kirby J), [133]–[134] (Hayne J). See further the discussion in Byrne and Heydon, n 88 above, pp 255–9. 94. Courts are sceptical of the sufficiency of such an inference in establishing criminal liability. In Waldie v Cook (1988) 91 FLR 413, Martin J refused to infer a driver’s lack of due care from the fact of an accident. 95. DPP v Smith [1961] AC 290, reversed by s 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 (UK). Cf the position of the High Court in, for example, Vallance v R (1961) 108 CLR 56 at 82; and Parker v R (1962) 111 CLR 610 at 632. 96. Dover v Doyle (2012) 34 VR 295; [2012] VSC 117 at [51], [57]–[60] (Bell J). 97. For example, McInerney J in Re Peatling [1969] VR 214; see also In the Estate of Hills [2009] SASC 176 at [24] (Gray J: ‘I am satisfied that the presumption of continuance of life has been displaced. I further consider that the evidence gives rise to a presumption of death’). 98. Pullin JA in Mowday v Western Australia (2007) 176 A Crim R 85; [2007] WASCA 165 at [38]–[39] recognises that such a presumption is simply an inference of fact. 99. Compare with McInerney J in Re Peatling [1969] VR 214. 100. [1969] VR 214. 101. (1937) 59 CLR 395. 102. Latham CJ in Axon was of the view that the presumption was evidential, but Evatt J agreed with Dixon J on this point. 103. This was the view of Evatt J in Axon by analogy to the statutory defence in bigamy cases, but the majority of authority favours the presumption arising to presume death only at the date of the proceedings in question, and not before. 104. The closest a court has come to a real conflict is found in Taylor v Taylor [1967] P 25 where, in a

situation similar to the hypothetical example above, the plaintiff attacked the validity of A’s marriage to C by setting up an earlier marriage between C and D. Cairns J avoided any difficulty by holding there was insufficient evidence of this earlier ceremony. One might query how the matter would have been approached if such evidence had been sufficient. 105. Morgan, ‘Some Observations Concerning Presumptions’ (1931) 44 Harv LR 906; Cohen, ‘Presumptions According to Purpose: A Functional Approach’ (1981) 45 Albany LR 1079. Re Peatling [1969] VR 214 favours this view, but it is submitted that it was not appropriate to apply it in the circumstances. 106. (1881) 6 QBD 366. 107. [1982] AC 484. 108. (1976) 13 SASR 433 (followed in Henderson v Richardson (1996) 5 Tas R 375 at 389–90). 109. Thompson v Kovacs [1959] VR 229; Redman v Klun (1979) 20 SASR 343. 110. R v Jarrett (1994) 73 A Crim R 160 at 188 (Mulligan J). 111. Porter v Kolodzeij [1962] VR 75; Mehesz v Redman (No 2) (1980) 26 SASR 244. Statute now governs the proof of the accuracy of readings from breathalysers: see 7.25 n 115. Where the statutory presumption runs out it may be possible to invoke the common law presumption: see R v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26 at [7]. Furthermore, with previous authority refusing judicial notice of the accuracy of breathalyser instruments in R v Ciantar the court (at [8]–[9]) permitted expert evidence to establish general acceptance of that accuracy so the presumption could apply. 112. Police v Butcher (2014) 119 SASR 509; [2014] SASC 85 at [72]–[73] (Stanley J). 113. Cf Barton v R (1980) 147 CLR 75 (objection was taken to an ex officio indictment). 114. R v N Ltd [2009] 1 Cr App R 3. This case emphasises that this does not prevent parties managing the case in other ways through sensible agreement when it becomes clear the prosecution case cannot succeed. For example, in R v Browning (1991) 103 FLR 425, after the prosecution had opened, the defence asked the judge to invite the prosecution to elect to call no evidence. Section 108 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) permits a judge to consider whether to find ‘no case to answer’ ‘at any time after the close of the prosecutor’s case and before the jury gives its verdict’. This power may be exercised whether or not the accused has made a no case submission. Sections 66 and 226 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) entitle a submission of no case to answer at the close of the prosecution case. 115. May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 652 at 658. 116. The jury’s acceptance of the direction results in a verdict of acquittal which the Crown cannot seek to overturn on appeal: R v Cheng (1999) 48 NSWLR 616. Under s 108 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), it is the judge who is required to find the accused not guilty and the judge does not direct the jury to acquit. 117. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) Ch 3 Pt 2; Justices Act 1886 (Qld); Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA); Justices Act 1959 (Tas); Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) Ch 4; Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA); Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT); Local Court (Criminal Procedure) Act (NT) Pt V Div 1. 118. Section 107(1) of the Summary Procedure Act 1921 (SA) provides that evidence is ‘sufficient’ to put an accused on trial where, ‘if accepted, [it] would prove every element of the offence’. Notwithstanding the distinction drawn in the following footnote, and the use of the word would rather than could, this is arguably, because of the words ‘if accepted’, still a standard equivalent to that on a no case submission. See also s 141(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) requiring ‘evidence of sufficient weight to support a conviction’, words which have been held to demand the no case standard in Thorp v Abbotto

(1992) 106 ALR 239 (Fed Ct). 119. In New South Wales, following the decision in Wentworth v Rogers [1984] 2 NSWLR 422, the standard of sufficiency was altered, the current legislation (Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW)) providing that, notwithstanding prosecution evidence capable of satisfying a jury, properly instructed, beyond reasonable doubt (see s 62), the accused must be discharged where the magistrate is not of the opinion that there is a reasonable prospect that a reasonable jury, properly instructed, would convict on that evidence (see s 66 formerly the Justices Act 1902 (NSW) s 41(6) and applied in, for example, Saffron v DPP (1989) 16 NSWLR 397; Kolalich v DPP (1991) 173 CLR 222). 120. Expressly provided by s 177(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) and s 87(7) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA). Cf Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) s 350(1)(a), (ab) (judge may direct verdict of not guilty). A judge may refuse to allow a prosecutor to enter a nolle prosequi where to do so would be an abuse of process; for example, during trial to avoid an incompetent prosecution. 121. R v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161. The prerogative is referred to without apparent disapproval by Dawson J in Whitehorn v R (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 672 as a ‘Prasad invitation’ and is accepted by the High Court in Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207. See also Benney v Dowling [1959] VLR 237 at 242; Police v Tupe [1999] SASC 314; R v Reardon (2002) 186 FLR 1; [2002] NSWCCA 203 at [153] (Simpson J). 122. See Thomson, ‘No Case Submissions’ (1997) 71 Aust LJ 207, who argues that the leading authorities can be interpreted to set aside questions of sufficiency altogether. In this respect he disagrees with Glass, ‘The Insufficiency of Evidence to Raise a Case to Answer’ (1981) 55 Aust LJ 842, who accepted that the cases allowed the judge to consider also whether the evidence was capable of persuading a reasonable juror to the requisite standard. 123. (1962) 108 CLR 433 at 442. 124. R v Briggs (1987) 24 A Crim R 98 at 104 (Burt CJ, with whom Brunsden and Kennedy JJ agreed); Cox v Salt (1994) 12 WAR 12. This aspect of R v Briggs was disapproved of by Malcolm CJ in Morrison v Kiwi Electrix Pty Ltd (1998) 103 A Crim R 312 at 319–21, and King CJ’s approach, referred to next, was preferred. 125. R v Bilick and Starke (1984) 36 SASR 321 at 337; see also King CJ in Questions of Law Reserved on Acquittal (No 2 of 1993) (1993) 61 SASR 1 at 5; R v Macaskill (No 1) (2001) 81 SASR 152 at [13]–[16]; Western Australia v Montani (2007) 182 A Crim R 155; [2007] WASCA 259 at [6]–[11]; R v Stott (2011) 111 SASR 346; [2011] SASCFC 145 at [25]–[26] (Gray J, David J agreeing); R v Hamra [2016] SASCFC 130 at [51]–[52] (Kourakis CJ), [109]–[112] (Peek J). 126. Thorp v Abbotto (1992) 106 ALR 239; R v Brady (2005) 92 SASR 135; [2005] SASC 277 at [10]–[14]; Western Australia v Montani (2007) 182 A Crim R 155; [2007] WASCA 259; DPP v Lawson (2012) 226 A Crim R 138; [2012] VSC 526. No case rulings upheld in Police v Leo (2006) 94 SASR 496; [2006] SASC 144 at [30]–[39]; R v Barnes (2008) 182 A Crim R 56; [2008] VSC 66 at [32]. In R v P [2008] 2 Cr App R 6, the court said the central question was simply whether there was evidence on which a properly directed jury could convict, and innocent hypotheses did not necessarily exclude such a result. 127. R v Prasad (1979) 23 SASR 161 at 163; R v Galbraith (1981) 73 Cr App R 124; Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1983) [1983] 2 VR 410; R v Haas (1986) 22 A Crim R 299; R v R (1989) 18 NSWLR 74. Contrary English authority was rejected in Galbraith. The point was left open by the High Court in Whitehorn v R (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 665, 689, but was expressly determined in Doney v R (1990) 171 CLR 207 at 214–15. See also the discussion by Glass, n 122 above; and Glissen, ‘Unsafe and Unsatisfactory: The Law as to Directed Verdicts’ (1989) 63 Aust LJ 283. 128. Dean v R (1995) 65 SASR 234 at 239. But cf s 34KC of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) requiring judge to direct acquittal where unsafe to convict when based substantially upon an out-of-court statement made admissible by that Act.

129. For example, as in Morris v R (1987) 163 CLR 454. 130. This is the approach taken in R v Briggs (1987) 24 A Crim R 98; Cox v Salt (1994) 12 WAR 12 (but disapproved of by Malcolm CJ in Morrison v Kiwi Electrix Pty Ltd (1998) 19 WAR 482 at 489–91). Consistent with this approach is R v R (1991) 57 A Crim R 39 (CCA (NSW)), where the court held that in a case dependent upon circumstantial evidence it is enough that there is evidence supporting the Crown’s hypothesis of guilt and it is not necessary for the Crown to negative any hypotheses which might lead to reasonable doubt. 131. Evgeniou v R (1964) 37 ALJR 508 at 510 (McTiernan and Menzies JJ). In Western Australia, an accused may submit no case to answer at any time after the close of the prosecution case and before the jury gives its verdict: Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) s 108. By s 82, any power to make an order may be exercised by a superior court on its own initiative. 132. R v Abbott [1955] 2 QB 497. 133. R v Johnson (1979) 22 SASR 161 at 182–3. 134. Prashar v R (1989) 1 WAR 190 at 198–9 (Rowland J). 135. R v Anthony [1962] VR 440; R v Faure and Corrigan [1978] VR 246. 136. Evgeniou v R (1964) 37 ALJR 508 at 510. Enacted in ss 66 and 226 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic). 137. Tepper v Di Francesco (1984) 38 SASR 256 at 268, explaining the previous decision in Brauer v O’Sullivan [1957] SASR 185 by reference to the prerogative to acquit at an early stage. Applied in Police v Leo (2006) 94 A Crim R 496; [2006] SASC 144 at [35] (Doyle CJ). Where there is a trial on indictment before a judge alone (Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ss 132–133; Criminal Code (Qld) ss 614– 615E; Juries Act 1927 (SA) s 7; Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) ss 118–120; Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) ss 68B, 68C) the legislation provides that (in Qld and WA) ‘the judge must apply, so far as is practicable, the same principles of law and procedure as would be applied in a trial before a jury’, (in NSW and ACT) ‘A judge may make any finding that could have been made by a jury on the question of the guilt of the accused’ and (in SA and also in Qld and WA) that ‘the judge may make any findings and give any verdict that a jury could have made’. Query whether in jurisdictions other than Queensland and Western Australia the effect of these provisions is that, as where there is trial by jury, the defendant will not be put to his or her election where a judge exercises his or her discretion to consider a Prasad submission. 138. R v Abbott [1955] 2 QB 297; R v Cockley [1984] Crim LR 429. 139. R v Johnson (1979) 22 SASR 161 at 182–3. 140. R v Wood [1974] VR 117. 141. Riseley v R [1970] Tas SR 41 at 60–1 (Neasey J). 142. Low v R (1978) 23 ALR 616 at 623–4; Prashar v R (1989) 1 WAR 190 at 198–9. 143. It may be argued that the failure to uphold a submission of no case is a fundamental error to which the proviso cannot apply. However, the High Court in Weiss v R (2005) 224 CLR 300, while recognising fundamental procedural error, appears to encourage application of the proviso where the appellate court is convinced by the record of the accused’s guilt: see further 2.14 nn 60–62. 144. HCR 2004 Pt 27 r 9; FCR 1979 O 11 r 16, O 20 r 2; UCPR 2005 (NSW) Pt 13 r 1, Pt 14 r 28; UCPR 1999 (Qld) r 171; SCCR 2006 (SA) r 104; SCR 2000 (Tas) r 259; SC(GCP)R 2005 (Vic) rr 23.01, 23.02; RSC 1971 (WA) O 20 r 19; CPR 2006 (ACT) r 425; SCR (NT) O 23 rr 1–2. See generally Cairns, n 9 above, at [6.590]. 145. The following discussion draws heavily upon the definitive and learned analysis of Windeyer J in Jones v

Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 322–32. 146. Fox v Star Newspapers [1900] AC 19. A possible contrary argument is raised by Windeyer J in Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 324 that non-suits at the application of the defendant could be regarded as unaffected by the discontinuance procedure. It was accepted that non-suits are not available in the Federal Court in James v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1985) 9 FCR 448 at 454; (1986) 64 ALR 347 at 403 (Toohey J). 147. HCR 2004 Pt 27 r 10; FCR 1999 O 22; UCPR 2005 (NSW) Pt 12 Div 1; UCPR 1999 (Qld) Ch 9 Pt 3; SCCR 2006 (SA) rr 107–108; SCR 2000 (Tas) Pt 12; SC(GCP)R 2005 (Vic) r 25; RSC 1971 (WA) O 23; CPR 2006 (ACT) Pt 2.11 Div 6; SCR (NT) O 25. See generally Cairns, n 9 above, [12.670]ff. 148. As, for example, in NSW: UCPR 2005 Pt 29 rr 29.8, 29.9 (dismissal on plaintiff’s or defendant’s application). Rule 29.10 preserves the submission for a directed verdict (judgment for want of evidence). In Hunt v Watkins (2000) 49 NSWLR 508, the Court of Appeal stated the test for sufficiency for a directed verdict as whether, taking the evidence at its highest, a jury verdict, if challenged, would necessarily be set aside on appeal. The words ‘taking the evidence at its highest’ appear to confuse the principles behind the different standards required for, on the one hand, the non-suit and, on the other, the directed verdict: see 6.38. 149. Metropolitan Railway Co v Jackson (1877) 3 App Cas 193 at 207; Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 304–5 (Dixon CJ), 319–20 (Windeyer J). 150. Union Bank of Australia v Puddy [1949] VLR 242 at 244 (Fullagar J); Tate v Johnson (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 492; Bank of NSW v Signorini [1966] Qd R 322; Copper Industries Pty Ltd v Hill (1975) 12 SASR 292 at 294; Protean (Holdings) Ltd v American Home Assurance Co [1985] VR 187 at 238–9 (Tadgell J); James v ANZ (1986) 64 ALR 347 at 403 (Toohey J). 151. Tate v Johnson (1953) 53 SR (NSW) 492 at 495. The effect of this is that the judge considers the evidence as if asked to make a final judgment: Tru Floor Service Pty Ltd v Jenkins (No 2) (2006) 232 ALR 532 at [16]; [2006] FCA 632 at [36]–[40] (Sundberg J). 152. Union Bank of Australia v Puddy [1949] VLR 242; TPC v George Weston Foods Ltd (No 2) (1980) 43 FLR 55; Protean (Holdings) Ltd v American Home Assurance Co [1985] VR 187; J-Corp Pty Ltd v ABLFU of WA (No 2) (1992) 38 FCR 458; Rosomen Pty Ltd (t/as Shell Fairview Park) v Shell Co of Australia Ltd (1997) 144 ALR 497 (FCA Full Ct); Compaq Computer Australia Pty Ltd v Howard Merry (1998) 157 ALR 1 (FCA); ACCC v Amcor Printing Papers Group Ltd (2000) 169 ALR 344 at [52]ff (FCA); Prentice v Collins (No 4) [2002] FCA 1215; Prentice v Collins (No 5) [2002] FCA 1503 at [109]–[115]; Green v Wilden Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 105 at [25]–[34] (Hasluck J); Tru Floor Service Pty Ltd v Jenkins (No 2) (2006) 232 ALR 532; [2006] FCA 632 at [19]–[35] (Sundberg J); Cahill v CFMEU (No 2) (2008) 170 FCR 357 at [17]–[30] (Kenny J); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Healey (2011) 196 FCR 291; [2011] FCA 717 at [540] (Middleton J) (election not demanded); Helal v McConnell Dowell Constructors (Aust) Pty Ltd (No 3) (2011) 285 ALR 281; [2011] FCA 1344 at [29]–[35] (Tracey J). This is expressly recognised in Pt 29 r 10 of the UCPR (NSW), which effectively demands election before a defendant can seek a judgment by direction. 153. See the cases listed at n 152 above. 154. Copper Industries Pty Ltd v Hill (1975) 12 SASR 292. 155. See generally the cases listed at n 152 above. To permit a judge time to properly consider the nature of the submission and whether election should be compelled, the decision to compel election may be deferred until argument on the submission has been heard: Tru Floor Service Pty Ltd v Jenkins (No 2) (2006) 232 ALR 532; [2006] FCA 632 at [17]–[18] (Sundberg J). 156. James v ANZ (1986) 64 ALR 347 at 400 (Toohey J). 157. Protean (Holdings) Ltd v American Home Assurance Co [1985] VR 187 at 236 (Fullagar J: election not

compelled); Compaq Computer Australia Pty Ltd v Howard Merry (1998) 157 ALR 1 at 7–9 (Finkelstein J: election not compelled); ACCC v Amcor Printing Papers Group Ltd (2000) 169 ALR 344 at [66]–[72] (Sackville J: election not compelled); Prentice v Collins (No 4) [2002] FCA 1215 (Sackville J: fraud of non-party no ground for not compelling election); Tru Floor Service Pty Ltd v Jenkins (No 2) (2006) 232 ALR 532; [2006] FCA 632 at [32] (Sundberg J: election not compelled); Cahill v CFMEU (No 2) (2008) 170 FCR 357; [2008] FCA 1292 at [21]–[30] (Kenny J: election required on second part of submission despite allegations of conduct attracting civil penalties). 158. J-Corp Pty Ltd v ABLFU of WA (No 2) (1992) 38 FCR 458 at 463–4. 159. Hummerstone v Leary [1921] 2 KB 664; Menzies v Australian Iron and Steel Ltd and Hill (1952) 52 SR (NSW) 62; James v ANZ (1986) 64 ALR 347 (Appendix); J-Corp Pty Ltd v ABLFU of WA (No 2) (1992) 38 FCR 458. 160. Payne v Harrison [1961] 2 QB 403. 161. Portland Manufacturers Ltd v Harte [1977] QB 306. 162. Compare with the remarks of Tadgell J in Protean (Holdings) Ltd v American Home Assurance Co [1985] VR 187 at 239. 163. Whenever election is not compelled, the standard of sufficiency should be this adversarial (non-suit) standard, as evidence cannot be weighed to determine whether it would be safe or satisfactory to find for the plaintiff until all the evidence is in. Thus, some criticism of Protean (Holdings) Ltd seems appropriate, so far as election was not required, and the court proceeded to apply the standard appropriate to the verdict by direction. This approach is nevertheless endorsed in Rosomen Pty Ltd (t/as Shell Fairview Park) v Shell Co of Australia Ltd (1997) 144 ALR 497 (FCA Full Ct). 164. Rare in criminal cases because of the privilege against self-incrimination (see 5.134–5.144) but more common in civil cases. Nevertheless, in civil cases, great care must always be taken in inferring admissions from a party’s silence: see 8.98. 165. In civil cases, see De Gioia v Darling Island Stevedoring and Lighterage Co Ltd (1941) 42 SR (NSW) 1 at 4; Katsilis v BHP (1978) 52 ALJR 189 at 196–7 (Barwick CJ). In criminal cases, see, for example, Donoghue v Terry [1939] VLR 165, but the High Court in Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285; 192 ALR 181 demonstrates its extreme reluctance to make any use of an accused’s ability to produce evidence: see further 5.132, 6.20. 166. M’Queen v Great Western Railway Co (1875) LR 10 QB 569 at 574 (Cockburn CJ); May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654; Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298. Note that in this situation an inference may arise because a defendant can be regarded as ‘required to answer’: cf Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings (2000) 200 CLR 121; 171 ALR 594 at [50]–[54]. 167. (2002) 210 CLR 285; 192 ALR 181. 168. Prentice v Collins (No 5) (2002) 124 FCR 67; [2002] FCA 1503 at [114], [150]–[153] (Sackville J applying Jones v Dunkel to assist in determining whether case proved following closure of case after election). 169. Protean (Holdings) Ltd v American Home Assurance Co [1985] VR 187 at 215 (Young CJ). 170. See, for example, Spence v Demasi (1988) 48 SASR 536; Packer v Cameron (1989) 54 SASR 246; Apand Pty Ltd v Kettle Chip Co Pty Ltd (1994) 52 FCR 474 at 489–90; Manly Council v Byrne [2004] NSWCA 123 at [44]–[75] (no inference from failure to call two available eyewitnesses when other clear evidence available); Hesse Blind Roller Co Pty Ltd v Hamitoski [2006] VSCA 121 (no inference from failure to call doctor where other medical evidence not challenged). 171. Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298; Brandi v Mingot (1976) 12 ALR 551 at 559–60; Spence v Demasi (1988) 48 SASR 536; Cubillo v Commonwealth (2000) 174 ALR 197 at [353]–[362] (O’Loughlin J); Ho v

Powell (2001) 51 NSWLR 572; Booth v Bosworth (2001) 114 FCR 39; Manly Council v Byrne [2004] NSWCA 123 at [51]. 172. The leading cases are Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217; RPS v R (2000) 199 CLR 620; Azzopardi v R (2001) 205 CLR 50; Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285; 192 ALR 181. See further 5.117–5.133. 173. Taylor v Hayes (1990) 53 SASR 282; R v Beserick (1993) 30 NSWLR 510 at 532. See cautionary comments of Gaudron and Hayne JJ in Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285; 192 ALR 181 at [6], [16]–[18] and the discussion of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Police v Kyriacou (2009) 103 SASR 243 (magistrate justified in drawing no inference where not all available witnesses called). 174. See Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence of the Common Law, Little Brown and Co, Boston, 1898, Chs 2–5. 175. See, for example, Cavanett v Chambers [1968] SASR 97; Pope v Ewendt (1977) 17 SASR 45; Government Insurance Office of NSW v Bailey (1992) 27 NSWLR 305 at 309–17 (Kirby P); In the Marriage of Zantiotis (1993) 113 ALR 441; AOTC Ltd v McAuslan (1993) 47 FCR 492; Marelic v Comcare (1993) 121 ALR 114 at 125–7 (Beazley J); Griffiths v Wood (1994) 62 SASR 204 at 208 (Matheson J), 217 (Ollson J); Grosser v SA Police (1994) 63 SASR 243; R v Martin (No 4) (2000) 78 SASR 140; Lamereaux & Noirot (2008) 216 FLR 432; [2008] FamCAFC 22 at [50]–[56]. This principle may be expressed as the need for procedural fairness or natural justice: cf, for example, R v Fisher [2009] VSCA 100 at [63]–[69]. 176. For criticism of these essential features of the common law trial, see, for example, Eggleston, ‘What is Wrong with the Adversary System?’ (1975) 49 Aust LJ 428; Menkel-Meadow, ‘The Trouble with the Adversary System’ (1996) 38 William & Mary LR 5; Davies, ‘Fairness in a Predominantly Adversarial System’ in Stacey and Lavarch (eds), Beyond the Adversarial System, Federation Press, Sydney, 1999, Ch 7. See also Managing Civil Justice, ALRC Report 89 (2002), particularly at [1.111]–[1.134], [1.47]ff, [3.30]–[3.41]; Edmond, Hamer and Cunliffe, ‘A Little Ignorance is a Dangerous Thing: Engaging with Exogenous Knowledge not Adduced by the Parties’ (2016) 25 Griffith LR 291. 177. Re Enoch and Zaretzky; Bock and Co’s Arbitration [1910] 1 KB 327 (questioned by Wilcox J in Obacelo Pty Ltd v Taveraft Pty Ltd (1986) 10 FCR 518 at 536–40, but followed by Powell J in Clark Equipment Credit of Australia Ltd v Como Factors Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 552 at 567–8); R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563; Griffis v R (1996) 67 SASR 170. 178. A broad power to call witnesses in civil cases is contained in UCPR 1999 (Qld) r 391 and may be implicit in rules providing power to ‘give directions as to the order of evidence and addresses and generally as to the conduct of the trial’ (for example, FCR 1979 O 32 r 4(1); SCCR 2006 (SA) rr 10, 117; SCR 2000 (Tas) r 569; SC(GCP)R 2005 (Vic) r 49.01; SCR (NT) O 49.01). Some Magistrates Courts have a general power to conduct an inquiry and call witnesses: see, for example, Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 38(1); Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 15.04. Rules also permit the appointment of experts either on the court’s own motion (UCPR 2005 (NSW) Pt 31 r 46; UCPR 1999 (Qld) r 425; SCCR 2006 (SA) r 118), or on application of a party (FCR 1979 O 34; RSC 1971 (WA) O 40) and permit them to testify concurrently: see 7.64. See generally Sheppard, ‘Court Witnesses: A Desirable or Undesirable Encroachment on the Adversary System?’ (1982) 56 Aust LJ 234. 179. This interpretation of s 26 is supported by Besanko J in Sharp v Rangott (2008) 167 FCR 225; [2008] FCAFC 45 at [48]. 180. This appears to be the view of the court in Sharp v Rangott (2008) 167 FCR 225; [2008] FCAFC 45, but whilst Besanko J (at [53]–[70]) considered that at common law only in the ‘most exceptional’ case would a judge be justified in taking the ‘highly unusual’ course of calling a witness in a civil case, Gray and North JJ (at [3]) preferred ‘not to express a view that would anchor the exercise of the discretionary power in the particular view of the adversary system identified by [Besanko J]’. 181. This is mitigated by s 38 of the Uniform Acts which enables a party to cross-examine a witness it has

called where the testimony is ‘unfavourable’ rather than ‘adverse’ (see discussion of Greg James J in R v Kneebone (1999) 47 NSWLR 450 at [54]–[56] and more fully at 7.118–7.123). 182. R v Evans [1964] VR 717; approved in R v Lucas [1973] VR 693 at 698 (Smith ACJ), 707 (Newton J and Morris AJ). 183. An unsuccessful attempt to so argue can be found in Sharp v Rangott (2008) 167 FCR 225; [2008] FCAFC 45. 184. And appellate courts are always reluctant to find counsel’s conduct so incompetent as to produce a miscarriage of justice: see cases referred to at 2.49 nn 275, 276. 185. [1910] 1 KB 327. 186. The decision is strongly criticised by Street CJ in R v Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750 at 755–6; and by Wilcox J in Obacelo Pty Ltd v Taveraft Pty Ltd (1986) 10 FCR 518 at 536–40. 187. (2008) 167 FCR 225; [2008] FCAFC 45 at [3]. See also Wilcox J in Obacelo Pty Ltd v Taveraft Pty Ltd (1986) 10 FCR 518 at 536–40. 188. [1982] 2 NSWLR 750. 189. (1984) 154 CLR 563. 190. Compare with the stricter post-Apostilides view in Griffis v R (1996) 67 SASR 170, where the court disapproved of a judge calling a witness, in face of objection from the defence, to avoid the jury speculating as to why the witness had not been called by the prosecution. In R v Wilson [1998] 2 Qd R 599, where an unrepresented accused with a psychiatric disorder failed to call medical evidence relevant to his intention, the majority (at 659–60) thought the court should itself have called the witness in the absence of the jury and have allowed the prosecutor to cross-examine, enabling the parties to reconsider their positions and the judge to decide whether as a last resort to call the witness. 191. These principles, emphasising the importance of the consequences of failure to call, were endorsed by the High Court in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Hellicar (2012) 286 ALR 501; [2012] HCA 17 at [153] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) in explaining that ASIC owed no higher duty to call witnesses as to the truth and holding (at [168]–[170]) that the failure of ASIC to call a witness did not provide an evidential basis (applying the approach in Blatch v Archer; see also Heydon J at [263]–[267] and n 74 above) for discounting the other evidence presented by it. See also Diehm v Director of Public Prosecutions (Nauru) (2013) 303 ALR 42; [2013] HCA 42, where Apostilides principles again applied but no miscarriage of justice was established. 192. (1983) 152 CLR 657. See also R v Wilson [1998] 2 Qd R 599, where the majority held that the absence of medical evidence critically relevant to the mental state of an unrepresented accused created an unacceptable risk of an improper conviction; R v Kneebone (1999) 47 NSWLR 450, where the absence of the only additional witness to an assault was critical to determining whether to accept the testimony of accused or victim; and Gilham v R [2012] NSWCCA 131 at [404] (McClellan CJ at CL, Fullerton and Garling JJ agreeing), where prosecutor failed to call a patently reliable and material forensic pathologist: ‘The Apostilides principles are not the rules of a game. They are rules designed as a protection against unfairness or the abuse of prosecutorial power’. 193. Tran v Magistrates’ Court of Victoria [1998] 4 VR 294 (witness unreliable); Lewis v R (1998) 20 WAR 1 (unreliable witness’s testimony not critical); R v Gibson [2002] NSWCCA 401 (unreliable witness’s testimony not critical); Rich v R (2014) 43 VR 558; [2014] VSCA 126 at [350]–[352] (no miscarriage). Cf R v Jensen [2009] VSCA 266 at [68]–[78] (witness was not patently unreliable and should have been called by the prosecution). 194. R v O’Brien (1996) 66 SASR 396 at 398–9 (Doyle CJ). 195. R v Seigley (1911) 6 Cr App R 106 at 107; R v Sullivan [1923] 1 KB 47; Fallon v Calvert [1960] 2 QB

201 at 205; Burns v Joseph [1969] Qd R 130; Phelan v Black (1971) 56 Cr App R 257. 196. DPP (NSW) v Wililo (2012) 222 A Crim R 106; [2012] NSWSC 713 (where a magistrate forbade the prosecutor from calling witnesses). Of course, once called, on objection, the judge may rule the testimony given or to be given irrelevant or inadmissible. 197. Briscoe v Briscoe [1968] P 501; Bond v ABT (1988) 19 FCR 494 at 514 (Wilcox J). 198. R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563; applied in R v O’Brien (1996) 66 SASR 396 (CCA). Note that although it is desirable that the accused testifies first in defence this is not mandatory: R v Lister [1981] 1 NSWLR 110. 199. The inferences permitted are limited, even in civil cases: see generally at 6.45–6.46 and for a detailed discussion of the position in criminal cases, see 5.117ff. 200. Whitehorn v R (1983) 152 CLR 657; R v Shaw (1991) 57 A Crim R 425 (CCA (Vic)). There will generally be no miscarriage of justice merely because the accused has been forced to call the witness, certainly where there are good reasons for the prosecutor’s refusal to call the witness: R v O’Brien (1996) 66 SASR 396. 201. R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563 at 576. 202. R v Cavanagh (1972) 56 Cr App R 407, as interpreted by R v Lucas [1973] VR 693 at 698; R v Foley (1984) 13 A Crim R 29 at 32; R v Wilson [1998] 2 Qd R 599 at 658 (Fitzgerald P and Lee J). 203. (1974) 131 CLR 116. 204. (1983) 152 CLR 657. Followed in R v Komornick [1986] VR 845; R v Su (1995) 129 FLR 120 at 151– 6. 205. See, for example, Lee v R [2014] HCA 20 at [45] (prosecutor obliged to reveal improper access obtained to compulsory examination of accused — defence counsel’s failure to object irrelevant). 206. See, for example, Libke v R (2007) 230 CLR 559; R v Pelly (2015) 122 SASR 84; [2015] SASCFC 25 at [66]–[77] (Gray J), [116]–[128], [206] (Bampton J, Parker J agreeing); R v Gathercole [2016] QCA 336 at [49]–[56] (Margaret McMurdo P). 207. At 674–5. These principles may apply less strictly in a summary court: Ninness v Walker (1998) 143 FLR 239. They do not apply where the state is taking civil proceedings for penalty against a defendant: Visy Industries Holdings Pty Ltd v ACCC (2007) ATPR 42–184; [2007] FCAFC 147 at [112] (Lander J). The application of these principles to prosecution tender of expert evidence was discussed in Velevski v R (2002) 187 ALR 233 at [46]–[47] (Gleeson CJ and Hayne J: prosecution not required to seek out and call the contrary expert opinions), [116]ff (Gaudron J: available contrary opinions should have been tendered), [171]–[176] (Gummow and Callinan JJ: prosecutor should have called contrary expert opinions in question but strong direction cured any miscarriage of justice). See also Gilham v R [2012] NSWCCA 131 at [404], where McClellan CJ at CL explained that: ‘The fact that there is disagreement between the experts from whom the Crown have sought an opinion provides no basis for the Crown to elect to call only those experts who will give evidence that supports the Crown case, or whose views are consistent with the Crown case theory’. 208. For example there is no obligation upon the prosecution to call evidence of the accused’s police interview which would be admissible to prove both admissions and self-serving statements on tender: Barry v Police [2009] SASC 295; Ritchie v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 134 at [38]–[39]; see further 8.108 n 314. Nor can the trial judge direct the prosecution not to call a particular witness who can give relevant and admissible evidence: Rawcliffe v R (2000) 22 WAR 490. 209. Dyers v R (2002) 210 CLR 285; 192 ALR 181 at [6], [16]–[17] (Gaudron and Hayne JJ). 210. Ibid at [5], [7]–[13] (Gaudron and Hayne JJ), [52] (Kirby J), [116]–[122] (Callinan J). See also Garven v Quilty (1988) 148 FLR 273 at 282–3.

211. See cases in nn 192, 193. 212. In R v Nobes (2001) 120 A Crim R 18, the court did not accept that the Crown had failed to make a witness available to the defence. 213. (1999) 47 NSWLR 450. Under the uniform legislation, the greater availability of cross-examination of Crown witnesses via s 38 ‘has placed more emphasis on the Crown’s obligation to call witnesses whose main relevance is the availability of their evidence unfavourable to the Crown case’: Kanaan v R [2006] NSWCCA 109 at [84]–[85]; Santo v R [2009] NSWCCA 269 at [22]–[32] (Hidden J); Doyle v R [2014] NSWCCA 4 at [236] (Bathurst CJ). 214. [2002] NSWCCA 401 at [48]. See also R v Rigney [2005] SASC 264 at [16] (Vanstone J). 215. Jurors have a right to ask questions and may be reminded of this right by judges. But they should not generally ask questions directly of witnesses, and, in any case, they must always have the judge’s permission: R v Pathare [1981] 1 NSWLR 124; R v Lo Presti [1992] 1 VR 696 (affirmed by the High Court (1994) 68 ALJR 477). On the less than satisfactory engagement of courts with questions asked by juries in image comparison cases, see R v Tang [2006] NSWCCA 167 at [74], [106]–[110] and Morgan v R [2011] NSWCCA 257 at [108]ff. 216. Yuill v Yuill [1945] P 15; Jones v National Coal Board [1957] 2 QB 55 at 63–4; R v Olasiuk (1973) 6 SASR 255; R v Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750 at 762–3; R v Davies [1984] 3 NSWLR 572; Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSWLR 263 at 280–2 (Kirby ACJ). Under s 29 of the uniform legislation, the court may on its own motion direct the witness to testify in narrative form. 217. On the limits of permissible questioning, see LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [17135]. Though as Whealy JA explains in FB v R [2011] NSWCCA 217 at [90]ff, ‘increasing complexity’ and ‘limited resources’ have led to judges taking ‘an active part in the conduct of cases’. See also R v T, WA (2014) 118 SASR 382; 238 A Crim R 205; [2014] SASCFC 3 at [37]ff (Kourakis CJ). 218. For example, Mawson v R [1967] VR 205; R v Davies [1984] 3 NSWLR 572; Galea v Galea (1990) 19 NSWLR 263 at 280–2 (Kirby ACJ); R v Boykovski and Atanasovski (1991) 58 A Crim R 436 (CCA (Vic)); R v Cunningham (1992) 61 A Crim R 412 (CCA (Vic)); R v Lars (aka Larsson); Da Silva and Kalanderian (1994) 73 A Crim R 91 at 121–42 (CCA (NSW)); R v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442 at 472 (Wood CJ at CL: not the role of the judge to cross-examine an accused to ensure ‘justice to the community’ particularly following objection by defence counsel), 477–8 (James J: trial judge at times adopted the role of prosecutor), 478 (Adams J: ‘To ask a clarifying question or two is very different from embarking on a hostile cross-examination’); R v Brdarovski (2006) 166 A Crim R 366; [2006] VSCA 231 at [21]–[25] (Esposito applied; judge had crossed the line in questioning accused to create an issue the prosecutor sought not to raise); Lockwood v Police (2010) 107 SASR 237; [2010] SASC (magistrate’s excessive interventions caused no miscarriage of justice); R v Mohammadi (2011) 112 SASR 17; [2011] SASCFC 154 (excessive interventions during witness examinations and interruptions during counsels’ closing addresses caused miscarriage of justice); R v T, WA (2013) 118 SASR 382; [2013] SASCFC 3 (no miscarriage); R v L, GA [2015] SASCFC 166 at [115]–[116] (miscarriage established). 219. Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149 at 153 (Isaacs J); Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings (2002) 208 CLR 460; 186 ALR 145 at [64] (McHugh J), [162] (Callinan J). 220. Generally, on this topic, see Morgan, ‘Judicial Notice’ (1944) 57 Harv LR 269; and Carter, ‘Judicial Notice’ in Waller and Campbell, n 1 above. 221. Blatchford v Dempsey [1956] SASR 285. 222. Malone v Smith (1946) 63 WN (NSW) 54. 223. Kent v Scattini [1961] WAR 74. 224. Denver v Cosgrove (1972) 3 SASR 130 at 133; Pope v Ewendt (1977) 17 SASR 45 at 48. Compare with

the decision in Mullen v Hackney London Borough Council [1997] 1 WLR 1103, where judicial notice was taken of previous breaches of court undertakings (criticised by Allen, ‘Judicial Notice Extended’ (1997) 2 E & P 37). 225. R v McCourt (1993) 69 A Crim R 151 (CCA (SA)). 226. Mutemeri v Cheesman [1998] 4 VR 484. However, it was held that the degree to which life was endangered was not notorious, nor indisputable. Cf R v Parenzee (2007) 101 SASR 456; [2007] SASC 143, where an accused (unsuccessfully) sought to call ‘experts’ to throw doubt upon whether the HIV infection was a transmissible virus. 227. Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307 at [542], [543] (Callinan J). Although one might distinguish this as a legislative fact, Callinan J (at [526]) was of the view that legislative facts required proof by evidence in the ordinary way unless judicial notice could be taken of them (see further n 280 below) and was prepared to take judicial notice of these facts on the ground they were notorious. 228. Kent v Wotton & Byrne Pty Ltd [2006] TASSC 8 at [12] (Blow J). 229. Sullivan v Gordon (1999) 47 NSWLR 319 (decided under s 144 of the Uniform Evidence Acts). 230. Collins v Northern Territory (2007) 161 FCR 549; 232 ALR 483; [2007] FCAFC 152 at [97]–[100] (French J), [159] (Sundberg and Branson JJ); but judicial notice could not be taken that a particular variety of unmilled timber was or was not such a product. 231. For a more extensive catalogue of examples, see LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [3020], [3040]. 232. Read v Bishop of Lincoln [1892] AC 644 at 652–4; Timbury v Coffee (1941) 66 CLR 277 at 283–4; Horman v Bingham [1972] VR 29; Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (Nos 15 & 16) (1987) 14 NSWLR 107; Australian Granites Ltd v Eisenwerk Hensel Bayreuth Dipl-Ing Burkhardt GmbH [2001] 1 Qd R 461 (existence and content of Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce); Pikos v Bezuidenhout (2004) 145 A Crim R 544; [2004] QCA 178 at [11] (date of Good Friday ascertained from the Almanac annexed to the Common Prayer Book). For a more extensive catalogue of examples, see LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [3025], [3030], [3040]. Cf Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 64; and Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 72, discussed at 6.67 below. 233. Duff Development Co v Kelantan [1924] AC 797. See similarly Attorney-General (Cth) v Tse Chu-Fai (1998) 193 CLR 128 (certificate from Minister for Foreign Affairs established that Australia recognised that the Peoples’ Republic of China was responsible for the international relations of the territory of Hong Kong). 234. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner and Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853. 235. Shaw Savill and Albion Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1940) 66 CLR 344 (although the question of whether the ship in question had been engaged in those exercises at the time of the relevant collisions was held to be decided by the court, not the executive: at 364). Cf Anglo Czechoslovak and Prague Credit Bank v Janssen [1943] VLR 185 at 197–9. In Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307 at [542], Callinan J on the authority of Shaw Savill was prepared to use Annual Reports of ASIO to take judicial notice of the fact that Al Qa’ida regarded Australia as a terrorist target. 236. For a more extensive catalogue of examples, see LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [3080], [3085]. 237. Pope v Ewendt (1977) 17 SASR 45, where the right to comment was held to have been waived when the prosecutor failed to object when informed by the justices that they had taken a view. 238. As, for example, in McQuaker v Goddard [1940] 1 KB 687. 239. (1979) 22 SASR 302. 240. See also Freeman v Griffiths (1976) 13 SASR 494, where the court refused to take judicial notice after the plaintiff had failed to prove time of sunset; and Palos Verdes Estates Pty Ltd v Carbon (1992) 6 WAR

223, where the court refused to utilise the doctrine to find that a minister had consented to prosecution. 241. On the discretion to reopen, see also Harrison v Flaxmill Road Foodland Pty Ltd (1979) 22 SASR 385; McDonald v Camerotto (1984) 36 SASR 66; Reynolds v Bogan Holdings Pty Ltd (1984) 36 SASR 193; Higgins v Parker (1984) 35 SASR 229; Piszczyk v Bolton (1984) 38 SASR 330. See generally 2.8. 242. For example, Pope v Ewendt (1977) 17 SASR 45. 243. Many references in the cases to notoriety cannot be taken as stipulating a necessary condition for the taking of judicial notice. The recognition of judicial notice following inquiry (Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149 at 153 (Isaacs J)) can only with contrivance be reconciled with the idea of notoriety. 244. (1917) 23 CLR 149. Applied in Kent v Wotton & Byrne Pty Ltd (2006) 15 Tas R 264 (consequences of exposure to asbestos common knowledge). For examples of the application of s 144, see Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law, 12th ed, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2016, [EA.144.60]. 245. In Aytugrul v R (2012) 247 CLR 170; [2012] HCA 15, the court declined to take notice under s 144 of published research suggesting that some ways in which DNA results are statistically presented carry greater persuasive potential than others as it was not ‘knowledge that is not reasonably open to question’. See also anxiety about reliance upon background theories manifesting in the Family Court not applying s 144 in McGregor v McGregor [2012] FamCAFC 69 at [74]. Contrast Tuite v R [2015] VSCA 148, where the Court of Appeal in Victoria simply ignored formal proof in referring to literature about the shortcomings of the forensic sciences. 246. Gattelaro v Westpac Banking Corp (2004) 204 ALR 258; [2004] HCA 6 at [17] (in holding that it was not common knowledge that the bank used a standard form guarantee — an adjudicative fact). This dictum was approved by French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ in Aytugrul v R (2012) 247 CLR 170; [2012] HCA 15 at [21] (and applied in declining to take notice of published research about the persuasive potential of different statistical expressions of DNA evidence as this was not ‘knowledge that is not reasonably open to question’; Heydon J at [73] querying whether s 144 applied to legislative facts). See also Norrie v NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] NSWCA 145 at [101]–[104] (Beazley ACJ), [223] (Sackville AJA) (where authoritative texts taken into account in determining that the meaning of ‘sex’ under the relevant legislation was not simply the binary ‘male’/‘female’). On the distinction between ‘adjudicative’ and ‘legislative’ facts and the application of s 144, see further 6.71ff. 247. See McQuaker v Goddard [1940] 1 KB 687. 248. The general need for procedural fairness in taking judicial notice (of the fact that tax avoidance through cash payments was then endemic in the building industry) is emphasised by McColl JA in Crown Glass & Aluminium Pty Ltd v Ibrahim [2005] NSWCA 195 at [131]–[140] (the majority decided that the trial judge’s findings could be supported by the evidence given). See also DPP (NSW) v Gramelis [2010] NSWSC 787 at [51]: s 144(4) is ‘directed at ensuring the parties are accorded procedural fairness’. 249. Cavanett v Chambers [1968] SASR 97 at 101–2 (Bray CJ). 250. Common law discretions as well as the discretion so expressed in s 144(2) may apply: see Prentice v Cummins (No 5) (2002) 124 FCR 67; [2002] FCA 1503 at [82]–[86] (Sackville J). 251. Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 72. In Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244 at [28]–[29], the dangers of the court formulating identification warnings by acting upon scientific texts tendered under s 72 but not subjected to rigorous examination by the parties was adverted to, but the texts were nevertheless relied upon as there was a clear consensus amongst the authors. 252. Casley-Smith v FS Evans and Sons Pty Ltd (1988) 49 SASR 339. 253. [1968] SASR 97 at 102. 254. Bray CJ in Cavanett v Chambers [1968] SASR 97 at 100 refused to limit s 64 to where the parties tender the information themselves, but this view does not prevent the section being interpreted as here

suggested. 255. Section 190(3). See also Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 129A. 256. In Trueman v DPP (Cth) (2007) 99 SASR 431, Gray J held s 59J could not be relied upon to receive an affidavit that contradicted evidence from the defendant. In particular it denied the defendant the procedural protection of the rule in Browne v Dunn. Gray J (at [14]–[16]) held that s 59J could only be used where there was no injustice to any party and it was otherwise in the interests of justice to inform itself outside the rules of evidence. 257. An example of the importance judges give to the maintenance of adversary procedures is the decision of Powell J in Clark Equipment Credit of Australia Ltd v Como Factors Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 552 at 567, that a referee appointed under the Supreme Court Rules could not call a witness without the parties’ consent. 258. Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1949, p 14. 259. Pantorno v R (1989) 166 CLR 466 at 473–4 (Mason CJ and Brennan J). In Prentice v Cummins (No 5) (2002) 124 FCR 67; [2002] FCA 1503 at [77], Sackville J held judicial notice of a High Court decision could also be taken to infer an adjudicative fact — the reason for disposing of assets. 260. Uniform Acts s 143; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 43; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 35; Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA) s 10; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 53(1)(b). 261. Brebner v Bruce (1950) 82 CLR 161. 262. The meaning of an ‘as if enacted’ clause is a matter of some debate. See, for example, R v Harm (1975) 13 SASR 84. 263. Brebner v Bruce (1950) 82 CLR 161; Reynolds v Bogan Holdings Pty Ltd (1984) 36 SASR 193 (and the authorities there referred to). 264. The ‘judicial notice’ approach: Uniform Acts s 143; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 43; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 35, 37; Acts Interpretation Act 1931 (Tas) ss 39, 39A. The ‘prescribing a form of proof’ approach: Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 48; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 37, 37A, 37B; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 58–61. By-laws and regulations made under statutory power can be proved under the following provisions: Uniform Acts s 143; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 48; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 37; Local Government Act 1999 (SA) Ch 14 Pt 3; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 58, 78; Local Government Act 1993 (NT) s 200. For a catalogue and discussion of these sorts of provisions, see Evidence, ALRC Interim Report No 26 (1985), vol 2, pp 294–6. 265. This idea is floated by Bray CJ in R v Harm (1975) 13 SASR 84 at 99; and Freeman v Griffiths (1976) 13 SASR 494 at 498, and is quoted with approval in Reynolds v Bogan Holdings Pty Ltd (1984) 36 SASR 193 and the other South Australian authorities mentioned in that case. 266. Re Duke of Wellington [1947] Ch 506. See generally LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [41005]– [41030]. The expert may prove the content of the foreign law but not give an opinion on its application to the case at hand: for example, Nicola v Ideal Image Development Corp (2009) 261 ALR 1 at [16] (notwithstanding s 80 of the uniform legislation, which permits opinions on ultimate issues: AllState Life Insurance Co v ANZ (1996) 137 ALR 138 (FCA), but qualified in Idoport Pty Ltd v NAB (2000) 50 NSWLR 640). 267. Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 53(1)(b). 268. Uniform Acts Pt 4.6 Div 3; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) ss 67, 68; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 63; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 70, 71. 269. See the legislation listed at nn 260, 264.

270. Davis, ‘Judicial Notice’ (1955) 55 Columbia LR 945. Heydon J in Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307 at [614]–[615], accepting the distinction between adjudicative and legislative facts, distinguishes four categories of legislative facts: facts going to the constitutional validity of a statute (constitutional facts); facts going to the construction of non-constitutional statutes; facts going to the construction of constitutional statutes; and facts relating to the content and development of the common law. Heydon J’s categorisation is employed by Beazley JA in Norrie v NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] NSWCA 145 at [93]–[100] (discussing the common law) and at [101]–[104] (discussing s 144 of the uniform legislation and its relationship to the common law). 271. [1940] 1 KB 687. 272. See the examples referred to by McHugh J in Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings (2002) 208 CLR 460; 186 ALR 145 at [65]–[69]. For a more detailed and extensive categorisation of legislative facts and examples of them, see LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [3005], [3159]–[3159]. 273. On the importance of facts in interpreting constitutional validity, see Faigman, ‘“Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”, Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation’ (1991) 139 U Penn LR 541. 274. See, for example, Matthews v Chicory Marketing Board (Vic) (1938) 60 CLR 263 at 293–9; Marcus Clark and Co Ltd v Commonwealth (1952) 87 CLR 177 at 217; Griffin v Constantine (1954) 91 CLR 136 at 140–3. 275. Farey v Burvett (1916) 21 CLR 433 at 459; Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 197, 208. 276. (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 197, 208. 277. Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 254, 267, 276 (Fullagar and Kitto JJ); Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings (2002) 208 CLR 460; 186 ALR 145 at [163] (Callinan J). 278. Stenhouse v Coleman (1944) 69 CLR 457 at 469 (suggesting judicial notice not the explanation); Breen v Sneddon (1961) 106 CLR 406 at 411, distinguishing legislative and adjudicative facts. See the discussion by Lane, ‘Facts in Constitutional Law’ (1963) 37 Aust LJ 108. 279. Commonwealth Freighters Pty Ltd v Sneddon (1959) 102 CLR 280 at 292. This liberal approach is endorsed by McHugh J in Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings (2002) 208 CLR 460; 186 ALR 145 at [65]. See also Maloney v R (2013) 252 CLR 168; [2013] HCA 28 at [351]–[353] (Gageler J). 280. (2002) 208 CLR 460; 186 ALR 145 at [163]–[165]. Insofar as Callinan J requires parties to have the opportunity to comment before a court acts on legislative or constitutional facts, Heydon J agrees in Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307 at [618], [636]. 281. Thomas v Mowbray at [523], [526], [551]. Heydon J agrees with Callinan J about the constitutional facts that can be taken into account but uses a route which he declares (at [613]) to ‘differ a little from’ that used by Callinan J. 282. Aytugrul v R (2012) 247 CLR 170; [2012] HCA 15 at [73] (Heydon J queried whether s 144 applied to legislative, as opposed to adjudicative, facts). In Norrie v NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2013] NSWCA 145 at [104], Beazley ACJ, accepting that s 144 now covers the field (at [103]), was nevertheless of the view that, under either common law or s 144 tests a court could ‘act upon knowledge or take notice of facts, that were the subject of authoritative texts, even in developing areas of science, medicine or technology. For example, it is unlikely that science has heard the last word in gene technology. That would not, in my opinion, prevent a court from having regard to material relating to that topic so as to understand the legislative purpose of enacting legislation relating to that subject matter, provided it was accepted that the material was the work of a respected expert in the field’. She then went on to consider, in determining whether the meaning of ‘sex’ in the legislation before her was binary, the authoritative texts of scholars on the meaning of terms such as ‘transgender’

and ‘transsexual’ and ‘intersex’ and (at [107]) remarks ‘that “most experts agree” that 1 to 2 per cent of the population are born with sexual features that vary from the medically defined normal for “male” and “female”’, to conclude (at [114] ‘from this material that questions of sexual identity are more complex than the characterisation of persons being “male” or “female”’. Sackville AJA (at [227]) in applying s 144 as covering the field expressly limited using expert information relating to knowledge that he regarded as not reasonably open to dispute. 283. See Evidence, ALRC Interim Report No 26 (1985), vol 1, [974]–[977]. 284. [1976] QB 773. 285. See also R v Field; Ex parte White (1895) 64 LJMC 158 at 160, where Wills J speaks as an experienced mountaineer. 286. (1977) 17 SASR 45. 287. See also Isaacs J in Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149 at 153. 288. Dennis v AJ White & Co [1916] 2 KB 1 at 6. 289. Clayton v Hardwick Colliery Co Ltd [1915] WN 395. 290. Re a by-law made by the District Council of Prospect; Ex parte Hill [1926] SASR 326. 291. Paul v DPP (1990) 90 Cr App R 173. 292. Wong v R (2001) 207 CLR 584; 185 ALR 233; [2001] HCA 64 at [64]; R v Stanbouli (2003) 141 A Crim R 531; [2003] NSWCCA 355 at [103]; cf R v Pidoto (2006) 14 VR 269 at [61]; [2006] VSCA 185 at [61] (court could not use its own knowledge to determine the relative harmfulness of drugs). 293. The process is referred to at 1.13. 294. For example, Lopes v Taylor (1970) 44 ALJR 412; Burns v Lipman (1974) 132 CLR 157 at 161. 295. The admissibility of expert testimony is discussed fully at 7.43ff. Note that empirical knowledge may be relevant to establishing adjudicative facts or to relying on legislative facts or the generalisations of knowledge upon which inferences are based, and must be treated according to its particular functional use. See generally Saks, ‘Judicial Attention to the Way the World Works’ (1990) 75 Iowa LR 1011. 296. See, for example, Commissioner for Government Transport v Adamcik (1961) 106 CLR 292.

[page 707]

Chapter Seven

The Testimonial Emphasis Introduction 7.1 At common law, as a general rule, material facts and events are inferred from the oral testimony of witnesses to those facts and events (or to other facts and events from which the material facts can ultimately be inferred). This testimony is presented to the court by the one party calling and examining the witness in-chief, and the other party being given the opportunity to test the information given through cross-examination. Many rules of evidence, including the rule forbidding the reception of hearsay, have their rationale in this testimonial emphasis. The exposition of the hearsay rule is an exercise in itself and will be the subject of Chapter 8. Other rules dealing with the testimonial presentation of evidence are discussed in this chapter. First, some explanation is required of the degree to which fact-finding at common law depends on the oral presentation of testimony, and of the other forms in which evidence can be put before the court. 7.2 Essentially, a trier of fact can act upon two sorts of evidence: that reported by witnesses (testimonial evidence), and that experienced directly by the trier (real and documentary evidence). Almost always, triers act upon a combination of both. When a witness reports facts and events, the trier will have regard to the witness’s physical appearance and reactions in deciding whether to accept his or her account. Where a physical object is presented to the court, a blood-stained knife for example, a witness will at least have to explain the circumstances in which it was found to connect it to the material facts, and probably one or more

experts will be required to identify the blood found. Similarly, with evidence retrieved from machines or computers recording or analysing relevant facts, it will be necessary for witnesses to explain the circumstances in which the devices were used and the nature and accuracy of the results produced. Consequently, although triers will and are permitted to act upon physical matter experienced directly by them, no trial can take place without some reliance upon human testimony about other circumstances that make that real evidence relevant to the material facts in issue. Only with a time-machine, transporting the trier back to experience the events giving rise to the dispute directly, is it possible to envisage the [page 708] absence of connecting human testimony. Even then, some testimony would have to be given about the reliability of the time-machine. 7.3 Where testimony is to be considered, the general rule is that the witness must orally report relevant experiences directly to the court, and be present and available to have that testimony tested by cross-examination (although in this era of instantaneous electronic communication, ‘presence’ is given an extended meaning).1 Witness testimony preserved in documents or computers, or on video or audio recordings, or lodged in the memories of others, cannot satisfy these conditions and is therefore generally excluded at common law as hearsay.2 Unless that storage or the information contained in it has a relevance arising independently of the truth of a witness’s account, it is inadmissible, as hearsay. Testimony from witnesses to facts and events cannot be tendered to the court indirectly in other forms unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies. Thus, for example, legislation was required to permit vulnerable witnesses to have their testimony presented via a video recording: see 7.33–7.34. 7.4 The two principal forms of non-testimonial evidence are real evidence and documentary evidence. The reception of these forms of evidence, it is suggested, remains dependent upon other evidence that can establish its relevance to the material facts in issue. Presumptively at least, that ‘authenticating’ evidence will take the form of human testimony, increasingly from so-called experts, although legislation, including the Uniform Evidence Acts, does ease the conditions for ‘authenticating’ documents.

The focus is also slowly moving away from requiring testimony to be given directly to the court through the many exceptions to the hearsay rule created by [page 709] legislation. For example, the uniform legislation admits first-hand hearsay generally in civil cases. In these circumstances the challenge is to provide an adequate procedure, in substitution for the process of examination and crossexamination, to gauge the probative value of that ‘testimony’.

Documentary Evidence Definition 7.5 The notion of a document can only be precisely defined in the context of a particular legal rule. The common law may define ‘document’ differently for different purposes and legislatures may create particular rules for the reception of particular types of documents. At its broadest, the notion includes all records made by any process whereby information is stored and can be retrieved; records as different as the chiselling of a name on a rock, graffiti, more conventional writings, sound recordings, photographs, video recordings, through to the most sophisticated electronic storage of information.3 At its narrowest, the notion of a document includes only writings. The following discussion takes as its starting point the broadest notion, but recognises that, as we turn our attention to more specific rules of evidence, it may be necessary to take a more restricted view of the notion of a document if the interests of those rules are to be served.

Authentication 7.6 As explained above, the common law’s insistence upon the oral testimony of witnesses means that, as a general rule, their reports about direct experiences cannot be presented to the court in documentary form. However, this does not mean that documents can never be tendered as evidence. In the first place, exceptions to the hearsay rule exist to allow documents to be used testimonially in particular circumstances. But, secondly and more fundamentally, documents are always admissible if relevant other than testimonially. For this reason,

documents of direct legal effect are admissible — contracts, deeds, leases and the like — as are documents tendered to establish the fact that a statement, relevant as such, was made; for instance, a threatening statement contained in documentary form,4 or a prior inconsistent statement of a witness contained in a document.5 Documents in the form of relevant photographs or audio and visual recordings are in many cases non-testimonial evidence of events. In these cases, the document is itself relevant information that can be experienced first-hand by the court (akin to real evidence), and appropriate inferences can be drawn directly from it. 7.7 The principal requirement at common law whenever otherwise admissible documentary evidence is tendered is that it be authenticated as the document it [page 710] purports or is alleged to be. This entails establishing the circumstances in which it has come into existence and, if its relevance depends upon its authorship or adoption by a particular person or persons, then that also must be established. Generally at common law this link in the chain of proof will be established through the oral testimony of a witness. Therefore, even in the case of documentary evidence, the importance of direct witness testimony remains fundamental. At common law, before admitting a document the judge must decide whether there is sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact can find that the document originated as alleged; the trier of fact must then decide whether it is persuaded by this evidence to find the document authentic.6 The maintenance of this distinction is of particular importance in criminal cases where juries sit. For example, while the judge determines whether there is evidence from which a jury can find that a confession has been made, it is for the jury to determine whether the accused did make that confession.7 Thus, whether a document is the confession of the accused is a jury question. While the common law evolved technical requirements for the authentication of some documents these have been removed by legislation. Authentication is now generally simply a question of fact to be inferred from any relevant evidence. But at common law, evidence from which authentication can be found by the trier of fact must be before the court before a document may be received into

evidence at all. The assumption in the common law approach is that a document cannot authenticate itself, so that there must be some evidence of authentication that comes from a source independent of the document. 7.8 The position under the uniform legislation has been controversial. The legislation does not generally deal with the authentication of documents as a separate question. [page 711] It simply provides in s 56(1) that: ‘Except as otherwise provided by this Act evidence that is relevant … is admissible’. As authentication is a step towards establishing the relevance of otherwise relevant and admissible documents, on its face this section admits such documents provided there is evidence of authenticity before the court. Section 57(1) provides that where a determination of relevance depends upon another finding, ‘(including a finding that the evidence is what the party claims it to be), the court may find that the evidence is relevant … if it is reasonably open to make that finding’. This would appear to endorse the common law approach to authentication. There must be evidence upon which a finding of authenticity is reasonably open to the trier of fact. But furthermore, s 58 provides that, if a question arises concerning the relevance of a document (or thing), the court may draw inferences from the very document (or thing) itself.8 This is a liberalisation of the common law position. However, whether it will be reasonably open to a trier to find a document authentic upon the basis of such an inference is another matter. And courts remain reluctant to allow documents to authenticate themselves.9 Reflecting that reluctance, Bryson J in NAB Ltd v Rusu10 appears to have taken a more radical approach to the question of authentication under the uniform legislation. In his view, ss 57 and 58 are concerned only with determining ‘relevance’; authenticity is a separate question,11 the Act (and in particular s 48) not intending to do away with the requirement of ‘authentication’. Furthermore, before a document can be received as authentic the judge must be satisfied of that authenticity on the balance of probabilities. This approach is difficult to justify from the wording of the legislation. Insofar as it suggests that inferences of authenticity cannot be drawn from the document itself it is inconsistent with ss 58 and 183.12 Insofar as it requires authenticity to be

established on the balance of probabilities it is not only inconsistent with s 57 but also [page 712] with the common law.13 Later authorities prepared to follow Bryson J in requiring proof of authentication have nevertheless permitted inferences from the document itself,14 although agreeing that only in rare circumstances should a court be prepared to permit a document to prove itself.15 The arguments for rejecting Bryson J’s approach have now been endorsed. In ACCC v Air New Zealand Ltd (No 1), Perram J declared Bryson J’s view ‘clearly wrong’ and White J in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Active Super Pty Ltd noted that ‘Perram J gave detailed reasons for that conclusion with which I respectfully agree’.16 In this context it should be noted that s 167 of the uniform legislation permits a party to ‘make a reasonable request of another party for the purpose of determining a question that relates to … the authenticity … of a document’.17 This includes (s 166) requests to produce documents, to permit examination, testing or copying of documents, and requests that another party call witnesses concerned in their production or maintenance or keeping. These sections are designed to ensure that relevant evidence of authenticity is available to parties. Failure to comply with requests may, most extremely, lead to exclusion of evidence in relation to which a request was made. 7.9 Where documents are operative legal instruments (for example, deeds, leases, wills, contracts, and the like) the law often provides formalities (such as sealing, signatures and attestation) that must be met before such documents can have legal effect. Where this is the case, evidence of these formalities must be adduced if the document is to be received as relevant. At common law, this required calling attesting witnesses, unless shown to be unavailable, but this requirement has been abolished in all Australian jurisdictions and any execution can be established through any admissible probative evidence, most often oral testimony.18 In the absence of formalities, the reception of a document otherwise admissible

will often depend upon sufficient evidence of authorship or adoption, and this is achieved by tendering testimony from a witness present when the person signed, [page 713] wrote or otherwise adopted the document in question. Again, at common law, if there was a signatory to the document that signatory had to be called (unless unavailable) but this requirement has also been modified by legislation.19 Adoption may be oral20 or in writing, express or implied, direct or indirect. The question is one of fact. There is authority for the view that a person unable to read a written document, through illiteracy or incapacity, may acknowledge the document, orally or by signing it, after it has been read over to him or her.21 An agent may be authorised to adopt a document on behalf of a principal.22 7.10 Evidence of authorship or adoption can be tendered through calling the author of or signatory to the document, a witness to the author signing or other adoption of it (be the adoption oral or written, express or implied, direct or indirect), or a witness who, through first-hand experience23 or special expertise,24 can identify a signature or writing by which the document has been authored or adopted. It used to be the case at common law that a genuine writing could not be used for the purpose of comparison with writing in dispute unless it was otherwise admissible in the instant case. This is expressly altered by a number of Evidence Acts,25 provided that the genuineness of the writing to be authenticated is in dispute26 and that sufficient evidential basis has been established for the comparative sample.27 The Uniform Acts contain no express provision, but in R v Hannes the court held that a comparative [page 714] sample could be received on the grounds of simple relevance under s 56(1).28 Once a sample is received the jury may then, either with or without the assistance of an expert, make the comparison directly itself. 29 7.11 To overcome the problem of authenticating written documents that are very old, the common law persuasively presumes documents dated 30 years previously and produced from proper custody to have been duly executed on the

specified date. The period for this presumption is reduced to 20 years by some of the Evidence Acts.30 Where public action, executive and legislative, needs to be established through the tender of documents embodying those actions, formal authentication is often difficult and impractical. Although some courts have been willing to dispense with proof of some official seals and signatures by taking judicial notice of them and effectively allowing official documents to prove themselves,31 others have been reluctant to act upon signed documents alone.32 As a result, extensive legislation exists in all Australian jurisdictions providing for the proof of a miscellany of public documents, either by directing the courts to take judicial notice of the seals or signatures on them,33 by allowing certain public documents and their official copies to prove themselves,34 or by presuming the authenticity of their attesting signatures and their contents.35 [page 715] 7.12 Modern means of recording have changed authentication requirements. As machines intervene in the production of documents and other records, the issue of authentication shifts from being principally a question of authorship and adoption to being a question of the operation and reliability of the machine. It must be kept in mind that authentication is required by the common law to ensure the relevance and reliability of documentary evidence. Where machines intervene in the production of records of information, it is not enough merely to connect the record to a particular machine (operated through human intervention or not), but that machine must be shown to be capable of producing a reliable record containing reliable information, and to have been properly operated on the occasion in question. Where machines collect information directly, independently of testimonial information fed in by any human operator (for example, spectrometers which directly analyse physical matter), no question arises of any record being hearsay and the principal issue becomes the nature and reliability of the analysis and the record of it. With the assistance of the authenticating testimony of experts such information is admissible at common law,36 although legislation may provide practical short-cuts to establishing this reliability.37 The authenticating of electronic records, such as messages sent or

processed by electronic mail,38 creates its own set of authentication problems, where both authorship and reliability must be established. 7.13 As the hearsay rule has been modified by statute and documents (originals and copies) allowed in as evidence, parliaments have had to stipulate new authentication requirements. Thus, with the reception of business and computer records in exception to the hearsay rule, legislation stipulates what is required to authenticate these records. Business records may be authenticated by showing they form part of a record of business and were made in the course, or for the purpose, of business.39 Documents and other records generated by computers and other devices are authenticated by evidence showing their production by the computer or device in question, proving the [page 716] accuracy and reliability of the computer or device, and proving its proper operation on the occasion in question.40 With these new authentication requirements legislatures have relaxed their modes of proof. For example, in the case of computers and other devices, ss 146 and 147 of the uniform legislation presume authentication until evidence sufficient to raise a doubt is adduced (an evidential presumption). And in addition, the uniform legislation in Pt 4.6 Div 2 permits authentication at first instance through the tender of affidavits and written statements of evidence (although the opponent is entitled to ask that the witness be called). 7.14 Some legislation takes a more radical step and allows documents to prove themselves. For example, in South Australia, documents that are ‘apparently genuine’ can be acted upon without more, in exception to the hearsay rule, and courts are left to draw from them what inferences they consider appropriate.41 In the case of documents purporting to contain electronic communications under the uniform legislation and in South Australia, the stated nature, authorship and time of sending and receiving the communication is presumed (in the absence of evidence sufficient to raise doubt).42 Although ss 58 and 183 of the Uniform Acts permit courts to examine documents and draw from them inferences that appear reasonable in the circumstances, courts may be reluctant to use these provisions either to authenticate documents43 or to find satisfied other statutory requirements for the admissibility of documents.44

As mentioned above, the Uniform Evidence Acts contain in Pt 4.6 Div 1 procedural safeguards against courts too easily accepting the authenticity or admissibility of documents. In a case where documentary evidence is to be tendered under s 167, a party may reasonably request an opponent to produce documents for inspection and examination before trial, answer before trial requests for information relating to a document’s authenticity, and request the opponent to call an available authenticating witness at trial.45 In addition, s 193 gives the court extensive powers to order the discovery, production and exchange of documents and evidence before and at trial. These procedural safeguards are the necessary corollary to a legislative scheme seeking [page 717] to relax authentication and admissibility requirements but at the same time seeking to ensure that the reliability of authentication and admissibility can be adequately probed by opponents. The provisions in the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) relating to documents and their proof apply in all Australian courts where certain Commonwealth records are tendered (s 182), and other provisions applicable in all Australian courts ease authentication requirements for other documents within the Commonwealth’s constitutional power (s 5).

Tender of original 7.15 If sufficiently relevant, and with evidence from which authentication is reasonably open before the court, documents may be tendered and their admissible contents used to establish facts in issue. But at common law, to avoid unreliability through tampering and distortion, only an original document so authenticated can be tendered. Admissible contents may not be disclosed in any other way, whether through tender of a copy or through oral testimony, and even questions in cross-examination may be disallowed where the answer must rely upon the content of a document not before the court.46 On the other hand, oral references may be made to the contents of a document merely for the purposes of identifying it or an object attached to it; for example, a bottle may be identified by oral testimony of the writing on its label.47 This rule is said to be part,48 and now the last remaining vestige,49 of the best evidence rule, but it has proved inconvenient and may exclude even reliable

secondary evidence of a document’s contents. For this reason, some judges have been unwilling to extend it to records which are not written — by, for example, permitting the playing of copies or the tender of a transcript of an audio recording.50 7.16 However, the majority of the High Court in Butera v DPP (Vic) took a different approach to audio recordings, holding that it is the sounds capable of reproduction [page 718] which constitute the evidence: the sounds may be reproduced from any authenticated copy of the original recording, but a transcript or oral evidence of the sounds is generally inadmissible secondary evidence of them.51 Where the recording is available, secondary evidence of its sounds is inadmissible as unnecessary. Where the recording is lost or destroyed and secondary evidence is required, that evidence should not take the form of an authenticated transcript; rather, witnesses who have heard the recording should testify to its sounds, as they can testify to any other relevant real evidence,52 and might, where necessary, refresh their memories in court from a transcript made or adopted by them at a time when the sounds were fresh in their memories. As a matter of inclusionary discretion, however, if the tape is played in court, a transcript summarising it may be shown to the jury and taken into the jury room, if this is considered by the trial judge as useful for the jury to properly comprehend the sounds and any expert interpretation of them.53 7.17 Video recordings must presumably be treated in the same way as audio recordings: the evidence consists of the sights and sounds produced by playing the recording or an authenticated copy. Disks which store electronic codings that are reproducible in documentary form can arguably also be treated in this way. After all, such codings may produce information in sounds, images or as a written document, so that in each case one might say that the evidence is whatever medium is reproduced from the coding. Authenticated copies of the codings and the information produced from them can then, by analogy to the majority reasoning in Butera, provide admissible evidence (sounds, images or writings) without breaching the secondary evidence rule.54 By

[page 719] the same token, a witness who has viewed a CCTV recording of a crime can give evidence of the contents where the recording is accidentally destroyed.55 The effect of this approach is to take electronic recordings outside the definition of ‘document’ for the purposes of the common law secondary evidence rules. Another technique for avoiding the arbitrariness of the requirement to tender the original document is to stretch the concept of an original as far as possible. An original has been held to comprise all written documents produced in the one process,56 and all copies separately executed or signed by the relevant parties;57 there is even authority for the view that an unsigned carbon copy produced instantaneously with the top copy can be regarded as an original document for the purpose of the rule.58 7.18 Indeed, judges have taken a pragmatic approach, and the rule is rife with important exceptions (mostly developed with written documents in mind). Secondary evidence of the contents of a document may be given in the following circumstances:59 1.

A notice to produce the original has been served upon the opponent but has not been complied with.60

2.

The pleadings have given the opponent in possession of the original sufficient notice that the document is material to the issues raised and will be required in court.61

3.

The original is itself a notice which has been served upon the opponent.62 [page 720]

4.

The original is in the hands of a third person who cannot be lawfully compelled through subpoena to produce it.63

5.

The original document has been lost or destroyed.64

6.

Production of the original is physically impossible — where, for example, it is an inscription on a wall.65

7.

The original is a public document and it would be inconvenient and

impractical to produce it.66 This common law exception has been taken over by statute for most practical purposes, and the contents of many public documents and registers (local and foreign) can be established through certified copies which are deemed authenticated.67 8.

The opponent has orally admitted the contents of the document in question.68

9.

In the case of reproductions of documents, legislation exists in a number of states making certified machine and photocopy documents admissible.69 Legislation also allows the use of copies of entries in books of account and bankers’ books.70 Section 57 of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) and s 73A of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA) more radically admit reproductions. The former permits the reception of a ‘reproduction’ made ‘(a) by an instantaneous process; or (b) by a process in which the contents of a document — (i) recorded by photographic, electronic or other means; or (ii) stored on a data storage device, are reproduced, whether in the same form or in some other form; or (c) in any other way’. The court, in determining whether the document accurately reproduces the original, is not bound by the rules of evidence and may act upon its own knowledge of the nature and reliability of the processes by which the reproduction was made. On request, reasons must be given if reception under this provision is refused. The Western Australian provision is to similar effect.

It is also possible to prove a person’s status as, for example, partner, tenant, and so on, without reference to the document creating that status.71 [page 721] 7.19 The uniform evidence legislation provides in s 51: The principles and rules of the common law that relate to the means of proving the contents of documents are abolished.

The best evidence rule and its requirement of tendering the original of any document is thus abolished. Rather than leaving a void, s 48(1) provides ways of adducing evidence of the contents of a document other than by tendering the document itself: (a)

adducing evidence of an admission made by another party to the proceeding as to the contents of the document in question;72

(b) tendering a document that: (i)

is or purports to be a copy of the document in question; and

(ii) has been produced, or purports to have been produced, by a device that reproduces the contents of documents;73 (c) if the document in question is an article or thing by which words are recorded in such a way as to be capable of being reproduced as sound, or in which words are recorded in a code (including shorthand writing) — tendering a document that is or purports to be a transcript of the words;74 (d) if the document in question is an article or thing on or in which information is stored in such a way that it cannot be used by the court unless a device is used to retrieve, produce or collate it — tendering a document that was or purports to have been produced by use of the device;75

[page 722] (e) tendering a document that: (i)

forms part of the records of or kept by a business (whether or not the business is still in existence);76 and

(ii) is or purports to be a copy of, or an extract from or a summary of, the document in question, or is or purports to be a copy of such an extract or summary;77 (f)

if the document in question is a public document78 — tendering a document that is or purports to be a copy of the document in question and that is or purports to have been printed: (i)

by the Government Printer or by the government or official printer of a state or territory; or

(ii) by authority of the government or administration of the Commonwealth, a state, a territory or a foreign country; or (iii) by authority of an Australian Parliament, a House of an Australian Parliament, a committee of such a House or a committee of an Australian Parliament.79

These modes of tender apply whether the original is in existence or is unavailable: s 48(2). Where the document in question is unavailable (defined in the Dictionary), s 48(4) permits evidence of the contents through tendering a copy or by adducing oral evidence of the document in question.80 Unavailability and that the copy is genuine may be established through drawing reasonable inferences from the tendered copy: s 183.81 The procedural protections of requests (s 167) and discovery (s 193) ensure that opponents are given the opportunity to dispute whether any conditions for tender have been met. Where a document is in a foreign country additional notice requirements are demanded by s 49. By abolishing the secondary evidence rule and simplifying procedures for

authentication, the uniform evidence legislation has much streamlined the proof of [page 723] documents in court. The procedural protections of requests and discovery ensure that in cases of real dispute, testimony, subject always to cross-examination, remains decisive. The testimonial basis of the system is thus preserved.

Real Evidence 7.20 Real evidence is information experienced directly by the trier of fact and not reported through the testimony of a witness. Real evidence may take various forms and will be received if of sufficient relevance and reliability. There are no special rules concerning its admissibility although, as with all evidence, it must be presented by a party in open court and thereby be subject to examination and comment from opponents. The major problem with real evidence is determining its relevance and reliability, and this must generally be established through oral testimony. A subsidiary problem arises where the trier of fact is left to examine real evidence itself without the safeguard of party comment, a situation which may occur where the court embarks upon views or demonstrations or examines tendered objects (exhibits) after the parties have closed their cases and addressed on the evidence. These problems can be illustrated by a consideration of some forms of real evidence. The uniform legislation expressly provides in s 52 that it is not intended to affect the operation of existing Australian law so far as it permits real evidence to be adduced.82 Another problem that commonly arises in relation to real evidence is the propriety of its collection, particularly by the police on behalf of their public prosecutors. As police powers to search premises and to collect bodily samples are increased by statute so are these powers circumscribed by strict procedures designed to protect the interests of suspects. Where these procedures are not adhered to, the evidence may be excluded in exercise of the courts’ discretion. The principles for discretionary exclusion on grounds of impropriety are introduced at 2.36–2.37 and discussed in more detail at 5.255ff and 8.143ff. These principles will not be pursued in this context.

7.21 Objects tendered as exhibits are the simplest form of real evidence: the murder weapon, the goods alleged defective, a copy of a designer hand bag, and so on. Such objects have no relevance in themselves and their connection with the material facts will have to be established through witnesses testifying where and when the weapon was found, the goods were delivered, and so on. Once they have been tendered (as exhibits), the trier may be equipped to draw the appropriate inferences upon their examination. Exhibits can, with the permission of the court,83 be taken into the jury room for this purpose. But this creates a risk that the object will be examined in a way not [page 724] commented upon by the parties. For example, in Kozul v R,84 the jury was invited by the judge to conduct various experiments upon a gun used to kill the victim, in order to ascertain what trigger pressure was required to discharge it. In the circumstances, it was held that the experiments did not go beyond the parties’ evidence and argument. But the case illustrates the potential problem as there was no indication of whether the gun, and particularly the trigger, was in the same condition as when fired or examined by forensic technicians. Where there is a risk of unauthorised experiment or other prejudice the judge has a discretion to refuse to allow the jury to take an exhibit into the jury room.85 Where legislation permits a video record of evidence taken at a preliminary proceeding or at a formally held interview to constitute the witness’s testimony at a later trial before a jury (as, for example, in the case of young children and vulnerable witnesses or where testimony has been given in prior proceedings),86 if a jury requests that the video be replayed, this should presumptively be done in open court and subject to clear direction to ensure that the evidence does not receive undue weight. The video recording is akin to oral testimony and is not simply an exhibit to be taken into the jury room and replayed at will. But where this is permitted, the question remains whether allowing the jury access to the record may have caused a miscarriage of justice, taking account of the importance of the testimony and the directions given in respect of it, so the general presumption is far from absolute.87 7.22 It may not, however, be possible to bring the real evidence into court, and it may be more convenient for the court to be taken to it, upon what is

known as a ‘view of either a location or an object’. As the general rule is that it is left to the parties to present and comment upon evidence, a view should be taken at the request of and in the presence of the parties, who should have a full opportunity of explaining the significance of it. The accused should have the opportunity to attend a view but not be compelled to attend.88 The problem that arises where the trier is taken on a view is the risk that he or she may act upon a perception of the scene or object that has not been alluded to or commented upon by the parties. For this reason, it is often said that views are taken only to enable the trier of fact to follow the evidence, and cannot be [page 725] used in place of evidence.89 This should be understood in the light of the principles of party presentation of, and comment upon, evidence, and does not stand for the conclusion that views can never constitute tendered evidence. An emphasis of these principles has led appellate courts to condone views taken by judges in the absence of the parties where a view has added nothing beyond matters alluded to by the parties in court.90 Other courts are more wary of giving apparent sanction to such a practice.91 7.23 Mere views of a static environment or object are to be distinguished from demonstrations, where an active reconstruction of the incident in issue is attempted.92 The active demonstration has a further dimension of reliability, and only assumes relevance if the re-enactment is sufficiently equivalent to the original event. This equivalence may be assumed where the parties agree to the demonstration,93 but in principle, a party should be able to tender a demonstration where, first, sufficient equivalence can be shown,94 and secondly, there is minimal risk that the trier will act upon information not alluded to by the parties or be otherwise prejudiced. The uniform legislation provides in s 53(1) that: ‘A judge may, on application,95 order that a demonstration, experiment or inspection be held’.96 From any demonstration, experiment or inspection, s 54 allows ‘any reasonable inference’ to be drawn.97 Before [page 726]

granting an application, s 53(2) requires a judge to be satisfied that the parties have a reasonable opportunity to be present and that the judge and any jury will be present. In deciding whether to grant the application under s 53(3),98 the judge may take into account whether the parties are able to attend; whether granting the application will assist the court in resolving any issues of fact or understanding evidence; whether there is a danger of the court being misled, confused or wasting time; whether a demonstration is an adequate reproduction; and, in the case of an inspection, whether there have been any material alterations to the site.99 Section 53(4) prohibits a court or jury from undertaking its own research, conducting experiments, or returning independently to examine a crime scene during the course of its deliberations.100 Evans v R101 (discussed further at 2.23) decides that ss 53 and 54 do not apply to in-court ‘demonstrations’, the references in s 53 to exhibits and the requirements relating to the presence of parties and court making this clear. In Evans, the accused was required in court, over objection, to don a balaclava and overalls — found at his house and similar to those used in an armed robbery — as well as a pair of sunglasses produced by the prosecutor. He was also required, again over objection, to walk in front of the jury and rehearse certain phrases allegedly spoken during the armed robbery. While the relevance and admissibility of this evidence was somewhat controversial (see discussion at 2.23) the court agreed it fell outside s 53 as it was presented in court. Furthermore, Heydon J did not regard the accused’s doing of any of these things as demonstrations: They did not involve [the accused] demonstrating anything about what happened; they simply involved him revealing particular features of his appearance, gait and pronunciation, as revealed in sentences similar to those the offender was said to have uttered … they were not ‘demonstrations’ designed, in the language of s 53(3)(d), to ‘reproduce the conduct or event to be demonstrated’.102

[page 727] 7.24 Where it is impossible or impractical to experience an object or event firsthand through a view or demonstration, a party may seek to tender a video or audio record (photograph, film, video and audio recording etc) of the object or event, in addition to eyewitness testimony. Such evidence can be admitted at common law if supported by appropriate testimony of the circumstances in which the recording was made (including identification of the participants where necessary), the nature and reliability of the recording device (and any device used

to play the recording to the court), and testimony of the correct use of any devices employed.103 The common law evidential presumption of the accuracy of scientific instruments104 may apply to cameras and other recording and playing devices, but the practical reality is that, in cases where recordings have been tendered (historically commonly audio recordings), the accuracy of the device has not been put in issue. The controversial links in the chain of reliability are more likely to concern the circumstances of the recording and the techniques employed to produce the end result (for with — and often without — technical manipulation, recording devices can deceive).105 The more sophisticated the nature of the record, the more room there is for controversy, and the greater the need for authenticating testimony (often of an expert kind).106 Photographs, for example, are often admitted as a matter of course;107 and, as for audio recordings, the most controversial issue has been whether transcripts may be tendered.108 [page 728] Under the uniform evidence legislation, photographs, films, video and audio recordings and all other records of information are within the definition of documents, so that their tender is governed by the provisions discussed at 7.5–7.19. 7.25 It has been assumed in the examples of real evidence discussed so far that the trier of fact is able to draw the appropriate inferences without assistance. With much real evidence this may be so, but in some cases expert assistance will be required to explain the information and background knowledge necessary to draw appropriate inferences.109 Increasingly, analysis takes place with the assistance of machines and computers, and it is their results that are tendered to the court. Machines are now available to analyse breath, blood, urine and, through spectrographic analysis, virtually any physical substance. The admissibility of these results is essentially a matter of reliability, but as the links in the chain of reliability increase, so it becomes more important to ensure that oral testimony exists to explain the limits of the analysis.110 Testimony must explain the circumstances in which the sample was collected and given to the expert for analysis;111 the way in which the analysis was carried out through use of the machine or computer; and the nature and reliability of the program directing the machine or computer.112 The presumption of accuracy is of little

assistance in these circumstances, operating only to presume the accuracy of machines well understood or notoriously accurate.113 As machines become increasingly sophisticated and variable, courts are reluctant to assume their reliability without expert assistance, which must generally be given orally to the court. In the case of breathalyser instruments (to which courts [page 729] had refused to apply the presumption of accuracy),114 legislation provides an automatic procedure for verification of accuracy.115 7.26 More general provisions now exist to enable the authentication of output from computers and other devices.116 While one approach is to permit authentication at first instance through the certificate or affidavit of a person responsible for the computer or device, making that certificate or affidavit admissible evidence (Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 95),117 under s 56 of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) and in the jurisdictions party to the uniform legislation, ss 146 and 147, it is simply provided that a document or thing produced by a device or process asserted by the tendering party to produce that particular outcome is admissible, in the absence of evidence to the contrary sufficient to raise doubt, if the device or process properly used will ordinarily produce that outcome. The Uniform Acts facilitate proof of such matters when required through the service of affidavits and procedures for requests (Pt 4.6 Div 1) and discovery (s 193). An opponent may request discovery of any document or thing so that it may be adequately examined and tested before trial and insist that a party call at trial witnesses ‘concerned in the production or maintenance of a specified document or thing’. These provisions recognise that, on the one hand, real evidence should be capable of speedy authentication where reliable, while on the other hand, opponents should be entitled to put authentication to the test in appropriate cases. This requires advance notice of the evidence and its analysis, opportunities for opponents to carry out their own analysis where possible, and of course, an opportunity to cross-examine all authenticating witnesses at trial. Ultimately, the authentication and reliability of all real evidence is most appropriately determined through an examination of the human beings involved in its collection and creation. In this sense human testimony lies at the heart of

the common law adversary trial. To the presentation of evidence in this form we must now turn. [page 730]

Testimonial Evidence Outline 7.27 At common law witnesses testify orally from memory upon oath. All witnesses are called by one party, examined in-chief, and are then available for cross-examination by all other parties to the proceedings.118 Witnesses must testify to facts observed by them and otherwise experienced through their senses, not reports of facts experienced by others. Nor may they give opinions about or relating to the inferences that may be drawn from facts experienced by them or others. The requirement that eyewitnesses orally report their sensory experiences directly to court gives rise to the rule prohibiting the reception of hearsay and so will be dealt with in the next chapter. The aspects of the presentation of testimony which are dealt with here are as follows: witnesses testify upon oath; witnesses testify to facts, not opinions; witnesses testify orally from memory; prior out-of-court statements by witnesses are inadmissible; witnesses testify through being examined in-chief and cross-examined.

Witnesses testify upon oath Testimonial formalities 7.28 Some formality is still thought to be generally required for the giving of oral testimony in order to emphasise the solemnity of the occasion, the importance of testifying truthfully, and to provide a basis for punishment in the event of falsehood. In addition, by ensuring that the witness understands the obligation of testifying truthfully, the formality provides some standard against which to measure the competence of the witnesses to testify at all.119

The original common law formality was an oath sworn upon the gospels. In 1744, this was extended to include any oath making reference to divine sanction and binding upon the witness’s conscience.120 To provide flexibility in the required formalities [page 731] while still providing some measure for competence, the position is now governed by legislation in each Australian jurisdiction.121 The general evolution of legislative reform has been towards simply reducing the required formalities. At first, particular witnesses and then witnesses generally who, although understanding the obligations of the oath, could establish that they sincerely objected to taking it, were permitted to make instead a solemn promise (affirmation). The legislation permitting affirmation in Queensland arguably remains in this form.122 But the legislation in most jurisdictions now simply permits a witness to choose whether to testify by taking an oath or making a solemn affirmation.123 The grounds for the choice are of no significance. Furthermore, the religious beliefs (if any) of the witness do not affect the validity of any oath taken.124 And now that the form of the oath requires no reference to God or any particular belief, the distinction between swearing and affirming is tenuous. But, in addition, in all jurisdictions, witnesses can sometimes give testimony without formality as unsworn testimony. This legislation (which at first only applied to children but in the legislation dealt with in this section extends to witnesses generally) was originally enacted at a time when a witness could not affirm unless able to reject in conscience the obligation of the oath. To deal with the situation where a person could not understand the oath at all, the legislation originally enacted permitted unsworn testimony. But with witnesses now able, effectively, to simply choose to testify on oath or affirm, the need for unsworn evidence only arises where the witness does not understand the [page 732]

obligation of the affirmation (rather than the obligation of the oath);125 that is, is not able to appreciate the solemnity of the occasion, and the legal and moral responsibility to tell the truth when testifying publicly in a court over and above the ordinary social duty to be truthful.126 The uniform legislation provides in s 21 that sworn evidence may be given on oath or affirmation and in s 13(3): A person who is competent to give evidence about a fact is not competent to give sworn evidence about the fact if the person does not have the capacity to understand that, in giving evidence, he or she is under an obligation to give truthful evidence.127

7.29 But allowing a witness to testify without understanding of any formality raises the issue of whether there should be some other preliminary test to ensure the competence of the witness. Thus, some state legislation128 expressly requires the witness also to understand the duty to tell the truth and the liability to punishment if evidence is false before being permitted to give unsworn testimony, and such an understanding has been implied into the South Australian Act.129 However, a different approach is taken in Queensland by the Evidence Act 1977. While s 9 presumes all persons competent to testify, s 9A provides that if a party or the court raises the issue of a witness’s competency it must be established to the satisfaction of the court that the witness is able to give an intelligible account of relevant events experienced or observed. Section 9B then provides that if the court is satisfied that the witness does not understand the obligations of the solemn affirmation, then, having explained to the witness that giving evidence is a serious matter and that the obligation to tell the truth is over and above the ordinary duty to tell the truth, whether or not he or she understands this explanation, the witness being otherwise competent the judge must receive the testimony unsworn. The inquiry thus shifts from the witness’s understanding about truth and lies and duties to be truthful, to the witness’s sufficient intelligence to give reliable evidence.130 [page 733] 7.30 It is this latter approach that has been brought to the forefront of the competency requirements under the uniform legislation.131 Thus, s 13(1) and (2) provide: (1) A person is not competent to give evidence about a fact if, for any reason (including a mental, intellectual or physical disability):132

(a)

the person does not have the capacity to understand a question about the fact; or

(b) the person does not have the capacity to give an answer that can be understood to a question about the fact; and that incapacity cannot be overcome. (2) A person who, because of subsection (1), is not competent to give evidence about a fact may be competent to give evidence about other facts.

As a consequence, however the witness testifies — on oath, by affirmation or through unsworn testimony — the witness must be of sufficient capacity to testify;133 not merely to testify generally, but to testify about the particular facts to which that competency relates134 — this capacity being presumed under s 13(6) until the contrary is established on the balance of probabilities.135 Section 13 proceeds to explain the circumstances where a witness can give sworn testimony (on oath or by affirmation) — where the witness has ‘the capacity to understand that in giving evidence, he or she is under an obligation to give truthful evidence’ (s 13(3)) — or unsworn evidence, s 13(5) providing: [page 734] (5) A person who, because of subsection (3), is not competent to give sworn evidence is competent to give unsworn evidence if the court has told the person:136 (a)

that it is important to tell the truth, and

(b) that he or she may be asked questions that he or she does not know, or cannot remember, the answer to, and that he or she should tell the court if this occurs, and (c) that he or she may be asked questions that suggest certain statements are true or untrue and that he or she should agree with the statements that he or she believes are true and should feel no pressure to agree with statements that he or she believes are untrue.

Unsworn testimony is not admissible unless received in satisfaction of the applicable legislation, and its reception at trial in breach will generally be a fundamental error that cannot be saved through applying the proviso.137 Satisfaction of the legislative conditions is determined on the voir dire.138 Authority, and s 189(4) of the uniform legislation, favours this inquiry presumptively taking place in the absence of the jury,139 [page 735]

although some judges advocate that where the matters to be elicited are relevant to the witness’s credibility, the jury should be present.140 In deciding competence to testify, expert evidence may be received,141 the uniform (and South Australian)142 legislation also providing in s 13(8) that the court in determining competence may inform itself as it thinks fit.

The testimony of children and other vulnerable witnesses 7.31 With the requirement of competence to testify without being sworn now defined in every jurisdiction other than South Australia and Western Australia in terms of the witness’s capacity to give an intelligible account of experiences, there is no need for special provisions relating to children. And whilst South Australia and Western Australia retain a requirement that the witness understand the obligation to be truthful before unsworn testimony is permitted, in Western Australia143 in the case of children under 12 and mentally impaired witnesses this requirement is removed in favour of a capacity to give an intelligible account.144 This test is wide enough to encompass the whole question of the cognitive development of the witness and expert evidence can be given about this.145 Originally legislation permitting children to give unsworn testimony also required its corroboration, but accepting criticism that such a requirement discriminates against the testimony of children and unreasonably frustrates the conviction of the guilty, the requirement has been abolished in all Australian jurisdictions: see 4.4, 4.14. Furthermore, legislation in most jurisdictions expressly forbids judges from giving any corroboration warnings in respect of testimony on the ground that the witness is a child.146 However, this legislation allows a judge to warn a jury about particular circumstances that may make the testimony of a specific child unreliable and, where these are significant matters that may not have been fully appreciated by the jury, warning may be required to avoid a miscarriage of justice: see 4.20–4.21. [page 736] 7.32 There are strong arguments for not requiring a child (or indeed any witness) to understand the moral duty to tell the truth before being permitted to testify. Such a requirement may result in the exclusion of reliable testimony. In principle, relevant evidence should be maximised and the trier of fact left to

decide whether to act upon it. Formal requirements should not be allowed to stand in the way of the receipt of sufficiently reliable testimony, particularly where there may be no other evidence available and crimes will otherwise go unpunished. There is no necessary connection between a witness’s understanding of some moral duty to tell the truth and the reliability of the testimony the witness can give. And in practice it is very difficult for a trial judge to conduct any meaningful inquiry about a child’s understanding of moral concepts.147 This argument is made in the knowledge of a maturing psychological research literature suggesting that, in certain circumstances, the evidence of even very young children148 is sufficiently reliable to be received and sometimes acted upon.149 And, reliability can be further enhanced through the modification of the procedures under which the child’s testimony is elicited, to avoid the formal and rigorous courtroom confrontation between the mere child and the accused and counsel. Without denying the accused the right to cross-examine accusing witnesses, children might be questioned more sympathetically in more convivial surroundings either directly, linked to the court by video, or indirectly, through a video recording of their testimony.150 Certainly these approaches accord with the arguments in Chapter 1 that [page 737] the adversary procedure should seek its justification in the maximisation of evidence in the individual case. If modifications to existing procedures can achieve this then there are strong grounds for putting them into effect. 7.33 Similar arguments apply in the case of other witnesses who may have difficulty in dealing with the formal and confronting process of examination and cross-examination demanded by the common law adversarial trial, particularly in criminal proceedings. Complainants of sexual assault and other crimes against the person, including organised crime, must endure confrontation with the accused when testifying and other witnesses may be vulnerable to the pressures of responding coherently and rationally, not only on account of their young age but because of physical disability or cognitive impairment. As a consequence, and seeking a process to protect witnesses and encourage rational and accurate testimony, in all jurisdictions legislation empowers the court to make alternative

arrangements for the tender of testimony by such persons at trial.151 The legislation is not uniform (often within as well as between jurisdictions) in either scope or content. At the most basic level, legislation exists to simply give the court a wide discretion to permit appropriate alternative arrangements for any witness in any proceedings to protect the witness from embarrassment or distress or intimidation or where the witness is unable because of disability, age or culture to give evidence satisfactorily in the normal manner.152 But other provisions are more focused. For example, in South [page 738] Australia, s 13A demands, where application is made, that alternative arrangements be made in all criminal proceedings where a ‘vulnerable witness’153 testifies, at the same time extending the alternative options (most significantly to audio video recordings). In Victoria, alternative arrangements can only be made for witnesses in sexual assault or family violence proceedings with particular arrangements demanded in respect of complainants who testify: Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) Ch 8 Div 4. In general terms, alternative arrangements include doing away with wigs and gowns and having participants seated in a less formal setting, allowing the witness the support of parent or friend or communication assistant (including toy or pet) while testifying, screening the accused from the witness, and having the witness testify by video-link (CCTV) away from the more threatening surroundings of the court. To ensure these procedures do not affect the fairness of the trial the accused remains entitled at all times to see and hear the witness while testifying and entitled to cross-examine the witness — though not necessarily in person and subject to limits related to the vulnerability of the particular witness.154 In addition, any jury must be directed to draw no adverse inference against the accused or adverse to the witness where other than the normal procedures are used.155 7.34 But in most jurisdictions the legislation extends further to permit the tender of the testimony of children and other ‘vulnerable’ (or ‘special’ or ‘protected’ or ‘cognitively impaired’) witnesses as an audio video record made in a preliminary proceeding, again

[page 739] modified to protect the witness but ensuring the full participation of the defence. Thus in South Australia, s 12AB permits a party to a trial for a serious offence to seek a preliminary proceeding at which, with the participation of the accused but with appropriate alternative arrangements, a young child or a person with a disability can testify, and an audio video record be taken to constitute that witness’s evidence at the subsequent trial: s 13BA. A similar process is available in Western Australia in trials for specified offences for taking the testimony of children (Evidence Act 1906 ss 106I–106M) and of special witnesses (s 106RA); and in Tasmania (Evidence (Children and Special Witnesses) Act 2001 ss 6, 6A, 8(2)(b)(iib)), in respect of the testimony of a child or a special witness. At its most extreme this procedure entails the witness being examined, cross-examined and re-examined at the preliminary proceeding so that at the trial the testimony can simply be presented as an audio video record (with provision being made for the witness to be recalled with leave). In Victoria, the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Pt 8.2 Div 6) provides for a compulsory preliminary proceeding comprising examination, cross-examination and re-examination of the witness, but only in the case of children and cognitively impaired witnesses who are complainants to charges for sexual offences. Further examination and cross-examination cannot take place at trial without leave. A similar procedure permitted under s 21B of the Evidence Act 1939 (NT) is not restricted to complainants but applies only to cases of sexual or serious violence offences. In Queensland, under the Evidence Act 1977, a similar procedure is enacted and demanded for children who are witnesses in a relevant proceeding: Pt 2 Div 4A Subdivs 1 and 3. Orders for the recording of the testimony of ‘special witnesses’ generally can also be made by the court: s 21A(2)(e). It might be noted in passing that where the testimony of a child or vulnerable witness has not been prerecorded and is given orally at trial, that oral testimony may be recorded so that, to avoid distress through recalling a child, victim or vulnerable witness, if a retrial is ordered the testimony may or must be tendered as a video record or other transcript.156 But legislation, for example s 13BA of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) and ss 106HA–106HC of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA), now extends further, permitting the prosecution to tender at trial an audio video record that the police

are required to make of any interview of a young child or vulnerable/mentally impaired witness [page 740] held as part of their investigation. The conditions for this interview are prescribed by regulation to ensure the witness has appropriate support and that the interviewer is appropriately qualified to undertake the task. The recorded interview is then admissible at trial, specified in Western Australia to constitute the witness’s testimony in-chief. The accused does not participate in this interview so the witness must be available at trial to be further examined, crossexamined and re-examined (although leave may be required). Part 8.2 Div 5 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) similarly permits in sexual offence and assault cases the tender of the audio visual record of an interview (in a prescribed form) of a child or a cognitively impaired witness with a qualified person.157 This interview is also declared to constitute the witness’s evidence-in-chief but the witness must be available to be cross-examined and re-examined. Of similar scope are provisions in Ch 6 Pt 6 Divs 1–3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), s 21B(2)(a) of the Evidence Act 1939 (NT) (‘recorded statement’ by ‘vulnerable witness’; terms defined in s 21A(1)), Pt 4.2.2A of the Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (ACT), and Pt 1AD Div 5 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). Sections 5 and 8(2)(b)(iia) of the Evidence (Children and Special Witnesses) Act 2001 (Tas) go further to admit any prior statement however recorded of a child or special witness as long as the witness is available to testify at trial. To similar effect is s 93A of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld).158 In South Australia, s 34LA of the Evidence Act 1929 admits prior statements (not made as part of a formal interviewing process) of a victim of a sexual offence, provided the victim is not to be called at trial because at the time the statement was made the person was a ‘young child’ or ‘a person with a disability that adversely affects the person’s capacity to give a coherent account of the person’s experiences or to respond rationally to questions’, and further, provided the judge ‘is of the opinion that the evidence has sufficient probative value to justify its admission’.159 Section 26E(1) of the Evidence Act 1939 (NT) creates a more general exception to the hearsay rule in admitting ‘[i]n a proceeding arising from

a charge of a sexual offence or a serious violence offence … evidence of a statement made by a child to another person as evidence of facts in issue if the Court considers the evidence of sufficient probative value to justify its admission’. An accused cannot be convicted solely upon the basis [page 741] of such evidence (s 26E(3)) but contemporaneity is just one factor in determining sufficient probative value (the purpose and scope of this section are extensively discussed in MLB v R160). These last provisions admitting prior statements of children and vulnerable witnesses create radical exceptions to the hearsay rule, justified by the desirability of obtaining statements from witnesses at a time closer to the events in question when the memory is fresh and safeguarded by the requirement that the witness be available for cross-examination at trial. The intention is to increase the quantity of evidence put before the court in cases where such evidence is often difficult to find.161 But it is one thing to admit a prescribed interview with a qualified person and another to admit other prior statements, especially if, as in South Australia, the witness is not available to be cross-examined at trial (despite strict requirements to warn the jury that the reliability of the statements have not been tested by cross-examination and to treat these statements with the care demanded by the circumstances of their making).162 Furthermore, by creating hearsay exceptions for particular witnesses the question arises whether the exceptions should rather be part of more general reform. This is achieved in the uniform legislation by s 66, which, in criminal proceedings, admits the prior statements of all available witnesses made at a time when the events were fresh in the witness’s memory (see, for example, at 7.102); and in criminal proceedings where witnesses are not available their statements are admissible if first-hand hearsay in the circumstances specified in s 65: discussed generally at 8.195–8.198. State legislation enacting more general hearsay reforms in criminal proceedings where witnesses are unavailable include s 93B of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) and ss 34KA–34KD of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) (these provisions are discussed at 8.181).

Formalities and competency

7.35 Unlike the uniform legislation (discussed at 7.30), the common law developed no formal test of competency beyond the ability to understand the oath. This informal test was extended by that legislation (referred to above) requiring the witness to at least demonstrate an understanding of the moral duty to tell the truth. At common law, there is, strictly, no further test of a witness’s psychological [page 742] or physical competence, such as his or her capacity to understand questions and to answer rationally.163 Generally these are matters that go only to the credibility of the witness, with an appropriate direction in criminal cases where judge sits with a jury.164 Exceptionally, this lack of understanding might provide grounds for arguing that a verdict is unsafe.165 It seems that, at common law, exceptionally a witness may be so unable to respond to questions, through mental incompetence or derangement,166 or for physical reasons,167 that the witness will be held incompetent to testify. And in criminal cases the trial judge always has a discretion not to receive evidence which might act unfairly against an accused, and may exceptionally use this power to exclude testimony which carries too high a risk of being given more probative value than that of which it is capable. This power was exercised in R v Horsfall168 to render incompetent the child-complainant where, following the alleged assault, she had undergone hypnotherapy which, in the judge’s opinion, created too great a risk of unreliability through suggestion for her testimony to be put before the jury.169 Where a witness is able to communicate effectively only through an interpreter or other communications assistant, this is now legislatively required,170 but an accused has a common law right to a competent interpreter in order to ensure the fairness of [page 743] the trial.171 Employment of an interpreter may justify an adverse comment by

counsel or judge as to its effect in determining the witness’s credibility: Tsang v DPP (Cth).172

Formalities and credit 7.36 In determining the credibility of the witness, given that a witness can choose whether to take the oath or affirm, no distinction can be drawn between testimony given on oath and testimony on affirmation, although the reasons for affirmation may be adverted to in cross-examination (if the judge does not intervene). Some legislation allowing testimony to be given without formality expressly provides that the credibility given ought to be that attached to evidence given without the sanction of oath.173 That the taking of an oath is a better guarantee of reliability than affirmation or testimony given informally is a highly doubtful proposition.174 However testimony is given, it is always open to crossexamination, and credibility is better determined upon the merits of the testimony given, not the way in which the witness promises to testify truthfully. Even if the oath is for some witnesses the appropriate way of indicating the promise of truthfulness and should for that reason be retained, there are other ways of promising and of testifying reliably and these should not be discriminated against. The common law only permits testimony on oath, so one must look to the legislation permitting other forms of testifying and whether distinctions are to be drawn between them: see discussion at 7.28–7.30 above. The High Court in R v GW175 was clear in deciding that the uniform legislation draws no distinction between the reliability of testimony on the basis of whether it is sworn (oath/affirmation) or unsworn. The common law requirement of testifying on oath has therefore been considerably undermined by legislation.

Witnesses testify to facts, not opinions The rule and its rationale 7.37 The question of the admissibility of opinion evidence raises issues fundamental to the law of evidence. As emphasised in Chapter 1, triers of fact are charged with [page 744]

discovering those material facts and events that give rise to legal remedy. As those facts and events can but rarely be experienced directly by the trier of fact, they must be reconstructed from their ‘traces’.176 The theory of the common law trial is that those traces — physical remnants and the experiences and recollections of witnesses — are presented to the court by the parties, and from this evidence and this evidence alone, the material facts and events are reconstructed; inferred, by the trier of fact employing his or her general knowledge and experience of the world. It is not for others, and particularly not for witnesses, to draw inferences from the evidence, to suggest what knowledge of the world should be employed as a basis for drawing inferences, or to suggest how evidence should be combined to determine the existence or nonexistence of facts in dispute. To permit parties to call witnesses to give their opinions on the crucial inferences in the case would lead to usurpation of the trier’s function, as witnesses of prestige and apparent expertise would be called to present their authoritative, and potentially influential, inferential views. The theory is that these difficult and controversial epistemological issues are entirely the province of the trier of fact. In this sense witnesses are, at common law, prohibited from testifying about their opinions. The exclusionary rule thereby defines the respective roles of witnesses and triers of fact in the common law adversary trial. 7.38 Section 76 of the uniform evidence legislation reflects this common law approach. It provides (in language covering the field) that: Evidence of an opinion is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed.

It provides no definitions of facts and opinions but gives two simple examples of the operation of the exclusionary rule: one cannot prove that a surgeon carried out an operation negligently by adducing a lay opinion to that effect (rather, unless there are exceptions to the rule,177 one must adduce evidence of the operation itself and simply ask the trier of fact to infer negligence from this evidence); again, one cannot prove that electrical work was performed unsatisfactorily by proffering an opinion that the electrician did not possess the requisite skills (a lay witness could testify about what [page 745] he or she observed and again, in the absence of any exception to the general rule,

the trier of fact would be left to its own knowledge and experience to draw inferences about the sufficiency of the electrician’s performance). The approach of the Australian Law Reform Commission,178 firmly based as it is upon the common law, accepts that opinion means the drawing of inference from observed facts, and subsequent cases have so interpreted the prohibition in s 76.179 As a consequence, as at common law, s 76 prohibits the calling of a witness to testify whether or not an inference should be drawn. Thus, in Smith v R,180 Kirby J held that the testimony of a witness identifying as the accused a person photographed on a security camera was evidence of opinion and inadmissible under s 76. But, as even a cursory examination of the examples relating to s 76 reveals, to apply a blanket prohibition against a witness being called to testify to inferences will often leave a lay trier to draw inferences based upon very little relevant knowledge and experience of the matter under consideration. So that if the very evidential process is to work there must be exceptions to the rule. These exist at common law and are enacted in ss 77–79 of the uniform legislation. As the discussion that follows demonstrates, these exceptions achieve very similar ends.

Observational inferences 7.39 The first problem with the analysis that produces the general exclusionary rule is the practical distinction between the sensory impressions or primary trace [page 746] (fact) and the inference(s) drawn from them (opinion).181 In the case of physical traces — to the extent that they are preserved — experienced directly by the trier there is no need for the trier formally to distinguish facts and inferences. But if the distinction is required of observational testimony it can be appreciated that the observations of witnesses, as they must be reported to the court, are in every case an inextricable admixture of sensory impressions (the primary experiences, always subject to a range of vulnerabilities) and the inferences drawn from them. If witnesses were automatons that could report their each and every sense impression to the court, it might be possible to eliminate epistemological

decisions by witnesses (and metaphysics) altogether. But they are not, and witnesses must report their observations through a conceptual medium, circumscribed by language, which necessitates drawing epistemological inferences (opinions) from sense impressions (facts). Where a witness reports having observed a car, the witness reports that, from those sense impressions experienced, he or she drew the inference that the object observed was what is classified in the English language as ‘a car’.182 When a witness identifies the person involved in the incident as the accused, the witness reports that, from those sense impressions of the culprit experienced at the time of the incident and those experienced on later seeing the accused, the necessary epistemological inferences can be drawn to conclude the persons one and the same.183 It would be counter-productive in many cases for the law to insist upon witnesses reporting, or attempting to report, observations in the form of primary sense impressions. Human beings just do not, and cannot, operate in this cognitive way.184 Such testimony would be quite alien to the witness’s normal mode of reporting observations. It would be time-consuming and confusing. Consequently, the common law allows witnesses testifying to observations considerable latitude in drawing inferences from their primary sense impressions. [page 747] Lord MacDermott LCJ in Sherrard v Jacob185 gives examples of various matters that can be compendiously reported to the court:186 (1) the identification of handwriting, persons and things; (2) apparent age; (3) the bodily plight or condition of a person, including death and illness; (4) the emotional state of a person — eg whether distressed, angry, aggressive, affectionate or depressed; (5) the condition of things — eg worn, shabby, used or new; (6) certain questions of value; and (7) estimates of speed and distance.

It is impossible to define the limits of this latitude. In practical terms, the parties to the case will generally not want testimony dissected into facts experienced and the inferences drawn from them. A dissection will only be pursued if the witness’s process of inference is open to challenge. And in many cases it will be enough to pursue this through cross-examination. But when can a party insist at common law that a witness not draw a particular observational inference? 7.40 A number of considerations arise when imposing limits to observational inferences. Most fundamentally, a party can object whenever the witness is able

to give an accurate and sensible observational report without drawing the inference in question. But there are situations where, although a witness could distinguish sense impressions and inferences, the trier can only be assisted by the opinion of the on-the-spot witness about what inference to appropriately draw. For example, if the issue is a person’s capacity to drive at a particular time, although a witness could describe the experience without drawing that inference (for example, saw a person drinking beer for several hours at a bar, heard their slurred speech, observed their difficulty walking in a straight line and struggling to open a car door with a key), one might argue that the witness is the person best placed to draw the inference of capacity. In other words, one might conceptualise this as a situation where the witness has a helpful opinion to offer to the court. Taking this a step further, it can be argued that inferences should always be able to be drawn by an observational witness in a better position than the court to draw the appropriate inferences. If then, specialised knowledge based on training, study or experience (or expertise at common law) is relied upon to justify a witness drawing such inferences, the observing witness will have to be shown to have the requisite knowledge or expertise before so testifying. In the simplest case, a witness seeking to identify handwriting (where there is no comparable sample before the court) may have to show considerable familiarity with the known handwriting before any inference of identity can have probative value.187 Or, where a witness seeks to identify [page 748] a person in a photograph or the person speaking on a voice recording it will have to be shown that the witness has some experience beyond that of the trier of fact that makes his or her opinion relevant and of assistance.188 A witness seeking to identify a particular drug may have to show expertise in chemistry gained through experience or formal qualification.189 A witness describing a person’s injuries in any detail will have to demonstrate medical expertise. A witness testifying that DNA profiles ‘match’ and opining about the significance will have to establish an expertise (whether in biology or statistics) that enables such a conclusion to be drawn.190 And so on. The degree of expertise is dependent upon the nature of the observations and inferences being reported to the court.191 In some cases, while a lay witness may be able to offer

[page 749] an opinion based upon observations or experience, an expert may be able to give a more comprehensive opinion.192 The first general conclusion we can draw is that, at common law, where the very process of reporting observations involves epistemological inferences that cannot be practically separated from primary sense impressions, this compendium may be received as observational testimony. This enables witnesses to give testimony-in-chief in a natural and non-confusing way, and opponents can always seek to dissect observational testimony into its constituent elements through cross-examination. Only where there is a clear and distinct division between primary sense impressions and consequent inferences, or expertise is required to make observations or to draw inferences, are courts likely to restrict the reports of observing witnesses. 7.41 It is this same approach that underlies the exception to the opinion rule enacted in s 78 of the Uniform Acts: The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion expressed by a person if: (a)

the opinion is based on what the witness saw, heard or otherwise perceived about a matter or event; and

(b) evidence of the opinion is necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of the person’s perception of the matter or event.

The requirement that the opinion be based on what the witness perceived about a matter or event is fundamental to this exception.193 The exception exists to enable observational witnesses to testify about relevant observations without having to distinguish unnecessarily between facts and inferences. If the witness can testify to a relevant matter or event he or she may also testify to any opinion (inference) that is necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of that matter or event. The precondition to the application of the section is that the witness is entitled to give evidence of that matter or event; that is, such evidence must be relevant to proving the material facts in issue. Once so relevant, the witness may in giving that evidence draw any inferences necessary in testifying to that event. In Smith v R,194 Kirby J regarded an opinion of identity based on the witness’s perception of a photograph of the crime taken by a security camera as not being

based on ‘the person’s perception of the matter or event’. To Kirby J the relevant event was the crime. The witness had no perception of that event. The event was captured on a [page 750] security camera, but the witness’s testimony describing that image was either irrelevant or inadmissible in proving the charge. What the witness was attempting to do was to draw inferences from that image based upon limited familiarity with the accused and that was simply an opinion, which, to be admissible, had to be based upon some sort of expertise: s 79. It could not be tied to any relevant and admissible observational evidence that the witness could otherwise give about the crime to enable s 78 to be enlivened. In other words, before an opinion can be regarded as necessary under this section, the witness must first be entitled to testify to the matter or event as a relevant matter or event. This approach is not only conceptually sound but has important practical consequences. A problem in taking a liberal approach to a person’s perception ‘about a matter or event’ is that it can be used to enable individuals (such as police officers and other investigators and even persons with formal qualifications), remote from the ‘matter or event’, to express their incriminating opinions (often pertaining to identity)195 based on repeated exposure to sound recordings or images.196 This enables individuals involved in an investigation, who are not observational witnesses, and not in possession of appropriate expertise or specialised knowledge, to express their opinions. It has also been used to allow police officers (and interpreters) to express opinions about identity where, as in Smith, they possess some familiarity with the accused.197 Allowing displaced viewers and listeners to express opinions about identity198 does not seem to be consistent with the text of s 78 or common law antecedents. [page 751] Even if an opinion can be derived from recordings of a matter or event (something that the witness did not directly perceive) it is doubtful that the opinion is ‘necessary’ to understand the ‘person’s perception of the matter or

event’.199 In R v Leung and Wong,200 Simpson J concluded that an interpreter’s identification of voices from a limited set of known individuals, captured during covert surveillance, was not an opinion admissible by virtue of s 78. Simpson J was prepared to hold that ‘the relevant matter or event was the identity of the speakers on the … tapes’.201 Such an interpretation might allow observers of that event to express opinions necessary to understand the person’s perception. However, Simpson J emphasised the need for the ‘matter or event’ to be relevant to the proceeding. Finding that the relevant ‘matter’ was the identity of the speakers on the recording, she concluded that the interpreter’s perception of the matter ‘did not become relevant until he had formed his opinion as to that identity’. Consequently, evidence of the opinion was ‘not necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of his perception’ for there was ‘no “matter or event” perceived by [the interpreter], understanding of which would be facilitated by evidence of his opinion’. The opinion was the ‘primary, not the incidental, evidence’.202 The requirement that the opinion be ‘necessary’ to recount the witness’s perception of the event has been considered in a number of cases. Whether this permits a witness to say that an accused caught immediately after an alleged sexual assault had a ‘look of like sexual gratification’ seems extremely doubtful (and of such unfair prejudice to require exclusion under s 137).203 Nor was a correctional services officer, who witnessed the end of a melee, allowed to express an opinion about the identity of participants based on a subsequent interpretation of poor quality CCTV images in R v Drollett.204 The opinion, characterised as ‘deduction’, was not ‘necessary to obtain an adequate understanding of his perception of any matter or event’.205 Further, if the evidence can be received in an alternative form it may not be ‘necessary’.206 [page 752] In R v Whyte,207 the admissibility of a daughter’s statement to her mother, that ‘A man tried to rape me’, was in question. Spigelman CJ suggested that this statement — reflecting the daughter’s opinion, based on what she perceived — was ‘necessary to obtain an adequate account of that perception’. That is, whether the appellant had intended to have sexual intercourse with the complainant.208 Simpson J agreed that the complainant’s opinion (or ‘conclusion’) was ‘based on

what she saw, heard or otherwise perceived about the events in question’. She was not convinced, however, that the opinion was ‘necessary to obtain (or to give the jury) an adequate account or understanding of her perception of the matters and events in question’. For Simpson J, the complaint’s factual evidence about being grabbed, pushed and detained by a man in the toilet and struggling to break free meant that evidence of her opinion was not strictly ‘necessary’.209 In Lithgow City Council v Jackson, referring to the meaning of ‘necessary’ from s 78(b), the High Court explained:210 The word ‘necessary’ is not directed to meeting difficulties that arise where it is impossible or inconvenient to call the person propounding the opinion as a witness. … Section 78 is not a ‘best evidence’ provision, permitting reception of the evidence if there is no better evidence. The word ‘necessary’ is instead directed to a relationship internal to the evidence of the perceiver — the relationship between the perceiver’s perceptions and the perceiver’s opinion. … It is true, though, that the less the witness or other observer states his or her primary perceptions, the harder will it be for the tendering party to establish the condition of admissibility in s 78(a) (because of the difficulty of establishing that the opinion is ‘based’ on the perceptions) and the condition of admissibility in s 78(b) (because of the difficulty of establishing that the opinion is necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of the person’s perceptions).

The less liberal interpretation of s 78 here advocated also assists in reconciling s 78 and the requirements for specialised knowledge demanded by s 79(1). Where events are not perceived, a witness cannot testify to an opinion unless specialised knowledge is established under s 79(1). Where the events are perceived, and s 78 is invoked to justify the giving of an opinion by a witness, it may be argued that the opinion is not ‘necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of the person’s perception’ if specialised knowledge is required before that opinion can be regarded as capable [page 753] of producing an ‘adequate account or understanding’. If courts are not prepared to so interpret s 78 then, in the absence of requisite specialised knowledge, the opinion might still be excluded as either irrelevant (incapable of ‘rationally’ affecting the probability of a fact in issue under s 55) or in exercise of the discretions under s 135 or s 137. Or it might simply be argued that it is the exception created by s 79(1) that must always be satisfied where an opinion can only be justified by specialised knowledge.211 It must be wrong for opinions requiring specialised knowledge to become admissible without the requisite

knowledge merely because a witness happens also to be able to testify to relevant facts, more so if those facts were not directly perceived.

Example: sobriety and consequent capacity 7.42 Cases concerning charges of drinking and driving while under the influence of alcohol illustrate the circumstances where observational inferences have been permitted at common law (although strict liability, breath and blood analysis, and presumptions about the reliability of equipment used to determine blood alcohol levels have eliminated the need for such evidence in most cases). Generally, such cases involve three separate issues: whether the accused had taken alcohol; whether the accused had been under the influence of alcohol; and whether the accused had been so under the influence of alcohol as to have been incapable of exercising effective control over a motor vehicle. Although some courts have attempted to distinguish between the first two issues where there is no witness to the actual drinking,212 most courts will allow a witness to the state of the accused at the relevant time to testify that the accused had been under the influence of alcohol.213 Strictly, the first issues are conclusions of fact inferred from primary sense impressions, but it may be unrealistic for a witness to testify only in terms of primary sense impressions (incapable of precise description or forgotten) and the witness’s on-the-spot overall impression can be related to the court. Thus, unless a witness has had no experience with alcohol and its effects, lay witnesses may be asked, in addition to questions about their observations, to express an opinion on the questions of whether the accused had been ‘under the influence’ or ‘drunk’.214 In cross-examination these overall impressions may be suitably dissected into their constituents. The same approach should be taken to capacity to drive, the observational [page 754] witness being best placed to draw such a conclusion and unable to easily distinguish between this inference and the impressions upon which it is based. But at this point most courts have hesitated, for there are complicating factors; such incapacity is an important ultimate issue (see discussion at 7.60) involving a legal standard and any opinion on the issue should be ostensibly reliable before

received. The majority view is thus that only a qualified medical practitioner is entitled to draw such an observational inference.215

Expert assistance in drawing inferences: a functional approach 7.43 The second difficulty with the analysis that leaves it to the trier of fact to draw inferences from primary traces is that, even where those traces can be reported to the court free of inference, the trier itself may not have the general knowledge and experience required to draw reliable inferences. A trier can be assumed to possess that general knowledge commonly held, and in many cases this will be sufficient to enable it to draw the appropriate inferences from the facts before it. But where the trier’s knowledge runs out there remains no option but to turn to those who do have the requisite knowledge and abilities — experts — and ask them for guidance.216 This may take the form of instruction in the relevant field of knowledge or more directly be testimony, based upon expert knowledge, as to the very inferences the expert witnesses would draw from the facts they have observed or from the facts which have been, or are likely to be, proven in the instant case. This sort of expert assistance is an integral part of the common law trial process.217 In civil litigation, biomedical experts (including epidemiologists) testify about the causes and extent of injuries and their prognoses,218 engineers about defects in constructions,219 economists about the effect of restrictive trade practices,220 investment [page 755] advisers about the reasonableness of investments,221 truck drivers about the handling capabilities of their vehicles,222 airline pilots about normal cockpit visibility,223 and so on. In criminal cases, forensic scientists testify about the matching characteristics of handwriting,224 writing style,225 voices,226 fingerprints,227 bite-marks,228 DNA,229 glass [page 756]

fragments,230 and persons in images,231 about the spectrographic analysis of materials,232 and increasingly, psychologists and psychiatrists are called to testify about the mental capacities and processes of witnesses233 and the accused.234 As specialist knowledge increases, counsel seek to introduce new experts and new technologies and expertise to ‘assist’ triers with their decisions. The problem is to define the circumstances in which courts will permit expert assistance in exception to the general prohibition against evidence of opinion. 7.44 The most often quoted common law test for the admissibility of expert opinion in Australia is that given by Dixon J in Clark v Ryan: … the opinion of witnesses possessing peculiar skill is admissible whenever the subject matter of inquiry is such that inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment upon it without such assistance, in other words, when it so far partakes of the nature of a science as to require a course of previous habit, or study, in order to obtain knowledge of it.235

This dictum, and other leading High Court decisions on the common law, make three things clear.236 First, the test for admissibility is functional: expert evidence is admissible only if it can assist the trier of fact in reaching a more reliable decision. Secondly, this assistance must be by virtue of the knowledge and experience that the expert possesses but the trier of fact does not. Thirdly, it is not enough that an expert opinion is of mere relevance. There is a general rule that excludes opinions even though they may be relevant. To be admissible the expert opinion must add in some significant way to the body of knowledge and experience available to the trier and thereby enable it to draw more accurately the inferences required to decide the case. Courts are ever-wary [page 757] of experts usurping the role of the trier of fact and therefore demand that the expert have something additional to contribute to the accuracy of the fact-finding process. As Dawson J in Murphy v R remarked: The admission of such evidence carries with it the implication that the jury are not equipped to decide the relevant issue without the aid of expert opinion and thus, if it is wrongly admitted, it is likely to divert them from their proper task which is to decide the matter for themselves using their own common sense.237

These elements of admissibility are illustrated by comparing the High Court decisions in Weal v Bottom and Clark v Ryan.238 Both cases concerned actions for damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of articulated lorries colliding

with passenger vehicles. In each, the plaintiff’s case depended upon establishing the tendency of the trailer to slew outwards to the centre of the road during cornering. In the first case, the plaintiff called testimony from experienced drivers of similar vehicles to explain the slewing tendency and the conditions under which it might occur. The testimony, knowledge outside the general experience of the jurors, was admitted as of assistance to it in inferring whether, given the conditions established by the admissible evidence, it was likely that the accident was caused through the slewing of the trailer towards the centre of the road. In the second case, the plaintiff also sought to adduce expert testimony about the tendency of the trailer to slew. But in this case, the testimony was from a poorly credentialled ‘consulting engineer’, and the witness had no specific knowledge or experience of the articulated lorries in question and the conditions in which these particular lorries were likely to slew. The expert evidence was held inadmissible because it was little more than an exposition of basic principles of physics of which it could be presumed the members of the jury were perfectly aware. The expert could provide no additional assistance to the jury in drawing inferences from the particular circumstantial facts before it. The tender of the expert testimony was no more than a thinly disguised attempt to influence the jury through expert ‘advocacy’.239 7.45 What this analysis shows is that whether expert evidence is of sufficient assistance to admit can only be determined in the context of that inferential analysis open on the admissible evidence before the court. The expert must be able to assist in that particular inferential analysis. If unable to assist in that particular analysis the expert evidence will technically be irrelevant. But even if relevant, expert evidence [page 758] will not be admitted at common law unless the assistance is by virtue of knowledge and experience that the expert possesses but the trier of fact does not.240 The assumption in all this is that the additional knowledge and experience of the expert will be conducive to more accurate decision-making. Dixon J in Clark v Ryan (quoted above) explains that an expert opinion will be of assistance ‘when it so far partakes of the nature of a science as to require a course of previous habit,

or study, in order to obtain knowledge of it’. The nature of a science is the organisation of knowledge upon a rational basis likely to produce accurate explanations of the world. Some threshold of reliability is implicit in Dixon J’s remarks. But courts have struggled with this threshold.241 This is a crucial issue. We are surrounded by expertise and claims to expertise.242 As knowledge advances so do the claims made by experts. But how accurate are their claims? Can they simply be put before triers of fact to determine their reliability or are we now so surrounded by doubtful expertise (so-called ‘junk science’) and unreliable expert opinion, that courts have a special responsibility to filter from triers, most particularly juries in criminal cases, ‘knowledge’ which remains extravagant or doubtful?243 For example, when the prosecution seeks to explain why those alleging sexual assault did not complain by calling a psychologist to testify that the complainant exhibited all the symptoms of ‘child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome’, or when the defence seeks to explain why an accused woman resorted to violence rather than escape from a violent man by calling evidence that the accused exhibited the symptoms of ‘battered woman syndrome’, should this evidence be simply put before the jury leaving it to decide what assistance to draw, or should the court determine as a question of admissibility whether the knowledge claimed is of sufficient reliability to assist the jury?244 [page 759] Perhaps the problem of reliability becomes even more focused when we ask whether experts should be able to testify that the accused’s DNA matches that found on the victim and that the chances of a random match are in the billions. It being always remembered that this decision is made against the background that we want triers of fact to draw inferences from evidence without being overwhelmed by the opinions of others, particularly witnesses who might be impressive but extravagant or misleading in their claims.245 7.46 Of significance, recent research and reviews have questioned many forensic techniques routinely relied upon in investigations and admitted in criminal trials. Courts cannot simply assume the reliability of expert evidence relating to fingerprint, foot- and shoe-print, ear-print, voice, image, handwriting, bite-mark, gait and hair comparisons as well as document examination, blood

spatter analysis, tool marks, ballistics, stab wound analysis, and many other techniques now routinely relied upon. As the National Research Council (NRC) of the United States National Academy of Sciences has concluded: ‘The simple reality is that the interpretation of forensic evidence is not always based on scientific studies to determine its validity. This is a serious problem’.246 Subsequently, the US President’s Council of Advisers on Science and Technology, also reviewing the forensic sciences, insisted that ‘establishing foundational validity based on empirical evidence is thus a sine qua non. Nothing can substitute for it’.247 Nor do the forensic sciences in Australia have a stronger or separate research base to those in the United States. Claims about Australian exceptionalism warrant close scrutiny.248 A liberal case-by-case approach to the admissibility of expert forensic science evidence makes it difficult for trial and appellate courts to develop rules and procedures that address foundational issues, such as validity and reliability, informed by mainstream scientific advice.249 [page 760] Courts cannot abandon the regulation of expert opinion to outside institutions and must continue to regulate and assess expert opinion evidence in the context of particular proceedings. But as is shown in the following discussion, courts have focused upon epiphenomena such as training and experience, formal qualifications, apparent plausibility and previous use, rather than seeking direct evidence of the reliability of a professed expertise. The reliability of expert opinions is too often left to the trier of fact to determine in circumstances where the trier of fact is in no position to assess it. It may be that ultimately our current procedures, practices and institutions are incapable of effectively managing or evaluating expert opinion evidence in seeking substantially accurate (rather than procedurally regular) decisions. Recent empirical studies and reviews, from the United States and the United Kingdom,250 suggest that many long-cherished adversarial safeguards such as prosecutorial restraint, cross-examination, scope for defence experts,251 judicial directions and warnings, lay juries, and appellate review, do not consistently expose or convey the most serious problems with the reliability of expert opinion evidence,252 especially incriminating opinion evidence.253 The fact that trial

safeguards might afford protections against weak and speculative forensic science evidence is not a particularly persuasive justification for liberal admission and reliance.254 [page 761] Studies from the United States suggest that judges tend to apply admissibility standards in ways that appear inconsistent with principle; most aggressively against the expert opinion evidence adduced by plaintiffs and criminal defendants, and less aggressively in response to the state’s forensic scientists.255 While Australian judges do not have the same incentives (namely, constitutionally mandated civil juries) to exclude expert evidence in most civil proceedings, they have demonstrated a remarkable willingness to reform civil procedures regulating expert opinion evidence under the auspices of efficiency, and to liberally admit incriminating opinion evidence in criminal trials, trusting the adversary system of trial to put the jury in a position to accurately assess its reliability. But if trial safeguards work poorly the current treatment of incriminating expert opinion evidence might be systematically biased in favour of the prosecution. There may be a need to modify rules and procedures in ways that are more sensitive to the limitations of lay judges, lawyers and jurors,256 and to the present frailties of many forms of expert opinion, most conspicuously in criminal proceedings.257 These arguments should provide strong incentives for judges, if they are serious about factual rectitude and fairness, to look closely at the imposition of threshold tests for the admissibility of expert knowledge. Indeed, the very basis of the common law exception imposes a threshold test by requiring that expert evidence be admitted only if it assists the fact-finder in reaching an accurate decision. The question is what sort of test is most conducive to achieving this end. [page 762]

Threshold tests at common law for expert knowledge Liberal relevancy 7.47 The approach traditionally followed in common law courts might be

called the liberal relevancy approach.258 By this approach, once the court determines the witness qualified by training or practical experience in an area of knowledge beyond that possessed by the trier of fact, and of apparent assistance to it, then the witness may testify. There is no further threshold of reliability to be applied to that area of knowledge. The expert testimony can be scrutinised in cross-examination and contradicted by opposing experts and the trier of fact is left to determine whether to act upon the expert knowledge presented. This approach is illustrated by Weal v Bottom (above at 7.44) and most vividly by Commissioner for Government Transport v Adamcik.259 In Adamcik, the plaintiff claimed damages in respect of the death of her husband who died from leukemia following an injury suffered by him when he fell from the defendant’s tram. The defendant’s negligence in respect of the accident was admitted but it was denied that the leukemia had been caused by the injury suffered. The plaintiff called an academically well-qualified and experienced Sydney physician, who had published his theory on the causes of leukemia, to opine that the leukemia had been caused by the stress associated with the injury. This expert opinion was countered by mainstream medical testimony to the effect that medical science had not yet isolated the causes of leukemia but there was little evidence or support for the idea that it could be caused by stress. The plaintiff’s medical evidence was admitted without objection, as opinion evidence beyond that of the jury, and it was left to the jury to decide whether the husband’s death from leukemia had, on the balance of probabilities, been caused by the accidental injury. The jury found for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, not complaining about the procedure followed in admitting the expert testimony, but arguing that on the evidence presented the court should substitute a verdict for the defendant. The High Court refused to do this, apparently accepting the correctness of the procedure and accepting that the decision about which expert opinion to act upon was properly left to the jury. In this context, it was entitled to act upon the views of a qualified medical scholar and practitioner even [page 763] though his views were not accepted generally by other experts within the medical profession.260

By this approach, once it is shown that the expert has knowledge beyond that of the trier and of apparent assistance to the case, then the witness can testify to opinions based on that knowledge.261 It is then left to the trier of fact to assess the value of the opinion. Adamcik probably represents the apogee of the liberal relevance approach. It is far less likely that a contemporary trial judge, particularly when acting as the trier of fact in civil proceedings, would admit and rely upon the bare ipse dixit of an individual expert, especially when opposed by more mainstream opinions grounded in biomedical and scientific research. Sufficient reliability determined by the court 7.48 As new and more sophisticated areas of knowledge have developed to make quite specific and influential claims, courts have been increasingly asked by counsel to decide the reliability of these areas and their claims before admitting the expert opinion evidence. R v Gilmore262 provides a useful example. The issue was the identity of a voice on a tape recording and a lecturer in English who had specialised in phonetics was called by the accused to testify, inter alia, to a spectrographic comparison between the culprit’s voice on the tape and the voice of the accused using the same words on another tape. The trial judge refused to allow the witness to so testify, one reason being that spectrographic voice analysis was not a field of knowledge sufficiently reliable to be the basis of expert opinion. Without disapproving of this consideration of the reliability of the field of knowledge in question, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial judge’s conclusion. Having investigated the application of voice spectography, particularly in America where courts had admitted such evidence, the court concluded: The science has developed to the point where, although by no means one hundred per cent accurate, it can properly and responsibly be used as an aid in the resolution of contests of identity … the question will always remain one of fact for a jury properly instructed and duly warned about the dangers that may be inherent in the evidence,

[page 764] and in the scientific process involved in the particular case in hand. To recognise however, a degree of risk of inaccuracy and to recognise a need for caution in the use of the evidence, is far from treating the evidence as inadmissible. This study has developed, in my view, to a point where it can,

and indeed should in appropriate cases, be made available to tribunals of fact who are concerned with questions of identity of voices.

This suggests there is a threshold of reliability before knowledge upon which an opinion is based can responsibly be left to the trier of fact.263 7.49 In other cases where an area of knowledge has been disputed courts have similarly determined its sufficient reliability as a condition of admissibility. Thus, the Supreme Court of South Australia held that although a Sergeant Swain, who had studied accident investigation in the United States, could testify about inferences of speed from skid marks,264 he could not testify to inferences of the likely behaviour of vehicles upon impact. This was not based upon a sufficiently organised area of knowledge for his opinions to be regarded as anything more than mere guesses.265 Somewhat reluctantly, the Queensland Court of Appeal in Eagles v Orth266 was prepared to accept the trial judge’s decision that ‘the study of seat belts’ was a recognised field of specialist knowledge able to justify opinions about the likely effect of wearing a seat belt upon the extent of injury in a road accident.267 In Lewis v R,268 Muirhead AJ doubted whether forensic odontology had reached a stage of sufficient reliability to permit an opinion that bite-marks were those of a particular person. In each of these cases, the courts were prepared to determine whether the expert knowledge claimed could justify the opinion that was being put.269 [page 765] Interestingly, recent inquiry suggests that spectrographic voice comparison (or voiceprints), like bite-marks, and many other forms of forensic science routinely relied upon by investigators, adduced by prosecutors and admitted by judges, may not be reliable or underpinned by serious scientific research. Reports by the National Research Council,270 of the prestigious United States National Academy of Science, cast serious doubts on the scientific foundations and accuracy of the kinds of voice comparison techniques admitted in R v Gilmore.271 The approach to admissibility exemplified in Adamcik may be too liberal and that in Gilmore insufficiently rigorous when applied to forensic science evidence adduced by the prosecution in criminal proceedings. And if admitted it is doubtful whether counsel and judges are capable of consistently identifying the

limitations of such evidence and conveying them to the trier of fact to enable an informed and accurate decision. General acceptance within the relevant scientific community: Frye and Daubert 7.50 In the United States, an influential test for the admissibility of scientific evidence, requiring general acceptance of the evidence in the relevant scientific community, was established in Frye v United States.272 [page 766] A federal court was asked to admit evidence of the results of a ‘systolic blood pressure deception test’ (an early lie detector test).273 Although the experts called by the defence were convinced that the tests were reliable indicators of honesty, it was the state’s contention that the majority view of psychologists with experience of the tests was that they were unreliable. In these circumstances the court held that until the technique had achieved general acceptance in the relevant scientific community, it must remain inadmissible. The importance of this approach is that, rather than itself seeking to determine the reliability of the knowledge being presented by experts, a task for which a lay judge may not be suitably equipped, the court thought the better approach was to leave the decision to the relevant scientific community, to the experts themselves.274 7.51 This approach has found favour in Australia as a test of the sufficient reliability of expert evidence for it to be admissible.275 In R v Runjanjic and Kontinnen, the court was asked to rule upon the admissibility of the opinion of a psychologist that two women accused of murder exhibited symptoms of ‘battered woman syndrome’ and that women with these symptoms may be regarded as having acted under duress.276 [page 767] King CJ remarked (at 119): An essential prerequisite to the admission of expert evidence as to the battered woman syndrome is that it be accepted by experts competent in the field of psychology or psychiatry as a scientifically

established facet of psychology. This must be established by appropriate evidence … A perusal of the literature … indicates a wide acceptance of the syndrome as having a valid existence.

The same approach has been taken to evidence of ‘child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome’ (which explains why a child repeatedly assaulted by an adult may not complain), King CJ rejecting its reception in R v C,277 explaining: I assume, for the purpose of discussing whether the topic is a fit subject of expert evidence, that it is proved that there is a scientifically accepted body of knowledge concerning the behaviour of child sexual abuse victims … The evidence in this case did not go so far as to establish the existence of a scientifically established body of knowledge as to the relevant points.

It is interesting to compare King CJ’s approach to the reception of this ‘accommodation syndrome’ evidence with that of Brooking J in R v J,278 which advocates the approach of liberal relevance. He says: Provided that the judge is satisfied that there is a field of expert knowledge to which recourse may be had, it is no objection to the reception of the evidence of an expert within that field that the views which he puts forward do not command general acceptance by other experts in the field: compare Commissioner for Government Transport v Adamcik (1961) 106 CLR 292. So it might be argued, for example, that, provided that it was shown that the behaviour and responses of those who were assaulted or sexually abused was the subject of a field of expert knowledge, the opinion of a given expert might be received even though that expert’s theory was not generally accepted by other experts in the field. There is a distinction between proof of the existence of a field of expert knowledge and proof that the views of the particular witness command general assent in the field.

[page 768] A similar view was expressed by Winneke P in R v Bartlett, although in R v Anderson, the judge takes a stricter approach towards admitting expert opinion evidence as to whether wounds were self-inflicted.279 7.52 As a rule of admissibility, general acceptance has not been without its difficulties and critics.280 The major problems include: its failure to accommodate new and controversial areas of science and technology which constitute the focus of many recent claims (for example, the syndrome evidence discussed above at 7.51);281 the difficulty of determining the most relevant fields and communities (should, for example, critics who are not ‘experts’ in contested ‘fields’ be allowed to testify);282 the difficulty of determining precisely what is accepted and by whom;283 its formal indifference to the reliability of expert opinions and techniques (with the primary focus on the extent of acceptance); and legal deference to exogenous communities of experts.

More recently, the Supreme Court of the United States in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals284 decided that the Frye test did not survive the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) in 1975. Daubert concerned a claim that birth [page 769] defects had been caused by the mother ingesting the drug Bendectin (marketed as Debendox in Australia).285 The plaintiffs sought to establish causation through expert evidence that arguably did not satisfy the Frye standard of general acceptance. But, in a radical departure from the philosophy underlying Frye, the court held that it is the responsibility of judges, rather than the relevant scientific community, to determine whether scientific evidence is of sufficient reliability to admit.286 The court adopts a functional test of admissibility based on r 702 of the Federal Rules. The expert evidence must have ‘a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility’. What is a sufficient degree of connection (sometimes referred to as ‘fit’) depends upon the relevance of the expert evidence to the issues in the case and its reliability.287 In determining reliability, the judge will have to consider whether the reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid and can credibly be applied to the issues in the case. Without presuming to lay down a definitive checklist the court mentions four criteria that may be of significance: (i) whether the evidence has been or can be adequately tested (to see whether an hypothesis can be falsified);288 (ii) whether the techniques or opinions have been exposed to peer review and published;289 (iii) the rates of error (and what controls are applied to the evidence); and (iv) whether the evidence and the underlying technique is accepted by other experts.290 In their dissenting opinion, [page 770] Rehnquist CJ and Stevens J doubt whether r 702 imposes on judges ‘the obligation or the authority to become amateur scientists in order to perform [a gate-keeping] role’.291 The Daubert criteria are intended to enable a trial judge, acting as ‘gate-keeper’,

to determine if ‘scientific knowledge’ (from r 702) is sufficiently reliable to be presented to fact-finders. The Daubert approach was formally extended to encompass ‘technical or other specialized knowledge’ (also from r 702) in Kumho Tires Pty Ltd v Carmichael.292 Responding to ongoing inconsistency in the application of Daubert to experiential and non-scientific forms of expertise, in Kumho the Supreme Court explained that the Daubert criteria might be flexibly applied to determine the reliability of other types of expert evidence. In 2000, the Federal Rules of Evidence were revised to entrench the need for reliability.293 Following Daubert and Kumho, admissibility decision-making can involve a wideranging inquiry of some complexity. United States appellate courts will only interfere where a trial judge has proceeded upon some clearly erroneous basis, such as an abuse of discretion.294 Daubert and the need for reliability have exerted a conspicuous influence beyond United States borders. The basic approach from Daubert was embraced by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v J-LJ.295 Subsequently, in R v Trochym, the same court explained that a reliability threshold now forms part of the Canadian common law. According to the majority, the need for reliability applies to opinions (and associated theories and methods) routinely admitted in the past as well as novel technologies.296 In a public inquiry in Ontario, in response to serious mistakes in the provision of [page 771] paediatric forensic pathology evidence, Commissioner Goudge placed emphasis on the importance of ‘threshold reliability’ in admissibility decision-making.297 In 2011, the Law Commission of England and Wales recommended the adoption of a reliability based approach to admissibility, also conspicuously influenced by Daubert.298 The Law Commission’s proposal represents a departure from English admissibility practice, which was described as ‘laissez faire’.299 English courts had exhibited very relaxed attitudes to the admissibility of incriminating opinion evidence and remarkable confidence in adversarial trial protections. The failure of the English government to enact the Law Commission’s recommendations led the Chief Justice to embed the need for reliability and Daubert-style criteria in recent revisions to the Criminal Procedural Rules and Criminal Practice Directions for England and Wales.300

The need to focus on reliability, that is, the validity and reliability of scientific and technical forms of evidence, is the cornerstone of the (United States) President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) report Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-comparison Methods, in which it was concluded that ‘valid scientific knowledge can only be gained through empirical testing of specific propositions’.301 [page 772] The council questioned the effectiveness of concepts often used by courts to evaluate expertise in the forensic sciences: We note … that neither experience, nor judgment, nor good professional practices (such as certification programs and accreditation programs, standardized protocols, proficiency testing, and codes of ethics) can substitute for actual evidence of foundational validity and reliability. … Similarly, an expert’s expression of confidence based on personal professional experience or expressions of consensus among practitioners about the accuracy of their field is no substitute for error rates estimated from relevant studies.

While Daubert and criteria focused on reliability (and validity) have not inspired much interest among Australian judges it is clear that, given the basis of the common law exception and as science advances, more rigorous approaches could be evolved at common law to ensure that fact-finders are assisted (rather than misled) by expert evidence: see discussion at 7.53. But significantly, as is discussed at 7.54, in interpreting s 79(1) of the uniform legislation, courts have refused to interpret the ‘specialised knowledge’ upon which expert opinion must be based to be admissible as imposing any requirement that the knowledge be demonstrably reliable.

