Atomic Energy Policy in France Under the Fourth Republic 9781400876198

Table of contents :
PREFACE
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
Part I. From Liberation to the First Five Year Plan
GLOSSARY
CHAPTER I . BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE OF THE CEA
CHAPTER 2. THE FORMATIVE YEARS: I946-I951
CHAPTER 3. THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN: OPTION FOR THE FUTURE
Part II. France Enters the Nuclear Club
CHAPTER 4. THE BASIS OF THE FRENCH BOMB
CHAPTER 5. EURATOM AND THE FRENCH ATOM
CHAPTER 6. THE ROAD TO REGGANE
CHAPTER 7. THE FIFTH REPUBLIC AND THE ATOM
CONCLUSION
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX

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ATOMIC ENERGY POLICY IN FRANCE UNDER THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

ATOMIC ENERGY POLICY IN FRANCE UNDER

THE

FOURTH REPUBLIC BY LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

1 9 6 5

Copyright © 1965 by Princeton University Press ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

L.C. Card: 65-10839 Printed in the United States of America by The William Byrd Press, Inc.

TO

MY

P A R E N T S

PREFACE

T

HERE are few scholars who do not owe a debt of grati­

tude to foundations or universities for generous assist­ ance in the conduct of field research. I would like to express my deep appreciation to the Michigan Memorial Phoenix Foundation of the University of Michigan and to the Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studies of that University for their support of the project that ultimately led to the publication of this book. I also wish to extend thanks to the University of California for the award of a Faculty Fellowship in the summer of 1964 which enabled me to devote my full attention to the completion of the final manuscript. Many persons participated directly or indirecdy in the development of this book. To the many scientists, adminis­ trators, parliamentarians, political figures, and military of­ ficers who, while preferring to remain anonymous, patiendy and helpfully discussed facets of the evolution of the French atomic program in the Fourth Republic, I extend my most sincere thanks. I am equally indebted to the Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique which granted me the use of its facili­ ties and archives within the stringent limits demanded by considerations of national security. Many important doors were opened to me through the good offices of Professor Georges Vedel of the Faculty of Laws of the University of Paris and through Jean Monnet. In this sense, both of these individuals were instrumental in the successful completion of my research project. Professors Harold K. Jacobson and Eric Stein of the University of Michigan, and my colleague at UCLA, Richard Rosecrance, as well as Bernard Brodie and Arnold Kramish of The RAND Corporation, all ofyii

PREFACE fered their time, interest and energy in reading through all or parts of the manuscript and in making many valuable suggestions and comments. Finally, I would like to register a special note of gratitude to professor Roy Pierce of the University of Michigan for his encouragement, astute guid­ ance and unceasing efforts on my behalf from the inception of this study in 1961 through its final stages in 1965. Somewhat out of the usual tradition I would like to thank my brother Ronald who, while spending his junior college year in France proved a first-class researcher and com­ pleted a number of tasks I had to leave undone. Generous assistance in style and composition has been the hallmark of Mrs. Eve Hanle of the Princeton University Press and for her assistance I wish to render thanks. My debt to my wife Lorraine, who tirelessly read, reread, and constructively criticized the manuscript, needs no emphasis. I, of course, assume responsibility for the content. Los Angeles, California July, 1965

L.S.

CONTENTS

PREFACE

Vii

INTRODUCTION

xi

GLOSSARY

2

Part I. From Liberation to the First Five Year Plan CHAPTER I .

BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE OF THE CEA

CHAPTER 2 .

THE FORMATIVE YEARS:

CHAPTER 3 .

THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN: OPTION FOR THE

I946-I951

3 20 58

FUTURE

Part II. France Enters the Nuclear

Club

CHAPTER 4 .

THE BASIS OF THE FRENCH BOMB

CHAPTER 5 .

EURATOM AND THE FRENCH ATOM

129

93

CHAPTER 6 .

THE ROAD TO REGGANE

166

CHAPTER 7 .

THE FIFTH REPUBLIC AND THE ATOM

I92

CONCLUSION

202

BIBLIOGRAPHY

224

INDEX

245

INTRODUCTION R A N C E H A S had a substantial impact on international affairs, especially in recent years. This is true not only because of the dynamic and aggressive qualities of General de Gaulle, but also because that nation today, more than at any time since the Liberation, is in fact approximating a policy to which she has long aspired: the politique du grand sticle. This policy of grandeur has been manifested in de­ liberate and bold acts ranging from the development of a national nuclear striking force and the quashing of Great Britain's application for membership in the European Eco­ nomic Community to the recognition of the Peking Gov­ ernment. The development of the force de jrappe raises grave questions for the cohesiveness of the Atlantic Alliance, for the general problem of the diffusion of nuclear weapons and, consequently, for the stability of world order. Out­ side of the Communist bloc, France is the most recent state to inscribe its name in the ledger of the "atomic nations" and is the only non-Communist state to have organized and developed a military nuclear program in time of peace. The American and British programs both originated under wartime conditions and were explicitly oriented toward achieving an advantage in weapons technology. Although the British program was for all intents and purposes ab­ sorbed in the American program after 1943, the decision to continue to pursue an atomic development program with a specific military content was reaffirmed as a matter of course in late 1945.1 France, then, appears to be in a special

F

1 Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), Ch. 3; Richard Rosecrance,

I N T R O D U C T I O N

category as a military nuclear power, for despite an incipi­ ent prewar atomic program2 and the creation of an atomic energy agency in early 1945, the question of nuclear weap­ ons was not given serious consideration for nearly a decade to come. Neither the problem of nuclear proliferation per se, nor the efficacy of the French force de frappe—both subjects of much colloquy today—is of immediate concern to us.8 Rather, this study is designed to examine the origins of the striking force upon which contemporary French policy places much weight. While the force de frappe as presently conceived has distinct Gaullist overtones, it should be im­ mediately noted that the nuclear ingredient in the Gaullist recipe of French power stems from the Fourth Republic. The decisions which led to the detonation of France's first atomic device at Reggane on February 13, i960, were taken while General de Gaulle was in retirement at Colombeyles-deux-Eglises. This point cannot be emphasized too strongly. In the first place, recognition of this fact invites us to give more reasoned consideration to the conditions under which France was moved to expend considerable time, effort, manpower and money on the development of a military nuclear program. Secondly, it raises the question of whether the fine rhetoric against the force de frappe which today emanates from the anti-Gaullist forces in the National Assembly is a reflection of conviction—in which case we might expect France to reverse course and follow a policy more compatible with our own after de Gaulle leaves "British Incentives to Become a Nuclear Power," The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons, ed. Richard Rosecrance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), Ch. 3; Alfred Goldberg, "The Atomic Origins of the British Nuclear Deterrent," International Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 3 (July, 1964), 409-29. 2 See below, Chapter One. 3 On the Nth-country problem, see Beaton and Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons; Rosecrance, The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons. On the force de frappe, see Pierre Gallois, Strategic de Vage nucleaire (Paris, i960), and Ciro Zopp0, "France as a Nuclear Power," in Rosecrance, The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 126-56.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

the political scene—or is merely part of the game of poli­ tics.4 If the latter is closer to the truth, as this author is strongly inclined to believe, then the development of French military nuclear policy has deeper implications for the future of the Atlantic Alliance than might appear to be the case.® Finally, recognition of the essential continuity of French nuclear policy between the Fourth and Fifth Re­ publics helps dispel essentially useless and divisive notions which can only be characterized as "devil-theory" interpre­ tations of General de Gaulle. The purpose of this study, then, is twofold: to describe the nature and development of French atomic policy dur­ ing the Fourth Republic and to discover the process by which this policy was made. The study is confined to France alone and does not purport to draw general con­ clusions of universal application with regard either to the relationship of technocrats or scientists to politics in the atomic age, or to the general experiences of today's nuclear nations in the development of atomic energy policy. While this study may adduce some tentative suggestions concern­ ing the problem of nuclear incentives or the relationship of political process to technology, the author's aims are more modest: to uncover and analyze an experience through which a much maligned Republic passed so that we may learn something of the process by which that Republic came to terms with one of the most awe-inspiring phe­ nomena of our time—the atom. 4 See, France, Journal Officiel 1 Debats Parlementaires, Assemblee Na· tionale, No. 71, October 25, i960, passim; No. 62, July 17, 1962, especially pp. 2482-86 for the comments of Guy Mollet and, pp. 2,486-88 for the comments of M. Maurice Faure. 5 A continuing national nuclear capability on the part of France could well require the reordering of alliance responses to aggressive activities in the European theatre. It would also raise the necessity of reconsidering command and control systems and the desirability of creating a genuinely independent European nuclear defense capability. In any event, it would clearly raise the issue of whether partnership and interdependence can exist among unequal entities.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

A study of the policy-making proccss raises the question of the nature of the political milieu in which that policy develops. A few comments on the nature of politics in the Fourth Republic are therefore in order. It has become al­ most axiomatic to assert that the Governments of the Fourth Republic were not wholly masters of the policies which were promulgated during their terms of office. In shaping policy goals, the coalition Governments were rig­ orously limited in both the selection of policy alternatives and in the ability to produce positive policy decisions. The coalitions which were formed lacked stability, for they cut across political associations which often were antagonistic to one another with respect to the goals to be pursued and the means to attain these goals. The tenuous nature of co­ alitions demanded the avoidance of potentially divisive issues. Socialists and Popular Republicans (MRP), at one on the question of European integration or economic policy, were opposed to each other on clerical issues; Radicals and Socialists were uneasy allies when economic policy was in question; social and economic issues were the main stum­ bling blocks of Moderate-Socialist alliances. Communists and Gaullists could agree on nothing more than their disaf­ fection with the parliamentary regime of the Fourth Re­ public, and further contributed to instability. With rare exception that Government survived longest which gov­ erned least. The result was weak and often ineffective gov­ ernment, and the policy decisions which emanated from these tenuous coalitions were frequendy framed in vague and noncommittal terms. A number of observers of the French political scene, on the other hand, have tended to assign the administration a strong role in the policy-making process.® The bureaucracy has been alleged to have wielded great power and influeHerbert Luethy, France Against Herself (New York: Meridian Books Inc., 1957); Philip Williams, Politics in Post-War France (2nd. ed.; Lon­ don: Longmans, Green U Co., 1958).

INTRODUCTION

cnce, both in the drafting and the executory stages of policy elaboration. The inability of the numerous and sometimes undisciplined party groups in Parliament to arrive at a con­ sensus on given policy questions has been said to have strengthened even further the hand of the bureaucracy in policy-making—with the unfortunate result that responsi­ bility could not be affixed to the politically accountable rep­ resentatives of the people. While the legislature of the Fourth Republic held the power of life and death over the political executive, its con­ trol over the administration was less imposing. The main source of legislative control resided in the parliamentary committees, especially the Finance Committee. No special committee was created for atomic energy until 1954, and this committee existed for only a short time. Indeed, one of the most singular features of atomic policy in the Fourth Republic was the almost total lack of parliamentary discus­ sion of the implications of atomic power for France in either a peaceful or military context. Similarly, as this study will bear out, the Government also avoided coming to grips with the problem, for to do otherwise would have been to raise unsettling issues. It was not until 1956, when the Euratom negotiations were under consideration, that the National Assembly came face to face with the problem of the relationship of France to the atom. Even at this time, however, debate and discussion turned on the negative proposition that France should not mortgage her atomic future. The positive question of just what French policy toward atomic energy should be was posed by only a few deputies, and then in vain. Nevertheless, one salutary ef­ fect of the Euratom debates was to raise irrevocably the problems and prospects of atomic energy development in France. When the dust finally settled over the Fourth Republic, it became readily apparent that France had made substantial progress in developing nuclear technology and in paving

I N T R O D U C T I O N

the way for a military atomic program. But for the con­ scious and progressive development of nuclear capability in the Fourth Republic, General de Gaulle would not have been able to say with assurance in October 1958, that, "everybody knows that we now have the means of provid­ ing ourselves with nuclear weapons and the day is ap­ proaching when we, in our turn, will carry out tests."7 When, on February 13, i960, France detonated her first atomic device, the question of whether the Fourth Repub­ lic had contributed to the result was put to rest. The dilemma is evident. If the Fourth Republic lacked an official atomic policy, if both the Parliament and the Government parried the central issues posed by the atom, how then did policy come to pass? In view of the nature of the French political system—caution, avoidance where pos­ sible of contentious issues which threatened coalitions, inertia and eventual immobilisme—one may speculate that the impulse to action and the continuity thereof came from outside the formal institutional structures of policy-making. The burden of the argument of this study, insofar as the policy-making process is concerned, is that French nuclear policy in the Fourth Republic was guided and developed by a relatively small group of people, well situated in au­ thoritative positions and operating through informal chan­ nels of communication outside the mainstream of political activity. A good deal of public policy, of course, evolves through informal channels, in France as elsewhere. Major policy issues, however, are invariably brought into the political forum where the merits and pitfalls of various alternatives can be subjected to reasoned consideration. It is the at­ tendant equivocation, and the attitude that the course of 7Press conference of Premier Charles de Gaulle, Paris, October 23, 1958, Major Addresses, Statements & Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle May 19, 1958—January 31, 1964 (New York: Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, 1964), p. 27.

INTRODUCTION

events will resolve the issues, that distinguishes the evolu­ tion of atomic policy in France in this respect. In the United States, and later in Great Britain, questions per­ taining to nuclear policy were subjected to extensive dis­ cussion and debate in high political quarters. In France, however, the handling of atomic questions serves as an­ other example of a case in which M. Mendes-France's admonition "gouverner, c'est choisir" was not applied. Regardless of the nature of nuclear decision-making in France under the Fourth Republic, the evolution of nu­ clear policy can be fully appreciated only in the context of the external political and military environment. Although this study is focused on the internal political process, a full understanding of the latter requires that the reader bear in mind the evolution of external events. For this reason external factors are treated here. In view of the absence of official doctrine on atomic affairs and the inability of the Government to come to terms with the issues posed by atomic energy, there can be little doubt that in­ ternal pressure alone to create a military nuclear capability would not have sufficed to bring France over the brink and into the nuclear club. When, however, pressure from the few well-placed political spokesmen and the interested tech­ nocratic dirigeants committed to the development of a French nuclear capability merged with external develop­ ments, the issue was joined. From the time when it ap­ peared that the only direction which a non-nuclear France's fortunes were going to take was one of deterioration, in­ ternal apathy toward and resistance against putting France on the nuclear map began rapidly to erode. It was the evolu­ tion of international affairs between the Liberation and Sput­ nik that served as a catalyst to the eventual development of a military nuclear capability for France. At the close of the war, France's international image was considerably tarnished. The demographic, economic, in-

INTRODUCTION

dustrial and military basis of her power was markedly re­ duced. As in the case of the other European states, France entered the postwar world shorn of her ability to exercise either dominant power or influence. Her aspirations, how­ ever, were not brought into line with her reduced status, and under General de Gaulle's leadership France sought to reassert a grande politique which would maximize her primary goals of security and independence. In brief, "Gen­ eral de Gaulle ordered France to play a role commensurate not with her means, but with his own conceptions of her grandeur. The parliamentarians who followed him . . . took over without abandoning the policy of greatness."8 However ill-equipped France was to maintain first-rank international status, she was equally unprepared to relin­ quish her claims and to adjust her policies to the decline in power which the war and the attendant technological rev­ olution had wrought. The disparity between objectives and capabilities was a crucial one. It created paradoxical situations wherein France pursued policies she could not support for want of sufficient power or influence and from which she had to retreat, gracefully or otherwise. It also highlighted the dif­ ferences between France and her major ally, the United States. Despite some brilliant strokes of diplomacy in build­ ing the foundation for an integrated European community, and in liquidating some festering sores under MendesFrance, the general record in foreign policy in the Fourth Republic is marked by a good deal of frustration, some re­ treat and even ignominious defeat, as at Dien Bien Phu. The success or failure of French policy was frequently re­ lated to the degree to which such policy corresponded with American policy on the same issue. Roy Macridis, in ana­ lyzing the foreign policy of the Fourth Republic, put the problem succincdy when he noted that "there were few 8Raymond Aron, France, Steadfast and Changing (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, i960), p. 148.

INTRODUCTION

commitments that Francc could undertake and carry out successfully without Anglo-American support."9 This condition prevailed even after France recovered from defeat and occupation because of the formidable gap which had opened between the prewar powers and the superpowers which emerged from World War II. This gap was accentuated by nuclear weapons capability, and it stood to reason that any nation aspiring to international leadership would have to make the connection between that aspiration and the power of the atom. Nuclear status, then, became symbolic of the disparity between French goals and capabilities. The Fourth Republic, shordy before its demise, opted to bridge that gap by engaging at last in a conscious and positive development of nuclear energy for military purposes. One further general point remains. The quest for lead­ ership and first-rank status pervaded the Fourth Republic even as it does the Fifth Republic. Whether Gaullist, Mendesist or "European," French leadership sought to reestab­ lish France in the council of the Great Powers. Regardless of the emphasis of any one tendance—traditional territorial and military power, economic strength and viability, or an integrated European community—there was present an un­ remitting intention to prevent the permanent relegation of France to the status of a second-rate nation. Even proposals for a unilateral commitment not to produce atomic weap­ ons despite French capability to do so were made in terms of a gesture of a great nation and not as public acknowl­ edgment that France was withdrawing into oblivion. Thus, despite the lack of positive direction in much of the Fourth Republic, all of the major strains of leadership contributed 9 Roy Macridis, "French Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy in World Poli­ tics, ed. Roy Macridis (2nd ed.; Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1962), p. 59. See also J. B. Duroselle, "The Foreign Policy of France," Foreign Policies in a World of Change, ed. Kenneth Thompson and Joseph Black (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 57-88.

INTRODUCTION

to the progressive evolution of French nuclear policy if only by not actively impeding that development. The specific developments which impelled France to­ ward the creation of a military nuclear capability are nu­ merous and complex. Nevertheless they may, for analytic convenience, be considered in two broad but interdepend­ ent categories: political and military-strategic. Economic considerations cut across both categories. The political factors derive from the psychological atti­ tude toward France's intra-alliance and international po­ sition indicated above. As an aspirant to Great Power sta­ tus, or to an influential voice in those councils, France was unwilling to accept a back seat. Yet, in at least three areas of predominant concern to France—Germany, NATO, the colonial world—she was forced by circumstances and con­ ditions beyond her control to retreat from her initial policy positions and to settle for considerably less than she had bargained for. The composite result of almost incessant withdrawal on these questions was a sense of isolation from her closest allies and a growing belief that the only way in which to compensate for diplomatic failures and to pre­ vent their continuation was to develop a nuclear capability. In pursuit of the goal of security, France sought early to prevent the revival of German power and influence on the Continent. The evolution of Soviet-American relations, which crystallized into the Cold War, undermined this goal and caused the United States to take ameliorative action with regard to Germany. As a result, political, economic and, eventually, military rejuvenation of Germany was fos­ tered by the United States. Unable to contain the German renaissance, France sought to control the evolution and development of the new Germany by pursuing a policy of European integration. This policy was considered the best means of channeling German energies in a direction con­ ducive to French goals and of preventing German recovery from presenting a serious challenge to French continental

I N T R O D U C T I O N

leadership. While integration was an effective palliative with respect to German economic growth and served to extricate France from the unhappy circumstance of con­ stantly backpedaling in the face of American pressure to develop a strong Western German nation, the prospect of German rearmament proved a more difficult question to handle. The dilatory tactics to which France resorted to postpone this inevitable decision served no useful end and led not only to threats of "agonizing reappraisal" of Ameri­ can policy toward France but also to a net loss of French prestige in the councils of the Western Alliance. It would not be beyond reason to suggest that the fact of German re­ armament, coupled with the possibility of the eventual withdrawal of American troops from the Continent, led many Frenchmen to conclude that France must take steps to guarantee her own security—in the instant case through the development of a nuclear capability. A second, and related area of frustration was the Atlan­ tic Alliance. Again in keeping with Great Power preten­ sion, France claimed equality with the leading members of NATO—the United States and Great Britain. Once again, however, the claim could not be sustained and France had to capitulate to American policy in the European theatre. The rearmament of Germany and her admission to NATO is another case in point, as is the development of an Anglo-American decision-making conclave which fre­ quently informed France after the fact rather than con­ sulting her prior to taking decisions affecting the Alliance as a whole. It was with considerable acrimony and equal perspicacity that the distinguished French military analyst, Jean Planchais, noted that "under his (Norstad's) reign SHAPE has become in good part what the man in the street thinks it is: an American etat-major.... The important de­ cisions and the most vital information are reserved for American hands."10 French resentment of this condition in10 Jean

Planchais, Le Malaise de VArmce (Paris: Plon, 1958), p. 53.

INTRODUCTION

crcascd as the nation surged forward economically during the decade of the 1950's and became less and less dependent on American economic and military assistance. The evolu­ tion of the NATO relationship, then, again contributed to the conviction that the only way in which France would be able to exert any influence in the Alliance was by speaking with an authority that only a nuclear capability could pro­ vide. The third aspect of this growing political frustration was the colonial problem. It was difficult enough for France to relinquish control over her empire because of the peculiar French doctrine of mission civilisatrice which implied as­ similation rather than national self-determination. The sit­ uation was all the more difficult to accept when France's NATO allies—principally the United States—seemed to be making a conscious attempt to undermine French interests in Africa and Asia by fostering the principle of national self-determination and furthermore by apparently replac­ ing French influence with American influence in such places as South Vietnam and North Africa. The evolution of colonial affairs, in which the divergence of interest be­ tween France and the United States was so clear, led France to conclude that only an independent diplomatic capability would or could prevent the sacrifice of French interests outside the NATO area. Once more the question of what constituted an independent diplomatic capability arose and once again the response had a nuclear ingredient. In all three areas, then, the evolution of international affairs imposed the necessity of a nuclear arsenal if France were to insist upon first-rank status. From continental Europe to Indochina, France felt consciously ousted or the victim of allied complacency. Not only could she not act effectively on her own, as the Suez incident in 1956 so dramatically demonstrated, but she also seemed incapable of exercising any degree of influence on her allies. Indeed, it would not be an overstatement to say that France de-

INTRODUCTION

vcloped her nuclear capability as much to save herself from her friends as to defend herself against her enemies. A second category of developments which contributed toward the evolution of the French nuclear force was mili­ tary-strategic in nature. As long as the United States had a nuclear monopoly or a preponderant nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union, France could seek the protection of the American nuclear umbrella with assurance. At least this was true with respect to her continental security, and East-West tension was focused on this area until after the outbreak of the Korean War. With this protection, France was free to concentrate her energies and resources on her extra-continental problems, especially Indochina. When, however, the Soviet Union acquired a nuclear capability, the situation altered. Until the middle of the 1950's, Soviet capabilities were limited to the extent that they could not effectively threaten a strike against the United States. Dur­ ing this period, the major concern of America's European allies was that the United States might "go nuclear" un­ necessarily, in which event the Soviet riposte would be de­ livered against the European nations. When the Soviet Union gained the ability to deliver nuclear weapons on the United States, the situation was reversed, and the Euro­ pean allies became concerned about the credibility of the American promise to respond to any Soviet attack on Europe—nuclear or conventional—with a massive nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. To increase the reliability of the American deterrent, it appeared necessary to develop a separate nuclear force, one adequate to trigger the Ameri­ can nuclear arsenal. The evolution of the military situation, together with the discovery that nuclear weapons had tacti­ cal as well as strategic use, contributed to the ultimate de­ cision to bring France into the military nuclear club. While both military-strategic and political considerations entered into the decision leading to the nuclear arsenal, it is well to note that the military-strategic factors, though of

INTRODUCTION

considerable importance today, were less so in the Fourth Republic, especially in the earlier years. Political motiva­ tions, the frustration of European, Atlantic and colonial policies, the concern for prestige and the desire for status and a voice in the policy-making councils of the free world and the Atlantic Alliance—these were the dominant con­ siderations. The evolution of the military-strategic situa­ tion served more to ratify than to initiate the French nu­ clear arsenal. The study which follows is divided into two parts. The first part discusses the background, organization and com­ position of the Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique11 and through general discussion and the use of case examples attempts to assess the relative roles of the leadership groups within this organization and the relationship of the Com­ missariat to the political institutions of France. The second part develops the growth of policy and the nature of the policy-making process with regard to the atomic bomb. 11 This organization will be referred to alternately as CEA or as Com­ missariat.

PART I FROM LIBERATION TO THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN

GLOSSARY Bureau d'Etudes Generales Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique Cornice d'Action Scientifique de la Defense Nationale Comite Consultatif de !'Utilisation de l'Energie Comite de l'Energie Atomique Comite d'Entente des Anciens Combattants pour la Defense de l'Union Fra^aise Commandement des Armes Speciales Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique Commission de l'Energie du Plan Departement de Techniques Nouvelles Direction des Applications Militaires Direction des Etudes et Fabrications D'Armement Direction des Poudres Direction de Recherches et Exploitations Minieres Direction Techniques et Industrielles Ecole Militaire de Specialisation Atomique de 1'Armee de Terre Electricite de France Office Nationale d'Etudes et de Recherche Aeronautique

BEG CNRS

Bureau of General Studies National Center of Scientific Research Scientific Action Committee of National Defense Advisory Committee for the Use of Energy Atomic Energy Committee Veterans Committee for the Defense of the French Union

CAS CEA

DTN DAM DEFA

DREM DTI EMSAAT

EDF ONERA

Commandement of Special Weapons Atomic Energy Commission Energy Committee of the Plan Department of New Techniques Division of Military Applications Division of Weapons Study and Manufacture Division of Explosives Mine Prospecting and Exploitation Division Technical and Industrial Division Army Military School of Atomic Specialisation French Electric Authority National Office of Aeronau­ tical Studies & Research

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE OF THE CEA HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

the Provisional Government of O France, under18, the1945,presidency o£ General Charles de N OCTOBER

Gaulle, enacted an ordinance establishing an Atomic Energy Commission.1 Devastated by the war and occupation, France would seem to have had far more pressing tasks than to inaugurate an atomic energy program. Yet the establish­ ment of such a program, or at least the structural frame­ work for future programs, was in a larger sense the rational extension and continuation of what had preceded the fall of France in 1940. In the face of the atomic giants of today, it is easy to forget that atomic science received its initial impetus in the Parisian laboratories of Henri Becquerel and the Curies. From the last decade of the nineteenth century to the eve of World War II, France ranked among the lead­ ing nations in atomic research. In 1934, two of France's leading scientists, Frederic and Irene Joliot-Curie discovered artificial radioactivity. This Nobel Prize-winning discovery constituted a major step toward greater understanding of the potential of the atom. Five years later, Joliot-Curie and his colleagues, Hans Halban and Lew Kowarski, contributed to the discovery of atomic fission and the concept of a chain 1 Ordonnance No. 45-2563 du 18 octobre 1945, instituant un Commis­ sariat 4 l'Energie Atomique, France, Journal Officiel, Lois et Decrets, Oc­ tober 31, 1945, p. 7,065. (Hereafter cited as Ordonnance No. 45-2563, J.O., October 31, 1945.)

L I B E R A T I O N T O T H E F I R S T P L A N

reaction. This led them, a short time later, to apply for a number of patents for an "atomic machine."2 The basic objective of this work was to harness atomic power for peaceful purposes. The outbreak of war between France and Germany, however, shifted the emphasis from peaceful to military applications. The Minister of Arma­ ments, Raoul Dautry, apprised of the strategic value of atomic power, put all possible facilities and credits at the disposal of the Joliot-Curie team in the hope that this new form of energy might be integrated into the war effort.3 Under Joliot-Curie's initiative, France acquired from Bel­ gium the uranium oxide necessary to fuel an atomic device, and an agreement, in 1940, with the Societe Norvegienne de PAzote resulted in the delivery to France of the entire Norwegian stock of heavy water (used as a moderator in conducting controlled atomic reactions). Three months prior to the fall of France, the Joliot-Curie team had reached the point where it was believed possible to con­ duct an actual chain-reaction experiment, but the invasion of France precluded the possibility of conducting any tests.4 The signing of the armistice in June 1940 brought a quick end to the concerted French nuclear effort and effectively paralyzed it until the postwar period. French contact with atomic research continued, how­ ever, in the form of scientific participation in AngloCanadian atomic projects. The uranium oxide was re­ moved from Joliot-Curie's laboratories and hidden in Mo­ rocco, while the heavy water was sent with Halban and Kowarski to England for use in the British atomic re­ search program. In the wake of the Nazi conquest, other French scientists, among them Pierre Auger, Bertrand Goldschmidt and Jules Gueron, left the Continent to par2 Jacques Allier, "Les Premieres Piles Atomiques et l'Eflort Frantais," Les Extraits de la Revue Scientifique, Extrait du No. 3314 (NovemberDecember, 1951), p. 2. 3 Ibid., p. 3. * Ibid.

BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE OF THE CEA

ticipate in allied nuclear research enterprises. These scien­ tists ultimately became associated with the Canadian proj­ ect at Montreal and were joined by Kowarski, who later directed the construction of the first Canadian pilot re­ actor.5 The prewar experience of French scientists in atomic physics and the high-level research which they conducted in both French and Anglo-Canadian laboratories do not alone explain the decision to renew the French effort so soon after victory and liberation. The basic steps toward this end were taken by the two men who had been most directly concerned with atomic energy prior to the defeat of France—Joliot-Curie and Dautry. After the Liberation, Joliot-Curie resumed his position as the Director of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS),® and Dautry was named Minister of Reconstruction in the Pro­ visional Government. Both men attempted to convince the Government of the advisability of underwriting an atomic energy program because of the potential economic and military roles it would play in the future.7 General de Gaulle, as head of the Provisional Government, was the focal point of these efforts, which began as early as 1944.8 5

Ibid., p . 9 . Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique was first established in 1939 as a means for coordinating scientific research in France. It con­ tinued to function during the Occupation and was revitalized after the war to facilitate pure and applied research and to coordinate public and private scientific research. See Henry E. Guerlac, "Science and National Strength," Modern France: Problems of the Third and Fourth Republics, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 81-108. 7 Bertrand Goldschmidt states that it was M. Joliot-Curie along with Pierre Auger, another leading French scientist, who finally convinced Gen­ eral de Gaulle of the need to create an organ devoted to atomic energy. Bertrand Goldschmidt, L'Aventure Atomique (Paris: Arthime Fayard, 1962), p. 75. M. Goldschmidt also notes that when General de Gaulle visited Canada in July 1944, French scientists working on the Anglo-Canadian atomic projects informed him of the coming atomic military revolution. Ibid., P- 54· 8Allier, Les Extraits de la Revue Scientifique, No. 33r4, p. 10. eThe

LIBERATION TO THE FIRST PLAN

But it was not until March 1945 that a comprehensive memorandum, drafted by Dautry and stressing the ration­ ale for instituting a framework for atomic research, was sent to General de Gaulle. M. Dautry noted the stage of re­ search which France had reached by 1940 and emphasized that this new form of energy would have not only immedi­ ate effects on national defense but also long-range effects of substantial importance to the economic life of the world. In a spirit "corresponding less to a military preoccupation ... than to a desire to secure for France the legitimate share which could eventually revert to her in ... peaceful use"8 of this energy, Dautry advocated that three steps be taken by the Government: that France "reintroduce herself into the field of research by creating a team of workers which would be placed at the disposition and under the authority of Joliot-Curie"; that Anglo-French contacts be made to assure that France "will be included in eventual interna­ tional arrangements" on atomic energy; finally, that France demonstrate her permanent interest in atomic affairs by purchasing the heavy water loaned to her by the Norwe­ gians in 1940.10 In stressing the far-reaching economic advantages to be derived from the mastery of atomic energy, Dautry tailored his suggestions to fit one of the primary concerns of Gen­ eral de Gaulle and most of France: the reconstruction and rehabilitation of an industrially and economically viable nation capable of resuming its role as a leading nation on the international stage. The allusion to the obvious mili­ tary implication of atomic energy, on the other hand, served to appeal to the General's hope that France would 8 Republique Fran^aise, Presidence du Conseil Commissariat a I'Energie 1 Atomique, Rapport d'Activite du Commissariat a I'Energie Atomique du ι" janvier 1946 au 31 decembre 1950 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1952), p. 212. (This source is hereafter cited as Commissariat & I'Energie Atomique, Rapport d'Activite 1946-1950.) 10 Ibid., pp. 212-13.

BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE OF THE CEA

not be permanently relegated to a second-rate status in the family of nations. It was undoubtedly a combination of these factors which induced General de Gaulle to give his imprimatur to a na­ tional atomic energy program, but in 1945 the economic aspects seem to have been predominant in his thinking. Discussing his concern about securing adequate sources of energy for France following the Liberation, General de Gaulle notes in his Memoirs that, "as for the nascent atomic energy production, the resources of uranium which seemed abundant in our territories as well as our scientific and in­ dustrial capacities offered us an opportunity of reaching an exceptional level. The High Commission created to this ef­ fect was to get the project under way."11 The most sweeping and vague declaration of intent, how­ ever, is found in the explanatory statement of the institut­ ing ordinance of October 18, 1945: "Pressing necessities of a national and international order obligate taking the neces­ sary measures in order that France can take her place in the domain of atomic energy research."12 To this end, "there is instituted under the name Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique, an establishment of scientific, technical and in­ dustrial character, vested with a civil personality as well as administrative and financial autonomy and placed under the authority and control of the President of the Provi­ sional Government."13 Within this framework, the Commissariat a l'Energie 11 Charles de Gaulle, The War Memoirs of General de Gaulle: Salva­ tion 1944-1946, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Simon and Schuster, i960), pp. 269-70. Even General de Gaulle is not always consistent, for during the debates on the EDC Treaty, which would have affected France's rights to make or detain atomic weapons, General de Gaulle claimed that he had created the CEA in order that France would have the atomic bomb. New York. Times, April 8, 1954. Whatever rationalization General de Gaulle might offer for starting a nuclear program, the military value of the atom weighed heavily in his decision. 12 Ordonnance No. 45-2563, J.O., October 31, 1945, p. 7,065. 13 Ibid., Article 1.

LIBERATION TO THE FIRST PLAN

Atomique (CEA) was charged with a broad range of re­ sponsibilities: pursuit of "scientific and technical research with a view to the utilization of atomic energy in the sev­ eral areas of science, industry and national defense"; study of appropriate measures of protection against the destruc­ tive effects of atomic energy; organization and control of prospecting for and exploiting necessary primary mate­ rials in conjunction with the interested ministerial depart­ ments; industrial development of generators operated by nuclear energy; and, in general, "taking all measures neces­ sary to put France in a position to benefit from the de­ velopment of this branch of science."14 The CEA, therefore, directs, conducts or oversees not only scientific research projects but also the industrial development of atomic energy and the commercial functions of buying and selling minerals, radio-elements and related materials. Despite the multiple functions and substantial powers accorded to the CEA, it does not in law exercise a monop­ oly in the field of atomic energy. In fact, however, it has preempted the areas of exploitation, research and, until recendy, construction in nuclear development. One distinct exception to this is electricity production; Electricite de France (EDF) is responsible for the production and distri­ bution of electricity regardless of the source of power. Private individuals and groups are legally competent to prospect for uranium or thorium or to undertake the con­ struction of nuclear reactors.16 The de facto monopoly of the CEA is the result of the technical and financial invest­ ment necessary for the development of atomic energy— and at the close of the war, only the State was in a position «Ibid. Prospecting for and exploitation of atomic materials is subject to state controls such as licenses, permits and concessions. For a general discussion of Government controls in mining and exploitation see M. Vergne, "Le Controle Gouvernemental dans Ie Domaine Atomique," Supplement au Bulletin d'Informations Seientifiques et Techniques, No. 30 (June, 1959), 16pp. 15

BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE OF THE CEA

to undertake these investments. In recent years, despite the preeminent position of the CEA, many of France's larger and wealthier corporations have organized companies for the purpose of exploiting the potentialities of atomic de­ velopment. These companies conduct mining operations, treat and concentrate raw materials, manufacture special materials used in atomic reactors and even undertake the construction of entire reactors.16 Frequendy the CEA in­ vests in these companies and becomes a partner in a joint enterprise.17 These inroads of private participation in nu­ clear development have not, however, moved the Commis­ sariat from its clearly predominant position. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CEA

The structure of the CEA is unique among French institu­ tions. Fashioned to an extent along the lines applied in or­ ganizing the Regie Renault, the CEA enjoys a greater degree of freedom of action and autonomy than either Renault or the other nationalized sectors of the economy: electricity, gas, coal and several of the banks. The traditional method of dealing with public establishments had been to place the administrative functions in the hands of one of the min­ istries within the executive branch of Government.18 The 18 Ambassade de France, France and the Atom (New York: Service de Presse et d'Information, 1962), p. 43. Public-private relations in atomic development are discussed by J. M. Auby, "Les Problemes Administratifs de l'Energie Atomique en France," Recueil Dalloz, 38* Cahier (November 15, 1961), pp. 185-92. Private interest in atomic energy has increased considerably over the past five or six years, as atomic energy has become a more commercially profitable enterprise. 17 One example is Compagnie Franjaise des Minerals d'Uranium which includes the CEA, Pechiney, Kuhlmann, the Rothschild Bank and a number of other industrial concerns. This is a mining and processing concern. For a discussion of this company see Agenee Quotidienne d'Informations Eeonomiques et Financibes, No. 2770, March 5, 1956. Another example is the Societe des Minerals d'Uranium de Franceville, created in 1958 by the CEA and several industrial concerns for the same purposes. 18 See generally on public establishments in France, Bernard Chenot, Les Entreprises Nationalisees (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1956); Andre G. Delion, L'Etat et les Entreprises Publiques (Paris: Sirey,

LIBERATION T O T H E FIRST P L A N

however, was granted administrative autonomy, which meant in essence that its administrative organ was a self-contained unit and thus once removed from the con­ fines of classic bureaucracy.19 At the same time, in keeping with the traditional method of allocating duties in public enterprises, the CEA was vested with commercial and indus­ trial functions. The key innovation of administrative au­ tonomy has provided a buffer for the CEA against the op­ erative methods, and red tape, of the standard administra­ tive structure. Commensurate with its administrative au­ tonomy is the guarantee of financial autonomy which frees the CEA from some of the ordinary financial controls applied to public establishments.20 A second distinguishing feature of the CEA is that it has

CEA,

1958); Mario Einaudi, Mauricc Bye, Ernesto Rossi, Nationalization in France and Italy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955). 19The term "classic bureaucracy" refers to the traditional centralized hierarchical administrative structure of which the elite are to be found in the Grands Corps de l'Etat, such as the Council of State and the Inspec­ torate of Finance. 20 Ordonnance No. 45-2563, J.O., October 31, 1945, p. 7,065, Article 5, deals with finance. The CEA budget covers all scientific, technical, indus­ trial and administrative activities. The financial autonomy which was granted to the CEA in the 1945 Ordinance means that the budget is "an internal document which is not, in its particulars, submitted to the ap­ proval of the Ministre de tutelle or the Ministre de Finance." At the beginning of the year, subsequent to the approval of the Atomic Energy Committee, the above ministers are presented with a provisional estimate of receipts and expenditures and a distribution scheme of the program authorizations among the various "general objectives" which number about twenty. During the course of the year, as studies progress to the point where the cost of a project may be more accurately deter­ mined, the Committee decides on program authorizations. There is no a priori control over the finances of the CEA. There is, however, a posteriori control through the Commission de Verification des Comptes des Entreprises Publiques. This organ does not have direct access to CEA documents and bases its reports to Parliament on information sup­ plied by the Mission de Controle of the CEA, an internal organ consisting of three persons. As of the present time, its members include an Inspector of Finance, a Councilor of the Court of Accounts and a representative of the Ministry of the Army. The latter official was not part of the Mission de Controle in the early years. This information was received from a qualified member of the CEA. IO

BACKGROUND

AND

STRUCTURE

O F T H E

CEA

been placed under the direct authority and control of the Prime Minister,21 who, in this capacity, is president of the administrative body of the CEA, the Comite de l'Energie Atomique.22 The Atomic Energy Committee is a collegial body, reminiscent of the American and British atomic au­ thorities and constitutes the third part of a triumverate of governors. The other two parts are the scientific and ad­ ministrative presiding officers, respectively the High Com­ missioner and the Administrator-General. Technically the CEA is responsible only to the Prime Minister, from whom it derives its authority. In the event of disagreement be­ tween a majority of the Committee and the AdministratorGeneral or High Commissioner, the question at hand may be brought before an interministerial committee composed of the ministers immediately interested in the problem. Final decision in such an instance rests with the Prime Minister. Thus, the final arbiter for Commissariat prob­ lems is the executive head of the Government.23 The end result of this arrangement is to remove the CEA from the direct line of fire of interministerial conflicts at the political level in much the same way as its administrative and finan­ cial autonomy offers it protection against administrativelevel competition. The proximate relationship of the CEA to the Executive head of the Government is justified in the explanatory statement of the enabling ordinance of 1945. After noting that this newly created organization must be at the same 21 Originally the CEA was under the President of the Provisional Gov­ ernment. 22 Ordonnance No. 45-2563, J.O., October 31, 1945, p. 7,065, Article 2. The Ordinance provided for the delegation of this function to a minister

while the modifying decree of 1951 (Decret No. 51-7 du 3 janvier 1951, J.O., January 4, 1951, p. 164), allocates this function to the AdministratorGeneral in the absence of the Minister-delegate. 23 Decret No. 45-2572 du 18 octobre 1945 portant reglement d'administration publique pour !'application de l'ordonnance du 18 octobre 1945

instituant un Commissariat & l'Energie Atomique, J.O., October 31, 1945, p. 7,079, Article 3. (Hereafter cited as Decret No. 45-2572, J.O., October 31. 1945·)

LIBERATION TO THE FIRST PLAN

time "very close to the Government and, so to speak, mingled with it, and nevertheless vested with great free­ dom of action," the text continues, it must be very close to the Government because the fate of the nation can be affected by developments in this branch of science, and it is therefore indispensable that it be under the authority of the Government. It must, on the other hand, be vested with great free­ dom of action because this is the sine qua non of its ef­ ficacy.24 Reduced to its simplest terms, the potential effects of atomic energy on the military and economic life of the nation re­ quired close surveillance and control by the Executive head of Government, while the need for rapid progress, to close the gap between France and the Anglo-American na­ tions, readily lent itself to an organization vested with a relatively high degree of autonomy. Even within the theoretical framework of its charter, however, the CEA did not at first fully escape partial political control by some of the other ministries. The agreement of the Ministers of National Education, Industrial Production and, occasionally, Finance was required in the selection of certain officials of the CEA, such as the members of the Atomic Energy Committee.25 This was changed in 1951, and since that time the Administrator-General has played an important role in the selection of his associates. The pro­ visions for interministerial meetings either to settle dis­ putes between the Atomic Energy Committee and the Administrator-General or High Commissioner,28 or to facilitate the solution of questions concerning the CEA,2T again bring members of the Government other than the 24Ordonnance No. 45-2563, J.O., October 31, 1945, p. 7,065, Expose des Motifs. 25 Jbtd., Article 2. 2eDicret No. 45-2572, J.O., October 31, 1945, p. 7,079, Article 3. 27 Ordonnance No. 45-2563, J.O., October 31, 1945, p. 7,065, Article 4.

B A C K G R O U N D

A N D

S T R U C T U R E O F

T H E C E A

Prime Minister into contact with the CEA. Its financial au­ tonomy is also limited to the extent that a Control Mission, charged with surveillance over the accounts and financial progress of the CEA, was created at the very beginning.28 Counterbalancing these aspects of control is the statutory provision that the CEA "has at its disposal for the execution of its mission and according to the rules governing its op­ eration, the powers presently vested in the Ministers con­ cerned."29 It has been pointed out by the legal draftsman of the original ordinance that in theory this provision means nothing less than that, —if it is a question of mining research in the colonies, the Commissariat.. .isthe Ministry of Overseas France; —if it is a question of mining concessions in France, it is the Ministry of Industry; —and, if it were a question of manufacturing atomic weapons, it would be the Ministry of National Defense.80 This description turned out in practice to be rather ac­ curate. The Atomic Energy Committee, which is presided over by the Prime Minister or his representative (either a Sec­ retary of State or, in his absence, the AdministratorGeneral), is an administrative council alongside of which two of its members, the Administrator-General and the High Commissioner, exercise their statutorily defined 28Dicret

a

No. 45-2572, J.0., October 31, 1945, p. 7,079, Article 10. For

more complete statement of the Mission de Controle, see n. 20 above. 29Ordonnance

No. 45-2563, J.O., October 31, 1945, p. 7,065, Article 1.

Every minister is bound to inform the Administrator-General of all pro­ posals for ordinances, decrees, laws, etc., and all instruments likely to affect the objects of the CEA. The Administrator-General, High Commis­ sioner and Atomic Energy Committee may submit comments on such proposals. 30

Jean Toutie, "Le Commissariat 4 ITinergie Atomique: Ses Aspects

Juridiques," Droit Social, No. 6 (June, 1953), p. 319.

L I B E R A T I O N

T O

T H E

F I R S T

P L A N

roles. The functions of the Committee are to establish the research, industrial and work programs in the domain of atomic energy; to examine and approve the annual report of activity and management; to approve loans, purchases and sales; and to examine all questions presented to it by the Prime Minister, Administrator-General or High Com­ missioner.31 This Committee was originally composed of the High Commissioner, the Administrator-General and "three persons qualified by their work relative to atomic energy." The President of the Comite d'Action Scientifique de la Defense Nationale was a member ex officio.32 Since 1951, the Committee has been expanded to ten members and the qualifications for appointment have been altered. Tenure on the Committee is for a five-year period, with renewable terms for the incumbents. The most unusual structural feature of the CEA is the pro­ vision for dyarchical authorities—the High Commissioner and the Administrator-General. Whereas the Atomic En­ ergy Committee meets on the convocation of its President, at least once a month or exceptionally upon the request of the High Commissioner or Administrator-General, the lat­ ter officials exercise continuous powers to supervise the daily affairs of the CEA. In general, the scientific and tech­ nical tasks are allocated to the High Commissioner while administrative and financial matters are under the control of the Administrator-General. Both of these officials are authorized to represent France in international negotiations concerning atomic energy33 Both are masters of their re­ spective spheres, but the Administrator-General enjoys a dual position which enhances his office: not only is he ad81 Decret

No. 45-2572, J.O., October 31, 1945, p. 7,079, Article 3. No. 45-2563, J.O., October 31, 1945, p. 7,065, Article 2. This post was held by General Dassault from 1946 to 1948, by General 82 Ordonnance

Bergeron from 1948 to 1955 and by General Guerin from 1955 to Decem­ ber 1956. In December 1956, the military representative on the Atomic Energy Committee was changed to a representative of the Minister of National Defense. 33

Ibid.,

Article 3. Η

BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE OF THE CEA

ministrative director of the CEA, but he is also "delegate of the Government." In this capacity he is the spokesman of the Government and the most direct link between the Commissariat and the office of the Prime Minister. Aside from this aspect, there are no technical provisions which place either official in a position superior to the other.34 Due to personality differences, however, this theoretical parity has never existed in fact. The relationship between the Atomic Energy Commit­ tee and the Administrator-General is a coordinate one, neither exercising absolute control over the other. Since 1951, a certain preeminence has been accorded the Admin­ istrator-General, for in the absence of the Prime Minister or a Secretary of State designated by him, the Adminis­ trator-General presides over the Committee. His position as "delegate of the Government" places him on a higher level than the Committee and the High Commissioner. Al­ though he must submit annual management and financial reports to the Committee and receive approval for certain purchases and sales,35 these qualifications do not seriously affect his position. On the other hand, the provision for interministerial committee meetings in the event of a dis­ pute between the Administrator-General (or High Com­ missioner) and a majority of the Committee would seem to prevent the Administrator-General from forcing through policy or administrative measures unacceptable to the Com­ mittee. There are sound administrative and political reasons for this bicephalous structure. From an administrative point of view, the distribution of functions according to their sci­ entific or administrative nature relieves the respective of­ ficials from an overextended concern with a wide range of 34 It may be noted, however, that the Administrator-General, as the financial head of the organization, could effectively block funds for scien­ tific research, thus placing the High Commissioner at a serious disadvan­ tage. This would be a potent weapon in a conflict between the two officials. 35Decret No. 45-2572, J.O., October 31, 1945, p. 7,079, Article 3.

L I B E R A T I O N T O T H E F I R S T P L A N

problems. A purely administrative official would frequendy find himself frustrated should he have to deal with the alien language and concepts of scientific matters about which he has litde understanding. Conversely, scientists have traditionally sought to avoid the entanglements of administrative red tape in order to devote full time and effort to research. Scientific leadership and administrative direction require divergent talents not often found in one individual. The allocation of such functions to specifically qualified individuals guarantees the efficient and smooth functioning of the organization. When one considers that the CEA is not merely a scientific organ, but an industrial and commercial enterprise as well, the bicephalous concept assumes rational proportions. Conflict between the administrative and scientific lead­ ers would seriously hamper the efficiency and progress of the Commissariat and defeat one of the main purposes for applying the dyarchical concept. This possibility was ex­ plicitly recognized in the preamble of the CEA'S charter: "These dispositions lead to a surely novel creation which, justified by the exceptional character of the matter to which it applied, will not be invoked as a precedent."36 The bicephalous structure is a two-edged sword which can function in a more efficient manner than alternative struc­ tural devices and thus justify its implementation, or create the possibility of conflicts so basic that the organization is paralyzed. The author of the 1945 ordinance neatly char­ acterized the dilemma in saying, "the authors of the . . . ordinance in truth played with difficulty; they played—and won."37 The most adequate defense is that this system has functioned with a tradition of cooperation and coordina­ tion. The rationale for bicephalous leadership may be found seOrdonnance No. 45-2563, J.O., October 31, 1945, p. 7,065, Exposi des Motifs. 37Toutee, Droit Social, No. 6 (June, 1953), p. 320.

BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE OF THE CEA

at another level—the political one. This may be viewed from both a theoretical and a practical point of view. The­ oretically there is always a danger in concentration of power. To place administrative and scientific-technical powers in the hands of one individual, accountable only to the Prime Minister, who must oversee the entire political structure, is to create an eminence grise whose tenure fur­ ther enhances his power. In the case of France, this theo­ retical danger was directly linked to a more practical one— the presence of Frederic Joliot-Curie. The unquestioned leader of the French scientific com­ munity and the person most qualified to direct the scien­ tific activities of the CEA at the close of the war was JoliotCurie, France's most recent recipient of the Nobel Prize for science. Although Joliot-Curie had sent his closest associ­ ates, Halban and Kowarski, to England in 1940, he himself had remained at his laboratory in the College de France and had taken part in underground activities. Along with Dautry, Joliot-Curie had lobbied vigorously for the crea­ tion of an atomic energy commission for France. His great liability was political: he was a member of the French Communist Party. Despite the fact that the first two years after the Liberation were characterized by a political honey­ moon among the contesting parties and factions, and that the economic ministries of the Provisional Government were in the hands of Communists, there was an atmos­ phere of mutual suspicion and distrust between the Com­ munist Party and the other sectors of political opinion. M. Joliot-Curie's conception of how the CEA should be structured leaned toward the establishment of a single head who would oversee both the scientific and adminis­ trative aspects of the nascent institution. "It was the old story of popes and emperors," one of his close associates has said; "Joliot wanted to play both roles and believed that he could." Despite these differences of opinion on how the CEA should be structured, the provision of the ordinance

LIBERATION TO THE FIRST PLAN

raised no substantial objections, and it was drafted and ac­ cepted within a very short time. Whatever General de Gaulle's views (and those of his associates, including Dautry) may have been on the merits of a single-or dualheaded organization, Joliot-Curie's political inclination clearly played a role in the decision to opt for the dyarchical solution. Thus the stage was set to provide political as well as organizational balance. The appointment of the conservative Dautry to the post of Administrator-General provided the political balance for the simultaneous appoint­ ment of Joliot-Curie as High Commissioner.88 During its first seven years, the CEA had a SecretaryGeneral whose basic function was to assist the Adminis­ trator-General and the High Commissioner. The precise nature of this assistance was never clarified by decree or ordinance, nor did the internal rules of the Commissariat define the scope of his duties. The incumbent was nomi­ nated by the Administrator-General and appointed by de­ cree upon the consent of the Ministers of Finance and Na­ tional Education. In fact, the Secretary-General was the link between the administrative and scientific services and also functioned as a liaison between the Commissariat, private industry and other ministerial departments. The more detailed aspects of his duties included surveillance of the application of decisions made by the Atomic Energy Committee, the High Commissioner and the Administra­ tor-General, the centralization and coordination of admin­ istrative activities and control over the efficiency of the ad­ ministrative and financial services of the Commissariat.89 The office of Secretary-General consequendy became a meeting ground for the several branches of the Commis38Decret du 3 janvier 1946 portant nomination du Haut Commissaire a I'Energie Atomique, de 1'Administrateur-General, Delegue du Gouvernement, et des membres du Comite de I'Energie Atomique, J.O., January 4, 1946, p. 1,985. 39 Commissariat i I'Energie Atomique, Rapport d'Activite 1946-1950, p. 68.

BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE OF THE CEA

sariat, but it was closer to the administrative than to the scientific service of the CEA. Theoretically, within the con­ text of bicephalism, the Secretary-General occupied a sub­ ordinate position, but this was subject to considerable fluc­ tuation over the seven-year period. The abolition of the office in May 1953,40 at the instigation of the AdministratorGeneral, was not entirely unrelated to the fact that the office of Secretary-General represented a potential threat to the high level of control exercised by the AdministratorGeneral within the Commissariat. 40 Decret

No. 53-482, J.O., May 24, 1953, p. 4,716.

CHAPTER TWO

THE FORMATIVE YEARS: 1946-1951

T

H E M A T E R I A L and technical situation of France in 1946 substantially narrowed the range of policy alternatives available in atomic energy development. The lack of a ma­ terial basis from which to operate meant that decisions with long-range implications could not be taken. Only after a sound infrastructure had been built, a large cadre of scien­ tists and technicians trained and an adequate supply of raw materials acquired would France be able to determine the course she would follow in the application of atomic energy. These conditioning factors predetermined the immediate future of French atomic development and more than any others, justified the French declaration by M. Parodi in the United Nations in June 1946 that,

. . . one essential trait marks these studies, these projects and these realizations: it is that they are entirely oriented toward peace, toward the works of peace, toward activi­ ties whose essential goal is the welfare of humanity. I am authorized to say that the goals the French Government has assigned to the research of its scientists and technicians are purely peaceful... .1 The credibility of this declaratory policy was further en­ hanced by the prevailing international situation. The United States, sole possessor of a nuclear weapon, had pre1Republique Frangaise, Prisidence du Conseil, Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique, Rapport d'activite du Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique du 1" janvier 1946 au Ji decembre 1950 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1952)1 P- 8. (This source is hereafter cited as Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique, Rapport d'activite 1946-1950.)

T H E FORMATIVE YEARS: 1 9 4 6 - 1 9 5 1

sented the Baruch Plan before the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. This plan, if adopted, would have precluded the development of national nuclear arsenals. In June 1946, Soviet-American relations were still generally good, riding on the crest of wartime collaboration, and therefore, the necessity of considering a French defense force based on atomic weapons had not yet become evident. Nor did France yet feel the pressure of a crumbling co­ lonial empire, a situation which was later to lead some Frenchmen to conclude that the respect of the French Community and the emergent Afro-Asian nations turned on whether the mother country was endowed with a nu­ clear weapons capacity. The French atomic program, unlike its British and American counterparts, was born in peacetime circumstances. This factor, together with the limited human and ma­ terial resources available to France, eliminated the early emergence of a civil-military tug-of-war for a dominant po­ sition in the shaping of atomic energy policy. The eco­ nomic problems of reconstruction and industrial develop­ ment further served to protect the Commissariat from the whirlpool of politics. The Government declaration in the United Nations that France would devote its effort to the peaceful applications of atomic energy, the modest finan­ cial resources requested and allocated to the CEA, the re­ moteness of the effects which atomic energy development would have on industry and the labor force and the com­ plexity which atomic concepts and terminology presented to the average man all contributed toward a general politi­ cal apathy vis-a-vis the Commissariat and its program in the early years.2 For the members of Parliament, atomic 2 William Francois, "L'Industrie Atomique Franiaise," Hommes et Monies, No. 94 (May, 1954), p. 229. M. Francois states that, "in 1945, after the Occupation, which had committed the country to a long eclipse, it was difficult to give a well-defined priority to a problem as new as atomic energy . . . given the number . . . and urgency of the tasks it was necessary to undertake for national revival."

LIBERATION TO THE FIRST PLAN

matters were not politically rentable. The presence of a Party member in the highest echelon of the Commissariat hierarchy virtually eliminated Communist Party attempts to obstruct the elaboration of the Commissariat program. The Government ministers, on the other hand, were pre­ occupied with economic, fiscal and foreign affairs prob­ lems. The Prime Minister, although responsible for the Commissariat, more often than not, left atomic affairs in the hands of his official advisors—the AdministratorGeneral and the High Commissioner. During the period between 1946 and 1950, only 11 of the Atomic Energy Committee's 105 sessions were conducted under the presi­ dency of the Prime Minister or his duly appointed repre­ sentative.3 The essential function of these plenary sessions was the discussion and adoption of Commissariat pro­ grams.4 These meetings were largely formal, as the Atomic Energy Committee studied the questions involved before­ hand, and the plenary session served mainly to secure Government approval for the execution of the programs. The definition of the tasks facing French atomic develop­ ment and the elaboration of the programs necessary to meet these tasks fell on the shoulders of the CEA. What were these problems and in what manner were they resolved? FIRST PRIORITIES

France entered the postwar period with a handful of trained scientists and a limited amount of basic materials. The possibility of material or technical aid from abroad was precluded by the Anglo-American policy of total se­ crecy in atomic affairs. This policy, designed, at least in part to forestall the development of atomic weapons and their consequent spread to other nations, was ensured by parallel control over the most basic of all nuclear materials 3 Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique, Rapport d'Activite 1546-1950, pp. 64-65. * Ibid., p. 64.

THE FORMATIVE YEARS: 1946-1951

—uranium. A 1944 agreement with the de jure Belgian government gave the Anglo-American powers exclusive rights to all uranium mined in the Belgian Congo, the principal and richest source of that element in the world.® A Norwegian-American agreement assured the United States most of the heavy water produced in Norway, at that time the only nation to produce this moderator on an in­ dustrial scale. The French scientists who had participated in the Allied wartime atomic projects were placed at a dis­ advantage which was equally awkward for France: they were obligated not to divulge to France any knowledge acquired as a result of their work in British or American laboratories.® These technical and material handicaps were complemented by a financial one: the French program would have to operate on limited resources, for the economy could not support an elaborate effort so soon after the war. Success would depend on France's ability to pull herself up by her own bootstraps. The difficulties facing France in these early years were somewhat modified by other factors. The uranium oxide which had been hidden in Morocco during the war was re­ turned and put at the disposal of the scientific team of the Commissariat. It was also possible to obtain some heavy water from Norway under a prewar Franco-Norwegian contract which Norway was still prepared to honor. Thus, the Commissariat had in its possession, or at least could acquire, a small quantity of basic material with which to 8 The United States and Great Britain formed a Combined Development Agency whose objective was to purchase all available uranium which would be shared between the United States and Great Britain. A full and authoritative treatment of the American wartime atomic program may be found in Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The New World 1939-1946 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962). 6 Danielle Hunebelle, "Une Epopee de ΓApres-Guerre: l'Epanouissement de Notre Industrie Atomique," Realities, No. 155 (December, 1958), p. 110. This disadvantage was obviously illusory and was honored only in the breach. The main problem was that French scientists had not partici­ pated on the production side of the development of the first atomic bomb.

L I B E R A T I O N T O T H E F I R S T P L A N

work. More important were some less tangible assets—the high morale and indomitable will to succeed of the scien­ tists entrusted with the imposing task of building France into an atomic nation. Coupled with this was a long­ standing tradition of scientific leadership in the community of nations. The scientific entourage was built around Frederic Joliot-Curie and the nucleus of trained scientists who had worked on the Anglo-Canadian projects during the war, Lew Kowarski, Jules Gueron and Bertrand Goldschmidt. Within Commissariat circles these three men shortly became known as the Anglo-Canadian group. The wartime experience of those who had been able to continue their research in allied countries proved invalu­ able for several reasons. The continuous contact with nu­ clear research had made these men aware of the myriad technical and theoretical problems involved in the con­ struction and operation of atomic reactors. Equally im­ portant was their experience and participation in the ex­ periment of organized science which, in pursuit of the war effort, had grown out of necessity. Prior to the war, scien­ tists, while occasionally working on behalf of their gov­ ernments, had traditionally labored in the privacy of their laboratories. To many, it was a somewhat traumatic ex­ perience to be cast into large groups which were subse­ quently broken into specialized operational units much in the manner of plant assembly-line organization. The ad­ ministrative structure which accompanied this phenome­ non was also alien to the vast majority of scientists. How­ ever, the French scientists who had been through this ex­ perience were accustomed to its routine and aware of its defects and pitfalls. This helped considerably in organizing a similar operation on the smaller French scale.7 To the Atomic Energy Committee and the Anglo7 Lew Kowarski, "Psychology and Structure of Large-Scale Physical Re­ search," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v, Nos. 6-7 (June-July, 1949). 186.

T H E FORMATIVE YEARS: 1 9 4 6 - 1 9 5 1

Canadian group, the program for the immediate future was self-evident:8 the establishment of facilities which would be adequate to train a substantial body of scientists and technicians capable of dealing with a broad range of theoretical and practical problems, and the prospecting and exploitation of uranium deposits accessible to France. A simultaneous effort had to be made to induce certain spe­ cialized industrial concerns to master basic techniques so that the Commissariat would have recourse to indigenous industries for nuclear-pure materials used in atomic re­ search programs. An adequate training program for scientists and techni­ cians could be only pardy achieved in the lecture hall. Practical experience in dealing with an atomic reactor was indispensable to a full understanding of theoretical impli­ cations. The CEA, therefore, established an atomic research center at Chatillon, near Paris, with the dual purpose of providing training in nuclear physics and chemistry and serving as the site for an experimental reactor to comple­ ment and augment this instruction. In December 1948, France's first nuclear reactor, ZOE,9 went into operation at Chatillon. The CEA recruited its scientists, engineers and technicians from the universities and the grandes ecoles and trained them in nuclear physics. At the same time, it collaborated with university and industrial laboratories by providing subsidies for the study of nuclear physics. These laboratories purchased or borrowed instruments from the CEA, which also gave them supplies of radioactive isotopes for experimentation. The theoretical and practical applica­ tions of radioisotopes were studied in concert with the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique.10 By 1950, the 8An excellent general review of atomic development in France between 1946 and 1950 is to be found in several articles by Etienne Gibert, "Le CEA a Cinq Ans," Le Monde, January 20, 21, 1951. See also, "La France Produira-t-elle de l'Energie Atomique?," Perspectives, March 15, 1952. 9 ZOE stands for Zero-energie—oxyde d'uranium—eau lourde. 10 Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique, Rapport d'Activite 1946-50, p. 16.

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CEA had recruited some 250 scientists and engineers, of which 75 were members of the CEA Mining Division. This growth in the number of trained personnel enabled the Commissariat to establish a number of new services in the areas of theoretical physics, chemical-physics and technology during the course of the first four-year period.11 From its inception, the CEA had to compete with univer­ sities, and especially industrial concerns, in recruiting sci­ entists and engineers. The French educational structure has been basically oriented toward the classic tradition in which philosophy, literature and the arts are emphasized.12 As a result, only a small number of scientifically trained students are graduated each year from French schools. The allocation of the scientists between the universities, industry and the CEA has not always been favorable to the latter since it could not meet industrial salaries, though it could offer other inducements, such as advanced educational oppor­ tunity and rapid promotion. At least one observer has noted that with regard to science in general, "the bottle­ neck of our economic development is unquestionably the lack of scientists and technicians and this scarcity will be­ come even more of a problem in the future."13 Equally important to the CEA in its formative years was the acquisition of enough uranium to develop a nuclear industry and to guarantee to France an independent source of this basic nuclear material.14 Reliance on external sources would render France vulnerable to changes in the market supply and price of this element as well as to the quantita­ tive export restrictions which might be imposed by sup­ plier nations in the pursuit of foreign policy goals. To meet this problem, the CEA created a Direction de Re1 1 1bid.,

p. 21. Henri Longchambon, "Pas de Revolution Technique Sans Techniciens," Gauche Europeene, No. 29 (March, 1956), pp. 18-20. i 3 Ibid., p. 19. 14 Frederic Joliot-Curie, "La Premiere Pile Atomique Franfaise," La Pensee, No. 23, Nouvelle serie (March-April, 1949)» pp. 3-7. 12

THE FORMATIVE YEARS: 1946-1951

chcrchcs ct Exploitations Miniercs (DREM). This unit was charged with the function of systematically prospecting and exploiting metropolitan France and the French over­ seas territories. It was also given the responsibility for re­ cruiting and training engineers and technicians and of overseeing all mining operations conducted by the CEA. Within France, three main regions of potential supply were discovered—Grury, Lachaux and, in 1948, La Crouzille, which was to become a major source of uranium. Subse­ quent discoveries in the metropolitan area and in overseas territories have made France the leading uranium pro­ ducer in Western Europe.15 The final phase of the Commissariat's initial program in­ volved the establishment of contacts with French industry. This arose out of the need for specialized material and equipment for the conduct of nuclear experiments and re­ search. The security inherent in independence once again was a motivating factor. Despite the assurance from Nor­ way of a supply of heavy water, the Commissariat consid­ ered it desirable to develop the use of an alternative mode­ rator, graphite, which could be supplied by French in­ dustry. As a result, the CEA contracted with France's lead­ ing manufacturer of graphite, Pechiney, for a constant and adequate supply of nuclear-pure graphite for future reac­ tors.16 Simultaneously, new contracts were concluded with the Norwegian corporation for heavy water,17 and the pos­ sibility of French production of heavy water was taken under consideration. The Commissariat also asked heavy industry to supply structural materials suitable for use in atomic reactors. During the early years of the Commis­ sariat's existence, however, participation by private in15 Commissariat ί l'Energie Atomique, Le Commissariat & I'Energie Atomique: 1945-1960 (Paris: l'Edition Artistique, i960), p. 35; Le Monde, November 28, 1953. 16 Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique, Rapport d'Activite 1946-1950, P- 151· " Ibid., pp. 152-53.

LIBERATION TO THE FIRST PLAN

dustry in the field of nuclear energy was slight. To the ex­ tent that such participation did occur, it was basically con­ fined to the role of supplier and contractor. It is only in recent years that French industry has taken an active in­ terest in the commercial value and marketability of atomic reactors and products. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC LEADERSHIP

Throughout this initial period, the entire program was left to the discretion of the CEA—and within this organization, largely to the scientific experts. Direction by the Govern­ ment and Parliament was totally lacking, and neither the military establishment nor private industry expressed any substantial interest. The result was that the CEA operated on the margin of the political scene during its formative years. The autonomy which had been granted to it in the enabl­ ing ordinance existed in fact. The link between the Gov­ ernment and the Commissariat became even more tenuous as a result of the frequent changes of Government which were characteristic of the Fourth Republic. Twelve Gov­ ernments were invested between January 1946 and De­ cember 1950, and eight of these changes brought new men to the post of Prime Minister. This lack of continuity at the political level sharply contrasted with the constancy prev­ alent in the Commissariat and assured the top-level officials of that organization a minimum of external interference in the elaboration of the Commissariat program. The lack of Government stability was not particularly important in the early stages of the atomic energy program, for the issues to be resolved concerned the creation of a scientific and tech­ nical basis from which later programs with more farreaching implications would emanate. The great majority of problems handled by the CEA in this period pertained to administrative details, the acquisition of materials and technical-scientific affairs.18 The CEA, however, was growliIbid.,

pp. 199-207 lists the decisions taken at 47 of the 94 ordinary

T H E F O R M A T I V E Y E A R S : 1 9 4 6 - 1 9 5 1

ing accustomed to a very liberal interpretation of the con­ cepts of "freedom of action" and "autonomy," and an atti­ tude was being shaped with which later Governments found it difficult to deal. Within the Commissariat itself, a tendency toward scien­ tific supremacy began to unfold at an early date. Rivalry between the administrative and scientific services smol­ dered beneath the surface but did not affect the progress and continuity of the atomic energy program. The pre­ dominant factor underlying this development was the ag­ gressive and domineering personality of the High Com­ missioner, Joliot-Curie. It must be remembered that he had been partial to an organizational structure in which scien­ tific and administrative control would have been vested in a single individual. M. Joliot-Curie had acceded out of necessity to the bicephalous formula which was ultimately adopted, but he tended throughout his term as High Commissioner to minimize the jurisdictional limitations of his office and to consider the Commissariat in its entirety as his personal domain. The most important manifestation of Joliot-Curie's atti­ tude was at the policy-making level of the Commissariat. The low level of Government concern about atomic energy policy shifted the burden to the Commissariat, a fact which rendered control of policy within the organization all the more important. In general, the formal processes required by the instituting ordinance and the Rule of Administra­ tive Procedure, which implemented the CEA charter, were respected, but the cadre of persons involved in decision­ making was enlarged formally and informally—with the scientific branch emerging in a favored position. There is little doubt, despite the vagueness of the record, that the first phase of the Commissariat's existence was under the dominant influence of the scientific leadership. sessions of the Atomic Energy Committee. This statement is also based on interview sources.

LIBERATION TO THE FIRST PLAN

Scientific control can be explained not only by the pres­ ence of Joliot-Curie, but by the nature of the tasks facing the Commissariat. It has been stressed that most of the prob­ lems which had to be met in the formative years required a specialized scientific knowledge. Administrative decisions were based on prior scientific judgments as to the types of materials necessary, the relative costs and validity of dif­ ferent projects, the order of priorities necessary to the achievement of given ends and the recruitment of special­ ized personnel. The immediate effect of this situation was to create a principal-agent type of relationship, one in which the administrative branch rendered services to the scientific branch and deferred to the judgment and supe­ rior knowledge of the latter. The aggressive qualities of Joliot-Curie served to accentuate this relationship and to magnify the power disequilibrium between the scientific and administrative services. In the area of policy-making, this process was formalized by a number of departures from the statutory norm. The instituting ordinance of 1945 had charged the Atomic Energy Committee with the function of elaborating and controlling the programs of the Commissariat. The impli­ cation of this mandate was that the Committee would act as a sounding board for program direction and would be the forum in which Commissariat problems would be re­ solved. This six-member Committee was composed of four scientists and two non-scientists. Consequendy, as long as the scientific members maintained a solid front they would hold a clear majority on any given question. The solidarity which existed among the CEA scientists in general was largely the result of common background shared by most members of the Commissariat's scientific service. The great majority were products either of the Laboratoire de Chimie Nucleaire of the College de France which was di­ rected by Joliot-Curie himself, or the Radium Institute which

T H E F O R M A T I V E

Y E A R S : 1946-1951

was under the direction of Mme Irene Joliot-Curie.19 The dominant figure on the Committee, of course, was JoliotCurie whose almost charismatic qualities assured him the support of his fellow scientists. As a general rule, there was a strong esprit de corps among the Commissariat scientists which extended to those who were members of the Atomic Energy Committee, and which virtually eliminated fac­ tional disputes of a non-technical character in the scien­ tific service. The position of the scientists was enhanced by the crea­ tion of a Scientific Council. It had become evident to the Commissariat scientists as early as 1946 that the CEA could not operate in a vacuum and would have to establish close and functional relationships with other scientists and or­ gans external to the Commissariat. To this end, the Com­ mittee proposed the creation of a Scientific Council com­ posed of eminent scientists representing a broad range of activity. In a note to the President of the Provisional Gov­ ernment, the Administrator-General, speaking on behalf of the Atomic Energy Committee, stated that, since the first study sessions of the Committee, the Scien­ tific Commissioners have expressed the view that they cannot alone pretend to exert the full sum of energy, ac­ tivity, and knowledge that France must put at the dis­ posal of nuclear physics and its applications, and on their initiative the Committee has sought the best way of bringing together in its work the most qualified French scientists. In this sphere the Committee proposes that a certain number of savants be designated as scientific counsellors 20 of the Commissariat Government approval, a matter of formality, quickly fol19 Ε. A., "La 'Reorganisation' du C.E.A.," La Pensee, No. 35, Nouvelle serie (March-April, 1951), pp. 66-76. 20 Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique, Rapport d'Activite 1946-1950,

P- 70.

LIBERATION TO THE FIRST PLAN

lowed, and the Commissariat was vested with a Council of ten men which included many of France's most eminent scientists.21 Its function was purely advisory, but it served to add even more authority to the voice of the scientists within the Commissariat on those occasions when it was called upon. At the same time that it recommended the creation of a Scientific Council, the Atomic Energy Committee took a more far-reaching step and brought into existence a Scien­ tific Committee—or inner council—composed of the scien­ tific commissioners of the Atomic Energy Committee and three other scientists who all held key directive posts in the Commissariat; the three were the Anglo-Canadian group of MM. Kowarski, Gueron and Goldschmidt. Two other persons were eventually added to this group: Pierre Biquard, chef du cabinet and long-time friend of Joliot-Curie, and A. Berthelot, a physicist who was transferred from as­ sistant to Joliot-Curie at the College de France to head of nuclear physics at the CEA. This Committee, whose func­ tions were never officially defined and whose very exist­ ence was of an informal nature, was intended as an internal consultative organ. In fact, it met quite frequently and dis­ cussed, debated and resolved most of the questions which faced the Commissariat. In the final analysis it made practi­ cally all of the main decisions concerning the CEA and atomic energy development during the initial period. Thus, decisions were largely determined prior to being brought before the formal Atomic Energy Committee for consider­ ation. In both this inner council and in the formal Atomic En­ ergy Committee the central figure was Joliot-Curie. If major policy differences were to arise, they would most likely occur between the scientists and the Administrator-General at the level of the formal Committee, where scientific soli­ darity was already assured. Accommodation with the po2x Ibtd.;

the scientific counselors are listed on p. 73.

THE FORMATIVE YEARS: 1946-1951

sition and attitude of the Administrator-General consequendy would tend to be resolved as a matter of comity rather than as a result of the need of the scientists to defer to the wishes of the Administrator-General. The increase in the number of persons involved in the decision-making process and the inclusion of individuals other than those officially prescribed by statute is not in and of itself unusual. The opinions and judgment of un­ official advisors are frequendy resorted to both within and without Government circles. The striking feature of the broadening of the Commissariat policy-making cadre is that only one type of individual was brought into the inner councils—the scientist. As the scientists already held the numerical weight of authority on the formal policy­ making organ, the admission of even more scientists to the inner circles, rather than bringing new and divergent view points into direct confrontation at a crucial stage, could only serve to increase the disequilibrium of the Committee. It would be erroneous to conclude from the above that the Administrator-General was powerless in the face of the scientists or that the Atomic Energy Committee was merely a rubber-stamp institution in the usual sense of that term. The Administrator-General, in addition to his power of persuasion, had the ability to call upon the Prime Minister in the event of a major dispute at the Commissariat level. The Atomic Energy Committee, on the other hand, was primarily composed of the same persons who belonged to the Scientific Committee. The basic difference between them was the presence of several additional persons on the informal committee and the absence of the AdministratorGeneral and the military representative. Aside from these modifications, a core of individuals, including M. and Mme Joliot-Curie and Francis Perrin, were present at all levels of discussion and decision-making. In all, only eight or nine persons can be said to have been instrumental in

L I B E R A T I O N T O T H E F I R S T P L A N

policy development in the CEA . The weight of authority, however, rested with the scientists and especially the High Commissioner. We may conclude, then, that the existence of informal in­ stitutions in the Commissariat, while detracting from the authority of the Atomic Energy Committee, did not render that body useless. Nevertheless, the trend toward scientific leadership and control in the CEA, and of CEA influence and authority in the Government, remain characteristic of this first period of development. SCIENTISTS AND POLITICS

The minimal concern of the Government with the Com­ missariat and the tendency toward scientific supremacy within the organization itself contained dangers for the future. A situation was evolving which could have serious repercussions once the atomic energy program reached a level where policy decisions would have important domes­ tic and international implications. Reversal of these trends would become increasingly difficult as time passed and normative patterns developed, but this factor tended to be obscured by the almost exclusive concern with pure re­ search in the initial period. Even within this framework, however, there were a number of instances which illustrate the potential results of scientific supremacy within the Commissariat on the one hand, and of Commissariat in­ fluence in Governmental policy on the other. French scientists generally, and a substantial number of the Commissariat scientists in particular, inclined toward a statist economic philosophy.22 Consequently, these men 22 The scientists did not consider themselves "statists," but were so viewed by the administrative leadership. Since many scientists were either Communist or Socialist in their political affiliation, it would be reasonable to assume that they tended toward statist theories. See, Henry E. Guerlac, "Science and National Strength," Modern France: Problems of the Third and Vourth Republics, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton: Princeton Uni­ versity Press, 1951), especially pp. ioo-ioi, where, in discussing Joliot-

T H E FORMATIVE YEARS: 1 9 4 6 - 1 9 5 1

were concerned lest private industry control or exercise a dominant influence over the development of atomic energy. Even though many of these scientists were not militantly statist, they still desired to keep the CEA small and to either minimize industrial contacts or to exercise close surveil­ lance over such relationships as might develop. Some, like M. Joliot-Curie, were members of the Communist Party; others were sympathetic to the views and programs of the non-Communist Left. In either case they were cautious about CEA-industrial relationships. The most direct link be­ tween the CEA and private industry was the SecretaryGeneral whose job it was, in part, to establish contacts with industry for the provision of materials necessary to the atomic program and to negotiate contracts subject to the approval of the Atomic Energy Committee. The first Sec­ retary-General, Leon Denivelle, a personal friend of JoliotCurie, was closely associated with private industry and, in the view of the scientists, personified the danger of indus­ trial penetration of the CEA. There was also some feeling that M. Denivelle was not satisfactorily carrying out his duties. A number of top scientists, among them the AngloCanadian group, sought his removal, and in 1948 he was replaced by Rene Lescop, an engineer and former civil servant. Although the scientists were unable to successfully control the selection of Denivelle's successor, their ability to secure his removal exemplified the weight of scientific in­ fluence in the Commissariat.23 More important in terms of over-all policy orientation was the role played by the Commissariat in influencing the Curie's control over the recovery of French science in the postwar period, Guerlac notes that "the postwar scientific program in France, while by no means the work of the Socialists alone, is colored an ineluctable pink." 23 The failure of the scientists to control the appointment of a successor to the office of Secretary-General was the result of Dautry's insistence that as Administrator-General he should play an important role in the selection of personnel who were not, strictly speaking, in the scientific service of the CEA. The matter was not of sufficient importance to Joliot-Curie for the latter to contest this claim.

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"peaceful purposes" statement made by M. Parodi on be­ half of France before the United Nations in June 1946. The "peaceful purposes only" statement, although presented as the policy set by the French Government, was suggested and prepared by the Atomic Energy Committee.24 While it is not unusual for administrative and advisory bodies to aid Governments in establishing policy objec­ tives, this event indicates the role of the CEA in framing French atomic policy. The peaceful purposes formula was proposed to the Government in March 1946, and the latter adopted it without any change. It may be suggested that the policy declaration was the only rational course France could then hope to pursue. It was expedient in terms of creating good will in the international community and in setting the stage for possible American material and tech­ nical atomic aid; it was realistic in terms of French atomic potential for at least a decade to come. It is nonetheless true that Government reliance on the views and attitudes of the Commissariat—in this case its scientific cadre—did not stop at the purely technical boundary but extended into more basic political areas. There were, of course, limits to just how far CEA officials could go in shaping major policy, as Joliot-Curie was to discover in 1950. COMMUNISM AND THE CEA: THE JOLIOT-CURIE CASE

A number of substanial differences existed between MM. Joliot-Curie and Dautry.25 Among them were questions of political orientation and conflict of personality. But from the very beginning of the Commissariat's work, a deeper schism existed which revolved around the divergent views they entertained concerning the prospective applications of 24 Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique, Rapport d'Activite 1946-1950, p. 8. 25 VObservateur, No. 45, February 15, 1951, notes that Dautry "suc­ ceeded in alienating most of the Commissariat specialists by his autoritarisme nuance de paterndisme and his incomprehension of the scientific mentality."

THE FORMATIVE YEARS: 1946-1951

atomic energy. M. Joliot-Curie, like many scientists, was committed to the principle of banning atomic weapons and of concentrating exclusively on the peaceful applica­ tions of atomic power. M. Dautry, while not purposefully seeking a military orientation in nuclear research and de­ velopment, entertained a more open-minded approach to the future of the French atomic energy program. This bi­ furcation of views was, in general, reflected in the respec­ tive services of the Commissariat. The scientists were in basic accord with the High Commissioner, and the ad­ ministrators maintained at least a noncommital attitude to­ ward military uses of atomic energy. Cognizant that a fail­ ure to articulate the peaceful purposes policy could lead to increased interest in military applications of atomic power, Joliot-Curie tended to reassert this orientation at frequent intervals within and without the Commissariat. This con­ trast of views, however, was essentially limited to the level of theoretical discussion, and there was a conspicuous lack of any concrete effort in the Government, Commissariat or military to orient research toward military ends at this time. As in the case of most decisions concerning atomic energy in these early years, the selection of possible courses of action was limited by the practical capacities of the CEA.

M. Joliot-Curie's appointment to the post of High Com­ missioner had received the universal applause of the French scientific community. Conversely, his membership in the Communist Party had been a disquieting factor out­ side scientific circles, especially to the more conservative po­ litical elements. Long before Joliot-Curie was to take a con­ troversial position on the orientation of atomic policy, he aroused the ire of conservative members of Parliament, among them Paul Reynaud and Maurice Petsche. In 1947, a reaction to the growing external and internal threat of communism began to crystallize. In May 1947, the Ramadier Government dismissed its Communist ministers,

LIBERATION T O T H E FIRST P L A N

MM. Thorez, Billoux and Tillon, an event which marked the end of tripartisme and opened the floodgates of con­ sistent parliamentary obstruction and opposition by the Communist Party. The general strike of November 1947, led by the Communist-dominated Confederation General du Travail [CGT], and corresponding demonstrations and riots over wage and price policy, together with the success­ ful Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, tended to fire an anti-Communist crusade in France. The political isolation of the Communist Party abruptly shifted the political fulcrum away from the Left and gave greater authority to the conservative voices in Parliament. As a re­ sult, by early 1948, Parliamentary reaction to the presence of Communists in high-ranking Government and admin­ istrative positions began to take shape. The growing concern about Communist control or in­ fluence in key positions was brought into the open in March 1948 by Henri Monnet, an RGR member of the Na­ tional Defense Committee of the Council of the Republic.26 M. Monnet sought to amend the CEA budget by reducing its authorizations and credits by one million francs on the grounds that in the CEA, and in other public scientific es­ tablishments such as the OiEce Nationale d'Etudes et de Recherche Aeronautiques (ONERA), "one finds at the con­ trols representatives, avowed or otherwise, of a political party . . . whose thinking shows a disturbing synchronism with that of Stalinist Russia. . . ."27 The CEA was singled out not only because it was there that Communist Party affiliation existed at the highest echelon of authority, but 26The Neiv Yor\ Times, March 19, 1948, referred to M. Monnet as a member of the RPF at this time. 27 France, Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires, Conseil de la Republique, No. 26, March 19, 1948, p. 807. (This source hereafter cited as J.O., C.R.) The ONERA was created under the direction of M. Tillon, a Communist minister, and contained a number of Communists.

THE FORMATIVE YEARS: 1946-1951

also because of the conviction that scientific research and national defense were closely related. With respect to the latter correlation, M. Monnet challenged the Government, stating: "You have not put at the head of your great com­ mittees a Communist president. You have not put at the head of your army a Communist general-staff. I ask you not to put at the head of scientific research, which interests in the first instance the national defense, Communist oper­ ators."28 The amendment was rejected by a vote of 83 to 79, with more than 150 members not voting. The reasoning underlying this rejection was expressed by a spokesman for the Socialist Party: not only was there no reason to doubt that Joliot-Curie was a Frenchman first who knew the dif­ ference between his action as a militant and as an expert responsible for national defense, but the suggested action would do little more than create the "obsession of espio­ nage and treason."29 Clearly the sense of the Council was against the instigation of a political purge at this time. The growing tension of the Cold War, manifested by over-all Soviet policy, the Prague coup and the Berlin Blockade, evoked the necessity of Western solidarity. In 1948, the Brussels Pact was signed, and in 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created. In the midst of these events France succeeded in completing its first ex­ perimental atomic reactor, ZOE. To France's allies, the disquieting aspect of this development was not that this suc­ cess demonstrated French capacity to create an atomic in­ dustry, or eventually, atomic weapons. It was, rather, the continuation of the French policy of free and open pub­ lication of the results of nuclear research while the AngloAmerican nations, in an attempt to retard Soviet progress toward the development of an atomic bomb, were vigi­ lantly pursuing a policy of total secrecy on the publication is Ibid., 28

p. 808. Ibid., p. 810.

LIBERATION T O T H E FIRST PLAN

of nuclear information. The presence of a Communist in the post of High Commissioner of Atomic Energy, and the lack of a French policy establishing requirements of po­ litical reliability for personnel engaged in nuclear research, increased Allied anxiety over the implications of French atomic development.30 At an Anglo-American press conference in January 1949, Joliot-Curie attempted to satisfy any apprehensions which may have existed in the French Government by stating that the results of nuclear research capable of contributing to an atomic weapons program would be kept secret "as long as arms of mass destruction such as the atomic bomb are not oudawed by the United Nations."31 To clarify his view of his public trust as High Commissioner, Joliot-Curie added: "A French Communist, like any other French citi­ zen, occupying a post confided to him by the Government could not honestly contemplate communicating to a for­ eign power, any foreign power, results which do not be­ long to him but are the property of the collectivity which has enabled him to work."82 These declarations, however, did not allay the fears of Anglo-American observers who, considering Soviet atomic potential in the light of France's bootstrap operation, continued to raise the question of the retention of Joliot-Curie as High Commissioner.33 The Government's failure to remove the regulation of informa­ tion publication from the discretion of the scientific leader ioTime, December 27, 1948, p. 27; Time, May 8, 1950, p. 24; News­ week, May 8, 1950, p. 34. The Brussels Pact between the Benelux countries, France and Great Britain bound all participants to carefully guard military information; see France Dimanche, January 9, 1949. This obligation could be rendered ineffective with a Communist at the head of the CEA. "France on the Atomic Trail," The Economist, January 15, 1949, pp. 108-109. slJournal de Genhve, January 12, 1949. 32Ibid. Two months later, a CEA staff member was arrested during the course of a Government inquiry into Communist leaks of secret defense information. New Yorkk Times, March 4, 1949. ssNew Yorl^ Herald Tribune, January 18, 1949; New York Herald Tribune, February 3, 1949.

THE FORMATIVE YEARS: 1946-1951

of the Commissariat is indicative of the deference accorded to the latter by the politically responsible leaders.34 During the year following these declarations of loyalty, Joliot-Curie's attitude shifted radically and politics began to play an increasingly important role in the life of the High Commissioner. This trend became publicly manifest in April 1950, when, at the Communist Party National Convention at Gennevilliers, Joliot-Curie declared that, "never will progressive scientists, never will Communist scientists give a particle of their knowledge for a war against the Soviet Union. And we shall stand fast, upheld by our conviction that by so doing we are saving France and all humanity."35 The High Commissioner had also been participating as a militant partisan in Communist-led organizations, among them the World Federation of Sci­ entific Workers, of which he was President, and the World Peace Congress. M. Joliot-Curie further endorsed a Com­ munist Party resolution calling on workers to refuse to make or transport arms for atomic war.36 It is not clear exactly what inspired Joliot-Curie to change his position. The conspicuous absence in the Com­ munist press of any reports of Joliot-Curie's January 1949 press conference led some commentators to conclude that his declarations were unacceptable to the Communist Party and that the latter forced the High Commissioner to adopt a more acceptable position.87 It is probable that some meas­ ures were taken to censure him for his declaration that it was tantamount to treason to convey information to for­ eign nations, but it is equally unlikely that the Party wanted to jeopardize his position at this time unless some political capital could be gleaned from such action. 84 The general question of secrecy is treated by Etienne Gibert, "Discre­ tion Volontaire et Secrets Industriels," Le Monde, January 21, 1951. ssNew York, Times, April 29, 1950. 3i New Yor^ Times, April 7, 1950. 87 A number of Joliot-Curie's close associates were also of the opinion that the Party was exerting pressure on him at least to modify these statements. See also, Journal de Geneve, May 6, 1950.

L I B E R A T I O N T O T H E F I R S T P L A N

It may also be suggested that Joliot-Curie's action was in part a response to international developments, in part a re­ action to certain tendencies which were germinating in the Commissariat. The French decision to participate in the North Adantic Treaty Organization was opposed by the French Communist Party, for the Atlantic Community had been established in answer to aggressive Soviet tendencies once the concept of United Nations collective security proved to be ineffective. Quite probably Joliot-Curie feared that the United States (as senior partner in the Alliance) and the more conservative elements in France would ma­ nipulate French atomic energy organization in a manner antithetical to the political commitments he entertained. Indeed, one of the basic apprehensions of French Com­ munists was that France's atomic resources would be placed at the disposal of the United States, not that French participation in the North Atlantic Organization would lead to the production of French atomic weapons.38 Within the CEA, the scientific service had begun to sus­ pect a growing interest in a military orientation after Rene Lescop replaced Leon Denivelle as Secretary-General. M. Lescop, who had been the choice of Dautry, was a grad­ uate of the EcoIe Polytechnique and politically leaned to the Right. The Ecole Poly technique, prior to World War II, had been one of the principal sources for the Army Engineer Corps, but after the war many more polytechniciens entered the Government service or private industry as administrators than entered the military service. M. Dautry had been partial to Lescop perhaps in the expectation that a classic administrative-type person would strengthen the position of the administrative service in its relation with the scientists. But to many CEA scientists M. Lescop repre­ sented more than the simple threat of a reversion to the 38E-A., La Pensee, No. 35, Nouvelle serie (March-April, 1951), p. 70; Etienne Fajon, "La Lutte pour l'interdiction de I'Arme Atomique," Cahiers du Communisms, No. 6 (June, 1950), p. 11.

T H E F O R M A T I V E YEARS: 1 9 4 6 - 1 9 5 1

classic administrative pattern with its implication of re­ duced scientific autonomy; for as long as Joliot-Curie re­ mained High Commissioner this sort of realignment would meet powerful resistance. What did concern the scientists was M. Lescop's appreciation for military appli­ cations of atomic energy and his penchant for atomic industrial growth, a penchant shared by the AdministratorGeneral. In 1948 and 1949, however, this possibility was mainly speculative, and as long as Joliot-Curie remained in the CEA, M. Lescop took no steps to secure a change of priorities in the atomic development program. The Government failed to respond immediately to Joliot-Curie's Gennevilliers statements, but in the National Assembly a request to interpellate the Government on the Joliot-Curie case was tabled by M. Legendre, an RPF deputy. Whether the domestic pressure to remove JoliotCurie from his post was reinforced by suggestions from Washington, as alleged in the Communist and nonCommunist left-wing press,39 remains a moot question; but on April 28, 1950, the Bidault Government issued a decree relieving Joliot-Curie of his functions on the ground of fundamental incompatibility between the duties of his office and the tenor of his public statements.40 Two other incidents which occurred during the previous half-year undoubtedly influenced M. Bidault's decision to terminate the High Commissioners's mandate: the success­ ful detonation of a Soviet atomic bomb and the arrest and conviction of the British scientist Klaus Fuchs for passing atomic secrets to the Kremlin. The security questions raised by the Fuchs case were reflected in even sharper tones in the matter of JoIiot-Curie. If espionage activities 39

Liberation, April 29, 1950; Combat, April 29, 1950. France, Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires, Assemblee Nationale, No. 49, May io, 1950, p. 3,384. M. Bidault read the letter o£ dismissal he sent to M. Joliot-Curie to the chamber. (This source hereafter cited as J.O.rd-N.) See also, VAnnee Politique: 1950 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1951), pp. 73, 286. 40

LIBERATION T O T H E F I R S T P L A N

could be carried on by persons working under conditions of tight security regulation, how much greater the chance of information passing out of a country which not only lacked security measures with regard to personnel working on atomic projects, but also left the direction of its atomic energy commission in the hands of an outspoken Commu­ nist Party militant? The Government's action was endorsed by all the mem­ bers of the National Assembly except the Communists. The Socialist Party, which in 1948 had refused to support the Monnet amendment in the Council of the Republic, re­ versed its position and now reprimanded the Government for not having intervened immediately after the Gennevilliers statements.41 In justifying the Government's action be­ fore the National Assembly, Prime Minister Bidault flady denied the charge of external interference and pressure, a charge which stemmed from the release of 70 billion francs of Marshall Aid by the United States three days after the termination of Joliot-Curie's mandate.42 He also stressed the point that the Commissariat was under the rigorous control of the Government.48 That M. Bidault felt constrained to emphasize Government control over the CEA would seem to indicate that the Government had not been greatly con­ cerned with the operations of the CEA during the preceding four years. The removal of Joliot-Curie was not an isolated incident. The end of tripartisme saw the beginnings of a trend to­ ward the elimination of Communists from important posts in the Government and administration as well as in the nationalized industries which had been liberally staffed with Communists in 1945 and 1946. This practice became more marked as East-West relations deteriorated and the po41 l-O.yA.N., No. 49, May 10, 1950, p. 3,382. Jean Le Bail spoke on behalf of the Socialist Party. 42 Ibid., p. 3,383. 43 Ibid., p. 3,384.

T H E FORMATIVE

YEARS: 1 9 4 6 - 1 9 5 1

litical fulcrum in France moved toward the Right. As evi­ denced by the Monnet amendment of February 1948, par­ liamentary concern with the presence of Communists in key scientific positions antedated the Joliot-Curie incident.44 The French counterpart of the McCarthy period in the United States, however, had not yet taken hold, and be­ tween February 1948 and Joliot-Curie's removal in April 1950, only a few Communist scientists were dismissed from their posts. Immediately preceding the Government's ac­ tion against Joliot-Curie, there had been a mild purge of the Office Nationale d'Etudes et de Recherche Aeronautiques, and Georges Tessier, Communist director of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, was relieved of his duties.45 There was therefore reason to believe that Joliot-Curie's mandate, which expired in January 1951, would not have been renewed even in the absence of provo­ cation. The debate based on M. Lengendre's interpellation con­ cerning Joliot-Curie's public statements at the Gennevilliers Conference, and a Communist deputy's interpellation of the Government concerning the High Commissioner's dismissal, did not raise the question of a full-scale purge of Communist personnel from public scientific organiza­ tions.46 The position of the non-Communist deputies in the Assembly during this debate was essentially limited to con­ cern over Joliot-Curie's defiant position with regard to an as yet unarticulated Government policy to engage in a nu­ clear weapons program. The Communist deputies argued that internal and external forces were seeking to lead the program in the direction of atomic weapons and that this was the basic motivation for discharging the High Com­ missioner. Thus, debate was focused on the action of a single individual rather than on a matter of general prin44

J.O.,C.R., No. 26, March 19, 1948, pp. 807-12. L'Annee Politique: 7950, p. 73. * e ] . 0 . N o . 49, May to, 1950, pp. 3,378-88. 45

L I B E R A T I O N

T O

T H E

F I R S T

P L A N

ciple which involved all of the public scientific institutions at all levels of authority. The Joliot-Curie case had repercussions, for between his dismissal and the public announcement in late 1951 by Secretary of State for Atomic Affairs, Felix Gaillard, of a Five Year Plan for atomic development, the question of purging the Commissariat of its Communist members and sympathizers assumed greater proportions. The increasing strength of the Right in the National Assembly at the turn of the decade, and their good showing in the elections of June 1951, meant that Governments of the day would have to take cognizance of right-wing demands if their policies were to be effective. Generally speaking, appeals for a purge of the CEA took place during budget debates dealing with administrative costs and equipment funds for that or­ ganization rather than during debates specifically devoted to removing Communists from Government posts. During a debate on rearmament in December 1950, M. Frederic-Dupont, an RPF deputy who was a blend of Senator McCarthy and Charles Maurras, asserted the need for a general purge in those scientific services which related to national defense. Although the charge was general in nature and encompassed organs other than the CEA, the latter was the focal point of Frederic-Dupont's attack. M. Dupont claimed, as he was to do on many subsequent occasions, that the Chatillon center of the CEA was "honey­ combed" with Communists and that as of December 1950 more than 50 per cent of the engineers and scientists lo­ cated at this major atomic center adhered to the Commu­ nist ideology. He was concerned that France had promoted "no serious purge," had taken no steps to eliminate Com­ munists from the atomic energy program when France's allies had already done so.47 Several days later, the Govern­ ment indirecdy responded to Dupont when Jules Moch, 47

J.O.S.tN., No. 147, December 30, 1950, p. 9,781.

T H E F O R M A T I V E YEARS: 1 9 4 6 - 1 9 5 1

Minister of Defense, stated before the Council of the Re­ public that, for the command posts in the two areas of authority and security there is incompatibility between obedience to foreign orders and the occupation of those posts On the other hand, for other workers one can only require that they do not mix their political opinions with their professional activities.48 As of 1951, therefore, parliamentary interest in the ques­ tion of the relationship between responsible State positions and political affiliation had begun to take shape. During 1951 and 1952, the Government was to be continually faced with the decision of just how far it was necessary to go in dismissing members of the CEA on grounds of membership in the Communist Party. The final solution of the problem was left in the hands of the administrative service of the Commissariat. The Government decision to remove Joliot-Curie was not well received in either domestic or foreign scientific circles. Many American scientists considered this action "the greatest possible folly" since it eliminated an irre­ placeable man and the driving force of the French atomic program. These same men contended that his dismissal would in no way open up Franco-American atomic co­ operation, especially in the area of military applications, because France lacked the material and technical means to play an effective role.49 Within the French Commissariat, thirteen leading scientists of all political persuasions, pub­ licly declared their solidarite with Joliot-Curie and stated that "the future of the Commissariat cannot be dissociated from the person of its creator whom no scientific or tech­ nical personality is qualified to replace.... We consider the decision just taken as regrettable and heavy with conse48

].0.,C.R„ No. 1, January 5, 1951, p. 39. May 4, 1950.

t3LObservateur,

LIBERATION T O T H E F I R S T P L A N

quences for the future of atomic energy in France."50 Out­ side the scientific community, however, French public opinion, exclusive of the extreme Left, regarded the re­ moval of the High Commissioner as the only possible re­ course available to the Government.51 For Le Figaro, which had long been asking whether the Government would continue to allow public figures to take positions such as Joliot-Curie's without any sanctions, the importance of the decision was its indication that the Government finally had resolved the problem of incompatibility between member­ ship in a party which took its orders from a foreign nation and the exercise of functions related to the security of the State.52 The most profound effect of M. Joliot-Curie's dismissal was in the Commissariat itself where morale was torn by the event. No successor was appointed until April 1952, and the year following the High Commissioner's depar­ ture was characterized by a malaise which virtually brought Commissariat work to a standstill.53 M. Joliot-Curie had been the binding force of the scientific service of the CEA. He had provided the spirit and drive which led to the rapid progress of the formative years. His removal signified not only the loss of scientific leadership but of scientific pre­ eminence in policy-making as well. The Atomic Energy Committee functioned only sporadically and without a sense of direction. It operated from May 1950 to May 1951 as litde more than a caretaker organ which, together with some of Joliot-Curie's "inner council" and the SecretaryGeneral, managed the unproductive daily affairs of the Commissariat.54 The lack of scientific direction was ampli50

Informations-Presse, No. 204, April 29, 1950. Journal de Genive, May 6, 1950. 82Ltf Figaro, April 29, 1950. i3VObservateur, No. 41, January 18, 1951; "Rapport present^ par 107 inginieurs et cadres de ChStiIlon et du Bouchet, Rapport sur Ie Probleme du CEA, 1951" (in the files of the CEA). 84Marcel RoubauIt in Le Monde, March 7, 1951; VObservateur, No. 41, January 18, 1951. 61

T H E FORMATIVE YEARS: 1946-1951

fied by Dautry's dismissal of the advisory Scientific Coun­ cil in January 1951. Since this Council had never had more than a passing significance, it may be assumed that its dis­ solution by the Administrator-General was designed to symbolize the authority of the administration of the CEA. The atmosphere in the Commissariat was even further clouded by the fear of a political purge on the part of Joliot-Curie's personal and political associates. This fear soon materialized. THE POLITICS OF REORGANIZATION

The months following the dismissal of Joliot-Curie were months of transition for the Commissariat. The end of sci­ entific control which accompanied the High Commission­ er's departure did not leave a permanent vacuum but in­ stead cleared the way for the assertion of a new set of forces. The new balance was codified in the Reorganiza­ tion Act of January 3, 1951.56 The reorganization, which was planned, elaborated and carried out by Rene Lescop and Raoul Dautry, but mainly by the former, sought to re­ dress the balance of power within the Commissariat and subordinate the scientific service to the administration in fact and in law. Without the obstinate leadership of JoliotCurie, the scientists were incapable of stemming the tide. Lescop, furthermore, sought support for reorganization at the Government level and received it from Maurice Bourges-Maunoury, Secretary of State for Atomic Energy. The Government, embarrassed by the Joliot-Curie affair which had required a public reassertion of political control and authority over the Commissariat, willingly lent support to a plan designed to strengthen the ties between the Govern55 Decret No. 51-7 du 3 janvier 1951 portant modification de l'Ordonnance du 18 octobre 1945 instituant un Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique, J.O., Lois et Decrets, January 4, 1951, p. 164. (Hereafter cited as Decret No. 51-7, /.O.)

L I B E R A T I O N T O T H E F I R S T P L A N

ment and the leadership in the CEA. Despite the alliance be­ tween the CEA and the Government, the entire reorganiza­ tion was conducted by Lescop and not by the political authorities who promulgated the reorganization decree in January 1951. Administrative reliance on political power forced the scientific service of the Commissariat into a defensive po­ sition from which it could extricate itself only by seeking political aid to counterbalance the administrative branch's drive for power. While Lescop relied on BourgesMaunoury of the Radical Party, Francis Perrin, the new scientific leader, appealed to the Socialist Party's Minister of Defense, Jules Moch. The scientific-political link, how­ ever, was not as aggressive or well organized as the ad­ ministrative-political link and did not manifest itself as a force to be contended with until it appeared that Lescop's Government supporters intended to politicize the new Atomic Energy Committee. The scientific members of the Commissariat, though unable or unprepared to prevent the reorganization, were still important enough to affect the implementation of the new provisions. The reorganization of 1951, while not touching the basic characteristics of bicephalism and autonomy, "consecrated the guardianship of the scientists to the administrators"58 and prepared the way for the administrative leadership and control which was to typify the life of the Commissariat during the next decade. The membership of the Committee was increased to ten and its composition modified to in­ clude high civil servants and representatives of industry. Whereas the original ordinance provided for an Atomic Energy Committee on which "three persons qualified by their work relative to atomic energy"57 would sit along with a High Commissioner, the new formula stipulated that "four persons qualified by their competence in science or 5eEtienne 57Decret

Gibert in L'Observateur, May 10, 1951. No. 51-7, J.O., January 4, 1951, p. 164, Article 2.

T H E FORMATIVE YEARS: 1946-1951

industry of which one will exercise the functions of High Commissioner"58 would be on the Committee.69 In addition to the Administrator-General (whose position was now su­ perior to that of the High Commissioner in the Ordinance's rank order of Committee members), the director of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique and the mili­ tary representative, the Committee was also to include "three high civil servants chosen by the Premier."60 The ac­ cord of the Ministers of National Education and Industrial Production in the selection of Committee personnel was no longer necessary; nor was the countersignature of the Minister of Finance required in the selection of the Ad­ ministrator-General. The Commissariat had never been the subject of ministerial-level disputes. Now that an ad­ ministrative orientation was taking place, the Commissar­ iat hierarchy may have felt that other administrations as­ sociated in some measure with atomic affairs might seek to bring the Commissariat more within the classic administra­ tive tradition. By eliminating this ministerial influence at the organizational level, the CEA would be in a better posi­ tion to safeguard its theoretical autonomy. The new Committee was to be presided over by the Pre­ mier, or the Minister or Secretary of State designated by him, or, in their absence, the Administrator-General; it was to operate "in conformity with the general directives of the Government."61 The latter provision was clearly designed to rectify a situation that the Government and Commissariat administration realized had not existed dur­ ing the initial period of operation. It also appeared as an a posteriori reaction to Joliot-Curie's defiant position at Gennevilliers and was thus to serve as a warning to the is Ibid. 88 This phraseology was indicative of the lesser significance accorded to the High Commissioner who would no longer be distinguished from the rest of the scientists in so far as his appointment was concerned. eoDicret No. 51-7, J.0., January 4, 1951, p. 164, Article 2. «1 Ibid.