Current Australian position At common law 7.53 Gaudron J in HG v R states: The position at common law is that, if relevant, expert or opinion evidence is admissible with respect to matters about which ordinary persons are unable ‘to form a sound judgment … without the assistance of [those] possessing special knowledge or experience … which is sufficiently organised or recognised to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or experience’.302

This demonstrates the ambiguity in this area — accepted by whom? By the court or other experts? In R v Karger,303 Mulligan J took King CJ’s dictum to refer to

the latter. In Velevski v R,304 Gummow and Callinan JJ themselves considered whether a body of experiential knowledge about the characteristics of selfinflicted wounds was sufficiently reliable to provide a basis for expert testimony, using common law authority in deciding that it was. [page 773] The better view is that courts do have a gate-keeping role and should not admit expert testimony unless it is based upon an area of knowledge sufficiently reliable to be accepted. Although some courts suggest that it is for other experts in the field to determine that acceptance, and some state courts have taken that approach, it is unlikely that Australian courts will expressly abdicate their responsibility for determining the sufficiency of an area of knowledge before expert evidence can be based upon it. The acceptance by other experts will, as in Daubert, be relevant to but not necessarily decisive of admissibility. However, the reality is that the more complex or technical an area of knowledge the more likely courts will be left in the hands of experts in determining sufficient reliability. Perhaps this explains why Hunt CJ in R v Pantoja305 rejected Daubert in favour of Frye in determining the admissibility of expert DNA evidence. The other perspective that needs to be given to this discussion is that the gatekeeping role is probably of more practical importance in a case tried before a jury, where a decision to exclude expert evidence will completely insulate the jury from its influence. In cases tried before a judge alone (most cases in Australia — unlike America), the judge will be necessarily exposed to the evidence in determining its admissibility. In these circumstances, the more practical approach may be simply to admit the evidence (by taking a liberal approach towards its sufficient reliability) and leave it to the judge to determine how to use it, if at all, in deciding the case. In many civil cases, counsel are content to accept this approach. Once this approach has been taken, on appeal the only question is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the findings of the trial judge. Admissibility decisions assume greater significance in criminal proceedings, especially where the evidence is incriminating opinion evidence. Ultimately, the criterion for admissibility of expert opinion must be the helpfulness of the evidence in the case at hand. This suggests the criteria for putting areas of knowledge before the trier of fact might depend not only upon

the probative value of the opinion but also upon the nature of the case before the court. Helpfulness, in that it relates to the court reaching a sound judgment, unavoidably incorporates some consideration of reliability. For scientific, medical and technical forms of evidence, especially in criminal proceedings, that will ordinarily require attending to validity. Thus, the standard of reliability might be higher where, for example, the opinion is tendered for the prosecution than where it is tendered for the defence, or in a civil case,306 where the expert testimony is extremely technical and difficult for a layperson [page 774] to understand, so that no jury can sensibly arbitrate upon any dispute between the experts,307 or where the scientific opinion is to be put before the court in specific terms decisive of the case.308 The functional principle remains decisive. Will the evidence assist the trier reach a more accurate decision in the case at hand? As Dawson J remarked in Murphy v R:309 … the heavy hand of the courts (and, even more, of academic commentators) can be seen in the apparently irresistible tendency to lay down rules and then to criticise them as being inappropriate where there is no truth but a single principle.310

Under the uniform legislation 7.54 The Uniform Acts simply provide in s 79(1): If a person has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience, the opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion of that person that is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge.

In Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar, the High Court explained that opinions admitted under s 79(1) ‘must satisfy two criteria’:311 The first is that the witness who gives the evidence ‘has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience’; the second is that the opinion expressed in evidence by the witness ‘is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge’.

[page 775]

Earlier, in HG v R,312 Gleeson CJ explained that those proffering opinions based on ‘specialised knowledge’ should attend to the form of the evidence so that it was possible to answer the question of whether the ‘two criteria’ were satisfied: The provisions of s 79 will often have the practical effect of emphasising the need for attention to requirements of form. By directing attention to whether an opinion is wholly or substantially based on specialised knowledge based on training, study or experience, the section requires that the opinion is presented in a form which makes it possible to answer that question.

Section 79(1) assumes the expert will testify in the form of opinion, about inferences they can draw from observed or assumed facts, rather than testifying more generally about a relevant area of knowledge.313 Literally the section permits the expert to testify to an opinion wholly or substantially based on his or her ‘specialised knowledge’. But under s 56(2), the opinion must first be relevant; that is, be capable of rationally affecting the probability of the existence of the facts in issue: s 55(1). This means that the opinion to which the expert testifies must rationally assist in drawing an inference from admissible evidence towards the facts in issue: s 55. If there is doubt about the opinion, the expert may be obliged to disclose its rational basis: Quick v Stoland.314 As at common law, judges in uniform evidence legislation jurisdictions have, at least formally, read the need ‘to furnish the trier of fact with criteria enabling evaluation of the experts’ conclusions’ into the application of s 79.315 What s 79(1) does expressly require is that the testimony of the expert must be wholly or substantially based upon ‘specialised knowledge’, and taken literally this requires, as Heydon JA concludes in Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles,316 that the party tendering the expert evidence demonstrate how the opinion evidence is relevant, how it will assist in the inferences to be drawn from the available admissible evidence, and how this relevance is achieved through substantial reliance upon the witness’s specialised knowledge. Again, where serious doubts arise about these matters they will have to be investigated and justified.317 The practical difficulties of pursuing such [page 776] complex factual analysis at the admissibility stage, particularly in civil cases in the Federal Court, are adverted to by Branson J in Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd,318 and as a practical matter, in many (particularly civil) cases (tried by judge alone), it may be as fair and more efficient to take a liberal

approach to admissibility and leave the complexities of such analysis for consideration when the facts are being determined — which is what occurred in Makita (see the discussion at 7.66) and is what happens most often at common law. In Velevski v R,319 Gaudron J remarks: The concept of ‘specialised knowledge’ imports knowledge of matters which are outside the knowledge or experience of ordinary persons and which ‘is sufficiently organised or recognised to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or experience’.

And Gummow and Callinan JJ (at [154]–[160]) quote common law authority in holding as sufficiently reliable a body of knowledge about whether wounds have been self-inflicted or not, and admitting opinion evidence based upon it.320 If there are serious doubts about the ‘specialised knowledge’ these must of necessity be resolved by the court investigating its foundations and organising principles before admitting testimony based upon it. There is no definition of ‘specialised knowledge’ in the uniform legislation. In R v Tang, Spigelman CJ (Simpson and Adams JJ agreeing) drew upon the definition of ‘knowledge’ adopted by the majority in the United States Supreme Court Daubert decision, in saying: [T]he word ‘knowledge’ connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. The term applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.321

[page 777] In his analysis of ‘specialised knowledge’, Spigelman CJ explicitly disclaimed the need to consider ‘reliability’. For the Court of Criminal Appeal the ‘focus of attention must be on the words “specialised knowledge”, not on the introduction of an extraneous idea such as reliability’.322 There is, nevertheless, a serious tension between apparent disinterest in ‘an extraneous idea such as “reliability”’ and a focus on ‘specialised knowledge’ that involves ‘known facts’, inferences from such facts on ‘good grounds’, and requires more than ‘subjective belief’ or ‘unsupported speculation’. Few modern philosophers or scientists, for example, would equate ‘knowledge’ with claims that were not empirically grounded or demonstrably reliable.323 More recently, in Honeysett v R (at [23]), the High Court adopted, in the

process supplementing, the definition of ‘knowledge’ from Tang (and Daubert): ‘Specialised knowledge’ is to be distinguished from matters of ‘common knowledge’. Specialised knowledge is knowledge which is outside that of persons who have not by training, study or experience acquired an understanding of the subject matter. It may be of matters that are not of a scientific or technical kind and a person without any formal qualifications may acquire specialised knowledge by experience. However, the person’s training, study or experience must result in the acquisition of knowledge. The Macquarie Dictionary defines ‘knowledge’ as ‘acquaintance with facts, truths, or principles, as from study or investigation’ (emphasis added) and it is in this sense that it is used in s 79(1). The concept is captured in Blackmun J’s formulation in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc: ‘the word “knowledge” connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. … [It] applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds’.

The High Court introduced terms such as ‘study’ and ‘investigation’ that might be applied to, or expected, in relation to scientific, medical and technical forms of evidence. However, even in this criminal appeal, the court was unwilling to engage with reliability. The case concerned the admissibility of an anatomist’s opinions about similarities between a disguised person captured on CCTV during a robbery and the accused. Purporting to assist the court on the question of identity, the anatomist reported several similarities and no differences. Rather than determine whether the technique used by the expert was valid and reliable — thereby determining whether the anatomist (and any other individual asked to proffer an opinion about such images) possessed relevant expertise — the court instead declared that he was not an expert in image interpretation and image comparison. In so doing the court deemed the opinions inadmissible but provided little assistance to lawyers and trial judges [page 778] endeavouring to understand how to determine whether an opinion is wholly or substantially based on specialised knowledge in this and other domains. 324 Opinions based on specialised knowledge must necessarily be inferred on good grounds, and in consequence, it is difficult to understand s 79(1) without employing some kind of reliability threshold. When the Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the meaning of the phrase ‘scientific, technical and other specialized knowledge’ under the Federal Rules in Kumho, Breyer J explained: In Daubert, the Court specified that it is the Rule’s word ‘knowledge’, not the words (like ‘scientific’) that modify that word, that ‘establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability’.325

Whatever effect the adjective ‘specialised’ exerts, it cannot be thought to remove or reduce the need for reliability. Logically, ‘specialised knowledge’ cannot have a lower epistemological content or status than ‘knowledge’. Moreover, it subverts the very rationale for excluding opinion evidence (s 76) if those with formal qualifications or long experience (particularly investigators and forensic scientists) can simply express opinions without any need to justify what makes their opinions and the techniques used probative. 7.55 While s 79 has been interpreted to achieve aims consistent with the common law, it imposes different formal requirements for admissibility. Once logically relevant under s 55, there is no requirement that opinions based on specialised knowledge assist triers of fact to reach a more accurate decision by going beyond the knowledge already possessed: see also the discussion of s 80(b) at 7.58.326 It is enough that the opinion ‘could rationally affect’ assessment of the facts in issue: s 55.327 The stricter interpretations of the common law, where expert evidence must extend the knowledge of jurors (see, for example, R v Turner and R v Smith), must be taken into account, if at all, through exclusionary discretion: ss 135, 137.328 [page 779] Secondly, s 79(1) formally requires the trial judge to assess how the opinion and the specialised knowledge are related to the ‘training, study or experience’. The particular opinions must be substantially based on ‘specialised knowledge’ grounded in ‘training, study or experience’.329 There is sometimes, as in Tang, latitude between the formal training and experience possessed by experts and the opinions they present. It is not unknown for experts (and some non-experts), particularly in criminal proceedings, to present incriminating opinions even when there is no discernible field and little that could credibly be considered to constitute knowledge.330 Thirdly, expert opinion evidence is subject to the mandatory and exclusionary discretions: ss 135 and 137. Opinions might be excluded, for example, where the probative value would be substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence would cause an ‘undue waste of time’. Such a clause might appear to minimise differences between the common law and uniform legislation where the evidence is of a type that might be familiar to the fact-finder.331 Although this is

not how it has been interpreted by the Full Federal Court: see the discussion of s 80(b) at 7.58. Perhaps more importantly, balancing probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice, required by the mandatory and discretionary exclusions, particularly s 137, makes little sense without some attempt to rationally determine the probative potential of scientific and other forms of expert opinion evidence. The High Court’s apparent excision of reliability (and credibility) from the determination of ‘probative value’ in IMM seems poorly suited to opinions based on [page 780] specialised knowledge.332 In order to determine the magnitude of the risk confronting the accused that an expert opinion will be given more probative value than it deserves, the judge must gauge the rational potential value of that opinion. Ironically, validity studies provide the very information that enables decision-makers to ascertain the value of most forms of scientific, medical and technical evidence, because they furnish information about limitations, error and proficiency. Historically, judges have been reluctant to usurp the role of the fact-finder by making an actual assessment of the probative value of evidence: see the discussion at 2.30–2.31. While this may be defensible in relation to many types of evidence (and witnesses), when the evidence is of a kind where an indication of the probative value can be obtained through validation studies and proficiency testing (as well as the failure to test), it is argued that judges should adopt a more proactive role. Indifference to the probative value of expert opinion evidence practically eviscerates the value of ss 135(a) and 137 and leaves to lay fact-finders potentially unreliable opinion evidence masquerading as specialised knowledge. And as demonstrated at 7.46, there are reasons to doubt not only the reliability of many of the forensic sciences but also the general efficacy of the trial to expose that unreliability. This point has been recognised by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Tuite v R.333 Although refusing on the basis of authority to interpret ‘specialised knowledge’ in s 79(1) as requiring the reliability of that knowledge to be established, nevertheless the court (at [11]) held that:

The obvious risk in a criminal trial when expert evidence is led from a forensic scientist is that a jury will give the evidence more weight than it deserves. To prevent unfair prejudice of that kind, it is essential that the reliability of expert evidence be established to the court’s satisfaction (under s 137) before it is led. We have concluded that the touchstone of reliability for this purpose is proof of appropriate validation, both of the underlying science (where necessary) and of the particular methodology being employed.

The status of Tuite and the implications of IMM, for forensic science and medicine evidence contested under s 137, are now unclear. Opinion based on specialised knowledge might be considered exceptional, because there are formal means of determining the validity and accuracy of procedures and the proficiency of practitioners. Alternatively, unreliability or uncertainty about the status of procedures and opinions might be incorporated into the assessment of the danger of ‘unfair prejudice’ to the accused in the balancing exercise. Where the validity and reliability of procedures are unknown there would always seem to be a risk that the trier of fact might attribute more weight to the evidence than it can support, [page 781] or not recognise the significance of a failure to have a procedure validated and the risks that creates. While such responses might leave open the possibility of incorporating consideration of unreliability, they seem less direct and less suited to criminal proceedings than interpreting s 79 in a way where the requirement of ‘knowledge’ is directly indexed to reliability. Further, locating concern with (validity and) reliability in s 137 has the tendency to shift responsibility for persuading the court that techniques routinely relied upon to (investigate, negotiate pleas and) prosecute are demonstrably reliable from the state to individual defendants, frequently dependent on legal aid.

Ad hoc experts 7.56 Recent decisions in both common law and uniform evidence jurisdictions have tended to affirm earlier liberal relevancy approaches. In practice, even those courts endeavouring to consider the reliability of expert opinion evidence have not imposed particularly onerous demands. Moreover, the case law suggests that, perhaps with the exception of DNA evidence, lawyers and judges often concern themselves more with the quality of expert opinion

evidence adduced by plaintiffs and criminal defendants than the forensic science evidence adduced by the prosecution. Consequently, the jurisprudence around expert evidence appears more developed, and the proffers of opinion evidence more closely scrutinised, in many civil proceedings (such as negligence, intellectual property and native title litigation) than in criminal trials.334 These orientations sit awkwardly with the goals of factual rectitude and trial efficiency, let alone the presumption of innocence in criminal trials that demands, through fair process, that the prosecution adduces sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. One particularly troubling manifestation of the liberal approach to the admissibility of incriminating opinion evidence is the expansion of the idea of ad hoc expertise. At common law, ad hoc experts are permitted, for example, to interpret sounds and sometimes differentiate between voices or speakers in one or more sound recordings. They may also be permitted to produce transcripts of recordings that could be given to the jury ‘as an aid’ (‘aide memoire’), in circumstances where accredited interpreters [page 782] had listened repeatedly to recordings and had thus become ‘ad hoc experts as to what was recorded’.335 Under the uniform legislation, notwithstanding ss 76 and 79, judges in New South Wales and the Federal Court have invoked the idea of ad hoc expertise to enable police officers, interpreters, corporate employees, and some highly qualified individuals with expertise in putatively related domains, to express opinions about facts in issue (including on ultimate issues) where their opinions do not appear to be substantially based on ‘specialised knowledge’.336 In New South Wales, those who have been recognised as ad hoc experts from repeatedly listening to sound recordings or examining images (or videos) have been allowed to positively identify, or express opinions about similarities, notwithstanding the existence of relevant research communities, ongoing research, and individuals with ‘specialised knowledge’ who are often unwilling or unable to testify (particularly in such confident terms).337 There is, in addition, an inconsistency between the treatment of the ad hoc opinions of those interpreting images and

those interpreting sound recordings that does not appear to be based in principle. Anatomists and others interpreting images were, [page 783] before Honeysett, somewhat arbitrarily restricted to comments about similarities — even where there was no evidence about the frequency of particular features, or combinations of features — whereas police officers, (police) interpreters and linguists were normally allowed to positively identify the accused on the basis of repeated listening to voice recordings and speech338 or from observing the accused during the course of an investigation.339 Several judges have suggested that s 79(1) is sufficiently broad to encompass these forms of ad hoc expertise.340 The problem is that in these decisions questions about ‘specialised knowledge’, ‘training, study or experience’ and, in consequence, the reliability of the techniques are rarely considered in any detail. The category ‘ad hoc expert’ allows those without formal training, study or sufficient experience and no (interest in) ‘specialised knowledge’ to express opinions. It also appears to enable those with formal training to express opinions even where their opinions are not based on their specialised knowledge or training. These opinions appear to be admitted on grounds of expediency and convenience rather than through any attention to a requirement for ‘specialised knowledge’. Reliability, notorious dangers with comparing unfamiliar individuals,341 and the question of whether repeated exposure to a limited set of images [page 784] or sounds substantially (or actually) improves accuracy are rarely considered.342 The very real danger of ‘unfair prejudice to the defendant’ (s 137), on the basis that the jury may overvalue or misunderstand the limitations of ad hoc expert opinions, or the defence being required to somehow counter highly persuasive incriminating opinions (where the jury views the same evidence in highly suggestive circumstances), seem not to be outweighed by the unknown probative value of the opinions.343 In principle, it seems inappropriate to require the

defence to respond to opinions that are either unreliable or of unknown probative value. Where, as with ad hoc opinion evidence, there are strong grounds for doubting the reliability of opinions and/or they are produced by non-expert investigators, the evidence should ordinarily be excluded. The transformation and expansion of the common law concept of ad hoc expertise is difficult to reconcile with the uniform legislation. The common law ad hoc expert, used to interpret recordings, is made unnecessary by the legislation’s more liberal approach to admitting transcripts under s 48(1).344 Furthermore, the expansion of the concept appears to ignore the strong prohibition against opinion evidence (s 76) and [page 785] the requirements for ‘specialised knowledge’ if expert opinions are to be exceptionally admitted (s 79(1)). One might add that at common law the same questions arise about the reliability of the opinions of ad hoc experts and the ability of adversarial trial mechanisms to assess them effectively: see general discussion at 7.46. The idea of ad hoc expertise has been most influential in New South Wales, although it is not unknown to other Australian jurisdictions. In Victoria, courts prefer to rely on s 78 of the Evidence Act 2008, thereby allowing interpreters (and translators) of audio recordings and those who repeatedly watch video recordings, to express their interpretations as to words spoken, the identity of speakers or as to the nature or identity of items in videos (for example, shoes) as lay opinions.345 This interpretation has several difficulties. First, it is difficult to reconcile with the terms of s 78: discussed at 7.41. The opinions are not ‘based on what the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived about a matter or event’. Rather, they relate to a recording of the matter or event. It is not ‘necessary to obtain an adequate account or understanding of the person’s perception of the matter or event’. The person did not perceive the event and the trier of fact might review the recording itself. It is only when the displaced observer has identified a person or thing that the opinion then becomes ‘necessary’. Moreover, applying s 78 to remote audiences would seem to enable anyone who has repeatedly listened to a voice recording (or set of voice recordings), or more realistically repeatedly watched a video, to express an opinion in court. In the

absence of expertise and admission via s 79, there are few reasons to privilege the repeated listening or viewing of investigators. Without attention to validity and reliability we do not know if these lay observers perform better than average and, therefore, whether the opinions are even relevant. Secondly, in allowing those who are non-experts to express their opinions, some of the potential safeguards associated with s 79 — the need for ‘specialised knowledge’ and for it to be based on ‘training, study or experience’ — are circumvented. Opinions admitted under s 78 do not need to comply with relevant practice notes and any codes of conduct for expert witnesses associated with the preparation of expert reports and the provision of testimony: discussed at 7.64. These non-experts may be unable to identify serious limitations or problems with their opinions and may not be familiar with the best methods of undertaking analysis to avoid risks notorious amongst trained professionals. They may know nothing about controversies, critical literatures, relevant studies or limitations. They might also testify in categorical terms — making positive identifications — against the advice of independent scientists and oblivious to the ubiquitous risk of error. [page 786]

Two illusory tests of admissibility 7.57 In deciding whether opinions should be received, common law judges have referred to further categorisations as relevant to the functional decision, and later courts have attempted to elevate two of these categorisations into rules of admissibility — the so-called common knowledge rule and the rule forbidding opinions upon ultimate issues. Both are abolished as rules of admissibility by the uniform legislation in s 80. The ‘rules’ are discussed to show how they illustrate factors relevant to the functional decision. Common knowledge 7.58 The reference to common knowledge is merely one way of saying that the expert has no knowledge additional to that of the trier of fact and therefore cannot contribute to the case. For example, in the context of human behaviour, courts have been reluctant to admit expert opinions from psychiatrists and psychologists on the ground that we all have experience and knowledge of human behaviour and the introduction of expert evidence may be on the one

hand confusing, where the experts cannot agree, and on the other overwhelming, where the only expert opinion favours a particular behavioural conclusion.346 In rejecting behavioural evidence courts have sometimes said that it relates to a matter within the common knowledge of the trier, or said that it relates to a behavioural condition that may be described as normal and therefore a condition all triers can be presumed to know about.347 In R v Turner,348 the accused was charged with murdering his girlfriend by beating her to death with a hammer after she had admitted infidelities while the accused was in prison. To establish provocation the defence sought to call a psychiatrist, who had examined the accused and read reports of his medical history, to opine upon his likely reaction to the victim’s revelations, made so soon after his release from prison. The psychiatrist wished to report that although the accused was suffering from no particular psychiatric illness his psychological condition of profound grief was such that, given his personality and the circumstances, he was particularly vulnerable to [page 787] provocation by the victim’s remarks. The Court of Criminal Appeal held the evidence inadmissible, Lawton LJ remarking (at 841): Jurors do not need psychiatrists to tell them how ordinary folk who are not suffering from any mental illness are likely to react to the stresses and strains of life.

This decision was followed in Australia to reject psychological evidence about the likely effects of taking drugs and alcohol, tendered by the defence to negative intent, in the absence of specific research findings that in certain circumstances a person would be unable to form any intent. In the absence of such findings the expert could say nothing beyond the common knowledge of the jury.349 Similarly, in R v Smith,350 Vincent J rejected testimony from a psychologist about the general unreliabilities of eyewitness testimony on the ground that it could not usefully extend the jury’s general knowledge on the subject.351 More recently, several courts have been willing to admit, or consider, expert psychological evidence pertaining to memory, perception and identification.352 One of the difficulties with restrictive interpretations of s 80(b) of the uniform legislation is that human perception, memory, suggestion and displacement tend to be more powerful, and therefore more insidious and incorrigible, than

laypeople appreciate. Limitations with judicial directions and instructions, and the inability to credibly explore subtle and unconscious influences during crossexamination, would seem to make the need to consider whether to allow expert witnesses contesting prevalent, if potentially misguided, assumptions pressing. [page 788] While courts are suspicious of generalised expert evidence relating to the cognitive abilities of human beings, where witnesses are prepared to testify to specific and recognised medical or psychological conditions (whether an accused is addicted to a particular drug;353 whether an accused is intellectually impaired;354 the mental processes of an intellectually impaired complainant;355 the physical effects of taking valium and alcohol in combination;356 whether an accused was insane or suffering from automatism357 or from some other recognised psychological condition;358 whether a complainant is suffering from an identifiable psychological syndrome359 or some personality disorder which might affect his or her reliability as a witness)360 or to patterns of behaviour in particular sections of society,361 they appear more willing [page 789] to admit opinion testimony relating to human behaviour as outside the common knowledge of the trier of fact and therefore of assistance. Where experts are allowed to testify about human memory or the behaviour of victims of sexual assault under ss 79 and 108C, they are typically restricted to describing research findings and general behaviours. Ordinarily, experts are prevented from offering opinions about whether research might suggest that the memory was compromised or that a person was assaulted and even applying general observations about memory or behaviour to the details of the case. These remain matters for the trier of fact.362

7.59 However, common knowledge and normalcy are not legal tests of admissibility. This is made clear by the High Court in Murphy v R.363 The guiding principle at common law is whether the evidence will add to the trier of fact’s stock of knowledge so that it can reach a more accurate decision (the 3:2 split only serving to emphasise the difficulty in applying this principle to particular facts). The accused had allegedly confessed to the police. Defence counsel sought to tender evidence of a consulting psychologist (who had examined the accused) that the accused’s limited intellectual capacity made it unlikely that he would have answered the questions with the words he allegedly used. The trial judge refused to accept the expert testimony, holding that it established no specific abnormality on the part of the accused and that a reliable decision could be made by the jury using its common knowledge of normal human comprehension and behaviour. The majority of the High Court disagreed. In the case before them the issue was not whether the accused was suffering from any specific abnormal behavioural condition. The contention was simply that the accused’s comprehension and use of language was such that it was unlikely that he had made the confession attributed to him. On this issue the expert had a significant contribution to make and should have been permitted to testify. At common law, the question is whether ‘the matters to which [the expert will] speak [are] outside the experience and knowledge of the judge and jury’. Normality and abnormality — the determination that a condition can be specifically isolated or not — may be convenient categories to use in some cases to determine whether an expert is able to assist, but they provide no definitive test of admissibility. And, furthermore, even where [page 790] the trier has some knowledge of the behaviour in issue, this is not to say that an expert may not be able to make a significant contribution.364 The legacy of the common law common knowledge requirement was read down under the uniform legislation in Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd,365 where, reversing the trial judge’s decision to exclude marketing evidence about the use of the colour purple in passing off litigation, the Full Court of the Federal Court explained: [A]n expert may still be of assistance to the Court, even in an area about which most people know

something. So long as s 79 is satisfied, and the opinion evidence is based on specialised knowledge and that specialised knowledge is based on training, study or experience, that opinion evidence will be admissible, whether or not it might then be excluded in the exercise of the discretion … The fact that an opinion is expressed concerning the making of consumer decisions for the purchase of everyday items of commerce does not disqualify the opinion from being admissible, so long as s 79 is satisfied.366

Ultimate issues and legal standards 7.60 It is when the trier is considering the ultimate and decisive issues in the case that the greatest care must be taken not to usurp its decision-making responsibility by [page 791] tendering opinions. Moreover, the danger of usurpation increases where additionally the decisive issue involves the application of a legal standard to a party’s behaviour (for example, whether a party acted with reasonable care, or possessed sufficient capacity to perform a legal act). To guard against these risks it is often said that experts are prohibited from giving their opinions on ultimate issues.367 But the rule is cautionary rather than binding.368 If possible, counsel should avoid putting ultimate issues to experts. Counsel should not employ experts as advocates on ultimate issues.369 Yet skilful questioning through hypothetical examples may often reveal an opinion on an ultimate issue implicitly rather than explicitly. Nevertheless, if the expert can properly assist upon the very inference to be drawn by the trier of fact, then that assistance can be sought, even where the inference might involve the application of a legal standard. Thus, judges have permitted expert testimony on purely factual ultimate issues — did the victim stab herself?370 Did the accused know what he was doing was wrong?371 And upon ultimate issues applying legal standards — was the defendant unfit to drive?372 Did the literature have a tendency to corrupt young children?373 Is there similarity for the purposes of a copyright action?374 Were professional standards of conduct met?375 7.61 A major difficulty in permitting experts to testify upon ultimate issues is that they might base their opinion either upon evidence that is not before the

court or upon assumptions that the trier of fact might not accept. The opinion in either [page 792] case would be inappropriate and might also be misleadingly influential. Great care must be taken in appreciating the limits of expert assistance in every case, particularly where assistance is offered upon a decisive issue. But once evidence is admitted on an ultimate issue the trier must properly consider it along with all the other evidence in deciding the case.376 In one case common law judges have taken a stricter approach. Where a case turns on the application of foreign law, courts may receive expert evidence about its content and interpretation but should not receive an opinion about its application to the facts in question for fear of a court abdicating its very responsibility to determine that application. This responsibility is recognised by s 176 of the Uniform Acts, and s 80 does not admit expert evidence that would result in its abdication and ‘impinge on the essential curial function’.377 7.62 Some of the limits to expert assistance upon ultimate issues can be more clearly appreciated in Bayesian terms.378 Bayesians argue that the prior odds of a conclusion of fact are increased by the ratio between the further evidence existing if the conclusion is true and the further evidence existing if the conclusion is false. In Bayesian terminology the prior odds are affected by the likelihood ratio. But while an expert is often in a position to testify about a likelihood ratio, seldom (if ever?) is the expert in a position to know the prior odds (for only the trier of fact is in a position to and entitled to compute this), and therefore is seldom in a position to compute the posterior odds. To permit the expert to give an opinion upon the posterior odds (the ultimate issue) in these circumstances would be to misuse that expertise. For example, a psychologist might be called to testify that 90% of sexually abused children examined by psychologists have nightmares involving sexual subjects. If the complainant has such nightmares the psychologist might say that this is consistent with such abuse. It would be quite incorrect to testify to a 90% probability of abuse, for this would be to assume that the complainant was already within a class of abused children. The issue is how much more likely abuse is, given this evidence. This in turn depends upon what proportion of children

generally have such dreams. If studies show that 2% of randomly selected children have such nightmares, then it is 90:2 times more likely that a person who has those dreams has been abused. But the odds of abuse in the case in question are not 45 to 1. To so opine would be to assume that the child in [page 793] question has an equal chance of having been abused or not having been abused. Such an assumption of prior equal odds, equi-possibility, might be appropriate in some cases, but it is unlikely to be appropriate in the particular case. Other evidence will have been tendered and the jury must compute prior odds from this before incorporating the expert’s likelihood ratio to determine posterior odds.379 Where all that an expert can testify to is a likelihood ratio, then it will be inappropriate for the expert to give an opinion on the ultimate issue. That would be to improperly usurp the role of the jury by employing assumptions of prior odds which the expert is in no position to make. The expert can only opine on the basis of assumptions and evidence properly before the court. The importance of experts confining their opinions to inferences from admissible evidence is discussed further at 7.68–7.70. The uniform legislation, whilst not addressing the Bayesian problem, provides in s 80(a) that an opinion is not inadmissible only because it is about a fact in issue or an ultimate issue. While the uniform legislation makes it clear that any common knowledge and ultimate issue rules have been abolished, the need for caution remains where opinions (for example, relating to untested techniques, such as facial mapping) are closely linked to ultimate issues (such as the identity of a robber captured on CCTV). An expert may even express relevant opinions based on specialised knowledge where couched in legal language, such as causation. Though, as Mason P explained in R v GK, ‘judges should exercise particular scrutiny when experts move close to the ultimate issue, lest they arrogate expertise outside their field or express views unsupported by disclosed and contestable assumptions’.380

Procedural aspects Adversarial presentation of expert testimony

7.63 At common law, evidence is presented testimonially. All testimony, including expert testimony, is presented adversarially and parties seek to persuade the court on the basis of the testimony called by them and elicited through crossexamination. The parties decide which witnesses they will call and for all practical purposes are obliged to call only witnesses who will support their contentions. This includes experts. But this causes problems for the experts who are obliged to respond to questions advanced by counsel. It also creates problems for lay triers of fact who must interpret and apply [page 794] this expert oral testimony that may be partisan (and therefore apparently contradictory) but also complex and technical.381 7.64 With counsel taking increasing advantage of experts, some trials have become longer and more costly.382 As a consequence, rules of court and practice directions now exist in all Australian jurisdictions in civil and criminal proceedings seeking to streamline the preparation and presentation of expert evidence.383 These reforms are not intended to alter the rules of admissibility; rather, they affect the preparation and the adversarial dynamics of the case, with a view to enhancing the analysis and understanding of the expert evidence and producing a more efficient trial, particularly in civil proceedings.384 But they may have the effect of encouraging judges in practice to be more liberal in receiving expert evidence and leaving the determination of its reliability to when the case is decided.385 Traditionally, this has been considered the more practical approach where cases are tried before judges alone. Recent reforms seek to achieve three things. First, they demand early disclosure of expert evidence in a written form between the parties. This is intended to enable parties to carefully consider an opponent’s expert evidence before trial with a view to settlement or at least to a narrowing of the issues to be litigated. It also enables parties to contest an opponent’s expert evidence through further testing of evidence, exchange of reports before trial or through the tender of evidence or conduct of cross-examination at trial. In some jurisdictions the written report of the expert becomes the evidence-in-chief of the witness. Secondly, they seek to ensure the disclosure and presentation of expert evidence in a form which clearly reveals the field of expertise relied upon, the qualification

of the witness to speak to that field of expertise, the assumptions of fact or evidence from which the expert inferences are being drawn, [page 795] and an explanation of how and why the opinions advance the issues in the case.386 Thirdly, the reforms emphasise that the principal role of the expert witness is to assist the court in reaching a more accurate decision.387 Rules require experts to receive an authorised explanation of their role and the form and matters to be covered in their report before they write their reports.388 These rules are not rules of admissibility and appellate courts have indicated that breach, including flagrant partisanship, is likely to be a matter for weight or the application of exclusionary discretion: s 135 or s 137.389 Changes to the rules regulating the engagement of experts, the production of reports and the presentation of testimony have placed increasing and more explicit emphasis on impartiality, restraint, disclosure and cooperation. Several reforms to pretrial procedures and even the presentation of evidence at trial (for example, concurrent evidence) raise fundamental issues for the adversarial trial and the independence of judges. Whether the reforms can or have improved the quality of expert opinion evidence is not easy to ascertain. The new procedures may have encouraged more parties to settle and may have reduced the extent of disagreement in court. To the extent they have reduced the volume and length of litigation, or narrowed the issues, their popularity with many judges is understandable. It is far from clear, however, whether such rules have stimulated the production of less partisan opinion evidence, or exerted a positive influence on the reliability of expert evidence, particularly in criminal proceedings. Revealingly, there seem to have been few disciplinary actions flowing from the requirement of impartiality (and related codes of conduct for expert witnesses), and their primary value would seem to be symbolic or aspirational.390 [page 796] In practice, rules purporting to regulate expert opinion evidence are not always strictly enforced. Trial judges are just as likely to receive an application to exclude

expert evidence in civil as criminal proceedings, and non-compliance with the form of evidence does not necessarily lead to the exclusion of speculative opinions based on untested forensic science procedures. Notwithstanding judicial aspirations, and the institutional value attributed to impartiality, ‘evidence of opinion’, as Selway J explained in Gumana v Northern Territory,391 ‘is not inadmissible merely because the person giving the evidence is not “independent”’ or does not strictly adhere to the terms of the court rules. It is not uncommon for expert reports tendered by the prosecutor to lack any clear explanation of the kind envisaged in Makita (see the discussion at 7.66) and for inconsistent bodies of research, alternative techniques and substantial methodological criticisms to be simply ignored or omitted from reports and oral testimony.392 Nevertheless, reforms to the preparation and presentation of expert evidence are subtly changing the shape of the adversarial trial. Following procedural experimentation driven by judges, initially in the Federal Court, the New South Wales Land and Environment and Supreme Courts and the Federal Court, courts now routinely require experts to meet before trial to agree, or narrow the scope of disagreement should the matter proceed to trial (so-called pre-trial expert meetings or conclaves). These meetings usually take place without lawyers and often lead to the production of a joint report. Where the matter is litigated, the experts, if called, may appear together as a panel to provide their evidence concurrently.393 Concurrent evidence procedures (known colloquially as ‘hot tubs’) are now routine for many civil proceedings before courts and tribunals (such as the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) and the Supreme Court of New South Wales) and are even sometimes utilised for the voir [page 797] dire in criminal proceedings.394 They were developed with the intention of reducing disagreement, encouraging a collegial ‘discussion’ between experts, undermining party alignment, and making experts more accountable to their colleagues.395 The imposition of such inquisitorial-style procedures has introduced a range of issues for judges and others operating in an essentially adversarial tradition. Some of the issues, such as regulating the number and seniority of experts called and combining opinions from different, though apparently related, fields,

are relatively familiar to common law judges.396 Others are potentially more disruptive to adversarial procedures. In particular: how is party control maintained when the experts are provided with considerable testimonial latitude and the judge is not discouraged from asking lots of questions, and perhaps even leading the evidence? How does a judge maintain independence if he or she is responsible for questioning experts, or maintaining a collegial atmosphere? At what stage of the trial should concurrent evidence procedures be held? In criminal proceedings, is the accused obliged to participate before the close of the prosecution case? Are parties entitled to aggressively cross-examine the experts called by other parties (or will this disrupt the collegial ‘conversations’ concurrent evidence seeks to achieve)? Are the expert witnesses entitled to question one another and so forth?397 Concurrent evidence may save time and money and may help judges (and other fact-finders) to understand the issues, the extent and reasons for disagreement, and to gauge the relations between experts. Although we have very limited empirical [page 798] information about its actual effects on costs and comprehension, let alone the quality of the evidence and the accuracy of any decision based upon it.398 Concurrent evidence may change expert performances, but to the extent that experts conform to judicial expectations and engage in a more collegial and apparently efficient discussion, this does not make the evidence or any resulting consensus reliable or even more reliable. The provision of information about validity and reliability is generally more important than expressions of cordiality and impressions of credibility. Significantly, in their reviews of the forensic sciences (discussed at 7.46) the NRC and PCAST expressed the need for research and testing of the validity and reliability of techniques rather than impartiality or new forms of inquisitorial-style procedures. In line with attempts to reduce costs and improve speed and efficiency, the new rules of practice and procedure facilitate the use of expert reports over expert testimony.399 The uniform legislation assumes the adversarial presentation of expert evidence but does in s 177 provide a procedure whereby expert evidence can be presented in a written form so that the expert need not be called unless the opponent insists. It also provides for enhanced discovery through its procedure

for permitting parties to make evidential requests in s 167 and through its giving wide powers to make orders for discovery in s 193. While experts can be called and cross-examined, in some situations this may be seen as unnecessary and even incur cost penalties. It is increasingly common in criminal proceedings to rely on reports from biologists, especially where simpler forms of DNA evidence are involved. One of the recurring problems with expert reports is insensitivity to the process of reasoning and the place of expert opinions in the proof of material facts. Reports frequently conflate (or mix) factual materials, admissible and inadmissible evidence (see the discussion at 7.66–7.70), opinions, assumptions and advocacy. Confronted with long, complex, terminologically challenging and legally insensitive reports, often giving rise to multiple objections, judges of the Federal Court have encouraged lawyers and experts to cooperate in the production of reports for native title proceedings.400 The aim is to produce expert reports that are more directly related to material facts in issue and that clearly conform with evidential rules.401 [page 799] Notwithstanding some qualified calls for cooperation between experts and lawyers, where several experts work together to produce an expert report, such arrangements can, as the court explained in Commonwealth v Yarmirr,402 create practical ‘difficulties and dangers’. Where expert reports are co-produced by several experts, opposing parties should be entitled to cross-examine all of those experts substantially involved in the production of the evidence and the writing of the report.403 Although the principal thrust of recent reforms preserves party control over the selection of experts — if not always over the way they negotiate with other experts, prepare their reports, or present evidence — in most jurisdictions the court has power to appoint expert assessors404 or its own experts405 to assist in the drawing of necessary inferences, or to require the parties to agree on the selection of a party’s single expert.406 However, most judges remain reluctant to utilise these powers in the absence of the consent of the parties,407 although this reluctance may be diminishing as the adversarial trial undergoes gradual transformation.

[page 800] The quest for impartiality and the models of science and expertise underlying many of the recent reforms appear simplistic when juxtaposed with the perspectives on expertise developed by contemporary sociologists, anthropologists and historians of science,408 and when contrasted with concerns about partisanship, bias, sponsorship and conflicts of interest generating anxiety among scientific researchers and biomedical journals.409 Many problems with expertise are intractable.410 In legal proceedings, it should be emphasised that however expert opinion is received by a court the problem remains in most cases of combining the expert opinion with other inferences to be drawn from evidence presented in the case (in Bayesian terms, the prior odds always remain to be assessed). It is the need for this combination that stands in the way of leaving entire cases to experts to decide. The reality is that the bulk of civil and criminal cases that come before the courts involve matters of human behaviour which either fall within no one particular field of expertise or have not been a matter of expert study at all. [page 801] Establishing the admissibility of expert testimony: the voir dire 7.65 Where the tender of expert testimony is objected to, the party tendering the evidence must on the voir dire establish the conditions for its admissibility on the balance of probabilities: see 2.91 and Uniform Acts s 142. The precise nature of this voir dire will depend upon what the court considers to be its gate-keeping role.411 If the very area of knowledge relied upon as justifying the opinion is objected to as unreliable, unless the court takes an approach equivalent to ‘liberal relevancy’ and leaves that issue to the jury, some inquiry into the reliability of that area will be necessary. At common law, this will be put in terms of ‘general acceptance’ or simply ‘reliability’ in relation to the assistance afforded to the trier of fact, while under the uniform legislation in terms of ‘specialised knowledge’: s 79(1). If the area is complex or the technique likely to become a routine feature of investigation and proof, this may require a lengthy examination and cross-examination of experts working in the relevant field, and

reference to published works, in order to satisfy the court. In R v Karger,412 a voir dire over six months canvassed the details of DNA technology before Mulligan J held the processes used in the Quadruplex and Profiler Plus systems ‘recognised and accepted by the relevant scientific community as reliable’ and therefore admissible. Similarly, when the admissibility of the method for calculating probabilities for complex DNA samples (that is, STRMix) was challenged in Tuite v R, an extensive voir dire was conducted finding the technique based on ‘specialised knowledge’ under s 79(1) and its validity and reliability sufficient to satisfy s 137.413 In many cases the area of knowledge justifying the opinion will not be in dispute. At common law, a separate question might arise about whether the area is sufficiently beyond that possessed by the trier of fact to assist it to reach a more reliable decision, although under the uniform legislation, with the abolition of the common knowledge rule in s 80(b) these considerations are more likely to be subsumed within the requirement for ‘specialised knowledge’.414 Otherwise, more commonly questions will arise about whether the witness is qualified through [page 802] formal training or experience (Weal v Bottom;415 s 79(1)) to speak to that area of knowledge,416 whether the witness’s evidence relates to that knowledge,417 and whether that knowledge will, on the particular facts of the case, practically assist the trier in drawing the required inferences from the admissible evidence to determine the material facts in issue.418 7.66 This last issue requires the party tendering the expert evidence to show precisely how that evidence assists in the analysis of the admissible evidence before the court. To do this it must make apparent upon what admissible evidence or assumptions (capable of proof by admissible evidence) the expert bases his or her opinion, and explain how the particular expert knowledge rationally assists in drawing relevant inferences from that evidence.419 [page 803]

The required rigor in demonstrating this assistance as a precondition for the admissibility of expert evidence was emphasised by Heydon JA in Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles.420 In Makita, the question was whether expert evidence about the slipperiness of a step could justify a finding to that effect in the face of evidence that over a long period of time no other user had slipped on the steps. Heydon JA summarises (at [85]) the conditions for admissibility in remarks which, although made in the context of the Uniform Acts, also have direct application to cases governed by the common law:421 In short, if evidence tendered as expert opinion evidence is to be admissible, it must be agreed or demonstrated that there is a field of ‘specialised knowledge’; there must be an identified aspect of that field which the witness demonstrates that by reason of specific training, study or experience, the witness has become an expert; the opinion proffered must be ‘wholly or substantially based on the witness’s expert knowledge’; so far as the opinion is based on facts ‘observed’ by the expert, they must be identified and admissibly proved by the expert, and so far as the opinion is based on ‘assumed’ or ‘accepted’ facts they must be identified and proved in some other way; it must be established that the facts on which the opinion is based form a proper foundation for it; and the opinion of an expert requires demonstration or examination of the scientific or other intellectual basis of the conclusion reached; that is, the expert’s evidence must explain how the field of ‘specialised knowledge’ in which the witness is expert by reason of ‘training, study or experience’ and on which the opinion is ‘wholly or substantially’ based applies to the facts assumed or observed so as to produce the opinion propounded.

The rigor of Heydon JA’s approach was characterised, in Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd,422 as ‘a counsel of perfection’ as a test of admissibility in a civil case tried by judge alone; Branson J preferring to defer such rigorous analysis until she came to deciding the material facts of the case. But in criminal cases tried by judge and jury, the rigor of Heydon JA’s approach to admissibility may be regarded as more appropriate where prosecutors seek to tender expert evidence against an accused. What Heydon JA emphasises is that to be admissible it must be established that expert opinion evidence is based upon specialised knowledge that can be used to draw inferences from particular facts or assumptions (capable of proof through admissible evidence), and that these inferences are in turn relevant to a determination of the material facts in issue in the case. His remarks have been described as stating ‘the basis rule’, although, because of the required close relationship between the specialised knowledge and the facts determinative of the case, the exact ambit of the rule has [page 804]

not been without its share of controversy and confusion.423 The ALRC endeavoured to clarify the confusion, by drawing from the language of Gleeson CJ in HG v R:424 … s 79 does not, and cannot by its terms, require the factual basis of the expert opinion to be proved before the opinion can be admissible. Instead, s 79 has the practical effect of directing attention to the form in which the opinion is expressed so that it is possible to answer whether an opinion is wholly or substantially based on specialised knowledge based on training, study or experience. As Branson J accepted in Red Bull, in applying s 79 the factual basis of the expert opinion will also need to be identified ‘in order to differentiate between the assumed facts upon which the opinion is based, and the opinion in question …’ In each case s 79 requires the expert to ‘expose … the facts upon which the opinion is based … sufficient[ly]’ to enable the court to decide whether the opinion satisfies the requirement of the section.

Lindgren J in Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S425 is more explicit in explaining the complexities of the basis rule: It is necessary to distinguish between two potential meanings of the notion of a ‘basis rule’. The expression may be used to refer to a supposed rule that evidence of expert opinion is not admissible unless the expert identifies the assumed factual basis for his or her opinion, thereby distinguishing between what is opinion and what is not. This goes to the form taken by the expert’s evidence. The provisions of s 79 of the Evidence Act tend to have the practical effect of requiring attention to the form that expert evidence takes: HG v R [1999] HCA 2; (1999) 197 CLR 414 at [39] per Gleeson CJ. As I noted in Harrington-Smith v State of Western Australia (No 2) [2003] FCA 893; (2003) 130 FCR 424 at [25], in the absence of a distinction between opinion and assumed factual basis, the Court may not be able to be satisfied: as to what is the opinion proffered; that the facts assumed by the expert are sufficiently like the actual facts to make the opinion relevant for the purposes of s 56 of the Evidence Act (see Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371 at 374 per Branson J; Sydneywide at [14] per Branson J); or that the opinion is one substantially based on the expert’s specialised knowledge, for the purposes of s 79 of the Evidence Act (see Makita at [85] per Heydon JA). On the other hand, the expression ‘basis rule’ may be used to refer to a supposed rule that evidence of expert opinion is not admissible unless the factual basis of the opinion is proved by admissible evidence.

The second usage has produced its own confusions, for, as is argued at 7.71–7.72, at both common law and under the uniform legislation, while it may be argued that [page 805] the facts in the case to which specialised knowledge is applied in drawing an

inference require proof through admissible evidence, at common law the specialised knowledge itself does not need to be so proved. More recently, in Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar,426 a decisive majority of the High Court (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Keiffel and Bell JJ) refers to ‘the basis rule’ in the following dicta (at [41]): … this analysis does not seek to introduce what has been called ‘the basis rule’: a rule by which opinion evidence is to be excluded unless the factual bases upon which the opinion is proffered are established by other evidence. Whether that rule formed part of the common law of evidence need not be examined. It may be accepted that the Law Reform Commission’s interim report on evidence [ALRC Interim Report No 26 (1985)] denied the existence of such a common law rule and expressed the intention to refrain from including a basis rule in the legislation the Commission proposed and which was later enacted as the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). What has been called the basis rule is a rule directed to the facts of the particular case about which an expert is asked to proffer an opinion and the facts upon which the expert relies to form the opinion expressed. The point which is now made is a point about connecting the opinion expressed by a witness with the witness’s specialised knowledge based on training, study or experience.

As things stand, the only requirements for admissibility under s 79(1) are the need for an opinion to be wholly or substantially based on specialised knowledge and for that knowledge to be based on the expert’s training, study or experience. It appears, according to the majority dicta in Dasreef, that opinion needs only to be distinguished from facts and assumptions so that the trial judge can determine whether, as Gleeson CJ explained in HG v R (at 7.54), the terms of s 79(1) are satisfied. But if at trial the facts upon which the opinion is based are not capable of proof by admissible evidence then, although satisfying s 79(1), the opinion may become of little weight or irrelevant altogether, and if the latter, become inadmissible under ss 55 and 56: cf Heydon J in Dasreef (at [127]). In a civil case tried before a judge alone, the expert opinion may be admitted pending admissible proof of the facts upon which it is based. But in a criminal case, to admit the opinion in the absence of admissible proof of the basis, or at least assurance that the basis can be so proved, may result in irremediable prejudice to the accused, and for that reason require deferral of reception of the expert opinion or exclusion of the opinion altogether. The situation is the same under the uniform legislation as at common law. In this way, Heydon J’s views can be accommodated with the views in the other quotes above.427 Generally, whether evidential assumptions are proved are matters to be pursued and determined at trial along with the weight to be accorded to opinions and relevant

[page 806] inferences.428 Questions about the credibility of the expert or the sufficiency of their evidence should as far as possible be pursued at the trial rather than on the voir dire.429 However, where, especially in criminal proceedings, there are serious questions about the field, the relevance of the expertise and whether it constitutes knowledge, it will be necessary to resolve these questions on the voir dire. Furthermore, as Brooking J in R v J430 notes, many of the matters canvassed on the voir dire to determine admissibility may have to be canvassed again before the jury to enable it to determine whether or not to act upon the expert evidence. One fundamental requirement, still applicable to expert opinion evidence whether adduced at common law or under the uniform legislation, was mentioned in Makita. Though not explicit in the evidence statutes, this common law principle seems to be necessitated by both the adversarial form of proceedings and the use of lay triers of fact. The principle was clearly stated in Davie v Magistrates of Edinburgh:431 Expert witnesses however skilled or eminent can give no more than evidence. They cannot usurp the functions of the jury or Judge sitting as a jury … Their duty is to furnish the Judge or jury with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of their conclusions so as to enable the Judge or jury to form their own independent judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts proved in evidence. The scientific opinion evidence, if intelligible, convincing and tested, becomes a factor (and often an important factor) for consideration along with the whole other evidence in the case, but the decision is for the Judge or jury. In particular the bare ipse dixit of a scientist, however eminent, upon the issue in controversy, will normally carry little weight, for it cannot be tested by cross-examination nor independently appraised, and the parties have invoked the decision of a judicial tribunal and not an oracular pronouncement by an expert.

The rules governing admissibility, as well as procedures regulating the form, of expert opinion evidence and opinions based on specialised knowledge should be applied with these issues in mind. The purpose of expert assistance is to enhance fact-finding by citizens and judges and so opinion evidence must be presented in a manner that enables them to rationally engage with it. Form of expert assistance 7.67 The form of assistance that may be given by an expert can be quite specific. Where the expert is also an observer of relevant traces, the testimony may relate to

[page 807] quite specific inferences that may be drawn from those observations. Thus, the doctor who has examined the victim of an accident may be, indeed must be, quite specific in explaining what inferences of incapacity may be drawn from the primary observations. Where the expert is not called to testify to observations but only to assist in the drawing of inferences, that assistance may still be quite specific. Thus, the expert is not limited to attempting to explain in general terms the field of knowledge which may assist but may — and, on practical grounds, is encouraged to — explain that knowledge in terms of how it can be employed to draw inferences from given or assumed primary facts. It is important to ensure that the expert keeps to the limits of his or her expertise. To revert to the Bayesian analogy given above, if the expert can only give evidence of a likelihood ratio, then care must be taken to ensure that it remains in the trier of fact’s domain to determine the prior odds to which that likelihood ratio might apply. Again, if the opinion consists of an inference drawn from specific primary evidence — from the symptoms of the injured victim or the confused accused, for example, or from material allegedly found at the scene of the crime — it must be left to the trier of fact to determine, where there is dispute, whether those symptoms have been established or the materials found where alleged and properly collected and analysed. Thus, where the primary facts which form the basis of an expert opinion are in dispute, the expert should testify upon the basis of assumed or hypothetical primary facts,432 emphasising that it remains the province of the trier of fact to find the primary facts to which the expert opinions apply. The role of the expert must be confined in this way if he or she is not to distract the court from its obligation to determine the existence of any facts from which the expert is asked to draw an inference using his or her specialised knowledge. Without proof of these basic facts the opinion will be irrelevant. Questions about the form of an expert’s opinion arose in Aytugrul v R.433 The appeal questioned whether ‘mathematically equivalent’ expressions could be adduced and relied upon by the prosecutor, if there was evidence that jurors (and judges) are likely to treat them inconsistently. Studies in cognitive science suggest that laypersons tend to

[page 808] misinterpret specific types of probabilistic statements, such as ‘exclusion percentages’. A majority of the High Court was unmoved by these arguments, particularly as they had not been anticipated and addressed by defence counsel at trial. Aytugrul seems to stand for the propositions that any secondary materials (including mainstream scientific research) to be relied upon must be introduced at trial, and that provided statements are mathematically equivalent, the fact that ordinary citizens might be less susceptible to misvaluing some forms of expression is not typically an issue for admissibility. The unsuccessful appeal focused on the failure of the trial judge to exclude the ‘exclusion percentage’ using s 137. Establishing primary facts through admissible evidence 7.68 These facts from which the expert is asked to draw an inference (hereinafter referred to as ‘primary facts’) using his or her specialised knowledge must be capable of proof by admissible evidence. If no evidence is tendered, the whole foundation for the expert testimony may disappear, so rendering that testimony irrelevant.434 And, if the only tendered evidence of these primary facts is inadmissible, for example hearsay evidence,435 or information subject to legal professional privilege,436 then an opinion dependent upon those primary facts becomes in turn irrelevant.437 Difficulties arise where the expert opinion is based upon primary facts only some of which are dependent upon inadmissible evidence.438 The situation often arises in the case of observational experts whose opinion about, for example, the physical or mental condition of a patient, is based not only upon their direct observations but also upon inadmissible hearsay reports from the patient or the patient’s associates. At common law, although statements by a patient as to current sensations and feelings can be used by an expert to establish those feelings without infringing the hearsay rule (akin to direct observations), the patient’s statements about the facts leading up to those sensations cannot be used as a basis for an opinion without infringing the hearsay rule.439 When this situation is discovered in the course of trial (often upon [page 809]

cross-examination)440 the judge is faced with the difficult decision of whether to disregard the expert testimony altogether as based upon inadmissible hearsay, or whether to salvage those aspects of the testimony that are based upon primary facts which can be proved through admissible evidence. The court must determine on the facts to what extent the expert testimony remains probative of observational facts and is a reliable guide to the drawing of inferences from primary facts that are capable of admissible proof.441 These may not be easy decisions and depend upon rigorous analysis of the evidence and inferences to be drawn. But courts must take care not to allow expert testimony to assume greater significance than it deserves. 7.69 The Uniform Acts extend the admissibility of hearsay evidence (see further 8.191ff) so that experts have greater scope to themselves testify admissibly to the facts upon which their opinions may depend. In civil cases, first-hand hearsay is generally admissible (ss 63, 64), so that a doctor may testify admissibly to a history reported to him or her by the patient or others, thus mitigating the problem that arose at common law (in Ramsay v Watson). But s 60 may also apply to admit the hearsay of an expert. That section provides that once evidence of a representation has been admitted for a relevant non-hearsay purpose then, in both civil and criminal cases, it may also be used as hearsay; that is, to prove the truth of the facts asserted in the representation (unless the court is persuaded to exercise its s 136 discretion).442 If, then, in a criminal case, a doctor opines about the cause of a patient’s condition on the basis not only of his or her own observations but also on the basis of facts reported to him or her by the patient or others who have observed them, it has been held that, as the expert’s opinion is admitted and requires reference to this history to explain its basis, that history, being admissible to explain the basis of the opinion, is admitted for a relevant non-hearsay purpose. As a result it can also be admitted under s 60 for its hearsay purpose — to prove that history.443 [page 810] 7.70 However, it can strongly be argued that when the opinion of an expert is admitted it is only the opinion that is admitted together with any otherwise admissible evidence that the expert may give about the primary facts upon which the opinion is based. Any other primary facts asserted by the expert as the basis

for the opinion are at most hypothetical assumptions upon which the opinion is based and which if proved make the opinion relevant and probative. These assumptions are not part of evidence ‘admitted’ for another relevant purpose and so s 60 does not apply. To hold otherwise is to distinguish between an expert who expresses an opinion as based upon factual assumptions and one who expresses an opinion as based upon representations made to the expert, and thereby provides an incentive to parties to have their experts refer to every representation which might provide a basis for the opinion proffered. As Branson J recognises in Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd,444 it is not entirely satisfactory if admissibility under s 60 depends on the form in which the expert testifies. In both situations, if the expert cannot give admissible evidence of a fact upon which the opinion is based, then, as Sperling J argues forcefully in R v Lawson,445 the expert can do no more than testify upon the basis of factual assumptions. There is no reason in logic or policy to regard representations referred to by the expert and asserting such assumptions as ‘admitted’ for another relevant purpose so as to invoke s 60. To clarify the position Sperling J suggests (at [108]) that every expert witness should be first asked to state the assumptions upon which their opinion is based: The witness would only be asked when, how and by whom the history was communicated to the witness if the communication was relevant and admissible as such. Then the evidence of the communication would be led with the same care as evidence of any other relevant communication is led, rather than the witness simply reading from a report in whatever form the communication may be recorded there, as is mostly done now.

General expertise not subject to proof 7.71 Whereas any primary facts from which expert inferences are drawn must be established through admissible evidence, this formal proof is not required at common law in the case of that expert knowledge used by the expert witness to draw inferences from primary facts. Just as the trier’s general knowledge and experience of the world, employed to draw inferences, is not subject to proof through admissible evidence, neither is the similarly employed knowledge and experience of the expert. The Uniform Acts do not specifically refer to this aspect of expert evidence. Where it is common knowledge or knowledge verifiable by reference to a document the authority of which cannot be disputed, and that knowledge is not reasonably open

[page 811] to question, s 144 allows the court to inform itself as it thinks fit: see further 6.65. However, in Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S, Lindgren J, referring to reports of the ALRC, employed s 60 to admit journal reports of clinical studies used by an expert as the basis for the specialised knowledge he used to opine as to the efficacy of a particular drug. The position under the uniform legislation was thereby interpreted to mirror the common law position.446 Thus, if an expert in spectrographic analysis is called to explain the inferences to be drawn from a particular analysis (for example, about the matching of paint specks) the expert knowledge, principally gained through the study of the work of others (hearsay), is not proved, and expertise in the field having been shown, can be acted upon without further proof. If an opponent wishes to dispute that knowledge and its application to the analysis in question, it is necessary to crossexamine the expert, then call another expert in the field to explain the proper limits of the field of spectrographic knowledge and the proper inferences to be drawn. The acquisition of expert knowledge is not an issue of admissible proof even where the basis of that knowledge is easily identified.447 In R v Abadom,448 a scientific officer from the Home Office forensic laboratories was called to identify glass fragments (found in the accused’s shoes) as coming from a window allegedly smashed during the course of a robbery (with which the accused stood charged). The Home Office laboratories had over the years conducted many tests on broken glass presented to them for analysis, and the officer testified that statistics from these tests showed that only 4% of samples had the same refractive index as the glass samples analysed by him on this occasion. The statistical evidence was objected to as based upon hearsay, but the Court of Appeal allowed the evidence as evidence of an expert field of knowledge that could be used to infer the likelihood of the accused having got the glass fragments in his shoes from another source. The court contrasted this general knowledge with the primary facts, that the samples in the present case had a particular refractive index, and explained that while the refractive index of the samples before the court (the primary facts) could only be established through [page 812]

admissible evidence, the expert knowledge used to draw inferences from primary facts did not have to be so proved.449 7.72 A difficult decision is that of Blackburn J in Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd and Commonwealth450 where he allowed anthropologists to give expert evidence based upon conversations they and other anthropologists had held with Aboriginal people, for the purpose of ascertaining the traditional relationship between those people and a particular area of land. In holding the hearsay prohibition inapplicable, Blackburn J explained (at 161): It could not be contended — and was not — that the anthropologists could be allowed to give evidence in the form: ‘Munggurrawuy told me that this was Gumatj land.’ But in my opinion it is permissible for an anthropologist to give evidence in the form: ‘I have studied the social organisation of these aboriginals. This study includes observing their behaviour; talking to them; reading the published work of other experts; applying principles of analysis and verification which are accepted as valid in the general field of anthropology. I express the opinion as an expert that proposition X is true of their social organisation’.

This case is not explicable upon the basis that the experts were allowed to use hearsay information only in establishing their general field of expertise, in turn used to draw inferences from primary facts. The experts were observers to the primary facts and were seeking to employ their anthropological expertise to infer the relationship of the Aboriginal people to the land from these primary facts. Their expertise was necessary to isolate the relevant primary facts. But one of the sources of primary facts upon which the anthropologist exercises skill and knowledge is apparently hearsay evidence, what they are told through conversation with members of the society under scrutiny. To have rejected this information as prohibited hearsay would have been to reject all expert evidence relating to the historical structure of indigenous societies and their beliefs, which depend for a large part upon such information. As Blackburn J pragmatically concluded (at 161): To rule out any conclusion based to any extent upon hearsay — the statements of other persons — would be to make a distinction for the purpose of the law of evidence, between a field of knowledge not involving the behaviour of human beings (say chemistry) and a field of knowledge directly concerned with the behaviour of human beings, such as anthropology.

The case is thus better regarded as illustrating a situation where the hearsay prohibition does not apply or where there is an exception to the general prohibition. [page 813]

Just as a doctor is entitled to rely upon the statements of the patient to determine the patient’s physical or mental condition, so the anthropologist is entitled to rely upon the statements of members of society to determine the organisation and beliefs of that society. It is suggested that the case is not authority for the proposition that the law leaves it to experts to determine the most reliable way of collecting information establishing primary facts and, as a general rule, primary facts must be established through admissible evidence. However, s 60 of the uniform legislation may justify a much wider reference by experts to hearsay evidence.

The opinions of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander groups under the uniform legislation 7.73 Courts in Australia and many other jurisdictions have encountered difficulties with proof in native title, land rights, heritage protection, and many other matters — such as customary law for criminal law, defences, succession and family law.451 Of particular (and arguably surprising) difficulty have been attempts to gather evidence of pre-contact and early post-contact relations,452 along with evidence of practice, custom and secret-sacred knowledge and beliefs.453 At common law, and under the Uniform Acts, after the amendment of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) in 1998, the ordinary rules of evidence were restored to the opinion evidence of indigenous Australians.454 Through recent reforms, the uniform legislation has endeavoured to more readily facilitate the admission of the opinions of individuals from Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander ‘groups’ about the existence and content of ‘traditional laws and customs’.455 Section 78A states: The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion expressed by a member of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander group about the existence or non-existence, or the content, of the traditional laws and customs of the group.

[page 814] ‘Traditional laws and customs’ is defined in the Dictionary and ‘includes any of the traditions, customary laws, customs, observances, practices, knowledge and beliefs of the group’. Section 78A should facilitate the admission of the opinions of indigenous peoples based on oral traditions, hearsay and other cultural practices

and beliefs. This may eliminate some of the problems encountered in Milirrpum and reduce the need for reliance upon the opinions of anthropologists. Significantly, s 78A does not apply to the opinion evidence of non-indigenous anthropologists, archaeologists, linguists and historians. Such experts must justify their testimony under s 79(1) but may refer to hearsay evidence of any research used to justify their specialised knowledge and that may become admissible under s 60 (subject to any exercise of the judicial discretions under ss 135 and 136). Questions of weight, however, remain the province of the fact-finder.456

Facts and inferences are ultimately decided by the trier of fact 7.74 Notwithstanding expert testimony, it remains with the court to decide the existence of the primary facts and the inferences to be drawn from them. Experts are called to assist with these decisions, not to make them for the court. The precise assistance an expert may provide depends upon the facts and issues in particular cases. It is closely related to the issue of reliability generally and, as the analysis in Chapter 1 shows, the precise guidelines to reliability are a matter of eternal uncertainty. Rigorous analysis is the responsibility of the individual judge and trier of fact. Where apparently conflicting expert evidence is called, it is the trier’s responsibility to resolve that conflict. But counsel and judge should assist in explaining in clear and precise terms just what the extent of the conflict is. This requires clear articulation of the chains of inference necessary to reach a particular conclusion so that the points of conflict can be appreciated. If a field of knowledge, or particular technique or methodology, is ruled as a sufficiently reliable basis for expert opinion it should not be subject to serious dispute by experts at trial. Any dispute should be over the application of that accepted knowledge to the particular facts in the case at hand. If there is a dispute about these facts, it should be left to the jury to determine. Consequently, the possibility for dispute where expert evidence has been rigorously presented should in theory be small. Yet many trials degenerate into trials by expert because there remains disagreement about the precise approach to be taken to the inferential analysis of a particular fact situation and many methods have not been appropriately evaluated. More attention to inferential processes, employing perhaps the formal scheme developed by Wigmore and discussed at 1.8–1.11, might assist in narrowing the ambit

[page 815] of expert dispute.457 More practically, careful scrutiny of the relevant field (or fields) or ‘specialised knowledge’, the underlying evidence and the reasoning process(es), might help to prevent the admission of unreliable opinion evidence and thereby prevent gratuitous disagreement. If, ultimately, there remains a conflict of expert opinion about the appropriate inferences to be drawn from particular primary facts upon the basis of a particular area of knowledge, then the trier of fact must decide which expert testimony to act upon. As long as that expert testimony is admissible and credible, an appellate court will be unlikely to interfere, even where the trier appears to have acted upon an opinion held by only a minority of experts.458 Where expert evidence remains uncontradicted, although it may be theoretically rejected, in practice it will have to be accepted by the court, and criminal appeals have succeeded where juries have been directed that they may reject unanimous expert testimony in favour of the accused.459 Decisions may also be overturned if against the weight of evidence. 7.75 Where conflicting expert evidence is at such a level of difficulty and sophistication that the general scientific knowledge of a jury is incapable of deciding, an appropriate direction to the jury may be required. In Chamberlain v R,460 expert analysis of blood conflicted upon whether it was foetal blood and it was impossible for the jury on its own knowledge to determine the blood foetal. It being impossible to find beyond reasonable doubt that the blood was foetal, the court held that this could not be used as a ‘link’ in a circumstantial fact ‘chain’ in determining the guilt of the accused: see the discussion at 2.78. Gleeson CJ and Hayne J in Velevski v R461 recognise that some direction might be required in such circumstances, although holding that in the case before them the jury was perfectly capable of resolving on the evidence conflicting expert evidence about whether wounds had been self-inflicted. Gummow and Callinan JJ (at [177]– [182]), while recognising the need for careful direction where any expert evidence conflicts, were loath to distinguish as a matter [page 816]

of law between ‘difficult and sophisticated’ and ‘simple and unsophisticated’ expert evidence: [It is not] the law, that simply because there is a conflict in respect of difficult and sophisticated expert evidence, even with respect to an important, indeed critical matter, its resolution should for that reason alone be regarded by an appellate court as having been beyond the capacity of the jury to resolve.

Where a party wishes to call further expert testimony to contradict expert testimony adduced by an opponent, the party should first put the substance of those contrary theories to the opponent’s expert to give that expert a fair opportunity to comment upon them. Failure to cross-examine in this way, which contravenes the rule in Browne v Dunn,462 may lead the court to prohibit the further contradictory testimony. At best, the first expert will have to be recalled and the extra expense will have to be borne by the party initially failing to crossexamine.463 Pre-trial disclosure of expert reports by all parties in both civil and criminal cases (see 7.64) goes some way to ensuring that expert evidence is subject to careful scrutiny at trial.

Witnesses testify orally from memory Memory and its refreshment 7.76 Perhaps the central assumption of the common law trial is that the most reliable form of evidence is to be found in the observations (and other experiences) of witnesses to events in issue reported directly to the trier of fact by way of oral testimony. By having witnesses testify in this way the trier can determine for itself their credibility by observing how they testify, and having the advantage of the direct questioning from all parties to the case.464 But for this assumption to be most effective it is important that the witnesses are called soon after the events in issue so that they may testify to their experiences from recent memory. Sadly, this is not possible in most common law jurisdictions, with the heavy business of the courts creating long delays before most cases come to trial. Rather than seeking a system whereby witnesses can be examined orally soon after the events, the common law assumption that witnesses are capable of testifying from memory generally continues to apply in all jurisdictions. The only exceptions apply in some jurisdictions to the testimony of children, vulnerable witnesses and those

[page 817] alleging sexual assault.465 The common law assumption also lies behind ss 32 and 34 of the Uniform Acts.466 One way of realising this assumption in practice is by permitting witnesses to refresh memory in court by referring to documents467 made or adopted by them when their memories were clear(er). The Uniform Acts embody this procedure in s 32. For practical reasons, the common law does not demand that by this process witnesses actually revive their memories. To maintain the oral presentation of testimony, witnesses may ‘refresh’ their memories in court not only by reference to documents which actually revive their memories, but also by reading documents made or adopted by them closer to the events in issue (at a time when memory still existed) so long as they are prepared to vouch in court for the accuracy of the memory in that record. Although s 32 of the uniform legislation uses the terminology of ‘revive’, this has been interpreted as embodying the common law idea of ‘refresh’.468 Giving a court power to permit a witness to read from a document seems to imply the section can be satisfied where the witness’s memory is not actually revived, and in criminal cases police officers are expressly permitted to read their signed contemporaneous reports to the court as their testimony-in-chief under s 33.469 As a result, both at common law and under the uniform legislation, the assumption that witnesses testify orally from [page 818] memory is in some cases a complete fiction. This alone must call into question the very efficacy of the common law oral trial. 7.77 Nevertheless, the assumption is made and witnesses may ‘refresh’ their memories in either of these two senses in court provided certain conditions are met: see 7.79–7.83. But, while being able to ensure these conditions where the memory is refreshed in court, it is impossible to ensure them where the witness revives memory before coming to court. In practice, all witnesses will be carefully proofed by counsel before trial, and encouraged to ‘revive’ their memories by whatever means possible. Although aware of these pre-trial discussions, courts can

do little to control them and, as will be seen at 7.84–7.86, are anyway reluctant to interfere as such ‘revival’ is vital to an oral trial. As a result, the oral testimony given in court may be based upon a memory revived from various sources and, although this may be revealed during the witness’s examination-in-chief or crossexamination, this will not necessarily be so. Where it is revealed, s 34 of the uniform legislation adds to the common law by permitting the court to exclude the oral testimony if the document or thing used is not produced to it.470 This practice of out-of-court refreshment creates an air of unreality to the strict conditions required for in-court refreshment. Consequently, these in-court conditions have more effect upon the use and admissibility of documents in court than upon the conditions under which a witness is permitted to revive memory. 7.78 The final difficulty caused by the common law’s relaxation of the memory requirements is the relationship between the oral testimony of the witness and any document used to refresh memory. Quite sophisticated rules exist to determine the admissibility and use of these documents, rules which further emphasise the artificiality of the common law approach. It is in regard to the admissibility of documents and things used by a witness to attempt to revive memory that the uniform legislation makes the greatest change to the common law. From this perspective the following analysis distinguishes between in-court and out-of-court refreshment of memory and discusses each category separately. Throughout this discussion the distinction between actual revival of memory and the mere preparedness of a witness to vouch for the accuracy of a documented memory is emphasised, as is the relationship between the oral testimony and any materials used for refreshment in either sense. [page 819]

In-court refreshment of memory 7.79 A witness may only refer to a document in court for the purpose of refreshing memory with the permission of the judge.471 At common law, permission will only be granted if the witness can satisfy the judge that accurate memory has run out472 and that the document to which the witness wishes to refer was made (or adopted) by the witness at a time when the events in issue

were still fresh in the witness’s memory. These latter matters may be decided following voir dire examination of the witness.473 The uniform legislation expressly refers to these same conditions (s 32(2)) but only as matters that may be taken into account by the court in deciding whether to permit a witness to use a document in court to attempt to revive memory.474 At common law, a document used to refresh memory need not be actually written or signed by the witness as long as its contents have been affirmed by the witness while the events were still fresh in the witness’s memory.475 This same approach is enacted in s 32(2)(b) of the Uniform Acts. The witness or some other person will have to give evidence of that affirmation. In normal circumstances this will require that the witness has read the document, but in exceptional circumstances, common law authority suggests that a witness may affirm the contents of a document after it has been read to him or her by another.476 [page 820] Thus, at common law, it has been held that a witness may refresh memory from a newspaper report477 or other document prepared by another,478 or by reference to jointly prepared notes, as long as the witness has affirmed those documents and only uses passages in them which embody the witness’s own admissible observations of the facts in issue. In O’Sullivan v Waterman,479 police officers were permitted to refresh their memories from a jointly prepared report (although it could be argued that the dangers of this practice warrant consideration of discretionary exclusion of testimony presented in this manner).480 The use of a joint report would not be appropriate where it produced no recall in the witness and the witness was unable to identify those passages in the report embodying his or her own observations. Where the memory is revived it is not necessary that the document contain all the witness’s observations and it may be used to revive memory on any other matter.481 At common law, the document must have been made at a time when the events remained fresh in the witness’s memory.482 Section 32(2)(b)(i) embodies the same requirement of freshness.483 Although the High Court has suggested, in the context of applying s 66, that under the uniform legislation the temporal aspect of this requirement cannot be ignored, at common law the question of

freshness appears to depend rather upon factors qualitative of memory, such as the complexity or difficulty of the observation, the witness’s education and capacity to retain a memory of events, the uniqueness of the events, the time which has elapsed between the event and the record, and so on. The addition of s 66(2A) appears intended to emphasise that it is this approach that should also be taken to the freshness of memory under the uniform legislation.484 [page 821] 7.80 Once a witness’s memory is revived by reference to a document in court, common law authorities require that the witness continue to testify without reference to the document. Only where the witness is unable to proceed accurately from memory should the document be merely read to the court as the witness’s oral testimony.485 Of course, in practice this is a difficult condition to enforce, and the reality is that a document satisfying the above conditions can be used as a constant aide memoire by the witness, reading those detailed passages where precise recall is important. Section 33 of the uniform legislation permits police in criminal proceedings to testify in-chief by reading or being led through a signed statement made at the time of or soon after the events,486 provided a copy has been provided to the accused a reasonable time before the hearing. Their memory of the events appears irrelevant under this section. 7.81 The assumption is that the witness’s oral testimony remains the primary admissible evidence at all times, so that it is no objection that the memory was refreshed by reference to a document in inadmissible form (for example, an unstamped document).487 But, if the oral testimony is the primary evidence in the case, what then is the status of the document? This question will first be answered at common law before considering important modifications made by the Uniform Acts. To maintain the notion of the oral trial, the common law position is that the document is only a sounding board against which the credibility of the oral testimony may be gauged. The document is used by the witness without tender and on request must be handed to the opponent,488 who may then use its contents for the purpose

[page 822] of discrediting the witness during cross-examination.489 If there are inconsistencies between those parts of the document used by the witness to (allegedly) refresh memory and the witness’s oral testimony-in-chief, the opponent may cross-examine the witness to explain these inconsistencies. If the inconsistency is admitted by the witness, whether with or without an accompanying explanation, the document has served its discrediting purpose and there is no need for any part of it to be tendered to the court.490 If, on the other hand, the witness denies the inconsistency or does not admit its full extent, that part of the document containing the inconsistency may be tendered by the opponent to establish it. The statement in the document that thereby becomes admitted in evidence may be referred to by the trier only for the purpose of gauging the reliability of the witness’s oral testimony. At common law, the statement is not admissible evidence of any assertions of fact contained in it. The statement may be used negatively to discredit the witness but not positively to establish the contradictory fact. Only if during cross-examination the witness admits the truth of the contradictory fact will there be admissible evidence of it from that witness at common law.491 By this approach, the primacy of the oral testimony is retained. 7.82 This procedure gives rise to a number of practical problems. In the first place, the opponent may suggest inconsistencies during cross-examination, which are denied by the witness, but not substantiate these by tender of the document. In this situation, the party calling the witness may re-examine to dispel the innuendo and, if this cannot be satisfactorily achieved without the trier seeing the relevant parts of the document, these may be tendered during re-examination.492 The purpose of the tender is to maintain the creditworthiness of the witness’s oral testimony and those parts of the document tendered may therefore only be relied upon for this purpose at common law. [page 823] Secondly, the opponent may during cross-examination make reference to parts of the document, not used by the witness to refresh memory and unrelated to the

creditworthiness of the witness’s oral testimony, for the purpose of attempting to reveal these further matters to the court. For example, the document may contain notes written by a person other than the witness called and it may be made apparent in cross-examination that the document contains such matters.493 Such reference to inadmissible documentary material is not technically permitted, but the common law nevertheless gives the party calling the witness a further option in these circumstances, to insist that the cross-examining party tender that documentary material in evidence. The forced tender is justified on adversary grounds. A party calling for material that a party is not entitled to inspect may be obliged to tender it, and similarly a party cross-examining on material to which reference ought not have been made may be obliged to tender it.494 Furthermore, such authorities as there are suggest that in these circumstances the whole of the document should go in,495 and that it becomes admissible evidence of its entire contents, hearsay notwithstanding.496 Where a party wishes to oblige tender in these circumstances, tender should as a general rule be sought during cross-examination, so that the cross-examining party at least has the opportunity to continue cross-examination in explanation of the document.497 In exceptional circumstances, later tender may be permitted.498 But the third and most significant practical problem arises where the witness is unable to revive any memory independently of the document. As mentioned above, in [page 824] this situation a witness may vouch for and read a document as his or her testimony.499 But when the document is inspected by the opponent, what course can be taken in cross-examination to test the credibility of the ‘oral’ testimony? In reality, the oral and documentary testimony are one, and some judges have suggested that this should be recognised by insisting that the party calling the witness tender the document as the primary evidence in these circumstances.500 The difficulty with this would be that the evidence of such witnesses would be put before the trier of fact in documentary form.501 To mitigate this consequence, other judges suggest that the option of tender should be with the opponent in these circumstances; that, in other words, the opponent may ask the party calling the witness to tender the document.502 The recognition that the

evidence is, in reality, documentary, can be found in these circumstances in the common law’s insistence that, unless the opponent does not object, the original document should be produced and read. That is, the rule with respect to admissible documentary evidence applies.503 Where the memory is revived, courts have not insisted upon production of the original.504 7.83 The Uniform Acts retain the procedure whereby a witness can be crossexamined about previous inconsistent statements (s 43) and these may be proved where denied — although where the statement is caught by the credibility rule (s 102),505 the witness must deny the substance of the evidence before the previous statement can be proved (s 106). But once admitted to discredit the witness, the representations in the statement are also admissible to the extent that they are hearsay: s 60. The common law limit on credibility use is therefore to this extent modified by the uniform legislation. But more fundamentally, in a civil case, under s 64, either party may simply tender first-hand hearsay in a document and in a criminal case, under s 66, may tender [page 825] that hearsay document ‘if, when the representation was made, the occurrence of the asserted fact was fresh in the memory of’ the witness. The effect of these sections is that, whether the witness’s memory is revived or not, in these situations his or her documentary statement about observed events may simply be tendered as evidence of the facts in issue. The requirement ‘fresh in the witness’s memory’ is the same as that used in s 32 of the Act and s 66(2A) makes it clear that freshness is not simply the temporal connection suggested by the majority in Graham v R.506 In one respect the Uniform Acts may narrow the common law. Section 35 abolishes the common law rule whereby a party calling for or inspecting a document to which he or she is not entitled may be obliged to tender it; as this rule underlies the common law allowing the opponent to insist on tender of a document where the cross-examination extends beyond the parts used to refresh memory, an opponent may not be able to insist upon such tender under the uniform legislation.507

In other jurisdictions, legislation permits the tender of documentary evidence in exception to the hearsay rule in certain situations and these may apply to extend the use of documents used to refresh memory. No general attempt has been made to take oral evidence closer to observed events, but courts are empowered to take evidence where witnesses are ill or likely to be unavailable (powers exercised only in exceptional cases) and, as discussed at 7.33–7.34, legislation permits statements and videoed interviews given by children, vulnerable witnesses and alleged victims of sexual crimes closer to the events to be admitted in exception to the hearsay rule.

Out-of-court refreshment of memory 7.84 As mentioned above, strict conditions for refreshment of memory are only enforceable where the witness refreshes memory in court. In view of the difficulty of policing refreshment out of court, and of the dependence of the trial upon such preparation, the common law makes little attempt to control such refreshment.508 At common law, if the court has drawn to its attention the fact that a witness has refreshed memory out of court, and that memory has been revived, the oral testimony remains technically admissible without production of the document used to revive [page 826] the memory.509 However, the opponent is entitled to call for the document without being obliged to tender it, and failure to produce it may affect the credibility of the witness. Furthermore, if the document is important the court may, pursuant to its inherent510 or statutory powers,511 insist upon production, with a stay of proceedings being the ultimate sanction against a party in contempt. Under s 34 of the Uniform Acts, the court may order production of any document or thing used to try to revive memory out of court and if it is not produced without reasonable excuse may exclude the testimony altogether. Where the document is produced the situation becomes as if memory had been revived in court as far as cross-examination and tender are concerned.512 7.85 At common law, as production of the reviving document is not

obligatory, it appears that the oral testimony remains admissible whatever the nature of the document that has been used to revive the memory. It need not be a document made contemporaneously with the events observed513 and, while there is no logical reason why the document should be made by the witness, it will in a sense be adopted as it revives memory. The important point is that the witness is prepared to testify in court on the basis of a revived memory and without the assistance in court of any aide memoire. In these circumstances, the oral testimony must be regarded as paramount. Consequently, in R v Da Silva,514 where a witness’s memory had lapsed in court and the judge had permitted an adjournment to allow the witness to revive his memory by looking at a noncontemporaneous statement made by him to the police, the Court of Appeal held the procedure perfectly justifiable because the witness was prepared to come back into court and testify from memory without any further assistance from the document. In these circumstances, the contemporaneity of the document was not crucial (although may have been relevant to credit). Although under the Uniform Acts production of any document or thing used to try to revive memory can be obliged as a condition of admissibility, as the witness testifies from a revived memory and makes no request to use the document in court, the time and conditions under which the document or thing was made are, as at common law, irrelevant to the ability of the witness to testify from memory. This being so, the power to declare testimony inadmissible if the document or thing is not produced might be seen as merely a threat to ensure production of the aide memoire, not to ensure that the witness uses only particular documents or things to revive memory. [page 827] 7.86 If it is discovered by the opponent that the witness has ‘refreshed’ his or her memory out of court and memory has not been revived (where the witness will admit to having merely memorised an out-of-court document), and the opponent calls for the document, the common law is stricter. The oral testimony cannot be left to stand unless the document — the original document if counsel insists — is produced.515 Once it has been produced, the situation is as if the witness had read the document in court. Therefore, the strict requirements for the use of documents in court must be satisfied if insisted upon by opposing

counsel. It must be the original and must have been made or adopted by the witness when the events were fresh in the witness’s memory. This recognises that in such a situation it is in reality the document that is the evidence in the case (although, as explained above, the option may be given to the opponent whether to tender it). Under the Uniform Acts, memorised testimony is admissible if the witness has not asked to refer to any document in court — so s 32 does not apply — and has, if directed, produced the document memorised — so that s 34 is satisfied. The only remaining question will be that of credibility. These out-of-court rules depend upon the opponent discovering the fact of, and the nature of, the refreshment. There is a strong argument that parties should disclose in all cases (criminal as well as civil) the fact and nature of refreshment prior to the trial and have available, at least at the trial, the documents used for this purpose. Discovery rules (see 5.4ff) may result in disclosure of such documents but there is no right to be informed of out-of-court refreshment. In some circumstances, failure to do so may produce a miscarriage of justice.516

Prior statements of witnesses General rule: prior consistent statements inadmissible 7.87 To maintain the system of trial whereby witnesses report their observations directly and orally to the court, the prior statements of witnesses are as a general rule inadmissible at common law. Where tendered to prove the assertions of fact contained in them they are hearsay. The witness is available to make the same assertions orally on oath and subject to cross-examination and the common law generally insists that testimony be presented in this form. The prior statement is in this sense unnecessary to establish the facts asserted in it. But while unnecessary for this purpose, the prior statement may be of crucial importance in determining the credibility of the witness’s oral testimony. [page 828] For this reason, in cross-examination an opponent can put to a witness prior inconsistent statements relating to the events in issue — not (as a general rule) to establish the contradictory version (for that would breach the hearsay rule), but to

discredit the testimony given in the witness box. This important aspect of crossexamination is described more fully at 7.147–7.152, and it will be seen that where the witness denies the prior statement it may be independently proved. 7.88 Although a witness’s prior consistent statements have a similar relevance to credit they are generally not admissible at common law. In the first place, this can be seen simply as one aspect of a wider ‘bolster rule’, which, both at common law and under the uniform legislation (ss 101A, 102), generally prohibits the party calling a witness from tendering evidence in support of that witness’s credibility: see further at 7.116. Such evidence can be tendered neither through examination-in-chief of the witness nor through the calling of other evidence. There is no reason for a party to produce such evidence, at least until that witness’s credibility has been put in issue. But furthermore, even where credit is in issue, one must always be suspicious that the previous consistent statements of a party’s own witnesses may have been concocted. Therefore, as a general rule at common law, and (at least formally) under the uniform legislation, a party is prohibited from adverting to or tendering evidence of the previous consistent statement of his or her own witness, irrespective of whether the statement is tendered as hearsay evidence or as relevant to the witness’s credit. The strictness of the bolster rule at common law insofar as it applies to prior consistent statements is illustrated by Corke v Corke and Cook.517 In divorce proceedings the husband alleged adultery that the wife denied on oath. Her credit was crucial to the case. To support her denial she sought to establish that when challenged by her husband immediately after the alleged adultery she thereupon sought medical examination, believing it could demonstrate that no intercourse had occurred. She had contacted a doctor who had refused to examine her on the basis that it would establish nothing. This conversation with the doctor was excluded as merely a previous consistent denial of adultery by the wife. In applying the rule strictly, the majority emphasised the ease with which such testimony could be manufactured. In R v Martin (No 2),518 Doyle CJ considered whether the prior statements of a key prosecution witness who had testified to the accused’s confession to her could be admitted to show that she had not acted in the vindictive way suggested by the defence in her cross-examination. The Chief Justice refused to permit tender of the statements, although relevant to the witness’s credit, commenting (at 441–2): … any principle that would allow the admission of the evidence that the judge admitted in this case

would be capable of extension to a good many other cases, and is likely to lead to fairly lengthy detours in the course of a trial; to the examination of evidence

[page 829] which will often be of questionable weight; to the production of evidence in court which is readily open to fabrication, or which will depend to a large degree upon an impression formed by the witness called to relate an out-of-court statement or out-of-court conduct. That is not to say that there will not be cases where, as here, it might be thought that on balance the benefits of admitting the evidence outweigh the drawbacks. However, it is necessary to have a general rule, and for the reasons that I have indicated I favour a general rule excluding such evidence.

The rule applies as strictly to an accused as to any other witness. Although the prior admissions of an accused are admissible, the rationale for admitting admissions (statements against interest) as hearsay does not extend to permit an accused who testifies to call evidence of prior consistent statements: R v Callaghan.519 The only situation where these may be referred to at common law is where they are self-serving statements made on the same occasion as admissional statements and which tend to explain those admissions (see 8.106–8.108), but once the admission is excluded the accused has no right to tender the self-serving statements: R v Byster.520 7.89 However, where credit has been put in issue, particularly where that credibility is likely to be decisive of the case (as was the position of the complainants’ testimony in HML v R)521 there are strong arguments for not applying the bolster rule. One might argue that in this situation any distinction between evidence relevant only to credibility and evidence relevant to the issue breaks down as the credibility evidence becomes decisive of the issue: see further discussion at 7.116. And in other situations where the credibility of a witness is in issue a prior consistent statement may be of such clear support to the witness’s credibility that it seems churlish to exclude it. Furthermore, where the previous statement is made in circumstances strongly suggestive of the reliability of the assertions of fact contained in it, one might also argue that the statement should be admitted as hearsay evidence of those asserted facts. There are, as a consequence, at common law, a number of exceptions to the general rule that prior consistent statements are inadmissible. 7.90 The uniform legislation states in s 102 that ‘credibility evidence about a

witness is not admissible’.522 The intention of this section (made clear by s 101A) is to reflect the common law ‘bolster rule’ by ensuring that evidence relevant to credibility and not otherwise relevant and admissible is generally excluded. This includes a witness’s prior consistent statements. Section 108 then permits tender in circumstances akin to those where the common law exceptionally allows tender in support of the witness’s credit (discussed in the sections to follow). [page 830] But, as at common law, there are many situations under the Uniform Acts where prior consistent statements containing assertions relevant to proving the material facts in issue are independently admissible as hearsay evidence. Once a statement is admitted as hearsay there are seldom strong reasons for preventing any credibility use. As a consequence, where a statement is independently admissible as hearsay, s 101A provides that the credibility prohibition does not apply to it. But, most significantly, the uniform legislation admits the first-hand hearsay statements of witnesses in every case in civil proceedings and, where the statement was made when the events were fresh in the witness’s memory, also in criminal proceedings. As a result, the credibility prohibition in s 102 seldom applies to them. This very substantially undermines the general formal prohibitions in the uniform legislation against the tender of a witness’s prior consistent statements. The following discussion concentrates upon those situations where the common law admits prior statements as credibility evidence in exception to the general rule. It also explains how the legal consequences in these situations are altered by the uniform legislation. The hearsay exceptions generally are not the principal focus of this discussion. These are explained for children and vulnerable witnesses at 7.33–7.34 and more generally in Chapter 8. However, because of the substantial impact of some of the uniform legislation hearsay exceptions upon the situations where the common law admits a witness’s prior statements only as credibility evidence, these are also considered as part of this discussion. Testimony induced through hypnosis is also discussed as a technique for producing prior statements by a witness which may be relevant not just to the credibility of the witness’s in-court testimony but which may lay claims to reliability in their own right.

Exception: prior statements rebutting alleged invention 7.91 At common law, where in cross-examination it has been suggested that the witness’s account is of recent invention or concoction (conscious or unconscious) and this suggestion can be rebutted through evidence of a consistent statement by the witness, for example, a statement made before the suggested grounds for invention or concoction arose, that consistent statement may be established in re-examination or rebuttal.523 The uniform legislation enacts this exception in s 108(3)(b), but it additionally allows proof of the prior consistent statement where the suggestion has or will be made. The recent invention exception is a clear example of a situation where the consistent statement is of such relevance to the witness’s credibility (and has been made relevant [page 831] through the suggestions of the opponent) that the general prohibition gives way — but only, at common law, insofar as the consistent statement is relevant to the credibility of the testimony orally given (the consistent statement is not evidence of its contents).524 The situation is otherwise by virtue of s 60 of the uniform legislation, which provides that once admitted for a non-hearsay purpose previous representations may also be used as hearsay: see 8.194. 7.92 At common law, this exception applies only in the strictest of circumstances.525 The cross-examiner must suggest a ground for the invention of an important material fact and the consistent statement must be capable of rebutting that ground. In Nominal Defendant v Clements,526 it was suggested the plaintiff had been coached by his father and this could be rebutted by a consistent statement made to the police before any opportunity for coaching arose. By contrast, in Mapp v Stephens,527 a suggestion that the witness had invented evidence to overcome amnesia supervening upon an accident to the witness was not rebutted by a previous consistent statement also made subsequent to the accident and therefore open to the same suggestion.528 With the operation of this exception subtle and so dependent upon the actual course of cross-examination and the precise grounds alleged for invention, appellate courts are reluctant to

interfere with decisions made by trial judges. In this sense, whether rebuttal is allowed is a matter for the discretion of the trial judge.529 A less demanding requirement for suggestion may be imposed by the formulation contained in s 108(3)(b):530 The credibility rule does not apply to evidence of a prior consistent statement of a witness if … it is or will be suggested (either expressly or by implication) that evidence

[page 832] given by the witness has been fabricated or reconstructed (whether deliberately or otherwise) or is the result of a suggestion … and the court gives leave.

7.93 At common law, there is no general right to tender prior consistent statements in order to re-establish the credit of a witness, even where credit has been attacked through proof of prior inconsistent statements. In limited circumstances, prior statements may be referred to in re-examination and even proved if this is necessary to clear up an ambiguity or misapprehension arising from cross-examination.531 But there is no general right to prove prior consistent statements on a witness’s credit being attacked.532 However, it may be otherwise under the uniform legislation, which simply provides in s 108(3)(a): The credibility rule does not apply to evidence of a prior consistent statement of a witness if … evidence of a prior inconsistent statement of the witness has been admitted … and the court gives leave.

As discussed at 7.90, as a result of the hearsay exceptions in the uniform legislation there will be many situations where the credibility prohibition in the uniform legislation will not apply to a prior statement also of relevance to a witness’s credibility (for example, where a first-hand hearsay is statement admitted under ss 64 and 66). But where it does apply, s 108 appears to go further than the common law in permitting the re-establishment of credibility through proof of prior consistent statements.533 And once admissible for this credibility purpose, representations in the prior statements then become admissible as hearsay under s 60 (see 8.194), subject to any warning requested under s 165, and subject to any limit on use being imposed under s 136.534

Exception: prior statements identifying accused 7.94 There is considerable debate surrounding the admissibility of evidence of

an out-of-court identification.535 If admissible without the identifying witness being called, then such evidence, tendered as an out-of-court assertion of identity, would constitute a true exception to the hearsay rule. On the other hand, if admissible only where the identifying witness is also called to identify someone (usually an accused) [page 833] in court, then the evidence may better be regarded as a true exception to the rule prohibiting tender of prior consistent statements as simply self-serving. The hearsay rule demands that any witness make their assertions of observed facts at trial before the trier of fact. In the case of identification evidence this means that the witness must identify the suspect (or other person) in court. Evidence of a prior identification is not only hearsay evidence but also, where an identification has been made in court, evidence of a prior consistent statement contravening the bolster rule: see discussion at 7.88, 7.116. But in practice, although witnesses are obliged to identify the suspect (or other person) in court, the witness will almost always have previously identified the accused. Indeed, unless the suspect is well known to the witness, the High Court has held that incourt identification testimony will generally be of very little value where the witness is asked to identify the accused for the first time since observation at trial,536 for it is all too easy for the witness simply to point to the person in the dock. It is therefore fundamental to the credibility of an in-court identification that the witness has identified the accused previously in more reliable circumstances. Generally, the preferred out-of-court process of identification is that made at a properly constituted identification parade, but at common law, the High Court has not insisted upon this and will accept other forms, including identification from photographs, even where an identification parade could have been held.537 The position under the uniform legislation is stricter and in-court identification evidence may be inadmissible unless an identification parade has previously been held: s 114; and see further at 4.69. Furthermore, in many jurisdictions these out-of-court processes of identification are now routinely recorded and it may be argued that this record is the most reliable evidence of the identification. If this is the case, it seems to make little sense to insist that the witness repeat the identification in court,

particularly where the degree of confidence has increased without credible justification. Because increased — but unjustified — confidence levels pertaining to identification, from cues such as consensus or reinforcement, are notorious.538 7.95 While neither the common law nor the uniform legislation has altered the requirement that a witness make their identification in court, nevertheless, as a consequence of some of the above reasoning, it has been held, in apparent contravention of the bolster rule, that where a witness identifies in court an accused [page 834] previously unknown to him or her539 and the accuracy of his or her identification is in dispute, then that witness may also testify in examination-in-chief to any prior recognition and its circumstances to explain the basis and hence reliability of the in-court identification testimony. Given that identification testimony is notoriously fragile, and that it is the first identification that is normally crucial to a witness’s reconstructed memory of identity, common sense, as well as authority,540 suggest that these matters are relevant to the credit of the witness, and can be taken into account. The witness may also tender any photographs,541 identikit pictures542 or digi-board543 used in the out-of-court identification process (unless the court excludes these as unduly prejudicial). Insofar as the witness may testify to the prior identification itself, that is simply evidence of a prior consistent statement, admitted in exception to the general rule because of its vital importance to the witness’s credibility.544 Assuming then that credibility remains in issue, once the identifying witness has testified to the out-of-court identification and its circumstances, an independent witness to these matters may also be called in confirmation.545 While the identification is confirmed by proof of the identifying witness’s previous consistent statement (that is, ‘that is the person’), the circumstances are confirmed by the independent witness’s direct observation of them. The confirmation of both matters is allowed as they are vital to the credibility of the identifying witness’s oral testimony.546 Where a witness identifies the accused in court, but is not asked (during examination-in-chief or cross-examination) about the previous identification and

its circumstances, dicta suggest it would be improper to call another witness to these [page 835] matters.547 If the credibility of the witness is in issue this situation is extremely unlikely to occur except through oversight or negligence. If it does occur the problem is that the prior identification and its circumstances should first be put to the identifying witness for comment in satisfaction of the rule in Browne v Dunn.548 If necessary, a trial judge could recall the identifying witness who had not testified about these matters. 7.96 So far the common law rules we have been examining suggest no general exception to the hearsay rule. The importance of evidence relating to out-ofcourt identification is its usefulness in assessing the credibility of oral testimony. Hearsay questions only arise at common law when the identifying witness is not called, or, if called, is unable (or refuses) to identify the accused in court. Such authority that exists differs on the question of whether evidence of the prior identification and its surrounding circumstances is generally admissible in exception to the hearsay rule. Where an identifying witness is called and able to testify to the fact of a prior identification, but is unable to recall the person identified and is unable to identify the accused in court, that prior identification and its circumstances may be proved through calling another witness (and tendering any relevant photographs). Alexander v R stands for this proposition.549 But the court divided on whether the prior identification would be admissible without the identifying witness’s testimony of the fact of an out-of-court act of identification.550 Mason and Aickin JJ supported the view that it would still be admissible, and later authorities follow this approach.551 But there is no decided [page 836] authority permitting admission of a prior identification where the identifying witness is not called to testify at all. While it may be that it is the identification made in more reliable circumstances that gives weight to identification testimony in court it may be

argued that, given the suspect nature of identification evidence, it is inappropriate to admit evidence of an out-of-court identification in exception to the hearsay rule except where the identification witness is also called to identify the accused (or other person) in court. Exceptionally, where the identifying witness cannot identify the accused in court through a lapse of memory or the changed appearance of the accused, but swears in court that an identification was made, it may be permissible to establish an out-of-court identification by calling other witnesses to it, despite that testimony being logically hearsay.552 At least the witness can still be cross-examined to some extent about the fact of identification and its circumstances in determining the reliability of the identification. Where the witness has no memory of an out-of-court identification or refuses to recall that identification — and, indeed, may be hostile — less reason exists for admitting the hearsay evidence of the identification. 7.97 The Uniform Acts take a complicated but ultimately more generous approach to the admission of evidence of identifications made out of court. In a criminal case where a witness identifies a defendant in court the witness’s prior consistent identifying statement may be caught by the credibility rule (ss 101A, 102) where it fails to satisfy the test of hearsay admissibility under s 66 (for example, where the assertion of identity was not made when fresh in the witness’s memory). If so caught the prior statement might still be admitted under s 108(3) as a prior consistent statement following admission of a prior inconsistent statement or to support a challenge that the witness has reconstructed (deliberately or otherwise) his or her testimony, and if so admissible s 60 would also admit its hearsay use. It may be more difficult to justify evidence given inchief of the surrounding circumstances of the prior identification insofar as this evidence seems relevant only to the witness’s credibility and thus caught by the credibility rule. Nor does s 108A (numbered s 107 in the Tasmanian Act) apply as the person who made the representation has been called. But the opposing party will be able to cross-examine about these matters under s 103 where it ‘could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness’553 and furthermore the credibility rule does not apply to re-examination: s 108(1). [page 837] If a witness testifies and refuses to identify the accused and is declared adverse

under s 38, the prior identification may be introduced through cross-examination of the witness and if denied might be proved under s 43 as a prior inconsistent statement. Once so admitted, s 60 would apply to allow its hearsay use.554 7.98 But where the identifying witness is called as a witness (whether or not he or she identifies the accused or recalls any prior identification), the hearsay use of the prior identification (clearly caught by s 59) will, in civil proceedings, generally be admitted under s 64, and in criminal proceedings, will be admitted under s 66 if the representation was made while the occurrence was still fresh in the memory of the person who made it.555 If s 64 or s 66 are satisfied, the credibility rule will not apply to exclude evidence of the prior identification: ss 101A, 102. In R v Barbaro and Rovero,556 it was held that not merely the act of identification but also the occasion upon which it is based (the crime charged) are the facts asserted that must be fresh in the memory to satisfy s 66. However, where the crime occurred long before the identification, these sections may yet be satisfied if the witness, although unable to identify the accused in court, testifies to the prior act of identification and that the person he or she then identified was the person who committed the crime. If the first of these assertions is fresh in the witness’s memory so necessarily will be the second and s 66 is thus satisfied for both.557 If the witness is not called, in civil cases a witness to the identification can be called to give evidence of the out-of-court assertion (s 63), and s 108A (numbered s 107 in the Tasmanian Act) would also permit evidence relating to the surrounding circumstances as of substantial probative value, but in criminal cases, unless perhaps admitted exceptionally as sufficiently reliable under s 65(2) (c), the identification evidence seems to be inadmissible hearsay.

Recent complaints in sexual assault cases 7.99 Another true common law exception to the general prohibition against previous consistent statements is evidence of a victim’s complaint of assault made shortly after the assault as alleged in oral testimony.558 The High Court has held that, [page 838]

despite the confused historical origins of this exception, it operates only to admit a recent complaint in support of the complainant’s oral testimony, and not in general exception to the hearsay rule.559 If the complainant does not testify then the previous complaint is not admissible. The High Court has also held that it is not strictly necessary that the complainant testify to the recent complaint as long as he or she testifies to the crime so that the consistency of his or her testimony is in issue.560 7.100 The origin of the admissibility of complaints is quite at odds with the modern rule. In medieval times where a woman alleged rape, failure to raise an immediate ‘hue and cry’ was taken as evidence of consent, so that it was necessary for evidence of complaint to be given. The evidence was directly admissible to the issue of consent. In practice, the complainant would always testify so that the complaint could be interpreted as also going to their credibility. Emphasising this aspect, courts allowed evidence of a complaint in sexual crimes where consent was not an element of the offence,561 although the complaint was still admissible as independent evidence of failure to consent where this remained an element of the sexual offence (and therefore the complaint was technically admissible even where the complainant failed [page 839] to give relevant testimony). The High Court has now firmly rejected any inferences of consent from failure to complain and, in so holding in Kilby v R,562 it emphasised that a complaint is now only ever admissible in support of a complainant’s credibility, whether or not consent is in issue.563 7.101 Thus, although beginning as a true exception to the hearsay rule, the recent complaint rule is now at common law merely an exception to the rule prohibiting a witness’s prior consistent statements. In practice, complainants must always testify to secure a conviction, particularly where a crime involving nonconsent is alleged, and the High Court recognises the need for this in its approach. The justification for still allowing a recent complaint to be admitted to determine the complainant’s credit probably lies in the difficulty of finding independent evidence of sexual crimes, and it gives some added weight to a complainant’s allegations. But there is some ambivalence here, for common law judges have always required at least a warning about the possibly unreliable

testimony of the complainant in a sexual assault and a preference for corroboration,564 and they have always been adamant that, although admissible, a recent complaint cannot constitute that corroboration, not being evidence sufficiently independent of the complainant.565 That legislation which has abolished the requirement of the corroboration warning in sexual assault cases may be regarded as removing some of this incongruity,566 but only in some jurisdictions does that legislation prohibit judges from warning altogether; in the others the warning continues often to be given.567 In all, the admissibility of complaints can be regarded as an anomalous but important exception to the rule prohibiting revelation of a witness’s [page 840] prior consistent statements. Its importance is emphasised in Queensland and South Australia where the exception is no longer limited to ‘recent’ complaints.568 7.102 The position of a complaint under the uniform legislation is somewhat complex but ultimately it seems a complaint will generally be admitted. If relevant and admissible only to credibility, the complaint is excluded by the credibility rule (ss 101A, 102), but given its usual significance and admissibility as firsthand hearsay under s 66, the credibility rule will seldom apply to exclude it. If for some reason s 66 does not apply and the credibility rule remains operative the complaint may be admissible to support the witness’s credibility by leave of the court under s 108(3) as a prior consistent statement rebutting a suggestion of fabrication that has or will be made.569 Hunt CJ was of the view in R v BD570 that such was the importance of complaints in sexual assault cases that leave would always have to be granted to permit tender of evidence of a complaint unless the accused through counsel states expressly that no suggestion is to be made that the complainant’s evidence is the result of fabrication. Nevertheless, leave must be sought and if the complaint is not otherwise admissible an appeal will succeed unless leave would inevitably have been given571 or counsel has acquiesced to the tender for tactical reasons.572 Once admissible to rebut fabrication, it becomes evidence of the truth of what was said pursuant to s 60, unless its use is limited pursuant to s 136 on grounds of unfair prejudice.

However, as indicated above, as a statement made when events were fresh in the witness’s memory the complaint will be admissible under s 66(2) in exception to the hearsay prohibition, unless the residual discretions in s 136 or s 137 apply. Smart JA (at 147) in R v BD was of the view that the use should generally be limited to credibility, but Hunt CJ disagreed (at 139), noting that the warning that may be requested under s 165 in respect of hearsay evidence would generally meet any argument against leaving the hearsay use to the jury. This matter was considered in Papakosmas v R,573 where the High Court held that the Uniform Acts were intended to alter the common law and admit as hearsay complaints which satisfied the hearsay exceptions to the Acts, and it was not prepared to undermine this clear legislative intent either by reading down the concept of relevance under s 55(1), limiting the use of the evidence to credibility under s 136, [page 841] or exercising the discretionary and mandatory exclusions against the hearsay use of a complaint under s 135 or s 137. 7.103 The application of the common law rule admitting recent complaints has generated much litigation. It has been held to apply to all manner of crimes arising out of a sexual relationship, irrespective of consent and the genders involved:574 rape, carnal knowledge, unlawful sexual intercourse and offences alleging gross indecency between males. But it appears that the exception does not extend to other crimes involving personal violence.575 The logic behind this is not obvious. The exception is justified by the importance of the witness’s credibility and the significance of the complaint in supporting this. It is arguable that a complaint should be admissible whatever the crime so long as it may be expected and is probative of the credibility of the complainant. Certainly an appeal by an accused against the reception of such evidence in a non-sexual case would be unlikely to succeed on application of the proviso (that there has been no substantial miscarriage of justice). 7.104 It is for the judge to determine as a matter of law whether there is sufficient evidence of a complaint for it to be left to the trier of fact. At one time only the fact of the complaint could be left to the trier, not its terms, but it was held in R v Lillyman576 that the terms of the complaint should be left to the jury

to enable it to draw the appropriate inferences about credibility.577 The jury must be clearly directed that the complaint can only be used to support the complainant’s testimony and is not to be used as hearsay evidence of the alleged assault.578 But it remains with the trial judge to determine whether the conditions for the operation of the exception have been satisfied. Authority suggests that there are three conditions to be satisfied: there must be evidence of a complaint (that is, a statement containing an element of grievance or accusation rather than merely narrating events)579 alleging an offence of a sexual nature (and not merely related non-sexual offences);580 the complaint must have been made at the first opportunity after the offence which reasonably offers itself; and the complaint [page 842] must not have been the result of questions of a leading and inducing or intimidating character — that is, in this sense, the complaint must have been spontaneous.581 7.105 Despite the anomalous nature of the complaints exception, on the whole courts have refused to approach these conditions with undue technicality and remain guided by the overall probative value of the complaint in determining the complainant’s credibility. The complaint need not mention the specific sexual offence as long as this can be inferred;582 a complaint may be inferred from a stressful narration;583 the first opportunity is the first reasonable opportunity (and the matter must be looked at from the point of view of the distressed complainant);584 and only leading questions which clearly rob the complaint of its relationship to the alleged incident will prevent the consequent complaint going to the jury.585 Yet courts remain wary of late complaints made without emotion and where the inference of fabrication is strong.586 7.106 It is said that previous decisions on the application of these conditions should be treated as individual decisions of fact, not technical and binding precedents. Thus, the Full Court in R v Freeman587 observed: The ultimate question must always be does the ‘complaint’, in the circumstances in which it was uttered, tend to buttress the prosecutrix’s credit as a witness.

The problem with this formulation is that every consistent statement of a witness

will to some degree buttress credibility, yet the common law exception is not intended to encompass every previous statement of the complainant (it might be argued that s 108(3)(b) of the uniform legislation should be so liberally interpreted). Rather, the exception appears to only admit those statements that might reasonably be concluded [page 843] to have been provoked by the assault. This conclusion will in every case depend upon an admixture of accusation, spontaneity and contemporaneity. But these are indicators only and are better not interpreted independently to produce technical and arbitrary conditions for admissibility. For example, it seems pointless to attempt to clearly distinguish ‘narration’ from ‘complaint’.588 The question is whether the statement can be regarded as provoked by the assault. In this way the apparently non-accusatory statements of children might be regarded as complaints. It is this requirement that legislation in Queensland and South Australia has removed by admitting more generally an initial complaint.589 7.107 It should be emphasised that, just as the presence of a complaint is admissible to reinforce credit, so too can the opponent refer to the absence of complaint in seeking to discredit the complainant. Kilby v R590 holds that, although no inference of consent can be inferred directly from such absence, the trier is entitled to use it to doubt the complainant’s testimony. In New South Wales, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia, the jury is required to be warned that failure or delay in complaining should not automatically be regarded as capable of discrediting the witness and other good reasons may exist for such failure or hesitation.591 It is doubtful whether this adds significantly to the warning required at common law (which has been held to co-exist with the New South Wales legislation).592 The trial judge’s direction must be fair and where a failure to complain may give rise to an inference against the complainant should ensure the jury is left to decide whether to draw such an inference.593 In Queensland (Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 s 4A(4)) and South Australia (Evidence Act 1929 s 34M(2)) no suggestion can be made to the jury that failure or delay in complaining is of itself of any probative value in relation to the reliability of the complainant’s testimony.594

[page 844] 7.108 Where failure to complain is relied upon by an accused the prosecution is entitled to call evidence to show that this inference should not be drawn. In R v C,595 the prosecution sought to call a psychiatrist to establish child sexual assault accommodation syndrome as an explanation for the failure of the child to complain. Although recognising the prosecution’s entitlement to rehabilitate the credit of the complainant, the evidence was not admitted as, first, the syndrome was not proved to be a scientifically established body of knowledge and, secondly, the court felt evidence of the syndrome would add nothing to the jury’s common knowledge about children’s reluctance to complain. Although the decision in R v C has been followed in later cases, they leave open the possibility that a field of expert knowledge might be established that would assist the jury in such a matter.596 The Uniform Acts have been revised to eliminate ‘doubt’ about the potential admissibility of expert opinion evidence pertaining to ‘child development and child behaviour (including specialised knowledge of the impact of sexual abuse on children and their development and behaviour during and following the abuse’ (Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) ss 79(2), (3), 79A), even where the opinion is limited to the credibility of the witness (s 108C).597 The inclusion of these didactic subsections does not circumvent the requirement for ‘specialised knowledge’ under s 79(1) or the need to balance probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant: s 137.

Statements induced by hypnosis 7.109 As emphasised at 7.76, in the context of rules for refreshing memory, a major problem with the common law trial is its reliance upon memory and the fact that trials often take place years after the event. Legislation referred to in 7.34 shows how technology may be used to overcome this problem, but such provisions do not provide generally for testimony to be taken closer to the events in issue. While most witnesses must still rely on memory, hypnosis and Eye Movement Desensitisation and Reprocessing (EMDR) therapy have been used either to revive an independent memory or to recover information from the witness while he or she is in an hypnotic or similar condition.598

[page 845] 7.110 Where the witness claims that his or her conscious memory has been revived through hypnosis or other therapy, upon general evidential principles that testimony should be received in the normal way, just as testimony based upon memory revived out of court in any other way is received. Cross-examination may then seek to probe the effect this hypnosis has had upon the witness’s memory (and credibility) and the person who administered the hypnosis and other experts in the field of hypnosis may be called to assist with that determination. This was the approach taken to receiving testimony in Van Vliet v Griffiths599 and in R v Roughley, Marshall and Haywood,600 where Zeeman J, speaking for the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal, was strongly of the view that the revived memory was relevant and therefore admissible. If the opponent can persuade the court on the voir dire that the memory allegedly revived following hypnosis carries a high risk of unreliability which cannot be fully revealed through cross-examination, the calling of expert testimony and an appropriate direction to the jury, so that in this rectitudinal sense it would be unfair to admit the testimony against the accused, then the trial judge may exercise the residual discretion to exclude the evidence. Thus, in R v Horsfall,601 where a child-complainant had been subjected to hypnotherapy following an alleged sexual assault, the trial judge excluded her testimony because expert testimony given on the voir dire showed that the therapeutic hypnotherapy may have contaminated memory through inaccurate suggestion.602 Although in Horsfall the hypnotherapy was employed for therapeutic purposes rather than to revive memory, a fortiori the same approach must be taken to the latter situation.603 In BJS v R,604 the court refused to exercise s 137 of the uniform legislation to exclude testimony from complainants to sexual assault, agreeing with the trial judge that testimony from counsellors that in sessions with the complainants they had used techniques akin to hypnotherapy was irrelevant to assessing the credibility of their [page 846]

testimony as the sessions were undertaken for therapeutic purposes unrelated to the sexual assaults — not for the purpose of reviving memory of the assaults charged — and had no discernible influence upon the accounts give by the complainants prior to these sessions. In DPP v JG,605 sessions that a crucial witness had with an hypnotherapist specifically in an attempt to further revive her memory again did not give rise to exercise of s 137 to exclude her recorded interview containing relevant evidence made prior to her hypnotherapy. While her memory at trial may have been affected, creating problems for crossexamination, the majority was of the view that these difficulties could be dealt with at trial if required (by calling expert testimony under s 108C(1) and/or limiting cross-examination and providing appropriate directions to the jury) and did not provide a basis for excluding the prerecorded interview altogether under s 137. 7.111 Other courts have been reluctant to approach a memory revived by psychological therapy in this way. They are influenced in the first place by the view of psychologists that although therapies, particularly hypnosis, may revive reliable memories, the therapy, particularly hypnosis, carries with it such a high risk of confabulation through suggestion that courts, at the very least, should ensure that a memory allegedly revived was not carried out under conditions conducive to suggestion. This being the case, these courts feel that guidelines for appropriate conditions should be laid down and sufficient records should be kept so that the likely accuracy of the allegedly revived memory can be properly evaluated. This approach found favour in New South Wales in R v Jenkyns (memory revived by hypnosis),606 and was followed by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Tillott (memory revived by EMDR),607 the courts imposing a rule of admissibility requiring the party adducing testimony based upon a memory allegedly revived through either of these methods, to establish the testimony of sufficient reliability to make it safe to admit. This approach was also accepted by Seaman J in R v J (No 2) in calling for a voir dire and endorsed by the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal in R v WB in holding, where admissibility had not been challenged, that the absence of appropriate directions made the verdict unsafe and unsatisfactory.608 But Basten JA in DPP v JG was of the view that this approach is at least controversial at common law and is inconsistent with the uniform legislation where exclusion must be justified, if at all, under s 135 (civil cases) or s 137 (prosecution tender in a criminal case).609

7.112 Although ultimately the proposed test is intended to be flexible, the courts refer to the Californian Evidence Code and New Zealand authority in suggesting a [page 847] series of guidelines which should be satisfied before such evidence is admitted.610 The use of the therapy must be discovered to the opponent; the therapy must be carried out by a qualified person, independent of the police and prosecution; safeguards must be taken against influencing the witness by suggestion or otherwise; the therapy must be limited to events which the witness has been able generally to recall prior to hypnosis; the pre-hypnotic recall must be recorded in writing or otherwise; all material provided to the therapist for the purposes of the treatment must be recorded and available; the witness must give informed consent to the hypnosis; and the hypnosis session and any pre- and post-hypnosis interviews with the witness should be videotaped. In addition, before admitting the evidence the judge should have regard to whether evidence exists confirming the witness’s account and if the judge does admit the evidence the jury should be warned of the special need for caution before relying upon it.611 The uniform legislation does not specifically deal with the problem of the revival of memory through hypnosis or similar methods. Where an attempt to revive memory has taken place out of court, s 34 allows the court to order production of documents or things so used. Under the uniform legislation, expert evidence to explain the circumstances of recall is not admissible without leave in exception to the prohibition upon ‘credibility evidence’ (ss 102, 101A) under s 106(2)(d), as the exception does not apply to expert evidence relating to an inability to ‘recall’, as opposed to an inability to be ‘aware’.612 However, s 108C(1) now creates a general exception for expert evidence ‘concerning the credibility of another witness’ provided the opinion ‘is wholly or substantially based on’ ‘specialised knowledge’ and ‘could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness’.613 When exclusion of relevant testimony revived or affected by hypnotherapy is sought, the only avenues for exclusions are [page 848]

ss 135 and 137, which may apply if, having regard to the probative value of which the testimony is rationally capable, this is outweighed by the unfair prejudice that would be engendered by its admission. These sections, together with s 165 requiring appropriate directions where evidence may be unreliable, are arguably sufficiently flexible to take into account the matters referred to by those courts seeking a more definitive approach. The problem, referred to by Basten JA in DPP v JG (at [129]), is that the only advantage experts appear to have over juries in assessing the consequences of hypnotherapy is their ‘knowledge of ignorance’, that the consequences cannot be reliably assessed. In this situation the more sceptical judges are less likely to give weight to arguments based upon the possible consequences in exercising the exclusionary discretion. 7.113 The situation where the witness claims a revived conscious memory is to be distinguished from that situation where the witness, while under hypnosis, makes statements apparently based upon a memory of events. Even where it is the witness who testifies to such statements made under hypnosis, if the conscious memory is not revived then that evidence, as a previous out-of-court statement about events, is inadmissible hearsay. Some exceptions to the hearsay rule might admit such statements. For example, the out-of-court admission or confession of a party would be admissible. Under the uniform legislation, it might also be possible to argue for admissibility on the basis of s 64(2), or on the basis of s 66(2) if the prior statement was made at a time ‘when the occurrence of the asserted fact was fresh in the memory of’ the witness. But the fundamental question is whether courts should be prepared to admit as reliable evidence such out-of-court statements. Judges are reluctant to admit such evidence, even where it is admissible in exception to the hearsay rule, unless its clear reliability can be established. It is apparently one thing to leave the trier to decide, with the assistance of crossexamination and the testimony of experts, the reliability of a witness claiming to testify from a memory revived by hypnosis; it is another to admit as reliable the out-of-court statement of a witness made under hypnosis. Thus, in R v Geesing,614 the court refused to accept evidence of a statement made under hypnosis in the absence of any expert testimony about its reliability. In R v Horvath,615 the Supreme Court of Canada excluded the confession of an accused made while under hypnosis, although on grounds of involuntariness and oppression rather than mere unreliability. 7.114 The difficulty is that psychological research is not sufficiently advanced

to establish the likely reliability of statements made under hypnosis. Even where hypnosis [page 849] takes place under ideal conditions, the subject remains highly susceptible to suggestion and confabulation. Hypnosis is capable of producing evidence and as a technique it might be appropriate for use by investigators to uncover further information. But the probability of it producing inaccurate evidence makes it a doubtful technique upon which to base a general exception to the hearsay rule. If research should establish the sufficient reliability of statements made using hypnotic techniques it might be argued that the witness be hypnotised in court to permit questioning by the opponent (or the opponent’s expert witnesses). In Van Vliet v Griffiths,616 the offer to hypnotise the witness in court was rejected by the judge, but the witness was anyway able to testify through a revived memory. In R v Pitt,617 an accused suffering from functional amnesia was permitted to give her testimony while under hypnosis. Although the theatricality of such testimony, the problems for cross-examiners and issues of reliability make this an unlikely last resort. For good reasons, courts remain wary of the reliability of previous statements induced by hypnosis (and similar techniques) and they are generally inadmissible, whether as mere hearsay or as previous consistent statements relevant only to credit.

Questioning witnesses 7.115 The common law demands that facts be discovered from information collected and presented by the parties. Primarily this information consists of the oral testimony of witnesses to the material events in issue or facts relevant to their proof. Before trial, parties must interview potential witnesses and decide who can be called to give favourable testimony. The theory is that, with the parties presenting their cases in their most forceful form, the truth will emerge. The Uniform Acts are based upon the same adversarial assumptions.618 It should be emphasised that parties have no property in witnesses and each party is always free to interview and to call every witness to testify.619 But

witnesses are not obliged to answer questions prior to trial and in practice will be interviewed and called by one party rather than another, and thereby be regarded as ‘supporting’ one side rather than the other. This is an inevitable consequence of the adversarial nature of the common law trial. [page 850] Nevertheless, in criminal cases it seems the prosecution has an overriding duty to pursue truth, which generally requires it to call all material witnesses, whether they will testify favourably or not: see further 6.55–6.57. This adversarial nature manifests itself in the way in which witnesses testify at trial. Thus, testimony does not take the form of an objective unprompted narrative (as is demanded in civil law jurisdictions). On the contrary, witnesses testify only in response to questions put to them by the parties or their counsel. In this way, their testimony is confined to those aspects each party hopes will produce favourable information. By allowing each party to question each witness, it is assumed that the whole story will be revealed, or at least the whole story insofar as it concerns the parties to the dispute in question. Consequently, witnesses are called by particular parties, examined by them inchief, are available to be cross-examined by opponents and, if the circumstances demand, may be re-examined by the party calling them. This common law procedure is apparently maintained by the uniform legislation. As discussed at 6.48, the uniform legislation does not expressly alter the common law assumption that parties remain responsible for the calling of witnesses. Sections 26–29 appear to assume this and that parties are responsible for questioning witnesses, providing that parties (not the court) may question any witness (s 27) and the order for examination-in-chief, cross-examination and reexamination (s 28). Other sections assume party questioning; for example, the enactment of the common law stance against leading questions in examinationin-chief: s 37. However, s 26 does give the court power in relation to the way in which witnesses are to be questioned and the order in which witnesses are questioned, and s 29(2) expressly provides that the court may direct a witness to testify in narrative form, either upon application of the party calling the witness or upon its own motion.620 Along with other sections, for example s 42, which allows a court to disallow leading questions, and s 41, which requires the court to

disallow improper questions (see further 7.138), there is no doubt that the court’s powers over the process of questioning have been increased and there is potential for changing the extremities of party questioning so typical of common law process. But the process remains far from the court-centred procedures of civil law jurisdictions. [page 851]

Examination-in-chief Scope and purpose: the bolster rule 7.116 The object of examination-in-chief is to obtain evidence relevant to the material facts in issue. The credibility of a witness, whilst relevant to determining the material facts, is regarded as of indirect relevance: cf uniform legislation s 55. Moreover, until disputed it is really of no relevance at all so it would be a waste of time to pursue it.621 Consequently, a witness must not generally be examined in-chief to obtain evidence relevant only to the witness’s credibility. It is in crossexamination that the common law permits matters of credibility to be pursued. But even where this occurs, the law strictly controls not only the evidence a party may consequently tender in support of a witness’s credibility,622 but also the evidence an opposing party may consequently tender to establish discrediting allegations denied by the witness in cross-examination.623 These controls ensure practical limits upon pursuing credibility evidence of indirect relevance to determining material facts. The uniform legislation, in ss 101A, 102, 103, 106 and 108, enacts an approach similar to the common law. The rule prohibiting parties from tendering evidence in support of their witnesses’ credibility, whether in examination-in-chief or in calling other witnesses, is sometimes referred to as the ‘bolster rule’.624 It is not, however, absolute. In practice witnesses, particularly experts, will introduce themselves to the court in a way that enhances as far as possible their credibility,625 and while the prior consistent statements of witnesses are generally excluded (7.88) there are exceptions in the case of prior statements of identity (7.94ff) and recent (but out-of-court) complaints of sexual assault (7.99ff). The result of taking a stricter approach to the bolster rule can be seen in the

discussion of Heydon J in HML v R.626 This appeal involved three separate cases of sexual [page 852] assault, but in each the determinative issue was whether to believe the complainants’ allegations. Heydon J was of the view that the bolster rule prohibited each complainant from referring in-chief to the whole history of her allegations to provide the context for determining whether or not to believe her testimony about the crimes charged. In particular, this history explained that the assaults did not occur ‘out of the blue’ but were accompanied by conduct, including uncharged acts, demonstrating the accused’s sexual attraction towards the complainant. Furthermore, the history explained why the accused were able to approach the complainants with such apparent confidence, and why the complainants did not feel able to complain immediately of the assaults. All these matters were characterised by Heydon J as being prima facie caught by the bolster rule. It was only because he was also able to characterise the evidence as having a relevance beyond credibility, as admissible propensity evidence independently implicating the accused in the crimes charged, that Heydon J was prepared to permit tender of the evidence and to permit its use also in support of credibility. The difficulty with this analysis is in the distinction it seeks to maintain between issue and credibility. The simple point, recognised by Gleeson CJ and Crennan and Kiefel JJ in HML, was that the evidence of the complainants was not tendered to establish an admissible propensity from which it could be inferred that the accused had committed the crimes charged. Rather, it was tendered to establish the coherence of the testimony of each complainant so that the trier of fact could determine whether to believe the complainant’s testimony of the charged assaults beyond reasonable doubt. The case demonstrates that in some situations the credibility of a witness is of such crucial and obvious significance to a determination of material facts in issue that it is not just appropriate but absolutely necessary that it be supported in the witness’s evidence-in-chief. Under the uniform legislation, credibility evidence is defined in terms of evidence relevant to a witness’s credibility, so courts appear required to distinguish it. But the definition of ‘credibility’ in the Dictionary is inclusive rather than definitive and it may be arguable that when evidence is crucial to a

determination of material facts it ceases to be credibility evidence for the purposes of s 101A.627 The prohibition against leading questions 7.117 Some attempt is made by the common law to permit witnesses called by a party to testify in narrative form. When the witness has been guided to the particular [page 853] disputed issues about which the party desires evidence, then the witness must testify in his or her own words. This is achieved by the basic rule of examinationin-chief: a party calling a witness cannot elicit information through the asking of leading questions;628 that is, questions suggestive of the desired answer or otherwise involving express assumptions with which it is hoped the witness will agree.629 The rule is enacted in s 37 of the uniform legislation in terms which retain the common law position. The rule is essentially one of practice. Mere breach would not be an appealable error and would go rather to the reliability of the information obtained.630 By the same token, in exceptional circumstances, at an enforced second hearing631 or where the witness is confused,632 a trial judge may permit leading questions even about controversial matters.633 The rule against leading questions is not a rule to be applied mechanically; it is a rule to ensure that, on controversial matters, the witness testifies as far as possible in his or her own words. On introductory matters, the witness may be led until the matters in issue have been identified: see also s 37(1)(b). The witness should then take over.634 In practice, this is made easier by the fact that in most cases the witness will have been fully interviewed before trial by the party calling him or her and a statement (‘proof’) taken which he or she will have seen prior to testifying, and which the examining counsel will also have. With this rehearsal, the witness is able to testify as expected according to his or her proof when given non-leading prompts (as opposed to testifying to how he or she was ‘coached’ by counsel).635 [page 854]

One problem is what to do when the witness does not testify as expected. It is when this happens that the rule forbidding leading questions has its most crucial effect as it prevents the party calling the witness from putting to the adverse witness the version that may have been given at interview. Hostile and unfavourable witnesses 7.118 One way around the difficulty exists where other witnesses are available to establish those matters about which the first witness has failed to testify as expected. There is no prohibition at common law or under the uniform legislation against calling later witnesses to contradict testimony given by a party’s earlier witnesses,636 although if the trier is to be persuaded, a satisfactory explanation of the contradiction will have to be put forward, and this may be difficult when the earlier witnesses remain apparently credible. But at common law, a party can, in exceptional instances, put a contradictory version of events to his or her own witness where that witness manifests an unwillingness to testify truthfully. In this extreme situation, it is regarded as unfair that the party be able to do nothing to counter the witness’s testimony.637 The party may therefore apply to the court to have the witness declared hostile, in which case any previous statements can be put to the witness through leading questions and the witness can be otherwise examined to nullify the effect of any hostile oral testimony given in-chief.638 Whether this enables cross-examination similar to that of an opponent’s witness is a matter not clearly decided, although in practice the examination will proceed only so far as is necessary to nullify the testimony-in-chief, and cross-examination on general [page 855] character and previous convictions will not normally be permitted.639 Nor will a party be permitted to pursue credit beyond cross-examination by calling further witnesses to establish bias or a reputation for untruthfulness.640 One doubt in the common law position was whether the witness’s prior inconsistent statement, if denied, could be independently proved. This matter was clarified by s 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1865 (UK), and, in jurisdictions other than those now covered by the uniform legislation, there remains legislation

based on that Act,641 which has been interpreted to strengthen and clarify the common law position rather than being seen as providing an exhaustive code on the subject of hostile witnesses.642 7.119 In practice, at common law, the principal effect of a declaration of hostility will be the use of prior statements, either through leading questions or, where denied, through independent proof.643 Unless the witness admits the truth of previous statements in examination644 they may be relied upon (when proved) only for the purpose of discrediting the hostile witness.645 It is normally considered dangerous to rely upon previous statements as evidence of the facts asserted in them, but exceptionally this may be permitted where an exception to the hearsay rule applies. Some legislation creating exceptions to the hearsay rule expressly provides that a party may seek leave to tender his or her own witness’s prior inconsistent written statements.646 Other hearsay legislation appears to apply in order to enable proof of a witness’s prior statements.647 [page 856] In the absence of a hearsay exception, the clarifying legislation permits prior statements of a hostile witness to be admitted only to discredit the oral testimony of that witness. It is left to the trier of fact to determine which parts (if any) of that oral testimony to accept, and in a criminal case the trial judge is not obliged as a matter of course to direct the jury to disregard altogether the oral testimony of a hostile witness.648 The appropriate direction will depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. Where legislation admits the prior statement in exception to the hearsay rule, the trial judge should carefully canvass the circumstances and warn the jury of the dangers of accepting and acting upon the prior out-of-court statement.649 A conviction based substantially upon such an out-of-court statement might well be regarded as unsafe.650 7.120 As mentioned at 7.118, for a witness to be declared hostile requires a finding that he or she is unwilling to tell the truth for the advancement of justice.651 This is a serious matter and the finding cannot be lightly reached. The decision is based upon the witness’s demeanour in the witness box, the coherence of his or her testimony and any prior inconsistent statements that the witness may have made before trial.652 Any of these matters may be decisive. At the one

extreme, the witness may be ostentatiously hostile when asked to testify; at the other, the witness may be outwardly friendly but have made prior statements that give the lie to his or her demeanour.653 It is a difficult decision that must be made on the spot, and appellate courts are reluctant to interfere with a trial judge’s decision about hostility.654 The decision is made by the trial judge upon the application of the party calling the witness. The application may be made even during re-examination.655 If the demeanour of the witness is obviously hostile the ruling may be made immediately in [page 857] open court.656 If there is any doubt about his or her demeanour, or if the determination that a witness is hostile is to be based upon his or her prior inconsistent statements, then hostility should be determined following a voir dire hearing (in the absence of the jury, if any).657 The party seeking the declaration may ask leading questions of the witness and must put any prior inconsistent statements to him or her. If the witness denies the prior statements they must be strictly proved, through authentication of any statements in writing or through calling witnesses to previous oral statements. That is, the procedure for proving inconsistent statements on the voir dire is the same as that at the trial, and governed by the general clarifying legislation.658 Where the witness seeks to explain away a prior statement, there is some authority for the view that further evidence may be called at the voir dire to rebut that explanation.659 This may be necessary if a clever witness is to be justly exposed as hostile. The opponent should normally be permitted to cross-examine the witness before any declaration of hostility is made.660 7.121 The declaration of hostility is an extreme method for dealing with a witness who does not come up to proof. The declaration can be made only in limited circumstances and its practical effect is to undermine the witness’s credibility. It is therefore not an apposite procedure where the witness has failed to come up to proof not through hostility, but through forgetfulness or confusion. In some cases of this kind it may be possible to salvage the situation by having the witness refresh his or her memory from a document.661 Where this is not possible it has been held that the judge may go a step further and permit

counsel to put a previous statement in the hands of the witness and proceed by way of leading questions — a compulsory refreshment of memory.662 The existence of this procedure serves to emphasise that the rule prohibiting leading questions is designed to promote (not hinder) truth and it must therefore give way if circumstances are appropriate. Nevertheless, this procedure is used only in exceptional instances and should not [page 858] be employed to undermine the general rule. When employed, it enables counsel to put leading questions to his or her own witness without that witness having first been declared hostile. But the discretion to permit leading questions can be of only limited use where a witness is truly adverse; if the witness, though not hostile, adheres to the adverse testimony, at common law, nothing can be done. The problem with this is that it is unlikely that the witness’s testimony will be tested through cross-examination, for the opponent will not wish to cross-examine in these circumstances. This raises the question of whether courts should have a wider discretion to permit a party to cross-examine an adverse witness. 7.122 The Uniform Acts give an affirmative answer to this question in s 38. But this section does not take an all or nothing approach to whether a witness is adverse. Rather, it permits, with leave of the court, a party to cross-examine his or her own witness663 about three particular matters: unfavourable evidence given by the witness; matters about which the witness does not appear to be making a genuine attempt to give evidence; and prior inconsistent statements made by the witness. In giving leave to cross-examine about one or other of these matters,664 the court must consider whether the party has given notice of his or her intention to cross-examine at the earliest opportunity,665 and whether another party is likely to cross-examine about the matter in question: s 38(6). In addition, the court must consider the matters referred to in s 192 before granting leave.666 Thus, with leave, cross-examination about particular matters is permitted without the witness being declared ‘hostile’. At a minimum, it is enough that the witness, whatever his or her intent, has merely given unfavourable evidence, that is, evidence that does not favour the party calling the witness, and that evidence will not be

[page 859] probed by the cross-examination of another party.667 Thus, the section ensures that all evidence is open to probing through cross-examination. It is vital to emphasise that at first instance the section gives a party no general right to crossexamine about matters relevant only to the witness’s credibility. At first instance, the questions must be relevant to acquiring true information about the matters that have triggered the cross-examination.668 Although this must necessarily extend to testing the witness’s account of these matters (and therefore to this extent may extend to matters going only to credibility),669 more general crossexamination relevant only to credibility is subject to the seeking of further leave (s 38(3)) and will presumably only be allowed exceptionally where it is required in order fairly to determine the truthfulness of the witness.670 7.123 Section 38 has an important impact upon the ability of the prosecution to test evidence given by witnesses it has been obliged to call in satisfaction of its general obligation to call all material witnesses: see 6.55. The prosecution can call material witnesses in the knowledge that their unfavourable testimony can be properly tested by cross-examination. But this section, together with the operation of s 60, which admits as hearsay an inconsistent statement admitted to discredit a witness, does increase the opportunity for the prosecution to call adverse witnesses for the very purpose of obtaining from them in crossexamination prior inconsistent statements known to contain assertions favourable to the prosecution case. One way of restricting this opportunity would be to read down the meaning of unfavourable,671 but it is submitted that the Uniform Acts intend to increase the availability of first-hand hearsay where witnesses are called and any abuse can be controlled through the discretion to give [page 860] leave.672 The essential question is whether leave should be given to test the inconsistent evidence ‘in the interests of truth’: R v SH.673 The High Court in Adam v R674 recognises that it is now generally proper for the prosecution to call material witnesses in the knowledge that their prior inconsistent statements might be proved against them and used as first-hand

hearsay under s 60.675 It was held in R v Parkes676 that it is not abuse but a legitimate forensic tactic for the prosecution to call a witness and attempt to avoid adverse topics during examination-in-chief, knowing it might later apply to crossexamine under s 38 if the adverse evidence is revealed during the defence’s crossexamination of the witness.677 Where the prior statement of a witness is admitted during a s 38 crossexamination and it is admissible hearsay under s 60, under s 165 (subject to subs (3)), if a party requests the judge must warn the jury that the evidence may be unreliable, the reasons for this, and that the jury should take care before acting upon it.678

Cross-examination The right to cross-examine 7.124 It was Wigmore who described cross-examination as ‘the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth’.679 Some, however, doubt that the extremities permitted in cross-examination are conducive to this discovery.680 This [page 861] is not the context in which to resolve this debate, although it is hoped that a proper understanding of the nature and purpose and the limits of crossexamination will contribute to an accurate and informed analysis. Too often the debate is marked by the adversarial extremities that purport to be its subject. The right to cross-examine a witness called by a party is fundamental and granted to each and every other party to the proceeding, whether or not that witness has given testimony in-chief for or against that other party.681 The right is preserved in the uniform legislation, which provides in s 27 that ‘[a] party may question any witness, except as provided by this Act’. But the witness must be properly called to testify and, if he or she has been called mistakenly682 or merely to produce a document,683 it would be inappropriate to cross-examine, and any party wishing to question the witness should call him or her to testify in-chief. However, a witness formally called (to prevent an adverse inference from failure to call, or in satisfaction of the prosecution’s duty to call all material witnesses)

and not questioned may be cross-examined, at least as to the issue (for the witness’s credibility will not in those circumstances normally be relevant).684 Nevertheless, the overriding consideration on appeal is always whether a trial was fairly conducted. This allows a trial judge considerable leeway in limiting cross-examination. Exceptionally, where in a civil case parties have the same interest in the litigation, a judge may permit only one party to cross-examine on behalf of all, or permit parties to cross-examine only upon matters not already canvassed in cross-examination by other parties.685 While at common law a judge has a discretion to refuse cross-examination that is improper, now in some jurisdictions (see 7.138 below) a judge must not allow such cross-examination. In addition, cross-examination must be refused if it will produce unfairness in the trial (through exercise of residual discretion — at common law, or under ss 135– 137 of the uniform legislation). [page 862] For example, in Palmer v R,686 the High Court held it unfair for the Crown to ask an accused charged with rape why the complainant would lie, for not only is this a matter outside the accused’s knowledge, but it also throws a burden of explanation on the accused which is inconsistent with the presumption of innocence: see further 2.71. So, the right to cross-examination is not unfettered. Yet presumptively all other parties are entitled to cross-examine: see uniform legislation s 27. 7.125 A simple example of the importance of the right to cross-examine testimony given in court is seen in those decisions which declare that the unsworn statement of one accused, untested by cross-examination, cannot be admissible against another co-accused.687 It is arguable that, if a witness having testified in-chief is unable to continue through incapacity or illness, then his or her testimony should be inadmissible,688 although some courts have been prepared to adopt a more flexible approach when cross-examination would not have been of much significance.689 A more far-reaching example of the importance of the right to cross-examination is the hearsay rule, which renders inadmissible out-of-court assertions, one reason being the absence of testing through cross-examination.690 Courts remain wary, particularly in criminal cases, of findings based purely upon out-of-court assertions admitted in exception to the

hearsay rule,691 but may be prepared to allow convictions based solely upon such evidence to stand if the jury has been properly directed, including being warned that it has not had the advantage of cross-examination.692 On the request of [page 863] a party, s 165(3) of the Uniform Acts requires a jury to be directed (in the absence of good reasons to the contrary) that hearsay evidence admitted by virtue of the Acts may be unreliable, the reason for this, and the need for caution before acting on it. With state and territory legislation making admissible as hearsay recorded interviews and other out-of-court statements with children and vulnerable witnesses made closer to the events in issue, courts remain similarly wary: see further 7.34 above. 7.126 The fundamental difference between examination-in-chief and crossexamination (enacted in ss 37 and 42 of the uniform legislation) is that in crossexamination leading questions may be put to the witness.693 Having provided (largely) unprompted testimony-in-chief, the witness may be tested in crossexamination through express suggestion. 7.127 The most obvious purpose of cross-examination is to test the credibility of the testimony given in-chief, but evidence directly relevant to material facts is just as welcome in cross-examination as in-chief (and is subject to the same rules of relevance and admissibility). Cross-examination, therefore, has two objects: to obtain evidence relevant to the material facts in issue and to obtain evidence relevant to determining the credit of the witness. The line between these two objects will often be difficult to draw but the following discussion deals, first, with ‘issue cross-examination’, and, secondly, with ‘credit cross-examination’. Additional rules relating to cross-examination of the accused, which deal with questions concerning the revelation of character and the maintenance of the privilege against self-incrimination, have already been discussed at 3.83ff. Issue cross-examination: introducing evidence 7.128 In a criminal case, there are limits to introducing evidence relevant to the material facts in issue during cross-examination of the accused and his or her witnesses. R v Chin694 authoritatively decides that fairness demands that an

accused have notice of the evidence to be met by way of defence, so that as a general rule the prosecution must tender in-chief, as part of its case, all evidence relevant to prove the material facts that it has at its disposal and can legally tender. It is inappropriate to introduce [page 864] in cross-examination of the accused or his or her witnesses, following closure of the prosecution case, such evidence that could reasonably have been introduced in-chief.695 This limit is unaffected by the uniform legislation. Where the general rule is breached, the accused can only succeed on appeal by showing prejudice resulting from the omission. If notice has been given by the prosecutor, the matters were disclosed during the committal, or the matters are peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused or his or her witnesses, then the cross-examination will not produce a miscarriage of justice. Similarly, if the matters are incapable of proof in-chief there appears no ground for complaint. Brennan J in R v Chin dissented on the ground that the evidence in that case elicited in cross-examination could not have been reasonably tendered in-chief. The majority disagreed. Issue cross-examination: satisfying the rule in Browne v Dunn 7.129 The importance of cross-examination in obtaining comment upon facts in issue is seen in the so-called rule in Browne v Dunn696 (the continued existence of which is the assumption behind s 46 of the Uniform Acts).697 This rule demands that, where the cross-examining party intends to later challenge a witness by calling further evidence or by suggesting the witness’s account can be otherwise explained, the witness should be given the opportunity in crossexamination to comment upon the contradictory or alternative version. Not only is this fair to the witness, giving that witness the opportunity to comment upon something within his or her knowledge, it also enables the trier to assess more accurately the credibility of any contrary version.698 It also serves to give notice to the party calling the witness which particular aspects of that witness’s testimony are being challenged so that party can decide what further corroborating evidence to call. Failure to cross-examine may suggest an opponent is not going to contest

certain matters and this may lead a party not to fully explore them by calling all possible witnesses.699

These reasons manifest themselves where, for example, the plaintiff calls an expert to give a certain opinion and that witness is not cross-examined on a contradictory [page 865] or qualifying opinion that will be alleged.700 This is unfair to the witness, denies the court the assistance of the expert’s comment upon the other opinion, and may lead the proponent to fail to call other supporting experts because the opponent did not indicate in cross-examination that the opinion put forward was under challenge. The more specific the matter in issue and the more it is within the knowledge or expertise of a witness, the stronger the reasons for having the matter put in cross-examination. 7.130 Whether failure to cross-examine gives rise to any of these undesirable consequences will depend upon all the circumstances. The rule does not require every matter upon which it is desired to challenge a witness to be put in crossexamination.701 Where the challenge is general and known to the witness and the witness has already made it clear in examination-in-chief what view is held on a particular contrary matter there may be no unfairness to the witness and the issue of fact may be sufficiently joined to determine its credibility.702 Nor can a party claim unfairness where he or she otherwise has notice that the matter is being contested and can raise these matters with the witness in-chief and call contradictory evidence. But if, for example, an accused in a sexual assault case wishes to explain a relationship in terms which contradict the complainant, to comply with Browne v Dunn requires the details of that explanation to be put to the complainant. Only in this way will the trier of fact be in the best position to decide whether to accept the complainant’s allegations beyond reasonable doubt.703 Where at trial it is argued that the rule in Browne v Dunn has not been satisfied, a party might argue that the opponent is estopped from leading evidence or argument challenging the witness’s account. Although there is authority suggesting that a trial judge has a discretion to enforce such an estoppel,704 even where the opponent is unrepresented, it is difficult to envisage circumstances where it would be proper for a trial judge during trial simply to bar further evidence or contradiction. The most fair and practical course is to recall the

witness and put the necessary matters in cross-examination,705 and the power to so recall is expressly granted by s 46 of the [page 866] Uniform Acts.706 Again, if the failure to cross-examine has misled a party into not calling witnesses, the most practical and fair course is to allow those witnesses to be called. If this necessitates the reopening of a party’s case or the calling of evidence by way of rebuttal, then so be it. For these reasons later authorities doubt whether a trial judge has any power to prevent a party calling evidence or putting arguments on the sole ground that a contradictory matter was not put to the relevant witness in cross-examination.707 7.131 Although the trier of fact retains the prerogative to reject all testimony, even where it has not been subject to cross-examination,708 the failure to put a contradictory or challenging account to a witness is a matter to be taken into account in deciding whether to accept that witness’s testimony and a jury may be appropriately directed.709 More controversial is the question of what adverse inferences, if any, may be drawn against a party who fails to challenge a witness in cross-examination with the contrary account. In some circumstances, where there has been no debate or contradictory evidence called, the failure to cross-examine takes upon even greater significance as denying notice to the opponent of that account may deny an opportunity to challenge it in re-examination or by calling further evidence. And the jury may be so directed. It may be possible to argue further that the failure effectively amounts to acceptance of that witness’s [page 867] testimony.710 In other circumstances, a failure to cross-examine a witness and then later to suggest a contrary account may give rise to an inference of recent invention.711 Courts are wary of permitting inferences against a party, particularly against an accused, on account of counsel’s failure to cross-examine a witness.712 As King CJ warned, in R v Manunta,713 such a process of reasoning should be:714 … used only with much caution and circumspection. There may be many explanations of the omission [to cross-examine] which do not reflect upon the credibility of witnesses. Counsel may

have misunderstood his instructions. The witness may not have been fully co-operative in providing statements. Forensic pressures may have resulted in looseness or inexactitude in the framing of questions. The matter might simply have been overlooked.