LIBERATION TO THE FIRST PLAN

Commissariat scientists that they were agents of a higher authority. The second feature of the 1951 reorganization was the institution of a Scientific Council which was essentially a carry-over of the body which had existed on a less formal basis during the first period. The new Council was to be comprised of no more than fifteen persons selected by the Premier "because of their competence"; they would serve for a three-year term.®2 Unlike the original Council, the new body was dressed with some formal powers: the Com­ mittee was expected to consult it on the study and research program of the Commissariat, and members of the Coun­ cil were qualified to give advice on scientific questions sub­ mitted to them. It was to meet whenever necessary but at least once every three months. The Council remained, nevertheless, basically an advisory organ. The Rule of Public Administration which elaborated the CEA ordinance and specifically defined the functions of the Committee, the Administrator-General and the High Commissioner was simultaneously amended to comply with the ordinance revisions. The Administrator-General, who now presided over the Committee on the conditions indicated above, could exercise a tie-breaking vote and after presiding over a Committee decision, could request the Premier to reexamine the question at hand.63 More im­ portant, however, was the provision that the Administra­ tor-General no longer had to receive the approval of the High Commissioner in the revocation of contracts of sci­ entific and technical personnel.64 Even greater power was subsequently vested in the Administrator-General in this respect when the Personnel Protocol of the Commissariat was amended to provide that "any refusal to carry out a specific task in the framework of his functions constitutes 62

Ibid., Article 4.

83Decret fii Jbid.,

No. 51-863 du 9 juillet 1951, ).0., July n, 1951, p. 7,340. Article 3.

THE

FORMATIVE YEARS: 1946-1951

a serious error resulting in an annulment of the contract."65 This clause served as the basis for the elimination of po­ litically undesirable elements in the Commissariat subse­ quent to the initial purge of Joliot-Curie and several of his closest associates. In essence, the refusal of a scientist to carry out research which had military implication could and did result in the immediate termination of his con­ tract. This clause was put into effect over the objection of the personnel unions in the CEA, including the CGT which represented two-thirds of the workers in the scientific serv­ ice.66 The ipuration of the Commissariat deprived France of the services of a number of atomic physicists. Even prior to the reorganization, the Government, working through M. Dautry (who had been reappointed AdministratorGeneral in January 1951) and M. Lescop, sought to clean its atomic house. A number of key scientists such as M. Orcel, Chef du Service Mineralogique, as well as some engineers and technicians, were relieved of their posts. The weeding-out process continued through 1956, but the major purge took place in 1951 and 1952 and was directed at Communists holding important positions and at persons who could exercise influence in the scientific-technical service, such as the head of the CGT union in the Commis­ sariat.67 Implementation of the reorganization formula was diffi­ cult. In large measure the difficulty resulted from a political struggle at high Government levels over the staffing of the new Atomic Energy Committee.68 Although the reorgani­ zation formula had been announced in January 1951, it was 65 Riglement Interieure, Article 63. This is an unpublished document supplied by a qualified member of the CEA. ββ L'Observateur, May 4, 1950. 67 Le Monde, February 5, 1951, notes that among those relieved of their posts in the CEA were the Secretary-General, M. Allard, and the Assistant Secretary-General, M. Bretonneau, of the CGT union in the CEA. es Marcel Roubault, Le Monde, March 7, 1951; L'Observateur, Febru­ ary 15, 1951; Le Monde, April 7, 1951.

LIBERATION TO THE FIRST PLAN

not until April of that year that the membership of the Committee was finally determined. The political fulcrum had long since decidedly shifted to the Right, and no Gov­ ernment could hope to survive without the support of the Conservatives and Radicals in the National Assembly. From the little evidence available, it appears that some members of the Government and the CEA were attempting to give a political configuration to the Atomic Energy Committee. The issue developed most decisively around the tentative appointment of Henri Lafond, former Minis­ ter of Energy in the Vichy Government, director of nu­ merous mining corporation boards and President of the Conseil National du Patronat Fran^ais (CNPF). The strong objections of the prospective High Commissioner, Francis Perrin, to M. Lafond—on the grounds of Lafond's Vichyite background and the nature of private interests which he represented—led to speculation that Pierre Ricard, vicepresident of the Conseil National du Patronat Fran^ais, would be chosen for the position.69 At this time it appeared that political equilibrium would be maintained by the ad­ dition of the president of the Confederation General du Travail-Force Ouvriere (CGT-FO), Leon Jouhaux, to the Committee.70 It is probable that the tendency toward politi­ cal infusion was being championed by Lescop and Bourges-Maunoury, while the feeling against this development was being fostered by M. Perrin with the support of Min­ ister of Defense Jules Moch. It was through the latter that Perrin had interceded, with the threat of resignation, on the question of Henri Lafond. The situation was further complicated by the attempt of Lescop and Dautry to con­ vince the Government that the right-wing and allegedly military-minded scientist, Jean Thibaud, should be placed on the Committee.71 M. Perrin and the other scientists re69 Le Monde, February 18-19, 1951. •"> Ibid. 71 L'Observateur, February 15, 1951.

T H E F O R M A T I V E YEARS: 1 9 4 6 - 1 9 5 1

acted with equal vigor to this potential development. They finally succeeded in their campaign, and both the manage­ ment and labor candidates were dropped from considera­ tion for Committee posts. New forces had gained a foot­ hold in the Committee, however, for scientific representation was reduced to three out of ten, and one scientist, Yves Rocard, was amenable to large-scale development, and eventually to an atomic weapons program.72 The removal of Joliot-Curie left a vacuum in the CEA. Due to the bicephalous system upon which that organiza­ tion was based, it was only natural that the administration would step into the breach. The existence of administrative parity with, or administrative subordination to, scientific leadership was alien to French tradition. Administrators, wedded to the classic tradition of administrative control, seized the opportunity offered by the Joliot-Curie affair to turn the Commissariat back into the more familiar pattern. MM. Lescop and Dautry were the leaders of this crusade, but they could not fully succeed in reducing the power of the scientists within the Commissariat without some out­ side support. The necessary strategy was to turn to the Government in order to acquire an official imprimatur for redressing the balance of power in the CEA. Politically the move was well timed. The growing hos­ tility between the Communists and the other political forces in France, as well as the increasing tension of EastWest relations in general, led the Western democracies to take firmer steps to assure the security of their nations. Within France, the existence of a strong Communist Party had implied the necessity of cautious action on the part of the Government. As the Communists became further alien­ ated from the Government and Parliament, the position of the right wing improved, and as early as 1948 their sup72 Prior to 1951, M. Rocard was connected in an advisory capacity with the Marine de guerre. VObservateur, No. 45, February 15, 1951.

LIBERATION TO THE FIRST PLAN

port of, if not participation in, cabinets became necessary to the survival of Governments which formed around the nucleus of center parties. As right-wing support became necessary, so too did response to right-wing views and policies which, in the matter of removal of Communists from high-ranking positions of responsibility, harmonized with the changing views of the Socialists and Christian Democrats. Under these circumstances it was not difficult for the CEA'S administrative leadership to find adequate support at the political level. Matters were even further facilitated by the fact that their main political supporter, BourgesMaunoury, was of the same educational background and political persuasion as Lescop. The Joliot-Curie case had brought into relief the laxity of Government control over and participation in the functions and policies of the Com­ missariat. Consequendy, it was necessary for the Govern­ ment to reassert its control over this institution; thus, a further rationale was provided for like-minded individuals in both the Government and CEA to join forces in a com­ mon endeavor. The administrative leaders of the CEA had found potent support in their campaign to reverse the tendency of scientific supremacy in the policy-making proc­ ess within the Commissariat. The Government, on the other hand, found in the reorganization scheme a vehicle through which it could reassert its authority. The administrative-scientific struggle which began at the institutional level became progressively politicized as the contestants sought support at the political level and even­ tually transferred the problem to their political allies. The necessity of asserting the ultimate control of the Govern­ ment over the CEA expedited the response of Government officials to the appeal of their administrative allies. The ancillary purge of the Communist Party militants and fellow travelers from the ranks of the CEA, while not calcu­ lated to do so, was sure to win the approval of the Right

THE FORMATIVE YEARS: 1946-1951

and to remove at least one pretext for bringing down a Government. It must also be remembered that Parliament annually voted the appropriations of the Commissariat, and it is clear that by 1950 an amendment such as the one pro­ posed by Henri Monnet in 1948 would have elicited a fav­ orable response. In this context it would have been politically dangerous for a Government to continue to give unqualified support to some of the more prominent Communists in the CEA.

Finally, it is not unreasonable to assume that French politicians were aware of, and responsive to, criticism which had been raised by their Anglo-American allies con­ cerning the retention of Communists in sensitive posts. This probably reflects more how the French perceived American policy than actual overtures made to the Gov­ ernment by Washington. The opinion of the American scientists interviewed by LObservateurli—that it was irra­ tional to assume that American technical or material atomic aid would be forthcoming on the basis of a CEA shakeup—suggests one way in which the Government ac­ tion was viewed from outside and, perhaps, by some French officials. French action was more probably affected by the unarticulated fear that other forms of aid, military or economic, might suffer if France did not remove JoliotCurie and his compatriots. Organizational disputes and political factors do not, however, fully account for the re­ organization of the Commissariat. To understand the total aspect of the reorganization, it is necessary to turn to the question of projected French atomic capability and the level of atomic development, for both of these factors played a role in the events of 1951. 73 VObservateur,

May 4, 1950.

CHAPTER THREE

THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN: OPTION FOR THE FUTURE REORGANIZATION: THE LONG-RANGE VIEW L T H O U G H T H E reorganization of the Commissariat had

strong political overtones, it cannot be explained on those grounds alone. It was also conditioned by the material and technical advances that France had made in the atomic field, and to a lesser extent by the projected French needs for basic energy-producing sources. The political aspects of the reorganization had essentially revolved around the de­ sire of administratively oriented persons in the Commis­ sariat to redress the internal administrative-scientific balance of power and the willingness of these persons to use Gov­ ernment-level support to achieve this end. In conducting this campaign, the administrative leaders had taken into account the increasing size and capacity of the Commis­ sariat and applied these factors to the question of the pros­ pects of future French atomic programs. As early as 1949, MM. Dautry and Lescop had begun to forecast the possi­ bility not only of expanding the size of the Commissariat but also of extending its range of activities to include in­ dustrial applications. Throughout its early years, from ne­ cessity rather than design,1 the Commissariat had had a basically scientific orientation, but its enabling charter had charged it with "conducting scientific and technical re1Danielle Hunebelle, "Une Epopee de 1'Apres-Guerre: l'Epanouissement de Notre Industrie Atomique," Realites, No. 155 (December, 1958), p. 110, deals very graphically with the period 1946-1950.

T H E FIRST FIVE YEAR P L A N

search with a view to the utilization of atomic energy in the various fields of science, industry and national defense."2 It was this mandate that provided the framework within which the Commissariat could devote itself to the indus­ trialization and large-scale application of atomic energy.3 By 1951, the initial program of providing trained per­ sonnel competent to deal with nuclear problems, of pros­ pecting for, mining, concentrating and refining uranium, and of developing nuclear research facilities was in large measure well on the way to being met. The Commissariat staff, which in 1946 had numbered 235 administrators and scientists, had been expanded to nearly 1,700, of which several hundred were highly trained scientists, engineers and mining experts.4 With this nucleus of trained person­ nel, the Commissariat was in a position to undertake more extensive work and projects. In the matter of raw materials, the discovery of uranium deposits in metropolitan France, and the promise of even more rewarding discoveries, had put France in a position of independence wherein the CEA would have adequate supplies with which to carry on ex­ tensive work in the nuclear field. This contrasted sharply with the period of 1946-1948 when the sole resources were a few tons of uranium oxide—a supply adequate for little more than the construction of a zero-energy experimental reactor.5 Finally, in the area of nuclear research facilities, a 2Ordonnance No. 45-2563 du 18 octobre 1945 instituant un Commis­ sariat a l'Energie Atomique, France, Journal Officiel, Lois et Decrets, Octo­ ber 31, 1945, p. 7,065. (Hereafter cited as Ordonnance No. 45-2563, J.O., October 31, 1945.) 3 This view is also taken in "Oil en sont Ies Recherches Atomiques Fran5aises," Bilans Hebdomadaire, No. 349, February 6, 1953. In discuss­ ing the Reorganization, it is stated that "this change bears witness to the Government's preoccupation. At the time when the Commissariat has established a new five year program [the Government] wishes to reinforce the control of the State and to give the administration a greater role." 4 "Ou en est l'Energie Atomique en France?," Perspectives, December 15, 1951. 5 Jacques Allier, "Les Premieres Piles Atomiques et l'Effort Franfais," Les Exlrails de la Revue Scientifique, Extrait du No. 3314 (November-

LIBERATION T O T H E F I R S T P L A N

1948 decision to expand beyond the confines of Chatillon, which housed the entire physical assets of the Commissar­ iat, led to the construction of a nuclear research center at SacIay near Paris. This new research center, which in 1950 was close to completion, was the site not only of nuclear chemistry and physics research laboratories, but of accelera­ tors, a cyclotron, a second experimental reactor for re­ search and radioisotope production as well. This second reactor, EL 2, was the first reactor in the world to use com­ pressed gas as a coolant and provided empirical proof that a nuclear reactor could provide a method for the produc­ tion of electricity.® Thus, substantial material and technical progress had been made in the first quinquennial of French atomic development. A final factor undoubtedly contributing to the consid­ eration of an expanded atomic program which would stress industrialization and application was the growing need for energy sources if France were to continue to grow econom­ ically and industrially. A nation traditionally poor in basic resources such as coal and oil, France always had to rely in part on importing these energy-producing factors to supply her industries and transportation and electricity complexes. With a program of postwar industrialization and modern­ ization, this need rapidly increased. In the period between 1948 and 1950, French imports of coal and oil were approxi­ mately 30 to 32 million tons coal equivalent, which consti­ tuted about one-third of her energy needs. Of all the members of the Organization for European Economic Co­ operation (OEEC), France has been the biggest net importer of energy.7 In terms of her desire for rapid economic expanDecember, 1951), p. 13; Bertrand Goldschmidt, L'Aventure Atomique (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1962), pp. 76-77. eAmbassade de France, France and the Atom (New York: Service de Presse et d'Information, June, 1962), p. 12. 7 Sir Harold Hartley et al., Europe's Growing Needs of Energy: How Can They Be Met?, A Report prepared by a group of experts (Paris: Or­ ganization for European Economic Cooperation, May, 1956), p. 80.

THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN

sion, this energy-trade imbalance promised to increase an­ nually, reaching 40 per cent by i960,8 and 45 per cent by 1970.9 Those who were concerned with France's economic development, such as the Commission de I'Energie du Plan or the Comite Consultatif de !'Utilisation de I'Energie,10 were aware of these circumstances. The CEA'S special con­ cern with this problem was that eventually atomic energy would be called upon to supplement the traditional energy sources. The Commissariat therefore would not only have to be prepared to justify the investment of state funds in atomic energy by providing some tangible results, but also to secure the industrial base necessary to any such program. Working within these circumstances, men such as Dautry and Lescop began to shape their ideas about the direction which the French atomic program should take in the com­ ing years. To achieve the end of atomic industrial capacity implied the development of a large-scale organization, op­ erating in close contact with private industry and univer­ sities, and the consequent need for a more broadly based Atomic Energy Committee and increased administrative control. The role of atomic energy in providing energy for the state was further bolstered by the interest in atomic energy development displayed by Felix Gaillard, a member of the Inspectorate of Finance. M. Gaillard had come in contact with the Commissariat in 1949 when he paid a visit to Chatillon, and he quickly became convinced of the need to 8 This level of imports was actually reached by 1957. See, "French Atomic Development," No. 58-2444 (Commissariat έ I'Energie Atomique, Paris, 1958). (Mimeographed.) 8 Hartley, Europe's Growing Needs of Energy: How Can They Be Met?, Appendix in, p. 100. See also, Ambassade de France, France From Recon­ struction to Expansion: 1948-1938 (New York: Service de Presse et d'lnformation, 1958), pp. 15-20. 10 The Comite Consultatif de I'Energie is under the Minister of Indus­ try (formerly the Secretary of State for Industry and Commerce). The Commission de I'Energie du Plan is within the Commissariat General au Plan. It was created in November 1953, and in 1954 its members included MM. Armand and Guillaumat.

L I B E R A T I O N T O T H E F I R S T P L A N

develop an expanded and strong atomic energy program.11 A former associate of Jean Monnet, Gaillard appreciated the relationship between atomic energy and France's basic energy needs, and from that day on he worked at the Government level to secure the maximum funds possible for the CEA.12 His interest and concern, along with that of Dautry and Lescop, his political compatriot, eventually dovetailed and provided an elaborate and well-financed framework for the development of applied nuclear energy. In principle, the scientific community was not averse to the extension of atomic activity, although the statist views of many of the scientists made them balk at the notion of close affiliation with private industry in the absence of stringent controls over those industries working with the Commissariat. Indeed, Joliot-Curie himself, subsequent to the successful completion of the first French nuclear re­ actor noted that, "this first pile will enable us to construct reactors of moderate power and then of great power.. . . It is a question of means, and men put at our disposal or that we can train that will enable us to build reactors of mod­ erate power and then the great atomic energy generator."13 Consequently, it would be erroneous to assume that the Commissariat scientists were opposed to the development of a peaceful nuclear industry. They were, however, not fully aware of the requisite nature and magnitude of an industrial program. They tended to play down the dimen­ sions of the program and the size of the reactors necessary to an industrial effort, an attitude which may have been a reflection of their fear that atomic energy would be turned to non-peaceful purposes. The scientists were under con­ stant pressure from the administrative leadership and from Gaillard, a major proponent of the first long-range atomic 11Hunebelle,

Redites (December, 1958), p. 112. L'Aventure Atomique, p. 97. 13Frederic Joliot-Curie, "La Premiere Pile Franjaise," La Pensee, No. 23, Nouvelle serie (March-April, 1949), p. 4. 12Goldschmidt,

T H E FIRST FIVE YEAR

PLAN

program, to reorient their concepts and to accept the judg­ ment of the technicians and planners on this matter.14 The scientists had three main concerns: that the CEA reretain control over private industries engaged in atomic energy work; that the industrialization program be geared toward peaceful uses only; and that the scientists, whose expertise was germane to the rational elaboration of a nu­ clear program, retain a vigorous and strong voice in the policy-making councils. Eventually they were to lose their batde on the latter two aspects. THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN

The year of malaise and immobtlisme which followed the firing of Joliot-Curie came to an end in April 1951 with the announcement of the new members of the Atomic Energy Committee and the official appointment of Francis Perrin as the new High Commissioner of Atomic Energy. During the succeeding months, the scientific leadership of the Commissariat, including M. Perrin, the still-present Anglo-Canadian group of MM. Kowarski, Gueron and Goldschmidt, and two new men, Yves Rocard and Louis Leprince-Ringuet,15 met on several occasions to discuss al­ ternative possibilities for the orientation of the future French program. These discussions were purely specula­ tive, for the CEA was not yet aware of how much money would be at its disposal. In August 1951, Felix Gaillard re14In reviewing the developments up to 1951 and the first Five Year Plan, m. Gaillard stated that "from all evidence the Commissariat has reached a stage where it can no longer do all the work alone, and it has found itself in a position where it must address a more urgent appeal to the various French industries." Felix Gaillard, "La Liaison entre la Sci­ ence et l'lndustrie Franjaise," Ulnformation, November 19, 1952. This statement is suggestive of the lack of thinking "big" on the part of the CEA up to this time. 15 MM. Rocard and Leprince-Ringuet had been suggested as possible replacements for Joliot-Curie. M. Rocard was alleged to have been closely associated with the Radical Party. Neither Rocard nor Leprince-Ringuet were, strictly speaking, atomic scientists. The former was a mathematician and the latter a physicist.

LIBERATION T O T H E FIRST P L A N

placed M. Bourges-Maunoury as Secretary of State for Atomic Energy. M. Gaillard's experience with the Monnet group rendered him amenable to the idea of long-range plans, and he proposed that the Commissariat elaborate a plan which could be fulfilled within the limits of approxi­ mately 40 billion francs allocated over a period of five years. Against this background of greater resources, active political interest and new needs, the CEA set about to frame an atomic development plan. It appears that Gaillard did not have any specific type of plan in mind. He was only concerned that some kind of plan be elaborated which would put France in the business of atomic energy produc­ tion. It was the function of the Commissariat to produce such a plan. Unlike the situation in the Joliot-Curie period, the sci­ entists were no longer able to deliberate and resolve issues in isolation. The removal of Joliot-Curie and the events which followed his departure from the CEA had made the Government more sensitive to the functioning of that or­ ganization. The scientists' freedom of action was further reduced by the fact that the duties of M. Dautry, who was critically ill in 1951, were being assumed more and more by M. Lescop, who was operating within the framework of a reorganized Commissariat. It is clear that Lescop weighed heavily in the scientific discussions and was impressing on the scientific cadre his views about the need for applied atomic research and fissionable material. Moreover, the scientific group was no longer of one mind. Although there is no evidence that the scientists split into two clearly antagonistic camps (i.e. along lines either completely favor­ ing or utterly rejecting the notion of power reactors de­ signed to produce fissionable material), it does appear that M. Perrin spoke in favor of a more cautious procedure than did some of the other scientists. One could hazard a guess that Yves Rocard, a member of the Atomic Energy Committee, represented a more adventurous spirit in light

T H E FIRST FIVE

YEAR PLAN

of the fact that a few years later he assumed the role of sci­ entific director of the Commissariat's military applications division. The first problem which the Commissariat had to re­ solve was whether France ought to construct research re­ actors and attempt to put atomic energy to immediate in­ dustrial use, or to undertake the production of fissionable material. Both alternatives were technically possible but each had its drawbacks. A program to construct research reactors designed to harness atomic power for industrial uses would mean that fissionable material used to fuel such reactors would have to be imported. This implied de­ pendence on British and American supply policy. The pos­ sibility of receiving any fissionable material at that time or in the near future, however, was not very encouraging. The alternative of producing fissionable material, on the other hand, raised the spectre of a diversion from peaceful to non-peaceful uses. Many of the scientists, for whom M. Perrin was the chief spokesman, were especially wary of this latter possibility.16 There were a number of reasons for this fear. One was that as of 1951 the only uses to which fissionable material had been put were military. Therefore, it appeared reasonable to assume that the adoption of a fissionable material program would carry in its wake an in­ creased interest in military applications. This assumption was given added weight by the fact that the scientists sus­ pected just such an interest on the part of Lescop and Dautry. Both of these men had been associated with the ieThere are few public statements to the effect that the scientists were against the production of plutonium, and the above information is based on interview sources. An allusion to scientific reticence to engage in the production of fissionable material is found in an article by Nicolas Vichney, "La Bombe Fraru;aise aura Exige Dix Ans d'Etudes et d'Efforts," Le Monde, December 31, 1959. See also France, Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires, Assemblee Nationale, No. 67, October 19, i960, p. 2,589 where Pierre de Montesquiou, in an attack against the CEA, contended that the 1952 plutonium plan was submitted to the Government over the opposition of the scientists. (This source hereafter cited as J.Q.yAJN.)

L I B E R A T I O N T O T H E F I R S T P L A N

military at one time or another. M. Dautry was a former Minister of Armaments, and M. Lescop had been associ­ ated with the Direction des Etudes et Fabrications d'Armement (DEFA), which in the late 1940's had created a Section Atomique to deal with military nuclear problems.17 Futhermore, both Dautry and Lescop were Polytechniciens, which immediately raised suspicions, founded or not, of strong military interests. It appears that a number of CEA scientists tended to stereotype Polytechniciens as having a military bent because of the military-type training at Ecole Polytechnique and its prewar tradition of supplying per­ sonnel to the Army Engineer Corps. On the other hand, production of fissionable material had certain advantages, among them the assurance of atomic independence. Despite the risks inherent in the pro­ duction of fissionable material, it was equally feasible that with proper guidance it could be applied to peaceful ends. It was with the expectation that France would continue its peaceful atomic policy that the great majority of scientists agreed to this course of action. They were, of course, sub­ jected to considerable pressure from the administrative service to accept this policy orientation. A second question to be resolved was whether to pro­ duce plutonium or uranium-235—the two fissionable ma­ terials which could be used to fuel reactors. Unlike the first question, which had been resolved by the scientists in co­ operation with the administration of the CEA, the alterna­ tive of plutonium or U235 was left more to the discretion of the scientists, for it involved a question of technical capacity rather than basic policy. In terms of the eventual uses to which fissionable material would be put, both plu­ tonium and U235 could be used for peaceful or military purposes. Despite the substantial progress which the French had made as of 1951, the CEA was quite unaware of 17 Ambassade de France, France's First Atomic Explosion (New York: Service de Presse et d'Information, February 13, i960), p. 6.

THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN

the technology involved in producing enriched uranium. Access to information from the United States, which had resolved production problems in this area, was not avail­ able because of the American policy of secrecy. On the other hand, under the guidance of Bertrand Goldschmidt, the CE\ had succeeded in isolating plutonium as early as 1949. Moreover, it was known that the cost of constructing and operating the isotope separation plant necessary for the production of U235 exceeded the funds available. The sci­ entists were also aware that substantial quantities of uranimum metal were needed if an isotope separation plant were to pay its way. On the basis of these technological and cost factors, and in the belief that plutonium was the key to an atomic future, the CEA opted for the production of plu­ tonium.18 At this early date, the difficulties of utilizing plu­ tonium—because of its highly toxic nature—were not fully appreciated by the French. In the last analysis, the decision to produce fissionable material of one sort or another caused the scientists to select the course of action which most closely approximated their financial, technical and material capacity. What light do these events shed on the nature of the policy-making process? It may at first appear that the sci­ entists still retained a very great share of the policy-making power. A closer look at the circumstances surrounding the 1951 decision, however, precludes such an interpretation. M. Dautry died in August 1951 and was not replaced until November. The gap of official administrative leadership was filled by the Secretary-General of the CEA, M. Lescop. He and his supporters had favored the expansion of CEA activities, and an essential new goal in their opinion was the development of high-power reactors capable of producing appreciable quantities of fissionable material. Many of the 18 Bertrand Goldschmidt, "La Politique Franjaise de Production des Materiaux Nucleaires," a speech given during the Journies d'Information au Centre d'Etudes Nucleaires de Saclay, July 9, 1958, p. 26. (Mimeo­ graphed.)

LIBERATION TO THE FIRST PLAN

scientists did not entertain the same views. The decision to embark on a program of fissionable material production and the choice of plutonium as a means to achieve this end were shaped under the guidance of M. Lescop, with the support of Felix Gaillard. M. Perrin's initial preference for research reactors gave way to the final decision to produce fissionable material. Failing in his attempt to orient the French atomic program, Perrin and his supporters sought to affect the size of the plutonium reactors by arguing in favor of low-power reactors. M. Perrin contended that a French program designed to produce fissionable material would not stand France in good stead internationally since many would consider this a military-oriented program— which Perrin himself feared—and as such a breach of France's undertaking in the United Nations to restrict her­ self to research in the peaceful applications of atomic energy. Furthermore, it was argued that the United States would not look favorably upon the principle of production of fis­ sionable material and would be even more alarmed if the program called for the production of large quantities of plutonium. Therefore, it would be better to proceed slowly and cautiously if, in fact, fissionable material were to be produced. Despite these objections and attempts to re­ strain or reduce the projected program, the principle of producing fissionable material was adopted and the de­ cision to build two high-power plutonium producing re­ actors was finally made in the three-month interim when M. Lescop, a partisan of these decisions, was at the admini­ strative helm of the CEA. M. Gaillard's reaction to the new program was made public subsequent to the decision to construct the plu­ tonium reactors. In a radio broadcast in early November 1951, M. Gaillard sketched the progress which France had made in the preceding five-year period; he emphasized the fact that atomic energy was essential to the future of France, stating that there were few activities of greater im-

T H E FIRST FIVE YEAR

PLAN

portance to the future of the nation. He warned that those nations which did not follow a clear path of atomic devel­ opment would be, twenty-five years hence, as backward rel­ ative to the nuclear nations of that time as the primitive peoples of Africa were to the industrialized nations of today.19 Defining France's intentions for the future in a manner designed to assuage the fears of those political, scientific and lay elements programmatically committed to peace, he added that, "several years ago France solemnly declared that she would not orient her efforts toward the fabrication of bombs. But she intends to give the greatest possible extension to fundamental research and to the prac­ tical applications of nuclear physics. . . . France must un­ dertake the construction of large atomic reactors produc­ ing plutonium without delay ... mainly for the production of electrical energy of which we have so much need."20 Thus the die was cast for the presentation of a long-range program based on the principles of future energy needs and peaceful applications. In newspapers and journals there was little, if any, public reaction to the broad outlines of the new program—just as had been the case throughout the entire atomic development program. PARLIAMENT AND ATOMIC ENERGY: BACKGROUND

The presentation of the first Five Year Plan to Parliament gave that body its first opportunity to critically assess the long-range development of atomic energy. Parliamentary interest in atomic affairs, which had been negligible prior to the Joliot-Curie episode, subsequently began to increase. However, it was characteristic of this interest that it was largely confined to deputies associated with right-wing parliamentary groups. It was also less oriented toward con­ cern with the intrinsic merits and value of atomic develop19New

Yor\ Times, November 13, 1951. au Bulletin Quotidien de Presse Etrangere, No. 3034 (Paris: La Documentation Fransaise, November 19, 1951). 20Annexe

L I B E R A T I O N T O T H E F I R S T P L A N

ment than with the existence of politically undesirable ele­ ments in the scientific service of the Commissariat and other public scientific establishments. The concern of the Right about the relationship between science and the po­ litical Left had roots which extended back into the late nineteenth century, when many members of the scientific community had taken up the Dreyfusard banner.21 The problem has been characterized by one observer as the in­ ability of French science to escape the traditional LeftRight cleavage and to rise au dessus de la melie.22 The atti­ tude of the Right manifested itself with renewed vigor in the postwar era when scientific programs were in large measure shaped under the guiding hand of the Socialists and the Left in general. This time, however, the Left in­ cluded Communist cadres dedicated to the principle of proletarian revolution and closely tied to the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, it was natural for representa­ tives of the Right to take exception to the existence of Communist Party members or fellow travelers in the ranks of public scientific establishments, especially in areas such as atomic energy which could affect national defense and security. Concurrently with these developments, the Government announced the reorganization of the cea on January 4, 1951, stating that in the future "a much greater loyalty to­ ward the Republican State will be required of members of the Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique."23 The Socialist Party which was participating in the Government pre­ viously had condemned any movement toward a general purge of Communists; however, after the Joliot-Curie case it shifted its position and approved the principle of purge on 21 Henry E. Guerlac, "Science and National Strength," Modern France: Problems of the Third and Fourth Republics, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 81-105. 22 Ibid., p. 89. 23 Statement made by M. Maurice Bourges-Maunoury, Secretary of State for Atomic Affairs, Le Monde, January 5, 1951.

T H E F I R S T F I V E Y E A R P L A N

condition that "the law, all the law and nothing but the law" be used to obtain this end.24 The camp of Spuration was therefore sufficiently enlarged to provide a legitimate basis for pruning highly placed Communists from the sci­ entific ranks. The road to a general purge, however, was still not open, nor was it necessary in early January 1951, for the plutonium decision which automatically would raise military implications had not yet been reached. Except for the elimination of a number of CEA engi­ neers in late January 1951—for participation in a Govern­ ment-prohibited Communist-led demonstration against General Eisenhower, then Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces in Europe—nothing further was done by the Gov­ ernment to remove Communists from the Commissariat.28 A number of conservative and moderate deputies in the National Assembly were becoming restless because of the Government's failure to complete its reorganization plans28 and because it had not yet carried out an epuralion of the CEA.27 These concerns were manifested by the introduction of motions to reduce CEA credits by token amounts, and they were passed in the Assembly by majorities which paralleled the majority by which M. Henri Monnet's 1948 2 4

M o n d e , January 5, 1951. Politique: /95/ (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1951), p. 5. The Government had forbidden participation in the demon­ stration on pain of suspension and dismissal for all workers in nation­ alized enterprises who took part. 26 M. Petit (Peasant Party), rapporteur for the Finance Committee, in­ dicated that his committee requested a reduction of CEA appropriations to induce the Government to clarify its goals in the CEA and to explain how the latter organization functioned. The National Assembly felt that it was inadequately informed on both points. No. 46, April 4, *95l* P· 2,603. Frederic-Dupont was in agreement on this matter. 27 M. Montel (RPF intergroup), president of the National Defense Com­ mittee, in requesting a token reduction of CEA appropriations was equally concerned over how the CEA was being run and who, in fact, was in control of it. He was also disturbed at the continued presence of known Communists in the CEA. J,O.^A.N., No. 46, April 4, 1951, pp. 2,610, 2,612. 25 VAnnee

L I B E R A T I O N T O T H E F I R S T P L A N

amendment,28 to the same general effect, had been defeated. The temperament of the legislature had clearly changed over the span of three years, and the Government found itself in the position of having to take legislative opinion into account if atomic policy were not to meet stiff parlia­ mentary resistance. Communist reaction to these developments was negli­ gible. Communist deputies had moved for a total suppres­ sion of Commissariat funds in the Finance Committee on the ground that the CEA was becoming an integral part of the "arsenal of aggression." Failing there, the Communist Party introduced a similar motion in the Assembly but was resoundingly defeated.29 It is strange but true that during the Fourth Republic the Communist Party never really at­ tempted to raise atomic policy as an issue on its own initia­ tive, or to seriously obstruct the development of policy. Rather, the Party confined itself to casting negative votes on budgetary allocations and to raising counteramendments whenever funds for the CEA were requested. The elections of June 1951 affected the distribution of power in the National Assembly and strengthened the hand of the Right. Consequendy, the attack on Govern­ ment policy was pursued with renewed vigor. This time, however, the Government's stake in meeting the Assembly halfway was considerably higher, for M. Gaillard had al­ ready announced the Government's intention to present Parliament with a long-range atomic development plan which entailed a large sum of money to be distributed over a five-year period. When, in November 1951, the CEA budget for the following year was placed before the Na­ tional Assembly, M. Frederic-Dupont again took the lead in raising the question of Communists in the CEA.30 On this occasion his position was backed by two other RPF dep28 France, Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires, Conseil de la Republique, No. 26, March 19, 1948, p. 807. (Hereafter cited as ].0.,C.R.) 29 JV., No. 46, April 4, 1951, p. 2,612. 80 JV., No. 142, November 22, 1951, pp. 8,369-71.

THE FIRST FIVE

YEAR PLAN

uties, Edouard Charret and Jacques Soustelle.31 M. Frederic-Dupont questioned the Government's intention to carry out a purge of the CEA in light of the appointment of Francis Perrin as High Commissioner, for the latter had publicly declared himself unwilling to conduct a purge of the CEA. This intervention, one of many, represented the height of Frederic-Dupont's Maurrassian tendencies, for he contended that more than one-half of the CEA engineers were born of foreign parents, this being the same per­ centage of engineers and scientists whom he charged with Communist leanings.32 He further indicated that others than himself and his political compatriots were concerned with the personnel of the CEA, among them the Association des Anciens Eleves de l'Ecole Polytechnique which, at a recent meeting, had heard its president say: What has been done and what is being done to cleanse the scientific services so carefully organized by the Com­ munists ... ? Very little. That we no longer understand. Now our foreign friends . . . refuse to give us aid to enable us to make up to an extent our delay in the area of scientific research, so sterile today with regard to research on the engines and 33 tactics of tomorrow Frederic-Dupont further contended, on the basis of this statement, that France could acquire its needed plutonium at much less cost than the forty to fifty billion francs indi3 1 Ibid., p. 8,370. MM. Jacques Chaban-Delmas and DiomMe Catroux also gave support to Frederic-Dupont. 32 This was not the first occasion on which Frederic-Dupont attacked Perrin. In May 1951, he had tabled an interpellation based on the failure of the Government to purge the CEA; at this time he cited M. Perrin's appointment as evidence that the Government had no intention of purging that organization. No. 74, May 6, 1951, p. 4,610. M. FredericDupont could only really be sure that 8 of the 107 engineers of ChStillon were Communists. 83 Ι.Ο.,Α.Ν., No. 142, November 23, 1951, p. 8,369.

LIBERATION TO THE FIRST PLAN

catcd by M. Gaillard if Frcnch public scientific establish­ ments, and especially the CEA, were cleansed of their Com­ munist Party members. Although the Government was not as naive as either the author of the statement or FredericDupont with regard to the parsimonious atomic aid policy of the United States at that time, the argument did raise an important point. If the Government continued to avoid taking steps to eliminate at least some of the Communists from the CEA, the National Assembly might refuse to allo­ cate the necessary funds for the atomic development pro­ gram. The Government appeared to have recognized this contingency, for in the ensuing months M. Gaillard and the administrative leadership of the Commissariat fired eighteen known Communists from their CEA posts. During the parliamentary debate on the Five Year Plan in July 1952, Frederic-Dupont alluded to this event as an implicit admission by the Government that his contentions were neither unfounded nor unreasonable.34 The Five Year Plan was a major issue which involved French commitment to a development program. Yet, in general terms, Parliament failed to meet its task of criti­ cizing and debating the Plan. This may have been par­ tially the responsibility of the Government, for it scheduled the debate within a week of the end of the parliamentary session in early July, a time when many other fragmentary matters still had to be disposed of by the legislature. De­ spite this, one would have expected the parliamentarians to utilize their relatively brief time to the best possible ad­ vantage and to have gone immediately to the heart of the question: the proposition that France should embark on a cosdy program of producing fissionable material. The Government placed before the Parliament a format from which rational debate could ensue. The central fea­ ture of the Five Year Plan was plutonium production, but 3i

No. 65, July 4, 1952, p. 3,454·

T H E FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN

it was not limited to this facct alone. The Plan was based on the premise that energy resources determine the level of industrialization which a nation is capable of attaining. It stressed France's traditional shortcomings in coal, oil and hydro-electric power85 and concluded that atomic energy provided the key to the solution of these difficulties. Granted that atomic energy had been exclusively the pre­ rogative of military interests elsewhere, it did have peaceful uses as well. Indeed, argued the planners, "we must be aware . . . that if . . . these efforts can be reconverted to­ ward industrial uses, there is no doubt that in a few years the energy sources put at the disposition of people would so profoundly and radically transform and augment their economic activity that the nations which do not have it will appear as helpless as the most backward nations of the world today appear in the face of modern nations."38 The justification for the adoption of the current Plan was that France had reached a level of atomic development from which she now had the opportunity and ability to move into the area of industrial realizations. This entailed not merely the construction of plutonium reactors but also the intensification of fundamental research, uranium ex­ ploitation, continued training of specialized personnel and the construction of the instruments and apparatus necessary to provide scientists, engineers and technicians with practi­ cal experience. To a great extent, much of the Five Year Plan would be a continuation and reinforcement of the work which had been done during the preceding period. The program would involve the construction of several accelerators and experimental reactors, while plutonium production would require the construction of high-power reactors. The latter were to serve no purpose other than the 35 Prisidence du Conseil, "Note Annexe au Projet de Loi de Programme pour la Realisation du Plan de Developpement de I'Energie Atomique, 1952-1957" (n.d.), 5 pp. 3 i Ibid., p. 2.

L I B E R A T I O N T O T H E F I R S T P L A N

production of fissionable material which allegedly was to be used eventually in the field of naval propulsion and in the fueling of secondary reactors producing electrical energy.37 The fundamental question of the intrinsic merits of the Plan was not really considered by the legislators in the Na­ tional Assembly. The general debate consisted of three in­ terventions which revolved around two central issues: communism in the CEA and the eventual relationship be­ tween atomic energy and national defense. M. Charret of the RPF confined his statements to the continued presence of Communists in the CEA, contending that, "the presence of Communists in the CEA is scandalous, for it subordinates the work of an organ where the atomic future of our country is being worked out to Moscow's control."38 In view of this tendency, he warned the Government that, "it is necessary that ipuration be pushed to the maximum in the shortest possible time and that the AdministratorGeneral and the Secretary-General have the support of the Government to act."39 It is indicative of the parliamentary Right's lack of con­ fidence in the High Commissioner, Francis Perrin, under whose authority the alleged Communists served, that he was not included in the officialdom to whom the task of continued 6puration should be entrusted. M. Charret would also appear to have been aware that the 1951 re­ organization act had placed the task of firing employees exclusively in the hands of the Administrator-General. The principal speaker was M. Frederic-Dupont, who by this time had dropped from the ranks of the RPF and 87 Ibid., p. 4. See also the report of M. Boutemy for the Finance Com­ mittee of the Conseil de la Republique, Journal Officiel, Documents du Conseil de la Republique, Annexe No. 384 (July, 1952), pp. 557-58. 38 No. 65, July 4, 1952, p. 3,455. iaIbid., p. 3,456. See also Franc-Tireur, June 27, 1952, where it is reported that M. Corniglion-Molinier (RPF) raised the question of a Com­ munist Party nucleus in the CEA when the Finance Committee of the National Assembly discussed the Five Year Plan.

T H E F I R S T FIVE YEAR P L A N

moved back to the Right40 Although in full agreement with M. Charret on the question of Communist personnel in the CEA, Frederic-Dupont centered his attention on the plutonium plan. His main concern was the undeniably close relationship between plutonium production and national defense. Pointing to the fact that there were two clear groups within the CEA, those who refused to associate them­ selves with plutonium production, and the "dynamic men —scientists and administrators" who understood the need to engage in plutonium production, he cautioned the Gov­ ernment to firmly resist those members of the CEA who did not wish to serve the interests of national defense. Al­ though France promised to devote its efforts to peaceful uses only, "it must be well understood that despite the scruples of the high commissioners of atomic energy or of their confidants, desirous not to be in disaccord with their former patron, M. Joliot-Curie, who remains the spiritual guide of this house, France can reclaim the right to use the work, which will be done thanks to the credits which we are voting, to the end of consolidating her defense and safeguarding her independence and security."41 Whereas previously Frederic-Dupont had confined his arguments to the principle of the retention of Communists in sensitive areas, on this occasion he based his contentions on a spe­ cific problem: the relationship of atomic energy to national defense in view of the decision to produce a fissionable ma­ terial unquestionably capable of serving the end of national defense. While this did not constitute a patent demand that the plutonium be so applied, it did raise the question of compatibility between one's political allegiance and national defense interests. In this sense, Frederic-Dupont was rais­ ing a very real question which the Commissariat and the Government would face when the decision was made to undertake concrete military research. 40 M. 41

Frederic-Dupont was now part of the ARS. No. 65, July 4, 1952, p. 3,455.

L I B E R A T I O N T O T H E F I R S T P L A N

The reaction of the Communist Party to the Five Year Plan was directed at the question of military applications of plutonium and the problem of political discrimination in the Commissariat. The Communists maintained that the program was oriented toward military ends under the whiplash of American imperialism and was premised on political discrimination. If the Plan had only the peaceful development of atomic energy as a goal they argued, it would include a statement in its preamble that the ma­ terials produced under the Plan would in no case serve the end of producing atomic weapons either in France or else­ where; that atomic development would be pursued with the cooperation of all competent French scientists and tech­ nicians, regardless of political affiliation; and that a substan­ tial proportion of the funds allocated would be used for fundamental research.42 An amendment to this effect was introduced by the Communist Party in both the National Assembly and the Council of the Republic,43 where essen­ tially the same arguments against the Plan were presented. The Communist amendment was resoundingly defeated in both chambers, and in the National Assembly44 M. Jules Moch explained the Socialist Party's negative vote in these terms: We judge [the amendment] to be both useless and too clever. It is useless because there is no question of either start­ ing the manufacture of mass-destruction weapons or even of undertaking their study with the credits asked of us. . . . 42

Ibid., pp. 3.457-58].0.,C.R., No. 5 4 , July n, 1 9 5 2 , p. 1, 5 9 9 . 44 M. Chambrun, a Catholic Progressive, raised the point that the Com­ munists' amendment actually safeguarded French national interest because even though France was not prepared to undertake a nuclear weapons program, the United States could benefit from French uranium or pluto­ nium. This amendment, he argued, would preclude such a possibility from arising. ].Ο.^Λ.Ν., No. 6 5 , July 4 , 1 9 5 2 , p. 3 , 4 6 1 . 43

T H E FIRST FIVE YEAR

PLAN

And this amendment is too clever because it will then be said that we voted for the manufacture of massdestruction weapons and an attack will be launched against all those who voted against the Communist amendment.45 Of greater importance was M. Moch's further statement that while the Socialist Party was agreed that nuclear weapons must be eliminated from national arsenals, it thought that such disarmament could not be unilateral, and that until a guaranteed and controlled agreement was reached, "we will not vote for a text which can be used in the public forum but which in no way corresponds to a step forward on the road to real security and peace."46 This statement is highly descriptive of the real, if not the public, position that would be taken by the Socialist Party in the years to come.47 The debate in the Council of the Republic differed some­ what from that which took place in the National Assembly. The questions of purge and military applications were argued only by Senator Ramette of the Communist Party. The reports of Senators Boutemy and Longchambon, rap­ porteurs respectively of the Finance and Industrial Pro­ duction committees, gave evidence of serious consideration of the future role of atomic energy in France. Both rappor­ teurs supported the plan on the grounds that it was ra­ tionally conceived, broad in scope and necessary to the in45

Ibid., pp. 3,460-61. Ibid., p. 3,461. 17 Generally speaking, the Socialist Party has been an outspoken partisan of disarmament and of French refusal to enter the atomic weapons race. It was, however, under the Mollet Government that the greatest military atomic effort of the Fourth Republic took place. See, for example, Senator Marcel Champeix, "A Propos de la Bombe Fran^aise," he Populaire, No­ vember 15, 1959. Senator Champeix stated that while the Socialist Party is against the Government on many things, "when the Government, when France, wants to build and test her bomb, we will not let ourselves be intimidated or affected by the strange clamouring [we hear] and we say clearly: we approve. . . ." 46

L I B E R A T I O N T O T H E F I R S T P L A N

dustrial future of the nation; but they raised the question of the Commissariat's exclusiveness. They suggested that the CEA act more as a directorate than as an exclusive agency, and that it delegate some research problems to the univer­ sities and other scientific groups in the nation and some in­ dustrial elaboration to private industrial concerns. Senator Longchambon, one of the more farsighted members of either chamber on matters of atomic development, cau­ tioned the Government that its estimate that five years hence atomic energy "will be able to massively reinforce disposable French energy"48 was far too optimistic. Never­ theless, he felt that atomic energy in the long run would be an important factor and this alone justified the Five Year Plan. M. Longchambon contended that France's failure in past decades to move rapidly enough in the development of petroleum resources was a mistake which she could illafford to repeat. In speaking on behalf of the Government, M. Gaillard sought to place the plan in the perspective of projected French energy needs, stressing the necessity of an energetic atomic development program if France were not to be rele­ gated to the position of a secondary industrial-economic power. The essence of the program was preparation for in­ dustrial applications, and the central aspect of this was the production of plutonium, for which three-fourths of the credits asked would be used. Admitting the validity of M. Longchambon's contention that atomic energy could not be the exclusive prerogative of any one group, and that it required industrial participation, M. Gaillard guaranteed that these ends would be met as the Plan ran its course.49 The problem of Communists in the CEA was one of the 48 J.O.,C.R., No. 54, July n, 1952, pp. 1,597-98. In October 1952, eight new chairs in nuclear physics were to be created. Plans were made for opening a school for engineers in nuclear physics in October 1953. It was expected that industry would be called upon more and more to assist the CEA in developing its projects. 49 /.0.^4 JV., No. 65, July 4, 1952, p. 3,460.

T H E F I R S T FIVE YEAR P L A N

central issues on which the Government wished to clarify its position. M. Gaillard indicated Government concern about the loyalty of CEA personnel and assured the Parlia­ ment that the Government "will not tolerate the menacing or diminution of the goals of the Commissariat as defined in its constitutive text by the shortcomings of those who collaborate in this organ."50 With regard to the question of military applications, Gaillard emphasized the fact that the cost of a single bomb was ten times greater than the ap­ propriation requested. He did not, however, foreclose the possibility of the eventual application of atomic energy to non-peaceful purposes. The simple volume of credits which are asked today suffice to show . . . that France, who five years ago uni­ laterally declared that she would not make the A bomb— but who made no such contractual engagement— ... has not any further intention of doing it now. And I may say that this declaration . . . can be even­ tually annulled if the Government deems it expedient. I do not see why, when on both sides of the iron curtain atomic weapons are being made, France, on principle should refuse herself the right and the possibility of making it later.51 The production of plutonium admittedly had national de­ fense implications and the Government shared Parliament's concern over loyalty, national defense and plutonium. However, ". . . in this respect there are no measures to be taken against persons concerned with plutonium for the good reason that we still don't have any, and that the whole °° ibid. 51 J.O.,C.R., No. 54, July n, 1952, p. 1,597. (Italics mine.) In discussing the peaceful orientation of atomic development in France, Andre Leveuf noted that, "weakened by the war, our industrial potential in great part dismantled, we could not hope to launch into the enormous expenses that the study of the manufacture of weapons of destruction would require." Le Monde, November 27, 1953.

LIBERATION TO THE FIRST PLAN

part of the plan, the most important part, which will con­ cern plutonium will be the object of a special section of the Commissariat, which will be subjected to all security pre­ cautions with regard to the protection of its work (and) the recruitment of those who will be called upon to work on it... ."52 This statement is of paramount importance for two reasons. In the first place, it is a tacit admission that the Commissariat still housed persons whose loyalty was not totally assured, and as such, it implicitly justified the con­ cern of the Right. In the second place, M. Gaillard all but acknowledged an existing interest in the military side of plutonium production. For if there were no military appli­ cations or studies in view, there would be no more need for surveillance in plutonium study and production than there was in any of the other areas of atomic research. One can argue that Gaillard was directing his attention toward those who were concerned lest French discoveries be turned over to foreign powers who might use the knowl­ edge for military purposes, and this prospect may have entered his mind. True as this may be, the subsequent de­ velopments in France, and knowledge of the attitude of key individuals such as M. Lescop, lend support to the con­ tention that M. Gaillard's statement did have military im­ plications. Parliament entertained a rather low level of interest on the basic policy question of the long-range plan for French atomic development. Despite the more incisive nature of the debate in the upper chamber, the over-all tone of the debate was for the most part superficial and did not ade­ quately confront the essential issues. Parliamentary interest centered on the problem of Communists in the CEA, a ques­ tion which had become rather traditional over the preced­ ing years, and on the problem of national defense. The former question did not concern atomic policy per se, but it did deal with Government policy toward Communists in 52

No. 65, July 4, 1952, p. 3,460.

T H E FIRST FIVE YEAR P L A N

public scientific organizations. In clarifying and restating the attitude of most of the parliamentary groups toward this problem, the debate did contribute toward the estab­ lishment of future Government policy on the compatibil­ ity of political allegiance and public service. The connec­ tion between atomic energy and national defense was only lighdy brushed by Parliament. The debate merely indicated that while Parliament as a whole was not prepared to de­ bate this question fully, it was, at the same time, unwilling to forego the eventuality of military uses of atomic energy. The defeat of the Communist amendment, stipulating that atomic energy should be devoted only to peaceful uses, would seem to support this conclusion. Perhaps a more profound debate should not have been expected because of the technical complexity presented by atomic energy. Despite Parliament's legal position as a cen­ tral institution in the policy-making process, it has gener­ ally not become as involved in technical areas as it has with political questions. In discussing planning in general, one writer has stated that "in contrast with political decisions an intimate confrontation with a program or with political convictions no longer suffices. An economic decision re­ quires a deep knowledge of the economic mechanisms and all the complex ideas of a dossier."53 One need only substi­ tute the word "technological" for "economic" to rationalize the minimal interest and concern of parliamentarians for atomic affairs. Again, it is worth noting the essentially nonpolitical nature of atomic energy development at this time and the very minor role which atomic energy had and would play in the economic development of France for some time to come.64 53 Andre G. Delion, L'Etat et Ies Entreprises Publiques (Paris: Sirey, 1958). P- 41· 54 This is to be contrasted with the United States, where, although atomic energy did not threaten to create labor and industrial problems in the immediate future, atomic questions were very much in the political limelight because of the military aspects.