And later cases make it clear that, if a judge is prepared to leave the possibility of such an adverse inference to a jury,715 in appropriate cases it should be carefully directed in these terms.716 Care may also be required to avoid any suggestion that an inference may be drawn from the mere silence of the accused (compare with Dyers v R),717 but [page 868] this will not be the situation where the failure to cross-examine is being contrasted with the evidence that has already been called by the accused (Pinkstone v R).718 It is at the trial level that the rule in Browne v Dunn is likely to be most influential. Mere breach gives no rise to successful appeal, and to succeed, the party appealing must show a resulting miscarriage of justice — demonstrating, for example, that a party was improperly estopped from calling relevant information, that the denial of crucial comment makes the resultant decision unreliable,719 that the jury was insufficiently directed about the effect of a failure to crossexamine,720 that the judge failed adequately to explain to the jury their prerogative to reject evidence whatever the degree of cross-examination, or to explain that caution which must be exercised before drawing adverse inferences against an accused who fails to cross-examine.721 Credibility cross-examination 7.132 The rule in Browne v Dunn ensures that witnesses are properly crossexamined about matters relevant to proving the facts in issue. It also ensures that their credibility is fairly contested. This testing of credibility is the other main object of cross-examination, and the object most popularly recognised and criticised. As discussed at 7.116, the common law assumes that it is only during crossexamination that the creditworthiness of a witness as such can be probed. However, although credibility can be raised in cross-examination, it cannot, as a general rule, be pursued any further than this. The bolster rule prevents the party

calling the witness from tendering evidence to support a witness’s credit (see 7.87–7.90), and the [page 869] opponent is not entitled to call evidence to contradict answers given by the witness in cross-examination about matters going only to credibility: see 7.139ff. The latter is generally referred to as the ‘collateral evidence rule’. By the bolster and collateral evidence rules, inquiry into credibility is generally confined to cross-examination. In this way, courts are prevented from undue inquiry into matters of credibility at the expense of seeking evidence relating to the very material facts in issue in the case. 7.133 While at common law this restriction upon credibility evidence is at most assumed, the uniform evidence legislation makes it express. Sections 101A and 102 provide that ‘credibility evidence’ is not admissible; s 103(1) that the ‘credibility rule does not apply to evidence adduced in cross-examination of a witness’, and immediately adding a proviso (critical of a too liberal common law approach), ‘if the evidence could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness’.722 Further exceptions, apparently drafted to replicate the common law, where credit may be pursued beyond cross-examination, are enacted in ss 106 (by an opponent, in exception to the collateral evidence rule, in order to discredit: discussed at 7.141ff), and 108 (by the party calling the witness, in exception to the bolster rule, in order to re-establish credibility: discussed above at 7.91–7.93). Section 108C extends the common law by generally permitting expert evidence of an opinion based on specialised knowledge (including evidence of child development and behaviour following sexual abuse) that could substantially affect the credibility of a witness provided leave is given: discussed at 7.108, 7.112. Sections 102 and 103 draw a fundamental distinction between evidence relevant to credibility and evidence relevant to the issue. The difficulty of drawing this distinction in terms of relevance is discussed at 7.116 and below at 7.139–7.141,723 the latter paragraphs suggesting that, in the context of the collateral evidence rule, the common law recognised in principle a continuum of relevance, from direct relevance to the issue to relevance only to credit, using little more than a concept of sufficient relevance to control the reception of

evidence that appears to be distracting the trier from its principal task. However, this flexible approach, seeking the fair and efficient conduct of litigation, was expressly rejected by the High Court in Nicholls v R; Coates v R,724 where in a court of seven, six judges demanded (McHugh J strongly disagreeing)725 [page 870] that a clear distinction be maintained between evidence directly relevant to the material facts in issue and evidence relevant collaterally to credit. The majority was of the view that evidence relevant only collaterally to credit is inadmissible beyond cross-examination unless a specific exception to the rule applies, and that a court has no wider authority to determine, in the interests of justice, evidence of sufficient importance to be pursued beyond cross-examination. As Gleeson CJ preferred to put it (at [2]), the collateral evidence rule cannot be characterised simply ‘as a guide to discretionary case management’. 7.134 Under the uniform legislation, credibility evidence is now defined in s 101A to make clear that the credibility rule does not cease to apply where evidence is relevant beyond credibility but is inadmissible for that other purpose.726 Functionally, the Uniform Acts are now more consistent with the common law. Where evidence is relevant and admissible for another purpose the credibility rule does not apply and the evidence becomes simply admissible both to the issue and to credibility. Where evidence is relevant and only admissible for a credibility purpose, then it is caught by the credibility rule and must fall within an exception to be admissible. 7.135 In the vast majority of cases, whether material facts are found proved depends upon an assessment of the reliability (or credibility)727 of the eyewitness testimony. In this perspective, issues of mathematical probability assume an air of unreality as triers of fact grapple with the problem of whether to believe witnesses. The common law oral trial highlights the importance of this assessment in discovering facts by confronting human triers (in the most serious cases, mere laypersons) with witnesses and demanding that triers decide, having heard and seen all the relevant witnesses to the material facts, which witnesses to believe. In this way, the common law trial embodies a fundamental human process and assumes that there is no more socially legitimate

[page 871] way to discover past truths.728 The testimony of the crucial witnesses, particularly the parties to the case, including the accused, becomes decisive, and it is clear that, in cases dependent to a degree upon circumstantial evidence, triers’ decisions often turn upon those explanations parties seek to give.729 7.136 Research into the reliability and evaluation of eyewitness testimony has progressed steadily since the early twentieth century,730 yet in assessing the credibility of witnesses the common law remains wary of expert assistance from psychiatrists and psychologists.731 An oft-stated reason is the unproved reliability of techniques such as hypnosis and lie detection,732 but fundamentally judges want to retain the human aspect of the common law trial,733 for that is a process that both judges and the community can understand and accept. There is a scepticism of trial by expert where the focus is placed upon particular issues to the distraction of others. The scepticism may be justified, but increasingly courts are under pressure to accept expert assistance in determining the credibility of witnesses, and already there are signs that courts are prepared to accept such assistance in appropriate cases. The need for assistance is endorsed in s 108C of the uniform legislation. [page 872] In criminal cases, considerable leniency has always been extended to a coaccused adducing psychological or psychiatric evidence to establish the likelihood that the other accused was the instigator of the alleged crime;734 and that leniency now extends to every situation where the particular intellectual abilities and psychological development of the accused are relevant.735 But, furthermore, as will be shown below, the law now generally allows expert testimony in determining the credibility of witnesses, so long as that testimony can advance the trier’s understanding of the specific aspects of credibility in issue.736 General instruction on the reliability of testimony is usually of insufficient assistance.737 What is important is that the expert evidence remains at the level of assistance, consisting of relevant information only, and is not permitted to undermine the responsibility of the trier of fact to ultimately determine the issue of credibility.738

The credibility of a witness turns upon, in the first instance, an interpretation of the language he or she uses in order to understand the precise nature of the facts alleged to have been observed. Next, the honesty and sincerity of the witness must be assessed. Finally, the accuracy of his or her observations and memory of them must be gauged. These are the four possible weaknesses of all human testimony: narration, sincerity, observation and memory.739 The theory of the common law trial is that these four weaknesses are best tested through crossexamination before a decision upon credibility is made. Through the use of leading questions the witness can be directly asked to comment upon possible weaknesses: ambiguities in the language used, interests which throw doubts upon sincerity (conscious or unconscious), factors which throw doubts upon the accuracy of the observation and leave open other possible versions of the observed facts, and factors which may have affected or otherwise coloured the witness’s memory of the observations.740 [page 873] 7.137 The main difficulty with cross-examination is that of properly limiting the suggestions that can be put to the witness through leading questions. The suggestions, if not directly relevant to the issues in the case, must at least be sufficiently relevant to assessing the witness’s credibility in one or more of the four ways described (this indirect relevance to facts in issue via credibility is expressly recognised in s 55(2) of the Uniform Acts). Common law judges have an inherent power to control questioning741 and will determine the appropriateness of questioning principally on the ground of sufficient relevance.742 They also have long had statutory discretion to disallow questions relevant only to credit where the imputation made cannot significantly affect the witness’s credibility743 and to prohibit unreasonable, insulting, vexatious and scandalous questions.744 But judges are traditionally reluctant to interfere with the questioning of witnesses,745 often a matter of careful strategy by [page 874] counsel,746 and tend to draw the line only in circumstances of obvious

irrelevance. Some attempt to alter this attitude is made by s 103(1) of the uniform legislation, which provides that the prohibition against credibility evidence in s 102 is only lifted if the party seeking to cross-examine can convince the court that the evidence adduced in cross-examination ‘could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness’.747 By these words the uniform legislation gives judges power to restrict credibility cross-examination of doubtful significance. But as appellate courts seldom allow appeals based solely upon improper questions asked during cross-examination, the section has done little to encourage any change in judicial attitudes. 748 7.138 The generous common law attitude to cross-examination is illustrated by the cross-examination permitted concerning the general character and reputation of witnesses, presumably upon the basis of its sufficient relevance to the determination of the witness’s sincerity (conscious or unconscious). As we saw in Chapter 3, the reluctance of trial judges to limit the cross-examination of those complaining of sexual assault forced legislatures to intervene to restrict cross-examination about a complainant’s previous sexual history.749 The relevance of this to the complainant’s credit is dubious, but courts had refused to intervene. The result was to discourage the reporting of offences through fear of the gruelling cross-examination which would occur at any subsequent trial. Another example of the traditionally generous attitude to cross-examination is the latitude in allowing previous convictions to be put to witnesses. Although at common law any cross-examination should be at least sufficiently relevant to credit, and although summary offences of a strict liability nature are arguably not normally so relevant,750 judges have never restricted cross-examination of witnesses to their previous crimes [page 875] requiring proof of mens rea or of dishonesty.751 The assumption is that the mere fact of criminality is sufficiently relevant to a determination of credit.752 This dubious conclusion appears to be endorsed by that legislation permitting a witness’s previous convictions to be proved where denied.753 Literally, this legislation imposes no limit upon the nature of the convictions that can be put to the witness in cross-examination and proved on denial. Although it might be argued that the reception of all evidence is subject to the notion of sufficient

relevance, a notion acted upon at common law and found in those statutory provisions referred to above giving trial judges the power to limit crossexamination, nevertheless there is authority for the literal interpretation,754 and in practice, judges have seldom imposed strict limits on cross-examination about a witness’s previous convictions.755 Legislatures have now made a further attempt to encourage judges to exercise their authority in controlling the cross-examination of witnesses, in an attempt to take the interests of witnesses into account, particularly those vulnerable to the pressures imposed by formal adversarial process, and protect them from unnecessary harassment (protections available for children and other vulnerable witnesses are discussed generally at 7.33–7.34 above). Apart from in Victoria and the Northern Territory, where the court may disallow improper questions except in the case of vulnerable witnesses where it must do so,756 s 41(1) of the remaining Uniform Acts now makes it mandatory for a judge to disallow such questions put to any witness. In all Acts a question is referred to as ‘disallowable’ or ‘improper’ if it is: ‘misleading or confusing’; ‘unduly annoying, harassing, intimidating, offensive, oppressive, humiliating or repetitive’; asked in a ‘manner or tone that is belittling, insulting or otherwise inappropriate’; or ‘has no basis other than a stereotype’. Section 25 of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) is to the same effect. But, under ss 41(6) ((8) in Victoria and the Northern Territory) and 25(5) respectively, if a witness answers a question that should have been disallowed, the admissibility of the answer is unaffected. The onus therefore remains on the trial judge to exercise authority under these provisions. [page 876] Pursuing credit/credibility beyond cross-examination: the general prohibition 7.139 While judges are reluctant to limit the ambit of cross-examinations that may be relevant to the assessment of credit, the common law does not allow inquiry into these collateral matters to extend beyond cross-examination. As a general rule, the answer given by a witness (including a party who testifies)757 to a collateral matter — generally thought of as a matter relating to credibility alone — is final and cannot be pursued through re-examination or rebuttal. Nor, at common law, can a collateral matter be pursued in-chief in anticipation of a

witness’s testimony. The same result is achieved by ss 102 and 103 of the Uniform Acts, so far as the questions seek evidence relevant only to credibility (or to credibility and another relevant purpose for which the evidence is inadmissible or cannot be used): s 101A. The limitation is imposed upon the practical grounds that court inquiries are not open-ended and considerations of cost-effectiveness demand that a line be drawn against pursuing matters of only marginal probative value.758 The problem is in determining what is a matter of limited probative value and, as the earlier discussion of the notion of sufficient relevance clearly showed, it is impossible to lay down a definitive test because of the uncertainty that exists about the very nature of fact-finding. Previous cases determining limits must be seen in their own circumstances and not be regarded as dogmatically determining the limits of inquiry. They nevertheless illustrate in general terms where courts consider it is appropriate to draw the line.759 7.140 There are two general tests of what is a collateral matter for the purpose of the common law finality rule. One defines collaterality in terms of credit, so that information relevant only to a witness’s credit cannot be pursued beyond cross-examination, in contrast to information relevant to the facts in issue which can be pursued in re-examination or rebuttal.760 It is this distinction that forms the basis of the Uniform Acts’ credibility rule. But there is no definitive explanation of credibility.761 The problem is retaining a conceptual distinction between credibility and issue. The credibility of a witness is always indirectly relevant to establishing facts in issue and is sometimes of such crucial importance that it is decisive of such facts. This is particularly so where the witness is a participant in the very facts in issue or the only eyewitness [page 877] to them.762 To exclude evidence by way of rebuttal where this may be decisive of that testimony can scarcely be justified by the distinction between credibility and issue. The other test defines collaterality in terms of matters upon which evidence could not be tendered by a party as part of its case during examination-inchief.763 But although this emphasises the importance information must have to proving the material facts in issue, sometimes issues do not crystallise until after a

party’s case has closed, and anyway it does not help in defining the requisite degree of importance before information can be tendered in-chief. At common law, that can only be a matter of sufficient relevance to material facts in issue.764 7.141 These difficulties are illustrated by the High Court decision in Piddington v Bennett and Wood.765 A witness to a road accident (the subject of a civil claim) was asked in cross-examination why he happened to be in the vicinity of the accident. He replied that, as far as he could recall, he had gone to a nearby bank to either deposit or cash a cheque for a Major Jarvie. Consequently, as part of the defence case, the manager of the bank in question was called to establish that on the relevant day no transaction had been effected in relation to Major Jarvie’s account. The question upon appeal was whether the trial judge should have permitted this evidence, it being argued that its only relevance was to a collateral issue, namely, the truth of the witness’s explanation [page 878] for being in the vicinity, a matter relevant only to the witness’s credibility. Against this, it was argued that the information went to the issue of whether the witness was present at the scene of the accident, and this matter was of such importance to finding the material facts that it could be pursued beyond crossexamination. The court held that the bank manager should not have been called, that the reason given by the witness for being at the scene was given casually to the best of the witness’s recollection, and that the bank manager’s testimony was indecisive of the issue of whether the witness had been at the scene of the accident. If the evidence had been able to establish with some degree of certainty that the witness had not been present at the scene it would have been allowed. Presence at the scene is not a collateral matter, a matter going only to credibility. On the other hand, the reason given for being present usually is, for it can seldom be decisive of presence. Nevertheless, in exceptional circumstances where the reason is clearly given and is of importance to the witness it may be so decisive. Evatt J accepts this possibility (at 558); Dixon J takes a more arbitrary approach (at 554), holding that the witness’s reason for being present is always a collateral issue. The Evatt view seems preferable. Ultimately, sufficient relevance determines

whether a matter can be pursued beyond cross-examination, and that sufficient relevance depends upon the importance of the fact in issue to proving material facts and the degree to which further evidence can establish that fact in issue. This more flexible approach appeared to have been endorsed by the High Court in Goldsmith v Sandilands.766 However, in Nicholls v R; Coates v R,767 the court, with the exception of McHugh J, demands that the distinction between evidence relevant to the issue and evidence relevant collaterally (generally to credit) be rigorously maintained: see discussion at 7.133. Under both the common law and the uniform legislation, there are a number of situations where ostensibly collateral issues can be pursued beyond crossexamination. Some of these may accurately be regarded as exceptions to the general rule, but others might better be regarded as examples of situations where issues assume an importance beyond collaterality and for that reason can be pursued. The uniform legislation enacts these exceptional circumstances in s 106(2), which provides that, where a witness has denied certain collateral matters in cross-examination, independent proof of them can be brought without infringement of the credibility rule and without leave. However, s 106(1) of the uniform legislation also states that provided the substance of credibility evidence has been put to the witness in cross-examination and been denied or not admitted or agreed to, then a judge may give leave to pursue that evidence relevant to [page 879] a witness’s credibility beyond cross-examination in any case. This appears to endorse the dissenting views of McHugh J (noted above at 7.133) that the collateral evidence rule is fundamentally a rule of case management to be exercised in accordance with the interests of justice, so that under the uniform legislation a judge can allow credibility evidence to be admitted beyond crossexamination if of the opinion that this is in the interests of justice. Exceptions to the general rule 7.142 General repute and previous convictions: Two apparent exceptions proper are those concerning proof of a witness’s general reputation for veracity, and

proof of a witness’s previous convictions. The former does not appear to survive the uniform legislation but the second is enacted in s 106(2)(b). The first is discussed in R v Richardson and Longman,768 where the English Court of Criminal Appeal confirmed that an opponent may, having attacked a witness’s veracity during cross-examination, call evidence of that witness’s reputation for veracity. And the witness called to establish that reputation may go further and also express an opinion upon whether he or she would believe the witness on oath. What that witness cannot be asked during examination-in-chief is the basis for that reputation or opinion (although these matters may be disclosed as a result of a cross-examination seeking to discredit the testimony of that reputation or opinion). The second exception apparently exists at common law,769 but is now generally enacted in legislation passed primarily to make it clear that witnesses with convictions remain competent to testify. That Australian legislation which exists (see n 753 above) is modelled on s 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1865 (UK), and simply provides that a witness may be questioned about a previous felony or misdemeanour770 which may be proved if denied. It was argued (at 7.138) that this provision should be subject to those other provisions which make it clear that any cross-examination should be relevant to issue or credit, so that if the conviction is not relevant in this way it cannot be revealed, but in practice courts appear to have allowed cross-examination about previous convictions of the most peripheral kind. The Uniform Acts’ requirement in s 103(1) of ‘evidence that could substantively affect the credibility of the witness’ before evidence admissible only for credibility purposes can be revealed in crossexamination, and the requirement in s 106(2) that a conviction can only be proved if denied in cross-examination, means that only convictions capable of substantially affecting credibility [page 880] can be independently proved under s 106. And s 106(2)(e), by additionally including as an exception to the credibility rule false representations knowingly made while under a legal obligation (Australian or foreign) to tell the truth, might also suggest that substantial credibility relevance should be required before pursuing credibility beyond cross-examination.

In some jurisdictions, limits on cross-examination revealing convictions may be imposed by ‘rehabilitation of offenders’ legislation.771 7.143 Bias, interest or corruption: The other so-called exceptions to the general prohibition are better regarded as examples of situations where matters assume an importance beyond collaterality. Yet the uniform legislation dutifully enacts them in s 106(2) as exceptions to the credibility rule. At common law, where evidence of bias, interest or corruption capable of causing a witness to testify falsely is specifically put to a witness and denied,772 the evidence may be pursued beyond cross-examination. Under s 106(2)(a) of the uniform legislation, the exception is expressed as applying where there is evidence that shows a witness ‘is biased or has a motive for being untruthful’. At common law, there must be evidence of bias, interest or corruption capable of causing the witness to testify untruthfully for the exception to apply.773 Thus, in R v Phillips,774 it could be proved in rebuttal that a child-complainant, alleging incest, had admitted to another that her mother had put her up to making the allegations. But in Attorney-General v Hitchcock,775 a witness, who denied saying he had been offered a bribe by customs officers to testify against the accused, could not be contradicted by evidence that he had said he had received such an offer, for there was no evidence that the offer had been accepted so that there was [page 881] a motive to be untruthful. If the witness had admitted having accepted the bribe the case would have been decided differently. The circumstances giving rise to this exception were fully discussed in Nicholls v R; Coates v R776 by McHugh J (at [61]–[73]) and Hayne and Heydon JJ (at [261]–[270], [286]). Their approach is captured by the statement of the latter (at [286]) that ‘the key question is whether the witness’s state of mind is such as to cause the witness to lie about the principal factual issues’. This arguably indicates a liberal approach to interpreting whether bias, interest or corruption is present. Hayne and Heydon JJ (at [269]) distinguish between ‘bias’ (hostility or prejudice against one party personally or of favour to the other personally), ‘interest’ (the specific inclination apt to be produced by the relation between the witness and the cause at issue in the litigation), and ‘corruption’ (the conscious false intent which is to be inferred from giving or taking a bribe or from expressions of a

general unscrupulousness in relation to the case).777 The evidence in the case before them, that the witness had said he had been offered a deal by police if he would testify falsely against the accused, was categorised as capable of establishing ‘corruption’ rather than ‘bias’ or ‘interest’. However, the court was unanimous in holding that evidence of this statement was inadmissible because counsel had failed to lay a sufficient foundation for it in cross-examination by putting the statement to the witness. The arbitrary effects of having definitive exceptions to the collateral evidence rule are illustrated by R v Umanski.778 In incest proceedings, the complainant’s mother was asked in cross-examination whether she had said to a Mr Lawrence: Stefan my husband has been playing around with Helga. I am going to give him up to the police unless he gives me my share of the property. If he sells up and gives me two-thirds I will say nothing.

The witness denied having made the statement. It was held that this statement could not be proved in rebuttal as it disclosed no motive to falsify her testimony. While this decision was technically justified under the limits of the bias, interest and corruption exception, the complainant’s mother being a crucial witness, arguably in the interests of justice this statement was of sufficient importance to be put before the jury. In the terms of s 106(2)(a) of the uniform legislation, one might argue that the evidence at least showed ‘a motive for being untruthful’. Otherwise this might be regarded as a situation where leave to pursue the evidence should be granted under s 106(1). 7.144 Physical or mental capacity: Where in cross-examination it is suggested to a witness that he or she is suffering from a specific physical or mental condition that throws serious doubts upon the reliability of the witness’s testimony, this may be a [page 882] matter of sufficient importance to be pursued in rebuttal through expert medical testimony.779 It seems that this situation is contemplated by s 106(2)(d) of the uniform legislation, which provides that: The credibility rule does not apply to evidence that is relevant to a witness’ credibility and that is adduced otherwise than from the witness if in cross-examination of the witness the substance of the evidence was put to the witness and the witness denied, or did not admit or agree to, the substance of the evidence … if the evidence tends to prove that the witness is, or was, unable to be aware of matters to which his or her evidence relates.

This exception does not, according to R v PLV,780 admit evidence to prove that a witness is, or was, unable ‘to recall’ matters to which his or her testimony relates, the phrase ‘unable to be aware of or recall’ being used in s 104(3)(b) but not in s 106(2)(d). This being so, evidence relevant only to credibility and relating to the recovery of memory through hypnosis or EMDR was held not admissible by virtue of this section. In this respect, the position under the Uniform Acts would seem narrower than that at common law. However, this result has been altered by s 108C, which creates a general exception for expert evidence ‘concerning the credibility of another witness’ provided the opinion ‘is wholly or substantially based on’ ‘specialised knowledge’ and ‘could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness’: see further at 7.108, 7.112 above. 7.145 The House of Lords in Toohey v Metropolitan Police Commissioner781 finally clarified that at common law matters relating to a physical or mental condition, though relevant only to a witness’s credit, may be pursued beyond cross-examination. In that case, a doctor who had examined a complainant soon after an alleged assault could establish in rebuttal the victim’s hysteria to throw doubt upon the testimony given by the complainant at the trial. In R v Eades,782 a psychologist could testify in rebuttal for the Crown that in his opinion a person suffering from hysterical amnesia could not recover memory in the circumstances alleged by the accused. Even if such evidence might be regarded as of sufficient importance to go beyond the bounds of mere collaterality, to satisfy the rule in Browne v Dunn will generally require that these matters be first put to the witness in cross-examination before independent evidence of them is called. [page 883] 7.146 There is no logic in limiting this exception to abnormal conditions and diseases. In the simplest case an expert might testify about a witness’s capacity to see or hear. But an expert might also testify to a witness’s psychological and intellectual capacities as well if information about these matters could assist the trier in resolving an issue of credit. But, as mentioned in 7.58, courts remain sceptical of the psychological assistance that experts can give, and are therefore reluctant to receive, for example, information on the reliability of eyewitness testimony generally.783 They remain sceptical about techniques such as lie detection784 and hypnosis: see

7.109–7.114. But, on the other hand, if a party can demonstrate that expert testimony will specifically assist in solving a particular issue, explaining, for example, a mental handicap which produces the witness’s circumlocutory manner of speech,785 or explaining some other relevant intellectual capacity of a witness,786 then such evidence might be admitted. Whether medical or expert evidence of this sort can be called depends upon what assistance the court sees as flowing from it and to what degree the evidence might distract the court from its principal task. As medical and scientific knowledge advances, so courts become more willing to admit expert psychological evidence not only where it relates to a relevant psychological state of an accused but also where it is sufficiently relevant to determining the credit of a crucial eyewitness. Under the Uniform Acts (notably s 108C), there is less discretion for the court to exclude such (opinion) evidence to the extent that it possesses probative value (s 55) and is based on specialised knowledge: see further at 7.108, 7.112. 7.147 Prior inconsistent statements: The final (so-called) exception to the finality rule concerns the witness’s prior inconsistent statements about those facts in issue that are the subject of the witness’s testimony. It is the importance of these statements in assessing the credibility of the witness’s testimony about facts in issue that allows their proof. Where a witness denies such relevant statements, these should be capable of independent proof. Although relevant primarily to the witness’s credit, they are of such importance in this context that they can be regarded as sufficiently relevant to an accurate assessment of the issues in the case. In the terms of the Uniform Acts, [page 884] such inconsistent statements relating to the subject matter of the action are subject to the credibility rule and its exceptions unless admissible for some other purpose, most notably as falling under an exception to the hearsay rule. 7.148 The admissibility of prior inconsistent statements in Australia in nonuniform legislation jurisdictions is contained in legislation modelled upon ss 4 and 5 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1865 (UK).787 This applies equally in civil and criminal proceedings. But whereas the strongest rationale for pursuing an inconsistent statement beyond cross-examination is that it relates to a matter in

issue, this limit is not contained in the uniform legislation. One reason may be that such a limit would make the exception of limited application because under the uniform legislation the credibility prohibition has no application where a witness’s prior statement is admissible firsthand hearsay of matters in issue. Section 106(2)(c) provides: The credibility rule does not apply to evidence that is relevant to a witness’ credibility and that is adduced otherwise than from the witness if in cross-examination of the witness the substance of the evidence was put to the witness and the witness denied, or did not admit or agree to, the substance of the evidence … if the evidence tends to prove that the witness has made a prior inconsistent statement.

The procedure under the uniform legislation for proof of those statements, similar to that in the legislation based on the Criminal Procedure Act, is contained in s 43, which applies also to any prior inconsistent statement, whether or not it relates to the matters in issue between the parties: see 7.149 below. 7.149 The legislation equivalent to the Criminal Procedure Act 1865 (UK) contains separate sections dealing with prior oral statements and statements reduced to writing (statements written, signed or otherwise adopted by the witness).788 At common law, the procedure for proving a witness’s inconsistent written statement was governed by the rulings of the House of Lords in The Trial of Queen Caroline.789 These demanded that, before cross-examination could proceed, the document, as the best evidence of any prior statement, had to be read in its entirety into evidence upon proof of its authentication as the witness’s document. This lost the cross-examiner the tactical opportunity of testing the witness’s testimony through first asking about particular statements and then unexpectedly proving them in the event of denial. It also obliged the crossexaminer to put in an entire document as part of his or her case, thereby in some cases losing the right of reply and in others being forced to tender unfavourable [page 885] information.790 The important reform of the Criminal Procedure Act was to remedy this situation and effectively put the tender of prior oral and written statements upon the same footing. This is recognised in the Uniform Acts drawing no distinction between these statements. The legislation equivalent to the Criminal Procedure Act is not a code, but is intended only to deal with the specific problem of the proof of the prior

inconsistent statements of a witness.791 It allows a witness’s prior inconsistent statements to be put one by one to the witness in cross-examination (without any document being shown to the witness) and, if not admitted, allows them to be proved independently.792 Unlike ss 43 and 106 of the Uniform Acts, these sections are limited to statements relative (that is, relevant)793 to the subject matter of the cause or prosecution. Where the limiting words apply, prior statements about matters not relative to the subject matter of the action remain collateral matters794 that can only be proved to establish bias795 or some other exceptional matter (oral statements to be so used must first be specifically put to [page 886] the witness (Nicholls v R; Coates v R);796 but if they are in writing, The Queen’s Case797 rules appear still to apply to determine the procedure for their use). 7.150 Where a prior inconsistent statement appears to fall also within another exclusionary evidentiary rule, whether that rule prevents proof of the statement as a prior inconsistent statement appears to depend upon the nature and purpose of the exclusionary rule and the circumstances in which the contradiction is sought. For example, where a prior statement is protected by legal professional privilege, Carter v Managing Partner, Northmore Hale Davey and Leake798 decides that even when sought by an accused to establish innocence, the statement cannot be disclosed unless the privilege has been waived. In Lui Mei Lin v R,799 the Privy Council held that one co-accused could put to another who had given evidence against him that other accused’s prior inconsistent statement, even though it was contained in a confession which the court had declared inadmissible. An accused has an unfettered right to discredit an in-court accuser by proving his or her prior inconsistent statement (but does not have the right to use its confessional hearsay to establish innocence: see discussion at 8.77–8.78). 7.151 Where the witness admits making a prior statement, no further evidence of it is required.800 But if the witness then denies the truth of the assertions in the statement, except where s 60 of the Uniform Acts and s 101 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) apply, the statement may be used only to discredit the witness, not as evidence of the truth of the assertions contained in it, and only if the witness admits on oath the truth of these assertions (thereby incorporating them into the

witness’s in-court testimony) can the statement be used as evidence of these asserted facts.801 Where, on the other hand, the witness does not ‘distinctly admit’802 the making of the prior oral statement or it is ‘intended to contradict such witness by the writing’, the legislation requires that the prior statement be first identified to the witness and [page 887] if still not admitted it may be proved by the cross-examining party,803 either by calling a witness to an oral statement804 or by authenticating and then tendering the relevant contradictory parts of the witness’s prior written statement.805 This proof should preferably be given before the witness is released from crossexamination in case further questions need to be asked in cross-examination or re-examination.806 Again, where the prior statement is proved, except where s 60 of the Uniform Acts or s 101 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) apply, the prior statement can only be used to discredit the witness and not as hearsay unless the truth of the prior statements are admitted by the witness on oath.807 And the jury must be carefully directed about the uses permitted in the individual case.808 7.152 It is the legitimate object of cross-examination to draw attention to contradictory statements without giving the witness the opportunity for qualification or explanation.809 These matters may be pursued in re-examination. But care must be taken not to allow the cross-examination to distort the existence or extent of any prior statement. Where the witness’s prior statement is in writing, the legislation based on the Criminal Procedure Act 1865 (UK) and s 45 of the Uniform Acts empowers the court to call for and inspect any document containing an inconsistent statement and ‘thereupon make such use of it for the purposes of the trial … as the court thinks fit’.810 [page 888]

This enables the court to compel the cross-examining party to tender statements in the witness’s documents where this ought to have been done (where a witness’s document is identified and it is suggested that it contains an inconsistent statement and it does not, tender may also be insisted upon).811 It also allows the court to let the other party tender in re-examination statements in the witness’s document which have not been tendered but which qualify or explain the apparent inconsistencies.812 Presumably, it also empowers the court to direct the tender of statements in a document of its own motion (s 45 expressly so provides), but it is suggested that courts should not direct tender in other than exceptional circumstances. Where the alleged inconsistent statement is oral but not proved by the cross-examiner, any distortions must be cleared up through reexamination; but if the previous statement is proved through a witness (or recording), any qualifying or explaining statements may be elicited (or played). At common law, there is no right in the party calling the witness to restore the witness’s credit through the proof of prior consistent statements in re-examination or rebuttal. However, by virtue of s 108(3)(a) of the Uniform Acts a judge may give a party leave to prove such prior consistent statements: see also at 7.158. Cross-examination on documents 7.153 Disputes over a witness’s prior inconsistent versions of material facts are one example of an issue which can achieve sufficient relevance to be pursued beyond cross-examination. Although, perhaps incongruously, now extended by legislation to permit cross-examination upon and proof of a witness’s prior inconsistent statements generally, there is no general right at common law, or by legislation, to cross-examine a witness generally about out-of-court statements, whether they are oral or in writing.813 Such statements are generally irrelevant to the witness’s credit and are otherwise inadmissible hearsay. [page 889] Out-of-court statements can generally be received only where not prohibited by the hearsay rule, and, when in writing, where the writing is properly authenticated. Where a party wishes to refer to the contents of an admissible document during cross-examination, and that document is not a prior inconsistent statement of the witness, the effect of The Queen’s Case is that the

document must be authenticated and proved in the ordinary way before any cross-examination takes place. However, short of this, courts will allow a crossexamining party to put a document into the hands of a witness, without identifying it or otherwise referring to its contents, and then ask the witness whether he or she still wishes to adhere to testimony already given.814 This technique can be used with any document, whoever is the author and whether it is admissible or not. But as soon as the document is identified or reference made to its contents then the proper course is for it to be formally authenticated and tendered then and there in accordance with The Queen’s Case rules. Consequently, only a document otherwise admissible can be legitimately referred to in this way during cross-examination.815 The uniform legislation in s 44 enacts this common law position.816 There is some authority for the view that, where the witness is a party, crossexamination may seek admissions about the contents of documents, whether the document is admissible or not.817 No doubt assertions in those documents may be put to the party, without their source being identified, but if the opponent seeks to rely upon the document itself as evidence it is suggested that it must be properly proved and tendered and this process cannot be cut short by putting the document’s contents [page 890] to the party-witness.818 Therefore, if the document is not admissible, its contents cannot get before the court. 7.154 While considering cross-examination upon documents generally, the rule in Walker v Walker819 requires mention. By that rule, if one party calls for a document in the possession of the opponent (where normally that party has no right to inspect that document), the opponent may insist upon its tender. The justification appears to be the adversary idea that a party who calls to inspect a document to which he or she is not strictly entitled, calls for it at his or her peril and may be obliged then to tender it. This justification is applied to admit the entire document as evidence of the facts asserted in it in exception to the hearsay rule. Where the document in question is one that a party is entitled to see, for example, a document used by the opponent’s witness to refresh memory,820 or the depositions of a Crown witness,821 the rule has no application unless

reference is made to parts of the document beyond that entitlement.822 Similarly, if a party successfully requests the court to exercise its wide power to subpoena or otherwise order production of a document to the court for the purpose of evidence, and the party thereby gains access to the document, the rule is inapplicable.823 The rule stands as a warning only to cross-examiners who call for documents to which they are not entitled. As discovery rules expand, the ambit of the rule correspondingly diminishes. In a criminal case, the residual discretion may be exercised to prevent an unfair use of this rule by a prosecutor and to prevent the rule leaving prejudicial documentary evidence before the jury.824 The rule in Walker v Walker is abolished by s 35 of the uniform legislation.

Re-examination 7.155 With cross-examination being a one-sided affair, allowing suggestions to be put to witnesses through leading questions without giving the witness a full opportunity to explain or qualify answers,825 it is important that the party calling the witness be permitted to re-examine to remove any distortions created by that [page 891] cross-examination. Thus, re-examination is permitted to explain ambiguities and uncertainties and to adduce information that explains or qualifies matters arising out of cross-examination.826 For example, if it is suggested in cross-examination that a witness has a particular motive to distort testimony and the witness is given no opportunity in cross-examination to explain that that motive did not exist, this may be clarified in re-examination.827 If previous inconsistent statements are put to a witness in cross-examination, other statements explaining or qualifying the apparent inconsistencies may be put and, if in writing, proved, through reexamination.828 Or if it is suggested in cross-examination that the conduct of the witness is inconsistent with his or her account, a consistent explanation may be pursued in re-examination.829 In these ways, re-examination is an important process for restoring the credit of a witness whose testimony may have been unfairly distorted by cross-examination. 7.156 The important limit to re-examination is that it must be confined to clearing up matters raised during cross-examination and cannot be used to elicit other information which should have been elicited, if at all, during examination-

in-chief.830 Theoretical and practical reasons demand that evidence-in-chief be given before cross-examination takes place. Re-examination is allowed in order to raise matters that cannot normally be referred to in-chief as they arise out of cross-examination.831 Re-examination may be regarded as an important right to prevent distortion of the truth, but it is kept within important boundaries. Leading questions may not generally be put in re-examination.832 But prior consistent statements may be proved to restore a witness’s credit where suggestions of invention have been made in cross-examination: see 7.91–7.93.833 [page 892] The Uniform Acts again endorse this common law position, s 39 providing that: (a)

On re-examination a witness may be questioned about matters arising out of evidence given by the witness in cross-examination; and

(b) other questions may not be put to the witness unless the court gives leave.

— and s 37 generally prohibiting leading questions in re-examination. 7.157 An analogy can be drawn between re-examination and the right of the prosecutor to reopen in order to tender evidence in rebuttal. Not only should the evidence of a witness be given entirely during examination-in-chief, the prosecution must also give its entire case in one hit, so that reopening is permitted only to rebut matters that have arisen as a result of issues raised and evidence tendered by the defence upon which it would be unreasonable to expect the prosecutor to raise and tender evidence in advance. But reexamination and reopening to tender evidence in rebuttal are still quite distinct procedures; while the former is commonly permitted, the latter is exceptional.834 One question raised directly by the structure of the Uniform Acts is the extent to which evidence can be called in rebuttal to restore the credibility of a witness attacked in cross-examination. Where this evidence is relevant to the issue (rather than credibility only) and capable of tender in-chief, then the general rule against splitting applies and the party may be estopped from calling evidence that should have been called in-chief. But where, for example, the attack could not have been anticipated, then the rule against splitting would not apply.

7.158 At common law, where evidence is relevant and admissible only to credit, unless one of the exceptional situations arise, the general rule is that the matter cannot be pursued beyond cross-examination. The clear exceptions are where a prior consistent statement might be tendered to rebut a suggestion of recent invention (7.91–7.93), and where the capacity, physical or mental, has been attacked in cross-examination and expert testimony is available to rebut that attack.835 Authorities supporting the right to rebut in this latter situation raise the question of whether there is a more general right to restore the credibility of one’s witness in rebuttal. Brooking J in R v J836 suggests that, where a witness may be re-examined to provide a consistent account of prior statements or of behaviour alleged in cross-examination to be contradictory and discrediting, there is no reason why this sort of rehabilitating evidence cannot be elicited from a third person.837 It is not clear how far Brooking J intended this principle of rehabilitation to go, but it is suggested that [page 893] it should not extend beyond evidence also relevant and admissible to the issue or admissible credibility evidence rebutting recent invention or relating to the witness’s physical or mental incapacity. The uniform legislation expressly provides for the restoration of a witness’s credibility. According to s 108(1), the credibility rule ‘does not apply to evidence adduced in re-examination of a witness’, and under s 108(3): The credibility rule does not apply to evidence of a prior consistent statement of a witness if: (a)

evidence of a prior inconsistent statement of the witness has been admitted; or

(b) it is or will be suggested (either expressly or by implication) that evidence given by the witness has been fabricated or reconstructed (whether deliberately or otherwise) or is the result of suggestion;838 and the court gives leave to adduce the evidence of the prior consistent statement.

This enables a witness’s prior consistent statements to be tendered in restoration of credibility839 under the uniform legislation wherever a prior inconsistent statement has been admitted (whether in-chief or in cross-examination),840 whereas at common law an allegation of recent invention is required. In R v Corbett,841 the court held that no miscarriage of justice was caused by allowing

the Crown to tender a prior consistent statement-in-chief in anticipation of the accused’s later cross-examination on a prior inconsistent statement. That later cross-examination having duly occurred, the conditions of the section were sufficiently satisfied. ______________________________ 1.

Legislation exists in most jurisdictions for the taking of testimony from children and vulnerable witnesses by video-link: see 7.32ff. Video-link evidence is also expressly permitted in most jurisdictions to facilitate testimony from witnesses who are unavailable or interstate or overseas: see, for example, Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 ss 27, 47–47C; Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 s 33A; Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) Pt 1AE; Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998 (NSW) (discussed in R v Ngo [2003] NSWCCA 82); Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) Pt 3A; Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1958 (Vic) Pt IIA (discussed in R v Kyu Hyuk Kim (1998) 104 A Crim R 233); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 59E(4), Pt 6C; Evidence (Audio and Visual Links) Act 1999 (Tas); Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 120–132; Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (ACT) Ch 3; Evidence Act 1939 (NT) Pt 5. The willingness of courts and parties to use video technology when necessary is illustrated by R v Hines (No 2) (2014) 242 A Crim R 316; [2014] NSWSC 990, where testimony was received via CCTV under s 26(a) of the uniform legislation. Inherent powers and general rules of court to give directions upon the manner in which evidence is to be taken have also been interpreted to permit evidence by video-link: Garcin v Amerindo Investment Advisers Ltd [1991] 4 All ER 655, discussed in Dockray, ‘Evidence by Television’ (1992) 109 LQR 561. Rules of court now also expressly so provide: see, for example, UCPR 1999 (Qld) r 392; FamCR O 30 r 2AAA (the limits of evidence by telephone are discussed in In Marriage of S and R (1998) 149 FLR 149 at [73]–[80]). And see generally R v Accused [1992] 1 NZLR 257 at 261–2; Park v Citibank Savings Ltd (1993) 31 NSWLR 219 at 224–5; B v Dentists Disciplinary Tribunal [1994] 1 NZLR 95.

2.

Myers v DPP [1965] AC 1001; uniform legislation s 59(1). The hearsay rule is explained in Chapter 8.

3.

See, for example, the definition of ‘document’ in the Dictionary to the Uniform Evidence Acts.

4.

Compare with Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 965.

5.

The admissibility of such statements is discussed at 7.147–7.152.

6.

This appears also to be the situation in authenticating audio recordings: R v Robson (1972) 56 Cr App R 450 at 452 (prosecution need only adduce prima facie evidence of authenticity of a confessional recording); R v Gilmore [1977] 2 NSWLR 935 (issue of the identity of a voice in a recording is a jury question); see also R v Chen [1993] 2 VR 139 at 150 (evidence from which a trier of fact can reasonably conclude that the recording is of a conversation which occurred and which would be admissible if proved by oral testimony); but cf Conwell v Tapfield [1981] 1 NSWLR 595 at 599, which held that the judge is to decide the reliability of recording equipment on the basis of expert evidence before admitting a confession. Before a jury can compare handwriting, legislation in some states requires the judge to be satisfied of the genuineness of the comparative sample: see R v Mazzone (1985) 43 SASR 330 (beyond reasonable doubt); R v Browne-Kerr [1990] VR 78 (the civil standard is appropriate to proof of facts on the voir dire); and the legislation listed at n 18 below. In the states where the Uniform Acts apply, the comparative sample is received under s 56(1) on grounds of relevance alone: R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359 at [323]–[328], [487]–[502]. Where authentication is left to the trier and is an indispensable link in the chain of proof the standard of proof should be that appropriate for proof of the material facts in issue: see 2.83–2.89.

7.

MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 520–3 (not a matter going to admissibility ever necessitating a

voir dire); Uniform Evidence Acts s 88 (provided on the evidence presented it is reasonably open to so find: see R v Hall [2001] NSWSC 827 at [28]–[29]). 8.

Inferences may be similarly so drawn to support a finding that a document or thing satisfies any provision of the Acts, including rules of admissibility: s 183.

9.

Daw v Toyworld (NSW) Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 25 at [46] (Heydon JA); Inspector Stephen Campbell v Hitchcock [2003] NSWIR Comm 148 at [94], [107]3 (Walton J); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich [2005] NSWSC 417 at [117], [119]–[120] (Austin J in finding all the documents before him to have been authenticated); NSW Bar Association v Archer (No 7) [2005] NSWADT 223 at [76]–[78] (Chesterman M finding sufficient evidence of authentication).

10. (1999) 47 NSWLR 309. 11. Cf Inspector Stephen Campbell v Hitchcock [2003] NSWIR Comm 148 at [89], [107] point 5. (Walton J: rejecting the argument that authenticity is conceptually distinct from the issue of relevance). 12. Lee v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 305 at [25]. But one might argue that in Rusu the document itself supported no inference that it related to any named person (the account was identified only by a number), and that the essence of Bryson J’s decision was that he was not prepared to find that authentication proved only from the production of the document in response to a subpoena seeking a statement on the account of that named person: see Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich [2005] NSWSC 417 at [117]; NSW Bar Association v Archer (No 7) [2005] NSWADT 223 at [75]–[76]. 13. While the facts upon which admissibility depend must be proved on the balance of probabilities, both at common law and under s 142 of the uniform legislation, the question whether a finding is reasonably open, being a matter of relevance, does not involve a matter of such proof: see n 6 above. 14. Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich [2005] NSWSC 417 at [117]; New South Wales Crime Commission v Cassar (2012) 224 A Crim R 448; [2012] NSWSC 1170. 15. See cases at n 9 above. 16. [2012] FCA 1355; [2015] 207 FCA 342; (2015) 235 FCR 181 at [94] respectively. See also Matthews v SPI Electrical Pty Ltd (Ruling No 35) [2014] VSC 59 at [27]–[31] (Forrest J) but cf In the Matter of Maiden Civil Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1618 at [23]. 17. Discussed in Trimcoll Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2007] NSWCA 307. 18. Uniform Evidence Acts s 149; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 61; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34E; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 79A. Note that this legislation does not extend to wills and other testamentary documents. 19. Uniform Evidence Acts s 149; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 60; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 31; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 30. 20. See, for example, R v Daren and Tange [1971] 2 NSWLR 423 (oral adoption following a silent reading of the document); R v McGillivray (1993) 97 Cr App R 232 (deceased witness too ill to sign). Compare with R v Walker (1993) 61 SASR 260 (copy of transcript of testimony in other court proceedings never adopted by witness). Note that, in criminal cases, courts have a discretion to exclude, and are extremely wary of, unsigned confessions: Driscoll v R (1977) 137 CLR 517; Stephens v R (1985) 156 CLR 664; and see 8.167. 21. Curtis v R [1972] Tas SR 21; R v Van Beelen (1972) 6 SASR 534; R v Salameh (1985) 4 NSWLR 369; R v Rose (1993) 69 A Crim R 1 at 11–12 (the court assumed the contemporaneous record of an illiterate’s witness statement had been authenticated in permitting it to be read in court to the witness to enable him to refresh his memory from the statement). Where a document has been adopted after being read aloud by another that other person must be called to authenticate it.

22. Rivers v Fuller; Ex parte Rivers [1977] Qd R 97. 23. Duke v Duke (1975) 12 SASR 106, where the witness had seen the signatory sign; and Doed Mudd v Suckermore (1836) 5 Ad & E 703; 111 ER 1331, where the witness had regularly seen writings acknowledged by signatory as his writings. 24. Sumner v Booth [1974] 2 NSWLR 174. 25. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 59; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 30; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 31. 26. Adami v R (1959) 108 CLR 605; R v Nicholas [1988] Tas SR 155; Grayden v R [1989] WAR 208 at 211–13 (Malcolm CJ questioning whether a copy can constitute the ‘disputed writing’ for the purposes of the section). 27. The trial judge determines the genuineness of the sample for comparative purposes: see Adami v R (1959) 108 CLR 605; R v Mazzone (1985) 43 SASR 330 (genuineness to be established beyond reasonable doubt); compare with R v Browne-Kerr [1990] VR 78 (the civil standard is that appropriate to proof of facts on the voir dire). See further at 2.91 and 8.160. 28. (2000) 158 FLR 359 at [323]–[328], [487]–[502]; Hannes v DPP (Cth) (No 2) [2006] NSWCCA 373 at [305]–[320]. 29. Adami v R (1959) 108 CLR 605 at 616; Grayden v R [1989] WAR 208 at 213–14 (Malcolm CJ). Allowing the jury to perform such tasks is usually insensitive to empirical research that not only questions some of the capabilities of those legally recognised as experts, but frequently points to high levels of error when laypersons are asked to compare handwriting, voices, images of strangers and so forth in controlled conditions. See, for example, Dyer, Found and Rogers, ‘An Insight into Forensic Document Examiner Expertise for Discriminating between Forged and Disguised Signatures’ (2008) 53 J Forensic Sci 1154; White et al, ‘Passport Officers’ Errors in Face Matching’ (2014) 9 PLoS ONE e103510; Burton and Jenkins, ‘Unfamiliar Face Perception’ in Calder et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Face Perception, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011. 30. Uniform Evidence Acts s 152; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 62; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34F. 31. See Phipson, Law of Evidence, 14th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1990, [2]–[17]; Re Cooper (1876) 2 VLR (I) 82. 32. For example, Zelling J in Leydon v Tomlinson (1979) 22 SASR 302. See also R v McIvor (1883) 4 LR (NSW) 43; Sutherland v Cooley (1898) 24 VLR 410. 33. Judicial notice of seals and signatures: Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) ss 41, 42, 42A; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 54–56. 34. Uniform Evidence Acts ss 157 (public documents relating to court processes), 158 (certain public documents), 159 (official statistics); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 36–39. Cf the closely related and extensive provisions in all Australian jurisdictions enabling proof of the contents of a wide variety of public documents and registers (local and foreign) through the tender of secondary evidence usually in the form of a certified copy. These important provisions are summarised in Evidence, ALRC Interim Report No 26 (1985), vol 2, pp 141–46. 35. Uniform Evidence Acts ss 148 (attestation by justices, lawyers and notaries public), 150 (seals and signatures), 151 (seals of bodies established under state law — Cth Act only), 152 (documents produced from proper custody), 153 (gazettes and other official documents), 154 (documents published by authority of parliament, etc), 155 (evidence of official records), 156 (public documents). And see also Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) ss 177B (proof of proceedings of Councils and Committees), 177C (Probate and Letters of Administration), 177D (Certificate of Surveyor General) and 177E (Certificate of Chief Parliamentary Counsel). 36. See R v Wood (1982) 76 Cr App 23; cf R v Pettigrew (1980) 71 Cr App R 39. Also see the comments in

Smith, ‘The Admissibility of Statements by Computer’ [1981] Crim LR 387; Pengilly, ‘Machine Information: Is it Hearsay?’ (1982) 13 Melb ULR 617; Brown, ‘Computer Produced Evidence in Australia’ (1984) 8 Tas LR 46. Things can, however, become quite complicated, as when the state is put to proof that pornographic images stored electronically on a computer were of actual children, as opposed to having been engineered. See, for example, US v Fabrizio 445 F Supp 2d 152 (2006); US v Fabrizio 463 F Supp 2d 111 (2006). 37. For example, provisions in the various Road Traffic Acts providing for the admissibility of the results of breathalyser tests: see n 115 below. 38. See generally Reed, ‘Authenticating Electronic Mail Messages — Some Evidential Problems’ (1989) 52 Mod L Rev 649; Pattenden, ‘Authenticating “things” in English Law: Principles for Adducing Tangible Evidence in Common Law Jury Trials’ (2008) 12 E & P 273. 39. For example, Uniform Evidence Acts s 69. 40. Uniform Evidence Acts ss 146–7; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) ss 95, 95A (DNA evidentiary certificates); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 56; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 50B (DNA evidentiary certificates), 79B–79F (documentary evidence generally); see further at 8.188. 41. Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 45, 52, 53. 42. Uniform Evidence Acts s 161; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 54. 43. See cases at n 9 above. 44. See Ocean Marine Mutual Insurance Assoc’n (Europe) OV v Jetopay Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1463 at [20]–[22] (where the trial judge was unwilling to interpret the meaning and relevance of letters, appearing after the name of the author of an expert report, as evidence that opinions expressed in the report were based on ‘specialised knowledge’ based on ‘training study or experience’: Uniform Acts s 79(1)). Though cf Roads & Traffic Authority of NSW v Tetley [2004] NSWSC 925 at [22] (Windeyer J); SS v Australian Crime Commission [2009] FCA 580 at [16] (Jagot J). 45. Discussed in Trimcoll Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2007] NSWCA 307. 46. Macdonnell v Evans (1852) 11 CB 930; 138 ER 742. 47. Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Young (1962) 106 CLR 535; Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (No 21) (1988) 14 NSWLR 128. See also Semple v Noble (1988) 49 SASR 356, where a charge of falsely misrepresenting the value of goods by changing price tags in a supermarket required the tender of the original price tag attached to prove the value asserted in it. If the charge had been merely falsely misrepresenting the displayed price then the store detective could have testified to the price displayed on the tags without producing them. Applied in Godfrey v Woolworths (WA) Ltd (1998) 103 A Crim R 336 to permit evidence of weights displayed on articles as evidence of an inscription on a chattel rather than the content of a document. 48. Trial of Queen Caroline (1820) 2 Bro & B 286 at 289; 129 ER 976 at 978. 49. Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 194 (Dawson J). But cf Matthews v SA Police (1996) 65 SASR 516 where, although the best evidence rule was held not to apply, Nyland J would not permit tender of a blood-test kit without evidence that it was identical to that handed to the accused on the occasion in issue. 50. R v Matthews and Ford [1972] VR 3; Walsh v Wilcox [1976] WAR 62 at 64; R v Gaudion [1979] VR 57; Beames v R (1980) 1 A Crim R 239 (CCA (Qld)). See also the approach of Dawson J in Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180. 51. (1987) 164 CLR 180; approving Conwell v Tapfield [1981] 1 NSWLR 595. 52. R v Sitek [1988] 2 Qd R 284 at 288 (Carter J: ‘In my view the evidence of the video tape itself and the

evidence of Miss Estreich as to what she saw on the day in question on the monitor as well as her evidence given by way of explanation in court whilst the video was being played to the jury was admissible. … In addition … it was permissible for the video to be played in the course of her evidence so as to permit her to refresh her memory of what she had seen at the time of the commission of the alleged offence’) and 291–2 (de Jersey J). This was the approach adopted in Wade (a Pseudonym) v R (2014) 239 A Crim R 29; [2014] VSCA 13 at [22]–[31], following Sitek and Taylor v Chief Constable [1986] 1 WLR 1480 (Ralph Gibson LJ). 53. It was on this ground that the majority of the High Court (Gaudron J dissenting) upheld the judge’s ruling to admit the transcript as an ‘aide memoire’ in Butera. Significantly, the languages spoken in the recordings in Butera were foreign. See also R v Watts [1992] 1 Qd R 214; R v Maladinovic (1992) 60 A Crim R 206 at 213–14 (Miles CJ); R v O’Neill [2001] VSCA 227; R v Cornwell (2003) 57 NSWLR 82; R v Morgan [2009] VSCA 225 at [47]–[52] (Ashley JA and Lasry AJA); Christos v R [2013] VSCA 202 at [15], [24] (Nettle JA). Though the use of such transcripts is not without dangers: see Fraser and Stevenson, ‘The Power and Persistence of Contextual Priming: More Risks in Using Police Transcripts to Aid Jurors’ Perception of Poor Quality Covert Recordings’ (2014) 18 Evid & Proof 205. 54. The majority in Butera state at 184–5 that: ‘The rules which govern the admission in evidence of tape recordings and the procedure to be followed by a court in ascertaining what is alleged to have been recorded on them must be moulded so as to deal with the technical and logical conditions which must be satisfied before a tape recording can furnish proof of what is recorded’. This was applied by Malcolm CJ in Markovina v R (1996) 16 WAR 354 at 382–3 to admit contents of electronic diaries, and endorsed in R v Rayner [1998] VSC 263 (Callaway JA). 55. Wade (a pseudonym) v R (2014) 239 A Crim R 29; [2014] VSCA 13 at [51] (Redlich JA). But compare with R v Tropeano (2015) 122 SASR 298; [2015] SASCFC 29 at [57]–[60] (Duggan J), where the recording was still in existence and the events in the video had not been observed by the witness. 56. R v Watson (1817) 2 Stark 116; 171 ER 591, which dealt with printed placards. 57. Forbes v Samuel [1913] 3 KB 706 at 722. 58. Durston v Mercuri [1969] VR 507; Hay v Mitchell [1973] 2 NSWLR 736; Novacic v Cooper (1973) 1 ACTR 99; Rivers v Fuller; Ex parte Rivers [1977] Qd R 97. 59. The better view is that there are no degrees of secondary evidence: Doe d Gilbert v Ross (1840) 7 M & W 102; 151 ER 696; Lafone v Griffin (1909) 25 TLR 308; cf R v Collins (1960) 44 Cr App R 170. 60. At common law, a notice to produce can be served before trial or made orally at trial (in both civil and criminal proceedings). It does not compel production, but it lays the foundation for the giving of secondary evidence: Dwyer v Collins (1852) 155 ER 1104; Morgan v Babrock and Wilcox Ltd (1929) 43 CLR 163; Ewart v Royds (1954) 72 WN (NSW) 58. (Cf the subpoena duces tecum and the various court rules by which the court may, on threat of contempt, oblige production to the court: Maddison v Goldrick [1976] 1 NSWLR 651; Waind v Hill [1978] 1 NSWLR 372.) A party failing to comply with a notice may be forbidden from relying on the document: Doe d Thompson v Hodgson (1840) 113 ER 762. A party who does produce may compel the party who sought production to tender the document: Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630. There is no comparable rule where the court compels production by means of a subpoena: Waind v Hill [1978] 1 NSWLR 372 at 378, 381. 61. R v Elwarthy (1867) LR 1 CCR 103 at 105. 62. Sandersan v Nicholson [1906] VLR 371. 63. On grounds, for example, of diplomatic immunity (R v Nowaz (1976) 63 Cr App R 178), or other privilege where secondary evidence is still admissible: Bell v David Jones Ltd (1949) 49 SR (NSW) 223. 64. Brewster v Sewell (1820) 106 ER 672; Godfrey v Woolworths (WA) Ltd (1998) 103 A Crim R 336.

65. Mortimer v M’Callan (1840) 151 ER 320 (Alderson B); Owner v Bee Hive Spinning Co Ltd [1914] 1 KB 105. 66. Mortimer v M’Callan (above). 67. The principal state provisions are: Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) ss 51; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 39; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 65(1). 68. Slatterie & Pooley (1840) 151 ER 579. 69. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) Pt 7; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 73B, 73BA. Other legislation allowing business and other records to be admitted in exception to the hearsay rule provides for copies of such documents to be admitted. These provisions are discussed at 8.169ff. 70. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) Pt 5 Div 6; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) Pt 4 Div 4; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 89–96. See also at 8.189. 71. Alderson v Clay (1816) 1 Stark 405; 171 ER 511; R v Holy Trinity, Kingston upon Hull (Inhabitants) (1827) 7 B & C 611; 108 ER 851; Mallinson v Scottish Australian Investment Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 66. 72. In which case the contents of the document can only be used in respect of the case against the admitting party: s 48(3). 73. This is intended to admit photocopies and the like; ‘copy of the document in question’ is defined in s 47(2) to include ‘a document that is not an exact copy … but that is identical … in all relevant respects’. It is enough that the document ‘purports’ to be a copy for the document to be received. The accuracy of the copying device can be presumed under s 146. See North Sydney Leagues’ Club Ltd v Syndergy Protection Agency Pty Ltd (2012) 83 NSWLR 710; [2012] NSWCA 168 at [61]–[63] (Beazley JA). 74. The word ‘purport’ seems to do away with any authentication requirements. Section 48(1)(d) overrules the decision in Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180. See, for example, Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden [2002] NSWCA 419 at [690]; R v Giovannone [2002] NSWCCA 323 at [61] (Mason P); R v NZ [2005] NSWCCA 278 at [179] (per curiam). Nevertheless, a court may properly in its discretion limit the use of the transcript to an aid to understanding the sounds on a recording or exclude it altogether: see Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9 at 112–13; R v Cassar and Sleiman (Judgment No 17) [1999] NSWSC 436 at [7] (Sperling J); R v Hall [2001] NSWSC 827 (Greg James J: evidence of recording excluded in exercise of discretion as sound unintelligible and transcript prejudicial); R v Cornwell (2003) 57 NSWLR 82; Griffith v Australian Broadcasting Commission [2003] NSWSC 483. A document translating to English a conversation on a recording in a foreign language can be admitted under the Uniform Acts: Foreign Media v Konstantinidis [2003] NSWCA 161. 75. This provision is intended to permit the tender of information stored on computers and other devices. Again the word ‘purports’ appears to avoid the need for authenticating evidence. The accuracy of the retrieving device can be presumed under s 146. See R v Dudko [2002] NSWCCA 336 at [47]–[60]. 76. The course of business (defined in Pt 2 of the Uniform Acts Dictionary) might be inferred from the document itself under s 183 or, if evidence is required, it can be provided in the first instance by affidavit under s 171. See O’Meara v Dominican Fathers [2003] ACTCA 24 at [79], [85]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich [2005] NSWSC 417 at [120], [150]–[154] (Austin J). Cf Bryson J’s approach in NAB Ltd v Rusu (1999) 47 NSWLR 309, discussed at 7.8. 77. The use of a summary prepared by the prosecution, to assist the jury to focus on specific themes in a record of interview, was allowed in R v Sam (No 14) [2009] NSWSC 561 (Johnson J). 78. Defined in the Dictionary. Re IBM Global Services Australia Ltd [2005] FCAFC 66 at [90]–[94] (Moore J). 79. Section 48(1)(f) of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) assumes a slightly different form. 80. See, for example, R v Cassar and Sleiman (No 28) [1999] NSWSC 651 at [8]–[14]; Chapman v Luminis

Pty Ltd (No 2) (2000) 100 FCR 229 at [22.1]; Eschenko v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2005] FCA 1772. Definition of ‘document’ includes photograph or video and s 48(4) permits oral evidence of its contents: see Minassian v Minassian [2010] NSWSC 708 at [49]–[53] (Ball J); Wade (a pseudonym) v R (2014) 239 A Crim R 29; [2014] VSCA 13 at [38]–[39] (Nettle JA), [50] (Redlich JA). 81. Contrast the reluctance of Bryson J in NAB Ltd v Rusu (see 7.8 and n 74 above) to allow documents to authenticate themselves in this way or from other evidence. 82. Aneve Pty Ltd v Bank of Western Australia Ltd [2005] NSWCCA 441 at [70]–[72]; Re IBM Global Services Australia Ltd [2005] FCAFC 66 at [89] (Moore J). 83. In several cases jurors have, without authorisation, uncovered things like syringes, apparently concealed in clothing, from their examination of exhibits in the jury room. On the response to such ‘evidence’, see, for example, Qing An v R [2007] NSWCCA 53. 84. (1981) 147 CLR 221; applied in Jones v Multiple Sclerosis Society of Victoria [1996] 1 VR 499. 85. R v Bradshaw (1978) 18 SASR 83. This common law discretion applies under the Uniform Acts by virtue of s 52. 86. See further 7.34 below. 87. R v BAH (2002) 5 VR 517; R v NZ (2005) 63 NSWLR 628; [2005] NSWCCA 278 at [12] (Spigelman CJ), [152], [196], [210]–[212] (Howie and Johnson JJ); Gately v R (2007) 232 CLR 208; [2007] HCA 55; R v Tichowitsch [2007] 2 Qd R 462 (transcript taken into jury room produced no miscarriage); and cf Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 306Z; Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (ACT) s 40K(3); R v J, JA [2009] SASC 401 at [30] (Duggan J); R v Ryan (No 7) (2012) 218 A Crim R 384; [2012] NSWSC 1160 (electronic police interview admitted as exhibit permitted into jury room with appropriate direction); Jarrett v R (2014) 86 NSWLR 623; [2014] NSWCCA 140 at [95] (Campbell J: access by jury to video of interview with vulnerable witness an irregularity but not productive of a miscarriage of justice). 88. Cf R v Crossman [2011] 2 Qd R 435; [2011] QCA 126. 89. Unsted v Unsted (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 495 (Davidson J), quoted with approval by the High Court in Scott v Numurkah Corp (1951) 91 CLR 300 at 310–11. See also Commissioner for Railways v Murphy (1967) 41 ALJR 77. 90. Salsbury v Woodland [1970] 1 QB 324. 91. Pope v Ewendt (1977) 17 SASR 45 (although the court held justices were entitled to take judicial notice of general features of the locality observed on viewing); Grosser v SA Police (1994) 63 SASR 243. 92. The distinction is emphasised by the High Court in Scott v Numurkah Corporation (1951) 91 CLR 300. 93. The High Court in Scott emphasised that consent would have overcome the lack of evidence of equivalence, but we submit that the court did not rule out the possibility of equivalence being established through oral testimony. 94. Compare with R v Quinn and Bloom [1962] 2 QB 245, where a film reconstructing a striptease was held not sufficiently equivalent. In Thompson v R (1986) 13 FCR 165, experiments to determine whether a car would catch fire upon impact were admitted. Contrast with the futile attempt of a biased ‘expert’ to reconstruct the alleged throwing of the victim over a cliff by the accused in Wood v R (2012) 84 NSWLR 581; [2012] NSWCCA 21. In Birks v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 29, fire reconstruction evidence was admitted, notwithstanding problems. For an example of a highly complex and expensive reconstruction of a car accident, consider the English case of R v Dudley [2004] EWCA Crim 3336. 95. Which might, if there is no prejudice to the accused, take place before the jury: R v FD [2006] NSWCCA 31 (Sully J).

96. The section does not apply to inspection of an exhibit: s 53(5). 97. The trial judge might have advantages, over a court of appeal, where a view assists his or her understanding: Pledge v Roads & Traffic Authority (2004) 78 ALJR 572 at [49] (Callinan and Heydon JJ); Turnbull v Alm [2004] NSWCA 173 at [23] (Bryson JA). And, where the view is relied upon, any inferences should be explained, as in Gillett v Murphy [2001] NSWCA 199 at [55] (Rolfe AJA); Metricon Homes Pty Ltd v Barrett Property Group Pty Ltd [2008] FCAFC 46 at [63]–[68]. Although the NSW Bench Book and the Supreme Court of Victoria, in Ha v R [2014] VSCA 335 at [30]–[35] (Priest JA), both suggest that a discrete video recording may be helpful should the matter be appealed. On interpretive difficulties with experiments and demonstrations the work of sociologist Harry Collins is instructive: Changing Order, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1986; ‘Public Experiments and Displays of Virtuosity: The Core-Set Revisited’ (1988) 18 Soc Stud Science 725. 98. Failure to provide the accused with a reasonable opportunity to be present may constitute ‘a fundamental flaw in the trial process’: Jamal v R (2012) 223 A Crim R 585; [2012] NSWCCA 198 at [26]–[46] (Hidden J). Though there is no obligation for the accused to attend: Tongahai v R (2014) 241 A Crim R 217; [2014] NSWCCA 81 at [20]–[26] (Basten JA). Note that the matters specified in s 192 must also be taken into account in determining the application: Stanoevski v R (2001) 202 CLR 115. 99. See, for example, Vairy v Wyong Shire Council [2002] NSWSC 881 at [59] (Bell J); Chotiputhsilpa v Waterhouse [2005] NSWCA 295 at [86]–[89] (Beazley JA); EPA v Unomedical Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWLEC 111 (Pepper J). 100. The dangers are summarised in R v Skaf [2004] NSWCCA 37 at [234]–[277], especially [275] (per curiam). See also Kozul v R (1981) 147 CLR 221. Though see the discussion of judicial notice at 6.59ff. 101. (2007) 235 CLR 521; [2007] HCA 59. Section 53 was not discussed in R v Kirby [2000] NSWCCA 330, where Wood CJ at CL considered, referring explicitly to a ‘demonstration’, that asking the accused to wear an Akubra hat similar to the hat worn by the robber so that the jury could compare him with security images of the robbery, was not unfair. 102. (2007) 235 CLR 521; [2007] HCA 59 at [223], [226]. 103. Compare with the approach taken by White J in Mehesz v Redman (No 2) (1980) 26 SASR 244 at 251– 2 to the proof of results from scientific instruments generally. What supporting testimony is appropriate will depend upon what links are in practical terms controversial. For a practical example, see Chiou Yaou Fa v Morris (1987) 46 NTR 1 at 7–16 (Asche J). 104. Porter v Kolodzeij [1962] VR 75 at 78; Redman v Klun (1979) 20 SASR 343; Mehesz v Redman (No 2) (1980) 26 SASR 244; Dunsmore v Elliott (1981) 26 SASR 496. And see Chapter 6, n 91 and 6.28. 105. See, for example, Davis and Valentine, ‘CCTV on Trial: Matching Video Images with the Defendant in the Dock’ (2009) 23 Applied Cognitive Psych 482; Porter, ‘CCTV Images as Evidence’ (2009) 41 Aust J Forensic Sci 11. 106. See the remarks by White J in Mehesz v Redman (No 2) (1980) 26 SASR 244 at 251–2; and Street CJ in Conwell v Tapfield [1981] 1 NSWLR 595 at 598. 107. R v Ames [1964] NSWR 1489 at 1492 (Herron CJ, Taylor and Moffitt JJ) states that: ‘It is too late in the day to suggest that photographs should be no longer regarded as admissible evidence’. Notably, in R v Smith (2001) 206 CLR 650, the admissibility of security photographs seems to be of far less concern than the relevance and admissibility of opinions about the identity of the bank robbers or, in R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681 and Honeysett v R (2014) 253 CLR 122, whether an anatomist’s opinion about similarities in images (presented to the jury) of a robbery was based on ‘specialised knowledge’. In R v Tropeano (2015) 122 SASR 298; [2015] SASCFC 29 at [61]–[72] (Duggan AJ, Kourakis CJ and Parker J agreeing), expert opinion was led on problems with CCTV, the risks of interpretation as well as some

of the things depicted. The most controversial issue with images appears to be whether they should be excluded altogether, or at least from the jury room, as being unduly prejudicial: see, for example, Ames and R v O’Sullivan and Mackie (1975) 13 SASR 68; and R v Telford (1996) 86 A Crim R 427 (CCA (Vic)), involving gruesome photographs of victims; R v Gordon and Gordon (1991) 57 A Crim R 413 (CCA (NSW)), which deals with photographs depicting the accused in previous sexual acts. On taking admissible video recordings into the jury room, see cases at n 87 above. 108. Now settled by the High Court in Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 and permitted under s 48(1) (c) of the Uniform Acts: see at 7.16, 7.19. In Korgbara v R [2007] NSWCCA 84, the decision to allow a jury to undertake its own cross-lingual comparison of voices recorded speaking in English and the Nigerian dialect of Igbo was affirmed by a majority (see further 4.56 n 208 and Edmond, Martire and San Roque, ‘“Mere Guesswork”: Cross-Lingual Voice Comparisons and the Jury’ (2011) 33 Sydney LR 395). On the problems with the admissibility at common law of tape recordings generally, see Wilson and Garner, ‘Evidence of Tape Recordings’ (1988) 4 QUT Law & Justice Journal 113. 109. The admissibility of expert assistance of this sort is discussed in the context of opinion evidence, in particular at 7.43ff. 110. Pursuant to s 167 of the uniform legislation, the accused may request that technicians and analysts appear to testify: cf Sharwood v R [2006] NSWCCA 157 at [20]–[35] (Hoeben J). In the United States, the confrontation clause (Sixth Amendment) has been read in a way that may require actual analysts to attend court: Melendez-Diaz v Massachusetts 129 S Ct 2527 (2009). See Mnookin and Kaye, ‘Confronting Science: Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause’ (2012) Supreme Ct Rev 99. 111. Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v Young (1962) 106 CLR 535. 112. Though, in practice, these issues are often effectively ‘black boxed’ and not contested by defence lawyers. See, for example, Garrett and Neufeld, ‘Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions’ (2009) 95 Virginia LR 1; Lynch et al, Truth Machine: The Contentious History of DNA Fingerprinting, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2008. 113. Authorities supporting the presumption are cited at n 104 above. 114. Porter v Kolodjzeij [1962] VR 75. On the use of programs to extract text message from mobile phones, the court in Bevan v Western Australia (2012) 43 WAR 233; [2012] WASCA 153 at [61]–[68] (Pullin JA), held that the evidence of a detective with training in computer systems and experience with the relevant software was ‘sufficient assurance that the results produced by the machines were reliable and accurate’, although according to Buss JA (at [139]) the detective was ‘not qualified to express an opinion about the trustworthiness of the … machines/software in general or about their acceptance’. 115. Road Transport Act 2013 (NSW) s 109; Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 (Qld) s 80(15), (15A); Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) s 47K; Road Safety (Alcohol and Drugs) Act 1970 (Tas) s 25; Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) s 58(2), (4); Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) s 70(2); Road Transport (Alcohol and Drugs) Act 1977 (ACT) s 41; Traffic Act 1987 (NT) s 29AAU. 116. Uniform Evidence Acts ss 146–147, 170–173; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 95; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 56. 117. Section 95A of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) and s 50B of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA) take this certification approach to the tender of DNA analysis of relevant materials in criminal cases. 118. ‘Although it may be common practice to require most witnesses to remain out of the court room until they have entered to give evidence, it is not a rule of law … the decision whether to allow a particular witness to remain in court will often depend on the balance between the assistance to be derived in the elucidation of the truth on the one hand and possible prejudice to the other side on the other hand’: Isherwood v Tasmania (2010) 20 Tas R 375; [2010] TASCCA 11 at [68] (Crawford CJ, Evans and Blow JJ).

119. See generally Weinberg, ‘The Law of Testimonial Oaths and Affirmations’ (1976) 3 Monash ULR 26. 120. Omychund v Barker (1744) 1 Atk 21; 26 ER 15. The need for a belief in divine sanction has been questioned in England in R v Hayes (1977) 64 Cr App R 194; and R v Lal Khan (1981) 73 Cr App R 190; but cf stricter view in R v Brown [1977] Qd R 220; and R v Schlaefer (1992) 57 SASR 423 (doubted in R v Simmons (1997) 68 SASR 81 at 85 (Perry J); R v Climas (1999) 74 SASR 411 at [80] (Lander J)). Forms of oath depend upon religious belief. The more extreme include killing the cock, breaking the saucer and extinguishing the candle: see Evidence, ALRC Interim Report 26 (1985), vol 2, pp 106–7. 121. See generally Uniform Evidence Acts ss 13, 21–24A, Sch (s 24A is enacted in all Uniform Acts except the Commonwealth Act; it eliminates the need for any belief in or reference to God in taking of an oath); Oaths Act 1900 (NSW) ss 11A–13; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) ss 9, 9B; Oaths Act 1867 (Qld) ss 17–19; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 6–12; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 97–106, 106B, 106C; Oaths and Affirmations Act 1984 (ACT) ss 7, 14, 17; Oaths, Affirmations and Declarations Act (NT) Pt 2. See also the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 77F and the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 44. This legislation is procedural in nature and therefore any changes are arguably retrospective: Rodway v R (1990) 169 CLR 515. 122. Oaths Act 1867 (Qld) s 17. But Quakers, Moravians and Separatists have the right to affirm: Oaths Act 1867 (Qld) ss 18–19. 123. Uniform Evidence Acts s 23; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 6(3); Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 97(3); Oaths, Affidavits and Statutory Declarations Act 2005 (WA) s 5; Oaths, Affirmations and Declarations Act (NT) s 5. Although a person refusing to take, or unable to take, a particular form of the oath may be obliged to affirm. 124. R v Kemble [1990] 1 WLR 1111; R v T (1997) 71 SASR 265. See also Uniform Acts s 24(2) (‘An oath is effective for the purposes of this Division even if the person who took it (a) did not have a religious belief or did not have a religious belief of a particular kind; or (b) did not understand the nature and consequences of the oath’); Evidence Act (SA) 1929 s 6(2); Oaths, Affidavits and Statutory Declarations Act 2005 (WA) s 4(2). 125. Uniform Evidence Acts s 13(3); Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 9B; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 9(1); Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 100A(1) (does not understand the obligation imposed by an oath or a solemn affirmation). This procedure for giving unsworn testimony must be distinguished from that situation where the accused was entitled to make an unsworn statement not subject to crossexamination: see 5.115–5.116. It is therefore inappropriate for the trial judge to direct the jury as if the testimony of the witness has been given by an accused in an unsworn statement: R v Wills (1985) 39 SASR 35. 126. R v Hayes [1977] 2 All ER 288 at 291 (Bridge LJ); R v Climas (1999) 74 SASR 411 at [133]–[139] (Lander J); R v Pascoe (2004) 90 SASR 505; Cox v New South Wales [2007] NSWSC 471. And cf Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 9B(2); R v Cooper (2007) 175 A Crim R 94. 127. See, for example, Cox v New South Wales [2007] NSWSC 471. 128. Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 100A(1)(a), (b). 129. In R v Meier (1982) 30 SASR 126 at 129, King CJ accepted that the requirement to tell the truth could not be regarded as ‘explained’ to a witness (under Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 9(2)(b)) unless he or she understood the requirement. There is a presumption of competency under s 9(1) and reasons are required before a judge is obliged to conduct inquiry: Nichols v Police (2005) 91 SASR 232. 130. Section 9C permits the reception of expert testimony on this issue. This is the common law position as well: Murphy v R (1989) 167 CLR 94; R v Horsfall (1989) 51 SASR 489. See generally Magner, ‘Evidence as to Credibility’ (1989) 5 Aust Bar Rev 225; and 7.144.

131. As a consequence of Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [4.1]–[4.89]. 132. Mere age, mental, intellectual or physical disability alone being insufficient. In this way the revised uniform legislation appears to be more liberal than its predecessor, and more consistent with emerging authority: R v JTB [2003] NSWCCA 295; R v RAG [2006] NSWCCA 343 (Latham J); R v Cooper [2007] ACTSC 74 at [62]–[65] (Higgins CJ); Pease v R [2009] NSWCCA 136 (Grove J). See also Talwar et al, ‘Children’s Conceptual Knowledge of Lying and Its Relation to Their Actual Behaviors: Implications for Court Competence Examinations’ (2002) 26 Law & Hum Behav 395; AIJA Committee, Bench Book for Children Giving Evidence in Australian Courts, AIJA, Melbourne, 2010; Cossins, ‘CrossExamining the Child Complainant: Rights, Innovations and Unfounded Fears in the Australian Context’ in Spencer and Lamb (eds), Children and Cross-examination: Time to Change the Rules?, Hart, London, 2012; Lamb et al (eds), Children’s Testimony: A Handbook of Psychological Research and Forensic Practice, 2nd ed, Wiley-Blackwell, Chichester, 2011. 133. Where such incapacity can be overcome but at substantial cost or delay and adequate evidence will be tendered from another source the witness, although competent, cannot be compelled to testify: s 14. Other sections overcome incapacity by permitting the use of interpreters (s 30) and other appropriate arrangements in the case of deaf or mute witnesses (s 31). 134. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Commonwealth amending legislation of 2008 explains at [13]: ‘[A] young child may be able to reply to simple factual questions but not to questions which require inferences to be drawn’. 135. RA v R [2007] NSWCCA 251 at [8]–[11] (McClellan CJ at CL); R v GW (2016) 90 ALJR 407; [2016] HCA 6 at [14]. On this question, s 13(8) permits the court to inform itself as it thinks fit, including obtaining expert assistance. 136. See, for example, R v Suarwata [2008] ACTSC 140 at [18]–[25] (Penfold J); MK v R [2014] NSWCCA 274 at [68]–[74]. There is no requirement that the witness understands or even acknowledges what he or she is told (R v Muller (2013) 273 FLR 215; [2013] ACTA 15 at [41]) and once the conditions of s 13 are satisfied the unsworn evidence is treated no differently from other evidence given under the section: R v GW (2016) 90 ALJR 407; [2016] HCA 6 at [43], [46]. According to Muller at [40] and SH v R (2012) 83 NSWLR 258; 222 A Crim R 43; [2012] NSWCCA 79 at [5]–[8], there is no discretionary power to prevent the witness offering unsworn testimony once the requirements of s 13(5) have been satisfied. 137. R v Brooks (1998) 44 NSWLR 121 (under the earlier version of s 13); R v Starrett (2002) 82 SASR 115; R v BBR [2010] 1 Qd R 546; [2009] QCA 178 at [18]; R v Chalmers [2011] QCA 134; [2013] 2 Qd R 175; SH v R (2012) 83 NSWLR 258; [2012] NSWCCA 79; R v J, AP (2012) 113 SASR 529; [2012] SASCFC 95 (but cf Vanstone J rejecting the appeal as no miscarriage of justice shown); R v French (2012) 114 SASR 287; [2012] SASCFC 118; MK v R [2014] NSWCCA 274 at [72]–[74], [132] (Hoeben CJ at CL, Fullerton and Hamill JJ agreeing); R v Lomman (2014) 119 SASR 463; [2014] SASCFC 55. And cf R v Lau (1991) 6 WAR 30 at 39 (Seaman CJ), 66 (Owen J), where their Honours appear rather to ask whether the procedural breach had led to a miscarriage of justice. In R v GW (2016) 90 ALJR 407; [2016] HCA 6 at [31], the court concluded that ‘[i]n the circumstances, the failure to express the conclusion in the terms of [uniform legislation s 13(3)] did not support a finding that Burns J was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the witness lacked the requisite capacity [to understand the obligation to give truthful evidence]’. 138. As it is the responsibility of the court to determine competence (cf R v Fang (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 1784 at [38] (Johnson J)) the judge may question the witness without the assistance of cross-examination by counsel: see, for example, R v Lyons (1889) 15 VLR 15; R v Z [1990] 2 QB 355; R v Schlaefer (1992) 57 SASR 423; R v Brooks (1998) 44 NSWLR 121; R v Stevenson (2000) 23 WAR 92; R v Chalmers [2013] 2 Qd R 175; [2011] QCA 134; MK v R [2014] NSWCCA 274. In R v Starrett (2002) 82 SASR

115, the court suggests that it may not be improper in some circumstances for the prosecution to conduct the examination so long as the judge makes a clear determination about how the witness should testify. Judges may now have regard to the witness’s admissible prerecorded statements for the purpose of determining competence, and of understanding of the oath in deciding whether to allow unsworn evidence: see, for example, MK v R [2014] NSWCCA 274 at [41]. 139. Demirok v R (1977) 137 CLR 20; R v Harding [1989] 2 Qd R 373; R v T (1997) 71 SASR 265 at 272 (Doyle CJ). See also R v Caine (1993) 68 A Crim R 233 (decision of judge to permit child to testify wrongly suggested to jury that child’s testimony reliable). 140. R v Lau (1991) 6 WAR 30 at 35 (Seaman J), 41–5 (Murray J), 57–9 (Owen J); R v Deakin [1995] 1 Cr App R 471 (voir dire examination of the witness whose competency is in question should be in the presence of the jury but any additional expert evidence on competency should be heard in the jury’s absence). 141. See n 135 above. 142. Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 9(3). 143. Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 106B, 106C (applies to children under 12 years and mentally impaired witnesses). 144. See, for example, R v Stevenson (2000) 23 WAR 92 at 97 (Pidgeon J); GO v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 132 at [33]–[42]. In GO, the conviction was allowed to stand despite the witness being unable to complete cross-examination. 145. Expressly under s 13(8) of the Uniform Acts and s 9C of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) but also at common law: Murphy v R (1989) 167 CLR 94 (see further n 135 above and at 7.144–7.146). 146. Uniform Acts s 165A; Criminal Code (Qld) s 632(3); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 9(4) (as interpreted in R v Starrett (2002) 82 SASR 115 at [40] (Doyle CJ)), 12A; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 106D. 147. The traditional voir dire inquiry (ostensibly facile and often confusing for the witness) tended to ask about the child’s schooling and attendance at Sunday school before more direct questions were asked. If the child is shy and confused then negative answers will make it difficult for the trial judge to find that the child understands the moral duty to be truthful: R v Williams [1989] 1 Qd R 601. See also Uniform Evidence law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [4.10]–[4.13]; Talwar et al, n 132 above; Powell et al, An Evaluation of How Evidence is Elicited from Complainants of Child Sexual Abuse, Commonwealth of Australia, 2016. 148. Jones, ‘The Evidence of a Three-Year-Old Child’ [1987] Crim LR 677. 149. This literature is too extensive to be cited fully. See, for example, McEwan, ‘Child Evidence: More Proposals for Reform’ [1988] Crim LR 813; Warner, ‘Child Witnesses in Sexual Assault Cases’ (1988) 12 Crim LJ 286; Naylor, ‘The Child in the Witness Box’ (1989) 22 ANZJ Crim 82; Geddis, Taylor and Henaghan, ‘Child Sexual Abuse’ [1990] NZLJ 371 at 388, 425; Birch, ‘Children’s Evidence’ [1992] Crim LR 262; Myers, Saywitz and Goodman, ‘Psychological Research on Children as Witnesses: Practical Implications for Forensic Interviews and Courtroom Testimony’ (1996) 28 Pacific LJ 3; Westcott, Davies and Bull (eds), Children’s Evidence, Wiley, Chichester, UK, 2002. 150. An extensive discussion of alternative procedures can be found in the Pigot Report, Report of the Advisory Group on Video Evidence, United Kingdom Home Office, 1989. See also Children’s Evidence by Video Link, ALRC Discussion Paper No 40 (1989); McEwan, ‘In the Box or on the Box? The Pigot Report and Child Witnesses’ [1990] Crim LR 363; Spencer, ‘Child Witnesses, Video Technology and the Law of Evidence’ [1987] Crim LR 76; Cashmore, ‘The Use of Video Technology for Child Witnesses’ (1990) 16 Monash ULR 228; Williams, ‘Video Technology and Children’s Evidence: International Perspectives and Recent Research’ (1998) 17 Med & Law 263; Cashmore, ‘Child Witnesses: The Judicial Role’ (2007) 8 Jud Rev 281; Bowden, Henning and Plater, ‘Balancing Fairness

to Victims, Society and Defendants in the Cross-examination of Vulnerable Witnesses: An Impossible Triangulation?’ (2014) 37 Melb ULR 539. 151. Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) Pt 1AD; Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ss 294B–294D (complainants of sexual assault), Ch 6 Pt 6 Divs 1, 4 and 5 (vulnerable witnesses); Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) ss 9E, 21A (applied R v West [1992] 1 Qd R 227), 21AA–21AX, 93A; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 12AB–14A (children and vulnerable witnesses); Evidence (Children and Special Witnesses) Act 2001 (Tas); Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) Pt 8.2 Div 3 (cross-examination of protected witnesses in sexual offence and family violence proceedings), Div 4, (alternative arrangements for all witnesses in sexual offence and family violence proceedings), Div 5 (recorded evidence-in-chief of children and cognitively impaired children in sexual offences and other indictable offences against the person and child pornography offences) (prior equivalent section applied in R v Anders (2009) 20 VR 596; [2009] VSCA 7 at [6]; see critical comments of these procedures by Winneke P in R v Knigge (2003) 6 VR 150 at [30]), Div 6 (statements recorded at special hearings for children and cognitively impaired witnesses); Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 106A–106T (children and special witnesses) (discussed in Dixon, ‘“Out of the Mouths of Babes …”: Review of the Operation of the Acts Amendment (Evidence of Children) Act 1992’ (1995) 25 WA LR 301); Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (ACT) Ch 2 (children), Ch 4 (sexual assault and violent crime victims), Pt 7.2 (witnesses with disabilities and vulnerabilities); Evidence Act 1939 (NT) ss 21A–21C (sexual assault victims). And see generally Bench Book for Children Giving Evidence in Australian Courts, AIJA, Melbourne, 2009. 152. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 21A(2); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 13; Evidence (Children and Special Witnesses) Act 2001 (Tas) s 8; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 106R; Evidence Act 1939 (NT) s 21A. Interpreted to require protection where plausible and reasonable applications made: see, for example, Griffis v R (1996) 67 SASR 170; Question of Law Reserved (No 2 of 1997) (1998) 98 A Crim R 544; R v WS (2000) 78 SASR 33. 153. Defined in s 4 to include children under 16, persons cognitively impaired, victims of serious crime and witnesses under threat. 154. Provisions seeking to avoid confronting cross-examination by the accused in person include: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 15YF–15YH; Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 294A (victims of sexual assault), 306ZL (vulnerable witnesses); Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) ss 21N, 21O (protected witnesses — defined s 21M); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 13B (victims of serious offences against the person); Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 353–358 (in sexual offence and family violence proceedings complainant and family members of both complainant and accused and such other witnesses declared protected by the court); Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 25A (witnesses generally), 106G (children and victims of sexual assault or organised crime); Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (ACT) s 38D (sexual assault and violent crime victims); Sexual Offences (Evidence and Procedure) Act (NT) s 5. Limits upon improper cross-examination generally are imposed by Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 15YE; Uniform Acts s 41; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 21; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 25; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 26. 155. Such directions are generally demanded whenever alternative procedures are employed: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 15YNE, 15YQ; Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ss 294B(7), 306X, 306ZI; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 21A(8) (R v Bisht (2013) 234 A Crim R 309; [2013] QCA 238 at [48]–[52]: failure to direct appropriately an error of law and proviso not applied), s 21AW (R v Hellwig [2007] 1 Qd R 17; [2006] QCA 179 at [19]–[24]; R v Drake (2013) 233 A Crim R 588; [2013] QCA 222; and R v Little (2013) 231 A Crim R 145; [2013] QCA 223: proviso not applied on deficient directions under s 21AW(2); R v Carter (2014) 241 A Crim R 522; [2014] QCA 120: Bisht distinguished and proviso applied where s 21AW(2) breach); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 13(7), 13A(12), 13BA(6); Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) ss 358, 361, 375, 375A, 382; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 106HB(7), 106P, 106R(7); Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (ACT) s 13; Evidence Act 1939 (NT) s 21A(3).

156. Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) Pt 1AD Div 5A; Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) Ch 6 Pt 5 Divs 3 and 4; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 21A(6)(b); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 13C, 13D (R v B, AM (2015) 124 SASR 176; [2015] SASCFC 174: mere refusal of vulnerable witness to testify at the later trial is not in itself a sufficient basis for exercise of the court’s discretion under s 13D to admit unconditionally the video record of a previous proceeding thereby avoiding cross-examination); Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) Pt 8.2 Div 7; Evidence Act 1939 (NT) s 21E (R v SG (2011) 250 FLR 337; [2011] NTSC 44 at [27]–[36], [42]–[45] Barr J: court obliged to receive at retrial video record of vulnerable witness taken at special sitting under s 21B(2)(b) and tendered at trial despite prosecutor’s decision not to call or tender evidence of witness at retrial; decision may also be justified if recording also regarded as taken under s 21E). 157. Knowles v R [2015] VSCA 141 at [41]–[80] (Ashley, Redlich and Priest JJA: use of leading questions at a VARE interview not productive of a miscarriage of justice). For critical comments of the admissibility of such hearsay evidence, see Winneke P in R v Knigge (2003) 6 VR 150 at [30]. 158. Applied in R v Cowie; Ex parte Attorney-General [1994] 1 Qd R 326; R v Ferguson (1994) 75 A Crim R 31 at 37–8; R v Morris; Ex parte AG [1996] 2 Qd R 68; R v FAR [1996] 2 Qd R 49; R v Griffin [1998] 1 Qd R 659; Gately v R (2007) 232 CLR 208; [2007] HCA 55. 159. Earlier attempts at exception, Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34CA, seeking to admit as hearsay the out-ofcourt statements of protected witnesses, following criticism by the Full Court (see, for example, R v J, JA [2009] SASC 401 and H, SA v Police (2013) 116 SASR 547; [2013] SASCFC 86 (Blue J)), have been repealed and replaced by ss 34KA–34KD and 34LA. 160. (2010) 203 A Crim R 575; [2010] NTCCA 11. 161. For a critical review of empirical research on children’s hearsay evidence, see Edmond and Hamer, ‘Evidence’ in Cane and Kritzer (eds), Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Studies, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010; and Goodman et al, ‘Hearsay Versus Children’s Testimony: Effects of Truthful and Deceptive Statements on Jurors’ Decisions’ (2006) 30 Law & Hum Behav 363. 162. Expressly demanded by s 34D of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA); applied in R v Cheng [2015] SASCFC 189 to require detailed directions to jury about all relevant circumstances where statement admitted under (the now repealed) s 34CA. Courts also insist that alternative procedures and warnings required for children and vulnerable witnesses be meticulously followed: see, for example, cases referred to in n 155 above. 163. R v Hill (1851) 2 Den 254; 169 ER 495, which held that a lunatic is able to testify if he or she understands the nature of the oath; and R v Lau (1991) 6 WAR 30, which held that a witness suffering from Down’s syndrome can testify if he or she understands the duty to speak truthfully. 164. R v Bagshaw (1984) 78 Cr App R 163; R v Spencer (1985) 80 Cr App R 264; Bromley v R (1986) 161 CLR 315. 165. Morris v R (1987) 163 CLR 454; M v R (1994) 181 CLR 487; R v Robinson (1995) 80 A Crim R 358. 166. Compare with remarks in Sinclair v R (1946) 73 CLR 316. 167. R v Whitehead (1866) LR 1 CCR 33, where a deaf-mute was held incompetent. 168. (1989) 51 SASR 489. 169. The dangers of suggestion in the case of child-witnesses as a result of the ways in which they have been interviewed during investigation are adverted to in, for example, R v Lyndon (1987) 31 A Crim R 111 (SC (Qld)); C v Minister of Community Welfare (1989) 52 SASR 304; R v Warren (1994) 72 A Crim R 74 at 83 (CCA (NSW)); R v Dunphy (1994) 98 Cr App R 393. These cases highlight the need for guidelines for the interviewing of children and other vulnerable witnesses during the course of investigation. See Pathak and Thompson, ‘From Child to Witness to Jury: Effects of Suggestion on the

Transmission and Evaluation of Hearsay’ (1999) 5 Psych, Pub Policy & Law 372; Warren and Woodall, ‘The Reliability of Hearsay Testimony: How Well Do Interviewers Recall Their Interviews with Children?’ (1999) 5 Psych, Pub Policy & Law 355; Warren et al, ‘The Believability of Children and Their Interviewers’ Hearsay Testimony: When Less is More’ (2002) 87 J Applied Psych 846; Cossins, ‘Children, Sexual Abuse and Suggestibility: What Laypeople Think They Know and What the Literature Tells Us’ (2008) 15 Psychiatry, Psychology & Law 153. 170. Uniform Acts ss 30, 31; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 131A; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 14 (interpreter), 14A (communication assistant); Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) s 75(3)(b) (adjourn to obtain services of an interpreter). 171. Deitrich v R (1992) 177 CLR 292 at 300 (Mason CJ and McHugh J); R v Saraya (1994) 70 A Crim R 515 at 516; R v Wurramara (2011) 213 A Crim R 440; [2011] NTSC 89. For an insightful anthropological account of practical difficulties with translation in legal and quasi-legal contexts, see Good, Anthropology and Expertise in the Asylum Courts, Routledge-Cavendish, London, 2007. 172. (2011) 35 VR 240; [2011] VSCA 336 at [102]–[112] (Nettle and Neave JJA, Sifris AJA). 173. For example, Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 9(4); Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 100A(2). The judge may comment appropriately but cannot draw an analogy to the accused’s unsworn statement (R v Wills (1985) 39 SASR 35), and the mere fact that testimony is unsworn provides no ground for a corroboration warning: R v Lau (1991) 6 WAR 30 at 48–9 (Murray J), 62–3 (Owen J). 174. Endorsed in s 9D(2)(a) of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) (probative value not decreased only because evidence not given on oath). This issue receives a full discussion in Evidence, ALRC Interim Report 26 (1985), vol 1, [560]–[583]. 175. [2016] 90 ALJR 407; [2016] HCA 6. 176. These are conditions which bear some resemblance to traditional forms of historical inquiry: Collingwood, The Idea of History, Clarendon University Press, Oxford, 1946; Carr, What is History, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1961. Though cf Jenkins, Re-thinking History, Routledge, London, 1991; Wootten, ‘Conflicting Imperatives: Pursuing Truth in the Courts’ in McCalman and McGrath (eds), Proof and Truth: The Humanist as Expert, The Australian Academy of the Humanities, Canberra, 2003, p 15; Ginzburg, The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1980. 177. Of course there are exceptions so that experts may tender opinions based upon their knowledge or familiarity with professional practice. This kind of expert proof may be influenced by supplementary legislation such as s 50 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), which governs the standard of care required of professionals. See, for example, Dobler v Halverson [2007] NSWCA 335. See also Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 22; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) ss 40, 41; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 22; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) ss 58, 59; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5PB. 178. Evidence, ALRC Interim Report 26 (1985), vol 1, [731]–[751]; vol 2, [95]–[111]. 179. Allstate Life Insurance Co v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (No 32) (1996) 136 ALR 627 at 629 (Lindgren J: what the witness would have done in an hypothetical situation is not evidence of opinion as it involves no drawing of inferences from assumed facts); Seltsam Pty Ltd v McNeil [2006] NSWCA 158 at [115], [123] (Bryson JA: a plaintiff’s statement about his state of mind is not opinion evidence: ‘I do not find it possible to see evidence given by a person about his state of mind, in an actual or hypothetical situation, as an opinion. The state of a person’s mind is a fact and remains a fact whether what is under discussion is an actual state of mind, or the state in which a person’s mind would be in some contingency which has not happened. The strongest theme of dissatisfaction with such evidence is its lack of reliability because of its self-serving nature …’). See also Guide Dog Owners’ and Friends’ Association v Guide Dogs Association of NSW and ACT (1998) 154 ALR 527 at 532 (Sackville J); Quick v Stoland (1998) 87 FCR

371 at 373 (Branson J); Bank of Valetta PLC v NCA (1999) 165 ALR 60 at [20]–[22] (Full Fed Ct); Idoport Pty Ltd v NAB [2001] NSWSC 529 at [6]–[9] (Einstein J). Cf Hoyts Pty Ltd v Burns (2003) 77 ALJR 1943 at [40]–[54] (Kirby J). And see the discussion by Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law, 12th ed, Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2016, [EA.76.90]; and Heydon, ‘The Impact of ss 76–80 of the Evidence Acts 1995 on Opinion Evidence: Recent Cases’ (1999) 18 Aust Bar Rev 122 at 122–3, 129–30. 180. (2001) 206 CLR 650. Kirby J also held that none of the statutory exceptions applied to admit the evidence. The majority held the evidence simply irrelevant: see 2.23. The interpretation of images and whether an ensuing identification is recognition (and therefore fact) or interpretation (and therefore opinion) has been an issue of continuing inconsistency. See, for example, R v Smith [1999] NSWCCA 317 at [14]–[24] (Sheller JA); Haidari v R [2015] NSWCCA 126 (Johnson J). 181. Epistemologically, things are quite complex, as our primary (or sensory) experience of the world is unavoidably mediated by social and cultural values (that is, beliefs, commitments, experiences) and expectations. On the theory-loading of observation and its effects, consider Chalmers, What is This Thing Called Science?, University of Queensland Press, Queensland, 1982; Hanson, Patterns of Discovery, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1958; Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1962; Galison and Daston, Objectivity, Zone Books, Brooklyn, 2007. 182. Bowker and Starr, Sorting Things Out: Classification and its Consequences, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1999; Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, London, 2001 (1953). 183. Though identification evidence, especially the identification of non-familiars, is notoriously unreliable: Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide For Law Enforcement, United States Department of Justice, 1999; Wells and Olson, ‘Eyewitness Testimony’ (2003) 54 Ann Rev Psych 277; National Academy of Sciences, Identifying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification, National Academies Press, Washington DC, 2014. See further 4.54ff. 184. These were some of the difficulties encountered by members of the Vienna Circle in the early twentieth century. See, for example, Parrini, Salmon and Salmon (eds), Logical Empiricism — Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 2003. 185. [1965] NI 151 at 156. 186. See also R v Whitby (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 441 at 443; Ex parte Sampson (1966) 66 SR (NSW) 501 at 514; R v Wright [1980] VR 593 at 596–7; Grubisic v Western Australia (2011) 41 WAR 524; [2011] WASCA 147 at [48]–[67] (Buss JA), [114]–[125] (Hall JA, Pullin JA agreeing). 187. Doe d Mudd v Suckermore (1836) 5 Ad & E 703; 111 ER 1331; Duke v Duke (1975) 12 SASR 106. The reliability of handwriting comparison expertise, and document analysis more generally, has been the subject of withering critique. See, for example, Risinger, Denbeaux and Saks, ‘Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification Expertise’ (1989) 137 U Penn LR 731; Risinger, ‘Cases Involving the Reliability of Handwriting Identification Expertise Since the Decision in Daubert’ (2007) 43 Tulsa LR 477; as well as scientific studies such as Sita, Found and Rogers, ‘Forensic Handwriting Examiners’ Expertise for Signature Comparison’ (2002) 47 J Forensic Sci 1117. 188. In R v Griffith (1995) 79 A Crim R 125, without proof of further expertise, police familiar with the accused were not permitted to assist the jury by drawing the observational inference that the stockinged man in a video recording of the crime was the accused. In Smith v R (2001) 206 CLR 650, the majority of the High Court held the testimony of police identifying the accused as the person filmed on a security camera irrelevant under s 55 of the Uniform Acts as the police had no meaningful additional experience (Kirby J held the evidence relevant but inadmissible evidence of opinion); see discussion at 2.23. Smith was followed in R v Gardner (2001) 123 A Crim R 439. In R v Leung and Wong [1999] 47 NSWLR 405, additional knowledge acquired through constant replaying of recordings and participation in an investigation created sufficient ad hoc expertise to permit the witness to testify to

voice identity. See also R v Camilleri [2001] NSWCCA 527; R v Riscuta and Niga [2003] NSWCCA 6; R v El-Kheir [2004] NSWCCA 461; R v Madigan [2005] NSWCCA 170. But cf the refusal of Greg James J to so find in R v Hall [2001] NSWSC 827 at [39]. See discussion at 7.56. In R v Tang [2006] NSWLR 681, Murdoch v R [2007] NTCCA 1, and R v Dastagir (2013) 224 A Crim R 570; [2013] SASC 26; affirmed (2013) 118 SASR 83; [2013] SASCFC 109, anatomists were permitted to express opinions about similarities between CCTV images (stills) and the accused on the basis of repeated exposure to the images. They became ad hoc experts, from extended exposure to the images, and their anatomical expertise seems to have been used to overcome the problems identified by the entire court in Smith: see the discussion at 7.41 and 7.56. The status of this evidence is uncertain in the wake of Honeysett v R (2014) 253 CLR 122. In R v Marsh [2005] NSWCCA 331 at [31]–[32] (Studdert J), the accused’s sister identified him from images of a bank robbery published in a newspaper. The evidence was either direct evidence (that is, recognition evidence that did not involve conscious interpretation); or the sister was sufficiently ‘familiar’ to be able to express an opinion based on specialised knowledge based on her experience with the accused: s 79. 189. Borowski v Quayle [1966] VR 382. Though the age of a drug might be another matter: R v Howard [2005] NSWCCA 25. See also the discussion in Oteri, Weinberg and Pinales, ‘Cross-Examination in Drug Cases’ in Barnes and Edge (eds), Science in Context: Readings in the Sociology of Science, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1982, p 250. 190. For example, R v Tran (1990) 50 A Crim R 233 (SC (NSW)); Tuite v R [2015] VSCA 148. For a more extensive list of cases discussing the admissibility of DNA evidence, see n 229. 191. In Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd and Commonwealth (1971) 17 FLR 141, only anthropologists could observe those features of Aboriginal society which formed the basis of the inference that the society was ‘associated’ with a particular piece of land. More recently, judges of the Federal Court have struggled with formal objections to the form of anthropological, linguistic and historical evidence in native title proceedings. In part this is an artefact of the reform of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), through s 82 of the Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth), which imposed the expectation that proof in native title claims would be subject to the rules of evidence. See the discussion at 7.72–7.73. 192. For example, when giving evidence of distress: Aldersea v Public Transport Corp (2001) 3 VR 473 at [16] (Ashley J). 193. In Guide Dog Owners’ & Friends’ Association Inc v Guide Dog Association of NSW & ACT (1998) 154 ALR 527 at 531, Sackville J recognised, without resolving, some of difficulties with s 78. 194. (2001) 206 CLR 650. 195. In Hamod v Suncorp Metway Insurance Ltd [2006] NSWCA 243 at [23], Basten JA explained that s 78 ‘permits opinions to be expressed by non-experts where, as for example with identification evidence, it may not be reasonably possible for the witness to give an adequate explanation of his or her perceptions without expressing an opinion’. See also Nguyen v R [2017] NSWCCA 4. 196. Significantly, s 78 is not routinely invoked as a basis for biologists giving opinion evidence about DNA analysis of physical evidence taken from a crime scene. Similarly, fingerprint experts do not rely upon s 78 for their opinions about ‘matches’. Rather, s 78 has been used to allow emerging fields and technologies to be relied upon without any attendant proof of their validity or reliability. See the discussion at 7.46. 197. Nguyen v R [2007] NSWCCA 363 at [28]–[30] (Smart AJ). Consider also the Victorian approach to identification evidence and s 78 in criminal proceedings, discussed at 7.56. Familiarity was also used to ground ‘specialised knowledge’ according to s 79: see discussion at 7.54–7.56. See also Nokia Corporation v Cellular Line Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 726 at [20] (Kenny J), effectively repeating Crennan J in Nokia Corporation v Truong [2005] FCA 1141 at [35].

198. Regardless of whether the High Court might consider them relevant or not: R v Smith (2001) 206 CLR 650; Evans v R [2007] HCA 59. Here, the main advantage over the jury might be repeated exposure and, possibly, the type of equipment. There is, however, very little evidence that this type of activity dramatically improves the accuracy of resulting opinions, and to the extent that opinions derive from investigators or those in their camp, this type of interpretation might be considered undesirable. See, for example, Solan and Tiersma, ‘Hearing Voices: Speaker Identification in Court’ (2003) 54 Hastings LJ 373; Kerstholt et al, ‘Earwitnesses: Effects of Speech Duration, Retention Interval and Acoustic Environment’ (2004) 18 Applied Cognitive Psych 327; Cutler and Penrod, Mistaken Identification, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1995; Yarmey, ‘Earwitness Speaker Identification’ (1995) 1 Psych, Pub Policy & Law 792. 199. For it is not their perception, but their interpretation, that is being admitted as opinion evidence. 200. R v Leung and Wong (1999) 47 NSWLR 405 at [28]–[33] (Ipp JA). See also Idoport Pty Ltd v NAB [2001] NSWSC 529 at [11]–[23] (Einstein J); Stockland Constructions Pty Ltd v Coombs [2004] NSWSC 333 at [57]–[58] (Einstein J). 201. Leung at [34]. 202. Ibid. Although the interpreter’s opinion was not admissible via ss 78 and 79, the court accepted that it was admissible as ad hoc expert evidence: see 7.56 and the discussion of the approach to such evidence in Victoria. Cf Nguyen v R [2017] NSWCCA 4. 203. See the discussion of Odgers, n 179 above, at [EA.78.60], referring to R v Harvey (NSWCCA, 11 December 1996, unreported) and R v Van Dyk [2000] NSWCCA 67 at [131]–[134]. 204. R v Drollett [2005] NSWCCA 356 (Simpson J). See also R v Howard [2005] NSWCCA 25 at [25] (per curiam); R v Sterling; R v McCook [2014] NSWDC 199 (Yehia DCJ); Haidari v R [2015] NSWCCA 126 (Johnson J). 205. Drollett at [63]. 206. Mid-City Skin Cancer and Laser Centre Pty Ltd v Zahedi-Anarak [2006] NSWSC 615 at [14]–[19]. 207. [2006] NSWCCA 75. Spigelman CJ and Barr J were both of the opinion that the statement was admissible hearsay, via s 66. Simpson J, in contrast, explained that the statement was based on the daughter’s impression of events and as hearsay should have been limited (by virtue of s 136) to the consistency of her version of events and her credibility. 208. R v Whyte [2006] NSWCCA 75 at [35]–[39]. 209. Ibid at [56]–[57]. This is another example of the distinction between a descriptive (that is, factual) account and the more interpretive version where, quite reasonably, an intention to assault might be inferred. For discussion of s 78 in civil litigation, see Angel v Hawkesbury City Council [2008] NSWCA 130 at [53]–[54] (Beazley and Tobias JJA); Jackson v Lithgow City Council [2008] NSWCA 312 at [45]– [56] (Allsop P). 210. (2011) 85 ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36 at [54]–[57] (French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ). 211. In R v Leung and Wong (1999) 47 NSWLR 405, all members of the court held voice identification evidence admissible under s 79 on the basis that the witness had been shown to have sufficient ad hoc expertise: see discussion at 7.56. In R v Fernando [1999] NSWCCA 66 at [153]–[155], a witness was permitted to give evidence about the apparent level of the accused’s intelligence without qualifications beyond close association with the accused, but it is not clear whether this was admitted under s 78 or s 79. 212. R v Kelly [1958] VR 412. 213. R v Whitby (1957) 74 WN (NSW) 441; R v Davies [1962] 3 All ER 97; cf R v Aldridge (1990) 20 NSWLR 737 at 744 (Hunt J). One would expect s 78 to similarly permit such an opinion.

214. Cf Warming v O’Sullivan [1962] SASR 287; and Normandale v Rankine (1972) 4 SASR 205. 215. R v Davies [1962] 3 All ER 97; Cavanett v Chambers [1968] SASR 97 at 104–5; and cf Blackie v Police [1966] NZLR 910 at 914. The same result can be achieved under the Uniform Acts by holding the opinion either irrelevant, beyond s 78, or regarding s 79(1) as decisive and requiring the opinion to be based on specialised knowledge. 216. Jasanoff, Science at the Bar, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995; Beecher-Monas, Evaluating Scientific Evidence, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006; Dwyer, The Judicial Assessment of Expert Evidence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008. For a review of scientific approaches to expertise, consider Martire and Edmond, ‘Re-thinking Expert Opinion Evidence’ (2017) 40 Melb ULR (forthcoming). 217. In several jurisdictions it has encouraged the production of authoritative treatises by distinguished authors designed to assist judges and lawyers: Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 3rd ed, Federal Judicial Centre, Washington, DC, 2011. See also Freckelton and Selby, Expert Evidence, looseleaf, Law Book Co, Sydney. 218. For example, Commissioner for Government Transport v Adamcik (1961) 106 CLR 292; Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642; Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 (epidemiologists). 219. Folkes v Chadd (1782) 3 Dougl 157; 99 ER 589. See Golan, Laws of Nature, Laws of Men, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2004. 220. TPC v Arnotts Ltd (No 5) (1990) 21 FCR 324. 221. Thannhauser v Westpac Banking Corp (1991) 31 FCR 572. 222. Weal v Bottom (1966) 40 ALJR 436. 223. Skyways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1984) 57 ALR 657 at 684–5. 224. R v Silverlock [1894] 2 QB 766; Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) [2006] NSWCCA 373. 225. R v Tilley [1985] VR 505. 226. R v Gilmore [1977] 2 NSWLR 935. See also Zetterholm, Sarwar and Allwood, ‘Earwitnesses: The Effect of Voice Differences in Identification Accuracy and the Realism in Confidence Judgments’ (2009) Proceedings FONETIK; Olsson, Juslin and Winman, ‘Realism of Confidence in Earwitness versus Eyewitness Identification’ (1998) 4 J Experimental Psych: Applied 101. For an overview, consider Edmond, Martire and San Roque, ‘Unsound Law: Issues with (“Expert”) Voice Comparison Evidence’ (2011) 35 Melb ULR 52. 227. R v O’Callaghan [1976] VR 676; Bennett v Police [2005] SASC 167 (expert opinion of fingerprint identification admissible without production of the fingerprint images used for comparison); Bennett v Police [2005] SASC 415; JP v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2015] NSWSC 1669. There is growing concern about the decisiveness of such evidence: see, for example, Cole, Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and Criminal Identification, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 2001; Haber and Haber, ‘Scientific Validation of Fingerprint Evidence under Daubert’ (2008) 7 Law, Prob & Risk 87; Cole, ‘Comment on “Scientific Validation of Fingerprint Evidence under Daubert”’ (2008) 7 Law, Prob & Risk 119. Lord Campbell, The Fingerprint Inquiry Report, APS Group Scotland, 2011; Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis, Latent Print Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Washington DC, 2012; Cole and Roberts, ‘Certainty, Individualisation, and the Subjective Nature of Expert Fingerprint Evidence’ [2012] Crim LR 824; Edmond, Thompson and Tangen, ‘A Guide to Interpreting Forensic Testimony: Scientific Approaches to Fingerprint Evidence’ (2013) 12 Law, Prob & Risk 1. 228. R v Carroll (1985) 19 A Crim R 410; R v Lewis (1987) 29 A Crim R 267 (CCA (NT)). See President’s

Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), Forensic Science in Criminal Proceedings: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature Comparison Methods, Executive Office of the President of the United States, Washington DC, 2016, pp 83–7. 229. R v Tran (1990) 50 A Crim R 233 (discussed by McLeod, ‘English DNA Evidence Held Inadmissible’ [1991] Crim LR 583); R v Lucas [1992] 2 VR 109; R v Jarrett (1992) 62 SASR 443; R v Sopher (1993) 74 A Crim R 21; R v Milat (1996) 87 A Crim R 446; R v Pantoja (1996) 88 A Crim R 554; R v Humphrey (1999) 72 SASR 558. As technology in this field advances so have courts been forced to consider the admissibility of DNA evidence, it being unanimously admitted in all jurisdictions: see Latcha v R (1998) 127 NTR 1; R v Noll [1999] 3 VR 704; Gibson v R [2001] TASSC 59; R v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317; R v Galli [2001] NSWCCA 504; R v McIntyre [2001] NSWSC 311; R v Gallagher [2001] NSWSC 462; R v Karger [2001] SASC 64 (ruling of Mulligan J following extensive voir dire about Profiler Plus); (2002) 83 SASR 135 (ruling upheld by CCA); R v To [2002] NSWCCA 247; R v Yates [2002] NSWCCA 520 at [153]; Tuite v R [2015] VSCA 148 (ruling on the admissibility of STRMix, a new method for evaluating complex DNA mixtures); as well as the assessment by PCAST, n 228 above, pp 67–83. The possibility of error or contamination will generally be insufficient to sustain an appeal, especially where it should have been adduced at trial: R v Butler [2010] 1 Qd R 325; [2009] QCA 111 at [137] (Keane JA). 230. R v Abadom [1983] 1 WLR 126; R v Templeton [2004] QCA 338; R v Debs [2005] VSCA 66. 231. R v Tang [2006] NSWLR 681; Murdoch v R (2007) 167 A Crim R 329; Honeysett v R (2014) 253 CLR 122. 232. R v Van Beelen (1972) 4 SASR 353 at 381–96. 233. Toohey v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1965] AC 595; R v C (1993) 60 SASR 467; Farrell v R (1998) 194 CLR 286; Dupas v R (2012) 218 A Crim R 507; [2012] VSCA 328; Gittany v R [2016] NSWCCA 182. 234. For example, Shultz v R [1982] WAR 171; R v Barry [1984] 1 Qd R 74 at 90; Murphy v R (1989) 167 CLR 94; R v Runjanjic and Kontinnen (1991) 56 SASR 114. Although not without some controversy: see, for example, Rogers, ‘Diagnostic Validity and Psychiatric Expert Testimony’ (2004) 27 Int’l JL & Psychiatry 281. 235. (1960) 103 CLR 486 at 491. See also R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45. The Uniform Acts are somewhat different. Relevance (ss 55, 56) and the need for the opinion to be based on ‘specialised knowledge’ (s 79(1)), rather than assisting a jury (purportedly in need), govern admissibility under the uniform legislation. In addition, the common knowledge and ultimate issues rules have been abolished: s 80. 236. There are remarkably few High Court decisions discussing the common law principles for the admissibility of expert evidence. The principal cases, which we believe support the propositions in the text, are Transport Publishing Co Pty Ltd v Literature Board of Review (1956) 99 CLR 111; Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486; Weal v Bottom (1966) 40 ALJR 436; Murphy v R (1989) 167 CLR 94; Osland v R (1998) 197 CLR 316; Farrell v R (1998) 194 CLR 286. 237. (1989) 167 CLR 94 at 131. Even professional boards, including those entitled to inform themselves, should not be overborne by expert evidence: Physiotherapy Board of SA v Heywood-Smith (2008) 101 SASR 573 at [40] (Gray and Layton JJ). See also Schwark v Police (2011) 111 SASR 451; [2011] SASC 212 at [21] (Gray J) (risk that psychiatrist’s evidence on ultimate issue acted upon without magistrate determining issue himself). 238. (1966) 40 ALJR 436; (1960) 103 CLR 486, respectively. 239. Clark at 506 (Windeyer J). 240. The Uniform Acts strictly only require that the opinion be based on specialised knowledge (s 79) that ‘if

it were accepted, could rationally affect (directly or indirectly) the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue’ (s 55). 241. See, for example, Hand, ‘Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony’ (1901) 15 Harv LR 40; Edmond et al, ‘Admissibility Compared’ (2013) U Denver Crim LR 31. 242. Collins, Are We All Scientific Experts Now?, Polity, Cambridge, 2014. To appreciate the range of expert forensic evidence available, see Freckelton and Selby, n 217 above. 243. Huber, Galileo’s Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom, Basic Books, New York, 1991. For substantial critiques of Huber’s claims, see Loevinger, ‘Science and Legal Rules of Evidence: A Review of Galileo’s Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom’ (1992) 32 Jurimetrics 487; Chesebro, ‘Galileo’s Retort: Peter Huber’s Junk Scholarship’ (1993) 42 Am Univ Law Rev 1637; Edmond and Mercer, ‘Trashing “Junk” Science’ (1998) Stanford Tech LR 3. 244. For a sceptical discussion of the admissibility of syndrome evidence, see Freckelton, ‘Contemporary Comment: When Plight Makes Right — The Forensic Abuse Syndrome’ (1994) 18 Crim LJ 29. Cf Uniform Acts s 79(2). 245. For a highly informative account of the history and refinement of DNA evidence, see Aronson, Genetic Witness, Rutgers University Press, New Jersey, 2007. One of the difficulties with DNA evidence is that the very real risk of handling and laboratory error may compromise the astronomical probabilities generated by the population statistics. 246. National Research Council (NRC), Strengthening the Forensic Sciences in the US, National Academies Press, Washington DC, 2009, p 8 (emphasis added). The primary exception is DNA typing. While DNA evidence may have a more scientific basis because of its origins in biological science and the investment of hundreds of millions of dollars in research, equipment, and the refinement of population statistics, problems and limitations persist. See the insightful discussion by Lynch et al, n 112 above, Chs 5, 8 and the PCAST review of complex DNA mixtures, n 228 above, pp 8, 75–83. 247. PCAST, n 228 above, p 8. 248. Australian forensic sciences have been particularly concerned with standardisation and accreditation. While desirable, standards are no substitute for basic research into the validity and reliability of techniques. Further, the National Institute of Forensic Science in Australia is effectively funded and controlled by state and federal police. The NRC report, in contrast, recommended making any national institute independent of investigators and managed by scientists. 249. Consider the discussion in the Adel LR (2015) as well as: Saks and Faigman, ‘Failed Forensics: How Forensic Science Lost its Way and How it Might Yet Find It’ (2008) 4 Annual Rev Law & Soc Sci 149; Saks and Koehler, ‘The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science’ (2005) 309 Science 892; Pyrek, Forensic Science under Siege, Elsevier, Burlington, MA, 2007; Scheck, Neufeld and Dwyer, Actual Innocence, Basic Books, New York, 2001; Huff and Killias (eds), Wrongful Conviction: International Perspectives on Miscarriages of Justice, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 2008; Garrett, Convicting the Innocent: Where Criminal Prosecutions Go Wrong, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2011. 250. We accept that there are methodological limitations with some of the empirical research and problems extrapolating from United States experience to Australia, but disturbingly there does seem to be a consistent refrain — critical of the adversarial trial — emanating from a variety of sources. And, we might wonder whether it is appropriate to maintain faith in the efficacy of trial safeguards and protections in the face of this accumulating critical research. At the very least Australian courts, legislatures and scholars should be facilitating independent research into trial processes to improve our understanding and, where appropriate, facilitate reform. Confronted with damning critiques from preeminent scientific institutions, scientists and social scientists, appeals to tradition, ‘judicial experience’ and anecdotes might not appear particularly persuasive.

251. There is an assumption amongst Australian judges that where the defence has a rebuttal expert witness available it is generally fair to admit the prosecution’s expert opinion evidence. Usually, the availability of a defence witness encourages a more liberal attitude to the reception of incriminating opinion evidence. See, for example, R v Jung [2006] NSWSC 658. 252. So concluded the Law Commission of England and Wales, Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales, HMSO, London, 2011, [1.20], [1.24]. See the analyses in Findley, ‘Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the Search for the Truth’ (2008) 28 Seton Hall LR 893; Garrett and Neufeld, n 112 above. 253. Sometimes the availability of a defence witness encourages a more liberal attitude to the reception of incriminating opinion evidence. See, for example, R v Jung [2006] NSWSC 658. 254. Edmond and San Roque, ‘The Cool Crucible: Forensic Science and the Frailty of the Criminal Trial’ (2012) 24 Current Issues Crim Just 51; ‘How to Cross-examine Forensic Scientists: A Guide for Lawyers’ (2014) 39 Aust Bar Rev 174. Few cases explore expert evidence in the detail that a highly resourced defence team might. Consider Lynch, ‘The Discursive Production of Uncertainty: The OJ Simpson “Dream Team” and the Sociology of Knowledge Machine’ (1998) 28 Soc Stud Science 829. 255. Empirical studies of the impact of Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc 509 US 579; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993) (discussed at 7.50ff) suggest that it tends to be used more aggressively against the expert evidence adduced by plaintiffs than the forensic science routinely relied upon by the state. This research also suggests, somewhat surprisingly, that judges only rarely engage with the Daubert criteria and that the actual practical differences between jurisdictions relying upon Frye and those relying upon Daubert are insignificant. See Groscup et al, ‘The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases’ (2002) 8 Psych, Pub Policy & Law 339; Cheng and Yoon, ‘Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility Standards’ (2005) 91 Virginia LR 471; Dixon and Gill, ‘Changes in the Standards for Admitting Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Cases Since the Daubert Decision’ (2002) 8 Psych, Pub Policy & Law 251; Harris, Black Robes, Whites Coats, Rutgers University Press, New Jersey, 2008. See also Edmond and San Roque, ‘Just(,) Quick and Cheap? Contemporary Approaches to the Regulation of Expert Evidence’ in Legg (ed), The Future of Dispute Resolution, 2nd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2016. 256. Gatowski et al, ‘Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World’ (2001) 25 Law & Hum Behav 433; Edmond and Mercer, ‘Scientific Literacy and the Jury’ (1997) 6 Public Understanding of Science 32; Freckelton et al, Expert Evidence and Criminal Jury Trials, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016. 257. See, for example, McQuiston-Surrett and Saks, ‘The Testimony of Forensic Identification Science: What Expert Witnesses Say and What Factfinders Hear’ (2009) 33 Law & Hum Behav 436. See also Cole and Dioso-Villa, ‘Investigating the “CSI effect”: Media and Litigation Crisis in Criminal Law’ (2009) 61 Stanford LR 1335. 258. This is the terminology of Bernstein in ‘Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth’ (1996) 21 Yale J Int L 123. See also Redmayne, Expert Evidence and Criminal Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; Roberts, ‘Drawing on Expertise: Legal Decision-Making and the Reception of Expert Evidence’ (2008) Crim LR 443. The Law Commission of England and Wales, n 252 above, at [1.17], described English admissibility jurisprudence as ‘laissez faire’ and recommended replacement with a formal reliability threshold. See Edmond and Roberts, ‘The Law Commission’s Report on Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Sufficiently Reliable?’ (2011) Crim LR 844. 259. (1961) 106 CLR 292. 260. Though the High Court was split on this issue, with Taylor J (at [7]) providing a spirited dissent based on the facts of the case and the empirically tendentious opinions expressed by the plaintiff’s expert witness during cross-examination. Where there is disagreement between experts and a marked

discrepancy between their relative experience there is no obligation to direct the jury in those terms: R v Gemmill (2004) 8 VR 242 at [41]–[42] (Eames JA). 261. Other cases which appear to take this liberal relevancy approach include R v O’Callaghan [1976] VR 676; R v Carroll (1985) 19 A Crim R 410 (conflicting forensic odontology testimony admissible although unable to support a verdict of guilt); R v J (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 at 535–6 (Brooking J); R v Bartlett [1996] 2 VR 687 at 695 (Winneke P). 262. [1977] 2 NSWLR 935; applied in R v McHardie [1983] 2 NSWLR 733. 263. Although more recent authority in New South Wales, drawing upon an expert’s experience as a linguist, did not focus on the reliability of the ‘specialised knowledge’ or underlying technique used to identify the person speaking in incriminating covert voice recordings. In R v Li [2003] NSWCCA 290 at [85], Ipp JA explained that ‘Dr Gibbons did not appear to apply scientific methodology in the sense of using machines or measuring (or other) equipment, and although he relied only on his experience, knowledge and hearing, that did not detract from the inherent expert quality of his evidence and I consider that his evidence was properly admitted as being expert in nature’. See also Bain v R [2009] NZSC 16. 264. McKay v Page and Sobloski (1972) 2 SASR 117. Cf R v Farquharson (2009) 26 VR 410; [2009] VSCA 307; Farquharson v R [2012] VSCA 296. 265. Cooper v Bech (No 2) (1975) 12 SASR 151. See also Bugg v Day (1949) 79 CLR 442. In Western Australia v Silich (2011) 43 WAR 285; [2011] WASCA 135, a psychiatrist allowed to testify about mental states and behavioural effects produced by sleep disorders although not an expert in their diagnosis and treatment; jury to take this into account. In Kalbasi v Western Australia (2013) 235 A Crim R 541; [2013] WASCA 241, a police expert could testify about drug dealing practices but not about the behaviour of those in the upper echelon of drug importation and dealing. 266. [1976] Qd R 313. 267. See also Richardson v Schultz (1980) 25 SASR 1. 268. (1987) 88 FLR 104 at 117–18. 269. Identification from bite-marks remains controversial. See Beecher-Monas, ‘Reality Bites: The Illusion of Science in Bite Mark Evidence’ (2009) 30 Cardozo LR 1373. In its review of bite-mark evidence, PCAST, n 228 above, pp 9, 83–7, concluded: ‘available scientific evidence strongly suggests that examiners not only cannot identify the source of bitemark with reasonable accuracy, they cannot even consistently agree on whether an injury is a human bitemark’. 270. National Research Council (NAS), On the Theory and Practice of Voice Identification, National Academies Press, Washington DC, 1979; NRC, n 246 above; Morrison and Thompson, ‘Assessing the Admissibility of a New Generation of Forensic Voice Comparison Testimony’ (2017) Columbia Science & Tech LR (forthcoming). There is, however, ongoing research by linguists, phoneticians and engineers endeavouring to develop empirically-based, probabilistic approaches to voice comparison. See Rose, Forensic Speaker Identification, Taylor and Francis, London, 2002; Gonzalez-Rodriguez et al, ‘Emulating DNA: Rigorous Quantification of Evidential Weight in Transparent and Testable Forensic Speaker Recognition’ (2007) 15 IEEE Transactions on Audio, Speech, and Language Processing 2104. Although the apparent demise of the spectrographic techniques and the emergence of more empirically based and scientifically credible methods of voice comparison has not prevented courts from admitting the opinions of investigators, interpreters and linguists based simply on auditory comparison: see 7.56. 271. Significantly, the relatively liberal decision in Gilmore might be explained on the basis that the evidence was adduced by the defence rather than the prosecution. In adversarial jurisdictions, where the accused is presumed innocent and has no obligation to adduce evidence or mount a defence, there is a basis for arguing that admissibility standards should not necessarily be the same as those for the prosecution. To

the extent that there is support for a liberal relevance approach to admissibility, on principle it should be applied to expert evidence adduced by the defence, at least. On whether the standard should be uniform, see the discussion in Edmond and Roach, ‘A Contextual Approach to the Admissibility of the State’s Forensic Science and Medical Evidence’ (2011) 61 U Toronto LJ 343 at 406–9. 272. 293 F 1013 (DC Cir, 1923); see generally Imwinkelreid, ‘A Comparative Law Analysis of the Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: The US Stands Alone’ (1989) 42 Foren Sci Int 15. Frye has had a chequered and inconsistent history between 1923 and 1975 — when the US Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) were introduced — and between 1975 and 1993, when Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc 509 US 579 (1993) was handed down. ‘General acceptance’ remains the dominant admissibility standard in many United States states. To the extent that it was in use in the United States, the ‘general acceptance’ standard was typically applied to proffers of novel technology in criminal proceedings. 273. See Alder, The Lie Detector: The History of an American Obsession, Free Press, New York, 2007. 274. In practice Frye rarely involved anything more than a superficial inquiry into the extent to which techniques or opinions were accepted among particular knowledge communities. Such evidence, interestingly enough, was almost always impressionistic hearsay proffered by the witnesses called by the parties. General acceptance was considered in Tuite v R [2015] VSCA 148 at [103]–[104], where the Victorian Court of Appeal expressed a preference for validation and reliability. 275. The following cases (in addition to those above) appear to apply or be influenced by Frye: R v Carroll (1985) 19 A Crim R 410 at 415; R v Lewis (1987) 88 FLR 104 at 121–2; Casley-Smith v FS Evans and Sons Pty Ltd and DC of Stirling (No 1) (1988) 49 SASR 314 at 320, 323; R v Jarrett (1993) 62 SASR 443 at 447 (DNA evidence using polymerase chain reaction (PCR) accepted by experts, but jury must decide the reliability of the laboratory procedures in the particular case); R v Sopher (1993) 74 A Crim R 21 at 22–3 (while holding that the DNA analysis employed was generally accepted, the question of the definitive application of Frye was left open; in considering whether evidence calculating the random frequency of DNA in the population generally the testimony was held ‘not so unreliable that the jury could not use it as logically probative’); R v Pantoja (1996) 88 A Crim R 554 at 558 (Hunt CJ at CL: general acceptance applies in Australia despite it having been altered by the Federal Evidence Rules in America); R v Karger [2001] SASC 64 at [171]–[186] (Mulligan J: Frye test accepted and applied in Australia; determined that Profiler Plus DNA analysis was admissible; the more general reliability test was rejected); R v Parenzee (2007) 101 SASR 456; [2007] SASC 143 (Sulan J: finding expert evidence challenging the idea that HIV is a sexually transmitted virus inadmissible and, in the process, distinguishing Adamcik). 276. (1991) 56 SASR 114. This case is discussed in Freckelton (1992) 17 Alternative LJ 39 and Freckelton, n 244 above. Whether evidence of the syndrome is relevant to establishing a defence of duress, selfdefence or provocation is another matter: see further R v Chhay (1994) 72 A Crim R 1; R v Singleton (1994) 72 A Crim R 117; Osland v R (1999) 197 CLR 316. On the application of the battered woman syndrome generally, see Sheehy, Stubbs and Tolmie, ‘Defending Battered Women on Trial: The Battered Woman Syndrome and its Limitations’ (1992) 16 Crim LJ 369. Sheehy, Stubbs and Tolmie, ‘Securing Fair Outcomes for Battered Women Charged with Homicide: Analysing Defence Lawyering in R v Falls’ (2014) 38 Melb ULR 666; Crofts and Tyson, ‘Homicide Law Reform in Australia: Improving Access to Defences for Women who Kill their Abusers’ (2013) 39 Monash ULR 864. More recently, controversy has emerged concerning risk and the prediction of future dangerousness; see, for example, McSherry, ‘Risk Assessment by Mental Health Professionals and the Prevention of Future Violent Behaviour’ (2004) 281 Trends & Issues in Crime & Crim Just 1; Keyzer and McSherry, ‘The Preventive Detention of Sex Offenders: Law and Practice’ (2015) 38 UNSW LJ 792. 277. (1993) 60 SASR 467 at 473–4. King CJ’s approach is referred to with approval in R v F (1995) 83 A Crim R 502 at 508–9 by the CCA (NSW). Though the court rejected expert testimony of the same syndrome because of ‘the particular evidence that was adduced in the individual case’. For the situation

in the United States, see Mason, ‘A Judicial Dilemma: Expert Witness Testimony in Child Sex Abuse Cases’ [1991] J Psychiatry & Law 185; and Faigman et al, Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony, West Group, St Paul, MN, 2016. Opinions based on specialised knowledge about the behaviour of complainants (and other victims) is now potentially admissible, via ss 79(2) and 108C of the uniform legislation, and routinely admitted. 278. (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 at 535–6.

279. R v Bartlett [1996] 2 VR 687 at 695; R v Anderson [2000] 1 VR 1 at [55] (Winneke P); Velevski v R (2002) 187 ALR 233 at [153]–[160] (Gummow and Callinan JJ); Whitsed v R [2005] WASCA 208 at [129]–[138] (Miller AJA); R v Sica [2013] QCA 247 at [103]–[111] (the court). Cf R v Cao [2004] NSWCCA 61; Gilham v R [2012] NSWCCA 131 at [240]ff. 280. See, for example, Gross, ‘Expert Evidence’ (1999) Wisconsin LR 1113; Faigman, Porter and Saks, ‘Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying about the Future of Scientific Evidence’ (1994) 15 Cardozo LR 1799. Cf Schwartz, ‘A “Dogma of Empiricism” Revisited: Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc and the Need to Resurrect the Philosophical Insight of Frye v United States’ (1997) 10 Harv J L & Tech 149. 281. Critics of liberal admissibility standards, particularly in United States civil litigation, often promoted the resulting delay (the ‘test of time’) as an advantage. See, for example, Foster and Huber, Judging Science, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997, p 17. 282. Identifying and managing non-experts is not always simple: R v Parenzee (2007) 101 SASR 456; [2007] SASC 143 (Sulan J). For more theoretical discussion of the issues, consider Lynch and Cole, ‘Science and Technology Studies on Trial: Dilemmas of Expertise’ (2005) 35 Soc Stud Science 269; Cole, ‘A Cautionary Tale about Cautionary Tales About Intervention’ (2009) 16 Organization 121; and more generally, Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1999; Collins and Evans, Rethinking Expertise, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2007. 283. Some of these issues emerged in mass tort litigation over silicone gel breast implants. See Hooper, Cecil and Willging, ‘Assessing Causation in Breast Implant Litigation: The Role of Science Panels’ (2001) 64 Law & Contemporary Problems 139; Jasanoff, ‘Science and the Statistical Victim’ (2002) 32 Soc Stud Science 37. 284. 509 US 579; 125 L Ed 2d 469 (1993). There is a massive literature in the United States and beyond on Daubert. On the pronunciation of the name, the Dauberts’ counsel answered this question definitively: ‘… the folks who brought this case to the Supreme Court pronounce their name “Dow-burt”— or, as some might say, exactly as it’s spelled. The penchant for foreign fancies has caused many to show their expertise in French pronunciation at the expense of this all-American family’: Gottesman, ‘Admissibility of Expert Testimony After Daubert: The “Prestige” Factor’ (1994) 43 Emory LJ 867 at 867. 285. Sanders, Bendectin on Trial: A Study of Mass Tort Litigation, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbour, 1998; Green, Bendectin and Birth Defects: The Challenges of Mass Toxic Substance Litigation, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1996. 286. This actually resembles the Australian High Court’s reluctance to simply accept expert consensus in medical negligence litigation, espoused in Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. This approach, modifying the principle espoused in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582, was subsequently modified by statutes such as Div 6 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). 287. Rules 401 and 402 of the FRE resemble ss 56 and 57 in the Uniform Acts. 288. For criticism of falsifiability as a universal touchstone for genuine science, see Haack, ‘An Epistemologist in the Bramble Bush: At the Supreme Court with Mr Joiner’ (2001) 26 J of Health, Politics, Policy & Law 217; Leiter, ‘The Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of Science Would Not Make for Good Philosophy of Evidence’ (1997) Brigham Young ULR 803; Edmond and Mercer, ‘Keeping “Junk” History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science Out of the Courtroom: Problems with the Reception of Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc’ (1997) 20 UNSW LR 48, responding to Odgers and Richardson, ‘Keeping Bad Science Out of the Courtroom: Changes in American and Australian Expert Evidence Law’ (1995) 18 UNSW LR 108. 289. See n 409 as well as the discussion in Edmond, ‘Judging the Scientific and Medical Literature: Some Legal Implications of Changes to Biomedical Research and Publication’ (2008) 28 Ox J Legal Studies

523. See also LaFollette, Stealing into Print: Fraud, Plagiarism, and Misconduct in Scientific Publishing, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1992; Chubin and Hackett, Peerless Science: Peer Review and US Science Policy, SUNY Press, Albany, 1990; Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policy-makers, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1990; Lock, A Difficult Balance: Editorial Peer Review in Medicine, ISI Press, Philadelphia, 1986. 290. Some commentators include the need for standards as a fifth criterion. This criteria-based approach was advocated by McCormick, ‘Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility’ (1981) 67 Iowa LR 879 at 911, where relevant criteria are specified. 291. Judge Kozinski expressed apprehension as he endeavoured, in the wake of the appeal to the United States Supreme Court, to determine the reliability of complex scientific evidence (epidemiology) when the case was remanded to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc 43 F 3d 1311 (1995). 292. In Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael 526 US 137 (1999) (discussed at 90 ALR 5th 453), the Supreme Court endorsed the actions of a trial judge rigorously applying all the Daubert criteria in assessing the reliability of the ‘expert’ testimony of an engineer with considerable experience working for Michelin. See Edmond, ‘Legal Engineering: Contested Representations of Law, Science (and Non-Science) and Society’ (2002) 32 Soc Stud Science 371. 293. The rules were subsequently revised in 2011 as part of a ‘restyling’. Rule 702 now states: ‘A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.’ 294. General Electric v Joiner 522 US 136 (1997). 295. [2000] 2 SCR 600 at [33] (Binnie J). See R v DD [2000] 2 SCR 275. See also Binnie and ParkThompson, ‘The Perils of Law Office Science’ (2015) 36 Adel LR 125. 296. R v Trochym [2007] 1 SCR 239 at [31]–[32] (Deschamp J): ‘Therefore, even if it has received judicial recognition in the past, a technique or science whose underlying assumptions are challenged should not be admitted in evidence without first confirming the validity of those assumptions’. The voiceprints from Gilmore (discussed above at 7.48) are an example of the ongoing need for vigilance. 297. Justice Goudge, Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology in Ontario, Queens Printer for Ontario, Toronto, 2008. That position was endorsed in R v Abbey, 2009 ONCA 624. See also Binnie, ‘Science in the Courtroom: The Mouse that Roared’ (2008) 27(2) Advocates Soc J 11. 298. Law Commission of England and Wales, n 252 above. This is consistent with the position advocated in the House of Commons, Science and Technology Seventh Report, Stationery Office, London, 2005, [171]: ‘Establishing the validity of new scientific techniques or theories, and the basis for their interpretation, is essential before evidence derived from them can be used in court’. See Edmond, ‘Is Reliability Sufficient? The Law Commission and Expert Evidence in International and Interdisciplinary Perspective’ (2012) 16 Evid & Proof 30. Child death cases created particular difficulties for English (and other) courts: R v Cannings [2004] EWCA Crim 1; R v Kai-Whitewind [2005] EWCA Crim 1092; R v Clark [2006] EWCA Crim 231. See Cunliffe, Murder, Medicine & Motherhood, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011; Turkheim, Flawed Convictions: ‘Shaken Baby Syndrome’ and the Inertia of Injustice, Oxford University Press, New York, 2014. 299. See, for example, R v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161 at 167; R v Stockwell (1993) 97 Cr App R 260; R v Luttrell [2004] 2 Cr App R 31; Atkins v R [2009] EWCA Crim 1876). See the discussion in Ward, ‘English Law’s Epistemology of Expert Testimony’ (2006) 33 J Law & Society 572.

300. Law Commission, n 252 above, [1.17]; Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 (UK); Criminal Practice Directions 2015 (UK) r 19A. See also Ward, ‘A New and More Rigorous Approach to Expert Evidence in England and Wales’ (2015) 19 E & P 228. Interest in validity and reliability has simultaneously been promoted by the Forensic Science Regulator, an independent statutory actor responsible for maintaining standards across the forensic sciences following the demise of the Forensic Sciences Service in the UK. 301. PCAST, n 228 above, pp 46–7. Validity provides insight into whether a technique does what is intended and in what conditions. We generally use ‘reliability’ in its ordinary sense of trustworthiness, but it has a range of technical meanings. PCAST suggests that scientific reliability is informed by ‘repeatability’, ‘reproducibility’ and ‘accuracy’. They explain: ‘By “repeatable,” we mean that, with known probability, an examiner obtains the same results, when analyzing samples from the same sources. By “reproducible,” we mean that, with known probability, different examiners obtain the same result, when analyzing the same samples. By “accurate,” we mean that, with known probability, an examiner obtains correct results both (1) for samples from the same source (true positives) and (2) for samples from different sources (true negatives)’. 302. (1999) 197 CLR 414 at [58], quoting King CJ in R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45 at 46–7. See also King CJ in R v C (1993) 60 SASR 467 and Besanko and Vanstone JJ in R v Bjordal (2005) 93 SASR 237 at [53]–[60]. Although the putative expert must have some relevant expertise and a method or reasoning that does not involve circular reasoning: Kalbasi v Western Australia (2013) 235 A Crim R 541; [2013] WASCA 241 at [105]–[116] (Mazza JA, Martin CJ and Buss JA agreeing). The common law approach rests uneasily with s 80(b) of the uniform legislation. See the discussion at 7.58–7.59. 303. [2001] SASC 64 at [178]. 304. (2002) 187 ALR 233; [2002] HCA 4 at [153]. 305. (1996) 88 A Crim R 554 at 558. 306. Gianelli, ‘The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, Frye v United States, A Half-Century Later’ (1980) 80 Columbia LR 1197 at 1247. This might explain the differing decisions in R v Runjanjic and Kontinnen and R v C. The question of whether the same admissibility standard should be imposed on potentially exonerating expert evidence adduced by a defendant, as that applied to forensic science techniques routinely relied upon by the state, has received limited attention. The initial appeal of symmetry might be tempered by the different roles, responsibilities, resources and burdens on the respective parties. Though cf Law Commission of England and Wales, Expert Evidence in Criminal Trials: Consultation Paper, London, 2008, [6.63] and Edmond and Roach, n 271 above, pp 406–9. 307. Note Hampel J in R v Lucas [1992] 2 VR 109 at 115–17 in the context of DNA testimony; and Abadee J in R v Tillott (1995) 38 NSWLR 1 at 13–14 in doubting the admissibility of EMDR therapy. But cf Mulligan J’s comments in R v Jarrett (1993) 62 SASR 443 at 456–7. This is not a recent concern: see Hand, n 241 above; Dwyer, ‘Expert Evidence in the English Civil Courts, 1550–1800’ (2007) 28 J Legal History 93. 308. For example, evidence of the effects of hypnosis has been subjected to quite strict admissibility criteria in some jurisdictions: R v Jenkyns (1993) 32 NSWLR 712; R v Tillott (1995) 38 NSWLR 1; contrast with the liberal relevancy approach of other jurisdictions: R v Roughley (1995) 78 A Crim R 160; R v Sparkes (1996) 88 A Crim R 194 (CCA (Tas)). 309. (1989) 167 CLR 94 at 130. 310. Nor is there any point in attempting to avoid the application of this principle by leaving the exclusion of expert evidence to the realm of the exclusionary discretion. Once expert evidence has been rigorously determined admissible, there should be little scope for operation of the discretion: R v Jarrett (1993) 62 SASR 443; R v Sopher (1993) 74 A Crim R 21 at 26.

311. Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 85 ALJR 694, endorsed in Honeysett v R [2014] HCA 29. For discussion of Dasreef, see Kumar, ‘Admissibility of Expert Evidence: Proving the Basis for an Experts’ Opinion’ (2011) 33 Syd LR 427. See also Neowarra v Western Australia (2003) 205 ALR 145 at [16]–[27] (Sundberg J). At [21] Sundberg J proposes a tripartite test. In R v Tang [2006] NSWLR 681 at [134], Spigelman CJ advocates a two-part test, though the need to attend to the same three issues is retained. Section 79 was recently revised in response to concerns about child sexual assault cases. Section 79(2) was added to remove any ‘doubt’ about the potential application of s 79(1) to those with specialised knowledge ‘of child development and child behaviour’. See Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [9.138]–[9.158]. 312. HG v R (1999) 197 CLR 414 at [39]. See also Daniels v Western Australia [2000] FCA 1334; Gambro Pty Ltd v Fresenius Medical Care Australia Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1828; Dura (Australia) Constructions Pty Ltd v Hue Boutique Living Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 99 at [91]. 313. In this regard the section can be contrasted with the equivalent section in the United States Federal Rules of Evidence, r 702, particularly the original version: see 7.52. See also Uniform Acts s 144 (judicial notice). 314. (1998) 87 FCR 371 at 374 (Branson J). 315. The common law case of Davie v The Lord Provost, Magistrates and Councillors of the City of Edinburgh (1953) SC 34 is endorsed in Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705 at [59]–[63] (Heydon JA); and R v Jung [2006] NSWSC 658 at [60] (Hall J). See the discussion at 7.66. See also R v Kotzmann (1999) 2 VR 123 at 156 (Batt JA). 316. (2001) 52 NSWLR 705 at [85]. 317. Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705 at [85]. A police officer’s explanation of Pig Latin, contending that ‘snankos’ meant ‘bank’ in a covertly recorded telephone conversation, was deemed admissible opinion evidence based on ‘specialised knowledge’ where the reasoning behind the translation was explained with the assistance of an online encyclopedia entry, in Dodds v R [2009] NSWCCA 78 at [19]–[26] (McClellan CJ at CL); Keller v R [2006] NSWCCA 204 at [24]. The NSWCCA has split on the opinions of dog handlers about the meaning of the behaviour of their animals: R v Benecke [1999] NSWCCA 163 at [22] (Barr J); Muldoon v R [2008] NSWCCA 315 at [38]– [41] (Hodgson JA). 318. [2002] FCAFC 157 at [6]–[17]. 319. (2002) 187 ALR 233 at [82]. See also HG v R (1999) 197 CLR 414 at [58], where Gaudron J expresses the same view. 320. See also R v Anderson [2000] 1 VR 1. 321. R v Tang [2006] NSWCCA 167 at [138]. This definition, from the Webster’s Dictionary, was adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States. Tang was an appeal concerning the admissibility of controversial and contested ‘facial mapping’ evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeal ultimately admitted the incriminating opinion evidence of a forensic anatomist even though they accepted that there was no ‘specialised knowledge’ capable of facilitating an identification from the CCTV images. The court concluded that the opinion evidence was admissible to describe similarities between the accused and the person of interest on the basis of the anatomist’s repeated exposure to the low quality CCTV recording (as ad hoc expertise), despite the lack of testing (that is, validation) of these subjective interpretations, the absence of any indication of the error rate, and no information about the frequency of purportedly ‘similar’ facial features among relevant sub-populations. 322. R v Tang [2006] NSWCCA 167 at [137]. See also James v Launceston City Council (2004) 13 Tas R 89 at [4] (Slicer J). The Victorian Court of Appeal effectively endorsed Tang in Tuite v R [2015] VSCA 148 at [66], [70], concluding that validity and reliability should instead be incorporated into the assessment of

probative value under s 137. The status of Tuite following R v IMM [2016] HCA 14 is uncertain. 323. The suggestion that legal ‘knowledge’ might be different to scientific and philosophical formulations is far less persuasive than analogous claims about legal causation in March v Stramare (1991) 171 CLR 506 at [5] (Mason CJ). 324. In IMM v R [2016] HCA 14 at [54], the majority indicated that there are few occasions ‘for a trial judge to consider the reliability of evidence’. In Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588 at [37]–[38], the court suggests that where ‘fields’ are established or legally recognised, the terms of s 79(1) ‘will require little explicit articulation or amplification once the witness has described his or her qualifications and experience’. Cf Edmond, ‘A Closer Look at Honeysett: Enhancing our Forensic Science and Medicine Jurisprudence’ (2015) 17 Flinders LJ 287; Edmond, ‘The Admissibility of Forensic Science and Medicine Evidence under the Uniform Evidence Law’ (2014) 38 Crim LJ 136. 325. Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael 526 US 137 (1999) at 147 (Breyer J). Honeysett did not address the question of reliability. 326. The majority would seem to be mistaken in R v Smith (2001) 206 CLR 650, as Kirby J explains. For relevance is the ability of evidence to ‘rationally affect the assessment of the existence of a fact in issue’. See further at 2.23. 327. There is no strict requirement for reliability here. The need for a capacity to ‘rationally affect’ expands the range of potentially admissible evidence. The need for reliability is derived from the opinion rule, exceptions to it, the need for ‘specialised knowledge’, concern about probative value and unfair prejudice, and the overall fairness of the trial. 328. R v Turner [1975] QB 834; R v Smith [1987] VR 907. 329. HG v R (1999) 197 CLR 414 at [39] (Gleeson CJ); Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588 at [32]. These requirements are also part of the common law as expressed by Dixon J in Clark v Ryan: see 7.44 above. 330. R v Tang [2006] NSWLR 681. Facial mapping and body mapping are useful examples. Courts allowed highly trained and experienced anatomists (and others) to compare (usually low quality and distorted) images associated with crimes with high quality police reference photographs of suspects. Until Honeysett, so-called ‘facial mappers’ were allowed to testify about similarities even though there is no standardised method, no documented means of overcoming various distortions, no testing of techniques, no personal proficiency testing, no databases with information about the frequency of facial features or how common combinations of facial features are (particularly among sub-populations). These omissions might lead us to wonder whether there is a field and, more pertinently, any ‘specialised knowledge’. In Tang, the NSWCCA allowed the anatomist to testify as an ad hoc expert, because she had studied the images, rather than apply ss 76, 79 or 137 to exclude her speculative opinions. That possibility was not explicitly rejected by the High Court in Honeysett at [47]–[48]. See the discussion at 7.56. Consider also Edmond et al, ‘Law’s Looking Glass: Expert Identification Evidence Derived from Photographic and Video Images’ (2009) 20 Current Issues Crim Just 337 and the review of gait analysis by forensic podiatrists in Cunliffe and Edmond, ‘Gaitkeeping in Canada: Mis-steps in Assessing the Reliability of Expert Testimony’ (2014) 92 Canadian Bar Rev 327. 331. The abolition of the common knowledge rule (s 80(b)) means that the subject of ‘specialised knowledge’ does not have to be ‘outside the knowledge or experience of ordinary persons’. Cf Velevski v R (2002) 187 ALR 233 at [82] (Gaudron J). 332. See the discussion at 2.31 where it is argued that to take evidence at its highest does not require evidence to be simply taken at its face value but requires a more rigorous determination of its rational probative potential. See the discussion in Edmond, ‘Icarus and the Evidence Act: Section 137, probative value and taking forensic science evidence “at its highest”’ (2017) 41 Melb ULR (forthcoming).

333. [2015] VSCA 148. 334. Consider, for example, Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria [1998] FCA 1606; Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness [2000] NSWCA 29; Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) [2003] FCA 893; Jango v Northern Territory (No 2) [2004] FCA 1004; Pan Pharmaceuticals Ltd (in liq) v Selim [2008] FCA 416. On survey evidence, see Gas Corporation v Phasetwo Nominees Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 773; Adidas AG v Pacific Brands Footwear Pty Ltd (No 3) [2013] FCA 905; Australian Postal Corporation v Digital Post Australia [2013] FCAFC 153; Telstra Corporation Ltd v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 568. Cf the relative ease of admissibility of speculative methods and opinions in R v Rose [2002] NSWCCA 455; R v Tang [2006] NSWLR 681; or the exclusion of the defendant’s expert opinion evidence in R v Madigan [2005] NSWCCA 170. 335. Butera v DPP (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 187 (discussed at 7.16–7.17). See, for example, R v Solomon (2005) 92 SASR 331 at [39] (Doyle CJ). Cf R v Crouch (1850) 4 Cox CC 163 at 164 and R v Rickard (1918) 13 Cr App R 140. See also Fraser, ‘Transcription of Indistinct Forensic Recordings: Problems and Solutions from the Perspective of Phonetic Science’ (2014) 1 Language & Law 5. 336. See Munday, ‘Videotape Evidence and the Advent of the Expert Ad Hoc’ (1995) 159 Justice of the Peace 547; Edmond and San Roque, ‘Quasi-Justice: Ad Hoc Expertise and Identification Evidence’ (2009) 33 Crim LJ 8. Victorian courts have demonstrated, contrary to the concerns expressed by Kirby J, in Smith v R (2001) 206 CLR 650 at [56]–[57], a willingness to admit the impressions of investigators as lay opinion using s 78. This, in effect, enables remote viewers and listeners to express opinions about similarity or identity in ways that are not constrained by the (limited) protections given to opinions based on specialised knowledge and the procedures regulating expert evidence. See, for example, Kheir v R [2014] VSCA 200 at [62]. Consider also the discussion in England in the Law Commission, n 252 above, at [5.75] and R v Flynn [2008] 2 Cr App R 266 at [14]. 337. Some individuals, such as those involved in the refinement of forensic voice comparison, are only willing to testify in terms of probabilities based on the use of likelihood ratios. See Rose, Forensic Speaker Identification, Taylor & Francis Forensic Science Series, New York, 2002; Gonzalez-Rodrigeuz et al, ‘Emulating DNA: Rigorous Quantification of Evidential Weight in Transparent and Testable Forensic Speaker Recognition’ (2007) 15 IEEE Transactions on Audio, Speech & Language Processing 2104; Morrison, ‘Distinguishing Between Forensic Science and Forensic Pseudoscience: Testing of Validity and Reliability, and Approaches to Forensic Voice Comparison’ (2014) 54 Science & Justice 245. Psychologists who study perception and memory, and forensic scientists specialising in forensic photography, have been highly critical of recourse to ‘facial mapping’. See, for example, Porter, ‘Visual Culture in Forensic Science’ (2007) 39 Aust J Forensic Sci 81; ‘CCTV Images as Evidence’ (2009) 41 Aust J Forensic Sci 11; Edmond and Wortley, ‘Interpreting Image Evidence: Facial Mapping, Police Familiars and Super-recognisers in England and Australia’ (2016) 3 Journal of International and Comparative Law 473. More generally on hermeneutical difficulties, see Biber, Captive Images: Race, Crime, Photography, Routledge, London, 2007; Schwartz, Mechanical Witness: A History of Motion Picture Evidence in US Courts, Oxford University Press, New York, 2008; Fiegenson and Spiesel, Law on Display: The Digital Transformation of Legal Persuasion and Judgment, New York University Press, New York, 2009. 338. See, for example, R v Leung and Wong [1999] NSWCCA 287 (Simpson J); R v Riscuta and Niga [2003] NSWCCA 6 (Heydon JA); R v El-Kheir [2004] NSWCCA 461 at [94]–[116] (Tobias JA); Morgan v R [2016] NSWCCA 25 at [37]–[38]. This approach seems unprincipled. Furthermore, restricting opinions to similarities, in relation to images, does not somehow improve or sanitise opinions in the absence of information about the frequency of features or explanation of the ability to actually identify them: R v Tang [2006] NSWLR 681 (Spigelman CJ); R v Dastagir (2013) 224 A Crim R 570; [2013] SASC 26; affirmed (2013) 118 SASR 83; [2013] SASCFC 109. Consider the more sophisticated approach in R v Sterling; R v McCook [2014] NSWDC 199. 339. Li v R [2003] NSWCCA 290 at [103]–[113]. Such exceptions were facilitated by the majority in Smith

v R (2001) 206 CLR 650 at [15] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). In the absence of valid techniques, it is unclear why this distinction is maintained. If individuals are not able to make positive identifications (or methodologically rigorous comparisons), because they do not have techniques that are demonstrably reliable, then on what basis do alleged similarities have probative value? Judicial constraints on the expressions used by ad hoc experts (and others) probably make little practical difference in the context of a broader circumstantial case and criminal trial. See also Nguyen v R [2007] NSWCCA 363. 340. R v Leung and Wong (1999) 47 NSWLR 405 (Simpson J); Li v R [2003] NSWCCA 290 (Ipp JA); R v Tang [2006] NSWLR 681 (Spigelman CJ); Nasrallah v R; R v Nasrallah [2015] NSWCCA 188 at [21]– [41] — but this tends to strain the meaning of ‘knowledge’ as well as credible interpretations of ‘training, study or experience’. Unfortunately, the prosecutor (as respondent) amended submissions so as to pre-empt the High Court from considering ad hoc expertise in Honeysett v R (2014) 253 CLR 122 at [47]–[48]. In Nokia v Truong [2005] FCA 1141 at [35], Crennan J allowed a Nokia employee, responsible for investigating trademark infringements, to express his opinion as to whether a telephone case was a genuine Nokia product or a replica. Interestingly, many fashionable trademark products are manufactured in similar conditions (and locations) and not always readily distinguishable from ‘originals’. 341. The fact that most ad hoc witnesses are police officers or part of the investigation would seem to make the need for a reliability threshold particularly pressing. Rather, the possibility of robust crossexamination, defence (rebuttal experts) and instructions are presented as appropriate means of exploring and managing reliability at trial. For a review of scientific research on the difficulties of matching unfamiliar faces, see Burton and Jenkins, ‘Unfamiliar Face Perception’ in Calder et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Face Perception, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011. 342. While repeated listening may improve the ability to identify voices, there is little evidence about how much difference it makes, how good untrained individuals are, or whether it is desirable to convert investigators into experts by encouraging them to listen to audio recordings or watch video recordings over and over. Several judges have invoked the concept of the ad hoc expert in relation to identification evidence: R v Drollett [2005] NSWCCA at [63] (Simpson J); Dodds v R [2009] NSWCCA 78 at [87] (McClellan CJ at CL). However, to the extent that a witness is very familiar with another person, there is no reason why an opinion about identity derived from a sound recording or set of images could not be considered to be ‘specialised knowledge’ derived from long ‘experience’, thereby satisfying s 79(1). See, for example, R v Marsh [2005] NSWCCA 331 at [32] (Studdert J). At common law, the question is whether this experience will assist the jury in reaching a more accurate decision. 343. Significantly, the techniques and individuals involved in the provision of ad hoc expert opinions could be tested, but they have not been. That is, we could actually determine the validity of their techniques and the levels of error involved to inform the determination of ‘probative value’. In its report on the condition of the forensic sciences in the United States, the National Research Council was particularly alarmed by the many biases and forms of contamination that persist in investigations and forensic science practice. See the NRC report, discussed at 7.46. For an influential discussion of biases that may contaminate opinions, especially those that are not grounded in demonstrably reliable methods, consider Dror, Charlton and Peron, ‘Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous Identifications’ (2006) 156 Foren Sci Int 74; Risinger et al, ‘The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion’ (2002) 90 California LR 1; Edmond, Searston, Tangen and Dror, ‘Contextual Bias and Cross-contamination in the Forensic Sciences: The Corrosive Implications for Investigations, Plea Bargains, Trials and Appeals’ (2014) 13 Law, Prob & Risk 1; Found, ‘Deciphering the Human Condition: The Rise of Cognitive Forensics’ (2015) 47 Aust J Forensic Sci 386. 344. Section 48 effectively removes the need to rely on ad hoc expert opinions for the admission of

transcripts: see 7.19. Under s 48(c), transcripts of sound recordings become evidence of the contents of recordings. See Eastman v R (1997) 76 FCR 9; R v Cassar and Sleiman [1999] NSWSC 436. 345. Kheir v R [2014] VSCA 200 at [62] (where the court allowed voice identification as lay opinion evidence on the basis that in ‘Victoria … identity evidence has never been treated as a matter of expertise’). Followed in Tran & Chang v R [2016] VSCA 79 at [64] (Weinberg, Santamaria and McLeish JJA). See also Meade v R; DPP v Meade [2015] VSCA 171 at [147]ff. Although, see Nguyen v R [2017] NSWCCA 4 at [39] (Basten JA). 346. This is an extremely curious approach as experimental psychology has many insights to offer to legal and investigative processes. Consider, for example, research into the suggestibility of child and adult witnesses through cues and reinforcement: Goodman et al, n 161 above; Loftus, ‘Illusions of Memory’ (1998) 142 Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 60; Wells, ‘Field Experiments on Eyewitness Identification: Towards a Better Understanding of Pitfalls and Prospects’ (2008) 32 Law & Hum Behav 6. See also Benton et al, ‘Eyewitness Memory is Still Not Common Sense: Comparing Jurors, Judges and Law Enforcement to Eyewitness Experts’ (2006) 20 Applied Cognitive Psych 115. 347. Section 79(2) of the Uniform Acts was designed to ‘avoid doubt’ about the potential admissibility of opinions based on specialised knowledge about ‘child development and child behaviour’. See Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [9.138]–[9.158]. This ‘clarification’ might, by analogy, create greater scope for the opinions of experimental psychologists and other researchers, especially where results challenge views widely held by lay citizens (and judges). Section 108C permits, with leave, opinion based on specialised knowledge about the credibility of witnesses. 348. [1975] QB 834. 349. R v Darrington and McGauley [1980] VR 353; R v Haidley and Alford [1984] VR 229. See also R v Massey (1994) 62 SASR 481 (expert psychological testimony on the likelihood that the accused, as a mentally normal person, would succumb to police temptation to supply heroin rejected as being a matter of ordinary experience); R v Quesada (2001) 122 A Crim R 218 (psychological evidence of likely fear of newly arrived, non-English speaking, suspected drug-importer not based on ‘specialised knowledge’). 350. [1987] VR 907. 351. See also R v Fong [1981] Qd R 90; R v Landon (2011) 109 SASR 216; [2011] SASCFC 12 (jury could use its own knowledge to determine how a reasonable person would take the threat in question without assistance from police expert). But more specific expert testimony about particular problems with eyewitness testimony may be admitted. For the position in the United States, see generally Comment, ‘Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: The Constitution Says, Let the Expert Speak’ (1989) 56 Tenn LR 735; Klingsberg, ‘The Admissibility of Eyewitness Expert Testimony’ (1989) 25 Crim Law Bull 219; Wells and Quinlivan, ‘Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later’ (2009) 33 Law & Hum Behav 1; National Academy of Sciences, n 183 above. 352. Several appellate courts have been willing to grapple with expert literatures and research communities bearing directly on investigative techniques, criminal justice processes and other evidentiary issues. See, for example, R v BDX [2009] VSCA 28; Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244; Dupas v R (2012) 218 A Crim R 507; [2012] VSCA 328; Gittany v R [2016] NSWCCA 182. For a scientific perspective on memory, see Howe and Knott, ‘The Fallibility of Memory in Judicial Processes: Lessons from the Past and their Modern Consequences’ (2015) 23 Memory 633. 353. R v Collins (1976) 12 SASR 501. 354. Shultz v R [1982] WAR 171; R v Laurie [1987] 2 Qd R 762. 355. R v Y (1995) 81 A Crim R 446 (CCA (Qld)). 356. R v Honner [1977] Tas SR 1; R v Fowler (1985) 39 SASR 440; R v Cameron [1990] 2 WAR 1 (Malcolm

CJ and Ipp J). 357. See R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30, which deals with non-insane automatism. See also the discussion by Malcolm CJ in R v Cameron [1990] 2 WAR 1. 358. R v Whitbread (1995) 78 A Crim R 452 (the CCA (Vic) rejected the trial judge’s view that how an accused might have reacted to a traumatic event was a matter of common knowledge upon which a psychologist who had examined the accused could not testify); R v Bartlett [1996] 2 VR 687 (accused should have been permitted to tender expert evidence concerning alleged recovered memory of victim of sexual assault). In Kosian v R (2013) A Crim R 156; [2013] VSCA 357 at [55] (Redlich JA, Coghlan JA and Dixon AJA agreeing), the court indicated that where the psychiatrists for the parties basically agreed about the mental illness of the accused a trial judge may be required to offer directions that the opinions should be afforded ‘very considerable weight’ in the absence of specific limitations. In RST v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 59, the court rejected evidence from a psychologist that the accused did not have a sexually deviant preoccupation. 359. For example, expert testimony of ‘battered woman syndrome’ to explain the accused’s resort to violence as the only escape from a man was accepted in R v Runjanjic and Kontinnen (1991) 56 SASR 114 as outside the ordinary experiences of the jury. Also admitted in Osland v R (1998) 197 CLR 316. Compare with R v C (1993) 60 SASR 467, where the same court rejected evidence of ‘accommodation syndrome’ tendered by the prosecution to explain a child victim’s failure to complain of the sexual interferences of the accused. This tendency was said to be within the jury’s ordinary knowledge. ‘Accommodation syndrome’ evidence was also rejected in R v F (1995) 83 A Crim R 502 as it had not been established by a qualified person. In R v J (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 at 536, Brooking J disagreed with the view in R v C that ‘accommodation syndrome’ is a matter within the general knowledge of jurors. 360. In Farrell v R (1998) 194 CLR 286, although the only issue on appeal was the adequacy of the trial judge’s direction, no member of the High Court criticised the admission of a psychiatrist’s opinion that the complainant witness suffered from an anti-social personality disorder and that such persons ‘are inherently less truthful than the average person’. 361. Transport Publishing Co Pty Ltd v Literature Board of Review (1956) 99 CLR 111 (High Court refused expert evidence on the tendency of literature to deprave and corrupt members of the public generally, but it remarked in passing that expertise might assist when dealing with a special class of people); DPP v A and BC Chewing Gum [1968] 1 QB 159 (expert psychological evidence was received on the likely effects of literature on young children); E v Australian Red Cross (1991) 31 FCR 299 (a psychologist could testify as to how blood donors might have understood statements on screening forms completed by them); R v Yildiz (1983) 11 A Crim R 115 (CCA (Vic)) (expert called by the Crown could explain attitudes in the Turkish community in Melbourne towards homosexual behaviour in order to assess how an accused member of the Turkish community might have reacted to specific allegations); R v Watson [1987] 1 Qd R 440 (the court rejected defence evidence of a sociologist about the prevalence of knife brandishing and cutting among Aboriginal people of Palm Island as irrelevant to the accused’s intention in the instant case). 362. Gittany v R [2016] NSWCCA 182 at [28]ff (Basten JA). 363. (1989) 167 CLR 94. 364. See also R v Langdon (2011) 109 SASR 216; [2011] SASCFC 12 at [17] (White and Sulan JJ). English courts appear to be moving towards a similarly broad functional approach: see the comments in Mirfield, ‘Expert Evidence and Reliable Confessions’ (1992) 108 LQR 528; and R v Ward (1993) 96 Cr App R 1 at 66 (where Glidewell LJ was prepared to admit expert psychological or psychiatric evidence ‘if it is to the effect that a defendant is suffering from a condition not properly described as a mental illness, but from a personality disorder so severe as properly to be categorised as mental disorder’); R v

Strudwick and Merry (1994) 99 Cr App R 326 at 332; R v Gilfoyle (No 2) [2001] 2 Cr App R 57 at 66–7. 365. Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 363 (Heerey J); Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 70 at [55]–[57]; Henley v Tu [2009] ACTSC 37 at [77] (Besanko J). This approach has the added benefit of focusing inquiry on the ‘specialised knowledge’ — subject to s 135 (and s 137) — rather than speculating about what the jury might or might not know. See also Campbell v Hall [2014] NSWCCA 175 at [220]–[225] (Bathurst CJ, Simpson and Hidden JJ agreeing). 366. The interest in s 80 was not, even in civil proceedings discussing marketing evidence, at the cost of consideration of reliability. The Full Court in Cadbury explained at [109]: ‘It is for the Court to judge the reliability of, and the weight to be given to, particular evidence. Opinion evidence, like any other evidence, must be comprehensible and reach conclusions that are rationally based. The process of inference or reasoning that leads to conclusions ought to be stated or revealed in a way that enables the conclusions to be tested and a judgment to be made about their reliability and the weight that should be given to them. If not, the opinion evidence would normally be rejected under s 135’. The meaning of reliability will obviously vary depending on the proceedings, the centrality of the evidence, the type of evidence, the discipline, and the various means available to assess it. Cf Velevski v R (2002) 187 ALR 233 at [82] (Gaudron J). On some occasions, s 144 may allow ‘common knowledge’ to circumvent the need for proof: see, for example, Kent v Wotton & Byrne Pty Ltd [2006] TASSC 8 at [12] (Blow J), where the dangers of asbestos and its removal were described as ‘facts of modern life’. 367. The reasons for a rule are less strong in the case of non-expert opinions admitted to understand observational evidence and where the danger of usurpation is not so great: Australian Securities Commission v McLeod (2000) 22 WAR 255. 368. Murphy v R (1989) 167 CLR 94 at 110 (Mason CJ and Toohey J), 127 (Deane J); Thannhauser v Westpac Banking Corp (1991) 31 FCR 572; Idoport Pty Ltd v NAB (2000) 50 NSWLR 640 at [33]–[36]. For examples of a more than a cautionary approach, see Cavanett v Chambers [1968] SASR 97 at 104–5; Samuels v Flavel [1970] SASR 256 at 261–2; R v Darrington and McGauley [1980] VR 353; R v Haidley and Alford [1984] VR 229 at 235; R v Fowler (1985) 39 SASR 440 (Matheson J; cf King CJ and Johnston J). 369. ULV Pty Ltd v Scott (1990) 19 NSWLR 190 at 202–5 (Priestley JA); Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v Boulton (1994) 33 NSWLR 735 (expert could not opine whether the defendant’s solicitors were negligent). But one must distinguish gratuitous arguments from informed and rationally persuasive opinions: Barbosa v Di Meglio [1999] NSWCA 307 at [33] (Priestley JA). 370. R v Mason (1911) 7 Cr App R 67; R v Anderson [2000] 1 VR 1; Velevski v R (2002) 187 ALR 233. 371. R v Holmes [1953] 2 All ER 324. 372. R v Davies [1962] 3 All ER 97; cf Cavanett v Chambers [1968] SASR 97. 373. DPP v A and BC Chewing Gum Ltd [1968] 1 QB 159. Cf Vokalek v Commonwealth (2008) 101 SASR 588 at [54] (Gray J). On the history of expert evidence in relation to obscenity in the United States and Canada, see Nowlin, Judging Obscenity: A Critical History of Expert Evidence, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Canada, 2003. 374. Ancher, Mortlock, Murray and Woolley Pty Ltd v Hooker Homes Pty Ltd [1971] 2 NSWLR 278. 375. Sills v Brown (1840) 9 Car & P 601; 173 ER 16; Thannhauser v Westpac Banking Corp (1991) 31 FCR 572, where an investment adviser testified to the reasonableness of investments; and cf ULV Pty Ltd v Scott (1990) 19 NSWLR 190, where Priestley JA doubted whether a town planner could testify usefully to the reasonableness of a council’s planning decision. 376. Executive Director of Health v Lily Creek International Pty Ltd (2000) 22 WAR 510 at [67]–[70] (Ipp J). The trier of fact must consider all of the evidence rather than ‘simply adopt’ the conclusions of the

expert: Schwark v Police (2011) 111 SASR 451; [2011] SASC 212 at [21] (Gray J). 377. All-State Life Insurance Co v ANZ (No 6) (1996) 64 FCR 79 at 83; Guide Dog Owners’ & Friends’ Association Inc v Guide Dog Association of New South Wales & ACT (1998) 154 ALR 527 at 530–1; Idoport Pty Ltd v NAB (2000) 50 NSWLR 640 at [43]–[47]. See also at 6.70. 378. Robertson and Vignaux, ‘Expert Evidence: Law, Practice and Probability’ (1992) 12 Ox J Legal Studies 392; Robertson, Vignaux and Berger, Interpreting Evidence: Evaluating Forensic Science in the Courtroom, Wiley, London, 2016. See also 1.23. 379. Such issues, even if not expressed in Bayesian terms, will be of significance in the application of s 79(2) of the Uniform Acts. 380. R v GK [2001] NSWCCA 413 at [40]; Amaca Pty Ltd v King (2011) 35 VR 280; [2011] VSCA 447 at [100]–[114] (Nettle, Ashley and Redlich JJA); Allianz Australia Ltd v Sim [2012] NSWCA 68 at [33]– [36] (Allsop P), [117]–[123] (Basten JA). 381. See Mnookin, ‘Expert Evidence, Partisanship, and Epistemic Competence’ (2008) 73 Brooklyn LR 1009. On the dangers of trial judges straying beyond evidence adduced by the parties, consider McGregor v McGregor [2012] FamCAFC 69. 382. Influential reference to these problems is found in National Justice Compania Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (The ‘Ikarian Reefer’) [1993] 2 Ll LR 68 at 81–2 (Creswell J); [1995] 1 Ll LR 455 at 496–8 (Stuart-Smith LJ). See also Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report, The Stationery Office, London, 1996. 383. For the position in civil cases, see Cairns, Australian Civil Procedure, 11th ed, LawBook, Sydney, 2016, Ch 15. See, for example, UCPR 2005 (NSW) and the influential English Civil Procedure Rules 1998. In serious criminal cases, pre-trial disclosure of expert reports by both prosecution and accused is required or may be ordered in New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Victoria and Western Australia: see 5.14. In England and Wales, the discovery of expert reports in criminal cases is provided for in ss 3, 4, 6D and 7A of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 (UK) (as amended by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK)) and Pt 19 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 (UK). 384. Though factual rectitude is a more complex problem than reducing cost and delay. 385. See the remarks of Branson J in Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd [2002] FCAFC 157 at [16]–[17]. 386. See, for example, Federal Court of Australia, Expert Evidence Practice Note (GPN-EXPT) (2016): the Federal Court practice note includes sections approved by the Council of Chief Justices’ Rules Harmonisation Committee; Supreme Court of Victoria, Practice Note No 2 of 2014 Expert Evidence in Criminal Trials (2014): this is the first of the practice notes and codes that is written for criminal proceedings and the first to make explicit reference to the goal of improving the reliability of expert evidence. See also UCPR 2005 (NSW) Pt 31 Sch 7; SCCR 2006 (SA) r 160, Practice Directions 5.4, 46; SC(GCP)R 2015 (Vic) Form 44A. 387. Kirch Communications Pty Ltd v Gene Engineering Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 485 at [14] (lack of independence goes to credibility rather than admissibility). 388. New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Expert Witnesses Report 109 (2005). 389. Wood v R [2012] NSWCCA 21 at [728]–[729] (McClellan CJ at CL). In JP v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2015] NSWSC 1669, failure to comply with the basic requirements of report contents was said to be repaired by the answers provided during cross-examination. Such a liberal approach to admission and repair puts the defendant in the invidious position of not being presented with an adequate report, and having to choose whether to challenge otherwise admissible but defective evidence with the risk of the trier otherwise relying upon it, or potentially curing the opinion through

cross-examination. Cf Ocean Marine Mutual Insurance Association (Europe) OV v Jetoplay Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1463, discussed at n 401. 390. Many of these rules seem to be driven by highly idealised images of science and expertise. See Edmond, ‘Judicial Representations of Scientific Evidence’ (2000) 63 Mod L Rev 216 at 242–9; Caudill and LaRue, No Magic Wand: The Idealization of Science in Law, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, Lanham, Maryland, 2006; Edmond, ‘After Objectivity: Expert Evidence and Procedural Reform’ (2003) 25 Syd LR 131. At common law, experts have a range of relatively modest duties when writing reports and testifying: Meadow v General Medical Council [2007] QB 462; James v Keogh [2008] 101 SASR 42 (Debelle J). Unlike their counterparts in England and Wales, expert witnesses in Australia remain immune from suit: Jones v Kaney [2011] UKSC 3. 391. Gumana v Northern Territory of Australia [2005] FCA 50 at [163]. See also Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria [1998] FCA 1606. Doyle CJ explains that there is no rule preventing an employee giving expert evidence on behalf of their employer, but it is essential to disclose this or any other relationship: Fortson v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2008) 100 SASR 162 at [114]–[118]. See also Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246. 392. This was certainly Edmond’s experience when studying the reception of forensic science evidence in courts in New South Wales. See, for example, JP v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) [2015] NSWSC 1669. See Edmond, Martire and San Roque, ‘Expert Reports and the Forensic Sciences’ (2017) 40 UNSW LJ (forthcoming). 393. This procedure was employed by Rogers J in Spika Trading Pty Ltd v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd (SC (NSW), 3 October 1985, unreported), discussed in Freckelton and Selby, n 217 above, pp 234–5. See also R v Phillips (1989) 13 Crim LJ 52. The procedure is now available under UCPR 2005 (NSW) Pt 31 rr 24–6. See in general Practice Note No 121 (2001) 51 NSWLR 263. See also FCR 2011 r 23.15(g); UCPR 1999 (Qld) r 423(d); SCCR 2006 (SA) r 213; Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 65K. 394. Edmond, ‘Merton and the Hot Tub: Scientific Conventions and Expert Evidence in Australian Civil Procedure’ (2009) 72 Law & Contemporary Problems 159. The extension of concurrent evidence procedures to the criminal trial, beyond the voir dire, raises a number of issues that threaten to undermine traditional party control. Allowing experts to speak freely may increase the risk of unfair prejudice if inadmissible evidence is discussed or gratuitous claims made in the more free-form concurrent evidence sessions. See also Edmond, ‘Impartiality, Efficiency or Reliability? A Critical Response to Expert Evidence Law and Procedure in Australia’ (2010) 42 Aust J Forensic Sci 83. 395. See, for example, Re Queensland Independent Wholesalers Ltd (1995) ATPR 41–438 at 40,925; Coonawarra Penola Wine Industry Association Inc and Geographical Indications Committee [2001] AATA 844 at [78], [87], [107]; Halverson v Dobler [2006] NSWSC 1307; Jetset Properties v Eurobadalla Shire Council [2007] NSWLEC 198 at [42]; Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (Ruling No 32) [2013] VSC 630; Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited v AstraZeneca AB [2013] FCA 368; Sanchez-Sidiropoulos v Canavan [2015] NSWSC 1139. 396. Where, for example, a type of evidence or field is criticised, should membership of the panel be restricted to experts from that field — enabling them to self-regulate and artificially insulate themselves — or should well-regarded experts from related scientific fields be allowed to participate and express their criticisms? See Cole, ‘A Cautionary Tale about Cautionary Tales about Intervention’ (2009) 16 Organization 121. 397. Many of these issues can be resolved by determining the procedure to be used pre-trial. See also, for example, Justice McClellan, ‘Expert Evidence — Aces up Your Sleeve’ (2006) (available at ); Mulheron et al, Concurrent Expert Evidence & ‘Hot-Tubbing’ in English Litigation since the ‘Jackson Reforms’, Civil Justice Council, London, 2016.

398. See, for example, the survey commissioned by the AAT: An Evaluation of Concurrent Evidence in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 2005; McKenzie, ‘Concurrent Evidence in the Kilmore East Bushfire Proceeding’ [2016] VicSCLRS 2. 399. In New South Wales, for example, under the Civil Procedure Act 2005, the overarching goal is to make civil litigation ‘just, quick and cheap’: s 56. See Basten, ‘Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) — The Overriding Purpose Provisions’ in Kumar and Legg (eds), Ten Years of the Civil Procedure Act (NSW), Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2015; Edmond and San Roque, ‘Just(,) Quick and Cheap? Contemporary Approaches to the Regulation of Expert Evidence’ in Legg (ed), The Future of Dispute Resolution, 2nd ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2016. 400. Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) [2003] FCA 893 at [27] (Lindgren J). 401. In Ocean Marine Mutual Insurance Association (Europe) OV v Jetoplay Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 1463 at [22] (per curiam), the Federal Court refused to decipher the letters — for example, ‘C Eng, FI Mar E FCMS’ — appearing after the name of one of the authors of a ‘Survey Report’ so that the author’s qualifications to testify upon the basis of ‘specialised knowledge’ under s 79 were not established. While apparently pedantic, the decision underscores the need for parties to establish the requirements for the admissibility of expert evidence and emphasises that judges are not always in a position to ascertain the significance of membership of even august sounding institutions and societies. See also the detailed discussion of a defence expert’s qualifications in Bropho v Western Australia (No 2) [2009] WASCA 94 at [127]–[141] (Miller JA). 402. (2001) 208 CLR 1 at [84] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 403. Though cf the approach in Sharwood v R [2006] NSWCCA 157 with the more inclusive approach preferred by the United States Supreme Court in Melendez-Diaz v Massachusetts 129 S Ct 2527 (2009). Sharwood might be limited to the particular fact scenario, and it is important to consider the effect of the ‘confrontation clause’ in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 404. See, for example, Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 217; UCPR 2005 (NSW) r 31.54; UCPR 1999 (Qld) r 501; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 67; SCR 2000 (Tas) rr 560, 574; Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s 37; Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) ss 65M, 65Q; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 77; CPR 2006 (ACT) Pt 2.15 Div 4; Supreme Court Act (NT) s 26. See Cairns, n 383 above, Ch 15, as well as McKenzie, ‘Assessors in the Kilmore East Bushfire Proceeding’ [2016] VicSCLRS 1 and Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (Ruling No 32) [2013] VSC 630 (Forrest J). 405. FCR 2011 r 23.01; UCPR 2005 (NSW) Pt 31 Div 5; Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) s 65M; UCPR 1999 (Qld) r 429J; SCCR 2006 (SA) r 208; RSC 1971 (WA) O 40 r 2. See generally Cairns, n 383 above, Ch 15. For criticisms of the common law presentation of expert evidence and proposals for reform, see generally Basten, ‘The Court Witness in Civil Trials — A Comparative Appraisal’ (1977) 40 Mod L Rev 174; Freckelton and Selby, n 217 above, Ch 11; Spencer, ‘The Neutral Expert: An Implausible Bogey’ [1991] Crim LR 10; Howard, ‘The Neutral Expert: A Plausible Threat to Justice’ [1991] Crim LR 98. For a sceptical view of these suggestions, see Edmond and Vuille, ‘Comparing the Use of Forensic Science Evidence in Australia, Switzerland and the United States: Transcending the Adversarial/Non-adversarial Dichotomy’ (2014) 54 Jurimetrics 221 and Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992, Ch 16. 406. UCPR 2005 (NSW) Pt 31 Div 2 Subdiv 4 r 31.37. 407. For some discussion of the United States experience with court-appointed experts, see Cecil and Willging, Court-Appointed Experts: Defining the Role of Experts Appointed Under the Federal Rule of Evidence 706, Federal Judicial Centre, Washington DC, 1993; Hooper, Cecil and Willging, n 283 above; Lee, ‘Court-Appointed Experts and Judicial Reluctance: A Proposal to Amend Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence’ (1988) 6 Yale L & Policy Rev 480; Johnston, ‘Court-Appointed Scientific Expert Witnesses: Unfettering Expertise’ (1987) 2 High Tech LJ 249.

408. For example, Jasanoff et al, Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, Sage, Thousand Oaks CA, 1995; Latour, Science in Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1987; Yearley, Making Sense of Science, Sage, London, 2005; Collins, Gravity’s Shadow, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 2004; Hackett et al, Handbook of Science and Technology Studies, 3rd ed, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 2007. 409. International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals: Writing and Editing for Biomedical Publication, 2005 (available at ); Angell, The Truth About the Drug Companies: How They Deceive Us and What to do About It, Scribe, Melbourne, 2005; Kassirer, On the Take: How Medicine’s Complicity with Big Business Can Endanger Your Health, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004; Angell et al, ‘Is Academic Medicine for Sale?’ (2000) 343 New Eng J Med 508; Mirowski and Van Horn, ‘The Contract Research Organization and Commercialization of Scientific Research’ (2005) 25 Soc Stud Science 503; Relman, ‘Dealing with Conflicts of Interest’ (1984) 310 New Eng J Med 1182; Rennie et al, ‘Conflicts of Interest in the Publication of Science’ (1991) 266 JAMA 266; Koshland, ‘Conflict of Interest Policy’ (1992) 257 Science 595; Kassirer and Angell, ‘Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research’ (1993) 329 New Eng J Med 570; Davidoff et al, ‘Sponsorship, Authorship and Accountability’ (2001) 345 New Eng J Med 825; DeAngelis et al, ‘Reporting Financial Conflicts of Interest and Relationships between Investigators and Research Sponsors’ (2001) 286 JAMA 89; Bekelman, Li and Gross, ‘Scope and Impact of Financial Conflict of Interest in Biomedical Research’ (2003) 289 JAMA 454; Lexchin et al, ‘Pharmaceutical Industry Sponsorship and Research Outcome and Quality: Systematic Review’ (2003) 326 BMJ 1167. See also Edmond et al, ‘Contextual Bias and Cross-contamination in the Forensic Sciences: The Corrosive Implications for Investigations, Plea Bargains, Trials and Appeals’ (2014) 13 Law, Prob & Risk 1. 410. Turner, ‘What is the Problem with Experts?’ (2001) 31 Soc Stud Science 123; Collins and Pinch, The Golem: What Everyone Should Know About Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998; Collins and Evans, n 282 above. 411. See, for example, R v Frugtniet [1999] VCSA 58; R v Callaghan [2001] VCSA 209 at [18]–[21] (Winneke P). 412. [2001] SASC 224. See also R v Wenitong [2007] VCSA 202. 413. Tuite v R [2015] VSCA 148 at [12]. Subsequently, in its review of procedures underpinning complex DNA samples, PCAST, n 228 above, pp 8, 75–83, concluded ‘that subjective analysis of complex DNA mixtures has not been established to be foundationally valid and is not a reliable methodology’. 414. See, for example, Yates Property Corporation v Boland (1998) 85 FCR 84 (Federal Court judge did not need assistance from an expert witness in determining whether a lawyer was negligent unless questions of particular practice arose); Bellevue Crescent Pty Ltd v Marland Holdings Pty Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 364 (local social historians had no specialised knowledge); NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank (1999) 161 ALR 576 (knowledge of the funds industry not specialised knowledge of an identifiable kind); Costello v Random House Pty Ltd (1999) 137 ACTR 1 (evidence of former politician as to effect of unfounded rumours on deterring political candidates not based on specialised knowledge); Dyson v Pharmacy Board of NSW (2000) 50 NSWLR 523 (lexicographical evidence on ordinary meaning of word not specialised knowledge). 415. (1966) 40 ALJR 436. 416. R v Bennett and Vaughan (1998) 100 A Crim R 228 at 233–4 (experience in fossil market sufficient expertise upon which to base opinion of value); R v Lam (2001) 121 A Crim R 272 at [81] (CCA (Qld)) (experienced player of card games could assist with expert evidence explaining recorded conversations about those games). 417. Every opinion given by an expert must, at common law and under s 79(1) (‘wholly or substantially’) be

based upon the expertise established. See, for example, R v Van Beelen (1972) 4 SASR 353 at 381–6 (spectrographic expert not qualified to express results in statistical terms); HG v R (1999) 197 CLR 414 at [40] (Gleeson CJ) (opinions of witness must be related to his expertise); Henschke and Co v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1561 (wine expert has expertise on reputation of particular wines but not upon whether names on labels are likely to deceive; wine market not a specialised market upon which expert evidence could be received); Cadwallader v Bajco Pty Ltd (2001) 189 ALR 370 (accountants could give no expert evidence about whether company insolvent or whether directors should have so realised); Gilham v R (2012) 224 A Crim R 22 (a forensic pathologist’s opinion on the significance of the volume of carbon monoxide in the blood of the deceased was speculative); Kalbasi v Western Australia (2013) 235 A Crim R 541; [2013] WASCA 241 (a police expert could testify about drug dealing practices but not about the behaviour of those in the upper echelon of drug importation and dealing.); Honeysett v R (2014) 253 CLR 122 (anatomist not expert in image interpretation and comparison). 418. Lay fact-finders, whether judges, lawyers or jurors, are naturally reluctant to use expert knowledge to assist in drawing inferences where these appear contrary to common sense (cf Heydon JA’s concerns about the derivation and value of the expert opinion in Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705, discussed at 7.66). But ‘common knowledge’ and ‘common sense’ are repeatedly shown through empirical research to be mistaken and misleading. Identification evidence is perhaps the most obvious example of where experimentally derived findings have helped to reform legal and investigative practice. 419. The need to present expert testimony in this proper form is emphasised in HG v R (1999) 197 CLR 414 at [39]–[40] (Gleeson CJ); Hillier and Carney v Lucas (2000) 81 SASR 451 at [310]–[314] (Lander J); Idoport Pty Ltd v NAB [2001] NSWSC 123 at [83] (Einstein J). In Jetopay Pty Ltd v Ocean Marine Mutual Insurance Association (Europe) OV (1999) 95 FCR 570 at [42], Tamberlin J explained that it may only be possible to appreciate this assistance in the context of other factual and expert evidence given in the case. 420. (2001) 52 NSWLR 705. 421. For example, this dictum was applied by Debelle J in R v Bjordal (2005) 93 SASR 237; [2005] SASC 422 at [26] and by White J in Police v Barber (2010) 108 SASR 520; [2010] SASC 329 at [82]. See also Kalbasi v Western Australia (2013) 235 A Crim R 541; [2013] WASCA 241 at [88] (Mazza JA). 422. [2002] FCAFC 157 at [7], [16]–[17] (Branson J), [87] (Weinberg and Dowsett JJ). 423. See, for example, Adler v ASIC [2003] NSWCA 131 at [631] (Giles JA); Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) [2003] FCA 893 (Lindgren J); Hevi Lift (PNG) Ltd v Etherington [2005] NSWCA 42 at [82] (McColl JA); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich [2005] NSWCA 152 at [136] (Spigelman CJ); Paino v Paino [2008] NSWCA 276 at [59]–[68] (Hodgson and McColl JJA); Rylands v R [2008] NSWCCA 106 at [85] (Mason P). 424. Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [9.70]; HG v R (1999) 197 CLR 14 at [39]. See also Neowarra v Western Australia [2003] FCA 1399 at [24] (Sundberg J); Flavel v South Australia (2008) 102 SASR 404 at [63]–[67] (Vanstone J). 425. Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S [2008] FCA 559 at [758], [759]. 426. [2011] HCA 21. 427. Cf Kyluk Pty Ltd v Chief Executive Office of Environment and Heritage [2013] NSWCCA 114 at [169]– [179] (Schmidt J). 428. Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd [2002] FCAFC 157 at [9] (Branson J), [87] (Weinberg and Dowsett JJ); Neowarra v Western Australia [2003] FCA 1399 at [24] (Sundberg J); Jango v Northern Territory (No 4) (2004) 214 ALR 608 at [19] (Sackville J); Smith v Eurobodalla Shire Council

[2004] NSWCA 479 at [121] (McClellan CJ at CL); C v N (2007) 215 FLR 131 at [39]–[41] (Altobelli FM). 429. R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45; Casley-Smith v FS Evans and Sons Pty Ltd and DC of Stirling (No 1) (1988) 49 SASR 314 at 323. 430. (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 at 531–2. 431. Davie v The Lord Provost, Magistrates and Councillors of the City of Edinburgh (1953) SC 34 at 40; Hillstead v R [2005] WASCA 116 at [48]–[49]; Edmond, ‘The Conditions for Rational (Jury) Evaluation of Forensic Science Evidence’ (2015) 39 Melb ULR 1. 432. For example, Wolper v Poole (1972) 2 SASR 419 at 421. Where primary facts are not in dispute, an expert who has listened to the evidence in court may give an expert opinion upon the basis of those facts: R v Mason (1911) 7 Cr App R 67; cf R v Fowler (1985) 39 SASR 440. In TPC v Arnotts Ltd (No 2) (1990) 21 FCR 324, the expert opinion of an economist upon the basis of what he had heard in court and read in the transcript of a trial lasting 55 days was held to have been improperly admitted without seeking to isolate the particular facts upon which his opinion was based. 433. Aytugrul v R (2012) 247 CLR 170. Discussed critically at 2.70 and by Ligertwood, ‘Forensic Science Expressions and Legal Proof’ (2013) 45 Aust J Forensic Sci 263 for failing to insist on a particular statistical expression compatible with the criminal standard of proof. See also Hamer, ‘Expected Frequencies, Exclusion Percentages and “Mathematical Equivalence”: The Probative Value of DNA Evidence in Aytugrul v The Queen’ (2013) 45 Aust J Forensic Sci 271. 434. For example, R v Haidley and Alford [1984] VR 229 at 250–1 (Kaye J); Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd (1985) 62 ALR 85; R v Lee (1989) 42 A Crim R 393 (CCA (Vic)); Pollock v Wellington (1996) 15 WAR 1 at 3–4; Rhoden v Wingate [2002] NSWCA 165. This may occur under the uniform legislation where an opinion based on specialised knowledge is deemed relevant provisionally (s 57(1)(b)), but where the supporting evidence does not appear or is inadmissible. 435. Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642; R v Reiner (1974) 8 SASR 102 at 109–10, 118–19. 436. R v Ward (1981) 3 A Crim R 171 (CCA (NSW)). 437. Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd (1985) 62 ALR 85 at [9] (per curiam); Makita (Aust) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705 at [64]. 438. Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd [2002] FCAFC 157 at [13]–[14] (Branson J); TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd v Anning (2002) 54 NSWLR 333 at [143]–[149]. See generally Pattenden, ‘Expert Opinion Evidence Based on Hearsay’ [1982] Crim LR 85. 439. Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642; Woods v DPP (WA) (2008) 190 A Crim R 356 at [46]–[52] (Steytler P and Buss JA). 440. Lawton LJ in R v Turner (1974) 60 Cr App R 80 at 82 urges counsel calling experts to make clear in examination-in-chief the primary facts upon which the opinion is based, but this will not always occur. 441. R v Schafferius [1977] Qd R 213 at 217 suggests that Ramsay v Watson leaves this decision to the discretion of the court, but ‘discretion’ is used loosely here, and the matter is best expressed in terms of the probative value of the testimony. For a clear example of the salvaging of expert opinion partly based upon hearsay, see Steffen v Ruben [1966] 2 NSWR 622. See also Pownall v Conlan Management Pty Ltd (1995) 12 WAR 370; Woods v DPP (WA) (2008) 190 A Crim R 356 at [61] (Steytler P and Buss JA). 442. See, for example, Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S [2008] FCA 559 at [761]–[783] (Lindgren J). Section 60(2) has been added to extend the use beyond first-hand hearsay. The first-hand limit read into s 60 in Lee v R (1998) 195 CLR 594 has now been removed by the insertion of s 60(2). 443. Authority for this result, which was intended in Evidence, ALRC Interim Report 26 (1985), vol 1, [685], can be found in R v Welsh (1996) 90 A Crim R 364 at 368–9 (Hunt CJ at CL); Lee v R (1998)

195 CLR 594 at [39]; Quick v Stoland (1998) 87 FCR 371 at 377–8 (Branson J), 382 (Finkelstein J); R v Lawson [2000] NSWCCA 214 at [6]–[8] (Stein JA), [34] (Dunford J); Moran v Amoret Installations Pty Ltd [2000] NSWCA 106 at [5]–[6] (Heydon JA); Daw v Toyworld (NSW) Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 25 at [70] (Heydon JA); R v RTB [2002] NSWCCA 104 at [17]. 444. (1998) 87 FCR 371 at 378 (Branson J), at 382 (Finkelstein J). 445. [2000] NSWCCA 214 at [101]–[107]; Roach v Page (No 11) [2003] NSWSC 907 at [75]. 446. [2008] FCA 559 at [754]–[783]. See, for example, Clambake Pty Ltd v Tipperary Projects Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 35 WAR 394 at [38]–[44] (Heenan J). Cf Aytugrul v R (2012) 247 CLR 170 and Tuite v R [2015] VSCA 148. See also Hamer and Edmond, ‘Judicial Notice: Beyond Adversarialism and into the Exogenous Zone’ (2016) 25 Griffith LR 1. 447. Borowski v Quayle [1966] VR 382 at 386; Eagles v Orth [1976] Qd R 313 at 321; Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck A/S [2008] FCA 559 at [754]–[783]. 448. [1983] 1 WLR 126. Applied in PQ v Australian Red Cross Society [1992] 1 VR 19 at 34 (McGarvie J). See also R v Fazio (1997) 69 SASR 54 at 63–4 (Bleby J); Woods v DPP (WA) (2008) 190 A Crim R 356 at [53]–[59] (Steytler P and Buss JA). For a suggested Bayesian analysis of Abadom, see Robertson, Vignaux and Berger, n 378 above, pp 141–4. Distinguished in Pownall v Conlan Management Pty Ltd (1995) 12 WAR 370 (particular transactions relied upon by expert valuer must be proved by admissible evidence). 449. More recently in R v T [2010] EWCA Crim 2439, the English Court of Appeal found expert opinion evidence on shoeprints inadmissible because the expert witness had not disclosed the existence of a database or the way the form of expression adopted by the footwear examiner had been developed. For criticism, see Morrison, ‘The Likelihood-ratio Framework and Forensic Evidence in Court: A Response to R v T’ (2012) 16 Evid & Proof 1; Redmayne et al, ‘Forensic Science Evidence in Question’ (2011) Crim LR 347. 450. (1971) 17 FLR 141 at 159–65. 451. Reilly and Genovese, ‘Claiming the Past: Historical Understanding in Australian Native Title Jurisprudence’ (2004) 4 Indigenous LJ 19; Edmond, ‘Thick Decisions: Expertise, Advocacy and Reasonableness in the Federal Court of Australia’ (2004) 74 Oceania 190. See also Good, n 171 above. 452. See discussion in Curthoys, Genovese and Reilly, Rights and Redemption: Indigenous Peoples, History, and Law, University of New South Wales Press, Sydney, 2008; Reilly, ‘The Ghost of Truganini: Use of Historical Evidence as Proof of Native Title’ (2000) 28 Fed L Rev 453; Carter, ‘The Definition and Discovery of Facts in Native Title: The Historian’s Contribution’ (2008) 36 Fed L Rev 301. 453. See, for example, Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 5) [2001] FCA 1106 (von Doussa J). Epistemologically, if not always practically, these difficulties were compounded by the revision of s 82 of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) in 1998. 454. Though where the evidence of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples is descriptive, it is factual evidence and not caught by the opinion rule. This may create difficult decisions where a witness describes mythological beliefs and origin stories, though any conceptual subtleties might be substantially removed by s 78A. 455. Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [19.1]–[19.45]. There is no equivalent section in the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas). 456. Daniel v Western Australia (2000) 178 ALR 542 at [30] (Nicholson J); Neowarra v Western Australia [2003] FCA 1399 at [15]–[27]; Jango v Northern Territory (No 2) [2004] FCA 1004 at [74] (Sackville J). 457. See similar comments by Selinger, ‘Expert Evidence and the Ultimate Question’ (1986) 10 Crim LJ 246 and, more generally, Roberts and Aitken, The Logic of Forensic Proof: Inferential Reasoning in Criminal

Evidence and Forensic Science, RSS, London, 2014. 458. Commissioner for Government Transport v Adamcik (1961) 106 CLR 292; O’Kelly v Dalrymple (1993) 45 FCR 145 at 155–6 (Lee J). When the trial judge acts as the trier of fact, the preference for one opinion over another may be impressionistic: Wiki v Atlantis Relocations (NSW) Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 174 at [60]–[68] (Ipp JA); Flinders Medical Centre v Waller (2005) 91 SASR 378 at [166]–[169] (Perry J). Though the decision in Weiss v R (2005) 224 CLR 300 might encourage appellate judges to uphold appeals where they have doubts about the reliability of (incriminating) opinion evidence, and appellate courts can consider studies or research on the reliability of forensic science as well as, and often more objectively than, trial judges. 459. Taylor v R (1978) 22 ALR 599. 460. (1984) 153 CLR 521. 461. (2002) 187 ALR 243 at [35]–[38]. 462. (1894) 6 R 67; see 7.129–7.131. 463. Reid v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367. Recall is permitted under s 46 of the uniform legislation to deal specifically with this situation. 464. Although psychological research suggests that humans, including highly trained or experienced investigators, often perform poorly when trying to assess the credibility of witnesses. See, for example, Bond and DePaulo, ‘Accuracy of Deception Judgments’ (2006) 10 Personality & Social Psych Review 214 and comparison of judges and laypersons, discussed in Saks and Spellman, The Psychological Foundations of Evidence Law, New York University Press, New York, 2016. 465. These reforms not only improve reliability through testimony based on recent memory but through protecting witnesses who may be intimidated by testifying at trial. See 7.33–7.34 and legislation referred to in n 151. Legislation in most jurisdictions expressly or effectively permits a recorded interview to be tendered as the witness’s testimony-in-chief (for the witnesses and in the cases specified). 466. However, the legislation does allow, in addition to the oral testimony a witness is able to give, the tender of a previous statement by the witness about the events observed in civil proceedings (s 64(2) and in criminal proceedings s 66(2)) if that statement was made at a time when the events were fresh in the witness’s memory. This is not a substitute for oral testimony and a previous statement in a document cannot be tendered until the completion of the witness’s oral testimony-in-chief: ss 64(4), 66(4). 467. The memory may be revived by other than documentary association (for example, events, smells, dreams, associations of things etc). This often happens out of court and the law does nothing to hinder this process: see 7.84–7.86. Query whether memory could be revived in court through hypnosis (cf R v Pitt (1967) 68 DLR 2d 513; and Van Vliet v Griffiths (1978) 19 SASR 195); see further at 7.109–7.114. The discussion in this part is based upon the refreshment of memory through use of documents, the situation most common in practice and consequently dealt with in cases. But a document might include a photograph or video recording: R v Sitek [1988] 2 Qd R 284. The uniform legislation provisions are confined to the use of documents where it is attempted to revive memory in court (s 32) but permits a court to order production of ‘documents and things’ used to try to revive memory out of court (s 34). Although the use of contemporaneous audio recordings as ‘documents’ may create difficulties: see Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd v Marsden [2002] NSWCA 419 at [695]–[699]. 468. MGICA (1992) Ltd v Kenny and Good Pty Ltd (1996) 135 ALR 743 at 745 (Lindgren J). 469. O’Connor v R [2007] NSWCCA 266 at [21]. According to s 122(6), attempts to revive memory using ss 32, 33 or 34 may lead to the loss of client legal privilege regardless of whether the attempt was successful: Grundy v Lewis [1998] FCA 1537 (Cooper J); Marsden v Amalgamated Television Services Pty

Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1155 at [13]–[14] (Levine J); Moran v Moran (No 9) [2000] NSWSC 219 at [13]– [20] (Kirby J); Spalding v Radio Canberra Pty Ltd [2009] ACTSC 26 at [1]–[61] (Refshauge J). See also 5.49 n 222. 470. In Lowe v Lang [2000] NSWSC 309 at [6]–[9], Hamilton J suggests that s 34 applies where documents are used in refreshing memory in preparation of affidavits, so that a court may order their production to the opponent as a condition to admission of the affidavit. 471. See also s 32(1) of the uniform legislation. At common law, normally, permission will be sought at the outset of a witness’s testimony, but if, for example, a witness omits or departs from points of detail related in a previous statement and is not hostile, counsel may invite the witness to refresh memory at a later stage; cf R v Da Silva [1990] 1 WLR 31. In R v Sutton (1992) 94 Cr App R 70, the witness was permitted to refresh memory during re-examination. 472. Hetherington v Brooks [1963] SASR 321; O’Sullivan v Waterman [1965] SASR 150 at 157; Prestage and Shearing v R [1976] Tas SR 16. 473. The witness should not be cross-examined at this stage to find out what he or she can remember without the assistance of the document: Hetherington v Brooks [1963] SASR 321. 474. In deciding whether to grant leave the judge must also take into account the matters referred to in s 192(2): Stanoevski v R (2001) 202 CLR 115 at [41]; referred to in Isherwood v Tasmania (2010) 20 Tas R 375; [2010] TASCCA 11, where the court wrongfully demanded that unrepresented accused not refer to notes without considering whether they could be used to refresh memory. But leave may exceptionally be given even if all the conditions mentioned in s 32(2) are not satisfied: R v Cassar and Sleiman (No 28) [1999] NSWSC 651 at [24] (Sperling J); and Isherwood at [81] suggesting more flexibility may be required where witness an accused appearing in person. 475. R v Singh (1977) 15 SASR 591 at 593 (Sangster J); R v Fowler [2003] NSWCA 321; R v Dodds [2009] NSWCCA 78. 476. R v Van Beelen (1972) 6 SASR 534 (observing witness failed to read notes dictated by him to his assistant); R v Rose (1993) 69 A Crim R 1 (a witness unable to read could adopt his written statement after it had been taken and read back to him, and then could later refresh memory at trial by having the statement read back to him). Where a document has been adopted after being read back by another that other person must be called to authenticate it. 477. Dyer v Best (1866) 4 H & C 189; LR 1 Exch 152. 478. Burrough v Martin (1809) 2 Camp 112; 170 ER 1098. 479. [1965] SASR 150; R v Brown [2004] VSCA 59 at [125]–[129]. 480. See also R v Singh (1977) 15 SASR 591. In Heanes v Herangi (2007) 175 A Crim R 175; [2007] WASC 175, Johnson J held that witness collaboration was a matter going to weight, not admissibility, refusing to exercise his exclusionary discretion. See also State of New South Wales v Kuru [2007] NSWCA 141 at [71]–[77] (Santow JA); and comments by Sheller JA in Day v Perisher Blue Pty Ltd [2005] NSWCA 110 at [30]. 481. Crnisanin v Logan (1972) 4 SASR 340. Cf Wilson v R [2006] NSWCCA 217 at [67]–[72] (Latham J). 482. R v Van Beelen (1972) 6 SASR 534; R v Singh (1977) 15 SASR 591. 483. The same requirement applies in criminal proceedings where a witness’s previous representation is tendered as hearsay under s 66. See Dodds v R [2009] NSWCCA 78. 484. In Graham v R (1998) 195 CLR 606 at 608, the majority say that: ‘Although questions of fact and degree may arise, the temporal relationship required will very likely be measured in hours or days, not, as was the case here, in years’. Query whether a stricter test may apply where the question is, as it was in Graham, whether the witness’s previous representation should be admitted as hearsay, particularly

where the witness has no memory of it or the circumstances in which it was made. Later cases suggest that, even under the hearsay exceptions, longer periods of weeks and months may satisfy the notion of freshness: see R v Adam (1999) 47 NSWLR 267 at [132]–[133] (10 weeks probably acceptable); R v Le [2000] NSWCCA 49 at [51]–[52], [126] (continuum of assaults over previous six months acceptable), but cf Hulme J at [91]–[93] (six months too long but two months acceptable). By expanding focus beyond merely temporal dimensions, s 66(2A) seems designed to encourage courts to grapple with circumstances that may affect the memory of a witness and the reliability of their evidence. Despite there being no amendment to s 32, courts have taken a more liberal approach than Graham in interpreting freshness under s 32: see, for example, R v Rogerson; R v McNamara (No 24) [2016] NSWSC 105 at [12] (Bellew J: but still refusing permission). For further authorities, see cases at 8.198 n 659. 485. R v Baffigo [1957] VR 303; Hetherington v Brooks [1963] SASR 321; Moore v Skinner (1990) 101 FLR 152. The same approach appears to be taken to granting leave to read under s 32(3): Amaca Pty Ltd v CSR Ltd [2015] VSC 582 at [173]–[183] (Macaulay J). Cf s 33 of the Uniform Acts which simply permits police to read signed contemporaneous notes: Orchard v Spooner (1992) 28 NSWLR 114; O’Connor v R [2007] NSWCCA 266. 486. O’Connor v R [2007] NSWCCA 266 at [21] (Mason P). In Steve v R [2008] NSWCCA 231 at [89]– [90], Beazley JA held that ‘a statement made about eight days after the incident was not sufficiently contemporaneous and fell outside s 33(2)(a)’. See also Chisari v R (No 2) [2006] NSWCCA 325. In Dodds v R [2009] NSWCCA 78 at [63]–[68], McClellan CJ at CL upheld the decision to allow a police officer to use a document prepared by listening to voice recordings 18 months after the events as ‘in the relevant sense the statement was in relation to matters which were contemporaneous to its making’. 487. Maugham v Hubbard (1828) 8 B & C 14; 108 ER 948; Amaca Pty Ltd v CSR Ltd [2015] VSC 582 at [173]–[183] (Macaulay J: document inadmissible hearsay). 488. R v Harrison [1966] VR 72 (there is no obligation to tender at this stage). Cf s 32(4) of the Uniform Acts, which empowers the court to ensure the document is produced to the opponent. Section 35 makes it clear that no obligations to or rights of tender arise from the mere calling for an inspection of a document. It is unlikely, the witness having testified from the document, that legal professional privilege will apply to it, since the privilege will be regarded as having been waived: R v Bryant (No 2) [1956] St R Qd 570 at 584; Burnell v BTC [1956] 1 QB 187; TPC v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647; Mancorp Pty Ltd v Baulderstone Pty Ltd t/as Baulderstone Hornibrook (1991) 57 SASR 87 (Debelle J). Section 122(6) of the uniform legislation expressly so provides (applied in MGICA (1992) Ltd v Kenny & Good Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 135 ALR 743). 489. Dairy Farmers Co-operative Milk Co Ltd v Acquilina (1963) 109 CLR 458. 490. Alchin v Commissioner for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498. The procedure here described for the tender of the previous inconsistent statement is that which applies following cross-examination upon previous inconsistent statements generally: see 7.147ff. 491. R v Thynne [1977] VR 98. This common law position is altered by s 101 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) and by s 60 of the Uniform Acts. Though the insertion of subs (3) makes it clear that s 60 does not apply in criminal proceedings to evidence of an admission. 492. Alchin v Commissioner for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498; Webbie v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1968) 12 FLR 271; R v Weatherstone (1968) 12 FLR 14. Sections 39 and 45 seem to permit the same to be done under the Uniform Acts, though subject (as s 45(4) reminds us) to Ch 3. 493. It is one thing to refer to information and another to refer, expressly or impliedly, to the fact that the information is contained in a document. It is suggested that it is the latter which should activate compulsory tender, but authorities do not emphasise this distinction: see R v Britton [1987] 1 WLR 539.

494. Senat v Senat [1965] P 172 at 177; R v Harrison [1966] VR 72 at 76; Webbie v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1968) 12 FLR 271; R v Weatherstone (1968) 12 FLR 14; Hatziparadissis v GFC (Manufacturing) Pty Ltd [1978] VR 181; R v Britton [1987] 1 WLR 539. In that s 35 abolishes forced tender as a consequence of calling to see a document the Uniform Acts appear to alter this common law position. 495. R v McGregor [1984] 1 Qd R 256 at 265 (McPherson J). 496. Webbie v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1968) 12 FLR 271 at 279 (Fox J); R v Vella (2006) 14 VR 592 at [39]–[40] (Bongiorno AJA suggests in many cases the document may be probative only to the credibility of the witness who has been cross-examined). 497. See Hatziparadissis v GFC (Manufacturing) Pty Ltd [1978] VR 181; Alexander v Manley (2004) 29 WAR 194 (no absolute rule but tender should be made promptly); cf Dawson J in R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 at 689–91, dealing generally with the tender of documents proved during cross-examination. 498. See R v McGregor [1984] 1 Qd R 256, which held that a memory-refreshing document containing a statement by another witness could be tendered after that other witness was called. Later authority makes it clear that Hatziparadissis is wrong insofar as it suggests there is an absolute rule: R v Foggo; Ex parte Attorney-General (1989) 2 Qd R 49; Alexander v Manley (2004) 29 WAR 194; R v Vella (2006) 14 VR 592 at [10]–[23] (Bongiorno AJA). 499. Wentworth v Rogers (No 10) (1987) 8 NSWLR 398 at 406; R v Markovina (1997) 19 WAR 119 at 127– 32; Amaca Pty Ltd v CSR Ltd [2015] VSC 582 at [173]–[183] (Macaulay J). 500. Hetherington v Brooks [1963] SASR 321 at 324 (Travers J, citing R v Naidinovici [1962] NZLR 334); Gillespie v Steer (1973) 6 SASR 200 at 202 (Sangster J). 501. Although the court has a discretion not to allow the jury to take such exhibits into the jury room when it retires: see, for example, R v Bradshaw (1978) 18 SASR 83 at 93–4 (Zelling J) and further at 7.21. 502. R v Alexander and Taylor [1975] VR 741 leaves open the question of tender, but the court’s approach, giving the opponent the option of insisting on production of the original document, would appear consistent with this view. 503. R v Shea (1978) 18 SASR 591. So that, if the original is lost or destroyed, an authenticated copy might be used. This best evidence rule in the case of documents is modified by s 57 of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) and s 73A of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA): see further 7.18. Section 51 of the Uniform Acts abolishes the requirement to produce the original and s 32 accordingly permits reference to copies of documents whenever memory is ‘revived’. 504. R v Cheng (1977) 63 Cr App R 20. This might justify the use of a copy made from rough contemporaneous notes: Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 1979) (1979) 69 Cr App R 411; R v Chisnell [1992] Crim LR 507. 505. Section 101A was inserted to circumvent the effect of Adam v R (2001) 207 CLR 96 at [31]–[38]. See Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [12.5]–[12.19]. 506. (1998) 195 CLR 606 at 608. Although other judges had remained sceptical of this view even before s 66(2A) was inserted in the Acts: R v Adam (1999) 47 NSWLR 267; Skipworth v R [2006] NSWCCA 37 at [18] (Mason P); Langbein v R [2008] NSWCCA 38 at [85] (McClellan CJ at CL). The difficulties in having regard to temporal and other matters is discussed in ISJ v R (2012) 38 VR 23; [2012] VSCA 32 at [43]–[49] (Nettle, Redlich and Osborn JJA) and by Bathurst CJ in Doyle v R [2014] NSWCCA 4 at [182]. See further 7.79 n 484 and cases at 8.198 n 659. 507. The Explanatory Memorandum to the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) explains that s 35 ‘abolishes the rule in Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630’. See also Evidence, ALRC Interim Report 26 (1985), vol 1, [290]– [291]. 508. R v Richardson [1971] 2 QB 484 emphasises these practical considerations. See also Grant, ‘Refreshing

the Memory of Witnesses in Criminal Trials’, paper presented to the Australian Stipendiary Magistrates Conference, 1980. 509. Collaton v Correl (1926) SASR 87 at 93–4. 510. Mather v Morgan [1971] Tas SR 192; R v Pachonick [1973] 2 NSWLR 86. 511. Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 15; Evidence Act 1939 (NT) s 21(3). See also R v Kingston [1986] 2 Qd R 114. 512. R v Pachonick [1973] 2 NSWLR 86; R v Alexander and Taylor [1975] VR 741; Owen v Edwards (1983) 77 Cr App R 191. 513. R v Richardson [1971] 2 QB 484; R v Pachonick [1973] 2 NSWLR 86; R v Da Silva [1990] 1 WLR 31. 514. [1990] 1 WLR 31. 515. Ames v Nicholson [1921] SASR 224 at 228–9; R v Bryant (No 2) [1956] St R Qd 570; R v Alexander and Taylor [1975] VR 741. Presumably now the original or a copy permitted by s 57 of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) and s 73A of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA). 516. R v Webb (1974) Crim LR 159; R v Westwell (1976) 62 Cr App R 251. 517. [1958] P 93. 518. (1997) 68 SASR 419. 519. [1994] 2 Qd R 300. 520. (2001) 80 SASR 373. 521. (2008) 235 CLR 334. 522. Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [12.1]–[12.19]. 523. Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1967] VR 263. McLelland J in Pearse v Sommers [1992] 28 NSWLR 492 suggests that only independent evidence of the previous statement is significant but in R v DJT [1998] 4 VR 784, Brooking JA refused to follow Pearse v Sommers and (at 794) cites convincing authority suggesting that the prior statement can be proved through the witness impugned. 524. Transport and General Insurance v Edmondson (1961) 106 CLR 23. Legislation in Queensland (Evidence Act 1977 s 101(1)(b)) provides that statements admitted to rebut recent invention may be used for hearsay purposes. 525. See generally Glissen, ‘Prior Consistent Statements and the Doctrine of Recent Invention’ (1989) 63 Aust LJ 552. 526. (1960) 104 CLR 476. 527. [1965] NSWR 1661. 528. See also Fox v General Medical Council [1960] 1 WLR 1017; R v Fraser (1995) 65 SASR 260 (Olsson and Williams JJ permitted proof of a prior consistent statement upon mere suggestion of fabrication whilst Doyle CJ took the view here expressed that the exception could only operate if the consistent statement was made before the time of the alleged invention and therefore directly rebutted that allegation); R v Martin (1996) 65 SASR 590 (statements made before implicit ground for concoction). 529. Nominal Defendant v Clements (1960) 104 CLR 476 at 479 (Dixon J). 530. R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 at 140–1 (Hunt CJ at CL). There is a subtle distinction ‘between putting squarely to a witness that he or she is lying about the substance of his/her evidence and putting a proposition to that witness that certain events did not take place’: Wilson v R [2006] NSWCCA 217 at [52] (Latham J). According to Pavitt v R [2007] NSWCCA 88 at [105] (McColl JA and Latham J), the suggestion does not have to be explicit, though it should be more than mere denial of the charges: see

also R v Whitmore [1999] NSWCCA 247; R v DWH [1999] NSWCCA 255. 531. Alchin v Commissioner for Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498; Webbie v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1968) 12 FLR 271; R v Weatherstone (1968) 12 FLR 14. See further 7.155ff. 532. R v Coll (1889) 25 LR Ir 522 at 524 (Holmes J); Nominal Defendant v Clements (1960) 104 CLR 476 at 495 (Windeyer J). 533. The prior statement need not be identical, merely ‘consistent’: Dunks v R [2014] NSWCCA 134 at [32]–[40]. In Gordon-King v R [2008] NSWCCA 335 at [25]–[26], McClellan CJ at CL indicated that unlike s 66 there is no requirement for the prior consistent statement to have been made while events were ‘fresh in the memory’. He also emphasised that any leave is subject to s 192, and that s 137 may also require consideration. See also R v MDB [2005] NSWCCA 354 at [23] (Simpson J), where a prior consistent statement from the complainant, though not fresh, was held admissible. 534. Papakosmas v R (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [74], [90]–[99] (McHugh J). 535. See Libling, ‘Evidence of Past Identification’ [1977] Crim LR 268; Weinberg, ‘The Admissibility of Out-of-Court Identification Evidence in Criminal Cases’ (1980) 12 Melb ULR 543. Cf Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593. 536. Gibbs CJ in Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 399, following the previous High Court decision in Davies and Cody v R (1937) 57 CLR 170 at 181–2. 537. Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 is the leading authority, the majority emphasising that reliability is the issue of ultimate importance. On the assumption that the identification parade is the most accurate form of identification, see discussion at 4.66. 538. See, for example, Clark and Godfrey, ‘Eyewitness Identification Evidence and Innocence Risk’ (2009) 16 Psych Bull & Rev 22; National Academy of Sciences, Identifying the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification, National Academies Press, Washington DC, 2014. 539. If the suspect is previously known to the identifying witness so that no process of interpretation has been necessary to ‘identify’ the suspect then prior statements of the witness asserting the identity of the suspect are simply inadmissible prior consistent statements. Thus, in R v Jansen (2001) 80 SASR 590 at [34], evidence of a (spontaneous) statement made just before the crime that the identifying witness recognised the accused as being a person in the vicinity of the crime was excluded as simply a prior consistent statement of identity. 540. R v Christie (1914) AC 545; Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395. Despite differences of opinion in these two cases, this is a common denominator of the various opinions. See also R v Jansen (2001) 80 SASR 590 at [27], [33] (Doyle CJ). 541. Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395. 542. R v Cook [1987] QB 417; R v Hentschell [1988] VR 362; R v Constantinou (1990) 91 Cr App R 74; R v Sparkes (1996) 88 A Crim R 194 at 205–6. 543. Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244 at [31]–[37]. 544. Compare with the analysis of Gibbs CJ and Murphy J in Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 403–5, 434; and Viscount Haldane in R v Christie (1914) AC 545 at 551. 545. See the cases cited in the previous footnote. See also R v Lam (2001) 121 A Crim R 272 at [56] (CCA (Qld)). 546. Note that, whereas the statement making the out-of-court identification may be open to the allegation of concoction (the rationale for the strictness of the general exclusion of prior consistent statements), the circumstances of the out-of-court identification are not open to such a charge. 547. Gibbs CJ in Alexander v R (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 405; and Viscount Haldane in R v Christie [1914]

AC 545 at 551. If there is a general exception to the hearsay rule it will be irrelevant whether or not the identifying witness is called. 548. (1894) 6 R 67: see 7.129–7.131. 549. (1981) 145 CLR 395; again, this proposition is a common denominator in the varying opinions. 550. Mason and Aickin JJ supporting admissibility and claiming the out-of-court identification is not hearsay; Gibbs CJ and Murphy J holding that an out-of-court identification is hearsay other than in the exceptional case referred to here. In R v Turner (2000) 76 SASR 163, a witness testified to picking out a person at an identification parade but his testimony did not make it clear whether that picking out was or was not an act of identification. Doyle CJ and Perry J were of the view that independent evidence of the parade could be given to assist the jury in determining whether when the witness picked the accused at the parade he was making an identification or merely saying that the accused looked similar to the culprit. Mulligan J was of the view that the witness’s testimony had to be capable of being interpreted as asserting identity before any evidence relating to the parade could be admitted. Presumably the argument is that otherwise the evidence of what the witness did and said at the parade is merely hearsay evidence, evidence of an out-of-court assertion of identification by the witness. 551. In R v Osbourne [1973] QB 678, the witness testified that she could not remember picking anyone out at a previous parade. A police witness to the parade was held entitled to testify that she identified the accused. This decision represents the high-water mark of those decisions favouring a general exception to the hearsay rule. The wider view is also favoured in R v Hentschel [1988] VR 362 at 374 (Brooking J), but the identifying witness also testified in that case, as she did in other cases favouring this view: R v Sutton (1990) 159 LSJS 96; R v Barbaro (1993) 32 NSWLR 619 at 627–34; Murphy v R (1994) 62 SASR 121; R v Turner (2000) 76 SASR 163 (Doyle CJ and Perry J; Doyle CJ at [10] expressly not deciding if evidence of the out-of-court identification could be admitted where the identifying witness did not testify at all). 552. This proposition is established at 8.54–8.55. Where identification is made by voice, an in-court identification may not be practicable. In R v EJ Smith [1984] 1 NSWLR 462, O’Brien CJ admitted evidence (from the identifying witness and third persons) of an out-of-court voice identification, holding this evidence not to be hearsay. But the identifying witness was called and available for crossexamination. Without this availability it is suggested that the evidence should remain inadmissible hearsay. 553. And is unlikely to object to the proponent leading evidence of these circumstances in-chief. 554. R v Gee (2000) 113 A Crim R 376; [2000] NSWCCA 198. See also R v Yates [2002] NSWCCA 520 at [266]; and R v Coe [2002] NSWCCA 385, where leave was given under s 38 to cross-examine unfavourable witnesses about the content of inconsistent statements relevant to identification. 555. In which case the credibility rule does not apply to exclude evidence of the prior identification. 556. (2000) 112 A Crim R 551 at [34]. See also R v Darwiche [2006] NSWSC 924 at [45] (Bell J). 557. R v Barbaro and Rovero (2000) 112 A Crim R 551 at [41], as explained in DPP v Nicholls [2001] NSWSC 523 at [24]–[27] (Adams J). 558. This common law rule is abolished in South Australia and replaced by a rule applying in similar circumstances to evidence relating to an ‘initial complaint’ insofar as it is evidence of the consistency of the victim’s conduct but not as evidence of the truth of facts alleged: Evidence Act 1929 s 34M (applied in R v J, JA (2009) 105 SASR 163; [2009] SASC 401 at [93]–[95] (Duggan J: no misdirection to direct that the complaint was relevant to ‘consistency and therefore credibility’)); R v H, T (2010) 108 SASR 86; [2010] SASCFC 24 at [45]–[50] (Gray J), [81]–[82] (White J), [91] (Kourakis CJ, offering differing views on directions required in relation to ‘consistency of conduct’); R v Usher (2014) 119 SASR 22; [2014] SASCFC 32 (terms of general complaint did not embrace crime alleged); R v Landmeter (2015)

121 SASR 522; [2015] SASCFC 3 at [9]–[14] (Vanstone and Kelly JJ, Peek J dissenting) (initial complaint included conversation later elaborating that complaint); R v Place (2015) 124 SASR 467; [2015] SASCFC 163 (while complaint must refer to crime alleged specific details not required nor need all details be consistent with crime alleged: Christie and fairness exclusionary discretions remain available); cf R v Vlies [2016] QCA 276 at [48]–[52] (Philippides JA). Without abolishing the common law, s 4A of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 (Qld) makes a ‘preliminary complaint’ (made before any formal statement to police in anticipation of proceedings: R v DBA (2012) 219 A Crim R 408; [2012] QCA 49, and made ‘about the alleged commission of the offence’; R v NM [2013] 1 Qd R 374; [2012] QCA 173) admissible but it was held in R v RH [2005] 1 Qd R 180 that this section should not be construed more widely than necessary to admit the preliminary complaint as hearsay. Section 26E(1) of the Evidence Act 1939 (NT) creates an exception to the hearsay rule extending beyond s 66 of the uniform legislation admitting ‘[i]n a proceeding arising from a charge of a sexual offence or a serious violence offence … evidence of a statement made by a child to another person as evidence of facts in issue if the Court considers the evidence of sufficient probative value to justify its admission’. An accused cannot be convicted solely upon the basis of such evidence (s 26E(3)) but contemporaneity is just one factor in determining sufficient probative value: see MLB v R (2010) 203 A Crim R 575; [2010] NTCCA 11. 559. Kilby v R (1973) 129 CLR 460; Ugle v R (1989) 167 CLR 647. See also Gleeson CJ and Hayne J in Papakosmas v R (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [11]ff. For state court decisions to a similar effect, see, for example, Lapthorne v R [1989] WAR 207; R v Robertson; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 262. 560. See Breen v R (1976) 50 ALJR 534, where it was held that complaints not referred to by the prosecutrix in her evidence could be proved by the persons to whom they were made. The prosecutrix did, however, testify to some complaints, but there seems no good reason to distinguish the decision upon this basis. 561. See R v Lillyman [1896] 2 QB 167; and R v Osborne [1905] 1 KB 551, although in each case the victim in fact denied having consented to the criminal sexual acts. 562. (1973) 129 CLR 460. 563. In every case, the jury must be appropriately directed: Jones v R (1997) 71 ALJR 538; R v Stoupas [1998] 3 VR 645. The direction required where there is evidence of a failure to complain is now governed by legislation which requires the jury to be directed that such failure does not necessarily mean the complaint is false and there may be many reasons why the victim of a sexual assault may hesitate to complain about it: Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 294(2); Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) s 371A; Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) ss 51–54; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 36BD; Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (ACT) s 71; Sexual Offences (Evidence and Procedure) Act (NT) s 4(5). In Queensland (Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 s 4A(4) and South Australia (Evidence Act 1929 s 34M(2)) no suggestion can be made to the jury that failure or delay in complaining is of itself of any probative value in relation to the complainant’s credibility. See further 4.45, 7.107. 564. Strictly speaking, no warning was required in Australia even at common law (see Kelleher v R (1974) 131 CLR 534) although many state courts continued to warn in sexual assault cases: see R v Byczko (No 1) (1977) 16 SASR 506 at 510 (Bray CJ); R v Ridgeway [1983] 2 NSWLR 19. 565. Eade v R (1924) 34 CLR 154 at 157; R v Yates [1970] SASR 302 at 307; R v E (1996) 39 NSWLR 450 at 457–61. 566. See further at 4.40–4.41. 567. See, for example, Question of Law Reserved on Acquittal (1993) 59 SASR 214. For the current position in relation to the warnings that may be given, see the discussion at 4.42–4.51. 568. Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 (Qld) s 4A (‘preliminary complaint’); Evidence Act 1929

(SA) s 34M (‘initial complaint’). 569. Nikolaidis v R [2008] NSWCCA 323. 570. (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 at 142. 571. R v MRW (1999) 113 A Crim R 308 at [16]–[18]. 572. R v TJF (2001) 120 A Crim R 209 at [29]–[35]. 573. (1999) 196 CLR 297. Followed in ISJ v R (2012) 38 VR 23; [2012] VSCA 321 at [57]–[61] (Nettle, Redlich and Osborn JJA). 574. R v Camelleri [1922] 2 KB 122; R v Greenwood [1962] Tas SR 319; In the Marriage of E (1978) 31 FLR 171 (custody proceedings). But the crime and circumstances must be such that a complaint may be reasonably anticipated: De B v De B [1950] VLR 242 at 246; R v Starr [1969] QWN 23. 575. R v Saunders [1965] Qd R 409; Gooderson, ‘Previous Consistent Statements’ [1968] Camb LJ 64. 576. [1896] 2 QB 167. 577. See also R v Manwaring [1983] 2 NSWLR 82 at 90 (Miles J); R v Matthews [1999] 1 VR 534 (jury must be left free to decide effect of complaint on credit of complainant); R v Mustafa (2005) 91 SASR 63 at [61]–[62] (Besanko J); R v Humble [2009] SASC 51 at [69]–[70] (Kelly and Kourakas JJ). 578. See, for example, R v Baltensperger (2004) 90 SASR 129 at [79]. 579. R v Manwaring [1983] 2 NSWLR 82. This condition is criticised below as impossible of definition. In R v Robertson; Ex parte Attorney-General [1991] 1 Qd R 262, the majority held that a mere narration could constitute a complaint if the other conditions were satisfied. 580. R v Saunders [1965] Qd R 409. 581. R v Osborne [1905] 1 KB 551 at 561 (Ridley J) emphasises these latter two conditions. Cf R v Wannan (2006) 94 SASR 521 (complaint consequent upon questions admitted). For discussion of the conditions generally, see R v Mustafa (2005) 91 SASR 62 at [47]–[62] (Besanko J); R v HRA (2008) 183 A Crim R 91 at [55]–[98] (Kellam JA). 582. R v Saragozza [1984] VR 187; R v Griffin [1971] Qd R 12; R v Saunders [1965] Qd R 409 at 425–6, which suggests that it must be possible to infer from the complaint an assault of a sexual nature. In R v Whyte [2006] NSWCCA 75, a case involving an attempted sexual assault, Spigelman CJ and Simpson J disagreed about the admissibility of the complainant’s opinion about the accused’s intentions (under s 78): see discussion at 7.41. 583. R v Manwaring [1983] 2 NSWLR 82. 584. R v Freeman [1980] VR 1; R v Roissetter [1984] 1 Qd R 477 at 479–80; R v Sailor [1994] 2 Qd R 342; M v R (1994) 69 ALJR 83 at 97 (Gaudron J); R v King (1995) 78 A Crim R 53; Miller v R (1995) 13 WAR 504; R v W [1996] Qd R 573 (complaint by a nine-and-a-half-year-old made a week after the alleged assault admitted); R v Young [1998] 1 VR 402 at 424–5 (CCA); R v S (2002) 129 A Crim R 339 at [16] (CCA (Qld)). 585. R v Dubois [1966] QWN 25. 586. R v Peake (1974) 9 SASR 458. 587. [1980] VR 1 at 5. Applied in SPW v Western Australia (2012) 220 A Crim R 301; [2012] WASCA 41 at [68] (Buss JA, Pullin and Mazz JJA agreeing). See also the realistic approach of the Court of Criminal Appeal to the satisfaction of the conditions for recent complaint in the case of a child-complainant in R v HRA (2008) 183 A Crim R 91 at [2]–[10] (Neave JA), [55]–[98] (Kellam JA). 588. Compare with the discussion in R v Robertson; Ex parte Attorney General [1991] 1 Qd R 262. 589. For further discussion of this legislation, see n 558 above.

590. (1973) 129 CLR 460. See also R v LTP [2004] NSWCCA 109 at [123] (Howie J); and the Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [18.147]–[18.173]. 591. Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 294(2); Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) s 371A; Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic) s 51; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 36BD; Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (ACT) s 71; Sexual Offences (Evidence and Procedure) Act (NT) s 4(5). Cf Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 (Qld) s 4A(4). 592. R v Davies [1985] 3 NSWLR 276. See R v Stewart (2001) 52 NSWLR 301 at [2]–[32] (Spigelman CJ in dissent). 593. R v Wang [2007] VSCA 296; Crofts v R (1996) 139 ALR 455; R v Miletic [1977] 1 VR 593; R v Hewitt [1998] 4 VR 862 at 865–6. The warning required on account of failure to complain and the warning required where prosecution occurs long after the events alleged (Longman warning) is discussed at 4.44ff. 594. The significance and extent of this prohibition is raised by Kourakis J in R v H, T (2010) 108 SASR 86; [2010] SASCFC 24 at [91]–[106] in emphasising that the only use that a jury should make of a complaint admitted under s 34M of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) is to establish consistency with the assault to which it relates. 595. (1993) 60 SASR 467. 596. R v J (1994) 75 A Crim R 522; R v F (1995) 83 A Crim R 502. And see generally the discussion at 7.51. 597. There is no s 108C in the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas). Section 79A assumes a form which requires relevant specialised knowledge. In Bellemore v Tasmania (2006) 16 Tas R 364 at [53] (Crawford J), [196]ff, especially [213] (Blow J), s 79A was found to override the more general credibility rule. For less comprehensive but equivalent legislation in Western Australia, see s 36BE of the Evidence Act 1906 and in Queensland, s 9C of the Evidence Act 1977. 598. See generally Orne et al, ‘Hypnotically Induced Testimony’ in Wells and Loftus (eds), Eyewitness Testimony: Psychological Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984; and Odgers, ‘Trial by Trance: Hypnosis, Witnesses and the Development of Rules of Evidence’ (1988) 4 Aust Bar Rev 18. Other therapeutic techniques, raising similar problems, may lead to the memory of suppressed events such as child sexual abuse: Hough, ‘Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse: Applying the Daubert Standard in State Courts’ (1996) 69 Sthn Calif LR 855; Webert, ‘Are the Courts in a Trance? Approaches to the Admissibility of Hypnotically Enhanced Witness Testimony in Light of Empirical Evidence’ (2003) 40 Am Crim LR 1301. 599. (1978) 19 SASR 195. 600. (1995) 78 A Crim R 160, followed by Underwood J in R v Sparkes (1996) 88 A Crim R 194. 601. (1989) 51 SASR 489. 602. The decision of Cox J might be criticised in that he did not consider the further question of whether a properly informed and instructed jury may have been perfectly able to assess that risk of unreliability: compare with the approach in Rozenes v Beljajev (1994) 126 ALR 481. Where unreliability cannot be accurately gauged it will usually be unfair to admit such testimony: see R v Sparkes (1996) 88 A Crim R 194 at 204–5 (Underwood J); cf R v Glossop [2001] NSWCCA 165 (Sully J). 603. See Abadee J in R v Tillott (1995) 38 NSWLR 1 at 16–17. 604. [2013] NSWCCA 123. 605. (2010) 220 A Crim R 19; [2010] NSWCCA 222. 606. (1993) 71 A Crim R 1.

607. (1995) 38 NSWLR 1. 608. (1994) 13 WAR 346; R v WB (2009) 23 VR 319 at [36]. 609. (2010) 220 A Crim R 19; [2010] NSWCCA 222 at [64]–[75] (Schmidt JA agreeing at [179]). 610. R v McFelin [1985] 2 NZLR 750. That these are guidelines rather than requirements is endorsed in R v KG (2001) 54 NSWLR 198 (CCA). The guidelines also assume that hypnotherapy can produce reliable memories of events, an assumption yet to be empirically validated. See the discussion in French and Ost, ‘Beliefs about Memory, Childhood Abuse, and Hypnosis among Clinicans, Legal Professionals, and the General Public’ in Burnett (ed), Wrongful Allegations of Sexual and Child Abuse, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, Ch 11; and, more generally, Nash and Barnier (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Hypnosis: Theory, Research, and Practice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012. 611. This warning is additional and different to any warning that may be required where an assault which occurred long before trial is alleged (Longman warning): Christophers v R (2000) 23 WAR 106 at [40]– [47]. 612. R v PLV (2001) 51 NSWLR 736 at [75]–[91], referring to s 104(3)(b), which expressly provides ‘unable to be aware or to recall’. Though most authority seems to allow the cautious use of experts: R v Souleyman (SC (NSW), 5 September 1996, unreported); Farrell v R (1998) 194 CLR 286 (Gaudron and Hayne JJ); R v Rivkin [2004] NSWCCA 7 at [336]–[337]. 613. The court must also give leave: s 192. See Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [12.108]ff. Exclusionary orientations to specialist evidence about perception, memory and behaviour, expressed in cases such as Smith v R (1990) 64 ALJR 588 and Farrell v R (1998) 194 CLR 286, are gradually being modified by more accommodating approaches: R v BDX [2009] VSCA 28 at [50]–[96] (Vincent and Weinberg JJA); Dupas v R (2012) 218 A Crim R 507; [2012] VSCA 328; MA v R (2013) 40 VR 564; [2013] VSCA 20 at [51]–[52] (Osborn JA); Gittany v R [2016] NSWCCA 182 at [14]ff; albeit strictly monitored as exemplified in De Silva v Director of Public Prosecutions (2013) 236 A Crim R 214; [2013] VSCA 339 at [27]–[29] (Priest, Coghlan and Lasry JJA). 614. (1984) 39 SASR 111. 615. (1979) 93 DLR (3d) 1. See also R v Trochym [2007] 1 SCR 239. 616. (1978) 19 SASR 195. 617. (1967) 68 DLR (2d) 513. 618. Evidence, ALRC Interim Report 26 (1985), vol 1, [64]. 619. Since parties and their witnesses are no longer disqualified on grounds of interest it is now even possible for one party to call another in civil cases. Spouses of parties may be called to testify against parties even in criminal cases: see 5.200–5.204. The prosecution should not call a witness known to be hostile for the purpose of proving a prior inconsistent (but favourable) statement which is admissible only to discredit the witness and inadmissible as hearsay: see Munday, ‘Calling a Hostile Witness’ [1989] Crim LR 866; Blewitt v R (1988) 62 ALJR 503 at 505. This is also the position in Queensland where the prior statement is admissible as hearsay: R v Williams [2001] 2 Qd R 442. 620. Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [5.6]–[5.13], especially at [5.11], specifically refers to experts, children, Aborigines, Torres Strait Islanders, and individuals with intellectual disabilities, as those who might testify in more narrative terms. See also Odgers, n 179 above, at [EA.29.90]. One criticism that has been levelled against narrative reporting is that it leads to witnesses, rather than lawyers, taking charge of the proceedings. 621. This justification for the ‘bolster rule’ is put by Heydon J in HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334 at [301]: ‘Immense waste of time could be caused if witnesses were permitted to arm themselves, in advance, with responses to attacks on their credibility which may never be made. Getting one’s retaliation in first

may be habitual in Welsh rugby circles; it is not encouraged by the classical common law model of trial’. Of course, in the cases before him it was perlucidly clear from the start that the only defence available to the accused was to attack the complainants’ credibility. The rugby analogy simply trivialises the realities in cases such as these and the difficulty of convincing juries beyond reasonable doubt if a complainant is not permitted to establish credibility by telling the whole story. Furthermore, Heydon J at [312] concedes that, in jurisdictions where the accused must disclose defences prior to trial, making clear when credibility is in issue, his Welsh rugby analogy breaks down. 622. For example, prior consistent statements may be admitted at common law only if they can rebut suggestions in cross-examination of recent invention. The limits under s 108 of the uniform legislation are not so strict. See further 7.91–7.93. 623. See further 7.132ff. 624. Authority for the bolster rule is discussed by Heydon J in HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334 at [297]. 625. See Heydon J in HML at [298]. 626. (2008) 235 CLR 334 at [292]–[336]. 627. Such evidence appears admissible in New South Wales; apparently not considered to be credibility evidence (according to s 101A): JDK v R [2009] NSWCCA 76 at [28]–[39] (McClellan CJ at CL). The NSWCCA’s inability to ‘appreciate that credibility evidence can be not only evidence relevant to credibility but can extend to evidence relevant to the credibility of evidence given by that witness’ — in Peacock v R [2008] NSWCCA 264 at [57] (Simpson J), endorsed in RGM v R [2012] NSWCCA 89 at [73]–[74] (Fullerton J) — has been criticised by Odgers, n 179 above, at [EA.101A.120]. 628. This is a subject not often mentioned on appeal. But see the discussion about the nature of the rule and its ambit in Mooney v James [1949] VLR 22 at 26–9 (Barry J); and Gordon v Carroll (1975) 27 FLR 129 at 135–6. 629. Contrast this with questions drawing the witness’s attention to the subject about which questions are to be asked: GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15 at 25 (Young J). 630. Moor v Moor [1954] 2 All ER 458 at 459; R v Shaw (1995) 78 A Crim R 150 at 154 (Fitzgerald P). 631. Ex parte Bottomley [1909] 2KB 14 at 20–22. 632. R v Neal, Regos and Morgan [1947] ALR 616 (Dixon J); R v Thynne [1977] VR 98. 633. In R v IA Shaw [1996] 1 Qd R 641 at 646, Davies and McPherson JJA considered it perfectly proper for the Crown to ask the victim of rape directly whether she had consented. 634. For a practical guide to conducting an examination-in-chief, see Wells, ‘Examination In Chief’ [1977] Sth Aust Law Soc Bull 2, reprinted in Wells, Evidence and Advocacy, Butterworths, Sydney, 1988. See also Ta v R [2011] NSWCCA 32 at [66]–[69] (James J). 635. Referring to prior authorities the distinction between proofing and coaching is canvassed by Martin CJ (Buss and Mazza JJA agreeing) in Majinski v Western Australia (2013) 226 A Crim R 552; [2013] WASCA 10 at [29]–[42], the line (crossed only insignificantly in the case before him involving a 13year-old boy) being explained thus at [32]: ‘Questioning of a witness moves beyond “proofing” to impermissible “coaching” when the witness’ true recollection of events is supplanted by another version suggested by the interviewer or other party, whether by repetitive reading of a statement to the point where their testimony is mere regurgitation or by otherwise influencing the witness … [a] solicitor or counsel should not advise a witness as to how to answer a question’. 636. R v Welden (1977) 16 SASR 421 (Wells J); Graham v Police (2001) 122 A Crim R 152. Despite the suggestion in s 27 of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) that a witness cannot be contradicted unless declared adverse (hostile), these words have not been interpreted as changing the common law position. The

same conclusion applies in Western Australia (Evidence Act 1906 ss 20–21), where the section is similarly worded, and in Queensland (Evidence Act 1977 s 17(1)) where contradiction by other evidence is expressly permitted. Nor is there any prohibition against prosecution counsel, where a Crown witness has not been declared hostile, suggesting in closing that the witness’s testimony should not be accepted: R v Macfie (No 2) (2004) 11 VR 215; R v Colquhoun [2009] SASC 138. But the prosecution must otherwise act fairly. In uniform legislation jurisdictions where the prosecution has wider scope to cross-examine its own witnesses under s 38, it may be unfair to make such a suggestion in closing without having so cross-examined: R v Kennedy (2000) 118 A Crim R 34. 637. On this rationale, counsel cannot seek to have the party he or she is representing declared hostile: see Vocisano v Vocisano (1974) 130 CLR 267, where counsel at the behest of an insurer (which, while not a party, was effectively conducting proceedings) could not have the defendant (the insured) declared hostile); and cf Jacobson v Suncorp Insurance [1991] 2 Qd R 46, in which it was held that a co-defendant insurer could have the insured defendant declared hostile. Section 38(7) of the uniform legislation now allows a nominal defendant to be declared hostile. 638. On the subject of hostile witnesses generally, see Newark, ‘The Hostile Witness and the Adversary System’ [1986] Crim LR 441. 639. In R v Hunter [1956] VLR 31, the court was unable to find any cases restricting cross-examination of one’s hostile witness and felt that, in theory, cross-examination was unrestricted. But in practice trial judges may impose limits: see, for example, R v Jacquier (1979) 20 SASR 543 at 549 (Walters and Wells JJ). 640. R v Hunter [1956] VLR 31. Impeachment by general evidence of bad character is prohibited expressly by s 20 of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA). 641. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 17; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 27; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 20, 21. 642. R v Hunter [1956] VLR 31. One early problem with the legislation based upon s 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1865 (UK) was the reference not to ‘hostile’ witnesses but ‘adverse’ witnesses. This was interpreted in Greenough v Eccles (1859) 5 CB (NS) 786; 144 ER 315 to mean ‘hostile’ and therefore to reflect the common law position. 643. The enabling legislation has its exact equivalent when it allows cross-examining opponents to prove previous inconsistent statements: see 7.148–7.152. 644. R v Thynne [1977] VR 98 at 99–102. 645. R v Golder [1960] 1 WLR 1169; Driscoll v R (1977) 137 CLR 517. 646. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 101(1)(a) (equivalent legislation in the Australian Capital Territory: Evidence Act 1971 s 28(2), now superseded by the uniform legislation, was discussed in Vocisano v Vocisano (1974) 130 CLR 267 at 268–74). 647. Most notably those Australian equivalents to the Evidence Act 1938 (UK). Such authority as there is favours the literal interpretation of the legislation to allow the hearsay use of previous statements whether they are already before the court (see Burnell v BTC [1956] 1 QB 187 at 190) or not: see Harvey v Smith-Wood [1964] 2 QB 171; cf Cartwright v W Richardson and Co Ltd [1955] 1 All ER 742. See also 8.173. 648. Driscoll v R (1977) 137 CLR 517; Morris v R (1987) 163 CLR 454 at 467–70. 649. Morris v R (1987) 163 CLR 454 at 468–9 (Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ); R v Nguyen [1989] 2 Qd R 38. 650. R v Nguyen [1989] 2 Qd R 38. In R v Parkinson [1990] 1 Qd R 382 at 384, Macrossan CJ said: ‘It will almost inevitably be the case (I find it hard to visualise an exception) that a conviction cannot safely be entered when the only evidence to support it consists of a prior statement of a prosecution witness

which is steadfastly contradicted and declared to be false by that witness on oath at the trial’. In R v Seidkofsky [1989] 1 Qd R 655, there was additional evidence which made the verdict safe. 651. R v Hayden and Slattery [1959] VR 102 at 103 (Sholl J). Proof of a motive for this unwillingness — hostility towards the party calling the witness, for example — is not required: R v Hutchinson (1990) 53 SASR 587. 652. McLellan v Bowyer (1961) 106 CLR 95. 653. Ibid; Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81 at 95 (Walters J). 654. McLellan v Bowyer (1961) 106 CLR 95 at 101; R v McLachlan [1999] 2 VR 553. But cf Hunter v Police (2011) 111 SASR 411, where the appellate court held that magistrate should not have held that a prosecution witness, a friend of the accused present at the assault charged, should have been declared hostile simply on the basis of inconsistencies between his testimony and a CCTV record of the incident. 655. Willis v Magistrates Court (Vic) (1996) 89 A Crim R 273 at 279 (Smith J). 656. See R v Hadlow [1992] 1 Qd R 440, where a voir dire to prove previous inconsistent statements was considered unnecessary as the trial judge had based his ruling solely upon the witness’s obviously hostile demeanour. 657. R v Hunter [1956] VLR 31 at 32; R v Matthews and Ford [1972] VR 3 at 8; Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81. See also Uniform Acts s 189. 658. Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81. 659. Ibid at 92 (Bray CJ), 97 (Walters J); cf the view of Andrews J in R v Cox [1972] Qd R 366 at 374–5. 660. Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81 at 92 (Bray CJ); R v Henderson (1984) 37 SASR 82 at 87; R v Ashton (1999) 108 A Crim R 200 at [4]–[5] (CCA (Qld)). 661. In, for example, R v Sutton (1992) 94 Cr App R 70, the witness was allowed to refresh memory in reexamination where details were omitted in examination-in-chief. See also R v Da Silva [1990] 1 WLR 31, discussed at 7.85. 662. R v Neal, Regos and Morgan [1947] ALR 616; R v Thynne [1977] VR 98 at 101–3; R v Houston (1982) 8 A Crim R 392 (CCA (Vic)); R v Lam (Ruling No 6) [2005] VSC 280; (Ruling No 8) [2005] VSC 282; (Ruling No 9) [2005] VSC 283; R v Kuster (2008) 21 VR 407; [2008] VSCA 261 at [36]–[42]. 663. Witness is defined to include a party giving evidence, and party includes an accused (Dictionary Pt 2 cl 7). Section 38(7) expressly permits a subrogated insurer to cross-examine the insured who gives unfavourable evidence, thus reversing the decision in Vocisano v Vocisano (1974) 130 CLR 267. Either this provision is unnecessary as a result of the wide definition of ‘witness’, or the drafters did not intend the section to apply to party witnesses except in this one situation: cf Odgers, n 179 above, at [EA.38.90]. 664. The court must, within the bounds of practicality, give leave to cross-examine on particular matters rather than granting leave to cross-examine more generally: R v Hogan [2001] NSWCCA 292 at [80]– [81]; R v Le (2002) 54 NSWLR 474 at [72]–[73]. 665. The application to cross-examine should not be delayed for unfair tactical reasons but where the adversity does not manifest itself until the opponent cross-examines leave may be granted (s 38(4) requires cross-examination under the section to take place before other parties cross-examine unless leave is given) to ask leading questions in re-examination: R v Patsalis and Spathis (No 10) (1999) NSWSC 990; R v Reardon, Michaels and Taylor [2002] NSWCCA 203 at [30]–[34] (Hodgson JA); R v Parkes [2003] NSWCCA 12 at [70] (Ipp JA); Burrell v R [2009] NSWCCA 163 at [188]–[212] (per curiam). 666. Stanoevski v R (2001) 202 CLR 115 at [41]; R v Hogan [2001] NSWCCA 292.

667. Unfavourable has been interpreted as ‘not favourable’. Generally, this broad and principled approach is supported by R v Souleyman (1996) 40 NSWLR 712 at 715; R v Velevski (No 2) (1997) 93 A Crim R 420; R v Fowler [2000] NSWCCA 142 at [121] (Wood CJ at CL); R v Glasby (2000) 115 A Crim R 465 at [59]; R v Le [2001] NSWSC 174 at [15] (McClellan J); R v Cakovski (2002) 133 A Crim R 18 (O’Keefe J); R v White [2003] NSWCCA 64 (Smart AJ); R v Sood (Ruling No 3) [2006] NSWSC 762 (Simpson J); R v SH [2011] ACTSC 198 at [35]–[37] (Refshauge J); DPP v Garrett [2016] VSCA 31 at [64]–[74]. 668. For an example of an appellate court approving the limits upon cross-examination imposed by the trial judge in ruling a witness unfavourable to find there was no unfairness in giving leave, see Lane v R (2013) 241 A Crim R 321; [2013] NSWCCA 317 at [158]–[168] (Bathurst CJ, Simpson and Adamson JJ). 669. R v Le (2002) 54 NSWLR 474 at [65]–[67], [78] (Heydon JA). 670. And therefore subject to Pt 3.7 of the Uniform Acts. See discussion of Odgers, n 179 above, at [EA.38.210]. 671. See, for example, dicta of Kirby J in R v Patsalis and Spathis (No 10) (1999) NSWSC 990 at [27]; and of Greg James J in R v Kneebone (1999) 47 NSWLR 450 at [54]–[55]. But compare with wider approach in authorities at n 667 above. See also discussion of the meaning of ‘unfavourable’ in Odgers, n 179 above, at [EA.38.60]. 672. R v Souleyman (1996) 40 NSWLR 712 at 715; R v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 443 at 456 (the Crown cannot seek to introduce unreliable prior statements under s 38); R v Fowler [2000] NSWCCA 142 at [124]; Razzak v R [2008] NSWCCA 204; Col v R (2013) 237 A Crim R 67; [2013] NSWCCA 302 (discretion not exercised to exclude clear and unambiguous inconsistent statement introduced in crossexamination of adverse prosecution witness). 673. [2011] ACTSC 198 at [35] (Refshauge J). 674. (2001) 207 CLR 96 at [18]–[19]. 675. See also R v Le (2002) 54 NSWLR 474 at [66]–[68], where Heydon JA explains the propriety of the prosecution’s conduct in the particular circumstances of that case. See also Power v R (2014) 43 VR 261; [2014] VSCA 146 at [55]–[60] (Redlich JA and Robson AJA); Casey v R [2016] NSWCCA 77 at [61]– [62]. Similarly, in Queensland, the prior statements of an adverse witness are admissible as hearsay: R v Williams [2001] 2 Qd R 442. 676. (2003) 147 A Crim R 450 at [81]–[85] (Ipp JA). 677. See also Burrell v R [2007] NSWCCA 65 at [246] (McClellan CJ at CL); Burrell v R [2009] NSWCCA 163 at [188]–[212] (per curiam). 678. Cf MAH v R [2006] NSWCCA 226 at [42]–[45] (Grove J). It is useful to remember, however, that s 38 is not concerned with the admissibility of evidence: R v Milakovich [2004] NSWCCA 199 at [22]–[33] (Sperling J); KH v R [2014] NSWCCA 294 at [22]–[29] (Leeming JA); DPP v Garrett (a pseudonym) [2016] VSCA 31 at [64]–[79]. 679. Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev), Little Brown and Co, Boston, 1974, vol 8, [1367]. 680. For example, Eggleston, ‘What is Wrong with the Adversary System?’ (1975) 49 Aust LJ 428. In the social sciences, cross-examination is understood in more ambivalent ways: Lynch and Bogen, The Spectacle of History: Speech, Text and Memory at the Iran-Contra Hearings, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1996; Atkinson and Drew, Order in Court: The Organisation of Verbal Interactions in Judicial Settings, Macmillan, London, 1979; Potter, Representing Reality, Sage, London, 1996. Those involved in United States Innocence Projects have endeavoured to remind proponents of the highly variable effectiveness of cross-examination, particularly in criminal trials.

681. R v Hilton [1972] 1 QB 421; R v Schuller [1972] QWN 41. Judges should avoid questioning witnesses unnecessarily (see 6.58), although as Whealy JA explains in FB v R [2011] NSWCCA 217 at [90]ff, ‘increasing complexity’ and ‘limited resources’ have led to judges taking ‘an active part in the conduct of cases’. See also R v T, WA (2014) 118 SASR 382; 238 A Crim R 205; [2014] SASCFC 3 at [37]ff (Kourakis CJ). 682. Wood v Mackinson (1840) 2 Mo & Rob 273 at 275–6; 174 ER 286 at 287; Uniform Acts s 40. 683. Summers v Moseley (1834) 2 Cr & M 477 at 480–2; 149 ER 849 at 850–1. This situation is not expressly dealt with by the uniform legislation but s 26, which gives the court a general power to make orders in relation to the way in which witnesses are questioned, and s 11, which gives the court a general power to control the conduct of its proceedings, may permit a court to ensure that the other party call the witness as its own in these circumstances. 684. Bracegirdle v Bailey (1859) 1 F & F 536; 175 ER 842. 685. GPI Leisure Corp Ltd v Herdsman Investments Pty Ltd (No 3) (1990) 20 NSWLR 15; Searle v Keayes (1994) 126 ALR 728. Again, ss 11 and 26 may empower this under the uniform legislation: see n 683 above. 686. (1998) 193 CLR 1. See also Libke v R (2007) 230 CLR 559 (particularly Heydon J) where, although critical of the prosecutor’s cross-examination, it was held by a majority to have produced no miscarriage of justice. 687. R v Harbach (1973) 6 SASR 427 at 436–40; the unsworn statement is now abolished in all Australian jurisdictions (including Norfolk Island). By the same token the out-of-court admission of one accused is not admissible against another, even to establish the principal offence which forms the basis for a coaccused’s liability as an accessory after the fact: R v Welsh [1999] 2 VR 62. While a bare plea of guilt by one co-accused is irrelevant to establishing the guilt of another, if that co-accused testifies against another it may be relevant to his or her credibility: Power v R (2014) 43 VR 261; [2014] VSCA 146 at [18] (Redlich JA and Robson AJA). 688. Meyer v Hall (1972) 26 DLR (3d) 309. 689. R v Mitchell (1892) 17 Cox CC 503; R v Solomon and Thumbler (1958) 25 WWR 307 at 316. 690. Discussed in Park, ‘Visions of Applying the Scientific Method to the Hearsay Rule’ (2003) Mich St LR 1149; Rakos and Landsman, ‘Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future Directions’ (1992) 76 Minnesota LR 655. 691. For example, R v Nguyen [1989] 2 Qd R 72, in which it was held that the out-of-court statements of hostile witnesses could not support a safe verdict. For other (random) examples, see In the Marriage of B (1988) 91 FLR 105, which held the admission of statements in files during custody proceedings improper as the opponent was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the makers of the statements; and R v Hodge (1987) 48 SASR 91, which held that the trial judge was in error in not permitting cross-examination of a doctor who had presented a sentencing report. 692. See Nembhard v R [1982] 1 All ER 183 (conviction based on a dying declaration upheld); Scott v R [1989] AC 1242 (a conviction based upon a deposition was quashed as the jury had not been properly directed about the lack of cross-examination nor about the dangers of acting upon identification evidence); Nalberski v R (1989) 44 A Crim R 434 (CCA (WA)) (a conviction based upon a deposition from committal was upheld where the witness had died before trial); R v Birch (1994) 74 A Crim R 585 (conviction upon basis of depositions taken from witnesses dead at the time of trial and admissible by statute upheld as jury properly directed). A trial judge may be asked to exercise the residual discretion to exclude depositions admissible under statute where the absence of cross-examination might lead to the evidence being more prejudicial than probative: see, for example, R v Bond (1996) 16 SR(WA) 207; R v Stackelroth (1996) 86 A Crim R 438 (CCA (NSW)); R v Clark [2001] NSWCCA 494 at [164]

(Heydon JA); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich [2005] NSWSC 417 at [335]–[443] (Austin J). 693. But this is not an absolute right and leading questions may be inappropriate where the witness displays a clear partisanship towards the cross-examining party: Mooney v James [1949] VLR 22 at 28–9 (Barry J). 694. (1985) 157 CLR 671. 695. In R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299, the majority holds that this principle takes precedence over legislation permitting cross-examination of a defence witness upon a prior inconsistent statement. If the prior statement is admissible in-chief in support of the prosecution case it should be so tendered. McHugh J was prepared to permit cross-examination on an otherwise admissible prior statement unless it could be shown that this caused unfairness to the accused. 696. (1894) 6 R 67. 697. Hawthorn Glen Pty Ltd v Aconex Pty Ltd (No 1) [2007] FCA 2010 at [25] (Goldberg J). 698. Reid v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367 at 373–4 (Wells J). Whether it also permits an adverse inference against the party failing to cross-examine is discussed in R v Manunta (1989) 54 SASR 17, and considered further at 7.131. 699. This reason (along with the others given) is emphasised in Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [1983] 1 NSWLR 1 (Hunt J). 700. Dayman v Simpson [1935] SASR 320; Reid v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367. 701. MWJ v R (2005) 80 ALJR 329 at [18] (Gleeson CJ and Heydon J), [38]–[39] (Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ). 702. Thomas v Van Den Yssel (1976) 14 SASR 205; R v Romeo (1982) 30 SASR 243; see also Seymour v ABC (1977) 19 NSWLR 219; Gutierrez v R [1997] 1 NZLR 192; Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [1983] 1 NSWLR 1 at 23–4 (examples given by Hunt J); White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower and Hart (1998) 156 ALR 169 at 216–21 (Goldberg J) (affirmed (1999) 163 ALR 744 at [51]); Brockway v Pando (2000) 22 WAR 405 at [54]–[62]; State Rail Authority of NSW v Brown (2006) 67 NSWLR 540. 703. See, for example, R v Morrow (2009) 26 VR 526; [2009] VR 291 at [46]–[55] (Redlich JA). 704. Payless Superbarn (NSW) Ltd v O’Gara (1990) 19 NSWLR 551; R v Schneidas (No 2) (1981) 4 A Crim R 101 at 110–11 (CCA (NSW)), not followed by McGarvie J in R v Allen [1988] VR 736, nor by the CCA (NSW) in R v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91. 705. Bulstrode v Trimble [1970] VR 840 at 847; Reid v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367 at 375; R v Killick (1980) 24 SASR 137 at 153; Crosthwaite v City of Elizabeth (1989) 51 SASR 105; cf Brown v R [1980] Tas SR 61. See also Leydon v Tomlinson (1979) 22 SASR 302 at 306–7; MWJ v R (2005) 222 ALR 436 at [40] (Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ). 706. See, for example, Scalise v Bezzina [2003] NSWCA 362 at [97] (Mason P). 707. R v Allen [1988] VR 736, which held that the court has no discretion to prevent an accused from calling relevant evidence; and Crosthwaite v City of Elizabeth (1989) 51 SASR 105, in which a trial judge rejected an application in civil proceedings to rule evidence inadmissible on the basis of failure to comply with the rule in Browne v Dunn and awaited further appropriate applications from counsel. But cf R v Thompson (2008) 21 VR 135, where the failure of the prosecutor to cross-examine the accused about why his defence had not been put to prosecution witnesses resulted in a miscarriage of justice when it alleged in its closing address that the reason was that the defence was of recent invention, and in the absence of any direction from the trial judge that it would be improper in these circumstances to draw any such adverse inference against the accused.

708. Bulstrode v Trimble [1970] VR 840 at 849 (Newton J); O’Connell v Adams [1973] Crim LR 113; Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [1983] 1 NSWLR 1 at 18; Paric v John Holland Constructions Pty Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 505 at 507; Masterman Homes Pty Ltd v Palm Assets Pty Ltd (2009) 261 ALR 382; (2009) NSWCA 234 at [105] (Campbell JA). 709. R v Foley [2000] 1 Qd R 290 at [20]: ‘[I]t is now generally recognised in criminal trials that … the judge should simply point out to the jury that the particular matter was not put to the relevant witness; that it should have been so put so that the witness could have the opportunity of dealing with the suggestion; and that the witness has been deprived of the opportunity to give that evidence and the court has been similarly deprived of receiving it’. If there is a dispute about whether the matter was adequately put to the witness in cross-examination then the jury must also be directed to find that it was not before turning to the question of what inference to draw: Beattie v Ball [1999] 3 VR 1 at 5. In this situation it is effectively left to the jury to decide whether the rule in Browne v Dunn has been satisfied. 710. It will be difficult to so argue where the matters are the very material facts in dispute or facts indispensable to proof of these disputed facts: Garrett v Nicholson (1999) 21 WAR 226 at [45]. 711. For example, Beattie v Ball [1999] 3 VR 1; R v Foley [2000] 1 Qd R 300; R v Prasad [2009] SASC 131. Also allowing evidence to rebut the allegation: see, for example, R v Howes (2000) 2 VR 141. But cf R v Thompson (2008) 21 VR 135 (no such inference open in the absence of the prosecution putting to the accused why his defence had not been put to prosecution witnesses in cross-examination) and Theophilus v Police (2011) 110 SASR 420 at [47] (Peek J: suggested inference of recent invention not open and any adverse inference can only be drawn following extreme caution; preferable to recall witnesses for cross-examination). 712. R v Liristis [2004] NSWCCA 287 at [59]–[89] (Kirby J). 713. (1989) 54 SASR 17 at 23. See also SAM v Western Australia (No 2) [2016] WASCA 64 at [36]ff (Corboy J). 714. Followed in R v Birks (1990) 19 NSWLR 677; R v McDowell [1997] 1 VR 473; R v Thompson (2008) 21 VR 135; [2008] VSCA 144 at [59] (Neave JA). See also R v Costi (1988) 48 SASR 269; Pearmine v R [1988] WAR 315; and Pinkstone v R [2003] WASC 66, where the adverse comments of trial judges were upheld. In R v S [1995] 1 Qd R 558, adverse comments on an accused’s failure to testify to matters expressly put to the victim by counsel in cross-examination to avoid any possible adverse inferences were held inappropriate. 715. R v Burns (1999) 107 A Crim R 330 at [30]–[42], [65]–[67], [81]–[91] (inference not open). 716. R v McLaughlin [1999] 2 VR 553; R v Foley [2000] 1 Qd R 290; Abdallah v R [2001] NSWCCA 506 (similar direction where inconsistency between counsel’s opening and evidence given by the accused); R v Camilleri [2001] NSWCCA 527 at [67]–[69]. It is suggested in R v Foley [2000] 1 Qd R 290, that the jury should be directed not to draw an adverse inference unless there is no other reasonable explanation for the omission to cross-examine; but this application of the criminal standard to an inference unlikely to be an indispensable link in a chain of inferential proof is difficult to justify. On the need for detailed direction to prevent jury misunderstanding, see R v Morrow (2009) 26 VR 526; [2009] VSCA 291 at [67]–[71] (Redlich JA). Cf R v Curran (2008) 100 SASR 71 (failure to give a Manunta direction not an error in the circumstances). 717. (2002) 210 CLR 285; and see the discussion at 5.132–5.133. The accused is under no obligation to cross-examine a witness to clear up an inconsistency which may give rise to a reasonable doubt about the prosecution’s case: MWJ v R (2005) 222 ALR 436 at [41] (Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ). 718. [2003] WASCA 66 at [51]. 719. See, for example, Bale v Mills (2011) 81 NSWLR 498; [2011] NSWCA 226 at [85], where failure to put to the crucial witness that his conduct was deceitful was regarded by the appellate court as

preventing proof of that misconduct to the standard demanded by Briginshaw v Briginshaw. Applied in New South Wales v Hunt (2014) 86 NSWLR 226; [2014] NSWCA 47 to a party witness where both counsel had agreed on there being no cross-examination. 720. A mere direction to the jury that the process in Browne v Dunn has not been complied with may be insufficient to avoid successful appeal where the breach has been egregious and has seriously affected the proper conduct of the trial: Baulch v Lyndoch (2010) 27 VR 1; [2010] VSCA 30. See also KC v R (2011) 32 VR 61; [2011] VSCA 82, where judge’s directions criticised for lack of particularity. And it may be a serious misdirection to suggest cross-examination was required by Browne v Dunn when this was not the case: Buchwald v R (2011) 38 VR 199; [2011] VSCA 445 at [11]–[13] (Redlich JA). Contrast Reza v Summerhill Orchards Ltd (2013) 37 VR 204; [2013] VSCA 17, where directions following application to discharge jury following Browne v Dunn breach sufficient to avert a miscarriage of justice. 721. It is difficult to find reported cases where appeals have succeeded as a result of mere breach of the rule, but see R v Hart (1932) 23 Cr App R 202; Dayman v Simpson [1935] SASR 320; Transport Minister v Garry [1973] 1 NZLR 120; Laxy v IBM Australia Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 79; Marelic v Comcare (1993) 121 ALR 114; Smith v Advanced Electrics Pty Ltd [2003] 1 Qd R 65. Appeals are more likely in criminal cases on the ground that the jury has not been adequately directed about the possible inference from an accused’s failure to cross-examine: see, for example, cases referred to in nn 716, 720 above. 722. Section 103 was revised by replacing the requirement for ‘substantial probative value’ following the recommendations of Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [12.20]–[12.30]. Sections 108A and 108B of the Uniform Acts govern the admissibility of credibility evidence relating to persons who have made previous representations but are not witnesses. See Azzi v R [2013] NSWCCA 249 at [47]– [51] (Fullerton J). 723. For a useful illustration of these distinctions, in a case where the evidence is relevant to credibility and facts in issue under the uniform legislation, see, for example, R v Spiteri [2004] NSWCCA 321 (Simpson J). 724. (2005) 219 CLR 196. 725. Despite McHugh J being very much in the minority, the CCA (Vic) quoted his views with approval in R v FTG (2007) 15 VR 685 at [73]–[74], to conclude at [75]–[76] that the defence should have been permitted to call evidence that a complainant had made a false allegation in similar circumstances. This decision might require justification under the ‘bias, interest or corruption’ exception to the collateral evidence rule: see 7.143. In Papazoglou v R (2010) 28 VR 644; [2010] VSCA 201 at [41]–[47] (Maxwell P and Coghlan AJA), the majority approach in Nicholls was emphatically endorsed. 726. This had been held in Adam v R (2001) 207 CLR 96 at [31]–[38] not to be the position under the previous s 102, with the consequence that the credibility rule did not apply so long as evidence was relevant (although not admissible) for a purpose beyond credibility. As a consequence, such evidence as relevant (to credibility) was admissible for that purpose and for any hearsay purpose (s 60) unless excluded in exercise of ss 135–137. 727. For an unsuccessful attempt to create some formal distinction between these terms when directing juries, see R v NRC (No 2) (2001) 124 A Crim R 580 at [50]–[52]. In Dupas v R (2012) 40 VR 182 at 196 [63(c)], the court sought to distinguish between credibility and reliability in applying the Christie discretion embodied in s 137, regarding credibility as always a matter for the jury but permitting a judge to assess reliability when determining probative value to weigh against unfair prejudice. The distinction was rejected by the High Court in R v IMM [2016] HCA 14. See discussion at 2.31. 728. Whether the nuances to be drawn from demeanour are the accurate guide to credibility that the common law assumes them to be is another matter: see Wellborn, ‘Demeanor’ (1991) 76 Cornell LR 1075; Raskin et al (eds), Credibility Assessment: Scientific Research and Applications, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2014. These are also problems for tribunals: see Coffey, ‘The Credibility of Credibility Evidence at the

Refugee Review Tribunal’ (2003) 15 Int’l J Refugee L 377. 729. The verdicts in R v Van Beelen (1972) 4 SASR 353; and Chamberlain v R (No 2) (1984) 153 CLR 521 might not have been reached in the absence of an explanation from the accused which was considered to have been inadequate. For a theoretical justification of the best explanation approach, see Pardo and Allen, ‘Juridical Proof and the Best Explanation’ (2008) 27 Law & Phil 223; and discussion at 1.43–1.44. 730. See generally Lloyd-Bostock and Clifford (eds), Evaluating Witness Evidence, John Wiley and Sons, London, 1983; Wells and Loftus (eds), n 598 above. A sceptical view of this research is found in Coady, n 405 above, Ch 15. Cf Shieber, Testimony: A Philosophical Introduction, Routledge, New York, 2015, Ch 2. For historical insight into some of the early psychological influences, such as Munsterberg, Hutchins and Slesinger, see Park and Saks, ‘Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn’ (2006) 46 Boston College LR 949. 731. See, for example, R v Turner [1975] QB 834; R v Fong [1981] Qd R 90; R v Smith [1987] VR 907; R v C (1993) 60 SASR 467. But cf the more liberal approach of the High Court in Murphy v R (1989) 167 CLR 94; and the CCA (SA) in R v Runjanjic and Kontinnen (1991) 56 SASR 114. See further 7.58. 732. See R v Geesing (1984) 39 SASR 111 and the authorities cited therein; cf R v Doe (1987) 31 CCC (3d) 353; R v Béland [1987] 2 SCR 398. See further 7.109ff. Common law courts, like the United States Federal Court in Frye v US 293 F 1013 (DC Cir, 1923) have generally been resistant to evidence from lie detectors and their precursors: Mallard v R [2003] WASCA 296. Though many organisations, such as the United States military, have been more receptive: US v Scheffer 523 US 303 (1998). For informative socio-legal historical work on polygraphy and its limitations in the United States, see Alder, n 273 above, and Bunn, The Truth Machine: A Social History of the Lie Detector, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 2012. 733. Phillon v R [1978] 1 SCR 18. 734. Lowery v R [1974] AC 85; R v Forde (1986) 19 A Crim R 1 (CCA (Vic)); Uniform Acts ss 108C, 111. See also at 3.80–3.82. 735. Murphy v R (1989) 167 CLR 94; Uniform Acts s 108C. 736. Toohey v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1965] AC 595. See generally Magner, n 130 above, and s 108C of the uniform legislation. 737. Cf R v Smith [1987] VR 907 and on appeal at (1990) 64 ALJR 588 (the High Court refusing leave to appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeal), where psychological testimony on the general dangers of identification testimony was held inadmissible. Interestingly, several Australian courts have considered empirical psychological research when reviewing procedures governing the admissibility and use of identification evidence, for example, Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244. 738. Thus, in R v C (1993) 60 SASR 467, the court ultimately rejected expert psychological testimony on the ground that the jury already had sufficient knowledge of the psychology of children. Though ss 79(2), (3), 80(b) and 108C of the Uniform Acts have begun to facilitate admission. See, for example, Dupas v R (2012) 218 A Crim R 507; [2012] VSCA 328; Gittany v R [2016] NSWCCA 182. 739. Morgan, ‘Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept’ (1948) 62 Harv LR 177. 740. There is an implicit assumption that fact-finders will comprehend limitations with perception and memory or that such limitations might be productively explored through cross-examination. Such assumptions, grounded in the common law and practice associated with the uniform legislation, seem to apply even where problems might be inadvertent or unconscious, or unwittingly influenced by postobservation reinforcement in ways that are not obviously amenable to investigation through questioning or the personal reflections of witnesses. See, for example, Goodman et al, n 161 above; Cossins, n 169

above. 741. Mooney v James [1949] VLR 22 at 28 (Barry J); Hally v Starkey [1962] Qd R 474; Alcoa Australia Ltd v McKenna (2003) 8 VR 45 at [26]–[28] (Chernov JA). The Uniform Acts provide this power specifically in ss 26 and 41 and generally in s 11. 742. R v Funderburk [1990] 1 WLR 587, discussed at [1991] Camb LJ 52. The emphasis given to particular matters by a witness may result in a cross-examination on those matters assuming the status of sufficient relevance to credit. In Funderburk, emotional testimony from the victim to a sexual assault that she had lost her virginity in the assault led to the defence being permitted to cross-examine her about an admission made before the assault that she was not a virgin. Furthermore, it was held that the admissions could be proved in rebuttal if denied because she had made the issue of her virginity crucial to the determination of the case. 743. These provisions remain current in the non-uniform jurisdictions: Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 20 (may disallow); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 23, 24 (duty of the court to decide whether to disallow); Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 25 (duty of court to decide whether to disallow). The majority in HAR v Western Australia (No 2) (2015) 49 WAR 266; [2015] WASCA 249, rejecting the trial judge’s ruling to disallow a question to a complainant, emphasised that under s 25, the question must be allowed, unless the imputation embodied in the question is baseless or totally implausible. The nature of the question rather than the anticipated answer determines the propriety of the question. 744. Current non-uniform provisions: Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 21 (‘a question that uses inappropriate language or is misleading, confusing, annoying, harassing, intimidating, offensive, oppressive or repetitive’); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 22, 25 (may disallow vexatious and must disallow inappropriate questions); Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 26 (court may disallow questions that are ‘improper’ — misleading, unduly annoying, harassing, intimidating, offensive, oppressive or repetitive). 745. In Wakeley v R (1990) 64 ALJR 321 (discussed at (1990) 64 Aust LJ 596), the High Court, while recognising the trial judge’s duty to control cross-examination, disapproved of a judge’s strict attitude which prevented the defence from cross-examining investigating police about their use of drugs and thereby developing a defence that the police had planted the drugs in question upon the accused. This liberal attitude was endorsed in R v Maslen and Shaw (1995) 79 A Crim R 199 at 204 (Hunt CJ at CL); State Rail Authority of NSW v Brown [2006] NSWCA 220 at [20]–[21] (Giles JA). In Stack v Western Australia (2004) 29 WAR 526, a majority held the trial judge in error in not permitting an Aboriginal witness called by the prosecution to be cross-examined by the use of leading questions. While the court recognised the discretion in a court to control the form of questioning, the majority were of the view that ‘great caution’ should be exercised before altering the ordinary form of questioning in crossexamination. 746. Hally v Starkey [1962] Qd R 474 at 478 (Gibbs J); Reid v Kerr (1974) 9 SASR 367 at 374 (Wells J). 747. Assuming the witness will give the answer sought, the assessment is directed to the credibility of the witness and not to the issues in the case: R v Beattie (1996) 40 NSWLR 155 at 162–3; Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustee WA Ltd (2000) 185 ALR 463 at [39]–[40] (Sundberg J); and on appeal at (2000) 106 FCR 51 at [85], [86], [92] (Sackville J). 748. The phrase ‘could substantially affect’ seems to impose a lower standard than the original ‘substantial probative value’ threshold. On the original standard, see R v El-Azzi [2004] NSWCCA 455; Redpath v Hadid [2004] NSWCA 295 at [35] (Sheller JA); R v Galea [2004] NSWCCA 227 at [117] (Ipp JA). Though judges often agreed about the application of the previous standard: R v Lumsden [2003] NSWCCA 83; R v Burns [2003] NSWCCA 30. Further examples of s 103 causing judges to hesitate before permitting cross-examination include Jacara Pty Ltd v Perpetual Trustees WA Ltd (2000) 185 ALR 463 at [41] (Sundberg J), upheld on appeal at (2000) 106 FCR 51 at [92]–[96] (Sackville J); Brown v Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 47 ATR 143 at [1]–[5].

749. See the remarks of Wells J in R v Gun; Ex parte Stephenson (1977) 17 SASR 165 at 185; see also 3.142ff. 750. Bugg v Day (1949) 79 CLR 442 at 463–8 (Dixon J), although in that case the circumstances contrived to make even a traffic conviction relevant to credit.

751. For example, Clifford v Clifford [1961] 1 WLR 1274 at 1275–6 (Cairns J). 752. R v Aldridge (1990) 20 NSWLR 737 at 741 (Hunt J). 753. This legislation is based on s 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1865 (UK): Uniform Acts s 106(2)(b) (‘an offence’); Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 16 (‘any indictable or other offence’); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 26 (‘any offence’); Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 23(1) (‘any indictable offence’). 754. R v Aldridge (1990) 20 NSWLR 737; R v Millar (1998) 103 A Crim R 526 at 530 (McPherson JA). 755. Even where it is the accused who is the witness. In Phillips v R (1985) 159 CLR 45, the majority expressed no reservations about the relevance of housebreaking convictions to credit. Deane J was rather more sceptical. Compare with the attitude of Dowd J in R v Fowler (SC(NSW), 15 May 1997, unreported). And for a greater willingness, in a slightly different context, to look more closely at the relevance of prior convictions, see R v Millar (1998) 103 A Crim R 526 at 531 (McPherson JA). 756. Section 41(1) and (2) of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) and Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT); ‘vulnerable witness’ — defined in s 41(4). See Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [5.70]–[5.132]. 757. Kurgeil and Kurgeil v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (1990) 54 SASR 125 at 130 (Cox J). 758. Nicholls v R; Coates v R (2005) 219 CLR 196 at [39], [55] (McHugh J). 759. See the discussion in Zuckerman, ‘Evidence’ [1982] All England Law Reports Annual Review 126, pp 128–9. 760. Harris v Tippett (1811) 2 Camp 637; 170 ER 1277 (Lawrence J); Piddington v Bennett and Wood (1940) 62 CLR 533 at 545 (Latham CJ); R v Livingstone [1987] 1 Qd R 38; Kurgeil and Kurgeil v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (1990) 54 SASR 125 at 130; Natta v Canham (1991) 32 FCR 282 at 300. 761. In the uniform legislation, s 101A defines ‘credibility evidence’ in terms of ‘credibility’ and the legislation’s Dictionary definition of credibility is inclusive rather than definitive. 762. As, for example, in R v Funderburk [1990] 1 WLR 587 (discussed at n 742); Natta v Canham (1991) 32 FCR 282; Bannister v R (1993) 10 WAR 484; and HML v R (2008) 235 CLR 334 (discussed at 7.89). See also Narkle v R (2001) 23 WAR 468 at [33], where Murray J explains that the question is not whether the matter goes to credit but whether it can also be regarded as relevant ‘to the facts in issue, at least in the sense that the answers given “may fairly influence the belief of the jury as to a matter in dispute”’: see Piddington v Bennett and Wood Pty Ltd (1940) 63 CLR 533 at 545 (Latham CJ). The better view is that there is no special rule applying in sexual assault cases: Narkle v R (2001) 23 WAR 468 at [44]–[49]. Cf Heydon J in HML. 763. Attorney-General v Hitchcock (1847) 1 Exch 91 at 99; 154 ER 38 at 42 (Pollock CB). In Natta v Canham (1991) 32 FCR 282, the shortcomings of this as a definitive test are adverted to. 764. The need to resort ultimately to this flexible notion is expressly recognised in R v Funderburk [1990] 1 WLR 587 at 598; Natta v Canham (1991) 32 FCR 282 at 295–300; Urban Transport Authority of NSW v Nweiser (1992) 28 NSWLR 471; R v Hawes (1994) 35 NSWLR 294 at 301 (Hunt CJ at CL); R v Palmer (1998) 193 CLR 1 at 23–4 (McHugh J); R v V (1998) 100 A Crim R 488 at 493–5; Narkle v R (2001) 23 WAR 468 at [35]; R v Lawrence [2002] 2 Qd R 400 at [10]–[14] (McPherson JA); Goldsmith v Sandilands (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [3] (Gleeson CJ), [39]–[41] (McHugh J), [70] (Kirby J), [83] (Hayne J), [96]–[103] (Callinan J); R v Musolino (2003) 86 SASR 37 at [112]ff (Lander J). In Natta v Canham, the court explains (at 300) that the rule in question ‘is a rule of practice related to the proper management of litigation. A trial judge should not be precluded from determining in an appropriate case that the matter on which a witness’s credit is tested is sufficiently relevant to that credit as it bears upon issues in the case that such evidence may be admitted’. For an interesting example of a court refusing to inquire into a sexual assault victim’s similar but allegedly untrue allegations against another

man, for fear of distracting the jury from the events in issue, see R v S [1992] Crim LR 307. Whether a court would permit an accused to pursue allegations of previous police fabrication beyond crossexamination is discussed in Pattenden, ‘Evidence of Previous Malpractices by Police Witnesses and R v Edwards’ [1992] Crim LR 549. 765. (1940) 63 CLR 533. 766. (2002) 190 ALR 370 at [3] (Gleeson CJ), [39]–[41] (McHugh J), [70] (Kirby J), [83] (Hayne J), [96]– [103] (Callinan J). 767. (2005) 219 CLR 196. 768. [1969] 1 QB 299. Discussed and applied in R v Hanrahan [1967] 2 NSWR 717, 718–19; R v BDX [2009] VSCA 28 at [26]–[49]; R v J, SM (2012) 117 SASR 535; [2012] SASCFC 96. 769. See Katz, ‘Extrinsic Proof of Prior Conviction to Impeach Credibility in New South Wales’ (1990) 6 Aust Bar Rev 176. 770. The uniform legislation (s 106(2)(b)) applies to ‘an offence, including an offence against the law of a foreign country’. In Queensland, the legislation extends to any ‘indictable or other offence’, in South Australia to ‘any offence’ and in Western Australia to ‘any indictable offence’. 771. For example, Criminal Records Act 1991 (NSW) s 16; Criminal Law (Rehabilitation of Offenders) Act 1986 (Qld) (applied in R v Millar (1998) 103 A Crim R 526); Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 15A; Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (UK) ss 4, 7(1) (discussed in Thomas v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1997] 2 WLR 593). 772. The importance of putting the specific evidence of bias — rather than only the general allegation — to the witness in cross-examination is starkly illustrated in Nicholls v R; Coates v R (2005) 219 CLR 196 (particularly McHugh J at [88], [90], Gummow and Callinan JJ at [189], and Hayne and Heydon JJ at [272]–[283]) where failure to do so was crucial in the High Court’s unanimous finding that the judge was correct in refusing to permit that evidence being called. Under s 106(1) of the uniform legislation, it is enough that the ‘substance of the evidence’ is put to the witness. This appears to give more latitude to cross-examining counsel. 773. Other examples of bias can be found in R v S (1998) 103 A Crim R 101 at 107–9 (CCA (Qld)) (coaching); R v Harrington [1998] 3 VR 531 (cold treatment by girlfriend’s parents gave victim a motive to fabricate and fantasise allegations against the father); R v LSS [2000] 1 Qd R 546 (coaching). Cf R v PMC (2004) 11 VR 175; [2004] VSCA 225 at [30]–[33] (prior acquittal of accused of offences against a witness insufficient to establish bias of that witness or that he influenced other witnesses to give false evidence); MJH v Western Australia (2006) 33 WAR 9 at [91] (Roberts-Smith JA), [137]–[138] (McLure JA) (complainant’s relationship with mother incapable of establishing bias). 774. (1936) 26 Cr App R 17. 775. (1847) 1 Exch 91; 154 ER 38. 776. (2005) 219 CLR 196. 777. Police corruption of itself does not give rise to the exception: R v Roberts (2004) 9 VR 295 at [91] (Batt JA). 778. [1961] VR 242. 779. See generally Magner, n 130 above; Harris, ‘The Admissibility of Expert Evidence on the Reliability of Witnesses’ (1992) 13 Qld Lawyer 3. If of sufficient relevance it would generally be inappropriate to call such evidence without first cross-examining appropriately to satisfy the fairness requirements of the rule in Browne v Dunn: see R v Robinson (1994) 98 Crim App R 370. There is no breach of the rule where the matter was not in issue: Director, Office of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2013] FCAFC 8 at [104]–[110] (Besanko and Perram JJ), [133]–[135]

(Bromberg J). 780. (2001) 51 NSWLR 736. But see discussion at 7.112 noting that such evidence is now permitted by s 108C; and see Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [12.108]ff. 781. [1965] AC 595. 782. [1972] Crim LR 99. 783. R v Smith [1987] VR 907. 784. See R v Murray (1982) 7 A Crim R 48; Mallard v R [2003] WASCA 296 at [373] (per curiam); and cf R v Doe (1987) 31 CCC (3d) 353. See generally Elliott, ‘Lie Detector Evidence: Lessons from the American Experience’ in Campbell and Waller (eds), Well and Truly Tried, Law Book Company, Sydney, 1982; Gudjonsson, ‘Lie Detection: Techniques and Countermeasures’ in Lloyd-Bostock and Clifford (eds), n 730 above, Ch 8; Horvath, ‘Detecting Deception in Eyewitness Cases: Problems and Prospects in the use of the Polygraph’ in Wells and Loftus (eds), n 598 above, Ch 10; Alder, n 273 above. 785. State Bank of New South Wales v Lawrence (Cohen J, 1987, unreported) referred to in Magner, n 130 above. 786. Compare with Murphy v R (1989) 167 CLR 94, where it was the accused’s intellectual capacity that was in issue. 787. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) ss 18–19; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 28, 29; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 21, 22. 788. R v Walker (1993) 61 SASR 260. 789. (1820) 2 Brod & Bing 286; 129 ER 976. For the history of the case, see Stern and Gnosh, ‘A Visit with Queen Caroline: Her Trial and its Rule’ (1976) 6 Capital ULR 165; Lord Denning, Landmarks in the Law, Butterworths, Sydney, 1984, pp 177–84; McGeachie, ‘The Principle of Orality’, unpublished honours dissertation, Law School, Adelaide University, 1986, pp 29ff. 790. An accused tendering evidence beyond character witnesses and his or her own testimony in defence at common law loses the right of having the last word to the jury. This is modified by legislation for criminal cases in most jurisdictions: see 2.11. 791. R v Umanski [1961] VR 242. It does not make previously inadmissible documents admissible: R v Musolino (2003) 86 SASR 37 at [108] (Lander J); Nicholls v R; Coates v R (2005) 219 CLR 196 at [280] (Hayne and Heydon JJ). And if the statements are in a document it must be a document made or adopted by the witness: cf DPP (Vic) v McEwan (No 2) (2012) 221 A Crim R 21; [2012] VSC 170 (accused could not be cross-examined upon the defence response prepared and filed by his lawyer). 792. Therefore, any document containing the inconsistent statements cannot be automatically tendered in its entirety, only those portions necessary to establish the particular inconsistencies alleged in crossexamination: Alchin v Commissioner of Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 (Jordon CJ). Nor should a trial judge allow inconsistent statements to be put under threat that he or she will then allow unrelated previous consistent statements to be led: R v Bartlett [1996] 2 VR 687 at 696–7 (Winneke P). 793. R v Trotter [1977] Tas SR 133. To be so relevant the statement does not have to itself be relevant and admissible to prove the crime charged: see MJH v Western Australia (2006) 33 WAR 9 at [71] (RobertsSmith JA: ‘The test … [is] whether, on the way the prosecution presented its case, the evidence challenged was sufficiently closely related to the subject matter of the indictment for justice to require investigation for the basis of such a challenge’), [127] (McLure JA: ‘[T]here must be a connection between the content of the prior inconsistent statement and the subject matter of the proceedings. I accept that “the subject-matter of the proceedings” means the facts in issue and the facts relevant to a fact in issue in the proceedings’), [159] (Buss JA: ‘[I]f the prior statement and [a fact in issue or relevant

to a fact in issue] are so related to each other that, according to the common course of events, the prior statement, either taken by itself or in connection with other facts, could rationally affect, directly or indirectly, the assessment of the probability of the existence or non-existence of the fact in question’). 794. See, for example, Kurgeil and Kurgeil v Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd (1990) 54 SASR 125 at 130 (Cox J); Narkle v R (2001) 23 WAR 468; R v Musolino (2003) 86 SASR 37 at [110]–[112] (Lander J); MJH v Western Australia (2006) 33 WAR 9 at [63]–[64], [75]–[77] (Roberts-Smith JA), [130]–[132] (McLure JA), [160]–[161] (Buss JA). 795. For example, R v Umanski [1961] VR 242; Nicholls v R; Coates v R (2005) 219 CLR 196. 796. (2005) 219 CLR 196 at [272]–[283] (Hayne and Heydon JJ). 797. The Queen’s Case (1820) 2 Brod & Bin 284; 129 ER 976. 798. (1995) 183 CLR 121. 799. [1989] AC 288. 800. Alchin v Commissioner of Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 at 509 (Jordon CJ); Webbie v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1968) 12 FLR 271 at 279; R v Thynne [1977] VR 98. 801. R v Thynne [1977] VR 98. See generally Stuesser, ‘Admitting Prior Inconsistent Statements for Their Truth’ (1992) 71 Can Bar Rev 48. 802. R v Mursic [1980] Qd R 482, where it was held that the accused who admitted making a statement to the police but denied having believed in its truth did not distinctly admit for the purposes of the section. There is authority for the proposition that once a witness denies a statement made in a recording the recording may be proved and tendered although the witness does not persist in the denial after hearing the recording: R v Soma (2001) 22 A Crim R 537 at [32] (CCA (Qld)); upheld on appeal at (2003) 212 CLR 299 at [25] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ), but contrast view of McHugh J at [56]–[57] that once a prior statement is admitted then the requirement for independent proof of it disappears. 803. There is no compulsion to tender it (Wood v Desmond (1958) 78 WN (NSW) 65), nor does the opponent have any entitlement to prove it (TPC v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1983) 56 ALR 647 at 681). 804. Or authenticating an accurate recording of that oral statement: Waters Motors Pty Ltd v Cratchley [1964] NSWR 1085. Care would have to be taken against playing the entirety of such a recording to any jury: R v Bragg (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 436. 805. It is important that previous statements be strictly proved: Price v Bevan (1974) 8 SASR 81. Crossexamination upon a previous written statement should therefore not take place unless that writing can be readily produced to establish the contradiction: R v Anderson (1929) 21 Cr App R 178. 806. Cheney v R (1991) 28 FCR 103, where it was held that allowing a prosecutor to reopen the case in order to prove an inconsistent statement by a defence witness gave undue emphasis to inconsistency and caused a miscarriage of justice. It seems the practice in New South Wales is to permit reopening: R v Soma (2003) 212 CLR 299 at [23]. 807. See n 801 and R v CBL and BCT [2014] 2 Qd R 331; [2014] QCA 93 at [143]–[158] (Muir JA, Gotterson and Douglas JJA agreeing) holding that prior statement only admissible to credibility as neither s 101 applied nor did witness admit the truth of the statement’s contents. 808. Driscoll v R (1977) 137 CLR 517 at 535–7 (Gibbs J); Morris v R (1987) 163 CLR 454 at 468–9 (Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ emphasising need for jury to be carefully directed when a prior statement is admissible as hearsay evidence against an accused); Soma v R (2003) 212 CLR 299 at 334 (Callinan J); R v CBL and BCT [2014] 2 Qd R 331; [2014] QCA 93 at [143]–[158] (Muir JA, Gotterson and Douglas JJA agreeing).