S3

L I B E R A T I O N T O T H E F I R S T P L A N

However, once the question of plutonium production enters the picture, this attempt to rationalize parliamentary disinterest in atomic affairs begins to lose its force. A dis­ tinguished French scientist pointed out a number of years ago that "it is necessary [here] to distinguish two areas, that of pure science ... and that of atomic energy which is the practical development, with its political and military consequences. . . .'*®5 Despite the technicalities involved in atomic energy, the question of the production of fissionable material had definite implications with regard to the even­ tual uses of atomic energy. And it is this facet which should have fired parliamentary interest and led to a more pro­ found examination of the Five Year Plan. What developed instead was essentially a Communist-anti-Communist dia­ tribe. The effect of Parliament on atomic energy development, then, was quite limited during this first period. It was not an important element either in elaborating the direction and content of the atomic energy program or in setting positive limits to this direction. Parliament's failure to probe the domestic and international implications of the Five Year Plan's provision for plutonium production il­ lustrated not only a general lack of interest but also an essential lack of foresight, or unawareness, of the implica­ tions inherent in plutonium production. Finally, Parlia­ ment's attitude might be indicative of a sense of abandon in the face of a complex problem, which suggests the In December 1954, on the initiative of a number of parliamentarians, the National Assembly created a Commission de Coordination de l'Energie Atomique et des Recherches Nucleaires. It consisted of 36 members desig­ nated by a number of other parliamentary committees. The purpose of the committee was to examine problems concerning atomic energy and nuclear research, he Monde, December 16, 1954. The committee members were designated in February and March 1955, and M. Gaillard was elected president. Le Monde, March 18, 1955. This committee met infrequently and was not reinstituted after the general elections of January 1956. 85 Bertrand Goldschmidt, "Le Probleme de l'Energie et TEffort Franfais," Cahiers d'lnjormation Frangais (September 15, 1952), p. 15. (Italics mine.)

THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN

abdication of political responsibility to the technocrats. The most that can be said for Parliament in this early period is that through questions and interpellations it induced, or perhaps even forced, Government action on the question of Communism in public establishments. This was motivated by the demagogy of some parliamentarians and the appre­ ciation by others of the potential links between atomic energy and national defense. To the extent that the latter proposition is true, it may be argued that these individuals were confident that such a rapport would best be created if a full-scale parliamentary debate on military nuclear policy were not precipitated at a time when military applications were still in a rudimentary stage. To this extent, perhaps, the interested deputies, such as they were, were wise to let sleeping dogs lie. What was the major import of the first Five Year Plan for French atomic development? In the first place, it may be termed an "industrial production decision" as opposed to a "research decision." It involved a shift of emphasis from research reactors to high-power reactors designed to produce the fissionable material necessary to fuel secondary reactors from which energy could be recuperated. Sec­ ondly, the decision to produce plutonium had the longrange probability of relieving France of its reliance on foreign sources for fissionable material. With this inde­ pendent source of fissionable material, France would then be free of restrictions and limitations on the use of such ma­ terial as may have been imposed by supplier-nations. Fi­ nally, the production of fissionable material meant that the seeds from which a nuclear arsenal could grow were being sown—a situation which, in the long run, could have profound effects on France's role in the international com­ munity and on the weight of her authority as a world power. Despite the public protestations that plutonium was to be produced solely for peaceful purposes, there is no

L I B E R A T I O N T O T H E F I R S T P L A N

doubt that at least some of the individuals responsible for this decision intended that the plan would blossom into a weapons program. There is adequate support for this con­ clusion in a recent publication by one of the highest offi­ cials in the French Commissariat and a member of that organization since its inception, Bertrand Goldschmidt. In discussing the Five Year Plan, Goldschmidt notes that, "the five year plan of 1952 mentioned no eventual use of plutonium for military ends, a decision on this subject not having been taken for several years. It is certain, however, that this aspect of the atomic problem was present, and un­ doubtedly predominant in the mind of those who inspired and were responsible for the plan."69 The importance of this statement should not be under­ estimated, for it throws into sharp relief the changed na­ ture of the group exercising dominant influence over atomic policy-making. The preceding chapter indicated the large degree of autonomy exercised by the CEA relative to the Government in the early period. This was explained in terms of the technical complexity of the field, the preoccu­ pation of the Government with more immediate problems of reconstruction and rehabilitation, the relative unimpor­ tance of the appropriations allotted to the CEA and the re­ moteness of possible effects of atomic energy on the econ­ omy or politics of the nation. Within the Commissariat, the structural administrativescientific dichotomy was translated into scientific control over the management of atomic policy. The leadership and ambition of Joliot-Curie and the need to rely on scientific acumen and judgment were suggested as the basic reasons underlying the tendency toward scientific supremacy not only within the CEA but also in the relationship of the latter to the Government, under whose legal authority and con­ trol the organization existed. If scientific leadership had 66

Goldschmidt, L'Aventure Atomique, p. 98. (Italics mine.)

THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN

remained constant between 1950, when Joliot-Curie was deposed, and late 1951, when the plutonium production de­ cision was taken, it would seem that the latter might not have been adopted, or, if adopted, then probably not on the same order of magnitude. For the scientific inclination was to pursue basic research rather than to engage in a largescale industrial production program, especially one which would emphasize substantial quantities of fissionable ma­ terial. Consequently, M. Goldschmidt's statement, that military considerations were "undoubtedly predominant" in the minds of those who inspired and were responsible for the plutonium decision, lends strong support to the contention that the decision-making cadre had undergone a change during the interim. The scientific participants in the policy­ making process did approve the plan as ultimately elab­ orated, but a substantial number of them did so reluctantly. Their approval was less a matter of choice than of the ne­ cessity of following a mandate imposed on them by Rene Lescop and Felix Gaillard. The Five Year Plan implied not only a shift of control within the CEA but increased vigilance over, and interest in, atomic affairs by the Government as well. This is not sur­ prising since the Plan called for an investment of 37 billion francs as compared with the 15 billion francs France had expended over the previous 6 years. Such a costly program required careful consideration by the politically responsible authorities. Rearmament, Indo-China and reconstruction were all imposing heavy burdens on the nation, and it may be suggested that some members of the Government looked upon this new investment as a possible source of future military power. One high official of the CEA pointed out in an anonymous letter to I'Observateur that, "it is not in the habit of our successive Governments, living from day to day, incessantly cutting civil budgets in order to meet exorbitant military expenses to grant so important a sum

LIBERATION T O T H E F I R S T P L A N

to an enterprise which hasn't immediate rentabilite."5T At the time, the only proven use of plutonium was for mili­ tary purposes. This would seem to support the contention that the Five Year Plan had other than peaceful ends in view and the observation that scientific influence, which strongly militated against such applications, had been sub­ stantially reduced. The evolution of policy from pure to applied research parallels not only the changing nature of the policy­ making elites but also the changed technical and material status of French atomic capacity. A new plateau had been reached which could serve as a springboard for industrial development and the eventual exploitation of atomic en­ ergy as a source of power. In economic and technical terms, therefore, France was enjoined to develop its atomic com­ plex progressively, and only two alternatives were avail­ able: the development of research facilities and reactors or the production of fissionable material. A simultaneous de­ velopment was not economically feasible for France, and it is at this point that administrative-political considerations became paramount. In conclusion, the main characteristic of French atomic efforts between 1945 and 1952 was the creation of a founda­ tion from which any number of courses could follow. The primary goal was to bridge the gap between France and other atomic nations. Atomic policy-making centered at first on the scientific elite in the CEA which, in turn, was the principal if not the exclusive policy-making organ. Subse­ quent to the dismissal of Joliot-Curie, scientific leadership and control was challenged, and increasingly the scientists were replaced by a group of individuals concerned less with fundamental research than with the applications of 57 L'Observateur, No. 92, February 14, 1952. The writer also stressed the weakened position of the High Commissioner and his inability to do more than raise "platonic protests" for fear that the funds necessary to continued work would be cut off.

THE FIRST FIVE YEAR PLAN

atomic energy. This change did not mean the total exclu­ sion of scientific opinion from the atomic field but rather a reduction of the scientists' authority in determining policy. The degree of their participation in future decisions would be measured largely by their ability to compromise and to convince their adversaries of the technical and po­ litical correctness of their position. The consequence of the shift from scientific to administrative leadership in the CEA was a change in policy orientation which was to have a marked effect on the future of French atomic development.

FRANCE

ENTERS

NUCLEAR

THE

CLUB

CHAPTER FOUR

THE BASIS OF THE FRENCH BOMB

PRELIMINARY ATTITUDES ON MILITARY USES OF THE ATOM H E A D O P T I O N of the first Five Year Plan, with its pro­ vision for plutonium production, opened up a new phase in the development of French atomic energy policy, a phase which included the possibility of military applica­ tions. The manufacture of fissionable material, of course, did not automatically produce this result, but a combi­ nation of circumstances and policy leadership eventually led to the development of a military atomic program for France. The plutonium plants located at Marcoule were, in part, built for the purpose of harnessing nuclear power for the production of electricity. To an extent, they have served this purpose by providing an experimental basis for the re­ covery of energy from the heat produced in nuclear reac­ tions. This has led Electricite de France to undertake the construction of a series of reactors at Chinon in the Loire Valley, with the expectation that by 1965 three reactors, EDF I, EDF 2, and EDF 3 will supply approximately 600,000 kilowatts to the national grid.1 The kilowatt cost of elec­ tricity derived from nuclear sources is still not competitive with the kilowatt cost of electricity produced from classic energy sources such as coal and water power. Together with access to traditional energy sources, the competitive

T

1Ambassade de France, France and the Atom (New York: Service de Presse et d'lnformation, June 1962), p. 31.

FRANCE ENTERS THE NUCLEAR CLUB

cost factor has tended to direct efforts toward prototype re­ search rather than toward mass production. The atomic bomb project was not given the "green light" until several years after work on electricity production had begun, but the bomb was completed two years before the first of the Chinon plants went into operation. Thus, as of i960, the atomic bomb had no rival for honors as the out­ standing product of fifteen years of atomic research and development in France. French interest in the possession of a nuclear weapon is readily comprehensible. What is less easily understood is the manner in which France decided to produce the bomb. For it was not a single decision, a clear-cut long-range policy rationally planned and executed, but rather a series of events and decisions—or, perhaps, lack of decisions—which led to the Sahara test in i960. The most candid statement to the effect that France drifted toward the possession of an atomic bomb without the project ever receiving official sanction at the cabinet level, is found in the following statement which issued from a ranking member of the Quai d'Orsay and of the Atomic Energy Committee: "On the political level there had been no doctrine of French nuclear armament. In fact the manufacture of an atomic bomb, on which the work began well in advance of the de­ cision which was not finally taken by the Government un­ til very recently, wedged itself into our public life as a sort of by-product of an officially peaceful effort, there existing no overview of the problems involved, nor of the means necessary to solve them, nor of the results to be expected. Until a very recent date we found ourselves in the para­ doxical situation of a country which already spent by vir­ tue of . . . accords . . . between the Commissariat and Na­ tional Defense important sums in view of a program of nuclear armament without the Government having taken the decision to make the weapons and also without a de-

T H E B A S I S O F T H E F R E N C H B O M B

bate . . . in Parliament to approve such a decision."2 The question which arises, then, is how and why France developed a military atomic program. The argument which will be advanced in Part n of this study is that in the face of vacillation and indecisiveness by the government, and unawareness and abdication of responsibility by Parlia­ ment, policy issues were debated and resolved at another level, and that the elaboration of a military atomic program was guided by a small group of persons from the CEA, the military and the Government. Although leadership and direction in atomic policy may have come from sources other than the Government, this does not deny the latter's interest or concern. The Five Year Plan was considered by the Government on several occasions in 1951 and approved by it without any apparent change.3 Government concern at that time about potential military applications of atomic energy has recently been in­ dicated by Maurice Schumann: "The decision to provide France with atomic weapons was first taken by Govern­ ments that firmly believed in the Atlantic Alliance and favored European integration. I remember clearly the argu­ ments that carried weight at that time notably in the min­ isterial councils. . . of 1951, 1952 and 1953. First of all [we thought] the surest way . . . of ruining the credit of the Grand Alliance in the minds of the French people would be to let them believe that from now on there would be two categories of allies: those who were the sole possessors of deterrent weapons and those who were entitled to pos­ sess only conventional weapons. Any French Government would be particularly unlikely to accept this discrimina2 Francois de Rose, "Aspects Politiques des Problemes Poses Par 1'Armement Nucleaire Franfaise." Speech given before the Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Defense Nationale, November 18, 1958 (Paris: Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Defense Nationale, Direction des Etudes, No. 1043, December 17, 1958), p. 3. (Mimeographed.) s France-Soir, June 19, 1952.

FRANCE ENTERS THE NUCLEAR CLUB

tion because it would not apply to Great Britain."4 To say that the weapons decision was made at this time is to clearly overstate the case, for the conditions under which the eventual decision was taken were yet to materialize. Nevertheless, M. Schumann's statement is valuable as an indication of existing apprehensions and awareness of the basic problem at the level of Government authority. Doubt­ less, many persons foresaw the possibility of atomic weap­ ons deriving from the adoption of the Five Year Plan. Yet, no firm decision was taken to orient policy in such a direc­ tion. The CEA has always been marginally associated with na­ tional defense. The Ordinance of October 18, 1945, charged the CEA with "conducting scientific and technical research with a view to the utilization of atomic energy in the various fields of science, industry and national de­ fense."5 The military link was immediately forged by plac­ ing the President of the Comite d'Action Scientifique de la Defense Nationale on the Atomic Energy Committee.® Be­ cause of the central position occupied by the CEA in atomic development in France, the question of who exercises con­ trol within the organization has always been important. In the first period, M. Joliot-Curie was the central au­ thority, and, within the framework of the above ordinance, scientific research was heavily stressed. In large measure this was a necessity, for prior to 1952 France was not in a position, technically or materially, to undertake either a peaceful or military industrial program. The possibility of 4 Maurice Schumann, "France and Germany in the New Europe," Foreign Affairs, XLI, NO. I (October, 1962), 75-76. 6 Ordonnance No. 45-2563, France, Journal Officiel, Lois et Decrets, October 31, 1945, p. 7,065. β The Comite d'Action Scientifique de Ia Defense Nationale functions as a coordinating body for scientific and technical research of interest to national defense and is under the authority of the Prime Minister. It follows the evolution of fundamental and applied techniques of research, defines the needs and means and assigns the tasks to the ministries in­ volved.

T H E BASIS O F T H E FRENCH BOMB

military applications had been introduced into the CEA by the Secretary-General, Rene Lescop, who was instrumental in the decision to construct the plutonium reactors. This orientation was reinforced by Pierre Guillaumat who was named Administrator-General in November 1951, in place of M. Dautry. M. Guillaumat has more than once been characterized as the "symbol of atomic energy in France." In a very real sense he was the administrative counterpart of Joliot-Curie, and because of his forceful personality he greatly expanded the powers and authority of the office of Administrator-General. It was M. Guillaumat who assured the administrative dominance which had begun with the 1951 reorganization. In contrast with Joliot-Curie, Guillaumat was interested in the growth and industrialization of atomic energy, and his educational background at Ecole Polytechnique rendered him amenable to a military orien­ tation. As early as 1953, he called to the Government's at­ tention "the importance and urgency of taking the pre­ liminary decisions in the military area."7 M. Guillaumat's interest in the military aspects of atomic energy provided substantial continuity and direction to military atomic pol­ icy. Certain elements in the military also were instrumental in military atomic development. It should be understood, however, that the military was not a homogenous bloc. Only a limited number of military officers were dedicated to the proposition that France must become an atomic mil­ itary power in its own right. In general, the upper echelons of the military were either unfavorable to the pursuit of a military program or unwilling to seriously lobby for such a cause. This attitude eventually changed, but at least until late 1956, the weight of military authority was not partial 7 Bertrand Goldschmidt, L'Aventure Atomique (Paris: Arthime Fayard, 1962), p. 115. M. Guillaumat's sympathy toward military applications of atomic energy is also noted by a former member of the military division of the CEA, M. Marc de Lacoste Lareymondie, in Le Monde, May 5, 1964.

FRANCE ENTERS T H E NUCLEAR

CLUB

to an atomic weapons program. Consequently, references to the military are intended to mean basically that small group of officers who actively sought an atomic military policy. It should also be noted that the military leadership was not always in accord with its political representatives in the Ministry of National Defense, and that the latter were generally more favorable to a military atomic policy than the former. The failure of the military to conduct an all-out cam­ paign in favor of nuclear weapons for France, and to seek a commensurate conversion of national defense structure and planning may be attributed to several factors. One was the immediate problem of revolutionary war which the French Army faced, first in Indo-China, then in Algeria. A second factor was the problem of financing a military nu­ clear effort at a time when conventional forces were needed to meet existing French commitments. Related to this, in all probability, was the wariness of the various services toward the cuts which they might suffer in the event of a military conversion. This is the impression one receives from Gen­ eral Ely's admonition in 1957 that a new military policy, comprising nuclear conversion, must include a revolution dans Ies esprits as well: "We must free ourselves from ser­ vility to certain ideas, to recognize, for example, that the number of troops or planes or the amount of tonnage are no longer as important as they used to be, or [are impor­ tant only] in another manner. If we fail to recognize this we will be swallowed up in a network of difficulties and especially financial impossibilities from which we will be unable to extricate ourselves."8 A final matter which prob8 General Ely, "Notre Politique Militaire," Revue de Defense Nationale (July, 1957), p. 1,049. See also General Paul Gerardot1 "Au Dela de l'lmpasse: la Defense de l'Europe," Revue Militaire Generate (March, 1958), p. 300. General Gerardot argued that it was necessary for France to eliminate the manufacture of outdated arms and aircraft and to con­ centrate on the only valid weapon of the day, the thermonuclear ballistic missile. He also attacked the mentality of those who, even after Sputnik 1 and 11, refused to recognize the changed nature of national defense.

T H E BASIS O F T H E FRENCH BOMB

ably contributed to complacency was the fact that French defense needs were in large measure fulfilled by the Brus­ sels Pact of 1948, which provided for collective self-defense, and the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, which placed France under the protective wing of the American Stra­ tegic Air Command. As long as France was protected by American nuclear forces, what advantage would there be in duplicating this effort? Despite the absence of any concerted effort by the French military to secure a military atomic capability for France, some preliminary steps to acquaint French officers with the military implications of atomic energy were taken by the military establishment. These studies were devoted essen­ tially to the problems involved in protection from atomic weapons rather than to their use. The army annually sent a small group of officers to the universities and the CEA for nuclear training, and the Direction Techniques et Industrielles of the three services—army, air, navy—as well as the Direction des Poudres, trained a limited number of military engineers in nuclear science. The Direction des Etudes et Fabrications d'Armement and the Section Tech­ nique de TArmee also undertook some specialized training in nuclear problems.8 These groups were not designed for any specific end but merely to acquaint the armed forces with certain facts about nuclear potentialities and effects. The primary concern of the military at this time was the study of means of protecting the armed forces against nu­ clear attack; but it was not until 1951 that a concerted ef­ fort to this end was made by the Commandement des Armes Speciales under the authority of the Chief of Staff of the Armee de Terre.10 Training centers were set up at Bourges, Cherbourg and the Ecole Militaire de Specialisa­ tion Atomique de TArmee de Terre at Lyon.11 By 1955 the 9Ambassade de France, France's First Atomic Explosion (New York: Service de Presse et d'Information, February 13, i960), p. 6. 10 Ibid., p. 7. w Ibid.

FRANCE ENTERS T H E NUCLEAR

CLUB

military had succeeded in reaching a satisfactory level of radioactivity detection for both the armed forces and civil­ ian population.12 Although there is no evidence that either the military representative on the Atomic Energy Committee, General Bergeron, or other military personnel in any way at­ tempted to influence the decision to construct plutonium reactors, the provision for plutonium production in the first Five Year Plan did not go unnoticed by the military. At the time when the plutonium plan was being discussed in the inner councils of the CEA, the Commandement des Armes Speciales expanded its studies to include the use of nuclear weapons and the conditions necessary for their manufacture. "Those studies led to the conclusion that those armaments were perfectly conceivable for a country like France."13 The effect of increased interest in the alternative of mili­ tary applications, both on the part of the military and the CEA, rather than resulting in an harmonious development between the two organizations led to certain difficulties. Now that plutonium would be at France's disposal, some members of the military campaigned in the Government and Parliament not only for a military atomic orientation but also for the establishment of a special military organi­ zation separate and distinct from the CEA which would have full authority and control over a military program.14 The military's attitude may be explained largely by a general distrust with regard to the CEA, where scientific 12

"Chronique de l'Armee et l'Air," Revue Militaire d'Information, No. (December 25, 1955), p. 16. An Interministerial Center of Irradiation and Decontamination was created in the Section Technique de l'Armee with the cooperation of the Service Nationale de la Protection Civile so that military and civil protec­ tion studies could be combined. Ambassade de France, France's First Atomic Explosion, p. 7. is Ibid. 14Goldschmidt L'Aventure Atomique, p. 115. See also the article by 1 M. Marc de Lacoste Lareymondie in Le Monde, May 5, 1964. 264

IOO

T H E BASIS O F T H E F R E N C H BOMB

opinion was known to be anti-military and where the Com­ munist Party still had a foothold. The CEA was generally hostile to the creation of a separate military group—the scientists on principle and M. Guillaumat because of his view that the CEA must control all aspects of atomic de­ velopment. Both the scientists and the administrators, fur­ thermore, agreed that France did not have an adequate number of scientists and engineers to be able to afford two atomic energy commissions. Either the peaceful develop­ ment of atomic energy would come to a halt or the military program would make only slight progress, or both would suffer in the end. However, when the issue was finally re­ solved in favor of the CEA, a military official was placed at the head of the specially created military department of the CEA.15

Despite the increasing pressure, the Government failed to respond by taking positive action. This failure undercut efforts for an early start on weapons study, for work could not begin without funds. Antagonism between the CEA and the Ministry of National Defense, a result of the contest for control over the military studies, precluded any transfer of funds from the military to the CEA. The most that could be done, then, was to prepare for the construc­ tion of the plutonium reactors. To this end, MM. Guillaumat and Gaillard created an Industrial Department, to staff the Marcoule project with engineers and technicians, and an Industrial Equipment Committee.16 Administrative 10 M. Guillaumat was interested in securing the services of a military engineer to take charge of the military branch of the CEA. It was difficult to find an engineer who could work harmoniously with the scientists and the eventual selection of General Buchalet, who was not an engineer but a graduate of St.-Cyr, was the result of the inability to work out an amenable relationship between scientists and engineers. It would seem, therefore, that M. Guillaumat selected a military officer not in order to appease the military services but as a matter of choice. 16 The Industrial Equipment Committee is discussed at length by Andri Leveuf, Le Monde, December 2, 1953.

IOl

FRANCE ENTERS THE NUCLEAR CLUB

control over plutonium development was placed in the hands of Pierre Taranger, a former associate of M. Guillaumat and a fellow Polytechnicien. The technical and scientific direction of the program was placed under the control of M. Yvon, a Normalien. Since preliminary construction was still the main task confronting the Commissariat, the tem­ porary shelving of military development did not entail any major consequences for France. The Industrial Equipment Committee was charged with giving advice on industrial equipment programs and pro­ posing methods for cooperating with those industrial con­ cerns which could aid the Commissariat in bringing its industrial programs to fruition. Members of the Commit­ tee were appointed by the Premier—in fact, at the sugges­ tion of the Administrator-General—and the secretaryship was entrusted to the Industrial Director (M. Taranger) in charge of the plutonium project of Marcoule. Nearly all of the members of the Committee, which was to number not less than six nor more than twelve, were associated with French industry. One notable exception was M. l'lngenieur General Fleury, who was in charge of the Direction des Poudres and who therefore stood as a military repre­ sentative on the Committee. The flow of military engi­ neers and technicians into what was eventually to become the military department of the CEA has been attributed to General Fleury's membership on this Committee and on the Scientific Council created by the Reorganization Act of 1951. It also should be noted, however, that Electricite de France has always been represented on the Industrial Equipment Committee in the person of Didier OlivierMartin, long-time Equipment Director of EDF. Like most of the other committees attached to the Commissariat, this Committee has met only sporadically and has no more than an advisory role. Its main purpose is, by and large, to forge contacts between the CEA and those industries capable of contributing to the needs of that organization.

T H E BASIS O F T H E F R E N C H BOMB

THE EDC, INDO-CHINA AND THE MILITARY ATOM

In 1954 the question of military applications of atomic energy was first brought into the public forum. This was the year of the great debate on the European Defense Community and the termination of the Indo-China war. The 1954 military budget discussion introduced, for the first time, official recognition of the potential role of atomic weapons in national armaments. This combination of fac­ tors did not lead to a positive decision on atomic weapons but initiated a trend, the end product of which was the atomic bomb. To a great extent, the latter was the result of administrative continuity in the CEA and the ultimate de­ velopment of CEA-National Defense rapport. The European Defense Community Treaty (EDC) ques­ tion was very generously cast as "the greatest ideological and political debate France has known since the Dreyfus affair."17 Although the EDC was only peripherally related to the military development of atomic energy in France, its importance cannot be denied since the EDC Treaty con­ tained provisions regulating the whole question of atomic weapons. Article 107 prohibited the production, importa­ tion or exportation of, as well as technical research on, war materials. Several annexes to this article defined war ma­ terials to include atomic weapons and classified the latter as "any weapon which contains . . . nuclear fuel or radio­ active isotopes and which, by explosion or other uncon­ trolled nuclear transformation . . . is capable of mass destruction."18 No participating nation could produce in ex­ cess of 500 grams of material "designed for, or primarily useful in atomic weapons."19 Nuclear fuels were designated 17 Raymond Aron, "Historical Sketch of the Great Debate," France Defeats EDC, ed. Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron (New York: Fred­ erick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 10. 18 Treaty establishing the European Defence Community, and Related Protocols. Signed at Paris, May 27, 1952. (Paris: Imprimeries P. Dupont, 1953), Article 107, Annex 11. 19Ibid., Annex 11(b).

FRANCE ENTERS T H E NUCLEAR

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as plutonium, uranium-233 and uranium-235. Atomic de­ velopment, however, was not precluded for the Commu­ nity since Article 106 provided that the Commissariat "shall prepare a common program for scientific and tech­ nical research in military fields... ."20 The drawbacks of the Treaty, which "would submit even the functioning of the Marcoule center to interna­ tional authority,"21 were impressed upon the Government by M. Guillaumat in his capacity as government advisor on all atomic affairs. The precise nature of M. Guillaumat's objections are not known, but the main themes appear ob­ vious. From the point of view of the national interest, France could be affected in two ways: not only would EDC prevent the development of French atomic military weap­ ons, but peaceful research could be hampered as well. The 500-gram limitation on the production or possession of material "designed for or primarily useful in atomic weap­ ons" fell far short of the quantities of such material neces­ sary for applied atomic research. It should be noted here that the High Commissioner, Francis Perrin, also appar­ ently had some reservations about EDC, and excluding the political aspects of the treaty—Perrin was a member of that wing of the Socialist Party which disapproved of the Treaty—this limitation was probably the root of his appre­ hensions. In view of M. Guillaumat's earlier attempt to orient Government interest toward the military use of atomic energy, it may be assumed that this was his major concern, EDC would also have markedly affected the influ­ ence exercised by the CEA and its Administrator-General in 2» ibid. 21GoIdschmidt, L'Aventure Atomique, p. 115. See also Jean Planchais, he Monde, April 14, 1955. M. Planchais noted that tinder Article 107 of the EDC Treaty "not only is all military research subjected to the Com­ missariat of the EDC but the limit of annual production is so strict that if the treaty were ratified the great part of the CEA'S work, even the peaceful studies, would be subject to the authorizations of the Commissariat of the Community.

THE BASIS OF THE FRENCH BOMB

the formulation of atomic policy. It would therefore have been in M. Guillaumat's best interests to seek a solution which would leave the CEA with the greatest amount of autonomy. The unfavorable attitude which Guillaumat and others in the CEA were to express in the case of Euratom in 1956, would seem to support these general conclu­ sions. In the last analysis, the main themes in the EDC debate were German rearmament and the transfers of sover­ eignty inherent in a supranational community, not Article 107 and its corollaries. In general, little public attention throughout the entire EDC debate focused on the purely mil­ itary aspects of the Community, and when this question was raised, it was apparently discussed behind closed doors by the small group of individuals who were most atten­ tive to these considerations. The effect of the Indo-China war in producing an at­ mosphere favorable to an atomic military program was also marginal but not negligible. In the midst of the crisis surrounding the attack on Dien Bien Phu by Communist Viet-Minh forces, the French Government had sought American military aid in the form of air support.22 Admi­ ral Radford, head of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of State Dulles were favorable to this support, but negotiations fell through and Indo-China was lost to France. American reluctance to intervene in the French cause raised the question of the extent to which France could rely on allied support when peculiarly French na­ tional interests were at stake.23 The question was left un­ answered at the time only to be thrown into even sharper relief in the Suez affair in 1956. Nevertheless, members of the French military, as well as others, were undoubtedly impressed by the incident, for it caused them to contem22William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Coblenz, United States Foreign Policy 1945-1955 (Washington: The Brookings In­ stitution, 1956), pp. 403-404. 23 See, generally, George Kelly, "The Political Background of the French Α-Bomb," Orbis, iv, No. 3 (Fall, i960), 287.

FRANCE ENTERS T H E NUCLEAR

CLUB

plate the desirability of possessing atomic weapons.24 Si­ multaneously, Rene Pleven, Minister of Defense, was un­ der pressure from certain military attaches in his Ministry to consider the possibility of atomic weapons for France. The rationale underlying this pressure was purely strategic in nature and was underwritten by a few French military officers who foresaw the day when Soviet retaliatory power might weaken the efficacy of American promises to defend the Continent against Soviet attack by the use of atomic weapons. M. PLEVEN AND THE MILITARY QUESTION

The debate on the military budget which took place in March 1954 publicized the incipient concern of certain parliamentarians and the Government about the applica­ tion of atomic energy to military ends. Spokesmen for the Finance and National Defense committees alluded to the absence of provisions in the budget for even the study of atomic weapons which, all agreed, were the arms of the future.25 The question was put most directly by Max Lejeune, advisory reporter for the War Section of the Com­ mittee on National Defense: "Will France, a uranium pro24It has been stated from time to time, and confirmed to me in a personal interview with one of the French participants, that Admiral Radford and Secretary Dulles were amenable to dropping a tactical atomic weapon on Viet-Minh supply lines. See Alexander Werth, France 19401955 (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1956), pp. 671, 683. M. Laniel, at that time Prime Minister, was reported to have said that "American intervention would not have touched off a general war which international communism did not want at that time." Alfred Grosser, La IV" Republique et sa Politique Exterieure (Paris: Armand Colin, 1961), p. 298. 25 Christian Pineau, rapporteur special of the Finance Committee; Pierre Koenig, president of the National Defense Committee; Andre Fran^ois-Montiel, rapporteur pour avis of the National Defense Committee, section air; and Max Lejeune, rapporteur pour avis of the National De­ fense Commitee, section guerre. All spoke favorably on the question of French atomic weapons. France, Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires, Assemblee Rationale, No. 21, March 17, 1954, pp. 877-98. (This source hereafter referred to as J.O.^i.N.)

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ducer, endowed with high-caliber scientists, continue to be under the lead of more powerful and dynamic people? Studies have [however] been made, plans established; it would only take a few years to possess the atomic projectile like certain other nations."26 The most eloquent appeal for atomic weapons was made by Pierre Andre during the general debate. Finally, M. Ie Ministre [Pleven] I will ask you a ques­ tion which I deem important, indeed principal: What is an army worth today which does not possess the atomic weapon? To ask the question is to answer it. Without atomic weapons a country doesn't count because its defense is out of date.... A nation without atomic weapons . . . is at the mercy of those who possess this weapon. A national defense without atomic weapons is incomplete and unavail­ ing To recover our rank in the world, to preserve peace, M. Ie Ministre de la Defense Nationale, supply our coun­ try with the weapons which are indispensable to her... 27 M. Pleven's answer must have been comforting, not only to the militant members of Parliament, who loudly applauded M. Andre's plea, but to those elements in the military and the Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique who desired an atomic military plan as well. "In the first place, our military research—I repeat, military, in atomic matters cannot yet be allotted as important means as could be wished. I think that in the coming months, and in any event before the preparation of the 1955 budget, the Government will have to examine in all particulars the problem raised concerning the manufacture of nuclear weapons by a country of France's importance."28 M. Pleven went on to state that 26

J.O., A.N., No. 21, March 17, 1954, p. 897. Ibid., p. 907. 28 /.O.^iJV., No. 22, March 18, 1954, p. 941. 27

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technical and financial problems rather than Government disinterest were responsible for the absence of a military atomic program. He also pointed out that a cEA-military liaison had been established several years earlier and had led to substantial results in anti-atomic protection. In the Council of the Republic, Pleven made his position even more definitive. He noted that there were certain areas of national defense which were not adequately fi­ nanced, including "new research concerning nuclear weap­ ons which France cannot set aside as long as international accords for their abolition have not been concluded."29 M. Pleven was not alone in relying on the failure of dis­ armament negotiations as a justification for French de­ velopment of nuclear weapons. The Socialist Party, long an adherent of the "peaceful-uses" doctrine and committed to disarmament conferences and negotiations, also justified their acceptance of an atomic bomb for France on this ground. Writing in January 1955 in La Revue des Deux Mondes, admidst a flurry of articles on atomic weapons and France, P. O. Lapie concluded that, "so long as the period of simultaneous and controlled general disarma­ ment will not open the era of solely peaceful construction of atomic energy, France must have her independence as­ sured by inventions, tests, and development of military atomic devices."80 Similar sentiments were expressed by Jules Moch at the time of the first French bomb test in February i960.81 29France, Journal Officiel, Dibats Parlementaires, Conseil de la Republique, No. 22, April I, 1954, p. 562. (This source hereafter referred to as J.O.,C.R.) 30 P. O. Lapie, "Arme Atomique, Armie Nouvelle," La Revue des Deux Mondes (January i, 1955), p. 27. The Comite Directeur of the SFIO took a contrary position in March 1955 and denounced the campaign for atomic weapons as a result of "lingering nationalism out of touch with present realities." Le Populaire, March 24, 1955. 81 Jules Moch, "L'O.N.U. et !'Experimentation Atomique du Sahara," La Revue Socialiste, No. 130 (February, i960), p. 144.

T H E BASIS O F T H E FRENCH BOMB

The parliamentary debate on the military budget was a most important event, for it committed the Government at least to examine the question of military applications. In addition, the public became more informed than it had been on the problems of national defense, for both news­ papers and journals picked up where Andre had left off. For the first time since the war, the Revue de Defense Nationale, under the pen of Colonel Charles Ailleret (one of the earliest and most persistent but rare military advocates of a French nuclear force), devoted space to the question of atomic armaments for France. Colonel Ailleret argued that: "Atomic weapons are . . . inexpensive weapons in contrast to classic weapons . . . [and] are as of now pro­ duced in the world in great numbers and henceforth con­ stitute the criterion of a modern army, since an army which does not have them at its disposal can no longer seriously measure itself against an army which is provided with them."32 Furthermore, he argued, military research cannot but benefit peaceful applications. Thus, Ailleret summed up the attitude of journalists and military officers alike who favored the creation of a French atomic bomb.33 As eminent a scientist as Louis de Broglie was disposed to admit the latter point of Ailleret.34 S C I E N T I S T A N D T H E M I L I T A R Y A T O M '. F I R S T R E A C T I O N S

There were also those who advocated continued dedica­ tion to peaceful development of atomic energy. Jean Plan32 Colonel Charles Ailleret, "Applications 'pacifiques' et "militaires' de l'Energie Atomique," Revue de Defense Nationale (November, 1954), p· 427.

83 See also "Pour des Armements Atomiques Franfais," Perspectives, February 6, 1954; General Gerardot, Combat, February 22, 1955; General Gerardot, Combat, February 26, 1955; Le Monde, March 21, 1955; Captain Pierre J-P Maurin, "Perspectives Atomiques, 1," Revue de Defense Nationale (June, 1954), pp. 706-20; Captain Pierre J-P Maurin, "Perspectives Atomiques, 11," Revue de Defense Nationale (July, 1954), pp. 760-72. 34 Louis de Broglie, "La Recherche Scientifique et la Defense Nationale," Revue de Defense Nationale (May, 1955), p. 508.

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chais, writing in Le Monde, noted that France lacked suffi­ cient fissionable material for peaceful uses, and that at the very time President Eisenhower was calling for an end to the nuclear arms race, the French Government was speak­ ing of a reverse trend. M. Planchais asked whether France's international prestige and moral radiance would not gain more from remaining attached to the principle of peaceful development than from possession of an atomic bomb.35 The most violent reaction to the proposition that atomic development be turned to military ends came from the sci­ entific service of the Commissariat. In July 1954, more than one-third of the scientists, engineers and technicians work­ ing in the CEA addressed a lengthy petition to M. Perrin, the High Commissioner, urging that he do all in his power to assure that the French atomic program continue along the lines of peaceful development. The petition attacked the propositions that only an atomic army is of value in the modern world and that French prestige would be enhanced if France possessed an atomic bomb. A military program, the scientists argued, would hamper peaceful research and development severely, for France had neither the financial capacity, material, nor the personnel to undertake two si­ multaneous programs. They also noted that a decision to engage in a military program would completely eliminate any opportunity to use plutonium for peaceful research since the Marcoule piles could furnish only enough plu­ tonium to conduct military tests. In the final analysis, their appeal rested on moral grounds: "It is to work along the lines that we have defined above that the members of the CEA personnel have come to this enterprise. In doing that they were conscious of participating in a work of national interest, and trusted in the official declarations (notably that of M. Parodi in 1946) affirming that the Commissariat 35L^ Monde, April 14, 1954. An even stronger indictment of the promilitary position is to be found in two articles by Etienne Gibert in Com­ bat, April 16, 17, 1954.

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works for the establishment of civil atomic energy to the exclusion of all military objectives. That is why they would now consider it an abuse of their confidence to ask them to work for a bomb, the manufacture of which they have never envisaged participating in."36 It is interesting to note that the petition was addressed to M. Perrin alone, and not to the Administrator-General as well. In view of M. Guillaumat's superior position as Government delegate to the Commissariat, this omission implies that Guillaumat's fav­ orable attitude toward military applications was known to the scientists. Of even greater interest is the reply to this petition, for it was made not by Perrin but by Guillaumat. He recalled that Parliament had rejected amendments purporting to limit Government action in the area of atomic weapons at the time they voted the first Five Year Plan; furthermore, while such a decision would be taken only after careful consideration by the Government, "it goes without saying that in this matter as in all others the Government... would expect from the personnel of the in­ terested establishments, and particularly the personnel of the Commissariat ... an absolute concurrence in the execu­ tion of its decisions."37 This response followed by one day a decree creating a Commission Superieure des Applications Militaires designed to study the problems involved in a po­ tential military program.38 THE MENDES-FRANCE GOVERNMENT: THE FIRST OPTION

It was not until December 1954 that the question of whether France should embark upon an atomic weapons program was subjected to official consideration. The West36 Petition from 665 Scientists and Engineers in the CEA to M. Perrin, High Commissioner for Atomic Energy (July, 1954)» p. 9. Many of the employees of the CEA scientific service were members of the Communist-dominated CGT. New Yor\ Times, March 19, 1954. 37 Letter from Pierre Guillaumat in response to the petition of the 665 scientists and engineers, October 27, 1954. 38 Ambassade de France, France's First Atomic Explosion, p. 8.

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em European Union Agreement, which arose from the ashes of EDC, provided for arms regulation and control by an Agency for the Control of Armaments. Only Germany, by her own choice, was denied the right to manufacture atomic weapons or delivery systems. France was once again free of encumbrances should she decide to undertake the manufacture of atomic weapons. Until December, no offi­ cial position had been taken either on the public battle waging between those who favored and those who were against atomic weapons, or on the equally important question of whether National Defense or the Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique should control a future military pro­ gram. Pierre Mendes-France, then Prime Minister in a Government drawn from the Center and Right, had not been well informed on the status of atomic development in France, although atomic energy was under his authority and control. The combination of pressures from the CEA and certain quarters of the military, together with MendesFrance's lack of knowledge in the affair, led him to call an interministerial meeting to discuss the general situation.39 Prior to this, in October 1954, and through the intermediacy of Henri Longchambon, Secretary of State for Scien­ tific Research, the Prime Minister had posed two questions to a group of atomic technicians: how long would it be be­ fore France could have an atomic bomb and submarine, and how soon must the Government definitely opt for such a plan? According to the experts consulted, it would be five years before France could possess a nuclear bomb, and the last two years of this program "would have to be de­ voted exclusively to the manufacture of the bomb itself, without any benefit to research or industry."40 With these facts in hand, the interministerial committee met on December 26,1954. The meeting was attended by a Le Monde, December 28, 1954. Editorial by Pierre Mendes-France, Les Cahiers de la Republique, No. 24 (March-April, i960), p. 6. 40

T H E BASIS O F T H E FRENCH BOMB

large group of people including cabinet members, military officers, MM. Guillaumat and Perrin, and Etienne Hirsch, Commissaire General au Plan. The results of the ensuing discussion were noncommittal, for consensus could not be reached among the participants. Edgar Faure, Minister of Finance, was alleged to have considered curtailing even peaceful research of the CEA in the general interest of econ­ omy, and was not amenable to adding additional burdens to the already strained economy by providing military re­ search funds.41 M. Perrin and a number of others were clearly opposed to the idea. The military officers present were not fully in favor of establishing a full-scale atomic military program either. M. Mendes-France, supported by M. Guillaumat and several other participants, nevertheless took the position that France could not close the door on the possibility of eventual military applications42 and con­ cluded that any studies which might be undertaken would be under the auspices and control of the CEA.43 41While not specifically referring to M. Faure, who was Minister of Finance in the Laniel Government, M. Gaillard asked what the reactions of the French Government were to the Soviet H-bomb explosion, the American construction of a nuclear submarine and a British decision to build nuclear electricity plants. "We do not know what the reactions arc but it appears that several days ago the pure and simple suppression of the CEA and its appropriations was proposed in a ministerial council in the name of economy. This amusing suggestion appears forgotten for the moment, but on the other hand, it appears certain that an appropriations cut . . . has been decided." Felix Gaillard, "Pour une Politique Atomique Fran^aise," Le Monde, November 25, 1953. L'Express, October 3, 1953, noted that CEA appropriations had been re­ duced nearly 40 per cent over the preceding two years. M. Faure had been Minister of Finance since June 1953, and thus it may reasonably be as­ sumed that these cuts received his approval. See also Le Monde, December 3, 1953, where M. Perrin stated that the Ministry of Finance refused to support a joint proposal of the Ministry of National Education and the CEA for increasing scientific training. Thus, peaceful projects were being curtailed during 1953 when M. Faure was Minister of Finance. 42Editorial by Pierre Mendes-France, Les Cahiers de la Republique, No. 24 (March-April, i960), p. 6. 43 While the decision to place the CEA in control might suggest a de­ cision to economize in terms of men, money and material, it might also

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The results of this meeting were consequently negative in nature—the Prime Minister concluded only that France would reserve decision on military uses of atomic energy for a later time. Mendes-France himself has pointed out that it was not until several years later that a clear-cut de­ cision to produce an atomic bomb was taken.44 Shortly be­ fore the defeat of his Government in early February 1954, Mendes-France called a meeting of the Council of Min­ isters to discuss further the question of a military atomic program. The administrative leadership of the CEA, seeking to bring about a more positive decision, submitted a report indicating that financially and technically France was ca­ pable of making an atomic weapon. But the weight of au­ thority at this meeting was opposed to adopting such a plan, and Mendes-France was both politically unable to bring about a final decision and unwilling to shoulder the responsibility alone. The matter was, therefore, officially left in abeyance. Although no official order was ever sent from the office of the Prime Minister to the CEA, the CEA proceeded, on the basis of the apparent sympathies of the Prime Minister, to carry out its plans for the establishment of a military pro­ gram. The Administrator-General's desire to set up such a program, his preliminary preparations to this end and the lack of a firm Government conviction one way or the other enabled the Commissariat to lay the groundwork upon which some future Government might be better prepared to act. indicate the persuasive and influential position of the CEA high command in Government circles. 44Editorial by Pierre Mendes-France, Les Cahiers de la Republique, No. 24 (March-April, i960), p. 6. The UNR'S Le Courrier de la Nouvelle Republique, No. 4, Nouvelle Serie, February 19, i960, claims that M. Mendes-France actually decided on the bomb in 1954. This may be a question of semantics, but it may be noted that it has been characteristic of the Gaullist Governments to stress continuity between the IVth and Vth Republics on the matter of military atomic applications.

T H E BASIS O F T H E FRENCH BOMB

What M. Mendes-France did, in fact, was to acquiesce in the face of a series of events which had begun more than a year earlier. Military studies had indicated that atomic weapons were within the reach of France. Both Pierre Guillaumat and the few military officials concerned had been pressing for Government action in this area for some time. During the same period, however, Indo-China and the EDC debate had overshadowed all other aspects of French policy, both internal and external. As a result, Mendes-France, who had assumed office in June 1954 with definite ideas on economy and financial measures, had to wait a full six months before he could turn his attention to these matters. Little wonder that the Government lacked adequate time to fully consider the question of atomic mili­ tary applications. This situation allowed those favorable to a weapons program to carefully lay the groundwork which would inevitably lead to a positive decision. The proweapon forces were further aided by the presence of a num­ ber of Gaullists in the Mendes-France cabinet, especially General Koenig and Diomede Catroux. Although the former resigned from the cabinet in August 1954 in protest against the equivocal position of Mendes-France on the EDC Treaty, he had previously expressed an interest in atomic weapons. Furthermore, M. Catroux, Secretary of State for Air, had lent a willing ear to the pro-military ex­ ponents attached to his office. It is also probable that Jacques Chevallier, who replaced General Koenig as Minister of National Defense, was also sympathetic to these overtures, for he was known to have been ardendy in favor of a gen­ eral modernization of French national defense.45 Finally, the development of the international situation, which in­ creasingly demonstrated that France could not prevent the 45 Kelly, Orbis, iv, No. 3, 284. M. Bourges-Maunoury was attached to M. Chevallier's office in a nondesignated post and was later to be very instrumental in fostering an atomic weapons program in the Mollet Gov­ ernment in 1956.

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FRANCE ENTERS THE NUCLEAR CLUB

atrophy of her once vast empire and could not always count on support from her atomic allies, was making its mark. If France would have to stand alone when only her national interest was involved and was a second-rate mili­ tary power in an atomic world, then perhaps possession of atomic weapons would reverse a deteriorating situation. From the time of the Mendes-France interministerial meeting in December 1954 until April 11,1958, the date on which Prime Minister Felix Gaillard decided on the manu­ facture of an atomic bomb, France proceeded to prepare for the bomb without official sanction. Between these two dates, France prepared the basis for an atomic bomb to such a high degree that M. Gaillard was able to say, in April 1958, that the first tests would occur in the early part of i960. The timetable suggested by the experts to MendesFrance in 1954 was to be accurately met. Two events o£ substantial importance intervened in this period: the deci­ sion of Premier Faure in 1955 to forego atomic weapons de­ velopment, and the decision of the Mollet government in 1956 to forego atomic weapons development, and the de­ cision of the Mollet government in 1956 to join Euratom. The latter event is significant enough to constitute a chap­ ter in itself. M. FAURE AND THE BOMB

In 1955 the Premiership fell to Edgar Faure, whose Gov­ ernment officially and publicly declared itself not to be partisan to a military atomic orientation. Prior to M. Faure's investiture, however, the CEA took steps to initiate an atomic weapons study program. In late December 1954, M. Guillaumat called General Albert Buchalet into his office and asked him to head an atomic bomb project. The General's acquiescence led to his recall from a paratroop command in North Africa in May 1955, at which time a Bureau d'Etudes Generales (BEG) was created within the CEA. This Bureau was the cover organization for a secretly

T H E BASIS O F T H E FRENCH BOMB

planned atomic weapons unit which in 1958 became the Direction des Applications Militaires (DAM). This was the state of affairs when M. Faure took control of the Government. The entire Faure episode is replete with contradictions. M. Faure's initial impulse, despite his apparent reservations as Minister of Finance in the previus Government, was to follow in the line of the MendesFrance position. By decree of March 5, 1955, M. Gaston Palewski was named Minister of State for National De­ fense and Atomic Affairs,46 thus combining in one office authority over both atomic energy and national defense planning. Furthermore, another Gaullist, General Koenig, who had served as Defense Minister in the Mendes-France cabinet from June to August 1954, again assumed this office in the Government of M. Faure. Thus, two key posts deal­ ing with atomic energy and national defense were given to members of a party which was known to be in accord with General de Gaulle's admonition that France must become a military power, vested with atomic weapons if necessary.47 Throughout the month of March 1955, the question of whether France should definitely opt for the possession of an atomic bomb was again under study in Government circles.48 There is no doubt that M. Guillaumat and his mil­ itary compatriots attempted to influence this study, for they now had a vested interest in the BEG. M. Andre, who in March 1954 had confronted M. Pleven with the need for an independent French nuclear force, again took up the call during a budget debate on national defense in March 1955.49 And in the journals and newspapers the campaign for and against military orientation, which had begun in 40Decret No. 55-280, J.O., March 5, 1955, p. 2,422. The decree gave M. Palewski charge of the General Secretariat of National Defense which is the coordinating center for defense planning in the Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Defense Nationale. New Yorfc Times, March 6, 1955. 47 At a press conference quoted in the New Yorfc Times, April 8, 1954. isUExpress, March 5, 1955. 49 J.O.^iJN., No. 20, March 2, 1955, p. 908.

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mid-1954, was stepped up.50 Against this background of pressure and polemic, the Faure Government considered the alternatives. Finally, on March 16, 1955, Prime Minister Faure declared that France should, in his opinion, consider making a nuclear weapon. Noting that soon there would be two classes of nations, those possessing thermonuclear weapons and those not possessing them, he added, "I ask myself whether France can relinquish her right to be in the former category. The question will be examined in the near future, and I think it is safe to say that we shall reject a purely negative solution."51 Within a month, however, Premier Faure shifted his position. At a press conference on April 13, the Premier stated: "It is necessary for France to become an atomic power, We should make rapid progress toward that end. But we have decided to elimi­ nate research devoted to specifically military uses. As a re­ sult we do not intend to devote any study to the creation of an H-bomb or any other bomb."52 No reason other than that the Government had given careful consideration to the question was offered for this change of attitude, and M. Faure has abided by his position of April 1955 ever since.53 The only other cabinet minister to express his views pub­ licly on the subject was Minister of Finance Pflimlin, a member of the MRP, a party which was against the bomb 60 Pro-weapons: Combat, February 22, 1955; Le Monde, February 26, 1955. Against weapons: Le Monde, March 11, 1955; Combat, March 16, 1955; Le Monde, March 19, 1955. The latter was an article by Louis Leprince-Ringuet, member of the Atomic Energy Committee. See also Jules Moch in the New Yori{ Times, March 20, 1955. 51 Neu/ Yor\ Times, March 12, 1955; Keesing's Archives, August 6-13, 1955, p. Ι4,36ΟΛ. s2 Le Monde, April 14, 1955. (Emphasis supplied.) 53 Le Monde, February 14-15, i960: "I noted with interest the news and above all the declaration of the French Government according to which this explosion would place us in the best circumstances to pursue an effort toward disarmament. This is, in effect, the only advantage one can find in this experience." See also Le Monde, June 5, 1957, where, however, M. Faure noted that "if our example remains without effect, our country would be free to reconsider its attitude. . . ."