809. Savanoff v Re-Car Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 219 at 229. 810. Section 45 of the uniform legislation is in slightly different form but the power is as wide (in Matthews v SPI Electricity (Ruling No 17) [2013] VSC 146 at [21], Forrest J characterised s 45 as ‘exceptionally broad’). The power to order production assumes that any document containing the prior statement put in cross-examination is capable of being produced and cross-examination should not proceed if it is not: R v Anderson (1929) 21 Cr App R 178. 811. This is the narrow ground upon which the decision in the controversial case of R v Jack (1894) 15 LR (NSW) 196 can be justified. See also Hrysikos v Mansfield (2002) 5 VR 485 at [80] (Eames JA). Insofar as R v Jack stands for any wider rule, that rule may be doubted: see Webbie v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1968) 12 FLR 271 at 278; Maddison v Goldrick [1976] 1 NSWLR 651 at 660. But in J Boag and Son Brewing Ltd v Bridon Investments Pty Ltd (2001) 10 Tas R 26 at [15], Slicer J accepted: ‘[I]f the crossexaminer directly or indirectly gets any of the contents of a document to the tribunal of fact he can be required to tender the document … during the course of cross-examination’. 812. Meredith v Innes (1931) 31 SR (NSW) 104 at 112; Alchin v Commissioner of Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 at 509 (Jordan CJ); Webbie v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (1968) 12 FLR 271 at 277–9 (Fox J); R v Weatherstone (1968) 12 FLR 14 at 17 (Smithers J); R v Walker (1993) 61 SASR 260 at 268 (Duggan J). 813. See Starke, ‘Cross-Examination Based on Documents’ (1945) 19 Aust LJ 262; McHugh, ‘CrossExamination on Documents’ (1985) 1 Aust Bar Rev 51; Malcolm, ‘Cross-Examination on Documents’ (1986) 2 Aust Bar Rev 267; McNamara, ‘Cross-Examination of a Party on Pleadings’ (1989) 5 Aust Bar Rev 176; Arnold, ‘Use of Documents in Courts’ (1990) 20 Qld LSJ 35; Phillips, ‘Cross-examination and Documents’ (1990) 64 Aust LJ 591. 814. R v Orton [1922] VLR 496; R v Bedington [1970] Qd R 353; Alister v R (1984) 154 CLR 404 at 442–3 (Wilson and Dawson JJ). Hunt CJ at CL in R v Hawes (1994) 35 NSWLR 294 at 303 doubts the validity of this practice. See also Chesterman J in Southern Cross Mine Management Pty Ltd v Ensham Resources Pty Ltd [2006] 2 Qd R 145, holding it impermissible to cross-examine a witness upon the statement or document of another witness in the proceedings. 815. R v Sehan (Yousry) (1914) 11 Cr App R 13 at 18; R v Gillespie (1967) 51 Cr App R 172; cf R v Jack (1894) 15 LR (NSW) 196, which suggests that whenever a document is identified during crossexamination the cross-examiner must undertake to tender the document. But this cannot be interpreted to permit references to documents that are inadmissible. Cross-examination upon inadmissible documents should not be permitted. Illegitimate reference to an inadmissible document may give the opponent the option to compel tender: Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630; J Boag and Son Brewing Ltd v Bridon Investments Pty Ltd (2001) 10 Tas R 26 at [15]. Any tender should be made during crossexamination (to facilitate explanation during re-examination): Dawson J in R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671 at 689–91; J Boag and Son Brewing Ltd v Bridon Investments Pty Ltd (2001) 10 Tas R 26 at [15]. 816. See, for example, Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich [2006] NSWSC 643 (Austin J). 817. Alchin v Commissioner of Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 at 508–9 (Jordan CJ). Apparently this practice was followed in New South Wales: McHugh, ‘Cross-examination on Documents’, n 813 above, at 56. 818. Darby v Ousley (1856) 1 Hurl & Nor 1; 156 ER 1093; Henman v Lester (1862) 12 CB (NS) 776; 142 ER 1347; R v Banks (1916) 12 Cr App R 74 at 75–6. See also the discussion in McHugh, n 813 above. 819. (1937) 57 CLR 630. 820. Senat v Senat [1965] P 172. 821. R v Weatherstone (1968) 12 FLR 14.

822. For example, a reference in cross-examination to parts of a document not used to refresh the witness’s memory: Senat v Senat [1965] P 172. 823. R v Kingston [1986] 2 Qd R 114 at 126 (Macrossan J). In R v Moore (1995) 77 A Crim R 577 at 583, Hunt CJ at CL suggests that where possible this procedure should be used rather than a formal call, adding that, without exhausting other possibilities, a formal call need only be made where a party wishes to tender the document in evidence or wishes to lay a foundation for the admissibility of secondary evidence of a document. 824. R v Moore (1995) 77 A Crim R 577. 825. For example, Savanoff v Re-Car Pty Ltd [1983] 2 Qd R 219 at 229. 826. R v Lavery (No 2) (1979) 20 SASR 430 at 449–52 (Wells J); R v Szach (1980) 23 SASR 504 at 511–19 (Wells J); Wentworth v Rogers (No 10) (1987) 8 NSWLR 398 at 409; Phillips v R [2015] SASCFC 67 at [52]–[57] (Sulan, Nicholson and Lovell JJ). 827. R v Nation [1954] SASR 189, where it was suggested in cross-examination that a witness was a disgruntled rebuffed homosexual and re-examination could establish he was a policeman acting under orders to investigate a circle of vice; Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1969] VR 323; and R v Saleam (1989) 41 A Crim R 108 (CCA (NSW)), where an attack on the witness’s honesty in crossexamination could be restored in re-examination by revealing the absence of criminal convictions. 828. Alchin v Commissioner of Railways (1935) 35 SR (NSW) 498 at 509 (Jordan CJ); cf Meredith v Innes (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 104, where a document was not authenticated and could not therefore be tendered. See also The Queen’s Case (1820) 2 Brod & Bin 284 at 297–8; 129 ER 976 at 981. 829. R v J (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 at 534 (Brooking J), referring to Wojcic v Incorporated Nominal Defendant [1969] VR 323; and R v Phair [1986] 1 Qd R 136. 830. Prince v Samo (1838) 7 Ad & El 627; 112 ER 606. 831. R v Clune (No 1) [1975] VR 723 at 734. 832. But exceptionally a court may permit a witness to be led in re-examination: Rawcliffe v R (2000) 22 WAR 490 at [8]–[26] (Kennedy ACJ), [50]–[56] (Miller J). 833. Uniform Acts s 108. 834. On reopening by the prosecution, see generally R v Chin (1985) 157 CLR 671; and 2.8–2.9. 835. R v C (1993) 60 SASR 467; R v J (1994) 75 A Crim R 522; R v Robinson [1994] 3 All ER 346; R v F (1995) 83 A Crim R 502. 836. (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 at 534. 837. Cf the contrary view expressed in R v Hickman (1993) 60 SASR 415 at 418–19, 426–7. 838. If this is the justification for the admissibility of the prior consistent statement it must be capable of rebutting the suggestion of invention: Abdul-Kader v R [2007] NSWCCA 329 at [42]–[64] (Beazley JA); R v Syed [2008] NSWCCA 37 at [50] (Hulme J). 839. R v KNP (2006) 67 NSWLR 227 (consistent statement may reinstate credibility even where it does not respond to or elucidate the inconsistent statement). 840. Ibid (inconsistent statement led in-chief by prosecution in pursuance of its obligation to put evidence of all relevant events before the jury). 841. [2002] NSWCCA 402.

[page 895]

Chapter Eight

Hearsay Scope of the Hearsay Rule Rationale and definition 8.1 In Chapter 7, it was shown that the common law has constructed a sophisticated and elaborate procedure for determining the reliability of the relevant experiences which constitute the testimony of witnesses. This procedure demands that these experiences be reported directly and orally to the court, from memory, and subjected to the safeguards of examination-in-chief and crossexamination. By this procedure, the trier of fact is placed in the best position to interpret the report, to determine (from the way the report is given and the witness’s demeanour) its sincerity, and to make an assessment (from detailed questions put to the witness) of the witness’s capacity accurately to observe (or otherwise sense) and recall those relevant experiences. The assumption of the common law is that these experiences of the world provide the fundamental evidence from which facts and events can be inferred and that by this procedure the material facts in issue are most likely to be accurately determined. 8.2 But to ensure that this procedure is effective demands also that witnesses to those relevant experiences report their experiences directly to the court. This is the function of the hearsay rule that prohibits these experiences being put indirectly to the court, either through the tender of documents reporting (asserting) those experiences or through the calling of witnesses who have had those experiences reported (asserted) to them. Thus the hearsay rule complements

a particular procedure of fact discovery assumed the most conducive to rectitude of decision.1 This faith in the procedural [page 896] system is reflected in the dictum of Lord Normand, so often quoted as explaining the rationale of the hearsay rule:2 The rule against the admission of hearsay is fundamental. It is not the best evidence and it is not delivered upon oath. The truthfulness and accuracy of the person whose words are spoken to by another witness cannot be tested by cross-examination, and the light which his demeanour would throw on his testimony is lost.

What does not logically follow from this explanation is that the law should insist that all experiences of relevant facts and events be reported directly to the court. The procedural system exists to ensure accurate fact-finding and therefore should give way in the face of reliable experiences that cannot be reported directly. And there are situations where this is so. Consequentially, there is a tension in the law between upholding a particular procedural system on the one hand, and receiving otherwise sufficiently reliable information on the other. Assuming the importance of the procedure described above, the problem is to devise an exclusionary rule that resolves this tension. There are two possible approaches. 8.3 By the first, which is the approach most often assumed,3 the law may prohibit all hearsay evidence — all evidence deriving probative value from the experience of a witness not reported (asserted) directly to the court4 — and then subject this broad general prohibition to well defined exceptions to allow the receipt of probative hearsay evidence. The broad definition, in that it comprises all out-of-court assertions of relevant experiences, be they express or implied and be they contained in words or conduct, will include much reliable information, but if the common law is perceived dynamically judges can create new exceptions to ensure reliable hearsay is admitted. However, if the common law is perceived statically, or is slow to create exceptions, and existing exceptions are insufficient, this approach breaks down. 8.4 Yet this is exactly the situation that initially developed at common law in England. In Myers v DPP,5 the House of Lords made it clear that English courts would take no responsibility for creating further exceptions to the hearsay rule,

declaring that it was now up to the legislature to avoid the results of a strict application of the common law hearsay rule. The House rejected as hearsay the manufacturer’s microfiche record of numbers stamped indelibly upon car engines (tendered to identify cars allegedly stolen and disguised by the accused). The probative value of the record derived from assertions based upon the observations of an unknown employee, [page 897] not therefore able to be called as a witness, and reported indirectly to the court. The prosecutor argued that the system for observing and recording the numbers was a guarantee of the reliability of the assertions in the report, that the employee who observed the numbers in question could not be now identified and called, and that the tender of such reliable information could not be regarded as undermining the usual procedural safeguards. But the majority refused to create any exception to the general prohibition saying that was a matter for the legislature (which immediately passed the Criminal Evidence Act 1965 (UK) to admit such business records; little consolation to the prosecutors in Myers).6 The approach taken in Myers was applied by a majority of the House of Lords 27 years later in R v Kearley.7 To establish that the accused was in possession of drugs with intent to supply, the prosecution tendered police evidence of the interception of 10 telephone calls and seven personal visits made to the accused’s house, in which the callers asked to speak to or see the accused about the supply of drugs. The majority, defining hearsay broadly, analysed the evidence as hearsay as its relevance was based upon an implicit assertion by various callers, not called as witnesses, that they believed, either as a result of their direct experiences or as a result of what they had been told, that their call was made to premises where the accused was carrying on a business to supply drugs. Once the evidence had been identified as hearsay, the majority was constrained by the approach in Myers to exclude the evidence and could not use the obvious reliability, created by the coincidence of such a large number of calls by unrelated persons, to admit the evidence in exception to the hearsay prohibition. Thus, if the hearsay prohibition is formulated broadly, and a conservative (and un-common-law-like) attitude is taken towards the creation of exceptions, the result is, in the absence of legislative intervention, the exclusion of much reliable

evidence. The existing common law exceptions to the hearsay prohibition are a quite inadequate catalogue of the circumstances where hearsay evidence is sufficiently reliable to admit; and admit without unduly undermining the procedure requiring witnesses to report their relevant experiences directly and orally to the court. 8.5 In Australia, the High Court indicated in a number of cases that it was prepared to take a more adventurous approach to clearly reliable hearsay evidence. Although uncertain of the exact scope of the hearsay prohibition, in Walton v R,8 R v Benz9 and Pollitt v R,10 the majority view was that if the prohibition leads to the exclusion of [page 898] clearly reliable evidence and its tender is required if facts in issue are to be accurately determined, then exceptions would be evolved to avoid this consequence.11 In Pollitt v R, the majority was prepared to admit (in some circumstances) evidence of the spontaneous greetings and other identifying formalities of the one party to a telephone conversation to prove the identity of the other party to the call. Such implicit assertions of identity by a witness not called to testify clearly fall within a broad definition of hearsay, and the majority appeared to apply a broad definition, but the general reliability of spontaneous and reactive assertions and the need for their tender persuaded the majority to generally admit such identifying assertions in exception to the hearsay prohibition. Mason CJ in Walton v R (at 293) was of the view that a more general exception based upon the reliability of the evidence, often the situation in the case of implied assertions, should be available. 8.6 The consequence of being prepared to admit ‘new’ exceptions to the hearsay rule is that it makes it less necessary to limit the broad scope of the hearsay prohibition. But there are difficulties in taking a wide approach to hearsay and subjecting it to exceptions, particularly exceptions of a general nature. This approach may be attractive to a High Court judge who can rule with definitive authority. It is not so attractive to a trial judge who wants more guidance on questions of admissibility, nor to parties who do not want to waste their resources disputing the admissibility of evidence through the court hierarchy. It was really

the uncertainty inherent in this approach which persuaded Lord Reid in Myers v DPP12 to ask parliament to intervene, not just on a case-by-case basis but through general reform following a wide survey of the whole field. Subsequent to Pollitt, the High Court reverted to a more restrictive approach to hearsay at common law. In Bannon v R,13 an accused sought to have admitted as evidence in his favour out-of-court statements of a co-accused which it was argued implied that that co-accused was solely responsible for the crime alleged. To avoid the hearsay prohibition it was argued that the court could, on the basis of dicta in Walton, Benz and Pollitt, either confirm a general flexible exception to the prohibition where the evidence could be regarded as sufficiently reliable in the circumstances; confirm a specific exception admitting statements against the maker’s penal interest; or follow Canadian authority and create an exception based on notions of necessity and reliability. No member of the court was prepared to meet the argument head on, the court being unanimous that, on the facts, even if one or other of these exceptions applied, there were no guarantees of reliability which could justify applying any of [page 899] them to the facts of the case before them. But there is an air of caution in the judgments, particularly those of Brennan CJ and McHugh J, who are reluctant to give discretions to trial judges and to create further common law exceptions in the face of growing legislative reform to the hearsay rule, most particularly the comprehensive provisions of the uniform legislation.14 In Baker v R,15 where the statements of a co-accused were so equivocal that there was no miscarriage of justice, the majority rejected counsel’s invitation to change the common law in respect of third party confessions in Queensland to bring it into line with the position under the uniform legislation. 8.7 These arguments suggest a second approach in common law jurisdictions, that rather than focusing upon the creation of new exceptions to the hearsay prohibition it may be more productive to focus on the scope of the prohibition itself, for that has never been definitively interpreted. What is needed is a prohibition not extending to evidence that, although dependent upon the reliability of an out-of-court assertion for its probative value, is nevertheless generally sufficiently reliable to admit, and where admission will not unduly

undermine the procedure whereby relevant facts are proved by calling witnesses who have experienced them. A narrower definition can provide more guidance to trial judges by making the need for exceptions less acute and by itself taking up some of the tension between upholding a particular procedural system on the one hand and receiving reliable information on the other. Indeed, it seems that overall, the authorities show that the common law hearsay prohibition may not be so wide as is generally assumed. Given that the prohibition seeks to ensure that experiences of facts are asserted directly to the court not indirectly via another to whom the assertion was conveyed, it does not necessarily follow that all evidence dependent for its relevance upon an out-ofcourt assertion of experience (fact) should be excluded. It is the indirect report that the law centrally seeks to prohibit; that is, hearsay evidence in testimonial form — the form in which experiences are reported directly to a court — whereby experiences are reported through statements (words or other symbols for communication) narrating them. Thus it might be argued that the hearsay prohibition extends only to the reception of out-of-court statements tendered to prove asserted experiences of relevant facts or events narrated in such [page 900] statements. If there is no out-of-court statement, the rule has no field of operation. If there is an out-of-court statement, the rule operates only insofar as the statement is tendered to establish those asserted facts or events narrated in it; furthermore, if the statement has probative value that arises independently of the assertions of fact contained in the narration, then it may be received to that extent. If the statement does not make assertions by way of narrative, it may be received to prove those non-narrative assertions. The argument is that it is because non-narrative assertions cannot be reproduced later in court in testimonial form that their reception should not lead to automatic exclusion as hearsay.16 8.8 The uniform legislation defines prohibited hearsay in s 59(1): Evidence of a previous representation made by a person is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert by the representation.

Although this widely embraces representations made through words or conduct, it uses the idea of intention to limit the assertions to which it applies17 (s 59 is

discussed further at 8.27 below). It is argued that intention is also central to the idea of narration isolated in the previous paragraph, the very essence of the testimonial presentation of evidence being an intention to assert relevant facts experienced. In many situations, out-of-court representations made other than in words are unlikely to have been intended to assert anything. The application of both limits — narrative and intention — to contentious situations will be considered in the following discussion of the common law prohibition. The extensive exceptions to the hearsay prohibition created by the uniform legislation will be considered more generally in the context of statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule. 8.9 Judicial formulations of the common law hearsay prohibition are not easy to find. The formulation usually used defines hearsay as an out-of-court statement tendered to establish as true assertions of fact made in that statement. The most quoted dictum to this effect is that found in Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor:18 Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay

[page 901] and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement but the fact that it was made.

Members of the High Court define hearsay in similar terms. In Walton v R,19 Mason CJ says ‘the hearsay rule applies only to out-of-court statements tendered for the purpose of directly proving that the facts are as asserted in the statement’. In Pollitt v R,20 Brennan J says ‘evidence of an out-of-court statement tendered to prove the truth of some fact asserted by the maker of the statement, expressly or impliedly, is prima facie inadmissible’, while Dawson and Gaudron JJ state (at 601–3): ‘The rule against hearsay excludes evidence of an out-of-court statement if tendered to prove the truth of the matter stated’. McHugh J quotes (at 620) the above definition in Subramaniam. The majority in Bull v R21 explain hearsay in terms of ‘statements made out-of-court … adduced as evidence of the facts asserted’. Each of these definitions requires that the assertion be made, expressly or impliedly, in an out-of-court statement. Assertions implicit in mere conduct are

apparently outside the hearsay prohibition (although this remains controversial, as the discussion below will explain). 8.10 The formulation of the Privy Council in Ratten v R is probably intended to emphasise the same ideas: ‘A question of hearsay only arises when the words spoken are relied upon testimonially, ie, as establishing some fact narrated by the words’.22 But the use in this dictum of the words ‘testimonially’ and ‘narrated’ suggests there may be a further limitation on the hearsay prohibition, the limitation identified above — that the statement must be a narrative report of a past observation. Certainly, those cases commonly discussed under the heading of res gestae point to this requirement, regarding as hearsay only assertive statements amounting to the narration of a past event. It will be argued below, although the matter remains contentious, that these res gestae cases are better regarded not only as dealing with a quite separate exception to the hearsay prohibition, but also as illustrating this limit to the very common law hearsay prohibition. Decisions holding that statements asserting belief, knowledge and intention fall outside the hearsay prohibition further support this analysis. These points are developed in the following paragraphs, and it is argued that the narrow hearsay prohibition here put forward is consistent with many decisions in this area, and that the cases cannot be reconciled with a hearsay prohibition in its widest form. 8.11 At the outset, it might be useful to give an example to clarify the difference between the hearsay prohibition at its broadest and the more limited prohibition which is here advocated. In Wright v Doe d Tatham,23 Baron Parke suggested that an [page 902] attempt to establish the seaworthiness of a lost ship by calling a witness to testify that, prior to the departure of the ship in question, it was carefully inspected by the captain, who then boarded with his family and sailed, would be prohibited as hearsay. Such evidence is broadly hearsay as it can only establish the seaworthiness of the ship through reliance upon an assertion of seaworthiness implicit in the captain’s reported conduct. Only upon the assumption that the captain’s (implied) out-of-court assertion of seaworthiness is true does the evidence have probative value. But on the narrower approach here advocated the evidence is not prohibited hearsay because the assertion of seaworthiness is not made in

testimonial form; that is, it is not made through a statement by the captain narrating an assertion of the ship’s seaworthiness (although apparently caught by s 59(1) of the uniform legislation as a representation constituted by conduct, it is questionable whether, even objectively from the circumstances, the captain intended to assert seaworthiness by the conduct). The narrower approach is not merely put forward upon pragmatic grounds, allowing as it does more information to be received and avoiding some of the difficulties in creating ad hoc exceptions to the hearsay rule. It is also put forward as the minimum requirement to ensure that the common law procedural system is maintained, and as an appropriate compromise between, on the one hand, maintaining the procedural system, and on the other, of ensuring that reliable information is received. To define the hearsay prohibition more widely leads to the exclusion of too much evidence normally regarded as sufficiently reliable to be received. To insist that all observational evidence be reported directly to the court so that the risks of its unreliability can be determined first-hand serves no purpose other than to exclude reliable and often necessary evidence. The fact that some evidence may not be presented in this way can and will be taken into account in determining whether the evidence is sufficiently relevant to be received, whether the evidence runs the risk of being given more weight than it rationally deserves, and ultimately whether, if received, it is sufficiently probative to be acted upon. These are sufficient safeguards against erroneous decisions. It might be argued that the prohibition could be even more narrowly formulated and still operate to maintain the common law procedural system by applying only where the maker of the out-of-court statement is available to testify directly to the court. But authority is clearly against taking questions of the availability of witnesses into account in the application of the prohibition. Myers v DPP is an example of this.24 Questions of availability are considered only in the context of exceptions to the prohibition (the uniform legislation also only uses availability in this context). And pragmatic reasons dictate against the availability of a witness being a precondition of the rule, because separate evidence would be required upon this issue. The general [page 903] prohibition operates more efficiently and effectively as one dependent only upon

the form in which the evidence is tendered.

Out-of-court ‘statements’ 8.12 If the hearsay prohibition operates only to exclude the tender of out-ofcourt statements to prove the experienced facts or events narrated in them, the first matter to determine is what is a ‘statement’ for this purpose.25 And if the hearsay rule is intended to ensure that such statements are made directly to the court, then the term ‘statement’ requires explanation within this perspective.26 Consequently, a ‘statement’ can be defined as the means by which experiences of facts or events are reported directly to the court. Most often such statements take the form of words, usually oral,27 which use conventions of speech to report experiences. In cases of necessity, experiences can be communicated through signs. This is recognised in Chandrasekera (alias Alisandiri) v R,28 where the hearsay rule was applied to prevent a witness testifying to signs made by a dying woman whose throat had been cut, the signs apparently being intended to communicate to the witness the identity of the assailant. By the same token, evidence of an outof-court identification through pointing to the alleged suspect should be regarded as hearsay evidence.29 8.13 But while words are a communicative medium, conduct is presumptively not. Only where conduct can be shown to be intended as communicative, as a substitute for words, should it be regarded as giving rise to a statement for the purposes of the hearsay prohibition.30 If conduct is not intended as communicative, arguably it may be tendered although only relevant through reliance upon an out-of-court assertion implicit in the conduct. Such implied assertions can be admitted without undermining the procedural system and their probative sufficiency can be adjudged in the light of the fact that the observational witness is not in court. [page 904] Authority upon this question — whether conduct containing no statement can give rise to the hearsay rule — is difficult to find and that which exists is difficult to reconcile. The very paucity of cases itself suggests that most lawyers and judges do not regard conduct not intended to be communicative as triggering the hearsay prohibition. Some judges express this view in their decisions. In

Manchester Brewery Co Ltd v Coombs,31 evidence that customers failed to drink a batch of beer was received as evidence that the beer was bad outside the hearsay prohibition, arguably because the mere failure to drink the beer intended no communicative statement about the quality of the beer, so that any assertion implicit in the customers’ conduct did not fall foul of the hearsay rule. In Holloway v McFeeters,32 evidence of a motorist’s flight from an accident interpreted as an admission of fault was not regarded as hearsay by Dixon CJ, although the majority appear to assume the hearsay prohibition, contriving to admit the evidence in exception to it. One judge has expressly emphasised the need for an out-of-court statement if evidence of conduct is to be excluded as hearsay. Mahoney JA in Jones v Sutherland Shire Council states that: The hearsay rule does not exclude all inferences which may be drawn from conduct … In the case of an implied assertion there is no ‘statement’ in the ordinary sense. The hearsay rule applies to such assertions generally, because there is seen to be a functional equivalent of the kind of expressed statement to which ordinarily the hearsay rule applies. Therefore, in deciding whether the hearsay rule should exclude an inference from conduct, it is necessary to examine the reasoning according to which the inference is drawn to see whether it involves the equivalent of a statement and whether the fact to be inferred is to be inferred as true because of that statement.33

8.14 The distinction between assertions contained in implied statements and assertions inferred from conduct is implicit in the following dictum of Lord Atkinson in Lloyd v Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co Ltd,34 where the paternity of a posthumous child was in issue: The proposal to marry and the acceptance of it may, of course, be made by word of mouth; but the making and the acceptance of it are acts, matters of conduct, and strong pieces of evidence on the issue of paternity, inasmuch as they shew the character in which the parties regarded the child en ventre sa mere, and desired to treat it.

In the High Court Dawson J argued that assertive conduct is not within the hearsay prohibition. In Walton v R,35 the question before the court was whether, to prove that the accused had met his murder victim at a shopping centre at a certain time, evidence could be adduced that the victim had mentioned to witnesses on a number of separate occasions (on the day of and on the day before the alleged meeting) that she had an arrangement to meet there with the accused at that time. As out-of-court [page 905] statements asserting an arrangement, the evidence was clearly hearsay. But the

whole court agreed that, as out-of-court statements containing the implicit assertion of the victim’s intention of going to the shopping centre in the belief that she was meeting the accused, the evidence was admissible if relevant to establishing the meeting. And, in conjunction with other evidence that the accused also intended to go to the shopping centre at that time to meet with the victim, the majority (with Deane J dissenting) regarded the evidence as sufficiently relevant to establishing a meeting. In holding the evidence of intention admissible, Dawson J argued that, although containing an implicit assertion of the victim’s intention, the evidence is more significantly regarded as conduct from which a relevant inference (the victim’s intention to go to the shopping centre) could be drawn. His emphasis appears to be that, although assertive, the significance of the expression of intent lay in its timing, and that its expression at this time could be conceptualised as admissible as conduct, relevant circumstantially. 8.15 In conceptualising the expression of intent as conduct, Dawson J argues that assertions implicit in relevant conduct are ordinarily admitted without thought being given to the hearsay prohibition. While one can accept Dawson J’s starting point, that relevant conduct should not give rise to hearsay problems, the difficulty with his analysis is that it does not then explain the distinction between conduct and statements. Instead, he simply asserts that statements can be regarded as conduct when made at a significant stage of the events in issue. This point may be better pursued, not by seeking to conceptualise statements as conduct, but by arguing that, because the statements were not made to assert the existence of an intention or belief and their significance lies in the time at which they were made, they were not statements made in narrative form and are therefore not caught by the hearsay prohibition. In the words of the Privy Council in Ratten v R, the statements are not made ‘testimonially to establish some fact narrated by the words’. To simply call such statements ‘conduct’ obscures the reasons why they should be admissible. This is not to say that their relevance is not based upon an assertion and so relied one might argue that the jury is likely to give the evidence more probative value than it deserves. But this is another issue. 8.16 In R v Benz,36 the accused, mother and daughter, were charged with murder, it being alleged that they dumped the victim’s unconscious body from a remote bridge into a river. A witness testified that he came across two women (whom he could not later identify but whom he described in terms matching the characteristics of the accused) on the bridge in question in the middle of the night

the Crown alleged the victim was dumped into the river. The witness stopped his vehicle and in response to his inquiry about their wellbeing one of the women replied: ‘It’s OK. My mother is just feeling a bit sick’. The witness then drove off. The issue being identity, the question was whether the response given on the bridge could be admitted as evidence [page 906] that the two women on the bridge were mother and daughter, thus adding to the circumstantial case against the accused. Dawson J had no hesitation in admitting the out-of-court statement. But his reasons come somewhat closer to recognising that it is the non-testimonial form of the statement that makes it admissible. Having quoted the Privy Council in Ratten v R, Dawson J concluded (at 134): The behaviour of the younger woman as a daughter in referring to the older woman as her mother was as much a fact as any other circumstances described by the witness Saunders and the jury were entitled to have regard to it in drawing their conclusions about the identity of those two women. The younger woman’s statement did not form part of a narrative but constituted conduct from which, together with the other evidence, it might be inferred that the two women on the bridge were the respondents … The making of the statement constituted conduct which went to the identity of the two women on the bridge and was admissible, not as an exception to the hearsay rule, but as a relevant fact.

Thus, while recognising that the out-of-court statement did contain an implied assertion of relationship, Dawson J was prepared to admit it for its assertive content because its form and timing made it significant in a non-testimonial way; it ‘did not form part of a narrative’. As such, it was not within the hearsay prohibition (although it was clearly hearsay in the broadest sense). 8.17 The conduct approach was also taken by Dawson and Gaudron JJ in Pollitt v R.37 The accused was charged with murder, the Crown alleging that, in attempting to carry out an agreement with Allen to kill Williams, the accused by mistake shot and killed Simpson. By the time of the trial, Allen was dead and could not be called to prove that he had an agreement with the accused to kill Williams. To establish the agreement, Dawson and Gaudron JJ held admissible, inter alia, testimony that Allen had spoken to someone on the telephone after Simpson had been killed, saying, ‘You get the rest of the money when you do the job properly’. Although containing an implied assertion of an arrangement, this was held to be admissible as the conduct of Allen at a significant time from

which it could be inferred, along with other conduct by Allen at about this time, that he had an arrangement to have Williams killed.38 The foundation of Dawson J’s approach was that Allen’s statement formed part of a number of ‘interconnected events which, taken together, constitute a sequence or pattern of conduct’. But again it may be argued that the reason for exclusion from the [page 907] hearsay prohibition is that the statements, although containing implicit assertions of fact, were not in form part of any testimonial narrative. 8.18 The clearest and most express dicta in favour of including relevant conduct within the hearsay prohibition are found in the judgment of Baron Parke in Wright v Doe d Tatham.39 He provides various examples of conduct that he would regard as falling within the hearsay prohibition: … the supposed conduct of the family or relations of a testator, taking the same precautions in his absence as if he were a lunatic; his election, in his absence, to some high and responsible office; the conduct of a physician who permitted a will to be executed by a sick testator; the conduct of a deceased captain on a question of seaworthiness, who, after examining every part of the vessel, embarked in it with his family; all these, when deliberately considered, are, with reference to this matter in issue in each case, mere instances of hearsay evidence, mere statements, not on oath, but implied in or vouched by the actual conduct of persons by whose acts the litigant parties are not to be bound.

Baron Parke uses the concept of a statement in a very wide sense in embracing the implicit assertions in these examples within the hearsay prohibition. His concept is sufficiently wide to embrace all implied assertions, whether or not they can be regarded as part of any testimonial narrative. Yet the receipt of evidence in that case is not easy to reconcile with his view, with the evidence of taunts of neighbours and children (‘Silly Marsden’) having been admitted without objection upon the issue of Marsden’s testamentary capacity, while letters written to Marsden in a manner suggesting the authors considered Marsden sane were excluded as hearsay. Mason CJ in Walton v R40 was equally clear in regarding assertions implicit in conduct as embraced by the hearsay prohibition, declaring that ‘the distinction between conduct and statement is both artificial and difficult’. His approach is influenced by his ready willingness to create exceptions and his view that

‘especially in the field of implied assertions there will be occasions upon which circumstances will combine to render evidence sufficiently reliable for it to be placed before the jury’. 8.19 On authority, therefore, one cannot be dogmatic in concluding that at common law, conduct not part of any testimonial narrative does not give rise to the hearsay prohibition.41 Most commentators support the view that at least assertions implicit in mere conduct are not hearsay, but do not emphasise that it is the absence of a statement in narrative form that leads to this conclusion.42 Rather, they emphasise [page 908] the reliability of assertions implicit in conduct because that conduct often constitutes action upon the observed fact implicitly asserted. 8.20 The sea captain’s implied assertion of seaworthiness is vouchsafed by his action upon the observation. But this is not so in all cases where assertions are implicit in conduct, and provides no conceptual reason for excluding conduct from the broad view of the hearsay prohibition. Rather, as Mason CJ points out in Walton, it is a reason for creating exceptions to the prohibition. The difficulty in construing the hearsay prohibition broadly and subjecting it to case-by-case exception has already been emphasised. It may be argued that better guidance can be given to trial judges by narrowly construing the hearsay prohibition as applying only to out-of-court statements containing assertions of fact. In this way, the issue of whether implied assertions are caught by the hearsay rule is subsumed within the preliminary question of whether there is any statement containing that assertion. 8.21 As suggested at 8.13, while conduct only may be communicative, words generally are. This being so, whether words contain statements asserting observed facts is generally not a question of the intention of the maker of the statement; rather, it is a question of interpreting the words used by means of the conventions of speech to conclude whether a statement has been successfully made.43 Of course, the intention of the author of the statement will be relevant to determining its probative value, should it be received as outside the scope of, or in exception to, the hearsay prohibition. If intentions can be put aside in this way

and words are allowed to speak for themselves, it is quite logical to exclude as hearsay statements made in a private diary or muttered sub voce.44 But where words are used, some statements are expressly made in pursuance of the conventions of speech, while others are merely implicit in the words used. Can it be argued that the hearsay rule should extend only to express statements containing assertions of observed facts? This conclusion would not be consistent with the narrow view here advocated. That view excludes out-of-court testimony, and where testimony is given in court it may be used to establish asserted facts contained in express statements as well as asserted facts contained in implicit statements. Ultimately, the trier of fact is asked to decide what statements, express or implied, are being made by the witness. If implicit statements are an integral part of in-court testimony then it is reasonable that their existence out of court should give rise to the hearsay prohibition. [page 909] Clear authority favouring this view is found in Teper v R,45 the Privy Council excluding evidence of the statement of a bystander at a fire allegedly lit by the accused — ‘Your place burning and you going away from the fire’ — to establish the accused’s presence. As well as containing express statements asserting the facts of ‘the place burning’ and ‘the accused going away’, the evidence necessarily contained the implicit statement ‘the accused is present’. Whether statements containing assertions of observations are expressly or implicitly made is often a mere accident of language. The bystander could just as well have said, ‘there is Teper’ before calling to him. These practical arguments support the view here put forward. 8.22 The crucial question at common law is simply whether the asserted observation is contained within an express or implicit out-of-court statement. In the absence of such a statement, out-of-court assertions implicit in conduct or words can be admitted without infringing the hearsay prohibition. A number of decisions commonly discussed in the context of implied assertions may be explicable upon this basis (and upon other grounds to be adverted to later in this chapter).46 For example, it has been held that, to prove that premises are being used for betting purposes, it is permissible to tender evidence of telephone calls received at

the premises in which unknown callers have asked for money to be put upon horses in certain races at certain odds. Herring CJ in McGregor v Stokes47 explained that the words spoken in the call are not tendered to prove facts asserted in the express statements.48 Thus, if one of the callers said: ‘This is Tom Jones, I live in Birdwood Avenue, Oakleigh, and I want 10 shillings each way on Roarer in the XYZ Handicap’, the words are not tendered to prove that it was Tom Jones or where he lived or that there was a horse of that name running in a particular race. Indeed, this would be a prohibited hearsay use of the words. But, argued Herring CJ, the words are tendered to show only the nature of the call, a betting call, and this is not a hearsay use; words accompanying acts which give content to those acts are not used in infringement of the hearsay prohibition. But the betting call is in itself irrelevant to proving the use of the premises in question. As is argued below, it is the implicit out-of-court assertion by the callers that these premises are betting premises that makes the evidence relevant.49 The case is therefore [page 910] authority for not regarding implied assertions as within the hearsay prohibition. But this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that all implied assertions are outside the hearsay prohibition. Rather, it can be argued that the particular implied assertion was admissible because it was not contained in any statement implicit in the words used by the callers. As Guest concludes:50 The statement ‘I am talking to a person who is taking bets at an illegal gambling house,’ for example, is not implicit in the statement ‘Look Guv, put ten quid on Nijinski in the two-thirty at Newmarket’ although, of course, that belief is implied by the speaker’s having made a telephone call to that address and his uttering those words.

8.23 The decision of the Privy Council in Ratten v R51 may be explicable upon a similar basis. The accused was charged with murdering his wife by shooting her. There were no eyewitnesses to the shooting which occurred while the accused and his wife were at home with only their young children. The accused admitted having shot his wife but alleged that the gun had discharged accidentally while he was cleaning it. To rebut this defence, the prosecution tendered the testimony from a telephonist who, at a time established to be immediately before the fatal shooting, received a call from the premises (connected by direct line to the exchange) in which a woman asked hysterically,

‘Get me the police please!’, gave her address and then, before the police could be connected, hung up. Upon the police being immediately contacted and telephoning the premises, the accused reported his wife dead. The Privy Council held that the evidence of the telephonist could be received and that it was not caught by the hearsay prohibition. Insofar as the evidence gave rise to the implicit assertion of the wife that she was fearful of being attacked, or being attacked by the accused, this assertion was not made in any out-of-court statement expressly or implicitly made by the wife to the telephonist. The mere request to get the police contained no implicit statement that the woman was being attacked. It was rather the fact that such a call was made hysterically at the crucial time that gave rise to the implied assertion of an attack.52 8.24 By the same token, calling evidence of the argumentative conversations between people to establish the terms upon which they live gives rise to no hearsay statement.53 The express or implicit statements in the conversations are not being relied upon to establish observations there asserted. Any out-of-court assertion by the parties of the nature of their relationship is implicit in evidence of the course of [page 911] their argumentative conversations, but is arguably contained in no express or implicit statements made during them.54 8.25 And, to establish that premises are being used as a brothel, evidence of offers of sexual services made by women upon the premises is admissible.55 The mere fact of such offers contains no express or implied statement asserting the nature of the premises, and therefore this assertion, undoubtedly implicit in the making of such offers on the premises, is arguably not caught by the hearsay prohibition. 8.26 Cases concerned with negative hearsay show that the failure to make an express statement may constitute a prohibited implicit hearsay statement. That is, implicit statements may be made by silence. The silence of the accused in the face of allegations of his or her involvement in a crime, if admissible at all (see 5.134–5.144), can only be admitted if regarded as an implicit admission of guilt received in exception to the hearsay rule. Similarly, the omission to state a fact in a record may contain an implicit statement prohibited by the hearsay rule. In R v

Patel,56 it was held that Home Office records of legal immigrants could not be tendered to prove, by the absence of the accused’s name, that he had entered the United Kingdom illegally.57 Statements tendered as relevant because of their proved falsity contain an assertion to be implied from any conscious falsity, but in the absence of a statement containing that implied assertion do not fall within the hearsay prohibition.58 Thus it may be argued that at common law the hearsay prohibition should be interpreted to extend only to out-of-court statements making observational assertions, that such statements may be express or implicit in words or, where an intention to communicate is shown, in conduct. In the absence of an out-ofcourt statement, any implied observational assertion can be acted upon without the hearsay rule being [page 912] infringed. In the absence of a statement, the evidence is not in testimonial form. By defining the hearsay prohibition in this more limited way, the prohibition is itself able to take up some of the tension between upholding a particular procedural system on the one hand, and admitting evidence that is generally reliable on the other. 8.27 With the common law rule abolished in those jurisdictions party to the uniform legislation, the cases discussed above, whilst interesting as examples of evidence that relies upon the reliability of an express or implied out-of-court assertion, are irrelevant to the interpretation of the hearsay rule formulated in s 59. In the first place, that section applies to ‘[e]vidence of a previous representation’ and the Dictionary defines ‘representation’ as including ‘(a) an express or implied representation (whether oral or in writing), or (b) a representation to be inferred from conduct, or (c) a representation not intended by its maker to be communicated to or seen by another person, or (d) a representation that is for any reason not communicated’. Therefore the rule cannot be read down as applying only to assertions contained in out-of-court statements.

But, secondly, the section provides that a representation is ‘not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert by the representation’. And s 59(2A) provides that in determining whether an intention to assert can be reasonably supposed, ‘the court may have regard to the circumstances in which the representation was made’. With s 56(1) providing that evidence that is relevant is admissible ‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this Act’, the onus is upon the party seeking exclusion under s 59. That requires proof on the balance of probabilities that it can reasonably be supposed that the maker of the representation intended to assert the fact sought to be proved. This does not require proof of an actual intention (subjective) but of a reasonably supposed intention (objective) having regard to the circumstances in which the representation was made. This approach extends the ambit of s 59(1) beyond that originally enacted which required subjective intention to be established to invoke the rule,59 and is more likely to encompass not only facts expressly asserted but also facts implicitly asserted.60

Statements tendered as assertions 8.28 While the ambit of the exclusionary rule is now defined by s 59(1), the essence of the common law hearsay principle remains. To be hearsay at both common law or under the uniform legislation, the out-of-court statement or representation must be [page 913] tendered as relevant in reliance upon an assertion of fact. It is the chain of reasoning dependent upon the truth of an out-of-court assertion of fact that is prohibited. If a statement or representation is relevant to a matter in issue independently of the truth of the assertions of fact contained in them, neither hearsay rule prohibits tender for that purpose. Thus, for example, to prove the ability of a person to speak, that person’s oral out-of-court statements may be proved. The statements are relevant because they are spoken. The truth of any facts that happen to be asserted in them is irrelevant to establishing that the person can speak. Similarly, a tape recording of a voice may be played to the court for the purpose of identifying that voice. Or, to prove a person’s knowledge of a particular state of affairs, evidence may be tendered of

out-of-court statements bringing those affairs to that person’s attention.61 The statement is relevant to the matter in issue — knowledge — independently of the truth of the facts asserted in it. Such an out-of-court statement would be hearsay only insofar as it was tendered to establish the facts asserted in it as true. Where statements are relevant independently of the assertions contained in them, they may be described as being used as ‘original evidence’ (as opposed to ‘hearsay evidence’). And at common law, the same item of information may be admissible as ‘original evidence’ but inadmissible as hearsay — although to avoid the confusion of having to distinguish admissibility for particular uses, s 60 of the uniform legislation provides that once evidence is otherwise admissible it may also be used as hearsay. To determine whether evidence has a non-hearsay use, the precise chain of relevance from the information tendered to the fact in issue is crucial. As Brennan J commented in Pollitt v R: The distinction calls for a precise identification of the probative relationship between the statement and the facts to be proved, that is, the manner in which the tribunal of fact is invited to reason from the statement to the fact to be proved.62

The most quoted example of the original use of an out-of-court statement is found in Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor, where threats made by terrorists to the accused were admissible to establish that, in possessing illegally guns and ammunition, the accused had acted under duress. So far as the threats were contained in statements, those statements were not tendered to establish the truth of any facts asserted in them. Rather, they were tendered as statements which could reasonably have been interpreted by the accused as threats and which were therefore in themselves relevant to establishing a defence of duress. The statements were in this sense tendered for a non-testimonial purpose and to this extent were not prohibited by the rule.63 [page 914] 8.29 Where a tendered statement has a permissible non-hearsay use together with a hearsay use it is admissible at common law (but not under s 60)64 only for the non-hearsay use. Therefore it might be possible to envisage a situation where the hearsay use operates so prejudicially against a party, or more pertinently an accused, that the evidence should be excluded altogether in exercise of the court’s

residuary discretion.65 Short of exclusion, a court must guard against an impermissible hearsay use by means of appropriate direction to the jury. In Wilson v R,66 the High Court was prepared to admit evidence that an accused and his wife had been often heard arguing, in order to infer the terms of their relationship and to rebut his defence (to a charge of murdering her) that his gun had accidentally discharged.67 This evidence was admitted even though it disclosed that the wife had [page 915] on one occasion said, ‘I only know you want to kill me for my money’. To use this statement to prove that the accused did so intend to kill the victim was prohibited as hearsay. Barwick CJ commented (at 340): It is impossible, in my opinion, to maintain the proposition that though the fact of quarrelling may be admissible, the primary evidence of the quarrelling, namely the words and gestures passing between the parties in the course of the quarrel, may not. Of course, care must be taken by appropriate directions to the jury to properly confine their use of such statements.

It is important not to confuse the permissible and prohibited uses of out-ofcourt statements. One false argument maintains that an assertive statement always has a relevance towards proving the asserted facts that arises independently of the truth of the assertion.68 It contends that the very fact that an assertive statement is made is itself relevant evidence of the occurrence of the asserted facts, because of the unlikelihood of that assertive statement having been made if the facts were not as asserted. The fact that it is asserted that A shot B makes it more likely that A did in fact shoot B. But one only has to ask ‘how likely?’ to reveal that the relevance of such a statement depends upon the truth of the assertion made in it, and has no independent relevance.69 8.30 Statements tendered to establish assertions of observed facts contained in them are necessarily used for a hearsay purpose. This is recognised by the House of Lords in Myers v DPP70 in the implicit rejection of the reasoning in R v Rice.71 In the latter case, to prove that the accused had travelled upon a particular flight, the prosecution tendered a ticket used upon that flight bearing the name of the accused: ‘Rice’. In giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal in favour of admitting the ticket, Winn LJ explained (at 871): The relevance of that ticket in logic and its legal admissibility as a piece of real evidence both stem from the same root, viz, the balance of probability recognised by common sense and common

knowledge that an air ticket which has been used on a flight and which has a name upon it has more likely than not been used by a man of that name.

But while it is possible to accept the strength of the inference in such circumstances, the ticket is necessarily used for a hearsay purpose, for its connection with the accused depends upon the implicit statement of an unknown author, asserting that it was issued to Rice. Only if independent evidence could show the connection between the accused and the particular ticket used on the flight could the ticket be tendered [page 916] without infringement of the hearsay rule. These criticisms of R v Rice are endorsed by Gibbs J in Re Gardner72 in holding that an unused ticket could only establish travel by the person named via a prohibited hearsay chain of reasoning.73 Gibbs J regarded the decision in R v Rice as inconsistent with the House of Lords decision in Myers v DPP.74 8.31 Statements are not used assertively where they operate to change legal relationships. For example, evidence may be given that upon the handing over of a book the donor declared ‘take this as a gift’ to establish the gift.75 It is arguable that in these circumstances the words are used operatively to effect the gift. Similarly, words said in the creation of a contractual relationship may be proved by a witness to them, for the words are not tendered to establish matters asserted by them. Rather, the words operate to create a legal relationship between parties. Certainly these conclusions are correct if words operate quite independently of the intentions implicit in them. Where this is not the case, and the legal relationship depends upon proof of an implicit intention, a hearsay problem is created if there is an implicit statement asserting that intention.76 In the gift example given above, this may well be the case, so that the words are not operative and are tendered as an implicit statement asserting the requisite intent. If the hearsay prohibition is to be avoided it must therefore be upon the basis that the words do not constitute a narration of observed events (further examples of non-narrative statements of intention and physical sensation are considered at 8.42). It is suggested that operative words are not hearsay, but that care must be taken before concluding that words can be categorised as operative.

[page 917] 8.32 Examples of an apparently original use of evidence can be found in those cases which seek to establish the use of premises through evidence of personal or telephone calls made to the premises. In McGregor v Stokes,77 discussed at 8.22, the court held that a charge of using premises for illegal betting could be established by evidence of telephone calls made to the premises seeking to place bets. It was argued that the calls were not tendered to establish any assertion in them, merely as evidence of the existence of betting calls from which the inference could be drawn that the premises were being used as alleged. But, as explained, the calls only lead to the inference sought by relying on the implied assertion of the callers that the place to which the calls were made was being so used. The characterisation of the calls as betting calls does not lead to the inference sought. That inference depends upon the callers having got it right; on the callers genuinely believing that they are able to make bets on those premises. The words have no relevance independently of this implicit assertion. The words are not operative. They can have no legal significance in themselves. They are merely indicative of the belief of the callers. Of course, if enough calls are made, one might argue that the callers have all got it right and the premises are being so used, but this does not make the calls admissible unless the courts are prepared to redefine the hearsay prohibition so that it does not catch such implicit assertions, or are prepared to create an exception to the hearsay prohibition. 8.33 Nonetheless, other courts in Australia have claimed an original use for such words. In R v Firman,78 the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia took this claim a step further by holding calls admissible not only to establish the use of premises but also to identify the person on those premises carrying on the illegal activity.79 The decision in Woodhouse v Hall80 can be criticised on similar grounds. To prove the use of the accused’s premises for prostitution, police testified about going to the premises and there being offered sexual services by women. It is not possible to argue that the statements by the women offering their services were operative. Even if the offers had been accepted by the police officers the contracts they concluded could have no legal operation. Nor were the offers original

evidence, unless the very making of the offer can be regarded as the prohibited act of prostitution.81 Strictly, the offers [page 918] were only relevant in that they impliedly asserted that the police could obtain sexual services from the women on those premises. The strength of this inference is entirely dependent upon the genuineness of the women in making the offers. Again, if such evidence is to be admitted, either the hearsay prohibition must be read down82 or an exception to the rule created. The problem is that courts do not seem prepared to do this and therefore seek to describe the evidence as being used originally when it is not. Much sophistry is required to argue that such evidence can be put to an original use. The simpler approach, advocated here, is to redefine the hearsay prohibition so that it does not catch assertions unless they are contained in express or implied statements and unless the assertive statements can be regarded as a testimonial narrative of the facts or events asserted. Otherwise an exception to the rule must be found. In R v Kearley,83 the House of Lords refused to find that personal and telephone calls made to premises could be used originally to establish that the accused on those premises possessed discovered drugs for the purposes of sale. The only original use was to show, at most, the existence of a clientele for drugs, but the connection of this clientele to the accused could only be made through the implicit assertion that the accused was carrying on a business to supply drugs. But, having correctly analysed the evidence in this way, their Lordships refused to redefine or create exceptions to the hearsay rule, and excluded a body of evidence that, because of the number of calls involved, was clearly of considerable probative strength. 8.34 Sensible results in cases such as McGregor v Stokes and Woodhouse v Hall cannot logically be reached by regarding the evidence in those cases as involving no implied assertion of fact — as only involving original uses of evidence. They can, however, absent creating an exception to the hearsay rule, be reached logically without infringing the hearsay prohibition by denying that the assertions were made either, on the one hand, in an out-of-court statement (as argued at 8.12ff), or by way of testimonial narrative, on the other. To the important notion of narrative we must now turn.

Narrative statements 8.35 The notion of narrative is a key to the formulation of the common law hearsay prohibition. It is a notion that has always been intuitively recognised by common law judges in their use of the phrase res gestae.84 Common law intuitions are not to be put [page 919] lightly aside, and although one may criticise judges’ attempts to raise a Latin phrase to the status of a mechanical rule of law, arguably the intuition behind the use of the phrase remains decisive in the formulation and operation of the common law hearsay prohibition. This can be appreciated if the prohibition is seen as designed to ensure the efficacy of a particular procedural system. That system prefers witnesses to report their experiences directly to the court. By that direct report the accuracy of their recalled experiences can be most effectively determined. But the system is one of preference, not dogma. Ultimately, the aim is accurate fact discovery. Consequently, the hearsay prohibition should not be interpreted to exclude outof-court statements that have some probative value and are not capable of effective repetition in court. Statements asserting the past observation of facts or events are generally capable of effective repetition in court and therefore should be made there. But statements made during events, spontaneously or as a commentary upon continuing events, may not be capable of repetition in this way. Their probative value may derive from the time at which they are made. That is not to say that their probative value arises independently of their assertive content; in most cases the assertion is of crucial importance. But their probative value also lies in the time at which the assertion is made, and this element may not be capable of reproduction by later making the same assertion in court. It is not that the time at which the assertion was made necessarily guarantees the truth of the assertion, although in many cases this may be so and may be a reason for creating an exception to the hearsay prohibition. Rather, the nature and timing of the statement may prevent it being effectively repeated directly to the court. Only statements which are in narrative form, that is, statements in the nature of a report upon past observation of facts or events, can generally be

effectively reproduced in court and their accuracy better determined at that time. It is counter-productive to exclude non-narrative statements. Such an exclusion may mean that significantly relevant information is lost. Exclusion is not necessary to ensure the continuation of a particular procedural system, and exclusion denies the court access to relevant, and often reliable, information. Therefore, the common law hearsay rule should be seen, not as a rule prohibiting the tender of out-of-court assertions, but rather as a rule prohibiting the tender of out-of-court assertive narratives.85 This more limited hearsay prohibition produces a more effective compromise between, on the one hand, upholding a particular procedural system and, on the other, ensuring that reliable information is received. [page 920] It is submitted that the following discussion of the cases illustrates and supports this conclusion. Although the idea of narrative does not appear to have a place in the hearsay prohibition of the uniform legislation, spontaneous representations are admitted exceptionally under s 65(2)(b) and (c), and contemporaneous representations of state of mind exceptionally under s 66A. But these exceptions are based on notions of reliability rather than the notion of narrative here discussed.

Assertions part of the res gestae 8.36 Under the heading of res gestae a number of cases discuss the admissibility of spontaneous statements made by participants in, or observers to, a transaction in issue. The cases are commonly regarded as being concerned with an exception to the hearsay prohibition, and some of them can only be interpreted in this way. But other cases dealt with under this heading can also be explained as defining the limits of the hearsay prohibition. Cases in this latter category are those which emphasise that, for a statement to be admissible as part of the res gestae, it must be made during and as part of an event or transaction so as not to constitute a narration of that event or transaction (no matter how recently concluded). 8.37 The distinction is dramatically illustrated by R v Bedingfield,86 where, the accused charged with murder and having raised the question of suicide, the court refused to admit the statement made by the victim as she emerged, her throat cut,

from a room where she had been alone with the accused: ‘See what Bedingfield has done to me’. This case was followed by the High Court in Brown v R,87 where, having been mortally shot, the deceased walked out of a house to a gate some 25 yards away and there commented upon the shooting that had occurred. In excluding evidence of these comments Isaacs and Powers JJ concluded (at 598) that: … it would in our opinion be going beyond the limit of authority to admit evidence which is in substance and reality a mere narration respecting a concluded event, a narration not naturally or spontaneously emanating from or growing out of the main transaction, but arising as an independent and additional transaction.

And in Adelaide Chemical and Fertilizer Co Ltd v Carlyle,88 where a wife was suing in respect of her husband’s death from acid which spilled on him at work, Dixon CJ excluded evidence of statements made by the deceased about the accident immediately afterwards while washing the acid from his legs. In excluding the evidence, Dixon CJ emphasised (at 530) that the law excludes declarations that are ‘a narrative of a past event … recounted to the court as the equivalent of or as a substitute for direct testimony of the event it narrates’. [page 921] Only in the context of the law’s insistence that narrative be reported directly to court is it possible to understand the apparent strictness of these decisions. In terms of the hearsay prohibition, each concerned inadmissible narrative and therefore, unless excepted from the prohibition by a specific rule, had to be rejected as inadmissible hearsay. 8.38 Later cases concentrate upon whether there is a specific rule excepting narrative made close to reported events, and these will be discussed in due course. But it is important that these decisions do not obscure the proposition that nonnarrative statements are not prohibited by the hearsay rule. Unfortunately, there is a tendency for judges to forget this proposition in discussing the admissibility of contemporaneous statements. This has occurred in two ways. First, Dixon CJ in Carlyle, having distinguished statements during and part of events from statements that are mere narrative of events, sought to justify the admission of statements during events upon the basis that such statements are part of relevant events and therefore can be disclosed as relevant original evidence. He

denied that such statements were admissible to establish observed facts asserted in them. Leaving aside the more obvious practical objection to such a view (that such statements are seldom relevant apart from their contents and once admitted would inevitably be used to establish facts so asserted), Dixon CJ arguably failed to appreciate that it is the very fact that the statements are not narrative which takes them outside the hearsay prohibition. Secondly, the proposition that non-narrative is not hearsay is obscured by those cases which seek to determine the admissibility of contemporaneous statements by mechanically asking whether the statements were made at the time of the transaction or event in issue. The inquiry concentrates upon defining a transaction rather than determining whether the statement can be regarded as past narrative of a transaction or event. The definition of ‘transaction’ in the abstract is an impossible task. ‘Transaction’ must be defined for particular purposes. In this context the purpose is to determine whether statements are made as distinct and separate comments upon past transactions, and for this reason it must be determined whether the statement is made at a time when the transaction has concluded. In this perspective it is illogical to take a liberal view of how long an event or transaction can be regarded as continuing, as Starke J sought to do in Adelaide Chemical and Fertilizer Co Ltd v Carlyle in admitting the statement of the deceased, and as Isaacs and Powers JJ hint at in Brown v R89 in suggesting that the ‘natural connection by continuance … may have liberal connotation’. On the other hand, the liberal view may be justified where, once it has been concluded that a statement is narrative, it is being asked whether that narrative should be admitted in exception to the hearsay rule. But that is a separate matter, to which we can now turn. [page 922] 8.39 The explanation of the notion of res gestae as creating a quite separate exception to the hearsay rule was developed by the Privy Council in Ratten v R90 (see 8.23) and adopted by the House of Lords in R v Andrews.91 It finds apparent expression in s 65(2)(b) of the uniform legislation: see 8.66 below. In Ratten v R, the Privy Council was of the view that the evidence in question was not hearsay and therefore their discussion of res gestae, proceeding on the assumption that this view was wrong, is strictly dicta.

It has already been argued that one reason why the evidence was not hearsay in that case was that it involved no express or implied statement containing an assertion of observed fact. It could equally be argued that the evidence was not hearsay because any statements made were not made in narrative of a past event but as spontaneous comments constituting the event and not capable of reproduction in court. With the evidence in Ratten clearly involving implicit assertions by the deceased victim, it is difficult to see how the evidence could not be hearsay, unless the narrow formulation of the hearsay prohibition here advocated is applied. Nevertheless, having concluded that the evidence was not prohibited hearsay, the Privy Council held that even if the evidence did involve a prohibited hearsay statement that statement could be admitted in exception to the general prohibition. The Privy Council held (at 391): … that there is ample support for the principle that hearsay evidence may be admitted if the statement providing it is made in such conditions (always being those of approximate but not exact contemporaneity) of involvement or pressure as to exclude the possibility of concoction or distortion to the advantage of the maker or the disadvantage of the accused.

If Ratten v R is authority for the narrow hearsay prohibition here formulated, it illustrates quite vividly the relevance of the transaction in determining whether a statement constitutes narrative and its relevance in determining whether a narrative statement should be admitted in exception to the hearsay prohibition. On the one hand, the transaction is merely one aspect to be considered in determining whether the statement is a narrative of it; on the other, it is considered to be a factor capable of so reducing the risk of a narrative having been concocted that it is sufficiently reliable to be admitted in exception to the general prohibition.92 Both contexts provide a conceptual justification for considering the notion of a ‘transaction’, justification which is missing if the res gestae doctrine is looked upon as a rule arbitrarily defining the event in issue. [page 923] 8.40 It is submitted that these conceptual justifications should be clearly distinguished so that the common law hearsay prohibition and its exception can be separately applied. Dicta of the High Court in Vocisano v Vocisano93 may be

criticised for failing to have done this. The case, a claim for damages arising out of injuries sustained in a road accident, turned upon the admissibility of statements made by one of the occupants of the car concerned, more or less immediately after the accident. The court admitted the statements under applicable legislation, but commented on the common law position and gave their view (at 273) that, at common law, the statements could not be received: … in the present case, there was, in my opinion, no sufficient contemporaneity of the statements made … to warrant the conclusion that the statements were part of the res. The occurrence was the accident, and although the statements by the respondent were made proximately to the occurrence of the accident they were in the nature of a historical account rather than in the nature of a statement made as part and parcel of the occurrence … Accordingly, the evidence … was inadmissible … as part of the res gestae.

But this conclusion concerns only the application of the extent of the hearsay prohibition. Clearly, the evidence was hearsay narrative. The High Court failed to recognise that Ratten v R creates an exception to the hearsay rule where statements are hearsay narrative but made under such conditions of involvement in or as a result of the transaction to exclude the possibility of concoction or distortion. The High Court failed to consider this separate question and upon this basis it is submitted that their strict test of contemporaneity is too narrow. This criticism is recognised by Mason CJ in Walton v R94 and, although the majority in Walton cite Vocisano (at 304) as good authority for the proposition that it must still be the transaction in issue that mitigates the risks of concoction and that the mere unlikelihood of concoction is not sufficient to render a hearsay statement admissible, this does not rule out some criticism of Vocisano and the adoption of a broader view of the transaction for this purpose. This is recognised by Dawson J in R v Benz.95 8.41 Dawson J also provides some support for the view advocated here, that only assertive narrative is caught by the hearsay prohibition. In R v Benz (at 133– 5), as discussed above at 8.16, he concludes the statement made by the women on the bridge as relevant conduct from which the involvement of a mother and daughter in the crime might be inferred. But his use of the concept of conduct is heavily dependent upon the idea that the assertions implicit in that conduct are not made as narrative: ‘The younger woman’s statement did not form part of a narrative but constituted conduct’. In essence, Dawson J is supporting the view here put forward, that only assertive narrative is hearsay. But to conceptualise non-narrative as conduct is unnecessarily

[page 924] confusing. It is not the fact that the statement is regarded as conduct that is of importance. It is the fact that the statement is not made testimonially, as narrative, that is the key to its admissibility, and this point is clearly recognised by Dawson J. In conclusion, then, the better explanation of these common law res gestae cases is that, on the one hand, they explain the limits of the hearsay prohibition and, on the other, they develop an exception to that prohibition. However, where relevant assertions are determined to have been made during and constitute part of the transaction, these conceptual distinctions tend to be forgotten and reliability referred to as the justification for reception.96 However, South Australian judges, aware of the distinction, have emphasised that where there is strict contemporaneity the reliability of the assertions is not of relevance, but, as a consequence of Walton,97 remain reluctant to endorse the hearsy exception expressed in Ratten and Andrews.

Assertions of knowledge, belief and intention 8.42 The other line of cases supporting the conclusion that the common law hearsay prohibition embraces only narrative statements concerns statements tendered to establish a relevant state of mind or intention. Again, these cases are often regarded as invoking res gestae to create an exception to the hearsay rule (and are in this sense embodied in s 66A of the uniform legislation), but they are better explained at common law as showing the limits of the hearsay prohibition. Certainly, a number of more recent authorities are clear in deciding that express or implied statements of knowledge or intention are not prohibited by the hearsay rule. In R v Blastland, the House of Lords held that statements by a third person made shortly after a murder and indicating knowledge of details of that murder (ultimately alleged by the Crown against the accused) were not hearsay: ‘What a person said or heard said may well be the best and most direct evidence of that person’s state of mind’.98 But the House went on to hold that as the state of knowledge of the third person in question was neither directly in issue, nor in itself sufficiently relevant

to the question of the accused’s guilt, it could not be received. As Lord Bridge emphasises (at 54): [page 925] ‘What was relevant was not the fact of Mark’s knowledge but how he had come by that knowledge … The statements which it was sought to prove that Mark made, indicating his knowledge of the murder provided no rational basis whatever on which the jury could be invited to draw an inference as to the source of that knowledge. To do so would have been mere speculation’. Thus, although statements asserting a state of mind may be admitted outside the hearsay prohibition they must still be shown to be sufficiently relevant before they can be admitted by the court.99 One might also add, by way of parenthesis, that Lord Bridge’s reluctance to find Mark’s knowledge sufficiently relevant may have been influenced by his acceptance of that line of authority which excludes even the express out-of-court confessions of third parties as hearsay.100 8.43 In holding that the assertion of knowledge is outside the hearsay rule their Lordships in Blastland placed considerable reliance upon Lloyd v Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co Ltd,101 where statements by a deceased workman indicating his belief that a carried child was his and his intention to support it and marry the mother were received to establish that belief and intention. This decision is emphasised by the majority of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Dobson v Morris, where, to establish that a deceased worker had not been travelling to work at the time of an accident, the court admitted evidence of statements made shortly before the journey in which the worker indicated an intention to take a separate journey to deliver her child before going to work.102 Reynolds JA preferred the view that such evidence of intention was not hearsay; Glass JA admitted the evidence without expressing a concluded view upon whether the evidence was not caught by the rule at all or whether it was admitted by way of exception. The Supreme Court of South Australia is clear in its view that statements of intent are not hearsay. In R v Hendrie, to explain why the deceased may have voluntarily entered her bedroom with a painter and decorator alleged to have there strangled her, the court admitted her prior statements to her husband that she intended to have a window in the bedroom converted into a door.103 Having

determined that the deceased’s intention was a relevant fact, King CJ held (at 585) that: The conversation between the deceased and her husband was original evidence tending to prove the state of mind and intention of the deceased … It is well established law that a person’s state of mind may be proved by contemporaneous statements made by that

[page 926] person. Such statements are not hearsay because they are not adduced for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements. They are original circumstantial evidence tending to establish the state of mind … what a person says is some evidence of what he is thinking. It is circumstantial evidence which may form a basis for an inference as to his intention or other state of mind.

Although one may agree with King CJ’s conclusion, his reasoning to it is not altogether convincing. 8.44 It is possible that assertions of intention are not contained in express or implied statements (or cannot, under s 59(1) of the Uniform Acts, be reasonably supposed to have been intended to be asserted by the representations which express them) and are for that reason outside the hearsay prohibition. But in Hendrie, the statement was expressly made and contained an intentional assertion of intent. Unless one is prepared to conclude that intentions cannot have an existence separate from the statements manifesting them, so that the statement contains no assertion of fact but is itself the intention (and courts have never approached the proof of intent in this Wittgensteinian manner), express statements of intent do appear to be statements containing assertions of fact. The only way of escaping the hearsay prohibition altogether at common law (rather than avoiding the prohibition by way of exception, as is effected by s 66A of the Uniform Acts) is to argue that statements of intention are not in narrative form such that they are capable of effective reproduction at a later stage in court. The time at which the statement asserting intention is made is the crucial determinant of its probative value and it would be counter-productive to exclude such statements as hearsay. 8.45 High Court authority for the view that statements asserting a contemporaneous state of mind are not hearsay is found in Hughes v National Trustees Executors and Agency Co of Australasia Ltd.104 In a testator’s family maintenance petition, the testatrix’s son claimed that his mother had inadequately provided for him in her will. Out-of-court statements made by his mother were

tendered to show that he had been guilty of misconduct capable of disentitling him under the relevant legislation from such maintenance. Gibbs J clearly explains the hearsay position in the following passage (at 149): To enable that question to be considered, it is necessary to decide what effect should be given to the evidence of the statements made by the testatrix as to the conduct of the appellant, and as to the reasons why she deprived him of any benefit under her will. It is clear that under the rules of common law a statement by a testatrix that her son has been guilty of misconduct, and for that reason she has excluded him from any benefit under her will, is not admissible to prove that the son was in fact guilty of misconduct. What the testatrix said about the son’s conduct is hearsay, and no exception to the rule against hearsay which is recognised by the common law allows the statement to be

[page 927] given in evidence to prove the facts stated. Such a statement is admissible as original evidence to prove the knowledge, motive or other state of mind of the testatrix should that be relevant. It is, however, difficult to see how the state of mind of the testatrix can be relevant in an application under testator’s family maintenance legislation.

One might quibble with Gibbs J in his use of the words ‘original evidence’, for expressions of a state of mind can be characterised as (descriptive) assertions. The word is used merely to describe a statement not caught by the hearsay prohibition. It is the non-narrative nature of the asserting statement that, it is suggested, is crucial. 8.46 Similarly, Walton v R provides clear High Court authority for the admission of out-of-court statements to prove a relevant intention.105 Mason CJ argues that statements of intention are original evidence ‘because the making of the statement has independent evidentiary value in proving the author’s intentions’. The majority argue that statements of relevant intention can be regarded as relevant conduct. Both these views are criticised above and it is suggested a better explanation is that it is the absence of narrative which justifies the reception of the evidence. Subsequently, in Bull v R,106 the court held admissible defence evidence of a telephone conversation between one accused and his alleged rape victim as relevant to establishing that the complainant knew she was being invited over to the accused’s house to have sex with a group of men (which was in turn relevant to the question of whether she had consented to the intercourse which the accused admitted took place). Whatever the justification, it is now accepted without debate that at common

law relevant statements of intention, knowledge and belief are admissible. The uniform legislation also so provides in s 66A.107 8.47 The practical debate is over the sufficient relevance of such states of mind. Although in Blastland Lord Bridge suggests in the quote at 8.42 that the state of mind need be itself a fact in issue, the High Court in Bull v R108 accepted that it is enough that the state of mind be of sufficient relevance to a fact in issue. Thus, the question of sufficient relevance is decisive. As to be expected, this sufficient relevance has been elusive to common law judges. Of particular difficulty is the relevance of an intention in establishing whether that intention was carried out. Where the cooperation of other persons is not required for the carrying out of the intention, sufficient relevance will generally be found.109 But [page 928] where the cooperation of another is required for the intention to be carried out, for example, where the question is whether there was a meeting of two people, then the sufficient relevance of the intention of one person to so meet to establish that meeting is doubtful. Although contrary authorities exist, most notably the celebrated United States decision in Mutual Life Insurance Co v Hillmon,110 the better view is that the bare intention on one person to meet is generally not of sufficient relevance to establish a meeting.111 A number of more recent decisions illustrate the sufficient relevance of intentions otherwise admissible outside the hearsay prohibition.112 8.48 That evidence of intention may be used to circumvent an apparently prohibited hearsay use of evidence so long as its sufficient relevance is clear is well illustrated by the High Court decision in Walton v R.113 In that case, out-of-court statements asserting that the victim had arranged to meet with the accused at a particular time at a shopping centre could not be used as evidence that such an arrangement had been made without infringing the hearsay prohibition. But the statements were admissible to establish the victim’s intention to meet the accused, provided that this intention was independently sufficiently relevant to the fact in issue, which was whether the accused did meet with the victim at the shopping centre. On grounds of sufficient relevance, the

victim’s intention to meet with the accused at the shopping centre could be received to show that she went to the centre so intending, but it was doubtful there was sufficient relevance to show either that the accused went there, or that he went there and met with the victim. [page 929] But the majority held that as there was also evidence that the accused intended to meet the victim there, the conjunction of the two intentions was sufficiently relevant to show that they did meet there. But, as Deane J argues, it may be doubtful that this inference of a meeting can be drawn without relying upon the out-of-court assertion that the parties had agreed to meet. Their bare intentions to meet at the centre were insufficiently relevant to establishing that they did there meet. 8.49 Problems of relevance are also illustrated by those cases where the courts have been willing to admit the results of opinion surveys as evidence.114 By regarding the survey as one of a relevant state of mind of the persons surveyed, the surveyor can testify to the results without infringing the hearsay rule (or the opinion rule).115 Australian cases now recognise this,116 also pointing out that, where opinion surveys are tendered in civil cases (as they usually are), even if the evidence may infringe the common law hearsay prohibition, it will still be admissible in many cases under a statutory exception. But even though usually admissible, the main issue is inevitably the relevance of the tendered survey, a matter which will depend upon the material facts in issue, the nature and number of persons surveyed, and the precise questions asked of them. Against these practical relevance problems, issues of hearsay will generally pale into insignificance.117 One might be able to avoid a prohibited hearsay chain of reasoning by relying upon an out-of-court statement only to establish knowledge, intention or belief, but care must be taken to completely ignore prohibited assertions in constructing that chain of reasoning.

Assertions of physical sensation and health 8.50 Similarly, statements of contemporaneous physical sensation and health should, it is suggested, be treated as outside the hearsay prohibition

(representations of such feelings are, under the Uniform Acts, admissible in exception to s 59(1) as a result of s 66A). However, in admitting such statements (to be used at common law, but [page 930] not where s 60 applies, only for the purpose of establishing a contemporaneous sensation or health and not to establish other observations asserted), the High Court in Ramsay v Watson considered the admission to be an exception to the general rule excluding hearsay.118 In addition, the High Court said (at 647): ‘It is easier to suppose it originated in practical necessity than to give it a logical place in a symmetrical scheme of conceptions concerning evidence’ — although the idea of narrative put forward in this chapter does provide a conceptual explanation for the admission of such evidence outside the hearsay prohibition. It is concluded that before observational assertions contained in express or implied statements can be prohibited by the common law hearsay rule, those assertions must be a narrative of past observations of a fact or event. Only narrative statements fall within the rationale of a hearsay rule intended to prohibit out-of-court testimony. Although this conceptualisation is not embodied in the Uniform Acts, its provisions are drafted to admit some non-narrative statements exceptionally on grounds of reliability (for example, s 65(2)(b) and (c)).

The availability of the maker of an out-of-court statement 8.51 As explained at 7.87ff, the previous consistent statements of a witness are, as a general rule, inadmissible evidence for the purpose of supporting or destroying that witness’s credit. Practical reasons provide a basis for this rule. But, furthermore, the hearsay rule prohibits the tender of previous out-of-court statements to establish the facts asserted in them. The hearsay rule is designed to ensure that witnesses report their experiences directly to court, so that their credibility in making reports of their experiences can be assessed first-hand. The fact that the witness is present in court provides a strong reason for insisting that that witness makes a first-hand report and does not rely upon the tender of any prior reports the witness may have made to others.

If the witness is unable to recall the facts observed, the witness is entitled to refresh his or her memory by reference to a previous statement made or adopted by the witness when the events were fresh in the witness’s memory: see 7.76–7.86. The very breadth of the memory refreshment rule, which allows a witness to read a statement vouched for as accurate but recording facts of which the witness has no revived memory, is an indication of the importance the common law places upon witnesses reporting orally to the court. But difficulties arise where there is no contemporaneous memorandum by which a forgetful witness is able to refresh his or her memory, and circumstances arise where arguments of reliability favour the admission of a witness’s previous statement (usually oral) in exception to the general prohibition. The fact that the forgetful witness is [page 931] available in court and can be cross-examined about the circumstances in which the previous statement was made then becomes a significant factor in deciding whether the reliability of the out-of-court statement can be sufficiently gauged to let it in as an exception to the general prohibition. This justification supports the statutory admissibility of statements made by children and vulnerable witnesses to investigators closer to the events in question: see 7.34. 8.52 The reluctance of English courts to create any further exceptions to the hearsay rule, even where circumstances strongly support its reliability, is found in Myers v DPP: see 8.4.119 In R v McLean,120 immediately following a robbery, the victim dictated the registration number of the getaway car to a bystander who recorded it. This record was never read or checked by the victim. At the trial of the accused the victim-witness was unable to recall what he had told the bystander and, having never adopted the bystander’s record, could not refresh memory from it. The prosecution sought to call the bystander to read his record but this was held by the Court of Criminal Appeal to be prohibited by the hearsay rule, and no exception existed to let in such information.121 This case was distinguished by the Western Australian Court of Appeal in Guy and Finger v R,122 on the ground that the victim-witness in McLean had no memory at all about what he had said to the bystander (making cross-examination of little use). However, in the case before it, the Western Australian court held

that both witness and bystander recalled the incident and could be effectively cross-examined, so that (as the court states at 127): The very bases for the exclusion of hearsay evidence, that is the giving of evidence on oath and the availability of the witness to be cross-examined thereon so as to test his testimony are both available.

The Western Australian court emphasised Gaio v R123 in admitting the evidence. In Gaio, the court held that a police officer could give evidence of the confession of an accused made to the police officer through an interpreter. To the argument that the police officer did not hear the confession first-hand but reported indirectly the interpreter’s observation of it, the High Court refused to apply the hearsay prohibition, the interpreter having testified that he had heard and interpreted accurately. 8.53 It is difficult to argue that in Guy and Finger and Gaio the out-of-court statements, testified to by bystander and police officer respectively, were tendered as [page 932] original evidence. The testimony of the forgetful observers that their observation and report is accurate may enhance the reliability of the assertions in their out-ofcourt statements, but it does not prevent the purpose of the tender of those statements being to prove the truth of assertions contained in them. Both cases are more logically regarded as creating exceptions to the hearsay rule. In creating exceptions, the availability of the observing witness who has made the out-of-court statement to testify on oath is the critical factor.124 And the situation is logically the same under s 59(1) of the uniform legislation, for what is tendered is a previous representation (by the interpreter if the Gaio situation is in mind) tendered to prove a fact (an admission by the accused) that it can be reasonably supposed the interpreter intended to assert by that representation. If this is so then an appropriate exception under the legislation (ss 63–66) must be invoked. But in the case of admissions relayed through interpreters another analysis is possible. Hill J in Tsang Chi Ming v Uvanna Pty Ltd,125 following the High Court in Gaio, held that in the case of admissions made through an interpreter, the police

officer hearing the reported admission can testify to the admission without infringing s 59(1). This is because the interpreter can be likened to a mechanical means of communication, so that no previous representation is being testified to by the police officer; rather, the police officer listens directly to the admission via an interpreting machine.126 Alternatively, the interpreter can be regarded, if the circumstances so permit, as the agent of the person making the admission so that the police officer can report the agent’s authorised admission directly to the court. Either way, there is no report of a previous representation or out-of-court statement. But under the first approach it will be necessary to call the interpreter to establish his or her accuracy;127 while in the second, agency may be satisfactorily established without calling the interpreter. [page 933] 8.54 In an analogous situation, it seems probable that a common law exception to the hearsay rule is created by the High Court decision of Alexander v R.128 In that case, a victim was unable to identify the accused in court but testified that he had previously recognised someone as the culprit at an identification parade, although he could not in court recall whom. The prosecution called a police officer, a witness to the identification parade, to prove that at that parade the victim had identified the accused as the culprit. The court unanimously admitted the police officer’s evidence. Gibbs J concluded (at 407–8): Such evidence would not be hearsay: it is not tendered to prove the truth of what the identifying witness asserted on the previous occasion … The evidence of the observer of the earlier act of identification is in such a case admitted as original evidence. It explains and gives meaning to the evidence of identification given by the identifying witness in the witness box.

However, as explained at 8.53, the evidence is tendered ‘to prove the truth of what the identifying witness asserted on the previous occasion’. That truth may be easier to accept having heard what the identifying witness has to say in court, but the only evidence of who was identified remains the witness’s out-of-court statement asserting that fact. Furthermore, given the risks of identification evidence being unreliable, the bare assertion by the identifying witness that an accurate choice was made at the parade is little safeguard. If the identifying witness has no precise memory of the features of the suspect and the accused, or of the circumstances of the identification parade, evidence of a mere act of identification is hardly reliable. There is little to be said for creating an exception

to the hearsay rule in these circumstances unless the identifying witness can, through his or her testimony, give further guarantee to the probable reliability of the out-of-court identification. (Though in most cases, things said and thought by the identifying witness after an identification process may have little, if any, additional probative value.) 8.55 Despite such arguments, two judges in Alexander v R were prepared to go further and admit evidence of an out-of court identification even where the identifying witness is unable to testify to any prior act of identification or, indeed, is not available to testify at all. Mason J declared (at 407, with Aickin J agreeing) that such evidence is not contrary to the hearsay rule: … because an identification out of court, being earlier in time and made under circumstances which involve a selection in the absence of any compulsion, is more likely to be reliable than an identification in court.

One can accept the thrust of the reasoning without accepting that an out-ofcourt identification should be received without any testimony from the identifying witness concerning the circumstances of observation and recognition. Even accepting the warnings that accompany identification evidence, it is doubtful that evidence of a mere act of prior identification should be admissible. [page 934] As a general rule, evidence of a prior out-of-court identification should be admissible only to support the credibility of a witness who is prepared to identify the accused in court. However, where a witness is prepared to testify to the prior act of identification and its circumstances so that there is some further guarantee of its reliability, then evidence of who was identified may, on grounds of sufficient reliability, be admitted in exception to the hearsay rule: for a more detailed discussion, further authority and for the position under the Uniform Acts, see 7.94–7.98. 8.56 It can be concluded that at common law, the hearsay prohibition applies whether or not the maker of an out-of-court statement is called, because as a general rule, the common law demands the direct report of observations; but, where direct report is not possible, the availability of the maker of the statement provides a gauge to reliability which may justify reception of the out-of-court statement in exception to the general prohibition.129

Machine-generated information 8.57 It is well established that the place of origin of an article cannot be proved, without breach of the general hearsay prohibition, by tender of a writing on or attached to the article. In Patel v Comptroller of Customs,130 the place of origin of bags of coriander seed could not be proved through tender of the mark ‘Produce of Morocco’ upon the bags. The inherent reliability of such evidence does not avoid the logic that this reliability depends upon the truth of an observational assertion contained in an out-of-court statement (made by an unknown observer).131 Section 70 of the Uniform Acts creates an exception to admit tags, labels and other writings which may reasonably be supposed to have been attached to objects in the course of business for the purpose of ‘describing or stating the identity, nature, ownership, destination, origin or weight of the object’ or its contents.132 The section does not apply in customs and excise prosecutions. [page 935] But where a mark of origin is stamped upon an article by a machine situated at that place of origin, the mark may be established independently of an out-ofcourt statement that can attract the hearsay prohibition.133 The hearsay prohibition exists to ensure that witnesses report observations directly, not that machines so report.134 The uniform legislation endorses this approach in that s 59 applies only to representations made by persons. Where a mark is generated by a machine the principal question is one of authentication, not hearsay.135 If it can be established that the mark was made by the machine in question, and that the machine is situated at the place of origin, then the mark is admissible. The problem is establishing these matters. In some cases, the court may be prepared to take judicial notice of both. This seems the better explanation of R v Kelly and R v Leroy,136 where courts in South Australia and New South Wales held that the postmark upon a parcel sent by post is admissible evidence of the place from which the parcel was posted. In other cases, witnesses may have to be called to establish the authenticity of the mark. 8.58 The admissibility of machine-generated information assumes a further complexity where the machine analyses or measures, in which case evidence will be required as to the accuracy of the analysis or measurement. But this again is a question of authentication, and should be distinguished from the question of the

reception of the result ‘stated’ by the machine. That ‘statement’ is not itself hearsay evidence. Of course, in authenticating that result, further evidence must be called and that evidence must not fall foul of the hearsay rule. And, where the machine itself processes out-of-court statements containing human observational assertions, the output cannot escape classification as hearsay if tendered to establish a computation or analysis based upon such observations. 8.59 These issues must be clearly distinguished when considering whether machine-generated information falls foul of the hearsay rule. Where the accuracy of machines is not in doubt, courts sometimes ignore the question of authentication in admitting [page 936] the machine result as real evidence. The decision in R v Wood137 is an illustration of such an approach, the machine analysis of the chemical composition of stolen metal being admitted as ‘real evidence’ without requiring any proof of the accuracy of the analysis.138 This case may again be better explained as one where the court was prepared to take judicial notice of the accuracy of the process, but the preferable approach would have been to authenticate the result through calling expert testimony about the reliability of the machine.139 Under the uniform legislation, the reliability of machines and processes may be presumed in certain circumstances under ss 146 and 147. The authentication of real evidence generated by machines is further discussed at 7.25.

Exceptions to the Hearsay Prohibition 8.60 Although the formulation of the hearsay prohibition here advocated takes up some of the tension between upholding a particular procedural system and ensuring the reception of reliable information, to apply the prohibition without exception would lead to the exclusion of much significantly reliable information not available from other sources. Consequently, there are exceptions to the prohibition, both at common law and by way of statute. Their basis is the probable reliability of the information and the need to consider that information if the true facts are to be discovered. It might be argued that, if the hearsay prohibition exists to ensure the direct

report of experiences then, where direct report is impossible or impractical because the witness is unavailable (because of death, illness, mental or physical disability, absence or cost), indirect report through tender of the witness’s out-ofcourt testimony should be permitted. But this argument ignores the importance of the procedure demanding direct report. This procedure is an important aid in determining the reliability of observational testimony. Only where reliability can be adequately gauged without resort to the normal procedure can indirect report be permitted. Before necessity can justify the reception of out-of-court testimony some other gauge of reliability is required. 8.61 What constitutes sufficient guarantee of reliability depends upon why the testimony may be unreliable in the first place. Testimony is unreliable where its language is unclear or ambiguous, or where the accuracy of the alleged observations, the memory of the observations or the sincerity of the report are in some way [page 937] doubtful.140 Not all testimony is subject to the same risks of unreliability. Whether circumstances guarantee sufficient elimination of existing risks is therefore not a matter easily determined in a general way. Better to look to all the circumstances surrounding the out-of-court testimony. A simple example of circumstances where necessity and reliability demand the reception of hearsay arises where a witness, having testified to a particular matter in previous proceedings between the parties, is unavailable, for example through serious illness or death, to testify at later proceedings. In these circumstances the previous testimony, having been tested through examination by the parties, is admissible hearsay.141 Although not as reliable as a first-hand report of the matters in issue, where the trier can observe the witness’s demeanour, nevertheless necessity and sufficient reliability still permit the reception of such testimony. However, the isolation of exceptions to the hearsay prohibition has not hitherto been regarded as part of a case-by-case approach. Neither the common law nor the legislature, probably to the great relief of trial judges, has been prepared in England or Australia to allow judges to determine admissibility in exception to the rule merely upon a case-by-case approach. Such legislation that does exist has tended towards defining exceptions to apply in particular

circumstances, an approach to be contrasted with that permitted by the United States Federal Rules of Evidence, where a residual exception admits hearsay on a case-by-case basis.142 [page 938] But, moreover, in England, consequent to Myers v DPP,143 the general view has been that both the rule and its exceptions are now ossified at common law as parliament has taken on the responsibility to evolve further the common law rule and create exceptions to it. In Australia, the situation is not so clear. In Pollitt v R,144 the majority favoured creating a new exception to allow a witness to testify to spontaneous and reactive assertions by one party to a telephone conversation to establish the identity of the other party.145 In Walton v R,146 Mason CJ might be interpreted as going further and, at least in the case of implied assertions, being prepared to permit exceptions by trial judges on a case-by-case basis.147 But in Bannon v R,148 there appears a reluctance, expressed particularly by Brennan CJ and McHugh J, to judicially reform or create exceptions to the common law hearsay prohibition. While parliaments continue to make legislative reforms, the High Court maintains a relatively conservative approach. 8.62 Those specific exceptions which do exist in Australia by way of common law and statute tend towards the admission of first-hand hearsay and documentary hearsay. Although also the primary thrust of the uniform legislation, it does extend its exceptions to oral hearsay, quite generally in the case of first-hand oral hearsay in civil cases. First-hand hearsay is a report to the court of assertions made by a witness about relevant facts or events experienced. As those assertions are reported from one person to another (moving from first-hand hearsay to secondhand etc) so the risks of unreliable report increase. If hearsay evidence is to be admitted it is preferable that it be limited to first-hand hearsay, whether the assertions are reported orally or in an authenticated document which carries some guarantee of accurate report. Thus, for example, the exceptions to the hearsay rule enacted in Pt 3.2 Div 2 of the uniform legislation are all restricted to the admissibility of first-hand hearsay (s 62: ‘a previous representation that was made by a person who had personal knowledge of an asserted fact’). Legislation exists throughout Australia to permit the tender of authenticated hearsay documents. The wider community, particularly the business community,

is prepared to act upon such documentary information and, at least in civil disputes, the pressure for the admissibility of such evidence is strong. In fact, the business community is often prepared to act upon documents quite indirectly embodying out-of-court assertions, and legislation, including the uniform legislation, allows the tender of documents made by persons other than observational witnesses. Furthermore, such documents can in some cases be admitted without formal oral authentication, as is always required [page 939] at common law. Thus, the statutory reception of documentary hearsay poses a clear threat to the very continuation of the common law oral trial, at least in civil cases. 8.63 The other clear distinction retained by legislation is that between the reception of hearsay in civil and criminal cases. Legislation, including the uniform legislation, is carefully drafted to ensure that prosecutors do not fail to call available eyewitnesses, and that documents or other oral hearsay tendered by prosecutors be significantly reliable before it is received. Although in civil disputes parties may be prepared to have documents or oral hearsay tendered without available witnesses being called, and may be happy to accept the reliability of documents in general business and community use, the same presumptions do not apply in criminal cases. In criminal cases, the protection of the innocent accused is paramount. Witnesses who have experienced relevant facts and events should normally be called. Hearsay can be admitted only where necessary, where witnesses are unavailable, and where there is some significant guarantee of the reliability of the out-of-court testimony. The situation may be different where the accused seeks to tender hearsay to demonstrate his or her innocence (a situation recognised in, for example, s 65(8) and (9) of the Uniform Acts) but, where the prosecution is concerned, great stress continues to be put, at common law and by statute, upon the need for observational witnesses to testify so that their observations can be fully tested through cross-examination. 8.64 The exceptions to the hearsay rule which do exist come back in every case to the notions of necessity and reliability.149 The notions apply quite differently from context to context and, in reality, from case to case. But here we are concerned to isolate those general situations where hearsay exceptions have

been formulated. The common law and statutory exceptions are discussed separately except where legislation is intended to enact and replace the common law. In these cases, the legislation is discussed in the context of the common law exception to demonstrate what changes the legislation intends to effect.

Common Law (and Related Statutory) Exceptions 8.65 It is not possible to discuss the common law exceptions in any particular logical order. Nor, given High Court uncertainties, and that the uniform legislation applies in all jurisdictions but three, is it possible to take a global view and explain in which direction the common law exceptions are likely to evolve. Consequently, there is a certain arbitrariness to the order and classification of the following discussion for which no apology can be made. Only the basic notions of necessity and reliability provide any real coherence to the discussion. The common law exceptions and statutory exceptions derivative of them are discussed in three categories. [page 940] First, the so-called res gestae exceptions; secondly, the exceptions that allow tender of statements by persons since deceased where there is some guarantee of their reliability; and thirdly, the exceptions based upon necessity and reliability that admit statements in public documents and allow the out-of-court admissions and confessions of parties and accused to be used against them.

The so-called res gestae exceptions: spontaneous statements 8.66 This Latin phrase has already been referred to in explaining the scope of the hearsay rule: see 8.36–8.41. There, it was explained that the phrase embodies a notion of contemporaneity, relevant in determining, first, whether a statement is made by way of narrative, and secondly, whether contemporaneity gives some guarantee to the reliability of spontaneous narrative made close to the events or states it describes. In this second context the phrase embodies a true exception to the hearsay rule, applicable in both civil and criminal cases, and even though the

maker of the statement may be available as a witness, the out-of-court testimony may be received. Reliability is the essence of the exception. As the Privy Council in Ratten v R and the House of Lords in R v Andrews150 have explained, it is the spontaneity of the statements in relation to the events it asserts which mitigates risks of both concoction and memory (although it does not mitigate, and may increase, risks of inaccurate perception and narration). It is this common law reasoning151 that underlies the hearsay exception contained in s 65(2)(b) of the Uniform Acts. All the exceptions in s 65 apply only to first-hand hearsay: s 62. Section 65(2)(b) provides that, in criminal proceedings where the maker of the representation is unavailable, a representation is admissible if ‘made when or shortly after the asserted fact occurred and in circumstances that make it unlikely that the representation is a fabrication’. A similar provision, based on s 65(2)(b), is found in s 93B(2)(a) of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld). Under these provisions, unlike the common law, the maker of the representation must be unavailable to testify. The uniform legislation defines ‘unavailability of persons’ in Pt 2 cl 4 of the Dictionary. It comprises death, incompetence to testify, mental or physical disability, unlawfulness, and reasonable steps to find or compel a person to testify.152 But unlike the common law that requires proximity to the events [page 941] in issue, proximity only to the occurrence of a relevant asserted fact is required.153 And, in addition, the representation must have been made ‘in circumstances that make it unlikely that the representation is a fabrication’.154 Although spontaneity provides a reason for thinking that contemporaneous narrative statements are reliable, and strong arguments have been put, in particular by Mason CJ, for using spontaneity as the basis for a more general common law exception to the hearsay rule, there is no support for such a common law approach from the majority of the High Court. Spontaneous statements made during or shortly after the events in issue may be admissible in exception to the hearsay rule, and spontaneity may provide an argument for creating quite specific exceptions to the hearsay rule, but there is no general licence to trial judges to consider whether spontaneity as such provides sufficient guarantee of reliability in

a specific case to admit evidence in exception to the hearsay rule. It appears that it is not only spontaneity but, at common law, also involvement in the transaction in issue which guarantees the reliability of statements [page 942] admitted exceptionally as res gestae. These propositions receive support in Walton v R and Pollitt v R.155 8.67 In Walton, a witness testified that the victim to a murder was heard talking on the telephone, that she turned to her young child and said, ‘M, daddy’s on the phone’, and the child then took the phone and said, in apparent response to something said by the person on the telephone, ‘Hello daddy’, and continued to have a conversation in filial tones. The question was whether this testimony could establish that it had been the child’s father on the telephone. Mason CJ appears to take the view that the trial judge has some discretion in admitting reliable implied assertions in exception to the hearsay rule, saying (at 293): ‘In the present case the extreme unlikelihood of concoction on the part of the child would have been a factor favouring admissibility of the statements’. He goes on to refer to Ratten and Andrews (at 294) as approving: … an approach which places emphasis upon the spontaneity of an assertion (as evidence that it was not concocted) rather than upon the contemporaneity of that assertion to the occurrence to which it relates … These cases relate to the doctrine of res gestae, but in truth the extension of the scope of that rule necessarily affects the scope and operation of the hearsay rule.

There is no acceptance of this approach by the other members of the court. The majority argued, on grounds of relevance, that as the mother’s saying to the child ‘M, daddy’s on the phone’ was clearly inadmissible hearsay, the child’s statement on taking up the phone could add little, if anything, to the mother’s inadmissible assertion. 8.68 In Pollitt, a similar issue arose, but the testimony established, not a greeting during a telephone conversation, but an assertion of identity immediately afterwards. This time a majority of the court was prepared to create a specific exception to the hearsay rule. Deane J formulates the exception in the following terms (at 596): … where the circumstances do not on their face give rise to a significant possibility of fabrication or impersonation, a witness may give evidence that the party to a telephone conversation who in his or

her presence identified the person at the other end of the line by a statement made immediately before, in the course of, or immediately after the conversation. … A corresponding exception should apply … where the witness was an actual party to the telephone conversation and the other party identified himself or herself expressly or by implication in circumstances which do not, on their face, give rise to a significant possibility of impersonation.

The exception extends only to allow hearsay evidence of identity, and does not apply to make admissible any other prohibited hearsay assertions made before, during or after the conversation.156 [page 943] While Mason CJ and Deane J were prepared to apply the exception in the case before them, Toohey and McHugh JJ refused to apply it to an identification by a proven criminal following a telephone conversation in the course of a criminal purpose. In these circumstances they felt there was too significant a risk of fabrication to admit the assertion of identity. Although Mason CJ again emphasises spontaneity, his conclusion is couched in terms of a specific telephone identification rule, and in no other judgment is there support for his more general approach. In fact it is specifically rejected by both Brennan J (at 582) and Toohey J (at 610), who insist that generally spontaneous statements are only admissible if contemporaneous with the events in issue. Dicta in other cases can be found supporting this view.157 And the court in Bannon v R158 was apparently reluctant not only to take a more general approach to the exceptional admission of reliable hearsay but also to create specific exceptions to the prohibition. Thus, the only spontaneous assertions generally admissible at common law are those made proximate to the events in issue. 8.69 The degree of proximity required at common law, on the authority of Ratten and Andrews, is determined by inquiring whether that proximity sufficiently precludes the risk of concoction. In this regard, as argued at 8.40, Vocisano v Vocisano159 must be seriously doubted, in that it appears to require exact contemporaneity before reliability can be guaranteed.160 The uniform legislation takes a similar approach to proximity in asking whether the representation is made ‘when or shortly after the asserted fact occurred’, emphasising that exact contemporaneity is not required.161

But if, as here argued, proximity is related to reliability, there are arguably other limits to the common law exception (perhaps comparable to relevant ‘circumstances that make it unlikely that the representation is a fabrication’ under s 65(2)(b)). First, at common law the statement must have been made by someone whose reliability was likely to be influenced by the events in issue. Normally, participants are likely to be influenced,162 but in many cases mere observers may be quite unaffected by these [page 944] events. The modern cases have all involved participants, although dicta in them are wide enough to include the statements of mere observers.163 Secondly, it is a statement about the event which prompts it which is likely to be reliable, not a statement about an unassociated matter. Thus, in R v Plevac,164 the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal held that a wife’s statement while being taken to hospital to be treated for burns after she had been doused with petrol, that her husband had not done it, was held admissible as res gestae, but not her narrative statement that her husband had, on a previous occasion, threatened to burn her.165 This requirement appears to be embodied in s 65(2)(b) insofar as it requires the representation to have been made shortly after the occurrence of the ‘asserted fact’ that prompts it. 8.70 If contemporaneity is related to the issue of reliability in this way, it would seem that the judge should decide as a matter of law whether there is sufficient contemporaneity and involvement to invoke the res gestae exception. Yet in R v Benz,166 Gaudron and McHugh JJ suggest that the jury should decide whether tendered statements were made during the events as alleged. In that case, Gaudron and McHugh JJ regarded the statement, ‘We’re OK, my mother’s just feeling sick’ as admissible to assert the relationship of mother and daughter if made while the women were dumping the victim’s body into the river, and that the jury should have been directed to so determine. It is submitted that, if this direction was required, and both Mason CJ and Dawson J held that it was not, it was required not to determine whether the statements were admissible, but rather to establish a chain of proof whereby the jury could logically use the tendered evidence. It is wrong to involve juries in questions of admissibility. Their task is

to determine rationally the material facts upon the evidence that has been admitted by the trial judge. 8.71 Other specific exceptions to the hearsay rule are often discussed in the context of res gestae because they may find their rationale in the notion of spontaneity; for example, contemporaneous expressions of state of mind, knowledge, emotion and physical condition. By analogy, in Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd and Commonwealth,167 Blackburn J admitted evidence from anthropologists based upon their analysis of out-of-court statements by Aboriginal people about their social order and organisation. As argued at 8.42–8.50, the reception of out-of-court statements concerning all these matters may be better explained as falling outside the hearsay prohibition altogether as [page 945] not being in testimonial form (narrative). Whatever the position, such statements ought to be admissible.168 The Latin phrase emphasises a common thread of contemporaneity and spontaneity but itself obscures the various reasons why statements are admissible (either as non-narrative or as reliable narrative). 8.72 The phrase res gestae is also often used more literally, and quite unnecessarily, to explain the relevance of tendered evidence. It is said that where a particular event is in issue then all the surrounding parts and circumstances of the event are admissible as part of the res gestae. Thus, in O’Leary v R,169 to implicate the accused in the brutal murder of a member of a logging team, it was held that reference could be made to the accused’s drinking and violence during the day in question, as supporting the inference that the culmination of this ‘drunken orgy’ was the murder alleged. In this context res gestae merely embodies the notion of relevance. It need not be raised to the status of a separate inclusionary principle. General principles can explain the reception of such evidence adequately, evidence which did not reveal a merely prejudicial disposition but was relevant and important to understanding and proving the events in issue.170 The use of the phrase in this context of probative sufficiency has little to do with the hearsay prohibition or its exceptions. The only link is that of contemporaneity, but this is too incidental for anything but confusion to arise from the use of the phrase in both contexts.171

Out-of-court statements by persons since deceased (or otherwise unavailable) 8.73 Such first-hand hearsay statements are admissible upon one ground of necessity — death — where reliability can be adequately guaranteed. This guarantee is deemed adequate in six situations: 1.

statements against pecuniary or proprietary interest;

2.

statements made and reported in the course of duty; [page 946]

3.

statements concerning public and general rights;

4.

statements by deceased relatives as to pedigree;

5.

statements by persons under a hopeless and settled expectation of death; and

6.

statements by testators about the contents of their wills (since lost).

The strictness of the guarantee is relative to the need for the tender of the evidence. Statements as to public and general rights and statements by deceased relatives and testators are important and crucial items of evidence and are thus received without much guarantee, while statements against interest, in the course of duty, and dying declarations rely more upon their degree of reliability for their reception. Explained in this way, there is an adequate and coherent reason for these exceptions to the hearsay rule, and by analogy courts could if they wished extend and evolve these common law exceptions to other situations. 8.74 The need for extension of the exceptions has been mitigated by the existence of legislation allowing the tender of hearsay, particularly in documentary form. Where the common law exceptions prima facie apply, most often the out-of-court statements will be in documentary form (although this is not strictly necessary for any of the exceptions to apply). Consequently, tender will be possible under legislation, avoiding the uncertainties of the common law exceptions. So in practice, the common law exceptions are not often relied upon. Judges in Australia have not therefore been given many opportunities to develop

the common law and with the advent of the Uniform Acts they are now reluctant to do so.172 If the exceptions were required more often in practice, judges would be forced to extend them. The arbitrariness of their scope is most vividly illustrated by the need, in each instance, to establish the death of the out-of-court declarant. The necessity of admitting out-of-court testimony produced through other causes of unavailability, illness or absence for example, is not taken into account. It would be a small and logical step to develop the exceptions in at least this regard.173 So far as these exceptions are somewhat recognised in criminal cases by s 65 of the uniform legislation and s 93B of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), and s 34KA of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ‘unavailability of persons’ is more widely defined.174 These exceptions have no role in civil cases governed by the Uniform Acts, as s 63(2) admits generally first-hand hearsay where the maker of the representation is [page 947] unavailable175 and notice has been given under s 67. Furthermore, in criminal cases under s 65(8), the accused has a general right to tender first-hand hearsay, again where the maker of the representation is unavailable, provided notice has been given under s 67, and this obviates the need for an accused to rely upon more specific exceptions contained in the legislation.176

Statements against interest 8.75 Such statements by deceased persons are received upon the basis that, if a person with personal knowledge of a relevant fact (the exception applies only to firsthand hearsay: cf s 62) knowingly makes a statement against interest, it may be regarded as reliable, at least so far as the statement of fact is against interest. The exception is enacted by s 65(2)(d) of the uniform legislation in criminal cases where the maker is unavailable177 and the representation was made in circumstances that support its likely reliability178 (and notice has been given: s 67), but there is no requirement, equivalent to that at common law, that the representation be knowingly against interest and it is enough that it can be so construed.179 A similar enactment is found in s 93B(2)(c) of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld).

Although some judges have suggested a strict approach to the common law requirement that the statement be made knowingly against interest, others have been prepared to allow the exception to apply as long as, on the face of it, the statement can be reasonably construed as made knowingly against interest.180 No other practical approach is possible given the unavailability of the declarant. It is enough for the statement to be prima facie knowingly made against interest and any opponent would need to tender further information to permit further investigation of these matters.181 8.76 Common law courts have been strict in their interpretation of the requirement that the statement be against interest. In the first place, it is not enough that the statement disclose an agreement which contains mutual benefits and obligations, such as a promise to marry,182 or an agreement for services at an agreed price.183 In the [page 948] second place, the courts have taken a restricted view of what interests are capable of guaranteeing reliability. There are many interests that might guarantee the reliability of statements made knowingly against them, from financial interests to moral interests. Most authority restricts the appropriate interests to pecuniary and proprietary interests, such as the acknowledgment of indebtedness to another, of payment of a debt once owed to the declarant184 or of receipt of monies (or other property) by the declarant on behalf of another.185 Coward v Motor Insurer’s Bureau decided that the acknowledgment of a moral liability to pay for regular transport in a friend’s motor car was sufficient to invoke the exception, but that case is traditionally regarded as an aberration against authority.186 No clear authority exists upon whether the acknowledgment of tortious liability is against interest187 but acknowledgment of criminal liability has been expressly held not to invoke the exception.188 8.77 The result of this last limitation is that the out-of-court confession of a third party to the crime alleged against an accused is inadmissible. At first sight it may seem odd that, while the prosecution is able to tender the accused’s out-ofcourt confession to establish guilt, the accused is unable to tender a third party’s confession to establish innocence. In both cases there is no other practical way of

tendering this evidence, for no witness can be obliged to give such incriminating testimony in court. A distinction may be the availability of the accused to explain away ambiguities or unreliabilities in the out-of-court confession. Courts have generally refused to extend the common law exception to cover this situation, emphasising the ease with which such information may be concocted by the accused or witness. These matters were emphasised by the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Van Beelen189 in refusing to extend the exception. But on the facts that was a weak case. The third party was intellectually disabled, and on making the confession to a police officer at once withdrew it, adding that he had just been released from a mental asylum. The refusal of the High Court to [page 949] grant leave to appeal was certainly justified on the facts. But the House of Lords in R v Blastland,190 in dicta, was also not prepared to reconsider so extending the common law exception. In Bannon v R191 (discussed at 8.6 above), a case where there was doubt that the out-of-court remarks of a co-accused could be interpreted as assuming sole responsibility for a murder, and where the trial judge had not expressly directed the jury that they could not use those remarks to support the case of the appealing accused if they so interpreted them, the majority felt it strictly unnecessary to decide whether the exception should extend to such a statement against penal interest. But there was no enthusiasm shown for extending the exception to the hearsay prohibition and state appellate courts have generally followed their approach.192 In R v Button, although the full ‘gallows’ confessions of a convicted murderer were rejected as unreliable, a majority of the Court of Appeal was prepared to admit other of his confessional statements to relevant hit and run incidents where their reliability was confirmed by other evidence before the court.193 However, in the later case of Hoy v R, the court emphatically rejects any general extension of this exception to statements against penal interest.194 And in Baker v R,195 the High Court refused to revisit Bannon and the admissibility of third party confessions as statements against interest or otherwise.

8.78 In R v Myers,196 the House of Lords suggests that the exception should extend to where an accused seeks to put before the court a co-accused’s confession (not tendered by the prosecution or inadmissible if so tendered) where the confession contains evidence exculpating the accused. The hearsay objection is met by regarding the confession as that of a party admissible at the tender of another party (and if not so admissible the hearsay objection remains). Less dramatically, Deane J in Bannon v R197 suggests that, in fairness, where the prosecution does tender a co-accused’s confession in support of its case, another accused should be able to rely upon statements in it that [page 950] suggest that accused is innocent.198 But in Question of Law Reserved (No 3 of 1997),199 the judges of the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal agreed that neither of these extensions was consistent with the majority view in Bannon that statements against penal interest are not admissible in exception to the hearsay rule. Baker v R,200 in endorsing Bannon, rejected arguments for there being any limited exception; based upon notions of fairness, where the received confession of a co-accused contains evidence exculpating an accused. If this is correct, at common law the only use that can be made of the out-ofcourt confession of a third party or co-accused is where it can be put to that third party or accused as a previous inconsistent statement, when at common law it goes only to the witness’s credit and cannot be relied upon as evidence of the facts asserted in it. In the case of a co-accused, that co-accused must choose to testify before this situation can arise, but when it does, the confession may be put as an inconsistent statement even where inadmissible at the tender of the prosecution.201 Section 83 of the uniform legislation modifies the common law by providing that one party to proceedings, for example a co-accused, may consent to the hearsay use in respect to his or her case of evidence of an admission202 by another party to those proceedings,203 but with the proviso that consent cannot be given to part only of that evidence. Thus the evidence may be used not only to assist that party (the co-accused) but also to implicate him or her if it can be so interpreted. Blastland204 also illustrates that, while the confession of a third party may

remain inadmissible to prove that person’s involvement in the crime, statements of a third party are admissible to establish the knowledge of that party and, if it can be sufficiently inferred that only the culprit could have had that knowledge, it may be sufficiently relevant to be admitted. This illustrates how the same item of evidence may become [page 951] admissible by constructing a relevant chain of reasoning which avoids the prohibited hearsay chain. In R v Szach,205 such ‘esoteric knowledge’ was also held admissible. 8.79 The uniform legislation in s 65(2)(d), applying only where the maker of the representation has personal knowledge of the relevant facts and is unavailable to testify,206 provides simply that the representation be ‘against the interests of the person who made it at the time it was made’. Whether it is so against interest should be determined in the context of the whole statement or conversation that has taken place: R v Suteski.207 To deal with the controversies at common law about the extent of interests which justify exceptional admission, s 65(7) provides: Without limiting paragraph (2)(d), a representation is taken … to be against the interests of the person who made it if it tends: (a) to damage the person’s reputation; or (b) to show that the person has committed an offence for which the person has not been convicted; or (c) to show that the person is liable in an action for damages.

Thus, representations against penal interest are within s 65(2)(d). But to be admissible, in addition it must be shown that the particular representation relied upon (the maker having personal knowledge of the relevant fact asserted: s 62) was made in circumstances that make it highly likely that the representation is reliable. Thus, in Sio v R,208 whilst the court was prepared to find an accomplice’s representation against interest, it was not prepared to find that the circumstances made it highly likely that the particular representation implicating the accused in mitigation of the maker’s involvement in the crime was reliable.209 There is no extended definition of the phrase ‘against the interests’ in s 93B of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), nor the additional requirement that circumstances make the reliability of the representation highly likely.210 8.80 Once a statement against interest is established, a question arises whether collateral matters referred to in the statement have a sufficient guarantee of

reliability to be also admitted. There is authority for the reception of collateral out-of-court testimony, a written receipt of a midwife in Higham v Ridgway211 being held to be evidence, not only of payment, but also of the date of birth of the child delivered. It seems reasonable, on grounds of reliability, for the exception to extend to such closely related matters. But what constitutes a closely related matter for this purpose will be a question of fact for the judge to decide on determining admissibility. The Uniform [page 952] Acts admit only a ‘representation … against the interests of the person who made it’ in ‘circumstances that make it likely that the representation is reliable’: s 65(2) (d). In Sio v R,212 the High Court made it clear that a strict approach should be taken to the admission of each particular representation sought to be admitted under s 65(2)(d) so that any collateral representation would have to satisfy the conditions of the exception. 8.81 Whether the exception applies to admit second-hand hearsay is extremely doubtful. The uniform legislation exceptions apply only to representations made by persons with personal knowledge of the facts asserted: s 62. At common law, on balance, authority favours the view that the deceased declarant must have personal knowledge of the facts asserted in the out-of-court statement against interest.213 In principle, this view appears correct, as the reliability of the observation is crucial where that observation is being tendered against a third party. The fact that the observation is against interest is some guarantee of its accuracy. The fact that the statement against interest is from the declarant’s point of view concessional or admissional in nature is of little comfort to the party involved in litigation, who seeks not a guaranteed concession but a guaranteed observation. Section 93B of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) demands personal knowledge.

Statements in the course of duty 8.82 While it is possible to envisage circumstances where statements against interest may be oral, it is more difficult to envisage such circumstances in this category. The rationale of the exception is that where a statement is made in the course of a duty to report observations, that report has some guarantee of

reliability. Most often reports are made in writing. There is some Australian authority for the view that the exception only extends to written reports.214 The point in emphasising this is that written reports will generally be caught by statutory documentary hearsay exceptions, so this common law exception is consequently of limited practical importance. The guarantee of reliability produced by a duty to record is picked up in some hearsay legislation.215 More specifically, s 65(2)(a) of the uniform legislation enacts this common law exception in criminal cases in the case of first-hand hearsay generally where the maker of the representation is unavailable216 (and notice has been given: s 67). But, in contrast to the common law, as s 65(2) requires evidence of the representation to be given by a person who perceived the representation being made, it is unlikely to apply to representations in documents.217 [page 953] 8.83 The exception is narrowly construed at common law. There must be a clear duty owed to another (usually through employment or office) to record the very matter in question. And the matter in question must have been observed or performed by the deceased declarant218 (also required by s 62 of the uniform legislation). Two Australian decisions illustrate the strictness of these conditions. In Western Australian Trustee Executor and Agency Co v O’Connor,219 the contents of a will could not be proved through the tender of a letter from solicitor to testator, as there was no duty to make that particular record. In R v O’Meally,220 the statement of a constable, after being shot, made to fellow constables and describing the assailant was inadmissible, as there was no duty to make such report. The matter may have been different if the report had been to superior officers. The case of The Henry Coxon221 suggests that there may be other limits to this exception: that the record must relate to acts performed by the deceased; that the record must be made contemporaneously; and that it must be shown that there was no motive to misrepresent the reported facts. For all these reasons an entry by a deceased mate in the ship’s log explaining the navigation of the ship with which the mate’s ship collided was held inadmissible. The entry was clearly unreliable. There is little other authority on these points and the limits are not expressed in s 65(2)(a) of the Uniform Acts.

In view of the strictness of the requirement that there be a duty to report particular matters, collateral facts may not be admissible under this exception.222 Section 65(2)(a) applies to representations ‘made under a duty to make that representation or to make representations of that kind’ and Sio v R223 strictly focuses upon the admissibility of each representation sought to be admitted exceptionally as unexamined hearsay under s 65.

Statements as to public or general rights 8.84 If public or general rights are regarded as questions of law rather than questions of adjudicative fact, one might argue that their establishment is strictly not a matter for the rules of evidence and accordingly all a court need do in such cases is to inform itself as it best sees fit. Ancient rights are not capable of proof in the ordinary way, and all one can establish is their long repute. To establish long repute of public and general rights (as opposed to private rights),224 English courts permit the receipt [page 954] of out-of-court statements by persons since deceased (and by persons still living) concerning this repute.225 Such statements must directly concern this repute and not refer to matters from which the repute may be inferred. The planting of a tree is not admissible evidence of the reputed existence or otherwise of a right of way.226 Nor, it seems, are maps indicating boundaries admissible evidence of repute.227 This limitation appears unduly technical. If this is a true exception to the hearsay rule it is based primarily on necessity; though considerations of reliability are not ignored. Statements made after a dispute over the rights in question has arisen will not be received.228 Similarly, statements concerning the repute of rights applying only to a limited class or neighbourhood may only be established through deceased persons likely to have had the requisite knowledge.229 With most rights in Australia embodied in legislation of one kind or another, this exception is of little practical application. It may, however, be important in the establishing of Aboriginal customary rights. In Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd and Commonwealth, Blackburn J was prepared to invoke this exception to prove the association of Aboriginal clans with particular tracts of land.230 However, s 72 of

the Uniform Acts (not limited to first-hand hearsay) now exempts representations about the existence or non-existence of traditional laws and customs from the hearsay rule. Furthermore, s 78A exempts opinions, expressed by members of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander groups, about traditional laws and customs from the opinion rule. The general exception here under discussion is enacted by s 74(1) of the uniform legislation (not limited to first-hand hearsay) which simply provides: The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of reputation concerning the existence, nature or extent of a public or general right.

Section 74(2) provides that the exception cannot be relied upon by the prosecution in a criminal case except to contradict such evidence adduced by the accused. [page 955]

Statements by relatives as to pedigree 8.85 Necessity and reliability provide the basis for this common law exception. In proceedings in which pedigree (a genealogical question) is in issue (contrast, for example, with proceedings in contract where infancy is pleaded as a defence)231 then, as stated in Cross on Evidence:232 The oral or written declarations of a deceased person, or declarations to be implied from family conduct, are admissible as evidence of pedigree provided the declarant was a blood relation, or the spouse of a blood relation, of the person whose pedigree is in issue, and provided the declaration was made before the dispute arose.

This definition of the exception was judicially approved in Re Pennington (dec’d) (No 2).233 There is some doubt about the application of this exception where legitimacy is in issue. An illegitimate child is at common law filius nullius, without recognised family for the purpose of this exception. It has been held that, at least in legitimation proceedings, this anachronistic common law attitude should be ignored and the declarations of all blood relations be admissible within the exception.234 The relationship of the declarant to the person whose pedigree is in issue must be established independently; that is, it cannot be established by the statement of the declarant.235

It is interesting to note that, where evidence establishing the relationship between living persons is concerned, the statements between them expressly or implicitly asserting that relationship are arguably admissible, either upon the basis that they are not narrative or upon the basis that such spontaneous statements are unlikely to be concocted.236 This common law exception is expressly preserved by hearsay legislation in South Australia.237 The uniform legislation enacts in s 73 a hearsay exception (not limited to first-hand hearsay) admitting evidence of reputation concerning whether a person was married at a particular time, a person’s age or ‘family history or relationship’.238 Unless tendered to contradict evidence of the same kind already admitted, a prosecutor may not tender such evidence at all, and an accused must give notice of tender. Other hearsay exceptions, for example ss 63(2) and 64(2) which admit generally first-hand hearsay in civil cases, may apply to representations as to pedigree. [page 956]

Dying declarations 8.86 Statements made under a hopeless and settled expectation of death are admitted at common law under this exception. The belief (at least of common law judges) that one should meet one’s maker with a clear conscience is some guarantee that such statements are reliable. Whether the proved existence of such a belief is a condition of the exception is doubtful, although in New Guinea the exception was not applied in the case of an islander whose tribe did not hold such a belief.239 But the exception applies in the most limited circumstances. First, it applies only in proceedings of murder or manslaughter arising out of the declarant’s death. Secondly, it applies only to admit statements by the declarant concerning the cause of death. Thirdly, it applies only if it can be shown that the declaration was made when the declarant believed death imminent and held no hope for recovery — a settled and hopeless expectation of death must be established.240 For a victim suffering from the most serious injuries to threaten to take revenge on an assailant would be to display hope. In R v Rogers,241 a deceased declaring she would ‘never see the day out’ before implicating the accused did not satisfy the exception in view of medical evidence that her physical condition at the time

gave her no reasonable ground for believing that death was imminent. But the court’s insistence that the lack of hope of recovery be proved beyond reasonable doubt influenced this decision, and that standard has since been held an inappropriate standard of proof on the voir dire in these cases.242 8.87 In Tasmania, legislation was passed to mitigate this last requirement, invoking the common law exception where the deceased believed on the whole that death was imminent, despite holding some hope of recovery.243 This provision no longer exists now that Tasmania has adopted the uniform legislation. 8.88 When the exception does apply it has been held by the Privy Council in Nembhard v R244 that an accused may, as long as the jury receives strong and adequate warning, be convicted upon the uncorroborated dying declaration of a victim. This produces the unusual result of an accused being convicted solely upon the basis of out-of-court testimony, having no opportunity to crossexamine the accusing witness. [page 957] Courts in Australia have been unwilling to extend this exception, operating as it does to provide the Crown with out-of-court testimony in a serious criminal prosecution. But while courts have been unwilling to extend the dying declaration exception, there is authority suggesting such a declaration may be admissible under the common law res gestae exception admitting as hearsay statements made close to and under the pressure of events. This is illustrated by the House of Lords decision in R v Andrews.245 Soon after being stabbed by the accused, the victim made a statement to the police. The injuries did not appear serious at the time, but two months later and before a trial was possible, the victim died as a result of the wounds. There was no question of the statement being admissible as a dying declaration. No hopeless and settled expectation of death could be established. Nevertheless, the statement was admitted, their Lordships holding that:246 … where a victim of an attack informed a witness of what had occurred in such circumstances as to satisfy the trial judge that the event was so unusual or startling or dramatic as to dominate the thoughts of the victim so as to exclude the possibility of concoction or distortion and the statement was made in conditions of approximate but not exact contemporaneity, evidence of what the victim said was admissible as to the truth of the facts recited as an exception to the hearsay rule.

8.89 In Australia, the application of this decision requires the distinguishing of the High Court’s decision in Vocisano v Vocisano,247 where a strict requirement of contemporaneity is insisted upon before such statements can be received. The arguments in favour of there being a res gestae hearsay exception based upon reliability, supported by the judgments in Ratten and Andrews, are considered at 8.39–8.41. In R v Daylight,248 Thomas J of the Supreme Court of Queensland admitted the statement of a stabbed victim in circumstances similar to those in Andrews. While the uniform legislation makes no express provision for dying declarations, the Andrews approach is effectively enacted in s 65(2)(b) and (2)(c), which permit first-hand hearsay representations to be admitted where made in circumstances that make fabrication unlikely or reliability highly probable.249 These exceptions apply only in criminal cases and require notice under s 67. In civil cases, a dying declaration which is first-hand hearsay will generally be admissible under s 63. [page 958]

Post-testamentary statements by testators about the contents of their wills 8.90 Where it can be established that a deceased has executed a will, but that will cannot be found, there is no better evidence of the contents than the testimony of its author. As there is no question of calling the author to testify directly to the court, such out-of-court testimony is admissible in exception to the general hearsay prohibition. The exception was first invoked by the Court of Appeal in Sugden v St Leonards (Lord)250 and has been since applied in In the Estate of Macgillivray,251 though unsuccessfully in that the statements were held not sufficient to prove the contents of the lost will. Although this exception finds no expression in the uniform legislation, s 63(2) admits generally first-hand hearsay in civil cases where the maker of the representation is unavailable252 and notice has been given under s 67.

Statements in public documents 8.91 On the grounds of necessity and reliability, statements in public

documents are admissible in exception to the hearsay rule. Production of the document, or a certified copy of it,253 is sufficient proof of the facts asserted in it when this exception applies. There are three conditions which must be satisfied before the exception can be invoked:254 First, the document must be brought into existence and preserved for public use on a public matter. Secondly, it must be open to public inspection. Thirdly … the entry must be made by a person having a duty to inquire and satisfy himself as to the truth of the recorded facts.

‘Public’ is not taken to mean the whole world, but may be constituted by members of a public corporation or a section of the public. In Sturla v Freccia,255 Lord Blackburn thought the ‘entry in the books of a manor is public in the sense that it concerns all the people interested in the manor’. In the same case, while it is clear the maker need not have personal knowledge of the facts, Lord Blackburn said there must be ‘a judicial, or quasi-judicial, duty to enquire’. 8.92 It is the public duty to inquire and record which ensures the reliability of a public document. The duty to inquire does not mean that the inquirer must have [page 959] personal knowledge of the investigated facts, but it was long considered necessary that the same person be obliged to inquire and record. However, in R v Halpin,256 it was held that company returns publicly registered fell within the exception, although the duty to inquire was placed upon the public officer of the company furnishing the return and the duty to record upon an official in the Companies Registry. This important extension of the exception has since been accepted in Australia by Franki J in TPC v TNT Management Pty Ltd,257 although Franki J emphasised that it is still necessary to construe strictly the ambit of the duties to inquire and to record. Information included in a company return beyond that required to be filed cannot therefore be admitted pursuant to this exception. 8.93 This exception to the hearsay rule has been applied in Australia to admit, inter alia, public birth and marriage certificates,258 public maps,259 government gazettes insofar as they relate to matters of state,260 public motor vehicle registers,261 and meteorological records.262

But the records are only admissible to prove facts falling within the duty to inquire and record, and the record must be created for the purpose of public inspection.263 Statutory provisions (such as those in n 253) often exist to facilitate the proof of public documents and to make the assertions in them admissible in exception to the hearsay rule. Provisions exist in the Uniform Acts to facilitate the proof of various public records (see ss 153–159) but these provisions do not affect the question of whether these records are admissible where tendered as hearsay. The answer to this [page 960] question depends upon the application of the hearsay exceptions created in Pt 3.2.264 For example, a public document may be a business record within s 69.

Admissions and confessions Terminology and the rationale for a hearsay exception 8.94 At common law, the out-of-court admissions and confessions by parties to civil and criminal proceedings are admissible against them in exception to the hearsay rule. The terminology in this area is imprecise. Commonly, the term ‘admission’ is used in civil cases and ‘confession’ in criminal cases. Although a total acceptance of the crime or claim alleged is not required at common law, and any implicatory statement may invoke this exception to the hearsay rule, in criminal cases a partly implicating statement by an accused may sometimes be referred to as an ‘admission’, distinguishing it from a full confession to the crime.265 The codifying provisions in Pt 3.4 of the Uniform Acts use just one term — ‘admission’ — which applies to civil and criminal proceedings and which is defined as any previous representation by a party which is ‘adverse to the person’s interest in the outcome of the proceedings’: Dictionary Pt 1. Section 81 provides that ‘[t]he hearsay rule and the opinion rule do not apply to evidence of an admission’.266 8.95 There are two possible justifications for a hearsay exception in the case of admissions and confessions: a concessional justification and a reliability justification.267

The concessional justification proceeds from the adversary principle that one adversary can always concede to another the existence of facts in dispute. In civil cases, formal admissions are encouraged by rules of court and often made by parties.268 In criminal cases, material facts are, in practical terms, often conceded during trial and legislative provisions exist for formal ‘admissions’ to be made by the accused.269 Formal [page 961] concessions do away with the need for proof. By analogy, it is arguable that an out-of-court admission by one adversary, or potential adversary, at least to an opponent, gives rise to a similar concession. But it is readily apparent that the analogy quickly breaks down. It is the very formality of the admission made during proceedings which gives rise to the concession. Informal out-of-court admissions and confessions cannot fairly give rise to such a concession. They can be, and usually are, disputed. This justification is incapable of explaining the evidential use made of informal out-of-court implicating statements in exception to the hearsay prohibition. Nevertheless, it is a justification that may creep in at various points to influence legal decisions in this area, particularly in civil cases. The reliability justification provides the better explanation of this hearsay exception.270 The risks of acting upon out-of-court statements are mitigated in the case of admissions and confessions, first, by the fact that the statement is against interest and can therefore be assumed not to have been lightly made, and secondly, by the fact that the party may always testify at the trial to explain possible unreliabilities in the out-of-court statement. There is also an element of the idea that a party’s out-of-court statement about events in issue is often the best evidence, in the sense that a party is unlikely to disclose adverse information at trial if it can be avoided. This is particularly so in a criminal case where a guilty accused may always choose not to testify. Thus, the notions of reliability and necessity again provide the principal justification for this exception to the hearsay rule.

Defining admissions and confessions 8.96 If we conceive of the common law rules now being considered as only defining circumstances in which some out-of-court statements are admitted in

exception to the hearsay rule, then admissions and confessions may be defined accordingly. Thus, as has been argued, if the common law hearsay prohibition extends only to assertions in out-of-court statements then inferences from conduct which cannot be regarded as an out-of-court ‘statement’ are arguably not caught by the hearsay prohibition. Consequently, for example, if flight from the scene of a crime is not a statement and therefore inferences from it not caught by the hearsay prohibition, then there is no need to characterise it as an admission or confession for the purposes of receiving it exceptionally outside that prohibition.271 The only practical issue is the relevance

[page 962] of that flight.272 Again, if adverse inferences from lies are not regarded as assertions implicit in statements and are outside the hearsay prohibition,273 the only question is their relevance, not whether they can be exceptionally admitted as admissions or confessions. These same examples may similarly fall outside the definition of hearsay under s 59 of the Uniform Acts as there is neither a representation nor a (reasonably supposed) intention to assert the fact inferred, so again there is no need to rely upon the hearsay exception applicable to admissions. If admissions and confessions are being defined only to create an exception to the hearsay rule, then one might argue that statements whenever made and whether or not intended to be communicated,274 as long as against interest, should fall within the exception. The definition of admission in the Uniform Acts is apparently in these terms.275 There seems no reason in principle to impose the limitation, as some cases suggest in other contexts, that the admission or confession be an ex post facto statement implicating the party or accused.276 Thus statements asserting plans to commit a crime (‘I am planning to rob a bank’) or statements made during a crime (‘Don’t move, this gun is loaded!’) might be regarded as confessional if otherwise excluded as hearsay. Of course, such statements will often be admissible anyway outside or in exception to the hearsay prohibition, for example as statements of intention or as statements tendered as non-narrative res gestae, so there may anyway be no need to resort to the admissions hearsay exception. 8.97 However, if the notion of an admission or confession exists not merely to admit statements in exception to the hearsay rule but to ensure that implicating statements [page 963] by accused persons are made in circumstances conducive to reliability and in exercise of the right to remain silent, then the definition of admission or confession may well be different.277 To advance these policies it may be more

appropriate to say that admissions and confessions may be express or implied and constituted by words or conduct.278 It might also be more appropriate to confine admissions or confessions to words or conduct occurring after the event in dispute. At common law, any ‘confession’ must be proved voluntary before it may be received and it may be excluded if it would be unfair to use it against an accused. As argued below, the voluntariness rule exists to ensure that when a party provides testimony against himself or herself it is given in exercise of a free choice to speak or remain silent: see 8.128–8.133. Thus, if a party is forced to talk to police and, although making no expressly implicating statements, makes statements which can be proved to be such lies that an adverse inference can be drawn against the accused, then, although the lies may not be hearsay, so that there is no need to define an exception to the hearsay rule, nevertheless the lies may be regarded as confessions for the purpose of excluding them as having been involuntarily made.279 Similarly, under the Uniform Acts, there are various provisions applying to admissions which do not exist to create hearsay exceptions but to ensure that incriminating statements by individuals are made free from threats and otherwise in circumstances of reliability: by s 84 no admission influenced by violent, oppressive, inhuman or degrading conduct (or threats of such conduct) is admissible in either criminal or civil proceedings;280 by s 85 admissions in criminal proceedings made in the presence of an investigating official or a person reasonably believed to be capable of influencing the decision to prosecute must have been made in circumstances unlikely to have affected their truth; by s 86 records of admissions in criminal proceedings made to an ‘investigating official’ in response to a question or representation can only be admitted if signed (or recorded); and by s 90 an admission may be excluded in criminal proceedings if having regard to the circumstances in which the admission was made, it would be unfair to the accused to use the evidence. Other legislation pursuing similar policies to protect suspects requires confessions made to police to be electronically recorded.281 In all [page 964] these contexts, ‘admission’ and ‘confession’ require a definition which does more than provide reasons for an exception to the hearsay rule.

8.98 At common law, a party’s reactions to statements made in his or her presence can give rise to adverse inferences which will constitute admissions or confessions for the purposes both of creating an exception to the hearsay rule and for the purposes of special rules protecting the accused. The position is the same under the definition of admission in the Uniform Acts. The admissibility of statements made in the accused’s presence was discussed at 5.137–5.139, and is affected by the right to remain silent in the face of questions put by investigating officials (enacted in s 89 of the Uniform Acts). But in a criminal case where investigating officials are not involved and in a civil case, whether mere silence to questioning or statements can be admissional is a simple question of fact.282 Decisions can be found where silence has been held admissional,283 but generally courts are reluctant to so infer.284 In Thatcher v Charles,285 the High Court held inadmissible the silence of a motor-cyclist in the face of allegations by the distraught mother whose daughter he had just run down: ‘Why did you do it? You drive too fast around here. We have always said you would collect somebody’. In Davies and Davies v Nyland and O’Neil, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia held that the failure of a party’s solicitor to respond to written allegations from an opponent could not be construed as admissional.286 8.99 The legal context will determine whether previous statements containing assertions prima facie exculpatory need to be conceptualised as ‘admissions’ or ‘confessions’ where it can be shown by other evidence that the exculpatory assertions are lies from which a consciousness of liability or guilt might be inferred. It has already been argued that such inferences may not give rise to the common law hearsay prohibition,287 nor might they give rise to intended assertions within s 59 of the uniform legislation. If that is so, there is no need to conceptualise the lies as admissions for hearsay purposes. But for the purposes of applying those policies which seek to protect suspects, there may be, as adverted to above (see 8.97), strong reasons to regard lies as ‘admissions’ or ‘confessions’. Thus, if an accused talks to authorities who have misrepresented their power to compel answers and gives exculpatory but false answers, the accused may argue that any implicit ‘admission’ or ‘confession’ cannot be regarded as voluntary at common law, not having been made in exercise of a free choice to speak or remain silent. Or if a person talks following threats, again, [page 965]

any adverse use of what was said should be regarded as admissional and excluded as involuntary at common law or as contrary to s 84 of the Uniform Acts. If legislation requires the recording of police questioning before an admission may be received, a wide definition of admission (and official questioning)288 appears to advance these legislative policies. In these contexts, principle and authority favours regarding the adverse inferences arising from the proved falsity of prima facie exculpatory statements as ‘confessions’ or ‘admissions’ so that the relevant protections for the accused can operate.289 This seems consistent with the wide definitions of ‘admission’ (‘a previous representation … adverse to the person’s interest in the outcome of the proceedings’) and ‘representation’ (‘express or implied … or a representation to be inferred from conduct’) in the Uniform Acts. But to regard every statement against interest as an ‘admission’ and to embrace exculpatory statements shown by other evidence to be false as admissional may produce anomalous results. For example, in R v Turner (No 13),290 the defence argued that false returns submitted allegedly in the course of a conspiracy to defraud fishery authorities gave rise to confessional inferences to which the common law voluntariness rule applied. In admitting the evidence, Blow J rejected the argument holding that the voluntariness rule applies only to confessions made after the event and has no application to statements which are in substance conduct in the very course of the conspiracy.291 8.100 In R v GH,292 an accused was coerced by his co-conspirators to tell police (falsely) that he had been accidentally shot. Evidence of this false statement was the very basis of the conspiracy alleged, but also as an admission it appeared excluded by s 84 of the Uniform Acts. This conclusion the court avoided. Spender J (at [15]–[16]) held [page 966] that there was no admission as there was, as is required by the Dictionary definition of ‘admission’, no ‘representation … adverse to the person’s interest in the outcome of the proceeding’. The statement was on its face exculpatory and it is the representation itself which must be against interest, not proof of its falsity by other evidence. Spender J recognised this conclusion as inconsistent with those cases mentioned at n 289 but (at [23]–[25]) confined these cases to ex post facto admissions. The reasoning of Miles J (at [55]) and Madgwick J (at [79]) is more

elusive, both holding that the statement was not on its face against the accused’s interest in the outcome of the proceeding nor tendered itself to give rise to an admissional inference. Rather, it was tendered to prove the very carrying out of the conspiracy, other evidence establishing its falsity and the intention to deceive. Madgwick J (at [80]) was of the view that if the statement had been on its face against interest the fact that it was also admissible as part of the conspiracy would not have avoided the protections given by s 84. The provision of a photograph,293 or handwriting sample294 or use of a voice sample obtained during a police interview295 to identify an accused have been held not to invoke admissions demanding the protections in Pt 3.4 of the Uniform Acts. These decisions are reconciled with the wide definition of ‘admission’ in the uniform legislation (a ‘representation … adverse to the person’s interest in the outcome of the proceeding’) by regarding the evidence as not used as ‘representation’, there being no asserted fact in the use of the evidence. Nor do conversations tendered to establish the accused’s consent to the search of a car. Refusal to participate in an identification parade has been held not an admission for the purposes of legislation demanding electronic recording.296 8.101 Whether an admission or confession has been made is a jury question.297 The judge’s function is to determine whether the evidence is capable of justifying [page 967] such a conclusion — whether such a finding is ‘reasonably open’ (as enacted in s 88 of the Uniform Acts). Once such evidence exists, the issue must be left to the trier of fact. In criminal cases, following the logic of Shepherd v R,298 if the confession is an indispensable fact in a chain of proof (which in many cases it will be) then the jury must be satisfied of the existence of the confession beyond reasonable doubt before acting upon it.299 Otherwise the confessional inferences can be considered together with other inferences of guilt in determining whether the crime is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Issues of fact relevant to the legal question of the admissibility of admissions and confessions are decisions for the judge, and are not within the province of any jury.300 Thus, at common law, whether a confession is voluntary or should be excluded in exercise of a judge’s residuary discretion are questions, insofar as

they give rise to decisions of fact, entirely within the province of the trial judge.301 So are the factual issues that arise in deciding whether an admission is admissible under Pt 3.4 of the Uniform Acts. In that these rules exist to prevent inadmissible information going to the jury, decisions about them are necessarily for the judge to determine on the voir dire: see generally 2.40–2.45. In criminal cases, these respective roles of judge and jury have created a number of difficulties which are considered at 8.160–8.168.

Personal knowledge of admitted facts 8.102 Following the reliability justification for this hearsay exception, admissions and confessions ought only be received if the facts asserted in them are based upon a party’s personal observations. It is self-interest that guarantees accurate observation, memory and report, and these guarantees are not present where a third party communicates observations to the party making the admission. One might argue that a party is unlikely to make an implicatory statement lightly, whether or not it is based on personal knowledge, and this is some guarantee of its reliability, but these arguments come close to confusing the reliability and concessional justifications. 8.103 In criminal cases, at common law a confession is not admissible unless the accused has personal knowledge of the facts asserted by the confession. In Comptroller of Customs v Western Lectric, the Privy Council held inadmissible a confession that goods were made in the United States based upon the (hearsay) markings on the goods.302 In Horne v Comino,303 the confession of a defendant that goods had been carried on a [page 968] particular day was not received where the defendant had no recall of the delivery and had confessed in reliance upon (hearsay) records produced to him by the police. 8.104 But a strict application of this requirement may create practical problems in some cases. For example, if an accused clearly admits to possession of stolen goods or possession of prohibited drugs, must it be established that the accused had personal knowledge of the theft of the goods or of the nature of the drugs

before there is admissible evidence of those material facts? It is clearly more convenient for the Crown to rely upon such confession than to have to call further witnesses. And in some cases it may be difficult to find witnesses to the theft, or the drug in question may have been disposed of. In R v Gibbons,304 the Supreme Court of Victoria appeared to act upon the accused’s (hearsay) confession that goods were stolen, although, the point not having been raised at trial, the decision is explicable on other grounds. In Anglim and Cooke v Thomas, the same court held that an accused, relying upon the labels of stolen bottles, could confess admissibly to having possessed the drugs concerned. But there was additional evidence that the accused had had experience with the drug and was able to identify it upon the basis of personal knowledge.305 In subsequent cases the admissibility of such confessions has turned upon the question of whether the accused has had sufficient experience to be able to identify the drug possessed. This sufficient experience qualifies the accused to give admissible observational opinion evidence insofar as the confession may be regarded as embodying an opinion as to the nature of the drug. In R v Pfitzner,306 where the accused was charged with selling marijuana, Bray CJ commented in a worldly way (at 178): I am beginning to think that marihuana or Indian hemp or pot or grass is becoming, by those or any other names, so familiar an object in the contemporary scene that a general knowledge of it may be taken for granted.

Although there is Australian authority for the view that strictly a confession is admissible to prove matters not within the accused’s personal knowledge, the courts give effect to the personal knowledge requirement by looking for other evidence of such matters before allowing the jury to find them proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, in Ollerton v R,307 the accused’s admission that goods he had received were ‘hot’, based upon what he had been told by his supplier, was admitted by the Western Australian Court of Appeal, although the court emphasised other circumstantial evidence in being satisfied that the jury could find the received goods stolen beyond reasonable doubt. The admission by itself may not have been sufficient to support a conviction. [page 969] 8.105 The position in civil cases at common law has been clearly articulated

by the High Court in Lustre Hosiery v York.308 The defendant’s admission of bad debts (relevant to an action under a guarantee, made by the defendant to cover the debts) based upon statements made to him by auditors, was held admissible (though insufficient) in proof of the debts alleged. The High Court (Rich, Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ) explained (at 138–9): No doubt an admission made by a party as to the correctness of a fact is admissible notwithstanding that the party has no direct knowledge of the fact and must rely for his belief upon the statements of others, or upon inferences from circumstances which he knows, or which have been reported to him. But such an admission may indicate a state of mind varying from a firm belief based upon a thorough investigation of the existence or occurrence of the fact down to a wavering preference for one of two or more possible hypotheses none of which have been tested or determined. It is apparent that the admissibility of the evidence must be distinguished from its [probative value]. It does not follow that, because such evidence is admissible, it is enough to prove the issue.

Consequently, an ostensibly unreliable admission is nevertheless admissible, and weight may be accorded to inferences of fact drawn by a party (in apparent breach of the rule forbidding witnesses to draw inferences). In civil cases, the reception may be justified by analogy to the concessional arguments put forward above.309 But there is little justification for extending this notion to criminal cases, and confessions made in such circumstances of unreliability should be inadmissible. Certainly no criminal court should allow a jury to act upon such a confession without corroboration.310 The definition of admission under the Uniform Acts makes no mention of any personal knowledge requirement; it is enough that the representation is against interest.311 Section 82 expressly requires first-hand evidence of the admission itself.

Self-serving statements 8.106 The justifications for receiving admissional and confessional statements in exception to the hearsay rule extend only to admitting statements contrary to the interests of a party. The very fact that the evidence is adverse warrants its reliability or constitutes the concession. Self-serving statements of a party do not warrant admission [page 970] under this rationale.312 However, it may be artificial to dissect a series of

statements made on the one occasion into those containing assertions contrary to the interests of the party and those containing assertions that are self-serving (socalled ‘mixed statements’). Most importantly, the self-serving statements may be relevant to determining the extent to which other statements are against interest. In the light of a concurrent explanation, a statement may lose its admissional or confessional character. For example, in Revesz v Orchard,313 a defendant interviewed by the police immediately after an accident made various statements, in some admitting to not having seen the plaintiff’s car and in others explaining that he had seen the car and had slowed down. Unless the whole of the interview had been admitted, the court would not have been able to accurately determine whether the defendant had admitted to having failed to keep a proper lookout.314 It is submitted that, once a series of closely related statements is capable of being construed as admissional or confessional, then the series may (depending on the facts) have to go to the trier of fact for it to determine whether to construe the statements in this way. 8.107 The more difficult question is whether related self-serving statements can be used beyond determining whether an admission or confession has been made; whether, that is, they can be used as positive (hearsay) evidence in favour of the admitting or confessing party. Furthermore, can such self-serving statements constitute sufficient evidence to leave a particular issue to the trier of fact? In Day v Dyson,315 it was held that, while the admission of a truck driver that he was driving without the appropriate licence was admissible, his statement, made on the same occasion, that the truck was involved in an interstate journey was inadmissible to prove such a journey for the purpose of establishing a defence under s 92 of the Australian Constitution. On the other hand, there is High Court authority favouring the use of such self-serving statements. In Allied Interstate Qld Pty Ltd v Barnes,316 Barwick CJ held that a self-serving statement about an interstate journey was admissible in circumstances similar [page 971] to Day v Dyson. However, the High Court did not rule that the issue of whether the journey was interstate was one where the defendant bore an evidential burden. It is possible to retain the decision in Day v Dyson by concluding that

self-serving statements are admissible but are not capable of satisfying an evidential burden. 8.108 It is not at all clear that, in principle, parties should be entitled to rely positively upon self-serving statements. Such statements cannot be justified on the grounds that they are adverse to the interests of the parties making them, unless they are so inextricably bound up with adverse statements that the one cannot be accepted without the other. Furthermore, if a party wishes to establish a particular defence there is much to be said for the view that the party should call admissible evidence to establish it. The party always has the opportunity to testify. On the other hand, there does appear to be a certain artificiality in categorising individual statements as self-serving or as admissional or confessional. In principle, self-serving statements should only be admitted if they are so connected to admissional or confessional statements that their revelation is necessary to determine the extent of those statements or is so connected that the reliability of the self-serving use is guaranteed by the statement against interest.317 Even in such a case, the self-serving statement should not normally be sufficient to satisfy a burden of proof, thereby compelling parties to call evidence to establish defences they are obliged, evidentially or persuasively, to prove. Exceptionally, a self-serving inference may be admissible to establish a defence where no other evidence of it is available — where, for example, the defendant is incapacitated and unable to testify. Nevertheless, on the whole, Australian courts have been relatively liberal in admitting self-serving statements made in the same conversation or even series of conversations as admissions and tend to consider the above sorts of arguments only in assessing the probative value of such evidence.318 For example, in Spence v Demasi,319 Cox J refused to follow the [page 972] logic of Revesz v Orchard and regarded as admissible at large an entire interconnected statement containing admissions. In criminal cases, authority also demands a prosecutor who chooses to rely upon admissions made in a statement (for example, to police) to tender the entire statement, including self-serving assertions. These can then be used not only to determine the extent of any admission but also, where appropriate, as hearsay evidence in support of the

defence case.320 As a result, the trial judge must ensure that the accused is given the benefit of the self-serving statements. But this does not prevent the judge from directing the jury that the statements have not been formally made (sworn or otherwise) subject to cross-examination, nor to direct that it is up to them to decide which statements to accept, and that they may distinguish between selfserving and admissional statements in deciding what weight to give to them. It may also be appropriate to point out that exculpatory statements may be motivated by self-interest so long as there is no suggestion that the jury should necessarily (as a matter of law or fact) give such statements less weight for that reason. Nor must the judge suggest that because admissions are against interest, for that reason the law regards them as more reliable than self-serving statements.321 By this pragmatic non-technical approach, although strictly admissible and to be given appropriate weight, the reliability of self-serving statements made around the same time as admissions inevitably comes under close scrutiny in both civil and criminal cases. The uniform legislation provides in s 81 that in addition to the hearsay and opinion rules not applying to evidence of an admission, these rules: — do not apply to evidence of a previous representation: (a)

that was made in relation to an admission at the time the admission was made, or shortly before or after that time; and

(b) to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the admission.