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as a matter of principle. In response to an inquiry by I'lnformation (May 7, 1955), M. Pflimlin concluded that ". . . France, in its present state of resources cannot simultane­ ously pursue all objectives. In the atomic area it is not pos­ sible for us to hope to make up all of our backwardness. . . . Since we must concentrate our effort, I believe it is reasonable to orient it in such a manner that we will be able to use atomic energy for economic ends in the shortest possible time." Previously, he had stated that he wished France would rapidly acquire atomic power plants and atomic ships, but that she should not manufacture bombs.54 The economic and practical problems noted above appar­ ently carried the day in the Government. One explanation for M. Faure's initial attitude may be found in the publication of the British White Paper in February 1955 which stated that England was going to de­ velop the hydrogen bomb and a missile delivery system. This announcement undoubtedly stimulated many French leaders to consider a reorientation of French policy, since France lacked even the atomic bomb. In the view of many Frenchmen, France's interests were as extensive as those of Great Britain; if Great Britain felt that her security obliga­ tions required that she possess a nuclear weapons arsenal, then France should recognize the same need and take steps to assure herself a nuclear force. There were several factors involved in the reversal of M. Faure's attitude. From a personal point of view, M. Faure, unlike a number of his fellow Radical-Socialists, in­ clined toward pacifism. In this respect he was philosophi­ cally akin to M. Perrin and was somewhat influenced by the latter's views on atomic weapons. Furthermore, there were several other problems of more immediate concern to France in 1955. No sooner had France liquidated her Indo-China problem than she was faced with problems in French North Africa. Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria were 54 Ulnformation,

May 7, 1955.

FRANCE ENTERS THE NUCLEAR CLUB

seeking independence from metropolitan France. The Mendes-France Government had taken steps to grant Tu­ nisian autonomy, and under the Faure administration, this policy, which had to be carefully steered between native and French extremists, was pursued and expanded to include Morocco. Franco-Algerian relations created an even more delicate situation, for general French sentiment favored integration rather than autonomy. French policy toward Algeria not only had internal effects but external repercus­ sions as well, for France was sending troops originally committed to NATO to Algeria, in order to restore order there. In addition, the Council of Ministers of the member nations of the Coal and Steel Community were preparing to meet at Messina, Sicily to discuss European integration, and Faure was aware that atomic cooperation would be one of the areas subjected to investigation. Consequently, he felt that any major decisions on atomic policy should take into account possible developments on a European scale. Finally, Faure knew that a French decision to under­ take a military atomic program would not be well received in either the Allied or Soviet camps. American reaction to the idea of the spread of nuclear weapons would surely be negative, especially when the nation involved was receiv­ ing substantial military aid from the United States and was not fully meeting its commitments within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. From the Soviet point of view, the official adoption of an atomic military policy could only serve to exacerbate international tensions. Capping the en­ tire situation was the fact that France had nothing to gain from announcing an atomic military policy at a time when she was still, technically and materially, several years away from bringing such a plan to fruition. THE "PALEWSKI PLAN"

As in the case of M. Mendes-France, M. Faure did not close the door completely on an atomic military program but

T H E BASIS O F T H E FRENCH BOMB

merely concluded that for the moment the military option should not be picked up. Subsequent events, however, sug­ gest that Faure was not in complete control of the situa­ tion. In keeping with his desire to develop the peaceful ap­ plications of atomic energy, M. Faure approved a program prepared under the direction of Gaston Palewski, the min­ ister responsible for the development of atomic energy, calling for a substantial increase in the funds allocated to the CEA. This "Palewski Plan"55 more than doubled the funds allocated to the CEA in the first Five Year Plan, rais­ ing them from 37 to 100 billion francs. The "Palewski Plan" was first made public by M. Faure at the time he stated that France had decided to eliminate research devoted to specifically military uses of atomic energy. Although France would not make atomic weap­ ons, it still had to become an atomic power. The increased budget of the Commissariat was justified on the grounds that France would soon need electricity derived from nu­ clear sources to supplement her diminishing coal and hy­ dro-electric reserves.56 The Plan called for increased pro­ duction of raw materials and primary materials, such as uranium metal and heavy water, extension of the Marcoule center to include more graphite plutonium piles and re­ search on marine engines and new techniques. Roughly one-third of the new program was to be devoted to the Marcoule center, another 20 per cent to be used for studies on propulsion. Military studies appeared to be totally lack­ ing, in conformity with M. Faure's decision, and M. Pa­ lewski, when asked whether his new Plan would take atomic weapons into account, said, "I think it is necessary in any case to acquire our atomic infrastructure and to in®5 Decret No. 55-548, /.0., May 21, 1955, p. 5,021. On April 21, 1955, a Commission Consultative pour la Production d'Electricite d'Origine Nucleaire was created as an advisory body on the production of nuclear electricity for the CEA. This committee is part of the CEA. J.O., April 27, 1955, p. 4,231. 58

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crease our stock of fissionable material. Then, necessity will judge. . . . I personally think that the distinction between conventional weapons and atomic weapons will become more and more arbitrary. . . ."57 All public statements, then, pointed toward at least a temporary renunciation of a military program. Almost immediately, events were to prove otherwise. On May 20, 1955, the very day that the "Palewski Plan" was officially decreed, a protocol was signed by M. Palew­ ski, General Koenig and Pierre Pflimlin, "which provided for the carrying out by the CEA of a nuclear development program including . . . the extension of the basic nuclear infrastructure [and] technical research."58 A third plutonium reactor, G3, was included under the provision for ex­ tending the nuclear infrastructure. To help meet part of the costs, the Ministry of the Army contributed to the G3 program. The precise agreement between the CEA and Na­ tional Defense was that the military would make this finan­ cial contribution to the CEA program, totaling at least a quarter of a billion francs, in return for a CEA agreement to furnish National Defense with plutonium and to conduct the studies necessary for the development of a prototype weapon. The new plutonium reactor, G3, "was constructed at the request of National Defense," which makes it even clearer that the "Palewski Plan" was designed to serve more than just the peaceful purposes alleged in its "ex­ planatory statement" and in the public statements which accompanied the announcement of the Plan. A second aspect of the military-CEA agreement concerned the construction of an atomic submarine for which the French Navy transferred substantial funds to the CEA. In­ terest in an atomic submarine dated from 1954, when the Navy and the CEA planned the construction of two atomic submarines. No action was taken on the submarine dur57 58

Le Parisien Libere, April 21, 1955. Ambassade de France, France's First Atomic Explosion, p. 8.

T H E B A S I S O F T H E F R E N C H B O M B

ing 1954; the question was reopened in January 1955,59 but was not viewed favorably by either M. Faure, then Foreign Affairs Minister, or Robert Buron, Minister of Finance, be­ cause they felt that the 80 billion francs necessary for the construction of an atomic submarine could not be found anywhere in the budget.60 Nevertheless, in July 1955, Min­ ister of National Defense Koenig gave the order to under­ take construction of an atomic submarine, designated as the Q-244. Lacking enriched uranium, which fueled the American atomic submarine Nautilus, the French at­ tempted to build a natural uranium reactor for propulsion. This attempt eventually proved unsuccessful and led to the cessation of work in 1958.61 The atomic submarine was one project which, though decidedly military in nature, won the early support of the Commissariat scientists. The ex­ planation for their interest lies in the advantages which a naval atomic engine could bring to the field of propulsion in general. Furthermore, there was a clear distinction be­ tween a nuclear submarine and an atomic bomb.62 The final phase of the 1955 military program was the establishment of the Bureau d'Etudes Generales, which had been decided upon in principle in December 1954. The BEG began to function in May 1955 with a staff of only three: General Buchalet, Yves Rocard, member of the Atomic Energy Committee since 1951 and one of the few 59 New Yorh i Herald Tribune, January 29, 1955. The result of this protocol was to further assure CEA control over military studies and nuclear development programs. 60 Le Monde, January 29, 1955. ei Provenfal (Marseille), March 15, 1961. Close to 8 billion francs had been spent on the project before it was deemed a failure. 62 In 1956 the construction of a nuclear tanker had been decided upon in principle as a joint project between the CEA and the Merchant Marine, but to this date this project has apparently not left the drafting board. It appears that the Navy was more anxious and more optimistic about the development of a nuclear powered submarine, but since the CEA was de­ termined to prevent any polycentrism in the nuclear field, it proceeded to explore the problem.

FRANCE ENTERS THE NUCLEAR CLUB

scientists favorable to a military orientation, and a secre­ tary. The presence of General Buchalet at the head of the BEG served to smooth over CEA-National Defense differenCES. Technically, the BEG was not under the control of either the Ministry of National Defense or the CEA and its head was responsible primarily to the Prime Minister. In fact, the relationship between the BEG and the CEA was so close, due to a harmony of interest and good personal relations, that the former became an integral part of the latter. This relationship, however, extended much more to the ad­ ministrative service of the CEA and MM. Guillaumat and Taranger than it did to the scientific service, many of whom were for a long time unaware of the existence of the BEG or of the precise nature of this organization. It was only with rare exception that personnel from the scientific branch of the CEA were placed on the staff of the BEG.63 Most of the engineers and technicians were supplied by the Di­ rection des Poudres whose director, General Fleury, was a member of the Scientific Council of the CEA. The first task of the BEG, beyond recruitment of personnel, was to under­ take the study of numerous problems associated with an atomic weapon, including theoretical and experimental nu­ clear physics, metallurgy and ballistics research. Until these studies were completed, work on the construction of the bomb itself could not be pursued. In its first year of opera­ tion the BEG remained rather small, and its financial re­ sources were limited to less than ioo million francs. The following year this figure was to exceed 6 billion francs. The paradox of 1955 was the launching of a definite and coordinated program of military atomic applications at the same time that the same time that the Government offi­ cially declared itself opposed to such a development. That the "Palewski Plan" was certainly intended, at least in part, esM. Perrin at a dinner debate in May 1955 stated that if atomic weapons were made in France, it would not be by the personnel of the CEA but by "others." L'lnjormation, May 2, 1955.

THE BASIS OF THE FRENCH BOMB

to serve military ends is indicated by the protocol of May 20,1955, and the financial contribution of National Defense to the construction of a third plutonium reactor. The sub­ stantial benefits which peaceful uses and the industrial program stood to gain in no way affected this situation. Three factors would seem to explain the events of 1955: the attitude of the CEA, that of the small group of proweapons military officers and the presence of Gaullist min­ isters in the Faure cabinet. For more than a year prior to M. Faure's decision to forego a military atomic program, at least temporarily, Pierre Guillaumat and his collaborators in the CEA had been advocating the development of a military weapons plan. M. Guillaumat's concern over certain of the EDC pro­ visions, the failure of the CEA scientists in July 1955 to ad­ dress their petition to him as well as to M. Perrin (when the Administrator-General was the true power in the CEA), bear witness to this fact. The apparent acceptance by Prime Minister Mendes-France in December 1954 of at least a study program, and the consequent plans for the creation of a Bureau d'Etudes Generales within the CEA, represented a substantial victory for Guillaumat. With these achievements to his credit, it is highly unlikely that Guillaumat would have let victory slip through his hands without a struggle. Undoubtedly, he campaigned at the Government level for continued support of the nascent military development program. As M. Faure was a mem­ ber of the preceding Government, and now Prime Min­ ister, he was apprised of the preparations leading to the Bureau d'Etudes Generales. It is probable that he sanc­ tioned the continued existence of this organization, for he had not fully and irrevocably precluded the eventual possi­ bility of French atomic weapons; but he did not go be­ yond this point and approve a general military atomic program.

FRANCE E N T E R S T H E NUCLEAR

CLUB

Certain elements of the military, limited in number, also had been advocating the creation of a nuclear force in the interests of French defense and security. Although they originally had sought the creation of a second atomic energy commission under the authority of the Minister of National Defense, their failure to achieve this result did not cause them to cease their broader campaign for atomic weapons. Knowledge that one of their own officers was to be placed in charge of the BEG undoubtedly led them to join forces with the CEA in seeking official approval of mili­ tary atomic development. The problem of guerilla warfare, first in Indo-China, then in Algeria, was one of the primary concerns of the military, with the result that pressure for atomic weapons, of litde apparent use in localized warfare, was confined to a relatively small group of men. One should not take this to mean that guerilla warfare was the only concern of the military. There was also strong interest in air warfare, logistics and technological advance. In 1954 and 1955, however, the military and their political representatives at Rue Saint Dominque had not yet come to full agreement on the necessity of atomic weapons, and consequently, a full-fledged campaign for nuclear weapons had not yet materialized. Nevertheless, there was sufficient interest to make the military voice heard. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there was a small cadre of Government officials who were sympathetic to the arguments of the CEA and the military. While General Koenig was a member of the Mendes-France Government, he had been interested in atomic weapons and had spoken favorably on the question before the National Assembly in March 1954, as a member of the National Defense Com­ mittee. M. Palewski, always a close associate of General de Gaulle and a partisan of his views, was hailed by fellow Social-Republicans as a key defender of France's right to manufacture atomic weapons64 and as the man who gave 64

Speech by Diomede Catroux before the First National Congress of

T H E B A S I S O F T H E F R E N C H B O M B

the French atomic military program its initial impetus.65 The limited number of Government officials committed to supporting the eventual development of a military atomic force was offset by the positions which they held. General Koenig was Minister of National Defense in 1954 and 1955, and M. Palewski held a dual portfolio which gave him authority over both national defense planning and atomic energy. The very existence of the dual portfolio suggests that at first the Faure Government intended to bring national defense and atomic energy development closer together. Both the military and the Commissariat were in an excellent position, for the most sympathetic Government officials could provide them with full support. In sum, the efforts of a very small group of persons, of whom only two were officials of cabinet rank, sufficed to create a divergence between declared policy and actual policy. One may argue, as suggested earlier, that this di­ vergence can be explained on the ground that the Prime Minister was not in full control of the policy of his Gov­ ernment. While this is in some measure true, it would not seem to be a fully satisfactory explanation, and there is good reason to believe that M. Faure's policy statement against atomic weapons was intended more as a piece de propagande than as a reflection of the policy actually de­ cided upon. M. Faure, for example, did not approve the Palewski suggestion that a firm decision to make the bomb be taken in 1955. Although M. Faure was unwilling and unprepared to approve a total military program or to yield to the pressures exerted on him by Palewski and Guillaumat, he was nevertheless incapable of making a decision which would quash the BEG and put an end to the contin­ ued existence of this organization or the military studies the Social Republican Party, Federation Unies des Republicains-Sociaux, November 19, 1955 (in the files of the Party). Q5Note d'Information du Parti Republicain-Soeial, No. 12 (July 25, 1956). P- 3· I27

FRANCE ENTERS THE

NUCLEAR CLUB

which it was created to pursue. The CEA capitalized on this vacillation and indecisiveness and managed to save the military program from total extinction. Despite his per­ sonal leaning toward pacifism, the Prime Minister could not bring himself to totally negate the preparatory work for the bomb. His compromise may have been a politic one, but the Faure episode serves to highlight the role and effec­ tiveness of the CEA in the atomic policy process. It also in­ dicates the limitations which could be placed on that or­ ganization and its political supporters. In the last analysis, it would appear that the influence of the CEA outweighed the limitations placed upon it. For, while a positive decision and full-scale program could not be exacted from the Faure Government, the CEA was suffi­ ciently effective to assure continued financial support for a program which was not very popular either in scientific, political, or even military circles.

CHAPTER FIVE

EURATOM AND THE FRENCH ATOM ALTERNATIVES FOR ATOMIC COOPERATION 1

THE same time France was initiating the rudimentary

phases of an atomic weapons program, a movement to revitalize the European idea was beginning to take shape among the member nations of the European Coal and Steel Community. The failure of the European Defense Com­ munity to materialize had temporarily halted the movement toward European unification, but following the ratification of Western European Union, the proponents of a united Europe began to consider new approaches to integration. The failure of EDC had made it clear to the pro-Europeans that unification, certainly along political and military lines, was still premature for Europe, and that any attempt to weld a political community so soon after the defeat of EDC could only lead to a similar disaster. Consequendy, the European architects concentrated their efforts on economic integration, including the new and technical area of atomic energy development. Official endorsement for the relaunching of European in­ tegration came on May 14, 1955, when the Common As­ sembly of the European Coal and Steel Community adopted a resolution calling upon member states to con­ sider possible proposals for European integration at a forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Six.1 The Foreign Ministers, meeting at Messina, Sicily, 1 "Assemblee Commune de la C.E.C.A.: Resolution a l'Adresse du Conseil Special des Ministres de la C.E.C.A. adoptee Ie 14 mai, 1955," Chronique de Politique Btrangere, x, No. 4 a 6 (July-November, 1957),

731-32.

FRANCE ENTERS

THE NUCLEAR CLUB

on June ι and 2, 1955, were presented with a memorandum submitted by the Benelux nations, largely under the in­ spiration of the Dutch representative, M. Beyen. The mem­ orandum, which formed the basis of the Messina Resolu­ tion, called for increased economic integration of the ECSC nations and common action in other areas such as the de­ velopment of peaceful applications of atomic energy. The memorandum suggested the creation of a common au­ thority responsible for, and capable of, guiding atomic energy development with common funds, exchange of knowledge and technicians and non-discriminatory access to primary materials. These two suggestions formed the basis for the eventual Common Market and the European Atomic Energy Community, commonly known as Euratom. The Messina Resolution accepted the general lines of the Benelux Memorandum and differed only in asking for the study of the creation of a common organization. This change of wording probably reflected a compromise be­ tween the Benelux position favoring an extension of the supra-national concept within the framework of the ECSC and the French position that success would depend upon realistic solutions rather than on what might be ideally de­ sirable. M. Pineau, the French representative, was of the opinion that it would be necessary to operate outside the cadre of the Coal and Steel Community, any extension of the latter's competence implying a modification of the Treaty. It is well to remember that the coalition which formed the Government of the day in France contained a number of Gaullist ministers, among them General Koenig and MM. Palewski and Corniglion-Molinier.2 Hence, an overtly pro-European posture could not be maintained by 2M. Palewski stated to Le Parisien Libere (April 21, 1955) that he was a partisan of both international and European cooperation in atomic energy. It must be assumed, however, that Palewski was referring to loose coopera­ tion as opposed to supra-national communities, for he was a member of the Social-Republican Party.

EURATOM A N D T H E F R E N C H ATOM

the Government. Nevertheless, Premier Faure and several other ministers entertained a sympathetic attitude toward the expansion of European integration. Prior to the Mes­ sina Conference, Premier Faure had stated to the AngloAmerican Press Association that he wished the European policy to be pursued. But, he added, "it must be flexible and moving. I would happily view two types of develop­ ment which could be immediately approached; the com­ mencement of European organizations in the area of trans­ portation, and in certain areas of energy including, eventually, atomic energy."3 The remaining members, Italy and Germany, were receptive to the Benelux Memorandum. The atmosphere was favorable to the further development of European unity. On the basis of the Messina Conference, an Intergovern­ mental Committee was formed under the presidency of M. Spaak. The French delegation was headed by Felix Gaillard and included, among others, MM. Perrin, Guillaumat and Armand.4 At a meeting in Brussels on July 18, 1955, this Committee created a Comite Directeur composed of the delegation heads of the Six. The Comite Directeur in turn set up subcommittees to deal with the respective areas of classic energy, transportation, nuclear energy and common market. At the time of the Messina Conference, it was expected that the study reports of the technical and economic experts would be ready by October 1955, but in fact they were not presented until February 1956. Expectations were high that a European Atomic Energy Community could be developed with relative ease. Atomic energy was a new field in which the six had few vested in­ terests which would have to be compromised. Technically and financially, the cost of atomic development was suffisUAnnee Politique: 195$ (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1956), p. 305. In light of this statement, Pineau's comment clearly implied the French desire to move cautiously in relaunching the European idea. 4France, Journal Officiel, Lois et Decreis July 10, 1955, p. 6,922. t

I31

FRANCE E N T E R S T H E N U C L E A R

CLUB

ciently great that no one country among the Six could hope to develop a broad array of atomic installations, whereas together they could make substantial progress in the con­ quest of this new form of energy. Finally, a report sub­ mitted by Louis Armand to the Organization for Euro­ pean Economic Cooperation (OEEC) had concluded that European energy needs were rapidly mounting and faced increasing recovery costs, and that "nuclear energy gives Europe the possibility of having an abundant supply of power at steadily decreasing cost in 15 or 20 years' time."6 Thus, aside from its political value as an opening gambit in the renewed effort toward a united Europe, the Euratom idea had the added advantage of technical and economic necessity, as perceived at that time. Although the Messina Conference and the Resolution had indicated a favorable attitude toward close collabora­ tion among the Six, the nature of this collaboration in in­ stitutional terms remained obscure. For the hard-core Euro­ peans such as Jean Monnet, however, the acceptance in principle of atomic cooperation was an opening wedge in the incessant drive for a united Europe. M. Monnet, shordy after the Messina Conference, claimed that the reason that the Americans and the Russians are go­ ing ahead faster . . . is that despite the differences of their regimes, they are both developing their economies on a continental scale. By contrast, the resources of the markets of the European countries are separate from one another and small. The most striking illustration is provided by atomic energy. . . . The power of any nation to play its part in the future will depend on what it does now to develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes. By pooling their efforts, scientists, technicians, indus5

Louis Armand, Some Aspects of the European Energy Problem (Paris: The Organization for European Economic Cooperation, July, 1955), p. 47.

EURATOM AND THE FRENCH ATOM

trial resources, these nations can make up lost ground, β

In October 1955, Monnet founded the Action Committee for a United States of Europe designed to carry on a cam­ paign to assure the success of new steps toward European unity.7 Inviting political and trade-union leaders from the Coal and Steel Community to support a renewed effort for a united Europe.8 Monnet pointed out that the Committee's task "will be . . . to express to Governments, Parliaments and public opinion its determination to see that the Messina Resolution should become a true step toward a United States of Europe."9 The Council of the OEEC had also un­ dertaken a study of possibilities in the field of nuclear energy which would be based on a loose voluntary coopera­ tion scheme. Consequendy, Monnet continued, "mere co­ operation between Governments will not suffice. It is es­ sential that States shall delegate certain of their powers to European federal institutions. . . ."10 The Monnet appeal met with success in France and gained 33 adherents, in­ cluding Guy Mollet of the Socialist Party, Rene Pleven of the UDSR, Pierre Garet of the Independent Republicans and Robert Lecourt of the MRP.11 Although at the time of the formation of the Action Committee Monnet was not quite clear as to just what practical content could be given to an atomic community, he was convinced that "it was the right star to hitch [his] European wagon to."12 In contrast with the working committees created under the aegis of the eNew

Yor\ Times, June 12, 1955. L'lnformation, October 16, 1955. 8 It was the opinion of the "Europeans" that the EDC had failed because of workers' lack of support for that project. "L'Euratom," Gauche Europeene, No. 28 (February, 1956), p. 12. 9 Keesing's Archives, October 13-20, 1956, p. 15,141. 10 Ibid. 11According to the New Yor\ Times, October 14, 1955, Maurice Faure, Secretary-General of the Radical-Socialist Party and Antoine Pinay, of the Independent-Republican Party, were also charter members. 12New York Times, January 18, 1956. 7

FRANCE ENTERS T H E NUCLEAR

CLUB

Messina Conference which concentrated attention on the technical and economic aspects of an atomic pool, the Monnet Committee was intended as an "alliance of parties and trade-unions capable of fostering European action at the political level."13 By the end of 1955, three study programs for European atomic cooperation were under way: the Messina Plan based on the Coal and Steel Community cadre, the Monnet Committee plan, also confined to the Six but providing for even tighter political and institutional integration, and the OEEC plan. The OEEC version advocated a loose and volun­ tary arrangement, for this organization had not and could not develop supra-national institutions akin to the Coal and Steel Community. It was this lack of supra-national politi­ cal bonds which made the OEEC proposal acceptable to the ardent nationalists of France and the industrial leaders of Germany and Belgium. In early January 1956, the OEEC Council, prior to official consideration and approval, published the report of its study group, Possibilities of Action in the Field of Nuclear Energy.14 The loosely knit scheme suggested by the Work­ ing Committee went no further than to provide for techni­ cal cooperation. Whatever common installations might be developed, such as a heavy-water production plant or an isotope separation plant, would be managed by the inde­ pendent corporations, and control would extend only to such fissionable materials as were produced in these plants. There would be no common budget and no monopoly over the purchase or sale of atomic materials, each country securing its own supplies through bilateral accords. The constitutional structure of the organization would center on a Steering Committee responsible to the Council of the 13 Henri Rieben, "De la C.E.C.A. a l'Euratom," Revue Economique et Sociale, No. 2 (April, 1956), p. 118. 14 L. Nicolaidis, R. Ockrent and W. Harpham, Possibilities of Action in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris: The Organization for European Eco­ nomic Cooperation, January, 1956).

EURATOM AND THE FRENCH ATOM

OEEC9 but its role would be limited to assuring the publiciz­ ing of national programs, the promotion of common en­ terprises and the harmonization of national legislation in matters of security and public health.15 As there would be no common budget, the member nations would be free to join in only such undertakings as they desired, their finan­ cial contributions being determined on this basis alone. The elaboration of this general scheme placed the proEuropean forces in the position of justifying the need for a more integrated program. The Messina Plan, which was made public in February 1956, provided that Euratom would acquire all nuclear materials and would retain control throughout their trans­ formation into fissionable products. All nuclear produc­ tion would be devoted, at least in the forseeable future, to peaceful ends. Each nation would be able to continue its own national programs, and the community would under­ take the construction of various nuclear installations such as an isotope separation plant; these installations would be communally owned and would be paid for out of a com­ mon budget. Euratom would have the right to receive no­ tice of all national programs and to advise nations on their fruitfulness. Finally, there would be a nuclear common market, for both primary and transformed nuclear mater­ ials and the specialized equipment necessary to nuclear production. The institutional framework had not yet been elaborated. Despite differing views on what the political and insti­ tutional nature of a European atomic community should be, there was general agreement among the Six that the or­ ganization which ultimately evolved should be vested with the right to stock fissionable materials, to create and man­ age common installations, to coordinate research and plan­ ning and to open a common market for nuclear material 15

Ibid., pp.

21, 28.

FRANCE ENTERS T H E NUCLEAR

CLUB

and equipment—without, however, infringing on national programs of the member states.18 It was the Monnet Committee which acted first to give institutional content to the Messina Resolution, which it deemed the most acceptable alternative. Meeting in Paris on January 18, 1956, the Monnet Action Committee unani­ mously approved a draft resolution calling upon the gov­ ernments and parliaments of the member states of "litde Europe" to proceed as rapidly as possible to the conclusion and ratification of a treaty establishing a European Atomic Energy Community. This resolution contained three key provisions, which constituted the nucleus of the impend­ ing Euratom debate: the new organization should be vested with supra-national institutions capped by a Euro­ pean Atomic Energy Commission; atomic development should be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes, a pro­ vision which entailed renunciation of the right to make atomic weapons;17 and, to ensure peaceful development, "all nuclear fuels produced in or imported into the territories under the jurisdiction of our countries should be acquired by the European Atomic Energy Commission. . . . The Commission should retain the outright ownership of all nuclear fuels throughout all of their processes of transfor­ mation. . . ."18 M. MOLLET'S COMMITMENT

The political importance of the Monnet Action Committee resolution was heightened by the fact that Guy Mollet, one leLe

Monde, November 17, 1955. It was implied, however, that existing arrangements such as NATO would not be affected. The question of atomic weapons had not been dis­ cussed at all at Messina, and the Monnet Resolution was the first public document to raise the issue. 18 Keesing's Archives, October 13-20, 1956, p. 15,141. The question of supra-national institutions does not fall within the purview of this paper and will occasion only marginal comment. The two key factors, control and ownership of fissionable material and the right of member states to pursue independent military programs, will be dealt with fully. 17

EURATOM AND THE FRENCH ATOM

of its signatories, was invested as Premier of France a short time after the meeting of the Action Committee. The Ex­ ecutive Committee of the Socialist Party had previously given unanimous support to the aims and principles of the Action Committee, and Mollet, as Secretary-General of the Party, had stated that "European Socialism is determined to become a motive power in European development."18 During his investiture speech, Mollet gave positive content to this general principle: Together the nations of Europe can themselves develop their atomic industry and bring themselves up to the level of the two Great Powers. Alone, they will not catch up on their backlog. A preliminary choice should be made. Should we create a European nuclear industry allowing for the production of atomic bombs, a production which would be essentially impossible on the national level in each of the countries involved: My answer will be clear: NO! The European Organization for Atomic Energy will therefore have a dual objective. On the one hand to facilitate the development of a nuclear industry.... On the other hand, to establish a system of control which will rigorously guarantee the peaceful nature of European nuclear activities. Whoever possesses nuclear material is capable of making the atomic bomb. There­ fore, the Government will ask that Euratom have exclu­ sive ownership of all nuclear material and that it should keep it throughout its transformation.20 If there were any doubts as to the import of Mollet's state­ ments, they were dissipated by a further statement which he made in an article appearing in February 1956: We will ask that the member states of Euratom take a ι» ibid. 20

VAnnee Politique: 1956, p. 463.

FRANCE ENTERS THE NUCLEAR CLUB

solemn engagement to renounce the use of the atom for military purposes.... It will be Euratom's job to assure respect of this en­ gagement: —in having the monopoly and the exclusive property of nuclear combustibles; —in having the most extensive rights of control and in­ spection over nuclear installations.21 Reaction to the Monnet Committee Resolution, and im­ plicitly to M. Mollet's comments elucidating the position, was vigorous. Until the publication of the Resolution, the Euratom proposal had remained dormant; but the highly charged issues raised by the Resolution revitalized French interest in and concern over the projected atomic energy community. The problem of military uses of atomic energy really in­ volved two questions. The more immediate problem was whether France was to retain the legal and material ca­ pacity to pursue an atomic weapons program if and when she chose to do so. This was somewhat paradoxical since with the establishment of the clandestine Bureau d'Etudes Generates, the groundwork for a full-scale program was in the process of being laid. The second question was, granted the capacity to make nuclear weapons, should France in fact officially adopt such a policy. The polemic which sur­ rounded the Euratom proposal sometimes confused these two issues. In general, most of those who ardently advo­ cated that France retain her sovereign right to determine the limits and nature of her atomic policy were also of the opinion that a military policy should be pursued. The reaction of the pro-atomic weapons contingent in the avant-garde of the military was a foregone conclusion, for it had been carefully articulated in military journals 21 Guy Mollet, "Le Front Republicain devant l'Europe," Gauche Europiene, No. 28 (February, 1956), pp. 6-7.

EURATOM A N D T H E FRENCH ATOM

over the preceding eighteen months. Atomic weapons were the weapons of the future, and those nations which lacked atomic military capability would be relegated to the status of satellites.22 An army without atomic weapons would be powerless in the face of an adversary who possessed these weapons; lacking atomic fire-power, an army relying upon classic arms would be subject to virtual annihilation 23 Not only were atomic weapons an essential part of the modern military arsenal, but they had the further advantage of be­ ing armes a bon marche when cost and effect were taken into account.24 Those military officers who argued in this vein were equally convinced that France was technically and materially capable of meeting the challenge presented by the creation of nuclear weapons. They had only to turn to the example of Great Britain to show that atomic weap­ ons were not the peculiar province of the super-powers.25 It was clear that the supporters of the Monnet proposal would have to surmount the military campaign which was sure to develop against the renunciation of the right to make nuclear weapons. Although it is true, as was indi­ cated in Chapter Four, that in general the military services were not overly interested in the production of French atomic weapons, the question of renouncing the right to make such weapons did raise concern in military circles. It was also evident that the military would find strong allies among those political elements which, in principle, 22 Captain Pierre J-P. Maurin, "Perspectives Atomiques I," Revue de Defense Nationale (June, 1954), pp. 706-20. 23Colonel Charles Ailleret, "L'Arme Atomique: Ultima Ratio des Peuples," Revue de Defense Nationale (December, 1954), pp. 553-63. 24Colonel Charles Ailleret, "L'Arme Atomique: Arme a Bon Marche," Revue de Defense Nationale (October, 1954), pp. 315-25. See also Colonel Charles Ailleret, "Applications 'pacifiques' et 'militaires' de l'Energie Atomique," Revue de Defense Nationale (November, 1954), pp. 421-32. 25Captain Maurin, Revue de Defense Nationale (June, 1954); Colonel Ailleret, Revue de Defense Nationale (November, 1954); Colonel E. J. Debau, "Les Armes Atomiques et la Defense Nationale," Revue de DSfense Nationale (July, 1955), pp. 3-7.

FRANCE

ENTERS T H E

NUCLEAR

CLUB

were against supra-national communities. To the latter group would be added other political figures who, while not averse to the creation of a European atomic pool re­ sponsible for general atomic research and activity in the cadre of the Six, would be unfavorable toward any a priori renunciation of the right to make atomic weapons if and when France saw fit to do so.26 One of the most reasoned critiques of the Monnet Reso­ lution came from the pen of Raymond Aron.27 Aron ar­ gued that the movement for European cooperation in the field of atomic energy had substantial support but that it might possibly suffer the same fate as the EDC Treaty if cer­ tain risks and exigencies of the situation were not carefully taken into account. Not only were the members of the Six at different stages of development and under different eco­ nomic systems,28 but the separation of peaceful and military uses was, in practice, impossible. To accept total renuncia­ tion of military rights not only created a dilemma for 2eAn anonymous article in Combat (January 26, 1956), contended that the idea of the "Europeans" was to sacrifice the interests of France to supra-national organs where Germany would have a preponderant voice. The Soviet Union had not shown a pacifist tendency, and perpetual reli­ ance on the United States constrained Europe to follow the United States for better or worse. Implicit in this argument is the necessity that Euro­ pean nations, alone or in concert, keep the door open to the eventuality of developing an atomic force. A similar argument is found in the Bulletin Mensuel d'lnjormation du Bureau Politique de Monseigneur Ie Comte de Paris, No. 85 (March 9, 1956), where it is stated that "politically, this formula, in spontaneously and without recourse denying the member nations of Europe [the right] to manufacture and retain atomic weapons, subjects them entirely to American aid. . . ." 27 Le Figaro, January 23, 1956. 28Germany and Belgium, for example, were strongly in favor of con­ trol by private industry, whereas France adhered more to an etatique system in both atomic development and electricity production. Bertrand Goldschmidt refers to this discrepancy in the stages of development in the Six and concludes that the union of these nations appeared quite difficult in the eyes of the specialists "but powerful political forces working for European unity made its success certain." Bertrand Goldschmidt, L'Aventure Atomique (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1962), p. 129.

EURATOM AND T H E FRENCH ATOM

France, who unlike Germany, was not bound to forego military atomic development,29 but also "... in an age when all weapons are being renewed by the use of nuclear energy, when the navy today, the air force tomorrow, will have recourse to atomic propulsion, the nations which a priori deny to themselves military uses of this new source of energy not only put themselves outside the circle of Great Powers, they resign themselves to total impotence."30 M. Aron concluded that perhaps the OEEC concept of vol­ untary cooperation was the more prudent and practical option. What was most important was that a solution be chosen, not because it suited individual preferences most precisely, but because it had the greatest chance of success. In the ensuing months, the opponents of a united Europe and of supra-national institutions frequendy sought to justify their objections on the basis of the greater practi­ cality of the OEEC plan, rather than merely on their adver­ sity to supra-nationalism per se. Full development of con­ flicting views had to await publication of the Messina Plan. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MESSINA PLAN

The Intergovernmental (Spaak) Committee met in Brus­ sels on February n, 12,1956, to present its interim report to the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Six.31 M. Spaak indi­ cated at this meeting that the question of the eventual military uses of the atom was one of the most difficult problems facing the atomic pool. This aspect of atomic de­ velopment had been held in abeyance by the working com­ mittee, but the Monnet Resolution had raised the problem in unequivocal terms. M. Spaak, a dedicated European, was concerned lest the retention of free disposition by 29 Germany unilaterally undertook not to make or receive atomic weapons under the Western European Union accords of 1954. 80Ltf Figaro, January 23, 1956. 81 VAnnee Politique: 1956, pp. 262-63. This meeting was to have taken place several months earlier, but the intervening Government crisis and national election in France forced the delay.

FRANCE ENTERS THE NUCLEAR CLUB

member nations to use fissionable material for military ends endanger the success of the Euratom idea. He sug­ gested that one solution would be that proposed by the Monnet Committee—renunciation by all members of the community of the use of nuclear energy for military pur­ poses. M. Pineau, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, indi­ cated that his Government's opinion was that only in the event of failure of world disarmament could the question of non-peaceful uses of atomic energy arise,32 but he ex­ pressed reservations about the Spaak formula and sug­ gested that the problem of military uses be tied to that of general disarmament. This was a departure from the Monnet-Mollet position of absolute renunciation of military uses of the atom and is indicative of a divergence of opin­ ion between the Prime Minister and his Minister of For­ eign Affairs. M. Pineau, however, was closer to the Mollet position than to any of the other alternatives and later sub­ mitted a compromise proposal of a five-year moratorium on the manufacture and testing of nuclear weapons. The moratorium concept was part of a compromise solution eventually adopted by the Mollet Government. M. Spaak, on the other hand, tended to be more under the influence of Monnet. He eventually took the position that if total re­ nunciation could not be achieved, then Euratom must re­ tain full control over any eventual military uses. Speaking at a luncheon engagement in June 1956, M. Spaak directed his comments to the French: "I ask them to reflect care­ fully. Is it really necessary to devote a great part of their economy and finance to the manufacture of bombs when the allied nations . . . can eventually put them at our dis­ posal?"33 No firm conclusion was reached by the Foreign Ministers at Brussels, beyond recognition of the need to find a solution which did not definitively exclude military uses of atomic energy. 82 83

Jbid., p. 263. Le Monde, June 22, 1956.

I42

EURATOM A N D T H E FRENCH

ATOM

Debate in the French Parliament on the Euratom pro­ posal was not opened until July 1956, but the legislature had been seized of the problem long before that time. In February 1956, several days after the Brussels conference, the Monnet Committee Resolution had been tabled as a proposition de rSsolution in the French National Assem­ bly.34 Whatever may have been the intention of the mem­ bers of the legislature who introduced this proposal, it gave adequate opportunity for the pro-Euratom and antiEuratom forces to crystallize. Although Euratom was not to ride the same turbulent seas that finally engulfed the EDC, it had to negotiate a difficult course because of the sensitive military and political problems it raised. As in the case of the EDC, Euratom faced the unbending opposition of the political extremes, whose presence had so often hampered French policy in the past, as well as the frenetic hostility of the anti-European forces. But, unlike the EDC, the Euratom idea neither conjured up fears of a revived Wehrmacht nor required, by definition, political and military supra-nationalism. From the very outset, there were certain essentials agreed on by all parties concerned: the general European need, and the specific French need, to harness atomic power as a supplement for classic energy sources; the desirability of cooperation and coordination of atomic development among a number of small nations whose economic struc­ tures would be taxed by large-scale national atomic pro­ grams; the urgency for rapid development which could be secured by pooling, in some measure, industrial, techni­ cal and material competencies.35 Conversely, certain diffi­ culties existed as a result of the different economic systems 34 France, Journal Officiel, Documents de VAssemblee Nationale, Annexe No. 472 (February 15, 1956), pp. 257-58. "Proposition de Resolution Tendant 4 Inviter Ie Gouvernement 4 Assurer Ie Developpement Pacifique de l'Energie Atomique en Europe." 35 Rieben, Revue Economique et Sociale, No. 2 (April, 1956), pp. 122-2&

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of the Six. Belgium and Germany were much less under the influence of statism or dirigisme than were the French, whose economic structure provided for state-owned atomic and electric authorities. The Belgian industrialists favored bilateral arrangements with the United States whereby Congo uranium was sold to the United States which in turn offered technological aid and enriched uranium to Belgium. The German industrialists entertained similar hopes of bilateral accords and, furthermore, felt that they had the technical capability to rival other nations in atomic development. In these two countries, consequently, there was a stronger aversion to communal control and organi­ zation than existed in France.3® Many Frenchmen, on the other hand, could and did claim that on the economic-technical level France was sub­ stantially ahead of its potential partners in atomic devel­ opment.37 Granted this lead, could France benefit from anything short of an atomic pool which included the only European nation in a superior atomic position to herself, Great Britain? Granted that cooperation was a useful and even a necessary factor, did it follow, argued the oppo­ nents of Euratom, that the Coal and Steel Community cadre was the only, or even the most propitious means, to this end? One of the most vigorous critics of the proEuropean forces, Professor Bernard Lavergne, while ad88 See Allen S. Nanes and Reuben Efiron, "Atomic Energy and the European Community," World Affairs Quarterly, XXVII, No. 4 (January, 1957). 361. 87 The fear that entry into an atomic pool including Germany would be of invaluable assistance to that nation was one of the main concerns of many Frenchmen. Writing in Le Monde Diplomatique (March, 1956), Andre Fontaine summed up this fear: "Germany has practically no atomic industry and is in no position to catch up with us. Under the pretext of placing her in a pool with us for political reasons, are we going to sacri­ fice the advance that we have taken and share it with her?" Cf. Louis Armand, L'Express, April 6, 1956: "[Certain scientists] . . . pretend that in choosing plutonium as the basis of French atomic industry they are in a position to create an independent and profitable national production."

EURATOM AND T H E FRENCH ATOM

mitting the desirability of common action in given spheres of atomic development—the OEEC thesis—was moved to argue that, "it is in no degree necessary to imagine all the juridical restraints, all the supra-national institutions that the intellectual obstinacy of Jean Monnet has suggested. . . . the essential goal of M. Jean Monnet's Euratom is to break all the levers of French independence, to make the French state . . . a memory of past times. . . ."38 The tech­ nical and economic factors which weighed in favor of atomic cooperation did not, therefore, imply to all persons the need for structural devices which would be sure to pre­ clude the adherence of nations outside the Six, and es­ pecially Great Britain.89 In discussing the development of French policy toward Euratom, it is necessary to exclude the Communist Party which, in many ways, fell outside the mainstream of French politics. Ideologically committed to the Soviet brand of communism, the French Communist Party had consistendy taken a negative stand on the matter of Euro­ pean integration. Whereas Soviet policy was dedicated to loosening the bonds of Western alliance, the movement for a united Europe tended to strengthen those bonds. Euratom was viewed by the communists as an aggressive instrument designed in preparation for war and subject to the domination of the United States. From the beginning, the founders of Euratom consid­ ered that all former projects of the European Commu­ nity were rejected because of their clearly expressed ob­ jective: rearmament of West Germany, preparation for war. That is why the Messina project as well as the 88 Tribune

des Nations, April 13, 1956. The Monnet Committee proposal specifically stated that all possible steps should be taken to include Great Britain in at least some measure in the proposed atomic pool. It was nevertheless clear to most persons that Great Britain would remain aloof from any organization which involved such a derogation of political sovereignty as the Monnet Committee pro­ posal called for. 89

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CLUB

Monnet Plan is presented as a program for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and all propaganda in their favor stresses this theme. In truth it is more a military than a peaceful matter. The possibility will be offered, in the first place, to West Germany that the creation of Euratom will free it of all restrictions concerning the production of atomic weap­ ons.40 As in the cases of the Coal and Steel Community and the European Defense Community, the Communist Party members in the Parliament voted against the Euratom pro­ ject. Between M. Mollet's investiture speech in January 1956 and the Parliamentary debate on Euratom in July of that year, the Prime Minister's position on the question of atomic weapons underwent substantial change. Starting from the principle that Euratom must be devoted to exclu­ sively peaceful purposes, and consequently must exercise vigorous control over the uses of all fissionable material, Mollet shifted to the position that France's juridical and material capacity to manufacture atomic weapons, if she chose to do so, should not in any way be hindered by French membership in the Euratom community. There were two basic reasons for this change in M. Mollet's atti­ tude: the exertion of pressure by a combination of forces (among which military representatives and the CEA were very influential) and his assessment of the balance of po­ litical forces in the National Assembly regarding the pro­ posed atomic pool. The reconciliation of the conflicting opinions of those who supported and those who opposed the limitations suggested by the Monnet Committee Reso­ lution goes far to explain why the Euratom proposal es­ caped the fate of the EDC. 40 N. Moltchanov, "Pools Atomiques," Temps Nottveaux, No. 13 (March 22, 1956), p. 7.

EURATOM AND THE FRENCH ATOM

THE QUESTION OF RENUNCIATION: THE MILITARY

There is, of course, no public record of the arguments used by the military establishment or the CEA to influence the Mollet Government to modify its initial stand on Euratom's ultimate jurisdictional prerogative. On the basis of limited evidence, however, it appears that the attitude of those who worked behind the scenes to assure French atomic military rights very closely approximated the pub­ licly stated views of the military. The views of the rela­ tively small group of military officers who favored an in­ dependent atomic capability for France were recorded prior to the Euratom debate and were noted earlier in this chapter. They were now rephrased by some higher mili­ tary authorities: nonatomic military organizations were anachronisms in the nuclear age and were incapable of meeting challenges emanating from states endowed with nuclear weapons capacity; reprisal capacity sufficed; and, finally, atomic weapons were economically "cheap" in terms of their effect.41 In light of the economic feasibility, and France's technical competence, the irresistible conclu­ sion favored an atomic weapons program. The capstone of this line of reasoning was articulated by General Maxim Weygand: The United States have assured their atomic intervention in the event of Russian aggression. But never, to my knowledge, have they considered delivering atomic weapons to Europe.... But we must also question whether national impera­ tives can prevail, if .. . the United States, until now pro­ tected by distance, finding themselves directly menaced by progress in Russian aviation and bombs, feel obli­ gated to renounce undertaking the defense of their European bridgehead and to devote their maximum mil­ itary effort to protection of the homeland 4lSee,

for example, General Dassault, Le Monde, May 31, 1956.

F R A N C E

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N U C L E A R

C L U B

The idea of eliminating the employment of atomic energy to military ends is clearly insane. It is not a ques­ tion of prestige; it is a question of life or death.42 General Weygand's conclusions on the necessity of leaving France free to manufacture atomic weapons went further than most of the previous statements by military officials, for he recognized not only the advisability of such a pro­ gram but also its imperative nature. It was not until the air around the Suez crisis had cleared that the French military recognized the full implications of reliance upon American atomic defense and the potential danger inherent in de­ pendence on allied nuclear support. Thus, the full impact of General Weygand's plea for atomic weapons was not to marshall military propaganda for such a program but merely to coalesce military thought on the indispensability of excising an a priori renunciation of atomic weapons from the Euratom program. In sum, the military attitude was opposed to renouncing the right to manufacture atomic weapons, but the high command of the armed forces had not yet reached the point of presenting a united front in favor of the actual initiation of a heavily endowed, full-scale, atomic military program. THE SCIENTISTS AND EURATOM

The opinion of the CEA on the Euratom proposal was some­ what more complex. The scientific-administrative split with regard to atomic weapons had long been evident, and it would have been logical to assume that this dichotomy would be simply translated into a pro-Euratom and antiEuratom differentiation between the two services. In gen­ eral terms, the administrative leadership, under M. Guillaumat, was cautious if not hostile to the Euratom idea, but the scientific service, under M. Perrin, was also circumspect in 42JLtf

Monde, January

31, 1956.

(Italics mine.)

EURATOM AND THE FRENCH ATOM

its approach to the atomic-pool program. The Mollet Gov­ ernment, however, was irrevocably committed to the Euratom idea, and the most the CEA could accomplish under these circumstances was to attempt, in its capacity as Gov­ ernment adviser on atomic affairs, to tailor the future community to their conceptions. It is the conclusion of a number of competent observers that the Euratom program represents the only major occasion during the Fourth Re­ public when the CEA was obliged to compromise its posi­ tion on atomic energy policy, and to defer in some measure to the will of the responsible political authorities. From the point of view of the Commissariat scientists, the concept of atomic cooperation per se provided substan­ tial advantages. What was less clear was whether such co­ operation had to be ensconced in a supra-national commu­ nity. A number of scientists and technicians felt that a cooperative scheme which incorporated Great Britain would be more advantageous. This was essentially the same view entertained by Mendes-France and the former Gaullists who comprised the Social-Republican Party. M. Perrin, the High Commissioner for atomic energy and chief atomicscientific spokesman in France, indicated his sympathy with this view when he stated: "It would appear . . . that, rather than limiting itself to the Six, Europe might be better off developing the totality of its efforts and in count­ ing on establishing within ten years one or several new atomic industries cohesive and strong enough to show [Eu­ rope] to be equally free from the United States and the Soviet Union, that is to say, independent."43 A second related factor which influenced scientific thought on Euratom was the disparity in the level and rate of development between France and her five potential atomic allies. The variations in atomic development among the Six led many atomic scientists and technicians to con­ clude that union on an equitable basis would at best be dif43 Combat,

May 17, 1956.

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ficult. France's substantial advance had been achieved in virtual isolation, Belgium had received some technical in­ formation from the United States by virtue of bilateral ac­ cords, but the other nations were neophytes in the field. France alone had twice as many atomic technicians as the rest of Europe put together, and French development had placed her in a position of relative independence, while her national program was capable of providing ample growth.44 Thus, atomic union would place France in the position of surrendering a certain amount of independence and of according her future partners the benefits of her material advance and technical knowledge and skills for an as yet undetermined consideration. The scientific leadership of the Commissariat was given a sterling opportunity to express its views publicly on Euratom in July 1956 when M. Mollet, using a rarely em­ ployed parliamentary rule, invited High Commissioner Perrin to speak on the Euratom proposal before the Na­ tional Assembly. M. Perrin, however, confined his com­ ments to the strictly technical domain and abstained from dealing with the political aspects of the problem or of pro­ posing tentative solutions to meet the need for atomic co­ operation. Despite Perrin's evasiveness with regard to the necessity of the particular Euratom plan, his address re­ veals a certain degree of hesitancy toward Euratom.45 Dis­ cussing the technical-economic facets of atomic energy development, the High Commissioner took a balanced ap­ proach in which he admitted that France could, without particularly close association with other nations, develop an atomic industry sufficient to cover most of her prospec44Goldschmidt

1 VAventure Atomique, p. 129. Entreprise, April 15, 1955, P· J3> reported that there was resistance to European cooperation by M. Perrin, among others, on the ground that cooperation with Germany was considered undesirable. This is question­ able, as far as the CEA is concerned, for France approached Germany shortly thereafter with a plan for joint construction of a U235 plant. See below, Chapter Six. 45

EURATOM A N D T H E F R E N C H ATOM

tive needs over the next several decades. On the other hand, indigenous development would require a much more sub­ stantial financial program than the Government had yet underwritten and would preclude the possibility of explor­ ing all the possible reactor types, which in turn meant taking the risk of not finding the most economic reactor or the one which was most adaptable to large-scale produc­ tion. On balance, financially, technically and materially, France could develop a total atomic industrial complex in­ dependently of other nations, but it would require a tre­ mendous effort—an effort which Perrin seemed to imply France was not likely to make. Consequently, there was virtue in cooperation of some sort. Despite these factors, . . . European union, to be productive, must not englobe national programs in excessive centralization with the risk of suffocating the most advanced, especially the French program, but must sustain these national pro­ grams, it being understood that all information must be exchanged, each country nevertheless guarding its auton­ omy and its possibilities of initiative in its programs. It is, on the other hand, essential . . . that the advance of certain nations be recognized in allowing them a pri­ ority of use of primary or elaborated materials which they have produced in their previously launched pro­ grams. . .. These essential conditions have been fulfilled by the present projects for European cooperation, that which has been prepared in the cadre of the OEEC as well as the 46 Euratom project This brief statement is instructive on several counts. Firstly, it appeals for the differentiation of national and communal programs, a situation which probably would 46 France, Journal Officiel, Dibats Parlementaires, AssembUe Nationale, No. 78, July 6, 1956, pp. 3,266-67. (This source hereafter cited as ].0., AM.)

FRANCE ENTERS THE NUCLEAR CLUB

be better maintained in the loose cooperative scheme of the OEEC than in the highly centralized Euratom plan. It is dif­ ficult to escape the atomic nationalism in this statement. France was the only member of the Six to be in a position to produce plutonium, which accounts for Perrin's insist­ ence that a right of priority be granted to those nations which have succeeded in mastering the technique of pro­ ducing fissionable material. One of the major considera­ tions underlying this line of thought was undoubtedly the realization that the only other potential atomic power among the Six was West Germany, whose ascendency in this area the French were not disposed to entertain. A sec­ ond implication of Perrin's statements is that the OEEC was quite as acceptable a framework within which to build atomic cooperation as was the Coal and Steel Community. The OEEC had the advantage of assured British participa­ tion and, consequently, at least limited access to advanced British technology. The OEEC plan would not even raise the question of national atomic programs. M. Perrin's preoccu­ pation with national development was most clearly indi­ cated in one of his closing statements before the National Assembly: "European collaboration in the area of atomic energy would be detrimental from the technical point of view if it had as a consequence a diminution of national efforts."47 The Euratom pool presented a greater danger in this respect than did the OEEC, and this stood out clearly in Perrin's mind. One aspect of atomic cooperation was of special interest to the Commissariat scientists—the possibility of develop­ ing a European isotope separation plant. When the first French Five Year Plan was elaborated in 1952, the theo­ retical choice, insofar as production of fissionable material was concerned, was between plutonium and enriched ura­ nium. The plutonium alternative had been selected bas­ ically on economic and technical grounds. Substantial 47

Ibid.,

p. 3,267.

EURATOM AND THE FRENCH ATOM

amounts of natural uranium were needed for isotope sepa­ ration, the cost of a plant alone exceeding the total amount of money available under the Five Year Plan, and France totally lacked the technological data necessary for isotope separation. By 1955, however, French uranium deposits were sufficient to supply an isotope separation plant, and the highly toxic nature of plutonium, which made that material difficult to work with in peaceful applications, led French scientists to conclude that an isotope separation plant was in order at least until plutonium technology was mastered. The Commissariat felt that a separation plant was within French competency but that it could be com­ pleted in a shorter time and with less material and eco­ nomic strain if carried out jointly with other nations. In alluding to this cooperative enterprise, M. Perrin noted that Swiss industrial participation would be most beneficial. As Switzerland did not contemplate joining the Coal and Steel Community nations in a supra-national community, but was a participant in OEEC, the High Commissioner once again intimated that Euratom was not necessarily the cureall for cooperative atomic development. THE CEA ADMINISTRATION AND THE QUESTION OF RENUNCIATION

The administrative leadership of the CEA was less disposed toward the Euratom plan, but only partly for the same reasons that motivated the scientific leadership. As in the case of the EDC, M. Guillaumat was concerned lest the Euratom plan affect the autonomy enjoyed by the CEA. This concern with the retention of autonomy over policy direc­ tion, planning and control, was the corollary of M. Perrin's insistence that French national atomic development be in no way impeded or encumbered by the existence of an atomic community. It would be unjust to assign purely self­ ish motives to the Administrator-General's view that the proposed Euratom Commission, which would exercise ex-

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ecutive authority over planning and programs, must be vested with limited jurisdiction. France's advance in the atomic field and the existence of a large-scale national de­ velopment program geared to national needs and objectives would best be governed by an organization which was thoroughly familiar with the French program. M. Guillaumat, therefore, sought to preserve the position of the CEA and to assure to the greatest extent possible its continued hegemony over national development. The Euratom for­ mula eventually adopted left the CEA untouched in this re­ spect. Of equal concern to M. Guillaumat and his pro-military allies in the CEA was the retention of French freedom to en­ gage in a military applications program. It was on this point that the scientific and administrative services did not see eye to eye. M. Perrin and many of the scientists were not averse to the concept of an exclusively peaceful Euratom which would entail the renunciation of the right to make atomic weapons by the member nations. The Administrator-General and General Albert Buchalet, head of the military applications unit in the CEA, labored hard to preserve France's juridical and material right to make atomic weapons. They took the position that France must not commit herself not to make atomic weapons and, con­ sequently, must assure that all fissionable material remain free from any restrictions on its use. Material capacity had to accompany juridical capacity, for "nothing would be gained by reserving, in an international accord, a certain freedom in principle to use atomic energy for military ends if the supply of fissionable materials of national programs does not enjoy a corresponding degree of freedom."48 Un48 "La Liberte de Fabrication d'Armements Nucleaires et Ie Projet d'Euratom-Spaak," Fiche (!'Information (Paris: in the files of the CEA), p. 2. (The greater part of this document appeared anonymously in Com­ bat, July 9, 1956.) (This document is hereafter cited as Fiehe d'lnjormation.)

EURATOM AND THE FRENCH ATOM

hampered by Euratom engagements, the argument went, France would not only be free to purchase nuclear ma­ terials abroad by bilateral agreements, but would also be able to freely utilize her native resources to whatever end she desired. While the French military program would have to be kept at a modest level for some time to come, once the atomic infrastructure was completed, including Electricite de France reactors, the military program could rapidly ex­ pand. Once tied to a purely peaceful Euratom agreement, however, France would lose both the juridical and material capacity to provide herself with atomic weapons. The pro-military contingent in the CEA was against both an absolute or a provisional renunciation of the right to make atomic weapons. M. Spaak, president of the Inter­ governmental Committee on Euratom, had noted at the Brussels conference in February 1956 that the Foreign Ministers of the Six seemed to agree on the necessity of finding a compromise solution between the position that military uses of atomic energy must be totally renounced and the view that military rights must be totally retained. The meeting which had taken place on Euratom had been confined mainly to technical questions, and the specific problem of military uses of atomic energy had been left for the Foreign Ministers to setde. The compromise proposal suggested by Spaak called for a moratorium on the manu­ facture and testing of nuclear weapons for a period of five years. During this time, a unanimous vote could restore these rights, and at the end of the moratorium, such rights could be reinstated if three members approved.49 The pro­ vision that two other member states, apart from the re­ questing nation, approve military uses was suggested by the French Foreign Minister, M. Pineau.60 The reaction of the CEA to this proposition was guided by 49Rieben, Revue Economique et Sociale, No. 2 (April, 1956); Combat, April 19, 1956. 50 Combat, April 19, 1956.

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two essential factors. On the one hand, it was felt to be highly unlikely that a French Government would request a change of position four or five years after Euratom had been effectively functioning as a peaceful atomic develop­ ment organization. With billions of francs invested in Euratom projects, it would be most difficult to commence anew special national nuclear facilities to supply military needs. Even granted that a positive governmental position to manufacture atomic weapons was taken, the necessary facilities would have to be constructed. This would mean not only the aforementioned excessive financial burden, but a long-term delay in reaching the point at which atomic weapons could be manufactured. An isotope separation plant, deemed essential to an atomic national defense pro­ gram, was also being considered as one of the Euratom projects. In the view of the pro-military cadre, a mora­ torium would delay construction of a national isotope sep­ aration plant while a Community plant was being built be­ cause of the prohibitive factor of costs: France could not readily afford to support two such projects simulatneously. Furthermore, France would not be able to utilize Euratom U235 eventually for a national military program since the Community was restricted to peaceful applications.61 Fi­ nally, even if U235 from the Community plant could be allocated for defense purposes (a contingency admitted by M. Spaak), there was a substantial difference between the degree of enrichment necessary for civil as opposed to mili­ tary purposes.62 Since the degree of enrichment determined the cost per unit of U235, the CEA argued that it was most likely that economic factors would lead to the conclusion that only slight enrichment should be carried out. Under these circumstances, the U235 from the proposed Euratom isotope separation plant would be of little use to a military si Fiche

(!'Information, pp. 6, 7. A 20 per cent enrichment would easily suffice for most civil needs, but 98 per cent enrichment is frequently necessary for military uses. 62

EURATOM AND THE FRENCH ATOM

program.53 The CEA concluded that under these conditions "it would do France no good to recover her liberty if she had not previously constructed a series of reactors for mili­ tary ends. Thus, rather than economy there would be double expense."54 The Spaak compromise was viewed by the pro-military group as a political solution which was conceived in a purely peaceful optique and without regard to technical realities. The Government, it was felt, could reach no other conclusion than that even a provisional re­ nunciation of atomic weapons ran the risk, in all events, of becoming an irrevocable decision. THE POLITICAL PARTIES, PARLIAMENT AND EURATOM

Atomic policy had never evoked sustained political interest, but the prospect of France relinquishing her sovereign right to manufacture atomic weapons, by joining the Euratom community, unleashed a torrent of rhetoric con­ cerning atomic weapons. The attitude of the political par­ ties was perhaps most influential in causing the Mollet Government to modify its views on renunciation and to reach a compromise acceptable to a majority of the political groups. M. Mollet was well aware that a Euratom treaty signed without the support of a majority of the members of the National Assembly would not be ratified and would meet the same fate as the EDC. Although the Prime Minister did not make Euratom the subject of a vote of confidence, un­ official sources indicated that parliamentary rejection of the Euratom proposal might well lead to the resignation of the Government.55 The Euratom proposal faced opposition on several counts: its implication of supra-national institu­ tions, its limitation to the cadre of the Coal and Steel Community and its prospective elimination of military uses of atomic energy. Despite the importance of the na­ tionalist position against the derogation of sovereign pow55

Fiche d'lnformation, p . 7 . p. 10. is New York. Times, July 7, 1956. si Ibid.,

FRANCE ENTERS THE NUCLEAR CLUB

ers to supra-national institutions, it was the military issue which evoked the most heated discussion and was the question on which the Euratom vote ultimately turned. Except for the Communists and the Poujadists, who were resolutely hostile to any project for European inte­ gration, though on quite different grounds, the political groups were divided. The most ardent supporters of Euratom were the Socialist Party (SFIO) and the Popular Republicans (MRP), both of which were advocates of European integration. While both of these groups laid heavy emphasis on the technical and economic advantages inherent in atomic cooperation and the growing energy deficit in the community of the Six, which could best be overcome by joint action of the member nations, their es­ sential concern was the building of a united Europe along the lines of the Coal and Steel Community. The Socialist viewpoint on atomic weapons, shared by the great majority of the parliamentary representatives of that group, was that the French commitment in the United Nations in 1946 to devote its atomic effort to exclusively peaceful ends was still valid.56 "It does not seem at all unreasonable at present," argued Felix Gouin on behalf of the SFIO, "since NATO is still good for twenty years, to have confidence in it to guarantee the peace of our homeland, especially since the Atlantic organization will shortly receive the atomic weapons which she might eventually have need of."57 For the MRP, concentration of resources on military ends could only serve to provide an inconsequential atomic arsenal outmoded by the advanced military technology of the United States and the Soviet Union. At the same time, such concentration of effort risked "losing the real war which we will wage . . . the economic war."58 In the last analysis, 56

J.0.^4.N., No. 78, July Ibid., p. 3,257. si Ibid., p. 3,261.

67

6, 1956,

p. 3,254.

EURATOM AND THE FRENCH

ATOM

our security or our prosperity, our place in the world, will not be safeguarded unless we dispose of an atomic industry commensurate with our responsibilities. We will not attain this end in the absence of close co­ operation with our neighbors.59 The MRP, it should be added, was still of a mind which would not preclude the eventual application of atomic energy to military ends. Together, the Socialists and the MRP commanded only 174 votes; they needed support from other parties if Euratom were to materialize. The groups which were crucial to this success were the Radical-Socialists, the Independents and the Social-Republicans who together could provide 167 votes. If any two of these parties defected in substantial numbers, the chances for parliamentary approval for con­ tinued negotiations on Euratom would have been markedly affected. Furthermore, the Radical and Social-Republican parties were represented in the Government, and unless the Socialist Party and the MRP could come to terms, there was a serious risk that several of the ministers would re­ sign from the cabinet.60 The military weapons problem was not the only issue on which the conservative groups judged the Government. None of them wished to precipitate a Government crisis, for M. Mollet, who as a matter of electoral principle had promised an end to Algerian strife, was pursuing a policy of pacification which was in keeping with nationalist senti­ ment. Consequently, only a very serious issue of immediate importance would have moved the moderates and con­ servatives to risk overturning the Government. Among »9 Ibid. The Radical-Socialists held several important posts in the Govern­ ment, among them the Ministry of National Defense (Maurice BourgesMaunoury) and the post of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Maurice Faure). M. Mendes-France was Minister without portfolio. M. Jacques Chaban-Delmas of the Social-Republican Party was Minister of State for Ex-Servicemen. 60

FRANCE ENTERS THE NUCLEAR CLUB

these groups, the position of the Radicals was the least co­ hesive. There were two basic schools of thought on the Euratom question—one supporting, the other rejecting, the proposed community. M. Mendes-France and his followers within the party were favorable to the principle of the con­ struction of a united Europe, but insisted that the Western European Union which included Great Britain among others, and not the Coal and Steel Community, should serve as the basis for such construction. This group never felt it necessary to meet the weapons problem, for they re­ jected the principle itself; and at the close of the parlia­ mentary debates on July n, 1956, 27 Radicals voted against the continuation of negotiations. The balance of the Radi­ cal party viewed Euratom in a favorable light, but pre­ sented a gradation of views on the military weapons prob­ lem. At the more militant end was M. Bourges-Maunoury, who not only insisted on French retention of juridical and material capacity to possess atomic weapons, but went fur­ ther and stated that: A number of years hence . . . an army not vested with atomic weapons will be an outmoded force.... The option which we face is not between classic weap­ ons and nuclear arms, but between the possession of the latter and the abandonment of the national defense. . . . All studies indicate that there is no major obstacle to the establishment of a military program on condition that it is on a reasonable level, i.e. sufficiently curtailed in its beginnings, and developing only in the measure that our French atomic structure and industrial applications increase. . . . More than any other department, national defense is interested that more plutonium be produced in France and that an enriched uranium plant be quickly constructed.81 A more moderate position was underwritten by Maurice 61

JV., No. 80, July u, 1956, p. 3,443.

EURATOM AND T H E FRENCH ATOM

Faure, who energetically supported Euratom on material, technical and economic grounds. He admitted, however, his personal sympathy with those who were concerned about the validity of an armed force which was deprived of military weapons.62 Nevertheless, there were others in France who were devoted to the principle of exclusively peaceful uses of atomic energy and who had conceded only to the principle of a moratorium—a moratorium, further­ more, which would not preclude research on military ap­ plications and at the end of which France would be totally free to manufacture atomic weapons if she so desired.63 Euratom would, therefore, in no way affect France's national security, nor deny her the possibility of manufacturing atomic weapons. The official organ of the Party, L'lnformation Radicale-Socialiste, never took an open and decisive position on the military question, but the few references made left litde doubt that the overwhelming opinion within the Party was favorable to France safeguarding her rights in the military area.64 The Independents presented a similar range of opinion, but the clear sense of this group was that France must not give up a priori, her right to manufacture atomic weapons. The Independents were, by and large, amenable to the concept of a European atomic pool based on the Messina Resolution. But the Euratom to which they were partisan was the purely economic organization in which there would be control over the use of fissionable material as well as community ownership of such material. They could not, ®2 No. 79, July 7, 1956, p. 3,318. «a ibid. 84See I'lnformation Radicale-Socialiste, No. 104 (April, 1956), p. 8, where it is stated that "the problem [of atomic weapons] merits reflection for it would perhaps be too thoughtless to renounce in a formal and defin­ itive way a weapon, possession of which could cause an eventual aggres­ sor to think twice." In I'lnformation Radieale-Soeialiste, No. 108 (July, 1956), under the rubric "Libres Opinions," a more militant argument which followed the Bourges-Maunoury line was presented, and the editors asked the readers to give it careful attention.

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however, accept the proposition that upon signing a treaty France would lose her right to use atomic energy for mili­ tary ends; in their opinion, the existence of the Community and a military weapons program were perfectly compatible. Speaking on behalf of the Independent parliamentary group, Andre Mutter pointed out that ". . . a treaty of a stricdy economic character would surely be ratified. If you add the problem of a military clause . . . you will augment the difficulty."65 A more passionate appeal was launched by Jean Crouzier, former Secretary of State for Armaments in the Faure Government: ". . . no formula would be acceptable from the point of view of National Defense, of French independence, of the dignity and morale of the army, if it did not fully preserve France's freedom to manufacture atomic weapons which are as in­ dispensable for her today as the cannons of Valmy and the Marne were in the past."8® M. Crouzier, like M. BourgesMaunoury, argued that France must retain her military rights and capacity, and that the military development ef­ fort was needed in the immediate future. The most ex­ treme position taken in the Independent group—one which was representative of only a few voices—was Pierre Andre's contention that France did not have need of a Euratom community in order to develop a full range of atomic industrial activity ®T On the military question, even the moratorium proposal was inadmissible because it was absolutely necessary that France proceed immediately to establish an atomic force if she was not irrevocably to con­ cede the American-British-Soviet monopoly.88 The last of the crucial groups, the Social-Republicans, entertained a confirmed hostility toward the supra-national character of the prospective treaty. Speaking on the ques65

J.0. N o . 78, July 6, 1956, p. 3,283. Ibid., p. 3,286. 97 J.O.^iJV., No. 80, July ii, 1956, p . 3,346. 88 Ibid., p. 3,348.

68

EURATOM AND THE FRENCH ATOM

tion of the Euratom community before the debate, M. Michel Debre, their most eloquent orator, summarized the attitude of the Gaullists toward military atomic prob­ lems in this manner: What is true today is that the power of atomic arms is such that there is no longer any defense, no longer any army, no longer any independence for a nation unless it possesses atomic weapons Who today has the bomb? The United States, Soviet Russia and Great Britain. Who today, has not the right to have the bomb or to possess atomic arms ? Germany. . . . Who has begun and has the ability to go further in the way of atomic arms? France, in particular.69 A line of reasoning, similar to that presented by MM. An­ dre, Bourges-Maunoury, Crouzier and Debre, flowed from the pens of Gaullist parliamentarians in the months pre­ ceding the Euratom debate in the National Assembly.70 The evidence leads irresistibly to the conclusion that the 69 France, Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires, Conseil de la Republique, No. 20, April 20, 1956, p. 579. 70 M. Debre, Combat, June 26, 1956; ibid., July 3, 1956, in which Debre admitted the necessity of atomic cooperation in Europe but argued that the OEEC had presented an acceptable and adequate plan. See Gaston Palewski, Le Monde, July 8, 1956 and Combat, July 10, 1956. In the former article it was argued that "it is not a question of refusing the organization of a European atomic cooperation which remains indispensable. At this moment it is a question of France not renouncing the freedom to develop her national defense in accordance with scientific and technical progress." MM. Bokanowski and Bayrou, Social-Republican deputies in the Na­ tional Assembly, contended that their group was prepared to support Euratom if it was to be a project for organizing the atom in Europe but not if this was only a pretext for further supra-nationalism. M. Bayrou argued that "it is high time that France herself engaged in [atomic] re­ conversion. The army and the nation will therein find confidence in the future and will free themselves from the inferiority complex which has so often been a handicap to us over the past ten years." J.0., AM., No. 80, July 11, 1956, p. 3,335.

FRANCE

ENTERS

T H E

NUCLEAR

CLUB

movement for atomic European union would have suf­ fered defeat at Parliament's hands if the Mollet Govern­ ment had not conceded to the powerful political forces op­ erating within Parliament by guaranteeing the retention of French rights and capacity to undertake military atomic development. It is reasonably clear that many of the In­ dependents, Radicals and Gaullists, including several cabi­ net members, would have withdrawn support for the Euratom project if its acceptance implied renunciation of atomic weapons.71 In the end, the Government did concede that France would undertake not to carry out a nuclear bomb test for a period of four years, at the end of which time she would be as free to conduct such tests and to establish a military arsenal as she had been before Euratom ever came into play. Furthermore, during the moratorium, she would be free to conduct any military research she chose and would retain control over all fissionable material produced in national reactor plants both for any potential military program and for national civil programs such as the production of elec­ tricity from nuclear sources. These concessions were suffi­ cient to retain the support of the ministers representing the conservative and moderate groups in the Government and thus gave at least the pretense of solidarity on atomic union. The parliamentary vote which approved continu­ ing negotiations toward a Euratom treaty was 332 to 186, but it would be an oversimplification to assert that this majority was wholeheartedly pro-Euratom. Atomic coop­ eration of some sort was considered desirable not only by the supporters of the Monnet Action Committee. The vote that was cast for Euratom authorized the Government to continue its negotiations, but only on terms which would 71 The fact that M. Mollet's Algerian policy was very satisfactory to the parliamentary Right may well have induced many partisans of Algerie Franfaise to support M. Mollet's European policy despite its reservations on military policy in order to allow his Algerian policy to continue apace.

EURATOM AND THE FRENCH ATOM

assure French autonomy in both the peaceful and military atomic spheres. The principle of freedom in the military sphere was only half of the question. There still remained the problem of whether, in fact, France should proceed to conduct these studies and to produce an atomic bomb.

CHAPTER SIX

THE ROAD TO REGGANE HE MOLLET Government's decision to retain French military atomic rights in negotiating the Euratom Treaty left the door open for continuation of the French military pro­ gram which had originated under the Faure administration in 1955. M. Mollet, however, had conceded only the reten­ tion of the capacity to make the bomb, not that France should, in fact, proceed to do so. When, in an appearance before the National Assembly, he agreed to effect this com­ promise, the Prime Minister stated that: "... at the expira­ tion of the moratorium, France will have not only full legal capacity, but full material capacity to launch immediately . . . into military fabrications. Let me only express the hope . . . that this decision will always appear needless, as in my view it would appear today."1 Although M. Mollet's language was guarded, there is litde doubt that he had no intention of underwriting the construction of an atomic bomb during his tenure of office. This is amply demon­ strated by Mollet's comments in the National Assembly in October i960, during the course of a debate on a motion of censure directed against the force de frappe:

T

Our colleagues who belonged to the preceding legislature will, I am sure, remember this Assembly's debates dur­ ing my investiture declaration where this same problem was posed, or again the debate on the Euratom project. 1 France, Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires, Assemblee Nationale, No. 8i, July 12, 1956, p. 3,385. (Hereafter cited as JV.) (Italics mine.)

THE ROAD TO REGG ANE

Certainly there is some continuity. We have, as much as anyone, concern for the grandeur of France. We are not neutralists and for this reason we wished that study and research in the atomic area be pursued. But we did not wish—at least as far as we Socialists are concerned— that it be to military ends, even less so for a stricdy na­ tional force.2 As in the case of the Faure Government, however, there eventually developed an inconsistency between declared policy and the actual course of events. Despite Mollet's de­ sire to pursue only a peaceful atomic policy, it was under his administration that the greatest impulse, up to that time, was given to the development of the French atomic bomb. THE FORCES AT PLAY

There are a number of factors which largely explain why France, during the Mollet administration, moved closer to possession of an atomic bomb. M. Bourges-Maunoury, one of the cabinet ministers who insisted that France retain atomic military capacity even with membership in the pro­ posed Euratom community, was Minister of National De­ fense. His attitude toward atomic weapons was examined in the previous chapter and is clearly indicative of a proatomic military position. His views were more clearly articulated in Government circles in the spring of 1956. It appears that in response to questions posed by his cabinet colleagues on the problem of atomic weapons, BourgesMaunoury stressed that within a decade an army without such weapons would have little more effect than a police force, for atomic weapons were not only weapons of mass destruction, but had tactical advantages as well. They would, therefore, be useful in situations other than total war. He considered possession of atomic weapons as a sine qua non for allied atomic aid and expressed the view that 2 J.0.y4.N„ No. 71, October 25, i960, p. 2,720.

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even in the event of disarmament, possession of atomic weapons was necessary, since under existing disarmament plans, prohibition of the manufacture and use of such weapons would come only in the last stages. Ultimately, the question was not whether France would or would not make atomic weapons, but whether or not she would es­ tablish an effective national defense. This attitude clearly shows that the CEA pro-military contingent had an enthusi­ astic supporter in a crucial cabinet post.3 Early in the summer of 1956, Bourges-Maunoury ar­ ranged a meeting of armed service officers, ministers and chief administrators of governmental agencies concerned with armaments and invited one of the leading military ad­ vocates of a French atomic weapon to speak to this group. The general tenor of the meeting was noncommital on the question of a French A-bomb, and many of the military officers present appeared to be seeking truth in the old books of the Napoleonic campaigns. The general line of argument pursued by this officer was that France would not always be able to rely on American nuclear capacity within the NATO framework, for an American decision to make use of its retaliatory capacity was directly linked with American vulnerability to Soviet long-range bombers. This contingency eventually became a contributory factor to the shifting attitude of both military and political leaders toward American reliability in the defense of continental Europe. Nevertheless, there was reluctant admission on the part of most of the military officers that eventually an atomic orientation of defense policy would have to be faced. Pressure for a decision to pursue a military atomic pro­ gram was not restricted to members of the CEA or of the Government. In June 1956, the upper chamber of the 3 In March, 1956 M. Mollet himself had been approached by one of the military officers who favored atomic weapons for France, and he was sufficiently impressed to sanction a meeting between this military officer and Bourges-Maunory in order to discuss the feasibility of such a program.

T H E ROAD T O REGGA NE

French Parliament, after giving careful consideration to a proposal introduced by Senator Edgar Pisani which called for the creation of a military division in the CEA, adopted this proposal by a substantial majority. The Pisani pro­ posal was in part intended as an expression of senatorial reaction to the suggestion that France renounce the right to manufacture atomic weapons upon joining Euratom. It did not stop here, however, but went further and focused focused public attention on the very important problem of the relationship between atomic development and national defense. The proposal was based on a series of assumptions which had by now become commonplace among the pro­ ponents of a French military program: there is no national independence without a national defense; there is no ef­ fective national defense without an atomic army; France is technically, economically and financially capable of creat­ ing an atomic military capacity.4 Furthermore, it was ar­ gued, atomic weapons are not costly, and investments made toward military ends would also serve to benefit peaceful atomic development.5 Finally, it was stressed that any fu­ ture war would be an atomic war, one in which atomic weapons would be used on a tactical if not a strategic basis. An army which lacked such weapons would consequently be defeated ab initio. This attitude was apparently not yet fully shared by the military high command who, as indi­ cated in Chapter Four, tended either toward the view that subversive and guerilla wars were more likely to occur in the future, as evidenced by Indo-China, Korea and Al­ geria, or that quick-strike, mobile conventional forces de­ manded priority. 4France, Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires Conseil de la Republique, No. 39, June 22, 1956, p. 1,234. (This source hereafter cited as J.O..C.R.) 5 Ibid., p. 1,235. Pisani, rapporteur for the National Defense Com­ mittee, sought to substantiate the latter contention by alluding to state­ ments made by Oppenheimer, Einstein and Joliot-Curie to the effect that the suppression of atomic explosions could put a brake on scientific development. Ibid., p. 1,236.

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The proponents of the bill® contended that in light of the above conditions, the Government should be author­ ized to create a military division in the CEA and to pursue an atomic military policy.7 A counterpart bill was never in­ troduced in the National Assembly, although the renuncia­ tion clause was considered during the Euratom debate, and rejected. The Pisani proposal served as a moral lever which could be applied by non-parliamentary groups in their at­ tempts to orient Government policy toward military appli­ cations of atomic energy.8 Thus, even at the time of the Euratom debate in July 1956, Prime Minister Mollet was under considerable pres­ sure to take more far-reaching steps toward the establish­ ment of a military atomic policy than the simple declara­ tion that France would retain her right to make a bomb if she so desired. As Mollet's parliamentary declaration indi­ cates, he was not yet convinced of this necessity. Neverthe­ less, the military bureau of the CEA received continued fi­ nancial support from the Ministry of National Defense dur­ ing this time and grew sufficiendy in size to change from a bureau (Bureau d'Etudes Generates) to a department (Departement de Techniques Nouvelles, DTN) in May 1956.® β The measure was introduced by Senators Pisani, Plaisant, Piales, Rotinat, Coude de Foresto, de Maupeou, Debre and General Bethouart, Ibid., p. 1,234. 7 The proponents of the bill were aware of the existence of some sort of program but did not deem it adequate. M. Pisani noted that M. Mendes-France in 1954 had opted for a military direction in atomic energy but that MM. Faure and Mollet had seriously impeded any such development, as evidenced by their public statements. 8 The Government's attitude was that the proposition was unnecessary and inopportune: unnecessary because the CEA ordinance charged it with questions concerning national defense, and consequently the bill was re­ dundant; inopportune, because the Government would not be dealing with the atomic weapons in the Euratom framework until September or Oc­ tober and would make no engagement regarding atomic weapons without first consulting both houses of Parliament. J.O.,C.R., No. 39, June 22, 1956, pp. 1,241-42. 9 Six billion francs were allocated for military studies from the resources of the Ministry of National Defense during 1956. The French "White

T H E ROAD T O REGGA NE SUEZ

A crucial event in the evolution of the French A-bomb was the Suez crisis in the fall of 1956. Abandoned by the British and subjected to pressure by the United States in the face of Soviet rocket-rattling, many Frenchmen were driven to conclude that the only true means of national de­ fense rested in an autonomous French nuclear capacity. It was not a question of Suez alone, for Great Britain, itself a nuclear power, also had to retreat. Rather, it was a ques­ tion of what the future held for France if she would always have to bend to atomic blackmail when French and Amer­ ican interests did not coincide. French commitments were not confined to the Continent, but extended throughout Africa. Except for Algeria, the North Atlantic Treaty Or­ ganization did not cover the African continent, nor did France wish it to do so on a military basis.10 Consequendy, national nuclear capacity would serve as an acceptable al­ ternative and guarantee France the ability to meet her extra-European commitments. The Suez incident, there­ fore, brought forth diplomatic as well as military rational­ izations for providing France with atomic weapons. The Gaullist journal Carrefour vividly expressed these sentiments: "The first lesson of Suez is that only possession of the atomic bomb confers power. If France again wishes to intervene in international competition in an effective manner, her essential task is to establish her strategic and tactical nuclear potential so as to weigh in the balance of the destiny of the world."11 This attitude was reflected in Paper," France's First Atomic Explosion, notes that subsequent to the 1955 protocol between National Defense and the CEA, the latter received appropriations from the Minister of the Army in addition to its alloca­ tions from the Minister of Finance. Ambassade de France, France's First Atomic Explosion (New York: Service de Presse et d'Information, i960), p. 8. 10 Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., France, Troubled Ally (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, i960), p. 280. 11 Carrejour, November 28, 1956.

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more subdued language by high-ranking military officers such as the recently retired Marshal Juin: "Let us work to assure ... that the [NATO] participants not be again sub­ jected as rigorously for the production and use of nuclear arms to the good will of one alone. It is a question of pres­ tige, and the coalition will gain power from it."12 Marshal Juin was basically concerned that political harmony pre­ vail in NATO councils. Although there is no specific ap­ peal for an independent nuclear force as a sine qua non of French independence, this statement would seem to indi­ cate an evolution in thinking on the part of some senior French military officers.13 Less restraint was evidenced by General Bethouart, MRP Senator in the Council of the republic and one of the proponents of the Pisani proposal. General Bethouart argued that France could not count on her allies outside of the European theatre and must there­ fore take steps to vest herself with the necessary arms in­ cluding "a small but powerful thermonuclear reprisal force."14 At the political level, M. Felix Gaillard, in a general ar­ ticle devoted to the need of a French atomic policy, con­ cluded that "the political evolution and in particular the Soviet ultimatum and threats.. . prove the necessity of not excluding the eventuality of a military atomic program. It should even lead us to decide to carry on, without delay, all preliminary studies for the first explosion."15 12 Marshal Alphonse Juin, "Que Devons-Nous Penser de la Securite Franfaise?" Revue de Defense Nationale (January, 1957), p. 16. Marshal Juin became more concrete toward the end of the year when he stated at a press conference: "Since the bomb is the guarantee of peace France and Europe must have it. Then they will be able to act effectively in the political game of the balance of power." L'Aurore, November 12, 1957. 13 See also General Combaux, "Au-Dela de Clausewitz: Une Nouvelle Doctrine de la Guerre," Revue de Defense Nationale (April, 1957), pp. 518-32; Genera] d'Armee P. Ely, "Notre Politique Militaire," Revue de Defense Nationale (July, 1957), pp. 1033-51. General Ely also seemed to be thinking of nuclear reprisal capacity in the NATO framework. 14 Ecrits de Paris, May, 1957. l s L e M o n d e , December 7, 1956. The Independent and Peasant Party,

T H E R O A D T O RE G G A NE

Reaction to the Suez incident was not long in coming in the Government itself. On November 30,1956, a new proto­ col was signed between the CEA and the Ministry of Na­ tional Defense which established a definitive military pro­ gram for the succeeding four years and allocated responsi­ bilities between the CEA and the armed forces. It was the Commissariat's responsibility to prepare the preliminary studies for a nuclear explosion, to supply the necessary plutonium and to be ready to make experimental proto­ types if requested. The CEA. was also charged with the re­ sponsibility of preparing studies for the creation of an iso­ tope separation plant to provide France with U235. The actual conduct of the experiments was left to the armed services.18 In December 1956, a Committee of Military Applications of Atomic Energy was created which in­ cluded a number of military personnel and both the Ad­ ministrator-General and High Commissioner of the CEA. This organization, which was under the presidency of the Chef d'Etat-Major General des Armees, was a consultative body which reviewed research programs and the manner of allocation of funds.17 Various executory organs were also established. A significant move was made in December 1956, when the military representative to the Atomic En­ ergy Committee was changed from General Guerin, Presi­ dent of the Comite d'Action Scientifique de la Defense Nationale to General Lavaud, Technical Counselor in the cabinet of the Minister of National Defense. The purpose of substituting a member of the Ministry for a general at its annual congress in December 1956, passed a resolution calling for a modern army vested with nuclear weapons "thanks to which we will remain masters over our own destinies." France Independents, Numero special du Congres, Nos. 254-56 (December 14, 1956), p. 23. 16 Ambassade de France, France's First Atomic Explosion, p. 9. It can­ not be said that Suez alone provoked the new protocol. Other factors such as the need for integrating the CEA and the military in a more harmonious project undoubtedly entered into the decision. 17 Ibid., p. 10.

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military representative was to establish closer contact be­ tween National Defense and the CEA. This suggests that M. Bourges-Maunoury was determined to establish a firm military atomic policy to the extent that he was able. The creation of these organs reflected less the views of Prime Minister Mollet than they did those of M. BourgesMaunoury, and a firm decision to actually make an atomic bomb was yet to be taken. Clearly, however, more and more persons in informed circles were reaching the con­ clusion that in the modern era a rational defense program had to be built on an atomic basis, and that this was a po­ litical as well as a military necessity. This attitude was tersely stated in Juvenal in late 1956 in an article reflecting on the Suez incident: "France is not an atomic power: she must cede to force. It is, therefore, necessary that France become an atomic power. . . . That France must become a military atomic power was a necessity before Suez and re­ mains a necessity after. It is the condition sine qua non of our maintenance in Africa, of our influence in the Mediter­ ranean, of our prestige in Europe."18 The military orienta­ tion which had been nurtured by M. Guillaumat, and sup­ ported by Gaullist ministers in previous Governments, was now well on the way to acceptance under the impulsion of a Radical Minister of National Defense. The official po­ sition of the MoJlet Government, however, was that a mili­ tary weapons program would not be underwritten at that time. Consequently, the military development plan went forward at a slower pace than would have been true if full consensus had been reached in the cabinet.19 The pace of development was of concern to the military contingent in the CEA. When asked by the office of the 18

]uvenal, November 30, 1956. In October 1960, M. Mollet, while indicating that his Government had not been favorable to a military atomic orientation, noted that "we were concerned not to hinder anything, we were concerned to leave the possibility of taking an option to future Governments." J.O.,A.N., No. 71, October 25, i960, p. 2,720. 19

m

T H E ROAD T O REGGA NE

Prime Minister to draft a response to several questions posed by Senator Michel Yver in the Council of the Re­ public on the nature and extent of French military atomic plans, the CEA contended that firm decisions and corre­ sponding financial support were necessary in four basic areas. There was need for the acceleration of plutonium production, as well as for studies concerning engins and test preparations, for general development of studies and especially "advanced studies," and for the construction of an isotope separation plant. To meet these needs, the CEA also requested additional technical personnel from the staff of National Defense.20 The Commissariat pointed out that a massive injection of money would not suffice to make up lost time; that had such decisions and funds been provided earlier, the military program would have been further ad­ vanced. "This is why," it was argued, "it is so important to support an increasingly harmonious rhythm of appropria­ tions and operational funds."21 These requests of the CEA were not new. At the time of the Euratom debate in July 1956, the CEA had insisted that if there must be a morato­ rium on atomic military development, it should be as short as possible and should be accompanied by an acceleration of plutonium production by the construction of a fourth plutonium reactor and the launching, in January 1957, of a pilot French isotope separation plant. In the end, the CEA did not win its point on the length of the moratorium or on the construction of a fourth plutonium plant, the latter probably because of the expense involved and the unwill­ ingness of the Mollet Government to actively participate in a weapons plan. The pressure for a uranium isotope separ­ ation plant, on the other hand, won the support necessary to bring this project to fruition. 20 Department de Techniques Nouvelles, "Elements de Reponse a Ques­ tions Orales sans Debats Nos. 813, 814 posees par M. Yver, Senateur," November 28, 1956 (in the files o£ the CEA).

21 Ibid.

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T H E U R A N I U M -235 PROBLEM

An important aspect of French atomic development, for both peaceful and military purposes, was the decision to construct an isotope separation plant. This did not consti­ tute a modification of the French atomic program, but added a new activity. Enriched uranium was needed while awaiting the development of plutonium technology. It was also useful in electricity production, propulsion and for nuclear weapons. Isotope separation studies had been started as early as 1952, shortly after the decision on plu­ tonium production, and for the first few years these studies were carried out by the Service des Poudres, a military establishment under agreement with the CEA.22 It was possi­ ble, as of 1955, to acquire U235 from the United States under the "Atoms-for-Peace" proposal of President Eisen­ hower, but the United States made supplies of enriched ura­ nium available only under stringent conditions and limi­ tations. The enriched uranium could be used only for peaceful research (which precluded even propulsion stud­ ies), and even when used solely for peaceful research, the receiving nation was obliged to submit to controls and in­ spection by American teams.23 Due to the high toxicity of plutonium and the conse­ quent inability to use it effectively as a fuel for production reactors, France sought to acquire U235 free from any re­ strictions. At first the French asked for technological aid from Great Britain, but this was precluded by limitations imposed by Anglo-American agreements.24 France then tried to conclude an agreement with West Germany, but the Messina conference in June 1955 ended these prelimi­ nary negotiations, and the question of an isotope separation 22Bertrand Goldschmidt, L'Aventure Atomique (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1962), p. 118. 2 s I b i d . , p. 122. 24 Bertrand Goldschmidt, "La Recherche a la Collaboration Europeenne en Matiere de Separation Isotopique de l'Uranium," December 26, 1956, 6 pp. (Mimeographed.)

T H E ROAD T O REGGA NE

plant was transferred to a European scale. From the in­ ception of the Euratom idea to the conclusion of the Treaty in March 1957, France sought acquiescence in the development of a European isotope separation plant. Gen­ eral interest was at first high, but steadily decreased until, finally, France alone deemed it necessary that such a plant should be built immediately, on a European scale. Several factors contributed to the declining interest of France's future Euratom partners. In February 1956, the United States offered 20 tons of U235 for foreign industrial use at a price which unit for unit was at least one-half the cost of a European undertaking. Subsequently, in Novem­ ber 1956, the United States reduced the selling price even further, and the obvious conclusion was that the United States was attempting to prevent the establishment of a European enriched uranium plant by offering an economi­ cally appealing alternative. The French reacted to the American offer of February 1956 with mixed emotions. M. Perrin summed up the general reaction in stating to Le Monde that: . . . however generous this offer may be, it is not really important from the qualitative point of view of technical progress. . . . Unquestionably we think that serious arguments mili­ tate in favor of the pursuit of European efforts in this area. If Europe wishes to achieve independence in the atomic sphere ... she cannot rely on a single supplier for a material which may remain essential for certain appli­ cations such as propulsion.... We also think that even if we must produce U235 at an increased price . . . which is higher than that which can be bought from the United States, it is worth the effort. . . .25 25 Le Monde, March 13, 1956. M. Pierre Ailleret, member of the Atomic Energy Committee and Directeur-Adjoint of EDF reacted by say-

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The balance of what was to become the Euratom com­ munity, however, considered the alternative of purchasing American enriched uranium attractive. The cost factor may have partially accounted for their attitude, but a more probable explanation is that none of the other Euratom na­ tions were contemplating the study or manufacture of atomic weapons and consequently were not concerned about the limitations which the United States would place on the U235 it sold to Euratom. Conversely, the intense French interest in gaining independence from the United States with regard to fissionable material supplies probably was a reflection of the growing interest in military applica­ tions which was being demonstrated in France. A second explanation for the other nations' loss of in­ terest in an enriched uranium plant derives from the report "Un Objectif Pour Euratom" prepared by MM. Armand, Etzel and Giordani. These three European experts were commissioned by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Six in November 1956 to prepare a report on the estab­ lishment of a nuclear energy program for Euratom. This group, known as the "Three Sages," was invited to the United States in February 1957 by Secretary of State Dulles and Admiral Strauss, head of the American Atomic En­ ergy Commission. Upon their return, the very favorable reaction of the United States to Euratom was made known in addition to the fact that the United States was prepared to give the organization material and technical aid. Asked whether the result of the mission put the European isotope separation plant project in question, M. Armand stated: "On an economic basis a national plant cannot be justified. On a European scale it can be discussed and would merit a careful examination. No doubt it can only be conceived in European nations where energy is cheap, in the Scandiing: "Will the United States which presently is offering U2as very freely and at a dumping price, continue to be so generous and to sell at such advantageous prices?" L'lnjormation, March 19, 1957.

T H E ROAD T O REGGA NE

navian countries, for example."26 The official report, pub­ lished in May 1957, took an even stronger position on the question and made it quite clear that the purchase of American supplies was the most economically sound al­ ternative. Noting that any enriched uranium produced in a European plant would cost two or three times as much as the purchase price of American U235, the report concluded that "... if it is indispensable that our countries pursue the study of the economic and technical aspects of uranium enrichment with the greatest possible care, it is important to note that the decision to construct an isotope separation installation on an industrial scale, which would require considerable capital and would consume great quantities of energy, need not now be taken in order to start a pro­ gram of atomic electricity production."27 This report not only convinced France's partners that there was no pressing need for the establishment of an isotope separation plant in the immediate future, but also led to a dialogue in France between M. Armand and the Commissariat au Plan on the one hand and the CEA on the other.28 The basic arguments against the creation of such a plant in France, or even in the European context, re­ volved around the cost factor, the length of time that would be required to build an operating unit and the fact that coal and oil imports would have to be increased to meet the energy needs for running a separation plant. The CEA, however, felt that it was within French and, therefore, by definition, European means and was a guarantee of technical and political independence; that a national or European plant would leave the decision on the degree of enrichment of uranium in the hands of the Community rather than in the hands of the United States. This was 26

Le Monde, February 20, 1957. Louis Armand, Franz Etzel, Francesco Giordani, Un Objeetif pour Euratom, Notes et Etudes Documentaires, No. 2.291 (Paris: La Docu­ mentation Franfaise, May 9, 1957), p. 8. 28 La Croix, June 5, 1957. 27

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an important factor because, as mentioned previously, the different uses of enriched uranium required different de­ grees of enrichment: 3 per cent enrichment sufficed for electricity production, 20 per cent for propulsion and as much as 90 per cent enrichment for atomic weapons.29 Although enriched uranium could serve a variety of purposes, both civil and military, the latter aspect received greater attention. The Assistant Director for General Pro­ grams of the CEA, Jean Andriot, implied the predominance of the military aspect in the minds of the CEA leadership in stating that "the availability of U235 · · · necessary to a big atomic nation which desires to dispose of a complete panoply of weapons and which desires to build compact motors for its navy. . . . If, therefore, the production of U235 is not indispensable on the civil level it is, on the other hand, very expedient on the military level. That is why the construction of an isotope separation plant was decided and financed in July, 1957."30 In the 1956 Euratom debate before the National Assembly, a number of speakers insisted on the urgent need for France to secure adequate and unrestricted supplies of U235 and that she not be de­ pendent on the United States for this material.31 M. Bourges-Maunoury made it quite clear that the military aspects of U235 were not being overlooked by the military: "More than any other department, national defense is concerned . . . that an enriched uranium plant rapidly see the light of day."32 The attitude of the pro-military political forces was adequately summed up by Gaston Palewski, former Secretary of State for Atomic Affairs, in his statement that "a realistic policy concerned with preserving national de2® Ibid. 30 Jean Andriot, "Le Probleme de la Production des Matieres Fissiles," Revue Militatre d'lnformation, No. 331 (October, 1961), p. 17. The ref­ erence to July 1957 concerns the adoption of the Second Five Year Plan, which will be treated below. 31M. Jean Crouzier, J.0.^4.N., No. 78, July 6, 1956, p. 3,286; M. Pierre Andre, J.O.^A.N., No. 80, July 11, 1956, p. 3,346. 32 No. 80, July 11, 1956, p. 3,343.

THE ROAD TO REGGANE

fense must insist on . . . the creation of an isotope separa­ tion plant... ."33 It would also appear that the military itself had decided that an isotope separation plant was necessary, for according to l'Aurore, "the responsible authorities of the Armes Speciales have recommended to the Etat-Major the accelerated development of nuclear technology. . . . They also ask that in the next deliveries of Pu. and U235 priority henceforth be given to National Defense over civil industries."34 There was, consequently, a very strong con­ sensus among scientists, technicians, military and political personnel that France undertake the construction of an isotope separation plant.35 This decision was incorporated in the Second Five Year Plan which was presented to Parliament in July 1957 and approved with even less dis­ cussion than the First Five Year Plan of 1952. The Second Five Year Plan, which covered a wide va­ riety of research and development projects and included a number of annexed and associated programs dealing with national defense and electricity production in con­ junction with Electricite de France, devoted a separate 33Gaston Palewski, "Supprimez la Renonciation Provisoire ou Supprimez la Defense Nationale," Combat, July 4, 1956. Although not referring specifically to the military aspect of UKB, Felix Gaillard stated that, "the production of Uaa implies the building of a plant . . . which would be one of the principal and most useful realiza­ tions of Euratom. . . . In the absence of a quick response, it seems that France must alone undertake this project in such a way that the produc­ tion of Ua5 will begin before the end of i960." Le Monde, December 7, 1956. 34 L'Aurore, January n, 1957. 35 The Conseil Economique devoted a study to the problems of atomic development in 1957, at which time the isotope separation plant was taken under consideration. The Conseil adopted an avis which concluded that Uas was necessary for France and that a production plant was within French means. Nevertheless, they felt that France should first attempt to secure supplies of enriched uranium from foreign sources, and that if continuous supplies could not be acquired without compromising French independence, only then should France undertake the construction of an enriched uranium plant. Conseil Economique, "Etude des Problemes Poses par l'lndustrie Atomique Franiaise," Journal Officiel, Avts et Rapports du Conseil Economique, No. 19 (November 26, 1957), pp. 821-39.

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chapter to the isotope separation plant project. Twenty-five billion frances were allotted for an enriched uranium plant capable of treating three hundred tons of uranium and of producing annually one ton of enriched uranium. The fi­ nancial allocation represented approximately one-half the projected cost of such a plant, and it was still an open question whether France would construct a national plant or would participate in a European project. The parlia­ mentary committees which studied the Five Year Plan in both houses were very favorable to an isotope separation plant and tended to favor a national plant. The eventual need for a strictly national plant was recognized by the Government, for its spokesman in Parliament, M. Fran^ois-Benard, Under Secretary of State in the office of the Prime Minister, stated that: "A European plant would without doubt produce enriched uranium of not more than a io or 20 per cent concentration. But from such a product France could satisfy her needs for enriched uranium of a greater concentration by building a relatively small reconcentration plant which would consume little energy."36 With the isotope separation plant approved in principle by the Government and the Parliament, and fully supported by both the military and the CEA, France was now theoreti­ cally prepared to undertake a broad and expansive atomic development program incorporating electricity production, marine propulsion and atomic weapons. In 1956 Colonel Charles Ailleret, the most outspoken military officer in favor of atomic weapons for France, was elevated to the rank of General and put in charge of the Commandement des Armes Speciales. This unit was given the task of overseeing the problems related to an eventual atomic test and the study of the organization of these tests.37 General Ailleret proceeded, in November 1956, to outline a national military atomic program. Arguing that only the 36 37

J.O.,C.R. f No. 43, July 17, 1957, p. 1,549. Ambassade de France, France's First Atomic Explosion, p.

10.

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military uses of atomic energy were immediately rentable, and that nuclear electricity was still a long way off in terms of need and technology, General Ailleret defined what he considered to be the essential elements of a mini­ mum French program: the completion of the Marcoule plants; the realization of explosive atomic devices based on plutonium; the building of an isotope separation plant and the construction of nuclear generators capable of produc­ ing electricity from which National Defense would take the plutonium by-product. The end result, he concluded, would be the production of sufficient plutonium to produce one bomb in 1958, two in 1959, six in i960 and twenty in 1961.38 The importance of General Ailleret's article is that he was no longer advocating a nuclear weapons program as an outsider, but as an officer who held an official post—and a key one—in the atomic weapons program. According to later reports,39 the Etat-Major in late 1957 established a na­ tional atomic plan providing for the opening of credits reaching 40 billion francs over a three-year period for ex­ perimentation dealing with atomic bombs. The plan, more­ over, complied fully with General Ailleret's allocation of bombs. By the end of 1956, then, the question of whether France should or should not make an atomic bomb was, for all intents and purposes, resolved. The official decision was not actually taken until April 1958, but in a very real sense this decision was more a formality than a shift in atomic policy. In May 1957, Defense Minister Bourges-Maunoury announced a new military policy based on the premise that, "the new conditions of war, our adversary's possession of a substantial stock of atomic weapons.. . require that on the 38 General Charles Ailleret, "De I'Euratom au Programme Atomique National," Revue de Defense Nationale (November, 1956), pp. 1,319-27. 39 "La France Sera-t-elle Bientot la Cinquieme Puissance Militaire Atomique?" Documents et Informations Parlementaires, No. C1458, No­ vember 15, 1958.

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list of studies to be undertaken, the strategic reprisal weapon must have priority. . . ."40 The only two things lacking were a formal government decision and the appro­ priation of funds to prepare for a test. The French navy, for its part, had created a specialized school for atomic sub­ mariners at Cherbourg in February 195741 and continued to supply funds to the CEA for the study of a nuclear sub­ marine. At the same time, M. Guillaumat and representa­ tives of the armed services had held a number of meetings in early 1957 to discuss the technical problems associated with the bomb and atomic tests.42 The general direction in which France was moving was indicated by Jules Moch, French representative for dis­ armament negotiations. In July 195743 and again in October 195744 M. Moch publicly stated that in the absence of a dis­ armament agreement between East and West, France would push ahead with her atomic bomb research for which she was already preparing the fissionable material. THE RATIFICATION OF EURAT0M

The Euratom Treaty, which had been ratified by the French Parliament in July 1957, reserved French juridical and material rights insofar as atomic weapons were con40

Le Monde, May 12/13, 1957. Le Monde, February 2, 1957. 42La Croix, February 13, 1957. In May 1957, M. Bourges-Maunoury, General Ailleret, General Lavaud and General Challe, among others, had a dinner debate, the outcome of which was clear recognition of the need and validity of atomic weapons for France. Le Figaro, May 21, 1957. General Challe at the time was chef de I'etat-major of General Ely, chefd'etat-major general des forces armees. General Lavaud was BourgesMaunoury's conseiller technique and General Ailleret, commandant des armes speciales, the unit responsible for the military's job in the atomic program. 43 Combat, July 3, 1957. iiNew Yorl( Times, October 23, 1957. The evolution of French atti­ tudes toward disarmament and its relationship to French national nuclear policy is treated to an extent in Bernard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotia­ tions For Arms Control (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1961). 41

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cerned. In fact, no moratorium provision was written into the Treaty. The general rule with regard to fissionable ma­ terials was that they would become Euratom property but that its ownership and control would cease the moment such materials were turned to military uses. No article of the Treaty limited a nation's right to use atomic energy for military purposes. A number of military officers, among them Marshal Juin and General Weygand, condemned the Treaty for not giving adequate guarantees in the matter of French national defense.45 This view was publicly sup­ ported by the Comite d'Entente des Anciens Combatants pour la Defense de l'Union Franjaise, a veterans group, and by Pierre Andre, rapporteur for the National De­ fense Committee of the National Assembly.46 The great weight of opinion, however, was favorable to the Treaty and was satisfied that French national security was in no way jeopardized. M. Andre argued that there was no need for Euratom, since France was capable of building an atomic industry through her own means,47 a view fully supported by an anonymous group of technicians writing in La Nef in March 1957.48 As to the military question, Andre contended that France alone among the European nations was ca­ pable of becoming a major atomic power, "but in order that these interests be safeguarded, it would be necessary that she could use the production of her deposits as she intends, to freely negotiate contracts of sale and use of minerals and fissionable materials, to conserve the freedom of her for­ eign supplies, to construct a national isotope separation is UInformation, June 28, 1957. Marshal Juin said: "In its present state the project would, purely and simply, sanction the loss of our national independence, especially in matters of defense." General Weygand, in more eloquent terms stated that "it is better to lose a little time than to lose a national cause." 46 Le Monde, July 4, 1957. 47 Combat, July 4, 1957. 48 "Pour une Politique Atomique Franfaise," La Nef, xiv (March, 1957), 81-87.