This permits assertions and opinions in self-serving statements to be admitted but emphasises that this should only occur where this is ‘reasonably necessary’ if the admission is to be properly understood. This connection appears to receive more emphasis in the legislation than is given to it by some common law judges.322 [page 973]

Parties and their privies: vicarious admissions and confessions 8.109 Out-of-court admissions or confessions are, strictly speaking, only admissible in exception to the hearsay rule against the parties making them. Thus, for example, where the nominal defendant is sued, the out-of-court ‘admissions’ of the driver for whom that defendant is responsible are not admissible by virtue of this exception.323 Similarly, admissions by co-defendants or co-accused are

inadmissible hearsay as against the other parties to the proceedings.324 The outof-court admission or confession can operate assertively only against the party making it. This also produces the result that admissions made in a personal capacity cannot bind a party who sues or is sued in a representative capacity,325 for this would enable an admission to operate as hearsay against a third party (represented in the proceedings). 8.110 But to this general rule, there are a number of exceptions where, as a matter of substantive law, it is considered appropriate that one person should be affected by the out-of-court admissions of another. If there is a legal relationship whereby one person is responsible for or acting jointly with another, admissions and confessions made in the course of such a relationship may be admissible assertively against every party to that relationship. Two specific examples of rules of law resulting in admissions being admissible against another in this fashion are, first, the partnership rule, whereby the admission of one partner concerning partnership affairs made in the ordinary course of the business is admissible against the other partners;326 and, secondly, the rule whereby admissions by predecessors in title concerning that title are admissible against successors in title.327 [page 974] But, more generally, admissions by employees and agents may be assertive evidence against their employers and principals if the admission is made in the course of a conversation about a subject matter which the employee or agent can be regarded as authorised to discuss. Seldom is an employee or agent expressly authorised to make admissions, so authority must be ‘implied’. Where the employee or agent has authority to hold discussions on a particular subject matter then he or she will also have an implied authority to make admissions about that subject matter, admissions which are binding upon an employer or principal. The decisive question then becomes what matters an employee or agent has authority to discuss. 8.111 The limits of such an approach are illustrated by Pomery v Rural Hotels Pty Ltd and Ellison,328 which concerned a claim for an injury suffered by the plaintiff when she slipped and fell in the defendant’s hotel. Sangster J held that admissions made by the manageress at the time of the accident, as she assisted the

injured plaintiff, were admissible against the defendant, stating (at 194) that ‘the manager is the alter ego of the company and the person to whom direct approach may be made on any of those myriad of matters which in a licensed hotel call for immediate attention’. He contrasted the position of manager with the position of a person merely working in the bar, who has no authority to discuss such problems. He also held that admissions made by the manageress to the plaintiff at a later date at a social function were not made during an authorised conversation and were therefore not admissible assertively against the defendant. 8.112 These difficult questions of authority are of crucial importance where companies are parties to proceedings. Stricter views of such authority can be found in Fraser Henleins Pty Ltd v Cody329 and Ex parte Gerard and Co Pty Ltd,330 where directors were held unauthorised to make admissions on behalf of their companies, this being a matter within the authority of those officers concerned with day-to-day management of the company.331 Later decisions may illustrate a more liberal approach to this question, with admissions by directors being admissible against their companies in trade practices proceedings, although in each case the director had some management duties to which the court was able to attach the authority to make the admission in question.332 Such authority is ultimately a question of fact from case to case. A final situation where the admission of one person will be held to bind another is where the admission is made otherwise in pursuance of a common purpose. The concept of common purpose is relied upon most often in criminal cases and will [page 975] be discussed more fully in that context in the next section (8.115ff), but there is no reason why the same principles should not apply in civil cases. The uniform legislation in s 87(1) provides: For the purpose of determining whether a previous representation made by a person is to be taken as an admission by a party, the court is to admit the representation333 if it is reasonably open to find that: (a)

when the representation was made, the person had authority to make statements on behalf of the party in relation to the matter with respect to which the representation was made; or

(b) when the representation was made, the person was an employee of the party, or had authority otherwise to act for the party, and the representation related to a matter within the scope of the

person’s employment or authority;334 or (c) the representation was made by the person in furtherance of a common purpose (whether lawful or not) that the person had with the party or one or more persons including the party.

Clause (b) appears to extend the common law position in that it is sufficient if the representation relates to a matter within the scope of the person’s employment or authority (express or implied) and does not require actual or ostensible authority to make the representation.335 8.113 There is some support for the view that, for the admission of an employee or agent to be assertive evidence against an employer or principal, it must be made to a third party. In South Australia Co v City of Port Adelaide,336 letters written by an Adelaide manager to a principal in England were held to be inadmissible, being categorised as confidential reports to the principal rather than as admissions made to a third party. This decision followed the view in Re Devala Provident Gold Mining Co,337 where admissions by the chairman of a company at a shareholders’ meeting were held inadmissible against the company. But Re Devala has been distinguished in the case of public companies, with Owen J in Finance and Guarantee Co Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation338 commenting (at 370): [page 976] With respect, I feel some doubt as to the correctness of the decision but, in any event, I am of the opinion that at the present day when it is a common practice for a chairman’s address to shareholders at an annual meeting of a public company to be supplied to the stock exchange and to the public through the medium of the press, it would be contrary to common sense to hold that such an address cannot be used in evidence in proceedings by a third party, assuming of course it is relevant to a fact which that third party is seeking to establish.

This decision has been applied in later cases to admit annual reports of public companies against them, and, in appropriate circumstances, their subsidiaries.339 The uniform legislation contains no such limitation. 8.114 If the admission of an employee or agent is to be admissible against an employer or principal in exception to the hearsay rule, then the relationship and authority must be capable of proof through admissible evidence.340 Until authority is established, out-of-court statements by the alleged employee or agent are generally, as against an alleged employer or principal, inadmissible hearsay. Therefore, authority must be established without resort to the alleged agent’s outof-court assertive statements about that authority. If the only evidence of

authority is the assertion of the alleged agent, then that assertion remains inadmissible hearsay. If the assertion of authority is made by conduct or other evidence not giving rise to a prohibited hearsay statement it may remain admissible evidence of authority. In Edwards v Brookes (Milk) Ltd,341 the court held that authority could be established through a witness (to whom the admission was made) who testified that, when he called at the defendant’s depot and asked to see the depot manager, the person who subsequently made the admission came forward.342 Although the conduct of coming forward gives rise to an implied assertion of authority, as this assertion is not contained in a narrative statement it is arguable that the evidence is not caught by the hearsay prohibition. On such an analysis much circumstantial evidence of authority is admissible. In the case of a telephone call to an unknown person, the response of that person to a request to speak to someone with the requisite authority is arguably similarly admissible to establish that authority without infringing the hearsay prohibition.343 In the case of telephone statements asserting identity, Pollitt v R344 suggests there may [page 977] be a more general exception to the hearsay prohibition. But only to identify the caller, not to establish the truth of other assertions that have also been made. Assertions of authority by the caller do not appear to be caught by the Pollitt exception, however widely it embraces assertions of identity. The uniform legislation appears to cover this situation in s 87(2), which provides that the hearsay rule also does not apply to previous representations that a person has authority to make statements on behalf of another.

Vicarious admissions and confessions: the co-conspirator rule 8.115 The above discussion focuses on the admissibility of vicarious admissions in civil cases. In (principally) criminal cases, an analogous exception exists. Confessional statements by co-partners in crime are admissible assertively against all partners before the court, provided the statements are made in furtherance of the crime to which the partners conspired.345 The exception is enacted in s 87(1)

(c) of the uniform legislation, which extends to both civil and criminal proceedings.346 The exception has an obvious application where conspiracy is the crime charged, but it is not limited to such cases, and in any case, as long as the requisite common purpose can be independently established, the out-of-court confessional statements made by conspirators in the course of the crime planned by and charged against them are admissible against each other.347 These out-ofcourt assertions may then be used to identify an accused as a party to a criminal conspiracy, or used to establish the scope of the agreed misconduct. 8.116 As this is an exception to the hearsay prohibition, it need only be relied upon to admit evidence which falls foul of that prohibition. Although in Tripodi v R348 the High Court appears to require proof of preconcert before evidence of any acts or words of third persons are admissible against an accused, acts or words not tendered as statements asserting facts do not fall foul of the hearsay prohibition and ordinary principles of relevance determine their reception. This is made clear in the later High Court decision of Ahern v R,349 where it is stressed that the separate acts and words of the alleged conspirators may originally and circumstantially establish a conspiracy independently of assertions, in which case ordinary principles of relevance will [page 978] determine the reception of the evidence.350 It is only where acts and words are being relied upon assertively that this exception to the hearsay rule needs to be invoked. Nevertheless, in terms of relevance, the conduct of one person may generally be irrelevant to establishing the acts of another unless that conduct is linked to the other through a common purpose. 8.117 The prerequisite to the admission of confessional assertions against another is proof of preconcert to commit the crime alleged.351 Just as in the case of admissions by agents, authority must be established through admissible evidence, so preconcert must be first established through admissible evidence before admissions can be received against co-conspirators. And assertions of preconcert by one conspirator remain inadmissible hearsay evidence against coconspirators until the preconcert is established. Although s 87(2) of the uniform legislation expressly provides that a person’s previous hearsay representation may be used assertively to prove that person’s authority to make an admission within s

87(1)(a) and (b), it does not extend to permit such hearsay representations to prove the common purpose required if s 87(1)(c) is relied upon.352 Preconcert — common purpose — can be established through direct or circumstantial evidence.353 If an eyewitness to the very agreement is called or the accused has (in or out of court) expressly admitted being party to the agreement, then statements of co-partners in the crime made in pursuance of that agreement become admissible assertions. But more often, particularly where the crime charged is the conspiracy itself, the preconcert is established through circumstantial evidence.354 To establish the conspiracy against the particular accused, only relevant and admissible circumstantial evidence can be relied upon. The primary source of such evidence is the parallel conduct of all alleged partners to the crime. If, when looked at in total, the only explanation of that parallel conduct is an unlawful agreement, then the agreement is established. Thus, parallel conduct which is explicable as consistent with the furtherance of an agreement and which is originally relevant, is admissible circumstantial evidence of that agreement, and in this sense is evidence against each and every party to [page 979] that agreement. Ordinary principles of relevance determine the reception of such evidence.355 8.118 But in this context the situation becomes complicated by the fact that statements made in alleged furtherance of an agreement are themselves relevant ‘conduct’ in circumstantial proof of the agreement. The question is whether such statements are admissible to establish the agreement against each and every alleged partner or only against the person making the statement. The answer is that such statements are admissible not as hearsay to establish the truth of assertions contained in them but as the parallel conduct of each and every party from which their agreement may be inferred.356 In this sense the conduct of each becomes admissible against them all. But the fact that such a statement is made is relevant originally, and as such does not fall foul of the hearsay prohibition. Consequently, where an agreement is to be proved by circumstantial evidence, parallel conduct and statements (by persons including the accused) made in

alleged furtherance of the conspiracy are admissible originally to infer agreement.357 In the absence of parallel conduct and statements by the accused in question, there will generally be no relevant or admissible evidence to show that the accused is party to any agreement. Again, in that sense, the conduct and statements of third parties may not be received against the particular accused. But once the agreement and its parties are established, these statements can be used assertively to establish further the nature of the accused’s participation and the scope of the conspiracy. If the jury was obliged to find the criminal agreement without recourse to assertive statements by co-conspirators before being entitled to use those statements assertively, there would be little point in the exercise where the charge is one of conspiracy itself. For in that case the jury would have to find the very conspiracy charged before using the assertive evidence, and then the assertive evidence would be quite unnecessary. But Ahern v R358 establishes that it is for the judge, not the jury, to determine these conditions of admissibility, and if there is ‘reasonable evidence’ of an unlawful conspiracy then the trial judge may permit the jury to use the assertions of co-conspirators against each other, as relevant to establishing the participation of an [page 980] accused in the conspiracy or establishing the precise scope of the conspiracy.359 The position is the same under s 87(1)(c) of the uniform legislation.360 8.119 One might query the standard of proof for admissibility in this context. Normally where facts require establishing as a condition to admissibility, the standard is the civil standard. In this context, the standard of ‘reasonable evidence’ appears to be equivalent to that for establishing a prima facie case.361 Once there is prima facie evidence that an accused is a party to a conspiracy, then the admissional assertions of co-conspirators are admissible. This minimum standard appears to be employed because the issue of fact decisive of admissibility is, where the charge is conspiracy, the very fact determinative of guilt. But if questions of admissibility are regarded as quite separate determinations there is no reason why the higher civil standard should not prevail. It is this standard which determines, for example, the admissibility of confessions. Nevertheless, the authority of Ahern is clear on this point. And R v Brownlee362 recognises that it is this same standard

that is enacted in the uniform legislation, s 87(1) admitting the representation ‘if it is reasonably open to find’ that it was made in furtherance of a common purpose. The procedure for determining the hearsay admissibility of statements tendered in a conspiracy trial is complicated by the fact that the statements are in many cases already admissible as original evidence to establish the fact of conspiracy. In such circumstances there will be no need for a preliminary ruling on admissibility and the issue of the precise use to which the evidence can be put will not arise until the jury is to be addressed and directed about how it should go about reaching its findings of fact. It is at this stage that counsel will seek a determination that there is the reasonable evidence necessary to support the hearsay admissibility of the co-conspirator’s out-of-court statements.363 8.120 The judge’s decision to admit the statement of a co-conspirator assertively against an accused in no way prejudges the case against that accused. The jury must [page 981] still determine the material facts in issue, but will have available to it evidence which would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay. But the jury need not accept this evidence as reliable. In this sense the decision of a trial judge to admit the confession of a co-conspirator in exception to the hearsay rule in no way prejudges the issues in the case or usurps in any way the role of the jury.364 Some courts appear to have failed to appreciate this.365 Furthermore, there is no need for the trial judge to explain to the jury the basis upon which evidence has been admitted at the trial, and the direction to the jury should be kept as simple as possible in directing which evidence may be used to convict the accused of the crime charged. This is not to say that the directions in a case of conspiracy may not be complicated, and there may be difficult decisions about how evidence is to be used originally rather than assertively, but the direction must depend upon ordinary principles of relevance and not be confused by reference to issues which are questions of admissibility solely within the province of the trial judge.366 The trial judge should also, as a matter of prudence, direct the jury about the possible risks associated with admissible hearsay evidence.367

Confessions and admissions in criminal cases The rules and their rationale 8.121 Although criminal confessions and admissions constitute an important exception to the hearsay rule and for that reason are dealt with in this chapter, as emphasised at 8.97, additional rules control their admissibility, rules not ensuring the sufficient reliability of hearsay evidence but ensuring that suspects are afforded fair treatment during investigation and trial. These rules maintain the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to human dignity, and ensure that investigations are pursued lawfully and with propriety. The rules discussed in this section therefore have rationales extending well beyond the reliability focus of a hearsay exception. The common law rules controlling the admissibility of confessions can be simply stated. Their application is another matter, for in the past courts have failed to articulate the principles underlying particular rules. However, as R v Swaffield; Pavic v R368 [page 982] demonstrates, as a consequence of the High Court decision in Cleland v R,369 which recognised the application of the public policy discretion to confessional evidence, the various common law rules can now be explained in a more principled way. 8.122 Two rules determine the admissibility of a confession at common law. First, no confession is admissible until the prosecution can establish that it has been made voluntarily. Secondly, a voluntary confession may nevertheless be excluded if the accused can persuade the court to exercise its residual discretion.370 The requirement of voluntariness is developed by Dixon J in McDermott v R:371 At common law a confessional statement made out of court by an accused person may not be admitted in evidence against him upon his trial for the crime to which it relates unless it is shown to have been voluntarily made. This means substantially that it has been made in the exercise of his free choice. If he speaks because he is overborne, his confessional statement cannot be received in evidence and it does not matter by what means he has been overborne. If his statement is the result of duress, intimidation, persistent importunity, or sustained or undue insistence or pressure, it cannot be voluntary. But it is also a definite rule of the common law that a confessional statement cannot be

voluntary if it is preceded by an inducement held out by a person in authority and the inducement has not been removed before the statement is made … It is perhaps doubtful whether, particularly in this country, a sufficiently wide operation has been given to the basal principle that to be admissible a confession must be voluntary, a principle the application of which is flexible and is not limited by any category of inducements that may prevail over a man’s will.

8.123 The matters embraced within the residuary discretion are clearly articulated by the High Court in Cleland v R372 in terms accepted in later cases. A voluntary confession should be excluded where it would be unfair to the accused to admit it, or where it would be contrary to public policy to do so. But these notions of voluntariness, fairness and public policy are complex, and can only be understood in the light of the policies they are intended to reflect. There are four relevant policies. First, given that a confession is hearsay and hearsay of a potentially damning nature, it is of fundamental importance that the trier of fact be in a position to properly assess its reliability and not give any confession more weight than it deserves. Confessions must be of sufficient reliability to be put before juries for consideration so that juries are in a position to accurately determine their probative value. Secondly, the privilege against selfincrimination demands that every person be accorded a free choice whether to confess and no person can be forced or otherwise pressured into confessing. Thirdly, those law enforcement officers seeking, [page 983] on behalf of the state, to bring criminals to justice should not use improper or illegal methods to obtain confessions and courts should not be seen to be condoning such methods. Fourthly, given the vulnerability of the accused in the face of accusation by the state, the accused is entitled to human dignity, including procedural fairness, both before and during trial, before being found guilty of a criminal offence. These policies have always influenced the common law in this area, although never equally.373 Moreover, as the common law rules and discretions have evolved in sophistication and complexity, courts have been able to express particular policies within particular rules or discretions. Originally there was but one rule of voluntariness, and this notion was interpreted to embrace (and compromise) various policies. For example, although originally concerned only to ensure the sufficient reliability of hearsay evidence, voluntariness soon became

more difficult to establish when law enforcement officers had employed improper means to obtain a confession, thus highlighting the need to control investigations as well as to ensure reliability. But as the discretion has developed it has become possible to refine the voluntariness rule and the various aspects of the discretion to clarify which policies each reflect. This makes many of the cases decided before the version of the discretion advanced in Bunning v Cross374 of little relevance to an understanding of the current conceptualisation of the common law in Australia. 8.124 As the common law now stands, the voluntariness rule primarily expresses the privilege against self-incrimination.375 No accused can be forced or otherwise overborne to talk and thereby run the risk of making (expressly, impliedly, consciously or not) a statement that supports the case alleged by the prosecution.376 Until the prosecution can show that the accused freely chose to make a statement then, leaving aside questions of reliability, police impropriety and procedural fairness, any implication of guilt that can be drawn from that statement is inadmissible. To the extent that these other matters are relevant they find expression in the residuary discretion. [page 984] If the confession, although given freely, carries a risk of unreliability which the fact-finder, even with appropriate direction, will have difficulty in assessing in light of the available information, then it may be unfair to admit it. Unfair because of the risk of the conviction of an innocent accused. This is the application of the Christie discretion (explained at 2.29–2.31) to confessional evidence. If improper or illegal (police) practices have been employed to obtain the (voluntary and probably reliable) confession, the need for courts not to be seen approving of such practices, generally and in the particular case, must be considered and weighed against the need to punish the guilty in deciding whether to exclude the confession on grounds of public policy (the public policy discretion is discussed generally at 2.36–2.37 and 5.255ff). Whether the fairness discretion embodies a further policy of ensuring human dignity and procedural fairness to the particular accused so that it is ipso facto unfair to admit a confession obtained in denial of those rights and privileges is, arguably, doubtful, for this policy already finds expression in the public policy

balance which demonstrates the courts’ disapproval of those improper and illegal practices which lead to a denial of these rights. A strong expression of this argument is found in the judgment of Dawson J in Cleland v R (at 36) and later in R v Swaffield; Pavic v R,377 where the court holds that ultimately the denial of an accused’s rights and privileges must be taken into account within the public policy balance. 8.125 By keeping distinct these various policies and giving them expression through the particular aspects of the voluntariness rule and the fairness and public policy discretions, it is possible to clarify the law in this area. The problem is that in practice these distinctions are not so easy to maintain. The same facts are often relevant to each of these issues — for example, the conduct of the police is relevant in determining whether the accused’s will is overborne, whether the resulting confession may be too unreliable to admit, and whether as a matter of public policy the confession should be excluded — and courts have not always been careful in distinguishing these various issues. In particular, the content of the fairness and public policy discretions was not seriously analysed by the High Court until R v Swaffield; Pavic v R.378 In this perspective, the common law rules determining the reception of confessions are discussed, dealing, first, with the voluntariness rule and, secondly, with the rules applicable on exercise of the residuary discretion — the fairness discretion and the public policy discretion. It should be kept in mind that the admissibility of a confession is a question for the judge alone, to be determined upon the voir dire in the absence of any jury. Aspects of the voir dire are dealt with in a final section: 8.160ff. It should [page 985] also be emphasised that whether a confession has been made, and, if made, whether accepted as reliable, are questions of fact to be determined by the jury in deciding whether the case has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. 8.126 There has long been some Australian legislation governing the admissibility of confessions379 and this has always been interpreted as leaving intact the common law except to the extent that it has been expressly modified.380 However, the position under the Uniform Acts is otherwise. They

cover the field and do not reflect exactly the common law position. Nor are the relevant provisions clear in distinguishing the various policies that underlie them. Most notably, the common law voluntariness rule is not enacted in the Uniform Acts.381 It is replaced by two sections, neither of which appears to draw upon the privilege against self-incrimination (upon which the voluntariness rule is based). Section 84(1), which applies in civil and criminal cases, provides that, once the issue is raised, no admission is admissible unless the court is satisfied that it was not influenced by: (a)

violent, oppressive, inhuman or degrading conduct, whether towards the person who made the admission or towards another person; or (b) a threat of conduct of that kind.

This section appears based upon ensuring minimal standards of human dignity within the judicial process.382 Section 85(1) applies: … only in a criminal proceeding and only to evidence of an admission made by a defendant:

[page 986] (a)

to, or in the presence of, an investigating official who at that time was performing functions in connection with the investigation of the commission, or possible commission, of an offence; or

(b) as a result of an act of another person who was, and who the defendant knew or reasonably believed to be, capable of influencing the decision whether a prosecution of the defendant should be brought or should be continued.

No evidence of an admission is then admissible (under s 85(2)): … unless the circumstances in which the admission was made were such as to make it unlikely that the truth of the admission was adversely affected.

In determining this question the court must consider (s 85(3)) the relevant personal characteristics of the person making the admission as well as the nature and manner of the questioning and of any threat, promise or other inducement made to the person questioned. The policies underlying this section are less clear. Ostensibly, s 85 is concerned with ensuring that any confession made is of sufficient reliability to put before the trier of fact. But the limits upon the admissions to which the section applies suggest it is also concerned to ensure that officials and those capable of

influencing the decision to prosecute do not abuse their position. As will be seen, this admixture of policies creates some problems in its interpretation. 8.127 The uniform legislation appears to enact the common law residuary discretion in both its aspects. Section 90 gives the court a discretion to exclude an admission adduced by the prosecution where, ‘having regard to the circumstances in which the admission was made, it would be unfair to a defendant to use the evidence’. However, this itself creates policy overlaps because insofar as unfairness embraces considerations of unreliability s 90 covers some of the same ground as s 85. Thus, where the unreliability limits of s 85 run out, an accused may still argue the risks of unreliability under s 90. But while s 85 places the onus on the prosecution to negate circumstances which may have produced unreliability, s 90 places the onus on the accused to persuade the court that it would be unfair to receive the admission. Section 138 enacts the public policy discretion (although, importantly, once illegality or impropriety is established the onus is on the prosecution to justify on grounds of public policy the reception of the admission). In the admissional context it should be noted that s 138(2) stipulates as impropriety, conduct which substantially impairs the ability of an accused to respond rationally to questioning, and false statements which might cause an accused to make an admission. In addition, the residual discretions and obligations under ss 135–137 (discussed at 2.31) continue to operate in respect of confessional evidence and exclusion may be sought under them. The exact relationship between these various provisions in the uniform legislation is far from clear. On their face, counsel may seek to invoke any one of them to [page 987] exclude confessional evidence. But with the onus upon the prosecution to satisfy the requirements of ss 84 and 85 before a confession will be admitted, arguments invoking these sections will be considered before defence counsel need invoke the exclusionary discretions.383 Where exclusion is sought for impropriety under s 138, the defence will throw the onus onto the prosecution once impropriety has been established. The result is that the discretions under ss 90 and 135–137, which the defendant must convince the court to apply, can be seen as a safety net

applying only after these other provisions have been considered.384 Nor would it seem to matter under which section counsel seeks to justify the safety-net arguments: see further at 2.35. However, there may be an argument that the notion of unfairness under s 90 is wider than the notion of unfair prejudice stipulated in s 137: see further discussion on this issue at 2.34. Although not enacting a voluntariness rule, ss 84 and 85 draw upon notions at one time embodied in that rule and therefore will be discussed in that context. Sections 90, 138 and 135–137 obviously require discussion alongside the common law residual discretion. Those sections of the Uniform Acts that affect the voir dire will be referred to in that context.

The voluntariness requirement 8.128 The determination of voluntariness at common law involves a specific decision of fact: was the will of the accused so overborne that the confession was not made in the exercise of a free choice to speak or remain silent?385 The limit of involuntariness is the external overbearing of an accused’s will.386 It is protection from external influence that is guaranteed by the privilege against selfincrimination. Whether the will is overborne must be determined ‘according to the age, background and psychological condition of each confessionalist and the circumstances in which [page 988] the confession is made’.387 The internal circumstances must be considered along with the external circumstances. It is generally assumed that the repeat offender is less likely to be overborne by the persistence of police than the timid tribal Aboriginal person unused to such persistence. Persistence and pressure from persons in authority is more likely to be influential in overbearing the will than such persistence from an accused’s peers. But there are no definitive rules. The question is one of fact. Breach of this fundamental concept of voluntariness, the ‘basal principle’ referred to by Dixon CJ in the quote at 8.122, produces what is described by the High Court in Tofilau v R as ‘basal involuntariness’.388

8.129 This basal principle must be contrasted with the original common law position. Involuntariness had a technical meaning: a confession resulting from a threat or promise held out by a person in authority. This rule still finds exact expression in s 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1894 (Qld). The rule was designed not to secure a privilege against self-incrimination but to ensure that only reliable confessions were adduced (the rule developed at a time when accused were still unable to testify in serious cases), and that police (still to be centrally organised) did not act improperly in obtaining confessions. But the rule came to be interpreted to apply only to persons seen to have influence over the laying and prosecution of the charge in question, and to require a threat or promise related to that charge. Although any confession would generally be made to the person making the threat or promise, in principle this seems unnecessary as long as the confession is made as a result of that threat or promise.389 By the same token, the threat or promise may be conveyed to the suspect indirectly through a third person.390 But while the specific rule will still produce an overbearing of the will, the concept of involuntariness is no longer limited to these circumstances at common law.391 [page 989] They do, however, resurface in s 85 of the uniform legislation. The section applies specifically to admissions made to or in the presence of an ‘investigating official’392 performing functions connected to the investigation of an offence or as the result of an act of another person capable of influencing the decision to prosecute,393 and such admissions may not be received unless the circumstances in which the admission was made were such as to make it unlikely that the truth of the admission was adversely affected.394 By s 85(3)(b), where admissions are made in response to questioning the circumstances include the nature of the questions and the manner in which they were put and the nature of any threat, promise or other inducement made to the person questioned. This all looks very much like the old voluntariness rule which was based on an admixture of policies (reliability and controlling officials) now taken up at common law within the residuary discretion.395 [page 990]

8.130 But there is a problem in interpreting s 85 to achieve this admixture of policies because strictly it may apply in the absence of any official misconduct and, even where misconduct is established, in the absence of any causal connection between that misconduct and the unlikely truth of the admissions (although that official misconduct may produce this unlikelihood is envisaged by s 85(3)(b), and where s 85(1)(b) applies a causal connection does appear to be required).396 Section 85(2) provides simply: Evidence of the admission is not admissible unless the circumstances in which the admission was made [which include the age, intellect and psychological condition of the admissionalist at the time as well as the conduct of the officials: s 85(3)] were such as to make it unlikely that the truth of the admission was adversely affected.

Courts do appear to have interpreted this to require some causal connection between the questioning process and the likely truth of the admission. As Simpson J remarks in R v Ye Zhang: ‘The focus of s 85 is the reliability of the admission in the circumstances in which it was made’.397 And as Barr J in R v Rooke explains, s 85 ‘has generally no part to play in the admissibility of admissions which may be untrue or unreliable for other reasons’.398 Evidence that a suspect chose to lie when questioned, that a suspect is a compulsive liar or otherwise psychologically unlikely to have been telling the truth, have been held not to be relevant circumstances for the purposes of s 85.399 There must be some intersection between the condition of the suspect and the questioning process (or circumstances in which the admission is made) before s 85 can take effect.400 But there need be no official misconduct for the section to apply. The section does not fit exactly either the policy of controlling official conduct nor of ensuring that only likely reliable admissions go to the jury. [page 991] 8.131 At common law,401 external influences capable of establishing involuntariness now extend beyond those made by persons in authority402 and to any external overbearing of the will, be it through a specific threat or promise in relation to the charge, some other specific threat or promise, violence, torture, prolonged questioning,403 deception404 or more subtle forms of psychological pressure. It may be that the accused’s will is more likely to be overborne by persons in authority making threats or promises,405 but this is not a legal

requirement and the issue is simply one of fact. By the same token, it may be that illegality or impropriety is an effective way of breaking the will of an accused, but such misconduct is not a prerequisite for a finding of involuntariness. Nor, in this context, is the court required to make any finding about the possible reliability of any confession given involuntarily406 as it is under s 85 of the uniform legislation. Misconduct and reliability are issues picked up at common law in Australia by the residuary discretion. [page 992] But just as s 85 of the uniform legislation enacts a definitive rule to deal with circumstances giving rise to possible unreliability, more generally s 84 provides that, where the defence raises the issue as a reasonable possibility,407 then no admission may be received unless the prosecution can establish that it was not the result of ‘violent, oppressive, inhuman or degrading conduct’ or such a threat. This section appears to go beyond any principle of exclusion at common law.408 It is not concerned with reliability, nor with statements made to investigating officials; it is concerned with ensuring minimal standards of conduct generally, suggesting that every citizen is entitled to treatment which does not exceed certain bounds of propriety. As Miles CJ pointed out in R v Truong,409 it enacts the sort of standards of propriety that would be found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is based upon a similar provision in s 76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (UK).410 Once these human rights standards are breached and this can be shown to have had some influence upon the making of an admission,411 then it must be excluded, notwithstanding that it can be shown to be reliable. (This contrasts with the common law position where such breach can only lead to exclusion if it affects voluntariness or reliability or gives rise to exclusion as a matter of public policy.) 8.132 In determining voluntariness at common law it is doubtful whether there should be any limits to the external pressures that may overbear the will of a particular accused. It has been held that a confession made as a consequence of moral exhortation to tell the truth should not be regarded as involuntary.412 Few accused are likely to be overborne by exhortation and for that reason it may usually be disregarded, but if circumstances arise so that an accused is put in a

dilemma by such exhortation, courts should not be prevented from finding a consequent confession involuntary. But it is vital that external pressure has caused the consequent confession. Given the external limit to involuntariness, this issue of causation cannot be avoided. The question is whether the accused’s will has been overborne by external pressure. The problem is that people confess for a variety of reasons, some internal and some external. To what degree must external reasons influence before it can be said that the accused’s will is overborne? Take, for example, a young Aborigine caught suspiciously at the scene of a crime and, ignorant of the right to silence, and so fearful in his drunken state of the white police officer, that when asked ‘what are you doing here?’ [page 993] makes a full confession. Is the will overborne in these circumstances, or has the suspect confessed for internal psychological reasons into which the court will not inquire? Most courts would favour the latter approach in these circumstances, for reasons which are pragmatic rather than principled. As Gleeson CJ of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal concludes in R v Azar: The simplicity of words such as ‘in the exercise of a free choice to speak or to remain silent’ can be deceptive. There are many situations in which a person who makes an admission, if left uninfluenced by other persons or considerations, would not have done so. It does not follow that a statement made in such circumstances is involuntary. People speak under all manner of constraints, and impelled by all manner of influences, and the meaning that a psychiatrist or a philosopher would attach to the concept of free choice in this context is not necessarily the same as that which a lawyer would give it. Metaphysical disputes about issues concerning free will and determinism open up a range of problems about the concept of ‘free choice’ in which the law has never become involved. There are no doubt some who would regard the law’s approach to the question as, at best, grossly oversimplified and hopelessly unscientific … However, law is a practical and normative science, and is constrained to evaluate, and not merely observe, human nature and conduct.413

8.133 The fundamental question, if the privilege against self-incrimination lies at the heart of the voluntariness requirement, is whether there is a distinction in principle between internal and external pressure. The privilege demands that suspects only confess in exercise of a free choice to speak or remain silent. To confess freely a suspect must, first, appreciate the existence of the choice and then be psychologically capable of exercising that choice. In principle, it appears

irrelevant why a person is incapable of choosing: whether because of a particular psychological make-up; because his or her will is affected through lack of sleep, drink or drugs; because external pressure has been applied to encourage a confession; or because of a combination of these factors. Nevertheless, as authority now stands, the will must be overborne by external pressure, so that where it is the accused’s psychological condition alone that has produced confession this is considered under the residual discretion, in asking whether the confession is of sufficient reliability to be put before the jury.414 However, it is possible in virtually every case, except where the confession has been volunteered, to [page 994] find that the confession is the result of a combination of internal and external factors and to hold that as long as the external factors, innocuous as they may seem to have been, have contributed to the incapacity to choose, then the will may be regarded as overborne for the purposes of the voluntariness rule. Brennan J in Collins v R415 takes this approach in excluding confessions by Aboriginal accused. In other cases, where the accused has been injured, is intoxicated, or otherwise mentally or psychologically affected, most courts have been unwilling to consider confessions produced through normal police questioning involuntary416 and have left the accused’s psychological condition to be otherwise considered under the discretion.417 Although mere ignorance of the right to remain silent cannot in itself constitute involuntariness,418 there remain cases where judges have been prepared to exclude as involuntary confessions made by persons unable to comprehend the right to silence because of their lack of English.419 [page 995] One highly significant factor in determining voluntariness will be whether the accused has been clearly advised of the right to remain silent. The majority in Collins emphasise that the suspects were so cautioned but as Brennan J forcefully argues this should never foreclose the issue of voluntariness. In Em v R, a majority

accepted that admissions recorded covertly in a park in the absence of a complete warning were voluntary, because the appellant knew he was speaking to police officers, had previously been warned at the police station in relation to the same investigation, knew that he did not have to speak and could leave at any time.420 The failure to caution may also give rise to an impropriety relevant to the exercise of the public policy discretion, and the obligation to caution is referred to further in that context. A confession made in the absence of a caution will not for that reason be involuntary as the mere failure cannot constitute an external overbearing of the will.421 The question of voluntariness was considered by the High Court in a series of appeals in response to Victorian police operations where undercover police officers persuaded persons suspected of unconnected murders to individually confess their deeds in order to join a criminal gang. In some cases in response to claims that gang leaders could make police ‘heat’ or interest ‘go away’.422 In Tofilau v R, and three other instances, the suspect made (recorded) admissions in relation to the particular crimes being investigated. In these appeals, unreliability did not loom large, notwithstanding the offer of apparently lucrative gang membership or importunity by ‘gang members’ and ‘gang leaders’.423 Instead, the appeals focused on whether the confessions were voluntary. With the exception of Kirby J, the High Court concluded that undercover police officers were not seen by the suspects as ‘persons in authority’ nor had they improperly induced the various confessions.424 In each case the pressure was not ‘so sustained or undue, as to overbear his will’. Recourse to a deceptive scenario did not deprive the various confessions of their voluntariness, even though each of the appellants was misled about the conditions under which their decision was made. Several judges accepted that the accused were subjected to ‘powerful psychological pressures’, but considered separately from the official investigation, the presence of investigators and risks to reliability, these pressures did not amount to conduct [page 996] that impugned their voluntariness or admissibility.425 Furthermore, the kind of scenario played out was conceived, by all except Kirby J, as an appropriate means of investigating serious crime and eliciting confessions in ways that were not inconsistent with ‘community standards’.

The fairness discretion 8.134 The common law fairness discretion (discussed more generally at 2.29ff) was articulated by the High Court, well before any public policy discretion had evolved, in R v Lee,426 in terms of ‘whether, having regard to the conduct of the police and all the circumstances of the case, it would be unfair to use his own statement against the accused’. Section 90 enacts this discretion in allowing exclusion if, ‘having regard to the circumstances in which the admission was made,427 it would be unfair to a defendant to use the evidence’. The discretion therefore exists to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial. The question is not whether the evidence has been fairly obtained but whether it would be unfair to use the evidence against the accused at trial: see Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ in R v Swaffield; Pavic v R.428 But when does the admission of confessional evidence against an accused produce an unfair trial? At the very least, a fair trial seeks rectitude of decision, so that it will be unfair at common law to admit evidence of dubious reliability in circumstances where its admission creates an unacceptable risk of wrongful conviction. Given that a confession once admitted is likely to be extremely influential, care must be taken only to admit confessions capable of being adjudged by the trier of fact as of sufficient reliability to be acted upon.429 It is also unfair to admit a confession that might produce an unacceptable risk of wrongful conviction through it being given more probative value by the trier of fact than it deserves. This might occur where the confession testified to reveals prejudicial information, such as the previous convictions of the accused.430 Evidence of a confession may also be given more probative value than it deserves where the [page 997] circumstances are such that its reliability cannot be adequately assessed and tested. Thus, for example, where police deny an accused independent evidence of what takes place whilst an accused is in police custody, and the accused wishes to dispute those events, it might be argued unfair to admit the police evidence because the accused has been put in a position where it is difficult to adequately dispute that evidence.431

A risk of wrongful conviction based upon any of the above arguments would be sufficient justification for the exclusion of confessional evidence on grounds of unfairness. 8.135 But a fair trial demands more than rectitude of decision. It demands rectitude of decision through what is regarded as a ‘fair’ process; that is, a process that respects the rights and privileges of the accused. Without attempting to define those rights and privileges, where evidence has been produced in breach of them, and would not otherwise have existed, it may be argued that it would be unfair to admit that evidence. But it is not clear whether unfairness in this sense is itself sufficient justification for exclusion of a confession so obtained (under the Uniform Acts, s 90 would here ostensibly apply) or whether the ‘impropriety’ thus occurring more properly falls for consideration under the balance of the public policy discretion (under the Uniform Acts, s 138 might more appropriately apply).432 Unfairness as the unacceptable risk of wrongful conviction 8.136 First, when can a judge withdraw a confession from the trier of fact on the ground that it is just not of sufficient reliability to be acted upon at all? One might argue that given that the accused is protected at trial by the very highest standard of proof and by appropriate directions from the trial judge, and may appeal on the ground that the verdict cannot be supported by the evidence, the unfairness discretion should be exercised on this basis only in exceptional circumstances.433 Authority supports this approach. In Sinclair v R, the High Court refused to interfere with the considered decision of the trial judge not to exclude the confession of an accused suffering from [page 998] schizophrenia.434 The court was of the view that only where a mental condition is such that the confession can be regarded as made by a person quite incompetent to testify should a court exclude, on grounds of unreliability, the confession of a person suffering mental incapacity. Consequently, confessions by accused suffering from severe injuries, including head injuries, have been accepted by courts as potentially of sufficient reliability to be fairly put before juries,435 although appellate courts retain the prerogative to quash any resulting conviction

as unsafe.436 Under the Uniform Acts, courts take the same approach, with likely unreliability being considered under s 85 (and s 90 if required) where it arises from the circumstances in which the confession was made, including the mental condition of the accused.437 8.137 Where external pressure, including force, has been used to obtain a confession it may carry such a high risk of unreliability that it should not be considered by the jury at all. But confessions obtained in this way will not have been made in exercise of a free choice to speak or remain silent and will be excluded as involuntary (or as within the circumstances of ss 84 and/or 85 of the Uniform Acts) before any question of the exercise of the discretion arises. In R v Geesing,438 a confession alleged to have been made to fellow prisoners in intimidating circumstances was excluded as involuntary, although King CJ did emphasise the possible unreliability of such a confession as a reason for the protection of the voluntariness rule. However, there is no need to confuse issues of voluntariness and reliability in this way, and greater clarity is achieved by leaving issues of reliability to the fairness discretion, so that the voluntariness rule can be left to reflect the privilege against self-incrimination. However, this approach is not possible under the Uniform Acts because s 85 enacts a definitive rule excluding unreliable confessions made in the presence of investigators, and s 90 will only need to be relied upon by the defence if the prosecution can avoid the application of s 85. 8.138 But secondly, in what circumstances can confessional evidence be withdrawn from the jury upon the basis that the jury is not in a position to determine its true probative value so that a risk of wrongful conviction would necessarily arise? This will [page 999] depend upon the evidence available. If that evidence is scanty, there are reasons for doubting the confession, and if the confession is damning, it may be unfair to admit the confession. If the available evidence is detailed and complete, there may be no reason to take the decision of reliability away from the trier of fact. This problem of scanty evidence is illustrated by the decision of the High Court in Foster v R.439 The accused, a young Aborigine suspected of involvement in the arson of a school on the south coast of New South Wales, despite emphatic

denials, was unlawfully taken into custody by police for questioning. Less than an hour later he had signed a full confession, allegedly after being told that his ‘accomplices’ had confessed and had told police of his involvement with them. The police gave the accused no access to a lawyer or friend nor sought to provide any other independent evidence or recording of the interview. The only evidence of the interview was that of the interrogating officers and their account was hotly disputed by the accused. He alleged he had been forced to sign the confession following threats of violence to him and threats to arrest his younger brother. All judges, except McHugh J, held that it would be unfair to admit the disputed confession. The police had created a situation whereby a lack of any independent evidence made it impossible for the jury accurately to assess the likelihood that a reliable confession had been made. In these circumstances it was unfair, on grounds of rectitude of decision, to admit evidence of the confession.440 8.139 But the judgments are not so clear in confining fairness to the issue of rectitude of decision. The joint majority judgment, having emphasised the lack of independent evidence, then elucidated three other factors which weighed heavily in favour of exclusion under the fairness discretion. First, there was the serious and reckless interference with the accused’s rights by the police; secondly, by acting unlawfully the police had created a situation from which the accused was unable to withdraw; and thirdly, there was a real question of whether the confession was made in exercise of the choice to remain silent. These remarks simply confuse the exact content of the fairness discretion and its relationship to that based on public policy. One reconciliation with the view here advanced might be to argue that these three factors went to explain why the court suspected the reliability of the alleged confession so as to require independent evidence of it before it could be fairly admitted against the accused. Foster illustrates a situation where the denial of procedural rights designed to ensure rectitude of decision-making justifies discretionary exclusion. Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ in R v Swaffield; Pavic v R441 cited Foster as an example of a situation where the denial of procedural rights creates a forensic disadvantage. The principal [page 1000]

effect of that denial is that it makes it impossible to sufficiently eliminate the risk of wrongful conviction. Unfairness as procedural impropriety 8.140 But it might also be argued that the majority in Foster recognise that the unfairness discretion embodies more than eliminating the risk of wrongful conviction and contains also a demand for procedural propriety, for recognition of the accused’s rights and privileges within the entire process of criminal justice, which demand is distinct from those considerations which arise under the public policy discretion. The majority accept that ‘[t]o no small extent [the discretions] overlap’ but distinguish them by emphasising that while the public policy discretion concentrates upon general matters of public policy, the fairness discretion concentrates upon the effect of ‘unlawful’ conduct on the particular accused, the retention of the word unlawful serving to stress that it is the propriety of the criminal process in relation to the individual that is in issue under this discretion. It is certainly arguable that this was intended by the court in R v Lee.442 When was decided, common law courts had not yet recognised the public policy aspect of the residual discretion. Consequently, if procedural propriety was to be taken into account at all it had to be accommodated within the notion of fairness or not at all. However, with the recognition in R v Ireland443 and Bunning v Cross444 of a wider public policy aspect to the discretion, it can be strongly argued, as Dawson J contends in Cleland v R,445 that the fairness aspect of the discretion is not now required to extend so far and need embrace only notions of rectitude of decision. Procedural impropriety always has public policy repercussions and is better accommodated within the balance of a public policy discretion, whether or not it directly affects the particular accused. But courts have not generally accepted this approach. Procedural propriety is regarded as relevant in the context of fairness as well as in the context of public policy. Brennan J explains the separate uses of impropriety in his judgment in Duke v R.446 The focus of each aspect of the discretion is different. In the context of fairness, courts ask whether impropriety has affected the particular accused. In the context of public policy, courts ask whether, notwithstanding that the impropriety has had no such effect, does public policy favour excluding the confession. Where impropriety has affected the accused it will be unfair to admit

the confession if, without the impropriety, the accused may not have confessed at all,447 or at least would not have [page 1001] been faced with seeking to explain away uncorroborated police testimony.448 Other judges have taken the further step of holding that impropriety affecting the accused is ipso facto unfairness449 and it is likely that the majority in Foster were taking this view when explaining the different focuses of the fairness and public policy discretions. 8.141 The problem with this approach is that it hides the public policy balance that arguably must take place in every case where impropriety has occurred, whether that impropriety has caused this sort of unfairness to the individual or not. In each case, the crucial issue is whether a conviction will be bought at too high a price. Where the impropriety has caused the confession or manipulated the evidence in the individual case, the argument for exclusion may be stronger than where the impropriety has had no such effect. But, nevertheless, a balance must be struck. To ignore the balance is to ignore the decision in Bunning v Cross that impropriety in obtaining evidence may lead to exclusion. The High Court in that case was not concerned only with impropriety that has no influence in the obtaining of the evidence. On the contrary, the court stressed that the more influential the impropriety was in obtaining the evidence the more likely that the public policy balance would be exercised to exclude it. The same reasoning applies to improperly obtained confessions. By dressing up the question of procedural impropriety in terms of unfairness, the importance of the balance is hidden, if not lost. It appears that exclusion depends only upon establishing an impropriety that may have influenced the accused. It is then argued that it is ipso facto unfair to admit the evidence. But why unfair? If it creates no risk of wrongful conviction where is the unfairness to the accused? Is it in the procedural impropriety to the accused? But unless one accepts that there should be an exclusionary rule in cases of improperly obtained evidence, or evidence obtained in breach of a citizen’s procedural rights and privileges, and Australian courts have never accepted that approach, rather demanding a weighing of the relevant interests, should not the

need for the court to disapprove of such impropriety be weighed against the need to convict the guilty? To argue that procedural impropriety to the accused is ipso facto unfairness hides the issue to be decided: would a (correct) conviction based upon this impropriety be bought at too high a price? In this respect, the reliability aspect of the fairness discretion can be sharply distinguished. Once the unreasonable risk of unreliability is established there is no further matter to consider. The evidence of the confession must be excluded to avoid the risk of convicting an innocent accused. There is no balance to be struck. [page 1002] 8.142 R v Swaffield; Pavic v R supports the approach here argued.450 In each case, the confession of an accused had been covertly recorded, in one by an undercover police officer investigating unrelated drug crimes, in the other by a friend of the accused who, the accused having refused to talk to police, had agreed with police to discuss the alleged murder with the accused. In each case, counsel argued that the exclusionary discretion be invoked on the ground that to admit the confession would be unfair. Respective counsel accepted each confession as voluntary (there being no apparent overbearing of the will) and legally obtained so as not to invoke the public policy discretion, but argued it would be unfair to admit the evidence. The exclusionary discretion was therefore invoked on this ground alone. It was argued unfair to admit each confession as it was obtained without the accused being given the procedural right of choosing whether to speak to police. The covert nature of the recording had removed this choice. But this argument in turn raised the question of the propriety of the police conduct in covertly recording, and such propriety appeared to raise the question of whether the discretion should be exercised rather on grounds of public policy. Thus, the High Court was faced with the relationship between these two grounds for exercise of the exclusionary discretion. Its approach was to combine them in cases where a confession is obtained in breach of an accused’s rights and privileges. The question as formulated by Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ (at 194) is whether in: … all the circumstances of the case … the admission of the evidence or the obtaining of a conviction

on the basis of the evidence is bought at a price which is unacceptable having regard to contemporary community standards.

The discretion is thus put in the same terms used by Barwick CJ when he first formulated the public policy discretion in R v Ireland: ‘Convictions obtained by the aid of unlawful or unfair acts may be obtained at too high a price. Hence the judicial discretion’.451 Brennan CJ in Swaffield is even clearer in concluding that ‘there is much to be said for remitting consideration of the conduct of law enforcement officers to the public policy discretion in all cases except where that conduct makes the reliability of the confession dubious’.452 Using this analysis, the majority considered whether the police had acted improperly in covertly recording the confessions in issue, and held that whilst it is not improper to covertly record a conversation it is improper for police to use such a conversation to actively elicit information, for then the conversation takes the form of a police interrogation, and such interrogation should take place subject to the normal [page 1003] procedural safeguards. The majority held the conversation with Swaffield had actively elicited the confession to arson, but the friend’s conversation with Pavic involved no such elicitation. They agreed with the lower courts that the Swaffield confession be excluded and the Pavic confession admitted. Kirby J concluded active elicitation in both cases and was of the view that both confessions should be excluded. In Em v R,453 the common law approach advocated above on the basis of Swaffield does not appear to have been endorsed by a majority of the High Court in interpreting the notion of fairness in s 90 of the uniform legislation. In Em, the appellant contested the admissibility of covertly recorded admissions made to police officers in circumstances where he had indicated that he did not want to participate in a formal interview, where he believed that the conversation was ‘off the record’ and unrecorded and therefore could not be used against him, and where the police officers knowingly perpetuated and took advantage of that belief. The appeal focused on whether the police acted improperly by secretly recording the conversation and taking advantage of his mistaken belief and whether, given his mistaken belief, it was otherwise unfair under s 90 to use the

recorded admissions against the accused. While Gummow and Hayne JJ regarded s 90 as a safety net applying only where other provisions of the legislation controlling the admissibility of admissions were not enlivened (at [109]), the other members of the court did not read down the notion of fairness in s 90 in this, or any other, way (Gleeson CJ and Heydon J at [56], Kirby J at [196], and see further at 8.144). The majority agreed that the recordings were admissible. For Gleeson CJ and Heydon J, the fact that a conversation was being secretly recorded, especially where a warrant had been issued under the Listening Devices Act 1984 (NSW), was not sufficient to make it unfair to the defendant to admit the recording into evidence, even without a proper warning.454 They concluded that his freedom to speak was not impugned as he knew the individuals were police officers investigating two home invasions; he knew, having been formally cautioned previously, that he was not obliged to speak to the officers; and he was free to leave. Em’s freedom to speak was not impugned: ‘He spoke to those officers knowingly and willingly’. The fact that he believed the conversation could not be used against him, and was not being recorded, cannot ‘of itself make it unfair for the conversation to be received in evidence’.455 [page 1004] Apart from Kirby J, none of the judges considered the covert recording, police importunity, the incomplete warning and the perpetuation of the suspect’s mistaken belief about the admissibility of unrecorded statements, made it unfair to admit the admissions under s 90 nor constituted unlawful or improper conduct invoking s 138.456

The public policy discretion 8.143 Prior to R v Swaffield; Pavic v R,457 authority favoured the consideration of procedural impropriety affecting the accused in the context first of unfairness and then of public policy. As a result, because impropriety will in most cases impact upon the individual accused, Brennan J concluded in Collins v R that, once a judge has considered the fairness discretion, ‘it is difficult to conceive of a case … where a voluntary confession which might fairly be admitted … would be rejected in the public interest because of unlawful conduct’.458 Such a case would

have to involve the situation where the impropriety has had no impact on the individual accused and is to be discouraged for its own sake. It is important that majority dicta in Cleland v R suggesting that the public interest discretion will be rarely exercised459 be interpreted in this way. As a result there may not be such a difference between that approach and the more liberal exercise of the public interest discretion advocated by Deane and Murphy JJ in that case.460 The later cases of Foster v R and Pollard v R461 show High Court judges not unwilling to consider the public policy discretion following analysis of fairness, and in both decisions the view is clear that where improprieties have been deliberate or reckless the court should register its disapproval by indicating that it would also have exercised the public policy discretion. But Swaffield v R; R v Pavic462 suggest that there are not now separate grounds for exercise of the discretion where the accused has been denied procedural rights [page 1005] and privileges, and that the effect of the denial upon the individual accused and the more general public policy repercussions are to be considered together in deciding whether to receive the evidence would be to procure conviction at too high a price.463 And Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ (at 198) are quick to add that remarks in Cleland that only exceptionally will the public policy discretion be exercised where the impropriety has produced no unfairness to the individual accused suggest too narrow an approach. 8.144 The Uniform Acts simply enact the fairness (s 90) and public policy (s 138) discretions without giving any indication of the relationship between them (nor between them and the notion of unfair prejudice that may demand exclusion under s 135 or s 137). Given the expressions used in these sections, some judges have simply followed common law authority without seeking to determine the precise ambits of these sections.464 In Em v R, Gummow and Hayne JJ, by suggesting that s 90 enacts a residual discretion (a ‘safety net’) that applies only where other provisions of the Act, including s 138, do not warrant exclusion, give some support for also taking the Swaffield approach under the uniform legislation.465 But the remaining members of the court are more reluctant to read down the s 90 fairness discretion in any way: see 8.142 above. Nevertheless, even if there is not majority support for the Swaffield approach, as a matter of

practice, through the shift of onus enacted in s 138, defence counsel would do well first, to argue impropriety, thereby forcing the prosecution to justify reception, and then if necessary to rely upon any argument of unfairness ‘having regard to the circumstances in which the admission was made’ under s 90. The need to rely on s 90 may be further mitigated by the courts making it clear that the effect of any impropriety on the confessionalist is an important matter for consideration in the exercise of the s 138 discretion.466 [page 1006] Thus, in cases of impropriety467 there may be little reason to resort to s 90. All relevant factors can be considered under s 138. Only if courts were prepared to hold that it is ipso facto unfair to admit a confession against an accused where, but for impropriety it would not have been made, would it be advantageous to resort to s 90. But this approach would undermine s 138, is not discussed in Em v R, and would certainly be contrary to the spirit of R v Swaffield; Pavic v R.468 8.145 At common law, the bias in the public interest weighing process generally favours the reception of reliable information and the apprehension of criminals rather than the ensuring of procedural justice. Just as in the context of public interest immunity the bias is in favour of receiving evidence necessary to discover truth, so in this context the bias is arguably the same. Nevertheless, there are arguments favouring a more liberal approach to the exercise of that discretion in this confessional context. First, the countervailing general public interest in this context is not a matter extraneous to the legal process; on the contrary, it is a public interest in ensuring that the legal process, including the investigative process, produces not only reliable but also procedurally fair decisions. It may be argued that this procedural fairness is central to the very legitimacy of the adjudicatory process469 and, more mundanely, procedural fairness is anyway likely to be conducive to overall reliability. Secondly, the countervailing impropriety in many cases will have affected the particular accused before the court and on that ground may be given stronger weight. 8.146 Although these arguments have not been expressly adopted by the High

Court in its exercise of the Bunning v Cross discretion, the very willingness to consider improprieties in the context of the unfairness discretion and to avoid the express articulation of the weighing process suggests that these arguments have their influence. While R v Swaffield; Pavic v R seeks to bring these arguments more into the open by giving the public policy discretion greater scope, the majority of the court in Em v R tends towards the opposite approach by their reluctance to restrict the notion of fairness under s 90 of the uniform legislation. There are a number of reported cases where judges have been prepared to exclude confessions, shown to be voluntary and reliable, on grounds of impropriety. South [page 1007] Australian courts were initially most willing to exercise the exclusionary discretion.470 But examples of exclusion appear in Victoria, Queensland and New South Wales;471 and in the Federal Court, in Seymour v Attorney-General (Cth),472 Fitzgerald J inclined to the view that admissions improperly obtained from a witness at a committal proceeding should be excluded. But research suggests exclusion remains the exception.473 Some judges show a willingness to exclude improperly obtained evidence upon a public policy balance.474 Others are more willing to exclude if they can conceptualise the impropriety as producing unfairness to the particular accused.475 Whether competing interests are weighed in the context of fairness or within the context of public policy, procedural impropriety is more likely to result in the exclusion of confessional evidence where it has had some influence upon the accused. But, as the rules of criminal procedure become the subject of legislative guidelines, their breach becomes a serious matter that it is difficult for courts to ignore, whether or not the accused has been influenced by the breach.476 That the discretion to exclude in cases of impropriety should be taken seriously receives emphasis in s 138 of the Uniform Acts, which provides that once it is shown that evidence is the result of impropriety then the onus is upon the prosecution to justify its reception. Courts in jurisdictions using the uniform legislation have been particularly sensitive to the nature of impropriety and the considerable weight ordinarily ascribed to admissions.477

Criminal investigations: standards of propriety 8.147 The formal procedures for investigating criminal offences are a topic of their own.478 It is not possible to deal with them in any detail in this work, nor to analyse [page 1008] in detail the legislation that now applies extensively to official investigations. But some kind of outline is necessary to explain the circumstances in which the residual discretion is likely to be invoked against police evidence and to indicate which improprieties will be taken most seriously by the courts in exercising their discretion. It might be also noted by way of introduction that where confessions are made not to official investigators there may still be statutory standards that apply; for example, laws against unlawful listening (see n 523 below) and laws protecting communications made during confidential professional relationships.479 At common law, police questioning can take place only with the consent of the person questioned. Citizens have a right to privacy which entitles them to refuse to be questioned or to answer questions.480 For the same reason, police have no common law entitlement to detain suspects for questioning and may only take a person into custody upon formal arrest.481 An arrest can be made when reasonable grounds exist for suspecting that an offence has been committed by that person.482 Once a person has been taken into custody then, at common law, the judicial process commences. The suspect must be told the charge upon which arrest has been made, told that there is no obligation to answer questions, formally charged, and be taken before a court as soon as is practicable483 so that the formal charges can be dealt with. When judicial proceedings are then adjourned, as they must inevitably be, the suspect may [page 1009] apply to the court for bail.484 At common law, the taking of the accused into custody on arrest marks the end of the investigative process and the commencement of the judicial process. This continues to be the situation in Australia except where modified by statute.485

8.148 Where persons are validly arrested for Commonwealth offences486 or for serious offences punishable in New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania, Western Australia and the Northern Territory,487 legislation permits further investigation prior to the commencement of the judicial process.488 Along with this power of custodial investigation the legislation grants procedural safeguards to the suspect. Generally, these provide that arrested489 suspects be informed that there is no obligation to answer questions, that there is a right to have an interpreter present during questioning, that there is a right to consult with a lawyer on arrest and to have a lawyer present during questioning,490 and that suspects have the right to inform relatives or friends of their whereabouts and to have a friend present during any questioning. There are further requirements for the electronic recording of questioning if confessions there made are to be admissible.491 Magisterial permission is required where the police wish to detain the suspect for investigation beyond the initially stipulated period. The Commonwealth, New South Wales, Queensland, Victorian, Western Australian and South Australian legislation stipulates a particular maximum period during which [page 1010] police investigation may reasonably continue (generally four to eight hours, although extendable under certain conditions), but in Victoria, unless a court permits, to investigate only the offence for which the suspect is apprehended.492 Under anti-terrorist legislation, these powers have been considerably extended to allow preventative detention (under the Criminal Code (Cth) Pt 5.3 and parallel state legislation), the legislation being drafted to ensure that the processes are supervised judicially so far as is possible and to define the extent of the orders and the treatment of the individual concerned. Furthermore, under Pt III Div 3 of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth), persons may be detained, with judicial approval, for the purpose of questioning, not only where reasonably suspected of terrorism but where reasonably suspected of being able to provide information relating to terrorist acts, and in certain circumstances access to a lawyer, or at least a lawyer of choice, may be restricted during questioning, along with the ability to disclose circumstances.493 Crime and anti-corruption commissions in most jurisdictions

also have compulsory powers to examine in the course of their investigations, and in some cases this extends to the compulsory examination of persons already accused.494 8.149 The common law makes no formal provision for procedural safeguards during police questioning, although the English Judges’ Rules of 1912, used as guidelines in all Australian jurisdictions,495 require suspects to be informed of their right to remain silent once the police have decided to charge496 and before any further questioning takes place in custody. Mason CJ suggests in dicta that the obligation to caution should arise whenever persons are being questioned about their suspected involvement in an [page 1011] offence, that is, whenever the accusatory stage of an investigation commences, and state courts have endorsed this approach.497 The obligation to caution is now mandated in legislation in every jurisdiction.498 The Uniform Acts (s 139) enact an obligation to caution, either on arrest (s 139(5)) or on official belief of sufficient evidence to establish an offence (s 139(2)),499 and statements made in the absence of adequate communication of the caution500 are deemed to have been improperly obtained. At common law, there is no formal right to the assistance of an interpreter or solicitor on arrest or during police questioning, although a suspect might always refuse to answer questions in the absence of an interpreter or lawyer.501 [page 1012] As mentioned above, at common law an accused is taken into custody for the purpose of administering justice, not for the purpose of investigation. This does not, however, prohibit further questioning while the accused is in custody and this may take place, following caution, with the accused’s consent.502 But the administration of justice cannot be delayed for the purpose of questioning.503 The suspect must, on arrest, be taken as soon as is practicable before a court to be dealt with and to have the opportunity to apply for bail (although by legislation police may now grant bail pending a court appearance).504 While on bail or awaiting a

court appearance, and while on remand following that first appearance where bail is refused, the accused may be questioned with their consent and following advice that there is no obligation to answer any questions.505 It is quite lawful for the police to arrest an accused upon one charge and, so long as the judicial process is not delayed, question the suspect with his or her consent about other offences while he or she is in custody.506 But an accused may not be arrested on one charge merely for the purpose of questioning on another507 and it is unlawful to delay the administration of justice for the purpose of questioning the accused about any offence. This common law position has been modified in those jurisdictions mentioned above which permit investigation following arrest, although in South Australia and Victoria police may only investigate the crime for which the accused has been apprehended. However, in these jurisdictions a magistrate may give permission to take a person out of that custody for the purpose of investigating another offence. 8.150 Some suspects are given further formal protection. In the case of children it is arguable that, rather than merely being told of their rights on arrest, their inexperience warrants there being an obligation on police to inform their parents of the arrest [page 1013] and warrants the presence of an independent adult, preferably a parent, or a solicitor during any interrogation.508 In Western Australia, only the former obligation is legislatively imposed, whereas in the other jurisdictions (with the exception of Tasmania, where there is no specific legislation) the latter obligation, expressed in more or less stringent terms, is imposed by statute as well.509 Breach of the Commonwealth, South Australian and Victorian Acts attracts consideration of the generally applicable public policy discretion. But in the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory, the seriousness of this obligation owed to child suspects is also reflected in an express reverse onus provision, which obliges the Crown, once a breach of the legislation has been established, to justify the admission of evidence obtained in breach on grounds of public interest.

In New South Wales, the legislation goes further and makes ‘[a]ny statement, confession, admission or information made or given to a member of the police force by a child’ inadmissible unless the judge is satisfied that there was a sufficient reason for the absence of an adult and considers that in the particular circumstances of the case the evidence should be admitted.510 As well as these statutory obligations, in every jurisdiction there are police standing orders which impose both obligations upon investigating police and which would be given consideration in exercise of the residuary discretion in addition to any further considerations relevant to impropriety or unfairness.511 8.151 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are given similar statutory protection under s 23H of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). Aboriginal legal services must be informed on arrest, and questioning is prohibited in the absence of an ‘interview friend’ unless the suspect has expressly and voluntarily waived the right to the presence of such a friend. The onus of establishing the waiver is upon the prosecution in subsequent proceedings. Breach of the section is an impropriety for the purposes of [page 1014] exercise of the applicable exclusionary discretion. Equivalent provisions are enacted in s 420 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), and in reg 33 of the Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Regulations 2005 (NSW). 8.152 Other similar guidelines for the interrogation of Aboriginal people have existed for a number of years. In South Australia, a police order has been in existence since the early 1970s requiring a friend where ‘tribal Aborigines’ are interrogated,512 and in the Northern Territory case of R v Anunga,513 the Supreme Court laid down more extensive guidelines to be followed on the interrogation of Aboriginal suspects. This decision has since been embodied in the general orders of the Northern Territory Commissioner of Police.514 Although relevant to discretionary exclusion, failure to comply with the rules, particularly to ensure an understanding of the caution, has been taken into account by some judges in determining voluntariness, despite the absence of any other external pressure from the police.515 The guidelines for interrogation are designed to ensure that Aboriginal people

are not intimidated by the process of police questioning, are properly treated on apprehension, fully understand their right to remain silent, in appropriate cases have access to interpreters, and have access in every case to the assistance of a prisoner’s friend or the Aboriginal Legal Service. Legislation or police instructions also exist in some jurisdictions forbidding questioning of the intellectually disabled or other potentially vulnerable persons (including children and Aborigines) in the absence of an independent third person. These were applied in R v Warrell516 to exclude (on grounds of unfairness) a confession obtained in their breach. 8.153 The presence of a third person at an interrogation serves two purposes. First, it provides protection against police impropriety by ensuring independent testimony [page 1015] of what has occurred at the interrogation; secondly, it gives disadvantaged persons access to advice from an independent and responsible person before answering police questions. Given that a third person is not ordinarily demanded and that independent evidence can now be provided electronically, arguably it is the latter objective that is of paramount importance. This being so, it is of the utmost importance that any ‘friend’ is able to fulfil that role and is not disqualified through personal animosity (to or from the suspect) or self-interest, and courts show a willingness to exclude confessions obtained in the presence of ‘friends’ who are so disqualified.517 8.154 Apart from these formal guides for the investigation of offences, courts refer to more abstract notions. That the common law public policy discretion extends beyond illegality to impropriety is recognised in Ridgeway v R,518 where it is said that the misconduct must be ‘clearly inconsistent with minimum standards of acceptable police conduct in all the circumstances’. Any questioning should be conducted with propriety. Although the Judges’ Rules suggest that an accused should not be cross-examined by police during interrogation nor have alleged statements by accomplices put to them, these practices are not regarded as improper per se in Australia519 — but it is improper to confront an accused deliberately with a

victim during police interrogation,520 and improper to mislead a suspect and thus induce a confession.521 A suspect may be misled [page 1016] by a deliberate lie or an unintentional ambiguity. Thus, failure to disclose the reason why questions are being asked may be improper in particular circumstances.522 8.155 Some of these notions of propriety during questioning are within s 138(2) of the Uniform Acts, which makes improper acts or omissions ‘likely to impair substantially the ability of the person being questioned to respond rationally to the questioning’, as well as the making of false statements ‘likely to cause’ an admission. The secrecy of a recording will not itself constitute an impropriety at common law but police should not use such an occasion as a substitute for a formal interrogation by actively eliciting incriminating information while a conversation is being secretly recorded by plain clothes or undercover officers (or persons acting as their ‘agents’).523 [page 1017] Where the recording is sanctioned by a warrant (as in Em) it is important that the suspect’s free will is not overborne, and they understand that there is no compulsion to speak. By the same token, formal procedures, committal proceedings for example, should not be abused by questioning witnesses to obtain admissions concerning other offences that may have been committed.524 Whether the use of agents provocateurs constitutes impropriety is a matter of degree. Mere infiltration of a criminal scheme for the purpose of obtaining evidence, including confessions, is not regarded by the courts as improper (just as mere eavesdropping is not considered improper). Similarly, recording ‘pretext’ telephone calls by sexual assault complainants asking why alleged perpetrators assaulted them may produce admissible confessions.525 Even the creation of artificial scenarios involving no unlawfulness beyond deception where suspects are

encouraged to make confessions to undercover police officers is acceptable following Tofilau v R.526 However, where police deliberately and actively procure offences, Ridgeway v R appears to require grave and entrenched misconduct before courts will be prepared to exclude evidence of the offence so procured,527 and where police deliberately and actively participate [page 1018] in the commission of the offence or associated offences themselves, the illegality may lead to exclusion on grounds of public policy.528

Excluding for impropriety 8.156 Whether impropriety resulting from the breach of formal procedures or from disregard of more abstract notions will result in the exclusion of any confession so obtained is a matter within the discretion of the court. At common law, the onus is on the accused to persuade the court to exercise this discretion but under the uniform legislation the onus is reversed once it is shown the evidence was obtained improperly. Although, as explained at 8.140, courts often fail to undertake any express weighing of interests when they are able to conceptualise the impropriety in terms of fairness to the accused, following Swaffield v R; Pavic v R,529 in every case of impropriety such a balance should be struck. Moreover, as accused rely upon the reverse onus of the uniform legislation this weighing process may be rendered more transparent. At common law, the impropriety and the need to disapprove of it, must be weighed against the interests of justice; the desirability of convicting a guilty accused. Some general guidance for this weighing process can be found in Bunning v Cross.530 Where the impropriety is deliberate and committed with a view to cutting short procedures designed to protect a suspect, and in that sense operating unfairly against the accused in question, reliable evidence may be excluded.531 On the other hand, where police or other persons in authority have acted in a bona fide fashion according to a reasonable view of their situation and the impropriety is unintentional and technical in the sense that it has had little impact

on the accused in question, it is unlikely that reliable evidence will be excluded.532 Where procedures are designed to [page 1019] protect generally suspects in a vulnerable situation, for example, children and tribal or semi-tribal Aborigines, any breach of procedure will entail serious consideration of the exclusionary discretion.533 And in every case the seriousness of the offence is a crucial consideration.534 But this can cut both ways, with Miles J holding in McKellar v Smith535 that confessions obtained from children charged with minor offences should be excluded more or less as a matter of course if obtained in breach of legislative procedures. 8.157 As is apparent from the above discussion, there is a trend towards embodying investigatory procedures in legislation. The intent is to strike an appropriate balance between the power of the police and the rights of the suspect. The legislation seeks to stipulate how far the police can take their investigation without unduly impinging upon the right of citizens to privacy. The ultimate justification for the existence of legislation is to prevent the police from going too far; that is, to protect the rights of citizens generally, and suspects in particular, from unreasonable police intrusion into their lives. In this context it becomes increasingly difficult for courts to ignore breaches of statutory procedures in exercising their residual discretion to exclude. Where a breach of procedure causes some unfairness to the particular suspect, courts have always shown some willingness to intervene. Now that the procedures are embodied in legislation designed to protect the public generally, even where there is no unfairness to the particular suspect, courts are obliged to look very carefully at the situation before being seen to condone the statutory illegality by admitting evidence. Some judges recognise this.536 Ultimately, though, there remains a balance to be struck on the facts of the individual case. 8.158 Where an accused has lost statutory protections through the impropriety of a person not in authority, there may be less reason to exclude evidence: Police [page 1020]

v Jervis; Police v Holland.537 But if, as the majority stresses in Swaffield v R; Pavic v R,538 considerations of fairness to the accused seek to protect the accused’s rights and privileges generally, one might argue that in an appropriate case a conviction would be bought at too high a price where these have been lost through no action by the law enforcement authorities. Although following establishment of impropriety the onus is reversed under the uniform legislation, those factors elucidated in Bunning v Cross remain influential in determining whether the public interest will be advanced by admitting the improperly obtained evidence (see, for example, the reference to Bunning v Cross by Miles CJ in R v Truong539 in admitting an unlawfully recorded confession under s 138 of the Uniform Acts).

Appeals 8.159 Where a trial judge refuses to exercise the exclusionary discretion it is difficult for an accused to appeal successfully. Appellate courts are reluctant to interfere with decisions of fact. A finding of voluntariness will be difficult to disturb on appeal. An exercise of the residuary discretion will be even more difficult. Unless a discretion is exercised upon a wrong basis or a judge has failed to take into account a relevant consideration, appellate courts will generally not interfere.540 This approach, based upon the decision in House v R,541 continues to apply to appeals (interlocutory, and in New South Wales, but not Victoria, final) based upon ss 137 and 138 even though these sections are not expressed in terms of exercise of a discretion.542 As a consequence, the appellate courts’ influence on the exercise of the residual discretion is substantially mitigated.

Determining the reception of confessions: the voir dire 8.160 The onus of establishing that a confession is voluntary lies, as stated already, upon the prosecution in every case. This voluntariness must be established on the balance of probabilities. Yet it is up to the accused to persuade the court to exercise its residuary discretion.543 [page 1021] Under the Uniform Acts, the distribution of the burdens is similar but a little

more complicated. Section 84 requires the prosecution to establish that an admission was not obtained by violent, oppressive, inhuman or degrading conduct, but only where the admissionalist ‘has raised in the proceeding an issue about whether the admission or its making were so influenced’. It seems there must be a ‘real issue’ capable of being raised on the evidence (compare with an evidential burden), but it is of no significance which party’s evidence raises the issue.544 Under s 85, once an accused can establish that the admission was made in the presence of an investigating official performing functions relating to the commission of a crime or the result of the act of a person capable of influencing the decision to prosecute, then the prosecution must establish that it was made in circumstances ‘such as to make it unlikely that the truth of the admission was adversely affected’. Where the unfairness discretion of s 90 is invoked, the accused must persuade the court to exercise it, but where exclusion is sought on grounds of impropriety or illegality under s 138, once the accused has established that the evidence was obtained as a result of impropriety or illegality, then the prosecution must persuade the court that reasons of policy favour the admission of the evidence.545 In each case, where a party bears a persuasive burden the standard is that of the balance of probabilities: s 142(1). 8.161 The admissibility of a confession is established on the voir dire in the absence of the jury, if there is one.546 Where the accused is represented, counsel will apply for a voir dire hearing. Once a real question of admissibility arises then a voir dire must be held.547 When the accused is unrepresented there is a duty placed upon the trial judge to ensure that once a real question of admissibility arises it is dealt with on the voir dire, and, if necessary, conducted by the judge.548 [page 1022] The question of the admissibility of a confession must be distinguished from the question of whether a confession has been made. The latter is a jury question.549 Where, however, an accused puts both matters in issue, a voir dire must be held as a preliminary inquiry before leaving to the jury the question of whether any confession was made.550 Once the jury decides that a confession has been made it must then determine its reliability.

8.162 At common law, if voluntariness is in issue, the Crown must begin calling evidence at the voir dire, whether or not issues also arise under the residuary discretion. If only the discretion is in issue then the accused technically should begin, but this may not be insisted upon by the Crown. Under the uniform legislation, the accused is obliged to establish preconditions (ss 85, 138) and under s 90 it may be that technically the accused should begin (unless there is already evidence of these preconditions before the court: R v GH).551 The voir dire procedure is a formal trial within a trial. Each party has the right to call witnesses552 and the rules of evidence apply in the same way as in the main trial.553 The failure of the accused to testify may count against an accused once there is prima facie evidence that the confession is voluntary.554 8.163 One issue which has perplexed common law courts is whether, if the accused chooses to testify upon the voir dire, he or she may be asked directly whether the alleged confession is true. Related to this are the questions of whether the accused is obliged to answer and whether the answer is subsequently admissible at the main trial. If positive answers are given to all of these questions then the accused’s rights to dispute the admissibility of a confession and to choose whether to testify at trial are significantly undermined. The uniform legislation therefore provides in s 189(3) that the prosecution cannot ask whether the alleged admission is true or not unless the issue has been introduced by the defendant.555 [page 1023] Ultimately, whether the question can be asked must depend upon the relevance of the truth of the confession to the issues to be decided by the court on the voir dire. At common law, these issues are voluntariness and the exercise of the discretion, on the grounds of unfairness or public policy. If voluntariness is understood in the sense of the right to choose freely whether to speak or remain silent, the truth of any subsequent confession is apparently of no significance. The Privy Council in Wong Kam-ming v R556 has held that the question cannot be asked where voluntariness is in issue. But it is not impossible to envisage situations where truth may be relevant to voluntariness. For example, if the accused alleges having been made to falsely confess as a result of improper pressure during interrogation, the truth or falsity of the confession assumes critical importance in determining the credibility of the accused’s allegations.557 Other

situations can be envisaged, and it seems the better view is that there should be no blanket prohibition against such a question where voluntariness is in issue. But the question cannot be asked as a matter of course (which is the practice against which the decision in Wong Kam-ming appears to have been directed), and a basis of relevance must be established for such a question.558 Where at common law the discretion is in issue, which was not the case in Wong Kam-ming, the question of truth or falsity of the confession may have direct relevance. If, for example, it is argued that the confession was made while the accused was incapacitated and is too unreliable to be admitted, then its truth or falsity assumes crucial importance.559 In other cases concerning exercise of the discretion, truth or falsity is not so obviously relevant. It is arguable that in the public policy balance it is relevant in every case to weigh the truth or falsity of the evidence,560 but the better view is that this balance is a hypothetical exercise; that is, assuming that the evidence is reliable, one must ask whether it should nevertheless be excluded on grounds of unfairness or public policy.561 Although Wong Kam-ming is binding authority against the relevance of the question to the issue of voluntariness, Gibbs CJ and Wilson J expressly left the point open in MacPherson v R562 in the light of earlier contrary High Court authority.563 At least Wong [page 1024] Kam-ming should be confined to voluntariness and courts may admit the question on grounds of relevance where exercise of the discretion is concerned.564 Under the uniform legislation, the truth of an admission assumes importance under s 85, but s 189(3) provides that this issue cannot be pursued by the prosecution on the voir dire unless first raised by the defendant. 8.164 Whether the accused can refuse to answer such a question upon the grounds of self-incrimination is doubtful, for an accused who chooses to testify on oath is obliged to answer questions notwithstanding that the answers may tend to incriminate that accused in the crime charged.565 However, under the Uniform Acts, the effect of s 189(6) is to preserve on the voir dire the accused’s privilege against self-incrimination under s 128. 8.165 Whether the answer to such a question should be admitted against the

accused at the subsequent trial is another matter. The House of Lords in R v Brophy566 was strongly of the view that the privilege of the accused not to testify at the trial should not be undermined by seeking to have admitted evidence given by the accused at the voir dire in exercise of the right to contest the admissibility of evidence. Thus, in a case where a voir dire inquiry led to the exclusion of a confession on the grounds that it had been unfairly obtained, admissions on the voir dire were held to have been improperly tendered by the prosecution at the trial. The accused had chosen not to testify at the trial. The exclusion of such admissions was held by the House of Lords to be mandatory and not within the discretion of the court. On the rationale given by their Lordships, the same position should apply even where the confession has been admitted following voir dire inquiry. Again, the privilege of the accused not to testify at trial would be undermined by admitting evidence given on oath at the voir dire in rightful contest of the admissibility of evidence. But if the accused does choose to testify at the trial the rationale disappears, and it is arguable that statements made at the voir dire may be put to the accused as previous inconsistent statements. On the other hand, if the confession has been excluded on the voir dire this ruling would be undermined by permitting the accused’s voir dire admissions to be revealed, even in cross-examination. In Wong Kam-ming v R, the Privy Council favours this approach.567 [page 1025] The Uniform Acts also appear to accept this approach, s 189(8) providing that evidence given on the voir dire in the absence of a jury568 is not to be adduced unless ‘(a) it is inconsistent with other evidence given by the witness in the proceeding; or (b) the witness has died’. Once the inconsistent statement is admissible to discredit the accused there seems no reason why it cannot then be used as hearsay (as ‘first-hand hearsay’ under s 81: see s 60(3) Note). 8.166 Once a confession is admitted, the jury’s only task is to decide whether it, together with any other evidence, constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. In so deciding the jury will have to determine whether or not to accept any tendered confession as having been made and, if it was made, whether to accept it as reliable.569 The circumstances in which the confession was obtained will be relevant to this question, and as a result witnesses who have

testified on the voir dire may be called again at the trial. In appropriate circumstances their previous inconsistent statements made at the voir dire may be put to them in cross-examination and proved if denied. It is important that the trial judge does not during trial suggest to the jury that any onus lies upon the accused to prove improprieties alleged against the police, or otherwise suggest that the accused bears any burden in relation to the circumstances of the alleged confession and its unreliability.570 8.167 Where a written confession has been made or adopted by an accused it is technically admissible as documentary evidence. However, the High Court is sceptical of admitting such documents where they have not been written or signed by the accused and it is alleged that the document was orally acknowledged by the accused. There is too much opportunity for abuse in the admission of such documents, and as a general rule they will be excluded in exercise of the residuary discretion.571 This does not, however, prohibit the police from testifying to any oral confession allegedly made by the suspect. The discretion merely extends to prevent any unsigned document being tendered as a confession. This discretion has been elevated to the status of an exclusionary rule by s 86 of the uniform legislation.572 [page 1026] 8.168 Where the only testimony of a confession allegedly made while an accused was in police custody comes from the police, McKinney and Judge v R insists that the jury be warned of the risks in acting upon such uncorroborated testimony.573 Similar warning must be given under s 165(1)(f) of the Uniform Acts if requested by a party. The intent is to encourage police to provide independent evidence of alleged confessions, and thereby avoid dispute about exactly what was said by an accused while in police custody and the circumstances in which the statement was made. In a number of jurisdictions as a matter of prudence police began electronically recording formal interviews,574 and now legislation exists in every Australian jurisdiction demanding the electronic recording of interviews with persons suspected of serious offences before confessional evidence contained in them can be tendered.575 Where recording is impractical, most legislation requires a written record be taken and put to the suspect and electronically recorded when facilities are

available. And in most jurisdictions the confession may yet be admissible, with appropriate direction, in the absence of recording where this is in the interests of justice.576 Most jurisdictions [page 1027] also make provision for other evidence of confessions and admissions where there are reasonable excuses for not recording.577 The shortcomings of the legislation are that it generally applies only when the suspect is in custody or is reasonably suspected of an offence,578 and it is difficult to interpret as requiring the recording of every conversation with the suspect during the investigative process; so disputes may continue about what is alleged to have occurred during unrecorded conversations.579 In addition, because of the potentially devastating effect of videotaped evidence, courts must be on the lookout to ensure that the interrogation was fairly conducted and that the tape does not contain prejudicial comments or innuendos by interrogators.580

Statutory Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule Introduction 8.169 While the task of explaining the principal statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule has been lessened by the extent to which the uniform legislation has been enacted, with only Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia outside the scheme, the task remains technical and, in a work attempting to keep principle at the forefront, an exhaustive technical analysis would be inappropriate. But the areas in which such legislation operates and the principles upon which it is based can be explained. Until the uniform legislation, no parliament had sought to approach hearsay in any fundamental way, rather creating piecemeal exceptions to the common law prohibition. These generally apply in addition to, and not to the exclusion of, the common law.581 Nevertheless, the inevitable result of permitting the tender of [page 1028]

more hearsay has been the undermining of the common law emphasis upon oral testimony. For example, the reception of prior written statements of a witness under statutory exception impacts upon the common law procedure for examining and cross-examining witnesses. Some legislation pays insufficient regard to the necessary effect the admission of more hearsay has upon fundamental common law procedural assumptions and their role in determining the probative value of testimony. But the Uniform Acts take a more principled approach. They do not just graft exceptions upon common law rules. Their approach is to codify the exclusionary rules of evidence by reference to fundamental common law procedural principles. This can be seen most clearly in their approach to hearsay. They take the initiative by defining the hearsay prohibition (s 59); the following exceptions are exceptions to that prohibition, and, where appropriate, these exceptions explain their relationship to the other evidential rules and procedures (for example, ss 64 and 66 provide that the prior statement of an available witness is admissible in exception to the hearsay rule but is not to be tendered before the witness has been examined in-chief). 8.170 Where legislation exceptionally admits hearsay it essentially does so on grounds of reliability and necessity. But, particularly in civil cases, these notions are influenced by the use citizens generally make of hearsay information. ‘Necessity’ is a practical necessity, ensuring that courts act upon that information which citizens generally act upon, most particularly in their commercial and business affairs. In civil disputes, after all, the settlement sought from the court is a reasonable settlement, one based on a reasonable search for truth. If parties are willing to accept the general use of hearsay information in their daily affairs there is strong reason for parliaments and courts to do the same.582 The same justification is not present in criminal cases. The presumption of innocence and its requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that courts act only upon the most reliable information. Consequently, much legislation distinguishes between civil and criminal cases where it does exceptionally admit hearsay. It is society’s reliance upon the written word and other means of preserving information that has produced the greatest pressure for piecemeal hearsay exceptions. For example, in a commercial case where the financial state of a business is in dispute, what better evidence of that state could there be than the company’s accounts certified by the company’s accountant? But at common law the accounts, based upon the books, based upon information supplied by diverse

employees, are hearsay, as is the testimony of the accountant based upon them. This situation led Dixon J in Potts v Miller to create (or at least condone) a common law exception to the rule:583 [page 1029] Little English authority will be found explaining the grounds upon which the books of account kept according to an established system in organized business are receivable in evidence as proof, not of the occurrence of some particular fact recorded or indicated by a specific entry or narration, but of the financial progress or result of business operations conducted on a large scale. Common sense has prevailed and such materials are used in practice without objection.

But this problem is merely illustrative of many situations where commercial practicalities demand the reception of written hearsay statements. Other judges proved more timorous than Dixon J, until ultimately the House of Lords in Myers v DPP declared that the common law could evolve no further and invited the legislature to intervene.584 The interventions that have been made by other than the Uniform Acts principally deal with the problems created by written and other recorded hearsay. Until the Uniform Acts, which exceptionally admit both oral and recorded hearsay, the only legislation (now repealed) that affected the reception of oral hearsay was that extending the common law exceptions admitting dying declarations585 and statements made contemporaneously with events.586 8.171 Despite the pressures of practical convenience, the notion of reliability plays a leading role in the statutory reception of hearsay. The problem is that there are many reasons for unreliability, and many ways in which legislation may overcome it. Hearsay may be unreliable because the observations have been reported only indirectly to the witness who testifies or to the maker of a record that is tendered, or the very observations may be unreliable because of the circumstances of the observation or the doubtful credibility of the eyewitness. The problem of indirect report can be eliminated by permitting the receipt of first-hand hearsay only; that is, by insisting that the report by the observer be made directly to the testifying witness or that the tendered record be made by the observer. This limit is central to the approach taken by the uniform legislation. The problems of inaccurate recording and observation can be overcome in various ways. For example, it can be insisted that the maker of a record or the witness to the observations, or both, be called to testify to enable cross-

examination upon possible unreliabilities. But if these witnesses can be called, why tender the record? It is where witnesses are unavailable that tender of hearsay is most required. Where witnesses [page 1030] are unavailable, reliability can be ensured by requiring circumstances which guarantee the reliability of the observation and its recording. Observations and recordings made in pursuance of a duty or in the course of an undertaking or business (one which can only operate effectively where observations are reliably made and recorded) are the most common guarantees of sufficient reliability to be found in statutory exceptions. Other techniques provide that notice be given to opponents where a party intends to tender hearsay (thereby giving the opponent the opportunity to investigate the reliability of such evidence) and, where observers and recorders are not available, permit opponents to call evidence relevant to their credit. The uniform legislation utilises all of these techniques. 8.172 These techniques for ensuring reliability can operate in various permutations and in various forms. Prior to the uniform legislation, each jurisdiction had its own separate legislation, substantially based upon the (now repealed) Evidence Act 1938 (UK) and the Criminal Evidence Act 1965 (UK) (passed to remedy the decision in Myers v DPP).587 These Acts remain the basis of legislation in jurisdictions outside the uniform scheme, although only in South Australia is the original drafting retained. In Western Australia, it might be argued that the English approach has been extended beyond recognition, and although recognisable in Queensland it is supplemented by separate less technical provisions. In South Australia even more innovative and far-reaching supplementary provisions have been enacted. The following discussion first explains the current position in the non-uniform jurisdictions. It begins by explaining that legislation derived from the Evidence Act 1938 (UK) and the Criminal Evidence Act 1965 (UK), before turning to other provisions admitting statements in criminal cases, the more radical provisions admitting documents in South Australia, information generated by machines and computers, and finally, some more significant residuary provisions, for example, those relating to the reception of banker’s books and other financial records.

As mentioned, the Uniform Acts take a more comprehensive approach. Most significantly they extend beyond documentary hearsay to oral hearsay. But they are also intended as a comprehensive hearsay package. Although aspects of the package have equivalents in other hearsay legislation, the whole package is separately considered in a final section.

The English approach and its variations Legislation based on the Evidence Act 1938 (UK) 8.173 The form of the Evidence Act 1938 (UK) remains substantially preserved only in South Australia.588 It applies only in civil proceedings. It admits statements (which [page 1031] would be admissible statements if given orally to the court)589 made in documents590 where the maker of the statement is called to testify and either: (a)

had personal knowledge of the matters dealt with by the statement; or

(b) where the document in question is or forms part of a record purporting to be a continuous record, made the statement (in so far as the matters dealt with thereby are not within his personal knowledge) in the performance of a duty to record information supplied to him by a person who had, or might reasonably be supposed to have, personal knowledge of those matters.

The condition that the maker be called591 can be dispensed with if the maker is unavailable,592 or if an unreasonable expense or delay would result from insisting upon attendance. The document must be authenticated as written, signed, initialled or otherwise recognised in writing by the maker, although:593 For the purpose of deciding whether or not a statement is admissible … the court may draw any reasonable inference from the form or contents of the document …

The original document must be produced unless unreasonable expense or delay would result, in which case a copy, authorised by court order, can be tendered. No ‘statement made by a person interested at a time when proceedings were pending or anticipated involving a dispute as to any fact which the statement might tend to establish’ may be admitted under this exception. ‘Document’ is defined to include ‘books, maps, plans, drawings and photographs’.

‘Statement’ includes ‘any representation of fact, whether made in words or otherwise’. Various discretions are given to the court to exclude statements admissible under the sections, and give the court latitude to decide what weight to give to admissible statements. Thus, the legislation extends generally to first-hand hearsay, and in particular cases to second-hand hearsay, contained in documents authenticated by writing. Further, it [page 1032] permits the tender of statements in such documents where the maker is also called as a witness, thereby tending to undermine common law rules generally prohibiting the tender of prior statements. After some reluctance, the courts have recognised that the legislation must apply notwithstanding these common law rules.594 8.174 The legislation gives rise to many technical difficulties. It applies to ‘statements’ in ‘documents’. The definition of document has not caught up with the electronic age. Statements are more widely defined as including any representation of facts whether in words or otherwise. But requests and recommendations can only with difficulty be regarded as representations of fact,595 and the definition does not expressly extend to statements of opinion.596 Second-hand hearsay is admitted only upon proof of a ‘continuous record’597 made from information supplied to the maker.598 All documents containing statements must be authenticated by the maker in writing.599 The original must be produced unless expense or delay would be caused. Non-production through [page 1033] loss (or privilege) of the original does not permit tender of a copy.600 Interest in pending or anticipated proceedings concerning stated facts precludes admission, but the precise nature and degree of the interest is not explained,601 nor is it entirely clear to which persons this interest disqualification applies.602 A number of these problems are addressed by the form of the legislation in

Queensland and Western Australia. While in South Australia the legislature is prepared to live with these problems because supplementary provisions exist for the reception of documentary hearsay, in these other jurisdictions the English approach remains the principal vehicle for the reception of recorded hearsay and has therefore been redrafted. 8.175 In Queensland, the exception, limited to civil proceedings, is contained in ss 92, 94 and 96–103 of the Evidence Act 1977. The alterations to the original legislation are extensive. Again, ‘document’ is extensively defined in s 3 (Sch 3) and includes ‘any other record of information whatever’. ‘Statement’ is defined to include ‘any representation of fact, whether made in words or otherwise and whether made by a person or computer or otherwise’. A statement in a document is ‘made’ by a person if ‘written, made, dictated or otherwise produced by him’, ‘recorded with his knowledge’, ‘recorded in the course of a proceeding’ or ‘recognised by him … in writing’: s 92(4). 8.176 Authentication of the document or its copy can be established ‘in such manner as the court may approve’. The wide definitions cause an overlap between these general hearsay provisions and s 95, which specifically provides for the admission of computer-generated statements. Opinions in statements are not specifically covered, but it has consistently been held in Queensland that the exception extends to such opinions if they would be admissible if tendered orally.603 The requirement for a continuous record in the case of second-hand hearsay is replaced in s 92(1) with the requirement that ‘the document is or forms part of a record relating to any undertaking and made [page 1034] in the course of that undertaking’.604 It is enough that information is supplied to the maker ‘directly or indirectly’, thereby overcoming the decision in Barkway v South Wales Transport Co Ltd.605 But these words would appear to have the additional effect of letting in hearsay further removed than second-hand, as long as the statement made in the document can be traced back to a supplier with personal knowledge. As in the original English legislation, first-hand hearsay is admissible only if the maker of the statement is called, unless unavailable or otherwise excused. But in the case of second-hand hearsay (or beyond), it is made clear that the person who

must be called, unless excused, is the person who supplied the information to the maker of the statement in the document. Although this may have been the intent of the original English legislation it was not effected by the words used. These witnesses can be excused where unavailable, where undue expense or delay would be caused, where no opponent wishes to cross-examine, or where it cannot be reasonably supposed the witness would recall the matters dealt with in the statement. Where such witnesses are not called, an opponent may call other evidence relevant to determining their credit: s 94. Section 98 enacts a discretion to reject a statement otherwise admissible if inexpedient in the interests of justice and otherwise failure to call a witness may be taken into account in determining the weight of the evidence.606 8.177 Finally, recognising that the effect of these provisions may be to admit the prior statements of a witness, s 101 provides generally that, in those common law situations where a witness’s prior statements become admissible (as to credit), those statements are also admissible to establish facts asserted in them. Section 101 extends to criminal proceedings. The Queensland legislation is a genuine attempt to coherently formulate the principles lying behind the Evidence Act 1938 (UK) and to avoid technicality in their application. It concentrates upon the possible unreliability of the information by insisting that either the maker of the statement or the supplier of the information be called to testify, and in their absence admits evidence relevant to their credit. In the case of second-hand hearsay, it is arguable that both maker and supplier should be called or have their credibility assessed in this way, but no Australian legislation provides for this. 8.178 A far-reaching, but simple, revamp of the English approach exists in Western Australia pursuant to ss 79B, 79C, 79D and 79E of the Evidence Act 1906. Unlike the legislation in South Australia and Queensland discussed above, these provisions have [page 1035] been extended to apply in both civil and criminal proceedings. In criminal proceedings, important limitations apply. Section 79C(4) exempts statements in documents made during the investigative process and for the preparation of court proceedings (to avoid self-serving evidence); statements may be excluded if

prejudicial or misleading to any jury (s 79C(6); and statements in documents cannot be used to corroborate the testimony of the eyewitness from whom the documentary statement derives (s 79D(2)). ‘Document’ is defined widely to embrace most conceivable modes of electronic recording of information (including sounds and images) in the modern age, while ‘statement’ is defined to ‘include any representation of fact or opinion whether made in words or otherwise’: s 79B. As in the English Act, the Western Australian Act begins by making admissible first-hand hearsay statements in documents, always upon the condition that the makers of the statements are also called as witnesses unless they are unavailable, cannot be expected to recall the matters, or refuse to testify. But the second limb, subject to the same condition, makes admissible not only second-hand hearsay statements in documents but ‘any-hand’ hearsay statements in documents; it is enough that the document ‘directly or indirectly reproduces or is derived607 from … information in one or more statements each made by [a person with personal knowledge]’: s 79C(1). 8.179 There is no requirement for some guarantee of the reliability of the statement in the document; for example, that it be a continuous record or a business record.608 The question of reliability is principally relevant in determining the weight to be given to the evidence (s 79D) but may also be grounds for the exercise of the discretionary exclusion, on the basis that the probative value is outweighed by considerations of time and cost, or possible prejudice or confusion (s 79C(6)). But, in addition, the opponent is entitled to adduce evidence relevant to the credibility of the person from whose observations the statement in the document derives: s 79E. There is no requirement that there be written authentication of the document.

Legislation derived from the Criminal Evidence Act 1965 (UK) 8.180 As mentioned above, the Western Australian Evidence Act deals together with the reception of documentary hearsay in civil and criminal proceedings. The Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), on the other hand, contains a provision similar to that found in the Criminal Evidence Act 1965 (UK). Section 93 of the Queensland Act provides:609 [page 1036]

(1) In any criminal proceedings where direct oral evidence of a fact would be admissible, any statement contained in a document and tending to establish that fact shall, subject to this part, be admissible as evidence of that fact if: (a)

the document is or forms part of a record relating to any trade or business and made in the course of that trade or business from information supplied (whether directly or indirectly) by persons who had, or may be reasonably supposed to have had, personal knowledge of the matters dealt with in the information they supplied; and

(b) the person who supplied the information recorded in the statement in question — (i)

is dead, or unfit by reason of his bodily or mental condition to attend as a witness;

(ii) is out of the State and it is not reasonably practicable to secure his attendance; (iii) cannot with reasonable diligence be found or identified; or (iv) cannot reasonably be supposed (having regard to the time which has lapsed since he supplied the information and to all the circumstances) to have any recollection of the matters dealt with in the information he supplied.

Section 94 provides that, in cases where witnesses are unavailable, evidence may be called relevant to their credit; and copies are admissible under s 97.

Other legislation admitting hearsay evidence in criminal cases 8.181 In Queensland, there are three other provisions which affect the exception of hearsay evidence in criminal cases. By s 93A, documents containing statements made by children and the intellectually impaired closer to the events are admitted provided they have personal knowledge of the facts asserted and provided they are called to testify if any party so requires. This provision is designed to make admissible statements made to investigators to overcome the difficulties such witnesses have in testifying reliably at a trial often held long after the events observed occurred. In addition, it may protect such witnesses from difficulties they may have in testifying at trial, although much more extensive provisions now exist to ameliorate these difficulties: see Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) Pt 2 Divs 4, 4A. Provisions also exist in other jurisdictions to admit out-of-court statements by children, victims of sexual assaults and vulnerable witnesses. These are discussed at 7.33–7.34. By s 93B, in prescribed criminal proceedings, where a person with personal knowledge of an asserted fact makes a representation about the fact and is unavailable to testify because the person is dead or mentally or physically

incapable of testifying, then a person who heard or otherwise perceived the representation may testify to it, provided it was either: (a)

made when or shortly after the asserted fact happened and in circumstances making it unlikely the representation is fabricated; or

[page 1037] (b) made in circumstances that make it highly probable the representation is reliable; or (c) at the time it was made, against the interests of the person who made it.

This potentially broad provision appears modelled on s 65 of the Uniform Acts: discussed at 8.197. Like s 65, it extends only to permit first-hand oral hearsay.610 However, unlike s 65, it is not clear whether it extends to statements against penal interest: cf discussion at 8.79. In addition, s 93C provides that on request and in the absence of good reasons, any jury must be warned that such evidence may be unreliable, the reasons for that unreliability and the need for caution in acting upon it. Furthermore, statements admitted under s 93A or s 93B may be excluded under s 98 (if ‘for any reason it appears to [the court] to be inexpedient in the interests of justice that the statement should be admitted’) and s 130 (the court may exclude evidence ‘if the court is satisfied that it would be unfair to the person charged to admit that evidence’).611 The South Australian Evidence Act 1929 contains a provision, s 34KA,612 perhaps analogous to s 93B, applying in prescribed criminal proceedings where the maker is unavailable, applying to oral and documentary out-of-court statements which would have been otherwise admissible if able to be testified to by the maker, but without demanding any conditions from which their reliability might be inferred, and extending unavailability, with the leave of the court having regard to the interests of justice, to where the maker, who must be identified, is through fear unwilling to testify. None of the conditions of unavailability can have been created by a party or a person acting on his or her behalf ‘in order to prevent the relevant person from giving oral evidence’. Evidence relevant to the credibility of the maker may be tendered under s 34KB; s 34KC allows the judge to direct acquittal where the out-of-court statement is the only evidence; and s 34KD enacts an exclusionary discretion additional to any other residual discretions to exclude the court may have. As already mentioned in a number of contexts, s 101 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), which applies to both civil and criminal proceedings, provides generally that where a witness’s previous statement is admitted as relevant to the witness’s credit ‘that statement shall be admissible as evidence of any fact stated therein of which direct oral evidence by the person would be admissible’.

[page 1038]

Business records 8.182 Legislation specifically providing for the admission of business records continues to apply in South Australia (Evidence Act 1929 s 53, discussed at 8.184) and in jurisdictions party to the uniform scheme (s 69, discussed at 8.199). In Queensland, under s 92 (discussed above), in civil cases statements made as part of an ‘undertaking’ are admitted and ‘undertaking’ is defined in Sch 3 to include, amongst other things, any ‘business’, and s 93 (discussed above) applies to documents that are records of a ‘trade or business’. In Western Australia, as part of the extensive provisions discussed above, s 79C(2a) and (2b) of the Evidence Act 1906 make admissible statements in any document tending to establish an otherwise admissible fact or opinion where ‘the statement is, or directly or indirectly reproduces, or is derived from a [genuine] business record’, and the person with personal knowledge of the matters in the statement shall not be called unless the court orders otherwise. These exceptions apply in both civil and criminal proceedings.613

A more liberal approach to documents: South Australia 8.183 In South Australia, the legislation based on the Civil Evidence Act 1938 is now supplemented by legislation that takes a more radical and liberal approach to the reception of documentary hearsay. While the approaches so far discussed focus upon particular statements (or representations) of fact (or opinion) and seek to admit them on satisfaction of certain conditions, the more liberal approach seeks to admit documents of particular kinds and allow them to be used generally for the purpose of drawing any relevant inferences. This approach can be seen in ss 52 and 53 (formerly ss 45B and 45A) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA). The provisions apply to both civil and criminal proceedings. 8.184 Section 53 provides for the admissibility of business records in the following terms:

(1) An apparently genuine document purporting to be a business record — (a)

shall be admissible in evidence without further proof; and

(b) shall be evidence of any fact stated in the record, or any fact that may be inferred from the record (whether the inference arises wholly from the matter contained in the record, or from that matter in conjunction with other evidence).614

‘Business record’ is defined to mean ‘any book of account or other document prepared or used in the ordinary course of a business for the purpose of recording any matter [page 1039] relating to the business’ and ‘photographic, photostatic, lithographic or other like’ reproductions.615 ‘Business’ is defined as meaning ‘business, occupation, trade or calling and includes the business of any governmental or local governmental body or instrumentality’.616 8.185 Section 52 is even wider in its apparent scope: (1) An apparently genuine document purporting to contain a statement of fact, or written, graphical or pictorial matter in which a statement of fact is implicit, or from which a statement of fact may be inferred shall, subject to this section, be admissible in evidence.

But it extends only to permit statements to be inferred from the document; furthermore, subs (2) provides that the document is only admissible to prove such statements if the court is ‘satisfied that the person by whom, or at whose discretion, the document was prepared could, at the time of the preparation of the document, have deposed of his own knowledge to the statement’ (which presumably means ‘to the facts asserted in the statement’). So s 52 is intended to extend only to first-hand hearsay617 (although ‘maker’ is not defined and a liberal interpretation of ‘at whose direction’ allows the section effectively to embrace some second-hand hearsay).618 ‘Document’ is not defined except to include reproductions by ‘photographic, photostatic or lithographic or other like process’: s 52(6). 8.186 The breadth of these provisions is then controlled by a wide discretion given to the court (ss 52(3), 53(2)): [page 1040]

A document shall not be admitted in evidence under this section if the court is of the opinion — (a)

that the person by whom, or at whose direction, the document was prepared can and should be called by the party tendering the document to give evidence of the matters contained in the document;

(b) that the evidentiary weight of the document is slight and is outweighed by the prejudice that might result to any of the parties from the admission of the document in evidence; or (c) that it would be otherwise contrary to the interests of justice to admit the document in evidence.

The first aspect of the discretion preserves the primacy of oral testimony. The section is not intended to permit documentary testimony where a witness is available to be called.619 It also prevents the sections applying to the previous statements of a witness who is called. But it is also arguable that it indicates that parliament intended the section to extend only to first-hand hearsay, the provision envisaging in every case that the maker of the document is potentially able to give admissible oral testimony of asserted facts.620 But this would make the personal knowledge restriction upon s 52 unnecessary. It is suggested, and it has now been held,621 that a broader interpretation is possible and applies to extend s 53 beyond first-hand hearsay. 8.187 There are criticisms that can be levelled at the drafting of the section: documents are not clearly defined and statements of opinion are only covered if included within the notion of a statement of fact.622 Copies are admitted pursuant to s 57 (formerly s 45C), which generally abolishes the best evidence rule to permit the tender of ‘accurate’ copies. In their general approach the sections attempt to avoid technicality by admitting, without authentication,623 prima facie reliable information, namely first-hand hearsay and documents acted upon in business, subject to the court’s discretion in the circumstances of the particular case. By this means certainty and discretion are compromised. [page 1041]

Computer output 8.188 Machine-generated information is not necessarily caught by the hearsay prohibition: see 8.57–8.59. If it is not derived from the out-of-court statement of a human being — such as where telephone records or information about files stored on a computer are produced automatically — the only issue is one of

reliability; that is, authentication. Where the hearsay rule does operate, many of the provisions discussed above extend to information stored in or generated by computers. The simple definition of ‘document’ to include any record of information brings computers within the umbrella of the documentary hearsay legislation. Furthermore, in those jurisdictions retaining (more or less) the approach of the Civil Evidence Act 1938 (UK), the definition of ‘document’ is wide — in, for example, Western Australia (s 79B) and Queensland (s 5) — and clearly embraces information stored and reproduced in computers. Even where ‘document’ is narrowly defined it covers documents printed by computers. The limiting factor in this legislation is a requirement that the document be authenticated by a maker in writing. This requirement does not apply in Western Australia and Queensland. It is preserved in South Australia: s 34C. In light of all this, it can be argued that there is no need for further specific provisions dealing with computers other than provisions to provide a simple means for authenticating the reliability of the computing process.624 And this appears to be the position in all jurisdictions, including those within the uniform scheme, except Queensland. For example, s 146 of the uniform legislation, mirrored by s 56 of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA), simply provides that: (1) This section applies to a document or thing: (a) that is produced wholly or partly by a device or process; and (b) that is tendered by a party to proceedings who asserts that, in producing the document or thing, the device or process has produced a particular outcome. (2) If it is reasonably open to find that the device or process is one that, or is of a kind that, if properly used, ordinarily produces that outcome, it is presumed (unless evidence sufficient to raise doubt about the presumption is adduced) that, in producing the document or thing on the occasion in question, the device or process produced that outcome.

Section 147 provides a similar evidential presumption in the case of devices or processes used to produce documents which are or were when produced part of the records of, or kept for the purposes of, a business and the device was used for the purposes of the business. In Queensland, s 95 of the Evidence Act 1977, before stipulating a simplified process for authentication to which subs (1) is subject, provides: [page 1042] (1) In a proceeding where direct oral evidence of a fact would be admissible, a statement contained

in a document or thing produced wholly or partly by a device or process and tending to establish that fact is, subject to this part, admissible as evidence of that fact.

Thereby, assuming the device or process is authenticated, a statement contained in a document or thing produced by that device or process becomes admissible evidence of a fact, capable of proof by direct oral evidence, whatever the origin of the information upon which the relevant assertion in that statement is based. This relevant assertion is thereby admissible in exception to the hearsay rule.

Bankers’ books and other books of account 8.189 In jurisdictions in Australia,625 other than those governed by the Uniform Acts, provisions exist allowing ‘a copy of an entry in a banker’s book626 … as evidence627 of the entry, and of the matters, transactions and accounts recorded in the entry’.628 Despite doubts that existed about whether these provisions created an exception to the hearsay rule or were passed only to facilitate the production of copies, so that the original books must be otherwise admissible,629 any ambiguity has been removed by the provision that ‘the entry and the copy’ are evidence of the matters specified. The legislation in Queensland goes much further. It admits such entries and copies in the case of all books of account. The legislation (s 83) defines book of account to include: … any document used in the ordinary course of any undertaking to record the financial transactions of the undertaking or to record anything acquired or otherwise dealt with by, produced in, held for or on behalf of, or taken or lost from the undertaking and any particulars relating to any such thing.

Subject to authentication, by a ‘responsible person familiar with the books of account of the undertaking’ (s 85), this definition creates an extensive exception to the hearsay prohibition. These provisions apply to both civil and criminal proceedings, always subject in the latter to the tight control of the residuary discretion.630 [page 1043]

Transportation documents 8.190 In South Australia, provisions exist for the reception of various

transportation documents, to prove facts stated in and to be inferred from such documents, including the ownership of transported goods.631

The Uniform Legislation 8.191 It is not possible to deal exhaustively with the uniform provisions.632 Their principal ambit and scope are here described, although in other specific contexts their repercussions have already been more precisely noted (for example, in Chapter 7 in the discussion of the need to prove by admissible evidence the facts upon which expert opinions are based (7.69–7.70), the use of documents to refresh memory (7.83), and the tender of a witness’s prior statements (7.90, 7.93, 7.97–7.98, 7.102), and throughout this chapter, in the discussion of the ambit of the common law hearsay prohibition and its exceptions). Where the Uniform Acts apply, these provisions effectively constitute a code of the circumstances in which hearsay evidence will be admissible.633

The definition of hearsay 8.192 Two fundamental changes are made to the common law by the definition of hearsay contained in s 59. First, the rule applies not to statements but to representations,634 so that it seems no longer possible to argue that prohibited hearsay must take only a testimonial form.635 Secondly, the prohibition extends only to representations tendered ‘to prove the existence of a fact636 that it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert by the representation’. Assuming the evidence is relevant, the evidence is admissible ‘except as otherwise provided by this Act’: s 56(1). This would seem to place the burden on the party seeking to invoke an exclusionary provision.637 [page 1044] Like the common law, representations relevant independently of any assertions contained in them are not hearsay: see in particular 8.28–8.34. But, where the relevance does depend upon the truth of an asserted fact, whether that assertion of fact is prohibited now depends under s 59(1) upon whether it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert the existence of that fact in making

the representation. In formulating the hearsay prohibition, the ALRC expressly rejected a rule based upon a distinction between express and implied assertions in favour of one based upon intended or unintended assertions (the assumption being that the latter are likely to be more reliable). But the application of the rule turns upon an intention necessarily inferred from the circumstances in which the assertion was made, from which it can reasonably be supposed what the intention was of the person making the representation; a person who by definition will often not be before the court. Can a person who says ‘Hello X’ be reasonably supposed to have intended to assert the fact that X is present? Can the sea captain who boards the ship with his family be reasonably supposed to have intended to assert by that representation that the ship is seaworthy? How can we reasonably suppose, let alone actually know, that a person had such intentions? There is thus considerable scope for courts to impute intentions one way or the other in applying the hearsay prohibition. 8.193 As originally drafted, s 59(1) simply required the maker of the representation to have intended the assertion of the fact relied upon. But Spigelman CJ in R v Hannes638 interpreted this notion of intention broadly: It is arguable that the scope of the word ‘intended’ in s 59(1) goes beyond the specific fact subjectively adverted to by the author as being asserted by the words used. It may encompass any fact which is a necessary assumption underlying the fact that the assertor does subjectively advert to.

Thus, he appeared prepared to hold that a written list of reasons for and against one ‘Mark’ attending a meeting with the Australian Securities Commission contained an intentional implied assertion that a person of that name existed. By this logic, ‘Hello Mark’ contains an intentional implied assertion of Mark’s presence and is therefore hearsay — as it is at common law: Walton v R;639 and see 8.67. Confusion around the scope of ‘intention’ after Hannes led to the insertion of reasonable supposition in s 59(1); the focus being upon the surrounding circumstances in which the representation was made in deciding what it can reasonably be supposed a person intended to assert. The ALRC explained the reasoning behind this reform: The test proposed … is external to the maker of the representation. It proceeds on the basis that ‘intention may properly be inferred from the external and objective manifestations normally taken to signify intention’. Intent or state of mind is inferred from the conduct engaged in by a person. Investigation into the subjective mindset

[page 1045] of the representor is not required. A subjective approach requires the party opposing a finding that a fact was subjectively intended to be asserted to do battle with the intangible shadows of subjective intentions, to use Deane J’s metaphor. Proof of a subjective state of mind is very difficult, particularly if the maker of the representation is not called to give evidence.640

While an objective standard may appear more desirable than seeking a subjective intention, and addresses the approach suggested by Spigelman CJ in Hannes, the distinction is elusive as intention, whether objective or subjective, can only be inferred from surrounding circumstances. That these ‘circumstances’ can be widely defined to take into account all matters relevant to determining supposed intention is implicit in the approach taken by the High Court in considering ‘circumstances’ in determining likely reliability under s 65.641 The problems in determining whether it can be reasonably supposed that a person intended to assert something are somewhat mitigated by the existence of other provisions in the Uniform Acts; on the one hand, if a court is reluctant to reasonably suppose intention, the discretion to exclude may be exercised to prevent the reception of evidence which may be given undue weight (ss 135– 137), and if it is received, on request the jury must be warned against its possible unreliability (s 165); and on the other hand, if a court is prepared to reasonably suppose that implicit assumptions are intended and therefore hearsay, reception may yet be permitted under one of the many hearsay exceptions in the legislation. 8.194 A crucial provision which limits the ambit of the hearsay prohibition is s 60. Subsection (1) provides: The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation that is admitted because it is relevant for a purpose other than proof of an asserted fact.

That is, where a representation is relevant independently of the truth of any assertion in it and is admissible for that purpose, then once so admitted ‘the hearsay rule’ has no application to it.642 For example, if a representation is admitted as a prior inconsistent statement to discredit a witness it may also be used to establish the truth of the facts asserted in it.643 [page 1046] But s 60 does not permit hearsay use at large. It only lifts ‘the hearsay rule’.

That rule is defined by s 59, evidence of a representation that is tendered ‘to prove the existence of a fact that it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert by the representation’. In Lee v R, the High Court held that a person can only intend to assert the existence of facts he or she directly experiences, and that as a consequence ‘the hearsay rule’ contained in s 59 extends only to first-hand hearsay.644 The effect of s 60, which is to lift the application of s 59, is therefore that, where a representation is admissible for nonhearsay purposes it may also be used as first-hand s 59 hearsay. This logic is illustrated by the facts of Lee v R. A witness was called by the prosecution to testify that the accused had admitted the crime to him. When the witness did not come up to proof the prosecution was permitted (under s 38) to discredit him by calling a police officer to testify that the witness had in fact told him of the accused’s admission. Evidence of that prior inconsistent statement was clearly admissible to discredit the witness. It was not, however, admissible evidence of the accused’s admission because s 81 requires the witness to the admission to give evidence of it. But it was argued by the prosecution that s 60 applied to allow the evidence of what the witness had told the police officer, admitted to discredit the witness, to be also used as hearsay evidence of the accused’s commission of the crime. The High Court disagreed. The only fact the witness intended (within the terms of s 59) to assert in the representation made to the police officer was what the accused had spoken about to him.645 The witness did not intend (within the terms of s 59) to assert in that representation that the accused had in fact committed the crime, because he had no direct knowledge about this. As s 60 originally only lifted hearsay insofar as it falls within s 59, the evidence of the representation was admissible only to prove what the accused had spoken about to the witness (first-hand hearsay), not to prove the truth of what the accused intended to assert in those words (second-hand hearsay). Section 60 has since been amended. The result in Lee was preserved, but the High Court’s insistence on first-hand hearsay was overridden by supplementing s 60(1) with: (2) This section applies whether or not the person who made the representation had personal knowledge of the asserted fact … (3) However, this section does not apply in a criminal proceeding to evidence of an admission.

With the exception of admissions, s 60 now applies to previous representations that are not first-hand and removes them from the ambit of the hearsay rule.

[page 1047] Where s 60 operates to admit hearsay, direction may be required, or use may be limited under s 136, or the evidence may be excluded altogether under s 135 or s 137 if it is unfairly prejudicial.646

Exceptions to the prohibition 8.195 These are extensive and varied. Some pick up common law exceptions, others seek to create more principled exceptions to the prohibition. With the exception of assertions of intention admissible under s 66A, they only apply to admit the assertions of persons who are capable of giving rational replies to questions: s 61. The exceptions contained in Pt 3.2 Div 2 apply only to first-hand hearsay (s 62), whereas those contained in Div 3 have a wider ambit.

First-hand hearsay 8.196 The most far-reaching hearsay reform of the uniform legislation is to admit first-hand hearsay.647 In civil cases (ss 63 and 64) it becomes generally admissible, whether oral or documentary, although the legislation distinguishes between where the witness is unavailable (defined in Pt 2 cl 4 of the Dictionary648), and where the witness is available. In both cases the evidence is admissible subject to notice being given (ss 67 and 68) and in the former to the calling of evidence relating to the credibility of the unavailable witness (s 108A). Even where the witness is available, the evidence remains admissible ‘if it would cause undue expense or undue delay, or would not be reasonably practicable, to call the person who made the representation’.649 Where the witness is called, if the representation is in a document, that document must not be tendered, without leave, [page 1048] until after the witness has given testimony in-chief: s 64(4). Thus, the legislation seeks to relate the hearsay exception to the general procedures for the

presentation of testimony and is discussed in that context at 7.83. In every case, admissibility remains subject to discretionary exclusion and use: Pt 3.11. 8.197 In criminal cases, the reception of first-hand hearsay (oral or documentary)650 where the witness is unavailable is more strictly controlled: s 65. Notice is generally required: s 67. First-hand hearsay representations are admitted in three specified circumstances. First, s 65(2) admits hearsay representations ‘made in circumstances’ of reliability651 derivative of those where the common law admits hearsay (and consequently are discussed in the context of the common law exceptions). Hearsay representations are admitted if: (a)

‘made under a duty to make that representation or to make representations of that kind’: see discussion at 8.82–8.83; or

(b) ‘made when or shortly after the asserted fact occurred and in circumstances which make it unlikely that the representation is a fabrication’: 652 see discussion at 8.66–8.69; or [page 1049] (c) ‘made in circumstances that make it highly probable that the representation is reliable’;653 or (d) ‘was (i) against the interests of the person who made it at the time it was made; and (ii) made in circumstances that make it likely that the representation is reliable’:654 with s 65(7) providing that a statement against interest includes a statement tending to damage reputation, to show the commission of a criminal offence, or to show liability in an action for damages: see discussion at 8.75–8.81. Although s 65(2)(c) creates an open-ended extension, the court must be satisfied by the circumstances to a higher likely degree of the reliability of the representation before admitting it as hearsay.655 As for s 65(2)(b) and (d), the issue is whether the circumstances in which the representation is made objectively guarantee the representation’s reliability.656 Secondly, s 65(3)–(6) provides that if the representation was made in prior

proceedings and the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine on that occasion, then the representation is admissible in exception to the hearsay rule.657 Thirdly, s 65(8) provides that the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a prior representation adduced by a defendant.658 But the sting in the tail is that under s 65(9), once a defendant has adduced hearsay evidence ‘about a matter’ other parties are then also entitled to tender first-hand hearsay ‘about the matter’. There is obvious scope for disputing whether opposing hearsay relates to the same ‘matter’. 8.198 In criminal proceedings, where the witness is available (s 66) hearsay is admitted ‘if when the representation was made, the occurrence of the asserted fact was fresh in the memory of the person who made the representation’.659 As a consequence [page 1050] of remarks by the High Court in Graham v R,660 suggesting this was simply a temporal concept, s 66(2A) has now been inserted to ensure that the issue is one of the quality of the witness’s memory.661 Statements taken indicating the evidence a witness would be able to give in a proceeding are not admissible by virtue of subs (3).662 It should also be noted that in criminal cases where hearsay evidence is admitted via Pts 3.2 and 3.4 of the Act, under s 165 a party can request the judge to warn any jury that the evidence may be unreliable, the reasons for this, and the consequent need for caution before acting upon it. A final first-hand hearsay exception, applying in both civil and criminal proceedings, now properly located in Div 2 and reflecting the common law (see discussion at 8.42–8.50), is found in s 66A, which excludes first-hand hearsay evidence of contemporaneous representations about ‘the person’s health, feelings, sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind’ from the ambit of the hearsay rule.

Business records 8.199 We turn now to the exceptions contained in Pt 3.2 Div 3, which unless otherwise stated extend beyond first-hand hearsay. Yet another version of a

business records exception is enacted by s 69, admitting documents made reliable as a record of a business or as containing a representation made in the course of a business.663 The hearsay rule does not apply insofar as the maker of the representation either had personal knowledge of the asserted fact or made the representation on the basis of [page 1051] information supplied directly or indirectly by someone who had or might reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the asserted fact.664 Inferences to this effect can be drawn from the document itself: s 183. The absence of a record may be used to infer the non-occurrence of a fact: s 69(4).665 The representation must not have been made in contemplation of proceedings or as part of a criminal investigation, and the absence of a representation in a systematic record is evidence that the fact did not occur. There are no further authentication requirements in s 69, and appropriate inferences can be drawn from the document itself: s 58; see 7.8. The document may be part of computer maintained records as long as the conditions of the section can be otherwise satisfied. The document can be tendered by any of the methods permitted by s 48. Where the document is produced by a process, machine or other device, ss 146 and 147 can be used to presume the reliability of the process. Where the reliability of the record depends upon the credibility of a person who made a previous representation and that person has not been called, evidence relevant to that person’s credibility may be given under s 108A. It is also important to note that a party wishing to rely upon this exception may request that a person involved in the production of the record be called as a witness: s 166.666

Other exceptions 8.200 The remaining sections in Div 3, ss 70–75, enact a miscellany of further exceptions extending beyond first-hand hearsay unless otherwise stated. Some seek to fill lacunae highlighted by the common law, for example s 70 (discussed at 8.57), which admits tags, labels and writings attached to objects in the course of

business and which describe or state ‘the identity, nature, ownership, destination, origin or weight of the object, or of the contents (if any) of the object’, while others ensure that evidence admitted at common law remains admissible, such as s 73 (noted at 8.85), which admits evidence of reputation as to age and certain relationships generally in civil cases and on a restricted basis in criminal cases,667 and s 74 (noted at 8.84), which [page 1052] admits evidence of reputation ‘concerning the existence, nature or extent of a public or general right’.668 Section 72 admits representations about the existence or non-existence, or content, of the traditional laws and customs of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander group.669 Section 71 seeks to ensure that the hearsay rule does not prevent documents recording messages transmitted670 by electronic mail, fax, telegram, lettergram, or telex, from being used to identify the identity of sender, the date of transmission and the destination of the message.671 ______________________________ 1.

Academic writing upon the scope of hearsay is vast, particularly in America. The works which have been most influential in the writing of this chapter are Morgan, ‘Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept’ (1948) 62 Harv LR 177; Tribe, ‘Triangulating Hearsay’ (1974) 87 Harv LR 957; Weinberg, ‘Implied Assertions and the Scope of the Hearsay Rule’ (1973) 9 Melb ULR 268; Guest, ‘The Scope of the Hearsay Rule’ (1985) 101 LQR 385; and ‘Hearsay Revisited’ (1988) 14 CLP 33. For a comprehensive survey of the literature, see Williams, ‘Issues at the Penumbra of Hearsay’ (1987) 11 Adel LR 113, n 2; Ashworth and Pattenden, ‘Reliability, Hearsay Evidence and the English Criminal Trial’ (1986) 102 LQR 292; Pattenden, ‘Conceptual Versus Pragmatic Approaches to Hearsay’ (1993) 56 Mod L Rev 138; Rein, ‘The Scope of Hearsay’ (1994) 110 LQR 431; Palmer, ‘Hearsay: A Definition That Works’ (1995) 14 Tas LR 29; ‘The Reliability Approach To Hearsay’ (1995) 17 Syd LR 522.

2.

Teper v R [1952] AC 480 at 486. Quoted with approval by the House of Lords in R v Blastland [1986] AC 41 at 54; and by Brennan J in Pollitt v R (1992) 174 CLR 558 at 573.

3.

Of the articles referred to in n 1 above, only Guest does not make this assumption.

4.

Under this approach, hearsay might be defined as ‘evidence tendered as relevant to an issue on account of the truth of an express or implied assertion of fact contained in that evidence’.

5.

[1965] AC 1001.

6.

In England, hearsay evidence in civil cases is now generally admissible, subject to various procedural safeguards, by virtue of the Civil Evidence Act 1995 (UK). The hearsay provisions (Ch 2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK) admit a range of statements ‘not made in oral evidence in the proceedings’.

7.

[1992] 2 AC 228. Noted in Tapper (1992) 109 LQR 524.

8.

(1989) 166 CLR 283.

9.

(1989) 168 CLR 110.

10. (1992) 172 CLR 558. 11. Walton at 293 (Mason CJ), 308 (Deane J); Benz at 117–18 (Mason CJ), 121 (Deane J), 143–4 (Gaudron and McHugh JJ); Pollit at 564–6 (Mason CJ), 592–4 (Deane J), 609–12 (Toohey J), 621–2 (McHugh J). 12. [1965] AC 1001 at 1021–2. 13. (1995) 185 CLR 1. 14. These remarks have not discouraged a majority of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in Button v R (2002) 25 WAR 382 from admitting in exception to the hearsay rule the confessional evidence of a third party. Malcolm CJ (at [257]) was prepared to admit confessional evidence in circumstances where its reliability was significantly confirmed by other evidence. Wallwork J (at [317]–[339]) was prepared to admit more generally such confessional evidence. Owen J (at [342]) felt bound by Bannon to decide there was no such exception to the hearsay rule in Australia. Owen J’s approach is supported in Brown v Western Australia (2011) 207 A Crim R 533; [2011] WASCA 111 at [58]–[70] (Mazza J, McLure P and Pullin JA agreeing), where the Queensland authorities were regarded as overruled by Bannon. See further 8.77 below. Wallwork J also takes a liberal view towards creating exceptions to the hearsay rule in Willis v R (2001) 25 WAR 217, admitting an accused’s self-serving statements made to the police. 15. (2012) 245 CLR 632 at [56]. 16. In an insightful critique of this view, Arenson, ‘Unravelling The Hearsay Riddle: A Novel Approach’ (1994) 16 Syd LR 342 criticises the idea of narration and that the limits here suggested do not take into account the reliability of assertions falling outside the rule. That narration turns upon intention is some answer to his critique of this term. Furthermore, the exclusionary discretion remains to prevent the admissibility of evidence where there is an unacceptable risk that the jury will give it excessive probative value. But his conclusion that it is up to parliament to reform such a basic principle of procedural fairness as the hearsay rule has been realised. 17. On the assumption that the veracity of an unintentional assertion is not open to doubt, see Evidence, ALRC Interim Report 26 (1985), vol 1, [684.1]. 18. [1956] 1 WLR 965 at 970. 19. (1989) 166 CLR 283 at 288. 20. (1992) 172 CLR 558 at 577. 21. (2000) 201 CLR 443 at [116]. 22. [1972] AC 378 at 387. 23. (1837) 7 Ad & E1 313 at 388; 112 ER 488 at 516. 24. [1965] AC 1001. See also R v Perry (No 2) (1981) 28 SASR 95, where Cox J held an out-of-court declaration of health admissible notwithstanding the availability of the declarant. 25. It might be noted from the outset that the statement limit does not apply under the uniform legislation, which extends to all ‘representations’, defined in the Dictionary to the legislation to include: ‘(a) an express or implied representation (whether oral or in writing); or (b) a representation to be inferred from conduct; or (c) a representation not intended by its maker to be communicated to or be seen by another person; or (d) a representation that for any reason is not communicated’. 26. Much of this discussion derives from the innovative arguments of Guest (1985) 101 LQR 385 and (1988) 14 CLP 33 (see n 1 above). Direct judicial authority for the approach here advocated is found in the judgment of Mahoney JA in Jones v Sutherland Shire Council [1979] 2 NSWLR 206 at 230.

27. If the witness is unable to speak, the most appropriate way of taking evidence would be through written answers. Statutory recognition is given to this procedure in s 31 of the Uniform Acts. 28. [1937] AC 220. 29. On the admissibility of out-of-court identification evidence, see 8.54–8.55. 30. So far as this distinction relies upon a notion of intention, it bears some relationship to the intention requirement of the uniform legislation. But it may be easier to reasonably suppose that a course of conduct was intended as communicative than to reasonably suppose which assertions of fact were intended by particular representations. 31. [1901] 2 Ch 608. 32. (1956) 94 CLR 470 at 476 (Dixon CJ), 482 (Williams, Webb and Taylor JJ). 33. [1979] 2 NSWLR 206 at 230. 34. [1914] AC 733 at 740. 35. (1989) 166 CLR 283. 36. (1989) 168 CLR 110. 37. (1992) 174 CLR 558. 38. The majority did not, however, consider the existence of such an arrangement to be in issue. They regarded the defence as having conceded the arrangement and to be denying that it was Pollitt with whom Allen had his arrangement. The majority considered the principal issue in the case to have been whether Pollitt was the other party to this arrangement. And the telephone conversation and Allen’s conduct immediately after Simpson’s shooting could not establish this except through out-of-court statements by Allen asserting Pollitt’s involvement, which were caught by the hearsay prohibition. 39. (1837) 7 Ad & E1 313 at 388; 112 ER 488 at 516. 40. (1989) 166 CLR 283 at 290, 293. 41. Although one can be dogmatic in saying that any facts it can reasonably be supposed a person does not intend to assert by a representation do not give rise to the hearsay prohibition under s 59(1) of the uniform legislation. 42. See the discussion in LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [31050]. 43. Again it should be emphasised that this is not the approach taken by s 59(1) of the uniform legislation, which compels us to ask which assertions of fact can reasonably be supposed to have been intended by the representation. 44. Which are clearly in principle hearsay: see, for example, Carter, Cases and Statutes on Evidence, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1981, p 320. The Dictionary to the uniform legislation defines representation (see n 25 above) to include representations that are never communicated and therefore s 59(1) extends to such representations: applied in R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359 at [337]. Diary entries might be construed as admissional: R v Folbigg [2003] NSWCCA 17 at [8] (Hodgson JA). 45. [1952] AC 480. 46. The application of the uniform legislation to these cases will be adverted to in footnotes. 47. [1952] VLR 347. 48. See also Fingleton v Lowen (1979) 20 SASR 312; R v Firman (1989) 52 SASR 391. But cf R v Harry (1988) 86 Cr App R 105, where phone calls were held inadmissible to identify D (to whom callers asked to speak) as the drug dealer on the premises; and R v Kearley [1992] 2 AC 228, where phone calls were inadmissible to establish that the accused possessed drugs as part of a business to supply drugs. In Abrahamson v R (1994) 63 SASR 139, the court followed Firman in preference to Kearley. A position

endorsed in R v Nguyen [2008] ACTSC 40 at [18]–[27] (Higgins CJ). 49. Can it be reasonably supposed there was an intention to assert this fact by the representation, so that s 59(1) applies? Can we presume that the absence of (reasonably supposed) intention makes concoction unlikely? 50. Guest, ‘The Scope of the Hearsay Rule’, n 1 above, at 394. 51. [1972] AC 378. 52. There is a representation containing an implicit assertion of fact which is within s 59(1), but query whether we can reasonably suppose the implicit assertion was intended by the representation. Can we reasonably suppose a lack of intention that makes concoction unlikely? 53. Wilson v R (1970) 123 CLR 334. 54. Can it be presumed that no assertion of the state of the relationship can reasonably be supposed to have been intended by the argumentative conversation so that s 59(1) of the uniform legislation does not apply? It might depend upon the circumstances. 55. Woodhouse v Hall (1980) 72 Cr App R 39. Applying s 59(1), again can it be reasonably supposed that the women intended to assert that the premises were being used as a brothel in making their offers, or merely that they were prepared to have sex? 56. (1981) 73 Cr App R 117. 57. See also Commissioner for Motor Transport v Collier-Moat Ltd (1959) 60 SR (NSW) 238. The compiler of a record who has first-hand knowledge of the observations recorded by it may testify to the significance of an omission in the record: R v Shone (1983) 76 Cr App R 76. It would seem that it can be reasonably supposed that there was an intentional assertion of the fact omitted so the evidence is caught by s 59(1) of the uniform legislation. If so, s 69(4) will nevertheless admit evidence of an omission to prove that an event did not occur where a business has a system for the recording of all events of that kind: see, for example, Prasad v Minister for Immigration, Local Government & Ethnic Affairs (1991) 101 ALR 109. 58. Attorney-General v Good (1825) M’Cle & Yo 286; 148 ER 421; Mawaz Khan v R [1967] 1 AC 454. May it be reasonably supposed that no assertion of fact was intended by the lie so that s 59(1) of the uniform legislation cannot be invoked? 59. In R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359 at [361], Spigelman CJ opined, ‘It is arguable that the scope of the word “intended” in s 59(1) goes beyond the specific fact subjectively adverted to by the author as being asserted by the words used. It may encompass any fact which is a necessary assumption underlying the fact that the assertor does subjectively advert to’. This remark led to revision of s 59(1) and the incorporation of an objective test — of what it ‘can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert’. 60. Recognised in Karam v R [2015] VSCA 50 at [62] n 16 (Weinberg, Priest and Beach JJA). 61. For example, R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321 at 333 (Barwick CJ); Bull v R (2000) 201 CLR 443. 62. (1992) 174 CLR 558 at 572–3. Brennan J’s judgment contains a very useful general discussion of the distinction between hearsay and original evidence. 63. [1956] 1 WLR 965. A similar non-testimonial use occurs whenever the making of a statement is relevant to show knowledge of matters asserted: see, for example, R v Baron Von Russen (1995) 77 A Crim R 566 (knowledge of police officer that accused had previous convictions). A request for information may similarly be relevant independently of the truth of facts asserted in the request: R v Holt and Merriman (1996) 87 A Crim R 82 at 86–7 (Callaway JA). 64. See, for example, Guthrie v Spence [2009] NSWCA 369 at [75]ff (Campbell JA). 65. Some excellent examples of one judge’s views of the balancing exercise can be found in the judgment

of Ipp J in T (A Child) v R (1998) 20 WAR 130 at 144–6. Under the uniform legislation, even where the hearsay use is permitted because of s 60, it might still be argued that the jury, even with adequate direction, might give undue weight to an unreliable hearsay use and for this reason the evidence should be excluded under the residual discretion enacted in ss 135–137 (though contrast Jango v Northern Territory of Australia (No 4) [2004] FCA 1539 at [8]–[10] (Sackville J)); but mere lack of the opportunity to cross-examine may not itself be sufficient basis for discretionary exclusion: see 2.32 nn 194, 195. 66. (1970) 123 CLR 334. The death of a previous wife, also by gunshot wound, was not relied upon by the Crown, although it seems to have been inadvertently revealed during cross-examination of the accused. 67. Other cases prepared to admit direct observational evidence of the conversation and conduct between parties to establish a relevant relationship include R v Hissey (1973) 6 SASR 280; R v Matthews (1990) 58 SASR 19; R v Frawley (1993) 69 A Crim R 208 (CCA (NSW)); and Sands v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd (2009) 104 SASR 452; [2009] SASC 215 at [532]–[536] (Bleby J). Arguably, this is still a hearsay use because the inference depends upon an assertion to be implied from the terms of conversations and conduct, but it would not be prohibited if the hearsay prohibition is limited to assertions in statements because there is no express or implied statement about the relationship. Nor will the hearsay use be prohibited if, as is argued below, only assertions in the form of narrative are excluded by the hearsay rule. Where the evidence of the relationship is of an out-of-court assertion by one of the parties to the relationship made in the absence of the other this seems more clearly hearsay evidence of the relationship. But such evidence may still be admissible evidence of a state of mind under Walton v R (1989) 166 CLR 283 (or Uniform Acts s 66A) if that state of mind is, alone or in combination with other evidence, of sufficient relevance: see Heydon JA in R v Clark [2001] NSWCCA 494 at [77]ff, who admitted such evidence; applied in R v Lester (2008) 190 A Crim R 468 at [79]–[80] (fear of accused admitted; but belief of deceased that accused was arranging to have her killed excluded as irrelevant: [54]–[77]). In T (A Child) v R (1998) 20 WAR 130, Pidgeon and White JJ simply regarded the deceased’s disparaging statements about the accused (in his absence) as not tendered to establish their truth but to show they were made, and from which an inference about the nature of the relationship could be drawn. Ipp J justifies the admissibility of the statements by reference to Walton. Under the Uniform Acts, assertions of a relevant relationship may also be admissible in exception to the hearsay rule under s 65(2)(b), (d): see, for example, R v Serratore [1999] NSWCCA 377. 68. A similarly false argument suggests that, if assertions of belief are admissible to prove those beliefs, then those beliefs become in turn evidence that the facts believed are true. All assertions of fact stem from beliefs and the hearsay rule prohibits out-of-court assertions because it is concerned about the very reliability of the beliefs which give rise to those assertions: see the comments of Brennan J in Pollitt v R (1992) 174 CLR 558 at 577–8. 69. To permit the argument would allow all hearsay to be exceptionally admitted under s 60 of the uniform legislation: ACCC v World Netsafe (No 2) (2002) 119 FCR 307 at [13]. 70. [1965] AC 1001. 71. [1963] 1 QB 857; see also Patel v Comptroller of Customs [1966] AC 356 at 365 (Lord Hodson). 72. (1967) 13 FLR 345. 73. But cf R v Romeo (1982) 32 SASR 243, followed in R v Sean Lydon (1987) 85 Cr App R 221, where the accused’s name on a document found near the crime was held admissible to connect the accused with it and therefore the scene. 74. Section 45 of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) admits tickets and other transportation documents in general exception to the hearsay prohibition; s 70(1) of the uniform legislation more specifically provides: ‘The hearsay rule does not apply to a tag or label attached to, or writing placed on, an object (including a document) if the tag or label or writing may reasonably be supposed to have been so attached or placed: (a) in the course of a business; and (b) for the purpose of describing or stating the identity, nature,

ownership, origin or weight of the object, or of the contents (if any) of the object’. 75. Hayslep v Gymer (1834) 1 Ad & El 162; 110 ER 1169. 76. Authority for an objective theory of contract is found in Lederberger v Mediterranean Olives Financial Pty Ltd (2012) 38 VR 509; [2012] VCA 262 at [19] (Nettle and Redlich JJA and Beach AJA). At 8.42ff it will be established that contemporaneous expressions of intention are not prohibited hearsay, so that contractual words will, whatever theory of contract is taken, be admissible, either as operative words or as non-narrative statements of intention: cf discussion of Re Wright; Hegan v Bloor [1920] 1 Ch 108 in LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [31.090]. First-hand contemporaneous representations of intention are also admissible under s 66A of the Uniform Acts. 77. [1952] VLR 347. 78. (1989) 52 SASR 391. 79. Cf R v Harry (1986) 86 Cr App R 105. Firman was followed in preference to Kearley in Abrahamson v R (1994) 63 SASR 139; a position endorsed in R v Nguyen [2008] ACTSC 40 at [18]–[27] (Higgins CJ). The application of s 59(1) of the uniform legislation to these cases is questioned at n 49 above. 80. (1980) 72 Cr App R 39. 81. Dicta of Lord Oliver in Kearley v R [1992] 2 AC 228 at 269 might be interpreted to mean this. 82. The application of s 59(1) of the uniform legislation to these cases is questioned at n 55 above. 83. [1992] 2 AC 228. 84. ‘Res gestae’ refers to matters surrounding and comprising events or transactions in issue. The phrase is most often used as embodying rules of law that purport to allow courts to receive information relating to such contemporaneous matters. But it is often unnecessarily used. The fundamental concept of relevance is usually sufficient to admit evidence of such surrounding matters: cf O’Leary v R (1946) 73 CLR 566. The situation in which the phrase is most argued to be necessary is that where relevant evidence of contemporaneous matters appears to be excluded by the hearsay rule. But if, as advocated here, the rule only prohibits narrative, there is only a limited need to use the phrase to embody an exception to the rule. Rather, the phrase can be seen as emphasising that only narrative is caught by the hearsay prohibition. For the more conventional approach to res gestae, see LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, Ch 19. 85. R v Fragomeli [2008] SASC 96 at [64] (Vanstone J). 86. (1879) 14 Cox CC 341. 87. (1913) 17 CLR 570. 88. (1940) 64 CLR 514. 89. (1913) 17 CLR 570 at 598. 90. [1972] AC 378. 91. [1987] AC 281. 92. This distinction is drawn by Gray J in Llewellyn v Police (2005) 91 SASR 418 at [51]–[57] and he suggests that where there is no contemporaneity the justification for the res gestae exception is reliability. 93. (1974) 130 CLR 267. 94. (1989) 166 CLR 283 at 295. 95. (1989) 168 CLR 110 at 135. 96. See, for example, the ruling of the trial judge, approved on appeal, in Armstrong v Western Australia (2012) 220 A Crim R 274; [2012] WASCA 42 at [41] (ruling of Schoombee DCJ), [46], [55] (Buss JA),

where the reliability of assertions found not to constitute narrative was taken into account. 97. In R v Duong, Sem and Huynh (2011) 110 SASR 291; [2011] SASC 121, Kourakis J ruled that as there was exact contemporaneity he did not have to decide whether the broader approach to the res gestae exception in Andrews applied. His ruling was upheld by the Full Court ((2011) 110 SASR 296; [2011] SASCFC 100) with Doyle CJ remarking at [40] that where there is a contemporaneous and spontaneous statement reliability is not a condition of admissibility. Cf reference to reliability by the Full Court in R v Sumner; R v Fitzgerald (2013) 117 SASR 271; [2013] SASCFC 82 at [69]. 98. [1986] AC 41 at 54. Discussed in Carter, ‘Hearsay, Relevance and Admissibility: Declarations as to State of Mind and Declarations Against Penal Interest’ (1987) 103 LQR 106. 99. Had the knowledge been esoteric to the culprit it may have been sufficiently relevant: R v Szach (1980) 23 SASR 504 at 528–30; Kamleh v R (2005) 213 ALR 97 at [40] (Heydon J). 100. See Bannon v R (1995) 185 CLR 1; and discussion at 8.77. 101. [1914] AC 733. 102. (1986) 4 NSWLR 681. Followed by Wilcox J in Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd v Plumbers and Gasfitters Employees’ Union (No 2) (1987) 15 FCR 64 at 81; Italiano v Barbaro (1993) 114 ALR 21 at 39. 103. (1985) 37 SASR 581. Applied in R v Von Einem (1985) 38 SASR 207 at 209–10, where it was held that testimony of victim’s attitude to homosexuality was relevant and could be proved by victim’s out-ofcourt statements. 104. (1979) 143 CLR 134. The limited admissibility at common law of a testator’s out-of-court statements is specifically altered by legislation: Succession Act 2006 (NSW) s 100; Family Provision Act 1969 (ACT) s 22; Family Provision Act 1970 (NT) s 22. It may also be affected by other general statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule: see 8.169ff. 105. (1989) 166 CLR 283; applied in R v Matthews (1990) 58 SASR 19; R v McRae (1995) 80 A Crim R 380. See the vehement critique of Walton in Tapper, ‘Hillmon Rediscovered and Lord St Leonards Resurrected’ (1990) 106 LQR 441. 106. (2000) 201 CLR 443. 107. See, for example, Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd v CFMEU (No 2) [2015] VSC 459 at [6]–[11] (Bell J). 108. Ibid at [124]–[125]. Cf reservations of Heydon J in Kamleh v R (2005) 213 ALR 97 at [37]–[39]. 109. R v Buckley (1873) 13 Cox CC 293; R v Hendrie (1985) 37 SASR 581 (discussed at 8.43); Dobson v Morris (1986) 4 NSWLR 681. But there are contrary older authorities: see, for example, R v Wainwright (1875) 13 Cox CC 171 (statements of deceased she was going out to meet the accused inadmissible); R v Thomson [1912] 3 KB 19 (intention of woman to commit an abortion upon herself inadmissible). And Heydon J in Kamleh v R (2005) 213 ALR 97 at [37]–[39] is sceptical of inferences from intention to their execution. 110. (1892) 145 US 285. Discussed in McFarland, ‘Dead Men Tell Tales: Thirty Times Three Years of the Judicial Process After Hillmon’ (1985) 30 Vill LR 1; Tapper, n 105 above, at 459–61. See also R v Moghal (1977) 65 Cr App R 56 (accomplice’s vehement expressions of intent to murder relevant to whether accused acted under duress), discussed and explained in Blastland on its special facts. 111. See Walton v R (1989) 166 CLR 283, discussed at 8.48; applied in R v Hytch (2000) 114 A Crim R 573. 112. See also R v Anic, Stylianiou and Suleyman (1993) 68 A Crim R 313 (knowledge of a telephone number relevant to establish association); T (a child) v R (1998) 20 WAR 130; Middleton v R (1998) 19 WAR 179 (evidence of accused’s highly emotional and distressed state during police interview relevant to reliability of a later confession); R v Nguyen [1999] 1 VR 457 (evidence that police attended ‘as a result

of information received’ relevant to explain their presence but evidence could not reveal details of that information without disclosing inadmissible and prejudicial hearsay); R v Ung (2000) 173 ALR 287 (conversation between an accused and his associate revealing the associate’s knowledge that some tins being unloaded contained drugs relevant to establishing the accused’s same knowledge); R v Hemmelstein [2001] NSWCCA 220 (evidence of (genuine) intention to play golf in Australia relevant to issue of whether golfing trip a mere front for drug import); R v Gujanovic (No 2) (2002) 130 A Crim R 179 (statements by victim showing her state of mind relevant evidence of their relationship); Pinkstone v R [2003] WASCA 66 (knowledge of associate relevant to establishing accused’s knowledge). 113. (1989) 166 CLR 283. 114. See more generally Becker, ‘Public Opinion Polls and Surveys as Evidence: Suggestions for Resolving Confusing and Conflicting Standards Governing Weight and Admissibility’ (1991) 70 Oregon LR 463. 115. The Uniform Acts only prohibit opinions tendered to prove a fact about which the opinion is expressed, so that where the opinion is itself a relevant state of mind it does not seem to be prohibited by s 76. Moreover, it seems to be outside the hearsay prohibition by virtue of s 66A. The legislation thereby enacts the common law position: Gas Corporation v Phasetwo Nominees Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 773. Though cf Woolworths Ltd v BP plc (No 2) [2006] FCAFC 132; Chocalaterie Guylian NV v Registrar of Trade Marks [2009] FCA 891 (Sundberg J); Adidas AG v Pacific Brands Footwear Pty Ltd (No 3) [2013] FCA 905. The Federal Court maintains a practice note: Survey Evidence Practice Note (GPN-SURV). 116. Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 158 at 177–81; Arnotts Ltd v TPC (1990) 24 FCR 313. 117. See, for example, Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1991) 102 ALR 379 at 407–16, affirmed at (1992) 111 ALR 577 (Fed Ct). 118. (1961) 108 CLR 642; applied in R v Pangallo (1989) 51 SASR 254 (Prior J); Woods v DPP (WA) (2008) 190 A Crim R 356 at [46]–[52] (Steytler P and Buss JA). 119. [1965] AC 1001. 120. (1967) 52 Cr App R 80. 121. See also Grew v Cubitt [1951] 2 TLR 305; Jones v Metcalfe [1967] 1 WLR 1286; R v Townsend [1987] Crim LR 411. More recently see R v PP [2002] VSC 530, where the judge refused to admit evidence of assertion of a registration number as part of the res gestae. 122. [1978] WAR 125. 123. (1960) 104 CLR 419. 124. In Guy and Finger v R at 127, the court distinguished the previous English decisions (see n 121 above) on grounds of unreliability. If Guy and Finger is regarded simply as determining, upon grounds of reliability, an exception to the hearsay rule, the distinguishing of these decisions on such grounds is quite logical. 125. (1996) 140 ALR 273. 126. Difficulties with interpretation were recognised by Kenny J in Perera v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 507 at [24]–[31]. See also Good, Anthropology and Expertise in the Asylum Courts, Taylor & Francis, London, 2006. 127. As occurred in Gaio and R v West London Youth Court; Ex parte N [2000] 1 All ER 823 at 831. Applied in NT v R (2012) 225 A Crim R 102; [2012] VSCA 213 at [46]–[50]. The first approach was ingeniously applied in DPP (Vic) v BB (2010) 29 VR 110; [2010] VCA 2011 at [34]–[37] (Bongiorno JA, Harper and Hansen JJA agreeing) to hold that the translation by an interpreter of the complainant’s testimony at the committal could be regarded as provided by a ‘translation device’ so that a record of the interpreted testimony could be regarded as first-hand hearsay, and as such qualify for exceptional

admissibility under s 65(3). With the proviso that to ‘authenticate’ the ‘translation device’, the interpreter had to be called. 128. (1981) 145 CLR 395. 129. The availability of the maker of the out-of-court statement was emphasised by Kirby P, who quoted in support Art 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in admitting hearsay tendered by the accused in R v Astill (1992) 63 A Crim R 148. The accused, charged with murdering a baby left by the mother in his care in a house he occupied with two other men, was held entitled to rely upon her evidence that she had later rung the house and had been told by one of the other occupants that the accused was asleep and the third occupant was attempting to calm the agitated baby. Given that the other occupants were the only other likely culprits, what they had said during the relevant time was highly significant and its reliability could be fairly adjudged as both testified at the trial. The availability of all relevant witnesses was also emphasised by the Victorian Court of Appeal in R v Radford (1993) 66 A Crim R 210 at 234–6 in allowing an accused to rely upon hearsay evidence. In that these cases also stress the need for a flexible approach to hearsay they might be affected by the apparent change of approach by the High Court in Bannon v R (1995) 185 CLR 1. 130. [1966] AC 356. 131. See also Comptroller of Customs v Western Electric Co Ltd [1966] AC 367. 132. Though a byline to a newspaper article might not constitute a label attached during the course of business: Kessing v R [2008] NSWCCA 310 at [37]–[42] (Bell JA); but a union logo might: Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v BHP Coal Pty Ltd [2015] FCAFC 25 at [166] (Logan, Bromberg and Katzmann JJ). 133. On machine-generated information generally, see Smith, ‘The Admissibility of Statements by Computer’ [1981] Crim LR 387; Pengilly, ‘Machine Information: Is it Hearsay?’ (1982) 13 Melb ULR 617; Brown, ‘Computer Generated Evidence in Australia’ (1984) 8 Tas LR 46. 134. This argument also applies to exclude from the hearsay rule the observations of animals, so that, provided sufficient experience can be established on the part of dog and handler, the handler of a tracker-dog can testify to the dog’s behaviour in following a trail: R v Lindsay [1970] NZLR 1002; R v Pieterson and Holloway [1995] 2 Cr App R 11; R v Benecke (1999) 106 A Crim R 282. Cf Muldoon v R [2008] NSWCCA 315 at [38]–[41]. The use of a sniffer-dog to detect suitcases containing drugs has been held not to constitute a ‘search’: Question of Law Reserved (No 3 of 1998) (1998) 71 SASR 223. 135. Authentication of documents and real evidence is discussed in detail at 7.6–7.14 and 7.24–7.26 respectively. 136. (1975) 12 SASR 389; [1984] 2 NSWLR 441, respectively. 137. (1982) 76 Cr App R 23; [1982] Crim LR 668–9. 138. Similar decisions are R v Maqsud Ali [1966] 1 QB 688 (tape recording of relevant events received); The Statue of Liberty [1968] 2 All ER 195 (film of radar traces was received); Taylor v Chief Constable of Cheshire [1986] 1 WLR 1479 (a witness could report on the contents of a videotape, since erased, of relevant events); Rook v Maynard (1993) 126 ALR 150 (record of data accessed and times and dates could be proved on oral authentication of program without infringing the hearsay rule). 139. In fact, the persons who had prepared and run the program were called in Wood. 140. See Morgan, n 1 above. See also Saks and Spellman, The Psychological Foundations of Evidence Law, New York University Press, New York, 2016, Ch 6. 141. Pallante v Stadiums Pty Ltd (No 2) [1976] VR 363; R v Thompson [1982] QB 647; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Robinswood Pty Ltd (2001) 24 WAR 284. Depositions from committal proceedings may be admitted by statute where the witness is unavailable and the accused (or counsel) had the

opportunity to cross-examine: see, for example, Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ss 284–289 (equivalent applied in R v Stackelroth (1996) 86 A Crim R 438; R v Gover (2000) 118 A Crim R 8; R v Grant (2001) 127 A Crim R 124); Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 111 (R v Hudson [2016] QCA 80 at [25]– [40]: appropriate directions required); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34K; Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 194A; cf Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1991 (ACT) s 40V; Local Court (Criminal Procedure) Act (NT) s 152. And, where a witness is dangerously ill or for some other reason cannot testify, legislation allows the court to order the taking of a deposition (subject to the opportunity of cross-examination if possible) admissible in later proceedings: see, for example, Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 284; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 23; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34J; Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 181A; Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 198; Evidence Act 1971 (ACT) s 72; Justices Act 1928 (NT) ss 153–155. 142. Rule 807 of the Federal Evidence Rules (US) provides: ‘Under the following circumstances, a hearsay statement is not excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not specifically covered by a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804: (1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; (2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact; (3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and (4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the interests of justice.’ A general exception exists by virtue of s 65(2)(c) of the uniform legislation, which, in a criminal case where the witness is unavailable, admits a representation made in circumstances that make it highly probable that the representation is reliable. 143. [1965] AC 1001. 144. (1992) 174 CLR 558. 145. The ambit of this exception is discussed at 8.68. 146. (1989) 166 CLR 283 at 293. 147. For an example of a trial judge being influenced by this approach, see R v Miladinovic (1992) 60 A Crim R 206 at 212–13 (Miles CJ, SC (ACT)). 148. (1995) 185 CLR 1. 149. ‘Necessity’, if accepted, will invariably satisfy ‘sufficient relevance’. 150. [1972] AC 378; [1987] AC 281, respectively. Andrews is discussed in more detail in the context of dying declarations at 8.88. 151. See Evidence, ALRC Interim Report 26 (1985), vol 1, [692] (endorsed in Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [8.58]); and Williams v R (2000) 119 A Crim R 490 at [45]–[47]. For a case decided under s 65(2)(b) or (c) in circumstances similar to Ratten, see Potter v R (2013) 39 VR 655; [2013] VSCA 291. 152. Authorities considering ‘unavailability’ under the uniform legislation are discussed in Odgers, Uniform Evidence Law, 12th ed, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2016, at [EA. Dict.Pt.2.30]. In Cox v New South Wales (2007) 71 NSWLR 225 at 229 (Simpson J), the definition was held wide enough to include a witness with no recollection of the events the subject of the claim; but cf Singh v R [2011] VSCA 263 at [8]–[33] (Almond AJA, Buchanan and Bongiorno JJA agreeing). Conditional refusal to testify may constitute unavailability: R v Darmody (2010) 25 VR 209; [2010] VSCA 41. Under s 93B(1)(b) of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), the person must be unavailable because dead or mentally or physically incapable of giving evidence (in R v SJC [2015] QCA 123, this was held to include a witness formally incompetent to testify due to mental incapacity). Cf s 34KA of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) where unavailability expressly extends to where a person refuses to testify through fear (to be widely construed and including fear of death or injury to another) from threats. 153. That proximity to the events in issue was not required was simply assumed in cases such as R v Lock

(1997) 91 A Crim R 356 at 359–60; R v Mankotia [1998] NSWSC 295; Conway v R (2000) 98 FCR 204 at [124]; R v Toki (2000) 116 A Crim R 536 at [86]. But see dicta in R v Serratore (1999) 48 NSWLR 101 at [26]–[27] (Dunford J), [228] (Smart AJ) and cases referred to there. Although proximity ensures recent and reliable memory it must also be sufficiently close to the asserted event to infer that fabrication is unlikely before the statutory exception can apply: Williams v R (2000) 119 A Crim R 490 at [48]. But compare with Atkinson J in R v Uittenbusch (2012) 219 A Crim R 562; [2012] QSC 89, where ‘shortly after the asserted fact or event’ is given a liberal interpretation. See further cases at n 652 below. 154. In Sio v R [2016] HCA 32 at [67]–[73], the court emphasises that under s 65 the question is not the actual reliability or truth of the representations sought to be admitted but whether the objective circumstances make the particular representation relied upon unlikely to be a fabrication (s 65(1)(b)), or make it highly probable that the representation is reliable (s 65(1)(c)), or likely to be reliable (s 65(1)(d)). In that case, a statement to police by an accomplice implicating the accused was held inadmissible under s 65(1)(d) for the very reason that objectively he had a purpose to serve by making that particular representation. That he appeared to talk candidly to the police could not negate that purpose and make it likely that the particular representation was reliable. The court was reluctant to speculate upon what objective circumstances were relevant to this determination (at [71]) but did not (at [69]–[70]) disapprove of Mason P’s dictum in R v Ambrosoli (2002) 55 NSWLR 603 at [28]–[29] that ‘evidence of events other than those of the making of the previous representation [can] throw light upon the circumstances of the making of that representation and its reliability as affected thereby’. See also R v Robertson [2015] QCA 11 at [63]–[65] (Holmes JA, Morrison JA and Atkinson J agreeing), supporting ‘the narrower view — that is, that the focus regarding reliability is on the circumstances of the representation’s making, not on the representation itself — is to be preferred’. 155. (1989) 166 CLR 283; (1992) 174 CLR 558, respectively. 156. But cf Miles CJ in the earlier case of R v Miladinovic (1992) 109 ACTR 11 at 17–18, where the assertion by a party to a (taped) telephone conversation that the accused was with him was admitted to establish that fact. 157. Walton v R (1989) 166 CLR 283 at 304 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ: ‘The unlikelihood of concoction or distortion is not sufficient of itself to render a hearsay statement admissible’). See also R v Benz (1989) 168 CLR 110 at 144, where Gaudron and McHugh JJ refuse to consider a more general approach because it was not argued in the case before them. 158. (1995) 185 CLR 1. 159. (1974) 130 CLR 267 at 273. 160. See Mason CJ in Walton v R (1989) 166 CLR 283 at 295. For a later example of the application of the res gestae exception, see R v Astill (1992) 63 A Crim R 148 at 165 (Smart J). 161. See, for example, R v Ryan (2013) 33 NTLR 123; [2013] NTSC 54 at [17]ff (Kelly J: considering authorities interpreting ‘shortly after’). 162. In R v Glover [1991] Crim LR 48, the identifying statement by the defendant assailant in threatening assault was admitted. In Edwards and Osakwe v DPP [1992] Crim LR 576, proximity to the crime justified receiving the assertion of theft by a victim notwithstanding that he was drunk at the time. 163. For example, Ratten v R [1972] AC 378 at 388–9. 164. (1995) 84 A Crim R 570. 165. But on the facts there was a close connection between the two statements, the conversation between the wife and the ambulance officer being: ‘Did your husband or boyfriend do this? No. Did you recognise the man who did? No, but my husband has something to do with this, he’s threatened me with this before (she then sighed). To burn me’.