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plant whose capacity would in no way be limited, to exe­ cute a nuclear armaments program whose extensiveness also would not be limited. . . ."4e The National Defense Committee was split on the ratification, but was nearly unanimous on the proposition of Andre that, "the thermo­ nuclear bomb opens a new era. It is the disintegration of internal concepts and of present armies. The nation has made a leap forward: national defense must also "50 The Government, speaking through its Minister of Na­ tional Defense, Andre Morice, insisted that French au­ thorities were fully satisfied with the Euratom provisions and that, "France fully retains the juridical freedom to apply atomic energy to military ends and especially to manufacture atomic weapons. France retains full physical capacity to develop military uses of atomic energy."51 These arguments were superfluous and could only serve to fuel the propaganda fire which had been lit in favor of the bomb, for at this time there were not many persons in re­ sponsible positions who seriously doubted the need for French atomic weapons. A GOVERNMENT ACTS

In the last analysis, what turned an agreement in principle into a firm Government decision to vest France with an atomic weapon was the course of external affairs. The two most important circumstances were the development of the nuclear balance of terror between East and West and the deterioration of French-NATO relations. An assessment of these two factors by military and political personnel led Prime Minister Gaillard to sign an order on April n, 1958, calling for the detonation of the first French A-bomb in the first quarter of i960.82 Combat, July 4, 1957. Le Monde, July 5, 1957. 51 VInformation, July 6, 1957. 82 Following the detonation of the bomb on February 13, i960, M. Gaillard stated: "On this day which is so important for the future of 80

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Until 1957, the Soviet Union was not in a position to match the United States in nuclear armaments. The So­ viet long-range bombers had an effect on the credibility of American statements that she would defend Europe against Soviet attack in Europe with nuclear reprisal, but it was the launching of Sputnik, in October 1957, that seriously raised the question of the validity of the American promise. The United States was visibly shaken by this event, for at the December 1957 NATO meeting she pro­ posed the installation of missile emplacements on the soil of NATO countries; not having an Intercontinental Bal­ listic Missile (ICBM), the United States sought to compen­ sate for this lack with the Intermediate-range Ballistic Missile (IRBM). From the French point of view, as pointed out by Jacques Vernant, the massive retaliation concept was valid when the West controlled "the launching of strategic reprisal" and held an edge over the Soviet Union. But, "from the day when this superiority disappears, when American territory tends to become as vulnerable as Soviet territory, the menace of this reprisal becomes less con­ vincing for the adversary."63 A number of French military authorities noted this ad­ vance of the Soviets in the missile field and contended that the United States was not working quickly enough to catch up. In reviewing this situation, General Paul Gerardot concluded that: Our only defense essentially resides . . . in the possession of reprisal weapons, the development of which depends on us and on us alone.... France, I cannot without emotion recall the time when, eight years ago with Pierre Guillaumat and Francis Perrin we established a five-year pro­ gram which led to France's entry into atomic industry, nor the day two years ago when, as Prime Minister, I gave the order to make the bomb." La Figaro, February 15, i960. 53 Jacques Vernant, "Strategie et Politique a l'Age Atomique," Revue de Defense Nationale (May, 1958), p. 859.

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France must, therefore, if she wishes to remain a great power and to enter into the "club of the greats" in order to make her civilizing action felt, build atomic weapons as soon as possible.84 Parallel with this, the French had been impressed by the American decision in October 1956, to reduce their Sffectifs, and the British decision in the same month to do the same with regard to their conventional forces. Furthermore, the British in the spring of 1957 issued a White Paper on the defense of England in which it was stated that there was no way to defend Great Britain except through a deterrent capacity. By the fall of 1957, French military thinking had become impregnated with a number of new ideas, one of which was the adaptation of her military structure and equipment to the new possibilities offered by science and technology. In this view, there was no valid defense against atomic attack except a reprisal capacity, a matter which was technically and financially within French means. As a result, as one observer concluded, whether France makes her own weapons or receives them from the United States, one thing was certain: "the French army will have them."65 One of the new directions of French national defense policy, as elaborated in 1957 by M. Bourges-Maunoury, was to create a nuclear capacity which would guarantee France the ability to remain among the Great Powers and to meet her commitments in the Atlantic Alliance.68 For the political personnel, the conclusion was essentially the same, but less for military than for diplomatic reasons. Jacques Chaban-Delmas, then Minister of National De­ fense, noted in his press conference of November 22, 1957, that: "An alliance cannot ask any nation to exert itself, 64 General Paul Gerardot, "La Competition pour Ie Suprematie Thermonucleaire," Revue de Defense Nationale (April, 1958), pp. 583-84. 65 Claude Delmas, "La France et la Defense Nationale," Revue de Defense Nationale (October, 1 9 5 7 ) , p. 1 ,443. 68 Ibid., p. 1,446.

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body and soul, if there is not the certainty that its vital in­ terests will be taken into consideration. It is quite the same with regard to any discrimination among allies in the matter of weapons. For France, for Europe to accept dis­ crimination in the matter of weapons and especially atomic weapons would be equivalent to self-condemnation to per­ manent decadence."57 The diplomatic nature of the impend­ ing French decision to manufacture and test an atomic bomb is seen even more clearly in Prime Minister Gaillard's statement to U. S. News and World Report that, "if in the division of tasks within NATO in the matter of research and manufacture and in the precise conditions under which the nuclear arms are to be employed, France feels herself treated as an inferior partner, it is clear that she will be led much more easily to undertake her own effort."58 Speaking on behalf of the Social-Republican Party, M. Frey, the Secretary-General, noted that "as to the manu­ facture of atomic weapons... it would be inconceivable for France not to do everything to close the gap which threatens to eliminate her permanently from the great pow­ ers' club and to deny herself eventual access to the summit conference. The last NATO conference showed in a strik­ ing manner that a nation is nothing if she does not have the nuclear weapon. "59 In sum, from a military point of view, France needed a deterrent to hedge against the credibility of American as­ surances that she would defend Europe against Soviet ag­ gression with her nuclear capacity. Diplomatically, France had discovered during the preceding several years that her nuclear inferiority had markedly affected her capacity to 57

Revue Militaire d'lnjormation, No. 287 (December, 1957), p. 77. U. S. News and World Report, January 3, 1958, p. 61. See also M. Chaban-Delmas' statement in Combat, February 8, 1958, that "France is proceeding to prepare for the manufacture of total weapons in order to maintain a just equilibrium in the heart of the Atlantic Alliance." 69 Extract from the Report of the National Council of Social-Republi­ cans, March 22-23, '95¾- On the files of the Party.) 58

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play a major role in the strategy-direction and decision­ making councils of NATO. The theoretical determining body—the Standing Group—had given way to an AngloAmerican directorate. The dilemma was succinctly phrased by Courrier de la Colere, which, in analysing the situation prophesied the evolving French policy: In the permanent conflict that opposes East and West, only those really count, only those make the final deter­ mination who possess the decisive argument. Undoubt­ edly the other powers are consulted, but consulted only; and only a nuclear arsenal enables a nation to pass from the circle of those who submit to the circle of those who decide. If our nation intends to remain on all continents as it does now, if it intends to maintain the French Union, it must . . . acquire the prestige of power of the first order which only the decisive weapon can confer.60 On April n, 1958, Prime Minister Gaillard signed the crucial order.61 His decision to accept the responsibility for this order was influenced by the military and diplomatic factors discussed above, but it may also be suggested that it was facilitated by virtue of the fact that the political groups supporting the Government had reached consensus on the need for this decision. During a debate on the military budget in the National Assembly in February 1958, Jean Montalat, speaking on behalf of the National Defense committee expressed dissatisfaction with the rate of plutonium production and suggested that the plutonium proj­ ect be put under the authority of the armed services. He further contended that France must have her own atomic weapons.62 As M. Montalat was a member of the Socialist Party and its spokesman on national defense issues in the 60

Courrier de la Colere, March 20, 1958. Ambassade de France, France's First Atomic Explosion, p. 11. 62 }.O.yii.N., No. 25, February 28, 1958, pp. 1,096-97. This interven-

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National Assembly, it may be assumed that even within the Socialist Party a definite pro-military wing had developed to the point of open articulation. Aside from the Commu­ nist Party, all of the other political groups had at one time or other recognized the possible eventual need for French atomic weapons. It therefore appears probable that if the Gaillard Government had presented to the National As­ sembly the question of whether France should make an atomic bomb it would have received a favorable response. The Gaullist policy of grandeur and prestige was in play— and it preceded its mentor. tion is also of interest because it raises the question of whether the CEA actually impeded progress on the military development of atomic energy. Several persons have argued that the CEA leadership did, in fact, retard progress and was able to do so because of its crucial position in atomic policy development. These allegations have never been supported by em­ pirical proof, but they do bring to light a different interpretation than that presented in this paper. See for example, Jean Goujon, "Marcoule et Ies Origines de son Echec," Service Direction (August-September, 1957), pp. 593-97; Jean Goujon, "Notre Avenir dans Ie Domaine Nucleaire: Jes Etapes d'une Decadence," Service Direction (March, 1958), pp. 241-47. The burden of M. Goujon's argument is that M. Guillaumat was more interested in following the United States' desire to preclude France from gaining access to the industrial and military nuclear club than he was in France herself. See also, Lettres de Paul Dehbne, secret letters published daily beginning in 1956. If this were true, however, it is unlikely that M. Guillaumat would have been appointed Minister of the Army in the De Gaulle and Debre Governments.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE FIFTH REPUBLIC AND THE ATOM ALTHOUGH IT is not the purpose of this study to deal l\. with the atomic policy of the Fifth Republic, it would appear useful to discuss briefly the nature and direction of that policy especially as it relates to the policy pursued in the Fourth Republic. If one word could be used to describe this relationship, it would be "continuity." The Fifth Re­ public brought into political power a new set of actors, but there were no major changes in personnel among those responsible for conducting French atomic policy. M. Guillaumat was appointed Minister of the Army in 1958 and in this capacity exercised joint control with the CEA over the nuclear armament program. It also is quite certain that M. Guillaumat continued to exercise substantial control over the CEA. His personal choice of Pierre Couture to suc­ ceed him as Administrator-General gave him a supple link through which to exercise continued hegemony over that organization. The key military officers, General Ailleret, Commandant des Armes Speciales, and General Lavaud, head of the Bureau Technique of the Etat-Major General des Armees, retained the posts which they had originally received in 1956. There are three basic areas in which the relationship be­ tween atomic policy in the Fourth and Fifth Republics can be most clearly seen: the bomb program, the development of peaceful uses of the atom and the relationship between France and Euratom.

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THE BOMB

The major difference between the Fourth and Fifth Re­ publics, insofar as the military aspects of the atom are con­ cerned, is that possession of the A-bomb by France has become official public policy under General de Gaulle.1 Al­ though the decision to test the bomb by 1960 was taken under the Gaillard administration shortly before the end of the Fourth Republic, it was characteristic of that Re­ public that Governments vacillated, hesitated and were un­ willing to shoulder the responsibility of underwriting an atomic military program for France. Indeed, the Algerian yoke and the economic stresses of the Fourth Republic go far toward explaining this hesitation.2 In the Fifth Republic, on the other hand, there was never any question that France would undertake to provide herself with the atomic bomb. To the extent that a change did occur under the Gaullist regime, one must turn to the notion of a national nuclear striking force, a panoply of strategic and tactical atomic weapons complete with a delivery system. In a sense then, one could look upon the Fifth Republic as an executor of a policy initiated by its predecessor.3 1 See

generally, Bertrand Goldschmidt, VAventure Atomique (Paris:

Artheme Fayard, 1962), pp. 147S. Ciro Zoppo, "France as a Nuclear Power," The Dispersion of

Nuclear Weapons, ed. Richard Rosecrance

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 126-56. 2 In 1957, even the military budget was cut because of economic and financial pressure, L'Annee Politique: 1957 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France), p. 81. Nor did the CEA itself escape credit cuts. In December 1957, the Gov­ ernment, in seeking to make ends meet in general, reduced CEA appro­ priations by 4 billion francs. Le Monde, December 14, 1957. In February 1958, M. Perrin, in an interview with Le Monde, noted that the Marcoule project suffered a slowdown as a result of these financial

cuts. Le Monde,

February 28, 1958. 3 In noting this fact, Raymond Aron has argued that "foreign com­ mentators should abstain from conjuring up la politique de grandeur and French commentators must not be accused of having . . . hidden motives when they try to objectively appraise the import of the event." Le Figaro, August 14, 1959.

FRANCE

ENTERS T H E

NUCLEAR

CLUB

The purposes for which the Gaullist regime pursued an atomic military policy did not differ very gready from those which motivated the Gaillard Government to take a defin­ itive position on the atomic bomb. For both Governments, there was the expectation that a demonstration of military nuclear capacity would give France access to American technological aid. It was also felt that a military nuclear capacity would assure France a greater voice in the man­ agement of the Atlantic Alliance and the direction of West­ ern policy.4 Official spokesmen for the Fifth Republic have gone to great lengths to justify France's development into a mili­ tary atomic power. The bases of these justifications range from the narrow need to consider the strategic importance of French positions in the Mediterranean5 and in areas which fell outside the scope of NATO but within the framework of French interests,® to the broader considera­ tion of France's proper role in the defense of the free world. Prime Minister Debre argued that "to avoid being crushed by agreements between very great powers, a na­ tion like France must have the power to make herself heard and understood."7 What this entailed in terms of French policy was highlighted by Jacques Soustelle, former Minister-Delegate for Atomic Research: "I regret that for a nation such as ours, possession of such a weapon is still 4M. Franiois de Rose makes clear these intentions in stating, "if the only result of possessing the atomic weapon were to make us a member of the collective suicide club, the result would be meager. We must hope that it will give greater authority to our voice in orienting world politics toward a general settlement of the problems, for the solution of which it appears less and less likely that either camp would touch off a general war." Francois de Rose, "Aspects Politiques des Problemes Poses par 1'Armement Nucleaire Franjais" (Paris: Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale, Direction des Etudes, No. 1,043, December 17, 1958), p. 20. See also Alfred Grosser, "France and Germany in the Adantic Community." 5 Prime Minister Debre, Agifi, January 16, 1959. eMinister of Information Frey, Combat, February 5, 1959. T The Times (London), August 19, 1959.

T H E F I F T H REPUBLIC A N D T H E ATOM

necessary for entry into a sort of world "Jockey-club." But in the present state of affairs we must devote part of our re­ search to [atomic] weapons which constitute an admission card among the truly Great Powers."8 Gaullist leadership, which had long been convinced that those nations which did not possess atomic military ca­ pacity would be little more than satellites of the possessor nations, and that access to the nuclear club—and sup­ posedly to American atomic secrets—depended upon pos­ session of the bomb, forged the reluctant preparations of the Fourth Republic into the political and military banner of the Fifth.9 There was, therefore, no shift in the basic military atomic policy of France when the Gaullist Repub­ lic was formed. But the continuity which prevailed was given positive and effective leadership by a Government which stated what it needed and was courageous and audacious enough to pursue the ends decided upon. PEACEFUL USES

In the matter of peaceful development of atomic energy, too, there was basic continuity between the two Republics. The Second Five Year Plan was voted in July 1957 and was intended to extend until 1962. The plans and programs which were then decided were not altered because of the change of regime.10 A fourth nuclear center, Cadarache, had been decided upon in 1958 by the CEA as a place for prototype reactors and the implementation of a number of studies called for by the Second Five Year Plan.11 The GovsLe

M e r i d i o n a l (Marseille), May 27, 1959. Revision of the Atomic Energy Act of the United States in 1958, to the effect that American military atomic aid might be provided to those nations which had made substantial progress in the military atomic field, could only serve to encourage these convictions. 10 Jean Andriot, "L'Evolution du Programme Atomique Fran?ais Pend­ ant Ies Cinq Dernieres Annees," Energie Nucleaire, 11, No. 5 (SeptemberOctober, i960), 306-309. 11 Goldschmidt, L'Aventure Atomique, p. 146. 9

F R A N C E

E N T E R S

T H E

N U C L E A R

C L U B

ernment approved this new center in 1959.12 As evidenced by its continued financial support of general nuclear de­ velopment, the Gaullist Government is interested not merely in the military potential afforded by the atom but in its industrial and economic potential as well.13 When visiting Marcoule in i960, Prime Minister Debre stated that "thanks to all that has been done at Marcoule, France has been given a chance to become a great indus­ trial power. . . . In enabling us to realize a true industrial revolution based on an atomic foundation, Marcoule brings to France an important element of grandeur."1* The isotope separation plant project, which, while France sought out­ side support,1® had remained merely a decision in principle during the Fourth Republic, was given the necessary ap­ propriations early by the Gaullist regime. The U235 plant is, of course, of great military interest and the release of credits for work reflects the military preoccupation of the new leaders of France. EURATOM AND THE FIFTH REPUBLIC

With regard to Euratom, Government policy in the Fifth Republic did undergo some change. To better understand this change, we should remember that Euratom is a com­ bination of two words—"European" and "atom." Those who were responsible for the initiation and successful con­ clusion of the Euratom and Common Market treaties, were, by and large, more concerned with the building of a 12

Le Monde, March 22-23, 1959· Capital investments in the civil program of the CEA in 1957 amounted to $8.6 million, in 1959 to $31.0 million and in 1961 to $36.5 million, to which the EDP program for nuclear electricity must be added: $11 :5 million in 1957, $28.8 million in 1959 and $36.0 million in 1961. Total investments and expenditures in 1958 were $164.4 million and in i960, $222.5 million. Ambassade de France, France and the Atom (New York: Service de Presse et d'Information, June, 1962), p. 16. 14 Combat, May 30, i960. 15 In November 1957, the Euratom Interim Committee put the French proposal for a joint U2ss effort before the Community, but only Italy showed any interest in the project. 13

T H E F I F T H REPUBLIC A N D T H E ATOM

united Europe than with either the coordination of atomic efforts or the reduction of tariff barriers, and consequently stressed the European aspect.16 The Gaullists and other "anti-European" forces, on the other hand, had opposed Euratom not only on the grounds that it might possibly be detrimental to national security through the renunciation of atomic weapons, but also because of the supranationalism which it implied. M. Mollet's promise that Euratom would in no way impair France's rights and abilities in the area of national defense was in large meas­ ure carried out. When, however, the Euratom Treaty was presented to Parliament for ratification in 1957, the SocialRepublican Party took a negative stand, and the reason of­ fered was the European aspect of the proposed community. In December 1956, the National Council of SocialRepublicans issued a statement that, "our national council has just adopted by an absolute majority a motion once again defining our conceptions with regard to Euratom. In this respect, it appears indispensable to us to point out that the project which the "little Europeans" appear to be pre­ paring constitutes, as did the EDC, an exceptionally grave menace to the fundamental interests of France and to her national defense."17 Michel Debre, then President of the Senatorial group of Social-Republicans, reiterated and clari­ fied this attitude when he contended that "it is known that the Euratom and Common Market treaties were neither technical nor economic treaties but, above all, political treaties. Ovir negotiators have been inspired . . . by the pos­ sibility of being able to create an assembly capable of again taking up Article 38 of the EDC, i.e. the construction of a litde Europe. . . ."18 M. Debre contended that the Rome treaties constituted an "illegitimate abandon" of France's resources. "If by some misfortune Euratom should ever 18

See for example the statement of M. Jean Monnet, Chapter Five,

P- 133. 17 18

Le Monde, December 23, 1956. L'lnformation, February 26, 1957.

F R A N C E

E N T E R S T H E

NUCLEAR CLUB

see the light of day," he concluded, "a national Govern­ ment will be able to declare it null and void. .. ."19 Under these circumstances, it could have been expected that a Gaullist government would destroy or at least fail to apply the Euratom Treaty. Euratom has, however, survived the transition from the Fourth to the Fifth Republics, for General de Gaulle, upon resuming power, agreed to honor outstanding French com­ mitments to the European communities.20 Nevertheless, Euratom's role has been restricted as a result of certain French political and technical views. From the political point of view, the Gaullists are out of sympathy with the concepts of political integration and supra-nationalism which European fathers such as Jean Monnet saw as the end-product of economic and technical integration. The Gaullist basis for European unity—I'Europe des Patries— retains and relies upon the continued existence of sover­ eign states. Consequently, French support for any of the three existing communities extends only to economic and technical matters and ceases when political implications come into play. In the case of Euratom, the French tend­ ency has been to support that organization insofar as basic research is concerned but to contest any extension of au­ thority outside this area.21 This attitude has been complemented by the views of both M. Guillaumat, Minister-Delegate for Atomic Re­ search from February i960 to May 1962, and of the CEA: Euratom should restrict itself to general research develop­ ment, especially in those cases where it is clearly beyond the capacity of any single nation to undertake the task.22 The 19

Quoted from he Monde by L'Humanite, July 3, 1957. Michael Shanks and John Lambert, The Common Market Today —and Tomorrow (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 165-73. 21 New Yorfc Times, December 22, 1961, referred to General de Gaulle as "lukewarm" to Euratom, and M. Debre as "resolutely hostile." 22 For example, the CEA for several years was reluctant to put its studies pertaining to breeder reactors in the Euratom cadre, for it felt that it could do this alone. 20See

T H E F I F T H REPUBLIC AND T H E ATOM

implication of this is that the closer a proposed research project comes to French interests and needs, the more will­ ing the latter will be to grant support.23 One factor which led to a less enthusiastic approach to Euratom was the reassessment of European and French energy needs. The original Euratom program, as submitted by the "Three Sages" in 1957, called for 15 million kilo­ watts installed nuclear electricity by 1965. This estimate was severely cut by an overabundance of coal, and by discover­ ies of oil and gas both in the Sahara and metropolitan France. The French especially benefited from this new situation and EDF decided upon a program of constructing prototype reactors every eighteen months in order to find the most economic method of producing nuclear electricity. Consequently, the total nuclear electric output has been re­ duced.24 A case illustrative of the Gaullist attitude toward Euratom was the refusal of the French Government to renew the appointment of Etienne Hirsch to the Euratom Com­ mission. In 1961, as President of Euratom's executive body, the Commission, M. Hirsch favored a project calling for financial support by Euratom of three power reactors to be built in Italy, France and Belgium. No specific funds hav­ ing been allocated for this purpose, Hirsch proposed that part of the funds from Euratom's First Five Year Plan for research be allocated for power reactor development. Speaking on behalf of France, M. Guillaumat stated that this would be an improper use of the funds in question and that France could not accept such a proposal.25 He also ob23 Le Monde asked to what extent claims that responsible French circles want Euratom "to only conduct those studies which are complementary to those which France undertakes on her own" were founded. Le Monde, July 5, 1961. 24 See Pierre Ailleret, "Le ProbIeme de l'Energie," Revue de Defense Nationale (October, 1958), pp. 1,496-1,516; A. Hannothiaux, "Panorama General du Plan d'Equipement Nucleaire de TE-D1F.," Energie Nucleaire, n, No. 5 (September-October, i960), 302-305; Le Figaro, November 2, i960. 26 Agence Economique et Financiire, July 4, 1961.

F R A N C E

E N T E R S T H E

N U C L E A R

C L U B

jected to the proposal on the ground that it entailed support for industrial reactors, not for obtaining information; that support of the project constituted a subsidy which is pre­ cluded by Article 6 of the Euratom Treaty, and that the first Euratom Plan was oriented strictly toward research. Finally, it was argued that the nature of the plants pro­ posed were based on non-European techniques and there­ fore would be of no benefit to European research efforts.28 Despite these objections, M. Hirsch, with the support of the Commission, forced a majority decision in the Council of Ministers, and, for the first time in the history of the European communities, France was in a minority of one.27 The replacement of Hirsch by Pierre Chatenet, former Minister of Interior in the De Gaulle Government, was the French answer to this defeat. The act is important, of course, not as a technical interpretation of the Euratom Treaty provisions, but as the manifestation of the Gaullist attitude toward the powers and prerogatives exercised by European institutions 28 The issue also raised the question of the true interpreta­ tion of Article 126 (2) of the Euratom Treaty which pro­ vides that: The members of the Commission shall perform their duties in the general interest of the Community with complete independence. In the performance of their duties they shall not seek or accept instructions from any Government or other body. . . . Each Member State undertakes to respect this character and not to seek to influence the members of the Commission in the performance of their duties."29 ie Le

Monde, July 5, 1961; New Yorfc Times, December 19, 1961. Yorfc Times, December 19, 1961. Article 118 of the Euratom Treaty allows for a majority vote of its members unless otherwise pro­ vided. 2i IJExpress, December 21, 1961, termed the replacement of M. Hirsch by a more "national" and "disciplined" person, a "reproach for supranationality." 28 Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community. Brus27Neiv

T H E F I F T H REPUBLIC A N D T H E ATOM

M. Hirsch, in his farewell speech before the European Parliament at Strasbourg, in December 1961, defended this principle of independence and the international character and responsibility of European community personnel. "The German President of the Common Market is not employed by the Federal Republic of Germany; the Italian Presi­ dent of the European Coal and Steel Community is not in the service of Italy; the French President of Euratom is not an employee of France."30 In the opinion of the French Government and, incidentally, of M. Guillaumat, M. Hirsch had placed too much emphasis on "European" and not enough on "atom."31 In conclusion, atomic policy under the Fifth Republic has manifested a basic continuity with the policy which evolved throughout the Fourth Republic. The military atomic program has been extended well beyond the pro­ duction of an atomic bomb and national defense planning has centered largely on atomic weapons. The European Atomic Energy Community has been given an interpreta­ tion which de-emphasizes the political nature of the Com­ munity and attempts to orient Euratom's program toward those matters which are of most interest to France. This latter facet of French policy, however, should not be con­ sidered a peculiarly Gaullist approach, for any nation which is the leading member in a cooperative endeavor would be expected to be most influential in the develop­ ment of that community's policies. sels: The Secretariat of the Interim Committee for the Common Market and Euratom. (n.d.) 30 European Atomic Energy Commission—The Commission—Speech by Etienne Hirsch, President of the Commission, before the European Parlia­ ment at Strasbourg, December 1961, p. 6. z i UExpress, December 21, 1961. La Libre Belgtque stated that "M. Hirsch presided over the destinies of Euratom with competence and courtesy. He has defended the European nature of Euratom in all inde­ pendence, but this attitude has gready offended certain French circles and most particularly, M. Debre." Quoted in the New York. Times, December 10, 1961.

CONCLUSION retrospect, the development of atomic energy in France can be divided into two distinct phases. The V first phase covers the period from the inception of the Com­ IEWED IN

missariat a l'Energie Atomique in 1945 through the estab­ lishment of the first Five Year Plan in 1952. The essential characteristics of this period were the quest for knowledge, the training of specialists, the acquisition of necessary ma­ terials and the development of a general framework for future atomic growth. This first phase was distinguished by scientific leadership and control over the policy-making proc­ ess within the CEA—although this power was diminished during the course of elaborating the Five Year Plan—and by the high level of influence exercised by that organization within the Government. The nature of the tasks confront­ ing those responsible for the development of atomic energy justified this state of affairs, and the dominant personality of the High Commissioner, M. Joliot-Curie, assured it. The second phase, which spans the period 1952-1960, was dominated by the concept of industrial growth. The essen­ tial concern of the responsible authorities was the creation of an atomic industrial capacity capable of meeting a variety of needs and alternatives. Within this industrial framework, military applications of atomic energy received an increasingly greater emphasis, partly as a result of the assessment of French security requirements, partly because peaceful applications were not economically feasible enough to war­ rant a large-scale industrial effort. This does not deny the importance which was attached to other potential applica­ tions of atomic energy, such as electricity production, but it does bear witness to the priorities decided upon by those

CONCLUSION

persons who directed atomic policy in the second phase. The growth and development of French atomic policy has been conditioned by capacity and characterized by continuity. The atomic program underwent steady growth which at most times was geared to the technical, financial and material resources available to the CEA. On some pro­ jects, such as the nuclear submarine, policy outdistanced capacity and resulted in failure. In general, however, policy and capacity were in step and combined to produce sub­ stantial results—prototype electricity production reactors and the atomic bomb. The continuity of French atomic policy leads to the ques­ tion of the nature of the policy-making process itself. A central theme of this study has been that atomic policy, both in its civil and military perspective, was molded, guided and developed by a small group of persons operat­ ing through informal channels of communication outside the mainstream of political activity. The formal policy­ making institutions, in other words, played a relatively minor, and in the case of the Parliament, even a nebulous role in the formulation of French atomic policy. The small cadre of individuals which shaped atomic policy was drawn from administrative, executive, military and legisla­ tive sources in roughly that order of importance. It was largely through their efforts, and because of the general course of external affairs, that the final decision to enter the nuclear club imposed itself on the responsible political au­ thorities. The development of public policy through informal channels of communication which exist beneath the veneer of formal political institutions is not, as we noted in the beginning of this study, unusual. The uniqueness of the present case derives from the nature of the policy issue in­ volved. Decisions of such importance as national security or the future defensive posture of the nation, both of which are implicitly bound up with atomic policy, are not as a

CONCLUSION

matter of course shuttled among middle-range politically unaccountable officials. Given the tremendous implications of nuclear power, it is quite evident that nuclear policy falls into that category of issues which deserve and are usually given the highest priority and the most careful consideration by responsible political leadership. It is this consideration which was lacking through a good part of the Fourth Republic. The similarities which may appear to exist between the French experience on the one hand and that of the United States and Great Britain on the other, are more apparent than real and will be treated below. It is submitted that the French experience has a number of unique qualities which result more from the nature of the political system of the Fourth Republic than from any other single factor. And it is to that political system that we once again turn our atten­ tion. In the Fourth Republic, the legislature, and certain ele­ ments of the administration, exercised substantial influence —if not control—over many policy areas. French cabinets, initially weakened by their coalition nature, were con­ demned to negotiate from a position of weakness and con­ sequently were often unable effectively to promulgate posi­ tive policy measures. One highly regarded scholar has stated that ministerial instability "renders the ministers impotent and therefore ineffective as representatives of the deputies' will, leaving the bureaucracy as the principle source of policy making. . . Z'1 The nature of French politics made it difficult for Gov­ ernments to adopt and pursue positive atomic policy, espe­ cially insofar as military matters were concerned. In its initial stages, atomic energy was too insignificant in com­ parison with economic, agricultural or educational issues to engage the interest of the Government. When, in the mid1Philip Williams, Politics in Post-War France (2d ed.; London: Long­ mans, Green and Co., 1958), p. 405.

CONCLUSION

1950's, the military implications of the existence of an atomic complex on French soil no longer could be real­ istically disregarded, no Government was prepared to take the responsibility for defining what this policy should be. Governments of the period were composed of political groups which were either ideologically and electorally committed to a position which precluded them from pub­ licly supporting a military atomic policy or, if favorable in principle, generally unwilling to support a policy which would require vast sums of money to activate. The Gaullists were an exception to this general rule, and they con­ sistently lobbied both in the Government and Parliament for a definitive and positive military atomic policy. At the time, however, they did not hold so commanding a position in French politics that they could successfully force the issue. Coalition cabinets, formed between members of those po­ litical groups which dominated politics in the Fourth Re­ public, led to a situation in which policies of drift and noncommitment were the most rational ones to pursue. In­ deed, it may generally be said that during most of the life of the Fourth Republic, the political executive did not have an atomic policy but was guided by M. Queuille's formula of postponing any decision which threatened the cohesiveness of the coalition. Quite simply, Government coalitions could not reach consensus. The failure of the Government to define and promulgate a military atomic policy denied Parliament the opportunity of critically assessing the development of such policy. At no time during the Fourth Republic was there an organized debate on the relationship of French atomic development to its military implications. Even the 1956 debate on the Euratom proposal did not directly broach this problem. The tenor of the arguments presented by those desirous of re­ taining freedom to engage in a weapons program, however, gave evidence of tacit approval for a positive military atomic policy on the part of a number of parliamentary

C O N C L U S I O N

groups. Furthermore, it was suggested in Chapter Four that it is highly probable that by 1958 Parliament, if given the opportunity, would have sanctioned a military atomic program. Nevertheless, except for the Pisani Resolution, introduced in the Council of the Republic in June 1956, there was no concerted effort of any parliamentary group to precipitate a debate on military atomic policy by use of written or oral questions with debate or through the use of the interpellation. The number of parliamentarians who did utilize the question device in order to clarify atomic military policy were few in number, one of the most prom­ inent being M. Michel Debre. The general apathy of the legislature with regard to mili­ tary policy extended to civil atomic programs as well. This is evidenced by the nature and paucity of the debates on the Five Year Plans of 1952 and 1957. The former debate turned on the problem of communists in the cea; that of 1957 was lost in the shadow of the ratification debate on the Rome Treaties which preoccupied the parliamentarians. Parliamentary apathy also reflects the general lack of in­ terest of the political parties in atomic policy. Again, the Gaullists represented an exception to the general rule, and all the Gaullist who held cabinet posts—General Koenig, M. Palewski and M. Chaban-Delmas—were instrumental in moving atomic policy closer to the bomb. The Radicals also contributed to this trend, but as a group they were clearly divided on the issue of the bomb. MM. Gaillard and Bourges-Maunoury represented that wing of the Party which favored military atomic policy, and they were prob­ ably joined in this view by the Mendesists, judging by Mendes-France's favorable attitude in 1954 and his gen­ erally nationalist position. M. Faure and his supporters rep­ resented a more pacifist attitude. Aside from these two po­ litical parties, however, public support for a military atomic policy came from a few isolated deputies such as Pierre Andre.

CONCLUSION

Thus, it cannot be said that the traditional formal gov­ ernment institutions, qua institutions, were instrumental in or crucial to the elaboration of atomic policy. The political executive did not supply initiative and direction, and the legislature did not serve as a forum in which a dialogue on atomic policy could develop. Despite this void in political leadership, there did exist an atomic policy in the Fourth Republic which unfolded progressively until it publicly manifested itself in the Sahara desert in February i960. As we have maintained, this policy evolved through the efforts of administrative, political and military personnel operating outside the public political forum in what, for the sake of convenience, we might call a political subsystem. The focal point of these activities was the Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique, and thus it is important to under­ stand the nature of this institution. Legally insulated from the ministries and from the permanent civil service, respon­ sible only to the Prime Minister who was vested with au­ thority and control over the CEA, that agency occupied a crucial position in the atomic sphere. The ministerial in­ stability prevalent in the Fourth Republic enhanced the power and autonomy of the CEA in the same manner that the traditional administrative structure gained flexibility under these circumstances. The scientific and administra­ tive leadership of the CEA capitalized on its legal position and on the political setting to firmly establish that organi­ zation as the focal point for the conception as well as for the execution of atomic policy. Parliamentary apathy only served to reinforce the position of the CEA, and the result was that initiative and guidance on atomic policy matters flowed upward from the CEA to the political executive. More often than not, the latter granted the support neces­ sary to the elaboration of programs to which the Commis­ sariat had assigned priority. In keeping with the tradition of administrative caution, however, the CEA never went too far too fast—it always sought to acquire at least a modicum

CONCLUSION

of support among members of the political hierarchy. As events during the Faure administration in 1955 indicated, positive support was not always forthcoming. Yet this did not result in a change of policy—or even a breach of con­ tinuity—and with the exception of the Gaillard Govern­ ment in 1958, no Government in the Fourth Republic appeared strong enough to bear the responsibility for mak­ ing a final determination one way or the other on a military atomic program for France. The lack of positive support only delayed the final result; it did not affect the nature of policy itself. Apart from the CEA, after 1954, military atomic policy was developed with the almost continuous support of the Min­ ister of National Defense, Gaullist members of the dif­ ferent Governments and a number of Radicals. In addition there was the core of military officers who favored an atomic weapons program and who, from time to time, held important positions in the Ministry of National Defense. This group's consensus on military policy received further support from members of Parliament, many of whom held positions on the parliamentary committees of Finance and National Defense in both chambers. Other groups may have participated in the atomic policy process, but the most effective were those enumerated above. By mid-1957, the consensus which had been reached among the groups most interested in a military orientation extended far into the public arena, and by 1958, even mem­ bers of the Socialist Party, such as M. Montalat, were speak­ ing openly in favor of an atomic bomb for France. Clearly, however, by this time political and public opinion rather than conditioning the direction of policy, could do little more than give moral support to a Government willing to accept the responsibility for a final decision. The Euratom Treaty case is instructive on several points. Euratom represents the only policy measure dealing with atomic energy, during the Fourth Republic, where it may

CONCLUSION

fairly be said that the initiative came from the political ex­ ecutive. Atomic energy was only a secondary factor; the primary objective was the continuation of the drive toward a united Europe. Matters were complicated by the existence of the Monnet Action Committee which spearheaded the drive for European integration in the mid-195o's, and counted M. Mollet and several members of his cabinet among its adherents. In a sense, what was involved here was a conflict between what might be termed two political subsystems centering on different policy issues. The case involved a confrontation of value priorities between the po­ litical and administrative leadership: atomic integration and the renunciation of atomic weapons on the one hand, atomic independence and freedom to pursue a military atomic program on the other. The eventual result was a diluted form of integration coupled with military atomic freedom. Because Euratom brought atomic policy questions onto the open political stage, the arena of debate became wider, with various forces picking up adherents so that a general debate on policy began to develop. For the pro-Euratom forces, the main priority was integration, not renunciation, and for the Commissariat administration and its support­ ers, military freedom was the basic priority, not total defeat of atomic cooperation in the cadre of the Six. In this sense, the value priorities were more complementary than may at first appear to be the case. Despite the polemics over the Euratom project, the resolution of the issues involved took place at the secondary levels of the political system. The po­ litical executive, the CEA administration and key GauIlist and Radical ministers, managed to effect a compromise in advance of public debate, so that Prime Minister Mollet did not, in the end, find it necessary to use the confidence weapon. In this instance the atomic policy forum was broader than that usually experienced during the Fourth Republic. The Euratom case both highlighted the division

CONCLUSION

of forccs over the nuclear armaments question and pointed up the role and effectiveness of these groups. Two general conclusions may be drawn from this study: that French atomic policy, rather than developing through the institutional channels of the political executive and the legislature, evolved as a result of consensus-building be­ tween interested parties holding a variety of effective gov­ ernmental posts, and that the focal point of policy leadership was the continuous administration of the Com­ missariat a l'Energie Atomique. The executive was not a source of atomic policy but a medium through which the crucial actors sought and gained support for their policies. Final authority, of course, rested with the responsible po­ litical authorities, and to the extent that their official im­ primaturs were necessary for policy to be fully elaborated, they were essential elements in the policy-making process. Governments, however, were not strong enough to under­ write a military atomic policy or courageous enough to stop the trend toward a French atomic bomb which origi­ nated as early as 1952. It is vain to argue that MendesFrance, or Faure or Mollet, adopted one position or an­ other; in truth, each of them reserved decision for a future Government while France steadily progressed toward the atomic bomb under the tutelage of the military atomic cadre discussed above. The central role of the CEA derived not only from its position as France's atomic agency but also from the continuity in its leadership and the dual role played by its administrative head who served in a political capacity also as delegate of the Government. Similarly, the legislature was neither a source of policy nor an element of control over policy. Atomic policy, then, developed outside the mainstream of politics and its formulation and elabora­ tion were dealt with at a secondary level of government where the participants were relatively unaffected by the ir­ resolute political system which prevailed above. Considered in the general framework of French politics,

C O N C L U S I O N

this study lends support to the proposition that ministerial instability enhances the influence and policy-making role of administrative or technocratic services. The immobilisme of Governments, to which administrative influence is in great part attributed, is evident in the matter of atomic policy development. Whether the overriding importance of more immediate problems than atomic energy or the un­ steady nature of political coalitions are raised as an expla­ nation, it would seem clear that in the Fourth Republic, French atomic destiny was not molded by the responsible political authorities. It may be argued with some justification that whatever the effect of the peculiarities of the political system on the development of nuclear policy, the French experience has a good deal in common with that of the other nuclear na­ tions. It is certainly true, for example, that the initial im­ pulse to action for military applications of nuclear power in France, Great Britain and the United States came from sci­ entific sources. However, French scientists were, on the whole, much less disposed to lobby for a nuclear weapons program than were their American and British counter­ parts. The role of American scientists in initiating the atomic bomb project and in later nuclear programs is well known.2 It is also a matter of record that British scientists were among the first to express an interest in the military potential of the atom in the early days of the war, and that British scientists also strongly urged their Government to continue atomic research, including the production of plutonium, at the close of the war.3 The interest of French 2 For the postwar experience of American scientists see, Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). 3 Alfred Goldberg, "The Atomic Origins of the British Nuclear Deter­ rent," International Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 3 (July, 1964), p. 417; Harvey A. DeWeerd, "British-American Collaboration on the A-Bomb in World War II," The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons, ed. Richard Rosecrance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 29-47.

CONCLUSION

scientists in the military applications of atomic power was short-lived in comparison with the sustained interest even­ tually exhibited by several groups of American and British scientists, especially after the Cold War crystallized and the Soviet Union entered the nuclear club. The French scien­ tific community was by no means monolithic, but the weight of scientific thinking tended toward the peaceful uses of atomic energy—even after France advanced to the point where it was possible to take the option for a military nuclear program. The conspicuous absence of Francis Perrin, High Commissioner of the CEA, from the testing grounds of the first French nuclear device in February i960 bears witness to this attitude. Of course, as this study shows, interest in atomic weap­ ons for France was not lacking. The role played by scien­ tists of the United States and Great Britain in generating interest .in nuclear weapons was taken in France by what we may call the administrator-technicians or technocrats. For our purposes, this term is intended to apply largely to the French Polytechnicien, the individual possessing scien­ tific and technical knowledge, trained for leadership, and endowed with administrative skill and esprit. It was the aneiens Polytechniciens such as M. Guillaumat, Admin­ istrator-General of the CEA, and M. Taranger, Industrial Director of the CEA, who fulfilled, in France, the role at­ tributed to elements of the scientific community in the United States and Great Britain. To be sure, a relationship of reciprocal support existed between the administrativetechnocratic leadership of the CEA and both political and military groups, but it was the Commissariat cadre which provided the element of continuous advice and support for a military atomic program and which assured continuity in French nuclear progress, even in the face of disinterested or unsympathetic political leadership. There is little basis upon which to equate technocrats in one system with scientists in another beyond the proposi-

CONCLUSION

tion that both belong to the category of non-political par­ ticipants in the political process. In the present situation, however, the technocrat, unlike the scientist, is more than a consultant or advisor. He also occupies an authoritative po­ sition in the political hierarchy and while often as limited as the scientist in determining the broad lines of policy, his participation at the executory level enables him to empha­ size certain policy features over others. This may be partic­ ularly evident when the administrative-technocratic insti­ tution enjoys a considerable degree of autonomy as does the CEA. Technocrats and scientists also hold comparable positions on the ground that technologically advanced na­ tions, interested in maintaining and improving their condi­ tion, are bound to place considerable weight on the advice of such persons, regardless of the nature of the political system. This has been the experience of Western democratic nations as much as it has become somewhat characteristic of the totalitarian system of the Soviet Union. Distinctions aside, however, of the three Western nuclear nations under consideration, France under the Fourth Republic would appear to represent the most striking example of minimal political leadership and maximum technocratic direction in the orientation of atomic policy. Another similarity between France, Great Britain and the United States is that in all three countries the decision to undertake an atomic weapons program preceded public debate on this issue. Again, the analogy has only limited application, for both the American and British programs were conceived in time of war, when in the interest of na­ tional security even minimal public discussion and debate could not be held. Nor were the implications of atomic power as clear in the early and mid-1940's as they were later. France, however, undertook a comparable program in time of peace. Moreover, in France, the opportunity to come to grips with the issue of atomic weapons was pre­ sented when the National Assembly considered the Eur-

CONCLUSION

atom proposal. As we have seen, this debate only went so far as to prevent the foreclosure of France's atomic future by assuring that France would remain free of juridical and material restraints which might prevent her from pursuing a nuclear weapons program should she eventually deter­ mine to do so. The question of what atomic policy should be was bypassed by both the parliamentarians and the Government. In the United States, a Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was established in 1946, and its extensive power over the atomic development of the nation thus brought atomic energy under Congressional control. This commit­ tee not only brought atomic energy problems into the poli­ tical marketplace but also has exercised its mandate with considerable vigilance.4 In the Fourth Republic, Parliament had little more than a passing acquaintance with nuclear problems or nuclear programs. In Great Britain, the Par­ liament was excluded from the atomic policy dialogue for a number of years after the war, but this would appear to reflect the nature of the British political system where command, control and continuity emanate from the top leadership in the cabinet. It was the latter which made the unequivocal decision to enter Great Britain in the nuclear club.5 This last comment marks the crucial difference between the British and American programs and the evolution of the French program. In the former two cases, the decision to embark on a nuclear weapons program was taken, after some urging by scientists, by the responsible political au­ thorities as a matter of positive public policy. The British and American decisions were unqualified and clear politic cal acts from which flowed the executory action of the re­ sponsible military, political, administrative and scientific 4 Harold P. Green and Alan Rosenthal, Government of the Atom (New York: Atherton Press, 1963). 6 Goldberg, International Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 3 (July, 1964), p. 420.

CONCLUSION

agencies. Within the broad limits set by those decisions, middle-range advisory and executory groups could and did exercise a considerable amount of influence. In France, the situation was reversed. The action of responsible political leadership was the last in a long chain of events—a re­ sponse to protracted internal pressure combined with the force of the external military and political environment. Guidance and direction for nuclear policy came not from the French Government or the French Parliament, but from a small, dedicated group of administrator-technocrats, politicians and military officers whose activities centered on and emanated from the CEA. This group exhorted suc­ cessive governments at least to prepare the groundwork for an eventual decision to create an atomic arsenal, and their persuasiveness increased in direct proportion to the decline of French influence and prestige in the international en­ vironment. Whatever the similarities between France and its nuclear allies in terms of the role of the administrative, technocratic or scientific bureaucracies in the policy­ making process, the French case must be distinguished on the ground that the ultimate decisions were reached in noticeably different ways. The remaining question concerns nuclear motivation. What, if any, generalizations can be drawn from the French experience on the matter of nuclear incentives? To what extent can the French case serve as an indicator for what other nations which have the technical, scientific, material and economic capacity to undertake a nuclear weapons program may do? The answers to these questions are necessarily speculative and turn on our interpretation of the psychological, political, military and economic factors which conjoined to lead France into the nuclear club. In a manner of anticipating our conclusions, one observa­ tion should be made at the outset: the question is not so much what induced France to take the nuclear plunge as

CONCLUSION

it is a question of whether the eventual outcome could have been otherwise. At the close of the Second World War, France was in an unusual position: a victorious—though liberated—nation with world-wide commitments and obli­ gations, a tradition of first-rank status and prestige, yet unable even to closely approximate her position in the pre­ war world. This situation was referred to earlier as the gap between aspirations and capabilities. Only two real alterna­ tives existed: either France had to relinquish her preten­ sions, reconsider her goals and reconcile herself to new circumstances, or she had to strive to reassert herself ma­ terially in the rank of Great Power nations. It was in part her failure to make this choice which accounted for the vacillation and hesitancy over engaging in a nuclear weap­ ons program; in the same manner, this fence-straddling created other difficulties for France in the field of foreign relations. However, given the tremendous military poten­ tial and the apparent diplomatic advantage afforded by nu­ clear weapons, or by at least a demonstrable nuclear capa­ bility, and the general inclination toward grandeur which characterized most leaders of the Fourth Republic, there would seem to be little doubt that France, like Great Britain, would eventually orient her national defense policy along nuclear lines. The probabilities of this orientation increased as France drew away from her moral and material condition at the close of the war. The greater her economic and material strength, the more evident became the disparity between her real status and her theoretical position in the Western alliance and the world. A member of NATO, with al­ legedly first-rank status in that organization's policy-and strategy-planning, France more often than not felt that she was being informed rather than consulted. With respect to policy positions on extra-alliance issues, French interests appeared to receive only slight consideration by her AngloAmerican allies. On occasion this divergence of interests be-

CONCLUSION

tween France and her major NATO allies led the former to conclude that her vital interests were being consciously sacrificed by her partners on the basis of their particular view of what constituted the interest of the western al­ liance as a whole. In the United Nations, France was a per­ manent member of the Security Council, a position of pres­ tige and influence; yet, in fact, France had become a public whipping-boy of the anticolonial forces, often with the tacit or expressed sympathy of the United States. In short, both in the councils of the Western alliance and the free world in general, France felt that her voice carried little author­ ity and less than her proper share of influence. French anxieties and frustrations were further com­ pounded by the more favored position entertained by Great Britain in the Atlantic Alliance. France and Great Britain had a good deal in common at the close of the war: like France, Great Britain was a former Great Power with a long tradition of world leadership, extensive commitments, but a distinctly middle-rank power in the postwar world. Unlike France, however, Great Britain had succeeded in at least partially bridging the gap between herself and the United States. While the United States retained an over­ riding influence over policy and strategy in NATO, Brit­ ain exercised considerable influence over that policy, and a pattern of mutual consultation appeared to characterize British-American relations throughout most of the postwar period. Whatever the limits of British influence over Ameri­ can policy in Europe or elsewhere—and they were sub­ stantial as Suez and Skybolt attest—French influence was considerably less. What distinguished France from Great Britain perhaps more than any other single feature was that the latter pos­ sessed nuclear weapons. More and more Frenchmen came to regard the atomic arsenal as the means to bridge the gap between the real and theoretical status of France in the world. Only with such a capability, it was argued, could

CONCLUSION

France exercise substantial influence over her major allies in the Atlantic Alliance, or support diplomatic action out­ side the purview of the organization and beyond the pro­ tective American nuclear umbrella. To these political and diplomatic considerations were added military justifications. Subject to the caveat that the separation of political and military factors is somewhat arbitrary, the word "justification" is important, for it signi­ fies that political considerations were preponderant in the Fourth Republic. While cliches such as "an army without atomic weapons is no army at all," or, "a national defense without atomic arms is incomplete and unavailing," were common fare among the nuclear protagonists of the Fourth Republic, the general concern for atomic weapons centered on considerations of international status and pres­ tige and an insistence that France's voice be heard and listened to in the councils of the Great Powers of the midtwentieth century. Military arguments for a nuclear force intensified as a nuclear balance of power began to develop between East and West. The 1954 decision that NATO strategy would be based on nuclear weapons, regardless of the nature of the aggression, contributed to the French in­ clination to base national defense on nuclear weapons.® This decision not only highlighted the importance of nu­ clear weapons but also indicated that such weapons could serve tactical as well as strategic ends. The impulse to "go nuclear" was fortified when it became apparent that the United States was no longer invulnerable to a Soviet nu­ clear attack, initially because of the Soviet long-range bomber force and later because of the introduction of mis­ sile delivery systems into the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Vul­ nerability threw into relief the question of the credibility of the American promise to come to Europe's defense with its nuclear arsenal and raised the spectre of Europe being saceRobert E. Osgood, NATO, The Entangling Alliance (Chicago: Uni­ versity of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 131.

CONCLUSION

rificed to the Russian bear. In view of this possibility, could France, could any nation, rely any longer on extracontinental defense? The response which the French gave to this question was "no." Yet it was a response given less as the result of a careful assessment of the military value of a nuclear arsenal than as a result of the apparent political ad­ vantages which would accrue to a nuclear nation. This brings us to a point of considerable interest. It does not appear that in reaching the decision to enter the nu­ clear club, French officials or their advisors gave much serious consideration to the effectiveness or credibility of a French nuclear force. There is no evidence that the costs in­ volved in building a sophisticated nuclear arsenal were taken into account or that the French seriously weighed the validity of the argument that nuclear weapons would give "a bigger bang for the franc." Given the fact that only the British program could serve as an example for France, the failure to examine closely the basic assumptions of a nu­ clear capability is not surprising. Only in the last several years have the British come to realize that a credible and effective independent nuclear force, including warning and delivery systems of a more than rudimentary type, can become an intolerable financial strain. Secondly, little study would seem to have been devoted to the use or military credibility of a small or medium-size nuclear force. The Suez episode, if anything, should have indicated the super­ ficiality of a medium-size nuclear force when a major nu­ clear power chooses to intervene against a medium-size power. Yet, the French drew the opposite conclusion: a nation without a nuclear capability must cede automatically to a nuclear power or suffer the consequences. Jhe extensiveness of French commitments in Africa, outside the scope of NATO, apparently blinded Frenchmen to the in­ conveniences and problems associated with the building of a viable nuclear force. In the long run, however, the as-

C O N C L U S I O N

sumptions and the ensuing decisions may prove to have been correct. What should be noted here is that at least in the Fourth Republic, nuclear weapons were intended less as a weapon to use against the Soviet Union than as a possible means of triggering the tremendous power of the Strategic Air Com­ mand under conditions when that power might not ordi­ narily have been put into use. Or, such weapons may have been considered as a means of exerting greater influence over American policy, both with regard to East-West rela­ tions and with regard to specifically French interests in areas not covered by NATO. From the vantage point of the Fourth Republic, these propositions appeared sound. The scope of the Fifth Republic's force de frappe goes con­ siderably beyond the uses indicated above and reflects the diplomatic intentions and world view entertained by Gen­ eral de Gaulle. On the political plane, at least one observer has raised the issue of whether France has actually gained status and in­ fluence through the development of a nuclear arsenal in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. In discussing the force de frappe of the Fifth Republic, Richard Rosecrance has pointed out that: "Within NATO, France probably exerts less influence than was once the case, and she no longer is the leader of the movement for European inte­ gration. . . . General de Gaulle's 'independent' position has not merely served to raise his bargaining position within Western and alliance councils, it has raised the question whether France is a full and participating member of either group."7 While this observation is essentially correct, it does overlook one fact: there are no other De Gaulles in France or elsewhere. From a long-term point of view, the question would appear to be not whether France has at this moment 7 Richard Rosecrance, 'International Stability and Nuclear Diffusion," The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons, ed. Richard Rosecrance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 304.

CONCLUSION

improved its influence or not, but what effect a national nuclear capability would have over Alliance and Western policy in the hands of more tractable, less intransigeant political leaders. In view of the more limited goals of the Fourth Republic, it is quite probable that had that Repub­ lic survived, the French nuclear force would have served to reinforce the political position of France in NATO, and, to have enhanced France's status and influence in the world at large. It is quite probable that post-Gaullist French lead­ ership, while pruning the scope of French ambitions, will seek to use French nuclear capability as a lever to obtain both increased security and political advantage in the At­ lantic and world arenas. That there is a general concern in the Western alliance over the use and control of nuclear weapons is a wellknown fact, and is appreciated by the United States to the extent that the formula of a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) is presently being offered as a palliative to our al­ liance partners.8 The general concern of non-nuclear na­ tions over nuclear sharing and nuclear control implies the possible development of more national nuclear forces if satisfaction is not forthcoming through some other me­ dium. The British, French and now NATO experiences are less than reassuring. What lessons can be drawn from the French experience? We may conclude in the first place that the French experi­ ence is somewhat unique. Except for Great Britain, no na­ tion found itself in quite the same position as France over the past two decades. These were the two great colonial Powers who discovered in the aftermath of the war that power was measured not only by the traditional indices but by the ability of nations to stay in the vanguard of the technological revolution. Compared with the resources and 8On the MLF generally, see: John Newhouse, "An Appraisal of the Multilateral Force," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (September, 1964), pp. 13-17; John Silard, "The Case Against the Multilateral Force," Bul­ letin of the Atomic Scientists (September, 1964), pp. 18-20.

CONCLUSION

capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union, both of these nations were relegated to a second-rank status, a fate common to most other nations which in an earlier day might have been in the forefront of the world powers. Un­ like these other countries, however, France and Great Britain in 1945 were victorious nations who retained their extensive commitments across two continents.9 While Great Britain adjusted to the changed colonial situation much more quickly than did France, neither nation adjusted to its own changed status in the world at large. This psycho­ logical factor must distinguish these two nations from other nations which have the technical, scientific, material and economic capability to enter the nuclear club. The psychological factor is of primary importance, for it is against this framework that nations will interpret the political or military factors which might induce them to follow in the footsteps of France or Great Britain. Political and military factors, in other words, become incentives to nuclear action to the extent that a nation's perception and interpretation of the international milieu induces them to take such action. Nations such as Canada or India, which are in a position to enter the nuclear club have not done so either because the economic considerations have discour­ aged them,10 or because their geographic location renders such action unnecessary,11 or because other factors such as moral considerations have been more compelling than the 9 The term "victorious" cannot apply equally to France and Great Britain, since French victory came only through liberation. Furthermore, at the close of the war, France was economically and industrially much further behind than Great Britain and had considerably more ground to recover in order to claim first-rank status. This gap may have made the nuclear decision eventually appear even more necessary to French than to British leaders. 10 Canada is an example of a nation which has given the economic problems consideration. See John E. Mueller, "Canada as a Non-Nuclear Power," National Securities Study Program, University of California, Los Angeles, June, 1963 (mimeo). 11 Canada, once again, serves as an example. See Leonard Beaton and

CONCLUSION

factors which would lead to the development of a nuclear arsenal.12 All of this, of course, is subject to the fluid nature of the international situation which might change at any moment and in changing bring about a different set of con­ clusions concerning the advisability of developing a na­ tional nuclear arsenal. The world situation has progressed considerably since first Great Britain and then France opted to establish a na­ tional nuclear force on their territory. The nuclear test-ban treaty has opened new possibilities for future international control of nuclear weapons. The incredible costs attached to the development of a viable and effective nuclear arsenal are so forbidding as to dissuade all but the most determined nations, such as China, to undertake the effort. Techno­ logical breakthroughs may ease the burden and alter this judgment. But, on the other side of the coin, technological breakthrough also points up the need for a nation to en­ gage in constant research and development in the national defense sector—a very costly proposition—if it is not to find itself holding an expensive but antiquated nuclear arsenal in its hand. It is the unique rather than the common features of the evolution of the French nuclear program that stand out. While that nation's experience may serve either to encour­ age or to inhibit other nations in pursuing a national nu­ clear policy, those other nations will be influenced primar­ ily by their image and perception of the milieu in which they exist and by their interpretation of the effect, of hav­ ing or not having a nuclear capacity, on their political ef­ fectiveness and defense capabilities. John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), Ch. 5. 12 India and Japan are countries representative of this tendency.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

France. Ambassade de France. France and the Atom. New York: Service de Presse et d'Information, June, 1962. France. Ambassade de France. France's First Atomic Explosion. New York: Service de Presse et d'Information, February, i960. France. Ambassade de France. France from Reconstruction to Expansion: 1948-1958. New York: Service de Presse et d'In­ formation, April, 1958. France. Ambassade de France. Two Years of the De Gaulle Administration. French Affairs, No. 101. New York: Service de Presse et d'Information, April, i960. France. Commissariat General au Plan. Troisieme Plan de Modernisation et d'Equipement 1958-1961. Paris: Imprimerie des Journaux Officiels, 1959. France. Commission de Verification des Comptes des Entreprises Publiques. Rapports d'ensemble, Journal Officiel, An­ nexe Administrative. Paris: 1952, 1954, 1956, 1958, i960. France. Conseil Economique, "Etude des Problemes Poses par l'lndustrie Atomique Fran^aise," Avis et Rapports du Conseil Economique, Journal Officiel, November 26, 1957. France. La Documentation Franchise. "Les Problemes Administratifs en France Relatifs a !'Utilisation Pacifique de l'Energie Atomique." Reprint of a report submitted by M. Henri Puget to the Congres de !'Association Internationale de Sci­ ence Politique, September, 1961. Notes et Etudes Documentaires, No. 2.856. Paris: La Documentation Frangaise, Feb­ ruary i, 1962. France. Journal Officiel. Debats Parlementaires. Assemblee Nationale. France. Journal Officiel, Debats Parlementaires. Conseil de la Republique.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

France. Journal Officiel. Debats Parlementaires. Senat. France. Journal Officiel. Documents de ΐAssemblee Nationale. France. Journal Officiel. Documents du Conseil de la Republique. France. Journal Officiel. Lois et Decrets. France. Premier Ministre, Commissariat a I'Energie Atomique, Commissariat a I'Energie Atomique: 1945-1960. Paris: L'Edition Artistique, March, i960. France. Premier Ministre, Commissariat a I'Energie Atomique, Rapport Annuel. Paris: L'Edition Artistique, 1958-1960. France. Presidence du Conseil, Commissariat a I'Energie Atom­ ique, Rapport d'Activite du Commissariat a I'Energie Atom­ ique du Ier janvier 1946 au 31 dicembre 1950. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1952. France. Presidence du Conseil, Commissariat a I'Energie Atom­ ique, Rapport Annuel. Paris: L'Edition Artistique, 19541958. PARTY LITERATURE

Bulletin IntSrieur du Parti Socialiste, 1950-1958. France Independante. L'Hebdomadaire des Independants et des Paysans, 1952-1958. L'Information Radicale-Socialiste, 1948-1958. Note d'lnformation du Centre National des RepublicainsSoeiaux, 1955-1958. NEWSPAPERS

Articles of special interest derived from newspaper sources are included among the entries under Articles L'Aurore (Paris) Combat (Paris) Le Courrier de la Colire (Paris) La Croix (Paris) UExpress (Paris) La Figaro (Paris) France-Observateur (Paris) L'Humanite (Paris) L'lnjormation (Paris) Juvenal (Paris)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Liberation (Paris) Le Monde (Paris) New Yor\ Times L'Observateur (Paris) Le Populaire de Paris (Paris) BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS

Billy, Jacques. Les Techniciens et Ie Pouvoir. ("Que Sais-je?," No. 881). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, i960. Blazot, Jacqueline. UEnergie Nucleaire. Paris: Banque de l'Union Parisienne, April, 1958. Chenot, Bernard. Les Entreprises Nationalisees. ("Que Saisje?," No. 695). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1956. Cottier, Jean-Louis. La Technocratic, Nouveau Pouvoir. Paris: Editions de Cerf, 1959. Delion, Andre G. LEtat et Ies Entreprises Publiques. Paris: Sirey, 1959. Earle, Edward M. (ed.). Modern France: Problems of the Third and Fourth Republics. Princeton: Princeton Univer­ sity Press, 1951. Einaudi, M., Bye, M., and Rossi, E. Nationalization in France and Italy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955. Furniss, Edgar S. Jr. France, Troubled Ally. New York: Fred­ erick A. Praeger, i960. Goldschmidt, Bertrand. L'Aventure Atomique. Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1962. Grosser, Alfred. La IVe Republique et sa Politique Exterieure. Paris: Armand Colin, 1962. Julian, Pierre. Le Statut Juridique de I'Energie Atomique: Uti­ lisations Pacifiques. Lyon: Institut de Droit Compare de l'Universite de Lyon, 1958. Lerner, Daniel and Aron, Raymond (ed.). France Defeats EDC. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957. Lichtheim, George. The New Europe: Today—And Tomorrow. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. Luethy, Herbert. France Against Herself. New York: Meridian Books, 1957. May, Roger. La France a La Bombe. Paris: Gallimard, 1959.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Meynaud, Jean. Technocratic et Politique. ("Etudes de Science Politique," No. 2) La Ferte-Bernard: Bellanger, 1960. Moore, Ben T. The American Interest in Euratom. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1958. Naissance d'une Industrie Nucleaire Pranqaise. Paris: Banque Mobilier Privee, April, 1957. Osgood, Robert. NATO, the Entangling Alliance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. Rieben, Henri. Euratom: Necessite Vitale et Urgente Pour la Prance et Pour I'Europe. Lausanne: Centre de Recherches Europeennes de l'Universite de Lausanne, 1957. Shanks, Michael and Lambert, John. The Common Market Today—And Tomorrow. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. Williams, Philip M. Politics in Post-War Prance. 2d ed.; London: Longmans, Green, 1958. ARTICLES AND PERIODICALS

"A Quand la Fusee Frangaise?," Entreprise, No. 144 (June 7, 1958)> PP- 33-35E.A. "La 'Reorganisation' du C.E.A.," La Pensee, No. 35 (March-April, 1951), pp. 66-76.

Ailleret, Colonel Charles. "L'Arme Atomique, Arme a Bon Marche," Revue de Defense Nationale (October, 1954), pp. 3I5-25.

. "Applications 'pacifiques' et 'militaires' de l'Energie Atomique," Revue de Defense Nationale (November, 1954), pp. 421-32. . "L'Arme Atomique, Ultima ratio des Peuples," Revue de Defense Nationale (December, 1954), pp. 553-63. . "L'Arme Atomique, Facteur de Paix?," Revue de Defense Nationale (January, 1955), pp. 34-41. "Progres des Armements Atomiques," Revue Militaire d'Information, No. 251 (May 10, 1955), pp. 21-24. . "Immobilisme des Doctrines et Progres des Armements," Revue de Difense Nationale (December, 1955), pp. 539-54. "Complexe Atomique du Frangais," Revue de Defense Nationale (January, 1956), pp. 3-9. 227

BIBLIOGRAPHY

. "La Protection Anti-atomique I," Revue Militaire d'lnjormation, No. 266 (February 10, 1956), pp. 22-30. . "La Protection Anti-atomique II," Revue Militaire d'lnjormation, No. 267 (February 25, 1956), pp. 26-29. . "De l'Euratom au Programme Atomique Nationale," Revue de Defense Nationale (November, 1956), pp. 1,319-27. . "Illusion ou Realite de l'Arme Absolue," Revue de Defense Nationale (July, 1957), pp. 1,067-81. . "Armes Atomiques Strategiques et Tactiques," Revue Militaire Generale, No. 9 (November, 1957, pp. 443"54. "Energie Nucleaire et Problemes de Defense," Revue Militaire d'lnformation, No. 312 (January, i960), pp. 98-108. Ailleret, Pierre. "Les Perspectives d'Integration de l'Energie Nucleaire dans les Moyens de Production d'Energie Electrique," Revue Frangaise de l'Energie, No. 51 (March, 1954), pp. 203-11. . "L'Energie Nucleaire dans l'Equipement Energetique Frangais," Revue Franqaise de l'Energie, No. 91 (November, T

957)> PP- 83-89. "Le Probleme de l'Energie," Revue de Defense Nationale (October, 1958), pp. 1,496-1,516. Ailleret, Pierre and Tabourier, Pierre. "Integration de l'Energie Nucleaire Parmi les Moyens de Production de l'Energie en France," Revue Franqaise de l'Energie, No. 67 (September, "955) > PP- 4 22_2 4Allier, Jacques. "Les Premieres Piles Atomiques et l'Effort Frangais," Les Extraits de la Revue Scientifique, Extrait No. 3,314 (November-December, 1951). Alphandery, C. "L'Energie Nucleaire de Hiroshima a Geneve," Economie et Politique, No. 16 (October, 1955), pp. 9-20. . "Bientot 1'Electricite Nucleaire?," Economie et Politique, No. 18 (December, 1955), pp. 31-44. Als, G. "Euratom et le Probleme Energetique de l'Europe," Revue de I'JJniversite de Bruxelles, Nos. 1-2 (October, 1958February, 1959), pp. 86-106. Andriot, Jean. "Les Lignes Principales du Programme Atomique Frangais," Revue Politique et Parlementaire, No. 702 (May, i960), pp. 447-52.' . "L'Evolution du Programme Atomique Frangais Pend228

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"Le Conseil Economique Favorable a la Construction d'une Usine de Separation Isotopique," Revue Frangaise de I'Energie, No. 92 (December, 1957), p. 102. Daillet, Jean-Marie. "Euratom et le Second Souffle Energetique de l'Europe," France-Forum, No. 36 (November, 1961), pp. 25-27. Dassault, General. "L'Arme Atomique et la France," Le Monde, May 31, 1956. Debau, Colonel E. J. "Les Armes Atomiques et la Defense Fran^aise," Revue de Dejense Nationale (July, 1955), pp. 3-7. Debiesse, M. J. "Le Nouveau Plan Atomique Frangais," Les Conferences du Palais de la Decouverte, Serie A, No. 237 (March 8, 1958). Debrabant, Colonel H. "Chronique Aeronautique," Revue de Dejense Nationale (May, 1954), pp. 623-25. 230

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Debre, Michel. "Le Complot de 1'Euratom et la Conference de Bruxelles," L'Annee Politique et Economique, No. 131 (JuneJuly, 1956), pp. 191-98. Deheme, Paul. "Energie Nucleaire," Economie et Realites Mondiales, No. 74 (March, 1956), pp. n-17. Delmas, Claude. "La France et sa Defense Nationale," Revue de Defense Nationale (October, 1957), pp. 1,434-48. Desfontaines, Jean. "L'Utilisation de l'Energie Nucleaire en France," Revue de I'Action Populaire, No. 88 (May, 1955), pp. 531-39. "Devant le Traite Instituant la Communaute Europeenne de l'Energie Atomique (Euratom)," Note d'Information du Centre National des Republicains-Sociaux, No. 21 (June, 1957)-

"Le Developpement Atomique Fran^ais," Les Cahiers Frangais, No. 35 (December, 1958), pp. 2-7. Dienne, Jean. "L'Exemple de Frederic Joliot-Curie, a Propos du XX e Anniversaire de la Radioactivite Artificielle," La Nouvelle Critique, No. 59 (November, 1954), pp. 115-21. Drouin, Pierre. "Au Tournant de la Politique Atomique Fran PP- 13-18· Ledard, Charles. "Des Bombes Franchises: Oui," La Nef, Vol. xii, No. 10 (September, 1955), 163-73. Leprince-Ringuet, Louis. "Prestige de la France et Armements Atomiques," Le Monde, March 19, 1955. Longchambon, Henri. "Les Possibilites d'Utilisation Industrielle de l'Energie Atomique en France," Monde Nouveau (July, 1955), pp. 28-34. . "Pas de Revolution Technique sans Techniciens," Gauche Europeenne, No. 29 (March, 1956), pp. 18-20. "Marcoule, Premiere Centrale Nucleaire Fran^aise," UEconomie, No. 523 (January 12, 1956), pp. 20-21. Maubert, Jean. "L'Euratom," Revue de VAction Populaire, No. 96 (March, 1956), pp. 310-16. Maurin, Captain Pierre, J-P. "Perspectives Atomiques, I," Revue de Defense Nationale (June, 1954), pp. 706-20. . "Perspectives Atomiques II," Revue de Defense Na­ tional (July, 1954), pp. 760-72. Maquenne, Paul. "Besoins d'Investissements des Industries d'Avantgarde," Banque, No. 128 (February, 1957), pp. 75-82. Mayer, Roger. "Grandeur ou Bombe," La Nouvelle Critique, No. 106 (May, 1959), pp. 56-62. Moch, Jules. "L'O.N.U. et !'Experimentation Atomique du Sahara," La Revue Socialiste, No. 130 (February, i960), pp. 131-45. Mollet, Guy. "Le Front Republicain Devant l'Europe," Gauche Europeenne, No. 28 (February, 1956), pp. 6-7. Moltchanov, N. "Pools Atomiques," Temps Nouveaux, No. 13 (March 22, 1956), pp. 6-10. Morance, Gustave. "Euratom Devant ses Premieres DiiEcultes," Economie Contemporaine, No. 140 (December 22, 1959), pp. 5-7· Moraque, Contre-Amiral Paul. "Apergus sur la Politique Navale Fran 37! and military applications, 65; and structure of CEA, 18 Debre, Michel, 163, i7on, 194, 206; and Euratom, 197, 1 9 8 ^ 2 0 m De Gaulle, General Charles, xii, xiii, 126; and establishment of CEA, 3 ; in development of atomic program, 5-6, 7; and Euratom, 196, 199, 200; and nuclear weapons, xvi, 117, 192, 193, 194, 195; policy of grandeur, xi, xviii, 220; position on N A T O , 220; views on structure of CEA, 17 Denivelle, Leon, 35, 42 Departement de Techniques Nouvel-

248

les ( D T N ) , 170 Dien Bien Phu, xviii, 105

INDEX Direction des Applications Militaires ( D A M ) , 117 Direction des Etudes et Fabrications d'Armement (DEFA), 66, 99 Direction des Poudres, 99, 102, 124 Direction de Recherches et Exploitations Minieres (DREM), 27 Direction Techniques et Industrielles, 99 disarmament, 79, 108, n 8 n , 142, i 8 4 n , 223 Dulles, John Foster, 105, i o 6 n , 178 East-West relations, 44, 55, 186, 218, 220 Ecole Militaire de Specialisation Atomique de I'Armee de Terre, 99 Ecole Polytechnique, 42, 66, 97. See also Polytechniciens ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community), 129, 130, 133, 134, 144, 152, 153, 157, 158, 160, 201; Common Assembly of, 129; Council of Ministers of, 120; French Communist Party and, 146; and peaceful uses of atomic energy, 130 EDC (European Defense Community), 7n, 103, 104, 112, 115, 125, 129, I33n, 140, 143, 146, 153, 197; and French nuclear weapons program, 103, 104; and peaceful atomic research, 104 E D F (Electricite de France), 8, 93, 102; and nuclear electricity, 93, 155, I96n, 199; reactors, 93, 155; and Second Five Year Plan, 181 EEC (European Economic Community), xi, 130, 196, 197, 201 Einstein, Albert, i 6 g n Eisenhower, General Dwight D., 71, n o , 176 EL-2 reactor, 60 electricity and atomic energy, cost of, 93, 94; enriched uranium and, 176, 180; plutonium and, 69; production of, 76, 93, 94, 121,

164, 179, 181, 182, 183, I96n, 199, 202 Ely, General, 98, 184n enriched uranium, 104, 156, 160, 173, 176, 177; Euratom and, 156, 19611; military aspects of, 176, 177, 180; production of, 66, 67, 152> 153> 177> 178, 181n; United States as a source for, 176, 177; uses of, 176, 180. See also Euratom, insotope separation. Etzel, M „ 178 European atomic cooperation, 133, 134. 135. 136 Euratom (European Atomic Energy C o m m u n i t y ) , background of, 130-135; CEA and, 146, 147, 148, 198, I 9 8 n ; CEA administrators' views on, 148, 153, 155, 209; CEA scientists' views on, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 154; Commission of, 153, 199-200; and control of nuclear installations, 138; Council of Ministers of, 200; debates on in Parliament, xv, 136, 143, 150, 152, 157, 159, 163, 164, 170, 197, 205, 213-14; economic factors, 132; and enriched uranium, 152, 153, 156, 177, 178, 179, 180; and Fifth Republic, 192, 196-201; finances, 156, 199; first Five Year Plan of 199; and French atomic policy in general, 208-209; French Communist Party on, 145, 146, 158; French participation in, 116; French policy on, 145; Gaullists (Social Republicans) and, 159, 162, 163, 164, 1997, 209; G o v e r n m e n t a n d , 186, 2 0 9 ; Guillaumat and, 105, 198, 199; Independents and, 159, 161, 162, 1964; industrial reactors, 200; Interim Committee of, I 9 6 n ; military in France and, 138, 139, 146-48; military rights retained, 161, 162, 184, 209, 214; military uses of atomic energy and, 137,

249

INDEX Five year plan for atomic development (1952). 46. 58-59. 78. 93. 95, i n , 121, 152, 153, 202, 206; Communist Party reaction to, 78; cost factors, 87; military and, 96, 100; parliament and, 69-85, 206. See also fissionable material, plutonium Five year plan for atomic development (1957), 181. See isotope separation, Second Five Year Plan Fleury, General, 102, 121 force de frappe, xi, xiii, 166, 220; effectiveness of, 219 Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Six, 129, 141, 155 Foresto, Senator Coude de, i 7 o n Fourth Republic, bureaucracy in, xiv-xv, 204, 213; economic development, xxi, 61; foreign policy, xx, xxi, xvii-xviii, 4on (see also French foreign policy); leadership in, xix, 204; nature of politics in, xiv, 204-05; political parties in, xiv, 208-09; France, and N A T O , xx, xxi, xxii, 186, 220-21

138, 141, 142, 153-57; Mollet and, 146, 147; Mollet Government and, 130-31, 164, 166; mora t o r i u m proposal, 164; MRP (Popular Republicans) and, 158, 159; national defense questions, 161, 162, I70n, 185, 197; opposition to, 134, 143, 157, 158, 160, 185; and ownership of nuclear materials, 137; Perrin and, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 177; Poujadists and, 158; provisions of treaty, 184-86; Radical-Socialists and, 159, 160, 161, 164, 209; ratification of by Parl i a m e n t , 1 8 4 ; Socialist P a r t y (SFIO) and, 158, 159; supporters of, 158, 160, 161; and United Kingdom, 144, 145, 149; and United States, 145, 178 European energy needs, 132, 143, 158, 199 European nuclear industry, 137 European Parliament, 201 European socialism, 137 European integration, xviii, xx, 95, 129, 130, 198, 209; and atomic cooperation, 1220, 129

Frangois-Montiel, Andre, i o 6 n Frederic-Dupont, M., 46, 7 m , 72,

Faure, Edgar, and European integration, 131; and military research funds, 113; and nuclear weapons program, 116, 117, 118, 119, 125, 127, 17on, 206; and Palewski Plan, 121, 123 Faure Government, 120, 125, 127; and nuclear weapons program, 128, 166, 208 Faure, Maurice, xiiin, I33n, I59n, 160-61, i 7 o n Finance Committee of National Assembly, 7 m , 72, 76n, 79, 106 fissionable material, control of, 161, 164; foreign sources, 85; military uses of, 65, 66, 181, 184; peaceful uses of, 66, 181; production of, 65, 66, 67, 68, 74, 84, 85, 88, 93, 122, 152; supply of, 154

73. 74. 76 French atomic program, cost factors of, 156; funds for, 74 (see also CEA, budget); industrialization of, 59, 60 (see also CEA, industry) ; military development of, xi, xii, xiii, 93, 97, 103, 176 (see also military national defence); military justifications for 218; national defense and, 115, 169, 188, 202, 203, 216; peaceful uses, I i 3 n , 123, 176, 212; prewar, xii; relation to British and American programs, xix, 21, 40, 42, 47 (see also Anglo-American atomic policy). See also atomic policy, atomic energy program, CEA French atomic research, security in, 39, 4 0 , 4 1 . 43. 44

250

INDEX French atomic resources, 42, 59 French educational structure, 26 French energy supplies, 61, 62, 75, 93, 143, 179, 199; coal and oil imports, 60, 61, 80, 179; electricity and nuclear power, 121 French foreign policy, xi, xvii-xxiv, 171-74, 186-91 French Government, approval of first Five year plan, 95; CEA influence in, h i , H 4 n , 147, 149, 202, 207; and Communists in public scientific organizations, 82, 83, 85; and Euratom, 13-31, 186; and isotope separation plant, 182; and nuclear weapons program, 94. 95. 96, 101, 106, 108, 109, i n , 115, 119, 124, 125, 126, 127, 170, 206, 210; role in atomic policy, 28, 29, 203, 204, 207, 214. See also atomic policy, Prime Minister, individual Ministers and Ministries French navy, 55n, 122, I23n, 184 French North Africa, 119, 120 French science, Left-Right cleavage, 70 French status, in Atlantic Alliance, 216, 217, 220; in world, 216, 217, 222 Frey, Roger, 189 Fuchs, Klaus, 43, 44 Gaillard, Felix, 84n, 131; atomic bomb development and, 172, 186, i 8 7 n , 190, 191, 193, 194; and atomic bomb order, 190, 193; and Communists in CEA, 81; and enriched uranium production, 1 8 i n ; and first Five year plan, 46, 63, 64, 72, 74, 80; influence on atomic program, 62; interest in atomic development, 61, 62; and plutonium production, 68, 69, 87, 101; and nuclear weapons, 82, H 3 n , 116, 206, 208 Garet, Pierre, 133 251

Gaullism, xii Gaullists, and Euratom, 149, 163, 164, 209; and European political integration, 130, 198; in Faure Government, 117; in Fourth Republic, xiv; in Mendes-France Government, 115; and nuclear weapons, 115, 117, 125, 171, 174, 194, 205, 206, 208; policy of grandeur, 191 Gennevilliers, Communist congress at 41, 43, 44, 45, 51 Gerardot, General Paul, 98n, 187 Gibert, Etienne, 11 on Giordani, F., 178 Guillaumat, Pierre, 6 i n , 97, 192; and BEG, 124; and Euratom, 131, 148, 153, 154, 198, 199. 201; and EDC, 104; influence over atomic policy, 116, 117, 125, 127; military orientation of, 97, 174; and nuclear weapons program, 97, n o , 115, 184, 18596, 212; and plutonium reactor construction, 101; and Second Five Year Plan, i 8 7 n ; views on role of CEA in atomic development, 101, 113. See also Administrator-General Goldschmidt, Bertrand, 4, 5n, 24, 32, 63, 67, 86, I 4 0 n Gouin, Felix, 158 graphite, 27, 121 Great Britain, see United Kingdom Grury, 27 Gueron, General, I4n, 173 Gueron, Jules, 4, 24, 32, 63

Halban, Hans, 3, 4, 17 Heavy water, Norwegian stock, 4, 23, 27; production of, 121 H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r (of C E A ) , functions of, 7, 11, 12, 13, 22, 34, 51, 52, 173; policy-making role, 202; relationship to Administrator-General, 14, 51, 89; relationship to Secretary-General,

INDEX of, 182; military and, 181, 182; parliamentary approval of, 182 Italy, and Benelux m e m o r a n d u m , 131; and isotope separation plant, I96n

18. See also, Francis Perrin, Frederic Joliot-Curie, scientists high power reactors, 67, 68, 75, 85 Hirsch, Etienne, 113, 199-200, 20m

incentives for nuclear development, 215-20 Independent and Peasant Party, I 33» I33 n > I 7 2 n ; and Euratom, 159, 161, 162, 164 India, 222, 223n Indochina, xxii, xxiii, 87, 98, 103, 105, 115, 119, 126, 169; nuclear weapons and, 105 industrial atomic program, peacef u l purposes, 63. See also private industry, industrial growth Industrial Equipment Committee (of CEA), 101, 102 industrial growth, 48, 58, 62, 64, 101, 102, 202 Industrial Production Committee (of Council of the Republic), 79 industrial reactors, and Euratom, 200 Inspectorate of Finance, 61 Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Defense Nationale, H 7 n intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), 187 Intergovernmental Committee (Spaak Committee), 131, 141, 155 intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM), 187 Interministerial Center of Irradiation and Decontamination, l o o n Isotope separation plant, 173, 180, 181, 183; appropriations for, 182; CEA support for, 179, 180, 182; Conseil Economique and, i 8 i n ; construction of, 175, 176, 181; cost factors, 67, 179; European cooperation and, 152, 153, 156, I77> 178. 179; Gaullist regime and, 196; Government approval

Japan, 2230 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (United States), 214 Joliot-Curie, Frederic, atomic research and, 3, 4, 5, 6, 35, 97, 169ns attitudes toward CEA structure, 17, 29, 30; Communist affiliation, 17, 18, 39, 41 Dautry and, 36; dismissal of, 43, 44, 45, 57, 88; effect of dismissal on CEA, 48, 55; influence in atomic policy-making, 24, 30, 31, 32, 33, 86, 96, 202; views on French atomic development, 62; views on Franco-Soviet relations, 41; views on nuclear weapons, 45, 77; views o n peaceful applications, 37; views on security in atomic research, 40 Joliot-Curie case, 36-49, 56, 70 Joliot-Curie, Irene, 3, 31, 33 Jouhaux, Leon, 54 journalists, and nuclear weapons program, 109 Juin, Marshal: 172, 185 Koenig, General Pierre, i o 6 n 122, 130; atomic submarine and, 123; in Faure Government, 117; in Mendes-France Government, 115; nuclear weapons development and, 126, 127, 206 Korean war, xxiii, 169 Kowarski, Lew, 3, 4, 17, 24, 32, 63; and Canadian atomic projects, 5, 24 K u h l m a n n (industry), 9n Laboratoire de Chimie Nucleaire (College de France), 30 Lachaux (mining site), 27 Lafond, Henri, 54

252

INDEX Laniel, Joseph, i o 6 n , 113n] Lapie, Pierre-Olivier, 108 Lavaud, General Gaston, 173, 184n, 192 Lavergne, Bernard, 144 Lecourt, Robert, 133 Legendre, M, 43, 45 Lejeune, Max, 106 Leprince-Ringuet, Louis, 63 Lescop, Rene, 35, 53, 54, 56, 66; and industrial growth of CEA, 43, 58, 62, 64; and military uses of atomic energy, 42, 43, 65, 66, 82, 97; and reorganization of CEA 49, 50; role in CEA policymaking, 67, 68, 87; role in Plut o n i u m production, 67, 68; Leveuf, Andre, 8 i n , I0In lberation, xi, xvii, 5 Loire Valley, E D F reactors in, 93 Longchambon, Henri, 79, 80, 112 low-power reactors, 68

McCarthyism, 45, 46 Macridis, Roy, xviii Marcoule, 93, 104, n o , 121, 196; project at, 101, 102, 183, I93n Marshall Plan aid, 44 massive retaliation, concept of, 187 Maupeou, Senator de, i 7 o n Maurras, Charles, 46 Mediterranean, French position in, 194 Mendes-France, Pierre, xvii, xviii, I 5 9 n ; and Euratom, 149, 160; and nuclear weapons, 112, 113, 114,

115,

116,

117,

125,

17011,

206, 210 Mendes-France Government, 115, 120, 126 Messina conference, 120, 129, 131, 132, 134, 176; Plan of, 134, 135, 141; Resolution of, 130, 132, 133, 136, 161 military, 98; concern with guerilla warfare, 126; five year plan and, 100; influence on Mollet Govern-

ment re Euratom, 146-48; nuclear weapons program and, 95, 97. 98, 99. 100, 105, 106, 107, 109, 113, 125, 126, 127, 147,148, 169, 172, 187-88, 203, 207, 208; views on isotope separation plant, 181, 182 military nuclear program, BourgfcsMaunoury and, 174, 183; Dautry and, 37; development of, xvi, xix, 65-66, 97, 99, 113-14, 12023, 166, 173, 183, i86ff; CEA and, 37, 43, 100, 101, 108, 122, I23n, 124, 125, i 7 o n , 173, 176; and Euratom, 138-39, 155-57, 161, 162, 209, 214 (see also E u r a t o m ) ; Faure Government and, 166; Gaillard and, 186; Pleven and, 106-08; renunciation of, 122; views of Mollet on, 174. See also CEA, French Government, national defense, Parliament. Minister of Finance, 12, 18, 51, 113, 117, 118, 123, 1 7 m Minister of Foreign Affairs, 123, 142, 155 Minister of Industry, 12, 13, 51, 6in Minister of Interior, 200 Minister of National Defense, 115, 117, 123, 127, 173, 186; nuclear weapons and, 106, 123, 126, 173, 174, 183, 208. See also Bourges-Maunoury, Koenig, Pleven. Minister of National Education, 12, 18, 51 Minister-Delegate for Atomic Research: 194, 198 Minister of State for National Defense and Atomic Affairs, 117 Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Six, 178 Ministry of the Army, 122, 1 7 m , 192 Ministry of National Defense, 13, 124, I 5 9 n ; and CEA, 101, 170,

INDEX ment funds and, 72, 74, 81; enriched uranium and, 180; Euratom and, xv, 143, 150, 152, 157, 163, 170, 213-14; in Fifth Republic, xii; Finance Committee of, 71n, 72, 76n; first five year plan and, 76, 78, 79, 80; interest in purge of communists, 71, 72, 74; Joliot-Curie case and, 43, 44 45; military budget debate in, 190; National Defense Committee of, 7 m , 106, 126, 185-86, , Guy, xiii n, 136, 142; Al190; nuclear weapons and, 84, gerian policy of, 16411; Euratom 126, 166, 191, 205, 208; political and, 146, 150, 157, 197, 209; right wing in, 46, 53, 72. See European integration and, 133; also atomic bomb decision, atomic nuclear weapons and, 137, 146, policy, Parliament 166-67, i 6 8 n , 170, 174, 210 National Council of Social-RepubMollet Government, Euratom and, licans, 197. See also Gaullists 116, 142, 149, 157, 164, 166; defense, energj nuclear weapons programandNational 1 1 5 n ,157, 164, atomic 166, 167, 174, and, 76, 77, 169, 203, 216; CE.A 175 and, 96, 103, 117, 122, 124, Monnet, Jean, 62, 133, 142, 145, 175; enriched uranium plant and 198 180; Euratom and, 161, 162, Monnet Committee for a United 185, 197; fissionable material! States of Europe, 133, 134, 136, and, 181; general secretariat of, 137, 142, I45n, 164, 209; and H 7 n ; nuclear weapons program European atomic cooperation, and, 112, 125, 127, 160, 171, 132, 134, 146; Resolution of, 138, 216, 218; Parliament and, 82; 139, 140, 141, 143, 146; criticplutonium production and, 77, ized by Raymond Aron, 140 8 i , 183; Second Five Plan and, Monnet, Henri, 38, 39; amendment 181 of, 44, 45, 57 Nationalized industries, removal ol Montalat, Jean, 190, 208 Montel, Pierre, 7 m Communists from, 44 Montesquiou, Pierre de, 65n N A T O (North Atlantic Treaty Ormoratorium proposal on atomic ganization), xx, 99, 120, I36n weapons in Euratom, 155, 161, 158, 168, 171, 172, 189, 194 162,164, 166, 175, 184-85 establishment of, 39; France and ; Morice, Andre, 186 xxi, 172, 186, 190, 216, 220-21: Morocco, 4, 23, 119, 120 influence of Anglo-American alMRP (Mouvement Republicain lies in, xxi, 216, 217; missile! Populaire), xiv, 56, 118, 133, for, 187; opposition of French 172; and Euratom, 158-59 Communist Party to, 42; use oi Multilateral Nuclear Force ( M L F ) , nuclear weapons by, 218; view! 221 of De Gaulle on, 220 natural uranium reactor, 123 Mutter, Andre, 162 Nautilus, 123 Norway, 23, 27 National Assembly, atomic develop173. 174; nuclear weapons program and, 98, 208 Ministry of National Education, H3n Ministry of Overseas France, 13 Mission de Controle, see CEA Moch, Jules, 46, 50, 54, 78, 79, 108, 184 M o d e r a t e - S o c i a l i s t a l l i a n c e s in Fourth Republic, xiv

254

INDEX 116, 119, 124, 125, 126, 127, 170, 206, 210; Guillauma and, 97, n o , 115, 184-96, 212; incentives for, xix, xx, xxiii, 220-21; Indochina war effect on, 105; initiation of, 94; interest of Western alliance in controlling, 221; international control and, 223; Mendes-France and, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 125, i7on, 206, 210; military and, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 105, 106, 107, 109, 113, 125, 126, 127, 147, 148, 169, 172, 208; Ministry of National Defense and, 98, 208; Mollet and, 137, 146, 166-67, i68n, 170, 174, 210; Mollet Government policy on, 157, 164, 166, 167, 174, 175; National Assembly and, 84, 126, 166, 191, 205, 208; and national defense policy, 112, 125, 127, 166, 171, 216, 218; Palewski Plan and, 121, 122, 124; Parliament and, 94, 106, 169, 170, 208; Pleven and, 106, 107, 108; polytechntciens and, 212; Radical-Socialists and, 206, 208; scientists and, 65, 68, 10001, n o , 124, 211; Socialist Party (SFIO) and, 108, 208; Soviet reaction to, 120; Suez crisis and, 171, 173. 174

nuclear club, future members of, 222 nuclear fuels, 103-04; American supply policy, 65; British supply policy, 65. See also fissionable material, isotope separation, plutonium nuclear explosion, studies for, 173 nuclear installations and Euratom, 138 nuclear materials and Euratom, 137 nuclear reactors, 25, 39, 60, 93, 104, n o , 121, 155, I93n, 196. See also EDF, ZOE nuclear submarine, 122, 123, 203 nuclear test-ban treaty, 223 nuclear weapons, in French Fifth Republic, 192, 194, 220-21. See also atomic bomb decision, military nuclear weapons program, administrative-technocrats and, 212, 213; Administrator-General (of CEA) and, 114, 153-57; allied reaction to, 120; Bourges-Maunoury and, 162, 163, 167-68, 174, J 80, 183, 1 8 4 n , 188, 2 0 6 ; CEA and, 95, 107, m , 112, 113, 117, 127, 128, 174, 175, 191, 207, 210; disarmament and, 79, 108, n 8 n , 142, 184n, 223; General Ely and, 98; enriched uranium for, 176, 180, 182; EDC and, 103, 104; Euratom and, 161, 162, 170n, 184, 209, 214; Edgar Faure and, 116, 117, 118, 119, 125, 127, 17011, 206; financing of, 98, 113, 118-19, 122-23, 173, 219; five year plan (first) and, 96; five year plan (second) and, see isotope separation; Gaillard Government and, 82, 113n, 116, 206, 208; de Gaulle and, xvi, 117, 192; Gaullist ministers role in, 125, 171, 205, 208; General Gerardot on, 98n, 187; Government role in, 94, 95, 96, 101, 106, 108, 109, 111, 114, 115,

OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation), 6o, 132, 133, 151, 152, 153, i 6 3 n ; Council of, 134, 135; European atomic cooperation and, 134, 135, 141, 145 Olivier-Martin, Didier, 102 ONERA (Office Nationale d'Etudes et de Recherches Aeronautiques), 38, 45 Oppenheimer, Robert, i69n Orcel, M „ 53 Palewski, Gaston, European atomic cooperation and, 130; isotope

255

INDEX separation plant and, 180; nuclear weapons program and, 117, 126, 127, 206 Palewski Plan, 121, 122, 124 Parliament, and atomic energy, xv, 69-85, 203, 205, 206; and atomic policy, xv, 28, 83, 84, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 214, 215; CEA Communists and, 39, 45, 46, 47, 77, 82, 206; Communists in, 38, 55. 78, 79; conservatives in, 37, 69, 70, 76, 159; Euratom debate in, 143. 157. 159. 164, 184, 197, 205, 206; and five year plans, 69-85, 182, 206; and isotope separation plant, 182; and nuclear weapons program, 94. 95. 106, 107, 108, 169, I70n, 208. See also Council of the Republic, National Assembly Parodi, M., 20, 36, 110 Pechiney (industry), gn. 27 Peking Government, xi Perrin, Francis, 33, 76, 119, 125, 131, 18711, 212; appointed H i g h Commissioner, 50; attitude toward communists in CEA, 73, 76; and EDC, 104; and enriched uranium, 177; and Euratom, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 177; and military uses of atomic energy, n o , m , 113, 119, 212; and research direction of CEA, 63, 64, 65, 68 personnel protocol of CEA, 52, 53 Petit, M., 7 m petroleum resources, of France, 80 Petsche, Maurice, 37 Pflimlin, Pierre, 118, 119, 122 Piales, Senator, i 7 o n Pinay, Antoine, I33n Pineau, Christian, i o 6 n , 130, 142, 155 Pisani, Senator Edgar, 169; proposal of, 169, 170, 172, 206 Plaisant, Senator, i 7 o n Planchais, Jean, xxi, 109, n o Pleven, Rene, 117; and European

atomic cooperation, 133; and nuclear weapons program, 106, 107, 108 plutonium, administrative control over production of, 102; costs of, 73; and electrical energy, 69; and national defense, 77, 78, 81, 82, 86, 88, 104, 173, 183; in peaceful research, 110; plan for (1952), 65, 69; production of, 65, 66, 68, 74, 80, 84, 85, 93, 100, 152, 160, 176, 190; reactors, 75> 97> 100, 101, 122, 125 political parties and atomic policy, 188-91, 206. See also individual parties political Right in National Assembly, 46, 69, 70, 72 polytechniciens: 42, 66 102, 212. See also Ecole Polytechnique Poujadists, and Euratom, 158 Prague coup, 39 Prime Minister, and AdministratorGeneral (of CEA), 15; as President of Atomic Energy Committee, 22; relation to CEA, 11, 12, 13, 14, 52, 102, 124, 207; role in Euratom issue, 137, 209 (see also Euratom); role in nuclear weapons decision, 114, 127, 174, 175, 186, 205, 209, 210, 211 private industry, influence on atomic development, 35, 42, 62, 63, 80; role in nuclear energy, 9, 27-28, 3 5 , 6 3 n , See also i n d u s t r i a l growth propulsion, studies on, 121, 123, 176, 180, 182 Provisional Government of France, 3. 5. 17 Quai d'Orsay, 94. See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs Queuille, M., 205 Radford, Admiral William, 105, io6n Radical-Socialist Party, xiv, 50, 54,

=>56

INDEX 63η, 119, 133η; and Euratom, 159, 160, 161, 164, 209; and nu­ clear weapons, 206, 208. See also Bourges-Maunoury, Edgar Faure, Gaillard, Mendes-France radioisotope production, 60 Radium Institute, 30 Ramadier Government, 37 Ramete, Senator, 79 Reggane, xii Regie Renault, 9 renunciation of atomic weapons, 153-57

reorganization of CEA, 49-52, 53, 102 Reynaud, Paul, 37 RGR (Rassemblement de Gauche Republicaines), 38 Ricard, Pierre, 54 right-wing groups in Parliament, 55-56

Rocard, Yves, 55, 63, 64, 123 Rome Treaties, see EEC, Euratom Rose, Francois de, 194η Rothschild Bank, 9η Rotinat, Senator, 170η RPF (Rassemblement des Peuples Francais), 43, 46, 71η, 72, j6. See also Gaullists, Social-Repub­ licans Rule of Public Administration (of CEA), 52 Saclay, 60 Sahara Test (i960), 94, 207 St.-Cyr, ioin Scandinavian countries, 178-79 Schumann, Maurice, 95 Scientific Committee of CEA, 32 Scientific Council of CEA, 31, 32, 52, 102, 124; creation of, 31; dismissal of, 49; function of, 32; powers of, 52 scientists (CEA), AdministratorGeneral and, 32, 33, 42, 49, 56, 148; backgrounds, 30; and in­ dustrial atomic program, 62; in­ fluence on atomic policy, 33, 34,

63, 64, 67, 86, 87, 88, 89; and nuclear weapons program, 65, 68, 100-01, no, 124, 211; and peace­ ful applications, 37, 65, no; and plutonium plan, 65, 66, 68; poli­ tical affiliations of, 34η, 50; su­ premacy of in CEA: 29, 34, 35, 86, 87, 202, 207; views on Eura­ tom, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 154; recruitment of by CEA, 25, 26; wartime experience of, 4, 5, 17, 23, 24; Second Five Year Plan, 181, 182, !95

Secretary-General (of CEA), 18, 42, 48; abolition of office of, 19; functions of, 18, 35, 48 Secretary of State for Air, 115 Secretary of State for Foreign Af­ fairs, 159η Section Technique de 1'Armee, 99, ioon Security Council of United Nations, authority of France in, 217 security in French atomic program, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 48; and Anglo-American policy, 39; views of Joliot-Curie on, 40 Service Nationale de la Protection Civile, ioon Service Minerologique, 53 Service des Poudres, 101, 176 SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe), xxi. See also NATO Skybolt, 217 Socialist Party (SFIO), 44, 50, 133; and Action Committee for a United States of Europe, 137; and atomic bomb decision, 190; CEA scientists association with, 34η; and EDC, 104; and Eura­ tom, 158, 159; and five year plan, 78; and force de frappe, 166; and nuclear weapons, 108, 208; views on Communist purge, 56; views on disarmament, 79. See also Mollet, Mollet Government, Socialists, in Fourth Republic, xiv;

INDEX and postwar scientific programs, 351, 70 Social-Republican Party, and Euratom, 130n, 149, 159, 162, 163, 197; and nuclear weapons, 126, I59n, 189. See also Gaullists, RPF Societe des Minerais d'Uranium de Franceville, 9n Societe Norvegienne de l'Azote, 4. See also heavy water. Soustelle, Jacques, 73, 194 Soviet Union, see USSR Spaak, Paul-Henri, 131, 141, 142, 155, 156; influence o£ Monnet on, 142 Sputnik, xvii, g8n, 187 statism, 34, 62, 144 Strategic Air Command (SAC), 220. See also N A T O Strauss, Admiral Lewis, 178 Suez crisis, xxii, 105, 148, 171, 217, 219; influence on nuclear weapons development, 171, 173, 174 supranationalism, 136, I40n, 141, 145, 157, 158 Switzerland, atomic cooperation and, 153 Taranger, Pierre, 102, 124, 212 technicians, recruitment of to CEA, 25-26 technocrats, influence of in nuclear decision-making, xvii, 85, 212, 213; role of in Soviet Union, 213 Tessier, Georges, 45 Thibaud, Jean, 54 Thorez, Maurice, 38 Tillon, M „ 38 tripartisme, 38, 44 Tunisia, 119 United Kingdom, and Brussels Pact, 4on; in Combined Development Agency, 23n; and Euratom, 144, I45n, 149; and N A T O , xxi, 217; participation in OEEC, 152; and

Suez, 171; technological aid from, 176; and Western European Union, 160; world status of, 221-22; United Kingdom atomic program, xi, xvii, 4, 204; electricity and, i i 3 n ; French program and, 21, 204, 211-15; Government role in, 214, 215; middle-range advisory groups and, 214; nuclear fuel supply policy, 65; nuclear weapons and, 96, 119, 139, 163, 188, 213, 219; Parliament and, 214; scientists and, 211-12, 214 United Nations, 21, 36, 40, 42, 68, 158, 217 United States, xviii, xix, xx, 20, 83, I i 3 n , 158, 204, 213; Algeria and, xxii; in Combined Development Agency, 23n; Euratom and, 145, 178; Indochina and, xxii; Marshall Plan, 44; military aid, 105, 120; in N A T O , xxi-xxii, 187, 188, 189, 190, 216, 217; nuclear force, xxiii, 99, 163, 221, 222; nuclear protection, 168, 187, 188, 189, 218-19; and Suez crisis, 171; vulnerability to Soviet nuclear force, 218 U n i t e d States a t o m i c p r o g r a m , Atomic Energy Act, I95n; atomic and technical aid policy, 36, 57, 74, 144, 150, 180, 194; French program and, xviii, xxi, 21, 40, 42, 47, 57, 68, 211-15; nuclear fuel supply policy, 65, 67, 149; nuclear military aid, 140, 147, 148, 168, I95n; origins of, xi; policy-making in: role of Congress, 214; role of Government, 214, 215; role of middle-range advisory groups, 214; role of scientists, 211-12, 214; sources of heavy water, 23; submarine, I i 3 n , 123; uranium supplies for, 176, 177, 178, 179 uranium, 23, 26, 59, 75, 121; Congo sources of, 144; enriched, (see enriched uranium, isotope

INDEX 5

separation), isotope ®, 104; oxide, as atomic fuel, 4, 23, 59 USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), 70, 140, 145, 22; European independence from, 149; foreign policy of, 39, 42; nuclear capability of, xxiii, 44, 106, 11311, 158, 163, 187, 212, 218-19; power of, 147, 172; relations with United States, xx, 21; role of technocrats in, 213; views of Joliot-Curie on, 41;

Vernant, Jacques, 187 Vichy Government, 54 Viet-Minh, 105, i o 6 n West Germany, Federal Republic of, xx, 4, 134, 144, 176; atomic weapons and, 112, 141, 146, 163;

259

and European atomic cooperation, i 5 o n , 152; and E E C 201; and Euratom, 131, 140; French attitudes toward, xx-xxi; industrialists in, 144; rearmament, 105, 145 Western alliance, xxi, 186-91, 21620. See also N A T O and control of nuclear weapons, 221 Western European Union, i l l , 112, 129, 160 Weygand, General Maxim, 147, 148, 185 W o r l d F e d e r a t i o n of Scientific Workers, 41 World Peace Congress, 41 Yver, Michel, 175 Yvon, M., 102 ZOE (reactor), 25, 39, 59