166. (1989) 168 CLR 110. 167. (1971) 17 FLR 141. 168. These particular representations appear to support expert opinion (or opinion based on specialised knowledge: s 79). See the discussion of the basis rule at 7.66 and the need for supporting admissible evidence (7.68–7.70). Under the uniform legislation, such representations are exempted from the hearsay rule by s 72 and, where provided by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, not affected by the opinion rule: s 78A (see 7.73). Section 60 may also apply. 169. (1946) 73 CLR 566. 170. It might be argued that the evidence was prima facie inadmissible under the Makin principle and that the res gestae conceptualisation operated as an inclusionary rule, but in reality the admissibility stems from the exceptional probative value (albeit via propensity) allowed for by that principle and has nothing to do with the conceptualisation of res gestae. Compare with the res gestae views of McHugh J in Harriman v R (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 628–34; and see Odgers, ‘Res Gestae Regurgitated’ (1989) 12 UNSW LJ 262 at 274–9; HML v R (2007) 235 CLR 334 at [495]–[497] (Kiefel J). See also at 3.31. 171. For other cases using res gestae in this wider sense, see R v Vidic (1986) 43 SASR 176; R v MacFarlane [1993] 1 Qd R 202; R v Gouldren [1993] 2 Qd R 534 at 538; R v Byrnes and Hopwood (1996) 20 ACSR 260. 172. Cf Bannon v R (1995) 185 CLR 1. 173. In R v Van Beelen (1974) 9 SASR 163 at 204–5, the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court assumed for the purpose of argument that, in the case of statements admitted against interest, unavailability caused by reasons other than death was sufficient. But the evidence in question was excluded. 174. See further n 152 above. 175. See further n 152 above. 176. Thus, s 65(8) would permit an accused to tender first-hand hearsay evidence of the exculpating confession of a third party unavailable to testify. See, for example, R v Elms [2004] NSWCCA 467 at [58]–[60] (Adams J). Cf R v O’Connor [2003] NSWCCA 335 at [11]–[14] (Barr J). 177. Unavailability discussed at n 152 above. 178. See further discussion at n 154 above. 179. R v Suteski (2002) 56 NSWLR 182 at [92]–[94]. 180. Roberts v Burns Philp Trustee Co Ltd (1985) 5 NSWLR 72 at 78 (Hodgson J). Cf s 65(2)(b), which refers not to actual reliability but to circumstances supporting reliability: see n 154 above. 181. For an example of a statement not knowingly against interest, see R v Rogers (1995) 1 Cr App R 374 (to say ‘I am being chased for money’ does not acknowledge that it is owed). 182. Ward v HS Pitt & Co [1913] 2 KB 130 (Court of Appeal). 183. R v Inhabitants of Worth (1843) 4 QB 132; 114 ER 847. 184. Higham v Ridgway (1808) 10 East 109; 103 ER 717 (King’s Bench). 185. Short v Lee (1821) 2 Jac & W 464 at 478; 37 ER 705 at 710–11. In Nowell v Palmer (1993) 32 NSWLR 574, the court regarded a statement by the owner of property that he did not have full testamentary rights in regard to it as a statement against interest. 186. [1963] 1 QB 259; criticised in Nokes (1962) 25 Mod L Rev 458. But in R v Rogers (1995) 1 Cr App R 374, the court was of the view that an acknowledgment of an obligation (to pay for heroin) even if not enforceable (‘except by the strong arm tactics of the criminal fraternity’) would be against pecuniary

interest. 187. The difficulty is in establishing that the deceased knew and was conscious of likely proceedings when the statement was made. Where proceedings are not pending this is difficult to establish (see Tucker v Oldbury UDC [1912] 2 KB 317; R v Schwarz [1923] SASR 347) but exceptionally it may be possible: Watt v Miller [1950] 3 DLR 709. 188. Sussex Peerage case (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85 at 110–14; 8 ER 1034 at 1044–6 (House of Lords). 189. (1974) 9 SASR 163. 190. [1986] AC 41 at 52–3. 191. (1995) 185 CLR 1 at 22–3 (Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ). 192. Robinson v R (1996) 15 WAR 191; Question of Law Reserved (No 3 of 1997) (1998) 70 SASR 55; R v Errigo (2005) 91 SASR 80 at [16]–[23] (Besanko J). 193. (2002) 25 WAR 382, Malcolm CJ at [257], Wallwork J at [334]–[339], Owen J contra at [342]. 194. [2002] WASCA 275 at [133] (Miller J, Anderson and Wheeler JJ agreeing). See also Lawson v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 212 at [35], where Martin CJ entertains ‘severe reservations’ about an ‘exception to the rule against hearsay which extends to confessions out of court by persons other than the accused’. See also cases at n 14 above, which reject prior Queensland and Western Australian authorities suggesting such an exception and following Bannon. 195. (2012) 245 CLR 632. 196. [1998] AC 124. 197. (1995) 185 CLR 1 at 13–16. This approach is taken in Queensland: R v Martin (2002) 134 A Crim R 568 at [20]–[21] (McPherson JA). 198. This is permitted by s 83 of the uniform legislation. Where an accused is jointly tried with a party who makes an admission, s 83(1) provides (probably unnecessarily) that evidence of this admission remains admissible only against its maker; however, s 83(2) provides that the other accused may consent to its use in respect of his or her case. But s 83(3) provides that consent cannot be given in respect to part only of this evidence (so it may be used for or against the consenting accused). Consent will permit use whether or not the admission is ultimately admissible against its maker: see R v Rahme [2001] NSWCCA 414; R v Bunevski [2002] NSWCCA 19. 199. (1998) 70 SASR 555. 200. (2012) 245 CLR 632. 201. Lui Mei Lin v R [1989] AC 288. 202. In R v Rahame [2001] NSWCCA 414, the admission was held not admissible against the accused by virtue of s 84 but, as the evidence was not technically an admission against the co-accused s 84 had no application and he could consent to the ‘evidence of the admission’ being used to support his exculpation! 203. See Power v R (2014) 43 VR 261; [2014] VSCA 46, where section of no application in relation to admission made by co-offender in separate proceedings. 204. [1986] AC 41, discussed at 8.42 above. 205. (1980) 23 SASR 504 at 528–31. See also Kamleh v R (2005) 213 ALR 97 at [40] (Heydon J). 206. On what constitutes ‘unavailability’, see further at n 152. 207. (2002) 56 NSWLR 182 at [93] (Wood CJ at CL). 208. [2016] HCA 32.

209. Cf R v Potts (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 340. See further discussion of Sio at n 154. 210. Although under s 93C on request and in the absence of good reasons, a warning must be given, and s 130 provides that the court may exclude evidence ‘if the court is satisfied that it would be unfair to the person charged to admit that evidence’. 211. (1808) 10 East 109; 103 ER 717. 212. [2016] HCA 32 at [67]. 213. See LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [33065]; Ward v HS Pitt and Co [1913] 2 KB 130 at 137; Roberts v Burns Philp Trustee Co Ltd (1985) 5 NSWLR 72 at 78 (Hodgson J). 214. R v O’Meally [1952] VLR 499. 215. For example, that modelled upon the Evidence Act 1938 (UK): see 8.173ff. 216. On ‘unavailability’, see further n 152 above. 217. Conway v R (2000) 98 FCR 204 at [153]. In R v Suteski [2002] NSWCCA 509; [2002] NSWSC 218, an authenticated video of a police interview was held admissible under s 65(2). 218. Compare with Price v Earl Torrington (1703) 1 Salk 285; 91 ER 252; and Brain v Preece (1843) 11 M & W 773; 152 ER 1016. 219. (1955) 57 WALR 25 at 38–9 (Jackson J). 220. [1952] VLR 499. 221. (1878) 3 PD 156. 222. Chamber v Bernasconi (1843) 1 C, M & R 347; 149 ER 1114. 223. [2016] HCA 32 at [67]. 224. ‘[Public or general] rights must be enjoyed by the claimant as a member of the public or as a member of some clearly defined class’: LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [33180]. 225. R v Bedfordshire (Inhabitants) (1855) 4 E & B 335 at 342; 119 ER 196 at 198 (Lord Campbell). Testimony given in court as to repute is not hearsay. The observed fact is the reputation, not the individual opinion upon which it is based. Thus, a witness may testify to the good reputation of an accused (see R v Rowton (1865) Le & Ca 520; 169 ER 1497) or to another witness’s reputation for veracity: R v Richardson and Longman [1969] 1 QB 299. 226. R v Bliss (1837) Ad & El 550; 112 ER 577 (King’s Bench). 227. Mercer v Denne [1905] 2 Ch 538 (Court of Appeal). 228. See LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [33190]. 229. Crease v Barrett (1835) 1 Cr M & R 919; 149 ER 1353. 230. (1971) 17 FLR 141. See also Yamirr v Northern Territory (1998) 82 FCR 533; De Rose v South Australia [2002] FCA 1342 at [265]–[271] (O’Loughlin J); Gumana v Northern Territory [2005] FCA 50 at [152]– [161] (Selway J). Section 82(1) of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) now provides that the Federal Court is bound by the rules of evidence except to the extent that it otherwise orders. 231. Haines v Guthrie (1884) 13 QBD 818; Porteous v Dorn (1974) 45 DLR (3d) 596. 232. LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [33205]. 233. [1978] VR 617 at 624. 234. Re Davy [1935] P 1; Battle v Attorney-General [1949] P 358. 235. Re O’Neil [1972] VR 327. 236. See Mason CJ’s discussion in R v Benz (1989) 168 CLR 110 at 117.

237. Evidence Act 1929 s 34G(2)(b). This provides that the legislative modifications to the hearsay rule do not operate to admit declarations of pedigree unless they are admissible at common law apart from the legislation. 238. For examples, see Odgers, n 152 above, at [EA.73.90]. 239. R v Madobi (1963) 6 FLR 1 (Papua New Guinea Supreme Court), disapproved by Burbury CJ in R v Savage [1970] Tas SR 137 at 145. The matter is discussed in Brazil, ‘A Matter of Theology’ (1960) 34 Aust LJ 195; and O’Regan, ‘Aborigines, Melanesians and Dying Declarations’ (1972) 21 ICLQ 176. 240. R v Morgan (1875) 14 Cox CC 337 (this may be inferred from the nature of the wound or the statement made). 241. [1950] SASR 102. 242. R v Savage [1970] Tas SR 137 at 143; R v Arnott (1995) 79 A Crim R 275 at 277 (Coldrey J: allowing a tape-recorded dying declaration to be played to the jury); R v Buzzacott (2010) 107 SASR 564; [2010] SASC 234 (Vanstone J: civil standard applied after discussion of authorities but not satisfied). 243. Evidence Act 1910 (Tas) s 81K. 244. (1982) 74 Cr App R 144. See also Western Australia v Montani [2007] WASCA 259 at [31]. 245. [1987] AC 281. Applied in Edwards and Osakwe v DPP [1992] Crim LR 576, where the statement of a drunken victim soon after the events in question was admitted to establish the theft of a wallet; and R v Glover [1991] Crim LR 48, where an assertion of identity by the defendant assailant when threatening assault was admitted. 246. R v Andrews [1987] AC 281 (headnote). 247. (1974) 130 CLR 267. 248. (1989) 41 A Crim R 354. See also R v Debs and Roberts [2005] VSCA 66 at [159] (Vincent JA), where a dying declaration concerning the number of assailants was admitted. 249. See, for example, R v Sleiman [2003] NSWCCA 231. See further at n 154 above. 250. [1876] 1 PD 154. See the discussion of this case by Tapper, n 105 above, at 455–9. 251. [1946] 2 All ER 301. 252. On ‘unavailability’, see further n 152 above. 253. Uniform Evidence Acts s 156; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 51; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 39; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 65(1). 254. R v Halpin [1975] QB 907 at 913. 255. (1880) 5 App Cas 623 at 643–4. 256. [1975] QB 907. 257. (1984) 56 ALR 647 at 667–9, 671–2; see also Residues Treatment and Trading Co Ltd v Southern Resources Ltd (1989) 52 SASR 54; Pooraka Holdings Pty Ltd v Participation Nominees Pty Ltd (1991) 58 SASR 158 at 190, 208; Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Pilmer (1994) 63 SASR 364. 258. In the Estate of Beatty [1919] VLR 81 (certificate only admissible to prove the fact and date of a New York baptism); Re Thomas; Queensland Trustees Ltd v Thomas [1932] St R Qd 57 (certified extract admissible to show the marital status of parents); Carlton and United Breweries v Cassin [1956] VLR 186 (certified extract from a public register admitted as evidence of celebrant’s age). Statutory exceptions admitting such public certificates as hearsay include Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 102; Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1995 (NSW) s 49; Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 74; Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 2003 (Qld) s 44; Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 (SA) s

46; Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 (Vic) s 46; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 69A; Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1998 (WA) s 57; Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1997 (ACT) s 65; Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 (NT) s 44. 259. Attorney-General v Wheeler (1944) 45 SR (NSW) 321; Foletta v Merri Creek Quarry Pty Ltd [1951] VLR 149. 260. Walt Disney Productions Ltd v H John Edwards Publishing Co Pty Ltd (1954) 55 SR (NSW) 162. 261. Compare with Crawford Earthmovers Pty Ltd v Fitzsimmons (1972) 4 SASR 116. 262. Batlow Packing House and Cool Stores Co-op v Commonwealth and Dominion Line (1937) 37 SR (NSW) 314; cf Goldman v The Ferry Kameruka [1971] 1 NSWLR 393. 263. Gaggin v Moss [1984] 2 Qd R 513 at 521–2 (recorded evidence before a Marine Board Inquiry not admissible). 264. See, for example, Nezovic v Minister for Immigration (2003) 203 ALR 33 (French J). 265. See, for example, the responses from the owner of a restaurant to a person investigating a fire in the restaurant on behalf of an insurance company in R v Frangulis [2006] NSWCCA 363 (Hidden J). 266. ACCC v Pratt (No 3) (2009) 175 FCR 558 at [73]–[74] (Ryan J: finding that the question of whether pleadings from previous proceedings constitute an admission is a question of fact. Merely ‘admitting’ an allegation may not always constitute a positive assertion or acknowledgment of a material fact). See also Beckett v R [2014] NSWCCA 305 at [173]–[187] (Beazley P, Hulme and Bellew JJ agreeing), false statement made during an interview with investigators was not an admission where relied upon as ‘primary evidence’ of making a false statement while under oath. 267. Morgan, ‘Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule’ (1921) 30 Yale LJ 355. 268. FCR 1979 O 18; UCPR 2005 (NSW) Pt 17; UCPR 1999 (Qld) rr 186–190; SCCR 2006 (SA) Ch 7 Pt 8; SCR 2000 (Tas) Pt 13 Div 2; SC(GCP)R 2005 (Vic) O 35; RSC 1971 (WA) O 30; CPR 2006 (ACT) Pt 2.6 Div 9; SCR (NT) O 35. A formal admission made for the purposes of proceedings will not necessarily be regarded as an informal admission for the purposes of different proceedings: ACCC v Pratt (2009) 175 FCR 558 at [72]–[74] (Ryan J). 269. Uniform Evidence Acts s 184; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 644; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34; Evidence Act 1958 (Vic) s 149A (admissions in proceedings under the Confiscation Act 1997 (Vic)); Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 32; Criminal Code (NT) s 379. It has been held that these provisions do not preclude evidence on the issue being called (R v Smith [1981] 1 NSWLR 193; R v Frazer [2002] NSWCCA 59 at [45]–[46]) — although s 55 of the Uniform Acts deems evidence only to be relevant where a fact is in issue and if this is no longer the case it is arguable that no further evidence should be permitted. The Uniform Acts also provide in s 191 for the agreement of facts in criminal cases, in which case no evidence may be called to contradict or qualify an agreed fact. 270. This was certainly Wigmore’s position in A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law, 2nd ed, Little, Brown and Co, Boston, 1923, vol 2, pp 139–42. 271. The actual reason(s) for, and consequently meaning of, flight might not only be complicated but unfairly prejudicial (leading to exclusion in exercise of discretion: see, for example, Jamal v R (2012) 223 A Crim R 585; [2012] NSWCCA 198, where flight from Australia excluded under s 137 as could only be explained by disclosure of allegedly terrorist activities). On problems with flight in relation to consciousness of guilt and inferences about intentions, see Royall v R (1991) 172 CLR 378; R v Cook [2004] NSWCCA 52 at [20]–[49] (Simpson J); R v Lee [2005] VSC 167 (Coldrey J); Mulvihill v R [2016] NSWCCA 259 at [219]–[233] (Ward JA, Beech-Jones and Fagan JJ). For directions as to use of flight to infer consciousness of guilt and as corroboration, see further at 4.86 particularly nn 371–373. 272. R v McKenna (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 345; R v Bridgman (1980) 24 SASR 278; R v Dickson [1983] 1 VR

227. The hearsay issue may arise where the flight of a non-party is tendered: Holloway v McFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470. 273. Mawaz Khan v R [1967] 1 AC 454, referred to at 8.26 n 58. For use of lies as corroboration, see discussion at 4.86–4.88. 274. In McDonald v R [2013] VSCA 128, statements against interest made in soliloquies (ruminations) overheard by a listening device were considered to determine whether they indicated a consciousness of guilt. 275. Although judges in other contexts have attempted to read down this wide definition to prevent exclusion under s 84 of apparently coerced but reliable and probative representations: see, for example, Spender J in R v GH (2000) 105 FCR 419 at [23]–[25]. 276. Numerous cases have used this definition in determining the application of the voluntariness rule: R v S (1953) 53 SR(NSW) 460 at 469–70 (Street CJ), 477 (Owen J); R v Veneman [1970] SASR 506 at 507 (Bray CJ); R v G, F, S, and W [1974] 1 NSWLR 31 at 40–1, 45; Feiler v McIntyre [1974] 2 NSWLR 268 at 272–3 (Isaacs J); R v Turner (No 13) [2001] TASSC 104. 277. The importance and distinctiveness of these non-hearsay policies in defining admissions is emphasised by Madgwick J in R v GH (2000) 105 FCR 419 at [77]–[78]. 278. LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [33425]–[33435]. 279. See R v Elliott (SC (Vic), Vincent J, 6 May 1996, unreported). 280. As this rule is most likely to be invoked in criminal cases it is discussed in the context of confessions in criminal cases. 281. Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 23U, 23V; Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 281; Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) ss 436–439; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) ss 74C–74G; Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 85A; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 464G, 464H; Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA) s 118; Police Administration Act 1978 (NT) ss 139–142. Majorities in Nicholls v R; Coates v R (2005) 219 CLR 196; and R v Taouk [2005] NSWCCA 155 at [53]–[74], favoured a purposive interpretation of recording regimes to overcome the danger to those reasonably suspected of crimes being ‘verballed’ by investigators. 282. For examples of inferences being drawn from the accused’s silence when confronted by acquaintances, victims, relatives etc, see 5.139 and cases referred to in n 519. And on such inferences generally, see the discussion in Guest, ‘The Scope of the Hearsay Rule’, n 1 above, at 498–9. 283. Bessela v Stern (1877) 2 CPD 265. 284. Wiedemann v Walpole [1891] 2 QB 534. 285. (1961) 104 CLR 57. 286. (1975) 10 SASR 76 at 101–2, 109; see also Mundey v Askin [1982] 2 NSWLR 369 at 373. 287. Mawaz Khan v R [1967] 1 AC 454; and see 8.26 n 58. 288. Narrowly constructed by Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Heydon JJ in Kelly v R (2004) 218 CLR 216. But cf approach in Nicholls and Taouk referred to in n 281 above. 289. See the dicta in R v Su (1995) 129 FLR 120 at 172 (CA (Vic)); R v Elliott (SC (Vic), Vincent J, 6 May 1996, unreported); Elliott and Wakefield, ‘Exculpatory Statements by Accused Persons’ [1979] Crim LR 428. This approach is confirmed in R v Horton (1998) 45 NSWLR 426; R v Crowther-Wilkinson [2003] NSWSC 44 (compulsory recording of police questioning); R v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442; R v Hinton (1999) 150 FLR 20 (in the context of the application of ss 84 and 85 of the Uniform Acts); and in R v Ngo (2001) 122 A Crim R 467 (in the context of the application of s 82 of the Uniform Acts). A contrary and narrower approach has been taken to the concept of a confession under s 10 of the

Criminal Law Amendment Act 1894 (Qld), which excludes confessions ‘induced by any threat or promise by some person in authority’; see R v Clarke; Ex parte Attorney-General [1999] QCA 438 and authorities cited there. This approach requires the statement itself to be against interest. This narrower approach is followed by the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal in Carr v R [2002] TASSC 60 at [68]ff in rejecting the need for the electronic recording of exculpatory statements that could be shown to be false by other evidence. 290. [2001] TASSC 104. 291. Query whether the common law should take the same approach to the definition of admission in the context of creating an exception to the hearsay rule: see 8.96. 292. (2000) 105 FCR 419. See also Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas) v Cook (2006) 166 A Crim R 234 at [31] (Crawford J), [117]–[120] (Tennent J). 293. R v G [2005] NSWCCA 291 at [6]–[29]. 294. R v Knight (2001) 120 A Crim R 381 (NSWCCA). 295. R v Gao [2003] NSWCCA 390. In Haddara v R (2014) 43 VR 53; [2014] VSCA 100 at [28], Priest JA (Redlich and Weinberg JJA agreeing) was of the view that use of a voice sample was not to use a ‘representation’ made by the accused (as it did not in itself involve an assertion of fact) and therefore could not be regarded as an ‘admission’. 296. Re A (A child) (2000) 115 A Crim R 1 at [28] (Bryson J); DPP v Leonard (2001) 53 NSWLR 227. And juries should generally be directed to draw no inference from an accused’s refusal to participate in an identification parade: see 4.66 n 285. 297. MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512; Ajodha v The State [1982] AC 204; R v Johns (1999) 110 A Crim R 149 at [31]–[32] (CCA (NSW)). Although R v Christie [1914] AC 545 held that all statements made in the accused’s presence are admissible so that the jury can adjudge the accused’s reaction, the better view in Australia is that the judge must first determine whether the reaction is capable of giving rise to a confessional inference: see, for example, R v Thomas [1970] VR 674; R v Strausz (1977) 17 SASR 197; 5.138–5.139. Statements incapable of being construed as confessional should therefore be excluded: R v Doolan [1962] Qd R 449; Mickelberg v R [1984] WAR 191. In R v Lodhi (2006) 163 A Crim R 526 at [28], Whealy J explained that where the identity of the maker of a representation was contested ‘it would be entirely circular to make use of the statements … [i]f there be no evidence beyond the representations themselves from which it might be reasonably open to find the statements were made by the accused’. 298. (1990) 170 CLR 573: see 2.83ff. 299. And generally be so directed if a miscarriage of justice is to be avoided: see cases at Chapter 2, n 407. 300. MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512; Ahern v R (1988) 165 CLR 87 (not following Tripodi v R (1961) 104 CLR 1 at 6). 301. Tofilau v R (2007) 231 CLR 396 at [24] (Gleeson CJ), [405]–[415] (Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 302. [1966] AC 367; see also R v Surujpaul [1958] 1 WLR 1050. 303. [1966] Qd R 202. 304. [1971] VR 79. 305. [1974] VR 363; followed by the CCA (NSW) in R v Brady (1980) 2 A Crim R 42 and CCA (WA) in Ollerton v R (1989) 40 A Crim R 133 and R v Mabbott [1990] WAR 323. More recently considered in the context of the accuracy of DNA results based on continuity and handling of samples: R v Stafford [2009] QCA 407. 306. (1976) 15 SASR 170.

307. (1989) 40 A Crim R 133. 308. (1935) 54 CLR 134; see also Smith v Joyce (1954) 89 CLR 529; TPC v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647; Bond Media Ltd v John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd (1988) 16 NSWLR 82. 309. Bond Media Ltd v John Fairfax Pty Ltd (1988) 16 NSWLR 82 at 85 (Giles J), approving dicta of Franki J in TPC v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647 at 678 that out-of-court statements of opinion may be similarly concessionally admissible. 310. Although there is no general requirement that the evidence contained in admissible confessions be subject to corroboration or warning before being acted upon: McKay v R (1936) 54 CLR 1; Whitehorn v R (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 660. This should be distinguished from the requirement to warn a jury to take care before finding that a disputed confession has been made where the only evidence of it is uncorroborated police testimony: McKinney and Judge v R (1990) 171 CLR 468. 311. Section 60 of the Uniform Acts does not apply in a criminal proceeding to evidence of an admission: s 60(3) and see note to s 82. 312. That wholly self-serving statements are inadmissible see, for example, R v Callaghan (1994) 2 Qd R 300; Willis v R (2001) 25 WAR 217; R v Byster (2001) 80 SASR 373; R v S (2002) 132 A Crim R 326 at [24]–[27] (CCA (WA)); R v Helps [2016] SASCFC 154. On the inadmissibility of a witness’s self-serving statements generally, see 7.87ff. On grounds of fairness, to avoid the jury speculating about what the accused said when questioned by police, as a matter of practice in Victoria prosecutors traditionally adduce an accused’s wholly self-serving statement (R v Su [1997] 1 VR 1; R v Rudd (2009) 23 VR 444; Theodoropoulos v R [2015] VSCA 364 at [110]) but this is not the practice in Queensland (R v Callaghan [1994] 2 Qd R 300; [1993] QCA 419; R v SCD [2013] QCA 352; R v Reynolds [2015] QCA 111), South Australia (R v Helps [2016] SASCFC 154 at [25]) or Western Australia (Ritchie v Western Australia [2016] WASCA [134] at [46]). See also R v Familic (1994) 75 A Crim R 229 at 234–6 (CCA NSW). Cf problems arising from revelation of the accused’s silence: discussed at 5.143. Under the uniform legislation, if an accused testifies, the previous self-serving statement may be tendered by the defence under s 66 (see discussion by Kourakis J in Barry v Police [2009] SASC 295 at [52]). 313. [1969] SASR 336. 314. Hogarth J refused to otherwise admit self-serving statements as evidence of asserted facts. 315. [1965] VR 165. 316. (1968) 118 CLR 580 at 585. 317. In Gardner v Duve (1978) 19 ALR 695 at 702 (Fed Ct), McGregor J emphasises that, where statements are inextricably connected, they stand or fall together. Police interviews held on distinct occasions have been held not inextricably connected so an accused must testify in court to excuses contained in an interview not tendered by the prosecution: Middleton v R (1998) 19 WAR 179; Willis v R (2001) 25 WAR 217. 318. Allied Interstate Qld Pty Ltd v Barnes (1968) 118 CLR 580; Lopes v Taylor (1970) 44 ALJR 412, particularly Gibbs J at 421–2; R v Williamson [1972] 2 NSWLR 281; TPC v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (1979) 40 FLR 83 at 94–5 (Fisher J); Herbert v R (1982) 62 FLR 302 at 318 (Toohey and Sheppard JJ), 333–6 (McGregor J); Barbaro v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 30 at 40 (Hunt J); Spence v Demasi (1988) 48 SASR 538; R v M (1994) 72 A Crim R 269; R v Rudd (2009) 23 VR 444; [2009] VSCA 213 at [46]–[62] (Redlich JA, Maxwell P and Vickery AJA agreeing justifies a (very) wide view on grounds of ‘fair play’); cf Flowers v R (2005) 189 FLR 423; [2005] NTCCA 5; Fair Work Ombudsman v Valuair Ltd (2014) 314 ALR 499; [2014] FCA 404. The English position is similar: R v Sharp [1988] 1 WLR 7 (House of Lords); R v Aziz [1996] 1 AC 41; Western v DPP [1997] 1 Cr App R 474 (and see the critical discussion by Birch, ‘The Sharp End of the Wedge: Use of Mixed Statements by the Defence’ [1997] Crim LR 416).

319. (1988) 48 SASR 538. See also R v Cox [1986] 2 Qd R 55 at 65 (Thomas J); Mule v R (2005) 156 A Crim R 203 at 209, 212; R v Barrett (2007) 16 VR 240 at [100] (Eames JA); R v J, JA (2009) 105 SASR 563; [2009] SASC 401 at [123]–[124] (Duggan J). 320. If the prosecution decides to tender a mixed statement (that tender is within its discretion; see at 6.56) it must tender the entire statement: R v Curran and Torney [1983] 2 VR 133 at 148 (McGarvie J); Ritchie v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 134 at [38]–[39] (citing Mule v R (2005) 221 ALR 85). And see also cases in n 312 above distinguishing entirely self-serving statements which are generally inadmissible. 321. R v Duncan (1981) 83 Cr App R 359 at 365 (CA); R v Sharp [1988] 1 WLR 7 (House of Lords); R v Beck [1990] 1 Qd R 30; Mule v R (2005) 156 A Crim R 203; [2005] HCA 49 at [19]–[25]; R v Rudd (2009) 23 VR 444; [2009] VSCA 213 at [44] (Redlich JA, Maxwell P and Vickery AJA agreeing); R v Weetra (2010) 108 SASR 232; [2010] SASCFC 52 at [10]–[18] (White J, Anderson J agreeing); R v Allen (2011) 109 SASR 396; [2011] SASCFC 40 at [27]–[28] (Kelly J, Doyle CJ agreeing), [118] (Peek J); R v Jassar (2013) 233 A Crim R 510; [2013] QCA 115 at [27]–[34] (Peter Lyons J, Holmes and Fraser JJA agreeing); Burke (a pseudonym) v R (2013) 40 VR 161; [2013] VSCA 351 at [71] (Redlich, Weinberg and Priest JJA); Xypolitos v R [2014] VSCA 339 at [46]–[70] (Redlich, Tate and Priest JJA). 322. Section 81(2) also admits associated representations by third parties which are necessary to understand the admission: see Odgers, n 152 above, at [EA.81.240]. 323. Holloway v McFeeters (1956) 94 CLR 470 at 476, 482; Nominal Defendant v Hook (1962) 113 CLR 641. 324. For example, R v Smith [1964] NSWR 537; R v Ciesielski [1972] 1 NSWLR 504 at 511 (Taylor J); Re Attorney-General’s Reference (No 1 of 1977) [1979] WAR 45 (a ground for separate trials); R v Spinks (1981) 74 Cr App R 263; R v Welsh [1999] 2 VR 62 (no case against accessory after the fact where only evidence of offence the admissions of the co-accused principal). By the same token out-of-court confessional statements of a co-accused which may assist another accused remain inadmissible hearsay at common law but an accused may consent to their use under s 83 of the uniform legislation: see 8.77–8.78 above. 325. Legge v Edmonds (1855) 25 LJ Ch 125 at 141(Wood VC). 326. Partnership Act 1892 (NSW) s 15; Partnership Act 1891 (Qld) s 18; Partnership Act 1891 (SA) s 15; Partnership Act 1891 (Tas) s 20; Partnership Act 1958 (Vic) s 19; Partnership Act 1895 (WA) s 22; Partnership Act 1963 (ACT) s 19; Partnership Act 1997 (NT) s 19. In the case of a limited partnership, created under legislation, the limited partner cannot take part in the management and has no power to bind the firm: Partnership Act 1892 (NSW) s 67(1); Partnership Act 1891 (SA) s 65; Partnership Act 1891 (Tas) s 79; Partnership Act 1958 (Vic) s 67(1); Limited Partnerships Act 1909 (WA) s 6(1). See, for example, Ingot v Macquarie (No 4) [2005] NSWSC 90 (McDougall J). 327. Woolway v Rowe (1834) 1 Ad & E 114; 110 ER 1151; Jones v Sutherland Shire Council [1979] 2 NSWLR 206 at 212 (a planning restriction not a matter of title); Nowell v Palmer (1993) 32 NSWLR 574 (admission by a person that he is subject to a legal obligation in respect of his testamentary power to dispose of an estate admissible against the successor to that estate). 328. (1973) 5 SASR 191. 329. (1944) 70 CLR 100. 330. (1944) 44 SR NSW 370. 331. See generally Golden, ‘Who Can Confess for the Corporation?’ (1975) 3 Aust Bus LR 163. 332. TPC v Allied Mills Industries Pty Ltd (No 3) (1981) 55 FLR 174; TPC v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647 at 660–2 (Franki J). 333. See comments of Odgers, n 152 above, at [EA.87.60] criticising the apparent mandatory admissibility. But s 87(1) only admits the representation against another party: ACCC v World Netsafe (No 2) (2002)

119 FCR 307 at [14]. 334. ‘Representation’ includes conduct so that making workers’ compensation payments might constitute an admission: Gordon v Ross [2006] NSWCA 157 at [127]–[128] (Basten JA). 335. See comments of Odgers, n 152 above, at [EA.87.90] n 753; and see the varied approaches to implied authority in Daniel v Western Australia (2001) 186 ALR 369 at [9]–[11] (Nicholson J); Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Retail Pty Ltd (2008) 167 FCR 314 at [15]–[19] (Rares J); Tim Barr Pty Ltd v Narui Gold Coast Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 657 (Barrett J); Qantas v TWU (2011) 280 ALR 503; [2011] FCA 470 at [32]–[35] (Moore J); The Age Co Ltd v Liu [2013] NSWCA 26 at [15]–[19]. 336. [1914] SALR 16. 337. (1883) 22 Ch D 593. 338. (1970) 44 ALJR 368. 339. TPC v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647 at 669, 670 (Franki J). 340. Whether such authority exists is a question for the judge, not the trier of fact: see Ahern v R (1988) 165 CLR 87, overruling Tripodi v R (1961) 104 CLR 1. 341. [1963] 1 WLR 795. 342. See also Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Gorman [1973] VR 570, where circumstantial evidence of authority was found; cf Chappell v Ross and Sons Pty Ltd [1969] VR 376; and ACCC v World Netsafe (No 2) (2002) 119 FCR 307, where bare statements were not admitted to prove authority. 343. See TPC v Heating Centre (1984) 4 FCR 197, where circumstantial proof of the identity of a telephone caller was found. In R v Ryan (1984) 55 ALR 408, no circumstantial evidence was available on the identity of a caller. 344. (1992) 174 CLR 558, discussed at 8.68. 345. R v Blake and Tye (1844) 6 QB 126; 115 ER 49. The notion of ‘in furtherance of’ is discussed in R v Masters (1992) 26 NSWLR 450 at 461–3; and R v Su (1995) 129 FLR 120 at 159–63 (CA (Vic)) (warning after conspiracy had gone awry made in furtherance of the conspiracy). 346. Section 87(1)(c) is most likely to be applicable in criminal prosecutions. It does, however, as Gray ACJ explained in Rural Export & Trading (WA) Pty Ltd v Hahnheuser [2007] FCA 1535 at [35], apply in civil proceedings. See also Italiano v Barbaro (1993) 114 ALR 21. 347. See Tripodi v R (1961) 104 CLR 1 (the charge was larceny); Davidovic v R (1990) 51 A Crim R 197 at 205–6 (charges of conspiracy to supply heroin and of possessing heroin for supply); R v Addison (1993) 70 A Crim R 213 (charge of supplying heroin). 348. (1961) 104 CLR 1. 349. (1988) 165 CLR 87. 350. These principles are affirmed in Tsang v R (2011) 35 VR 240; [2011] VSCA 336 at [35]–[37] (Nettle and Neave JJA and Sifris AJA). See also Elomar v R [2014] NSWCCA 303 at [268]–[284] (Bathurst CJ, Hoeben CJ at CL and Simpson J). 351. Tripodi v R (1961) 104 CLR 1 at 6; Ahern v R (1988) 165 CLR 87 at 94–5; Choi v R [2007] NSWCCA 150 at [27]–[31] (Hulme J applying s 87(2)(c)); Tsang v R (2011) 35 VR 240; [2011] VSCA 336 at [38]– [41] (Nettle and Neave JJA and Sifris AJA). 352. ACCC v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 794 at [52]–[54] (Gray J). 353. Tripodi v R (1961) 104 CLR 1; R v Ernst [1984] VR 593 at 596–601 (McGarvie J); Tsang v R (2011) 35 VR 240; [2011] VSCA 336 at [35]–[37] (Nettle and Neave JJA and Sifris AJA). 354. For example, R v Minuzzo and Williams [1984] VR 417; Davidovic v R (1990) 51 A Crim R 197 (Fed

Ct). 355. R v Ernst [1984] VR 593 at 597 (McGarvie J). 356. Ibid. See also Tsang v R (2011) 35 VR 240; [2011] VSCA 336 at [35]–[37], [48]–[71] (Nettle and Neave JJA and Sifris AJA showing that statements may be relevant originally not just to prove agreement but to establish individual criminal involvement); Elomar v R [2014] NSWCCA 303 at [275]–[284] (Bathurst CJ, Hoeben CJ at CL and Simpson J explaining that conversations may be admissible circumstantial evidence establishing common purpose). 357. So that where the charge is simply the conspiracy, parallel statements may be admissible originally to establish that agreement, and need not rely upon the co-conspirator’s exception to justify their reception: see, for example, R v Louden (1995) 37 NSWLR 683. 358. (1988) 165 CLR 87. 359. Overruling previous authority: see, for example, R v Minuzzo and Williams [1984] VR 417, which suggests that the issue was one for the jury. Ahern applied in, for example, R v Smith (1990) 51 A Crim R 434 (CCA (Vic)); R v Davidovic (1991) 51 A Crim R 197 (Fed Ct); R v Masters (1992) 26 NSWLR 450; R v Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153; Lewis v R (1998) 20 WAR 1 (CCA); Tsang v R (2011) 35 VR 240; [2011] VSCA 336 at [38]–[41], [74]–[80] (Nettle and Neave JJA and Sifris AJA); Rich v R (2013) 43 VR 558; [2013] VSCA 126 at [217] (Nettle, Neave and Osborn JJA). 360. Elomar v R [2014] NSWCCA 303 at [285]–[291] (Bathurst CJ, Hoeben CJ at CL and Simpson J). 361. Ahern v R (1988) 165 CLR 87 at 100; Smith v R (1990) 50 A Crim R 434 at 442–3 (CCA (Vic)); R v Masters (1992) 26 NSWLR 450 at 464–6. In Masters it is suggested that if this standard produces any unfairness to the accused then the residuary discretion might be used to exclude the hearsay operation of the evidence. 362. (1999) 105 A Crim R 214 at [18]–[21] (CCA (NSW)). See also R v Sukkar [2005] NSWCCA 54 at [36]–[44] (Wood CJ at CL); Fattal v R [2006] NSWCCA 359 at [39]–[43] (Sully J); Landini v New South Wales [2007] NSWSC 259 (Hall J). 363. R v Masters (1992) 26 NSWLR 450 at 465–6; R v Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153 at 188–9; R v Louden (1995) 37 NSWLR 683. 364. Ahern (1988) 165 CLR 87 at 104–5; Smith v R (1990) 50 A Crim R 434 at 443. 365. See R v Pektas [1989] VR 239, in which Murphy and Gray JJ criticise Ahern for taking issues of fact from the jury. In Smith v R (1990) 50 A Crim R 434 a differently constituted Victorian Court of Appeal confines Pektas to its facts. 366. Smith v R (1990) 50 A Crim R 434 (CCA (Vic)); Davidovic v R (1991) 51 A Crim R 197 (Fed Ct); R v Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153 at 187–8. 367. R v Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153 at 190–1. A similar direction must be given on request of a party under s 165(1)(a) and (2) of the Uniform Acts. See Tsang v R (2011) 35 VR 240; [2011] VSCA 336 at [86]–[93] (Nettle and Neave JJA and Sifris AJA holding judge’s failure to emphasise lack of crossexamination of hearsay evidence did not cause a miscarriage of justice). 368. (1998) 192 CLR 159. 369. (1982) 151 CLR 1. 370. Williams, ‘An Analysis of Discretionary Rejection in Relation to Confessions’ (2008) 32 Melb ULR 10. 371. (1948) 76 CLR 501 at 511–12. 372. (1982) 151 CLR 1. 373. For a history of the rules, see LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [33620]–[33625]. See also Cleland

v R (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 27–30 (Dawson J); R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159 at 167–84 (Brennan CJ), 188–98 (Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ), 207–14 (Kirby J); and for a detailed historical overview, the joint judgment of Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ in Tofilau v R (2007) 231 CLR 396 at [268]ff. 374. (1978) 141 CLR 54; as applied to confessions by the High Court in Cleland v R (1982) 151 CLR 1 and subsequently explained in R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159. 375. Support for this can be found in Cleland v R (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 18 (Deane J), 30 (Dawson J); R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159 at 168–9 (Brennan CJ), 196–7 (Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ), 214 (Kirby J). See also the discussion of nemo tenetur se ipsum prodere in Tofilau v R (2007) 231 CLR 396 at [43] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), [291] (Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 376. This rather complicated terminology is used to emphasise that the rationale of these rules applies not just to formal confessions but to any statements an accused may give and that can be used by the prosecution to implicate the accused in the crime charged: see 8.97–8.100. From here on, the word ‘confession’ will be used, but understood in this way. 377. (1998) 192 CLR 159. For the implications of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (Vic) and the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), see Gans, Henning, Hunter and Warner, Criminal Process and Human Rights, Federation Press, Sydney, 2011, Chs 4, 6. 378. Ibid; for an excellent earlier academic analysis see Clough, ‘The Exclusion of Voluntary Confessions: A Question of Fairness’ (1997) 20 UNSW LJ 25. More recently, in the context of the uniform legislation, see Pavitt v R (2007) 169 A Crim R 452; [2007] NSWCCA 88. 379. The only remaining example (beyond the uniform legislation) is s 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1894 (Qld). Admissibility rule endorsed by s 416 of the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld), ‘A police officer who is questioning a relevant person must not obtain a confession by threat or promise’. 380. Cornelius v R (1936) 55 CLR 235; McDermott v R (1948) 76 CLR 501; R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133. 381. Although its absence has been held to constitute unfairness under s 90: cf R v Pitts (No 1) [2012] NSWSC 1652 at [40] (Adamson J). The privilege against self-incrimination during investigation is recognised in other sections of the Uniform Acts. In particular, s 139 provides that a statement or action of the accused will have been improperly obtained if police have failed to advise the accused of the right to remain silent on arrest (or when they believe there is sufficient evidence to establish the offence). The evidence is thereupon presumptively inadmissible under s 138. Nor is the accused’s failure to answer questions put by an investigating official, in connection with the commission of an offence, admissible to draw an inference unfavourable to the accused: s 89 (cf s 89A in NSW). The privilege is also recognised at trial where an accused cannot be compelled to testify (s 17) and judges may not suggest to any jury that an adverse inference can be drawn from the accused’s failure to give evidence (s 20). 382. Judges still refer to s 84 as a ‘voluntariness’ rule: see, for example, R v Ye Zhang [2000] NSWSC 1099 at [38], [51] (Simpson J). 383. Thus, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Em v R (2007) 232 CLR 67 at [119]–[122] recognise that because s 85 deals with likely reliability in the presence of police ‘it follows that consideration of the reliability of what was said in a statement made to police can have no part to play in the operation of s 90’. 384. Although this was the view of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Em v R (2007) 232 CLR 67 at [109], the remaining judges were not prepared to commit to reading down the content of s 90 to prevent arguments that might also be made under other more specific provisions of the Act: see Gleeson CJ and Heydon J at [53]–[56], Kirby J at [155]. 385. McDermott v R (1948) 76 CLR 501 at 511–12; R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159 at 169

(Brennan CJ), 188–9 (Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ), 208 (Kirby J). A clear exposition of the subjective approach to the question of voluntariness can be found in the judgment of Brennan J in Collins v R (1980) 31 ALR 257 at 304–11. Brennan J dissented on the ground that the prosecution had not shown that the wills of young Aboriginal suspects had not been affected by their treatment by the police. This subjective approach is emphasised in Seymour v Attorney-General (Cth) (1984) 1 FCR 416 at 428–30 (Fitzgerald J); and in R v K (1984) 14 A Crim R 226 (SC (NSW), Wood J). 386. R v Azar (1991) 56 A Crim R 414 (CCA (NSW)). But compare with the decision of Perry J in Smith v R (1992) 58 SASR 491; and the comments of Doyle CJ in R v Pfitzner (1996) 66 SASR 161 at 173. 387. Collins v R (1980) 31 ALR 257 at 307 (Brennan J). These subjective considerations are picked up in s 85(3) of the uniform legislation but in the context of reliability rather than voluntariness. See, for example, R v Nelson [2004] NSWCCA 231 at [55] (Sperling J); R v McLaughlan [2008] 218 FLR 158 at [62]–[67] (Refshauge J); Tasmania v Stojakovic [2008] TASSC 48 at [88]–[93] (Porter J). 388. (2007) 231 CLR 396 at [191]ff (Kirby J), [325]ff (Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ). 389. R v Cowan [2015] QCA 87 at [68]–[73] (McMurdo P, Fraser JA agreeing, considering s 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1894 but rejecting the contentions that any threat or promise was made and that the confessions resulted from the circumstances alleged to have constituted a threat). 390. R v Naylor [2013] 1 Qd R 368; [2012] QCA 116 at [7]–[9] (Holmes JA, Margaret McMurdo P and Mullins J agreeing, threat conveyed via the suspect’s lawyer in ordinary course of engagement enlivened s 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1894). 391. In Australia, this appears to have been so at least since McDermott v R (1948) 76 CLR 501, where Dixon J explains the subjective nature of involuntariness (see also cases at n 401). In England, these technical limitations were not finally discarded until the decision in DPP v Ping Lin [1976] AC 574. In the absence of a person in authority a confession may still be involuntary on account of duress, intimidation, persistent importunity, or sustained or undue insistence or pressure: see, for example, the approach taken in H, SA v R (2013) 116 SASC 547; [2013] SASCFC 86 at [33]–[34] (Kelly J finding de facto guardian not a person in authority and no basal involuntariness), [87]ff (Blue J, Nicholson J agreeing, finding involuntariness under the basal rule). 392. Defined in the Dictionary as: ‘(a) a police officer (other than a police officer who is engaged in covert investigations under the orders of a superior)’ or ‘(b) a person appointed by or under an Australian law (other than a person who is engaged in covert investigations under the orders of a superior) whose functions include functions in respect of the prevention or investigation of offences’. 393. In R v Truong (1996) 86 A Crim R 188, Miles CJ held a confession to a friend connected to a listening device by police was not made during ‘official questioning’ (now amended to read ‘admission to or in the presence of an investigating official’) nor to someone capable of influencing the bringing of the charge within s 85(1) (the mere fact a person has influential evidence to give does not make him or her so capable: see also R v TJF (2001) 120 A Crim R 209 (CCA (NSW)). In R v Donnelly (1997) 96 A Crim R 432, a police officer, visiting his cousin in hospital, was ‘official[ly] questioning’ only following a caution. 394. The original s 85(1) was revised partially in response to Kelly v R (2004) 218 CLR 216. See discussion in Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [10.11]–[10.66] and Odgers, n 152 above, at [EA.85.150]. 395. It is possible to argue that s 85 is not concerned with unreliability at all (which is dealt with in s 90), but with the control of official conduct which may produce unreliable admissions: see Odgers, n 152 above, at [EA.85.210]; and Dennis, ‘The Admissibility of Confessions under Sections 84 and 85 of the Evidence Act 1995: An English Perspective’ (1996) 18 Syd LR 34 at 47–8. Indeed, this is the position advocated by Weinberg CJ in R v McNeil (No 1) (2007) 209 FLR 124 at [184]. This ‘objective’

approach is difficult to reconcile with s 85(2) which focuses on the question of whether it was unlikely ‘in the circumstances in which the admission was made … that the truth of the admission was adversely affected’, and s 85(3)(a) which requires the subjective state of the suspect to be considered in determining this unlikelihood whether or not they were apparent to the investigator. Examples of serious or decisive consideration of the suspect’s subjective state during interview can be found in R v Donnelly (1997) 96 A Crim R 432; R v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442 at 456–60 (CCA (NSW)); R v Helmhout [2000] NSWSC 185; [2001] NSWCCA 372 at [20]–[22]; R v Moffat [2000] NSWCCA 174; R v McLaughlan [2008] ACTSC 49; R v McNiven [2011] VSC 397 at [70]–[74] (Lasry J); Tasmania v Woodberry (2012) 225 A Crim R 510; [2012] TASSC 89 at [31]–[32] (Blow J); Soteriou v R [2013] VSCA 328 at [29]–[30], [46]; R v Munday (No 1) [2016] VSC 26 at [8]–[9], [22]–[23] (T Forrest J). Another objection to the objective approach is that the effect of s 189(3) is that if the accused raises the issue of truth at the voir dire then this may be pursued and be decisive to admissibility under s 85: R v Ye Zhang [2000] NSWSC 1099 at [51]–[54] (Simpson J). The emphasis on controlling official misconduct is also undermined by the absence in s 85(2) of any requirement for such misconduct before the section may apply: see, for example, R v McNiven [2011] VSC 397 at [69]–[74] (Lasry J). 396. In R v TJF (2001) 120 A Crim R 209 at [38] (CCA (NSW)) a volunteered admission was held outside s 85(1)(b). 397. [2000] NSWSC 1099 at [51]. See also FMJ v R [2011] VSCA 308 at [39] (Weinberg JA, Beach and Hansen JJ agreeing). 398. Unreported, CCA (NSW), 2 July 1997. 399. R v Taylor [1999] ACTSC 47 at [26]; R v Munce [2001] NSWSC 1072 at [27]–[28]. In R v Ye Zhang [2000] NSWSC 1099 at [51]–[54], Simpson J suggests that the effect of s 189(3) is that if the accused raises the issue of truth at the voir dire then this may be pursued and be decisive to admissibility under s 85. 400. As in, for example, R v Taylor [1999] ACTSC 47 at [29]–[32]; R v Ye Zhang [2000] NSWSC 1099; R v Waters [2002] ACTSC 13 at [41]–[43]. A similar intersection is required at common law if the external overbearing of the will necessary to constitute involuntariness is to be established: see discussion at 8.133. 401. The statutory modification in Queensland maintains the person in authority requirement. Consistently with Collins, whether there is such a person is determined by the impression or perception which the confessionalist might have in relation to such person rather than the person’s authority objectively ascertained: R v Dixon (1992) 28 NSWLR 215; R v Burt [2000] 1 Qd R 28; Tofilau v R (2007) 231 CLR 396 at [13] (Gleeson CJ), [45] (Gummow and Hayne JJ), [320] (Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ); R v Cowan (2013) 237 A Crim R 388; [2013] QSC 337 at [32] (Atkinson J), affirmed [2015] QCA 87 at [67]. The common law applies where this statutory provision runs out: see cases at n 380 above. 402. See, for example, R v Geesing (1985) 38 SASR 226, which involved threats by fellow prisoners. 403. R v John Loe (No 1) [1969] PNGLR 12. Courts have been reluctant to exclude as involuntary confessions simply because they follow long periods of questioning: see, for example, R v Jones [1970] 1 NSWR 190 (confession excluded in exercise of the discretion); R v Banner [1970] VR 240 (confession admitted). The High Court in Van der Meer v R (1988) 82 ALR 10, was more willing to scrutinise carefully the course of questioning in determining voluntariness. Persistent questioning after the suspect has clearly indicated a wish not to answer may make it difficult for the Crown to establish voluntariness: R v Cumes (1990) 102 FLR 113 (SC (NT), Nader J). But persistent questioning after refusal to answer will not necessarily give rise to exclusion under the Uniform Acts: R v Clarke (1997) 97 A Crim R 414; R v Phan [2001] NSWCCA 29 at [54]–[56]. 404. Cf R v Elliott (SC (Vic), Vincent J, 1997, unreported) where the NCA compelled attendance by claiming it was acting within a reference to it by the Attorney-General, when in fact it was acting ultra

vires. The resulting statements were excluded as not having been voluntarily made. 405. Traditionally, little has been required to constitute involuntariness in the case of police, with a remark such as ‘tell the truth and it will be better for you’ being sufficient; see R v Jarvis (1867) LR 1 CCR 96; R v Moore (1972) 56 Cr App R 373. But with the earlier involuntariness rule based upon various policies these decisions cannot be regarded as binding. Voluntariness is in each case one of fact. Nevertheless, the traditional formulation may be applied to presume involuntariness: see, for example, R v Bosman (1988) 50 SASR 365; Jonkers v Police (1996) 67 SASR 401. Its continuing practical influence, in both non-Uniform and Uniform Act jurisdictions, is illustrated by DPP v Toomalatai (2006) 13 VR 319 at [22]–[39] (Bell J); and R v Rahme [2001] NSWCCA 414 at [16]–[18]. 406. Sinclair v R (1946) 73 CLR 316 at 323; R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133 at 149–50; Lam Chi-ming v R [1991] 2 AC 212, where the Privy Council held that evidence confirming the reliability of a confession does not affect the issue of voluntariness insofar as it gives effect to the privilege against selfincrimination. 407. Habib v Nationwide News Ltd (2010) 79 NSWLR 299; [2010] NSWCA 34 at [227]–[234] (Hodgson, Tobias and McColl JJA). 408. Although in Tofilau at [322], Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ expressed the view that the various confessions would all have been admitted notwithstanding ss 84, 85 and 90 of the Uniform Acts. 409. (1996) 86 A Crim R 188 at 192. 410. Consequently, English cases may be of assistance in interpreting s 84. See Dennis, n 395 above; Dennis, Law of Evidence, 5th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2013, [6.07]–[6.026]. 411. It is enough that the inhuman conduct is a contributing cause: R v Ye Zhang [2000] NSWSC 1099 at [44] (Simpson J). 412. R v Bodsworth [1968] 2 NSWR 132. 413. (1991) 56 A Crim R 414 at 418; Tofilau v R (2007) 231 CLR 396 at [6]; Western Australia v Gibson (2014) 243 A Crim R 68; [2014] WASC 240 at [175] (confession involuntary as direction from support person placed tribal accused under obligation to answer police questions). 414. Perhaps counter-intuitively, false confessions seem relatively easy to procure. See generally Kassin, ‘False Confessions Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Reform’ (2008) 17 Curr Directions Psych Sci 249–53; Kassin at al, ‘Police-induced Confessions, Risk Factors, and Recommendations: Looking Ahead’ (2010) 34 Law & Human Behav 49. Interestingly, demonstrably reliable forensic science techniques have shown that confessions in sexual assault and murder cases are sometimes false. Indeed, the results of DNA evidence in the case of Colin Pitchfork, the first high profile criminal case using DNA comparison, disrupted the police investigation by suggesting that the prime suspect, who had confessed during a police interview, was excluded as a source of the semen. 415. (1980) 31 ALR 257 at 309; Tofilau v R (2007) 231 CLR 396 at [19] (Gleeson CJ). 416. But in R v Smith (1992) 58 SASR 491, Perry J held involuntary a confession made when the suspect was so drunk that she was incapable of choosing whether to speak or remain silent. This approach approved in R v Garth (1994) 73 A Crim R 215 at 220, 228 (Matheson J), 235 (Olsson J). In R v Arnott (2009) 26 VR 490; [2009] VSCA 299 at [24], Ashley JA (Nettle and Redlich JJA agreeing) cited Sinclair v R (1946) 73 CLR 316 as laying down a special rule requiring the exclusion of a confession by a person with a mental condition which would prevent him or her from being a competent witness. In Western Australia v Silich (2011) 43 WAR 285; [2011] WASCA 135 at [54], Martin CJ, quoting Sinclair, refused to consider involuntariness unless ‘the appellant was so intoxicated at the time of his interview by police that he was incapable of choosing whether or not to participate in the interview, or to understand the questions being asked and provide reasonable responses to those questions’, and at [154]– [155] (Buss JA: ‘Where an accused is intoxicated, to some extent, a confession will not be voluntary

unless the evidence demonstrates that, on the balance of probabilities, the accused was capable of appreciating that he or she had a free choice as to whether to speak or remain silent and was capable of exercising sufficient volition to give effect to what he or she knew was this right’). See also R v Sica (2012) 224 A Crim R 146; [2012] QSC 5 at [58]–[66] (Byrne SJA). 417. Sinclair v R (1946) 73 CLR 316 (accused a schizophrenic); R v Starecki [1960] VR 141 (accused suffering from head injuries); R v Ostojic (1978) 18 SASR 188 (accused under the influence of alcohol); Klemenko v Huffa (1978) 17 SASR 549 (accused with psychiatric condition); R v Bradshaw (1978) 18 SASR 83 (accused affected by drugs); R v Parker (1990) 19 NSWLR 177 (accused with psychiatric condition); R v Ainsworth (1991) 57 A Crim R 174 (SC (NSW), Hunt J) (accused tired and drunk); B (child) v Potts (1992) 59 A Crim R 136 (accused a mildly impaired 16-year-old); R v Pfitzner (1996) 66 SASR 161 (mental illness producing psychotic episodes). Doyle CJ in Pfitzner (at 173) was not prepared to express a view upon whether a confession can be involuntary in the absence of pressure external to the accused, but he continues to consider the ability of the accused to understand the significance of the occasion and the right to choose whether to speak as relevant to the question of whether to admit the confession would be unfair: at 174–82. 418. Dumoo v Gardner (1998) 143 FLR 245 at 256. 419. For example, R v Li [1993] 2 VR 80, or lack of intellectual understanding and capacity (R v Warrell [1993] 1 VR 671). In contrast to the common law involuntariness rule, s 49 (now repealed) of the Aboriginal Affairs Planning Authority Act 1972 (WA) provided that a court must refuse to accept the confession of a person of Aboriginal descent who ‘from want of comprehension of the nature of the circumstances alleged … was not capable of understanding … that admission of guilt or confession’. Applied Simon v R [2002] WASC 329; Cox v R [2002] WASCA 358. 420. Em v R (2007) 232 CLR 67 at [78] (Gleeson CJ and Heydon J). The covert recording was sanctioned by warrant, but the accused was repeatedly assured that the conversation was not being recorded and his mistaken belief that unrecorded admissions were inadmissible was never corrected. 421. R v Azar (1991) 56 A Crim R 414 at 418–20 (Gleeson CJ: though failure to caution about the right to silence may render the use of any admission unfair and may be ‘of factual relevance to the question of voluntariness’). See also R v Tracey (2005) 93 SASR 101 (Nyland J). 422. Palmer, ‘Applying Swaffield Part II: Fake Gangs and Induced Confessions’ (2005) 29 Crim LJ 111. 423. (2007) 231 CLR 396. Indeed, the majority judges considered that the confessions were made in ‘circumstances that supported’ their reliability. See generally Glazebrook, ‘Mr Big Operations: Innovative Investigative Technique or Threat to Justice?’, Judicial Colloquium 2015, 22–26 September 2015, Hong Kong. 424. Gleeson CJ at [1]; Kirby J at [168]ff; Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ at [249]ff, [320]–[323]. 425. Gleeson CJ at [16]–[19]. 426. (1950) 82 CLR 133 at 154. 427. These are words of limitation and are found also in s 85: McClellan J in R v Munce [2001] NSWSC 1072 at [31]; and see 8.130. Potential unreliability, unrelated to the circumstances in which the admission was made, will not give rise to an exercise of discretion under s 90. The common law fairness discretion does not embody this limitation. 428. (1998) 192 CLR 159 at 189. 429. Under s 90 of the Uniform Acts, the circumstances in which the admission was made must give rise to this potential unreliability; otherwise it must technically be considered under s 137. See also nn 427 and 430. 430. See, for example, R v Hasler; Ex parte Attorney-General [1987] 1 Qd R 239, although, first, it might be

argued that in such circumstances exclusion is not a matter of discretion but should be determined by the Makin rule, and, secondly, prejudicial information can usually be severed so that the confessional statement remains admissible (as in R v Kallis [1994] 2 Qd R 88, where a videotaped interview was edited to exclude prejudicial statements; see also R v Heaney and Walsh [1998] 4 VR 636 at 647). This sort of unfairness, unless arising from the circumstances in which the admission was made, would again call for consideration under s 137 rather than s 90 of the Uniform Acts. 431. The unfairness illustrated by this example would arise from the circumstances in which the admission was made and be capable of consideration under s 90 of the Uniform Acts. 432. Cf R v Cowan [2015] QCA 87 at [77] (McMurdo P, Fraser JA agreeing, distinguishing simply between matters of rectitude and of public policy). But in R v Playford [2013] 2 Qd R 567; [2013] QCA 109 at [4]–[6], [12] the same judge distinguished between the fairness discretion protecting the rights of the individual accused on the one hand and the public policy discretion protecting the interests of the community on the other, recognising that in this form the discretions overlapped, and not criticising the judge for not dealing with each discretion separately. A similar approach is taken in R v Sica (2013) 232 A Crim R 572; [2013] QCA 247 at [54]–[61] (Muir and Gotterson JJA and Applegarth J). 433. See Rozenes v Beljajev [1995] 1 VR 533 for a forceful presentation of this approach in a non-confessional context. 434. (1946) 73 CLR 316; applied in R v Stiles (1990) 50 A Crim R 13 (CCA (Vic)); R v Pfitzner (1996) 66 SASR 161 (where Doyle CJ remarks at 177 that ‘the presence of a mental disorder which makes it possible that a confession is unreliable, in the sense that the mental disorder is such that one cannot accept it as intrinsically likely to be true, is not sufficient to render a confession inadmissible’); R v Arnott (2009) 26 VR 490; [2009] VSCA 299 at [24] (Ashley JA, Nettle and Redlich JJA agreeing). In Riley v R [2011] NSWCCA 238 at [155]–[158], s 90 was not engaged as jury able to assess reliability and in R v Jarrett [2012] NSWCCA 81 an interlocutory appeal against exclusion under s 90 succeeded as there was no evidence of the accused’s mental condition at the time the admission was made. The common law principles applying in the case of confessions by the mentally disabled are usefully summarised by Gleeson CJ in R v Parker (1990) 19 NSWLR 177 at 183–4. 435. R v Starecki [1960] VR 141; R v Buchanan [1966] VR 9 at 14–15 (Sholl J). 436. Morris v R (1987) 163 CLR 454; R v Pfitzner (1996) 66 SASR 161 (CCA held confession of a mentally ill accused admissible but quashed the conviction as unsafe). 437. See, for example, cases at n 395 above asserting subjective approach to s 85. 438. (1985) 38 SASR 226. 439. (1993) 113 ALR 1. 440. See also R v Smith (1996) 86 A Crim R 398 at 403 (in a case where the police failed to videotape the interview, Franklyn J held that depriving the accused of the opportunity to have voluntariness determined by reference to a video recording made it unfair to admit the evidence against him). 441. (1998) 192 CLR 159 at 198. 442. (1950) 82 CLR 133. 443. (1970) 126 CLR 321. 444. (1978) 141 CLR 54. 445. (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 33–6. 446. (1989) 83 ALR 650 at 653; see also his judgment in Collins v R (1980) 31 ALR 257. Applied by Doyle CJ in R v Murphy (1996) 66 SASR 406 at 411. 447. See Brennan J in Duke v R (1989) 83 LR 650.

448. See Deane J in Cleland v R (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 25. 449. See, for example, Deane J in Pollard v R (1992) 176 CLR 177 at 200–5. 450. (1998) 192 CLR 159. Cases expressly applying Swaffield and the approach here argued include Dumoo v Garner (1998) 143 FLR 245 at 265 (Kearney J); R v Bondareff, Usachov and McCabe (1999) 74 SASR 353 at [71]–[72] (CCA); R v Spencer (2000) 113 A Crim R 252 at 261–2 (Thomas J). 451. (1970) 126 CLR 132 at 335. 452. (1998) 192 CLR 159 at 181. 453. (2007) 232 CLR 67. See also discussion of this case at 2.34–2.35. 454. According to Gleeson CJ and Heydon J at [67]–[68], [78], once the warrant for the listening device had been obtained, Em ‘possessed no right not to be recorded’. Contrast R v Frangulis [2006] NSWCCA 363 at [33] (Hidden J); and Higgins v R [2007] NSWCCA 56 at [30]–[40] (Hoeben J) where those conducting the interviews were not police officers (that is, investigating officials) or agents of the state. 455. (2007) 232 CLR 67 at [78] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). Cf R v Hein [2013] SASCFC 97 at [12]–[18] (Vanstone J: where police questioning misled suspect and no attempt was made to disabuse her of the misunderstanding); R v Simmons (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 189 at [151]–[152] (Hamill J: admissions made after accused had exercised right to silence and police induced admissions by saying further conversation ‘off the record’ excluded under s 90 as unfair to admit). 456. In R v Schaeffer (2005) 13 VR 337 at [6], Warren CJ thought that the failure of a police officer to put to the suspect admissions, overheard while the accused made a telephone call during a break in an interview, made it unfair to admit the evidence. The failure to question about the admissions meant that the opportunity to respond ‘on an early and spontaneous basis was irreparably lost’. 457. (1998) 192 CLR 159. For further discussion of Swaffield, see 2.32–2.34, 2.36 and 5.260. The public policy discretion is discussed more generally at 2.36–2.37 and 5.255ff. 458. (1980) 31 ALR 257 at 317; applied in R v Zorad (1990) 19 NSWLR 91 at 99; R v Ainsworth (1991) 57 A Crim R 174 (CCA (NSW)). 459. Cleland (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 9 (Gibbs CJ, with whom Wilson J agreed), 34–5 (Dawson J). See also Gibbs CJ in Williams v R (1986) 161 CLR 278 at 286. 460. In Cleland at 27, Deane J states: ‘[W]here a confession has been procured while the accused was unlawfully imprisoned by the police, special circumstances, such as the illegality being slight, would commonly need to exist before the balancing of considerations of public policy would fail to favour the exclusion of evidence of the confession’. 461. (1993) 113 ALR 1; (1992) 176 CLR 177, respectively. 462. (1998) 192 CLR 159. 463. This approach is endorsed in R v Bondareff, Usachov and McCabe (1999) 74 SASR 353 at [71]–[72] (CCA). 464. See, for example, R v Suckling [1999] NSWCCA 36; and R v Fernando [1999] NSWCCA 66, where in both cases Swaffield was applied in refusing to exclude under ‘either s 90 or s 138’; R v Helmhout [2001] NSWCCA 372 at [11] (Ipp AJA). 465. Em v R (2007) 232 CLR 67 at [109] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). Applied in R v Cooney [2013] NSWCCA 312 at [8], where Leeming JA (Latham and Johnson JJA agreeing) held that ‘regard to [impropriety] through the prism of s 90 by the primary judge [and not s 138] in my view amounts to error which engages House v The King review’; and R v Meade (2013) 233 A Crim R 40; [2013] VSC 250 at [115]–[116] (Weinberg JA). In R v Sumpton [2014] NSWSC 1432 at [100]–[119], Hamill J was not restrained by s 138 in considering impropriety also in the context of s 84. In Tasmania v Challender

[2007] 16 Tas R 339 at [15], procedural impropriety amongst other considerations taken into account by Blow J to justify exclusion under s 90 rather than s 138. See Garsia, ‘The Unsettled Safety Net of the Unfairness Discretion: Section 90 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) in Em v The Queen’ (2008) 30 Syd LR 715. 466. R v Helmhout [2001] NSWCCA 372 at [10]–[12] (Ipp AJA), [39]–[41] (Hulme J), [62] (Sperling J). 467. A wide notion further extended by s 138(2) to include conduct by the questioner which he or she knows or ought reasonably to have known will impair substantially the ability of the person questioned to respond rationally to the questioning, and any false statement he or she knows or ought reasonably to have known will cause the person questioned to make an admission. 468. It also appears to have been implicitly rejected by Hulme J in R v Helmhout [2001] NSWCCA 372 at [49]–[52]. 469. Dennis, The Law of Evidence, n 410 above, at [2.022]–[2.029]. 470. See, for example, R v Stafford (1976) 13 SASR 392; Walker v Marklew (1976) 14 SASR 463; R v Eyres (1977) 16 SASR 226; R v Fieldhouse (1977) 17 SASR 92; R v Ajax (1977) 17 SASR 88; R v Killick (1979) 21 SASR 321; T v Waye (1983) 35 SASR 247; R v Hallam and Karger (1985) 42 SASR 126. 471. R v Hart [1979] Qd R 8 (Qld); McKellar v Smith [1982] 2 NSWLR 950 (NSW) R v Larson and Lee [1984] VR 559 (Vic). 472. (1984) 1 FCR 416. 473. Presser, ‘Public Policy, Police Interest: A Re-Evaluation of the Judicial Discretion to Exclude Improperly or Illegally Obtained Evidence’ (2001) 25 Melb ULR 757. 474. In South Australia, Bray CJ took this approach: see Ligertwood, ‘The Evidentiary Bray’ (1980) 7 Adel LR 138 at 139–46. 475. Those cases which consider impropriety in the context of a discretion for guaranteeing fairness to the accused often do not appear to recognise a weighing process as applying: see, for example, Seymour v Attorney-General (Cth) (1984) 1 FCR 416; R v Larson and Lee [1984] VR 559; R v Hallam and Karger (1985) 42 SASR 126. 476. Some legislation pre-empts exercise of the discretion by itself providing evidence inadmissible if procedural guidelines are breached: for example, that demanding the electronic recording of the police questioning of suspects: see n 575 below. 477. See, for example, R v Camilleri (2007) 169 A Crim R 197 at [35] (McClellan CJ at CL). 478. See generally Lawbook Co, The Laws of Australia, looseleaf, ‘11.1: Criminal Investigation’. 479. Cf R v Leung [2012] NSWSC 1451 at [21]–[25] (Price J holding it ‘unfair’ to admit admissional communications made to a health professional protected by s 126A of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)). 480. Failure to answer questions is not an offence unless legislation so provides: Rice v Connolly [1966] 2 QB 414. 481. An arrest is lawfully constituted by the deprivation of the suspect’s freedom and by the suspect being informed of the reasons for his or her detention: Christie v Leachinsky [1947] AC 573 at 586–7; Alderson v Booth [1969] 2 QB 216 at 221. But a de facto deprivation of liberty will give rise to those procedural obligations (common law and statutory) owed to the suspect on arrest: see, for example, R v Lavery (1978) 19 SASR 515 at 516–17; R v Easton (1988) 144 LSJS 107; Van der Meer v R (1988) 92 ALR 10 at 27–8 (suspects not in de facto custody when questioned); R v Trotter (1992) 58 SASR 223 (SC (SA), Perry J); Norton v R (2001) 24 WAR 488 at 515–17 (accused voluntarily accompanied police). These matters are expressly provided for in some legislation permitting custodial investigation: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 23B(2); Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) Pt 9 s 111;

Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 464(1) (DPP v Meade (No 1) (2013) 233 A Crim R 40; [2013] VSC 250 at [36]–[42] (Weinberg JA) (accused not ‘in custody’). 482. This common law notion which gave the power to arrest for felony (see Williams, ‘Arrest for Felony at Common Law’ [1954] Crim LR 408) is embodied in legislation which gives power to police to apprehend suspects. For example, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 3W; Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) s 99; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 546; Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) Ch 14 Pt 1; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 75; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 27; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 459; Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA) ss 127–128; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 212; Police Administration Act 1978 (NT) s 123(1). 483. Williams v R (1986) 161 CLR 278; R v Ainsworth (1991) 57 A Crim R 174 (CCA (NSW)); R v Bell (1995) 77 A Crim R 213 at 216–17 (Gleeson CJ), 221 (Priestley JA); Michaels v R (1995) 184 CLR 117 at 124. 484. Legislation in each Australian jurisdiction now gives the police power to grant bail following arrest and pending court appearance: Bail Act 2013 (NSW) s 43; Bail Act 1980 (Qld) s 7; Bail Act 1985 (SA) ss 5(1)(e), 6(3); Justices Act 1959 (Tas) s 34, Criminal Law (Detention and Interrogation) Act 1995 (Tas) s 4(3); Bail Act 1977 (Vic) s 10; Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA) s 142; Bail Act 1982 (WA) s 6; Bail Act 1992 (ACT) ss 13, 14; Bail Act 1982 (NT) s 16. 485. Williams v R (1986) 161 CLR 278. 486. Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) Pt IC ss 23A–23V. 487. Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 (NSW) Pt 9; Police Powers and Responsibility Act 2000 (Qld) Ch 15; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) Subdiv 30A, in particular ss 464A–464B; Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA) Pt 12 Div 5; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) ss 78, 79A (discussed in R v Bennett and Clark (1986) 44 SASR 164; Santos v R (1987) 61 ALJR 668); Criminal Law (Detention and Interrogation) Act 1995 (Tas) in particular s 4; Police Administration Act 1978 (NT) Pt VIII Divs 6, 6A in particular ss 136–138. 488. The Commonwealth legislation and that in New South Wales, Queensland, Tasmania, Western Australia and the Northern Territory permits the investigation of offences other than that for which the accused is arrested. In Victoria and South Australia, the suspect may only be detained to investigate the offence for which the suspect has been apprehended. Magisterial permission may be sought to question and investigate another offence: R v Heaney [1992] 2 VR 531 at 552–5. 489. If the suspect is not in custody within the meaning of the legislation the statutory protections will not apply: see, for example, R v Vollmer [1996] 1 VR 95 at 122–4. The legislation does not permit arrest for the purpose of questioning: R v Dungay [2001] NSWCCA 443 at [17]–[31] (Ipp JA). 490. So long as the solicitor is not obstructive: see R v Watkins (1989) 50 SASR 467. See also Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) ss 424–426. 491. See 8.168. 492. Discussed in R v Heaney [1992] 2 VR 531 at 550–1. 493. For a ‘human rights’ critique of such legislation, see Head, ‘“Counter-Terrorism” Laws: A Threat to Political Freedom, Civil Liberties and Human Rights’ (2002) 26 Melb ULR 666. For further discussion of counter-terrorism legislation, see the Symposium in (2004) 27(2) UNSW LJ; Lynch and Williams, What Price Security? Taking Stock of Australia’s Anti-terror Laws, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2006; and Lynch, McGarity and Williams, Inside Australia’s Anti-Terrorism Laws and Trials, NewSouth Publishing, Sydney, 2015.

494. See, for example, legislation in Chapter 5, n 651 and XZ v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92; [2013] HCA 29; Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196; [2013] HCA 39, where such legislation was challenged; and Lee v R (2014) 253 CLR 455; [2014] HCA 20, where unauthorised access by the prosecution led to a miscarriage of justice. See further 5.108, 5.183. 495. Teh, ‘An Examination of the Judges’ Rules in Australia’ (1972) 46 ALJ 89; Van der Meer v R (1988) 82 ALR 10 at 15–16 (Mason CJ), 26 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ), 32–3 (Deane J). See also R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159 at 202–3 (Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ), 214–15 (Kirby J); R v Meade (2013) 233 A Crim R 40; [2013] VSC 250 at [57]–[63] (Weinberg JA). The rules are the basis of police standing orders in most jurisdictions. Some Australian courts have been prepared to use the 1964 English Judges’ Rules: see, for example, R v Hart [1979] Qd R 8. 496. Arrest will signal this decision. Delaying a caution until arrest permits police to complete their inquiries before advising the suspect of the right to silence: R v Williams (1976) 14 SASR 1. 497. Van der Meer v R (1988) 82 ALR 10 at 18–19. In R v Trotter (1992) 60 A Crim R 1 at 14–16 (SC (SA)), Perry J interprets Mason CJ as requiring a caution ‘when the police have sufficient evidence to justify a charge, even though they are undecided whether or not to proceed with a charge’. See also Coleman v Zanker (1992) 58 SASR 7 at 15–16 (Olsson J); R v Ellis (1992) 58 SASR 117. In R v Dolan (1992) 58 SASR 501 at 505, King CJ says the caution should be given if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting a particular person, particularly if a formal interview is held. There were held to be no such grounds in R v Harris (1995) 64 SASR 85; and in R v To and Tran (2006) 96 SASR 1 at [13]–[28] (Vanstone J), the accusatory stage of the investigation had not been reached during an initial conversation so there was no obligation to caution. Whilst accepting King CJ’s approach as a general guide to fairness Doyle CJ distinguished Dolan in R v Murphy (1996) 66 SASR 406 at 414 and held that it was not unfair to admit a confession made where the accused well understood he was suspected of murder and had access to legal advice during police questioning. See also Sell v R (1995) 15 WAR 240, where although accepting the caution should be made at the accusatory stage Malcolm CJ held it was not unfair to admit unrecorded confessions as they were clearly reliable. See also Kelly v R (1995) 12 WAR 405 (no caution required where accused a mere suspect and the accusatory stage of the inquiry has not been reached). In R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159 at 215, Kirby J said the caution is only required where police decide to charge. In Jager v Lynch (2003) 12 Tas R 195 at [7], Blow J considered admissions made in an unsolicited letter sent to Centrelink, in response to a formal request for an interview, not to have been made in response to ‘questioning’ or contrary to any provisions of the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) requiring a caution. In R v Meade (2013) 233 A Crim R 40; [2013] VSC 250 at [64]–[87], Weinberg JA held that questioning before defendant regarded a suspect did not attract the caution. 498. The following provisions exist in addition to s 139 of the uniform legislation: Cth: Crimes Act 1914 s 23F; NSW: Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Act 2002 s 122(1); Qld: Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 s 431 and Police Powers and Responsibilities Regulation 2000, Sch 10, s 37; SA: Summary Offences Act 1953 s 79A(1)(b)(iii),(3); Vic: Crimes Act 1958 s 464A(3); WA: Criminal Investigation Act 2006 s 138(2)(b) and (3); ACT: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 23A(6) (applying investigative provisions to the investigation of ACT offences punishable by imprisonment for a period exceeding 12 months); Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 186 (applying Pt 1C of the Crimes Act (Cth) to the investigation of summary ACT offences); NT: Police Administration Act s 140. Tasmania simply relies upon s 139 of its Uniform Evidence Act. 499. R v Pearce [2001] NSWCCA 447 at [103]. 500. R v Taylor [1999] ACTSC 47 at [19]–[20] (Higgins J); R v Deng [2001] NSWCCA 153 at [17]; R v Age (2011) 257 FLR 85; [2011] NTSC 104 (confession excluded as clear to police that the accused did not understand the caution).

501. The obligation to stop questioning on refusal to answer questions is recognised in R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321 at 333; R v Stafford (1976) 12 SASR 501 at 507 (Bray CJ); R v Hart [1979] Qd R 8 at 13; R v Cumes (1990) 102 FLR 113 (SC (NT), Nader J); R v Pfennig (No 1) (1992) 57 SASR 507 (confession to a fellow prisoner on remand acting as a police informer was excluded where the accused had previously refused to answer questions); Western Australia v May (2011) 215 A Crim R 199; [2011] WASC 365. Cf R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159 (confession obtained through clandestine recording after accused refused to answer at formal interrogation admitted where not elicited through questioning). But the obligation is by no means absolute: R v Merritt and Roso (1985) 19 A Crim R 360 at 375; R v Clarke (1997) 97 A Crim R 414 at 419 (Hunt CJ at CL); R v Phan [2001] NSWCCA 29 at [54]–[56]; R v Crooks [2001] 2 Qd R 541. 502. Norton v R (2001) 24 WAR 488 at [133]. In Lee-Wright v Police (2010) 109 SASR 96; [2010] SASC 353, Vanstone J held that where police had cautioned but then told the accused he was obliged to answer some questions the failure to caution when police moved to questions where there was no obligation to answer was an impropriety enlivening the exclusionary discretion. 503. Williams v R (1986) 161 CLR 278 (only Gibbs CJ dissented from this proposition); Norton v R (2001) 24 WAR 488 at [90], [118]. 504. See the legislation listed at n 484 above; cf R v Ng (2002) 5 VR 257 at [104]–[106], [119]. 505. Williams v R (1986) 161 CLR 278 at 306 (Wilson and Dawson JJ); Santos v R (1987) 61 ALJR 668 at 670 (HC); R v Khalil (1987) 44 SASR 23; R v Warner (1988) 49 SASR 125. 506. Williams v R (1986) 161 CLR 278. 507. For an example of such improper arrest, see R v Hallam and Karger (1985) 42 SASR 126. 508. The desirability of a parent being present in some cases is recognised in Peters v R (1987) 23 A Crim R 451 (CCA (WA)). 509. Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 23K; Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW) s 13; Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) s 421 (must be statement to police officer: R v T and M; Ex parte Attorney-General [1999] 2 Qd R 424); Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) s 29; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 79A(1a), (1b); Young Offenders Act 1993 (SA) s 14; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 464E; Young Offenders Act 1994 (WA) s 20; Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA) s 136; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) Subdiv 10.7.2; Youth Justices Act 2005 (NT) ss 15, 18. 510. Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW) s 13. Discussed in Scarlett, ‘Children’s Statements to Police: Admissible Evidence or Not?’ [1992] Law Soc J 38. See also R v Cotton (1990) 19 NSWLR 593; R v T [2001] NSWCCA 210; Spurling v R [2006] NSWCCA 2; Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Regulations 2005 (NSW) Pt 3 Div 3. 511. For example, R v FE [2013] NSWSC 1692 at [125] (Adamson J: persistent questioning of vulnerable 15-year-old girl after her refusal to talk and without caution led to exclusion of admissions under ss 90 (at [123]–[126]) and 138 (at [103]–[119])). 512. General Order 3015 was applied in R v Ajax (1977) 17 SASR 88 (confessions excluded); R v S and J (1983) 32 SASR 174 (confessions admitted). See also ALRC, The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Law: Report 31, AGPS, Canberra, 1986, at [554]–[560]; Johnston, Hinton and Rigney, Indigenous Australians and the Law, 2nd ed, Routledge-Cavendish, Abingdon, 2008, pp 95–7. 513. (1976) 11 ALR 412. Applied in, for example, R v Age (2011) 257 FLR 85; [2011] NTSC 104, where further steps required under Anunga Rules to ensure understanding of caution. 514. Discussed in Collins v R (1980) 31 ALR 257; R v Jabarula (1984) 11 A Crim R 131; R v Gudabi (1984) 1 FCR 187; MDO (a child) v McKinlay (1984) 31 NTR 1; R v Anderson (1991) 57 A Crim R 143 (SC (NT)); R v Jimmy Butler (No 1) (1991) 57 A Crim R 451; R v Echo (1997) 6 NTLR 51; R v Bara (1998)

106 A Crim R 1 (SC (NT)); Dumoo v Gardner (1998) 7 NTLR 129; R v Spencer (2000) 113 A Crim R 252 (SC (NT)); R v LHH (2002) 132 A Crim R 498 (Mildren J). 515. R v Ninnal (1992) 109 FLR 203; R v Echo (1997) 6 NTLR 51; R v RR [2009] NTSC 44; Western Australia v Gibson (2014) 243 A Crim R 68; [2014] WASC 240 (Hall J) at [82]–[84] (interpreter required), [116] (no understanding of caution demonstrated); but cf Kearney J’s approach and conclusion in Dumoo v Gardner (1998) 7 NTLR 129. 516. [1993] 1 VR 671 (police instructions). See also Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) Regulations 2005 (NSW) Pt 3 Div 3; Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) ss 422, 423. 517. Confessions by children excluded wholly or in part: Walker v Marklew (1976) 14 SASR 463; McKellar v Smith [1982] 2 NSWLR 950; T v Waye (1983) 35 SASR 247; DPP v Blake [1989] 1 WLR 432; R v Cotton (1990) 19 NSWLR 593. Confessions by Aborigines excluded: Walker v Marklew (1976) 14 SASR 463; R v Ajax (1977) 17 SASR 88; Rockman v Stevens (1981) 1 Aboriginal Law Bull 6; R v Jabarula (1984) 11 A Crim R 131; Dumoo v Gardner (1998) 7 NTLR 129 at 258–60; Cox v R [2002] WASCA 358 at [54]; Western Australia v Gibson (2014) 243 A Crim R 68; [2014] WASC 240 (commands of ‘support person’ undermined voluntariness of admissions); but cf R v Duncan and Perre [2004] NSWCCA 431 at [251]–[266] (Wood CJ at CL). See also the discussion of the role of the prisoner’s friend in R v Gudabi (1984) 1 FCR 187 at 199–200; R v Jimmy Butler (No 1) (1991) 57 A Crim R 451 at 452–6 (SC (NT), Kearney J); R v Weetra (1993) 93 NTR 8 at 11 (Mildren J). In R v Warrell [1993] 1 VR 671, the confession of an intellectually disabled person was excluded in exercise of the discretion as the third party, whose presence was required by police instructions, was not given the opportunity to talk privately to the suspect. There is no obligation for the support person to caution the suspect: JB v R [2012] NSWCCA 12 at [23]–[44] (Whealy JA, Hislop J and Grove AJ agreeing). See also Boersig, ‘The Duty of “A Responsible Person” Under Section 13 of The Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW)’ (2002) QUT Law & Justice Journal 14. 518. (1995) 184 CLR 19 at 37 (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ). 519. R v Lavery (No 2) (1979) 20 SASR 430 at 460 (Wells J); Van der Meer v R (1988) 82 ALR 10 at 19–20 (Mason CJ), 32–6 (Deane J). 520. Van Der Meer v R (1988) 82 ALR 10 at 20 (Mason CJ), 37–8 (Deane J). 521. R v Linnane (1979) 32 SASR 72; R v Sharp (1983) 33 SASR 366; R v Mason [1988] 1 WLR 139; R v Anderson (1991) 57 A Crim R 143 (SC (NT), Martin J); R v Hein [2013] SASCFC 97 at [12]–[18] (Vanstone J: improper for police questioning to mislead suspect and no attempt be made to disabuse suspect of misunderstanding). At common law, an untrue representation may also lead to involuntariness: Cleland v R (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 14–15 (Murphy J); cf Tofilau v R (2007) 231 CLR 396 at [349]–[360] (Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ: confessions to undercover agents admitted). For examples of exclusion where conversations induced by police as ‘off the record’: R v Noakes (1986) 42 SASR 489; R v Bennett and Clark (1986) 44 SASR 164 at 184; cf R v Sumption [2014] NSWSC 1432 at [76] (Hamill J: misleading statement about secondary transfer of blood vigorously pursued unfair to admit under s 90 of the uniform legislation); R v Simmons (No 3) [2015] NSWSC 189 at [151]–[152] (Hamill J: admissions made after accused had exercised right to silence and police induced admissions by saying further conversation ‘off the record’ excluded under s 90 of the uniform legislation). In R v Elliott (SC (Vic), 6 May 1996, unreported), Vincent J held involuntary statements made to the NCA where it was acting outside its terms of reference and had therefore wrongly held out that it was entitled to conduct compulsory questioning. In R v McNeil (No 1) (2007) 209 FLR 124 at [99], Weinberg CJ considered that ‘untrue representations’ required wilfulness in the sense of being made ‘with the object of extorting a confession’; upheld in McNeill v R (2008) 168 FCR 198. Mistaken assumptions not induced by police may attract s 90: Tasmania v Stebbings (2015) 248 A Crim R 128; [2015] TASSC 9 at [71]–[74] (Porter J: holding not unfair to admit admissions in case before him).

522. R v Fieldhouse (1977) 17 SASR 92; R v Hart (1977) 17 SASR 100; cf R v Szach (1980) 23 SASR 504 at 582–6; R v Vollmer [1996] 1 VR 95 at 123–4 (Southwell and McDonald JJ); R v Porter [2002] SASC 347 (Mulligan J). This may be a particular problem under s 89A of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). See Hamer and Edmond, ‘When You Say Nothing at all: NSW and the Right to Silence’, The Conversation, 22 March 2013. 523. Kirby J, the sole dissentient in Em v R (2007) 232 CLR 67 and Tofilau v R (2007) 231 CLR 396, expressed this anxiety: discussed at 8.133 and 8.142. See R v O’Neill [1996] 2 Qd R 326; R v Davidson and Moyle; Ex parte Attorney-General [1996] 2 Qd R 505; R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (above); R v Heaney and Walsh [1998] 4 VR 636; R v T and M; Ex parte A-G [1999] 2 Qd R 424; R v Lewis [2000] 1 VR 290 at [49]–[58]; R v Koelman [2000] 2 VR 20; R v Franklin (2001) 119 A Crim R 223 (CCA (Vic)); R v Roba (2000) 110 A Crim R 245 (SC (Vic)); R v Carter (2001) 1 VR 175; R v Dewhirst (2001) 122 A Crim R 403 (SC (Vic)); R v Vale [2001] WASCA 21 (CCA (WA)); Foo v R (2001) 161 FLR 279 (CCA (NT)); R v Kiah (2001) 120 A Crim R 365 (CCA (NT)); R v Juric (2002) 4 VR 411; R v Fraser [2004] 2 Qd R 544; [2004] QCA 092; Pavitt v R (2007) 169 A Crim R 452; [2007] NSWCCA 88 at [170] (McColl JA and Latham J); Western Australia v May (2011) 215 A Crim R 199; [2011] WASC 365; R v Burton (2013) 237 A Crim R 238; [2013] NSWCCA 335 at [123]–[132] (Simpson J, RA Hulme J and Barr AJ agreeing). See generally Palmer, ‘Police Deception, the Right to Silence and the Discretionary Exclusion of Confessions’ (1998) 22 Crim LJ 325; Martinez, ‘Confessions and Admissions to Undercover Police and Police Agents’ (2000) 74 Aust LJ 391. But care must be taken not to breach that legislation which regulates the use of listening devices: Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth); Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NSW) (interpreted to permit recording by child of conversation with her molester: DW v R (2014) 239 A Crim R 192; [2014] NSWCCA 228); Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972 (SA); Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas); Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT); Surveillance Devices Act 2007 (NT). In R v Truong (1996) 86 A Crim R 188, Miles CJ held that despite the reverse onus provision of s 138 of the uniform legislation, a secret but reliable recording mistakenly obtained in breach of s 12F of the Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth) was admissible. 524. Seymour v Attorney-General (Cth) (1984) 1 FCR 416. Where there is no such abuse, answers given in formal proceedings in ignorance of, or without invoking, the privilege against self-incrimination are admissible (being voluntary, reliable and fairly obtained) in subsequent proceedings: R v Clyne [1985] 2 NSWLR 740; R v Zion [1986] VR 609. Unwilling answers compellable on statutory inquiry may also be admissible: DPP (NSW) v Alderman (1998) 45 NSWLR 526 at 533–7 (although courts will only interpret legislation as sanctioning the removal of the privilege against self-incrimination in this way where this is unambiguously expressed: see further at 5.183). 525. Discussed in Pavitt v R (2007) 169 A Crim R 452; [2007] NSWCCA 88 at [70], where McColl JA and Latham J provide a useful list of propositions for analysing the admissibility of such representations under ss 90 and 138 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW); applied in R v Burton (2013) 237 A Crim R 238; [2013] NSWCCA 335 at [123]–[132] (Simpson J, RA Hulme J and Barr AJ agreeing). In each case, to the extent that the complainant was not an agent (or ‘puppet’) of the police and the alleged perpetrator had not refused to speak to police, there were no reasons to think any admissions unreliable, and nor was the freedom to speak impugned. See also R v Burt [2000] 1 Qd R 28; R v M (2002) 135 A Crim R 324 (QCA). 526. (2007) 231 CLR 396. See also R v Cowan [2015] QCA 87 at [88]–[91] (McMurdo P, Fraser JA agreeing, explaining that mere deception was not sufficient to exclude the confession of a dangerous criminal). 527. (1995) 184 CLR 19 at 39; see further 4.52–4.53 and 5.258–5.260. Earlier decisions which suggest automatic exclusion or stay where police actively encourage offences must be regarded as now overruled: Hunt v Wark (1986) 40 SASR 489; R v Vuckov (1986) 40 SASR 498; R v Papoulias [1988]

VR 858; R v Venn-Brown [1991] 1 Qd R 458; R v Hsing (1991) 25 NSWLR 685. 528. Ridgeway v R (1995) 184 CLR 19; R v Fraser [2004] 2 Qd R 544; QCA 92 (confession to fellow prisoner and police informer by deception to which police not complicit did not lead to exclusion on grounds of unfairness or public policy). See further 4.52–4.53 and 5.259–5.260. 529. (1998) 192 CLR 159. 530. (1978) 141 CLR 54. Discussed at 5.256. 531. For example, arresting to interrogate: R v Larson and Lee [1984] VR 559; R v Hallam and Karger (1985) 42 SASR 126; Foster v R (1993) 113 ALR 1; continuing to question a suspect following refusal to answer: R v Stafford (1976) 12 SASR 501; R v Hart [1979] Qd R 8; R v Cumes (1990) 102 FLR 113; but cf Robinson v R (1996) 89 A Crim R 42; covertly recording and questioning after refusal to answer: R v Swaffield; Pavic v R (1998) 192 CLR 159; R v Roba (2000) 110 A Crim R 245 (SC (Vic)); R v Dewhirst (2001) 122 A Crim R 403 (SC (Vic)); or acting in reckless disregard of statutory procedures: Pollard v R (1992) 176 CLR 177 (distinguished in R v Tang, Dang and Quach [1998] 3 VR 508); R v Bondareff (1999) 74 SASR 351; R v Cvitko (2000) 159 FLR 403. 532. For example, R v Halse (1980) 25 SASR 510 (breach unintentional); Collins v R (1980) 31 ALR 257 (police had made reasonable efforts to comply with the Anunga Rules and an interpreter was present); R v Ainsworth (1991) 57 A Crim R 174 at 185 (police did not act in reckless disregard of the law and the confession was reliable); R v Lancaster [1998] 4 VR 550 (even if not informed exactly of reason for questioning no unfairness to accused); R v Frugtniet and Frugtniet [1999] 2 VR 297 (any breach cured before formal interview begun); R v Nicholas [2000] 1 VR 356 at 389 (no deliberate breach of law or other unfairness); R v Camilleri (2007) 169 A Crim R 197 at [35] (where the breach was innocent and offence alleged serious ‘there must be powerful countervailing considerations before the evidence should be rejected’). Cf where the evidence was obtained in deliberate, wilful or even reckless disregard of an individual’s civil rights in Parker v Comptroller-General of Customs (2007) 243 ALR 574 at [65] (Basten JA). 533. See, for example, cases at n 514 above. In R v FE [2013] NSWSC 1692 at [125], Adamson J excluded persistent questioning of a 15-year-old girl without caution. In Western Australia v Gibson (2014) 243 A Crim R 68; [2014] WASC 240 at [176]–[179] (Hall J), questioning of tribal Aboriginal suspect excluded where failure to record or provide interpreter as required by Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA). 534. For example, Cox J in R v Halse (1980) 25 SASR 510. 535. [1982] 2 NSWLR 950 at 961. 536. For example, Johnston J in R v Bennett and Clark (1986) 44 SASR 164; Wallwork J in R v Smith (1996) 86 A Crim R 398 at 410; cf Victorian courts which have consistently refused to interpret Pollard v R (1992) 176 CLR 177 as laying down any exclusionary presumption where there have been breaches of statutory rights and regard the ‘seriousness of the breach’ as decisive: R v Heaney [1992] 2 VR 531 at 554–5; R v Percerep [1993] VR 109; R v Crupi (1996) 86 A Crim R 229. 537. (1998) SASR 1. 538. (1998) 192 CLR 159 at 189. 539. (1996) 86 A Crim R 188. 540. For example, R v Austin (1979) 21 SASR 315 at 319; Collins v R (1980) 31 ALR 257; R v Byczko and McCloud (1982) 30 SASR 578; R v Gudabi (1984) 1 FCR 187 at 200; R v Merritt and Roso (1985) 19 A Crim R 360 at 372–3 (SC (NSW), Hunt J); R v Narula (1985) 22 A Crim R 409 (CCA (Vic)); Peters v R (1987) 23 A Crim R 451 (CCA (WA)); Robinson v R (1996) 89 A Crim R 42 at 57 (CCA (Vic)); R v Bartlett [1996] 2 VR 687. 541. (1936) 55 CLR 499.

542. See further 2.26 nn 120–122. 543. These propositions are now beyond dispute in Australia: see MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 519–20 (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J), 532 (Mason J); Cleland v R (1982) 151 CLR 1 at 19 (Deane J), and the authorities cited in that case. Although the prosecution bears the evidential and persuasive burdens of establishing voluntariness, in tactical terms the accused will have to point to some aspect of the prosecution evidence which suggests the confession was not voluntarily made. Tactically, once there is evidence of some external pressure — in particular pressure that can be regarded as a threat or promise held out by a person in authority — the confession must be excluded unless the prosecution can satisfy the court that the pressure had no causative effect upon the accused: R v Bosman (1988) 50 SASR 365. 544. R v GH (2000) 105 FCR 419 at [59] (Miles J). 545. R v Farr (2000) 118 A Crim R 399 at [75] (Smart AJ). See also at 2.27. 546. MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 520 (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J), 532 (Mason J), 542 (Brennan J). See also uniform legislation s 189(1), (2). 547. MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 523 (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J) and 533–4 (Mason J); R v Walbank [1996] 1 Qd R 78 (judge must determine voluntariness even where objection has not been taken at the earliest opportunity). 548. MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 524 (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J), 534–5 (Mason J, who held that it is sufficient for the judge merely to inform an unrepresented accused of his or her right to a voir dire), 536–7 (Aickin J), 543 (Brennan J). Where counsel for a represented accused fails to take a voluntariness point it is unlikely that a trial judge can do more than inform counsel that the point is there. Tactical reasons may influence a counsel’s decision not to take a particular point and the court should not interfere. 549. R v Johns (1999) 110 A Crim R 149 at [31]–[32] (Greg James J, CCA (NSW)). 550. MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 520–3 (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J), 536 (Mason J); Ajodha v State [1982] AC 204. The logic of these cases applies equally to the uniform legislation. 551. (2000) 105 FCR 419 at [59] (Miles J). 552. MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 524 (Gibbs CJ and Wilson J). 553. R v Vuckov (1986) 40 SASR 498; Uniform Acts s 189(7). See further at 2.40–2.45. 554. For example, Collins v R (1980) 31 ALR 257 at 276–7 (Muirhead J); R v Sharp (1983) 33 SASR 366 (Cox J). But the principles in Weissensteiner v R (1993) 178 CLR 217 must be adhered to. See 5.120ff. 555. This prohibition is of considerable significance where the prosecution is seeking to establish under s 85 that an admission was made in circumstances that make it unlikely that its truth was adversely affected. Assuming the truth of the admission is relevant to that inquiry, it cannot be put to an accused on the voir dire unless he or she has already raised that issue: R v Ye Zhang [2000] NSWSC 1099 at [52]. Where the prosecution is able to ask about an admission’s truth, if a jury was not present at the voir dire the answer given is not admissible at the trial unless ‘it is inconsistent with other evidence given by the witness in the proceeding’: s 189(8) (query whether it can then only be used as a prior inconsistent statement relevant to credibility). 556. [1980] AC 247. 557. R v Hammond (1941) 28 Cr App R 84; Burns v R (1975) 132 CLR 258 at 264 (Barwick CJ, Gibbs and Mason JJ); Frijaf v R [1982] WAR 128 at 147–9 (Brinsden J), criticising the majority in Wong Kamming; R v Semyraha [2001] 2 Qd R 208; R v Hein (2013) 117 SASR 444; [2013] SASCFC 97 at [26] (Vanstone J discussing views of Bray CJ in R v Wright (1969) SASR 256). 558. Cf inconclusive discussion by Vanstone J in R v Hein (2013) 117 SASR 444; [2013] SASCFC 97 at

[23]–[29]. 559. Frijaf v R [1982] WAR 128 at 133 (Wickham J). 560. Ibid at 146 (Wallace J). 561. Ibid at 134–6 (Wickham J). 562. (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 523–4. 563. Burns v R (1975) 132 CLR 258 at 264. 564. Frijaf v R [1982] WAR 128 is clear authority for this proposition. 565. Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (UK) s 1(e) (now s 1(2)) and its Australian equivalents: see 3.85 n 357. See R v Wright [1969] SASR 256; R v Vuckov (1986) 40 SASR 498. The same interpretation has been given to the Queensland legislation: R v Semyraha [2001] 2 Qd R 208; [2000] QCA 303 at [13] (overruling R v Post and Georgee [1982] Qd R 495 at 496). 566. [1982] AC 476. 567. [1980] AC 247; it also seems to be supported by Mason J in MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 535. These remarks should be limited to the situation where a confession becomes subsequently admissible. 568. By implication in a trial without a jury it may be admitted if otherwise relevant and admissible: Commissioner of Taxation v Brown [2002] FCA 318 at [92]–[95]. 569. Basto v R (1954) 91 CLR 628 at 640; Burns v R (1975) 132 CLR 258 at 261 (Barwick CJ, Gibbs and Mason JJ); MacPherson v R (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 520; Ajodah v The State [1982] AC 204 at 222; Morris v R (1987) 163 CLR 454 (High Court interfered with the jury’s acceptance of an unreliable confession); R v Green (2002) 4 VR 471 (must direct jury accordingly); R v Buckley (2004) 10 VR 215 at [30]–[32] (Charles JA). Jury may be required to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt before acting on it; for example, Magill v R (2013) 42 VR 616; [2013] VSCA 259; and see further at 2.85 and cases referred to there at n 407. 570. R v Toumer (1991) 56 A Crim R 221 (CCA (NSW)). 571. Driscoll v R (1977) 137 CLR 517; Stephens v R (1985) 156 CLR 664; R v Devine (1985) 18 A Crim R 185 (CCA (Qld)). 572. R v Reid (1999) NSWCCA 258 at [69] (Smart AJ). Subject to objection: Gonzales v R [2007] NSWCCA 321 at [22]–[23] (Giles JA). 573. (1991) 171 CLR 468. Affirmed in Nicholls v R; Coates v R (2005) 219 CLR 196. McKinney is discussed in more detail at 4.32ff. 574. And courts became suspicious if no recording was made: R v Woods (1991) 103 FLR 321. 575. Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 23U, 23V; Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) s 281 (R v Schiavini (1999) 108 A Crim R 161: applies in addition to the requirements under s 86 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth); R v Farr [2001] NSWSC 3 at [36]–[38]: applies only on investigation of indictable offences; R v Rowe (2001) 50 NSWLR 510: all answers given to questions about an indictable offence ‘relate to’ that offence and require recording, even when answer tendered as admission in a prosecution for a summary offence); Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld) ss 436–439 (R v Kingston [2008] QCA 193 at [23]–[31]); Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) ss 74C–74G (R v Day (2002) 82 SASR 85); Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) s 85A (Tasmania v Challender [2007] 16 Tas R 339 at [2]–[7]; Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas) v Cook (2006) 166 A Crim R 234); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) ss 464G, 464H (DPP v Donnelly & Reed [2006] VSC 423); Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA) ss 118, 155 (Slater v Western Australia [2009] WASC 144); ACT: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 23A(6) (applying investigative provisions to the investigation of ACT offences punishable by imprisonment for a period exceeding 12 months); Crimes

Act 1900 (ACT) s 186 (applying Pt 1C of the Crimes Act (Cth) to the investigation of summary ACT offences on arrest); Police Administration Act 1978 (NT) ss 139–142 (R v Nagawalli [2009] NTSC 25). This legislation applies in precedence to any other requirements for the admissibility of confessional evidence: R v Day (2002) 82 SASR 85. Some of this legislation was revised to overcome the narrow construction, by a majority of the High Court, of the phrase ‘in the course of official questioning’ in Kelly v R (2004) 218 CLR 216. 576. Courts have refused to read down this notion and will generally approach the discretion broadly in line with the common law public policy discretion: Grimley v R (1995) 121 FLR 282; R v Charlie (1995) 121 FLR 306; R v Duong [2002] 1 Qd R 502; R v Day (2002) 82 SASR 85 at [26]; R v Tripodi [2002] SASC 420; R v Hastings (2003) 85 SASR 256 at [14] (but regard must be had to the strictness of the recording regime). In Nicholls v R; Coates v R (2005) 219 CLR 196, a bare majority found that admissions made ‘off the record’, during breaks in a long recorded interview, did not comply with the Criminal Code (WA) and so the evidence of several sets of police officers about what was said was deemed inadmissible. Part of the problem, exemplifying the value of recording, was disagreement as to who had requested various breaks and for what purposes. The Nicholls decision is to be contrasted with the narrow construction of Tasmanian legislation in Kelly v R (2004) 218 CLR 216. 577. Ordinarily admissibility requires compliance with recording provisions; see, for example, R v Murcott (2005) 31 WAR 198 (Owen J: where a signed handwritten statement taken by police officers visiting a prison to speak to a prisoner was deemed inadmissible because on the balance of probabilities there was no reasonable excuse for not recording the interview). These provisions are not concerned with the reliability of admissions or fairness per se, although they seek to embody such considerations. Generally, the existence of a clear recording means that what was said is not contested. 578. In R v Heaney [1992] 2 VR 531, admissions by the accused made before she was reasonably suspected by the interviewing officer were admissible although not tape-recorded. See also DPP v Meade (No 1) (2013) 233 A Crim R 40; [2013] VSC 250. 579. McConville, ‘Videotaping Interrogations: Police Behaviour On and Off Camera’ [1992] Crim LR 532. And see R v Pollard (1992) 176 CLR 177; Heatherington v R (1994) 179 CLR 370; R v Vollmer [1996] 1 VR 95 at 106–21 (obligation to record under s 464H of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) extends only to each discrete period of questioning); R v Blayney and Blayney [2002] SASC 192 at [38]–[40] (although s 74C of the Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) defines ‘interview’ to include ‘a series of conversations’ not all conversations with a suspect are for that reason a series); R v MDR [2002] SASC 336; R v Flaherty (2002) 133 A Crim R 42 (Besanko J). 580. R v Pritchard [1991] 1 VR 84; R v Kallis [1994] 2 Qd R 88; R v Heaney and Walsh [1998] 4 VR 636 at 647. 581. Some Australian legislation expressly provides that this is the case: see, for example, Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 103; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34G(2)(a). 582. See the remarks of Hope JA in Albrighton v Royal Prince Alfred Hospital [1980] 2 NSWLR 542 at 548–9. 583. (1940) 60 CLR 22 at 303. Followed and explained in Re Montecatini’s Patent (1973) 47 ALJR 161 at 169, where Gibbs J explains that Potts v Miller establishes two rules: ‘First, that books of account kept according to an established system in organised business are receivable in evidence as proof of the financial process or of the result of business operations conducted on a large scale, and secondly, that when the books are produced, or their production is not insisted on, an accountant who has examined them may state their general effect’. Potts v Miller was applied in R v Markovina (1996) 93 A Crim R 149 at 176–8 by Malcolm CJ, who admitted computer diaries of a drug business kept by an accomplice as real evidence of the business in which the accused was allegedly involved. 584. [1965] AC 1001. The willingness to now leave reform in the hands of the legislature, especially in light of the move towards uniform legislation, can be seen in recent High Court judgments; for example,

McHugh J in Bannon v R (1996) 185 CLR 1 at 32, 40–1. 585. Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 408(1); Evidence Act 1910 (Tas) s 81K (see 8.87); Evidence Act 1971 (ACT) s 65. 586. Evidence Act 1910 (Tas) s 81F. 587. The Evidence Act 1938 (UK) was replaced first by the Civil Evidence Act 1968 (UK) and later by the Civil Evidence Act 1995 (UK). 588. Evidence Act 1938 (UK) Ch 28.1(1)(i); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 34C, 34D, 34G. While equivalent legislation in other Australian jurisdictions has been repealed and replaced (most significantly by provisions in the uniform legislation), cases concerning the interpretation of that repealed legislation, and the UK legislation, continue to be cited herein to interpret the South Australian provisions. 589. This interpretation is placed upon the opening words: ‘Where direct oral evidence of a fact would be admissible’, in, for example, Milne v Pope and Belair Cellars Pty Ltd (1972) 4 SASR 45 at 55–6 (Mitchell J); Carusi v Housing Commission [1973] VR 215 (privileged communication not made admissible by the section). 590. In Ventouris v Mountain (No 2) [1992] 1 WLR 887, it was held that, although tape recordings were documents under the applicable legislation, if the speakers had not intended their voices to be recorded then they could not be regarded as having made a statement in a document. 591. The condition is that the maker of the statement in the document be called, not that any supplier of the information be called. 592. Through death, incapacity, absence overseas or where all reasonable efforts to find him or her have been made without success. 593. Evidence Act 1938 (UK) Ch 28.1(5). The practical importance of this is that the document may be used to authenticate itself: see, for example, McKay v Hutchins and Fire and All Risks Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 1 Qd R 533. 594. For an example of a case where a previous consistent statement was admitted, see Hilton v Lancashire Dynamo Nevelin Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 952; and cf TPC v TNT Management Pty Ltd (1984) 56 ALR 647 at 707–8, where Franki J refused to admit an expert’s evidence in documentary form. Previous inconsistent statements of a party’s own witness were admitted in Harvey v Smith-Wood [1969] 2 QB 171; cf Cartwright v Richardson and Co Ltd [1955] 1 WLR 340. Where statements tendered according to the common law procedures also satisfy this statutory exception they become admissible not only as relevant to the witness’s credit but also as evidence of the facts asserted in them. 595. Although most courts are prepared to take a wide view and include them in the notion of a statement: Lenehan v Queensland Trustees Ltd [1965] Qd R 559; Cullis v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd [1970] WAR 170; and cf O’Leary v Lamb (1973) 7 SASR 159. Requests and recommendations are arguably not narrative assertions and therefore not within the hearsay prohibition anyway. 596. But courts have been prepared to admit opinions, not only as facts in themselves, but also, where otherwise admissible, in proof of the inferences of fact drawn by them: Lenehan v Queensland Trustees Ltd [1965] Qd R 559; Morley v National Insurance Co [1967] VR 566; Mansour v Standard Telephone and Cables Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 205; TPC v TNT Management Pty Ltd [1984] 56 ALR 647 at 706–7. 597. Courts have struggled with this notion and have tended to interpret it restrictively to require more than a mere ‘file containing one or more documents of a similar nature dealing with the same … subject matter’: Thrasyvoulos Iounnou v Papa Christophoros Demetriou [1952] AC 84 at 92. Two recorded analyses of shipments of meat-meal were held to be isolated recordings with no element of continuity that might guarantee reliability: Berjak (Victoria) Pty Ltd v Peerless Processing Co Pty Ltd [1963] VR 515 at 519. A police officer’s notebook was also held not to be a continuous record: Newton v Pieper [1968] 1 NSWR

42. See also Atra v Farmers and Graziers Co-op Co Ltd (1986) 5 NSWLR 281. 598. It is not sufficient that the maker record information supplied to another (as, for example, a court reporter records information supplied to the court): Barkway v South Wales Transport Co Ltd [1949] 1 KB 54; Re Practitioners of the Supreme Court [1980] 26 SASR 275. 599. The maker is therefore the person who actually writes or signs the document and not the person at whose direction the document may be written. See Newton v Pieper [1968] 1 NSWR 42, where a witness dictating a statement to a police officer was not the maker as the witness did not authenticate the police officer’s notes; and cf s 45B (now renumbered s 52) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) (interpreted in R v Calabria (1982) 31 SASR 423 at 429–32; and Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Arthur Young (No 1) (1990) 54 SASR 498) according to which it is sufficient that a document is made by or at the direction of a person with personal knowledge. 600. Bowskill v Dawson [1954] 1 QB 288; White v Venus [1968] SASR 83. 601. The better approach is to look at the matter from the point of view of the person allegedly interested in the consequences of the contemplated proceedings and ask whether it is likely as a consequence that the person’s statement will be unreliable. An effect upon reputation as well as financial consequences is enough to invoke the disqualification. This liberal approach is illustrated by Monfries v MTT [1970] SASR 521; Roberts v Burns Philp Trustee Co Ltd (1985) 5 NSWLR 72 at 80; Accident Insurance Mutual Holdings Ltd v McFadden (1993) 31 NSWLR 412 at 426–8 (Kirby P), 434–6 (Clarke JA); Murray-Oates v Jjadd Pty Ltd (1999) 76 SASR 38; Southern Equities v Bond (No 2) (2001) 78 SASR 554 at 592–3. Earlier cases took a stricter view and suggested that proof of a complete absence of bias was required before the witness’s disqualification did not apply (see Goddard LJ in Robinson v Stern [1939] 2 KB 260 at 269) but this view is inconsistent with the more realistic view modern judges take to the reception of hearsay evidence: see generally LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [35075]–[35090]. 602. It has been held to apply to both the maker and supplier: Barkway v South Wales Transport Co Ltd [1949] 1 KB 54. 603. Lenehan v Queensland Trustees Ltd [1965] Qd R 559. 604. ‘Undertaking’ is defined in s 5(1) to include ‘public administration and any business, profession, occupation, calling, trade or undertaking’ whether by the Crown, whether or not for profit, and whether or not it is carried on in Queensland. 605. [1949] 1 KB 54. See also nn 598 and 602 above. 606. See Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Managed Investments Pty Ltd (No 7) [2015] 2 Qd R 32; [2015] QSC 72. 607. ‘Derived’ is defined (s 79B) to include ‘derived, by the use of a computer or otherwise, by calculation, comparison, selection, sorting, consolidation or by accounting, statistical or logical procedures’. 608. In 2000, s 79C(2a) and (2b) were added, making admissible statements in any document tending to establish an otherwise admissible fact or opinion where ‘the statement is, or directly or indirectly reproduces, or is derived from a [genuine] business record’, and the person with personal knowledge of the matters in the statement shall not be called unless the court orders otherwise. 609. For more detailed discussion of this provision, see LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [35420]– [35425]. 610. Applied in R v Lester (2008) 190 A Crim R 468; [2008] QCA 254 at [43]–[52] (statements of deceased as to her state of mind, fear of the accused and belief that he had arranged to kill her, admissible under s 93B; but belief excluded on grounds of relevance); R v McGrane [2002] QCA 173. 611. Authorities considering the nature and breadth of these discretions in their application to statements admissible under ss 93A and 93B are discussed in R v Adcock [2016] QCA 264 at [66]–[70] (Morrison

JA). 612. Discussed generally in R v Koenig (2013) 229 A Crim R 108; [2013] SASC 42 at [198]ff (White J) admitting text messages from the victim of the murder alleged against the accused. 613. For further detail of the intricacies in applying specifically ‘business’ exceptions, see LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, Ch 18 s 2, particularly at [35190]–[35210]. 614. For examples of the application of this section, see R v Gum [2007] SASC 311 at [19] (Vanstone J); Sands v Channel Seven Adelaide Pty Ltd (2009) 104 SASR 452; [2009] SASC 215 at Appendix 6 (Bleby J). 615. Documents from third parties formally kept by a business may constitute records of that business to the extent that that business has made use of those documents. Appropriate inferences may be drawn from such records, but this does not make the documents generally admissible as hearsay: Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Arthur Young (No 3) (1990) 55 SASR 11 (Perry J), distinguishing the remarks of Olsson J in Ryan v ETSA (No 2) (1987) 47 SASR 239 at 246–7. This limitation upon the hearsay use of the records was disapproved of by Bleby J in Southern Equities v Arthur Anderson (No 10) (2002) 82 SASR 53; [2002] SASC 128 at [29]. Compare with the position that existed under Pt IIIA of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth): Karmot Auto Spares Pty Ltd v Dominelli Ford (Hurstville) Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 560 at 564–5. 616. Cox J in R v Perry (No 3) (1981) 28 SASR 112; and R v Perry (No 4) (1981) 28 SASR 119 took a liberal view of the notion of business records, including medical records kept at a hospital and an analyst’s report found in police records within s 45A (now s 53). See also Burnside Sub-Branch RSSLA Inc v Burnside Memorial Bowling Club Inc (1990) 58 SASR 324 at 338 (Full Ct). In R v Errigo (2005) 91 SASR 80 at [89], White J doubted whether the court was a ‘business’ given the possibility of proof of conviction through s 42. 617. Ryan v ETSA (No 2) (1987) 47 SASR 239; Southern Equities Pty Ltd v Arthur Anderson (No 11) (2002) 82 SASR 63; [2002] SASC 148 at [24]–[25] (Bleby J). 618. See King CJ in R v Calabria (1982) 31 SASR 423 at 429–32, where a statement dictated to a lawyer was held to be made by the person dictating it. Followed by Perry J in Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Arthur Young (No 1) (1990) 54 SASR 498; and by Bleby J in Southern Equities Pty Ltd v Arthur Anderson (No 11) (2002) 82 SASR 63; [2002] SASC 148 at [28]. 619. Hillier and Carney v Lucas (2002) 81 SASR 451 at [174]–[194] (Lander J). 620. This interpretation is suggested by Bray CJ in O’Leary v Lamb (1973) 7 SASR 159 at 198–9. 621. Ryan v ETSA (No 2) (1987) 47 SASR 239. 622. Cox J was inclined to take this view in R v Perry (No 4) (1981) 28 SASR 119, although he was able to conclude that an analyst’s document stated facts from which inferences could be drawn, rather than interpreting it as a statement of expert opinion. In R v Nguyen [2009] SASC 91 at [60]–[61] (David J), a document containing assertions of opinion and speculation tendered under s 45A was ruled inadmissible on the ground that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to admit it as, had the maker been called, his testimony in terms of those assertions would have been inadmissible. In R v Keogh (No 3) (2014) 121 SASR 410; [2014] SASCFC 137 at [25]–[26], the court held that documents containing relevant expert opinions were capable of being admitted under ss 45A (53) and 45B (52). 623. Apparent genuineness is sufficient authentication. 624. This argument is accepted in Evidence, ALRC Interim Report 26 (1985), vol 1, pp 388–9. 625. Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) ss 83–91; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 46–51; Evidence Act 1906 (WA) ss 89– 96. 626. This may extend to computer records (see Griffiths v ANZ (1990) 53 SASR 256) and thereby avoid any separate statutory requirements for the admissibility of computer-generated information.

627. Harding v Williams (1880) 14 Ch D 197 (Fry J); Myers v DPP [1965] AC 1001 at 1028 (Lords Morris and Hodson). See also the discussion in LexisNexis, Cross on Evidence, looseleaf, [35340]. 628. This is probably intended to admit only the clinical financial facts and not admit, for example, opinions expressed in a banking record refusing a loan: R v Aylen (1987) 47 SASR 254 at 291–2 (Prior J). 629. R v Smart [1983] 1 VR 265. 630. Emphasised in R v Smart [1983] 1 VR 285. 631. Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 45. See also uniform legislation s 70. 632. For more complete discussion, see Odgers, n 152 above; and Williams, Anderson, Marychurch and Clegg, Uniform Evidence in Australia, LexisNexis Butterworths, Sydney, 2015, pp 216ff. 633. See 2.3. 634. These are defined widely in the Dictionary to include express or implied representations and representations inferred from conduct; there need be no intention to communicate the representation, but if there is it does not matter that the representation was not communicated. Silence may give rise to an implied representation: R v Rose (2002) 55 NSWLR 701 at [257]–[262], but there was no relevant representation on the facts. 635. Is the removal of a gold Rolex watch during a toilet break in a bankruptcy meeting an admission of fact (or some other assertion of fact by conduct)? See, for example, Fitz-Gibbon v Wily [1998] FCA 1193. 636. An ‘asserted fact’ includes an ‘asserted fact that involves a representation in the form of an opinion as to the existence of a fact’: see SPAR Licensing Pty Ltd v MIS QLD Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 1116 at [238]–[240] (Griffiths J considering the authorities). 637. But cf R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359 at [477] (Studdert J). The effects of failure to object is discussed at 2.46ff. 638. (2000) 158 FLR 359 at [359]. 639. (1989) 166 CLR 283. 640. Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), at [7.4]–[7.62], especially [7.60]–[7.62]. 641. See Sio v R [2016] HCA 32 at [67]–[73] (discussed at n 154 above). 642. But other rules determining its reception still apply: so if it is not relevant s 60 cannot make it so. Section 60 does not render an alleged co-offender’s guilty plea admissible against the defendant where they are tried separately: Power v R (2014) 43 VR 261; [2014] VSCA 146 at [66] (Redlich JA and Robson AJA). Victorian courts suggest that notice of reliance on s 60 should be given: Ghebrat v R [2011] VSCA 299 at [45]–[47] (Tate JA, Buchanan JA and Sifris AJA agreeing). 643. It has been held that another example of where a representation is admitted for a non-hearsay use is where it is referred to by an expert as the basis for his or her opinion: R v Welsh (1996) 90 A Crim R 364. Whether such representations are admitted in evidence for this purpose or merely provide the assumptions for provisional admission of the opinion under s 57 is debatable: see 7.69–7.70. 644. (1998) 195 CLR 198; applied in Ho v Powell (2001) 51 NSWLR 572; R v Suteski [2002] NSWCCA 509. 645. So far as the witness may also have intended to assert that he believed the accused, that belief was either irrelevant or an inadmissible opinion. 646. If requested, it may be desirable for the judge to warn about reliability and, where the representation may not be used to prove the truth of the fact asserted, to direct the jury about the use of the evidence: Power v R (2014) 43 VR 261; A Crim R 553; [2014] VSCA 146 at [78]–[81] (unless there are good reasons not to so direct: Raimondi v R [2013] VSCA 194 at [26]–[31]). In the case of evidence of a

complaint admitted to support the testimony of a victim of sexual assault, courts have recognised the ‘discretion’ to restrain the hearsay use under s 137, although generally refusing to exercise it: R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 at 139 (Hunt CJ at CL), 147–9 (Smart J); Papakosmas v R (1999) 196 CLR 297; and see 7.102. 647. Section 62 defines first-hand hearsay by requiring a previous representation to be ‘made by a person who had personal knowledge of an asserted fact’ (s 62(1)), based on ‘something that the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived’ (s 62(2)). On ‘perceived’, see Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 85 ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36 at [42]–[43] (French CJ, Heydon and Bell JJ). On the intricacies of conceptualising evidence as involving only ‘first-hand’ hearsay so an exception may apply, see Amaca Pty Ltd v CSR Ltd [2015] VSC 582 at [165]–[178]. Where the representation is in a document, cl 6 of the Dictionary requires it to be produced, or signed, initialled or marked, by the witness, and if not the document can be regarded only as second-hand hearsay: see Nichia Corporation v Arrow Electronics Australia Pty Ltd (No 3) (2016) 240 FCR 13; [2016] FCA 466. 648. On the scope of unavailability under Pt 2 cl 4 of the Dictionary, see further n 152 above. 649. See, for example, Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Franklin [2014] NSWCA 329 at [19]– [22] (Meagher JA, Beazley P and Leeming JA agreeing). 650. See Odgers, n 152 above, at [EA.65.60]. 651. The test of likely reliability is not subjective but to be determined objectively from these circumstances: see Sio v R [2016] HCA 32 at [67]–[73], discussed at n 154 above. Some judges have suggested that this does not permit consideration of other circumstances relating to the reliability of the representation; for example, subsequent consistent statements: R v Mankotia [1998] NSWSC 295 (Sperling J); R v Polkinghorne (1999) 108 A Crim R 189 at [12]–[49] (Levine J). However, although it is the circumstances relating to the making of the representation that are decisive, one of these circumstances is the apparent credibility of the maker at that time, and previous and subsequent events and statements may be relevant to this: see Mason P in R v Ambrosoli (2002) 55 NSWLR 603 at [15]–[37] and his explanation of Conway v R (2000) 98 FCR 204; and Williams v R (2000) 119 A Crim R 490. Mason P concludes (at [36]) that ‘prior or later statements or conduct of the person making the previous representation are only to be considered to the extent that they touch the reliability of the circumstances of the making of that previous representation’. The court in Sio was reluctant to speculate upon what objective circumstances were relevant to the determination of reliability (at [71]) but did not (at [69]–[70]) disapprove of Mason P’s dictum in R v Ambrosoli (2002) 55 NSWLR 603 at [28]–[29] that ‘evidence of events other than those of the making of the previous representation [can] throw light upon the circumstances of the making of that representation and its reliability as affected thereby’. See also, for example, Youkhana v R [2013] NSWCCA 85 at [51]–[61] (Bellew J, Hoeben CJ at CL and Slattery J agreeing). For further discussion of the relevant circumstances, see Odgers, n 152 above, at [EA.65.180]. 652. For interpretations and examples of ‘when or shortly after’, see R v Gover (2000) 118 A Crim R 8 at [33] (Dunford J) (NSW (CCA)); R v Ambrosoli [2002] NSWCCA 386 at [13]–[14] (Mason P); Harris v R (2005) 158 A Crim R 454 at [32]–[40] (Studdert J); R v Uittenbusch (2012) 219 A Crim R 562; [2012] QSC 89; Azizi v R (2012) 224 A Crim R 325; [2012] VSCA 205 at [47] (Bongiorno JA, Buchanan JA and Hollingworth AJA agreeing); R v Ryan (2013) 33 NTLR 123; 234 A Crim R 299; [2013] NTSC 54 at [17]–[30] (Kelly J). 653. For an example of consideration of s 65(2)(c), see R v Ambrosoli (2002) 55 NSWLR 603 at [15]–[41] and authorities discussed therein. 654. In Sio v R [2016] HCA 32, the court held that the circumstances did not guarantee reliability: see further n 154 above. See also R v Potts (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 340. 655. The importance of this higher standard is emphasised in Conway v R (2000) 98 FCR 204 at [145]–

[146]; Williams v R (2000) 119 A Crim R 490 at [55], [58]. 656. See Sio v R [2016] HCA 32 at [67]–[73], discussed at n 154 above. 657. DPP v BB; DPP v QN [2010] VSCA 211 at [8]–[11] (Bongiorno JA, Harper and Hansen JJA agreeing). Section 65(3) is not dependent on the nature and extent of cross-examination: Puchalski v R [2007] NSWCCA 220 at [95] (Smart AJ), but the difference between committal proceedings and a trial have been recognised: Luna (a pseudonym) v R [2016] VSCA 10 at [30]–[32]. Its terms are not restricted to prosecution witnesses: Taber v R [2007] NSWCCA 116 at [38] (Hodgson JA). 658. See, for example, R v Elms [2004] NSWCCA 467 at [31]–[44] (McClellan CJ at CL), [57]–[60] (Adams J). 659. The notion of freshness is discussed at 7.79 n 484 and 7.83 n 506. Additional relevant decisions include R v XY (2010) 79 NSWLR 629; [2010] NSWCCA 181 at [80]–[105] (Whealy J, Campbell JA and Simpson J agreeing); LMD v R [2012] VSCA 164 at [24]–[26] (Harper JA, Bongiorno and Davies JJA agreeing); ISJ v R [2012] VSCA 321 at [48]–[49] (Nettle, Redlich and Osborn JJA); Clay v R [2014] VSCA 269 at [37]–[50] (Weinberg, Osborn and Priest JJA: considering previous cases and deciding that a statement made over 20 years after event not fresh in the memory); Boyer (a pseudonym) v R [2015] VSCA 242 at [58]–[74] (Priest JA, Kyrou and Kaye JJA agreeing); Pate (a pseudonym) v R [2015] VSCA 110 at [52]–[66] (Weinberg JA), [141]–[147] (Priest JA). 660. (1998) 195 CLR 606 at 608: ‘Although questions of fact and degree may arise, the temporal relationship required will very likely be measured in hours or days, not, as was the case here, in years’. However, cases following Graham nevertheless can be interpreted as focusing on the substantive issue: R v Adam (1999) 47 NSWLR 267 at 282; Langbein v R [2008] NSWCCA 39 at [83]–[85] (McClellan CJ at CL: 85-day delay meant that asserted facts were not fresh in the memory). Cf Skipworth v R [2006] NSWCCA 37 at [18] (Mason P: ‘the time gap (66 days) was not great and … the memory of the events was sufficiently fresh’). 661. Following discussion and recommendations in Uniform Evidence Law, ALRC Report 102 (2005), [8.88]– [8.112]. 662. The subsection is not limited to formal proofs taken from witnesses: R v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442; Saunders v R (2004) 149 A Crim R 174 at [59]–[61] (Crawford J) (CCA (Tas)); Stevens v McCallum [2006] ACTCA 13 at [156]–[180]. 663. Business is defined widely in Pt 2 cl 1 of the Dictionary. See also Valoutin Pty Ltd v Furst (1998) 154 ALR 119 at 129 (Finkelstein J: a trust is a business); Nye v NSW (2002) 134 A Crim R 245 (a Royal Commission is a business and outside s 69(3)); Mundine v Brown (No 3) [2010] NSWSC 515 at [8] (Harrison J: ‘Domestic Violence Forum’ not a business). Under s 69(3), the business record exception does not apply to representations prepared for the purpose of conducting or in contemplation of legal proceedings: Haque v Commissioner of Corrective Services (2008) 216 FLR 271 at [20] (Fullerton J). This, as Finn J explains in Australian Medic-Care Company Ltd v Hamilton Pharmaceutical Pty Ltd (No 4) (2008) 170 FCR 9 at [14]–[15], applies to ‘any legal proceedings in which the representation might become admissible’. 664. See, for example, Daniel v Western Australia (2000) 173 ALR 51 at [22]–[24]. A representation asserting a fact in the form of an opinion is within s 69 (Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 85 ALJR 1130; [2011] HCA 36 at [43] (French CJ, Heydon and Bell) and has been held to satisfy by itself the requirement of personal knowledge: see Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Ltd [2003] FCA 933 at [18] (Hely J: point left open in Lithgow at [17]). See commentary of Odgers, n 152 above, at [EA.69.210]. 665. This inference would not be hearsay under s 59 in the absence of being able to reasonably suppose an intention to assert it. The hearsay position at common law is discussed at 8.26. 666. These provisions do not create any preconditions to admissibility under s 69: Australian Petroleum Pty Ltd

v Parnell Transport Industries Pty Ltd (1998) 88 FCR 537 (Mansfield J). 667. Section 73 has been afforded a broad interpretation, although it does not extend to ‘family gossip’: Ceedive Pty Ltd v May [2004] NSWSC 33 at [6]–[13] (Levine J). And in Cvetkovic v R [2010] NSWCCA 329 at [351]–[356] (Campbell JA, Simpson and Whealy JJ agreeing), it was held that a belief needs to ‘held by more than one person before it rose to the status of “reputation”’. 668. See, for example, Gumana v Northern Territory [2005] FCA 50 at [157] (Selway J). 669. Framlingham Aboriginal Trust v McGuiness and Chatfield [2014] VSC 241 at [50] n 27. See also s 78A: exempting testimony of the opinions of members of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander groups, concerning traditional laws and customs, from the opinion rule (s 76): see further at 7.73. Section 72 is not restricted to evidence from ‘members’ of the ‘group’. 670. May be presumed under ss 161 and 162 or inferred from the document under s 183. 671. A similar provision exists in South Australia: Evidence Act 1929 s 54.

Index References are to paragraph numbers

A Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people accused, confessions obtained in breach of procedures …. 8.156 voluntariness, determination of …. 8.128, 8.132–8.133 anthropologists’ evidence, analysis of statements …. 7.72, 8.71 Anunga guidelines …. 8.152 customary rights …. 8.84 interrogation of suspects …. 8.151–8.152 land claims anthropologists, opinion evidence …. 7.72 waiver of privilege related to …. 5.51 legal services …. 8.152 lore and heritage, public interest immunity …. 5.222, 5.225, 5.226 opinion evidence …. 7.73 traditional laws and customs …. 7.73 Absence accused see Voir dire evidence see Inferences Jones v Dunkel inference …. 5.121, 5.133 jury see Jury; Voir dire Abuse of process fairness discretion and …. 2.29, 2.35

Access to information see also Discovery; Interrogatories; Subpoena adversary context …. 5.1–5.3 civil cases …. 5.5–5.11 confidential relationships …. 5.104, 5.205–5.214 criminal cases …. 5.12–5.18 freedom of information legislation and …. 5.16 policy factors …. 5.20 pre-trial …. 5.11, 5.13 privilege see Privilege restrictions, adversary legal professional privilege see Legal professional privilege manifestations …. 5.21 nature of …. 1.54, 5.19–5.21 privilege against self-incrimination see Self-incrimination, privilege against privilege in aid of settlement see Settlement, privilege in aid of public policy …. 5.20, 5.195–5.267 tender of evidence …. 5.186–5.194 rules …. 5.4 Accomplices see also Corroboration accessory after the fact as …. 4.26 agent provocateur …. 4.30, 4.52, 4.53 co-accused as …. 4.26, 4.27 corroboration warning failure to give …. 4.26, 4.27, 4.30 mandatory …. 4.5, 4.17, 4.19, 4.20, 4.22, 4.24 judge, role of …. 4.26, 4.28, 4.99–4.103 jury, role of …. 4.28, 4.99–4.103

meaning of, for corroboration purposes …. 4.23–4.30 mutual …. 4.97 receiver of thief as …. 4.25 spouses of, corroboration by …. 4.98 turned Queen’s evidence …. 4.23 unreliability of testimony …. 4.23 Accuracy, presumption of audio and visual recording devices …. 7.24 computers …. 7.25 machines …. 7.25 scientific instruments …. 6.23, 6.28 Accusatory principle burden of proof and …. 6.8 Accused persons absence during voir dire and trial …. 2.43 acquittal, full benefit entitlement …. 2.14, 5.189 admissions …. 8.94 alibi …. 5.14, 5.142 arrest, formal rights on …. 8.147, 8.149 bad character see Bad character burden of proof borne by, when …. 6.8, 6.14, 6.21, 6.22 civil standard …. 6.22 insanity defence …. 6.8, 6.14 knowledge …. 6.19–6.20 character of bad see Bad character discretion of court …. 3.109

exclusionary principle, general …. 3.6, 3.12 good see Good character meaning …. 3.5, 3.108, 3.129 rebuttal …. 3.131–3.135 clemency …. 2.14 competence to testify defence …. 3.84, 3.85, 3.97, 5.110–5.112 prosecution …. 5.110, 5.112 conducting own defence …. 6.51 confession see Confessions and admissions in criminal cases confidential information, disclosure to show innocence …. 5.68 cross-examination see Bad character discreditable conduct of see Bad character; Character evidence; Similar fact evidence; South Australia failure to cooperate …. 5.14 family of, competence and compellability …. 5.200–5.204 exemption …. 5.202 good character see Good character inadmissible evidence, failure to object …. 2.47, 2.49 insanity, burden of proof …. 6.8, 6.14 interrogation see self-incrimination, privilege against (below); Interrogation material facts at option of …. 3.66 no case submission see Case to answer notice of evidence to be tendered …. 3.67 presence during trial …. 2.45 proof of guilt see Standard of proof right to silence see Right to silence search and seizure …. 5.19

self-incrimination, privilege against see Self-incrimination, privilege against statements in presence of party, reactions …. 5.138, 5.139, 8.98 unsworn statement …. 5.106, 5.114–5.116 Weissensteiner direction …. 5.125, 5.127, 5.129, 5.130, 5.131 witness called by …. 6.49, 6.52 defence …. 3.83–3.84, 5.114–5.116 prosecution, accused for …. 5.110–5.112 Acquittals appeal against …. 2.14 civil proceedings, admissibility …. 5.189, 5.191–5.194 issue estoppel …. 5.188, 5.189 relevance of …. 3.92, 5.194 Acts of Parliament burden of proof allocation of …. 6.14, 6.15, 6.21 exceptions and provisos …. 6.15–6.18, 6.19, 6.21 judicial notice …. 6.69 proof legislative facts …. 6.73 regulations, need for …. 6.69 requirement …. 6.69 Address closing …. 2.11 opening …. 2.7, 2.11 order of …. 2.11 unrepresented accused …. 2.11 Adjudicative facts

judicial notice …. 6.60, 6.64, 6.65, 6.73, 6.77 legislative facts, distinguished …. 6.71, 6.72, 6.73 Admissibility confidentiality and see Confidential relationships determination where propensity evidence evidence …. 3.70 notice …. 3.67–3.68 onus …. 3.69 discretion as to see Discretion to exclude disputed …. 2.40 failure to object …. 2.47, 2.49 general principle …. 2.46 inadmissible, effect of …. 2.38 material fact in issue …. 2.38–2.39 objection to, by parties …. 2.46 procedure for determining …. 2.38–2.49 purpose/use of evidence …. 2.41 rejection on public interest grounds …. 2.36, 2.37, 5.255–5.267 relevance, distinguished …. 2.20–2.25 requirement …. 2.17 right to object …. 2.46, 2.47 uniform legislation …. 2.46, 2.48 unsworn testimony …. 7.30 voir dire see Voir dire waiver of rules …. 2.46–2.49 Admissions in civil cases see also Confessions and admissions in criminal cases admissibility …. 8.94–8.95

companies agents and employees …. 8.110–8.114 directors …. 8.112 shareholders …. 8.113 concessional justification …. 8.95, 8.102 conduct as …. 8.96–8.99 definition …. 8.96, 8.100 electronic recording …. 8.100 exculpatory assertions …. 8.99 flight as …. 8.96 formal admissions …. 8.95 informal out-of-court admissions …. 8.95 meaning …. 8.94 personal knowledge of facts …. 8.102–8.105 self-serving statements …. 8.106–8.108 statements in presence of party reactions …. 8.98 silence …. 8.98 terminology …. 8.94 uniform legislation …. 8.94, 8.108, 8.126 vicarious agents …. 8.110, 8.113, 8.114 co-defendants …. 8.109 directors …. 8.112 employees …. 8.110, 8.111, 8.113, 8.114 managers …. 8.111, 8.114 nominal defendant …. 8.109 partners …. 8.110

personal representatives …. 8.109 predecessors in title …. 8.110 Admissions in criminal cases see Confessions and admissions in criminal cases Adultery corroboration requirements …. 4.75 ecclesiastical censure …. 5.159 prior consistent statement …. 7.88 Adversary trial burden of proof see Burden of proof case to answer see Case to answer claim, formulation of …. 6.1 common law system …. 1.49–1.51, 5.1, 6.1 double jeopardy …. 2.14 evidence oral presentation …. 1.50, 7.1 party presentation …. 1.49–1.50, 6.1, 6.47 evolution of …. 5.106–5.107 expert, by, scepticism …. 7.136 features distinguishing …. 1.49–1.50, 6.1, 7.1 fundamental principle …. 5.107 Hollington v Hewthorn, rule in …. 5.186, 5.191–5.194 judge-alone …. 2.7 jury …. 2.7 justifications …. 5.1 merits …. 1.51 parties …. 2.7 party-driven …. 2.5

party prosecution of case …. 1.49, 1.50, 6.1, 6.47 principles …. 6.47 free disposition …. 1.5, 5.87, 6.4, 6.10 process see Trial process restrictions upon tender of evidence …. 5.186–5.194 retrial …. 2.14 right of reply …. 2.11, 7.149 separation of trials …. 3.71, 3.78, 3.81, 5.110 splitting, rule against …. 2.8, 2.9 tactical approach …. 2.49 theory …. 6.29 Adverse witnesses see Hostile and unfavourable witnesses Advice privilege see Legal professional privilege basis of …. 5.39 Affidavits authentication by …. 7.13, 7.26 privilege claims …. 5.168 public interest immunity contents of …. 5.244 cross-examination …. 5.245, 5.246 witness, inference from false affidavit …. 5.168 Affiliation proceedings corroboration requirement …. 4.4, 4.14, 4.83 Affirmation see also Oath witnesses testifying on …. 7.28, 7.36 credibility …. 7.36 document refreshing memory of …. 7.79 understanding of …. 7.29

uniform legislation …. 7.28 Agent provocateur accomplices …. 4.30, 4.52, 4.53 discretion to warn …. 4.30, 4.52–4.53 secretly recording conversations …. 8.155 Agents admissions in civil cases …. 8.110, 8.113, 8.114 authorisation to adopt document …. 7.9 clients of lawyers, disclosure to …. 5.56 documents prepared by …. 5.37, 5.38 Agreed facts see Admissions in civil cases; Material facts Aide memoire document …. 7.80 transcripts of recordings …. 7.56 AIDS litigation disclosure of blood donor identity …. 5.238 Alcohol see also Breathalysers admissions by intoxicated person …. 8.132, 8.133 drink driving, opinions about effect of …. 7.42 effects, psychological evidence …. 7.58 tests …. 5.156, 5.256 Alibi accused persons …. 5.14, 5.142 burden of proof …. 6.8 failure to disclose …. 5.14 notice requirements …. 5.14 Alternative dispute resolution

modes …. 1.3 privilege in aid of settlement …. 5.105 Amnesia testimony under hypnosis and …. 7.114 Ancient rights proof of …. 8.84 Anthropologists opinion evidence …. 7.72, 8.71 Anti-terrorist legislation preventative detention …. 8.148 Anton Piller orders purpose …. 5.157 Appeals convicted accused, by …. 4.13 decisions of fact, against …. 2.14 dismissal of …. 2.14 double jeopardy …. 2.14 exercise of discretion to exclude …. 8.159 failure to object …. 2.46–2.47, 2.49 grounds …. 2.13, 2.14, 4.13 interim …. 2.15 interlocutory, criminal cases …. 2.15 jury direction inadequate …. 2.13, 4.5, 4.6 no case submission wrongly rejected civil cases …. 6.40 criminal cases …. 6.31, 6.33, 6.35 proviso, criminal cases …. 2.14, 2.90, 4.5, 4.17 verdict

following …. 2.14 unsafe …. 4.13 Arbitration dispute settlement mode …. 1.2 reasons for decision, privilege in respect of …. 5.184 Arbitrators immunity from explaining decisions …. 5.184 witness, right to call …. 6.50 ASIO documents public interest immunity and …. 5.232, 5.234, 5.248 Assertions see also Hearsay knowledge, beliefs and intentions …. 8.42–8.49 sufficient relevance of …. 8.47–8.49 physical sensation and health …. 8.50 res gestae …. 8.36–8.41 statement tendered as …. 8.28–8.34 Attestation requirement …. 7.9 Audiotapes see Tape recordings Australian Capital Territory children, interrogation of …. 8.150 identification evidence …. 4.68, 4.70 professional confidential relationship privilege …. 5.214 sexual assault cases character of complainants …. 3.146–3.148 communications privilege …. 5.208, 5.213 Australian Crime Commission (ACC)

compulsory examination of accused …. 5.108, 5.183 Australian Taxation Office (ATO) searches …. 5.81 Authentication affidavit, by …. 7.13, 7.26 certificate …. 7.26 computer output …. 7.13, 7.26, 8.188 documents see Documentary evidence machine-generated information …. 8.188 prior inconsistent statement …. 7.149 procedural safeguards …. 7.14 real evidence …. 7.24–7.26 uniform legislation …. 7.8, 7.14 Authorship evidence of …. 7.9, 7.10, 7.12 Automatism burden of proof …. 6.8 Autrefois acquit plea res judicata and …. 5.188 Autrefois convict plea res judicata and …. 5.188 Averments negative, burden of proof …. 6.19 prima facie evidence …. 6.22

B Baconian probabilities see Inductive probabilities Bad character see also Character evidence; Cross-examination

co-accused cross-examination on by other accused …. 3.117–3.124 evidence excluded where prejudicial, grounds …. 3.79 in-chief by other accused …. 3.76–3.82 jury direction …. 3.138 cross-examination, of accused on …. 3.83–3.124 ‘charged’, meaning …. 3.92 co-accused, evidence against …. 3.117–3.124 direction to jury …. 3.107 discretion of trial judge …. 3.98, 3.124 facts in issue, to establish …. 3.97–3.98 good character in issue …. 3.106–3.109, 3.130, 3.131, 3.134 leave …. 3.104 limitations under legislative compromise …. 3.88–3.91 procedural issues …. 3.99–3.105 prohibition, extent of …. 3.92–3.96 prosecution, on accused’s bad character …. 3.95 prosecution witnesses, imputation against …. 3.110 prosecutor, imputation against …. 3.110–3.116 purpose …. 3.107, 3.118 ‘tending to show’, meaning …. 3.94 witness, accused as …. 3.83–3.84 defence case …. 3.91, 3.125 accused tendering criminal propensity evidence …. 3.125 co-accused’s incriminating propensity …. 3.76–3.82 similar fact evidence …. 3.77, 3.140 third parties, character of …. 3.140–3.141 uniform legislation …. 3.104

definition …. 3.92 exclusionary presumption …. 3.4, 3.12 Lord Herschell’s dictum …. 3.13–3.14, 3.28 meaning …. 3.92, 3.95 predictive value …. 3.7 propensity evidence tendered by accused …. 3.125–3.138 prosecution case …. 3.12–3.75 accused, to identify …. 3.17, 3.25, 3.42 directions to jury …. 3.73–3.75 discreditable conduct …. 3.38, 3.53, 3.59, 3.64, 3.74 evidence at admissibility, determination of …. 3.70 exceptional admission, justification in principle …. 3.41–3.43, 3.66 exclusion, rationale for …. 3.7–3.10 exclusionary rule, ambit of …. 3.22, 3.28–3.40 history and evolution of exclusionary rule …. 3.13–3.27 identification of accused …. 3.17, 3.42 inadvertent disclosure …. 3.72 Makin rule …. 3.14, 3.15, 3.16, 3.17 multiple counts …. 3.71 non-tendency evidence …. 3.54, 3.55–3.57 notice …. 3.67 onus …. 3.69, 3.105 Pfennig case …. 3.12, 3.21, 3.28, 3.29, 3.32, 3.38, 3.41, 3.45–3.52 probative strength, determination …. 3.66 procedural matters …. 3.67–3.75 propensity/tendency reasoning …. 3.5, 3.11 relationship between accused and complainant …. 3.17, 3.33–3.36 res gestae, character admissible …. 3.31

residual discretion …. 3.18, 3.38, 3.69, 3.101 restrictions …. 3.22 ‘similar fact’ evidence …. 3.6, 3.30, 3.39, 3.40, 3.44, 3.47, 3.49, 3.51, 3.58, 3.63 Straffen case …. 3.17, 3.42, 3.58 ‘striking similarities’ …. 3.20, 3.44 tendency evidence …. 3.54–3.57, 3.59, 3.60 voir dire …. 3.70 wrongful revelation …. 3.52, 3.77, 3.80, 3.81 Bad debts personal knowledge, admissibility of …. 8.105 Balance of probabilities see Standard of proof Bankers’ books copies of entries …. 7.18 hearsay, exceptions to prohibition …. 8.189 Basal involuntariness confessions, application to …. 8.128–8.129 Basis rule opinion evidence …. 7.66 Battered woman syndrome expert opinion, admissibility …. 7.45, 7.51 Bayes’ Theorem application …. 1.18, 1.24 combining empirically-based frequencies …. 1.25 DNA evidence …. 1.26, 1.32, 2.70 expert assistance …. 7.62, 7.64 identification evidence …. 1.21–1.22, 1.33 new evidence …. 1.24

odds version …. 1.25 presumption of innocence …. 1.32 problems with …. 1.28–1.34 standard of proof …. 2.59, 2.66 Best evidence rule abolition …. 7.19 documents application to …. 7.15, 7.149 exceptions …. 7.19 cross-examination …. 7.149 secondary evidence, when permitted …. 7.16 tape recordings …. 7.15, 7.16 videotapes and disks …. 7.17 Best explanation approach overview …. 1.43 Beyond reasonable doubt see Standard of proof Bias public interest immunity …. 8.145 witnesses cross-examination …. 7.118 interest, distinguished …. 7.143 proof …. 7.143 Bigamy presumption of marriage and …. 6.28 Birth certificates hearsay, exceptions to prohibition …. 8.93 Blood tests

admissibility …. 2.78, 2.79, 7.25 AIDS litigation, disclosure of blood donor identity …. 5.238 opinion evidence …. 2.78, 2.79 power to take …. 5.8, 5.17 privilege against self-incrimination …. 5.156 Bolster rule credibility of witnesses and …. 7.88, 7.89, 7.116, 7.132 Books of account admissibility common law …. 8.170 statute …. 8.189 Breath tests admissibility …. 7.25 illegal tests, discretion to include …. 5.256 privilege against self-incrimination …. 5.156 Breathalysers presumption of accuracy …. 6.28 fairness discretion …. 2.32 verification of accuracy …. 7.25 Browne v Dunn, rule in credibility evidence …. 7.132, 7.145 cross-examination and …. 7.129–7.131 estoppel …. 7.130 purpose …. 7.132 Bunning v Cross discretion exclusion of evidence …. 2.27, 5.62, 5.256, 5.258 Burden of proof

allocation …. 6.6, 6.7, 6.23 legislation, by …. 6.14–6.22 unclear or silent …. 6.21 averments see Averments evidential burden defendant, on …. 6.10–6.11 nature of …. 6.2–6.7 civil cases …. 6.3, 6.10–6.13 criminal cases …. 6.3, 6.8 exceptions and provisos, statutory …. 6.15–6.18, 6.19, 6.21 incidence of …. 6.4–6.7 civil cases …. 6.10–6.13, 6.25 confessions and admissions, admissibility …. 8.160 criminal cases …. 6.8–6.9 legislative allocation of …. 6.14–6.22 voir dire …. 2.45, 2.91, 6.3 insanity defence …. 6.8, 6.14 Jarvis rule …. 6.15–6.18 knowledge of party …. 6.19–6.20 meaning …. 6.2 persuasive burden nature of …. 6.2–6.7 plaintiff …. 6.12 presumptions, effect upon …. 6.8 see also Presumptions res ipsa loquitur …. 6.25 shifting of …. 6.6 stages …. 6.1, 6.3 tactical burden …. 6.6, 6.9, 6.11, 6.25

terminology …. 6.2 ultimate burden …. 6.6 voir dire …. 2.45, 2.91, 6.3 Woolmington rule …. 6.8, 6.14–6.16, 6.23 Business records admissibility under statute …. 7.13, 8.182–8.187, 8.199 authentication of documents …. 7.13, 8.176, 8.188, 8.189, 8.199

C Calderbank offers privilege in aid of settlement and …. 5.98 Calendars judicial notice …. 6.67 Capacity parties making admissions see Admissions witnesses, to testify see Witnesses Case to answer civil cases …. 2.50–2.51, 6.36–6.42 appeal where submission overruled …. 6.40 co-defendants …. 6.40 election, putting opponent to …. 6.44 failure to call evidence …. 6.43–6.46 grounds for submission …. 2.51 non-suit, submission in nature …. 2.56, 6.36–6.37 res judicata …. 6.37 standard of sufficiency …. 2.56, 6.36–6.37 non-suit procedure …. 6.38, 6.39, 6.42 timing …. 6.39

verdict by direction, submission in nature …. 6.36–6.37, 6.41, 6.42 criminal cases …. 2.50 adversary right …. 6.32 appeals against rejection …. 6.35 circumstantial evidence …. 6.33 co-accused, timing of submission …. 6.34 committal proceedings …. 6.31 distinguishing factors …. 6.31 failure to call evidence …. 6.43–6.46 grounds for submission …. 2.51 joint accused, submission timing …. 6.34 nolle prosequi …. 6.31 Prasad submission, distinguished …. 2.55, 6.33 privilege against self-incrimination, link with …. 6.34 procedures …. 6.30 res judicata …. 6.30, 6.31 standard of sufficiency …. 2.51, 2.54, 6.31, 6.32 case to answer …. 2.55–2.56, 6.32 nature of …. 2.53 verdict by direction (Prasad submission) …. 2.55, 6.33 timing …. 6.34 hypotheses …. 2.53 judicial involvement …. 2.50, 2.52 process …. 2.8 requirement …. 2.50, 2.51 Case withdrawn submission overview …. 2.55 Casus omissus

application of …. 3.97 Chamberlain direction standard of proof …. 2.78–2.81, 2.83, 2.86, 2.90 Character evidence bad see Bad character categories …. 3.6 coincidence evidence propensity evidence, overlap with …. 3.58, 3.64 rape case …. 3.58 similar facts …. 3.44 similarities, witnesses’ testimonies …. 3.58 criminal propensity, predictive value …. 3.7 discreditable conduct as …. 3.38, 3.53, 3.59, 3.64, 3.74 exclusionary principle …. 3.3, 3.6, 3.12, 3.53 evolution of common law rule …. 3.13 legislative enactments Queensland …. 3.65 South Australia …. 3.64 uniform legislation …. 3.54–3.62 Western Australia …. 3.63 good see Good character multi-relevance …. 3.11 nature of …. 3.5 propensity/tendency evidence character defined in terms of …. 3.5 civil actions …. 3.153–3.163 coincidence evidence, overlap with …. 3.58, 3.64 defence, tendered by …. 3.125–3.138

directions to jury …. 3.73–3.75 drug cases …. 3.26, 3.37, 3.56 exclusion of …. 3.7–3.10, 3.164 exclusionary presumption …. 3.12 ambit …. 3.14, 3.22, 3.28–3.40 conduct capable of constituting criminal offence …. 3.28 exclusionary rule categories of exception …. 3.14 evolution …. 3.13–3.27 Makin rule …. 3.13, 3.15, 3.17, 3.18, 3.22, 3.28, 3.31, 3.64 identity of accused …. 3.17, 3.27, 3.42 inadvertent disclosure …. 3.72 ‘mere’ propensity …. 3.25 non-propensity evidence, distinguished …. 3.32–3.38, 3.55 notice …. 3.160 persons other than accused …. 3.10 prosecution …. 3.12–3.27 establish identity …. 3.17 relevant relationship …. 3.17 reasons for excluding …. 3.6, 3.7–3.10 relationship, proving relevant …. 3.17, 3.26, 3.27, 3.42 sequential propensity reasoning …. 3.6, 3.13, 3.15–3.17, 3.24, 3.25, 3.27 sexual assault …. 3.15, 3.29 accused’s sexual interest in complainant …. 3.36 complainant’s character …. 3.142–3.152 identity of accused …. 3.27 similar facts …. 3.44 South Australian legislation …. 2.87, 3.64

standard of proof for admissibility …. 2.87 suspicion towards use …. 3.3, 3.127, 3.165 tendency evidence, definition …. 3.55 third parties …. 3.139–3.152, 3.165 defence evidence revealing …. 3.140–3.141 disposition …. 3.163, 3.165 material fact in issue …. 3.153 sexual assault complainants …. 3.142–3.152 similar facts …. 3.155–3.158 sufficient relevance …. 3.139, 3.140, 3.144, 3.151, 3.154 uncertain reliability …. 3.9–3.10 Western Australian legislation …. 3.63 relevance of …. 3.4 uniform legislation …. 3.5, 3.6, 3.11, 3.54–3.62 Charts and maps judicial notice …. 6.67 Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome opinion evidence …. 7.45, 7.51, 7.108 Children compellability against parent …. 5.201 competence of opinion evidence pertaining to …. 4.39, 7.108 sworn and unsworn testimony …. 4.14, 7.28–7.31 voir dire to determine …. 2.42 confessions interrogation …. 8.150 obtained in breach of procedures …. 8.156 confidential information, disclosure to protect interests …. 5.68

corroboration judges’ direction …. 4.38–4.39, 7.31 repeal of mandatory requirements …. 4.14, 4.37 sexual assault where delay …. 4.46, 4.47 sworn testimony …. 4.14 testimony on oath …. 4.37–4.39 unsworn testimony …. 4.14–4.16 corroboration warning factors relevant to …. 4.38 mandatory warnings repealed …. 4.37, 7.31 hypnosis …. 7.110 identity protection, persons reporting cruelty against …. 5.224 illegitimate …. 6.23, 6.24, 8.85 interrogation …. 8.150 opinion evidence, impact of sexual abuse on children …. 7.51, 7.108 prior consistent statements …. 7.106 sexual assault complaints admissibility …. 7.34, 7.99–7.108 non-accusatory statements …. 7.106 protections whilst testifying …. 7.33, 7.34 testimony formalities …. 7.32, 7.33 reliability …. 4.81, 7.31, 7.32 unsworn …. 7.31–7.34 video recording or video-link …. 7.32–7.34 unreliable evidence …. 4.14, 4.37 unsworn evidence …. 7.31–7.34 video-link testimony …. 7.32, 7.33

video recording of testimony …. 7.32, 7.34 witnesses testifying on oath, as …. 7.31–7.34 Christie discretion civil cases …. 3.158–3.159 examples …. 2.30 exclusionary principle, distinction …. 3.12 fairness …. 2.29 inquiry …. 2.30 nature of …. 2.29, 2.31, 5.138 statements in presence of accused …. 5.138 uniform legislation equivalent …. 2.31, 3.159 Circumstantial evidence analysis …. 1.11, 1.13, 1.42, 2.74–2.89 case to answer submission …. 6.33 directions to jury …. 2.74, 2.75, 2.81–2.89 ‘intermediate’ and ‘primary’ facts …. 2.83 hypothesis of guilt, requirement for …. 3.52 standard of proof application …. 2.74–2.89 Wigmorean analysis of …. 1.8–1.11, 2.75 Claim book privilege …. 5.51 Clemency accused, of …. 2.14 Clergy communications with penitents, admissibility …. 5.205, 5.210 privilege to withhold information …. 5.197 Client legal privilege see Legal professional privilege

Co-accused accomplice, as, corroboration requirements …. 4.25, 4.26 adducing mental health evidence …. 7.136 bad character of cross-examination on by other accused …. 3.117–3.124 evidence excluded where prejudicial, grounds …. 3.79 in-chief by other accused …. 3.76–3.82 jury direction …. 3.138 confession evidence against, as …. 8.109 hearsay prohibition …. 8.77, 8.78 good character of, jury direction …. 3.138 separation of trials …. 3.71, 3.78, 3.81, 5.110 witness for prosecution …. 5.110–5.112 Co-conspirator rule vicarious admissions and confessions …. 8.115–8.120 pre-concert, proof of …. 8.117 Co-defendants admissions in civil cases …. 8.109 case to answer, civil cases …. 6.40 good character, tendered by …. 3.82 separation of trials …. 3.71, 3.78, 3.81, 5.110 Coincidence evidence see also Character evidence; Similar fact evidence exclusion of …. 3.58 propensity evidence, overlap with …. 3.58, 3.64 rape case …. 3.58 similar facts …. 3.44 similarities, witnesses’ testimonies …. 3.58

Collateral evidence rule exceptions …. 7.133, 7.143 overview …. 7.132 Collateral questions see Cross-examination Commission of a crime proof through reference to relationship …. 3.42 Committal proceedings case to answer …. 6.31 discovery …. 5.12, 5.13 ‘paper’ or ‘hand-up’ …. 5.12, 5.13 pre-trial discovery …. 5.12 purpose …. 2.5 Common knowledge rule opinion evidence, admissibility of …. 7.58–7.59 Common purpose criminal conduct …. 8.112, 8.115, 8.119 proof of …. 8.117 Communications privilege see also Legal professional privilege communication with third parties …. 5.23 lawyers and clients …. 5.26 legal professional privilege, part of …. 5.23 materials from third parties …. 5.23 purpose …. 5.25 scope …. 5.22, 5.25 uniform legislation …. 5.24 Companies see also Corporations admissions …. 8.110–8.114

legal professional privilege …. 5.72, 5.75 self-incrimination, claim to privilege …. 5.148–5.155 Compellability see Accused persons; Children; Witnesses Competence see Accused persons; Children; Witnesses Complaints in sexual assault cases absence of, jury direction …. 7.107 admissibility …. 7.99–7.108, 8.155 origins of exception …. 7.99, 7.100 character of complainant …. 3.142–3.152 state legislation …. 3.142, 3.145–3.149 children see Children communications with counsellors, admissibility …. 5.205, 5.209, 5.212–5.213 conditions …. 7.104, 7.105 corroboration …. 4.84, 7.101 credibility, buttressing …. 7.106 cross-examination …. 3.142, 3.145, 3.148, 3.149 distress, humiliation and embarrassment …. 3.146, 3.150 evidential effect …. 7.106 failure to complain, inferences from …. 7.100 ‘hue and cry’, consent in absence of …. 7.100 narration …. 7.104–7.106 rebuttal …. 3.151 sexual experience, evidence of …. 3.143–3.145 specific sexual activities, evidence of …. 3.146 spontaneity …. 7.104 terms …. 7.103 Computer output authentication …. 7.13, 7.26, 8.188

Computers accuracy, presumption of …. 7.25 Conciliation settlement, mode of …. 1.3 Concoction prior statements rebutting …. 7.91 risk of …. 3.58, 4.98 Conduct accused, discreditable conduct see Bad character; Character evidence; Similar fact evidence; South Australia admission by …. 8.98 hearsay, as see Hearsay other occasions see Bad character; Character evidence; Similar fact evidence police misconduct see Police Confessions and admissions in criminal cases Aboriginal people …. 8.132–8.133, 8.151–8.152, 8.156 procedural breach, obtained in …. 8.138, 8.156 voluntariness, determination of …. 8.128, 8.132–8.133 admissibility co-accused’s out-of-court statement …. 8.77, 8.78 common law rules …. 8.121–8.128 discretionary rejection see Discretion to exclude out-of-court statement by third party, hearsay and …. 8.77 voluntariness …. 5.136 accused’s mental/physical condition …. 8.133 basal principle …. 8.128–8.129 breach …. 8.128

burden of proof …. 8.160 determination …. 8.128–8.133 external influences …. 8.131, 8.132 fact, decision of …. 8.128 issues …. 8.163 meaning …. 8.128–8.133 moral exhortation …. 8.132 person in authority …. 8.129 privilege against self-incrimination …. 8.124 questioning …. 8.129 reason for requirement …. 8.97, 8.122–8.124 reliability, relevance …. 8.124, 8.129 standard of proof …. 8.160 statutory modification …. 8.126–8.127, 8.129, 8.137 authentication of document as …. 7.7 children admissibility …. 8.150 obtained in breach of procedures …. 8.156 Christie discretion …. 8.124 co-accused …. 8.109 consciousness of guilt …. 4.83, 5.138, 5.142, 5.144 conspirators …. 8.115–8.120 corroboration warning …. 4.31–4.34, 8.168 definition …. 8.96–8.101 denials …. 5.128, 5.138 fabricated …. 3.140 formal concessions …. 8.95 hearsay …. 8.94–8.101

interrogation connection with likely truth of admissions …. 8.130 investigating official, by …. 8.129, 8.138, 8.160 judges’ function …. 8.101, 8.161 jury’s function …. 8.101, 8.161, 8.166 Lee discretion …. 2.27, 2.34, 8.140–8.142 lies …. 4.85, 5.138, 8.15, 8.96, 8.97, 8.99, 8.130 personal knowledge of confessed facts …. 8.102–8.105 police testimony of disputed …. 4.31–4.34, 8.168 mandatory corroboration warning …. 4.22 preconcert, proof of …. 8.117 recording electronically …. 4.33, 8.168 records of interview …. 7.21, 8.168 refusal to answer …. 5.134–5.144 reliability justification …. 8.95, 8.102 selective answering …. 5.138, 5.143 self-serving statements …. 8.106–8.108 silence admissibility …. 5.134–5.135 confession …. 5.135 direction to jury …. 5.138, 5.144 statements made, in presence of accused admissibility …. 5.138 silence in face of see silence (above) terminology …. 8.94 unfairness procedural impropriety, as …. 2.32, 2.34, 2.37, 8.127, 8.140–8.142, 8.144,

8.146, 8.155 unacceptable risk of wrongful conviction …. 8.136–8.139 uniform legislation …. 8.94, 8.96, 8.100, 8.101, 8.108, 8.109, 8.114, 8.115, 8.117, 8.119, 8.126, 8.127, 8.129, 8.130, 8.134–8.137, 8.143, 8.160, 8.162, 8.163 voir dire …. 8.160–8.168 accused cross-examination …. 2.45, 3.98, 8.163 preconditions …. 8.162 privilege, not to testify at trial …. 8.165 privilege against self-incrimination …. 8.164 burden of proof …. 8.160 commencing party …. 8.162 court, on own motion …. 8.161 evidence, rules of admissibility …. 8.162 jury, absence …. 8.161 standard of proof …. 8.160 truth, alleged confession asking accused, relevance …. 8.163 subsequent admissibility …. 8.165 unrepresented accused …. 8.161 written …. 8.167 Confidential documents client legal privilege of …. 5.39 equitable restraint on disclosure …. 5.63–5.67 Confidential relationships admissibility and access, restrictions on …. 5.205–5.206 statutory modification …. 5.207–5.214

Consent car search …. 8.100 sexual assault and see Sexual assault Conspirators confessions, admissibility of …. 8.115–8.120 Constitutional facts judicial notice …. 6.72, 6.73 Contemporaneous statements see Res gestae Continuance presumption …. 6.26 Contracts proof …. 8.31 Convicted persons appeals by …. 4.13 cross-examination on previous conviction …. 3.116, 7.138, 7.142 Convictions see also Hollington v Hewthorn, rule in previous, procedures for giving evidence …. 5.191–5.194 witness, cross-examination on previous …. 7.138, 7.142 Copies admissibility of photocopies …. 7.18 authentication …. 7.13 unprivileged material …. 5.44–5.46 Corporations see also Companies legal professional privilege …. 5.36 self-incrimination, privilege against …. 5.148–5.155, 5.157 Correspondence theory of knowledge overview …. 1.6

Corroboration accomplice see Accomplices adultery see Adultery affiliation see Affiliation proceedings agent provocateur see Agent provocateur bigamy see Bigamy categories of testimony …. 4.35, 4.36 children see Children co-accused see Co-accused complaints …. 4.84, 7.99, 7.101 concoction, risk of …. 4.98 confessions, police evidence …. 4.22, 4.31–4.34 deceased estates, claims against …. 4.75 definition …. 4.80 direction to jury …. 4.5–4.6, 4.99–4.105 mandatory corroboration warning …. 4.100–4.103 sexual assault …. 4.35, 4.40, 4.42–4.51 warning as matter of practice …. 4.42, 4.104–4.105 discretionary corroboration warning …. 4.35–4.79 distress …. 4.84, 4.85 dying declaration …. 8.88 implication in crime, requirement …. 4.85–4.96 independence, requirement …. 4.83–4.84 informer …. 4.76 innocent explanation …. 4.90–4.93 judge sitting alone …. 4.12 jury, functions …. 4.99–4.105 lies as …. 4.85–4.88, 4.93

mandatory, testimony requiring …. 4.14–4.15 abolition …. 4.14, 7.101 corroboration warning …. 4.17–4.34 mutual …. 4.16, 4.97–4.98 nature of …. 4.80–4.98 perjury …. 4.14 police informer …. 4.76 police testimony, of confession …. 4.22, 4.31–4.34 prior consistent statements …. 4.84, 7.101 procuration …. 4.14 sexual assaults, complainants corroboration required …. 4.14, 7.101 corroboration warning abolition of statutory requirements …. 4.41, 7.101 common law, practice …. 4.40 Longman warning …. 4.44–4.47, 4.49, 4.50 delay in reporting assault …. 4.45–4.48 forensic disadvantage …. 4.48, 4.51 distress of complainant …. 4.84 judges’ direction …. 4.40, 4.42–4.45, 4.50 Murray direction …. 4.44, 4.50 uncorroborated testimony of one witness …. 4.44 similar fact evidence …. 4.97 spouse …. 4.98 techniques …. 4.2–4.13 unreliable testimony see warning (below); Unreliable evidence warning discretionary …. 4.35–4.79

agent provocateur …. 4.30, 4.52–4.53 categories of testimony …. 4.35, 4.36, 4.75, 4.76–4.79 children …. 4.37–4.39, 7.31 identification evidence …. 4.54–4.79 judges’ direction to jury …. 4.104–4.105 prison informers …. 4.76 sexual assault complainants …. 4.40–4.51 unreliable testimony …. 4.9, 4.75–4.79 full corroboration warning …. 4.5 Longman warning …. 4.44–4.47, 4.49, 4.50 mandatory …. 4.17–4.34 abolition of …. 4.7, 4.12, 4.14, 4.20, 4.21, 7.101 categories of testimony …. 4.19 judges’ direction to jury …. 4.100–4.103 police testimony of confession …. 4.22 Murray direction …. 4.44, 4.50 practice, as matter of …. 4.35–4.79 Counsellors communications with sexual assault complainants, admissibility …. 5.205, 5.212–5.213 Courts fact discovery …. 1.7 guardians of public policy, as …. 5.217–5.218 problems arising …. 5.219 hypotheses, formation …. 6.47 moral responsibility …. 1.36 prerogative to acquit …. 6.35 procedures, sources and general nature …. 2.2–2.13, 2.38–2.49

trial, essential tasks of …. 2.16 proof …. 2.57–2.92 reception of evidence …. 2.17–2.56 witnesses, intervention by court …. 6.54–6.58, 7.138 sanctioned …. 6.58 witnesses, power to call …. 6.48–6.53 after jury retired …. 6.53 cross-examination by both parties …. 6.49 duty to call witness on own motion …. 6.49 exceptions …. 6.49–6.53 consent of both parties …. 6.49 interests of justice …. 6.49 mentally ill, conducting own defence …. 6.51 party, failure to call witness …. 6.49 recall witness on own motion …. 6.53 Credibility direction good character evidence of accused …. 3.137 Credibility evidence see also Prior consistent statements admissibility …. 7.90, 7.133 credibility rule, application of …. 7.134 cross-examination and …. 7.132–7.138 Browne v Dunn rule …. 7.132, 7.145 exceptions to prohibition …. 3.90 definition …. 3.90, 7.116 issue, conceptual distinction between …. 7.140 probative value and …. 2.30 uniform legislation …. 7.90, 7.116, 7.133, 7.134, 7.136–7.138 Credibility rule

basis of …. 7.140 credibility evidence and …. 7.134 cross-examination of witness …. 7.133 exceptions …. 7.142–7.144, 7.148, 7.158 false representations …. 7.142 prior consistent statements …. 7.83, 7.92, 7.97, 7.98, 7.102, 7.147, 7.158 re-examination and …. 7.158 scope …. 7.134 Crime communications with lawyers in furtherance of …. 5.29, 5.30 Criminal Evidence Act 1898 (UK) accused’s character, cross-examination prohibition …. 3.92–3.96 legislative compromise …. 3.91 Criminal Evidence Act 1965 (UK) hearsay rule …. 8.4, 8.172 Australian legislation based on …. 8.180 Criminal investigations standards of propriety …. 8.147–8.155 Cross-examination see also Examination-in-chief; Re-examination accused, of bad character see Bad character bad reputation …. 7.142 bias …. 7.118 Browne v Dunn rule …. 7.129–7.131 credibility …. 7.132, 7.145 estoppel …. 7.130 character, as to accused see Bad character; Good character sexual assault complainants …. 3.142–3.152, 7.138

witnesses …. 7.138 collateral questions exceptions to finality bias …. 7.143 convictions …. 7.142 corruption …. 7.143 incapacity, physical and mental …. 7.144–7.146 interest …. 7.143 prior inconsistent statements …. 7.147–7.152 veracity …. 7.142 finality rule …. 7.139–7.141 exceptions …. 7.142–7.148 collaterality …. 7.140–7.141 complainant to sexual assault …. 3.142–3.152, 7.138 court witness …. 6.48, 6.49, 6.50 credibility …. 1.50, 7.132–7.138 credibility of testimony extension beyond, prohibition …. 7.139–7.141 exceptions …. 7.142–7.152 testing …. 7.127 credibility rule basis of …. 7.140 limits …. 7.133, 7.134 difficulty in limiting …. 7.137 documents …. 7.153–7.154 other than witnesses’ …. 7.153 possession of opponent …. 7.154 Queen Caroline’s case …. 7.149, 7.153

Walker v Walker, rule in …. 7.154 witness’s own documents hostile witness …. 7.118 memory refreshed …. 7.81, 7.82 prior inconsistent statements …. 7.149–7.152 evidence, limit on introducing …. 7.128 examination-in-chief, distinguished …. 7.126 generally …. 3.84 good character cross-examination following …. 3.90 in issue …. 3.106–3.109 hostile witness see Hostile and unfavourable witnesses importance of …. 1.54, 3.3, 7.125 issue …. 7.128–7.131 judges control by …. 7.138 limitations on …. 7.137 refusal to allow …. 7.124 leading questions …. 7.136 limiting suggestions …. 7.137 limit, discretion of judge …. 7.137 objects …. 7.127, 7.132, 7.152 oppressive, courts discretion to limit …. 7.138 physical and mental capacity …. 7.125, 7.144–7.146 presence of witness …. 7.3 previous conviction …. 3.116, 7.138, 7.142 prior inconsistent statements admissibility …. 7.148

common law …. 7.152 courts power to call document …. 7.152 facts in issue …. 7.147 legislation …. 7.148, 7.149, 7.151, 7.152 proof and tender …. 7.150 evidential …. 7.151 need for, on denial …. 7.151 right to …. 7.124–7.127 self-incrimination, modification of privilege against …. 3.85–3.87, 5.160–5.165 sexual assault complainant …. 3.142–3.152 unfavourable witnesses see Hostile and unfavourable witnesses uniform legislation …. 7.124–7.126, 7.130, 7.133, 7.139, 7.141–7.144, 7.153 Crown privilege see also Public interest immunity overview …. 5.220, 5.254 Crown prosecutor see also Prosecution appeal against acquittal …. 2.14 duty to act fairly …. 5.13, 6.55 imputation against …. 3.110–3.116 witnesses, discretion to call …. 6.52, 6.56 Custody interrogation admissibility …. 8.147–8.149 investigating official, by …. 8.129, 8.160 Customary rights proof of …. 8.84

D Daubert criteria

opinion evidence, admissibility of …. 7.52–7.54 De facto spouse compellability …. 5.201 self-incrimination, privilege against …. 5.165 Death see also Deceased estate; Deceased persons presumption of …. 6.23, 6.24, 6.26 Debts bad, personal knowledge of …. 8.105 repayment, burden of proof …. 6.13 Deceased estate uncorroborated evidence of claimant …. 4.75 Deceased persons out-of-court statements by, hearsay and …. 8.73–8.74 dying declarations …. 8.86–8.89 statements against interest …. 8.75–8.81 statements in course of duty …. 8.82–8.83 statements on pedigree …. 8.85 statements on public rights …. 8.84 testators, post-testamentary statements …. 8.90 Defence address by …. 2.11 burden of proof …. 6.8 conducting own …. 6.51 evidence, calling of …. 2.10 Defences burden of proof, criminal cases, in …. 6.8 entrapment …. 4.53, 5.257

insanity …. 6.8, 6.14 pre-trial disclosure …. 5.14, 5.142 Degrees of proof see Standard of proof Demonstrations real evidence …. 7.23 Directions to jury accused’s failure to testify on oath …. 5.117–5.133 adequacy …. 2.13, 4.5, 4.6 appeals, basis of …. 2.13 beyond reasonable doubt …. 2.71–2.73, 2.83–2.89 misdirection …. 2.82 non-traditional terms …. 2.71 role of jury, as to …. 2.72 Victorian legislation …. 2.73 Chamberlain direction …. 2.78–2.81, 2.83, 2.86 character of accused see Bad character; Good character circumstantial evidence see Circumstantial evidence comment, distinguished …. 2.13 corroboration see Corroboration ‘credibility direction’ where good character …. 3.137 cross-examination of accused on character …. 3.107, 3.136–3.138 duty of judge …. 2.12, 4.6 effectiveness of …. 2.13 failure of accused to testify on oath …. 5.124, 5.125–5.133 forensic disadvantage, delay causing …. 4.51 McKinney direction …. 4.32–4.34, 8.168 propensity evidence …. 3.73–3.75 relationship cases …. 3.74

requirement …. 2.12 sexual assault complaint, failure/delay in …. 7.107 warning …. 4.40, 4.41, 4.44–4.47, 4.49, 4.50, 7.101 silence of accused out of court …. 5.144 Discovery access to information rules …. 5.4 civil cases …. 5.5–5.11 intending parties …. 5.10 parties, from Anton Piller orders …. 5.157 blood tests …. 5.8 discovery and inspection …. 5.7 discretion, unnecessary for disposal of issues …. 5.83 emergency access …. 5.9 interrogatories …. 5.6 limitations upon access …. 5.10 medical examinations …. 5.8 pre-trial conference …. 5.11 preservation of property pending trial …. 5.8 privileges protecting production …. 5.9 see also Privilege suspected information …. 5.10 third parties …. 5.10 witnesses …. 5.5 criminal cases …. 5.12–5.18 accused by alibi …. 5.14 defence …. 5.14 failure to discover …. 5.14

opinion evidence …. 5.14 freedom of information legislation, under …. 5.16 pre-trial discovery …. 5.12 prosecution, by committal proceedings …. 5.13 pre-trial disclosure …. 1.50, 5.15–5.16 subpoena by …. 5.12 witnesses, obligation to disclose …. 5.13 freedom of information legislation and …. 5.16 legal professional privilege …. 5.83, 5.84 limitations …. 5.10 police powers …. 5.17 scope …. 5.7 self-incrimination, privilege against …. 5.157, 5.158, 5.160, 5.161 summary proceedings …. 5.15 Discretion to exclude admissibility rules …. 2.26 admissional evidence …. 2.34, 2.35 appeals, against exercise of …. 2.26, 8.159 breach of confidentiality …. 5.206 Bunning v Cross …. 2.27, 5.62, 5.256 Christie discretion …. 2.29–2.31, 3.12, 3.159 civil cases …. 2.28, 3.158 confessions and admissions Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people …. 8.138, 8.151–8.152, 8.156 agent provocateur …. 8.155 appeal against exercise …. 8.159 arrest, procedures following …. 8.147–8.150

balancing factors …. 8.157 breach of procedure …. 8.156 burden and standard of proof …. 8.160 caution requirement …. 8.149 discretion, nature of …. 8.122–8.125 entrapping and misleading questions …. 8.155 ‘fairness’ …. 8.134–8.142, 8.144, 8.146 grounds for exercise …. 8.123–8.124 holding charges …. 8.149 Judges’ Rules …. 5.134, 8.149 mental/physical condition of accused …. 8.136 public policy …. 2.34, 5.266, 8.121, 8.124, 8.125, 8.135, 8.140–8.146 questioning in custody …. 8.138, 8.147–8.149 recording requirements …. 4.33, 8.153, 8.168 refusal to answer …. 8.149 unreliability grounds …. 8.136–8.139 voir dire …. 8.160–8.168 efficiency, time and cost …. 2.27, 2.28 fair trial …. 2.29, 2.32, 2.33 fairness see Fairness discretion House decision …. 2.26, 8.159 identification evidence …. 4.55, 4.66–4.68, 4.74 ignorance of rights …. 2.34 improperly or illegally obtained evidence …. 2.32, 2.33, 2.35–2.37, 5.256, 5.258, 5.263, 5.264, 5.266, 5.267, 8.138–8.158 jury evidence …. 2.30 Lee discretion …. 2.27, 2.34, 8.140–8.142 loss of procedural rights …. 2.33–2.35

mandatory exclusion …. 2.23, 2.27, 2.31 nature and function at trial …. 2.26 public interest immunity, balance of interests …. 2.37, 5.255–5.267 public policy discretion to exclude evidence …. 2.36–2.37 confessions and admissions …. 2.34, 5.256, 5.258, 5.259, 5.266, 8.121, 8.143–8.146 rejection of evidence contrary to public interest …. 2.36, 2.37, 5.255–5.267 residual exclusionary discretions …. 2.27, 3.2 unfair prejudice …. 2.27, 2.31, 2.32, 2.35 uniform legislation …. 2.28, 8.127 unsigned record of interview …. 8.167 visual media, criminal cases …. 7.24 voir dire hearings …. 2.40 Disjunction equation overview …. 1.27 ‘Displacement effect’ identification parade …. 4.65 Disposition see Character evidence Dispute settlement common law civil cases …. 1.1 correctness of …. 1.4 criminal cases …. 1.1 distinction between judge and mediator …. 1.2 mediator’s role …. 1.2 methods …. 1.2, 1.3 principal techniques, through agreement …. 1.3 rationalist tradition …. 1.2 Distress

corroboration as …. 4.84, 4.85 sexual assault …. 3.146, 3.150 Divorce proceedings uncorroborated testimony …. 4.75 Divorcees competence and compellability of …. 5.200 DNA evidence Bayes’ Theorem, application …. 1.26, 1.32, 2.70 collection before trial …. 5.17 expert opinions, admissible …. 7.40, 7.43, 7.45, 7.64, 7.65 multiplicational equation for conjunction …. 1.20 problems with …. 1.22 reliability …. 7.45 standard of proof …. 2.87, 2.90 Doctors see Medical practitioners Documentary evidence admissibility operative issues …. 7.9 procedural safeguards …. 7.14 testimonial issues …. 7.7 authentication of documents …. 7.4, 7.6–7.14, 8.62, 8.173, 8.174, 8.176, 8.189, 8.199 adoption …. 7.9, 7.10 affidavits …. 7.13 attestation …. 7.9 authorship …. 7.9, 7.10 business records …. 7.13, 8.176, 8.188, 8.189, 8.199 computer output …. 7.13, 7.26, 8.188

dispensation of …. 7.11 electronic records …. 7.12 evidence of …. 7.8, 7.10 handwriting, proof …. 7.10 inspection and examination before trial …. 7.14 jury question …. 7.10 machine-generated documents …. 7.12 meaning …. 7.6 official signatures …. 7.11 oral acknowledgment …. 7.9 prior inconsistent statement …. 7.149 procedural safeguards …. 7.14 production from proper custody after 20 or 30 years …. 7.11 relaxation of requirements …. 7.13 seals …. 7.11 signatory …. 7.9, 7.10 uniform legislation …. 7.8 written statements of evidence …. 7.13 bankers’ books see Bankers’ books birth certificates …. 8.93 books of account see Books of account business records see Business records; Hearsay calling for and inspection of consequence where no entitlement …. 7.154 refreshing memory …. 7.79–7.86 computers see Computer output confession, written …. 8.167 copies

admissibility originals, as …. 7.17 secondary evidence, as …. 7.18 privileged or immune originals legal professional privilege …. 5.41–5.48, 5.61–5.67, 5.86 public interest immunity …. 5.227, 5.234 settlement, privilege …. 5.102 courts’ discretion to withhold from jury …. 7.21 cross-examination on see Cross-examination definition …. 7.5 hearsay rule see Hearsay inferences from …. 7.8 marriage certificates …. 8.93 nature of …. 7.4 non-testimonial evidence, as …. 7.4, 7.6 notice to produce …. 7.18 original, requirement …. 7.15 carbon copies …. 7.17 duplicates …. 7.17 exceptions, secondary evidence …. 7.18 extended meaning …. 7.17 refreshing memory …. 7.83 scope, contents being proved …. 7.15 tape recording …. 7.16 tender, modes of …. 7.18 video recording …. 7.17 presumption of due execution, 20 or 30 year rule …. 7.11 previous inconsistent statements see Cross-examination

public documents …. 8.91–8.93 reception of …. 7.4 refreshing memory see Refreshing memory relevance …. 7.7 secondary evidence admissible originals …. 7.18 privileged or immune originals legal professional privilege …. 5.41–5.48, 5.61–5.67 public interest immunity …. 5.227, 5.234, 5.239 settlement, privilege …. 5.102 subpoena duces tecum see Subpoena third parties, preparation of documents …. 5.37–5.38, 5.39 trier of fact, use by …. 7.2 uniform legislation …. 7.8, 7.13, 7.14, 7.19, 7.26 Dominant purpose test legal professional privilege …. 5.34–5.35, 5.36, 5.39 Double jeopardy appeals …. 2.14 res judicata and …. 5.190 Drink driving opinion evidence …. 7.42 Drug cases corroboration, accused, implication in crime charged …. 4.85 defence of duress …. 3.85 destruction of evidence …. 5.262 entrapment evidence …. 4.53 personal knowledge of accused …. 8.104 propensity evidence …. 3.26, 3.37, 3.56

psychological evidence …. 7.58 right to remain silent …. 5.133 Duress battered woman syndrome …. 7.51 burden of proof …. 6.8 defence of …. 3.85, 8.28 threats uttered by terrorists …. 8.28 Duty deceased persons, statements in course of …. 8.82–8.83 Dying declaration admissibility …. 8.86–8.89 corroboration …. 8.88 hearsay exception, deceased persons and …. 8.86–8.89 statutory modification …. 8.87 voir dire, standard of proof …. 8.86

E Eavesdropping see also Agent provocateur communications with lawyers overheard …. 5.61 matrimonial dispute …. 5.102 Ecclesiastical censure adultery …. 5.159 existence …. 5.159 privilege against …. 5.147, 5.149, 5.151, 5.155, 5.159 Electronic codings documentary evidence …. 7.17 Electronic media see also Computer output; Video recording; Visual and audio recordings

digi-boards, identification procedure …. 4.67, 4.70 email, authentication problems …. 7.12 independent evidence provided by …. 8.153 interrogation, use in …. 4.33, 8.148, 8.168 recordings, admissibility …. 7.17 records, authentication …. 7.12 Email authentication problems …. 7.12 Entrapment see also Agent provocateur defence of …. 4.53, 5.257 drug cases, evidence …. 4.53 Estoppel Browne v Dunn rule and …. 7.130 issue see Issue estoppel Evidence admissibility of see Admissibility approaches …. 1.12 calling …. 2.10 circumstantial see Circumstantial evidence DNA see DNA evidence documentary see Documentary evidence exclusionary rules, pre-trial procedures …. 5.14 expert see Opinion evidence failure to call see Accused persons; Case to answer; Inferences forms of …. 7.1 fundamental conceptions …. 2.17 identification see Identification evidence irrelevant …. 2.17

legislation, uniform …. 2.2 exclusionary principle under …. 3.54–3.57 non-testimonial …. 7.4, 7.6 ‘prima facie evidence’ …. 6.22 probability theory see Probability theory probative value see Probative value real see Real evidence ‘reasonably suspected’ …. 6.22 reception of …. 2.17–2.56 presumption of …. 2.46 relevance see Relevance rules ambit of …. 2.93 discretionary …. 2.26 exclusionary …. 4.1–4.3 hearsay see Hearsay procedural, object of …. 1.1–1.4, 3.1 structuring …. 1.52–1.53 tendered adversary restrictions …. 5.187–5.194 notice of …. 3.67 reception of …. 2.38–2.45 dispute over …. 2.40 prosecution, justified …. 3.12 use of, restrictions on …. 2.49 testimonial …. 7.2 uniform legislation scheme, overview …. 2.2–2.3 waiver of rules …. 2.46–2.49

weight …. 2.64 Evidence Act 1938 (UK) exceptions to hearsay rule, Australian legislation based on …. 8.173–8.179 technical difficulties …. 8.174 Evidential presumptions burden of proof and …. 6.28 inferences of fact, distinguished …. 6.25 overview …. 6.23 Examination-in-chief bolster rule …. 7.116 cross-examination, distinguished …. 7.126 hostile witness see Hostile and unfavourable witnesses leading questions see Leading questions prior consistent statements see Prior consistent statements procedure …. 2.7, 7.115 scope and purpose of …. 7.116 unfavourable witness see Hostile and unfavourable witnesses uniform legislation …. 7.116 Exceptions and provisos see Burden of proof Exhibit see Real evidence Experts see also Opinion evidence ad hoc expert …. 7.56 code of conduct …. 7.64 court-appointed …. 7.64 Daubert …. 7.50–7.52 Frye test …. 7.50–7.52 ‘hot tubs’ …. 7.64 National Research Council …. 7.46

PCAST …. 7.46 practice notes …. 7.64 pre-trial meetings …. 7.64 reports …. 7.64 exchange …. 5.8 quality in legal context …. 7.64 Eye Movement Desensitisation and Reprocessing (EMDR) therapy application …. 7.109, 7.111

F Facts adjudicative see Adjudicative facts best evidence see Best evidence rule descriptive approaches to decisions of …. 1.43 determination of …. 7.74–7.75, 7.135 discovery of courts, by …. 1.7, 1.37 past events as …. 1.6 theories underlying …. 1.6–1.7 intermediate …. 1.10, 2.80, 2.83–2.85, 2.88, 2.89 legislative see Legislative facts material facts see Material facts opinion, distinguished …. 7.38 primary expert opinions, establishing through …. 7.68–7.70 standard of proof …. 2.80, 2.83 rational process …. 1.9 trier of see Judges; Jury

Failure to call evidence see Accused persons; Case to answer; Inferences Failure to object waiver of rules …. 2.46–2.49 Failure to testify see Accused persons; Case to answer; Inferences Fairness discretion see also Discretion to exclude admissional evidence …. 2.34 Christie discretion …. 2.29, 2.30 common law references …. 2.29 confessions and admissions accused’s psychological condition …. 8.133 considerations …. 5.266, 8.134–8.135 procedural impropriety …. 2.32, 2.34, 2.37, 8.127, 8.140–8.142, 8.144, 8.146, 8.155 wrongful conviction, risk of …. 8.134, 8.136–8.139 exclusion of evidence, basis for …. 2.26, 2.27, 2.29–2.35, 5.260 factual rectitude and …. 2.32, 2.33, 5.260 general discretion as to unfair operation of evidence …. 2.35 Lee discretion and …. 2.34 loss of procedural rights …. 2.34 scope …. 2.32 stay of proceedings, basis for …. 2.29 trial, ensuring at …. 2.29, 2.32, 2.33 uniform legislation …. 8.134, 8.135, 8.144, 8.146 Films see also Photographs; Video recording; Visual and audio recordings admissibility …. 2.23, 7.24 discretion to exclude, criminal cases …. 7.24 presumption of accuracy …. 7.24 Fingerprints

compulsory test …. 5.152 expert testimony …. 7.43 power to take …. 5.17 privilege against self-incrimination …. 5.156 Flight admission in civil case …. 8.96 Foreign law incrimination under …. 5.164 judicial notice …. 6.70 Foreign lawyers legal professional privilege and …. 5.26 Forensic science see also Opinion evidence reliability of …. 7.43, 7.46, 7.49, 7.52, 7.55 Forfeiture of property corporations …. 5.151 Forfeiture privilege evolution …. 5.160 rationale …. 5.161 Formal admissions civil cases …. 8.95 criminal cases …. 8.95 informal admissions, distinguished …. 8.95 Frankian equation consequence of application …. 6.2 judicial notice and …. 6.69 overview …. 1.4 Fraud

communications with lawyers in furtherance of …. 5.29, 5.30 standard of proof, civil case, allegation of …. 2.65 Free disposition principle burden of proof and …. 6.4, 6.10 meaning …. 1.5 privilege in aid of settlement …. 5.87 Freedom of information pre-trial discovery …. 5.16 Fresh evidence admissibility …. 2.8 burden upon accused to adduce …. 5.192 Frye test opinion evidence, admissibility of …. 7.50–7.53

G Good character see also Character evidence; Cross-examination cross-examination following …. 3.90 direction to jury …. 3.107, 3.136–3.138 limitations on evidence of …. 3.129 meaning of …. 3.108, 3.129 nature and purpose …. 3.108, 3.126–3.130 purpose of tender …. 3.108, 3.130 rebuttal …. 3.106, 3.131–3.135 reputation, establishing …. 3.106, 3.128, 3.129 right to tender evidence …. 3.106–3.109, 3.130 Rowton rule …. 3.129, 3.130 tendering, ways of …. 3.106, 3.108, 3.130 testimony of accused and …. 3.135

Government see also Crown privilege; Public interest immunity ASIO documents …. 5.232, 5.234, 5.248 disclosure of documents high level …. 5.232, 5.233, 5.235 security sensitive …. 5.223, 5.247 public interest immunity Aboriginal lore and heritage …. 5.222 failure to object to communication disclosure …. 5.216 ‘matters of state’ …. 5.222 protection of functions …. 5.221

H Handwriting expert opinions …. 7.40, 7.43 proof …. 7.10, 7.40 provision of sample …. 8.100 Hansard reports admissibility of …. 5.199 Hearsay air ticket …. 8.30 approaches to …. 8.4–8.7, 8.11 argumentative conversations …. 8.24 assertions statements, false arguments …. 8.29 statements in, distinguished from assertions in conduct …. 8.14 bets …. 8.22, 8.32 conduct …. 8.13–8.27 contracts, proof …. 8.31

definition …. 8.3–8.11, 8.192–8.194 documents …. 8.173, 8.175, 8.178 authentication …. 8.62, 8.173, 8.174, 8.176, 8.189, 8.199 statements in …. 8.174 reliability …. 8.179 exceptions to prohibition …. 8.4–8.5, 8.60–8.64 account, books of …. 8.189 admissions see Admissions in civil cases; Confessions and admissions in criminal cases bankers’ books …. 8.199 see also Bankers’ books birth certificates …. 8.93 business records …. 7.13, 8.182–8.187, 8.199 statements in …. 8.174–8.176, 8.178–8.180, 8.182–8.187 case-by-case approach …. 8.61 collateral matters in statement …. 8.80 common law and related statutory exceptions …. 8.65–8.168 computer output …. 8.58–8.59, 8.188 confessions see Confessions and admissions in criminal cases deceased persons dying declarations …. 8.86–8.89 out-of-court statements …. 8.73–8.74 statements against interest …. 8.75–8.81 statements in course of duty …. 8.82–8.83 statements on pedigree …. 8.85 statements on public rights …. 8.84 testators, post-testamentary statements …. 8.90 documents business records …. 7.13, 8.182–8.187, 8.199

calling for, inspecting …. 7.154 statutory exceptions …. 8.169–8.200 testators’ statements …. 8.45 transportation documents …. 8.190 experts basis of expertise …. 7.68–7.70 published works …. 6.67 government gazettes …. 8.93 identification evidence …. 7.96, 8.54 knowledge, beliefs and intentions …. 8.42–8.49 machine-generated information …. 8.57–8.59, 8.200 maps, public …. 8.93 marriage certificates …. 8.93 mental state …. 8.42–8.49 meteorological records …. 8.93 motor vehicle registers …. 8.93 necessity …. 8.170 new …. 8.6, 8.7 pedigree/genealogy, statements as to …. 8.85 physical state …. 8.50 Potts v Miller, rule in …. 8.170 previous testimony …. 8.61 prior consistent statements …. 7.90 public records …. 8.91–8.93 rationale …. 8.60–8.64 reliability …. 8.170, 8.171, 8.172, 8.179 res gestae …. 8.10, 8.35–8.41, 8.65–8.72 spontaneous statements …. 8.35–8.37, 8.39, 8.66–8.72

proximity requirement …. 8.69 statutory exceptions …. 8.169–8.190 Criminal Evidence Act 1965 (UK), Australian legislation based on …. 8.180 Evidence Act 1938 (UK), Australian legislation based on …. 8.173–8.179 grounds …. 8.170 Queensland …. 8.66, 8.74, 8.75, 8.172, 8.174–8.176, 8.178, 8.181, 8.182 reliability, role of …. 8.171, 8.172 South Australia …. 8.74, 8.172, 8.174, 8.178, 8.183–8.187 uniform legislation …. 8.35, 8.44, 8.50, 8.53, 8.57, 8.62, 8.63, 8.74, 8.75, 8.78, 8.79, 8.81–8.85, 8.89, 8.93, 8.94, 8.169, 8.195–8.200 Western Australia …. 8.172, 8.174, 8.178–8.180 telephone calls …. 8.67, 8.68 testators family maintenance petition …. 8.45 post-testamentary statements …. 8.90 first-hand admissibility …. 8.62, 8.66, 8.73, 8.74, 8.82, 8.85, 8.89, 8.90, 8.176, 8.178, 8.185–8.187, 8.196–8.198 definition …. 8.62 indirect report and …. 8.171 function …. 8.2 identikit reconstructions …. 4.65 implied assertions …. 8.13–8.27 inadmissible …. 2.39 intention, relevance of …. 8.8 interpreters’ evidence …. 8.52, 8.53 labels …. 8.57, 8.200 machine-generated information …. 8.57–8.59, 8.200

maker of statement, availability …. 8.51–8.56 ‘unavailability of persons’, meaning …. 8.66 mark of origin …. 8.57, 8.200 narrative statements …. 8.10, 8.35–8.50 assertive …. 8.41 non-narrative statements …. 8.7, 8.35, 8.38, 8.41, 8.45, 8.50 negative …. 8.26 offers …. 8.33 operative words …. 8.31–8.32 opinion evidence …. 7.68–7.69, 7.71, 7.72 opinion surveys …. 8.49 original evidence …. 8.28, 8.32–8.34 photofits …. 4.70 post-marks …. 8.57, 8.200 premises, use of …. 8.25 prior statements of witness see Prior consistent statements; Prior inconsistent statements ‘prohibited’, definition …. 8.8 rationale …. 8.1–8.11 reform, reluctance to …. 8.6, 8.61 reliability of evidence and …. 8.61 reputation …. 7.142, 8.84, 8.85, 8.200 scope of rule …. 8.1–8.59 second-hand …. 8.62 admissibility …. 8.81, 8.173, 8.174, 8.178 ‘continuous record’ as proof …. 8.174, 8.176 credibility and …. 8.177 silence …. 8.26

statements non-hearsay use …. 8.29 out-of-court …. 7.94–7.98, 8.12 availability of maker …. 8.51–8.56 tendered as assertions …. 8.28–8.34 telephone calls …. 8.17, 8.22–8.23, 8.32, 8.33, 8.67, 8.68 testator’s conduct, statements as to …. 8.18 transportation documents …. 8.30, 8.190 uniform legislation …. 8.8, 8.27, 8.191–8.194 exceptions to prohibition …. 8.35, 8.44, 8.50, 8.53, 8.57, 8.62, 8.63, 8.74, 8.75, 8.78, 8.79, 8.81–8.85, 8.89, 8.93, 8.94, 8.169, 8.195–8.200 witness, availability of observing …. 8.51–8.56 Historical facts judicial notice …. 6.60, 6.72 Hollington v Hewthorn, rule in prior convictions, admissibility of …. 5.186, 5.191–5.194 statutory modification …. 5.194 Homosexuality assault provoked by homosexual advances, third party propensity evidence …. 3.140 Honest mistake burden of proof …. 6.8 Hostile and unfavourable witnesses adverse, distinguished …. 7.121 contradict testimony …. 7.118 cross-examination …. 2.26 extent permitted …. 7.122 prior inconsistent statement …. 7.118–7.120, 7.122, 7.123

declaration …. 7.118, 7.120 circumstances …. 7.121 considerations …. 7.120 interest, distinguished …. 7.143 leading questions …. 7.118–7.121 prior inconsistent statement denied …. 7.118, 7.120 evidential effect …. 7.119 unfavourable, meaning …. 7.123 Hot tubs opinion evidence …. 7.64 Human rights general embodiment in legislation …. 1.48 legislation, presumption of innocence …. 6.14 privilege against self-incrimination …. 5.152, 5.153 Hypnosis admissibility guidelines …. 7.112 statements made under …. 7.113 child-witnesses …. 7.35, 7.110 confessions made under …. 7.113 opinion evidence …. 7.110 reliability …. 7.110, 7.111, 7.114, 7.136 revived memory …. 7.109, 7.110, 7.113 statements induced by …. 7.109–7.114 uniform legislation …. 7.110–7.113 Hypothesis Bayes’ Theorem, problems with …. 1.34

case to answer …. 2.53 co-existence of …. 1.40 competing, determination of …. 1.43 court refrain from forming …. 6.47 inconsistent with evidence …. 1.40 judgment, akin to …. 1.40 posterior odds equation …. 1.23 proof and …. 2.53 total probabilities equation …. 1.27

I Identification evidence Bayes’ Theorem …. 1.21–1.22, 1.33 bite-marks …. 7.49 circumstantial proof of …. 4.56 computer constructions …. 4.65 confident witness …. 4.62 corroboration by multiple witnesses …. 4.73 cross-racial identification …. 4.58 cumulative effect …. 4.73 definition …. 4.55, 4.56, 4.69 digi-board identification …. 4.67, 4.70, 7.95 direct proof of …. 4.56 direction to jury …. 4.54, 4.61, 4.71 misdirection …. 4.60 discretion to exclude …. 4.55, 4.66–4.68 uniform legislation …. 4.68–4.70 dock identification …. 4.64

hearsay rule …. 4.74, 7.94–7.98, 8.12 exception to prohibition …. 7.96, 8.54 identification testimony, meaning …. 4.56 identikit constructions …. 4.65, 4.70, 4.74, 7.95 illegally obtained …. 4.68 opinion of identity …. 7.41 out-of-court assertions, admissibility …. 4.74 out-of-court identification, admissibility …. 4.74 prior consistent statements …. 7.94–7.98, 8.12 uniform legislation …. 7.97–7.98 personal characteristics identified …. 4.57 photofits …. 4.70, 7.95 photographic identification …. 4.65–4.67, 4.70, 4.73, 4.74, 7.95 picture identification …. 4.70 police procedures …. 4.64–4.67, 4.70 positive-identification evidence …. 4.56 prior consistent statements and …. 4.74, 7.94–7.98, 8.12 procedures for identification, risks of …. 4.64 risks of …. 4.56–4.58 ‘rogues’ gallery’ effect …. 4.65 security camera footage …. 2.23 strangers …. 4.58 unreliability (potential) …. 4.54 verbal descriptions …. 4.65 visual identification …. 4.57, 7.56 voice identification …. 4.57, 7.56 warnings …. 4.55, 4.59–4.61, 4.71 factors undermining reliability …. 4.62–4.65

failing to warn …. 4.60 presumptive duty to warn …. 4.54, 4.55 supporting evidence, effect on obligation …. 4.71–4.72 testimony of identification …. 4.57 witness’s acquaintance with suspect …. 4.63 Identification parade admissibility of evidence …. 4.74, 8.74 ‘displacement effect’ …. 4.65 exclusionary discretion of evidence …. 4.68 illegally conducted …. 4.67 necessity …. 4.67 participant selection …. 4.65 procedure …. 4.65 refusal to participate …. 8.100 reliability of …. 4.65 Ill health confessions, admissibility of …. 8.136 statements in support …. 8.50 Illegally obtained evidence agent provocateur …. 4.30, 8.155 breath test, discretion to include …. 5.256 Bunning v Cross discretion …. 5.256 confessions see Confessions and admissions in criminal cases discretion to exclude …. 2.32, 2.33, 2.35–2.37, 5.256, 8.138–8.158 identification illegally conducted …. 4.67 Illegitimacy (person) presumption of …. 6.23, 6.24 Impeaching

party’s own witness see Hostile and unfavourable witnesses Implied admissions see Admissions in civil cases; Confessions and admissions in criminal cases Implied assertions see Hearsay Incapacity admissions by person, under …. 8.133, 8.136 opinion evidence …. 7.42 physical and mental collateral questions, exceptions …. 7.144–7.146 statements asserting …. 8.50 Income tax returns Privileged to extent statute provides …. 5.238 Indifference principle of …. 1.15, 1.17, 1.45, 1.47 Inducement see Confessions and admissions in criminal cases Inductive probabilities isolating facts to which criminal standard applies …. 2.74–2.76, 2.92 mathematical probabilities, distinguished …. 1.40, 1.41 Inferences admissional from lies …. 4.88 adverse circumstantial cases …. 5.129, 5.131 civil cases …. 5.133 permissible on facts …. 5.130–5.132, 5.142, 5.144 sexual assault …. 5.128, 5.129 assent from silence …. 5.139 catenate …. 1.9 chains of …. 1.10, 1.11

circumstantial …. 2.83 coincidence supporting …. 3.60 convergent …. 1.9, 1.10, 4.84–4.86, 4.92 corroborative …. 1.9 deductive form …. 1.13–1.17 determination of …. 7.74–7.75 documents from evidence …. 7.8 doubtful, combining as proof …. 1.10, 2.77, 2.79 expert assistance …. 7.43–7.46, 7.67 failure of accused to testify on oath, from …. 5.124–5.133 failure to call evidence, from …. 2.50, 6.45 implicative, prior conduct or statement …. 4.84 independent, as corroboration …. 4.92–4.94 Jones v Dunkel …. 5.121, 5.133 nature of …. 1.8–1.11 negligence of …. 6.25 observational …. 7.39–7.41 presumptions, distinguished …. 6.25 primary facts, distinguished …. 2.80 primary sense impressions, distinguished …. 7.39 probability and see Probability theory relationship evidence …. 3.33 res ipsa loquitur, as …. 6.25 sexual assault, failure to complain …. 7.100 statements in presence of party, reactions …. 5.138, 5.139, 8.98 Wigmorean analysis of process …. 1.8–1.11, 2.75, 4.85 Informal admissions see also Admissions in civil cases formal admissions, distinguished …. 8.95

Informants immunity …. 5.205, 5.216, 5.238 disclosure of identity, effect upon …. 5.216 journalists’ sources …. 5.208, 5.214 warning to jury …. 4.76 Injunctions confidential material, grant in respect of …. 5.63, 5.65 inadvertent disclosure …. 5.65 limitation …. 5.66 Mareva …. 5.157, 5.176 Innocence, presumption of basis …. 3.2 Bayes’ Theorem …. 1.32 burden of proof and …. 3.2, 6.8 civil cases …. 6.25 human rights legislation …. 6.14 Insanity defence burden of proof …. 6.8, 6.14 Intellectually disabled persons interrogation of …. 8.152 Intention expert testimony of …. 7.58 hearsay …. 8.43–8.44 contemporaneous expressions of intention …. 8.45 inference of …. 6.25–6.26 presumption …. 6.25–6.26 proof, statements asserting …. 8.42–8.49 Intermediate facts

explained …. 2.75, 2.80 standard of proof when indispensable …. 2.83–2.89 Interpreter hearsay evidence …. 8.52, 8.53 opinion evidence …. 7.56 right to during interrogation …. 8.148, 8.149, 8.152 police caution …. 8.148 witness, communicating through …. 7.35 Interrogation see also Confessions and admissions in criminal cases Aboriginal people, third person presence …. 8.151, 8.152 waiver of …. 8.151 admissibility, accused’s silence …. 5.108, 5.109 bail, on …. 8.149 cautions, statutory requirement …. 8.149 children …. 8.150 confrontation by complainant …. 8.154 cross-examination by police …. 8.154 custodial …. 8.148 electronic recording …. 4.33, 8.148, 8.168 friend’s presence, right to …. 8.148, 8.152–8.153 holding charges …. 8.149 improper conduct by police …. 2.33, 2.34, 8.154–8.155 intellectually disabled persons …. 8.152 interpreter, right to …. 8.148, 8.149, 8.152 Judges’ Rules …. 5.134, 8.149, 8.154 lawyer, right to …. 8.148, 8.149 record of interview, admissibility …. 7.21, 7.34, 7.83, 7.110, 7.125, 8.155

remand, on …. 8.149 self-incrimination, privilege against, during …. 5.135–5.144 silence, right to …. 8.149 statutory procedures …. 8.148 third person, presence of …. 8.148, 8.150, 8.151–8.153 vulnerable persons …. 8.152 Interrogatories discovery, as means of …. 5.6 fishing, used for …. 5.6, 5.12 limitations …. 5.10 Intoxication admissions by person, under …. 8.133 drink driving, opinions concerning …. 7.42 Involuntariness see also Confessions and admissions in criminal cases external influences …. 8.131 limit …. 8.128 meaning …. 8.129 Irrelevant evidence see Relevance Issue cross-examination Browne v Dunn rule and …. 7.129–7.131 overview …. 7.128 Issue estoppel acquittals …. 5.188 res judicata and …. 5.188, 5.190 waiver of privilege and …. 5.55

J Jarvis rule

burden of proof, allocation of …. 6.15–6.18 Jones v Dunkel inference failure to call evidence …. 5.121, 5.133 Journalists communications with informants, admissibility …. 5.205 sources, disclosure of …. 5.208, 5.214 Judge-alone trial accused may apply for judge alone trial …. 2.7 corroboration and …. 4.12 overview …. 2.7 voir dire evidence …. 2.42 Judges admissibility, determination of …. 2.40–2.49 competence of witness …. 2.44 confessions see Confessions and admissions in criminal cases discretion see Discretion to exclude exhibits …. 7.21 expert opinions …. 7.68–7.70 hostility, determination of …. 7.119–7.121 ‘case to answer’ determination …. 2.50, 2.52, 2.54 comments by …. 2.12, 2.13 cross-examination control of …. 7.138 limitations on …. 7.137 refusal to allow …. 7.124 directions to jury see Jury directions discretion, exercise of …. 2.26, 2.30, 2.31 immunity from explaining decisions …. 5.184, 5.185

legal professional privilege, process for determining …. 5.77 male-dominated perspectives …. 1.46 mediator, distinguished …. 1.2 personal knowledge, judicial notice after inquiry …. 6.59, 6.72 powers calling witness …. 6.50–6.52 questioning witness …. 6.58, 7.138 privilege against testifying …. 5.185 public interest immunity, process for determining …. 5.232–5.240 role dispute settlement …. 1.2 trial process …. 2.12, 4.35 scientists, distinguished …. 1.40 self-incrimination, privilege, process for determining …. 5.166–5.185 trier of fact, as …. 1.9, 7.74–7.75, 7.135 evidence used by …. 7.2 unreliable evidence judge/magistrate sitting alone …. 4.12 responsibility for decisions …. 4.106 Judges’ Rules right to silence …. 5.134, 8.149 Judgment binding nature of …. 5.191 gendered criticism …. 1.46 hypotheses, akin to …. 1.40 non-positivist concepts …. 1.4 positivist approach …. 1.4 procedural rules and …. 1.1

res judicata principle …. 5.187 Judicial discretion see Discretion to exclude Judicial notice Acts of Parliament …. 6.69 adjudicative facts …. 6.60, 6.64, 6.65, 6.73, 6.77 legislative facts, distinguished …. 6.71–6.73 circumstances for taking …. 6.60–6.63 constitutional facts …. 6.72, 6.73 disclosure to parties …. 6.66 doctrine employed by courts …. 6.66 economic facts …. 6.72 examples …. 6.60, 6.65 foreign law …. 6.70 Frankian equation …. 6.69 general knowledge …. 6.65, 6.75 generalisations of knowledge …. 6.75–6.77 historical facts …. 6.60, 6.72 inquiry, after …. 6.59, 6.61, 6.66 knowledge, definitive limits …. 6.65 knowledge of language …. 6.59 legislative facts …. 6.65, 6.71, 6.72 adjudicative facts, distinguished …. 6.71–6.73 community interest …. 6.73 limit of …. 6.61 localities and geographical facts …. 6.60, 6.75 mode of inquiry …. 6.66 notorious facts …. 6.60, 6.62, 6.64, 6.75 official signatures and seals …. 7.11

overview …. 6.59 personal knowledge …. 6.59, 6.72 political matters …. 6.60, 6.72 published books, calendars, maps and charts …. 6.67 rationale …. 6.59 regulations …. 6.69 scientific facts …. 6.60 scientific instruments, accuracy …. 7.26, 8.58 scope …. 6.74 simpliciter, notorious facts …. 6.59 statutory provisions official signatures …. 7.11 published books, calendars, maps and charts …. 6.67 undue expense or delay …. 6.68 Junk science reliability …. 7.45 Jury absence of, on voir dire …. 2.41, 2.42 authentication of document, question for …. 7.10 competence and compellability of jurors …. 5.185 confessions, role of …. 8.101, 8.161, 8.166 directions from judge see Directions to jury evidence, discretion to exclude, prejudicial evidence from …. 2.30 handwriting, comparison of by …. 7.40 immunity from explaining decisions …. 5.185 origins …. 6.47 real evidence power of court to withhold from …. 7.21

statutory restrictions …. 7.23 request questions be put to witness …. 6.58 trial by election by accused …. 2.7 role …. 2.12, 2.57, 2.72, 4.35 trier of fact, as …. 1.9, 1.49, 1.51, 2.57, 7.74–7.75, 7.135 evidence used by …. 2.7, 27.2 verdict direction see Case to answer voir dire and see Voir dire

K Knowledge correspondence theory of …. 1.6 proof, statements asserting …. 8.42–8.49 Kotzmann analysis standard of proof of intermediate facts …. 2.84–2.87

L Law Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people …. 7.73 evidence, of, fundamental conceptions …. 2.17 foreign judicial notice of …. 6.70 self-incrimination …. 5.164 Lawyers see also Legal professional privilege definition …. 5.26 employees, as …. 5.27 foreign …. 5.26 private practice …. 5.27

right to …. 8.148, 8.149 failure to caution …. 5.267 role, evolution of …. 5.106 search warrant procedure, premises of …. 5.80, 5.81 Lay opinion see Opinion admissibility …. 7.41 Leading questions see also Cross-examination; Examination-in-chief; Reexamination cross-examination, use in …. 7.136 prohibition against in examination-in-chief …. 7.117 exceptions hostile and unfavourable witnesses …. 7.118–7.121 non-controversial matters …. 7.117 witness, confused or forgetful …. 7.117, 7.121 uniform legislation …. 7.117 re-examination, use in …. 7.156 Lee discretion see also Confessions and admissions in criminal cases; Discretion to exclude; Fairness discretion overview …. 2.34 Legal practitioners see also Lawyers foreign …. 5.26 Legal professional advice meaning …. 5.27 Legal professional privilege abuse of …. 5.50 accident reports …. 5.34 adversary context …. 5.2 advice sought …. 5.27

bar to access …. 5.61 claims to …. 5.77–5.81 common law, two privileges under …. 5.22–5.23 communications with lawyers agents, documents prepared by …. 5.37–5.38 bona fides …. 5.29–5.31 confidentiality …. 5.28 dominant purpose of legal advice …. 5.27, 5.32–5.40, 5.42, 5.43, 5.46, 5.47 lawyer, definition …. 5.26 leaked beyond relationship …. 5.61 materials to facilitate confidential communication …. 5.32, 5.33 mixed/multiple purposes …. 5.34, 5.40 severance …. 5.40 sole purpose test …. 5.34, 5.36 third parties documents prepared by …. 5.37–5.38, 5.39 presence of …. 5.28 company searches and investigations …. 5.72, 5.75 copies …. 5.44–5.48, 5.86 corporations, claims to …. 5.36 crime and fraud exception …. 5.29 death of client …. 5.26 disclosure to agent …. 5.56 third party …. 5.50 discovery and …. 5.83, 5.84 documents or communications …. 5.49

dominant purpose test …. 5.27, 5.34–5.36, 5.40 equitable proceedings against third parties …. 5.63–5.67 exceptions abuse of power …. 5.31 admission in presence of police officer …. 5.28 crime or fraud …. 5.29, 5.30 non-professional advice …. 5.27 good faith …. 5.30 ignorance, disclosure in …. 5.50 inquiries by statutory bodies …. 5.22 intentional waiver …. 5.49 inter partes …. 5.78 joint …. 5.49 justification for …. 5.22, 5.23, 5.85 law firm premises, searches of …. 5.80, 5.81 limits …. 5.47–5.76 liquidators’ investigations …. 5.75 litigation privilege see Litigation privilege materials collected by lawyers, protection …. 5.23 mistaken disclosure …. 5.54 NCA (ACC) investigations …. 5.75 non-professional matters …. 5.27 procedural aspects of inspection by court …. 5.77, 5.78 search warrants, objection to …. 5.77, 5.79–5.81 subpoena, objection to …. 5.78 public interest immunity …. 5.68, 5.82 public policy limits

accused, disclosure to show innocence …. 5.68 child, disclosure to protect interests …. 5.68 crime and fraud exception …. 5.29 death of client …. 5.69 enforcement of court order …. 5.69 impact on person’s rights …. 5.70 relationship between executive government and legislature …. 5.68 purpose …. 5.23, 5.26 rationale and scope …. 5.22–5.23, 5.60, 5.86 relating to party’s own case …. 5.84 retainer, whether required …. 5.33 search warrants …. 5.77, 5.79–5.81 see also Search warrants severance …. 5.40 sole purpose test …. 5.34, 5.36 statutory removal of …. 5.71–5.76 surviving death of client …. 5.26 taxation searches …. 5.22, 5.81 tender of disclosed privileged material or secondary evidence …. 5.62–5.67 uniform legislation …. 5.24, 5.25, 5.28, 5.31, 5.35, 5.39, 5.42, 5.47, 5.49, 5.58, 5.59, 5.69, 5.70 voluntary disclosure to opponent …. 5.49, 5.54 discovery or at trial …. 5.55 waiver …. 5.49 estoppel and …. 5.55 extent …. 5.55 imputed …. 5.50, 5.51–5.53 inconsistency …. 5.57, 5.58

Mann v Carnell conceptualisation …. 5.57, 5.58 mistake …. 5.54 partial disclosure …. 5.51 principles …. 5.51, 5.52 terms of …. 5.58 unfair advantage and …. 5.57 work-product, protection of …. 5.23, 5.60 Legality, principle of legal professional privilege …. 5.76 overview …. 1.53 interpreting legislation to ensure …. 5.146, 5.183, 5.209, 5.220 self-incrimination, privilege against …. 5.183 Legislative facts adjudicative facts, distinguished …. 6.71–6.73 community interest …. 6.73 judicial notice …. 6.65, 6.71, 6.72 Letters postage, proof of …. 8.57, 8.200 Liberal relevancy opinion evidence …. 7.47 Lies confessions and admissions in criminal cases as …. 4.85, 5.138, 8.15, 8.96, 8.97, 8.99, 8.130 consciousness of guilt, corroboration, as …. 4.83, 4.86–4.88, 4.93 detection test …. 7.50, 7.136 discredit accused’s testimony …. 4.88 Edwards direction …. 4.87, 4.88 guilt, as sole evidence of …. 2.88

indispensable intermediate fact, as …. 2.85, 2.88 Liquidators investigations legal professional privilege …. 5.75 Litigant in person no common law privilege …. 5.41 statutory privilege …. 5.42 Litigation privilege accountant’s report for client …. 5.38 ambit …. 5.46 anticipated or pending litigation …. 5.43 communications made for multiple purposes …. 5.34 copies third parties’ hands, in …. 5.46 unprivileged material …. 5.44, 5.45, 5.86 dominant purpose test …. 5.41 justification …. 5.23, 5.34 material collected for litigation …. 5.41–5.46 copying unprivileged material …. 5.44–5.46 created by client …. 5.43 documents prepared by third parties …. 5.38 evidence excluded …. 5.42 lawyer’s written communications written …. 5.43 litigant in person …. 5.41, 5.42 prospects of litigation …. 5.43 purpose …. 5.41 tape recording …. 5.46 Longman warning uncorroborated testimony …. 4.44–4.47, 4.49, 4.50

M Machine-generated information admissibility under common law …. 8.172 authentication …. 7.13, 7.26, 8.188 hearsay …. 8.57–8.59, 8.200 Machines see also Scientific instruments accuracy, presumption of …. 7.25 Magistrates case to answer, before …. 6.35 custody, orders …. 8.149 mandatory warning …. 4.12, 4.99 prerogative to acquit …. 6.35 Makin rule exclusion of evidence …. 3.13–3.18, 3.31, 3.47, 3.58, 3.64 application …. 3.28 restrictive approach …. 3.16 Maps and charts admissibility …. 8.84, 8.93 judicial notice …. 6.67 Marriage competence and compellability of spouses …. 5.107, 5.113, 5.200, 5.203, 5.204 promise to marry, breach of …. 8.76 validity presumption …. 6.23, 6.24, 6.26, 6.28 Material facts see also Burden of proof; Case to answer accused, at option of …. 3.66 burden of proof …. 6.2, 6.3, 6.8–6.13 case to answer …. 2.50–2.58

civil cases, pleadings in …. 2.38 defined …. 2.19, 2.20 ‘materiality’ …. 2.24 nature of …. 1.5 past events …. 1.5 correspondence theory of knowledge …. 1.6–1.7 inferential process, Wigmorean analysis and …. 1.8–1.11 probability theory …. 1.12–1.43 testing for relevance …. 2.19 theory …. 6.47 ‘traces’ …. 7.37 when in issue …. 2.19, 2.40 Wigmorean analysis, example …. 1.10–1.11 Material objects see Real evidence Mathematical probabilities inductive approach, distinguished …. 1.41 standard of proof as …. 1.35–1.38 McKinney direction unreliable evidence …. 4.32–4.34, 8.168 Mediation see also Alternative dispute resolution dispute settlement mode …. 1.2, 1.3 Mediators role in dispute settlement …. 1.2 Medical examination courts’ power to order …. 5.8 Medical practitioners see also Psychologists communications with patients, admissibility …. 5.205, 5.211

expert testimony accused, mental capacity of …. 7.43, 7.58 alcohol, effect on capacity to drive …. 7.42 child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome …. 7.45, 7.51, 7.108 direct observations as basis …. 7.68 hypnosis …. 7.110, 7.112 psychiatrists …. 7.43, 7.45, 7.51, 7.58, 7.59, 7.108 threshold test …. 7.47 witnesses, physical/mental capacity …. 7.144–7.146 privilege to withhold information …. 5.197 Mens rea burden of proof and …. 6.9 Mentally disabled person see also Vulnerable witnesses accused, conducting own defence …. 6.51 confessions admissibility …. 8.136 voluntariness …. 8.133 cross-examination …. 7.144–7.146 witness, reliability of evidence …. 4.77 Mickelberg, rule in see also Hollington v Hewthorn, rule in admissibility of prior conviction …. 5.192, 5.193 Microspectrophotometers presumption of accuracy …. 6.28 Ministers of religion privilege to withhold information …. 5.197, 5.207–5.210 Misconduct accused see Accused persons police see Confessions and admissions in criminal cases; Interrogation

third parties see Character evidence witnesses see Character evidence; Cross-examination Multiple identification see Identification Multiplicational equation for conjunction overview …. 1.20 problems …. 1.21–1.22 Murray direction uncorroborated testimony …. 4.44, 4.50

N Narrative rule against see Hearsay National security public interest immunity …. 5.216, 5.223, 5.247 Natural law rules, approach to …. 1.4 Negligence inferences of …. 6.25 Negotiation definition …. 1.3 Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum self-incrimination, privilege against …. 5.106 New South Wales criminal investigations …. 8.148 child suspects, obligations regarding …. 8.150 inference from accused’s failure to refer to fact …. 5.142, 5.144 interim appeal …. 2.15

medical communications privilege …. 5.207, 5.208, 5.209 pre-trial disclosure …. 5.13 professional confidential relationship privilege …. 5.214 sexual assault cases character of complainants …. 3.146–3.150 communications privilege …. 5.208, 5.209, 5.212, 5.213 complaint failure/delay …. 7.107 silence, inferences from …. 5.140–5.142, 5.144 No case submission see Case to answer Nominal defendant admissions by driver …. 8.109 Non-expert opinions see Opinion evidence Non-testimonial evidence forms of …. 7.4 Northern Territory criminal investigations …. 8.147 children, interrogation of …. 8.150 medical communications privilege …. 5.207–5.209 sexual assault cases character of complainants …. 3.146, 3.147 communications privilege …. 5.208, 5.209, 5.212, 5.213 witnesses, children and vulnerable persons as …. 7.34 Notice of alibi see Alibi Notice to produce see also Subpoena best evidence rule …. 7.18 Notorious facts judicial notice …. 6.60, 6.62, 6.64, 6.75

O Oath see also Affirmation ability to understand, test …. 7.35 formalities …. 7.28–7.30 sworn testimony …. 7.28 uniform legislation …. 7.28 unsworn testimony …. 7.28–7.30 Objection see Failure to object Observational inferences see also Opinion evidence limits …. 7.40 opinion testimony based on …. 7.39–7.41 Offers hearsay, as …. 8.33 settlement, privilege in aid of see Settlement, privilege in aid of Officials misconduct by …. 8.130, 8.131, 8.154, 8.155 Omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta presumption application …. 6.28 Opinion ad hoc expert …. 7.56 evaluation …. 7.66 jury …. 7.74–7.75 lay opinion …. 7.41 non-expert …. 7.39 specialised knowledge …. 2.23, 7.41, 7.54–7.56, 7.59, 7.66, 7.146 uniform legislation prohibition …. 7.38 Opinion evidence

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander groups …. 7.73 accidents causing disease …. 7.47 motor vehicle …. 7.44, 7.49 ad hoc experts …. 7.56 admissibility …. 7.37, 7.44, 7.53, 7.55, 7.59 common law …. 7.53 tests, illusory …. 7.57–7.62 uniform legislation …. 7.38, 7.41, 7.54–7.55, 7.58, 7.62, 7.64, 7.108 voir dire …. 7.65–7.66 adversarial presentation …. 7.63–7.64 advocacy, distinguished …. 7.44 anatomists …. 7.54 anthropologists …. 7.72, 8.71 assistance to court …. 7.43–7.46, 7.136 form of …. 7.67 basis rule …. 7.66 battered woman syndrome …. 7.45, 7.51 Bayesian approach …. 7.62, 7.64 biomedical/biological experts …. 7.43, 7.64 bite marks …. 7.43 Chamberlain direction …. 2.78, 2.79, 2.80, 2.81, 2.83 children, in relation to development and behaviour …. 7.108 sexual abuse accommodation syndrome …. 7.45, 7.51 common knowledge rule …. 7.58–7.59 computers, reliability of …. 7.25 concurrent …. 7.64

conflict …. 7.74, 7.75 Daubert criteria …. 7.52–7.54 disclosure, pre-trial …. 7.64 discretion, mandatory and exclusionary …. 3.28, 7.55 DNA …. 7.40, 7.43, 7.45, 7.64, 7.65 doubtful expertise …. 7.45 economists …. 7.43 engineers …. 7.43 epidemiologists …. 7.43 examples …. 7.43 expert reports …. 5.8, 7.64 expertise fields of …. 7.52, 7.64, 7.74 requirement …. 7.58 facial-mapping …. 7.54, 7.55, 7.62 fact, distinguished …. 7.38 fingerprints …. 7.43 forensic science …. 7.43, 7.46, 7.49, 7.52, 7.55 Frye test …. 7.50–7.53 glass, refractive indices …. 7.43, 7.71 handwriting …. 7.40, 7.43 hearsay rule and …. 7.68–7.69, 7.71, 7.72 human behaviour …. 7.58–7.59 hypnosis …. 7.110, 7.112 images of people …. 7.43 interpreters …. 7.56 investment advisers …. 7.43 judicial notice and …. 6.76

legal standards …. 7.60 machines, reliability of …. 7.25 Makita rule see basis rule (above) medical practitioners …. 7.42, 7.47, 7.69 observational inferences …. 7.39–7.41 pilots …. 7.43 pre-trial disclosure …. 7.64 primary facts …. 7.68–7.70 probative value …. 2.30, 2.31, 7.4, 7.34, 7.35, 7.53, 7.56, 7.55 procedural matters …. 7.63–7.64 proof, not subject to …. 7.71–7.72 psychiatrists …. 7.43, 7.58, 7.59, 7.108 psychologists …. 7.43, 7.50, 7.51, 7.58, 7.59, 7.62, 7.145, 7.146 reforms …. 7.64 regulation …. 7.46, 7.64 rule restricting …. 7.37 exceptions expert opinions …. 7.43, 7.44, 7.56 observational inferences …. 7.41 scepticism …. 7.136 sobriety and incapacity …. 7.42 specialised knowledge …. 2.23, 7.41, 7.54–7.56, 7.59, 7.66, 7.146 spectrographic analysis …. 7.43, 7.48, 7.71 standard of reliability …. 7.53 status …. 7.136 stylistic analysis …. 7.43 testimony …. 7.67 threshold tests …. 7.47–7.52

acceptance within scientific community …. 7.50–7.52 liberal relevancy approach …. 7.47 sufficient reliability …. 7.48–7.49 truck drivers …. 7.43, 7.44 ultimate issues rule …. 7.60–7.62 uncontradicted opinions …. 7.74 uniform legislation …. 7.38, 7.41, 7.54–7.55, 7.64, 7.108 voice analysis …. 7.43, 7.48, 7.56 voir dire …. 7.65–7.66 Original document see Documentary evidence

P Parents compellability of …. 5.201 Parliamentary privilege access to information, restriction on …. 5.198–5.199 Parol evidence rule overview …. 1.55 Partners admissions in civil cases …. 8.110 Party presentation principle proof …. 1.49, 1.50 Patent attorneys legal professional privilege …. 5.26 Patients communications with doctors, admissibility …. 5.205, 5.211 Pedigree statements by relatives as to, hearsay and …. 8.85

Penalty civil proceedings for …. 5.162 definition …. 5.162 punishment, distinguished …. 5.162 Penalty privilege see also Privilege; Self-incrimination, privilege against application …. 5.162 evolution …. 5.160 Penitents see also Priests; Privilege communications with priests, admissibility …. 5.205, 5.210 Perjury proof, corroboration …. 4.4 Personal injury claims exchange of medical evidence …. 5.8 material facts …. 1.5 proof of pre-existing injury …. 6.4, 6.5 Personal knowledge admitted facts …. 8.102–8.105 bad debts …. 8.105 drug offences …. 8.104 judges, use of own …. 6.59, 6.72 Personal representatives admissions in civil cases …. 8.109 Persuasive presumptions overview …. 6.23 Pfennig, rule in propensity or similar fact evidence, admissibility of …. 3.12, 3.21, 3.29, 3.32, 3.38, 3.45–3.52, 3.63 Photocopies

admissibility …. 7.18 Photofits identification evidence …. 4.70, 7.95 Photographs admissibility …. 7.24 discretion to exclude, criminal cases …. 7.24 evidence of identity, as …. 2.23, 4.65–4.67, 4.70, 4.73, 4.74, 7.41, 7.95 non-testimonial evidence, as …. 7.6 police photography, agreeing to …. 8.100 Plaintiffs burden of proof …. 6.3–6.6, 6.10 Plea accused, by …. 2.7 not guilty, effect of …. 2.38, 3.66 Police acting illegally …. 2.36, 5.257, 8.155 ad hoc expertise …. 7.56 admission in presence of …. 5.28 agreeing to being photographed by …. 8.100 cautions as to rights inform relatives …. 8.148 interpreter …. 8.148 lawyer, failure to give …. 5.267 silence …. 5.134, 5.167, 8.133, 8.149 failure to give …. 5.267 confessions, disputed testimony of …. 3.140, 4.31–4.34 detaining suspect beyond stipulated period …. 8.148 evidence, collection of …. 5.17

expert opinion, car accidents and …. 7.49 identification evidence custody, in …. 4.70 procedures …. 4.64, 4.65, 4.66–4.67, 4.70 misconduct …. 2.36, 5.257, 5.266, 5.267, 8.154 during interrogation …. 8.154–8.155 public policy discretion and …. 2.36, 5.263, 5.264, 8.154–8.155 refreshing memories …. 7.79, 7.80 secretly recorded conversations …. 2.33, 2.34, 5.259, 8.155 testimony confessions, where disputed …. 4.31–4.34, 8.167 mandatory corroboration warning …. 4.22 undercover operations …. 2.33, 2.34, 5.257–5.259, 8.142, 8.155 grounds, public policy discretion …. 5.258–5.260 Police reports public interest immunity …. 5.230, 5.231 Police witnesses testify to confession, mandatory warning …. 4.22 Political matters judicial notice …. 6.60, 6.72 Positivism judgment, approach to …. 1.4 Possession presumptions arising from …. 6.22 Post-marks hearsay, as …. 8.57, 8.200 Practising certificate

legal professional privilege, whether required …. 5.26 Prasad submission case to answer …. 2.55 no case submission, distinguished …. 2.55, 6.33 Pre-existing injury defendant, evidential burden …. 6.4, 6.5 Pre-trial process civil claims …. 2.6 criminal charges …. 2.5 effect upon factual issues …. 2.4 Precedent judicial warnings and …. 4.6 natural rules of relevance, interference with …. 2.20 Predecessors in title admissions by …. 8.110 Presumptions basic facts, proof …. 6.23 classifications …. 6.23 conclusive …. 6.23 conflicting …. 6.27 continuance …. 6.26 death …. 6.23, 6.24, 6.26 documentary evidence …. 7.11 effect of …. 6.23, 6.24 evidential …. 6.23, 6.25, 6.28 inferences, distinguished …. 6.25, 6.26 innocence see Innocence, presumption of irrebuttable …. 6.23

legal see persuasive (below) legitimacy …. 6.23, 6.24 marriage, validity of …. 6.23, 6.24, 6.26, 6.28 natural consequences of actions, intending …. 6.25 omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta …. 6.28 persuasive …. 6.23 possession of things …. 6.22 reasons for allocating burden of proof …. 6.28 regularity …. 6.25, 6.28 res ipsa loquitur …. 6.25 sanity …. 6.23 scientific instruments, accuracy of …. 6.23, 6.28, 7.24 Preventative detention anti-terrorist legislation and …. 8.148 Previous convictions see Accused persons; Bad character; Character evidence; Convictions Priests communications with penitents, admissibility …. 5.205, 5.210 privilege to withhold information …. 5.197 Prima facie case see Case to answer Prima facie evidence meaning …. 6.22 Primary facts expert opinion …. 7.68–7.70 inferences, distinguished …. 2.80 jury direction …. 2.81–2.83 standard of proof …. 2.80, 2.83 Wigmorean analysis …. 1.8, 2.81

Prior consistent statements bolster rule …. 7.88, 7.89 credibility, buttressing …. 7.106 prohibition …. 7.87–7.89 exceptions children’s statements …. 7.106 hearsay …. 7.90, 8.12 identification evidence …. 7.94–7.98, 8.12 induced by hypnosis …. 7.109–7.114 re-examination …. 7.93 recent invention …. 7.91–7.92 sexual assault complaints …. 7.99–7.108 purpose of tender …. 7.87, 7.158 uniform legislation …. 7.88, 7.90, 7.92, 7.93, 7.102, 7.106, 7.113 Prior inconsistent statements admissibility …. 7.148 common law …. 7.152 court’s power to call document …. 7.152 facts in issue …. 7.147 finality rule, exception to …. 7.147–7.152 hostile or unfavourable witness …. 7.118–7.120, 7.122, 7.123 legislation …. 7.148–7.152 proof and tender …. 7.150 evidential …. 7.151 need for, on denial …. 7.151 tender by party calling witness …. 7.152 re-examination and …. 7.153, 7.155, 7.158 uniform legislation …. 7.147–7.152

void dire procedure …. 7.120 Prisoner’s friend presence at interrogation …. 8.148, 8.152 purpose …. 8.153 Privilege clergy see Clergy confidential professional communications see Confidential relationships doctors see Medical practitioners forfeiture, against disclosure resulting in see Self-incrimination, privilege against informers see Informants journalists see Journalists judges see Judges jury see Jury legal professional see Legal professional privilege litigation see Legal professional privilege medical practitioners see Medical practitioners negotiating privilege see Settlement, privilege in aid of own case, documents …. 5.84 parliamentary …. 5.198–5.199 penalty, against disclosure resulting in see Self-incrimination, privilege against priests see Priests public interest immunity, distinguished …. 5.216 refusal to disclose documents …. 5.21, 5.84 restricting tender of evidence …. 5.19 scope of privileges …. 5.19 search warrants see Search warrants

self-incrimination see Self-incrimination, privilege against settlement in aid see Settlement, privilege in aid of sexual assault counsellors see Sexual assault, complainants spouses see Spouse terminology …. 5.2, 5.22 uniform legislation, overview …. 5.19 without prejudice negotiations see Settlement, privilege in aid of Probability theory approaches …. 1.12 best explanation approach …. 1.43–1.45 correct probability approach …. 1.44–1.45 inductive approach …. 1.39–1.43 mathematical approach Bayes’ Theorem …. 1.18 combining empirically-based frequencies …. 1.25 DNA evidence …. 1.26, 1.32 expert assistance …. 7.62 identification evidence …. 1.21–1.22, 1.33 new evidence …. 1.24 presumption of innocence …. 1.32 problems with …. 1.28–1.34 classical probabilities …. 1.14 disjunction equation …. 1.27 distinction between classical and frequency …. 1.17 equi-possibility …. 1.15 frequency probabilities …. 1.16 mathematical probabilities …. 1.13 equations …. 1.19–1.27

limitations …. 1.28–1.34 posterior odds equation …. 1.23 principle of complementation …. 1.35 principle of indifference …. 1.15, 1.17, 1.45, 1.47 standard of proof …. 1.35–1.38 weight of evidence …. 2.60–2.63 multiplicational equation for conjunction …. 1.20, 1.21, 1.24–1.26 posterior odds equation …. 1.23 proof and …. 2.59–2.63 rejection …. 1.42 subjective probabilities …. 1.18, 1.30 Probative value actual and potential, distinguished …. 2.30, 2.31 basis of …. 1.54 Pfennig case and …. 3.12, 3.21, 3.28, 3.41, 3.45–3.50 prejudicial as opposed to …. 2.30, 2.31 relationship evidence …. 3.33, 3.63 relevance as precondition …. 2.30, 2.31 ‘significant’ …. 3.60, 3.61, 3.63, 3.139 strength, determination of …. 3.45, 3.66 ‘substantially outweighing prejudicial effect’ …. 2.31, 3.62 uniform legislation …. 2.30, 3.59–3.60 unreliable evidence filter …. 3.2 weight …. 2.30 Procedural rules see also Discovery object …. 1.1 purpose …. 1.1 Procuration

corroboration …. 4.14 Proof see also Burden of Proof; Inferences; Presumptions common law adversary trial …. 1.49–1.51 correspondence theory of knowledge …. 1.6 cumulative nature …. 4.15 degrees of …. 2.57–2.58 factual rectitude …. 1.47–1.48, 2.17 formal power to dispense with …. 6.68 hypotheses, weighing of …. 2.53 inferences, doubtful, combining as …. 1.9, 2.77, 2.79 judge, role of …. 2.57 jury, role of …. 2.57 mathematical probabilities and standards of …. 1.35–1.38 natural rules of …. 4.15, 4.16 party presentation principle …. 1.49, 1.50 past events, discovery of …. 1.6–1.7 probability theory see Probability theory rationalist approach …. 2.58 relevance, distinguished …. 2.18 standards see Standard of proof statistical probability amounting to …. 2.62 theories of knowledge …. 1.6–1.7 voir dire …. 2.45, 2.91, 8.160 weight of evidence …. 2.64 Wigmorean analysis …. 1.8–1.11, 2.75 Propensity evidence see Character evidence; Bad character; Similar fact evidence Proponent

overview …. 2.7 Prosecution see also Crown prosecutor accused’s failure to testify, comment …. 5.118, 5.120, 5.121ff address by …. 2.11 defence disclosure to …. 5.12–5.13, 5.15 duty to in form witness, refreshed memory …. 7.79, 7.80 witness not to be called …. 5.12, 5.13, 5.15 duty of fairness …. 5.13, 6.55 reopening case …. 2.8 re-examination and …. 7.157 witness discretion to call …. 6.52, 6.56 obligation to call …. 6.52, 6.57 refusal to call …. 5.12, 5.13, 5.15, 6.52 Provocation burden of proof …. 6.8 Psychiatrists see Medical practitioners Psychologists expert testimony accused, mental capacity …. 7.43, 7.45, 7.59 human behaviour …. 7.58 sexual assault complainant …. 7.45 witness, mental capacity …. 7.43, 7.145, 7.146 Public documents admissibility of photocopies …. 7.18 reliability …. 8.92

statements in, hearsay and …. 8.91–8.93 Public interest admissibility of evidence and …. 2.37, 5.255–5.267 nature of …. 5.221 Public interest immunity Aboriginal lore and heritage …. 5.222, 5.225, 5.226 bias …. 8.145 cabinet documents …. 5.229, 5.232, 5.234–5.236 claiming, procedural aspects affidavit, contents of …. 5.244 balance …. 5.241–5.254 inspection by court …. 5.247–5.249 onus of proof …. 5.243, 5.249, 5.250 ‘provisional’ immunity …. 5.246, 5.247 stage of claim …. 5.218 class claims …. 5.228–5.240 ASIO reports …. 5.232, 5.234, 5.248 cabinet documents …. 5.229, 5.232, 5.234 informers …. 5.205, 5.224 non-government public bodies …. 5.238 overview …. 5.220 police reports …. 5.230, 5.231 relationship to content claim …. 5.224, 5.239, 5.240 Sankey v Whitlam …. 5.232, 5.233, 5.239, 5.243, 5.254 statutory bodies …. 5.235, 5.237, 5.238 confidentiality, as basis for immunity …. 5.218, 5.238 contents claims …. 5.223–5.227 Aboriginal secrets …. 5.225, 5.226

identity protection …. 5.224 internal security …. 5.223 national security …. 5.223 relationship to class claim …. 5.224, 5.239, 5.240 court duty to consider public interests …. 5.216 powers to restrict access …. 5.254 Crown privilege …. 5.220, 5.254 disclosure, effect on claim class claim …. 5.239 contents claim …. 5.227, 5.239 discovery, discretion …. 5.242 government failure to object to communication disclosure …. 5.216 protecting functions of …. 5.221 judges …. 5.184–5.185 jurors …. 5.185–5.185 ‘matters of state’ …. 5.222 national security …. 5.216, 5.223, 5.247 nature of …. 5.215–5.219 onus …. 5.243 privilege, distinguished …. 5.216 problems …. 5.219 professional legal advice …. 5.82 public interests involved …. 5.220–5.240 restricting access to information …. 5.21 secondary evidence of immune documents class claim …. 5.239

contents claim …. 5.227 terminology …. 5.216 uniform legislation …. 5.215, 5.216, 5.218, 5.223, 5.253 Public officials misconduct …. 8.130 Public policy see also Public interest immunity admissibility and …. 2.46 courts as guardians of public policy …. 5.217–5.218 problems arising …. 5.219 facts, indisputable …. 6.60, 6.61 restrictions on access to information definitive …. 5.197 competence and compellability of spouses …. 5.197, 5.200–5.204 parliamentary privilege …. 5.198–5.199 legal professional privilege …. 5.103 overview …. 5.195–5.197 Public policy discretion basis …. 2.36 considerations …. 5.265 essence …. 2.37 grounds …. 2.37, 5.255–5.267 Bunning v Cross …. 2.27, 5.62, 5.256 confessions and admissions …. 2.34, 5.256, 5.258, 5.259, 5.266, 8.121, 8.143–8.146 police acting illegally …. 2.36, 5.257, 8.155 police acting improperly …. 2.36, 5.257, 5.258, 5.263, 5.264, 5.266, 5.267, 8.154 police undercover operations …. 5.257, 5.258, 5.259

limits to circumstances …. 5.261–5.263 overview …. 2.36–2.37 police misconduct …. 5.263, 5.264, 8.154–8.155 uniform legislation …. 2.37, 5.265, 5.267, 8.144, 8.146 Published books judicial notice …. 6.67 Punishment definition …. 5.162 penalty, distinguished …. 5.162 Punishment privilege see Self-incrimination, privilege against

Q Queen Caroline’s case prior inconsistent statement, proof of …. 7.149, 7.153 Queensland accused as witness …. 3.85 failure to testify on oath, comment and direction on …. 5.118, 5.125 appeals, interlocutory …. 2.15 authentication of computer output …. 7.26 character of sexual assault complainants …. 3.146, 3.147 competence and compellability of spouses …. 5.201 confessions, voluntariness of …. 8.129 corroboration warning …. 4.20 criminal investigations …. 8.148 cross-examination of accused …. 3.97, 3.98, 3.123 bad character …. 3.92, 3.96 provisions for leave …. 3.102–3.103 evidence of convictions in civil proceedings …. 5.194

exclusionary rule …. 3.65 hearsay rule, statutory exceptions to …. 8.66, 8.74, 8.75, 8.172, 8.174 business records …. 8.182 civil cases …. 8.175–8.177 criminal cases …. 8.181 identification parade …. 4.68 pre-trial disclosure …. 5.13 prior convictions, admissibility of …. 5.194 relationship evidence …. 3.38, 3.75 separation of trials …. 3.71 sexual assault complainants, testimony of …. 4.41 complaint failure/delay …. 7.107 prior consistent statements …. 7.101 similar fact evidence …. 3.49 witnesses children and vulnerable persons as …. 7.34 competency …. 7.29

R Rape see also Sexual assault; ‘Rape-shield’ provisions admissibility of complaints …. 7.100, 7.103 burden of proof and mens rea …. 6.9 character of complainant …. 3.142–3.152 male judges’ perspectives on …. 1.46 ‘Rape-shield’ provisions aim …. 3.144, 3.145 application …. 3.146, 3.152 effect …. 3.142, 3.146

uniform legislation …. 3.152 Rationalist tradition overview …. 1.2 Re-examination credibility rule, application of …. 7.158 leading questions …. 7.156 limits to …. 7.156 prior consistent statements …. 7.93 prior inconsistent statements …. 7.155 purpose …. 7.155 rebuttal analogy …. 7.157 uniform legislation …. 7.156, 7.158 Reopening see also Rebuttal guiding principle …. 2.8 justification …. 2.8 re-examination, analogy between …. 7.157 Real evidence authentication …. 7.24–7.26 computer output authentication …. 7.26 reliability …. 7.25 demonstrations …. 7.23 documents see Documentary evidence electronic recordings …. 7.24 exhibits …. 7.21 experiments …. 7.21 expert assistance …. 7.25 jury

power of court to withhold from …. 7.21 statutory restrictions …. 7.23 machine-generated information …. 7.25, 7.26 meaning …. 7.20 nature of …. 7.4 non-testimonial evidence, as …. 7.4 objects …. 7.21 viewing out of court …. 7.22 visual or audio recording of …. 7.24 photographs see Photographs problems …. 7.20 public policy discretion to exclude …. 5.256, 5.266 reception of …. 7.4 tape recordings (video or audio record) …. 7.24 uniform legislation …. 7.23 view of location or object …. 7.22 demonstrations, distinguished …. 7.23 Reasonable doubt see Standard of proof Reasonable mistake burden of proof …. 6.8 Reasonable satisfaction see Standard of proof Reasoning non-positivist approach …. 1.4 positivist approach …. 1.4 principles and system of evidence …. 1.6–1.7 Rebuttal see also Reopening accused persons, good character of …. 3.106, 3.131–3.135 evidence in sexual assault …. 3.151

re-examination, in …. 7.157 Recent complaint see Complaints in sexual assault cases Recent invention prior statements, rebuttal by …. 7.91–7.92 Recording confessions …. 4.33, 7.7, 8.168 recording electronically …. 4.33, 8.168 requirements …. 4.33, 8.153, 8.168 interrogation sanctioned by a warrant …. 8.155 secret, in …. 8.155 Records documents as …. 7.5 Refreshing memory common law …. 7.76–7.78, 7.83 confused witness, by leading questions …. 7.117, 7.121 documents, in-court …. 7.79–7.83, 8.51 admissibility memory not revived …. 7.82 memory revived …. 7.79, 7.80 conditions for use contemporaneously …. 7.76 document adoption …. 7.76–7.78 copies, admissibility and use …. 7.80 inspection and cross-examination, by opponent …. 7.81, 7.82 joint reports …. 7.79 problems …. 7.82 reading, when permitted …. 7.79

status …. 7.81 uniform legislation …. 7.83 documents, out-of-court …. 7.84–7.86 admissibility of memory not revived …. 7.86 memory revived …. 7.84 compelling production …. 7.85, 7.86 conditions for use adoption of document …. 7.85 contemporaneity …. 7.85 hypnosis …. 7.109–7.111 memorised testimony, admissibility of …. 7.86 oral testimony, primacy of …. 7.76, 7.81 overview …. 7.76–7.78, 8.51 tape recording transcript …. 7.16, 7.56 uniform legislation …. 7.76, 7.79, 7.83, 7.86 voir dire …. 7.79, 7.110 Regularity presumption of …. 6.25 Regulations judicial notice …. 6.69 proof of …. 6.69 Relationship evidence admissibility of to prove crime …. 3.17, 3.33–3.36, 3.56, 3.63 direction to jury …. 3.74 Relevance see also Proof admissibility, distinguished …. 2.20–2.25 definition …. 2.20

importance of …. 2.18 legal notion …. 2.24–2.25 ‘materiality’ …. 2.24 natural rules of …. 2.17, 2.21, 2.22 interference with …. 2.20, 2.21 nature of …. 2.18–2.19, 2.23 policy and …. 2.22, 2.23 probative value, precondition of …. 2.30 proof, distinguished …. 2.18 requirement …. 2.17 res gestae rule …. 2.20, 8.72 specificity of …. 2.25 subjects of …. 2.19 sufficiency …. 2.21–2.23, 3.2 uniform legislation …. 2.17, 2.18, 2.23, 2.24 Reputation bad see Accused persons; Bad character; Character evidence; ‘Rapeshield’ legislation good see Accused persons; Character evidence; Good character public rights, proof by repute …. 8.84 right of accused to establish …. 3.129, 3.130 sexual assault complainant, of …. 1.46 veracity of witness …. 7.142 Res gestae see also Hearsay accused, other misconduct as …. 3.31 assertions as …. 8.36–8.41 knowledge, belief and intention …. 8.42–8.49 physical sensation and health …. 8.50

concept …. 1.55, 8.10, 8.35 contemporaneous statements, admissibility exception to hearsay prohibition …. 8.66–8.72 original evidence …. 8.35–8.41, 8.45 exception to hearsay prohibition …. 3.31, 8.36, 8.39, 8.42, 8.66–8.72 relevance and …. 2.20, 8.72 similar fact evidence and …. 3.31 uniform legislation …. 8.39, 8.42 Res ipsa loquitur inference of negligence …. 6.25 Res judicata doctrine abuse of process …. 5.188, 5.189, 5.190 accused, acquittal entitlement …. 5.189–5.190 autrefois acquit plea …. 5.188 autrefois convict plea …. 5.188 evidentiary rule flowing from …. 5.187–5.190 issue estoppel …. 5.188, 5.190 justification …. 5.190 tender of evidence, restrictions on …. 5.186 Residual discretion see also Confessions and admissions in criminal cases; Discretion to exclude; Illegally obtained evidence; Public policy discretion discretion to exclude …. 2.26 appeals …. 8.159 civil cases …. 3.158 reject evidence contrary to public interest …. 5.255 Revived memories see also Refreshing memory hypnosis and …. 7.110

admissibility of statement made under …. 7.113 Ridgeway dictum discretionary exclusion, police illegality and …. 4.53 Right of reply adversarial trial …. 2.11, 7.149 Right to silence admission in civil cases …. 8.98 burden of proof and …. 6.20 civil and criminal proceedings, distinguished …. 5.122 direction to jury …. 5.144 failure to contradict prosecution evidence …. 5.127–5.129, 5.133 failure to cross-examine witness …. 5.132, 5.133 failure to testify on oath, comment and direction upon …. 5.117–5.133 adverse inferences …. 5.124, 5.125–5.133 permissible circumstances …. 5.123, 5.124 uniform legislation …. 5.120, 5.123, 5.128 Weissensteiner direction …. 5.125–5.133 failure to answer pre-trial, comments and directions upon …. 5.134–5.144 NSW legislation …. 5.144 interrogation …. 5.108, 5.109 Judges’ Rules …. 5.134, 8.149 police caution …. 5.134, 5.167, 5.267, 8.133, 8.149 failure to give …. 5.267 pre-trial questioning …. 5.134–5.144 privilege against self-incrimination, relationship with …. 5.108, 5.109 trial …. 5.106, 5.107, 5.115, 5.120 uses …. 5.140 Risk

allocation of …. 1.48 Rowton rule evidence of reputation …. 3.129, 3.130 Royal Commission self-incrimination, privilege …. 5.166, 5.180

S Sanity presumption of …. 6.23 Sankey v Whitlam public interest immunity …. 5.232, 5.233, 5.239, 5.243, 5.254 Scientific facts see Experts; Opinion; Opinion evidence judicial notice …. 6.60 Scientific instruments accuracy authentication …. 7.26, 8.58 presumption of …. 6.23, 6.28, 7.24 Search warrants legal professional privilege company searches and investigations …. 5.72, 5.75 lawyers’ premises …. 5.80, 5.81 NCA (ACC) investigations …. 5.75 objection to warrants …. 5.77, 5.79–5.81 procedure upon claim …. 5.77 taxation purposes …. 5.22, 5.81 Secondary evidence best evidence rule, when permitted …. 7.16 copies, admissibility …. 7.18

privileged or immune originals legal professional privilege …. 5.41–5.48, 5.61–5.67 public interest immunity …. 5.227, 5.234, 5.239 settlement, privilege in aid of …. 5.102 tape recordings of …. 7.16 Self-defence burden of proof …. 6.8 Self-incrimination, privilege against see also Confessions and admissions in criminal cases; Right to silence abrogation by legislation …. 5.149, 5.183 accused …. 3.85–3.87 incompetence as witness …. 5.110–5.112 refusal to answer questions …. 8.164 right to silence not to testify on oath for defence …. 5.114–5.116 police caution …. 5.134, 8.133 pre-trial questioning …. 5.135–5.144 voir dire …. 3.85, 3.87, 8.164 accused’s spouse, incompetence as witness …. 5.107, 5.113 administrative inquiry …. 5.183 admissibility where answer compelled in breach of …. 5.167 adversary context …. 5.2 application, extension of …. 5.146–5.147 claiming …. 5.166–5.174 admissional inference drawn from claim, rule against …. 5.168 advice that privilege available …. 5.167 bona fide …. 5.174 disclosure to judge in camera …. 5.169

failure to claim as waiver …. 5.100 false affidavit sworn …. 5.168 judicial proceedings, in …. 5.166 non-judicial proceedings, in …. 5.166 onus …. 5.169 representation on claim, right to …. 5.170 risk of incrimination avoiding …. 5.172–5.173 degree to justify claim …. 5.171 third party …. 5.170 voir dire …. 5.167 companion principle …. 5.108, 5.183 corporations …. 5.148–5.155, 5.157 de facto spouses …. 5.165 derivative incriminating evidence …. 5.171 discovery …. 5.157, 5.158, 5.160, 5.161 ecclesiastical censure privilege …. 5.151, 5.159 evidentiary rules based on …. 5.108 foreign law, incrimination under …. 5.164 forfeiture disclosure leading to …. 5.158, 5.160, 5.161 property, of …. 5.151 human rights approach …. 5.152, 5.153 indictable offences, disclosure …. 5.163 information already available to prosecutor …. 5.172 interrogation, during …. 5.135–5.144 see also Interrogation; Right to silence nemo tenetur prodere seipsum …. 5.106

non-judicial proceedings …. 5.147 penalty, disclosure leading to …. 5.158, 5.160, 5.162 pre-trial proceedings …. 5.148 propensity chain of reasoning, risk of …. 3.84 punishment, disclosure leading to …. 5.158, 5.162 rationale …. 5.106–5.109 refusal to answer questions …. 3.84, 8.164 right to remain silent …. 5.108, 5.109 scope …. 5.145–5.157, 5.163 search warrants …. 5.157 spouse of …. 5.165 statutory modification …. 3.85–3.87, 5.175–5.177, 5.180–5.181 abrogation of privilege …. 5.149, 5.182–5.183 necessary implication, by …. 5.181–5.183 specific modification …. 5.180 summary offences, disclosure …. 5.163 testimonial link in act of production …. 5.156 testimonial privilege …. 5.152, 5.156 third party …. 5.170 unsworn statement …. 5.106, 5.114–5.116 Settlement, privilege in aid of abuse of …. 5.96 admissions …. 5.89 alternative dispute resolution …. 5.105 bona fides, requirements …. 5.94 Calderbank offer …. 5.98 concessions …. 5.89, 5.93 costs …. 5.98

criminal cases …. 5.99 doctrinal propositions …. 5.91 exceptions to, right of person affected …. 5.92 fact, observations of …. 5.89 justification …. 5.87 limits to …. 5.89, 5.94, 5.96, 5.103 offers of compromise …. 5.98 proceedings in which claimed …. 5.101 proof of settlement …. 5.97 public policy …. 5.103 purpose …. 5.87, 5.94 scope …. 5.88–5.97 extension …. 5.93 secondary evidence of privileged admissions …. 5.102 setting-aside …. 5.89, 5.96 spouses, negotiations between estranged …. 5.104 third parties access to negotiations …. 5.91–5.92 negotiators, as …. 5.104 proceedings involving …. 5.101 uniform legislation …. 5.88, 5.90, 5.97, 5.100, 5.102 waivers …. 5.100 ‘without prejudice’ negotiations …. 5.93, 5.94 Severance legal professional privilege and …. 5.40 Sexual assault, see also Complaints in sexual assault cases; Corroboration accused disclosure of other misconduct, exclusionary presumption …. 3.29, 3.31,

3.34, 3.36 evidential/tactical burden upon …. 6.9 failure to testify or otherwise call evidence …. 5.128, 5.129 sexual interest in complainant …. 2.87, 3.36 coincidence reasoning …. 3.58 complainants admissible confessions …. 8.155 character of …. 3.142–3.152 state legislation …. 3.142, 3.145–3.149 communications with counsellors, admissibility …. 5.205, 5.209, 5.212–5.213 corroboration …. 4.84, 7.101 cross-examination of …. 3.142, 3.145, 3.148, 3.149 distress, humiliation and embarrassment …. 3.146, 3.150 failure to complain, inferences from …. 7.100 ‘hue and cry’, consent in absence of …. 7.100 rebuttal of evidence …. 3.151 sexual experience, evidence of …. 3.143–3.145 specific sexual activities, evidence of …. 3.146 complaints absence of, jury direction …. 7.107 admissibility …. 7.99–7.108 children admissibility …. 7.34, 7.108 non-accusatory statements …. 7.106 protections whilst testifying …. 7.32, 7.34 conditions …. 7.104, 7.105 credibility, buttressing …. 7.106

credibility rule …. 7.102 evidential effect …. 7.106 failure to make, inferences from …. 7.100 history of exception …. 7.99, 7.100 narration …. 7.104–7.106 spontaneity …. 7.104 terms …. 7.103 uniform legislation …. 7.102 consent medieval view …. 7.100 proof of …. 3.142, 3.151 corroboration accused implication in crime charged …. 4.92 innocent explanation …. 4.90, 4.92 delay in reporting assault …. 4.45–4.48 forensic disadvantage …. 4.48, 4.51 independent inference …. 4.92 requirement …. 4.14, 7.101 risk of concoction by complainants …. 3.58, 4.98 warning abolition of statutory requirements …. 4.41, 7.101 common law, practice …. 4.40 Longman warning …. 4.44–4.47, 4.49, 4.50 exclusionary rule in Makin …. 3.15 expert opinion evidence hypnotherapy …. 7.110 sexual abuse, impact on children …. 7.108

failure to complain, inferences from …. 7.100 male judges’ perspectives …. 1.46 prohibited evidence, grounds for leave …. 3.149 propensity/tendency evidence …. 3.15, 3.29 ‘rape-shield’ legislation …. 3.146–3.152 relationship evidence …. 3.17, 3.33–3.36, 3.56 voir dire hearings …. 3.148 Silence assent inferred from …. 5.139 hearsay and …. 8.26 right to see Right to silence uses, permissible and impermissible …. 5.140 Similar fact evidence disclosing propensity or disposition civil cases …. 3.154–3.161 defence cases …. 3.77, 3.140 exclusionary rule …. 3.30, 3.31 prosecution cases …. 3.6, 3.30, 3.39, 3.40, 3.44, 3.47, 3.49, 3.58, 3.63 striking similarity …. 3.44 Sobriety observational inferences …. 7.42 Sole purpose test legal professional privilege …. 5.34, 5.36 South Australia accused as witness …. 3.85 failure to testify on oath, comment and direction on …. 5.118, 5.120 authentication of computer output …. 7.26 common law mandatory corroboration warnings …. 4.21, 4.22

competence and compellability of spouses …. 5.201–5.203 corroboration warning …. 4.21, 4.37 criminal investigations Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people …. 8.152 children, obligations regarding …. 8.148, 8.149 cross-examination of accused …. 3.97 bad character …. 3.92, 3.96 prosecution, gratuitous attacks on …. 3.112 disclosure at committal …. 5.13 ‘discreditable conduct’ of accused, admissibility of …. 3.64 documents ‘apparently genuine’ …. 7.14 evidence and civil proceedings …. 5.194 evidential rules, power to dispense with …. 6.68 forensic disadvantage, sexual assault cases …. 4.51 hearsay rule, statutory exceptions …. 8.74, 8.172, 8.174, 8.178 computer output …. 8.188 criminal cases …. 8.181 documents …. 8.183–8.187 business records …. 8.182, 8.183–8.184 transportation documents …. 8.190 identification evidence, directions …. 4.54, 4.59, 4.61, 4.63 identity parade …. 4.65, 4.68 judicial notice of published materials …. 6.67 magistrate, prerogative to acquit …. 6.35 no case to answer submission …. 6.35 pre-trial disclosure, failure to comply …. 5.14 prior consistent statements, sexual assault complaints …. 7.101 prior convictions, admissibility of …. 5.194

privilege against self-incrimination …. 3.85 propensity evidence …. 2.87 relationship evidence …. 3.75 residual discretion …. 3.69 separation of trials …. 3.71 sexual assault cases communications privilege …. 5.208, 5.209, 5.212, 5.213 testimony of complainants …. 4.41 witnesses, vulnerable persons as …. 7.33, 7.34 Specialised knowledge see Opinion; Opinion evidence Spectrographic analysis admissibility …. 7.25 opinion evidence …. 7.43, 7.71 reliability …. 7.12, 7.48 Speedometers presumption of accuracy …. 6.28 Splitting case see Reopening Spouse accomplices, of, corroboration …. 4.98 accused’s spouse, incompetence as witness …. 5.107, 5.113 competence and compellability public policy restrictions …. 5.197, 5.200–5.204 exemption …. 5.202 voir dire …. 2.41 self-incrimination, privilege against …. 5.165 Standard of proof accused, burden upon trial …. 6.8, 6.32

voir dire …. 2.45, 2.91, 8.160 application …. 2.93 across cases …. 2.65 Bayesian analysis …. 2.59, 2.66 case to answer see Case to answer Chamberlain direction …. 2.78–2.81, 2.83, 2.86, 2.90 civil standard balance of probabilities …. 1.38, 1.48, 2.58–2.67 hypothesis proved on …. 2.66 mathematical interpretation …. 2.59–2.61, 2.66 weight of evidence …. 2.60–2.67 Briginshaw formulation …. 2.64–2.67 crime alleged …. 2.64 criminal standard, distinguished …. 2.69–2.70 mathematical probabilities …. 1.37, 2.59, 2.65 difficulties …. 2.66 reasonable satisfaction …. 2.64, 2.67 seriousness of allegation …. 2.65 uniform legislation …. 2.64 criminal standard appellate courts, role of …. 2.90 beyond reasonable doubt …. 1.48, 2.58, 2.68–2.90, 3.2 judicial elaboration, scope of …. 2.72–2.73 civil standard, distinguished …. 2.69–2.70 eliminative nature …. 2.90 facts applied to …. 2.74–2.90 accused’s lie …. 2.88 case as a whole …. 2.74

Chamberlain direction …. 2.78–2.81, 2.83, 2.90 criminal propensity …. 2.87 distinction, ‘facts’ and ‘inferences’ …. 2.80 DNA evidence …. 2.87, 2.90 inductive approach …. 2.74–2.76, 2.92 intermediate facts …. 2.80, 2.83–2.85, 2.88, 2.89 Kotzmann analysis …. 2.84–2.87 primary facts …. 2.80, 2.83 Wigmorean analysis …. 2.75, 2.80, 2.81 jury direction …. 2.71–2.73, 2.82–2.89 mathematical probabilities …. 1.35 mathematical terms …. 2.70 proviso, applying …. 2.90 unreasonable verdicts, challenging …. 2.90 Wigmorean analysis …. 2.75, 2.80, 2.81 mathematical probabilities …. 1.35–1.38 voir dire …. 2.45, 2.91, 8.160 Statements see also Hearsay accompanying relevant acts see Res gestae asserting plans to commit a crime …. 8.96 conduct, admissible as …. 8.13–8.20, 8.22 made during a crime …. 8.96 partly implicating, as admission …. 8.94 prior consistent statements see Prior consistent statements prior inconsistent statements see Prior inconsistent statements self-serving, admissibility of …. 8.106–8.108 tendered as assertions …. 8.28–8.34 Subordinate legislation

judicial notice …. 6.69 proof of …. 6.69 Subpoena ad testificandum …. 5.5 duces tecum discovery, for …. 5.5 documents sought by …. 5.233–5.234 documents subject to …. 5.5 fishing, used for …. 5.5, 5.12 ‘for the purpose of evidence’ …. 5.5, 5.12 forensic purpose, legitimate …. 5.5, 5.12 public interest immunity …. 5.218 specificity …. 5.12 Sufficiency of evidence see Case to answer; Standard of proof Support person witness, for …. 7.33 Systolic blood pressure deception test reliability …. 7.50

T Tape recording accuracy of devices presumption …. 7.24 best evidence rule …. 7.16 copies …. 7.15 expert analysis …. 7.16, 7.48 interrogation see Interrogation police making secretly …. 5.259 privilege …. 5.46

real evidence, as …. 7.24 secondary evidence …. 7.16 transcript refreshing memory …. 7.16, 7.56 tender …. 7.15 voice identification …. 8.28 Tasmania identification evidence, out-of-court assertions …. 7.97, 7.98 medical communications privilege …. 5.207–5.209 professional confidential relationship privilege …. 5.214 sexual assault cases character of complainants …. 3.146 communications privilege …. 5.208, 5.209, 5.212 complaint failure/delay …. 7.107 testimony of complainants …. 4.41 witnesses, children and vulnerable persons as …. 7.34 Taxation searches legal professional privilege …. 5.22, 5.81 Telephone calls hearsay …. 8.17, 8.22–8.23, 8.32, 8.33, 8.67, 8.68 Tendency evidence see Character evidence Terrorism preventative detention of suspects …. 8.148 Testators statements by, hearsay and …. 8.18, 8.45 post-testamentary …. 8.90 Testimonial evidence

nature of …. 7.2 oath, formalities of …. 7.28–7.30 outline …. 7.27 unreliable …. 8.61 Testimonial privilege see Self-incrimination, privilege against Testimony see also Hearsay; Witnesses children see Children incriminating, given in ignorance …. 5.167 memorised, admissibility of …. 7.86 oral, general principle …. 1.49, 7.1–7.3 presentation, aspects of …. 7.27 unsworn, admissibility of …. 7.30 voir dire …. 2.40 Threats uttered by terrorists, admissible statement …. 8.28 Torres Strait Islander people see Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people Traditional laws and customs meaning …. 7.73 Trial process addresses …. 2.11 ambit of …. 2.4 appeal …. 2.14 calling evidence …. 2.10 defence …. 2.8 civil …. 2.7 criminal …. 2.7 essential tasks of the trial court …. 2.16

initiating proceedings …. 2.7 jury direction …. 2.12, 2.13 material facts, establishing …. 2.7 meaning …. 2.4 ‘no case’ option …. 2.8 outline …. 2.7–2.13 plea …. 2.7 pre-trial …. 2.5–2.6 reopening a case …. 2.8 sources …. 2.1–2.3 split case …. 2.8, 2.9 stages …. 2.4

U Ultimate issues rule opinion evidence, admissibility of …. 7.60–7.62 Unblemished record reference by accused to …. 3.128 Undercover police operations discretion to exclude evidence …. 2.33, 2.34, 5.257–5.259 recording conversations, admissibility of …. 2.33, 2.34, 8.142, 8.155 Unfairly obtained evidence see Confessions and admissions in criminal cases; Discretion to exclude; Illegally obtained evidence; Interrogation Unfavourable witnesses see Hostile and unfavourable witnesses Unreliable evidence approaches to …. 3.2 children …. 4.14, 4.37

common law approaches …. 3.1–3.2 confirmation or warning, rules requiring …. 4.4–4.13 corroboration approach …. 4.4 corroboration techniques appeal by convicted accused …. 4.13 exclusion rules …. 4.1–4.3 exclusionary principle evolution …. 3.13–3.27 Lord Herschell’s dictum …. 3.13–3.14 object of …. 3.12 scope of …. 3.4, 3.12, 3.14 exclusionary techniques …. 4.2 filters against …. 3.2 judge/magistrate sitting alone …. 4.12 judges responsibility for decisions …. 4.106 sitting alone …. 4.12 juries, responsibility for decisions …. 4.106 non-exclusionary techniques …. 4.5–4.13 residuary discretion …. 3.2, 4.3 sufficient relevance, test of …. 4.3 warning failure to warn, error of law …. 4.9 miscarriage of justice …. 4.6 mandatory …. 4.6 judge/magistrate sitting alone …. 4.12 McKinney direction …. 4.32–4.34, 8.168 obligatory on request …. 4.10

Unreliable propensity reasoning exclusionary principle …. 3.12, 3.30 Unstamped document refreshing memory …. 7.81 Unsworn testimony accused persons …. 5.106, 5.114–5.116 children …. 7.31–7.34 vulnerable witnesses …. 7.33–7.34 witnesses generally …. 7.28–7.30

V Veracity witness credibility and …. 7.142 Verdict direction, by, submission in nature …. 6.36–6.37, 6.41, 6.42 unreasonable, challenging …. 2.90 unsafe, appeal against …. 4.13 Vicarious admissions see Admissions in civil cases Victims see Character evidence; Sexual assault Victoria accused’s failure to testify …. 5.118, 5.120, 5.124, 5.132, 5.133 appeal against interlocutory decision …. 2.15 corroboration warning …. 4.20, 4.36 criminal investigations …. 8.148, 8.149 criminal standard of proof, directions as to …. 2.73 direction to jury corroboration warnings …. 4.5, 4.105, 4.106 good character …. 3.136

identification evidence …. 4.54, 4.59, 4.61–4.63 Jury Directions Act, generally …. 2.13 standard of proof …. 2.73 forensic disadvantage, sexual assault cases …. 4.51 medical communications privilege …. 5.207–5.209 no case to answer submission …. 6.34, 6.35 pre-trial disclosure …. 5.13, 5.14 propensity evidence, jury direction …. 3.73 separation of trials …. 3.71 sexual assault cases character of complainants …. 3.146–3.148 communications privilege …. 5.208, 5.212 complaint failure/delay …. 7.107 testimony of complainants …. 4.41 witnesses, children and vulnerable persons as …. 7.33, 7.34 Video-link testimony by …. 7.32, 7.33 Video recording see also Visual and audio recordings best evidence rule …. 7.17 children’s testimony …. 7.32, 7.34 documentary evidence, original …. 7.17 identification procedures, of …. 4.65 real evidence, as …. 7.24 vulnerable witness’s testimony …. 7.34 Views location or objects, out of court …. 7.22 Visual and audio recordings accuracy presumption of devices …. 7.24

non-testimonial evidence, as …. 7.6 Voice analysis admissibility …. 7.43, 7.48, 7.56 Voice identification expert analysis …. 7.43, 7.48, 7.49 tape recordings …. 8.28 voice samples …. 5.156 Voir dire accused absence of …. 2.43 burden upon …. 2.45, 2.91, 8.160 self-incrimination, privilege against …. 3.85, 3.87 admissibility character evidence …. 3.70 disputes decided by …. 2.40 evidence …. 2.45 expert testimony …. 7.65–7.66 rules, application of …. 2.45 burden of proof …. 2.45, 2.91, 6.3 children’s competence determination at …. 2.42 competence of witness …. 2.44 confessions …. 8.160–8.168 discretion to exclude …. 2.40 dying declaration …. 8.86 hostile witness …. 7.120 inconsistent statements …. 7.120 jury, absence of …. 2.41, 2.42 meaning …. 2.40

opinion evidence …. 7.65–7.66 primary use …. 2.45 privilege claim …. 2.44 procedure …. 2.44–2.45 proof …. 2.45, 2.91, 8.160 refreshing memory …. 7.79, 7.110 rules of evidence, application …. 2.45 sexual assault complainant …. 3.148 spouses’ competence determined in …. 2.41 standard of proof …. 2.45, 2.91 testimony …. 2.40 timing …. 2.40 uniform legislation …. 2.40, 2.45 waiver, rules of admissibility …. 2.46 Voluntariness rule see Confessions and admissions in criminal cases Vulnerable witnesses alternative arrangements for testifying …. 7.33 formalities …. 7.33 support person …. 7.33 testifying on oath …. 7.34 video-link testimony …. 7.33 video record of prior statement admissibility of …. 7.34 as evidence-in-chief …. 7.34 as exhibit …. 7.21 video record of testimony at preliminary proceeding as evidence-in-chief …. 7.34

W Waivers see also Legal professional privilege; Public interest immunity; Settlement, privilege in aid of failure to claim privilege against self-incrimination …. 5.100 legal professional privilege …. 5.49–5.59 privilege related to Aboriginal land claims …. 5.51 rules of admissibility …. 2.46–2.49 settlement, privilege in aid of …. 5.100 third person presence at interrogations …. 8.151 voir dire, rules of admissibility …. 2.46 Walker v Walker, rule in cross-examination upon documents …. 7.154 Warrants see Search warrants Weissensteiner direction right to silence …. 5.125, 5.127, 5.129–5.131 Western Australia accused as witness …. 3.85 failure to testify on oath, comment and direction on …. 5.118 committal proceedings, purpose of …. 5.12 competence and compellability of spouses …. 5.201, 5.204 corroboration warning …. 4.20 criminal investigations …. 8.148 children, obligations regarding …. 8.150 cross-examination of accused …. 3.97 bad character …. 3.92 hearsay rule, statutory exceptions …. 8.172, 8.174, 8.178–8.180 business records …. 8.182 incrimination, certification procedure …. 5.178

extra-territorial effect …. 5.179 pre-trial disclosure …. 5.13, 5.14 privilege against self-incrimination …. 3.85 professional confidential relationship privilege …. 5.214 propensity evidence …. 2.87, 3.63 relationship evidence …. 3.63, 3.75 separation of trials …. 3.71 sexual assault cases character of sexual assault complainants …. 3.147 communications privilege …. 5.208, 5.212, 5.213 complaint failure/delay …. 7.107 witnesses, children and vulnerable persons as …. 7.34 Wigmorean analysis disjunction equation …. 1.27 inference …. 1.8–1.11, 1.13, 4.85 primary facts …. 1.8, 2.81 standard of proof …. 2.75, 2.80, 2.81 Wills post-testamentary statements by testators …. 8.90 Without prejudice negotiations see Settlement, privilege in aid of Witnesses accused as see Accused adversarial realities …. 7.115 adverse …. 7.121, 7.122 affirmations …. 7.28, 7.36 bias …. 7.143 children see Children competence and compellability …. 7.35

accused see Accused communicate through interpreter …. 7.35 intelligible account …. 7.29–7.30 physical or mental capacity …. 7.35, 7.125, 7.144–7.146 understanding oath …. 7.35 uniform legislation …. 5.112, 7.30 voir dire …. 2.44 corruption …. 7.143 courts’ power to call …. 6.48–6.53 credibility …. 7.36, 7.135, 7.136 bolster rule …. 7.88, 7.89, 7.116, 7.132 collateral evidence rule …. 7.132, 7.133, 7.143 cross-examination, through …. 7.116 pursuing beyond cross-examination, prohibition on …. 7.139–7.141 weaknesses …. 7.136 expert see Experts; Opinion; Opinion evidence facts, not opinion, testimony as to …. 7.37–7.38 hostile see Hostile and unfavourable witnesses interest, relevance of …. 7.143 interpreter …. 7.35 intervention by court into calling and questioning of …. 6.54–6.58, 7.138 judges, call and question …. 6.50–6.52, 6.58 leading questions see Leading questions mental illness, reliability of evidence …. 4.77 oath, testifying on children …. 7.31–7.34 competency …. 7.35 credit …. 7.36

formalities …. 7.28–7.30 vulnerable persons …. 7.33–7.34 obligations, understanding …. 7.29 opinion, lay …. 7.41 ‘presence’, meaning …. 7.3 prior consistent statements see Prior consistent statements property in …. 7.115 prosecution not calling …. 5.12, 5.13, 5.15, 6.52 questioning court intervention …. 6.54–6.58 discretion …. 6.48–6.58 form of …. 7.115 judges’ powers …. 6.58, 7.138 procedure …. 7.115 uniform legislation …. 7.115, 7.116 re-examination see Re-examination refreshing memory see Refreshing memory sensory impressions …. 7.39 spouse of accused see Spouse unfavourable see Hostile and unfavourable witnesses unsworn testimony …. 7.28–7.30 vulnerable persons, testifying on oath …. 7.34 support person …. 7.33 Wives see Spouse Woolmington rule burden of proof and …. 6.8, 6.14–6.16, 6.23 Work-product privilege overview …. 5.60

US, in …. 5.23 Writings documents, as …. 7.5

Related LexisNexis Titles Field, Queensland Evidence Law, 4th ed, 2017 Field & Offer, Western Australian Evidence Law, 2015 Heydon, Cross on Evidence, 10th ed, 2015 Williams, Anderson, Marychurch & Roy, Uniform Evidence in Australia, 2015